WO2008022559A1

WO2008022559A1 - Device and method for safely making use of network service needless of relying on security of client side

Info

Publication number: WO2008022559A1
Application number: PCT/CN2007/002473
Authority: WO
Inventors: Tong Shao
Original assignee: Tong Shao
Priority date: 2006-08-18
Filing date: 2007-08-16
Publication date: 2008-02-28
Also published as: CN101127605A

Abstract

A device and method for safely making use of the service of the network server (1) are provided, which are concrete and do not rely on the security of the client side. By using the keyboard (4), the encryption device (6), the network server (1), and the suitable information flowing way, together with combining with good password protocol, the problem of safely making use of the service of the network server (1) on the unsafe computer (3) is simply and safely solved.

Description

Device and method for safely using network service without relying on computer security

The present invention relates to an apparatus and method for securely using a network service independent of computer security. Simply put, it relates to a device and method for how to securely make bank payments on an untrusted computer. In particular, it relates to an apparatus and method that can securely use a web server service on a potentially insecure networked computer client. '

Background technique

In a recent article in "Computer World", "SSL is difficult to protect e-commerce security" (Computer World News, May 29, 2006, No. 20, B24, B25), the latest developments and countermeasures of the current computer Trojan attack banking system are described. method. With SSL Trojans or more advanced phishing techniques, hackers can either steal user login information or sneak away the funds in the account after the user successfully logs in. In both cases, the SSL connection between the computer and the bank is complete without any damage. However, someone has done something at the end of SSL. In other words, the Trojans have been sniffing or manipulating transactions before the transaction information has been sent to the bank via the Internet. Today, some banks require users to use a random screen keyboard on the computer display, or ask the user to enter a random number that appears on the web page, or enter information via a hardware-encrypted keyboard. However, in the face of SSL Trojan attacks, these do not work. The crux of the problem is that letting the computer replace our people to make trading decisions, and the computer does not actually know which ones are right and which ones are wrong. Consumers can't see the transaction process in real time, so they can't terminate an auto-completed transaction authorization, and there is no way for the bank to distinguish whether it is a trading decision made by a Trojan or a trading decision made by a person. Just persuading users not to run unsafe software does not prevent infection. Few users will realize that their computer has been infected, even the smallest users may be SSL Trojans. The SSL Trojan can bypass the security authentication mechanism, and this security and authentication mechanism is the most important security measure for online banking and online trading institutions. Once the computer is infected with this Trojan, all actions that require user approval can be sneaked without the user's knowledge. The same is true of the online gaming industry and all industries that require network identity authentication.

In order to solve the problem of Trojans stealing user passwords (PINs), there are a large number of patent applications in the Chinese Patent Office. Some of them use the keyboard to automatically send a password (PIN) to accommodate users who use passwords that are not easy to remember. These patent applications include: "Intelligent keyboard for single-key trigger key signal transmission" (Chinese patent application CN00105838.X), "Intelligent keyboard for storing key signal sequences and sequentially transmitting" (Chinese patent application CN00105603.4), Computer downloads and redefines the smart keyboard for key operations" (Chinese patent application) Please CN00106095.3), "Keyboard that receives, converts and sends information by defined conditions by definition" (Chinese patent application CN01109489.3), "Keyboard signal converter downloaded and redefined by computer"

(Chinese patent application CN01109485.0), "Keyboard signal converter capable of storing key signal sequences and sequentially transmitting"

(Chinese patent application CN01109486.9), "Keyboard signal converter that triggers receiving, converting and transmitting information in a defined manner by defining conditions" (Chinese Patent Application CN01109487.7). The patents related to keyboards, passwords and hardware are: "Microcomputer password input device" (Chinese patent application CN90106710.5), "IC card password exporter"

(Chinese patent application CN98112879.3). In addition, the combination of cryptography and keyboard to prevent ordinary trojans from stealing keyboard input passwords (PIN) are: "Computer keyboard information interference to achieve password protection method" (Chinese patent application CN200410062399.2), "keyboard with secure password authentication" Device and method thereof (Chinese patent application CN9912169U), "Setting and identification technology of computer remote login password and password" (Chinese patent application CN200310111808.9). The above patents are all solutions for protecting passwords (PIN). They do not refer to modern cryptography concepts such as digital certificates and public passwords; they cannot input protection such as bank payment information, prevent tampering and digital signatures, and do not use the security of these hardware. Information flow.

In order to solve the Trojan Stealing Authentication Code (PIN) problem, U.S. Patent No. 5,809,143 also discloses a cryptographic keyboard solution that addresses the authentication problem but does not combat "replay attacks." Correct here

"Password keyboard and its data burning device and password confidentiality method" (Chinese Patent Application CN99125238.1) The patent application file describes the error described in the US patent, that is, the seventh line of the second page of the specification "the keyboard interface to the computer" The data is the character that has been encrypted ", should be "the data that arrives at the computer's keyboard interface is a string that has been encrypted" because the password (PIN) is encrypted as a string in the above U.S. patent. The "Password Keyboard and its Data Burning Device and Password Privacy Method" (Chinese Patent Application CN99125238.1) proposes a corresponding improvement. The solution essentially encrypts the user's password (PIN) by two encryptions: the first is to encrypt the random number with the key stored in the password keyboard and the authentication server; the second time is the user The password encrypts the random number and is an authentication scheme for protecting the password (PIN).

None of the above patent schemes solves the problem of SSL Trojan attack transactions. In fact, this SSL Trojan attack can be modified to break the USBKEY digital certificate system that banks now consider to be the safest. The applicant believes that the root cause of this situation is that the user cannot determine whether his or her computer is in an unsafe state. When the computer is not secure, any solution that requires the computer to provide the most basic security guarantee is actually not safe. The display of the keyboard and computer screen that the general computer user believes may have security problems. For example, when the user wants to pay 300 yuan to Zhang San, the computer displays 300 yuan for Zhang San and asks the user to confirm the signature, the user can use various confirmation means including digital signature or payment password; however, the computer Trojan actually requires the user Confirmed that Li Si will pay 100,000 yuan. The root cause of this insecurity is when calculating When the machine is not secure, all the information you see on your computer may not be true. The applicant took a term for this situation called: "visual fraud."

The main means of hacking is the man-in-the-middle attack, and there will be simulated operational attacks and visual scam attacks in the future. The simulated operation attack is that when the computer user inserts the USBKEY digital certificate into the computer to prepare for the transaction, the Trojan takes the operation of simulating the user's keyboard and mouse to perform the attack: Modify the transaction object, modify the transaction price, and modify the number of transactions: If the computer exists Security factors, simulation operations attacks may succeed. Visual scams are an advanced way of simulating operational attacks. Modifying the URL of IE, even when the user enters the correct URL, the Trojan allows IE to display the correct URL, but the internal URL is the address of the scammer, simulating the bank's website to implement fraud. In short, in order to completely solve the problems caused by Trojans, "Methods and systems for secure transactions in computer systems" (Chinese patent application CN99806523.4) and "A network security system and security method" (China applied by the inventor) Patent application CN02138659. 5) can solve the problem. However, the two-machine solution has a popularization process, and solutions with trusted displays are not easy to promote.

In order to solve the security of the keyboard input data, Korea Security Technology Corporation applied for the Chinese patent ZL00801562. 7 "Adapter with security function and computer security system using this adapter" (Chinese Patent Publication No. CN1319294), also disclosed a kind of A password keyboard scheme that encrypts keyboard information. "Enables the user to establish a secure connection between the computer system and the keyboard to input data from the keyboard to the computer system" on page 2, line 15. From the entire scheme of the patent, it is obvious that the "computer system" here refers to the computer client we usually say instead of the server, see page 8, page 10, page 8, line 30, page 9, page 5 of the manual. Line and Figure 3. Since the computer client is not secure, all of the client's software, including the operating system and the software that works with the security adapter, may be Trojans, so the technical solution does not guarantee security. Therefore, the 20th line on page 14 of the manual begins to say that the technical solution is only "possible to prevent third parties from breaking into the computer system to plagiarize and steal users for stock trading". In fact, because the network server can't distinguish, at the end of the day, the Trojan tricks the legitimate user to realize the transaction or the user's real transaction, so the technical solution has no practical security use. From the current legal status of the application, the patent application has been revoked. This patent application is a background art that is very close to the present invention.

All of the patent documents mentioned above are the background documents implemented by this patent. In order to save the space of this patent specification, the applicants have made all the above-mentioned patent documents as part of this patent application, indicating that these application documents have been written in this document. Instructions.

Now, the main problem of computer network security is not whether the user's networked computer is safe or not; but when the networked computer is not secure, how to ensure that the correct network service of the network server can be obtained. For example, when a networked computer is not secure, the bank customer can safely use the computer for bank transfer services; or game players It is safe to play and trade without being replaced or tampered with by hackers.

Currently, in all other computer client security solutions, more or less or unconsciously, the computer client should have a certain degree of security, which causes all the programs to have such security holes. The starting point of our invention is that the computer client is a big Trojan, not just a Trojan. We assume that the operating system is a trojan written by a hacker. The hacker fully grasps the client, and the user does not trust the security of the client. From the user's point of view, he just wants the computer client to handle the problem correctly, and doesn't care if the computer is safe.

So the user wants: All the data sent to the server is the data that the user wants to send; all the data seen on the display screen is the real data sent back by the server or the real data entered by the user. When the computer is not safe, it is obvious that the above hopes cannot all be established. However, the inventor believes that the acceptable security is that after the user displays the normal operation according to the screen, even if the data is tampered with, the user cannot cause actual loss; nor does the user falsely display the screen, so that the user generates the normal operation according to the display. Actual loss. The fact that no actual loss is caused is that the result is equivalent to the fact that the terminal is broken and cannot be used.

To this end, the most important thing is to ensure that the keyboard and mouse of the most important input device of the computer are indeed controlled by the computer operator. The displayed information is provided and expected by the operator as much as possible. If the display is tampered with, it cannot mislead the user to actually produce the actual information. loss. The most important point is that the information obtained on the web server side must be provided by the operator.

For example, when entering the online transaction, the transaction object, the bank card number, and the transaction price are all input.

After the USBKEY is signed or encrypted, it is transmitted to the server. After the server decrypts the message, it returns the information and confirms the password (PIN) through the mobile phone, and confirms the password (PIN). However, if the data is not displayed on the computer in time when the transaction object, bank card number, and transaction price are entered, it will cause great confusion to the user. If displayed normally on the screen, the Trojan can tamper with the data sent to the web server or display the data that has been tampered with. So the most reasonable way is that all the operator's input can only be sent by the keyboard, the network server receives the operator's correct key code and saves the record, and the correct key code can be correctly displayed locally. Since the computer client may be unsafe, when the display is tampered without affecting the correct input, at most the operator does not confirm the wrong display data, but no loss occurs. For example, when the user is ready to enter 500 circles, the user types 5 and the Trojan displays 7; the user will think that he has typed the wrong key and re-tweaked. Therefore, the 7 displayed by the Trojan is not accepted by the user. But the server may receive 55, which is the "re-attack attack." The means to prevent "re-attacking" is the fixed-point input, that is, the fixed input position. When the position is input 5 and then re-tap, the original input data is replaced. Of course, after entering 5 in this position, there must be a confirmation button (or mouse button) to confirm the completion of the fixed point input. When a line is entered, there should also be a confirmation button (such as the ENTER button). For the amount input can be taken from Fill in large to small, to prevent "less filling". That is, if the Trojan allows the user to enter a zero in the front, and the latter user cannot fill in more than one, the total number of the filled digits will be incorrect. The server can protect the user's interests without confirming the input.

Several background art documents are disclosed after the priority date of this patent application.

200510116685. 7 "An electronic signature control device and control method" uses a control switch to confirm that the USBKEY can be used. You can also add a timer to turn off the use when it times out. It is even possible to add a display where the user observes the display and confirms the data to be signed.

200410103401. 6 "A way to enhance the security of using electronic signature tools on computers", the network is authorized to use the signature tool. Use the signature of the other party's computer to treat the signature data. After the inverse solution, compare it with the data to be signed, and then sign it correctly. Security can only be done after the other party's computer and the local computer are compromised. Of course, you can also tamper with the two original data to achieve the purpose of the attack.

200610099201. 7 "A method to enhance the security of using electronic signature tools on computers", to ensure the security of transaction data by directly obtaining transaction data, the characteristic is that the transaction data moves the cursor to the data to be used on the screen of the password device (USBKEY). It is directly obtained by keyboard and mouse confirmation. It can also be used in its published specification, in claim 2, "the electronic signature tool directly connects to the keyboard from which the data to be traded is entered", where the keyboard refers to the keyboard on the cryptographic device. Referring to it according to claims 8, 9, 10 and on lines 7, lines 1 to 14, of the specification, it is clarified that the keyboard belongs to the data input module. It can be seen that the device has an input device, a confirmation device, a display device or a prompt device (audio). The input device is a cursor input module or a keyboard located above the device. The keyboard of the computer is specifically represented by a "computer keyboard." See page 7 on page 9 of the manual.

The most original patent application for computer terminal security is "Method and System for Secure Transaction in Computer Systems" (Chinese Patent Application CN99806523.4). The solution is to use a trusted computer to solve the problem of untrustworthy computer terminals, that is, to use trusted terminals to add trusted computers. The inventor's authorized patent and "a network security system and security method" (CN02138659. 5) use a computer to play the role of a trusted computer and an untrusted terminal to solve the problem of terminal security. The trusted computers in both scenarios consist of a trusted host (CPU), a trusted keyboard, and a trusted display. However, our trusted dual-machine solution has a popularization process. The "method and system for secure transaction in a computer system" scheme is not easy to promote because it is not portable or occupying a desktop.

As technology advances, trusted hosts (CPUs) are getting cheaper. Many improved technical solutions have been proposed due to portability and minimal changes in the use of computer habits. For example, the currently widely used USBKEY certificate is essentially a scheme for canceling a trusted keyboard and a trusted display in the "method and system for secure transaction in a computer system" scheme. Although this solution satisfies the requirements of portability and tries not to change people Use computer accustomed requirements, but the security is reduced too much is not safe.

200610099201. 7 "A method to enhance the security of using electronic signature tools on a computer" is to solve the problem by making the keys of the trusted display small and the keyboard less. However, we think that after the display of the solution becomes smaller, it is inconvenient to watch; after the keyboard keys are reduced, it is inconvenient to use. In short, changing the user's usage habits is not easy to pass.

The Chinese patent ZL00801562. 7 "Container with security function and computer security system using such adapter" (Chinese Patent Publication CN1319294) applied by Korea Security Technology Co., Ltd. only wants to provide a trusted keyboard. The encrypted or signed data is not directly delivered to the server for processing, so the problem of the server trusted service when the client is not trusted is not solved.

Summary of the invention

In order to be portable and under the conditions of existing computers, secure use of web server services is realized. A cryptographic device can be used to connect between the computer keyboard and the computer keyboard interface to ensure a trusted keyboard. When a key combination is issued from the keyboard or the password device is activated by the computer application to authenticate with the server that wishes to connect, and the session key is negotiated, this is the identity authentication between the cryptographic device and the server, not the client computer and the server. Identity authentication; when the operator taps the keyboard, the key code generated by the keyboard is sent to the cryptographic device; the cryptographic device encrypts the key code and transmits it to the network server through the computer terminal; the server decrypts the key code, transmits it back to the computer and provides Give the app. Since the key code is encrypted and the server only receives the encrypted key code, other programs in the computer (including Trojans and operating systems) can only tamper with the key code provided to the application, and cannot tamper with the key code obtained by the server; After the data has been tampered with, the operator or server may incorrectly reject the correct data; it is impossible to produce the correct input data after the data has been tampered with, and the operator or server accepts the consequences of the tampered data. That is to say, the computer may not be used to obtain the network service, but the result of the wrong service may not be obtained from the network server by using the computer. Obviously, the cryptographic device can collect multiple key codes to form a string, and then encrypt or sign it and send it to the server. In order to represent the two-key code and the key code string, in the present patent application, we collectively refer to a single key code and a key code string as a key code string.

Of course, the Trojan can also use the key string that is not encrypted or signed to be sent to the server for attack. This is equivalent to the computer being broken and cannot be used. Replay attacks can be eliminated due to key string encryption, adding random numbers, increasing the key sequence number, and finally re-signing all inputs.

Use a cryptographic device to connect between the computer keyboard and the computer keyboard interface. You can issue a key combination from the keyboard or use the computer application to start the password device to authenticate with the server you want to connect to, and negotiate the session key, which is the identity authentication between the password device and the server, not the client computer and server. Identity authentication; when the operator taps the keyboard, the key code of the key generated by the keyboard is sent to the cryptographic device; The cryptographic device collects all input key codes, which may represent all keyboard input (such as the other party's account number, own account number, transaction amount, etc.) of a transaction, and may also represent part of the input (such as an account number) of a transaction. The key string is encrypted or signed and transmitted to the network server through the computer; the server performs the corresponding work. Since the server receives the encrypted or signed key string, other programs in the computer (including Trojans and operating systems) cannot tamper with the key string obtained by the server. Therefore, after the correctly entered data is tampered with, the operator or the server may incorrectly reject the correct data; and it is impossible for the operator or the server to accept the falsified result after the data that is correctly input is falsified. That is, you may not be able to use the computer to get network services, but you cannot produce the result of using the computer to get the wrong service from the network server. Of course, the signed key string may not be the original key string of the key, but the cryptographic device analyzes the meaningful result according to the input key string, converts a certain form, encrypts or signs the data and uploads the data. We still recalculate the data after it has been transformed or analyzed, so it is called a key string.

For convenience, we connect the cryptographic device directly to the computer interface. For example, USB interface, PS2 interface and 1394 interface. After the cryptographic device authenticates and negotiates the session key with the server to be connected, when the operator taps the keyboard, the keyboard generates a key code string and transmits the key code string to the computer terminal; the computer terminal transmits the key code string to the cryptographic device; The key string is encrypted and transmitted to the web server; the server decrypts the key string, passes it back to the computer and provides it to the application. Since the key string is transmitted through the computer terminal, there is a possibility of being tampered with. In order to prevent this, a sounding device should be added to the cryptographic device. When the cryptographic device receives the key code string from the computer terminal and reads it out through the sounding device, the operator uses the audible check to verify the correctness of the key code string.

In the scheme where the cryptographic device is connected between the computer keyboard and the computer keyboard interface, the sounding device may also be required to prevent the key code from being displayed, the user is tricked into thinking that the keyboard is not hit correctly, and then the keyboard tap is performed once more (multiple times). The attack is a heavy attack. For example, when the user inputs an amount of 1000, the Trojan causes the computer screen to not display one of the zeros, causing the user to think that the keystroke error is knocked once again, and the actual amount of input data is 10000 and fraud.

Obviously, according to the method of the present invention, when the cryptographic device is connected between the computer keyboard and the keyboard interface of the computer terminal, the request for the network banking service can completely ignore the security problem of the computer client. In the way of directly connecting the cryptographic device to the computer interface, it is necessary to pay attention to the correspondence between the key code and the sound, and the human ear can detect the difference very sensitively. The essence of the scheme for adding a sounding device is to replace the function of the trusted display in the "party and system for secure transactions in a computer system" (Chinese Patent Application CN99806523.4).

According to the method of the present invention, in the computer game service, since the server receives only the encrypted key string data, it is impossible to play the game without the cryptographic device. The way to connect a cryptographic device directly to a computer interface When you listen to the key code sound, you can determine whether there is a hacker illegally using the cryptographic device.

Purpose of the invention

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION It is an object of the present invention to provide a specific, portable device and method for securely using a network server service that does not rely on terminal security. The device and method for safely using the web server service on the untrusted terminal can be easily and safely solved by using a keyboard, a cryptographic device, a network server, and a reasonable flow of information, combined with a good cryptographic protocol.

According to an aspect of the present invention, a portable device for securely using a web server service without relying on client security includes: a key code input interface device, an encryption device, and an output interface device, wherein the key code input interface device receives the keyboard The transmitted key code string; the encryption device encrypts or signs the key code string; and transmits it to the network server through the output interface device and the client;

More securely, there is also a serial number generating device; the serial number generated by the serial number generating device is connected with the key code string; the encryption device encrypts the connected key code string; and is transmitted to the network server through the output device and the client;

Further, there is a sounding device, when the input interface device receives the key code string, the sound corresponding to the key code string is read out by the device;

According to another aspect of the present invention, a method for securely using a web server service without relying on a client includes: having a password device between the client and the keyboard; transmitting information input by the keyboard to the password device; encrypting the password device Or (and) the key code string input by the signature keyboard; transmitting the encrypted or (and) signed key code string to the server through the client; the network server decrypting or (and) confirming the received key code string; the network server receives the And confirm the key code string to perform the corresponding service;

Further, there is a step of the server transmitting the decrypted key code string to the client operating system.

Normally, the cryptographic device also has the step of encrypting or (and) signing the string of keys after collecting multiple key codes. More preferably, there is a step of analyzing the string validity of the string to determine whether to encrypt or (and) sign the key. In order to prevent replay attacks, there may be a step of connecting the encrypted key code information by using a random number generated by the random number generating means.

To prevent replay attacks, there may be a step of connecting the encrypted key string information using the serial number generated by the serial number generating means.

Optionally, there is a step of the server determining whether to provide the service based on the recorded key code compared to the sensitive request submitted by the last user.

More securely, there is also a step of reading out the sound corresponding to the received key code.

In general, there is also the step of the web server negotiating a session key with the cryptographic device. Possibly, there is also a step in which the web server negotiates a pseudo random number generating device seed with the cryptographic device.

DRAWINGS

The present invention is described below with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which

Figure 1 is a schematic diagram showing a conventional networked computer and network;

2 is a schematic view showing the addition of the cryptographic device of the present invention between a keyboard and a keyboard interface;

Figure 3 is a schematic diagram showing the direct connection of a cryptographic device incorporating the present invention to a computer;

Figure 4 is a flow chart showing the operation of the present invention;

Figure 5 is a flow chart showing the direct connection of the cryptographic device of the present invention;

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a general computer and network service. After the computer terminal enters the operating system or the application program 31 normally, after the user inputs the key code through the computer keyboard 4, it is transmitted to the application 31; in general, the key code The representative characters are sent to the display 5 by the application 31 for display. Obviously how the key code is transferred to the application 31 is a function provided by the operating system, but all paths in the transfer process can be hooked up by the hook program or a Trojan can be installed therein. In order to implement the safety device and method of the present invention, the following embodiments are available.

detailed description

Example 1

The core of the invention is that the data generated by the cryptographic device is processed directly by the server, and the original data used for encryption can only be derived from a keyboard or mouse controlled by the cryptographic device. According to an embodiment of the present invention, an apparatus and method for implementing secure use of a web server service without relying on terminal security are as shown in FIG. This is the key string encryption scheme.

After the computer normally enters the operating system or application 31, when the user inputs the key code through the computer keyboard 4, the encryption device 6 performs encryption or signature processing according to the obtained key code string; then transmits to the computer 3, and the computer 3 transmits to the server through the network 2. 1; The server 1 decrypts or confirms the key code string, and performs corresponding work according to the confirmation result, and the server 1 transmits back to the computer 3 and the application 31 through the network 2; in general, the character represented by the key code string is The application is sent to display 5 for display.

In fact, the application 31 can be an IE browser, a client of an online game, or a client of an online banking. When the computer enters the application 31, it is obviously necessary to notify the cryptographic device 6 to enter the network service connection. The cryptographic device 6 can implement an authentication connection with the network server according to the certificate and password (PIN) stored therein; or can exchange the connection. The session key ", using the session key, can realize the encryption and decryption of the cryptographic device 6 and the network server 1; it is also possible to sign the transaction data for online banking payment.

Obviously, the network server 1 also has a decryption or signature authentication device corresponding to the cryptographic device 6. If the encrypted key code string transmitted from the cryptographic device 6 to the computer 3 is also accompanied by the original key code string, the step of the server 1 transmitting the key code string back to the application 31 via the network 2 can be omitted.

In addition, regarding each one-key code encryption, there may be a problem that the password strength is low. Because the key code has only two bytes and only a few hundred different key codes. To do this, you can use "keycode + random number" (byte join) to extend the length of the keycode; then use the encryption algorithm. Thus, the ciphertext of the same character is inconsistent, which increases the strength of encryption. Since the attacker cannot analyze the information of the first 16-bit key code of the plaintext through the ciphertext, a high encryption strength can be achieved.

Further, since the hacker can trick the user into thinking that the keyboard is not hit correctly by not displaying or displaying the key code less, then the attack is performed one more time (multiple times). This can be solved by the sounding device of Embodiment 2. It can also be solved according to the keystroke serial number, fixed input position and input confirmation.

A better method is that the cryptographic device 6 does not encrypt the key code once, but collects a plurality of key codes transmitted by the keyboard, and the key codes may represent all keyboard inputs of a transaction (such as the other party's account, their own account, The transaction amount, etc.) can also represent part of the input (such as an account number) of a transaction. The key string is encrypted or signed and transmitted to the web server via the computer: The server performs the corresponding work. Since the server receives an encrypted or signed key string, other programs on the computer (including Trojans and operating systems) cannot tamper with the key string obtained by the server. Of course, the Trojan can also use the encryption key string to send the server to the attack. However, replay attacks can be eliminated due to keychain encryption, increased keycode serialization, and finally re-signing all inputs. Therefore, after the correctly input data is tampered with, the operator may erroneously reject the correct data; and it is impossible for the operator to accept the falsified result after the data that is correctly input is falsified. That is, you may not be able to use the computer to get network services, but you cannot produce the result of using the computer to get the wrong service from the network server. Of course, the signed key string may not be the original key string of the key, but the cryptographic device analyzes the meaningful result according to the input key string, converts the certain form, encrypts or signs the data and uploads the data. We still use this transformed or analyzed data to be regenerated to be called a key string.

In addition, when we entered the account number, the letter key was entered. This does not comply with the rules of the account, so the cryptographic device can also determine whether it is legal according to the input key string analysis, and decide whether to sign according to the result. Example 2

According to a second embodiment of the present invention, an apparatus and method for implementing secure use of a network service without relying on computer security are implemented as shown in FIG. This mode is that the cryptographic device 6 is directly connected to a computer interface (for example, a USB interface, a PS2 interface, a 1394 interface, etc.).

After the computer normally enters the operating system or the application 31, when the user inputs the key code through the computer keyboard 4, The key code is transmitted to the computer 3, and the computer 3 transmits the key code to the cryptographic device 6, and the cryptographic device 6 performs encryption processing based on the obtained key code string; then transmits it to the computer 3 and transmits it to the server 1 via the network 2; the server 1 decrypts the key The code string is transmitted back to the computer 3 and the application 31 via the network 2; in general, the character represented by the key code string is sent to the display 5 by the application 31 for display. The computer 3 can be attacked by a Trojan, so the key code data may be tampered with, and there is an insecure factor.

In order to prevent this, a sounding device should be added to the cryptographic device. When the cryptographic device receives the keycode from the computer 3 and reads it out through the uttering device, the operator corrects the correctness of the input keycode with the audible check. Example 3

According to a third embodiment of the present invention, a method for implementing secure use of a network service without relying on a terminal is as shown in FIG.

First, the network server and the cryptographic device perform identity authentication; after the authentication is passed, the session key is negotiated, and the authentication does not pass the service obviously; when the key code string is input, the cryptographic device is connected by a random number or a serial number; after being encrypted or signed, the message is transmitted to The terminal transmits the encrypted or signed key code string to the server; the server decrypts or confirms the key code string, and records the key code string; the server transmits the key code string back to the terminal.

Embodiment 3 is an information flow chart when the corresponding cryptographic device is in the connection mode between the keyboard and the keyboard interface. Due to security issues, Embodiment 4 is an information flow diagram of a method in which a cryptographic device is directly inserted into a computer interface.

If the encrypted key code transmitted to the computer terminal after encryption is also accompanied by the original key code, the step of transmitting the decrypted key code to the computer terminal can be omitted.

In addition, regarding each one-key code encryption, there may be a problem that the password strength is low. Because the key code has only two bytes and only a few hundred different key codes. To do this, you can use "keycode + random number" (byte join) to extend the length of the keycode; then use the encryption algorithm. Thus, the ciphertext of the same character is inconsistent, which increases the strength of encryption. In order to prevent replay attacks, it is necessary to include the key code serial number in the encryption key code.

Further, the hacker can attack by intercepting the encrypted signature information by replaying, which can be prevented by combining a serial number with the key string. His function is similar to the time stamp in cryptography.

Further, since the hacker can trick the user into thinking that the keyboard is not hit correctly by not displaying or displaying the key code less, then the attack is performed one more time (multiple times). This can be solved by the sounding device of the second embodiment. It can also be solved according to the keystroke serial number, fixed input position and input confirmation.

A pseudo-random number generator can be used to solve the problem of the key code serial number and the random number, so it is also possible to add a step of negotiating the pseudo random number generator seed with the server.

Further, there is a step of analyzing whether the string of legality of the string determines whether to encrypt or/and sign the serial key. This kind of analysis is a good technical means to deal with heavy attack attacks. Example 4

According to a fourth embodiment of the present invention, a method for implementing secure use of a network service without relying on computer security is as shown in FIG.

First, the network server and the cryptographic device perform identity authentication; after the authentication is passed, the session key is negotiated, and the authentication does not pass, obviously does not provide the service; when the key code string is input, the key code string is transmitted to the computer terminal; the computer terminal transmits the key code string to a cryptographic device; in the cryptographic device, the key code is connected by a serial number, encrypted and transmitted to a computer terminal and gives a sound of the key code string; the computer terminal transmits an encrypted or signed key code string to the server; the server decrypts the encryption or signature key The code string and the decrypted key code string are transmitted to the computer terminal, and the key code is recorded; the system keyboard intermediate software transmits the key code to the application.

Further, the key code output by the keyboard is a replacement key code, that is, a substitute code in cryptography. While the invention has been described by way of example, the embodiments of the invention may

Claims

Rights request

A device for securely using a network server service without relying on client security, comprising: a key code input interface device, an encryption device, and an output interface device; wherein, the key code input interface device receives the key code string transmitted by the keyboard; The encryption device encrypts or signs the key code string; and transmits it to the network server through the output interface device and the client;

The apparatus according to claim 1, further comprising a serial number generating means, wherein the serial number generated by said serial number generating means is connected to the key code string; the encrypting means encrypts the connected key code string; and passes through the output means And the client transmits to the network server for processing;

3. Apparatus according to claim 1 and (or) 2, characterized in that it further has a sounding means for reading out the sound corresponding to the key code string by the means when the input interface means receives the key code string;

4. A method for securely using a web server service without relying on client security, comprising: a password device between the client and the keyboard;

The information input by the keyboard is transmitted to the password device;

A key string that the cryptographic device encrypts or (and) the signed keyboard input;

Transfer the encrypted or (and) signed key string to the server through the client;

The network server decrypts or (and) acknowledges the received key code string;

The network server performs corresponding services according to the received and confirmed key code string;

The method of claim 4 wherein the server further transmits the decrypted key string to the client operating system.

6. A method according to claim 4, characterized in that the cryptographic device also has the step of encrypting or (and) signing the string of keys after collecting a plurality of key codes.

7. A method according to claim 6 further characterized by the step of analyzing the legitimacy of the string of keys to determine whether to encrypt or/and sign the string of keys.

The method according to claim 4, further comprising the step of expanding the encrypted key code information by using a random number generated by the random number generating means.

The method according to claim 4, further comprising the step of expanding the encrypted key string information by using the serial number generated by the serial number generating means.

10. The method of claim 4, further comprising the step of the server determining whether to provide the service based on the recorded key string being compared to the sensitive request submitted by the last user.