WO2005036820A1 - Method and system for detecting and preventing unauthorized signal usage in a content delivery network - Google Patents
Method and system for detecting and preventing unauthorized signal usage in a content delivery network Download PDFInfo
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- WO2005036820A1 WO2005036820A1 PCT/CA2004/001831 CA2004001831W WO2005036820A1 WO 2005036820 A1 WO2005036820 A1 WO 2005036820A1 CA 2004001831 W CA2004001831 W CA 2004001831W WO 2005036820 A1 WO2005036820 A1 WO 2005036820A1
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- usage
- receiver
- signal
- indicia
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Classifications
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- H04N21/835—Generation of protective data, e.g. certificates
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- H04N7/173—Analogue secrecy systems; Analogue subscription systems with two-way working, e.g. subscriber sending a programme selection signal
- H04N7/17345—Control of the passage of the selected programme
Definitions
- This invention relates generally to detecting and preventing unauthorized signal usage in a content delivery network, and more particularly to the detection and prevention of unauthorized signal usage for content distributed by way of wired or wireless networks to subscriber receiving devices.
- a content delivery network such as for cable or satellite television
- various components that reside on a single physical system or on separate systems linked by one or more communication networks.
- Such content delivery networks may include content providers which provide content delivered across the network, such as audio, video, data, applications, or combinations thereof.
- a method for detecting unauthorized signal usage in a content delivery network comprises the steps of: acquiring at least two signal usage records for a receiver of the content; evaluating the at least two signal usage records for indicia of usage of a combination of signals not normally authorized on the receiver; and detecting unauthorized signal usage upon the at least two signal usage records being consistent with the indicia.
- the indicia may include use at the receiver of at least two signals each of which is only normally authorized for use in mutually distinct geographic locations. Usage of each at least two signals may be associated with a geographic blackout region, wherein geographic locations in which usage is normally authorized for any one of the at least two signals by reference to its respective blackout region is exclusive from geographic locations in which usage is normally authorized for all others of the at least two geographic blackout regions associated with every other of the at least two signals.
- the method may further comprise disabling the receiver in the content delivery network upon detecting unauthorized signal usage at the receiver.
- At least one of the steps of acquiring at least two signal usage records, evaluating the at least two usage signal records, detecting unauthorized signal usage and disabling the receiver may be performed at a different time than in immediate succession to each other of the steps.
- the steps of acquiring at least two signal usage records, evaluating the at least two usage records, detecting unauthorized signal usage and disabling the receiver may be performed by the receiver.
- the content delivery network may include a conditional access system in communication with the receiver.
- the steps of acquiring of at least two signal usage records, evaluating said at least two signal usage records, detecting unauthorized signal usage and disabling said receiver may be performed by the conditional access system. Further, the receiver may perform at least one of the steps of acquiring at least two signal usage records, evaluating the at least two signal usage records, detecting unauthorized signal usage and disabling the receiver, and the conditional access system may perform a step other than the at least one of the steps.
- the receiver may be associated with an interactive television system.
- a method for controlling unauthorized signal usage in a content delivery network comprises the steps of: acquiring geographic indicia for a receiver of the content, the geographic indicia identifying a geographic location associated with the receiver; acquiring at least one signal usage record for the receiver; evaluating the at least one signal usage record for indicia of usage of at least one signal not normally authorized on the receiver; and detecting unauthorized signal usage upon the at least one signal usage record having indicia of usage of a signal not normally authorized for usage in the geographic location.
- the step of evaluating the at least one usage record may be performed by at least one of the receiver, an advertising management system, a blackout control subsystem, a conditional access system, a multiplexer, and a parental control system, in each case being connected to the content delivery network.
- Figure 1 is a block diagram illustrating functional components of a content delivery network.
- Figure 3 is a flow diagram for detecting unauthorized signal usage in the network of Figure 1.
- Figure 4 is a flow diagram for detecting unauthorized signal combination usage in the network of
- Figure 11A is a flow diagram of usage record acquisition in the network of Figure 1.
- Figure 1 IB is a flow diagram of usage record acquisition and logging in the network of Figure 1.
- Figure 11C is a flow diagram of usage record acquisition from multiple sources in the network of
- Figure 13 is a flow diagram of taking action to prevent usage based on verification of a setting of an unauthorized usage flag in the network of Figure 1.
- Figure 14A illustrates the distribution of unauthorized usage detection process steps in a receiver in the network of Figure 1.
- a method and system for detecting unauthorized signal usage in a wireless or wired signal distribution environment can determine whether unauthorized usage of signal is taking place even when network and receiver based security systems, as previously described, have been compromised in a manner that permits unauthorized access to one or more signals.
- the embodiment may directly or indirectly hinder or prevent usage of one or more features or signals by the receiver or another component in the network 10.
- the content is made available to receivers 16 in network 10 as determined by an operator of network 10 or by request from a user of receiver 16.
- the content may be broadcast or transmitted on a point-to-point, point-to-multipoint or other basis as is known in the art.
- Examples of content streams include television signals with audio, video, closed captioning and interactive applications that may be embedded into a composite signal, as is the case with a television signal supporting the WinkTM or WebTVTM interactive television specifications.
- Content streams may also be a series of separate digital transport streams for audio, video, interactive television, and conditional access.
- a given instance of content may be shared by one or more services.
- Multiplexer 13 may then be delivered through a network interface 14 to communication network 15 for delivery to a plurality of receivers 16.
- the function of multiplexer 13 varies with the network and content type, and format of the content. Examples of multiplexers 13 that may be used include MPEG-2 multiplexers, asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) packet switches, gigabit Ethernet devices, and other switching, networking or multiplexing systems known in the art.
- ATM asynchronous transfer mode
- Network 10 may provide multiple facilities for communication between receivers 16 and other components of network 10. As examples, on a cable television network, bandwidth may be allocated separately for content transmission, control signal transmission, and return communication from a receiver 16 with all communication occurring on the same cable. On a satellite television system, the content and control signals are transmitted over the satellite, while receiver 16 may communicate back to components of network 10 through a telephone connection.
- SI tables may be produced and transmitted by SI generator 17, and may also include various forms of control information from external sources to control access for content such as subscription services and pay-per-view movies, and other forms of information the content of which may be used by receiver 16.
- Signal enhancements such as station logos, data, and other forms of content may be included with the content from the various sources, may be added to or removed from signal associated with the content by injector/filter 19 that may be performed before or after the encoding process.
- injector/filter 19 is shown in Figure 1 as performing signal enhancements after the encoding process of content from operator content server 1 lb.
- CA 20 controls which content a particular receiver 16 is authorized to access.
- Services and functions provided by C A 20 include, among other things, permission management 21 for control of authorizations of a per user or receiver basis, content management 22 for controlling access to content, message encryption 23 facility to secure the communication authorization and other messages for transmission.
- CA 20 operates in conjunction with content encoder 12 for protecting of the content during transmission from unauthorized access, and a receiver conditional access system 26 (RCAS) at receivers 16 for communication with CA 20.
- RCAS 26 may include local secure storage of permissions and other content access information.
- Content encoder 12 may perform various transformations on all or part of the content signal to prevent unauthorized access, including signal modification, encryption, and other methods as is known in the art.
- Subscription control of CA 20 may be managed by entering service authorization and cancellation commands on a subscriber management system (SMS) 25. SMS 25 forwards subscription control requests to CA 20, which may then generate the appropriate commands and operations to deliver subscription control commands in the form and manner required to be accepted by a receiver 16.
- SMS 25 subscriber management system
- communication network 15 examples include DTH (direct to home) satellite, microwave multichannel multipoint distribution service (MMDS), local multipoint distribution system (LMDS) television distribution system, DSL (Digital Subscriber Loop) and its various high-speed variants such as VDSL (as used, for example, by telephone companies for high-speed data and video transmission), ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Mode) networks, cellular telephone and other communication networks for transferring data as is known in the art.
- DTH direct to home
- MMDS microwave multichannel multipoint distribution service
- LMDS local multipoint distribution system
- VDSL Digital Subscriber Loop
- ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode
- Receiver 16 includes one or more network interfaces 41 for communication to and from communication network 15.
- network interfaces 41 may consist of one or more tuners to receive a signal from communication network 15, and a modulator or a telephone modem for returning data to communication network 15.
- Receiver 16 may further include demodulate/demultiplex function 42 to convert modulated signals received from network 15 into digital data, and extract the desired data from the signal stream.
- a decrypter function 43 performs decryption functions on the signals, and is typically controlled by RCAS 26 for controlling unauthorized use and access. The decryption of decrypter function 43 may be based on analog or digital means of preventing unauthorized access to the signal.
- decoder 45 transforms the signal's decrypted bits into a content format required by a user to receiver 16, such as a television viewer. For example, decoder 45 may convert the bits from MPEG digital audio and video bit streams into analog television signals.
- RCAS 26 may typically be included in receiver 16 which controls the content that may be accessed and used at receiver 16. Examples of control mechanisms include channel subscription authorizations received from CA 20, and pay-per-view purchases made at receiver 16. In some embodiments, RCAS 26 can determine whether access is allowed through its own locally stored parameters, or by making an authorization check with CA 20. RCAS 26 may also provide additional functions for implementing or controlling the decryption process by decrypter 43 such as controlling the reception and processing of data, or providing decryption keys or other information required for controlling the decryption or access processes at receiver 16. [0076] One or more processors 50 may be used to implement the functions of receiver 16 or to provide or control communication between the various functions of receiver 16. The functions and facilities of receiver 16 may further be controlled by an operating system and one or more software modules that execute on the one or more processors 50.
- EPG electronic program guide
- iTV interactive television
- System applications 53 may include system configuration, audience measurement, advertising management and other functionality.
- Advertising management systems may include systems for presenting or substituting advertisements, and presenting advertisements in a targeted manner based on viewing habits, user demographics or other criteria. Advertising management system may also include the ability to capture usage data such as time and date of channel viewing.
- EPG 51 and the other applications may in turn be iTV applications that use the facilities of iTV subsystem 52.
- system applications 53 may also include capabilities for exercising some control over what may be viewed through receiver 16, such as parental control and copy protection. These and other applications may in turn require additional processing of an accessed signal by network components that may be implemented in one or more of the injector/filters 18 or 19, content spooler l ie, CA 20, SI Generator 17, or component, data or other signal information.
- functions and applications may be provided and managed in multiple ways on receiver 16.
- the applications may be part of the software provided with receiver 16, and included with receiver 16 when it is shipped to a user or updated thereon after the user has put receiver 16 in use.
- one or more separate binary applications may be transmitted separately to receiver 16 through communication network 15.
- interpreted applications may be executed within an iTV environment.
- the iTV applications may be considered separate content provided in network 10, or may be included with video or other content as optional enhancements. Transmission of an application may be managed as a separate content stream or as a component of another content instance such as video program.
- receivers 16 may include any and all of the following operating alone or in combination: digital set-top cable and satellite receivers; integrated components within digital televisions; personal computers with appropriate network connections; cellular telephones and personal digital assistants (PDAs) connected through wireless networks or computer network hook-ups; and gaming consoles.
- PDAs personal digital assistants
- Such receivers 16 typically rely on CA 20 having one or more capabilities similar to those used in television transmission, including satellite and other digital radio systems, mobile telephones using chip-card technology, and mobile or home devices and related services for receiving music, video or other content that receive content either directly from a network or indirectly through a computer such as the iPodTM music player and iTunesTM music service.
- Receivers 16 may have the ability to receive software updates and applications through communication network 15.
- Receivers 16 may also include one or more application execution environment to receive and execute scripts or compiled or interpreted applications. Examples include various JavaTM systems such as Personal JavaTM, Java TVTM and others, as implemented in computers, web browsers and other devices.
- application execution environments of receiver 16 include iTV products and specifications such as WebTVTM and MSNTMTV services, the WinkTM and OpenTVTM systems, and specifications such as DVB-MHP from the DVB Project, and OCAP (Open Cable Application Platform) from the Society of Cable Telecommunications Engineers (SCTE), and others.
- network 10 and receiver 16 typically rely on the encryption and access control components provided in network 10 and CA 20. Such components control which receivers 16 have access to particular content and signals in network 10, whether in the form of specific viewing channels, program selections, or other features available to the subscriber such as interactive applications.
- CA 20 security and authentication of access may be provided by CA 20 and other components at the site of the operator of network 10 (such as encoders 12) and within receivers 16, as described above with reference to Figures 1 and 2.
- CA 20 communicates authorizations to access and use signals to RCAS 26 located on each receiver 16.
- Receiver 16, RCAS 26, or a component or subsystem peripheral to RCAS 26 such as a smart card typically has one or more identifiers. These identifiers, alone or in combination, may identify receiver 16 in network 10, and may be used by CA 20 or other systems to communicate with and send authorization commands to RCAS 26 or other components or subsystems of receiver 16.
- authorizations are typically based on transmitting one or more authorizations periodically to a receiver 16; upon receiver 16 requesting access to a specific service or a list of authorized services from CA 20; or, for services such as pay-per-view movies, on a credit scheme where the credit is transmitted to or provided with receiver 16 and the credit is reduced through usage of pay-per-view content at receiver 16.
- the credit may be based on a financial amount (dollars), a number of tokens or other methods that are known in the art.
- the credit may be provided by SMS 25 that may be separately accessed by a user of receiver 16 (such as by telephone orders to SMS 25).
- the authorization request and related credit information to is typically provided by SMS 25 to CA 20 for processing and transmission to receiver 16.
- SMS 25 include systems such as those provided by DST Innovis, Inc., El Dorado Hills, CA, CSG Systems, Incorporated, Englewood, CO, and others. Detecting and Preventing Unauthorized Signal Usage
- FIG. 3 a flow-chart of a method for detecting and preventing unauthorized signal usage in network 10 is shown. Briefly, the steps of the method include the acquisition of one or more usage records 100, and evaluating the usage records 100, to determine if unauthorized signal usage has occurred. If unauthorized signal usage is detected, then optional initiation of preventive action, including disabling of a particular receiver 16, is taken.
- the method detects unauthorized signal usage at a receiver 16 by way of comparing combinations of signal usage recordsto behaviours that are consistent with unauthorized signal usage.
- the steps of acquiring usage records 100, evaluating such usage records 100, and disabling receiver 16 may all be performed by receiver 16, by CA 20, or by one or more components throughout network 10, as explained in greater detail below.
- record 100 may comprise an identifier for the current content being used on receiver 16, which, for example, in the context of television signals, may be the channel number or another code identifying the channel being viewed through receiver 16.
- one or more function calls, memory or register accesses, data access or other method of accessing data, or combinations thereof, may be used to acquire data for signal usage record 100, as explained in greater detail below.
- Usage record 100 generically refers to any record of signal usage at a receiver 16 that is available or kept, and it may contain data such as a channel identifier, blackout information to control the geographical or other locations that are authorized to view a particular program, the date and time of the content signal usage, information on the content used such as the program name, the schedule start time for the program, the time and date of the viewing, the content type for authorization purposes (subscription channel, pay-per-view event, or other characteristic), and other information that is available to one or more processes of receiver 16 or other components of network 10.
- the step acquisition of usage records 100 may also include storing usage records 100 for subsequent processing.
- the current status of receiver 16 may be such that it contains multiple usage records 100.
- Examples of different records 100 include: the channel currently being viewed; the channel identifier stored to enable the "previous channel” feature that is accessible from may remote control devices; a channel in a "picture-in-picture” (PIP) window; the "previous channel” feature for the PIP window; and a channel being recorded in the background on a receiver with personal video recorder capability.
- Usage records 100 may also be accessed from other subsystems of receiver 16, or from other components of network 100, such as CA 20, where usage records 100 may be stored. Additional details the acquisition of usage records 100 are described below.
- step 305 a step of evaluating usage records 100 is performed. Therein, analysis is performed on the one or more usage records 100 that were acquired to determine if unauthorized usage has occurred. In the embodiment, there are multiple tests and comparisons that may be used to detect if unauthorized signal usage has occurred, as described below. Then at step 308, if unauthorized signal usage is detected, step 310 is taken to optionally initiate preventive action, as described below. If unauthorized signal usage is not detected at step 308, then the detection process ends at step 312.
- acquired usage records 100 may be compared in the embodiment to a predetermined signal usage indicator having indicia relating to combinations of signals normally unauthorized on any one receiver 16 to determine if a combination of the records 100 acquired from a receiver 16 are associated with services, programs or signals that are not normally authorized in combination on the receiver 16.
- Examples of inconsistencies in combinations of channel usage indicative of unauthorized signal usage include the accessing through receiver 16 local stations from multiple communities on satellite television systems operated by different operators, such as the DISH Network from EchoStar Communications Corporation, Littleton, CO, and DirecTV, from Hughes Electronics Corporation, El Segundo, CA. These operators typically carry the local stations from multiple United States cities. A particular receiver 16 therefore would normally only be authorized to access and use local signals for the city or area in which a user of receiver 16 has registered a subscription with the particular operator.
- Another example includes accessing through receiver 16 cable and satellite television channels that are normally only authorized for viewing in certain geographical areas, such as the regional signals from Fox SportsNetTM from Fox Entertainment Group, New York, NY.
- premium signals such as, for example, The Movie Network from Astral Media Inc., Montreal, Canada, may only be normally authorized for receivers 16 of subscribers in the eastern part of the country, and signals for Movie Central from Corus Entertainment, Inc., Calgary, Canada, may only be normally authorized for receivers 16 of subscribers in the western part of the country.
- users of a compromised receiver 16 may be able to view such combinations of signals that are not normally authorized for access for subscribers in a single area through any particular receiver 16.
- the use of such combinations of signals accessed at a particular receiver 16 may be used to detect unauthorized viewing through the receiver 16. Even without knowledge of the location of a receiver 16, the use at the receiver 16 of a first signal normally authorized only for a specific set of users and a second signal normally authorized for a second set of users that does not overlap with the first set of users is indicative that the viewer is not authorized for one or both of the signals and that unauthorized signal usage at receiver 16 has occurred.
- the comparison function may be implemented in other combinations of hardware or software, by other components or combination of components in network 10.
- the comparison or test may refer to one or more data structures, bit maps, lists, arrays, files or other structures accessible to a process that would list the incompatible services for a given channel. The test may perform a lookup from such a structure to determine if a given pair of channels is incompatible. In this example, such a list that includes channels 211 through 220 is referred to as
- a set of instructions or processes can be directly associated with usage of a given service or signal.
- Generalized compatibility functions may also be used.
- a function IS_CHANNEL_COMPATIBLE(channell, channel2) could be implemented to check against one or more lists or other structures for compatibility between the two channels, as may be readily implemented by one skilled in the art.
- Other methods and data structures for comparing a pair of variables, a variable against a set of variables, or two sets of variables for performing a comparison test are also known to those of skill in the art.
- the performance of tests in the step of evaluating usage records 100 for detecting unauthorized signal usage may take place in various manners at various times, such as at the time of viewing, or may be executed at a later time based on logged viewing records. Details on the implementation, triggering and timing of test execution are described in greater detail below.
- FIG. 4 a flow-chart diagram of a detection method of the embodiment using the above describe test of inconsistent signal combinations is shown.
- the method shown on Figure 4 describes a system in which checks are made against both the signal usage records 100 available from the current receiver state of receiver 16 and from a set of logged records 100. However, it will be appreciated that a check against records from either of the current signal usage records 100 or logged records 100 is sufficient.
- one or more parameters 480 may be retrieved from any one or more components of network 10 as indicia of unauthorized signal usage for evaluating usage records 100 against.
- data and data structures can be used as indicia of unauthorized signal usage to generalize or limit the methods and processes for testing of unauthorized signal usage. For example, the tests described above may be limited to a specified number of records 100 or combinations of records 100.
- a signal usage record 100 is retrieved from the available records and evaluated. Typically, the analysis may start with the most recent record 100.
- a check is performed to determine if all desired records 100 are processed. If so, then no unauthorized signal usage is determined to have taken place at step 408.
- the next record 100 may be obtained at step 410 from any of the record storage structures created or populated by the acquisition of records 100 in step 304 described with reference to Figure 3 above.
- both a usage record 100 from the most recent acquisition of records (or the current receiver state of receiver 16), and a usage record log 161 that is compiled by earlier instances of usage record acquisition, as described at step 304 described with reference to Figure 3, are obtained for analysis.
- the current usage records 100 or the usage record log 161, or both may be used at step 410.
- the process of obtaining a record 100 will depend on the storage structure used for the usage records 100 being accessed, and may be as simple as accessing a memory location or register.
- step 412 for evaluating the one or more usage records 100 obtained in step 410. If unauthorized signal usage is detected, then the method proceeds to step 414 to identify such unauthorized signal usage and return operation to step 308 as described with reference to Figure 3. If unauthorized signal usage is not detected at step 412, then the method loops back to step 406 to check if there is another desired record 100 to process.
- the records 100 for the test of inconsistent combination of signals usage may be acquired in a variety of manners, with the manner chosen being relevant to determining how the method will be implemented.
- the following pseudocode samples are examples of some the possibilities implementing the acquisition of records and performing the test.
- the determining of whether channels are compatible and consistent with authorized signal usage may include the use of one or more structures such as arrays or matrices. Such structures may be stored within the process executable: as data structures, files or other storage or transmission mechanisms accessible to the processes as optional parameters 480 as acquired in step 404 described with reference to Figure 4. In an iTV implementation, the processes and data files containing the list of incompatible channels could be transmitted within the iTV streams.
- a matrix is provided as a file that is transmitted within an iTV stream that is accessible to an iTV process.
- one index of the matrix may be an individual channel identifier, or a range or set of channel identifiers, and the other index of the matrix is the set of incompatible channel identifiers, ranges or sets of channel identifiers. It will be appreciated that there are other methods for comparing whether two channels are compatible. Additionally, various teclmiques may be used to reduce the number or rows and columns in the bit map by only representing rows and columns for channels that are to be tested for compatibility. Detection Method 2: Indicia of Usage of Unauthorized combination of Signals and Blackout Indicia
- this method utilizes indicia of signal usage behaviours associated with a combination of programs or signals that has been used when such a combination of signal use would normally have been prevented through a mechanisms to control access to the signals in different geographic locations. For example, if a program A is only available to viewers in New York state, and a program B is only available to viewers in California, a receiver 16 that has been used to access both programs A and B can be determined to have engaged in unauthorized signal usage, regardless of the actual or intended location of the receiver 16.
- a blackout zones definition will control which blackout sections of the viewing area are permitted or forbidden from watching a program or receiving a particular signal.
- another method for determining inconsistent channel usage may be to compare usage records 100 of two or more separate programs, or of two or more signals, to determine if any combination of viewed programs or accessed signals were subject to blackouts that would not normally permit viewing or access of the signals in combination in the same geographical area.
- this method may be used to detect unauthorized signal usage without knowing the specific location of a receiver 16 or the blackout configurations and sections that should be applicable to each particular receiver 16.
- Testing for indicia of incompatible signals for a given signal based on program blackout information may be implemented in several ways, including by way of software modules being executed on processor 50 of receiver 16. Coding may be done within a process of specific tests against one or more sets of one or more channels or programs. For instance, assume that the process implementing the test is associated with one or more channels or programs which contain blackout information. For example, if a given set of blackout sections named 2001, 2002 and 2003 each identify areas that can each separately view programs covered by blackout zones that are not allowed in the other sections, then the following set of instructions provides detection of unauthorized usage for a program associated with the above set of blackout sections. In this example, a usage record 100 for a channel or program which is governed by blackout zones control contains information on the applicable blackout configuration section or sections that are allowed to view a program or access the signal in question.
- test may refer to one or more data structures, bit maps, lists, arrays, files or other structures accessible to a process that would list the incompatible services for a given blackout pattern.
- the process could perform a lookup from such a structure to determine if a given pair of blackout patterns is incompatible.
- the examples described above use the blackout zones system as the determinant of incompatible geographical location for a signal use.
- blackout control mechanism appears to be the predominant mechanism in deployment today for geographical control of viewing signals, it will be appreciated that other mechanisms used to geographically control the availability of programs could be accessed by alternate embodiments to identify unauthorized signal usage.
- blackout zones information on programs and signals may be accessed for use in the analysis processes of the second detection method of the embodiment. Detection Method 3: Concurrent Usage of Multiple Pay-Per-Usage Signals
- FIG. 5 a flow-chart diagram of analysis of signal usage records 100 for indicia of usage of multiple pay-per-usage signals within a pre-determined time period for detecting unauthorized signal usage is shown in Figure 5.
- Pay-per-usage is also typically referred to as pay-per-view (PPV) in television environments.
- PSV pay-per-view
- a pay-per-view signal has a purchase cost associated with its usage through a particular receiver 16, and a user of the receiver 16 must agree to pay this cost as part of the pay-per-view purchase process. Due to this cost, a television viewer is unlikely to purchase multiple pay-per-view events which are shown at the same time, and thus, it is unusual for channel switching or "channel surfing" between multiple pay- per-view programs or other channels to occur at any particular receiver 16.
- a security system of a receiver 16 When a security system of a receiver 16 is compromised, a user of that receiver 16 may be able to watch multiple pay-per-view channels without accepting or paying the charges normally associated with the pay- per-view programs. The viewer's behavior may therefore change, as the viewer may now elect to "channel surf between pay-per-view channels and other channels. "Channel surfing" between pay-per-view channels may therefore be used as indicia of unauthorized signal usage.
- This third detection method of the embodiment therefore identifies unauthorized signal usage by identifying "channel surfing" between pay-per-view channels as the near-simultaneous use of two or more pay- per-view signals.
- the determination of near-simultaneous use may be made through different means. For instance, usage records 100 that are logged with the time of viewing may be used. Unauthorized signal usage may also be determined if the signal usage records 100 of a receiver 16 show two or more pay-per-view signals were used within a pre-determined period of time.
- the third detection method may use two or more usage records 100 from the current state of a receiver 16, such as the current channel, the previous channel, a picture-in-picture channel, a previous channel for picture-in-picture, or a channel being recorded within a PVR device, to determine if there is simultaneous pay-per-usage signal usage. If two or more of these records are for pay-per-view signal usage, then unauthorized signal usage may be determined to have occurred. [00124] Tests for concurrent use of multiple PPV signals may be made based on the actual concurrent usage of signals, or on signals used within a defined period of time that is short enough for the operator of network 10 to judge that unauthorized viewing has occurred.
- the usage records 100 may be limited to the current channel and the channel from the "previous channel" feature. If both the current and previous channels are PPV channels, then unauthorized usage may be deemed to have occurred by the operator of the network 10 on which the receiver 16 is located. [00125] Where a log of prior usage records 100 is available, a timestamp within the record 100 may also be used in the assessment.
- the third method of the embodiment may be implemented within the step 412 of checking for inconsistent channel usage described above with reference to Figure 4.
- the time units X and/or the number of channels Y may be defined in the test or may be obtained from parameters 480.
- the test could omit the IS_PPV(recordxhannel) component of the test if only PPV usage records 100 are logged.
- the time tests could be based on the difference in time between a set of records 100, or finding a set of records within a given time interval.
- features of an electronic program guide EPG or other tool used to assist in program selection at receiver 16 may be used to detect concurrent pay-per-use signal usage or to obtain viewing records for the other methods of the embodiment described herein.
- EPG functions may be presented with picture-in-picture capabilities; depending on the capabilities of a receiver 16.
- a usage record 100 representing the current state of receiver 16, or set of usage record logs 161 is retrieved.
- usage record 100 or record log 161 is analyzed as described above for indicia of near-simultaneous use of multiple PPV signals. If such indicia is found, then the method proceeds to step 512 to conclude that unauthorized signal usage occurred at the receiver 16. If there was no indicia of near- simultaneous use of multiple PPV signals at step 508, then step 510 is taken to determine if there are other records 100 which are desired to process. If not, then the method proceeds to step 514 to declare that no unauthorized signal usage is detected.
- the use of one or more signals intended for a given geographical area may be compared against one or more indicia of a usage record 100 that may be used to derive the intended location of a receiver 16 to provide indicia of unauthorized signal usage.
- a usage record 100 may be used to derive the intended location of a receiver 16 to provide indicia of unauthorized signal usage.
- data pertaining to the time zone in which a receiver 16 is intended to operate, or a current time can be used as an indicator of geographical location for the receiver 16.
- receiver 16 that has an indicator for Eastern Time zone and that is utilizing a signal that is normally only authorized for a western time zone may be used as indicia that the receiver 16 is operating in an unauthorized manner.
- indicia that may be available in a receiver 16 to indicate its intended location include location codes such as a US Postal Service ZIP code; one or more blackout zone indicators as typically used to control viewing areas of sporting events; and other data that may be sent specifically to a receiver 16 to indicate the location thereof.
- GPS Global Positioning System
- Indicators of the intended geographical area for a given program or channel may include blackout zone definitions as described earlier, authorization procedures and rules that normally only allow programs to be authorized for receivers 16 in specific geographical locations. It will be appreciated that other mechanisms for determining geographical location may be used in other embodiments.
- the fourth method of detecting unauthorized signal usage its operation is very similar to that described for the third method with reference to Figure 4. However, for this fourth method the "get next record" step of 410 and the test for all records processed step of 406 may be omitted if only the usage record corresponding to the currently used signal at receiver 16 is to be tested against one or more indicia described above.
- the test for inconsistent channel usage under this fourth method would test a record 100 against a value or range of one or more indicia. For example, if the usage record 100 is associated with a local channel from Los Angeles, the method may check if a ZIP code stored within the record 100 is within a range of ZIP code values for which local Los Angeles signals may be accessed.
- Implementation of this fourth detection method is similar to that described above with respect to the other unauthorized signal usage detection methods, with minor adjustments as will be apparent to those skilled in the art.
- the fifth detection method may, for a high-value service such as a premium movie channel, create and transmit one or more iTV applications to receivers 16 in network 10 to store a data element on one or more receivers 16.
- a high-value service such as a premium movie channel
- the fifth detection method may, for a high-value service such as a premium movie channel, create and transmit one or more iTV applications to receivers 16 in network 10 to store a data element on one or more receivers 16.
- different values for a data element can be set based on whether a receiver 16 is authorized or not to receive the premium channel, or the simple existence or definition of a given data element on a receiver 16 can be used to indicate that the receiver 16 is authorized to receive the service or signal.
- the same process or another subsequently running process can check available usage records for indication that a specific channel was viewed, and, if so, can then check if an appropriate data element is present and has a specific value to indicate that access to that signal for the specific channel has been authorized.
- Pay-per-usage signals may include pay-per-view movies, events or other programs.
- a user of a receiver 16 associated with television programs may purchase pay-per-view signal through usage of receiver functions of a receiver 16, which purchase typically results in the creation of an event purchase record within the receiver 16.
- a user may be able to access or view pay- per-view content and signals without first going through the payment process of pay-per-view. Therefore, in cases where security has been compromised, there may not exist a purchase record at a receiver 16 where one would be expected when a viewer is accessing pay-per-view content through the receiver 16. In a compromised system, the pay-per-view signal usage is initiated without going through the purchase process, and therefore no purchase record is created on receiver 16.
- pay-per-view (PPV) purchase records 681 are retrieved, which may be available from a receiver 16 or a network component of network 10, such as CA 20.
- PPV records 681 may be directly accessible through memory, file or other storage access; through a function call, network protocol or other form of request of communication with a subsystem such as RCAS 26 on the receiver 16 that may have the information, or through access to another component in network 10.
- a usage record 100 representing the current state of receiver 16, or set of usage record logs 161 is retrieved.
- step 608 the usage record 100 or record log 161 is analyzed as described above for indicia of PPV signals usage without a purchase record. If so, then the method proceeds to step 612 to conclude that unauthorized signal usage occurred at the receiver 16. In this respect, if at least one usage record 100 does not have a corresponding PPV purchase record 681, then unauthorized signal usage may be deemed to have occurred. If there was no indicia of a lack of consistent PPV signals purchase record 681 at step 608, then step 610 is taken to determine if there are other records 100 which are desired to be processed. If not, then the method proceeds to step 614 to declare that no unauthorized signal usage is detected.
- the comparison of purchase records 681 to signal usage records 100 in the purchase record for a signal used at step 608 may also compare the purchase records 681 to multiple available usage records 100.
- the number of records 100 used for comparison may be limited by using criteria such as a maximum number of records 100, the records 100 from a given period of time, the records from a set of channels, or other criteria. Such limitations may be based on usage parameters. Such parameters may be made available by including the optional step 210 of the second detection method described with reference to Figure 4 to acquire the appropriate parameters, and implementing the test 606 in a manner that uses the parameters. Such limitations and methods for setting the limitations may be applicable to the other methods for determining unauthorized usage described herein. [00148] Implementation of this sixth detection method of the embodiment is similar to that described above with respect to the other detection methods, with adjustments as will be apparent to those skilled in the art. Detection Method 7: Trap channel
- FIG. 7 a flow-chart diagram of a seventh detection method of the embodiment is shown, whereby indicia relating to usage of a channel that is not normally authorized for subscribers in network 10 is used to detect unauthorized signal usage.
- An operator of network 10 may provide signals to the network that are not normally authorized for use by any customer receivers 16. Such signals may include test signals, signals for internal operations, signals specifically transmitted to help in the detection of unauthorized usage, and other signals not normally authorized for any customer access or use. These various forms of signals are referred to as trap channels. Any usage of these trap channel by a receiver 16 can be considered an indication of unauthorized usage at the receiver 16. [00151] Referring to Figure 7, parameters 780 relating to indicia of unauthorized signal usage relating to trap channel use is retrieved at step 704. Thereafter, at step 706 a usage record 100 representing the current state of receiver 16, or a set of usage record logs 161 is retrieved.
- the usage record 100 or record log 161 is analyzed for indicia of trap channel use. This may be done by comparing usage record 100 or record log 161 against a list of one or more trap channels identified by parameters 780. If evidence of trap channel use is found, then the method proceeds to step 712 to conclude that unauthorized signal usage occurred at the receiver 16. If there was no indicia of trap channel use at step 708, then step 710 is taken to determine if there are other records 100 which are to be processed. If not, then the method proceeds to step 714 to declare that no unauthorized signal usage is detected. However, if additional records 100 or logs 161 are to be processed, then the method returns to step 606 to get the next record 100 or log 161 for processing.
- a trap channel can be created using audio, video or other signals that may be associated with other channels.
- Channel 3 is a channel that may be authorized using normal subscription commands.
- the same video and audio components are also used by Channel 4.
- Channel 4 has a separate CA stream CA4, and an iTV component iTV2 associated with it.
- iTV2 contains the software and data necessary to perform a trap function.
- Channel 4 is never authorized within a normal subscription. Therefore, for this example only users of compromised receivers 16 would be capable of accessing Channel 4.
- the conditional access system 20 may provide the control information and data required to generate stream CA4.
- the multiplexer 13 may provide the encryption and a portion or all of the SI generation facilities, which define the channels and their associated streams.
- a trap channel is authorized for all viewers on all receivers 16 in network 10, but access is controlled through a blackout zone or other control mechanism in a manner that prevents viewing of the channel for all normally authorized viewers. In this way, unauthorized signal usage may still be identified by any record of usage of the trap channel.
- Implementation of this seventh detection method is similar to that described above with respect to the other unauthorized signal usage detection method, with adjustments as will be apparent to those skilled in the art.
- a program can be created with a blackout definition that would prevent a set of some or all normally authorized receivers 16 from using the signal associated with the trap channel. Any receiver 16 within this set, however, that has a usage record 100 evidencing use of this channel can then be determined to have engaged in unauthorized signal usage.
- Implementation of this eighth detection method is similar to that described above with respect to the other detection methods, with adjustments as will be apparent to those skilled in the art.
- a ninth detection method of the embodiment the previously described detection methods are used in combination to evaluate indicia of unauthorized signal usage as part of step 308 described above with reference to Figure 3.
- an exemplary ninth detection method is shown in which the detection methods previously described are combined within a single method which first determines at step 902 the channel type associated with the set of usage records 100 being evaluated. Tests for additional channel types may be included in other embodiments.
- the channel type is determined to be a trap channel, then applying the seventh or eighth methods it may be determined immediately that there was unauthorized signal and so that preventive action, as described below, is taken immediately at step 906.
- step 902 if a pay-per-view channel types is detected then path 907 is taken to step 908 for evaluation of indicia of unauthorized signal usage by the above described concurrent pay-per-use method, and then at step 910 by the above described Pay-Per-View purchase check method. If at step 902 neither a trap nor PPV channel is detected, then step 904 is taken to perform a check for incompatible channels as per the method of detection method 1 described earlier. For the example shown in Figure 10, it can be seen that one or more test methods can be applied for a given channel type, such as the two tests for a PPV signal in steps 908 and 910, and that for other channels, such as a trap channel, no test method are necessarily utilized (as shown in step 906). It will be appreciated that in other embodiments, other combinations of tests and methods may be used.
- the processes may be configurable through the use of parameters as described above to determine the timing, channels, content, signal or other constraints on when the steps of one or more detection methods of unauthorized signal usage as described herein may be executed.
- Combinations of methods under this ninth detection method may include but are not limited to: • Requirement that a minimum number of separate methods show that unauthorized usage has occurred; • Requirement that one or more specific methods show that unauthorized usage has occurred; • Requirement that a minimum number of instances of each of one or more detection methods show that unauthorized usage has occurred; • Requirement that a minimum number or combination of determinations of unauthorized usage have taken place within defined time period.
- step 308 if no unauthorized signal usage was detected by way of one of the above described detection methods in step 308, then path 309 is taken to step 312 to complete the process of detecting unauthorized signal usage. However, if at step 308 unauthorized signal usage was detected, then step 310 is taken, where optionally a preventive action process may be initiated.
- the preventive action at step 310 may be implemented as one or more processes or steps. For example, upon detection of unauthorized usage, an instance of a preventive action process 300a may simply set a flag to indicate that unauthorized usage has occurred at the receiver 16 in question. Another instance of a preventive action process 300b can be execute at a later time, in which the process checks for the flag indicating unauthorized viewing has occurred, and then takes further steps to prevent or otherwise disrupt usage of the receiver 16 in question.
- An instance of preventive action process 310 may include, but is not limited to, any or all of the following actions: • Displaying a message, graphic or other content in a manner that blocks the usage of the underlying content from being viewed or used at receiver 16. As an example, when implemented on a television receiver, a message box could be displayed that covers the entire screen; • Distorting or otherwise hindering the presentation of the content at receiver 16; • Logging a record of the unauthorized signal usage event; • Switching the receiver 16 to another signal, such as a different channel for television receivers; • Disabling one or more capabilities of the receiver 16, or disabling the entire receiver 16; • Displaying a message to the receiver 16 for viewing by a user thereon; • Reporting the unauthorized signal usage event to another network component or system using any network connections or communications protocols that may be available in network 10; • Reporting the unauthorized signal usage event to conditional access system 20 or a component thereof, such as receiver 16; • Testing to verify that two or more instances of unauthorized signal usage have occurred before one or
- Such a test may also require that the multiple usage records 100 indicate that the events took place within a given time period; and • Where preventive action process 310 takes place outside of a receiver 16, sending flags, processes, instructions or other data to the receiver 16 to prevent usage of any or all signals on the receiver 16.
- Instances of the preventive action process 310 and the actions taken therein may vary from method to method of taking preventive action, between channels and services, at different times of day, or based on other parameters accessible to the process.
- separate preventive action processes for separate methods may set separate flags to indicate that unauthorized signal usage has occurred. A given flag may be based on one or more methods, instances, channels or other characteristics.
- flags may be used set on a global basis for the receiver 16 in question, to indicate one or more forms or instances of unauthorized signal usage; on a per service basis, to indicate unauthorized use of a single service; or on a class of service basis, to indicate unauthorized use of a group of services such as, for example, pay-per-view services.
- a given flag may be a binary indicator of whether the flag has been set, or may contain one or more fields such as a count of the number of times the flag was set to indicate the number of instances of unauthorized usage detection of the type applicable to the given flag, date and time information, and other data.
- These different versions of the process 310 may perform different actions, and may be dependent on prior execution of one or more specific instances and versions of preventive action processes 310.
- one preventive action process to disable a receiver 16 may require that flags be set to show more than one type or instance of unauthorized usage has been detected, such as viewing a combination of channels that is not authorized as described as the first detection method describe above, and channel surfing through multiple PPV channels as describe as the third detection method described above.
- Such a preventive action process 310 will therefore not disable the receiver 16 until other preventive action processes 310 have been invoked to set appropriate flags that indicate the two types of unauthorized signal usage have occurred, in accordance with, for example, the ninth detection method.
- the types of structures that can be used to represent flags are the same as those that can be used to represent usage records 100 and log entries, as described above.
- a process may check for the existence of the flag, and if it is not available, create the appropriate structures as required, in one or more manners as known in the art. These flags may then be examined by receiver 16 or a CA 20 of network 10. Upon detecting that a "disable" flag is set at receiver 16, the receiver 16 may disable itself by not allowing one or more signal to be further used at the receiver 16, or the CA 20 may no longer permit one or more signals to be used by the receiver 16.
- Examples of preventing access can include changing to another channel, displaying a message, shutting off the receiver and others, as described above [00169]
- the same mechanisms described in greater detail below for controlling access to logs and other data on the receiver 16 may be applied to the creation, storage and retrieval of data elements of these flags. Acquisition of Usage Records
- Usage records 100 may be provided and stored as data sets, such as software modules or databases stored at one or more components of network 10 as known in the art. While it will be appreciated that other methods of acquisition of usage records 100 may be used, as examples only and not as limitation, methods of acquiring usage records 100 include: • Passing of the current receiver state of a receiver 16 as one or more parameters to the pro cess of acquisition of usage records 304 as part of the process initiation of receiver 16. This method may be of use when as part of a software subsystem such as an EPG which already has the required information; • A function call to the operating system or another subsystem within a receiver 16 which can provide access to the requested records.
- a process can execute on a server which requests one or more records from the receiver 16, or from a server process that has acquired one or more records from the receiver 16; • Requesting or accessing of the usage records 100 from another system or subsystem within receiver 16 or external to the receiver 16 that is used to maintain usage records 100, such as a diagnostic subsystem, an audience measurement system, advertising management system, electronic program guide software or other system. Such system may accumulate records within receiver 16, and may also gather records from the receiver 16 for storage on one or more server systems in network 10; • Data from a subscriber management or conditional access system, such as SMS 25 or CA 20, that holds limited viewing records reported by a receiver 16.
- a subscriber management or conditional access system such as SMS 25 or CA 20
- subscriber management system 25 will collect pay-per-view purchase records from a receiver 16, either directly or indirectly through CA 20; • Using data from state information, memory locations, registers or access to functions or features of the receiver operating software or any subsystem that can provide the current state for features of receiver 16.
- state information may include information on content the viewer on the receiver 16 is currently or has recently used. State information may depend on the features available on the receiver 16 and the related data these features may require.
- Examples of these features include the "previous channel” feature, which, in a television receiver, holds information on the channel that was viewed prior to the current channel being viewed; the picture-in-picture feature, which will have data on two viewed channels; the "previous channel” feature that may be associated with a picture-in-picture feature, and may therefore have data on four separate channels, including the current main picture channel, the previous main picture channel, the current picture in picture channel, and the previous picture in picture channel; the recording function on a PVR-equipped receiver, which may be recording from a channel while a viewer is watching another channel.
- the data from this feature provides access to another usage record 100, and may be available through one or more methods described above. [00171] It will be appreciated that other methods of acquiring signal usage records 100 may be used in other embodiments.
- the usage data 111 represents the source of the data. This data may be from one or more of the methods and sources described above, obtained using one or more functions as appropriate for the source of the records.
- the data from the required source is obtained and then placed into records 120 for further use by the other steps of the method.
- Records 120 may be in the form of variables in memory within the process, in shared storage, in parameters to a function call for the next step of the method, in a record for transmission to another process or system, or other form of storage that would allow access to another process or transmission to another system or process.
- the records 120 may simply consist of the same data and storage location as the data 111, providing that data 111 is accessible to subsequent steps of the method as required.
- the storage of one or more records 120 may involve transmission of the one or more records to another process or system that will directly or indirectly store the record 120 or portion thereof.
- an optional logging process 140 is used to enter records 120 into a log 161. Details regarding this optional logging provided with reference to Figures 12A to 12D, described further below.
- the usage data 111 is accessed using one of the mechanisms described above.
- additional data may be accessed as required to create the usage record 100.
- the viewing data 111 may consist of data from a memory location, register, parameter passed to the process, result from a function call or other method that provides the current channel number. Additional viewing data such as the program type may also be acquired in step 112 from sources such as an electronic program guide.
- other data such as the time of day may be acquired from a memory location, result returned from a function call on memory location, parameter passed to the process or from another method is collected.
- one or more signal usage records 100 are created using the data acquired in steps 112 and 114.
- the process of creating usage records 100 may require their creation or availability on another component or components in network 10, in which case usage records 100 would consist of one or more data structures for transmission to another software component on another component or components in network 10.
- the method does not require that all usage records 100 be obtained or retained. For instance, a periodic polling of the receiver state of receiver 16 may not have the records for all the content viewed, but one or more iterations of the process can nevertheless generate sufficient data to make a determination of unauthorized signal usage in accordance with the methods and schemes described above.
- the acquisition of usage records 100 may optionally including storing one or more of the usage records 100 in one or more logs 161.
- One or more elements of a usage record 100 may be stored.
- the records 100 to be stored, the log 61 in which they are stored, and the elements of the record 100 to be stored may be selected based on the channel or content type, time of day, volume of records, availability of storage space and other factors determined to be appropriate for the unauthorized signal usage detection and prevention scheme being implemented.
- Figure 12A shows the basic steps for entering a usage record 100 into a record log 161.
- a test for the existence of the log 161 and a related log creation step 160 as shown in figure 12 B are optionally provided within a logging process 140, as a log 161 may be defined, initialized and generated.
- log 161 can take the form of an array that is defined and initialized as a set of one or more memory storage variables or records within the application program that implements the logging process 140.
- the create log 160 step may allocate the storage space required and may initialize the space as required to allow storage, retrieval and management of the records 100 in log 161.
- the log 161 may be represented as a set of records stored in memory, on disk, or in any other form of storage accessible by the various components of network 10 associated with the conditional access system 20, such as CA 20 itself and RCAS 26 of receiver 16.
- the log 161 may take the form of one or more records, which may consist of a sequential list of data, a set of records, a file or other storage format.
- the physical storage for records 100, log 161, and other data structure described above may be in any form of storage such as memory, registers, or disk or other forms of storage, and may be located on or accessible to any of the systems or subsystems described above within network 10. Even volatile forms of memory may be in some embodiment, since long-term storage of records and data structure is not necessarily required, as the various embodiments described above does not necessarily require a complete or extensive set of usage records 100 to detect unauthorized signal usage and to take optional preventive action.
- the log 161 may be in a form that provides a measure of self management, such as a circular log, where any new entry overwrites the least recently used entry.
- the log may also be in a form that requires management, in which case filtering and log management processes may be required, as described below.
- log 161 can reduce the amount of storage from what might typically be used by keeping a single bit for each channel that is of interest for unauthorized signal usage detection purposes. For example, a bit value of zero would indicate that the channel had not been used, and the bit for a given channel would be set to one when a usage record indicates that the channel has been used.
- Figure 12B is a flow diagram of logging process 140 with the optional steps of filtering a log entry at step 165 and managing the log step 190.
- the optional filter log entry step 165 may be used to reduce the number of entries in the log 161 based on conditions stored within the process, or using parameters available to the process. For example, logging may only be required for specific channels, and therefore some entries may be deleted and not logged.
- the list of channels to be logged may be stored as data within the process, or may be provided as data in a parameter list 180 that is accessible to process 140.
- Record filtering at step 165 may include elimination of consecutive records for the same service or content (for example, in a periodic polling scenario, consecutive records for the same channel may be deleted since there is in effect no state change from the first record); limiting the storage of records to signals of interest to the operator from a theft of signal perspective; limiting the records to a single record per channel or instance of content, and other mechanisms. Where a single record 100 is kept per channel or instance of content, an existing record may be updated with the current record 100. For example, if only a single record 100 per channel is kept and the record 100 includes the time the usage occurred, the time of usage could be updated with the time from subsequent viewing records for the same channel. It will be appreciated that a variety of compression methods may be used in different embodiments.
- the optional manage log 190 step is used to further manage the content, size, location or other features of the log 161.
- a logging process 140 may use encryption, checksums, digital signatures and other techniques to protect the content of the log 161 from being accessed or tampered by other processes or hackers attempting to circumvent unauthorized signal usage detection and prevention.
- information which may be unique and may be available from a subsystem within a receiver 16, or other source accessible to the logging or other processes, may be used to make the storage identifier, location, encryption key or other characteristic of the log 161 unique to one or more receivers 16, or to change the location or other characteristics of the log 161 on a periodic basis, thus increasing the difficulty for a person or persons attempting to determine the means of operation of the unauthorized signal usage detection methods of the embodiment.
- a logging process 140 may modify, move, delete or replace the existing log structures. In this manner, means that may be used by hackers to detect, disrupt, or destroy the log structures can be circumvented.
- the create log step 160, add log record(s) step 170 and manage log step 190 may require access to parameters 180 or other data to coordinate the placement, method of entry, access and management of the log entries.
- the logging, log creation and log management functions may be within the same process or occur as separate processes.
- the logging and log management functions would only execute if the log 161 had already been created by an instance of the log creation process 160.
- Figure 12C shows a flow- chart for a separate process 141 that is used for log filtering and management.
- the filter log step 166 in this case, may filter log 161 based on the current content of the log 161 and not on the record 100 currently being written.
- the process of Figure 12C may be dependent on the prior execution of a process 140 or 141 that created the log 161.
- a separate process that creates a log 161 is shown.
- It will be appreciated that other methods of acquiring and managing records 100 and logs 161 will be known to those skilled in the art.
- FIG. 3 a scheme for unauthorized signal usage and prevention is shown in which the acquisition of usage records 100 at step 304, evaluating usage records 100 at step 305, detecting unauthorized usage at step 308, and optionally initiating preventive action 310 appear as executing in direct, immediate succession.
- the steps referred to in Figure 3 are not required to operate in immediate succession, and may operate at different times.
- one or more processes implementing each of, combinations of or parts of the acquisition of records 304, the analysis of records 305, the optional steps of preventive action 310, and the creation, making of entries to and managing one or more usage logs 161 may occur in immediate succession as shown in Figure 3, or may be performed or executed independently at different times.
- a particular step of Figure 3 may require that one or more of the preceding steps have executed at least once, and the results of that step be stored in network 10 so that the next step shown in Figure 3 may operate.
- step 304 of acquiring the usage record 100 must have first occurred at least once, so that at step 305 there are usage records 100 to evaluate.
Abstract
Description
Claims
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EP2654308A4 (en) * | 2010-12-14 | 2014-10-01 | 4Dream Co Ltd | System for monitoring the misuse of image information |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
EP1680887A4 (en) | 2013-06-26 |
CA2542624C (en) | 2015-06-16 |
EP1680887A1 (en) | 2006-07-19 |
US20070076872A1 (en) | 2007-04-05 |
CA2542624A1 (en) | 2005-04-21 |
US7958524B2 (en) | 2011-06-07 |
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