US7800502B2 - Process for deterring the theft of notes, note, corresponding inactivation device and activation device - Google Patents
Process for deterring the theft of notes, note, corresponding inactivation device and activation device Download PDFInfo
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- US7800502B2 US7800502B2 US11/924,320 US92432007A US7800502B2 US 7800502 B2 US7800502 B2 US 7800502B2 US 92432007 A US92432007 A US 92432007A US 7800502 B2 US7800502 B2 US 7800502B2
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- note
- activation
- inactivation
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- code
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
- G06Q20/3415—Cards acting autonomously as pay-media
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
- G06Q20/3823—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction combining multiple encryption tools for a transaction
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07D—HANDLING OF COINS OR VALUABLE PAPERS, e.g. TESTING, SORTING BY DENOMINATIONS, COUNTING, DISPENSING, CHANGING OR DEPOSITING
- G07D7/00—Testing specially adapted to determine the identity or genuineness of valuable papers or for segregating those which are unacceptable, e.g. banknotes that are alien to a currency
- G07D7/01—Testing electronic circuits therein
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F17/00—Coin-freed apparatus for hiring articles; Coin-freed facilities or services
- G07F17/42—Coin-freed apparatus for hiring articles; Coin-freed facilities or services for ticket printing or like apparatus, e.g. apparatus for dispensing of printed paper tickets or payment cards
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1016—Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/12—Card verification
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07G—REGISTERING THE RECEIPT OF CASH, VALUABLES, OR TOKENS
- G07G1/00—Cash registers
- G07G1/0036—Checkout procedures
- G07G1/0045—Checkout procedures with a code reader for reading of an identifying code of the article to be registered, e.g. barcode reader or radio-frequency identity [RFID] reader
- G07G1/009—Checkout procedures with a code reader for reading of an identifying code of the article to be registered, e.g. barcode reader or radio-frequency identity [RFID] reader the reader being an RFID reader
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/56—Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
- H04L2209/805—Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/84—Vehicles
Definitions
- the field of the disclosure is that of deterring the theft of notes.
- the disclosure applies to making secure the transport of notes (bank notes, concert tickets, etc) using electronic tags, or radio-tags.
- bank notes are transported by means of fund transport companies and require the use of very expensive labour, and involve very high risks for the employees of the companies that are responsible for providing the security of this transport.
- the notes themselves have marks, which permit them to be authenticated and permit counterfeits to be restricted or prevented.
- the marking techniques used for notes are very advanced and are regularly updated according to the technical progress made in the field, with the use for example of serial numbers, water marks, holograms, magnetic strips, etc.
- RFID Radio Frequency Identification
- markers or radio-tags, themselves composed of a chip and an antenna, wherein the chip is not powered and uses the energy from a signal received to return a response signal and of receivers or readers.
- An aspect of the present disclosure relates to a process for deterring the theft of notes equipped with an authenticity check element of the radio-tag type, capable of returning an item of authenticity information, in response to an authentication request emitted by a checking device.
- Such a process comprises the following steps:
- an aspect of the disclosure is based on a novel and inventive approach for deterring the theft of notes, by rendering them invalid, or inactive, temporarily, notably during their transport, for example between a merchant and a bank.
- these notes are rendered non reactive or non authenticatable by any device which checks their authenticity.
- the process is non destructive. It permits of course the notes to be made once again valid, in order that they may be placed back into circulation. In this way, once these notes have been transported and received by the bank for example, they are reactivated so that they become once again valid. However, an additional specific code may be provided, rendering the note definitively inactive.
- the process may comprise one secured transmission step of at least one activation code or of at least one item of information permitting said activation code to be reconstructed, to an activation device.
- a reactivation device transmits a code, or an item of information, to each note.
- This information may notably comprise one or several items of data corresponding to or permitting the reconstruction of the activation code.
- said secured transmission step may be carried out via Internet.
- At least one said activation code is provided for each said note following the receipt of said inactivation request.
- the note provides the activation code itself permitting it to be reactivated later.
- This activation code is preferably unique and dependent on the inactivation request, so that the note only accepts reactivation by this activation code.
- the note may have this code, for example stored as soon as the note is placed in circulation, or it may even be calculated, notably dependent on the inactivation request.
- said inactivation request comprises at least one inactivation code, designed to be stored by said note upon receipt of said inactivation request. Said activation code is then dependent on said inactivation code.
- the note compares (using an appropriate algorithm), during reactivation, the activation code to the stored inactivation code, received in the inactivation request.
- the activation code may be provided by the note and/or by the inactivation device.
- said inactivation and/or activation codes may be obtained using an algorithm belonging to the group comprising:
- algorithms of the AES type (“Advanced Encryption Standard”), DES type (“Data Encryption Standard”) or HMAC-SHA type (“keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code—Secure Hash Algorithm” may be used.
- said notes may have at least the two states belonging to the group comprising:
- a note in the active state is capable of responding correctly to an authentication request, emitted for example during a purchase by the payment terminal responsible for verifying the validity of the notes.
- a note in the inactive state is not capable of responding correctly to an authentication request.
- a note in the inactive state may either not reply, or return an item of non authenticity or false note information, and thus be identified as being issued from a theft during a transport of invalid notes.
- said note equipped with said check element in the active state it is preferably capable of responding to at least one request belonging to the group comprising:
- a note in the active state may thus respond correctly to an authentication request.
- the note is moreover capable of receiving and processing a specific inactivation request.
- said process comprises advantageously an inhibition step, per said check element, of the capacity to respond to an authentication request, causing said note to switch to the inactive state.
- the radio-tag with which is equipped switches to a deactivated mode, in which it does not respond to an authentication request or emit an item of non-authenticity information.
- the activation device and/or the note use the following steps:
- the radio-tag of a note in the inactive state uses a verification mechanism for the validity of the activation code received, for example dependent on the activation code delivered by the note.
- This verification may also consist of a combination of the activation code received in the activation request, and the inactivation code stored during the inactivation step, dependent on a predetermined algorithm.
- the radio-tag of the note switches to a reactivated or valid mode, allowing the note to be used again.
- a permanent blocking mechanism may be provided in the deactivated mode (or the passage to a “definitively inactive” mode) in certain conditions, and for example beyond a predetermined number of reactivation attempts, or beyond a predetermined lapse of time.
- Such a note is equipped with a radio-tag type authenticity check element, capable of returning an item of authenticity information, in response to an authentication request emitted by a checking device.
- This check element comprises:
- Yet another aspect of the disclosure relates to an inactivation device of a radio-tag type authenticity check element which equips a note as previously described, designed to be used for example by a merchant.
- Such an inactivation device comprises the following means:
- such an inactivation device comprises means of transmitting to at least one activation device an activation code, capable of rendering the note valid.
- the disclosure also relates to an activation device of a radio-tag type authenticity check element which equips a note as previously described, which may for example be used by a bank.
- such an activation device comprises:
- inactivation and activation devices may be provided, regrouping the means of the two devices described above. These different devices may further comprise means, themselves known, for the authentication of notes.
- FIG. 1 illustrates one example of a system using an aspect of the disclosure
- FIG. 2 illustrates one example of steps of the process for deterring the theft of notes in one specific embodiment of the disclosure
- FIG. 3 shows a block diagram of a process of activation and inactivation of notes used in one embodiment of the disclosure
- FIG. 4 shows, diagrammatically, the means used in one note of the disclosure
- FIG. 5 shows one example of different states that a note may adopt in one specific embodiment of the disclosure.
- the general principle of an exemplary aspect of the disclosure is therefore based on the use of a system of radio-identification on the notes and the inactivation and the reactivation of the radio-tags.
- such a process permits a radio-tag to be rendered inactive so as to make a note non reactive or non authenticatable by any device checking its authenticity.
- note will be used to designate the note itself and the check element, or the radio-tag, with which it is equipped.
- FIG. 1 an example of a system using one embodiment of the disclosure.
- a note 10 used for a transaction is considered. This note is equipped with a check element 11 , notably permitting its authenticity to be checked.
- Such a check element 11 permits the note to adopt several states, notably according to the requests received from the different devices.
- a merchant wishes to transfer securely notes to his bank and for this purpose uses an inactivation device 12 for each note.
- Such a device of this specific embodiment of the disclosure permits the authentication capacities of the note 10 to be locked, by transmitting to it an inactivation code C 1 .
- this inactivation of the note is the same as fitting a lock to the note, or more precisely to the check element of the note, and to transmitting a key C 2 , to the device 14 in charge of the reactivation of the note, permitting the lock to be opened.
- an algorithm may notably be used, such as those used for encryption, such as for example AES-type (“Advanced Encryption Standard”), DES-type (“Data Encryption Standard”) or HMAC-SHA-type (“keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code—Secure Hash Algorithm”) algorithms.
- AES-type Advanced Encryption Standard
- DES-type Data Encryption Standard
- HMAC-SHA-type keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code—Secure Hash Algorithm
- the inactivation and the reactivation of the note may use an asymmetric algorithm, using a public key and a private key.
- the inactivation code C 1 corresponding to the “lock” fitted to the note, may use a CP public key sent by the activation device 14 to the inactivation device 12 .
- the latter transmits, at the time of the inactivation of the note, a private key C 2 to the device 14 , such as a function F (C 1 , C 2 ) permits the validity of the reactivation of the note to be verified.
- the inactivation request does not comprise an inactivation code.
- the note when it receives this request, generates a corresponding activation code, which will be required to reactivate it later.
- This code calculated by the note according to the inactivation request, is transmitted to the device which emits this request, and is stored in the note, for later validation of a reactivation request.
- This code is then transmitted, by the inactivation device, to the activation device, in parallel to the transport of the inactivated notes.
- the note 10 thus rendered inactive is transported by a fund transport company 13 to the bank (which no longer needs to use an armoured vehicle).
- the bank therefore receives an inactive note, namely on which a “lock” has been fitted corresponding to an inactivation code C 1 .
- the activation device 14 of the bank then emits an activation request to the note, notably comprising a code C 2 , received securely from the inactivation device 12 .
- the note which receives this activation request must combine the codes C 1 and C 2 , that is to say to check if “the key C 2 indeed allows the lock C 1 to be opened”, to validate the activation request and thus return to the active state.
- the note is then once again in a state where its authentication capacities are again active.
- the note validates the activation request by comparing the activation code that it has in memory and that transmitted with the activation request. If these two codes match, then the request is validated and the note is again in the active state.
- inactivation and activation of notes ensure that only the holder of the correct activation code may reactivate an inactive note. In fact, in either case, the note only validates the activation request if it recognises the activation code corresponding to the inactivation request.
- FIG. 2 illustrates one example of the steps of the process in one specific embodiment of the disclosure, corresponding to the example described in FIG. 1 .
- a first step 20 for the transmission of an inactivation code to an active note is considered, step which for example may be used by an inactivation device by a merchant.
- the process then comprises one storage step 21 of the inactivation code by the note, for later reactivation.
- the check element of the note switches to a deactivated mode during one inhibition step 22 and the note is then in the inactive state.
- the merchant must also transmit to the bank to which the note is addressed, the corresponding activation code for the invalidated note, in a transmission step 23 of the activation code.
- a secured communication mode is used, for example via Internet.
- the inactive note is transported to the bank, during a transport step 24 .
- the transfer of the note in this case does not require any particular security, as the note transported is rendered non reactive to an authentication request. In fact, an inactive note stolen during its transport cannot respond correctly to an authentication request and will thus be recognised as a stolen note.
- the process may also be used for making secure storage of the notes.
- the merchant may need to invalidate (or “put to sleep”) notes to store them, for example during a week-end, and to then reactivate them so that they may be put back into circulation.
- the merchant may use note inactivation and activation devices, communicating with one another to transmit the activation codes.
- the activation and the inactivation may also be functions of a same device, which may also act as the authentication mechanism.
- the process comprises a step for reactivating the note 25 , implemented by an activation device.
- the latter then emits a specific activation request, destined to the inactive note, notably comprising the activation code received corresponding to the deactivated note.
- the step 20 corresponds to the transmission of an inactivation request, without an inactivation code
- the step 21 corresponds to the generation, by the note, of an activation code for its subsequent reactivation.
- the following steps, 22 , 23 and 24 are the same, the reactivation step 25 does not use a comparison of an inactivation code and an activation code, but a comparison between the activation code stored in 21 and that transmitted in the reactivation request in step 25 .
- FIG. 3 a block diagram of an activation and inactivation process for notes used in one embodiment of the disclosure.
- a note 10 is considered equipped with a check element of the disclosure.
- Such a note is capable of responding to an authentication request 300 emitted by a check device 30 , for example an authentication detector by a merchant to verify the validity of a note used during a transaction or an authentication detector used during a check of a ticket at the entrance to a sporting event or a show for example.
- the note 10 emits a response to this authentication request 300 , or challenge, in the form of an item of authenticity information 301 .
- this information 301 may adopt different values, such as an item of valid authenticity information (in the active state) or an item of invalid authenticity information (in the inactive state).
- an inactive note it may also not emit a response to an authentication request.
- This same note is also capable of receiving an inactivation request notably comprising a code C 1 , emitted by an inactivation device 12 , for example by a merchant wishing to make notes inactive before transmitting them to a bank, or to store them securely.
- Such a note may be reactivated when it is in the inactive state, by an activation device 14 which transmits an activation request to it, comprising an activation code C 2 , corresponding to the inactivation code C 1 previously received by the note.
- This activation device 14 may be used for example by a central department, for the first emission of the note (which may also, by default, be in the active state from the beginning), then by banks, to reactivate a note.
- the code C 1 is replaced by an inactivation request without an inactivation code, and the code C 2 is generated by the note and transmitted to the activation device when the inactivation request is made. Then this device transmits this code C 2 to the reactivation device.
- batch processing of notes may be used, using suitable algorithms.
- a note equipped with a check element is considered which permits it to receive and to respond to different requests, including authentication, inactivation and activation requests.
- the note first of all has reception means for the different requests and then distinct response means for these different requests.
- the response means to an authentication request permit the note to send an item of authenticity information, when it is in the inactive state.
- the note also has means of managing an inactivation request, comprising or not an inactivation code C 1 (corresponding to a lock) in the embodiment used, permitting the response means to be locked to an authentication request.
- an inactivation code C 1 corresponding to a lock
- the note has means of generating an activation code and storing it.
- the note also has means of managing a reactivation request, notably comprising an activation code C 2 .
- Such management means notably comprise means of validating the request, that is to say means of combining the stored inactivation code C 1 and the received activation code C 2 . In this way, these validation means determine if “the key C 2 permits the lock C 1 to be unlocked”. If this is the case, then the means for managing the reactivation request take into account this request and reactivate the request response means to an authentication request. Otherwise, the means for managing the reactivation request do not take this request into account and the note remains in the inactive state.
- these means of validating the request are in fact means of comparing the activation code received in this request and the activation code generated and stored at the time of the inactivation.
- a note is considered in the active A or valid state, which may receive at least two types of requests:
- the note may also receive an activation request, to which it will not respond as it is already in the active state.
- the note As the note is active, it emits in response an item of authenticity information 51 , permitting the device emitting the request to validate the use of the note.
- the note first stores at least one inactivation code, in a storage step 53 , for later reactivation.
- the note may store information which permits it to reconstruct later the inactivation code, and to validate an activation request.
- the note itself generates an activation code, which it stores and emits, in response to the inactivation request.
- the note inhibits its response capacities to an authentication request, in one predetermined inactivity mode, and is then in the inactive I or invalid state.
- This predetermined inactivity mode defines the response 54 of the note to an authentication request 50 , which may adopt the following forms:
- the note may thus receive two types of request:
- the note In the case of an activation request 55 , the note first determines the validity of the request, in a validity verification step 56 . To do so, it uses the inactivation code or the items of information permitting it to reconstruct its inactivation code, stored in the inactivation step, and compares it to the activation code received in the reactivation request.
- the note uses the activation code stored previously, to compare it to the activation code received in the activation request.
- the note is in the active state A, and regains its capacities to respond to authentication requests and to inactivation requests.
- One or more aspects of the present disclosure overcome disadvantages of the prior art.
- an aspect of the disclosure provides a technique that permits the theft of notes to be fought, notably during their transport or storage, efficiently and reliably.
- Another aspect of the disclosure provides such a technique for deterring the theft of notes, which is relatively inexpensive and simple to implement.
Abstract
Description
-
- transmission to said check element of at least one inactivation request, rendering the note invalid;
- delivery by said note of at least one activation code or at least one item of information permitting said activation code to be reconstructed;
- secured transmission of at least said one activation code or at least said one information permitting said activation code to be reconstructed, to an activation device;
- storage and/or transport of said invalid note;
- re-activation of said check element by said activation device, using at least said one activation code, rendering said note valid.
-
- numbering algorithms;
- MAC type algorithms;
- hash algorithms.
-
- an active state, in which a note is capable of returning an item of authenticity information, in response to an authentication request;
- an inactive state, in which a note does not return a response, following an authentication request, or provide a non authenticity response.
-
- an authentication request;
- an inactivation request.
-
- verification of the validity of the activation code received dependent on the activation code delivered by said note, and delivery of an item of validity information, positive or negative, for the reactivation;
- switching of said note to the active state, if said validity information is positive.
-
- inactivation means, in response to an inactivation request, rendering said note invalid;
- means of delivery of at least one activation code or at least one item of information permitting said activation code to be reconstructed;
- re-activation means, using at least one activation code, rendering said note valid.
-
- means for transmitting to said check element at least one inactivation request, rendering the note invalid;
- means of storing at least one activation code or at least one item of information permitting said activation code to be reconstructed, delivered by said note, for the re-activation of said check element.
-
- means of receiving at least one activation code or at least one item of information permitting said activation code to be reconstructed, delivered by said note;
- means for transmitting to said check element at least one activation code, rendering the note valid.
-
- an
authentication request 50; - an
inactivation request 52.
- an
-
- non response: the note is “silent” and does not respond to an authentication request;
- incorrect response: the note emits an incorrect item of authenticity information, which does not correspond to any expected response;
- non authenticity response: the note emits an explicit item of information of non authenticity or false note.
-
- an
authentication request 50; - an
activation request 55.
- an
Claims (14)
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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FR06/09390 | 2006-10-25 | ||
FR0609390A FR2907948B1 (en) | 2006-10-25 | 2006-10-25 | METHOD OF FIGHT AGAINST TICKET FLIGHT, TICKET, CORRESPONDING INACTIVATION DEVICE AND ACTIVATION DEVICE |
FR0609390 | 2006-10-25 |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
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US20080100449A1 US20080100449A1 (en) | 2008-05-01 |
US7800502B2 true US7800502B2 (en) | 2010-09-21 |
Family
ID=37964620
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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US11/924,320 Active 2028-12-29 US7800502B2 (en) | 2006-10-25 | 2007-10-25 | Process for deterring the theft of notes, note, corresponding inactivation device and activation device |
Country Status (4)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US7800502B2 (en) |
EP (1) | EP1916631B1 (en) |
AT (1) | ATE518218T1 (en) |
FR (1) | FR2907948B1 (en) |
Cited By (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US20060248517A1 (en) * | 2003-04-01 | 2006-11-02 | Eduard Bartsch | Method and computer system for activation of source files |
US9811671B1 (en) | 2000-05-24 | 2017-11-07 | Copilot Ventures Fund Iii Llc | Authentication method and system |
US9818249B1 (en) | 2002-09-04 | 2017-11-14 | Copilot Ventures Fund Iii Llc | Authentication method and system |
US9846814B1 (en) | 2008-04-23 | 2017-12-19 | Copilot Ventures Fund Iii Llc | Authentication method and system |
Families Citing this family (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
SE531614C2 (en) * | 2007-11-27 | 2009-06-09 | Mikael Gaardhagen | Value-bearing unit and system for safe management of value-bearing units |
US7940073B1 (en) * | 2008-12-05 | 2011-05-10 | Kovio, Inc. | Deactivation of integrated circuits |
Citations (13)
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US4114140A (en) * | 1977-04-25 | 1978-09-12 | Engineered Systems, Inc. | Verification checking system |
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US9818249B1 (en) | 2002-09-04 | 2017-11-14 | Copilot Ventures Fund Iii Llc | Authentication method and system |
US20060248517A1 (en) * | 2003-04-01 | 2006-11-02 | Eduard Bartsch | Method and computer system for activation of source files |
US7921417B2 (en) * | 2003-04-01 | 2011-04-05 | Sap Ag | Method and computer system for activation of source files |
US9846814B1 (en) | 2008-04-23 | 2017-12-19 | Copilot Ventures Fund Iii Llc | Authentication method and system |
US10275675B1 (en) | 2008-04-23 | 2019-04-30 | Copilot Ventures Fund Iii Llc | Authentication method and system |
US11200439B1 (en) | 2008-04-23 | 2021-12-14 | Copilot Ventures Fund Iii Llc | Authentication method and system |
US11600056B2 (en) | 2008-04-23 | 2023-03-07 | CoPilot Ventures III LLC | Authentication method and system |
US11924356B2 (en) | 2008-04-23 | 2024-03-05 | Copilot Ventures Fund Iii Llc | Authentication method and system |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
EP1916631B1 (en) | 2011-07-27 |
ATE518218T1 (en) | 2011-08-15 |
US20080100449A1 (en) | 2008-05-01 |
EP1916631A1 (en) | 2008-04-30 |
FR2907948A1 (en) | 2008-05-02 |
FR2907948B1 (en) | 2009-01-30 |
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