DE19608757A1 - Method and device for checking the authenticity of documents in the form of chip cards - Google Patents

Method and device for checking the authenticity of documents in the form of chip cards

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Publication number
DE19608757A1
DE19608757A1 DE19608757A DE19608757A DE19608757A1 DE 19608757 A1 DE19608757 A1 DE 19608757A1 DE 19608757 A DE19608757 A DE 19608757A DE 19608757 A DE19608757 A DE 19608757A DE 19608757 A1 DE19608757 A1 DE 19608757A1
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Germany
Prior art keywords
chip
register
document
detector
foreign body
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
DE19608757A
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German (de)
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Individual
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Individual
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Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Individual filed Critical Individual
Priority to DE19608757A priority Critical patent/DE19608757A1/en
Priority to AU18799/97A priority patent/AU1879997A/en
Priority to PCT/EP1997/001041 priority patent/WO1997033252A1/en
Publication of DE19608757A1 publication Critical patent/DE19608757A1/en
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06KGRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/08Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code using markings of different kinds or more than one marking of the same kind in the same record carrier, e.g. one marking being sensed by optical and the other by magnetic means
    • G06K19/083Constructional details
    • G06K19/086Constructional details with markings consisting of randomly placed or oriented elements, the randomness of the elements being useable for generating a unique identifying signature of the record carrier, e.g. randomly placed magnetic fibers or magnetic particles in the body of a credit card
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06KGRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/08Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code using markings of different kinds or more than one marking of the same kind in the same record carrier, e.g. one marking being sensed by optical and the other by magnetic means
    • G06K19/10Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code using markings of different kinds or more than one marking of the same kind in the same record carrier, e.g. one marking being sensed by optical and the other by magnetic means at least one kind of marking being used for authentication, e.g. of credit or identity cards

Abstract

The proposed method is used for checking the authenticity of documents in the form of chip cards or smart cards fulfilling one or more functions, e.g. as bank, cash and credit cards used for withdrawing money and debiting amounts, and/or as ID documents for persons, motor vehicles (registration document, tachograph), as ke ys, etc. An inexpensive but reliable authenticity check is achieved as follows: the document comprising a base material with embedded foreign bodies whose physical properties differ from those of the base material and are distributed randomly within it is scanned for foreign bodies by a detector when first issued, in at least one scanning track selected by a random generator. The detector output values are then recorded in a first register present in the chip and locked following initialisation; the stored contents of that register cannot be read, manipulated or compared to other values from outside. When the document thus prepared is used, its foreign body data are read by at least one detector in the terminal unit which receives the document, stored in a second register in the chip which is separate from the first register, compared internally with the foreign body pattern in the first register and evaluated so as to release the document if the output values and foreign body density match.

Description

Die Erfindung bezieht sich auf ein Verfahren zur Echtheitskontrolle von Dokumenten in Form von Chipkarten oder Smartcards, die eine oder mehrere Funktionen ermöglichen, z. B. als Bank-, Cash- und Kreditkarten zur Ausgabe von Geld, zum Abbuchen von Werteinheiten dienen und/oder als ID-Dokument für Personen, Kraftfahrzeuge (Zulassungsdokument, Fahrtenschrei­ ber), Schlüssel od. dgl. einsetzbar sind. Wertvolle Dokumente wurden bisher schon gegen Fälschung und Mißbrauch gesichert. Das geschah durch die Verwendung besonderer Papierqualitäten mit Wasserzeichen, durch Einbetten von Metallstreifen und die Verwendung eines möglichst fälschungssicheren Drucks. Die Echtheitsprüfung von Dokumenten ist unter diesen Gesichtspunk­ ten schwierig. Sie erfordert insbesondere bei Automaten einen beträchtlichen Aufwand oder eine Verminderung der durch die Echtheitsprüfung erzielbaren Fälschungssicherheit.The invention relates to a method for Authenticity control of documents in the form of chip cards or Smart cards that enable one or more functions, e.g. B. as bank, cash and credit cards for spending money, for Debit value units and / or serve as an ID document for People, motor vehicles (registration document, trip scream ber), keys or the like. Valuable documents have been protected against counterfeiting and abuse. This was done using special paper grades with watermark, by embedding metal strips and the Use of a print that is as forgery-proof as possible From this point of view, authentication of documents is important difficult. It requires one, especially in machines  considerable effort or a reduction in through the Authenticity test achievable counterfeit security.

Der am nächsten kommende Stand der Technik auf dem Ge­ biet der Sicherung von Dokumenten gegen Kopieren und Fälschung ergibt sich aus folgenden Referenzen: CH-PS 569144 "Blatt­ förmiges Material für Dokumente", CH-PS 577722 "Gerät zur Echtheitskontrolle von Dokumenten", DE-PS 26 35 795 "Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Echtheitskontrolle von Dokumenten", US-PS-4,218,674 "Method and System for Verifying Authenticity Safe against Forgery". Das eingangs genannte Problem der Echt­ heitskontrolle von Dokumenten ist auch durch diese vorbekann­ ten Vorschläge nicht zur vollsten Zufriedenheit gelöst worden, insbesondere dann nicht, wenn es sich um den Einsatz von Smartcards, d. h. Automatenkarten, die mit einem Chip (elek­ tronische Einheit zum Steuern, Lesen und Schreiben von Infor­ mationen) ausgerüstet sind, handelt. Für den Verkehr von Kun­ den mit Geldautomaten, Automaten anderer Art oder von Anwen­ dungen in Netzwerken wie z. B. Internet wäre deshalb ein Prüf­ verfahren und eine dazu dienende Vorrichtung wünschenswert, das eine wirklich zuverlässige, fälschungssichere Echtheits­ prüfung ermöglicht.The closest state of the art on the Ge offers the security of documents against copying and forgery results from the following references: CH-PS 569144 "Blatt shaped material for documents ", CH-PS 577722" device for Authenticity control of documents ", DE-PS 26 35 795" procedure and device for checking the authenticity of documents ", U.S. Patent 4,218,674 "Method and System for Verifying Authenticity Safe against Forgery ". The problem of authenticity mentioned at the beginning The control of documents is also known by this suggestions have not been fully satisfied, especially not when it comes to the use of Smart cards, d. H. Vending machine cards with a chip (elec tronic unit for controlling, reading and writing information mations) are equipped. For the traffic of Kun with ATMs, other types of machines or from users in networks such as B. Internet would therefore be a test method and a device intended for this purpose, a really reliable, tamper-proof authenticity testing enabled.

Das erfindungsgemäße Verfahren, nach dem eine beson­ ders preisgünstige und dennoch sichere Echtheitsprüfung ermög­ licht wird, ist im wesentlichen dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß das aus einer Grundmasse mit eingelagerten Fremdkörpern, deren physikalische Eigenschaften von denen der Grundmasse abweichen und in der Grundmasse eine Zufallsverteilung haben, bestehende Dokument bei der Erstausstellung in mindestens einer von einem Zufallsgenerator ausgewählten Abtastspur von mindestens einem Detektor auf Fremdkörper abgetastet wird, daß die Ausgangs­ werte des Detektors in ein im Chip der Chipkarte vorgesehenes, nach Initialisierung gesperrtes erstes Register eingeschrieben werden, dessen gespeicherter Inhalt von außen her weder lesbar noch mit anderen Werten vergleichbar ist, und daß bei Anwen­ dung des so vorbereiteten Dokuments dessen Fremdkörperinfor­ mationen von mindestens einem Detektor des das Dokument auf­ nehmenden Terminals gelesen und in einem parallel zum ersten Register im Chip vorhandenen zweiten Register gespeichert und mit dem Fremdkörpermuster im ersten Register intern verglichen und im Sinne einer Freigabe des Dokuments bei Übereinstimmung der Ausgangswerte ausgewertet werden. Die Erfindung beruht so­ mit auf der Erkenntnis, daß nunmehr eine Echtheitsprüfung mit dem Kartenleser mit einfachen Mitteln ermöglicht ist, ohne daß die Sicherheitsinformation (d. h. die die Echtheitserkennung der Chipkarte gewährleistenden Daten) jemals den Chip der Kar­ te verläßt.The inventive method, according to which a particular affordable, yet secure authenticity check light is essentially characterized in that that from a basic mass with embedded foreign bodies whose physical properties differ from those of the basic mass and have a random distribution in the basic mass, existing ones Document at first issuance in at least one of one Random generator selected scan track of at least one Detector for foreign objects is scanned that the output values of the detector into a provided in the chip of the chip card, first register locked after initialization the stored content is neither legible from the outside  is still comparable with other values, and that with users of the document prepared in this way, its foreign body information mations of at least one detector of the document reading terminals and in a parallel to the first Registers stored in the second register and existing in the chip internally compared with the foreign body pattern in the first register and in the sense of a release of the document if there is a match of the initial values are evaluated. The invention is based on this with the knowledge that now an authenticity check with the card reader is made possible with simple means without the security information (i.e. the authenticity detection the chip card guaranteeing data) ever the chip of the card te leaves.

Bei dieser Technik ist ein Trägermaterial für Chipkar­ ten Voraussetzung, das zur Erhöhung der Fälschungs- und Ko­ piersicherheit mit optisch und/oder elektronisch erkennbaren Fremdkörpern zufallsmäßig versetzt ist. Durch einfache Erken­ nung der Position und der Eigenschaften des Fremdkörpers, so­ wie durch Vergleich dieser Information in einem Speicher des Chips kann die Chipkarte auf ihre Echtheit überprüft werden.In this technique, there is a substrate for Chipkar ten prerequisite that to increase the counterfeiting and Ko pier safety with optically and / or electronically recognizable Foreign bodies are accidentally displaced. By simple orken position and properties of the foreign body, as by comparing this information in a memory of the The chip card can be checked for authenticity.

Die Koordinaten (X-Y [Position], Z [physikalische Ei­ genschaften]) dieser Fremdkörper werden bei der Ausstellung der Chipkarte mit Hilfe eines Zufallsgenerators erfaßt (die ganze Fläche oder ein ausgewählter Teil der Fläche X-Y) und im Kartenchip als nicht auslesbare Information gespeichert. Beim Lesen der Chipkarte in einem Chipkartenterminal werden alle Fremdkörper koordinatenmäßig gelesen und mit den im Koordina­ tenspeicher der Chipkarte enthaltenen Werten verglichen. Stim­ men die im Kartenchip gespeicherten Daten mit den für die Ko­ ordinaten (X-Y-Z) der Fremdkörper ermittelten Daten überein, wird die Chipkarte als gültig anerkannt und der Chip für Transaktionen freigegeben. Stimmen die im Kartenchip gespei­ cherten Daten über die Koordinaten (X-Y-Z) der Fremdkörper nicht überein, wird die Chipkarte als ungültig erkannt und ab­ gewiesen oder einbehalten.The coordinates (X-Y [position], Z [physical egg properties]) of these foreign bodies at the exhibition the chip card with the help of a random generator (the whole area or a selected part of the area X-Y) and in Card chip saved as non-readable information. At the Everyone reads the chip card in a chip card terminal Foreign objects read according to coordinates and with those in the coordinate Tent memory of the chip card values compared. Stim men the data stored in the card chip with the data for the Ko ordinates (X-Y-Z) of the data determined from the foreign body, the chip card is recognized as valid and the chip for Transactions released. Voices that are saved in the card chip saved data about the coordinates (X-Y-Z) of the foreign bodies  does not match, the chip card is recognized as invalid and ab assigned or withheld.

Die Fremdkörper können in Abhängigkeit von ihren un­ terschiedlichen physikalischen Eigenschaften mit unterschied­ lichen Erkennungsmethoden geortet und gelesen werden. Zu die­ sen Methoden zählen Laser, Infraroterkennung (z. B. Energieab­ strahlung), magnetische Eigenschaften (hierzu wird auf die eingangs zum Stand der Technik zitierten Patentschriften ver­ wiesen), Ultraschall (z. B. Echo-Erkennung) usw. Die verschie­ denen Erkennungsmethoden können auch gleichzeitig eingesetzt werden und machen somit ein Kopieren oder Fälschen praktisch undenkbar, da jeder Fremdkörper mehrere Eigenschaften besitzt und diese Eigenschaften in der Position (Koordinate) auf der Chipkarte im Chip gespeichert sind.The foreign bodies can be un depending on their different physical properties with differences detection methods can be located and read. To the methods include lasers, infrared detection (e.g. energy ab radiation), magnetic properties (please refer to the patent specifications cited at the beginning of the prior art pointed), ultrasound (e.g. echo detection) etc. The various which detection methods can also be used simultaneously and thus make copying or counterfeiting practical unthinkable because every foreign body has several properties and these properties in the position (coordinate) on the Chip card are stored in the chip.

Im übrigen ist es auch möglich, den Chipkartenvortrieb mit einem Schrittmotor vorzunehmen, der durch einen Taktfre­ quenzteiler im Chip der Chipkarte gesteuert wird, um schnell und sicher das gewünschte Koordinatenfeld (X, Y) zur errei­ chen.Otherwise, it is also possible to advance the chip card to make with a stepper motor, which by a Taktfre Sequence divider in the chip's chip card is controlled to quickly and safely reach the desired coordinate field (X, Y) chen.

Weitere Einzelheiten ergeben sich aus der folgenden Beschreibung anhand der beigefügten Zeichnung; es zeigen:Further details emerge from the following Description with reference to the accompanying drawing; show it:

Fig. 1 eine sehr schematische perspektivische Ansicht einer Chipkarte mit zugeordnetem Detektor und Fig. 1 is a very schematic perspective view of a chip card with an associated detector and

Fig. 2 eine analoge Ansicht der Chipkarte zur Veran­ schaulichung der Bedeutung der Koordinaten. Fig. 2 is an analog view of the chip card to illustrate the meaning of the coordinates.

Wie ersichtlich, ist sowohl bei Ausstellung als auch beim Einsatz die in Richtung der Kartenlängsachse verlaufende Leserichtung 1 der Chipkarte 2 zu berücksichtigen. Dabei wer­ den die Fremdkörper 3 mit Hilfe eines Fremdkörperdetektors 4 koordinatenmäßig erfaßt, und die Meßwerte werden vom Detektor 4 über ein Anschlußkabel 5 weitergeleitet. Der genaue Ort der Fremdkörper 3 wird festgestellt und im Kartenchip 6 gespei­ chert. In Fig. 2 ist schematisch die Taktspur 7 herausge­ stellt, die auf die vorstehend geschilderte Weise für die Ver­ arbeitung der Fremdkörperinformation anhand der zur Abtastspur 8 gehörenden Koordinaten 9 eines Fremdkörpers sorgt.As can be seen, the reading direction 1 of the chip card 2 running in the direction of the longitudinal axis of the card must be taken into account both when it is issued and when it is used. In this case, whoever the foreign body 3 detected in terms of coordinates with the aid of a foreign body detector 4, and the measured values are passed from the detector 4 via a connecting cable. 5 The exact location of the foreign body 3 is determined and saved in the card chip 6 . In Fig. 2, the clock track 7 is schematically provides, which in the manner described above ensures the processing of foreign body information using the coordinates 9 of a foreign body belonging to the scanning track 8 .

Claims (9)

1. Verfahren zur Echtheitskontrolle von Dokumenten in Form von Chipkarten oder Smartcards, die eine oder mehrere Funktionen ermöglichen, z. B. als Bank-, Cash- und Kreditkarten zur Ausgabe von Geld, zum Abbuchen von Werteinheiten dienen und/oder als ID-Dokument für Personen, Kraftfahrzeuge (Zu­ lassungsdokument, Fahrtenschreiber), Schlüssel od. dgl. ein­ setzbar sind, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß das aus einer Grund­ masse mit eingelagerten Fremdkörpern, deren physikalische Eigenschaften von denen der Grundmasse abweichen und in der Grundmasse eine Zufallsverteilung haben, bestehende Dokument bei der Erstausstellung in mindestens einer von einem Zufalls­ generator ausgewählten Abtastspur von mindestens einem Detek­ tor auf Fremdkörper abgetastet wird, daß die Ausgangswerte des Detektors in ein im Chip der Chipkarte vorgesehenes, nach Ini­ tialisierung gesperrtes erstes Register eingeschrieben werden, dessen gespeicherter Inhalt von außen her weder lesbar noch mit anderen Werten vergleichbar ist, und daß bei Anwendung des so vorbereiteten Dokuments dessen Fremdkörperinformationen von mindestens einem Detektor des das Dokument aufnehmenden Ter­ minals gelesen und in einem parallel zum ersten Register im Chip vorhandenen zweiten Register gespeichert und mit dem Fremdkörpermuster im ersten Register intern verglichen und im Sinne einer Freigabe des Dokuments bei Übereinstimmung der Ausgangswerte ausgewertet werden.1. Method for checking the authenticity of documents in the form of chip cards or smart cards that enable one or more functions, for. B. as banking, cash and credit cards for dispensing money are used for debiting monetary units and / or as an ID document issued to motor vehicles or (to lassungsdokument, tachograph) key. Like. Are settable, characterized in that that the document consisting of a basic mass with embedded foreign bodies, the physical properties of which differ from those of the basic mass and have a random distribution in the basic mass, is scanned for at least one detector for foreign bodies in at least one scanning track selected by a random generator, that the output values of the detector are written into a chip provided in the chip card, after initialization locked first register, the stored content of which is neither readable nor comparable with other values from the outside, and that when using the document prepared in this way, its foreign body information from at least one Detector of the doc Entent receiving ter read and stored in a second register in parallel to the first register in the chip and internally compared with the foreign body pattern in the first register and evaluated in terms of a release of the document if the initial values match. 2. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die bei der Erstausstellung längs der ausgewählten Abtastspur von dem mindestens einen Detektor festgestellten Ausgangswerte Taktimpulsen zugeordnet werden und daß das durch Zusammenfal­ len von Ausgangswerten des oder der Detektoren mit den Taktim­ pulsen erzeugte Fremdkörpermuster in das erste Register für die weitere Auswertung einschreibbar ist. 2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that at the first exhibition along the selected trace output values determined by the at least one detector Clock pulses are assigned and that by collapse len of output values of the detector or detectors with the clock pulse generated foreign body patterns in the first register for the further evaluation can be registered.   3. Vorrichtung zur Durchführung des Verfahrens nach An­ spruch 1 oder 2, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß der Abtastspur auf dem Dokument ein Koordinatensystem zur Festlegung von Ab­ tastpunkten längs der durch das erste Register im Chip der Chipkarte vorbestimmten Abtastspur überlagert ist.3. Device for performing the method according to An saying 1 or 2, characterized in that the scanning track on the document a coordinate system to define Ab sampling points along the through the first register in the chip Chip card predetermined scan track is superimposed. 4. Vorrichtung nach Anspruch 3, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Abszisse des Koordinatensystems durch eine den Taktge­ ber bildende Taktspur gebildet ist.4. The device according to claim 3, characterized in that the abscissa of the coordinate system by a is formed over the forming clock track. 5. Vorrichtung nach Anspruch 3 oder 4, dadurch gekenn­ zeichnet, daß die Taktspur aus Marken besteht, die sich in ih­ ren physikalischen Eigenschaften von denen der Grundmasse des Dokumentes und ihrer Fremdkörper unterscheidet.5. The device according to claim 3 or 4, characterized records that the clock track consists of marks that are in ih ren physical properties of those of the basic mass of the Document and its foreign bodies. 6. Vorrichtung nach einem der Ansprüche 3 bis 5, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die horizontale Taktspur mit dem ersten Fremdkörper auf der Chipkarte beginnt.6. Device according to one of claims 3 to 5, characterized characterized in that the horizontal clock track with the first Foreign matter on the chip card begins. 7. Vorrichtung nach einem der Ansprüche 3 bis 6, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß der Chip auf der Chipkarte eine verschlüs­ selte Angabe zur Zufallsverteilung der Fremdkörper aufweist.7. Device according to one of claims 3 to 6, characterized characterized in that the chip on the chip card encrypts has rare information on the random distribution of foreign bodies. 8. Vorrichtung nach einem der Ansprüche 3 bis 6 sowie 7, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß für das schnelle Erreichen der gewünschten Koordinaten ein Chipkartenvortrieb für Chipkarten­ terminale mit einem durch einen Taktfrequenzteiler im Chip der Chipkarte gesteuerten Schrittmotor versehen ist, der durch die verschlüsselte Angabe zur Zufallsverteilung gesteuert wird.8. Device according to one of claims 3 to 6 and 7, characterized in that for quickly reaching the desired coordinates a chip card drive for chip cards terminals with a through a clock frequency divider in the chip Chip card controlled stepper motor is provided by the encrypted information about random distribution is controlled. 9. Vorrichtung nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 7, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß das Terminal mit mindestens einem Fremd­ körperdetektor ausgerüstet ist, durch den die Fremdkörper­ eigenschaften erkennbar und auswertbar sind.9. Device according to one of claims 1 to 7, characterized characterized that the terminal with at least one foreign body detector is equipped through which the foreign body properties are recognizable and evaluable.
DE19608757A 1996-03-04 1996-03-06 Method and device for checking the authenticity of documents in the form of chip cards Withdrawn DE19608757A1 (en)

Priority Applications (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE19608757A DE19608757A1 (en) 1996-03-04 1996-03-06 Method and device for checking the authenticity of documents in the form of chip cards
AU18799/97A AU1879997A (en) 1996-03-04 1997-03-03 Process and device for verifying the authenticity of documents in the form of chip cards
PCT/EP1997/001041 WO1997033252A1 (en) 1996-03-04 1997-03-03 Process and device for verifying the authenticity of documents in the form of chip cards

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE19608233 1996-03-04
DE19608757A DE19608757A1 (en) 1996-03-04 1996-03-06 Method and device for checking the authenticity of documents in the form of chip cards

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Cited By (13)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO1998057299A1 (en) * 1997-06-11 1998-12-17 Nova-Technik Entwicklung Von Und Handel Mit Medizinischen Geräten Gmbh Document with an authentication feature
EP1139302A1 (en) * 1998-12-07 2001-10-04 Hitachi, Ltd. Method of checking authenticity of sheet with built-in electronic circuit chip
WO2002054356A2 (en) * 2001-01-02 2002-07-11 Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh Valuable document having an integrated circuit, method for checking authenticity and method for monitoring the quality of said valuable document
EP1239413A2 (en) * 2001-03-08 2002-09-11 Spectra Systems Corporation Authentication using a digital watermark
WO2003030094A1 (en) * 2001-10-02 2003-04-10 Moosa Eisa Al Amri Smart documents
WO2004006165A1 (en) * 2002-07-09 2004-01-15 Bnc Ip Switzerland Gmbh System and method for providing secure identification solutions
DE10325564A1 (en) * 2003-06-05 2004-12-30 Infineon Technologies Ag Smart card module
DE10328134A1 (en) * 2003-06-23 2005-01-20 Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh Data carrier, especially a chip card, with personalized electronic and visual data, has an additional security element, e.g. a seal for preventing falsification of the visual data
DE10328792A1 (en) * 2003-06-25 2005-01-27 Tbs Holding Ag Personal identification method for producing documents like identity cards incapable of being forged applies digitally signed features to a document
WO2007057121A1 (en) 2005-11-18 2007-05-24 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Method and apparatus for producing a security document
DE102007049540A1 (en) * 2007-10-16 2009-04-23 Siemens Ag Object i.e. label, safeguarding method for identification of plagiarism of e.g. cigarette packet, involves verifying authenticity of object with physical identification feature and authentication data produced with respect to object
FR2957705A1 (en) * 2010-03-17 2011-09-23 Advanced Track & Trace Microcircuit card e.g. bank card, securing method, involves capturing image from part of surface of microcircuit card, processing image to obtain information representing image, and storing information in microcircuit carried by card
US10872478B2 (en) 2015-09-14 2020-12-22 Neology, Inc. Embedded on-board diagnostic (OBD) device for a vehicle

Cited By (50)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO1998057299A1 (en) * 1997-06-11 1998-12-17 Nova-Technik Entwicklung Von Und Handel Mit Medizinischen Geräten Gmbh Document with an authentication feature
EP1139302A1 (en) * 1998-12-07 2001-10-04 Hitachi, Ltd. Method of checking authenticity of sheet with built-in electronic circuit chip
EP1139302A4 (en) * 1998-12-07 2005-07-27 Hitachi Ltd Method of checking authenticity of sheet with built-in electronic circuit chip
US7007854B2 (en) 1998-12-07 2006-03-07 Hitachi, Ltd. Method of checking authenticity of sheet with built-in electronic circuit chip
US7309019B2 (en) 1998-12-07 2007-12-18 Hitachi, Ltd. Method of checking authenticity of sheet with built-in electronic circuit chip
WO2002054356A2 (en) * 2001-01-02 2002-07-11 Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh Valuable document having an integrated circuit, method for checking authenticity and method for monitoring the quality of said valuable document
WO2002054356A3 (en) * 2001-01-02 2004-07-08 Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh Valuable document having an integrated circuit, method for checking authenticity and method for monitoring the quality of said valuable document
EP1239413A2 (en) * 2001-03-08 2002-09-11 Spectra Systems Corporation Authentication using a digital watermark
EP1239413A3 (en) * 2001-03-08 2004-04-07 Spectra Systems Corporation Authentication using a digital watermark
WO2003030094A1 (en) * 2001-10-02 2003-04-10 Moosa Eisa Al Amri Smart documents
US7014120B2 (en) 2001-10-02 2006-03-21 Moosa Eisa Al Amri Smart documents
AP2285A (en) * 2001-10-02 2011-10-31 Amri Al Smart documents.
AU2002339221B2 (en) * 2001-10-02 2006-10-26 Moosa Eisa Al Amri Smart documents
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