US20050055312A1 - Software control flow watermarking - Google Patents

Software control flow watermarking Download PDF

Info

Publication number
US20050055312A1
US20050055312A1 US10/920,672 US92067204A US2005055312A1 US 20050055312 A1 US20050055312 A1 US 20050055312A1 US 92067204 A US92067204 A US 92067204A US 2005055312 A1 US2005055312 A1 US 2005055312A1
Authority
US
United States
Prior art keywords
program
watermark
formula
software
value
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Abandoned
Application number
US10/920,672
Inventor
Kelce Wilson
Jason Sattler
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Riverside Research Institute
Original Assignee
Riverside Research Institute
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Riverside Research Institute filed Critical Riverside Research Institute
Priority to US10/920,672 priority Critical patent/US20050055312A1/en
Assigned to RIVERSIDE RESEARCH INSTITUTE reassignment RIVERSIDE RESEARCH INSTITUTE ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: SATTLER, JASON DEAN, WILSON, KELCE STEVEN
Publication of US20050055312A1 publication Critical patent/US20050055312A1/en
Priority to US12/482,552 priority patent/US8661559B2/en
Abandoned legal-status Critical Current

Links

Images

Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/10Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
    • G06F21/16Program or content traceability, e.g. by watermarking

Definitions

  • the present invention relates generally to embedding identifying information into a computer program, and more particularly relates to a method of providing software control flow watermarking.
  • Another solution is to insert additional variables or logic into the program after the primary logic has been validated.
  • the likelihood that removing the watermark may still allow the program to function properly increases.
  • the compiler which converts the source code to object code, may alter the structure of the program, thus removing or altering all or part of the intended watermark.
  • Cloakware Corporation of Ottawa, Canada has an approach to watermarking that uses what is referred to as branch flattening technology.
  • hierarchical program execution is transformed into a minimum number of SWITCH statements and new CASE variables are introduced.
  • the portion of the program executed by each CASE option updates the CASE variable and sends the execution point back through a SWITCH statement via a GOTO point placed just prior to a SWITCH.
  • CASE values are automatically generated by their TransCoder software, and appear to be a series of sequential numbers with an arbitrary initial seed value.
  • FIG. 3 shows software code of the Cloakware TransCoder using sequential coding.
  • the TransCoder program logic flow is controlled by a SWITCH statement.
  • the SWITCH statement in this embodiment is: switch(r_13968) ⁇ case 2135361786: goto L_65_new; case 2135361787: goto L_13952; case 2135361788: goto L_13955; case 2135361789: goto L_97_new; case 2135361790: goto L_13958; ; ⁇
  • An exemplary CASE variable is r — 13968.
  • An exemplary CASE value assigned to a CASE variable is case 2135361786.
  • One object of the present invention is to provide a system and method of watermarking computer software in a manner that is easy for the developer to insert, yet difficult for an attacker to remove.
  • a method of software watermarking which includes obtaining a program for protection, generating at least one watermark value using a formula or process, placing the at least one watermark value in a CASE variable, or in a formula to calculate the watermark value, and assigning corresponding watermark values to the variable used in the SWITCH statement or the variables used to calculate the CASE value.
  • the values themselves are not created by a sequential counting algorithm as in the prior art, but instead are read in from a file containing results of a formula or process.
  • an extension may be added which uses a formula within the SWITCH statement to replace the CASE variable.
  • a further extension may be added which uses an external value such as a password, dongle, biometric data, or internet data in the formula.
  • FIG. 1 is a flow chart illustrating a method of watermarking software in accordance with the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 is a screen shot view of an exemplary embodiment of a graphical user interface used in the present invention for generating at least one watermark value.
  • FIGS. 3A and 3B are software code of a prior art TransCoder program without watermarking as described in the present invention.
  • FIGS. 4A and 4B are a listing of an exemplary embodiment of software code after placing the at least one watermark value in the at least one CASE value, in accordance with the present invention.
  • FIG. 5 is a display of a binary file of software processed in accordance with the present watermarking methods showing inserted watermark values after compilation.
  • FIGS. 6A and 6B are a partial listing of computer software showing an alternate embodiment of the software code of the present invention.
  • FIG. 7 is a flow chart illustrating an alternate embodiment of the present invention.
  • watermark values are the result of a process or function, such as a hash function or an encrypted data stream.
  • This approach can be used to provide a watermark for the software, so long as the watermark values that result from the selected function are not likely to be otherwise valid values of the CASE statement during program execution. That is, if a specific potential watermark value might be a legitimate data value in the program or an already existing CASE variable, then that value, and therefore that function, cannot be used.
  • the primary constraints on the allowable watermark values are that the watermark value should not duplicate other values in the logic flow and that the watermark value does not cause compilation or runtime problems with the compiler.
  • a first method in accordance with the present invention is illustrated.
  • a program or software module to be protected by the present invention is selected (step 100 ).
  • a formula or process that will be used to generate watermark values is also selected (step 105 ).
  • the formula or process of step 105 is selected such that the resulting watermark values will not be readily determined or detected in the final software.
  • the formula or process selected in step 105 is further selected to generate watermark values which are not likely to be used in the normal course of run-time operation in the software. This minimizes the likelihood that the watermark values will effect the actual software operation.
  • the Secure Hash Standard 1 SHA-1 can be applied to a pre-selected alphanumeric string in order to generate the watermark values.
  • the selected formula or process in step 105 is then used to generate at least one watermark value (step 110 ).
  • the resulting watermark values in step 110 are: 3F498006, 25778F89, 6A2EF626, 252A7B1F, 1EBFF326. It will be appreciated that for the formula or process of step 105 , many other hash values, encrypted data stream, or any other hex result chosen by the watermarking party may be used.
  • the watermark values generated in step 110 are then embedded in the software to be protected by placing the watermark value in at least one CASE statement as a CASE value (step 115 ). Since the formula of step 105 was selected to generate watermark values which are not likely to be encountered during execution of the program, the insertion of the watermark as a CASE value is unlikely to adversely effect program execution.
  • the program is compiled to generate an executable file (step 120 ). The integrity of the watermarking process can be verified by evaluating the compiled Hex file to identify the presence of the watermark value (step 125 ).
  • FIG. 2 shows an embodiment of a graphical user interface used in the method for generating at least one watermark value.
  • the watermark values used in this example are the Secure Hash Standard 1 (SHA-1) values of the phrase: “Watermarking test #1 for Cloakware's Transcoder,” which is entered in data entry field 210 .
  • SHA-1 Secure Hash Standard 1
  • the resulting watermark values in step 110 are: 3F498006, 25778F89, 6A2EF626, 252A7B1F, 1EBFF326, as shown in display field 125 .
  • FIG. 3 illustrates a sample source code listing prior to watermarking.
  • FIG. 4 shows software code after placing the at least one watermark value in the at least one CASE value.
  • the TransCoder CASE values of FIG. 3 are substituted with watermark values in accordance with the present invention in FIG. 4 . This is done in this embodiment by post-processing, but may be included as part of the TransCoder process or any other compiler's pre-processing step.
  • the software developer may then ensure that the watermark exists in a binary executable file (step 125 ).
  • a binary file editor can be used to verify the presence of the static watermark values in the program after compilation. Because of the complexity of compilers, not all watermark values may be present in the compiled code, but if enough values are seeded into the source code, a probability can be established that the software is effectually watermarked. Depending on the computer for which the program was compiled, the watermark values may be in reverse-byte order as shown in FIG. 5 .
  • FIG. 6 shows a listing of software code for an alternate embodiment of the present invention.
  • a SWITCH statement evaluates a formula, such as in the form “a+b”, where the variables “a” and “b” of the formula are assigned in a function prior to returning program control to the switch block.
  • FIG. 7 illustrates an alternate embodiment of the present invention.
  • a SWITCH statement evaluates a formula, such as in the form “a+b”, where the variables “a” and “b” of the formula are assigned in a function prior to returning program control to the switch block.
  • the watermark values are generated, they are inserted into a formula such as “a+b” for evaluation by the switch statement (step 130 ).
  • the formula calculates a watermark for insertion into at least one CASE value (step 115 ).
  • An advantage to using a function for evaluating the SWITCH statement is that the formula can calculate the watermark value immediately prior to use. As a result, the watermark values do not appear in a static form in the executable code in more than one location.
  • the formula used to generate the watermark values can use other watermark values as the variables “a” and “b” to further reduce the likelihood that tampering will eliminate all embedded watermark values. The watermark values generated in this case are only visible during a dynamic analysis of the software.
  • the variables “a” and “b” 610 have been inserted with an exemplary formula of “a+b” within the SWITCH statement, replacing the variable r — 13968 ( 410 in FIG. 4 ) with a watermark value.
  • This formula can be simpler than the formula or process such as SHA-1.
  • the formula “a+b” for example, the proper CASE value is determined.
  • the use of addition as the selected formula in 610 is only one of many potential formulas that can be used in this process.
  • a watermark value in the formula itself reduces the number of times each part of the watermark appears in the binary file, improving stealthiness and reducing the likelihood that the program will be tampered with. Also, since a formula is used in this embodiment, rather than assignment, multiple watermark values can be used in each CASE branch, one as the expected result and one or more as inputs to the evaluation. This approach further increases tamper resistance since multiple values must be removed simultaneously to remove the watermark which makes it difficult for a tampering party to preserve logic flow.
  • a further extension to the use of a formula to calculate a watermark value is to use an externally provided value, such as a password, biometric data, internet data or dongle for insertion into the formula.
  • an externally provided value such as a password, biometric data, internet data or dongle for insertion into the formula.
  • the value of “a” can be provided during software development by the watermarking party and the value of “b” can be provided to the authorized user or purchaser of the protected software.
  • the user may be prompted to enter the authentication data for variable b. If this value is not correctly input at run-time of the software or is not provided, the software program will stop execution. This will deter any unauthorized use of the program.
  • the present watermark is embedded into the software executable file making it difficult to remove or bypass.
  • the watermark values generated in accordance with the present invention are preferably implemented in a manner that generally survives the compilation process.
  • One method to accomplish this objective is to embed the watermark values in sections of the source code that a compiler is not likely to eliminate or significantly modify during optimization.
  • a normal GOTO statement using labels employs tokens that the compiler has the option of replacing.
  • the present invention may perform a calculation that the compiler does not believe it has the option to replace. From the compiler's perspective, the calculation of the control-flow label is a necessary functionality rather than a sequential number. The compiler cannot distinguish the calculation from other program elements, and therefore does not remove it.

Abstract

The present invention is a system and method of software control flow watermarking including the steps of obtaining a program for protection, generating at least one watermark value using a formula or process from an external file, and placing the at least one watermark value in CASE values of the program. The system and method may further include determining the at least one watermark value by a formula with at least one variable. The formula may also contain a variable from outside of the program. The system may also stop the program if the variable from outside of the program is incorrect.

Description

    RELATED APPLICATIONS
  • This application claims priority from U.S. Provisional Application Ser. No. 60/495,858, entitled “Software Control Flow Watermarking,” filed on Aug. 18, 2003, the disclosure of which is hereby incorporated in its entirety by reference.
  • FIELD OF THE INVENTION
  • The present invention relates generally to embedding identifying information into a computer program, and more particularly relates to a method of providing software control flow watermarking.
  • BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
  • Software “piracy” is a significant problem for the computer software industry. As a result, in order to protect the integrity of the authorship and ownership of computer software, and reduce the occurrences of illicit copying, techniques have been developed to track software programs and to disable software that has been modified by an unauthorized user. Techniques for protecting authorship by embedding information into the source code are often referred to as “watermarking.” Techniques to track unauthorized copying by embedding information into the source code are generally referred to as “fingerprinting.”
  • One of the traditional difficulties in watermarking software is in making the watermark an integral part of the program in such a way that it cannot be readily detected and removed. One existing solution to this is to insert identifying marks so thoroughly into the software development plan that tampering efforts are likely to destroy the logic and the reliability of the software itself before the embedded information is fully removed. A problem with this approach is that the watermarking adds to development complexity and could limit the programming style of the individual programmers. Additionally, tying the logic of the program to uniquely identifiable features may introduce errors or “bugs” in the software under development, and changing the watermark to allow fingerprinting can be tedious and prohibitive.
  • Another solution is to insert additional variables or logic into the program after the primary logic has been validated. However, in this case, the likelihood that removing the watermark may still allow the program to function properly increases. Furthermore, the compiler, which converts the source code to object code, may alter the structure of the program, thus removing or altering all or part of the intended watermark.
  • Cloakware Corporation, of Ottawa, Canada has an approach to watermarking that uses what is referred to as branch flattening technology. In this approach, hierarchical program execution is transformed into a minimum number of SWITCH statements and new CASE variables are introduced. The portion of the program executed by each CASE option updates the CASE variable and sends the execution point back through a SWITCH statement via a GOTO point placed just prior to a SWITCH. In the Cloakware approach, CASE values are automatically generated by their TransCoder software, and appear to be a series of sequential numbers with an arbitrary initial seed value.
  • FIG. 3 shows software code of the Cloakware TransCoder using sequential coding. The TransCoder program logic flow is controlled by a SWITCH statement. The SWITCH statement in this embodiment is:
    switch(r_13968)
    {
    case 2135361786:
    goto L_65_new;
    case 2135361787:
    goto L_13952;
    case 2135361788:
    goto L_13955;
    case 2135361789:
    goto L_97_new;
    case 2135361790:
    goto L_13958;
    ;
    }
  • An exemplary CASE variable is r 13968. An exemplary CASE value assigned to a CASE variable is case 2135361786.
  • While this approach is effective, since the CASE values take the form of a predictable sequence of numbers (i.e., sequential), a person interested in disabling this form of watermark can remove it by searching the code for the sequential CASE values.
  • Thus, a problem remains in the art to reliably and effectively insert a watermark or fingerprint into a computer program in a manner that is relatively simple for the designer to implement yet still provides a significant deterrent to potential copiers.
  • SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
  • One object of the present invention is to provide a system and method of watermarking computer software in a manner that is easy for the developer to insert, yet difficult for an attacker to remove.
  • It is another object of the present invention to provide watermarking software wherein the watermarking scheme and watermark values are publishable to software developers without the risk of compromising the integrity of the resulting watermark values.
  • It is another object of the present invention to increase tamper resistance in software.
  • In a first embodiment of the present invention, a method of software watermarking is provided which includes obtaining a program for protection, generating at least one watermark value using a formula or process, placing the at least one watermark value in a CASE variable, or in a formula to calculate the watermark value, and assigning corresponding watermark values to the variable used in the SWITCH statement or the variables used to calculate the CASE value. The values themselves are not created by a sequential counting algorithm as in the prior art, but instead are read in from a file containing results of a formula or process.
  • In an alternate embodiment, an extension may be added which uses a formula within the SWITCH statement to replace the CASE variable. A further extension may be added which uses an external value such as a password, dongle, biometric data, or internet data in the formula.
  • BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
  • FIG. 1 is a flow chart illustrating a method of watermarking software in accordance with the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 is a screen shot view of an exemplary embodiment of a graphical user interface used in the present invention for generating at least one watermark value.
  • FIGS. 3A and 3B are software code of a prior art TransCoder program without watermarking as described in the present invention.
  • FIGS. 4A and 4B are a listing of an exemplary embodiment of software code after placing the at least one watermark value in the at least one CASE value, in accordance with the present invention.
  • FIG. 5 is a display of a binary file of software processed in accordance with the present watermarking methods showing inserted watermark values after compilation.
  • FIGS. 6A and 6B are a partial listing of computer software showing an alternate embodiment of the software code of the present invention.
  • FIG. 7 is a flow chart illustrating an alternate embodiment of the present invention.
  • DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT OF THE INVENTION
  • In the present invention, rather than rely on a detectable series of sequential numbers as watermark values, at least a portion of watermark values are the result of a process or function, such as a hash function or an encrypted data stream. This approach can be used to provide a watermark for the software, so long as the watermark values that result from the selected function are not likely to be otherwise valid values of the CASE statement during program execution. That is, if a specific potential watermark value might be a legitimate data value in the program or an already existing CASE variable, then that value, and therefore that function, cannot be used. Thus, the primary constraints on the allowable watermark values are that the watermark value should not duplicate other values in the logic flow and that the watermark value does not cause compilation or runtime problems with the compiler.
  • Referring to FIG. 1, a first method in accordance with the present invention is illustrated. In this method, a program or software module to be protected by the present invention is selected (step 100). A formula or process that will be used to generate watermark values is also selected (step 105). The formula or process of step 105 is selected such that the resulting watermark values will not be readily determined or detected in the final software. The formula or process selected in step 105 is further selected to generate watermark values which are not likely to be used in the normal course of run-time operation in the software. This minimizes the likelihood that the watermark values will effect the actual software operation. In one embodiment, the Secure Hash Standard 1 (SHA-1) can be applied to a pre-selected alphanumeric string in order to generate the watermark values.
  • The selected formula or process in step 105 is then used to generate at least one watermark value (step 110). For example, if SHA-1 is applied to the arbitrary phrase: “Watermarking test #1 for Cloakware's TransCoder,” the resulting watermark values in step 110 are: 3F498006, 25778F89, 6A2EF626, 252A7B1F, 1EBFF326. It will be appreciated that for the formula or process of step 105, many other hash values, encrypted data stream, or any other hex result chosen by the watermarking party may be used.
  • The watermark values generated in step 110 are then embedded in the software to be protected by placing the watermark value in at least one CASE statement as a CASE value (step 115). Since the formula of step 105 was selected to generate watermark values which are not likely to be encountered during execution of the program, the insertion of the watermark as a CASE value is unlikely to adversely effect program execution. After the watermark values are embedded, the program is compiled to generate an executable file (step 120). The integrity of the watermarking process can be verified by evaluating the compiled Hex file to identify the presence of the watermark value (step 125).
  • FIG. 2 shows an embodiment of a graphical user interface used in the method for generating at least one watermark value. The watermark values used in this example are the Secure Hash Standard 1 (SHA-1) values of the phrase: “Watermarking test #1 for Cloakware's Transcoder,” which is entered in data entry field 210. Of course, it will be appreciated that this is an arbitrary text string selected by the watermarking party. In the example where SHA-1 is used to generate watermark values from this string, the resulting watermark values in step 110 are: 3F498006, 25778F89, 6A2EF626, 252A7B1F, 1EBFF326, as shown in display field 125.
  • FIG. 3 illustrates a sample source code listing prior to watermarking.
  • FIG. 4 shows software code after placing the at least one watermark value in the at least one CASE value. The watermark values are apparent by comparing, for example assignment 310, r 13968=2135361787 in the unwatermarked code with assignment 410, r 13968=OX25778F89 in the watermarked code of FIG. 4.
  • The TransCoder CASE values of FIG. 3 are substituted with watermark values in accordance with the present invention in FIG. 4. This is done in this embodiment by post-processing, but may be included as part of the TransCoder process or any other compiler's pre-processing step.
  • The software developer may then ensure that the watermark exists in a binary executable file (step 125). As shown in FIG. 5, a binary file editor can be used to verify the presence of the static watermark values in the program after compilation. Because of the complexity of compilers, not all watermark values may be present in the compiled code, but if enough values are seeded into the source code, a probability can be established that the software is effectually watermarked. Depending on the computer for which the program was compiled, the watermark values may be in reverse-byte order as shown in FIG. 5.
  • FIG. 6 shows a listing of software code for an alternate embodiment of the present invention. In this alternate embodiment, a SWITCH statement evaluates a formula, such as in the form “a+b”, where the variables “a” and “b” of the formula are assigned in a function prior to returning program control to the switch block.
  • The flowchart of FIG. 7 illustrates an alternate embodiment of the present invention. In this alternate embodiment, a SWITCH statement evaluates a formula, such as in the form “a+b”, where the variables “a” and “b” of the formula are assigned in a function prior to returning program control to the switch block. In this embodiment, after the watermark values are generated, they are inserted into a formula such as “a+b” for evaluation by the switch statement (step 130). The formula calculates a watermark for insertion into at least one CASE value (step 115).
  • An advantage to using a function for evaluating the SWITCH statement is that the formula can calculate the watermark value immediately prior to use. As a result, the watermark values do not appear in a static form in the executable code in more than one location. In an alternate embodiment, the formula used to generate the watermark values can use other watermark values as the variables “a” and “b” to further reduce the likelihood that tampering will eliminate all embedded watermark values. The watermark values generated in this case are only visible during a dynamic analysis of the software.
  • Referring to FIG. 6, the variables “a” and “b” 610 have been inserted with an exemplary formula of “a+b” within the SWITCH statement, replacing the variable r13968 (410 in FIG. 4) with a watermark value. This formula can be simpler than the formula or process such as SHA-1. Note that the previous assignment of the CASE variable r 13968 to 0X6A2EF626 (410 illustrated in FIG. 4) has been replaced by a=0X3F498006 and b=0X2AE57620 (610 in FIG. 6). Using the formula “a+b” for example, the proper CASE value is determined. The use of addition as the selected formula in 610 is only one of many potential formulas that can be used in this process. Also note that the value a=0X3F498006, used in the calculation of 0X6A2EF626, is another watermark value.
  • The use of a watermark value in the formula itself reduces the number of times each part of the watermark appears in the binary file, improving stealthiness and reducing the likelihood that the program will be tampered with. Also, since a formula is used in this embodiment, rather than assignment, multiple watermark values can be used in each CASE branch, one as the expected result and one or more as inputs to the evaluation. This approach further increases tamper resistance since multiple values must be removed simultaneously to remove the watermark which makes it difficult for a tampering party to preserve logic flow.
  • A further extension to the use of a formula to calculate a watermark value is to use an externally provided value, such as a password, biometric data, internet data or dongle for insertion into the formula. In such as case, the value of “a” can be provided during software development by the watermarking party and the value of “b” can be provided to the authorized user or purchaser of the protected software. At the time that the software is executed, the user may be prompted to enter the authentication data for variable b. If this value is not correctly input at run-time of the software or is not provided, the software program will stop execution. This will deter any unauthorized use of the program. Unlike conventional password protection, the present watermark is embedded into the software executable file making it difficult to remove or bypass.
  • The watermark values generated in accordance with the present invention are preferably implemented in a manner that generally survives the compilation process. One method to accomplish this objective is to embed the watermark values in sections of the source code that a compiler is not likely to eliminate or significantly modify during optimization. A normal GOTO statement using labels employs tokens that the compiler has the option of replacing. The present invention may perform a calculation that the compiler does not believe it has the option to replace. From the compiler's perspective, the calculation of the control-flow label is a necessary functionality rather than a sequential number. The compiler cannot distinguish the calculation from other program elements, and therefore does not remove it.
  • The present invention is not to be limited in scope by the specific embodiments described herein. Indeed, various modifications of the invention in addition to those described herein will become apparent to those skilled in the art from the foregoing description and accompanying Figures. Such modifications are intended to fall within the scope of the appended claims. Various references are cited herein, the disclosure of which are incorporated by reference in their entireties.

Claims (8)

1. A method of software control flow watermarking comprising the steps of
obtaining a program for protection;
generating at least one watermark value using one of a formula or process; and
placing the at least one watermark value in at least one CASE value of the program.
2. The method of claim 1 wherein at least a portion of the at least one watermark value is determined by an internal formula with at least one variable.
3. The method of claim 2 wherein the formula includes at least one variable from outside of the program.
4. The method of claim 3 wherein the program stops if the at least one variable from outside of the program is incorrect.
5. A software control flow watermarking system comprising:
a program for protection;
software code for generating at least one watermark value using one of a formula or process; and
software code that places the at least one watermark value in at least one CASE value of the program.
6. The system of claim 5, further comprising software code which determines at least a portion of the at least one watermark value by an internal formula with at least one variable.
7. The system of claim 6 wherein the formula includes at least one variable from outside of the program.
8. The system of claim 7 wherein software code stops the program if the at least one variable from outside of the program is incorrect.
US10/920,672 2003-08-18 2004-08-18 Software control flow watermarking Abandoned US20050055312A1 (en)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US10/920,672 US20050055312A1 (en) 2003-08-18 2004-08-18 Software control flow watermarking
US12/482,552 US8661559B2 (en) 2003-08-18 2009-06-11 Software control flow watermarking

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US49585803P 2003-08-18 2003-08-18
US10/920,672 US20050055312A1 (en) 2003-08-18 2004-08-18 Software control flow watermarking

Related Child Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US12/482,552 Continuation-In-Part US8661559B2 (en) 2003-08-18 2009-06-11 Software control flow watermarking

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
US20050055312A1 true US20050055312A1 (en) 2005-03-10

Family

ID=34228594

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US10/920,672 Abandoned US20050055312A1 (en) 2003-08-18 2004-08-18 Software control flow watermarking

Country Status (1)

Country Link
US (1) US20050055312A1 (en)

Cited By (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20050262347A1 (en) * 2002-10-25 2005-11-24 Yuji Sato Watermark insertion apparatus and watermark extraction apparatus
US20090097646A1 (en) * 2005-11-17 2009-04-16 Perry Smith Digital Video Recorder Anti-Skip System
US20090254752A1 (en) * 2004-12-22 2009-10-08 Bjorn Johansson Watermarking computer program code
US20090290850A1 (en) * 2006-09-14 2009-11-26 Hickman Paul L Content Server Systems and Methods
US20100095376A1 (en) * 2008-03-07 2010-04-15 Rodriguez Tony F Software watermarking
US8515971B2 (en) * 2005-11-08 2013-08-20 Thales Method for assisting in making a decision on biometric data

Citations (14)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5123045A (en) * 1989-08-18 1992-06-16 Massachusetts Institute Of Technology Comprehensive software protection system
US5559884A (en) * 1994-06-30 1996-09-24 Microsoft Corporation Method and system for generating and auditing a signature for a computer program
US5588137A (en) * 1993-06-02 1996-12-24 Kawasaki Steel Corporation Data flow control apparatus and memory apparatus
US5745569A (en) * 1996-01-17 1998-04-28 The Dice Company Method for stega-cipher protection of computer code
US5768596A (en) * 1996-04-23 1998-06-16 Silicon Graphics, Inc. System and method to efficiently represent aliases and indirect memory operations in static single assignment form during compilation
US5940513A (en) * 1995-08-25 1999-08-17 Intel Corporation Parameterized hash functions for access control
US6006328A (en) * 1995-07-14 1999-12-21 Christopher N. Drake Computer software authentication, protection, and security system
US6185312B1 (en) * 1997-01-28 2001-02-06 Nippon Telegraph And Telephone Corporation Method for embedding and reading watermark-information in digital form, and apparatus thereof
US6192475B1 (en) * 1997-03-31 2001-02-20 David R. Wallace System and method for cloaking software
US6367012B1 (en) * 1996-12-06 2002-04-02 Microsoft Corporation Embedding certifications in executable files for network transmission
US20030074516A1 (en) * 2000-12-08 2003-04-17 Ingenuity Systems, Inc. Method and system for performing information extraction and quality control for a knowledgebase
US6591415B1 (en) * 1999-04-30 2003-07-08 Trymedia Systems Polymorphic code generation method and system therefor
US6594761B1 (en) * 1999-06-09 2003-07-15 Cloakware Corporation Tamper resistant software encoding
US7236610B1 (en) * 1998-04-30 2007-06-26 Fraunhofer Gesellschaft Authenticating executable code and executions thereof

Patent Citations (14)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5123045A (en) * 1989-08-18 1992-06-16 Massachusetts Institute Of Technology Comprehensive software protection system
US5588137A (en) * 1993-06-02 1996-12-24 Kawasaki Steel Corporation Data flow control apparatus and memory apparatus
US5559884A (en) * 1994-06-30 1996-09-24 Microsoft Corporation Method and system for generating and auditing a signature for a computer program
US6006328A (en) * 1995-07-14 1999-12-21 Christopher N. Drake Computer software authentication, protection, and security system
US5940513A (en) * 1995-08-25 1999-08-17 Intel Corporation Parameterized hash functions for access control
US5745569A (en) * 1996-01-17 1998-04-28 The Dice Company Method for stega-cipher protection of computer code
US5768596A (en) * 1996-04-23 1998-06-16 Silicon Graphics, Inc. System and method to efficiently represent aliases and indirect memory operations in static single assignment form during compilation
US6367012B1 (en) * 1996-12-06 2002-04-02 Microsoft Corporation Embedding certifications in executable files for network transmission
US6185312B1 (en) * 1997-01-28 2001-02-06 Nippon Telegraph And Telephone Corporation Method for embedding and reading watermark-information in digital form, and apparatus thereof
US6192475B1 (en) * 1997-03-31 2001-02-20 David R. Wallace System and method for cloaking software
US7236610B1 (en) * 1998-04-30 2007-06-26 Fraunhofer Gesellschaft Authenticating executable code and executions thereof
US6591415B1 (en) * 1999-04-30 2003-07-08 Trymedia Systems Polymorphic code generation method and system therefor
US6594761B1 (en) * 1999-06-09 2003-07-15 Cloakware Corporation Tamper resistant software encoding
US20030074516A1 (en) * 2000-12-08 2003-04-17 Ingenuity Systems, Inc. Method and system for performing information extraction and quality control for a knowledgebase

Cited By (9)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20050262347A1 (en) * 2002-10-25 2005-11-24 Yuji Sato Watermark insertion apparatus and watermark extraction apparatus
US20090254752A1 (en) * 2004-12-22 2009-10-08 Bjorn Johansson Watermarking computer program code
US8458476B2 (en) * 2004-12-22 2013-06-04 Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ) Watermarking computer program code
US8515971B2 (en) * 2005-11-08 2013-08-20 Thales Method for assisting in making a decision on biometric data
US20090097646A1 (en) * 2005-11-17 2009-04-16 Perry Smith Digital Video Recorder Anti-Skip System
US8355506B2 (en) * 2005-11-17 2013-01-15 Nds Limited Digital video recorder anti-skip system
US20090290850A1 (en) * 2006-09-14 2009-11-26 Hickman Paul L Content Server Systems and Methods
US8644503B2 (en) * 2006-09-14 2014-02-04 G&H Nevada-Tek Content server systems and methods
US20100095376A1 (en) * 2008-03-07 2010-04-15 Rodriguez Tony F Software watermarking

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US8458476B2 (en) Watermarking computer program code
US7757097B2 (en) Method and system for tamperproofing software
US7287166B1 (en) Guards for application in software tamperproofing
Naumovich et al. Preventing piracy, reverse engineering, and tampering
US7080257B1 (en) Protecting digital goods using oblivious checking
US8661559B2 (en) Software control flow watermarking
Myles et al. Software watermarking through register allocation: Implementation, analysis, and attacks
US20140165210A1 (en) Software watermarking techniques
US7647639B2 (en) Methods for detecting executable code which has been altered
US20080301452A1 (en) Systems and Methods for Watermarking Software and Other Media
JP2004362532A (en) Watermark insertion device and watermark extraction device
US20050198526A1 (en) Static and run-time anti-disassembly and anti-debugging
CN103858128B (en) The system and method that the dependence network throughout application for attack resistance is provided
JP5455914B2 (en) Tamper resistant technology
US9081962B2 (en) Anti-tamper techniques
Hamilton et al. An evaluation of static java bytecode watermarking
US20050055312A1 (en) Software control flow watermarking
JP3865347B2 (en) Watermark insertion method and system for program
Myles et al. Self-validating branch-based software watermarking
CN116611032A (en) Method, system and storage medium for embedding and extracting software watermark in JAR package
Kumar et al. A comparative analysis of static java bytecode software watermarking algorithms
KR102193017B1 (en) Method for Software Copyright Protection using Method Generation based Watermarking
US20230359712A1 (en) Method and device of embedding watermark in software
US10762179B2 (en) System and method for watermarking software
Hamilton An Empirical Evaluation of Java Decompilation and Intellectual Property Protection via Software Watermarking

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
AS Assignment

Owner name: RIVERSIDE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, NEW YORK

Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:WILSON, KELCE STEVEN;SATTLER, JASON DEAN;REEL/FRAME:016024/0361

Effective date: 20041110

STCB Information on status: application discontinuation

Free format text: ABANDONED -- FAILURE TO RESPOND TO AN OFFICE ACTION