WO2007067474A1 - Key distribution for secure messaging - Google Patents
Key distribution for secure messaging Download PDFInfo
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- WO2007067474A1 WO2007067474A1 PCT/US2006/046205 US2006046205W WO2007067474A1 WO 2007067474 A1 WO2007067474 A1 WO 2007067474A1 US 2006046205 W US2006046205 W US 2006046205W WO 2007067474 A1 WO2007067474 A1 WO 2007067474A1
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- Prior art keywords
- domain
- key
- message
- secured message
- communications gateway
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/36—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes
- G06Q20/367—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes
- G06Q20/3674—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes involving authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0822—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using key encryption key
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/60—Digital content management, e.g. content distribution
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
Definitions
- the present description relates to key distribution for secure messaging.
- a transmitting end point for implementing network communication may utilize a retrieved public key that is associated with an intended recipient, the recipient's network device, a gateway with which the intended recipient is associated, or a domain with which with the intended recipient is associated to secure an outbound message.
- a retrieved public key that is associated with a source, the source's network device, a gateway with which the source is associated, or a domain with which with the source is associated may be utilized to authenticate and validate the secured message.
- FIG. 1 shows network communication nodes, with the nodes implementing example technologies pertaining to key distribution.
- FIG. 2 shows an example configuration of communications agents and corresponding communications gateways comm unicating over a network, implementing example technologies pertaining to key distribution.
- FIG. 3 shows an example configuration of a communications gateway, further to the example of FIG. 2.
- FIG. 4 shows an example processing flow according to at least one implementation of key distribution.
- the description pertaining to key distribution may relate to systems, methodologies, techniques, processes, instructions, routines, and tools that may be utilized to secure messaging from one end point for implementing network communication to at least one other such end poi nt.
- Domain as referenced herein, may refer to, but not be limited to, one or more organizational logical collections of network end points that are capable of implementing network communication that may share a common naming suffix; such devices including, but not limited to, servers, client devices, or other device or various combinations thereof. [An organization may have multiple domains.]
- Gateway may refer to, but is not limited to, one or more devices that facilitate interaction between two or more domains, networks, or sub-networks.
- a gateway may function as either an entry point or an exit point for a respective domain or network.
- Transport protocol conversion may not be required, but some form of processing is typically performed.
- FIG. 1 shows example network environment 1 00 in which example technologies for key distribution 1 05 may be implemented over network 1 10.
- server devices 1 1 5 and 1 20, client device 1 25, handheld client device 1 30, and "other" device 1 35 may be end points for implementing network communication that are coupled to one another via network 1 1 0; and, further, at least one of server devices 1 1 5 and 1 20, client device 1 25, handheld client device 1 30, and "other" device 1 35 may be end points for implementing network communication that are capable of implementing the aforementioned technologies.
- Server devices 1 1 5 and 120 may represent devices, or end points for implementing network communication, that serve as domain gateways or are otherwise capable of transmitting and receiving messages ⁇ i.e., electronic packages) or any other of a variety of data and/or functionality to other devices in network environment 1 00.
- Implementations of key distribution 1 05 may be applicable to an exchange of electronic packages between server devices 1 1 5 and 1 20 in the clear (i.e., without any security measures implemented thereon); although alternative implementations may be applicable even if data to be exchanged is restricted to certain users or only if an appropriate subscription or licensing fee is paid.
- Server devices 1 1 5 and 1 20 may be at least one of a gateway, mail transport agent (MTA), domain server, network server, application server, blade server, or any combination thereof.
- MTA mail transport agent
- server devices 1 1 5 and 120 may represent devices that may be a content source, and client devices 1 25 and 1 30 may represent any device that may receive such content either via network 1 1 0 or in an off-line manner.
- server devices 1 1 5 and 120 and client devices 1 25 and 1 30 may interchangeably be sending nodes or receiving nodes in network environment 1 00. More particularly, relative to each other, server devices 1 1 5 and 120 may interchangeably be a sending node and a receiving node.
- "Other" device 135 may also be embodied by any of the above examples of server devices 1 1 5 and 1 20.
- Client device 125 may represent at least one of a variety of known computing devices, or end points for implementing network communication, including a laptop computer, desktop personal computer (PC), workstation, mainframe computer, Internet appliance, media center, or set-top box that may be associated with network 1 10 by either a wired or wireless link, and is able to implement example technologies associated with key distribution 105. Further, client device 1 25 may represent the client devices described above in various quantities and/or combinations thereof. "Other" device 1 35 may also be embodied by any of the above examples of client device 125.
- Handheld client device 130 may represent at least one device that is capable of being associated with network 1 10 by a wireless link, including a mobile (f.e., cellular) telephone, personal digital assistant (PDA), music player, video player, etc., and is able to implement example technologies associated with key distribution 1 05. Further, handheld device 1 30 may represent the handheld devices described above in various quantities and/or combinations thereof. "Other" device 1 35 may also be embodied by any of the above examples of handheld client device 130.
- "Other” device 1 35 may represent any further device or end point for implementing network communication that is capable of implementing technologies associated with key distribution 105 according to one or more of the example implementations described herein. That is, "other" device 1 35 may represent any computing device that is capable of at least storing and sharing security information for any other of the devices associated with network 1 10, and sending or receiving electronic packages ⁇ e.g., e-mail) to any other devices associated with network 1 10. Thus, "other" device 1 35 may be a hardware device or a computing device having at least one of an operating system, an interpreter, converter, compiler, or runtime execution environment implemented thereon. These examples are not intended to be limiting in any way, and therefore should not be construed in that manner.
- Network 1 1 0 may represent any of a variety of conventional network topologies and types, which may include wired and/or wireless networks. Network 1 1 0 may further utilize any of a variety of conventional network protocols, including public and/or proprietary protocols. Network 1 1 0 may include, for example, the Internet as well at least portions of one or more local area networks (also referred to, individually, as a "LAN"), such as an 802.1 1 system or, on a larger scale, a wide area network ⁇ i.e.,
- WAN wide area network
- PAN personal area network
- FIG. 2 shows example network environment 200 in which communication agents and corresponding communications gateways communicate over network 1 1 0, implementing example technologies pertaining to key distribution 1 05 (see FIG. 1 ).
- Comm unications gateway A 205 may represent a gateway device, MTA ⁇ e.g., SMTP server), or a combination thereof on domain A 203.
- Communications gateway A 205 may further be implemented as a domain name server having a distributed database as part of the domain naming system (DNS), although such implementation is described only as an example.
- DNS domain naming system
- Alternative implementations of communications gateway A 205 may be independent of the DNS.
- Communications gateway A 205 may be capable of transmitting and receiving messages ⁇ i.e., electronic packages) to other devices, on behalf of agent A 207, over network 1 1 0.
- Such transmitting and receiving of messages may be implemented by, e.g., simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP).
- SMTP simple mail transfer protocol
- Agent A 207 may represent at least one of a variety of functionalities implemented on one or more end points for implementing network communication on domain A 203 capable of transmitting a message ⁇ i.e., electronic package) to one or more nodes on network 1 1 0.
- Such devices may include, but are not limited to a client device or handheld device. More particularly, agent A 207 may be a source of an electronic message that is intended for a user associated with a counterpart agent associated with network 1 10.
- the electronic messages referenced herein may include e-mail that may or may not have one or more files attached thereto.
- Such an attached file may include, as non-limiting examples, a text file, an audio file, a video file, a uniform resource locator (URL), etc.
- URL uniform resource locator
- key distribution 1 05 may further contemplate scenarios in which the electronic message is an instant message, a stream of data, a stream of audio packets such as those utilized by voice over IP (VoIP) protocols, RSS, TLS, RFC, or a direct download of electronic packets ⁇ i.e., text, audio, video, etc.) from an agent in one domain to an agent in another domain.
- VoIP voice over IP
- RSS Really, TLS, RFC
- RFC Remote Link Control Protocol
- a direct download of electronic packets ⁇ i.e., text, audio, video, etc.
- Network 1 1 may represent any of a variety of conventional network topologies and types, which may include wired and/or wireless networks.
- Network 1 10 may include, for example, the Internet as well at least portions of one or more LANs, a WAN, or a PAN.
- Communications gateway B 210 may be a gateway device or MTA on domain B 208. That is, communications gateway B 210 may be an intended receiving gateway counterpart to transmitting communications gateway A 205. Similar to communications gateway A 205, communications gateway B 21 0 may further be implemented as a domain name server having a distributed database as part of the domain naming system (DNS) or, alternatively, independent of the DNS.
- DNS domain naming system
- Agent B 21 2 accordingly, may be a receiving counterpart to sending agent A 207 from which a message ⁇ i.e., electronic package) may originate. Agent B 21 2 may be associated with a user in domain B 208 to which the message is intended.
- Key distribution 105 may include securing a message that is sent from agent A 207 via transmitting communications gateway A 205 using a key that is associated with domain B 208 and is retrieved from a DNS database.
- the DNS database may or may not be physically disposed in domain B 208.
- the intended recipient may be a recipient agent ⁇ i.e., device) or a user to which the agent is associated.
- the implementations of key distribution 1 05 described herein are not beholden to any particular transmitting protocol, and therefore no such limitations should be inferred, the present description may contemplate messages being transmitted between domains using SMTP.
- the example of key distribution 1 05 may also contemplate authenticating and validating a message at receiving comm unications gateway B 21 0 using at least one key retrieved from a DNS database ⁇ i.e., server) associated with domain A 203, which is the domain corresponding to a source of the message.
- a DNS database ⁇ i.e., server
- Agent A 207 may be a client device from which an outbound message ⁇ i.e., electronic package) intended for agent B 212, or a user associated therewith, originates.
- the outbound message may be received at communications gateway A 205, which, similar to agent A 207, may be associated with domain A 203.
- Communications gateway A 205 may retrieve a public encryption key associated with domain B 208 from a DNS database. At least one alternative implementation may include the aforementioned public encryption key associated with domai n B 208 corresponding more particularly to a user associated with domain B 208, and such implementation may be contemplated by the present description.
- the DNS database stores one or more encryption keys for domain B 208, the DNS database may or may not be associated with communications gateway B 210. Agent B 21 2, or a user associated therewith, may not necessarily be the only intended recipient of the outbound message, and therefore communications gateway A 205 may further retrieve a public encryption key for other domains to which intended recipients of the message are associated.
- agent B 21 2 may be the sole intended recipient of the message from agent A 207.
- communications gateway A 205 may utilize the retrieved key to secure the outbound message.
- communications gateway A 205 may secure the outbound message by generating a symmetric key (alternatively referred to as a "content encryption key" or "CEK”) and secure the outbound message using the retrieved key and the randomly generated encryption key in combination together.
- the secured outbound message includes securing at least a portion of the identity or address of at least one of the sender and one or more intended recipients of the secured message as part of, or separate from, a secured portion of the message itself.
- key distribution 1 05 d contemplate the usage of RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) private/public key pairs.
- key distribution 1 05 is not so limited, and no such limitations should be inferred.
- alternative implementations may utilize Diffie- Hellman secret key pairs as described further below or other cryptography methods that exploit a public and private encryption key pairing.
- communications gateway A 205 may then transmit the secured outbound message, via network 1 1 0, to domain gateway 210 corresponding to intended recipient agent B 21 2 or a user associated therewith.
- Communications gateway B 21 upon receiving the secured message from communications gateway A 205 via network 1 10, may determine domain A 203 to be the source of the secured message. Therefore, communications gateway B 21 0 may retrieve a public verification key associated with domain A 203 from a DNS database or from a storage device associated with domain A 203. Alternative implementations may contemplate the public verification key associated with domain A 203 corresponding more particularly to a user of agent A 207 from which the message originates. Such implementations are contemplated throughout the present description. Though the DNS database stores one or more encryption keys for domain A 203, the DNS database may or may not be associated with communications gateway A 205.
- communications gateway B 21 0 may utilize the retrieved public verification key associated with domain A 203 in combi nation with the private decryption key corresponding domain B 208 to decrypt and validate the symmetric key, which may be used to decrypt and validate the content of the message.
- the private decryption key may be the private counterpart to the public verification key utilized by communications gateway A 205 to secure the outbound message.
- the private decryption key may be locally stored at domain B 208 or may be otherwise associated with domain B 208. Regardless, the private encryption key may be utilized to decrypt an encryption key by which the secured message has been signed.
- communications gateway B 210 may utilize the private encryption key, which is the private counterpart to the public key retrieved by communications gateway A, to decrypt the symmetric key and then authenticate and validate the secured message. Further, a signature associated with the decrypted encryption key may be validated using the retrieved public encryption key associated with domain A 203.
- the decrypted decryption key may then be used to decrypt the message, including the sender and/or one or more intended recipients of the message, depending upon which portions of address information associated with the message are secured. Consequently, the address of intended recipient agent B 21 2, or user associated therewith, may be revealed, and communications gateway B 21 0 may then forward the decrypted message to recipient agent B 21 2.
- FIG. 3 shows example configuration 300 of a comm unications gateway, further to the example of FIG. 2.
- Agent 305 may be representative of either agent A 207 or agent B 21 2 described above with reference to FIC. 2. More particularly, agent 305 may represent a client device, associated with a user, which is capable of originating a message ⁇ i.e., electronic package) to be transmitted to one or more nodes on network 1 1 0 and capable of receiving such a message via a corresponding communications gateway.
- agent 305 may represent a client device, associated with a user, which is capable of originating a message ⁇ i.e., electronic package) to be transmitted to one or more nodes on network 1 1 0 and capable of receiving such a message via a corresponding communications gateway.
- Communications gateway 310 may be representative of either transmitting communications gateway A 205 or receiving communications gateway B 210 described above with reference to FIG. 2, and therefore communications gateway 31 0 may be referred to as transmitting comm unications gateway 31 0 or receiving communications gateway 310 depending upon the role thereof. Further, communications agent 31 0 may represent a gateway device or MTA that may or may not be further implemented as a distributed database as part of the domain naming system (DNS).
- DNS domain naming system
- Communications gateway 31 0 may be capable of transmitting and receiving messages ⁇ i.e., electronic packages) in relation to other devices, particularly other gateways, over network 1 10. Such transmitting and receiving of messages may be implemented by, e.g., SMTP.
- transmitting communications gateway 31 0 may be capable of accessing a receiving communications gateway 31 0 or, alternatively, a DNS database to retrieve a corresponding public component of a private/public encryption key pair.
- a transmitting communications gateway 31 0 may be capable of generating random encryption keys according to various implementations of key distribution 1 05.
- Storage device 31 5 may be associated with communications gateway 31 0 either logically or physically. That is, storage device 31 5 may be associated with a domain to which communications gateway 31 0 corresponds without being physically disposed within such domain. More particularly, storage device 31 5 may be a component of the distributed DNS database corresponding to the domain of communications gateway 31 0.
- Storage device 31 5 may store, in various combinations thereof, one or more public and private encryption key pairs as well as domain-related identification records, which may be associated with the domain itself, an agent or device associated with the domain, or a user associated with the domain. For example, when associated with receiving communications gateway 31 0, storage device 31 5 may store one or more retrieved public encryption keys for the domain or an agent device corresponding to an intended recipient of an outbound message. Such retrieved public encryption keys may contribute to securing the outbound message. Alternatively, when associated with transmitting communications gateway 310, storage device 31 5 may store one or more public encryption keys for the domain, device, or user corresponding to the source of a secured message. Such retrieved public encryption keys may be used to authorize, validate, and decrypt the secured message.
- storage device 31 5 may also store therein private encryption keys corresponding to the domain to which communications gateway 310 is associated.
- the pairs of private/public keys referenced above may include a domain-related encryption key and a domain-related signing key, which may or may not reference the same key, depending upon the implementation of key distribution 1 05.
- Storage device 31 5 may further facilitate a trusting relationship between a transmitting communications gateway 31 0 and a receiving communications gateway 31 0 that may reduce the exposure of encryption keys at, particularly, transmitting comm unications gateway 31 0.
- transmitting comm unications gateway 310 may store therein an identity text record that includes a certificate corresponding to the public encryption key for the transmitting domain concatenated to a certificate corresponding to a public signing key associated with the transmitting domain; that are further concatenated to an authority certificate by which the other certificates are signed.
- the identity text record may be retrieved in advance, authenticated either manually or using a private key infrastructure (PKI), and may be used for sending and receiving secure messages.
- receiving communications gateway 31 0 may access the public encryption key and public signing key for the transmitting domain by decrypting the authority certificate for the transmitting domain. Such decryption may be performed using the public authority key for the transmitting domain, which may be retrieved and/or stored by receiving communications gateway 31 0.
- PKI private key infrastructure
- FIG. 4 shows example processing flow 400 according to at least one implementation of key distribution 1 05 (see FIC. 1 ).
- Various operations described as part of processing flow 400 may be attributed as being performed by, or otherwise in association with, features described above with reference to FIGS. 1 - 3. Such attributions, as well as the operations, are described as examples only, and the operations may be implemented as hardware, firmware, or software, either singularly or in various combi nations together.
- Processing flow 400 is described below with reference to example implementations A, B, and C. Such implementations are not described in any order of preference, nor are the implementations to be construed as limiting in scope. Rather, the example implementations are provided to illustrate the flexibility and variance enabled by key distribution 105. Further, the sequences by which example implementations A, B, and C are illustrated and described may vary, and therefore the example implementations of processing flow 400 should be viewed as non- limiting examples.
- Block 405 may refer to communications gateway A 205 receiving a message ⁇ i.e., electronic package) from agent A 207 ⁇ i.e., client device) or a user to which agent A 207 is associated for transmittal beyond domain A 203.
- block 405 may refer to communications gateway A 205 as a content source independent of agent A 207.
- block 405 may refer to at least one intended recipient of the message received at comm unications gateway A 205 being associated with domain B 208.
- Block 41 0 may refer to communications gateway A 205 retrieving a public encryption key associated with domain B 208, although alternative implementations may contemplate the public encryption key associated with domain B 208 corresponding more particularly to an agent or device associated with domain B 208 or a user associated with domain B 208.
- communications gateway A 205 may access a DNS server, which may or may not be associated with communications gateway B 21 0, to retrieve a public encryption key associated with domain B 208.
- Block 41 5 may refer to communications gateway A 205 securing the outbound message using at least the public encryption key associated with domain B 208 as well as a public encryption key associated with domain A 203, which may be stored locally at, or otherwise associated with, domain A 203.
- Alternative implementations may contemplate the public encryption key associated with domain A 203 corresponding more particularly to an agent or device associated with domain A 203 or a user associated with dom ain A 203.
- block 41 5 may refer to communications gateway A 205 encrypting the outbound message using the public encryption key associated with domain B 208 and attaching a signature that may be produced using a public encryption key associated with domain A 203. Encrypted portions of the message may include address information relating to at least one of the sender or intended recipient of the message.
- the signature may be produced using a public encryption key associated with domain A 203 as a component in an encrypted hash algorithm that is appl ied to at least a portion of the contents of the outbound message.
- Block 420 may refer to the secured message being transmitted from communications gateway A 205 to communications gateway B 210 over network 1 10. Typically, block 420 may refer to the secured message being transported in accordance with SMTP. Key distribution 105, however, is not beholden to SMTP. 6 046205
- Block 425 may refer to the secured message being received at communications gateway B 21 0.
- Block 430 may refer to communications gateway B 210 validating and authenticating the secured message.
- communications gateway B 21 0 may detect that the secured message originated from domain A 203.
- Communications gateway B 210 may then retrieve the public signing key associated with domain A 203 from a DNS server which may or may not be associated with communications gateway A 205.
- the retrieved public signing key associated with domain A 203 which may be selected in accordance with an indication associated with the secured message, may be used to authenticate the signature of the secured message. That is, the public signing key is used to decrypt, de-hash, and therefore authenticate, the signature of the secured message.
- a public signing key associated with domain A 203 may be accessed by communications gateway B 21 0 by authenticating an identity record stored in storage device 31 5 corresponding to communications gateway A 205. That is, communications gateway B 210 may access the public encryption key and public signing key associated with domain A 203 by decrypting the authority certificate for domain A 203 using the public authority key associated with domain A 203, which may have been used to sign the text identity record that includes certificates corresponding to the public encryption key and public signing key associated with domain A 203.
- the authority certificate for domain A 203 may be retrieved by communications gateway B 21 0 from the DNS server associated with domain A 203; or the authority certificate for domain A 203 may be retrieved by communications gateway B 210 from a local storage associated with domain B 208.
- block 430 may further refer to communications gateway B 210 using the private encryption key associated with domain B 208 to decrypt the authenticated message, including portions of address information that may have been encrypted, which was encrypted at communications gateway A 205 using the public encryption key associated with domain B 208.
- communications gateway B 21 0 may then transmit the un-secured message to the intended recipient agent B 212.
- Block 405 may refer to communications gateway A 205 receiving a message ⁇ i.e., electronic package) from agent A 207 ⁇ i.e., client device) or a user to which agent A 207 is associated for transmittal beyond domain A 203.
- block 405 may refer to communications gateway A 205 as a content source independent of agent A 207.
- block 405 may refer to at least one intended recipient of the message received at communications gateway A 205 being associated with domain B 208.
- Block 41 0 may refer to communications gateway A 205 retrieving a public encryption key associated with domain B 208, although alternative implementations may contemplate the public encryption key associated with domain B 208 corresponding more particularly to an agent or device associated with domain B 208 or a user associated with domain B 208.
- communications gateway A 205 may access a DNS server, which may or may not be associated with communications gateway B 210, to retrieve a public encryption key associated with domain B 208.
- Block 41 5A may refer to communications gateway A 205 securing the outbound message in accordance with the processing described for, at least, blocks 41 6 - 41 8.
- Block 41 6 may refer to communications gateway A 205 generating a symmetric key ⁇ i.e., CEK).
- Block 417 may refer to communications gateway A 205 using at least the public encryption key associated with domain B 208 to encrypt the symmetric key, and further signing the symmetric key using at least the public encryption key associated with domain A 203, which may be stored locally at, or otherwise associated with, domain A 203.
- Block 41 8 may refer to communications gateway A 205 using the symmetric key to encrypt and hash at least a portion of the contents of the outbound message, which may or may not include portions of address information regarding a sender and an intended recipient of the outbound message.
- the message may be cryptographically hashed using HMAC (Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication) or another known key-based hashing function.
- HMAC Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication
- Block 420 may refer to the secured message being transmitted from communications gateway A 205 to communications gateway B 21 0 over network 1 10. Typically, block 420 may refer to the secured message being transported in accordance with SMTP. Key distribution 1 05, as stated above, is not beholden to SMTP.
- Block 425 may refer to the secured message being received at communications gateway B 21 0.
- Block 430A may refer to communications gateway B 210 validating and authenticating the secured message in accordance with the processing described for, at least, blocks 431 - 434.
- Block 431 may refer to communications gateway B 21 0 using the private encryption key associated with domain B 208 and the public encryption key associated with domain A 203 to decrypt the symmetric key associated with the secured message. Such decryption is possible because, at communications gateway A 205, the symmetric key may have been encrypted using the public encryption key associated with domain B 208, and the symmetric key was signed using the private encryption key associated with domain A 203.
- Block 432 may refer to communications gateway B 210 validating the signature on the encrypted symmetric key using the public signing key associated with domain A 203. That is, communications gateway B 210 may retrieve the public signing key associated with domain A 203 from a DNS server which may or may not be associated with communications gateway A 205. The retrieved public signing key associated with domain A 203 may be used to validate the signature by which the symmetric key was signed by recomputing the hash of the secure message, decrypting the signature, and comparing the hash values, and therefore authenticating, the signature.
- the public signing key associated with domain A 203 may be accessed by communications gateway B 21 0 by authenticating an identity record stored in storage device 31 5 corresponding to communications gateway A 205. To do so, communications gateway B 21 0 may access the public encryption key and public signing key associated with domain A 203 by decrypting the authority certificate for domain A 203 using the public authority key associated with domain A 203, which may have been used to sign the text identity record that includes certificates corresponding to the public encryption key and public signing key associated with domain A 203.
- the authority certificate for domain A 203 may be retrieved by comm unications gateway B 21 0 from the DNS server associated with domain A 203; or the authority certificate for domain A 203 may be retrieved by communications gateway B 21 0 from a local storage associated with domain B 208.
- Block 433 may refer to communications gateway B 210 using the decrypted symmetric key to validate the key-based hashing function ⁇ e.g., HMAC) used to cryptographically secure a message digest.
- HMAC key-based hashing function
- Block 434 may refer to communications gateway B 21 0 decrypting the encrypted portions of the secured message, including encrypted address information, using the symmetric key.
- communications gateway B 21 0 may then transmit the un-secured message to the intended recipient agent B 21 2.
- Block 405 may refer to communications gateway A 205 receiving a message ⁇ i.e., electronic package) from agent A 207 ⁇ i.e., client device) or a user to which agent A 207 is associated for transmittal beyond domain A 203.
- block 405 may refer to communications gateway A 205 as a content source independent of agent A 207.
- block 405 may refer to at least one intended recipient of the message received at Communications gateway A 205 being associated with domain B 208.
- Block 41 0 may refer to communications gateway A 205 retrieving a public encryption key associated with domain B 208, although alternative implementations may contemplate the public encryption key associated with domain B 208 corresponding more particularly to an agent or device associated with domain B 208 or a user associated with domain B 208.
- communications gateway A 205 may access a DNS server, which may or may not be associated with communications gateway B 21 0, to retrieve a public encryption key associated with domain B 208.
- Block 41 5A may refer to communications gateway A 205 securing the outbound message in accordance with the processing described for, at least, blocks 41 6 - 41 8.
- Block 41 6 may refer to communications gateway A 205 generating a symmetric key ⁇ i.e., CEK).
- Block 41 6 may refer to communications gateway A 205 further generating a second random encryption key ⁇ i.e., "key encryption key” or "KEK").
- Block 41 7 may refer to communications gateway A 205 using at least the public encryption key associated with domain B 208 to encrypt and sign the KEK. More particularly, com munications gateway A 205 may encrypt the KEK using the public encryption key associated with domain B 208 and add thereto a hash of the KEK that is signed by the private key associated with domain A 203.
- Block 41 8 may refer to comm unications gateway A 205 using the symmetric key and the encrypted and signed KEK to encrypt and hash at least a portion of the contents of the outbound message, which may or may not include portions of address information regarding a sender and an intended recipient of the outbound message.
- An example of the encrypted message may include at least a portion of the contents of the message encrypted by the symmetric key; added thereto the symmetric key encrypted by the KEK; and added thereto the encrypted KEK, described above as the KEK encrypted by the public encryption key associated with domain B 208 added to a hash of the KEK that is signed by the private key associated with domain A 203.
- Block 41 8 may further refer to communications gateway A 205 using the symmetric key and the encrypted and signed KEK to sign the encrypted message.
- An example of the signed and encrypted message may include the encrypted message cryptographically hashed using HMAC or another key-based hashing function; added thereto the symmetric key encrypted by the KEK; and added thereto a newly encrypted KEK, which includes the KEK encrypted by the public encryption key associated with domain B 208 added to a hash of the KEK that is signed by the private key associated with domain A 203.
- Block 420 may refer to the secured message being transmitted from communications gateway A 205 to comm unications gateway B 21 0 over network 1 1 0. Again, block 420 may refer to the secured message being transported in accordance with SMTP, although key distribution 1 05 is not so limited .
- Block 425 may refer to the secured message being received at communications gateway B 21 0.
- Block 430A may refer to communications gateway B 210 validating and authenticating the secured message in accordance with the processing described for, at least, blocks 431 - 434.
- Block 431 may refer to communications gateway B 21 0 using the private encryption key associated with domain B 208 and the public encryption key associated with domain A 203 to decrypt the KEK associated with the secured message.
- decryption is possible because, at communications gateway A 205, the KEK was encrypted using the public encryption key associated with domain B 208, and the KEK was signed using the private encryption key associated with domain A 203.
- the symmetric key used to encrypt at least a portion of the contents of the secured message may also be decrypted.
- Block 432 may refer to communications gateway B 210 validating the signature on the encrypted KEK using the public signing key associated with domain A 203. That is, communications gateway B 21 0 may retrieve the public signing key associated with domain A 203 from a DNS server which may or may not be associated with communications gateway A 205. The retrieved public signing key associated with domain A 203 may be used to validate the signature by which the KEK was signed by recomputing the hash of the secure message, decrypting the signature, and comparing the hash values. Matching hash values, therefore, authenticates the signature.
- the public signing key associated with domain A 203 may be accessed by communications gateway B 21 0 by authenticating an identity record stored in storage device 31 5 corresponding to communications gateway A 205. To do so, communications gateway B 21 0 may access the public encryption key and public signing key associated with domai n A 203 by decrypting the authority certificate for domain A 203 using the public authority key associated with domain A 203, which may have been used to sign the text identity record that includes certificates corresponding to the public encryption key and public signing key associated with domain A 203.
- the authority certificate for domain A 203 may be retrieved by comm unications gateway B 21 0 from the DNS server associated with domain A 203; or the authority certificate for domain A 203 may be retrieved by communications gateway B 21 0 from a local storage associated with domain B 208.
- Block 433 may refer to communications gateway B 21 0 using the decrypted KEK and symmetric key to validate the key-based hashing function ⁇ e.g., HMAC) used to cryptographically encrypt at least a portion of the contents of the secured message.
- HMAC key-based hashing function
- Block 434 may refer to communications gateway B 21 0 decrypting the encrypted portions of the secured message, including encrypted address information, using the KEK and symmetric key.
- communications gateway B 21 0 may then transmit the un-secured message to the intended recipient agent B 21 2.
- the KEK may remain stable for prolonged periods of time ⁇ e.g., weeks), while the symmetric key may be generated on a per-message basis.
- the KEK may be encrypted, signed, and stored in accordance with any of the techniques described above, which enables the KEK to be re-used.
- keys may be posted and retrieved for securing, authenticating, and validati ng messages (i.e., electronic packages) sent over a network from one domain to another.
- the example implementations described herein are not limited to just the network environments of FIGS. 1 and 2, the components of FIG. 3, or the processing flow of FIG. 4.
- Technologies e.g., tools, methodologies, and systems associated with key distribution 1 05 (see FIG. 1 ) may be implemented by various combinations of the components described with reference to FIG. 3, as well as in various orders of the blocks described with reference to FIG. 4.
- the computer environment for any of the examples and implementations described above may include a computing device having, for example, one or more processors or processing units, a system memory, and a system bus to couple various system components.
- the computing device may include a variety of computer readable media, including both volatile and non-volatile media, removable and nonremovable media.
- the system memory may include com puter readable media in the form of volatile memory, such as random access memory (RAM); and/or non-volatile memory, such as read only memory (ROM) or flash RAM.
- RAM random access memory
- ROM read only memory
- flash RAM non-volatile memory
- RAM random access memory
- ROM read only memory
- flash RAM random access memory
- RAM read only memory
- EEPROM electric erasable programmable read-only memory
- code module initialization may be implemented without one or more of the specific details, or with other methods, resources, materials, etc.
- well known structures, resources, or operations have not been shown or described in detail merely to avoid obscuring aspects of the invention.
Abstract
Description
Claims
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RU2008122778A (en) | 2009-12-20 |
AU2006322124B2 (en) | 2011-01-27 |
US8135645B2 (en) | 2012-03-13 |
US20070130084A1 (en) | 2007-06-07 |
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