EP1113403A1 - Method for generating a security imprint - Google Patents

Abstract

Generating a security copy requires that sizes are made available, in order to print these sizes in an encrypted form in a copy with a postal amount and a date stamp. Encryption is achieved through a partial or full stage (45) executed by a microprocessor in a postal franking machine's controller before a demand for printing. Records are called up (43) for display. Current window and frame data is entered (41).

Description

The invention relates to a method for production a security imprint in the in the preamble of Specified claim 1 type. The process starts from the formation of a crypto number as part of the Security imprint made using a franking machine is printed on a piece of mail.

The invention relates in particular to franking machines, which generated a fully electronic impression Franking of postal items including reprinting one Deliver advertising clichés and a marker. The franking machine is with at least one input means, an output means, an input / output control module Storage means, a control device and one Printer module equipped.

A franking machine usually creates an imprint right-justified in a form agreed with Swiss Post, starting parallel to the upper edge of the mail with the content of postage in the postmark, date in Daily stamps and stamp impressions for advertising slogan and if necessary, type of shipment in the election stamp. The post value that The date and the type of shipment form the corresponding ones variable information to be entered into the item of mail.

The post value is usually that of Sender prepaid transportation fee (franking), which is taken from a refillable credit register and used to clear the mail item.

The date is a current date or a future date in a postmark. While the current date from a clock / date block automatically is provided must be manual Predating a setting of the desired future Date. Pre-dating is interesting in all cases where the volume of postal items processed and stamped very early, but at one certain date must be dispatched. The embedding the variable dates for the date in the day stamp can basically as well as when printing the postage value be made.

The approved advertising clichés can send a wide variety of messages Kind contain, especially the Address, company logo, mailbox and / or another any message. The advertising cliché is about is additional information in the postal sense, which must be agreed with the postal authority.

An electronic franking machine is known from US 4,580,144 known with two thermal printing devices, with the first the fixed part of the printed image (postal code and picture frame) and with the second one variable print image part (postage and date) one after the other to be printed. Through this division and separate The treatment of variable and constant data can Print speed can be increased. However is due the missing "fingerprint" hereby no security print already given in itself.

DE 38 23 719 is a security system with a character printing authorization device known. A computer of the franking machine is a Memory for the graphics change data to be loaded and the data of the associated date. If the user is looking for a change in funds from the computer of the franking machine to an external dialing device via a connection device (modem) accessed a selection of one to print Character pattern. The disadvantage here is that the user of the franking machine no freedom of choice for the selection of the character pattern is granted. It is provided that the printed character pattern for review the security of the authorization of the franking machine is used. But here's the whole those printed with that special pattern of characters Print image to evaluate by the postal authority, what only with a high effort is possible.

On the other hand, for franking machine printing is already been suggested to hide or certain cryptified characters, bar code, with multiple print heads as visible or invisible markings apply the mail to identify counterfeits to be able to.

Thus in US 4,775,246 is an alphanumeric Number, in US 4,649,266 a single alphanumeric Number in a number additionally in the postmark printed, with the comparison by the postal official such digits or numbers are not subjective errors excluded are. In US 4 934 846 (ALCATEL) a machine-readable barcode in a separate field next to the postage stamp printed, but what the disadvantage available printing area for the postmark and / or of the advertising cliché reduced.

Such a bar code using a separate Printers can be found in US Pat. No. 4,660,221 U.S. 4,829,568, the latter being the patent also printed a character with offset elements whose offset is the relevant safety information contains. The imprinter will be variable on the one hand by means of a selection device Data from a storage device and on the other Data from an encryption circuit alternately fed. In the field provided for the variable Data are alphanumeric characters with mixed in Areas (SPECKLE) created and printed on the print medium. The evaluation is carried out in accordance with US 4,641,346. by reading such a character column by column and using stored characters is compared in columns recover the safety information. In doing so those from the encryption circuit Data separated again, which is another facility is required. The evaluation is accordingly complicated and only by means of complex devices and qualified post office personnel.

For batch mail processing with a service device, according to US 4,760,532, by means of which not every item of mail has to be franked individually, but instead a postage and an additional passport are printed, a postcode in bar code format has already been proposed on that To print mail. It can be used with a fast, relatively inexpensive unsecured printer, which also prints the recipient address. If there is evidence of tampering with the accounting unit of the service device, an incorrect postal code is printed in the form of a bar code. The data listed on the passport with a secured printer about the stack of mail is electronically transmitted from the service device to the central station after each batch has been processed. This means that the post office can, if necessary, compare the data printed on the passport with the data stored electronically in the central station if a post identified as manipulated is found.
This invalid manipulated mail identified in this way can only be sorted out in the post office if the entire post is constantly checked in the post office. In terms of the result, this effort is far too high, especially since only one manipulation on the service device but other manipulations on the post on the way to the post office cannot be determined.

From EP 540 291 it is a device for the analysis of Post meter use for counterfeiting known is based on a post-calculation system. Likewise is the functioning of the system again on that Instructed to scan the entire mail flow. The individual franked values are scanned, summed and then with the reload amount for the corresponding one Franking machine compared. Although here data with an OCR (Optical Character Recognition) reader automatically be entered and a complex computing technology is used for this type of data acquisition relatively unsafe and too slow for a post office, especially since the entire post is evaluated in this way should be.

Crypted data is printed in accordance with the US 4,725,718 in the address field. It is also known a comparison of plain text data for evaluation including the crypted representation of this data address data. Although for that crypted data in the address field relatively much space is consumed and also the generation of the crypted Data consuming and using a special Encryption module must be done, this is System not completely forgery-proof, because it becomes a Encrypted text composed of segments generated from the individual output data, which with the related segments related by which long-term observation to be explored could. This also applies if it is printed as a barcode or in another machine-readable form. For Franking machines without address printing is - because none Inclusion of the address data in the encryption is possible - this solution is unsuitable. Already in Operating franking machines with non-mechanical Printing principle can also be due to the required additional special encryption module not used to be a marker for one Generate security imprint. Finally it stays Problem continues to be solved that the representation additional Information, especially in the form of a cash or Barcodes, requiring a relatively large amount of space.

A security system known from US 4,949,381 uses imprints in the form of bitmaps in a separate Marking field under the franking machine stamp imprint. Although the bitmaps are packed particularly densely there are required by the relatively large Mark the height of the stamp image around the The height of the selection field is reduced. A lot goes with that lost of the space usable for an advertising cliché. Another disadvantage is the necessary high-resolution Detection device for evaluating the marking with the two-dimensional barcode used for smaller post offices, the effort for an automatic evaluation cannot drive, is unacceptable. Thus remains the disadvantage is that such code only mechanically, i.e. can no longer be checked manually.

According to US 44 61 028 (DE 31 41 017) an examination is carried out with the help of reference patterns that are used when testing a Predecessor stamp imprint have already been used. When variable data is encrypted with every print be printed and if the evaluation in real time this procedure is unsuitable.

Another security system uses imprints in Form of a diagram (US 5 075 862) within the franking machine stamp imprint. But if individual printing elements failed, dots are missing in the print image, which signals an alleged forgery can lead. Such markings in diagram form within of the franking machine stamp imprint are therefore not so sure. Even with an error-free impression the machine evaluation is difficult because that is always the case entire print image is to be evaluated.

Furthermore, DE 40 03 006 A1 describes a method for Labeling of postal items to enable identification been proposed by franking machines, including a multi-digit crypto number the date, the machine parameters, the postal value and of the advertising cliché and cached separately becomes. Via a printer media setting Printer control becomes the crypto number when printing additionally inserted in the print pattern. So can a counterfeit or any imitation using the crypto number of the franking machine stamp by an unpaid one Postage imprint can be recognized. Also at a large number of users of a single franking machine, the user can easily find out who manipulated the post value. However it is neither fully electronic generated print image for an impact-less printer, yet can such a print image electronically on simple Way to be evaluated.

For a fully electronic print image already in DE 40 34 292 from safety-related Reasons have been proposed only a constant part save the franking image in the franking machine and the other associated variable part from the data center to the franking machine to send the assemble final print image. The fully electronic generated advertising cliché belongs in this solution but also to the constant data of the franking image, like the frame arrangement of the value and day stamp with location and possibly the postcode.

Everyone is responsible for the compilation of print data Franking a communication of the one franking module included terminal with a control center necessary. This will delay the pressure of what this solution for mass franking of large volumes of mail also unsuitable.

In the case of a franking machine known from US Pat. No. 4,746,234, fixed and variable information is stored in storage means (ROM, RAM) in order to be read out by means of a microprocessor when a letter actuates a microswitch on the transport path in front of the printing position and to send a print control signal form. Both are then electronically assembled into a print image and can be printed on an envelope to be franked using thermal printing media. With a large number of variable window print image data to be integrated, the formation of the print control signal is delayed accordingly. The maximum print speed that can be achieved with constant postal data is limited in particular by the time required for the formation of the print control signal. An additional material effort would have to be made or the reduction in printing speed would have to be accepted if a crypto number was to be calculated from the data in order to generate a marking for a security print. In both cases, such a machine (high price and / or too slow) would ultimately result in a lack of customer acceptance.
The advantage of such a marking lies in the fact that a franking stamp printed by a franking machine could not be changed by a manipulator without a corresponding change in the marking, because a franking stamp with a marking that is not intended to be counterfeited can in principle be recognized. On the other hand, it would be necessary to determine the manipulated franking machine, the function of which was interfered with for manipulation purposes.

It is already a remote inspection system in US 4,812,965 for franking machines, which on special messages in the printing of mail pieces based, which are sent to the headquarters have to. Sensors inside the franking machine are supposed to detect every act of falsification, so that a flag is set in the associated memories can, if in the franking machine for manipulation purposes intervened. Such an intervention could be done to put an unpaid credit in the Load register. Adversely, with a Such a system cannot be prevented from being sufficient qualified manipulator, which is in the franking machine collapses, its traces left subsequently removed by deleting the flags. Nor can it be prevented that the Imprint itself is manipulated, which by a properly operated machine is manufactured. At known machines there is the possibility of manufacturing of prints with zero postage. Such Zero frankings are required for test purposes, and could also be forged afterwards by a postage value greater than zero is simulated.

The task was to solve the disadvantages of the stand the technology to overcome and a significant increase in safety without an extraordinary inspection to be reached on site. With a security imprint should in an uncomplicated way an evaluation whether manipulation of the mail piece or on the Franking machine was made possible.

The task is carried out with the characteristic features of the Claim 1 solved.

An arrangement for generating a security imprint consists of a franking machine with a microprocessor in a control device, which is an encryption a combination number to a crypto number carries out and this as marker pixel image data in the remaining fixed and variable pixel image data during of printing inserts. The process includes steps for Formation of a series of marking symbols from the Crypto number encrypted combination number, where the latter from at least a first number (sum of all Postage since the last reload date), one third number (postage value) and a fourth number (from the serial number) is composed. This allows a review of the security imprint in one Postal authority, with further involvement in the Data center of stored and / or calculated data Manipulations are recognized. An order for review has a marker reader consisting from a CCD line scan camera, D / A converter, comparator and Encoder, which has an input / output unit with a Input means are connected. To use a Computers, storage and output means marking data the input device with the data center is to be evaluated connected.

A first variant of checking a security imprint with a row of marker symbols begins with a transmission of information from the data center to the postal authority regarding such franking machines, who have not reloaded any credit for a long time have or are no longer at the data center have reported and therefore appear suspicious.

The solution according to the invention is based on the knowledge that that only stored centrally in a data center Data adequately protected against manipulation can be. Corresponding register values are at communication, such as in Within the framework of a remote value specification for a reload credit.

The accrued credit amounts, which are in the Totaling the franking machine will ultimately be at Franking used up. So in a calculation the average credit inflow through the data center with the outflow of credit (postage consumption) compared to the previous use of the franking machine to analyze and to determine future user behavior to forecast.

The franking machine, which has a regular credit recharge receives or regularly at a data center reports, can be classified as suspicious become. The on a forecast reload date franking machine operated without reloading, however, does not necessarily have to be manipulated his. Rather, this may differ from the franking machine Mail volumes to be processed are above average have decreased. So if in the franking machine sufficient remaining credit available is, of course, a user must continue franking be allowed. Only an extraordinary one In this case, an on-site inspection could clarify whether manipulation has occurred. But this inspection can a franking machine user with irregular Postpone franking and credit reloading behavior, when he reports to the data center as soon as he receives the information that its franking machine as is suspect. The data center then takes one Remote inspection before. For security, the invention proposed both measures, i.e. a remote inspection the franking machine through the data center and a check of the mail items in the post office or a commissioned institute.

The invention is based on the one hand on the consideration that the user who manipulated either would have to bear increased effort if he tried to undo his manipulation to himself to report in good time to the data center, which the Queries register values, or only irregularly or would no longer report. At the same time, an intervention in the franking machine function for manipulation purposes also by the safety construction the franking machine by means of a sensor and detector device to complicate as much as possible. So it works a significant increase in security without one to achieve extraordinary inspection on site.

On the other hand, a security imprint with separate Areas for the marker information from the Franking machine made on the mail piece. By the verification of a series of marking symbols by a competent authority, preferably at the post office, can Inspection of the franking machine to be replaced on site. Then only in justified cases (manipulation) by an inspector or for on-site inspection authorized person still a direct inspection of the Franking machine can be made on site.

Because only a separate one contains only the marking information area to be evaluated can by the postal authority in an inexpensive and relative manner easily between the manipulated with the intention of falsification of such unmanipulated franking machine imprints be distinguished. With the as marking information The series of symbols used is an evaluation easily possible, also with regard to a reference to a machine that has been mimicked by the manipulator or that has been manipulated and regarding a reference to the machine made by the user the remote inspection date was continued.

The series of marking symbols also printed for security purposes is based on its compressed representation on an encrypted combination number whose Digits for an assignment of evaluable Sizes are predetermined. A series of marker symbols can be done through a routine by the microprocessor Franking machine without using an additional one Encryption circuit can be generated. there are different variants of marking information possible, which from a marking symbol row can be recovered.

• augenblickliche Summenwert an Frankierungen
• augenblickliche Summenwert an Frankierungen seit dem letzten Nachladedatum
• noch vorhandener Restwert, der zum Frankieren verbraucht werden kann
• augenblickliche Datums/Zeitdaten
• augenblickliche Datums/Zeitdaten seit dem letzten Nachladedatum
• physikalische zeitlich determiniert sich ändernde Daten

In addition to the postage value that is actually to be checked, which forms the one size, a monotonously continuously variable size is essential. A certain monotonously continuously variable size and further sizes form certain marking information variants. The following sizes are possible for the monotonously continuously variable size:

• current total value of frankings
• Current total value of frankings since the last reload date
• residual value that can still be used for franking
• current date / time data
• current date / time data since the last reload date
• physical temporally determined changing data

• Datum des letzten Nachladezeitpunktes
• Guthabennachladedaten zum Datum des letzten Nachladezeitpunktes
• eine bestimmte physikalische Größe, welche zum Datum des letzten Nachladezeitpunktes gemessen wurde und nur der Frankiermaschine und der Datenzentrale bekannt ist.

The representation of this monotonously continuously variable quantity takes the form of a first number, to which a second number can optionally be added for certain meaningful combinations, regarding:

• Date of the last reload time
• Credit reload data on the date of the last reload time
• a certain physical quantity, which was measured at the date of the last reload time and is only known to the franking machine and the data center.

Each digit or each by predetermined digits within the combination number is a number assigned in terms of content. Then later in an evaluation, for further evaluation relevant information can be separated.

Due to the monotonously constantly changing size changes the mark with each print, what such a franked postage unmistakable, and provides information about the previous credit consumption and the latest credit reload data at the time of the last credit reload or about certain other dates like that last reload date / time etc.

The above information about other data can but also from the post office or the one with the check commissioned institute queried by the data center become. In this case, if the corresponding one second number forming size in the data center stored, needs the monotonously changeable Size only partially to form the combination number be included, but then only the part maximum change to form a first number is included.

Another at predetermined positions in the combination number assigned third number corresponds to the size of the Postage. A fourth number corresponds to the information via the corresponding franking machine identification number (Serial number). The information can in the franking stamp additionally or exclusively as Barcode can be printed. Such information can also the checksum or another suitable one Wise derived number from the identification number because the only thing that matters is the franking stamp on the mail piece or indirectly the franking machine by means of the impression of manipulation check. If manipulation is found, it must also be possible to use the mail piece to determine the open true sender.

• die Frankiermaschine übermittelt ihre Registerwerte an die Datenzentrale zwecks Überprüfung,
• Ermitteln des Zeitpunktes der nächsten Kommunikation durch die Datenzentrale und/oder Frankiermaschine,
• die Datenzentrale prüft die Verdachtsmomente und meldet dies der Frankiermaschine oder löst eine außerplanmäßige Überprüfung der Frankiermaschine vor Ort aus,
• durch das zuständige Postamt oder ein damit beauftragtes Prüfinstitut wird der Sicherheitsabdruck auf Basis einer Stichprobenkontrolle oder auf Basis einer Information von der Datenzentrale, daß die Frankiermaschine als verdächtig eingestuft wird, überprüft,
• Auswertung der zusätzlich im Sicherheitsabdruck enthaltenen speziellen Zeichen, oder des Fehlens solcher speziellen Zeichen, falls die Frankiermaschine selbst eine Manipulation feststellt,
• Ermittlung des wahren Absenders im Falle einer Manipulation.

The review process therefore includes the following steps:

• the franking machine transmits its register values to the data center for checking,
• Determining the time of the next communication by the data center and / or franking machine,
• the data center checks the suspicions and reports this to the franking machine or triggers an unscheduled check of the franking machine on site,
• the security post is checked by the responsible post office or a test institute commissioned with it, on the basis of a random check or on the basis of information from the data center that the franking machine is classified as suspicious,
• Evaluation of the special characters additionally contained in the security imprint, or the absence of such special characters if the franking machine itself detects manipulation,
• Finding the true sender in the event of tampering.

For the time-critical generation of the marking data the microprocessor of the franking machine is used, to at least one after all entries have been completed Form combination number from the predetermined sizes and to do this according to an encryption algorithm to encrypt a crypto number, which is then converted into a Marking symbol row is implemented. For checking a security imprint is a random one or centrally initiated control of mail pieces is provided, order from the printed marking of a security imprint in a postal authority or similar authorized institution the individual information recover and with the open on the mail piece compare printed information.

The verification of the series of marking symbols by the Postal authority is based on a second variant only on samples. When checking the sample the imprint of any one is selected Mail piece examined for manipulation without that there is already evidence of manipulation elsewhere or has given suspicion.

After all symbols in a symbol row and their conversion into data can be done with the appropriate DES keys, which are decrypted. The result is the COMBI number from which the Sizes, especially the sum of all franking values and the current postage value can be split off. The split size postage value is open with the printed postage value compared.

The value of a split off current size, for example the total value of all since the last Reloading franking values is a monotony check using data of the last recorded value subjected to this size. This rules out that for example, by fraudulently copying the Franking impression apparently by means of a color copier real copies are created that are not original would be different. Between the actually in the Marking encoded with the current one printed Size and the last recorded size must be a difference at least equal to the postage value. in the The aforementioned case is the last size recorded in the Data center during the last remote query of the register status stored total value of all previously made Frankings. Likewise, if after the Decryption from the COMBI number the corresponding one Size has been separated by comparing the Counterfeiting of the franking machine serial number using the Marking can be recognized.

If regarding the identification of the serial number of the Postage meter no manipulation can be determined could, the postal authority or that with the Testing instructed the institute the associated franking machine serial number the data center. With this The pieces of mail (letters) could work together with the data center of this indirectly be checked.

It has been proven beyond any doubt that the print has been manipulated the sender specified on the mailpiece checked. You can also use the serial number printed on it serve the franking machine if there is a Identification of the sender is possible or if available, the plain text on the envelope printed sender. Such information is missing or is the franking machine serial number has been manipulated, can legally open the letter to determine the sender become.

The aforementioned marking is preferably in the form a series of symbols in a field of the franking machine image simultaneously with this by the single printer module printed. The shape of the symbols With their orthogonal edges, pattern recognition is possible with minimal computational effort.

An integral measurement of the degree of blackening with a simple optoelectronic sensor (e.g. Photo transistor) and downstream A / D converter particularly easy and quick machine readability. For this purpose the symbols became like this designed so that they are clearly in their integral Degree of blackening (share of the printed area in the Area of the drawing field). Any symbol corresponds to a certain value at the output of the A / D converter. With the row of symbols is opposite Barcode reaches a higher density of information and thus saving space in the franking machine print image. On the other hand, the graphic symbols can do more Information is printed encoded.

Another advantage over a bar code is in that due to the symbolism of the image content good legibility of the individual strings Icons in the checkbox and the possibility Linguistically the image content for manual evaluation capture. The symbolism is next to the machine also a visual evaluation by a trained examiners of the form and the conceptual content which evaluates symbols, made possible in the post office.

On the one hand were machine readable as well as manual legible and decodable form of labeling which together with the franking imprint visible on the mail piece or the franking strips are applied can, and on the other hand a solution for assembling of constant and quickly editable editable ones Data for franking machines and their pressure control for a column-wise printing of a franking image to develop. The aforementioned solutions to the state of the Techniques are either used to achieve a high level Print speed too expensive or have several Printers on or are for a time-optimized Compilation of constant and variable data for Formation of a pressure control signal for a single one Unsuitable printer. To the disadvantages of the state of the Overcoming technology has been also a procedure and an arrangement for generating a security imprint created.

The invention assumes that after switching on the franking machine automatically receives the postage in the value impression according to the last entry before switching off the franking machine and the date in the day stamp according to the current date that the variable data in the fixed dates for the frame and unchanged for everyone permanent associated data electronically embedded become. This variable data of the window contents hereinafter briefly as window data and all fixed data for the value stamp, the day stamp and the advertising slogan stamp referred to as framework data. The framework data are a first memory area of a read-only memory (ROM), which also serves as a program memory serves, removable. The window data becomes one taken from the second memory area and correspond to the Input saved in a non-volatile working memory and this at any time for assembly to an overall representation of a franking image removable.

According to the invention, it is proposed to transfer hexadecimal window data in run-length-coded form to the respectively separate memory areas of a non-volatile working memory and to store them there. If no new input is made, the data is transferred to a volatile pixel memory and the window data is classified according to the predetermined assignment in the frame data. Here, however, it is possible through the invention to work in a time-optimized manner, so that the printing speed becomes high.
According to the invention, the data from the two memory areas are combined in accordance with a predetermined assignment before printing to form a pixel print image and are completed during printing to form a column of the entire franking machine print image. Those variable data which are embedded in the printing column during printing comprise at least the marking data. The time required for previously assembling the entire pixel image with the remaining data is accordingly reduced.
The previous composition is similar to the date in the postmark and as with the postage in the value print, whereby the variable information can be added and modified subsequently in the window provided. In order to save time, only those parts of a graphic representation that are actually changed are stored in the non-volatile working memory when a change is made.

Figur 1,

Blockschaltbild einer ersten Variante der erfindungsgemäßen Frankiermaschine,

Figur 2,

Kommunikation bei einer Auswertung des erfindungsgemäßen Sicherheitsabdruckes

Figur 3a,

Darstellung eines Sicherheitsabdruckes mit einem Markierungsfeld

Figur 3b bis 3e,

Weitere Varianten der Anordnung von Markierungsfeldern für Sicherheitsabdruck

Figur 3f,

Darstellung eines Satzes an Symbolen für ein Markierungsfeld im Werbeklischee

Figur 4a,

Aufbau einer Kombinationszahl,

Figur 4b,

Sicherheitsabdruck-Auswerteschaltung,

Figur 4c,

Teilschritt zur Markierungssymbol-Erkennung,

Figur 4d,

Sicherheitsabdruck-Auswerteverfahren,

Figur 5,

Ablaufplan für die Druckbilderstellung nach der ersten Variante der erfindungsgemäßen Frankiermaschine mit zwei Pixelspeicherbereichen,

Figur 6,

Ablaufplan nach einer zweiten Variante der erfindungsgemäßen Frankiermaschine mit einem Pixelspeicherbereich,

Figur 7,

Postwertzeichenbild mit zugeordneten Druckspalten,

Figur 8,

Darstellung der auf ein Pixelspeicherbild bezogenen und davon getrennt gespeicherten Fensterkennwerte,

Figur 9a,

Dekodierung des Steuercode, Dekomprimierung und Laden der festen Rahmendaten sowie Bildung und Speicherung der Fensterkennwerte,

Figur 9b,

Einbettung von dekomprimierten aktuellen Fensterdaten vom Typ 1 in die dekomprimierten Rahmendaten nach dem Start der Frankiermaschine bzw. nach dem Editieren von Rahmendaten,

Figur 9c,

Einbettung von dekomprimierten variablen Fensterdaten vom Typ 1 in die dekomprimierten Rahmendaten nach dem Editieren dieser Fensterdaten vom Typ 1,

Figur 10,

Bildung neuer kodierter Fensterdaten vom Typ 2 für ein Markierungsbild,

Figur 11,

Dekodierung von Steuercode und Umsetzung in dekomprimierte binäre Fensterdaten vom Typ 2,

Figur 12,

Druckroutine für das Zusammensetzen von Daten aus den Pixelspeicherbereichen I und II,

Figur 13,

Druckroutine für das Zusammensetzen aus einem Pixelspeicherbereich I und Arbeitsspeicherbereichen entnommenen Daten,

Advantageous developments of the invention are characterized in the subclaims or are shown in more detail below together with the description of the preferred embodiment of the invention with reference to the figures. Show it:

Figure 1,

Block diagram of a first variant of the franking machine according to the invention,

Figure 2,

Communication when evaluating the security imprint according to the invention

Figure 3a,

Representation of a security imprint with a check box

3b to 3e,

Further variants of the arrangement of marking fields for security imprint

Figure 3f,

Representation of a set of symbols for a marking field in the advertising cliché

Figure 4a,

Building a combination number,

Figure 4b,

Safety print evaluation circuit,

Figure 4c,

Partial step for marking symbol recognition,

Figure 4d,

Security imprint evaluation method,

Figure 5,

Flow chart for the creation of print images according to the first variant of the franking machine according to the invention with two pixel memory areas,

Figure 6,

Flow chart according to a second variant of the franking machine according to the invention with a pixel memory area,

Figure 7,

Postage stamp image with assigned printing columns,

Figure 8,

Representation of the window characteristic values related to a pixel memory image and stored separately therefrom,

Figure 9a,

Decoding of the control code, decompression and loading of the fixed frame data as well as formation and storage of the window parameters,

Figure 9b,

Embedding of decompressed current window data of type 1 in the decompressed frame data after the start of the franking machine or after editing frame data,

Figure 9c,

Embedding decompressed variable window data of type 1 in the decompressed frame data after editing this window data of type 1,

Figure 10,

Formation of new coded window data of type 2 for a marking image,

Figure 11,

Decoding of control code and conversion into decompressed binary window data of type 2,

Figure 12,

Print routine for the compilation of data from the pixel memory areas I and II,

Figure 13,

Print routine for the compilation of data taken from a pixel memory area I and working memory areas,

Figure 1 shows a block diagram of the invention Franking machine with a printer module 1 for a fully electronically generated franking image, the one Advertising slogan and / or a mark for a security imprint contains, with at least one actuator having input means 2, and with a Display unit 3, both via an input / output control module 4 are coupled, a non-volatile Memory 5 for at least the constant parts of the Franking picture and with a control device 6. A Character memory 9 provides the necessary print data for the volatile memory 7. The control device 6 has a microprocessor µP, which with the Input / output control module 4, with the character memory 9, with the volatile memory 7 and with the non-volatile working memory 5, with a cost center memory 10, with a program memory 11, with a transport or feed device, if necessary Strip release 12, an encoder (coding disk) 13 as well as with a permanently in use Clocks / date block 8 is connected.

An additionally developed method for improvement the security of franking machines according to the German application P 43 44 476.8 is based on the consideration the falsification of in the franking machine to make data stored so difficult that the Effort for a manipulator is no longer worth it. In Connection with this procedure can - in the in the 1 shown way - on the input / output control module 4th a sensor 21 with a detector device 20 be connected. In another variant can but also - in a not shown in Figure 1 Way - on the microprocessor directly or within the Microprocessor an appropriate security device be provided.

The preferred arrangement for generating a security imprint for franking machines has a first memory area A in the program memory 11 (inter alia for the data of the constant parts of the franking image, including the advertising slogan frame). The sub-memory areas A _i are provided for i = 1 to m frame or fixed data, an assigned indicator i identifying the respective frame, which is preferably assigned to a specific cost center. A cost center number is usually entered in order to select the advertising cliché. However, an advantageous method for user-oriented billing has already been proposed, in which the selected cliché is examined in order to automatically determine the cost center under which billing is to be carried out.

The character memory 9 contains all alphanumeric characters or symbols are stored pixel by pixel as binary data. Data for alphanumeric characters or symbols are in the non-volatile memory 5 compressed in the form a hexadecimal number. Once the number entered the cost center or in memory area C the compressed data is saved from the program memory 11 with the help of the character memory 9 into a binary pixel data Print image converted, which decompressed in such Form stored in volatile memory 7 becomes.

According to the position report supplied by encoder 13 about the feed of the postal items or paper strips in relation to the printer module 1, the compressed data read from memory 5 and using the character memory 9 into a binary Converted print image having pixel data, which also in such decompressed form in volatile Memory 7 is saved. To explain the Memory 7a, 7b and Pixel memory 7c is used, although this is physical preferably by a single memory chip acts.

The working memory 7b and the pixel memory 7c stand with the printer module 1 via a print register (DR) 15 and a printer controller having output logic 14 in connection. The pixel memory 7c is on the output side to a first input of the printer controller 14 switched, at the other control inputs output signals the microprocessor control device 6.

The constant parts of the franking image once called up and advertising clichés are in the pixel memory rich I constantly decoded in volatile pixel memory 7c to disposal. For a quick change of Window data, there is a second memory area B in non-volatile memory 5. The pixel memory area I in the pixel memory 7c is also for the selected decompressed data of the variable Parts of the franking image provided, which with the Indiz j are marked. The second pixel storage area II in the pixel memory 7c is for the selected decompressed data of the variable parts of the franking image provided, which with the indication k Marked are. This is the only immediately before the security imprint is printed marker data formed.

It has already been proposed with only one microprocessor and a printing module of a franking machine Method and arrangement for rapid generation to create a security imprint (EP 576 113). Embedding the print data of the marker information in the remaining print data preferably takes place during printing the respective column.

Using the fully electronically generated print image, succeeds it to realize the security imprint that variable data marking in one or more windows within a fixed through the franking machine print image given frame during column by column Printing. An essential reason for that the printing speed is required by the Time for the creation of the marking data not reduced is in tapping into a time reserve during printing, by the microprocessor the control device, which is the columnar embedding of window data.

The memory areas B to ST in the non-volatile working memory 5 can contain a large number of sub-memory areas, under which the respective data are stored in data records. The sub-memory areas B _j are provided for j = 1 to n semi-variable window data and B _k for k = 1 to p variable window data, different assignments between the sub-memory areas of the different memory areas being selectable and / or stored in a predetermined manner.

The number strings (sTrings) that are entered for the generation of the input data with a keyboard 2 or via an electronic balance 22 connected to the input / output device 4 and calculating the postage value are automatically stored in the memory area ST of the non-volatile working memory 5. In addition, data records of the sub memory areas, for example B _j , C etc., are also retained. This ensures that the last input values are retained even when the franking machine is switched off, so that after switching on the postage value in the value print is automatically specified in accordance with the last entry before the franking machine was switched off and the date in the day stamp in accordance with the current date.

It is provided that the program memory 11 is connected to the control device 6, the data for the constant parts of the franking image, which relate to at least one advertising slogan frame, being stored in a first memory area A _i and an assigned name identifying the advertising slogan frame. It is further provided that the non-volatile working memory 5 is connected to the control device 6, the data for the semi-variable parts of the franking image being stored in a second memory area B _j and an assigned name identifying the semi-variable part, a first assignment of the names of the there are semi-variable parts to the names of the constant parts. A second assignment can be made in the franking machine in accordance with the cost center number stored in a third memory area C, so that an advertising slogan is optionally assigned to each cost center KST.

The corresponding assignment of the respective cost center the frame data is automatically switched on after switching on queried. In another variant, after each Switch on the cost center during the start routine be entered again in the memory area C, during brief interruptions in operating voltage preserved. The number of printed Letters with the respective above Setting the Advertising clichés about the cost center are in the franking machine registered for later evaluation.

In each data record of a sub memory area A _i , B _j or B _k , control code and run length-coded frame or window data are alternately contained one after the other.

Before the first print, the non-volatile Program memory 11 the respective selected common Framework data for the advertising slogan stamp, for the Postmark and postage stamp in register 100, 110, 120, ..., a volatile working memory 7a taken over, whereby during the takeover tax code decoded and in a separate memory area of the RAM 7b are stored. Likewise, the respective selected window data in register 200, 210, 220, ..., loaded. Preferably the Register of sub memory areas in the memory area of the working memory 7a. In another Variant are these aforementioned registers and / or the volatile memory 7 part of the microprocessor control 6.

The run-length encoded are decompressed hexadecimal data into corresponding binary pixel data transferred. The decompressed binary Pixel data that remains unchanged over a long period of time can remain in a first pixel storage area I and the binary pixel data that is the marking data that changes constantly with every print relate to the second pixel memory area II accepted. Figure 1 shows a block diagram for such a first variant of the invention Solution.

The less changeable (semivariable) Window data are subsequently referred to as window data from Type 1 designated. In contrast, with window data from Type 2 below the constantly changing (variable) Called window data.

New frame and / or window data of type 1 can be selected as long as after inserting and saving of binary pixel data in the first pixel storage area I have a need for this. Is this not the case, an automatic generation of follows Type 2 window data with subsequent decompression and their storage as binary pixel data in the second pixel memory area II. In another Variant not shown can above Repeat steps if there are still none There is a print request. The assembly with the remaining binary stored in the pixel memory area I. Pixel data preferably takes place after the presence of a Print request during a print routine.

By means of the input means 2 and the control device 6 the data in the memory areas C, D and E be changed. It is preferably the same Microprocessor of the control device 6, which is also the Accounting routine and the printing routine executes used. The data from the storage areas will be according to a predetermined (in certain Limits freely selectable) assignment during printing for an overall presentation of a security imprint composed. Here, for example, fourth and fifth memory areas D and E of the non-volatile RAM 5 usage. In the fourth storage area D of the non-volatile memory 5 is present Name saved before that of the currently set Features an advertising cliché frame while in a fifth memory area E data for another selectable assignments of at least one advertising slogan part corresponding to a frame of the advertising cliché the aforementioned name are stored. It it is provided that the data from the memory areas according to a predetermined (in certain Limits freely selectable) assignment during printing for an overall presentation of a security imprint be put together.

A franking machine is usually identified by means of an 8-digit serial number, which but only partially in the marking symbol row needs to do a review of the in Allow plain text printed serial number. In a simple variant, this can be done, for example Cross sum from the serial number. In more complicated ones other variants use other data for education preferably at least two-digit information which allows the serial number to be checked.

In particular, in modification of DE 40 03 006 A1 solution shown, a marking of mail based on a crypto number flag to enable identification of franking machines can be made without difficulty if the multi-digit Crypto number not including the as hexadecimal number of stored data values of the whole Clichés, but only with the inclusion of selected ones Data values of the cliché frame and other data, such as the machine parameters of the value setting and the date is formed and cached. It can with the method according to the invention not only numerical or numerical values, such as the number of the used Advertising clichés, but also data values of the image information to form the encrypted information is used. In contrast to DE-PS 40 03 006 can use any range to form the crypto number of advertising clichés, which separate data, in one Data record are assigned. Out individual data are selected for this data set. It is advantageous that the end of the column marked as a tax code for each column to be printed which is based on the run length coded hexadecimal Data connects. It can preferably the run length coded in the first place of the data set hexadecimal data can be used.

In a development of the solution according to the invention by an existing and / or generated in the machine Size, especially by the current date, the associated Data of the columnar regional image information selected from the data set to at least one Take the number of data (hexadecimal numbers).

Furthermore, several can be added to each advertising slogan number Records can be assigned, with each record those a part of the advertising cliché has relevant data. This is done by an in existing and / or generated size of the machine Data record with the associated data of the columns regional image information selected to at least take a number of data (hexadecimal numbers).

Preferably, those run length-coded hexadecimal data corresponding to a predetermined print column are combined with at least some of the data of the machine parameters (serial number, monotonously variable size, time data, inspection data, such as the number of prints during the last inspection, or suspicious variable) and the postage value in in a special way - explained in connection with FIG. 10 - combined and encrypted. When new, coded window data is formed before it is stored in the second memory area II, the DES algorithm (Data Encryption Standard) for encryption and, in addition, a conversion into a special graphic character set can be used for a high security standard.
This enables the encryption of at least a first, third and fourth number of combination numbers in an 8-byte data record.

Through the character memory 9 is a conversion a crypto number in a symbolic identifier performed. In particular, one is through another size, advantageously by the Post value, selected list that the individual Maps crypto numbers to graphic symbols used. The encrypted hexadecimal data decompressed by means of the character memory to the from the symbols to be printed to press. This is also a too machine-readable marking.

However, other encryption methods are also available Methods of converting the crypto number to a marker or marking suitable.

It is particularly advantageous if the window data from Type 2 for the security markings in a separate Window in the postage stamp or in the day stamp or between the two stamps. Then the entire franking imprint is not enlarged (which is also not permitted by post) or it will no additional printing unit, which is elsewhere in the Letter prints, required.

There can also be specially generated encrypted ones and stored in a sixth memory area F. Marking data for marking - for example the Franking machine serial number - can be used. Another option is machine-readable though communication of the Franking machine serial number, the data of which either the memory area F of the non-volatile working memory 5 or taken from the program memory 11 will be like this in the franking image shown for example with reference to FIG. 3e - insert. A communication by means of a separate Sender address to be printed on using a Barcodes can be promoted through a discount. These above-mentioned messages can be according to the invention reduce the inspection effort for mail items, because it's a targeted machine review allow certain senders or franking machines. It is provided in a second variant that the Data center suspect franking machines identified and the serial number of the postal authority or one with submitted to the review commissioned institution.

Newer franking machines are based on a remote value specification FWV from a data center with a new one Reload credit loaded. The data center saves the credit amounts for each franking machine user and the dates on which these balances are sent to the Franking machine were transferred. On the base this data is stored in the data center more security checks to check the regular Use of the franking machine possible.

Figure 2 shows what communication in a Evaluation of the security imprint according to the invention, is required. On the one hand there is a data connection line L needed for credit reloading. At the same time receives the data center with every communication via the data link L information about the respective franking machine. It is provided that a selection parameter in a further memory area N. and / or phone number is stored to the Establish a communication connection to the data center DZ to be able to see at least the postal registers in the queries non-volatile cost center memory 10. To the data center provides their evaluation if necessary a data connection via a line H to the evaluation device 29 in the post office or in the Evaluation of the franking stamp of the postal items commissioned institute.

The first check variant assumes a franking machine is considered suspect by the postal authority inspects the mail items. The The postal authority receives information from the data center via the data connection line H together transmitted with the serial number. Is also for Inquiries from the post office depending on the The data connection line H to the type of evaluation to use. On the other hand, for inquiries from the Franking machine to the data center the data connection line L provided.

In a first check variant that has been initialized centrally in accordance with the invention in this way, the data center determines an average postage consumption P _K on the basis of the user-specific historical data of a specific past time period. It is assumed according to the invention that the average credit inflow also corresponds to the average credit outflow, ie the average postage consumption. This is the same as the ratio of the sum of the credits G transferred in the period under consideration and the sum of the periods t between the reloads:

On the basis of this average postage consumption P _{K of} the franking machine user K and on the basis of his last credit reload G _{K, n} , the expected time t _{K, n + 1} until the next credit reload can be calculated: t K, n + 1 = G K, n P K * (1 + 1 / β)

R1

(descending register) vorrätige Restbetrag in der Frankiermaschine,

R2

(ascending register) Verbrauchssummenbetrag in der Frankiermaschine,

R3

(total resetting) die bisherige Gesamtvorgabesumme aller Fernwertvorgaben,

R4

(piece count Σ printing with value ≠ 0) Anzahl gültiger Drucke,

R8

(R4 + piece count Σ printing with value = 0) Anzahl aller Drucke

The term (1 + 1 / β) serves to compensate for normal fluctuations in postage consumption. Therefore a surcharge 1 / β (in this example preferably 10%, ie 1 / β = 1/10) is charged for G _{K, n} .
The franking machine can transmit register values to the data center before reloading the credit:

R1

(descending register) remaining amount in the franking machine,

R2

(ascending register) amount of consumption in the franking machine,

R3

(total resetting) the previous total of all remote values,

R4

(piece count Σ printing with value ≠ 0) number of valid prints,

R8

(R4 + piece count Σ printing with value = 0) Number of all prints

Taking into account the total stored in the rising register (amount of consumption R2) of all previously loaded (used) reloading credits, the following also applies:

A value R2 taken from the ascending register corresponds to the current query value. According to the default _request , which is to lead to a reload _credit G _{K.n + 1} , which must be added to the current query value R2, the future value R _{2 new results} . The following applies: R2 New - R2 = G K, n + 1

The following also applies: R3 = R2 + R1

Taking into account a still available postage credit (remaining amount R1) stored in the falling register of the cost center memory 10, the following total value can therefore be used for franking: R1 New = R1 + G K, n + 1

With each remote value specification, the remaining amount R1 can be queried and statistically evaluated. If the remaining amount R1 becomes larger and larger, the same reloading amount can be reloaded in ever larger reloading periods, or the number of pieces that can be franked until the next communication is set. From this consideration and because customary reload amounts are often requested in the same amount, the expected time t _{K, n + 1} until the next credit reloading is now determined using the following formula: t K, n + 1 = (G K, n + 1 + R1 * α x ) * 1 / P K

The disposition factor α _x depends on the classification of the franking machine user as an A, B or C customer.

On the basis of the average postage consumption determined for the user K P _K disposition factor α _K is assigned to one of for example three consumption classes A, B and C: P _K ≤ P _{A / B} → α _A P _{A / B} <P _K ≤ P _{B / C} → α _B P _K > P _{B / C} → α _C

Each of these consumption classes is assigned a typical disposition factor α _A , α _B , α _C , which means that according to equation (6) the longest time (t _A ) is reached for consumption class A, i.e. the class with the lowest consumption, and at consumption class C the shortest time (t _C ).

A simplification of this calculation scheme can be achieved in that the individual variables α _K and t _{K, n + 1} are no longer recalculated for each user K, but instead a classification is carried out. On the basis of the determined for the user K average postage consumption P _K of this is classified into one of for example three consumption classes A, B and C. P _K ≤ P _{A / B} → A P _{A / B} <P _n ≤ P _{B / C} → B P _K > P _{B / C} → C

A typical consumption time t _A , t _B , t _{C is} assigned to each of these consumption classes, whereby the longest time (t _A ) is assigned to the consumption class A, i.e. the class with the smallest consumption, and the shortest time (t _C ).

a) Die Datenzentrale nimmt Kontakt zur K-ten Frankiermaschine FM_K auf. Bei Vorhandensein eines Modemanschlusses kann dies automatisch geschehen. Im Fall der sogenannten voice controll ist ein Telefonanruf beim FM_K-Kunden erforderlich. In jedem Fall wird der Kunde bzw. die Frankiermaschine aufgefordert, die überfällige Kommunikation durchzuführen. Bei einer Kommunikation können von der Datenzentrale die aktuellen Registerstände angefordert werden, um die Größe des Restguthabens zu überprüfen oder weitere statistische Daten über die Benutzung der K-ten Frankiermaschine FM_K zu erhalten. Diese Übertragung ist aus Sicherheitsgründen in gleicher Weise zu schützen wie die Fernwertvorgabe selbst. Dazu dient beispielsweise die Verschlüsselung der Nachricht mit dem DES-Schlüssel. Die Datenzentrale kann dann ggf. an die K-te Frankiermaschine FM_K die Nachricht übertragen, daß sie nicht mehr verdächtig ist. Anderenfalls geht die K-te Frankiermaschine FM_K in den Verdachtsmodus über. Dies bedeutet, daß sie innerhalb einer begrenzten Zeit vor Ort zu überprüfen ist, wenn anschließend keine Kommunikation zwischen der Datenzentrale und der Frankiermaschine durchgeführt wird.Von der Datenzentrale wird das Verhalten des Frankiermaschinenbenutzers auch auf der Basis von während der Kommunikation übermittelten weiteren Daten überwacht, um verdächtige Frankiermaschinen festzustellen. In die Berechnung zur Ermittlung des Frankiermaschinen-Profils können auch solche frankiermaschinenspezifischen Daten, wie die Stückzahl an vorgenommenen Frankierungen oder aller Drucke (Registerwerte R4 oder R8) einfließen. Vorteilhaft sind folgende Formeln nacheinander anzuwenden: Vsusp1 = R4(R3 - R1) * Fmin = R4R2 * Fmin und falls R1alt Ï R1, um die Änderung zu überprüfen, außerdem: Vsusp2 = R4 - R4altR1alt - R1 * Fmin mit

R1 :

R1 Abfragewert bei der n-ten Fernwertvorgabe

R1_neu:

R1 Abfragewert vor der (n+1)-ten Fernwertvorgabe eines Nachladeguthabens

V_susp:

heuristischer Wert, der Auskunft über den Zustand der Frankiermaschine gibt

F_min:

minimaler Frankierwert

Bei einem Mindestfrankierwert von z.B. F_min = 20 Cent ergibt sich folgende Fallunterscheidung:

V_susp1 < 5   okay

V_susp1 = 5..100   suspicous

V_susp1 > 100   manipulated

Anhand der frankiermaschinenspezifischen Daten läßt sich so ein Frankiermaschinen-Profil erstellen. Dieses Frankiermaschinen-Profil gibt darüber Auskunft, ob ein Kunde mit den durchgeführten Nachladevorgängen in der Lage war, die ermittelte Anzahl an Frankierungen durchzuführen. Es sind innerhalb des Suspicious Mode zwei Stufen zu unterscheiden:

Stufe 1:

Frankiermaschine ist verdächtig oder

Stufe 2:

Frankiermaschine ist manipuliert worden.

Ein entsprechender Suspicious Mode kann nur von der Datenzentrale aktiviert werden, wobei keine direkten Auswirkungen auf die Frankiermaschine stattfinden.

b) Ebenso wie in der Datenzentrale kann auch die K-te Frankiermaschine FM_K die Nachricht selbsttätig ermitteln und anzeigen, daß sie verdächtig ist. Die K-te Frankiermaschine FM_K geht mit Anzeige der Nachricht in den Verdachtsmodus. Dies bedeutet, daß die Datenzentrale innerhalb einer begrenzten Zeit vor Ort eine Überprüfung veranlaßt, wenn anschließend keine Kommunikation zwischen der Datenzentrale und der Frankiermaschine durchgeführt wird. Eine solche Kommunikation kann beispielsweise zum Zwecke einer Fernwertvorgabe eines Guthabens vorgenommen werden. Bei der Fernwertvorgabe eines Guthabens werden die einzelnen Transaktionen mit verschlüsselten Meldungen nacheinander durchgeführt. Nach Eingabe der Identifikations-Nummer (ID-Nr.) und der beabsichtigten Eingabeparameter prüft die Frankiermaschine, ob ein MODEM angeschlossen und betriebsbereit ist. Ist das nicht der Fall, wird angezeigt, daß das Transaktionsersuchen wiederholt werden muß. Anderenfalls liest die Frankiermaschine die Wahlparameter, bestehend aus den Herauswahlparametern (Haupt-/Nebenstelle, usw.) und der Telefonnummer aus dem NVRAM-Speicherbereich N und sendet diese mit einem Wahlaufforderungskommando an das Modem 23. Anschließend erfolgt der für die Kommunikation erforderliche Verbindungsaufbau über das MODEM 23 mit der Datenzentrale.Nach dem Verbindungsaufbau erfolgt die Übermittlung der verschlüsselten Eröffnungsnachricht an die Datenzentrale. Darin ist u.a. die Portoabrufnummer zur Bekanntmachung des Anrufenden, d.h. der Frankiermaschine, bei der Datenzentrale enthalten. Außerdem erfolgt die Übermittlung der verschlüsselten Registerdaten an die Datenzentrale.Diese Eröffnungsnachricht wird in der Datenzentrale im auf Plausibilität überprüft, die Frankiermaschine identifiziert und auf Fehler ausgewertet. Von der Datenzentrale wird erkannt, welches Ersuchen die Frankiermaschine gestellt hat und eine Erwiderungsnachricht zur Frankiermaschine als Vorspann gesendet.Wurde ein Vorspann empfangen, d.h. die Frankiermaschine hat eine OK-Meldung erhalten, erfolgt eine Überprüfung der Vorspannparameter hinsichtlich einer Telefonnummeränderung. Wenn ein verschlüsselter Parameter übermittelt wurde, liegt keine Telefonnummernänderung vor und es wird von der Frankiermaschine an die Datenzentrale eine Beginnmeldung verschlüsselt gesendet. Wird dort der Empfang ordnungsgemäßer Daten festgestellt, beginnt die Datenzentrale eine Transaktion durchzuführen. Im vorgenannten Beispiel werden neue Nachladeguthabendaten verschlüsselt zur Frankiermaschine übertragen, die diese Transaktionsdaten empfängt und speichert. Dabei ist in einer anderen Variante vorgesehen, daß die Frankiermaschine bei jeder erfolgreichen Kommunikation aus dem Verdachtsmodus in den Normalmodus zurück überführt wird. Gleichzeitig wird in der Datenzentrale aufgrund der neuen übertragenen Registerwerte wieder der Status der Frankiermaschine ermittelt.

c) Erfindungsgemäß kann in dieser ersten Überprüfungsvariante kann zusätzlich zu den Reaktionen a) oder b) eine Mitteilung an die Postbehörde gesandt werden, die für die Prüfung der K-ten Frankiermaschine FM_K zuständig ist. Diese Postbehörde kann dann beispielsweise eine zielgerichtete Überprüfung der Frankierung der Poststücke und ggf. eine Inspektion vor Ort einleiten, wenn die vorgenommenen Ermittlungen ergeben haben, daß die Frankiermaschine manipuliert worden sein muß. Wurde von der Datenzentrale ermittelt, daß die Frankiermaschine verdächtig ist, wird der Postbehörde bzw. dem mit der Prüfung beauftragten Institut die zugehörige Frankiermaschinenseriennummer übermittelt. Somit kann u.a. das Vorkommen der von dieser suspekten Frankiermaschine frankierten Briefe bzw. Poststücke überwacht werden, wenn die Briefe bzw. Poststücke eine maschinenlesbare Adresse des Absenders bzw. die Frankiermaschinenseriennummer aufweisen. Das Vorkommen der von dieser suspekten Frankiermaschine frankierten Briefe wird überwacht, indem deren Anzahl und/oder Wertsumme im Zeitintervall beispielsweise von 90 Tagen gezählt und mit dem Guthabenwert, welcher in der Frankiermaschine vorhanden war seit der letzten Nachladung, verglichen werden.

d) Unabhängig oder in Kombination mit den Reaktionen a) bis c) wird nach Annahme des Verdachtsmoduses durch die K-te Frankiermaschine FM_K ein spezielles Zeichen aktiviert und an vorbestimmter Stelle im Frankierabdruck mit abgedruckt. Dieses Zeichen kann im einfachsten Fall ein Cluster aus gedruckten Bildpunkten oder ein Strichcode sein, der z.B. rechts des Feldes FE9 (Figur 3a) gedruckt wird. Bei der Überprüfung des Frankierabdruckes erhält die Postbehörde sofort den Hinweis, daß diese Frankiermaschine verdächtig ist. Die Postbehörde kann daraufhin eine Überprüfung der Frankierung des Poststücks und bei Erhärtung des Verdachtes beispielsweise eine Inspektion der K-te Frankiermaschine FM_K vor Ort durchführen.

If the time t _{K, n + 1} or t _A , t _B or t _{C is} exceeded, the K th franking machine FM _{K in question} is considered suspicious in principle. A plausibility check of all franking machines in use is carried out in the data center at regular intervals. In this process, the machines are identified and reported to the postal authority whose franking behavior seems suspicious or which has obviously been manipulated. Upon entering this suspect mode, several reactions involving several steps are now possible:

a) The data center contacts the K-th franking machine FM _K. If there is a modem connection, this can be done automatically. In the case of the so-called voice controll, a phone call to the FM _K customer is required. In any case, the customer or the franking machine is requested to carry out the overdue communication. In the event of communication, the current register status can be requested from the data center in order to check the size of the remaining credit or to obtain further statistical data on the use of the K-th franking machine FM _K. For security reasons, this transmission must be protected in the same way as the remote value specification itself. This is done, for example, by encrypting the message with the DES key. The data center can then optionally transmit the message to the K-th franking machine FM _K that it is no longer suspicious. Otherwise, the K-th franking machine FM _K goes into suspicious mode. This means that it must be checked on site within a limited time if no communication is subsequently carried out between the data center and the franking machine. The behavior of the franking machine user is also monitored by the data center on the basis of further data transmitted during the communication detect suspicious franking machines. Data such as the number of frankings made or all prints (register values R4 or R8) can also be included in the calculation for determining the franking machine profile. The following formulas are advantageous to use one after the other: V susp1 = R4 (R3 - R1) * F min = R4 R2 * F min and if R1alt Ï R1 to check the change, also: V susp2 = R4 - R4 old R1alt - R1 * F min With

R1:

R1 query value for the nth remote value specification

R1 _new :

R1 query value before the (n + 1) -th remote value specification of a reload credit

V _susp :

heuristic value that provides information about the state of the franking machine

F _min :

minimum franking value

With a minimum franking value of e.g. F _min = 20 cents, the following case distinction results:

V _susp1 <5 okay

V _susp1 = 5..100 suspicous

V _susp1 > 100 manipulated

A franking machine profile can be created on the basis of the franking machine-specific data. This franking machine profile provides information as to whether a customer was able to carry out the determined number of frankings with the reloading processes carried out. There are two levels within Suspicious Mode:

Step 1:

Franking machine is suspicious or

Level 2:

Franking machine has been manipulated.

A corresponding suspicious mode can only be activated by the data center, with no direct effects on the franking machine.

b) Just as in the data center, the K-th franking machine FM _K can automatically determine the message and indicate that it is suspicious. The K-th postage meter FM _K goes into suspicious mode when the message is displayed. This means that the data center initiates a check on site within a limited time if no communication is subsequently carried out between the data center and the franking machine. Such communication can be carried out, for example, for the purpose of specifying the remote value of a credit. When specifying a remote value for a credit, the individual transactions are carried out one after the other with encrypted messages. After entering the identification number (ID number) and the intended input parameters, the franking machine checks whether a MODEM is connected and ready for operation. If this is not the case, it is indicated that the transaction request must be repeated. Otherwise, the franking machine reads the dialing parameters, consisting of the dial-out parameters (main / extension, etc.) and the telephone number from the NVRAM memory area N and sends them to the modem 23 with a dial request command. The connection required for communication is then established via the MODEM 23 with the data center. After the connection has been established, the encrypted opening message is sent to the data center. This includes, among other things, the postage call number for the announcement of the caller, ie the franking machine, at the data center. The encrypted register data is also transmitted to the data center. This opening message is checked in the data center for plausibility, the franking machine is identified and evaluated for errors. The data center recognizes which request the franking machine has made and sends a reply message to the franking machine as the header. If a header has been received, ie the franking machine has received an OK message, the header parameters are checked for a telephone number change. If an encrypted parameter has been transmitted, there is no change in the telephone number and the franking machine sends an encrypted start message to the data center. If the receipt of correct data is determined there, the data center begins to carry out a transaction. In the aforementioned example, new reload credit data is encrypted and transmitted to the franking machine, which receives and stores this transaction data. In another variant, it is provided that the franking machine is switched from the suspected mode back to the normal mode with each successful communication. At the same time, the status of the franking machine is determined again in the data center on the basis of the new transferred register values.

c) According to the invention, in this first check variant, in addition to reactions a) or b), a message can be sent to the postal authority which is responsible for checking the K-th franking machine FM _K. This postal authority can then, for example, initiate a targeted check of the franking of the mail items and, if necessary, an on-site inspection if the investigations carried out have shown that the franking machine must have been manipulated. If it has been determined by the data center that the franking machine is suspicious, the postal authority or the institute commissioned with the test is sent the associated franking machine serial number. Thus, among other things, the occurrence of the letters or mail pieces franked by this suspect franking machine can be monitored if the letters or mail pieces have a machine-readable address of the sender or the franking machine serial number. The occurrence of the letters franked by this suspect franking machine is monitored by counting their number and / or value sum in the time interval, for example of 90 days, and comparing them with the credit value that has been present in the franking machine since the last reloading.

d) Independently or in combination with reactions a) to c), a special character is activated by the K-th franking machine FM _K after acceptance of the suspected mode and is also printed at a predetermined position in the franking imprint. In the simplest case, this character can be a cluster of printed pixels or a bar code that is printed, for example, to the right of the field FE9 (FIG. 3a). When checking the franking imprint, the postal authority is immediately informed that this franking machine is suspicious. The postal authority can then check the franking of the item of mail and, if the suspicion has hardened, can, for example, inspect the K-th franking machine FM _K on site.

If the manipulator of the K-th franking machine FM _K knows the imprint of such suspicious signs according to d), he can attempt to remove this imprint. This is rendered ineffective by additionally printing the information about the suspected mode in cryptified form. A further digit is sufficient for this, which is cryptified together with the other sizes (postage value, date and franking machine number, if applicable) and printed out in a suitable form, for example the symbol row according to FIGS. 3a-3e. In another variant, without requiring the space for another digit for a Suspiciusvariable SV _V , a fourth number in the combination number, which allows the serial number to be checked, is set to a special value which cannot normally occur.

Was in the reactions according to the first review variant checking the correct handling of a Franking machine essentially from the remote value specification center, i.e. the data center initiates, or designed at least understandable, this is how it works Initiative in response according to a second Verification variant via the security imprint and its review by the competent authority, or Institution and ultimately indirectly from the Franking machine itself, being the data center and the post office or review institute the response only checked afterwards.

In the second check variant, is for random selected mail items or senders a random check carried out. The security imprint is evaluated in cooperation with the data center. Via the data connection H are franking machine data queried which in the data center stored and not open on the mail piece are printed.

During the sample check, the imprint of any arbitrarily selected mail item is examined for manipulation. After all symbols in a series of symbols have been recorded and converted into data, the corresponding DES key can be used to decrypt them. The result is the COMBI number from which the sizes, in particular the sum of all franking values and the current postage value, are split off. The split postage value G3 is compared with the actually printed postage value G3 '.
The split-off size G4, ie the total value of all franking values carried out since the last reload, is subjected to a monotony check using data of the last recorded size G4 '. There must be a difference of at least the amount of the postage value between the size G4 actually encoded in the marking and the last size G4 'recorded. In the simplest case, the size G4 'last recorded is the total value of all frankings made so far, which was stored in the data center when the register readings were last remotely queried. Likewise, the counterfeiting of the franking machine serial number can be identified by means of the marking, in that, after decoding, the size G0 is separated from the COMBI number and checked.

It has been proven beyond any doubt that the print has been manipulated the sender specified on the mailpiece checked. You can also use the serial number printed on it serve the franking machine, via which a Identification of the sender is possible or if available, the plain text on the envelope printed sender. Such information is missing or is the franking machine serial number has been manipulated, can legally open the letter to determine the sender become.

The franking machine accumulates the used postage values since the last credit reload or forms a residual value by the previously loaded credit the sum of the postage used is subtracted. This value is updated with each franking. He is shared with other security-related data (Postage value, date, franking machine serial number) combined and cryptified for security against counterfeiting and finally printed in the manner described above. After capturing the security imprint and the Decrypting and separating the individual Data as in the above Way already described takes place the evaluation. The comparison of postage values and the The monotony test can be carried out as described above. Way performed become. The information about since the last Reloading used postage values W will now compared to those stored at the examining center Data on this franking machine.

In the simplest case, the value W is fixed Threshold value for normal use of the franking machine is not exceeded, compared. If exceeded is suspicious.

In an improved version, W is compared with a threshold value SW _n , which corresponds to the respective postage consumption class. These postage consumption classes can be defined once for the use of the respective franking machine. However, they can also come from a statistic that was kept for this franking machine. These statistics can be kept by the verifying postal authority or the statistical data that the data center creates anyway and which are then transferred to the postal authority are used.

A further refinement of the check results from the fact that, according to a first marking information variant, the combination number also contains the date of the last credit reload t _L as a second number and is also printed with the other data in cryptified form. The postal authority is then able to check to what extent certain specified maximum time periods between two credit reloads have been exceeded, as a result of which the franking machine in question has become suspicious. In addition, the postal authority would be able to determine the current postage consumption P since the time t _{L of} the last credit reload with t _A for the current date, according to equation (16): P = W t A - t L

The same criteria can be used for checking P be applied as in connection with the first Verification variant has already been described.

1. Datum der letzten Guthabennachladung

2. absolute Zeitzählung zwischen den Guthabennachladungen mit Rücksetzung.

For example, in another marking information variant, the date / time data form a monotonously growing quantity. In order not to require additional space in the security imprint for the date of the last credit reload, this variant can be combined with the absolute time count in this variant. The latter is necessary in order to identify counterfeits in the form of copies by means of a monotony check after a first evaluation variant - explained in FIG. 4c. The time data is then made up of two components:

1. Date of the last credit reload

2. absolute time counting between credit reloads with reset.

When asked how this information along with the Plain text information visually / manually or automatically can be detected, is further below in Connection with the explanations for Figures 4a to 4c received.

The serial number can also be printed out as a barcode become. However all other information will be on represented another way according to the invention, because a Barcode claimed in the franking machine print image in Dependence on the amount of information coded below Considerable space or forces enlargement of the franking machine imprint or it can not all information is reproduced in the barcode imprint become.

According to the invention a special graphic Symbols of existing particularly compact imprint related. For example, from symbols to be printed License plate formed can be in front, behind, under u./o. above a field within the actual franking stamp imprint to be printed. This is what it is about himself according to man, as well machine-readable marking.

A letter envelope transported under the printer module 1 17 comes with a franking machine stamp image printed. The check box is located in an advantageous manner for an evaluation in one Line below the fields for the value stamp for which Daily stamp, for the advertising cliché and possibly in the field for the optional print addition of the franking machine stamp image.

From a - shown in Figure 3a - representation of a first example of the security imprint can be seen that good readability for a manual Evaluation as well as machine readability with good recognition reliability given is.

The check box is located inside of the franking machine print image under the Daily stamp arranged window FE 6. The the postage value in a first window FE 1, the machine serial number in a second and third window FE 2 and Value stamps containing FE 3 may have a reference field in a window FE 7 and a possible specification of the Number of the advertising cliché in a window FE 9. The reference field is used for pre-synchronization for the Reading the graphic string and for extraction a reference value for the light / dark threshold at a machine evaluation. A pre-synchronization for reading the graphic string also by and / or in connection with the frame, in particular the postage stamp or stamp.

The fourth window FE 4 in the day stamp contains the current one or the predated entered in special cases Date. Below that is an eighth window for FE 8 a compressed exact time, in particular for high-performance franking machines with tenths of a second. This ensures that no one else's footprint The impression is the same, which means that it can be counterfeited by copying of the impression with a color copier becomes.

A fifth window FE 5 is in the advertising cliché for one editable advertising cliché text part provided.

FIG. 3b shows a security imprint with a checkbox in the columns between the value stamp and the day stamp can be seen, the upstream vertical part of the frame of the Value stamp of the pre-synchronization and if necessary as a reference field serves. This eliminates a separate window FE7. The marking data can in this variant with a vertical arrangement of the symbol row in shorter Time can be recorded almost simultaneously.

It is also possible compared to that in FIG. 3a windows shown further windows for the open unencrypted Save footprint. On the other hand, that is the print speed can be increased because less Embed windows in the frame data before printing and thus the formation of marking data earlier can start. To achieve simple copy protection the cryptified impression using is sufficient Marker symbols without an open unencrypted Print the absolute time in a window FE8. The marking data FE 6 contains the marking data, which based on at least the post value and such a time count are generated - as below is explained with reference to Figure 10 - already sufficient.

In a third example - shown in FIG. 3c for the security imprint, is in addition to that a further marking field in the variant shown in FIG. 3b in the postmark under the window FE 1 for the Postage value arranged. Here you can find more information, for example about the number of the selected advertising cliché, unencrypted but in a machine readable Form to be communicated.

In FIG. 3d a fourth example of the security imprint, two more check boxes in the postmark below and above the window FE 1 for the Postage value arranged.

In FIG. 3e, in a fifth example for the security imprint, two more check boxes in the postmark below and above the window FE 1 for the Postage value arranged. The check box indicates which in the postmark above the window FE 1 for the Postage value is arranged on a barcode. So that can for example, the post value unencrypted but in one machine-readable form. A comparison the encrypted and the unencrypted Since both are machine-readable, information can be fully automated be performed.

With a smaller number of available symbols need more symbol fields for the same information to be printed. Then a row of symbols can either two lines or in the form of a combination of those in the Figures 3a to 3e shown variants take place.

The form of marking is freely compatible with any postal authority. Every general change of the marking picture or the arrangement of the check box is because of the electronic printing principles possible without any problems.

The arrangement for the rapid creation of a security imprint for franking machines allows a fully electronic generated franking image, which by the microprocessor-controlled printing process from fixed data and current data was formed.

The data for the constant parts of the franking image, which relate to at least part of the fixed data, are stored in a first memory area A _i and, by means of an assigned address, and the data for the variable parts of the franking image are in a second memory area B _j or for marking data stored in a memory area B _k and identified by an assigned address.

At predetermined intervals, for example regularly every inspection of the franking machine can also a change or replacement of - in the figure 3f shown - set of symbols can be made to further increase the security against counterfeiting.

3f shows a representation of a sentence Icons for a check box are shown, with the Symbols are suitably shaped so that both a mechanical as well as a visual evaluation made possible by trained personnel in the postal authority becomes.

A sentence is added to increase the security against counterfeiting Used symbols that are not in the standard character set of common pressure equipment is included.

Basically, the very high number of variations allows also a variant that has multiple symbol sets for uses the marker.

According to the invention, the information density is higher compared to a barcode when printing the symbols Space saved. It is sufficient to choose between 10 Distinguish degrees of darkness, for example compared to the ZIP-CODE one shorter by a factor of three To achieve length in the representation of the information. This results in ten symbols, whereby the Degree of blackening differs by 10% in each case. At a Reduction to five symbols can reduce the degree of blackening differ by 20%, however it is necessary to increase the number the symbol fields to be printed significantly increase if the same information as with that in the symbol set shown in Figure 3f, are reproduced should. Also a set with a higher number of symbols is conceivable. Then the row or rows are shortened of symbols accordingly, but also reduced accordingly the detection security, so that then suitable evaluation devices of the digital Image processing, for example those with edge detection, required are. Through the continuous Use of orthogonal edges and no rounding, is already using simple digital algorithms Image processing sufficient detection security reached. Use such detection systems for example, commercially available CCD line cameras and commercially available personal computer-based image processing programs.

FIG. 4a shows the structure of a combination number KOZ in an advantageous variant with a first Number (sum of all postage values since the last reload date), third number (postage value) and a fourth number (generated from a serial number).

A corresponding one - shown in FIG. 4b - Security imprint evaluation device 29 for a A computer 26 has manual identification suitable program in memory 28, input and Output means 25 and 27. The one at the respective Evaluating device 29 used by the postal authority with a data center DZ shown in FIG. 2 via a communication line H in connection.

FIG. 4c shows a partial step for marking symbol recognition shown which for an automatic Input, according to a - in Figure 4d closer explained - security imprint evaluation method, is required.

The check box is in the preferred variant at least under or in a field of the franking machine stamp image arranged and it becomes a series of such symbols below the franking stamp imprint and printed with it at the same time. The checkbox can, however, also be different - such as in the Figure 3 b shown - be arranged, each appropriate transport devices for the mail item are provided if the image sensor, for example the CCD line camera is immovably arranged. An in The marking reader 24 shown in FIG. 4b can for example also as a guided tour Read pen to be designed. The device preferably comprises a CCD line camera 241, one with the CCD line camera 241 and with a D / A converter 243 connected comparator 242 and an encoder 244 for Detection of the gradual movement. The data input of the D / A converter 243 for digital data and the The outputs of comparator 242 and encoder 244 are included connected to an input / output unit 245. This is about it is a standard interface to the input means 25 of the security imprint evaluation device 29.

The machine identification of the symbols in the license plate can be done in two ways: a) via the integrally measured degree of darkness of each symbol or b) via edge detection for symbols.

The orthogonal edges of the symbol set according to FIG. 3 allow a particularly simple and with little effort Automatic detection method to be implemented. The detection device contains one Medium resolution CCD line scan camera, e.g. 256 pixels. With a suitable lens, the height of the Row of symbols depicted on the 256 pixels of the line scan camera. The respective symbol field is now corresponding a letter movement from left to right with scanned column by column starting from the right column. The line scan camera is preferably stationary arranged and the letter is placed under the line scan camera guided away by uniform motor drive. As the row of symbols within the franking imprint according to an agreement once made is positioned in the same place, and the Franking impression in turn by existing ones Postal regulations are positioned on the envelope, it is sufficient to guide the envelope on a fixed edge of the detection device.

The CCD line scan camera determines the contrast value for each column of the pixels belonging to the column. The The output of the CCD line scan camera is with a comparator connected by means of threshold value comparison of the pixels assigns binary data 1 and 0. Even at constant artificial lighting conditions an adjustment of the threshold to the very different Light reflection factors of the different required for paper types used for envelopes his. For this purpose, the threshold value is managed according to a reference field FE 7, which consists of a series of bars and arranged at and in front of the row of symbols is. The threshold is called the mean of the light-dark stripes of the reference field. The scan of the reference field is either with an additional Sensor (e.g. a photo transistor), or with the CCD line scan camera itself. In the latter In this case, the measured values of the line scan camera A / D must be changed be connected in a via a standard interface Computer from which the threshold is formed and the comparator via a D / A converter be fed. Newer CCD line scan cameras have that Comparator integrated, its threshold value directly be controlled by the computer with a digital value can.

The ones supplied by the line scan camera, including the comparator binary data are computerized Column and evaluation device in an image memory filed line by line. An easy and quick ongoing evaluation program examined in each column of a symbol field the change of the binary data contents from 1 to 0 or 0 to 1, as shown in FIG. 4c has been shown. For example, that starts Program a column of a symbol field with the top one Examining the (white) edge is the binary content of this first pixel data = 0. After ml points this Column finds the 1st change to binary content 1 (printed) instead. The address of this 1st binary change and also the address m2 of the following binary change (1st unprinted) pixel is stored in a feature memory saved. The one shown in Figure 3f Symbol set these two contours are sufficient, if the process for all columns of a symbol field is repeated. If a symbol field has n columns, see above are located in the assigned after its detection Feature memory 2n data before, which by comparison with the data records stored in a sample memory a clear assignment of the pattern symbols enable. This procedure is due to its Simplicity real-time capable and has a high redundancy against individual pressure or sensor errors.

Due to the quantized difference in density between the symbols becomes a simple machine Evaluation without complex pattern recognition possible. For this purpose, a suitably focused is in a reader Arranged photodetector.

Even with different colored envelopes this simple machine evaluation is possible. To compensate obtained different measured values, their diversity due to the different printing conditions or paper types, becomes a reference value derived from the reference field. The reference value is used for the evaluation of the degree of blackening. With this obtained reference value can be advantageous Way a relative insensitivity too against unusual printing elements, for example a thermal bar 16 can be achieved in the printer module 1.

The security imprint evaluation method according to FIG. 4d, shows like this security information printed in the franking field evaluated in an advantageous manner become. Individual sizes are required manually and / or enter it automatically. The row of symbols is in this case vertically between the value and the Date stamp arranged. It contains in cryptified Form information about the printed Postage value, a monotonically variable variable (for example the date or an absolute time count) and the Information about the serial number or whether the suspected mode is present. This information is shared with the Plain text information visually / manually or automatically detected.

A first evaluation variant - according to FIG. 4d - consists of the printed marking recover individual information and use the information printed on the mail piece to compare. The series of symbols acquired in step 71 becomes converted into a corresponding crypto number in step 72. This unique assignment can be made using an im Memory of the evaluation device stored table, in a particularly advantageous manner from the Icon set in Figure 3f is used, wherein then each symbol field a digit of the crypto number corresponds. The crypto number determined in this way is Step 73 using the data stored in the evaluation device Decrypted crypto key.

The crypto numbers were used for the marking after a symmetric algorithm (for example the DES algorithm) generated, after step 73 the first evaluation variant from each crypto number again the starting number are generated. The starting number is a combination number KOZ and contains the number combination at least two sizes, one size through the upper digits of the combination number KOZ and the other size by the lower digits of the KOZ is represented. That part of the number combination (for example, the post value) to evaluate is separated and displayed in step 74.

Any location of the one obtained after decryptification The initial number is assigned a meaning in terms of content. In this way, those relevant for further evaluation Information to be separated. Besides, it is essential the postage value actually to be checked, which one Size forms, among other things a monotonously changeable Size. A certain monotonously continuously variable size and other sizes form certain marking information variants.

Based on this consideration, forms in a first Marking information variant of the in a franking machine register Total value saved on frankings at least one of the predetermined digits Combination number assigned first number. The above first number is a monotonously continuously changeable Size. This changes the marking for everyone Printing what such a franked mail piece makes distinctive and at the same time information delivers on the current credit consumption. This Information about the credit consumption is in Intervals based on known ones in the data center saved available credit consumption and Credit reload data checked for plausibility. The total value preferably forms franking values at least one den since the last reload date assigned predetermined digits of the combination number first number. A second number that is at predetermined Places the combination number is placed for example, the last reload date.

In a second marking information variant this aforementioned first number corresponding to the total value franking together with the second number, regarding the credit reload data at the time of last reload, a monotonously changeable Size.

In a third marking information variant forms this aforementioned first number corresponding to the total value franking together with the second number, regarding the quantity data at the time of the last Reloading, a constantly changing variable.

A corresponding number of alternative variants arises when to form the marker information instead of the total value of frankings (used postage values since the last credit reload) now the residual value is used. The Residual value results from the previously loaded Credit the sum of the used postage values is subtracted.

A corresponding number of other alternatives Variants result when forming the Marking information of current date / time data in total or since the last reload date, Total quantity data or since the last Reload date or other physical, however, temporally determined data (e.g. battery voltage) be included.

a) Der aus den Sicherheitsabdruck extrahierte tatsächliche abgerechnete Portowert PW_v wird mit dem im Schritt 70 ermittelten, als Klartext im Wertstempel abgedruckten Portowert PW_k im Schritt 75 verglichen. Stimmen beide nicht überein, wurde offensichtlich der abgedruckte Wertstempel manipuliert. Im Schritt 76 wird das Erfordernis einer Inspektion der Frankiermaschine vor Ort festgestellt und angezeigt.

b) Der im Schritt 74 extrahierte Zeitpunkt t_n ist nun die aus dem Sicherheitsabdruck abgetrennte Monotonievariable MV_v und kennzeichnet in eindeutiger Weise den Zeitpunkt der Abbuchung des Portowertes bzw. der Ausführung der Frankierung. Diese Daten können bestehen aus dem Datum und der Uhrzeit. Wobei letztere nur so weit aufgelöst wird, daß die nächstfolgende Frankierung sich mit ihrem Zeitpunkt t_n vom vorigen Zeitpunkt t_n-1 unterscheidet. Diese Daten können auch eine fiktive Zeitzählung beginnend mit einem Fixdatum = 0 darstellen. Letzteres kann zum Beispiel den Beginn der Inbetriebnahme der Frankiermaschine betreffen.
Jeder im Schritt 74 als Monotonievariable MV_v abgetrennter Zeitpunkt kennzeichnet also in eindeutiger Weise einen einzelnen Frankierabdruck dieser Frankiermaschine und macht diesen somit zum Unikat. Jede Frankiermaschine wird durch ihre Seriennummer charakterisiert, welche im Schritt 77 erfaßt wird. Durch einen Vergleich im Schritt 80 mit einem oder mehreren früheren Abdrucken dieser Frankiermaschine, wobei eine zur Seriennummmer zugeordnet gespeicherte vorhergehende Monotonievariable MV_k-1 im Schritt 79 abgerufen wird kann die o.g. Einmaligkeit überprüft werden. In vorteilhafter Weise bildet die Folge der Zeitpunkte ... t_n-1, t_n einer Frankiermaschine eine monotone Reihe. Es ist dann lediglich die Monotonie an Hand des letzten gespeicherten Zeitpunktes t_n-1 dieser Frankiermaschine zu überprüfen. Ist die Monotonie nicht gegeben, liegt eine Kopie von einem früheren Abdruck dieser Frankiermaschine vor, was im Schritt 76 angezeigt wird.

c) Zur Prüfung, ob sich die Frankiermaschine während des Druckens im Verdachtsmodus befand, ist lediglich eine Susspiciosvariable SV_v im Schritt 81 auszuwerten. Nimmt das entsprechende Digit einen speziellen Wert an oder ist beispielsweise ungerade, so bedeutet dies, das diese Frankiermaschine überfällig zur Guthabenladung war. Die Feststellung des Verdachtsmodus im Schritt 81 und die Prüfung der Richtigkeit der Seriennummer im Schritt 78 können dabei auf einer abgespaltenen vierten zweistelligen Zahl basieren, welche im Normalfall aus der Seriennummer abgeleitet wird, d.h. wenn sich die Frankiermaschine nicht im Verdachtsmodus befindet. Im Schritt 76 erfolgt zur Anzeige eine Oderverknüpfung der Informationen aus den Schritten 75, 78, 80 und 81.

In the following exemplary embodiment, the current date / time data form a monotonously continuously variable variable for a monotonicity variable MV _v , which is separated from the combination number in step 74. The evaluation variant then comprises the following steps:

a) The actual billed postage value PW _v extracted from the security imprint is compared with the postage value PW _k determined in step 70 and printed as plain text in the value stamp in step 75. If the two do not match, the printed value stamp was obviously manipulated. In step 76, the need for an inspection of the franking machine on site is determined and displayed.

b) The time t _n extracted in step 74 is now the monotony variable MV _v separated from the security imprint and uniquely identifies the time when the postage value was debited or the franking was carried out. This data can consist of the date and time. The latter is only resolved to such an extent that the subsequent franking differs with its time t _n from the previous time t _n-1 . This data can also represent a fictitious time count starting with a fixed date = 0. The latter can relate, for example, to the start of commissioning of the franking machine.
Each time separated in step 74 as a monotony variable MV _v thus uniquely identifies an individual franking imprint of this franking machine and thus makes it unique. Each franking machine is characterized by its serial number, which is recorded in step 77. The above _- mentioned uniqueness can be checked by comparing in step 80 with one or more previous impressions of this franking machine, with a previous monotony variable MV _k-1 stored in association with the serial number being called up in step 79. The sequence of times ... t _n-1 , t _{n of} a franking machine advantageously forms a monotonous row. It is then only necessary to check the monotony on the basis of the last stored time t _{n-1 of} this franking machine. If the monotony is not present, there is a copy of an earlier impression of this franking machine, which is displayed in step 76.

c) To check whether the postage meter machine was in the suspected mode during printing, only a sweetspicios variable SV _{v has to be} evaluated in step 81. If the corresponding digit takes on a special value or is, for example, odd, this means that this franking machine was overdue for credit loading. The detection of the suspected mode in step 81 and the checking of the correctness of the serial number in step 78 can be based on a split fourth two-digit number which is normally derived from the serial number, ie if the franking machine is not in the suspected mode. In step 76, the information from steps 75, 78, 80 and 81 is ORed for display.

An evaluation with an appropriate program is sufficient equipped device (laptop). This can also possibly not from the franking machine stamp image Removable sizes G1 or G4 and at least one only the franking machine manufacturer and / or the data center known size and notified to the postal authority G5 encrypted. These are also through Decryption recovered from the mark and can then be saved with the user-specific Sizes are compared. The stored in memory 28 Lists can be connected to the data center 21 be updated.

The one created for each serial number or user preferably in data center databases for all Franking machines saved existing lists included for each variable data values for verification the authenticity of a franking. On the one hand, the assignment of the symbols can listed values and on the other hand with one another sentence - not shown in FIG. 3f Symbols the assignment of meaning and degree of blackening set differently for different users become.

The advantage of using a symbol set of the specified type Art is that depending on the requirement of respective national postal authority in a simple manner mechanically (by, for example, integral measurement of the Degree of blackening of the symbols) and / or manually Identification of an authentic franking stamp is made possible through the conceptual content of the symbols.

In a second - not shown in Figure 4d Evaluation variants are in the evaluation device 29 manually or automatically by the operator using a Reader unencrypted in plain text Sizes G0, G2, G3 and G4 entered to match the same key and encryption algorithm as it is used in the franking machine, only one Crypto number and then a row of markers to derive. Further details are given in Connection with the - shown in Figure 10 - Step 45, formation of new encoded window data made of "Type 2" for a marker picture. A the marking created from it is displayed and by the Operator with the on the mail item (envelope) printed marking compared. The operator the comparison to be made comes the symbolism of shown in the output means 25 and on the Marks printed on postal items.

In a third - also not shown Evaluation variants are in a first step in the input means 25 by the trained examiner manually or automatically by means of a suitable reading device 24 the graphic symbols entered in order to the marking printed on the postal matter (letter) in convert back at least a first crypto number KRZ1. Here, the actuators, in particular Keyboard, the input device marked with the symbols to facilitate manual entry. In a second step, the Franking machine stamp image removable openly printed Sizes, especially G0 for the serial number SN of the franking machine, G1 for the advertising cliché frame number WRN, G2 for the date DAT and G3 for the Post value PW, G4 for non-repeating time data TIME and at least one only from the franking machine manufacturer and / or the data center known and size G5 INS communicated to the postal authority at least partially used to compare at least one crypto number VKRZ1 form. The review is done in a third step by comparing two Crypto numbers KRZ1 with VKRZ1 in the computer 26 Evaluation device 29, wherein a signal for authorization in the event of equality or non-justification given a negative comparison result (inequality) becomes.

In the exemplary embodiment explained below an evaluation after the second or third Evaluation variant explained in more detail.

The first size G1 is the advertising slogan frame number WRN, which the inspector recognizes from the franking stamp image. In addition to the user, this first size is also known to the franking machine manufacturer and / or data center and is communicated to the postal authority. In a variant, preferably with a data connection to the data center, the advertising slogan frames WR _n belonging to the serial number SN of the respective franking machine with assigned numbers WRN _n are displayed on a screen of the data output device 27. The comparison with the advertising slogan frame WR _b used on the letter is made by the examiner, who enters the number WRN _n determined in this way.

Those transferred from the data center to the memory 28 stored lists contain the current one Allocation of the parts of the advertising slogan frame WRNT to a second size G2 (e.g. the date DAT) and on the other hand the assignment of symbol lists to a third size G3 (e.g. the Post value PW). Additionally, a list of through the first size G1, in particular the advertising cliché frame number WRN, selected parts SNT of the serial number SN to be available. User-specific information such as for example, the advertising slogan frame number WRN can be used for random manual evaluation of the marking can be used by decoding lists based on the user-specific information can be selected, the contain corresponding data records. With the size G2 (DAT) the byte is then determined from the data record what is used in generating the combination number becomes.

In the preferred variant, on the one hand, for testing the uniqueness of the impression a monotony test used. The examiner takes the serial number SN the windows FE2 and FE3 of the impression and represents the Franking machine user fixed. This can additionally the ad cliché number will be used as it is in are assigned to certain cost centers as a rule, if the same machine from different Users. In the above Lists are data from last test also data from the last inspection registered. Such data are, for example Number of pieces if the machine has an absolute piece count or the absolute time data if the machine has an absolute time count.

In the first test step, the accuracy of the printed is checked Postage value according to the valid regulations checked by the postal authority. This can be fraudulent Subsequent manipulations be determined on the value print. In the second The test step is then the monotony of the data, in particular which checked in window FE8. It can make copies of a franking imprint. A Manipulation for counterfeiting is therefore not promising, because this data is in the form of a cryptified Symbol row additionally in at least one marking field be printed. With an absolute Time or piece counting, the must Number specified in the FE8 window since last exam increased. There are nine in the FE8 window Digit represented what is the representation of a period of about 30 years with a resolution of seconds, allowed. Only after this time would the counter run over. These sizes can be selected from the marking be recovered to them with the openly printed compare unencrypted sizes. In a third optional test step can then be carried out at Other manipulations are suspected of manipulation, in particular the serial number SN of the franking machine, if necessary, the user's cost center is checked and ascertained become. The information, such as the advertising slogan frame number WRN, on the other hand, can be predetermined Window FE9 must be specified. The associated Window data is of type 1, i.e. they are becoming fewer often changed as type 2 window data, like for example in the window FE8 the TIME data and in Window FE6 the marking data.

In a further embodiment variant, the data the window FE8 and FE9 are not printed open and unencrypted, but are only used for encryption. Therefore, the ones shown compared to FIG. 3a are missing Windows FE8 and FE9 in the - in Figures 3b to 3e shown - franking machine print images, to illustrate these variants.

In a preferred input variant for the test the temporarily variable sizes to be entered, for example the advertising cliché frame number WRN, the Date DAT, post value PW, time data TIME and serial number SN automatically by means of a reading device 24 each from the corresponding field of the franking machine stamp image detected and read. Here is the arrangement of the windows in the franking machine imprint to comply with in a predetermined manner.

Others temporarily assigned to the respective serial number SN variable sizes are only available to the franking machine manufacturer and / or data center and become the Post office notified. For example, the the last inspection reached a defined number of pieces on frankings, as a fifth size G5.

All sizes to be entered, except for sizes G1, G4 and G5, must be evident from the individual windows FE _{j of} the franking machine stamp image. The size G5 forms, for example, the key for the encryption, which is changed at predetermined time intervals, ie after each inspection of the franking machine. These time intervals are dimensioned such that even when using modern analysis methods, for example differential cryptanalysis, it is certainly not possible to reconstruct the original information from the markings in the marking field in order to subsequently produce counterfeit stamp images.

For example, size G1 corresponds to an advertising cliché frame number. Corresponding number strings (sTrings) for window or frame input data are stored in the sub-memory areas ST _i , ST _{j of} the working memory 5 of the franking machine.

The sizes G0, G2 and G3 correspond, for example, to the window data stored in the sub-storage areas ST _{j of} the non-volatile working memory 5 of the postage meter machine, the size G0 in the windows FE2 and FE3 from the sub-storage areas ST ₂ and ST ₃ and the size G2 in the window FE4 the sub-storage area ST ₄ and the size G3 in the window FE1 originate from the sub-storage area ST ₁ .

In the sub-memory areas B ₅ B ₆ and B _{7 of} the working memory 5 of the franking machine, the stored window data for an advertising slogan text part, a marking field and possibly for a reference field are available. It should be noted that in some of the sub-memory areas of the main memory 5 of the postage meter machine identified as B _k , the window data are written and / or read out more often than in other sub-memory areas. If the non-volatile working memory is an EEPROM, a special storage method can be used to ensure that it remains safely below the limit number of storage cycles that is permitted for it. On the other hand, a battery-backed RAM can also be used for the non-volatile working memory 5.

5 shows a flow chart of the invention Solution shown, the procedure on the Presence of two shown in Figure 1 Pixel storage areas.

Depending on the frequency of a change in data, decoded binary frame and window data are stored in two pixel storage areas before printing.
The (semi-variable) window data of type 1, such as the date, serial number of the franking machine and the cliché text part that is not to be constantly changed, can be decompressed together with the frame data in binary data before printing and combined to form a pixel image stored in the pixel memory area I. In contrast, constantly changing (variable) window data of type 2 are decompressed and stored as binary window data in the second pixel memory area II before printing. Type 2 window data are, for example, the postal value and transport-dependent postal value to be printed and / or the constantly changing marking. After a print request, the binary pixel data from the pixel memory areas I and II are combined to form a print column control signal for each column of the print image during the course of a print routine.

A franking machine can be switched on and on initializing several states (communication mode, Test mode, franking mode etc. Modes), what, for example, in application P 43 44 476.8 in German laid-open publications DE 42 17 830 A1 and DE 42 17 830 A1 have been described in more detail. After this Start step 40 of the franking mode takes place on the basis of Enter the cost center in step 41 an automatic Enter the last window currently saved and frame data and a corresponding one in step 42 Display. Relevant memory areas are also included C, D, E of the non-volatile working memory 5 with regard to a set assignment of window and framework data or cost center queried. After aforementioned or in another for example the manner described in DE 42 21 270 A1 can also a cliché text part, which a certain advertising cliché is assigned automatically.

In step 43, frame data are stored in registers 100, 110, 120, ..., of the volatile working memory 7a and thereby control code is detected and in the volatile working memory 7b saved. The rest of the framework data are decompressed and stored in volatile pixel memory 7c saved as binary pixel data. Likewise, the Window data in registers 200, 210, 220, ..., of the volatile RAM 7a loaded and control code detected and stored in volatile working memory 7b and the remaining window data after it has been decompressed accordingly in volatile pixel memory in columns 7c saved.

9a shows the decoding of the control code, Decompression and loading of the fixed frame data as well as the formation and storage of the window parameters and in Figure 9b the embedding is decompressed current window data of type 1 into the decompressed Framework data after the start of the franking machine or in detail after editing frame data shown.

In step 44 either the decompressed frame and type I window data as binary pixel data stored in the pixel storage area I before and can Step 45 are processed further or it is done a new entry of frame and / or window data. in the the latter case branches to step 51.

In step 51, the microprocessor determines whether an input has been made via the input means 2 in order to Window data, for example for the post value to replace a new one or for window data, for example for a line of cliché text or edit. If such an entry has been made, the necessary sub-steps for the entries have been made, i.e. it will be a finished one another data set selected (cliché parts) and / or a new data record is generated which contains the data for the individual characters (digits and / or letters) of the Includes input size.

In step 53, corresponding data records for a Called up to check the input data and for the subsequent step 54 for reloading the pixel memory area I with the window data of type 1 provided.

FIG. 9c shows step 54 for embedding decompressed type 1 semi-variable window data the decompressed frame data after a new entry or after editing this type 1 window data detailed. The data from according to the Called records are evaluated to Control code for a "color change" or a Detect "column end", which for embedding of the newly entered window data are required. Then those data that do not have a tax code are decompressed into binary window pixel data and into embedded the pixel memory area I in columns.

On the other hand, it was determined in step 51 that no window data should be selected or edited, then the program branches to step 55. In step 55 leads the possibility to change the fixed advertising cliché or frame data to a step 56 the input of the currently selected framework data records to be carried out together with the window data sets. Otherwise the program branches to step 44.

If a new entry of selected special sizes a flag is set in step 44 and in the subsequent step 45 for formation of Data for a new series of marking symbols taken into account, if here for a second variant Process step 45b.

In step 45, the new encoded is formed Type 2 window data Marking data generated for a window FE6, where previous steps of encrypting data for Generation of a crypto number are included. In this Step 45 is also a bar code form and / or symbol chain provided. Using FIG. 10 is the formation of new coded window data in two variants of type 2 explained for a marker image.

In a first variant, in a step 45a processed a monotonously variable size, so that ultimately through the printed symbol row every print becomes distinctive. In a second Variant are in a step 45b before the step 45a processed other sizes.

The correspondingly formed data record for the marking data is then loaded into an area F and / or at least in a sub-memory area B _{6 of} the non-volatile working memory 5 and overwrites the previously saved data record for which window characteristic values have already been determined or are predetermined and are only now in the volatile working memory 7b are stored. The sub-storage area B ₁₀ is preferably provided for a data record which leads to the printing of a second row of marking symbols, as is shown in FIGS. 3c and 3d. In addition, double rows of symbols can also be printed side by side - in a manner not shown in FIG. 3b. The area F is preferably provided for a data record which leads to the printing of a bar code, as is shown in FIG. 3e.

In step 46, the data of the data set is transferred byte by byte for the marking in registers in the volatile working memory 7a and the control characters "color change" and "end of column" are detected, in order then to decode the remaining data of the data set and to decode the decoded binary window pixel data of the type 2 to load into the pixel memory area II of the volatile working memory 7c. FIG. 11 shows the decoding of the control code and conversion into decompressed binary window data of type 2 in detail. Such type 2 window data are identified in particular by the index k and relate to the data for the window FE6, possibly FE10 for marking data and possibly FE8 for the TIME data of the absolute time count. The time data in particular represents a variable that can be changed in a monotonous manner, as it increases as a function of time. First, BCD-packed time data supplied from the clock / date module 8 are, if appropriate, converted into a suitable data set containing time data with run-length-coded hexadecimal data. Now they can also be stored in a memory area B ₈ for window data FE8 of type 2 and / or loaded immediately in step 46 into register 200 of the working memory 7a or into the print register 15 in columns.

In step 47, if a print request has been made, the step 48 containing a print routine is waited for and if the print request has not yet taken place, the print request is waited in a waiting loop.
In one embodiment, the waiting loop - as shown in FIGS. 5 and 6 - is directly traced back to the beginning of step 47. In another embodiment, the waiting loop - in a manner not shown in FIGS. 5 and 6 - is traced back to the beginning of step 44 or 45.

The print routine - shown in detail in FIG. 12 - carried out in step 48 for the compilation of print column data from the pixel memory areas I and II takes place while the print register (DR) 15 is being loaded. The printer controller (DS) 14 effects this immediately after loading the Print register (DR) 15 a print of the loaded print column. It is then checked in step 50 whether all columns for a franking machine printed image are printed by comparing the current address Z with the stored end address Z _end . If the printing routine has been carried out for a piece of mail, a branch is made to step 57. Otherwise, the process branches back to step 48 in order to generate and print the next print column until the print routine has ended.

In step 57 it is checked whether further mail pieces are closed are franking. If not, and that If the printing routine has ended, step 60 is reached and thus the franking ended. Otherwise it is Print end has not been reached and it becomes a step 51 branches back.

6 shows a fourth variant of the invention Solution, deviating from the block diagram According to FIG. 1, only one pixel memory area I is used. In this pixel storage area I become decoded binary frame data and window data type 1 assembled before printing and saved. The steps are up to step 46, which is saved here in this variant according to FIG. 6 and step 48, which is here by the Step 49 is replaced identically. Up to step 46 there is essentially the same order in the Procedure.

13 shows the printing routine for composing from a pixel memory area I and Data taken from memory areas received. The constantly changing window data of type 2 are in the Step 49 decompressed while printing each column and together with the columns to be printed binary pixel data from the pixel storage area I. composed of a print column control signal. Window data Type 2 are, for example, the one to be printed postal and postage dependent postage and / or the constantly changing marking.

Using a postage stamp image shown in FIG. 7 and the data of the print control signal assigned to a print column, its generation from the frame and window data is explained.
A letter envelope 17 is moved under the printing module 1 of an electronic franking machine at the speed v in the direction of the arrow and is thereby printed in columns s ₁ starting in a grid-like manner with the postage stamp image shown. The printer module 1 has, for example, a print bar 16 with a number of print elements d1 to d240. The ink-jet or a thermal transfer printing principle, for example the ETR printing principle (Electroresistive Termal Transfer Ribbon), can be used for printing.

A column s _f to be printed has a printing pattern 30 to be printed, which consists of colored printing dots and non-colored printing dots. A colored printing dot is printed by a printing element. In contrast, the non-colored print dots are not printed. The first two printing dots in the printing column s _f are colored in order to print the frame 18 of the postage stamp image 30. Then 15 non-colored (ie not active) and 3 colored (ie active) printing dots alternate until a first window FE1 is reached, in which the postage value (postage) is to be inserted. This is followed by a range from 104 non-colored pressure dots to the end of the column. Such run length coding is implemented in the data set using hexadecimal numbers. The space requirement is minimized by having all the data in such a compressed form.

With hexadecimal data "QQ" 256 bits can be generated. If the required control code bits are subtracted from this, less than 256 bits remain for driving the dots generating means. However, if additional control characters "00" causing a color change are used, even more than 256 dots can be controlled, but more memory space is now required in the sub-memory area A _{i of} the main memory 5. The exemplary embodiments according to FIGS. 9, 11, 12 and 13 are designed for such a high-resolution printer module.

Control characters "00" are provided for color changes. In order to a following hexadecimal number will still be as evaluated in color (f: = 1), otherwise as non-colored would apply. A reset color flip-flop (f: = 0) is set at color change (f: = 1) and at the next one Color change switched again (f: = 0). With this In principle, 256 dots or more can be addressed. Register 15 in print controller 14 becomes bit by bit loaded from the pixel memory (e.g. for a Printing columns with N = 240 dots).

Other control characters are "FE" for column end, "FF" for the end of the picture, "F1" for the beginning of the first window Window FE1, etc.

In the following example chosen to explain FIG. 7, less memory space is required in the ROM compared to a print column to be controlled with more than 240 dots, since the control characters are placed favorably. For hexadecimal data "01", "02", ..., "QQ", ... "F0" are 1 to 240 dot ("F0" = [F * 16 ¹ ] + [0 * 16 ⁰ ] = [ 15 * 16] + [0 * 1] = 240) can be controlled.

Here the control code "00" for color changes can theoretically be used omitted, since with a single hexadecimal number "F0" an entire print column of 240 dots with one same coloring can be fully defined. Nonetheless, with only a slight increase in memory, if there are several windows in one column, a color change make sense.

According to this method, a data record for the pressure column s _f results in the form shown in sections:
... "2", "0D", "02", "4F", "F1", "68", "FE", ..., ...

When transferring to a register 100 of the µP control 6 control characters are detected from hexadecimal numbers "QQ" and evaluated in the course of a step 43.

In this evaluation, window characteristic values Z _j , T _j , Y _j or Z _k , T _k , Y _{k are also} generated and together with defined values for the start address Z ₀ , end address Z _end and the total run length R, ie the number of each printing column required binary data, stored in volatile memory RAM 7b.

A maximum of 13 windows could be called for the 13 control characters "F1" to "FD" and the start addresses determined. For example, with "F6" for the start of a window of type FE6 window FE6, a start address Z ₆ can be determined and saved as a window characteristic value.

FIG. 8 shows the window characteristic values relating to a pixel memory image and stored separately therefrom for a first window FE1. The window has a window column run length Y ₁ = 40 pixels and a number of columns of approx. 120, which is stored as window column variable T ₁ . If for this purpose the window start address Z ₁ is stored as the destination address, the position of the window FE1 in the binary pixel image can be reconstructed at any time.

Binary data converted from the registers 100, 200 are read bit by bit into the volatile pixel memory RAM 7c, an address being assigned to each bit. If the hexadecimal number loaded in the register is a detected control character "F2", the window characteristic value Z _{j is determined} for a start address of the window of number j = 2 with a total of n windows. This means that window data can later be inserted into the frame data at this point identified by the address. It is the window column run _length Y _j <R total run length of the print column. From the addition with R the new address can be created in the same row but in the next column.

FIG. 9a shows the decoding of the control code, decompression and loading of the fixed frame data as well as the formation and storage of the window characteristic values. A control code "color change" was taken into account when considering the creation of very high-resolution prints. A color flip-flop 1 must therefore be reset to f: = 0 in a first sub-step 4310. The source address H _i for finding the frame data is initially H _i : = H _i - 1 and the destination address Z: = Z ₀ .

For the window data of type 1, the window column variable T _j : = 0 is set in sub-step 4311, for j = 1 to n windows and for the window data of type 2, the window column variable T _k : = 0 for k = 1 to p windows. In sub-step 4312, the source address H _i for frame data is incremented and a color change is carried out so that the initial data byte is evaluated as colored, for example, which later leads to correspondingly activated printing elements.

The above-mentioned byte, which is a run-length-coded hexadecimal number for frame data, is now transferred in sub-step 4313 from the area A _{i of} the non-volatile memory 5 which is automatically selected by the cost center KST to a register 100 of the volatile memory 7a. Control characters are detected and a run length variable X is reset to zero.

In sub-step 4314, a control character "00" for detected a color change, what after branching back on the sub-step 4312 leads to a color change, i.e. the next run length coded hexadecimal number an inactivation of the printing elements according to the Barrel length. Otherwise it is determined in sub-step 4315 whether there is a control character "FF" for end of image. If one is recognized, point d is corresponding of FIGS. 5 or 6 and step 43 is processed.

Otherwise, if such a control character "FF" for end of image is not recognized in sub-step 4315, it is checked in sub-step 4316 whether there is a control character "FE" for an end of column. If one is recognized, the color flip-flop 1 is reset in sub-step 4319 and a branch is made to sub-step 4312 in order to then load the byte for the next printing column in sub-step 4313. If there is no end of column, it is determined in sub-step 4317 whether there is a control character for a window of type 2. If one has been recognized, then a branch is made to sub-step 4322. Otherwise, it is examined in sub-step 4318 whether there is a control character for type 1 windows. If this is the case, a point c _{1 is} reached at which a step 43b - shown in FIG. 9b - is carried out.

No control character for window data becomes in sub-step 4318 recognized by type 1, then lie in the called Byte precedes the run-length-coded frame data, which in the Sub-step 4320 decodes and into binary frame pixel data implemented in the pixel memory area I of the pixel memory 7c saved under the set address Z. become. In the following sub-step 4321, the corresponding the column run length variable of the number of bits converted X determined and then the Destination address for the pixel memory area I around this variable X increased. A point b is thus reached and around Calling a new byte will go back to the sub-step 4312 branched back.

In sub-step 4322, if there is a control character for window data of type 2, the storage of window characteristic values T _{k is carried out} . If a window characteristic, in this case the window column run variable T _{k is} still at the initial value zero, the window start address Z _k corresponding to the address Z is determined in a sub-step 4323 and stored in the volatile working memory 7b. Otherwise, a branch is made to a sub-step 4324. Sub-step 4323 is also followed by sub-step 4324, in which the window characteristic of the window column variable T _{k is} incremented. In the subsequent sub-step 4325, the previous window column variable T _k stored in the volatile main memory 7b is overwritten with the current value, and the point b is reached.

The window parameters are thus for k = 1 to p windows, in particular FE6 or FE10 or FE8 loaded. After that is branched back to the sub-step 4312 to in the sub-step 4313 to load a new byte. The one from the hexadecimal Data converted bits (dot = 1) are thus in the step 43a shown in FIG. 9a byte-wise into the pixel memory area I of the volatile pixel memory 7c taken over and consecutively as Binary data saved.

FIG. 9b shows the embedding of decompressed current window data of type 1 in the decompressed frame data after the start of the franking machine or after editing frame data. Assuming a control character for windows of type 1 was recognized in sub-step 4318, point c ₁ and thus the beginning of step 43b are reached.

In step 4330, the storage of window parameters T _{j is carried out} . If a window characteristic value, in this case the window _column run variable T _{j is} still at the initial value zero, the window start address Z _j corresponding to the address Z is determined in a sub-step 4331 and stored in the volatile working memory 7b. Otherwise, a branch is made to a sub-step 4332. Sub-step 4331 is also followed by sub-step 4332, in which the window characteristic of the window column run length Y _j and the window column run length variable W _j to an initial value of zero, and the window source address U _j to the initial value U _oj -1 and the second color flip-flop for windows "Print in non-color" can be set.

In the subsequent sub-step 4333, the previous window source address U _{j is} incremented and a color change is carried out, so that any window bytes which are loaded in the subsequent sub-step 4334 are evaluated as colored, which subsequently leads to activated printing elements during printing.

In sub-step 4334, a byte from the sub-memory areas B _j in the non-volatile main memory 5 is loaded into register 200 of the volatile main memory 7 a and is thereby detected for control characters.

In sub-step 4335, the window column run length Y _j is incremented by the value of the window column run length variable W _j . In sub-step 4336 it is determined whether there is a control character "00" for color changes. If one has been recognized, the process branches back to sub-step 4333. Otherwise, it is examined in sub-step 4337 whether there is a control character "FE" for the end of the column. If this is not the case, window data is available. In a sub-step 4338, the content of the register 200 is decoded with the help of the character memory 9 and the binary window pixel data corresponding to this byte is stored in the pixel memory area I of the pixel memory 7c.

The window column run length variable W _j is then determined in a sub-step 4339 to increment the address Z to the value of variable W _j. The new address is thus available for a new byte of the data record to be converted and a branch is made back to sub-step 4333, in which the new source address for a byte of the data record for window FEj is also generated.

If a control character "FE" for a column end was recognized in sub-step 4337, a branch is made to sub-step 4340, in which the window column variable T _{j is} incremented and the volatile working memory 7b stored window column variable T _j and the window column run length Y _{j are} overwritten with the current value. A color change is then carried out in sub-step 4341 and point b has been reached.

This completes step 43b and new framework data could be implemented in step 43a if not a next window is recognized or the point d has been reached.

FIG. 9c shows the embedding of decompressed variable window data of type 1 in the decompressed frame data after editing this window data of type 1. As has already been shown, pixel memory data and window characteristics have already been stored before the start of step 54. The sub-step 5440 begins with the determination of the number n 'of windows for which the data have been changed and a determination of the associated one. Window start address Z _j and window column variable Tj for each window FEj. A window counter variable q is also set to zero.

In sub-step 5441, it is determined whether the value of the window count variable q has already reached the value of the number of window changes n '. If there are zero changes, ie n '= 0, the comparison is positive and point d is reached. Otherwise, a branch is made to sub-step 5442, the window start address Z _j and the window column variable T _{j being taken} from the volatile working memory 6b for a first window FEj whose data has been changed. In addition, the source address U _{j is set} to an initial value U _oj -1, the target address Z _{j is used} to address the pixel memory area I, a window column counter P _j and the second color flip-flop are reset to the initial value zero.

In the following sub-step 5443, the source address is incremented and a color change is carried out before the sub-step 5444 is reached. In sub-step 5444, a byte of the changed data record is called up in the non-volatile memory and transferred to the register 200 of the volatile memory 7a, control characters being detected. If a control character "00" for color change is branched back to sub-step 5443 in sub-step 5445. Otherwise, branch to sub-step 5446 to look for control characters "FE" for the end of a column. However, if such a control character is not present, the content of the register 200 can be decoded in the subsequent sub-step 5447 with the cooperation of the character memory 9 and converted into binary pixel data for the window to be changed. These now replace the previous pixel data stored in area I of the pixel memory 7c from the point predetermined by the window start address Z _j . The bits converted in this process are counted as window run length variables W _j , with which the target address V _{j is} incremented in sub-step 5448. The process then branches back to sub-step 5443 in order to load the next byte in sub-step 5444.

However, if a control character "FE" for the end of the column is recognized in sub-step 5446, a branch is made to sub-step 5449, in which the window column counter P _{j is} incremented.

In sub-step 5450, it is examined whether the window column counter P _{j has reached} the window characteristic value for the associated window column variable T _j . Then, for a first changed window, all the change data would be loaded into the pixel memory area I and branching back to the sub-step 5453 and from there to the sub-step 5441 in order to transfer change data into the pixel memory area I for a possibly second window. For this purpose, the window counter variable q is incremented in sub-step 5453 and the subsequent window start address Z _{j + 1} and the subsequent window column variable T _{j + 1 are} determined.

Otherwise, if the window column variable T _j has not yet been reached by the window column counter P _j in the sub-step 5450, a branch is made back to the sub-step 5443 via the sub-steps 5451 and 5452 in order to overwrite another window column in the pixel memory area until the old binary window pixel memory data is overwritten the new ones have been completely replaced. For this purpose, the target address for the data in the pixel memory area I is incremented by the frame total column length R in sub-step 5451. The target address V _j is thus set to the next column for binary pixel data of the window in the pixel memory area I. In sub-step 5452, the color flip-flop is reset to zero, so that the conversion begins with pixel data that is rated as color.

If no further new entry is found in step 44 in step 45, new ones can now be created coded window data of type 2 for a marking picture, especially after a first variant with a Step 45a take place.

Step 45 includes further ones - shown in FIG. 10 - Sub-steps to create new coded window data type 2 for a marker image.

While there is already decompressed binary pixel data in the pixel memory area I, after step 44 in step 45 the output data for the data records containing the compressed data for the windows FEj and possibly for the frame data are required again in order to generate new coded window data of type 2 for one To form a series of marking symbols. The individual output data (or input data) are stored in the memory areas ST _w as a BCD-packed number in accordance with the respective sizes G _w . In addition to the data records stored non-volatile in the sub-memory areas A _i and B _j, the data for a data record for window FEk of type 2 are now compiled in several steps and stored non-volatile in a sub-memory area B _k .

a) Generierung einer Kombinationszahl KOZ1, wobei eine stetig monoton veränderbare Größe G4 zur Bildung von ersten zusammenhängenden Stellen und mindestens eine das Postgut charakterisierende weitere Größe G3 zur Bildung von zweiten zusammenhängenden Stellen der Kombinationszahl KOZ1 zur Verfügung gestellt werden,

b) Verschlüsselung der Kombinationszahl KOZ1 zu einer Kryptozahl KRZ1,

c) Umsetzen der Kryptozahl KRZ1 in mindestens eine Markierungssymbolreihe MSR1 anhand eines Satzes SSY1 an Symbolen.

The method for the rapid generation of a security imprint comprises, after provision of quantities, a sub-step 45a carried out by the microprocessor of the control device 6 of the franking machine before a print request (step 47), comprising the sub-steps:

a) generation of a combination number KOZ1, whereby a continuously monotonically variable variable G4 for forming first connected positions and at least one further quantity G3 characterizing the mail item are provided for forming second connected positions of the combination number KOZ1,

b) encryption of the combination number KOZ1 to form a crypto number KRZ1,

c) converting the crypto number KRZ1 into at least one marker symbol row MSR1 using a set of SSY1 symbols.

In a first variant 1, a row of marking symbols is generated in a step 45a. In the manner according to the invention, at least some of the sizes are used in the postage meter machine to form a single number combination (sub-step 451) due to the amount of information from the sizes G0 to G5, which are only to be partially printed in the franking machine stamp image in an unencrypted manner a single crypto number is encrypted (sub-step 452) and then converted into a marking to be printed on the postal matter (sub-step 453). The data record to be generated for the marking in a window FE6 can be stored in a final sub-step 454. Then point c _{3 is} reached. This first variant, executed in partial step 45a, can save the time that would otherwise be required in the franking machine for generating further crypto numbers.

It is envisaged that the continuously monotonically variable quantity G _{w is} at least one ascending or descending machine parameter, in particular a time count or its complement during the life of the franking machine.

It is advantageous if a machine parameter is time-dependent is, especially if it is a diminishing one Characterizing the battery voltage of the battery-supported memory Size G4a and a second continuously monotonous falling size G4b or the respective complements size G4a and G4b.

It is also provided in a variant that the second steadily monotonically falling variable G4b the complement the number of pieces or a constantly monotonically falling time-dependent Size is.

In one variant, it is provided that the constantly monotonously decreasing size corresponds to a numerical value the next inspection date (INS) and one is constantly monotonically falling time-dependent variable.

On the other hand, it is provided that a constantly monotonous ascending size the date or the last one Inspection determined number of pieces included.

As has already been explained in more detail, if to form third contiguous positions the combination number KOZ1 is a part of the user of the Franking machine characterizing size G0, G1 from the control device 6 is made available.

In sub-step 451, the upper 10 digits of the combination number KOZ1 for the TIME data (size G4) and the lower 4 digits for the postal value (size G3) are preferably provided from the memory areas ST _w . This results in a combination number with 14 digits, which would then have to be encrypted. When using the DES algorithm, a maximum of 8 bytes, ie 16 digits, can be encrypted at once. This means that the combination number KOZ1 can be supplemented by a further size in the direction of the least significant digits. For example, the supplementary part can be part of the serial number SN or the number WRN of the advertising slogan frame or the byte which is selected from the data record of the advertising slogan frame depending on a further size.

This combination number KOZ1 can be found in sub-step 452 approx. 210 ms are encrypted into a crypto number KRZ1, here a number of others known per se Steps. After that is in the sub-step 453 the crypto number KRZ1 based on a predetermined in the memory areas M of the non-volatile working memory 5 saved marking list in a corresponding Convert a series of symbols. Here, in particular the one that is so advantageous for later printing, increased information density can be achieved.

Even if a sentence shown in FIG. 3f with 10 symbols, i.e. without increasing the information density compared to the crypto number KRZ1 is used, but two rows of markings (side by side or one below the other) additional symbols could be left remain with which further information is unencrypted or could be displayed encrypted. It is then preferably information that that don't change or hardly change, and only once encrypted and converted into a series of symbols needs. This is preferably the Size G5, i.e. Inspection data (INS), for example the date of the last inspection or the rest of the serial number SN or SN and the byte of the data record of the Advertising slogan frame, which in the first combination number KOZ1 was not included or selected predetermined parts thereof. In Figure 3c are in - here arranged orthogonally to each other - windows FE6 and FE10 each have a row with a total of 20 symbols with which, for example, the total 8 bytes, i.e. 16 digits, the crypto number KRZ1 and further information, if necessary, unencrypted or to others Played encrypted.

A second variant with an additional step 45b to step 45a differs from the first variant by others that have to be considered equally Output or input variables. In the second variant become one in two steps 45b and 45a Marker row of symbols generated, step 45b is carried out analogously to step 45a.

In a first sub-step 450 of the step 45 carried out by the control device 6, it is checked whether a flag has been set in order to cause sub-steps 45b and / or 45a to be carried out.
that in step 45b a second combination number KOZ2 having at least the other part of the size G0, G1 characterizing the user of the franking machine is formed, then encoded to a second crypto number KRZ2 and then converted into at least one second marking symbol row MSR2 using a second set SSY2 of symbols .

In sub-step 455 is compared to sub-step 451 a combination number KOZ2 formed, in particular here the sizes for other parts of the serial number, for advertising cliché (frame) number etc. Size can. In sub-step 456, as in sub-step 452 a crypto number KOZ2 is formed. This is done in sub-step 457 then again the transformation into a series of marking symbols, the non-volatile in sub-step 458 is cached.

Sub-step 45a, which comprises sub-steps 451 to 453, then takes place. If necessary, this can be connected by a sub-step 454. Then point c _{3 is} reached.

Here, despite twice using the DES algorithm, insofar as saving time, since an evaluation takes place in a first sub-step 450, whether the selected ones, for the formation of the marking symbol row required in substep 45b Sizes that have been changed by an entry. At New entry of selected special sizes, would in Step 44 set a flag and a subsequent one Formation of data for a new series of marking symbols are taken into account in order to process step 45b here. If this is not the case, then you can already previously formed and in a storage area 458 non-volatile stored existing symbol series or parts of the marking symbol series become.

In one embodiment variant, a is entered in sub-step 456 different encryption algorithm than the DES for Time savings used.

In an advantageous embodiment variant, the sub-step 453 of the first variant or in sub-step 457 the second variant is a transformation to the additional one Increasing the information density of the marking symbol row compared to the crypto number KRZ1 or KRZ2 performed. For example, with a crypto number with 16 digits now a set of 22 symbols used to the information using only 12 digits - in the in the Figure 3b apparent way - to map. For two Crypto numbers is the series of marker symbols shown there to double. That can be done by means of a - in Figure 3b shown - marking symbol row in parallel further marking symbol row.

Accordingly, it can be shown that for a Marker symbols row of 14 digits only one 14 symbols symbol set is required. The already previously described check in the postal authority of such Mail items showing marker symbol rows can consequently - after the second evaluation variant - by inverse transformation of the row of marking symbols in crypto numbers KRZ1 possibly KRZ2, their subsequent Decoding to combination numbers KOZ1 if necessary KOZ2, the individual sizes of which correspond to those on the postal item in the Franking image, openly printed sizes are compared, respectively.

A series of marking symbols - as shown in FIG. 3a has been shown - is designed for 10 digits and can map a crypto number KRZ1 if the symbol set 40 symbols. Here is a fully automated one Input and evaluation - if only subjective errors of the To avoid the inspector from recognizing the symbols, sensible.

In a step following step 45 then the data of a record for the marker symbol series after decompressing them into the others Pixel data embedded. According to the invention, in particular two different options are provided. One possibility becomes another on the basis of FIG. 11 explained in more detail with reference to FIG.

FIG. 11 explains step 46 in FIG. 5 in particular. In a sub-step 4660, window parameters Z _k and T _{k are} specified for changed window data, the window change number p ′ is determined and a window count variable q is set to zero. In a sub-step 4661 it is evaluated whether the window count variable q is equal to the window change number p '. Then point d ₃ and thus the next step 47 would already have been reached. However, this path is not regularly followed at the beginning, since the monotonously increasing size constantly creates new marker symbol rows for each print.

Otherwise, if a change has been made, will be on branched to sub-step 4662 to correspond to window characteristics enter the changed windows and initial conditions to put.

In a sub-step 4663 a new source address for the data of the data record of the window FEk just processed is generated in order to load a byte of the coded window data of type 2 from the memory area B _k into registers of the non-volatile memory 7 a and to detect control characters in the next sub-step 4664 .

In a sub-step 4665, the window column run length Y _k is then incremented by the window column run length variable W _k , which is still zero here. Then a check is carried out for control characters for color changes (sub-step 4666) and, if necessary, branching back to sub-step 4663 or a search for control characters for the end of the column (sub-step 4667). If successful, branch is made to sub-step 4669 and the window column counter P _{k is} increased. Otherwise, the next sub-step 4668 is to decode the control code and convert the called byte into decompressed binary window pixel data of type 2.

Sub-step 4670 then checks whether all of the window's columns have been processed. If this is the case, a branch is made to sub-step 4671 and the column run length Y _{k of} the window FEk is stored in memory 7b and branched back to sub-step 4673.
If it is recognized in sub-step 4670 that all the columns have not yet been processed, the sub-step 4672 branches back to sub-step 4663, with the window characteristic value Y _k and the color flip-flop being reset to zero. In the next sub-step 4668, a decoding of the control code and a conversion of the called byte into decompressed binary window pixel data of type 2 may then be carried out again.

After sub-step 4673, where the characteristic values of the next changed window are called, a branch is made back to sub-step 4661. When all change windows have been processed, point d _{3 is} reached.

The assembly printing routine shown in Figure 12 of data from the pixel memory areas I and II expires when a print request is made in step 47 is recognized and data in one - in FIG. 5 not shown - Sub-step 471 have been loaded.

In sub-step 471, the end address Z _{end is} loaded, the current address Z (run variable) to the value of the source address Z ₀ in area I of the pixel memory 7c, the window column counter P _k to the respective value corresponding to the stored window column variable T _k , the window bit count length X _k is set to the respective value corresponding to the stored window column run length Y _k and the target addresses Z _k for k = p windows and the total run length R for a print column s _{k are} loaded. The printing column has N printing elements.

Then, when point e _{1 is reached} at the beginning of step 48, several sub-steps take place. First, in a sub-step 481, the register 15 of the printer controller 14 is loaded serially bit by bit from the area I of the pixel memory 7c with binary print column data which are called up with the address Z, and the window counter h is set to a number which is the number of windows increased by one p corresponds. In sub-step 482, a window counter h is decremented, which outputs window numbers k one after the other, whereupon in sub-step 483 the address Z reached in the pixel memory is compared with the window start address Z _{k of} the window FE _k . If the comparison is positive and a window start address is reached, a branch is made to sub-step 489, which in turn consists of sub-steps 4891 to 4895. Otherwise, branch to sub-step 484.

In sub-step 4891, a first bit from the area II of the pixel memory 7c for the window FE _k, the binary window pixel data is loaded into the register 15, the address Z and the bit count variable 1 being incremented in sub-step 4892 and the window bit count length X _{k being} decremented. In a sub-step 4893, if not all bits corresponding to the window column run length Y _{k have been} loaded yet, further bits from area II are loaded. Otherwise, a branch is made to sub-step 4894, the window start address Z _k for addressing the next window column being increased accordingly by the total length R and the window column counter P _{k being} decremented. At the same time, the original window bit count length X _k is restored in accordance with the window column run length Y _k .

Sub-step 4895 then checks whether all window columns have been processed. If this is the case, then the start address Z _k for the corresponding window FE _{k is set} to zero or an address which lies outside the pixel memory area I. Otherwise and after sub-step 4896, a branch is made to point e ₁ .

In step 484 it is checked whether all window start addresses have been queried. Once that's done, then the program branches to sub-step 485 to determine the current Increment address Z. Hasn't that happened yet? the system branches back to sub-step 481 by which Continue decrementing window counter h until the next window start address is found or until in sub-step 484 the window counter h becomes zero.

In sub-step 486 it is checked whether all data for column s _k to be printed are loaded in register 15. If this is not yet the case, the bit count variable l is incremented in sub-step 488 to return to point e ₁ and then (in sub-step 481) to load the next bit addressed with the address Z from the pixel memory area into register 15.

However, if register 15 is full, the column is printed out in sub-step 487. Then, in a step 50 - already shown in FIG. 5 - it is determined whether all the pixel data of the pixel memory areas I and II have been printed out, that is to say the item of mail has been franked completely. If this is the case, then point f _{1 is} reached. Otherwise, a branch is made to sub-step 501 and bit count variable 1 is reset to zero, in order to then branch back to point e ₁ . Now the next print column can be created.

The printing routine for the compilation of data taken from only one pixel memory area I and working memory areas is explained in more detail with reference to FIG. 13. After the pressure request, which is determined in step 47 shown in FIG. 6, a sub-step 471 takes place immediately, as already explained in connection with FIG. 12, in order to reach point e ₂ . Step 49, which is already beginning in FIG. 6, comprises the sub-steps 491 to 497 and the sub-steps 4990 to 4999. The sub-steps 491 to 497 run with the same result in the same order as the sub-steps 481 to 487 have already been explained in connection with FIG. Merely in sub-step 493, a branch is made to sub-step 4990 in order to reset a color flip-flop to g: = 0, whereupon the process of decompressing the coded window data of type 2, which is explained in connection with FIG. 6, is initiated with sub-step 4991 becomes. Here there is a color change already explained - in connection with FIG. 7 - when evaluating the type 2 window pixel data to be converted, so that the first hexadecimal data of the called data set are, for example, evaluated as colored. The source address is incremented. The compressed window data for the type 2 windows FE _k , in particular for the marking data, are then loaded from the predetermined data record (stored in the corresponding sub-memory areas B _j ) into the registers 200 of the volatile main memory 7a in sub-step 4992. A hexadecimal number "QQ "corresponds to one byte.

The control code is also detected here. If a window column is to be printed which begins with non-colored, ie not to be printed, pixels, the control code "color change" would be in the first place in the data record. Thus, branching back to sub-step 4991 in sub-step 4993 in order to carry out the color change. Otherwise, branch to sub-step 4994. In sub-step 4994, it is determined whether there is a "column end" control code. If this is not yet the case, the register content must be decoded and thus decompressed. For each runtime-coded hexadecimal numerical value, there is a series of binary pixel data in the character memory (CSP) 9, which can be called up accordingly on the basis of the hexadecimal number loaded in the volatile working memory 7a. This is done in sub-step 4995, after which the decompressed window pixel data for a column of window type FE _j of type 2 are loaded serially into the print register 15 of the printer controller 14.

In step 4996, the address is then incremented and a corresponding next hexadecimal number is selected in the data record, which is stored in the non-volatile main memory 5 in sub-area B ₅ , and the bits converted during the decoding of the run length coding are determined in order to form a window column run length variable W _j , with which the destination address is incremented. The new destination address for reading is thus generated. and branching back to sub-step 4991.

If the end of the column has been reached, sub-steps 4997 to 4999 follow in order to then branch back to point e ₂ . The sub-steps 4998 and 4999 run similarly to the sub-steps 4895 and 4894 shown in FIG.

In sub-step 497, the print column is loaded printed. The sub-steps 491 to 497 run similar to the sub-steps shown in FIG 481 to 487.

In addition to less mechanical effort high print speed with a variety in a stored fixed print image to be embedded Print image data.

In a further variant of the method for generating a security imprint for franking machines, a printer module applies a fully electronically generated franking image to a mail piece, corresponding to the current inputs or data made via an input means and an input / output control module, which can be checked with a display unit . It is provided that the data for the constant parts of the franking image, which relate to at least the frame of an advertising cliché, are stored in a first memory area A _{i of} the program memory 11, that the non-volatile memory 5 has a plurality of memory areas and that the data for the variable or semi-variable parts of the franking image are stored in second memory areas B _k and B _{j of} the non-volatile memory 5. The selectable cost center numbers for the cost centers can be assigned the names of the advertising slogan frames in a third memory area C of the non-volatile memory 5. The name of the advertising slogan frames corresponds to advertising slogan frame numbers WRN.

With the microprocessor-controlled printing process and the printer control, the print pattern is generated from fixed data and current data. It is provided that according to the name or the advertising slogan frame number WRN, which are stored in the memory areas of the non-volatile memory 5 and identify the currently set frame of an advertising slogan. Frame data are taken from the first memory area of the program memory 11, decompressed and stored in a first area I of a pixel memory 7C. Semivariable window data from the second memory area B _j are subsequently embedded in the aforementioned constant data. Before printing, in the event of a print request 47, billing is carried out in a sub-step 470 under the aforementioned cost center number in the cost center memory 10 and then variable window data from the second memory area B _k for the marking data are embedded during printing, the embedding while the printing register 15 is being loaded he follows.

In particular, the advantageous variants are closer have been explained, but with a faster Hardware is quite possible, the order of the procedural steps to change to include a security imprint to generate quickly.

Is in step 47 when a print request has been made to step 48 or a printing routine 49 and if a print request has not yet been made in a queue for the print request serviced by - shown in Figures 5 and 6, respectively Way - to the beginning of step 47 directly according to the invention has one Another time advantage, since it is not constantly new crypto numbers are generated according to the DES algorithm have to. The next recordable time after one Generation of the marking symbol row can already Trigger pressure. Nevertheless, as mentioned, there are others Back branches possible. Step 47 can be a additional step 61 can be arranged in advance in order to can be found if a missing print request in step 61 to a standby mode (step 62) branch, for example at the current time and / or display the date and / or to check for errors perform automatically. From standby mode 62 becomes the starting step 40 directly or indirectly branched back over further steps or modes.

Likewise, in another variant, step 45 be placed between steps 53 and 54. In that Step 45 following step 54 then becomes the data a record for the series of marking symbols after decompression into the remaining pixel data of the pixel storage area I embedded. Another Pixel storage area is then not required.

Another opposite variant stores in the pixel memory area just frame pixel data and embeds all window pixel data equal to that in the print register 15 read corresponding columns without that in between requires a pixel memory for window data becomes.

In a variant, without the automatic editing of Cliché parts, can be stored in memory areas D and E. to be dispensed with. Instead, the unchangeable Image information for a finished cliché in a read only memory (ROM), e.g. in the program memory 11. When decoding the immutable Image information is stored on the read-only memory 11 accessed, with the caching of Cliché parts can be omitted.

The program memory 11 is connected to the control device 6, the data for the constant parts of the franking image, which relate to at least one advertising cliché frame, being stored in a first memory area A _i . An assigned name identifies the advertising slogan frame. The non-volatile working memory 5 is connected to the control device 6, the data for the semi-variable parts of the franking image being stored in the second memory area B _j and an assigned name identifying the semi-variable part. A first assignment of the names of the semi-variable parts to the names of the constant parts exists according to the stored program. A second assignment is made in accordance with the cost center number stored in a third memory area C, so that an advertising cliché is optionally assigned to each cost center KST. A microprocessor is provided in the control device 6 in order to encrypt the marker pixel image data before it is embedded in columns in the remaining pixel image data. A volatile working memory 7 is therefore connected to the microprocessor, and a printer controller 14 is connected to print register 15, with which the marker pixel image data are inserted into the remaining fixed and variable pixel image data during printing under the control of the microprocessor in accordance with a program stored in the program memory 11.

The invention is not based on the present embodiment limited. Rather is a number of Variants conceivable, which of the solution shown even with fundamentally different types Make use.

Claims (1)

Method for generating a security imprint, with provision of sizes in order to print these sizes in encrypted form in the imprint with the postage and day stamp, characterized by a sub-step carried out by the microprocessor of the control device (6) of the franking machine before a print request (step 47) (45a) or step (45), comprising the sub-steps: a) Generation of a combination number (KOZ1), whereby a constantly monotonically variable variable (G4) for the formation of first contiguous digits and at least one further variable characterizing the postal item (G3) for the formation of second contiguous digits of the combination number (KOZ1) are made available , b) Encryption of the combination number (KOZ1) to a crypto number (KRZ1).

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