CA2644015A1 - Method and apparatus for providing an adaptable security level in an electronic communication - Google Patents
Method and apparatus for providing an adaptable security level in an electronic communication Download PDFInfo
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- CA2644015A1 CA2644015A1 CA002644015A CA2644015A CA2644015A1 CA 2644015 A1 CA2644015 A1 CA 2644015A1 CA 002644015 A CA002644015 A CA 002644015A CA 2644015 A CA2644015 A CA 2644015A CA 2644015 A1 CA2644015 A1 CA 2644015A1
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
- H04L63/105—Multiple levels of security
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
- H04L63/0227—Filtering policies
Abstract
A method of communicating in a secure communication system, comprises the steps of assembling a message at a sender, then determining a frame type, and including an indication of the frame type in a header of the message. The message is then sent to a recipient and the frame type used to perform a policy check.
Description
2 SECURITY LEVEL IN AN ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION
3
4 FIELD OF THE INVENTION
100011 The present invention relates to a method and apparatus for providing an 6 adaptable security level in an electronic communication.
9 100021 In electronic communications, it is often necessary to prevent an eavesdropper from intercepting a message. It is also desirable to have an indication of the authenticity of a I 1 message, that is a verifiable identification of the sender. These goals are usually achieved 12 through the use of cryptography. Private key cryptography requires sharing a secret key prior 13 to initiating communications. Public key cryptography is generally preferred as it does not 14 require such a shared secret key. Instead, each correspondent has a key pair including a private key and a public key. The public key may be provided by any convenient means, and 16 does not need to be kept secret.
17 100031 There are many variations in cryptographic algorithms, and various parameters 18 that determine the precise implementation. In standards for wireless communications, it has 19 been customary to set these parameters in advance for each frame type.
However, this approach limits the flexibility of the parameters.
21 100041 When one device is communicating with several other devices, it will often need 22 to establish separate parameters for each communication.
23 [00051 It is an object of the present invention to obviate or mitigate the above 24 disadvantages.
27 [0006] In one aspect, there is provided a method of communicating between a first 28 correspondent and a second correspondent in a data communication system comprising 29 assembling a data stream at said first correspondent, said data stream having at least one frame, said frame having a header and data; incorporating in said header, an indication of a 31 frame type; and forwarding said frame to said second correspondent to enable said second 32 correspondent to detennine the acceptability of said frame aceording to said frame type.
21632046.1 1 [0007] In another aspect, there is provided a method of verifying a communication 2 between a first correspondent and a second correspondent in a data communication system 3 comprising said second correspondent: receiving from said first correspondent, a frame 4 having a header and data, said header including an indication of a frame type; determining said frame type from said header; and correlating said frame type to a policy to determine if 6 said frame type is acceptable for at least one attribute of said frame.
7 [0008] In yet another aspect, there is provided a method of communicating between a pair 8 of correspondents in a data communication system comprising exempting one of said pair of 9 correspondents from security rules associated with said communication system to enable said one correspondent to initialize communication with the other of said correspondents.
13 [0009] An embodiment of the invention will now be described by way of example only 14 with reference to the accompanying drawings in which:
[0010] Figure 1 is a schematic representation of a communication system;
16 [0011] Figure 2 is a schematic representation of an information frame exchanged in the 17 communication system of Figure l;
18 [0012] Figure 3 is a schematic representation of a frame control portion of the frame of 19 Figure 2;
[0013] Figure 4 is a schematic representation of a method performed by a sender in 21 Figure 1;
22 [0014] Figure 5 is a schematic representation of a method performed by a recipient in 23 Figure 1;
24 [0015] Figure 6 is a schematic representation of a network protocol used in one embodiment of the communication system;
26 [0016] Figure 7 is a schematic representation of an embodiment of the communication 27 system;
28 [0017] Figure 8 is a schematic representation of another embodiment of the 29 communication system.
[0018] Figure 9 is a schematic representation of another frame;
31 [0019] Figure 10 is a schematic representation of a method performed by a sender using 32 the frame of Figure 9;
21632046.1 1 [0020] Figure 11 is a schematic representation of a method performed by a recipient 2 using the frame of Figure 9;
3 [0021] Figure 12 is a schematic representation of another communication system; and 4 [0022] Figure 13 is a schematic representation of a method performed by a correspondent in Figure 12.
8 [0023] Referring to Figure 1, a communication system 10 includes a pair of 9 correspondents 12, 14 connected by a communication link 16. Each correspondent 12, 14 includes a respective cryptographic unit 18, 20.
11 [0024] Each correspondent 12, 14 can include a processor 22, 24. Each processor may be 12 coupled to a display and to user input devices, such as a keyboard, mouse, or other suitable 13 devices. If the display is touch sensitive, then the display itself can be employed as the user 14 input device. A computer readable storage medium (not shown) is coupled to each processor 22, 24 for providing instructions to the processor 22, 24 to instruct and/or configure processor 16 22, 24 to perform steps or algorithms related to the operation of each correspondent 12, 14, as 17 further explained below. The computer readable medium can include hardware and/or 18 software such as, by way of example only, magnetic disks, magnetic tape, optically readable 19 medium such as CD ROM's, and semi-conductor memory such as PCMCIA cards. In each case, the medium may take the form of a portable item such as a small disk, floppy diskette, 21 cassette, or it may take the form of a relatively large or immobile item such as hard disk 22 drive, solid state memory card, or RAM provided in a support system_ It should be noted that 23 the above listed example mediums can be used either alone or in combination.
24 [0025] In order to transfer data between the correspondents 12, 14, a packet stream 30 is assembled at one of the correspondents in accordance with a defined protocol.
The packet 26 stream 30 is shown schematically in Figure 2 and is composed of one or more frames 31, 27 each of which has a header 32 and data 34. In some protocols, the packet may itself be 28 organised as a frame with a header 32a and the data 34a consisting of a collection of 29 individual frames. The header 32 is made up of a string of bits and contains control infonnation at specified locations within the bit stream.
31 [0026] Included in each of the headers 34 are security control bits 33, that include a 32 security mode bit 35 and integrity level bits 36,37.
216 ~zo46. i 1 [0027] In this embodiment, security mode bit 35 is used to indicate whether eneryption is 2 on or off. Integrity level bits 36 and 37 together are used to indicate which of four integrity 3 levels, such as 0, 32, 64, or 128 bit key size is utilised. The security mode bit 35 may be used 4 to indicate alternative modes of operation, such as, authentication and the number of bits may be increased (or decreased) to accommodate different combinations. It will be recognized 6 that providing security bits in each frame 31 of the stream 30 allows the security level to be 7 on a frame-by-frame basis rather than on the basis of a pair of correspondents, therefore 8 providing greater flexibility in organizing communications.
9 [0028] In order to provide security, certain minimum security levels may be used. These levels should be decided upon among all of the correspondents through an agreed-upon rule.
11 This rule may be either static or dynamic.
12 [00291 In operation, the correspondent 12 performs the steps shown in Figure 4 by the 13 numeral 100 to send information to the correspondent 14. First, the correspondent 12 14 prepares data and a header at step 102. Then it selects the security level at step 104. The security level is determined by considering the minimum security level required by the 16 recipient, the nature of the recipient, and the kind of data being transmitted. If the security 17 level includes encryption, then the correspondent 12 encrypts the data at step 106. If the 18 security level includes authentication, then the correspondent 12 signs the data at step 108.
19 Then the correspondent 12 includes bits indicating the security mode and security level in the frame control at step 110. The correspondent 12 then sends the frame to the correspondent 14 21 at step 112.
22 [0030] Upon receiving the frame, the correspondent 14 performs the steps shown in 23 Figure 5 by the numeral 120. The correspondent 14 first receives the frame at step 122. It 24 then extracts the security bits at step 124. If the mode security bits 34 indicate encryption, then the correspondent 14 deerypts the data at step 126. If the security bits indicate 26 authentication, then the correspondent 14 verifies the signature at step 126. Finally, the 27 correspondent 14 checks the security level to ensure it meets predetermined minimum 28 requirements at step 128. If either the encryption or authentication fails, or if the security 29 level does not meet the minimum reqliirements, then the correspondent 14 rejects the message and, if the encryption and authentication do not fail, and the security level meets the 31 minimum requirements then the message is accepted, at step 130.
21632046. 1 1 [00311 It will be recognized that providing security bits and an adjustable security level 2 provides flexibility in protecting each frame of the communication. It is therefore possible for 3 the sender to decide which frames should be encrypted but not authenticated.
Since 4 authentication typically increases the length of a message, this provides a savings in constrained environments when bandwidth is at a premium.
6 [00321 In a further embodiment, the correspondent 12 wishes to send the same message 7 to multiple recipients 14 with varying minimum security requirements. In this case, the 8 correspondent 12 chooses a security level high enough to meet all of the requirements. The 9 correspondent 12 then proceeds as in Figure 4 to assemble and send a message with the security level. The message will be accepted by each recipient since it meets each of their 11 minimum requirements. It will be recognized that this embodiment provides greater 12 efficienc.y than separately dealing with each recipient's requirements.
13 100331 In another embodiment, a different number of security bits are used.
The actual 14 number of bits is not limited to any one value, but rather may be predetermined for any given application. The security bits should indicate the algorithm parameters. They may be used to 16 determine the length of a key as 40 bits or 128 bits, the version of a key to be used, or any 17 other pai-ameters of the encryption system.
18 [00341 [t will be recognized that in the above embodiments, a network stack may be used 19 to organize communications between the correspondents. Referring therefore to Figure 6, the a network stack of correspondent A is shown by the numeral 130. A network stack of 21 correspondent B is shown by the numeral 140. The network stacks are organized into layers 22 and have similar structures. The network stack 130 includes an application layer (APL) 132, a 23 network layer (NWK) 134, a message authentication layer (MAC) 136, and a physical layer 24 (PHY) 138. The network stack 140 includes similar components with similar numbering.
[00351 The sender determines how he wants to protect payload (and where to protect it, 26 i.e., which layer). For the APL layer, security should be transparent; its role is limited to 27 indicating at which level it wants to protect data (i.e., security services: none, confidentiality, 28 data authenticity, or both). The actual cryptographic processing then is delegated to lower 29 layers.
[00361 The recipient determines whether or not to accept protected payload, based on the 31 received frame and locally maintained status information. The outcome of the cryptographic 32 processing (done at the same layer as that of the sender), including info on the apparently 21632046.1
100011 The present invention relates to a method and apparatus for providing an 6 adaptable security level in an electronic communication.
9 100021 In electronic communications, it is often necessary to prevent an eavesdropper from intercepting a message. It is also desirable to have an indication of the authenticity of a I 1 message, that is a verifiable identification of the sender. These goals are usually achieved 12 through the use of cryptography. Private key cryptography requires sharing a secret key prior 13 to initiating communications. Public key cryptography is generally preferred as it does not 14 require such a shared secret key. Instead, each correspondent has a key pair including a private key and a public key. The public key may be provided by any convenient means, and 16 does not need to be kept secret.
17 100031 There are many variations in cryptographic algorithms, and various parameters 18 that determine the precise implementation. In standards for wireless communications, it has 19 been customary to set these parameters in advance for each frame type.
However, this approach limits the flexibility of the parameters.
21 100041 When one device is communicating with several other devices, it will often need 22 to establish separate parameters for each communication.
23 [00051 It is an object of the present invention to obviate or mitigate the above 24 disadvantages.
27 [0006] In one aspect, there is provided a method of communicating between a first 28 correspondent and a second correspondent in a data communication system comprising 29 assembling a data stream at said first correspondent, said data stream having at least one frame, said frame having a header and data; incorporating in said header, an indication of a 31 frame type; and forwarding said frame to said second correspondent to enable said second 32 correspondent to detennine the acceptability of said frame aceording to said frame type.
21632046.1 1 [0007] In another aspect, there is provided a method of verifying a communication 2 between a first correspondent and a second correspondent in a data communication system 3 comprising said second correspondent: receiving from said first correspondent, a frame 4 having a header and data, said header including an indication of a frame type; determining said frame type from said header; and correlating said frame type to a policy to determine if 6 said frame type is acceptable for at least one attribute of said frame.
7 [0008] In yet another aspect, there is provided a method of communicating between a pair 8 of correspondents in a data communication system comprising exempting one of said pair of 9 correspondents from security rules associated with said communication system to enable said one correspondent to initialize communication with the other of said correspondents.
13 [0009] An embodiment of the invention will now be described by way of example only 14 with reference to the accompanying drawings in which:
[0010] Figure 1 is a schematic representation of a communication system;
16 [0011] Figure 2 is a schematic representation of an information frame exchanged in the 17 communication system of Figure l;
18 [0012] Figure 3 is a schematic representation of a frame control portion of the frame of 19 Figure 2;
[0013] Figure 4 is a schematic representation of a method performed by a sender in 21 Figure 1;
22 [0014] Figure 5 is a schematic representation of a method performed by a recipient in 23 Figure 1;
24 [0015] Figure 6 is a schematic representation of a network protocol used in one embodiment of the communication system;
26 [0016] Figure 7 is a schematic representation of an embodiment of the communication 27 system;
28 [0017] Figure 8 is a schematic representation of another embodiment of the 29 communication system.
[0018] Figure 9 is a schematic representation of another frame;
31 [0019] Figure 10 is a schematic representation of a method performed by a sender using 32 the frame of Figure 9;
21632046.1 1 [0020] Figure 11 is a schematic representation of a method performed by a recipient 2 using the frame of Figure 9;
3 [0021] Figure 12 is a schematic representation of another communication system; and 4 [0022] Figure 13 is a schematic representation of a method performed by a correspondent in Figure 12.
8 [0023] Referring to Figure 1, a communication system 10 includes a pair of 9 correspondents 12, 14 connected by a communication link 16. Each correspondent 12, 14 includes a respective cryptographic unit 18, 20.
11 [0024] Each correspondent 12, 14 can include a processor 22, 24. Each processor may be 12 coupled to a display and to user input devices, such as a keyboard, mouse, or other suitable 13 devices. If the display is touch sensitive, then the display itself can be employed as the user 14 input device. A computer readable storage medium (not shown) is coupled to each processor 22, 24 for providing instructions to the processor 22, 24 to instruct and/or configure processor 16 22, 24 to perform steps or algorithms related to the operation of each correspondent 12, 14, as 17 further explained below. The computer readable medium can include hardware and/or 18 software such as, by way of example only, magnetic disks, magnetic tape, optically readable 19 medium such as CD ROM's, and semi-conductor memory such as PCMCIA cards. In each case, the medium may take the form of a portable item such as a small disk, floppy diskette, 21 cassette, or it may take the form of a relatively large or immobile item such as hard disk 22 drive, solid state memory card, or RAM provided in a support system_ It should be noted that 23 the above listed example mediums can be used either alone or in combination.
24 [0025] In order to transfer data between the correspondents 12, 14, a packet stream 30 is assembled at one of the correspondents in accordance with a defined protocol.
The packet 26 stream 30 is shown schematically in Figure 2 and is composed of one or more frames 31, 27 each of which has a header 32 and data 34. In some protocols, the packet may itself be 28 organised as a frame with a header 32a and the data 34a consisting of a collection of 29 individual frames. The header 32 is made up of a string of bits and contains control infonnation at specified locations within the bit stream.
31 [0026] Included in each of the headers 34 are security control bits 33, that include a 32 security mode bit 35 and integrity level bits 36,37.
216 ~zo46. i 1 [0027] In this embodiment, security mode bit 35 is used to indicate whether eneryption is 2 on or off. Integrity level bits 36 and 37 together are used to indicate which of four integrity 3 levels, such as 0, 32, 64, or 128 bit key size is utilised. The security mode bit 35 may be used 4 to indicate alternative modes of operation, such as, authentication and the number of bits may be increased (or decreased) to accommodate different combinations. It will be recognized 6 that providing security bits in each frame 31 of the stream 30 allows the security level to be 7 on a frame-by-frame basis rather than on the basis of a pair of correspondents, therefore 8 providing greater flexibility in organizing communications.
9 [0028] In order to provide security, certain minimum security levels may be used. These levels should be decided upon among all of the correspondents through an agreed-upon rule.
11 This rule may be either static or dynamic.
12 [00291 In operation, the correspondent 12 performs the steps shown in Figure 4 by the 13 numeral 100 to send information to the correspondent 14. First, the correspondent 12 14 prepares data and a header at step 102. Then it selects the security level at step 104. The security level is determined by considering the minimum security level required by the 16 recipient, the nature of the recipient, and the kind of data being transmitted. If the security 17 level includes encryption, then the correspondent 12 encrypts the data at step 106. If the 18 security level includes authentication, then the correspondent 12 signs the data at step 108.
19 Then the correspondent 12 includes bits indicating the security mode and security level in the frame control at step 110. The correspondent 12 then sends the frame to the correspondent 14 21 at step 112.
22 [0030] Upon receiving the frame, the correspondent 14 performs the steps shown in 23 Figure 5 by the numeral 120. The correspondent 14 first receives the frame at step 122. It 24 then extracts the security bits at step 124. If the mode security bits 34 indicate encryption, then the correspondent 14 deerypts the data at step 126. If the security bits indicate 26 authentication, then the correspondent 14 verifies the signature at step 126. Finally, the 27 correspondent 14 checks the security level to ensure it meets predetermined minimum 28 requirements at step 128. If either the encryption or authentication fails, or if the security 29 level does not meet the minimum reqliirements, then the correspondent 14 rejects the message and, if the encryption and authentication do not fail, and the security level meets the 31 minimum requirements then the message is accepted, at step 130.
21632046. 1 1 [00311 It will be recognized that providing security bits and an adjustable security level 2 provides flexibility in protecting each frame of the communication. It is therefore possible for 3 the sender to decide which frames should be encrypted but not authenticated.
Since 4 authentication typically increases the length of a message, this provides a savings in constrained environments when bandwidth is at a premium.
6 [00321 In a further embodiment, the correspondent 12 wishes to send the same message 7 to multiple recipients 14 with varying minimum security requirements. In this case, the 8 correspondent 12 chooses a security level high enough to meet all of the requirements. The 9 correspondent 12 then proceeds as in Figure 4 to assemble and send a message with the security level. The message will be accepted by each recipient since it meets each of their 11 minimum requirements. It will be recognized that this embodiment provides greater 12 efficienc.y than separately dealing with each recipient's requirements.
13 100331 In another embodiment, a different number of security bits are used.
The actual 14 number of bits is not limited to any one value, but rather may be predetermined for any given application. The security bits should indicate the algorithm parameters. They may be used to 16 determine the length of a key as 40 bits or 128 bits, the version of a key to be used, or any 17 other pai-ameters of the encryption system.
18 [00341 [t will be recognized that in the above embodiments, a network stack may be used 19 to organize communications between the correspondents. Referring therefore to Figure 6, the a network stack of correspondent A is shown by the numeral 130. A network stack of 21 correspondent B is shown by the numeral 140. The network stacks are organized into layers 22 and have similar structures. The network stack 130 includes an application layer (APL) 132, a 23 network layer (NWK) 134, a message authentication layer (MAC) 136, and a physical layer 24 (PHY) 138. The network stack 140 includes similar components with similar numbering.
[00351 The sender determines how he wants to protect payload (and where to protect it, 26 i.e., which layer). For the APL layer, security should be transparent; its role is limited to 27 indicating at which level it wants to protect data (i.e., security services: none, confidentiality, 28 data authenticity, or both). The actual cryptographic processing then is delegated to lower 29 layers.
[00361 The recipient determines whether or not to accept protected payload, based on the 31 received frame and locally maintained status information. The outcome of the cryptographic 32 processing (done at the same layer as that of the sender), including info on the apparently 21632046.1
5 1 offered protection level, is passed to the application layer, who determines whether the 2 offered protection level was adequate. The recipient may acknowledge proper receipt of the 3 frame to the original sender, based on this 'adequacy test'.
4 10037] The acknowledgement (ACK), if present, is then passed back to the sender and passed up to the appropriate level (if protected message sent at APL layer, then ACK should
4 10037] The acknowledgement (ACK), if present, is then passed back to the sender and passed up to the appropriate level (if protected message sent at APL layer, then ACK should
6 also arrive back at that level; similar for lower layers of course).
7 [0038] The sender A determines that it wants to protect payload m using the protection
8 level indicated by SEC (taking into account its own security needs and, possibly, those of its
9 intended recipient(s). The payload m and desired protection level SEC is then passed to a lower layer (e.g., the MAC layer, as in the diagram) which takes care of the actual 11 cryptographic processing. (This message passing could include additional status information 12 that aids in the processing of the frame, such as the intended recipient(s), fragmentation info, 13 etc. Note that the delegation of the cryptographic processing to a lower layer is only a 14 conceptual step if cryptographic processing takes place at the same layer at which the payload m originates.) 16 [0039] Cryptographic processing involves protecting the payload m and, possibly, 17 associated information such as frame headers, using the cryptographic process indicated by l 8 the desired protection level SEC. The key used to protect this information is derived from 19 shared keying material maintained between the sender and the intended recipient(s). After cryptographic processing, the protected frame, indicated by [m]K, SEC in Figure 6, is 21 communicated to the intended recipient(s) B.
22 100401 The intended recipient (s) retrieves the payload m' from the received protected 23 frame, using the cryptographic process indicated by the observed protection level SEC, using 24 a key that is derived from shared keying material maintained between the sender and the recipient(s) in question. The retrieved payload m' and the observed protection level SEC' is 26 passed to the same level at which the payload was originated by the sender, wllere the 27 adequacy of the observed protection level is determined. The observed protection level SEC' 28 is deemed sufficient, if it meets or exceeds the expected protection level SECO, where the 29 parameter SECO might be a fixed pre-negotiated protection level that does or does not depend on the retrieved payload m' in question. (Defining SECo in a message-dependent way would 31 allow'ne-grained access control policies, but generally involves increased storage and 32 processing requirements.) z1632odG.1 1 100411 The above approach works in contexts where expected and observed protection 2 levels can be compared, e.g., where the set of protection levels is a partial ordering or where a 3 membership test is performed (one of a set of protection levels). One example is the context 4 where protection involves a combination of encryption and/or authentication, with as ordering the Cartesian product of the natural ordering for encryption (encryption 6 OFF<Encryption ON) and the natural ordering of authentication (ordered according to 7 increasing length of data authenticity field). Moreover, if the set of protection levels has a 8 maximum element, then the sender can use this maximum protection level to ensure that 9 (unaltered) messages always pass the adequacy test. In anothcr example, the observed protection level is compared to SECo, where SECo is a set of protection levels rather than 11 only a minimum security level. In this way, if SECO ={None, Auth-32, Auth-64, Auth-128 }
12 and SEC=Auth-32, then the adequacy test would pass, whereas if SECO is the same as above 13 and SEC=Auth-32 + Confidentiality (e.g. eneryption), then the adequacy test would fail.
14 [00421 In the above embodiments, each sender pre-negotiates the minimum expected protection level SECo with each intended recipient. Thus, the approach might not be as 16 adaptive as desirable for some applications and may involve additional protocol overhead at 17 every change of the SECo parameter. These disadvantages can be overcome by using the 18 acknowledgeinent (ACK) mechanism from recipient(s) to sender as a feedback channel for 19 passing the SECo info. This is performed by incorporating in each acknowledgement message an indication as to the expected protcction level. This information can then be collated by the 21 original sender to update the minimum protection level expected by its recipient(s), whethcr 22 or not this is message-dependent or not.
23 100431 In a further embodiment, a method of synchronizing security levcls is shown.
24 Referring to Figure 7, another embodiment of the communication system is shown generally by the numeral 160. The system includes a sender A 162 and recipients 168 in a group 26 labelled G. The sender A includes parameters SECA 164 and SEC(; 166.
27 100441 Sender A wants to securely communicate a message m to a group G of devices.
28 The sender A has access to the two parameters, e.g., (1) The minimum level SEC,a at which it 29 would like to protect this message (in general, SECA might depend on the group it sends inforrnation to and the message itself, so proper notation would be SECA
(m,G)); (2) The 31 minimum protection level SEC(; that the group G of recipients expects (again, the proper 32 notation would be SEC(;(m,A) if this level would depend on the sender and the message itself I
1 as well). Here, the minimum expectation level of a group is the maximum over all group 2 members of the minimum expectation level for each group member.
3 100451 Initialization:
4 [0046] Sender A assumes that each parameter SECG is set to the maximum protection level (for eacli group G it securely communicates with).
6 [0047] Operational Usage:
7 100481 Sender A determines the minimum protection level SECA at which it wants to 8 protect the message m. The actual protection level SEC applied to the message m meets both 9 its own adequacy test (i.e., SEC > SECA) and the minimum expected level by the group G
(i.e., SEC > SECG).
11 [0049] Each recipient B that is in the group G of recipients (i.e., B (-=
G) indicates in its 12 secure acknowledgement message the minimum expected protection level (for sender A and 13 message m) at that particular moment of time.
14 [0050] A updates the parameter SECG such that it is consistent with all the minimum protection levels indicated in each of the acknowledgement messages it received baek (i.e., 16 SEC(; > SEC13 for all responding devices B).
17 100511 Note that the procedure described above sends messages with a protection level 18 that satisfies both the needs of the sender and expectations of recipient(s) and is adaptable to 19 changes herein over time. Alternatively, the sender might only take its own protection needs into account, at the cost of potentially sending messages that will be rejected by one or more 21 recipients due to insufficient--since less than expected--protection level.
22 100521 The procedure described above can be generalized towards a general self-23 synchronization procedure for status information among devices in any network topology, 24 where the feedback info on status information may be partially processed along the feedback path from recipient(s) towards sender already, rather than at the sender itself only (in the 26 example above, this graph is a tree with root A and leaves the recipient(s) and the 27 synchronization involves a specific security parameter).
28 [0053] As seen in Figure 8, A sends a payload secured at protection level SEC to a group 29 of devices consisting of B 1-134. The recipients B 1-134 provide feedback to the sender A on the expected protection level (indicated in the diagram as the integers l, 3, 2, 5, where these 31 integers are numbered in order of increasing protection level). The feedback is communicated 32 back to A via intermediate nodes C1 and C2, who collect the respeetive feedbacks of devices 21632040.1 1 in their respective groups G1 and G2 and process this, before returning a condensed 2 acknowledge message representing both groups to sender A. The condensed feedbacks 3 provided by these intermediate devices provides A with the same information on the 4 minimum protection level that satisfies the expectations of all recipients as would have been the case if this information would have been forwarded to A without intermediate processing.
6 (Here, we assume that the intermediate devices do not cheat in their calculations) 7 [0054] In another embodiment, each frame in the communication is structured as shown 8 in Figure 9 and is generally denoted by numeral 170. The frame 170 generally comprises a 9 header 172, a payload 174 and a footer 176. The footer 176 typically comprises one or more bits that represent an error code. The payload 174 includes the data which is to be sent in that 11 particular fraine 170, e.g. a message.
12 [0055] An exemplary header 172a is also shown in greater detail in Figure 9. The header 13 172a includes a key identifier 178, a representation of a key 180, a frame type 182, a security 14 level 184(as before) and an indication of the originator 186 of the message, e.g. the sender 12.
16 [0056] Each portion of header 172a contains one or more bits that represents a certain 17 attribute of the transmission or includes a piece of information. The key identifier 178 and 18 the representation of the key 180 are typically used to determine not only what key is to be 19 used but also how the key is to be used, e.g. for broadcast or unicast communications.
[0057] The frame type 182 provides an indication as to what type of transmission is being 21 sent in that particular frame 172a. Typical frame types 182 include data, command, 22 acknowledgement and beacon frames. Data-type frames transmit data, command-type frames 23 transmit commands, acknowledgement-type frames transmit information back to a sender, 24 e.g., an acknowledgement from the recipient that a frame has been properly received, and beacon frames are typically used to divide a transmission into time intervals.
26 [0058] In order to provide security, in addition to providing a minimum security level for 27 the recipient 14, the sender 12 includes the frame type 182 in the header 172a. The frame 28 type 182 is used by the recipient 14 to perform a policy check to determine if the security 29 level, key, key usage, etc. are appropriate for the type of frame being transmitted. For example, inadequate security for a frame type that should normally include high security 31 would be rejected.
21632040.1 1 [0059] In operation, the sender 12 performs the steps shown in Figure 10 by the numeral 2 200 to send information to the recipient 14. First, the sender 12 prepares the frame at step 3 202 according to steps 102-110 discussed above. It will be appreciated that these steps would 4 also include preparation of the header 172a to include the representation of the bits shown in Figure 9. At step 204, the sender 12 determines the frame type 182 and includes one or more 6 bits into the header 172a to indicate the frame type 182. The sender 12 then sends the frame 7 170 to the recipient 14 at step 206.
8 100601 Upon receiving the frame 170, the recipient 14 performs the steps shown in Figure 9 11 by the nunleral 208. The recipient 14 first receives the frame at step 210 and then performs the steps 124-126 discussed above at step 212. The recipient 14 then extracts the 11 frame type 182 from the header 172a at step 214. The frame type 182 is then correlated to a 12 policy in order to perform a policy check at step 216. In particular, a look-up-table is 13 accessed by the recipient that indicates one or more policy for each frame type. The recipient 14 14 thcn determines if the policy is met at step 218 and either rejects or accepts the frame 170 at step 220 based on whether or not the policy is met.
16 [0061] The policy check ineludes a correlation of the frame type 182 to some other data, 17 preferably something included in the frame. For example, the policy may include certain 18 correlations between key types and frame types such that based on the representation of the 19 key 160 the frame is accepted or rejected depending on whether or not the key is acceptable for use with the particular frame type 182. In the result, a certain type of key (or key usage) 21 is required in order for the policy to be met. If the key is not of the correct type, then the 22 frame 170 is not accepted by the recipient 14. If a single header 32a is used for multiple 23 frames 34a as shown in Figure 2 then the policy will also apply to the remaining frames in the 24 message.
[0062] In another example, the policy is set based on the security level 184 that is 26 included in the frame 170, e.g. minimum security level SECO discussed above. The franie 27 170 incli.ides a certain minimum security level that has been included at the time when the 28 header 172 is prepared by the sender 12, and this minimum security level is correlated to the 29 particular frame type 162. If the security level 184 is suitable for the frame type 162 then the frame 170 is passed by the recipient at step 220 and if not it is rejected. It will be appreciated 31 that the policy can be adapted to correlate any suitable information included in the frame with 32 the frame type 182.
21632046.1 1 [0063) The above principles enable security checks to be adapted to various messages, 2 frame types etc. in order to protect against combinations of security features that are more 3 prone to an attack. For example, a policy can cause a recipient to reject a frame for using no 4 encryption and only authentication, when that frame type is particularly vulnerable to an attack when encryption is not used.
6 100641 In general there are three security level checks that possess different levels of 7 granularity. The first is where SECo is message independent. In this case, the minimum level 8 of security is set once, and only one value needs to be stored locally for performing a policy 9 check. However, where SECO is message independent, a minimum granularity is provided since there is only one minimum security level for all messages and message types.
11 100651 The second is where SECo is completely message-dependent. In this case, a high 12 level of granularity is provided since each message has its own minimum security level.
13 However, this requires an enumeration of all messages and corresponding minimum security 14 levels to be stored locally in a table.
[00661 The third is where SECo is partially message dependent, namely, as discussed 16 makiiig i-eference to Figures 9-11, messages are divided into different types (e.g. by frame 17 type) and, a niinimum security level is allocated to each message type.
This ease balances the 18 competing space requirements and granularity of performing a policy check based on the 19 minimum security level. Typically, the number of inessages/frame types is significantly less than the number of inessages/frame types and thus more feasible to implement in a table.
21 100671 In another embodiment shown in Figure 12 a network N comprises one or more 22 correspondents (e.g. A, B) communicating through a central correspondent C.
Correspondent 23 A communicates over the network N by transmitting frames 150 to the central correspondent 24 C using, e.g., any of the principles described above. When correspondent A
first wishes to engage the network N, they do not have a key and thus cannot be authenticated to 26 communicate in the network N. The general steps for an initialization procedure are shown 27 in Figure 13. The correspondent C first obtains an indication that A wishes to join the 28 network N at step 224. This indication can be provided through a suitable registration 29 procedure. Correspondent C then includes A in a table that indicates its status, and sets the status for con-espondent A to "Exempt" at step 226. The exempt status takes into account 31 that an initialization procedure is required so that correspondent A can communicate 32 unsecurely until it has been initialized in the network N.
2 1 01_10=16.1 1 [0068] At step 228, correspondent A sends a frame to central correspondent C.
2 Correspondent C checks the table at step 230. In this first communication, the status of 3 correspondent A is exempt and a key exchange or other initialization procedure is carried out 4 at step 232 and the status of correspondent A is then changed to "not exempt" (or an exempt indicator is removed, set to zero etc.) at step 234. Correspondent A then sends frames to 6 correspondent C subject to normal security rules. At step 230 the status for correspondent A
7 would thereafter be determined as not exempt and the regular security rules are applied at 8 step 236, e.g. by checking the security level, frame type etc. It can be appreciated that A
9 could also exempt C such that the roles are reversed and A is allowing C to communicate therewith (e.g. where A is part of another network).
11 [0069] In an example implementation of the network N shown in Figure 12, the above 12 minimum security level test takes into account the frame 150 and also the originator 186. In 13 this case, the sender is correspondent A and the recipient is correspondent B. A check for the 14 minimum security level would thus be SEC > SECB(m,A). If the minimum security level is independent of originator A, this comes down to check SEC _> SECg (m), as discussed before.
16 The same storage considerations as with original security level test would then be used (case 17 1).
18 [0070] If the minimum security level is completely dependent on the originator A, a 19 minimum security level table is enumerated (dependent on frame m, frame type of m, or message dependent - as discussed before), but now for each originator (case 2). If the 21 minimum security level is independent of originator A, except when originator is in an 22 explicitly enumerated set of exempt devices, e.g. denoted by ExemptSet in the table, a single 23 minimum security level table is implemented for devices outside the ExemptSet (potentially 24 depending on frame type, etc.) and, additionally, a minimum security level table for each individual member of ExemptSet is implemented (case 3). Thus, if a correspondent (and 26 device associated therewith) is part of the ExemptSet table, case 2 is utilized and, if no device 27 is in the ExemptSet table, case 1 is utilized.
28 [00711 Case 3 can be made more implementati on- friendly if correspondents in the 29 ExemptSet table, a minimum security level table that is independent of the particular device in the ExemptSet is used. This requires that one security level table is implemented for 31 devices that are not in the ExemptSet table and one table is implemented for devices that are 32 in the ExemptSet table (case 4).
21032040.1 1 [0072] A further optimization of case 4 is where, for all devices in the ExemptSet table, 2 the minimum security level - which is potentially message or message type dependent (as 3 discussed before) - is either set to the minimum security level that holds for all devices that 4 are outside ExemptSet or is set to a prespecified value that may hold for all devices inside ExemptSet. Since this would lead to only two choices (e.g. per frame, frame type, overall), 6 this can be indicated using a Boolean parameter.
7 [0073] In summary:
8 [0074] SEC ? SECB (m,A)), where 9 = SECB (m,A))= SECB (m) if A is not a member of ExemptSet.
= SECg (m,A))= SECB (m) if A is a member of ExemptSet and Override parameter 11 OverrideSEC(m) for message in is set to FALSE.
12 = SECq (m,A))= ExemptSECB (m) if A is a member of ExemptSet and Override 13 parameter OverrideSEC(m) for message m is set to TRUE.
[0075] In general, the most practical scenario is where ExemptSECB(fsa) is set to `no 16 security'.
17 [0076] It is noted that one scenario allows devices that do not have a key yet (e.g., 18 because these just joined the network and still have to set up a key, e.g., via key agreement or 19 key transport protocol or PIN or any other mechanism) to "by-pass" the minimum security level check (i.e., the security check always succeeds), if these have been labeled by recipient 21 B as belonging to ExemptSet (and ExemptSECg(m) is set to `no security').
22 [0077] The by-passing of minimum security level checks may depend on the message m 23 received, the frame type of inessage m(which is visible to the recipient if the frame type of m 24 is included in the transmitted frame - normally frame types and other frame control information is not encrypted), or a parameter that can be set via the Override parameter 26 OverrideSEC(rn).
27 [0078] It is also noted that operations on the set ExemptSet by the recipient effectively 28 govern the operation of the minimum security level check (inclusion of a device in that set 29 may allow by-passing or lowered security requirements, while exclusion of a device from that set restores the ordinary minimum security level check and make it applicable (possibly 31 again) to the originating device in question).
32 [0079] Thus, the above allows a flexible mechanism to take into account transitionarv 33 behaviour of a correspondent (and their device) during the system's lifetime, and facilitates 34 the transgression of a device from some initial stage where it does not yet have a key, to t11e 21632046.1 1 stage where it has established a key and can be enforced to adhere to normal strict minimum 2 security level policies.
3 [0080] The override parameter OverrideSEC(m) allows fine-tuning of "by-passing" the 4 minimum security level check and make this dependent on the message m received (or message type - obviously one can make granularity as fine-grained as possible, at expense of 6 table implementation cost). As an example, in the scenario where a device joins a network 7 and still has to set up a key, one could set the Override parameter to TRUE
only for those 8 messages or message types minimally required for the originating device A to set up a key 9 with the recipient device B(or with some other device T in the network that could notify B
once the key has been established), thus restricting the permissible behavior of device A, but 11 not ruling out all behaviors. This can also be used for any other initialization procedure or 12 set-up pi-ocedure and should not be limited to key set up.
13 [00811 Again, operations on the Override parameter Override(ni) by the recipient B allow 14 for a very flexible and low-cost fine-tuning of security control policies.
As an example, by setting all Override parameters to FALSE, one effectively closes down all network operations 16 to devices that do not have a key (since all cryptographically unsecured messages to recipient 17 B will ultimately be rejected) - the so-called stealth mode - while setting all Override I S parameters to TRUE allows unlimited flows of unsecured information to device B, since this 19 may resiult in the minimum security level test to be effectively by-passed.
[0082] It will be recognized that the security rules can be adapted to provide flexibility 21 not only on a frame-by-frame basis but also based on the frame type such that a policy check 22 can detei-mine if certain security rules or key types can be used with a particular frame type.
23 100831 Although the invention has been described with reference to certain specific 24 embodiments, various modifications thereof will be apparent to those skilled in the art without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as outlined in the claims 26 appended hereto.
21632046,1
22 100401 The intended recipient (s) retrieves the payload m' from the received protected 23 frame, using the cryptographic process indicated by the observed protection level SEC, using 24 a key that is derived from shared keying material maintained between the sender and the recipient(s) in question. The retrieved payload m' and the observed protection level SEC' is 26 passed to the same level at which the payload was originated by the sender, wllere the 27 adequacy of the observed protection level is determined. The observed protection level SEC' 28 is deemed sufficient, if it meets or exceeds the expected protection level SECO, where the 29 parameter SECO might be a fixed pre-negotiated protection level that does or does not depend on the retrieved payload m' in question. (Defining SECo in a message-dependent way would 31 allow'ne-grained access control policies, but generally involves increased storage and 32 processing requirements.) z1632odG.1 1 100411 The above approach works in contexts where expected and observed protection 2 levels can be compared, e.g., where the set of protection levels is a partial ordering or where a 3 membership test is performed (one of a set of protection levels). One example is the context 4 where protection involves a combination of encryption and/or authentication, with as ordering the Cartesian product of the natural ordering for encryption (encryption 6 OFF<Encryption ON) and the natural ordering of authentication (ordered according to 7 increasing length of data authenticity field). Moreover, if the set of protection levels has a 8 maximum element, then the sender can use this maximum protection level to ensure that 9 (unaltered) messages always pass the adequacy test. In anothcr example, the observed protection level is compared to SECo, where SECo is a set of protection levels rather than 11 only a minimum security level. In this way, if SECO ={None, Auth-32, Auth-64, Auth-128 }
12 and SEC=Auth-32, then the adequacy test would pass, whereas if SECO is the same as above 13 and SEC=Auth-32 + Confidentiality (e.g. eneryption), then the adequacy test would fail.
14 [00421 In the above embodiments, each sender pre-negotiates the minimum expected protection level SECo with each intended recipient. Thus, the approach might not be as 16 adaptive as desirable for some applications and may involve additional protocol overhead at 17 every change of the SECo parameter. These disadvantages can be overcome by using the 18 acknowledgeinent (ACK) mechanism from recipient(s) to sender as a feedback channel for 19 passing the SECo info. This is performed by incorporating in each acknowledgement message an indication as to the expected protcction level. This information can then be collated by the 21 original sender to update the minimum protection level expected by its recipient(s), whethcr 22 or not this is message-dependent or not.
23 100431 In a further embodiment, a method of synchronizing security levcls is shown.
24 Referring to Figure 7, another embodiment of the communication system is shown generally by the numeral 160. The system includes a sender A 162 and recipients 168 in a group 26 labelled G. The sender A includes parameters SECA 164 and SEC(; 166.
27 100441 Sender A wants to securely communicate a message m to a group G of devices.
28 The sender A has access to the two parameters, e.g., (1) The minimum level SEC,a at which it 29 would like to protect this message (in general, SECA might depend on the group it sends inforrnation to and the message itself, so proper notation would be SECA
(m,G)); (2) The 31 minimum protection level SEC(; that the group G of recipients expects (again, the proper 32 notation would be SEC(;(m,A) if this level would depend on the sender and the message itself I
1 as well). Here, the minimum expectation level of a group is the maximum over all group 2 members of the minimum expectation level for each group member.
3 100451 Initialization:
4 [0046] Sender A assumes that each parameter SECG is set to the maximum protection level (for eacli group G it securely communicates with).
6 [0047] Operational Usage:
7 100481 Sender A determines the minimum protection level SECA at which it wants to 8 protect the message m. The actual protection level SEC applied to the message m meets both 9 its own adequacy test (i.e., SEC > SECA) and the minimum expected level by the group G
(i.e., SEC > SECG).
11 [0049] Each recipient B that is in the group G of recipients (i.e., B (-=
G) indicates in its 12 secure acknowledgement message the minimum expected protection level (for sender A and 13 message m) at that particular moment of time.
14 [0050] A updates the parameter SECG such that it is consistent with all the minimum protection levels indicated in each of the acknowledgement messages it received baek (i.e., 16 SEC(; > SEC13 for all responding devices B).
17 100511 Note that the procedure described above sends messages with a protection level 18 that satisfies both the needs of the sender and expectations of recipient(s) and is adaptable to 19 changes herein over time. Alternatively, the sender might only take its own protection needs into account, at the cost of potentially sending messages that will be rejected by one or more 21 recipients due to insufficient--since less than expected--protection level.
22 100521 The procedure described above can be generalized towards a general self-23 synchronization procedure for status information among devices in any network topology, 24 where the feedback info on status information may be partially processed along the feedback path from recipient(s) towards sender already, rather than at the sender itself only (in the 26 example above, this graph is a tree with root A and leaves the recipient(s) and the 27 synchronization involves a specific security parameter).
28 [0053] As seen in Figure 8, A sends a payload secured at protection level SEC to a group 29 of devices consisting of B 1-134. The recipients B 1-134 provide feedback to the sender A on the expected protection level (indicated in the diagram as the integers l, 3, 2, 5, where these 31 integers are numbered in order of increasing protection level). The feedback is communicated 32 back to A via intermediate nodes C1 and C2, who collect the respeetive feedbacks of devices 21632040.1 1 in their respective groups G1 and G2 and process this, before returning a condensed 2 acknowledge message representing both groups to sender A. The condensed feedbacks 3 provided by these intermediate devices provides A with the same information on the 4 minimum protection level that satisfies the expectations of all recipients as would have been the case if this information would have been forwarded to A without intermediate processing.
6 (Here, we assume that the intermediate devices do not cheat in their calculations) 7 [0054] In another embodiment, each frame in the communication is structured as shown 8 in Figure 9 and is generally denoted by numeral 170. The frame 170 generally comprises a 9 header 172, a payload 174 and a footer 176. The footer 176 typically comprises one or more bits that represent an error code. The payload 174 includes the data which is to be sent in that 11 particular fraine 170, e.g. a message.
12 [0055] An exemplary header 172a is also shown in greater detail in Figure 9. The header 13 172a includes a key identifier 178, a representation of a key 180, a frame type 182, a security 14 level 184(as before) and an indication of the originator 186 of the message, e.g. the sender 12.
16 [0056] Each portion of header 172a contains one or more bits that represents a certain 17 attribute of the transmission or includes a piece of information. The key identifier 178 and 18 the representation of the key 180 are typically used to determine not only what key is to be 19 used but also how the key is to be used, e.g. for broadcast or unicast communications.
[0057] The frame type 182 provides an indication as to what type of transmission is being 21 sent in that particular frame 172a. Typical frame types 182 include data, command, 22 acknowledgement and beacon frames. Data-type frames transmit data, command-type frames 23 transmit commands, acknowledgement-type frames transmit information back to a sender, 24 e.g., an acknowledgement from the recipient that a frame has been properly received, and beacon frames are typically used to divide a transmission into time intervals.
26 [0058] In order to provide security, in addition to providing a minimum security level for 27 the recipient 14, the sender 12 includes the frame type 182 in the header 172a. The frame 28 type 182 is used by the recipient 14 to perform a policy check to determine if the security 29 level, key, key usage, etc. are appropriate for the type of frame being transmitted. For example, inadequate security for a frame type that should normally include high security 31 would be rejected.
21632040.1 1 [0059] In operation, the sender 12 performs the steps shown in Figure 10 by the numeral 2 200 to send information to the recipient 14. First, the sender 12 prepares the frame at step 3 202 according to steps 102-110 discussed above. It will be appreciated that these steps would 4 also include preparation of the header 172a to include the representation of the bits shown in Figure 9. At step 204, the sender 12 determines the frame type 182 and includes one or more 6 bits into the header 172a to indicate the frame type 182. The sender 12 then sends the frame 7 170 to the recipient 14 at step 206.
8 100601 Upon receiving the frame 170, the recipient 14 performs the steps shown in Figure 9 11 by the nunleral 208. The recipient 14 first receives the frame at step 210 and then performs the steps 124-126 discussed above at step 212. The recipient 14 then extracts the 11 frame type 182 from the header 172a at step 214. The frame type 182 is then correlated to a 12 policy in order to perform a policy check at step 216. In particular, a look-up-table is 13 accessed by the recipient that indicates one or more policy for each frame type. The recipient 14 14 thcn determines if the policy is met at step 218 and either rejects or accepts the frame 170 at step 220 based on whether or not the policy is met.
16 [0061] The policy check ineludes a correlation of the frame type 182 to some other data, 17 preferably something included in the frame. For example, the policy may include certain 18 correlations between key types and frame types such that based on the representation of the 19 key 160 the frame is accepted or rejected depending on whether or not the key is acceptable for use with the particular frame type 182. In the result, a certain type of key (or key usage) 21 is required in order for the policy to be met. If the key is not of the correct type, then the 22 frame 170 is not accepted by the recipient 14. If a single header 32a is used for multiple 23 frames 34a as shown in Figure 2 then the policy will also apply to the remaining frames in the 24 message.
[0062] In another example, the policy is set based on the security level 184 that is 26 included in the frame 170, e.g. minimum security level SECO discussed above. The franie 27 170 incli.ides a certain minimum security level that has been included at the time when the 28 header 172 is prepared by the sender 12, and this minimum security level is correlated to the 29 particular frame type 162. If the security level 184 is suitable for the frame type 162 then the frame 170 is passed by the recipient at step 220 and if not it is rejected. It will be appreciated 31 that the policy can be adapted to correlate any suitable information included in the frame with 32 the frame type 182.
21632046.1 1 [0063) The above principles enable security checks to be adapted to various messages, 2 frame types etc. in order to protect against combinations of security features that are more 3 prone to an attack. For example, a policy can cause a recipient to reject a frame for using no 4 encryption and only authentication, when that frame type is particularly vulnerable to an attack when encryption is not used.
6 100641 In general there are three security level checks that possess different levels of 7 granularity. The first is where SECo is message independent. In this case, the minimum level 8 of security is set once, and only one value needs to be stored locally for performing a policy 9 check. However, where SECO is message independent, a minimum granularity is provided since there is only one minimum security level for all messages and message types.
11 100651 The second is where SECo is completely message-dependent. In this case, a high 12 level of granularity is provided since each message has its own minimum security level.
13 However, this requires an enumeration of all messages and corresponding minimum security 14 levels to be stored locally in a table.
[00661 The third is where SECo is partially message dependent, namely, as discussed 16 makiiig i-eference to Figures 9-11, messages are divided into different types (e.g. by frame 17 type) and, a niinimum security level is allocated to each message type.
This ease balances the 18 competing space requirements and granularity of performing a policy check based on the 19 minimum security level. Typically, the number of inessages/frame types is significantly less than the number of inessages/frame types and thus more feasible to implement in a table.
21 100671 In another embodiment shown in Figure 12 a network N comprises one or more 22 correspondents (e.g. A, B) communicating through a central correspondent C.
Correspondent 23 A communicates over the network N by transmitting frames 150 to the central correspondent 24 C using, e.g., any of the principles described above. When correspondent A
first wishes to engage the network N, they do not have a key and thus cannot be authenticated to 26 communicate in the network N. The general steps for an initialization procedure are shown 27 in Figure 13. The correspondent C first obtains an indication that A wishes to join the 28 network N at step 224. This indication can be provided through a suitable registration 29 procedure. Correspondent C then includes A in a table that indicates its status, and sets the status for con-espondent A to "Exempt" at step 226. The exempt status takes into account 31 that an initialization procedure is required so that correspondent A can communicate 32 unsecurely until it has been initialized in the network N.
2 1 01_10=16.1 1 [0068] At step 228, correspondent A sends a frame to central correspondent C.
2 Correspondent C checks the table at step 230. In this first communication, the status of 3 correspondent A is exempt and a key exchange or other initialization procedure is carried out 4 at step 232 and the status of correspondent A is then changed to "not exempt" (or an exempt indicator is removed, set to zero etc.) at step 234. Correspondent A then sends frames to 6 correspondent C subject to normal security rules. At step 230 the status for correspondent A
7 would thereafter be determined as not exempt and the regular security rules are applied at 8 step 236, e.g. by checking the security level, frame type etc. It can be appreciated that A
9 could also exempt C such that the roles are reversed and A is allowing C to communicate therewith (e.g. where A is part of another network).
11 [0069] In an example implementation of the network N shown in Figure 12, the above 12 minimum security level test takes into account the frame 150 and also the originator 186. In 13 this case, the sender is correspondent A and the recipient is correspondent B. A check for the 14 minimum security level would thus be SEC > SECB(m,A). If the minimum security level is independent of originator A, this comes down to check SEC _> SECg (m), as discussed before.
16 The same storage considerations as with original security level test would then be used (case 17 1).
18 [0070] If the minimum security level is completely dependent on the originator A, a 19 minimum security level table is enumerated (dependent on frame m, frame type of m, or message dependent - as discussed before), but now for each originator (case 2). If the 21 minimum security level is independent of originator A, except when originator is in an 22 explicitly enumerated set of exempt devices, e.g. denoted by ExemptSet in the table, a single 23 minimum security level table is implemented for devices outside the ExemptSet (potentially 24 depending on frame type, etc.) and, additionally, a minimum security level table for each individual member of ExemptSet is implemented (case 3). Thus, if a correspondent (and 26 device associated therewith) is part of the ExemptSet table, case 2 is utilized and, if no device 27 is in the ExemptSet table, case 1 is utilized.
28 [00711 Case 3 can be made more implementati on- friendly if correspondents in the 29 ExemptSet table, a minimum security level table that is independent of the particular device in the ExemptSet is used. This requires that one security level table is implemented for 31 devices that are not in the ExemptSet table and one table is implemented for devices that are 32 in the ExemptSet table (case 4).
21032040.1 1 [0072] A further optimization of case 4 is where, for all devices in the ExemptSet table, 2 the minimum security level - which is potentially message or message type dependent (as 3 discussed before) - is either set to the minimum security level that holds for all devices that 4 are outside ExemptSet or is set to a prespecified value that may hold for all devices inside ExemptSet. Since this would lead to only two choices (e.g. per frame, frame type, overall), 6 this can be indicated using a Boolean parameter.
7 [0073] In summary:
8 [0074] SEC ? SECB (m,A)), where 9 = SECB (m,A))= SECB (m) if A is not a member of ExemptSet.
= SECg (m,A))= SECB (m) if A is a member of ExemptSet and Override parameter 11 OverrideSEC(m) for message in is set to FALSE.
12 = SECq (m,A))= ExemptSECB (m) if A is a member of ExemptSet and Override 13 parameter OverrideSEC(m) for message m is set to TRUE.
[0075] In general, the most practical scenario is where ExemptSECB(fsa) is set to `no 16 security'.
17 [0076] It is noted that one scenario allows devices that do not have a key yet (e.g., 18 because these just joined the network and still have to set up a key, e.g., via key agreement or 19 key transport protocol or PIN or any other mechanism) to "by-pass" the minimum security level check (i.e., the security check always succeeds), if these have been labeled by recipient 21 B as belonging to ExemptSet (and ExemptSECg(m) is set to `no security').
22 [0077] The by-passing of minimum security level checks may depend on the message m 23 received, the frame type of inessage m(which is visible to the recipient if the frame type of m 24 is included in the transmitted frame - normally frame types and other frame control information is not encrypted), or a parameter that can be set via the Override parameter 26 OverrideSEC(rn).
27 [0078] It is also noted that operations on the set ExemptSet by the recipient effectively 28 govern the operation of the minimum security level check (inclusion of a device in that set 29 may allow by-passing or lowered security requirements, while exclusion of a device from that set restores the ordinary minimum security level check and make it applicable (possibly 31 again) to the originating device in question).
32 [0079] Thus, the above allows a flexible mechanism to take into account transitionarv 33 behaviour of a correspondent (and their device) during the system's lifetime, and facilitates 34 the transgression of a device from some initial stage where it does not yet have a key, to t11e 21632046.1 1 stage where it has established a key and can be enforced to adhere to normal strict minimum 2 security level policies.
3 [0080] The override parameter OverrideSEC(m) allows fine-tuning of "by-passing" the 4 minimum security level check and make this dependent on the message m received (or message type - obviously one can make granularity as fine-grained as possible, at expense of 6 table implementation cost). As an example, in the scenario where a device joins a network 7 and still has to set up a key, one could set the Override parameter to TRUE
only for those 8 messages or message types minimally required for the originating device A to set up a key 9 with the recipient device B(or with some other device T in the network that could notify B
once the key has been established), thus restricting the permissible behavior of device A, but 11 not ruling out all behaviors. This can also be used for any other initialization procedure or 12 set-up pi-ocedure and should not be limited to key set up.
13 [00811 Again, operations on the Override parameter Override(ni) by the recipient B allow 14 for a very flexible and low-cost fine-tuning of security control policies.
As an example, by setting all Override parameters to FALSE, one effectively closes down all network operations 16 to devices that do not have a key (since all cryptographically unsecured messages to recipient 17 B will ultimately be rejected) - the so-called stealth mode - while setting all Override I S parameters to TRUE allows unlimited flows of unsecured information to device B, since this 19 may resiult in the minimum security level test to be effectively by-passed.
[0082] It will be recognized that the security rules can be adapted to provide flexibility 21 not only on a frame-by-frame basis but also based on the frame type such that a policy check 22 can detei-mine if certain security rules or key types can be used with a particular frame type.
23 100831 Although the invention has been described with reference to certain specific 24 embodiments, various modifications thereof will be apparent to those skilled in the art without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as outlined in the claims 26 appended hereto.
21632046,1
Claims (30)
PROPERTY OR PRIVILEGE IS CLAIMED ARE DEFINED AS FOLLOWS:
1. A method of communicating between a first correspondent and a second correspondent in a data communication system comprising:
- assembling a data stream at said first correspondent, said data stream having at least one frame, said frame having a header and data;
- incorporating in said header, an indication of a frame type; and - forwarding said frame to said second correspondent to enable said second correspondent to determine the acceptability of said frame according to said frame type.
- assembling a data stream at said first correspondent, said data stream having at least one frame, said frame having a header and data;
- incorporating in said header, an indication of a frame type; and - forwarding said frame to said second correspondent to enable said second correspondent to determine the acceptability of said frame according to said frame type.
2. The method according to claim 1 further comprising said second correspondent:
- receiving said frame;
- determining said frame type from said header; and - correlating said frame type to a policy to determine if said frame type is acceptable for at least one attribute of said frame.
- receiving said frame;
- determining said frame type from said header; and - correlating said frame type to a policy to determine if said frame type is acceptable for at least one attribute of said frame.
3. The method according to claim 2 further comprising accepting said frame is said policy is met, and rejecting said frame otherwise.
4. The method according to claim 2 wherein said header includes a representation of a key and said policy indicates an acceptable frame type for said key.
5. The method according to claim 2 wherein said header includes an indication of a security level and said policy indicates an acceptable frame type for said security level.
6. The method according to claim 2 wherein said policy indicates frame types vulnerable to an attack where one or more combinations of security features of said frame are present, said method comprising rejecting said frame if one of said combinations is found.
7. The method according to claim 1 comprising preparing said frame by selecting a security level and incorporating one or more security bits into said frame indicative of said security level.
8. The method according to claim 7 comprising any one or both of encrypting said data and signing said data according to said security level.
9. The method according to claim 7 wherein said security level is a minimum acceptable security level and said minimum acceptable security level is independent of said data.
10. The method according to claim 7 wherein said security level is a minimum acceptable security level and said minimum acceptable security level is dependent on said data.
11. The method according to claim 7 wherein said security level is a minimum acceptable security level and said minimum acceptable security level is partially data dependent such that said minimum acceptable security level differs according to said frame type.
12. The method according to claim 2 wherein said frame includes one or more security bits indicative of a security level, and said method comprises said second correspondent extracting said security bits to determine said security level wherein said policy indicates whether or not said frame type is acceptable for said security level.
13. The method according to claim 10 wherein said data is any one or both of encrypted and signed, said method comprising said second correspondent decrypting said data and/or authenticating said data according to said security bits.
14. The method according to claim 2 wherein said policy comprises a look up table correlating said frame type to said at least one attribute.
15. The method according to claim 1 wherein said frame further comprises a footer comprising one or more bits representing an error code.
16. The method according to claim 1 wherein said header comprises a key identifier, a representation of a key corresponding to said key identifier, a security level, and an originator for determining the acceptability of said frame type.
17. A method of verifying a communication between a first correspondent and a second correspondent in a data communication system comprising said second correspondent:
- receiving from said first correspondent, a frame having a header and data, said header including an indication of a frame type;
- determining said frame type from said header; and - correlating said frame type to a policy to determine if said frame type is acceptable for at least one attribute of said frame.
- receiving from said first correspondent, a frame having a header and data, said header including an indication of a frame type;
- determining said frame type from said header; and - correlating said frame type to a policy to determine if said frame type is acceptable for at least one attribute of said frame.
18. The method according to claim 17 further comprising accepting said frame is said policy is met, and rejecting said frame otherwise.
19. The method according to claim 17 wherein said header includes a representation of a key and said policy indicates an acceptable frame type for said key.
20. The method according to claim 17 wherein said header includes an indication of a security level and said policy indicates an acceptable frame type for said security level.
21. The method according to claim 17 wherein said policy indicates frame types vulnerable to an attack where one or more combinations of security features of said frame are present, said method comprising rejecting said frame if one of said combinations is found.
22. The method according to claim 20 wherein said security level is a minimum acceptable security level and said minimum acceptable security level is independent of said data.
23. The method according to claim 20 wherein said security level is a minimum acceptable security level and said minimum acceptable security level is dependent on said data.
24. The method according to claim 20 wherein said security level is a minimum acceptable security level and said minimum acceptable security level is partially data dependent such that said minimum acceptable security level differs according to said frame type.
25. The method according to claim 17 wherein said frame includes one or more security bits indicative of a security level, and said method comprises said second correspondent extracting said security bits to determine said security level wherein said policy indicates whether or not said frame type is acceptable for said security level.
26. The method according to claim 25 wherein said data is any one or both of encrypted and signed, said method comprising said second correspondent decrypting said data and/or authenticating said data according to said security bits.
27. The method according to claim 17 wherein said policy comprises a look up table correlating said frame type to said at least one attribute.
28. A method of communicating between a pair of correspondents in a data communication system comprising exempting one of said pair of correspondents from security rules associated with said communication system to enable said one correspondent to initialize communication with the other of said correspondents.
29. The method according to claim 28 wherein said other correspondent includes an indication of the status of said one correspondent and if said status indicates that said one correspondent is exempt from said security rules, enabling said one correspondent to begin a communication, and requiring an initialization thereafter whereby subsequent to initialization said status is altered to indicate that said one correspondent is subject to said security rules.
30. The method according to claim 28 wherein said data communication system is a network, said other correspondent being a central correspondent responsible for controlling access to said network.
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| CA2941216A CA2941216C (en) | 2006-04-13 | 2007-04-13 | Method and apparatus for providing an adaptable security level in an electronic communication |
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| CN114584519A (en) * | 2022-05-05 | 2022-06-03 | 飞狐信息技术（天津）有限公司 | Message middleware and current limiting method thereof |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN114584519A (en) * | 2022-05-05 | 2022-06-03 | 飞狐信息技术（天津）有限公司 | Message middleware and current limiting method thereof |
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| EP2005636A4 (en) | 2011-06-15 |
| KR20080110672A (en) | 2008-12-18 |
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