WO2007118307A1 - Method and apparatus for providing an adaptable security level in an electronic communication - Google Patents
Method and apparatus for providing an adaptable security level in an electronic communication Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2007118307A1 WO2007118307A1 PCT/CA2007/000608 CA2007000608W WO2007118307A1 WO 2007118307 A1 WO2007118307 A1 WO 2007118307A1 CA 2007000608 W CA2007000608 W CA 2007000608W WO 2007118307 A1 WO2007118307 A1 WO 2007118307A1
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- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- frame
- security level
- correspondent
- security
- data
- Prior art date
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
- H04L63/105—Multiple levels of security
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
- H04L63/0227—Filtering policies
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a method and apparatus for providing an adaptable security level in an electronic communication.
- a method of communicating between a first correspondent and a second correspondent in a data communication system comprising assembling a data stream at said first correspondent, said data stream having at least one frame, said frame having a header and data; incorporating in said header, an indication of a frame type; and forwarding said frame to said second correspondent to enable said second correspondent to determine the acceptability of said frame according to said frame type.
- a method of verifying a communication between a first correspondent and a second correspondent in a data communication system comprising said second correspondent: receiving from said first correspondent, a frame having a header and data, said header including an indication of a frame type; determining said frame type from said header; and correlating said frame type to a policy to determine if said frame type is acceptable for at least one attribute of said frame.
- a method of communicating between a pair of correspondents in a data communication system comprising exempting one of said pair of correspondents from security rules associated with said communication system to enable said one correspondent to initialize communication with the other of said correspondents.
- Figure 1 is a schematic representation of a communication system
- Figure 2 is a schematic representation of an information frame exchanged in the communication system of Figure 1
- Figure 3 is a schematic representation of a frame control portion of the frame of Figure 2
- Figure 4 is a schematic representation of a method performed by a sender in Figure 1
- Figure 5 is a schematic representation of a method performed by a recipient in Figure 1
- Figure 6 is a schematic representation of a network protocol used in one embodiment of the communication system
- Figure 7 is a schematic representation of an embodiment of the communication system
- Figure 8 is a schematic representation of another embodiment of the communication system.
- Figure 9 is a schematic representation of another frame
- Figure 10 is a schematic representation of a method performed by
- Figure 11 is a schematic representation of a method performed by a recipient using the frame of Figure 9
- Figure 12 is a schematic representation of another communication system
- Figure 13 is a schematic representation of a method performed by a correspondent in Figure 12
- a communication system 10 includes a pair of correspondents 12, 14 connected by a communication link 16
- Each correspondent 12, 14 includes a respective cryptographic unit 18, 20
- Each correspondent 12, 14 can include a processor 22, 24
- Each processor may be coupled to a display and to user input devices, such as a keyboard, mouse, or other suitable devices If the display is touch sensitive, then the display itself can be employed as the user input device
- a computer readable storage medium (not shown) is coupled to each processor 22, 24 for providing instructions to the processor 22, 24 to instruct and/or configure processor 22, 24 to perform steps or algorithms related to the operation of each correspondent 12, 14, as further explained below
- the computer readable medium can include hardware and/or software such as, by way of example only, magnetic disks, magnetic tape, optically readable medium such as CD ROM's, and semi-conductor memory such as PCMCIA cards In each case, the medium may take the form of a portable item such as a small disk, floppy diskette, cassette,
- security mode bit 35 is used to indicate whether encryption is on or off. Integrity level bits 36 and 37 together are used to indicate which of four integrity levels, such as 0, 32, 64, or 128 bit key size is utilised. The security mode bit 35 may be used to indicate alternative modes of operation, such as, authentication and the number of bits may be increased (or decreased) to accommodate different combinations. It will be recognized that providing security bits in each frame 31 of the stream 30 allows the security level to be on a frame-by- frame basis rather than on the basis of a pair of correspondents, therefore providing greater flexibility in organizing communications. [0028] In order to provide security, certain minimum security levels may be used. These levels should be decided upon among all of the correspondents through an agreed-upon rule.
- the correspondent 12 performs the steps shown in Figure 4 by the numeral 100 to send information to the correspondent 14.
- the correspondent 12 prepares data and a header at step 102.
- the security level selects the security level at step 104.
- the security level is determined by considering the minimum security level required by the recipient, the nature of the recipient, and the kind of data being transmitted. If the security level includes encryption, then the correspondent 12 encrypts the data at step 106. If the security level includes authentication, then the correspondent 12 signs the data at step 108. Then the correspondent 12 includes bits indicating the security mode and security level in the frame control at step 1 10. The correspondent 12 then sends the frame to the correspondent 14 at step 1 12.
- the correspondent 14 Upon receiving the frame, the correspondent 14 performs the steps shown in Figure 5 by the numeral 120. The correspondent 14 first receives the frame at step 122. It then extracts the security bits at step 124. If the mode security bits 34 indicate encryption, then the correspondent 14 decrypts the data at step 126. If the security bits indicate authentication, then the correspondent 14 verifies the signature at step 126. Finally, the correspondent 14 checks the security level to ensure it meets predetermined minimum requirements at step 128. If either the encryption or authentication fails, or if the security level does not meet the minimum requirements, then the correspondent 14 rejects the message and, if the encryption and authentication do not fail, and the security level meets the minimum requirements then the message is accepted, at step 130.
- the correspondent 12 wishes to send the same message to multiple recipients 14 with varying minimum secu ⁇ ty requirements In this case, the correspondent 12 chooses a secu ⁇ ty level high enough to meet all of the requirements The correspondent 12 then proceeds as in Figure 4 to assemble and send a message with the security level The message will be accepted by each recipient since it meets each of their minimum requirements It will be recognized that this embodiment provides greater efficiency than separately dealing with each recipient's requirements [0033] In another embodiment, a different number of security bits are used The actual number of bits is not limited to any one value, but rather may be predetermined for any given application 1 he security bits should indicate the algorithm parameters They may be used to determine the length
- 21612046 1 offered protection level is passed to the application layer, who determines whether the offered protection level was adequate. The recipient may acknowledge proper receipt of the frame to the original sender, based on this "adequacy tesf . [0037] The acknowledgement (ACK), if present, is then passed back to the sender and passed up to the appropriate level (if protected message sent at APL layer, then ACK should also arrive back at that level; similar for lower layers of course). [0038] The sender A determines that it wants to protect payload m using the protection level indicated by SEC (taking into account its own security needs and, possibly, those of its intended recipient(s).
- the payload m and desired protection level SEC is then passed to a lower layer (e.g., the MAC layer, as in the diagram) which takes care of the actual cryptographic processing.
- a lower layer e.g., the MAC layer, as in the diagram
- This message passing could include additional status information that aids in the processing of the frame, such as the intended recipient(s), fragmentation info, etc.
- the delegation of the cryptographic processing to a lower layer is only a conceptual step if cryptographic processing takes place at the same layer at which the payload m originates.
- Cryptographic processing involves protecting the payload m and, possibly, associated information such as frame headers, using the cryptographic process indicated by the desired protection level SEC.
- the key used to protect this information is derived from shared keying material maintained between the sender and the intended recipient(s).
- the protected frame is communicated to the intended recipient(s) B.
- the intended recipient (s) retrieves the payload m' from the received protected frame, using the cryptographic process indicated by the observed protection level SEC, using a key that is derived from shared keying material maintained between the sender and the recipient(s) in question.
- the retrieved payload m' and the observed protection level SEC is passed to the same level at which the payload was originated by the sender, where the adequacy of the observed protection level is determined.
- the observed protection level SEC is deemed sufficient, if it meets or exceeds the expected protection level SECo, where the parameter SECo might be a fixed pre-negotiated protection level that does or does not depend on the retrieved payload m' in question. (Defining SECo in a message-dependent way would allow fine-grained access control policies, but generally involves increased storage and processing requirements.)
- the observed protection level is compared to SECo, where SECo is a set of protection levels rather than only a minimum security level.
- SECo is a set of protection levels rather than only a minimum security level.
- ACK acknowledgement
- SEC acknowledgement
- SECQ SECQ
- Sender A wants to securely communicate a message m to a group G of devices.
- the sender A has access to the two parameters, e.g., (1 )
- the minimum level SEC A at which it would like to protect this message (in general, SEC., ⁇ might depend on the group it sends information to and the message itself, so proper notation would be SEC A (m,G));
- the minimum protection level SECo that the group G of recipients expects (again, the proper notation would be SEC(;(m,A) if this level would depend on the sender and the message itself
- the minimum expectation level of a group is the maximum over all group members of the minimum expectation level for each group member
- Initialization Sender A assumes that each parameter SEC G IS set to the maximum protection level (for each group G it securely communicates with)
- Operational Usage Sender A determines the minimum protection level SEC A at which it wants to protect the message m
- the actual protection level SEC applied to the message m meets both its own adequacy test (i e , SEC > SEC A ) and the minimum expected level by the group G (i e , SEC > SEC G )
- Each recipient B that is in the group G of recipients i e , B e G
- A updates the parameter SEC G such that it is consistent with all the minimum protection levels indicated in each of the acknowledgement messages it received back (
- each frame in the communication is structured as shown in Figure 9 and is generally denoted by numeral 170
- the frame 170 generally comprises a header 172, a payload 174 and a footer 176
- the footer 176 typically comprises one or more bits that represent an error code
- the payload 174 includes the data which is to be sent in that particular frame 170, e g a message
- An exemplary header 172a is also shown in greater detail in Figure 9
- the header 172a includes a key identifier 178, a representation of a key 180, a frame type 182,
- the sender 12 performs the steps shown in Figure 10 by the numeral 200 to send information to the recipient 14
- the sender 12 prepares the frame at step 202 according to steps 102-1 10 discussed above It will be appreciated that these steps would also include preparation of the header 172a to include the representation of the bits shown in Figure 9
- the sender 12 determines the frame type 182 and includes one or more bits into the header 172a to indicate the frame type 182
- the sender 12 then sends the frame 170 to the recipient 14 at step 206 [0060]
- the recipient 14 Upon receiving the frame 170, the recipient 14 performs the steps shown in Figure 1 1 by the numeral 208
- the recipient 14 first receives the frame at step 210 and then performs the steps 124-126 discussed above at step 212
- the recipient 14 extracts the frame type 182 from the header 172a at step 214
- the frame type 182 is then correlated to a policy in order to perform a policy check at step 216 In particular, a look-up-
- Correspondent C checks the table at step 230.
- the status of correspondent A is exempt and a key exchange or other initialization procedure is carried out at step 232 and the status of correspondent A is then changed to "not exempt" (or an exempt indicator is removed, set to zero etc.) at step 234.
- Correspondent A then sends frames to correspondent C subject to normal security rules.
- the status for correspondent A would thereafter be determined as not exempt and the regular security rules are applied at step 236, e.g. by checking the security level, frame type etc. It can be appreciated that A could also exempt C such that the roles are reversed and A is allowing C to communicate therewith (e.g. where A is part of another network).
- the above minimum security level test takes into account the frame 150 and also the originator 186.
- the sender is correspondent A and the recipient is correspondent B.
- a check for the minimum security level would thus be SEC > SEC ⁇ (m,A). If the minimum security level is independent of originator A, this comes down to check SEC ⁇ SEC B (m), as discussed before. The same storage considerations as with original security level test would then be used (case 1). [0070] If the minimum security level is completely dependent on the originator A, a minimum security level table is enumerated (dependent on frame m, frame type of m, or message dependent - as discussed before), but now for each originator (case 2).
- the minimum security level is independent of originator A, except when originator is in an explicitly enumerated set of exempt devices, e.g. denoted by ExemptSet in the table, a single minimum security level table is implemented for devices outside the ExemptSet (potentially depending on frame type, etc.) and, additionally, a minimum security level table for each individual member of ExemptSet is implemented (case 3). Thus, if a correspondent (and device associated therewith) is part of the ExemptSet table, case 2 is utilized and, if no device is in the ExemptSet table, case 1 is utilized. [0071 ] Case 3 can be made more implementation- friendly if correspondents in the ExemptSet table, a minimum security level table that is independent of the particular device in the ExemptSet is used. This requires that one security level table is implemented for devices that are not in the ExemptSet table and one table is implemented for devices that are in the ExemptSet table (case 4).
- one scenario allows devices that do not have a key yet (e.g., because these just joined the network and still have to set up a key, e.g., via key agreement or key transport protocol or PIN or any other mechanism) to "by-pass" the minimum security level check (i.e., the security check always succeeds), if these have been labeled by recipient B as belonging to ExemptSet (and ExemptSEC ⁇ (m) is set to 'no security').
- the by-passing of minimum security level checks may depend on the message m received, the frame type of message m (which is visible to the recipient if the frame type of m is included in the transmitted frame - normally frame types and other frame control information is not encrypted), or a parameter that can be set via the Override parameter OverrideSEC(m).
- operations on the set ExemptSet by the recipient effectively govern the operation of the minimum security level check (inclusion of a device in that set may allow by-passing or lowered security requirements, while exclusion of a device from that set restores the ordinary minimum security level check and make it applicable (possibly again) to the originating device in question).
- the above allows a flexible mechanism to take into account transitionary behaviour of a correspondent (and their device) during the system's lifetime, and facilitates the transgression of a device from some initial stage where it does not yet have a key, to the
- the override parameter OverndeSEC(m) allows fine-tuning of "by-passing" the minimum security level check and make this dependent on the message m received (or message type - obviously one can make granularity as fine-grained as possible, at expense of table implementation cost)
- the Override parameter can also be used for any other initialization procedure or set-up piocedure and should not be limited to key set up [0081 ] Again, operations on the Override parameter Overnde(m) by the
Abstract
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Priority Applications (6)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
JP2009504535A JP4911736B2 (en) | 2006-04-13 | 2007-04-13 | Method and apparatus for providing adaptive security levels in electronic communications |
ES07719535.2T ES2556623T3 (en) | 2006-04-13 | 2007-04-13 | Method and apparatus for providing an adaptive level of security in an electronic communication |
CN200780020042XA CN101496338B (en) | 2006-04-13 | 2007-04-13 | Method and apparatus for providing an adaptable security level in an electronic communication |
KR1020087027745A KR101519151B1 (en) | 2006-04-13 | 2007-04-13 | Method and apparatus for providing an adaptable security level in an electronic communication |
CA2644015A CA2644015C (en) | 2006-04-13 | 2007-04-13 | Method and apparatus for providing an adaptable security level in an electronic communication |
EP07719535.2A EP2005636B1 (en) | 2006-04-13 | 2007-04-13 | Method and apparatus for providing an adaptable security level in an electronic communication |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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US79143406P | 2006-04-13 | 2006-04-13 | |
US60/791,434 | 2006-04-13 |
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WO2007118307A1 true WO2007118307A1 (en) | 2007-10-25 |
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PCT/CA2007/000608 WO2007118307A1 (en) | 2006-04-13 | 2007-04-13 | Method and apparatus for providing an adaptable security level in an electronic communication |
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US (5) | US8688978B2 (en) |
EP (1) | EP2005636B1 (en) |
JP (2) | JP4911736B2 (en) |
KR (1) | KR101519151B1 (en) |
CN (1) | CN101496338B (en) |
CA (2) | CA2644015C (en) |
ES (1) | ES2556623T3 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2007118307A1 (en) |
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