WO2006064768A1 - 不正機器検出装置、不正機器検出システム、不正機器検出方法、プログラム、記録媒体及び機器情報更新方法 - Google Patents
不正機器検出装置、不正機器検出システム、不正機器検出方法、プログラム、記録媒体及び機器情報更新方法 Download PDFInfo
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Classifications
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- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
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- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
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- G11B20/00188—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving measures which result in a restriction to authorised devices recording or reproducing contents to/from a record carrier
- G11B20/00195—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving measures which result in a restriction to authorised devices recording or reproducing contents to/from a record carrier using a device identifier associated with the player or recorder, e.g. serial numbers of playback apparatuses or MAC addresses
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- G11B20/00485—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier characterised by a specific kind of data which is encrypted and recorded on and/or reproduced from the record carrier
- G11B20/00492—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier characterised by a specific kind of data which is encrypted and recorded on and/or reproduced from the record carrier wherein content or user data is encrypted
- G11B20/00528—Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier characterised by a specific kind of data which is encrypted and recorded on and/or reproduced from the record carrier wherein content or user data is encrypted wherein each title is encrypted with a separate encryption key for each title, e.g. title key for movie, song or data file
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Definitions
- Unauthorized device detection device Unauthorized device detection device, unauthorized device detection system, unauthorized device detection method, program, recording medium, and device information update method
- the present invention relates to an unauthorized device detection apparatus for detecting an unauthorized device manufactured by imitation.
- the present invention relates to a technology for detecting a counterfeit device of a playback device that plays back content that is a copyrighted work such as a movie or music.
- the clone device holds the same key as the device key held by a legitimate playback device, and the encrypted content that permits decryption playback only to the legitimate playback device for copyright protection Decoding and playback in the same way as a simple playback device does. Therefore, the owner of the clone device can view the content illegally.
- Patent Document 1 discloses a method for detecting a clone terminal in a mobile phone which is a regular mobile terminal.
- the clone terminal detection apparatus determines that a clone terminal exists when a plurality of mobile terminals having the same telephone number exist simultaneously under the control of a plurality of base stations.
- Patent Document 1 Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 2000-184447
- the present invention provides an illegal device detection device, a content reproduction device, an unauthorized device detection system, an information device, and the like that can detect a clone device related to a content reproduction device. It is an object of the present invention to provide an information collection device, an unauthorized device detection method, a program, a recording medium, a device information update method, and an integration circuit.
- the unauthorized device detection apparatus of the present invention is an unauthorized device detection device that detects an unauthorized device manufactured by imitation, and holds it in association with a verification device identifier! / Generate and hold a verification value different from the verification value! / In place of the verification value, hold the generated verification value and the verification device identifier in association with each other.
- Distribution means for distributing the generated verification value to a device holding the identifier, and the target device identifier and the verification value written to the portable medium by the detection target device that is the target of fraud detection are stored in the portable medium card.
- the acquisition means to be acquired and the target device identifier and the verification device identifier match, it is determined whether or not the verification value held! / The verification value matches the acquired verification value. If it is determined that it does not match the determination means, the target And a registration means for registering the vessel identifier to Revocation List.
- the unauthorized device detection apparatus of the present invention has the above-described configuration, so that the detection target device holding the same target device identifier as the verification device identifier holds the updated verification value. Therefore, the device that holds the verification device identifier and holds the verification value before the update and the device that holds the verification device identifier and holds the updated verification value at the same time are simultaneously determined. A state of being present can be detected as an illegal state.
- the registration of the target device identifier determined to be a mismatch between the verification values by the registration unit to the unauthorized device list is performed by using the target device identifier determined not to match another target This represents the concept of performing some processing in distinction from the device identifier.
- the unauthorized device detection apparatus holds a plurality of target device identifiers in the RAM, and distinguishes the target device identifier determined to be inconsistent from other target device identifiers, and is provided separately. If you send it to! The target device identifier determined to be ⁇ is registered in the unauthorized device list, and the unauthorized device list is transmitted to the display unit.
- the illegal device list need not be stored in a nonvolatile memory or the like as long as it is at least on a volatile memory such as a RAM.
- the distribution unit further generates a verification value different from the verification value that is held and held when the determination unit determines that they match, and holds and holds the verification value. Instead of the verification value, the generated verification value and the verification device identifier are held in association with each other, and the generated verification value is distributed to the detection target device.
- the new same verification value can be held by the detection target device and the unauthorized device detection device. .
- the unauthorized device detection apparatus further includes a title key storage unit that holds a title key for decrypting the encrypted content, and the distribution unit further includes a case where the determination unit determines that they match.
- the title key may be distributed to the detection target device.
- the detection target device holds an individual key in advance
- the unauthorized device detection device further includes a title key storage unit that holds a title key for decrypting encrypted content, and the verification
- a copy key storage unit that holds a copy key that is a copy of the individual key in association with a device identifier
- an encrypted title key generation unit that encrypts the title key using the copy key.
- the distribution unit may further distribute the encrypted title key to the detection target device when it is determined by the determination unit that they match.
- the unauthorized device detection apparatus further determines a measurement unit that measures the number of times that the determination unit previously determined that the values match, and determines whether or not the number of times exceeds a predetermined number.
- the distribution means further generates a verification value different from the held verification value when the number of times exceeds a predetermined number, and replaces the held verification value with the verification value. Then, the generated verification value and the verification device identifier may be held in association with each other, and the generated verification value may be distributed to the detection target device.
- the unauthorized device detection apparatus further determines a measurement unit that measures a period that has elapsed since the distribution by the distribution unit, and whether the elapsed period has exceeded a predetermined period.
- a period determining unit that generates a verification value that is different from the verification value that is held when it is determined that the period has exceeded a predetermined period;
- the generated verification value and the verification device identifier may be stored in association with each other, and the generated verification value may be distributed to the detection target device.
- the distribution unit may generate the tongue L number as the verification value.
- the content playback device of the present invention is a content playback device that plays back content, and includes a device identifier and a verification value generated by an unauthorized device detection device that detects an unauthorized device manufactured by imitation.
- Storage means for storing the information in association with each other, notification means for notifying the device identifier and the verification value to the unauthorized device detection device, and response to the notification by the unauthorized device detection device.
- Update means for storing the acquired verification value and the device identifier in association with each other instead of the verification value stored in the storage means when the acquired device identifier matches the acquired device identifier. Equipped with a
- the content reproduction device rewrites the stored verification value with the verification value generated by the unauthorized device detection device.
- the new verification value can be notified to the unauthorized device detection device, and by notifying the old verification value, it is possible to prevent erroneous determination as an unauthorized device even though it is a legitimate device. .
- An unauthorized device detection system of the present invention is an unauthorized device detection system that detects an unauthorized device manufactured by imitation, and includes an unauthorized device detection device and a detection target device, and the detection target device is a target device identifier. And store the verification value in association with each other! /, The storage means, the notification means for notifying the target device identifier and the verification value to the unauthorized device detection device, and the verification device identifier and the unauthorized device detection distributed by the unauthorized device detection device. Update information acquisition means for acquiring the verification value generated by the apparatus, and when the target device identifier and the verification device identifier match, the verification value stored in the storage means is changed to V.
- Device identifier and generated verification value The distribution means for distribution, the acquisition means for acquiring the target device identifier and the verification value from the detection target device, and the target device identifier and the verification device identifier are retained when they match.
- the verification value held by a device determined to be legitimate is updated, and the detection target device holding the same target device identifier as the verification device identifier has the updated verification value. Since it is determined whether or not the force is held, if there is a device that is determined to be legitimate and a device that holds the verification device identifier and holds the verification value before being updated at the same time, V, an incorrect state is indicated. Can be detected.
- the notifying unit writes the target device identifier and the verification value to a portable medium
- the acquiring unit uses the information collecting device to record the pair of information recorded on the portable medium. It is also possible to read the target device identifier and the verification value.
- the information collection device includes a reading unit that reads the target device identifier and the verification value written in the portable medium from the portable medium, a transmission unit that transmits the target device identifier and the verification value.
- the acquisition means may receive the target device identifier and the verification value from the information collection device.
- the verification value is acquired from the detection target device via the portable medium, and is transmitted to the unauthorized device detection device by communication. Therefore, a plurality of detection target devices are geographically dispersed. Even in this case, the verification values held by the respective detection target devices can be aggregated in the unauthorized device detection apparatus.
- the information collection device of the present invention is an information collection device that transmits information held by a detection target device that is a target of fraud detection to an unauthorized device detection device that detects an unauthorized device manufactured by imitation.
- the target device holds the target device identifier and the verification value generated by the unauthorized device detection device, and the unauthorized device detection device generates a verification value and uses the generated verification value and the verification device identifier. If the target device identifier and the verification device identifier match, the target device identifier and the verification value are stored. -If it is determined whether or not they match and it is determined that they do not match !, the target device identifier is registered in the unauthorized device list, and the information collection device uses the detection target device as a portable medium.
- the target device information written in And a said verification value a child, reading means for reading from the portable medium, the said target equipment identifier read and the verification value, and transmitting means for transmitting to the illegitimate equipment detection device
- the verification value acquired from the detection target device via the portable medium is transmitted to the unauthorized device detection device by communication, a plurality of detection target devices are geographically dispersed. Even in this case, verification values held by each detection target device can be aggregated in the unauthorized device detection device.
- the unauthorized device detection method of the present invention is an unauthorized device detection method used in an unauthorized device detection apparatus provided with a storage means for detecting an unauthorized device manufactured by imitation, and includes a verification device identifier and a storage device.
- a verification value different from the verification value held in association is generated, and the generated verification value and the verification device identification are replaced with the verification value held.
- a distribution step of associating a different child with the storage means and distributing the generated verification value to a device that holds the verification device identifier, and a portable medium by a detection target device that is a target of fraud detection The acquisition step of acquiring the target device identifier and the verification value written in the portable medium strength, and the verification value to be retained when the target device identifier and the verification device identifier match.
- the computer program of the present invention is a computer program used in an unauthorized device detection apparatus including a storage unit that detects an unauthorized device manufactured by imitation, and associates a verification device identifier with the storage unit.
- a verification value that is different from the verification value that is held, and in place of the verification value that is held, the generated verification value and the verification device identifier are associated with each other and held in the storage unit,
- a recording medium of the present invention is a computer-readable recording medium in which the computer program is recorded.
- the verification value held by the device determined to be legitimate is updated, and the detection target device holding the same target device identifier as the verification device identifier holds the updated verification value. Therefore, the state that the device determined to be normal and the device that holds the verification device identifier and the verification value before the update exist at the same time is detected as an illegal state. be able to.
- the device information update method of the present invention is a device information update method used in a content playback device that plays back content, wherein the content playback device includes a device identifier and an improper device manufactured by imitation. Detected by an unauthorized device detection device that detects Storage means for associating and storing a verification value, and the device information update method includes a notification step of notifying the device identifier and the verification value to the unauthorized device detection device, and a response to the notification.
- the computer program of the present invention is a computer program used in a content playback device that plays back content, and the content playback device detects a device identifier and an unauthorized device manufactured by imitation.
- the acquisition step of acquiring from the portable medium the device identifier and the verification value generated by the unauthorized device detection device written to the portable medium by the unauthorized device detection device
- an update step for storing the acquired verification value and the device identifier in association with each other is included.
- the recording medium of the present invention is a computer-readable recording medium on which the computer program is recorded.
- the integrated circuit of the present invention is an integrated circuit used in a content reproduction device that reproduces content, and includes a device identifier and a verification value generated by an unauthorized device detection device that detects an unauthorized device manufactured by imitation. Are stored in association with each other, a notification means for notifying the device identifier and the verification value to the unauthorized device detection device, and portable as a response to the notification by the unauthorized device detection device.
- the device identifier written in the medium and the verification value generated by the unauthorized device detection device are acquired from the portable medium and stored in the storage device.
- the update means stores the acquired verification value in association with the device identifier instead of the verification value stored in the storage means.
- FIG. 1 is a diagram showing a configuration of a clone terminal discovery system in an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 2 is a diagram showing a data structure of a first portable medium in the embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 3 is a diagram showing a data structure of a second portable medium in the embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a management server in the embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 5 is a diagram showing a data structure recorded in a recording unit of the management server in the embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 6 is a flowchart showing an example of the operation of the management server in the embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 7 is a block diagram showing a configuration of an information collection server in the embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 8 is a flowchart showing the operation of the information collection server in the embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 9 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a user terminal in the embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 10 is a diagram showing a data structure of a recording unit of the user terminal in the embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 11 is a flowchart showing operations at the time of initial setting and updating when a second portable medium of a user terminal is inserted in the embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 12 is a flowchart showing content reproduction processing of the user terminal in the embodiment of the present invention. It is a chart.
- Second portable media insertion processing section 342 Title information acquisition unit
- a user terminal such as a DVD player, which is properly manufactured by a manufacturer, is illegally duplicated by an unauthorized manufacturer or the like and put on the market. If this happens, the illegally copied terminal (hereinafter referred to as the clone terminal) is discovered.
- a clone terminal discovery system 1 includes a management server 2, an information collection server 3, a first portable medium 4, and m (m is a natural number). It consists of second portable media 5a-5m, n (n is a natural number) user terminals 6a-6n, and communication path 7.
- the first portable medium 4 is an optical disc (for example, DVD-ROM) on which moving image content encrypted using a title key is recorded, and is sold at a retail store.
- optical disc for example, DVD-ROM
- the second portable media 5a to 5m are portable media (for example, SD cards) on which data can be rewritten, and the encrypted video content recorded on the first portable media 4 is restored.
- This key is used to exchange data between the user terminals 6a to 6n and the information collection server 3, which holds the key required for the issue and the terminal information related to the user terminal necessary for the discovery of the clone terminal.
- Each of the user terminals 6a to 6n is a playback device (for example, a DVD player) that decodes and plays back the moving image content recorded in the first portable medium 4, and is unique to each pre-assigned terminal. An individual key is held, and the title key of the encrypted video content is generated using the information recorded on any of the second portable media 5a to 5m and the individual key, Decode and play video content.
- a playback device for example, a DVD player
- the information collection server 3 is a computer device installed in a retail store that sells the first portable medium 4, and can read and write data recorded in the second portable media 5a to 5m.
- the terminal information recorded in the second portable medium is read from the inserted second portable medium, and the terminal information is stored in the network. Is transmitted to the management server 2 connected via the communication path 7, and information is received from the management server 2 as a response, and the received information is inserted and written to the second portable medium.
- the management server 2 is a computer device that discovers clone terminals, receives terminal information related to any of the user terminals 6a to 6n from the information collection server 3 via the communication path 7, and receives the received terminal information. It is determined whether the user terminal related to the information is a clone terminal power. If it is determined that the terminal is not a clone terminal, the encrypted title key obtained by encrypting the title key of the video content and the terminal information held by the user terminal related to the terminal information are updated. Update information is generated and sent to the information collection server 3.
- the clone terminal is a copy of a regular user terminal and holds the same individual key as the copy source user terminal holds. The determination of whether or not the terminal is a clone terminal will be described in detail later.
- the user first has a user who owns the second portable medium 5a owned by the user. Insert into terminal 6a.
- the user terminal 6a writes terminal information such as a user terminal identifier of the user terminal 6a in the second portable medium 5a.
- the user brings the second portable medium 5a to the retail store, and inserts the second portable medium 5a into the information collection server 3 installed in the retail store.
- the information collection server 3 reads the terminal information from the second portable medium 5a and transmits it to the management server 2.
- the management server 2 it is determined whether the user terminal related to the terminal information is a clone terminal based on the terminal information. If the terminal is not a clone terminal, it is recorded in the first portable medium 4.
- the encrypted title key is generated by encrypting the title key used for the encryption of the video content with the individual key of the user terminal corresponding to the terminal information, and the user terminal 6a Update information for updating the stored terminal information is generated, and the encrypted title key and the update information are transmitted to the information collection server 3.
- the information collection server 3 writes the encrypted title key and the update information to the second portable medium 5a.
- the user possesses the second portable medium 5a and the purchased first portable medium 4. Return home and insert the first portable medium 4 and the second portable medium 5a into the user terminal 6a.
- the user terminal 6a decrypts the encrypted title key to generate a title key, decrypts and plays the encrypted video content recorded in the first portable medium 4, and updates information. Based on, update the held terminal information.
- the first portable medium 4 is a DVD-ROM, in which a title identifier and encrypted content obtained by encrypting the content identified by the title identifier are recorded.
- the title identifier is an identifier that can uniquely identify the content stored in the first portable medium 4, such as the title of the content movie or song, the serial number (1, 2, 3,).
- the contents are encoded in a format such as the MPEG2 (Moving Picture Expert Group) format that can be decoded and reproduced and externally output by the user terminals 6a to 6n.
- MPEG2 Motion Picture Expert Group
- the first portable medium 4 includes a title identifier 401 "TLID1" as shown in FIG.
- the encrypted content 402 “ENCCNT1” is retained.
- ENCCNT1 is obtained by encrypting the content “CNT1” with the title key “TLK1” corresponding to the title identifier “TLID1”, and represents Enc (TLK1, CNT1).
- the description of Enc ( ⁇ , ⁇ ) indicates the ciphertext when plaintext ⁇ is encrypted with encryption key ⁇ .
- encryption and decryption processing are performed by a secret key encryption method, and block encryption AES is used as an example in the present embodiment. Since AES is publicly known, its description is omitted.
- the second portable medium 5a is an SD card and holds a user terminal table.
- the user terminal table includes one or more pieces of user terminal information.
- the user terminal information includes a user terminal identifier, a first user terminal random number, a second user terminal random number, and a tight terminal. And a cipher key title key.
- the user terminal identifier is an identifier for uniquely identifying each of the user terminals 6a to 6n.
- the first user terminal random number is a random number held by the user terminal when the second portable medium 5a is last inserted into the user terminal identified by the user terminal identifier. Written by the user terminal.
- the second user terminal random number is a random number generated by the management server 2 in order to update the first user terminal random number held by the user terminal, and the information collected by receiving the random number from the management server 2 Written by server 3.
- the title identifier is an identifier that uniquely identifies the content recorded on the first portable medium 4 and is written by the information collection server 3.
- the cipher title key is obtained by encrypting a title key corresponding to the title identifier using an individual key held by a user terminal identified by the user terminal identifier.
- the first user terminal random number, the second user terminal random number, the individual key, and the title key are assumed to be natural numbers of 128 bits as an example.
- the first user terminal random number value S is "0"
- the first user terminal holds the first power This means that it is not necessary to update the user terminal random number. If the value of the encryption key is “0”, it means that the encryption key is invalid or recorded. .
- the second portable medium 5a includes a user terminal identifier 511 ⁇ TM IDa '', a first user terminal random number 512 ⁇ TMRNDla '', a second user terminal random number ⁇ TMRND2 '' as shown in FIG. It holds a user terminal table 501 including user terminal information 531 consisting of “a”, a title key “TLID1”, and a cipher key title key “Enc (IKa, TLK1)”.
- the management server 2 includes a transmission / reception unit 21, a display unit 22, a recording unit 23, and a control unit 24.
- the management server 2 is a computer system composed of a microprocessor, ROM, RAM, hard disk unit, display unit, keyboard, mouse, modem, and the like.
- a computer program is stored in the RAM or the hard disk unit.
- Microprocessor power The management server 2 achieves its functions by operating according to the computer program.
- the transmission / reception unit 21 is a modem or the like, and communicates data with the information collection server 3 via the communication path 7 using a communication protocol such as TCP / IP.
- the display unit 22 is a display device such as a liquid crystal display, and receives a display instruction from the control unit 24 and performs screen display based on the display instruction.
- the recording unit 23 holds a terminal management table 251 and a title management table 252, as shown in FIG.
- the terminal management table 251 includes a plurality of terminal management information, and each terminal management information includes a user terminal identifier, a first management server random number, a second management server random number, and an individual key. .
- the user terminal identifier is an identifier for identifying the user terminals 6a to 6n.
- the value of the user terminal identifier for identifying the user terminal 6x (x indicates any one of a to n) is denoted as TMIDx.
- the second management server random number is a random number generated by the terminal information generation unit 243 described later in order to update the terminal random number held by the user terminal, and the first management server random number is the terminal information This is a random number generated by the generation unit 243 one time before.
- the first management server random number and the second management server random number are 128-bit natural numbers.
- the second user terminal random number is “0”, this indicates that the second user terminal random number is invalid. .
- the individual key is a unique device key assigned to each user terminal.
- the user terminal 6a is assigned an individual key IKa
- the user terminal 6b is assigned an individual key 1Kb.
- the individual key IKn is assigned to the user terminal 6n.
- the terminal management table 251 includes a user terminal identifier 262 that is a value TMIDa indicating the user terminal 6a, a first management server random number 263 “CRNDla”, a second management server random number 264, as shown in FIG. It includes terminal management information 261 consisting of “CRND2a” and individual key 265 “IKa”.
- terminal management information corresponding to a new user terminal is added to the terminal management table 251.
- the title management table 252 includes a plurality of title management information cards, and each title management information includes a title identifier and a title key.
- the title identifier is an identifier for identifying content
- the title key is a key for encrypting and decrypting the content identified by the title identifier.
- the title management table 252 includes a title identifier 272 “TLID1” and a title key 273 “TLK1” that is the title key of the content identified by TLID1, as shown in FIG.
- the title identification information 271 is included.
- title management information corresponding to the new content is added to the title management table 252.
- the control unit 24 includes a reception processing unit 241, a terminal information confirmation unit 242, a terminal information generation unit 243, a title key encryption unit 244, a transmission data generation unit 245, A transmission processing unit 246.
- the control unit 24 is a dedicated microcomputer having each function unit, and each function unit is realized by a program masked by the microcomputer. Each functional unit may be an independent microcomputer.
- the reception processing unit 241 receives the user terminal identifier, the first user terminal random number, and the title identifier from the information collection server 3 via the transmission / reception unit 21. Then, the received user terminal identifier and first user terminal random number are output to terminal information confirmation unit 242, and the user terminal identifier and title identifier are output to title key encryption unit 244.
- the terminal information confirmation unit 242 acquires the user terminal identifier and the first user terminal random number from the reception processing unit 241. Then, the first management server random number corresponding to the received user terminal identifier is acquired from the recording unit 23, and if the second management server random number corresponding to the user terminal identifier is recorded, the second management server random number is recorded. Get server random number.
- the user terminal identifier is output to the terminal information generation unit 243, and the encryption key title key generation request is output to the title key encryption unit 244.
- the terminal information generation unit 243 obtains a user terminal identifier from the terminal information confirmation unit 242 and first generates a random number, and the random number is stored in the recording unit 23 and corresponds to the user terminal identifier 2 Overwrites the management server random number and outputs the same random number to the transmission data generation unit 245 as the second user terminal random number.
- terminal information generation section 243 generates a random number different from at least the previously generated random number. Also, since a method for generating a random number is publicly known, a description thereof will be omitted.
- the title key encryption unit 244 obtains a user terminal identifier and a title identifier from the reception processing unit 241. Also, the encryption key title key generation request is acquired from the terminal information confirmation unit 242.
- an individual key corresponding to the user terminal identifier is acquired from the terminal management table 251 recorded in the recording unit 23, and a title key corresponding to the title identifier is acquired from the title management table 252.
- the title key encryption unit 244 encrypts the title key based on the acquired individual key to generate an encryption key title key, and the acquired title identifier and the generated encryption key.
- the title key is output to the transmission data generation unit 245.
- the transmission data generating unit 245 acquires the second user terminal random number from the terminal information generating unit 243. Also, a title identifier and a cipher key title key are acquired from the title key cipher key unit 244. Then, update instruction data including the acquired second user terminal random number, title identifier, and encryption key title key to be transmitted to the information collection server 3 is generated, and the update instruction data is transmitted to the transmission processing unit 246. Output to.
- the transmission processing unit 246 acquires the update instruction data from the transmission data generation unit 245 and transmits the update instruction data to the information collection server 3 via the transmission / reception unit 21.
- the information collection server 3 includes a transmission / reception unit 31, a second portable medium access unit 32, an external input unit 33, a control unit 34, and a display unit 35.
- the transmission / reception unit 31 is a modem or the like, and communicates data with the management server 2 via the communication path 7 using a communication protocol such as TCP / IP.
- the second portable medium access unit 32 is an SD card reader and is controlled when it is detected that a second portable medium is inserted into an SD card slot (not shown) provided in the information collection server 3. Send insert notification to part 34. Also, the data recorded on the inserted second portable medium is acquired, and the data is recorded on the inserted second portable medium.
- the display unit 35 is a display device such as a liquid crystal display, receives a display instruction from the control unit 34, and performs screen display based on the display instruction.
- the control unit 34 includes a second portable medium insertion processing unit 341, a title information acquisition unit 342, a transmission data generation unit 343, a transmission processing unit 344, a reception processing unit 345, and second portable medium data.
- the control unit 34 is a dedicated microcomputer having each function unit. Each functional unit is realized by a program masked by a microcomputer. Each functional unit may be an independent microcomputer.
- the second portable medium insertion processing unit 341 obtains the insertion notification from the second portable medium access unit 32, the user terminal identifier and the first user terminal recorded in the second portable medium.
- the random number is obtained through the second portable medium access unit 32.
- the acquired user terminal identifier and the first user terminal random number are output to transmission data generating section 343, and a title information request is output to title information acquiring section 342.
- the title information acquisition unit 342 receives a title information request from the second portable medium insertion processing unit 341
- the title information acquisition unit 342 transmits a message display instruction for prompting the input of the title identifier to the display unit 35, and displays the message.
- the title identifier input by the user using the external input unit 33 is acquired, and the acquired title identifier is output to the transmission data generation unit 343.
- the transmission data generation unit 343 acquires the user terminal identifier and the first user terminal random number from the second portable medium insertion processing unit 341, and acquires the title identifier from the title information acquisition unit 342.
- transmission data including the acquired user terminal identifier, the first user terminal random number, and the title identifier to be transmitted to the management server 2 is generated, and the generated transmission data is transmitted to the transmission processing unit 344. Output to.
- the reception processing unit 345 receives the update instruction data including the second user terminal random number, the title identifier, and the encrypted title key from the management server 2 via the transmission / reception unit 31, and receives the update instruction data
- the second user terminal random number, title identifier, and encryption key title key included in the data are output to the second portable medium data writing unit 346.
- Second portable medium data writing unit 346 receives the second user terminal random number, title identifier, and encryption key title key from reception processing unit 345, and receives the received second user terminal random number and title.
- the identifier and the encryption key title key are recorded on the second portable medium via the second portable medium access unit 32.
- the user terminal 6a includes a second portable medium access unit 61, a first portable medium access unit 62, an output unit 63, a recording unit 64, and a control unit 65.
- the second portable medium access unit 61 is an SD card reader, detects that a second portable medium has been inserted into a card slot (not shown) provided in the user terminal 6a, and notifies the insertion. Is notified to the control unit 65. It also reads data from the inserted second portable medium and writes data to the second portable medium.
- the first portable medium access unit 62 is a DVD drive, detects that the first portable medium has been inserted into a disk slot (not shown) of the user terminal 6a, and notifies the control unit 65 Notify The first portable medium access unit 62 reads data from the inserted first portable medium.
- the output unit 63 is a display adapter, and is connected to an external display such as a liquid crystal display or a plasma television, and displays data received from the control unit 65 on the external display.
- an external display such as a liquid crystal display or a plasma television
- the recording unit 64 holds a user terminal identifier, an individual key, a terminal holding random number, and a title information table.
- the user terminal identifier is an identifier for identifying the user terminal, and is written when the user terminal is shipped.
- the individual key is a key that is different for each user terminal, and is written when the user terminal is shipped.
- the terminal holding random number is a random number used for clone terminal detection by the management server 2, and the value “0” is written as an initial value when the user terminal is shipped.
- the title information table is composed of one or more title information modules, and the title information includes a title identifier and a title key.
- the title identifier is an identifier for identifying content
- the title key is a key used for encryption and decryption of the content identified by the title identifier.
- title information When title information is newly acquired, the title information can be added to the title information table.
- the recording unit 64 includes a user terminal identifier 671 “TMIDa”, an individual key 672 “IKa”, a terminal holding random number 673 “CRNDla”, and a title information table 681.
- the title information table 681 has a title identifier 6 whose value is TLID1.
- title information 682 including a title key 684 that is a key “TLK1” for encrypting and decrypting the content identified by TLID1.
- the control unit 65 includes a second portable medium insertion processing unit 651, a terminal information writing unit 652, an encryption title key decrypting unit 653, a terminal information updating unit 654, and a first portable medium.
- An insertion processing unit 655 and a descrambling processing unit 656 are included.
- the control unit 65 is a dedicated microcomputer having functional units. Each functional part
- Each functional unit may be an independent microcomputer.
- second portable medium insertion processing unit 651 acquires user terminal identifier 671 “TMIDa” recorded in recording unit 64. Next, it is confirmed whether or not the user terminal identifier of “value TMIDa” is recorded in the second portable medium via the second portable medium access unit 61! If the user terminal identifier having the value “TMIDa” is recorded on the medium, the user terminal identifier 671 is output to the terminal information writing unit 652, and the process is terminated.
- the second portable medium corresponds to the second terminal corresponding to the user terminal identifier "TMIDa”.
- 2User terminal Check whether the random number, title identifier, and encryption key title key are recorded.
- the read second user terminal random number is used as the terminal information update unit 65. 4 and overwriting the first user terminal random number recorded in the second portable medium with the value of the second user terminal random number via the second portable medium access unit 61, Second user Erase the terminal random number.
- the title identifier and encryption key key corresponding to the user terminal identifier "TMIDa" are recorded on the second portable medium, the title identifier and the encryption key key are stored in the second identifier.
- the second portable medium force is also read out via the portable medium access unit 61, and the read title identifier and the encrypted key title key are output to the encrypted key title key decrypting unit 653, and also to the second portable medium. Deletes the recorded title identifier and encryption key title key.
- the encrypted title key decryption unit 653 acquires the title identifier and the encrypted key title key from the second portable medium insertion processing unit 651, and acquires the individual key IKa from the recording unit 64.
- a title key is obtained by decrypting the encrypted title key based on the individual key IKa, and the title identifier and the title key are added to the title information table 681 of the recording unit 64.
- the terminal information update unit 654 acquires the second user terminal random number from the second portable medium insertion processing unit 651, and acquires the value of the terminal holding random number recorded in the recording unit 64 in the second usage Change to a random number value.
- the first portable medium insertion processing unit 655 obtains the insertion notification from the first portable medium access unit 62, and the title recorded in the first portable medium 4 through the first portable medium access unit 62. Get an identifier.
- the descrambling processing unit 656 obtains the title key from the first portable medium insertion processing unit 655, and sequentially stores the encrypted content recorded in the first portable medium 4 via the first portable medium access unit 62. Acquired, sequentially scrambles the encrypted content based on the title key, and sequentially outputs it to the outside via the output unit 63.
- TMIDb to TMIDn are held as user terminal identifiers, and I is used as an individual key. The only difference is that they hold and hold Kb to IKn, and the explanation is omitted.
- the initial setting and updating operation is performed when the user who plays the content inserts the second portable medium 5a owned by the user into the user terminal 6a owned by the user.
- the user brings the second portable medium 5a to the retail store, purchases the first portable medium 4 on which the content is recorded, This is the operation when the second portable medium 5a is inserted into the information collection server 3 installed in (3)
- the operation during content playback is when the user purchases the first portable medium 4 and returns home.
- the operation is performed when the first portable medium 4 and the second portable medium 5a are inserted into the user terminal 6a in order to evaluate the content.
- the value TMIDa is written as the individual key 672
- the value IKa is written as the individual key 672
- the CRNDla is written as the first user terminal random number 673
- the user terminal table 501 of the second portable medium 5a is shown in FIG. It is assumed that no data is written as shown in (a).
- the user inserts the second portable medium 5a into the card slot of the user terminal 6a.
- the second portable medium access unit 61 detects the insertion and transmits an insertion notification to the second portable medium insertion processing unit 651 (step S601).
- the second portable medium insertion processing unit 651 Upon receiving the insertion notification, the second portable medium insertion processing unit 651 reads the user terminal identifier 671 “TMIDa” from the recording unit 64. (Step S602)
- the second portable medium insertion processing unit 651 searches the data in the second portable medium 5a via the second portable medium access unit 61, and the user terminal identifier equivalent to “TMIDa” is recorded. ing Whether or not (step S603).
- step S603 If a user terminal identifier having a value of TMIDa is recorded in the second portable medium 5a (step S603: NO), the second portable medium insertion processing unit 651 reads the terminal information document. The user terminal identifier TMIDa is output to the insertion unit 652, and the terminal information writing unit 652 acquires the user terminal identifier TMIDa from the second portable medium insertion processing unit 651.
- the terminal information writing unit 652 sends the first user terminal random number 673 “TMRN” from the recording unit 64.
- step S604 the user terminal identifier 671 and the first user terminal random number 673 are recorded in the user terminal table 501 of the second portable medium 5a via the second portable medium access unit 61, and the process is performed.
- the process ends (step S604).
- the user terminal table 501 recorded in the second portable medium 5a is in the state shown in FIG. 3 (b).
- step S603 when a user terminal identifier having a value of TMIDa is recorded in the second portable medium 5a (step S603: Yes), the second portable medium insertion processing unit 651 stores in the second portable medium 5a. Then, it is determined whether or not the second user terminal random number corresponding to the user terminal identifier “TMIDa” is recorded (step S605). If it is recorded (step S605: No), it will be described later. Proceed to step S607.
- step S605 When the second user terminal random number corresponding to the user terminal identifier “TMIDa” is recorded (step S605: ⁇ ), the user terminal table 501 recorded in the second portable medium 5a.
- the second portable medium insertion processing unit 651 outputs the second user terminal random number TMRND2a to the terminal information updating unit 654, and the second portable medium access unit 651 is in the state shown in FIG. 61, the first user terminal random number recorded in the second portable medium 5a is overwritten with the value of the second user terminal random number, and the second user terminal random number is deleted.
- Terminal information update unit 654 obtains second user terminal random number T MRND2a from second portable medium insertion processing unit 651, and uses the value of terminal holding random number 673 recorded in recording unit 64 as the second value. Overwrite with the value of the user terminal random number TMRND2a (step S606).
- the second portable medium insertion processing unit 651 sends the title identifier corresponding to the user terminal identifier TMIDa to the second portable medium 5a via the second portable medium access unit 61 and the encryption title. It is determined whether or not the key has been recorded (step S607). Step S607: V ⁇ , e) If the process is completed and recorded! (Step S607: Yes), the title identifier and the encryption key key are read and the read title identifier and The user terminal identifier recorded in the second portable medium 5a is transmitted to the cipher key title key decryption unit 653 via the second portable medium access unit 61. Delete the title identifier corresponding to TMIDa and the cipher key title key.
- the user terminal table 501 recorded in the second portable medium 5a is in the state shown in FIG. 3 (d).
- the encryption key title key decryption unit 653 acquires the title identifier and the encryption key title key from the second portable medium insertion processing unit 651, acquires the individual key 672 from the recording unit 64, and acquires the individual key. Based on the above, the encryption key title key is decrypted to obtain the title key.
- the title identifier is “TLID1”
- the encrypted title key is Enc (iKa, TLK1) in which the title key “TLK1” is encrypted by the individual key “IKa”.
- the encryption key title key decryption unit 653 obtains TLID1 and Enc (IKa, TLK1) from the second portable medium insertion processing unit 651, and uses the recording unit 64 power individual key 672 “IKa”. Obtaining and decrypting the encrypted title key Enc (IKa, TLK1) based on the individual key I Ka and obtaining the title key TLK1.
- the cipher key title key decryption unit 653 records the set of the acquired title identifier and its title key as title information in the recording unit 64, and additionally writes the title information table 681 (step S608). ), The process ends.
- the second portable medium 5a stores the user terminal identifier TMIDa, which is the terminal information of the user terminal 6a, and the first user terminal random number TMRNDla. Shall.
- ENCCNT1 ENC (TLK1, CNT1)
- the first portable medium 4 is purchased, and the user inserts the second portable medium 5a into the card slot provided in the information collection server 3.
- the second portable medium access unit 32 detects that the second portable medium 5a has been inserted into the card slot, and sends a notification of insertion to the second portable medium insertion processing unit 34.
- the second portable medium insertion processing unit 341 acquires the insertion notification, and the user terminal identifier TMIDa recorded in the second portable medium 5a and the first usage via the second portable medium access unit 32.
- the user terminal random number TMRNDla is acquired (step S302).
- the second portable medium insertion processing unit 341 outputs the acquired user terminal identifier TMIDa and the first user terminal random number TMRNDla to the transmission data generation unit 343, and sends a title information request to the title information acquisition unit 342. Output. (Step S303)
- the title information acquisition unit 342 receives the title information request from the second portable medium insertion processing unit 341, transmits a message display instruction to input the title identifier to the display unit 35, and the display unit 5 follows the display instruction. Display the message.
- the user is prompted by the message and inputs the value “TLID1” of the title identifier for identifying the purchased content via the external input unit 33.
- the title information acquisition unit 342 acquires the title identifier TLID1 from the external input unit 33 (step S304), and outputs the acquired title identifier to the transmission data generation unit 343 (step S305).
- the transmission data generation unit 343 acquires the user terminal identifier TMIDa and the first user terminal random number TMRNDla from the second portable medium insertion processing unit 341, and acquires the title identifier TLID1 from the title information acquisition unit 342. Then, transmission data including the acquired user terminal identifier TMIDa, first user terminal random number TMRNDla, and title identifier TLID1 is generated, and the transmission data is output to the transmission processing unit 344 (step S306).
- the transmission processing unit 344 acquires the transmission data from the transmission data generation unit 343, and transmits the acquired transmission data to the management server 2 via the transmission / reception unit 31 (step S307).
- the management server 2 receives the transmission data and performs a clone determination process described later using the transmission data (step S308).
- the management server 2 sends the terminal update data generated in the clone determination process to the information collection server 3
- the transmission / reception unit 31 in the information collection server 3 waits for reception of the terminal update data from the management server 2 via the communication path 7 (step S309: V, E). S309: Yes), the terminal update data is transmitted to the reception processing unit 345.
- the reception processing unit 345 outputs the second user terminal random number TM RND2a, the title identifier TLID1, and the cipher key title key ENCTLKl included in the received terminal update data to the second portable medium data writing unit 346 ( Step S310).
- the second portable medium data writing unit 346 receives the second user terminal random number TM RND2a, the title identifier TLID1, and the encrypted title key ENCTLKl from the reception processing unit 345, and receives the received second user terminal random number TMRND2a. And the title identifier TLID1 and the encryption title key E NCTLKl are recorded in the second portable medium 5a via the second portable medium access unit 32 (step S311).
- the transmission / reception unit 21 in the management server 2 receives the transmission data from the information collection server 3 and transmits the transmission data to the reception processing unit 241.
- the reception processing unit 241 receives the transmission data, outputs the user terminal identifier TMIDa and the first user terminal random number TMRNDla included in the transmission data to the terminal information confirmation unit 242, and receives the user terminal identifier TMIDa and the title
- the identifier TLID1 is output to the title key encryption unit 244 (step S201).
- the terminal information confirmation unit 242 acquires the user terminal identifier TMIDa and the first user terminal random number TMRNDla from the reception processing unit 241 (step S202), and stores them in the recording unit 23 to the user terminal identifier TMIDa. It is determined whether or not the corresponding second management server random number CRND2a has been recorded (step S203). If it has been recorded! If not (step S203: None), the process proceeds to step S207 to be described later. If there is (Step S203: Yes), the second management server random number CRND2a is acquired from the recording unit 23 (Step S204).
- the terminal information confirmation unit 242 determines the value of the first user terminal random number TMRNDla and the second management server. It is determined whether or not the values of the random number CRND2a match (Step S205). If they do not match (Step S205: No), go to Step S207, which will be described later, and if they match, The value of the second management server random number CRND2a is copied to the value of the first management server random number CRNDla corresponding to the user terminal identifier TMIDa, the second management server random number CRND2a is deleted, and the process proceeds to step S210 (step S206).
- Step S205 If the terminal information confirmation unit 242 does not determine that the value of the first user terminal random number TMRNDla matches the value of the second management server random number CRND2a! / (Step S205: does not match) ), The first management server random number CRNDla corresponding to the user terminal identifier TMIDa is acquired from the recording unit 23 (step S207).
- the terminal information confirmation unit 242 compares the value of the first user terminal random number TMRNDla with the value of the first management server random number CRNDla (step S208) and determines that they match (step S208: Yes). Proceeding to S210, if they do not match (step S208: No), it indicates that the user terminal corresponding to the user terminal identifier TMIDa is a clone, for example, “Clone found: user terminal identifier TMIDa Is displayed on the display unit 22 (step S209), and the process proceeds to step S210.
- Terminal information confirmation unit 242 outputs user terminal identifier TMIDa to terminal information generation unit 243, and outputs a cipher title key generation request to title key encryption unit 244 (step S210).
- the terminal information generation unit 243 acquires the user terminal identifier TMIDa from the terminal information confirmation unit 242 and generates a new random number.
- the generated random number is stored in the second management corresponding to the user terminal identifier TM IDa of the recording unit 23. Record as the server random number CRND2a.
- the random number is output to the transmission data generating unit 245 as the second user terminal random number TMRND2a (step S211).
- the title key encryption key unit 244 acquires the user terminal identifier TMIDa and the title identifier TLID1 from the reception processing unit 241 and acquires the cipher key title key generation request from the terminal information confirmation unit 242. From 23, the individual key IKa corresponding to the user terminal identifier TMIDa and the title ⁇ TLK1 corresponding to the title identifier TLID1 are acquired.
- TLK1 is output to transmission data generation section 245 (step S212).
- the data generation unit 245 obtains the second user terminal random number TMRND2a from the terminal information generation unit 243, and the title identifier TLID1 and the encryption key title key EN from the title key encryption unit 244.
- the transmission processing unit 246 obtains the terminal update data from the transmission data generation unit 245, transmits the terminal update data to the information collection server 3 via the transmission / reception unit 21, and ends the processing (step). S 214).
- the user purchases the first portable medium 4 at a retail store, returns home, and inserts the first portable medium 4 and the second portable medium 5a into the user terminal 6a in order to view the content.
- the user terminal 6a performs the update process shown in steps S605 to S608 in FIG.
- the first portable medium access unit 62 detects the insertion of the first portable medium 4 and sends the first notification of insertion. This is transmitted to the portable medium insertion processing unit 655, and the first portable medium insertion processing unit 655 receives the insertion notification (step S651).
- the first portable medium insertion processing unit 655 acquires the title identifier TLID1 recorded in the first portable medium 4 via the first portable medium access unit 62 (step S652).
- First portable medium insertion processing unit 655 determines whether title ⁇ TLK1 corresponding to title identifier TLID 1 is recorded in recording unit 64 (step S653). Step S653: No) If the process is completed and recorded (Step S653: Yes), the first portable medium 4 force The title key (TLID1) corresponding to the read title identifier (TLID1) TLK1) is read from the recording unit 64 (step S654) and the The ital key is output to the descramble processing unit 656 (step S655).
- the descrambling processing unit 656 acquires the title key (TLK1) from the first portable medium insertion processing unit 655, and then records it on the first portable medium 4 via the first portable medium access unit 62.
- the encrypted content ENVCNT1 is sequentially descrambled by using the title ⁇ TLK 1 and then read out, and sequentially output to the external display via the output unit 63.
- one of the user terminals (here, 6a) is internally analyzed, and the user terminal identifier TMIDa, the individual key I Ka, and the first usage are used as the terminal information of the user terminal 6a.
- TMIDa the user terminal identifier
- I Ka the individual key I Ka
- TMRNDla the user terminal random number
- the user terminal 6a and the clone terminal 6y hold the same terminal information (user terminal identifier TMI Da, individual key IKa, and first user terminal random number TMRNDla).
- user a the user of user terminal 6a
- user y the user of clone terminal 6y
- user a and user y are different from each other.
- second portable medium 5a and the second portable medium 5y are held.
- the second portable medium 5a held by the user a is inserted into the information collection server 3 installed in the retail store.
- the management server 2 writes a new random number for the user terminal with the user terminal identifier TMIDa as the second user terminal random number in addition to the encrypted title key in the second portable medium 5a.
- User a inserts the second portable medium 5a into the user terminal 6a, and the value of the first user terminal random number held by the user terminal 6a is recorded in the second portable medium 5a. Update to the value of the second user terminal random number.
- the second portable medium 5a is similarly inserted into the information collecting server 3 installed in the retail store.
- a new random number value is set as the first user terminal random number in the second portable medium 5a.
- the management server 2 that has received the new random number via the information collection server 3 recognizes that the first user terminal random number of the user terminal 6a corresponding to the user terminal identifier TMIDa has been updated.
- the user y similarly inserts the second portable medium 5y into the information collection server 3 installed in the retail store.
- the user terminal identifier TMIDa and the old first user terminal random number when the terminal information is leaked are written.
- the management server 2 recognizes that the user terminal 6x corresponding to the user terminal identifier TMIDa holds the old first user terminal random number.
- the management server 2 recognizes that the first user terminal random number of the user terminal 6a corresponding to the user terminal identifier TMIDa has been updated to a new random number.
- one of the user terminals (also referred to as user terminal 6a here) is internally analyzed, and terminal information related to user terminal 6a (user terminal identifier TMIDa and individual key) And IKa 1st user terminal random number (TMRNDla)
- TMIDa user terminal identifier
- TMIDz user terminal identifier
- TMIDz false value
- the management server 2 encrypts the title key of the purchased encrypted content with the individual key corresponding to the received user terminal identifier. To offer.
- the management server 2 every time the second portable medium is inserted into the information collection server and the management server 2 acquires information from the information collection server, the management server 2 generates a new random number.
- the power of recording the second random number of the user terminal on the second portable medium and updating the random number of the user terminal every time is not limited to this.
- the random number may be updated only once in a certain period (for example, one month).
- the random number may be updated only when a random number update request signal is received from the outside.
- the random number may be updated every time the content is purchased a certain number of times (for example, 10 times). This can be realized by not generating a new random number and not recording the second user terminal random number on the second portable medium when the random number is not updated.
- step S208 After determining that the management server 2 does not match in step S205, it is determined in step S208 that the value of the first user terminal random number TMRNDla and the value of the first management server random number CRNDla match. If it is determined that it is not a clone terminal However, this is because the user terminal 6a may take time until the terminal internal random number of the user terminal 6a is updated.
- random numbers are used for terminal information, but it is not possible to estimate by a third party user who does not hold the corresponding terminal, and the management server 2 can grasp the value. It does not have to be a random number.
- the serial number may be counted up from 0.
- it may be information relating to the time when the management server 2 receives data from the information collection server 3.
- information on the time when the second portable medium is inserted into the information collecting server 3 may be used.
- the total number of times the second portable medium has been inserted into the information collection server 3 may be used.
- it may be information on the history of content titles that have been output to the outside at the corresponding user terminal. It may also be a hash value of those values.
- random numbers are used for the terminal information, but it cannot be estimated by a third party user who does not hold the corresponding terminal, and each user terminal is automatically updated. If it is, it may not be a random number. For example, it may be time information when the second portable medium was last inserted into the user terminal. The total number of times the second portable medium is inserted into the user terminal may be used. In this case, the management server 2 does not need to update the terminal information. As a result, the trouble of the management server 2 can be reduced.
- each user holds one second portable medium one by one has been described as an example, but the present invention is not limited to this.
- one user may hold two or more second portable media.
- the same user terminal identifier may be held by a plurality of second portable media, and the management sano 2 may receive the same user terminal identifier via a plurality of second portable media.
- the management server 2 may write the second user terminal random number corresponding to the user terminal identifier only to one second portable medium, or to one user terminal identifier. The same corresponding second user terminal random number may be written to a plurality of second portable media.
- the second use If the user loses the second portable medium in which the user terminal random number is written, the user terminal random number cannot be updated.
- the random number of the user terminal can be updated using another second portable medium.
- a random number update completion flag may be added as terminal information recorded on the second portable medium. The random number update completion flag is displayed when the second user terminal random number value recorded in the second portable medium has been updated to the first user terminal random number value of the corresponding user terminal. 2 This flag is written to the portable medium.
- the same second user terminal random number corresponding to one user terminal identifier is written to a plurality of second portable media, and the plurality of second portable terminals are written. Even if the terminal information is provided to the management server 2 via the medium, it can be recognized that the random update of the user terminal is completed only when the random number update completion flag is recorded.
- the second portable medium is a portable medium such as an SD card.
- the present invention is not limited to this.
- an IC card capable of arithmetic processing may be used.
- the second portable medium may authenticate the user terminal by cryptographic processing or the like and then provide the terminal information and the title key information. As a result, a safer system can be constructed.
- the random number update completion flag of modification (4) may be added in the IC card. As a result, an unauthorized user terminal can eliminate fraud such as not setting a random number update completion flag on the second portable medium! /.
- the first portable medium 4 is not limited to a DVD-ROM, and may be a medium such as a BD or a CD-R that can store contents.
- the second portable medium is not limited to the SD card, but any portable medium that can rewrite data.
- the management server 2 provides the title key information in response to the collection of terminal information via the second portable medium, but the present invention is not limited to this.
- the management sano 2 only collects terminal information via the second portable medium and does not need to provide any information.
- the management server 2 provides the user terminal with a license that is valid for a fixed period (for example, one month) in return for collecting terminal information via the second portable medium, and obtains the license at regular intervals. If you do not have a mechanism that makes the user terminal unavailable May be.
- the target for finding a clone is a user terminal that outputs content, but the present technology is not limited to this.
- a second portable medium eg SD force
- train commuter passes, coupon tickets, boarding tickets, IC cards, credit cards, cash cards, debit cards, electronic money, electronic tickets, electronic passports (electronic passports), entrance / exit management cards, driver's licenses, basics for residents It may be a ledger card, mobile phone, PDA, ST B (set top box), electronic book, computer, IC tag, computer software, online game license, etc.
- a random number is stored in the target for the clone.
- the encryption method has been described using the secret key encryption method AES, but is not limited to this.
- another secret key encryption method for example, DES
- public key encryption for example, RSA method
- another encryption method may be used! / ⁇ .
- the management server 2 when the management server 2 receives two different types of first user terminal random numbers corresponding to the same user terminal identifier, the user corresponding to the user terminal identifier
- the power that the terminal determined to be a clone is not limited to this. For example, if a different first user terminal random number exceeding a certain threshold (for example, 3) corresponding to the same user terminal identifier is received, the user terminal corresponding to the user terminal identifier is a clone. You may judge. This can reduce the probability of false detection of clones. This can also be applied to a system in which multiple user terminals share the same user terminal identifier.
- a certain threshold for example, 3
- the user terminal identifier is common for each model.
- the threshold is set to be equal to or greater than the number of user terminals having the same user terminal identifier. In this way, clones can be detected even in a system where multiple user terminals share the same user terminal identifier.
- the management server 2 and the information collection server 3 are each equipped with a modem or the like, and are not limited to this.
- the transmission / reception unit 21 of the management server 2 and the transmission / reception unit 31 of the information collection server 3 are LAN adapters and have communication channels. 7 may be the Internet.
- the present embodiment has been described with the example using the second portable media 5a to 5m which are the 13 second portable media, the present invention is not limited to this. For example, it may be 12 or less, or 14 or more. Moreover, although the example using the user terminals 6a to 6n, which are 14 user terminals, has been described, the present invention is not limited to this. For example, it may be 15 or more, or 13 or less. Further, the number of information collecting servers 3 may be any number as long as it is one or more. Further, the number of the first portable media 4 may be any number as long as it is one or more. Any number of title identifiers and title keys can be used as long as they are one or more.
- the management server 2 When the management server 2 is installed in the retail store, the management server 2 and the SD card reader / writer device as the second portable medium are not used without using the information collection server 3. It may be used. In this case, the management server 2 may acquire the title identifier acquired by the information collection server 3 by user input in the embodiment.
- the power described in the case of selling content at a retail store is used as an example.
- the present invention is not limited to this. .
- IC integrated circuit
- system LSI system LSI
- super LSI monolithic LSI
- the method of circuit integration is not limited to LSI, and may be realized by a dedicated circuit or a general-purpose processor. It is also possible to use a field programmable gate array (FPGA) that can be programmed after LSI manufacturing, or a reconfigurable processor that can reconfigure the connection and settings of circuit cells inside the LSI.
- FPGA field programmable gate array
- the present invention may be the method described above. Further, the present invention may be a computer program that realizes these methods by a computer, or may be a digital signal that also has the computer program power. The present invention also provides a computer-readable recording medium for the computer program or the digital signal, such as a flexible disk, hard disk, CD-ROM, MO, DVD, DVD-ROM, DVD-RAM, BD (Blu-ray Disc), recorded on a semiconductor memory, or the like. Further, the present invention may be the computer program or the digital signal recorded on these recording media.
- the computer program or the digital signal may be transmitted via an electric communication line, a wireless or wired communication line, a network typified by the Internet, or the like.
- the present invention may also be a computer system including a microprocessor and a memory, the memory storing the above-described computer program, and the microprocessor operating according to the computer program. . Further, by recording and transferring the program or the digital signal on the recording medium, or transferring the program or the digital signal via the network or the like, another independent computer system It may be carried out by.
- the unauthorized device detection device, content playback device, information collection device, program, recording medium, and integrated circuit of the present invention are used in a content management system that requires copyright protection. Manufacture, sales, etc. are performed by contractors handling digital home appliances and computer equipment such as a management server for playback devices.
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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US10/589,288 US7617536B2 (en) | 2004-12-13 | 2005-12-12 | Unauthorized device detection device, unauthorized device detection system, unauthorized device detection method, program, recording medium, and device information update method |
JP2006548829A JP4857123B2 (ja) | 2004-12-13 | 2005-12-12 | 不正機器検出装置、不正機器検出システム、不正機器検出方法、プログラム、記録媒体及び機器情報更新方法 |
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JP2004360437 | 2004-12-13 | ||
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JP2004360436 | 2004-12-13 |
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PCT/JP2005/022788 WO2006064768A1 (ja) | 2004-12-13 | 2005-12-12 | 不正機器検出装置、不正機器検出システム、不正機器検出方法、プログラム、記録媒体及び機器情報更新方法 |
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PCT/JP2005/022779 WO2006064765A1 (ja) | 2004-12-13 | 2005-12-12 | 不正機器検出装置及び不正機器検出システム |
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
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JPWO2006064768A1 (ja) | 2008-06-12 |
JP4857123B2 (ja) | 2012-01-18 |
JP4827034B2 (ja) | 2011-11-30 |
WO2006064765A1 (ja) | 2006-06-22 |
US20070283162A1 (en) | 2007-12-06 |
JPWO2006064765A1 (ja) | 2008-06-12 |
US20080016001A1 (en) | 2008-01-17 |
US7617536B2 (en) | 2009-11-10 |
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