CN1433558A - Method of authenticating tag - Google Patents
Method of authenticating tag Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN1433558A CN1433558A CN00818777A CN00818777A CN1433558A CN 1433558 A CN1433558 A CN 1433558A CN 00818777 A CN00818777 A CN 00818777A CN 00818777 A CN00818777 A CN 00818777A CN 1433558 A CN1433558 A CN 1433558A
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- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- safe block
- password
- tag
- data group
- label
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F17/00—Digital computing or data processing equipment or methods, specially adapted for specific functions
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
- G07C9/28—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass the pass enabling tracking or indicating presence
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/0806—Details of the card
- G07F7/0813—Specific details related to card security
- G07F7/082—Features insuring the integrity of the data on or in the card
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
Abstract
The present invention discloses a method for authenticating, for example, radio frequency identification (RFID) tags by providing an RFID tag having a stored security block that is cryptographically related to the tag address, obtaining the tag address from the tag, cryptographically transforming at least the tag address and a private data set to obtain a security block, and then comparing that security block to the stored security block. If the two security blocks match, then the tag can be presumed to be authentic. Alternatively, the stored security block can be cryptographically transformed using at least a private data set to obtain a tag address, and that tag address can then be compared with the stored tag address. If the two tag addresses match, then the tag can be presumed to be authentic.
Description
Invention field
The present invention relates to authenticating device, label, the method of mark or similar articles relates to the method for the label of verifying a matching block system cryptographically in one embodiment, makes as the hardware of the part of matching block system as long as the inquiry authentication is the label of the part of matching block system.
Background of invention
Encrypt and to have used for many years, make information security, prevent from should not to visit the effort that the people of those information obtains information.Information is at first encoded by first authorized user, and is decoded to obtain the visit to this information by second authorized user subsequently.The simple example of encrypting is the corresponding unique number of each letter that makes in the alphabet, uses these numbers then, rather than the letter representation information of interest.The people who knows this cryptographic algorithm (each letter is substituted with unique number) then can be to this information decoding to obtain the visit to it.Yet this type of simple encryption is decoded easily, is not very safe therefore.
Especially now, use other complicated more encrypted form, guarantee safety from an authorized user to another user's electronic information transmitted.For example, normal wish sending on the Internet as message, personal information such as credit number is also encrypted this information with suitable secured fashion.For the encryption of the adequate types of these purposes is " public keys/private key " encryption technologies, this has narration in the common textbook of relevant encryption and patent.
Patent document comprises a series of relevant operation technique tracking system divine force that created the universe product or finishes the list of references of item authentication.For example, see European patent 0 710 934 A2 that are entitled as " Methods and System for Performing ArticleAuthentication "; Be entitled as " Method of PreventingCounterfeiting of Articles of Manufacture " and be European patent 0 889 448 A2, with the U.S. Patent No. 5 that is entitled as " System for Identifying; Authenticating and Tracking ManufacturedArticle ", 768,384.But the method for narrating in these and other lists of references is not suitable for resembling below uses label as the means that authenticate with reference to what the present invention described.
Summary of the invention
Can provide the label or tag that comprises relevant Item Information with being used to read, scan or inquire the part of the hardware of those labels and mark as the matching block system.The example of system comprises bar code label (or printing device) and scanner like that; And radio-frequency (RF) identification (RFID) label and RFID interrogator.Encouraging to use a reason of matching block system is to make system avoid inquiring the label that belongs to other system.Therefore, error message reduces, and may use two or more systems at the different material of same position identification.Other reasons relate to product and system's guarantee.That is, their product a period of time is often guaranteed to keep in good repair by manufacturer, or has only when those products and just realize given function with the parts time spent that the fabricator is used for testing repeatedly this product, but if not so then not providing or reducing guarantee.Here describe under the situation of matching block system of type, if tag interrogator is used with the label of authentication, system supplier guarantees to keep in good repair the operation of system, does not guarantee to keep in good repair under other situations.Particularly, sell user RFID label and be used for that information write those labels and/or during from the equipment of label sense information, system supplier can guarantee to keep in good repair the operation of rfid system as the supplier of system.
For example, authentication method described herein makes system or user can authenticate radio-frequency (RF) identification (RFID) label, this method is by providing the RFID label with storage security piece relevant with tag addresses on the password, obtain tag addresses from this label, password is converted to Shaoshi is added to tag addresses and private data set obtaining safe block, and subsequently with the safe block comparison of this safe block and storage.If two safe block couplings think that then this label authenticates.In addition, the safe block of storage can use at least one private data set to do to change on the password to obtain tag addresses, and this tag addresses can compare with the tag addresses that stores then.If two tag addresses couplings think that then this label authenticates.Also described and used RFID label of the present invention.Find useful especially application in the inquiry of the present invention's portable or fixed RFID interrogator of RFID label in library's data (as books).
The accompanying drawing summary
The present invention is for a more detailed description with reference to the accompanying drawings, in the accompanying drawing:
Fig. 1 is a procedure chart, and the embodiment that the inventive method provides the label that has the safe block of changing as the password of tag addresses is shown.
Fig. 2 is a procedure chart, illustrates one that the inventive method is passed through on-the-spot encryption and compared authenticating tag
Embodiment.
Fig. 3 is a procedure chart, illustrates one that the inventive method is passed through on-the-spot deciphering and compared authenticating tag
Embodiment.
Fig. 4 is the synoptic diagram by a RFID label of the present invention.
Detailed description of the present invention
I. general introduction
In brief, a preferred approach that authenticates the RFID label by the present invention comprises the following steps.At first from tag ram, obtain the tag addresses of this label of identification.Secondly, the safe block that deposits in the tag ram to provide is provided by password for tag addresses and private data set and optional public data group.The 3rd, when hope authenticates this label, to obtain this tag addresses once more, and do the password conversion so that safe block to be provided with data set, the safe block of this safe block and storage is relatively.Perhaps, change a kind of method, use the inverse conversion of initial conversion that safe block is done the password conversion, comprise suitable data, obtain tag addresses, the tag addresses of the latter and storage relatively, the 4th, if two safe block (or tag addresses, depend on which process of use) identical, then this label authenticates.Otherwise this label does not authenticate.
To describe these steps of the present invention and other features in more detail below, change and embodiment.Though described the present invention by means of rfid system, the other system that information can be write label or read (preferably method for electrically) from label also within the scope of the invention.
II. label
Be suitable in the PCT publication number 99/65006 that is entitled as " Identification Tag WithEnhanced Security " description being arranged in conjunction with the RFID label that the present invention uses, its right has been given assignee of the present invention.As shown in Figure 4, RFID label 10 generally includes an antenna 12 that is connected to the memory device 14 as integrated circuit (IC).Label can comprise the power supply as battery or electric capacity, or can be powered separately by the RFID interrogator, makes it not only accept electric energy but also receive information from the RFID interrogator with the form of radiowave.The label that provides can have bonding agent (normally contact adhesive).Make it can be adhered on the books in library for example.This professional skilled person knows, and Fig. 4 only represents to be applicable among many embodiment of the geometric configuration of RFID label and Antenna Design.
A commercial example of the RFID label that is suitable for is from Dallas, and the Texas InstrumentsCompany of Texas can obtain the label of the trade mark for " TIRIS Tag-it ".The RFID label of Tag-it trade mark comprises the first memory memory block (being called " permanent labels storer ") of storing immutable data, and these data are as the unique immutable data (being called " tag addresses " here) of identification specific label; The second memory memory block of the variable information that provides with stored user (is called " variable tag ram ") here.As if present Tag-it trade mark RFID label comprises 256 variable tag rams, though can obtain more about storeies above-mentioned or other RFID labels in the future.Tag-it trade mark RFID label is with the work of 13.56MHz communication frequency, though can use the label and the interrogator of working under other frequencies.Tag-it trade mark RFID tag system also can use with the Windows compatible software that obtains from Texas Instruments, to simplify the use of Tag-it trade mark RFID label and equipment.
A. permanent labels storer
Tag addresses preferably deposits the permanent labels storer in.And preferably this tag addresses is unique, to guarantee in use to discern and visit specific label.For example, this tag addresses 32 long, allow to surpass 4,000,000,000 unique addresses.Usually this tag addresses is programmed in the label also " locked in factory " during manufacture, can not revise after making.As described below, tag addresses can comprise the information that is stored in permanent labels storer and the variable tag ram.
B. variable tag ram
Any application that is subjected to available memory quantity is placed restrictions on, and variable tag ram can be used for storing the information (for example when and where label is made) of relevant label fabricator and label itself, and/or the information of the article that maybe will adhere to that adhere to of relevant this label.For example, in the time of on the RFID label will be attached to the books in library or other data, about the exercise question of this book, the author uses number of times, inspection state and use statistics can deposit in this variable tag ram.Other information that deposit variable tag ram in comprise the library's name that has these books and data, lend the specific library department of books, the appropriate location of these books and data (as specific bookshelf position), type of items (book, CD, video-tape) etc.
The part of variable tag ram can be locked; make and to be revised absent-mindedly; for example, data relevant with the article that belong to the library on the label can be protected, avoids based on the course line parcel disposal system of RFID or the neglectful modification of other RFID write devices.Locking process is different because of different RF ID label supplier.Under the situation of the RFID label of Texas Instruments Tag-it trade mark, the minimum alterable memory piece that can lock in this way is 32, and it can store some password transitional information in the following manner.
III. reader (inquiry source) and write device (programmable device)
The RFID label of Shi Yonging is readable and programmable in one embodiment of the invention.That is, the RFID label can be read by the inquiry source or inquire obtaining some or all information in the variable tag ram that is stored in label, use or handle for the user, and the information programming (writing) that also can provide with system or user of RFID label.Suitable R FID inquiry source and RFID write device can be from Dallas, and the TexasInstruments of Texas has bought, " Commander 320 " by name.
In one embodiment of the invention, some information is changed by password, and is written to the part of available variable tag ram by the RFID write device, and the RFID reader is inquired this label in use, determine that whether this label is what authenticate, will be described in detail below.The RFID reader preferably can be inquired a plurality of RFID labels (the inquiry source of Commander 320 trade marks is 30 RFID labels of energy per second inquiry now) in fact simultaneously, though this feature is necessary.
IV. encrypt
Before label is certified, obtains some information and other information are deposited in wherein from label.Particularly, obtain tag addresses, as described belowly do the password conversion, deposit the safe block that obtains in label then from label.Shown in Fig. 1 by the example process that the invention provides label with storage security piece.
Step 100 is read or is inquired that label is to obtain tag addresses 102.Tag addresses and at least one data set cascade, preferably two data sets then.If use a data set, then this data set is usually not towards masses' private data set 106, but is deposited in the inquiry source and by its use.If, as in the remaining part in this description, use two data sets, then a data set is special-purpose, another is a public data group 104, as shown in Figure 1.Tag addresses and data set can be intersect or if need be hybrid coding (rather than cascade), though do not think and increased the security and the reliability of system so greatly.
Public and special-purpose data set can comprise any character and/or numeric string, and can be to use as ASCII, and UTF-8 or Unicode standard method are expressed as people's readable character string of binary data.As required, public data can extensively be issued or not issue.In other words, public and private data set only is two data sets, and the user has applied different safe classes to them.Data set, especially private data set, preferably random character and/or numeric string make that be difficult to maybe can not be from the reverse manipulation data group of information of password conversion.For setting up data set, can use at random or at random processing basically, as random number generator.
Public or special-purpose data set can be included in the software that is used for setting up with authenticating tag.Usually, software comprises machine language instruction, and they are not easy to understand to people and can not be decrypted, and does unless spend a large amount of time by very special people.Therefore, data set preferably is difficult in the software and locatees, even make extensively issue of software itself, data set is still thought special use to all actual purpose.Public and form private data set also can be selected, so that the legal protection under copyright, trade secret or other laws makes any unauthorized user of this data set will invade the right of legal protection.
Though tag addresses, public data group and private data set can have the length and the content of any hope, for example tag addresses can have 32 information, and the public data group has 32 byte information at least, and private data set has 32 byte information at least.An example tag address is a hexadecimal value 0 * 012345678, exemplary public data group can be an ASCII string " 3M Radio FrequencyIdentification Systems ", and exemplary private data set can be 0 * 0001E2882AC7B5C613FAF447170E90702957A5053C5C013D7235168E 268DE990.
Then, tag addresses 102 and private data set 106 and optional public data group 104 are sent into password transfer algorithm 108, as the hashing algorithm of password, and this algorithm translation data, and output as 160 long eap-message digests 110.The password conversion comprises traditional reversible encryption, as data encryption standard (DES, it also is called data encryption algorithm (DEA) by ANSI, is called DEA-1 by ISO), and other relevant technologies, as using the one-way cipher hash such as Secure Hash Algorithm 1 or SHA1.The example of two types of algorithms and C programming language detailed source program be included in the book AppliedCryptography that writes by Bruce Schneier together, Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C (John Wileyand Sons, Inc.1996 (2d version)) the 442nd page of book that begins people such as part and A.Menezes, in the beginning part that " Handbook of Applied Cryptography, " is the 238th page.Though other cryptographic algorithms as DES-CBC-MAC and DES-DMAC also can be used as password conversion method of the present invention, but preferably as SHA1, the cryptographic Hash algorithms that MD5 and RIPEMD-160 are such, because they during at known message summary and public data group the attempt of reverse manipulation exclusive data quite senior security is provided, also because they obtain easily, realize easily and remove important government placing restrictions on from use.The source program relevant with the SHA1 that describes among the above-cited list of references Applied Cryptography now can be from Bruce Schneier, Counterpane Systems, 7115 W.North Ave., Suit 16, OakPark, IL 60302-1002 obtain obtaining on the computing machine disc.
If because variable tag ram places restrictions on, wish on label, not store whole eap-message digest, but the specific part of specify message summary and deposit the variable tag ram of (writing) RFID label in then.This part eap-message digest is a safe block 112.In addition, as mentioned above, if wish that the locked secure piece can be determined the suitable size of security information piece according to the eap-message digest of specifying or deposit in variable tag ram in case neglectful change then may be the lock cell or the piece of 32 variable tag ram in variable tag ram.Also can wish to deposit eap-message digest or safe block in the permanent labels storer, or only deposit eap-message digest or safe block in the permanent labels storer, the permanent labels storer is made by the fabricator of label usually, or other people make for them.For simplicity, the output of password conversion (as SHA1) is called " eap-message digest ", and deposits being called as in whole or in part of eap-message digest " safe block " of RFID label in.Therefore, safe block 112 can be set up by being assigned to the small part eap-message digest, writes the RFID label in the mode shown in the above-mentioned steps 114 subsequently.
V. authentication
In case the safe block according to a password conversion expression eap-message digest or an eap-message digest part is deposited in label, this label can be used for on-site verification.Authentication is finished with some different modes, and wherein two kinds are described below.First kind is used for the identical process of encoded tag below comprising, subsequently that whether result's (safe block) is relatively identical to determine them with the safe block of storage.If two safe block are identical, then label authenticates.If their differences, then label does not authenticate.This is called " scene is encrypted and compared ".
The second kind of verification process that describes below mainly comprises inverse process.That is, verification process starts from obtaining from tag ram the safe block of storage, uses private data set, if need comprise the public data group, carries out reverse encryption conversion to obtain tag addresses.Tag addresses with tag addresses and storage compares then.If two tag addresses are identical, then label authenticates.If their differences, then label does not authenticate.This is called " scene is deciphered and compared ".For using this second kind of verification process, safe block should comprise whole eap-message digest.
These verification process are made more detailed description with reference to figure 2 and 3.
A. the scene is encrypted and is compared
Fig. 2 illustrates and is used to judge that the scene whether certain label authenticates encrypts and the comparison procedure step.The onsite user follows same quadrat method shown in Figure 1, subsequently with the safe block comparison of final value and storage to judge that whether label is authentication.
In the embodiment shown in Figure 2, step 200 to 212 is identical with the counterpart of Fig. 1.That is, obtain tag addresses 200; Tag addresses 202, private data set 206 and optional public data group 204 are offered password transfer algorithm 208, and the latter gives information and makes a summary 210, therefrom sets up safe block 212.For by authenticating tag relatively, the RFID reader obtains the safe block of storage from label shown in 214, and the storage security piece that obtains from label among the result (shown in 216) and 214 of safe block 212 is compared.If two safe block are identical, then label authenticates.If two message do not match, then the user can reach a conclusion, and these article do not authenticate, and take any suitable action.For example, this action comprises that termination pastes the article of this label.
B. the scene is deciphered and is compared
Fig. 3 illustrates on-the-spot deciphering and comparison procedure step, is used to judge whether certain label is what authenticate.As shown in Figure 3, step 300 obtains safe block (safe block is equal to eap-message digest in this embodiment) from label; Safe block 302, dedicated data set 306 and optional public data collection 304 are sent to password transfer algorithm 308, and the latter provides tag addresses 310.Then, the tag addresses 312 that the RFID reader stores from the label acquisition, and with the stored tag address comparison (shown in 314) that obtains in tag addresses 310 and 312.If two tag addresses are identical, then label authenticates.If two tag addresses differences, then label does not authenticate.The password conversion can be reversible block encryption, stream cipher or other suitable process.
VI. the variation of process of the present invention
Should be noted that, Fig. 1,2 with some step shown in 3 can be to finish with the different order shown in the figure.The step 214 of for example obtaining the storage security piece in Fig. 2 from label can occur in the stage early of process, even as the first step of process.Similarly, the step 312 of obtaining the tag addresses of storage from label in Fig. 3 can occur in the stage early of process.And, though tag addresses, public data group and private data set are shown the independent input of password transfer algorithm, as mentioned above they can cascade before input cryptographic transformation algorithm, intersection or other the combination.
In other embodiment, the effect of tag addresses and safe block can be put upside down.When storage tags address and safe block make one during than another more difficult change, such putting upside down is useful.Use the dealer if the label fabricator writes tag addresses and write safe block, some situation that acts on of then putting upside down tag addresses and safe block is useful.
According to routine down, the present invention is described in more detail.
Example
This example is the expression of any tag addresses, public data group and the private data set that can be used in combination with the inventive method.With hexadecimal representation, tag addresses can be 0 * 12345678. these addresses can with ASCII go here and there the public data group " Copyright (c) 2000; 3M IPC.ALL Rights Reserved”，“0×43 0×6f 0×70 0×79 0×72 0×69 0×67 0×68 0×74 0×200×28 0×63 0×29 0×20 0×32 0×30 0×30 0×30 0×2c 0×20 0×33 0×4d 0×20 0×490×50 0×43 0×2e 0×20 0×41 0×6c 0×6c 0×20 0×52 0×69 0×67 0×68 0×74 0×730×20 0×52 0×65 0×73 0×65 0×72 0×76 0×65 0×64”。 This cascade data will be further and the cascade of following sexadecimal private data set: " 0 * e0,0 *, 34 0 * c7; 0 * f0; 0 * f9; 0 * f7; 0 *, 37 0 *, 260 * f6; 0 *, 19 0 *, 53 0 *, 15 0 *, 11 0 *, 64 0 * e5,0 *, 30 0 *, 45 0 * 4b, 0 * e3,0 * bf, 0 * 6a, 0 * ca0 * dc, 0 * 6e, 0 * be, 0 * b4,0 *, 84 0 * e3,0 * b1,0 * 2d, 0 *, 77 0 * 38 "; The latter can be produced with Pseudo-random number generator by computing machine.Whole cascade string uses the SHA1 cryptographic Hash algorithms to handle, and is 0 * 3 with the final eap-message digest of hexadecimal representation38
52
75
89
1c
eb
2e
69cdc4a56031276413d6d702d.Therefrom can select in the eap-message digest the low nibble (4) of each in preceding 8 bytes (shown in underscore character in the eap-message digest in the above), they are cascaded so that safe block to be provided subsequently, with hexadecimal representation is 0 * 35781e26, and it can be existed on the RFID label by the RFID write device.This label use subsequently above-mentioned on-the-spot encrypt and comparison procedure certified, whether be authentication to judge this label.
In the RFID smart-tag authentication that uses with library's data (as books), authentication method described herein is found useful especially application.Can use portable (as portable) RFID interrogator interrogating rfid label, and, obtain other information useful the librarian from the RFID label if label authenticates.Fixing RFID interrogator as client's Possum, office worker's workstation with have only library's data of striation font code to be converted into the website with RFID label, also can use authentication method of the present invention.
Though most of above-mentioned announcements are limited in by in the certain content of RFID reader by some encryption of use (with deciphering in some cases) technical certification RFID label, the variation of the method that is disclosed also within the scope of the invention.For example, can substitute in order to label, reader and the write device of the frequency work of non-radio frequency described those.By suitable modification, the present invention can be applicable to bar code (comprising two-dimensional bar), and wherein the bar code address substitutes the RFID tag addresses, and so on.
Claims (100)
1. the method that the RFID label that has safe block is provided is characterized in that, comprises the following steps:
(a) obtain tag addresses;
(b) at least tag addresses and private data set are carried out the password conversion so that safe block to be provided; With
(c) safe block is stored on the label.
2. the method for claim 1 is characterized in that this label comprises permanent labels storer and variable tag ram.
3. method as claimed in claim 2 is characterized in that this tag addresses deposits the permanent labels storer in.
4. method as claimed in claim 2 is characterized in that depositing variable tag ram in to the small part tag addresses.
5. method as claimed in claim 2 is characterized in that step (c) comprises to deposit safe block in variable tag ram.
6. method as claimed in claim 5 is characterized in that also comprising the steps:
(d) lock the variable tag ram part of storage safe piece at least to prevent that this safe block from being revised inadvertently.
7. method as claimed in claim 2 is characterized in that step (c) comprises to deposit safe block in the permanent labels storer.
8. as any described method in the claim 1 to 7, it is characterized in that the password conversion comprises the hashing algorithm that accesses to your password.
9. as any described method in the claim 1 to 7, it is characterized in that this password conversion comprises use piece or stream cipher.
10. as any described method in the claim 1 to 7, it is characterized in that step (b) comprises at least tag addresses and private data set are done the password conversion that with the summary that gives information, and appointment at least a portion eap-message digest is as safe block.
11. method as claimed in claim 10 is characterized in that this password conversion comprises the hashing algorithm that accesses to your password.
12., it is characterized in that step (b) comprises tag addresses, private data set and public data group are done password conversion as any described method in the claim 1 to 7.
13. method as claimed in claim 12 is characterized in that step (b) comprises tag addresses, private data set and public data group are done password conversion that with the summary that gives information, and appointment at least a portion eap-message digest is as safe block.
14. method as claimed in claim 11 is characterized in that step (b) also comprises tag addresses, private data set and public data group are done password conversion.
15. method as claimed in claim 12 is characterized in that this public data group is " Copyright (c) 2000,3M IPC.ALL Rights Reserved ".
16. method as claimed in claim 13 is characterized in that this public data group is " Copyright (c) 2000,3M IPC.ALL Rights Reserved ".
17. method as claimed in claim 14 is characterized in that this public data group is " Copyright (c) 2000,3M IPC.ALL Rights Reserved ".
18. method as claimed in claim 12 is characterized in that this public data group is subjected to the protection of copyright, trade secret, trade mark or service mark method.
19. method as claimed in claim 13 is characterized in that this public data group is subjected to the protection of copyright, trade secret, trade mark or service mark method.
20. method as claimed in claim 14 is characterized in that this public data group is subjected to the protection of copyright, trade secret, trade mark or service mark method.
21. a method that authenticates the RFID label, this RFID label have the storage tags address of identification label and to the storage safe piece of small part from this tag addresses derivation, it is characterized in that this method comprises the following steps:
(a) obtain this tag addresses;
(b) at least tag addresses and private data set are carried out the password conversion so that safe block to be provided; With
(c) whether the safe block in the step (b) is identical to judge two safe block with the safe block comparison on being stored in label.
22. method as claimed in claim 21 is characterized in that this label comprises permanent labels storer and variable tag ram.
23. method as claimed in claim 22 is characterized in that this tag addresses deposits the permanent labels storer in.
24. method as claimed in claim 22 is characterized in that depositing variable tag ram in to the small part tag addresses.
25. method as claimed in claim 22 is characterized in that the safe block that stores deposits variable tag ram in.
26. method as claimed in claim 25 is characterized in that to the variable tag ram of the stored safe block of small part storage lockedly, is revised absent-mindedly with the safe block that prevents to store.
27. method as claimed in claim 22 is characterized in that the safe block that stores deposits the permanent labels storer in.
28., it is characterized in that the password conversion comprises the hashing algorithm that accesses to your password as any described method in the claim 21 to 27.
29. as any described method in the claim 21 to 27, it is characterized in that the password conversion comprises use piece or stream cipher, wherein this password moves with cipher mode.
30. as any described method in the claim 21 to 27, it is characterized in that step (b) comprises password switch labels address and private data set at least,, and specify at least a portion eap-message digest as safe block with the summary that gives information.
31. method as claimed in claim 30 is characterized in that the password conversion comprises the hashing algorithm that accesses to your password.
32., it is characterized in that step (b) comprises password switch labels address, private data set and public data group as any described method in the claim 21 to 27.
33. method as claimed in claim 32 is characterized in that step (b) comprises switch labels address, private data set and public data group with the summary that gives information, and selects at least a portion eap-message digest as safe block.
34. method as claimed in claim 31 is characterized in that step (b) also comprises password switch labels address, private data set and public data group.
35. method as claimed in claim 32 is characterized in that this public data group is " Copyright (c) 2000,3M IPC.ALL Rights Reserved ".
36. method as claimed in claim 33 is characterized in that this public data group is " Copyright (c) 2000,3M IPC.ALL Rights Reserved ".
37. method as claimed in claim 34 is characterized in that this public data group is " Copyright (c) 2000,3M IPC.ALL Rights Reserved ".
38. method as claimed in claim 32 is characterized in that the public data group is subjected to the protection of copyright, trade secret, trade mark or service mark method.
39. method as claimed in claim 33 is characterized in that the public data group is subjected to the protection of copyright, trade secret, trade mark or service mark method.
40. method as claimed in claim 34 is characterized in that the public data group is subjected to the protection of copyright, trade secret, trade mark or service mark method.
41. a method that authenticates the RFID label, this RFID label have the storage tags address of identification label and to the storage security piece of small part from this tag addresses derivation, it is characterized in that this method comprises the following steps:
(a) obtain safe block;
(b) use at least one private data set that safe block is carried out the password conversion so that a tag addresses to be provided; With
(c) whether the tag addresses with step (b) is identical to judge two tag addresses with the tag addresses comparison of storage.
42. method as claimed in claim 41 is characterized in that this tag addresses comprises permanent labels storer and variable tag ram.
43. method as claimed in claim 42 is characterized in that the tag addresses that stores deposits the permanent labels storer in.
44. method as claimed in claim 42 is characterized in that depositing variable tag ram in to the tag addresses of small part storage.
45. method as claimed in claim 42 is characterized in that the safe block that stores deposits variable tag ram in.
46. method as claimed in claim 45, the variable tag ram of safe block that it is characterized in that depositing in to small part storage is locked to prevent that safe block from being revised absent-mindedly.
47. method as claimed in claim 42 is characterized in that the safe block of this storage deposits the permanent labels storer in.
48. as any described method in the claim 41 to 47, it is characterized in that the password conversion comprises use piece or stream cipher, wherein password moves with manner of decryption.
49., it is characterized in that step (b) comprises that password conversion safe block, private data set and public data group are to provide tag addresses as any described method in the claim 41 to 47.
50. method as claimed in claim 49 is characterized in that the password conversion comprises use piece or stream cipher, wherein password moves with manner of decryption.
51. method as claimed in claim 49 is characterized in that the public data group is " Copyright (c) 2000,3M IPC.ALL Rights Reserved ".
52. method as claimed in claim 50 is characterized in that the public data group is " Copyright (c) 2000,3M IPC.ALL Rights Reserved ".
53. method as claimed in claim 49 is characterized in that the public data group is subjected to the protection of copyright, trade secret, trade mark or service mark method.
54. method as claimed in claim 50 is characterized in that the public data group is subjected to the protection of copyright, trade secret, trade mark or service mark method.
55. a method that provides and authenticate the RFID label, this RFID label have the storage tags address of identification label and to the storage security piece of small part from this tag addresses derivation, it is characterized in that this method comprises the following steps:
(a) provide the safe block of storage through the following steps
(i) obtain tag addresses;
(ii) at least tag addresses and private data set are carried out the password conversion so that safe block to be provided; With
(iii) safe block is stored on the label; And
(b) authenticate this label through the following steps
(i) obtain tag addresses;
(ii) at least tag addresses and private data set are carried out the password conversion so that safe block to be provided; With
(iii) that whether step (b) safe block (ii) is identical to judge two safe block with the safe block comparison of storage.
56. method as claimed in claim 55 is characterized in that this label comprises permanent labels storer and variable tag ram.
57. method as claimed in claim 56 is characterized in that this tag addresses deposits the permanent labels storer in.
58. method as claimed in claim 56 is characterized in that depositing variable tag ram in to the small part tag addresses.
59. method as claimed in claim 56 is characterized in that step (a) (iii) comprises to deposit safe block in variable tag ram.
60. method as claimed in claim 59 is characterized in that to the tag ram of the stored safe block of small part storage lockedly, is revised absent-mindedly with the safe block that prevents to store.
61. method as claimed in claim 56 is characterized in that step (a) (iii) comprises to deposit safe block in the permanent labels storer.
62., it is characterized in that in step (a) and the password (b) conversion includes the hashing algorithm that accesses to your password as any described method in the claim 56 to 61.
63., it is characterized in that in step (a) and the password (b) conversion includes and uses block encryption or stream cipher as any described method in the claim 56 to 61.
64., it is characterized in that this password moves with cipher mode as the described method of claim 63.
65. as any described method in the claim 56 to 61, it is characterized in that step (a) (ii) and (b) (ii) comprises at least password switch labels address and private data set with the summary that gives information, and specify a part of eap-message digest at least as safe block.
66., it is characterized in that in step (a) and the password (b) conversion comprises the hashing algorithm that accesses to your password as the described method of claim 65.
67., it is characterized in that step (a) (ii) and (b) (ii) comprises password switch labels address, private data set and public data group as any described method in the claim 56 to 61.
68., it is characterized in that step (a) (ii) He (b) (ii) comprises password switch labels address, private data set and public data group with the summary that gives information, and specify a part of eap-message digest at least as safe block as the described method of claim 67.
69., it is characterized in that step (a) and (b) also comprise password switch labels address, private data set and public data group as the described method of claim 66.
70., it is characterized in that this public data group is " Copyright (c) 2000,3M IPC.ALL Rights Reserved " as the described method of claim 67.
71., it is characterized in that this public data group is " Copyright (c) 2000,3M IPC.ALL Rights Reserved " as the described method of claim 68.
72., it is characterized in that this public data group is " Copyright (c) 2000,3M IPC.ALL Rights Reserved " as the described method of claim 69.
73., it is characterized in that the public data group is subjected to the protection of copyright, trade secret, trade mark or service mark method as the described method of claim 67.
74., it is characterized in that the public data group is subjected to the protection of copyright, trade secret, trade mark or service mark method as the described method of claim 68.
75., it is characterized in that the public data group is subjected to the protection of copyright, trade secret, trade mark or service mark method as the described method of claim 69.
76. a method that provides and authenticate the RFID label, this RFID label have the storage tags address of identification label and to the storage security piece of small part from this tag addresses derivation, it is characterized in that this method comprises the following steps:
(a) provide the safe block of storage through the following steps
(i) obtain tag addresses;
(ii) at least tag addresses and private data set are carried out the password conversion so that safe block to be provided; With
(iii) safe block is stored on the label; And
(b) authenticate this label through the following steps
(i) safe block of acquisition storage;
(ii) at least the safe block and the private data set of storage are carried out the password conversion to obtain tag addresses; With
(iii) that whether step (b) tag addresses (ii) is identical to judge two tag addresses with the tag addresses comparison of storage.
77., it is characterized in that this label comprises permanent labels storer and variable tag ram as the described method of claim 76.
78., it is characterized in that this tag addresses deposits the permanent labels storer in as the described method of claim 77.
79., it is characterized in that depositing variable tag ram in to the small part tag addresses as the described method of claim 77.
80., it is characterized in that step (a) (iii) comprises to deposit safe block in variable tag ram as the described method of claim 77.
81., it is characterized in that also comprising the steps: as the described method of claim 80
(a) (iv) be locked to the variable tag ram of small part storage security piece to prevent to revise because of carelessness safe block.
82., it is characterized in that step (a) (iii) comprises to deposit safe block in the permanent labels storer as the described method of claim 77.
83. as any described method in the claim 76 to 82, it is characterized in that password conversion comprises to use piece or stream cipher, step (a) (ii) in the cipher mode operation, and move with manner of decryption in (ii) in step (b).
84. as any described method in the claim 76 to 82, it is characterized in that step (a) (ii) comprises password switch labels address, private data set and public data group, and step (b) comprises that (ii) password transforms safe block, private data set and public data group.
85., it is characterized in that the public data group is " Copyright (c) 2000,3M IPC.ALL Rights Reserved " as the described method of claim 84.
86., it is characterized in that the public data group is subjected to the protection of copyright, trade secret, trade mark or service mark method as the described method of claim 84.
87. the method for claim 1 it is characterized in that this tag addresses is obtained by RFID inquiry source, and safe block deposits label in by the RFID write device.
88., it is characterized in that this method finished by the handheld RFID reader as claim 21 or 41 described methods.
89., it is characterized in that this method finished by the self-service unit of the client of library as claim 21 and 41 described methods.
90., it is characterized in that step (b) is finished by portable RF ID reader at least as claim 55 and 76 described methods.
91., it is characterized in that step (b) is finished by fixed RFID reader at least as claim 55 and 76 described methods.
92. a RFID label is characterized in that this label has the tag addresses of storage and with this tag addresses the safe block of the storage of code communication arranged.
93., it is characterized in that this tag addresses and private data set changed so that safe block to be provided by password as the described RFID label of claim 92.
94., it is characterized in that this tag addresses, private data set and public data group changed so that safe block to be provided by password as the described RFID label of claim 92.
95., it is characterized in that this label comprises permanent labels storer and variable tag ram as the described RFID label of claim 92.
96., it is characterized in that tag addresses deposits the permanent labels storer in as the described RFID label of claim 95.
97., it is characterized in that depositing variable tag ram in to the small part tag addresses as the described RFID label of claim 95.
98., it is characterized in that this safe block deposits variable tag ram in as the described RFID label of claim 95.
99. as the described RFID label of claim 95, it is characterized in that to the variable tag ram of small part storage institute storage security piece lockedly, revised absent-mindedly with the safe block that prevents to store.
100., it is characterized in that this safe block deposits the permanent labels storer in as the described RFID label of claim 95.
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| US49890200A | 2000-02-04 | 2000-02-04 | |
| US09/498,902 | 2000-02-04 |
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| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN1433558A true CN1433558A (en) | 2003-07-30 |
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ID=23982972
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| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN00818777A Pending CN1433558A (en) | 2000-02-04 | 2000-05-23 | Method of authenticating tag |
Country Status (10)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| EP (1) | EP1257974A1 (en) |
| JP (1) | JP2003524242A (en) |
| KR (1) | KR20020074494A (en) |
| CN (1) | CN1433558A (en) |
| AR (1) | AR029034A1 (en) |
| AU (1) | AU5157600A (en) |
| BR (1) | BR0017090A (en) |
| CA (1) | CA2399092A1 (en) |
| MX (1) | MXPA02007518A (en) |
| WO (1) | WO2001057807A1 (en) |
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- 2000-05-23 KR KR1020027010069A patent/KR20020074494A/en not_active Application Discontinuation
- 2000-05-23 CN CN00818777A patent/CN1433558A/en active Pending
- 2000-05-23 JP JP2001556986A patent/JP2003524242A/en active Pending
- 2000-05-23 EP EP00936230A patent/EP1257974A1/en not_active Withdrawn
- 2000-05-23 AU AU51576/00A patent/AU5157600A/en not_active Abandoned
- 2000-05-23 CA CA002399092A patent/CA2399092A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2000-05-23 MX MXPA02007518A patent/MXPA02007518A/en unknown
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| CN101111853B (en) * | 2004-12-31 | 2012-07-04 | 英国电讯有限公司 | Device, method and system of control of data exchange |
| CN101305385B (en) * | 2005-09-07 | 2012-12-19 | Mil.数码贴标公司 | Digital labels for product authentication |
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| CN101976365A (en) * | 2010-11-05 | 2011-02-16 | 中国航天科工集团第二研究院七○六所 | Safe radio frequency identification system |
| CN103679080A (en) * | 2012-09-20 | 2014-03-26 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Tag identification distance control method, reader and system |
| CN103679080B (en) * | 2012-09-20 | 2017-02-15 | 天津中兴智联科技有限公司 | Tag identification distance control method, reader and system |
| CN102930303A (en) * | 2012-09-25 | 2013-02-13 | 安徽思米来电子科技有限公司 | Active and passive radio frequency identification method and system for security domains |
| CN102932338A (en) * | 2012-10-24 | 2013-02-13 | 中国航天科工集团第二研究院七〇六所 | System and method for safe network access of radio-frequency identification system |
| CN102932338B (en) * | 2012-10-24 | 2015-01-21 | 中国航天科工集团第二研究院七〇六所 | System and method for safe network access of radio-frequency identification system |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| KR20020074494A (en) | 2002-09-30 |
| JP2003524242A (en) | 2003-08-12 |
| BR0017090A (en) | 2003-02-25 |
| MXPA02007518A (en) | 2003-01-28 |
| AR029034A1 (en) | 2003-06-04 |
| WO2001057807A1 (en) | 2001-08-09 |
| CA2399092A1 (en) | 2001-08-09 |
| EP1257974A1 (en) | 2002-11-20 |
| AU5157600A (en) | 2001-08-14 |
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