WO2001038953A1

WO2001038953A1 - Method for safeguarding the authorised use of a device, radio module and terminal

Info

Publication number: WO2001038953A1
Application number: PCT/DE2000/004122
Authority: WO
Inventors: Rainer Volland; Jörg Siewerth; Martin Peter
Original assignee: Siemens Aktiengesellschaft
Priority date: 1999-11-25
Filing date: 2000-11-22
Publication date: 2001-05-31
Also published as: DE19956851A1

Abstract

The invention relates to a terminal which is connected to a radio network via a radio module and which transmits its unique device identification to the radio module, as an anti-theft protection. The invention also relates to a radio module, which receives a unique device identification from a terminal and forwards the identification to the radio network, in such a way that said radio network can verify, with the help of a database, whether the terminal is to be authorised for use.

Description

description

Procedure for securing authorized device use, radio module and terminal

The invention relates to a method for securing an authorized device use, radio module and terminal device, the operation being made more difficult, in particular, by stolen terminal devices.

The social need for more mobility is driving the sale of mobile communication devices massively. This affects not only mobile phones, but also many other types of end devices, such as notebooks, palmtops or personal intelligent agents. Many of these communication terminals are so expensive that measures against theft are worthwhile.

The first security mechanisms are already in place for cell phones, which are intended to make it more difficult to steal a cell phone. The GSM standard (GSM: Global System for Mobil Communications), for example, provides a unique IMEI (International Mobile Station Equipment Identity; GSM 02.16) for every mobile phone. On the basis of this IMEI, which is sent from the mobile phone to a radio network each time a call is set up, each individual mobile phone can be identified by the radio network and, if necessary, the call transfer can be refused.

The IMEI has 15 digits, which corresponds to 60 bits. The IMEI includes a six-digit TAC field (TAC: Type Approval Code), a two-digit FAC field (FAC: Final Assembly Code), and a six-digit serial number. The last digit has not yet been filled. A GSM radio network maintains a database EIR (EIR: Equipment Identity Register). overall The EIR database habitually contains three "lists", namely a white, a gray and a black list. The white list includes the areas of IMEIs dedicated to independently approved types of mobile stations. Consequently, an IMEI that is not in an area specified by the white list does not correspond to an approved mobile station type. The black list includes the list of IMEIs from mobile stations that need to be blocked, either because they have been stolen or because they are seriously malfunctioning. As the name suggests, the gray list fulfills a function that lies between the functions of the white and black lists. It includes the IMEIs of faulty mobile stations, the faults of which are not important enough to justify complete blocking. The gray list can also be used as a buffer before authorities confirm or impose an entry in a mobile station in the black list.

It is an object of the invention to provide a method, a radio module and a terminal with a radio network, these objects making theft more difficult.

This object is achieved by the teaching of independent claims 1, 11 and 17.

Preferred embodiments are the subject of the dependent claims.

A preferred embodiment of the invention is explained in more detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Show:

1 shows a first preferred embodiment of the invention, in which, in addition to a module identification IMEI, a device identification GID is transmitted to a radio network, 2 shows a second preferred embodiment of the invention, in which a device identification GID is transmitted to a radio network instead of a module identification IMEI,

3 shows a third preferred embodiment of the invention, in which, based on a module identification IMEI and a device identification GID, a new identification ID is determined, which is then transmitted to a radio network, and

Fig. 4 shows an embodiment according to the GSM standard.

The first preferred embodiment of the invention is explained below with reference to FIG. 1. 1 shows a terminal 1 which is connected via an interface 2 to a radio module 3 via an air interface 4 to a radio network 5. The terminal is, for example, a notebook, a personal intelligent agent or a terminal for a reservation or logistics system.

The radio module is preferably a mobile phone. The air interface 4 between the radio module 3 and the radio network 5 preferably corresponds to the GSM standard or a successor standard to the GSM standard. As an alternative to this, the radio module and radio network can be connected, for example, via a directional radio link as an air interface, the radio module being installed in a fixed position. The interface 2 between the terminal 1 and the radio module 3 can be wired, for example an RS232 or a USB (Universal Serial Bus). Furthermore, the interface 2 can be designed wirelessly, ie as an infrared interface or as a DECT interface (DECT: Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications, an ETSI standard). The terminals are preferably mobile, but can also be installed permanently. Theft monitoring of permanently installed radio modules and permanently installed end devices appears to be particularly useful for detached holiday homes. On the one hand, holiday homes are often uninhabited for a long time, so there is an increased risk of break-ins. On the other hand, it is expected that the "last dirty mile" between the house and the telephone exchange will in future be bridged wirelessly. Internet-compatible televisions come into consideration as fixed end devices, which must be connected to a telephone network for Internet access.

According to the invention, a unique device identification GID is assigned by the manufacturer to valuable end devices. The manufacturer also assigned a clear identification, namely the IMEI, to the radio module, which is preferably a GSM cell phone. According to the first embodiment, the device identification GID is transmitted to the radio network 5 in addition to the module identification IMEI. A network operator of the radio network can thus identify both an individual terminal and the radio module via which the terminal is connected to the radio network. This entails a change or extension of the existing GSM standard.

Since the radio network receives the device identification GID together with the module identification IMEI, the network operator can not only exclude stolen end devices or stolen mobile telephones, which are used as radio modules, from operation by the radio network. Rather, participants can be identified who operate computers stolen on their (not stolen) mobile phones. This type of subscriber identification takes place in accordance with the GSM standard, but based on the INSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity, GSM 03.03, 03.20) and not on the basis of the IMEI. Because of this This possibility discourages participants from using stolen devices together with their mobile phones.

When specifying device identifications and module identifications, care should be taken to ensure that they cannot be changed without destroying the end device or radio module. For this purpose, it is advantageous to generate the identification on the basis of serial numbers stored in integrated circuits. To do this, the serial numbers must be stored in unchangeable read-only memories (ROM: Read only Memory). For example, the Pentium III processors from Intel are supplied with such serial numbers.

In a further preferred embodiment, a radio module is uniquely linked to the terminal during installation. This link can be checked in the terminal, with the radio module communicating its module identification IMEI to the terminal in this embodiment. Alternatively, the link can be checked in the radio module, the radio module being able to compare the device identification GID received from the terminal with a stored value. As a third possibility, this link can be communicated to the mobile radio network, so that the radio network checks whether the received module identification IMEI is linked to the device identification GID. This unique link should only be changed by the owner. This can be ensured by the owner entering a password or a PIN (Personal Identification Number) either into the terminal or into the radio module.

The second preferred embodiment of the invention is shown graphically in FIG. Here, too, a terminal 11 is connected via an interface 12 to a radio module 13, which in turn is connected to a radio network 15 via an air interface 14. The second preferred embodiment differs from the first preferred embodiment in that the radio module does not transmit its own module identification IMEI to the radio network 15. In this embodiment, too, the radio module 13 is preferably formed by a GSM mobile phone, so that the air interface 14 and the radio network also correspond to the GSM standard. An IMEI-analog number is assigned to the terminal 11 by the manufacturer as the device identification GID. This means that the device identification also consists of 15 digits, i.e. 60 bits, as well as a six-digit TAC field, a two-digit FAC field, a six-digit serial number and a one-digit reserve field.

The radio module receives the device identification GID from the terminal and transmits it to the radio network 15 instead of its own module identification IMEI. The device identification GID thus replaces the module identification IMEI in the communication between the radio module and the radio network. Therefore, this embodiment allows theft protection without changing or expanding the existing GSM standard.

In this embodiment, the network operator can only exclude undesired, for example stolen, end devices from operation on the basis of the GID. However, he can also identify the subscriber based on the INSI according to the GSM standard, so that the subscriber runs a high risk of discovery when using stolen devices. Since the IMSI is stored on a SIM card (SIM: Subscriber Identity Module) that is inserted into a mobile phone, the network operator cannot determine whether the mobile phone in which a valid SIM card is inserted is excluded from operation shall be. In a third embodiment, the radio module 23 calculates a new identification ID based on a unique device identification GID of a terminal 21 and its own unique module identification IMEI. The new identification of ID is then transmitted from the radio module 23 to a radio network 25 via an air interface 24. In the third embodiment, too, the radio module is preferably formed by a cell phone, cell phones, air interface and radio network conforming to the GSM standard. In this embodiment, the new identification replaces the module identification IMEI. The radio network 25 refuses to set up a communication path between a radio module and the terminal if the new identification ID is not permitted or is not in a permitted range. In this embodiment, the terminal 21 is uniquely linked to the radio module 23 by calculating the new identification ID.

In the preferred third embodiment, the new identification ID is preferably structured similarly to an IMEI. In particular, it has the same length as an IMEI, i.e. 60 bits. Consequently, the new identification ID can also be transmitted instead of the IMEI transmitted according to the GSM standard. This embodiment can therefore also be implemented without changing or expanding the existing GSM standard. An advantage of the third embodiment is that the radio network only serves predefined combinations of terminals and radio modules. This means that radio modules and end devices cannot be regrouped at will. A single end device loses value because it is not served by a radio network in connection with other radio modules.

The function for calculating the new identification ID preferably consists in an addition of device identification GID and module identification IMEI, with a carry over remains considered (addition modulo 2 ⁶⁰ ). In another embodiment, the device identification GID and the module identification IMEI are linked by an exclusive-OR operation. In both embodiments, the device identification GID has a length of, for example, 60 bits.

The link between a terminal and a radio module is preferably password-protected or PIN-protected so that it can only be carried out by the owner. When the link is established, the resulting new identification ID is essentially registered with the radio network 25.

In order to effectively prevent the operation of a terminal by an unauthorized user, in all of the above embodiments it is possible to provide for the terminal to be forced to log on via the radio module when the terminal is switched on. Alternatively, the compulsory login can be carried out every nth (n> 2) switch-on of the terminal. Furthermore, the login can be repeated after a predetermined operating time. Finally, this operating time can be set again and again by a random generator. A clear link between the end device and the radio module in connection with the verification of the identification sent by the radio module on the part of the radio network offers high protection against unauthorized use of the end devices and the radio modules.

Claims

claims

1. A method for securing an authorized use of the device, in which a communication path between a terminal (1, 11, 21) and a radio network (5, 15, 25) is provided via a radio module (3, 13, 23), the radio network at least comprises a base station and a control device, with the steps:

Storing a device identification (GID) unique to the terminal in the terminal;

Connecting the terminal to the radio module;

Connecting the radio module to the radio network via a wireless interface;

Transmitting the device identification from the terminal to the radio module;

Determining an identification (GID, ID) based on the device identification;

Sending the identification from the radio module to the radio network; and

Receiving the identification by the radio network;

Initiating a database query by the radio network to check whether the identification sent refers to a terminal device which is to be given access to the radio network;

Enabling access to the radio network for the end device depending on the result of the database query.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that the identification is identical to the device identification.

3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized by the steps:

Storing a module identification (IMEI) unique to the radio module in the radio module; and

Sending the module identification (IMEI) to the radio network.

, A method according to claim 1, characterized by the steps:

Calculate the identification based on a function that serves as input parameters as well as the device identification

(GID) and module identification (IMEI) are taken into account.

5. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized by the step of establishing a unique link between the terminal and the radio module during an installation of the radio module, the link after the installation can preferably only be changed upon entering a password.

6. The method according to claim 3 or 4, characterized in that the radio module is a GSM module, the air interface between the radio module and the radio network corresponds to a GSM standard and the module identification is an IMEI.

7. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized by the steps:

attempted logging in of the terminal (1; 11; 21) into the radio network (5; 15; 25) after a predetermined operating time or every nth switch on of the terminal; and

Refusing to operate the terminal if the radio network (5; 15; 25) refuses to release it.

8. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, characterized by the steps:

Transmitting a module identification (IMEI) from the radio module to the terminal; and

Deny the terminal to operate if it does not receive the correct module identification.

9. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 8, characterized by the step of

Generating the device identification (GID) from a serial number of an important integrated circuit of the terminal.

10. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 9, characterized by the step of comparing the database with databases of other radio networks.

11. Radio module for performing a method according to one of claims 1 to 10, wherein the radio module has the following devices:

an interface for connecting the radio module to a terminal (1; 10; 21), the radio module using the interface can receive a unique device identification (GID) for the terminal;

a logic device which determines an identification (GID; ID) from the device identification; and

an air interface for connecting the radio module to a radio network (5; 15; 25), the identification being able to be sent via the air interface.

12. Radio module according to claim 11, characterized in that the identification is identical to the device identification (GID).

13. Radio module according to claim 11 or 12, characterized in that the radio module further has a memory which stores a module identification (IMEI) which is unique to the radio module and the module identification is transmitted in addition to the identification via the air interface.

14. Radio module according to claim 11, characterized in that the radio module furthermore has a memory which stores a module identification (IMEI) which is unique to the radio module, and the logic device calculates the identification (ID) based on a function which is determined both by the Device identification as well as the module identification depends.

15. Radio module according to one of claims 11 to 14, characterized in that when the radio module is installed, there is a clear link to the terminal, which can only be changed upon entering a password.

16. Radio module according to claim 13 or 14, characterized in that the radio module is a GSM module, wherein the air interface corresponds to a GSM standard and the module identification is an IMEI.

17. Terminal for performing a method according to one of claims 1 to 10, wherein the terminal has the following devices:

a memory that stores a device identification (GID) that is unique to the terminal; and

an interface (2; 12; 22) via which the terminal can be connected to a radio module (3; 13; 23) and via which the device identification can be transmitted to the radio module.

18. Terminal according to claim 17, characterized in that when the radio module is installed, the terminal is uniquely linked to the radio module, the link only being able to be changed upon the input of a password.

19. Terminal according to claim 17 or 18, characterized in that the terminal has a control device which logs into the radio network after a predetermined operating time or every n-th switch-on,

the control device prevents the operation of the terminal when the radio network does not release the terminal.

20. A terminal according to one of claims 17 to 19, characterized gekennze i ^* seframe that the terminal refuses to operate when it receives an incorrect module identification.

21. Terminal according to one of claims 17 to 20, characterized in that the device identification of the terminal is generated from a serial number of an important integrated circuit of the terminal.