CA2115435C - Method for personalisation of an active card - Google Patents

Method for personalisation of an active card

Info

Publication number
CA2115435C
CA2115435C CA002115435A CA2115435A CA2115435C CA 2115435 C CA2115435 C CA 2115435C CA 002115435 A CA002115435 A CA 002115435A CA 2115435 A CA2115435 A CA 2115435A CA 2115435 C CA2115435 C CA 2115435C
Authority
CA
Canada
Prior art keywords
card
data
central computer
key
active
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Fee Related
Application number
CA002115435A
Other languages
French (fr)
Other versions
CA2115435A1 (en
Inventor
Tomas Julin
Bjorn Almgren
Leif Sandberg
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Individual
Original Assignee
Individual
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Individual filed Critical Individual
Publication of CA2115435A1 publication Critical patent/CA2115435A1/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of CA2115435C publication Critical patent/CA2115435C/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Fee Related legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06Authentication
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/22Payment schemes or models
    • G06Q20/229Hierarchy of users of accounts
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/355Personalisation of cards for use
    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07FCOIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0853Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/30Security of mobile devices; Security of mobile applications
    • H04W12/35Protecting application or service provisioning, e.g. securing SIM application provisioning

Abstract

Personalisation of an active so-called SIM card (11) for a mobile telephone system of GSM type is effected in a place (3) connected to the central computer (1) of the system via a communication network (2). The card identity IMSI and the card authentication key Ki are transferred in line-encrypted form (DES) to terminal equipment (9) in said place, where the card (11) is inserted in a reader (10). After line decryption (12, 13), the result thereof is transferred to the card in a manner to prevent unauthorised listening-in. This can be done in a safety box or by double encryption (A3/A8) of IMSI and Ki, the decryption thereof being performed within the card by means of a unique card key Ksim.

Description

' 1 21 15435 TITLE OF THE INVENTION
Method for personalisation of an active card TECHNICAL FIELD
The present invention relates to a method for personalisation of an active subscriber card, a so-called SIM card, for use in a mobile telephone system, comprising a central computer, the unique identity of the card, so-called ISMI, and the unique authentication key of the card, so-called Ki, being stored in the card from the central computer. The invention is especially applicable to a mobile telephone system of GSM type and will be described in more detail with reference thereto, although it is obvious that the invention is also applicable to other mobile telephone systems of similar type.

TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
In mobile telephone systems, in which the mobile units are controlled by active cards assigned to the subscribers, the personalisation of the respective card constitutes an essential procedure which is safeguarded by rigorous security measures and which includes activating the card and loading it with IMSI and Ki, and preferably also a so-called PUK code, (Personal Unblocking Key). It is essential that this loading be effected in a safe manner to prevent unauthorised people from having access thereto.
In view hereof, the personalisation procedure is carried out in a central personalisation place or a customer service place adjacent the central computer, where it is possible to meet the high demands of security.

OBJECT OF THE INVENTION
An object of an aspect of the present invention is to provide a method making it possible, still in a safe manner, to effect the personalisation procedure in other places than the above-mentioned central place, whereby a number of advantages can be gained.

~ W093/07697 2 ~ 1 5 4 3 5 PCT/SE92/~K~
, 2115~3~ 2 SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
The above-mentioned ob~ect is achieved by a method which accordlng to the invention has the features stated in the appended claims.
According to the invention, the storage procedure should thus be carried out when the card is in a persona-lisation place remotely connected to the central computer via a data communication network, especially a retail place, the card being inserted in a reader associated with data terminal equipment connected to the data communica-tion network, IMSI and Xi and preferably also PUK being transferred in line-encrypted form from the central com-puter to the data terminal equipment where line decryption is performed, and the result of the line decryption being transferred to the SIM card in a manner to prevent unauthorised l istening-in .
A distributed personalisation of this type makes it possible to divide up IMSI number series geographically, which is a major advzntage in that the network signalling is simplified or reduced, and also in that the service level towards a new subscriber can be kept very high. In fact, the personalisation can be effected directly and without any waiting times conditioned by the disp~tch of cards, code envelopes etc., from a central place. The direct communication with the central computer also makes it possible to provide for different special services in a rapid and simple manner.
The transfer of the result of the line decryption to the SIM card in a sa'e manner can be carried out in diffe-rent ways.
According to a first conceivable alternative, theline decryption and the result transfer to the SIM card take place in a physically sealed space, into which any attempt of unauthorised intrusion means that relevant information is erased and that the process is interrupted and cannot be continued without spec~al security measures being taken. Mechanical and electronic protection of this r W093/07697 PCT/SE92/0~6 2115~3~
klnd can be achieved by means of a special safety box, in whlch the c~rcuitry concerned is enclosed during the personalisation procedure.
Accordin~ to a second conceivable alternative, the result of the line decryption is transferred to the SIM
card in encrypted form, at least in respect of Ki. This is preferably done by encrypting Ki and preferably also PUX
and optionally IMSI an extra time in the central computer --~ before the line-encrypted transfer to the personalisation place, the result of the line decryption transferred to the SIM card being decrypted within the SIM card by means of a card key Ksim, which has suitably been stored in the -- SIM card in connection with the manufacture thereof. This card key Xsim is preferably unique to the respective card.
15The decryption in the SIM card here takes place advantageously by means of the card key and a secret algo-rithm, especially being the alyor~thm which is intended for encryption/decryption in connection with the regular use of the card in the mobile telephone system, and on which there is information in the central computer. Advan-tageously, the algorithm is of type A3/A8 according to GSM
rPrs~m~ndation .
According to the invention, it is preferred that the central computer before the double encryption calculates the reguired Ksim, using SIM-card identification trans-ferred from the personalisation place, the "master key" by _means of which the SIM card is manufactured and the per-taining algorithm.
It is understood that the central computer may have been separately supplied with information on both said master key and the algorithm concerned for new SIM cards after the manufacture thereof with the card manufacturer.
It is however also possible that the above-mentioned SIM-card identification transferred to the central com-puter may contain such information that the central com-puter can conclude on the basis thereof which master key ~ . , $
~; . .

4 2 ~ ~5435 ~
(among a number of possible ones) and which algorithm (among a number of possible ones) are at issue.
This obviously means that the key Ksim, for enhanced security, can be modified during the continuous s manufacture of the SIM cards.
The above-mentioned SIM-card identification may consist of the serial number of the card, which then can include special fields with information on e.g. master key and/or the algorithm concerned.
It is understood that, for further enhanced security, it is possible to combine the two alternatives described above.
According to the invention, it is further advantageous to control the personalisation procedure by means of an active personalisation card which is inserted in a reader associated with the data terminal equipment and which contains at least parts of the line-encryption function, especially a pertaining key, preferably also the pertaining algorithm.
Anyone who handles the personalisation procedure (e.g. a retailer) can thus have his own unique active card, which can thus be used both for authorisation checks (active and passive authentication), and as an encrypting unit. Everybody can then have an individual encryption key for further enhanced security.
According to one aspect of the invention there is provided a method for programming of an active card for use in a mobile telephone system comprising a central computer, the unique identity of the card and the unique authentication key of the card being stored in the card from the central computer, characterised by carrying out the storage procedure when the card is in a location remotely connected to the central computer via a data communication network, the card being inserted in a reader associated with the data terminal equipment connected to the data communication network; transferring the unique identity of the card and data terminal equipment, where line decryption occurs; and transferring the result of the 4a 2 ~ 1 5 4 3 5 line decryption to the card in a manner to prevent unauthorised intrusion, at least in respect of the unique S authentication key of the card.
According to another aspect of the invention there is provided a method for programming an active card from a remote central computer for use in a mobile telephone system comprising the steps of:
inserting the active card in a card reader associated with a data terminal;
encrypting data respresentative of a unique identity code and a unique authentication key with the remote central computer;
transferring the encrypted data from said remote central computer through a data communication network to the data terminal;
decrypting the encrypted data into card and data at the data terminal; and transferring the card to the active card.
Further features of the invention will appear from the following description of exemplifying embodiments with reference to the accompanying drawings.

2s BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
Fig. 1 is a diagrammatical general view illustrating and embodiment of the method according to the invention.
Fig. 2 is a block diagram which illustrates in more detail the embodiment of Fig. 1.
Fig. 3 is a block diagram illustrating another embodiment of the method according to the invention.

' W093/07697 PCT/SE92/~K~6 2115~35 DESCRIPTIO~ OF EMBODIMENTS
In Fig. 1, reference number 1 designates, in a mobile telephone system, a central computer whlch via a data com-munication network 2 comm~nicates wlth a number of retai-lers 3, 4, 5, 6, and which also ~orm-~nicates with a cus-tomer service place 7.
Each retailer has data terminal e~uipment 9, to which are connected a reader 10 for SIM cards 11 and line-- encryption eguipment 12, 13 consisting of a reader 12 and an active retailer card 13. A keyboard 14 for entering a PIN code in a SIM card concerned is connected to the reader 10.
~ he central computer 1 contains means 15 for calcu-lating Xsim on the basis of card information ICC-ID trans-ferred from the retailer place, means 16 for generatingIMSI, Ki and PUK, means 17 for encrypting the latter ones, using the key Ksim and an A3/A8 algorithm, and means 18 for DES line encryption.
The central computer provides information about PUK
to the customer service place 7, which on a printer 19 prints out a letter 20 with information about this. This letter is sent by post to the customer concerned.
The function according to the invention will now be described in more detail with reference also to Fig. 2.
The systems operator 21 informs the card manufacturer 22 and the central computer 1 about master key, DES and A3/A8 algorithms, and the central computer also about the retailer card key Kl. The card manufacturer calculates Ksim for the respective card in a series to be sent to a certain retailer 3 based on the DES algorithm, the master key and the card serial number. Ksim and the A3/A8 algo-rithm are loaded in the card along with card serial num-bers before the card is sent to the retailer.
From the systems operator, the retailer receives his personal active card 13 with the pertaining entered card key Kl and DES algorithm for the line encryption, about which the central computer thus holds information.

W093/07697 PCT/SE92/~K~6 2115~35 When a retailer is to personalise a new SIM card for a new subscriber, he starts by inserting his active card 13 ln a reader 12 assoclated wlth the retaller termlnal and loss in in customary manner, the active card serving as authentication means (optionally together with a PIN
code which is unique to the retailer and which is inputted on the terminal keyboard), thus verifying the authori-sation of the reta~ler.
A new SIM card 11 is now inserted in the pertaining reader 10, card-$ndentifying information ICC-I~ being transferred from certain fields, preprogrammed during the manufacture of the card, in the SIM card via the retailer terminal 9 and the network 2 to the central computer 1.
Other relevant subscriber data are inputted via the key-board of the terminal and transmitted to the central com-puter for customary checking, etc. If the subscriber is accepted, the number MSISDN selected or accepted by the subscriber is also transmitted to the central computer.
In the central computer, Ksim is calculated on the basis of the information received on master key, serial number and DES algorithm. Ki and PUK are generated as random numbers. IMSI is allocated from the IMSI series prepared for the retailer or the area to which the retai-ler belongs.
IMSI, Xi and PUK are encrypted using Ksim and the selected A3/A8 algorithm. The thus-encrypted IMSI, Ki and PUK and other data to be transferred are thereafter line encrypted using the key Kl and the DES algorithm, and transferred via the data communication network to the retailer terminal, where line decryption occurs using the card key Kl and DES algorithm of the retailer's active card 13.
Via the reader 10, the other data now decrypted can be loaded directly in the SIM card, while IMSI, Ki and 35. PUK, still in encrypted form, are transferred to the SIM
card for decryption therein, using the card key Ksim and the pertaining A3/A8 algorithm. Advantageously, this algo-W093/07697 PCT/SE92/~K~6 rithm is identlcal with the algorithm which ~s intended for the regular use of the card and which is unique to the systems operator and can be varied for different card serles, if deslred.
After decryption, IMSI, K1 and PUK are loaded in the pertaining data field in the SIM card.
Via the PIN keyboard 13, the subscr$ber can hims~lf load an optional PIN code in the SIM card in a strictly - confidential manner. The card is thus ready for use. The PUX code assigned by the central computer is sent to the subscriber by post after a day or two.
The alternative P~ho~i~ent of the invention shown in Fig. 3 differs from that in Figs 1 and 2 by the absence of the double encryption procedure. ~he transfer of Ki, IMSI
and PUK to the SIM card 11 after line decryption, which occurs by means of the retailer card 13 inserted in its reader 12, instead occurs in a protected manner, by the card reader 12 with its card 13 and the SIM card 11 in its reader 10 (connected to the reader 12) being mechanically and electronically protectively enclosed in a safety box 31 during the personalisation procedure.
As readily appreciated by those skilled in the art, the safety box 31 may be designed in many different ways, which also applies to the means which should be provided for interrupting the procedure and erasing sensitive data in the case of an attempted intrusion into the safety box.
It is understood that the two atternatives described above can be combined, if additional security is desired in the retailer place and/or during the transfer via the data communication network.

s

Claims (24)

THE EMBODIMENTS OF THE INVENTION IN WHICH AN EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY OF PRIVILEGE IS CLAIMED ARE DEFINED AS FOLLOWS:
1. Method for programming of an active card for use in a mobile telephone system comprising a central computer, the unique identity of the card and the unique authentication key of the card being stored in the card from the central computer, characterised by carrying out the storage procedure when the card is in a location remotely connected to the central computer via a data communication network, the card being inserted in a reader associated with the data terminal equipment connected to the data communication network; transferring the unique identity of the card and data terminal equipment, where line decryption occurs; and transferring the result of the line decryption to the card in a manner to prevent unauthorised intrusion, at least in respect of the unique authentication key of the card.
2. Method as claimed in claim 1, characterised in that the line decryption and the result transfer to the card are performed in a physically sealed space, such as a safety box, into which any attempt of unauthorised intrusion results in the erasure of relevant information.
3. Method as claimed in claim 1 or 2, characterised in that the result of the line decryption is transferred in encrypted form to the card.
4. Method as claims in claim 3, characterised in that the unique authentication key of the card and preferably also the unique identity of the card are double-encrypted in the central computer before the transfer to said location, the result of the line decryption transferred to said card being decrypted in the card by means of a card key, which has preferably been stored in the card in connection with the manufacture thereof.
5. Method as claimed in claim 4, characterised in that the decryption in the card is performed by means of said card key which is unique to the card, and an algorithm intended for the regular use of the card.
6. Method as claimed in claim 5, characterised in that before the encryption, the central computer calculates said card key, using an identification transferred from said location, the master key with which the card is produced and on which information has been entered in the central computer, and the pertaining algorithm.
7. Method as claimed in any one of the preceding claims, characterised in that it is controlled by means of an active personalisation card which is inserted in a reader pertaining to the data terminal equipment and which contains at least parts of the line-encryption function.
8. Method as claimed in claim 7, characterised in that use is made of a personalisation card with a DES
algorithm,
9. Method as claimed in claim 2 and claim 7 or 8, characterised in that the two readers and the path of communication therebetween are placed in said physically sealed space.
10. Method as claimed in any one of the preceding claims, characterised in that a PIN code is stored in the active card by means of a keyboard pertaining to the data terminal equipment.
11. Method as claimed in any one of the preceding claims, characterised in that a PUK code is transferred from the central computer to the card in the same way as defined for the unique authentication key for the card.
12. A method for programming an active card from a remote central computer for use in a mobile telephone system comprising the steps of :
inserting the active card in a card reader associated with a data terminal;
encrypting data respresentative of a unique identity code and a unique authentication key with the remote central computer;
transferring the encrypted data from said remote central computer through a data communication network to the data terminal;
decrypting the encrypted data into card and data at the data terminal; and transferring the card to the active card.
13. The method of claim 12 comprising the step of performing the steps of decrypting the encrypted data into the card data and transferring the card data to the active card in a physically sealed space wherein an unauthorized intrusion results in the erasure of the data.
14. The method according to claim 12 or 13 wherein the step of decrypting the encrypted data is performed so that the card data comprises second encryption data.
15. The method of claim 14 wherein the unique identity code and the unique authentication key are double encrypted in the remote central computer, and further comprising the step of decrypting the second encryption data in the active card by means of a card key.
16. The method of claim 15 wherein the card key for decrypting the second encryption data in the active card is unique to the card.
17. The method of claim 16 further comprising the step of calculating the unique card key by the remote central computer before encryption, said unique card key be calculated from an identification code from said active card, a master key with which the active card is produced and which information has been entered into the remote central computer, and an algorithm.
18. The method of claim 13 wherein the steps of decrypting the encrypted data into the card data and transferring the card data to the active card in a physically sealed space is performed with two readers and a communication path therebetween.
19. The method of claim 12 wherein said active card controls at least a portion of the encryption by the remote central computer.
20. A method of claim 19 wherein the remote central computer performs the step of encryption with a DES
algorithm.
21. The method of claim 12 wherein the step of encrypting data with the remote central computer further comprises the step of encrypting a personal unblocking key.
22. The method of claim 12 further comprising the step of storing a pin code in the active card by means of a keyboard associated with said data terminal.
23. The method of claim 12 wherein the mobile telephone system is a GSM type.
24. The method of claim 12 wherein the unique identity code is a ISMI.
CA002115435A 1991-09-30 1992-09-23 Method for personalisation of an active card Expired - Fee Related CA2115435C (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
SE9102835A SE468068C (en) 1991-09-30 1991-09-30 Procedure for personalization of an active card, for use in a mobile telephone system
SE9102835-7 1991-09-30

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
CA2115435A1 CA2115435A1 (en) 1993-04-15
CA2115435C true CA2115435C (en) 1998-09-15

Family

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Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
CA002115435A Expired - Fee Related CA2115435C (en) 1991-09-30 1992-09-23 Method for personalisation of an active card

Country Status (13)

Country Link
US (1) US5557679A (en)
EP (1) EP0606408B1 (en)
JP (1) JPH06511125A (en)
AT (1) ATE189351T1 (en)
AU (1) AU661048B2 (en)
CA (1) CA2115435C (en)
DE (2) DE69230618D1 (en)
EE (1) EE9400224A (en)
FI (1) FI940804A (en)
NZ (1) NZ244523A (en)
SE (1) SE468068C (en)
SG (1) SG44338A1 (en)
WO (1) WO1993007697A1 (en)

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EP0606408A1 (en) 1994-07-20
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SE468068B (en) 1992-10-26
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EP0606408B1 (en) 2000-01-26
SE9102835D0 (en) 1991-09-30
FI940804A (en) 1994-02-21
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US5557679A (en) 1996-09-17
SG44338A1 (en) 1997-12-19
JPH06511125A (en) 1994-12-08
AU661048B2 (en) 1995-07-13
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DE606408T1 (en) 1995-03-16
SE9102835L (en) 1992-10-26

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