CA2414789A1 - Wireless networks security system - Google Patents
Wireless networks security system Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CA2414789A1 CA2414789A1 CA002414789A CA2414789A CA2414789A1 CA 2414789 A1 CA2414789 A1 CA 2414789A1 CA 002414789 A CA002414789 A CA 002414789A CA 2414789 A CA2414789 A CA 2414789A CA 2414789 A1 CA2414789 A1 CA 2414789A1
- Authority
- CA
- Canada
- Prior art keywords
- ieee
- unauthorized
- devices
- threatening
- cndot
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Abandoned
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1491—Countermeasures against malicious traffic using deception as countermeasure, e.g. honeypots, honeynets, decoys or entrapment
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1466—Active attacks involving interception, injection, modification, spoofing of data unit addresses, e.g. hijacking, packet injection or TCP sequence number attacks
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
- H04W12/121—Wireless intrusion detection systems [WIDS]; Wireless intrusion prevention systems [WIPS]
- H04W12/122—Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W24/00—Supervisory, monitoring or testing arrangements
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W84/00—Network topologies
- H04W84/02—Hierarchically pre-organised networks, e.g. paging networks, cellular networks, WLAN [Wireless Local Area Network] or WLL [Wireless Local Loop]
- H04W84/10—Small scale networks; Flat hierarchical networks
- H04W84/12—WLAN [Wireless Local Area Networks]
Abstract
An IEEE 802.11 security system for monitoring wireless networks with a view to detecting and locating unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices entering a user's wireless network environment or a facility not intended to support wireless networks is disclosed. The security system comprises a network appliance subsystem and a portable computing subsystem with data means to interface between the two systems. Optionally, counter-measuring means for launching neutralizing and/or disabling counter-measures against a suspected device upon activation can be incorporated into the security system.
A method of operation of the IEEE 802.11 security system is also disclosed.
A method of operation of the IEEE 802.11 security system is also disclosed.
Description
Wireless Networks Security System COPYRIGHT NOTICE AND PERMISSION
A portion of the disclosure of this patent document contains material which is subj ect to copyright protection. The copyright owner has no objection to the facsimile reproduction by anyone of the patent document or the patent disclosure, as it appears in the Patent and Trademark Office patent files or records, but otherwise reserves all copyright rights whatsoever. The following notice shall apply to this document: Copyright ~
2002, Peel Wireless.
FIELD OF THE INVENTION
This invention relates to security automation system directed to IEEE 802.11 a, IEEE
802.1 1b and IEEE 802.11 g (henceforth "IEEE 802.11 ") wireless networks.
1s BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
Wireless communication is undergoing a rapid technological transformation, resulting in vastly increased potential for new services and applications. New transmission techniques known as Wireless Local Area Network WLAN (IEEE 802.1 lb/a/g), Bluetooth and 3ra Generation mobile phones - 3G (UMTS, CDMA2000) represent dramatic changes in wireless 2o service-capabilities. These technologies such as WLAN and 3G bring bandwidth to wireless devices on par with contemporary fixed-line Ethernet solutions available in homes and offices.
As wireless communication gains popularity, a significant demand will unfold for wireless security. Security will need to be enhanced in many different areas:
transmission security, wireless gateway security, transaction authentication (digital signatures) and mobile device security.
WLAN technology offers many advantages in terms of productivity and cost savings, however, it will be constantly exposed to threats. WLAN will be exposed to nevv threats presented by broadcast features of radio carriers: the ability of any device in range to contact or eavesdrop on communications through radio carrier signals. WLANs also make it possible for entities to very easily, possibly accidentally, bypass the contemporary firewalls and routers business has come to rely on. Referring to Figure l, Intruder 100 works to gain access to Network Coverage 102. Intruder 100 comes within a few hundred feet of the WLAN
Access 1 o Point 118 located within Office Building 110 to attempt to "associate" to gain network access or simply monitor traffic. WLAN 112 signals are then subj ect to eavesdropping, masquerade and denial of services by Intruder 100, thus placing Mobile Users 120 and other corporate assets on the Ethernet LAN 114 and Internal Workstations 116 at risk. As a result, wireless devices will require types of security and safeguards beyond those that have been developed for the fixed-line network world.
Intrusion Detection System ("IDS") is an analysis entity on a network that monitors traffic for anomalies that indicate an attempt to compromise the network.
Monitoring can take many forms and spans from low-level inspection of the "source" and "destination" of data, to inspecting the contents of data packets as they travel across the network to monitoring 2o activity on a specific host. An IDS will take this information and compare it to rules and heuristics. A match between a data stream or system operation and a rule may indicate a compromise or attack in progress. The IDS will then react to this information in a wide variety of ways: from sounding alarms to possibly launching automatic network defense counter-measures.
A portion of the disclosure of this patent document contains material which is subj ect to copyright protection. The copyright owner has no objection to the facsimile reproduction by anyone of the patent document or the patent disclosure, as it appears in the Patent and Trademark Office patent files or records, but otherwise reserves all copyright rights whatsoever. The following notice shall apply to this document: Copyright ~
2002, Peel Wireless.
FIELD OF THE INVENTION
This invention relates to security automation system directed to IEEE 802.11 a, IEEE
802.1 1b and IEEE 802.11 g (henceforth "IEEE 802.11 ") wireless networks.
1s BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
Wireless communication is undergoing a rapid technological transformation, resulting in vastly increased potential for new services and applications. New transmission techniques known as Wireless Local Area Network WLAN (IEEE 802.1 lb/a/g), Bluetooth and 3ra Generation mobile phones - 3G (UMTS, CDMA2000) represent dramatic changes in wireless 2o service-capabilities. These technologies such as WLAN and 3G bring bandwidth to wireless devices on par with contemporary fixed-line Ethernet solutions available in homes and offices.
As wireless communication gains popularity, a significant demand will unfold for wireless security. Security will need to be enhanced in many different areas:
transmission security, wireless gateway security, transaction authentication (digital signatures) and mobile device security.
WLAN technology offers many advantages in terms of productivity and cost savings, however, it will be constantly exposed to threats. WLAN will be exposed to nevv threats presented by broadcast features of radio carriers: the ability of any device in range to contact or eavesdrop on communications through radio carrier signals. WLANs also make it possible for entities to very easily, possibly accidentally, bypass the contemporary firewalls and routers business has come to rely on. Referring to Figure l, Intruder 100 works to gain access to Network Coverage 102. Intruder 100 comes within a few hundred feet of the WLAN
Access 1 o Point 118 located within Office Building 110 to attempt to "associate" to gain network access or simply monitor traffic. WLAN 112 signals are then subj ect to eavesdropping, masquerade and denial of services by Intruder 100, thus placing Mobile Users 120 and other corporate assets on the Ethernet LAN 114 and Internal Workstations 116 at risk. As a result, wireless devices will require types of security and safeguards beyond those that have been developed for the fixed-line network world.
Intrusion Detection System ("IDS") is an analysis entity on a network that monitors traffic for anomalies that indicate an attempt to compromise the network.
Monitoring can take many forms and spans from low-level inspection of the "source" and "destination" of data, to inspecting the contents of data packets as they travel across the network to monitoring 2o activity on a specific host. An IDS will take this information and compare it to rules and heuristics. A match between a data stream or system operation and a rule may indicate a compromise or attack in progress. The IDS will then react to this information in a wide variety of ways: from sounding alarms to possibly launching automatic network defense counter-measures.
The IDS is often considered both the first line of defense and the last line of defense in network security. They are sentries on either side of the network perimeter and/or located on host computers intended to look for attempts to penetrate or compromise the network perimeter or a host computer. IEEE 802.11 networks require IDS-like systems specific to the lower MAC layer management element (as defined by the seven layer OSI model).
These services are not present in traditional IDS services. These security services are especially important because of the ease of tapping into wireless networks - simply walk/drive/dig/fly/courier a "probe" within a hundred meters of these networks. Similarly, it is desirable to have IDS-like systems which enable organizations to centrally implement, 1o manage, monitor and maintain wireless security for either clients or employees. These products will be crucial to protection of client and corporate assets.
Due to the wide acceptance of the IEEE 802.11 networks, security products for WLANs operating under these specifications are particularly advantageous. Any such security products must be able to detect the presence of malicious, compromised, malfunctioning or "lost" mobile devices. Such products also need to provide tools to locate and neutralize the unauthorized, compromised, malfunctioning or lost devices, which would otherwise be nearly impossible to locate due to the ease of concealing wireless devices.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
2o This invention addresses the shortcomings of the current security concerns over wireless technologies identified herein.
More particularly, the wireless security system according to the present invention enables users to detect and neutralize unauthorized or defective 802.11 devices and pin-points their physical location so they can be removed before damage is done.
These services are not present in traditional IDS services. These security services are especially important because of the ease of tapping into wireless networks - simply walk/drive/dig/fly/courier a "probe" within a hundred meters of these networks. Similarly, it is desirable to have IDS-like systems which enable organizations to centrally implement, 1o manage, monitor and maintain wireless security for either clients or employees. These products will be crucial to protection of client and corporate assets.
Due to the wide acceptance of the IEEE 802.11 networks, security products for WLANs operating under these specifications are particularly advantageous. Any such security products must be able to detect the presence of malicious, compromised, malfunctioning or "lost" mobile devices. Such products also need to provide tools to locate and neutralize the unauthorized, compromised, malfunctioning or lost devices, which would otherwise be nearly impossible to locate due to the ease of concealing wireless devices.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
2o This invention addresses the shortcomings of the current security concerns over wireless technologies identified herein.
More particularly, the wireless security system according to the present invention enables users to detect and neutralize unauthorized or defective 802.11 devices and pin-points their physical location so they can be removed before damage is done.
The name given to the wireless security technology of the present invention is Wireless Integrity Technology ("WIT"). WIT will automatically detect an unauthorized or defective device entering a WLAN or a facility not intended to support WLAN, and will then monitor this device's activity and locate and neutralize the device. The security services provided by WIT rapidly determine the intentions of a new device. If it begins suspicious or malicious activities, the admini strator is immediately notified. Furthermore, by employing the WIT software in combination with a specially developf:d antenna system, the physical location of the intruding device is precisely established. Additionally, the neutralization capabilities of the system allow for automatic, remote counl:er-measures against the intruding to device. Consequently, the operators have the opportunity to physically intervene against the unauthorized, compromised or defective device.
Accordingly, the present invention provides for an IEEE 802.11 security system for monitoring wireless networks and detecting, neutralizing and locating unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices. The security system comprises a network appliance subsystem and a portable computing subsystem, wherein the network appliance subsystem comprises:
~ signal processing means for detecting and monitoring IEEE 802.11 signals;
~ analytical means for analysing information gathered from the unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices and determining nature of security breach;
~ alerting means for alarming administrative staff of the unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices;
and said portable computing subsystem comprises:
~ a directional anterma for locating said unauthorized or threatening IEEE
802.11 devices; and ~ signal processing means for managing IEEE 802.11 interface and interpreting information gathered by said directional antenna and data means to interface between said network appliance subsystem and said portable computing subsystem.
The present invention further provides for a method for monitoring IEEE 802.11 wireless networks and detecting, neutralizing and locating unauthorized or threatening IEEE
802.11 devices. The method comprising interfacing between a network appliance subsystem and a portable computing subsystem, wherein operation of the network appliance subsystem consists of:
~ sensing an interference or attack from the unauthorized or threatening IEEE
802.11 device;
~ detecting and monitoring IEEE 802.11 signals with a signal processing means;
~ analysing information gathered from the unauthorized or threatening IEEE
802.11 devices and determining nature of security breach by an analytical means; and ~ alarming a user presence of the unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices through an alerting means;
and operation of the portable computing subsystem consists of:
~ locating the unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices through a 2o directional antenna; and managing IEEE 802.11 interface and interpreting information gathered by the directional antenna via a signal processing means.
Accordingly, the present invention provides for an IEEE 802.11 security system for monitoring wireless networks and detecting, neutralizing and locating unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices. The security system comprises a network appliance subsystem and a portable computing subsystem, wherein the network appliance subsystem comprises:
~ signal processing means for detecting and monitoring IEEE 802.11 signals;
~ analytical means for analysing information gathered from the unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices and determining nature of security breach;
~ alerting means for alarming administrative staff of the unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices;
and said portable computing subsystem comprises:
~ a directional anterma for locating said unauthorized or threatening IEEE
802.11 devices; and ~ signal processing means for managing IEEE 802.11 interface and interpreting information gathered by said directional antenna and data means to interface between said network appliance subsystem and said portable computing subsystem.
The present invention further provides for a method for monitoring IEEE 802.11 wireless networks and detecting, neutralizing and locating unauthorized or threatening IEEE
802.11 devices. The method comprising interfacing between a network appliance subsystem and a portable computing subsystem, wherein operation of the network appliance subsystem consists of:
~ sensing an interference or attack from the unauthorized or threatening IEEE
802.11 device;
~ detecting and monitoring IEEE 802.11 signals with a signal processing means;
~ analysing information gathered from the unauthorized or threatening IEEE
802.11 devices and determining nature of security breach by an analytical means; and ~ alarming a user presence of the unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices through an alerting means;
and operation of the portable computing subsystem consists of:
~ locating the unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices through a 2o directional antenna; and managing IEEE 802.11 interface and interpreting information gathered by the directional antenna via a signal processing means.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
Figure 1 is a schematic diagram showing how network coverage can be compromised by an outside intruder.
Figure 2 is a logical diagram of the present invention showing sequential steps in the operational detection and respond to a security risk intruder.
Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of the present invention showing the counter-measures operations.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
1o In the following detailed description of the preferred embodiments, reference is made to the accompanying drawings that form a part hereof, and in which are shown by way of illustration specific embodiments in which the invention rr~ay be practiced.
It is understood that other embodiments may be utilized and structural changes may be made without departing from the scope of the present invention.
In accordance with the invention, the Wireless Integrity Technology ("WIT") is designed for use on the IEEE 802.11 wireless networks in general and, on IEEE
$02.I 1b, IEEE 802.11 a and IEEE 802.11 g wireless networks in particular. However, since these networks have very similar functionality as far as the WIT is concerned and all specifications related thereto apply to all varieties of IEEE 802.1 lb/a/g.
2o WIT provides security against a variety of threats to IEEE 802.11 networks such as:
~ Rogue nodes: IEEE 802.11 devices that attempt to establish, join or disrupt a network for malicious and unauthorized purposes, or devices that try and establish a "booby-trap" network to attract legitimate devices and compromise them ~ Benign nodes: IEEE 802.11 devices that "wander" or conflict with IEEE 802.11 networks such that they inadvertently impact performance, and must therefore be re-directed, re-configured or removed.
Figure 1 is a schematic diagram showing how network coverage can be compromised by an outside intruder.
Figure 2 is a logical diagram of the present invention showing sequential steps in the operational detection and respond to a security risk intruder.
Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of the present invention showing the counter-measures operations.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
1o In the following detailed description of the preferred embodiments, reference is made to the accompanying drawings that form a part hereof, and in which are shown by way of illustration specific embodiments in which the invention rr~ay be practiced.
It is understood that other embodiments may be utilized and structural changes may be made without departing from the scope of the present invention.
In accordance with the invention, the Wireless Integrity Technology ("WIT") is designed for use on the IEEE 802.11 wireless networks in general and, on IEEE
$02.I 1b, IEEE 802.11 a and IEEE 802.11 g wireless networks in particular. However, since these networks have very similar functionality as far as the WIT is concerned and all specifications related thereto apply to all varieties of IEEE 802.1 lb/a/g.
2o WIT provides security against a variety of threats to IEEE 802.11 networks such as:
~ Rogue nodes: IEEE 802.11 devices that attempt to establish, join or disrupt a network for malicious and unauthorized purposes, or devices that try and establish a "booby-trap" network to attract legitimate devices and compromise them ~ Benign nodes: IEEE 802.11 devices that "wander" or conflict with IEEE 802.11 networks such that they inadvertently impact performance, and must therefore be re-directed, re-configured or removed.
~ Defective nodes: an IEEE 802.11 device that has become a threat to the network because of a malfunction or misconfiguration.
WIT is not designed to be a general network IDS. Fixed-line network IDS
functions and applications are complimentary to WIT in that they pick up where WIT
leaves off, providing security at higher layers in the OSI protocol stack.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The operations of the present invention are described with the aid of Figure 2 which to outlines the overall concept of operations for the WIT system. The system is comprised of two major functional subsystems, namely the WIT Server subsystem and the Hunter-Seeker subsystem. Each subsystem further consists of a plurality of modules.
Preferably, the WIT
Server modules reside on the same physical platform. Optionally, these modules may be separated across several different physical platforms but still perform the same functions together.
Referring to Figure 2, the operational sequences of WIT system is as follows:
Step 1. Attack:
A Wireless Node 150 enters the network from Intruder 100 for the purposes of probing, eavesdropping, attracting or attacking and may attempt to associate with the network 2o or shutdown or jam the network and its signals are perceived on the Wireless Interface 202 Step 2. Listening Post:
The WIT Server 200 is equipped with one or more Wireless Interfaces 202, but is not part of the wireless network. This interface is only to monitor the wireless network(s).
Listening Post Module 210 gathers from all IEEE 802.11 radio channels and makes data available for analysis by other modules.
Step 3. Logs:
Log Files 220 are made available to third party applications for visualization and additional analysis. For instance, third party intrusion detection system tools for additional analysis or database tools for reporting.
Step 4. Lookout:
WIT Analysis Module 230 looks for IEEE 802.11-specific attack patterns using real-time analysis and contains configurations related to alert levels and security policy configurations. The WIT Analysis Module 230 has the capability to support active counter-measures as can be seen from the "Honey Pot" and Counter-Measure Agent described below.
1o Step 5. Honey Pot:
The intent of the Honey Pot Module 240 in Step 5 is to provide an "easy"
target to decoy intruders - which will set-off alarms and distract them with "bait"
files supplied by WLAN system administrators. The Honey Pot Module 24E0 will maintain detailed logs for evidentiary purposes and be connected to the WIT Alarm Module 250.
~s Step 6. Alarm Generation:
Alarm Module 250 is responsible for generating alarms to users and dispatching tracking information to Hunter-Seeker 300 and /or information to initiate automatic counter-measures from the Counter-Measure Agent 280. Alarm Module 250 interfaces with the internal network to send e-mail alerts to operators or security staff through existing SMTP
20 resources.
Step 7. Counter-measures The Counter-Measure Agent 280 is responsible to automatically neutralize suspect IEEE 802.11 devices as defined in the alarm data and for periods defined by administrators.
Counter-Measures Agent 280 launches counter-measures through one of multiple Wireless _g_ Interfaces 202.
Step 8. Dispatch Messages:
The Alarm Module 250 also interfaces with certificate stores on the server platform to secure Dispatch Data 310 going to Hunter-Seeker 300. Dislaatch Data 310 is transmitted over the air or transferred through out-of band (such as floppy disk) means to a Hunter-Seeker 300.
Hunter-Seeker 300 verifies message integrity and learns intruder and/or target parameters.
Alarm Module 250 continues to update Hunter-Seeker 300 with latest data about Intruder 100, or alternately about new intruders. Hunter-Seeker 300 will pick up data in the course of performing searches by directing the antenna towards the WIT Server 200 long 1o enough to receive update files.
Step 9. Directional Node Searches:
Using a Directional Antenna 400, Hunter-Seeker 300 is a manually operated, portable computing device which searches for specific devices through the unique combination of directional capabilities and the Hunter Seeker Module 330 signal processing engine. Hunter-1 s Seeker Wireless Interface Card 320 indicates when targeted (intruder) radio signals are found and indicate signal strength. Directional Antenna 400 interfaces with the expansion port on IEEE 802.11 Wireless Interface Card 320.
As discussed earlier, the IEEE 802.11 WIT is comprised of two distinct hard-and software subsystems: a WIT Server 200 subsystem and a Hunter-Seeker 300 subsystem. Both 2o subsystems perform unique functions through specially developed signal processing engines.
Iri the case of the WIT Server 200, the signal processing engine is represented by the Listening Post Module 210 and the Analysis Module 230. In the case of Hunter-Seeker 300, the specialized signal processing is represented by the Directional Antenna 400 in combination with signal processing software. Additionally, the IEEE 802.11 WIT
prepares data for input directly into Commercial Off The-Shelf ("COTS") Analysis Products 260 for the purposes of visualization and additional analysis in Hunter Seeker Module 330.
Counter-Measure Agent Referring to Figure 3, the Counter-Measure Agent 280 is a complimentary module which may be integrated with, or physically separate from, the Listening Post Module 210. It constitutes the counter-measure means of the present invention and launches neutralizing and/or disabling counter-measures against the suspected unauthorized device upon activation.
The Counter-Measure Agent 280 is activated either automatically by alerts from the Alarm Module 250 or through system administrator commands. The primary objective of the to Counter-Measure Agent 280 is to automatically launch neutralizing, radio frequency and protocol-based counter-measures against unauthorized devices until an administrator can respond to the alarm and make a positive or negative determination of the intent of the device(s).
The Counter-Measure Agent 280 has the following characteristics:
~ The Counter-Measure Agent 280 can be installed and run from either a stationary server appliance or from a portable device. A stationary server appliance is preferred since it has a greater capability to remain on-line at all time.
~ The Counter-Measure Agent 280 is implemented with high-performance omni-directional or Directional Antennas 400.
~ The Counter-Measure Agent 280 automatically responds to alarms from the Alarm Module 250 related to either specific devices or specific networks (ESS or IBSS).
Therefore the Agent can launch effective counter-measures against individual devices or entire groupings of devices.
~ System administrators have the capability to manually initiate counter-measures against devices or networks which can be configured into the Counter-Measure Agent 280 directly through a command-line or Graphic User Interface (GUI).
~ Once a counter-measure has been initiated, it will remain in effect until it has been manually de-activated by an approved administrator, or until a pre-configurcd expiry period elapses.
~ Counter-measures will exist in the form of both RF' and IEEE 802.11 manipulations which have the impact of either disabling devices or entire networks. The specific type of counter-measure to be launched will be configured by administrators at set-up time, but can be adjusted at a later date.
~ A list of RF and IEEE 802.11 manipulations which the Counter-Measure Agent 280 is capable of effecting include, but not be limited to, the following types of counter-measures:
Spectrum jamming ~- The Counter-Measure Agent 280 can emit high-powered RF
"noise" intended to shut down IEEE 802.11 channels through the inability of clear signals to be heard about the generated noise. 'This technique could be useful in environments and situations where all WLAN communications must stop or be prohibited either temporarily or permanently.
Signal dominance - Generation of a stronger signal than the target device or network in order to attract all traffic intended to the suspect device to the Counter-2o Measure Agent 280 instead. This technique may be used to capture traffic from unauthorized devices.
Protocol manipulation - Examples of IEEE 802.11 protocol manipulations which the Counter-Measure Agent 280 is capable of executing includes, but not be limited to, the following types of counter-measures:
(a) Device-specific - The Counter-Measure Agent 280 can target specific devices based on MAC addresses of these devices. Device-specific attacks inflict denial-of service attacks by either forcing the device to leave the network and thereby prevent any further communications. These attacks can be achieved through manipulation and generation of specific IEEE 802.11 management or control frames such as "Deauthentication" or "Disassociation" frames. Additionally, Counter-Measure Agent 280 can direct network traffic against a suspect device such that the device is over-whelmed and cannot accept any further data, or in order to exhaust the battery of a mobile intruder.
to (b) Network Specific - The Counter-Measure Agent 280 can target specific IEEE
802.11 networks according to the network name or other network-specific feature and shut down all traffic on this network by denying any of the nodes network resources with which to transmit e.g. through constant transmission of "request to send ("RTS")" and force all other nodes to "back-off" transmitting indefinitely.
The Counter-Measure Agent 280 can also specifically target and disable IEEE
802.11 Access Points 118, to shut down a network by removing the core infrastructure component from operation.
Accordingly, Counter-Measure Agent 280 effectively denies Intruder 100 access to Network Coverage 102, thus protecting the Mobile Users 120 and the proprietary information 2o resided at Ethernet LAN 114 and Internal Workstation 116.
OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
Since the IEEE 802.11 WIT is not a generalized network or host I17S, it specifically focuses on the MAC and Data-link layer of IEEE 802.11 networks. The other higher network layers of transport, session, presentation and application layers fall outside the scope of the preset invention.
The functional aspects of the WIT Server 200 subsystem and the Hunter-Seeker subsystem are now described in detailed with reference to Figure 2.
Network Appliance - WIT Server Subsystean The WIT Server 200 subsystem is the core of the 802.11 WIT security system which monitors wireless network traffic for possible intrusions.
The WIT Server 200 subsystem is a network appliance which requires minimal configuration. It is a stand-alone application on a hardened platform.
to WIT Server GUI - Server Graphac User haterface Start-up of all WIT Server 200 subsystems is accomplished through a single controlling WIT Server Graphic User Interface ("GUI"), which requires username and password. Users can be identified as either user administrators or user support staff on all modules. Operationally, a hierarchy of privileges can be assigned to the users. Por example, administrators can change configuration settings, while support staff can view but not change settings.
WIT Server GUI is equipped with the capability to display general status information such as:
~ networks being monitored: Server Set ID ("SS1D"), Name, Channels, 802.11 security framework (WEP, 802.1x, WPA, 802.11i) ~ other networks in range ~ number of devices on wireless network including details of IP, MAC, Access Points or Peer devices, SSIDs, Channels used, Signal/Noi;>e Strength whether device is "green" or "red" - authorized or unauthorized Passwords and Security Verification For security reasons, passwords should not be stored by the application.
Hashes of passwords are to be used for comparison purpose.
WIT has access to a PKI Certificate store for the purposes of digitally signing alarm and status information sent to Hunter-Seeker 300. Preferably, alarm and status data files are signed using keys designated by the administrators.
Listening Post Module The Listening Post Module 210 constitutes the signal monitoring means of the present invention and generates Log Files 220 at several different levels of detail.
Log Files 220 are stored and read to and from either local or network drives. Listening Post 210 logs all data in delimited plain text or standard "tcpdump" format with a specific intent of supporting analysis and display by third-party Analysis Products 260. Typically, logs contain the following data about the results of IEEE 802.11 network analysis and timestamp down to the second or tenth of a second if possible; packet number; source address; destination address;
MAC address;
I5 SSID and network name; devices manufacturer; security framework; protocol and application information; channel information; and signal strength and noise.
Analysis Module The WIT Analysis Module 230 constitutes the analytical means of the present invention and is capable of monitoring multiple wireless networks on multiple wireless 2o interfaces 202 from a single WIT Server 200.
The Analysis Module 230 is capable of detecting the following IEEE 802.11 specific events and reporting these events:
Network SSID the network name which must be used to distinguish one IEEE
802.11 network from another in the same range MAC address ( the unique identifier for a given node Frame information Management Frames Control Frames Data Frames: pure data streams without any management information available Information other information about the network or device which may have been configured and is carried in mana ement frames Channel the IEEE 802.11 channel being used by the device; channels range from 1 to 11 in North America Security Frameworkverify whether Wireless Equivalent Privacy (WEP), 802.1x, Wireless Protected Access (WPA) or 802.1 1i is being used to encrypt the data stream Data rate the negotiated speed of the connection between devices as support by IEEE 802.1 1b: 2 Mbps, 5.5 Mbps, 11 Mbps Traffic rates the number of packets observed from the given device; packets are categorized as follows:
LLC - IEEE 802.11 link layer control packet Data - 802.3 data packets Total = running total of all packets observed First/last appearancethe first time the device was observed and the latest observation time Analysis Module 230 allows for configuration of which events are considered threats.
Numerous specific attacks are monitored: unauthorized association, attempted association, j amming, sabotage, network lurking, device masquerade, man-in-the-middle, ARP
and MAC
address spoofing, WEP cracking, Denial-of Service (DOS) attacks and IEEE
802.11 protocol manipulation. These are explained as follows:
Unauthorized Association - a device with is not intended to access the wireless resources successfully joins the IEEE 802.11 network and has access to higher-level protocols and applications.
1o Attempted Association - an unauthorized device attempts to discover the necessary configuration elements to j oin the wireless network, or unsuccessfully presents credentials in an attempt to gain access to higher level resources.
.lamming - a device emits copious, or extraneous IEEE 802.11 frames in order to consume network resources.
Sabotage - a device emits IEEE 802.11 management or control frames in an attempt to paralyze the network as a whole or individual devices.
Network Lurking - Network lurking refers to detection of hosting sitting on the subnet but without any traffic being generated. The WIT is capable of distinguishing a node which has "stumbled" on the network and mistakenly tries to send data (e.g. using incorrect subnet configurations) from "lurking" nodes with forged or no IPs defined but MAC
address visible.
Masquerade - Detection of a device that attempts to overnde another by assuming the same IP
and broadcasting a stronger signal, such that traffic intended for legitimate device arrives at the rogue device. WIT looks far duplicate IP addresses on the network and differentiates the "new" device from the "original" device based on MAC addresses in ARP
messages.
Alternately, a MAC address can be forged. If two devices with the same MAC
address appear on the net, one or the other is ~,eliberately faked since MACS are hardware unique.
Access Point Masquerade - Another device attempt to broadcast a IEEE 802.11 management frames with the same or different SSID and IP address as a~ legitimate access point.
Man-In-The-Middle ("MITM")- Man-In-The-Middle attacks consist of masquerade, but with the added threat that information is then forwarded onto the original destination such that neither end of the connection is aware of interference or changes to packet content.
2o Wireless Equivalent Privacy ("WEP' ) Cracking -Tools which are publicly available to crack WEP keys in 1 gigabyte of data can be gathered from the network. In addition to detecting lurkers, the WIT looks far devices attempting to join the network with the correct WEP key but without knowing network configuration information or, optionally, performing no network operations after joining.
Station-to-Station - Traffic from one wireless station to another could indicate that an attack is being launched over the wireless Ethernet from one mobile; station to another.
For instance, port scans.
DOS - A wide range of DOS attacks are available to an entity that can get in range of the network. The following DOS attack methods are of primary concern, namely flooding the network with data to consume all bandwidth; protocol-based sabotage and jamming from conflicting networks.
IEEE 802.11 Protocol Manipulation - The techniques used in Counter Measure Agent 280 can be potentially mimicked by malicious entities. WIT will recognize such attacks.
l0 Hunter-Seeker dispatch settings are configured into Alarm Module 250 by system administrators (see discussions below). Typically, configuration features for Hunter-Seeker 300 include:
Multiple Hunter-Seekers - Multiple Hunter-Seekers are supported from a single WIT Server.
These can be dispatched individually or all at once.
MAC address - Hunter-Seekers are being identified on the; network using MAC
address in ARP requests, which will be cross-referenced with the expected IP.
1P Address - Hunter-Seekers will be identified by MAC address and IP address.
Signature Key - All dispatch information are signed by the WIT server. A key within the Windows certificate store is also selected.
As a general requirement, all configuration details must be supplied in order to complete configuration.
Alarm Module Multiple alarm types from the Alarm Module 250 axe displayed in the GLTI and are available for sending out via e-mail or pager. Alarm Module 250 constitutes the alerting means of the present invention and provides for three ranges of alarms, namely, Critical, Important, Suspicious. The three ranges are further described as follows:
Critical DOS attacks ~ node has successfully joined using WEP but sends incorrect login data such as network name ~ MITM
~ rogue access point identified ~ sabotage or jamming Important ~ nodes appear to be "lurking"
~ DOS from nodes which have come in range but broadcast different network advertisements ~ repeated, failed attempts to join network Suspicious ~ nodes which have come in range but broadcast different network advertisements Two types of alarms can be generated by Alarm Module 250:
E-mail Alarms - E-mail Alarms 270 are sent out via SMTP to possible several configurable addresses. Alarms may include the following data: alarm level; time; network name; category of intrusion or attack; and log information.
GUI Alarms - The GUI supports configuration to automatically pop-up alarm windows once alarms are triggered.
Information from the WIT Analysis Module 230 is formatted by Alarm Module 250 for use by the Hunter-Seeker Module 330 and Counter Measure Agent 280. This information may contain the following data: MAC address of the suspicious device; channel, if available;
type of attack; start time; subject of attack, if applicable, including IP and MAC of subject;
signal strength from listening post; and name of listening post, if multiple listening posts available.
Not all data is required to issue a dispatch. At a minimum, MAC address information is required to send Dispatch Data 310 to a Hunter-Seeker 300 or Counter Measure Agent 280.
This Dispatch Data 310 is placed in a delimited-format file far parsing by the Hunter-Seeker 300 or Counter Measure Agent 280.
Dispatch Data 310 files are either transferred to floppy disk or optionally transmitted to Hunter-Seeker 300 directly over the IEEE 802.11 network or over the Ethernet LAN to Counter Measure Agent 280. If transmitted, the information will be re-transmitted at a regular interval, e.g. every minute. If the wireless network is clown due to attack, data can be to transferred using floppy disk. WIT Server 200 checks the wireless network for access to Hunter-Seeker 300 and will continue to attempt updates regularly.
Transmissions of data to Hunter-Seeker 300 or Counter Measure Agent 280 require security. WIT Server 200 has the ability to transmit dispatch data to Hunter-Seeker 300 and Counter Measure Agent 280 which is digitally signed.
Hohey Pot Module Honey Pot Module 240 constitutes the decoying means of the present invention and its configurations are set in advance by a system administrator. The Honey Pot Module 240 can either be running all the time or can be activated automatically as a counter-measure. Honey Pot Module 240 uses a WLAN Interface 202 and imitates an IEEE 802.11 Access Point. If 2o necessary, Honey Pot Module 240 will provide a forged MAC address and broadcast the necessary ARP messages. Honey Pot Module 240 may operate either on the same channel or a different channel from the legitimate access point. Honey Pot Module 240 broadcasts IEEE
802.11 management frames with an unprotected SSID. Honey Pot Module 24U allows association from any device. An alternate configuration for the Honey Pot Module 240 is to configure moderate security to test the capabilities of the attackers.
Honey Pot Module 240 logs all data on activities from connected nodes for evidentiary purposes and issues a call to the Alarm Module 250 once activity commences.
Optically, it provides a deceptive means for tricking lurking, unauthorized or eavesdropping IEEE 802.11 devices into revealing themselves by attempted associations with Honey Pot Module 240.
Portable Computing Subsystem - Hunter Seeker Subs sw tem The various components of the Hunter Seeker subsystem 300 are described as follows:
Huhte~-Seeker Module 1o The Hunter-Seeker Module 330 constitutes of t:he signal processing means for managing IEEE 802.11 tracking interface and interpreting information gathered by Directional Antenna 400 in accordance with the present: invention. The Hunter-Seeker Module 330 runs on a portable device such as a laptop or palmtop with the ability to accommodate an 802.11 card.
Target nodes are configurable either through Alarm Module 250, Dispatches Data or through manual input directly via the Hunter-Seeker subsystem 300 GUI.
Configuration information is defined in the Alarm Module 250 functional :requirements since Alarm Module 250 is responsible for formatting Dispatch Data 310.
If multiple nodes with the same IP or MAC or otlher configuration parameters are 2o found, Hunter-Seeker subsystem 300 will prompt the system administrator for which node to track. Optionally, all nodes which match the criteria can be tracked. More than one node can be identified for tracking, with the Wireless Interface Card 320 indicating the signal strength of multiple nodes at the same time.
The Hunter-Seeker subsystem 300 reads from an IEEE 802.11 card in monitor mode and dynamically filters out all traffic unrelated to the target devices) prior to displaying any information in the GUI. The interface displays when a signal is being received from one of the target nodes including the following details about ~;he signal, namely Signal/Noise strength; IP address and subnet; MAC address; Channel; Applications and Protocols in use;
Destination of packets; SSID and Network Name; Management frame information (if applicable).
All variables except signal strength are always displayed as last known values. Signal strength is updated as often as feasible as the Directional Antenna 400 picks up and loses the signal.
l0 The Hunter-Seeker subsystem 300 verifies digital signature archives on Dispatch Data 310 information delivered from the Alarm Module 250. Successfully verified files have signature information displayed for manual confirmation by operators. After confirmation, the configuration data is loaded into Hunter-Seeker subsystem 300. If Hunter-Seeker subsystem 300 is already loaded with configuration data fo:r a target device, the user is being prompted to either overwrite the current data or load the ne;w data as an additional device to track.
Configurations and Dispatch Data 310 information can be saved once entered, or changed. Configuration information files can be reloaded into Hunter-Seeker subsystem 300.
In addition, Hunter-Seeker subsystem 300 data can be manually purged by the user with all settings back to null. Hunter-Seeker subsystem 300 is also capable of multiple logging levels which can be recorded in delimited text files in user-specified locations.
Default location is a directory called "logs" off the install directory of Hunter-Seeker subsystem 300, but location can be manually configured by users.
Logging levels according to the present invention are as follows:
None No logs kept B default setting.
Limited Start time Manual configuration or data from WIT Server Successful or failed verification of data from WIT Server 'Value of configuration data loaded Purge of data Shutdown Extensive All elements of "Limited", plus TCP-dump style data from received data about the target node Signal strength from tar et node Heavy All elements of "Extensive", plus Promiscuous dump of all in~:ormation picked-up by antenna Ahtenna Specifications Directional Antennas 400 for the purposes of operating this inventive IEEE
802.11 WIT system are custom made in accordance with the following specifications.
The antennas possess high gain and a narrow sensitivity field in the horizontal and vertical plains. Signals directly in front of the antenna appear strongest, but rapidly fade once the antenna is not pointed at t;he source of the signal. Thus a strong signal indicates the correct direction of the IEEE 802.11 node while a weak or no signal indicate the "wrong"
1 o direction.
The Directional Antenna 400 interfaces with IEEE 802.11 networks through a wide variety of available, off the-shelf or customized hardware. The WIT system relies on the physical interface provided by IEEE 802.11 system makers. For instance, an OrinocoTM
PCMCIA card with an interface for external antennas. The WIT system antennas connect to 1s the off the-shelf IEEE 802.11 radio through this means.
The Directional Antenna 400 itself may be a variety of different designs. Any antenna possessing significant directional capabilities is acceptable°, such as a patch array antenna, mufti-dipole antenna and yagi antenna.
The Directional Antenna 400 may be mounted on the back of a laptop computer such that the VGA display is directly "behind" the antenna. This allows the operator to walk forward while watching readings from the Hunter-Seeker subsystem 300 change in real time.
Alternatively, the antenna many be handheld and turned to face the strongest signal with one hand while the operator watches signal strength from the Hunter-Seeker subsystem 300 software GUI.
Commercial Off The-Shelf ("COTS") Packages COTS packages are suggested merely as an example. There is no dependencies upon to any other software. COTS may include:
~ Silent Runner from Raytheon: used for visualization of WIT data ~ IIS used for IDS analysis ~ Open Source tools Network Interfaces IEEE 802.11 WIT server subsystem is required to interface with minimum of one wireless network interface but multiple interfaces are supported. An interface with a second, fixed line network will also be required for accessing other network resources like SMTP for alerts and file server for log storage.
Depending on the sought-after device, the WIT Hunter-Seeker subsystem maintains one network interface through on-board or PCMCIA-type IEEE 802.11 radios. This interface will be for the Directional Antenna to receive signals from sought-after devices.
While the present invention has been described and illustrated herein with reference to the preferred embodiment thereof it will be understood by those skilled in the art that various changes in form and details maybe made therein without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention.
It is to be understood that the embodiments and variations shown and described herein are merely illustrative of the principles of this invention and that various modifications may be implemented by those skilled in the art without departing from the scope and spirit of the invention.
WIT is not designed to be a general network IDS. Fixed-line network IDS
functions and applications are complimentary to WIT in that they pick up where WIT
leaves off, providing security at higher layers in the OSI protocol stack.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The operations of the present invention are described with the aid of Figure 2 which to outlines the overall concept of operations for the WIT system. The system is comprised of two major functional subsystems, namely the WIT Server subsystem and the Hunter-Seeker subsystem. Each subsystem further consists of a plurality of modules.
Preferably, the WIT
Server modules reside on the same physical platform. Optionally, these modules may be separated across several different physical platforms but still perform the same functions together.
Referring to Figure 2, the operational sequences of WIT system is as follows:
Step 1. Attack:
A Wireless Node 150 enters the network from Intruder 100 for the purposes of probing, eavesdropping, attracting or attacking and may attempt to associate with the network 2o or shutdown or jam the network and its signals are perceived on the Wireless Interface 202 Step 2. Listening Post:
The WIT Server 200 is equipped with one or more Wireless Interfaces 202, but is not part of the wireless network. This interface is only to monitor the wireless network(s).
Listening Post Module 210 gathers from all IEEE 802.11 radio channels and makes data available for analysis by other modules.
Step 3. Logs:
Log Files 220 are made available to third party applications for visualization and additional analysis. For instance, third party intrusion detection system tools for additional analysis or database tools for reporting.
Step 4. Lookout:
WIT Analysis Module 230 looks for IEEE 802.11-specific attack patterns using real-time analysis and contains configurations related to alert levels and security policy configurations. The WIT Analysis Module 230 has the capability to support active counter-measures as can be seen from the "Honey Pot" and Counter-Measure Agent described below.
1o Step 5. Honey Pot:
The intent of the Honey Pot Module 240 in Step 5 is to provide an "easy"
target to decoy intruders - which will set-off alarms and distract them with "bait"
files supplied by WLAN system administrators. The Honey Pot Module 24E0 will maintain detailed logs for evidentiary purposes and be connected to the WIT Alarm Module 250.
~s Step 6. Alarm Generation:
Alarm Module 250 is responsible for generating alarms to users and dispatching tracking information to Hunter-Seeker 300 and /or information to initiate automatic counter-measures from the Counter-Measure Agent 280. Alarm Module 250 interfaces with the internal network to send e-mail alerts to operators or security staff through existing SMTP
20 resources.
Step 7. Counter-measures The Counter-Measure Agent 280 is responsible to automatically neutralize suspect IEEE 802.11 devices as defined in the alarm data and for periods defined by administrators.
Counter-Measures Agent 280 launches counter-measures through one of multiple Wireless _g_ Interfaces 202.
Step 8. Dispatch Messages:
The Alarm Module 250 also interfaces with certificate stores on the server platform to secure Dispatch Data 310 going to Hunter-Seeker 300. Dislaatch Data 310 is transmitted over the air or transferred through out-of band (such as floppy disk) means to a Hunter-Seeker 300.
Hunter-Seeker 300 verifies message integrity and learns intruder and/or target parameters.
Alarm Module 250 continues to update Hunter-Seeker 300 with latest data about Intruder 100, or alternately about new intruders. Hunter-Seeker 300 will pick up data in the course of performing searches by directing the antenna towards the WIT Server 200 long 1o enough to receive update files.
Step 9. Directional Node Searches:
Using a Directional Antenna 400, Hunter-Seeker 300 is a manually operated, portable computing device which searches for specific devices through the unique combination of directional capabilities and the Hunter Seeker Module 330 signal processing engine. Hunter-1 s Seeker Wireless Interface Card 320 indicates when targeted (intruder) radio signals are found and indicate signal strength. Directional Antenna 400 interfaces with the expansion port on IEEE 802.11 Wireless Interface Card 320.
As discussed earlier, the IEEE 802.11 WIT is comprised of two distinct hard-and software subsystems: a WIT Server 200 subsystem and a Hunter-Seeker 300 subsystem. Both 2o subsystems perform unique functions through specially developed signal processing engines.
Iri the case of the WIT Server 200, the signal processing engine is represented by the Listening Post Module 210 and the Analysis Module 230. In the case of Hunter-Seeker 300, the specialized signal processing is represented by the Directional Antenna 400 in combination with signal processing software. Additionally, the IEEE 802.11 WIT
prepares data for input directly into Commercial Off The-Shelf ("COTS") Analysis Products 260 for the purposes of visualization and additional analysis in Hunter Seeker Module 330.
Counter-Measure Agent Referring to Figure 3, the Counter-Measure Agent 280 is a complimentary module which may be integrated with, or physically separate from, the Listening Post Module 210. It constitutes the counter-measure means of the present invention and launches neutralizing and/or disabling counter-measures against the suspected unauthorized device upon activation.
The Counter-Measure Agent 280 is activated either automatically by alerts from the Alarm Module 250 or through system administrator commands. The primary objective of the to Counter-Measure Agent 280 is to automatically launch neutralizing, radio frequency and protocol-based counter-measures against unauthorized devices until an administrator can respond to the alarm and make a positive or negative determination of the intent of the device(s).
The Counter-Measure Agent 280 has the following characteristics:
~ The Counter-Measure Agent 280 can be installed and run from either a stationary server appliance or from a portable device. A stationary server appliance is preferred since it has a greater capability to remain on-line at all time.
~ The Counter-Measure Agent 280 is implemented with high-performance omni-directional or Directional Antennas 400.
~ The Counter-Measure Agent 280 automatically responds to alarms from the Alarm Module 250 related to either specific devices or specific networks (ESS or IBSS).
Therefore the Agent can launch effective counter-measures against individual devices or entire groupings of devices.
~ System administrators have the capability to manually initiate counter-measures against devices or networks which can be configured into the Counter-Measure Agent 280 directly through a command-line or Graphic User Interface (GUI).
~ Once a counter-measure has been initiated, it will remain in effect until it has been manually de-activated by an approved administrator, or until a pre-configurcd expiry period elapses.
~ Counter-measures will exist in the form of both RF' and IEEE 802.11 manipulations which have the impact of either disabling devices or entire networks. The specific type of counter-measure to be launched will be configured by administrators at set-up time, but can be adjusted at a later date.
~ A list of RF and IEEE 802.11 manipulations which the Counter-Measure Agent 280 is capable of effecting include, but not be limited to, the following types of counter-measures:
Spectrum jamming ~- The Counter-Measure Agent 280 can emit high-powered RF
"noise" intended to shut down IEEE 802.11 channels through the inability of clear signals to be heard about the generated noise. 'This technique could be useful in environments and situations where all WLAN communications must stop or be prohibited either temporarily or permanently.
Signal dominance - Generation of a stronger signal than the target device or network in order to attract all traffic intended to the suspect device to the Counter-2o Measure Agent 280 instead. This technique may be used to capture traffic from unauthorized devices.
Protocol manipulation - Examples of IEEE 802.11 protocol manipulations which the Counter-Measure Agent 280 is capable of executing includes, but not be limited to, the following types of counter-measures:
(a) Device-specific - The Counter-Measure Agent 280 can target specific devices based on MAC addresses of these devices. Device-specific attacks inflict denial-of service attacks by either forcing the device to leave the network and thereby prevent any further communications. These attacks can be achieved through manipulation and generation of specific IEEE 802.11 management or control frames such as "Deauthentication" or "Disassociation" frames. Additionally, Counter-Measure Agent 280 can direct network traffic against a suspect device such that the device is over-whelmed and cannot accept any further data, or in order to exhaust the battery of a mobile intruder.
to (b) Network Specific - The Counter-Measure Agent 280 can target specific IEEE
802.11 networks according to the network name or other network-specific feature and shut down all traffic on this network by denying any of the nodes network resources with which to transmit e.g. through constant transmission of "request to send ("RTS")" and force all other nodes to "back-off" transmitting indefinitely.
The Counter-Measure Agent 280 can also specifically target and disable IEEE
802.11 Access Points 118, to shut down a network by removing the core infrastructure component from operation.
Accordingly, Counter-Measure Agent 280 effectively denies Intruder 100 access to Network Coverage 102, thus protecting the Mobile Users 120 and the proprietary information 2o resided at Ethernet LAN 114 and Internal Workstation 116.
OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
Since the IEEE 802.11 WIT is not a generalized network or host I17S, it specifically focuses on the MAC and Data-link layer of IEEE 802.11 networks. The other higher network layers of transport, session, presentation and application layers fall outside the scope of the preset invention.
The functional aspects of the WIT Server 200 subsystem and the Hunter-Seeker subsystem are now described in detailed with reference to Figure 2.
Network Appliance - WIT Server Subsystean The WIT Server 200 subsystem is the core of the 802.11 WIT security system which monitors wireless network traffic for possible intrusions.
The WIT Server 200 subsystem is a network appliance which requires minimal configuration. It is a stand-alone application on a hardened platform.
to WIT Server GUI - Server Graphac User haterface Start-up of all WIT Server 200 subsystems is accomplished through a single controlling WIT Server Graphic User Interface ("GUI"), which requires username and password. Users can be identified as either user administrators or user support staff on all modules. Operationally, a hierarchy of privileges can be assigned to the users. Por example, administrators can change configuration settings, while support staff can view but not change settings.
WIT Server GUI is equipped with the capability to display general status information such as:
~ networks being monitored: Server Set ID ("SS1D"), Name, Channels, 802.11 security framework (WEP, 802.1x, WPA, 802.11i) ~ other networks in range ~ number of devices on wireless network including details of IP, MAC, Access Points or Peer devices, SSIDs, Channels used, Signal/Noi;>e Strength whether device is "green" or "red" - authorized or unauthorized Passwords and Security Verification For security reasons, passwords should not be stored by the application.
Hashes of passwords are to be used for comparison purpose.
WIT has access to a PKI Certificate store for the purposes of digitally signing alarm and status information sent to Hunter-Seeker 300. Preferably, alarm and status data files are signed using keys designated by the administrators.
Listening Post Module The Listening Post Module 210 constitutes the signal monitoring means of the present invention and generates Log Files 220 at several different levels of detail.
Log Files 220 are stored and read to and from either local or network drives. Listening Post 210 logs all data in delimited plain text or standard "tcpdump" format with a specific intent of supporting analysis and display by third-party Analysis Products 260. Typically, logs contain the following data about the results of IEEE 802.11 network analysis and timestamp down to the second or tenth of a second if possible; packet number; source address; destination address;
MAC address;
I5 SSID and network name; devices manufacturer; security framework; protocol and application information; channel information; and signal strength and noise.
Analysis Module The WIT Analysis Module 230 constitutes the analytical means of the present invention and is capable of monitoring multiple wireless networks on multiple wireless 2o interfaces 202 from a single WIT Server 200.
The Analysis Module 230 is capable of detecting the following IEEE 802.11 specific events and reporting these events:
Network SSID the network name which must be used to distinguish one IEEE
802.11 network from another in the same range MAC address ( the unique identifier for a given node Frame information Management Frames Control Frames Data Frames: pure data streams without any management information available Information other information about the network or device which may have been configured and is carried in mana ement frames Channel the IEEE 802.11 channel being used by the device; channels range from 1 to 11 in North America Security Frameworkverify whether Wireless Equivalent Privacy (WEP), 802.1x, Wireless Protected Access (WPA) or 802.1 1i is being used to encrypt the data stream Data rate the negotiated speed of the connection between devices as support by IEEE 802.1 1b: 2 Mbps, 5.5 Mbps, 11 Mbps Traffic rates the number of packets observed from the given device; packets are categorized as follows:
LLC - IEEE 802.11 link layer control packet Data - 802.3 data packets Total = running total of all packets observed First/last appearancethe first time the device was observed and the latest observation time Analysis Module 230 allows for configuration of which events are considered threats.
Numerous specific attacks are monitored: unauthorized association, attempted association, j amming, sabotage, network lurking, device masquerade, man-in-the-middle, ARP
and MAC
address spoofing, WEP cracking, Denial-of Service (DOS) attacks and IEEE
802.11 protocol manipulation. These are explained as follows:
Unauthorized Association - a device with is not intended to access the wireless resources successfully joins the IEEE 802.11 network and has access to higher-level protocols and applications.
1o Attempted Association - an unauthorized device attempts to discover the necessary configuration elements to j oin the wireless network, or unsuccessfully presents credentials in an attempt to gain access to higher level resources.
.lamming - a device emits copious, or extraneous IEEE 802.11 frames in order to consume network resources.
Sabotage - a device emits IEEE 802.11 management or control frames in an attempt to paralyze the network as a whole or individual devices.
Network Lurking - Network lurking refers to detection of hosting sitting on the subnet but without any traffic being generated. The WIT is capable of distinguishing a node which has "stumbled" on the network and mistakenly tries to send data (e.g. using incorrect subnet configurations) from "lurking" nodes with forged or no IPs defined but MAC
address visible.
Masquerade - Detection of a device that attempts to overnde another by assuming the same IP
and broadcasting a stronger signal, such that traffic intended for legitimate device arrives at the rogue device. WIT looks far duplicate IP addresses on the network and differentiates the "new" device from the "original" device based on MAC addresses in ARP
messages.
Alternately, a MAC address can be forged. If two devices with the same MAC
address appear on the net, one or the other is ~,eliberately faked since MACS are hardware unique.
Access Point Masquerade - Another device attempt to broadcast a IEEE 802.11 management frames with the same or different SSID and IP address as a~ legitimate access point.
Man-In-The-Middle ("MITM")- Man-In-The-Middle attacks consist of masquerade, but with the added threat that information is then forwarded onto the original destination such that neither end of the connection is aware of interference or changes to packet content.
2o Wireless Equivalent Privacy ("WEP' ) Cracking -Tools which are publicly available to crack WEP keys in 1 gigabyte of data can be gathered from the network. In addition to detecting lurkers, the WIT looks far devices attempting to join the network with the correct WEP key but without knowing network configuration information or, optionally, performing no network operations after joining.
Station-to-Station - Traffic from one wireless station to another could indicate that an attack is being launched over the wireless Ethernet from one mobile; station to another.
For instance, port scans.
DOS - A wide range of DOS attacks are available to an entity that can get in range of the network. The following DOS attack methods are of primary concern, namely flooding the network with data to consume all bandwidth; protocol-based sabotage and jamming from conflicting networks.
IEEE 802.11 Protocol Manipulation - The techniques used in Counter Measure Agent 280 can be potentially mimicked by malicious entities. WIT will recognize such attacks.
l0 Hunter-Seeker dispatch settings are configured into Alarm Module 250 by system administrators (see discussions below). Typically, configuration features for Hunter-Seeker 300 include:
Multiple Hunter-Seekers - Multiple Hunter-Seekers are supported from a single WIT Server.
These can be dispatched individually or all at once.
MAC address - Hunter-Seekers are being identified on the; network using MAC
address in ARP requests, which will be cross-referenced with the expected IP.
1P Address - Hunter-Seekers will be identified by MAC address and IP address.
Signature Key - All dispatch information are signed by the WIT server. A key within the Windows certificate store is also selected.
As a general requirement, all configuration details must be supplied in order to complete configuration.
Alarm Module Multiple alarm types from the Alarm Module 250 axe displayed in the GLTI and are available for sending out via e-mail or pager. Alarm Module 250 constitutes the alerting means of the present invention and provides for three ranges of alarms, namely, Critical, Important, Suspicious. The three ranges are further described as follows:
Critical DOS attacks ~ node has successfully joined using WEP but sends incorrect login data such as network name ~ MITM
~ rogue access point identified ~ sabotage or jamming Important ~ nodes appear to be "lurking"
~ DOS from nodes which have come in range but broadcast different network advertisements ~ repeated, failed attempts to join network Suspicious ~ nodes which have come in range but broadcast different network advertisements Two types of alarms can be generated by Alarm Module 250:
E-mail Alarms - E-mail Alarms 270 are sent out via SMTP to possible several configurable addresses. Alarms may include the following data: alarm level; time; network name; category of intrusion or attack; and log information.
GUI Alarms - The GUI supports configuration to automatically pop-up alarm windows once alarms are triggered.
Information from the WIT Analysis Module 230 is formatted by Alarm Module 250 for use by the Hunter-Seeker Module 330 and Counter Measure Agent 280. This information may contain the following data: MAC address of the suspicious device; channel, if available;
type of attack; start time; subject of attack, if applicable, including IP and MAC of subject;
signal strength from listening post; and name of listening post, if multiple listening posts available.
Not all data is required to issue a dispatch. At a minimum, MAC address information is required to send Dispatch Data 310 to a Hunter-Seeker 300 or Counter Measure Agent 280.
This Dispatch Data 310 is placed in a delimited-format file far parsing by the Hunter-Seeker 300 or Counter Measure Agent 280.
Dispatch Data 310 files are either transferred to floppy disk or optionally transmitted to Hunter-Seeker 300 directly over the IEEE 802.11 network or over the Ethernet LAN to Counter Measure Agent 280. If transmitted, the information will be re-transmitted at a regular interval, e.g. every minute. If the wireless network is clown due to attack, data can be to transferred using floppy disk. WIT Server 200 checks the wireless network for access to Hunter-Seeker 300 and will continue to attempt updates regularly.
Transmissions of data to Hunter-Seeker 300 or Counter Measure Agent 280 require security. WIT Server 200 has the ability to transmit dispatch data to Hunter-Seeker 300 and Counter Measure Agent 280 which is digitally signed.
Hohey Pot Module Honey Pot Module 240 constitutes the decoying means of the present invention and its configurations are set in advance by a system administrator. The Honey Pot Module 240 can either be running all the time or can be activated automatically as a counter-measure. Honey Pot Module 240 uses a WLAN Interface 202 and imitates an IEEE 802.11 Access Point. If 2o necessary, Honey Pot Module 240 will provide a forged MAC address and broadcast the necessary ARP messages. Honey Pot Module 240 may operate either on the same channel or a different channel from the legitimate access point. Honey Pot Module 240 broadcasts IEEE
802.11 management frames with an unprotected SSID. Honey Pot Module 24U allows association from any device. An alternate configuration for the Honey Pot Module 240 is to configure moderate security to test the capabilities of the attackers.
Honey Pot Module 240 logs all data on activities from connected nodes for evidentiary purposes and issues a call to the Alarm Module 250 once activity commences.
Optically, it provides a deceptive means for tricking lurking, unauthorized or eavesdropping IEEE 802.11 devices into revealing themselves by attempted associations with Honey Pot Module 240.
Portable Computing Subsystem - Hunter Seeker Subs sw tem The various components of the Hunter Seeker subsystem 300 are described as follows:
Huhte~-Seeker Module 1o The Hunter-Seeker Module 330 constitutes of t:he signal processing means for managing IEEE 802.11 tracking interface and interpreting information gathered by Directional Antenna 400 in accordance with the present: invention. The Hunter-Seeker Module 330 runs on a portable device such as a laptop or palmtop with the ability to accommodate an 802.11 card.
Target nodes are configurable either through Alarm Module 250, Dispatches Data or through manual input directly via the Hunter-Seeker subsystem 300 GUI.
Configuration information is defined in the Alarm Module 250 functional :requirements since Alarm Module 250 is responsible for formatting Dispatch Data 310.
If multiple nodes with the same IP or MAC or otlher configuration parameters are 2o found, Hunter-Seeker subsystem 300 will prompt the system administrator for which node to track. Optionally, all nodes which match the criteria can be tracked. More than one node can be identified for tracking, with the Wireless Interface Card 320 indicating the signal strength of multiple nodes at the same time.
The Hunter-Seeker subsystem 300 reads from an IEEE 802.11 card in monitor mode and dynamically filters out all traffic unrelated to the target devices) prior to displaying any information in the GUI. The interface displays when a signal is being received from one of the target nodes including the following details about ~;he signal, namely Signal/Noise strength; IP address and subnet; MAC address; Channel; Applications and Protocols in use;
Destination of packets; SSID and Network Name; Management frame information (if applicable).
All variables except signal strength are always displayed as last known values. Signal strength is updated as often as feasible as the Directional Antenna 400 picks up and loses the signal.
l0 The Hunter-Seeker subsystem 300 verifies digital signature archives on Dispatch Data 310 information delivered from the Alarm Module 250. Successfully verified files have signature information displayed for manual confirmation by operators. After confirmation, the configuration data is loaded into Hunter-Seeker subsystem 300. If Hunter-Seeker subsystem 300 is already loaded with configuration data fo:r a target device, the user is being prompted to either overwrite the current data or load the ne;w data as an additional device to track.
Configurations and Dispatch Data 310 information can be saved once entered, or changed. Configuration information files can be reloaded into Hunter-Seeker subsystem 300.
In addition, Hunter-Seeker subsystem 300 data can be manually purged by the user with all settings back to null. Hunter-Seeker subsystem 300 is also capable of multiple logging levels which can be recorded in delimited text files in user-specified locations.
Default location is a directory called "logs" off the install directory of Hunter-Seeker subsystem 300, but location can be manually configured by users.
Logging levels according to the present invention are as follows:
None No logs kept B default setting.
Limited Start time Manual configuration or data from WIT Server Successful or failed verification of data from WIT Server 'Value of configuration data loaded Purge of data Shutdown Extensive All elements of "Limited", plus TCP-dump style data from received data about the target node Signal strength from tar et node Heavy All elements of "Extensive", plus Promiscuous dump of all in~:ormation picked-up by antenna Ahtenna Specifications Directional Antennas 400 for the purposes of operating this inventive IEEE
802.11 WIT system are custom made in accordance with the following specifications.
The antennas possess high gain and a narrow sensitivity field in the horizontal and vertical plains. Signals directly in front of the antenna appear strongest, but rapidly fade once the antenna is not pointed at t;he source of the signal. Thus a strong signal indicates the correct direction of the IEEE 802.11 node while a weak or no signal indicate the "wrong"
1 o direction.
The Directional Antenna 400 interfaces with IEEE 802.11 networks through a wide variety of available, off the-shelf or customized hardware. The WIT system relies on the physical interface provided by IEEE 802.11 system makers. For instance, an OrinocoTM
PCMCIA card with an interface for external antennas. The WIT system antennas connect to 1s the off the-shelf IEEE 802.11 radio through this means.
The Directional Antenna 400 itself may be a variety of different designs. Any antenna possessing significant directional capabilities is acceptable°, such as a patch array antenna, mufti-dipole antenna and yagi antenna.
The Directional Antenna 400 may be mounted on the back of a laptop computer such that the VGA display is directly "behind" the antenna. This allows the operator to walk forward while watching readings from the Hunter-Seeker subsystem 300 change in real time.
Alternatively, the antenna many be handheld and turned to face the strongest signal with one hand while the operator watches signal strength from the Hunter-Seeker subsystem 300 software GUI.
Commercial Off The-Shelf ("COTS") Packages COTS packages are suggested merely as an example. There is no dependencies upon to any other software. COTS may include:
~ Silent Runner from Raytheon: used for visualization of WIT data ~ IIS used for IDS analysis ~ Open Source tools Network Interfaces IEEE 802.11 WIT server subsystem is required to interface with minimum of one wireless network interface but multiple interfaces are supported. An interface with a second, fixed line network will also be required for accessing other network resources like SMTP for alerts and file server for log storage.
Depending on the sought-after device, the WIT Hunter-Seeker subsystem maintains one network interface through on-board or PCMCIA-type IEEE 802.11 radios. This interface will be for the Directional Antenna to receive signals from sought-after devices.
While the present invention has been described and illustrated herein with reference to the preferred embodiment thereof it will be understood by those skilled in the art that various changes in form and details maybe made therein without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention.
It is to be understood that the embodiments and variations shown and described herein are merely illustrative of the principles of this invention and that various modifications may be implemented by those skilled in the art without departing from the scope and spirit of the invention.
Claims (11)
1. An IEEE 802.11 security system for monitoring wireless networks and detecting, neutralizing and locating unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices, said security system comprising a network appliance subsystem and a portable computing subsystem, wherein, said network appliance subsystem comprises:
.cndot. signal processing means for detecting and monitoring IEEE 802.11 signals;
.cndot. analytical means for analysing information gathered from said unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices and determining nature of security breach; and .cndot. alerting means for alarming administrative staff of said unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices;
and said portable computing subsystem comprises:
.cndot. a directional antenna for locating said unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices; and .cndot. signal processing means for managing IEEE 802.11 interface and interpreting information gathered by said directional antenna and data means to interface between said network appliance subsystem and said portable computing subsystem.
.cndot. signal processing means for detecting and monitoring IEEE 802.11 signals;
.cndot. analytical means for analysing information gathered from said unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices and determining nature of security breach; and .cndot. alerting means for alarming administrative staff of said unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices;
and said portable computing subsystem comprises:
.cndot. a directional antenna for locating said unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices; and .cndot. signal processing means for managing IEEE 802.11 interface and interpreting information gathered by said directional antenna and data means to interface between said network appliance subsystem and said portable computing subsystem.
2. An IEEE 802.11 security system for monitoring wireless networks and detecting, neutralizing and locating unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices, said security system comprising a network appliance subsystem and a portable computing subsystem, wherein, said network appliance subsystem comprises:
.cndot. signal processing means for detecting and monitoring IEEE 802.11 signals;
.cndot. analytical means for analysing information gathered from said unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices and determining nature of security breach;
.cndot. alerting means for alarming administrative staff of said unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices;
.cndot. decoying means for distracting and alluring the attention of said unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices; and .cndot. deceptive means for tricking lurking, unauthorized or eavesdropping IEEE
802.11 devices into revealing themselves by attempted associations with said decoying means;
and said portable computing subsystem comprises:
.cndot. a directional antenna for locating said unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices; and .cndot. signal processing means for managing IEEE 802.11 interface and interpreting information gathered by said directional antenna and data means to interface between said network appliance subsystem and said portable computing subsystem.
.cndot. signal processing means for detecting and monitoring IEEE 802.11 signals;
.cndot. analytical means for analysing information gathered from said unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices and determining nature of security breach;
.cndot. alerting means for alarming administrative staff of said unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices;
.cndot. decoying means for distracting and alluring the attention of said unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices; and .cndot. deceptive means for tricking lurking, unauthorized or eavesdropping IEEE
802.11 devices into revealing themselves by attempted associations with said decoying means;
and said portable computing subsystem comprises:
.cndot. a directional antenna for locating said unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices; and .cndot. signal processing means for managing IEEE 802.11 interface and interpreting information gathered by said directional antenna and data means to interface between said network appliance subsystem and said portable computing subsystem.
3. The IEEE 802.11 security system of claim 1 or 2, further comprising means for counter-measuring security breaches initiated by the unauthorized or threatening IEEE
802.11 devices, said counter-measuring means operatively interfacing with said network appliance subsystem and launches neutralizing and/or disabling counter-measures against a suspected device upon activation.
802.11 devices, said counter-measuring means operatively interfacing with said network appliance subsystem and launches neutralizing and/or disabling counter-measures against a suspected device upon activation.
4. The IEEE 802.11 security system of claim 1 or 2, said system is directed to IEEE
802.11 WLAN in general.
802.11 WLAN in general.
5. The IEEE 802.11 security system of claim 4, said system is directed to IEEE
802.11b or IEEE 802.11 a or IEEE 802.11g.
802.11b or IEEE 802.11 a or IEEE 802.11g.
6. The IEEE 802.11 security system of claim 1 or 2, said nature of security breach being covered by the system includes unauthorized association, attempted association, jamming, sabotage, network lurking, masquerade, access point masquerade, Man-In-The-Middle, Wireless Equivalent Privacy (WEP) breaches, Station2Staion attacks and Denial Of Services.
7. The IEEE 802.11 security system of claim 3, said counter-measuring means is installed and run from either a stationary server appliance or from a mobile computing device.
8. A method for monitoring IEEE 802.11 wireless networks and detecting, neutralizing and locating unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices, said method comprising interfacing between a network appliance subsystem and a portable computing subsystem, wherein, operation of said network appliance subsystem consists of:
.cndot. sensing an interference or attack from the unauthorized or threatening IEEE
802.11 device;
.cndot. detecting and monitoring IEEE 802.11 signals with a signal processing means;
.cndot. analysing information gathered from said unauthorized or threatening IEEE
802.11 devices and determining nature of security breach by an analytical means; and .cndot. alarming a user presence of said unauthorized or threatening IEEE
802.11 devices through an alerting means;
and operation of said portable computing subsystem consists of:
.cndot. locating said unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices through a directional antenna; and .cndot. managing IEEE 802.11 interface and interpreting information gathered by said directional antenna via a signal processing means.
.cndot. sensing an interference or attack from the unauthorized or threatening IEEE
802.11 device;
.cndot. detecting and monitoring IEEE 802.11 signals with a signal processing means;
.cndot. analysing information gathered from said unauthorized or threatening IEEE
802.11 devices and determining nature of security breach by an analytical means; and .cndot. alarming a user presence of said unauthorized or threatening IEEE
802.11 devices through an alerting means;
and operation of said portable computing subsystem consists of:
.cndot. locating said unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices through a directional antenna; and .cndot. managing IEEE 802.11 interface and interpreting information gathered by said directional antenna via a signal processing means.
9. A method for monitoring IEEE 802.11 wireless networks and detecting, neutralizing and locating unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices entering said wireless networks, said method comprising interfacing between a network appliance subsystem and a portable computing subsystem, wherein, operation of said network appliance subsystem consists of:
.cndot. sensing an interference or attack from the unauthorized or threatening IEEE
802.11 device via a real-time alerting mechanism;
.cndot. detecting and monitoring IEEE 802.11 signals with a signal processing means;
.cndot. analysing information gathered from said unauthorized or threatening IEEE
802.11 devices and determining nature of security breach by an analytical means;
.cndot. alarming a user presence of said unauthorized or threatening IEEE
802.11 devices through an alerting means; and .cndot. distracting and alluring the attention of said unauthorized or threatening IEEE
802.11 devices with decoying means;
and operation of said portable computing subsystem consists of:
.cndot. locating said unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices through a directional antenna; and .cndot. managing IEEE 802.11 interface and interpreting information gathered by said directional antenna via a signal processing means.
.cndot. sensing an interference or attack from the unauthorized or threatening IEEE
802.11 device via a real-time alerting mechanism;
.cndot. detecting and monitoring IEEE 802.11 signals with a signal processing means;
.cndot. analysing information gathered from said unauthorized or threatening IEEE
802.11 devices and determining nature of security breach by an analytical means;
.cndot. alarming a user presence of said unauthorized or threatening IEEE
802.11 devices through an alerting means; and .cndot. distracting and alluring the attention of said unauthorized or threatening IEEE
802.11 devices with decoying means;
and operation of said portable computing subsystem consists of:
.cndot. locating said unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices through a directional antenna; and .cndot. managing IEEE 802.11 interface and interpreting information gathered by said directional antenna via a signal processing means.
10. The method for monitoring IEEE 802.11 wireless networks and detecting, neutralizing and locating unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices entering said wireless networks of claim 8 or 9, said method of operation of said network appliance subsystem further comprises deceptive means for tricking lurking, unauthorized or eavesdropping IEEE 802.11 devices into revealing themselves by attempted associations with said decoying means.
11. The method for monitoring IEEE 802.11 wireless networks and detecting, neutralizing and locating unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices entering said wireless networks of claims 8 or 9, further comprising counter-measuring security activity initiated by the unauthorized or threatening IEEE 802.11 devices by activating counter-measuring means which operatively interfacing with said network appliance subsystem and launching neutralizing and/or disabling counter-measures against a suspected device.
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| US34629202P | 2002-01-09 | 2002-01-09 | |
| US60/346,292 | 2002-01-09 |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CA2414789A1 true CA2414789A1 (en) | 2003-07-09 |
Family
ID=23358754
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CA002414789A Abandoned CA2414789A1 (en) | 2002-01-09 | 2002-12-18 | Wireless networks security system |
Country Status (2)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| US (1) | US20030135762A1 (en) |
| CA (1) | CA2414789A1 (en) |
Families Citing this family (153)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US7162507B2 (en) * | 2001-03-08 | 2007-01-09 | Conexant, Inc. | Wireless network site survey tool |
| US20030041125A1 (en) * | 2001-08-16 | 2003-02-27 | Salomon Kirk C. | Internet-deployed wireless system |
| US8087083B1 (en) * | 2002-01-04 | 2011-12-27 | Verizon Laboratories Inc. | Systems and methods for detecting a network sniffer |
| US7711809B2 (en) * | 2002-04-04 | 2010-05-04 | Airmagnet, Inc. | Detecting an unauthorized station in a wireless local area network |
| CA2479854C (en) * | 2002-04-08 | 2010-08-24 | Airmagnet, Inc. | Monitoring a local area network |
| US6925069B2 (en) * | 2002-04-19 | 2005-08-02 | Meshnetworks, Inc. | Data network having a wireless local area network with a packet hopping wireless backbone |
| GB2388275B (en) * | 2002-04-30 | 2005-11-02 | Hewlett Packard Co | Wireless data network security |
| US7042852B2 (en) * | 2002-05-20 | 2006-05-09 | Airdefense, Inc. | System and method for wireless LAN dynamic channel change with honeypot trap |
| US7058796B2 (en) * | 2002-05-20 | 2006-06-06 | Airdefense, Inc. | Method and system for actively defending a wireless LAN against attacks |
| US7383577B2 (en) * | 2002-05-20 | 2008-06-03 | Airdefense, Inc. | Method and system for encrypted network management and intrusion detection |
| ES2558302T3 (en) * | 2002-05-20 | 2016-02-03 | Airdefense, Inc. | System to manage the activity of a wireless network |
| US6965674B2 (en) * | 2002-05-21 | 2005-11-15 | Wavelink Corporation | System and method for providing WLAN security through synchronized update and rotation of WEP keys |
| US7322044B2 (en) * | 2002-06-03 | 2008-01-22 | Airdefense, Inc. | Systems and methods for automated network policy exception detection and correction |
| US7965842B2 (en) * | 2002-06-28 | 2011-06-21 | Wavelink Corporation | System and method for detecting unauthorized wireless access points |
| US7606242B2 (en) * | 2002-08-02 | 2009-10-20 | Wavelink Corporation | Managed roaming for WLANS |
| US7697920B1 (en) * | 2006-05-05 | 2010-04-13 | Boojum Mobile | System and method for providing authentication and authorization utilizing a personal wireless communication device |
| US7522906B2 (en) * | 2002-08-09 | 2009-04-21 | Wavelink Corporation | Mobile unit configuration management for WLANs |
| US6957067B1 (en) | 2002-09-24 | 2005-10-18 | Aruba Networks | System and method for monitoring and enforcing policy within a wireless network |
| US8819285B1 (en) | 2002-10-01 | 2014-08-26 | Trustwave Holdings, Inc. | System and method for managing network communications |
| US7469418B1 (en) | 2002-10-01 | 2008-12-23 | Mirage Networks, Inc. | Deterring network incursion |
| US8260961B1 (en) | 2002-10-01 | 2012-09-04 | Trustwave Holdings, Inc. | Logical / physical address state lifecycle management |
| US20050166072A1 (en) * | 2002-12-31 | 2005-07-28 | Converse Vikki K. | Method and system for wireless morphing honeypot |
| US9137670B2 (en) * | 2003-02-18 | 2015-09-15 | Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. | Method for detecting rogue devices operating in wireless and wired computer network environments |
| US7295524B1 (en) | 2003-02-18 | 2007-11-13 | Airwave Wireless, Inc | Methods, apparatuses and systems facilitating management of airspace in wireless computer network environments |
| US7603710B2 (en) * | 2003-04-03 | 2009-10-13 | Network Security Technologies, Inc. | Method and system for detecting characteristics of a wireless network |
| US7346338B1 (en) | 2003-04-04 | 2008-03-18 | Airespace, Inc. | Wireless network system including integrated rogue access point detection |
| US7313113B1 (en) * | 2003-04-04 | 2007-12-25 | Airespace, Inc. | Dynamic transmit power configuration system for wireless network environments |
| US7342906B1 (en) | 2003-04-04 | 2008-03-11 | Airespace, Inc. | Distributed wireless network security system |
| US7522908B2 (en) * | 2003-04-21 | 2009-04-21 | Airdefense, Inc. | Systems and methods for wireless network site survey |
| US7359676B2 (en) * | 2003-04-21 | 2008-04-15 | Airdefense, Inc. | Systems and methods for adaptively scanning for wireless communications |
| US7324804B2 (en) * | 2003-04-21 | 2008-01-29 | Airdefense, Inc. | Systems and methods for dynamic sensor discovery and selection |
| US7539169B1 (en) | 2003-06-30 | 2009-05-26 | Cisco Systems, Inc. | Directed association mechanism in wireless network environments |
| US7453840B1 (en) | 2003-06-30 | 2008-11-18 | Cisco Systems, Inc. | Containment of rogue systems in wireless network environments |
| US7286515B2 (en) * | 2003-07-28 | 2007-10-23 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Method, apparatus, and software product for detecting rogue access points in a wireless network |
| US7293088B2 (en) | 2003-07-28 | 2007-11-06 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Tag location, client location, and coverage hole location in a wireless network |
| US6990428B1 (en) * | 2003-07-28 | 2006-01-24 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Radiolocation using path loss data |
| WO2005024598A2 (en) * | 2003-09-09 | 2005-03-17 | Oto Software, Inc | Method and system for securing and monitoring a wireless network |
| US20050060576A1 (en) * | 2003-09-15 | 2005-03-17 | Kime Gregory C. | Method, apparatus and system for detection of and reaction to rogue access points |
| US8161528B2 (en) * | 2003-10-07 | 2012-04-17 | Xr Communications, Llc | Detecting wireless interlopers |
| US7856209B1 (en) | 2003-12-08 | 2010-12-21 | Airtight Networks, Inc. | Method and system for location estimation in wireless networks |
| US7002943B2 (en) * | 2003-12-08 | 2006-02-21 | Airtight Networks, Inc. | Method and system for monitoring a selected region of an airspace associated with local area networks of computing devices |
| US7406320B1 (en) | 2003-12-08 | 2008-07-29 | Airtight Networks, Inc. | Method and system for location estimation in wireless networks |
| US7409715B2 (en) * | 2003-12-10 | 2008-08-05 | Alcatel Lucent | Mechanism for detection of attacks based on impersonation in a wireless network |
| US20050160287A1 (en) * | 2004-01-16 | 2005-07-21 | Dell Products L.P. | Method to deploy wireless network security with a wireless router |
| US7823199B1 (en) * | 2004-02-06 | 2010-10-26 | Extreme Networks | Method and system for detecting and preventing access intrusion in a network |
| US7310664B1 (en) | 2004-02-06 | 2007-12-18 | Extreme Networks | Unified, configurable, adaptive, network architecture |
| US7577996B1 (en) | 2004-02-06 | 2009-08-18 | Extreme Networks | Apparatus, method and system for improving network security |
| US7440434B2 (en) * | 2004-02-11 | 2008-10-21 | Airtight Networks, Inc. | Method and system for detecting wireless access devices operably coupled to computer local area networks and related methods |
| US7339914B2 (en) | 2004-02-11 | 2008-03-04 | Airtight Networks, Inc. | Automated sniffer apparatus and method for monitoring computer systems for unauthorized access |
| US7216365B2 (en) * | 2004-02-11 | 2007-05-08 | Airtight Networks, Inc. | Automated sniffer apparatus and method for wireless local area network security |
| US7260408B2 (en) * | 2004-02-20 | 2007-08-21 | Airespace, Inc. | Wireless node location mechanism using antenna pattern diversity to enhance accuracy of location estimates |
| US20050185666A1 (en) * | 2004-02-23 | 2005-08-25 | Maxim Raya | Misbehaving detection method for contention-based wireless communications |
| US7286833B2 (en) * | 2004-02-27 | 2007-10-23 | Airespace, Inc. | Selective termination of wireless connections to refresh signal information in wireless node location infrastructure |
| US7205938B2 (en) * | 2004-03-05 | 2007-04-17 | Airespace, Inc. | Wireless node location mechanism responsive to observed propagation characteristics of wireless network infrastructure signals |
| US7116988B2 (en) * | 2004-03-16 | 2006-10-03 | Airespace, Inc. | Location of wireless nodes using signal strength weighting metric |
| US20050213553A1 (en) * | 2004-03-25 | 2005-09-29 | Wang Huayan A | Method for wireless LAN intrusion detection based on protocol anomaly analysis |
| US20060165073A1 (en) * | 2004-04-06 | 2006-07-27 | Airtight Networks, Inc., (F/K/A Wibhu Technologies, Inc.) | Method and a system for regulating, disrupting and preventing access to the wireless medium |
| US7496094B2 (en) * | 2004-04-06 | 2009-02-24 | Airtight Networks, Inc. | Method and system for allowing and preventing wireless devices to transmit wireless signals |
| US7433696B2 (en) * | 2004-05-18 | 2008-10-07 | Cisco Systems, Inc. | Wireless node location mechanism featuring definition of search region to optimize location computation |
| US7286835B1 (en) * | 2004-09-10 | 2007-10-23 | Airespace, Inc. | Enhanced wireless node location using differential signal strength metric |
| EP1854019A4 (en) * | 2004-09-22 | 2010-12-22 | Cyberdefender Corp | Threat protection network |
| CN1906905B (en) * | 2004-10-12 | 2012-08-22 | 日本电信电话株式会社 | Service disabling attack protecting system, and service disabling attack protecting method |
| US8196199B2 (en) * | 2004-10-19 | 2012-06-05 | Airdefense, Inc. | Personal wireless monitoring agent |
| US20060123133A1 (en) * | 2004-10-19 | 2006-06-08 | Hrastar Scott E | Detecting unauthorized wireless devices on a wired network |
| US7516174B1 (en) | 2004-11-02 | 2009-04-07 | Cisco Systems, Inc. | Wireless network security mechanism including reverse network address translation |
| WO2006069604A1 (en) * | 2004-12-30 | 2006-07-06 | Telecom Italia S.P.A. | Method and system for detecting attacks in wireless data communication networks |
| CA2496939A1 (en) * | 2005-02-08 | 2006-08-08 | Cirond Networks, Inc. | Network security method and apparatus |
| US7596376B2 (en) * | 2005-02-18 | 2009-09-29 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Methods, apparatuses and systems facilitating client handoffs in wireless network systems |
| US7805140B2 (en) * | 2005-02-18 | 2010-09-28 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Pre-emptive roaming mechanism allowing for enhanced QoS in wireless network environments |
| US7370362B2 (en) * | 2005-03-03 | 2008-05-06 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Method and apparatus for locating rogue access point switch ports in a wireless network |
| WO2006099540A2 (en) | 2005-03-15 | 2006-09-21 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | System and method for distributing keys in a wireless network |
| US20060230450A1 (en) * | 2005-03-31 | 2006-10-12 | Tian Bu | Methods and devices for defending a 3G wireless network against a signaling attack |
| WO2006107712A2 (en) * | 2005-04-04 | 2006-10-12 | Bae Systems Information And Electronic Systems Integration Inc. | Method and apparatus for defending against zero-day worm-based attacks |
| US7975300B2 (en) * | 2005-04-15 | 2011-07-05 | Toshiba America Research, Inc. | Secure isolation and recovery in wireless networks |
| WO2007005799A1 (en) | 2005-06-30 | 2007-01-11 | Abbott Laboratories | Delivery system for a medical device |
| US7724717B2 (en) * | 2005-07-22 | 2010-05-25 | Sri International | Method and apparatus for wireless network security |
| US8249028B2 (en) * | 2005-07-22 | 2012-08-21 | Sri International | Method and apparatus for identifying wireless transmitters |
| US7392037B2 (en) * | 2005-08-19 | 2008-06-24 | Intel Corporation | Wireless communication device and methods for protecting broadcasted management control messages in wireless networks |
| ATE422799T1 (en) * | 2005-08-25 | 2009-02-15 | Research In Motion Ltd | DETECTION AND RESTRICTION OF AN UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS POINT |
| WO2007044986A2 (en) | 2005-10-13 | 2007-04-19 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | System and method for remote monitoring in a wireless network |
| US8638762B2 (en) * | 2005-10-13 | 2014-01-28 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | System and method for network integrity |
| US7551619B2 (en) | 2005-10-13 | 2009-06-23 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | Identity-based networking |
| US7573859B2 (en) | 2005-10-13 | 2009-08-11 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | System and method for remote monitoring in a wireless network |
| US7724703B2 (en) | 2005-10-13 | 2010-05-25 | Belden, Inc. | System and method for wireless network monitoring |
| US7710933B1 (en) | 2005-12-08 | 2010-05-04 | Airtight Networks, Inc. | Method and system for classification of wireless devices in local area computer networks |
| US8965334B2 (en) * | 2005-12-19 | 2015-02-24 | Alcatel Lucent | Methods and devices for defending a 3G wireless network against malicious attacks |
| JP2007174287A (en) * | 2005-12-22 | 2007-07-05 | Nec Corp | Radio packet communication system, radio packet base station, radio packet terminal and illegal communication canceling method |
| US7570625B1 (en) | 2006-01-10 | 2009-08-04 | Tw Acquisition, Inc. | Detection of wireless devices |
| US7715800B2 (en) | 2006-01-13 | 2010-05-11 | Airdefense, Inc. | Systems and methods for wireless intrusion detection using spectral analysis |
| US20070218874A1 (en) * | 2006-03-17 | 2007-09-20 | Airdefense, Inc. | Systems and Methods For Wireless Network Forensics |
| US7971251B2 (en) * | 2006-03-17 | 2011-06-28 | Airdefense, Inc. | Systems and methods for wireless security using distributed collaboration of wireless clients |
| US7558266B2 (en) | 2006-05-03 | 2009-07-07 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | System and method for restricting network access using forwarding databases |
| US20090021343A1 (en) * | 2006-05-10 | 2009-01-22 | Airdefense, Inc. | RFID Intrusion Protection System and Methods |
| US8966018B2 (en) | 2006-05-19 | 2015-02-24 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | Automated network device configuration and network deployment |
| US7821986B2 (en) * | 2006-05-31 | 2010-10-26 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | WLAN infrastructure provided directions and roaming |
| US7577453B2 (en) | 2006-06-01 | 2009-08-18 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | Wireless load balancing across bands |
| US8818322B2 (en) | 2006-06-09 | 2014-08-26 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | Untethered access point mesh system and method |
| US9191799B2 (en) | 2006-06-09 | 2015-11-17 | Juniper Networks, Inc. | Sharing data between wireless switches system and method |
| US7912982B2 (en) | 2006-06-09 | 2011-03-22 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | Wireless routing selection system and method |
| US9258702B2 (en) | 2006-06-09 | 2016-02-09 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | AP-local dynamic switching |
| US7970013B2 (en) | 2006-06-16 | 2011-06-28 | Airdefense, Inc. | Systems and methods for wireless network content filtering |
| US8281392B2 (en) * | 2006-08-11 | 2012-10-02 | Airdefense, Inc. | Methods and systems for wired equivalent privacy and Wi-Fi protected access protection |
| US8340110B2 (en) | 2006-09-15 | 2012-12-25 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | Quality of service provisioning for wireless networks |
| EP1906594A1 (en) * | 2006-09-28 | 2008-04-02 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Security monitoring device and method for security monitoring for wireless transmissions |
| US8817813B2 (en) * | 2006-10-02 | 2014-08-26 | Aruba Networks, Inc. | System and method for adaptive channel scanning within a wireless network |
| US7616555B2 (en) * | 2006-10-03 | 2009-11-10 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Minimum variance location estimation in wireless networks |
| US7835749B1 (en) | 2006-10-03 | 2010-11-16 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Location inspector in wireless networks |
| US7626969B2 (en) * | 2006-10-04 | 2009-12-01 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Relative location of a wireless node in a wireless network |
| US7983667B2 (en) | 2006-10-05 | 2011-07-19 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Radio frequency coverage map generation in wireless networks |
| US8072952B2 (en) | 2006-10-16 | 2011-12-06 | Juniper Networks, Inc. | Load balancing |
| US8069483B1 (en) | 2006-10-19 | 2011-11-29 | The United States States of America as represented by the Director of the National Security Agency | Device for and method of wireless intrusion detection |
| US20080151844A1 (en) * | 2006-12-20 | 2008-06-26 | Manish Tiwari | Wireless access point authentication system and method |
| US7865713B2 (en) | 2006-12-28 | 2011-01-04 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | Application-aware wireless network system and method |
| US7873061B2 (en) | 2006-12-28 | 2011-01-18 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | System and method for aggregation and queuing in a wireless network |
| US7904092B2 (en) * | 2007-01-04 | 2011-03-08 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Locally adjusted radio frequency coverage maps in wireless networks |
| EP2109986A2 (en) * | 2007-02-05 | 2009-10-21 | Bandspeed, Inc. | Approach for mitigating the effects of rogue wireless access points |
| US7516049B2 (en) * | 2007-02-19 | 2009-04-07 | Microsoft Corporation | Wireless performance analysis system |
| US8155662B2 (en) * | 2007-02-19 | 2012-04-10 | Microsoft Corporation | Self-configuring wireless network location system |
| US20090019539A1 (en) * | 2007-07-11 | 2009-01-15 | Airtight Networks, Inc. | Method and system for wireless communications characterized by ieee 802.11w and related protocols |
| US20090016529A1 (en) * | 2007-07-11 | 2009-01-15 | Airtight Networks, Inc. | Method and system for prevention of unauthorized communication over 802.11w and related wireless protocols |
| FI122209B (en) | 2007-08-10 | 2011-10-14 | 7Signal Oy | End-to-end quality of service monitoring system and system in radio network |
| US8522353B1 (en) * | 2007-08-15 | 2013-08-27 | Meru Networks | Blocking IEEE 802.11 wireless access |
| US8902904B2 (en) | 2007-09-07 | 2014-12-02 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | Network assignment based on priority |
| US7970894B1 (en) | 2007-11-15 | 2011-06-28 | Airtight Networks, Inc. | Method and system for monitoring of wireless devices in local area computer networks |
| US8238942B2 (en) | 2007-11-21 | 2012-08-07 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | Wireless station location detection |
| US8150357B2 (en) | 2008-03-28 | 2012-04-03 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | Smoothing filter for irregular update intervals |
| US8474023B2 (en) * | 2008-05-30 | 2013-06-25 | Juniper Networks, Inc. | Proactive credential caching |
| US8978105B2 (en) | 2008-07-25 | 2015-03-10 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | Affirming network relationships and resource access via related networks |
| US8238298B2 (en) | 2008-08-29 | 2012-08-07 | Trapeze Networks, Inc. | Picking an optimal channel for an access point in a wireless network |
| US8694624B2 (en) * | 2009-05-19 | 2014-04-08 | Symbol Technologies, Inc. | Systems and methods for concurrent wireless local area network access and sensing |
| US20100332593A1 (en) * | 2009-06-29 | 2010-12-30 | Igor Barash | Systems and methods for operating an anti-malware network on a cloud computing platform |
| US8929803B2 (en) | 2012-03-07 | 2015-01-06 | Symbol Technologies, Inc. | Radio frequency barrier in a wireless communication network |
| US9279878B2 (en) | 2012-03-27 | 2016-03-08 | Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc | Locating a mobile device |
| US9166732B2 (en) * | 2012-04-19 | 2015-10-20 | At&T Mobility Ii Llc | Facilitation of security employing a femto cell access point |
| CN102685225A (en) * | 2012-05-07 | 2012-09-19 | 国家海洋局南通海洋环境监测中心站 | Automatic network monitoring system for ocean observation |
| EP2677792A1 (en) * | 2012-06-20 | 2013-12-25 | Thomson Licensing | Method and device for countering fingerprint forgery attacks in a communication system |
| US9612121B2 (en) | 2012-12-06 | 2017-04-04 | Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc | Locating position within enclosure |
| US9776716B2 (en) | 2012-12-19 | 2017-10-03 | Elwah LLC | Unoccupied flying vehicle (UFV) inter-vehicle communication for hazard handling |
| US9810789B2 (en) | 2012-12-19 | 2017-11-07 | Elwha Llc | Unoccupied flying vehicle (UFV) location assurance |
| US9747809B2 (en) | 2012-12-19 | 2017-08-29 | Elwha Llc | Automated hazard handling routine activation |
| US9540102B2 (en) | 2012-12-19 | 2017-01-10 | Elwha Llc | Base station multi-vehicle coordination |
| US9405296B2 (en) | 2012-12-19 | 2016-08-02 | Elwah LLC | Collision targeting for hazard handling |
| US10518877B2 (en) | 2012-12-19 | 2019-12-31 | Elwha Llc | Inter-vehicle communication for hazard handling for an unoccupied flying vehicle (UFV) |
| US9669926B2 (en) * | 2012-12-19 | 2017-06-06 | Elwha Llc | Unoccupied flying vehicle (UFV) location confirmance |
| US9527587B2 (en) | 2012-12-19 | 2016-12-27 | Elwha Llc | Unoccupied flying vehicle (UFV) coordination |
| US9567074B2 (en) | 2012-12-19 | 2017-02-14 | Elwha Llc | Base station control for an unoccupied flying vehicle (UFV) |
| US9527586B2 (en) | 2012-12-19 | 2016-12-27 | Elwha Llc | Inter-vehicle flight attribute communication for an unoccupied flying vehicle (UFV) |
| US10279906B2 (en) | 2012-12-19 | 2019-05-07 | Elwha Llc | Automated hazard handling routine engagement |
| US9813930B1 (en) | 2014-07-21 | 2017-11-07 | 7Signal Solutions, Inc. | Method and apparatus for integrating active test capability to a wireless access point or base station |
| US9462013B1 (en) | 2015-04-29 | 2016-10-04 | International Business Machines Corporation | Managing security breaches in a networked computing environment |
| US9923908B2 (en) | 2015-04-29 | 2018-03-20 | International Business Machines Corporation | Data protection in a networked computing environment |
| US10075850B2 (en) * | 2015-12-15 | 2018-09-11 | The Boeing Company | Method and system for wireless attack detection and mitigation |
| US10230743B1 (en) | 2016-05-12 | 2019-03-12 | Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. | Rogue endpoint detection |
Family Cites Families (6)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US6687833B1 (en) * | 1999-09-24 | 2004-02-03 | Networks Associates, Inc. | System and method for providing a network host decoy using a pseudo network protocol stack implementation |
| JP3585422B2 (en) * | 2000-06-01 | 2004-11-04 | シャープ株式会社 | Access point device and authentication processing method thereof |
| US20020066034A1 (en) * | 2000-10-24 | 2002-05-30 | Schlossberg Barry J. | Distributed network security deception system |
| US20030065934A1 (en) * | 2001-09-28 | 2003-04-03 | Angelo Michael F. | After the fact protection of data in remote personal and wireless devices |
| US6897776B1 (en) * | 2002-02-06 | 2005-05-24 | Intermec Ip Corp. | Electronic countermeasure (ECM) system and method |
| US7058796B2 (en) * | 2002-05-20 | 2006-06-06 | Airdefense, Inc. | Method and system for actively defending a wireless LAN against attacks |
-
2002
- 2002-12-18 CA CA002414789A patent/CA2414789A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2002-12-20 US US10/323,728 patent/US20030135762A1/en not_active Abandoned
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| US20030135762A1 (en) | 2003-07-17 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| US20030135762A1 (en) | Wireless networks security system | |
| US7383577B2 (en) | Method and system for encrypted network management and intrusion detection | |
| US7086089B2 (en) | Systems and methods for network security | |
| US7779476B2 (en) | Active defense against wireless intruders | |
| US7042852B2 (en) | System and method for wireless LAN dynamic channel change with honeypot trap | |
| US7277404B2 (en) | System and method for sensing wireless LAN activity | |
| US7856656B1 (en) | Method and system for detecting masquerading wireless devices in local area computer networks | |
| US8196199B2 (en) | Personal wireless monitoring agent | |
| Lim et al. | Wireless intrusion detection and response | |
| Bahl et al. | Enhancing the security of corporate Wi-Fi networks using DAIR | |
| US7322044B2 (en) | Systems and methods for automated network policy exception detection and correction | |
| US7359676B2 (en) | Systems and methods for adaptively scanning for wireless communications | |
| US20060123133A1 (en) | Detecting unauthorized wireless devices on a wired network | |
| US20040255167A1 (en) | Method and system for remote network security management | |
| US20150040194A1 (en) | Monitoring of smart mobile devices in the wireless access networks | |
| WO2004092925A2 (en) | Method and system for detecting characteristics of a wireless network | |
| US20040203764A1 (en) | Methods and systems for identifying nodes and mapping their locations | |
| EP1522020B1 (en) | System for managing wireless network activity | |
| Kamal et al. | Analysis of network communication attacks | |
| Poonkuntran et al. | Study of Honeypots: analysis of WiFi_Honeypots and Honeypots tools | |
| Sinha et al. | Wireless intrusion protection system using distributed collaborative intelligence | |
| Pudney | An investigation into the unauthorised use of 802.11 wireless local area networks wireless local area networks | |
| Tao | A novel intrusion detection system for detection of MAC address spoofing in wireless networks. | |
| Meade | Guidelines for the development and evaluation of IEEE 802.11 intrusion detection systems (IDS) | |
| Singh et al. | Wlan security their vulnerability, threats and alternative solutions |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| FZDE | Discontinued |