WO2005017721A1 - Überwachungseinrichtung für datenverarbeitungsanlagen - Google Patents
Überwachungseinrichtung für datenverarbeitungsanlagen Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2005017721A1 WO2005017721A1 PCT/EP2004/008773 EP2004008773W WO2005017721A1 WO 2005017721 A1 WO2005017721 A1 WO 2005017721A1 EP 2004008773 W EP2004008773 W EP 2004008773W WO 2005017721 A1 WO2005017721 A1 WO 2005017721A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- alarm
- data processing
- network connection
- monitoring device
- processing system
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/86—Secure or tamper-resistant housings
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
- G06F21/575—Secure boot
Definitions
- the invention relates to a monitoring device for a data processing system according to the preamble of claim 1 and a method according to the preamble of claim 25.
- Monitoring devices for data processing systems such as Computers are well known. Usually, authorization requests with username and password are used to prevent unauthorized access to data storage devices.
- EP 0 276 450 AI describes a data protection circuit for blocking the transmission of signals via a bus.
- Code lock data is stored as a fixed value in a register and combined with code key data from a decoding circuit. If a certain result of the combination is available, the line of a bus is activated.
- a disadvantage of this device is that the entire circuit is arranged in the data processing system to be protected. For experienced users, there is therefore the possibility of improperly manipulating the data processing system in such a way that unauthorized access to the protected media is still possible. Even with current software encryption, it is possible to bypass the protection by using secondary, for example via. another operating system, this software is accessed and corresponding code key data is read out.
- the invention is therefore based on the object of providing a monitoring device of the type mentioned at the outset and a monitoring method for the data processing system in which the disadvantages mentioned above are eliminated and manipulation of the data processing system is impossible or at least not possible without being noticed.
- the invention advantageously provides that only a single data storage device is connected as a main boot device to a bootable interface of the data processing system, which can boot freely, that other bootable interfaces are initially blocked, and that at least one of the ones blocked via the blocking circuit is released Interfaces from a data processing point located remotely in the network after authorization. of an authorized person to the data processing center via the network connection.
- a data processing system for example a computer
- can only boot via a single data storage device for example a hard disk
- manipulation of the data processing system for example by installing a new operating system via a bootable interface
- the blocking circuit for blocking the bootable interfaces takes place via a CMOS.
- CMOS devices are standard components in electronics, are easy to control and therefore an inexpensive embodiment of the blocking circuit.
- the blocking circuit is integrated on the motherboard.
- This embodiment is particularly advantageous in the case of new computers to be acquired, because this is an inexpensive version which does not have any further interface, such as e.g. a card slot.
- the blocking circuit can also be arranged on a separate card with a separate interface, preferably a PCI card.
- a separate card with a separate interface, preferably a PCI card.
- the blocking circuit contains a microcontroller.
- a microcontroller in the blocking circuit, it becomes an active circuit that can also be addressed, for example, by the software of the data processing system, so that a switching process in the blocking position of the blocking circuit can also take place, for example, by a user logging off from the data processing system.
- the blocking circuit is controlled by the data processing point via a reception line of the network connection. It is therefore not necessary to add an additional single line to the network connection use a single cable connection, so that all lines of the network connections can also be used for data traffic.
- the blocking circuit can have a reset line.
- This reset line can be used, for example, to manually lock the blocking circuit using a key combination on the keyboard, or in the embodiment with a power reset, by switching off the computer, the blocking circuit can be switched to the blocking state.
- the above-mentioned software control of the microcontroller can also be carried out via the reset line.
- an alarm circuit is provided on at least one bootable interface, which is preferably connected to the network connection and can send an alarm signal via the network connection, and which is preferably connected to a free ground port of the interface.
- This alarm circuit means that manual manipulation of the data storage devices connected to the interfaces is not possible without being noticed.
- the alarm signal can be sent via this and registered accordingly at a remote location.
- Most interfaces nowadays have free, unused ground ports, so that when you connect to them, the actual functions of the interface are not changed. - - - -.
- an alarm circuit preferably with a push-button switch, is arranged on a housing of the data processing system, which is preferably connected to the network connection and can send an alarm signal via the network connection.
- This housing security prevents an unnoticed access to the hardware on the data processing system. Since the alarm circuit is connected to the network connection, an alarm signal can be sent to a remote location.
- an alarm circuit preferably with a socket switch, which is preferably connected to the network connection and send an alarm signal via the network connection, is arranged on at least one plug connection for a keyboard and / or a universal serial port on the data processing system can.
- This alarm circuit prevents unnoticed access to a universal serial port, for example a USB, or prevents the insertion of a so-called keyboard recorder, which can be used to spy on passwords, for one of the keyboard's plug connections.
- a universal serial port for example a USB
- keyboard recorder which can be used to spy on passwords, for one of the keyboard's plug connections.
- the network connection can be protected against unauthorized access, such as the removal of one or more connection pins, via an alarm circuit.
- This alarm circuit it is registered if a manipulation attempt is made on the data processing system by connecting a new network connection or connecting one or more pins of the network connection.
- one or more of the alarm circuits is connected to a transmit / receive line of the network connection, preferably to individual lines. If the alarm circuits on the send / receive line of the network connection, that is to say the part of the connection which is used for the data traffic, any free network connection parts can be used for other purposes in the future.
- an alarm can be assigned to the triggering alarm circuit when an alarm is registered, so that, for example, it can be immediately registered whether a hard disk is removed. According to the importance of the discovered manipulation of the data processing systems can trigger different alarm programs accordingly.
- the alarm circuits are predominantly connected in parallel and combined to form one line. It is also provided that the combined alarm circuits are connected to two lines of the network connections via star wiring and coils, that an alarm detection device is connected via coils to the second line of the network connection, remote from the data processing system, and that an alarm transmission path is formed via a phantom line. In this embodiment of the invention, little effort is required on the circuit side. Due to the transmission path via a phantom line, only two individual lines of the network connections are used. The arrangement of the coils blocks the standard high-frequency signal of the network connection in relation to the alarm circuits and the alarm detection device. This is advantageous because a clear signal can be transmitted between the alarm circuit and the alarm detection device. By arranging the resistors on the individual alarm circuits, for example by varying the size of the resistors, despite the transmission of the alarm signal via only two lines, the alarm signal can be clearly assigned, since the different resistors produce a different alarm signal.
- the individual lines. lines of the network connections each arranged at least two capacitors. Between the capacitors, the alarm circuits are connected to the individual lines of the network connection via star wiring. It is further preferably provided that the alarm detection device is connected to the individual lines of the network connection, in each case between the capacitors, via a star wiring, away from the data processing system.
- This arrangement has the advantage that a transmission of a Alarm signal can be done with direct current.
- an alarm is detected by monitoring a quiescent current that is applied to the alarm circuits.
- This enables a cost-effective solution for the alarm signal transmission and, by using resistors of different sizes in the alarm circuits, also the possibility of a precise assignment of the corresponding alarm signal, even if the number of interfaces or data storage devices to be monitored is greater than the number of individual lines of the network connections.
- the existing data transmission paths can be used, since these transmit the data at high frequency and are not influenced by the quiescent current.
- the quiescent current is generated dynamically via a random generator and fed to the alarm circuits on the one hand and to a parallel reference circuit on the other hand and then monitored at a comparison point away from the data processing system.
- the level of the quiescent current on the data processing system is not known or cannot be determined, and it is therefore not possible to manipulate the alarm circuit by externally applying a quiescent current of the same level.
- one or more of the alarm circuits is connected to a separate line of the network connection, preferably each to individual lines. Furthermore, it is provided that an alarm detection device is connected to individual lines of the separate line branch of the network connection away from the data processing system.
- the advantage of routing the alarm transmission path over a separate line of the network connection is that there can be no mutual interference between the alarm signals and the data traffic.
- an alarm is detected by monitoring a quiescent current applied via the network connection of the alarm circuits.
- a triggered alarm via a device causes mechanical destruction of at least one access-protected data carrier of the data processing system.
- a device for example a nail gun
- Particularly confidential data are not constructively destroyed by this device, so that the manipulation of the data processing system with high criminal energy, for example theft of the entire data processing system, renders it unusable for the person concerned.
- a circuit for manually triggering the alarm is arranged on at least one of the alarm circuits.
- This circuit can include a hand switch, for example. An alarm and thus a blocking of the interfaces and / or mechanical destruction of one Data carriers can thus also be triggered manually on the instruction of the authorized user.
- the invention further relates to a method for monitoring a data processing system in a network with network connections for protecting the data storage and / or data transmission devices of the data processing system against unauthorized access, in which only a single data storage device can be accessed at a bootable interface of the data processing system during a boot process, whereby other bootable interfaces are initially blocked and the blocked interfaces are released from a data processing point located remotely in the network after the authorization of an authorized person to the data processing point via the network connection.
- the data processing point can control the blocking of the interfaces via a reception line of the network connection and a blocking circuit.
- the lock on the bootable interfaces returns to a locked state by means of a reset.
- Removing a data storage device and / or a data transmission device of a data processing system and opening a housing of the data processing system can trigger an alarm on a remote alarm detection device.
- the alarm can also be triggered manually, for example using a switch. It is preferably provided that a triggered alarm causes mechanical destruction of at least one access-protected data carrier of the data processing system.
- FIG. 1 shows a circuit diagram of the monitoring device according to the invention, in which the transmission path of an alarm signal takes place via a phantom line,
- FIG. 2 shows a circuit diagram of an alternative embodiment of the monitoring device according to the invention, in which the alarm signal is transmitted via individual lines of the network connection,
- FIG. 3 shows a development of the exemplary embodiment from FIG. 2, in which a circuit for generating a dynamic quiescent current is additionally connected to the alarm detection,
- FIG. 4 is a circuit diagram of a further embodiment of the monitoring device according to the invention, in which the transmission path of an alarm signal is formed by separate lines of the network connection.
- a monitoring device 1 for a data processing system 2 is shown as a circuit in FIG. 1.
- the circuit can be implemented as a separate plug-in card or as a circuit directly on the motherboard of the data processing system 2.
- a single data storage device 9 for example a hard disk, is connected to a bootable interface 8, for example an IDE interface.
- bootable interface 8 for example an IDE interface.
- a lockable switching device 18, for example a CMOS is integrated in each case.
- the interface 14 can comprise one or more interfaces and is not shown. In Figure l . this is only shown for the interfaces 10 and 12. Of course, a switching device can also be integrated in the interface 14, not shown, in a similar manner.
- the switching devices 18 are controlled by a microcontroller 20. This microcontroller 20 is connected via the reception lines 22 of a network connection 4 to a remote data processing point 16, not shown, for example a central server.
- a reset line 24 is also connected to the microcontroller.
- the blocking switching devices 18 form the blocking circuit 6 together with the microcontroller.
- the blocking circuit 6 can also be implemented as a passive circuit without a microcontroller.
- the entire blocking circuit 6 is initially in a blocking position.
- the computer can only be booted by the data storage device 9, which is connected as the main boot device.
- a signal is sent from the data processing point 16 to the microcontroller 20 via the network connection 4, so that the blocking switching devices 18 of the bootable interfaces 10, 12, 14 are activated and the authorized person has access to all of them Has data storage devices of the data processing system 2.
- Alarm circuits 28, 30, 32, 34 are connected in a free port, for example a free ground port of individual or all interfaces 8, 10, 12, 14. These are combined into a line 42 via resistors 40 connected in parallel.
- the housing of the data processing system 2 is secured with pushbutton switches or, for example, the keyboard connection with socket switches, via further alarm circuits 36, 38.
- the socket switches trigger a switching process when the cable is removed or plugged in.
- the alarm circuits 36, 38 are connected to the line 42 via resistors which are also connected in parallel (not shown).
- the network connection 4 consists of at least four individual lines, which together form the receive / transmit line strand 26a, two lines being receive lines 22.
- the network connection 4 can also include even more lines, as shown for example in FIG. 4, with a further separate line branch 26b.
- the line 42 is connected to the two reception lines 22 of the network connection 4 via two coils 48.
- an alarm detection device 46 is connected to the reception lines 22 of the network connection 4 via two coils 48.
- the coils 48 serve to decouple the high-frequency signal that is sent via the network connection 4.
- a quiescent current is applied from the data processing system 46 to the alarm circuits 28-38 via the phantom line thus formed.
- Interrupting one of the alarm circuits for example by removing an interface, a data storage device or a secure plug connection, changes the quiescent current. This change is registered by the alarm detection device 46 and an alarm is triggered.
- the alarm detection device 46 can detect the source of the alarm, since the quiescent current is changed to a certain extent by the elimination of a resistor 40 of a certain size.
- FIG. 2 shows an alternative embodiment of the invention.
- the alarm circuits 28, 30, 32 are each individually connected to a line 4a, 4b, 4c of the network connection 4.
- the alarm circuits 34, 36, 38 which are not shown in this figure, are either individually connected to a line 4a-4d of the network connection 4 (not shown in this drawing) or are combined to form a line which is connected to the line 4d of the Network connection 4 is connected.
- Each alarm circuit contains a coil 48, which serves to shield against the high-frequency signal of the network connection 4.
- In each of the alarm circuits 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38 at least one resistor 40 is arranged, which serves as a load in these circuits.
- the corresponding alarm circuit is interrupted by removing, for example, a hard disk. The elimination of the resistance results in a change in the quiescent current.
- An alarm detection device 46 is connected to individual lines 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d of the network connection 4 via coils 48 at a distance from the data processing point 2.
- two of the capacitors 50 are arranged in the individual lines 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d of the network connection 4 such that a direct connection path remains between the alarm circuits 28-38 and the alarm detection device 46 and this line path is separated from the rest of the network connections 4 .
- the connecting line lines between the alarm detection device 46 and the network connection 4 can also be combined to form a line in an embodiment which is not shown.
- the alarm detection device 46 contains a current source which applies a quiescent current to the alarm circuits 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38 via the network connection 4.
- FIG. 3 shows a monitoring device according to the invention, in which the alarm is detected via a dynamically regulated quiescent current.
- the connecting lines of the alarm detection device 46 to the network connection 4 comprise coils 48 for decoupling the high-frequency signal in the network connection 4 and are combined into one line.
- a random generator 52 is connected to a current source 58 which generates a dynamic quiescent current and applies it to the network connection 4 and, via this, to the alarm circuits 28, 30, 32, 34, 36.
- a reference circuit 54 is also connected to the power source. The quiescent current applied to the reference line 54 and to the alarm circuits is compared at a comparison point 56. The comparator 56 registers changes in the dynamic quiescent current applied to the alarm circuit compared to the quiescent current applied to the reference circuit and triggers an alarm accordingly.
- Figure 4 shows a further alternative embodiment of the invention.
- the alarm signal is transmitted via a separate wiring harness 26b of the network connection 4.
- the alarm circuits 28, 30, 32 are connected to individual lines 4e-4g of the network connection 4.
- the alarm circuits 34, 36, 38 can be connected in individual lines 4e to 4h of the network connection 4 (not shown) or combined to form a line to the individual lines 4h of the network connection 4. be closed.
- An alarm detection 46 is connected to the individual lines 4e to 4h of the network connection 4 at a distance from the data processing system 2. According to the preceding exemplary embodiments, a quiescent current is applied from the alarm detection device via the network connection 4 to the alarm circuits 28, 30, 32, 34, 36.
- the individual connection lines of the alarm detection to the individual lines 4e to 4h of the network connection can also be combined to form a line which then connects this to the alarm detection device 46.
- the coils 48 shown in FIG. 4 are not necessary if only the alarm signal is transmitted via the separate cable run 26b.
- only one pole of the quiescent current is connected to the alarm circuits 28-38.
- the other pole is formed by the mass.
- the invention is not limited to the exemplary embodiments shown.
- the backup of other components of the data processing system is possible in a similar manner as shown.
- the different features of the individual exemplary embodiments can of course be combined with one another.
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP04763817A EP1654612A1 (de) | 2003-08-06 | 2004-08-05 | Überwachungseinrichtung für datenverarbeitungsanlagen |
US10/567,335 US20070083747A1 (en) | 2003-08-06 | 2004-08-05 | Monitoring device for data processing systems |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE10336404.8 | 2003-08-06 | ||
DE10336404A DE10336404B3 (de) | 2003-08-06 | 2003-08-06 | Überwachungseinrichtung für Datenverarbeitungsanlagen |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2005017721A1 true WO2005017721A1 (de) | 2005-02-24 |
Family
ID=34177375
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/EP2004/008773 WO2005017721A1 (de) | 2003-08-06 | 2004-08-05 | Überwachungseinrichtung für datenverarbeitungsanlagen |
Country Status (4)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US20070083747A1 (de) |
EP (1) | EP1654612A1 (de) |
DE (1) | DE10336404B3 (de) |
WO (1) | WO2005017721A1 (de) |
Citations (7)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
EP0276450A1 (de) | 1987-01-23 | 1988-08-03 | Xmit Ag | Datenschutzschaltung zur Sperrung der Uebertragung von Signalen über einen Bus |
WO1996013002A1 (en) * | 1993-08-04 | 1996-05-02 | Trend Micro Devices, Inc. | Method and apparatus for controlling network and workstation access prior to workstation boot |
US5515440A (en) * | 1992-06-04 | 1996-05-07 | Integrated Technologies Of America, Inc. | Preboot protection of unauthorized use of programs and data with a card reader interface |
US5610981A (en) | 1992-06-04 | 1997-03-11 | Integrated Technologies Of America, Inc. | Preboot protection for a data security system with anti-intrusion capability |
EP0945777A2 (de) * | 1998-03-25 | 1999-09-29 | Compaq Computer Corporation | Rechnerarchitektur mit einer Busbrücke zur Prüfung eines Kennwortes |
WO2002033522A1 (en) | 1999-01-04 | 2002-04-25 | Codex Technologies Incorporated | Preboot protection, identification and security of a computer system |
US20030008442A1 (en) | 2001-06-28 | 2003-01-09 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Method for improving inversion layer mobility in a silicon carbide metal-oxide semiconductor field-effect transistor |
Family Cites Families (10)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US4287513A (en) * | 1979-05-03 | 1981-09-01 | International Quartz Ltd. | Door knob alarm device |
US4675654A (en) * | 1984-11-13 | 1987-06-23 | Copeland Bobby E | Alarm monitoring device |
US4951249A (en) * | 1986-10-24 | 1990-08-21 | Harcom Security Systems Corp. | Method and apparatus for controlled access to a computer system |
US5406261A (en) * | 1993-01-11 | 1995-04-11 | Glenn; James T. | Computer security apparatus and method |
US5926091A (en) * | 1995-03-17 | 1999-07-20 | Tp Control Ab | Alarm system for computer equipment connected in a network |
US6081193A (en) * | 1997-07-30 | 2000-06-27 | Tecno Alarm Snc Di Trucchi Luciano E Negro Giovanni | Electronic intrusion detection system for monitored environments |
US6484262B1 (en) * | 1999-01-26 | 2002-11-19 | Dell Usa, L.P. | Network controlled computer system security |
US6194979B1 (en) * | 1999-03-18 | 2001-02-27 | Cts Corporation | Ball grid array R-C network with high density |
US6618810B1 (en) * | 1999-05-27 | 2003-09-09 | Dell Usa, L.P. | Bios based method to disable and re-enable computers |
US7093124B2 (en) * | 2001-10-30 | 2006-08-15 | Intel Corporation | Mechanism to improve authentication for remote management of a computer system |
-
2003
- 2003-08-06 DE DE10336404A patent/DE10336404B3/de not_active Expired - Fee Related
-
2004
- 2004-08-05 EP EP04763817A patent/EP1654612A1/de not_active Withdrawn
- 2004-08-05 US US10/567,335 patent/US20070083747A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2004-08-05 WO PCT/EP2004/008773 patent/WO2005017721A1/de active Application Filing
Patent Citations (8)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
EP0276450A1 (de) | 1987-01-23 | 1988-08-03 | Xmit Ag | Datenschutzschaltung zur Sperrung der Uebertragung von Signalen über einen Bus |
US5515440A (en) * | 1992-06-04 | 1996-05-07 | Integrated Technologies Of America, Inc. | Preboot protection of unauthorized use of programs and data with a card reader interface |
US5610981A (en) | 1992-06-04 | 1997-03-11 | Integrated Technologies Of America, Inc. | Preboot protection for a data security system with anti-intrusion capability |
WO1996013002A1 (en) * | 1993-08-04 | 1996-05-02 | Trend Micro Devices, Inc. | Method and apparatus for controlling network and workstation access prior to workstation boot |
EP0945777A2 (de) * | 1998-03-25 | 1999-09-29 | Compaq Computer Corporation | Rechnerarchitektur mit einer Busbrücke zur Prüfung eines Kennwortes |
WO2002033522A1 (en) | 1999-01-04 | 2002-04-25 | Codex Technologies Incorporated | Preboot protection, identification and security of a computer system |
US6463537B1 (en) * | 1999-01-04 | 2002-10-08 | Codex Technologies, Inc. | Modified computer motherboard security and identification system |
US20030008442A1 (en) | 2001-06-28 | 2003-01-09 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. | Method for improving inversion layer mobility in a silicon carbide metal-oxide semiconductor field-effect transistor |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US20070083747A1 (en) | 2007-04-12 |
EP1654612A1 (de) | 2006-05-10 |
DE10336404B3 (de) | 2005-05-04 |
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