US20150082052A1 - Encryption-enabled interfaces - Google Patents
Encryption-enabled interfaces Download PDFInfo
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- US20150082052A1 US20150082052A1 US14/512,496 US201414512496A US2015082052A1 US 20150082052 A1 US20150082052 A1 US 20150082052A1 US 201414512496 A US201414512496 A US 201414512496A US 2015082052 A1 US2015082052 A1 US 2015082052A1
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/82—Protecting input, output or interconnection devices
- G06F21/83—Protecting input, output or interconnection devices input devices, e.g. keyboards, mice or controllers thereof
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/82—Protecting input, output or interconnection devices
- G06F21/84—Protecting input, output or interconnection devices output devices, e.g. displays or monitors
Definitions
- the present invention relates generally to data decryption, and specifically to methods and devices for preventing unauthorized parties from accessing decrypted data.
- Data encryption is widely used in preventing unauthorized access to data.
- Various methods of data encryption are known in the art. In general, these methods use a key to convert data to a form that is unintelligible to a reader (human or machine), and require an appropriate key in order to decrypt the data.
- Symmetric encryption methods use the same key for both encryption and decryption. Such symmetric methods include the well-known DES (Data Encryption Standard) and AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) algorithms.
- DES Data Encryption Standard
- AES Advanced Encryption Standard
- asymmetric encryption methods such as the RSA (Rivest Shamir Adelman) algorithm, a computer that is to receive encrypted data generates complementary public and private keys and transmits the public key to the sender. After the sender has encrypted the data using the public key, only the holder of the private key can decrypt it.
- Embodiments of the present invention provide methods and apparatus for encryption and decryption that can be used to prevent unauthorized parties from accessing decrypted data on the receiving computer.
- a decryption processor reads and decrypts encrypted data from an input memory that receives the encrypted data, but the decryption processor is incapable of writing to the input memory. Rather, the decryption processor is coupled to convey the decrypted data solely to an output transducer, such as a video display, printer, or audio speaker, for presentation to the user.
- the decrypted data are never held on the receiving computer in a memory that could be accessed by unauthorized parties, and there is no link available over which the decryption processor could be made to transmit the decrypted data out of the computer other than directly to the output transducer.
- an encryption processor is coupled between an input transducer, such as a keyboard, microphone, touch screen or imaging device, and the computer.
- the encryption processor receives and encrypts input data signals from the input transducer, so that the data input to the computer are already encrypted.
- the computer is able to access the input transducer only via the encryption processor, so that an unauthorized party cannot gain access to the clear signals that are produced by the input transducer itself.
- the computer may then transmit and/or store the input data from the input transducer in encrypted form, without ever having to decrypt the data.
- decryption apparatus including:
- an input memory which is coupled to receive encrypted data
- an output transducer for presenting decrypted data to a user
- a decryption processor which is coupled to read and decrypt the encrypted data from the input memory but is incapable of writing to the input memory, and which is coupled to convey the decrypted data to the output transducer for presentation to the user.
- the apparatus includes an output memory, which is coupled to receive the decrypted data from the decryption processor and to output the decrypted data to the output transducer, wherein the input memory is coupled to receive the encrypted data from a central processing unit (CPU) of a computer, and wherein the output memory is inaccessible to the CPU.
- CPU central processing unit
- the decryption processor has an output that is coupled to the output transducer, and the apparatus includes a central processing unit (CPU) and a communication interface, wherein the CPU is coupled to receive the encrypted data from the communication interface and to write the encrypted data to the input memory, and wherein the CPU is unable to access the output of the decryption processor.
- the output transducer includes a video display, and the CPU is arranged to define a window on the video display for presentation of the decrypted data, and wherein the decryption processor is arranged to write the decrypted data to the window. Additionally or alternatively, the decryption processor is arranged to decrypt the encrypted data using a predetermined key, and the CPU is unable to access the predetermined key.
- the output transducer may include a video display, an audio speaker, or a printer.
- a method for decryption including:
- a computer input device for operation with a computer including:
- an input transducer which is coupled to receive an input from a user and to generate a data signal responsively to the input
- an encryption processor which is coupled to process the data signal so as to output data to the computer, and which has a first operational mode in which the encryption processor encrypts the data signal using an encryption key not accessible to the computer so that the data are unintelligible to the computer, and a second operational mode in which the data are intelligible to the computer;
- a mode switch which is operable by a user so as to switch between the first and second operational modes of the encryption processor.
- a method for inputting data to a computer including:
- an encryption processor which has a first operational mode in which the encryption processor encrypts the data signal using an encryption key not accessible to the computer so that the data are unintelligible to the computer, and a second operational mode in which the data are intelligible to the computer;
- FIG. 1 is a schematic, pictorial illustration of a system for transmission, reception and processing of encrypted data, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram that schematically shows elements of a terminal for encrypting and decrypting data, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 3 is a flow chart that schematically illustrates a method for decrypting and displaying encrypted data, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic, pictorial illustration of a system for transmission, reception and decryption of encrypted data, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
- a source computer 24 transmits encrypted data over a network 22 to a receiving terminal 20 .
- the data may be encrypted in accordance with any suitable method of encryption that is known in the art, including both symmetric and asymmetric methods.
- Network 22 may comprise the Internet or substantially any other public or private computer network.
- Terminal 20 comprises a computer console 26 , which is coupled to one or more output transducers for converting data in the console to a form in which a human user can receive and understand the data content.
- Examples of output transducers that are shown in FIG. 1 include a video display screen 28 , audio speakers 30 and a printer 32 .
- display screen 28 is used as the target transducer for purposes of secure decryption of encrypted data received by terminal 20 .
- the audio speakers or printer may be used for this purpose, as may output transducers of other types (not shown in the figures).
- terminal 20 also comprises one or more user input devices, which may comprise text, image capture and/or audio input transducers.
- the text input transducer comprises a keyboard 34 .
- the user input devices may comprise a camera 36 , or a microphone 38 , or a touch-sensitive screen, scanner or other types of input devices known in the art (not shown in the figures).
- certain techniques for secure input of encrypted data to console 26 are described, by way of example, with reference to keyboard 34 . These techniques may similarly be applied, mutatis mutandis, to input devices of other types.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram that schematically shows details of console 26 , in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
- Console 26 may be a general-purpose computer with a specialized display adapter 46 , which performs secure data decryption functions.
- the decryption functions of adapter 46 may be performed by a decryption circuit that is integrated into the electronics of screen 28 (or similarly integrated into the electronics of another type of output transducer), rather than into the computer console.
- keyboard 34 is adapted, as described hereinbelow, to perform secure data encryption.
- terminal 20 may comprise one or more dedicated, special-purpose devices that implement the principles of secure decryption and/or encryption that are described herein. Although for the sake of completeness, both secure decryption and secure encryption functions are illustrated in FIG. 2 , terminal may alternatively be configured with only secure decryption or only secure encryption capabilities.
- Console 26 comprises a central processing unit (CPU) 40 , which performs general computing functions.
- CPU 40 is coupled via a communication interface 42 to transmit and receive data to and from network 22 .
- the console comprises a memory 44 (which may typically comprise both RAM and disk memory), which is accessed by the CPU in a conventional manner.
- memory 44 which may typically comprise both RAM and disk memory
- CPU 40 writes the encrypted data to memory 44 .
- the key required to decrypt the data may also be held in the memory.
- the CPU would then decrypt the data using this key, and then would output the decrypted data to the user automatically or upon request. In the course of such a process, the CPU typically writes the decrypted data to memory 44 .
- CPU 40 does not decrypt the encrypted data transmitted by source computer 24 . Rather, the CPU writes the encrypted data to an adapter memory 48 of display adapter 46 .
- Memory 48 serves as the input memory for decryption purposes.
- a decryption processor 50 in the display adapter then decodes the encrypted data using the appropriate key and program instructions stored in a program memory 52 .
- the decryption processor may comprise a programmable processing device, such as a microprocessor or field-programmable gate array (FPGA), or it may alternatively comprise a hard-coded logic device. (In the latter case, memory 52 may be unnecessary, or this memory may be used only to hold the decryption key and/or other basic operating data.)
- Processor 50 writes the decrypted data to a screen memory 54 , typically in the form of either a bitmap or of characters and/or vectors for rendering to screen 28 .
- the screen memory thus serves as the output memory for the decryption process.
- a screen driver circuit 56 drives screen 28 to display the contents of memory 54 .
- decryption processor 50 may feed the screen driver circuit directly, or the functions of the decryption processor and the screen driver may be integrated in a single integrated circuit.
- decryption processor 50 is coupled to adapter memory 48 in a read-only configuration, i.e., the processor is able to read from the adapter, but not to write back to the adapter.
- This configuration may be implemented physically in hardware, by connecting the write output of processor 50 to screen memory 54 , but not to adapter memory 48 .
- the screen memory may be configured so that processor 50 can overwrite the memory contents, but the contents of the memory may be read out only by screen driver circuit 56 .
- decryption processor 50 may be configured in software to disable write access to memory 48 (and to other elements outside adapter 46 ), but if so, it is desirable that the software be stored in a way that prevents unauthorized parties from accessing and changing it.
- Adapter 46 may be configured as a plug-in card, which takes the place of a conventional display adapter in console 26 .
- terminal 20 may be a standard personal computer, which is enhanced for secure data decryption by installation of adapter 46 .
- some or all of the functions of adapter 46 may be integrated into the motherboard of console 26 .
- the secure decryption functions of adapter 46 may be integrated into the electronics of display screen 28 , in the form of suitable hardware components and/or embedded software.
- console 26 outputs encrypted data to screen 28 , and the circuitry in the screen decrypts and displays the data.
- the elements of adapter 46 are shown in FIG. 2 , for the sake of clarity, as separate functional blocks, in practice some or all of these functional blocks may be combined into in or more integrated circuit chips.
- a sound card with decryption capabilities may be coupled to drive speakers 30 to play decrypted messages, or a printer interface with decryption capabilities may drive printer 32 to print decrypted text and/or graphics.
- a printer interface with decryption capabilities may drive printer 32 to print decrypted text and/or graphics.
- the secure decryption capabilities in these example may be incorporated in console 26 or in the speakers or printer.
- the secure encryption functions of terminal 20 are embodied in keyboard 34 .
- the keyboard comprises a set of keys 53 , which generate respective data signals when depressed by the user, as is known in the art. These data signals are digitized and, optionally, held in a buffer 55 . The digitized data signals are then encoded by an encryption processor 57 , using an appropriate key and program instructions stored in a program memory 58 .
- the encryption processor may comprise a programmable processing device, such as a microprocessor or field-programmable gate array (FPGA), or it may alternatively comprise a hard-coded logic device, as in the case of decryption processor 50 .
- encryption processor 57 is integrated with keyboard 34 , typically within the keyboard package. Alternatively, the encryption processor may be packaged separately from the keyboard. Further alternatively or additionally, the functions of decryption processor 50 and encryption processor 57 may be integrated together in a single, secure input/output unit.
- encryption processor 57 has two modes of operation:
- the user In normal operation, the user maintains switch 59 in the clear position, so that the user can interact with terminal via keyboard 34 in the conventional manner. From time to time, however, the user may toggle switch 59 to the encryption mode, whereupon encryption processor 57 will output encrypted data to CPU 40 .
- the CPU in this case is unable to decipher the encrypted data (and cannot access the unencrypted data signals in the keyboard), but rather stores the encrypted data in memory 44 or transmits the encrypted data via communication interface 42 in accordance with instructions that the CPU received previously.
- computer 24 may prompt the user to flip switch 59 to the encryption mode position before inputting some particularly sensitive item of information.
- Software running on the terminal may prompt CPU 40 to generate a data packet for transmission to computer 24 , and to insert the encrypted data that are entered via keyboard 34 into the payload of the packet before transmission.
- Computer 24 holds the necessary key to decrypt the payload upon reception, but CPU 40 does not have access to the key. Therefore, even if a hacker were to gain control over the CPU and copy the data transmitted to computer 24 , the hacker will still have no way of deciphering the encrypted payload data.
- FIG. 3 is a flow chart that schematically illustrates a method for decrypting and displaying encrypted data, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. The method is described, for the sake of clarity, with reference to the hardware configuration shown in FIG. 2 , but it may similarly be carried out, mutatis mutandis, in other configurations, such as those mentioned above.
- terminal 20 functions is a personal computer, which runs a window-based operating system and carries out other sorts of computer applications, in addition to the secure decryption function of display adapter 46 . Therefore, the display adapter is capable of displaying both the decrypted data and other, non-secure application data on the same screen simultaneously.
- Decryption processor 50 may be bypassed or operate in pass-through mode for displaying the non-secure data.
- the method may be simplified, as will be apparent to those skilled in the art, if adapter 46 is limited to displaying decrypted data in full-screen mode.
- CPU 40 opens a window on screen 28 in which the decrypted data are to be displayed, at a window definition step 60 .
- the CPU opens the decryption window in response to a command by the user of terminal 20 when the user wishes to read an encrypted message or other encrypted data.
- the CPU may open the window automatically upon receipt of encrypted data from source computer 24 .
- the CPU then writes the encrypted data that are to be decrypted and displayed in the window to adapter memory 48 , at a data input step 62 . Together with the data, the CPU submits a header or other instructions to processor 50 indicating that the data should be decrypted (and possibly including decryption parameters, such as a key identifier), and defining the window in which the decrypted data should be displayed. Decryption processor 50 reads the instructions, decrypts the data, and writes the decrypted data to the appropriate address range in screen memory 54 , at a decryption step 64 .
- the decrypted data may have the form of alphanumeric characters, a bitmap, or graphical vectors, depending on the type of data involved and the rendering capabilities of screen driver 56 .
- the screen driver reads the decrypted data from memory 54 , and displays the decrypted content in the appropriate window on screen 28 , at a display step 66 .
- the method described above is suitable for displaying a single block of data (characters and/or graphics) of a predetermined size.
- the user may prompt CPU 40 to return to step 62 and feed the next block of encrypted data to adapter 46 .
- CPU 40 may load a file of data into adapter memory 48 , and decoder 50 may be configured to receive various user inputs so that the user can navigate through the file and change display parameters while viewing the file contents on screen 28 .
- the decryption processor may be programmed to support a Web browser-type interface in the window assigned for display of decrypted data.
- CPU 40 may pass encrypted graphical and text objects, together with markup-language instructions (which may or may not be encrypted) to adapter 46 , which then displays the decrypted graphics and text in the browser interface.
- the decryption processor may similarly be programmed to support application interfaces of other types.
- terminal 20 may also be configured to receive user input, via keyboard 34 , for example, in response to the decrypted data that are displayed on screen 28 .
- the encryption function of processor 57 may be turned on when secure encryption of the user input is required.
- the keyboard is not configured for secure encryption, the user input will reach CPU 40 in non-encrypted form, and may therefore be vulnerable to unauthorized access. Even so, application security is still enhanced, because the unauthorized party is unable to modify the contents of the display that has prompted the user input.
- a malicious party may attempt to spoof certain contents of the screen, in order to cause the user to approve a transfer of funds to a different account and/or in a different amount from the account and/or amount that are actually displayed on the screen. If the application uses secure decryption, as described above, the malicious party will be barred from access to the screen contents, and this sort of spoofing is prevented.
Abstract
Decryption apparatus includes an input memory (48), which is coupled to receive encrypted data, and an output transducer (28), for presenting decrypted data to a user. A decryption processor (50) is coupled to read and decrypt the encrypted data from the input memory but is incapable of writing to the input memory, and is coupled to convey the decrypted data to the output transducer for presentation to the user.
Description
- The present invention relates generally to data decryption, and specifically to methods and devices for preventing unauthorized parties from accessing decrypted data.
- Data encryption is widely used in preventing unauthorized access to data. Various methods of data encryption are known in the art. In general, these methods use a key to convert data to a form that is unintelligible to a reader (human or machine), and require an appropriate key in order to decrypt the data. Symmetric encryption methods use the same key for both encryption and decryption. Such symmetric methods include the well-known DES (Data Encryption Standard) and AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) algorithms. In asymmetric encryption methods, such as the RSA (Rivest Shamir Adelman) algorithm, a computer that is to receive encrypted data generates complementary public and private keys and transmits the public key to the sender. After the sender has encrypted the data using the public key, only the holder of the private key can decrypt it.
- Modern methods of encryption make it very difficult for a malicious party who intercepts an encrypted message to decrypt the message contents. On the other hand, once a computer that receives the message has decrypted it using the proper key and method, the message contents are typically held in clear (unencrypted) form on the receiving computer, at least temporarily. If a malicious party can gain access to the memory (RAM or disk) of the receiving computer (using a “Trojan horse” or other “spyware” program, for example), the malicious party will be able to read the message contents. Thus, the receiving computer itself becomes the weak link in the security chain over which encrypted messages are carried. A similar problem may occur with data that are input to the computer in clear form from an input device, before the computer has encrypted the data.
- Embodiments of the present invention provide methods and apparatus for encryption and decryption that can be used to prevent unauthorized parties from accessing decrypted data on the receiving computer. In some embodiments, a decryption processor reads and decrypts encrypted data from an input memory that receives the encrypted data, but the decryption processor is incapable of writing to the input memory. Rather, the decryption processor is coupled to convey the decrypted data solely to an output transducer, such as a video display, printer, or audio speaker, for presentation to the user. Therefore, the decrypted data are never held on the receiving computer in a memory that could be accessed by unauthorized parties, and there is no link available over which the decryption processor could be made to transmit the decrypted data out of the computer other than directly to the output transducer.
- In other embodiments, an encryption processor is coupled between an input transducer, such as a keyboard, microphone, touch screen or imaging device, and the computer. The encryption processor receives and encrypts input data signals from the input transducer, so that the data input to the computer are already encrypted. Typically, the computer is able to access the input transducer only via the encryption processor, so that an unauthorized party cannot gain access to the clear signals that are produced by the input transducer itself. The computer may then transmit and/or store the input data from the input transducer in encrypted form, without ever having to decrypt the data.
- There is therefore provided, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention, decryption apparatus, including:
- an input memory, which is coupled to receive encrypted data;
- an output transducer, for presenting decrypted data to a user; and
- a decryption processor, which is coupled to read and decrypt the encrypted data from the input memory but is incapable of writing to the input memory, and which is coupled to convey the decrypted data to the output transducer for presentation to the user.
- In one embodiment, the apparatus includes an output memory, which is coupled to receive the decrypted data from the decryption processor and to output the decrypted data to the output transducer, wherein the input memory is coupled to receive the encrypted data from a central processing unit (CPU) of a computer, and wherein the output memory is inaccessible to the CPU.
- In some embodiments, the decryption processor has an output that is coupled to the output transducer, and the apparatus includes a central processing unit (CPU) and a communication interface, wherein the CPU is coupled to receive the encrypted data from the communication interface and to write the encrypted data to the input memory, and wherein the CPU is unable to access the output of the decryption processor. In one embodiment, the output transducer includes a video display, and the CPU is arranged to define a window on the video display for presentation of the decrypted data, and wherein the decryption processor is arranged to write the decrypted data to the window. Additionally or alternatively, the decryption processor is arranged to decrypt the encrypted data using a predetermined key, and the CPU is unable to access the predetermined key.
- The output transducer may include a video display, an audio speaker, or a printer.
- There is also provided, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention, a method for decryption, including:
- receiving encrypted data in an input memory;
- reading and decrypting the encrypted data from the input memory using a decryption processor, which is incapable of writing to the input memory; and
- conveying the decrypted data from the decryption processor to an output transducer for presentation to a user.
- There is additionally provided, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention, a computer input device for operation with a computer, including:
- an input transducer, which is coupled to receive an input from a user and to generate a data signal responsively to the input;
- an encryption processor, which is coupled to process the data signal so as to output data to the computer, and which has a first operational mode in which the encryption processor encrypts the data signal using an encryption key not accessible to the computer so that the data are unintelligible to the computer, and a second operational mode in which the data are intelligible to the computer; and
- a mode switch, which is operable by a user so as to switch between the first and second operational modes of the encryption processor.
- There is further provided, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention, a method for inputting data to a computer, including:
- receiving a data signal from an input transducer responsively to an input by a user;
- processing the data signal so as to generate data for output to the computer using an encryption processor, which has a first operational mode in which the encryption processor encrypts the data signal using an encryption key not accessible to the computer so that the data are unintelligible to the computer, and a second operational mode in which the data are intelligible to the computer;
- setting a mode switch so as to select one of the first and second operational modes; and
- outputting the data to the computer in accordance with the selected one of the operational modes.
- The present invention will be more fully understood from the following detailed description of the embodiments thereof, taken together with the drawings in which:
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FIG. 1 is a schematic, pictorial illustration of a system for transmission, reception and processing of encrypted data, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention; -
FIG. 2 is a block diagram that schematically shows elements of a terminal for encrypting and decrypting data, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention; and -
FIG. 3 is a flow chart that schematically illustrates a method for decrypting and displaying encrypted data, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. -
FIG. 1 is a schematic, pictorial illustration of a system for transmission, reception and decryption of encrypted data, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. Asource computer 24 transmits encrypted data over anetwork 22 to a receivingterminal 20. The data may be encrypted in accordance with any suitable method of encryption that is known in the art, including both symmetric and asymmetric methods.Network 22 may comprise the Internet or substantially any other public or private computer network. -
Terminal 20 comprises acomputer console 26, which is coupled to one or more output transducers for converting data in the console to a form in which a human user can receive and understand the data content. Examples of output transducers that are shown inFIG. 1 include avideo display screen 28,audio speakers 30 and aprinter 32. In the description that follows,display screen 28 is used as the target transducer for purposes of secure decryption of encrypted data received byterminal 20. Alternatively, the audio speakers or printer may be used for this purpose, as may output transducers of other types (not shown in the figures). - Typically,
terminal 20 also comprises one or more user input devices, which may comprise text, image capture and/or audio input transducers. Typically, the text input transducer comprises akeyboard 34. Alternatively or additionally, the user input devices may comprise acamera 36, or amicrophone 38, or a touch-sensitive screen, scanner or other types of input devices known in the art (not shown in the figures). In the description that follows, certain techniques for secure input of encrypted data toconsole 26 are described, by way of example, with reference tokeyboard 34. These techniques may similarly be applied, mutatis mutandis, to input devices of other types. -
FIG. 2 is a block diagram that schematically shows details ofconsole 26, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.Console 26 may be a general-purpose computer with aspecialized display adapter 46, which performs secure data decryption functions. Alternatively, the decryption functions ofadapter 46 may be performed by a decryption circuit that is integrated into the electronics of screen 28 (or similarly integrated into the electronics of another type of output transducer), rather than into the computer console. Additionally or alternatively,keyboard 34 is adapted, as described hereinbelow, to perform secure data encryption. Further alternatively, terminal 20 may comprise one or more dedicated, special-purpose devices that implement the principles of secure decryption and/or encryption that are described herein. Although for the sake of completeness, both secure decryption and secure encryption functions are illustrated inFIG. 2 , terminal may alternatively be configured with only secure decryption or only secure encryption capabilities. -
Console 26 comprises a central processing unit (CPU) 40, which performs general computing functions.CPU 40 is coupled via acommunication interface 42 to transmit and receive data to and fromnetwork 22. The console comprises a memory 44 (which may typically comprise both RAM and disk memory), which is accessed by the CPU in a conventional manner. Typically, upon receiving an encrypted data transmission,CPU 40 writes the encrypted data tomemory 44. In conventional scenarios, the key required to decrypt the data may also be held in the memory. The CPU would then decrypt the data using this key, and then would output the decrypted data to the user automatically or upon request. In the course of such a process, the CPU typically writes the decrypted data tomemory 44. As a result, if a malicious party is able to gain access to the memory through a software security breach, for example, that party may be able to read the decrypted data (generally by causingCPU 40 or another component ofterminal 20 to transmit the decrypted data over network 22), notwithstanding the strength of the encryption that was used in transmission of the data over the network. - To avoid this sort of scenario in the present embodiment,
CPU 40 does not decrypt the encrypted data transmitted bysource computer 24. Rather, the CPU writes the encrypted data to anadapter memory 48 ofdisplay adapter 46.Memory 48 serves as the input memory for decryption purposes. Adecryption processor 50 in the display adapter then decodes the encrypted data using the appropriate key and program instructions stored in aprogram memory 52. The decryption processor may comprise a programmable processing device, such as a microprocessor or field-programmable gate array (FPGA), or it may alternatively comprise a hard-coded logic device. (In the latter case,memory 52 may be unnecessary, or this memory may be used only to hold the decryption key and/or other basic operating data.) -
Processor 50 writes the decrypted data to ascreen memory 54, typically in the form of either a bitmap or of characters and/or vectors for rendering to screen 28. The screen memory thus serves as the output memory for the decryption process. Ascreen driver circuit 56 drives screen 28 to display the contents ofmemory 54. Alternatively,decryption processor 50 may feed the screen driver circuit directly, or the functions of the decryption processor and the screen driver may be integrated in a single integrated circuit. - As illustrated by the directions of the arrows in
adapter 46,decryption processor 50 is coupled toadapter memory 48 in a read-only configuration, i.e., the processor is able to read from the adapter, but not to write back to the adapter. This configuration may be implemented physically in hardware, by connecting the write output ofprocessor 50 to screenmemory 54, but not toadapter memory 48. Similarly, the screen memory may be configured so thatprocessor 50 can overwrite the memory contents, but the contents of the memory may be read out only byscreen driver circuit 56. As a result, even if an unauthorized party is successful in gaining access, via a software breach, toCPU 40 and tomemories processor 50. Alternatively,decryption processor 50 may be configured in software to disable write access to memory 48 (and to other elements outside adapter 46), but if so, it is desirable that the software be stored in a way that prevents unauthorized parties from accessing and changing it. -
Adapter 46 may be configured as a plug-in card, which takes the place of a conventional display adapter inconsole 26. In this case, terminal 20 may be a standard personal computer, which is enhanced for secure data decryption by installation ofadapter 46. Alternatively, some or all of the functions ofadapter 46 may be integrated into the motherboard ofconsole 26. Further alternatively, as noted above, the secure decryption functions ofadapter 46 may be integrated into the electronics ofdisplay screen 28, in the form of suitable hardware components and/or embedded software. In this latter embodiment,console 26 outputs encrypted data to screen 28, and the circuitry in the screen decrypts and displays the data. Although the elements ofadapter 46 are shown inFIG. 2 , for the sake of clarity, as separate functional blocks, in practice some or all of these functional blocks may be combined into in or more integrated circuit chips. - As noted earlier, although the secure decryption functions of this embodiment are implemented in conjunction with
display screen 28, such functions may similarly be integrated with other types of output transducers. For example, a sound card with decryption capabilities may be coupled to drivespeakers 30 to play decrypted messages, or a printer interface with decryption capabilities may driveprinter 32 to print decrypted text and/or graphics. As in the case ofscreen 28, the secure decryption capabilities in these example may be incorporated inconsole 26 or in the speakers or printer. - The secure encryption functions of
terminal 20 are embodied inkeyboard 34. The keyboard comprises a set ofkeys 53, which generate respective data signals when depressed by the user, as is known in the art. These data signals are digitized and, optionally, held in abuffer 55. The digitized data signals are then encoded by anencryption processor 57, using an appropriate key and program instructions stored in aprogram memory 58. The encryption processor may comprise a programmable processing device, such as a microprocessor or field-programmable gate array (FPGA), or it may alternatively comprise a hard-coded logic device, as in the case ofdecryption processor 50. In the embodiment shown inFIG. 2 ,encryption processor 57 is integrated withkeyboard 34, typically within the keyboard package. Alternatively, the encryption processor may be packaged separately from the keyboard. Further alternatively or additionally, the functions ofdecryption processor 50 andencryption processor 57 may be integrated together in a single, secure input/output unit. - Typically,
encryption processor 57 has two modes of operation: - 1. An encryption mode, in which the processor encrypts the data signal using an encryption key that is not accessible to
CPU 40; and - 2. A clear mode, in which the encryption function of
processor 57 is turned off or bypassed, so that the output data from the keyboard are intelligible to the CPU, typically in the standard keyboard data output format.
A user-operable switch 59 permits the user to toggle between the two modes. The switch may simply be a manual switch on the keyboard package, so that even if a hacker gains access toconsole 26 viacommunication interface 42, for example, the hacker will be unable to change the switch setting. - In normal operation, the user maintains
switch 59 in the clear position, so that the user can interact with terminal viakeyboard 34 in the conventional manner. From time to time, however, the user may toggleswitch 59 to the encryption mode, whereuponencryption processor 57 will output encrypted data toCPU 40. The CPU in this case is unable to decipher the encrypted data (and cannot access the unencrypted data signals in the keyboard), but rather stores the encrypted data inmemory 44 or transmits the encrypted data viacommunication interface 42 in accordance with instructions that the CPU received previously. - For example, in a secure communication session between
computer 24 andterminal 20,computer 24 may prompt the user to flipswitch 59 to the encryption mode position before inputting some particularly sensitive item of information. Software running on the terminal may promptCPU 40 to generate a data packet for transmission tocomputer 24, and to insert the encrypted data that are entered viakeyboard 34 into the payload of the packet before transmission.Computer 24 holds the necessary key to decrypt the payload upon reception, butCPU 40 does not have access to the key. Therefore, even if a hacker were to gain control over the CPU and copy the data transmitted tocomputer 24, the hacker will still have no way of deciphering the encrypted payload data. -
FIG. 3 is a flow chart that schematically illustrates a method for decrypting and displaying encrypted data, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. The method is described, for the sake of clarity, with reference to the hardware configuration shown inFIG. 2 , but it may similarly be carried out, mutatis mutandis, in other configurations, such as those mentioned above. In the embodiment ofFIG. 3 , it is assumed that terminal 20 functions is a personal computer, which runs a window-based operating system and carries out other sorts of computer applications, in addition to the secure decryption function ofdisplay adapter 46. Therefore, the display adapter is capable of displaying both the decrypted data and other, non-secure application data on the same screen simultaneously. (Decryption processor 50 may be bypassed or operate in pass-through mode for displaying the non-secure data.) Alternatively, the method may be simplified, as will be apparent to those skilled in the art, ifadapter 46 is limited to displaying decrypted data in full-screen mode. - To initiate decryption,
CPU 40 opens a window onscreen 28 in which the decrypted data are to be displayed, at awindow definition step 60. Typically, the CPU opens the decryption window in response to a command by the user ofterminal 20 when the user wishes to read an encrypted message or other encrypted data. Alternatively, the CPU may open the window automatically upon receipt of encrypted data fromsource computer 24. - The CPU then writes the encrypted data that are to be decrypted and displayed in the window to
adapter memory 48, at adata input step 62. Together with the data, the CPU submits a header or other instructions toprocessor 50 indicating that the data should be decrypted (and possibly including decryption parameters, such as a key identifier), and defining the window in which the decrypted data should be displayed.Decryption processor 50 reads the instructions, decrypts the data, and writes the decrypted data to the appropriate address range inscreen memory 54, at adecryption step 64. As noted above, the decrypted data may have the form of alphanumeric characters, a bitmap, or graphical vectors, depending on the type of data involved and the rendering capabilities ofscreen driver 56. The screen driver reads the decrypted data frommemory 54, and displays the decrypted content in the appropriate window onscreen 28, at adisplay step 66. - The method described above is suitable for displaying a single block of data (characters and/or graphics) of a predetermined size. After viewing one block, the user may prompt
CPU 40 to return to step 62 and feed the next block of encrypted data toadapter 46. Alternatively, for interactive applications,CPU 40 may load a file of data intoadapter memory 48, anddecoder 50 may be configured to receive various user inputs so that the user can navigate through the file and change display parameters while viewing the file contents onscreen 28. For example, the decryption processor may be programmed to support a Web browser-type interface in the window assigned for display of decrypted data. In this case,CPU 40 may pass encrypted graphical and text objects, together with markup-language instructions (which may or may not be encrypted) toadapter 46, which then displays the decrypted graphics and text in the browser interface. The decryption processor may similarly be programmed to support application interfaces of other types. - As noted above, terminal 20 may also be configured to receive user input, via
keyboard 34, for example, in response to the decrypted data that are displayed onscreen 28. The encryption function ofprocessor 57 may be turned on when secure encryption of the user input is required. Alternatively, if the keyboard is not configured for secure encryption, the user input will reachCPU 40 in non-encrypted form, and may therefore be vulnerable to unauthorized access. Even so, application security is still enhanced, because the unauthorized party is unable to modify the contents of the display that has prompted the user input. For example, in an interactive banking application, a malicious party may attempt to spoof certain contents of the screen, in order to cause the user to approve a transfer of funds to a different account and/or in a different amount from the account and/or amount that are actually displayed on the screen. If the application uses secure decryption, as described above, the malicious party will be barred from access to the screen contents, and this sort of spoofing is prevented. - Although the description above relates to uses of embodiments of the present invention in preventing unauthorized access to decrypted data, the architecture and methods associated with these embodiments may also be useful in enhancing the efficiency and reliability of various encryption and decryption processes, as will be apparent to those skilled in the art. It will thus be appreciated that the embodiments described above are cited by way of example, and that the present invention is not limited to what has been particularly shown and described hereinabove. Rather, the scope of the present invention includes both combinations and subcombinations of the various features described hereinabove, as well as variations and modifications thereof which would occur to persons skilled in the art upon reading the foregoing description and which are not disclosed in the prior art.
Claims (13)
1-32. (canceled)
33. A computer terminal, comprising:
a communication interface, configured to be coupled to a network;
a secure input device, which comprises:
an input transducer, which is coupled to receive an input from a user and to generate a data signal responsively to the input;
an encryption processor, which is coupled to process the data signal so as to output data for transmission over the network, such that the data signal is not accessible outside the secure input device except in the data output by the encryption processor, and which has a secure operational mode in which the encryption processor generates the output data by encrypting the data signal using an encryption key not accessible to any elements of the computer terminal outside the secure input device so that the output data are unintelligible to such elements; and
a display configured to display non-secure data received from the network without decryption while the secure input device operates in the secure operational mode.
34. The terminal according to claim 33 , wherein the input transducer comprises a text input device.
35. The terminal according to claim 34 , wherein the text input transducer comprises a keyboard.
36. The terminal according to claim 33 , wherein the input transducer comprises an image capture device.
37. The terminal according to claim 33 , wherein the input transducer comprises an audio input device.
38. The terminal according to claim 33 , and comprising a central processing unit (CPU), which is coupled to receive the output data from the secure input device and to transmit the output data via the communication interface to the network,
wherein the encryption key is not accessible to the CPU, and the output data are unintelligible to the CPU.
39. A method for data communication, comprising:
in a secure input device of a computer terminal, receiving a data signal from an input transducer responsively to an input by a user;
processing the data signal using an encryption processor operating in the secure input device in a secure operational mode so as to generate data for output via a network, such that the data signal is not accessible outside the secure input device except in the data output by the encryption processor, which generates the output data in the secure operational mode by encrypting the data signal using an encryption key not accessible to any elements of the computer terminal outside the secure input device so that the output data are unintelligible to such elements;
transmitting the output data from the secure input device over a network to a computer; and
while the secure input device operates in the secure operational mode, receiving over the network non-secure data from the computer and displaying the non-secure data on the terminal.
40. The method according to claim 39 , wherein the input transducer comprises a text input device.
41. The method according to claim 40 , wherein the text input transducer comprises a keyboard.
42. The method according to claim 39 , wherein the input transducer comprises an image capture device.
43. The method according to claim 39 , wherein the input transducer comprises an audio input device.
44. The method according to claim 39 , wherein transmitting the output data comprises receiving the output data in a central processing unit (CPU) of the computer terminal and passing the output data from the CPU to the network,
wherein the encryption key is not accessible to the CPU, and the output data are unintelligible to the CPU.
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WO2008072234A3 (en) | 2009-05-07 |
EP2119075A4 (en) | 2011-07-06 |
HUE032806T2 (en) | 2017-11-28 |
WO2008072234A2 (en) | 2008-06-19 |
EP2119075A2 (en) | 2009-11-18 |
ES2623434T3 (en) | 2017-07-11 |
US20090300368A1 (en) | 2009-12-03 |
US9268957B2 (en) | 2016-02-23 |
IL180020A (en) | 2013-03-24 |
IL180020A0 (en) | 2007-12-03 |
EP2119075B1 (en) | 2017-02-08 |
US20100278339A1 (en) | 2010-11-04 |
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