CA2049083C - Information processing apparatus with replaceable security element - Google Patents
Information processing apparatus with replaceable security element Download PDFInfo
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- CA2049083C CA2049083C CA002049083A CA2049083A CA2049083C CA 2049083 C CA2049083 C CA 2049083C CA 002049083 A CA002049083 A CA 002049083A CA 2049083 A CA2049083 A CA 2049083A CA 2049083 C CA2049083 C CA 2049083C
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- Prior art keywords
- key
- security element
- data
- information processor
- authentication key
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0877—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords using additional device, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard, USB or hardware security module [HSM]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
- H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
- H04N21/43—Processing of content or additional data, e.g. demultiplexing additional data from a digital video stream; Elementary client operations, e.g. monitoring of home network or synchronising decoder's clock; Client middleware
- H04N21/436—Interfacing a local distribution network, e.g. communicating with another STB or one or more peripheral devices inside the home
- H04N21/4367—Establishing a secure communication between the client and a peripheral device or smart card
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
- H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
- H04N21/43—Processing of content or additional data, e.g. demultiplexing additional data from a digital video stream; Elementary client operations, e.g. monitoring of home network or synchronising decoder's clock; Client middleware
- H04N21/44—Processing of video elementary streams, e.g. splicing a video clip retrieved from local storage with an incoming video stream, rendering scenes according to MPEG-4 scene graphs
- H04N21/4405—Processing of video elementary streams, e.g. splicing a video clip retrieved from local storage with an incoming video stream, rendering scenes according to MPEG-4 scene graphs involving video stream decryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N7/00—Television systems
- H04N7/16—Analogue secrecy systems; Analogue subscription systems
- H04N7/167—Systems rendering the television signal unintelligible and subsequently intelligible
- H04N7/1675—Providing digital key or authorisation information for generation or regeneration of the scrambling sequence
Abstract
A field upgradeable security system deciphers signals received from a communication network. An information processor (10) include, a receptacle for receiving a replaceable security element (12). The replaceable security element generates a working key (WK) necessary to the operation of the information processor. The working key is communicated to the information processor encrypted under a secret key (A(M)). The information processor decrypts the encrypted working key for use in deciphering a received communication signal. additional layers of encryption (A(C), U(M), U(C)) can be added to the communications between the information processor and security element to increase the level of security.
Description
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The present a.nventian relates generally to security apparatus for information processing systems, and more particularly to apparatus far selectively controlling 'the deciphering of information signals, such as scrambled television programs.
There are many schemes available far controlling the remote descrambling of television signals. Such schemes are necessary ~to maintain security in subscription ~elevisian systems, including cable television systems and satellite television systems. Typically, a system subscriber is provided with a descrambler connected between a television signal source (e.g., cable feed ar satellite receiver) and a television set. Each subscriber's descrambler is remotely accessed by the system operator to enable or disable the receipt of specific services such as the Hame Box Office movie channel ax special pay°per°view sports events. One problem with such systems isthat "pirates" axe apt to break the system security and sel:L "black boxes°' that enable 'the reception of all prog~hmming without paying for the services received. Tt has been difficu:t.t and expensive fo:r system opera~tox~s to contend with the piracy problem. Once a particular
The present a.nventian relates generally to security apparatus for information processing systems, and more particularly to apparatus far selectively controlling 'the deciphering of information signals, such as scrambled television programs.
There are many schemes available far controlling the remote descrambling of television signals. Such schemes are necessary ~to maintain security in subscription ~elevisian systems, including cable television systems and satellite television systems. Typically, a system subscriber is provided with a descrambler connected between a television signal source (e.g., cable feed ar satellite receiver) and a television set. Each subscriber's descrambler is remotely accessed by the system operator to enable or disable the receipt of specific services such as the Hame Box Office movie channel ax special pay°per°view sports events. One problem with such systems isthat "pirates" axe apt to break the system security and sel:L "black boxes°' that enable 'the reception of all prog~hmming without paying for the services received. Tt has been difficu:t.t and expensive fo:r system opera~tox~s to contend with the piracy problem. Once a particular
2 security system is breached, the system operator must usually replace all existing descramblers with new units that operate with a different security algorithm. This solution is not cost effective.
Various systems have been designed to make piracy more difficult. One such system is disclosed in U.S. patent 4,613,901 to Gilhousen, et al entitled "Signal Encryption and Distribution System for Controlling Scrambling and Selective Remote Descrambling of Television Signals", In the Gilhousen, et al system, a "working key" signal is generated in accordance with the well known data encryption standard ("DES") security algorithm, after the algorithm is keyed by either a common category key signal or some other key signal. A
unique encryption key stream is generated by processing an initialization vector signal in accordance with the DES algorithm when the algorithm is keyed by the working key signal. A television signal is scrambled in accordance with the unique encryption key stream to provide a scrambled television signal. A plurality of unique encrypted category key signals individually addressed to different selected subscribers' descramblers are generated by processing the initial common category key signal in accordance with the DES algorithm when the algorithm is keyed by a plurality of different "unit key"
signals associated with different descramblers. The scrambled television signal, initialization vector signal, and plurality of encrypted category key signals are broadcast to the descramblers. At each descrambler, the encryption key stream is reproduced 'to descramble the television signal, Each descrambler has its unique unit key signal stored in memory for use in reproducing the cammon category key signal when the descrambler is addressed by its unique encrypted category key signal. 1By using the DES algorithm, the Gilhousen, e~t as system provides a high level of security, making it difficult and expensive for a pirate to reproduce the working key.
other selective subscription descrambling systems are disclosed in ~ilhousen, et al U.S.
Patents 4,712,238 and 4,792,973. These patents provide improved systems.for enabling descrambling of a received scrambled signal on an impulse-purchase basis. U.S. Patemt 4,634,808 to Moerder discloses a system for reproducing a key signal in a descrambler that is unique to the descrambler, and was used in encrypting a key signal that must be decrypted for use in descrambling a television signal. However, no security system is unbreakable, and determined pirates can be expected to ultimately prevail.
Tt would be advantageous to provide an improved system in which security can be economically upgraded after a breach. It would be furtYaer advantageous if the security upgrades could be made in the field lay the simple replacement of a relatively low cost security element containing a new security algorithm. The security element should be replaceable by a subscriber in his home without any need for a visit from service personnel.
It would also be advantageous to protect ttie interface between the subscriber's descrambler and the replaceable security element, so that others could not easi7.y manufacture their own security elements to defeat the system or to use the descrambler for other unauthorized purposes. If the wrong security element .is installed, the descrambler must not work.
The present invention provides an upe~radeable security system, an information processor, and a replaceable security element that enjoy 'the aforementioned advantages.
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Tn accordance with the present invention, a field upgradeable security system is,provided for deciphering signals received from a communication network. An information processor includes a receptacle for receiving a replaceable security elamewt. The replaceable security element includes means for generating a working key, means for encrypting the working key with a secret key, and means for communicating the encrypted working key to the information processor. The information processor decrypts the encrypted working key for use in deciphering a received communication signal..
Tn a preferred embodiment, the secret key comprises a first authentication key associated with the information processor. the first authentication key is securely communicated to the security element for use in encrypting the caorking key. A second authentication key is associated with the security ~0 element. Means are provided for securely communicating the second authentication key to the information processor. The security element then encrypts the working key with both 'the first and second authentication keys.
The information processor can further comprise a first unit key associated therewith and means for receiving the second authentication key encrypted under the first unit key. Means are provided for decrypting the received second authewtication key VJ
for subsequent use in decrypting the working key.
Similarly, the security element can comprise a second unit key associated therewith and means for receiving the first authentication key encrypted under the second unit key. The rece~.ved first authentication key is decrypted by the security element for subsequent use in encrypting the working key prior to communicating it to the information processor.
Tn order to generate the working key, the security element requires input data that can be securely communicated to it via the information processor. The informatx.on .processor receives the data in an encrypted form from a °°trusted center", decrypts it at least in part, and then further encrypts it for communication to the security element. In a preferred embodiment, the data is received by the information processor encrypted under at least the second unit key, and communicated from the information processor to the security element under the second unit key and at least one of the authentication keys.
In another embodiment, a replaceable security element is provided for use in combination with era z5 information processor having a secret cryptographic key. The security element receives data for use z.n generating a working lr.ey. ~.Clae security e~.emewt:
receives the secret key via an encrypted communication, and decrypts the secret key for use in encrypting the working key. The encrypted working key is 'than communicated to the information processor by the security element for use in processing an information signal. In a preferred implementation, the secret key is received by the security element encrypted under a unit key associated therewith. An additional cryptographic key may be associated with the security element, and the working key may be encrypted with both the secret and additional keys. The data received by the security element for use in generating the working key may also be encrypted under at least one of 'the secret and unit keys. :In this event, the security element comprises means for decrypting the received data.
An information processor is provided for use in combination with a replaceable security element.
Means are provided within the information processor for receiving the security element. A secret cryptographic key is associated with and stored in the information processor. Means are provided far receiving a working key, encrypted under the secrwt:
key, from the security elemewt. The received working key is decrypted and used to process an information signal. Tn a preferred embodiment, an additional cryptographic 3cey associated with the security element is received and stored. ~.L'he received working key is encrypted under the secret key and the additional key for decryption and use by the information ,processor.
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The information processor can also include means for receiving data for use by the security element in generating the working key. Means are provided for communicating the data to the security element. Means may also be provided for encrypting the data under one or both of the secret and additional keys before it is communicated to the security element.
Tkae information processor can further comprise means for receiving and storing characteristic information (e.g., an address) identifying the security element and means for screening the received data, on the basis of the characteristic information, for selective communication to the security element. The information signal processed by the information processor can comprise a scrambled communication signal to be descrambled.
Means can be provided for enabling and disabling the security element in response to a received control ~0 signal, and for descrambling eommunica~tion signals according to a default descrambling algorithm ira the absence of an enabled security element.
b>~ . v ~'~ ~~ ~~ ~:~ ~ ~3 a~
Figure 1 is a block diagram illustrating an information processor and replaceable security e7.ement in accardance with the present invention;
k'igure 2 is a diagram illustrating the information flaw to 'the informatian processor and the security element during initialization of a new security elements and Figure 3 is a diagram illustrating the information flow of data to the information processor and security element and the communication of the encrypted working key from the security element to the information processor in accordance with the present inventions The present invention provides a system for recovering from security compromises in an information processing system, such as a satellite television communication network. Ifi an illustrated 5 embodiment, a replaceable security element is coupled to a satellite television descrambler for use in generating working keys that are subsequently communicated to the descrambler to enable the descrambling of received signals. The security 10 element is a relatively low cost device that is replaced with a new security element operating with a different security algorithm each time a prior security element on its algorithm has been breached.
The security element can comprise, for example, a credit card sized "smart card" or a cartridge containing a microprocessor based working key generator together with various supporting components.
Turning to Figure 1, an information processor ("module") generally designated 10 is provided. Information processor 10 can comprise a descrambler module such as the VideoCipher II Plus'D°
descrambler module manufactured by General Instrument Corporation for use in connection with the VideoCipher line of satellite receivers.
Information processor 10 includes all of the components of the VideoCipher II Plus' descrambler module, including a microprocessor 14 and ROM 16 for storing program instructions for the microprocessor.
A cryptographic processor ("crypto") 24 is also provided in the VideoCipher II Pluses descrambler module, coupled to microprocessor 14 via bus 18, for effecting signal descrambling on the basis of a working key signal as set forth in the aforementioned Gilhousen, et al U.S. Patent 4,613,901.
In accordance with the present invention, information processor 10 also includes several new components. These are a key and address random access memory ("RAM") 20 and a message filter and interface circuit 22. Key and address RAM 20 stores a secret key for the information processor and a unique address assigned to a security element generally designated 12.
Message filter and interface 22 uses the security element address stored in RAM 20 to determine what messages received from the communication network (e. g., satellite television system) at input terminal 11 are specifically addressed to security element 12. The message filter discards all messages not intended for its associated security element 12.
It should be appreciated that other methods exist for providing messages to specific security elements. For example, data sent to a security element by a trusted center can be communicated to the associated information processor with instructions for passing the data on to the security element. The data itself can be encrypted under the information processor unit key to prevent its use by any other information processor and security element combination.
Information processor 10 and security element 12 are connected via signal path 26 and their respective interfaces 22, 36. Signals flowing from information processor i0 to security element 12 include 'the data required by the security element to generate working keys and data identifying a secret "authentication" key uniquely associated with the information processor. In a preferred embodiment, security element 12 also has its own authentication key, which can be preloaded upon manufacture or subsequently received by the security element via path 26 from data input to the information processor at terminal 11. The working keys required by crypto 24 to descramble an information (e. g., television) signal are also communicated over path 26, from security element 12 to information processor 10.
Tn accordance with the present invention, the working keys are encrypted by security element 12 with the secret authentication )cey of information processor 10. The encryption of the working keys with the information processor's secret key provides a substantial advantage in the presewt system. In particular, a security element that does not know the information processor's secret authentication key will be unable to properly encrypt working keys for txse by crypto 24. Fven if a security element were provided that could generate the necessary worlcing keys, there would be no way to intelligibly 'transfer the working keys to the infor~na~tion processor without knowledge of the secret key. Any information that an improper security element transferred to information processor 10 withowt encryption under the secret key would be processed by crypto 24, but would not result in a properly descrambled signal. Therefore, there is no need to disable information processor ~.p if an unauthorised security element is connected to it. If the wrong security element is installed, the system simply 1o will not work.
Security element 12 includes a cryptographic processor 34 that operates in combination with a microprocessor "working key generator" 28 to provide the working keys. Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the functions of working key generator 28 and cryptographic processor 34 can be provided in a single microprocessor. Data for generating the working keys, which can comprise, for example, a category key and program key transmitted by a trusted center as disclosed in the aforementioned U.S. Patent 4,613,901, is preferably received via path 26 in an encrypted Norm. Crypto 34 decrypts the encrypted data and passes it to working key generator 28 via bus 32. Program instructions containing the security algorithm used by working key generator 28 are stored in Rohl 30.
It is noted that the security a:Lgorithm could alternately be contained in special purpose trardware ~tha~t is part. of 'the working key generator. .An example of a known security algorithm is the DES
algorithm previously mentioned. New security algorithms will be developed for each version of security element that is used to replace a prior version breached by a pirate. In this manner, each time a pirate breaks a system, all that the system operator has to do is to send out new security elements to all authorized subscribers. The subscribers replace the old security element with the new one, and once the existing subscriber base has been upgraded all signals for the breached system are terminated. A pirate will then have to break the new system, at which time it will be replaced by a subsequent system.
During the transition from an old security system to a new security system, authorization signals can be transmitted for both systems. Alternately, crypto 24 in information processor 10 can resort to a default descrambling algorithm until all subscriber units have been upgraded. The default algorithm can be one previously used in existing VideoCipher II Plus descrambler modules.
Nonvolatile memory (e. g., key RAM 38) is provided in security element 12 to store the secret authentication key of information processor 10 for use by crypto 34, e.g., in encrypting the working keys prior to transmission via interface 36 and path 26 to information processor 10. Key RAM 38 will also store any other keys necessary in the specific implementation used by security element 12, such as a unique unit key and/or authentication lc.ey associated with the security element. :Power for security element 12 can be provided by a battery contained 'therein or from a power supply in information processor 10 via path 2~.
When it becomes necessary to implement a security upgrade, each subscriber is provided with a new security element. Upon installation of the new security element, an initialization routine takes place. This can be effected, for example, by instructing the subscriber to call a toll free telephone number to enable 'the receipt of an initialization message from a trLls'ted center via 'the satellite receiver. This is referred to as "remote initialization". Alternately, the security element andfor information processor can be programmed to automatically request (e. g., via a telephone modem) remote initialization upon installation of a new security element. :fin a different embodiment, the security element is pre-initialized with the necessary initialization data by the system operator prior to sending it to 'the subscriber.
The flow of information to the information processor and security element during remote initialization is illustrated in Figure 2. At ini~tializa~tion, the cryptographic processor 2,4 of information processor 10 will receive a message instructing it to ga into security elemc-ant support as~~~~~t~~
z s ~~ r mode. Tf the specific implementation provides for message filtering by 'the information processor on the basis of a security element address, the security element's address (SE address) will also be received. Tn addition, a security element authentication key (A(C)) encrypted under a unit key (U(M)) uniquely assigned to the information processor will be received. These signals are indicated at box 40.
Crypto 24 will decrypt the security element°s authentication key and store it in secure RAM 20.
Tt will also store the security element's address in RAM 20 if required for subsequent message filtering.
The remote initialization message will also ~.5 contain a unit addressed message to crypto processor 34 of security element 12 containing the information processor's secret authentication key (A(M)) encrypted under~a unit key (U(C)) assigned to the security element. In the event remote initialization is not used, all of the necessary initialization data will be loaded into the security element prior to forwarding it to the subscriber.
Tmmediately,after initialization, the data necessary to enable the security element to generate the working keys required by crypto 24 will be transmitted via satellite or other means (e. g., telephone), to enable authorized television signals to be descrambled. Tn the event remote in9.~tialization is not used, information not frequently broadcast (i.e., the category key) can be sent ahead of time and stored by the information processor for later transfer to the security element.
An information processor can be remotely placed into "stand alone" mode, for use without security element 12. In this mode, it will operate functionally in the same manner as known VideoCipher II Pluses descrambler modules, except that in remote initialization situations, it will always look for security element initialization messages that are addressed to it.
When the information processor receives a remote initialization message to enable security element support mode, it must decrypt the security element's authentication key (A(C)) and store it in nonvolatile secure memory (e.g., key and address RAM 20) as indicated at box 42 of Figure 2. The information processor must also store the security element's unit address in nonvolatile memory 20, for implementations where security element addressable message filtering is provided. It will then pass its own authentication key (A(M)) encrypted by the security element unit key (U(C)) to the security element, which will decrypt the module authentication key and store it in key RAM 38 as indicated at box 44. Crypto 24 will then function in security element support mode.
When crypts ~4 is in security element support mode, its funotional.i~ty changes. :C~:. will receive and process messages far both itself and fox crypts 34 of the security element, and will also receive and process 'the data needed by the security element far use in generating the working keys. If -the information processor receives a message to return to stand alone mode, it will do sa and disable the security element interface.
In a preferred embodiment, all secure values that cross the interface between the information processor and security element are encrypted (or decrypted) by the authentication keys of both 'the information praeessor and the security element. 1'he status of the secure values passed 'to the in.farmation processor and between the infarmatian processor and the security elememt are illa.astrated in Figure 3. ~1s can be seen, when information processor 10 receives a "category key" ("GIC") resessage (bores 50, 52), which key is part of the data used by the security element to generate working keys, it must decrypt the exacrypted category key (EutM'Du<u> (CK) ) using its own unit key (U (M) ) . and then it must decrypt the result under its own authentication key (A(M)) (which is known to the security element) before passing this field out 'to the security element (bn~c 54). mhe second decryption (Dp(ht) (~ucc~ (C~) ) ) is used to protect data and is not actually doing tkie :i.x~verse of a previous encrypt.
In a similar manner, the information processor must decrypt the category encrypted program keys (EcK(PIC)), which are used by the security elemewt to generate working keys, by both its awthentication key (A(M)) and the security element's authentication key (A(C)) before communicating the message to security element 12. This is depicted at box 54.
A frame count message (additional data used in generating the working keys) goes out to the security element without encryption as indicated at box 54.
The only values that are communicated by the security element to 'the information processor, as indicated at trae outpwt of box 56, are encrypted working keys. As shown, the working keys are encrypted under both the security element's authentication key (A(C)) and the information processor's authentication key (A(M)). Information processor crypto 24 must decrypt 'the working keys by its own authentication key and then by the security element's authewtication key. Tt then passes the clear working key to initialize key stream generation in a conwemtional manner. Since the working key is receiued by crypto 24 encrypted by the information processor°s secret authentication key, there is no way to breach the interface wit:kZaut knowledge of the secret authentication lcey. When in the security element support mode, the informat:Lon processor crypto 24 must always decrypt incoming working keys.
a As should be apparent, the only fob of the security element is 'to produce encrypted working keys. Because of its limited funct.i.onality, it can be manufactured at a l.ow cost. The derivation of 5 working keys from the data forwarded to 'the security element will depend on the particular security algorithm used. 'this algorithm should be different for every version of the security element, to maintain the difficulty of breaking each new 10 version.
Tt should now be appreciated that 'the present invention provides a field upgradeable security system that can be used for deciphering signals received from a communication network. As one 15 version of security is breached, a new version is implemented by replacing loca cost security elements that provide working keys to an information processor. Ttae working keys are communicated fram the security element to the information processor in 20 an encrypted form under a secret key known only ~to the information processor and an awthorized security element. In order to obtain the secret key, the unit key of the security element must be correct, since the secret key is communicated to the security element encrypted under the unit key.
Although the invention has been described in connection with a specific embodimewt thereof, those skilled irz the art will appreciate that numerous ~~~~a~~' adaptations and modifications may be made thereto, withotx~t departing from the spirit and ucope of the invention, as set forth in the fol7.owing claims.
Various systems have been designed to make piracy more difficult. One such system is disclosed in U.S. patent 4,613,901 to Gilhousen, et al entitled "Signal Encryption and Distribution System for Controlling Scrambling and Selective Remote Descrambling of Television Signals", In the Gilhousen, et al system, a "working key" signal is generated in accordance with the well known data encryption standard ("DES") security algorithm, after the algorithm is keyed by either a common category key signal or some other key signal. A
unique encryption key stream is generated by processing an initialization vector signal in accordance with the DES algorithm when the algorithm is keyed by the working key signal. A television signal is scrambled in accordance with the unique encryption key stream to provide a scrambled television signal. A plurality of unique encrypted category key signals individually addressed to different selected subscribers' descramblers are generated by processing the initial common category key signal in accordance with the DES algorithm when the algorithm is keyed by a plurality of different "unit key"
signals associated with different descramblers. The scrambled television signal, initialization vector signal, and plurality of encrypted category key signals are broadcast to the descramblers. At each descrambler, the encryption key stream is reproduced 'to descramble the television signal, Each descrambler has its unique unit key signal stored in memory for use in reproducing the cammon category key signal when the descrambler is addressed by its unique encrypted category key signal. 1By using the DES algorithm, the Gilhousen, e~t as system provides a high level of security, making it difficult and expensive for a pirate to reproduce the working key.
other selective subscription descrambling systems are disclosed in ~ilhousen, et al U.S.
Patents 4,712,238 and 4,792,973. These patents provide improved systems.for enabling descrambling of a received scrambled signal on an impulse-purchase basis. U.S. Patemt 4,634,808 to Moerder discloses a system for reproducing a key signal in a descrambler that is unique to the descrambler, and was used in encrypting a key signal that must be decrypted for use in descrambling a television signal. However, no security system is unbreakable, and determined pirates can be expected to ultimately prevail.
Tt would be advantageous to provide an improved system in which security can be economically upgraded after a breach. It would be furtYaer advantageous if the security upgrades could be made in the field lay the simple replacement of a relatively low cost security element containing a new security algorithm. The security element should be replaceable by a subscriber in his home without any need for a visit from service personnel.
It would also be advantageous to protect ttie interface between the subscriber's descrambler and the replaceable security element, so that others could not easi7.y manufacture their own security elements to defeat the system or to use the descrambler for other unauthorized purposes. If the wrong security element .is installed, the descrambler must not work.
The present invention provides an upe~radeable security system, an information processor, and a replaceable security element that enjoy 'the aforementioned advantages.
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Tn accordance with the present invention, a field upgradeable security system is,provided for deciphering signals received from a communication network. An information processor includes a receptacle for receiving a replaceable security elamewt. The replaceable security element includes means for generating a working key, means for encrypting the working key with a secret key, and means for communicating the encrypted working key to the information processor. The information processor decrypts the encrypted working key for use in deciphering a received communication signal..
Tn a preferred embodiment, the secret key comprises a first authentication key associated with the information processor. the first authentication key is securely communicated to the security element for use in encrypting the caorking key. A second authentication key is associated with the security ~0 element. Means are provided for securely communicating the second authentication key to the information processor. The security element then encrypts the working key with both 'the first and second authentication keys.
The information processor can further comprise a first unit key associated therewith and means for receiving the second authentication key encrypted under the first unit key. Means are provided for decrypting the received second authewtication key VJ
for subsequent use in decrypting the working key.
Similarly, the security element can comprise a second unit key associated therewith and means for receiving the first authentication key encrypted under the second unit key. The rece~.ved first authentication key is decrypted by the security element for subsequent use in encrypting the working key prior to communicating it to the information processor.
Tn order to generate the working key, the security element requires input data that can be securely communicated to it via the information processor. The informatx.on .processor receives the data in an encrypted form from a °°trusted center", decrypts it at least in part, and then further encrypts it for communication to the security element. In a preferred embodiment, the data is received by the information processor encrypted under at least the second unit key, and communicated from the information processor to the security element under the second unit key and at least one of the authentication keys.
In another embodiment, a replaceable security element is provided for use in combination with era z5 information processor having a secret cryptographic key. The security element receives data for use z.n generating a working lr.ey. ~.Clae security e~.emewt:
receives the secret key via an encrypted communication, and decrypts the secret key for use in encrypting the working key. The encrypted working key is 'than communicated to the information processor by the security element for use in processing an information signal. In a preferred implementation, the secret key is received by the security element encrypted under a unit key associated therewith. An additional cryptographic key may be associated with the security element, and the working key may be encrypted with both the secret and additional keys. The data received by the security element for use in generating the working key may also be encrypted under at least one of 'the secret and unit keys. :In this event, the security element comprises means for decrypting the received data.
An information processor is provided for use in combination with a replaceable security element.
Means are provided within the information processor for receiving the security element. A secret cryptographic key is associated with and stored in the information processor. Means are provided far receiving a working key, encrypted under the secrwt:
key, from the security elemewt. The received working key is decrypted and used to process an information signal. Tn a preferred embodiment, an additional cryptographic 3cey associated with the security element is received and stored. ~.L'he received working key is encrypted under the secret key and the additional key for decryption and use by the information ,processor.
%~~
The information processor can also include means for receiving data for use by the security element in generating the working key. Means are provided for communicating the data to the security element. Means may also be provided for encrypting the data under one or both of the secret and additional keys before it is communicated to the security element.
Tkae information processor can further comprise means for receiving and storing characteristic information (e.g., an address) identifying the security element and means for screening the received data, on the basis of the characteristic information, for selective communication to the security element. The information signal processed by the information processor can comprise a scrambled communication signal to be descrambled.
Means can be provided for enabling and disabling the security element in response to a received control ~0 signal, and for descrambling eommunica~tion signals according to a default descrambling algorithm ira the absence of an enabled security element.
b>~ . v ~'~ ~~ ~~ ~:~ ~ ~3 a~
Figure 1 is a block diagram illustrating an information processor and replaceable security e7.ement in accardance with the present invention;
k'igure 2 is a diagram illustrating the information flaw to 'the informatian processor and the security element during initialization of a new security elements and Figure 3 is a diagram illustrating the information flow of data to the information processor and security element and the communication of the encrypted working key from the security element to the information processor in accordance with the present inventions The present invention provides a system for recovering from security compromises in an information processing system, such as a satellite television communication network. Ifi an illustrated 5 embodiment, a replaceable security element is coupled to a satellite television descrambler for use in generating working keys that are subsequently communicated to the descrambler to enable the descrambling of received signals. The security 10 element is a relatively low cost device that is replaced with a new security element operating with a different security algorithm each time a prior security element on its algorithm has been breached.
The security element can comprise, for example, a credit card sized "smart card" or a cartridge containing a microprocessor based working key generator together with various supporting components.
Turning to Figure 1, an information processor ("module") generally designated 10 is provided. Information processor 10 can comprise a descrambler module such as the VideoCipher II Plus'D°
descrambler module manufactured by General Instrument Corporation for use in connection with the VideoCipher line of satellite receivers.
Information processor 10 includes all of the components of the VideoCipher II Plus' descrambler module, including a microprocessor 14 and ROM 16 for storing program instructions for the microprocessor.
A cryptographic processor ("crypto") 24 is also provided in the VideoCipher II Pluses descrambler module, coupled to microprocessor 14 via bus 18, for effecting signal descrambling on the basis of a working key signal as set forth in the aforementioned Gilhousen, et al U.S. Patent 4,613,901.
In accordance with the present invention, information processor 10 also includes several new components. These are a key and address random access memory ("RAM") 20 and a message filter and interface circuit 22. Key and address RAM 20 stores a secret key for the information processor and a unique address assigned to a security element generally designated 12.
Message filter and interface 22 uses the security element address stored in RAM 20 to determine what messages received from the communication network (e. g., satellite television system) at input terminal 11 are specifically addressed to security element 12. The message filter discards all messages not intended for its associated security element 12.
It should be appreciated that other methods exist for providing messages to specific security elements. For example, data sent to a security element by a trusted center can be communicated to the associated information processor with instructions for passing the data on to the security element. The data itself can be encrypted under the information processor unit key to prevent its use by any other information processor and security element combination.
Information processor 10 and security element 12 are connected via signal path 26 and their respective interfaces 22, 36. Signals flowing from information processor i0 to security element 12 include 'the data required by the security element to generate working keys and data identifying a secret "authentication" key uniquely associated with the information processor. In a preferred embodiment, security element 12 also has its own authentication key, which can be preloaded upon manufacture or subsequently received by the security element via path 26 from data input to the information processor at terminal 11. The working keys required by crypto 24 to descramble an information (e. g., television) signal are also communicated over path 26, from security element 12 to information processor 10.
Tn accordance with the present invention, the working keys are encrypted by security element 12 with the secret authentication )cey of information processor 10. The encryption of the working keys with the information processor's secret key provides a substantial advantage in the presewt system. In particular, a security element that does not know the information processor's secret authentication key will be unable to properly encrypt working keys for txse by crypto 24. Fven if a security element were provided that could generate the necessary worlcing keys, there would be no way to intelligibly 'transfer the working keys to the infor~na~tion processor without knowledge of the secret key. Any information that an improper security element transferred to information processor 10 withowt encryption under the secret key would be processed by crypto 24, but would not result in a properly descrambled signal. Therefore, there is no need to disable information processor ~.p if an unauthorised security element is connected to it. If the wrong security element is installed, the system simply 1o will not work.
Security element 12 includes a cryptographic processor 34 that operates in combination with a microprocessor "working key generator" 28 to provide the working keys. Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the functions of working key generator 28 and cryptographic processor 34 can be provided in a single microprocessor. Data for generating the working keys, which can comprise, for example, a category key and program key transmitted by a trusted center as disclosed in the aforementioned U.S. Patent 4,613,901, is preferably received via path 26 in an encrypted Norm. Crypto 34 decrypts the encrypted data and passes it to working key generator 28 via bus 32. Program instructions containing the security algorithm used by working key generator 28 are stored in Rohl 30.
It is noted that the security a:Lgorithm could alternately be contained in special purpose trardware ~tha~t is part. of 'the working key generator. .An example of a known security algorithm is the DES
algorithm previously mentioned. New security algorithms will be developed for each version of security element that is used to replace a prior version breached by a pirate. In this manner, each time a pirate breaks a system, all that the system operator has to do is to send out new security elements to all authorized subscribers. The subscribers replace the old security element with the new one, and once the existing subscriber base has been upgraded all signals for the breached system are terminated. A pirate will then have to break the new system, at which time it will be replaced by a subsequent system.
During the transition from an old security system to a new security system, authorization signals can be transmitted for both systems. Alternately, crypto 24 in information processor 10 can resort to a default descrambling algorithm until all subscriber units have been upgraded. The default algorithm can be one previously used in existing VideoCipher II Plus descrambler modules.
Nonvolatile memory (e. g., key RAM 38) is provided in security element 12 to store the secret authentication key of information processor 10 for use by crypto 34, e.g., in encrypting the working keys prior to transmission via interface 36 and path 26 to information processor 10. Key RAM 38 will also store any other keys necessary in the specific implementation used by security element 12, such as a unique unit key and/or authentication lc.ey associated with the security element. :Power for security element 12 can be provided by a battery contained 'therein or from a power supply in information processor 10 via path 2~.
When it becomes necessary to implement a security upgrade, each subscriber is provided with a new security element. Upon installation of the new security element, an initialization routine takes place. This can be effected, for example, by instructing the subscriber to call a toll free telephone number to enable 'the receipt of an initialization message from a trLls'ted center via 'the satellite receiver. This is referred to as "remote initialization". Alternately, the security element andfor information processor can be programmed to automatically request (e. g., via a telephone modem) remote initialization upon installation of a new security element. :fin a different embodiment, the security element is pre-initialized with the necessary initialization data by the system operator prior to sending it to 'the subscriber.
The flow of information to the information processor and security element during remote initialization is illustrated in Figure 2. At ini~tializa~tion, the cryptographic processor 2,4 of information processor 10 will receive a message instructing it to ga into security elemc-ant support as~~~~~t~~
z s ~~ r mode. Tf the specific implementation provides for message filtering by 'the information processor on the basis of a security element address, the security element's address (SE address) will also be received. Tn addition, a security element authentication key (A(C)) encrypted under a unit key (U(M)) uniquely assigned to the information processor will be received. These signals are indicated at box 40.
Crypto 24 will decrypt the security element°s authentication key and store it in secure RAM 20.
Tt will also store the security element's address in RAM 20 if required for subsequent message filtering.
The remote initialization message will also ~.5 contain a unit addressed message to crypto processor 34 of security element 12 containing the information processor's secret authentication key (A(M)) encrypted under~a unit key (U(C)) assigned to the security element. In the event remote initialization is not used, all of the necessary initialization data will be loaded into the security element prior to forwarding it to the subscriber.
Tmmediately,after initialization, the data necessary to enable the security element to generate the working keys required by crypto 24 will be transmitted via satellite or other means (e. g., telephone), to enable authorized television signals to be descrambled. Tn the event remote in9.~tialization is not used, information not frequently broadcast (i.e., the category key) can be sent ahead of time and stored by the information processor for later transfer to the security element.
An information processor can be remotely placed into "stand alone" mode, for use without security element 12. In this mode, it will operate functionally in the same manner as known VideoCipher II Pluses descrambler modules, except that in remote initialization situations, it will always look for security element initialization messages that are addressed to it.
When the information processor receives a remote initialization message to enable security element support mode, it must decrypt the security element's authentication key (A(C)) and store it in nonvolatile secure memory (e.g., key and address RAM 20) as indicated at box 42 of Figure 2. The information processor must also store the security element's unit address in nonvolatile memory 20, for implementations where security element addressable message filtering is provided. It will then pass its own authentication key (A(M)) encrypted by the security element unit key (U(C)) to the security element, which will decrypt the module authentication key and store it in key RAM 38 as indicated at box 44. Crypto 24 will then function in security element support mode.
When crypts ~4 is in security element support mode, its funotional.i~ty changes. :C~:. will receive and process messages far both itself and fox crypts 34 of the security element, and will also receive and process 'the data needed by the security element far use in generating the working keys. If -the information processor receives a message to return to stand alone mode, it will do sa and disable the security element interface.
In a preferred embodiment, all secure values that cross the interface between the information processor and security element are encrypted (or decrypted) by the authentication keys of both 'the information praeessor and the security element. 1'he status of the secure values passed 'to the in.farmation processor and between the infarmatian processor and the security elememt are illa.astrated in Figure 3. ~1s can be seen, when information processor 10 receives a "category key" ("GIC") resessage (bores 50, 52), which key is part of the data used by the security element to generate working keys, it must decrypt the exacrypted category key (EutM'Du<u> (CK) ) using its own unit key (U (M) ) . and then it must decrypt the result under its own authentication key (A(M)) (which is known to the security element) before passing this field out 'to the security element (bn~c 54). mhe second decryption (Dp(ht) (~ucc~ (C~) ) ) is used to protect data and is not actually doing tkie :i.x~verse of a previous encrypt.
In a similar manner, the information processor must decrypt the category encrypted program keys (EcK(PIC)), which are used by the security elemewt to generate working keys, by both its awthentication key (A(M)) and the security element's authentication key (A(C)) before communicating the message to security element 12. This is depicted at box 54.
A frame count message (additional data used in generating the working keys) goes out to the security element without encryption as indicated at box 54.
The only values that are communicated by the security element to 'the information processor, as indicated at trae outpwt of box 56, are encrypted working keys. As shown, the working keys are encrypted under both the security element's authentication key (A(C)) and the information processor's authentication key (A(M)). Information processor crypto 24 must decrypt 'the working keys by its own authentication key and then by the security element's authewtication key. Tt then passes the clear working key to initialize key stream generation in a conwemtional manner. Since the working key is receiued by crypto 24 encrypted by the information processor°s secret authentication key, there is no way to breach the interface wit:kZaut knowledge of the secret authentication lcey. When in the security element support mode, the informat:Lon processor crypto 24 must always decrypt incoming working keys.
a As should be apparent, the only fob of the security element is 'to produce encrypted working keys. Because of its limited funct.i.onality, it can be manufactured at a l.ow cost. The derivation of 5 working keys from the data forwarded to 'the security element will depend on the particular security algorithm used. 'this algorithm should be different for every version of the security element, to maintain the difficulty of breaking each new 10 version.
Tt should now be appreciated that 'the present invention provides a field upgradeable security system that can be used for deciphering signals received from a communication network. As one 15 version of security is breached, a new version is implemented by replacing loca cost security elements that provide working keys to an information processor. Ttae working keys are communicated fram the security element to the information processor in 20 an encrypted form under a secret key known only ~to the information processor and an awthorized security element. In order to obtain the secret key, the unit key of the security element must be correct, since the secret key is communicated to the security element encrypted under the unit key.
Although the invention has been described in connection with a specific embodimewt thereof, those skilled irz the art will appreciate that numerous ~~~~a~~' adaptations and modifications may be made thereto, withotx~t departing from the spirit and ucope of the invention, as set forth in the fol7.owing claims.
Claims (36)
PROPERTY OR PRIVILEGE IS CLAIMED ARE DEFINED AS FOLLOWS:
1. A field upgradeable security system for processing signals comprising:
an information processor (10) having:
a receptacle (26) for receiving a replaceable security element (12):
means (11) for receiving data in an encrypted form;
means (14,20,24) for at least partially decrypting the received data; and means (22,26) for communicating the at least partially decrypted, received data to said security element for use in generating a working key;
said replaceable security element (12) including:
means (28) for generating said working key;
means (34) for encrypting said working key with a secret key; and means (36,26) for communicating the encrypted working key to said information processor for decryption and use in processing a signal.
an information processor (10) having:
a receptacle (26) for receiving a replaceable security element (12):
means (11) for receiving data in an encrypted form;
means (14,20,24) for at least partially decrypting the received data; and means (22,26) for communicating the at least partially decrypted, received data to said security element for use in generating a working key;
said replaceable security element (12) including:
means (28) for generating said working key;
means (34) for encrypting said working key with a secret key; and means (36,26) for communicating the encrypted working key to said information processor for decryption and use in processing a signal.
2. A system in accordance with claim 1 wherein said information processor comprises:
means (14,20,20 for further encrypting said data before communicating it to said security element.
means (14,20,20 for further encrypting said data before communicating it to said security element.
3. A system in accordance with claim 2 wherein:
said secret key comprises a first authentication key (A(M)) assigned to said information processor;
said means for further encrypting encrypts said data under said first authentication key before communicating it to said security element; and said security element includes means for decrypting said data with said first authentication key.
said secret key comprises a first authentication key (A(M)) assigned to said information processor;
said means for further encrypting encrypts said data under said first authentication key before communicating it to said security element; and said security element includes means for decrypting said data with said first authentication key.
4. A system in accordance with claim 3 wherein:
said security element includes a second authentication key (A(C)) assigned thereto; and said means for further encrypting encrypts said data under said second authentication key and said first authentication key before communicating it to said security element.
said security element includes a second authentication key (A(C)) assigned thereto; and said means for further encrypting encrypts said data under said second authentication key and said first authentication key before communicating it to said security element.
5. A system in accordance with claim 2 wherein:
said security element includes an authentication key (A(C)) assigned thereto; and said means for further encrypting encrypts said data under said authentication key before communicating it to said security element.
said security element includes an authentication key (A(C)) assigned thereto; and said means for further encrypting encrypts said data under said authentication key before communicating it to said security element.
6. A system in accordance with claim 1 wherein:
said data is received by the information processor encrypted under a first unit key (U(M)) assigned to said information processor and a second unit key (U(C)) assigned to said security element;
said information processor partially decrypts said data with said first unit key;
the partially decrypted data is communicated to said security element still encrypted under said second unit key; and said security element decrypts said data with said second unit key for use in generating said working key.
said data is received by the information processor encrypted under a first unit key (U(M)) assigned to said information processor and a second unit key (U(C)) assigned to said security element;
said information processor partially decrypts said data with said first unit key;
the partially decrypted data is communicated to said security element still encrypted under said second unit key; and said security element decrypts said data with said second unit key for use in generating said working key.
7. A system in accordance with claim 6 wherein:
said secret key comprises a first authentication key (A(M)) assigned to said information processor;
said information processor comprises means for further encrypting said data under said first authentication key before communicating it to said security element; and said security element includes means for decrypting said data with said first authentication key.
said secret key comprises a first authentication key (A(M)) assigned to said information processor;
said information processor comprises means for further encrypting said data under said first authentication key before communicating it to said security element; and said security element includes means for decrypting said data with said first authentication key.
8. A system in accordance with claim wherein:
said security element includes a second authentication key (A(C)) assigned thereto; and said means for further encrypting encrypts said data under said second authentication key before communicating it to said security element.
said security element includes a second authentication key (A(C)) assigned thereto; and said means for further encrypting encrypts said data under said second authentication key before communicating it to said security element.
9. A system in accordance with claim 6 wherein:
said security element includes an authentication key (A(C)) assigned thereto; and said information processor comprises means for encrypting said data under said authentication key before communicating it to said security element.
said security element includes an authentication key (A(C)) assigned thereto; and said information processor comprises means for encrypting said data under said authentication key before communicating it to said security element.
10. A system in accordance with claim 1 wherein said security element further comprises:
an authentication key (A(C)) assigned thereto; and means for encrypting said working key with said authentication key in addition to said secret key for communication to said information processor;
wherein said information processor includes means for decrypting said working key with both said authentication key and said secret key.
an authentication key (A(C)) assigned thereto; and means for encrypting said working key with said authentication key in addition to said secret key for communication to said information processor;
wherein said information processor includes means for decrypting said working key with both said authentication key and said secret key.
11. A field upgradeable security system for processing signals comprising:
an information processor (10) having a secret first authentication key (A(M)) assigned thereto aced a receptacle (26) for receiving a replaceable security element (12);
said replaceable security element including:
a second authentication key (A(C)) assigned thereto, means (28) for generating a working key, means (34) for encrypting said working key with said first authentication key and said second authentication key, and means (36,26) for communicating the encrypted working key to said information processor;
wherein said information processor includes:
means (14,20,24) for decrypting the encrypted working key for use in processing a signal.
an information processor (10) having a secret first authentication key (A(M)) assigned thereto aced a receptacle (26) for receiving a replaceable security element (12);
said replaceable security element including:
a second authentication key (A(C)) assigned thereto, means (28) for generating a working key, means (34) for encrypting said working key with said first authentication key and said second authentication key, and means (36,26) for communicating the encrypted working key to said information processor;
wherein said information processor includes:
means (14,20,24) for decrypting the encrypted working key for use in processing a signal.
12. A system in accordance with claim 11 wherein said security element includes:
a unit key (U(C)) assigned thereto;
means (26,36) for receiving data from said information processor encrypted under said unit key;
and means (34) for decrypting said data with said unit key fox use in generating said working key.
a unit key (U(C)) assigned thereto;
means (26,36) for receiving data from said information processor encrypted under said unit key;
and means (34) for decrypting said data with said unit key fox use in generating said working key.
13. A system in accordance with claim 12 wherein:
said information processor comprises means (14,20,24) for encrypting said data under said first authentication key before communicating it to said security element; and said security element includes means (34) for decrypting said data with both said unit key and said first authentication key.
said information processor comprises means (14,20,24) for encrypting said data under said first authentication key before communicating it to said security element; and said security element includes means (34) for decrypting said data with both said unit key and said first authentication key.
14. A system in accordance with claim 13 wherein:
said information processor comprises means (14,20,24) for encrypting said data under said second authentication key before communicating it to said security element; and said security element includes means (34) for decrypting said data with said unit key, said first authentication key, and said second authentication key.
said information processor comprises means (14,20,24) for encrypting said data under said second authentication key before communicating it to said security element; and said security element includes means (34) for decrypting said data with said unit key, said first authentication key, and said second authentication key.
15. A system in accordance with claim 12 wherein:
said information processor comprises means (14,20,24) for encrypting said data under said second authentication key before communicating it to said security element; and said security element includes means (34) for decrypting said data with said unit key and said second authentication key.
said information processor comprises means (14,20,24) for encrypting said data under said second authentication key before communicating it to said security element; and said security element includes means (34) for decrypting said data with said unit key and said second authentication key.
16. A system in accordance with claim 11 wherein:
said information processor comprises means (14,20,24) for encrypting said data under said first authentication key before communicating it to said security element; and said security element includes means (34) for decrypting said data with said first authentication key fox use in generating said working key.
said information processor comprises means (14,20,24) for encrypting said data under said first authentication key before communicating it to said security element; and said security element includes means (34) for decrypting said data with said first authentication key fox use in generating said working key.
17. A system in accordance with claim 16 wherein:
said information processor comprises means (14,20,24) for encrypting said data under said second authentication key before communicating it to said security element; and said security element includes means (34) for decrypting said data with said first authentication key and said second authentication key,
said information processor comprises means (14,20,24) for encrypting said data under said second authentication key before communicating it to said security element; and said security element includes means (34) for decrypting said data with said first authentication key and said second authentication key,
18. A system in accordance with claim 11 wherein:
said information processor comprises means (14,20,24) for encrypting said data under said second authentication key before communicating it to said security element; and said security element includes means (34) for decrypting said data with said second authentication key.
said information processor comprises means (14,20,24) for encrypting said data under said second authentication key before communicating it to said security element; and said security element includes means (34) for decrypting said data with said second authentication key.
29 1.9. A replaceable security element, for use in combination with an information processor having a secret cryptographic key, comprising:
means (28) for generating a working key for use by said information processor in processing a signal;
means (26,36) for receiving said secret key;
means (34) for encrypting said working key with said secret key and an authentication key (A(C)) associated with said replaceable security element; and means (36,26) for communicating the encrypted working key to said information processor.
means (28) for generating a working key for use by said information processor in processing a signal;
means (26,36) for receiving said secret key;
means (34) for encrypting said working key with said secret key and an authentication key (A(C)) associated with said replaceable security element; and means (36,26) for communicating the encrypted working key to said information processor.
20. A security element in accordance with claim 19 further comprising:
means (26,36) for receiving data encrypted under a unit key (U(C)) assigned to said security element, and means (34) for decrypting the encrypted data with said unit key for use in generating said working key.
means (26,36) for receiving data encrypted under a unit key (U(C)) assigned to said security element, and means (34) for decrypting the encrypted data with said unit key for use in generating said working key.
21. A security element in accordance with claim 20 wherein said data is received encrypted under said unit key and said secret key, and said decrypting means decrypt the encrypted data with both said unit key and said secret key for use in generating said working key.
22. A security element in accordance with claim 21 wherein said data is received encrypted under said unit key, said secret key, and said authentication key, and said decrypting means decrypt the encrypted data with said unit key, said secret key and said authentication key for use in generating said working key.
23. A security element in accordance with claim 20 wherein said data is received encrypted under said unit key and said authentication key, and said decrypting means decrypt the encrypted data with said unit key and said authentication key for use in generating said working key.
24. A security element in accordance with claim 19 further comprising:
means (26,36) for receiving data encrypted under said secret key, and means (34) for decrypting the encrypted data with said secret key for use in generating said working key.
means (26,36) for receiving data encrypted under said secret key, and means (34) for decrypting the encrypted data with said secret key for use in generating said working key.
25. A security element in accordance with claim 24 wherein said data is received encrypted under said secret key and said authentication key, and said decrypting means decrypt the encrypted data with said secret key and said authentication key for use in generating said working key.
26. A security element in accordance with claim 19 further comprising:
means for receiving data encrypted under said authentication key, and means for decrypting the encrypted data with said authentication key for use in generating said working key.
means for receiving data encrypted under said authentication key, and means for decrypting the encrypted data with said authentication key for use in generating said working key.
27. An information processor, for use in combination with a replaceable security element, comprising:
an interface (22,26) for receiving a replaceable security element;
means (11) for receiving data in an encrypted form;
means (14,20,24) for partially decrypting the received data; and means (14,22,26) for communicating the partially decrypted, received data via said interface to said security element for use in generating a working key.
an interface (22,26) for receiving a replaceable security element;
means (11) for receiving data in an encrypted form;
means (14,20,24) for partially decrypting the received data; and means (14,22,26) for communicating the partially decrypted, received data via said interface to said security element for use in generating a working key.
28. An information processor in accordance with claim 27 comprising:
means (14,20,24) for further encrypting said partially decrypted data before communicating it to said security element.
means (14,20,24) for further encrypting said partially decrypted data before communicating it to said security element.
29. An information processor in accordance with claim 28 further comprising:
a secret key (A(M)) assigned to said information processor;
wherein said partially decrypted data is further encrypted under said secret key before communicating it to said security element.
a secret key (A(M)) assigned to said information processor;
wherein said partially decrypted data is further encrypted under said secret key before communicating it to said security element.
30. An information processor in accordance with claim 29 wherein:
said partially decrypted data is further encrypted under an authentication key (A(C)) assigned to said security element before communicating it to said security element.
said partially decrypted data is further encrypted under an authentication key (A(C)) assigned to said security element before communicating it to said security element.
31. An information processor in accordance with claim 28 wherein:
said partially decrypted data is further encrypted under an authentication key (A(M)) assigned to said security element before communicating it to said security element.
said partially decrypted data is further encrypted under an authentication key (A(M)) assigned to said security element before communicating it to said security element.
32. An information processor in accordance with claim 27 wherein:
said data is received encrypted under a first unit key (U(M)) assigned to said information processor and a second unit key (U(C)) assigned to said security element;
said information processor partially decrypts said data with said first unit key; and the partially decrypted data is communicated to said security element still encrypted under said second unit key.
said data is received encrypted under a first unit key (U(M)) assigned to said information processor and a second unit key (U(C)) assigned to said security element;
said information processor partially decrypts said data with said first unit key; and the partially decrypted data is communicated to said security element still encrypted under said second unit key.
33. An information processor in accordance with claim 32 further comprising:
a secret key (A(M)) assigned to said information processor; and means (14,20,24) for further encrypting said partially decrypted data under said secret key before communicating it to said security element.
a secret key (A(M)) assigned to said information processor; and means (14,20,24) for further encrypting said partially decrypted data under said secret key before communicating it to said security element.
34. An information processor in accordance with claim 33 wherein:
said partially decrypted data is further encrypted under an authentication key (A(C)) assigned to said security element before communicating it to said security element.
said partially decrypted data is further encrypted under an authentication key (A(C)) assigned to said security element before communicating it to said security element.
35. An information processor in accordance with claim 32 wherein:
said partially decrypted data is further encrypted under an authentication key (A(C)) assigned to said security element before communicating it to said security element.
said partially decrypted data is further encrypted under an authentication key (A(C)) assigned to said security element before communicating it to said security element.
36. An information processor, for use in combination with a replaceable security element, comprising:
means (22,26) for receiving a working key from said replaceable security element (12), said working key encrypted with a first authentication key (A(M)) assigned to said information processor and a second authentication key (A(C)) assigned to said security element, and means (14,20,24) for decrypting the encrypted working key for use in processing a signal.
means (22,26) for receiving a working key from said replaceable security element (12), said working key encrypted with a first authentication key (A(M)) assigned to said information processor and a second authentication key (A(C)) assigned to said security element, and means (14,20,24) for decrypting the encrypted working key for use in processing a signal.
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| US07/568,990 | 1990-08-17 | ||
| US07/568,990 US5111504A (en) | 1990-08-17 | 1990-08-17 | Information processing apparatus with replaceable security element |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CA2049083A1 CA2049083A1 (en) | 1992-02-18 |
| CA2049083C true CA2049083C (en) | 2000-01-25 |
Family
ID=24273628
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CA002049083A Expired - Lifetime CA2049083C (en) | 1990-08-17 | 1991-08-13 | Information processing apparatus with replaceable security element |
Country Status (11)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| US (1) | US5111504A (en) |
| EP (1) | EP0471373B1 (en) |
| JP (1) | JP2930149B2 (en) |
| KR (1) | KR100188425B1 (en) |
| AT (1) | ATE185461T1 (en) |
| AU (1) | AU632704B2 (en) |
| CA (1) | CA2049083C (en) |
| DE (1) | DE69131680T2 (en) |
| ES (1) | ES2137923T3 (en) |
| IE (1) | IE912876A1 (en) |
| NO (1) | NO179160C (en) |
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-
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-
1991
- 1991-08-13 CA CA002049083A patent/CA2049083C/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1991-08-13 AU AU82412/91A patent/AU632704B2/en not_active Ceased
- 1991-08-14 IE IE287691A patent/IE912876A1/en not_active IP Right Cessation
- 1991-08-15 NO NO913191A patent/NO179160C/en unknown
- 1991-08-16 ES ES91113757T patent/ES2137923T3/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1991-08-16 JP JP3229670A patent/JP2930149B2/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1991-08-16 EP EP91113757A patent/EP0471373B1/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1991-08-16 DE DE69131680T patent/DE69131680T2/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 1991-08-16 AT AT91113757T patent/ATE185461T1/en not_active IP Right Cessation
- 1991-08-17 KR KR1019910014191A patent/KR100188425B1/en not_active IP Right Cessation
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| NO913191D0 (en) | 1991-08-15 |
| EP0471373A2 (en) | 1992-02-19 |
| NO179160C (en) | 1996-08-14 |
| US5111504A (en) | 1992-05-05 |
| CA2049083A1 (en) | 1992-02-18 |
| AU8241291A (en) | 1992-02-20 |
| JPH04288743A (en) | 1992-10-13 |
| NO913191L (en) | 1992-02-18 |
| KR920005645A (en) | 1992-03-28 |
| EP0471373A3 (en) | 1992-07-29 |
| IE912876A1 (en) | 1992-02-26 |
| JP2930149B2 (en) | 1999-08-03 |
| EP0471373B1 (en) | 1999-10-06 |
| DE69131680D1 (en) | 1999-11-11 |
| KR100188425B1 (en) | 1999-06-01 |
| AU632704B2 (en) | 1993-01-07 |
| ATE185461T1 (en) | 1999-10-15 |
| ES2137923T3 (en) | 2000-01-01 |
| DE69131680T2 (en) | 2000-05-11 |
| NO179160B (en) | 1996-05-06 |
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| EEER | Examination request | ||
| MKEX | Expiry | ||
| MKEX | Expiry |
Effective date: 20110813 |