WO1998048538A2 - Method for secure key management using a biometric - Google Patents
Method for secure key management using a biometric Download PDFInfo
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- WO1998048538A2 WO1998048538A2 PCT/CA1998/000362 CA9800362W WO9848538A2 WO 1998048538 A2 WO1998048538 A2 WO 1998048538A2 CA 9800362 W CA9800362 W CA 9800362W WO 9848538 A2 WO9848538 A2 WO 9848538A2
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0866—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/34—Encoding or coding, e.g. Huffman coding or error correction
Definitions
- a symmetric key algorithm uses a single key to both encrypt and decrypt the data. These algorithms are usually fast and their security lies entirely in maintaining secrecy of the symmetric key. Two problems with these systems are the transportation of the key from the sender to the intended recipient, and the secure storage of the symmetric key.
- a public/private key system uses a two key method. The public key is used for encryption and can be distributed over open channels. Because the public key can be sent over open channels, the inconvenience and security risk associated with key transportation is minimized. However, the private key is still used to decrypt the information, and thus must be kept secret.
- PIN's have become the dominant method by which these encryption keys are secured.
- the encryption keys are then only as secure as the length of the PIN, as the PIN recalls or decrypts the encryption key.
- the length of a PIN which can easily be remembered is limited; thus the security of the system is also limited.
- PIN's are now, of course, prevalent in many other areas of life, such as banking, access control, and as an identification means for social programs. As the number of PIN's that one needs to remember/store escalates, the potential for a security breach arises.
- This invention overcomes the need to carry, store, or remember private keys for encryption/decryption, or PIN's for any other application by deriving a digital key from a biometric, during a live verification process.
- the digital key is linked to the biometric only through a secure block of data known as the protected filter.
- the correct key will only be derived via the interaction of this protected filter with the correct user biometric.
- the method should be capable of producing an arbitrary M-bit digital key in conjunction with the biometric.
- no key should be released when an unauthorized user of the protected filter attempts to use the system.
- the protected filter as an independent data block, has to be resilient to "attack".
- German patent DE 42 43 908 Al to Bodo a method was proposed for extracting a digital key directly from a biometric. While the invention of Bodo thus provides a method for producing a digital key from a biometric, the security of such a system is irrevocably lost if the digital key is ever compromised. For this reason, feature 1 above is preferred; i.e. for a system to remain secure, there should be the ability to change the digital key.
- the invention described herein proposes a method for linking a key to the biometric, rather than directly deriving the key from the biometric; thus the key can be changed at any time simply by re-enrolling the user and recreating the protected filter.
- a matched filter approach does not possess feature 4.
- a method for securely recovering a digital key comprising the steps of: capturing at least one biometric image; obtaining transformed image information comprising transforming said at least one biometric image to a transform domain; retrieving a protected filter from storage, said protected filter comprising a phase-only filter; applying said transformed image information to said phase-only filter to obtain verification information; and obtaining a digital key from said verification information.
- a method of linking a binary one-dimensional key having M elements with a given two-dimensional complex valued array comprising the steps of:
- a method for generating a protected filter comprising the steps of: capturing at least one biometric image; obtaining transformed image information comprising transforming said at least one biometric image to a transform domain; generating a random phase-only function; obtaining a complex conjugate of the phase component of said transformed image information; multiplying said phase-only function with said complex conjugate to generate a phase-only filter; and storing a protected filter, said protected filter comprising said phase-only filter.
- a method for secure user verification comprising the steps of: capturing at least one biometric image; obtaining transformed image information comprising transforming said at least one biometric image to a transform domain; obtaining magnitude information from said transformed image information; retrieving a phase-only filter from storage; applying at least said magnitude information to said phase-only filter to obtain a transitory filter with phase and magnitude information; multiplying said transformed image information with said transitory filter to obtain verification information; comparing said verification information with a retrieved reference pattern and, on obtaining a satisfactory match, providing a user verification signal.
- Figure 1 presents a diagram of the enrollment process for producing a protected filter.
- Figure 2 presents a diagram of a method to link an output plane with a digital key on enrollment.
- Figure 3 presents a diagram of the verification process for secure key extraction.
- Figure 4 presents a diagram of a method to extract the key on verification.
- This invention describes a method which firstly, reliably produces a two-dimensional array, c(x). using biometric images in conjunction with a protected filter, and secondly, describes a method for linking elements from c(x) to an M-bit digital key, k.
- the key, k is only extracted correctly when the correct biometric is combined with the correct protected filter.
- the key, k may be used directly as an encryption/decryption key or as a PIN in security or communication systems.
- the two-dimensional array, c(x) will be formed via the interaction of a fingerprint with a filter function, stored within the protected filter.
- the filter function is designed for a Fourier transform processor. Neither the filter function nor the fingerprint alone is capable of producing c(x).
- a digital key, k is extracted from the c(x) array. Once k has been extracted, it is used in conjunction with both an encryption algorithm and a hashing algorithm in order to produce an identification code id.
- the ID-code id will then be compared with a previously stored value id 0 to determine the validity of the key, before it is released into the encryption system, or other application.
- the process for obtaining the identification code is as follows.
- S bits from the protected filter will be encrypted using the generated key k.
- the resulting ciphertext block will then become the input to a one-way hash function which produces the identification code id. Since the hash algorithm is one-way, the id value cannot be transformed back into the key k.
- Examples proposed for the aforementioned encryption algorithm and hash algorithm are the International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) and the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA), respectively.
- IDEA International Data Encryption Algorithm
- SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
- using both an encryption algorithm and a hash algorithm provides more security than simply storing the hash value of the generated key alone. This is because the S bits that are chosen from the protected filter and encrypted using k will be unique for each user.
- an attacker who sought to obtain a "universal" look-up table of the relationship between k and id (so that he could extract id 0 from the protected filter, and thus determine ko for a particular user), would have to compute all possible permutations of encrypting S-bit messages with M-bit keys.
- the computational and memory resources required to generate such a look-up table makes such an attack infeasible.
- the filter function is designed to be tolerant to distortions of the finge ⁇ rint, so that it accommodates the natural variations that are apparent in biometric images over any significant period of time. Therefore, the filter function will be constructed using a set of T training images. It is assumed that the set of training images is sufficient to encompass all of the expected distortions of the finge ⁇ rint.
- the filter function will be calculated during an enrollment session using a series of training images.
- the filter function is to be used during a verification session using a series of non-training images.
- the filter function is designed for a legitimate user, and should be inappropriate for use with a non-legitimate user, or "attacker".
- the following typeface convention is used: y(x) - two-dimensional array in image domain 7(u) - two-dimensional array in Fourier domain
- T images of the biometric by ⁇ f 0 (x),fo (x), ...,f_ (x) ⁇ , where the subscript 0 denotes a training set image.
- H(u) The filter function that will be constructed using these images.
- and e" ⁇ H ⁇ u ⁇ , respectively, where i V- 1 .
- E s ⁇ m , ⁇ a ⁇ ry is thus defined using an arbitrary function, go(x), rather than a delta function, as is normally done in the process of correlation. Also, we wish to minimize the error due to distortion in the input images, i.e.:
- P(u) is readily approximated by a function which characterizes the type of object for which the filter is designed.
- P( ) may take the form of a Gaussian function.
- -°(u) may also take the form of a simple array whose elements all have unity value.
- the form of (u) will be fixed for all users of the system, although it could also be user-specific.
- E s ⁇ m , ⁇ anty characterizes the similarity of system output in response to each of the training set images
- E no ⁇ se characterizes the effect of image-to-image variation.
- E s ⁇ m , ⁇ a ⁇ ty determines how selective (or discriminating) the filter function is
- E no ⁇ se determines how tolerant it is to the expected distortions in the biometric images.
- E tota l ⁇ E noise + 1 - ⁇ 2 E similarity , 0 ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ 1 (6)
- H F (u) contains all of the terms of the filter relating to the training set of finge ⁇ rint images, and G 0 (u) is the Fourier transform of g 0 (x). Note that equation (14) defines a filter H(u) that is optimized for any function for G 0 (u). We seek to choose a G 0 (u) that provides maximum security of H(u).
- ⁇ in H(u) provides a trade-off between the discrimination capability and distortion tolerance of the filter.
- ⁇ can be used to produce a tighter or more forgiving system, depending on the requirements.
- the value of ⁇ is generally determined by testing the performance of filters using a large database of images.
- the parameter ⁇ may be universal, in which case it is stored in the system, or it may be user-dependent, in which case it will be stored as part of the protected filter. 1.4) Security of protected filter
- the protected filter must be immune to attack, i.e. neither the biometric image,/(x), nor the system output, g 0 (x), should be recoverable from the protected filter.
- the form of the protected filter has not yet been defined.
- G 0 (u) is a random, uniformly distributed phase function, and only the phase of H F (u), denoted e H? , is stored.
- the protected filter thus comprises the product of e H and a random phase-only function.
- the following text demonstrates the "perfect secrecy" of the protected filter. Perfect secrecy in this sense implies that given the protected filter, neither of the two elements comprising this filter can be reconstructed.
- Every key is used with probability equal to ⁇ / ⁇ K ⁇ , where ⁇ K ⁇ denotes the size of the keyspace, and
- [0,2 ⁇ )' used in the following lemma implies an r element string where each element can take on the values j such that 0 ⁇ j ⁇ 2 ⁇ .
- the elements of P , C , and K are defined as a string (or array) of r floating point elements where each element falls within the range of 0 to 2 ⁇ .
- ⁇ the number of possibilities in the space [0,2 ⁇ ) when taking into account the floating-point precision level.
- the biometric images comprising the training set are 128x128 dimensioned float or byte arrays.
- a random number generator 80 to generate, an M-bit key, ko, 90, as is required by the encryption or other system.
- a random number generator is the Blum-Blum-Shub (BBS) generator.
- the output c 0 (x), 60 is a 128x128 complex- valued array.
- a link algorithm, 64, used to link elements from c 0 (x), 60, with ko, 90, is defined by the following steps:
- an enrollment template, 1 1 1, of dimension 128x64 i.e. an array with 128 columns and 64 rows.
- 128x64 i.e. an array with 128 columns and 64 rows.
- the elements of the enrollment template, 1 1 1, are then sent into the decision box, 113, which sorts the elements by sign. Note that the negative elements from 1 1 1 will eventually represent '0 valued' elements of the key, ko, while positive elements from 11 1 will be used to represent '1 valued' elements of ko.
- the negative elements are then ranked in descending order according to their magnitude and the indices of the ranked elements (i.e. the row and column of each ranked element in the enrollment template) are stored in the vector Location_zeroes, 130.
- the same procedure is then executed for the positive elements of 1 11 in which the indices of the ranked elements are stored in the vector Location ones, 131. Notice that the names of these vectors have been chosen due to their eventual relation with the bits of the key as noted above.
- M represents the length of the requested key, ko, 90.
- M 0 represent the number of 0's in ko, 90, and let Mj represent the number of l's. Retain then the first M 0 xL elements of Location zeroes, 130, and the first MixL elements of Location_ones, 131.
- L elements extracted for key bit m form the m l column of a Link Index array, LI, 62, with M columns and L rows.
- the elements of LI, 62 thus form the link index "lookup- table" for the elements of the enrollment template, 1 1 1, that have been chosen to represent the key, ko, 90. Note that it has been observed that the probability of an error in each key bit is inversely proportional to the rank of the constituent bits.
- the rank was determined based on the distance of the point of the enrollment template from either the real or imaginary axes, i.e. the distance of the point from zero, depending on whether that point comes from the real or the imaginary part, respectively. Therefore, we may choose the L elements in an interleaving manner as presented in figure 2, such that the probability of error in each of the M key bits is homogenized. However, the elements may also be chosen randomly so as to minimize the information given to the attacker. Note also that for an M-bit key, the maximum value of L should be limited, so that all valid combinations of the key are supported by the available elements of the enrollment template (the requested key permutation has to be supported by the available number of zeroes and ones in the enrollment template).
- the protected filter which comprises H stored (u), 53, the Link Index array, LI, 62, and the ID-code, id 0 , 92.
- the protected filter may also contain the value of ⁇ and/or the function of P(u), unless they are universal to the system.
- H stored ( u ), 53, LI, 62, id 0 , 92, and, where necessary, ⁇ and/or P(u) are read in from the protected filter.
- k l5 93 as an M-element vector, and use the following steps to extract the elements of kj from the binarized verification template, 142, and the Link Index, 62.
- idj, 95 does not match id 0 , 92, then extract the portion of e ⁇ (x), 63, that is offset from the centre by one pixel, and repeat the above process to obtain a new id l5 95.
- idj the portion of C ⁇ (x) that are one pixel offset from centre, comparing idj with id 0 for each iteration (eight combinations, including diagonals). If at any point id] ⁇ id 0 then cease the algorithm and release kj ( ⁇ ko). If, for all locations, idj ⁇ id 0 , then repeat the above process for extractions that are offset from centre by two pixels, and so on up to approximately sixteen pixel offsets. If id] ⁇ id 0 for all locations, then send a message to the system that verification has failed and thus no key has been released.
- the ID-code, id 0 may also be stored at a secure location outside the protected filter. In this case, during verification, a new ID-code, id l5 is sent to that location and compared with id 0 . This will improve the system security in that an attacker trying to retrieve the key, ko, from the protected filter will not have access to id 0 , and thus can only know whether his/her efforts were successful via messages sent from the secure location and controlled by the system administrator. Hence, the system administrator may limit the number of consecutive failed comparisons between idj and id 0 so that an attacker cannot assemble a large database of finge ⁇ rints and use them to attempt to produce the correct key, ko-
- H st0 r ed ( u ) m y be stored as an array of quantized elements, where each element is one of a limited number, such as sixteen, of phase-levels.
- correlation could be used to judge the similarity between c ⁇ (x) with c 0 (x), and the ratio of correlation peak height divided by the total correlation plane energy could be used as the scalar value. This scalar value is then compared with a pre-determined system threshold and the user is either accepted or rejected by the system. If c 0 (x) can remain secure then it would be very difficult for an attacker to defeat such a system by generating an artificial c ⁇ (x) and obtaining a positive verification signal.
- the above embodiment sums the constituent bits from the binarized verification template with uniform weights
- various weighting functions could be used to further enhance performance of the system.
- the constituent bits could be weighted according to the inverse rank of each bit and summed.
- the constituent bits could also be weighted inversely proportional to the expected standard deviation of each bit before being added.
- the magnitude vectors could be added together using complex weights, comprising an amplitude term such as the standard deviation, and a phase term, which is added to the phase of each element and which is defined by the conjugate of the phase of that element in the enrollment template. For a legitimate user, this phase "correction" will provide a magnitude vector summation along the real axis.
- the summation will thus be far from the origin.
- the phase of the verification template will be random with respect to the legitimate user enrollment template. Because of this, the complex weights will not cancel the phase terms and the summation of the magnitude vectors should collapse to zero.
- the idea here is to force the legitimate user's summation to be far from the binarization threshold (i.e., zero on the real axis), while the attacker's summation is random about the binarization threshold.
- error-correcting codes such as Hamming codes and Reed-Solomon codes
- N the constituent bits of the binarized verification template
- error-correcting codes may be used to reduce the number of errors in the digital key, k. This would be achieved, for example, by using the constituent bits of the binarized verification template to derive N bits of data (where N > M), and then using error-correcting codes to transform the N encoding bits to the M key-bits.
- H st0red (u) and c 0 (x) can be regenerated (using a new version of G 0 (u)), and a new linking index array, LI, determined.
- the new versions of H stored (u) and LI should be stored in the protected filter. This process may be considered as "adaptive filtering", as the contents of the protected filter are adapted over time to encompass more of the natural variations of the biometric image than could be encompassed in a single enrollment session.
- the key, ko may be modified, if necessary. In this case id 0 should be modified in the protected filter. Updating the key has several benefits. For example, if it is known that ko has been compromised, then a new key should be introduced into the system. Also, if it is known that an attacker can establish the value of a key within a certain period of time, for example by using a brute- force computational search, then the value of the key should be updated within this period of time. Updating the value of the key periodically is a standard procedure used in cryptographic and other security systems, and it is evident that this is easily achieved using the methods described herein.
- a second embodiment of the invention deals with minutiae-based finge ⁇ rint verification techniques.
- minutiae are unique and reasonably robust characteristics of a finge ⁇ rint.
- Classical minutiae are defined as finge ⁇ rint ridge endings (type 1 minutiae) and finge ⁇ rint ridge bifurcations (type 2 minutiae).
- type 1 minutiae may be also defined as finge ⁇ rint groove bifurcations and the type 2 minutiae - as groove endings.
- finge ⁇ rint characteristics which are sometimes referred to minutiae, such as rods, pores, bridges, islands, line breaks, etc., but they are usually unstable and irreproducible in subsequent attempts.
- the minutiae extraction algorithms For the key management in this embodiment, we use one of the known minutiae extraction algorithms (see, for example, U.S. Patent No. 4,752,966 to Schiller inco ⁇ orated herein by reference).
- the algorithm scans a finge ⁇ rint image and finds a horizontal and vertical, x and y, positions of the minutiae, their orientation angles, ⁇ , and identifies them as types, 1 or 2.
- the minutiae are tested for their stability: if the same minutia is found, for example, in at least 4 attempts from 5 in total, this minutia will be retained, otherwise, it is considered unstable and dropped.
- a feature array, ⁇ x,y,Q), is formed in a 3D feature space which includes x, y minutiae coordinates and their angles.
- x 0 ,yo, ⁇ 0 ) 0 if there is no minutia in this cell.
- a 3D Fourier transform is performed to obtain a 3D complex function F(u,v, ⁇ ).
- F(u,v, ⁇ ) a 3D complex function
- this embodiment is also rotationally invariant. In other words, if during verification a finger is placed into a different position and at a different angle, this will not significantly affect the performance of the method.
- 64x64x16 array, H st0red may be extracted and stored, that is, its dimensions will be, for example, 64x32x16.
- the operator Q in equation (24) processes the amplitude ⁇ F 0 ⁇ in order to improve the system tolerance. It may contain, for example, a saturation denominator like in the first embodiment (equation (19)).
- the function c 0 (x,y, ⁇ ) is used to encode an M-bit digital key , ko • This is done via a link code and in the same manner as in the first embodiment. More particular, a central portion of c 0 (x,y, ⁇ ) is extracted; for example, its size may be 32x32x10 or 32x16x10, if the noted half of H st0red was stored. The real and imaginary parts of the extracted arrays are concatenated and binarized, thus the resulting array contains 20480 bits (or 10240, if the noted half was stored).
- the link code links each of the M bits in the key k to L bits picked from the array of 20480 or 10240 elements. There may be some more sophisticated methods, including various error correcting codes.
- the stored protected filter comprises the phase-only function, H storec a,v, ⁇ ) , the data defining the link code, and the ID-code, id 0 .
- yet another method for obtaining a biometric information signal is used.
- the information contained in a 2D finge ⁇ rint image, f_(x,y), is sorted into two parts: the most distinctive, fo m (x,y), and the least distinctive, fo ⁇ (x,y).
- the most distinctive information contains the areas (we call them "tiles") including minutiae, scars, places with a high line curvature, etc., in other words, the areas which do not have a parallel or quasi-parallel line structure.
- One of the methods for finding these areas is disclosed in U.S. Patent No. 5,067,162 to Driscoll et al and is inco ⁇ orated herein by reference.
- Another method may include any minutiae extraction algorithm, that is, after all minutiae have been found, the "tiles" from the original image containing the minutiae as centers are extracted.
- the least distinctive areas may be found in the opposite manner, that is, the "tiles" are located at the places where the lines are almost parallel and do not contain minutiae.
- the "tiles” could have dimensions of 16x16.
- the function fo ⁇ (x,y) may be taken as a straight strip at the bottom, at the top, at the right or the left side of the image, or as a combination of the above. In this case the information contained in f 0 ⁇ (x,y) should not necessarily be called least distinctive but rather the information retained for co-alignment.
- the functions/) m (x,j>) and fo ⁇ (x,y) are 128x128 images containing the "tiles" with the most or the least distinctive information, the pixels outside the "tiles” are set equal to 0 or to other pre-determined values. These "tiles" are located at the same places as they were in the original image fo(x,y).
- the most distinctive information is used for the key linking and is not stored into a protected filter, whereas the least distinctive information is used only to co-align a finge ⁇ rint to be verified with the enrolled finge ⁇ rint.
- the least distinctive information is stored into a protected filter.
- a few versions of the same finge ⁇ rint may be used to improve its consistency, as it was described in the first embodiment.
- a transformation, T is performed to obtain a transform, Fo m (u,v), of the most distinctive information:
- the transformation T is not necessarily a Fourier transform, it may be also a fractional Fourier transform, a Gabor transform, one of the wavelet transforms, etc.
- the transformation T should not necessarily yield a translation-invariant method, like the Fourier transform, because the images are co- aligned with the least distinctive information.
- the remainder of the operations is almost the same as in the first embodiment.
- a random phase-only function, G 0 (u,v) is generated; the functions
- T 1 is an inverse transformation
- Q ⁇ processes the amplitude of F 0m (u,v)
- a requested key, ko is linked to c 0 (x,y) via a link code.
- the entire c 0 (x,y) array is used, not only a central part, which increases the amount of the available information and improves the performance.
- a protected filter comprises H st0red , the link code, the least distinctive information
- a new finge ⁇ rint image,/ (x,y), is obtained.
- the array fo ⁇ (x,y) containing the least distinctive information from the enrolled finge ⁇ rint is read from the protected filter.
- the array / ⁇ (x,y) is used only to co-align the finge ⁇ rint images )(x,y) and/(x,y).
- a correlation function of two arrays, )i(x,y) and/(x,y) is calculated, and x and y positions of the correlation peak, x cor and y cor , are determined. If the images/(x,y) and/(x,y) were not shifted relatively to each other, the correlation peak would be located exactly at the center, i.e. at (64,64) in case of
- tiles are extracted at the same locations from/'(x,y) to obtain an array/ m '(x,y) which is supposed to coincide with the array /) m (x,y) extracted during enrollment.
- a few versions of the finge ⁇ rint/(x,y) may be obtained during verification, and a few versions of the arrays/ n '(x,y) and/ m '(x,y) may be extracted. If some of the arrays/ m '(x,y) differ too much from the most of the arrays, these arrays will be rejected. Then a composite image, / m (x,y), may be formed by adding together the remaining / m '(x,y) arrays.
- a key, kj is determined from e ⁇ (x,y) using the link code which was read from the protected filter. Then the hash value, idj , is calculated from kj and compared with the stored value id 0 . If they match, the correct key is released.
- the array C ⁇ (x,y) is not scanned, unlike the first and the second embodiments, because the images/ (x,y) and >(x,y) are co-aligned. However, there may be an error of the co-alignment, usually in 1 or 2 pixels. In this case the co- aligned input image/ '(x,y) may be shifted by ⁇ 2 pixels in both x and y directions in order to obtain a few functions/ m (x,y) and try them all for the verifications.
- a fourth embodiment of the invention deals with another type of biometric information: the eye's iris. It has been shown (see, for example, the article by J.Daugman, IEEE Trans, on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, Vol.15, No. l 1, p.p.1 148-1161, 1993 inco ⁇ orated herein by reference) that the iris scan is quite an accurate and reliable method for biometric verification and identification. There are two important advantages of the iris scan to finge ⁇ rint-based biometrics. First, the iris has a circular shape and, thus, a natural center, which solves the problem of the co-alignment of images. Second, the iris reading is free of mechanical contact, which allows to capture the iris image without irregular distortions.
- the first step includes receiving a 2D iris image, pre-processing, and transforming the image to dimensionless projected polar coordinate system (r, ⁇ ) to obtain a processed iris image, i 0 (r, ⁇ ).
- a few versions of the same iris may be used, similar to all previous embodiments.
- the next step includes performing a transformation of / 0 (r, ⁇ ) to obtain a transform, f 0 (R, ⁇ ).
- this is a Gabor transform
- a protected filter comprises H st0red , the link code, and the ID code, id 0 .
- a new processed iris image, i ⁇ ⁇ r, ⁇ ) is obtained.
- the Gabor transform is performed, and the real and imaginary parts of its result are concatenated and binarized to obtain a binary function, Bf ⁇ (R,&).
- the function H st0red is retrieved from the protected filter, and a binary function, BG ⁇ (R, ⁇ ), is obtained:
- a decrypted key, kj is determined from BG ⁇ (R, ⁇ ) using the link code which was read from the protected filter. Then the hash value, idj , is calculated from kj and compared with the stored value id 0 . If they match, the correct key is released.
- the key management may be also done in a manner similar to the previous embodiments, that is, via a function c 0 (r, ⁇ ) and an inverse Gabor (or any other) transform, like in equation (28).
- the function H stored would not be a binary but a phase-only function.
- the third embodiment of the invention may be also done similarly to the fourth embodiment, that is, by binarizing the function E 0m (u,v) and creating H st0red via the XOR operation, like in equation (31). This would especially make sense if a finge ⁇ rint input device were able to produce distortion-free images.
- the fourth embodiment may be implemented for any distortion-free biometric with co-aligned images.
Abstract
Description
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Priority Applications (4)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE19882328.2T DE19882328B3 (en) | 1997-04-21 | 1998-04-20 | Security key handling method using biometrics |
AU70208/98A AU7020898A (en) | 1997-04-21 | 1998-04-20 | Method for secure key management using a biometric |
CA002286749A CA2286749C (en) | 1997-04-21 | 1998-04-20 | Method for secure key management using a biometric |
GB9924562A GB2339518B (en) | 1997-04-21 | 1998-04-20 | Method for secure key management using a biometric |
Applications Claiming Priority (6)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
CA002203212A CA2203212A1 (en) | 1997-04-21 | 1997-04-21 | Methodology for biometric encryption |
CA2,203,212 | 1997-04-21 | ||
CA2,209,438 | 1997-06-30 | ||
CA002209438A CA2209438A1 (en) | 1997-04-21 | 1997-06-30 | Biometric encryption |
US08/947,224 US6219794B1 (en) | 1997-04-21 | 1997-10-08 | Method for secure key management using a biometric |
US08/947,224 | 1997-10-08 |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
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WO1998048538A2 true WO1998048538A2 (en) | 1998-10-29 |
WO1998048538A3 WO1998048538A3 (en) | 1999-02-11 |
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Family Applications (1)
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PCT/CA1998/000362 WO1998048538A2 (en) | 1997-04-21 | 1998-04-20 | Method for secure key management using a biometric |
Country Status (4)
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AU (1) | AU7020898A (en) |
DE (1) | DE19882328B3 (en) |
GB (1) | GB2339518B (en) |
WO (1) | WO1998048538A2 (en) |
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WO2000036566A1 (en) * | 1998-12-14 | 2000-06-22 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Biometric identification mechanism that preserves the integrity of the biometric information |
EP1063812A2 (en) * | 1999-06-21 | 2000-12-27 | Fujitsu Limited | Methods and equipment for encrypting/decrypting, and indentification systems |
EP1077555A2 (en) * | 1999-08-18 | 2001-02-21 | Nec Corporation | Encrypting communication system and encrypting communication method |
US6256737B1 (en) | 1999-03-09 | 2001-07-03 | Bionetrix Systems Corporation | System, method and computer program product for allowing access to enterprise resources using biometric devices |
WO2002033663A1 (en) * | 2000-10-18 | 2002-04-25 | Deutsche Post Ag | Method for checking postage stamps on letters and parcels |
WO2003100730A1 (en) * | 2002-05-24 | 2003-12-04 | Ncipher, Corporation, Ltd. | Biometric key generation for secure storage |
WO2005069534A1 (en) * | 2004-01-13 | 2005-07-28 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Biometric authentication |
EP1560362A1 (en) * | 2004-01-30 | 2005-08-03 | Hewlett-Packard Magyarorszag Szamitastechn. es Elektr. Berendezéseket Forgalmazo és Szolgaltato Korlatolt Felelösségü Tarsasag | Authentication method and system |
WO2006000989A1 (en) * | 2004-06-25 | 2006-01-05 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Renewable and private biometrics |
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US7882363B2 (en) | 2002-05-31 | 2011-02-01 | Fountain Venture As | Biometric authentication system |
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WO2000036566A1 (en) * | 1998-12-14 | 2000-06-22 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Biometric identification mechanism that preserves the integrity of the biometric information |
US6256737B1 (en) | 1999-03-09 | 2001-07-03 | Bionetrix Systems Corporation | System, method and computer program product for allowing access to enterprise resources using biometric devices |
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EP1063812A3 (en) * | 1999-06-21 | 2004-07-14 | Fujitsu Limited | Methods and equipment for encrypting/decrypting, and indentification systems |
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US7962754B2 (en) | 1999-06-21 | 2011-06-14 | Fujitsu Limited | Method and equipment for encrypting/decrypting physical characteristic information, and identification system utilizing the physical characteristic information |
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EP1077555A3 (en) * | 1999-08-18 | 2002-06-19 | Nec Corporation | Encrypting communication system and encrypting communication method |
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WO2002033663A1 (en) * | 2000-10-18 | 2002-04-25 | Deutsche Post Ag | Method for checking postage stamps on letters and parcels |
US8229177B2 (en) | 2001-05-31 | 2012-07-24 | Fountain Venture As | Data processing apparatus and method |
US7996683B2 (en) | 2001-10-01 | 2011-08-09 | Genkey As | System, portable device and method for digital authenticating, crypting and signing by generating short-lived cryptokeys |
WO2003100730A1 (en) * | 2002-05-24 | 2003-12-04 | Ncipher, Corporation, Ltd. | Biometric key generation for secure storage |
US7882363B2 (en) | 2002-05-31 | 2011-02-01 | Fountain Venture As | Biometric authentication system |
WO2005069534A1 (en) * | 2004-01-13 | 2005-07-28 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Biometric authentication |
EP1560362A1 (en) * | 2004-01-30 | 2005-08-03 | Hewlett-Packard Magyarorszag Szamitastechn. es Elektr. Berendezéseket Forgalmazo és Szolgaltato Korlatolt Felelösségü Tarsasag | Authentication method and system |
US8572673B2 (en) | 2004-06-10 | 2013-10-29 | Dominic Gavan Duffy | Data processing apparatus and method |
WO2006000989A1 (en) * | 2004-06-25 | 2006-01-05 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Renewable and private biometrics |
US8046589B2 (en) | 2004-06-25 | 2011-10-25 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Renewable and private biometrics |
EP1677537A1 (en) * | 2004-12-31 | 2006-07-05 | Swisscom Mobile AG | Method and device for receiving content data with conditional access and Remote Server |
WO2008030166A1 (en) * | 2006-09-07 | 2008-03-13 | Innitor Biosystems Ab | A method, an apparatus and a computer program product within fingerprint matching |
US8929617B2 (en) | 2006-09-07 | 2015-01-06 | Steria Biometrics Ab | Method for identifying an unknown fingerprint by generating a numeric representation through interleaving digits |
US8971596B2 (en) | 2006-09-07 | 2015-03-03 | Steria As | Method for identifying fingerprints through numeric representation |
US8971595B2 (en) | 2006-09-07 | 2015-03-03 | Steria As | Method for generating interleaving digits to match fingerprints |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
GB2339518A (en) | 2000-01-26 |
DE19882328B3 (en) | 2014-05-08 |
WO1998048538A3 (en) | 1999-02-11 |
GB9924562D0 (en) | 1999-12-22 |
AU7020898A (en) | 1998-11-13 |
DE19882328T1 (en) | 2000-07-13 |
GB2339518B (en) | 2002-04-10 |
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