US9154302B2 - System and method for secure two-factor authenticated ID-based key exchange and remote login using an insecure token and simple second-factor such as a PIN number - Google Patents
System and method for secure two-factor authenticated ID-based key exchange and remote login using an insecure token and simple second-factor such as a PIN number Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- US9154302B2 US9154302B2 US13/749,408 US201313749408A US9154302B2 US 9154302 B2 US9154302 B2 US 9154302B2 US 201313749408 A US201313749408 A US 201313749408A US 9154302 B2 US9154302 B2 US 9154302B2
- Authority
- US
- United States
- Prior art keywords
- client
- authentication service
- curve
- trusted authority
- authentication
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Active, expires
Links
Images
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
- H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
- H04L9/0844—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
- H04L9/0847—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving identity based encryption [IBE] schemes
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L9/3066—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
- H04L9/3073—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves involving pairings, e.g. identity based encryption [IBE], bilinear mappings or bilinear pairings, e.g. Weil or Tate pairing
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3234—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/44—Program or device authentication
- G06F21/445—Program or device authentication by mutual authentication, e.g. between devices or programs
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2207/00—Indexing scheme relating to methods or arrangements for processing data by operating upon the order or content of the data handled
- G06F2207/72—Indexing scheme relating to groups G06F7/72 - G06F7/729
- G06F2207/7204—Prime number generation or prime number testing
Definitions
- the present invention is in the field of electronic authentication and authenticated key agreement.
- the purpose of the invention is to provide a method of authenticated key agreement in a client to server setting that advances the concept of two-factor authentication and provides an alternative to token based schemes that are often based on expensive (and irreplaceable) smart-card tokens, and provides an alternative to password-only schemes require that username and password management in a client and server context.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating the internal components and the external components interacting with the entire system and method in the preferred embodiment of the invention.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram that illustrates the steps taken that securely initializes the set-up phase of the Trusted Authority (TA) according to an embodiment of the invention.
- TA Trusted Authority
- FIG. 3 is a block diagram that illustrates the steps taken that securely initializes the set-up phase of the Authentication Service Layer and its interaction with the Trusted Authority (TA) according to an embodiment of the invention.
- TA Trusted Authority
- FIG. 4 is a block diagram that illustrates the steps taken that securely distributes the Secret Number to the Client from the Trusted Authority (TA) according to an embodiment of the invention.
- TA Trusted Authority
- FIG. 5 is a block diagram that illustrates the steps taken that for the Client to initialize their Secret Number into the Token and PIN form using the Initialization Program, and stores their Token.
- FIG. 6 is a block diagram that illustrates the steps taken between the Client and the Authentication Service Layer to receive the Authentication Program and lookup the Client's Token.
- FIG. 7 is a block diagram that illustrates the steps taken between the Client and the Authentication Service Layer to construct the authenticated key agreement protocol using the Authentication Program according to an embodiment of the invention.
- Our system and method has desirable security properties including the required use of a large identity-based secret number and a PIN number, as this gives in effect strong 2-factor authentication.
- Another desirable feature is that a rogue client who steals another Client's long-term secret is not able to determine their PIN by performing off-line key-exchanges with themselves. That is, Clients should only be able to exchange keys with servers, not with other Clients.
- the object of the invention is to provide a system and method of authenticated ID-based key exchange and remote login with insecure token and PIN number that,
- the main components of the invention include a Trusted Authority (TA), responsible for generating a Master Secret, an Authentication System that receives a secret number from the TA, and a Client that receives a secret number from the TA.
- TA Trusted Authority
- the Client performs an additional step through the system and method whereby it allows the user of the Client system to create a desired PIN number, which during this additional step results in a Token being generated.
- This Token can then be stored insecurely, and the PIN, which in the preferred embodiment of the invention, is committed to memory by the User of the Client for later use.
- the Trusted Authority is a computer process running on a computer or server that generates a Master Secret.
- the TA is responsible for initially enrolling participants on the system, and allotting identifiers to these entities, for example, using an email address for Clients, and a URL for Authentication Services.
- the TA uses the identifiers to map them using a suitable hash function to points on a particular elliptic curve.
- the Authentication Service is a computer process running on a computer or server that receives a secret number from the Trusted Authority. It participates with the Client in the authenticated key agreement protocol to mutually verify each other's identity and generate a session key.
- the Client is a computer process running on a computer or server that that receives a secret number from the Trusted Authority. For avoidance of doubt, there is a user of the Client, generally a human being.
- the Client participates with the Authentication Service in the authenticated key agreement protocol to mutually verify each other's identity and generate a session key.
- the Trusted Authority (TA) ( 10 ) can be software running on a computer, or a dedicated hardware device, that contains a processor ( 11 ) with the appropriate computer code running the instructions. Additionally, the TA will create a Master Secret ( 12 ) and store the Master Secret is Secured Storage ( 13 ), ideally, in the preferred embodiment of the invention, storage that is tamper proof and tamper resistant. In the preferred embodiment of the invention, the Trusted Authority ( 10 ) sends to the Client ( 30 ) over a secure network connection its Secret Number ( 32 ) a computer program, i.e.
- the Initialization Program which programmatically enables the Client ( 30 ), using the Secret Number ( 32 ), to construct its PIN ( 34 ) and store the its Token ( 33 ) in the Client's browser storage ( 35 ) or other insecure storage medium.
- the Authentication Service ( 20 ) can be software running on a computer, or a dedicated hardware device, that contains a processor ( 21 ) with the appropriate computer code capable running the instructions.
- the Authentication Service ( 20 ) is enrolled with the Trusted Authority ( 10 ) to obtain its own Secret Number ( 22 ).
- the Secret Number ( 22 ) is stored in Secured Storage ( 23 ), storage that is tamper proof and tamper resistant.
- the Authentication Service ( 20 ) sends to the Client ( 30 ) over a secure network connection a computer program, i.e.
- the Authentication Program which programmatically enables the Client ( 30 ) to reconstruct it's Secret Number ( 32 ) from the PIN ( 34 ) and Token ( 33 ) and engages in the authenticated key agreement protocol with the Authentication Service ( 20 ).
- the Client ( 30 ) can be software running on a computer, or a dedicated hardware device, that contains a processor ( 31 ) with the appropriate computer code running the instructions.
- the Client will also have access to Storage ( 35 ) for the purpose of storing its Token ( 33 ).
- this Storage ( 35 ) can be the Client's browser's storage, or a wholly separate USB flash drive. This storage need not be protected at all.
- the PIN ( 34 ) is not stored, but in the preferred embodiment of the invention, is manually input by the human operator of the Client ( 30 ) in the protocol to assemble the Client's Secret Number ( 32 ).
- the TA chooses a 220 suitable hash function H: ⁇ 0, 1 ⁇ *E(F p2 ), which hashes identity strings it will receive during the Authentication Service and Client enrolment process (the IDs of the Authentication Service and Client) to a point on the supersingular curve. Finally, it publishes 230 the public parameters ⁇ p,r,H ⁇ to a readily accessible location that both Clients and Authentication Services can access, such as a public facing web site.
- the Authentication Service is uniquely identified and authenticated 300 to the Trusted Authority.
- the TA issues back to the Authentication Service over a secure network connection the Secret Number S, the curve parameters and the H 2 hash function 330 along with the location of the public parameters.
- the Client authenticates its 400 identity to the Trusted Authority.
- the Trusted Authority takes the Authentication Service's identity 410 ID a as input; the identity is hashed and mapped to a point A of large prime order on the curve 420 .
- the Client receives from the Trusted Authority over the secured network connection A and s A.
- a computer program for example, in JavaScript
- the Initialization Program is served from the Trusted Authority through a web server interface to the Client, 500 which in this case is a browser, where it runs.
- the program takes as input the user's PIN number 510 , and will calculate ⁇ A where ⁇ is the user's PIN number.
- the Client and Authentication Service want to mutually authenticate each other over a secure network connection.
- the Client initiates a secured connection to the Authentication Service, 600 and the Authentication Service serves the Authentication Program to the Client.
- the Authentication Program runs locally on the Client (for example, in the Client's browser) and prompts the user of the Client for their PIN and their identifier (i.e., email address) 610 .
- the Authentication Program hashes (using the same hash algorithm as the Initialization Program) ID a and looks up the key/value 620 pair to obtain the concatenated (s ⁇ )A and A which is then used in the following section.
- the Client and Authentication Service want to mutually authenticate each other using the system and method over a secure network connection.
- our system and method is adaptable to a number of authenticated key agreement protocols over the type-3 pairing.
- the system and method is adapted to use Wang's IDAK protocol 1 . 1 Wang's IEEE 1363.3 submission—http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/IBC/submissions/idak1363.pdf
- H 1 (.) is a hash function that hashes to a point of order q on the G 1
- H 2 (.) is a hash function that hashes to a point of order q on the G 2
- H q (.) is a hash function that hashes to a number in the range 1 to q.
- A H 1 (ID a )
- S H 2 (ID s )
- s is the TA master secret.
- the user of the Client then divides her secret into a token value (s ⁇ )A and a much smaller PIN value ⁇ A.
- P s ) and r s H q (P s
- the next steps are crucial to get right; the Client sends M over the secure connection 770 to the Authentication Service and this must happen first, before the Authentication Service can send anything to the Client, in order to prevent the Key Compromise Impersonation attack.
Abstract
Description
Claims (1)
Priority Applications (4)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US13/749,408 US9154302B2 (en) | 2012-01-25 | 2013-01-24 | System and method for secure two-factor authenticated ID-based key exchange and remote login using an insecure token and simple second-factor such as a PIN number |
JP2014554878A JP2015510335A (en) | 2012-01-25 | 2013-01-25 | System and method for secure two-factor authentication ID-based key exchange and remote login using an insecure token and a simple second factor such as a PIN number |
PCT/US2013/023255 WO2013112910A1 (en) | 2012-01-25 | 2013-01-25 | System and method for secure two-factor authenticated id-based key exchange and remote login using an insecure token and simple second-factor such as a pin number |
EP13740899.3A EP2807786A4 (en) | 2012-01-25 | 2013-01-25 | System and method for secure two-factor authenticated id-based key exchange and remote login using an insecure token and simple second-factor such as a pin number |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US201261590699P | 2012-01-25 | 2012-01-25 | |
US13/749,408 US9154302B2 (en) | 2012-01-25 | 2013-01-24 | System and method for secure two-factor authenticated ID-based key exchange and remote login using an insecure token and simple second-factor such as a PIN number |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
US20130191638A1 US20130191638A1 (en) | 2013-07-25 |
US9154302B2 true US9154302B2 (en) | 2015-10-06 |
Family
ID=48798227
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US13/749,408 Active 2033-11-28 US9154302B2 (en) | 2012-01-25 | 2013-01-24 | System and method for secure two-factor authenticated ID-based key exchange and remote login using an insecure token and simple second-factor such as a PIN number |
Country Status (4)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US9154302B2 (en) |
EP (1) | EP2807786A4 (en) |
JP (1) | JP2015510335A (en) |
WO (1) | WO2013112910A1 (en) |
Cited By (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US20150163065A1 (en) * | 2013-12-05 | 2015-06-11 | Xiaolai Li | Identity authentication method and apparatus and server |
Families Citing this family (10)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US9154302B2 (en) | 2012-01-25 | 2015-10-06 | CertiVox Ltd. | System and method for secure two-factor authenticated ID-based key exchange and remote login using an insecure token and simple second-factor such as a PIN number |
US9027097B2 (en) * | 2013-02-06 | 2015-05-05 | Dropbox, Inc. | Client application assisted automatic user log in |
US9106644B2 (en) | 2013-05-30 | 2015-08-11 | CertiVox Ltd. | Authentication |
US8971540B2 (en) | 2013-05-30 | 2015-03-03 | CertiVox Ltd. | Authentication |
GB201309702D0 (en) | 2013-05-30 | 2013-07-17 | Certivox Ltd | Security |
CN107800539B (en) | 2016-09-05 | 2020-07-24 | 华为技术有限公司 | Authentication method, authentication device and authentication system |
JP6762910B2 (en) * | 2017-06-09 | 2020-09-30 | 日本電信電話株式会社 | Authentication system, client device, server device, authentication method, program |
CN108306734B (en) * | 2017-12-28 | 2021-01-01 | 飞天诚信科技股份有限公司 | Communication link protection method and device |
CN110460438A (en) * | 2019-08-07 | 2019-11-15 | 南京信息工程大学 | The lightweight means of communication with privacy of user defencive function |
US20210103656A1 (en) * | 2020-11-06 | 2021-04-08 | Lilly Nahal Tahmasebi | Method and apparatus using virtual isolation layer in data security |
Citations (13)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US20030081785A1 (en) | 2001-08-13 | 2003-05-01 | Dan Boneh | Systems and methods for identity-based encryption and related cryptographic techniques |
US20050262353A1 (en) * | 2004-05-20 | 2005-11-24 | Docomo Communications Laboratories Usa, Inc. | Digital signatures including identity-based aggregate signatures |
US20060050886A1 (en) | 2002-09-20 | 2006-03-09 | Koninklijke Philips Elecronics N.V. | Method and system for generating a common secret key |
US7239701B1 (en) | 2000-05-02 | 2007-07-03 | Murata Machinery Ltd. | Key sharing method, secret key generating method, common key generating method and cryptographic communication method in ID-NIKS cryptosystem |
US20070165843A1 (en) | 2006-01-13 | 2007-07-19 | Microsoft Corporation | Trapdoor Pairings |
US7590236B1 (en) | 2004-06-04 | 2009-09-15 | Voltage Security, Inc. | Identity-based-encryption system |
US20090285386A1 (en) * | 2006-01-11 | 2009-11-19 | Katsuyuki Takashima | Apparatus for Generating Elliptic Curve Cryptographic Parameter, Apparatus for Processing Elliptic Curve Cryptograph, Program for Generating Elliptic Curve Cryptographic Parameter, and Program for Processing Elliptic Cryptograph |
US20100235627A1 (en) * | 2009-03-13 | 2010-09-16 | Sap Ag | Securing communications sent by a first user to a second user |
US7860247B2 (en) | 2004-11-12 | 2010-12-28 | Dublin City University | Identity based encryption |
US8285996B2 (en) | 2005-03-30 | 2012-10-09 | Dublin City University | Verification of identity based signatures |
US20130179679A1 (en) * | 2012-01-06 | 2013-07-11 | Ioannis Broustis | Methods And Apparatuses For Secure Information Sharing In Social Networks Using Randomly-Generated Keys |
US20130191638A1 (en) | 2012-01-25 | 2013-07-25 | Certivox, Ltd. | System and method for secure two-factor authenticated id-based key exchange and remote login using an insecure token and simple second-factor such as a pin number |
US20140105384A1 (en) * | 2010-06-16 | 2014-04-17 | Compagnie Industrielle Et Financiere D'ingenierie "Ingenico" | Cryptographic method using a non-supersingular elliptic curve e in characteristic 3 |
Family Cites Families (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JP4450969B2 (en) * | 2000-05-02 | 2010-04-14 | 村田機械株式会社 | Key sharing system, secret key generation device, common key generation system, encryption communication method, encryption communication system, and recording medium |
JP4863777B2 (en) * | 2006-06-07 | 2012-01-25 | 富士通株式会社 | Communication processing method and computer system |
-
2013
- 2013-01-24 US US13/749,408 patent/US9154302B2/en active Active
- 2013-01-25 WO PCT/US2013/023255 patent/WO2013112910A1/en active Application Filing
- 2013-01-25 JP JP2014554878A patent/JP2015510335A/en active Pending
- 2013-01-25 EP EP13740899.3A patent/EP2807786A4/en not_active Withdrawn
Patent Citations (13)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US7239701B1 (en) | 2000-05-02 | 2007-07-03 | Murata Machinery Ltd. | Key sharing method, secret key generating method, common key generating method and cryptographic communication method in ID-NIKS cryptosystem |
US20030081785A1 (en) | 2001-08-13 | 2003-05-01 | Dan Boneh | Systems and methods for identity-based encryption and related cryptographic techniques |
US20060050886A1 (en) | 2002-09-20 | 2006-03-09 | Koninklijke Philips Elecronics N.V. | Method and system for generating a common secret key |
US20050262353A1 (en) * | 2004-05-20 | 2005-11-24 | Docomo Communications Laboratories Usa, Inc. | Digital signatures including identity-based aggregate signatures |
US7590236B1 (en) | 2004-06-04 | 2009-09-15 | Voltage Security, Inc. | Identity-based-encryption system |
US7860247B2 (en) | 2004-11-12 | 2010-12-28 | Dublin City University | Identity based encryption |
US8285996B2 (en) | 2005-03-30 | 2012-10-09 | Dublin City University | Verification of identity based signatures |
US20090285386A1 (en) * | 2006-01-11 | 2009-11-19 | Katsuyuki Takashima | Apparatus for Generating Elliptic Curve Cryptographic Parameter, Apparatus for Processing Elliptic Curve Cryptograph, Program for Generating Elliptic Curve Cryptographic Parameter, and Program for Processing Elliptic Cryptograph |
US20070165843A1 (en) | 2006-01-13 | 2007-07-19 | Microsoft Corporation | Trapdoor Pairings |
US20100235627A1 (en) * | 2009-03-13 | 2010-09-16 | Sap Ag | Securing communications sent by a first user to a second user |
US20140105384A1 (en) * | 2010-06-16 | 2014-04-17 | Compagnie Industrielle Et Financiere D'ingenierie "Ingenico" | Cryptographic method using a non-supersingular elliptic curve e in characteristic 3 |
US20130179679A1 (en) * | 2012-01-06 | 2013-07-11 | Ioannis Broustis | Methods And Apparatuses For Secure Information Sharing In Social Networks Using Randomly-Generated Keys |
US20130191638A1 (en) | 2012-01-25 | 2013-07-25 | Certivox, Ltd. | System and method for secure two-factor authenticated id-based key exchange and remote login using an insecure token and simple second-factor such as a pin number |
Non-Patent Citations (65)
Title |
---|
A New Two-Party Identity-Based Authenticated Key Agreement; Noel McCullagh et al.; LNCS 3376, 2005, pp. 262-274. * |
A. Fiat and A. Shamir. How to prove yourself: Practical solutions to identification and signature problems. In Crypto 1986, vol. 263 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 186-194. Springer-Verlag, 1987. |
A. Shamir. Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes. In Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of CRYPTO 84, vol. 196 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 47-53, 1984. |
Authenticated ID-based Key Exchange and remote log-in with simple token and PIN number; 2002; Michael Scott; eprint.iacr.org/2002/164.pdf. * |
B. Chevalier-Mames, J-S. Coron, N. McCullagh, D. Naccache, and M. Scott. Secure delegation of elliptic curve pairing. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2005/150, 2005. http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/150. |
C. H. Lim and P. J. Lee. A key recovery attack on discrete log-based schemes using a prime order subgroup. In Crypto 1994, vol. 1294 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 249-263. Springer-Verlag, 1994. |
C. P. Schnorr. Efficient identification and signatures for smart cards. In Crypto'89: Advances in Cryptology, vol. 435 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 239-252, 1989. |
C. Tsai, C. Lee, and M. Hwang. Password authentication schemes: Current status and key issues. International Journal of Network Security, 3(2):101-115, 2006. |
Client-Server Authentication Using Pairings, 2012. |
Client-Server Multi-Factor Authentication Using Pairings, 2012. |
D. Boneh and M. Franklin. Identity-based encryption from the Weil pairing. SIAM Journal of Computing, 32(3):586-615, 2003. |
D. Boneh, B. Lynn, and H. Shacham. Short signatures from the weil pairing. In Asiacrypt 2001, vol. 2248 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 514-532. Springer-Verlag, 2001. |
D. F. Aranha, K. Karabina, P. Longa, C. H. Gebotys, and J. Lopez. Faster explicit formulas for computing pairings over ordinary curves. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2010/526, 2010. http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/526. |
D. Fiore and R. Gennaro. Making the Diffie-Hellman protocol identity-based. In Topics in Cryptology-CT-RSA 2010, vol. 5985 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 165-178. Springer, 2010. |
D. Freeman, M. Scott, and E. Teske. A taxonomy of pairing friendly elliptic curves. Journal of Cryptography, 23:224-280, 2010. |
D. Pointcheval and S. Zimmer. Multi-factor authenticated key exchange. In ACNS'08 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security, pp. 277-295. Springer-Verlag, 2008. |
D. Stebila, P. Poornaprajna, and S. Chang. Multi-factor password-authenticated key exchange. In Australasian Information Security Conference, CPRIT vol. 105, pp. 56-66. Australian Computer Society, 2010. |
D. Wang, C. Ma, and P. Wu. Secure password-based remote user authentication scheme with non-tamper resistant smart cards. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2012/227, 2012. http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/227. |
E. Yoon and K. Yoo. New authentication scheme based on a one-way hash function and Diffie-Hellman key exchange. In CANS'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Cryptology and Network Security, vol. 3810 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 147-160. Springer-Verlag, 2005. |
Efficient Algorithms for Pairing-Based Cryptosystems; Paulo S. M. Barreto et al.; 2002; ePrint.iacr.org/2002/008.pdf. * |
Extract from the "Get M-pin" part of the Certivox website (available in Jul. 2013). |
F. Bao, R. Deng, and H. Zhu. Variations of diffie-hellman problem. In ICICS 2003, vol. 2836 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 301-312. Springer-Verlag, 2003. |
F. Hao and D. Clarke. Security analysis of a multi-factor authenticated key exchange protocol. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2012/039, 2012. http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/039. |
Guomin Yang, Duncan S. Wong, HuaxiongWang, and Xiaotie Deng. Formal analysis and systematic construction of two-factor authentication scheme. In Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information and Communications Security, ICICS'06, pp. 82-91. Springer-Verlag, 2006. |
H. S. Kim, S. W. Lee, and K. Y. Yoo. ID-based password authentication scheme using smart cards and fingerprints. ACM Operating Systems Review, 37(4):32-41, 2003. |
I. Liao, C. Lee, and M. Hwang. A password authentication scheme over insecure networks. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 72:727-740, 2006. |
IBAKE: Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol; Vladimir Kolesnikov et al.; 2011. * |
IEEE P1363 home page. http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/, Oct. 10, 2008. |
International Searching Authority, International Search Report and Written Opinion for International Patent Application No. PCT/US2013/023255, Apr. 12, 2013, 7 pages. |
J. Cha and J. Cheon. An identity-based signature from gap diffie-hellman groups. In PKC 2003, vol. 2567 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 18-30. Springer-Verlag, 2003. |
J. Pollard. Monte carlo methods for index computation mod p. Mathematics of Computation, 32, 1978. |
K. Kurosawa and S-H. Heng. From digital signature to ID-based identification/ signature. In PKC 2004, vol. 2947 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 125-143. Springer-Verlag, 2004. |
L. Ballard, M. Green, B. de Medeiros, and F. Montrose. Correlation-resistant storage via keyword-searchable encryption. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2005/417, 2005. http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/417. |
L. Chen and C. Kudla. Identity based key agreement protocols from pairings. In Proc. of the 16-th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pp. 219-233. IEEE Computer Society, 2003. |
L. Fuentes-Castaneda, E. Knapp, and R. Rodriguez-Henriquez. Faster hashing to G-2. In Selected Areas in Cryptography-SAC 2011, vol. 7118 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 412-430. Springer-Verlag, 2011. |
M. Bellare, C. Namprempre, and G. Neven. Security proofs for identity-based identification and signature schemes. In Eurocrypt 2004, vol. 3027 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 268-286. Springer-Verlag, 2004. |
M. Scott and P. S. L. M. Barreto. Compressed pairings. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2004/032, 2004. http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/032. |
M. Scott. Authenticated ID-based key exchange and remote log-in with simple token and PIN number. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2002/164, 2002. http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/164. |
M. Scott. Computing the tate pairing. In CT-RSA 2005, vol. 3376 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 293-304. Springer-Verlag, 2005. |
M. Scott. Cryptanalysis of an ID-based password authentication scheme using smart cards and fingerprints. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2004/017, 2004. http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/017. |
M. Scott. On the efficient implementation of pairing-based protocols. In Cryptography and Coding 2011, vol. 7089 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 296-308. Springer-Verlag, 2011. |
M. Scott. Replacing username/password with software-only two-factor authentication. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2012/148, 2012. http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/148. |
M. Stam and A. K. Lenstra. Speeding up XTR. In Asiacrypt 2001, vol. 2248 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 125-143. Springer-Verlag, 2001. |
M-Pin Full Technology-Jul. 2013. |
M-Pin-A Multi-Factor Zero Knowledge Authentication Protocol-Jul. 2013. |
N. Smart and F. Vercauteren. On computable isomorphisms in efficient pairing-based systems. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 155:538-547, 2007. |
P.S.L.M. Barreto and M. Naehrig. Pairing-friendly elliptic curves of prime order. In Selected Areas in Cryptology-SAC 2005, vol. 3897 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 319-331. Springer-Verlag, 2006. |
R. Gallant, R. Lambert, and S. Vanstone. Faster point multiplication on elliptic curves with efficient endomorphism. In Crypto 2001, vol. 2139 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 190-200. Springer-Verlag, 2001. |
R. Martinez-Pelaez and F. Rico-Novella. Cryptanalysis of Sood at al.'s authentication scheme using smart cards. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2012/386, 2012. http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/386. |
R. Sakai and M. Kasahara. ID based cryptosystems with pairing on elliptic curve. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2003/054, 2003. http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/054. |
R. Sakai, K. Ohgishi, and M. Kasahara. Cryptosystems based on pairing. The 2000 Symposium on Cryptography and Information Security, Okinawa, Japan, 2000. |
R.P. Gallant, R.J. Lambert, and S.A. Vanstone. Faster point multiplication on elliptic curves with efficient endomorphisms. In Advances in Cryptology-Crypto 2001, vol. 2139 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 190-200. Springer-Verlag, 2001. |
S. Blake-Wilson, D. Johnson, and A. Menezes. Key agreement protocols and their security analysis. Cryptography and Coding, 1355:30-45, 1997. |
S. Galbraith and M. Scott. Exponentiation in pairing-friendly groups using homomorphisms. In Pairing 2008, vol. 5209 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 211-224. Springer-Verlag, 2008. |
S. Galbraith, K. Paterson, and N. Smart. Pairings for cryptographers. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 156:3113-3121, 2008. |
S. Sood, A. Sarje, and K. Singh. An improvement of Liao at al's authentication scheme using smart cards. International Journal of Computer Applications, 1(8):16-23, 2010. |
Shengbao Wang, Zhenfu Cao, Zhaohui Cheng, and Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo. Perfect forward secure identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol in the escrow mode. Science in China Series F Information Sciences, 52(8): 1358-1370, 2009. |
Subliminal Channel (Extract from Wikipedia)-Last modified Nov. 18, 2013 according to web page. |
T. Wu. The secure remote password protocol. In Proceedings of the 1998 Internet Society Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, pp. 97-111, 1998. |
Unbalancing Pairing-Based Key Exchange Protocols-Oct. 2013. |
X. Yi. An identity-based signature scheme from weil pairing. IEEE Communications Letters, 7:76-78, 2003. |
Y. Tseng and T. Tsai. Efficient revocable ID-based encryption with a public channel. The Computer Journal, 55 (4):475-486, 2012. |
Y. Wang. Efficient identity-based and authenticated key agreement protocol. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2005/108, 2005. http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/108. |
Y. Wang. Password protected smart card and memory stick authentication against off-line dictionary attacks. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2012/120, 2012. http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/120. |
Y.Wang. Efficient identity-based and authenticated key agreement protocol. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2005/108, 2005. http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/108. |
Cited By (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US20150163065A1 (en) * | 2013-12-05 | 2015-06-11 | Xiaolai Li | Identity authentication method and apparatus and server |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
JP2015510335A (en) | 2015-04-02 |
EP2807786A4 (en) | 2015-11-25 |
US20130191638A1 (en) | 2013-07-25 |
WO2013112910A1 (en) | 2013-08-01 |
EP2807786A1 (en) | 2014-12-03 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
US9154302B2 (en) | System and method for secure two-factor authenticated ID-based key exchange and remote login using an insecure token and simple second-factor such as a PIN number | |
Abdullah et al. | Blockchain based approach to enhance big data authentication in distributed environment | |
CN107948189B (en) | Asymmetric password identity authentication method and device, computer equipment and storage medium | |
Chen et al. | On the Security of a Chaotic Maps-based Three-party Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol. | |
US9628273B2 (en) | Cryptographic method and system for secure authentication and key exchange | |
US10110593B2 (en) | Device and method certificate generation | |
US20130191632A1 (en) | System and method for securing private keys issued from distributed private key generator (d-pkg) nodes | |
Yassin et al. | Anonymous password authentication scheme by using digital signature and fingerprint in cloud computing | |
US20070192836A1 (en) | Explicit Delegation With Strong Authentication | |
CA2551113A1 (en) | Authentication system for networked computer applications | |
CN106487786B (en) | Cloud data integrity verification method and system based on biological characteristics | |
WO2014069985A1 (en) | System and method for identity-based entity authentication for client-server communications | |
Zhang et al. | Efficient and privacy-preserving blockchain-based multifactor device authentication protocol for cross-domain IIoT | |
Shin et al. | Security analysis of password-authenticated key retrieval | |
Chou et al. | Efficient two-pass anonymous identity authentication using smart card | |
EP2905717A1 (en) | Device and method for device and user authentication | |
Momeni | A lightweight authentication scheme for mobile cloud computing | |
Al-Attab et al. | Authentication scheme for insecure networks in cloud computing | |
CN111490967B (en) | Unified identity authentication method and system for providing user-friendly strong authentication and anonymous authentication | |
Rawat et al. | PAS-TA-U: PASsword-based threshold authentication with password update | |
Kayathri Devi et al. | Comparison of ZKP based Authentication Mechanisms for securing the web server | |
CN113472731B (en) | Two-factor authentication method for database user identity verification | |
CN114915494B (en) | Anonymous authentication method, system, equipment and storage medium | |
Zhang et al. | Privacy-Preserving Blockchain-based User Authentication with Device Group Authorization for Mobile Edge Computing | |
Bhola et al. | Dynamic password authentication protocol using android device and one-way function |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
AS | Assignment |
Owner name: CERTIVOX LTD., UNITED KINGDOM Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:SPECTOR, BRIAN P.;SCOTT, MICHAEL;SIGNING DATES FROM 20130307 TO 20130313;REEL/FRAME:030150/0923 |
|
STCF | Information on status: patent grant |
Free format text: PATENTED CASE |
|
AS | Assignment |
Owner name: MIRACL LIMITED, GREAT BRITAIN Free format text: CHANGE OF NAME;ASSIGNOR:CERTIVOX LIMITED;REEL/FRAME:037581/0221 Effective date: 20151006 |
|
MAFP | Maintenance fee payment |
Free format text: PAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE FEE, 4TH YR, SMALL ENTITY (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: M2551); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: SMALL ENTITY Year of fee payment: 4 |
|
AS | Assignment |
Owner name: OMLIS LIMITED, GREAT BRITAIN Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:MIRACL UK LIMITED;MIRACL LIMITED;REEL/FRAME:049711/0872 Effective date: 20190131 |
|
AS | Assignment |
Owner name: OMLIS LIMITED, GREAT BRITAIN Free format text: CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE LISTING OF PROPERTIES TO REMOVE PATENT NO. 7860247 FROM THE LISTING PREVIOUSLY RECORDED ON REEL 049711 FRAME 0872. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE ASSIGNMENT;ASSIGNORS:MIRACL UK LIMITED;MIRACL LIMITED;REEL/FRAME:052657/0276 Effective date: 20190131 |
|
MAFP | Maintenance fee payment |
Free format text: PAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE FEE, 8TH YR, SMALL ENTITY (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: M2552); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: SMALL ENTITY Year of fee payment: 8 |