US20070067645A1 - Installation of black box for trusted component for digital rights management (DRM) on computing device - Google Patents
Installation of black box for trusted component for digital rights management (DRM) on computing device Download PDFInfo
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- US20070067645A1 US20070067645A1 US11/516,813 US51681306A US2007067645A1 US 20070067645 A1 US20070067645 A1 US 20070067645A1 US 51681306 A US51681306 A US 51681306A US 2007067645 A1 US2007067645 A1 US 2007067645A1
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- 230000004913 activation Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 216
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- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 4
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 description 4
- 230000009849 deactivation Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000005055 memory storage Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000006855 networking Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000009877 rendering Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000003213 activating effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000002093 peripheral effect Effects 0.000 description 2
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
- G06F21/109—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM] by using specially-adapted hardware at the client
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a system such as a digital rights management (DRM) system for enforcing rights in digital content. More specifically, the present invention relates to such an enforcement system that allows access to encrypted digital content on a computing device only in accordance with parameters specified by license rights acquired by a user of the digital content. Even more specifically, the present invention relates to installing and/or activating a cryptographic black box for a trusted component of the enforcement system on the computing device, and also removal and/or deactivating the black box.
- DRM digital rights management
- digital rights management (DRM) and enforcement system is highly desirable in connection with digital content 12 such as digital audio, digital video, digital text, digital data, digital multimedia, etc., where such digital content 12 is to be distributed to users.
- digital content 12 such as digital audio, digital video, digital text, digital data, digital multimedia, etc.
- DRM digital rights management
- enforcement system is highly desirable in connection with digital content 12 such as digital audio, digital video, digital text, digital data, digital multimedia, etc., where such digital content 12 is to be distributed to users.
- digital content 12 such as digital audio, digital video, digital text, digital data, digital multimedia, etc.
- a content owner distributing such digital content 12 wishes to restrict what the user can do with such distributed digital content 12 .
- the content owner may wish to restrict the user from copying and re-distributing such content 12 to a second user, or may wish to allow distributed digital content 12 to be played only a limited number of times, only for a certain total time, only on a certain type of machine, only on a certain type of media player, only by a certain type of user, etc.
- a DRM system 10 allows the controlled rendering or playing of arbitrary forms of digital content 12 , where such control is flexible and definable by the content owner of such digital content.
- content 12 is distributed to the user in the form of a package 13 by way of any appropriate distribution channel.
- the digital content package 13 as distributed may include the digital content 12 encrypted with a symmetric encryption/decryption key (KD), (i.e., (KD(CONTENT))), as well as other information identifying the content, how to acquire a license for such content, etc.
- KD symmetric encryption/decryption key
- the trust-based DRM system 10 allows an owner of digital content 12 to specify license rules that must be satisfied before such digital content 12 is allowed to be rendered on a user's computing device 14 .
- license rules can include the aforementioned temporal requirement, and may be embodied within a digital license 16 that the user/user's computing device 14 (hereinafter, such terms are interchangeable unless circumstances require otherwise) must obtain from the content owner or an agent thereof.
- license 16 also includes the decryption key (KD) for decrypting the digital content, perhaps encrypted according to a key decryptable by the user's computing device. Because the content 12 requires the license 16 for access thereto, then, the content 12 may be freely distributed. Significantly, the license 16 must somehow be bound either directly or indirectly to a computing device 14 on which the content 12 is to be rendered. Otherwise, the license 12 could potentially be copied to an infinite number of other devices 14 and rendered thereon, also.
- KD decryption key
- the content owner for a piece of digital content 12 must trust that the user's computing device 14 will abide by the rules and requirements specified by such content owner in the license 16 , i.e. that the digital content 12 will not be rendered unless the rules and requirements within the license 16 are satisfied.
- the user's computing device 14 is provided with a trusted component or mechanism 18 that will not render the digital content 12 except according to the license rules embodied in the licensel 6 associated with the digital content 12 and obtained by the user.
- the trusted component 18 typically has a license evaluator 20 that determines whether the license 16 is valid, reviews the license rules and requirements in such valid license 16 , and determines based on the reviewed license rules and requirements whether the requesting user has the right to render the requested digital content 12 in the manner sought, among other things.
- the license evaluator 20 is trusted in the DRM system 10 to carry out the wishes of the owner of the digital content 12 according to the rules and requirements in the license 16 , and the user should not be able to easily alter such trusted element for any purpose, nefarious or otherwise.
- the rules and requirements in the license 16 can specify whether the user has rights to render the digital content 12 based on any of several factors, including who the user is, where the user is located, what type of computing device the user is using, what rendering application is calling the DRM system, the date, the time, etc.
- the rules and requirements of the license 16 may limit the license 16 to a pre-determined number of plays, or pre-determined play time, for example.
- the rules and requirements may be specified in the license 16 according to any appropriate language and syntax.
- the language may simply specify attributes and values that must be satisfied (DATE must be later than X, e.g.), or may require the performance of functions according to a specified script (IF DATE greater than X, THEN DO . . . , e.g.).
- the digital content 12 can then be rendered.
- the decryption key (KD) is obtained from the license 12 and is applied to (KD(CONTENT)) from the content package 13 to result in the actual content 12 , and the actual content 12 is then in fact rendered.
- the trusted component 18 has a black box 22 .
- the black box 22 is trusted in the DRM system 10 to carry out the wishes of the owner of the digital content 12 according to the rules and requirements in the license 16 , and the user should not be able to easily alter such trusted element for any purpose, nefarious or otherwise.
- the black box 22 can be expected to perform both symmetric (single key) and asymmetric (public-private key pair) cryptographic encryption and/or decryption.
- the aforementioned decryption key (KD) is typically a symmetric key and is therefore transmitted in an encrypted form by being encrypted by another symmetric key or a public key or private key.
- the black box 22 To decrypt (KD(content)), and if for example it is the case that (KD) is encrypted by a public key (PU) (i.e., (PU(KD))), the black box 22 must first obtain the private key (PR) corresponding to (PU) and asymmetrically apply (PR) to (PU(KD)) to result in (KD), and then must symmetrically apply (KD) to (KD(content)) to result in the content.
- PU public key
- the black box 22 is provided with a secret and is entrusted to not reveal the secret to anybody or anything.
- the secret is the basis for encrypting the content key (KD), either directly or indirectly, and only the black box 22 as the bearer of the secret can decrypt the content key (KD).
- the license 16 having (KD) encrypted according to the secret is tied or bound to the black box 22 thereby.
- the secret is the private key (PR-BB) of a key pair (PU-BB, PR-BB) that is unique or nearly unique to the black box 22 , and the corresponding public key (PU-BB) of the black box 22 is employed to encrypt (KD), either directly or indirectly.
- the black box 22 must be able to hide (PR-BB) and protect same and related cryptographic code from tampering, and (PR-BB) and such code are therefore encapsulated in the black box.
- the black box 22 is tied to one particular hardware machine. Typically, such tying is achieved by hard coding machine properties into the black box 22 and authenticating such machine properties at run time.
- the black box 22 is also entrusted to cryptographically authenticate other software components, typically by verifying proffered digital signatures, and thus can ensure that other components of the trusted system 18 on the user's computing device 14 and that proffered items such as licenses 16 have not been tampered with.
- the black box 22 is separate from the remainder of the trusted component 18 so as to isolate the cryptographic functionality therein.
- maintaining the integrity of the trusted component 18 is achieved by maintaining the integrity of the (much smaller) black box 22 , and security for the trusted component 18 is thus focused on the black box 22 .
- the software code for the black box 22 is typically heavily obfuscated by means of a variety of techniques intended to maintain the integrity of such code and to hide the secret of the black box 22 .
- the black box 22 is individualized so that each black box 22 hides a unique or nearly unique (PR-BB).
- the executable code of each black box 22 may be individualized to have a unique or nearly unique binary image, even though all black boxes are functionally equivalent.
- each black box 22 is accompanied by a digital certificate bearing (PU-BB), a unique ID, and a version number.
- the certificate is thus tied to the black box 22 through the correspondence of (PU-BB) and (PR-BB).
- An issuer of a license 16 can decide to accept or reject a request for a license 16 from the trusted component 18 based on the certificate of the black box 22 thereof and the contents therein.
- a newer black box 22 typically must be installed before the request is accepted.
- a new black box 22 may be installed for other reasons, may be initially installed separate from the installation of the remainder of the trusted component 18 , may be installed with the remainder of the trusted component but not activated, etc.
- the process of obtaining and installing a black box 22 on the user's computing device 14 along with a machine certificate that certifies the public key (PU-BB) of the black box 22 is also referred to as machine activation.
- a user's computing device 14 typically accesses a black box server 24 by way of a network such as the Internet or the like and sends machine properties thereof to the black box server 24 as part of a request for a new black box 22 .
- the black box server 24 in response constructs the new black box 22 based in part on the machine properties so as to tie the new black box 22 to the computing device 14 , and then delivers the new black box 22 and machine certificate to the computing device 14 and installs same in a protected location on the computing device 14 .
- the black box 22 and machine certificate are installed in the protected location, such as a protected system folder, to prevent a user from accidentally or deliberately deleting such items. Accordingly, a malicious user cannot deny service to other users if the computing device 14 is shared.
- machine activation/installation of the black box 22 requires that the computing device 14 have network access to the black box server 24 , and that the user of the computing device 14 have the necessary privileges to install the new black box 22 in the protected location. Conversely, lack of such network access or such necessary privileges prevents such machine activation.
- a system installs a black box on a computing device.
- the black box operates in combination with a trusted component on the computing device, where the trusted component employs the black box to decrypt encrypted content for being rendered on the computing device only when rights and restrictions specified in a license corresponding to the encrypted content so allow.
- an administrator has access to the computing device and queries same for machine properties thereof.
- a black box server is in communication with the administrator, and the administrator sends the machine properties of the computing device to the black box server as part of a request for a new black box for the computing device.
- the black box server in response constructs the new black box based in part on the machine properties so as to tie the new black box to the computing device, and delivers the new black box to the administrator.
- the administrator thereafter installs the new black box on the computing device.
- the administrator may comprise an activation provider running on the computing device and an activation manager in communication with the activation provider.
- the activation provider determines the machine properties of the computing device and sends same to the activation manager, and the activation manager sends the request to the black box server and receives the new black box in response thereto. Thereafter, the activation provider receives the new black box from the activation manager and installs same on the computing device.
- the administrator may also be operated to remove or disable the black box on the computing device if it determines based on activation state information from the computing device that the black box on the computing device is no longer trustworthy.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing an enforcement architecture of an example of a trust-based system
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram representing a general purpose computer system in which aspects of the present invention and/or portions thereof may be incorporated;
- FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a digital rights management system including a computing device having a trusted component including a black box, an administrator including an activation provider on the computing device and an activation manager in communication with the activation provider for installing a new black box on the computing device, and a black box server for providing the new black box in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention; and
- FIG. 4 is a flow diagram showing key steps performed in installing the new black box on the computing device in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 1 and the following discussion are intended to provide a brief general description of a suitable computing environment in which the present invention and/or portions thereof may be implemented.
- the invention is described in the general context of computer-executable instructions, such as program modules, being executed by a computer, such as a client workstation or a server.
- program modules include routines, programs, objects, components, data structures and the like that perform particular tasks or implement particular abstract data types.
- the invention and/or portions thereof may be practiced with other computer system configurations, including hand-held devices, multi-processor systems, microprocessor-based or programmable consumer electronics, network PCs, minicomputers, mainframe computers and the like.
- the invention may also be practiced in distributed computing environments where tasks are performed by remote processing devices that are linked through a communications network.
- program modules may be located in both local and remote memory storage devices.
- an exemplary general purpose computing system includes a conventional personal computer 120 or the like, including a processing unit 121 , a system memory 122 , and a system bus 123 that couples various system components including the system memory to the processing unit 121 ;
- the system bus 123 may be any of several types of bus structures including a memory bus or memory controller, a peripheral bus, and a local bus using any of a variety of bus architectures.
- the system memory includes read-only memory (ROM) 124 and random access memory (RAM) 125 .
- ROM read-only memory
- RAM random access memory
- a basic input/output system 126 (BIOS) containing the basic routines that help to transfer information between elements within the personal computer 120 , such as during start-up, is stored in ROM 124 .
- the personal computer 120 may further include a hard disk drive 127 for reading from and writing to a hard disk (not shown), a magnetic disk drive 128 for reading from or writing to a removable magnetic disk 129 , and an optical disk drive 130 for reading from or writing to a removable optical disk 131 such as a CD-ROM or other optical media.
- the hard disk drive 127 , magnetic disk drive 128 , and optical disk drive 130 are connected to the system bus 123 by a hard disk drive interface 132 , a magnetic disk drive interface 133 , and an optical drive interface 134 , respectively.
- the drives and their associated computer-readable media provide non-volatile storage of computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules and other data for the personal computer 20 .
- exemplary environment described herein employs a hard disk, a removable magnetic disk 129 , and a removable optical disk 131
- other types of computer readable media which can store data that is accessible by a computer may also be used in the exemplary operating environment.
- Such other types of media include a magnetic cassette, a flash memory card, a digital video disk, a Bernoulli cartridge, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), and the like.
- a number of program modules may be stored on the hard disk, magnetic disk 129 , optical disk 131 , ROM 124 or RAM 125 , including an operating system 135 , one or more application programs 136 , other program modules 137 and program data 138 .
- a user may enter commands and information into the personal computer 120 through input devices such as a keyboard 140 and pointing device 142 .
- Other input devices may include a microphone, joystick, game pad, satellite disk, scanner, or the like.
- serial port interface 146 that is coupled to the system bus, but may be connected by other interfaces, such as a parallel port, game port, or universal serial bus (USB).
- a monitor 147 or other type of display device is also connected to the system bus 123 via an interface, such as a video adapter 148 .
- a personal computer typically includes other peripheral output devices (not shown), such as speakers and printers.
- the exemplary system of FIG. 2 also includes a host adapter 155 , a Small Computer System Interface (SCSI) bus 156 , and an external storage device 162 connected to the SCSI bus 156 .
- SCSI Small Computer System Interface
- the personal computer 120 may operate in a networked environment using logical connections to one or more remote computers, such as a remote computer 149 .
- the remote computer 149 may be another personal computer, a server, a router, a network PC, a peer device or other common network node, and typically includes many or all of the elements described above relative to the personal computer 120 , although only a memory storage device 150 has been illustrated in FIG. 2 .
- the logical connections depicted in FIG. 2 include a local area network (LAN) 151 and a wide area network (WAN) 152 .
- LAN local area network
- WAN wide area network
- the personal computer 120 may also act as a host to a guest such as another personal computer 120 , a more specialized device such as a portable player or portable data assistant, or the like, whereby the host downloads data to and/or uploads data from the guest, among other things.
- a guest such as another personal computer 120 , a more specialized device such as a portable player or portable data assistant, or the like, whereby the host downloads data to and/or uploads data from the guest, among other things.
- the personal computer 120 When used in a LAN networking environment, the personal computer 120 is connected to the LAN 151 through a network interface or adapter 153 . When used in a WAN networking environment, the personal computer 120 typically includes a modem 154 or other means for establishing communications over the wide area network 152 , such as the Internet.
- the modem 154 which may be internal or external, is connected to the system bus 123 via the serial port interface 146 .
- program modules depicted relative to the personal computer 120 may be stored in the remote memory storage device. It will be appreciated that the network connections shown are exemplary and other means of establishing a communications link between the computers may be used.
- the security of a DRM system 10 is dependent on a trusted component 18 on a user's computing device 14 , where the trusted component 18 includes a black box 22 for performing cryptographic functions.
- the black box 22 as installed on the user's computing device 14 is responsible for enforcing the rights and restrictions specified in a license 16 for DRM-protected content 12 .
- the process of obtaining and installing a black box 22 on the user's computing device 14 along with a machine certificate that certifies the public key (PU-BB) of the black box 22 is also referred to as machine activation.
- installation of a black box 22 /machine activation is achieved regardless of a user's privileges on the computing device 14 or whether the computing device 14 can network-access the black box server 24 .
- an administrator with network access to the black box server 24 remotely queries the computing device 14 for machine properties thereof and sends the machine properties to the black box server 24 as part of a request for a new black box 22 for the computing device 14 .
- the black box server 24 in response constructs the new black box 22 based in part on the machine properties so as to tie the new black box 22 to the computing device 14 .
- the black box server 24 delivers the new black box 22 and machine certificate to the administrator and the administrator with appropriate privileges then installs same in a protected location on the computing device 14 .
- the administrator with regard to a particular computing device 14 is represented by an activation manager 26 and an activation provider 28 .
- the activation provider 28 runs on the computing device 14 , and receives and processes commands from the activation manager 26 .
- the activation provider 28 in particular determines the necessary machine properties of the computing device 14 and sends same to the activation manager 26 .
- the activation provider 28 receives the new black box 22 and machine certificate from the activation manager 26 and installs same in the protected location on the computing device 14 .
- the activation manager 26 runs on an activation server 30 or other machine owned by or associated with the administrator: Significantly, and as seen in FIG. 3 , such activation server 30 has network access to the black box server 24 by way of a first network 32 , and therefore the activation manager 26 also has such network access to the black box server 24 by way of such first network 32 . In addition, the activation server 30 and activation manager 26 also have network access to the computing device 14 and activation provider 28 by way of a second network 34 . As shown in FIG.
- the first network 32 may be separate from the second network 34 , such as may be the case where the second network 34 is an internal network such as a LAN, WAN, Intranet, or the like and the first network 32 is an external network such as the Internet or the like.
- the activation server 30 bridges both networks 32 , 34 and allows communication between the computing device 14 and the black box server 24 even in the case where the computing device 14 does not otherwise have access to the first network 32 .
- the first network 32 and the second network 34 may also be one and the same without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention.
- the activation manager 26 and the activation provider 28 are constructed in accordance with a management implementation protocol such as the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) protocol, a product of MICROSOFT Corporation of Redmond, Wash.
- WMI Windows Management Instrumentation
- the WMI protocol allows for system management of a computing device 14 .
- the activation manager 26 and the activation provider 28 being WMI-based, such activation manager 26 and activation provider 28 can interact through available WMI infrastructure.
- access to the activation provider 28 can be restricted to an administrator by placing such activation provider 28 in a restricted WMI namespace.
- the activation manager 26 on the activation server 30 queries the activation provider 28 by way of the second network 34 for the machine properties of the computing device 14 thereof, sends a machine activation request by way of the first network 32 to the black box server 24 , receives the new black box 22 and machine certificate by way of the first network 32 in response to the request, and forwards same to the activation provider 28 on the computing device 14 by way of the second network 34 for installation on such computing device 14 in the protected location thereon.
- the activation server 30 typically is a dual-homed machine. Moreover, and in one embodiment of the present invention, the activation manager 26 can be physically split across two servers 30 a , 30 b or other machines in a high security environment.
- the sub-component 26 a that communicates with the computing device 14 runs on server 30 a , which is connected to the second network 34
- the sub-component 26 b that communicates with the black box server 24 runs on server 30 b , which is connected to the first network 32 .
- the two sub-components 26 a , 26 b can communicate through some secure mechanism such as a firewall, a filtering router, a shared disk, or the like.
- the activation manager 26 is instantiated on the activation server 30 and the activation provider 28 is instantiated on the computing device 14 (step 401 ).
- the activation provider 28 may be a continuously available service to respond at any time to a query from the activation manager 26 , or may be instantiated on demand by the activation manager 26 .
- the activation manager 26 need not necessarily be continuously available unless the activation provider 28 is capable of initiating the query by such activation manager 26 .
- the activation manager 26 queries the activation provider 28 to determine whether the computing device 14 thereof requires a new black box 22 (step 403 ). Such query may be initiated on a regular basis, or may be initiated in response to a particular condition, such as for example the trusted component 18 on the computing device 14 determining that a new black box 22 is necessary and thus prompting the activation manager 26 for the query by way of the activation provider 28 .
- the activation provider 28 collects activation state information from the computing device 14 and reports same to the activation manager 26 (step 405 ).
- Such activation state information may for example include whether any black box 22 is present on the computing device 14 , and if so, a version number thereof, a date of activation thereof, and the like.
- the activation manager 26 receives and reviews the activation state information and determines based thereon whether the computing device 14 requires a new black box 22 (step 407 ). Notably, such determination may be rule-based, such as for example according to a rules document setting out a plurality of rules, and therefore can be done based on most any criteria.
- such activation manager 26 requests and receives relevant machine properties of the computing device 14 from the activation provider 28 (step 409 ). Alternatively, such machine properties are received from the activation provider in response to the query of step 403 along with the activation state information.
- the activation provider 28 may initiate the process itself without any query from the activation manager 26 .
- the activation provider 28 requests a new black box 22 from the activation manager 26 without any prompting by such activation manager 26 (step 410 ), and as part of such request provides the relevant machine properties to the activation manager 26 (step 412 ).
- the activation manager 26 upon receiving the machine properties of the computing device 14 composes an activation request to include such machine properties (step 411 ), and sends the activation request to the black box server 24 (step 413 ).
- the activation manager 26 is actually a pair of sub-components 26 a , 26 b
- the sub-component 26 b that communicates with the black box server 24 by way of the first network 32 sends the activation request as at step 413 , and may also compose same as at step 411 .
- the sub-component 26 a that communicates with the activation provider 28 by way of the second network 32 performs steps 403 , 407 , and 409 .
- the black box server 24 receives the activation request and in response thereto creates a new black box 22 based on the activation request and in particular the machine properties contained therein, and also creates a corresponding machine certificate certifying the (PU-BB) for the created black box 22 and other attributes of the created black box 22 (step 415 ). Note that in creating the new black box 22 for the computing device, the black box server 24 selects a (PR-BB, PU-BB) key pair for the black box and hides (PR-BB) in the black box, and also ties the new black box 22 to the computing device 14 by hard coding the machine properties of the computing device 14 into the black box 22 .
- the black box server 24 places (PU-BB) in such certificate and signs the certificate based on the private key of such black box server 24 .
- PU-BB PU-BB
- the black box server 24 then sends the new black box 22 and corresponding machine certificate to the activation manager 26 and the activation manager 26 receives same (step 417 ).
- the activation manager 26 is actually a pair of sub-components 26 a , 26 b
- the sub-component 26 b that communicates with the black box server 24 by way of the first network 32 receives the new black box 22 and corresponding certificate as at step 417 .
- the activation manager 26 may verify the new black box 22 and corresponding machine certificate, perhaps by way of an accompanying digital signature from the black box server 24 .
- the activation manager 26 sends the new black box 22 and corresponding machine certificate to the activation provider 28 on the computing device 14 (step 419 ).
- the sub-component 26 a that communicates with the activation provider 28 by way of the second network 34 receives the new black box 22 and corresponding certificate from the sub-component 26 b and then sends same to such activation provider 28 as at step 419 .
- the activation provider 28 upon receiving the new black box 22 and corresponding machine certificate installs same into the protected location on the computing device 14 (step 421 ).
- the activation provider 28 on the computing device 14 assumes an administrator-type role to gain privileges necessary to write to the protected location on such computing device 14 .
- the activation manager 26 delivers the new black box 22 in the form of a call to such activation provider 28 and if he activation manager 26 already has administrative privileges.
- the activation provider 28 may run on the computing device 14 in the context of a privileged system service that can only be accessed by an administrator or the like. Accordingly, an ordinary user will not be able to misuse the activation provider 28 on the computing device 14 .
- the activation provider 28 verifies the new black box 22 and the corresponding machine certificate before installing same on the computing device 14 . Such verification provides protection against the misuse of activation provider 28 for installing malicious code on the computing device 14 . To facilitate verification, the activation manager 26 should communicate to the activation provider 28 appropriate verification information as received from the black box server 24 .
- the process as set forth above is with regard to installing a new black box 22 on a single computing device 14 on the second network 34 .
- the activation manager 26 may install a new black box 22 on each of a plurality of computing devices 14 on the second network 34 , where each computing device 14 gets a unique or nearly unique black box 22 installed thereon.
- the process of installing black boxes 22 to a plurality of computing devices 14 is similar to the process of installing a black box 22 to a single computing device 14 .
- the activation manager 26 queries each computing device 14 for activation state information and machine properties as at steps 403 and 409 . Thereafter, the activation manager 26 may issue a single batch activation request to the black box server 24 by way of the first network 32 as at steps 411 and 413 , where the batch activation request is with regard to each of the plurality of computing devices 14 . Alternatively, the activation manager 26 may issue a series of such activation requests.
- the black box server 24 then responds with a black box 22 and corresponding machine certificate for each of the plurality of computing devices 14 as at step 417 , and the activation manager 26 then sends each black box 22 and corresponding machine certificate to the computing device 14 for which same was created, as at step 419 .
- an activation manager 26 on a second network 34 of computing devices 14 can be configured to not only activate each computing device 14 by installing a new black box 22 thereon but also to deactivate each computing device 14 by removing or disabling the black box 22 thereon.
- an administrator for the second network 34 can specify an activation policy for the computing devices 14 thereon, where the activation policy specifies a minimum set of criteria that each computing device 14 must adhere to.
- Such activation policy may for example state a maximum age of the black box 22 on each computing device 14 , a minimum acceptable version number, etc.
- Failure of a computing device 14 to adhere to the policy may result in the activation manager 26 obtaining a new black box 22 for such computing device 14 , deactivation of the black box 22 currently on the computing device 14 , or the like.
- the activation manager 26 can deactivate the black box 22 on a computing device 14 by way of appropriate communications with the activation provider 28 on the computing device 14 , such activation provider 28 should not itself be deactivated by any user. Otherwise, deactivation of the activation provider 28 could be undertaken by a nefarious user to prevent deactivation of the black box 22 .
- the second network 34 upon which the computing devices 14 reside may be a trusted or non-trusted network. If trusted, communications between the activation manager 26 and the activation providers 28 need not be protected in any special manner. Conversely, if not trusted, such communications should be protected, for example by appropriate cryptographic technology or the like.
- the present invention is especially useful in connection with a computing device 14 such as a personal computer or the like, the present invention may be practiced with regard to any appropriate device, all without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, such as for example a server, an intelligent appliance, a networked portable device, etc. Accordingly, the device 14 is to be interpreted to encompass any appropriate device requiring installation of a black box 22 thereon.
- the present invention comprises a new and useful method and mechanism that installs and/or activates a black box 22 for a trusted component 18 residing on a user's computing device 14 .
- Such installation may be performed remotely from the computing device 14 regardless of the privileges of the user of the computing device 14 , and where a black box server 24 is not necessarily directly network-accessible to the computing device 14 .
Abstract
Description
- The present invention relates to a system such as a digital rights management (DRM) system for enforcing rights in digital content. More specifically, the present invention relates to such an enforcement system that allows access to encrypted digital content on a computing device only in accordance with parameters specified by license rights acquired by a user of the digital content. Even more specifically, the present invention relates to installing and/or activating a cryptographic black box for a trusted component of the enforcement system on the computing device, and also removal and/or deactivating the black box.
- As is known, and referring now to
FIG. 1 , digital rights management (DRM) and enforcement system is highly desirable in connection withdigital content 12 such as digital audio, digital video, digital text, digital data, digital multimedia, etc., where suchdigital content 12 is to be distributed to users. Upon being received by the user, such user renders or ‘plays’ the digital content with the aid of an appropriate rendering device such as a media player on apersonal computer 14 or the like. - Typically, a content owner distributing such
digital content 12 wishes to restrict what the user can do with such distributeddigital content 12. For example, the content owner may wish to restrict the user from copying and re-distributingsuch content 12 to a second user, or may wish to allow distributeddigital content 12 to be played only a limited number of times, only for a certain total time, only on a certain type of machine, only on a certain type of media player, only by a certain type of user, etc. - However, after distribution has occurred, such content owner has very little if any control over the
digital content 12. ADRM system 10, then, allows the controlled rendering or playing of arbitrary forms ofdigital content 12, where such control is flexible and definable by the content owner of such digital content. Typically,content 12 is distributed to the user in the form of apackage 13 by way of any appropriate distribution channel. Thedigital content package 13 as distributed may include thedigital content 12 encrypted with a symmetric encryption/decryption key (KD), (i.e., (KD(CONTENT))), as well as other information identifying the content, how to acquire a license for such content, etc. - The trust-based
DRM system 10 allows an owner ofdigital content 12 to specify license rules that must be satisfied before suchdigital content 12 is allowed to be rendered on a user'scomputing device 14. Such license rules can include the aforementioned temporal requirement, and may be embodied within adigital license 16 that the user/user's computing device 14 (hereinafter, such terms are interchangeable unless circumstances require otherwise) must obtain from the content owner or an agent thereof.Such license 16 also includes the decryption key (KD) for decrypting the digital content, perhaps encrypted according to a key decryptable by the user's computing device. Because thecontent 12 requires thelicense 16 for access thereto, then, thecontent 12 may be freely distributed. Significantly, thelicense 16 must somehow be bound either directly or indirectly to acomputing device 14 on which thecontent 12 is to be rendered. Otherwise, thelicense 12 could potentially be copied to an infinite number ofother devices 14 and rendered thereon, also. - The content owner for a piece of
digital content 12 must trust that the user'scomputing device 14 will abide by the rules and requirements specified by such content owner in thelicense 16, i.e. that thedigital content 12 will not be rendered unless the rules and requirements within thelicense 16 are satisfied. Preferably, then, the user'scomputing device 14 is provided with a trusted component or mechanism 18 that will not render thedigital content 12 except according to the license rules embodied in the licensel6 associated with thedigital content 12 and obtained by the user. - The trusted component 18 typically has a
license evaluator 20 that determines whether thelicense 16 is valid, reviews the license rules and requirements in suchvalid license 16, and determines based on the reviewed license rules and requirements whether the requesting user has the right to render the requesteddigital content 12 in the manner sought, among other things. As should be understood, thelicense evaluator 20 is trusted in theDRM system 10 to carry out the wishes of the owner of thedigital content 12 according to the rules and requirements in thelicense 16, and the user should not be able to easily alter such trusted element for any purpose, nefarious or otherwise. - As should be understood, the rules and requirements in the
license 16 can specify whether the user has rights to render thedigital content 12 based on any of several factors, including who the user is, where the user is located, what type of computing device the user is using, what rendering application is calling the DRM system, the date, the time, etc. In addition, the rules and requirements of thelicense 16 may limit thelicense 16 to a pre-determined number of plays, or pre-determined play time, for example. - The rules and requirements may be specified in the
license 16 according to any appropriate language and syntax. For example, the language may simply specify attributes and values that must be satisfied (DATE must be later than X, e.g.), or may require the performance of functions according to a specified script (IF DATE greater than X, THEN DO . . . , e.g.). - Upon the
license evaluator 20 determining that thelicense 16 is valid and that the user satisfies the rules and requirements therein, thedigital content 12 can then be rendered. In particular, to render thecontent 12, the decryption key (KD) is obtained from thelicense 12 and is applied to (KD(CONTENT)) from thecontent package 13 to result in theactual content 12, and theactual content 12 is then in fact rendered. - Typically, to perform cryptographic functions in the connection with the trusted component 18, including the aforementioned applying of (KD) to (KD(content)) and all other cryptographic functions, the trusted component 18 has a
black box 22. As with thelicense evaluator 20, theblack box 22 is trusted in theDRM system 10 to carry out the wishes of the owner of thedigital content 12 according to the rules and requirements in thelicense 16, and the user should not be able to easily alter such trusted element for any purpose, nefarious or otherwise. - Typically, the
black box 22 can be expected to perform both symmetric (single key) and asymmetric (public-private key pair) cryptographic encryption and/or decryption. In particular, the aforementioned decryption key (KD) is typically a symmetric key and is therefore transmitted in an encrypted form by being encrypted by another symmetric key or a public key or private key. Thus, to decrypt (KD(content)), and if for example it is the case that (KD) is encrypted by a public key (PU) (i.e., (PU(KD))), theblack box 22 must first obtain the private key (PR) corresponding to (PU) and asymmetrically apply (PR) to (PU(KD)) to result in (KD), and then must symmetrically apply (KD) to (KD(content)) to result in the content. - Critically, the
black box 22 is provided with a secret and is entrusted to not reveal the secret to anybody or anything. Thus, the secret is the basis for encrypting the content key (KD), either directly or indirectly, and only theblack box 22 as the bearer of the secret can decrypt the content key (KD). Thus, thelicense 16 having (KD) encrypted according to the secret is tied or bound to theblack box 22 thereby. Typically, the secret is the private key (PR-BB) of a key pair (PU-BB, PR-BB) that is unique or nearly unique to theblack box 22, and the corresponding public key (PU-BB) of theblack box 22 is employed to encrypt (KD), either directly or indirectly. Of paramount importance, theblack box 22 must be able to hide (PR-BB) and protect same and related cryptographic code from tampering, and (PR-BB) and such code are therefore encapsulated in the black box. In order to prevent unrestricted duplication, theblack box 22 is tied to one particular hardware machine. Typically, such tying is achieved by hard coding machine properties into theblack box 22 and authenticating such machine properties at run time. Theblack box 22 is also entrusted to cryptographically authenticate other software components, typically by verifying proffered digital signatures, and thus can ensure that other components of the trusted system 18 on the user'scomputing device 14 and that proffered items such aslicenses 16 have not been tampered with. - Significantly, the
black box 22 is separate from the remainder of the trusted component 18 so as to isolate the cryptographic functionality therein. As a result, maintaining the integrity of the trusted component 18 is achieved by maintaining the integrity of the (much smaller)black box 22, and security for the trusted component 18 is thus focused on theblack box 22. As should be appreciated, then, the software code for theblack box 22 is typically heavily obfuscated by means of a variety of techniques intended to maintain the integrity of such code and to hide the secret of theblack box 22. In addition, theblack box 22 is individualized so that eachblack box 22 hides a unique or nearly unique (PR-BB). Also, the executable code of eachblack box 22 may be individualized to have a unique or nearly unique binary image, even though all black boxes are functionally equivalent. - Bearing in mind that a nefarious entity may nevertheless defeat or ‘break into’ the
black box 22, suchblack box 22 should be revocable and field upgradeable. Typically, eachblack box 22 is accompanied by a digital certificate bearing (PU-BB), a unique ID, and a version number. The certificate is thus tied to theblack box 22 through the correspondence of (PU-BB) and (PR-BB). An issuer of alicense 16 can decide to accept or reject a request for alicense 16 from the trusted component 18 based on the certificate of theblack box 22 thereof and the contents therein. In the event that a request is rejected, a newerblack box 22 typically must be installed before the request is accepted. Of course, a newblack box 22 may be installed for other reasons, may be initially installed separate from the installation of the remainder of the trusted component 18, may be installed with the remainder of the trusted component but not activated, etc. - The process of obtaining and installing a
black box 22 on the user'scomputing device 14 along with a machine certificate that certifies the public key (PU-BB) of theblack box 22 is also referred to as machine activation. To obtain an individualizedblack box 22, a user'scomputing device 14 typically accesses ablack box server 24 by way of a network such as the Internet or the like and sends machine properties thereof to theblack box server 24 as part of a request for a newblack box 22. Theblack box server 24 in response constructs the newblack box 22 based in part on the machine properties so as to tie the newblack box 22 to thecomputing device 14, and then delivers the newblack box 22 and machine certificate to thecomputing device 14 and installs same in a protected location on thecomputing device 14. Notably, theblack box 22 and machine certificate are installed in the protected location, such as a protected system folder, to prevent a user from accidentally or deliberately deleting such items. Accordingly, a malicious user cannot deny service to other users if thecomputing device 14 is shared. - As should be appreciated, then, machine activation/installation of the
black box 22 requires that thecomputing device 14 have network access to theblack box server 24, and that the user of thecomputing device 14 have the necessary privileges to install the newblack box 22 in the protected location. Conversely, lack of such network access or such necessary privileges prevents such machine activation. - Accordingly, a need exists for a system and method for installing a
black box 22 for a trusted component 18 residing on a user'scomputing device 14. More particularly, a need exists for a system and method for remotely installing theblack box 22 regardless of the privileges of the user of thecomputing device 14, and even more particularly, a need exists for a system and method for remotely installing theblack box 22 in the situation where theblack box server 24 is not necessarily directly network-accessible to thecomputing device 14. - The aforementioned needs are satisfied at least in part by the present invention in which a system installs a black box on a computing device. The black box operates in combination with a trusted component on the computing device, where the trusted component employs the black box to decrypt encrypted content for being rendered on the computing device only when rights and restrictions specified in a license corresponding to the encrypted content so allow.
- In the system, an administrator has access to the computing device and queries same for machine properties thereof. A black box server is in communication with the administrator, and the administrator sends the machine properties of the computing device to the black box server as part of a request for a new black box for the computing device. The black box server in response constructs the new black box based in part on the machine properties so as to tie the new black box to the computing device, and delivers the new black box to the administrator. The administrator thereafter installs the new black box on the computing device.
- The administrator may comprise an activation provider running on the computing device and an activation manager in communication with the activation provider. Thus, the activation provider determines the machine properties of the computing device and sends same to the activation manager, and the activation manager sends the request to the black box server and receives the new black box in response thereto. Thereafter, the activation provider receives the new black box from the activation manager and installs same on the computing device.
- The administrator may also be operated to remove or disable the black box on the computing device if it determines based on activation state information from the computing device that the black box on the computing device is no longer trustworthy.
- The foregoing summary, as well as the following detailed description of the embodiments of the present invention, will be better understood when read in conjunction with the appended drawings. For the purpose of illustrating the invention, there are shown in the drawings embodiments which are presently preferred. As should be understood, however, the invention is not limited to the precise arrangements and instrumentalities shown. In the drawings:
-
FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing an enforcement architecture of an example of a trust-based system; -
FIG. 2 is a block diagram representing a general purpose computer system in which aspects of the present invention and/or portions thereof may be incorporated; -
FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a digital rights management system including a computing device having a trusted component including a black box, an administrator including an activation provider on the computing device and an activation manager in communication with the activation provider for installing a new black box on the computing device, and a black box server for providing the new black box in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention; and -
FIG. 4 is a flow diagram showing key steps performed in installing the new black box on the computing device in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention. - Computer Environment
-
FIG. 1 and the following discussion are intended to provide a brief general description of a suitable computing environment in which the present invention and/or portions thereof may be implemented. Although not required, the invention is described in the general context of computer-executable instructions, such as program modules, being executed by a computer, such as a client workstation or a server. Generally, program modules include routines, programs, objects, components, data structures and the like that perform particular tasks or implement particular abstract data types. Moreover, it should be appreciated that the invention and/or portions thereof may be practiced with other computer system configurations, including hand-held devices, multi-processor systems, microprocessor-based or programmable consumer electronics, network PCs, minicomputers, mainframe computers and the like. The invention may also be practiced in distributed computing environments where tasks are performed by remote processing devices that are linked through a communications network. In a distributed computing environment, program modules may be located in both local and remote memory storage devices. - As shown in
FIG. 2 , an exemplary general purpose computing system includes a conventionalpersonal computer 120 or the like, including aprocessing unit 121, asystem memory 122, and a system bus 123 that couples various system components including the system memory to theprocessing unit 121; The system bus 123 may be any of several types of bus structures including a memory bus or memory controller, a peripheral bus, and a local bus using any of a variety of bus architectures. The system memory includes read-only memory (ROM) 124 and random access memory (RAM) 125. A basic input/output system 126 (BIOS), containing the basic routines that help to transfer information between elements within thepersonal computer 120, such as during start-up, is stored inROM 124. - The
personal computer 120 may further include ahard disk drive 127 for reading from and writing to a hard disk (not shown), amagnetic disk drive 128 for reading from or writing to a removablemagnetic disk 129, and anoptical disk drive 130 for reading from or writing to a removableoptical disk 131 such as a CD-ROM or other optical media. Thehard disk drive 127,magnetic disk drive 128, andoptical disk drive 130 are connected to the system bus 123 by a harddisk drive interface 132, a magneticdisk drive interface 133, and anoptical drive interface 134, respectively. The drives and their associated computer-readable media provide non-volatile storage of computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules and other data for thepersonal computer 20. - Although the exemplary environment described herein employs a hard disk, a removable
magnetic disk 129, and a removableoptical disk 131, it should be appreciated that other types of computer readable media which can store data that is accessible by a computer may also be used in the exemplary operating environment. Such other types of media include a magnetic cassette, a flash memory card, a digital video disk, a Bernoulli cartridge, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), and the like. - A number of program modules may be stored on the hard disk,
magnetic disk 129,optical disk 131,ROM 124 orRAM 125, including anoperating system 135, one ormore application programs 136,other program modules 137 andprogram data 138. A user may enter commands and information into thepersonal computer 120 through input devices such as akeyboard 140 andpointing device 142. Other input devices (not shown) may include a microphone, joystick, game pad, satellite disk, scanner, or the like. These and other input devices are often connected to theprocessing unit 121 through aserial port interface 146 that is coupled to the system bus, but may be connected by other interfaces, such as a parallel port, game port, or universal serial bus (USB). Amonitor 147 or other type of display device is also connected to the system bus 123 via an interface, such as avideo adapter 148. In addition to themonitor 147, a personal computer typically includes other peripheral output devices (not shown), such as speakers and printers. The exemplary system ofFIG. 2 also includes ahost adapter 155, a Small Computer System Interface (SCSI) bus 156, and anexternal storage device 162 connected to the SCSI bus 156. - The
personal computer 120 may operate in a networked environment using logical connections to one or more remote computers, such as aremote computer 149. Theremote computer 149 may be another personal computer, a server, a router, a network PC, a peer device or other common network node, and typically includes many or all of the elements described above relative to thepersonal computer 120, although only amemory storage device 150 has been illustrated inFIG. 2 . The logical connections depicted inFIG. 2 include a local area network (LAN) 151 and a wide area network (WAN) 152. Such networking environments are commonplace in offices, enterprise-wide computer networks, intranets, and the Internet. Thepersonal computer 120 may also act as a host to a guest such as anotherpersonal computer 120, a more specialized device such as a portable player or portable data assistant, or the like, whereby the host downloads data to and/or uploads data from the guest, among other things. - When used in a LAN networking environment, the
personal computer 120 is connected to theLAN 151 through a network interface oradapter 153. When used in a WAN networking environment, thepersonal computer 120 typically includes amodem 154 or other means for establishing communications over thewide area network 152, such as the Internet. Themodem 154, which may be internal or external, is connected to the system bus 123 via theserial port interface 146. In a networked environment, program modules depicted relative to thepersonal computer 120, or portions thereof, may be stored in the remote memory storage device. It will be appreciated that the network connections shown are exemplary and other means of establishing a communications link between the computers may be used. - Black Box Installation/Activation
- As was set forth above, the security of a
DRM system 10 is dependent on a trusted component 18 on a user'scomputing device 14, where the trusted component 18 includes ablack box 22 for performing cryptographic functions. Thus, theblack box 22 as installed on the user'scomputing device 14 is responsible for enforcing the rights and restrictions specified in alicense 16 for DRM-protectedcontent 12. The process of obtaining and installing ablack box 22 on the user'scomputing device 14 along with a machine certificate that certifies the public key (PU-BB) of theblack box 22 is also referred to as machine activation. - In the present invention, installation of a
black box 22/machine activation is achieved regardless of a user's privileges on thecomputing device 14 or whether thecomputing device 14 can network-access theblack box server 24. In particular, in the present invention, an administrator with network access to theblack box server 24 remotely queries thecomputing device 14 for machine properties thereof and sends the machine properties to theblack box server 24 as part of a request for a newblack box 22 for thecomputing device 14. As before, theblack box server 24 in response constructs the newblack box 22 based in part on the machine properties so as to tie the newblack box 22 to thecomputing device 14. Here, though, theblack box server 24 delivers the newblack box 22 and machine certificate to the administrator and the administrator with appropriate privileges then installs same in a protected location on thecomputing device 14. - In one embodiment of the present invention, and turning now to
FIG. 3 , the administrator with regard to aparticular computing device 14 is represented by anactivation manager 26 and anactivation provider 28. Theactivation provider 28 runs on thecomputing device 14, and receives and processes commands from theactivation manager 26. Theactivation provider 28 in particular determines the necessary machine properties of thecomputing device 14 and sends same to theactivation manager 26. In addition, theactivation provider 28 receives the newblack box 22 and machine certificate from theactivation manager 26 and installs same in the protected location on thecomputing device 14. - The
activation manager 26 runs on anactivation server 30 or other machine owned by or associated with the administrator: Significantly, and as seen inFIG. 3 ,such activation server 30 has network access to theblack box server 24 by way of afirst network 32, and therefore theactivation manager 26 also has such network access to theblack box server 24 by way of suchfirst network 32. In addition, theactivation server 30 andactivation manager 26 also have network access to thecomputing device 14 andactivation provider 28 by way of asecond network 34. As shown inFIG. 3 , thefirst network 32 may be separate from thesecond network 34, such as may be the case where thesecond network 34 is an internal network such as a LAN, WAN, Intranet, or the like and thefirst network 32 is an external network such as the Internet or the like. Thus, theactivation server 30 bridges bothnetworks computing device 14 and theblack box server 24 even in the case where thecomputing device 14 does not otherwise have access to thefirst network 32. Of course, thefirst network 32 and thesecond network 34 may also be one and the same without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. - In one embodiment of the present invention, the
activation manager 26 and theactivation provider 28 are constructed in accordance with a management implementation protocol such as the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) protocol, a product of MICROSOFT Corporation of Redmond, Wash. As may be appreciated, the WMI protocol allows for system management of acomputing device 14. Thus, with theactivation manager 26 and theactivation provider 28 being WMI-based,such activation manager 26 andactivation provider 28 can interact through available WMI infrastructure. Moreover, access to theactivation provider 28 can be restricted to an administrator by placingsuch activation provider 28 in a restricted WMI namespace. - Generally, the
activation manager 26 on theactivation server 30 queries theactivation provider 28 by way of thesecond network 34 for the machine properties of thecomputing device 14 thereof, sends a machine activation request by way of thefirst network 32 to theblack box server 24, receives the newblack box 22 and machine certificate by way of thefirst network 32 in response to the request, and forwards same to theactivation provider 28 on thecomputing device 14 by way of thesecond network 34 for installation onsuch computing device 14 in the protected location thereon. - Inasmuch as the
activation manager 26 communicates with both the first andsecond networks activation server 30 typically is a dual-homed machine. Moreover, and in one embodiment of the present invention, theactivation manager 26 can be physically split across two servers 30 a, 30 b or other machines in a high security environment. The sub-component 26 a that communicates with thecomputing device 14 runs on server 30 a, which is connected to thesecond network 34, and the sub-component 26 b that communicates with theblack box server 24 runs on server 30 b, which is connected to thefirst network 32. The two sub-components 26 a, 26 b can communicate through some secure mechanism such as a firewall, a filtering router, a shared disk, or the like. - With the mechanism thus far disclosed and shown in
FIG. 3 , and referring now toFIG. 4 , a process for remotely activating thecomputing device 14 to install a newblack box 22 thereon is as follows: - Preliminarily, the
activation manager 26 is instantiated on theactivation server 30 and theactivation provider 28 is instantiated on the computing device 14 (step 401). Note that theactivation provider 28 may be a continuously available service to respond at any time to a query from theactivation manager 26, or may be instantiated on demand by theactivation manager 26. Theactivation manager 26 need not necessarily be continuously available unless theactivation provider 28 is capable of initiating the query bysuch activation manager 26. - At some point, the
activation manager 26 queries theactivation provider 28 to determine whether thecomputing device 14 thereof requires a new black box 22 (step 403). Such query may be initiated on a regular basis, or may be initiated in response to a particular condition, such as for example the trusted component 18 on thecomputing device 14 determining that a newblack box 22 is necessary and thus prompting theactivation manager 26 for the query by way of theactivation provider 28. - In response to the query from the
activation manager 26, theactivation provider 28 collects activation state information from thecomputing device 14 and reports same to the activation manager 26 (step 405). Such activation state information may for example include whether anyblack box 22 is present on thecomputing device 14, and if so, a version number thereof, a date of activation thereof, and the like. Theactivation manager 26 receives and reviews the activation state information and determines based thereon whether thecomputing device 14 requires a new black box 22 (step 407). Notably, such determination may be rule-based, such as for example according to a rules document setting out a plurality of rules, and therefore can be done based on most any criteria. - Assuming the
activation manager 26 in fact determines that thecomputing device 14 requires a newblack box 22,such activation manager 26 requests and receives relevant machine properties of thecomputing device 14 from the activation provider 28 (step 409). Alternatively, such machine properties are received from the activation provider in response to the query ofstep 403 along with the activation state information. - Also alternatively, the
activation provider 28 may initiate the process itself without any query from theactivation manager 26. In effect, in such a situation, theactivation provider 28 requests a newblack box 22 from theactivation manager 26 without any prompting by such activation manager 26 (step 410), and as part of such request provides the relevant machine properties to the activation manager 26 (step 412). - At any rate, the
activation manager 26 upon receiving the machine properties of thecomputing device 14 composes an activation request to include such machine properties (step 411), and sends the activation request to the black box server 24 (step 413). Note that in the instance where theactivation manager 26 is actually a pair ofsub-components black box server 24 by way of thefirst network 32 sends the activation request as atstep 413, and may also compose same as atstep 411. Correspondingly, the sub-component 26 a that communicates with theactivation provider 28 by way of thesecond network 32 performssteps 403, 407, and 409. - The
black box server 24 receives the activation request and in response thereto creates a newblack box 22 based on the activation request and in particular the machine properties contained therein, and also creates a corresponding machine certificate certifying the (PU-BB) for the createdblack box 22 and other attributes of the created black box 22 (step 415). Note that in creating the newblack box 22 for the computing device, theblack box server 24 selects a (PR-BB, PU-BB) key pair for the black box and hides (PR-BB) in the black box, and also ties the newblack box 22 to thecomputing device 14 by hard coding the machine properties of thecomputing device 14 into theblack box 22. Likewise, in creating the corresponding machine certificate, theblack box server 24 places (PU-BB) in such certificate and signs the certificate based on the private key of suchblack box server 24. Creating theblack box 22 and the machine certificate are known or should be apparent to the relevant public and therefore need not be disclosed herein in any detail. Accordingly, any appropriate method of creating theblack box 22 and machine certificate may be employed without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. - Once created, the
black box server 24 then sends the newblack box 22 and corresponding machine certificate to theactivation manager 26 and theactivation manager 26 receives same (step 417). Again, in the instance where theactivation manager 26 is actually a pair ofsub-components black box server 24 by way of thefirst network 32 receives the newblack box 22 and corresponding certificate as atstep 417. Theactivation manager 26 may verify the newblack box 22 and corresponding machine certificate, perhaps by way of an accompanying digital signature from theblack box server 24. - Assuming the verification is successful, the
activation manager 26 sends the newblack box 22 and corresponding machine certificate to theactivation provider 28 on the computing device 14 (step 419). Once again, in the instance where theactivation manager 26 is actually a pair ofsub-components activation provider 28 by way of thesecond network 34 receives the newblack box 22 and corresponding certificate from the sub-component 26 b and then sends same tosuch activation provider 28 as atstep 419. - Finally, the
activation provider 28 upon receiving the newblack box 22 and corresponding machine certificate installs same into the protected location on the computing device 14 (step 421). In one embodiment of the present invention, theactivation provider 28 on thecomputing device 14 assumes an administrator-type role to gain privileges necessary to write to the protected location onsuch computing device 14. Note that such role may be assumed by theactivation provider 28 if theactivation manager 26 delivers the newblack box 22 in the form of a call tosuch activation provider 28 and if heactivation manager 26 already has administrative privileges. Also note that theactivation provider 28 may run on thecomputing device 14 in the context of a privileged system service that can only be accessed by an administrator or the like. Accordingly, an ordinary user will not be able to misuse theactivation provider 28 on thecomputing device 14. - In one embodiment of the present invention, the
activation provider 28 verifies the newblack box 22 and the corresponding machine certificate before installing same on thecomputing device 14. Such verification provides protection against the misuse ofactivation provider 28 for installing malicious code on thecomputing device 14. To facilitate verification, theactivation manager 26 should communicate to theactivation provider 28 appropriate verification information as received from theblack box server 24. - Note that the process as set forth above is with regard to installing a new
black box 22 on asingle computing device 14 on thesecond network 34. In one embodiment of the present invention, however, and as should be appreciated, theactivation manager 26 may install a newblack box 22 on each of a plurality ofcomputing devices 14 on thesecond network 34, where eachcomputing device 14 gets a unique or nearly uniqueblack box 22 installed thereon. As may be evident, the process of installingblack boxes 22 to a plurality ofcomputing devices 14 is similar to the process of installing ablack box 22 to asingle computing device 14. - Generally, in installing
black boxes 22 to a plurality ofcomputing devices 14 on thesecond network 34, theactivation manager 26 queries eachcomputing device 14 for activation state information and machine properties as atsteps 403 and 409. Thereafter, theactivation manager 26 may issue a single batch activation request to theblack box server 24 by way of thefirst network 32 as atsteps computing devices 14. Alternatively, theactivation manager 26 may issue a series of such activation requests. Theblack box server 24 then responds with ablack box 22 and corresponding machine certificate for each of the plurality ofcomputing devices 14 as atstep 417, and theactivation manager 26 then sends eachblack box 22 and corresponding machine certificate to thecomputing device 14 for which same was created, as atstep 419. - Note that with an
activation manager 26 on asecond network 34 ofcomputing devices 14, such activation manager can be configured to not only activate eachcomputing device 14 by installing a newblack box 22 thereon but also to deactivate eachcomputing device 14 by removing or disabling theblack box 22 thereon. Thus, an administrator for thesecond network 34 can specify an activation policy for thecomputing devices 14 thereon, where the activation policy specifies a minimum set of criteria that eachcomputing device 14 must adhere to. Such activation policy may for example state a maximum age of theblack box 22 on eachcomputing device 14, a minimum acceptable version number, etc. Failure of acomputing device 14 to adhere to the policy may result in theactivation manager 26 obtaining a newblack box 22 forsuch computing device 14, deactivation of theblack box 22 currently on thecomputing device 14, or the like. Note that in the case where theactivation manager 26 can deactivate theblack box 22 on acomputing device 14 by way of appropriate communications with theactivation provider 28 on thecomputing device 14,such activation provider 28 should not itself be deactivated by any user. Otherwise, deactivation of theactivation provider 28 could be undertaken by a nefarious user to prevent deactivation of theblack box 22. - The
second network 34 upon which thecomputing devices 14 reside may be a trusted or non-trusted network. If trusted, communications between theactivation manager 26 and theactivation providers 28 need not be protected in any special manner. Conversely, if not trusted, such communications should be protected, for example by appropriate cryptographic technology or the like. - Conclusion
- Although the present invention is especially useful in connection with a
computing device 14 such as a personal computer or the like, the present invention may be practiced with regard to any appropriate device, all without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, such as for example a server, an intelligent appliance, a networked portable device, etc. Accordingly, thedevice 14 is to be interpreted to encompass any appropriate device requiring installation of ablack box 22 thereon. - The programming necessary to effectuate the processes performed in connection with the present invention is relatively straight-forward and should be apparent to the relevant programming public. Accordingly, such programming is not attached hereto. Any particular programming, then, may be employed to effectuate the present invention without departing from the spirit and scope thereof.
- In the foregoing description, it can be seen that the present invention comprises a new and useful method and mechanism that installs and/or activates a
black box 22 for a trusted component 18 residing on a user'scomputing device 14. Such installation may be performed remotely from thecomputing device 14 regardless of the privileges of the user of thecomputing device 14, and where ablack box server 24 is not necessarily directly network-accessible to thecomputing device 14. It should be appreciated that changes could be made to the embodiments described above without departing from the inventive concepts thereof. It should be understood, therefore, that this invention is not limited to the particular embodiments disclosed, but it is intended to cover modifications within the spirit and scope of the present invention as defined by the appended claims.
Claims (23)
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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US11/516,813 US8136166B2 (en) | 2002-10-21 | 2006-09-06 | Installation of black box for trusted component for digital rights management (DRM) on computing device |
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US10/274,630 US7152245B2 (en) | 2002-10-21 | 2002-10-21 | Installation of black box for trusted component for digital rights management (DRM) on computing device |
US11/516,813 US8136166B2 (en) | 2002-10-21 | 2006-09-06 | Installation of black box for trusted component for digital rights management (DRM) on computing device |
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US8136166B2 (en) | 2012-03-13 |
US7152245B2 (en) | 2006-12-19 |
US20040078581A1 (en) | 2004-04-22 |
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