WO2009038489A1

WO2009038489A1 - Method for carrying out a secret ballot

Info

Publication number: WO2009038489A1
Application number: PCT/RU2007/000500
Authority: WO
Inventors: Aleksandr Mihailovich Zulin
Original assignee: Aleksandr Mihailovich Zulin
Priority date: 2007-09-17
Filing date: 2007-09-17
Publication date: 2009-03-26

Abstract

The inventive method for carrying out a secret ballot consists in recording each voter, assigning an individual identification code to each voter, casting a vote including the selection by the voter one of several proposed options and in making public the voting results. The voting system assigns an individual identification code to a voter, provides the voter with proposed choice options, records the choice made by the voter, inputs said choice into a database of choices made by voters and delivers to the voter a certificate containing data about the choice made by the voter and his individual identification code, and also information aboutalternative choices of other proposed options made by other voters and their individual identification codes. When announcing the voting results, the individual identification codes of the voters voted for each proposed option are also disclosed.

Description

SECRET VOICE METHOD

Technical field

The invention relates to secret voting technologies, the purpose of which is to identify the winners of election companies of any level, or to identify public opinion on any issue.

State of the art

Secret ballot as a way of revealing the opinions of the majority has been known and used for a long time. Elections are widespread through paper-based voting ballots containing information about the options for expression of will, which are filled out by voters by putting a sign on a specified location (usually a square) related to that option for which a choice has been made and are dropped into a box for voting [Federal Law on the Election of Deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Article 73, 1999]. The disadvantage of this method of voting is the inability to prevent falsification of voting results, as well as the inability to ensure that the voter controls the result of their voting. There is a known secret voting method, including the receipt of a ballot by the voter, followed by mechanical separation along the line of separation of the part of the ballot with rejected options and lowering the remaining part with the chosen option into the ballot box. Then they count the number of votes cast for a particular candidate [RF Patent JVk 2010333].

The disadvantage of this ballot and the method of secret voting is the inability of the voter to verify the correctness of his vote in summing up the voting results.

A known method of secret ballot by ballot, including filling out the ballot by the voter and lowering the filled ballot in the ballot box, in which the voter previously removes the individual identification number from the closed box, executed on stamps with a sticky back side, fastens them on the ballot, which has two identical parts, on each part, fills both parts of the ballot, then mechanically separates it into parts along the tear line and lowers one marked part of the ballot in the ballot box and the other retains part of the bulletin [RF Patent JV ° 2153192]. The counting of votes is reduced to accounting for the individual identification numbers of the ballots cast “for” or “against” one or another voting option, and when publishing the results of voting, not only the number of votes cast for this option is indicated, but also the number of voters “for” or “against” his ballots. If a discrepancy is found in the results of their voting when publishing the results, the voter may appeal to the election commission by presenting a part of the ballot kept by him, i.e., retrospectively monitor the results of his vote.

There is a known secret voting method, including the receipt of a ballot by the voter, the separation of one part of the ballot intended for voting, and its placement in the ballot box, the counting of the number of votes cast regarding the candidate or the question submitted for voting, in which the ballot is used, each part of which a specially defined place for entering an individual anonymous code, and the second part is intended to control the correctness of the will of the voter, receive an individual they can either receive a separate anonymous code from the lottery drum or receive it in sealed form from the election commission and fill out the ballot with the introduction of the same individual anonymous code to each part of the ballot, and the results of the voting shall be announced with the number of votes cast regarding of another candidate or a question put to a vote, and with indication of individual anonymous codes of ballots that voted for him [RF Patent JVa 2178586]. The disadvantage of the last two methods is that the tear-off part of the ballot shows how the voter voted, which provides a documentary basis for the sale of votes, both voluntary and forced. It should be noted that the above methods of secret voting by means of ballots are associated with the advance production of paper ballots, their storage, distribution, delivery, as documents of strict reporting. The main disadvantages of paper-based voting methods are the large time, organizational and material costs involved in preparing and holding elections, the possibility for the subject of the will (voter, referendum) to incorrectly fill out the paper ballot for voting and invalidating his will, a low degree of protection of the voting results from falsification . Moreover, these methods do not provide protection against compromising the voting results, moreover, they provide a real opportunity for compromising the voting results. If you intend to compromise the results of voting at a polling station, the voter or group of voters may fill out parts of the ballot with a different election result, and then after announcing the results of voting at the polling station, accuse the election commission of falsifying the voting results. In addition, these methods do not provide automation of vote counts.

Known electronic methods of holding secret ballots. For example, the “Method of voting using electronic ballots)) is known [RF Patent M ° 2212056], which allows sensory voting using electronic ballots and automatically counts votes.

There is also known a method of electronic voting and processing of results, by which the subject of will expression is identified and registered, an electronic identification means containing unique identification codes is issued, the indicated identification means is introduced into the voting device, the voting program is activated, the verification check procedure is performed, if the verification result is negative, give out a message about the refusal to vote; if the result is positive, they select on the image electronic of the ballot paper on the touch screen of the monitor, record the voting result and certify it with an electronic digital signature, erase the unique code from the specified means of identification and hand over its commission, form the final protocol, which is authenticated with an electronic digital signature [RF Patent JVb 2298229].

There is a known electronic voting method “Caylay” (Kazakhstan), in which, by voting in an isolated booth, the voter, if desired, can press a special button and the voting code generated by the system temporarily appears on the scoreboard, which the voter either remembers or writes. At the end of the vote, the system prints out lists of code-based results that are posted at polling stations and anyone can check the correctness of including their vote in the overall voting results. However, this system also allows for the mass sale of votes from the moment the voter receives a unique code until the publication of lists of code-based results, since the publication of lists of code-based results may well be a documentary basis for the seller of the vote, and convenient for the buyer of votes means of control.

Thus, in the known secret ballot methods, either by paper ballots or using electronic means, it is either not provided and impossible for the voter to verify the inclusion of his own vote in the general vote count, or a truncated, “semi-transparent” check is provided. On the example of the above methods it can be seen that retrospective control over their own voice in them turns into the possibility of selling a voice. In addition, the possibility of control is provided not to all voters, but only to those who participated in the vote, therefore, the ideologists of these systems do not quite correctly call them "transparent secret voting technologies", rather, they are "translucent" technologies. At the same time, the control of those who vote for their vote does not guarantee the correctness of the vote count, since it does not exclude the massive cast-in of fictitious votes on behalf of non-voting or fictitious voters. The invention solves the problem of creating such a secret ballot method that would ensure high accuracy of the vote count by each voter controlling the correctness of his vote counting when counting votes in a polling station, constituency, the whole country without violating the principle of anonymity.

Disclosure of invention

The invention solves the problem of creating such a secret ballot method that would avoid distorting the aggregate will of the voters by ensuring that every voter, including those who did not vote, can control his vote correctly without violating the principle of anonymity.

This object is achieved by the fact that a method for conducting a secret ballot is proposed, which includes registering each voter, receiving an individual identification code, voting by the voter choosing one of several proposed options and publishing the voting results, in which a voting tool is used that assigns an individual identification code to the voter voter, made in such a way that the named code is assigned randomly and the demonstrator it is only given to the voter himself, and the said means of voting also supplies the voter with the proposed choices, records the choices made by the voter, enters them into the database of the elections made by the voters, and supplies the voter with a certificate containing information about the voter’s choice and his individual identification code, as well as information about alternative elections of other proposed options made by other voters, and their individual identification codes, and when Parenting of voting results is indicated by the individual identification codes of voters who voted for each proposed option.

Means of voting can be performed in various ways. For example, one of the options for implementing the voting tool is an electronic device that generates individual identification codes and forms the basis of the elections made by voters individual identification codes, equipped with a screen, a closed casing with a narrow slit - an eye, a means of making a choice by which the voter indicates his chosen voting option and means providing the voter with a certificate. Another embodiment of the voting tool is an isolated booth, inside which there is a member of the election commission, which forms a database of elections made by voters, and a narrow slit-eye is made in the wall of the booth through which an individual identification code and proposed options are shown to the voter outside the booth choice, and it is also equipped with a means of making a choice, with which the voter indicates his chosen option of voting, and a means of supplying voter certificate.

The certificate contains identification codes of mainly one voter for each proposed choice, but, if necessary, may contain codes of more voters for each alternative choice.

When the results of the voting are made public, a complete list of voters' addresses may be given indicating the number of voters who voted, living either at each address or in a group of neighboring addresses.

The publication of voting results can be carried out in the media, or on the Internet, or in other ways, depending on the size of the election.

It is advisable to organize the elections in such a way that the voter during the voting is in an open area in front of the means of voting so that he can be seen by the members of the election commission, public observers and other persons.

The secret ballot method is as follows. When voting using an electronic voting tool, it is necessary to have electronic devices at the polling station that fix the votes of voters and are connected to a common database of voting results, as well as a printing device - a printer. A voter arriving at the polling station presents an identity document, a note is made in the registration journal, and the voter signs it - this is how registration is carried out. A registered voter gains access to an electronic voting device having a screen or a panel closed by an opaque casing, for example, in the form of a pyramid, at the top of which there is a narrow peephole through which only the voter himself can see the selection process.

Having looked into the peephole, the voter sees on the screen an offer to set in motion a means for making a choice, for example, to press a button on a computer mouse. The voter presses the mouse button and in a certain place on the screen appears his individual identification code, which is a unique, generated electronic device. This code remains on the screen until the end of the voting process. After an individual identification code, an electronic menu appears on the screen containing a list of the proposed voting options and a proposal to the voter to select one of the options using, for example, the same computer mouse.

The voter makes his choice, the information about which enters the general database in the form of two fields: the first is the choice made by the voter, and the second is the individual identification code of this voter.

The means of supplying the inventor with a certificate — a printing device — prints out the named certificate, which is a document similar in content and form to the ballot paper, which differs from it in that the opposite to the voting option chosen by the voter is not a tick or a cross, but an individual identification code of the certificate holder, moreover in the certificate received by the voter is filled not one but all the lines with voting options - opposite to the option chosen by the voting voter, on its identification code is printed, which is still visible on the screen, and, on the contrary, the individual identification codes unknown, randomly selected by the electronic system of voters who previously voted for the corresponding option.

Having received a certificate in his hands, the voter once again looks into the peephole and makes sure that his personal code generated by the system and still visible on the screen matches the code printed on his chosen certificate line.

After making sure, the voter once again sets in motion a means for making a choice, for example, a computer mouse, and ends the voting. The electronic device erases all data on the screen and is ready for use by the next voter.

The narrow peephole used during voting will not allow the voter to take the voting procedure on the camera in a mobile phone, and then present this record as evidence to dishonest customers - this cannot be done by voting in an open area in front of the voting facility, in front of observers who have the opportunity to help, prompt the voter how to use the pointing device and on procedural issues, being in close proximity to the voter.

So that people around by the movement of the computer mouse could not determine the choice of the voter, the program each time specially can move the mouse pointer to a randomly selected corner of the screen.

Coded voting results can be published on the Internet already during the election, and voters can be given the opportunity to control their vote as they leave the polling station if they have computers connected to the Internet. It is also possible to control by-code results using mobile phones, for which the desired identification code and (or) address is sent in an SMS message, and a voting result corresponding to the code or address is sent in response.

When publishing the results in the media, the voter will be able to control his choice later, after the publication of these media. It is important that after the publication of the full election results, the voter using the certificate has the opportunity to control not only his choice, but also the elections of those unknown voters whose codes are entered on the remaining lines of the certificate. Each noticed distortion can be documented, corrected and possibly compensated by a monetary payment to the voter who found the distortion.

In addition to the publication of code-based results, it is possible to publish a complete list of voters' addresses indicating the number of voters who vote at each address or a group of neighboring addresses so that it is not possible to determine the identities of voters who voted, i.e. not violate the principle of confidentiality of elections. The total number of voters should be exactly equal to the length of the list of code-based results.

Lists are formed as follows. Since voter lists are required by law to be regularly published, the total number of voters at each address is not confidential. If in any apartment the number of voters voted is equal to zero, or equal to the total number of voters, then it is not possible to publish information separately at the address of this apartment - immediately incognito non-voters or voters will open. This address in the published list needs to be combined with the neighboring apartment, and if in the total of two apartments the number of voters is non-zero and does not equal the total number of voters, then it will be impossible to determine the identities of voters who have voted and who have not voted. The details of addressing can vary widely: this can be the number of voters on the landing, on the porch, on the whole house, or on several neighboring village houses. It is easiest for neighbors to exchange information with each other and determine the accuracy of the address list of voters. Thus, all voters, even those who did not vote, and not only those who have a certificate in their hands, can control their votes. The voting system becomes completely transparent.

In order for the first voters to vote in the described way, it is necessary to provide that the electronic system in advance, formed the minimum required number of fictitious votes, equally for each candidate or choice, which should be printed in the presence of an independent commission and hidden in a sealed envelope. Fictitious entries are initially published as genuine, but their number is deducted during the final vote count. This fact is entered into the protocol, verified by an independent commission, after which the envelope with printouts is destroyed.

When voting using an isolated booth, inside which there is a member of the election commission, a voter arriving at the polling station presents an identity document, a mark is made in the registration journal and the voter signs it - this is how registration is carried out.

A registered voter receives a pass to access an isolated booth, which can be called a box office due to external similarities. The box office window is a narrow gap - a peephole. It is also equipped with means for issuing a certificate, which can be performed, for example, in the form of a retractable pencil case, or a pneumatic tube with a case, and means for making a choice, which can be made, for example, in the form of a pointer inserted into the hole and accessible to the outside of the voter. Going to the box office window, the voter puts his pass into the pencil case and pushes it inside the box office. After that, he was eligible to vote.

Peering into a narrow slot, the voter sees the table of a member of the election commission - “kaccipa”, standing under the window and his hands, while the person sitting in the booth cannot see and does not know which of the voters is voting, just like the electronic system cannot “know” who vote in person.

In front of the voter, “kaccip” sets up on the table, end to the voter, a pre-mixed stack of cards with codes and asks the voter to show a pointer to one of the cards. The “kaccip” card selected by the voter is taken out of the pile and laid out on the table so that the voter always sees the code extended by him. Then, a list of voting options is laid out on the table and the voter is invited to indicate with a pointer to the option for which he casts his vote. The observer outside cannot determine the direction of movement of the pointer handle, how the voter voted, because "Acc" every time intentionally slightly changes the location of the menu on the table.

After that, the cashier fills in the certificate form, that is, he writes in hand, opposite the option chosen by the voter, his individual identification code, but also fills in the remaining lines of the certificate, entering the identification codes of voters who actually voted earlier for the corresponding options. If the number of choices is too large, “account ”may be limited to filling out only a few lines of the certificate, but in any case, the identification code of the certificate holder must be entered. In addition, in this case, “kaccip” offers to indicate another option from the menu with a pointer, especially for the voter report in front of the “vote holder” and fills in the ordered certificate line. If "kaccipa" has a personal computer with a printer, all these operations are performed using a computer, and the certificate is printed using a printer.

After that, “kaccip” allows the voting voter to make sure that the same code is written in the selected line of the certificate as on the card lying on the table, puts the card in a container corresponding to the selected voting option and issues a certificate to the voter through a drawer.

As in the case of electronic voting, an attempt to capture the moment of voting on the camera will be stopped by the members of the election commission and public observers, and the certificate cannot determine how its holder voted, which removes the danger of buying and selling votes.

The precinct election commission working according to the scheme ((election kacc ”) will have to take care of the minimum number of fictitious votes that will fit into the certificates of the very first voters.

Already during the voting, one of the members of the precinct commission gradually fills out the precinct protocol, which indicates how each identification code voted. Another member of the commission gradually fills out the precinct list of voters during the voting day, i.e. a list of registration addresses for this polling station indicating the number of voters who voted at each address. After the end of voting, the district protocol and list are finalized, certified and given to the printing house for replication. Printed in the form of newspaper sheets, district results are sent out to the site, hung out at the entrances of houses and in public places. In case of discrepancy between the published result and the one indicated in the certificate, this document is the basis to challenge the voting results.

In territorial (for example, city) newspapers, a table of the results of voting for each precinct is published, in the newspapers of the constituent entities of the federation, a table of the totals by territory, and in federal newspapers, a table of the totals of the federal constituencies. For each of these tables, it will be easy to check if there were any arithmetic errors when summing up the results. Thus, each ordinary voter, after checking the correctness of including his personal vote in the precinct results, can buy three newspapers - city, regional and federal and check: 1 The correctness of including the results of his precinct in the city results; 2) the correctness of including the results for your city in the regional results; 3) the correctness of the inclusion of the results of the subject of the federation in the federal results. Thus, any voter will be able to conduct end-to-end “low-up” control of the election results of that part of voters that was not covered by the electronic voting system.

Thus, the proposed secret ballot method allows making elections truly transparent, avoiding distortions in the aggregate will of the voters by ensuring that every voter, including those who did not vote, can correctly take his vote into account without violating the principle of anonymity.

Industrial Applicability The proposed secret ballot method can be used in various elections, polls and referenda.

Claims

Claim

1. A method of conducting a secret ballot, including registering each voter, receiving an individual identification code, voting by the voter choosing one of several proposed options and publishing the voting results, characterized in that a voting tool is used that assigns the voter an individual voter identification code, made so that the named code is assigned randomly and is shown only to the voter himself, p Moreover, the said means of voting also supplies the voter with the proposed choices, records the choice made by the voter, enters it into the database of the elections made by the voters, and supplies the voter with a certificate containing information about the voter’s choice and his individual identification code, as well as information about alternative elections of other proposed options produced by other voters and their individual identification codes, and when the results of the voting are made public proves the individual identification codes of the voters who voted for each proposed option.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that the voting means is in the form of an electronic device generating individual identification codes and forming a common base of elections made by voters with their individual identification codes, comprising a screen closed by a casing with a narrow slit - an eye, an implementation tool the choice by which the voter indicates his chosen voting option and the means providing the voter with a certificate.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that the voting means is in the form of an isolated booth, inside which there is a member of the election commission, forming a database of the elections made by voters, and in the wall of the booth there is a narrow peephole through which the voter located outside the cockpit, demonstrate its individual identification code and the proposed choices, and it also contains a means of making choices that the voter indicates the voting option chosen by him, and the means providing the voter with a certificate.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that the certificate contains information about one alternative choice of each proposed choice.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that when the results of the voting are made public, a complete list of voters' addresses is provided indicating the number of voters who vote, living either at each address or in a group of neighboring addresses.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that the publication of the voting results is carried out in the media.

7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that the publication of the voting results is carried out on the Internet.

8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that the publication of voting results is carried out through mobile telecommunication systems, by SMS.

9. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that the voter is in an open area in front of the voting facility during voting.