CA1256610A - Method of secured communications in a telecommunications system - Google Patents
Method of secured communications in a telecommunications systemInfo
- Publication number
- CA1256610A CA1256610A CA000524999A CA524999A CA1256610A CA 1256610 A CA1256610 A CA 1256610A CA 000524999 A CA000524999 A CA 000524999A CA 524999 A CA524999 A CA 524999A CA 1256610 A CA1256610 A CA 1256610A
- Authority
- CA
- Canada
- Prior art keywords
- user
- variable data
- data word
- exchange
- random variable
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Expired
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K1/00—Secret communication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04Q—SELECTING
- H04Q11/00—Selecting arrangements for multiplex systems
- H04Q11/04—Selecting arrangements for multiplex systems for time-division multiplexing
- H04Q11/0428—Integrated services digital network, i.e. systems for transmission of different types of digitised signals, e.g. speech, data, telecentral, television signals
- H04Q11/0435—Details
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04Q—SELECTING
- H04Q2213/00—Indexing scheme relating to selecting arrangements in general and for multiplex systems
- H04Q2213/13209—ISDN
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04Q—SELECTING
- H04Q2213/00—Indexing scheme relating to selecting arrangements in general and for multiplex systems
- H04Q2213/1333—Random systems
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04Q—SELECTING
- H04Q2213/00—Indexing scheme relating to selecting arrangements in general and for multiplex systems
- H04Q2213/13339—Ciphering, encryption, security
Abstract
ABSTRACT
Method of Secured Communications in a Telecommunications System.
The telecommunications system includes at least two exchanges and a plurality of user equipments. Each equipment includes a store for holding a user variable data word particular to that user. Each exchange is provided with a store for holding all the user variable data words of the users connected to it, and each exchange is also provided with its own random variable data word. When a first user makes a secure call to a second user, the first user equipment encrypts the call using its particular user variable data word and sends the encrypted data to its own exchange. The exchange decrypts the call using the particular user variable data word and generates the random variable data word that will be used for the call. The exchange encrypts the random variable data word with the particular user variable data word and returns it to the first user. The exchange also sends the random variable data word to the second user's exchange which encrypts it with the user variable data word particular to the second user, and sends it to the second user.
Method of Secured Communications in a Telecommunications System.
The telecommunications system includes at least two exchanges and a plurality of user equipments. Each equipment includes a store for holding a user variable data word particular to that user. Each exchange is provided with a store for holding all the user variable data words of the users connected to it, and each exchange is also provided with its own random variable data word. When a first user makes a secure call to a second user, the first user equipment encrypts the call using its particular user variable data word and sends the encrypted data to its own exchange. The exchange decrypts the call using the particular user variable data word and generates the random variable data word that will be used for the call. The exchange encrypts the random variable data word with the particular user variable data word and returns it to the first user. The exchange also sends the random variable data word to the second user's exchange which encrypts it with the user variable data word particular to the second user, and sends it to the second user.
Description
3~5~61 TITLE: ~IETHOD OF SECURED COMMUNICATIONS IN A
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM.
The present invention relates to a method of secured communications in a telecommunications system.
The invention finds application in a public telecommunications system, including System X type exchanges.
There are four main areas where security can be incorporated. The first is the customer facilities which can be used to ensure that the communications are made to the correct subscribers. The second is the encryption of the integrated digital network (ISDN) B and D channels.
The third is the encryption of certain signalling messages across the network. The fourth is the bulk encryption of 2048 kbit/s links which will be used to carry all speech (data) and signalling across the modern network. The combination of all these methods gives a very powerful security mechanism.
A System X telecommunication exchange already provides some capabilities such as Originating Line Identity (OLI), Terminating Line Identity (TLI), Closed User Group (CUG) and private circuits that provide access verification and some degree of secured access to its ISDN customers. However, these capabllities are not sufficient in themselves to provide really secure communications, and is a disadvantage of known telecommunication exchanges.
The present invention utilises the outband `~
~Z566~
signalling capabilities of ISDN subscriber access,and the CCITT No.7 signalling system. The subscribers do not have to call one another from a different telephone or send codes through the post before making a secure call.
Accordiny to the present invention there is provided a method of secured communication in a telecommunications system including at least two telecommunication exchanges and a plurality of user equipments, wherein each user equipment is provided with a store which holds a user variable data word particular to that user; and, each exchange is provided with a store which holds all the user variables data words of the users connected to it, and, each exchange is provided with its own random variable data word, so that when a first user makes a secure call to a second user, the first user equipment encrypts the call using its particular user variable data word and sends the encrypted data to its own exchange, the exchange is provided with e~uipment for decrypting the call using the particular user variable data word and generates the random variable data word that will be used for the call, and encrypts it with the particular user variable data word and returns it to the first user;
the exchange also sends the random variable data word to the second user's exchange which encrypts it with the ~5 user variable data word particular to the second user and sends it to the second user.
An embodiment of the invention will now be described with reference to the accompanying drawing which shows a ;6~
Ds block diagram of a secure communication telecommuncations system.
Referring to Figure 1, the user's equipment Sub A, Sub B contains a special chip which holds the subscriber's rekeying variable data word RKVA, RKVB
respectively. The rekeying variable data word is a number approximately 100 bits long. The rekeying variable data word can be changed by means of a device that exists. Each exchange also holds the rekeying variable data words of its subscribers. Therefore when the RKV is changed the change must be made bvth at the user's end and at the exchange~
The random variable data word RV is approximately 200 bits long and is generated by the exchange when required. A random variable data word may be generated once or more than once during a call. However, there are well defined events that triggers the generation of a new random variable data word.
An example is given below explaining the operation o~ the proposed method:
When Subscriber A wants to make a secure call to Subscriber B, Subscriber A encrypts his call request with his rekeying variable data word RKVA and sends it to his exchange. Subscriber A's exchange, ExcA decrypts the request using the rekeyiny variable data word RKVA.
Exchange ExcA then yenerates the random variable data word that will be used in that call, encrypts it with the rekeying variable data word RKVA and sends it to o Subscriber A. Exchange ExcA also sends the random variable data word to Subscriber B's exchange ~xcB by way of link Q. Exchange ExcB encrypts the random variable data word with the rekeying variable data word RKVB and sends it to Subscriber B. Thus both parties end up with the same random variable data word to be used in that call. The end to end synchronisation is provided by the user's equipment.
The method enables a large degree of flexibility for the users. For instance the user can start with an unsecured call and mid-way through the call may instigate a secure call by virtue of a recall request. Another example would be where the user can start with a secure telephony call and then swap to a secure data call. This is a case where two different random variable data words may be used, one for secure telephony and one for secure data. Another important feature is that the proposed method allows any party involved in a call to request secure communications. Furthermore it is possible to have secure communications in one direction and unsecured communicat1ons in the other direction.
Optionally, some of the functions described above may be performed by an external database. In this case the user's rekeying variables data words may be held in the data base and the random variable generated there.
In this mode, System X exchanges provide the required signalling and coordination functions.
The method depends heavily on the availability of outband message based signalling systems such as CCITT
I-~eries between the user and the exchange and No~7 in the network~
The proposed method can be extended to provide secure signalling across the network. In this case each exchange can have its own rekeying variable and random variables can be periodically issued to exchanges for use in encrypting and decrypting signalling messages.
Furthermore it is possible to encrypt only those messages that apply to a secure call.
Bulk Encryption.
The bulk encryption database DEDB, sends routine updates of the message random variable data word RV(~, and the bulk random variable data word RVQ encrypted by the rekeying variable data word RKV(l) to exchange ExcA, Routine updates of the message random variable data word RV(~) and the bulk random variable data word RVQ
encrypted by the rekeying variable data word RKV(2) are also sent to exchange ExcB.
For 2048 kbit/s links between exchanges it is possible to totally encrypt all the speech (data) and signalling, but not the frame synchronisation. The synchronisation patterns and the spare bits in time slot zero are not encrypted so that it is not necessary to know the encryption key to achieve 2048 kbit/s frame synchronisation or to be able to read the spare bits.
A frame consists of thirty two slots each of eight bits making a total of 256 bits ! time slot zero contains a synchronisation pattern in alternate frames. A
multiframe consists of sixteen frames which is 4096 bits.
The multiframe is signalled by one of the international bits. This international bit and the spare bits are contained in the time slot zero which does not contain a synchronisation pattern. Four spare bits are used to assist with bulk encryption.
There are two factors that both ends of an encryption link need to know. The first is the random variable which defines a pseudo random sequence that will be used to modify the speech (data). The second is to define the position in that sequence so that both ends are in step with one another.
It is necessary to be able to change the random variable data word rountinely without any loss of speech (data) or signalling. This implies that both ends must change at exactly the same instant. One spare bit can be used to indicate when the transmitting interface changes to the new random variable data word so that the receiving end knows when to change over to the new random variable data word. The new random variable data word will have been supplied to both ends independently some time before.
Three spare bits are used to transmit a twenty four bit number every multiframe. This is incremented every multiframe. This number will define where the following multiframe is in the sequence. The position of the first bit within a multiframe is of course defined by the ~ 8 synchronisation pattern. It takes over nine hours for the twenty four bit number to repeat.
Wherl a chanye to a new random variable data word is initiated the spare bit will change state four multiframes before hand. For these four multiframes a ; new sequence of twenty four numbers can be started to define the position in the se~uence of the new random variable data word. If a new random variable data word - is not supplied to each end when the spare bit changes then the old random variable data word will remain in use but a jump to the new defined position in the sequence will occur.
The random variable data word can be different for both directions of the 2048 kbit/s links and each link in the country can have its own random variables. The encryption is done prior to the insertion of the synchronisation pa~tern and spare bits. The encryption circuitry knows when the time slot zero information will be inserted as well as the state of the multiframe timing and twenty four bit number. The decoding is done after the detection of the frame synchronisation, multiframe synchronisation, and the spare bits. The line coding and decoding (HDB3) is performed at the line interfaces.
The present invention can be used in other applications such as in private fixed subscriber networks and in mobile networks. As such, for example, an integrated digital exchange can provide a similar facility for secure communications in a private local or i63 ` :
g wide area ne twork .
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM.
The present invention relates to a method of secured communications in a telecommunications system.
The invention finds application in a public telecommunications system, including System X type exchanges.
There are four main areas where security can be incorporated. The first is the customer facilities which can be used to ensure that the communications are made to the correct subscribers. The second is the encryption of the integrated digital network (ISDN) B and D channels.
The third is the encryption of certain signalling messages across the network. The fourth is the bulk encryption of 2048 kbit/s links which will be used to carry all speech (data) and signalling across the modern network. The combination of all these methods gives a very powerful security mechanism.
A System X telecommunication exchange already provides some capabilities such as Originating Line Identity (OLI), Terminating Line Identity (TLI), Closed User Group (CUG) and private circuits that provide access verification and some degree of secured access to its ISDN customers. However, these capabllities are not sufficient in themselves to provide really secure communications, and is a disadvantage of known telecommunication exchanges.
The present invention utilises the outband `~
~Z566~
signalling capabilities of ISDN subscriber access,and the CCITT No.7 signalling system. The subscribers do not have to call one another from a different telephone or send codes through the post before making a secure call.
Accordiny to the present invention there is provided a method of secured communication in a telecommunications system including at least two telecommunication exchanges and a plurality of user equipments, wherein each user equipment is provided with a store which holds a user variable data word particular to that user; and, each exchange is provided with a store which holds all the user variables data words of the users connected to it, and, each exchange is provided with its own random variable data word, so that when a first user makes a secure call to a second user, the first user equipment encrypts the call using its particular user variable data word and sends the encrypted data to its own exchange, the exchange is provided with e~uipment for decrypting the call using the particular user variable data word and generates the random variable data word that will be used for the call, and encrypts it with the particular user variable data word and returns it to the first user;
the exchange also sends the random variable data word to the second user's exchange which encrypts it with the ~5 user variable data word particular to the second user and sends it to the second user.
An embodiment of the invention will now be described with reference to the accompanying drawing which shows a ;6~
Ds block diagram of a secure communication telecommuncations system.
Referring to Figure 1, the user's equipment Sub A, Sub B contains a special chip which holds the subscriber's rekeying variable data word RKVA, RKVB
respectively. The rekeying variable data word is a number approximately 100 bits long. The rekeying variable data word can be changed by means of a device that exists. Each exchange also holds the rekeying variable data words of its subscribers. Therefore when the RKV is changed the change must be made bvth at the user's end and at the exchange~
The random variable data word RV is approximately 200 bits long and is generated by the exchange when required. A random variable data word may be generated once or more than once during a call. However, there are well defined events that triggers the generation of a new random variable data word.
An example is given below explaining the operation o~ the proposed method:
When Subscriber A wants to make a secure call to Subscriber B, Subscriber A encrypts his call request with his rekeying variable data word RKVA and sends it to his exchange. Subscriber A's exchange, ExcA decrypts the request using the rekeyiny variable data word RKVA.
Exchange ExcA then yenerates the random variable data word that will be used in that call, encrypts it with the rekeying variable data word RKVA and sends it to o Subscriber A. Exchange ExcA also sends the random variable data word to Subscriber B's exchange ~xcB by way of link Q. Exchange ExcB encrypts the random variable data word with the rekeying variable data word RKVB and sends it to Subscriber B. Thus both parties end up with the same random variable data word to be used in that call. The end to end synchronisation is provided by the user's equipment.
The method enables a large degree of flexibility for the users. For instance the user can start with an unsecured call and mid-way through the call may instigate a secure call by virtue of a recall request. Another example would be where the user can start with a secure telephony call and then swap to a secure data call. This is a case where two different random variable data words may be used, one for secure telephony and one for secure data. Another important feature is that the proposed method allows any party involved in a call to request secure communications. Furthermore it is possible to have secure communications in one direction and unsecured communicat1ons in the other direction.
Optionally, some of the functions described above may be performed by an external database. In this case the user's rekeying variables data words may be held in the data base and the random variable generated there.
In this mode, System X exchanges provide the required signalling and coordination functions.
The method depends heavily on the availability of outband message based signalling systems such as CCITT
I-~eries between the user and the exchange and No~7 in the network~
The proposed method can be extended to provide secure signalling across the network. In this case each exchange can have its own rekeying variable and random variables can be periodically issued to exchanges for use in encrypting and decrypting signalling messages.
Furthermore it is possible to encrypt only those messages that apply to a secure call.
Bulk Encryption.
The bulk encryption database DEDB, sends routine updates of the message random variable data word RV(~, and the bulk random variable data word RVQ encrypted by the rekeying variable data word RKV(l) to exchange ExcA, Routine updates of the message random variable data word RV(~) and the bulk random variable data word RVQ
encrypted by the rekeying variable data word RKV(2) are also sent to exchange ExcB.
For 2048 kbit/s links between exchanges it is possible to totally encrypt all the speech (data) and signalling, but not the frame synchronisation. The synchronisation patterns and the spare bits in time slot zero are not encrypted so that it is not necessary to know the encryption key to achieve 2048 kbit/s frame synchronisation or to be able to read the spare bits.
A frame consists of thirty two slots each of eight bits making a total of 256 bits ! time slot zero contains a synchronisation pattern in alternate frames. A
multiframe consists of sixteen frames which is 4096 bits.
The multiframe is signalled by one of the international bits. This international bit and the spare bits are contained in the time slot zero which does not contain a synchronisation pattern. Four spare bits are used to assist with bulk encryption.
There are two factors that both ends of an encryption link need to know. The first is the random variable which defines a pseudo random sequence that will be used to modify the speech (data). The second is to define the position in that sequence so that both ends are in step with one another.
It is necessary to be able to change the random variable data word rountinely without any loss of speech (data) or signalling. This implies that both ends must change at exactly the same instant. One spare bit can be used to indicate when the transmitting interface changes to the new random variable data word so that the receiving end knows when to change over to the new random variable data word. The new random variable data word will have been supplied to both ends independently some time before.
Three spare bits are used to transmit a twenty four bit number every multiframe. This is incremented every multiframe. This number will define where the following multiframe is in the sequence. The position of the first bit within a multiframe is of course defined by the ~ 8 synchronisation pattern. It takes over nine hours for the twenty four bit number to repeat.
Wherl a chanye to a new random variable data word is initiated the spare bit will change state four multiframes before hand. For these four multiframes a ; new sequence of twenty four numbers can be started to define the position in the se~uence of the new random variable data word. If a new random variable data word - is not supplied to each end when the spare bit changes then the old random variable data word will remain in use but a jump to the new defined position in the sequence will occur.
The random variable data word can be different for both directions of the 2048 kbit/s links and each link in the country can have its own random variables. The encryption is done prior to the insertion of the synchronisation pa~tern and spare bits. The encryption circuitry knows when the time slot zero information will be inserted as well as the state of the multiframe timing and twenty four bit number. The decoding is done after the detection of the frame synchronisation, multiframe synchronisation, and the spare bits. The line coding and decoding (HDB3) is performed at the line interfaces.
The present invention can be used in other applications such as in private fixed subscriber networks and in mobile networks. As such, for example, an integrated digital exchange can provide a similar facility for secure communications in a private local or i63 ` :
g wide area ne twork .
Claims (4)
PRIVILEGE IS CLAIMED ARE DEFINED AS FOLLOWS:
1. A method of secured communication in a telecommunications system including at least two communication exchanges and a plurality of user equipments, wherein each user equipment is provided with a store which holds a user variable data word particular to that user; and, each exchange is provided with a store which holds all the user variables data words of the users connected to it, and each exchange is provided with its own random variable data word, so that when a first user makes a secure call to a second user, the first user equipment encrypts the call using its particular user variable data word and sends the encrypted data to its own exchange, the exchange is provided with decrypting and generation equipment for decrypting the call using the particular user variable data word and generates the random variable data word that will be used for the call and encrypts it with the particular user variable data word and returns it to the first user; the exchange also sends the random variable data word to the second user's exchange which encrypts it with the user variable data word particular to the second user and sends it to the second user, said decrypting and generation equipment generates a different random variable data word, during communication, to permit the user to change between telephony and data calls.
2. A method of secured communication as claimed in claim 1, wherein the random variable data words are generated in an external data base.
3. A method of secured communication as claimed in claim 1, wherein to provide network signalling, each exchange is given its own variable data word, and random variable data words are periodically issued to exchanges for use in encrypting and decrypting signalling messages across the network.
4. A method of secured communication as claimed in claim 3, wherein a bulk encryption data base is provided which sends updates of a message random variable data word and of a bulk random variable data word to the exchanges.
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| GB8530485A GB2191661B (en) | 1985-12-11 | 1985-12-11 | Method of secured communications in a telecommunications system |
| GB8530485 | 1985-12-11 |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CA1256610A true CA1256610A (en) | 1989-06-27 |
Family
ID=10589579
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CA000524999A Expired CA1256610A (en) | 1985-12-11 | 1986-12-10 | Method of secured communications in a telecommunications system |
Country Status (14)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| US (1) | US4794644A (en) |
| EP (1) | EP0225756B1 (en) |
| JP (1) | JPS62140532A (en) |
| KR (1) | KR870006743A (en) |
| CN (1) | CN1007573B (en) |
| BG (1) | BG45710A3 (en) |
| CA (1) | CA1256610A (en) |
| DE (1) | DE3688423T2 (en) |
| DK (1) | DK591286A (en) |
| ES (1) | ES2040700T3 (en) |
| FI (1) | FI865023A (en) |
| GB (1) | GB2191661B (en) |
| IN (1) | IN169111B (en) |
| PT (1) | PT83901B (en) |
Families Citing this family (20)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EP0257585B1 (en) * | 1986-08-22 | 1992-11-25 | Nec Corporation | Key distribution method |
| GB8704920D0 (en) * | 1987-03-03 | 1987-04-08 | Hewlett Packard Co | Secure messaging system |
| US4897874A (en) * | 1988-03-31 | 1990-01-30 | American Telephone And Telegraph Company At&T Bell Laboratories | Metropolitan area network arrangement for serving virtual data networks |
| US4930159A (en) * | 1989-01-18 | 1990-05-29 | International Business Machines Corporation | Netbios name authentication |
| US5247576A (en) * | 1991-02-27 | 1993-09-21 | Motorola, Inc. | Key variable identification method |
| US5557518A (en) | 1994-04-28 | 1996-09-17 | Citibank, N.A. | Trusted agents for open electronic commerce |
| US7028187B1 (en) | 1991-11-15 | 2006-04-11 | Citibank, N.A. | Electronic transaction apparatus for electronic commerce |
| US5392357A (en) * | 1991-12-09 | 1995-02-21 | At&T Corp. | Secure telecommunications |
| US5434920A (en) * | 1991-12-09 | 1995-07-18 | At&T Corp. | Secure telecommunications |
| US5455861A (en) * | 1991-12-09 | 1995-10-03 | At&T Corp. | Secure telecommunications |
| TW242206B (en) * | 1993-08-27 | 1995-03-01 | At & T Corp | |
| US6088797A (en) * | 1994-04-28 | 2000-07-11 | Rosen; Sholom S. | Tamper-proof electronic processing device |
| DE4421615C1 (en) * | 1994-06-21 | 1996-12-05 | Matthias Dipl Ing Viehmann | Circuit arrangement for external interference protection for the wired telephone network |
| US5659684A (en) * | 1995-02-03 | 1997-08-19 | Isdn Systems Corporation | Methods and apparatus for interconnecting personal computers (PCs) and local area networks (LANs) using packet protocols transmitted over a digital data service (DDS) |
| US6373946B1 (en) * | 1996-05-31 | 2002-04-16 | Ico Services Ltd. | Communication security |
| US5889860A (en) * | 1996-11-08 | 1999-03-30 | Sunhawk Corporation, Inc. | Encryption system with transaction coded decryption key |
| US6266418B1 (en) | 1998-10-28 | 2001-07-24 | L3-Communications Corporation | Encryption and authentication methods and apparatus for securing telephone communications |
| DE10117930B4 (en) * | 2001-04-10 | 2015-03-05 | Deutsche Telekom Ag | Method for encrypting data to be transmitted and circuit arrangement for carrying out the method |
| US7280658B2 (en) * | 2001-06-01 | 2007-10-09 | International Business Machines Corporation | Systems, methods, and computer program products for accelerated dynamic protection of data |
| JP2008035438A (en) * | 2006-07-31 | 2008-02-14 | Fujitsu Ltd | Data repeating apparatus |
Family Cites Families (6)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US4369443A (en) * | 1979-12-26 | 1983-01-18 | Meta Systems, Inc. | Message communication system with message storage |
| US4578530A (en) * | 1981-06-26 | 1986-03-25 | Visa U.S.A., Inc. | End-to-end encryption system and method of operation |
| US4500750A (en) * | 1981-12-30 | 1985-02-19 | International Business Machines Corporation | Cryptographic application for interbank verification |
| US4458109A (en) * | 1982-02-05 | 1984-07-03 | Siemens Corporation | Method and apparatus providing registered mail features in an electronic communication system |
| US4578531A (en) * | 1982-06-09 | 1986-03-25 | At&T Bell Laboratories | Encryption system key distribution method and apparatus |
| US4549308A (en) * | 1982-07-12 | 1985-10-22 | At&T Bell Laboratories | Secure mobile radio telephony |
-
1985
- 1985-12-11 GB GB8530485A patent/GB2191661B/en not_active Expired
-
1986
- 1986-11-20 DE DE8686309084T patent/DE3688423T2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 1986-11-20 ES ES198686309084T patent/ES2040700T3/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1986-11-20 EP EP86309084A patent/EP0225756B1/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1986-11-25 IN IN903/MAS/86A patent/IN169111B/en unknown
- 1986-11-25 KR KR860009944A patent/KR870006743A/en not_active IP Right Cessation
- 1986-12-09 DK DK591286A patent/DK591286A/en not_active Application Discontinuation
- 1986-12-10 JP JP61294593A patent/JPS62140532A/en active Pending
- 1986-12-10 BG BG77452A patent/BG45710A3/en unknown
- 1986-12-10 CA CA000524999A patent/CA1256610A/en not_active Expired
- 1986-12-10 PT PT83901A patent/PT83901B/en not_active IP Right Cessation
- 1986-12-10 FI FI865023A patent/FI865023A/en not_active IP Right Cessation
- 1986-12-11 US US06/940,365 patent/US4794644A/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1986-12-11 CN CN86108509A patent/CN1007573B/en not_active Expired
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| DK591286D0 (en) | 1986-12-09 |
| FI865023A0 (en) | 1986-12-10 |
| US4794644A (en) | 1988-12-27 |
| EP0225756A2 (en) | 1987-06-16 |
| FI865023A (en) | 1987-06-12 |
| EP0225756A3 (en) | 1989-04-05 |
| EP0225756B1 (en) | 1993-05-12 |
| IN169111B (en) | 1991-09-07 |
| GB2191661B (en) | 1989-03-30 |
| JPS62140532A (en) | 1987-06-24 |
| GB8530485D0 (en) | 1986-01-22 |
| CN86108509A (en) | 1987-09-16 |
| GB2191661A (en) | 1987-12-16 |
| ES2040700T3 (en) | 1993-11-01 |
| DE3688423D1 (en) | 1993-06-17 |
| PT83901B (en) | 1989-06-30 |
| DK591286A (en) | 1987-06-12 |
| CN1007573B (en) | 1990-04-11 |
| BG45710A3 (en) | 1989-07-14 |
| PT83901A (en) | 1987-01-01 |
| DE3688423T2 (en) | 1993-08-19 |
| KR870006743A (en) | 1987-07-14 |
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Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| MKEX | Expiry |