WO2000030285A9 - Method and apparatus for secure distribution of authentication credentials to roaming users - Google Patents
Method and apparatus for secure distribution of authentication credentials to roaming usersInfo
- Publication number
- WO2000030285A9 WO2000030285A9 PCT/US1999/027621 US9927621W WO0030285A9 WO 2000030285 A9 WO2000030285 A9 WO 2000030285A9 US 9927621 W US9927621 W US 9927621W WO 0030285 A9 WO0030285 A9 WO 0030285A9
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- requestor
- authentication credential
- credential
- server
- challenge
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
- G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
- G06F21/6245—Protecting personal data, e.g. for financial or medical purposes
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/02—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols involving a neutral party, e.g. certification authority, notary or trusted third party [TTP]
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/36—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes
- G06Q20/367—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/36—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes
- G06Q20/367—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes
- G06Q20/3672—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes initialising or reloading thereof
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/36—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes
- G06Q20/367—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes
- G06Q20/3674—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes involving authentication
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
- G06Q20/3829—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction involving key management
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1025—Identification of user by a PIN code
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
- H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
- H04L9/0844—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3218—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using proof of knowledge, e.g. Fiat-Shamir, GQ, Schnorr, ornon-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
- H04L9/3231—Biological data, e.g. fingerprint, voice or retina
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/2127—Bluffing
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/56—Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
Definitions
- each user has two keys, a private key and a public key.
- the user performs a cryptographic operation (e.g., an encryption or a digital signature) on a digital quantity using his private key, such that the quantity may be authenticated by a verifier having access only to the user's public key.
- the private key therefore serves as the user's authentication credential. That is, the verifier need not know the user's private key in order to authenticate the user.
- the public key may be widely disseminated while the private key remains confidential, strong authentication is provided with enhanced security. Private keys are generally too long and complex for
- One such software token is the so-called software wallet, in which the private key is encrypted with a password or other access-controlled datum.
- software wallets In such software wallets, an intruder is not deterred from repeatedly trying passwords, in an exhaustive manner, until he recovers the private key. This poses analogous security risks to the simple password schemes described above.
- the software wallet is stored on a user's computer, which may be inconvenient if the user needs to freely roam from one location to another.
- hardware tokens such as smart cards are more secure, and can be conveniently carried as the user roams.
- the private key is stored in hardware, and protected by a watchdog chip that allows the user to access the private key, should he enter the correct password that unlocks the smart card.
- the smart card can even be configured so that, if a hacker attempts to guess passwords, the card locks up after a small number of successive missed attempts.
- the disadvantages of hardware token are: (1) roaming is restricted to locations where the appropriate token reader hardware is installed; (2) hardware tokens are expensive in contrast to software tokens; (3) hardware tokens must be physically carried wherever the user wishes to roam; and (4) hardware tokens are often lost, misplaced, or stolen.
- the present invention discloses a method and apparatus for the on-demand delivery of authentication credentials to roaming users. Credentials are stored, delivered and transmitted in software, obviating the need for additional hardware.
- a user can demand his credential at will, upon providing proof of identity in the form of shared secret(s) that he has previously escrowed with the credential server.
- the shared secret may be chosen by the user, and could be easily remembered secrets such as: mother's maiden name, third grade teacher, etc.
- the user will respond to challenges from the server via a challenge- response protocol, with the server demanding correct answers to such questions prior to releasing the user's credentials.
- a user's authentication credential can be stored on the server protected by a simple shared secret scheme such as a password, a biometric authentication scheme based on a fingerprint or retinal image, or a one-to-one hashed shared secret.
- the user interacts with the server via a cryptographically camouflaged challenge-response protocol.
- the server via a cryptographically camouflaged challenge-response protocol.
- the user will receive his authentication credentials.
- the user responds incorrectly such as might be the case with a hacker trying to break the system, the user will receive plausible and well-formed but invalid credentials.
- the authentication credential itself could be encrypted or camouflaged with an additional secret that is known only to the user.
- An authentication credential is said to be in cryptographically camouflaged form when it is embedded among many pieces of similar (pseudo- valid) data. These data are sufficiently different that the user can locate the correct piece without any difficulty, using a shared secret that he can remember. However, the pieces of data are also sufficiently alike that an intruder will find all of them equally plausible.
- Such a cryptographically camouflaged authentication credential can be provided to the user in either camouflaged or decamouflaged form that is, the decamouflaging can be performed at either the credential server or at the user's computer.
- Figure 1 illustrates an exemplary embodiment of the invention in which a user accesses a web server to conduct an electronic transaction with a transaction server protected by an access control server.
- Figure 2 illustrates an exemplary embodiment of a wallet in which a private key is protected by a PIN.
- Figure 3 illustrates an exemplary embodiment in which the wallet of Figure 2 is protected by a form of cryptographic camouflaging.
- a user at Browser 140 wishes to access a Web Server 110 to conduct an electronic transaction.
- Web Server 110 is, in turn, safeguarded by Access Control Server 120, which prevents unauthorized access to Transaction Server 130.
- Access Control Server 120 might be a company's home page
- Access Control Server 120 might be a firewall
- Transaction Server 130 might contain proprietary company data that the user wishes to access.
- Access Control Server 120 might be a membership or credit/payment verification system
- Transaction Server 130 might be a back-end shipping/delivery system.
- servers 110, 120 and 130 may be combined into a single server, that there may be more additional servers performing other specialized functions, that any of these servers may be co-located or widely distributed, and so forth.
- the electronic transaction may be of virtually any type including, but not limited to, secure electronic mail, accessing privileged or confidential information, and purchasing electronic or physical goods or services.
- the user Before accessing the Transaction Server 130 to perform the electronic transaction, the user first needs to authenticate himself to Access Control Server 120. As mentioned in the Background of the Invention, the user typically authenticates himself by using his private key to perform a cryptographic operation on a challenge sent by the Access Control Server 120.
- This cryptographic operation might be a simple encryption, a hash followed by encryption (commonly referred to as a digital signature), or still other protocols that are well known to those skilled in the art.
- the authentication credential might be a simple password. Private key, password and other authentication credentials are well known to those skilled in the art, and need not be described in detail here. For examples thereof, the reader is referred to well-known, standard texts as Applied Cryptography (Bruce Schneier, Second Edition, 1996, pp. 101-1 12 & 548-549) for details.
- the present invention provides a method and apparatus for providing the authentication credential, on demand, to a user who wishes to be able to access servers 110, 120 and/or 130 from a variety of Browsers 140 (the so-called "roaming user").
- This on-demand roaming capability is provided by a Credential Server 160 that downloads the authentication credential (e.g., private key) to the user at Browser 140 via a software Wallet 150.
- Wallet 150 need only serve as a basic container for the authentication credential.
- Credential Server 160 is embodied as a web server.
- the user points his Browser 140 to the Credential Server, which sends the user a challenge in the form of a shared secret that has previously been associated with the user during a set-up phase.
- This shared secret might be of the following exemplary forms:
- the Credential Server 160 obtains the user's wallet from a Wallet Database 170 (which may or may not be part of Credential Server 160) and provides the wallet to the user at Browser 140.
- the wallet, or a part thereof could be provided directly to any of servers 110, 120 & 130.
- the wallet could be installed either: 1) in the memory space of the software program, and/or subsequently 2) onto the hard drive or other physical memory of the computer. If only the former, the authentication credential would be destroyed when the session is ended. If the latter, the authentication credential could be available for use across multiple sessions on that particular computer. In either event, as the user roams to another computer, the process can be repeated to provide on-demand access to the needed authentication credential without the requirement of a physical token (even though the invention could also be used in conjunction with a physical token, as desired).
- the foregoing illustrates the use of so-called shared secrets, whereby the user and the server both share copies of information required to access the system.
- the invention is not limited to such simple protocols which, by their nature, are subject to abuse by a dishonest server.
- zero knowledge proofs whereby the user can prove to the server that he knows his mother's maiden name (or other secret information) without actually revealing the name to the server, can also be used.
- the user's private key itself could be used in this fashion; for a verifier need only know the corresponding public key to verify the private key.
- the principles and implementations of zero knowledge proofs are well known to those skilled in the art and need not be described here. The reader is referred to well-known, standard texts such as Applied Cryptography, supra, for details.
- the wallet might itself be protected by a shared secret.
- Figure 2 shows an exemplary embodiment of a wallet in which a private key is protected by a PIN.
- the PIN (more generally, a shared secret) might be the shared secret transmitted by the user to the Credential Server 160, as discussed previously, and the private key (more generally, the authentication credential) in the wallet might be decrypted by Credential Server 160 and provided in the clear to the user at Browser 140.
- the entire wallet (including the authentication credential in encrypted form) might be provided to the user, for the user to decrypt locally at Browser 140.
- the process of decrypting the PIN-protected authentication credential as follows.
- the user enters a PIN 200 (more generally, an access code) to unlock the wallet, and the PIN is passed through a one-to-one hash function 210.
- the hash function may also include a salt value or other security-enhancing feature, as will be appreciated by persons skilled in the art.
- the hashed value 215 of the entered PIN is compared with a stored hash value 220, which is the hashed value of the correct PIN. If the two hash values agree, the PIN is passed to decryption module 240.
- decryption module 240 which is typically DES or some other cryptographic function such as, for example, triple-DES, IDEA or BLOWFISH. Hence, the decrypted private key 250 is released for use.
- the cryptographic operations of computing the hash(es) and decrypting the stored hash may be implemented using one or more cryptographic logic (e.g., software or hardware) modules, and the correct hash value and private key may be stored in protected data fields or other forms of memory (e.g., read from ROM, from computer-readable media, etc.).
- a typical key wallet would also include input and output logic for receiving candidate PINs and outputting decrypted private keys, as well as logic for management, viewing, copying, and handling of keys and other data.
- the one-to-one nature of the hash function ensures that the correct PIN and only the correct PIN will unlock the key wallet. Unfortunately, it also allows a malicious hacker to guess the complete PIN via a brute force search. For example, he might write a program that simply checks all six-digit PIN codes on the key wallet. If he gets a copy of the key wallet, he can carry out this attack on his computer, completely undetected and in an automated fashion, in a matter of a few minutes. To resist the PIN hash attack, another embodiment of the invention uses a technique called cryptographic camouflaging to provide even greater security in connection with the authentication credential.
- the authentication credential (e.g., private key) is protected via an access code as in Figure 2.
- the one-to-one hash is replaced with a many-to-one hash, i.e., a hash in which many inputs produce (i.e., regenerate) the same hashed output.
- the many-to-one hash function 310 might hash six-digit codes to two-digit hash values.
- the hashed value 315 of the entered PIN 300 is compared with the stored hash value 320, which is the hashed value of the correct PIN. If the two hash values agree, the key wallet opens.
- the private key is again stored encrypted in field 330 of the key wallet, with the correct PIN as the encryption key.
- the stored encrypted key is decrypted and the correct private key 350 is released for use.
- the hash function is many-to-one, there will be many different entered PINs that will satisfy the hash challenge to open the key wallet.
- pseudo- valid PINs PINs that hash to the same hash value as the correct PIN, including the correct PIN, are referred to herein as pseudo- valid PINs.
- pseudo- valid PINs For example, if the hash function hashes six-digit codes to two-digit hash values, there will be 10,000 six-digit pseudo-valid PINs that will open the key wallet, out of a total of 1 ,000,000 possible six-digit codes. Pseudo-valid PINs will all be passed to the decryption module 340 to decrypt the stored encrypted key to produce a candidate private key. However, all but one of these candidate private keys will be incorrect decryptions of the stored (correct) private key. Only when the entered PIN is the correct PIN will the correct private key be recovered.
- the many-to-one hash function above should be chosen to be a good hash.
- MD5 and SHA are well-known good hash functions.
- Good hash functions are one means to substantially uniformly distribute the pseudo-valid PINs in the space of all possible PINs. For example, consider a hash function from six-digit codes to two-digit hash values. Of the 1 ,000,000 possible input values, 10,000 will be pseudo-valid PINs. If the hash function is a good hash, these values will be substantially uniformly distributed. In particular, one in a hundred PINs will be pseudo-valid, and these will be effectively randomly distributed. Specifically, the chances are 1/100 that if the user makes a typographical error in entering the correct PIN, then the resulting PIN will be a pseudo-valid PIN.
- Another possible embodiment uses a weak hash, i.e., one which results in clustering of pseudo-valid PINs, whereby an intruder who guesses one pseudo- valid PIN will more easily find others.
- a legitimate user making a series of 1 -digit typographical errors would also get a sequence of pseudo-valid PINs and, if the system accepting the private key or messages encrypted thereby has an alarm-or- disable-upon-repeated-failure feature, this would inadvertently lock out the legitimate user.
- a weak hash is typically disfavored over the good hash. Nevertheless, there may be some applications where a weak hash provides certain characteristics such as computational efficiency and ease of implementation that are advantageous for specialized applications.
- the decryption processes 200-250 and 300-350 may be performed at either the user's computer or at the Credential Server 160.
- the wallet is downloaded to the user in decrypted form, while in the latter, the wallet is decrypted at the Credential Server 160 before downloading to the user.
- the various challenge-response protocols described to this point can be used at either the Credential Server 160 or at Browser 140, and that such use can occur in any combination or permutation.
- the Credential Server 160 could be accessed by a simple shared secret, and the wallet could be downloaded to the user in the clear.
- the wallet could be further protected by a one-to-one or many-to-one (i.e., cryptographically camouflaged) hashed shared secret and decrypted at the Credential Server in response to the user's responding to the appropriate challenge-response protocol.
- the decrypted (or, in the case of the many-to-one hash, the decamouflaged) wallet would then be downloaded to the user in the clear.
- the wallet could be downloaded to the user in camouflaged form, with the decamouflaging occurring at the user's computer.
- a one-to-one or many-to-one hash process could replace the simple shared secret for the initial server access.
- the one-to-one hash or many-to-one hash could be deployed at the initial server access stage, while any of the simple shared secret, one-to-one hash, many-to-one hash techniques could be employed at the subsequent wallet downloading stage.
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (12)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP99959061A EP1131911B1 (en) | 1998-11-19 | 1999-11-19 | Method and apparatus for secure distribution of authentication credentials to roaming users |
DE69937196T DE69937196T2 (en) | 1998-11-19 | 1999-11-19 | METHOD AND DEVICE FOR THE SAFE DISTRIBUTION OF AUTHENTICATION DATA TO HANDLING PARTICIPANTS |
CA002347893A CA2347893C (en) | 1998-11-19 | 1999-11-19 | Method and apparatus for secure distribution of authentication credentials to roaming users |
JP2000583190A JP4612951B2 (en) | 1998-11-19 | 1999-11-19 | Method and apparatus for securely distributing authentication credentials to roaming users |
MXPA01004925A MXPA01004925A (en) | 1999-11-19 | 1999-11-19 | Method and apparatus for secure distribution of authentication credentials to roaming users. |
BR9915474-9A BR9915474A (en) | 1998-11-19 | 1999-11-19 | Method and apparatus for secure distribution of authentication credentials to users in transit |
NZ511397A NZ511397A (en) | 1998-11-19 | 1999-11-19 | Method and apparatus for secure distribution of authentication credentials to roaming users |
AU16312/00A AU1631200A (en) | 1998-11-19 | 1999-11-19 | Method and apparatus for secure distribution of authentication credentials to roaming users |
KR1020017006327A KR20020016760A (en) | 1998-11-19 | 1999-11-19 | Method and apparatus for secure distribution of authentication credentials to roaming users |
IL142836A IL142836A (en) | 1998-11-19 | 1999-11-19 | Method and apparatus for secure distribution of authentication credentials to roaming users |
NO20012463A NO20012463L (en) | 1998-11-19 | 2001-05-18 | Procedure and apparatus for securely distributing authentication credentials to roaming users |
HK02100322.7A HK1039228B (en) | 1998-11-19 | 2002-01-16 | Method and apparatus for secure distribution of authentication credentials to roaming users |
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US09/196,430 | 1998-11-19 |
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US20010034837A1 (en) | 2001-10-25 |
US6263446B1 (en) | 2001-07-17 |
WO2000030285A1 (en) | 2000-05-25 |
WO2000030285A8 (en) | 2001-07-19 |
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