CA1258907A - Card terminal and identification system of the same - Google Patents

Card terminal and identification system of the same

Info

Publication number
CA1258907A
CA1258907A CA000493102A CA493102A CA1258907A CA 1258907 A CA1258907 A CA 1258907A CA 000493102 A CA000493102 A CA 000493102A CA 493102 A CA493102 A CA 493102A CA 1258907 A CA1258907 A CA 1258907A
Authority
CA
Canada
Prior art keywords
card
data
terminal
input
circuit
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired
Application number
CA000493102A
Other languages
French (fr)
Inventor
Kenji Rikuna
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Casio Computer Co Ltd
Original Assignee
Casio Computer Co Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Casio Computer Co Ltd filed Critical Casio Computer Co Ltd
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of CA1258907A publication Critical patent/CA1258907A/en
Expired legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07FCOIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06KGRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K7/00Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns
    • G06K7/0013Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by galvanic contacts, e.g. card connectors for ISO-7816 compliant smart cards or memory cards, e.g. SD card readers
    • G06K7/0021Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by galvanic contacts, e.g. card connectors for ISO-7816 compliant smart cards or memory cards, e.g. SD card readers for reading/sensing record carriers having surface contacts
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06KGRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K7/00Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns
    • G06K7/0013Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by galvanic contacts, e.g. card connectors for ISO-7816 compliant smart cards or memory cards, e.g. SD card readers
    • G06K7/0086Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by galvanic contacts, e.g. card connectors for ISO-7816 compliant smart cards or memory cards, e.g. SD card readers the connector comprising a circuit for steering the operations of the card connector
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/36Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes
    • G06Q20/367Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes
    • G06Q20/3674Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes involving authentication
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/409Device specific authentication in transaction processing
    • G06Q20/4093Monitoring of device authentication

Abstract

Abstract of the Disclosure An IC card is placed on a card terminal main body, and an internal IC of the IC card is electrically con-nected to an electrical circuit in a terminal through a connector. Input data entered by a card holder at a keyboard and data read out from the IC card are encrypted in accordance with a predetermined encryption algorithm and are compared with each other.
Authenticity of the card terminal and the IC card is determined in accordance with the comparison result.

Description

:~ZS~3517 The ~resent invention relates to a card terminaL
and a card terminal identi-fication system which authenticates an identification card (ID card) and a card terminal.
Various systems have been developed to properly identify authenticity of an IC card, i.e., an ID card incorporating an IC chip instead of an ID card having a magnetic stripe. Card authentication terminals as point-of-sales (POS) terminals installed in stores to deal with ID cards must also be authenticated. This authentication process is inevitable in order to guarantee safe transactions. Demand has arisen for development of a system for authenticating an ID card presented by a customer and a card terminal installed in a store when a customer purchases an item in a store by using an ID card.
It is an object of the present invention to provide a card termlnal and a card terminal identification system for properly authenticating an ID card having a magnetic stripe and/or an IC chip and a card terminal, thereby confirming that a proper transaction is made.
In order to achieve the above object of the present invention, there is provided an ID card terminal comprising: emboss imprint means for transferring an embossed pattern onto a sheet of paper for representing the contents of a transaction by using the embossed ", pattern formeci on a surface of the ID card; read/write means for ~erforming read/write operatlon of data with respect to a memory in the ID card; means for processing the data; and casiny means for housing the em~oss imprint means, the read/write means and the data pro-cessiny means therein.
This invention can be more fully understood from the following detailed description when taken in con-junction with the accompanying drawings, in which:
Fig. l is a perspective view of a card terminal according to an embodiment of the present invention;
Fig. 2 is a plan view of an IC card suitable for the card terminal oE Fig. l;
Figs. 3~ and 3B are resuectively side sectional views showing the internal structure of the card terminal Oe ~lg. 1;
Fig. 4 is a block diagram showing an electrical circuit oE the card terminal of Fig. 1;
Fig. 5 is a block diagram showing a circuit arrangement of the IC card of Fig. 2;
Fig. 6 is a flow chart for explaining the operation for a sale at a store;
Fig. 7 is a flow chart for explaining the operation of the card terminal when a collation key of the card terminal is depressed;
Fig. 8 is a flow chart for explaining the internal operation of the IC card;

Fiy. 9 is a flow chart for explaining a calculation of a sales approval number (~AN);
Fig. 10 is a chart showing transaction and account settlement processes between the customer, the store, the credit card company and the bank; and ~ig. 11 is a flow chart showing authentication operation of the sales slip of the credit card company.
A preferred embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to the accompanyiny drawings.
Referring to Fig. 1, a card terminal main body 1 and an input unit 2 are connected through a cord 3, all constituting a card terminal 40. The unit 2 is independent of the body 1 so that a customer can enter secret key code data without beinc3 observed by a store clerk. The unit 2 has a data input keyboard 4 and a display unit 5 ~Eor displaying various data. The keyboard 4 includes a ten-key pad for entering numeric data.
The body 1 is operated by the store clerk and has an emboss imprint unit 11 at the upper portion of the body housing, and a keyboard 12 and a message/amount display unit 13, the latter two being arranged on the front surface of the housing. The keyboard 12 includes a ten-key pad 12a, a date key 12b, a total amount key 12c, a collation key 12d, a clear key 12e and an input designation key 12f~

:~5~

The unit ll includes a card holder 15 on which an IC card 14 is placed, a printing portion 16 and a carriage 17. Irhese portions are arrancJed on an upper plate la. The holder 15 has four positioning members 15a to 15d, so that the card is fixed in proper posi-tion.
An embossed portion 14b of the card 14 on the upper surface thereof represents a specific card holder's code number tl23-456-7~9 in this embodiment) when the card 14 is set in the holder 15. A connector 14a is arranged on an opposite surface of the card 14 which faces the body 1. The connector 14a is connected to an IC chip arranged in the card 14 and comprises eight contacts consisting o two arrays of four contacts, as shown in Fig. 2. A magnetic stripe 14c is formed on the surface with the connector 14a along the longitudinal edge of the card 14. ~n arrow 14d represents a setting direc-tion of the card 14 in the holder 15.
Referring back to Fig. 1, the printing portion 16 comprises a 6-digit amount printing ring unit 16a, a sales approval number (SAN) printing ring unit 16b and a date printing ring unit 16c. These units 16a to 16c are at the same level as the embossed portion 14b on the card 14. Two guides lOa and lOb are arranged along the holder 15 and the portion 16, and the carriage 17 is freely moved along the guide members lOa and lOb.
The structure and operation of the emboss imprint , ~
, ....

unit 11 includiny the carriage 17 will be described with reference to Fiys. 3A and 3B. Referring to Yig. 3A, the carriage 17 cornprises a press roller 1~, guide rollers l9a and l9b and a handle 20. The rollers l9a and l9b 5 are narrow rollers rolliny along the member lOa. Other guide rollers (not shown) which roll along the guide member lOb are also provided. The press roller 18 has a sufficient width to allow rolling on the portion 14b and the units 16a to 16c. Two ends of each of shafts 18a~
19a-1 and l9b-1 of the rollers 18, l9a and l9b are rotatably held between holding plates 21a and 21b as shown in Fiy. 1, respectively. The plates 21a and 21b are also mounted on the carriage 17, and the lower ends of the plates 21a and 21b are moved along the surface of the ~late la upon movement of the carriage 17. The shafts 18a, 19a-1 and l9b-1 of the rollers 18, l9a and l9b are supported at vertices of each oE the triangular holding plates 21a and 21b.
As shown in Fig. 3A, the left end of the unit 11 serves as the normal rest position of the carriage 17 When the carriage 17 is held in this state, the store clerk can place the card 14 in the holder 15 or remove it therefrom. The carriage 17 can be manually moved to the right end of the unit 11 along the guide members lOa and lOb while the store clerk holds the handle 20 and moves his hand to the right end. For illustrative convenience, only the unit 16a is illustrated in ;8~7 ~'igs. 3A and 3~.
In the rest position (Yig. 3A) of the carriage 17, a lever 22 is arranged at a position under the roller 18. rrhe lever 22 is pivotally supported by a shaft 23 on a plate lb at a position nearer to the holder 15 than the roller 18, a predetermined distance from a position immediately under the roller 18 located in the rest position. A coil spring 24 is inserted between one end of the lever 22 and the plate lb so as to always bias the lever 22 clockwise. One end oE a transmission wire 25 is fixed on the lower surface of the lever 22 between the shaft 23 and the spring 2~. The other end of the cord 25 i9 inserted in the body 1 through a roller 26 and is Eixed to one end of an L-shaped lever 27.
An intermediate portion of the lever 27 is pivotally supported by a shaEt 27a at the lower surEace side of the plate la. The other end of the lever 27 is pivotally supported at the intermediate portion of an actuating shaft 29 of a terminal mechanism 28. The mechanism 2~ extends through the plate la and is held to be vertically movable. The upward movement of the mechanism 2~ is stopped when a flange 32a formed on a terminal section 32 having con-tact terminals 31 abuts against the lower surface of the plate la. A spring 33 is provided about the shaft 29, so that the lever 27 is always biased counterclockwise.
The holder 15 has a recess corresponding to the , 89~1~

shape of the card 14 and a depth of about 0.8 mm corresponding to the thickness of the card 14. A window 15a is formed in the holder 15 to bring the connector 14a facing the terminal section 32 when the card 14 is S placed on the holder 15. The terminals 31 are located within the window l5a. When the roller 18 is located in the rest position of Fiy. 3A, the section 32 is moved downward to the OFF position by the biasing force of the spring 33. The biasing Eorce of the spring 33 is smaller than an elastic force of the spring 24. When the carriage 17 is moved toward the holder 15, as shown in Eig. 3B, the shaft 29 and the section 32 are moved upward by the elastic Eorce of the spring 24 throuyh the transmission wire 25 and the lever 27 and the section 32 lS are brought into the ON position so that the contact terminals 31 are in contact with the connector 14a.
Lead wires 34 are led ~rom the terminals 31 throu~h the section 32 and the shaft 29 and are connected to an electronic circuit 35 mounted on -the lower surface of the plate la.
The circuit 35 comprises an IC circuit (to be described in detail later). A ring holding mechanism 36 is arranged in the body 1 to hold the units 16a, 16b and 16c. The mechanism 36 comprises a motor herein and drives wheels of the units 16a, 16b and 16c in response to an instruction from the circuit 35, thus constituting a card terminal 40.

The detaiLed arrangement of the electronic circuit 35 will be described in detail with reference to Fig. 4.
Referriny to Fig. 4, reference numera] 41 denotes a bus.
The bus 41 is connected to a time measuring circuit 42, an arithmetic unit 43, a system proyram ROM 44, a control circuit ~5, a key controller 46 for controlling the keyboard 12, a dis~lay controller 47 for controlling the display unit 13, and a random number generator 48.
The circuit 42 has a date register 421 for storing 8-digit date data representing year (AD), month and day.
The unit 43 has a RAM 431 for storing arithmetic opera-tion data. The bus 41 is also connected to an RSA
encrypter A9 for storing a predetermined encryption algorithm of an RSA encryption scheme. The bus 41 is further connected to the terminals 31 of the mechanism 28 through an IC card interface controller 51. One input terminal oE the encrypter 49 is connected to the bus 41 throuyh an A register 52, and the other input terminal thereoE is connected to an MPUK (Manufacturer Public Key Code) memory 54 for storing an MPUK or an IPUK (Issuer Public Key Code) memory 55 for storing an IPUK. The MPUK code is preset by the manufacturer (i.e., a manufacturing company of the card terminal 40), and the IPUK code is preset by the manufacturer in accordance with a request of an issuer (e.g., a credit card company issuing the IC card). One of the memories 54 and 55 is accessed in response to a control signal ~Z~ 37 sent ~hrough the bus 41, and the accessed code is stored in a ~ register 53. The encrypter 49 encrypts the data in the register 52 in accordance with a key code stored in the register 53. An encrypted code is supplied to the bus 41 and the IC card interface controller 510 The bus 41 and the controller 51 are connected to a com-parator 58 through a C register 56 and a D register 57, respectively. The comparator 58 compares the data stored in the register 56 with that in the register 57.
A eomparison result is supplied to the cireui-t 45. The bus 41 is also eonneeted to an SAN (Sales Approval Number) ealeulation unit 62 through E, F and G registers 59, 60 and 61 and to a data riny driver 63. The unit 62 has an SAN algorithm proyram memory 621 and a ealeulation eireuit 622. The unit 62 also has arithmet:i.e rec~isters X, Y and Z and auxiliary register A
'and B. The driver 63 has a ring A register 631, a ring B reyister 632 and a ring C register 633 and eontrols motors 64a, 64b and 64e in aeeordanee with the data stored in the registers 631, 632 and 633. Desired numerie values are preset in the units 16a, 16b and 16e.
The bus 41 is also eonneeted to the input unit 2 through the eord 3. The unit 2 has a key eontroller 201 for eontrolling the keyboard 4 and a display eontroller 202 for eontrolling the unit 5.
The detailed arrangement of the IC ehip ineorporated in the eard 14 will be deseribed with ~`:

reference to Fig. 5. Referring to Fig. S, reference numeral 14a denotes a connector connected to a bus 72 through an interface 71. The bus 72 is connected to an arithmetic unit 73, an arithmetic RAM 74, a system proyram R~M 75, an RTR memory 76 for storing retry number data RTR and a CA (Card Authenticator) memory 77 for storing a CA code. The CA code comprises, for example, a 64-bit code assigned to each card so as to identify it. The CA code is preset during manufacture of cards and is used for encrypting and decrypting the message. The bus 72 is also connected to an MPRK
(Manufacturer Private Key) memory 78 or storing an MPRK
code, an IPRK (Issuer Private Key) memory 79 for storing an IPR[C code, a PIN (Personal Identification Number) memory 80 Eor stori[-c~ a PIN code, a and b registers 81 and 82, and an RSA decrypter 83 for decrypting the data encrypted by the encrypter ~9 in accordance with an RSA decryption scheme. The MPRK code written in the MPRK memory 78 is a decrypting code preset by the manufacturer and has one-to-one correspondence with the MPUK code stored in the memory 54 of Fig. 4. The IPRK
code written in the IPRK memory 79 is a decrypting code preset by the issuer and has one-to-one correspondence with the IPUK code stored in the memory 55 of Fig. 4.
The PIN code stored in the memory 80 is set by an individual card holder. The PIN code supplied from the card terminal 40 is written in the a register 81 and is ~, supplied together with the contents oE the memory 80 to a comparator ~4. The co~lparator ~4 receives the data from the memory 80 and the register 81, and a co~parison result is supplied to a control circuit 85~ The circuit S 85 selects one of the memories 78 and 79 in accordance with a coincidence/noncoincidence signal Erom the comparator ~4 and supplies a control signal to the decrypter 83. The code read out from the memory 78 or 79 is supplied to the decrypter 83 through the register 86. The decrypter 83 also receives data from the card terminal 40 through the register 82. The decrypter 83 decrypts the code in accordance with the storaye content of a register 86 which is read out Erom the memory 7~ or 79.
lS Goods sales ~rocessiny in the embodiment described above will be described with reference to a Elow chart of E`ig. 6. The terminal 40 shown in Figs. 1, 3A and 3B
is installed in a store or the ]ike. When a customer wishes to purchase an item, in step Al, the store clerk sets the card 14 on the holder 15 so that the embossed portion faces upward and the connector 14a side faces downward in the manner shown in Fig. 3B. The clerk places a sales slip 91 on the emboss imprint unit 11, i.e., on a portion above the card 14 and the units 16a, 16b and 16c, and sets the carriage 17 in the predeter-mined position in step A2. In other words, the carriage 17 is moved from the normal rest position to the start ~5~9~7 - 12 ~

point of the holder 15, as shown in Fig. 3B. When the carriage l7 is moved to the start position of the holder 15, the lever 22 can be released from the roller 18, so that the left end of the lever 22 ls moved upward by the elastic force of the spring 24. Upon movement of the lever 22, the lower end portion of the lever 27 is pulled by the wire 25 to the left. The lever 27 is pivoted c:Lockwise to move the shaft 29 of the mechanism 28 upward. In this state, the terminals 31 are in con-tact with the connector 14a of the card 14. As aresult, the internal circuit of the card 14 is connected to the circuit 35 in the body 1 through the terminals 31 and the wires 34. The clerk then operates the collation key l2d in the keyboard 12. ~lpon operation of the key 12d, the card holder is checked by the circuit 35 of Fig. 4 ln step A3. In this case, the customer enters his own PIN at the unit 2. The circuit 35 supplies the input PIN rom the unit 2 to the card 14 through the controller 51. The card 14 checks whether or not the input PIN is correct. More specifically, when the PIN
is supplied from the circuit 35, the comparator 84 (Fig. 5) of the card 14 compares the input PIN with the preregistered PIN to check whether or not the input PIN
is correct. The card 14 sends back an OK message to the circuit 35 when the input PIN is correct. However, when the input PIN is not correct, the card 14 sends back a BAD message to the circuit 35. When the circuit 35 '- `

~25~9~7 receives the BAD message from the card 14, the current transaction is interrupted. However, when the circuit 35 receives the OK message, the circuit 35 checks in step ~4 of Fiy 6 whether or not the card 14 is valid.
If NO in step A~, the transaction is interrupted.
However, if YES in step A4, the OK message is displayed on the unit 13. When the OK message is displayed on the unit 13, the clerk enters a total amount of money data at the keyboard 12 in step AS. Then, the total amount data is stored in the RAM 431 in the unit 43 and is also displayed on the uni-t 13 through the controller 47. The circuit 35 supplies the total amount data from the RAM
431 to the driver 63 and writes it in the register 631.
At the same time, the circuit 35 reads out the date data from the register 421 in the circuit 42 and stores it in the register 632 in the driver 63. The unit 62 calculates a sales approval number (SAN) which is then written in the register 633 in the driver 63. The driver 63 drives the motors 64a, 64b and 64c in accordance with the data stored in the registers 631, 632 and 633, so that the total amount, the date and the sales approval number (SAN) are set in the units 16a, 16b and 16c, respectively. Since the total amount of money is displayed on the unit 13l the customer can check in step A6 whether or not the input total amount is correct. After the total amount is checked by the customer, the clerk moves the carriage 17 in step A7 to ~5~0~7 imprint data such as an account number PAN (Primary Account Number) preset by the credit card company or the like on the slip 91. At the same time, the total amount, the date and the sales approval number preset in the units 16a, 16b and 16c are imprinted on the slip 91.
The contents of the slip 91 are checked by the customer in step A8. If no errors are found, a copy of the slip 91, the card 14 and the purchased item or goods are handed to the customer, thereby completing the transaction.
The operation of the card terminal 40 and the internal operation oE the card 14 which are shown in steps after step A3 will be described with reference to the flow charts of Figs. 7 and 8. In step A2, when the carriage 17 is set at a position as shown in Fig. 3B and the collation key 12d is depressed, the terminal 40 waits in ste~ Bl of Fig. 7 until a PIN is entered at the keyboard 12. When the PIN is entered at the keyboard 12, the input PIN is supplied to the card 14 through the controller 51 in step B2. Thereafter, the terminal 40 waits until the OK or BAD message is sent back Erom the card 14.
When the input PIN is supplied from the terminal 40 to the IC circuit in the card 14 which is illustrated in detail in Fig. 5, the input PIN is set in the register 81 in step Cl of Fig. 8. The card 14 checks in step C2 whether or not the data RTR stored ih the memory 76 has reached "5". If YES in step C2, the BAD message is sent back to the terminal 4~ in step C3, and processing is ended. The content of the memory 76 is set to be "0"
in the initial state. Since NO in step C2, the flow advances to step C~. The comparator 84 compares in step C4 the input PIN supplied from the terminal 40 and the data stored in the register 81 with the preset PIN read out from the memory 80 and checks in step C5 whether or not the input PIN coincides with the preset PIN. If NO
in step C5, the flow advances to step C6, and the con-tent of the memory 76 is incremented by one. In step C7, a NO message is sent back to the terminal 40.
However, iE YES ln step CS, the flow advances to step C8, and the contents o the memory 76 are cleared.
lS ThereaEter, in step C9, the OK messaye and the CA code read out from the memory 77 are sent back to the ter-minal 40. When the card 14 checks the card holder and the messaye is sent back to the terminal 40, the Elow advances to step C10. The card 14 waits until the encrypted data is sent from the terminal 40.
In step B3 of Fig. 7, the terminal 40 waits until the message is sent back from the card 14. When the message is sent back from the card 14, the terminal 40 checks whether or not the message is the OK message. If NO in step B3, the flow advances to step B4. The ter-minal 40 checks in step B4 whether or not the message is the BAD message. If NO in step B4, the messaye is . .

.. ....
.

determined not to be the BAD m~ssage but being no messaye, so that a message instructing re-entry oE the PIN is displayed on the unit 13 in step B5. ~hen no coincidence is established even if the PIN is entered five times, the BAD message is sent back from the card 14 to the terminal 40. The flow advances from step B4 to step B6, and the transaction is interrupted.
If YE~ in step B3, the flow advances to step B7, and the CA code from the card 14 is set in thc E
register 59. In step B8, a random number is generated from the random number generator 48. In step B9, the random number is set in the re~3isters 52 and 56.
Thereafter, in step B10, the circuit 45 accesses the memory 54 to read out the MPUK code and sets it in the B
re~3ister 53. In step Bll, the random number set in the register 52 is encrypted using the MPUK code. The encrypted data is set in the re~3ister 52 in step B12.
In step B13, the IPUK code is read out from the memory 55 and is set in the register 53. The data set in the register 53 is encrypted by the RSA encrypter 49 in accordance with the readout IPUK code in step B14. The encrypted data is supplied to the card 14 in step B15.
~The terminal 40 waits until the data is sent back from the card 14 in step B16.
When the encrypt~ed data is~sent from the terminal 40 to the card 14, the card 14 detects the encrypted data in scep C10 of Fig. 8. The encrypted data is set ....

.

:.

89~

in the register 82 in step Cll. In step C12, the IPRK
code is read out from the memory 79 and is set in the reyister ~6. The encrypted data stored in the register 82 is decrypted by the decrypter 83 in accordance with the readout IPRK code in step C13. In step C14, the decrypted data is written in the reyister 82. There-after, in step C15, the MPRK code is read out ~rom the memory 78 and is stored in the register 86. In step C16, the data stored in the register 82 is decrypted in accordance with the readout MPRK code. The decrypted data is sent back to the card terminal 40 in step C17.
Thus, the lC card 14 processing is completed.
When the decrypted data is sent from the card 14 to the terminal 40, the terminal 40 detects the decrypted data Erom the card 14 in step B16 of Fiy. 7, and the decrypted data is stored in the register 57 in step C17.
The flow then advances to step Bl~, and the random number set in the register 56 in step B9 is compared with the decrypted data set in the reyister 57. The terminal 40 checks in step Bl9 whether or not the random number coincides with the decrypted data described above. If NO in step Bl9, the data encrypted by the terminal 40 is not properly decrypted by the card 14.
This result indicates that the card 14 does not store the proper MPRK or IPRK or does not have the proper decrypter 83. In other words, the terminal 40 deter-mines that the card 14 is illeyally manu~actured or ~8~

issued. The transaction is interrupted in step B6.
However, if ~E~ in step Bl9, the terminal 40 determines that the card 14 is leyally manufactured and issued. In step B20, the ~K message is displayed on the unit 13.
Upon checkiny of the OK message, the clerk enters the total amount oE money data at the keyboard 12 and depresses the key 12c. The operation of the key 12c is detected in step B21, and the flow advances to step B22.
In step B~2, the total amount data is set in the register 631 in the driver 63. In step B23, the date data stored in the reyister 421 in the circuit 42 is set in the register 632. subsequently, after the total amount data is transEerred to the register 60 in step B24, in step B25, the date data held in the register 421 lS is transE0rred to the register 61. In step B26, the unit 62 calculates the sales approval number SAN in accordance with the data stored in the registers 59, 60 and 61. The SAN is calculated by the Elow chart of Fiy. 9. In step Dl oE Fig. 9, the CA code held in the register S9 is subjected to the following calculation:

((first figure) x (fourth figure)) ~ ((second figure) x (third figure)) + (fourth figure) The calculation result is stored in the X register in the unit 62. In step D2, the 8-digit date data stored in the register 61 is divided by 2, and the quotient is stored in the Z register. For example, when date data . ~ r ' "

~5~

represents ~ctober 18, 1984, the value "1984101~" is divided by 2, and the quotient "'3920509" is stored in the Z reyister. In step D3, -the total amount data AMT
stored in the register 60 is transferred to the Y
register. Thereafter, the flow advances to step D4.
The content of the Z register is divided by the content of the X register, and the ~uotient and remainder are respectively stored in the A and B registers. In step D5, the contents of the Y, A and B registers are added to obtain the sales approval number SAN. The SAN is supplied to the driver 63 in step B27 of Fig. 7 and is set in the register 633. Thereafter, the flow advances to step B28, and the motors 64a, 64b and 64c are driven in accordance with the data stored in the registers 631, 632 and 633, thereby setting the printing data in the units 16a, 16b and l6c. ~'he printing data setting process for the units 16a, 16b and 16c is completed.
Thereafter, the carriage 17 is moved to print the predetermined data on the slip 91.
When sales processing using the card 14 is completed, the slip 91 is issued. The issued slip 91 is then checked for authenticity by the credit card company. Fiy. 10 shows the relationship between a customer 100, a store 101, a credit card company 102 and a bank 103, and the checking operation of the slip 91 in the company 102. When the store 101 sells goods to the customer 100 using the card 14, the copy of the slip , . . .

91 is handed to the customer 100 together with the purchased ~JoodsO The store 101 mails the duplicate of the slip 91 to the comparly 102. The company 102 has a host computer 104 which stores in a memory 105, the personal account numbers (PANs) each assigned to a specific customer at the time of issuance of the card 14 and the CA code read out from the card 14 at the time of setting the PAN~ The pair of PAN and CA codes constitute personal reference data. The computer 104 also stores in a memory 106, an SAN algorithm program which is the same as that stored in the unit 62 in each card terminal. In the company 102, a means for discriminating whether or not the SAN (encrypted data) is calculated in accordance with the predetermined algorithm is arranged in the computer 104, i.e., the host authentication system. The company 102 thus checks whether or not the slip 91 is issued by a leyal card terminal 4U. When the slip 91 is mailed Erom the store 101 to the company 102, processing shown in the fiow chart of Fig. 11 is performed in accordance with the ~rogram in the memory 106 to check authenticity of the slip 91 and hence of the card terminal 40 which issued the mailed slip 91. In step El of Fig. 11, a CA code corresponding to the PAN recorded on the slip 91 is read out from the memory 105. In step E2, a sales approval number SAN' is calculated in accordance with the program in the memory 106 using the CA code read out from the .., ~

.
"~ ' ' .. . .

:~589~

memory 10~ and the AMT and date data printed on the slip ~1. In step E3, the ~AN' calculated in step E2 is compared with the SAN printed on the slip 91. If Y~ in step E3, the SAN algorithm program stored in the unit 62 in the terminal 40 is the same as that stored in the computer 104 in the company 102 This indicates that the terminal 40 is one legally approved by the company 102. The slip 91 is approved in step E4, so that the company 102 settles the account with the store 101.
However, if NO in step E3, the company 102 determines that the card terminal 40 is not legal. In step ES, the slip 91 is not approved, and no account settlement is perEormed. When the company 102 approves the slip 91 and settles the account wlth the store 101, the correspondin~ statement (transaction record) is mailed to the customer 100. At the same time, the company 102 re~uests account settlement with the banlc 103 specified by the customer. The bank 103 settles the account with the company 102 at a specific date. Therefore, the sales transaction is completed.
In the above embodiment, the printing portion 16 comprises ring units but may be constituted by a thermal printer or the like.
According to the present invention, there is provided a card terminal and a card terminal iden-tification system, wherein encrypted data is calculated in accordance with a predetermined encrypting algorithm usiny transaction data such as total amount data and card holder membership number data so as to approve a transaction as legal in accordance with the encrypted data, a means for discriminating that the encrypted data is calculat:ed by the predetermined algorithm is arranged in a host authenticator so as to check whether or not a terminal is legal, thereby properly approving authenticity of the transaction and the card terminal.

.

Claims (14)

THE EMBODIMENTS OF THE INVENTION IN WHICH AN EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY OR PRIVILEGE IS CLAIMED ARE DEFINED AS FOLLOWS:
1. An ID card terminal which deals an ID card having an IC circuit, a connector for electrically coupling said IC
circuit to external apparatus and embossed pattern formed on a surface thereof, said ID card terminal comprising:
card holding means for holding said ID card;
emboss imprinting means for transferring the embossed pattern of said ID card onto a transaction sheet;
input means for inputting information data;
data printing means for printing a total amount of money data input from said input means on the transaction sheet;
connecting means to be connected to said connector of said ID card;
data processing means coupled to said input means and coupled, via said connecting means and connector of said ID card, to said IC circuit of said ID card, for transferring the information data input from said input means to said IC circuit and for processing data output from said IC circuit and said input means.
2. The ID card terminal according to claim 1, wherein said data processing means includes:
first storage means for storing a card holder identification data output from said ID card;
second storing means for storing an encryption algorithm;
calculating means for calculating a sales approval number data in said first storing means and the total amount of money data input from said input means; and outputting means for outputtng the sales approval number data obtained by said calculating means; and said data printing means prints the sales approval number data output from said output means on the transaction sheet.
3. The ID card terminal according to claim 2, wherein said data processing means includes:
time measuring means for counting at least date data, and said calculating means calculates the sales approval number data using the date data obtained by said time measuring means.
4. The ID card terminal according to claim 1, wherein said input means inputs a personal identification number, and said data processing means transfers the personal identification number input from said input means to said IC circuit of said ID card and receives data, from said IC
circuit, which indicates whether the personal identi-fication number input from said input means is correct.
5. The ID card terminal according to claim 1, further comprising:
housing means for housing at least said card holding means and said emboss printing means therein; and wherein said imboss imprinting means has a carriage provided with a pressure roller mounted to roll along said housing means.
6. The ID card terminal according to claim 5, further comprising:
actuating means for alternately setting said connecting means into one of a first and second states in accordance with a position of said carriage, said first state being one in which the connecting means is in electrically connecting to said connector of said ID card, and said second state being one in which the connecting means is disconnected elecrically from said connector of said ID card.
7. A terminal system comprising:
a terminal having input means for entering total amount of money data, means for storing card holder identification data of a card, means for calculating sales approval number (SAN) data and means for outputting the sales approval number data; and a host computer for checking whether or not the sales approval number data is valid.
8. A system according to claim 7, wherein said card comprises an IC card incorporating an IC chip therein.
9. A system according to claim 7, wherein said system comprises means for storing a specific algorithm, and said host computer comprises means for discriminating whether or not the sales approval number data is encrypted in accordance with the specific algorithm.
10. A system according to claim 7, wherein said terminal comprises printing means for printing on a transaction sheet at least the sales approval number data and data used for calculation thereof; and said host computer comprises means for calculating reference sales approval number (SAN') data and means for comparing the sales approval number (SAN) data with the reference sales approval number data (SAN').
11. A system having an IC card and a terminal, comprising:
a terminal having means for inputting personal identification number (PIN) data of an IC card holder, means for encrypting predetermined data, means for supplying encrypted data to an IC card, and means for comparing said predetermined data with decrypted data; and an IC card having means for comparing input personal indentification number data with preset personal indentification number data, and means for decrypting the encrypted data.
12. A system according to claim 11, wherein said terminal comprises means for storing two encrypting key code data determined by an IC card manufacturer and an IC card issuer, and said IC card comprises means for storing two decrypting key code data corresponding to the two encrypted key code data.
13. A system according to claim 12, wherein said encrypting means in said terminal includes an RSA
encrypter.
14. A system according to claim 11, wherein said terminal comprises a random number generator for generating a random number, the random number being encrypted.
CA000493102A 1984-10-19 1985-10-16 Card terminal and identification system of the same Expired CA1258907A (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
JP219980/84 1984-10-19
JP59219980A JPS6198476A (en) 1984-10-19 1984-10-19 Card terminal and its certifying system

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
CA1258907A true CA1258907A (en) 1989-08-29

Family

ID=16744036

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
CA000493102A Expired CA1258907A (en) 1984-10-19 1985-10-16 Card terminal and identification system of the same

Country Status (8)

Country Link
US (1) US4827113A (en)
EP (1) EP0178659B1 (en)
JP (1) JPS6198476A (en)
AT (1) ATE71753T1 (en)
CA (1) CA1258907A (en)
DE (1) DE3585199D1 (en)
FR (1) FR2572205B1 (en)
HK (1) HK58396A (en)

Families Citing this family (151)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP2603958B2 (en) * 1987-08-03 1997-04-23 株式会社東芝 Transaction confirmation method
WO1989008899A1 (en) * 1988-03-10 1989-09-21 Datacard Corporation Credit card transaction apparatus and method
FR2633419B1 (en) * 1988-06-23 1991-10-25 Crouzet Sa AUTONOMOUS INVOICE PRINTING MACHINE FOR INTEGRATED CIRCUIT PAYMENT CARD
JPH02170272A (en) * 1988-12-23 1990-07-02 Hitachi Maxell Ltd Collation system for secret information
US5019697A (en) * 1989-05-25 1991-05-28 Tps Electronics Data collection system using memory card
FR2656444B1 (en) * 1989-12-27 1992-04-17 Sagem INVOICE EDITING APPARATUS.
US5163098A (en) * 1990-09-06 1992-11-10 Dahbura Abbud S System for preventing fraudulent use of credit card
FR2667068B1 (en) * 1990-09-26 1994-09-09 Adir NOVEL HETEROCYCLIC ALKYL AMINES, THEIR PREPARATION PROCESS AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL COMPOSITIONS CONTAINING THEM.
GB2276746A (en) * 1993-04-03 1994-10-05 Malcolm Gold Transaction card verification system
US5561282A (en) * 1993-04-30 1996-10-01 Microbilt Corporation Portable signature capture pad
JPH0997313A (en) * 1995-10-02 1997-04-08 Nippon Conlux Co Ltd Information recording and reproducing device
US5799290A (en) * 1995-12-27 1998-08-25 Pitney Bowes Inc. Method and apparatus for securely authorizing performance of a function in a distributed system such as a postage meter
US5923762A (en) * 1995-12-27 1999-07-13 Pitney Bowes Inc. Method and apparatus for ensuring debiting in a postage meter prior to its printing a postal indicia
FR2745402A1 (en) * 1996-02-28 1997-08-29 Philips Electronics Nv READER OF ELECTRONIC CARDS OF DIFFERENT FORMATS AND PORTABLE TELEPHONE INCORPORATING SUCH A READER
SE9602186D0 (en) * 1996-05-31 1996-05-31 Christer Johansson Electronic circuit ID circuit
JPH1020778A (en) * 1996-07-08 1998-01-23 Harumi Takeda Encoding device, decoding device and ic card
US7743262B2 (en) * 1997-07-15 2010-06-22 Silverbrook Research Pty Ltd Integrated circuit incorporating protection from power supply attacks
US7346586B1 (en) * 1997-07-15 2008-03-18 Silverbrook Research Pty Ltd Validation protocol and system
JPH11338982A (en) * 1998-05-25 1999-12-10 Mitsubishi Electric Corp Ic memory card system device and ic memory card therefor
WO1999064956A1 (en) * 1998-06-11 1999-12-16 Aqi Ltd. Method, apparatus and system for securing credit card transactions
US6816968B1 (en) * 1998-07-10 2004-11-09 Silverbrook Research Pty Ltd Consumable authentication protocol and system
GB9921324D0 (en) 1999-09-09 1999-11-10 Ncr Int Inc Electronic mailbox for receiving a package containing an electronic postage stamp
US6766525B1 (en) 2000-02-08 2004-07-20 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Method and apparatus for evaluating television program recommenders
US7320072B1 (en) * 2000-08-28 2008-01-15 Nokia Corporation Method and token for authenticating a control point
JP3709553B2 (en) * 2000-12-19 2005-10-26 インターナショナル・ビジネス・マシーンズ・コーポレーション Arithmetic circuit and arithmetic method
JP3904432B2 (en) * 2001-11-16 2007-04-11 株式会社ルネサステクノロジ Information processing device
US20040171405A1 (en) * 2003-01-08 2004-09-02 Sony Corporation Information processing apparatus, information processing method and program
US20050141095A1 (en) * 2003-12-29 2005-06-30 Youngtack Shim Reflecting sheet
US8306912B2 (en) 2007-12-19 2012-11-06 Metabank Private label promotion card system, program product, and associated computer-implemented methods
US8818887B2 (en) * 2007-12-21 2014-08-26 Metabank Computer-implemented methods, program product, and system for micro-loan product management
US8583515B2 (en) 2007-12-21 2013-11-12 Metabank Transfer account systems, computer program products, and associated computer-implemented methods
US8108272B2 (en) 2007-12-21 2012-01-31 Metabank Transfer account systems, computer program products, and computer-implemented methods to prioritize payments from preselected bank account
US20090228391A1 (en) * 2008-02-20 2009-09-10 Trent Sorbe Methods To Advance Loan Proceeds On Prepaid Cards, Associated Systems And Computer Program Products
US10515405B2 (en) 2008-03-03 2019-12-24 Metabank Person-to-person lending program product, system, and associated computer-implemented methods
WO2009124264A1 (en) * 2008-04-04 2009-10-08 Metabank System, program product, and method for debit card and checking account autodraw
WO2009124262A1 (en) 2008-04-04 2009-10-08 Metabank System, program product and method for performing an incremental automatic credit line draw using a prepaid card
US8150764B2 (en) * 2008-04-04 2012-04-03 Metabank System, program product, and method to authorize draw for retailer optimization
WO2009140520A1 (en) 2008-05-14 2009-11-19 Metabank A pre-paid card transaction computer to load a loan on a pre-paid card
US8538879B2 (en) * 2008-05-14 2013-09-17 Metabank System, program product, and computer-implemented method for loading a loan on an existing pre-paid card
US11227331B2 (en) 2008-05-14 2022-01-18 Metabank System, program product, and computer-implemented method for loading a loan on an existing pre-paid card
US7594821B1 (en) 2008-09-17 2009-09-29 Yazaki North America, Inc. Sealing gap formed by assembled connector parts
WO2010028266A1 (en) 2008-09-04 2010-03-11 Metabank System, program product and methods for retail activation and reload associated with partial authorization transactions
US8024242B2 (en) * 2008-09-04 2011-09-20 Metabank System, method, and program product for foreign currency travel account
US8403211B2 (en) * 2008-09-04 2013-03-26 Metabank System, program product and methods for retail activation and reload associated with partial authorization transactions
US8371502B1 (en) 2008-10-28 2013-02-12 Metabank Shopping center gift card offer fulfillment machine, program product, and associated methods
US8108977B1 (en) 2008-10-31 2012-02-07 Metabank Machine, methods, and program product for electronic order entry
US9213965B1 (en) 2008-11-26 2015-12-15 Metabank Machine, methods, and program product for electronic inventory tracking
US8090649B2 (en) * 2008-12-18 2012-01-03 Metabank Computerized extension of credit to existing demand deposit accounts, prepaid cards and lines of credit based on expected tax refund proceeds, associated systems and computer program products
US8175962B2 (en) * 2008-12-18 2012-05-08 Metabank Computerized extension of credit to existing demand deposit accounts, prepaid cards and lines of credit based on expected tax refund proceeds, associated systems and computer program products
US8286863B1 (en) 2009-02-04 2012-10-16 Metabank System and computer program product to issue a retail prepaid card including a user-designed external face using a chit and related computer implemented methods
US20110060684A1 (en) * 2009-03-25 2011-03-10 Jucht Scott J Machine, program product, and computer-implemented methods for confirming a mobile banking request
US20110082737A1 (en) * 2009-09-28 2011-04-07 Crowe Andrew B Computer-implemented methods, computer program products, and systems for management and control of a loyalty rewards network
US10546444B2 (en) 2018-06-21 2020-01-28 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for secure read-only authentication
CA3110521A1 (en) 2018-10-02 2020-04-09 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for cryptographic authentication of contactless cards
AU2019355110A1 (en) 2018-10-02 2021-04-08 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for cryptographic authentication of contactless cards
US10909527B2 (en) 2018-10-02 2021-02-02 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for performing a reissue of a contactless card
US10841091B2 (en) 2018-10-02 2020-11-17 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for cryptographic authentication of contactless cards
US10607214B1 (en) 2018-10-02 2020-03-31 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for cryptographic authentication of contactless cards
US10489781B1 (en) 2018-10-02 2019-11-26 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for cryptographic authentication of contactless cards
US10582386B1 (en) 2018-10-02 2020-03-03 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for cryptographic authentication of contactless cards
US10579998B1 (en) 2018-10-02 2020-03-03 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for cryptographic authentication of contactless cards
US10542036B1 (en) 2018-10-02 2020-01-21 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for signaling an attack on contactless cards
CA3115252A1 (en) 2018-10-02 2020-04-09 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for cryptographic authentication of contactless cards
SG11202102798TA (en) 2018-10-02 2021-04-29 Capital One Services Llc Systems and methods for cryptographic authentication of contactless cards
US10581611B1 (en) 2018-10-02 2020-03-03 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for cryptographic authentication of contactless cards
MX2021003217A (en) 2018-10-02 2021-05-12 Capital One Services Llc Systems and methods for cryptographic authentication of contactless cards.
US10511443B1 (en) 2018-10-02 2019-12-17 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for cryptographic authentication of contactless cards
US10505738B1 (en) 2018-10-02 2019-12-10 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for cryptographic authentication of contactless cards
WO2020072694A1 (en) 2018-10-02 2020-04-09 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for cryptographic authentication of contactless cards
US10592710B1 (en) 2018-10-02 2020-03-17 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for cryptographic authentication of contactless cards
CA3115084A1 (en) 2018-10-02 2020-04-09 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for cryptographic authentication of contactless cards
US10949520B2 (en) 2018-10-02 2021-03-16 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for cross coupling risk analytics and one-time-passcodes
US10565587B1 (en) 2018-10-02 2020-02-18 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for cryptographic authentication of contactless cards
US10733645B2 (en) 2018-10-02 2020-08-04 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for establishing identity for order pick up
JP2022501861A (en) 2018-10-02 2022-01-06 キャピタル・ワン・サービシーズ・リミテッド・ライアビリティ・カンパニーCapital One Services, LLC Systems and methods for cryptographic authentication of non-contact cards
US10554411B1 (en) 2018-10-02 2020-02-04 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for cryptographic authentication of contactless cards
CA3108917A1 (en) 2018-10-02 2020-04-09 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for cryptographic authentication of contactless cards
US10771254B2 (en) 2018-10-02 2020-09-08 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for email-based card activation
US11210664B2 (en) 2018-10-02 2021-12-28 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for amplifying the strength of cryptographic algorithms
JP2022508026A (en) 2018-10-02 2022-01-19 キャピタル・ワン・サービシーズ・リミテッド・ライアビリティ・カンパニー Systems and methods for cryptographic authentication of non-contact cards
US10680824B2 (en) 2018-10-02 2020-06-09 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for inventory management using cryptographic authentication of contactless cards
US10783519B2 (en) 2018-10-02 2020-09-22 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for cryptographic authentication of contactless cards
US10771253B2 (en) 2018-10-02 2020-09-08 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for cryptographic authentication of contactless cards
US11361302B2 (en) 2019-01-11 2022-06-14 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for touch screen interface interaction using a card overlay
US11037136B2 (en) 2019-01-24 2021-06-15 Capital One Services, Llc Tap to autofill card data
US11120453B2 (en) 2019-02-01 2021-09-14 Capital One Services, Llc Tap card to securely generate card data to copy to clipboard
US10467622B1 (en) 2019-02-01 2019-11-05 Capital One Services, Llc Using on-demand applications to generate virtual numbers for a contactless card to securely autofill forms
US10510074B1 (en) 2019-02-01 2019-12-17 Capital One Services, Llc One-tap payment using a contactless card
US10425129B1 (en) 2019-02-27 2019-09-24 Capital One Services, Llc Techniques to reduce power consumption in near field communication systems
US10523708B1 (en) 2019-03-18 2019-12-31 Capital One Services, Llc System and method for second factor authentication of customer support calls
US10438437B1 (en) 2019-03-20 2019-10-08 Capital One Services, Llc Tap to copy data to clipboard via NFC
US10643420B1 (en) 2019-03-20 2020-05-05 Capital One Services, Llc Contextual tapping engine
US10984416B2 (en) 2019-03-20 2021-04-20 Capital One Services, Llc NFC mobile currency transfer
US10535062B1 (en) 2019-03-20 2020-01-14 Capital One Services, Llc Using a contactless card to securely share personal data stored in a blockchain
US10970712B2 (en) 2019-03-21 2021-04-06 Capital One Services, Llc Delegated administration of permissions using a contactless card
US10467445B1 (en) 2019-03-28 2019-11-05 Capital One Services, Llc Devices and methods for contactless card alignment with a foldable mobile device
US11521262B2 (en) 2019-05-28 2022-12-06 Capital One Services, Llc NFC enhanced augmented reality information overlays
US10516447B1 (en) 2019-06-17 2019-12-24 Capital One Services, Llc Dynamic power levels in NFC card communications
US11694187B2 (en) 2019-07-03 2023-07-04 Capital One Services, Llc Constraining transactional capabilities for contactless cards
US11392933B2 (en) 2019-07-03 2022-07-19 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for providing online and hybridcard interactions
US10871958B1 (en) 2019-07-03 2020-12-22 Capital One Services, Llc Techniques to perform applet programming
US10713649B1 (en) 2019-07-09 2020-07-14 Capital One Services, Llc System and method enabling mobile near-field communication to update display on a payment card
US10498401B1 (en) 2019-07-15 2019-12-03 Capital One Services, Llc System and method for guiding card positioning using phone sensors
US10885514B1 (en) 2019-07-15 2021-01-05 Capital One Services, Llc System and method for using image data to trigger contactless card transactions
US10832271B1 (en) 2019-07-17 2020-11-10 Capital One Services, Llc Verified reviews using a contactless card
US11182771B2 (en) 2019-07-17 2021-11-23 Capital One Services, Llc System for value loading onto in-vehicle device
US10733601B1 (en) 2019-07-17 2020-08-04 Capital One Services, Llc Body area network facilitated authentication or payment authorization
US11521213B2 (en) 2019-07-18 2022-12-06 Capital One Services, Llc Continuous authentication for digital services based on contactless card positioning
US10506426B1 (en) 2019-07-19 2019-12-10 Capital One Services, Llc Techniques for call authentication
US10541995B1 (en) 2019-07-23 2020-01-21 Capital One Services, Llc First factor contactless card authentication system and method
JP2023503795A (en) 2019-10-02 2023-02-01 キャピタル・ワン・サービシーズ・リミテッド・ライアビリティ・カンパニー Client Device Authentication Using Contactless Legacy Magnetic Stripe Data
US10657754B1 (en) 2019-12-23 2020-05-19 Capital One Services, Llc Contactless card and personal identification system
US11615395B2 (en) 2019-12-23 2023-03-28 Capital One Services, Llc Authentication for third party digital wallet provisioning
US11651361B2 (en) 2019-12-23 2023-05-16 Capital One Services, Llc Secure authentication based on passport data stored in a contactless card
US10733283B1 (en) 2019-12-23 2020-08-04 Capital One Services, Llc Secure password generation and management using NFC and contactless smart cards
US10862540B1 (en) 2019-12-23 2020-12-08 Capital One Services, Llc Method for mapping NFC field strength and location on mobile devices
US10885410B1 (en) 2019-12-23 2021-01-05 Capital One Services, Llc Generating barcodes utilizing cryptographic techniques
US11113685B2 (en) 2019-12-23 2021-09-07 Capital One Services, Llc Card issuing with restricted virtual numbers
US11200563B2 (en) 2019-12-24 2021-12-14 Capital One Services, Llc Account registration using a contactless card
US10664941B1 (en) 2019-12-24 2020-05-26 Capital One Services, Llc Steganographic image encoding of biometric template information on a card
US10853795B1 (en) 2019-12-24 2020-12-01 Capital One Services, Llc Secure authentication based on identity data stored in a contactless card
US10757574B1 (en) 2019-12-26 2020-08-25 Capital One Services, Llc Multi-factor authentication providing a credential via a contactless card for secure messaging
US10909544B1 (en) 2019-12-26 2021-02-02 Capital One Services, Llc Accessing and utilizing multiple loyalty point accounts
US11038688B1 (en) 2019-12-30 2021-06-15 Capital One Services, Llc Techniques to control applets for contactless cards
US10860914B1 (en) 2019-12-31 2020-12-08 Capital One Services, Llc Contactless card and method of assembly
US11455620B2 (en) 2019-12-31 2022-09-27 Capital One Services, Llc Tapping a contactless card to a computing device to provision a virtual number
US11210656B2 (en) 2020-04-13 2021-12-28 Capital One Services, Llc Determining specific terms for contactless card activation
US11030339B1 (en) 2020-04-30 2021-06-08 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for data access control of personal user data using a short-range transceiver
US10861006B1 (en) 2020-04-30 2020-12-08 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for data access control using a short-range transceiver
US11823175B2 (en) 2020-04-30 2023-11-21 Capital One Services, Llc Intelligent card unlock
US11222342B2 (en) 2020-04-30 2022-01-11 Capital One Services, Llc Accurate images in graphical user interfaces to enable data transfer
US10915888B1 (en) 2020-04-30 2021-02-09 Capital One Services, Llc Contactless card with multiple rotating security keys
US10963865B1 (en) 2020-05-12 2021-03-30 Capital One Services, Llc Augmented reality card activation experience
US11063979B1 (en) 2020-05-18 2021-07-13 Capital One Services, Llc Enabling communications between applications in a mobile operating system
US11100511B1 (en) 2020-05-18 2021-08-24 Capital One Services, Llc Application-based point of sale system in mobile operating systems
US11062098B1 (en) 2020-08-11 2021-07-13 Capital One Services, Llc Augmented reality information display and interaction via NFC based authentication
US11165586B1 (en) 2020-10-30 2021-11-02 Capital One Services, Llc Call center web-based authentication using a contactless card
US11482312B2 (en) 2020-10-30 2022-10-25 Capital One Services, Llc Secure verification of medical status using a contactless card
US11373169B2 (en) 2020-11-03 2022-06-28 Capital One Services, Llc Web-based activation of contactless cards
US11216799B1 (en) 2021-01-04 2022-01-04 Capital One Services, Llc Secure generation of one-time passcodes using a contactless card
US11682012B2 (en) 2021-01-27 2023-06-20 Capital One Services, Llc Contactless delivery systems and methods
US11792001B2 (en) 2021-01-28 2023-10-17 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for secure reprovisioning
US11687930B2 (en) 2021-01-28 2023-06-27 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for authentication of access tokens
US11562358B2 (en) 2021-01-28 2023-01-24 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for near field contactless card communication and cryptographic authentication
US11438329B2 (en) 2021-01-29 2022-09-06 Capital One Services, Llc Systems and methods for authenticated peer-to-peer data transfer using resource locators
US11777933B2 (en) 2021-02-03 2023-10-03 Capital One Services, Llc URL-based authentication for payment cards
US11637826B2 (en) 2021-02-24 2023-04-25 Capital One Services, Llc Establishing authentication persistence
US11245438B1 (en) 2021-03-26 2022-02-08 Capital One Services, Llc Network-enabled smart apparatus and systems and methods for activating and provisioning same
US11935035B2 (en) 2021-04-20 2024-03-19 Capital One Services, Llc Techniques to utilize resource locators by a contactless card to perform a sequence of operations
US11902442B2 (en) 2021-04-22 2024-02-13 Capital One Services, Llc Secure management of accounts on display devices using a contactless card
US11354555B1 (en) 2021-05-04 2022-06-07 Capital One Services, Llc Methods, mediums, and systems for applying a display to a transaction card

Family Cites Families (15)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US3818187A (en) * 1972-02-08 1974-06-18 Amp Inc Credit verification system and terminal therefor
US4268715A (en) * 1978-05-03 1981-05-19 Atalla Technovations Method and apparatus for securing data transmissions
US4262589A (en) * 1979-01-08 1981-04-21 Gebhardt Robert G Apparatus for embossing and printing information on charge sales slip
IT1130118B (en) * 1980-04-16 1986-06-11 Olivetti & Co Spa ENVELOPE DEPOSIT EQUIPMENT WITH AUTOMATIC DISPOSAL OF ENVELOPES
US4341951A (en) * 1980-07-02 1982-07-27 Benton William M Electronic funds transfer and voucher issue system
JPS5925560B2 (en) * 1980-08-09 1984-06-19 松下電器産業株式会社 edgeless speaker
FR2497617B1 (en) * 1981-01-07 1989-08-18 Transac Develop Transactions A SECURITY METHOD AND DEVICE FOR TRIPARTITY COMMUNICATION OF CONFIDENTIAL DATA
US4423287A (en) * 1981-06-26 1983-12-27 Visa U.S.A., Inc. End-to-end encryption system and method of operation
FR2514593B1 (en) * 1981-10-09 1986-12-26 Bull Sa METHOD AND DEVICE FOR AUTHENTICATING THE SIGNATURE OF A SIGNED MESSAGE
JPS5979375A (en) * 1982-10-29 1984-05-08 Omron Tateisi Electronics Co Facility for settling transactions
GB2133744B (en) * 1983-01-14 1986-02-26 American Express Co Improvements relating to credit card imprinters
US4536647A (en) * 1983-07-15 1985-08-20 Atalla Corporation Pocket banking terminal, method and system
US4630201A (en) * 1984-02-14 1986-12-16 International Security Note & Computer Corporation On-line and off-line transaction security system using a code generated from a transaction parameter and a random number
US4650975A (en) * 1984-08-30 1987-03-17 Casio Computer Co., Ltd. IC card and an identification system thereof
US4678896A (en) * 1986-10-06 1987-07-07 Carlson Steven R Point-of sale mechanism

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
EP0178659A2 (en) 1986-04-23
EP0178659A3 (en) 1988-08-31
JPH0567990B2 (en) 1993-09-28
ATE71753T1 (en) 1992-02-15
JPS6198476A (en) 1986-05-16
EP0178659B1 (en) 1992-01-15
US4827113A (en) 1989-05-02
DE3585199D1 (en) 1992-02-27
HK58396A (en) 1996-04-12
FR2572205A1 (en) 1986-04-25
FR2572205B1 (en) 1990-10-19

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
CA1258907A (en) Card terminal and identification system of the same
EP0256768B2 (en) Transaction processing apparatus
US5195133A (en) Apparatus and method for producing a digitized transaction record including an encrypted signature
US4650975A (en) IC card and an identification system thereof
US4304990A (en) Multilevel security apparatus and method
US5892824A (en) Signature capture/verification systems and methods
US20070185820A1 (en) Multi-account security verification system with a virtual account and linked multiple real accounts
US20020111918A1 (en) IC card transaction system, electronic wallet transaction apparatus and IC card therefor
JPS58500498A (en) Check issuing terminal and issuing method
JPS6167192A (en) Collation card and validation system
US8684263B1 (en) Automated banking machine that operates responsive to data bearing records
JPS637982A (en) Portable memory medium
US20120091199A1 (en) Multi-account card system
JP2006500671A (en) Identification system
JP2793710B2 (en) Transaction authentication method
JPS60159992A (en) Checking system of rightfulness of ic card
JP2703940B2 (en) Card transaction processor
JP3624714B2 (en) Underage identification device for vending machines
JPS6289167A (en) Card identifying method
JP4647769B2 (en) PIN verification method, IC card
JPS6133573A (en) Card issuing system
JPH0542029B2 (en)
JP2575447B2 (en) Transaction confirmation method
JPS62279464A (en) Identification number collating system
JPS6198488A (en) Embossing in-printer having data printing function

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
MKEX Expiry