EP1118964B1 - Procédé et dispositif pour vérifier un motif destiné à la sécurité - Google Patents

Procédé et dispositif pour vérifier un motif destiné à la sécurité Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1118964B1
EP1118964B1 EP01250022A EP01250022A EP1118964B1 EP 1118964 B1 EP1118964 B1 EP 1118964B1 EP 01250022 A EP01250022 A EP 01250022A EP 01250022 A EP01250022 A EP 01250022A EP 1118964 B1 EP1118964 B1 EP 1118964B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
data
franking
machine
window
sub
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP01250022A
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German (de)
English (en)
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EP1118964A1 (fr
Inventor
Wolfgang Thiel Dr.
Harald Windel
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Francotyp Postalia GmbH
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Francotyp Postalia GmbH
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Publication date
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Publication of EP1118964A1 publication Critical patent/EP1118964A1/fr
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Publication of EP1118964B1 publication Critical patent/EP1118964B1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
    • G07B17/00193—Constructional details of apparatus in a franking system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
    • G07B17/00435—Details specific to central, non-customer apparatus, e.g. servers at post office or vendor
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00459—Details relating to mailpieces in a franking system
    • G07B17/00508—Printing or attaching on mailpieces
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00016—Relations between apparatus, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office, in a franking system
    • G07B17/0008—Communication details outside or between apparatus
    • G07B2017/00153—Communication details outside or between apparatus for sending information
    • G07B2017/00161—Communication details outside or between apparatus for sending information from a central, non-user location, e.g. for updating rates or software, or for refilling funds
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
    • G07B17/00193—Constructional details of apparatus in a franking system
    • G07B2017/00258—Electronic hardware aspects, e.g. type of circuits used
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00185—Details internally of apparatus in a franking system, e.g. franking machine at customer or apparatus at post office
    • G07B17/00435—Details specific to central, non-customer apparatus, e.g. servers at post office or vendor
    • G07B2017/00443—Verification of mailpieces, e.g. by checking databases
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00459—Details relating to mailpieces in a franking system
    • G07B17/00508—Printing or attaching on mailpieces
    • G07B2017/00572—Details of printed item
    • G07B2017/0058—Printing of code
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00459—Details relating to mailpieces in a franking system
    • G07B17/00508—Printing or attaching on mailpieces
    • G07B2017/00572—Details of printed item
    • G07B2017/0058—Printing of code
    • G07B2017/00588—Barcode
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00459—Details relating to mailpieces in a franking system
    • G07B17/00508—Printing or attaching on mailpieces
    • G07B2017/00572—Details of printed item
    • G07B2017/00604—Printing of advert or logo
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00459—Details relating to mailpieces in a franking system
    • G07B17/00508—Printing or attaching on mailpieces
    • G07B2017/00637—Special printing techniques, e.g. interlacing
    • G07B2017/00645—Separating print into fixed and variable parts
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00459—Details relating to mailpieces in a franking system
    • G07B17/00661—Sensing or measuring mailpieces
    • G07B2017/00701—Measuring the weight of mailpieces
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00459—Details relating to mailpieces in a franking system
    • G07B17/00661—Sensing or measuring mailpieces
    • G07B2017/00709—Scanning mailpieces
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G07B2017/00741—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system using specific cryptographic algorithms or functions
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G07B2017/00741—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system using specific cryptographic algorithms or functions
    • G07B2017/0075—Symmetric, secret-key algorithms, e.g. DES, RC2, RC4, IDEA, Skipjack, CAST, AES
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G07B2017/0079—Time-dependency
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07B—TICKET-ISSUING APPARATUS; FARE-REGISTERING APPARATUS; FRANKING APPARATUS
    • G07B17/00—Franking apparatus
    • G07B17/00733—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system
    • G07B2017/00822—Cryptography or similar special procedures in a franking system including unique details
    • G07B2017/0083—Postal data, e.g. postage, address, sender, machine ID, vendor

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for checking a security imprint in a postal authority or similar institution, in the manner specified in the preamble of claim 1.
  • the security imprint includes a marking and is generated by means of a franking machine.
  • a franking machine usually generates a print in a form agreed with the post office right-justified, parallel to the top edge of the mail starting with the content postage in the postmark, date in the day stamp and stamp imprints for advertising clichés and possibly transmission type in the Wahltikstkov.
  • the postal value, the date and the type of shipment form the variable information to be entered in accordance with the item of mail.
  • the postage value is usually the forwarding charge prepaid by the sender (Franko), which is taken from a refillable credit register and used to clear the postal consignment.
  • a security system with a character printing authorization device is known.
  • a computer of the franking machine is assigned a memory for the data to be loaded of the graphic change and the data of the associated date.
  • the computer of the postage meter machine accesses an external dialing device via a connection device (modem) which makes a selection of a character pattern to be printed.
  • modem connection device
  • the disadvantage here is that the user of the franking machine no freedom of choice for the selection of the character pattern is granted. It is envisaged that the printed character pattern will be used to verify the security of the franking machine.
  • the entire printed that special character pattern containing print image is evaluated by the postal authority, which is possible only with great effort.
  • Another security system uses imprints in the form of a diagram ( US 5 075 862 ) within the postage meter stamp imprint. But if individual printing elements have failed, dots are missing in the printed image, which can lead to a signaling of alleged falsification. Such markers within the franking machine stamp imprint are therefore not so secure. Even with a faultless impression, the machine evaluation is difficult because always the entire print image is evaluated.
  • the fully electronically generated advertising cliche belongs in this solution but also to the constant data of the franking picture, as the frame arrangement of the value and the day stamp with location and possibly the postcode.
  • a first variant of the verification of a security imprint with a marker symbol series begins with a transmission of information from the data center to the postal authority, with respect to those franking machines that have no longer reloaded credits or have no longer reported to the data center and therefore appear suspicious.
  • the solution according to the invention is based on the recognition that only data stored centrally in a data center can be adequately protected against manipulation. Corresponding register values are queried during a communication, for example as part of a remote value specification of a recharge credit.
  • the accumulated amounts of credit which accumulate in the franking machine, are ultimately consumed during franking.
  • the average credit inflow is compared with the outflow of credit (postage consumption) in order to analyze the previous use of the franking machine and to predict future user behavior.
  • the franking machine which receives a regular credit recharge or regularly reports to a data center, can be classified as unsuspicious. However, the franking machine which continues to operate without recharging beyond a predefined reload date does not necessarily have to be manipulated. Rather, if necessary, the mail volume to be processed by the postage meter machine may have reduced above average. If, therefore, sufficient residual value credit is still available in the franking machine, a user must of course be allowed to continue debiting this. Only an extraordinary on-site inspection could clarify in this case whether a manipulation exists. However, this inspection may defer a franking machine user with irregular postage and credit card recharge behavior when reporting to the data center as soon as he receives the information that his postage meter machine is suspect. The data center then performs a remote inspection. For safety reasons, it is proposed according to the invention that both measures, i. a remote inspection of the franking machine by the data center and a check of the mail pieces in the post office or an institute commissioned to perform.
  • the invention is based on the one hand on the consideration that the user who has manipulated, either an increased effort to bear if he tries to undo his manipulation to report in time to the data center, which queries the register values, or would only irregularly or no longer report.
  • intervention in the franking machine function for manipulation purposes even more difficult by the safety construction of the franking machine by means of the sensor and the detector device.
  • a security print is made with separate areas for the marking information from the postage meter on the mail piece.
  • a competent authority preferably at the post office
  • the on-site inspection of the postage meter can be replaced. Only in justified cases (manipulation) would then be made by an inspector or for inspection on the spot authorized person nor a direct inspection of the franking machine on site.
  • the postal authority can easily and relatively easily distinguish between the counterfeited manipulated and unmanipulated postage meter imprint.
  • an evaluation is easily possible, also with regard to an indication of a machine that was mimicked by the manipulator or that itself was manipulated and with regard to an indication of the machine, which was continued by the user beyond the remote inspection date.
  • the security symbol-printed mark symbol series is based on a compressed combination representation on an encrypted combination number whose digits are predetermined for an assignment of evaluable sizes.
  • a marker symbol string may be generated via a routine by the microprocessor of the postage meter machine without the use of an additional encryption circuit. In this case, different variants of marking information are possible, which can be recovered from a marker symbol series.
  • the aforementioned information about further data can also be requested from the data center by the post office or the institute commissioned with the verification.
  • the monotone variable need only be included in part to form the combination number, but then only the part of maximum change to form a first number is included.
  • a fourth number corresponds to the information about the corresponding postage meter identification number (serial number).
  • the information can be printed in the franking stamp additionally or exclusively as a barcode.
  • Such information may also be the checksum or any other appropriately derived number from the identification number, as all that matters is to check the franking stamp on the mail piece or, indirectly, the postage meter by means of the impression of manipulation. If manipulation is detected, it must also be possible to open the mail piece to identify the true sender.
  • the microprocessor of the franking machine is used to form at least one combination number of the predetermined sizes after the completion of all inputs and to encrypt them according to an encryption algorithm to a crypto number, which is then converted into a marker symbol series.
  • a random or centrally initiated check of mail pieces is provided to recover the individual information from the printed mark of a security imprint in a postal authority or similar institution and to compare it with the information printed on the mailpiece.
  • the verification of the marker symbol series by the postal authority is based on a second variant exclusively on random samples. In the random sample inspection of any arbitrarily selected mail piece is examined for manipulation, without there has been any other evidence of manipulation or suspicion.
  • the postal authority or the institute commissioned with the check transmits the corresponding franking machine serial number of the data center. With this information, the mail items (letters) could be checked indirectly in cooperation with the data center.
  • the sender indicated on the item will be checked.
  • the co-printed serial number of the franking machine can serve, if it is possible to identify the sender or, if available, the sender printed in clear text on the envelope. If such an indication is missing or if the franking machine serial number has been manipulated, the letter can be opened legally to determine the sender.
  • the aforesaid marking is preferably printed in the form of a series of symbols in a field of the postage meter image simultaneously with it by the single printer module.
  • the shape of the symbols with their orthogonal edges enables pattern recognition with minimal computational effort.
  • a further advantage over a bar code is the good readability of the individual symbols arranged in the marking field, due to the symbolism of the image content, and the possibility of this to capture the image content for manual evaluation.
  • a visual evaluation by a trained examiner, who evaluates the form and the conceptual content of the symbols is made possible in the post office.
  • the invention it is proposed to transfer hexadecimal window data in run-length-coded form into the respective separate memory areas of a non-volatile main memory and to store them there. If no new input is made, a transfer takes place in a volatile pixel memory and an arrangement of the window data corresponding to the predetermined assignment in the frame data.
  • the data from both memory areas are assembled according to a predetermined assignment before the printing to a pixel print image and completed during the printing to a column of the entire franking machine print image.
  • Those variable data embedded in the print column during printing include at least the marking data.
  • the time required for the previous composition of the entire pixel image with the other data is reduced accordingly.
  • the previous composition is similar to the date in the postmark and as the postage value in the value impression, the variable information can be subsequently supplemented and modified in the appropriate window.
  • only the parts of a graphical representation are re-stored in the nonvolatile RAM when they are changed, which are actually changed.
  • FIG. 1 shows a block diagram of the franking machine according to the invention with a printer module 1 for a fully electronically generated franking image, a Advertising cliché and / or a mark for a security impression contains, with at least one actuating elements having input means 2, and with a display unit 3, both of which are coupled via an input / output control module 4, a non-volatile memory 5 for at least the constant parts of the franking image and A character memory 9 supplies the necessary pressure data for the volatile random access memory 7.
  • the control device 6 has a microprocessor ⁇ P connected to the input / output control module 4, to the character memory 9, to the volatile random access memory 7 and to the nonvolatile working memory 5, with a cost center memory 10, with a program memory 11, with a transport or feed device optionally with strip trigger 12, an encoder (encoder disc) 13 and with a constantly in operation clock / date module 8 is in communication.
  • the preferred arrangement for producing a security impression for franking machines has in the program memory 11 a first storage area A (among others for the data of the constant parts of the franking image including the advertising cliché frame).
  • a cost center number is entered in order to select the advertising cliché, among other things.
  • an advantageous method for user-oriented billing has already been proposed in which the selected cliché is examined in order to automatically determine the cost center under which billing is to be carried out.
  • the compressed data are read from the main memory 5 and converted by means of the character memory 9 into a print image having a binary pixel data, which is also printed in such a decompressed form volatile memory 7 is stored.
  • memory 7a, 7b and pixel memory 7c will be used below, although physically this is preferably a single memory module.
  • the main memory 7b and the pixel memory 7c communicate with the printer module 1 via a printer controller 14 having a print register (DR) 15 and output logic.
  • the pixel memory 7c is connected on the output side to a first input of the printer controller 14, at the other control inputs output signals of the microprocessor control device 6 abut.
  • variable mark data can be realized in one or more windows within a fixed area by the franking machine print image in order to realize the security print given frame during column-wise printing.
  • a significant reason why the printing speed is not lowered by the time required to form the mark data is the development of a time reserve during printing by the microprocessor of the controller which performs column-by-column embedding of window data.
  • the memory areas B to ST in the nonvolatile random access memory 5 may contain a multiplicity of sub memory areas, under which the respective data are stored in data records.
  • the program memory 11 is connected to the control device 6, wherein the data for the constant parts of the franking image, which relate to at least one
  • the data for the constant parts of the franking image which relate to at least one
  • the non-volatile main memory 5 is connected to the control device 6, wherein the data for the semivariable parts of the franking image are stored in a second memory area B j and an associated name identifies the semivariable part, wherein a first assignment of the names of consists of semivariable parts to the names of the constant parts.
  • a second allocation can be made according to the cost center number stored in a third storage area C, so that optionally each cost center KST is assigned an advertising cliché.
  • the corresponding assignment of the respective cost center to the frame data is automatically requested after switching on.
  • the cost center must be reentered in memory area C each time it is switched on during the start routine, while it is retained in the case of short-term operating voltage interruptions.
  • the number of printed letters with the respective o.g. Setting the advertising cliché via the cost center is registered in the postage meter machine for later evaluation.
  • each record of a sub-memory area A i , B j and B k are successively control code and run-length-coded frame or window data included.
  • the respective selected common frame data for the advertising cliché stamp, for the postmark and the postage stamp are transferred from the non-volatile program memory 11 to the registers 100, 110, 120,..., Of a volatile main memory 7a, control code being transmitted during the transfer decoded and stored in a separate memory area of the working memory 7b.
  • the respective selected window data is loaded into registers 200, 210, 220, ....
  • the registers of sub-memory areas are formed in the memory area of the main memory 7a.
  • these aforementioned registers and / or the volatile memory 7 part of the microprocessor control. 6
  • FIG. 1 shows a block diagram for such a first variant of the inventive solution.
  • New frame and / or window data of type 1 may be selected as long as there is a need after inserting and storing binary pixel data in the first pixel memory area I. If this is not the case, automatic generation of window data of the type 2 with subsequent decompression and their storage as binary pixel data in the second pixel memory area II follows. In another variant, not shown, the above steps can be repeated, if still none Print request is present. The compilation with the remaining binary pixel data stored in the pixel memory area I preferably takes place after the presence of a print request during a print routine.
  • the data in the memory areas C, D and E can be changed.
  • the same microprocessor of the control device 6, which also executes the billing routine and the print routine is used.
  • the data from the memory areas are combined according to a predetermined (within certain limits freely selectable) assignment during printing to an overall representation of a security footprint.
  • fourth and fifth memory areas D and E of the non-volatile main memory 5 are used.
  • a name that identifies the currently set frame of an advertising cliché while in a fifth memory area E stores data for a further selectable assignments of at least one advertising cliché part to a frame of the advertising cliché according to the aforementioned name are. It is envisaged that the data from the memory areas according to a predetermined (within certain limits freely selectable) assignment during printing to an overall representation of a security footprint are composed.
  • the identification of a franking machine usually takes place by means of an 8-digit serial number, which, however, only partially needs to be included in the marking symbol series in order to enable a check of the printed serial number in plain text.
  • this can be the checksum from the serial number in a simple variant.
  • other data goes to education a preferably at least 2-digit information, which allows the verification of the serial number.
  • a marking of postal matter generated on the basis of a crypto-numeral to enable an identification of franking machines without difficulty if the multi-digit crypto not including the data stored as a hexadecimal number of the entire cliche, but only with the inclusion of selected data values of the stereotype frame and other data as the machine parameter of the value setting and the date is formed and buffered.
  • numbers or numerical values such as the number of the advertising clichés used, but also data values of the image information for forming the encrypted information can be used with the method according to the invention.
  • any area of the advertising cliché to which separate data is assigned in a data record can be used.
  • each column to be printed is identified as a control code, which follows the run-length-coded hexadecimal data.
  • the run-length-coded hexadecimal data that is in the first place of the data record can be used.
  • the associated data of the column-wise regional image information from the data set is selected by a quantity present in the machine and / or generated, in particular by the current date, in order to extract at least a number of data (hexadecimal numbers).
  • each advertising cliché number can also be assigned to each advertising cliché number, with each data record having those data relating to a subarea of the advertising cliché.
  • the data record with the associated data of the column-wise regional image information is selected by a quantity present in the machine and / or generated in order to extract at least a number of data (hexadecimal numbers).
  • those run length coded hexadecimal data corresponding to a predetermined print column together with at least some of the machine parameter data (serial number, monotone variable, time data, inspection data such as the number of prints at the last inspection, or suspicious variable) and the postage value become a number in more specifically - in connection with FIG. 10 explained - way combined and encrypted.
  • the DES algorithm Data Encryption Standard
  • a conversion into a special graphic character set can be used for a high security standard.
  • the encryption of at least a first, third and fourth number comprehensive combination number succeeds in an 8-byte long record.
  • the character memory 9 a conversion of a crypto-number into symbols having symbols is made.
  • a list selected by another size, advantageously by the postal value, which assigns graphic symbols to the individual crypto numbers, is used.
  • the encrypted hexadecimal data is decompressed by means of the character memory in order to print the identifier formed from the symbols to be printed. This is also a machine-readable mark.
  • window data of type 2 for the security markings are accommodated in a separate window in the postmark or in the day stamp or between both stamps. Then the entire franking imprint is not enlarged (which is also not allowed by mail) or no additional printing unit, which prints elsewhere in the letter, is required.
  • particularly generated encrypted marking data stored in a sixth memory area F can be used to identify, for example, the franking machine serial number.
  • Another possibility is the machine-readable but unverschüsselt printed as a bar code message of the franking machine serial number, the data either from the memory area F of the nonvolatile memory 5 or from the program memory 11 are removed to this in the franking image - such as based on FIG. 3e shown - insert.
  • a notification of the sender address to be applied by means of a separate printer by means of a barcode can be promoted by a discount.
  • these messages mentioned above can reduce the checking effort of mail items because they permit a targeted machine check of particular senders or franking machines.
  • the data center detects suspicious franking machines and transmits the serial numbers of the postal authority or a commissioned with the verification institute.
  • Newer franking machines are loaded by means of a remote value specification FWV from a data center with a new recharging credit.
  • the data center stores the credit amounts and the dates on which these credits were transferred to the postage meter machine.
  • further security checks are possible for checking the regular use of the franking machine.
  • the FIG. 2 shows which communication is required in an evaluation of the security imprint according to the invention.
  • a data connection line L is required for the credit recharge.
  • the data center receives information about the respective franking machine for each communication via the data connection line L. It is provided that in a further memory area N a dialing parameter and / or telephone number is stored in order to establish the communication link to the data center DZ, which queries at least the postal registers in the nonvolatile cost center memory 10. After evaluation, the data center, if necessary, establishes a data connection via a line H to the evaluation device 29 in the post office or in the institute commissioned with the evaluation of the franking stamp of the mailpieces.
  • the post office will initiate an inspection of the mail pieces.
  • the information is received by the postal authority from the data center via the data link H together with the serial number.
  • the data link H is to be used.
  • the data link L is provided for inquiries from the franking machine to the data center.
  • the data center determines an average postage consumption P K on the basis of the user-specific historical data of a certain past time period.
  • Each of these consumption classes is a typical disposition factor ⁇ A , ⁇ B , ⁇ C assigned, which according to the equation (6) in the consumption class A, ie the class with the smallest consumption, per time interval, the longest time (t A ) is achieved and at the consumption class C the shortest time (t C ).
  • Each of these consumption classes is assigned a typical consumption time t A , t B , t C , whereby the consumption class A, ie the class with the lowest consumption, is assigned the longest time (t A ) per time interval and the consumption class C the shortest time (t C ).
  • the respective K th franking machine FM K is in principle considered to be suspicious.
  • a plausibility check of all franking machines in use is carried out in the data center. In this procedure, the machines are marked and reported to the postal authority whose franking behavior appears suspicious or which have obviously been manipulated.
  • the data center makes contact with the K-th franking machine FM K on. In the presence of a modem connection, this can happen automatically. In the case of the so-called voice control, a telephone call is required at the FM K customer.
  • the customer or the postage meter machine is requested to perform the overdue communication.
  • the current status of the register can be requested from the data center in order to check the size of the remaining credit or to obtain further statistical data on the use of the K-th franking machine FM K.
  • this transmission is to be protected in the same way as the remote value specification itself. This is done, for example, by encrypting the message with the DES key.
  • the data center can then possibly transmit to the K-th postage meter FM K the message that it is no longer suspicious.
  • the K-th franking machine FM K goes into the suspicion mode. This means that it has to be checked on-site within a limited time, when subsequently no communication between the data center and the franking machine is performed.
  • V susp1 ⁇ 5 OK V susp1 5..100 suspicous V susp1 > 100 manipulated
  • a corresponding suspicious mode can only be activated by the data center, with no direct effects on the postage meter machine.
  • the individual transactions with encrypted messages are performed one after the other.
  • the franking machine After entering the identification number (ID No.) and the intended input parameters, the franking machine checks whether a MODEM is connected and ready for operation. If this is not the case, it is indicated that the transaction request must be repeated. Otherwise, the postage meter reads the dialing parameters consisting of the dial out parameters (main / extension, etc.) and the Telephone number from the NVRAM memory area N and sends them with an election request command to the modem 23. Then the required connection for communication via the MODEM 23 with the data center.
  • the encrypted opening message is transmitted to the data center.
  • the postage number for the notice of the caller i. the postage meter, at the data center included.
  • the transmission of the encrypted register data to the data center takes place.
  • This opening message is checked for plausibility in the data center, and the franking machine is identified and evaluated for errors.
  • the data center recognizes which request the franking machine has made and sends a reply message to the franking machine as a header.
  • a header has been received, ie the franking machine has received an OK message, the header parameters are checked with regard to a change of telephone number. If an encrypted parameter has been transmitted, there is no telephone number change and a start message is sent encrypted from the postage meter machine to the data center. If the reception of proper data is detected there, the data center begins to perform a transaction. In the above example, new postage credit data is encrypted and transmitted to the postage meter, which receives and stores this transaction data. In another variant, it is provided that the franking machine is transferred back to the normal mode with each successful communication from the suspicion mode.
  • the status of the franking machine is again determined in the data center on the basis of the new transferred register values.
  • the mailing authority or the institute responsible for the check is sent the associated postage meter serial number.
  • the occurrence of the letters or mailpieces franked by this suspect franking machine are monitored if the letters or mail pieces have a machine-readable address of the sender or the franking machine serial number.
  • the occurrence of the franked by this suspect franking machine letters is monitored by the number and / or value sum in the time interval, for example, counted from 90 days and compared with the credit value that was present in the postage meter since the last recharge.
  • a special character is activated after acceptance of the suspicion mode by the K-th franking machine FM K and printed at a predetermined position in the franking imprint.
  • this character can be a cluster of printed pixels or a barcode, eg to the right of the field FE9 ( FIG. 3a ) is printed.
  • the postal authority When checking the franking imprint, the postal authority immediately receives the indication that this franking machine is suspicious. The postal authority can then carry out a check of the franking of the mail piece and, if the suspicion is confirmed, for example, an inspection of the K-th franking machine FM K on site.
  • a random check is carried out for randomly selected mailpieces or senders.
  • the security impression is evaluated in cooperation with the data center.
  • About the data connection H franking machine data are queried, which are stored in the data center and are not printed on the mail piece open.
  • the impression of any randomly selected mail item is examined for manipulation. After collecting all symbols of a symbol series and converting them into data, they can be decrypted with the appropriate DES key. As a result, the COMBI number is available, from which the sizes, in particular the sum of all franking values and the current postage value are split off.
  • the split size of the postage G3 is compared with the actually printed postage value G3 '.
  • the split-off variable G4 ie the sum value of all franking values which have been carried out since the last reloading, is subjected to a monotonic test by means of data of the last detected variable G4 '.
  • the last detected quantity G4 ' is the total value of all previously made frankings stored in the data center at the last remote inquiry of the register statuses.
  • the counterfeiting of the franking machine serial number can be recognized by means of the marking by separating and checking the size G0 after decryption from the KOMBI number.
  • the value W is compared with a fixed threshold, which is not exceeded during normal use of the franking machine. If exceeded, suspicion is near.
  • the serial number can also be printed out as a barcode.
  • all other information is presented in a different manner according to the invention, because a bar code may take up considerable space or force the franking machine imprint to increase in the postage meter image, depending on the amount of information encoded, or not all information in the bar code imprint can be reproduced.
  • a particularly compact impression consisting of special graphic symbols.
  • An identifier formed, for example, from symbols to be printed can before, behind, under u./o. be printed over a field within the actual franking stamp imprint. In accordance with the invention, this is a man-made, as well as machine-readable mark.
  • a letter envelope 17 transported under the printer module 1 is printed with a postage meter stamp image.
  • the marking field is here in a manner advantageous for an evaluation in a row below the fields for the value stamp, for the day stamp, for the advertising cliché and, if necessary, in the field for the optional print supplement of the postage meter stamp image.
  • the marking field is located here in a window FE 6 arranged under the day stamp within the franking machine print image.
  • the stamp containing the post value in a first window FE 1, the machine serial number in a second and third windows FE 2 and FE 3 optionally has a reference field in one Window FE 7 and, if necessary, an indication of the number of the advertising cliché in a window FE 9.
  • the reference field serves for pre-synchronization for the reading of the graphic character string and for obtaining a reference value for the light / dark threshold in the case of a machine evaluation.
  • a pre-synchronization for the reading of the graphic string is also achieved by and / or in conjunction with the frame, in particular the postage stamp or value stamp.
  • the fourth window FE 4 in the day stamp contains the current or, in special cases, pre-dated date.
  • a fifth window FE 5 is provided in the advertising cliché for an editable advertising cliche text part.
  • FIG. 3b From the FIG. 3b is the representation of a security impression with a check box in the columns between the value stamp and the day stamp can be seen, wherein the upstream vertical part of the frame of the value stamp of the Vorsynchronisation and possibly serves as a reference field. This eliminates a separate window FE7.
  • the marking data can be detected in this variant with a vertical arrangement of the symbol series in a shorter time almost simultaneously.
  • the printing speed can be increased because fewer windows are to be embedded in the frame data before printing and thus the formation of marking data can start earlier.
  • the marking field FE 6 the marking data, which are generated on the basis of at least the post value and such a time count, are as follows FIG. 10 explained - already sufficient.
  • FIG. 3e In a fifth security print example, two more checkboxes are placed in the postmark below and above the FE 1 window for the postal value.
  • the marking field which is arranged in the postmark above the window FE 1 for the postal value, has a barcode.
  • the postage value can be communicated unencrypted but in a machine-readable form. A comparison of the encrypted and the unencrypted information can, since both are machine-readable, be carried out fully automatically.
  • a symbol series can be either two lines or in the form of a combination of the in the FIGS. 3a to 3e shown variants.
  • the marking form is freely compatible with any postal authority. Any general change of the marking image or the arrangement of the marking field is easily possible because of the electronic printing principle.
  • the arrangement for the rapid generation of a security impression for franking machines allows a fully electronically generated franking image, which was formed by the microprocessor-controlled printing process from fixed data and current data, to be set.
  • the data for the constant parts of the franking image which relate to at least part of the fixed data are stored in a first memory area A i and by an associated address and the data for the variable parts of the franking image are in a second memory area B j or for marking data stored in a memory area B k and identified by an associated address.
  • At predetermined intervals for example regularly with each inspection of the franking machine, can also be a change or replacement of - in the FIG. 3f - Set of symbols are made in order to further increase the security against counterfeiting.
  • FIG. 3f For example, an illustration of a set of icons for a marker box is shown, with the icons appropriately shaped to allow both machine and visual evaluation by trained post office personnel.
  • space is saved with a higher information density compared with a bar code when printing the symbols. It suffices to distinguish between 10 degrees of blackening in order, for example, to achieve a shorter length in the representation of the information by about a factor of three compared with the ZIP-CODE. This results in ten symbols, with a blackening of 10% each. When reduced to five symbols, the degree of blackening may differ by 20%, but it is necessary to considerably increase the number of symbol fields to be printed if the same information as that in the FIG. 3f displayed symbol set to be played. Even a sentence with a higher number of symbols is conceivable.
  • Safety-pressure evaluation device 29 for manual identification shown has a computer 26 with a suitable program in memory 28, input and output means 25 and 27.
  • the evaluation device 29 used by the respective postal authority is associated with a - in the FIG. 2 shown - data center DZ via a communication line H in combination.
  • FIG. 4c shows a partial step for marking symbol recognition, which is used for an automatic input, in accordance with a - in the FIG. 4d explained in more detail - safety footprint evaluation method is required.
  • the marker field is located at least under a field of the postage meter stamp image, and a series of such symbols are printed below and simultaneously with the postage stamp impression.
  • the check box can also be different - such as in the FIG. 3b Shown - may be arranged, in each case corresponding transport devices are provided for the mail piece, when the image sensor, such as the CCD line scan camera is immovably disposed.
  • An Indian FIG. 4b illustrated marker reader 24 may for example also be designed as a guided in a guide, reading pin.
  • the apparatus preferably comprises a CCD line camera 241, a comparator 242 connected to the CCD line camera 241 and a D / A converter 243, and an encoder 244 for detecting the stepwise movement.
  • the data input of the D / A converter 243 for digital data and the outputs of the comparator 242 and encoder 244 are connected to an input / output unit 245. This is a standard interface to the input means 25 of the security impression evaluation device 29.
  • the automatic identification of the symbols in the marking can take place in two variants: a) via the integrally measured degree of blackening of each symbol or b) via edge recognition for symbols.
  • the orthogonal edges of the symbol set after FIG. 3 allow a particularly simple and with little effort to implement automatic detection method.
  • the recognition device contains a CCD line scan camera of medium resolution, for example 256 pixels. With a suitable lens, the height of the symbol row is mapped to the 256 pixels of the line scan camera. The respective symbol field is now scanned column by column starting from left to right with the right column beginning.
  • the line scan camera is preferably arranged stationary and the letter is led away under the line scan camera by uniform motor drive. Since the row of symbols within the franking imprint is always positioned in the same place according to an agreement once made, and the Franking imprint is in turn positioned by existing postal regulations on the envelope, the leadership of the envelope to a fixed edge of the recognition device is sufficient.
  • the CCD line scan camera determines the contrast value of the pixels belonging to the column for each column.
  • the output of the CCD line scan camera is connected to a comparator, which assigns the binary data 1 and 0 to the pixels by means of threshold value comparison.
  • the threshold is guided to a reference field FE 7, which consists of a series of bars and is arranged at the level of the symbol row and in front of it.
  • the threshold value is defined as the mean value of the light and dark stripes of the reference field.
  • the scanning of the reference field is performed either with an additional sensor (e.g., a phototransistor) or with the CCD line scan itself.
  • the measured values of the line scan camera A / D must be displayed, the threshold value must be formed from this in a computer connected via a standard interface and fed to the comparator via a D / A converter.
  • Newer CCD line scan cameras have integrated the comparator, with its threshold controlled directly from the computer with a digital value.
  • this abovementioned first number corresponding to the sum value of frankings together with the second number, relating to the piece number data at the time of the last recharging, forms a monotone, continuously variable variable.
  • a postage meter can after switching on and their initialization several states (communication mode, test mode, franking mode, etc. modes), which, for example, in the application P 43 44 476.8 in the German Offenlegungsschriften DE 42 17 830 A1 and DE 42 17 830 A1 were described in more detail.
  • the input of the cost center in step 41 automatically enters the last currently stored window and frame data and in step 42 a corresponding display.
  • relevant memory areas C, D, E of the non-volatile main memory 5 are queried with regard to a set allocation of window and frame data or cost center.
  • a cliche text part which is assigned to a specific advertising cliché, can also be automatically specified.
  • Step 54 for embedding decompressed semivariable type-1 window data in the decompressed frame data after re-input or after editing of this type-1 window data is shown in detail.
  • the data of records called up according to the input are evaluated to detect control codes for a "color change" and a "column end", respectively, which are required for embedding the newly entered window data.
  • those data which are not control codes are decompressed into binary window pixel data and embedded in the pixel memory area I column by column.
  • step 45 the new type 2 coded window data is formed.
  • the tag data for a window FE6 is generated here, with previous steps of encrypting data to generate a crypto number included.
  • a shaping is also provided as bar code and / or symbol chain. Based on FIG. 10 In two variants, the formation of new coded window data of type 2 for a marker image is explained.
  • window data of type 2 are, for example, the postage- and forwarding-dependent postage value to be printed and / or the constantly changing marking.
  • a letter envelope 17 is under the printing module 1 of an electronic postage meter at the speed v is moved in the direction of the arrow and printed in the column s 1 starting grid-like columns with the postage value image shown.
  • the printer module 1 has, for example, a pressure bar 16 with a series of pressure elements d1 to d240.
  • the inkjet, or a thermal transfer printing principle for example, the ETR printing principle (Electroresistive Termal Transfer Ribbon) can be used.
  • control code "00" for color change can theoretically be omitted, since with a single hexadecimal number "F0" an entire pressure column of 240 dots with the same color can be completely defined. Nevertheless, with only a small number of additional memory requirements, a change of color can make sense for several windows in a column.
  • This method yields a data set for the pressure column s f in the form shown in detail: ... "2", “0D”, “02”, “4F”, “F1”, “68”, “FE”, ..., ...
  • FIG. 8 A representation of the window characteristic values related to a pixel memory image and stored separately therefrom is shown for a first window FE1.
  • FIG. 9a It shows the decoding of the control codes, decompression and loading of the fixed frame data as well as the formation and storage of the window characteristics.
  • the source address H i for frame data is incremented and a color change is made, so that the initial data byte is evaluated, for example, as colored, which later leads to correspondingly activated printing elements.
  • sub-step 4314 a control character "00" is recognized for a color change, resulting in a color change after branching back to the sub-step 4312, ie the next run-length-coded hexadecimal number causes inactivation of the printing elements corresponding to Run length. Otherwise, it is determined in sub-step 4315 whether there is a control character "FF" for the end of the picture. If such is detected, the point d is corresponding to the Figures 5 or 6 reached and processed the step 43.
  • FIG. 9b the embedding of decompressed current window data of type 1 into the decompressed frame data after the start of the franking machine or after the editing of frame data is shown.
  • a control character for type 1 window has been detected in sub-step 4318, the point c 1 is reached, and thus the beginning of step 43b.
  • the previous window source address U j is incremented and a color change is performed, so that any window bytes loaded in the subsequent sub-step 4334 are evaluated as colored, which subsequently leads to activated printing elements during the printing.
  • sub-step 4334 one byte from the sub-memory areas B j in the non-volatile main memory 5 is loaded into register 200 of the volatile main memory 7 a, thereby detecting for control characters.
  • sub-step 4335 the window column run length Y j is incremented by the value of the window column run-length variable W j .
  • sub-step 4336 it is determined whether there is a control character "00" for color change. If such has been detected, the program branches back to sub-step 4333. Otherwise, it is examined in sub-step 4337 whether there is a control character "FE" for the end of the column. If this is not the case, window data is available.
  • a sub-step 4338 the content of the register 200 is decoded with the aid of the character memory 9 and the binary window pixel data corresponding to that byte is stored in the pixel memory area I of the pixel memory 7c.
  • sub-step 4340 in which increments the window column variable T j and the volatile memory 7b saved window column variable T j, and the window column run length Y j overwritten with the current value are. Subsequently, a color change is performed in the sub-step 4341 and the point b is reached.
  • Fig. 3 illustrates the embedding of decompressed variable window data of type 1 into the decompressed frame data after editing of this type 1 window data.
  • pixel memory data and window characteristics have already been stored prior to the beginning of step 54.
  • Sub-step 5440 begins by determining the number n 'of windows for which the data has been changed and determining the associated window start address Z j and window column variable T j for each window F Ej.
  • a window count variable q is set equal to zero.
  • the source address U j is set to an initial value U oj -1, the destination address Z j used to address the pixel memory area I, a window column counter P j and the second color flip-flop set back to the initial value zero.
  • sub-step 5449 is called branches, in which the window column counter P j is incremented.
  • sub-step 5450 it is examined whether the window characteristic value for the associated window column variable T j is reached by the window column counter P j . Then, for a first changed window, all change data would be loaded into the pixel memory area I and branched back to sub-step 5453 and from there to sub-step 5441 to transfer change data into the pixel memory area I for a possibly second window.
  • the window count variable q is incremented for this purpose and the subsequent window start address Z j + 1 and the following window column variable T j + 1 are determined.
  • sub-step 5451 for this purpose, the destination address for the data in the pixel memory area I is incremented by the frame total column length R. The destination address V j is thus set to the next column for binary pixel data of the window in the pixel memory area I.
  • sub-step 5452 the color flip-flop is reset to zero to begin conversion with pixel data evaluated as colored.
  • step 44 If no further new input is determined in step 44, the formation of new coded window data of type 2 for a marking image, in particular according to a first variant with a step 45a, can now take place in step 45.
  • the step 45 includes further - in the FIG. 10 illustrated sub-steps for forming new coded window data of type 2 for a marker image.
  • step 44 in step 45 the output data for the data records containing the compressed data are again required for the windows FEj and possibly for the frame data to generate new coded window data of type 2 for a Make markup symbol array.
  • the individual output data (or input data) are stored in accordance with the respective quantities G w in the memory areas ST W as a BCD-packed number.
  • the data for a data record for window FEk of type 2 are now assembled in several steps and stored non-volatilely in a sub-memory area B k .
  • the steadily monotonically decreasing size is a numerical value corresponding to the next inspection date (INS) and a continuously monotonically decreasing time-dependent variable.
  • a steadily monotonically increasing quantity includes the date or the number of pieces determined during the last inspection.
  • a second variant with a step 45b in addition to the step 45a differs from the first variant by other output variables or input quantities that are to be considered equally.
  • a marker symbol series are successively generated in two steps 45b and 45a, the step 45b being carried out analogously to step 45a.
  • step 45 is checked If a flag has been set to cause the sub-steps 45b and / or 45a to be performed, a second combination number KOZ2 having at least the other part of the size G0, G1 characterizing the user of the franking machine is then formed in the sub-step 45b encrypted second crypto KRZ2 and then converted into at least one second marker symbol series MSR2 based on a second set SSY2 of symbols.
  • sub-step 455 is compared to the sub-step 451 a combination number KOZ2 formed, in which case in particular the sizes for other parts of the serial number, for advertising cliché (frame) number u.a. Sizes can go down.
  • sub-step 456 as in sub-step 452, a crypto-number KOZ2 is formed.
  • sub-step 457 the transformation then takes place again into a marker symbol series, which is temporarily stored in sub-step 458.
  • sub-step 45a comprising sub-steps 451 to 453 takes place. This may optionally be connected by a sub-step 454. Subsequently, the point c 3 is reached.
  • a different encryption algorithm than the DES is used for saving time in the sub-step 456.
  • a transformation is carried out in sub-step 453 of the first variant or in sub-step 457 of the second variant to additionally increase the information density of the marker symbol series compared to the crypto-number KRZ1 or KRZ2.
  • KRZ1 or KRZ2 For example, with a crypto number of 16 digits, a set of 22 symbols is now used to store the information using only 12 digits - in the FIG. 3b apparent way - to map. For two kryto numbers, the marker symbol row shown there must be doubled. This can be done by means of a to - in FIG. 3b shown - mark symbol series parallel other marker symbol sequence done.
  • step 46 of FIG. 5 explained.
  • window characteristics Z k and T k are specified for changed window data, the window change number p 'is determined, and a window count variable q is set equal to zero.
  • window count variable q is set equal to the window change number p '. Then the point d 3 and thus the next step 47 would already be reached.
  • this path is not regularly entered at the beginning because the monotonically increasing size constantly generates new marker symbol rows for each impression.
  • the program branches to sub-step 4662 to enter window parameters corresponding to the changed windows and set initial conditions.
  • a new source address for the data of the record of the currently processed window FEk is generated to load in the next sub-step 4664 a byte of the coded window data of type 2 from the memory area B k in registers of the nonvolatile memory 7a and to detect control characters ,
  • a sub-step 4665 the window column run length Y k then becomes the window column run length variable W k incremented, which is still zero here. Thereafter, control characters for color changes are examined (sub-step 4666) and, if necessary, branched back to sub-step 4663 or searched for control characters column end (sub-step 4667). If successful, the sub-step 4669 is branched and the window column counter P k is incremented. Otherwise, in the next sub-step 4668 a decoding of the control code and conversion of the called byte into decompressed binary window pixel data of type 2 is to be carried out.
  • Sub-step 4670 then checks whether all columns of the window have been processed. If this is the case, a branch is made to the sub-step 4671 and the column run length Y k of the window FEk is stored in the memory 7b and branched back to the sub-step 4673. If it is detected in sub-step 4670 that not all the columns have yet been processed, branching back to sub-step 4663 via sub-step 4672, whereby the window characteristic value Y k and the color flip-flop are set back to zero. In the next sub-step 4668, a decoding of the control code and an implementation of the called byte into decompressed binary window pixel data of type 2 may then be performed again.
  • the pressure column has N pressure elements.
  • a sub-step 481 the register 15 of the printer controller 14 is serially loaded bit by bit from the area I of the pixel memory 7c with binary print gap data called with the address Z and the window counter h is set to a number which is the number of windows increased by one p corresponds.
  • a window counter h is decremented, which successively outputs window numbers k, whereupon in sub-step 483 the address Z reached in the pixel memory is compared with the window start address Z k of the window FE k . If the comparison is positive and a window start address is reached, the process branches to sub-step 489, which in turn consists of sub-steps 4891 to 4895. Otherwise, a branch is made to sub-step 484.
  • sub-step 4891 a first bit from region II of pixel memory 7c for window FE k is serially loaded into register 15, the sub-step 4892 increments address Z and bit count variable 1 and decrements window bit count X k .
  • a sub-step 4893 if not all bits corresponding to the window column run length Y k have been loaded, further bits are loaded from area II. Otherwise, a branch is made to the sub-step 4894, wherein the window start address Z k for addressing the next Window column correspondingly increased by the total length R and the window column counter P k is decremented. At the same time, the original window bit count length X k corresponding to the window column run length Y k is restored.
  • Sub-step 4895 then checks whether all window columns have been processed. If this is the case, then the starting address Z k for the corresponding window FE k is set to zero or an address which lies outside of the pixel memory area I. Otherwise, and after the sub-step 4896, a branch is made to the point e 1 .
  • sub-step 484 it is checked whether all window start addresses have been queried. If this is done, then the sub-step 485 is branched to increment the current address Z. If this has not yet occurred, the system branches back to sub-step 481 in order to further decrement window counter h until the next window start address is found or until sub-step 484 causes window counter h to become zero.
  • Step 50 determines whether all the pixel data of the pixel storage areas I and II have been printed out, that is, the mailpiece has been fully franked. If that is the case, then the point f 1 is reached. Otherwise it will be on the sub-step 501 branches and the bit count variable 1 is reset to zero, after which branch back to the point e 1 . Now the next pressure column can be created.
  • an already - in connection with the FIG. 7 - Explained color change in the evaluation of the type 2 window pixel data to be converted, so that the first hexadecimal data of the retrieved record are evaluated as colored, for example.
  • the source address is incremented.
  • sub-step 4993 branch back to sub-step 4991 to perform the color change. Otherwise, the system branches to sub-step 4994.
  • sub-step 4994 it is determined whether a control code "column end" exists. If this is not the case, then the register contents must be decoded and decompressed.
  • the character memory (CSP) 9 contains a series of binary pixel data which can be correspondingly retrieved on the basis of the hexadecimal number loaded in the volatile main memory 7a. This is done in sub-step 4995, and then the decompressed window pixel data for a column of windows FE j of type 2 are loaded serially into the print register 15 of the printer controller 14.
  • sub-step 4996 the address is then incremented and a corresponding next hexadecimal number is selected in the data set stored in non-volatile random access memory 5 in sub-area B 5 , as well as the bits converted in decoding the run-length encoding to form a window column run-length variable W j with which the destination address is incremented.
  • W j the new destination address for the reading is generated. and it may be branched back to sub-step 4991.
  • sub-steps 4997 to 4999 follow, and then branch back to point e 2 .
  • the sub-steps 4998 and 4999 run similar to the - in the FIG. 12 shown - sub-steps 4895 and 4894.
  • Sub-step 497 prints the finished loaded print column.
  • Sub-steps 491 to 497 are similar to those in the FIG. 12 shown - sub-steps 481-487.
  • a printer module applies a fully electronically generated franking image to a mail piece, corresponding to the current inputs or data made via an input means and an input / output control module, which can be checked by a display unit ,
  • the data for the constant parts of the franking image which concern at least the frame of an advertising cliché, are stored in a first memory area A i of the program memory 11, that the nonvolatile memory 5 has a plurality of memory areas and that the data for the variable or ., semivariable parts of the franking image are stored in second memory areas B k and B j of the nonvolatile memory 5.
  • the selectable cost center numbers for the cost centers are in a third memory area C of the non-volatile memory 5, the name of the Manyklischeerrahmen assigned.
  • the name of the ad frame is equivalent to ad frame number WRN.
  • variable window data is embedded from the second memory area B k for the mark data during printing, with embedding during loading of the print register 15 he follows.
  • Step 47 may be preceded by an additional step 61 in order to branch to a standby mode (step 62) in step 61 if a missing print request is detected, for example the current time and / or display the date and / or perform error checks automatically. From the standby mode 62 is branched back to the starting step 40 directly or indirectly via further steps or modes.
  • step 45 may be placed between steps 53 and 54.
  • step 54 the data of a data set for the marking symbol series are then embedded in the remaining pixel data of the pixel memory area I after they have been decompressed. Another pixel storage area is not required.
  • Another opposite variant stores only the frame pixel data in the pixel memory area and embeds all the window pixel data equally into the corresponding columns read into the print register 15, without requiring a pixel memory for window data therebetween.
  • memory areas D and E can be dispensed with.
  • the immutable image information for a finished cliche is stored in a read-only memory (ROM), e.g. in the program memory 11.
  • ROM read-only memory
  • the decoding of the invariable image information is accessed on the read-only memory 11, wherein the caching of cliché parts can be omitted.
  • the program memory 11 is connected to the control device 6, the data for the constant parts of the franking image, which relate to at least one advertising cliche frame, being stored in a first memory area A i .
  • An assigned name identifies the ad frame.
  • the non-volatile main memory 5 is connected to the control device 6, wherein the data for the semivariable parts of the Franking image in the second memory area B j are stored and an associated name indicates the semivariable part.
  • a first assignment of the names of the semivariable parts to the names of the constant parts is according to the stored program.
  • a second assignment is made in accordance with the cost center number stored in a third memory area C, so that optionally each cost center KST is assigned an advertising cliché.
  • a microprocessor is provided in the controller 6 for encryption to tag pixel image data prior to its columnar embedding into the remaining pixel image data. Therefore, a volatile memory 7, a printer controller 14 is connected to the microprocessor with pressure register 15, with which, under the control of the microprocessor according to a program stored in the program memory 11, the marker pixel image data is inserted into the remaining fixed and variable pixel image data during printing.

Claims (13)

  1. Procédé de contrôle d'une impression de sécurité dans un bureau de poste ou autre institution similaire. Ledit procédé consiste à :
    - Déterminer la durée tk, n+1 probable jusqu'au prochain rechargement de l'avoir dans une centrale de données éloignée sur la base d'une consommation moyenne en ports déterminée d'un utilisateur de machine à affranchir le courrier et à partir de la hauteur d'un dernier rechargement d'avoir de l'utilisateur de la machine à affranchir le courrier,
    - Recevoir un message au bureau de poste que la machine à affranchir est considérée comme suspecte par une centrale de données éloignée. Les machines à affranchir sont celles qui n'ont depuis longtemps rechargées aucun avoir ou qui n'ont plus répondues à la centrale de données,
    - Contrôler l'affranchissement des articles postaux des machines d'affranchissement suspectes en reconnaissant y compris d'autres manipulations de données enregistrées et/ou calculées dans la centrale de données.
  2. Procédé selon la revendication 1, consistant à déterminer la durée tk, n+1 probable jusqu'au prochain rechargement de l'avoir sur la base d'une consommation moyenne en ports Pk déterminée de l'utilisateur de la machine à affranchir le courrier K et à partir de la hauteur de son dernier rechargement d'avoir GK,n selon la formule : t K , n + 1 = G K , n P K * 1 + 1 / ß
    Figure imgb0025
    avec le terme (1 + 1/β) pour comparer les variations normales de la consommation de ports.
  3. Procédé selon la revendication 1, caractérisé en ce que pour l'utilisateur K sur la base de la consommation moyenne de ports PK déterminée, ledit utilisateur est classé dans une des trois classes de consommation A, B et C, lesquelles sont classées respectivement selon un temps de consommation typique tA, tB, tC, afin de calculer la durée tK,n+1 moyenne jusqu'au prochain rechargement d'avoir.
  4. Procédé selon la revendication 1, caractérisé en ce que la durée tK,n+1 moyenne est calculée jusqu'au prochain rechargement de l'avoir selon la formule suivante : t K , n + 1 = G K , n + 1 + R ⁢ 1 * α x * 1 / P K
    Figure imgb0026
    avec l'avoir de rechargement souhaité GK,n+1, lequel est rechargé dans la machine à affranchir le courrier, avec le restant R1 disponible dans la machine à affranchir le courrier, avec la consommation moyenne de ports PK déterminée pour l'utilisateur K sur cette base et avec le facteur de disposition αx, en fonction du classement de l'utilisateur de la machine à affranchir le client comme client A, B ou C.
  5. Procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1 à 4, caractérisé en ce que la durée tK,n+1 moyenne est calculée jusq'au prochain rechargement d'avoir dans la centrale de données DZ éloignée et dans la machine à affranchir le courrier, afin de produire un signal disant que la machine à affranchir le courrier est considérée comme suspecte par une centrale de données éloignée.
  6. Procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1 à 5, caractérisé en ce que la machine à affranchir le courrier de la centrale de données transmet des valeurs de repère avant le rechargement d'avoirs durant une communication via une liaison de transmission L et, du côté de la centrale de données, le comportement de l'utilisateur de la machine à affranchir le courrier est sous surveillance sur la base d'autres données transmises durant la communication, afin de déterminer les machines à affranchir le courrier suspectes et d'établir un profil de la machine à affranchir le courrier. Un report au moins d'une inspection sur place de la machine à affranchir le courrier est effectué par une communication régulière de la machine à affranchir le courrier avec une centrale de données éloignée.
  7. Procédé selon la revendication 6, caractérisé en ce qu'en utilisant des données extraites spécifiques à la machine à affranchir le courrier, comme le nombre d'affranchissements effectués, ou toutes les impressions (valeurs de registre R4 ou R8) ou une valeur d'affranchissement minimale, les machines d'affranchissement suspectes sont décelées, selon les formules : V susp ⁢ 1 = R ⁢ 4 R ⁢ 3 - R ⁢ 1 * F min = R ⁢ 4 R ⁢ 2 * F min
    Figure imgb0027
    et pour R1alt ≠ R1, afin de vérifier la modification, en plus : V susp ⁢ 2 = R ⁢ 4 - R ⁢ 4 ⁢ alt R ⁢ 1 ⁢ alt - R ⁢ 1 * F min
    Figure imgb0028
     avec
    R1 : Valeur d'interrogation lors de la n-ème indication de la valeur
    R1neu : Valeur d'interrogation avant la (n+1)-ème indication de la valeur à distance d'un avoir de rechargement
    Vsusp : Valeur heuristique, des renseignements sur l'état de la machine à affranchir le courrier donnent
    Fmin : Un tarif d'affranchissement minimal.
  8. Procédé selon la revendication 7, caractérisé en ce qu'au moins deux étapes sont différenciées en utilisant des données extraites spécifiques à la machine à affranchir le courrier, dans le mode de suspicion :
    Etape 1 : La machine à affranchir est suspecte ou
    Etape 2 : La machine à affranchir a été manipulée.
  9. Procédé selon la revendication 5, caractérisé en ce qu'un message est produit. La machine à affranchir le courrier est considérée comme suspecte par une centrale de données éloignée, dans laquelle la machine à affranchir le courrier active un signal special en raison d'un calcul propre ou un message via une centrale de données et imprime à une place prédéterminée dans une impression d'affranchissement.
  10. Procédé selon la revendication 9, caractérisé en ce que le signe spécial est un cluster en pixels imprimés ou un code barres ou une information dans une suite de symboles de marques, par lesquelles il est indiqué, lors du contrôle de l'impression d'affranchissement, que cette machine à affranchir le courrier est suspecte ainsi que le bureau de poste procède à une vérification de l'article postal et, si le doute s'accentue fait effectuer par exemple une inspection de la K-ème machine à affranchir la machine FMK sur place.
  11. Procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 5, 9 et 10, caractérisé en ce que l'information du mode de suspicion est imprimée en plus sous une forme cryptique ou un quatrième chiffre servant de base est fixé sur une valeur spéciale dans une suite de symboles de marques, permettant le contrôle du numéro de série.
  12. Procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1 et 5, caractérisé en ce que pour vérifier une impression de sécurité dans un bureau de poste ou dans une institution similaire, les étapes suivantes sont effectuées :
    - la machine à affranchir transmet ses valeurs de registre à la centrale de données en vue d'un contrôle,
    - déterminer le moment précis de la prochaine communication par la centrale de données et/ou la machine à affranchir le courrier,
    - la centrale de données vérifie les moments de suspicion et le signale à la machine à affranchir le courrier ou déclenche sur place un contrôle qui n'était pas prévu de la machine à affranchir le courrier,
    - la machine à affranchir le courrier est classée suspecte après un contrôle effectué par le bureau de poste compétent ou un institut d'essai mandaté à cet effet sur la base d'un contrôle d'essai visuel ou sur la base d'une information de la centrale de données,
    - exploitation des signes spéciaux supplémentaires compris dans l'impression de sécurité ou du manque de ce type de signe spéciaux si la machine à affranchir le courrier constate elle-même une manipulation,
    - recherche du réel expéditeur en cas d'une manipulation.
  13. Procédé selon la revendication 12, caractérisé en ce qu'une caméra CCD détermine pour chaque colonne la valeur de contraste des pixels appartenant aux colonnes avant la vérification en vue de l'enregistrement de la marque d'une impression de sécurité avec un lecteur de labels (24) raccordé à un système informatique, un moyen de saisie, de sortie et de mémorisation. Ledit procédé consiste à procéder à une comparaison avec une valeur de seuil à l'aide d'un comparateur, afin de classer les pixels avec les données binaires 1 et 0 et d'adapter la valeur de seuil aux facteurs de réflection de la lumière des différentes sortes de papier utilisées pour les enveloppes. Ladite valeur de seuil est déterminée sur la base d'un champ de référence (FE 7), qui comprend une suite de barres et disposé en hauteur de la rangée de symboles et avant celle-ci comme valeur moyenne des bandes claires et sombres du champ de référence.
EP01250022A 1993-12-21 1994-10-19 Procédé et dispositif pour vérifier un motif destiné à la sécurité Expired - Lifetime EP1118964B1 (fr)

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DE4344471A DE4344471A1 (de) 1993-12-21 1993-12-21 Verfahren und Anordnung zur Erzeugung und Überprüfung eines Sicherheitsabdruckes
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DE59410458D1 (de) 2008-10-02
US5712916A (en) 1998-01-27
EP0660270B1 (fr) 2004-12-29
US5970151A (en) 1999-10-19
DE59410399D1 (de) 2005-02-03
US5680463A (en) 1997-10-21
EP0660270A3 (fr) 1995-09-06
EP1118964A1 (fr) 2001-07-25
EP1113403A1 (fr) 2001-07-04
DE4344471A1 (de) 1995-08-17
EP0660270A2 (fr) 1995-06-28
US5991409A (en) 1999-11-23
US5734723A (en) 1998-03-31

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