CA2478274A1 - Method and apparatus for synchronizing an adaptable security level in an electronic communication - Google Patents
Method and apparatus for synchronizing an adaptable security level in an electronic communication Download PDFInfo
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- CA2478274A1 CA2478274A1 CA002478274A CA2478274A CA2478274A1 CA 2478274 A1 CA2478274 A1 CA 2478274A1 CA 002478274 A CA002478274 A CA 002478274A CA 2478274 A CA2478274 A CA 2478274A CA 2478274 A1 CA2478274 A1 CA 2478274A1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
- H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0876—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
- H04L63/105—Multiple levels of security
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/16—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
- H04L63/162—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer at the data link layer
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Power Engineering (AREA)
- Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
A method of communicating in a secure communication system, comprises the steps of assembling as message at a sender, then determining a security level, and including an indication of the security level in a header of the message. The message is then sent to a recipient.
Description
2 SECURITY LEVEL IN AN ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION
3
4 BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
7 [000x] The present invention relates to a method and apparatus for providing synchronizing 8 an adaptable security level in an electronic communication.
I O DESCR11'TION OF THE PRIOR ART
11 [0002] In electronic communications, it is often necessary to prevent an eavesdropper from I2 intercepting a message. It is also desirable to have an indication of the authenticity of a message, 13 that is a verifiable identification of the sender. These goals are usually achieved through the use 14 of cryptography. Private key cryptography requires sharing a secret key prior to irritating I S communications. Public key cryptography is generally preferred as it does not require such a 16 shared secret key. Instead, each correspondent has a key pair including a private key and a public 17 key. The public key may be provided by any convenient means, and does not need to be kept I8 secret.
19 [0003] There are many variations in cryptographic algorithms, and various parameters that 20 determine the precise implementation. In standards for wireless communications, it has been 2I customary to set these parameters in advance for each frame type. However, this approach limits 22 the flexibility of the parameters.
23 [0004] When one device is communicating with several other devices, it will often need to 24 establish separate parameters for each communication.
25 [0005] It is an object of the present invention to obviate or mitigate the above disadvantages.
28 [0006] In accordance with one aspect of the present invention, there is provided a method of 29 communicating in a secure communication system, comprising the steps of assembling as McCarthy Tetrault LLP TDD-RED ~8?D3701 v l 1 message at a sender, then determining a security level, and including an indication of the security 2 level in a header of the message. The message is then sent to a recipient.
3 [0007] In accordance with another aspect of the present invention, there is provided a method 4 of providing a security level to a sender by including information in an acknowledgement message.
8 [0008] These and other features of the preferred embodiments of the invention will become 9 more apparent in the following detailed description in which reference is made to the appended drawings wherein:
11 [0009] Figure 1 is a schematic representation of a communication system;
12 [0010] Figure 2 is a schematic representation of an information frame exchanged in the 13 communication system of Figure 1;
14 [0011] Figure 3 is a schematic representation of a frame control portion of the frame of Figure 2;
16 [0012] Figure 4 is a schematic representation of a method performed by a sender in Figure 1;
17 [0013] Figure 5 is a schematic representation of a method performed by a recipient in Figure 18 1;
19 [0014] Figure 6 is a schematic representation of a network protocol used in one embodiment of the communication system;
21 (0015] Figure 7 is a schematic representation of an embodiment of the communication 22 system;
23 [0016] Figure 8 is a schematic representation of another embodiment of the communication 24 system.
27 [0017] Referring to Figure 1, a communication system 10 includes a pair of correspondents 28 12, i4 connected by a communication link 16. Each correspondent 12, 14 includes a respective 29 cryptographic unit 18, 20.
McCartlry Tetraalt LLP TDO-RED #8203702 r. l 1 [0018] Each correspondent 12,14 can include a processor 22, 24. Each processor may be 2 coupled to a display and to user input devices, such as a keyboard, mouse, or other suitable 3 devices. If the display is touch sensifive, then the display itself can be employed as the user 4 input device. A computer readable storage medium is coupled to each processor 22, 24 for providing instructions to the processor 22, 24 to instruct and/or configure processor 22, 24 to G perform steps or algorithms related to the operation of each correspondent 12, 14, as further 7 explained below. The computer readable medium can include hardware and/or software such as, 8 by way of example only, magnetic disks, magnetic tape, optically readable medium such as CD
9 ROM's, and semi-conductor memory such as PCMCIA cards. In each case, the medium may take the form of a portable item such as a small disk, floppy diskette, cassette, or it may take the 11 form of a relatively large or immobile item such as hard disk drive, Solid state memory card, or 12 RAM provided in a support system. It should be noted that the above listed example mediums 13 can be used either alone or in combination.
14 [0019] Referring to Figure 2, a frame used in communications between the correspondents 12, 14 is shown generally by the numeral 30. The frame 30 includes a header 32 and data 34. The 16 header 32 includes information about the source and destination of the frame 30 and is used for 17 processing frames. The header 32 may contain other control information as will be understood 18 by those skilled in the art.
19 [0020] Referring to Figure 3, the header 32 also contains frame control bits 33. The frame control bits 33 include security bits 35, 36, and 37. Security bit 35 indicates whether encryption 21 is on or off. Security bits 36 and 37 together indicate the integrity Ievel, such as 0, 32, 64, or 128 22 bits. It will be recognized that providing security bits in each frame allows the security level to 23 be modified on a frame-by-frame basis rather than on the basis of a pair of correspondents, 24 therefore providing greater flexibility in organizing communications.
~ [0021] In order to provide security, certain minimum security levels may be used. These 26 levels should be decided upon among all of the correspondents through an agreed-upon rule.
27 This rule may be either static or dynamic, 28 [0022] In operation, the correspondent 12 performs the steps shown in Figure 4 by the 29 numeral 100 to send information to the correspondent 14. First, the correspondent 12 prepares McCarthy Tetrnult LLP TDO-RED 118203702 v. l r 1 data and a header at step 102. Then it selects the security level at step 104. The security level is 2 determined by considering the minimum security level required by the recipient, the nature of the 3 recipient, and the kind of data being transmitted. If the security level includes encryption, then 4 the correspondent 12 encrypts the data at step 106. If the security level includes authentication, S then the correspondent I2 signs the data at step 108. Then the correspondent 12 includes bits 6 indicating the security level in the frame control at step 110. The correspondent 12 then sends the 7 frame to the correspondent 14.
8 [0023] Upon receiving the frame, the correspondent 14 performs the steps shown in Figure S
9 by the numeral 120. The correspondent I4 first receives the frame at step I22. It then extracts the security bits at step 124. If the security bits indicate encryption, then the correspondent 14 11 decrypts the data at step 126. If the security bits indicate authentication, then the correspondent 12 14 verifies the signature at step 126. Finally, the correspondent 14 checks the security level to 13 ensure it meets predetermined minimum requirements. If either the encryption or authentication 14 fails, or if the security Ievel does not meet the minimum requirements, then the correspondent 14 rejects the message.
16 [0024] It will be recognized that providing security bits and an adjustable security level 17 provides flexibility in protecting each frame of the communication. It is therefore possible for the 18 sender to decided which frames should be encrypted but not authenticated.
Since authentication 19 typically increases the length of a message, this provides a savings in constrained environments when bandwidth is at a premium.
21 [0025] In a further embodiment, the correspondent 12 wishes to send the same message to 22 multiple recipients 14 with varying minimum security requirements. In this case, the 23 correspondent 12 chooses a security level high enough to meet all of the requirements. The 24 correspondent 12 then proceeds as in Figure 4 to assemble and send a message with the security level. The message will be accepted by each recipient since it meets each of their minimum 26 requirements. It will be recognized that this embodiment provides greater efficiency than 27 separately dealing with each recipient's requirements.
28 [0026] In another embodiment, a different number of security bits are used.
The actual 29 number of bits is not limited to any one value, but rather may be predetermined for any given M~conu>> r~~~u~r LtP rvo-x~n saao3~oi ~ ~
1 application. The security bits should indicate the algorithm parameters.
They may be used to 2 determine the length of a key as 40 bits or 128 bits, the version of a key to be used, or any other 3 parameters of the encryption system.
4 [002?] It will be recognized that in the above embodiments, a network stack may be used to organize communications between the correspondents. Referring therefore to Figure b, the a 6 network stack of correspondent A is shown by the numeral 130. A network stack of 7 correspondent B is shown by the numeral 140. The network stacks are organized into layers and 8 have similar structures. The network stack 130 includes an application layer (APL) i32, a 9 network layer (NWK) 134, a message authentication layer (MAC) 136, and a physical layer (PHA 138. The network stack 140 includes similar components with similar numbering.
11 [0028] The sender determines how he wants to protect payload (and where to protect it, i.e., 12 which layer). For the APL layer, security should be transparent; its role is limited to indicating at I3 which level it wants to protect data (i.e., security services: none, confidentiality, data 14 authenticity, or both}. The actual cryptographic processing then is delegated to lower layers.
[0029] The recipient determines whether or not to accept protected payload, based on the 16 received frame and Locally maintained status information. The outcome of the cryptographic 17 processing (done at the same layer as that of the sender), including info on the apparently offered 18 protection level, is passed to the application layer, who determines whether the offered 19 protection level was adequate. The recipient may acknowledge proper receipt of the frame to the original sender, based on this 'adequacy test'.
21 [0030] The acknowledgement (ACK), if present, is then passed back to the sender and 22 passed up to the appropriate level (if protected message sent at APL layer, then ACK should also 23 arrive back at that level; similar for lower layers of course).
24 [0031] The sender A determines that it wants to protect payload m using the protection level indicated by SEC (taking into account its own security needs and, possibly, those of its intended 26 recipient(s). The payload m and desired protection level SEC is then passed to a lower layer 27 (e.g., the MAC layer, as in the diagram) which takes care of the actual cryptographic processing.
28 (This message passing could include additional status information that aids in the processing of 29 the frame, such as the intended recipient(s), fragmentation info, etc. Note that the delegation of
7 [000x] The present invention relates to a method and apparatus for providing synchronizing 8 an adaptable security level in an electronic communication.
I O DESCR11'TION OF THE PRIOR ART
11 [0002] In electronic communications, it is often necessary to prevent an eavesdropper from I2 intercepting a message. It is also desirable to have an indication of the authenticity of a message, 13 that is a verifiable identification of the sender. These goals are usually achieved through the use 14 of cryptography. Private key cryptography requires sharing a secret key prior to irritating I S communications. Public key cryptography is generally preferred as it does not require such a 16 shared secret key. Instead, each correspondent has a key pair including a private key and a public 17 key. The public key may be provided by any convenient means, and does not need to be kept I8 secret.
19 [0003] There are many variations in cryptographic algorithms, and various parameters that 20 determine the precise implementation. In standards for wireless communications, it has been 2I customary to set these parameters in advance for each frame type. However, this approach limits 22 the flexibility of the parameters.
23 [0004] When one device is communicating with several other devices, it will often need to 24 establish separate parameters for each communication.
25 [0005] It is an object of the present invention to obviate or mitigate the above disadvantages.
28 [0006] In accordance with one aspect of the present invention, there is provided a method of 29 communicating in a secure communication system, comprising the steps of assembling as McCarthy Tetrault LLP TDD-RED ~8?D3701 v l 1 message at a sender, then determining a security level, and including an indication of the security 2 level in a header of the message. The message is then sent to a recipient.
3 [0007] In accordance with another aspect of the present invention, there is provided a method 4 of providing a security level to a sender by including information in an acknowledgement message.
8 [0008] These and other features of the preferred embodiments of the invention will become 9 more apparent in the following detailed description in which reference is made to the appended drawings wherein:
11 [0009] Figure 1 is a schematic representation of a communication system;
12 [0010] Figure 2 is a schematic representation of an information frame exchanged in the 13 communication system of Figure 1;
14 [0011] Figure 3 is a schematic representation of a frame control portion of the frame of Figure 2;
16 [0012] Figure 4 is a schematic representation of a method performed by a sender in Figure 1;
17 [0013] Figure 5 is a schematic representation of a method performed by a recipient in Figure 18 1;
19 [0014] Figure 6 is a schematic representation of a network protocol used in one embodiment of the communication system;
21 (0015] Figure 7 is a schematic representation of an embodiment of the communication 22 system;
23 [0016] Figure 8 is a schematic representation of another embodiment of the communication 24 system.
27 [0017] Referring to Figure 1, a communication system 10 includes a pair of correspondents 28 12, i4 connected by a communication link 16. Each correspondent 12, 14 includes a respective 29 cryptographic unit 18, 20.
McCartlry Tetraalt LLP TDO-RED #8203702 r. l 1 [0018] Each correspondent 12,14 can include a processor 22, 24. Each processor may be 2 coupled to a display and to user input devices, such as a keyboard, mouse, or other suitable 3 devices. If the display is touch sensifive, then the display itself can be employed as the user 4 input device. A computer readable storage medium is coupled to each processor 22, 24 for providing instructions to the processor 22, 24 to instruct and/or configure processor 22, 24 to G perform steps or algorithms related to the operation of each correspondent 12, 14, as further 7 explained below. The computer readable medium can include hardware and/or software such as, 8 by way of example only, magnetic disks, magnetic tape, optically readable medium such as CD
9 ROM's, and semi-conductor memory such as PCMCIA cards. In each case, the medium may take the form of a portable item such as a small disk, floppy diskette, cassette, or it may take the 11 form of a relatively large or immobile item such as hard disk drive, Solid state memory card, or 12 RAM provided in a support system. It should be noted that the above listed example mediums 13 can be used either alone or in combination.
14 [0019] Referring to Figure 2, a frame used in communications between the correspondents 12, 14 is shown generally by the numeral 30. The frame 30 includes a header 32 and data 34. The 16 header 32 includes information about the source and destination of the frame 30 and is used for 17 processing frames. The header 32 may contain other control information as will be understood 18 by those skilled in the art.
19 [0020] Referring to Figure 3, the header 32 also contains frame control bits 33. The frame control bits 33 include security bits 35, 36, and 37. Security bit 35 indicates whether encryption 21 is on or off. Security bits 36 and 37 together indicate the integrity Ievel, such as 0, 32, 64, or 128 22 bits. It will be recognized that providing security bits in each frame allows the security level to 23 be modified on a frame-by-frame basis rather than on the basis of a pair of correspondents, 24 therefore providing greater flexibility in organizing communications.
~ [0021] In order to provide security, certain minimum security levels may be used. These 26 levels should be decided upon among all of the correspondents through an agreed-upon rule.
27 This rule may be either static or dynamic, 28 [0022] In operation, the correspondent 12 performs the steps shown in Figure 4 by the 29 numeral 100 to send information to the correspondent 14. First, the correspondent 12 prepares McCarthy Tetrnult LLP TDO-RED 118203702 v. l r 1 data and a header at step 102. Then it selects the security level at step 104. The security level is 2 determined by considering the minimum security level required by the recipient, the nature of the 3 recipient, and the kind of data being transmitted. If the security level includes encryption, then 4 the correspondent 12 encrypts the data at step 106. If the security level includes authentication, S then the correspondent I2 signs the data at step 108. Then the correspondent 12 includes bits 6 indicating the security level in the frame control at step 110. The correspondent 12 then sends the 7 frame to the correspondent 14.
8 [0023] Upon receiving the frame, the correspondent 14 performs the steps shown in Figure S
9 by the numeral 120. The correspondent I4 first receives the frame at step I22. It then extracts the security bits at step 124. If the security bits indicate encryption, then the correspondent 14 11 decrypts the data at step 126. If the security bits indicate authentication, then the correspondent 12 14 verifies the signature at step 126. Finally, the correspondent 14 checks the security level to 13 ensure it meets predetermined minimum requirements. If either the encryption or authentication 14 fails, or if the security Ievel does not meet the minimum requirements, then the correspondent 14 rejects the message.
16 [0024] It will be recognized that providing security bits and an adjustable security level 17 provides flexibility in protecting each frame of the communication. It is therefore possible for the 18 sender to decided which frames should be encrypted but not authenticated.
Since authentication 19 typically increases the length of a message, this provides a savings in constrained environments when bandwidth is at a premium.
21 [0025] In a further embodiment, the correspondent 12 wishes to send the same message to 22 multiple recipients 14 with varying minimum security requirements. In this case, the 23 correspondent 12 chooses a security level high enough to meet all of the requirements. The 24 correspondent 12 then proceeds as in Figure 4 to assemble and send a message with the security level. The message will be accepted by each recipient since it meets each of their minimum 26 requirements. It will be recognized that this embodiment provides greater efficiency than 27 separately dealing with each recipient's requirements.
28 [0026] In another embodiment, a different number of security bits are used.
The actual 29 number of bits is not limited to any one value, but rather may be predetermined for any given M~conu>> r~~~u~r LtP rvo-x~n saao3~oi ~ ~
1 application. The security bits should indicate the algorithm parameters.
They may be used to 2 determine the length of a key as 40 bits or 128 bits, the version of a key to be used, or any other 3 parameters of the encryption system.
4 [002?] It will be recognized that in the above embodiments, a network stack may be used to organize communications between the correspondents. Referring therefore to Figure b, the a 6 network stack of correspondent A is shown by the numeral 130. A network stack of 7 correspondent B is shown by the numeral 140. The network stacks are organized into layers and 8 have similar structures. The network stack 130 includes an application layer (APL) i32, a 9 network layer (NWK) 134, a message authentication layer (MAC) 136, and a physical layer (PHA 138. The network stack 140 includes similar components with similar numbering.
11 [0028] The sender determines how he wants to protect payload (and where to protect it, i.e., 12 which layer). For the APL layer, security should be transparent; its role is limited to indicating at I3 which level it wants to protect data (i.e., security services: none, confidentiality, data 14 authenticity, or both}. The actual cryptographic processing then is delegated to lower layers.
[0029] The recipient determines whether or not to accept protected payload, based on the 16 received frame and Locally maintained status information. The outcome of the cryptographic 17 processing (done at the same layer as that of the sender), including info on the apparently offered 18 protection level, is passed to the application layer, who determines whether the offered 19 protection level was adequate. The recipient may acknowledge proper receipt of the frame to the original sender, based on this 'adequacy test'.
21 [0030] The acknowledgement (ACK), if present, is then passed back to the sender and 22 passed up to the appropriate level (if protected message sent at APL layer, then ACK should also 23 arrive back at that level; similar for lower layers of course).
24 [0031] The sender A determines that it wants to protect payload m using the protection level indicated by SEC (taking into account its own security needs and, possibly, those of its intended 26 recipient(s). The payload m and desired protection level SEC is then passed to a lower layer 27 (e.g., the MAC layer, as in the diagram) which takes care of the actual cryptographic processing.
28 (This message passing could include additional status information that aids in the processing of 29 the frame, such as the intended recipient(s), fragmentation info, etc. Note that the delegation of
5 McCarlGy Telrault LL,P TDO-RED #8203701 v. I
1 the cryptographic processing to a lower layer is only a conceptual step if cryptographic 2 processing takes place at the same layer at which the payload m originates.) Cryptographic 3 processing involves protecting the payload m and, possibly, associated information such as frame 4 headers, using the cryptographic process indicated by the desired protection level SEC. The key used to protect this information is derived from shared keying material maintained between the
1 the cryptographic processing to a lower layer is only a conceptual step if cryptographic 2 processing takes place at the same layer at which the payload m originates.) Cryptographic 3 processing involves protecting the payload m and, possibly, associated information such as frame 4 headers, using the cryptographic process indicated by the desired protection level SEC. The key used to protect this information is derived from shared keying material maintained between the
6 sender and the intended recipient(s). After cryptographic processing, the protected frame,
7 indicated by [mJK, SEC in Figure 6, is communicated to the intended recipients) B.
8 [0032] The intended recipient {s) retrieves the payload m' from the received protected frame,
9 using the cryptographic process indicated by the observed protection level SEC', using a key that is derived from shared keying material maintained between the sender and the recipient{s) in I 1 question. The retrieved payload m' and the observed protection Ievel SEC' is passed to the same 12 level at which the payload was originated by the sender, where the adequacy of the observed 13 protection level is determined. The observed protection level SEC' is deemed sufficient, if it 14 meets or exceeds the expected protection level SECa, where the parameter SECo might be a fixed pre-negotiated protection level that does or does not depend on the retrieved payload m' in 16 question. (?defining SECo in a message..depcndent way would allow fine-grained access control 17 policies, but generally involves increased storage and processing requirements.) 18 [0033] The above approach works in contexts where expected and observed protection levels 19 can be compared, i.c., where the set of protection levels is a partial ordering. An exaraple is the context where protection involves a combination of encryption and/or authentication, with as 21 ordering the Cartesian product of the natural ordering for encryption {encryption OFF <
22 Encryption ON) and the natural ordering of authentication (ordered according to increasing 23 length of data authenticity field}. Moreover, if the set of protection levels has a maximum 24 element, then the sender can use this maximum protection level to ensure that {unaltered) messages always pass the adequacy test.
26 [0034) In the above embodiments, each sender has to pre-negotiate the minimum expected 27 protection level SECo with each intended recipient. Thus, the approach might not be as adaptive 28 as desirable for some applications and may involve additional protocol overhead at every change 29 of the SECo parameter. These disadvantages can be overcome by using the acknowledgement McCarlky Telraul! LLP TDO-RED #810370? v. l 1 (ACR) mechanism from recipients} to sender as a feedback channel for passing the SECo info.
2 This is performed by incorporating in each acknowledgement message an indication as to the 3 expected protection level. This information can then be collated by the original sender to update 4 the minimum protection level expected by its recipient(s), whether or not this is message..
dependent or not.
6 [0035] In a further embodiment, a method of synchronizing security levels is shown.
7 Refernng to Figure 7, another embodiment of the communication system is shown generally by 8 the numeral 160. The system includes a sender A I 62 and recipients 168 in a group labelled G.
9 The sender A includes parameters SECA 164 and SECT 166.
[0036] Sender A wants to securely communicate a message m to a group G of devices. The 11 sender A has access to the two parameters, i.e., 12 [0037] (1) The minimum level SECA at which it would like to protect this message (in 13 general, SECA might depend on the group it sends information to and the message itself, so 14 proper notation would be SECA (m,G));
[0038] (2) The minimum protection level SECT that the group G of recipients expects 16 (again, the proper notation would be SEC~(m,A) if this level would depend on the sender and the 17 message itself as well). Here, the minimum expectation level of a ,group is the maximum over all 1$ group members of the minimum expectation level for each group member.
19 [0039] Initialization [0040] Sender A assumes that each parameter SECG is set to the maximum protection level 21 (for each group G it securely communicates with).
22 [0041] Operational usage 23 [0042] - Sender A determines the minimum protection level SECA at which it wants to 24 protect the message m. The actual protection level SEC applied to the message m meets both its own adequacy test (i.e., SEC ZSECn) and the minimum expected level by the group G (i.e., SEC
26 zSECG).
27 [0043] - Each recipient B that is in the group G of recipients (i.e., B E
G) indicates in its 28 secure acknowledgement message the minimum expected protection level (for sender A and 29 message m) at that particular moment of time.
McCarthy T~trault LLP TDO-AED #8203702 v, l 1 (0044) - A updates the parameter SECT such that it is consistent with all the minimum 2 protection levels indicated in each of the acknowledgement messages it received back (i.e., 3 SECG ?SECB far all responding devices B).
4 [0045] Note that the procedure described above sends messages with a protection level that satisfies both the needs of the sender and expectations of recipients) and is adaptable to changes 6 herein over time. Alternatively, the sender might only take its own protection needs into account, 7 at the cost ofpotentially sending messages that will be rejected by one or more recipients due to 8 insufficient - since less than expected - protection level.
9 [8046] The procedure described above can be generalized towards a general self synchronization procedure for status information among devices in any network topology, where I 1 the feedback info on status information may be partially processed along the feedback path from 12 recipients) towards sender already, rather than at the sender itself only (in the example above, 13 this graph is a tree with root A and leaves the recipients) and the synchronization involves a 14 specific security parameter).
[0047] As seen in Figure 8, A sends a payload secured at protection level SEC
to a group of I6 devices consisting of B1-B4. The recipients BI-B4 provide feedback to the sender A on the 17 expected protection level (indicated in the diagram as the integers I, 3, 2, S, where these integers 18 are numbered in order of increasing protection level). The feedback is communicated back to A
19 via intermediate nodes C1 and C2, who collect the respective feedbacks of devices in their respective groups G1 and G2 and process this, before returning a condensed acknowledge 21 message representing both groups to sender A. The condensed feedbacks provided by these 22 intermediate devices provides A with the same information on the minimum protection level that 23 satisfies the expectations of all recipients as would have been the case if this information would 24 have been forwarded to A without intermediate processing. (Here, we assume that the intermediate devices do not cheat in their calculations.) 26 [0048] Although the invention has been described with reference to certain specific 27 embodiments, various modifications thereof will be apparent to thane skilled in the art without 28 departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as outlined in the claims appended hereto.
McCar~liy Teireult LLP TDO-RED 118203702 r, I
22 Encryption ON) and the natural ordering of authentication (ordered according to increasing 23 length of data authenticity field}. Moreover, if the set of protection levels has a maximum 24 element, then the sender can use this maximum protection level to ensure that {unaltered) messages always pass the adequacy test.
26 [0034) In the above embodiments, each sender has to pre-negotiate the minimum expected 27 protection level SECo with each intended recipient. Thus, the approach might not be as adaptive 28 as desirable for some applications and may involve additional protocol overhead at every change 29 of the SECo parameter. These disadvantages can be overcome by using the acknowledgement McCarlky Telraul! LLP TDO-RED #810370? v. l 1 (ACR) mechanism from recipients} to sender as a feedback channel for passing the SECo info.
2 This is performed by incorporating in each acknowledgement message an indication as to the 3 expected protection level. This information can then be collated by the original sender to update 4 the minimum protection level expected by its recipient(s), whether or not this is message..
dependent or not.
6 [0035] In a further embodiment, a method of synchronizing security levels is shown.
7 Refernng to Figure 7, another embodiment of the communication system is shown generally by 8 the numeral 160. The system includes a sender A I 62 and recipients 168 in a group labelled G.
9 The sender A includes parameters SECA 164 and SECT 166.
[0036] Sender A wants to securely communicate a message m to a group G of devices. The 11 sender A has access to the two parameters, i.e., 12 [0037] (1) The minimum level SECA at which it would like to protect this message (in 13 general, SECA might depend on the group it sends information to and the message itself, so 14 proper notation would be SECA (m,G));
[0038] (2) The minimum protection level SECT that the group G of recipients expects 16 (again, the proper notation would be SEC~(m,A) if this level would depend on the sender and the 17 message itself as well). Here, the minimum expectation level of a ,group is the maximum over all 1$ group members of the minimum expectation level for each group member.
19 [0039] Initialization [0040] Sender A assumes that each parameter SECG is set to the maximum protection level 21 (for each group G it securely communicates with).
22 [0041] Operational usage 23 [0042] - Sender A determines the minimum protection level SECA at which it wants to 24 protect the message m. The actual protection level SEC applied to the message m meets both its own adequacy test (i.e., SEC ZSECn) and the minimum expected level by the group G (i.e., SEC
26 zSECG).
27 [0043] - Each recipient B that is in the group G of recipients (i.e., B E
G) indicates in its 28 secure acknowledgement message the minimum expected protection level (for sender A and 29 message m) at that particular moment of time.
McCarthy T~trault LLP TDO-AED #8203702 v, l 1 (0044) - A updates the parameter SECT such that it is consistent with all the minimum 2 protection levels indicated in each of the acknowledgement messages it received back (i.e., 3 SECG ?SECB far all responding devices B).
4 [0045] Note that the procedure described above sends messages with a protection level that satisfies both the needs of the sender and expectations of recipients) and is adaptable to changes 6 herein over time. Alternatively, the sender might only take its own protection needs into account, 7 at the cost ofpotentially sending messages that will be rejected by one or more recipients due to 8 insufficient - since less than expected - protection level.
9 [8046] The procedure described above can be generalized towards a general self synchronization procedure for status information among devices in any network topology, where I 1 the feedback info on status information may be partially processed along the feedback path from 12 recipients) towards sender already, rather than at the sender itself only (in the example above, 13 this graph is a tree with root A and leaves the recipients) and the synchronization involves a 14 specific security parameter).
[0047] As seen in Figure 8, A sends a payload secured at protection level SEC
to a group of I6 devices consisting of B1-B4. The recipients BI-B4 provide feedback to the sender A on the 17 expected protection level (indicated in the diagram as the integers I, 3, 2, S, where these integers 18 are numbered in order of increasing protection level). The feedback is communicated back to A
19 via intermediate nodes C1 and C2, who collect the respective feedbacks of devices in their respective groups G1 and G2 and process this, before returning a condensed acknowledge 21 message representing both groups to sender A. The condensed feedbacks provided by these 22 intermediate devices provides A with the same information on the minimum protection level that 23 satisfies the expectations of all recipients as would have been the case if this information would 24 have been forwarded to A without intermediate processing. (Here, we assume that the intermediate devices do not cheat in their calculations.) 26 [0048] Although the invention has been described with reference to certain specific 27 embodiments, various modifications thereof will be apparent to thane skilled in the art without 28 departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as outlined in the claims appended hereto.
McCar~liy Teireult LLP TDO-RED 118203702 r, I
Claims (4)
OR PRIVILEGE IS CLAIMED ARE DEFINED AS FOLLOWS:
1. A method of communicating in a secure communication system, comprising the steps of:
a) assembling as message at a sender;
b) determining a security level;
c) including an indication of the security level in a header of the message;
d) sending the message to a recipient.
a) assembling as message at a sender;
b) determining a security level;
c) including an indication of the security level in a header of the message;
d) sending the message to a recipient.
2. A method according to claim 1, wherein the security level is chosen to be at least a minimum security level known to the sender and the recipient.
3. A method of communicating in a secure communication system, wherein each communication is divided into a plurality of frames, and each frame includes an indication of a security level, thereby allowing each frame to have a different security level to adapt to the nature of each frame.
4. A method of providing a security level to a sender by including information in an acknowledgement message.
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Cited By (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| US11563747B2 (en) | 2003-07-07 | 2023-01-24 | Blackberry Limited | Method and aparatus for providing an adaptable security level in an electronic communication |
| US11870787B2 (en) | 2003-07-07 | 2024-01-09 | Blackberry Limited | Method and apparatus for providing an adaptable security level in an electronic communication |
| US20200244669A1 (en) * | 2006-04-13 | 2020-07-30 | Certicom Corp. | Method and Apparatus for Providing an Adaptable Security Level in an Electronic Communication |
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| US9253161B2 (en) | 2016-02-02 |
| DE102004040312A1 (en) | 2005-03-17 |
| GB2406484B (en) | 2007-01-31 |
| US20050081032A1 (en) | 2005-04-14 |
| US20140181990A1 (en) | 2014-06-26 |
| US8245279B2 (en) | 2012-08-14 |
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| US8640253B2 (en) | 2014-01-28 |
| US9774609B2 (en) | 2017-09-26 |
| US20120284800A1 (en) | 2012-11-08 |
| CA2478274C (en) | 2015-12-08 |
| GB2406484A (en) | 2005-03-30 |
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