USRE39589E1 - Security method for transmissions in telecommunication networks - Google Patents

Security method for transmissions in telecommunication networks Download PDF

Info

Publication number
USRE39589E1
USRE39589E1 US10/936,830 US93683004A USRE39589E US RE39589 E1 USRE39589 E1 US RE39589E1 US 93683004 A US93683004 A US 93683004A US RE39589 E USRE39589 E US RE39589E
Authority
US
United States
Prior art keywords
security parameters
messages
interval
recalculation
security
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
US10/936,830
Inventor
Tommi Raivisto
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Nokia Technologies Oy
Original Assignee
Nokia Networks Oy
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Nokia Networks Oy filed Critical Nokia Networks Oy
Priority to US10/936,830 priority Critical patent/USRE39589E1/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of USRE39589E1 publication Critical patent/USRE39589E1/en
Assigned to NOKIA CORPORATION reassignment NOKIA CORPORATION MERGER (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: NOKIA NETWORKS OY
Assigned to NOKIA TECHNOLOGIES OY reassignment NOKIA TECHNOLOGIES OY ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: NOKIA CORPORATION
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

Links

Images

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H04L9/3242—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/033—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for providing connection security for transmission between the communicating parties in a telecommunication network.
  • FIGS. 1a and 1b of the attached drawings show block diagrams of two known cipher algorithms which can be used to protect a transmission: a symmetric and a public key algorithm.
  • FIG. 1a shows a symmetric algorithm based on a secret key shared between the participants.
  • the message M to be sent to party B is encrypted in box E of FIG. 1a with the shared secret key K.
  • the messages is sent over a transmission route as encrypted cipher text C, which party B can decrypt in box D shown in FIG. 1a with the same secret key K.
  • decryption party B gets the original message M.
  • An intruder eavesdropping transmission needs to know the secret key K in order to be able to read and understand the transmitted cipher text C.
  • FIG. 1b shows a public key algorithm which is an asymmetric approach. This algorithm is based on two keys: a public key and a private key. These two keys are related in such a manner that a message encrypted with a public key K + can only be decrypted with the corresponding private key K ⁇ and vice versa.
  • a message M is encrypted at party A's end in box E with the public key K + of the intended receiver, that is party B.
  • the encrypted cipher text C is transmitted over a transmission line to party B's end, where the cipher text C is decrypted in box D with the corresponding party B's private key K ⁇ and the original message M is retrieved.
  • a hybrid cryptography uses both the above-mentioned algorithms together. For example, only session keys are exchanged using public key algorithm, and the rest of the communication is encrypted with symmetric method.
  • a message authentication code MAC is calculated and attached to the transmitted message.
  • K is the key
  • M is the message
  • H is the hash function.
  • the input cannot be deduced from the output.
  • MAC is attached to a message, the message cannot be corrupted or impersonated.
  • the receiving party calculates MAC using the received message and the same hash function and key as the transmitting party and compares this calculated MAC to the MAC attached to the message in order to verify it.
  • FIG. 2 shows examples for communication connections.
  • a mobile station MS operating in the GSM network Global System for Mobile communications
  • GSM network Global System for Mobile communications
  • Other possible connections presented in FIG. 2 are connections from the GSM network to different services via gateway GW and Internet.
  • GSM Global System for Mobile communications
  • the air interface from the mobile station MS to the GSM network is well protected against misuse, but the rest of the transmission route is as vulnerable as any other public telephone network, providing measures are not taken to provide connection security.
  • the object of this invention is to provide a method for securely protecting transmitted information between communicating applications, especially over narrow-band connections, without unnecessarily loading the communicating parties.
  • the invention is based on the idea that the communicating parties recalculate the security parameters during the transmission session simultaneously with each other at agreed intervals and the continue communicating and providing connection security for messages with these new parameters.
  • the communicating parties monitor the time for recalculation and at the agreed intervals recalculate and thus change the security parameters without a handshake taking place.
  • the messages are numbered and the number agreed on triggers recalculation at intervals.
  • the advantage of the method according to the invention is that security parameters can be changed during the session without handshaking. This reduces the need for handshakes.
  • Another advantage of the method according to the invention is that the security of the transmission is improved, i.e. attacking is made more difficult and less profitable.
  • FIG. 1a shows a symmetric ciphering algorithm as a block diagram
  • FIG. 1b shows an asymmetric ciphering algorithm as a block diagram
  • FIG. 2 gives a few examples of connections from a mobile communication network to some applications
  • FIG. 3 shows session keys providing connection security for transmitted messages according to the primary embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 4 shows the primary embodiment of the invention as a flowchart.
  • the present invention can be applied to any telecommunication network.
  • Below the invention is described in more detail using as an example a mobile station operating in the digital GSM mobile communication system and communicating with an application located either inside or outside the GSM network.
  • FIG. 2 shows example connections as described earlier.
  • the mobile station MS contacting the server in the bank first performs a handshake according to the prior art, during which both the MS and the bank may authenticate the other and exchange any session key information needed.
  • a mobile station and an application in the bank negotiate and agree on appropriate intervals for recalculating the security parameters to be used to provide privacy, data integrity and authentication during the communication.
  • the negotiation can be implemented so that each of the communicating parties, i.e. in the example in FIG. 2 the mobile station MS and the application in the bank, propose a suitable interval for recalculation and one of the proposed intervals is chosen and agreed upon, for example, the one that is more frequent.
  • suitable parameters to determine intervals are a message sequence number, such as every fourth message, or a suitable time period. Even if handshaking is not needed and therefore not performed at the beginning of the communication session, according to the invention the communicating parties still need to agree on recalculation intervals.
  • both the parties After agreeing on the intervals for recalculation both the parties monitor the agreed intervals. If an interval after four messages is agreed on, either both parties monitor the number of messages sent, which requires a reliable transmission media with no lost messages, or they number all transmitted messages and transmit these sequence numbers with the messages.
  • the advantage of sending the sequence numbers or time stamps with the messages is that the recalculation is synchronous at both ends even though some messages get lost along the way or messages received are not in correct order.
  • both the communicating parties recalculate the security parameters and use these new parameters for providing connection security for the next four messages. A handshake or any other session key exchange is not performed during or after the recalculation of the parameters.
  • the recalculation can be based on a shared secret and the latest sequence number, for example.
  • FIG. 3 shows an example of changing the session key according to the invention.
  • the messages sent from the MS are numbered with the sequence numbers 0 to 3 .
  • the interval for recalculation is agreed to be after two sent messages.
  • the message with sequence number 0 is sent to the bank encrypted with session key K 1 .
  • the application in the bank decrypts the message 0 with the same session key K 1 when symmetric algorithm is applied in ciphering.
  • the message with sequence number 1 is also sent encrypted with session key K 1 .
  • both the MS and the application in the bank recalculate the security parameters, for example, the session key K 2 , using the shared secret and the latest sequence number that is 1 .
  • the MS After recalculation the MS sends the next message 2 to the bank encrypted with session key K 2 .
  • the application in the bank decrypts the message 2 with the same recalculated session key K 2 .
  • the message 3 is encrypted with session key K 2 before transmission.
  • FIG. 4 shows the primary embodiment of the invention as a flowchart.
  • the parties involved in communication in the example in FIG. 2 the MS and the application in the bank, negotiate and agree on the interval for security parameters recalculation.
  • the interval is agreed to be after two transmitted messages. Both communicating parties keep track of the number of transmitted messages, for example, with counters at each end.
  • one of the communicating parties for example, the MS, encrypts the first message to be sent with a session key K 1 obtained from the shared secret that was exchanged during the handshake or other-wise shared with the parties involved.
  • the encrypted message is sent and the receiving party decrypts the message with corresponding session key K 1 (stage 43 ).
  • the counter is set at 1.
  • both parties in this example the MS and the application in the bank, check whether the agreed interval has been reached by checking whether the value in the counter is equal to the value of the agreed interval, for example.
  • the message sent was only the first message, recalculation does not take place yet, and the next message is encrypted and decrypted with the same session key K 1 .
  • the clause at stage 44 becomes true and both communicating parties recalculate security parameters in a predetermined manner and obtain a new session key K 2 (stage 45 ).
  • the interval monitoring is reset, i.e. the message count is restarted, for example, by setting the counter to 0.
  • stage 47 a check is made as to whether there are still more messages to be sent, and if so the encryption of a message is continued at stage 42 with the first message to be encrypted using the latest session key K 2 , after which the message is sent and the counters may be set to value 1. The process continues in similar manner until all the messages to be sent are transmitted.
  • MAC is used to provide connection security for message transmission in the place of ciphering.
  • MAC is calculated, from the sequence number that last triggered recalculation of the security parameters, for example.
  • MAC is calculated with the sequence number 1 for the messages shown as encrypted with K 2 and with the sequence number 3 for the messages to be encrypted with K 3 . Otherwise this other embodiment of the invention is implemented in the same fashion as in the first embodiment described above.
  • Yet another embodiment of the invention uses ciphering and MAC to provide connection security for messages. This is implemented by combining the embodiments described above.
  • Recalculation of the security parameters includes also the possibility of changing the ciphering algorithm to be used in ciphering the next messages.

Abstract

The invention related to method for providing connection security for the transmission between communicating parties in a telecommunication network, the method comprising the steps of: exchanging security parameters between communicating parties, providing connection security for messages based on these security parameters, and transmitting said messages between communicating parties. It is characteristic for the method according to the invention that it further comprises the steps of: reaching agreement between communicating parties on an interval for recalculation of the security parameters, monitoring of the interval for recalculation by the communicating parties, recalculating the security parameters at the agreed interval, and providing connection security for messages based on the latest recalculated security parameters.

Description

This application is a continuation of PCT/FI98/00721 filed Sep. 15, 1998.
FIELD OF THE INVENTION
The invention relates to a method for providing connection security for transmission between the communicating parties in a telecommunication network.
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
At the beginning of a communication a handshake is usually performed between applications in telecommunication networks, during which the parties involved typically authenticate each other and exchange key information, for example, negotiate an encryption algorithm and cryptographic keys to be used in communication. It is only after the handshake that the actual data is transmitted. The confidentiality of the transmission is arranged, for example, through ciphering. FIGS. 1a and 1b of the attached drawings show block diagrams of two known cipher algorithms which can be used to protect a transmission: a symmetric and a public key algorithm.
FIG. 1a shows a symmetric algorithm based on a secret key shared between the participants. At party A's end the message M to be sent to party B is encrypted in box E of FIG. 1a with the shared secret key K. The messages is sent over a transmission route as encrypted cipher text C, which party B can decrypt in box D shown in FIG. 1a with the same secret key K. Through decryption party B gets the original message M. An intruder eavesdropping transmission needs to know the secret key K in order to be able to read and understand the transmitted cipher text C. The encryption and decryption of the symmetric algorithm can be expressed by the equations:
C=EK(M)
M=DK(C),
where C is the cipher text, M is the message in plain text, EK is the encryption with key K, and DK is the decryption with key K.
FIG. 1b shows a public key algorithm which is an asymmetric approach. This algorithm is based on two keys: a public key and a private key. These two keys are related in such a manner that a message encrypted with a public key K+ can only be decrypted with the corresponding private key K− and vice versa. In FIG. 1b a message M is encrypted at party A's end in box E with the public key K+ of the intended receiver, that is party B. The encrypted cipher text C is transmitted over a transmission line to party B's end, where the cipher text C is decrypted in box D with the corresponding party B's private key K− and the original message M is retrieved. The encryption and decryption of the asymmetric algorithm can also be expressed by the following equations:
C=EB +(M)
M=DB −(C),
where C is the cipher text, M is the message in plain text, EB + is encryption with the receiver's public key KB +, and DB − is decryption with the receiver's private key KB −.
In the public key algorithm the encryption of a message with the private key K− of the message sender acts as a signature, since anyone can decrypt the message with the known public key K+ of the sender. Since asymmetric keys are usually much longer than symmetric keys, the asymmetric algorithm requires much more processing power. Thus asymmetric algorithms are unsuitable for encrypting large amounts of data.
A hybrid cryptography uses both the above-mentioned algorithms together. For example, only session keys are exchanged using public key algorithm, and the rest of the communication is encrypted with symmetric method.
To provide message integrity and authentication in a connection, a message authentication code MAC is calculated and attached to the transmitted message. For example, MAC can be calculated with a one-way hash algorithm in the following way:
h=H(K, M, K),
where K is the key, M is the message, and H is the hash function. The input cannot be deduced from the output. When MAC is attached to a message, the message cannot be corrupted or impersonated. The receiving party calculates MAC using the received message and the same hash function and key as the transmitting party and compares this calculated MAC to the MAC attached to the message in order to verify it.
FIG. 2 shows examples for communication connections. A mobile station MS operating in the GSM network (Global System for Mobile communications) is able to make a connection to a bank directly from the GSM network. Other possible connections presented in FIG. 2 are connections from the GSM network to different services via gateway GW and Internet. In mobile communication networks, such as the GSM, the air interface from the mobile station MS to the GSM network is well protected against misuse, but the rest of the transmission route is as vulnerable as any other public telephone network, providing measures are not taken to provide connection security.
One problem with providing connection security is that handshaking requires plenty of processing time since several messages must be sent between the parties involved. The low processing power and narrow bandwidth in the mobile stations make handshakes particularly burdensome in mobile communication networks. Handshakes are also burdensome for applications which have numerous simultaneous transactions, for example, a server in a bank. Therefore, it is desirable to minimize the number and duration of the handshakes. This leads to the problem that an attacker has lots of time for cryptanalysis, as the same encryption keys are used between the two handshakes. If the attacker succeeds in the cryptanalysis, he can access all the material sent between the two handshakes.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
The object of this invention is to provide a method for securely protecting transmitted information between communicating applications, especially over narrow-band connections, without unnecessarily loading the communicating parties.
This is achieved by using a method according to the invention characterized by what is stated in the independent claim 1. Special embodiments of the invention are presented in the dependent claims.
The invention is based on the idea that the communicating parties recalculate the security parameters during the transmission session simultaneously with each other at agreed intervals and the continue communicating and providing connection security for messages with these new parameters. The communicating parties monitor the time for recalculation and at the agreed intervals recalculate and thus change the security parameters without a handshake taking place. In the primary embodiment of the invention, the messages are numbered and the number agreed on triggers recalculation at intervals.
The advantage of the method according to the invention is that security parameters can be changed during the session without handshaking. This reduces the need for handshakes.
Another advantage of the method according to the invention is that the security of the transmission is improved, i.e. attacking is made more difficult and less profitable.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
The description of the preferred embodiments of the invention will now be made with reference to the attached drawings, in which
FIG. 1a shows a symmetric ciphering algorithm as a block diagram;
FIG. 1b shows an asymmetric ciphering algorithm as a block diagram;
FIG. 2 gives a few examples of connections from a mobile communication network to some applications;
FIG. 3 shows session keys providing connection security for transmitted messages according to the primary embodiment of the invention; and
FIG. 4 shows the primary embodiment of the invention as a flowchart.
 DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
The present invention can be applied to any telecommunication network. Below the invention is described in more detail using as an example a mobile station operating in the digital GSM mobile communication system and communicating with an application located either inside or outside the GSM network.
In the following the primary embodiment of the invention is described in more detail with reference to FIGS. 2, 3 and 4.
FIG. 2 shows example connections as described earlier. The mobile station MS contacting the server in the bank first performs a handshake according to the prior art, during which both the MS and the bank may authenticate the other and exchange any session key information needed. According to the invention, for example, during the handshake, a mobile station and an application in the bank negotiate and agree on appropriate intervals for recalculating the security parameters to be used to provide privacy, data integrity and authentication during the communication. For example, the negotiation can be implemented so that each of the communicating parties, i.e. in the example in FIG. 2 the mobile station MS and the application in the bank, propose a suitable interval for recalculation and one of the proposed intervals is chosen and agreed upon, for example, the one that is more frequent. Examples for suitable parameters to determine intervals are a message sequence number, such as every fourth message, or a suitable time period. Even if handshaking is not needed and therefore not performed at the beginning of the communication session, according to the invention the communicating parties still need to agree on recalculation intervals.
After agreeing on the intervals for recalculation both the parties monitor the agreed intervals. If an interval after four messages is agreed on, either both parties monitor the number of messages sent, which requires a reliable transmission media with no lost messages, or they number all transmitted messages and transmit these sequence numbers with the messages. The advantage of sending the sequence numbers or time stamps with the messages is that the recalculation is synchronous at both ends even though some messages get lost along the way or messages received are not in correct order. When in the example described above the fourth message is transmitted and received, both the communicating parties recalculate the security parameters and use these new parameters for providing connection security for the next four messages. A handshake or any other session key exchange is not performed during or after the recalculation of the parameters. The recalculation can be based on a shared secret and the latest sequence number, for example. Security parameters can also be used to calculate session keys Kn for ciphering and the message authentication code MAC in the following way, for example:
Kn=H(S, N)
MAC=H(M, S, N),
where H is a predetermined hash algorithm, S is the shared secret, N is the latest sequence number, and M is the message to be transmitted in plain text.
FIG. 3 shows an example of changing the session key according to the invention. In FIG. 3 the messages sent from the MS are numbered with the sequence numbers 0 to 3. In the example in FIG. 3, the interval for recalculation is agreed to be after two sent messages. The message with sequence number 0 is sent to the bank encrypted with session key K1. The application in the bank decrypts the message 0 with the same session key K1 when symmetric algorithm is applied in ciphering. The message with sequence number 1 is also sent encrypted with session key K1. As the mobile station MS has now sent two messages, both the MS and the application in the bank recalculate the security parameters, for example, the session key K2, using the shared secret and the latest sequence number that is 1. After recalculation the MS sends the next message 2 to the bank encrypted with session key K2. The application in the bank decrypts the message 2 with the same recalculated session key K2. Also the message 3 is encrypted with session key K2 before transmission. After that the MS and the application in the bank again notice that the agreed interval has been reached and both parties recalculate the security parameters, for example, the session key K3, using the shared secret and the latest sequence number 3.
FIG. 4 shows the primary embodiment of the invention as a flowchart. At the beginning of a communication at step 41, the parties involved in communication, in the example in FIG. 2 the MS and the application in the bank, negotiate and agree on the interval for security parameters recalculation. As in the example described above, we again assume that the interval is agreed to be after two transmitted messages. Both communicating parties keep track of the number of transmitted messages, for example, with counters at each end. At stage 42 one of the communicating parties, for example, the MS, encrypts the first message to be sent with a session key K1 obtained from the shared secret that was exchanged during the handshake or other-wise shared with the parties involved. The encrypted message is sent and the receiving party decrypts the message with corresponding session key K1 (stage 43). At this time the counter is set at 1. At stage 44 both parties, in this example the MS and the application in the bank, check whether the agreed interval has been reached by checking whether the value in the counter is equal to the value of the agreed interval, for example. As the message sent was only the first message, recalculation does not take place yet, and the next message is encrypted and decrypted with the same session key K1. When two messages have been sent, and the counters indicate the value 2 which corresponds to the value of the agreed interval, the clause at stage 44 becomes true and both communicating parties recalculate security parameters in a predetermined manner and obtain a new session key K2 (stage 45). At stage 46 the interval monitoring is reset, i.e. the message count is restarted, for example, by setting the counter to 0. At stage 47 a check is made as to whether there are still more messages to be sent, and if so the encryption of a message is continued at stage 42 with the first message to be encrypted using the latest session key K2, after which the message is sent and the counters may be set to value 1. The process continues in similar manner until all the messages to be sent are transmitted.
In another embodiment of the invention, MAC is used to provide connection security for message transmission in the place of ciphering. According to the invention MAC is calculated, from the sequence number that last triggered recalculation of the security parameters, for example. In the example in FIG. 3, MAC is calculated with the sequence number 1 for the messages shown as encrypted with K2 and with the sequence number 3 for the messages to be encrypted with K3. Otherwise this other embodiment of the invention is implemented in the same fashion as in the first embodiment described above.
Yet another embodiment of the invention uses ciphering and MAC to provide connection security for messages. This is implemented by combining the embodiments described above.
Recalculation of the security parameters includes also the possibility of changing the ciphering algorithm to be used in ciphering the next messages.
The drawings and the accompanying explanation are only intended to demonstrate the principles of the invention. The details of the method according to the invention can vary within the patent claims. Although the invention was described above mostly in connection with a mobile station and service application communication, the invention can also be used for providing connection security for messages between any two or more applications communicating together, also in mobile to mobile connection in a speech, data and short message transmission. The invention is also suitable for use in recalculating other security parameters than session keys and MACs. The invention is not restricted for use only in connection with the ciphering algorithms presented above, but can be applied together with any ciphering algorithms.

Claims (31)

1. A method for providing connection security for the transmission between communicating parties in a telecommunication network, the method comprising the steps of:
exchanging security parameters between communicating parties,
providing connection security for messages based on these security parameters,
transmitting said messages between communicating parties,
wherein the method further comprises the steps of:
reaching agreement between communicating parties on an interval for recalculation of the security parameters,
monitoring of the interval for recalculation by the communicating parties,
recalculating the security parameters at the agreed interval, and providing connection security for messages based on the latest recalculated security parameters.
2. The method according to claim 1, wherein providing connection security for messages based on the latest recalculated security parameters comprises the step of
ciphering messages based on the latest recalculated security parameters.
3. The method according to claim 1, wherein providing connection security for messages based on the latest recalculated security parameters comprises the step of
authenticating and providing integrity for the messages based on the latest recalculated security parameters.
4. The method according to claim 1, wherein providing connection security for messages based on the latest recalculated security parameters comprises the steps of
ciphering messages based on the latest recalculated security parameters, and
authenticating and providing integrity for the messages based on the latest recalculated security parameters.
5. The method according to claim 3, wherein authenticating and providing integrity for the messages is arranged with a message authentication code MAC.
6. The method according to claim 1, wherein the method further comprises the steps of:
numbering the messages,
agreeing on the number of messages to determine the interval for the recalculation of the security parameters,
recalculating the security parameters after the agreed number of messages have been transmitted.
7. The method according to claim 6, wherein the method further comprises the steps of:
numbering the messages with sequence numbers,
transmitting the sequence number with the message, and
using the latest sequence number as input for recalculation of the security parameters.
8. The method according to claim 1, wherein the method comprises the step of
reaching agreement between communicating parties during handshaking on the interval for recalculation of the security parameters.
9. A mobile station configured to
exchange security parameters with at least one communicating party,
negotiate an agreement with the at least one communicating party on an interval for recalculation of security parameters,
monitor the interval for recalculation,
recalculate the security parameters at the agreed interval, and
providing connection security for messages transmitted between the mobile station and the at least one communicating party based on the latest calculated security parameters.
10. The mobile station according to claim 9, configured to cipher messages based on the latest recalculated security parameters.
11. The mobile station according to claim 9, configured to authenticate and provide integrity for messages based on the latest recalculated security parameters.
12. The mobile station according to claim 9, configured to cipher, authenticate and provide integrity for messages based on the latest recalculated security parameters.
13. The mobile station according to claim 11, wherein the messages are authenticated and integrity for the messages is provided with a message authentication code.
14. The mobile station according to claim 9, configured to
number the messages,
agree on a number of messages for determining the interval for the recalculation of security parameters, and
recalculate the security parameters after the agreed number of messages have been transmitted.
15. The mobile station according to claim 14, configured to
number the messages with sequence numbers,
transmit a respective sequence number with a message, and
use the latest sequence number as input for recalculation of the security parameters.
16. The mobile station according to claim 9, configured to negotiate and reach an agreement with said at least one communicating party during handshaking on the interval for recalculation of the security parameters.
17. A server configured to
exchange security parameters with at least one communicating party,
negotiate an agreement with the at least one communicating party on an interval for recalculation of security parameters,
monitor the interval for recalculation,
recalculate the security parameters at the agreed interval, and
provide connection security for messages transmitted between the server and the at least one communicating party based on the latest calculated security parameters.
18. The server according to claim 17, configured to cipher messages based on the latest recalculated security parameters.
19. The server according to claim 17, configured to authenticate and provide integrity for messages based on the latest recalculated security parameters.
20. The server according to claim 17, configured to cipher, authenticate and provide integrity for messages based on the latest recalculated security parameters.
21. The server according to claim 19, wherein the messages are authenticated and integrity for the messages is provided with a message authentication code.
22. The server according to claim 17, configured to
number the messages,
agree on a number of messages for determining the interval for the recalculation of security parameters, and
recalculate the security parameters after the agreed number of messages have been transmitted.
23. The server according to claim 22, configured to
number the messages with sequence numbers,
transmit a respective sequence number with a message, and
use the latest sequence number as input for recalculation of the security parameters.
24. The server according to claim 17, configured to negotiate and reach an agreement with said at least one communicating party during handshaking on the interval for recalculation of the security parameters.
25. A mobile station comprising
means for exchanging security parameters with at least one communicating party,
means for negotiating an agreement with the at least one communicating party on an interval for recalculation of security parameters,
means for monitoring the interval for recalculation,
means for recalculating the security parameters at the agreed interval, and
means for providing connection security for messages transmitted between the mobile station and the at least one communicating party based on the latest calculated security parameters.
26. A server comprising
means for exchanging security parameters with at least one communicating party,
means for negotiating an agreement with the at least one communicating party on an interval for recalculation of security parameters,
means for monitoring the interval for recalculation,
means for recalculating the security parameters at the agreed interval, and
means for providing connection security for messages transmitted between the server and the at least one communicating party based on the latest calculated security parameters.
27. A method of operating a mobile station, the method comprising
exchanging security parameters with at least one communicating party,
negotiating an agreement with the at least one communicating party on an interval for recalculation of security parameters,
monitoring the interval for recalculation,
recalculating the security parameters at the agreed interval, and
providing connection security for messages transmitted between the mobile station and the at least one communicating party based on the latest calculated security parameters.
28. A method of operating a server, the method comprising
exchanging security parameters with at least one communicating party,
negotiating an agreement with the at least one communicating party on an interval for recalculation of security parameters,
monitoring the interval for recalculation,
recalculating the security parameters at the agreed interval, and
providing connection security for messages transmitted between the server and the at least one communicating party based on the latest calculated security parameters.
29. A telecommunications network comprising at least two parties arranged to communicate with each other and to provide connection security, the at least two parties configured to
exchange security parameters with each other,
negotiate an agreement on an interval for recalculation of security parameters,
monitor the interval for recalculation,
recalculate the security parameters at the agreed interval, and
provide connection security for messages transmitted between the at least two communicating parties based on the latest calculated security parameters.
30. A telecommunications network comprising a server and at least one mobile station, the server and the at least one mobile station configured to
exchange security parameters with each other,
negotiate an agreement on an interval for recalculation of security parameters,
monitor the interval for recalculation,
recalculate the security parameters at the agreed interval, and
provide connection security for messages transmitted between the server and the at least one mobile station on the latest calculated security parameters.
31. A telecommunications network comprising at least two mobile stations, the at least two mobile stations configured to
exchange security parameters with each other,
negotiate an agreement on an interval for recalculation of security parameters,
monitor the interval for recalculation,
recalculate the security parameters at the agreed interval, and
provide connection security for messages transmitted between the at least two mobile station on the latest calculated security parameters.
US10/936,830 1997-09-15 2004-09-09 Security method for transmissions in telecommunication networks Expired - Lifetime USRE39589E1 (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US10/936,830 USRE39589E1 (en) 1997-09-15 2004-09-09 Security method for transmissions in telecommunication networks

Applications Claiming Priority (4)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
FI973694A FI113119B (en) 1997-09-15 1997-09-15 A method for securing communications over telecommunications networks
PCT/FI1998/000721 WO1999014888A2 (en) 1997-09-15 1998-09-15 Security method for transmissions in telecommunication networks
US09/521,759 US6449473B1 (en) 1997-09-15 2000-03-09 Security method for transmissions in telecommunication networks
US10/936,830 USRE39589E1 (en) 1997-09-15 2004-09-09 Security method for transmissions in telecommunication networks

Related Parent Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US09/521,759 Reissue US6449473B1 (en) 1997-09-15 2000-03-09 Security method for transmissions in telecommunication networks

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
USRE39589E1 true USRE39589E1 (en) 2007-04-24

Family

ID=8549534

Family Applications (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US09/521,759 Ceased US6449473B1 (en) 1997-09-15 2000-03-09 Security method for transmissions in telecommunication networks
US10/936,830 Expired - Lifetime USRE39589E1 (en) 1997-09-15 2004-09-09 Security method for transmissions in telecommunication networks

Family Applications Before (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US09/521,759 Ceased US6449473B1 (en) 1997-09-15 2000-03-09 Security method for transmissions in telecommunication networks

Country Status (11)

Country Link
US (2) US6449473B1 (en)
EP (1) EP0998799B1 (en)
JP (2) JP3816337B2 (en)
CN (1) CN1110924C (en)
AT (1) ATE266920T1 (en)
AU (1) AU9165298A (en)
CA (1) CA2303048C (en)
DE (1) DE69823834T2 (en)
ES (1) ES2219902T3 (en)
FI (1) FI113119B (en)
WO (1) WO1999014888A2 (en)

Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20030051056A1 (en) * 2001-09-10 2003-03-13 International Business Machines Corporation Method and system for transmitting compacted text data
US20070049251A1 (en) * 2005-08-31 2007-03-01 Mock Von A Method and system for wireless communication in emergency situations
US20080313458A1 (en) * 2007-06-15 2008-12-18 Koolspan, Inc. System and method of per-packet keying

Families Citing this family (86)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US8352400B2 (en) 1991-12-23 2013-01-08 Hoffberg Steven M Adaptive pattern recognition based controller apparatus and method and human-factored interface therefore
US10361802B1 (en) 1999-02-01 2019-07-23 Blanding Hovenweep, Llc Adaptive pattern recognition based control system and method
FI107097B (en) * 1997-09-24 2001-05-31 Nokia Networks Oy Targeted broadcast on the radio network
US7966078B2 (en) 1999-02-01 2011-06-21 Steven Hoffberg Network media appliance system and method
FI112315B (en) * 1999-05-11 2003-11-14 Nokia Corp Integrity protection method for radio network signaling
KR20010004791A (en) * 1999-06-29 2001-01-15 윤종용 Apparatus for securing user's informaton and method thereof in mobile communication system connecting with internet
JP2001359165A (en) * 2000-06-15 2001-12-26 Mitsubishi Electric Corp Mobile communication system
US6618584B1 (en) * 2000-08-30 2003-09-09 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Terminal authentication procedure timing for data calls
NL1016091C2 (en) * 2000-09-04 2002-03-05 Interpay Nederland B V Financial transaction system with secure system for checking PIN numbers, uses encryption channel between central station and customer terminal
FI111423B (en) 2000-11-28 2003-07-15 Nokia Corp A system for securing post-handover communications
ES2182679B1 (en) * 2001-02-15 2004-06-01 Airtel Movil, S.A. INTERCONNECTION SYSTEM OF A REMOTE SERVER WITH A SHORT MESSAGE SERVER CENTER (SMSC) THROUGH INETERNET.
WO2003039182A1 (en) * 2001-10-29 2003-05-08 Swisscom Mobile Ag Method and system for transmitting anonymous messages by means of a telecommunication network
US8027697B2 (en) 2007-09-28 2011-09-27 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Public safety access point (PSAP) selection for E911 wireless callers in a GSM type system
US8126889B2 (en) 2002-03-28 2012-02-28 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Location fidelity adjustment based on mobile subscriber privacy profile
US8290505B2 (en) 2006-08-29 2012-10-16 Telecommunications Systems, Inc. Consequential location derived information
US9154906B2 (en) 2002-03-28 2015-10-06 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Area watcher for wireless network
US7426380B2 (en) 2002-03-28 2008-09-16 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Location derived presence information
US8918073B2 (en) 2002-03-28 2014-12-23 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Wireless telecommunications location based services scheme selection
US20060064458A1 (en) * 2002-09-16 2006-03-23 Christian Gehrmann Secure access to a subscription module
US8666397B2 (en) 2002-12-13 2014-03-04 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Area event handling when current network does not cover target area
KR100956823B1 (en) * 2003-02-11 2010-05-11 엘지전자 주식회사 Method of processing a security mode message in a mobile communication system
EP1606899A4 (en) * 2003-03-14 2011-11-02 Thomson Licensing Wlan session management techniques with secure rekeying and logoff
JP4717329B2 (en) * 2003-03-14 2011-07-06 キヤノン株式会社 Digital signature generator
JP2005157930A (en) * 2003-11-28 2005-06-16 Matsushita Electric Ind Co Ltd Confidential information processing system and lsi
US7424293B2 (en) 2003-12-02 2008-09-09 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. User plane location based service using message tunneling to support roaming
US7260186B2 (en) 2004-03-23 2007-08-21 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Solutions for voice over internet protocol (VoIP) 911 location services
US20080090546A1 (en) 2006-10-17 2008-04-17 Richard Dickinson Enhanced E911 network access for a call center using session initiation protocol (SIP) messaging
US20080126535A1 (en) 2006-11-28 2008-05-29 Yinjun Zhu User plane location services over session initiation protocol (SIP)
US9008055B2 (en) 2004-04-28 2015-04-14 Kdl Scan Designs Llc Automatic remote services provided by a home relationship between a device and a server
US7280830B2 (en) * 2004-04-28 2007-10-09 Scenera Technologies, Llc Automatic registration services provided through a home relationship established between a device and a local area network
US8972576B2 (en) * 2004-04-28 2015-03-03 Kdl Scan Designs Llc Establishing a home relationship between a wireless device and a server in a wireless network
US6985105B1 (en) 2004-10-15 2006-01-10 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Culled satellite ephemeris information based on limiting a span of an inverted cone for locating satellite in-range determinations
US7629926B2 (en) 2004-10-15 2009-12-08 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Culled satellite ephemeris information for quick, accurate assisted locating satellite location determination for cell site antennas
US7266383B2 (en) * 2005-02-14 2007-09-04 Scenera Technologies, Llc Group interaction modes for mobile devices
US7353034B2 (en) 2005-04-04 2008-04-01 X One, Inc. Location sharing and tracking using mobile phones or other wireless devices
US8660573B2 (en) 2005-07-19 2014-02-25 Telecommunications Systems, Inc. Location service requests throttling
US8320880B2 (en) * 2005-07-20 2012-11-27 Qualcomm Incorporated Apparatus and methods for secure architectures in wireless networks
US9282451B2 (en) 2005-09-26 2016-03-08 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Automatic location identification (ALI) service requests steering, connection sharing and protocol translation
US7825780B2 (en) 2005-10-05 2010-11-02 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Cellular augmented vehicle alarm notification together with location services for position of an alarming vehicle
US8467320B2 (en) 2005-10-06 2013-06-18 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Voice over internet protocol (VoIP) multi-user conferencing
US7907551B2 (en) 2005-10-06 2011-03-15 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Voice over internet protocol (VoIP) location based 911 conferencing
US8150363B2 (en) 2006-02-16 2012-04-03 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Enhanced E911 network access for call centers
US8059789B2 (en) 2006-02-24 2011-11-15 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Automatic location identification (ALI) emergency services pseudo key (ESPK)
US9167553B2 (en) 2006-03-01 2015-10-20 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. GeoNexus proximity detector network
US7471236B1 (en) 2006-03-01 2008-12-30 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Cellular augmented radar/laser detector
US7899450B2 (en) 2006-03-01 2011-03-01 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Cellular augmented radar/laser detection using local mobile network within cellular network
US8208605B2 (en) 2006-05-04 2012-06-26 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Extended efficient usage of emergency services keys
US20080019515A1 (en) * 2006-06-22 2008-01-24 Li-Chih Tseng Method and apparatus for security sequence numbering in a wireless communication system
US7966013B2 (en) 2006-11-03 2011-06-21 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Roaming gateway enabling location based services (LBS) roaming for user plane in CDMA networks without requiring use of a mobile positioning center (MPC)
US8050386B2 (en) 2007-02-12 2011-11-01 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Mobile automatic location identification (ALI) for first responders
JP4631869B2 (en) * 2007-04-06 2011-02-16 株式会社日立製作所 Key distribution method and system for encrypted communication
EP2196014A4 (en) 2007-09-17 2014-12-24 Telecomm Systems Inc Emergency 911 data messaging
US7929530B2 (en) 2007-11-30 2011-04-19 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Ancillary data support in session initiation protocol (SIP) messaging
US9130963B2 (en) 2011-04-06 2015-09-08 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Ancillary data support in session initiation protocol (SIP) messaging
US8812858B2 (en) 2008-02-29 2014-08-19 Red Hat, Inc. Broadcast stenography of data communications
US8195949B2 (en) * 2008-02-29 2012-06-05 Red Hat, Inc. Mechanism for generating message sequence order numbers
US8401192B2 (en) * 2008-02-29 2013-03-19 Red Hat, Inc. Mechanism for securely ordered message exchange
EP2154814A1 (en) * 2008-08-14 2010-02-17 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Scalable key distribution
US8068587B2 (en) 2008-08-22 2011-11-29 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Nationwide table routing of voice over internet protocol (VOIP) emergency calls
US8892128B2 (en) 2008-10-14 2014-11-18 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Location based geo-reminders
US8525681B2 (en) 2008-10-14 2013-09-03 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Location based proximity alert
US9301191B2 (en) 2013-09-20 2016-03-29 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Quality of service to over the top applications used with VPN
US8867485B2 (en) 2009-05-05 2014-10-21 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Multiple location retrieval function (LRF) network having location continuity
US20120006610A1 (en) 2010-07-09 2012-01-12 Erik Wallace Telematics enhanced mobile device safety interlock
WO2012005769A1 (en) 2010-07-09 2012-01-12 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Location privacy selector
US8688087B2 (en) 2010-12-17 2014-04-01 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. N-dimensional affinity confluencer
US8942743B2 (en) 2010-12-17 2015-01-27 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. iALERT enhanced alert manager
US8682321B2 (en) 2011-02-25 2014-03-25 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Mobile internet protocol (IP) location
US8649806B2 (en) 2011-09-02 2014-02-11 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Aggregate location dynometer (ALD)
US9479344B2 (en) 2011-09-16 2016-10-25 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Anonymous voice conversation
WO2013048551A1 (en) 2011-09-30 2013-04-04 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Unique global identifier for minimizing prank 911 calls
US9313637B2 (en) 2011-12-05 2016-04-12 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Wireless emergency caller profile data delivery over a legacy interface
US9264537B2 (en) 2011-12-05 2016-02-16 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Special emergency call treatment based on the caller
US8984591B2 (en) 2011-12-16 2015-03-17 Telecommunications Systems, Inc. Authentication via motion of wireless device movement
US9384339B2 (en) 2012-01-13 2016-07-05 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Authenticating cloud computing enabling secure services
US8688174B2 (en) 2012-03-13 2014-04-01 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Integrated, detachable ear bud device for a wireless phone
US9544260B2 (en) 2012-03-26 2017-01-10 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Rapid assignment dynamic ownership queue
US9307372B2 (en) 2012-03-26 2016-04-05 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. No responders online
US9338153B2 (en) 2012-04-11 2016-05-10 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Secure distribution of non-privileged authentication credentials
WO2014028712A1 (en) 2012-08-15 2014-02-20 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Device independent caller data access for emergency calls
US9208346B2 (en) 2012-09-05 2015-12-08 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Persona-notitia intellection codifier
US9456301B2 (en) 2012-12-11 2016-09-27 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Efficient prisoner tracking
US8983047B2 (en) 2013-03-20 2015-03-17 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Index of suspicion determination for communications request
US9408034B2 (en) 2013-09-09 2016-08-02 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Extended area event for network based proximity discovery
US9516104B2 (en) 2013-09-11 2016-12-06 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. Intelligent load balancer enhanced routing
US9479897B2 (en) 2013-10-03 2016-10-25 Telecommunication Systems, Inc. SUPL-WiFi access point controller location based services for WiFi enabled mobile devices

Citations (20)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP0189823A2 (en) * 1985-01-26 1986-08-06 Rohde & Schwarz GmbH & Co. KG Method for transmitting digital information
US4607137A (en) * 1983-04-26 1986-08-19 U.S. Philips Corporation Method of distributing and utilizing enciphering keys
US4856063A (en) * 1988-01-27 1989-08-08 Technical Communication Corporation No-overhead synchronization for cryptographic systems
JPH01288131A (en) 1988-05-16 1989-11-20 Nec Corp Data transmission system
US5241599A (en) * 1991-10-02 1993-08-31 At&T Bell Laboratories Cryptographic protocol for secure communications
JPH066615A (en) 1992-06-19 1994-01-14 Canon Inc Facsimile equipment
WO1995006374A1 (en) 1993-08-26 1995-03-02 Motorola, Inc. Method and apparatus for providing cryptographic protection of a data stream in a communication system
WO1995008232A1 (en) * 1993-09-14 1995-03-23 Chantilley Corporation Limited Apparatus for key distribution in an encryption system
WO1995026087A1 (en) * 1994-03-23 1995-09-28 Chantilley Corporation Limited Apparatus for generating encryption/decryption look-up tables using a session key
US5602917A (en) * 1994-12-30 1997-02-11 Lucent Technologies Inc. Method for secure session key generation
US5812667A (en) * 1994-09-12 1998-09-22 Nippon Telegraph And Telephone Corporation Subscriber registration and authentication method
US5854841A (en) 1995-11-24 1998-12-29 Hitachi, Ltd. Communication system
US5905445A (en) * 1997-05-05 1999-05-18 Delco Electronics Corp. Keyless entry system with fast program mode
US5966449A (en) * 1993-12-22 1999-10-12 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha Method and network for communicating between a group of entities a text encrypted using an encryption key intrinsic to the group of entities in a network having a plurality of entities and a center
US5991405A (en) * 1998-01-27 1999-11-23 Dsc Telecom, L.P. Method for dynamically updating cellular phone unique encryption keys
US6014444A (en) * 1996-04-08 2000-01-11 Mita Industrial Co., Ltd. Apparatus for encrypted communication
US6125185A (en) * 1997-05-27 2000-09-26 Cybercash, Inc. System and method for encryption key generation
US6157722A (en) * 1998-03-23 2000-12-05 Interlok Technologies, Llc Encryption key management system and method
US6157723A (en) * 1997-03-03 2000-12-05 Motorola, Inc. Method and apparatus for secure communications with encryption key scheduling
US6230002B1 (en) * 1997-11-19 2001-05-08 Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ) Method, and associated apparatus, for selectively permitting access by a mobile terminal to a packet data network

Patent Citations (20)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4607137A (en) * 1983-04-26 1986-08-19 U.S. Philips Corporation Method of distributing and utilizing enciphering keys
EP0189823A2 (en) * 1985-01-26 1986-08-06 Rohde & Schwarz GmbH & Co. KG Method for transmitting digital information
US4856063A (en) * 1988-01-27 1989-08-08 Technical Communication Corporation No-overhead synchronization for cryptographic systems
JPH01288131A (en) 1988-05-16 1989-11-20 Nec Corp Data transmission system
US5241599A (en) * 1991-10-02 1993-08-31 At&T Bell Laboratories Cryptographic protocol for secure communications
JPH066615A (en) 1992-06-19 1994-01-14 Canon Inc Facsimile equipment
WO1995006374A1 (en) 1993-08-26 1995-03-02 Motorola, Inc. Method and apparatus for providing cryptographic protection of a data stream in a communication system
WO1995008232A1 (en) * 1993-09-14 1995-03-23 Chantilley Corporation Limited Apparatus for key distribution in an encryption system
US5966449A (en) * 1993-12-22 1999-10-12 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha Method and network for communicating between a group of entities a text encrypted using an encryption key intrinsic to the group of entities in a network having a plurality of entities and a center
WO1995026087A1 (en) * 1994-03-23 1995-09-28 Chantilley Corporation Limited Apparatus for generating encryption/decryption look-up tables using a session key
US5812667A (en) * 1994-09-12 1998-09-22 Nippon Telegraph And Telephone Corporation Subscriber registration and authentication method
US5602917A (en) * 1994-12-30 1997-02-11 Lucent Technologies Inc. Method for secure session key generation
US5854841A (en) 1995-11-24 1998-12-29 Hitachi, Ltd. Communication system
US6014444A (en) * 1996-04-08 2000-01-11 Mita Industrial Co., Ltd. Apparatus for encrypted communication
US6157723A (en) * 1997-03-03 2000-12-05 Motorola, Inc. Method and apparatus for secure communications with encryption key scheduling
US5905445A (en) * 1997-05-05 1999-05-18 Delco Electronics Corp. Keyless entry system with fast program mode
US6125185A (en) * 1997-05-27 2000-09-26 Cybercash, Inc. System and method for encryption key generation
US6230002B1 (en) * 1997-11-19 2001-05-08 Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ) Method, and associated apparatus, for selectively permitting access by a mobile terminal to a packet data network
US5991405A (en) * 1998-01-27 1999-11-23 Dsc Telecom, L.P. Method for dynamically updating cellular phone unique encryption keys
US6157722A (en) * 1998-03-23 2000-12-05 Interlok Technologies, Llc Encryption key management system and method

Non-Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
Davies et al, "Security for Computer Networks", Nikkei MacGrow Hill-Sha, Dec. 5, 1985, pp. 126-128. (with English Translation).
Mar. 25, 1999, International Search Report for PCT/FI98/00721. *

Cited By (7)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20030051056A1 (en) * 2001-09-10 2003-03-13 International Business Machines Corporation Method and system for transmitting compacted text data
US8234412B2 (en) * 2001-09-10 2012-07-31 International Business Machines Corporation Method and system for transmitting compacted text data
US20070049251A1 (en) * 2005-08-31 2007-03-01 Mock Von A Method and system for wireless communication in emergency situations
US20080313458A1 (en) * 2007-06-15 2008-12-18 Koolspan, Inc. System and method of per-packet keying
US7913085B2 (en) * 2007-06-15 2011-03-22 Koolspan, Inc. System and method of per-packet keying
US20110138170A1 (en) * 2007-06-15 2011-06-09 Koolspan, Inc. System and method of per-packet keying
US9209969B2 (en) * 2007-06-15 2015-12-08 Koolspan, Inc. System and method of per-packet keying

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
FI113119B (en) 2004-02-27
DE69823834D1 (en) 2004-06-17
CA2303048A1 (en) 1999-03-25
ATE266920T1 (en) 2004-05-15
EP0998799A2 (en) 2000-05-10
AU9165298A (en) 1999-04-05
JP3816337B2 (en) 2006-08-30
FI973694A0 (en) 1997-09-15
US6449473B1 (en) 2002-09-10
DE69823834T2 (en) 2005-04-28
WO1999014888A2 (en) 1999-03-25
JP2001517020A (en) 2001-10-02
CA2303048C (en) 2006-09-05
FI973694A (en) 1999-03-16
CN1270725A (en) 2000-10-18
EP0998799B1 (en) 2004-05-12
CN1110924C (en) 2003-06-04
JP2006148982A (en) 2006-06-08
WO1999014888A3 (en) 1999-06-03
ES2219902T3 (en) 2004-12-01

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
USRE39589E1 (en) Security method for transmissions in telecommunication networks
US5179591A (en) Method for algorithm independent cryptographic key management
US7542569B1 (en) Security of data connections
US6052466A (en) Encryption of data packets using a sequence of private keys generated from a public key exchange
US5230020A (en) Algorithm independent cryptographic key management
EP0651533B1 (en) Method and apparatus for privacy and authentication in a mobile wireless network
US8345875B2 (en) System and method of creating and sending broadcast and multicast data
KR100832893B1 (en) A method for the access of the mobile terminal to the WLAN and for the data communication via the wireless link securely
US9209969B2 (en) System and method of per-packet keying
JP2005515701A6 (en) Data transmission link
JP2005515701A (en) Data transmission link
JP2005515715A (en) Data transmission link
JPH04506137A (en) Key distribution method in public communication networks considering security level
US20020199102A1 (en) Method and apparatus for establishing a shared cryptographic key between energy-limited nodes in a network
CN111756528A (en) Quantum session key distribution method and device and communication architecture
CN112911588A (en) Lightweight narrowband Internet of things secure transmission method and system
JP3453944B2 (en) Secret communication method
Borsc et al. Wireless security & privacy
US20070055870A1 (en) Process for secure communication over a wireless network, related network and computer program product
US20040255121A1 (en) Method and communication terminal device for secure establishment of a communication connection
US6975729B1 (en) Method and apparatus for facilitating use of a pre-shared secret key with identity hiding
KR20020006985A (en) Certification service method in two different certifying system using certification gate way
JPH09326789A (en) Opposite party verification method and system in communication between portable radio terminal equipments
CN117062056A (en) End-to-end encryption method and system for 5G network service data based on IPSEC technology
WO2005038608A2 (en) Mass subscriber management

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
AS Assignment

Owner name: NOKIA CORPORATION, FINLAND

Free format text: MERGER;ASSIGNOR:NOKIA NETWORKS OY;REEL/FRAME:019235/0856

Effective date: 20050928

FPAY Fee payment

Year of fee payment: 8

FPAY Fee payment

Year of fee payment: 12

AS Assignment

Owner name: NOKIA TECHNOLOGIES OY, FINLAND

Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:NOKIA CORPORATION;REEL/FRAME:034840/0740

Effective date: 20150116