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11-17 JUNE 2007

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UNDERSTANDING
mis **UNDERSTANDING**

ED. BY
EERO TARASTI

Communication: Understanding / Misunderstanding

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Communication: Understanding / Misunderstanding

**Proceedings of the 9th Congress of the
IASS/AIS – Helsinki-Imatra:
11–17 June, 2007**

Edited by Eero Tarasti
Associated Editors
Paul Forsell
Richard Littlefield

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Eero Tarasti

Presidential Address

Opening of the 9th World Congress of Semiotics (Solemnity Hall, University of Helsinki)

Distinguished Mrs Councillor of State Uosukainen, Distinguished Rectors, Dear Semioticians from all over the world, Ladies and Gentlemen: We are now gathered for this long-awaited convention of semioticians of the world: the Ninth Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies (Association Internationale pour la Sémiotique). At the same time, we are also inaugurating here the international Charles S. Peirce Symposium.

History is present in this hall in many senses. First of all, these truly global meetings are not so numerous as to exceed the lifetime of one person – I know of scholars in this hall who have been attending these conventions ever since the first one, held in Milan in 1974. It was followed by the Vienna congress in 1979, the largest in the history of semiotics, with 2000 participants, and then in Palermo, Barcelona/Perpignan, Berkeley, Guadalajara (Mexico), Dresden, and Lyon. Now, for the first time, we are in Northern Europe, where for the second time such a congress is being shared between two cities, Helsinki and Imatra.

It may be asked, Why are we here? As a practical matter, we should recall that Finland was a candidate for the IASS congress even earlier, and I believe I am right in saying it was the dream of Thomas A. Sebeok, as well as the plan of A. J. Greimas, to have it here. Now the University of Helsinki and the International Semiotics Institute at Imatra are hosting this event.

We may also ask about our “raison d’être”, especially since our discipline has undergone so many changes and transformations during its half-century of existence as an institutional entity. The fact is that the

history of semiotics in the twentieth century, and now in the twenty-first, constitutes an amazing intellectual adventure and a real success story. The basic ideas and concepts of our discipline – discovered and defined many centuries ago, in classics of Antiquity and the Middle Ages – were grouped into various schools in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.... And now they appear in almost every congress organized in the humanities, social sciences and biosciences.

Semiotics has been victorious, to such extent that those who have not followed its paths since its origins are often even not aware of speaking the international scholarly language called “semiotics”. Some may say that semiotics has become irretrievably commingled with other trends and schools, such as media and communication studies, cognitive science, biosemiotics, cultural studies, philosophy, and so on. If you go to congresses of these fields and many others, you will find the mere titles to be purely semiotic, stemming from our tradition. Others may see that semiotics has “exploded” into an array of different galaxies, fragmented into highly detailed and specialized fields.

In such a situation, it is, to my mind, extremely important that congresses be organized which are expressly dedicated to semiotics, in order to refine its concepts, maintain their actuality and theoretical sharpness, and remind us of our origins in classical thinkers. That is the reason for a world congress of semiotics, the best proof of which is your presence here today.

To try to define briefly what we do, we could say that semiotics is a science that is always two steps ahead of the others. It has served as a field of innovation in its truest sense, not as *pensée domestiquée*, to produce immediate economic profit, but as *pensée sauvage*, to quote Claude Lévi-Strauss, whose centenary we are also celebrating on this occasion (albeit a year in advance).

In a word: semiotics has kept itself as the *avant-garde* of sciences. It has always looked forwards, seeking and discovering new territories, asking new questions, mounting new explorations.

Nous devons regarder l’histoire de notre discipline. Quel facteur l’a rendu quelque-chose nouvelle dans les années 60, à l’époque glorieuse du structuralisme, lorsqu’elle est devenue institutionnalisée? D’une part, quant aux topiques traditionnelles de haute culture dans les arts, his-

toire, mythologie, patrimoine culturelle, la nouvelle chose, la modernité consiste en efforts d'y appliquer des points de vue radicalement nouveaux de la théorie d'information, linguistique, cybernetiques, études par ordinateurs. Ce nouveau aspect fournit ces sujets avec un effet d'étrangement, ils étaient tout à coup vu dans une lumière complètement inattendue, satisfaisante les idéals de l'efficacité, précision, formalisation, analyse structurale, alors epistémés de l'époque et à la mode.

Néanmoins, de l'autre coté aussi radical a sonné l'idée d'étudier la culture populaire, les «*lesser arts*», comme on dit en anglais, cinéma, publicité, mode, gastronomie, média par un discours rigoureux et formel ; ces sujets étaient pour ainsi dire élevées à un status des objets sublimes et nobles qui valaient études sérieuses et académiques. Là restaient la nouveauté de toute la sémiotique.

Mais quelle chose pourrait être «*nouvelle*» dans le contexte de l'année 2007? Le structuralisme a donné sa place il y a longtemps au poststructuralisme et postmodernisme. Pourtant j'ai le sentiment que nous ne vivons plus dans aucun monde de «*post*» mais que nous sommes en face des challenges et défis imprévues. Je suis convaincu que la science, même la plus abstraite and théoretique, est en fin exercé et écrit à partir de son propre temps, réfléchi et filtrée par les expériences subjectives sur monde de notre savant. Cette nouvelle science, j'ai le courage de l'appeler comme «*néosémiotique*». De quoi s'agit elle, je le laisse à décider, à vous, chers amis sémioticiens du monde, selon vos traditions et considérations.

Dans certains pays on pense que l'on peut tenir la sémiotique vivante et de l'avantgarde en étudiant des phénomènes fraîches de notre environnement culturel, c'est-à-dire de média, nouvelles formes de communication, internet, portables, les choses de cyber, consommation, le lieu urbain et post-urbain, futurologie etc. Evidemment c'est une avenue, mais il faut que nous nous souvenons ne pas d'être les *seuls* savants qui recherchent de tels sujets. Ils sont aussi traité par des autres provenant d'autres disciplines, qui possèdent peut-être une plus grande attraction à la grande publique. Nous sémioticiens ont, à savoir, une tendance d'être des intellectuels difficiles qui par nos notions abstraites et critiques produisons des troubles et plutôt dérangons la gaité de la vie mondialisé. La science est aussi une activité idéologique.

Or, existe-t'il en fin aucune idéologie «sémiotique» qui nous garantis l'intérêt pour la sémiotique comme une science progressive? Voici nous entrons la domaine des valeurs, qui ne doivent guère d'être exclues de l'approche sémiotique. La sémiotique a été trop souvent critiqué qu'elle essaie seulement élucider comment les choses *fonctionnent* au lieu de réfléchir sur les questions vraiment essentielles, comme qu'est-ce-que nous devons faire? Sémioéthique est une nouvelle sous-discipline qui se souci de prendre cette défi au sérieux.

Let us look at the history. What made semiotics something new in the 1960s, in the glorious days of structuralism, when it became institutionalized? On the one hand, traditional high-culture topics in the arts, history, mythology and cultural heritage were studied from radically new viewpoints of information theory, linguistics, cybernetics and computer studies. These new viewpoints and frames of reference provided these topics with an estrangement effect, such that they were suddenly seen in a totally new light, as fulfilling the epistemic ideals of efficiency, formalisation, and structural analysis. On the other hand, the study of popular, “low-culture” phenomena and “lesser arts”, such as cinema, advertising, fashion, food, and media, with a rigorous and formal discourse, elevated all those to a status of sublime and noble objects worthy of serious academic study. That, too, was a novelty.

What might the “new” semiotics bring us today, in 2007? Structuralism has given way to poststructuralism and postmodernism, yet I have the feeling we are no longer living in a “post-world”, but rather facing new challenges. My conviction also is that science, even the most abstract and theoretical, is ultimately done and written in its own time; in it are reflected and filtered the personal experiences of the world by the scholars exercising it. This new science I have taken the liberty of calling “*neosemiotics*”. What it is and will be, dear semioticians from many countries and traditions, remains for you to decide.

In some countries it is thought that semiotics remains alive and avant-garde by studying the newest phenomena of our cultural environment, by focusing on media, new forms of communication, internet, mobile phones, “cyber-toys”, consumption, urban and posturban spaces, futurology, etc. That is one avenue; but we must remember that we are not the *only* scholars studying such issues. They are dealt with by

others whose discourse may have more direct appeal to a large audience, since we semioticians tend to be intellectuals who, with our critical and abstract concepts, disturb the blissful life of the globalized world. Science is also ideological activity. Is there, then, anything like a “semiotic” ideology, which would guarantee its interest as a progressive science? Here we enter the area of values. These can by no means be excluded from semiotics, which has been overly criticized for clarifying merely how things *function*, instead of pondering such vital questions as, What should we do? Semioethics – a new subdiscipline – is trying to take this challenge seriously.

The theme of each world congress has been different. As you know, our theme has to be general enough that any semiotician of the world can attend. On the other hand, it should display a kind of actuality. Moreover, it should to some extent reflect the traditions and achievements of the host country. Hence such themes as “Man and His Signs / L’homme et ses signes”, “Signs of the World / Les signes du monde” and the like have figured as headings of these conventions

This time our theme is *Communication: Understanding and Misunderstanding*. The first concept – communication – makes reference to one very important field of our studies, in the area of *signification*. As you know, you are now in the country of Nokia, a pioneer in modern communication. Moreover, the idea of “understanding” reflects the philosophical tradition of our country, in names like George Henrik von Wright (highly respected by Greimas, among others) and Jaakko Hintikka, not to mention the many Peirce scholars who are having their symposium simultaneously with this one.

Now we come to the word “misunderstanding” in our title. Nothing could be more urgent and actual: we live in a world of conflicts, misinterpretations, errors, suspicions, tensions, hostilities, prejudices ... In short, as the American linguist Walburga von Raffler-Engel once put it at a historic congress in Finland in 1983 in Jyväskylä, we live in a world of *crosscultural misunderstanding*. As the patron of our congress, President Martti Ahtisaari, one of the world’s leading specialists in this field has said: “If we semioticians study misunderstanding we can find ways and open paths to the self-understanding of mankind.”

If you will look at the cover picture of your program and abstract books, or at our poster, designed by Jussi Rossi, you will find signs that

are not arbitrary. On the former, you see a graffiti-sign of our present world, giving the impression of contemporaneity. But why in the world is the name of Brazilian Emperor Pedro II engraved there, on something resembling grey stone? Some of our guests already know: it comes from some rocks at the Imatra waterfall, admired by semioticians of many countries and generations. Among many other notables over the centuries, Pedro II visited Imatra in 1876 after attending a Bayreuth Festival produced by Richard Wagner. Thus, the sign on our poster may symbolize both the presence of history and global communication among continents.

Finally, I ask you to look at three geometric forms visible there: a triangle, a square, and a circle. These are supposed to refer to various semiotic theories – to which ones I leave to your imagination!

Ladies and Gentlemen, at the end of the opening speech there is always a place for thanks. We have to express our gratitude to the following institutes in this country: the University of Helsinki, the International Semiotics Institute at Imatra, the Finnish Network University for Semiotics, the Ministries of Education and Foreign Affairs, Finnish Academy of Sciences, Finnish Cultural Foundation, Nokia, the Niilo Helander Foundation, the Istituto italiano di cultura, the embassies of France and Lithuania, and the Metropol Polytechnic University of Helsinki.

And above all, we are indebted to all of you who are present here, having made the (often long) journey to Finland. It is thanks to your contributions that our tradition of world congresses of semiotics remains alive and vigorous.

Nadia Ablib

Comprendre la communication touristique

Approche sémiotique de la culture

I. Introduction

La communication touristique est devenue un élément indispensable pour faire connaître un lieu, le promouvoir et finalement le vendre à un destinataire “chercheur d’information” et “touriste potentiel”. Sous l’impact du développement croissant du tourisme urbain, de plus en plus de villes élaborent leurs communications touristiques. L’intérêt pour cette dernière n’a cessé de croître une fois que son influence sur le choix de la destination a été largement démontrée par des études de marketing. Mais l’utilité de la communication touristique va au delà de l’attraction des visiteurs ou d’investisseurs, elle joue un rôle déterminant dans la construction d’une image positive et valorisante de la ville. Cette image qui sera enrichie, maintenue, voire modifiée au cours du temps.

A travers cette étude, nous voulons montrer que la communication touristique est une pratique culturelle et donc sémiotique. Nous suggérons que l’appréhension de la communication touristique par la sémiotique permettra une meilleure intelligibilité de cet objet complexe. Pour élucider notre hypothèse, nous nous appuyons sur la sémiotique de la culture. Le travail présenté ici fait partie de notre recherche dont l’objectif principal est de montrer comment la communication touristique construit une identité de la ville en analysant un corpus de brochures touristiques concernant les villes de Lyon, Turin et Marrakech. Nous commençons par la présentation des deux éléments clés de cette étude: la communication touristique et la sémiotique de la culture.

1.1. La communication touristique

La communication touristique forme un champ vaste et riche en définitions. Marc Boyer et Philippe Viallon qui étaient parmi les premiers chercheurs qui ont consacré une étude complète à ce sujet ont bien souligné la diversité des supports, des émetteurs et des récepteurs de la communication touristique. Ce qui rend difficile la tâche de trouver une définition globale et précise de la communication touristique. Pour cerner cette diversité, Frustier et Perroy, dans “La communication touristique des collectivités territoriales”, font une distinction entre la communication “du tourisme” et la communication “touristique”. La première est élaborée uniquement par les professionnels du tourisme comme les agences de voyage ou les tours opérateurs. Elle porte sur un produit défini et vise une certaine cible. La deuxième englobe toute activité qui peut avoir un impact sur la fréquentation touristique. Cette distinction est importante mais les termes employés ne reflètent pas clairement cette différence dans le sens. Nous dirons plutôt qu’il existe deux visions de la communication touristique. Une vision “étendue” qui regroupe à la fois les moyens directs et indirects de la communication touristique. Nous pouvons citer comme exemples: un documentaire télévisé sur un pays (comme des Racines et des Ailes ou Thalassa qui sont deux émissions diffusées à la télévision française et qui présentent aux spectateurs des lieux différents), un article de presse qui accentue les avantages d’une région, un film qui met en avant une ville ou même un musée pour ne citer que “Da Vinci code”. Après sa diffusion en France, le musée du Louvre a enregistré un taux de visite exemplaire. Ces éléments énumérés relèveront de la communication touristique s’ils véhiculent une image positive et valorisante des lieux concernés. Dans cette considération large, nous dirons que tout élément qu’il soit médiatique ou pas est susceptible de devenir un instrument de la communication touristique sans oublier le fameux bouche à oreille. L’autre vision que nous appelons “restreinte” recouvre exclusivement les documents fournis par les organismes touristiques tels que les brochures, les affiches, les dépliants ainsi qu’internet.

Au sein de cette deuxième catégorie, nous devons aussi distinguer entre les organismes publics et privés. Cette distinction est d’autant plus importante puisqu’elle concerne deux types de discours qui sont aussi bien différents dans leur forme que dans leur contenu. Si le premier objectif des

tours opérateurs et des agences de voyage est d'attirer les foules de touristes, celui des offices du tourisme est de faire connaître leurs pays, leur villes et de promouvoir leurs cultures. Par conséquent, les documents publiés par les offices de tourisme utilisent un discours moins commercial et plus culturel que tout autre type de documentation touristique.

La communication touristique est donc un discours créé et élaboré pour représenter et vanter un espace donné – qui est dans notre cas la ville. Travaillant sur un discours officiel, celui des offices du tourisme des trois villes concernées, nous proposons de décrire ce type de communication touristique institutionnelle. Avant de procéder à notre analyse, nous devons d'abord présenter l'approche de la sémiotique de la culture.

1.2. La sémiotique de la culture

La sémiotique de la culture est généralement définie comme une perspective utilisant des méthodes et des concepts sémiotiques pour l'étude et l'interprétation de la culture. Elle a débuté dans les années 70 avec les travaux de l'école de Tartu qui portaient principalement sur l'histoire et la culture russe. Elle a connu ensuite des développements en Europe et en Amérique du Nord. Son projet principal est de fournir les éléments adéquats qui permettent l'analyse de la signification de tout ce qui relève de la culture que ce soit un objet ou une pratique. Son objectif est de rendre "les pratiques culturelles interprétables, en élucidant leurs codes, leurs références et les significations qu'elles peuvent représenter pour les acteurs sociaux qui les mettent en œuvre" (Lamizet 1999: 219).

Pour Lamizet, si la culture relève fondamentalement d'une sémiotique, c'est que le propre des pratiques culturelles est de s'inscrire toujours dans une logique de représentation. C'est d'ailleurs le principe fondateur du signe: représenter quelque chose. Par conséquent, la culture est intrinsèquement sémiotique car elle est un ensemble de formes symboliques dont la première fonction est la représentation de la sociabilité. Youri Lotman, un des fondateurs de l'école de Tartu et de la sémiotique de la culture, a plutôt adopté une définition opérationnelle de la culture. Selon lui, la culture c'est de l'information: "Nous dirons donc que la culture est constituée par l'information non-héréditaire que recueillent, conservent et transmettent les sociétés humaines" (Lotman 1971: 46).

Cette définition de la culture comme information est importante car, d'une part, elle insiste sur le rôle du langage naturel comme modalité de la transmission de la culture. D'autre part, elle souligne les caractérisations de la culture: le collectif, le sélectif, le conservé et le transmis. En adoptant cette définition, la communication touristique serait donc un objet culturel parce qu'elle est un ensemble d'informations recueillies, sélectionnées et transmises sur la ville. En parlant de Lotman, nous ne pouvons ne pas évoquer le concept de la "sémiosphère" qui occupe une place prépondérante dans sa sémiotique de la culture. Défini comme espace sémiotique, cette notion a permis de marquer l'hétérogénéité des formes culturelles et leur dynamisme même si elle est critiquée pour sa focalisation sur "le nous" ou le Soi (Rastier 2002). Traitant de la représentation de la ville, nous pouvons souligner le travail de Lotman sur l'importance de la ville dans le système symbolique d'une culture (voir le symbolisme de St Petersburg).

Cette courte présentation de la sémiotique de la culture nous a permis d'élucider le caractère sémiotique de la culture. Nous proposons maintenant trois considérations principales – et qui sont à notre avis complémentaires – explorer la communication touristique en tant que pratique significative.

2. La communication touristique: Une pratique culturelle

2.1. La mise en signes et en scène de la ville

Nous envisageons la communication touristique comme une pratique culturelle car elle est une pratique sociale signifiante menée par un acteur collectif – les décideurs – pour construire un objet sémiotique qui est la ville représentée. Selon Lamizet, toute pratique culturelle s'inscrit dans une logique de représentation, de signification et de sociabilité. A cet égard, la communication touristique ne peut être qu'une pratique culturelle dans la mesure où elle suit cette logique. La ville dans une brochure ou un dépliant touristique se manifeste sous la forme d'un ensemble signifiant composé de signes textuels et visuels. Ces signes sont sélectionnés, hiérarchisés et traités dans le but de créer une ville – discours qui représentera la ville réelle. La visée référentielle de la communication touristique qui consiste à faire croire que la ville représentée correspond à la ville réelle

n'est pas pour autant la seule. En d'autres mots, la ville n'est pas seulement représentée mais transformée en attraction – en employant un terme bien touristique – c'est-à-dire en objet de valeur qui pourra susciter l'intérêt d'un sujet. Cet objet sera également interprété comme une mise en œuvre de la sociabilité et surtout de l'identité. Nous développerons ce point dans la dernière section de ce travail.

Dans son livre *The Tourist*, D. MacCannell élabore une sémiotique de l'attraction. Selon lui, une attraction touristique met en relation un marqueur (marker) qui représente un "sight" (un lieu touristique à voir) pour un touriste. MacCannell définit le marqueur comme toute information à propos d'un "sight". Nous pouvons dire que MacCannell adopte une vision étendue de la communication touristique puisque – pour lui – un marqueur peut être une carte postale, un guide touristique, un article de presse, une photo, etc. L'intérêt du travail de MacCannell se lit dans sa définition du marqueur qu'il considère comme un signe représentant un "sight" au touriste. Dans ce contexte, la communication touristique serait la mise en circulation des marqueurs.

La communication touristique met en scène la ville en lui donnant une autre forme de présence: celle des signes qui la représentent et en même temps la construisent pour en faire un objet de valeur et de savoir. La communication touristique fait connaître la ville, ses atouts et sa culture au touriste – qui en principe ignore tout de la ville sauf peut-être le nom. Elle devient ainsi l'objet-intermédiaire entre la ville et le touriste. Pour cela, nous proposons de considérer la communication touristique comme une médiation culturelle.

2.2. La communication touristique comme médiation culturelle

Si on se représente le tourisme sous la forme d'un parcours narratif, la communication touristique se situe entre le désir de voyager et sa réalisation. L'envie de partir existe mais pour choisir sa destination, le touriste potentiel a pour solution de consulter la communication touristique. Cette dernière est souvent le premier contact qu'un touriste peut avoir avec une destination ou "un sight" comme l'affirme MacCannell: "Usually, the first contact a sightseer has with a sight is not the sight itself but with some representation thereof" (1989: 110).

La communication touristique met en scène la ville et rassure le touriste potentiel en lui proposant un voyage virtuel à travers ses textes et ses photos. Autrement dit, elle lui offre une première vue de la ville. La majorité des touristes ont donc déjà visité leurs destinations sans avoir quitté leur domicile. Par conséquent: “In many cases, tourists do not get to know the area, but get to re-know it” (Gali et Benito 2005: 778).

Nous voulons insister ici sur le fait qu’un lecteur est aussi un touriste – virtuel – et que la communication touristique est une zone de contact entre le touriste et la ville. Une brochure de notre corpus sur la ville de Turin commence avec l’énoncé suivant: “C’est en vous *promenant* que vous découvrirez les vrais trésors de cette ville, dans ses rues, dans les palais, dans les cours ...” Dès les premières lignes, la communication touristique met en relation le touriste – le sujet de référence du “vous” – et la ville. Certes, c’est l’actualisation du programme narratif “la promenade” – qui est une métonymie du voyage – qui permettra au touriste de découvrir les vrais trésors de la ville réelle. En attendant, il peut parcourir les pages de la brochure touristique et mener une promenade virtuelle par laquelle, il découvrira d’autres formes de trésors; celles de la ville représentée en mots et en photos. La communication touristique abonde en signes visuels iconiques représentant des espaces fermés et ouverts de la ville. Cette abondance est cruciale puisque le tourisme est le domaine du visible par excellence comme le montre bien d’ailleurs le mot anglais “sightseeing”. On voyage pour voir, d’où la nécessité de créer un monde sensible à l’œil du sujet-observateur dans et par la communication touristique.

La communication touristique crée un lien entre la ville et le touriste. Elle se présente ainsi comme une médiation culturelle entre le sujet (le touriste) et le monde représenté (la ville). Si l’objectif général de la médiation culturelle est la mise en lien du sujet avec l’objet ou l’espace culturel, nous pouvons dire que la communication touristique remplit pleinement cette fonction et de différentes manières. Premièrement, la communication touristique instaure un espace intersubjectif où le touriste rencontre la ville comme nous l’avons déjà signalé. Deuxièmement, la communication touristique cherche à séduire en représentant les objets et les espaces culturels attendus par les touristes sous un mode esthétique attirant. De plus, la communication touristique n’hésite pas à promettre explicitement aux touristes la satisfaction de leurs divers besoins culturels comme dans l’énoncé suivant: “L’art est chez lui, ici à Turin. 40 musées pour satisfaire

les passions et les curiosités culturelles et artistiques de chacun”. Troisièmement, la communication touristique n’est pas rédigée dans la langue naturelle de la ville (l’émetteur) mais souvent dans une langue étrangère: celle du touriste. Elle forme ainsi un discours sur Soi (la ville) traduit pour l’Autre (le touriste) constituant ainsi un pont culturel entre ces deux catégories. Ce que nous proposons de développer dans le prochain point est cette présence de soi et de l’autre dans la communication touristique.

2.3. La communication touristique comme présence de Soi et de l’Autre

La communication touristique n’est jamais neutre. Elle est surtout productrice d’images. Le concept “image” est utilisé ici dans le sens de représentation mentale qu’un sujet cognitif se fait d’un lieu sans être physiquement lié à ce lieu. Ainsi, la communication touristique transmet l’image que la ville veut donner d’elle-même au monde extérieur. Cette image construite est étroitement liée à une présence de soi et de l’autre dans le discours de la communication touristique. De ce point de vue, la communication touristique est une pratique où le soi se rend présent et signifiant à l’autre.

La communication touristique construit un objet sémiotique par lequel la ville est représentée à travers une pluralité de signes que le lecteur doit configurer et interpréter pour créer sa propre image de la ville. Cette représentation est essentiellement faite pour un autre- qui en principe un étranger qui veut découvrir la ville. Par conséquent, la communication touristique est le résultat d’une réflexion sur soi car l’émetteur s’engage dans un processus de sélection des éléments signifiants – des signes – qui selon lui, sont représentatifs de sa ville. Elle résulte également d’une réflexion sur l’autre puisque l’émetteur élabore son discours en prenant en considération ce que l’autre attend de lui. Ce faisant, la communication touristique relève en partie du métasavoir dans la mesure où elle traduit un savoir que le sujet-émetteur a sur le savoir du sujet-récepteur. Ce savoir qui est basé sur le croire-vrai de l’émetteur explique l’emploi des stéréotypes et des préjugés dans la communication touristique.

Dans la communication touristique se développe un processus identitaire complexe; celui de la valorisation de soi. Le sujet valorisant – l’émetteur de la communication touristique – donne du sens à la ville en faisant d’elle un objet singulier. Ce processus de distinction et de signification est

actualisé par l'emploi de plusieurs stratégies de valorisation qui font de la ville un objet utopique, ludique, historique ou pratique. C'est au lecteur de faire son choix selon ses motivations. Ce faisant, l'émetteur de la communication touristique met en scène et en valeur les éléments physiques de la ville (son patrimoine naturel et culturel) mais aussi ses croyances, ses traditions, ses valeurs, ses arts, son style de vie, ... en un mot son identité. La communication touristique se définit donc comme un lieu de construction de l'identité où on valorise les monuments et les paysages de la ville ainsi que ses bâtisseurs anciens et modernes, ses artisans et ses habitants qui font d'elle un objet unique comme le montre l'énoncé suivant extrait d'une brochure sur la ville de Lyon: "Au fil des ans, les Soyeux, les Imprimeurs, les Bâtisseurs, les Créateurs ont confirmé la vivacité de la Cité. Et ont tous façonné un patrimoine unique, rare, et beau".

La communication touristique transforme la ville en faisant d'elle un objet visible et lisible pour l'autre. Elle construit ainsi une identité de la ville, celle qui sera comprise, reconnue et acceptée par l'autre. Ce faisant, la communication touristique est un discours dont l'objectif est d'assurer la compréhension entre un émetteur et un récepteur appartenant à des cultures différentes.

3. *Conclusion*

La communication touristique n'est pas seulement une technique de promotion ou un moyen d'information; nous avons essayé de le montrer au cours de ce travail en élucidant son caractère sémiotique et culturel. En premier, nous avons proposé d'étudier la communication touristique comme une pratique culturelle puisqu'elle est une pratique sociale significative. Ensuite, nous avons élucidé son statut de zone de contact entre le touriste et la ville. Ce qui nous a amené à la définir comme une médiation culturelle. Enfin, la communication touristique construit une identité de la ville dans la mesure où elle est une présence de soi à l'autre et une présence de soi et de l'autre. Nous avons proposés ces trois pistes d'investigation afin d'assurer une meilleure compréhension de la communication touristique en tant que pratique significative et de l'inscrire dans la problématique d'une sémiotique des cultures.

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Tutku Akter

Power relations and construction of knowledge

Introduction

Mass media keep us aware of world events, act as a means of recreation, and have even become accepted as a guide for general decision making. Mass media also undertake the education of society, by constantly imprinting identities, social behaviours, status quos and the roles that we play in daily life. The owners of the media institutions influence the structure of the ideologies disseminated. Hence the “same” knowledge, when imparted by mass media, may vary considerably from venue to venue. It is possible to claim that the owner(s) of the media may also influence the audience’s perception via the ideology that is injected.

This paper examines the changing discourses of various newspapers concerning the bridge that is supposed to symbolically “re-unite” Nicosia, the only divided capital city in Europe. The printed biases of different newspapers lead to different accounts of the same events, which engenders profound effects on everyday life.

1. Communication as producing and exchanging meanings

Verbal and written skills are one of the main distinctions that make mankind different from other beings. The production and exchange of meanings includes two interrelated concepts: transmission and interaction. Mass media are the most widespread means of communication, enabling interaction between communities and nations; and spreading information to the masses has become one of the main tasks of the media. But with the constant development and diffusion of new communication technologies, it becomes difficult to talk about pure information. Nowadays, the media

are an arena in which the owners compete – they use media for their own benefit. Hence the kind of knowledge disseminated is not neutral, but infused with “power relations”.

The term “information” can be defined as receiving and sending news or collected facts and data, whereas knowledge can be explained as “the psychological result of perception and learning and reasoning” and as the product of thought that arise from human intelligence. In other words, knowledge is a type of processed information that involves learning. It is not pure information but a reproduction of it. Thus, transmitting information with objective and impartial discourses would influence the knowledge obtained by individuals and society.

Media, used as an ideological weapon by the owners, can be accepted as the mean of a system constructed through “power relations”. Since media have the power to determine the attitudes and ideas of audiences, they can format, construct and reconstruct our knowledge. In order to investigate the power of media it is necessary to deal with the power of language and discourse. Language is a system of sounds, words, patterns, etc. that humans use to communicate thoughts and feelings; as such, it is much more complicated than we might imagine. It has the power to dominate and, in a sense, construct the things in our lives, even ourselves.

2. Language and the construction of knowledge

Under the heading of textuality one could summon up a movement within literary and cultural theory and in philosophy towards the revaluation and revalorisation of the text as *text* rather than as pale reflection of some prior reality (Barrett 1991: 124).

Words refer only to themselves, not to objective realities; therefore giving meaning to them should be in the hands of the reader. How readers do so is interrelated with their background and psychology, as well as the texts that they read (intertextual meanings). Some postmodernist and new pragmatist thinkers, such as Tzvetan Todorov and Stanley Fish, explain the meaning of text as “everything” and “nothing”. They also insist that each text is pre-text and bears the meaning that the reader gives it; in other words, readers both read and construct texts. The deconstructionists, following Derrida, answered the question of “what is text” as nothing. According to them there should be both thesis and antithesis within the

text, and the difference between them is used in order to construct meaning. They believe that within a text, in order to construct the meaning, the reader should recognize the hidden “differences” therein; for instance, while reading the term “black”, (s) he should be able to understand also the concept of whiteness.

A close relation obtains between text, author and the interpretation of hidden meanings within statements. There is also an interrelation between text and discourse. In the modernist perspective, the author, who is accepted as the creator of the text, has authority over his or her creation, and hence determines the destiny of the text and its interpretation. By contrast, in postmodernist formulations the reader and the text, as constructors of meaning, are privileged over the authors. Meaning arises from the interaction of the reader with text, with the reader’s past experience also playing a role in the establishing of meanings. How these meanings arise is another matter to be explored.

The concept of “discourse” is used by Mikhail Bakhtin, Roman Jakobson and then later by Michel Foucault (Doltas 1999). Bakhtin, in his article “From the Prehistory of Novelistic Discourse”, defines discourse as the communication of ideas by way of language. Jakobson accepts discourse as part of the communication process and as a power by which to transform systems of meaning. In his view, discourse explores the relation between “word” and “world”. Therefore two of the most important questions to be asked are, Which peculiarity of this cosmos or universe is expressed? And, How is it expressed?

Foucault, as opposed to modernists, claimed that some knowledge and thoughts are taken for granted in the construction of discourse and that they are not independent from history, culture and ideologies. Foucault draws attention to the relation between text and discourse:

The question posed by language analysis of some discursive fact or other is always: according to what rules has a particular statement been made, and according to what rules could other similar statements be made? The description of the event of discourse poses a quite different question: how is it that one particular statement appeared rather than another? (Foucault, in Barrett 1991: 126)

According to Foucault, there is a strong relationship between statements, the source of the statement (centres of knowledge), the hidden meaning of the statement, and what the discourse tries to emphasize. Yet

Foucault rejects the concept of ideology for three reasons. First, because it “always stands in virtual opposition to something else which is supposed to count as truth”, the effect of the truth produced within discourses, which in themselves are neither true nor false. Therefore discourse has in itself the power to produce or reproduce “truth”. His second reason for rejecting ideology is because it refers to something of the order of a subject; his last reason is that it stands on a determinate base-and-superstructure model within Marxism.

According to Foucault, discourse can actively constitute or construct society on various dimensions. Discourse analysis is concerned with specifying socio-historically variable discursive formations, which include formation of objects, of enunciative modalities, of concepts and of strategies. Through discourse the objects of social life are conceptually transformed and reproduced. Moreover, discourse is historically specific, yet open to change. Therefore it can be assumed that the historical can also be reconstructed through history again.

Social context and verbal context (its position in relation to other statements) determine the form of a statement and the way it is interpreted (Fairclough 1994). There are also extra-discursive relationships, which pertain to the relation between statements and institutions (Barrett 1991). According to Scott Reid (1999), language relates to power in four aspects: (1) language reflects power; (2) creates power; (3) depoliticizes power; (4) and finally, it “routinizes” power. As a rule of thumb: the dominant power will impose its own language on the population at large, thereby making it the standard language to use.

3. Changing discourses and constructed knowledge

The print media of northern Cyprus is controlled by political parties, each newspaper being owned by one of them, and serving as a venue from which to promote their various political intentions. This situation may be taken as proof of the democratic infrastructure of the republic, but it may have some disadvantages when it comes to the construction of the knowledge of the society as well.

As mentioned earlier, different newspapers voice different views on the symbolic bridge that is supposed to “re-unite” Nicosia, the only divided European capital at the time this essay is being written. The newspapers in

question are: the Afrika Newspaper, which can be described as extremely left wing; the Volkan Newspaper (right wing); and the Kibris Newspaper, representing the democratic left.

In the first week of the December 2005, Afrika Newspaper set its agenda on the significance of the bridge that was going to be constructed for “peaceful” purposes. These last received considerable attention, and only one day was there hard news, concerning the proprietorship problem of people living in northern Cyprus. Setting their sights on the significance of this “peaceful” bridge, the authors mostly acted as adversaries to the government or to the military, using harsh words to make their case. On the first day of December the headline was about the money spent for construction of the bridge. One author attacked the necessity of constructing the bridge, and pointed out that the upper passageways, essential to preventing accidents, were never built. The headline emphasized that the bridge was constructed simply for military purposes. The following day’s headline was based on the same assertion. By doing this, the Afrika Newspaper tried to inject the idea that the bridge could not be accepted as a sign of “peace” but rather of political and military force. The third day saw a criticism of the bridge as a connector between Heaven and Hell. The Afrika Newspaper is one of those that defend the necessity of re-unifying Cyprus. Thus, they signify Northern Cyprus as hell, because of not being recognized politically, and South Cyprus, that is to say, the Republic of Cyprus, as heaven. December 4 saw no headline related to the bridge but on the fifth day the newspaper gave place to the concerns of the president of the Republic of Cyprus regarding the military purpose of the proposed bridge. The next day, after mentioning Papadopoulos’s doubts, they poured shame on the Turkish military for operating in the region that the bridge was going to be constructed. Thus, Afrika Newspaper clearly aligned itself with the Greeks about the military purposes of the construction of the bridge, rather than its “peaceful” purposes.

By contrast, Volkan Newspaper set its agenda to focus not on construction of the bridge, but on the proprietorship suit in the case concerning the re-unification of Cyprus. The issue concerns proposed laws about returning, trading, or parcelling the properties owned by Greeks in Northern Cyprus. The Volkan Newspaper showed itself sympathetic to the idea of compensating Greek Cypriots in the south.

On December 1, the Kibris Newspaper – a defender of the democratic left – claimed that the bridge, meant to be a sign of re-unification, was instead causing a panic among Greek Cypriots and clearly favoring Turkish Cypriots’ political designs for the same bridge. On December 2 the headline was about the reaction of the president of Northern Cyprus, denying any suggestions that the bridge was to be used for military purposes. Acceleration of the construction of the bridge and decisiveness of Turkish Cypriots made the headlines on December 3. The next three days saw no cover stories about the bridge, but on December 7 an article ran about the obstinacy of Greek Cypriots in refusing to remove the wall that divides the city.

Afrika Newspaper, which had supported the Greek Cypriot position and opposed the government, was trying to inject the idea that the construction of the bridge was based on military purposes. The right-wing, Volkan Newspaper did not want to set an agenda for construction of the bridge, choosing to ignore even the possibility of such an event. Yet by putting the proprietorship case on the agenda, they indirectly underlined the fact that they were not defenders of the bridge case. On the other hand, the Kibris Newspaper, as a proponent of the democratic left, featured some constructive discourse on the bridge case. All in all, it is possible to say that, despite the fact that the Greeks opposed the construction of such a symbolic bridge, to insist that it would have positive consequences was a bit of a utopian dream.

The different agendas and discourses of the newspapers make it possible to interpret the proposed bridge-building in various dimensions. In such a situation, the political views of the newspapers’ owners are the main designators of discourse about events, as well as how to handle them. In this way, the newspaper owners tell readers what to think and “how to think”, manipulating them according to their, the owners’, political views. Afrika Newspaper and Volkan Newspaper, which are extremely opposed to each other, nevertheless agreed on some points of the issue. None of the newspapers really wanted such re-unification, for various, self-seeking reasons. But somehow they all agreed that symbolic re-unification of two sides of the island was not a good idea.

To sum up: reflections on the same signs may vary according to the ideology of the media owners. These last set the agendas for public opinion by promulgating interpretations of the events in the way they want.

The matter of the symbolic bridge is just one example of the influence of printed media on the construction of knowledge. The content of each newspaper emphasized the fact that it was the southern part of the island that disapproved re-unification. Thus destruction of the bridge can be a signifier of the fact that the dominant part of the island does not want such re-unification. The failed erection of the “symbolic bridge” serves as but one demonstration of the power of media on the construction of public opinion.

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Peter Allingham

Autostadt – Cars, aesthetics, and movement

Die Theorie, man müsse nur genügend Angebote im Öffentlichen Nahverkehr erzeugen, dann stiegen die Leute auf die Straßenbahn um, ist deswegen falsch, weil die Straßenbahn niemals dieses Lebensgefühl, was auf gut bayerisch cocooning heißt, bieten kann, diesen Rückzug in einem Kokon in dem Sie niemand stört.

– Dr. Bernd Pischetrieder, Vorstandsvorsitzender
der Volkswagen AG (Eckard 2002: 10)

1. Introduction

The aim of this presentation is to examine the role of aesthetics in creating the experiential effects of the attractions of Autostadt. The latter is seen from the perspective of urban and regional development; in this context, brief reference is made to how Volkswagen AG has contributed to the development of the city of Dresden in Saxony by launching the production of luxury limousines at the centre of the city.

2. Autostadt

The 25 hectare Autostadt at Wolfsburg opened on 1 June 2000 in connection with the World Exhibition in Hanover, the EXPO2000. Today, Autostadt is the only existing tourist-oriented car theme park. It claims to be a futuristic theme park on the subject of “automotive mobility” (Brochure 2006: 11). Apart from being a communication and service platform, as well as a physical interface with the surrounding world, it serves at least three purposes. First, it is a piece of strategic marketing that takes care of the branding activities of Volkswagen AG. Secondly, it serves as the final stage in a sales process, namely, the delivery of the car. Thirdly, it is an important




Image 1. Map of Autostadt.

part of an urban and regional development of the city of Wolfsburg and the tourist attractions of Lower Saxony.

Apart from those who work there, people go to Autostadt as visitors or as customers. Each year approximately 600 customers choose to collect their new VW-model at the KundenCenter at Autostadt. Many customers make it a family outing, arriving early on a Saturday so they can spend the day in the “Stadt”. If you wish, Autostadt can arrange for you to be picked up at your home address anywhere in Germany, in a Phaeton or a Tuareg, and driven by chauffeur to Autostadt. If you wish, and can afford the cost, you can make a holiday of the whole business, and stay at the luxurious, 5 star Ritz-Carlton Hotel in the “stadt”. Prior to collection, your car is stored in one of the two transparent Autotürme that tower above the Autostadt as a landmark of the biggest producer of automobiles in Europe. The two towers contain 800 cars.

One of the first objects that meet the eye of anyone arriving at Autostadt is a full-stop traffic sign bearing the inscription “Smile”. This symbolic index also anticipates what the slogan “Menschen, Autos und was sie bewegt” expresses; viz., that “Bewegung”, emotion, pleasure is the main attraction. And true, inside the “Stadt” there is not much physical movement. Except for the strolling visitors, Autostadt appears as a frozen spatial aggregation of the industrial-cultural past; present and future are symbolized by the contrast between the chimneys of the gigantic power plant

and the transparent Autotürme which houses the cars that are soon to be handed over to their new owners.

Most guests and customers enter Autostadt through the KonzernForum. Architecturally, this building seems an attempt to unite urban extremes of the public square, the central Piazza, with the private domain, the secluded cubicles, with nature outside. Through the opening and closing of the enormous column windows to the north and south, the space inside the building can be exposed to changing wind and weather conditions. Standing on the glass-covered floor of the piazza, underneath a big suspended globe, and looking out of the enormous column windows – all this may easily generate a floating feeling in any expectant visitor.

Many visitors stroll from the KonzernForum to the Zeithaus. This building contains an experientially oriented presentation of the history of mobility through a selection of historical “Meilensteine” in the development of the automobile. Because this building is a key to understanding the experiential techniques generally applied at Autostadt, we shall take a closer look at its architecture and aesthetics.

“Zeithaus” is a three-part complex consisting of two separate bodies connected by a glass-covered staircase room. The northern part is a transparent, square-windowed glass “rack” containing a collection of historical cars distributed among four floors. The southern part is an organically shaped, closed concrete compartment.

In the transparent, pixel-square windowed building the historic car models are presented like miniatures in a collection case, separately, and in chronological order, so that each car represents a stage in the technical development of the automobile. As such, the windowed building represents a form of digital memory and recollection. The closed, concrete body contains various dramatisations of the automobile in social and historical contexts. This part of the complex stands for associative, emotional or analogue, memory. The contrasts between the analogous and the digital, the square and the organic, the transparent and the opaque, support a final symbolic reference of the complex to a brain with a right and a left side. The balconies and staircases between the two halves, in extension of this symbolism, trace out the neuronal net connecting the two sides. It seems to have been the idea of the Henn architects to shuttle visitors between the two halves of the building, like impulses in a neural network, following

up on impressions and ideas and in this way building up their individual experiences (Henn Architekten Ingenieure 2000).

The “Zeithaus” presents the experiential matrix of Autostadt. Through the architectural metaphor of a brain and through the aesthetics of various design stories, the visitor is propelled like a neural impulse moving between sensual impressions and memory or knowledge. You “sample” the “Meilensteine” in the digital part of the building and see some of them in selected contexts in the analogue part. What has not been dramatized you must fill in yourself. This is the coveted and enthusiastic “Bewegung”: neuronal impulses becoming experiences that are personified in the guest driving away in his customized VW cocoon.

And yet, this matrix of the creative brain seems to cut two ways. Its focus on joyous expectation (on “Freude”, as it says on the escalator in the KonzernForum) and on spotless aesthetics both subdues and accentuates certain blanks. Though the “Zeithaus” is technically not a museum, it is hard to restrain your historical knowledge of Volkswagen; for example, the fact that Volkswagen, under the name of KdF-wagen, was a part of the Nazi organization of “Kraft durch Freude” and that Wolfsburg, until 1945, was called “Stadt des KDF-Wagens”. You have to look very hard to find any traces of this neatly blanked-out bit of history anywhere at Autostadt or Wolfsburg.

In this sense, the matrix is somewhat lopsided in disposition: digital vs. analogue; transparent vs. opaque; the present vs. the past; design vs. production; clean vs. dirty; *Freude* vs. ?? The mere fact that Autostadt, with all its aesthetic strategies, has as a backdrop one of the largest, most monumental industrial complexes in the world constantly refers to a certain historical knowledge or memory: the production of war materials during World War II and, after the war, the production of endless numbers of “Käfers”. Perhaps feeling somewhat pinched from this disposition, the guest moves on to the MarkenPavillons. Except for the Bugatti, there is one of each of the car brands that Volkswagen AG manages: Bentley, Lamborghini, Skoda, Seat, Audi and VW. A further pavilion contains the Nutzfahrzeuge.

One remarkable thing about the “Stadt” is that you do not see many big logos or other visual brand-labels. The point is that the brand is embedded in and speaks itself through the elegant design of the interior and exterior

of each pavilion. A major aesthetic force is the storytelling choreographed into the layout of each pavilion.

One example is the Audi Pavilion. Seen from outside, the truncated, reciprocally mounted cones of this pavilion bear only a slight resemblance to the four-ring logo of the Audi brand. Inside, guests enter into a story about the life of an Audi prototype designer, Max, and his wife Klara. As you move through the couple's studio and stylish middle-class home, you can interact with Max and Klara – dolls, with TV sets as heads, that start talking to you on sight. Then comes a bedroom, where a sleeping person's dreams of Audi race cars are projected on a screen, and finally you leave the building by going down a spiral ramp and around a central, screen-covered column showing scenes of the "active life", all this taking you to a sparkling new-model Audi.

The choreography of this pavilion seems designed so as to merge the Audi-brand rings with the contemporary elegance of a middle-class life style. This condensation of corporate history with contemporary, everyday life impresses the Audi identity on the guest. He or she is invited to make final judgement, by walking down the "creative" ramp and finishing at the new Audi, which sums up the whole experience.

The above description suggests that the entire Autostadt is organized in accordance with the brain metaphor. Each pavilion leads the guest in a choreography that suspends him experientially between analogue representation (e.g., family life) and a digitized aesthetic presentation set forth by individually "stacked" model cars. Autostadt apparently does not attempt to build a single, strong and unanimous corporate identity so much as it tries to make the individual guest become a vitalized metaphor of a creative vision framed by Volkswagen. The guest should move according to his own experiences, and not formally become part of a particular "Bewegung". The brand you belong to is a private, individual matter. Therefore, the network-matrix hybrid of the "Stadt", with its grid of streets, places and locales, and the "park", replete with slopes and winding paths, together constitute the perfect frame for what may be called an individualized experiential community, where "You go to your brand, and I'll go to mine".

*3. Wolfsburg: From industrial complex
to city of experience*

In recent years the city of Wolfsburg has gone through a profound transformation, from being simply a residential estate for a large industrial complex, into a city of experience. This development is organized through Wolfsburg AG, a public-private partnership that is a joint venture of the city of Wolfsburg and Volkswagen AG.

Various urban planning devices have been implemented in order to channel the success of Autostadt into the city of Wolfsburg. One such device has been to establish an axis from the historic castle of Wolfsburg, running through Autostadt, across the Mittellandkanal on a pedestrian bridge, and connecting to Porschestrasse, the main street of Wolfsburg. It is, of course, debatable how well this means of unification functions. It seems that Autostadt outshine the attractions of the inner city, despite attempts to boost the town's shopping area by means of a pedestrian street, a shopping mall, and art. The well-informed guest, however, may find connections between Autostadt and the cultural attractions of Wolfsburg, among them an art museum designed by Alvar Aalto and a theatre by Hans Sharoun.

Another unifying device has been the erection of a major attraction. The Phaeno is an experimental-experiential landscape enclosed in a building along the banks of the Mittellandkanal stretching along the railway, designed by the world-famous Iraqi architect, Zaha Hadid. From the outside, the concrete shell of the building, hovering on broad concrete pillars, might be said to resemble a moored canal barge. Inside, and on several decks, it contains a myriad number of experimental devices from the natural sciences, around which enthusiastic crowds of mostly young people flock. To judge by their reaction to it, the Phaeno is an undisputed success.

The question remains, however, as to how strongly the Phaeno provides coherence. There is no doubt that Zaha Hadid's creation puts Wolfsburg on the world map of architectural attractions. Likewise, it cannot be questioned that the focus on the natural sciences, on technology, and above all on the experiential approach, all harmonize with the qualities and branding intentions of Autostadt, and with the AutoVision of the Wolfsburg AG. Nevertheless, this symbolic axis is not sufficient to create coherence

among the several experiential centres in and around Wolfsburg. The problem seems to be that the areas, at present, remain disconnected enclaves, the corridors linking them being either too “weak” (e.g., the pedestrian bridge across the Mittellandkanal) or too “strong” (road systems for cars only).

In one respect, though, the general focus on aesthetic communication seems to create a strong feeling of identity. 25 per cent of all visitors to Autostadt come from the region, and a large number of them are employees and their family members (Eckhardt 2002: 6). So, the *auto-communication* of Autostadt is quite a success.

4. Die Gläserne Manufaktur at Dresden

The concept of city and region of experience has been given another design at Dresden, in Saxony. Here, Volkswagen has launched another service and communication platform, an “assembly plant” where buyers are involved in customising their new luxury Volkswagen limousine, the Phaeton. The name of the plant is “Die Gläserne Manufaktur”, the transparent factory. The name refers to the fact that the factory building is transparent, most of it being a huge glass structure. This makes it possible to see the assembling of cars from both inside and outside the building. The factory lies close to Dresden’s historic city centre, in a corner of the famous park, the Grosser Garten. This park formerly a Baroque garden, dates back to the seventeenth century.

The act of buying a handmade VW Phaeton has been scripted as an experiential sequence that carries the characteristics of an initiation into the world of culture. The act of buying includes, apart from the customising activities, an invitation from Volkswagen to spend a week in the city of Dresden. During the stay the customer is enrolled in a cultural programme that includes visits to a number of cultural and historical attractions in Dresden, a night at the Semper Opera, a tour of the Zwinger, a visit at the gallery, an afternoon at Schlosspark Pillnitz, and the like.

If you ask how VW has succeeded in opening a factory within a stone’s throw from the cultural centre of Dresden, the Altstadt, the answer will have to factor in the balance of power between private enterprise and public authority. On the whole, it seems that VW planned the factory in

ways that have proved sensitive to the spatial and historical urban context of Dresden.

First, the angular volume of the building continues the city space instead of blocking it. Second, the architecture repeats the open, green-belt areas of the adjoining neighbourhoods from the DDR epoch. Third, the Gläserne Manufaktur, to the south, relates to the Grosser Garten by also being embedded in a park-like landscape with a lake. Historically, the Gläserne Manufaktur continues a local tradition of exhibitions that has been going on at the site for more than a hundred years. Until the end of the nineteenth century the “Crystal Palace” of Dresden stood here.

Two further adaptations to the surroundings have appeared. First, as the damp tropical climate of the nearby hothouses at the botanical gardens supports plants that would not survive in the open Dresden air, the VW glass architecture serves as an artificial “biotope” for a kind of work that is quite rare today: manufacturing. In this “theatre” of labor, workers in white overalls and white gloves can be seen, standing on parquet flooring and assembling cars, calling to mind the cultural traditions in this manufacturing region of the country – for example, the making of porcelain in the nearby city of Meissen. Secondly, the transparency of the building refers to the anatomical model of “die gläserne Frau”, exhibited at the “Deutsches Hygiene-Museum” only a few hundred metres towards the city. On this model the mass of skin and muscles have been made transparent in order to make internal organs, blood vessels and nerve tissue visible; likewise at die Gläserne Manufaktur, the dividing lines between inside and outside have been suspended.

5. *Concluding remarks*

Perhaps some may see in this suspension a further confirmation of Paul Virilio’s idea that modern telecommunication is the force behind the disappearance of city limits, and a possible future loss of urbanity (Virillo 1997). VW has considered it important that the setting and staging of the manufacture of the Phaeton should not take place in an ordinary experiential theme park. Rather, what the customer should see through the aesthetic prism of the VW Phaeton is a reflection of himself as an integral part of the authentic ambience of a historical and cultural city like Dresden. This is just what the (experientially oriented) Phaeton Konfigurator-computer in

the (experientially oriented) basement at the Gläserne Manufaktur anticipates. On this computer the visitor can design his own model Phaeton and insert it and himself into any number of cultural scenarios that suit his dreams, e.g., “the Phaeton of the Semper Oper”.



Image 2. The writer’s “dream” come true in print.

Although it is a physical reality, however, the Phaeton is like the Gläserne Manufaktur: a phantom that does not escape a destabilizing disposition, because in this case, too, transparency seems to act as a disguise. True enough, transparency promotes aesthetic quality, artifice, and presentation. But it disguises representation. Is this not why the discrete teams of “Putzfrauen”, hovering in the wings of the showrooms at the Gläserne Manufaktur and at Autostadt, spring into action, removing all fingerprints from the car models on display, whenever a group of visitors has left a showroom? The indexing fingerprints refer to use and a history of use, which means that they disturb presentation and experience.

In a further perspective, a comparison between the experiential strategies applied by VW at Wolfsburg and Dresden, respectively, makes possible a number of observations on the impact of these means on the development of cities. First, instead of promoting coherence, a commercial branding strategy built on creating experiences through aesthetic appeal to the senses, as at Autostadt, seems to individualise and promote “cocooning” and enclavism on both a reduced and an enlarged scale. The ques-

tion is, does this work *against* the urban project, which has been generally described as one of social and cultural exchange. Secondly, is the extent to which the theatre of the Gläserne Manufaktur “re-produces” the city of Dresden also an attack on the urban project? So much so, that the signs of the city represent VW products rather than Dresden. The Dutch architect Rem Koolhaas has defined a city as “relations of constantly changing flows superimposed onto a generic template” (2001). If we accept Koolhaas’s definition, then we may well ask, Is what we see at Wolfsburg and Dresden changing flows – or attacks on the template?

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Rodica Amel

To use signs vs. to invent signs

1. Premises of perception

1.1. Let us begin with two examples of signs and their possible interpretations. (a) First, a *moving staircase*: a moving staircase is an object, and this object may be considered a sign, a natural sign, in so far as it indicates the function which the respective object has, or, in Aristotelian terms, it indicates the object's final cause.¹ The semiotic force of an object conceived as a sign is codified through experience.

In Charles Morris's classification and behaviorist definitions, a *moving staircase* can be included within the type called "prescriptors". These last "are signs which signify to their interpreters the required performance of a specific response to some object or situation" (1946: 84). The signifying intention through "prescriptors" is normative; namely, they are signs that make demands upon a person's behavior. In Peirce's classification, a *moving staircase* might be considered an *indexical* sign – a *moving staircase* is an object that indicates the possibility for one to get to an upper or lower level, without having to climb up or down any steps.

(b) As the second example, we take the *180th meridian*, which has been *designated* as the International Date Line that separates one day from the next. On both sides of the line, the time is the same, but west of the line, it is one day later than it is to the east. The 180th meridian is a conventional sign and also a *prescriptor*, which, confirming international convention, establishes a prescriptive semiosis concerning the behavior of time.

1.2. Either by *using* or *inventing* a sign – or sign-function, following Hjelmslev's (1943) terminology – we accomplish a *semiosis*,² which corresponds to a sense-giving act. For Innis (1994), a semiosis is an act in consciousness, a kind of perception.³ In actuality, when a sign is perceived, a sense-giving act takes place. Sign perception is not strictly linear: in order to make possible the interpretation of the sign's meaning, the interpreter

should know the suitable premise of the perception. “Perception itself, properly taken, I argue, not only exemplifies the ‘play of signification, but, in fact, is its ineluctable matrix, foundation, and background” (Innis 1994, quoting Eco: 3). In our opinion, and from the perspective of hermeneutic philosophy, a “premise of perception” is more than the matrix of a sign; it represents, first of all, the ontological foundation of the sign’s meaning. The “premise of perception” is not only the condition of meaning that makes possible the understanding of the sign; it is also the condition that enables the sign’s meaning to become a reality in consciousness. We have in mind, here, the way Heidegger (1997) defines fundamental proof, as *der Satz vom Grund*.⁴

The two preceding examples can be considered pragmatic signs, because we *use* them for practical reasons, in virtue of codes of usage. If, in the case of those two signs, we replace the pragmatic function with a symbolic value, a completely different perception may develop. If we no longer *use* the respective signs for practical reasons, the codes that explain their meanings are no longer “in use”. By projecting the same reality, to which pragmatic signs refer, onto a transcendent horizon, we actually *invent* a new semiosis. In order to realize that we are confronted with new signs, the signification of which is different from that of previous ones, we should change their interpretation. In this way, we discover a new and unexpected perception of a reality that we had heretofore considered natural and unproblematic.

To illustrate, we return to the first example: (a) By abstracting the rolling image of staircases and their sound, we may perceive a sublime paroxysm of technical perfection, a “world” in which an indistinct crowd, deprived of any mark of humanity, rides up and down. What we discover is the peaceful ferocity of the life we live in. Regarding the second example (b), we have in mind Umberto Eco’s book, *The Island of the Day Before*. From the many interpretations this book can afford, we consider the most beautiful of all to be that which understands the discrete allegory of *nostos* (“the return”), the subtle meditation on the irreversibility of time: “... per quell’esiliato in un oggi senza fine, il cui futuro stava solo nell’arrivare, in qualche suo domani, al giorno prima.” (Eco 1998: 320) (“[Roberto’s] exile was in an endless today, whose future lay only in arriving, some tomorrow, at the day before.”)

Roberto, the last remaining survivor of shipwreck, is compelled to invent solutions in order to save his life. To do so fires his imagination, but

he drifts on, in vain, along a line (the 180th meridian), unable to cross it, as if it were a glass wall he could not sail through so as to reach land. After many aborted attempts, Roberto melancholically concluded: “La baya è ahimè troppo ieri” (The bay, alas, is also yesterday) (ibid.: 336).

Our present commentary is concerned with the second term of the opposition in our title: *inventing* signs. In this case, the position of the sign creator is symmetrical with that of the sign interpreter.

2. *Intelligible gain*

To use signs presupposes an innate competence, a natural behavior of humankind, that allows everyone to perform actions in ways that are codified, either through experience or through socially established conventions.

In turn, man has many opportunities *to invent* signs. We have in mind only the cultural framework of sign invention. Therefore, we focus on that semiosis through which man gets a cognitively spiritual experience, and through which his intelligible gain enables him to rise above NATURE to CULTURE.⁵ In a cultural framework, the new semiosis that man “invents” is a new premise of perception, by which a new perspective is thrown upon a functional sign. By shearing the world of its mundanity, the pragmatic dimension of a certain sign is transfigured into a symbolic representation of reality. Our idea corresponds to what the Romanian philosopher G. Liiceanu has said about symbolic activity: it implies “a redistribution of ontological emphasis in the perspective of a value system” (2005: 24). If a pragmatic sign is projected on a transcendent horizon, it gets new meaning, which is able to change the perception of life itself.

Semiotically speaking, the projection of a pragmatic sign on a transcendent horizon corresponds to a second-degree semiosis, which is a semiosis of a higher level than the original one. The last sentence emphasizes what we should understand by “inventing signs”: to invent signs means to change the ontological register of a sign-function. This occurs, for instance, in the following quotation from Malraux’s book, *La Tentation de l’Occident*. The author speaks about the contradictory ways in which two cultures, European and Indian, evaluate the dance ceremony – in a profane and sacred way, respectively: “Le mot ‘danse’ nous suggère le contraire de ce qu’il signifie dans l’Inde, qui ignore le bal. La danse des dieux est une

solennisation du geste, comme la musique sacrée est une solennisation de la parole” (Malraux 1967 : 277).

In our interpretation, by *inventing signs* man performs a cultural act, which is both creative and symbolic. When a new ontological horizon – a transcendent one – is opened to a pragmatic sign, the image of the human condition is perceived in its very essence.

To convert a pragmatic into a cultural sign requires a new interpretation, one which no longer involves the semiotic code as hermeneutical proof. Let us note, in passing, that while most of our examples of cultural signs have been drawn from the aesthetical field, the hermeneutical approach remains the same in any interpretative context. In so far as cultural signs are creative acts, they follow an interpretative dialectics, during which the ability to perform an ontological turn is relative. Not everybody can accomplish a semiotic “ascent” to second-degree semiosis.

2.1. Sign creativity is a subject that has long been debated in philosophical and/or aesthetical terms, in attempts to uncover the roots of human *energeia* in all its spiritual fullness. Semioticians normally explain the symbolic transfiguration of denotative signs as owing to some connotative attachment. The philosophy of symbolic forms approaches the issue from the perspective of both *formative* and *expressive* functions of signs; e.g., in the field of linguistics, Humboldt and his idea about *innere Sprachform*, or Ernst Cassirer’s (1972) sustained “philosophy of symbolic forms”, laid out in his book of that title.

In the present essay, our concern is with the *cognitive finality of signs*, how cultural signs are *invented* in attempts to find ever more sensible answers to the great questions that trouble humanity in respect to *the sense of life*. We call this problem: *the hermeneutical function of cultural signs*.

2.2. In many respects, the present study continues ideas debated in a previous contribution, “Sign systems vs. reference systems” (Amel 199b), presented at the 7th International Congress of IASS in Dresden. In that article, our philosophical interest was oriented towards the ontological origin of language, since we took for granted a Heideggerian premise (1985: 27): “Die Sprache spricht als das Geläut der Stille” (Language speaks as the bells of silence ring). By presuming the intelligible position of *being-in-the-world*, based on our capacity to render the world explicit and meaningful, we reach the starting moment of *language*. Originally, the intelligible func-

tion of signs was the call of *principium*, issuing from infinity and pointing towards finitude.

In the same study, we tried to go beyond Heidegger, by advancing the thesis that ontological representation is founded in consciousness through a process of axiological constitution. Here we should like to go deeper into this issue, by explaining the *persuasive*, not the relative, truth of axiology. From a very specific point of view, our approach reconsiders Protagoras's thesis: "Man establishes the measure of things."

We did not, in that study, engage with a very important problem, namely, that reference-systems actually represent the "premises of perception", either on the pragmatic or symbolic level. Reference-systems were operationally defined as follows: (a) Reference-systems should satisfy the transcendent principle of interpretative acts. (b) Reference-systems are not given, but synthesized through reflecting judgments. (c) In the hermeneutical field, reference-systems establish "possibility conditions" of meaning *pertinence*. In order to understand signs that are invented, not codified, we are compelled to establish such conditions of possibility. Consideration of the pertinence of cultural signs brings us to the aim of the present commentary, namely, to prove the cognitive finality of signs. In this regard, a very important remark should be made: *Cultural signs and reference-systems are members of the same semiotic triangle that refers to a second-degree, ideal reality.*

2.3. The present intervention is part of an extended study of mine, on the "Hermeneutical Turn" in semiotics. Not simply the interpretation of meaning, but a dialectical process of meaning constitution, Hermeneutics, from the semiotic point of view, becomes the way to render explicit the undetermined substance of Being. The conclusions reached in our study of reference-systems are taken as premises for the present one: (1) Second-degree semiosis – the semiotic step taking one from the pragmatic to the symbolic level – presupposes the institution of a "categorical sign", which, in our opinion, is a category of value. (2) The fact that second-degree semiosis develops an axiological dimension can be demonstrated by hermeneutical logic, which is not an ad-hoc concept.⁶ Hermeneutical logic is subject-oriented. The semiotic subject, the meaning intention of whom should be interrelated, accomplishes sense-giving acts, which are acts of

inventio. “La volonté culturelle du sujet”⁷ engenders a semiotic creativity that has both formative and expressive force.

What does it really mean to invent signs? From the cultural point of view, our answer emphasizes a reductive moment: to invent signs means to perceive the empirical features of life events in their *intelligible intensity*.⁸ This is the moment when a pragmatic object becomes more than itself; i.e., when the object signifies more than its function. Though Liiceanu was interested in opposing denotative to symbolic signs, and our own commentary establishes an opposition between pragmatic and symbolic signs, we are together in emphasizing the semiotic shift from *eikon* to *eidos*. Hermeneutical logic explains this shift dialectically.

Meaning in general, and hermeneutical meaning in particular, is open to opinion, choice and selection; for that reason, we qualify it as *doxastic*.⁹ In the course of interpretation, the task of hermeneutic logic is to establish the *original proof*. As the original proof is being sought, the cognitive intentionality of the semiotic subject is oriented towards the spiritual dimension of signs, namely, towards a principle of transcendence. From this moment on, we are close to Protagoras’s thesis. This issue was debated at length in our previous study, mentioned above.¹⁰ In this theoretically new context of debate, we try to explain the Final Cause of cultural signs. Here we extend the question to encompass the axiological acquisition of reference systems. In logical terms: at the first stage of axiological investment, signs are put under the determination of a *category of value*; at the second stage, the interpreter validates the finality of the *original proof*. The hermeneutics of cultural signs can not fulfill its task without admitting the contribution of cultural signs to man’s understanding of his place in the world.

3. *The moral object*

There is an *innate* condition of man’s consciousness that compels him to search for the meaning and sense of his life. One cannot ignore either the human need to transgress what is inherent, nor man’s effort to gain an intelligible perspective on his own experience. Through the cultural dimension of signs, “la condition humaine” acquires ontological value – a sense. To support our thesis, we shall explain the premises constitutive for the hermeneutical function of cultural signs.

(a) When hermeneutical logic raises the problem of validating the meanings of cultural signs, special emphasis is put on the original proof (Amel 1999). The cognitive subject gratifies his “volonté culturelle” by finding proofs of pertinence for his spiritual choices. He alleges, through self-reflection, a category of transcendence, which is by definition a category of value. We use the phrase “by definition” because, from the ontological point of view, the category of transcendence represents *the original proof*, the *value* in which the cultural subject recognizes himself and through which he defines himself.

(b) During “sense-giving acts”, the sensitive intelligence is extremely active, and the features of objects are perceived through the senses, in all their *symbolic intensity*. One may “translate” this affirmation with the Scholastic formula: *Nihil est in intellectu quod prior non fuerit in sensu*. In this context, *inventio* means to invent “una cosa mentale”, as Leonardo da Vinci described it.

When contemporary aesthetics theorizes the abolition of “art in itself”, the intention is to reduce the metaphysical dimension of art and to avert contemplation. The modern artist says: “Reality should be applied, not penetrated” (Honnef 1998: 76). The new trend in modern art – the so-called “installation” – can easily confuse the art consumer, because of the new premises it poses for art reception. By mixing art with reality, the real change at stake is the “distance” that the receiver takes vis-à-vis the object of art. In the installation, this distance is considerably reduced or no longer exists. The idea of artistic convention is extended in such a way that it implies active participation in a “possible world”, which actually is a virtual world, where the points of reference are no longer those of pragmatic life. Modern art is rather like a script or scene from a play, to be performed by those who enter it. It invites the art consumer to adopt an interactive attitude. As a case in point, I refer my readers to an exhibition by the artist Oli Grausz; I saw this exhibition in Israel, where it was entitled *Looking for the Lost Space*. The eye was trapped within a non-representative space, a space that remained pure and ideal. *The lost space* was deprived of time. Once inside this installation, the visitor was able to realize and evaluate the associative relationships between various objects that he uses every day, but at the same time was free to choose his role in the scene. The visitor discovered the coordinates through which the objects were symbolically projected. The artist helped the visitor to recompose in his consciousness

a space of significations, an essential space, within which all vital actions associated with the respective objects took place: for instance, the value of wheat, water and salt, the eating of bread, the vitality of grass, the greenness of which should be preserved in the temple of our soul, the sense of burning and combustion, which acquire quite mystical meanings ...

3.2. In our opinion, the semiotic step that aids in the transcending of an object – from a pragmatic to a symbolic level – becomes possible only when the premises of perception are changed.


We shall not lose the object of our commentary: *the hermeneutical function of cultural signs*. In trying to found the ontology of cultural signs on axiological terms, we are confronted with some puzzling aspects: on the one hand, “every school boy knows” and recognizes the relative condition of values; on the other hand, we try to invest them with grounding power. It seems that these two aspects stand in theoretical contradiction.

Nobody denies that values are context-dependent, but here we have in view man’s capacity to reach a universal level within the hierarchy of values, through his or her inner, *original experience*. For instance, through the semiotic representations that render sensible such “ideas” as *nostos, sacred, profane, splendor and magnificence of a feature in itself*, or “concepts” such as *technical perfection, or the peaceful ferocity of a life deprived of any trace of humanity*, and so on. All these values are values that ground the understanding of the human condition. There is no final “possibility” that could explain and define the way the semiotic subject gets the original experience of his own condition. The only way the semiotic subject can obtain the “idea” of what the “human condition” means is by searching for it. The fact that each cultural interpretation promotes disputable concepts is of less importance than the fact that all cultural acts have ontological power.

Cultural signs represent one of the many possibilities for providing evaluative interpretation through semiosis. During cultural achievement, the “ideal” reality is constituted as an inner event. An inner event *is* a value – and it is wrong when we say it *has* a value. The inner event, as an original proof, is waiting to be personalized, “objectified” under several sorts of signs. We should not forget that cultural signs have a sensible dimension. Cultural signs justify the spiritual choices of man (such as the examples listed above: *sacred, profane, technical perfection*, etc.), and they provide the moral sense for human life. They “represent” a *belief in a sensible way*; they

ground human beliefs, and, for that reason, the objects they refer to may be called “moral objects”. Through moral objects, belief gets the possibility of being defined. In so far as the moral object is only an “idea”, a cultural sign could be considered the sign of a *second-degree* referent.

4. Conclusions



If “language is a way of *being*”, as Heidegger said, then cultural production is also “a way of *being* – of “ideas” in sensible form, as Hegel would say. From the philosophical point of view, cultural signs can be considered an ontological proof.

Simultaneously, cultural production is an axiological proof that uncovers man’s spiritual effort to find meaning for his inner experience of life. Cultural signs “represent” both the categoric and the vectorial dimensions of the *original proof*. The human condition acquires meaning, and this meaning represents a kind of ontological orientation. By inventing categoric signs, humanity is involved in a great axiological acquisition of moral objects, onto which man projects his spiritual aspirations, and rejects that which seems to endanger his inner peace.

Notes

1. See the four causes of a phenomenon: efficient, formative, material and final, as established by Aristotle (*Metaphysics*, Bk.I, ch. 3; *Physics*, Bk. II, ch. 3; see Amel 2006).
2. A semiosis is a sense-giving act, either by “creating” a new sign-function (through metaphor or convention), or by “inventing” new interpretation for the same sign-function.
3. Innis (1994) finds his research on Eco’s thesis: “The reason is that a sign as such must be replicable, and hence social, and we must accordingly ascribe to ourselves powers of recognition, whose rules are deeply rooted in the mechanism of human perception. We must assume, [Eco claims], these rules to be already given in any semiotic inquiry.”
4. From our point of view, the principle of intelligibility (the principle that governs the interpretation of meaning) establishes grounding conditions, as the principle of reason does in epistemology. Due to the subjectivity of meaning, sign-foundation requires an original experience of meaning. The condition specifying that meaning should be perceived in itself, since being represents the possibility condition of speaking about it.
5. By opposing sign use to sign invention we mean the same thing as Liiceanu means (2005: 23) when speaking about “the shift from eikon to eidos”.
6. Cf. Amel (1999: 2). Bollnow (1983, vol. II) claims that the term acquired philosophical legitimation due to Misch and Lipps’s contribution to hermeneutics,
7. In his book, Liiceanu speaks about the will to culture, alluding to Cassirer’s similar idea and replying to Nietzsche’s syntagm, the will to power, and to Schopenhauer’s philosophical idea of the world as Will and Representation.
8. In Liiceanu’s book we find the same idea, differently formulated as “the sensitive genesis of abstraction”.
9. See Amel (1999: 3): “While questioning both the subjective and rhetorical involvement of doxa, our attention was focused on the mechanism of decidability in doxastic thinking.” Regarding doxastic dialectics, the conclusions we have reached concern the general philosophy of cognition: Doxastic dialectics engenders cognitive intervals between belief (a content posed in consciousness), opinion (belief’s discursive form), and doxa (the concept of value).
10. The principle of transcendence allows a categorical perception through which man defines himself from the spiritual point of view. In contradistinction to analytical logic, where the principle of transcendence is given a priori, in hermeneutical logic the principle of transcendence is sought

by reflecting judgments. Kant writes (1913: Einl & IV: 15): “Ist aber nur das Besondere gegeben wozu sie das Allgemeine soll, so ist die Urteilskraft bloß reflektierend.” Reflective power develops from within interpretative acts themselves. Through synthetic operations, the transcendence of semantic contents is conceptually instituted in a net of categories, which we call reference systems.

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Fernando Andacht

Reflections on an indexical Brazilian TV fable

Signs of the Other in representations of the Real

1. Introduction: A semiotic approach to an indexical fable

My aim here is to revisit the esthetic notion of “realism” in audiovisual media through a semiotic analysis of Brazilian, realistic-TV fiction. In contrast with the tele-reality of so-called reality shows, which portray a detective-like quest for physiological traces of the body semiotic, and unlike the melo-reality of the novela – Latin American soap opera – in which the Real surfaces as bright quotes that stud the fictional text, I propose a third form of representing the Real, namely, tele-realism. It accounts for the aesthetic effect of some episodes of the TV series *Cidade dos Homens* (2002–2005; henceforth CdH). What distinguishes this form of representation of the Real is the way in which the signs of existence, or indices, operate in this TV series. In reality TV, indexical signs are featured as the compulsive expressions of the body (pulse, blush, sweat, tears) and refer to moods or emotions. These kinds of sign can do this because their link with what they represent is factual and not conventional. Indexical signification entails a material contiguity between the perceptible sign and its object: “the index... like a pointing finger exercises a real physiological force over the attention, like the power of a mesmerizer, and directs it to a particular object of sense” (CP 8.41).¹ The rhetorical treatment of this semiotic ingredient separates the TV realism of CdH from similar TV shows; e.g., the road-movie series *Carga Pesada*, which features two truckdriver buddies, whose job takes us along the vast Brazilian territory (Globo 2005-present).

In *Big Brother Brasil* (Globo 2002–2007), tele-reality exploits indices to produce an effect that I have dubbed “index-appeal” (Andacht 2003); it is the upshot of the endless recording and editing of the participants’ physiological reactions in the course of the 24/7 reality show. The tele-realism of CdH relies on indices which furnish evidence of the human geography of the story, and which also make up the narrative axis, enabling the audience to meditate on the life world beyond that of the favela (shanty town) where the action takes place. To recall the words of one film critic (Bazin 1985: 314), the representation of the real in CdH seeks to “introduce more reality in the work of art”, to create “a phenomenology [which] only knows the immanence, the pure appearance of the people and of the world”. Bazin was describing twentieth-century Italian neo-realism, but his account also suits the representation of the Real in contemporary TV shows such as CdH, one of whose recurring features is the unreliable nature of appearances, as well as the corresponding need to sharpen the observational skills that skills we take for granted in everyday perception.

The purpose of the images and sounds of neo-realism is not to convey a social lesson, but an aesthetic effect. In the case of CdH that effect derives from the show’s rhetorical work going unnoticed; the audience witnesses a world that is both true and false, and which functions an indexical fable. This analytical term applies to the kind of representation of the Real in some episodes of CdH, such as the one titled *Saturday*, which I consider in some detail below.

The signification mechanism of tele-realism contrasts with that of melo-realism, whose “formal conception consists in dressing up a story with reality” (Bazin 1985: 319). Although it is impressionistic, I find relevance in the film critic’s proposed contrast between dressing up a narrative with everyday life items, as opposed to neo-realism’s staging a story that is inseparable from the represented fragments of the Real. Only in the latter does reality as such become the theme of the story, one whose validity can be questioned. The difference between the two kinds of realism may be likened to the one between a surface upon which glittery crystals are scattered, and a fabric whose threads are arranged as the layers of an onion: one cannot get to the core of it, lest one be left with nothing to hold. The abundant references to urban violence in the melo-realism of the soap opera *Mulheres Apaixonadas* (Globo 2003) function as quotes, as brief, shrill sallies of the Real, which is out there, beyond the melodramatic

TV story whose daily episodes are produced for nine months. A much discussed incursion was the occasion when the novela took to the streets of Rio's upper-middle class Leblon area, to shoot a "stray bullet" scene (Fernandes 2003). Another controversial episode consisted of the participation of some characters in a campaign for people to surrender the firearms kept in their homes. These are all quotes of the Real, not just allusions to it. The actual presence of famous actors, as *dramatis personae* amidst the crowd which filled the streets of Rio on that day, casts the Real as a "special guest" in the narrative economy of that popular TV fiction.

"Realist" soap-opera offers an overt pedagogical message which stands out from the plot as much as the thinly concealed product placements do. What distinguishes the series CdH is the homogeneous amalgamation of indices of everyday life in the represented shanty town and its narrative fabric. My indexical claim does not undercut the fantasy ingredient of a TV fable that was created to stage a story in a shanty town. In melo-realism, the bright nuggets of the Real are topical references which are supposed to bring in some flavor from the world outside, to provide this industrial fiction with social relevance. Each quote, however, reminds us that this TV genre belongs to the "as if" realm of fiction, one which expects its viewers to suspend their disbelief, and enter the dream-like realm of soap opera, even if it is a realistic one. Saturday is an episode of CdH about the sexual initiation of two boys; within in its plot, indexical signification is used to upset the reliable representation of what is taken for granted in most TV realism. Indices increase the complexity of the narrative, requiring an effort of perception from the audience.

2. This is not a shanty town: On the supposed deficit of reality in Cidade dos Homens

The title of this section alludes to "The betrayal of images", Magritte's depiction of the realistic, didactic image of a pipe which hovers paradoxically above a handwritten phrase: *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*. To this I refer media critics and scholars that find too little representation of the Real in CdH. My own take on it follows Bazin's ideas on neo-realism, adapting them to contemporary TV. The fundamental critique raised against CdH is that it lacks reality. One scholar writes that the "home-made images [of CdH] create an authenticity effect, although they are produced profession-

ally, but it is important to emphasize that [the] images receive a thorough treatment and ‘belong’ to the series; it is fiction in both cases: neither one is an image of reality” (Schwertner 2005:48). In Bragança’s (2003) view, the characters of CdH are “naturalistic automata, mere aesthetic reproductions of the visual common sense built upon the journalism of social denunciation – a trembling camera and a over-exposed photography”.

It is hard to imagine an audience so naïve as to mistake CdH for a documentary on favelas, such as the recent film *Falcão: Meninos do tráfico* (Brazil 2006). The criticism of the supposed representational anemia is based on a fallacy concerning the ontological status of this TV series. The semiotic theory of Peirce (CP 5.607) posits that our access to the Real is both direct and mediated; i.e., our (physical) perceptions of outer or inner world are also representations. Images, facts and conventions may be true or false, in life as well as in the media. Thus, to assert that there is no scene of CdH which is “an image of reality” (Schwertner 2005) is as implausible as to claim that what is represented in CdH is only “the aesthetic reproduction of what common sense constructed” (Bragança 2003). In contrast, Eagleton’s (2003) views on realism are akin to Peirce’s notion of representation: “We cannot compare an artistic representation with the way in which the world is, because the way in which the world is, is a representational matter in itself. We can only compare artistic and non-artistic representations”.

3. Documentary value and tele-realism in the twenty-first century

I posit the mixed representation regime of tele-realism between the fictional melo-realism of soap opera, whose audiovisual iconicity represents a sentimental realm in a verisimilar setting, and authenticity-seeking tele-reality of many formats, whose key aesthetic effect arises from the gathering and gazing at bodily indexical evidence given off by anonymous people in theatrical captivity. Tele-realism embodies a TV rhetoric which relies on two kinds of indexical signs: internal indices are part of the plot; and external indices anchor the narrative in space and time. In CdH, time is embodied in the actors, who were born and raised in the shanty town, and whose life partly overlaps the lives depicted in the series.² CdH, thought not strictly biographical, uses historical elements that are factually insepa-

rable from the protagonists' own existence. Although the two protagonists are now famous³ their having spent a significant part of their lives in the place which is represented in the series produces a "credibility" effect analogous to Bazin's (1985: 55) "documentary value" concerning neo-realist Italian cinema: "The events which they represent are partly true."

Despite the marketing value of filming the favela, there is a specific meaning-effect which comes from representing the life world of social marginality in Brazil. As in the Oscar nominated film *Cidade de Deus*, CdH features a teenaged Virgil, only duplicated this time: our two black guides go by the nicknames of Acerola and Laranjinha (two citrus fruits). Through their innocent gaze we get to witness murders, drug dealers, everyday hunger, and the haunting uncertainty of the next meal, or the much feared police raids up the steep streets of the favela which is spread upon Dona Marta morro (hill).

The melo-realism of TV melodrama is the realm of the authentically false generated by the prevalence of certain qualities – iconic signs – which depict human emotions. Reality shows generate the falsely authentic, based on the index-appeal, namely, the display of bodyprints of participants, caught by the sleepless cameras, in order to recreate "a thorough melo-chronicle of human interaction" (Andacht 2005). The tragicomic aesthetic of CdH is a blend of the residual index appeal – the accumulation of the historical evidence of the lived space – together with the narrative created to explore imaginatively life in the shanty town. The tele-realism of CdH creates an indexical fable to represent the material density of life. As with filmic neo-realism, "the documentary value (is) the basis of the fable, the solid and undeniable basis of the myth" (Bazin 1985: 55).

Not all episodes of CdH belong to this representational mode. It is a necessary but not sufficient condition that the story be filmed away from the TV studio, on the crowded hills of Dona Marta; the indices must also embody "a dialectic of the imaginary" (ibid.). In an episode of the fourth season of CdH (2005), tele-realism is replaced by another kind of representation, though the story is staged in the favela. In *Appearances Are Deceitful*, the represented Real corresponds to that of the long-lasting, popular sitcom *The Big Family* (since 1972, Globo); the shanty town serves only as the setting for the narrated events, which could take place anywhere else.

3. *Dubious indices in Cidade dos Homens:
A semiotic-aesthetic analysis*

For Bazin (1985: 298), the plot of *Bicycle Thief* (de Sica, Italy, 1948) is “an insignificant incident ... the whole story would not even deserve two lines in the newspaper section of run over dogs”. Nor does this neo-realist classic shot in the streets of Rome depend on the absence of professional actors: “what we should be talking about is a kind of cinema without interpretation ... such is the identification between the man and the character” (Bazin 1985: 315). Rather than the amateur status of the actors of CdH,⁴ what is decisive for its status as an indexical fable is the fact of there is no perceptible gap between those actors, their circumstances, and the characters they perform in the series.

The plot of *Saturday* may be summed up as the unrequited love story of a boy who is too shy to tell his feelings to the girl he worships. Not much happens in it, and the expected outcome is frustrated, because of the dubious nature of the indices that represent the situation. The plot develops along a path which overflows with indices of daily existence in the shanty town of Santa Marta. If “it would not be excessive to state that *Bicycle Thief* is the story of the anguished wandering through the streets of Rome of a father and of his son” (Bazin 1985: 303), then it would not be wrong to say that CdH is the story of the roaming of two boys in the alleys of the rowdy shanty town up the hills of Dona Marta, in Rio.

A nook of the favela serves as the stage for close observation of the other, which leads us to a basic misunderstanding. This part of the narrative illustrates clearly the poetics of tele-realism in CdH. Instead of falling into the pattern of a comedy of unrequited love, *Saturday* reveals the working of our everyday indices. The hero is led to ponder the signification which underpins normal perception in the interaction order, as we come face to face with others, and must rely on our always fallible interpretation.

4. *The misguided indexical journey of an adolescent love*

The viewers of *Saturday* are eye-witnesses to the budding love of Acerola, as he sees the girl of his dreams walk by him.⁵ In a sun-drenched, dusty nook of the favela, he is busy rehearsing with his group, “O bonde dos mané”, their performance for the dancing contest on *Saturday*, at the funk party. With

an aura of child-like purity, Cristiane passes by. She is a pretty, black teenager in a school uniform who is accompanied by an adult. Deeply moved by the girl's calm beauty, Acerola cannot stay at the rehearsal; he leaves his frustrated dancing partners, to follow Cristiane discretely, as she walks down the narrow alleys of the hill, her hand held firmly by the man. As we tag along with the trio, we hear a voice-over of Acerola's thoughts. When we reach the foot of the hill, where the shanty town meets the border of the city, the boy concludes by saying what he loves most in Cristiane is her being so gentle ("quietinha"). Acerola finds another motive for joy in discovering a hidden fact: "Now I know her secret, her dad belongs to the MP [Military Police], if the guys up there knew it, he'd be a dead man". He has witnessed the change of clothes of the stern-looking man inside a bar. As viewers, we share that dangerous revelation, and the uncanny pleasure of possessing a hidden knowledge, Cristiane's secret, who, Acerola now thinks, may be so gentle because "she is always afraid".

Saturday is the day of the dance contest and also the precious chance for Acerola to talk to the girl about his feelings. For the inexperienced boy it is a feat, more a dream than a plan. The climax of Saturday is represented with indices, signs which are connected physically with their object, such as the skirt and blouse of Cristiane's uniform, which represent materially her school girl status, or the delicate gestures which denote her innocence and make the boy fall in love with her. To become genuine signs, indices must be interpreted, must become symbols, which turn the potential factual meaning into a fallible understanding. Acerola can interpret only what he saw, and holds confidently to his cherished conclusion: he has witnessed Cristiane's innocence, her purity. As a narrative counterpoint, his buddy Laranjinha plans to seduce four girls that Saturday night, to show that he is smarter and more experienced than his naïve friend when it comes to the opposite sex. With audiovisual sophistication, we see a fourfold split-screen, one space reserved for each one of the girls targeted by Laranjinha; the device is also used for the fourfold repetition of the only image that fills up the mind's eye of Acerola.

Once the dancing choreography of his group is over, he gathers courage to approach the girl, in the middle of the boisterous crowd, and then everything goes wrong; she leaves him with a vague promise of return. Clad in a sky blue psychedelic T-shirt, with a large white peace sign on it, Acerola looks even more naïve and out of place, in the sultry funk dance.

To underline this effect, we are shown Laranjinha's cool Rastafarian hairdo; the short tresses on his head stand up as jeering exclamation marks. Up to this narrative point, indices have done their usual job, but we are close to a revelation that manifests the dubious mechanism of these key agents of the ambiguous realism of CdH. As shocked as Acerola, we witness a violently "counter-indexical" scene. As the boy is going over his failed strategy to conquer Cristiane, he is struck by an unexpected presence: "I've got no chance! What's her father doing here, at the party?" – we hear him thinking aghast. What happens then is indexical but no longer dubious. There is nothing ambiguous in the man's passionate kiss on the mouth of the girl of his dreams. In despair and rage, Acerola asks frantically, from a friend who close by, what seems to need no answer, given the brute force of facts. The reply is fast and heavy as a blow, and it makes the old couple seem more sordid: "That one over there is O Bigode, my boy, the guy's married and has two kids, he's dating that young girl over there!" Thus ends the first unforgettable lesson of the sentimental education of our forsaken hero.

Through a flashback, we get a second chance to watch the birth of Acerola's passion; this time the action starts a little earlier. We watch O Bigode as he leaves his shack and says good-bye to his wife and baby. Then we spot Cristiane, who is waiting discreetly for her lover, at a corner of the alley. After an exchange of conspiratorial smiles, we see her enter the next scene by herself, as she comes into Acerola's view. It is then that she gives the boy her seductive smile, but its meaning is radically altered; it connotes the cunning of a young woman who obviously enjoys her power of drawing the male gaze. This is the crisis of the dubious indices of Saturday; with it comes the painful end of the innocence of the hero. The evidence seemed solid, but it crumbled in a second and left our passionate index gatherer devastated. Such is the lesson of the indexical fable of CdH; the staging of it is inseparable from the physical realm of the shanty town in Rio de Janeiro, but its purport could easily be extended to any other life world.

To close the indexical revelations of Saturday, we see the smug Laranjinha running terrified, as he finds out that his third target is the girlfriend of a local drug lord, to seek advice from Acerola. When they meet, there ensues another striking revelation. "You are a virgin!" cries in astonishment Acerola, as he listens to the confession of the Rastafarian Dom Juan: "I haven't had sex with anyone, I only played around!" The assertion devaluates the previous indices firmly anchored in Laranjinha's body. Acerola's

eyes are wide open, as if he tried to perceive and understand more of the complexities of life.

In the indexical fable, external indices generate the aesthetic of tele-realism, as it represents the partially self-enacted shanty town, which is gazed upon from outside by the Brazilian producers of O2Filmes. This is life in the margins of society, in Rio de Janeiro, as it is represented in the vehicle of a commercial TV fiction. But people, places, behavior and every concrete aspect of this story is firmly anchored in the everyday life of the Other of middle-class urban existence. Internal indices furnish the theme of Saturday. The bodily evidence originated in a mild, gentle temper, and the innocence that Acerola believed he saw in Cristiane – all this turned out to be an illusion which led him and the viewers of CdH to the wrong inference. The episode evokes the limits of indexicality insofar as it produces a reliable, tangible signification in our life world. Indices are also capable of deceiving us, of leading us on a blind chase through nooks and narrow, dusty alleys which end up nowhere. The experience makes us wiser, maybe more cynical, in the shanty town, and in the paved streets of the city, that lies at its bottom.

6. Conclusion: On understanding the misunderstandings of an indexical fable

What are the ethical implications of this aesthetic mode of representing the Real, of recreating everyday life, sex and bitter knowledge, in a shanty town in the hills of Rio de Janeiro? On account of its being an indexical fable, CdH occupies a distinctive point in the evidential media cartography, this being a key function of TV in “the age of abundance” (Ellis 2000). In contrast with the empathy we feel when we face the real pain broadcast by TV news, as part of our own temporality, and with the gentle consternation that results from our being engrossed with the sentimental hurricane of the imaginary space and time of fictional representation, the indexical representation of CdH holds a middle ground. Life in the favela is not represented as a tragedy, as an inevitable dark fate, wholly cut off from the time and the circumstances of its audience. The violence up the hills is represented as remote and close to the paved streets; it takes place in a shared space and time. The sequences of CdH are not represented live; still it is not a typical fiction, as that of melo-realism. As the result of

the work of internal and external indices, we watch an indexical fable. Its representation of the Real is a vigorous narrative invitation to ponder the collective dilemma which many Brazilian cities live and suffer. This TV series furnishes us with materials for our “working through,” a notion from Freudian psychoanalytic theory, which Ellis (2000) applies to the interpretative process of the TV audience. Viewers turn over and over various signs of reality, in a cyclical, evolving hermeneutic process that furnishes us with new insights into a complex situation.

Without any pretense of being or resembling a documentary of daily existence in the shanty towns of Rio de Janeiro, *CdH* is an aesthetic artifact which may be used to meditate in action, without a total suspension of disbelief. The adventures and misfortunes of Acerola and Laranjinha, which are not identical with those of Douglas and Darlan, the young actors who come from up the hills of Rio in an original TV proposal to, imaginatively, put ourselves in the hard place of the Other who has been traditionally forsaken. Its rhetoric is a hybrid mix of the Christian appeal to share the pain of the oppressed of the world, with an invitation to embark on an imaginative, vicarious flight of these invented and cherished lives. *CdH* manages to represent the Real and the fable in similar proportions.

The likeable presence of the two boys who guide us into the favela’s labyrinthine world is crucial to evidence the troubled alterity, in contemporary Brazil. Through a comedic gaze, the audience of *CdH* becomes the witness of a different but familiar universe, one which, strangely enough, is almost invisible, as it is reduced to a few, violent or picturesque scenes in the daily TV news. We experience something as universal as the bitter-sweet mixture of living, dreaming, discovering sexuality, and looking for the solution to problems that are as simple as daily meals, and as subtle as the negotiations of friendship and affection.

Notes

1. I use the traditional way of quoting Peirce: Volume.Paragraph (x.xxx), from the *Collected Papers* edition.
2. Due to its sequential production, the audience of *CdH* witnesses the biological maturation of the protagonists: the pre-adolescent boys of the beginning (2002) become the young adults of the fourth season (2005).
3. Douglas Silva e Darlan Cunha, the actors who play Acerola and Laranjinha in *CdH*, tell about their artistic beginnings at an actors’ workshop

- in the shanty town, in the DVD of second season of *Cidade dos Homens* (2003).
4. Most of them had already acted in the film *Cidade de Deus*, in the short-lived *Palace II* (Globo 2001); others took acting lessons in a theatrical workshop in the favela.
 5. *Saturday* (“*Sábado*”) was broadcast by Rede Globo on October 14, 2003. The script was written by George Moura and Fernando Meirelles; the latter directed this episode, as well as the film *Cidade de Deus* (Brazil 2002).

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Celia Maria Antonacci Ramos

Graffiti: Polemic and protest in urban spaces

May of 1968 registered the classic youth protests: *It is forbidden to forbid! Anarchy is me! Imagination takes the power! Abolish slave labor!* In Brazil the messages of protest against the military dictatorship of the 1960s demanded the return of democracy, as in the phrase *Give us back the dungeons*, sprayed on the walls of the city of Rio de Janeiro. In a short space of time other youths had discovered new sites around the city. Monuments, public walls, and even private buildings were available to all and were of high public visibility. They had also discovered that spray paint was cheap, easy to write with, and had quick results.

Nearly fifty years have passed since the first interventions, and it is impossible to mention all the groups and artists, and less still to establish an analysis of forms, styles, contents or reasons the graffiti artists had. In Paris, May 1968, they were students, as I already cited above, and in New York they were youths from the peripheries of the Bronx, prefigurements of today's hip hop movement. They took possession of New York trains and made them their moving signatures – tags – with images of North American pop culture such as Santa Claus and Mickey Mouse; they criss-crossed the city provoking unrest in the population and the local authorities. In Berlin during the height of activist anxiety to end one of the most embarrassing political situations of the occident post concentration camp, passers-by, artists and activists started to make their mark with wall paintings and graffiti, symbolically knocking down this wall that entered history as the *wall of shame*. Many of its images are today safeguarded in contemporary art museums. In São Paulo, this novelty was started by students of architecture, Matuck and Zaidler, together with the Ethiopian, Vallauri, who had recently arrived in Brazil from New York and Buenos Aires. As artist Carlos Matuck points out, some images (the boot, for example) were extracted from a stamp catalogue, Dulcemira Ltd. Other images followed,

such as the panther, the comic book character Jungle Jim, and of the American, Alex Raymond and the Lacoste crocodile. From then on, many other characters started to liven up the São Paulo scene, among them, *TinTin and the Thief* by the Belgian Hergé, the *Little King* of Otto Soglow and many others of the North American pop universe, cinema characters like Laurel and Hardy, Elizabeth Taylor and Elvis Presley and also the *Queen of the Baked Chicken*, that came from the São Paulo rotisseries. This art work ended up in the Biennial of São Paulo 1987. Soon to follow, the *TupinãoDá* group, led by young middle-class students from USP who took over the urban São Paulo scene. The preference was abandoned places, neglected alleyways in disuse or neglected walls of houses. The majority of images were labyrinths and man-machines – metaphors of the contemporary city. Having studied pre-historic cave images at university, this group took over Rebouças Tunnel, the main access to the most important avenue of São Paulo’s financial center.

Even today graffiti artists prize the most unusual places. A good example of this is Zezão, who, unconcerned with the visibility of his images, went down into the city’s sewers and also to the ruins of the controversial prison Carandiru. He livened up these venues with organic paintings that remind us of rococo arabesques and also, contrary to all these interferences, the virtual possibility.

There is a site where gangs meet to collect images. Having been displayed in biennial galleries, graffiti started to be considered more elitist. Meanwhile *tags*, similar to those seen in New York, showed up in São Paulo, and since they are considered an act of vandalism, disturbing to inhabitants and local authorities of the city, they became known as *pichação*. The word in Portuguese *pichação* comes from the word “pitch” in English, which is a black and very sticky resinous substance distilled from juniper oil. The classification of *pitcher* is already considered racial discrimination.

Nowadays, the same gang who started it decided to write the word *pichação* with *x* instead of *ch*. Besides, they created a kind of personal alphabet that has been used and understood only by its own members. Beyond this intervention, they realized that the top of buildings, although difficult for conventional reading, was more visible as an infringement. One perceives that the spaces have not only been transgressed, but the grammar itself has been modified.

This not only excites quarrels regarding the occupation of the spaces of the city, but also on what is art, aesthetic, pretty, ugly, permitted, forbidden, etc., and who are the citizens of the city. More than anything, they defy the dominant chains that try to impose logic, linguistic and communicative aesthetic homogeneity on the city.

The graffiti artist Fred 04 says: “Pixadores make art, artists make money.” Art is for some an act of vandalism and a threat. The fact is that these interferences in urban spaces do not cease to bother the local authorities of the cities in their anxiety to regulate urban spaces according to their disciplinarian point of view. This epistemological controversy between graffiti artists and *pixadores* is on the border line as to what is considered art or vandalism and what is permitted and forbidden in public spaces. It is important to point out that this controversial force establishes frontiers not only of the urban spaces and the artistic values, but the space of its agents. In April of 2006, the city of Porto Alegre, capital of the state Rio Grande do Sul, awoke to find the tower of the Usina do Gasômetro (Gas Plant) spray painted with letters; *Letters painted by vandals on the picture post-card of Porto Alegre* was the headline read in the city’s local newspaper, *Zero Hora*. Four days later the same newspaper printed in red letters: *Stop graffiti*. The column stated that Gadenz, a rich local entrepreneur, had paid a team of mountain climbers out of his own pocket, to remove the “dirt” from the chimney. Gadenz, as quoted in the paper said: “When I saw on TV what they had done to the chimney I thought about taking steps immediately.” Apart from this headline the same paper printed another headline which read: *Stop graffiti – Art or Vandalism?* followed by an interview with Alan, the suspected author of the writing, who had been arrested the previous night. Questioned by the journalist from *Zero Hour* if it didn’t bother the artist to spray without authorization, Alan answered: *It is not pixação, it is graffiti.*

ZH: *But you didn’t have authorization to draw on the Mauá Wall.*

Alan: *The wall is full of drawings. In the part where I drew, there was nothing. You can’t generalize between pixadores and graffiti artists.*

ZH: *Which message did you want to give?*

Alan: *Of protest. Can’t you see it’s all wrong? Don’t say anything. You are part of the system too!*

ZH: *Why do you put yourself down?*

Alan: *Because it's like this. Just look at the injustice: I was painting but I've already been branded a pixador ...*

ZH: *What is the difference in this case?*

Alan: *The graffiti artist's work is more elaborate, it takes more time. Pixação is the same as scribbling on a piece of paper.*

ZH: *What would you scribble?*

Alan: *I would put, "In Charge". The system's in charge and the people obey.*

The newspaper article finishes by saying that, to prevent new *pixação*, city hall intends to block ladder access to the chimney with iron gratings and screens. It is interesting to point out that this plant was created in 1928 to generate electricity for the city of Porto Alegre with the use coal. In 1974 the plant was deactivated and in the 80s started to be transformed into a cultural space. Currently, the building has six floors dedicated to culture, from local craft fairs to contemporary art exhibitions. The Art Biennial of Mercosul is an example. This space also housed the World Social Forum in 2004. The Wall of the Mauá is a wall that separates the old wharf of the port to Mauá Avenue. This wharf was deactivated in the 60s but in the 90s, following the example of the Gas Plant, was transformed into an exhibition space housing art exhibitions. For ten years the Wall of the Mauá has been authorized by the city hall of Porto Alegre, for groups to paint. But this episode is not an isolated case of prejudice against urban interventionists. Recently, the Mayor of São Paulo, Gilbert Kassab, decided "to clean up" the city starting with graffiti images and their counterparts. But this politics of "cleanliness" in the city of São Paulo is not an administrative novelty. His colleague, Jânio Quadros, had followed the same path in the 80s.

This manifestation of authority by Mayor Jânio was mentioned in the biggest newspaper of the city. Thus, instead of intimidating the young "offenders", it seems to have propagated this idea and to have inspired these and other eager youngsters to appear in the pages of the newspaper.

From then on, graffiti artists and local authorities never again understood one another. Installed controversy, instant news! The chance to trespass! It is important to point out that it is not only in Brazil that these conflicts abound. This controversy has been apparent since the 70s, when the first graffiti appeared on New York trains. Some people thought that it

had been commissioned by the New York City Hall, “to decorate” the subways, and they started to enjoy the work. Others, threatened by the colorful drawings and phrases of protest, perceived them as subversive acts and demanded the “cleaning” of the trains. In the middle of all this confusion the graffiti artists crossed the labyrinths of the stations and subways sending their messages. But soon the authorities intervened, by starting to develop many techniques to dissolve both the images and the gangs themselves. At the beginning, The Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) ordered the cleaning of graffiti on a daily basis, using solvent that was normally used to remove daily dirt. The process was slow and expensive and the trains were soon painted all over again, as noted by Craig Castleman (1982: 149).

When these products were considered inefficient, other substances were sought and acid based chemical products started being developed by aerospace technicians. Between 1972 and 1973, \$1.3 and \$2.7 million dollars were spent respectively on products for cleaning trains, but the results were unsatisfactory. Meanwhile, the total number of imprisoned graffiti artists grew from 351 to 1,562 between 1972–73, reaching 1,653 in 1974. One third of these prisoners were sentenced and sent to clean the trains. In 1976, the head commissioner of the MTA, John de Roos, announced that a solvent had finally been found. A solution of polyurethane-base dissolved the spray paint and, guaranteed the commissioner, was not harmful to users of the subway (ibid.: 156).

More impressive still, was the repression by the authorities of Berlin, when a Berlin citizen was intercepted by a guard of the GDR for having, in the style of a minimalist performance, traced a white line over kilometers of graffiti work on the Berlin Wall (the wall of the shame). Having been sentenced, he remained in prison for six months, accused of having violated public patrimony (Waldernburg 1990: 13). Recently, a text by Anny Bloch-Raymond, *Du tag au graff jusqu’ aux fresques murales*, comments that these wall marks in France are perceived as signs of laziness, clutter and insecurity (2005: 265).

Attempts to discipline graffiti artists and their followers are not only manifested in the prohibition and “cleansing” of urban spaces. During the administration of Jânio Quadros, for example, a team of managers for urban spaces in São Paulo, having realized the task was impossible, decided to systematize it in such a way that they started to organize courses in graffiti. From then on, the department of urbanism of City Hall organized

those interested, gave them materials, and interrupted traffic in the spaces selected, generally on holidays and Sundays. The participants went to the City Hall very early and, upon arriving at the agreed destination, divided the space, delimiting it with white paint as if it were an enormous screen. As Milton Sogabe says: “In this space/time, delinquency is allowed.” Meanwhile, participants in the project, generally artists of the city, misinformed as to the intricacies of graffiti artists and their followers, considered the experience important, because apart from interrupting traffic in the streets, it gave free range to the artists: Even though they weren’t getting paid, the City Hall donated materials to their work in the studios (Ramos 1993: 60). To recall the words of Edward Said: “from whatever politics, governing bodies always stipulate disciplinary measures to reach order” (Said 2005: 385).

Without perspective, frame or owner, works cover the dominant culture and are mixed with other urban manifestations such as advertising announcements, political propaganda and together with random phrases and pornographic messages, these urban actions are perceived, most of the time, as graffiti, but when installed in galleries and museums, they gain *art status*. A good example of this are the pieces of the Berlin Wall, mentioned previously, that today are conserved in contemporary art museums. All human communication is expressed by symbols fixed in one medium.

For MacLuhan *the medium is the message*. However, like a sign, the medium is never neutral, it has always been of semiotic value, which is randomly codified from behind the hegemonic powers that give value to and fix their values on our perception through liturgical, political and pedagogic rituals.

In this form, in accordance with written law, the State, through the church and the schools, legitimizes codes and lends their support to them. As much by what is said or not said, what is written or shouldn’t be written, by means of signs or images, the messages go out and are pushed onto society. For example, the value of a message printed in the Bible or the newspaper will determine the appreciation of the message. Put like this, MacLuhan has a good point. However, we have to remember that the value of the Bible or newspaper had previously been established and ritualized, that is, fixed in our perception. In the same way, graffiti in the street, in a place pre-determined as sacred and therefore forbidden, takes on the value of *pixação* – and therefore vandalism. The same graffiti, in a museum or

gallery supported by the dominant system, acquires the status of *contemporary art*. The value of the support is semiotic, that is, arbitrary, according to cultural criteria.

Urban planners and the arts system itself have been institutionalizing and laying down rules of occupation to these spaces, either for architecture, commerce, art and other systems of communication. Those systems, in their planning, do not take contemporary diversity of the urban environment into account. Moreover, they do not perceive that a medium of communication is an interactive system that only gains meaning in the relationship of broadcaster versus receiver.

With one foot in art and the other in politics, these infringing interferences in the urban space represent an inventive or innovative act that encourages public participation not only by those who are artists but also those who circulate in the city. They offer social changes in the use of the urban spaces, and aesthetic appreciation no longer restricted to galleries and museums.

It is interesting to point out that these new forms of expression in the urban space represent manifestations of resistance or the expression of multitudes that accumulate in the cities. Today, with all the pushing and shoving, everyone wants a place in the city. A place to live, to work, to wander around, to write and leave a message; where you can see improvised and jumbled up architecture, the streets teeming with peddlers and salesmen and highways full of cars; but also and more especially, a place of manifestation. It seems that today all problems of habitation consist in communication and provoking presence in space. Graffiti artists and their followers tell a new story in defense of minorities, of multiculturalism, of the end to all differences, of dictatorships and of social and intellectual *apartheid*. In the humdrum of survival and communication strategies, in the body to body activities of hegemonic corporations and new citizens of history, spaces are being occupied and products, services, habits and codes are being innovated and globalized. The influence of these codes in media graffiti and in the language of expression can be seen all over. Remembering Joseph Brodsky: "All new aesthetic reality helps man to need his own ethical reality. The aesthetic is the mother of ethics."

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Compréhension esthétique vs compréhension sémiologique: Quels enjeux?

Les modèles musicologiques caractérisés par une orientation sémiotique/sémiologique ont souvent repris des problématiques fréquemment déjà débattues au cours de l'histoire de l'esthétique musicale: on pense à des notions cardinales comme "expression", "compréhension", "symbole", et beaucoup d'autres. On a souligné à quel point il était important de soumettre celles-ci à des formes d'éclairage nouvelles, rendues possibles par l'utilisation des outils conceptuels propres aux sciences de la communication, du langage ou, plus généralement, à l'étude des systèmes symboliques. Mais l'esthétique musicale peut-elle vraiment – ou doit-elle, comme on pourrait le dire en paraphrasant (et en modifiant *ad hoc*) une thèse de Gadamer – se résoudre dans une sémiologie? Nous nous proposons de répondre à cette question grâce à une brève analyse du thème de la compréhension. Notamment, pour dévoiler tout de suite nos cartes, nous avons l'intention de montrer: 1) pourquoi, à notre sens, on ne peut répondre par l'affirmative; 2) qu'un tel constat est susceptible de nous suggérer, par-delà une opposition de principe, une forme de complémentarité des différentes conceptions du phénomène musical.

1. Les recherches d'orientation sémiologique se proposent d'étudier la musique en tant que fait symbolique et d'explorer "ses possibilités et ses modalités de renvoi" (Nattiez 1987: 137). Qu'on se rapproche ou qu'on fasse abstraction des modèles communicationnels, ce présupposé n'est jamais vraiment démenti – car le refuser reviendrait, au fond, à nier ce qui demeure inséparable d'une propriété minimale (pour autant que celle-ci soit approximative, contextualisée, ou encore qualifiée de non-propriété) du signe, *aliquid stat pro aliquo*. Or, le pouvoir de renvoi fait du signe (et de la sémiologie) non seulement une entité indéfinissable, mais une notion

des plus envahissantes. Rien n'échappe, en principe, à une "sémiosphère": tout objet rentrant dans son champ de gravitation sera capturé et dématérialisé jusqu'à n'être que simple indice, représentant, trace. On dira que tout cela est bien inévitable; que notre environnement humain est rempli de signes. Rien de plus vrai, même si un tel constat peut quelquefois nous déconcerter ou nous laisser sur un sentiment de frustration. C'est, me semble-t-il, ce qui ressortait de certaines paroles que Luciano Berio m'avait adressées, il y a quelques années, au cours d'une conservation téléphonique : "Vous avez dit sémiologie? Certes, tout est signe. Autant dire que tout est rêve!" – le jeu de mots fonctionne mieux en italien: "Tutto è segno. Come dire che tutto è sogno!"

"Tutto è sogno": c'est-à-dire que, une fois que nous avons pris nos distances par rapport à la corporéité des choses – ou de ces singulières quasi-choses que sont les sons – pour entrer dans cette irréalité fantomatique, tout (et son ironique contraire) devient possible. Tentons à présent de comprendre les implications d'un tel constat, appliqué à un thème aussi central que celui de la compréhension/mécompréhension de l'œuvre musicale.

2. Pour les sémiologues, la question de la compréhension (et par conséquent, de la mécompréhension) est liée à celle de la *signification*: comprendre un objet/signe musical veut dire saisir sa signification à l'intérieur d'un système de relations. Cela demande une étude attentive des compétences et des connaissances relatives aux codes et aux contextes dans lesquels un tel objet/signe a été composé. On pourra appliquer cette recherche aux objets musicaux les plus divers, du générique des programmes de variétés télévisées, de la musique de film aux hymnes politiques, des cultures musicales populaires aux sonneries des téléphones. Or, lorsqu'ils ont remis d'actualité une telle enquête, les sémiologues ont eu du mal à résister à la tentation de concevoir la signification en termes de dénotation (faible, peut-être, mais néanmoins explicite). Le fait est que l'adoption de la notion de signe les amène inévitablement à distinguer, ou, encore plus explicitement, à séparer un signifiant d'un signifié un matériau musical à la signification spécifique. Une telle séparation (en elle-même problématique) a pour corollaire la volonté de décrire ou paraphraser des "contenus de sens" qui, malgré tout, demeurent trop génériques et parfois franchement abusifs. On songe également à la volonté de stabiliser et d'enfermer à l'intérieur de cadres épistémologiquement cohérents la richesse d'une expérience qui se trouve

par définition plus riche de sens (et de significations) que les descriptions ou les explications que nous pouvons en tirer.

On dira que c'est un peu le destin de toute musicologie, et que du reste le pari de la sémiologie/sémiotique consiste justement à tenter de réunir ces deux pôles, ou plutôt à expliquer comment fonctionne leur union en termes méthodologiquement fiables. Cette opération semble néanmoins ne réussir que lorsqu'on analyse des objets musicaux simples, ayant une fonction facilement repérable dans un contexte relativement clos. Le problème est que ces cas sont assez rares, l'écoute d'une œuvre musicale impliquant en principe un nombre illimité de références culturelles, sociales, cognitives ou plus généralement humaines. Étudier celle-ci en termes symboliques, la comparer à un discours, à une forme de langage ou de narration, cela signifie d'ailleurs souvent la dépasser ou la traverser d'une quantité de questions qui, pour autant qu'elles importent à la compréhension du monde qui l'entoure, concernent seulement une part de sa manière d'être. Nous nous avouons souvent impuissants à expliquer sa propre individualité, les caractères qui en font une présence si particulière, l'objet d'une autre forme de compréhension que nous serions tentés d'appeler "esthétique". Mais qu'entendons-nous par ce terme? Essayons de l'éclairer à l'aide de quelques arguments.

3. Le premier consiste à souligner l'inséparabilité fondamentale du contenu et de la forme qui caractérise l'expression musicale. Il a été formulé par plusieurs philosophes et repris par nombre de musicologues et critiques musicaux (comme, par exemple, de Schläezer 1947). Il n'a pas échappé aux sémiologues, qui ont alors cherché à le parer en se fondant sur la distinction saussurienne entre "langue" et "parole": saisir les traits pertinents d'un acte de parole spécifique, en ce sens, pourrait être une démarche relativement proche d'une forme de compréhension musicale dans un sens esthétique. Mais cette proximité ne peut pas pour autant se confondre avec une forme d'identité. Pour s'en persuader, il suffit de rappeler qu'une saisie esthétique ne fonctionne d'une manière analogue que si l'on se pose la question de la *fonction* qu'assument les éléments identifiés sur une échelle généralement assez réduite (et donc, si l'on fait plus ou moins explicitement rentrer le discours dans un paradigme communicationnel).

Pour surmonter cet obstacle, il est possible d'introduire une distinction supplémentaire : celle qui existe entre des symboles conventionnels et des symboles d'un genre spécial. Comme le soulignait Boris de Schläe-

zer (1947: 33): “A compris ne nous conduit pas vers autre chose mais nous ramène à un A1 qui n’est encore toujours que A envisagé sous un nouvel aspect. On ne les comprend, ces symboles, qu’en y demeurant fermement attaché”. Plus ou moins à la même époque, Susanne Langer (1942) théorise une différence destinée à être souvent reprise par les philosophes, celle entre “symboles relationnels” et “symboles présentationnels”.

Or, ce qui nous laisse sceptique dans une telle distinction, c’est précisément le fait qu’elle nous oblige à renoncer ou à remettre en question une propriété élémentaire de la notion de signe ou de symbole – ou plutôt son manque même de propriété, sa capacité à se présenter ou à apparaître sous la forme d’un *renvoi* à autre chose. Si cette fonction ne peut pas rendre raison de la signification d’une œuvre musicale, si “ce qu’elle dit elle l’est” (de Schläezer 1947: 34), si son sens ne se laisse pas détacher de ses matériaux sensibles – pourquoi continuer à parler de signes et de sémiologie?

4. Un deuxième argument consiste à reconnaître que, bien qu’elle soit structurée comme un système symbolique et qu’elle manifeste la présence de règles grammaticales, la musique ne peut pas vraiment compter sur une forme d’interprétation sémantique de ses éléments. Pour autant que les efforts accomplis en ce sens par les chercheurs soient dignes d’intérêt et attestent de leur efficacité lorsqu’ils sont appliqués à l’analyse de certains styles musicaux, ils se révèlent insuffisants lorsque l’objet est complexe ou expressivement prégnant, notamment lorsqu’il dépasse le cadre de la musique tonale. Dans ces cas, les genres de saisie et de reconnaissance que nous mettons en acte demeurent en grande partie distincts de ceux qui interviennent dans une compétence verbale.

On peut alors concevoir la compréhension musicale comme une forme particulière, relativement autonome, de compréhension intentionnelle. Sa particularité, comme l’a observé Roger Scruton (2003: 90), réside dans le fait que, si d’un côté elle dépend de nos capacités intellectuelles et de notre culture, cette dernière se manifeste dans une manière d’*entendre* spécifique plutôt que dans nos manières de *penser* la musique – et même, pourrions-nous ajouter, de l’*interpréter*. On constate avant tout qu’une séquence de sons ou de bruits ne manifeste pas en elle-même (c’est-à-dire grâce à ses propriétés physiques ou perceptives) une valeur musicale: pour que l’auditeur puisse l’assumer en tant que musique, il faut qu’il puisse l’“entendre comme” (par exemple, comme une mélodie, comme un accord, comme une marche harmonique, etc.). Or, cela implique certainement la présence

d'une conception – laquelle, à son tour, comme le note Scruton, met en évidence la présence de nos capacités imaginatives et d'invention métaphorique. Nous devons pouvoir saisir la forme de nécessité spécifique qui caractérise la liaison et la succession des événements sonores. Mais cela fait également ressortir le besoin de retrouver une telle liaison à l'écoute effective de l'œuvre.

5. Nous pouvons encore nous rendre compte que notre décision de choisir telle conception (*Auffassung*) plutôt que telle autre intervenant dans une compréhension musicale ne peut pas s'établir entièrement *a priori*, à partir de l'examen d'un code ou d'un système symbolique de références, puisqu'elle dépend au moins en partie de la façon dont s'organise la configuration sensible sous observation. Avec la croche = 60, un extrait comme celui-ci (que nous empruntons à une recherche de Bozzi et Vicario 1960: 84) peut être entendu comme une sorte de ligne mélodique constituée par des couples de grands intervalles: *do – sol*, *la bémol – do dièse*, etc. (voir la deuxième portée, indiquant le résultat perceptif).



Exemple 1. Bozzi et Vicario, exemple de regroupement.

Ce regroupement peut s'expliquer par la proximité temporelle: les couples de notes se forment puisque celles-ci sont séparées par des pauses. Mais cela est possible seulement si la vitesse d'exécution est inférieure à une certaine valeur. Essayez d'accélérer: au-delà d'un certain seuil, on constatera la différenciation de deux lignes mélodiques. L'action de la proximité tonale, en conflit avec la proximité temporelle, finit par gagner. Avec la croche à 240, nous percevons clairement encore des couples de notes; mais elles se forment entre le *sol* et le *la bémol*, et le *do* et le *do dièse*; il s'agit de deux petits intervalles situés dans deux régions différentes de l'espace tonal (l'un à l'aigu, l'autre au grave). Certes, pour rendre raison de la "compréhension" (interne) d'un passage comme celui-ci, nous devrions sans doute l'inscrire à l'intérieur d'un contexte ou d'un système de relations. Mais il nous semble ici opportun de souligner que cette fonction de renvoi ne peut

ignorer les configurations qui se manifestent dans la présentation concrète des matériaux, quitte à perdre de vue ce qui pour l'auditeur constitue un résultat perceptif effectif. L'assimilation d'un code pourrait-elle nous porter à entendre différemment ce résultat? Je pense que la réponse serait : seulement en partie – ou plus précisément, seulement si l'on comprend d'une certaine façon le verbe "entendre". Car même si cette série de grands intervalles était bien présente à l'esprit de l'auditeur – imaginons, dans un contexte donné, qu'elle soit thématique, ou qu'elle se présente comme une figure spécifique par rapport à un fond –, celui-ci n'arriverait pas à l'*entendre* de cette manière: et cela, à cause de l'*émergence* effective de la nouvelle configuration (la ségrégation entre les notes aigues et les graves est forte, elle donne lieu à une unification par proximité de deux séries). Ainsi, le fait de demander à quelqu'un de comprendre cette figure sur la base du regroupement précédent ne pourrait pas suffire, sauf si par ce terme nous voulons désigner une forme d'*interprétation* de ce passage.

La présence ou l'action de ces facteurs d'unification ne devrait pas donner lieu à des malentendus. Il ne s'agit pas de penser qu'il existe une seule manière d'entendre ou de jouer ce passage. La volonté de l'exécutant et de l'auditeur est sans doute très importante : c'est à partir d'elle qu'il faudrait penser la transformation d'une séquence de sons en musique. On dira que cet exemple est encore beaucoup trop simple par rapport à ceux que nous pouvons rencontrer dans une expérience d'écoute musicale, et que, d'ailleurs, les unités perceptives ici identifiées ne sont pas forcément les unités pertinentes dans notre compréhension esthétique. C'est vrai; mais cela nous suffit néanmoins pour constater que notre saisie dépend aussi des forces ou des tensions qui se manifestent à la surface phénoménologique de l'objet (intentionnel) en question. Nous sommes confrontés à une forme de saisie aspectuelle obtenue en étroit contact avec l'expérience.

6. Ces observations nous permettent peut-être de montrer comment une compréhension et, en parallèle, une mécompréhension musicales que nous pouvons qualifier d'"esthétiques", fonctionnent parfois d'une manière indépendante des formes de compréhension/mécompréhension que nous pouvons mettre en évidence à partir d'un modèle sémiotique, surtout si celui-ci fait référence à une situation communicationnelle. Reprenons ce schéma classique, proposé entre autres par Eero Tarasti :

sujet S₁ ⇒ signe ⇒ sujet S₂

Selon ce modèle, une mécompréhension peut se vérifier de deux manières: soit lorsque le sujet récepteur (S₂) “se méprend sur le signe parce qu’il emploie un code, ou un système de signes – dans le lexique de Husserl, un *Bedeutungszeichen* – autre que celui qu’a utilisé S₁”, soit “S₂ se méprend sur le signe parce qu’il ne le reçoit pas en tant que signe expressif (*Audruckzeichen*)” (Tarasti 2006: 31). Cette dernière remarque semble cependant impliquer deux présupposés: 1) que l’expression du signe est normalement conçue d’une manière transitive 2) que ce que nous *entendons* se laisse absorber par la notion de signe et par ses fonctions de renvoi. Or, ni l’un ni l’autre de ces présupposés ne paraissent aller de soi. Par exemple, nous pourrions savoir (ou penser savoir) qu’une certaine mélodie est un signe expressif (de quelque chose), et cependant la jouer sans expression (avec un phrasé, une sonorité ou un mode de jeu qui ne met pas en valeur son individualité) ; parallèlement, à l’écoute, nous pourrions rater ses connotations expressives propres, tout en nous fondant sur l’identification de sa fonction ou de sa valeur en tant que signe expressif.

Une œuvre comme *Sequenza terza* de Luciano Berio est susceptible de mettre en pleine lumière cette duplicité. Fondée sur l’exploitation des aspects les plus connus de la vocalité quotidienne, cette pièce, selon les déclarations du compositeur, cherche à “exorciser l’excès de connotations en les rassemblant en unités musicales” (Berio 1998: 43). Pour ce faire, elle joue sur la possibilité de “jongler” entre différentes manières d’entendre: les gestes vocaux que nous prenons d’habitude pour des signes expressifs peuvent être en même temps entendus comme des figures musicales douées d’une expression propre. En effet, deux exécutions différentes de cette pièce pourraient s’accorder parfaitement sur le premier plan, tout en divergeant sur le second: c’est à la chanteuse de “construire” les unités musicales virtuellement présentes dans le matériau, de les faire émerger à sa façon (par exemple, la texture polyphonique, la spatialité et le rapport figure/fond d’un passage comme celui de l’ex. 2). Et c’est d’ailleurs à l’auditeur de parvenir à les saisir, en se mesurant avec la force de ses connotations les plus directes: la mise en scène du rapport entre l’interprète et sa propre voix est une trace sonore saisissable à condition de ne pas nous laisser capturer par l’expression transitive des ses matériaux (il suffit de prendre le coup de toux de l’exemple 3 pour un “véritable” coup de toux pour détruire l’unité musicale qu’il suggère). Bref, un auditeur S₂ peut comprendre ces signes précisément parce qu’il ne “les reçoit pas en tant que signes expressifs”.



Exemple 2. Berio, *Sequenza terza, pour voix de femme* (1966), environ entre 2'10" et 2'40".

Encore une fois, il faut reconnaître que les sémiologues ont eu conscience de ces problèmes. Mais la tendance à vouloir définir des systèmes de référence stables et, surtout, le présupposé qui veut que de tels systèmes puissent s'articuler comme les grammaires du langage risquent parfois de les rendre aveugles aux aspects émergents de l'œuvre. Là, à notre avis, se situe une des limites des formes d'explication ou d'interprétation sémiologiques: celles-ci courent le danger de survoler d'une manière trop désinvolte les propriétés des configurations audibles à la faveur d'une forme d'holisme fondé sur l'omniprésence de la notion de signe. L'idée d'une compréhension esthétique peut, selon nous, suggérer que, indépendamment du fait que nous parvenons à reconnaître une certaine intention de communiquer ou de symboliser, nous sommes capables de saisir (et éventuellement de décrire et d'expliquer esthétiquement) un certain mode d'apparition et d'organisation de la figure. Nous ne pourrions pas obtenir le même résultat grâce à la simple connaissance de ce qui est dénoté ou signifié par une telle apparence.

8. Il faudrait tenir constamment à l'esprit le fait que, même si une unité musicale renvoie normalement à d'autres unités déjà entendues ou à venir, elle ne se résout pas dans ce renvoi. Un accord, une mélodie, une phrase, une harmonie-timbre ou un son obtenu par synthèse additive fonctionnent certainement grâce au système de relations à l'intérieur duquel ils sont inscrits (et confèrent ainsi toute sa pertinence à la démarche d'une *semiosis*, tant "introversive" qu'"extroversive"); mais, pour les comprendre, nous devons les écouter et faire ainsi interagir ces renvois avec les virtualités qui se manifestent dans le "présent sonore". Voilà un constat incontournable lorsque nous voulons rendre compte d'une compréhension musical: car, comme l'a efficacement montré Jerrold Levinson (1997), si l'on se place du côté de l'auditeur, même des compréhensions à grande échelle se révèlent être subordonnées aux formes de saisie qui se réalisent dans la perception présente (ou quasi-présente). Ce qui émerge à ce niveau pourra difficile-

ment être considéré comme un reste négligeable. À l'inverse, on pourrait dire que ce "reste", impossible à éliminer et qui agit parfois "en dehors" des processus de *semiosis* (ou contre ceux-ci), justifie la spécificité d'un regard esthétique par rapport à celui qui est propre à la sémiologie. La possibilité même de ce discours nous semble en outre liée aux modes de fonctionnement propres aux données sensibles dans la perception musicale.

Pour résumer ces remarques, on pourrait dire que, pour expliquer une compréhension musicale, nous devons compter d'un côté sur une forme de reconnaissance des aspects à la surface sonore de l'œuvre et sur l'identification de ses relations internes, de l'autre sur une appréhension de sa valeur en tant que signe ou fait symbolique susceptible d'être mis en évidence à l'intérieur d'un réseau de signes. Il serait illusoire de penser que ce sont les propriétés objectives de la musique que nous sommes en train d'écouter ou d'analyser qui nous poussent dans une direction ou l'autre. Un hymne ou un générique télévisé semblent en effet mieux se prêter à une compréhension sémiologique qu'une phrase de Mozart. Mais il est tout aussi aisément démontrable que de telles propriétés apparaissent en fonction du contexte et des compétences de l'auditeur: la même phrase de Beethoven qui fonctionne grâce à son individualité propre dans une symphonie fonctionne comme indice de décision et de force dans le cadre de la publicité d'un parfum pour hommes. La musique occidentale qui s'est développée à travers la pratique du concert instrumental public n'est certainement pas la seule concernée par l'idée d'une compréhension/mécompréhension esthétiques. Cela dépend fortement, en fin de compte, de nos intentions, des objectifs que nous voulons atteindre dans l'interprétation de l'objet musical.

9. S'il semble vain d'imaginer une compréhension esthétique affranchie d'une compréhension symbolique, il semble également nécessaire de souligner qu'une saisie aspectuelle de nature esthétique ne se laisse pas absorber dans l'interprétation sémiologique des phénomènes musicaux. Pour conclure, on remarquera donc qu'une distinction entre formes de compréhension esthétique et sémiologique demeure valide lorsque nous cherchons à expliquer une compréhension musicale, et que cette distinction nous semble pouvoir s'effectuer à l'intérieur d'un champ de forces situé entre nos différents modes d'*entendre* les aspects caractérisant l'individualité expressive de l'objet musical et notre volonté de l'*interpréter* ou d'analyser ses éléments en tant que faits symboliques. Si elle est susceptible

de faire apparaître des différences épistémologiques et conceptuelles, une telle différence ne nous amène pas à mettre au jour une forme de divorce ou d'exclusion réciproque des paradigmes, au risque de nous éloigner de l'expérience effective que nous souhaitons analyser. Une coordination des différents résultats auxquels nous pouvons aboutir à partir de ces deux approches nous semble envisageable et permettrait d'aborder d'une manière concrète et globale le thème de la compréhension musicale.

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How we lose memory in aging

A view according to the icon/ index/ symbol trichotomy of signs

1. Introduction

We commonly tend to lose memory in certain ways as we grow older. Why and how does this happen? Because we feel and think only in signs, our memories are also in signs, whether they are simply feelings, mere attention to an object, or verbal expressions. Assessing this problem according to the semiotic ideas of Charles S. Peirce, we find that these mental signs are hierarchical in nature, as instances of symbols, indexes, and icons.

Loss of memory in aging may be classified roughly into two types: the ordinary, which everyone experiences, and the pathological, such as Alzheimer's disease. The present discussion is limited to the ordinary type. I will analyze which elements of the sign are relatively less-retained in memory than are others, which may in turn help to explain why and how we lose memory in aging. It is indeed true that other, complicated social and/or physiological elements play a role in the loss of memory, but here I limit the scope of discussion to basic semiotic elements related to the icon/ index/ symbol trichotomy of signs. In my view, this trichotomy sheds light on significant points that have gone unnoticed in social psychological and physiological studies of memory (e.g., Vygotsky's theory) and in physiological ones concerning immediate, or "short-term", memory capacity. It may, incidentally, throw some light on general characteristics of aging as they relate to communication.

2. *Memory as icon/ index/ symbol trichotomy of signs*

The semiotic theory of Peirce is especially well-known for its seminal idea of icon/ index/ symbol, and the synechism of these three elements in signs (e.g., symbol involving index, index involving icon, and so on). Peirce's division of signs into icons, indexes, and symbols is based on quality, relation, and representation (or mediation), respectively, which is, in turn, based on the fundamental triadic relations of monadic, dyadic, and triadic. Triads cannot be reduced to dyads, nor dyads to monads; triads are composed of dyads and monads; and dyads are composed of monads. Logically, in this composition monads constitute Firsts, dyads Seconds, triads Thirds. Relations of Thirdness make up the elements of thought, such that Third implies Second and Second implies First. Peirce states:

First is the conception of being or existing independent of anything else. Second is the conception of being relative to, the conception of reaction with, something else. Third is the conception of mediation, whereby a first and second are brought into relation. ... In psychology, Feeling is First, Sense of reaction Second, General conception Third, or mediation.... (CP. 6. 32. [1891.])

Thus we find that feeling – a kind of First – is the deepest sign and one that is independent of anything else; reaction is Second, being relative to something else; and general conception is Third. The latter is semiotically the most superficial sign, relating feeling and reaction in itself. If all our memory obtains in signs, we may say that it consists of the hierarchical trichotomy of icon, index, and symbol.

3. *Typical phenomena of memory in aging*

According to questionnaires given to 100 Japanese people, from 40 to 90 years of age (see Arima 2005), as our memory decays in aging, we experience the following phenomena:

We seldom forget the names of such familiar people as our family members or close friends, but do tend to forget the names of mere acquaintances. Also, we seldom forget highly emotional experiences of any kind.

We keep memories of what happened in our childhood rather well, with a vivid sense of taste, touch, smell, and others.

We often retain the feeling and image of our acquaintances in memory; we can recognize who they are, but have difficulty recalling their names. There are also cases in which we retain some feelings and images in memory, but cannot recall the object(s) to which they relate.

Generally speaking, such senses as taste, smell, and touch often bring us back to the experiences related to them better than do other senses, such as sight or hearing.

Some verbal signs are liable to be lost before others: seldom-used signs before frequently used ones, proper nouns before common nouns, nouns before modifiers and modifiers before verbs.

Repeatedly used phonetic sequences are retained rather well in memory.

Connections between feeling, referent, and social meaning in the memory tend to become looser as we age.

All of these phenomena seem to indicate semiotically a definite hierarchical order of icon / index/ symbol, such that an image or feeling of the object is mainly iconic (First), reference to the object mainly indexical (Second), and verbal expression mainly symbolic (Third).

4. Some semiotic explanations of memory-loss phenomena

Now let us examine the above-mentioned phenomena one by one and explain them semiotically.

(1) As we have seen, emotions are iconic and weightiest in sign-value; hence they are, assumedly, the best-retained in memory. This seems to be demonstrated by the fact that we seldom forget the names of familiar people and highly emotional experiences. In addition, we are liable to remember very emotional objects of experience quite frequently; thus, they too may be indexically retained better in memory.

(2) This requires some explanation of the language-acquisition period, which is known to end at around 13 years of age. During this period, language is relatively underdeveloped, which necessarily makes the iconic and indexical elements more salient. Experiences are emotionally iconic and vividly indexical, hence their signs are better retained in memory. Thus the memory of experiences during this particular period is so distinguished by a relatively strong iconic and indexical interpretation that involves taste, touch, smell, and other senses. After the age of 13 or so, all experiences

come to be interpreted predominantly in a symbolic (linguistic) way; because of their semiotic superficiality, such experiences are more easily lost from memory.

Recent research into children's language development (Tomasello 2003) tells us that the "mutual attention" of gaze-following, joint engagement, social referencing and imitative learning emerges between 9 to 12 months of age. Gaze-following is to look where adults are looking; joint engagement is to interact with adults in relatively extended bouts of social interaction mediated by an object; social referencing is to use adults as social reference points; and imitative learning is to act on objects in the same way as adults act on them.

Observation shows that the expression of various feelings by a newborn baby is iconic in nature; mere attention to an object is only indexical; joint attention, however, is not just indexical, but indicates the emergence of a symbolic act, thus demonstrating an advanced stage of semiotic development. This order of semiotic development parallels the processes of First, Second, and Third as anticipated by Peirce.

(3) It seems that decay of memory proceeds from the most superficial Third to the deepest First (Symbol→Index→Icon), which is the reverse order of semiotic development (Icon→Index→Symbol). When symbolic elements are not working well but both the iconic and indexical elements are working more or less properly, we may have cases in which feelings and images of our acquaintances (= icon) and the recognition of who they are (= index) are retained in memory, and yet we have difficulty recalling their names (= symbol). When the iconic elements are working well but the indexical elements are not, some feelings and images of an object may be retained in memory, and yet we are unable to pinpoint the object(s) related to them.

Study of the ontogenetic emergence of human physical senses shows that the senses of taste, touch and smell are more primitive than those of sight and hearing. After impregnation has occurred, the senses of taste, touch, smell, hearing and sight emerge at about 7 weeks, 10–18 weeks, 24 weeks, 28 weeks and later than 38 weeks, respectively (see Ikuta 2002: 59–60). And according to Arima (2005), the more primitive senses of taste, touch, and smell are retained better in memory. Incidentally, modern brain research indicates that the senses of sight and hearing are largely processed in both the new cerebral cortex and the old cerebral cortex, whereas taste

and smell are processed mainly in just the old cerebral cortex, which is not linguistic (see Tokoh 2004: 103–105). If consciousness begins with the symbols of language, then the primitive senses are intrinsically more related to the unconscious, iconic aspect of signs, and for this reason may be better retained in the memory.

(4) Frequent use of the same verbal signs will strengthen their indexicality; conversely, verbal signs that are used infrequently become weakly indexical, causing the memory of them to be more easily lost. As a result of this process, little-used signs will be lost before frequently used ones.

Why are proper nouns lost before common nouns, nouns before modifiers, and modifiers before verbs? This problem also seems to be related to the relative strength of the indexicality of the sign in question. Proper nouns will be found to be indexically weaker and more independent from context than are common nouns, because they indicate only one particular object and indexically remain rather unstable, while common nouns indicate infinitely more objects of a given category and are made stable by infinitely more indices to a given category of object. This weaker indexicality may cause proper nouns to be lost to memory before common nouns.

Generally speaking, the more signs depend on context, the more stable they will be in context and the better retained in memory, because such signs may be more easily guessed or indicated abductively in a given context. Thus the degree of context dependency may be roughly taken as the degree of indexicality. As far as our knowledge of English and Japanese syntax indicates, nouns seem to depend less on context than do modifiers, and modifiers are less dependent on context than verbs. This may be demonstrated when we leave out the parts of speech in question and require their slots to be filled: e.g., *I met a _____*; *She lives in a _____ town*; *She _____ up the mountain*. Verbs will be easier guessed than modifiers, and modifiers better than nouns. We may take this difference of context dependency as at least one indicator of the different degrees of indexicality obtaining between some parts of speech.

Repeatedly used phonetic sequences will become more habitual, such that they become more unconscious (i.e., less symbolic). These kinds of indexical, relatively more iconic signs are called “chunks”. They are assumed to be retained better in memory because of their greater iconicity and/or indexicality.

As Peirce once wrote (see CP. 6. 105. [1892]), synechistic energy may be an occult power, and we are not sure from where it comes. It might be conceived as something like a vital energy, which seems to increase with growth and to decrease in aging. One aspect of this decrease of power may be the weakening of synechism between icon, index and symbol, which results in the loosening of continuity between feeling, referent and socio-linguistic meaning.

5. *Conclusion*

In this paper I have offered a hypothetical, Peircean semiotic account of how we lose memory in aging. Peirce tells us that feeling is mainly iconic, referencing is mainly indexical, and general conception is mainly symbolic. We have seen that iconic elements are deepest in signs and the last to be lost in memory; indexical elements are the second to be lost, and the symbolic elements are most superficial, and hence the earliest to be lost.

Thus we see that any emotional experience is retained best in memory, and any strongly indexical experience is retained better than mere symbolic experience. We have also seen that the language-acquisition period features the relative salience of the iconic and indexical elements of signs due to the underdevelopment of symbolic elements in this period. This is taken to explain why any experience during this period is retained relatively well and recalled quite vividly.

Concerning sensory memory, it was found that any experience involving such primitive senses as smell, touch and taste are retained best in memory, due to their stronger iconicity than sight and hearing. We have also seen that chunks are more iconic than symbolic, and this is why they are retained better in memory. We have assumed that at least some varying degrees of indexicality in syntactic context may be relevant to the problem of different degrees of forgetfulness of various parts of speech. And some weakening of continuity between icon, index and symbol has been suggested as a reason for the loosening of connectivity between feeling, referent and verbal expression.

On the whole, we may conclude that as we grow older we are liable to become more iconic than indexical, and more indexical than symbolic. We find this hypothesis to be consistent with observations of language-development in children, and hence more satisfactory and universal, than many

so-called cultural and other kinds of interpretation of memory retention and loss.

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John Ole Askedal

Semiotic reflections on the visual art of Brian Jungen

Introduction

Brian Jungen (b. 1970, Fort St. John, British Columbia) is a First Nation Canadian, the son of a Swiss father and a Dunne-za First Nation mother. In recent years he has won international acclaim for his visual art, using modern materials for the creation of works having traditional native forms expressing traditional themes and displaying colors characteristic of indigenous art. Examples are baseball bats carved in the manner of totem poles, indigenous-looking masks and sculpture-like creations made of parts of disassembled Nike Air Jordan running shoes, a First Nations tent made of material from eleven Natuzzi leather couches, and “whale bone” sculptures composed of modern plastic chairs. Concerning his Nike Air Jordan masks, Jungen makes the following comment:

It was interesting to see how by simply manipulating the Air Jordan shoes you could evoke specific cultural traditions whilst simultaneously amplifying the process of cultural corruption and assimilation. The Nike masks and sculptures seemed to articulate a paradoxical relationship between a consumerist artifact and an ‘authentic’ native artifact. (Wikipedia entry, ref. 29.11.2006 09.30)

The present paper is concerned with the “paradoxicality” indicated by the artist himself. Among the conceptual distinctions inherent in Brian Jungen’s artistic problematization of cultural authenticity in a (post-) modern context are the following: synthetic materials vs. organic nature, leisure activities vs. cultural rites, modern comfort vs. survival under primitive conditions.

Baseball bats: “Collective Unconscious”, “First Nation, Second Nature”, “Work to Rule” (2005)

The three bats are displayed together (cf. *Jungen*, pp. 2–4). They thus form a group consisting of separate parts whose individuality appears to be underscored by the fact that the three bats are given individual names. From left to right their colors are red, black and that of unpainted, but polished wood. In the group context, the unpainted wood by presupposed contrast substitutes for white among the three colors red, black and white used for artistic purposes in the First Nation cultural community to which Brian Jungen belongs by birth.

The industrial and artistic production process starts with organic wood as the basic material. The wood is formed and transformed into a bat, an instrument of sport, in the course of an industrial process. What Jungen does is to provide the industrial products in question with carvings that immediately evoke a specific cultural affiliation, namely the tradition of totem poles and the culture whose most emblematic artifact totem poles are commonly considered to be. The carvings cut through and break up the smooth polished surface of the industrial product, where the producer’s logo and corresponding textual elements still bear testimony to the modern industrial mode of production of the bats and, by metonymical inference, the social and economic establishment behind it. Jungen leaves his carvings unpainted, thereby creating a unity of secondarily imposed traditional form – the carved pattern – and the basic material brought to the fore through the carving process. In the carvings, the marks of the carving instrument used by the artist are clearly to be seen, contrasting with the smooth, polished surface produced by mechanical means.

The result is an artistic object that represents cultural reversal although the transformed bats are obviously not new totem poles. Jungen’s artistic object is created to be seen by modern people who have at best a theoretical knowledge of the beliefs and ritual practices connected with totem poles and it is created in a societal and cultural context in which totem poles can no longer serve their original purpose. In a post-mythological cultural context, authentic traditional totem poles have no doubt suffered defunctionalization – in linguistic terms one might speak of desemantization – from communicating a set of mythical beliefs to having a primarily ornamental function (as on Stanley Island in Vancouver), or at most to

-serving as reminders of beliefs and ritual practices that are now history. (In the early twentieth century, totem poles were sold by their owners to museums and private collectors.) Of Jungen's baseball bats and authentic totem poles, the former have the more complex production history insofar as they have a cultural reversal history that is lacking in the case of authentic totem poles. Whereas authentic totem poles have become defunctionalized, the artist's bats are refunctionalized to highlight the contrast between modern and traditional culture; originally modern instruments of physical sport and leisure, they have been turned into an artistic means of cultural reflection.

A final twist is provided by the fact that when the thick end of the bats is taken as the upper end (*Brian Jungen*, pp. 3–4), a kind of “roof” pattern (ã) is pervasive in the carvings, suggesting eyebrows and a regularly shaped nose. When the bats are stood against a museum wall, the same basic figure element is turned upside down (v) and looks more like a mouth. In both cases, other elements of the carved pattern are recognizable as eyes. When both vertical orientations are considered, the impression is one of Janus-like reversibility in the vertical dimension.

The Michael Jordan running shoe project: “Prototypes for New Understanding” (2005)

In this project, which comprises a larger number of objects than the previous one, Nike Jordan Air trainers are disassembled and their individual parts are then reassembled to form sculptural creations that carry an uncanny likeness to traditional Aboriginal masks; “... Nike running shoes [are] deconstructed and then reconstructed into objects similar to West Coast First Nations masks, ...” (Kitty Scott, *Brian Jungen*, p. 117). Dana Augaitis uses the term “simulations of Northwest Coast Aboriginal artifacts” (*Brian Jungen*, p. 7). The Nike Jordan Air trainers are the expensive running shoes named after the famous American basketball star Michael Jordan and well known as a symbol of modern leisure and entertainment culture. There are 23 creations of this kind, corresponding to the number 23 on the back of Michael Jordan's team jersey. In a North American and especially US cultural context, the name Michael Jordan carries with it a connotation of strength and personal fortitude.

The sculptural creations in question are made of synthetic, inorganic material. In some of them, however, human hair is added. This addition of organic material of a human provenance underscores in an admittedly somewhat uncanny way the human connection. The colors are again red, black and white, according to Dana Augaitis “a classic combination prevalent in many Aboriginal motifs” (*Brian Jungen*, p. 7). It is a fair guess that the recognition of traditional colors in the running shoes helped to trigger the artist’s recognition of the shoes’ potential as material for an artistic experiment in paradoxicality. The majority of the sculptural creations exploit all three colors but in a few of them black is predominant and in others red is hardly visible (*Brian Jungen*, p. 45).

The synthetic materials – the disassembled shoe parts – are used for creations bearing a likeness to organic objects. Some of the masks seem to allow for a figurative interpretation as the head of an eagle (or a wolf or perhaps a dog; cf. *Brian Jungen*, p. 45). In other cases the shoe parts are reassembled to form abstract geometric patterns of a distinctly Aboriginal ornamental nature (*Brian Jungen*, p. 39). In either case, what happens is that a certain type of contemporary leisure object having no natural or, to use a Peircean term, indexical connection with indigenous traditions is dismembered to provide material for traditional forms of expression. Running shoes that are indicative of sport and a leisurely and elegant modern lifestyle are turned into strikingly different tradition-based forms which can be interpreted as carriers of myths and rites belonging in a totally different cultural world whose conceptual content is often no longer accessible to us. The perception of the imagery created by Jungen’s *Prototypes* is not unlike the bewildering, but not totally meaningless experience one may have when looking at ancient rock carvings where one can easily recognize and assign referential meaning to individual elements within an assemblage of carvings but the presumably coherent communicative intent of the assemblage as a whole remains impenetrable. Our knowledge of the modern industrial character of Jungen’s material adds a paradoxical feeling of familiarity that may enhance the bewilderment.

A furniture sculpture project: The tepee (2006)

In this case the outcome of the artistic creation process is a tepee, one of a limited number of objects commonly considered to be characteristic of

so-called “primitive” Amerindian lifestyle. Being the movable home of nomadic North American aboriginals, it is arguably also the object most basic to that lifestyle. The materials out of which Brian Jungen’s tepee is created are, on the one hand, eleven modish Natuzzi leather couches, known as expensive providers of personal comfort and a true symbol of a modern comfortable and luxurious international style of living, and, on the other, simple wood in the shape of the slender stems of young trees. The two different kinds of material are dealt with by the artist in significantly different ways. The tree stems have presumably been treated in the traditional manner to be expected in connection with the construction of a tepee; the branches and the bark have been removed and quite possibly the length of the stems have had to be adjusted to form an adequately proportioned structure. The Natuzzi couches, on the other hand, have been disassembled and the individual sheets out of which they were composed have then been sown together to form the covering of the tepee. This process is analogous to the disassembling of the Michael Jordan trainers and the reassembling of their individual parts. The color of the couches – black – is one of the traditional colors also found in the Jordan trainers. (Natuzzi couches come in many different colors.)

Conceptually, we are again dealing with functional reversal, but the reversal in question is in no way a “direct” one. For one, the leather of Natuzzi couches is organic material but in all probability stems from animals of a different kind than the one used in the construction of authentic Aboriginal tepees. The Natuzzi leather stems from domesticated animals whereas the North American Indians used leather from wild animals in the construction of tepees. In this sense Brian Jungen’s stripping of the couches represents symbolic reversal on the material level from domesticated animals serving an industrial function to a function originally served by non-domesticated wildlife. Thus Brian Jungen’s tepee covering finds itself at a second remove culturally from its source, the Natuzzi leather couches. Functionally, there is a transformation from luxury furniture that is being sheltered in a modern home into a culturally primitive shelter typical of a civilization still unfamiliar with the concept of furniture.

*“Whale bone” sculptures: “Shapeshifter” (2000),
“Cetology” (2002), “Vienna” (2003)*

These sculptures have the shape of huge whale skeletons and are created from white plastic garden chairs that were cut into pieces and then reassembled. Displayed against a dark or light grey background, the visual effect is a striking one. As in the case of the Nike sculptures, the material is inorganic, synthetic. In a functional perspective, the point of departure is again a modern leisure commodity that is stripped of its functional value and reassembled to form the likeness of something organic and natural. A comment by the artist himself confirms that this is indeed his intention: “When I made my first whale work, *Shapeshifter* [2002], I was curious to see if a reproduction of an object from the natural world could be made from something completely inorganic” (Jungen, interview with Simon Starling, *Brian Jungen*, p. 133).

By way of artistic restructuring and iconic illusion, Jungen makes the viewer feel that he is leaving the domain of human culture and entering the realm of age-old biology. In this there is a time dimension involving several layers. First, plastic is an inorganic product of late, technical civilization and a far younger material than bone, which is the product of biological evolution extending over millennia. Second, a bare skeleton implies a preceding process of biological disintegration, with the bone skeleton as the remaining durable matter. Third, Jungen’s artificial whale skeletons are a structurally reminiscent of dinosaur skeletons known from museums of natural history (cf. Dana Augaitis, *Brian Jungen*, p. 10) and may by virtue of this cultural fact evoke an impression of pre-human existence in the mind of the viewer.

*Attempts at characterizing the visual art
of Brian Jungen: Towards a perspective*

Jungen’s art has invited comments and characterizations from a variety of theoretical perspectives. In the current intellectual climate it comes as no surprise that minimalism is brought into the picture (by Dana Augaitis and Trevor Smith, *Brian Jungen*, pp. 8 and 81–85, respectively) but Jungen’s intentional mixing of cultural levels raises doubt about the relevance of this concept. Some of the characterizations given are fairly general and

therefore less illuminating, cf. for instance Dana Augaitis's comment on the artist's interest in "the physicality of objects" (p. 9), which tells us nothing about the specific ways this interest manifests itself artistically.

Given Brian Jungen's personal biography, it is natural that ethnicity and geo-political issues pertaining to colonialism and neo-colonialism should enter the picture. Dana Augaitis simply states that in Jungen's "world, the Aboriginal is brought together with the colonizer" (*Brian Jungen*, p. 11). Trevor Scott sees in Jungen an artist "exploring the effects of neo-colonial and global economic forces on the construction of social space and representation" (p. 83) and a representative of "the local tradition of engaging in a critique of representation as a form of social criticism" (p. 84). Cuauchtémoc Medina refers to "the production of objective mirages that mediate the interethnic imaginary of both individuals and communities on the North and South American continents" (p. 28) and maintains that Jungen's art "unfolds against a global context of colonial stereotyping" (p. 29). Medina further proposes that Jungen's art "can be seen as an example of how to use cultural stereotypes as a means of critical engagement" (p. 29). Such views also underlie the specific comments Medina makes about individual works by Brian Jungen. In his view the Nike masks "project back onto Western society all the suggestions of primitive delusion formerly attributed to so-called 'totemic' societies, picturing capitalism as a variant of idolatry" (p. 31); thus "Michael Jordan is replaced by an undefined 'totemic' identity" (p. 35) arising through "... the simulation of a 'primitive' religious object" (p. 35).

More pertinent to an understanding of Brian Jungen's intentions and techniques are the historical perspectives indicated by some commentators. As the artist himself points out in an interview with Simon Starling, there exists in Aboriginal Amerindian art a tradition of purposeful intercultural recycling:

There are plenty of historic examples of the artwork of First Nations cultures where European products were modified and used for their aesthetic qualities, thereby changing the intended value of these products. (*Brian Jungen*, p. 134)

Cuauchtémoc Medina refers to this tradition as "cultural distortions" that are "able to play a mediating role between communities" (*ibid.*, p. 28

f.). Brian Jungen is careful to point out that this is a general possibility, not a detailed recipe:

... the methods of incorporation of non-Native objects into Native cultures are as diverse as the different cultures of the continent, and varied insofar as the uses to which they were adopted. (ibid., p. 135)

Jungen is acutely conscious of the connection between the recycling practice in question and his own childhood experiences and, later on, his artistic training:

My approach to working with existing objects and altering them is directly related to a material sensibility I experienced in my childhood, the way my mother's family would use objects in ways that weren't originally intended, a kind of improvisatory recycling that was born out of both practical and economic necessity. Witnessing that resourcefulness continues to exert a deep influence on how I relate to the world as an artist." (quoted by Trevor Smith, *Brian Jungen*, p. 81)

The artist is well aware of political implications of his childhood experiences as reflected in his work: "So even as a child, I was exposed and conditioned by a rudimentary form of globalism" (ibid., p. 12).

Jungen's own comments on some of the works we have surveyed testify to the conscious way in which he applies his artistic technique; consider, for example, his remark on the *Shapeshifter*:

When I made my first whale work, *Shapeshifter* [2002], I was curious to see whether a reproduction of an object from the natural world could be made from something completely inorganic." (Brian Jungen, interview with Simon Starling, *Brian Jungen*, p. 133)

The Nike Jordan Air trainer *Prototypes* project is the result of the artist's equally conscious reflection on the artistic potential of his material with a view to perspectives deriving from current global economical and political practices:

Sometime later, in 1998, I was on a residency at the Banff Centre and started to investigate the possibility of using athletic equipment as a sculptural medium. Researching into Nike's use of exploited labour – which was being widely discussed in the media – and thinking about the iconic status of their Air Jordan range of shoes fuelled my interest. I started to make

connections between the issues of exploitation, production and commodification and started to think about how this might relate to native art generally.” (quoted by Kitty Scott, *Brian Jungen*, p. 124, n. 20)

There is thus a personal and ideological background to the way in which Brian Jungen as an artist “reconfigur[es] ready-made objects” (Dana Augaitis, *Brian Jungen*, p. 7). The import of this general reconfiguration strategy is characterized in somewhat different terms by the critics. According to Dana Augaitis, Brian Jungen “disregard[s] fixed and rigid orders of meaning” (ibid., p. 11). This may be taken to point to the “reversals” described above. However, Dana Augaitis appears to be only partly right in her assumption that Jungen “injects disorder into modernity’s notions of order – by transforming materials and exposing interiors, and by rendering things impure and complex” (ibid., p. 5). One may wonder whether “impurity” really is an apt term for unexpected material and conceptual juxtapositions resulting in multi-level structured complexity? In my view, Simon Starling is on the right track in the following question addressed to Brian Jungen in an interview:

It seems that in many of your previous projects there is a very direct dialogue between a motif and the material you choose to “reproduce” it in. Is it a way of problematizing a traditional understanding of sculpture, where the material is no longer at the service of the subject but rather in dialogue with it? (Starling, *Brian Jungen*, p. 133)

This indicates a paradoxical relationship between form and material, and “paradoxicality” is indeed a work used by Jungen himself in connection with the Nike *Prototypes*: “The Nike ‘mask’ sculptures seemed to articulate a paradoxical relationship between a consumerist artifact and an ‘authentic’ native artifact” (quoted by Cuauchémoc Medina, *Brian Jungen*, p. 30).

In my view, the concept of “reversal” is basic to understanding the “paradoxicality” referred to by Jungen himself. Reversal is indeed also the word used by Ralph Rugoff in connection with Jungen’s *Capp Street Project* (not discussed above). Here, Rugoff speaks of an “aesthetic reversal” that “might seem an ironic gesture” (in *Brian Jungen*, p. 109). According to the analyses of four of Jungen’s projects given, this is what it is about. Using materials stemming from modern comfortable leisure and sports culture, Jungen recreates quasi-mythical objects of art where the paradoxical relationship

between material and artistic form results in conceptual tension. Certain aspects of the works discussed here – in particular some of the *Prototypes* and the whale skeletons – have a somewhat uncanny appearance evoking a sense of alienation that heightens this tension. Put differently, Brian Jungen's art uses contrasting, yet integrative juxtaposition of material modernity and traditional content as a means of highlighting the complex and problematic nature of modernity in a multicultural context. This again is an artistic variation of a basic traditional/non-traditional, form/content theme. And there is of course an aspect of irony to all this. Brian Jungen's artistic artifacts are just that, created for no other use than to be watched in a gallery or museum, as reminders of paradoxical, even impossible, yet important connections.

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Kristian Bankov

Bankov's razor: Some critical remarks on biosemiotics

Do not block the way of inquiry. No one could agree more than I do with this first rule of reason, which, Peirce suggests, should be “inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy” (CP 1.135). When I started to argue with my colleagues about some apparent contradictions within the philosophical foundations of biosemiotics, many of them understood my intent as a denial of the right of existence of biosemiotics, a negation of the whole project of inquiry. That is entirely wrong. *Bankov's razor is a contribution to biosemiotics, brought in from outside*, a tool for methodological perfection, or, if you prefer a congenial metaphor – a kind of immune agent within its theoretical organism. Biosemiotics needs to legitimize itself, needs to be taken more and more seriously by people not in the field. I want to help this process with my personal opinion, showing on one hand what I find unconvincing and, on the other, the direction to take in order to arrive at contributions that are irrefutably genuine.

Bankov's Razor was originally conceived as a reaction against my first impression of biosemiotics, mostly from conferences and congresses, including an entire semiotic school on that topic in Bulgaria in September 2000, of which I was one of the organizers. It seemed to me that the presentations were concerned, on the one hand, with “what biosemiotics should be”; on the other, there were descriptions of obvious and well-known facts about animal behavior and biological systems, paraphrased in semiotic terms. I saw no “profit” in that kind of theoretical mimicry, except the polemical justification or proof that everything in the living world is semiosis and not only human communication, as “those French guys” were trying to convince us. I thought this cannot be true – biosemiotics exists only for that semiotico-political reason! Fortunately, it was not entirely true, and I formulated the “razor” in order to separate, mostly for myself, the “political” from the “scientific” side of biosemiotics. The first formula-

tion was more or less this: *Let's speak about biosemiotics only if this discipline can say something new about biological, ethological and similar such facts.* And to “say something new” was not to repeat the obvious with new terms. What would be the point of using semiotics in biology if not to reveal, through its own paradigms, aspects of the observed phenomena in the natural world, the results of which are important, but are invisible or unexplained by any of the existing discourses? I am sure that there is room for such advances. But it is hardly convincing to say, for instance, that the service bull takes something that, under certain aspects, stands for something else, or that cells interpret glands' messages formulated as hormones, etc. The Razor cuts through all that stuff.

Time has passed since then. I have started to learn more about biosemiotics, thanks mostly to formal and informal debates with my colleagues and friends Kalevi Kull, Dario Martinelli, Soren Brier, John Deely and (by e-mail) Timo Maran. “The razor” started to work as my own interpretative key for biosemiotics, and it contributed a lot to the elaboration of my point of view. Most of all, it elaborated itself, so that now, for the first time, I dare to express those ideas in written form. And I use the verb “dare” because, as far as I know, no one else in recent years has explicitly criticized the biosemiotic approach.¹ But most of all I offer my reflections here because, after finally starting to read biosemiotics I found within its most representative contributors an awareness of those very problems which provoked my “razor” attitude. So, it goes without saying, the biosemiotics' immune system works, and I shall try to stimulate it with some methodological vaccinations.

The elaborated form of the “razor” includes three main questions about currently circulating biosemiotic ideas, regarding: (1) the philosophic grounds of the biosemiotic discourse; (2) the scientific output of biosemiotics; and (3) the ethical consequences of some biosemiotic presumptions.

Concerning the first point one must distinguish between several, inter-related discursive orientations within the field of biosemiotics. (a) There is a strong ontological pretense in biosemiotics, a philosophically grounded claim about how things hang together, what the real essence of nature and life is, etc. “Life is coextensive with semiosis” is characteristic of this kind of reflection. (b) A huge part of biosemiotics is dedicated to a kind of history of ideas, relevant to its predecessors and/or the discovery of biosemiotic

ideas in “unexpected” thinkers and scientists. Here enter also the contributions of systematization of contemporary advances in the field. (c) There is a descriptive, strictly scientific orientation, where we read about facts in the Universe and the biosphere: Big Bang, cells and molecules, plants and bacteria, animal behavior, etc. The kinds of just-described, theoretical mimicry can be found in most of those contributions. (d) Last but not least, there is the contribution of biosemioticians on current social and political issues, such as ecological consciousness, “bio-ethics” and more.

Considering this variety of discursive orientations, it is difficult to establish any clear identity for biosemiotics. After hearing that biosemiotics is “the study of signs, of communication, and of information in living organisms” (*Oxford Dictionary of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology*: 72) and even more: “the scientific study of biosemiosis” (Emmeche et al. 2002: 26), an unprejudiced observer would imagine people with an experimental agenda. Kalevi Kull would claim that “Biosemiotics means biology” (Kull 2002: 332–334). My expectations were in that direction too, but when I started to read books and papers I found much more philosophy than laboratory or field work. Somehow the identity of the discipline was to be established more as an interpretative than as a productive approach. And I think that more or less all scholars in biosemiotics would agree on the precept, present in any extended definition, that biosemiotics offers to the existing biological theories a kind of generalizing view which they lack and they need:

Biosemiotics attempts to bring together separate findings of the various disciplines of biology (including evolutionary biology) into a new and more unified perspective on the central phenomena of the living world, including the generation of function and signification in living systems, from the ribosome to the ecosystem and from the beginnings of life to its ultimate meanings. (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biosemiotics>)

This ambitious engagement could be achieved with considerations on the order of ontology and not with a kind of research program. This view is shared by Stjernfelt in an important article, in which he presents biosemiotics as a formal ontology, necessary for biology to overcome naive mechanistic approaches to the explanation of living nature (in Popova 2001: 14). In one of the landmark books on biosemiotics, Hoffmeyer also presents an ontology, arguing that natural and cultural history should be included

in one common view in order to overcome dualism (Hoffmeyer 1996: 95). Most explicit of all is probably Emmeche:

The philosophical status of biosemiotics is best viewed as compatible with the ontological-level thesis. This means that biosemiotics is not as such a research program (or paradigm) that should be an alternative for existing biological research (in e.g., molecular biology, physiology, ecology, etc.). But it gives the research done here a broader interpretation, and helps to relate the findings of biology better to the general picture of the living world and the physical universe, a picture which has been dominated by atomistic and mechanistic notions of nature. (Emmeche 1999: 108)

Another smart move of biosemiotics, to avoid the requirements of research and verification, was made by its founder Thomas Sebeok. Does biosemiotics (at the time, zoosemiotics) need a proper theoretical foundation? “... what zoosemiotics sorely lacked, I thought, was a sound theoretical basis. This uninformed belief, as I soon discovered, or, in fact, rediscovered by the end of that decade [1970s], was totally mistaken. The theory was there, in theoretical biology” (Sebeok 2001: *xxi*). My impression is that this statement is the real program for the biosemiotic theory representing the above-mentioned discursive orientation (2), namely, as a kind of science. Consequently “the study of signs, of communication, and of information in living organisms” is invisibly transformed in the study of books and in the systematizing of existing theoretical ideas.

Hence the result that biosemioticians do not promote genuine research, but use existing data and theories for the construction of new, more totalizing and comprehensive hypotheses about the living world. Such “self-determination” of biosemiotics presumes that the real “data collectors”, the experimental scientists from laboratories all over the world, are incapable of those kinds of generalizations; it presumes that they lack ontological awareness or wisdom. Emblematic of that attitude is Hoffmeyer’s description of the “true scientist” – a narrow-minded operator, one who is unable to differentiate between data and the real world (Hoffmeyer 1996: 90–91).

I think that here we need some shaving. This presumed superiority of biosemiotics over conventional biology and mechanical sciences is misplaced. Biosemiotics relies not only on existing data achieved within certain sciences; it is entirely dependent on the scientific worldview, on

its articulations and categorizations of the surrounding world, on biological terminology², on the theory of evolution, and the like. Biosemiotics would be nothing without them, whereas they, the conventionally affirmed disciplines, have existed, exist and will exist totally unaware of biosemiotics. Their plurality and partiality, envisaged as defects by biosemiotics, represent the very guarantee for objective results. There are many other approaches similar to biosemiotics, on the margins of the debate, and there are many, mutually contradictory approaches within it. Science is no longer a unifying project; it has become irreversibly transformed into a pluralistic reality.

One of the great promises and ambitions of biosemiotics is to restore unity to the life sciences. I would suggest to my colleagues, however, that they first make their discipline a member of the club of the scientific communities. How? Certainly not by denying the existing membership *en masse*, and presenting their discipline as some kind of alternative ontology (to all of them). And certainly not with the obsessive re-descriptions of known facts and theories in (bio)semiotic terms. If there is no unified science, there nevertheless do exist some common standards used to validate scientific contributions. Such are the criteria for the assignment of the Nobel prize or, let's say, for accepting an article for publication in *Scientific American* magazine. *Biosemiotics needs to regulate its discourse, assess its claims, based on the same standards of validation required of the other members of the club.* This means participating in the front line of scientific inquiry, not only in the repartitioning of already conquered territories.³ And such a turn requires the kind of "scientific humility" that is absent from most of the papers in biosemiotics that I have read. Of course, one might rejoin that every scientific revolution has been preceded by a drastic shift of paradigm; but while we are awaiting this auspicious event, it would be better for biosemiotics to adopt a line towards empirical inquiry; a line which certainly exists, but is blurred by the other discursive orientations. In addition to the standards of validating contributions among the scientific community, there are also commonly shared resistances of the natural world – observable phenomena, which do not fit into any existing hypothesis. Abduction and experimentation are ways to struggle with the resistance of the natural world, and the validity of any new paradigm consists in its "fresh" lead toward new abductions and their ensuing confirmations. Poets and ontologists propose possible worlds, while ignoring the judge-

ments of facts.⁴ But a scientifically oriented discipline such as biosemiotics would be better off legitimizing itself with facts, and perhaps on such stable ground to erect credible, if not verifiable, generalizations. If such facts, such validated explanatory contributions, do exist, I would suggest that the biosemiotics' PR team put them in the window display and take away the promises of new beginnings for a unified science and of ultimate truth about nature: "from the ribosome to the ecosystem and from the beginnings of life to its ultimate meanings."

Those were the Razor's suggestions for the "foreign office" of biosemiotics. Now let's have a look at the bureau of "internal affairs".

Let's start with an empirical observation. It seems quite one kind of discourse if I write a paper on the behavior of my pet, the green iguana Paola, than if I write one on the French philosopher Henri Bergson, not on his behaviour, but on his ideas. I could sketch a theory of why Paola is making messes in the least appropriate places, every time I set her free in a room. To do so, I must quote observable facts and try to fit them into existing theories, which theories certainly will be based on other observed facts. My theory might contradict or confirm some existing ones. Someone who knows more about green iguanas or shares a different paradigm may challenge my theory. Validation of the theories will consist in a comparison of their relative predictive power, also realized through observation of facts. Thanks to the dependence on observable facts it is easy to involve "experts", who can judge with "yes" or "no" which one of the competing descriptions works better.

If I write a paper on, let's say, what in Bergson's philosophy is good for contemporary semiotics (as I did in 2000) I shall not rely on observable facts, but on written ideas, by Bergson himself, by people who wrote about him, and by others, all of them pertinent to my proposal. The validity of my work will most probably depend on my ability to involve as many sources (written texts) as possible and to construct a logically consistent narrative. Of course I could use facts and, for instance, attribute to Bergson words which are not his, and my proposal could be refuted for that reason. But what is important is that the proposal could also be refuted whether or not erroneous facts are present, just as it can be appreciated even if I mistake Bergson's year of birth or the publication date of some book. Even if my "confuter" and I call in experts to settle the matter, their judgement could never be absolutely "correct". This kind of discourse does not presuppose

“yes” or “no” decisions about its validity, but rather the kinds of attitude of the “accept” or “do not accept” kind, with an infinity of gradations.

What I am trying to show here is the “internal” confrontation among different standards of theoretical validation. Far from imposing any methodological dualism, in Dilthey’s style, I insist that the whole pluralistic multitude of communities of inquirers is positioned in a space between two extremes. The iguana paper, or better, the standard of validation which its explanatory ambition (with the respective discursive style) presupposes, leans towards that extreme for which the emblematic situation would be the following: Aristotle and Galileo are disputing the speed of falling bodies. Aristotle insists that the heavier the body is, the higher its acceleration. On the contrary, Galileo insists that all bodies fall at the same rate of acceleration. The bet is made, and we all know the experiments which proved irrefutably – in a “yes” or “no” way – who was right. At that extreme of the validation standards of theoretical discourses lies the ideal of scientificity. It works like a pole of attraction. The ideal of scientificity, from the Enlightenment on, has assumed the monopoly over truth, and a lot of science was and is produced under its lead.

On the other extreme of that space or area of the various standards of validation, the one towards which it is reasonable to position the Bergson paper, we can imagine those discourses which do not require the sanction, consideration, or resistance of facts. An emblematic candidate for the flag is Plato’s metaphysics. Although he probably bet with Aristotle about the validity of his doctrine – and I think this was the very moment at which Raphael pictured them – there was no grounds, or at least no objective certainty, on which to determine who was the winner. Throughout the whole history of philosophy, both men mustered armies of followers, since the nature of that kind of discourse allows *parallel existence*. After Galileo’s experiments, however, there are not very many who still believe Aristotle’s views concerning falling bodies. We may call one of the extremes of the variety of discursive validations *loose*, and the other *rigid*. Quite similar considerations about the loose side of discursivity can be found in Michel Foucault’s memorable article “What is an author?” (cf. Rabinow 1984). There he introduces the notion of *founders of discursivity*, a cultural phenomenon relevant for understanding how the internal constitution of a discourse can determine its interpretative fate.

It is important to stress one thing here: the standards of discursive validation always depend, although in a different degree, on the community of inquirers, i.e., on social phenomena. Truths can exist within a single mind, uncommunicated to the others, but the standards are social and conventional, like languages and codes. Another thing to be underlined: although until now I have mentioned only great figures of western culture, the standards are the same for anyone who aspires to contribute in a given area of inquiry. We can imagine the pluralistic totality of communities of inquirers to be organized like leopard spots, though not static, but with changing dimensions and continuously tending to move, to merge or to subdivide into smaller groups, to appear and disappear, and even to destroy each other.

Elsewhere I have developed a hypothesis, from a semiotic point of view, concerning the reasons for the different kinds of truths with which different discourses operate; there I focused on instances that *produce* discourse and those which *are subject to* it. The kind of “anti-dualistic” conclusions arrived at through those reflections resulted in the claim that *theoretical discourse and conscious aspirations for truth can be produced only by culturally “trained” human beings*. These last are persons who enter into well-determined practices, and who undergo many years of intensive schooling and education, and who thereby acquire knowledge and skills that are communicated within a context of cultural conventions, mainly languages. This hypothesis could be immediately refuted, should someone succeed in adducing a reliable theoretical discourse that has been produced by some other kind of being.

Thus, it seems that there can be no theoretical discourse without human being(s) behind it, without a community (society) provided with languages and other cultural conventions. The simple proposition is that, when the objects of theoretical description (or modeling, or explanation) are some of the instances necessary for its production (mind, society, language, culture, memory, etc.), then the kind of truth achieved in that way is not independent. The theoretical approach influences the object it describes; the theory partially constructs it. The eye cannot see itself seeing. The “theoretical eye” is constituted by elements which deprive it of the possibility of seeing them independently. Moreover, the output of a theory of mind may influence the mind’s operation; a theory about society could change that society; a theory of culture is part of the culture itself.

By the way, Goebbels knew this pragmatic aspect of truth quite well, and he applied his “1000 time repetition” principle to a lot of issues. He constructed truths, which were spread and believed as real (not constructed) truths. This is because society, mind, culture, language and the like do not represent a genuine *resistance* to human descriptive efforts. They exercise a resistance which is the resistance of habit, of convention, of common sense, of ideology, of power, of logic, of rhetoric, of legislation and so on. All those instances are, in principle, subject to transformation(s) resulting from their discursivation.

Nothing of that kind happens to rocks, planets, light, molecules and the like. The principles which govern their existence are *independent* of mind, society, language, culture, etc. Theories are made up of human discourse, languages, symbols and so on; they are mind- and culture-dependent; but they do not influence “the things in themselves”, the subject of description. Their resistance is genuine. Goebbels could not influence their course. New theories might reveal new aspects of reality and perhaps change our minds, but not the regularities and persistence of those aspects’ phenomenal appearance. The things and their principles do not care what we think about them; they care nothing about our desires, ideologies, battles, quarrels and congresses.

The result is, again, a rigid pole with standards of discursive validation and dominated by theories concerned with the genuine resistance of what Peirce would call a “dynamic object”. The loose pole of standards is about mind, society and culture-dependent discourses.

For me it is not difficult to position the “leopard spot” of what Sebeok calls “normal semiotics” or “anthroposemiotics” (Sebeok 2001: *xxi*) towards the loose pole of the standards for discursive validation. There semiotics stays in the good company of the “normal wings” of cultural anthropology, sociology, literary criticism, philosophy and many other humanities. Although many members of those communities of inquirers believe they are superior to the others – the bearers of “true” semiotics, “true” sociology, etc. and deserving of special consideration – they all participate in the same discursive “ecosystem”. Interdisciplinarity makes the “spots” even more fragmented and “authority” (i.e., founders of discursivity) oriented.

And here we are again with our topic: where is the spot of the community of biosemiotic inquirers to be located? As I mentioned before, it is difficult to extract a unified picture of the problem from the various

contributors. What provoked the first intervention of the Razor was the biosemiotic pretensions to validity, ranging from ontology to experimental science. My suggestion was to work at exporting valid principles from “normal” semiotics to biology, and mostly in ethology, with the aim being that of genuine contribution, sanctioned by facts: *The second intervention of the Razor will consider from inside the cognitive resources of biosemioticians, which they use to position themselves above culture and society and thus to develop a kind of discursive universality, not sanctioned by the existing standards of discursive validation.*

One of the main issues in biosemiotics is the necessity to overcome *anthropocentrism*. For Sebeok “restricting semiotic inquiry to our species is absurd” (ibid). Postulating the enlargement of the semiotic phenomenon to the whole living world is a very attractive theoretical project, but it presupposes a hidden shift of perspective. From within our species-specific, socially and culturally determined condition, we are the only privileged authorities of constructing models and hypotheses about how things hang together within our species-specific environment. Normal, anthroposemiotics contributed a lot during the twentieth century toward enriching our awareness of the human cultural and social constitution. When the perspective is enlarged beyond our species and our purpose as biosemioticians is to enrich our more general biological awareness, we tacitly continue to retain the position of privileged authority and the justification is simple: we are human animals, we are totally dependent on the continuous exchange with the biological environment, our vital metabolism depends on nature and not on culture. In our ontological solidarity with the whole biosphere we could employ a theory about “man as a biological entity rather than as a cultural entity” (ibid). This is smart, but an entirely wrong shift. It is wrong because it neglects the fact that what it is all about still is theory, not life itself. *The communicable account of our enlarged biological awareness is inescapably a discourse; theory is inescapably anthropocentric.* With tremendous efforts and systematic training we can overcome our anthropocentrism, we can switch off our human rational identity and way of behaviour, and merge into the natural environment with other living beings. Excellent movies have been made on that subject. Diane Fossey is a real person who did that. But any theoretical account of such an experience is condemned to pass through the gate of human, rational, culturally determined discourse. And within this discourse are, as we have seen, its

privileged constituents, the tools of its construction – languages, symbols, social conventions and the like. They are seen/constructed from inside; the rest of the nature is seen from outside, as phenomena, as ever challenging our theoretical accounts the dynamic object. The *Umwelts* of animals are as external to the human observer as are the plants' interaction with the environment: as external as the stars in the sky.⁶ And this explains an observable fact in biosemiotics – its continuous expansion to include phenomena of the external world. This small step toward overcoming the human cultural perspective turned out to be a gigantic step for the developers of the discipline. At first only the highest species of animals were involved; then it became logical to expand to the whole animal world ... But why stop there? There is no precise border; every body is made of cells/signs. Martin Krampen's famous article opened biosemiotic discourse to plants. Fungi were involved, and then it was logical to start questioning the appearance of life itself; so biosemiotics expanded to the interaction of organic and inorganic matter. Finally, following that logic, it was inevitable that someone would postulate the right of existence of "physiosemiotics" – the study of communication among rocks!

I am sure that even the "worst" among the anthroposemioticians will acknowledge his own vital dependence on the natural resources of the environment. I am sure he will never question the fact that the body is an absolutely necessary condition for the working of the mind. He won't even question the assumption that evolution was a gradual progress of the complexity of living forms, the last of which is the human being. But from those premises, it is going too far to draw conclusions, as do biosemioticians, about the importance which our biological constitution has to the articulations of our thought. And to accuse anyone who questions the cultural limits of his own thought of being a Cartesian dualist or idealist is an unjustified and incorrect move. Hoffmeyer goes too far in that direction. One of the basic presumptions is that "anyone who places himself out of Nature will feel out of place" (Hoffmeyer 1996: 92). I accept that. But I would say that it is much worse to put yourself out of culture. To do so is to attribute to yourself the authority to judge others according to values that are presumably universal. With this presumption, Western civilization colonized the rest of the world. Dictators, reluctant to acknowledge that cultural diversity makes people completely diverse from each other, accomplished genocides. I believe in human rights and want them every-

where, but I feel something wrong in imposing them with massacres or, even worse, with torture in prisons. This means putting yourself out of culture and judging what is right and what is wrong from a universal point of view.

In his campaign against dualism, Hoffmeyer suggests that we must unite our cultural and natural story “into one meaningful story – one which will ensure that we feel at home both in human society and in the living world from which we came” (134). Again, as a project it is a wonderful idea; but it neglects its conditions for possibility. If this claim aims to make us change our understanding of the surrounding world, we must consider the fact that it is accessible only to people, introduced to a particular way of thinking, within a particular cultural tradition. Nature itself is not a story. What makes a story from nature is culture. In various cultures, there are absolutely different stories about nature. And if language is such a naturally embodied, biological phenomenon, then why there are so many languages and cultures for the same animal species? I believe this to be so because the main (of course not the only) principle of human language is the arbitrariness of the sign. But that is another story.

I am sure that Professor Hoffmeyer is a kind and tolerant person, as are those of his colleagues involved in biosemiotics. But let's imagine that in a distant future some “social engineer”, invested with power, takes the following passage too seriously:

Psychosomatic suffering is the price we pay for this self-propagating folly [dualism]. Our swarming innards cannot live up to the demand placed on them to be meaningless. The psychological root penetrates deep into the bodily fluids to become illness. The brain-module cell swarms misunderstand one another and send conflicting messages to tissue and glands. We fall ill because our cells cannot quite succeed in uniting to create us (128).

If the internal premises of this passage are to be taken seriously, the main polemic is against cultural contingency, independence and creativity of mind. So this is not an opinion, a moral statement or a fantasy. It is not even an experimentally controllable scientific hypothesis, since according to the same line of argumentation, conventional science is dualistic too (93). It seems to be the Truth – Nature speaking through a privileged part of itself: the biosemiotician's body. And Nature is saying, “Close your mind! Don't think dualistically! Be Natural!” Of course any dictator would love

that, and most probably it would inaugurate the birth of a clinic. But it also could represent a program for reforming any other cultural reality that does not acknowledge the supremacy of biosemiotic principles.

To conclude this second stroke of the Razor, I would encourage a formal confrontation between conventional semiotics and biosemiotics. Although far from any Cartesian dualism, much of semiotics relies on the opposition *nature VS culture*. It is an “either – or” situation. Biosemiotics questions this situation, opposing to it a *gradual transition* scenario. It derives from evolution theory. Gradual was the transition between less and more complex species, gradual is the appearance of more and more complex nervous systems, and the human mind appeared gradually, following the same evolutionary process. This account is sound and convincing. Nevertheless, what is not gradual, but “either – or”, is the choice of how to account for that process, the choice of theoretical argumentation and the terminology of affirmed disciplines such as biology and semiotics, the choice of commonly shared standards of discursive validation. Membership in the community of inquirers is the acceptance of a very far-reaching cultural construction, and it is somehow strange to pretend to destroy that construction while you are upon it. You can reform parts of it, even consistently, from inside, and this is auspicious. This can be done, as we said before, but only through facts or other controllable output. There is an intermediate form of accounting for the surrounding world, usually adopted by *religious sects*. There you can find projects for radical reconsiderations of social institutions, including science; these are coherent in a way, in so far as they, in their denial, do not rely on the existing scientific worldview.

To conclude the whole argument I shall say something about the *ethical implications* of biosemiotics, trying again to apply the hideous Razor.

When biosemiotics introduces into the scientific agenda, and from there into a larger public sphere, ideas in aid of better understanding the interaction among living beings, this is not only praiseworthy in itself, but it also contributes much to the interdisciplinary prestige of semiotics. Any success in that area is most probably proportional to the above-mentioned genuine contributions – advancements of the understanding of the phenomenon of life, by means of applying the doctrine of signs. Advancements that are accessible and in some way measurable and from which a larger public can benefit. *What I find wrong with the whole enterprise is the*

claim that, in order to be more conscious in that way, we need to overcome anthropocentrism. It is in fact exactly the other way round. The Animal Rights project is the most anthropocentric one of all. The concern of one species to protect the others, the systematic and large scale effort to do that, even when it runs contrary to our own immediate interests – this is a privilege of being human. If, however, we follow the logic of evolution, if we adopt our biological identities and act according to natural interests, then we have to continue to exterminate, eat, use and abuse animals, as a big part of mankind is doing. The biosemiotic consciousness, with all its theoretical apparatus, is a very advanced product of western civilization; it is not a product of de-culturation. In terms of ethical evolution: first there will be the pre-cultural man, hostile to all others; then there will be the capitalistic man, brilliant at abusing natural resources and considering himself “the winner” of evolution; and only then do we have the ecological man, with all his concerns and his deliberate abstention from many opportunities to consume. *To be responsible means to be anthropocentric.*

But let's take look at a passage in which my dear friend Dario Martinelli suggests an ethical overcoming of anthropocentrism:

Finally, to study other animals from the perspective of human sciences is the result of a very clear historical course in the human evolution, i.e. – borrowing the expression from Johann Galtung – enlarging the centre and including more and more periphery. Who are WE? Nowadays, “we” corresponds to a larger number of individuals than just one century ago. “We” also means Australian aborigines, African pygmies, people with mental deficits, women, etc. A long time ago, “we” corresponded to a very limited amount of beings. In years to come, “we” will also cover other animals, and this future has already begun, if we, for instance, think about New Zealand and the so-called Animal Welfare Act, which ascribes to Great Apes (chimpanzees, gorillas, bonobos, etc.) the same basic rights to life as human beings enjoy. (<http://www.umweb.org/zs/intro.pdf>)

It is the typical, politically correct program to which any responsible person, myself included, would subscribe. But for the hundredth time, the undervaluation of the burden of our human condition makes the promises unsustainable by the premises. What about marriages? First THEY, the potential candidates for marriage, were limited by their social status, by class, by noble origins, and the like. Then THEY became a larger group, eventually overcoming even racial differences. Than THEY started to

include human animals from the same gender. What is the next step? Should we extend this mutual right to intermarry to non-human animals? Although there are some undeniable advantages to marrying a cow, there will be a constitutional blackout when the “marriage right” rumor begins to spread throughout the phytosphere. Or we should decide to exclude the plants from the party?

More generally, what about the fundamental right of not being eaten? Who should enjoy this right and who should not? How could living Nature work with prohibitions within its nutritional chains? Sure, “anyone who places himself out of Nature will feel out of place” (Hoffmeyer 1996: 92). But anyone who places Nature inside culture, thinking that he has won a victory over anthropocentrism, is underestimating Nature’s complexity!

That being said, I am grateful for the opportunity to write these lines, and I hope no one would take them seriously enough to get offended. This is a sport among friends. Also, I must admit that many of the things I have written until now could not withstand the strokes of my own Razor.

Notes

1. After the first draft of this text was completed, Timo Maran informed me about another critical contribution, by Tommi Vehkavaara, accessible online: http://mtl.uta.fi/%7Eeattove/limitations_on_peirce.pdf
2. In the above-mentioned article, however, Stjernfelt insists that biology borrowed terminology from semiotics, and not vice-versa.
3. It is one thing to discover that the cell is the basic unit of a living thing, but quite another to call this unit a “sign”.
4. This idea comes from Umberto Eco (1999), the chapter entitled “The resistances of being” in his book, *Kant and the Platypus*.
5. An example – I don’t remember where it was mentioned – might be to study the use of proper names among social, “non human” animals.
6. Here Timo Maran voiced an objection, which I find important, although it does not answer the question of our dependence on a cultural background. Here are his words: “You can communicate with an ape, dog or iguana, you can see them communicating, you can (at least to a certain extent) enter into dialogic relations with them and draw conclusions about their ‘inside’ based on that communication.”

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Jacob Bañuelos

Análisis de la espectacularización en *You Tube: Broadcast Yourself*

Nuestra época, sin duda alguna, prefiere la imagen a la cosa, la copia al original, la representación a la realidad, la apariencia al ser... Para ella, lo único sagrado es la ilusión, mientras que lo profano es la verdad. Es más, lo sagrado se engrandece a sus ojos a medida que disminuye la verdad y aumenta la ilusión, tanto que el colmo de la ilusión es para ella el colmo de lo sagrado.

– Feurbach, *La esencia del cristianismo*, citado por Debord 1967: 9

La humanidad se ha convertido ahora en espectáculo de sí misma. Su autoalienación ha alcanzado un grado que le permite vivir su propia destrucción como goce estético.

– Walter Benjamin citado por Debord, *ibid.*

Introducción

El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo realizar un análisis de del sitio *You Tube, Broadcast Yourself* <http://www.youtube.com>, como una “matriz de espectacularización”, definir sus mecanismos de interacción, socialización y consumo, las categorías de la interacción casi mediática virtual y las formas de clasificación de contenidos del espectáculo en el sitio.

Internet, como matriz interactiva de contingencia, instante-sitio, impone nuevas prácticas de uso y consumo cultural, así como nuevos procesos de recepción, producción, circulación y socialización de textos. La dinámica de consumo en Internet, condiciona el fenómeno de la espectacularización tradicional y le atribuye nuevas características de uso espacio temporales, nuevas fórmulas de construcción textual, y un alcance social en términos de difusión, producción y consumo sin precedentes. *You Tube, Broadcast Yourself* es un caso ejemplar de la nueva cultura del espectáculo en la era de Internet, basado en la “*autoproducción del espectáculo*” y la “*cultura basura*”

del clip”, con un crecimiento de 100 millones de visitas al día y un valor económico de 1,6 billones de dólares en menos de dos años, desde su creación en 2005.

El abordaje teórico que realizamos para describir los mecanismos de You Tube parten de tres fuentes: el modelo de conversación textual de Gianfranco Bettetini (1984), la teoría de la “Casi-interacción mediática” de John Thomson (1997), y la Teoría crítica del espectáculo de Guy Debord.

Desde el modelo de conversación textual de Bettetini, reformulado desde la Interacción Persona-Ordenador por Carlos Scolari (2004), se describen las cualidades de “conversación textual interactiva” de You Tube. Aplicamos igualmente la teoría de la “casi-interacción mediática” de Thompson (1997) para describir la categorías de la interacción y tipos de textos que se publican en el sitio. Desde la teoría crítica del espectáculo de Guy Debord, hacemos una descripción de las características socioculturales del espectáculo en You Tube, como forma de la autoproducción y emisión mediática del “yo”, como producto de consumo cultural bajo los valores del espectáculo en el sistema capitalista: la banalidad, la fama, lo efímero y la cultura del desperdicio.

El presente estudio es una aproximación inicial al fenómeno de la espectacularización en Internet, mediante el objeto de estudio *You Tube, Broadcast Yourself*. La metodología de análisis es experimental, el enfoque es crítico y apunta a la construcción interdisciplinaria de una sociosemiótica del análisis de la espectacularización y la interacción mediática en Internet. You Tube, al igual que sus contenidos, es un fenómeno en permanente cambio que prefigura el sistema de la llamada “post-televisión”. You Tube está construido bajo la lógica de la cultura capitalista del espectáculo, con cualidades interactivas, bajo el control de contenidos de una administración privada, que responde a las reglas del mercado y a la dinámica de una cultura contemporánea caracterizada por la efemeridad, la banalidad, y la instantaneidad. Este es por tanto, un análisis teórico-metodológico de un proyecto de investigación a largo plazo y de mayores alcances sobre el tema y sus derivaciones, que proponemos de tipo multidisciplinario e internacional.

1. Semántica de You Tube: Broadcast yourself

You Tube: Broadcast Yourself, fue fundado en febrero de 2005 por Chad Hurley, Steve Chen, y Jawed Karim y comprado por Google en noviembre

de 2006 por 1,6 billones de dólares. Posee diversos acuerdos comerciales con empresas como: CBS, BBC, Universal Music Group, Sony Music Group, Warner Music Group, NBA, The Sundance Channel.

Según la propia definición del sitio: “Cualquiera puede ver y compartir videos originales en todo el mundo a través de la Web”. You Tube “permite subir y compartir video clips mediante Internet, sitios Web, dispositivos móviles (teléfonos, palms), e-mail y blogs. El sitio ofrece “poder ver acontecimientos y eventos actuales, encontrar videos sobre hobbies e intereses personales, así como descubrir lo inusual. En la medida en que la gente capture momentos especiales en video, You Tube podrá convertir a los usuarios en los ‘emisores’ del mañana”.

La construcción “*You Tube: Broadcast Yourself*”, posee múltiples significados, es una expresión metafórica y altamente polisémica que apunta al “yo”. *You Tube* podemos traducirlo como “*Tu receptor o transmisor de difusión televisiva*”, dado que “*Tube*” se refiere al dispositivo o tubo (“*picture tube*”) de electrones donde se genera la imagen televisiva. Sugiere también la noción de “yo” convertido en “transmisor”.

Por otra parte, *Broadcast Yourself*, podemos definirlo como “*Difusión de ti mismo*” o “*Difúndete*”. *Broadcast* es una palabra generalmente aplicada al campo de la Comunicación con diversas aplicaciones y cuyos sinónimos en inglés son: advertisement, air time, announcement, newcast, performance, program, publication, radiocast, show, simulcast, telecast, transmission. Todos estos términos también son asociados a la construcción del concepto de “Espectáculo” en el campo de los medios de comunicación.

Por lo tanto, desde la propia construcción del nombre, *You Tube: Broadcast Yourself*, el sitio propone una “autodifusión espectacularizante”, o bien, una pragmática de la difusión espectacular del “yo”, un “*Difúndete*” en el marco conceptual de la noción del “*espectáculo electrónico, mediático, comunicativo*”.

2. Teoría del espectáculo e interacción casi-mediática en *You Tube*

En *You Tube* encontramos diversas funciones espectaculares, propias de un medio interactivo en el espacio virtual. Es necesario tomar en cuenta que el sitio no permite una interacción “directa” en tiempo real con otros usuarios, ya que no incluye la posibilidad del chat o el foro virtual. Se trata más bien

de una interacción diferida, en donde el usuario puede enviar comentarios, subir videos y hacer otras intervenciones, dejar huellas de su paso por el sitio, que se insertarán en la “escena” de la interfaz en el momento de su actualización. Los “otros” usuarios podrán ver las intervenciones en tiempo diferido. A esta característica de interacción diferida, le llama Thompson (1987) “interacción cuasi-mediática” y hablaremos de ella más adelante.

Las claves You Tube como matriz cultural de la espectacularización son:




Figure 1.

Esta cualidad “interactiva cuasi-medática” del sitio You Tube le confiere características propias al momento de describir las función espectacular del sitio. En seguida, y siguiendo las aportaciones de Sonesson (1999), intentaremos describir los rasgos de la función espectacular en You Tube.

Para empezar diremos que en el sitio existe una función semiótica, dada por la relación expresión/contenido. Y una *función espectacular en la relación escena/público*. Entendemos como “escena” en You Tube la interfaz interactiva virtual.

You Tube: Broadcast Yourself Función Semiótica Expresión / Contenido				
YOU TUBE	Espacio	Tiempo	Expresión	Contenido
Expresión/ Contenido (función semiótica)	Ubícuo Desterritorializado Virtual	actual	Interfaz + Textos	Textos • Escritos • Audio • Video • Imagen fija

Table 1.

La función semiótica se realiza en You Tube con las siguientes características:

- El espacio es ubícuo, desterritorializado, virtual.
- El tiempo es actual, responde a necesidad de actualizar el sitio para realizar una lectura o una intervención.
- La expresión se da en la Interfaz y en los textos que contiene
- El contenido está expresado en la Interfaz y los textos que contiene: videos, escritos, audio, video, imagen fija.

La función espectacular en You Tube reúne las siguientes características:

- El espacio es ubícuo, desterritorializado, virtual.
- El tiempo es actual, responde a necesidad de actualizar el sitio para realizar una lectura o una intervención.
- Establece una relación entre usuarios de “autor” y “lector” alternativa e indistintamente.
- La interacción entre usuarios es diferida en tiempo y espacio, “casi-mediática” en palabras de Thompson (1997), y su intervención es actual-diferida, es decir, que tendrá que realizarse con la interfaz conectada y la intervención se mostrará al “otro” de manera diferida, no en tiempo real, ya que You Tube no cuenta con un chat acualmente (miércoles 6 de junio, 2007).
- La “escena” es la Interfaz y los escenarios de los diversos textos audiovisuales.
- El público es el universo de usuarios que participan interactivamente, ya como “autores/enunciadores” o “enunciarios/ lectores empíricos.
- El sitio reúne la condición de ser perceptible y sujeto a contemplación
- El sitio posee una componente predominantemente visual (Sonesson, 1999)

Por otra parte, debemos nutrir esta teoría de la función espectacular (Sonesson, 1999), con la Teoría del espectáculo de Guy Debord (1967), desde su extraordinaria reflexión vertida en el texto *La sociedad del espectáculo*.

La reflexión de Debord proviene de la teoría crítica heredada de la Escuela de Frankfurt, y prefigura cómo la lógica del poder en el sistema capitalista, invade las esferas de la vida cotidiana a través de la cultura del espectáculo como forma de dominación ideológica. You Tube queda descrito perfectamente en los valores que responden a esta lógica: banalidad, mercantilismo, instantaneidad, fama efímera, voyeurismo y construcción centrada en el “yo”.

En seguida resumimos los fundamentos de la Teoría del espectáculo en palabras de Debord (1967), que desde un enfoque crítico, describen a You Tube, interfaz, contenidos y usuarios, como una matriz cultural de la espectacularización:

YOU TUBE MATRIZ CULTURAL DE ESPECTACULARIZACIÓN		
Sociedad Espectacular	Usuario	Interfaz – Contenidos
Instrumento de aparente unificación	Relación social entre personas mediatizadas	Acumulación de espectáculos
Separación realidad-imagen	Visión del mundo objetivada	Representación
Unidad en cuanto separación	Monólogo autoelogioso	Aparece con réplicas mediatizadas
Lo verdadero es un momento de lo falso	Imitación extensiva	Carácter tautológico
Producto económico social: empleo del tiempo y cultura como mercancía	conciencia espectadora, prisionera de un universo plano, limitada por la pantalla	Dominantemente Audio-Visual
“lo que aparece es bueno, lo bueno es lo que aparece”	interlocutorios ficticios que la alimentan unilateralmente	Categorías del ver

Monopolio de las apariencias	necesidad de representación	Mapa interactivo virtual: ubicuo espacial y temporalmente
“El sol que nunca se pone en el imperio de la pasividad moderna”	“sentimiento torturante de hallarse al margen de la existencia”	Espectacularidad difusa: múltiple y superabundante
“filosofiza” la realidad	Invación de la privacidad	Lo “artificial ilimitado”
Especialización Del poder	Vigilancia y autovigilancia	Especialización técnica
Sistema ideológico: banalidad, empobrecimiento, servidumbre y negación de la vida real		
desvanecimiento de la distinción entre lo verdadero y lo falso		
<i>presencia real</i> de la falsedad que garantiza la organización de las apariencias.		
discurso ininterrumpido del orden actual		
“perpetuidad basada en el cambio, la instantaneidad y la eternidad del ciberespacio”		
Actividad soñada del idealismo, con la mediación técnica de los signos y señales que terminan por materializar un ideal abstracto, la “democracia de los sueños”		

Table 2.

You Tube como matriz cultural de la espectacularización, desde la perspectiva crítica, es un discurso ininterrumpido del orden actual, que ofrece la eternidad virtual del ciberespacio y la socialización, la mirada de los “otros”, mediante el acceso instantáneo a través de la imagen audiovisual. Responde a la lógica de la cultura como mercancía y al desvanecimiento de la distinción entre lo falso y lo verdadero, dada *la presencia real* de la falsedad como garantía de la organización de las apariencias. En palabras de Debord (1967):

El espectáculo, que es el desvanecimiento de la distinción entre el yo y el mundo por la destrucción del yo asediado por la presencia-ausencia del mundo, es también el desvanecimiento de la distinción entre lo verdadero y lo falso por represión de toda verdad vivida en beneficio de la *presencia real* de la falsedad que garantiza la organización de las apariencias. (Ibid.: 175)

Para Debord, la instauración de la verdad en el mundo, sólo podrá realizarse mediante el diálogo de individuos directamente vinculados con la historia universal, y no mediante individuos atomizados sumisos a la manipulación, es decir, reivindica el diálogo y el lenguaje como instrumentos de construcción social.

Quizás You Tube podrá convertirse en un instrumento de diálogo en el futuro próximo, dadas sus posibilidades técnicas y socializantes. Hoy no lo es. Se administra de forma empresarial, ejerce un estricto control de contenidos, “implicados” los propios usuarios, donde finalmente deciden los dueños del sitio. Ofrece una aparente plataforma de “autoproducción” con límites morales que responden a la lógica del mercado al que se ofrece. La “autoproducción” en You Tube tiene sus límites comerciales, moral y políticamente convenientes para el mantenimiento de su proyección político-mercantil.

Los “excesos” no convienen al sistema. Bajo el escudo de la defensa de los derechos de autor (el copyright) se erige en instrumento de censura e impone la lógica moral del sistema capitalista: la oferta y la demanda dentro del margen de lo moral y políticamente correcto, mientras no rompa con el *statu quo* del proyecto de negocio.

You Tube hereda los contenidos temáticos y el tratamiento banal de los contenidos que realiza el capitalismo para la industria cultural: cine, televisión, radio, música, prensa, internet. A los recursos técnicos de la plataforma virtual (Internet) -instantaneidad, tiempo real, ubicuidad territorial- se suman los contenidos establecidos en categorías temáticas y de tratamiento audiovisual (estrategias textuales), propias de la industria cultural dominante en el mundo capitalista actual.

3. *Interacción textual en You Tube*

Gianfranco Bettetini (1984), desde una perspectiva semiótico-pragmática, propone un modelo de conversación textual en el marco de una teoría del lenguaje audiovisual, que se puede extender a los medios virtuales interactivos (Scolari 2004: 58 y 155). El modelo de Bettetini va más allá de los valores semánticos presentes en un texto.

Bettetini plantea que un texto propone un intercambio comunicativo simbólico, en este caso You Tube como texto (y “como estructura textual”) e interfaz interactiva, que propone la creación de sentido y lectura al usuario:

El texto cumple un acto de puesta en escena suplementario respecto a su espesor semántico: el texto introduce también en escena un intercambio comunicativo simbólico, una “conversación” simbólica. La representación de sus valores semánticos es a su vez enmarcada en la representación de su traslación entre dos sujetos que al aparato textual constituye como imágenes fantasmales de quien transmite y de quien recibe. (Un texto, en síntesis, incluye también) la representación de sus normas de uso, de sus modalidades de acceso a su sentido a través de su articulación semiótica. (Bettetini, citado por Scolari 2004: 54)

El modelo de “conversación” textual presupone la existencia de un sujeto enunciador y un sujeto enunciatario. Todo texto incluye un “proyecto de relación comunicativa” apunta Bettetini, “un programa de desenvolvimiento de interacción con el público”. El espectador, por su parte recibe el texto con un “proyecto de interacción con las articulaciones semióticas que el discurso textual le propone” (Ibid.: 110/Ibid.: 55)

En la interacción Persona-Ordenador, siguiendo a Scolari (2004), podemos decir que en el sitio interactivo You Tube:

- La interacción en You Tube mantiene el carácter virtual y simbólico de la conversación textual.
- La interacción permite una intervención directa del usuario mediante la interfaz, en la producción de sentido.
- El sujeto enunciador se identifica con *un saber parcialmente estructurado*, debido a que está regido por *estrategias potenciales* que deben ser actualizadas por el usuario.
- El sujeto enunciatario/usuario asume un cuerpo simbólico simulado y además visible en la pantalla en forma de cursor para entrar en el texto. El simulacro del cuerpo del usuario aparece en la pantalla bajo la forma de cursor.
- El sujeto enunciatario/usuario es construido de una manera diversa, de acuerdo a las herramientas de interacción que ofrece y regula el sitio.
- La interacción presupone un “saber-ser”, un “saber-hacer” y además un “actuar” en forma de competencias de *diseño* y *uso*.
- El intercambio comunicativo en You Tube no se realiza entre dos sujetos empíricos, sino entre *estructuras simbólicas* (texto, sujeto, enunciador, enunciatario/receptor/usuario).
- El enunciador en You Tube se presenta como un *simulacro del emisor* instalado dentro del discurso (interfaz), que regula las formas de acercamiento al texto por parte del usuario.

- La interfaz de You Tube actúa como principio ordenador de los procesos simbólicos de los textos virtuales que contiene.
- You Tube se presenta como un *simulacro del emisor*, y este simulacro es “*un aparato ausente, productor y producto del texto, que deja las huellas de su paso ordenador sobre los materiales significantes*”. (Bettetini citado por Scolari, 2004: 155)
- El sujeto enunciatario, el usuario, es un destinatario implícito de la enunciación, presente en todo texto, con potenciales instrumentos de intervención interactiva en el texto que debe actualizar.

La interacción presupone un “contrato de lectura”, un “pacto de comunicación”, un “contrato de interacción”. Tanto el sujeto enunciatario como el enunciatario, dejan huellas estáticas y después de su intervención, así como huellas dinámicas (narrativas y comentativas) durante su interacción dinámica en el campo de la interface actualizada. Tales “huellas” son indicios de acciones que se revelan en la dinámica del consumo (Bettetini citado por Scolari 2004: 56). Ambos sujetos construyen huellas, “señales” e indicios del comportamiento de un interlocutor simbólico, “que adquiere gradualmente forma durante el progresivo encuentro de la interacción comunicativa de ‘lectura’” (Ibid,; 56).

El sujeto enunciatario y el sujeto enunciatario en You Tube tienen el mismo estatuto como usuarios-productores. El autor de un texto es tam-




Figure 2. Modelo de la conversación textual (Bettini 1994), aplicado a la interacción en el sitio You Tube: Broadcast Yourself. Modificado del modelo original.

bién lector de su propio texto en la trama del sitio y el usuario receptor tiene las mismas posibilidades de producción que el emisor. Esta capacidad interactiva del sitio convierte al emisor en lector y al lector en emisor indistintamente, en términos de sus posibilidades interactivas.

En You Tube, un “autor modelo” envía un texto a un “lector modelo” (Eco 1979). Tanto autor como lector “modelo” deben moverse para construir el texto, el autor generativamente y el lector interpretativamente. Sin embargo, no basta esperar que el lector modelo “coopere en la actualización textual”, el autor modelo deberá “mover el texto para construirlo”. Por su parte, el lector empírico debe delinear “una hipótesis de autor, deducida de los datos de la estrategia textual. Tanto el autor modelo, como el lector modelo, se construyen como “estrategias textuales”, por lo que la cooperación textual en You Tube “es un fenómeno que se realiza entre dos estrategias discursivas, no entre dos sujetos individuales” (Eco, citado por Scolari 2004: 157). La “comunicación” se realiza cuando ámbos instituyen un contrato que regulará el intercambio, un “contrato de interacción” *mediado* por las reglas de interacción de You Tube.

“Desde una perspectiva semiótica, la comunicación es una acción que un sujeto ejercita sobre otro, un intercambio simbólico que remite a las ideas de conflicto, estipulación y conquista” (Scolari 2004: 156). Tales “actos” de conflicto, estipulación y conquista se realizan mediante la intervención dinámica en la *actualización interactiva* de You Tube: subir videos (upload), salvar favoritos, compartir (share), responder con un video (post video), clasificar (tag), enviar comentarios (post comment), calificar con estrellas (rated), señalar como inapropiado con una bandera roja (flag), bloquear a un usuario, notificar sobre la violación de derechos de autor (copyright notice), aceptar o rechazar comentarios (kinda) y por supuesto, hacer diversos tipos de búsqueda.

You Tube incorpora una dimensión interactiva del intercambio, constituye un simulacro de usuario(s), que funciona como propuesta de interacción en relación al usuario empírico sentado frente a la pantalla interactiva, quien decidirá si aceptar, rechazar o intervenir (ibid: 157).

El usuario empírico de You Tube acepta un contrato de interacción, para entrar a un sitio que tiene una propia gramática, un entorno en el que tendrá que interactuar con dispositivos y realizar operaciones técnicas previstas (y no podrá realizar otras, como descargar los videos a su ordenador).

La interacción e intercambio simbólico en You Tube, presupone la existencia de un sujeto enunciador (productor y producto del texto) y un sujeto enunciatario o usuario (producido por el enunciador y el texto). Sin embargo, “el simulacro dialogante del receptor será muy diferente del enunciatario que el texto pretendía producir y, sobre todo, el sujeto enunciatario modelo producido por el destinatario difícilmente será conmesurable con el sujeto enunciador, origen programado del discurso-conversación textual” (Bettetini citado por Scalfari 2004: 56)

4. Categorías de espectacularización y estrategias discursivas en You Tube

En You Tube habrá que distinguir dos niveles de lectura textual:

- La interfaz del sitio como texto, que propone un discurso textual espectacularizante (escenario/escena/público), y una serie de estrategias potenciales de interacción para acceder a los textos.
- Los textos audiovisuales (videos) que contiene el sitio y que la interfaz organiza, administra, gestiona y hace visibles, y que los usuarios producen y clasifican.

La interfaz de You Tube permite realizar una interacción con las siguientes pautas o reglas de intervención:

- subir videos (upload)
- clasificar (tag)
- salvar los favoritos (no guardarlos)
- compartir (share): enviar la liga recomendando por e-mail
- responder con un video (post video)
- enviar comentarios (post text comment)
- calificar con estrellas (rated)
- señalar como inapropiado con una bandera roja (flag)
- bloquear a un usuario
- notificar sobre la violación de derechos de autor (copyright notice)
- aceptar o rechazar comentarios (kinda)
- hacer diversos tipos de búsqueda, por:
 - *Most Recent* (más reciente), *Most Viewed* (más visto), *Top Rated* (más calificado), *Most Discussed* (más discutido), *Top Favorites* (más preferidos), *Most Linked* (más “pinchado”), *Most Recently* (más reciente), *Most Featured* (más recomendado), *Most Responded* (más respondido), *Watch on Mobile* (visto en un móvil)
 - Búsqueda por tiempo: fecha, día, semana, mes

- Búsqueda por categoría: autos y vehículos, comedia, entretenimiento, film y animación, gadgets y juegos, howto and DIY, música, noticias y política, gene y blogs, mascotas y animales, deportes, viajes y luars.
- Búsqueda por idioma: inglés, frances, español, árabe, chino, japones, alemán
- Crear canales y grupos
- Participar en divesos tipos de concrusos audiovisuales (principalmente promovidas por empresas multinacionales, como por ejemplo: Samsung, Heinz, Malibu, etc.)

Los contenidos están clasificados por categorías, termas, (firmas, palabras clave) tags, y relacionados entre sí, asociadas a las formas de búsqueda y al autor productor del texto:

- autos y vehículos
- comedia
- entretenimiento
- film y animación
- gadgets y juegos
- how-to and DIY
- música
- noticias y política
- gene y blogs
- mascotas y animales
- deportes
- viajes y luars

Retomamos el concepto de Thompson (1997) sobre la “casi-interacción mediática”, salvo que en You Tube adquiere posibilidades dialógicas difereidas.

You Tube Interacción casi-mediática	
Características de la interacción	Interacción casi-mediática en You Tube
Constitución espacio-temporal	Separación de contextos: disponibilidad extendida en el tiempo y el espacio (ubícua, virtual, instantánea, actual)
Alcance de las señales simbólicas	Estrechamiento del radio de acción de señales simbólicas: texto escrito, imagen fija, video, audio

Orientación de la acción	Orientada hacia un indefinido número de recipientes potenciales
Dialógica/ monológica	Dialógica/monológica /diferida Carácter híbrido "Interacción mix": "interacción mediática" + "interacción casi-mediática"

Table 3. *General vs. "Mixed Interaction qualities", after Thompson (1997).*

Las descripciones de Thompson (1997) sobre las interacciones y las "casi interacción mediática", permiten comprender que la interacción en You Tube es de tipo "mix", ya que incluye la posibilidad dialógica diferida y monológica. La interacción en You Tube implica la comprensión de un espacio y un tiempo virtual, y con ello la separación de los contextos en los que se encuentran los participantes. You Tube establece una estructura interactiva depositaria de formas simbólicas (textuales-audiovisuales), que consiste en dos o más regiones separadas en el tiempo y en el espacio.

En You Tube, las regiones en la esfera de la recepción no afectan a la estructura de producción. La "estructura interactiva de recepción" de You Tube, puede ser usada como marco para la "interacción casi-mediática" y eventualmente como marco para la "interacción mediática" (con la posible inclusión de un chat/ web cam) y "interacción cara a cara" como marco de una actividad receptora socializante, los usuarios reunidos covivencialmente frente a la interfaz del sitio (Thompson 1997: 125).

You Tube "estrecha" el alcance de las señales simbólicas, ya que reduce las posibilidades formales a textos escritos y audiovisuales (videos), orientada hacia un número indefinido de recipientes potenciales a través de la Internet. Los emisores y receptores en You Tube no tienen obligación mutua de tomar en cuenta las respuestas del otro.

Thompson (1997) señala cuatro formas de actuación del emisor para los otros, en You Tube adquiere la forma de "autoproducción audiovisual", como forma de intervención en el sitio y que aquí identificamos como estrategias textuales de espectacularización en You Tube:

- orientación hacia el receptor
- actividad mediática diaria
- actividad cotidiana simulada
- acontecimientos mediáticos
- acción ficticia

You Tube Estrategias textuales de espectacularización		
Estrategia textual	Acto mediático	Ejemplo
<i>“Orientación hacia el receptor”</i>	Cuando los emisores miran y hablan a la cámara	Monólogo frente a la cámara (Monologue in front of the camera): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tony Blair (Views: 349,181) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P6Cu9187tCY • Lonely Girl 15 (Views: 1,425,906) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dZN-Wye4rDE • NumaNuma/ (Views: 3,506,565) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=60og9gwKh1 • Noah/ (Views: 6,106,672) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6B26asyGKDo
<i>“Actividad mediática cotidiana”</i>	Se presenta como parte del actual flujo de conducta de la vida cotidiana. Los “actores” puede saber o no que estan siendo filmados	Vida cotidiana (Daily Life): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Edgar se cae (Views: 1,902,736) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b89CnP0Iq30 • Surveillance / self-surveillance Mexico City Underground:
<i>“Actividad cotidiana simulada”</i>	Los individuos participan en una acción ordinaria con el propósito de ser grabados”	Acto cotidiano simulado: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evolution of dance (Views: 50,185,791) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dMH0bHeiRNq • News/Spencer Tunick México (Views: 1,902,736) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JDC0dqyn1tE&mode=related&search=
<i>“Acontecimientos mediáticos”</i>	Acontecimientos planificados, ensayados, contruidos en torno a la participación de los medios”	Acontecimientos mediáticos: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Olympic Games • Footbol • Concerts/ Freddie Mercury (Views: 72,040) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h4yjbsYCupQ

"Acción ficcionalizada"	Ficción narrativa planificada, representación propia de la producción televisiva / Delgada frontera entre acción ficticia y no ficticia	Ficción: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Films • TV-series • Soup-opera • Musical Videoclips • Clips • Documentaries, Fiction • Columbine High Scholl (20,777) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=361wevQhEuE&mode=related&search • Anuncios/ (Views: 40,319) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P7WleXpzmZA • Pornografy
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Table 4.

Algunas características de la recepción en You Tube, caracterizadas por Thompson (1997), los mensaje mediáticos adquieren:

You Tube Características de recepción		
Recepción	Cualidades	Ejemplo
"Elaboración discursiva"	Mensajes elaborados, refinados, criticados, elogiados y comentados por los receptores	Comentarios de texto escrito y en video
"mediatización extendida"	Respuestas mediáticas referidas a un texto o varios textos mediáticos relacionados: alto grado de autorreferencialidad, textos mediáticos referidos a otros textos mediáticos o acontecimientos relacionados relacionados	Videos que son "réplicas" inspiradas en un video anterior subido al sitio y tomado como modelo
"Apropiación"	Los textos mediáticos pueden ampliarse más allá de su actividad inicial-primaria, como un proceso extendido de recepción, en otros contextos.	Publicidad relacionada con algun video original subido en el sitio. Algunos canales de televisión, como Antena 3 (España) tienen como programa un espacio donde se emiten videos "preferidos" tomados de diversos sitios de Internet, entre ellos You Tube.

Table 5.

5. *Los contextos en You Tube*

En You Tube, como en cualquier otro sitio en Internet, el contexto es “multicontextual”, y podemos hacer una primera clasificación, de la siguiente manera:

- Contexto lingüístico y audiovisual
- Contexto situacional, conjunto de datos accesible a los participantes de una “conversación” o “intercambio”, en el contorno físico inmediato.
 - Contexto territorial (el tiempo y espacio de necesidad, el lugar del usuario)
 - Intracontexto, la Interfaz (el tiempo y espacio de sitio de Internet)
- Contexto sociocultural, conjunto de datos que proceden de condicionamientos sociales y culturales sobre el comportamiento “verbal”, “visual”, “sonoro”, y su adecuación a diferentes circunstancias. (Reyes 2000: 20)

En You Tube operan simultáneamente estos tres tipos de contexto, lo que convierte a los sitios en Internet en contextos complejos de socialización. Los contextos socioculturales contribuyen activamente a la interpretación de los enunciados. You Tube funciona como contexto dadas su reglas de intervención, consumo, intercambio, basadas en la “autoproducción” y la exploración o visualización “del otro”. Al igual que el lenguaje legal, religioso, político, médico, You Tube establece sus propias reglas de lectura, actualización e interpretación, centradas en la espectacularización y que hacen posible su funcionamiento, así como la interpretación de textos en su contexto que opera como el “frame sociocultural”. You Tube es un “*frame tecno-sociocultural*”.

You Tube como “*marco de referencia*” o *frame*, funciona como “*marco metacomunicativo*” que permite organizar y clasificar el texto, la situación de recepción e intercambio, así como el rol de los participantes. You Tube permite a los usuarios generar expectativas y presuposiciones que les permiten producir e interpretar los textos. (Reyes 2000: 20.)

You Tube, Broadcast Yourself como “marco metacomunicativo” tiene las siguientes cualidades:

- Es un marco de “autoproducción” centrado en el “yo”: “*Broadcast Yourself*”
- Es un marco interactivo de socialización, que permite participar activamente en la construcción del sitio: enviar videos, recomendar, calificar, emitir juicios de valor, escribir para comentar sobre los videos, lo que produce un sentido de apropiación individual y comunitaria del sitio.

- Es un marco referencial de lectura audiovisual sobre la alteridad: “los otros”, “lo otro”, el “alter-ego”.
- Es un “marco espectacular”, en el que todo texto y expectativa de lectura adquiere cualidades de “diversión”, “entretenimiento”, “efimeridad” y “espectacularización”.
- Es un “marco de instantaneidad” o “marco de actualización”, en el que domina la “instantaneidad” como experiencia de consumo en “tiempo real”, donde el espacio es el sitio y el tiempo el instante que opera como matriz de contingencia en el marco de Internet.

You Tube se construye como un “frame metacomunicativo”, como una “comunidad sociocultural” que comparte códigos y estructuras cognoscitivas, estructuras estereotípicas de tipo espectacular, sobre situaciones y conceptos, que permiten asociar significados.

You Tube permite realizar situaciones de comunicación ritualizadas (compartidas), donde el valor de verdad de los textos pasa a un segundo plano y el contexto, el “frame metacomunicativo” construido “colectivamente” bajo las reglas de consumo y producción textual del sitio, es lo que determina sus significados.

6. Las fronteras de You Tube

Como hemos apuntado, You Tube es un sitio en Internet sujeto a la lógica que lo fundamenta: lo efímero, la banalidad y el cambio permanente. Nuestro estudio se realiza durante junio de 2007 y sin duda el sitio tendrá modificaciones operativas, de contenido y de uso a lo largo del tiempo. No descartamos su desaparición, o bien, su conversión en una fórmula de la post-televisión. Por ahora hemos visto su evolución de ser un sitio con mayores libertades -menor ejercicio de censura y control de contenidos, la posibilidad de bajar los videos por parte de los usuarios, ausencia de publicidad-, a lo que tenemos ahora que ha sido adquirido por Google, con mayor control de contenidos, publicidad y sin la posibilidad de bajar los videos directamente al terminal del usuario, entre otros cambios.

Las principales fronteras de You Tube vienen dadas por la administración del propio sitio, aquí clasificamos tres fronteras en las que participan también los usuarios:

- Control de contenidos y censura por parte de los administradores del sitio con un carácter moral y legal.
- Control de contenidos por parte de los usuarios y “autocensura” con un carácter moral. Los administradores se encargan de revisar todos los videos marcados con una bandera roja por parte de los usuarios. Los usuarios no pueden quitar un video o texto escrito por sí mismos.
- Vigilancia sobre la no violación a los derechos de autor de contenidos registrados, con propiedad intelectual y derechos de uso lucrativo
- No protección a los derechos de autor de los usuarios.
- La responsabilidad final de cualquier contenido subido al sitio es del usuario, no de los administradores del sitio.

Como observamos, se trata de fronteras morales y legales, en cuanto a la protección de derechos de autor de terceros. En cuanto a la parte moral, el sitio es muy claro al establecer sus “códigos de conducta” (“Code of conduct”): http://www.youtube.com/t/community_guidelines), términos de uso (“Terms of use” <http://www.youtube.com/t/terms>), “recomendaciones de seguridad” (“Safety tips” <http://www.youtube.com/t/safety>).

Los administradores del sitio confían en la “responsabilidad de los usuarios” para usar el sitio, y señalan que todo uso irresponsable recae en los usuarios. You Tube no es un sitio de “choque” (“shock site”). No admite videos explícitos de: sexo, violencia, muerte, explotación infantil, odio, uso malintencionado que atente contra género, raza, orientación sexual, religión o nacionalidad. El sitio advierte sobre la “cero tolerancia” en el mal uso de información personal de otros usuarios.

En cuanto al respeto a los derechos de autor o “copyright” (véase: y las reglas sobre derechos de autor (“Copyright notices”, http://www.youtube.com/t/howto_copyright), se advierte que sólo se suban videos originales, hechos por el propio usuario, o bien, de los que se posea un permiso de derechos de uso por parte del autor o dueño del video. Esto incluye música original que acompañe un video. Un gran porcentaje de los videos en You Tube incluyen música original usada sin derechos de autor. El sitio hace caso omiso de sus propias reglas. Sólo aplica las que le son “políticamente y económicamente incorrectas”.

Las fronteras de You Tube están dictadas por una lógica empresarial. Google pagó por el sitio 1,6 billones de dólares y esto significa que detrás hay un mercado aproximado de 100 millones de usuarios potenciales cada día, es decir, un mercado que debe ser cuidado de acuerdo a un perfil de consumo establecido. Cualquier video o texto que altere el statu quo del

consumidor y del mercado de You Tube, debe ser quitado del sitio, censurado.

Sólo aquellos contenidos que alteren o excedan el perfil de los consumidores y ponga en riesgo el plan de negocios del sitio, serán sustraídos del mismo. La principal frontera de You Tube es su lógica de mercado. Y la plataforma que garantiza este mercado es la de la espectacularización.

Pongamos por caso un video subido a You Tube en abril de 2007, donde se ejecuta a un presunto miembro del grupo “Los Zetas”. Reseñado el día 2 de abril de 2007 por el periódico *El Universal* de México, se describe videograbación de la decapitación de un hombre con un “garrote” y un cable. Dicho video estuvo en el sitio por breve tiempo, aunque lo suficiente como para que se reseñara en la prensa mexicana a nivel nacional y trascendiera internacionamente. Actualmente dicho video no se encuentra por los motores de búsqueda, como www.google.com o www.yahoo.com en ningún sitio de Internet. Esto indica que hay sin duda, un enérgico control de contenidos en la red.

El castigo ejemplar por malos usos, que impone el sitio como penalización, es prohibir permanentemente el uso del sitio al usuario que viole sus reglas. Prohibe también, de una manera más bien inocente, que un usuario que haya violado las reglas, use la cuenta de otro usuario. Y advierte que se tomarán medidas legales contra aquellos que violen los derechos de autor de terceros. La pregunta es, ¿cómo identificarán a millones de usuarios que se identifican con nombres y datos falsos en el sitio? Quizás esto sea tema de otro estudio, en el que debamos entrar en materia de “policía informática”.

Por ende, la “autoproducción” en You Tube tiene sus límites, los límites de lo “político y económicamente correcto” de acuerdo a una lógica y un plan de negocios.

¿Podría You Tube trascender esta lógica empresarial como matriz espectacularizante, e ir más allá, para convertirse en un sitio de mayores alcances culturales? ¿Podrá convertirse en un sitio donde haya una verdadera interacción, una verdadera libertad en la “autoproducción” como forma de socialización, sin censura, o bien, con una verdadera autorregulación por parte de los usuarios? Son preguntas comunes cuando se hace un análisis crítico descriptivo del sitio You Tube, desde una semiótica pragmática como el presente. Tales preguntas responden a la promesa inicial que ofrece Internet desde su origen. La posibilidad de construir una verdadera “democracia de los sueños”, un verdadero foro de intervención e interacción social, un

espacio de diálogo en la esfera pública sin fronteras, y no una “democracia del espectáculo” comercializada.

El medio permite invocar nuevos usos y nuevos horizontes. Al igual que la televisión, Internet, es un instrumento tecnocultural que permite expandir los alcances del conocimiento, la capacidad de socialización y el crecimiento del ser humano en sociedad. Los nuevos desarrollos en biosemiótica e Internet exploran ya este nuevo curso de elementos sumados y colaborando en red para mantener y mejorar la vida humana.

Sin ánimo de ser apocalíptico, You Tube será sólo la matriz espectacularizante que se visualiza ya, mientras siga sea un sitio sujeto a la lógica del mercado. La potencialidad política del sitio basada en su enorme audiencia, puede introducir nuevos usos de carácter más educativo y cultural, tal como **e-youtube**, canal de difusión de la Unión Europea en You Tube, que persigue fines didácticos y culturales sobre el continente. Con seguridad, otros desarrollos más en Internet darán, sin duda, mayor impulso a la construcción de una cultura libre de la lógica del mercado y políticamente más humana y dialógica, y entonces sí, menos apocalíptica.

Conclusiones

You Tube es una matriz interactiva mixta (mix-interactive matrix) del espectáculo, basada en la interacción, el compartir, la socialización virtual, no en tiempo real, en donde el autor y el lector tienen las mismas oportunidades de interactuar, siempre bajo las reglas de uso de los administradores del sitio.

You Tube reproduce las principales cualidades de la sociedad del espectacularización propio de la industria cultural capitalista, basado en la estrategia de la “autoproducción”, limitada por la lógica de mercado y el plan de negocios del sitio.

Los límites de la “autoproducción” en You Tube, son los mismos que impone la lógica de mercado y el plan de negocios de los dueños del sitio.

Los usuarios buscan en You Tube una perpetuidad asentada en la memoria digital y el ciberespacio, con la “promesa de eternidad” y la promesa de “ser visto” por otros en la red interactiva: la promesa de la memoria visual interactiva.

La verdad es un momento de lo falso en You Tube, donde se diluyen las nociones de certidumbre y todo queda permeado por el tamiz de lo falso,

la incertidumbre, lo efímero y lo banal. La verdad en You Tube es la verdad de lo espectacular.

Las posibilidades interactivas de You Tube pueden crecer si se aleja de una lógica de mercado, y se abre a una auténtica socialización dialógica y de carácter humanista.

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Josep Barcons

The existential dimension of the phatic function in Arnold Schönberg's *Moses und Aron*

Early in Arnold Schönberg's opera *Moses und Aron*, God tells Moses: "Now announce" (Schönberg 1984, mm. 14–15).¹ It must be supposed that Moses has just received a message that he must announce. However, this imperative statement is heard when the voice of God has only said: "Lay your shoes aside: you have gone far enough; you stand on holy ground". Considering the meaning of these words, it is impossible to think that they carry the content of the message that Moses has to announce. Then Moses answers God: "God of my fathers, God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, thou who have awoken again their thought in me, my God, do not compel me to announce it. I am old; let me tend my sheep in peace."²

In Moses' answer nothing is said about shoes or about holy ground. On the contrary, he says he doesn't want to be compelled to announce his father's thought. To Moses' objection, God replies: "You have seen the horrors, known the truth; so you can do nothing else: you have to free your people from it". The question is: To what is the reference of "from it" (*daraus*)? Is it supposed to be the "horrors"? The "truth"? Or is the reference to the very "thought of his fathers", which, according to Moses, God has reawakened in him? From a purely grammatical analysis, it is impossible to determine the actual reference of this *daraus*. But knowing the accuracy Schönberg put on the elaboration of the libretto, this ambiguity cannot be a mistake, but intentional, and it seems must necessarily remain unsolved (cf. Schönberg 1958: letters 128, 129 and 151). For the actual referent of this *daraus* could be any or all of these possibilities (ibid.: letter 117). According to this view, the word "free" (*befrein*) gains utmost signification, since the people has to be freed from any kind of constriction or slavery (on the understanding that any kind of constriction is suggested by

the multiple, or indeterminate, referent of this *daraus*). One of these possible constrictions (maybe the greatest one) is, precisely, the very idea – the thought, the *Gedanken* – of God. And this will in fact form the basis of the whole drama.

The opera (not the scene, which starts 8 bars later) begins with 6 *Solostimmen* singing “O” (see Example 1). These 6 solo voices contain the whole range of the adult human register and are placed inside the orchestra, doubled by one instrument each one. Though in the score Schönberg never refers to them by any other words than 6 *Solostimmen*, we can certainly suppose that they are the invisible – they are in the orchestra – but audible aspect of God (both for Moses and the audience). These voices sing during bars 1–3 and 5–7, with one purely instrumental bar in between, according to this distribution: 3 + 1 + 3, totalling 7. Knowing the importance Schönberg gave to numbers (see, e.g. Sterne 1994), both this structure and the presence of the number 7 cannot be accidental. The fact that these six voices (3 female + 3 male) are singing 3-voice chords during 3 + 3 bars, produces an evident structural parallelism between them and the bars employed, thus strongly connecting the very nature of the voices (so to say, their essence) to the place they occupy. This point of view is reinforced by the communicative structure of the first words: “O – ” can serve no other means but to stress the presence of a Sender who addresses a Receiver, since they share a common Code and are placed in the same Context (cf. Jakobson, in Sebeok 1960). In other words, this first speech act opens the Channel that enables Contact (phatic function of language) between two existential instances. Still following Jakobson's communication schema, we find that the only item neglected in this speech act is the Message itself. The content of the first word (an interjection) can only stress the fact that a communicative act is happening. “O” simply points out that a “we” is there (a Sender and a Receiver); in other words, that “I am here” and “you are here”. This is not so different from the well-known “I am”, or “I am who I am”, from Exodus 3:14, which is the underlying source of this passage.

Reacting to the voices he has just heard, Moses replies in measure 8, when the first scene begins: “One, eternal, omnipresent, invisible and unimaginable God”. Thus he responds with theological concepts to the purely phatic “O–!” With such terminology, Moses' response implies not only a heavy displacement of the dominant function of language from the phatic level to the message, but also the abandonment of the pure *hic et*

The musical score shows a piano accompaniment for measures 1-7. The treble clef part begins with a half note 'O' followed by a quarter rest, then a quarter note, and continues with a series of chords. The bass clef part consists of a steady accompaniment of chords. Brackets below the staff indicate a 3-measure phrase, a 1-measure rest, and another 3-measure phrase.

Example 1. Moses und Aron, mm. 1–7: “6 Solostimmen”.

nunc in which the first communicative act of the 6 *Solostimmen* was sited. Moses’ verbalization of such marked terminology (which is highly connotative) breaks the intimacy of the here and now that any phatic act implies, by bringing into scene an alien presence that was lacking until that moment – namely, the meaning, the signified, the world of external references of the words employed.

Not allowing him to finish, and restoring the *hic et nunc*, the 6 *Solostimmen* anticipate Moses’ last word (“God”) and begin their speech, giving birth to a second intervention that presents some dissimilarities to the first one. The first difference is that here the 6 *Solostimmen* join the *Stimme aus dem Dornbusch* (voice – singular – coming from the burning bush), compounded by six non-soloist voices, all of them placed behind the scene; and instead of singing, they speak. These voices cover the same range of the 6 *Solostimmen*, but substitute mezzo-sopranos for children, thus endowing the voice of God with the whole spectrum of natural human voices. It is noteworthy that the visible part of God is, musically speaking, quite sober and austere, reduced only to rhythm and not sung. A second major difference is the fact that, instead of the interjection of measures 1–3 and 5–7, here God proffers words comprising four sentences: “Lay your shoes aside: you have gone far enough; you stand on holy ground. Now announce.”

Although sentences and not plain interjection, their meaning is not so different from that of the initial “O”. Two of them are imperative sentences, whose meaning has nothing to do with the assertion of any concept or idea, since they ask for an action, thus stressing the relation between the Sender (who commands) and the Receiver (who obeys). The other two sentences are declaratives, but they refer to the immediate context (the shoes and the ground), and the presence of the Receiver is also noticeable thanks to

the verb and even the pronouns (*bist* and *du stehst*).³ Thus, the phatic element of this whole intervention remains evident, since the presence of the Receiver arises in all four sentences. This constant presence of the “you”, in addition, is always linked to the present space and time (Context) by the verbal tenses employed (imperative, present or perfect, whose implications concern the moment the speech act is taking place). The result is, once more according to Jakobson's typology, the negligence of the Message, a result of stress being placed on other factors of communication.

If we compare God's words to those said by Moses, the first noticeable difference is that God's words always neglect any Message, and thus any external presence conveyed by the recall of the reference. Moses, however, puts complete emphasis on the Message, neglecting the other communicative factors, mainly the phatic one, as well as the time and space where the communicative act is happening; i.e., he recalls the past dimension of his fathers. Also, in the 4 bars of Moses' intervention we find 5 adjectives, and in the 5 bars of God's intervention we find 4 verbs. Thus, God's words are mainly active (verbs always imply movement, not reification), while Moses' words are adjectives (determiners, determinators, constrictors, attached to fixed concepts). In God's speech we find few concepts: the shoes and the ground are part of the immediate context, so they do not need to recall an *ex-tempore* and external referent; even the idea of holiness (the only adjective in God's words) arises from the very place the conversation is held. Apart from the dominant presence of verbs, we also find quite a few adverbs and prepositions, and these, too, have an immediate referential function linked to a concrete space and time.

But the roles of God and Moses remain at opposite poles, not only in terms of text, but also in terms of music. Apart from the highly significant ways the dodecaphonic row is employed, there are also musical differences that a competent listener can catch by ear.⁴ Just to quote these last ones, the first major difference arises from the fact that the voice of God is richly polyphonic, whereas Moses does not even sing a melody, but speaks in his characteristic *Sprechgesang*. Apart from this major difference, it is noticeable that the orchestra turns to the low register when Moses speaks, with the introduction of a tuba, thus anchoring his words in a weighty dimension, completely contrasting with the transparent textures of the voice(s) of God. In terms of rhythm, the malleability of the first 7 measures becomes petrified when Moses begins his speech: the orchestral accompaniment to his

spoken words stands only on the strong beats of the bar, separated, moreover, by quaver silences with *fermate*. In the first seven bars, the rhythm was syncopated (mm. 1–3) or counterpointed by the orchestra (mm. 5–7), in a rhythmical plasticity that vanishes at the very moment Moses says his first words. In terms of harmony, the constant three-voice realization and salient featuring of the major 7th in God’s speech is changed to four voices with a predominant sonority of the minor 7th.

Given these differences, and after Moses’ request to let him tend his sheep in peace, and God’s intervention (“You have seen the horrors, known the truth”), something curious happens. If we consider that the first chords sung by the 6 *Solostimmen* in the first seven bars are the original model of God’s nature (its essence, as shown in Example 2), we will see that in the intervention we are talking about (mm. 23–25) there is a kind of retrogression in terms of the harmony; it is as if God’s speech were retracing its own steps (see Example 3). Instead of going on, when the D chord is reached, the steps followed are not E-F, but C-B-A. From here on, when this kind of withdrawal takes place in God’s interventions, the original chords always appear changed and transposed, never having their original pitches. As if a closing statement, the first transpositions (m. 26) are precisely D’ and A’ (that is, the starting and ending points of the retrogression). The original pitches (B A, last sung by the 6 *Solostimmen* in mm. 24–25) do not appear again until measures 91–93 (as A B), when the text “*verkünde*” (announce) is said a second time. However, these pitches do not appear in their original disposition, but inverted (with both chords showing the same inversion), and with the lowest note surrounded by semitones (see Example 4).

Example 2. Moses und Aron, mm. 1–7, chord progression.

What happens between measures 26–90 to provoke such a change in the musical discourse? During all these bars, there is a dialogue between

Example 3 shows a piano accompaniment for two vocal lines. The first system (mm. 11-14) features chords A, B, A, and B. The second system (mm. 15-18) features chords C, D, C, and D. The third system (mm. 19-22) features chords B, A, and D'. The fourth system (mm. 23-27) features chords D, C, and A'. The lyrics are: "Le - ge die Schu - he ab: du stehst auf hei - li - gem Bo - den. Bist weit ge - mung ge - gaa - gen: nun ver - küm - de! die Wahr - heit er - kammt; so kannst du nichts an - ders mehr: dein Volk be - frei! Du hast die Greu - el ge - sehn; so kannst du so kannst du nicht an - ders mehr: Volk be - frei!"

Example 3. *Moses und Aron*, mm. 11–27, retrogression, transposition, and new chord.

Example 4 shows a piano accompaniment for two vocal lines. The first system (mm. 90-92) features chord A inverted. The second system (mm. 93-94) features chord B inverted. The lyrics are: "Ver - küm - de, ver - küm - de, ver - küm - de! Ver - küm - de, Ver - küm - de!"

Example 4. *Moses und Aron*, mm. 90–94: *A B non-transposed chords inverted.*

Moses and God. Moses fears he will not be able to accomplish his mission (m. 36), because his tongue is clumsy; he can think but not speak (mm. 47–49). This inability to speak is obviously represented by Moses' *Sprechgesang*, that stands far from God's rich polyphony. To his objections, God replies: "Aron shall be your mouth", and "He comes towards you, in the opposite direction of your path. You will recognize him for this". That is, Moses will recognize Aron because they walk – with all the implications that such an expression has – in opposite directions. Their opposition is also shaped musically. While Moses, a bass voice, only speaks, Aron

is a tenor (one might say even a *bel canto* tenor) that sings in a very agile (not clumsy) way. However, their major opposition lies in their comprehension of God and the way they talk about God to the people. Moses in fact has the ability to sing, as happens only once in the whole opera, in mm. 208–214 of Act I; alone with Aron, Moses says to him: “Purify your thought; detach it from the worthless; consecrate it to the truth.” Yet he opts not to do so; rather, Moses limits his expression to his abstract-conceptual comprehension of God, instead of trying to speak to the people in their language (singing). By contrast, Aron’s speech, in its richness and melodic exuberance, seems to pretend to *recreate* God’s polyphony, in a kind of transposition (translation) of a synchronic axis to a diachronic one. That is, it attempts to turn verticality into horizontality, polyphony into melody, so as to *re-present* God to the people by making Him comprehensible (although Aron has not experienced Him directly). Moses’ word is powerful enough, as demonstrated when at his command the golden calf vanishes (end of scene 4, Act II). Yet he performs no signs or wonders in the eyes of the people; only Aron performs such miracles. To sum up, their opposition is similar to that between icon-allegiance and iconoclasm, or that between apophatic and cataphatic theology. In the protagonists’ own words, Aron: “I love this people, I live for them”; Moses: “I love my thought and I live for it.”

We have not yet elucidated the reason for the musical change in God’s speech in measures 26 to 90. To do so, we must return to the initial “Now announce”. Until that moment, we have had one, purely phatic intervention of God, and one response by Moses stressing the message. Only once has God used morphosyntactic categories other than the interjection, and even then to stress phatic implications, ending with “*Nun verkünde*” (Now announce); and one intervention of Moses, saying he does not want to proclaim the thought of his fathers. It is when this moment is reached that the next intervention of God begins the movement of retraction. This retraction coincides with the moment the speech of God neglects the phatic dimension, and begins to act according to the communicative model that Moses has been using ever since his first intervention (which was not focused on the facticity of the communicative act, but on the message, that is, on its *external* content or reference). The “Now announce” in measures 14–15 represents this turn, since, as we have already seen, its chords (C-D) will not be followed by E and F, but by the retrogression,

C-B-A (Ex. 3). This backward movement seems to imply that the only content to be “announced” is what has happened until the moment, not what it is to come. Once the retrogression is completed (first beat of m. 25), a new texture appears (“*so kannst du nichts anders mehr*”, you can do nothing else), which leads to the first transpositions of God’s chords, and ultimately to a new chord, corresponding to the syllable “-*frei*” (free). The constitution of this new chord is meaningful, since its notes are the same one that provided the harmonic support to Moses’ words in measures 17–18 (“thou who have awoken again their thought in me”), with two only exceptions. As shown in Example 5, the only two notes employed during measures 17–18 that do *not* appear in the chord at measure 27 are B flat and A, the very notes that originally formed the characteristic sonority of God’s chords: the major 7th. It seems clear that this is no coincidence, and that it should be considered extremely meaningful, a pertinent *thought*, to echo God’s words. In Schönberg’s own words, it must be an “opera of musical ideas” (Schoenberg 1984: 337),

The image shows a page of a musical score for 'Moses und Aron'. It features several staves: 1. Fl, 1. Ob, 2. Kl, Bb Kl, 1. Hr, 2. Hr, 1. Pos, MOSES (with German lyrics: 'I - saaks und Ja - kobs, der du ih - ren Ge - dan - ken in mir wie - der - er - weckt hast.'), 1. Br, and 1. Vel. The score is divided into measures 17-18 and measure 27. A callout box on the right shows a chord with notes G, Bb, and A, with arrows pointing to the corresponding notes in the original score.

Example 5. *Moses und Aron*, mm. 17–18, m. 27: Same notes except for A and B flat.

In this way, the music attests to a connection between *befrein* (to free) and *Gedanken* (thought). Thus, it is not the “thought” that must be announced. Rather, it should be freed, as one of the constrictions (prob-

ably the main one) to which the *daraus* (from it) was making reference. The *daraus*, said only by the *Stimme aus dem Dornbusch* in measure 26, maintains its imprecise reference, in spite of the concretion that the *befrein* imposes in terms of musical similarity.

What has to be announced? We, like Moses, have had the answer from the very beginning, right under our own nose. No content is to be announced, other than the very *act* of communication. Moses, however, misunderstands this commitment, concluding instead that he must “announce” the thought of his fathers. In misunderstanding, he neglects the importance of the experience he is living; he is not living it in its full consequences, with full attention. In Heidegger’s words, Moses was not having a “phatical experience of life” (cf. Heidegger 1995: chapter 1). And this phatical experience of life is precisely what religion provides. Schönberg’s idea of what religion should be comes close to the Heideggerian conception of religion, which is linked to the idea of “authentic existence” – this last, of course, being a personal path, apart from any “institution”, and the main responsibility of the *Dasein*. The fact of living a revelatory experience (not the fact of being told about it) stresses the *hic et nunc* that the subject experiencing this revelation occupies, thus allowing him to be aware of the fact that he occupies a place, and thus making him conscious of his own existence. Under this point of view it can be understood why revelation is supposed to be always unique, yet always the same.

The crisis of modernity led to Existentialism, the main basis of which (to freely paraphrase Jean-Paul Sartre) is the fact that essence no longer precedes existence; rather, we begin to exist without knowing our essence). The fact of realizing the place that oneself occupies – the function of revelation – provides us with the opportunity to take care (the Heideggerian *Sorge*) of one’s own existence, thus taking the reins of one’s own life. And such a thing only happens when the essence (the *Sein*, the fact of being) is linked or *relinked* – *religare* as a consequence of *relegere* and *reelegere* – to the phatical dimension of life. Such is achieved only by realizing – and living – the *hic et nunc* (the *Da*) of one’s own vital experience.

Notes

1. All English translations of the libretto are mine. All of the text considered here occurs from measures 1 to 90 in the score.

2. I translate the word *Gedanke* as “thought” instead of “idea”, the latter being more common (for instance, Schönberg’s *Stil und Gedanke* translated as *Style and Idea*). “Thought” not only maintains the etymological correspondence in German between *zu denken* and *Gedanke*, but shows that it is a result of “thinking”.
3. “Are” and “you stand”: German verbs are inflected so as to incorporate reference to the Receiver.
4. Concerning the composer’s treatment of the twelve-tone row, see Kerling (2004) and the pioneering work of Schmidt (1988).
5. The German text reads: “*Er kommt dir auf deinem Weg entgegen; daran sollst du ihn erkennen*”. Although *entgegenkommen* commonly means “to meet halfway”, the presence of *entgegen* gives a nuance of opposition when considered by itself. Understanding the passage in such a way, we are following Schönberg’s opinion concerning the way his texts should be approached: “... all the more if – which is, after all, as you know, absolutely necessary with my work – you had looked at every word and every sentence from several points of view” (Schoenberg 1987: 143, in letter n. 117, 5.VIII.1930).

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¿Cómo negocian sus identidades a través de la lengua los mexicanos en Helsinki, Finlandia?¹

1. Introducción

“Mexicans and South Americans have only a vague idea where Finland is” y “A Finn’s ‘space bubble’ – or or personal space – is a circle of 1.2 meter radius, and woe betide the Italian or Mexican who invades it!” son las dos únicas alusiones a las relaciones entre mexicanos y finlandeses que incluye Richard D. Lewis en su libro *Finland, Cultural Lone Wolf* (2005: 129, 152). Sin embargo, en 2006, 229 mexicanos sí *ubicaban con exactitud* a Finlandia pues, *desafiando* la advertencia, habían *invadido* su territorio (Ulkomaalaisvirasto 2006). En este trabajo exploramos cómo diez de ellos negocian sus identidades en la Zona Metropolitana de Helsinki: cinco mujeres y cinco hombres, adultos todos, con licenciatura o maestría, y con uno a 15 años de residencia, a quienes entrevistamos en 2007. Así contribuimos al estudio de aquellas pequeñas minorías migrantes en Finlandia nunca antes descritas.

Con Bucholtz y Hall (2005: 586) definimos *identidad* como “the social positioning of self and other”, y seguimos sus cinco principios: aparición, posicionalidad, indexicalidad, relacionalidad y parcialidad. Por *negociación de identidades* entendemos “an interplay between reflective positioning, i.e. self-representation, and interactive positioning, whereby others attempt to position or reposition particular individuals or groups” (Pavlenko y Blacledge 2004: 20). La identidad, entonces, no es algo que una persona *es* o *tiene*, sino que *hace* a través de sistemas simbólicos como la lengua, co-construyéndola en contextos discursivos locales (Piller 2002: 10–12).

Además de esta introducción y la conclusión, integran el texto tres partes. Primero presentamos cómo posicionan los finlandeses a los mexicanos, de acuerdo con las propias experiencias de los migrantes. Luego mostramos cómo conciben los mexicanos la identidad nacional tanto de ellos que salieron el país, como de los compatriotas que permanecen. Finalmente examinamos los recursos lingüísticos con que se negocia la identidad mexicana en el nuevo lugar de residencia.

2. ¿Cómo posicionan los finlandeses a los mexicanos? *Testimonios de los migrantes*

Los mexicanos en la Zona Metropolitana de Helsinki bien pueden parafrasear la cita de Lewis que abre el capítulo: también los finlandeses tienen sólo una idea vaga de la identidad mexicana. Tal desconocimiento obedece a que su inmigración es reciente -frente a la sueca que data del siglo XII o la rusa que inició en el siglo XVIII (Latomaa y Nuolijärvi 2002: 104, 111) – reducida – compárese con los 25 315 rusos, los 17 543 estonios o los 8 295 suecos (Ulkomaalaisvirasto 2006); y a cuentagotas, en cambio, de 1990 a 1995 entraron a Finlandia unos 5 000 a 6 000 refugiados somalíes y hoy constituyen el cuarto grupo extranjero más numeroso (Degni, Pöntinen y Mölsä 2006).

¿Cómo posicionan los finlandeses a estos recién llegados, pocos y casi invisibles mexicanos? Distintos. Con este término nos referimos al segundo elemento de la táctica de intersubjetividad *adecuación/distinción* del *principio de relacionalidad* (Bucholtz y Hall 2004, 2005).² Los estereotipos que circulan en los medios de comunicación, la publicidad y el contacto directo con los mexicanos en Helsinki hace que los finlandeses borren las semejanzas y acentúen las diferencias entre ambos grupos. Recordemos que los estereotipos pueden ser tanto fuente de errores y prejuicios como factores de cohesión social que construyen la relación entre sí mismo y el otro (Amossy y Herschberg Pierrot 2005: 43).

En concreto, posicionan a los mexicanos como inferiores: los llaman “sudamericanos” y este error ilustra el *principio de indexicalidad* (Bucholtz y Hall 2005): los conceptos de “Norteamérica” y “Sudamérica” apuntan no tanto a ubicaciones geográficas diferentes cuanto a realidades socioeconómicas y geopolíticas distintas. Así, pertenecen al Tercer Mundo, viven en una nación no industrializada con un atraso tal que aún circulan caballos

y burros por las ciudades y cuyos habitantes son boxeadores y mueren de hambre por la pobreza. Esta imagen se alimenta de los medios finlandeses que casi siempre presentan noticias de acontecimientos negativos de México —“para ellos, era una fotografía de África”. Esta cita de María ejemplifica la *adecuación*, el primer elemento de la táctica de intersubjetividad que introdujimos antes, esto es, los finlandeses desvanecen las diferencias entre un país y todo un continente para igualarlos negativamente. Hambre, miseria y violencia, entre otras carencias, es lo que, también por indexicalidad, remite la palabra “África”.

Otra imagen que exhibe a los mexicanos como ensimismados en su cultura sin integrarse al mundo es la “[d]el mexicano con su sombrero y comiendo sus tacos, su salsa” (Emilio). Ésta se origina en la cinematografía estadounidense y en la publicidad de los alimentos y bebidas que México exporta a Finlandia, e. g., chiles, cerveza y tequila. Resulta interesante que los entrevistados reconozcan que las películas estadounidenses aportan en parte esa imagen; es decir, que no surge del contacto directo México-Finlandia sino que se triangula vía Estados Unidos. Camilo incluso afirma: “*todo* lo que saben de nosotros es a través de los americanos [sic]”.

Un estereotipo más procedente de Hollywood es el del *latin lover*, nacido con el actor italiano Rodolfo Valentino, quien en los años veinte del siglo pasado encarnó el papel del seductor irresistible. Así, otra vez por *adecuación*, se uniforma a todos los latinos como seductores. Pero aquí se pasa de la ficción de la pantalla grande a una amenaza de la vida real que posiciona a los mexicanos como violentos: los varones finlandeses creen que los hombres mexicanos llegan a *robarles* sus mujeres. Por lo tanto, hay que cuidarse de ellos pues, aunque estén en tierra ajena, los mexicanos *lucharán* contra los finlandeses y les ganarán una pareja que no les corresponde.

Irrumpir escandalosamente en el silencioso “space bubble” finlandés es otra característica violenta de los mexicanos que emerge del contacto directo entre grupos. Esta identidad que los mexicanos construyen siendo parlanchines y “hablando muy fuerte” (Jennifer) provoca que los finlandeses “cre[a]n que nosotros no tenemos privacidad ... que contamos todo” (Oralia) y que la descalifiquen. La *ilegitimación* es el segundo elemento de la táctica de intersubjetividad *autorización/ilegitimación* del *principio de relacionalidad* y, a través de ella, las estructuras del poder institucionalizado y la ideología desestiman, censuran o ignoran las identidades (Bucholtz y Hall 2005: 603).

Esta ilegitimación se origina porque mexicanos y finlandeses no comparten las mismas *ideologías lingüísticas*, “the situated, partial, and interested character of conceptions and uses of language” (Errington 2001: 110). La ideología lingüística finlandesa permea los diez valores básicos de los (hombres) finlandeses que plantea Lewis (2005: 58–63), de los cuales destacamos aquí dos: ser taciturnos y ser directos. Así, prefieren reservarse sus sentimientos y pensamientos optando por el silencio y desconfiando de y censurando a quienes no son breves y directos en su hablar – como los mexicanos.

Con todo, pese a que el silencio y la quietud sean la forma natural de ser finlandesa (Carbaugh et al. 2006), no siempre los mexicanos son posicionados de manera negativa: se les reconoce el ser cálidos, agradables y divertidos. ¿Coinciden estos posicionamientos recogidos de las experiencias de los entrevistados en Helsinki con la identidad que de sí mismos construyen?

3. ¿Cómo se posicionan a sí mismos los mexicanos? *Visiones y revisiones de cerca y de lejos*

La visión de los entrevistados hacia su propia identidad es más profunda que los estereotipos de los finlandeses. México no sólo es “lindo y querido” (Alfredo), sino se revela como “una mezcla de colores y sabores” (Paula). Detectamos cuatro líneas de comportamientos contrastantes que componen esa heterogénea mezcla de la identidad mexicana:

Aguantamos (la pinchi perra vida) vs. Luchamos (le entramos cabrón, nos la rifamos)

Nos abrimos (somos hermanos) vs. Abusamos (unos de otros)

Aguantando (la pinchi perra vida) significa padecer con resignación la situación económica del país. Esta pasividad es vista como una cualidad positiva, puesto que se soporta sonriendo y esa sonrisa es el *bastón* que permite *seguir andando*. Las mujeres mexicanas van un paso atrás en ese caminar, pues el que aguanten las “dictaduras” de los varones (Paula) se considera un defecto: más que pasividad, es conformismo.

Paradójicamente, *luchando (entrándole cabrón, rifándose, siendo chingones)* significa abandonar esa pasividad y volverse agente, entrándole (cabrón) y enfrentando esa adversidad porque “no hay de otra” (Javier).

Hombres y mujeres despliegan esa agencia luchando con pasión y sin cansancio, siendo creativos e ingeniosos aunque, como reconocen los entrevistados, no todos son así.

Abriéndose (somos hermanos) significa pinchar el espacio personal y abrirse de par en par: mostrándose sin miedo tal como uno es, compartiendo la comida, festejando, conversando, ayudándose, integrándose en familia y, más aún, llegando a considerar familiares a quienes no llevan la misma sangre: “el mexicano necesita hermanos, no de sangre, pero gentes ... alrededor” (Paula). Así, los mexicanos se abren y se acercan.

Abusando (unos de otros) significa que ese acercamiento a veces es invasivo: “el mexicano roba al mexicano ... no se respeta a sí mismo” (Leticia) ni al otro. También son incumplidos; los hombres abusan de su condición y son machos; las madres abusan de su papel y son regañonas. Precisemos que para nuestros entrevistados, ser madres más regañonas y conservadoras que las madres finlandesas es una virtud que las distingue de ellas. Es obvio que esta cualidad sólo emergió a través del contacto con el otro.

Así, los finlandeses no se equivocan del todo en imaginar a los mexicanos como inferiores y violentos: no todos los mexicanos llevan una existencia plácida; *hurtar* la mujer ajena sería otra forma de abusar del otro; y ser cálidos, alegres y divertidos forma parte de la convivencia fraterna.

Al mismo tiempo, radicar en Finlandia ha hecho que los migrantes mexicanos se repositionen tanto a sí mismos como a los compatriotas que no salieron del país. Nombraremos “finlandización” y “domesticación” (Emilio) a este proceso que integra elementos de ambas culturas. Por un lado, amplían sus perspectivas y reconocen y respetan a un otro diferente, por ejemplo, “que es normal no sonreír” (Camilo). Por el otro, aprenden “las cosas buenas de estos países” (Leticia) y enmiendan rasgos de su carácter, por ejemplo, se vuelven fríos y calculadores y ya no cometen las “locuras” que harían en México (Javier – convirtiéndose, al retornar al país de vacaciones, en presa fácil de abusos. Buena parte de esta “finlandización” ocurre a través de, precisamente, el finés, ¿cómo en concreto?

4. ¿Con qué medios lingüísticos negocian sus identidades los migrantes mexicanos?

Los individuos y grupos minoritarios se (re)posicionan eligiendo una lengua, aprendiendo otra como lengua segunda (L2), alternando entre

códigos, cruzando (*crossing*), inventando y usando una nueva variedad lingüística, aprendiendo a leer y a escribir, adquiriendo nuevas estrategias retóricas y creando nuevas identidades narrativas (Pavlenko y Blackledge 2004: 22-23). Para vivir en Finlandia y lograr ser audibles y visibles (Miller 2004) en esa *casa ajena* – así visualizan los entrevistados a su nuevo país – los mexicanos amplían su repertorio hablando inglés y aprendiendo finés como L2.

Hablar en inglés es dar el primer paso en ese espacio ajeno y salvar las comunicaciones básicas. Todos los entrevistados lo aprendieron en México, cursando su educación primaria en escuelas privadas, o como niños, adolescentes y jóvenes en academias de idiomas, o bien, residiendo una temporada en países anglohablantes. Su autoevaluación en esa lengua es muy alta: la mayoría reconoce hablar, leer, entender y escribir inglés con fluidez. Incluso, uno reconoce ser más competente en inglés que en español: “Español, mal español, a pura mentada de madre y... e inglés, o sea, hablar realmente, inglés” (Emilio).

El inglés no es la única lengua extranjera que han aprendido: algunos hablan además francés, italiano, alemán, holandés y sueco pero parece que no las utilizan (mucho).

El inglés les permite a los mexicanos trabajar y socializar con los finlandeses, llegando a funcionar como un “pequeño escudo” (Leticia) que relaja tensiones comunicativas -malentendidos, incomprensiones- cuando se les habla en finés. Sin embargo, el escudo es, justamente, “pequeño” porque no en todos los casos garantiza esa relajación y continuidad en la interacción: sólo sirve “para que te entiendan... *cuando quieren entenderte*” (Camilo). Por lo tanto, que los mexicanos empleen el inglés, la lengua global, no los coloca automáticamente al mismo nivel de los hablantes de finés, el idioma co-nacional, ni les asegura la completa audibilidad y visibilidad -procesos, como bien advierte Mills (2004: 291), co-construidos.

Es cierto, entonces, que se puede vivir en Finlandia sin hablar finés, “pero se vive mal ... si no sabes finés, nunca estarás integrado a la sociedad” (Camilo). Tal integración podrá vislumbrarse complicada, pues todos los entrevistados concuerdan en que es un idioma difícil, pero es en este nuevo entorno donde los mexicanos echarán mano de la agencia que, aseveran, los distingue. Así, en algún momento de su estancia, todos han llevado cursos en la Universidad de Helsinki, la Universidad de Verano o la Escuela para Adultos.

Ahora bien, aprender e interactuar en finés como L2 no es, simplemente, dar un segundo paso en esa casa ajena, sino “es la llave de la puerta principal” (María) que facilita la integración y nivelación con los finlandeses y agiliza la “domesticación”. Se dejará de ser el *latin lover* roba-mujeres para transformarse en miembro de la sociedad. Con el finés, los mexicanos están dentro de la casa, acceden a más posibilidades laborales, son aceptados socialmente y mejoran su audibilidad y visibilidad, aunque todavía deben pugnar para que los finlandeses los legitimen como hablantes de finés. Aquí entra en juego la táctica de intersubjetividad *autenticación/desnaturalización* del *principio de relacionalidad* (Bucholtz y Hall 2004, 2005).

En efecto, si un mexicano aborda en finés a un finlandés, con frecuencia éste le responderá en inglés. Proponemos dos explicaciones a esta ilegitimación: si el finlandés percibe -a través del acento, por ejemplo- que la competencia en finés del mexicano es limitada, intentará facilitar la comunicación cambiando al inglés. Desde luego, casi siempre, al finlandés le basta la vista para percatarse de que su interlocutor y él no hablan la misma lengua: como la fisonomía (estereotipada) mexicana – “moreno[s] de pelo negro” (Emilio) – difiere de la (estereotipada) finlandesa, indexicalizará una identidad extranjera que (en muchos casos) no autentificará a ese finés (cf. Miller 2004). Recalquemos que no todos los mexicanos se rebelan contra esta desnaturalización -vuelven al inglés antes de obligarse a sí mismos y al otro a usar el finés.

5. Conclusión

La *finlandización* de los mexicanos en la Zona Metropolitana de Helsinki nunca es total pues “no se puede negar lo que se trae en la sangre” (Camilo); empero, hablar inglés y aprender y comunicarse en finés como L2 sirven de estrategias para posicionarse ante los finlandeses y revertir los estereotipos negativos de inferiores y violentos. Negociar la identidad mexicana en Finlandia significa “sacar provecho” de ambas culturas, alcanzado “un punto medio” (Camilo). No obstante, toca a los finlandeses, los habitantes de la *casa ajena*, considerarlos audibles y visibles y legitimarlos como hablantes de esa L2. Así, esta *domesticación* es un proceso que, incluso para quienes llevan mayor tiempo residiendo en Finlandia, aún no culmina.

Notas

1. Este trabajo se inserta en el proyecto “Dinámica de los contactos entre español, lenguas indígenas y lenguas extranjeras: ideologías lingüísticas” con sede en el Departamento de Estudios Mesoamericanos y Mexicanos de la Universidad de Guadalajara (México). Agradecemos a nuestras familias por el apoyo y comprensión en el tiempo invertido en esta investigación, a Verónica Alcocer por su rápida y eficiente transcripción de las entrevistas, y a Jesús Cerpa por su apoyo y comentarios. Empleamos seudónimos para garantizar el anonimato de los migrantes.
2. “Tactics of intersubjectivity are the relations that are created through identity work” (Bucholtz y Hall 2004: 382).

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Pierluigi Basso Fossali

Dispositifs de mésentente dans l'*Hamlet* de Shakespeare

Notre contribution n'est pas une analyse textuelle, mais plutôt une petite investigation de la culture théâtrale par rapport au thème du congrès: *understanding/misunderstanding*. Une sémiotique de la culture théâtrale n'est pas sans méthode et doit s'occuper du statut textuel, des pratiques, des domaines sociaux qui sont tous impliqués dans l'*implémentation* publique d'une œuvre pour la scène. Mais le théâtre est aussi un *medium*; dans cette perspective il soutient d'une manière spécifique la vie d'une *culture* et sa relation avec l'*environnement* (d'une part, nous avons des *systèmes de signification* et, de l'autre, une *sémiosphère* qui exprime des facteurs d'indétermination). Dans la "médiation théâtrale" on peut trouver alors une écologie de valorisations spécifique et une reconfiguration des relations entre formes de vie et *sémiosphère* (Basso Fossali 2007b). Le théâtre n'est pas un simple opérateur de *mimesis*, mais un facteur de ré-médiation des accès aux valeurs et de leur polémologie communicative. Or, en raison de leur diffusion et impact social, les tragédies shakespeariennes semblent un terrain privilégié pour conduire une brève investigation sur la capacité théâtrale de mobiliser et "ré-cadrer les dispositifs d'entente et mésentente affectés par une culture.

Il y a un lien intime entre théâtre et compréhension, vu que le premier n'est que l'exemplification diagrammatique des asymétries que toute action engendre: c'est l'asymétrie énoncée entre celui qui prend l'initiative et celui qui est manipulé, entre rôle actantiel actif et rôle passif, entre stratégie et tactique; mais c'est aussi l'asymétrie énonciative entre observateur (spectateur) et observé (acteur). A ce propos il faut dire que le théâtre ouvre le vertige interminable d'une possible subversion, étant donné que l'acteur sur la scène peut devenir spectateur du spectateur dans la salle, même si ce dernier est protégé par l'obscurité; et en parallèle le spectateur peut réagir à l'action sur la scène et se proposer comme facteur d'indétermination par

rapport au déroulement du spectacle. Cet aspect est sans aucun doute plus important que la vulgate qui conçoit le théâtre comme un lieu d'autoreprésentation d'une société. Dans le théâtre émerge le vertige du social en tant que socialisation de l'asymétrie et de la contingence. Pour que ce vertige soit tolérable, il faut que l'asymétrie soit maîtrisable, donc *reproductible* (le théâtre construit une dialectique entre la partition littéraire et l'événement scénique) et *contournable* dans un espace délimité. Dans cette perspective la scène théâtrale est ambiguë car, d'une part, elle est une organisation qui relève d'un système et d'un jeu linguistiques; de l'autre, la scène théâtrale peut devenir – et cela constitue sa faiblesse extraordinaire – un “environnement”, un milieu qui exprime des facteurs d'indétermination. Dans la représentation tout est coordonné pour faire en sorte que la polémique et le différend soient affichés sur le plan de l'énoncé; mais dans l'énonciation tout est précaire et le contrat théâtral souffre de chaque type d'indétermination, à commencer par la subversion actantielle pour en finir avec la déstabilisation de l'espace scénique. En regardant l'espace scénique, le spectateur entre dans une relation médiatisée avec les corps actoriels où il y a une sorte de pellicule fictionalisante qui transforme un espace homéopathique et proximal en un territoire allopathique et distal. Plus les passions et les motivations qui soutiennent les actions des personnages sont renvoyées aux règles distales et indiscutables des conventions scéniques et aux prescriptions de la notation, plus un régime allopathique est soutenable: c'est-à-dire, “je comprends, je vais adhérer aux valeurs représentées, mais je peux le faire à travers la médiation d'un monde possible fictif et autoréglé; mes réactions émotives sont donc élaborées sous un régime “comme si” (*als ob*), ou – comme le dirait Gregory Currie (1995) – elles sont gérées *off line*. Par contre, plus les passions et les motivations des acteurs sont perçues comme contingentes, plus la co-présence des corps actoriels et spectatoriels retombe dans un régime homéopathique: c'est-à-dire, l'énonciataire retrouve une sorte de ré-embayage, de ré-assomption directe de l'espace de l'énoncé théâtral et le système de la représentation devient une sémiosphère qui exprime des facteurs d'indétermination communs entre acteurs et spectateurs.

Le mot grec “*drama*” signifie *action* et le théâtre n'est que le lieu expérimental d'une *observation de deuxième ordre* sur la gestion des asymétries que toute action implique. Les asymétries de points de vue sont avant tout une dialectique entre facteur systématique et facteur d'indétermination,

entre programme et contingence. Mais le théâtre est notamment le lieu culturel qui célèbre la dialectique entre compréhension et malentendu. Cette dialectique est beaucoup plus qu'un simple *topos*, elle exprime la vocation même du *théâtral*: (1) exemplifier le rôle de la médiation (spatiale, linguistique et médiatique) comme fondatrice de la compréhension *tout court* et en même temps (2) afficher sa vulnérabilité, sa faiblesse congénitale. A ce propos, "*understanding*" est un mot qui exprime la face cachée de la compréhension; en effet, "*understanding*" veut dire *to stand between*. Pour comprendre ("prendre ensemble") il faut construire un interstice, une médiation interstitielle. La "prise en direct" du faire scénique représente à la fois la volonté de préserver une compréhension implicative (participation au même scénario de valeurs) et la reconnaissance d'une médiation inévitable. Un geste est "théâtral" parce qu'il dénonce cette reconnaissance, donc il est marqué en soi-même par une observation de deuxième ordre, par une arrière-scène. L'enracinement du sens scénique est dans les coulisses. L'ultra-visibilité de l'action scénique est corrélative d'une médiation cachée ubiquiste. La fiction théâtrale affiche sa propre médiation et ses conventions, mais elle signale aussi, en abîme, des emboîtements de médiations ultérieures. Grâce à elle on comprend des interstices, des diagrammes de relations qui sont construits justement pour pouvoir attribuer des rôles actantielles et ne pas laisser un scénario expérientiel dans l'indétermination; mais le théâtre, dans son exemplification d'une sémiotique sociale, va continuer d'interroger les identités actérielles.

Dans la représentation théâtrale, les identités des personnages sont des environnements psychiques, des champs d'indétermination (Simondon 1964), et cela bien avant la leçon freudienne. Le système-personnage au théâtre est un faisceau des traits identitaires toujours précaires. La compréhension du domaine subjectif – qui a toujours besoin de médiations – devient "théâtralement" intime, intérieure. Dans le monologue, un *soi-ipse* ne recherche pas seulement les différents *soi-idem* qu'il a récités, mais recherche aussi le champs d'indétermination de ses énergies et de ses pulsions: il peut avoir confiance d'être fidèle à *soi-même* seulement dans une perspective à court rayon, c'est-à-dire limitée, car les fondements du *moi-chair* (Fontanille 2004) restent indéterminés.

Dans le théâtre, le même espace (le plateau) peut subir des partitions, ou mieux il est une totalité partitive par excellence: dans l'*aparté* on assiste à une partition de l'espace où d'autres personnages sur la scène ne peuvent

pas comprendre les mots de l'acteur absorbé par son monologue. Le théâtre est une anatomie de l'espace de médiation où chaque champ identitaire peut se mesurer à ses propres limites dans la sémantisation de l'entour. Le contrôle de la compréhension dans chaque espace est confronté avec sa dissolution par le moyen du comique ou du tragique. Le comique est le fruit d'un vertige de *valeurs opérantes* (facteurs hétéronomes) qui surmonte (ponctuellement ou à court rayon) l'initiative de signification du sujet ; le tragique est le fruit d'un vertige de *valeurs opérables* (c'est-à-dire dépendantes du sujet autonome) qui vont être surmontées par une trajectoire destinale incontournable.

Le héros tragique opère une anticipation destinale, mais cette prestation cognitive est en même temps – comme le dirait Peter Szondi – un anéantissement de la volonté, étant donné que le débouché destinal ne peut pas être compris (plutôt c'est le destin qui nous "comprend"). Bref, le débouché destinal ne peut pas admettre d'autres projets. Penser le tragique c'est une tragédie de la pensée. L'anticipation destinale confronte le héros tragique à l'absurde, c'est-à-dire à une érosion radicale du signifié à la faveur de l'empire d'une pure expression: la dernière image avant l'accomplissement du destin c'est l'horreur. Mais pourquoi faudrait-il penser tragiquement?

Le paradoxe de la pensée tragique, élaboré sans cesse par le théâtre, est que le destin *inéchangeable* du héros (c'est-à-dire, le destin que personne d'autre ne peut assumer et comprendre) est toujours anticipé dans la réflexion, étant donné que cette anticipation reste le seul moyen pour construire une vision éthique. L'éthique théâtrale prévoit une distribution des rôles actoriels en fonction d'une commensurabilité de destins inéchangeables, c'est-à-dire qu'elle ne parvient à une consistance sémantique que comme intersection de destins dans le point limite qu'ils partagent asymptotiquement.

Le scandale de l'asymétrie destinale est au niveau potentiel l'anéantissement de toute raison, de toute motivation à dialoguer et à rechercher une compréhension mutuelle: en perspective tout va nous séparer. Mais, dans la pensée tragique, et grâce au médium théâtral, on peut afficher cette asymétrie radicale pour la dépasser, pour renverser la direction de la désémantisation destinale de chaque forme de vie dans la valorisation de la lutte contre la contingence en acte. En anticipant la trajectoire destinale on trouve qu'il y a encore quelque chose à comprendre, à mettre en commun,

une socialisation de l'indétermination, une éthique qui peut penser dans le présent comme s'il y avait une intersection finale des destins.

Le théâtre exprime une conception laïque du fondement distal du sens, mais c'est une conception qui n'accepte pas le recours à la loi. Y a-t-il du sens au-delà de la loi? C'est à cette question que répond la pensée tragique. Le drame chante l'asymétrie destinale tandis que la loi survient seulement comme un deuil réparateur, vu qu'elle dénonce, en dirimant le caractère diabolique des relations, la fausseté de toute prétention irénique.

Le héros tragique peut officier la loi et en même temps éprouver son insuffisance. Il est condamné à une sorte de strabisme; avec un œil il peut percevoir le réconfort de la loi, avec l'autre il aspire à mettre en commun les instances anti-systématiques, à socialiser exactement contingences et asymétrie. À la rectification idéale des trajectoires de vie prévue par le droit, le tragique ouvre un œil doué d'une inhibition latérale particulière. Il emphatise la ruine future pour voir un salut (encore et malgré tout) possible/impossible, des asymétries destinales pour construire leurs intersections dans un point de fuite commun.

L'éthique du tragique est exactement un effort pour gérer la signification au-delà de la *jurisprudencia* et au dehors de toute juridiction. Le paradoxe est que le théâtre ne réussit à thématiser cette écologie des valorisations que par rapport à une juridiction, à un espace "réglementé" : le théâtre s'ancre dans un contrat spectatorial, dans des conventions, mais la compréhension qu'il vise (une commensurabilité des valorisations) et l'*understanding* qu'il projette (un interstice médiatique qui réinterprète les relations inter-identitaires) sont fonction de la confrontation possible avec le vertige de la signification (Basso 2007b), l'au-delà de la loi. Le reniement du savoir et la dénégation des valeurs codées relèvent d'une complexification de la gestion du sens, une complexification à son tour corrélative d'une recherche adaptative: sauvegarder une signification devant l'anéantissement et l'absurde.

Dans le théâtre on trouve un refus avant la lettre de la sémiotique du code. Et ce refus relève d'une double émancipation: d'une part, la prolifération de la multiplicité identitaire, de l'autre, le tissu narratif qui élabore ensemble des valeurs qui ont un statut et ancrage différents. L'histoire des héros n'est pas liée aux lois locales: c'est une histoire croisée des duperies, d'un côté, et des actions qui aspirent à la mémorabilité, de l'autre. Le mémorable c'est la mémoire en acte, ce qu'on ne peut ni archiver, ni classer,

ce qui reste indice d'un champ de possibilités ouvertes de valorisation.

Dans *Othello the Moor of Venice*, Iago est l'incarnation de la multiplicité identitaire ("I am not what I am" – avoue-t-il à Roderigo; *Othello*, I, 1), celui qui gère les facettes proliférantes du monde à son propre avantage. Par contre, Othello "is that he is" – comme le dit Iago (*Othello* IV, 1), c'est-à-dire un trou noir figuratif qui va absorber en lui toute conflictualité hétéronome. Du théâtre de la bataille, où Othello est un vaillant combattant, on passe au théâtre intérieur, où il est effaré par chaque duplicité, par toute duperie. Othello cherche une cohérence interne des valorisations même au prix de construire un amalgame de données perceptives, songes et suppositions.

Pour Othello la compréhension revient à assumer tragiquement en soi-même le germe de la multiplicité; Othello ne croit pas vraiment à Iago (voir Cavell 1987). La relation est plus complexe: Othello utilise Iago comme un agent de saturation de toute perversion possible par rapport à sa propre valorisation originelle de Desdemona. Pour anticiper son destin, le héros tragique doit épuiser toute possibilité. Devant les sollicitations provocatrices de la part de Iago, Othello est comme en transe: Iago est un facteur d'accélération de la computation des indéterminations, le catalyseur d'un procès d'auto-dévoration intérieure. En effet, dans toutes les tragédies shakespeariennes il faut relever la quantité énorme des raisonnements figuraux qui concernent le corps comme restriction progressive du royaume, de la juridiction. En outre, même la compréhension relève d'une restriction de domaine. S'il y a quelque chose de pourri au Danemark, mieux vaut se limiter à observer la corruption qui est déjà dans le corps, le venin qui court dans les veines.

Comprendre la multiplicité proliférante c'est l'assumer dans son propre corps, parce que pour le héros tragique shakespearien on ne peut pas posséder l'autre en terme de *savoir*. L'autre n'est pas quelque chose qu'on peut attester et cela révèle un échec indépassable pour la compréhension. L'intersection de destins propre à l'éthique tragique interdit de refuser chez les autres la capacité d'être "autrement", de se mettre en variation. Au début, Othello a peur de consommer son mariage parce que Desdemona est pure (elle est d'un blanc immaculé alors qu'il est noir et sale de tant de batailles); après la délation de Iago, il a peur de se mêler avec quelque chose qui a en soi la trace d'une corruption et il voudrait retrouver une Desdemona originaire. Dans les deux cas son aptitude reste la même: transfor-

mer sa femme dans une figure d'albâtre, dans le monument de la pureté perdue (*Othello*, V, II). En tant que homme de loi, il tuera Desdemona, de façon qu'aucun ne pourra être trahi ni corrompu par cette femme. Mais le héros shakespearien ne peut pas sauver sa conscience avec la loi et en effet il interroge la signification au-delà de la réglementation qui permet d'organiser l'indéterminé. Othello a besoin de croire en Desdemona et cette nécessité est déjà l'attestation de sa perte de confiance en elle. Le héros n'a pas peur des décisions qui le transcendent, mais plutôt de l'indétermination à portée de la main. Croire est déjà s'exposer à une vulnérabilité : en effet, une visée qui ne peut pas attester son objet est une perspective qui n'a pas une garantie d'être soutenable à l'infini, ou mieux jusqu'au bout. Le héros est indéterminé comme l'autre sujet qu'il voudrait attester; cependant il devient une figure de la concentration, une "prison d'interprétations". Pour le héros shakespearien l'ontologie négative de l'autre n'est pas un *a priori*, mais quelque chose qu'on obtient *a posteriori*, c'est-à-dire après la saturation intime et interminable de toutes les possibilités de duperie, de trahison, de déhiscence identitaire. La compréhension tragique est un voyage au bout de la nuit des incompréhensions. Or, la restriction de l'espace théâtral (le héros shakespearien réduit la scène à son corps) est paradoxale parce qu'elle reproduit un dualisme: au dedans de soi-même Othello retrouve la présence d'une autre scène intérieure, à savoir l'observation de deuxième ordre qui est au profit de l'autre. Pendant que le héros tragique essaie de se sauvegarder par rapport à l'indétermination de l'autre (une sorte de sacrifice anticipé en fonction de l'émancipation des ses propres valences), il est vulnérable au regard de ce dernier: il risque, dans cette tentative de "concentration", de finir par paraître ridicule, de jouer une parodie de lui-même. Pour rendre l'autre commensurable il faut perdre la mesure, devenir démesuré, une figure instable et exacerbée. C'est un autre paradoxe théâtral: la tension maximale à la compréhension de l'autre va coïncider avec l'assomption de l'apparence moins compréhensible, moins intersubjective. Othello, avant le congé de la vie en présence de Lodovico, Montano et Cassio, veut se consigner à l'histoire; il invoque une narration de sa propre vie, une inscription mémorable qui ne puisse pas le ridiculiser, fût-elle impitoyable.

Dans *Macbeth*, l'érosion des horizons de la signification procède de la confiance dans l'autre vers la croyance dans le transcendant. Macbeth doit comprendre un destin assigné (prophétisé) et pour l'assimiler il doit

dépasser tout principe éthique. De plus, il écoute seulement la partie de la prophétie qui le concerne directement (il sera roi), et il neutralise la pleine assomption cognitive de l'autre partie (les fils de Banquo inaugureront une longue lignée de rois). Donc, Macbeth manque de construire au début une intersection entre son destin et le destin de la lignée de Banquo; il laisse tomber toute confiance dans l'autre (sinon par rapport à sa femme), mais en même temps il réduit le rapport avec les sorcières et les esprits à une relation proximale, dialogique et déterminable. Il sera puni par la duplicité du langage, à savoir sa polysémie. Macbeth veut espérer dans une compréhension immédiate, sans médiation, si non dans une compréhension soutenue par un langage parfait: "langage des esprits". Or, paradoxalement, plus le circuit de médiation est court, plus le malentendu est probable; c'est la médiation qui réduit et règle les facteurs d'indétermination.

Macbeth et sa femme n'acceptent plus les lois du temps. La prophétie doit être *the future here and now*; une fois la prophétie réalisée Macbeth et sa femme projettent d'éterniser le royaume, sans lignée. Les corps royaux doivent se présenter sans plus aucun orifice (*Macbeth*, I, v); ils doivent rejoindre un stade d'auto-conclusion figurative, dans le refus de toute interpénétration avec le corps d'autrui. Donner ou recevoir compréhension n'est plus nécessaire; mais cette autonomisation radicale de la signification identitaire soustrait Macbeth et sa femme à tout principe de réalité: le premier ne parle désormais qu'avec les esprits et la deuxième passe les nuits dans un état somnambulique. Les esprits font des jeux de mots et le sommeil oblige Lady Macbeth à raconter les délits en anéantissant sa volonté. En habitant le transcendant, Macbeth et sa femme retrouvent une projection des tromperies mondaines. En réduisant le terrain des valeurs opérantes et opérables au corps royal (c'est à dire à son propre corps), Macbeth demande finalement au docteur qui soignait sa femme désormais morte, une purge pour tout son royaume (*Macbeth*, V, III).

Le vaillant Macbeth n'a plus de gloire à conquérir dans les batailles et il doit seulement garder un royaume qu'il voudrait réductible à une inscription éternelle. A la fin, la révélation qui s'annonce à Macbeth est que la vie est tout simplement théâtre: "Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player / That struts and frets his hour upon the stage / And then is heard no more. It is a tale / Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, / Signifying nothing" (*Macbeth*, V, v).

Le pli metathéâtral du *Macbeth* relève du vertige provoqué par chaque acte scénique au moment où on assume une observation de deuxième degré; l'acte scénique devient tragique en soi-même, il anticipe l'impossibilité de toute compréhension. Un pauvre acteur va continuer la représentation mais celle-ci n'a pas un futur significatif; elle reste intransitive, sans réponse. De même pour un narrateur idiot qui raconte des scènes, mais son conte reste inarticulé, absurde: une prolifération de l'expression ("sound and fury") et une dissolution du contenu ("signyfing nothing"). Voilà le double vertige théâtral: le tragique récité en première personne ne peut pas se sauver de l'anéantissement du sens à travers le témoignage, le conte qui déroule à nouveau le passé. Comme la tragédie de Macbeth, la tragédie d'Othello est double: "tragédie" dans l'aboutissement interminable d'un projet de vie, mais "tragédie" aussi de la mémoire, à savoir risque du ridicule par rapport à l'aspiration au *mémorable*.

Othello et Macbeth sont des victimes d'une théâtralisation tragique de leur vie; à l'inverse, peut-on utiliser le théâtre comme une arme? C'est le projet de Hamlet, même si le théâtre se révélera une arme à double tranchant. *To be or non to be* c'est exactement un problème paradoxal d'existence par rapport à la compréhension. Hamlet ne peut pas tolérer le mariage hâtif entre sa mère et son oncle (le nouveau Prince du Danemark); plutôt que démontrer qu'il comprend la situation, il préfère simuler la folie. La folie rend impertinente chaque tentative dialogique et reste un échec pour la socialisation. Plus tard, une compagnie théâtrale arrive à la cour du roi (à Elsinore), et Hamlet fait montre d'une culture théâtrale formidable (il se met dans la position d'un pauvre acteur qui délire presque en repentant des pièces théâtrales connues); de plus, il commence à réécrire une pièce (*The Murder of Gonzaga*) comme un narrateur idiot qui cherche à témoigner les vraies raisons de la mort de son père. Hamlet veut faire comprendre à son oncle le délit que ce dernier a commis. "Faire comprendre" c'est littérairement reconstruire une scène de manière qu'elle puisse être finalement assumée. Le théâtre d'ombres qu'il veut mettre en scène n'est que le terrain fictif où il peut installer un dispositif des miroirs qui devrait consigner sa famille (mère et oncle) à ses fautes réelles. Mais pour parvenir à ce résultat il faut absorber un gradient de fausseté, de fiction. "Etre ou ne pas être" n'est pas une réflexion sur la vie et la mort, mais sur l'anéantissement tragique devant la compréhension, c'est-à-dire la nécessité de construire un dispositif de fiction pour affirmer non pas soi-même, mais la possibilité

d'être un miroir pour l'autre. Si Hamlet se limite à *être*, il abandonne toute possibilité de partager une intersection destinale avec l'autre: il peut simplement attester une incommensurabilité des valorisations entre soi et sa famille. Par contre, si Hamlet devient faux (sa folie feinte, sa représentation théâtrale), il choisit de *ne pas être*; en s'abandonnant soi-même, il devient homme de théâtre qui construit sur le plan de l'énoncé la reproduction de l'assassin de son père et sur le plan de l'énonciation le vertige d'un spectateur électif (son oncle) qui perçoit à la fois la protection de la convention théâtrale et la possibilité que la représentation peut afficher un déictique accusateur envers lui.

Dans le même temps la compréhension reste un problème d'efficacité symbolique, une chose qui fait dépasser des "effets de sens" aux "effets de vie", aux *vécus de signification*. La représentation théâtrale, derrière la partition à exécuter en suivant la prescription prévue, affiche un milieu, un dispositif de capture, où l'autre parvient à une définition identitaire. Donc, la fiction, le jeu linguistique théâtral dévient un champ d'indétermination qui dispose l'émergence des figures identitaires par rapport auxquelles les deux partenaires réagissent asymétriquement, mais corrélativement: "The play's the thing / Wherein I'll catch the conscience of the King".

La compréhension du texte théâtral n'est pas réductible à sa sémantisation ou à son interprétation selon une observation de deuxième ordre; elle est une question de transformation des instances subjectives impliquées dans le régime communicatif réglé par le médium théâtre. Donc, la compréhension concerne la relation entre la forme de vie et la sémiosphère de la représentation théâtrale, une écologie de la valorisation identitaire qui va se rapporter à un champ d'indétermination, c'est à dire à un terrain qui rend vulnérable le caractère systémique du texte et du dispositif. Comprendre est la problématisation maximale du savoir, de l'information; donner aux valeurs apprises un statut positif seulement après l'anticipation de leur destin, c'est-à-dire actualiser l'indétermination de leur valence dans le temps. La compréhension mutuelle est en soi un mirage, mais dans le même temps elle ne peut pas être réduite simplement à l'attestation d'une action coordonnée. La compréhension mutuelle est reconnaissance à la fois d'un milieu commun caractérisé par des facteurs d'indétermination (*sémiosphère*) et par un milieu privé (le champ psychique): le travail de la sémiotisation construit un pont, à savoir une homogénéisation entre milieu

social et milieu psychique, une homogénéisation qui permet la synthèse disjonctive des identités où chacun joue le rôle de miroir pour l'autre.

L'incompréhension et le malentendu ne peuvent pas être réduits à une perturbation du canal de la communication ou à un décodage fallacieux de l'information. L'incompréhension est toujours méta-théâtre, dispositif qui va attester une gestion de l'indétermination de la signification identitaire insuffisamment partagée par les interlocuteurs. L'incompréhension devient une arme pour précariser la confiance *de et dans* l'autre au profit d'une relance des enjeux intersubjectifs, ou envers un croyance, ou envers un système de capture encore plus semblable à l'effet-miroir.

Le medium théâtral est exactement ce qui démontre la complexité du procès de compréhension, qui est bien loin du mouvement logique de porter quelque chose sous un concept, de subsumer une instance perçue dans une classe. Comprendre n'est pas faire du décodage, ni simple énonciation. La compréhension est la gestion du sens qui auto-observe les médiations utilisées et la sémiosphère qui reste indéterminée par rapport aux valeurs saisies. Pour cette raison la compréhension est la maîtrise d'un rapport entre deux extrêmes : fiction et croyance, initiative endogène de modélisation et attribution de fondement de valences à un horizon distale et imperceptible directement. Cela ne démontre que la nécessité persistante de nouvelles médiations.

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Misunderstanding technology: Communication and pedagogy in the L2 classroom

“It is the supreme art of the teacher to awaken joy
in creative expression and knowledge.”
– Albert Einstein

There has been an increasingly growing interest in researching the most effective system for learners to take charge of their own learning (Wenden and Rubin 1987). Bransford, Brown and Cocking (1999) have recently called this relatively new phenomenon of technology “constructivist learning” in which students are responsible for their learning process. Technology-enhanced curriculum is designed to this end, and therefore plays a crucial role within the instruction of a second language in a way that content, the tasks of the teacher (see Volman 2005) and teaching materials are undergoing a change in teaching methodologies. Against this background, the present article examines the impact of technology on student learning by conducting a survey, whose outcome aims at the improvement of both computer-generated feedback and affective activities. We discuss critically how educational software modifies instruction by facilitating acquisition of knowledge primarily through the learner’s activity, rather than through passively receiving information. The paper concludes with several pedagogical implications of the strengths and weaknesses of computer technology education on the role of the teacher.

1. The Spanish Basic-Language Program

Technology-enhanced instruction through a new digital environment is being implemented in the Spanish Basic Language Program of the Penn-

sylvania State University that numbers among the largest non-English language curricula, serving more than 5,000 students per year. In the Spanish Program, which started in Fall 2004 and comprises 3 different levels (Spanish 1, 2 and 3), class meetings have been reduced from four to two days of class per week due to the implementation of technology. From that date, students have been assigned to work with technology outside the classroom through a combination of a learning phase and a number of assignments on listening, reading and writing. In other words, after receiving input in the learning stage every week (e.g. at home, at computer labs), students complete several sets of homework designed so that the learners do something with the input (Lee and VanPatten 1995). In overall terms, the homework for the following week is due the week before the instructor carries out diverse communicative activities in class. Ideally every student will have exercised the grammar and vocabulary ahead of time.

2. Description of digital learning environments

Among educators, technology-based resources serve as a scaffold to provide comprehensible input which has been shown to be needed in order for second-language learning to take place (Krashen 1989). Along this line, ANGEL (a New Global Environment for Learning) developed by Penn State's Course Management System (CMS), is software that enables faculty to enhance their courses by a syllabus and lesson space, teams, discussion, quizzing, surveys, assignment drop boxes and grading, along with unique faculty tools (e.g., WhoDuntIt) that let the instructor track the students' work as well as modify their learning processes.

3. Strengths and weaknesses of digital learning environments

ANGEL facilitates learning primarily through interaction, rather than through a passive attitude in receiving information. The most salient advantage of technology resources is the non-judgmental nature of the computer, which represents an ideal tool for self-paced practice in grammar and vocabulary, as well as for helping second-language learners feel secure enough to make and, possibly, correct their own errors without anxiety. In addition to this, researchers have found that the use of media can

motivate students to learn (García-Barbosa & Mascazine 2002). In order to further highlight the strengths and weaknesses of digital educational tools, forty learners of two different sections of Spanish 1 participated in a survey that was conducted in Spring 2005. From the student's point of view, here are the most important strengths that they emphasized about the implementation of technology in the Spanish curriculum:

- Learning at your own pace.
- Teach yourself without just reading the textbook.
- You can continue to learn and progress outside the classroom.
- You do not have to worry about losing your homework because it is online.
- More resources and ways to learn.

By contrast, students stated the following with regard to the weaknesses:

- Unclear directions in the write-in sections. Fill-in-the-blanks were difficult due to the many possible answers. More attempts to submit answers in the fill-in-the-blank section.
- No interaction. Students cannot speak the language.
- Correct answers are not posted. Answers would be nice so that I could understand what I actually did wrong.
- No room for technological problems. No good sound files.
- Working alone. By having classes on line, students lose the student-teacher relationship that can be imperative to learning. It also takes out some of the fun. It leads to lack of motivation.
- Putting courses on-line is a way for the universities to make more money with less effort. I think it is absolutely wrong.
- Not being able to ask somebody a question about the on-line homework as you are doing it.

Regarding skills, students were asked on the questionnaire to what language skill does this learning environment contribute to developing the most. As a result, reading outperformed the rest of the skills, speaking being the least accomplished practice. The results are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.

In terms of digital learning effectiveness, students were asked if they received any type of help when doing their on-line homework (e.g., from a Spanish friend). More than 50% of the students were helped more than once. All of them agreed that the assistance of a native speaker was somehow helpful, but also stated the learning process did not occur, since students were more worried about getting the answers right.




Figure 1. The most effective skill in this particular digital learning environment.




Figure 2. Help received while doing on-line homework.

In light of these survey results, let us explore the two main weaknesses spotted in the survey: the use of feedback and the implementation of affective activities.

4. Computer-generated feedback

It is widely accepted that one of the goals of second-language instruction is to assist learners in achieving grammatical accuracy. From the various types of feedback on error, the most useful for research can be divided into four categories:

- Utterance Rejection: *Wrong. Move on to the next sentence.*
- Explicit correction: *Wrong. La chica es alta. Move on to the next sentence.*
- Recast: *La chica es alta. Move on to the next sentence.*
- Enhanced recast: *La chica es altA. Move on to the next sentence.*

The particular digital setting of the present article does not provide the learner with the correct answer after every question, just utterance response (“Right” or “Wrong”) for each item after the entire quiz has been submitted. To return to the survey: students wished to have some type of explicit on-line feedback. Research shows that the benefits of corrective feedback are being investigated in the classroom (Mackey, Gass & McDonough 2000) and in experimental studies (Mackey & Philip 1998). The findings of these experiments suggest that the type of teacher-generated feedback is based on the nature of learner error, and that the feedback type chosen by teachers does not necessarily result in successful learning. Other studies have confirmed that feedback generates little benefit (DeKeyser 1993).

More exhaustive research indicates that *utterance rejection* outranks *no feedback* in several studies (Nagata & Swisher 1995; Rosa & Leow 2004). Although utterance rejection seems to be beneficial, more research is still needed to find out if recasting is significantly more effective than utterance rejection. If so, then computer-administered feedback may facilitate the noticing of target forms and may promote language progress. Although still debated, technology could help students by providing some type of feedback before moving on to the next question.

5. *Affective activities*

Koper (2000) argues that it is possible to adapt content, format of class presentation and teaching method to the characteristics of students of a particular discipline. Following this line of research, technology outside the classroom seems to be beneficial when the instructor can customize materials and adapt them to the learner’s interests through innovative ways to achieve effective learning (e.g., by means of affective activities such as message boards within electronic environments). Since the implementation of technology in Fall 2004 in the mentioned state university, the greatest challenge has been to convert traditional, teacher-centered instruction into a more interactive learning experience. To exemplify this better, here are the guidelines of a particular assignment:

Week 6: February, 14 – 18. Homework 1.3. due on Wednesday. Writing 4 due on day 2 of class: Using the question words that you learned in the previous section, choose another student or your instructor from class and ask them 5 questions about themselves (25 words).

The objective of this writing was to master question words (interrogatives). After gathering a number of compositions as hard copies, the instructor realised that learners from the same section already knew well enough about each other so there was no real need in communication, therefore, no sign of challenge on this writing.

With the goal of interactive learning experience in mind, a message board was set up as a follow-up exercise to review question words by means of blending the rosters of the two different sections in order to provoke meaningful student-to-student communication. By means of a customized message board and a blended group, the instructor could provide an ideal atmosphere with the objective of engaging learners in more communicative activity. Students of one section were paired and assigned to ask questions to students of the other section, and vice versa, following the directions of the mentioned assignment. In this way, communicative interactions promote learners' intellectual thinking processes to reflect on and articulate ideas (Oliver and McLoughlin 1997). As a result, more meaningful student-to-student communication was created since students felt more motivated about inquiring other learners in the same level of Spanish that they did not know personally. Questions were more creative (e.g., What is your e-mail address? telephone number, favourite colour, etc.; a few even dared to meet each other eventually).

Although the assignment was over after those five questions, it was noted that learners showed motivation by posting new threads on the message board sessions, which remained open until the end of the semester. There was a clear need for communication implied in the assignment, which may have led students to start gaining self-confidence about communicating in the L2 (with the limitation in this specific task of using just the skills of writing and reading). These message boards can also be used for posting questions and doubts that learners can exchange with each other. Therefore, the students discover that technology may help them implement learning beyond classroom interaction. Taking into account the number of benefits, yet insufficiently explored, for second language learners in a technology-enriched curriculum, the task of training teachers, too, should not be disregarded.

6. *The new role of the teacher*

Computers are transforming our existence in ways we hardly have time to contemplate. According to Volman (2005), the teacher does not function exclusively as an instructor but, *inter alia*, as a trainer, consultant, and assessor. The instructor is not only the conveyor of meaning but also facilitates the learning process, systematizes heterogeneous forms of learning, and becomes a “didactic and instructional tailor” of lessons and projects, as in the example of the message board to review question words. Teachers can monitor and coach students in many unique ways, from small groups to one-on-one and by e-mail to threaded discussion boards. The following quote encompasses what has been previously stated:

The role of teachers, however, will become more complex rather than simpler. Teacher must know what programs are available that are suitable for their students’ individual needs and keep abreast of this. They are the “arrangers” of students’ learning processes: they bring together the educational tools and set them up in a particular way. In addition, they fulfill the role of the instructor, trainer, coach, advisor, consultant and assessor. (Volman 2005: 22).

This quotation implies a multi-faceted role for teachers. However, instructors do not have to be good at all of these tasks. Furthermore, they can be specialized in a particular type of duty. Some of the answers reported on the survey respond to several types of roles. The statements of “not being able to ask somebody a question about the online homework as you are doing it”, and “you do not have to worry about losing you homework because it is online” would fit into the task of consultant and administrator, respectively. From the point of view of the consultant, the teacher will still provide support to individual and collective learning processes. With the gradual shift of teacher competencies, some roles seem to outrank others. The task of assessing the learning process on the part of the teacher is becoming irrelevant, since assessment is predominantly done electronically. Hence, digital learning environments are well suited to monitor the progress and development of every student.

7. *Conclusions and pedagogical implications*

The relationship between SLA theories and classroom pedagogical practice has been a controversial issue in pedagogy as well as the amount of technology used in and outside the classroom. What seems clear is that technology is building an increasing activity and a greater responsibility on the part of the learners. Therefore, technology as a component of university classrooms is shifting the instructor role. Not only a conveyor of information, the teacher is turning into a “manager” of learning processes. We may be on the right track if not only teachers but also administrators learn how to teach and design technology appropriate to the pedagogical context. Technology should be intended to assist teachers in creating a supportive affective environment both in and outside the classroom. The next step may be to continue doing research on the specialization of tasks of the teacher, based on a ranking of numerous roles.

If technology is not used in context, it turns into a drill. This is why it is necessary to create engaging and customized activities, such as message boards that promote an interactive learning environment. The good news is that content has reappeared, by new technology generating multiple unexplored possibilities in which faculty need to be trained. The less good news is that it takes laborious adaptation, skillful design, and teamwork between teachers and students. To this agenda, we must add the need for intensive research on feedback. Investigation in this area is still in its infancy. Nevertheless, if a university seeks mastery both in educational technology and fruitful instruction, their teachers should make use of imagination in technology and critical thinking as their primary resources.

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Cristina Bayón García

Understanding and misunderstanding of genetically modified organisms (GMOs)

A semiotic analysis of biotechnology images

1. Introduction

Due to the complexity of making scientific discoveries comprehensible to the general public, popularization of science calls for images and visual signs, which serve as a tool to facilitate the understanding of informative messages about technological advances (Moreno Castro et al. 1996: 27). Since “media imagery can play a symbolic role in how the public views new technological advances” (Crawley 2007: 341), the present paper investigates six images that depict Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) employed by biotechnology companies, governments, NGOs and newspapers (see Appendix). In order to carry out the study, semiotics provides a methodological framework for a qualitative analysis so as to interpret how the visual signifier is encoded and how the signified can be construed by two potentially amalgamated sign systems (Peirce’s trichotomy of signs and the Greimassian square), if account is taken of the “context of communication” (Cook 2001: 3–4) in which the message is transmitted.

2. Description of biotechnology images

It is said that a “picture is worth a thousand words”, and clearly the selected biotechnology images capture a wide range of meanings. The first two images were downloaded from Monsanto 2004 pledge report (see appendix image 1 and Syngenta’s webpage, appendix image 2). It is worth noting

that there has been a change in these companies' webpage design, such that seem less picture-oriented than before. Concerning these first two visual signs, it is also worth noting that a human being is the central focus of the image.

In the first image, Monsanto seems to create a picture of the process of growing maize as being a wholesome family affair, with the father embracing his daughter in the foreground. They appear to be prosperous and content, and the farmer trusts the corn enough to give it to his own child. This ad probably targets farmers, as an effort to persuade them that growing GM corn is a good idea. This is supported by the slogan in which there a pun is intended on "growing": as it refers to our options increasing, referring both to the growing child and the growing corn. Hence this is a man who wants to feed his daughter, and feed her well. For a consumer, it would create a comforting image that the company is supportive of young families. These are healthy and vibrant people, pictured along with the green and thriving plants. What is more, it presents a positive picture of GM foods, making them seem like a natural "option" for receivers, rather than forcing the decision on them.

This positive aspect focuses on the depiction of the girl, a device that recurs frequently, at least since Charles Dickens' novel, *Hard Times*. One of Dickens' greatest achievements is narration through the eyes of a child so as to make the audience sensitive to social injustices (*Oliver Twist*); after all, children commonly represent to many the future of a nation. This is possibly what the blonde girl in this image is intended to signify: the potential of a new generation. In broad terms, it may also be identified as an image of capitalist economy and western culture.

In the second image, a mature farmer, thoughtfully examines grains, with a large field of wheat in the background. He is not a trendy newcomer, but rather has probably been farming for generations on his land, all this suggesting the traditional family aspect of farming. This serves as contrast to the highlighted word "innovation", perhaps as a form of reassurance – innovation need not necessarily mean the abandonment of traditional values. The scene seems to be somewhere in America, to judge by his dungarees and the flat land stretching into the distance. It is interesting to note that there is more focus on the cereal than in the first picture, although it the image is a bit blurred. It seems as if the details do not matter, only the big picture – making a profit for corporations – because this would prob-

ably feed more than one family. Apparently, this looks like it is targeting investors from big business who want to exploit the crops for maximum profits. In fact, this is the image of Syngenta's homepage and, therefore, one of its corporate emblems. Conceived of in this way, Robbins argues that "corporate images represent a type of visual capture of consumers, markets and global space" (2004: 5) in which marketing is brought into action. In the form of an ad, this multi-modal image encompasses visual signs and flashing on-line text, multimodality being one of the prototypical features in advertising discourse (Cook 2001: 219).

By contrast, the third image is one of a stick of GM maize designed to appear like a hand grenade, against a dark background to make it as stark as possible. This damaged cob of sweet corn is pinned with a man-made implement – mind you do not crack your teeth on it! It is certainly an extreme point from Greenpeace to the general consumer, which sends the message that GM food can only be harmful. There is not even the slightest hint that GM could be beneficial for people or the environment. In effect, the picture evokes images of a harmless and mundane object made to appear dangerous, or at least potentially so, via the grenade imagery. The caption backs this up in emphasising the danger of this "experiment". As a consumer, the word "dangerous" grabs the eye in the remark underneath – which does not appear in on the website view, but in the print one only. As a result, the addressee may feel manipulated by the biotech industry.

Along this line, the next image, issued by ecologists, appears to be another ad-buster, with the Kraft logo distorted to carry an anti-GM message. There is a play in the ad of the famous food manufacturer, where the logo is mutated or altered as well as are GM foods. The "Not in My Kitchen" slogan personalises the protest against GM foods. This may be just a statement of opinion – that Friends of the Earth (FoE) would not want GM in their houses – but it seems a more neutral picture than the previous image.

In the fifth image, from *The Washington Post*, a Latin American farmer is cautiously examining some crops from which he probably makes his living. However, the meaning or interpretant of this photograph is not clear enough until the text tells us what to see, namely, that there is something wrong with the crop, which looks sickly and is unpleasant to eat. On second glance, the farmer in the photo seems to be unhappy about the look of his crop. From the point of view of a farmer or consumer, the

subtext would make the reader concerned about the health implications of GM crops, both in terms of yield and consumption. The text would play on this fear.

Similarly, the last photograph does not clearly portray benefit or harm; in it a female scientist in a white lab coat and gloves is taking samples from a castor bean pod at the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). It looks like a working snapshot in which the plant is tagged, suggestive of a controlled experiment. It is unclear whether the photograph illustrates an experiment of what the scientists are trying to create, something they are trying to avoid, or if they are monitoring the possible contamination of another plant. The caption does not help, since the word “testing” might demonstrate that the science behind GM technology is both complex and, possibly, inconclusive.


What may be striking is the fact that photographs issued by governments are few in number. The DEFRA (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) has pictures of scientists, but none about GM food. Most of the information uploaded on its website abides by rules and regulations. As a drawback, we may point out that, unless they are customers or involved in the debate, many readers will never bother to wade through a biotech company webpage nor an activist one.

3. *Peircean semiotics*

Through the descriptions of those images, it is possible to make a connection between the sign and the object, which does not have to reflect all the object’s properties. Rather the link evokes different degrees (Peircean sign trichotomy of icon, index and symbol) of one or several characteristics of the object, as indicated in diagram 1.

Taking into account that a sign may be viewed as iconic, indexical, and arbitrary at the same time (Cook 2001: 75), I classified the images into one of these categories by virtue one feature being more salient with respect to the others. Of course, any type of classification is subjective, and the one provided below may differ from interpretations made by other readers.

To begin, the greatest degree of representation is expressed in the symbol. Based on the previous description, it may be argued that images 1 and 3 may have a more developed interpretant, a more open relation between the sign and the object, thus reaching the stage of a symbol. The

*Diagram 1.*

blonde girl seems to represent the future, and possibly the American dream and freedom of choice, whereas the maize is likely to stand for a metaphor of war or battle. A fairly loose relation between the sign and its object may be seen in image 2, which appears to point out the innovative “field” of GM crops, and in image 4, which hints at the “creation” of a mutant type of food – Frankenfoods. Finally, the tightest degree of denoting the object is expressed through photos 5 and 6 – those appearing in the newspaper and on the USDA webpage – which are the most iconic, that is, the most faithful imitations of the object. Although these last two photographs are intended to be referential, they nevertheless an undertext to get their meanings across.

4. Greimassian semiotics

Having supplied a narrative description of images using Peircean concepts, it would be interesting to move on to a cognitive position in which “images or metaphors not only constitute means of expressing ideas, but also function as sociocognitive devices that help to organise the understanding of a phenomenon” (Bauer & Gaskell, 2002: 266). Since the well-known Dr. Pustzai wrote up the term “harmful” in a reply to the Royal Society in 1999, public debate has swirled around the harmful-beneficial nature of GM food.

We have seen that biotech companies, responding to this hotly debated issue, have circulated photographs of happy people surrounded by text pro-

claiming the virtues of genetic engineering techniques. Dissenting voices attempt to neutralise this effect by claiming that “biotechnology and its applications” are “a harmful intervention in natural processes” (Bauer & Gaskell 2002: 254). Although it has not been proved that GM food is harmful, it is so in the eyes of those who believe that GMOs are interfering or tampering with nature, and thus wish to demythologise the potential power of GM propaganda.

I have studied this opposition in a comparison of the Monsanto pledge report 2004 with several reports by Greenpeace and FoE (cf. Bayón García 2007: 19–20). The issue is turned into a linguistic phenomenon – semantic prosody – in which verbs like “increase”, employed by biotech companies, are usually collocated with noun phrases impregnated with positive meaning (e.g., crop values); conversely, the tendency by ecologist organisations is to select a negative ones (e.g., “dangers”). Apart from this predictable stand-off, a larger corpus-based study may shed more on the use of semantic prosody as a tool in this battle of ideas and dollars.

In cognitive terms, this antagonism may be mapped onto the (Greimasian) semiotic square by the S_1 and S_2 primary positions, as illustrated in diagram 2.

Not only does this elementary structure of signification map out the rudimentary binary opposition S_1 - S_2 , but also alternative conceptual combinations such as S_1 /non- S_1 and S_2 /non- S_2 , which state contradiction. The semantic relation and logical conjunctions between these four notions – which are rooted in comparative mythology (Greimas 1987: 3–16) – denote the different actants of the biotech world through an opposing relation and a complementary one.

Placed within an oppositional relation would be governments (non- S_1 /non- S_2) and newspapers (S_1 - S_2). The USDA picture, with its relatively neutral and denotative image, does not illustrate to what extent this technology may be beneficial or harmful. In the same vein, and a little more strengthening, newspapers tend to include both positions, one of them predominant from time to time. A combination of both stances is displayed in the image from *The Guardian*, though overall this newspaper is likely to take an anti-GM position, whereas *The Times* is prone to adopt a more pro-GM one (Cook 2004: 47). As for a complementary relation, the information is conveyed by S_1 /non- S_2 (biotech companies) and S_2 /non- S_1 (NGOs), as shown in images 1–4.




Diagram 2.

The gestalt properties of the square can join Peircean insights with Greimassian ones. One may say that, the more the image is fulfilled by the most developed meanings on the Peircean scale (images 1–4), the more entails a complementary relation ($S_1/\text{non-}S_2$ and $S_2/\text{non-}S_1$). In contrast, the more iconic the picture (images 5 and 6), the more likely it is to trigger an oppositional connexion ($S_1\text{-}S_2$ and $\text{non-}S_1/\text{non-}S_2$).

5. Conclusion

The interpretation of these images reminds us that, although science as a discipline is neutral, the images which illustrate science may not be. As shown in the structural relations pictured in the semiotic square, the structure of biotechnology can be paired into four positions that interfere with each other; for example, beneficial (S₁), harmful (S₂), non-beneficial (non-S₁) and non-harmful (non-S₂).

The complementary relations of GMOs are structured into concepts loaded with positive (S₁/non-S₂) information, as in images 1 and 2, and negative information (S₂/non-S₁), as in images 3 and 4. When the information from a complementary relation reaches the highest expression of the sign, the interpretation of the object is subjective, connotative and advertisement-like. In turn, an opposite relation (S₁-S₂ and non-S₁/non-S₂) is conformable to the objects themselves; here the signified remains at the initial, developmental stage of the sign, and features objective, informative and referential images (5 and 6).

The semiotic analysis presented on this paper help explain why companies and NGOs picture the signified with a more focused lens, making images more salient than those employed by newspapers or governments. Others may appear to be torn between two lands: GM and non-GM.

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Appendices

- Image 1: <<http://www.monsanto.com/monsanto/layout/media/monsantopubs.asp>>
- Image 2: <<http://www.syngenta.com/en/index.aspx>>
- Image 3: <<http://www.greenpeace.org/international/photosvideos/photos/gm-maize-a-dangerous-experime>>
- Image 4: <http://sydney.foe.org.au/gene_ethics/media.htm>
- Image 5: <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/politics/specials/biotechfood/>>
- Image 6: <<http://www.ars.usda.gov/is/graphics/photos/jan01/k9197-1.htm>>



1. *Biotechnology Company, Monsanto, pictures genetically modified corn.*



2. *Home page corporate image of Biotechnology Company, Syngenta.*



3. GM maize: a dangerous experiment. Greenpeace's perspective on genetically modified maize.



4. Friends of the Earth concept of genetically modified food.



5. In Mexico, genetically modified corn may be contaminating indigenous corn species. (Reuters)5. (From Washington Post biotech food newspaper webpage.)



6. Plant physiologist Grace Chen removes castor bean pods to test for genetic transformation. (From USDA webpage [United States Department of Agriculture].)

Mirta Bialogorski

Campo semiótico y campo artesanal: El juego de las transformaciones y los bordes

En la actualidad, un conjunto de enunciados y significados vigentes en el discurso social, identifica una serie de comportamientos, objetos y prácticas como pertenecientes al llamado “campo artesanal”. Esta denominación se utiliza sobre todo, desde la década de 1980 en Latinoamérica, para aludir a un *campo social* (Bourdieu 1988) atravesado por tensiones, conflictos y alianzas de sectores (burocracias estatales, organizaciones no gubernamentales, intermediarios, etc.) en el que “artesano” y “artesanía” designan a un determinado grupo social y su producción, ligados al circuito económico por un lado, y al cultural por otro (García Canclini 1992; Cousillas, 2003). Pero ¿desde cuándo existen los términos “artesano” y “artesanía”? Sus significados ¿han sido siempre los mismos a lo largo de su historia?

Nuestra finalidad en este trabajo, es aproximarnos a los enunciados que otorgaron existencia a estas entidades, en tanto fenómenos reconocibles y acotables social e históricamente y a la transformación que han ido experimentado en el tiempo.

Orienta nuestra tarea, la noción de campo semiótico entendido como “conjunto determinado de fenómenos contextualmente situados en un momento determinado de una sociedad determinada, cuya existencia ontológica y perceptibilidad proviene del conjunto de enunciados y significaciones vigentes en esa concreta sociedad”.

Consideramos asimismo la noción de *bordes* conforme a esta misma propuesta según la cual, “los bordes de un campo semiótico (borde,) son los marcados por la necesidad de hacer posibles las operaciones mediante las que se construirían los enunciados y significaciones posibles que darían existencia ontológica y harían perceptibles a otros determinados fenómenos posibles. Esto iría desplazando el campo semiótico y en el continuum

de este desplazamiento, otro borde (borde₂) se iría delineando a partir de los enunciados y significaciones que irían dejando de ser posibles, con la consiguiente expansión entrópica de los fenómenos cuya existencia ontológica dejaría de ser perceptible” (ibid). Es ésta la primera etapa de la investigación que inicié con una búsqueda etimológica de los términos “artesano” y “artesanía” y mediante la consulta de textos historiográficos y fuentes históricas que hicieran alusión a los mismos.

“Artesano” y “artesanía” aparecen en el universo terminológico en distintos momentos históricos tanto en el ámbito europeo como latinoamericano pero no lo hacen de manera simultánea. Podemos adelantar que “artesanía” es posterior a “artesano” y que “artesano” está documentado de manera diferencial según se trate de la lengua castellana, francesa, italiana o inglesa acorde a las circunstancias de cada contexto.

En los diccionarios etimológicos de habla latina, el término “artesano”, es registrado recién a partir del siglo XIV (en italiano) o aún del siglo XV (en castellano). En lengua francesa, la referencia es aún más tardía ya que se la remite al siglo XVI.

Por su parte, la palabra “artesanía”, según los datos que pude hallar, está mencionada en los tres casos recién en el siglo XX. No ocurre lo mismo en lengua inglesa en donde esta situación tiene sus variantes a partir de que el término correspondiente es “craft”. Cuando nos remitimos a documentos tales como los “Libros de Oficios” y las Ordenanzas que regulaban la estructura interna y el funcionamiento de los gremios en época feudal (entre los siglos XIV y XVI en particular), observamos que no aparece utilizada ni la palabra “artesano” ni “artesanía”. Se hace mención en cambio, a oficios concretos: sombrereros, boneteros, sastres, jubeteros, tejedores de lienzo y mantas, herradores y herreros, doradores, cerrajeros, carpinteros, cesteros, plateros, orífices, cordoneros, etc. En cuanto a quienes desarrollan su actividad en los talleres se los nombra como “maestros”, “aprendices” y “oficiales”.

Pero vayamos más atrás en el tiempo, entre los siglos XI y XIII. Al no contar con diccionarios (al igual que en el caso anterior), acudimos a una de las fuentes fundamentales de la época como son las Crónicas Anónimas de Sahagún que documentan la historia del surgimiento de las primeras poblaciones urbanas que se crearon a lo largo del camino a Santiago de Compostela a fines del S.XI.

En su acápite 13 vemos que se hace referencia a los grupos sociales y a las actividades de los habitantes: comerciantes por un lado, y por otro, “... burguenses de muchos e diversos oficios, conbiene a saber, herreros, carpinteros, xartres, pelleteros, çapateros, escutarios ...” (Puyol y Alonso 1920: 32)

Tampoco aquí aparecen los términos en cuestión, lo que comprobamos ocurre también en otro documento perteneciente al siglo XIII, las Siete Partidas de Alfonso X, El Sabio. Suponemos por lo tanto que durante la Baja Edad Media, no existe todavía el concepto abstracto y sintetizador de “artesano” tal como se lo utilizará posteriormente. Se trata de múltiples, variados, heterogéneos oficios urbanos que producen lo imprescindible para atender las necesidades de los habitantes de las poblaciones.

Si bien todos esos oficios son “artesanales” en nuestra terminología, no encontramos esta palabra (ni ninguna otra) que abarque a sus ejecutores en una única entidad conceptual. Es posible creemos, que al no haber comenzado a generarse aún otro tipo de actividad u otros cambios en la estructura socio-económica, no fuera necesario un término que acotara e identificara diferencialmente a quienes producían esos bienes.

Al ser ésta una primera aproximación, podría darse el caso de que ambas palabras figuren en documentos todavía no consultados, o bien que, efectivamente se trate de una ausencia y que la misma sea significativa. La duda acerca de su existencia surge sobre todo, cuando consultamos la bibliografía actual que, para referirse a las actividades económicas medievales hablan de “artesanos” y “artesanías”.

Para retomar el ejemplo anterior, leemos en un texto contemporáneo de historia medieval, que las ciudades en la ruta de Santiago de Compostela eran habitadas por burgueses y otros grupos sociales dedicados al “comercio y las ‘artesanías’ citándose las Crónicas Anónimas de Sahagún como fuente de apoyo que incluso se transcribe textualmente” (Pastor de Togneri 1964: 56). Quizás sea interesante reflexionar sobre el uso que se hace de las palabras cuando con ellas se alude desde el presente a fenómenos del pasado. Son términos actuales, ya interpretados con los cuales se estaría asignando un significado que dichos fenómenos no tenían.

Pero entonces, si no encontramos un término que los identifique y que distinga sus actividades y producciones de otras ¿podemos decir que existían “artesanos” y “artesanías” antes del siglo XV? Como ya adelantamos al principio, “artesano” está documentado recién para finales de la Edad Media, más exactamente para 1440, de acuerdo con el Diccionario Crítico

Etimológico Castellano e Hispánico de Joan Corominas y José Pascual (1980). Como derivado de “arte”, el término alude a un “hacer algo bien con las manos”. Y “arte” como el “conjunto de preceptos y reglas para hacer bien alguna cosa”.

Una vez que aparece documentado el término, si seguimos su recorrido histórico para ver qué designa en distintos momentos y contextos, qué incluye y qué excluye, nos encontramos con que en la primera edición del Diccionario de Autoridades de la Real Academia Española, de 1726, se hace referencia a “artesano” como al “oficial mecánico que gana de comer con el trabajo de sus manos” y “el que tiene tienda pública y se emplea en tratos mecánicos”. “Mecánico” a su vez, refiere justamente, a “lo que se ejecuta con las manos” aunque no sólo eso. También se lo asocia a “una acción indecorosa y mezquina propia de la gente baja”. Sólo la palabra “mecánica” comienza muy tangencialmente a remitirse a “máquina” lo que indica que ya ha comenzado a identificarse en la sociedad un nuevo acontecimiento que incorpora al significado otro matiz.

En las versiones de 1770 y 1780, desaparece la alusión a “oficial mecánico” y la expresión “trabajo con las manos”. “Artesano” es ahora, aquel que “ejercita algún “arte mecánico” y se contrapone al que practica un “arte liberal” (...“la que se ejerce con solo el ingenio, sin ministerio de las manos”). También se contrapone “arte mecánico” a “bella arte” que “requiere el ejercicio del entendimiento y cuyo objeto es expresar la belleza” (tal el caso de la pintura, la escultura, la arquitectura, y la música.). O sea que, en este momento, “artesano” enfatiza la habilidad manual en oposición a la habilidad mental y al intelecto con un fin estético.

Durante el siglo XIX en los diccionarios se sigue conservando la idea de “artesano” como aquel que “ejercita algún “arte u oficio meramente mecánico” (RAE, 1803, 1817, 1822; 1869, 1884 y 1899) La diferencia sigue siendo entre el *trabajo manual* y el *intelectual*. No se registra todavía en la definición ninguna vinculación con el fenómeno de la *industrialización*. Es posible que el término “artesano” aún no se hubiese consolidado en el uso con ese sentido.

Recién en la segunda mitad del siglo XX (RAE 1956 y hasta la actualidad) estos cambios se incorporan a dicho término. “Artesano” designa entonces, “al que hace por su cuenta objetos de uso doméstico imprimiéndoles un sello personal, a diferencia del obrero fabril”. El *artesano* aparece entonces identificando a quien por su posicionamiento en la estructura

económica, por su modo de hacer y por el tipo de producción, se distingue del trabajador industrial.

Visto desde el presente, podríamos decir que hasta ese momento, su significado estaba en un borde todavía indefinido. Se encontraba aún en el borde entrópico de lo indiferenciable (Magariños de Morentin 2006). Es de notar que, a diferencia de lo que ocurre en francés y en italiano, en ninguna de las acepciones en castellano, se hace referencia a la palabra “manual” que se define desde 1734 como “lo perteneciente a las manos” y a “la obra que se hace con ellas”. En cambio siempre está presente el término “mecánico” que, recién a partir del siglo XX, se lo asocia explícitamente al uso, manejo o arreglo de máquinas (RAE, 1914, 1927, 1970).

En el momento actual, el término “artesano” no sólo se contrapone al de “obrero industrial” sino también al de “manualista” (aquél que realiza “manualidades”), palabra que no figura en los diccionarios pero aparece recortando un nuevo fenómeno y desplazando el campo semiótico del campo artesanal. Digamos además, que desde mediados del siglo XX, “artesano” designa a un sujeto político y en los últimos años se lo define en discursos patrimonialistas de organizaciones internacionales como la UNESCO, como “patrimonio cultural viviente”.

Ahora bien, ¿qué ocurre con el término “artesanía”? En principio, su recorrido histórico es más reciente que el de “artesano”. Tanto “artesanía” en castellano como “artigianato” en italiano y “artisanat”, en francés, están documentados para el siglo XX.

Esta palabra aparece por primera vez en el Diccionario de la Real Academia Española en la edición de 1947 designando a un *grupo social*, “la clase social constituida por los artesanos”, y a un *tipo de producción*, “el arte u obra de los artesanos”, acepciones que se mantienen hasta la actualidad. La historia del término “artesanía” va a ser distinta según se trate del contexto europeo o latinoamericano, pero además tendrá su desarrollo particular en cada uno de ellos. En el caso de la Argentina esta palabra comienza a utilizarse hacia fines de la década de 1940, en el discurso académico y en el ámbito de la gestión cultural.

A fines de 1949 se realiza un Primer Congreso Nacional de Folklore en el que se dedica una sección importante a trabajos sobre producciones asociadas a los sectores populares de la población, a las que se denominan explícitamente “artesanías”.

Al año siguiente, en 1950 y como resultado de otro encuentro de estudiosos también del Folklore, se establece una definición de la palabra “artesanía” que hace alusión a un “conjunto de oficios o actividades que produce objetos de uso práctico o ceremonial ... adornados o conformados con fines artísticos”. Para especificar aún más el fenómeno, sobre todo en relación a los productores, se incorpora la expresión “artesanía folklórica” con la cual se hace referencia a un conjunto actividades u oficios propios de la cultura tradicional de los sectores populares de las “sociedades civilizadas” que producen objetos de uso práctico o ceremonial con dimensión estética (Boletín del Museo José Hernández 1950)

A los objetos a los que se nombra como “artesanías” se les da el valor de supervivencias del pasado preindustrial, y los sectores a los que se describe como productores son los grupos indígenas y criollos. Hacia fines de la década de 1950, en el ámbito académico y de la gestión, se adopta una nueva definición de “artesanía folklórica” que se propone entonces, para designar actividades, destrezas o técnicas empíricas, practicadas tradicionalmente por el *pueblo*, mediante las cuales, con intención artística se crean objetos destinados a cumplir una función utilitaria. Deben dar cuenta de la labor manual (aunque puede complementarse con herramientas o máquinas), del trabajo individual o en grupos reducidos, por lo común familiares y de un estilo que concuerde con el predominante en la cultura tradicional de la comunidad” (Cortazar 1976: 43). “Pueblo” aquí refiere a comunidades denominadas “folk” caracterizadas por oposición a las sociedades urbanas, como pequeñas, aisladas, autosuficientes y con relaciones cara a cara. “Artesanía” se vincula, pues, a las comunidades folk y se las liga además, a un pasado hispano-criollo.

A diferencia de la definición anterior, se excluye de la expresión “artesanía folklórica”, la producción de los pueblos indígenas y también, las manualidades femeninas, los oficios masculinos y las producciones de grupos inmigrantes y urbanos en general. Si bien se habla ya de “artesanía urbana” se identifica con este término en ese momento, la creación personal de artistas (no de “artesanos”) que viven en la ciudad y cuyas pautas de producción se contraponen a las consideradas propias de la tradición popular.

Desde la década de 1980 la “artesanía” refiere a diversos repertorios de objetos cuya elaboración remite a diferentes técnicas, diseños, grados de funcionalidad y mecanización. Fundamentalmente, se deja de asociar su

producción a un determinado sector social. Técnicas tradicionales utilizadas en materiales novedosos; diseños tradicionales en nuevos formatos, la *artesanía* es nombrada desde entonces, como “tradicional”, “popular”, “indígena”, “urbana” y más recientemente, como “contemporánea”, “neartesanía” o “artesanía indígena urbana”. Hasta se habla de artesanía “post-industrial”. Sin embargo, no puede decirse que se trate de definiciones taxativas, los significados de cada una de estas expresiones se desplazan, emergen nuevos fenómenos y nuevos enunciados.

El universo significativo de la palabra “artesanía” al igual que “artesano” se complejiza cada vez más y son asumidos por múltiples discursos con componentes políticos, socio-económicos, históricos, académicos. Tal pluralidad de usos requiere desde ya un estudio analítico aparte, para el cual la perspectiva de la semiótica de los bordes se presenta como muy productiva.

En este trabajo hemos comenzado a explorar la eficacia que los términos “artesano” y “artesanía” tienen en relación al fenómeno social que están acotando.

Hemos investigado el campo semiótico y semántico de ambos términos y hemos observado algunos de sus cambios en su devenir histórico. Nos preguntamos ahora, siguiendo la propuesta de la mesa, ¿cuáles son sus bordes? Y por lo tanto, ¿hacia qué nuevas reconfiguraciones se dirige el campo artesanal? Una rápida mirada sobre el uso de estos términos hoy día, nos muestra que están vigentes en distintos ámbitos discursivos dando cuenta del desplazamiento de sus significados.

Podemos advertir por ejemplo, que si bien en los discursos patrimonialistas, artesano y artesanía, se asocian a oficio, experiencia, técnica y especificidad cultural, en los discursos de política social tal significado remite meramente, a quien vende lo que produce con sus manos, sean piezas que muestren valores genuinos de diseño o simples reproducciones semiseriadas de formatos estereotipados (Cousillas 2003).

En este caso, vemos un desplazamiento hacia otro campo que es el de las “manualidades” y los “manualistas”. También en la actualidad advertimos un desplazamiento en el significado de “artesano” y “artesanía” hacia la idea de fusión de lo autóctono con lo contemporáneo y de lo industrial con lo manual, e incluso hacia la idea de un nuevo concepto referido al destinatario o consumidor.

Mi experiencia cotidiana como investigadora en un Museo de Arte Popular que convoca a artesanos de todo el país y lleva a cabo un Programa de patrimonialización de las artesanías, muestra que estamos ante un campo en permanente transformación. Un campo en el que la investigación y la gestión trabajan sobre categorías difusas y sobre modalidades interpretativas múltiples y contradictorias. Un desafío que lleva a estar permanentemente atentos a la emergencia de nuevas significaciones, de nuevas expansiones y límites enunciativos y evidentemente, a la evolución misma del lenguaje.

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Bernard H. Bichakjian

The linguistic sign: From analog to digital

1. Introduction

In this paper, I argue that the changes which have taken place in the course of the evolution of languages consist of a shift from analog to digital features; I also discuss why the prototypical features were analog, and why they shifted to digital alternatives. Since the analog prototypes of lexical items are too few and far too remote, I focus on the wealth of tangible data provided by grammatical and phonological features, in arguing that a shift from analog to digital took place in all areas of language.

2. Analog vs. digital

The terms *analog* and *digital* are used constantly today. Their immediate meaning can readily be inferred from their application to items such as timepieces. An analog timepiece is one that uses the position of the “hands” on a dial to show the progress of time, whereas a digital timepiece provides that information numerically. The technical definition of these terms is based on the notion of continuity.

Analog signals are continuous electrical signals that vary in time, as shown in Figure 1a. Most of the time, the variations follow that of the original, non-electric signal. Therefore, the two are analogous; hence, the name *analog*. On AM radio, for instance, the strength of the radio wave goes up and down in analogy with the loudness of the original sound.

Digital signals are non-continuous; they change in discrete steps. They consist of pulses or digits having discrete levels or values. The value of each pulse is constant, but there is an abrupt change from one digit to the next (see Figure 1b).




Figure 1a. Analog signal.




Figure 1b. Digital signal.

Before being transmitted, the original information is converted into a string of bytes. A radio signal, for example, will be either on or off. Digital signals can be sent over long distances and suffer less interference than do analog signals.

In linguistics, perhaps the most obvious example of an analog signal having been replaced with a digital one is provided by writing. Writing started with the analogical representation of the referent. The graphic representation of an ox – natural, stylized or synecdochic – signaled an ox; the graphic representation of an owl signaled an owl, and so on. These graphic signals, called ideograms, were continuous: they followed the shape of the referent continuously, without displaying a sequence of discrete, distinctive elements. Alphabetic writing, by contrast, is not continuous, but made up of a sequence of discrete distinctive elements. Just as in electricity, where digital signals are obtained by converting signals that originally were analog, alphabetic writing is achieved by switching from the *signifié* to the *signifiant*, from the physical referent, which is continuous, to its linguistic label, which is not, and thence proceeding to represent the digital

label with discrete alphabetical items. The evolution of writing from hieroglyphs to alphabet is well known (inter al., see Diringer 1968, Gaur 1984; for an evolutionary presentation, Bichakjian 2002: 221–258).

3. *The shift from analog to digital in grammar*

The extent of the shift from analog to digital is considerable, and it is almost ubiquitous in grammar, where evolutionary processes can be traced quite far back in time. I shall discuss the evolution of argument alignments, word order, complex sentences and the expression of verbal action in reference to its occurrence.

3.1 The evolution of argument alignment

Typological data suggest that the prototypical sentence was built around the notions of agent and patient. The essential distinction was whether an argument was an agent, i.e., the one who performed the action, or the patient, i.e., the person who endures the action or is the scene of the action. In a sentence such as *The hunter killed the bear*, the hunter is the agent and the bear is the patient. But in a sentence such as *the old king died*, the king does not perform the action; he is merely the scene of death. The ancestral distinction can be seen, for example, in the contrast between Latin active and deponent verbs. The verb meaning ‘kill’ is active (*neco, occido, interficio*); the verb meaning ‘die’ is deponent (*morior*).

The agent-patient alignment has practically disappeared today. It survives in Basque and Georgian, the native languages of Australia, and a few native tongues of South America. The modern alternative is the nominative-accusative or subject-object alignment.²

The analog nature of the ancestral alignment can hardly be contested. The incipient speakers, striving to produce an argument-alignment model, copied the events they observed in real life, such that one either performs or endures an action. Just as ideograms followed the contour of their referents, the agent-patient syntactic model followed the roles of participants in the events taking place in the outside world.

But there is more: the agentive model is based on the continuity between the verb and its main argument: a verb such as *kill* must have an agent, while a verb such as *die* can only have a patient. Unlike agents and patients,

subjects are independent from the verb with which they combine. The action-*vs.*-endurance dichotomy binding verbs, on the one hand, and agents and patients, on the other, no longer plays a role. There is discontinuity between verbs and argument: all verbs take a subject, and, conversely, any subject combines with any verb.

3.2 The evolution of word order

Whereas the evolution of argument alignment took place a long time ago and today the overwhelming majority of languages use the subject-object model, the evolution of word order is a more recent phenomenon, with the ancestral model still present in many languages. The process is nevertheless certain: the ancestral order was head-last, or SOV, and the trend is toward head-first or SVO.¹ The shift has not taken place everywhere, and among the languages where the shift has indeed taken place, some have moved faster and covered more ground while others have shown restraint. Similar disparity exists elsewhere: technological advances, e.g., are not equal in all parts of the world. Whatever the rate, the evolution of word order is from head last to head first, and in normal circumstances, this trend is irreversible.¹

That the head-last order is holistic and continuous, while the head-first order is discontinuous and analytical is not difficult to see. If it is head-last, a sequence cannot be interpreted until the head, i.e. the last item, has been uttered. The modifier and its head are amalgamated and constitute a continuous block. Head-first structures on the other hand allow the interpretation to begin immediately and to proceed as the sequence unfolds. Heads and modifiers are not amalgamated, and head-first structures are therefore discontinuous. Given that head-last structures are continuous, and head-first structures discontinuous, the evolution of word order can rightly be concluded to move from analog to digital.

While the continuity of head-last structures can readily be seen and accepted, one is still left to wonder what the head-last structures were analogous to. This is not an easy question to answer because, unlike with ideograms and agent-patient alignment, the model is not concrete. Yet, the model exists: it is the holistic perception of an event. It will be recalled that chimpanzees required tremendous perceptual abilities to survive in the wild, and though in the course of human evolution they traded off these

remarkable abilities in favor of a greater potential for abstract concepts, the ancestral holistic perception of incipient speakers must have provided the input of the first grammatical structures (Springer 2006: 14).

Describing the situation of an autistic boy, Oliver Sacks wrote: “[w]e do not know ... how Stephen thinks ... [, b]ut we do know that though he may be lacking in the symbolic, the abstract, he has a sort of genius for concrete or *mimetic* representations” (Sacks 1995: 241; emphasis added). This is not an attempt to equate autistic patients with early humans. Yet, their deficit in abstract thinking, counterbalanced by a “genius for concrete mimetic representations”, can provide a window on the mental disposition of prelinguistic humans trying to cobble together a grammar and, by so doing, lend support to the view that the ancestral grammatical structures were modeled after their holistic perception of surrounding events. The resulting analogy could then explain why the ancestral structures were holistic, continuous, and head-last.

3.3 The rise of complex sentences

The distinction between analogous head-last structures and digital head-first structures also applies to the distinction between participial phrases and subordinate clauses. The sentence embedding technique is relatively recent. Before its invention, languages expressed subordination mainly with participial phrases (Meillet 1964: 373). These were head-last structures with limited grammatical marking and syntactic expansion. They are conveniently used today when the phrase is short and the marking limited. Though English would prefer *the lady in the blue dress*, it would be acceptable to say *the blue-dress wearing lady*, but it would be difficult if not outright impossible to express with participial clauses the contents of [*I spoke to*] *the lady who was wearing a blue dress she had bought in a store her friend had suggested when they had met for tea in a restaurant near the Opera*. Such a sentence is perfectly acceptable because it has a digital structure. Each embedded sentence is indeed embedded, i.e., part of a hierarchical structure, but it is fully autonomous and the embedding process almost endlessly recursive. The recursivity of sentence embedding makes complex sentences digital structures while participial or infinitival phrases are analogous because they allow very little or no recursivity. The model of the analogy is again the holistic perception of outside events.

3.4 From aspect to tense

Another well-established evolutionary development is the shift from aspect to tense. The ancestral languages made aspectual distinctions – an action was either completed or in progress or in a state resulting from a presumed action. In the course of evolution, temporal distinctions emerged and gained the upper hand. Temporal systems are organized around reference points in time – the present is opposed to past or future points in time, the past tense can have a past and a future of its own, and the future a past of its own.

The trend is well known. Meillet stated long ago that “l'élimination de l'aspect au profit du temps ... [est] l'un des traits qui caractérisent le développement des langues indo-européennes” (1928: xii), and Jerzy Kuriłowicz went even a step further by stating that “the opposite development does not seem possible” (1964: 130). This is not to say that aspectual distinctions have disappeared. French, e.g., makes a distinction between *j'ai fait* and *je faisais*), while English distinguishes *I have done* from *I did*, but French and English have essentially a temporal system, and the trend among languages has been a shift to temporal systems.

Speaking of a deaf boy who had been deprived not only of hearing, but also of sign language, Sacks made the following observation: “Joseph ... was *missing ... a clear sense of the past ...* he had no problems with perceptual categorization ..., but he could not, it seemed, go beyond this, hold abstract ideas in mind. ... He seemed, like an animal, or an infant, to be *stuck to the present*, to be confined to literal and immediate perception (1989: 40 and 44, original emphasis). It has also been established that chimpanzees “are excellent at perceiving the immediate significance of events, but they do not retain most of those events in long-term memory, nor do they think abstractly what the events might mean in the far future” (Smith 2006: 72). The assemblers of ancestral grammars were, of course, neither born with chimpanzee-like brains, nor congenitally deprived of hearing. Yet, as they were trying to construct a grammar, they were in fact in a prelinguistic state, and in that transitional state, exhibited the deficiencies observed in apes and in language-deprived patients. They were, we may surmise, confined to the present, and not yet ready to place an action in the past or in the future. It is therefore quite natural that incipient grammars would feature a system of aspectual distinctions that is analogical with the ancestral

speakers' perception of events. It should also be noted that aspectual distinctions are continuous, because they are confined to the present, during which they are constant. As they evolved, aspectual distinctions were gradually supplanted with temporal ones, which, unlike their antecedents, are discontinuous since tenses place events along a time scale. The shift from aspectual to temporal systems is therefore another shift from an analog to a digital system.

3.5 The evolution of marking techniques: From Ablaut to words

Along with the task of devising syntactic strategies and defining grammatical distinctions comes the job of inventing marking devices. The historical data suggest that grammatical marking started with forms of stem modulation, which was expanded and later largely replaced with suffixation, which in a third step has given way to fully independent grammatical words. The initial step is easy to imagine. Having achieved the coining of a word for a given action, incipient speakers were soon confronted with the task of stipulating whether that action was ongoing or completed. Their ingenious solution was to modify the shape of the word, either by stretching the vowel or by reduplicating the initial consonant-plus-vowel sequence of the stem. Latin preserves the process in pairs such as *ēdit* "(s)he eats" vs. *ēdit* "(s)he ate" and *pendit* "(s)he ponders" vs. *pēpendit* "(s)he pondered".

The next strategy was to take a consonant or a vowel or assemble a short segment, assign it a grammatical value, and tag it to the stem. In some Latin verbs, e.g., an *-s-* after the stem indicates that the action is completed: *dīcit* "(s)he says" vs. *dīxit* (phonetically, *dīk-s-it*) "(s)he said". Suffixation was highly developed in the classical languages, but as the greater frequency of, for instance, *more pleasant* over *pleasanter* suggests, the trend is toward marking grammatical values with independent words, such as prepositions, adverbs, auxiliaries, pronouns, etc.

One failure of linguistics since the mid-twentieth century has been the unwillingness to recognize the role of evolution, and instead to see circular changes everywhere, including where developmental processes have clearly pursued a unidirectional course. It has thus been claimed that suffixes were originally independent words that were downgraded to grammatical markers after being phonetically reduced and semantically hollowed out (see,

e.g., Heine 1994; and Bybee et al. 1994; for a critical account, cf. Joseph 2001). Grammaticalization is indeed documented. The classical example is that of Finno-Ugric *bél*, which once was a full-fledged lexical item meaning “intestine” or “bowels”, but which later developed into case markers for Hungarian nouns (Collinder 1936: 58–59 and 1956: 120). Another clear example is that of the Latin verb meaning “to hold” or “to own”, which withered into a temporal auxiliary and the suffixes marking the future tense in Romance languages.

That lexical items were occasionally reduced to suffixes or simply converted to vectors of grammatical notions is not disputed, but these are indeed occasional occurrences and cannot explain the abundant inventory of suffixes and thematic morphemes ubiquitously present in inflected languages. Neither can they explain the developmental logic of grammatical markers. Grammatical marking – it may be surmised – began with stem modulation techniques such as Ablaut and stem reduplication. Since words were modified holistically (e.g., *sing/sang* as opposed to *work/work-ed*) the signal was continuous and therefore analog, and indeed analogous with the perception of the actual referent. A completed action is not action plus something; it is action in a modified form. After stem modulation came suffixation, which represented a shift to digital signals: the markers are (largely) independent of the stem, though not always free of some phonetic blending. Finally, the use of auxiliaries, articles, pronouns and prepositions, etc. made the signal completely discontinuous and fully digital.

3.6 From vowel length to new vowels

Like the evolution of writing, which started with holistic items analogous to their referents and gradually changed to digital signals using letters for each sound of the referents’ lexical labels (*signifiants*), it appears that vocalizations were also originally holistic and continuous before becoming digital signals structured in discontinuous distinctive speech sounds. While to infer such a shift is legitimate, it must be stressed that the events occurred in the mists of time, and no data – observed or reconstructed – are available to document them.

A more recent development provides evidence that the shift from analog to digital also occurs in phonology – though perhaps on a smaller scale. That development is the shift from vowel quantity to vowel quality, or

from vowel length to new vowel sounds. Whatever their origin – Ablaut or compensatory lengthening – long vowels have often provided a way of enriching the inventory of vowels. If the five basic vowels are paired off with the corresponding long ones, which was the case with Latin, for instance, some ten syllable peaks become available, which in turn will reduce the chances of homonymy. In itself, a greater inventory of vowels is an advantage, but length, as a distinctive feature, tends to disappear, partly under the pressure of syllabic configuration. When long vowels become restricted to open syllables, where they are unmarked, and short vowels to close syllables, where they are more suitable, vowel length is no longer distinctive. To make up for the loss, languages tend to introduce newer vowel sounds such as *y*, *ø*, and *æ* or *ɨ* and *ʌ*. Examples of these new vowel sounds are Dutch *duur* “expensive”, Ger. *schön* “beautiful”, Fr. *sœur* “sister”, Ru. *сын* “son” and Eng. *cup*.

Since they are produced with one pitch held constant over two phonological units (*morae*), long vowels are indeed continuous, and as such they constitute an analog signal. Analogy may also be seen in the usage of the same vocalic “material” to create new vowels and the recourse to length, which is a perceptual experience. Vowels with a different pitch are original inventions, independent of the existing inventory. In that sense, they constitute digital signals.

4. *Why a shift from analog to digital?*

As stressed above, when it has been observed that A regularly becomes B, it is incumbent upon a scientist, not only to describe the change, but also to discuss (1) why A was the starting point and (2) why A shifted to B. In the foregoing, when a shift was presented and described, a sustained effort was made to suggest why the prototypical item was analog, and what it was probably analogous to. The question now is, Why the shift to digital alternatives? The answer is clear and unambiguous: because the digital alternatives are more advantageous. Subject is more advantageous than agent because it makes it possible for speakers to assign the subject function to any noun. Subject-object grammars are more powerful than agent-patient grammars because the action can be described from more than one vantage point. Head-first word order is also more advantageous than head-last. Because head-first order allows speakers and listeners to

process utterances as they unfold, more complex structures can be used, whereby information is organized in higher hierarchical constructs and is transmitted and received more economically. Temporal systems are also more advantageous than their aspectual forerunner because they allow speakers to guide their interlocutors through time, both past and future. The marking techniques have also shifted to more advantageous alternatives. The stem modulation techniques – Ablaut and reduplication – provide for a very limited number of distinctions, and also sharply reduce the variety of lexical items. If the *sing/sang* alternation were the only past-tense formation rule, it would mean that all English verbs would have to have an *i* in their stressed syllable, and verbs such as *bang*, *dance*, *glance*, *fence* etc. would be impossible. Suffixation parries this problem, but suffixes can exercise an unsettling influence at the phonetic level and trigger morphological irregularities. Word-type markers provide the best guarantee for the integrity and proper recognition of all constitutive segments of a word and its grammatical attributes. Finally, vowels such as the rounded front (*y*, *ø*, and *æ*) and unrounded back (*ɨ* and *ʌ*) provide better alternatives because they can be used without problem in all syllable configurations, whereas long vowels are less amenable for use in certain positions. In all of the above cases, the digital alternatives present definite advantages over the analog ones, and their advantageous character explains why languages have gradually shifted to them (for an extensive discussion of the notion of advantage in language evolution, see Bichakjian 2002 and 1999; for a brief discussion, see Bichakjian 2004).

5. *From grammar to lexicon: From seen to unseen*

While it has only been suggested, not demonstrated, that the prototypical form of the above-discussed features were analogous with the prelinguistic experience which incipient speakers brought to the task of formulating a grammar, arguments have been presented to support the view that ancestral features were indeed analog in nature, and that they shifted to digital alternatives because these last are more advantageous. In grammar and to the extent that they occur in phonology, these shifts are observable: they are either ongoing or part of the historical record, attested or reconstructed. The “birth” and subsequent development of lexical items are shrouded in the mists of time. We do not have the prototypes; our only data are

words in the form they are today. These words are said to be arbitrary, and indeed, they are. They are neither analogous to their referent nor do they constitute an analog signal. They are digital signals (cf. Martinet's second articulation), including the onomatopoeia, and because they are digital in nature, they must be fully or at least largely arbitrary. Arbitrariness is no doubt a salient feature of the lexicon, but the underlying feature is the digital character of words, which coincides with the shift from analog to digital observed in grammar and to some extent in phonology. These two sets of observation and the emerging similarities suggest that the shift from analog to digital has been a dynamic force active in all areas of language because it leads to more advantageous alternatives. Digital means more advantageous; hence, the shift ... taking place everywhere!

Notes

1. I, for one, had argued that the ancestral word order was head-last, and that wherever word order had evolved, it had become head-first (Bichakjian 1991). This observation was first met with skepticism, but mainstream linguistics finally concurred (Newmeyer 2000).
2. For a discussion of the shift from active to nominative syntax, directly or possibly via an ergative phase, see Klimov 1977: 318 and 1979: 332; and Plank 1979.

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Bogdan Bogdanov

Communication and understanding

Arguments for a broader pragmatic understanding of linguistic expressions, meanings, and things

There exists no generally accepted definition of communication; rather, it is discussed on the basis of models of different scopes. Some of the broader theories include communication in animals and in plants. More frequently, however, communication is considered a typically human phenomenon, conditioned by man's linguistic and social competence. Yet even in this case, the basic features of communication are determined in different ways.

Among these features there are certain less-disputed ones, such as understanding; hence the grounds for asserting that communication is *human* communication, in which understandings are exchanged or, conversely, in which messages are misunderstood. By the term "understanding" we mean the currently evolving, scientific idea that human communication constitutes itself in a context or situation, according to available rules, norms and meanings, which communicators rely on during the process of configuring and sending messages. This obviously concerns direct and indirect communication, as well as verbal and non-verbal exchange of information by means of gestures, mimicry and images.

According to this model, communication occurs on several levels. Communicators rely on both the verbal message, as well as on the accompanying non-verbal one(s). In the language of computer science, the human communicative act is construed as comprising and complementing one sort of digital message with another sort of analogue message. This dual, or rather multiple, encoding of the message in communication corresponds to the contemporary model of how the human brain functions:

different sections or structures of the brain encode signals coming from outside with a view to their eventual usage under different circumstances.

Probably to this end, the human communicative attitude is such that one and the same bit of information can be understood in at least two different ways. This is manifest not only in a differently configured message, on the lines of verbal and non-verbal communicating, but also in the ambiguously organised flow of the communicative verbal act. A certain understanding of the sender's message is not only understood equally/differently on the other side of the communicative act, but becomes different from its primary variant in the process of communication, even for the one who sends it.

In addition, the information of the verbal message itself signifies dually (or more). It is construed so as to be understood in different ways in the communicative act, as well as open to change in regard to one task or another. This holds also for an individual word, which is always polysemic, and, indeed, for any linguistic expression: both or either of them combine several meanings and can refer to several things. Particular words are more indisputably polysemic, whereas expressions and texts, developed according to certain specifications, are less polysemic, at least at first sight.

Of course, the verbal message in itself is a conditional state. Even in examples of one word or phrase, their usage becomes obvious, and there is a choice of one meaning over another. Be that as it may, no pragmatic usage can specify a linguistic expression so closely as to obliterate its polysemy. The latter always remains, serving as an internal resource for generating other understandings, either by steering a linguistic expression towards another meaning or by referring it to another thing.

Yet when considered by itself or, as it were, "unused", a linguistic expression has, at the very least a dual meaning and a dual message, combining an explicit and implicit meaning, if nothing else. These two meanings or messages can also be ordered successively. This occurs in cases where something spoken is clarified by a similar locution; in this way, an ambiguous message is clarified by being narrowed down to two alternatives. Expressed separately, however, each of them promptly inclines to ambiguity. The speaker is aware of this ambiguity and, eluding it, he continues in a linear way by explicating again and again the generated, implicit meanings. It should be noted, however, that ideal textual linearity can be achieved in an instant.

No message or meaning can be self-identical, because, as a linguistic form, it designates and denotes, but the meaning does not correspond to the denoted thing. Just as a linguistic expression is related to other expressions, a meaning is related to other meanings. In addition, the thing loosely corresponds to the linguistic expression and the meaning, because it is related with other things in many ways.

In every linguistic expression, then, meanings or possible messages are given as stratified, in the sense that one of them is the expression of another – or in the sense that a concrete message is attached to a general message, which motivates the former, but which does not refer to the thing commented upon; rather, it refers to the context of speaking or to the larger context of the world. In most cases, the concrete message intends the two contexts at the same time.

We can conclude, provisionally, the following concerning the issue of understanding and the communicative act: an understanding is always manifested in several combined understandings. This also corresponds to the dual setting of the communicative act, which, besides this act, is also the model of another, similar act that is constituted under different circumstances.

Just as a speech act, the communicative act has both an actual and model structure; that is to say, it occurs here and now, but it models and situates an event or act occurring in any place at any time. Just as the brain's activity allows for more uses, the communicative act combines more messages and meanings, starting from a basic primary message, then developing a secondary message that specifies and changes the former.

The text of the so-called primary verbal message is organized in a similar way. Its explicit meaning is layered upon other, implicit meanings which can also emerge in the foreground during this communicative act. One reason for this ambiguity is that the linguistic expression, or message, is something ready-made, something available and in this sense already used; in addition, it is something that has to change to a certain extent so as to serve in actuality, here and now. This is due to a kind of rotation of the “kaleidoscope” of what is already given, which must have at least two meanings.

In this sense the understanding, faced with polysemy, is called upon to choose one meaning and disregard another, and to combine meanings in regards to one concrete application or another. Understanding is not only

the understanding of something given as existing in a context of things; it is also a step-wise process. Above all, understanding is the making of an actual meaning and a thing. The thing can be an existing one, which is only specified and in this sense elaborated. Or it may be a non-existing one, and the communicative act can assure its existence. This means that the thing is posited in relation to other existing things, thus assuming a community that understands or accepts the existence of that thing, the context of other things, and the meanings produced for this purpose.

This making in the act of communicating not only makes something and its context. When a communication occurs, the complex, multilayered content of the message is refined and thus the communicators undergo a change. Even the most elementary of communicative acts are adjusted so as to fit within the context of the concrete communication as well as within the most extensive possible context, that of the world.

Understanding, conceived in this way, is achieved in the process of the communicative act; in addition, it is expressed in happening-making: of a thing, of a context of things, and of a more general context of the world and the community of those who understand in this way. Altogether, these activities change the participants in the communicative act, in which process they become different, to one extent or another. This activity is also a kind of making, insofar as it not only happens, but is made.

This leads to a more expanded understanding of the human communicative act – as a living situation of a passing move to something else. That is why, according to an authoritative model, communication occurs not only when people are really communicating, but also when a person is alone and in a state of mental activity. In this case, he communicates with himself as another or, on the level of understanding, he is performing the mental action of understanding himself in the world, which means an understanding of something and a context. All that is needed is the desire to communicate and an object of that desire.

Obviously, the communicative act may be fruitfully considered as not only a communication between people for the purpose of exchanging information and as a means of understanding and/or happening-making. It is also a process in which communicators achieve a new attitude toward a changing world, which is to some extent one of their own making.

A practical question arises. Of the many available models of understanding the human communicative act, which of them is the best? Is there

in fact an ideal model of understanding? That is unlikely. As with all things, also in this case: as thought accumulates, so do more models, according to the different tasks which they may perform. For, being linguistic entities, these models are true in a twofold sense. They ostend something existing and also show that, in some way, they are making this very thing.

Nonetheless, insofar as the choice is independent of the task, it can be based on a common-sense principle of good measure. We can take the line that the chosen model of communication is neither too narrow, and is directed towards understanding or an immanent change in the understanding community which, because of that, change the message itself; nor too large, such that the idea of communication would become blurred along the lines of the so-called “flow” of a living situation.

Hence we arrive at the appropriate delimitation, which directs the topic of communication towards its manifestation as speech activity. In this model, the topics of understanding and acting are preserved. Moreover, observation can eventually pass on to the discernible materials of the text of the message and the secondary text of the communication. A third strand of the line of action is constituted by those resources for understanding the speech act in a larger sense, as pervaded and completed by non-verbal gestures, such as those of images and other sign systems.

There is also another resource – the text of verbal and non-verbal communication that is pervaded with, and which pervades, regular human actions and the making of things without words. Both in doing something and by means of what is said, the human being is speaking, as it were. This holds even when he does something silently – either with a mental parallel with an internal silence; in either case he is moved towards a sense by a reason and a purpose. Evidently both acts – of thinking when speaking and of thinking when silently making – combine with something more general, which may be called speaking, and not only in a metaphorical sense.

Another thing: on the basis of the presented model of communication we can say that there is a speech activity of the communicator who speaks but ostensibly does not communicate. Since he is within and engaging in speech, however, there are others at his disposal with whom he communicates indirectly, and still others in the virtual community of those who understand or should understand as he does. Depending on the speech, the communicator may engage with a community that is listening to his

monologue, with an imagined other person in a dialogue, or with himself as the other in an internal, event-filled dialogue.

On this communicative base a typology can be expounded for various kinds of discourse. This typology would preserve and sustain the wider pragmatic conception of speech as a communicative act and would allow for developing a pragmatic theory of meaning. The basic principle of such a theory would be that all saying and speaking are to be understood as understanding and as making, as well as a change in the communicators' attitudes. Such a theory of meaning could be further elaborated by analyses of speech activity that is not isolated from other human activities, such as those treated by pragmatics in a large sense of the word, as a general theory of human activity. But for that it may be too early.

Priscila M. Borges

The sign tree: Peirce's philosophy through a visual model of the 66 classes of sign¹

1. Introduction

The creation of diagrams to help explain Peirce's Semiotic is a common practice among semioticians; even Peirce himself did so. He believed that diagrams were a good way to represent with precision the course of thought (CP 4.530). We find in his writings many diagrams and visual models used to explain triadic relations in phenomenology, semiotics and classes of signs. In this way he developed his logic – also called Semiotic – with the aid of *existential graphs*, which are diagrammatic ways of representing the reasoning processes.

As a scientist and philosopher, Peirce studied many different subjects, in trying to understand the logic of science and different types of reasoning. Therefore, we must take a careful look at the complex structure of his philosophy in order to understand the relations among its branches and not treat them as disconnected disciplines. For instance, from his studies of logic and mathematics he developed the concepts of relation, infinity and continuum, which are also important concepts for understanding semiotic processes.

Here I present a 3D model created according to the logic of cenopythagorean categories, as applied to the ten trichotomies which make up the 66 classes of sign. First I explain the relations between visual elements and the sign theory. Next, analyze the model, showing that although it was constructed to describe and illuminate the different classes of signs and their relations, it can also point out the connections among semiotics, metaphysics and pragmatism.

2. Model construction

Two different classifications were used by Peirce to explain how signs function: (1) according to sign-ground, called “cenopythagorean” categories; (2) according to those sign structures called “trichotomies”. Both classifications explain logically how signs work. Even though Peirce passed many years of his life developing the sign concept, he left that work unfinished. In his papers we find a very detailed description of how 10 classes of signs are produced by the combination of three cenopythagorean categories with three trichotomies. In his correspondence with Lady Welby, he developed the structure of signs in detail and expanded the trichotomies to 10. These 10 trichotomies, combined with the three cenopythagorean categories, make possible 66 different classes of sign. It is precisely this combination of ten trichotomies with three cenopythagorean categories that is presented here in a visual model.

Next, I will explain the logic of the relations that guide sign theory, since it was the ground for constructing the diagrams. The categories of phenomenology are related to the sign ground. Peirce worked first on observing all phenomenal types, trying to find the most general and fundamental categories of *phaneron*. He writes:

Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively and without reference to anything else. Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with respect to a second but regardless of any third. Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing a second and third into relation to each other. I call these three ideas the cenopythagorean categories. (CP 8.328)



Figure 1. The categories of phenomenology.

A relation of dependence is established between the three categories as follows: firstness is independent of anything, secondness depends on firstness, and thirdness depends on both secondness and firstness (see Figure 1).

Figure 2 is modeled on the growth of trees, an organic process that resembles sign growth in many respects. The concept of triad is related to bifurcation of branches, and their growing subjected to the action of time. It is necessary to pass from one trichotomy to the other. All relations between them are determining relations, such that the antecedent must act on the consequent. The antecedent is past, already determined, and the consequent is future, full of possibility, still undetermined.




Figure 2. Illustration of the semiosis process, based on the idea of tree rings.

Tree rings are used in dendrochronology to estimate the age of trees. As the years go by, the rings grow larger, but they are also affected by climate factors. More than a sign of time, tree rings show interaction between systems. All these concepts apply to the semiotic process. Each ring corresponds to one trichotomy: the first trichotomy comes in the centre, the second trichotomy in the second ring, and so on.

Since there is a determining relation among the rings, construction of the diagram of 66 classes of signs necessitated a better understanding of the order of the trichotomies. It was not easy to decide in which order the trichotomies should appear – one of the hardest problems facing Peirce scholars. According to Queiroz (2002: 87), there are several different opinions on this matter, due to the lack of development on this subject by Peirce. He did not describe the 66 classes of signs, and in his papers one finds more than one ordering of the trichotomies, and reports of his own doubts about how to order them.

At first I had the central “ring” represent the ground of Sign, because the semiosis process begins with it (Figure 3). This construction has its advantages. Firstly, it fits perfectly with the way Peirce described semiosis processes and ordered the ten trichotomies in a letter to Lady Welby (CP 8.344). Secondly, it emphasizes the sign in relation to object, showing that the knowing process begins with the sign. But a diagram constructed in this way – with rings ordered from center to periphery in a determining relation – does not go well with the analyses which Peirce, in the same letter, made of the possible relations between ground of sign and immediate object (CP 8.353–365).




Figure 3. Order of the sign trichotomies adopted in the ring-diagram.

Since the object determines the sign, and not *vice versa*, it was necessary to put the dynamical object in the central ring, followed by the immediate object and the ground of the sign. Given the first three correlates, we arrive at the first relation: between sign and dynamical object. This relation determines the possible interpretants, called “immediate interpretants”, which, when they are existent become dynamical interpretants. Then come the elements that compose the second relation: between sign and dynamical interpretant. Moreover, semiosis is an infinite process, the “goal” of which directs the dynamical interpretant; hence one more relation: the final interpretant and its relation to the sign. Finally, given all correlates and all dyadic relations, it is possible to theorize the triadic relation among sign, dynamical object and final interpretant.

Having defined the order of trichotomies we can combine them with the cenopythagorean categories. The cenopythagorean categories – represented by spheres, cubes and pyramids – should take place in every ring, starting from the central one and following the others according to the logic of categories (see Figure 4). So, if in the first ring there is a sphere, the next one must also contain a sphere. If in the first ring there is a cube, a sphere or a cube would take place in the second ring. And if in the first ring there is a pyramid, then a sphere, cube or pyramid would take place in the following ring.




Figure 4. Ring model of Peirce's 66 classes of signs.

This trichotomic order, which stresses the way things are in reality, can be a problem for the superficial reader who understands semiosis to begin with a dynamical object. This is not the case, however, since everything we know about the object comes only from its signs; thus, human knowledge appears in the middle of the semiotic process and not at its beginning. Putting the object as the starting point is a good way of taking man out of the center of knowledge. More than that, it forces us to acknowledge that the knowing process encompasses more than human knowledge, and that man cannot reach the origin or the end of this process. Putting the object as the starting point also accords with Peirce's belief that in fact a reality does it exist, and its existence does not depend on what we think of it; for this reason he can be called an "objective idealist". This is also in accordance with the concept of semiotic enlargement, which takes the concept of intelligence far beyond the human mind. In addition, the center of the rings represents the backward movement of the object, and its border represents the infinite semiosis. Together these create a temporal line similar to the one seen in trees (Figure 5).




Figure 5. Tree model of Peirce's 66 classes of signs.

The process of constructing the 66 classes of signs reveals that signs themselves are complex structures which can increase as more details are considered. However, the classification of signs, on its own, makes semiotics overly formal; moreover, it is an endless and goal-less project, as Peirce well knew. The mere naming of signs does not solve semiotic problems. It does, however, describe signs in detail and makes it possible to understand Peirce's philosophy. According to Nadin (in Santaella 2004: 15), "the sign can only be conceived and interpreted in the range of uncertain logic and with announcement of the continuum doctrine." The diagram shows both points: in the center, the incomplete knowledge of the dynamic object represents the uncertain beginning. And at the border, the growing of rings as time passes represents the growing of thoughts. Interpreting a sign is a process that, in turn, produces another sign with the same capacity of being interpreted and of creating signs, *ad infinitum*.

The 2D diagram was used as a guide to construct the front and side views, which in turn generated the 3D model. Both diagrams illustrate in detail the logical structure of the 66 classes of sign as being a complex system; they do not treat each sign as an individual and isolated from the rest. But it is only in the 3D model that the relation between semiotics and Peirce's philosophy comes into view. Akin to a tree, the theory of signs must be related to an environment, and it must have some purpose that guides the growth of its roots and branches.




Figure 6. Four different views of the 3D model representing Peirce's 66 classes of sign.




Figure 7. Top view of the 3D model representing Peirce's 66 classes of sign.

First let us see how the roots are formed. As it is known, in semiosis the dynamic object always refers backwards; it is never shown in its fullness. The sign can represent the dynamic object in many different ways, but always in parts, never completely. Since it is impossible to reach the dynamic object, we say that it retreats. This backwards motion appears on the z-axis in the negative direction. Because it is located in the center ring, we can imagine that the backwards movement of the dynamic object forms the trunk and roots of the tree.

To see how the branches grow, it is necessary to look at the external rings. In the last three rings we can find the final interpretant, the relation between sign and final interpretant, and the relation between dynamic object, sign, and final interpretant. Since the final interpretant is not an existent but a course of representation that the sign must follow, the end of this path is a place that will never be reached. It is always in the future, in the infinite, and it is the aim of semiosis. The other ring, representing the relation between sign and final interpretant, points to the description of semiosis *in toto*: the triadic relation among object, sign and interpretant.

As a result, we can observe two processes going on simultaneously. On one hand, the dynamical object retracts in the direction of the ground, forming the trunk and roots in a way that makes the object itself more complex and impossible of being fully represented by the sign. On the other hand, the triadic relation of signs shows a mediation process – which can also be understood as a way of thought – pointing to sign growth, which in the model is represented by the branches.

In view of all this, it is possible to presume that the retraction of the movement of the dynamic object connects semiotics to metaphysics, and that the growing of semiosis – toward the “future” of the final interpretant – connects semiotics to pragmatism. Considering this hypothesis, we will next look, on the central and external rings, for traces that relate semiotics to metaphysics and pragmatism.

In the dynamic-object ring, there are 55 signs of collection, 10 of occurrence, and 1 of possibility. If the dynamic object determines the sign and always appears mediated by it, then the dynamic object might be the reality. The recession of this object would seem to be the province of metaphysics: to discover the reality behind the appearances. In addition, the signs of possibility can be related with chance; the signs of occurrences with existence; and the signs of collections with law. Signs of collections are the greatest number of signs in this ring, which points to the realistic thought of Peirce that generalities are real and that reality is full of laws.

In the external ring we come across the exactly opposing relation among the classes of signs, since most of them are of Firstness and just one of Thirdness. As this ring represents the triadic relation, or the way of thought, it is composed of 55 classes of signs that are instinctive thought, 10 that are the thought of experience, and 1 that is formal thought. This exclusive class of sign that represents formal thought can be related with the aim of Peirce’s pragmatism: “concrete reasonableness”. By this he means that the purpose of thought doesn’t lie in an action, but in the development of an idea, and that it is through reason that we can reach this aim (CP 8. 212).

Finally, I hope you can see – through the explanation of this 3D model – some ways in which semiotics and other areas of Peirce’s philosophy are connected, and that further analysis may reveal even more about these relations. Although the model was constructed to clarify sign theory, it also is of use in describing the structure of Peirce’s philosophy. Comparing it to a tree enables one to consider Peirce’s philosophy as a system, and not

as an isolated discipline. I could sum up this by saying: first, semiotics is the structure of the Sign Tree; second, its relation to metaphysics is captured by the growing of roots that represent the increase of complexity of the reality; and third, its connection with pragmatism is accounted for by the growing of branches, which represent the development of thought.

Note

1. This research was made possible by funding from the Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo.

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Laurence Brunet-Hunault

Le récit d'une privatisation, ou comment le discours de presse dramatise ou enjolive une aventure économique

Ce travail est le résultat d'une expertise que le laboratoire DynaLang-SEM, dirigée par Anne-Marie Houdebine, a mené en 2006 pour EDF. Il s'agissait d'analyser un volumineux corpus média constitué d'articles de presse écrite (nationale et régionale), de scripts d'émissions de radio et/ou de télévision, de dépêches d'agences de presse et de caricatures (presse satirique). Sur les quelques deux mille « textes » qui constituaient les données fournies par EDF, nous avons sélectionné trois cents documents qui ont servi de support à l'analyse détaillée dont nous rendons compte aujourd'hui. Ainsi, bien que le corpus soit imposé par le commanditaire, il nous est possible de construire un objet d'étude. Le corpus est non seulement important mais aussi hétérogène tant sur le plan des supports concernés que sur celui des situations de communication qu'il met en scène.

L'analyse du corpus s'appuie sur la théorie mise au point par Anne-Marie Houdebine (2004), *la sémiologie des indices*. Cette théorie postule l'existence de la structure à la suite de Saussure et garde un rapport étroit avec la linguistique dans laquelle elle puise ses outils et ses méthodes. *La sémiologie des indices* se situe dans le cadre d'une sémiologie générale qui a pour objet la « les signes de la vie sociale » envisagée par Saussure. L'enjeu de cette sémiologie est de décrire les éléments de l'objet sémiologisable, en l'occurrence des discours de presse (phase descriptive), d'expliquer leurs fonctionnements (phase explicative) et d'en dégager les effets de sens et les valeurs symboliques (phase interprétative). Il s'agit ainsi de pratiquer une ou mise au jour des « insus culturels » dans ce type de discours.

La présentation de ce travail s'articule donc sur les trois étapes de la sémiologie des indices : la description du corpus, l'explication de ses modes de fonctionnement, l'interprétation, ou dans ce cas, la mise au jour de deux axes interprétatifs signifiants : l'idéalisation et la dramatisation.

*1. Description du corpus :
La structure événementielle du récit*

Nous considérons le récit comme un ensemble d'unités qui s'articulent autour d'une quête, d'une recherche ou d'une mission à accomplir, etc., ainsi « l'opération d'ouverture du capital » est la mission qu'on nous narre. Il s'agit dans ce corpus médiatique d'une narration élaborée par plusieurs narrateurs : l'ensemble des journaux, des radios et des télévisions.

Le récit débute sur une situation initiale (SI), /la décision de lancer l'ouverture du capital d'EDF/ qui à la suite d'une série de transformations se clôt par une situation finale (SF), /l'entrée dans le CAC40/. Les dates clefs de l'opération d'ouverture du capital, forment des repères événementiels qui cristallisent les différentes transformations propres au récit, c'est-à-dire les événements qui permettent de passer de la situation initiale à la situation finale : ces transformations peuvent aussi être considérées comme les épreuves qualifiantes que le héros doit franchir pour mener à bien sa quête (selon le modèle actantiel de Greimas [1966]). Ces dates clefs sont la fin de la souscription (18 novembre 2005), le congrès du Parti Socialiste au Mans (18-20 novembre), le premier jour de cotation (21 novembre), etc. ; puis suivent une série de petits événements : l'annonce quasi quotidienne du nombre de souscripteurs ou les mouvements contre la privatisation d'EDF, etc. qui maintiennent le récit dans l'actualité médiatique.

*2. Explication : Remaniement du schéma actantiel
de Greimas, les actants du récit*

La description événementielle du récit permet de mettre au jour les différents pôles actantiels qui supportent les transformations selon le schéma de Greimas (donateur(s)/narrateur(s), destinataire(s)/lecteur(s), quête, héros, adjuvant(s), opposant(s)). Les pôles actantiels, principalement ceux des donateurs/narrateurs, destinataires/lecteurs, adjuvants, opposants, sont tenus par des actants, les institutions bancaires et/ou financières, le

gouvernement, les associations de consommateurs, les syndicats etc. et/ou par des acteurs comme Dominique de Villepin, Thierry Breton, Pierre Gadonneix, les *leaders* syndicaux, etc. Nous incluons sous le terme d'*actant*, aussi bien les *acteurs* que les *actants* proprement dits, n'effectuant pas dans ce travail une analyse détaillée des personnages du récit.

Si l'on considère comme Roland Barthes (1966) que « ... le récit, comme objet, est l'enjeu d'une communication : [pour lequel] il y a un donateur du récit, un destinataire du récit », celui de l'augmentation du capital d'EDF possède une pluralité de donateurs ; qu'il s'agisse du gouvernement (premier ministre, ministre de l'économie et des finances, etc.), des syndicats et de leurs représentants ou des associations de consommateurs, etc. De la même manière, les narrateurs (les médias) sont multiples qui co-construisent le récit au travers des articles, interviews, dessins de presse et autres émissions de télévision, etc. Le *destinataire* du récit est à la fois le lecteur, le téléspectateur, l'auditeur, etc. et l'*investisseur potentiel*. Ces deux pôles de la narration sont invariables, c'est-à-dire occupés par les mêmes types d'actants.

La définition de la quête est le premier point qui interroge le modèle actantiel. D'une part on peut considérer qu'il s'agit de « l'ouverture (partielle) du capital d'EDF », quête portée par des actants héroïques comme EDF ou le gouvernement incarnés par des acteurs comme Pierre Gadonneix, Dominique de Villepin et/ou Thierry Breton. D'autre part on peut considérer que « la privatisation d'EDF » est la quête portée par des actants héroïques comme les syndicats (en particulier la CGT), la Gauche (en particulier le Parti communiste et/ou le Parti socialiste) incarnés par les différents *leaders* syndicaux et/ou différents représentants des partis de Gauche. En fait, au début du récit le terme *privatisation* est celui qui est utilisé par tous les actants, puis avant même la fin de la souscription, une différenciation apparaît entre « l'ouverture (partielle) du capital d'EDF » et « la privatisation d'EDF ». La première expression, utilisée par tous les actants favorables à l'action relatée par les médias est celle qui s'impose avant même la fin de la souscription ; cela pour éviter le champ sémantique mis en œuvre par le terme *privatisation* (du côté de l'opposition public/privé, libéralisme/socialisme, etc.) sur lequel s'appuient les syndicats et tous les opposants à *l'ouverture du capital*. Cette expression définissant la quête met en place les banques et les salariés souscripteurs comme *adjuvants*, les syndicats et la Gauche comme *opposants*.




Schéma 1. Rendrement <ouverture (partielle) du capital d'EDF> / <privatisation d'EDF>

A l'inverse, *la privatisation*, ou plutôt *le refus de la privatisation*, est la quête soutenue par les syndicats et la Gauche. Elle est le versant négatif de l'ouverture du capital ; dans ce cas les adjuvants deviennent les syndicats et la Gauche, les opposants les banques et les salariés souscripteurs. Le récit se construit ainsi autour d'une quête à double face que les indices discursifs permettent d'identifier. Comme le montre le schéma ci-dessus, le pôle ordonnateur change aussi pour être occupé par la Gauche et les syndicats.

La co-existence de deux quêtes conditionnant le renversement des pôles actantiels crée deux schémas actantiels qui peuvent exister en même temps dans la narration. Cependant les pôles actantiels ainsi définis ne suffisent pas à expliquer tous les fonctionnements narratifs du récit. Aussi ont été ajouté au schéma actantiel original : un pôle neutre et un fluctuant. Le pôle neutre, représenté par les journaux et les analystes financiers, les associations de consommateurs, ne soutient ni n'empêche la quête. De manière plus générale et souvent pédagogique, il informe sur ses avantages et ses inconvénients. Le pôle fluctuant peut tenir toutes les positions actantielles du récit (hormis la quête). Il est représenté par les journaux financiers et certains analystes qui, au cours de l'évolution du récit (évolution du nombre de souscripteurs, hypothèses sur le prix de mise en bourse de l'action, variation du cours, etc.), basculent de la position d'adjuvant à celle d'opposant ou à celle de neutre. Ces variations de positions se font à la fois sur l'axe du temps de la narration (diachronie narrative) et pour le même actant dans la synchronie narrative ; par exemple le même journal financier peut tenir par l'intermédiaire de différents journalistes des places neutres et adjuvantes ou neutres et opposantes. Toutefois, certaines com-

binaisons s'excluent mutuellement dans la synchronie narrative telles que opposant/adjutant.




Schéma 2. Extension du modèle actantiel

Sur le plan formel, les fréquences statistiques (en terme d'occurrence dans les documents) placent *l'ouverture du capital* avant *la privatisation* et construisent une hiérarchie qui favorise un récit, celui de « l'ouverture du capital » par rapport à l'autre, celui de « la (-) privatisation ». En outre, comme le montrent les schémas, les mêmes actants et leurs incarnations occupent une majorité de places pour une même quête (exemple : les pôles d'ordonnateur, de héros et d'adjutant pour le gouvernement : récit de « l'ouverture du capital ») ce qui confère à la narration médiatique une apparence de consensus, alors que la multiplication des pôles actantels et leur variabilité donnent une certaine confusion au récit, tant sur le plan de sa progression qu'en terme d'identification des positions actantielles et narratives. L'association de ces deux traits fait osciller le récit entre consensus apparent et dissension.

3. *Interprétation : Idéalisation ~ Dramatisation*

La troisième phase du travail, interprétative, consiste à dégager les effets de sens. Parmi les nombreuses pistes interprétatives dégagées, nous ne présentons dans ce travail que l'axe de l'idéalisation versus celui de la dramatisation, celui qualifiant le(s) récit(s). Cet axe interprétatif s'appuie d'une part sur des caractéristiques du discours et d'autre part sur les actants qui le supportent. Des nombreux indices mis au jour par l'analyse, nous ne retenons que quelques uns des traits identifiants, que nous jugeons pertinents dans la mesure où ils existent aussi bien dans le récit de « l'ouverture du capital », le seul présenté dans cet article, que dans celui de la « privatisation ».

Trois types de discours, s'appliquant à l'entreprise EDF et à l'opération « d'ouverture du capital » en elle-même, caractérisent les actants favorables à la quête (les ordonnateurs de la quête, les héros, les adjouvants). Le discours de la compétition, qu'elle soit sportive et/ou économique ; de celui de la satisfaction (auto-satisfaction) qui loue le(s) vainqueur(s) de la quête et celui de l'identification du coupable, sorte de catharsis qui permet d'attribuer les erreurs susceptibles de faire échouer la quête à d'autre(s) qu'au(x) vainqueur(s).

La compétition est avant tout économique. Dans ce domaine EDF est une entreprise en concurrence, la compétitivité est le maître mot de cet univers discursif. Au nom de la concurrence et pour répondre aux directives européennes, l'ouverture du capital est présentée comme le seul moyen de donner à l'entreprise la possibilité de faire face à la concurrence. Et à ce titre il la justifie. Ainsi dans un article de *L'Usine Nouvelle* (03/11/2005) sont exposées trois raisons pour justifier l'ouverture de capital d'EDF : « 1 Réussir son programme d'investissement ... S'il veut rester le premier exportateur d'électricité en Europe, sans risque de coupure, EDF doit relancer son outil de production et renforcer ses capacités d'échanges avec les autres pays. », « 2 Devenir un acteur gazier à part entière ... pour proposer une offre à la mesure de celles des grands concurrents européens diversifiés comme EON. », « 3 Elargir sa base européenne S'il ne veut pas être en reste dans un marché européen en plein mouvement, [...] ». Ce discours est celui de la compétition en termes d'objectifs à atteindre. Les expressions *délais à tenir*, *objectif chiffrable et quantifiable* sont employées comme dans les compétitions sportives peuvent être utilisées

les performances qu'il conviendrait d'atteindre pour telle ou telle équipe en vue de changer de division, etc. *L'augmentation de capital d'EDF* est donc construite comme une compétition et transforme l'entreprise en un concurrent parmi d'autres dans l'ensemble des *ouvertures de capital* précédentes (celles de France Télécom et Gaz de France, les plus fréquemment citées) : « Quatorze jours pour convaincre : c'est le laps de temps qui reste à EDF pour tenter de rallier les suffrages des investisseurs institutionnels mais surtout des particuliers alors même que le PDG, Pierre Gadonneix, s'est fixé un objectif ambitieux de 4 millions d'actionnaires individuels ». Une fois la compétition lancée et les objectifs fixés, les médias rendent régulièrement compte du score, c'est-à-dire du nombre d'actionnaires, en particulier, *petits actionnaires, actionnaires individuels, actionnaires particuliers*, ayant souscrit l'action EDF : « L'introduction en Bourse d'EDF suscite un réel engouement chez les particuliers. Moins de deux semaines après le lancement de l'opération, les *petits porteurs* ont déjà transmis plus de 2,5 millions d'ordre d'achat à leurs intermédiaires financiers. », (*Les Echos*, 10/11/2005) ; « Rué sur l'action EDF » (*Libération*, 16/11/2005)

Ainsi, compétition économique et compétition sportive entremêlent leurs mots et construisent comme un défi (sportif) que héros, donateurs et adjuvants doivent relever et gagner. Les défaillances par rapport à la quête, ou les échecs, sont commentés sur le même mode discursif : (*France soir*, 22/11/2005) avant-titre *Première heures de cotation titre L'action EDF déçoit les porteurs, ...* « Les banques qui ont organisé l'opération essaient de maintenir le cours en hausse, sinon une dégringolade serait une catastrophe pour l'Etat. C'est une hausse artificielle », a commenté M. Sabatier, stratège boursier chez JCF Facser. ... « Contrairement aux espoirs des petits porteurs, l'augmentation de capital d'EDF ne réalise pas la performance de Gaz de France ..., » parlant de maintien du cours ou de maintien en *ligue 1* et utilisant le registre de l'affect à la façon d'exprimer les états d'âme des supporteurs d'un club sportif aux de mauvais résultats.

Ce dernier exemple montre le lien entre discours de la compétition et discours de satisfaction (auto-satisfaction lorsque l'émetteur du message est l'ordonnateur de la quête et/ou le héros) qui qualifie les vainqueurs. Au même titre que le discours sportif, la satisfaction s'exprime par des superlatifs et par le verbe *gagner*.

Ce discours s'associe à celui de la compétition ; il appartient au gagnant ; il est donc tenu principalement par le pôle ordonnateur, héros y compris,

et concerne surtout *l'actionnariat populaire*, qualifiée le plus fréquemment de : *d'extraordinaire, très grand, formidable, ...* En outre, L'atteinte et le dépassement des objectifs du nombre de souscripteurs est souvent décrit de manière métaphorique par des expressions telles que : *record battu pour une privatisation, record battu toutes catégories pour le ministre, souscription qui explose (qui a fait exploser) les compteurs*. Cf. : (*Aujourd'hui en France*, 11/11/2005), sous-titre : *Privatisation. Les français ont réservé en nombre des actions EDF, s'est félicité hier le ministre de l'économie, etc.* ; *EDF a gagné son pari pour l'introduction en Bourse (La Tribune, 19/11/2005)* ; le discours de satisfaction concerne non seulement les commanditaires de la quête et les héros mais aussi les destinataires lecteurs, employés d'EDF¹ qui y ont participé (petits actionnaires - adjuvants), puisque l'entreprise victorieuse du défi de *l'ouverture du capital* en sort grandie et le destinataire *amoureux* rassuré. Enfin la quête est en elle-même qualifiée par ce discours de *succès populaire (sans précédent, ...)*, (*vrai, sensationnel, extraordinaire, etc.*) *plébiscite*, etc. Ainsi tout est fait pour glorifier. L'ensemble des effets de sens dégagés contribue à augmenter l'impression de consensus d'autant que la fréquence de ces discours est supérieure à celle qui supporte l'autre discours. On peut alors faire le parallèle avec l'ambiance euphorisante du Téléthon lors de l'annonce de l'augmentation des promesses de dons (nombre de souscripteurs pour EDF), le montant maximal de souscriptions étant dépassé, record battu. Ainsi, non seulement la quête répond à l'un des idéaux sociaux du moment, mais aussi elle valorise héros, adjuvants et destinataires en les faisant porteurs de « la bonne action ».

Or, tout n'est pas succès dans la quête et dans le flux de communication du récit, il convient de justifier les échecs, c'est-à-dire de trouver ce qui (ceux qui) en est la cause, soit à justifier ces « ratés », de trouver qui est responsable de *la mauvaise première cotation de l'action EDF, de l'effondrement du cours* : il s'agit de trouver un coupable.

Ce discours concerne essentiellement les premiers jours de cotation de l'action EDF. Si la quête connaît des ralentissements ou des échecs, ils ne peuvent être attribués aux actants soutenant la quête (ordonnateurs, héros, adjuvants). Deux mouvements de désignation du coupable sont en œuvre : le premier met en cause *les petits actionnaires*. Ce sont principalement les ordonnateurs de la quête et le héros² qui portent ces accusations (cf. *Europe 1*, 23/11/2005) à propos de la chute du cours « Pour la suite ça ne devrait pas s'arranger prévoient les analystes. Ils expliquent que de très nombreux

particuliers ont choisi de revendre leurs titres même à perte par crainte que la baisse se poursuive. Bref 48 heures après l'introduction officielle on cherche déjà les coupables [...] ». Puis, presque concomitamment, ce sont les *hedges funds* qui sont mis en cause non seulement par les ordonnateurs de la quête et les héros mais aussi par une partie de adjuvants (en particulier les petits actionnaires contre les *hedges funds* les particuliers contre les institutions). (*AFP*, 29/11/2005), titre *EDF enquête de l'AMF sur le rôle des fonds dans la baisse du titre*, « Les fonds sont soupçonnés par le gendarme de la Bourse d'avoir 'fait artificiellement baisser le cours de l'action lors de son introduction' ... ». Sans entrer dans le détail de l'analyse des différentes manières de porter l'accusation. Il est important cependant de constater que ces dernières finissent par n'être proférées que contre les actants les plus éloignés du pôle adjuvant : les *hedges funds*.³

L'idéalisation discursive et actantielle mise en place s'appuie sur les valeurs en cours dans le socius compétition sportive et identification au groupe des vainqueurs, *les gagnants gagnants*.⁴ La (-) *privatisation*, l'autre quête, construit, le contre discours qui se fonde sur trois types d'indices discursifs : les annonces et ou les compte rendus des actes contre l'ouverture du capital, des discours de mise en garde et de dénonciation. Comme dans la quête de « l'ouverture du capital », ce discours « anti » est tenu par le pôle ordonnateur, les héros et les adjuvants de la quête, c'est-à-dire la Gauche, les syndicats et leurs *leaders*, les associations, etc.

L'objectif de ce discours étant de mobiliser, c'est-à-dire de créer une réaction « contre »⁵ rend compte des mouvements sociaux « contre la privatisation et pour la défense du service public »⁶: *La Marseillaise* (09/11/2005), titre *Journée d'action pour la défense du service public*; *AFP*, (08/11/2005), titre *Mobilisation contre la privatisation d'EDF : Grèves et baisse de production*. Hormis la défense du service public qu'il faut entendre comme opposé au privé⁷, la protection des français et la sauvegarde d'EDF *patrimoine qui appartient à tous les français*⁸ figurent dans les arguments les plus utilisés.

Le discours de mise en garde met en place les risques et les dangers que fait courir la privatisation : dangers par rapport à la sécurité, à la santé en particulier en ce qui concerne le nucléaire et sa gestion ; les risques financiers dans la mesure où la privatisation coûte cher et donc qu'elle peut s'avérer être un placement dangereux : (*Challenge*, 03/11/2005) titre *La privatisation d'EDF pour qui la facture ?*, sous-titre *Le gouvernement*

privatise EDF, une entreprise qui présente à terme un lourd risque financier pour la collectivité ; Les privatisations spolient la nation et abusent les petits actionnaires. Cet ensemble de mises en garde se tresse avec le discours « anti », c'est-à-dire les thèmes qui cristallisent les craintes de la société, soit la mondialisation, le nucléaire (ses accidents, le stockage des déchets, etc.), les licenciements et le chômage, bref le capitalisme. Ces discours se retrouvent souvent mis en scène dans les dessins de la presse satirique. Discours « anti » et discours de mise en garde sont ainsi associés à celui de la mobilisation. L'ensemble de ces discours active les peurs économiques et sociales pour créer le drame autour du récit. Cette quête n'aboutissant pas, elle construit un récit dysphorique.

Ce travail d'analyse qui a permis d'étendre le schéma actantiel de Greimas, et de monter la coexistence simultanée de deux schémas, l'un euphorique l'autre dysphorique, le récit oscillant entre les deux positions, ou même, tenant toutes les positions comme en témoignent les actants fluctuants. Anne-Marie Houdebine parle alors d'oscillation discursive et Jean-Pierre Faye « d'oscillation sémantique ». Ces notions qui inscrivent le flou de cette médiatisation, qu'on peut dire *langue de caoutchouc*, qui semble être le propre du récit médiatique, marque éventuelle du désir d'objectivité de médias ou de manipulation.

Notes

1. Cette attachement à l'entreprise EDF, « *entreprise préférée des français* » est souvent repris par les médias dans la période qui précède l'annonce de l'ouverture du capital et pendant tout le récit que nous analysons.
2. Particulièrement le gouvernement, le Premier Ministre et le Ministre de l'Economie.
3. Il faut se rappeler que l'ouverture du capital a été annoncée comme le moyen pour les français de posséder leur « *entreprise préférée* », ou de favoriser « *l'actionnariat populaire* ». En outre, les *hedges funds* sont des institutions non des individus, ce qui rend l'accusation plus impersonnelle et permet aux petits actionnaires particulièrement concernés comme destinataires de ne pas se sentir visés.
4. Ainsi que dans les discours de la dernière présidentielle.
5. Contre l'idée d'ouvrir le capital avant l'ouverture de la souscription puis contre la souscription, etc.
6. C'est l'expression la plus utilisée dans les médias.

7. Dans cette quête le privé est vu comme négatif, il représente le « capital », le monde des finances dans lequel, seuls les profits comptent.
8. Le terme patrimoine est à entendre au sens économique.

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Patrizia Calefato

Dressing in signs: Fashion theory between sociosemiotics and cultural studies

1. Introduction

Since Roland Barthes wrote *The Fashion System* in 1967, semiotics has analysed the nature of what may be termed the “fashion sign”. For Barthes this was the sign of described fashion, i.e. fashion converted into language in specialised magazines. Apart from this special Barthesian type of sign, we can speak of “real” fashion (as he himself called it), i.e. a system that is not only “inscribed”, or described, but also a system of communication and social interpretation that is syncretically fed by other communication media – film, TV, the Internet, music, photography, video games, etc. – and is emerging as “mass fashion” (Calefato 1996; new ed. 2007).¹

In this sense, the semiotic perspective coincides with fashion studies, or what I would describe more exactly as “fashion theory”, a multidisciplinary field that looks at fashion as a system for producing meaning within which cultural and aesthetic performances of the clothed body are produced (see Calefato 2004). In this paper, after clarifying some methodological, historical and theoretical issues relating to fashion theory, I analyse certain aspects of the socio-semiotic fashion system – among them the relationship between the clothed body and identity, including gender identity – and then examine a number of topics such as luxury, proper names and writing.

2. Fashion theory

The term “fashion theory” refers to an interdisciplinary field that sees fashion as a meaning system within which cultural and aesthetic portrayals of

the clothed body are produced. From a terminological point of view, my choice of this term reflects a development in which the traditional history and sociology of clothing have been critically superseded and theory is implicitly seen as the deconstruction of universalistic canons. From a connotative point of view, “fashion theory” recalls such expressions as “film theory”, “gender theory”, “queer theory”, etc., in which “theory” means specific, genealogical knowledge. The “theory” sees its “subject” – in this case contemporary fashion – as a system in which roles, social hierarchies, models of the imagination, figures of the body are produced. In this sense, fashion theory is culture theory, an expression that partly covers modern “philosophy of culture” but reconceives its terms in the light of the tradition of cultural and gender studies, post-structuralism and post-colonialism.

“Fashion theory” is used here in preference to the term “fashion studies”, which more specifically extend to the various disciplines associated with the professions in the fashion world (from styling to marketing). The use of the term “fashion theory”, on the other hand, points to a transverse theoretical approach which, in advance of any professional know-how, constructs favourable conditions and theoretical filters by selecting from among the human and social sciences (including literature, philosophy and art) the fashion system understood as a special dimension of material culture, the history of the body, the theory of sensibility. Fashion Theory is also the title of an international quarterly edited by Valerie Steele and published by Berg (Oxford) since 1997, which adopts the selfsame approach.

Antecedents and fundamentals of fashion theory can be found in some basic early twentieth-century sociological studies, the most extensive and far-sighted of which are those by Georg Simmel; in the philosophical writings of Walter Benjamin, particularly his notes on nineteenth-century Paris; and in linguistic structuralism, which sees clothing and fashion as a semiological system that to some extent operates like language.

Georg Simmel’s 1895 essay on fashion defines it as a system of social cohesion that allows the individual’s membership of a group to be dialectically reconciled with his relative spiritual independence. Fashion, says Simmel, is governed by motives of imitation and distinction, which are transmitted vertically to the community by a particular social circle. They are accompanied by the “stimulating, piquant” charm that fashion conveys through what Simmel describes as the “contrast between its broad, all-permeating dissemination and its rapid, fundamental evanescence” and as the

“right to be unfaithful to it”. Simmel’s analysis implicitly lays the basis for a definition of fashion as a system that can only be spoken of in the context of modernity, and specifically the mature modernity of mass society, in which the production of goods automatically means the production of mass-producible signs and social meanings. In this classic phase of fashion the dissemination mechanism is a “trickle-down” process from the leisured social classes to the masses, followed by horizontal extension through the imitation mechanism, only to be immediately replaced, in a new cycle, by the distinction mechanism.

Written at the same time as Simmel’s work, Thorstein Veblen’s *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (1899) includes spending on clothing as part of conspicuous consumption by the upper middle classes, whereas Sombart (1913) takes the view that spending (especially by women) on luxuries, of which clothing and accessories are a significant part, has been a key feature of capitalism ever since its original accumulation phase.

As something that is inherent in the mass-reproducibility of commodities, fashion is graphically described in Benjamin’s *Passagen-Werk* (1982) as the “sex appeal of the inorganic”. To Benjamin, fashion represents the triumph of the commodity form, in which the body has become a cadaver, a fetish. In fashion, in an exemplary manner, the relationships between the living and the inorganic are Marxistically inverted and duplicated: the (female) body displays the charm of a devitalised, estranged nature, and remains as an envelope, an adornment, a cadaverous support for clothing. The scenario within which Benjamin constructs this spectral vision is that of the modern city, prototypically presented as the nineteenth-century Paris of passages and flâneurs, of goods exhibited at major fairs, of oneiric architecture, a city in which the Baudelairean worldly artist and the Poe-like madman are striking figures.

A comparison between fashion and language is provided, if only in passing, in two very brief references from Saussure’s *Course of General Linguistics*. The first notes that fashion, unlike language, is not a completely arbitrary system, since the obsession with clothing that fashion implies can only move so far beyond the conditions dictated by the human body. The second deals with the mechanism of imitation, which concerns both the phenomenon of fashion and the phonetic changes in language, and whose origin, says the *Course*, remains a mystery in both cases.

Linguistic semiology in the first half of the twentieth century is fascinated by fashion and costume phenomena, precisely because there it sees the operation of mechanisms of internal opposition between features, of compulsory yet unmotivated variation – a systematicity, in short, that is highly reminiscent of the functioning of language as seen in relation to the notion of sign. In the 1930s Nikolai Trubetskoy, the founder of structural phonetics and at the time a member of the Prague Linguistics Circle, applied the Saussurean contrast between *langue* and *parole* to the relationship between costume and clothing, seeing the former as a social phenomenon (which therefore includes fashion) similar to *langue*, and the latter as an individual act similar to *parole*. Trubetskoy speaks of a homologous relationship between the system of language and the system of clothing, between phonology and study of costumes, thus confirming the more general link that European structuralism established between linguistics and anthropology from the 1930s to the 1950s. In the same direction, Petr Bogatyrev, like Trubetskoy (and Jakobson) one of the leading members of the Prague Circle, produced an analysis of the folk costume of Moravian Slovakia, using a functionalist approach that identified a hierarchy of functions in the costume, including practical, aesthetic, magical and ritual functions (Bogatyrev 1937).

In 1931 the Lithuanian-born American linguistic and anthropologist Edward Sapir wrote the “fashion” entry in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, in which he established the differences between fashion and taste and between fashion and costume, in that the latter is a relatively stable type of social behaviour, whereas the former is subject to constant change. It may be no accident that both Sapir and Trubetskoy (admittedly in different cultural settings) turned their specific attention to both fashion and the notion of the phoneme, i.e. the basic unit of language which is a distinctive, constant feature of it, and on which the recognisability of a linguistic system by contrasts is based. Imitation and distinction, let us remember, are the very motives that Simmel identified in fashion.

3. *Clothing, fashion, identity*

Roland Barthes's *The Fashion System* (1967) is the text that most clearly reflects the shift to a theory of fashion as a social discourse. Radically, Barthes does not deal here with real fashion, but with fashion as described in

magazines: the garment is completely converted into language, and even image is merely used in order to be transposed into words. In this sense, not only (as Barthes provocatively maintained in the face of the Saussurean tradition) is semiology part of linguistics and not vice versa, but language, which “the science of all imagined worlds” (i.e. linguistics) endeavours to set up as a system “with a second birth”, is not “the same as that of linguists”: Barthesian linguistics breaks the canon. Barthes’s lesson, which thus goes beyond actual semiology, is that fashion only exists through the apparatus, technologies and communication systems that construct its meaning. In Barthes’s *System*, specialised journalism is the place where fashion is discussed, where both the subject of fashion and the person for whom it is intended (the reader) are constructed. The post-modern context makes clear that a whole series of social discourses from film to music, the new media and advertising, are the places where fashion exists as a syncretic, intertextual system, as a reticular reference between the signs of the clothed body and as a constant construction and deconstruction of the subjects that negotiate, interpret or receive its meaning.

Dick Hebdige’s 1979 analysis of the subculture fits in perfectly with this. Moving away from the more classic positions of British cultural studies, Hebdige defines style as a form of aesthetic and ethical group membership in mass society with emerging in-crowd cultures (the influence of Gramsci is fundamental here) made up of blocks that include ways of dressing, music, literature, film and daily habits – a pop universe that is expressed in “street styles” ranging from rockers to punks, which Hebdige contrasts with fashion seen as one of the “pre-eminent forms of discourse”. He believes that punk, in particular, was a strategy of denaturalising style, rather like surrealism, which had the effect of revealing paradoxical readings of objects, such as the safety pin stuck into the skin, or unnatural hair colour, simultaneously and criminally revealing the unnatural character of any discourse.

In fact, fashion theory reaches maturity with the abandonment by various disciplines of the whole notion of fashion as an institutional, upper-class social system. “Trickle-down” is turned into “bubble-up”, as is clearly shown by the history of two garments that are emblematic of the twentieth century: jeans and the mini-skirt. Fashion as mass fashion is seen as the place where a complexity of tensions, meanings and values – and not only in relation to clothing is manifested. This complexity is centred on the

body and the ways in which it exists in the world, is represented, is masked, disguised and measured, and clashes with stereotypes and mythologies.

The clothed body is the physico-cultural territory in which the visible, perceivable performance of our outward identity takes place. This composite cultural text-fabric provides opportunities for the manifestation of individual and social traits that draw on such elements as gender, taste, ethnicity, sexuality, sense of belonging to a social group or, conversely, transgression. Fashion studies of masculinity or of the gender differences that have been historically and culturally constructed through clothing show how the history of clothing has also been the history of the body, of the way in which we have constructed it, imagined it and divided it between men and women on the basis of its productive and reproductive functions, its discipline, the hierarchies written on it, the discourses that have constructed its passions and meanings. Fashion – or rather fashions, in the plural – are the devices that organise the signs of the clothed body in time and space, almost as if forging its language, and at the same time they represent possible ways of mixing the reference codes by constructing hybrids between signs, just like the linguistic and cultural hybrids within which the very idea of identity is constructed.

4. Names and brands

Proper names have to do with the body; to be more precise, they “inscribe” the body in the social sphere within a modelling practice – clothing – which can be entirely defined as a form of language, and within fashion seen as the communicative institution that defines clothing in our day and age. In this sense, the name as considered here is part of a range of terms for which I will now propose a provisional “glossary”. The signature is the designer’s signed name, associated with a craftsmanlike and even artistic dimension of stylistic creation; it includes manuality, the charge of passion and identity which the signature as a writing practice contains within it. I am thinking, for example, of the difference between a painter signing a picture and a citizen signing an official document. The former involves the meaning of the work, the complex relationship between the producer and the product which he is relinquishing and giving to others, to the world and to time. The latter involves the performative power of language: a signature on a cheque gives it value in exchange, a signature on a document

endorses what is written in it, and a signature on one's passport confirms one's social and civil identity. Everyday language invents neologisms such as *signé* – a French word that implies the exclusivity, the distinction, the economic and status value contained within the garment.

The brand is the name a company adopts, the sign it uses to “brand” the commodity, quite literally, like livestock. Sometimes it is a name in the strict sense (Armani, Missoni, Benetton, etc.); sometimes it is a symbolic name, a nickname or a fanciful name (Kookai, Krizia, Nike, etc.); sometimes it is a symbol that accompanies the brand and thus becomes a logo (the Nike swoosh, the Lacoste crocodile, the Trussardi dog, the Mandarina Duck duckling, etc.). The proper name is often sufficient on its own, as a text. Sometimes the brand is the genealogical, paternal number, like the signs on the body that the father of the main character in Greenaway's film *The Pillow Book* “gave” her every year on her birthday, but sometimes it enables the body and the identity to mimic itself through clothing, just like a “nickname” on the Internet.

Thus the clothed body often wears proper names. In various spiritual experiences, in religions, traditions and cultures that are sometime very distant from each other in space and time, “wearing” a name often means writing the sacred name of the divinity on one's body. The god's letter or symbol, tattooed or painted on the skin or woven into the garment, metonymically transfigures the devotee's body by bringing it closer to, or actually making it part of, God – a practice that would seem to bring even the great monotheistic religions close to an immanence that is conveyed by language, or rather writing.

Today the proper name written on the body is the secularised, trivial name whereby the garment is “christened” by the person who has the means and power not only to produce it, but above all to communicate it and make it circulate in the empire of signs: the name is in fact fundamentally the brand, symbol, logo or signature that the body is showing off. Here again there is a metonymic relationship, though it is different from the one discussed earlier; in this case it is the garment that becomes a name, and it is the name-as-brand that becomes, if not actually God, at least a myth, a principle and a vehicle of meaning that is seemingly “natural”, but in reality is developed culturally through complex strategies of manipulation and pretence. Objects thus have proper names that are separate from their everyday function: we have always been fond of objects,

like Linus of his blanket, and the best way to show fondness for an object is to give it a name, as though it were an animate being. A name effectively “animates” things, brings what is inert and inorganic to life, in this sense acting as one of the main vehicles of fetishist perversion, be it the expression of the rite of passage of the polymorphous infant, or the obsessive tic of the consumer. What happens when a garment is “christened” brings this perversion directly into contact with the transfigurations that we perform on our bodies whenever we get dressed, in the ordinary, everyday action that revives – though often imperceptibly and unintentionally – both the carnivalesque ritual of disguises and masks and the dress code of uniform.

Nevertheless, the closing years of the twentieth century were marked by hypertrophy, or hypercodification, of proper names in the clothing world. A specific characteristic of social reproduction in our time has in fact been the construction of a style or philosophy of life around the brand, which is the only “product” that companies, with multinationals in the forefront, now want to create, leaving the production of actual goods to “nameless” companies scattered around the world. The globalisation of production is now finally separating those who produce from what they produce: for example, if a multinational has a pair of shoes made at low cost in Indonesia, the shoes will never be worn by the people who have actually made them. The worker will have made the shoes with his or her own hands, but will be dispossessed of them from the outset, since the only thing that matters is who makes the brand, which is what finally gives these hypothetical shoes their name and the aura that the world of marketing and advertising surrounds them with. This can be conceived as an interesting twenty-first-century version of the notion of alienation caused by capitalistic methods of production, which makes one think deeply not only about the power of names, which are truly commodity signs (as Rossi-Landi would say), but also about how relations between “East” and “West”, “first” and “third” worlds, are being redefined in the communication of objects and images associated with the complex system of fashions.

In the fashion system the role of the proper name is particularly rich in both pragmatic (and, I would say, political) and theoretical implications. This notion has its roots in the fullest study ever carried out on the relationship between clothing and language: Barthes’s *The Fashion System*. As already indicated, Barthes treats fashion purely as “described fashion”, i.e. fashion converted into language in specialised magazine features. The

author keeps this fashion quite separate from the “image fashion” of photography and from “real” worn fashion. However, as has also been indicated, Barthes’s treatment sheds a good deal of light on the wider relationship between clothing and language, so much so that *The Fashion System* can truly be considered a “standard work” on the subject. This is also reflected in two striking elements introduced by the name: (1) the construction of a mythological frame of reference based on words: specifically, the brand assumes a precise role in the construction of values and meanings in which the value of the verbal sign is today translated as a commodity; and (2) the function of writing within the same “real” garment, which often explicitly shows the relationship between the garment and the world and between the garment and fashion, as happens with “inscribed” T-shirts or when, more generally, the signature is displayed on garments.

Today the objects of fashion – garments and accessories – have been completely converted into language, to the point where, beyond the requirements of empirical analysis, every presumed gulf between described fashion and real fashion can be said to have been bridged, so essential are the brands, the slogans, the “living captions” that make up the garment, as well as the intersemiotic practices of constant cross-reference between fashion and other meaning systems: film, advertising, metropolitan art, rock music, new in-crowd idiom. Ultimately, “real” fashion is always imbued with language, textuality and intertextuality.

5. *Conclusions*

Today, as Gayatri Spivak Chakravorty (1999) has said, fashion is the way in which narratives of transnational capitalist domination are organised. Yet fashion is ambivalent: it carries stories within in, it institutes spaces, it produces myths, it gives a voice to meanings and is a place of conflict, just like the whole contemporary world is a composite scenario in which clothing signs are in dialogue and are translated. The street is thus the physical and metaphorical place in which styles, tastes and habits that link fashions in a kind of diffuse, popular in-crowd culture emerge. Communication media, above all cinema as a great store and mainspring of social imagination, are acting in extremely close synergy with fashion. New communication techniques are altering the very definitions of corporeality in the social context, and there is a new theoretical awareness of what it means to

see body clothing as a disguise which allows people to abandon social or sexual stereotypes, break the rules of the game with deliberate ambiguity, and produce performances that give pleasure.

Note

1. *Mass moda* in the original Italian: a pun based on the similarity between the words *moda* (“fashion”) and “media”.

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Patrizia Calefato

What name are you?

Understanding/misunderstanding a “proper” sign^t

Proper names are like clothes in that they identify us within a multitude and, at the same time, cling to us like a second skin. As with clothes, we can hate them or love them; they can be light or heavy, fashionable or outdated, aristocratic or lower class. They may be our great-grandmother's legacy, like a sort of family *vintage*; they may be taken after film or TV stars, after the protagonist of a novel or an historical figure. They can arouse the senses – sight, touch or smell – like flowers; they can fit us, like a “little black dress”; sometimes we can slip out of our everyday names and put new ones on, a rebirth or to disguise and hide. They can inscribe our identity in the ciphers of a legend, like the one about a family from Emilia – a historically communist Italian region – whose 3 children were named *Rivo*, *Luzio* and *Nario*, so that the three names together would form the word *Revolutionary*. Likewise, the same thing happens when our clothes display a clearly visible brand. Some people achieve their name through many trials, some others make it up by themselves and many others hand it down to their children and offspring.

Names as clothes: this image seems a felicitous one when I focus of proper names as identity signs materializing on an individual body in a metonymic way, just like clothes and garments lie on the body itself. But the issue thickens if we shift from people to places and from places to objects. To name is to bestow life on what is lifeless, but sometimes it may imply the arrogance of considering as lifeless or nameless that which already has a name or a life of its own. Therefore proper names may signify possession, as revealed by the names scattered through History by the empires that have baptised human beings, cities, rivers, mountains and continents into the world. To name is always to infuse the territory with an identifying

sign: always a way to humanize nature. What image is then evoked when the bearer of a proper name is an animal? The owner is usually the one who names the animal, but it may also be an accidental human friend, as happens in the movie *Dances with Wolves*, whose protagonist names a lone wolf “Two Socks” on account of the white colour of his front legs; or as in *Breakfast at Tiffany’s* where the protagonist, Holly, calls her anonymous cat “Poor slob without a name”. But animals, too, use names to call each other with sorts of indices that, in their context, function as those name badges that waitresses wear on their chests in American movies. A way to simplify life. But when the name is placed within language, that is to say within a human system measuring the world, it is not a mere badge on the chest. And if it is, then it means something.

The issue of the name is not easily solved: it cannot be solved by onomastics, which collects valuable inventories of a world that is too big to be encompassed by one entry alone. Indeed, there are also proper designations similar to names, such as book and movie titles or shop signs. And in the same order of the name, bordering the stereotype, we can also include every definition that hastily and inexorably labels somebody or something. Also a proper name is the appellative we use to address our parents or relatives in direct speech: dad, aunt, grandpa. And in reported speech there is a different shade of meaning between “my mother” and “mom”; “aunt Rosa” and “aunt”. The different designation implies a relationship between the speaker and the one who is called. It is also here that the name, in all its senses and meanings, becomes a generating principle of affects, the sign of a relationship.

But there is more to this, because meanings of the name are not confined to verbal language alone, but live in close connection to images. In visual culture such elements as logos, brands, labels and goods packaging, function in a similar way to names: they are signs that translate richness into emblems. Signs that we can see and often feel with all our senses, sometimes even “touching” their smells and tastes. The issue of the name resists be solved, because its features and powers can only be touched upon in contexts other than that of communication.

What is a name? The answer that Juliet provides to this question conveys all the naiveté of her age. If Romeo Montague took off the family name that identifies him, he would no longer exist, because there would be no way for his story and for Juliet Capulet to exist. And yet, within and

without the narration, in the thread of a discourse whose end reaches us, she is talking about the family name as an intruding wedge between their love, and she advocates fighting against any chauvinist and identitarian idea of belonging that the proper name may symbolize.

In reality, as well as in fiction, the name hosts a narrative principle that makes it live as a sign; the name is always anchored to a myth, be it a foundational myth of an origin or a prosaic, contemporary one. My curiosity and passion for the status and the powers of proper names was prompted by an essay by Roland Barthes about names in Proust. I will let a quotation speak for itself:

Le Nom propre dispose des trois propriétés que le narrateur reconnaît à la réminiscence: le pouvoir d'essentialisation (puisqu'il ne désigne qu'un seul référent), le pouvoir de citation (puisqu'on peut appeler à discrétion toute l'essence enfermée dans le nom, en le proférant, le pouvoir d'exploration (puisque l'on "déplie" un nom propre exactement comme on fait d'un souvenir). Le Nom propre est en quelque sorte la forme linguistique de la réminiscence. (Barthes 1972: 124)

Therefore names designate, quote, help us remember, although sometimes we may forget them and they are stuck on the tip of the tongue. Unfortunately this is precisely one of the first signs that disappear from speech when some strange alchemies of the age make our memory fade selectively. To call somebody may express the wish to hold, to ask to come closer, to call for help, as when we call "mom" or "God" in moments of grief. Naming can also mean letting go, as when the proper name becomes the cipher of the separation between the maternal body and that of a newly born body. The name cannot be taken in vain.

The paths to the name cannot be exhausted in infinite surveys or typologies. They would be too many; maybe as many as the existing names, because the issue of the name is best explored through singularities, anecdotes and daily storytelling.

What happens, then, when we name? When we call or name others or ourselves, when we say the name, when we give the name, when we hide it? What signifying practices revolve around the proper name? These questions are not meant to find a univocal symbolism, a key or magical word that would reveal some kind of wonder. These questions are not searching for the name in itself, but rather for the act of naming as a way of living the

language and within the language, a way to build the relation between the speaker and the world, and at the same time to question that very relation, on the basis of language itself. These questions do not call for a univocal answer given once and for all, but rather question the common condition of possibility of speaking and of calling each other, the condition upon which the relationships between human beings originate and their positions are defined.

By naming, human beings address themselves, the world and things; they somehow question them, addressing them a simple question: “What’s your name”? This common attitude is to be found in all languages, though it is not an innate one: purloining the term from Christianity, I call it “baptizing”. Of course I am figuring the name according to the uses and powers that are known to me, according to the ways it usually works in European modern languages. But I can sense that multiple tensions are at play in this common attitude to “baptizing”.

The category of proper names has always played a key role in philosophical, linguistic and semiotic studies. It is peculiar to proper names, whether of people, animals or places, to raise the issue of the relationship between the *presence* of the being or of the object it refers to, and its *evocation* in the word. Surely this is a problem concerning the whole of verbal language; more generally, all signs, verbal or nonverbal, are kinds of “substitutes” for something to which they refer. But the proper name, in that it is usually considered as a sign precisely identifying its bearer, reveals the features of a peculiar element in language, not only with regard to the person, the place or the animal it refers to, but most of all in relation to identity.

Many modern linguistic, logical and philosophical theories on proper names are based on the assumption of an intrinsic relationship between language and truth. Albeit from different perspectives, all these theories have shown that the proper name is a very special entity in language. Philosophy of language has privileged the referential connections of the name with its *denotatum*, or referent, either real or fictional, which the proper name identifies, such as a person, an animal, a place, a star, a literary character, and so on. This trend was developed by twentieth century authors such as Frege (1892), Russell (1905) and Kripke (1980) who followed the classical theory on proper names by John Stuart Mill (1843).

Still, those various logical and linguistic-philosophical theories on proper names all agree on one aspect: proper names, as Mill stated, denote

but do not connote; that is to say, they have a somehow unique and identified referent, be it a person, an object, an animal or a place, but they don't have a meaning. These theories prompt a fascinating insight that reveals or resonates with the mysteries of language: in all of them, the object-“proper name” has been moulded according to the idea of the patronymic, of the name of the same. An implicit patriarchal view underlies them: a view of naming and baptizing that can be metaphorically defined as “male”, at least in the sense that in all these reflections we can see a baptism without “flesh” at work. What is lacking in all these “filiations” is that principle which, just as metaphorically, can be defined as “female” or “maternal”. According to this principle, the body receiving the name is a body that is separated through birth, a body to which we say “go now”, rather than a body on which the name is imposed as a “property” warranty.

Several issues have been raised by modern philosophical-linguistic theories. For instance, how is it possible to name the same thing with different names (such as the evening star and the morning star, Hesperus and Phosphorus)? Or what happens when a “definite description”, in Russell's definition, cannot be given any “true” name (“The present King of France is bald” might be a description, but there is no present king of France)? In a word, the limits of theory have appeared when it implicitly comes to light that the reference of a name is not the rigidly designated “thing”. On the contrary, the name can be better understood as interpretation, social context, thickening shifts, not only logical or conventional ones, that engage the subject in the act of naming and that constitute him/her in the relation with others and with that very linguistic matter of which names are made.

Does “naming” mean leaving a word as mark of identity and of property on the world, or does it rather mean leaving the word to others? According to Roman Jakobson (1963), proper names represent one of the forms of the “circularity of language”. Unable to express any kind of intellectual abstraction, proper names can only refer to the linguistic code in a circular way, according to this view. “Jerry”, writes Jakobson, means a person named Jerry. “Fido” a dog named Fido. Referring to Bertrand Russell, Jakobson writes that, the meaning of the attributes that might refer to Fido, such as “mongrel” or “pup” or “hound”, can always be replaced by general abstractions such as mongrelness, puppihood, or houndness, but there is no such thing as a general meaning of Fido that qualifies as “Fidoness”. In a word, the proper name would be but a tautology. Modern linguistic theo-

ries have often ill-treated proper names though at the same time they have been fascinated by them. Even personal pronouns – infinitesimal particles, such as “I” or “you”, sounding like trifles if compared to a proper name like “Vercingetorige” (see Caprini 2001) – have had a better, more decorous fortune, and, for instance, in the theory of enunciation (see Benveniste 1966) have even emerged as those elements in discourse by which subjectivity can emerge in language.

Yet the name is a whole world, it animates the world, it makes us alive – and not only because it classifies, as argued by Lévi-Strauss (1962), who nonetheless recognized that proper names had social meanings linked to their ability to identify and to qualify individuals in a human social system. But the order cannot fully explain proper names. Actually it is the less conventional side that captivates the dark and brilliant powers of proper names, especially of personal proper names. It is the space of laughter and of parody that sets names to work and, for instance, gives birth to nicknames and monikers, such as those that emphasize certain bodily features of the person that receives them.

Consider the worldwide web, that shapeless and “smooth” territory (Vulli 2005) which is nonetheless crossed by countless paths of meaning, by voices, bodies, drives and laughs, just like a square or a street crowded with people. It is on the web that we can withdraw at night, as if it were a room with transparent walls, and try to guess who will be the stranger that will cross those walls, calling us. It is there that one can be in dinning crowds, in a jarring choir of asynchronous lines that run one after another through open windows and childish ruses of emoticons and trills. It is there that the anonymous and brandless knowledge settles, is downloaded and searched for; it is there that images, music, videos, writings are posted and shared. It is there that we send and receive countless emails that might well remain there, unanswered for the next ten thousand years, if only we wanted them to. It is there that we wear our *nicks*.

Nicks interpret and fulfil the human vocation to create literature. That has always been a peculiar feature of nicknames: small texts that can hold together, in just one sign, body and laughter, very often a laughter that sounds like mockery, like a pillory. The nickname, like the sobriquet, is a sign achieved with art but, unlike the latter, is gained by the “owner” as if it were a small trophy. Boys and girls chatting on MSN can change one nick per day, according to their mood or to the music they are listening to

in their playlist, always managing to match it with a motto, a desire or a provocation in their “name cards” – a way to yield or deny oneself to those who hold us on their “contact list”.

Widespread technology has made us all more skilled in making up words: how many passwords do we have to coin and remember every day to access our mailbox, online banks or Ebay? A ciphered memory binds us to our money every time we use the cash card and are required to insert the pin code. But nicks we do not need to remember, because they belong to us. They allow us to make explicit the meanings conveyed by the name, like Manzoni did with “Azzeccagarbugli” (literally, someone who deliberately tangles things up; Manzoni used it to name the character of a pettifogging lawyer). Or they allow us to hint playfully at those meanings, as Dickens did with Jingle. Or they may allow us to reproduce the *senhal* of Provençal poets in a small scale, but with ourselves as depositories of the “screen name”.

Thus electronic *nicknames*, grotesque sobriquets or art pseudonyms, are all signs of a “scene of writing”, to use an expression by Derrida (1967). They are a way to get the chance to choose a “shifted” fate, both when the function of the name is limited to conveying an “essence”, and when naming ourselves as others lays open our desired choices, which language alone can fulfil.

The name “Luther Blissett”, for instance, has become one of the most anonymous and shared names of the last decades. Or better, it has become the typical example of the “anonymous” name, a name that belongs to everybody and to nobody, ownerless, with no possible denotation other than the media hoaxes that featured him as absent protagonist in the 1990s, or the fact that a multitude of newsgroup and chat users exhibited that name, it finally becoming the name of a collective of literary authors based in Bologna.

We live within received meanings, but we must not lose, or perhaps we must regain, the possibility to think about the meaning of the relationship that occurs between ourselves and the world through language. There are moments in life, like childhood, and places in language, like literature, in which our meta-linguistic awareness of this relationship is very high. Through the “why” of children or through the questions posed by poetic language, words interrogate themselves. They do not do so to get a sure answer, but rather to offer themselves as “question-words”, as crossings,

doors or bridges in language. The name can be one such question-word, if we manage to grasp its power. “Language, however formal it might be, lives on blood, flesh, material elements”, wrote Luce Irigaray (1985). Woven into language, we reproduce its materiality and every time the question-words drape us, all the articulations of our relationship to the world regenerate.

A sign becomes many-faceted when its function goes beyond one communicative system, such as the verbal one, and takes on a complex relational value that becomes a basis to build beliefs, behaviours, habits and ideologies. Brand, trademark, logo, *griffe*: in that disguise, proper names have gained extraordinary power in contemporary communication. We are surrounded by names; we wear them on clothes and accessories, hidden in labels or flaunted like decorative features; we find them on every street corner, on every magazine page. Sometimes the first act in the establishment of a firm, a company or a work group, is the creation of the brand. A creation that is all the more evocative, effective and stimulating if grounded on a culture and awareness that are not only graphic, but wide-ranging.

Perhaps the culture of the brand name can be found in the direct etymology of the current denomination of the trademark transformed into a visually recognizable emblem: “logo”. The word “logo” is an abbreviation for “logotype”, which is defined as “A name, symbol, or trademark designed for easy and definite recognition, especially one borne on a single printing plate or piece of type” (*American Heritage Dictionary* 2000). However, it is not without meaning that the term “logo”, unvaried in several languages, refers to “logos”, and not only from a lexical point of view. In the philosophical lexicon, the Greek word “logos” is often untranslated. In its semantic universe we include language, discourse, reason, besides the basic Heraclitean sense of “connection”. From “logos” originate such words as “logic”, and parts of such words as “monologue” and “dialogue”. In Italian and other modern European languages, it is a confix that expresses a reference to speech, in such terms as “logopaedics”. In another sense, the same confix “logo” recalls a specialism, as in “papyrology” or “allergology”. Even the brand-logo is a “concentrate” of language and reason, so to speak. Most of the time it is a proper name that is represented and stylized, namely, the surname of the owner or the name of the firm, inscribed as a word or an initial. But in other cases a specific symbol can visually represent by abstraction a general concept, as in the case of Nike’s “swoosh”: a swirl, a boomerang or apostrophe suggesting the idea of speed and movement.

The brand is a manifestation of contemporary myth, as Barthes (1957) meant it, that is to say, as signs and artefacts that manage to appear natural, eternal, beyond time. The brand gives life to things and places, as if it were the sign of an imaginary “baptism” through which objects, institutions, and spaces are invested with a life of their own. Brands are thus able to arouse passions, emotions, memories. Obviously the proliferation of brands, trademarks, labels and logos, especially in recent years, makes everything sound as if it were already heard, already named, already “baptised”. Sometimes there seems to be no room for the nobodies in this world. In today’s world of communication what has become more and more important is not so much the object in its usefulness, nor its monetary value (at least not directly): what matters nowadays is the communicative value of an object, its function as a sign, its philosophy, the “life style” it conveys. And what better symbol than a name, a brand, a logo to sum all this up? What greater power can be found in language than that of the proper name or of its graphic equivalent (signature or symbol), to seal the evocation of a whole world in just one sign? Teenagers are often seduced by the logo. It is the brand drawn on backpacks and on school diaries; it is the sign that makes them socially classify others and identify their “tribe”; sometimes it becomes a sign tattooed on the skin. The “monobrand”, metaphorically understood as uniformity in globalized habits and fashions, as copyright on things and people, lurks as linguistic cipher of money and of its power to reduce and flatten the world under its signs. As Benjamin (1928) wrote in “The Origin of German Tragic Drama”: “In the context of allegory the image is only a signature, the monogram of essence, not the essence itself in a mask.”

A real “naming euphoria” has crept into those systems that regulate the use, consumption and communication of objects, above all the fashion system which, by contrast, is also the system that decrees the emptiest generic-ness of the replaceability of bodies. Actually, the symbolic economy of fashion regulates other mythological institutions of these times, as well. Forms of consumption, media passions, political illusions – how many fashion patterns fit in the labels, brands and “colours” we follow! And the more the name as brand and as logo invades individual lives, the more anonymous, generic and interchangeable we become.

It is this semiotic and existential space that the possibility to perform a semantic inversion, a mocking treatment of the name, comes to life. It is

precisely this carnivalesque and derisory manipulation of the name that sheds special light on the phenomenon of the fake. In the fake, the brand – the registered institution, the source of wealth, the status symbol and the myth – is pilloried. In Italy the phenomenology of such places is well known: think of Forcella or street markets where explicit mystifications of big firms circulate freely. A source of profit for global mafias, a world risk if it enters the market of pharmaceutical products, an attack on the image of quality that distinguishes the “Made in Italy”, the fake occurs through the disguise or the copy of the brand, label or logo. Released on the market in this way are products resembling the “original” ones in everything except for their “quality”. The fake can be a mere imitation of a prototype, or a real forgery of the brand, or the counterfeiting of a name, or a symbol that resembles the original, but is slightly different from it.

Today, critical awareness of the power of the sign develops by means of several strategies. In recent years several associations, groups of activists, jammers and hackers, magazines and web sites have produced what has been defined as “culture jamming”, that is to say, the parody and exposure of misrepresentations connected to the brand and to advertisements by means of practices that include street graffiti, graphic interventions on billboards, and hacking. It is the proper name that becomes the main target of this real “semiotic guerrilla warfare”, which uses the same techniques of marketing and of advertisement to play on signs and to subvert completely the meaning of the values communicated. Also these jamming practices make use of names, as in the example of Yomango, a group of Spanish activists that deform the logo of a “youth fashion” brand, Mango, and subvert it with an expression meaning “I steal”. The proper name thus becomes the result of collective practices of “anonymity”, disguise and distortion, used by many contemporary metropolitan movements that strive for emancipation from those bonds that symbols impose on us, but that signs can defy.

Note

1. This article was translated from the Italian by Angela D’Ottavio.

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Alessia Caputo

The language of advertisement

The term *advertising* derives from the medieval Latin verb *advertere* “to direct one’s attention to”. It describes any type or form of public announcement intended to promote the sale of specific products or services. This kind of public announcement is directed towards large numbers of people, in an attempt to influence their behaviour.

In order to analyse advertising as a means of communication, it might be useful to consider Jakobson’s model of communication. In advertising, the *addresser* is the company or producer sending an *ad-message* to the *addressee* who is represented by the reader, the viewer, or the listener, depending on the kind of medium used. The message lives in a *context* that includes the sponsored product or service. The *code* common to the addresser and the addressee is oral or written depending on the medium. A *contact* between the addresser and the addressee is also necessary, “enabling both of them to enter and stay in communication” (Jakobson 1960: 353).

Jakobson proposed that each of these six factors determines a different function of language. All the functions analysed by Jakobson are present in advertising, as in each communicative act. However, as Eco (1968), Ferraro (1999) and other theorists say, one function might prevail over the others, so that the advert will be characterized by that particular function. According to these theories, there should be:

- a *referential message*: oriented towards the context, its main goal is to give information about the product;
- an *expressive message*: focused on the addresser, it is meant to express the image of the brand;
- a *phatic message*: concerning the contact, its purpose is to establish and maintain a relationship between the addresser and the addressee;
- a *conative message*: regarding the addressee, it is intended to influence the addressee’s behaviour;

- a *metalingual message*: oriented towards the code, it refers to the nature of interaction;
- a *poetic message*: concerning the message, it foregrounds textual features.

Since the addresser must exploit all the expressive and stylistic components of the message to be convincing, the *poetic* function is basic. However, according to Volli (2003: 56), the more a message is dominated by the poetic function, the latter being original, ambiguous and allusive, the more it risks not being understood. In this context, it is possible to understand the importance of the *metalingual* function, the purpose of which is to rule the communication of the code and so the comprehensibility of the message.

A *phatic* advertising message will use all the devices to attract the receiver's attention in order to create a contact between the addresser and the addressee. Through the use of colours, music, jingles, particular images, it will try to catch the addressees' attention so that they will not change the radio or TV programme, or they will look at the print advert or posters without turning the page or their head. The phatic function is necessary to the ad-message, since, if it fails to capture the attention of the addressee, it will never be decoded.

The contact created by advertising is often imposed on the receiver, invading his perceptual sphere. The receiver cannot escape from it, since it is present on every occasion in public or private life. Moreover the receiver's capacity to control ad-messages is limited, since the latter succeed in imposing themselves and attracting the attention of those who do not even look for them intentionally. Each type of advertising has a different way of creating a contact and imposing itself. In fact, the receiver's possibility to control ad-communication varies according to the medium used. TV and radio commercials last a few seconds, during which they try to catch the addressee's attention. Often receivers are not paying attention to the spot, as they are doing something else, as a recent study by Mark Ritson has demonstrated.¹ Moreover, they always have the communicative situation under control and can switch over when they want. So this type of advertising does not have a strong capacity to impose contact between addressee and addresser.

Posters wait to be looked at by addressees, so their location is crucial, and addressees can simply see them and then turn their head, or study them

attentively, it depends on the interest the ad arouses. The printed advertisement does not have the possibility of imposing itself in a stable way since it is located on a magazine page that is meant to be turned. However, it offers the possibility of being reread and re-examined, as with all written texts. Internet ads are the most intrusive: it is impossible to avoid them because they are on the pages that the addressee is reading. Recently, banners have started appearing on videos, placing themselves over the text. So the perceptual contact is imposed, but the communicative contact and the phatic function, as a consequence, are often obstructed. In fact the strong imposition is considered irritating by addressees, so the advert is not effective.

As for the referential function, it prevails over the others when the message is mainly a description of the advertised object or service. But the most characteristic function of advertising is the *conative* one. It tries to influence addressees so that they will change their initial indifference towards the product into acceptance, and finally into a desire to have it. Persuasion uses a lot of devices to be effective. One of them is to propose a model of the customer using the product in order to fascinate addressees and persuade them into thinking that, by buying the product, they can assimilate that model lifestyle. This method refers also to the *expressive* function so much used in the creation of an attractive brand image for the addressee. So it is possible to create the illusion that, by owning the product, you can transform your image into the one proposed by the addresser.

To look back through the history of advertising and study the evolutionary changes in the predominant communicative functions employed can be most informative. It enables us to see that past forms of advertising, such as ancient posters, town criers, the first printed ads – all these focused on the utilitarian aspects of the product itself (its qualities, price, and functions). Thus, it is possible to say that past adverts were mainly characterized by the referential function.

In the nineteenth century, printed ads began to exploit stylistic components of the language, particularly for slogans; adverts began to include rhetorical figures, rhymes, assonances, coining of new words. With this, the poetic function started to become a protagonist in advertising. Moreover the use of colours, particular font styles, and formats were employed to catch the readers' attention, so the phatic function started to be consciously exploited.

It is possible to say that, in the beginning, ads were more direct and explicit, then with the passing of time they became more implicit. From the 1920s onwards, advertisers began to give more importance to the hoped-for customer than to the product itself. This is the moment in which they began to realize the power of the expressive and conative functions. So their efforts have gone toward creating the consumer's image, and they focus on personality models (glamour, romance, sensuality) that the addressee may find attractive.

Considering the fact that the addresser imitates the lifestyle model to which the addressee aspires, it is possible to accept Marcel Danesi's theory that advertisers are not innovators:

They are more intent on reinforcing lifestyle behaviours than in spreading commercially-risky innovations. Advertisements are not in themselves disruptive of the value systems of the cultural mainstream; rather they reflect "shifts" already present in popular culture. If they are effective..., it is primarily because they tap into deeply-engrained mythical and metaphorical structures that constitute a culture. (Danesi 1995: 14)

In order to facilitate the construction of an image accepted by the consumer/addressee, ad campaigns often try to give local features to the product. Even if the product is created in a different country, in advertising it will often be perceived as belonging to the country in which it is advertised, and thus closer to the addressee.

Conversely, sometimes the campaign does not create the illusion that the product is local, but stresses the fact that it belongs to the country in which the product is made, if that country is synonymous with something that can be attractive to the viewer/reader. Paradoxically, some brands try to take features that are characteristic of other countries, as some kind of guarantee of the worth of their product. For instance, Roland Barthes (1964) in his essay *La rhétorique de l'image* analyses a printed advertisement of a pasta, made in France, which exalts the fact that it is produced *à l'italienne*, following the Italian way of pasta-making. In fact, its name *sounds* Italian, and the visuals of the ad display the colours of the Italian flag, etc. This occurs because Italy is perceived abroad as the best maker of pasta.

Other ad-campaigns are based on an "internationalized" nature. It is what Volli (2003: 85) calls "isotopia intertestuale", to denote the constant

presence of a textual element, concept, or other significant component that constitutes the text core, which in advertising is located around the brand. It is intertextual, since it is possible to find it in everything concerning the product. It can be the colour, the trademark, the content. For instance, *Coca Cola* has never changed its lettering and its red colour. These elements remain the same in time and in space, so the brand can give a reliable and stable image to the addressee.

Each campaign is addressed to a particular target audience who can identify themselves with the image established by the company. Advertisers study their target audiences closely in an attempt to create the image and message most likely to influence behaviour. As Fairclough says:

Adverts represent an interpersonal relationship between the producer/advertiser and the consumer. This relationship facilitates the “ideological work” of the advert: that is to establish trust, goodwill, or another relevant basis that will support acceptance of the product and consumer image, and therefore compliance with the message of the advert. Adverts construct “positions” for consumers that will give them a good fit with the product being advertised. Positioning of the consumer can be done by presupposing that s/he has certain knowledge, beliefs, aspirations, income, habits or possessions, or implying that s/he should have them. (Fairclough, cited in Delin 2000: 131).

As noted above, this strategy involves the expressive function in the brand image construction, and the conative function in the consumer’s image-creation. At the moment, this is the most exploited practice in advertising. It can be risky, however, when ads are excessively focused on the consumer’s image and needs. In fact, if the ad is accepted by addressees because it makes them dream or generates laughter, then it is not focusing on the product and will thus prove unsuccessful. It will fulfil the addressee’s escapist needs, but the product, its name, and its characteristics will be easily forgotten.

In conclusion: advertising must create a balance among all the communicative functions. The persuasive strategy, which includes the conative and expressive functions, needs to take into consideration the referential function, so that the right importance will be given to the brand, to the consumer image, and to the product itself. The poetic function should balance with the metalingual function, so that the ad’s message will, at the same time, be refined and comprehensible. Phatic aspects should be meas-

ured in relation to the ad's potential intrusiveness. The effectiveness of an advertisement may depend on suppressing those aspects that might cause a lack of equilibrium in the communicative process of advertising.

Note

1. Lecture given on 18th May 2005 at the Faculty of Economics, University of Bari (Italy).

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Stefano Carlucci

Contemporaries but different

Ex-vocation versus re-production?

Can this cockpit hold
The vasty fields of France? Or may we cram
Within this wooden box the very casques
That did affright the air at Agincourt?
(William Shakespeare, 1599)

La scena deve assigliarsi il più
che sia possibile al luoco dove si
finge che sia avvenuto il caso di cui
E' composta la favola.
(Angelo Ingegneri, 1598)

These two epigraphs, almost coeval, illustrate two different theoretical and methodological approaches to one of the most remarkable factors of the theatrical event: the dialogical and mutable relationship between the singular physical space in which every play must be staged and that “insubstantial pageant” (Shakespeare) to which the dramatical text refers. Here I examine on various levels the explicit differences, but also point out some unpredictable likenesses, between those dramatic conceptions embodied in the original London Globe Theatre, on the one hand, and the Teatro Olimpico in Vicenza, on the other. As George Kernodle said: “At first glance the Italian perspective stage and the Elizabethan stage, seem totally unrelated, indeed at opposite extremes ... But neither the theatre of Shakespeare nor any continental theatre of the Sixteenth Century can be considered alone.... Yet these theatres were not unrelated” (Kernodle 1944: 3).

It is in any case clear that each theatrical play is intended to be performed in the presence of an audience, ideal or not, within a concrete and therefore limited space, so the interpretation process which follows this production of meaning will involve all the senses, sight at first: “Le theatre est bien en effet cette pratique qui calcule la place regardé des choses: si je mets le spectacle ici, le spectateur verra cela, si je le mets ailleurs, il ne verra pas, et je pourrai profiter de cette cache pour jouer d’une illusion ...” (Barthes 1982: 86).

Sight, which can be considered at same time an inescapable vehicle and a polysemic instrument in the creation of sense in every form of theatre, tends to become in the Renaissance perspective theatres the privileged channel to realize the kind of direct persuasion demanded by practice. To accomplish this visual seduction, an active decodification or analysis must take place in the spectators, who can more easily understand scenery than they do any other part of the dramatic event.

The course of this practice will be emphasized in the Baroque theatre, to the point of conceiving the audience almost as a target to hit, and this fact will be materialised in the actual construction of seventeenth-century theatres, in which a more and more clear separation of the respective spaces and roles of actors and spectators will become the rule. Considering the five senses as waterproof compartments, each of them as an *hortus conclusus* could lead to potential misinterpretations. Barthes again: “Comme lieu de signifiante, le regard provoque une synesthésie, une indivision des sens, qui mettent leurs impressions en commun, de telle sorte que on puisse attribuer à l’un poétiquement, ce qui arrive à l’autre ... tous les sens peuvent donc ‘regarder’, et inversement, le regard peut sentir, écouter, tâter, etc. Goethe: ‘Les mains veulent voir, les yeux veulent caresser’” (Barthes 1982: 280). Sight, however, especially if intended in its double nature of seeing agent and observed object, deictically links actors, scenes and audience, contributing to the generation of meanings during the interpretation activity. Hence reducing sight to its mere physiological component deprives it of the status of language.

In the complex relationship between imagination and visibility the Olympic Theatre pursues, as the words of Angelo Ingegneri attest, a material and explicit resemblance of the scenes to the place to which the dramatic plot refers: the wood and stucco constructions behind the flowery *frons scaenae* try to reproduce the seven streets of Thebes, the location of *Edipo Tiranno*, Orsatto Giustiniani’s modern adaptation of Sophocles’ *Oedipus Rex*. Apart from representing the streets of Thebes, necessarily a theoretical exercise since probably no one among its builders had never seen the ruin of any ancient Greek city, the perspective buildings were a further interpretation of that recurrent idea of the ideal city so in vogue in the Renaissance: the Olympic Academicians wanted to erect Vicenza itself, but were only able to dream of doing so.

Any possible comparison between different ways of conceiving theatrical scenographies cannot ignore the fact that all of them are, in different forms, artistic expressions with common roots: “Le représentation ne se définit pas directement par l’imitation: se débarrasserait-on des notions de ‘reel’, de ‘vraisemblable’, de ‘copie’, il restera toujours de la ‘représentation’, tant qu’un sujet (auteur, lecteur, spectateur ou voyeur) portera son regard vers un horizon et y découpera la base d’un triangle dont son oeil (ou son esprit) sera le sommet” (Barthes 1982: 86). Actually the perspectival sceneries of the Teatro Olimpico connote deeply its dramatic possibilities, defining an interpretative course in some way pre-arranged, limited only to certain types of representation. This should be evident, since Angelo Ingegneri himself stated that without structural changes, mainly focused on the scenery, the Theatre would not have been very suitable for anything other than classical tragedy (Ingegneri 1585: 67).

This is the first landmark breaking point with Elizabethan theatres and their well-known flexibility: the Teatro Olimpico may be considered a delicate, pressed flower which can hardly endure even the slightest change of dramatical staging, should it differ from one for which it was originally created. In contrast stands the Elizabethan theatre: “With so many stage spaces, the multiple scenes of Shakespeare’s plays could be played through without interruption for scenery changes. The action moved from one playing space to another. In many ways it was the most flexible theatre ever developed” (Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 23).

The complicated dramatic essence of the Teatro Olimpico is a moot point as well as a subjective opinion based on the analysis of various attempts to conform its hardly negligible architectural and dramatic personality to different theatrical conceptions. For instance, its fixed three-dimensional scenes, probably constructed so as to last only for opening night, could not satisfy the fundamental need of Baroque plays, so as to appear chronologically near but dramatically distant.

Its uniqueness is one of the main reasons why, after the triumphal opening night (March 1585), the Olympic Theatre was piratically abandoned, left in its medieval shell, in a sort of dramatic lethargy. Because of its ephemeral status the Olympic Theatre has been compared to a minor character in Alessandro Manzoni’s *I Promessi Sposi*: an old servant of Don Rodrigo, who spent most of his life alone and neglected, except for some special occasions, when his classy manners were useful for receiving impor-

tant guests. In the same way, the Olympic Theatre, for more than three centuries, lived beneath a growing layer of dust, occasionally removed only to reflect and take advantage, however briefly, of its decaying beauty. It was a costly dramatic machine, difficult to maintain, but also an infallible weapon, perfect for amazing noblemen and dignitaries: an instrument that could “play its part” even without live actors.

In contrast to the architecturally existing presence of these theatres, which are still alive, the Elizabethan theatres were not able to survive beyond their building period; they occasionally burned down or were destroyed on purpose. It must be said, however, that they were not the ugly and bare structures described in some critical studies; that notion has been properly laid to rest. They were public structures, open to different social classes. But the Olympic Theatre, as all other Academic Italian theatres, was a private structure, far removed from even the perception of common people. It was a theatre only for the few persons invited to its rare performances; intended only for those who could experience its dramatic significance: “And by their very size, their capacity of holding large numbers of people, the English theatres were public theatres in the classic sense, more truly vitruvian in the spirit than any courtly or academic adaptation, with its limited audience” (Yates 1969: 129).

Paradoxically, sixteenth and seventeenth century Italian theatres somehow betrayed the spirit of that ancient theatre they wanted to recreate. The Olympic Theatre copies the forms of a Greek theatre, but it is much smaller and is covered, hidden; in a sort of architectural impersonation, it plays the role of an ancient theatre while differing greatly from it: “... the altered social structure of Renaissance Italy placed theatre in a very different social context from that of ancient times, and the physical configuration of the new theatres not surprisingly reflected this” (Carlson 1987: 38).

Carlson’s words summarize that renewed interest for classical drama which led to renewed building of theatrical buildings for the first time since the fall of the western Roman Empire.

The Olympic Theatre can be considered one of the most interesting results of that historical trend. It was built inside a medieval castle, the use of which varied over the centuries: from river control station, to prison, to monastery. Sometimes it is regarded as the first modern theatre; but it cannot be described as a complete theatre building: in the sixteenth century, theatres were not yet able to exist solely for the presentation of plays

or the like. The Olympic Theatre, in spite of its gorgeous interiors, could not reveal its dramatical identity through an architectural façade; it thus existed, protected, but hidden by its anonymous significance.

As regards this point, Elizabethan theatres had to coexist with the levels of society in which they were built. The City banned construction of public theatres within their boundaries; they were consequently decentred and marginal but, at least, visible.

They were inevitably a litmus test of the contradictions of the Umwelt by which they were generated, and differing from their contemporary Italian counterparts. Almost 10% of the population of London went to theatre at least once a week, making theatres a living part of society as well as a source of profit. By contrast, Italian theatres were private, were secluded from everyday life, and often a drain on their creators' purses.

From this point of view the Olympic Theatre can be considered more like the ephemeral parades typical of the Renaissance, and even the subsequent English court masques: the only actual difference is that the Olympic Theatre is still there. Practically unchanged since 1585 and thanks to the permanent, symbiotic relationship with its medieval shell, this wonderful "larva" keeps on surviving, but will never break its cocoon to fly away, for without its prison it cannot exist.

The only Elizabethan theatre in existence today is a drawing the interiors of the original Swan Theatre by Joannes de Witt; the actual, physical buildings, spread all over the world, are reproductions, copies, and translations of the Shakespearean Globe. The Globe Theatre (building) is dead, but its idea remains alive and changing day by day.

The relationship between actors and audience in the Elizabethan theatre was characterized by much interaction. In early reports of Hamlet productions, an explicit, dialogical intercourse is said to have taken place among them. This active participation of the audience will diminish during the following centuries, in which these dialogues will become actors' monologues. The influences of continental dramatic theories finally broke down that spatial and performative balance, a direct derivation of the medieval absolute concept of space, distinctive of the Elizabethan theatre: the represented space was only a part of the real one and not an artificial alternative to it. Applying a clear separation of roles between an audience, which beholds, and the whole cast on the stage which in the act of playing is seen, scenery in the seventeenth century becomes in general a drawing; the two

worlds are physically and metaphorically separated by a curtain, limited by a cornice.

There were some significant exceptions, such as the representation Bernardo Buontalenti stages in Florence in 1600 on occasion of the wedding of Maria de Medici and Henry IV of France: “It was marked by a pomp and splendor characteristic of the Baroque to come, but the most remarkable novelty, was the effect achieved by placing spectators on the stage and thus continuing the court in the realm of a fictitious, illusionistic world” (Bernheimer 1956: 225).

The evolution of the English stage began in private theatres, such as the Blackfriars Theatre, in which the unifying Italian principle, usually materialised by a square surrounded by houses, was approached via the presence of little symbolic scenes without any illusionistic aim. This process will end in Restoration Theatre in which the difficulty of finding a compromise between unification and the presence of different places was faced by Dryden in 1668: “By the variation of painted scenes, the fancy, which in this case will contribute to his own deceit, may sometimes imagine it [the stage], several places with some appearances of probability; yet it still carries the greater likelihood of truth if those places be supposed so near each other as in the same city or town; which may all be comprehended under the larger denomination of one place.”

Even the Olympic Theatre, in all its uniqueness, connotes itself as an experiment in which illusionistic results, attained by the application of perspectival principles, are linked to non-illusionistic screens. The Olympic Theatre was not a public theatre; nor was it a political instrument used to express a prince’s dreams of centralizing power. In its multifocal streets are represented the ideal, but mostly unachieved, aspirations of a club of equals, no one of which could see all the streets at the same time.

To conclude: it is evident that the relationship between real and the fictitious worlds was solved in different ways; but one must bear in mind that even the most realistic drawings inevitably interpret the reality that is their object. Hence the results of this process will always be different from the object itself. In the same way, any kind of perspective or realistic scenery will be able to reconstruct a street – for example, those of the Olympic Theatre; but they will always be perceived as artifice: “The realism of even the most advanced artist was a realism of method which still dealt with highly imaginative content” (Kernodle 1944: 78).

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Josiane Caron-Pargue

Sémiotisation et actualisation des connaissances

Approche cognitive

1. Introduction

Le présent travail est une approche cognitive des transformations qui modifient un savoir lors d'une activité contextuellement située: "donner des instructions graphiques ou orales à un pair pour faire un noeud plat", réalisée par des enfants de 5 à 10 ans, dans laquelle des significations peuvent être la source d'incompréhension. L'objectif, essentiellement méthodologique, est de délimiter des observables sémiotiques – graphiques et verbaux – et de les interpréter cognitivement, afin de pouvoir caractériser le geste mental impliqué dans la production spontanée des instructions.

A cette occasion, les processus sémiotiques sont placés au centre des réorganisations de la représentation mentale. Le savoir actualisé dans une situation donnée est considéré comme issu de réorganisations signifiantes, du fait de la sélection et de l'organisation de certaines informations, aussi bien dans le savoir que dans la situation. Afin de caractériser ces réorganisations, un double problème méthodologique se pose, celui de les caractériser à partir d'observables sémiotiques, et celui de les caractériser en tant que processus.

On se propose de rechercher la filiation des unités signifiantes, et de définir formellement leur signification à partir de leur contexte observable (Caron-Pargue 1983: 45–52; 1987: 153–173): à partir de l'analyse des tracés graphiques dans le cas du dessin; et dans le cas du verbal, à partir de la théorie des opérations énonciatives de Culioli, en interprétant cognitivement l'opération énonciative basique de "repérage" (Culioli 1982: 95–114).

2. La tâche

Des enfants, de 5 à 10 ans, doivent donner des instructions graphiques ou verbales à un pair afin que celui-ci réalise un noeud plat. Pour chaque tranche d'âge, la tâche a été effectuée par 10 couples d'enfants pour les instructions graphiques, et 10 pour les instructions verbales.

Pour chaque couple d'enfants, l'un des deux enfants apprend à faire le noeud plat. L'expérimentateur lui montre gestuellement comment faire le noeud, étant placé à côté de lui, sans parler. Puis dans un deuxième temps, l'enfant qui a appris à faire le noeud, donne des instructions graphiques ou verbales pour que le second enfant du couple réalise le noeud plat.

Chaque enfant du couple dispose de deux cordes de 1 cm de diamètre, et de 1 mètre de long. Le dessin fini est transmis à l'autre enfant par l'expérimentateur; dans le cas du verbal, les enfants sont placés dos à dos, de façon à ce qu'ils puissent s'entendre, sans cependant se voir.

Dans tout ce qui suit, les exemples graphiques sont présentés dans la figure 1, et les exemples verbaux dans le tableau 1.




Figure 1. Exemples de produits graphiques (l'âge de l'enfant est indiqué sous le dessin).

3. Les unités sémiotiques et leur structuration

3.1. Leur identification

Par définition, toute production graphique ou verbale, achevée, constitue une unité sémiotique globale; elle doit être considérée comme satisfaisante

- [1] 5(G1). A : Tu mets ta corde comme ça...ta corde comme ça (pause) tu mets ta corde comme ça après (pause) tu fais un autre nœud (pause) mets ta corde comme ça
B : elle est comment ta corde ?
A : sur celle-là
- [2] 5(G5). A : on fait un nœud (pause) et après ..et après tu fais un autre tout pareil
- [3] 5(G6). A : Tu croises (pause) je fais un pont après (pause) je passe dedans (pause) je recommence
- [4] 5(G7). A : Je croise (pause) je croise encore
- [5] 5(G8). A : Mets ta corde dessus l'autre (pause) tourne l'autre corde à l'autre côté (pause) mets ta corde en haut (pause) et fais un autre nœud (pause) et tu serres
- [6] 6(G1). A : croiser la corde – passer en dessous (pause) on croise encore et on passe dessous (pause) et on tire
- [7] 6(G5). A : tu prends ta corde – tu mets l'autre sur ta corde que t'as étendue – après tu fais un nœud (pause) après tu fais encore un autre nœud
- [8] 7(G2). A : Tu mets les deux cordes l'une sur l'autre (pause) la corde qui est derrière tu la passes dessous la corde qui est devant – tu fais un nœud et tu tires
- [9] 7(G4). A : Tu mets la cor...une corde sur l'autre – tu prends le bout ... tu prends le bout de la ficelle que tu as mis sur ta corde (pause) tu prends l'autre bout – après tu ... après tu repasses ta corde sur ... sur celle...sur l'autre et tu prends le bout de la corde et tu attrapes l'autre et tu tires
- [10] 7(G10). A : On passe la corde dessus l'autre (pause) on la tourne (pause) on refait pareil (pause) et on tire
- [11] 8(G7). A : Je croise – je passe la corde dessous (pause) je fais un nœud – je serre
- [12] 8(G8). A : Prends les deux cordes l'une sur l'autre – puis celle en dessous tiens la et prends la dans la main droite (pause) et puis ...et puis l'autre corde prends la dans la main gauche et fais un nœud
- [13] 8(G9). A : Tu as deux cordes dans la main tu les mets chacune ... une dans chaque de tes mains – après tu les croises et tu prends la corde et tu la retournes sur l'autre corde – maintenant il faut monter les cordes ...maintenant il faut monter les cordes – tu les croises – tu fais un nœud puis tu serres
- [14] 9(G1). A : Je mets les deux cordes l'une sous l'autre – celle qui est dessus je la passe dessous celle qui est dessous – je prends les deux bouts (pause) je prends les deux bouts que j'ai dans la main – je fais un nœud avec – je prends les deux autres qui sont en dessous et je tire
- [15] 9(G2). A : Tu prends les deux cordes une dans chaque main – t'en mets une en dessous de l'autre – t'en prends un morceau en bas – tu ne le lâches pas et tu prends l'autre de l'autre côté ... un morceau – après tu les croises – celle de gauche tu la mets en dessous de celle de droite – tu tires – tu prends les deux autres cordes et tu tires
- [16] 9(G8). A : Tu mets la corde l'une sur l'autre – tu fais un nœud (pause) quand tu as fais le nœud tu remontes les cordes – tu refais un nœud en haut (pause) et après tu tires sur les deux cordes
- [17] 10(G5). A : Nathalie tu prends les cordes des deux mains tu... celle que tu as dans la main gauche tu la mets dessus ça y est – tu la prends la corde que tu viens de mettre celle qui dépasse du côté droit tu la passes dessous l'autre ça y est ? on recommence
- [18] 10(G10). A : Tu prends une corde dans chaque main et tu ... tu les ... tu prends le milieu de chaque corde tu les mets l'une sur l'autre - tu fais un nœud (pause) tu gardes tes deux cordes – tu refais un autre nœud – tu le serres – tu prends les quatre bouts de corde et tu serres

5(G6) désigne le sixième groupe d'enfants, qui a passé l'expérience, pour la classe d'âge des 5 ans ; A est l'enfant qui sait faire le nœud, et qui donne des instructions à l'enfant B

Tableau 1.

et suffisante du point de vue de l'enfant. Sa signification est l'ensemble des instructions nécessaires pour faire le nœud plat. La comparaison des productions au sein d'un même médium représentatif, dessin, ou verbal, fait apparaître d'une part des unités sémiotiques élémentaires, constituées par exemple d'une simple boucle (cf. fig. 1₅ et 1₆), ou d'une croix pour le dessin (cf. fig. 1₄, 1₈), et d'une verbalisation archaïque pour le verbal (cf. Exemple 4), où seul le croisement est indiqué. Et d'autre part des unités complexes formées d'unités élémentaires séparées, juxtaposées, ou bien d'unités partiellement ou totalement intégrées, dont il faut préciser les critères de reconnaissance. Les critères de reconnaissance sont simples dans le dessin: ou bien le dessin est composé de plusieurs dessins élémentaires, juxtaposés (cf. fig 1₉, 1₁₀, 1₁₁, 1₁₃, 1₁₄, 1₁₅), ou bien plusieurs unités sémiotiques élé-

mentaires reconnaissables sont intégrées dans un seul dessin (cf. fig. 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 112). Dans le verbal, l'unité sémiotique globale peut se décomposer en une succession d'énoncés élémentaires (cf. exemples 6, 9, 11).

La décomposition des unités complexes en unités élémentaires, permet d'identifier les étapes signifiantes de la fabrication du noeud. En effet, la signification d'une unité sémiotique est modifiée si elle appartient à une structure plus ou moins complexe. Sa signification ne correspond plus alors qu'à une partie des instructions, au lieu de correspondre à leur ensemble. Les étapes principales de réalisation du noeud plat le décomposent en deux noeuds simples, et décomposent chaque noeud simple en croisement et passage, comme le montrent les exemples indiqués ci-dessus. Mais certaines de ces étapes peuvent être décomposées à leur tour, comme le passage du premier noeud simple (cf. fig. 115, et exemples 3, 13). De plus, la plus petite unité élémentaire, la "boucle" (cf. fig. 16), permet de dissocier sémiotiquement la fonction des deux cordes, l'une étant la corde qui agit, qui bouge, pour faire le noeud, alors que l'autre est immobile.

En outre, des unités "pragmatiques" sont identifiables dans ces décompositions: "pour initialiser le noeud plat", unité représentée dans le dessin par deux traits parallèles (cf. fig. 19, 110, 113, 114), et verbalisée par "avoir" ou "prendre" une ou les cordes (cf. exemples 7, [13], 17, 18); "pour terminer le noeud plat" en "serrant le noeud", en "tirant les cordes" (cf. fig. 110, 115, et exemples 5, 6, 8, 18); ou encore se positionnant "entre les deux noeuds simples" pour "monter les cordes", ou "prendre l'autre bout", ou "garder les cordes" (cf. fig. 110, 114, et exemples 5, 9, 17, 18).

3.2. L'intégration des unités sémiotiques

Trois modes d'intégration des unités élémentaires qui composent les unités complexes peuvent être répertoriés: l'effacement de séparations, l'intégration locale par continuité, et la démarcation d'unités plus larges plus ou moins structurées.

3.2.1. L'effacement de séparation entre deux unités se fait par un repérage des deux unités l'une à l'autre: L'opération de "repérage" (Culioli 1982: 95-114) a pour fonction de modéliser une relation orientée entre deux éléments a et b, allant du repère a vers le repéré b. Elle peut s'interpréter cognitivement en termes de mise en perspective attentionnelle, et

par l'implication automatique, $a \rightarrow b$, d'une façon proche de la notion de "point de référence: orienté vers une "cible" de Langacker (1987).

Le repérage du second noeud par rapport au premier noeud₁ → noeud₂, peut être marqué par l'unité pragmatique située entre les deux noeuds simples: pour le dessin, dans la quatrième unité de la fig. 114, dans laquelle le passage du premier noeud est précisé, et les ficelles "montées", pour commencer le second noeud (voir aussi fig. 110; et fig. 115 dans laquelle les flèches indiquées à partir de l'unité 3 assurent la continuité entre le passage et le croisement du deuxième noeud); dans le verbal, par "prendre (par en dessous le croisement) le bout de la corde qui est dessus et prendre l'autre bout" (cf. exemples 9, 12, 14, 15), ce qui est une façon spécifique de faire le noeud. Le repérage entre les noeuds peut également être marqué: par un procédé de répétition à l'identique, par exemple du croisement (cf. fig. 18, et exemple 4); par répétition du noeud, de façon symétrique (cf. fig. 112, 113), ou à l'identique (cf. fig. 111, et exemple 2), parfois positionné en haut (cf. Exemple 16). Ce repérage est parfois marqué dans le dessin par un dédoublement d'une des cordes (cf. fig. 13, 14), ou par un doublement des traits de l'unité focalisée, par exemple du premier noeud (cf. fig. 11), ou du croisement (cf. fig. 13). Dans le verbal, ce repérage peut être marqué par une différence de choix lexicaux tel que "les cordes" pour le premier noeud, et "les bouts (de ces mêmes cordes)" pour le deuxième noeud (cf. exemples [9], [14]).

Le repérage d'une des deux cordes par rapport à l'autre, marqué par le tracé graphique des deux cordes, l'une étant rectiligne, l'autre ondulée, amène à les interpréter comme étant l'une "immobile" et l'autre "motrice" au sens où c'est elle qui dirige *le faire du noeud*. La corde motrice étant la plus détaillée, et constituant à elle seule une unité élémentaire (cf. fig. 16), est focalisée, de ce fait "corde motrice → corde immobile". On peut remarquer la corde "motrice", qui effectue un passage "dessus-dessous", dans le dessin du noeud fini (cf. fig. 17; aussi fig. 110, 115). Ce repérage est marqué dans le verbal par une différence de choix lexicaux, par exemple "ta corde" positionnée "sur celle-là: (cf. exemple 1). On peut cependant noter, dans le dessin, un changement de corde motrice à l'issue du premier noeud (cf. fig. 112, 113, 114, 115); et dans le verbal, des choix lexicaux inverses (cf. exemple 7), "ta corde" étant "étendue", et "l'autre" étant positionnée dessus; dans ce dernier cas le noeud serait effectué par la corde de dessous.

3.2.2. L'intégration locale par continuité est marquée dans le dessin par la complétion de proche en proche des unités graphiques juxtaposées, par exemple une unité figurant un croisement suivie par une unité figurant à la fois ce même croisement et le "passage" qui suit. On aboutit souvent, bien que pas obligatoirement, à l'intégration complète des unités successives en une seule (cf. fig. 19, 110, 114, 115). Dans le verbal, le marqueur de continuité sera le lien établi par la dénomination d'une corde en position de "terme de départ" (Culioli loc. cit.), dont le critère de reconnaissance est une anaphore qui renvoie à cette corde. Dans l'exemple 10, "la corde" lors du premier croisement est "terme de départ", marqué par l'anaphore "la" du premier passage, ce qui assure leur continuité et leur intégration à l'intérieur du premier noeud. Une continuité analogue est visible dans l'exemple 16, le "terme de départ" étant "celle que tu as dans la main gauche", avec l'anaphore "la".

3.2.3. La démarcation de grandes unités correspond souvent aux deux noeuds simples; elles peuvent être composées de plusieurs unités disjointes, non intégrées, ou localement intégrées. Dans le verbal, d'une manière générale, cette démarcation est marquée par l'ouverture et la fermeture d'un site, dont le critère de reconnaissance est l'utilisation de termes pluriels, ou génériques, tels que "les deux cordes", "les deux bouts", "une corde dans chaque main".

4. *Discussion / conclusion*

Le présent travail permet de repérer de nombreuses façons de se représenter la façon de faire un noeud plat. Outre la caractérisation du type de "passage" (*passer sur, dessous, dessus dessous, dessous dessus, retourner par dessus, croiser, prendre par dessous*), l'intérêt de la méthode est de qualifier le mode de structuration des gestes élémentaires en unités mentales: de façon disjointe, par intégration locale ou progressive, avec unicité ou non de la corde motrice. L'une de ces représentations correspond à la réalisation du noeud plat par deux noeuds simples identiques, et successifs, à l'aide de la même corde, résultat déjà attesté par Stroecker (1991: 215-233) et Caron-Pargue (1987). D'une façon générale, le geste mental actualisé en situation n'est pas un décalque du geste appris, mais une reconstruction qui résulte de focalisations attentionnelles et d'implications automatiques, plus ou moins structurées. Il nous paraît évident que la méconnaissance de

ces phénomènes peut entraîner de nombreuses incompréhensions communicatives, et de nombreuses erreurs pédagogiques, susceptibles de limiter et de retarder un apprentissage, et de limiter sa plasticité.

Au delà du présent travail, des études complémentaires sur la façon dont s'articulent les différents types de structurations, qualifiés ci-dessus, peuvent déboucher sur une meilleure connaissance de la continuité et de la coordination des mouvements. Par exemple, le geste mental qui consiste à "prendre par dessous le croisement la corde qui est dessus" pour effectuer avec elle le second noeud simple, s'effectue avec une main, la main droite, alors que la main gauche tient les cordes et rattrape le bout de la corde immobile; de même le changement de corde motrice entre les deux noeuds peut préserver une action continue avec la même main; tandis que dans certaines organisations des unités, l'unicité de la corde motrice peut nécessiter une coordination élaborée des deux mains.

Les résultats obtenus s'appuient sur une double approche verbale et graphique de la représentation des gestes. Il ne s'agit pas d'une étude de traduction, mais bien de deux études indépendantes de la production graphique et de la production verbale. La méthode utilisée s'appuie essentiellement sur la recherche d'une filiation dynamique entre unités observables, au sein d'un même médium représentatif, interprétée en termes cognitifs de traitement de l'information. Nous avons utilisé l'évolution avec l'âge pour établir cette filiation, mais plus généralement, celle-ci pourrait être établie à un âge donné, en fonction de l'acquisition d'expertise, en référence aux travaux d'Inhelder, réalisés dans le cadre Piagétien (Inhelder et Cellier 1992). La caractéristique principale de notre méthode est de caractériser formellement la signification à partir des observables. La cohérence des résultats obtenus indépendamment dans le verbal et le graphique est à souligner. Au delà des retombées en ce qui concerne les aspects cognitifs, elle invite à de plus amples investigations dans l'un et l'autre médium représentatif.

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Giulia Ceriani

La prévision des tendances et la sémiotique

Pouvoir, risques et décision

1. Le modèle

La première question est celle-ci: les modèles de prévisibilité existent-ils ? Cette question touche directement aux conditions de formulation de ce que dans l'univers de la mode, du design, de l'architecture et maintenant plus en général dans l'univers des biens de grande consommation on appelle les tendances: un concept ambigu, qui touche d'abord à la prise de décision entre interprétation et mécompréhension.

Or, une tendance est tout d'abord un modèle, en même temps prédictif et prévisionnel; nous reprenons ici donc l'idée de vérifier :

- ce que c'est qu'un modèle « tendanciel »
- si le système des tendances peut être défini véritablement un « système »
- à quoi correspond et à quoi peut servir pragmatiquement une prévision
- quels sont les marges de crédibilité de la tendance, comment elles peuvent être contrôlées ou être à risque de mécompréhension.

Un modèle il faut le construire par analogie: on suppose une situation X énigmatique et on reconstruit un espace de simulation dans lequel on répond aux interrogations posées par X. Abstrait ou concret, un modèle permet de définir une morphologie qui peut être utilisée pour des fins prévisionnelles; la description qui s'enclenche, soit-elle de nature qualitative ou bien quantitative, met en jeu des grands axes catégoriels de construction (statique/dynamique, stable/instable, local/global, etc.), mais surtout souligne la nécessité d'une validation à travers les principes hjelmsleviens d'adéquation, d'exhaustivité et de simplicité.

Pour garder son statut d'hypothèse falsifiable qui prend la place de la pure intuition, un modèle doit satisfaire un principe de généralisation : dans ce cadre, un modèle construit pour faire des prévisions correspond justement à une représentation des tendances, c'est-à-dire, à un paradigme projeté par l'interprétation des dynamiques culturelles spécifiques d'une synchronie, prêt à être utilisé pour construire le futur proche, où il y aura une appropriation syntagmatique qui va le traduire de suite en diachronie.

Un modèle de ce type est nourri par deux dynamiques culturelles spécifiques: d'un côté l'état des choses dans le système de tendances en tant que tel, la portée et la dénomination de ce qui est actuel; de l'autre côté l'analyse du contexte, de la sémiosphère de l'actualité, dont la tendance est un des acteurs.

Cependant, entre le discours des médias et les représentations que les acteurs sociaux donnent de la société dans laquelle ils vivent, il y a un processus de « régulation mutuelle »: le modèle tendanciel s'organise en réponse à une situation de référence complexe, dans laquelle phénoménologies stylistiques, façons de se conduire et « boom » socioculturels se croisent. Dans l'espace ambigu de ces deux textes – médiatique et social – on reconnaît toute la fragilité du modèle, son énergie synthétique et productive, et finalement sa nécessité prévisionnelle, qui n'exclut bien sûr pas l'espace pour le libre gaspillage (et investissement) du malentendu.

Pour définir un modèle, il faut sous-entendre une différence qui empêche la reproductibilité exacte et assure le progrès du système. Cette différence est une réduction de l'information, une discrétisation du continuum des possibles.

« Il est donc naturel pour nous », écrit Hume (1757: 51), « de chercher une règle par laquelle les sentiments divers des hommes puissent être réconciliés, ou du moins, une proposition de décision, qui confirme un sentiment, et en condamne un autre ».

La recherche de la règle produit le modèle, parcours de connaissance qui impose un principe de cohérence à la relation à la valeur du sujet percevant. En 1995 Jacques Fontanille écrit : « Si la compréhension présuppose l'altérité et installe une intersubjectivité, l'explication les suspend, à la perspective de l'appropriation de la signification par un observateur se substitue la perspective de l'informateur, dont on ne retient que l'activité de construction, et dont on implique l'activité d'attribution ».

Le sujet qui élabore un modèle prévisionnel pour le système des tendances est donc, dans ce sens, un véritable sujet épistémologique, dont la recherche, du contrat à la sanction, peut adopter apparemment une position aussi débrayée que embrayée. Dans un contrat de confiance, sélectionner ce « qu'il faut faire savoir », c'est-à-dire l'union avec un objet de valeur, la tendance à encourager, résulte d'une compétence cognitive sélective, qui impose la cohérence à travers la réduction et l'imposition de la régulation/stabilisation.

Le sujet de l'énonciation alterne alors sa position d'observateur/informateur, externe/interne, avec la position du destinataire. Les effets pragmatiques sur le système de la mode/des tendances seront de trois types :

- Régulation: Le fait de maintenir en équilibre une situation à travers l'exécution répétée de la proposition du sujet cognitif;
- Cumulation cyclique: Où le feed-back de la réception modifie les propositions de base;
- Cumulation didactique: Quand les effets des messages proposés sont mémorisés pour permettre d'élaborer de nouvelles stratégies.

2. *Le système*

Si la prévision de la mode peut paraître illusoire, Roland Barthes en 1967 reconnaît que sa structuration ne l'est pas. C'est-à-dire : si le fait que l'acteur multiplie les variantes empêche de percevoir une structure d'ensemble, de même ces variantes sont clairement identifiables du point de vue des traits plastiques et figuratifs, et leur alternance forme un système. Aujourd'hui, toutefois, la déstructuration des signifiants ne ramène plus à un seul système, mais à une explosion/prolifération de plusieurs systèmes, dont la durée (et la cyclicité) est autonome ; tout cela rend encore plus difficile la prévision. Néanmoins, il nous semble possible de situer au delà des modèles de répétition, sur l'axe continuité/discontinuité, une isotopie fondamentale et à larges mailles, s'il est vrai qu'aujourd'hui le système des tendances semble reposer essentiellement sur l'assomption, de la part de ceux qui concrétisent la stratégie de l'offre, d'une position dans le modèle de simulation ordonnée par cette opposition: où la continuité sous-entend une confiance par rapport à son style et la discontinuité une rupture continue de la règle qui vient d'être créée. Pour le récepteur/ destinataire/ consommateur, il s'agira de focaliser son choix de style par rapport à son

dynamisme plus ou moins grand, où, alors uniquement et à posteriori, une mode/tendance imposera des contraintes spécifiques.

3. La prévision

Pouvoir faire des prévisions : la futurologie n'est pas une science nouvelle, et encore moins exacte, et elle a été récemment (les derniers cinquante ans) englobée dans les territoires plus ou moins heureux du marketing. Elle explicite son action, comme on sait, à travers la recherche de nature qualitative ou quantitative qui devrait servir à classer les motivations de la conduite humaine.

On a déjà observé comme les raisons de la variation de la tendance doivent être positionnées au carrefour de l'offre et de la demande, dans leur régulation réciproque. Chester Watson écrit à ce propos (dans un article qui reste fondamental): « Pour être utile, il faut bien qu'une théorie indique également la tendance générale de la variation nécessaire pour établir le moment dans lequel on remarque les premiers signes d'un nouveau changement » (dans Ragone 1988 :293). La valence de mode/de tendance touche cycliquement les objets et la façon de se conduire, en déguisant ou en exaltant l'aspect fonctionnel, en tous cas en se posant au-dessus de ce dernier aspect ; elle élabore la relation des signes bien avant de s'attacher à la nature de l'objet-énoncé même.

On dira alors que, même si aujourd'hui un modèle verticale de décision du changement ne peut plus être proposé dans le système de la mode, et si horizontalement il n'y a pas assez de coordination pour avoir l'imposition d'un style, pourtant on remarquera un principe commun d'alternance de valeurs (rupture → normalisation → désémantisation) suffisamment généralisable (Figure 2).

4. Les tendances

La question est de chercher à comprendre comment faut-il construire une alternance, et comment au juste sa manifestation est formulée en termes de tendance. En tout cas, après l'émergence d'une tendance il y a une logique, un schéma conséquent qui peut être parcouru de nouveau a posteriori/anticipé à priori. Tout cela intéresse aussi bien l'ÊTRE que le FAIRE, ainsi qu'un sujet percevant en relation à un objet perçu: par conséquent




Figure 1.

on assistera à l'implication d'une deixis, une opération de focalisation/occultation qui établit la direction de la relation. Reconnaître la tendance signifie notamment retrouver de traits qui renvoient à un parcours thématique commun. Ces traits possèdent un principe de cohérence qui peut être identifié par itération : éléments, signes, figures, motifs qui convergent vers une même thématique, ce qu'en sémiotique on appelle isotopie (cf. Greimas et Courtés 1979 : 188).

La redondance peut se trouver aussi bien au niveau de l'expression que du contenu (notamment, dans notre cas, à niveau des traits vestimentai-




Figure 2.

res, des valeurs cognitives ou pathémiques, ou encore pragmatiques qui lui sont connectés), et encore elle peut se rendre concrète par des « acteurs » qui représentent sa manifestation syncrétique (les vedettes du moment, des symptômes de grande importance pour décoder l'isotopie/tendance). On atteindra alors un vecteur prospectif/prévisionnel, à partir d'une localisation spatio-temporelle « avant/après ». En ce cas, on pourrait s'affronter avec l'épistémologie sémiotique qui fonctionne essentiellement de façon rétrospective. Cependant, il s'agit d'un faux problème car l'analyse des tendances, dans son application, se base principalement sur une évaluation que le sujet cognitif exprime à propos du présent : c'est à partir de cette évaluation qu'on formule les attentes auxquelles il faut attacher les schémas prévisionnels.

De toute façon le problème de la tendance reste celui de sanctionner, c'est-à-dire d'attribuer une valeur à l'existant et à son futur immédiat. La logique sanctionnée sera quand même partielle, dans le seul but de pouvoir l'étendre globalement comme deixis représentative. Le mouvement de la sanction répond généralement à un principe d'alternance qui produit un

rythme de la tendance – avec des cycles, des cours et des recours – mesuré sur la cognition d'une conjoncture par rapport aux valeurs proposées : car la mode est tout d'abord une conduite, consensuelle ou polémique, contractuelle ou rebelle, par rapport à un ensemble de valeurs qui sont, à bon droit, les tendances, dont la saturation produit inévitablement une nouvelle attente et de nouvelles valeurs.

5. *Le rythme*

L'histoire – car il s'agit de cela – est faite partiellement de cours et recours, et proprement l'histoire des tendances : toutefois le mouvement n'est pas du tout linéaire. À côté de la mode on assiste à l'évolution du social, et la qualité des valeurs placées dans le signifiant « mode » évolue aussi, en déterminant une différente qualification du consentement.

Pourtant, un modèle de prévisibilité rythmique se charge de la nécessité de transformations continues que le sujet percevant doit évaluer. Ces transformations s'inscrivent sur un axe de temps (apparition d'une certaine tendance dans une certaine période) qui comporte implicitement une organisation intérieure, un « point de vue » sur les frontières de temps et de transformation.

Cette organisation est caractérisée en sens aspectuel, là où l'aspectualité présuppose qu'un temps soit orienté, qu'il ait donc un début et une fin. Une tendance peut vivre un temps très bref ou peut s'enraciner dans le tissu social (on peut prendre comme exemple dans le domaine des vêtements, le blazer qui a été introduit par Armani dans la mode pour femme au début des années 80 et qui est devenu, dans toutes ses applications et infinies variations, un genre éternel et ce que l'on appelle sémiotiquement un motif). Du point de vue aspectuel, il faut différencier au moins trois phases dans une tendance :

- Phase inchoative: il s'agit du moment initial où la rupture avec la continuité se manifeste plus visiblement et que, par opposition, un nouveau champ sémantique s'ouvre;
- Phase durative: C'est la phase de la reconnaissance et de l'appropriation, de la diffusion, pendant laquelle la tendance multiplie comme un écho ses traces dans les différents espaces textuels, mais elle ne se régénère pas : elle se fixe ou se sature;

- Phase terminative: C'est la phase qui correspond à la perte de la valeur de mode ; si la tendance est suffisamment compatible avec une diffusion auprès d'une large cible, elle pourra facilement résister en changeant sa nature et en se transformant en motif qui revient et même en configuration. Si, au contraire, elle est peu réalisable, si l'on ne peut pas facilement l'assimiler, elle disparaîtra définitivement et ne laissera que des traces dans le mouvement contradictoire de la tendance antithétique qui va émerger.

La tendance contrôle l'image et l'interaction réciproque entre sa proposition et sa réception. Aujourd'hui, la variabilité d'un champ sémantique de tendance dépend fortement des oscillations d'identité soit au niveau micro-social (l'image d'une marque, d'un styliste) soit au niveau macro-social (l'image d'une femme, d'un homme, d'une conduite, présentée comme gagnante). S'il est vrai, alors, que la tendance est un modèle investi d'une valeur d'actualité, étant donné que les modèles sont excessifs en qualité et quantité, on prévoit que dans le futur proche il n'y aura plus et le temps et la raison de vérifier sa reproductibilité.

6. *Excès et insuffisance*

Il faut de nouveau souligner que le sujet de l'énonciation « tendancielle » se manifeste dans une situation de référentialisation interne, où la prévision doit assurer ses conditions de transmissibilité. Quand Nelson Goodman (1954) élabore sa propre théorie de la projection, il renverse exactement dans ce sens-ci la perspective. Toutefois, s'il est vrai que la démarcation entre les prédictions (inductions de projections) valables et pas valables repose sur le monde et sur comment le discours décrit le monde, il faut revenir à la conclusion – peut-être décevante – qu'une tendance s'installe (soit elle confirme sa prévision) si et seulement si un contrat local de confiance se réalise (perspective de l'énonciation) et si, dans une perspective énonciationnelle, la narrativisation d'un énoncé objet est reconnue fonctionnelle à l'attente du destinataire, au point d'arriver progressivement à sa saturation. Le principe de vérification de la tendance consisterait alors, banalement, dans le besoin de régler intérieurement la courbe de jonction à laquelle on empêche de s'enfuir vers les bornes de l'excès et de l'insuffisance imaginaire.

Le regard sémiotique n'est que partiellement d'aide pour traverser un terrain quand même sapé, fragile, facilement explosif. Aujourd'hui, on vit dans une période de totale emphase communicative : l'intertextualité

a atteinte, dans notre conscience, des niveaux maximes d'expansion, et il s'agit d'une tendance en hausse, qui n'a pas du tout l'air de vouloir se fixer.

7. Conclusion

La tendance est un des agents responsables du tourbillonnement communicatif. Mais contrairement à ce qu'on attendrait, elle n'en profite pas. Dans les années où la communication est une stratégie et le consensus est un facteur réel de succès, il est impensable d'imaginer une rhétorique naïve et une découverte de la tendance, une créativité pure ou une sociologie « en rose ».

L'interaction ne se joue plus à coups de symboles – comme il se passait encore au début du décennie passé. Au contraire elle se « structure » grâce à l'image et à ses constructions : ainsi conçue comme une proposition des signes, c'est véritablement l'image qui a une fonction régulatrice dans l'interaction réciproque entre celui qui propose et celui qui, on pourrait dire, dispose. C'est une représentation de valeurs qui se résout en production de compétence relativement au contexte social, en inspirant une sanction positive et une action cohérente aux fins stratégiques de celui qui propose.

Aujourd'hui, il est donc nécessaire de savoir non seulement ce qu'on fera ou où l'on arrivera, mais encore comment cela a été fait, selon quel logique et quels buts. Pourtant, à la question initiale : Des modèles, existent-ils pour le système des tendances ? On répondra sans aucun doute affirmativement, avec la seule ambition démesurée – d'inviter à soustraire la sensibilité créative aux plages fumeuses du mystère et du je ne sais quoi, d'un air du temps par rapport à laquelle nous considérons qu'il faut absolument repérer un principe d'intelligibilité.

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V. Charissis and Marianne Patera

Symbolic vs alphanumeric representations in human machine interface design

1. Introduction

Communication amongst humans and machines can be hindered when vital information is indistinguishable or invisible to the user. However, by following the mass production trends, the majority of automotive interfaces fall into the category of non-intuitive designs. Prior to commencing the design and modelling of the interface components, we proceeded in a series of user-tests that aimed to identify the appropriate method for conveying vehicle's information to the driver. A comparative study demonstrated the characteristics of symbolic versus alphanumeric representations rendering the first as the most capable for establishing a robust and swift communication with the user. The choice of visual feedback is essential for developing an automotive navigation/guidance interface since comprehensible and accurate information can affect and alter a situation from imminent collision to accident avoidance.

Overall, the paper is organised as follows: The next Section offers a succinct overview of the differences between alphanumeric and symbolic representations. In turn, Section 3 elaborates on the symbols utilisation and contribution in interface design. Section 4 highlights the importance of the simplicity in the overall interface design so as to improve human-machine communication. Subsequently, Section 5 contains a detailed illustration of the HUD design philosophy and implementation process. Finally the paper concludes with an outline of the important design aspects investigated during this study with regard to symbolic representations in HMI designs and presents a tentative plan for future work.

2. Alphanumeric vs. Symbolic Representation

Alphanumeric interfaces have been heavily used in the last decades as description method for real-time navigation. This reflects the original military origins of the HUD design as a mean of increasing targeting accuracy of military aircraft. Despite the fact that these interfaces serve a particular and well-defined purpose in that environment, their non-adjusted deployment in the automotive field can be inappropriate. A number of tests have shown that HUDs overloaded with information, especially those using textual output, can create the effect known as cognitive capture (Ward & Parkes 1995). The term cognitive capture describes the lack of attention and consequently situational awareness when switching from the HUD interface to the actual driving environment and vice versa (Gish & Staplin 1995). It could be argued that alphanumeric information can be much more suitable in some cases, e.g., in defining exactly the vehicle's coordinates in a navigation system. On the other hand, the amount of information that drivers need to process in this manner can substantially delay their reaction to a possible collision incident. Comparative studies of symbols and alphanumeric data in HUDs have conclusively demonstrated that symbols are interpreted much faster by humans (Shekhar et al. 1991).

Thus, symbolic representation is a significantly faster way to provide the user with information that would otherwise need a considerable number of words to be described. Provided that letters are primal symbolic representations of sounds (Daniels & Bright 1996), any word has definitely more symbols than an iconic symbol which can include the same meaning in only one entity. Humans, initially try to focus, to read and understand, and then to react. For reducing or even eliminating visual clutter, the conformal type of symbology for navigation information has been proposed. In short, conformal symbology simulates the visual transformations of external objects to give observers the perception that the symbology is part of the external scene (Gish & Staplin 1995). By this approach, it is also feasible to achieve minimal interference between the projected information and the critical details in the actual road scene.

The final HUD design developed for this research utilises simple geometric shapes as symbols in order to minimize the effect of cognitive capture and issues associated with it. Additionally, the symbols have been colour-coded depending on the vehicle's distance to the object of interest

(a road turn or other vehicles for example). Symbol size variability also indicates the speed of the vehicle in relation to the lead vehicles (i.e. indicates the pace of approach). A detailed discussion on this is included in the following section. A comparative example of alphanumeric representation versus conformal symbology is depicted below in Figure 1.



Figure 1. (a) alphanumeric VS (b) symbolic representations.

3. Symbols in interface design

In order to design an interface design that incorporates symbolic representations it is necessary to define the borderlines between symbols and icons. The use of symbolism can assist users to apprehend complex information. To this end, Webber suggests that: “A symbol is a story or picture told or presented by a familiar sign that may be read at a glance” (Webber 1927). Hence, any image, after a process of extensive simplification of shape details and colours, can be effectively transformed to symbol as illustrated in Figure 2. The intermediate transformation stages between an image and a symbol are effectively known as icons.

In the interface under investigation images from the surrounding scene (i.e. vehicles, barriers, lanes) have been directly represented in a symbolic form to avoid overwhelmingly complicated shapes and colours that would demand more visual attention (i.e. a stylised outline of the real-life object). In a typical iconic representation the eye would investigate the details of the icon distracting the user from the main task of driving. Similarly, an unrecognisable or abstract symbol would have the same effects, as the driver would require more time in order to interpret or identify the meaning of it. A compilation of iconic representations in symbolic form would therefore be the ideal visualisation of information.




Figure 2. Example of simplification sequence from image to icon and finally to symbol.

4. Simplicity of representation

A flexible and easily comprehensible HUD interface that incorporates symbols depends largely on the simplicity of the representation of the real events and objects. Although contemporary instrumentation panels entice the customer with aesthetically appealing simplified interfaces, real-life usability proves the contrary. In both cases, simplicity is a considerably difficult task to achieve as over-simplified systems could be equally annoying for the user. A recent example is the BMW's i-drive system which imposed simplicity through a generic deduction of buttons, monitors and LEDs. While the overall design provides the driver with a spacious minimal dashboard, the operational complexity of the interface has been substantially raised as all the functionalities have been assigned to a central rotating button as presented in Figure 3a.

Over-simplification had a negative impact on the vehicle models equipped with this interface and forced the company to release versions in which some of the functionalities have been placed in their initial positions. At the antipode is the contemporary Mercedes vehicle which has an overwhelmingly equipped dashboard that requires a considerable amount of time to identify and utilise the panel's functionalities (Figure 3b). Therefore, depending on the situation or level of the menu-structure, some interfaces need to be carefully redesigned in order to achieve simplicity. Simplicity could be broadly defined as the absence of unnecessary elements and that could be implemented through thoughtful thinking (Maeda 2006). A misconception of simplicity can be translated as boring or shallow. Simplicity is amazingly hard to achieve, since it reflects the essence of any information provided.

The philosophy of simple interface design is easily understandable therefore it adheres to the logic of “simple and effective”. During the simplification process of the incoming data and their presentation to the user, a coherent hierarchy irrelevantly to the complexity of the original information has to be followed. It is of major importance that coherence and logically expected reactions are enhanced and promoted by the interface.




Figure 3. (a) BMW oversimplified i-Drive and (b) Mercedes' cluttered central instrumentation panel.

Therefore simplicity in automotive interfaces has to be the mean of transferring essential information to the driver so as to minimise distraction from overwhelmingly presented visual cues. In Human Machine Interaction, simplicity does not imply a design style; it stands for effective and solid piece of information provided in timely manner. However, this can be commonly misinterpreted as reduction. On the contrary, simplicity requires solemn thought and considerable effort as Almqvist et al. state: “A modern paradox is that it's simpler to create complex interfaces because it's so complex to simplify them” (Almqvist et al. 2000).

5. Proposed HUD Symbolology

The interface design presented in this paper addresses primarily the problem of spatial and situational awareness under low visibility conditions. In adverse weather conditions, drivers' response times are predominantly associated with comprehension of the current situation and possible options/solutions available. In this vein, the proposed interface adheres to the dictum of the three stages of human understanding namely: see → analyse → react. Following the above sequence of events during the processing

of an alert, it was useful for this study to cluster them in these three main aforementioned categories. Consequently this three-tier categorisation (see, analyse, react) was also utilised to define the design characteristics of the proposed interface components. A correlation between human knowledge assimilation, collision stages and symbolic representation of the collision stages is offered in Figure 4.




Figure 4. Correlation between (a) human knowledge assimilation, (b) collision stages and (c) symbolic representation of collision stages.

Each category relates mutually to a different phase of human understanding and knowledge forming. Notably, during a potential accident, any information provided should be comprehended in milliseconds by the human brain in order to allow for effective reaction in the face of impending danger. Therefore a piece of information should be selected according to its relative significance at that particular moment otherwise “processing-bottlenecks” can create an impediment to human reactions (Endsley et. al. 2003).

This observation drives the following considerations on the development of the HMI elements that notify the driver of the potential dangers present under low visibility conditions. Notably, instant comprehension of a symbol’s meaning can effectively reduce or even by-pass completely the time-consuming analysing/thinking period. To this end Jung (1964: 256) observed that a person “never perceives anything fully or comprehends anything completely”. In the same work, the author further notes that collection of information through the senses may provide a wealth of different sensor conduits (hearing, touching, and so on) but it still remains questionable to what degree the incoming data are taken into account. As such, “seeing” is not always “believing”, as the human agent may ignore the data received by its own “sensors”. As an intuitive example, one may con-

sider a vehicular interface that provides predominantly visual information in an attention-demanding environment (i.e. under low visibility conditions), where the driver can easily miss information cues; in such a case it is crucial to highlight the absolutely necessary information in a distinguishable and timely manner.

In view of designing the proposed HUD display four pieces of information were identified as the most vital for collision avoidance in motorways, namely *lane recognition (pathway symbol)*, *lead vehicle detection (b1 & b2)*, *sharp turn notification* and *traffic warning* (depicted in Fig. 5). In particular the above information reflects the main obstacles that may be involved in a collision in a motorway environment under low visibility (e.g. lead vehicles and traffic congestion are typically the expected objects on a motorway). Furthermore the sharp turn, lane width and lane trajectory are structural characteristics of the road that can affect the driving behaviour if they are misjudged or neglected. The aforementioned pieces of information are, in turn, visually represented in the HUD design by four symbols (Fig. 5). Prior to commencing the design and modelling of these four symbols, valuable comments were gathered from drivers during informal interviews (Charissis & Papanastasiou 2006).




Figure 5. (a) Lane recognition (pathway symbol), (b1) lead vehicle detection (b2) lead vehicle detection in the same lane, (c) sharp turn notification and (d) traffic warning.

Notably, special care was taken to prioritise incoming information according to the level of importance and then display the most relevant cues promptly and predominantly. To exemplify the significance of this prioritisation, consider that it would be inappropriate during an imminent collision for the HUD to indicate for instance the engine oil-temperature. In this case, even if a potential engine failure was fast approaching, the top priority for the system should be to inform the driver about a potential collision and suggest possible avoidance manoeuvres. As soon as the

life-threatening situation has been overcome, the mechanical or infotainment issues could then be indicated. The shape and functionality of the symbols have been modelled according to the most relevant real-time data that offer information on other objects in close proximity as well as road characteristics. Defining the type and significance of information (quality) is the first step to providing sufficient and vital information to the driver. The evaluation trials of 40 users demonstrated that drivers could process the incoming information effectively (through the symbolic HUD representations) without affecting their response time to a potential accident scenario.

6. Conclusions

This paper has presented a novel design approach for an automotive full-windshield HUD interface which aims to improve the driver's spatial awareness and response times in near-zero visibility conditions. In its final form, the prototype interface design aims to present information in a timely and intuitive manner. Following the design mantra of distilling and simplifying (visually) the incoming information (derived from the vehicle's sensors) (Charissis & Papanastasiou 2006b) the HUD's design aims to minimise visual clutter and consequently the cognitive capture effect. In particular, this paper offered a description of the HUD interface elements that are based on minimalist visual representations of real objects. Evidently a simplification of the visual cues can potentially shorten the learning curve and offer a compact form of interactive guidance for motorway environments. In our future plans we intent to investigate further new symbolic representations and expand the interactivity of the system with the use of *direct manipulation interface* techniques.

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María Dolores Chávez García

The Mexican semiosphere

Musical intertextuality as a cultural expression of Latin American artistic signification

Latin America is a region integrated by language, by religion, and by artistic and cultural realities. Latin American countries moreover share a common past in their history of conquest by the Spanish and Portuguese empires. Among the identity processes of Latinos are forms of musical expression whose rhythmical-melodic units correspond to those of ancestral structures.

Here we approach manifestations of musical intertextuality as cultural expressions of the Latino people, in which one finds processes of creolization and dialogism (Bakhtinian “polyphony”). The signification of these processes is conceived in terms of a basic, relatively stable structural principle governing the internal organization of sense within that semiotic space which Lotman (1996) called the “semiosphere”. This basic nuclear structure manifests as intertextual processes operating within a narrow zone that delimits inside from outside,

1. Transdisciplinary approach, because the methodology includes the perspective of the analysis and musical theory, sociological aspects of consumption, discourse analysis and semiotics of culture.
2. Creolization within this Semiosphere and intertextuality.
3. Musical minimum structures pitch/rhythm.
4. Ideological-cultural operation of the use of “Spanglish”.

The first three aspects encourage understanding between Latino countries, whereas the fourth is a symptom of misunderstanding between them.

1. *Semiosis of Latin American musical production*

The semiosphere establishes an internal organization that generates meanings – in this case, the kinds of music described in Figure 1: Northern music (including drug-traffic songs), *gruperá* music, Colombian *cumbia*, Brazilian samba, tango, and folkloric music of each country that constitutes the nucleus of Latin American culture. In this sense, a relation obtains between nucleus and periphery, where the borderlines that delimit interior/exterior are complex relations that can appear as processes of intertextuality. Also, it is a sum of translations from other types of music, as it travels from the periphery and ancestral time of Afro-American cultures: blues, rock, gospel, pop-rock; Anglo-Saxon parades and marches, techno and rock (with all of its variants).




Figure 1. Nucleus-to-periphery movement of Latin American musical styles.

Lotman (1998) defines the nucleus-periphery concept as “a space of culture organized in a certain way that always includes some nuclear formation and a structural periphery ...” (1998: 76). Here, the characteristics of the nucleus include idiomatic, loosely pitched instruments and African rhythms. Moreover, Latin musical expression is a “creolized” one – to borrow a term from linguistics – a hybrid system that is different from the original. In Lotman’s conception (ibid.: 33), the nucleus-periphery phenomenon may also obtain in the field of culture, whose organization has a system with deep roots in societies and elements connected over time and space. According to Schuller (1978: 76), the term “creole” was used in New Orleans, in zones of French colonization of this part of America, and designated those of European ancestry born in the United States. A “creole” musical system, too, has both regionally-determined and European characteristics, the fundamental organization of which is both harmonic and rhythmical-melodic. Harmony is triadic and encoded with the letters A, B, C, D, E, F, G. Melody is centered in the main voice and can be measured metrically. In this case, it is executed generally by instruments forming the rhythmical nucleus of piano, bass and drums.

On the left side of Figure 1, types of traditional musics are located by region, with some possible some omissions, given the wide cultural diversity of every Latin country. This heterogeneity is, however, is a characteristic of folk music. The scheme on the figure illustrates dynamics of globalization, whose movement is combined with other dominant influences; these last include music distribution companies that showcase their products primarily by the Internet and commercial radio. In Mexico, these influences are mainly *grupera* music, *northern* music (regional Mexican), *cumbia* from Colombia (which mainly attracts listeners of socio-economic level), and “tropical” music, which is the dance music typical of beaches and other coastal areas.

Shared musical characteristics establish points of contact and relationships that help to establish identity and living cultural spheres. One aspect of the musical systems that we are analyzing here is that they use mostly major tonalities, a feature that supports the dominant social system (cf. Leeuwen 1999). Most of them use an organization of discourse (language and ideology) and, especially, drug-dealing songs and/

or northern music (discussed below), which have messages concerning government and to leaders of drug-traffickers.

*2. Minimal structures of pitch and rhythm:
The skull of Jade-Cráneo de Jade*

Within the distribution of harmony, the voices are laid out in traditionally western style, in tertian harmony (including 7th), with strong emphasis on the tonic note. In some regions, characteristic instrumentation includes bandoleón (for *tango* and *huapango*), piano, bass, drums, electric guitar and vocals.




Figure 2. Relationship between musical drum beats and the African god, Changó.

As to the rhythms in tropical music/salsa, the minimal structures are drawn from rituals of Santería. A typical rhythm may be seen on the left side of Figure 2, a description of the ternary-based *changó*; on the right side of the figure, we see that this rhythm corresponds to Orisha, the god of thunder and lightning, fire, war, dance, all music, and masculine beauty (protector of soldiers, etc.). In traditional folkloric music, the *huapango tamaulipeco* (from Tamaulipas, one of Mexico's states) corresponds to this same basic rhythmical structure. Therefore, it corresponds to dialogic voices within a musical text that are interdependent in different musical manifestations. In this sense, we have one of the symbols concretely delimited to music-producing subjects. We have included examples from linguistics and fusion music, in the lyrics of a song by Molotov. Such expressions are easily identifiable in clear semiotic processes, which on the reception side include competition from whomever listens. This type of public constitutes a nuclear group of a

large enough population to occupy a position in the culture of our country. Its nucleus, as in some other Latin American societies, is music with ancestral rhythmic cells, in particular, tropical songs and *salsa*. These can be identified by characteristic meters and syncopated rhythms; the melodies follow an easily outlined pattern, and the harmony is based on tonic/dominant relations. In all these aspects, we may speak of understanding/misunderstanding; understanding, because they are common, culturally defined communication schemes among Latin Americans. On the other hand, misunderstanding has often occurred, leading to unfortunate experiences that differ on ideas concerning sovereignty and integration. For example, the conception of different models (such as Chavez's misunderstanding of Bolivar); the Brazilian model (of president Da Silva); and the moves toward pragmatic models (United States). The failure of economic reforms in Latin America has caused a lack of definition in various governments there. For our concerns in this paper, however, we shall not dwell on those.

3. Ideological-cultural reflection in the use of "Spanglish"

People who speak Spanglish transgress linguistic norms, by using a new, creolized language. Latin American immigrants perceive a great resistance between subjects of American identities and themselves; they get an impression of greatness and power, along with a sense of coldness, distance, and impersonality. By contrast, Latin subjects are focused on people and intimate social relations (Massey and Sánchez 2002). Conditions of production and discursive reception are included in this process. In this regard, Haidar (2002, 2006) proposes a scheme of implicative relations among social formation, discursive formation and ideological-formation (Figure 3). Pecheux (in Haidar 2006) makes reference to the imaginary formation of social subjects, and its interlocutor refers to discourse-language manifestations (aggression and discrimination). In orthodox Marxism, "formation" is defined as a complex of contradictory economic structures; and according to Pecheux (1978), each of these elements has a structural combination. In this sense, social formation represents a complexity of superstructures corresponding to a whole social totality, historically determined, which interacts with a given economic

structures in several ways of production, and generates social classes and social groups.

However, these authors articulate their conception of social formation with ideological categories defined as “a complex set of attitudes and representations that are neither individual nor universal”, but that is related directly to class positions and discursive formations (Pecheux, in Haidar 2006). This author conceives that conditions of production and reception of language are like imaginary formations of sociological-ideological-discursive conditions that are implied mutually and included in the formation of subjects, which depend on one, concrete economic structure, with its own ways of production and setting of social relations. This social formation implies a perception of reality in which it may take part, as a force confronting other forces in the ideological conjunctions characteristic of a social formation (Pecheux 1978).




Figure 3. Implicative relation of discourse (from Haidar, 2006).

A given ideological formation determines what “it can and must say”; for that reason, some of these strategies have to regulate the lyrics (contents) of songs. Popular compositions are automatic constraints that creators apply to themselves. In this case, if *northern music* (regional Mexican) exceeds these automatic controls in *narcocorridos* (a musical discourse and style) so as to redeem itself in a cultural transgression, these musical genres constitute types of enunciation whose meaning admits concepts that can be judged and categorized as false/true and as “reasonable or unsuitable”. Such would be songs by activists opposed to a regime, regulated by the kind of auto-control (censure) usually omitted in a given declarative situation. Such constraints apply not only to the

content but also to the form. Moreover, we can see a process of Americanization (globalization) in the use of language, which is frequently legitimized in literary works that use Spanglish and the portray the life situations that Latinos are forced to face.


Some types of music constitute an identity discourse for a great number of people, from Baja California to the Yucatan peninsula. One example is a rap style in non English-speaking zones, which is successful because it is anchored in oral tradition in the discursive sphere and developed by contact with Spanglish-Chicano people. Therefore, these discursive manifestations also imply an imaginary creator (composer), whose formation expresses unconscious and conscious contents of a daily reality lived in bicultural processes. At the same time, the creator is also collective, since such songs are the implied artistic expressions of Spanish-speaking migrants. As such, they are signs of creolized culture. Language, with its argumentative statements and specific conclusions, is present in the lyrics of songs. They are macro-operations of discourse (with narration strategies, description and demonstration) in object-subject language schemas and musically creative songs that reconstruct the social subject at the level of superstructures.

4. *Conclusions*

In Latin America we find examples of artistic cultural expressions that support understanding between countries. In this regard, we have analyzed musical characteristics that, even though specifically Mexican, may be extrapolated to Latin America at large. In this type of musical text one can identify rhythmical structures that underlie a Latino cultural unit. Thus, it is not surprising to find lyrics opposed to dominant countries like the United States. However, understanding the relationship between Mexico and other countries is complex. For such purposes Lotman (1998) proposed concepts such as dialogism, production/reception of the artistic subject, cultural and border translation, *partenaire*. Latin artistic production is to be understood as a phenomenon nuclear for these same societies and peripheral for countries. Also, it shows creolized characteristics that allow us to identify it as a “text” (Lotman 1996), that signifies towards an audience and constitutes itself as a *partenaire* constructing a

dialogic relation; proving this point are examples of music with African rhythmic roots in Santería and other rituals.

Don't call me gringo,
You fuckin beaner
stay on your side
of that goddamn river
don't call me gringo,
You beaner.
No me digas beaner,
Mr. Puñetero
Te sacaré un susto
por racista y culero.
No me llames frijolero,
Pinche gringo puñetero.
Now I wish I had a dime
for every single time
I've gotten stared down
For being in the wrong side of town.
And a rich man I'd be
if I had that kind of chips
lately I wanna smack the mouths
of these racists.
Molotov(2001), *El frijolero*.



by Mac Margolis
Newsweek | may 06 '02
Newsweek's article of Fuguet, Alberto y
Edmundo Paz Soldán's book. *Se habla
español*. México: Alfaguara. 2000

Figure 4. Examples of artistic and linguistic manifestations in "Spanglish".

Latin America can find examples of cultural expression, especially artistic-musical ones, that can promote, by cultural translation, understanding between countries.

The semiotic border between Mexico and the USA, seen as a form of musical-cultural domination, constitutes the scene of alternative production of creolized musical systems. Nucleus-periphery relations of social movements also have repercussions in musical semiotic-discursive processes, which become materialized in peripheral musical genres.

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*Hsiang-Ju Chen, Kuo-Hsiung Lin, and
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One aspect of neo-Confucian structure in decision making

A yin-yang-based system theory

1. Introduction

Some ancient Chinese philosophers believed that everything in the universe was made up of two forces, called yin and yang. Lin (1999), a proponent of Yin-Yang theory, states: “At the beginning of the universe, the *Ultimate Nothingness* gave birth to the *Great Ultimate*. Then, they became a pair, *yin* and *yang* in the broader sense, and they began to interact with each other.” In other words, the concept of yin-yang describes two, primal, separate yet complementary forces found in all things in the universe. According to Mou (2003), *yin-yang* reflects not only the collective wisdom of ancient Chinese people concerning the fundamental features of the universe, but also influences later metaphysical thought in various of the Chinese schools or movements. *Yin-yang* is also a sign system used by Chinese people to convey feelings, thoughts, and ideas. It is therefore a major branch of Chinese Semiotics.

From the viewpoint of Chinese philosophers, since *yin-yang* is an encompassing, yet flexible, systematic concept; it hence can be used to explain many phenomena of our daily life. Using the notion of *yin-yang* as it applies to the workings of *wu-hsing* – the five agents: plant life, fire, earth, metal, and water – people can effectively explain many of the changes taking place, and in turn, relate them to nature, the human body, psychology, philosophy, historical changes or scientific findings. Chinese medicine is but one of the well-known scientific practices based on the theory of *yin-yang* and *wu-hsing*.

Derived from Chinese systematic thinking (De Bary et. al 1960; Wu 1972) and western systems-theory, the Neo-Confucian System Theory

(NCST) is composed of three subsystems (Lin 1999): the *Yin-Yang*-based system, the *Wu-Hsing*-based system, and the Triadic Talents,¹ i.e., Earth, Humans, and Heaven (see Figure 1). Among these, the *Yin-Yang*-based system is the one fundamental to development, in that it first simplifies space, which is of infinite dimension, into a pair of *yin-yang* forces. Due to its nature as an interactive system, it can then be developed into other pairs of *yin-yang* hierarchically, according to related axioms and by the ordering order of Earth-, Humans-, and Heaven-positions after the first *yin-yang* pair in Earth position. The *yang* of Earth position further splits into two patterns as another pair of *yin-yang* Human-positions, accompanied by a *yin-yang* pair of the Human-position, split further from the *yin* of the Earth position; these first and second splits lead to the creative evolution of *Four Scenarios*. The process continues with a third split – that of the Heaven position – producing the scenarios of *Eight Trigrams (Ba-Gua)*, which can be modeled effectively after these three pairs of *yang* and *yin* begin to interact.




Figure 1. The figure of NCST.

Senge (1990) advocated the view, highly relevant here, that systematic thinking explores things as wholes. Flood (1999) later pointed out the link between systematic thought and the study of complexity and uncertainty. As well as breaking through the limits of linear thought,² the NCST is capable of simplifying and structuring complex systems. The NCST has been used as a framework for academic research and as an analytic tool for business management in modern China (Chen et al. 2006; Lin 2001; 2002; 2003a; 2004; 2005; Tsai et al., 2004); and the concept of *yin-yang* is also widespread in many fields of social-science research in the west; e.g., in total quality management (Cunha et al. 2002), strategic project management (Curtis 2001), currency systems (Lietaer and De Meulenaere 2003), strategy innovations (Perlitz 1994), computer science (Sodan 1998), social behavior (Sodan 1999), and intercultural communication (Yuan 1997).

Past research, however, has not yielded rich enough insights into the core values of *yin-yang*; and in turn, it seems that no unified, guiding law or principle governs the theoretical and empirical application of *yin-yang*. Accordingly, the concept or theory of *yin-yang* somehow fails to be adequately emphasized or even fully realized. Issues as to how *yin-yang* can be effectively applied in modern management science remain relatively unexplored.

In this study, starting from a discussion of the concept of *yin* and *yang* as *Two Patterns* (two interactive forces) and following with construction of *Four Scenarios* and *Eight Trigrams*, the authors propose related axiomatic definitions, operational definitions, axioms, and laws that serve as a theoretical foundation for the *Yin-Yang*-based system. The authors illustrate how they can also be used to model the structure of qualitative decision-making, and in turn, as an analytic tool for business management.

2. *The Yin-Yang-based system*

More than two thousand years ago, *yin-yang* school emerged in China as explanations of how and why nature operates in such opposing ways. This ancient pair of seemingly opposite terms, which is the most influential dualism in the East, has gone on to surpass its religious content, and is now located in the realm of modern Chinese psychology and philosophy. Starting from systems theory, Lin (1992a; 1992b; 1997) has discovered similarities between *yin-yang* dualistic philosophy and economic duality. For

westerners who want to better understand Chinese thought, it is crucial to understand the *yin-yang* logic prevalent in “*Great Ultimate* thinking”. The *Yin-Yang*-based system theory is composed of the following axioms:

AXIOMATIC DEFINITION (1): That situation in which the human being senses no existence of system, order, and structure is called “*Ultimate Nothingness*”.

AXIOMATIC DEFINITION (2): That situation in which systematic order and structure can be recognized initially or has been recognized by human beings is called “the *Great Ultimate*”.




Figure 2. The Great Ultimate sketch.

Figure 2 is a general sketch of systematic thinking based on *yin-yang* logic as applied to the *Great Ultimate* system. The latter is pictured as a circle. The S-curve in the center divides the circle into two sectors, the white one standing for the *yang* pattern, the black one for *yin*. On one hand, this segmentation denotes benign interaction between the two patterns, but on the other hand, it indicates separation and scission between the two patterns. It also highlights the continuous movement and influence of *yin* on *yang* and *yang* on *yin*.

AXIOM (1): The *Great Ultimate* (system) is composed of two interactive forces, i.e., *yin* and *yang*. Multitudinous interactions between these two forces engender myriad objects and things (subsystems or small great-ultimates) in the universe. Through this two-way interaction, *yin* and *yang* can in turn transform those objects and things.

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION (1): The *Great Ultimate* splits forces up into two patterns, the movement-dominated force as *yang* pattern, and the tranquility-dominated force as *yin* pattern.

Inspired by Brugha's dichotomy (1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 2000), we present a qualitative decision structure for the *Yin-Yang*-based system theory. In spite of several differences between the latter and Brugha's dichotomy,³ the *Yin-Yang* system may be graphed as shown in Figure 3.




Figure 3. Yin-Yang system.

AXIOM (2): *Yin* and *yang* are separate forces, but are not necessarily hostile to each other.

AXIOM (3): The initial generation of *yang* and *yin* is ordinal.

AXIOM (4): The *Yin-Yang*-based system is an open system.

AXIOM (5): After interaction, *yin* and *yang* have a two-way, causal relationship.

AXIOM (6): The *Yin-Yang*-based system is an evolving system.

AXIOM (7): When insufficient reciprocity occurs, such internal changes of system would make the *yin* and *yang* *Gua*-transformation into a new phenomenon.

Generally speaking, a theorem must be deduced from axioms (Hunt 1991); nevertheless, laws are usually induced from observation and living experience. The question of whether any theorem can be deduced from related axioms of the *Yin-Yang*-based system theory remains to be explored. To engage problems that cannot be solved by the above axiomatic system,

Lin (1994) has also induced four laws from historical literature and opinion,⁴ to serve as complements to the above axioms:

LAW (1): Interaction between the two forces of *yin* and *yang* would cause the creative evolution of myriad objects and things.

LAW (2): Where one of the two forces is lacking, no singular system exists.

LAW (3): Under appropriate situations, *yin* can change its role into *yang* and vice versa.

LAW (4): The system can only be stable if the two forces of *yin* and *yang* are dynamically balanced. Conversely, a dynamically unstable system will result from a dynamic imbalance between these two forces.

There are two different situations where one is *yin-yang* in dynamic imbalance and the other is *yin-yang* in dynamic balance. The former continues changing until it reaches dynamic balance, and the latter can change, by certain external or internal motivation, to a state of dynamic instability. When all *yin* and *yang* pairs in the *Great Ultimate* reach overall dynamic balance, the system achieves the situation of harmony (Lin 1999).⁴ At this stage, the system remains dynamically stable unless there is a change of external environment or of internal motive.

3. *From the Two Patterns subsystem to the Four Scenarios subsystem*

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION (2): In the input (Earth-process) and output (Humans-process) structure, the *yin* and *yang* patterns of the “Earth” position can apply forces that further develop the system into four situations, namely, what we call the *Four Scenarios*.

Other stratifying principles, such as the WSR (*Wuli Shili Renli*) approach (Gu and Zhu 2000) differ from that of the *Four Scenarios* in the *Yin-Yang*-based system. The former adopts a three-level analytic method, whereas the latter embodies I-P-O (Input-Process-Output) structure. Yet another stratifying principle, proposed by Brugha (1998a, b, c; 2000), is a system for analyzing qualitative decision-making based on dichotomous answers to three simple questions: “What should be done?”, “Where should it be done?”, and “Who has the problem?”. But it neither fits into I-P-O structure nor meets the needs of the *yin-yang* stratifying principle. In this sense, and based on the ordinal principle of Earth-position and

Humans-position, the *Four Scenarios* structure may be sketched as in the middle part of Figure 4. As we can see, there are four situations (2^2) in the *Four Scenarios* structure.

Stratifying principle <i>Four Scenarios</i>	First split (Earth position)	Second split (Humans position after Earth position)	Symbol
Real scenario	<i>yang</i>	<i>yang</i>	☰
Pseudo-scenario	<i>yang</i>	<i>yin</i>	☱
Righteous scenario	<i>yin</i>	<i>yang</i>	☲
Useful scenario	<i>yin</i>	<i>yin</i>	☷

Table 1. Properties and symbols of Four Seasons.




Figure 4. Eight Trigrams structure.

4. From the Four Scenarios subsystem to the Eight Trigrams subsystem

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION (3): Any single situation in *Four Scenarios* can apply forces of *yin* and *yang*, derived from the following “Heaven” position, to further develop the system into *Eight Trigrams*.

The terminology used in this paper and corresponding western designations are shown in Table 3.

5. Decision-making structure in business management

Based on operational definitions of the *Yin-Yang*-based system theory proposed above, the *Great Ultimate* may split hierarchically into three pairs of *yin* and *yang* by order of “Earth” position, “Humans” position, and “Heaven” position. Since *yin* and *yang* interact with each other in the content of each single pair, there exists a two-way, causal relationship.

When an organization or a company is treated as the *Great Ultimate*, its first *yin-yang* stratifying principle would come up with the most fundamental production factors: the inputs of labor and the owner’s equities of the Earth-position. Here, the movement-dominated force of labor input, which operates production equipment and processes raw materials, is considered to be the *yang* pattern. The tranquility-dominated force of owner-equity input – hiring of laborers, purchases of raw materials and production equipment, drawing upon borrowed money – is considered to be the corresponding *yin* pattern. These two forces usually interact in the form of combination of different quantities and percentages resulting from the decision-making of management.

Different decision-making domains depend upon the focus of management. Specialized operation and synthetic management are two major types of management philosophy in business. Management based on specialized operation pursues higher productivity and competitiveness. It is a *yang* pattern with movement-dominated force in the Humans-position. By contrast, synthetic management takes greater account of risk-factors, diversification, and financial stability. It is a *yin* pattern with a tranquility-dominated force in the Humans-position. The first pair of *yin-yang* patterns, developed from Earth-position, can then individually connect with this second pair of *yin* and *yang* forces, internally developed from the

Stratifying principle <i>Eight Trigrams</i>	First split (Earth position) (地位)	Second split (Humans position after Earth position) (人位)	Third split (Heaven position after Earth & Humans position) (天位)	Symbol
<i>Qian-Gua</i> (乾卦)	<i>yang</i>	<i>yang</i>	<i>yang</i>	☰
<i>Dui-Gua</i> (兌卦)	<i>yang</i>	<i>yang</i>	<i>yin</i>	☱
<i>Li-Gua</i> (離卦)	<i>yang</i>	<i>yin</i>	<i>yang</i>	☲
<i>Zhen-Gua</i> (震卦)	<i>yang</i>	<i>yin</i>	<i>yin</i>	☳
<i>Xun-Gua</i> (巽卦)	<i>yin</i>	<i>yang</i>	<i>yang</i>	☴
<i>Kan-Gua</i> (坎卦)	<i>yin</i>	<i>yang</i>	<i>yin</i>	☵
<i>Geng-Gua</i> (艮卦)	<i>yin</i>	<i>yin</i>	<i>yang</i>	☶
<i>Kun-Gua</i> (坤卦)	<i>yin</i>	<i>yin</i>	<i>yin</i>	☷

Table 2. Properties and symbols of Eight Trigrams structure.

Terminology	Western vocabulary
<i>Ultimate Nothingness</i> (darkness)	(It seems to have no corresponding concept.)
<i>Great Ultimate</i>	system
<i>yin</i> (tranquility-dominated)	antithesis (but its meaning is limited)
<i>yang</i> (movement-dominated)	thesis (but its meaning is limited)
<i>Two Patterns</i>	two patterns (but its meaning is too broad)
<i>Four Scenarios</i>	four scenarios (but its meaning is too broad)
<i>Eight Trigrams</i>	eight scenarios (but its meaning is too broad)

Table 3. Terminology of the Yun-Yang-based system theory and its corresponding Western vocabulary.

Humans-position, resulting in the *Four Scenarios* (operational definition 2).

Rewards in the form of a paycheck for labor input are the most basic and important expenditure, and may be deemed a *yang* pattern of production outcome. Profits from specialized operation or earnings from synthetic management are less urgent and necessary objectives than are paycheck rewards; thus, they are considered to be *yin* patterns of production-activity outcome. This third pair of *yin* and *yang* is located in the ‘Heaven’ position. These three pairs of *yin* and *yang* together constitute the *Eight Trigrams* (operational definition 3).

People in management positions play the key role in connecting fundamental inputs to pursuant outcomes. The achievement of desired outcomes encourage repetition of the fundamental inputs. Since activities involved in any single path, through fundamental inputs on the way to pursuing outcomes, cover all possible management decisions, the *Eight Trigrams* can be used as a decision-making structure in business management. The *Eight Trigrams* structure, shown in Figure 4, may be practically applied to business management, as sketched in Figure 5.

Among the *Eight Trigrams*, the *Qian-Gua* causal chain can be used as a detailed illustration of how it works when the major concern of a company is to satisfy employees’ most fundamental and important needs (paycheck rewards). As we can see, employees are one of the most important resources of any company. Optimal quantity of qualified labor input is usually the domain of recruitment and selection, which is one function of the personnel department. After recruiting qualified employees, the company equips them with the assets needed to achieve the goals of specialized operation. The source of capital depends on the annual budget and is an important determination made by the financial department. The achievement of goals of specialized operation brings added value and covers the cost of employees’ paychecks. Satisfaction with salary in turn stimulates employees to work hard in pursuing future goals. The *Qian-Gua* causal chain can be expressed as follows:

$$\frac{A}{C} = \frac{A}{B} \cdot \frac{B}{F} \cdot \frac{F}{H} \cdot \frac{H}{J} \cdot \frac{J}{K_1} \cdot \frac{K_1}{L_1} \cdot \frac{L_1}{C}$$

where,




Figure 5. Eight Trigrams decision-making structure in business management.

- C: labor input
- L_i : real-assets inputs in specialized operation
- K_i : fixed-assets inputs in specialized operation⁵
- J: mechanical and electrical equipment inputs in specialized operation
- H: total-production value in specialized operation
- F: value-added in specialized operation
- B: labor costs
- A: paycheck expenses

The right-most item, with denominator (C), is labor input as a *yang* pattern of the Earth-position shown in Figure 5. Along with L_i , K_i , and J, they are the most decisive production-factors input when management is focus on specialized operation. Hence decisions regarding the “proportion or percentage of K_i / L_i and J / K_i ” are the key ones made in the pursuit of higher total-production value (H) or higher value-added (F). Combined

with efforts to decrease the consumption of raw materials and operating expenses, a company would be able to obtain higher value-added and, in turn, distribute labor costs (B) and employees' paychecks (A). The other seven causal chains of the *Eight Trigrams* may be implemented in similar fashion.

6. Conclusion

In this study, two axiomatic definitions, three operational definitions, seven axioms, and four laws have been proposed to elaborate a *Yin-Yang*-based system theory, as evolving from *Ultimate Nothingness*, *Great Ultimate*, *Two Patterns*, *Four Scenarios*, and, finally, to *Eight Trigrams*. To illustrate the latter, a decision-making structure based on the *Qian-Gua* causal chain was described, which may be taken as a model for business management. With this study, the authors have sought both to contribute to theoretical investigation of the Neo-Confucian System Theory (NCST), and to demonstrate a practical application of the *Yin-Yang*-based system theory. The other subsystem of the NCST – the *Wu-Hsing*-based system theory – will form the subject of future research.

Notes

1. According to Lin (1999), the active of the *Great Ultimate* would generate two patterns of Heaven and Earth through the corresponding operation of *yin-yang* two patterns. The active interaction of two patterns of Heaven and Earth then generates water, fire, plant, metal, land and Humans. The positions of Heaven, Earth, and Humans in one kind of operation correspond to *yang*, *yin*, and harmony, respectively. Harmony is a relatively active force that activates two relatively passive forces, namely *yang* and *yin*, in a passive system. These three forces of *yang*, *yin*, and harmony constitute the operating system in the *Yin-Yang*-based system theory, which is one of the subsystems of NCST.
2. In facing complicated problems, one is used to thinking about them in terms of manageable segments first, and coordinating them later. This so-called linear thinking is the mainstream of modern thought. Although linear thinking can solve many complicated problems, improper segmentation can cloud our perception of the problem as a whole. In addition, linear thinking tends to make phenomena too complicated to be conceiv-

able, even when only two or three variables are involved. Senge (1990) calls this “dynamic complexity”.

3. The eastern *Yin-Yang*-based system theory and that of the West are both derived from a common dichotomy. But these two decision-making structures differ in terms of stratifying principles, dichotomous content, and stratifying outcomes.
4. The term “harmony”, as used in this study, is almost equivalent to the meaning of “*Chung-Ho*”. Harmony is an important analytic concept in Chinese culture. According to Lin (1999), harmony is a relatively active force that activates two relatively passive forces, namely *yang* and *yin*, in a passive system. These three forces of *yang*, *yin*, and harmony constitute the operating system of the *Triadic Talents*. In contrast, equilibrium refers to temporary concordance of two different and independent forces. It seems there is no significant active harmonic force involved in either mechanical equilibrium or homeostatic equilibrium. That is why, in Lin’s opinion, harmony can only conditionally encompass equilibrium.
5. Management can privilege either specialized operation or synthetic management. When a company is managed with specialized operation in mind, the real assets inputs (L_1) are composed of fixed assets, current assets, and intangible assets. Among these, the value of fixed assets inputs (K_1) can be calculated after deducting those asset-values that do not contribute to the total production value, such as value of proprietary land, construction in progress, equipment in transit, and “fixed assets being rent or lent”. Of course, a company based on synthetic management will have different real-asset (L_2) and fixed-asset (K_2) inputs.

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Mehdi Chourou

Ethniktag: Ever-changing understanding

Introduction

This study elaborates a semiotic approach to interactive communication through an evolutionary reconstruction of signification that focuses on various possibilities of perception and evolution of the “plastic signifiant”. First, we define the artistic expression “Ethniktag” and its evolutionary construction. Then, we study its manifestations on two Internet blogs, “Maddart” and “Traddam”.

Ethniktag is an artistic expression that indicates a mix of “Tag und Graf” with plastic folk art, such as inscriptions in acrylic, as well as drawings and graphs closely resembling writing, scrawled on cloth that is attached to wood. Conceptually, *Ethniktag* relies on mathematical, geometrical and topological articulations (addition, multiplication, subtraction, division, rotation, removal, etc.) in the forming of symmetric, asymmetric, almost crystalline, asymptotic figures. This conceptual art establishes a plural signifier that evolves in five stages: (1) modus operandi; (2) imprint (*l’empreinte*); (3) pictorial choreographies (*les chorégraphies picturales*); (4) virtual plastic editing (*le montage plastique virtuel*) according to simple mathematical and geometrical rules; and (5) real plastic editing (*le montage plastique réel*) following both mathematical and topological rules.


1. The plural signifiant

Picture 1 represents the modus operandi, i.e., the consecutive steps in the production of a painting. The color progression (from signifiant–2, signifiant–1, to signifiant O) shows, on the one hand, the growth of the large black surface surrounding the elements of the plastic statement; and on the



Picture 1. Modus operandi.

other hand, the function of contrast in the perception of the signifying set (black, white, red, orange).



Picture 2. L'empreinte.


Picture 2 indicates the dual nature of the medium – painting attached to wood – which allows for at least two levels of expression. The first is the visible level, which is directly registered on the cloth; secondly, the “hidden” one, is the imprint of this registration on the wood.

2.1 Pictorial choreographies (topological variations)

The point of departure of the pictorial choreographies is the “signifiant zero”. This last refers to constituent plastic units, independent of the spatial position of the pictorial object. The use of topological variations around the zero-signifier is done by rotation (from 45 to 180 degrees), which combined with inversion creates eight different *signifiants*. These pictorial moves, as depicted in Figure 1, offer the receiver several perceptions of the same object, as kinds of “pictures of the picture”. These rotations moreover create a different logic of meaning by redefining the terms /top/, /bottom/, /left/, /right/.



Picture 3. The rotation.



Sa = *signifiant*


Figure 1. *Rotation and inversion based on signifiant-zero.*



Picture 4. *The inversion.*

2.2 Virtual plastic editing according to mathematical and geometric rules

If video editing is a way of assembling fragments of a movie into a coherent whole, plastic editing is a mode of assembling paintings involving dual spaces: the real and the virtual. The *addition* of plastic signifiants links two categories of figures, symmetric and asymmetric. Symmetric figures (Sa I + Sa I', Sa II + Sa II', etc.) are shown in pictures 5–7; pictures 8 and 9 display asymmetric figures (Sa I + Sa II', Sa III + Sa IV', etc.).



Picture 5.



Picture 6.



Picture 7.



Picture 8.



Picture 9.

In the tensional scheme of post-Greimassian semiotics, as developed by Fontanille and Zilberberg, a given value is constituted by the combination of two dimensions or “valences”: *intensity* and *extensity*. The extensity is that area to which intensity applies. It corresponds to the quality, variety, and spatial area of a phenomenon. The intensity and extensity may vary in strength, on a continuous scale going from no-strength to maximal strength. For each valence, Fontanille distinguishes two sectors: an “at-one” sector (low strength) and a “tonic” sector (high strength). He writes (2000: 103):

Sur le principe de base selon lequel les schémas assurent la solidarité entre le sensible (l’intensité, l’affect, etc) et l’intelligible (le déploiement dans l’étendue, le mesurable, la compréhension), on pourra définir l’ensemble des schémas discursifs comme des variations d’équilibre entre ces deux

dimensions, variations conduisant soit à une augmentation de la tension affective, soit à une détente cognitive. L'augmentation de l'intensité apporte la tension, l'augmentation de l'étendu apporte la détente.

[Based on the principle by which the schemes ensure solidarity between the sensible (intensity, affect, etc.) and the intelligible (deployment in space, the measurable, comprehension), we will be able to define the totality of discursive schemes as variations of equilibrium between these two dimensions, variations leading either to an augmentation of affective tension or to cognitive relaxation. The increase of intensity brings tension; the increase of space brings relaxation.]¹


In the asymmetric picture, we have high extensity and high intensity. The correlation between both dimensions is converse, because the increase of extensivity on the plane of the expression is accompanied by an increase of intensity on the plane of the content. In the symmetric figure, we have high extensity and low intensity. The correlation between the two dimensions is reversed, because the increase of extensity is accompanied by a decrease of intensity. The operation of *multiplication* produces asymptotic and quasi-crystalline figures.



Picture 10. *The operation of multiplication: Quasi-crystals.*

Why “quasi-crystalline”? The figure obtained is a set of patterns. Every motive is constituted by the smallest discernible entity, which is repeated periodically by translation. The periodical repetition of the motive by translation is defined by a base of linearly independent vectors; the dimension of each one is equal to the spatial dimensions in which the pattern

repeats. Why “asymptotic”? Because, following the rule of reproduction, the zero-signifier aims towards infinity, but without ever reaching it. The term “asymptote” is used in mathematics in reference to the possible properties of a curve reaching towards infinity.



Picture 11. *Multiplication: Asymptotic.*

The next operation is *division*, which concerns the fragmentation of the plastic signifiant into its lesser constituents (Sa I/2, Sa I/4, Sa I/6, Sa I / 8). This fragmentation, as shown in pictures 12–14, is accompanied by a “zoom” effect, which allows the dynamics of the plastic space to be seen, and which also reveals “clumping” (paints applied in a thickened form) and “dry passes” of the paintbrush (those made with small quantities of paint).



Picture 12.



Picture 13.



Picture 14.


In other words, division focuses attention on the perceptible and kinetic properties of the gestural imprint. In Fontanille's words (*ibid.*):

... l'interprétation visuelle est alors, dans ce cas, conforme à la pratique herméneutique telle que la tradition philosophique la définit, en ce sens qu'elle consiste à retrouver à travers les propriétés plastiques de l'image, certaines propriétés cinétiques de la pratique de production.

[Therefore, visual interpretation, in this case, conforms to hermeneutic practice as defined by philosophical tradition, in the sense that it consists in recovering, through the plastic properties of the image, certain kinetic properties of the practice of production.]

2.3 Real plastic editing: Superimposition of paintings

The superimposition of two paintings – A (positioned in the background) and B (in the foreground) – has a dual effect: the subtraction of a surface (X) from painting A, and the addition of a surface (Y) to painting B. This pictorial interaction is accidental; the two superimposed paintings were produced at different times.



Picture 15. *Superimposition of paintings.*

Surface X is equal to surface Y, and painting A can be superior or equal to painting B. We notice that the signifier sets obtained by this superposition forms a new *signifiant zero*, which may follow the rules of the 3rd and 4th planes (rotation, inversion, division, multiplication). The *removal* of


painting B, which was once positioned in the foreground, creates new perceptions of the set and a new zero-signifier.




Picture 16. With painting B removed.

2.4 From diptychs to triptychs


In the composition of triptychs, each pictorial object can occupy different positions (center, right, left). The use of a flexible paradigmatic axis produces two types of construction: a *motivated construction* marking continuity with the rest of the constituents; and an *arbitrary construction*, marking a break with the other constituents of the triptych



Picture 17.



Picture 18.



Picture 19. Triptych “movement” (2007), acrylic, 183 x 51 cm.

These bridges between art, mathematics, geometry and topology allow for a multiplicity of interpretations and perceptions of the same object. This systematic approach also affords us an objective view of a subjective mode of expression: painting. But, as Aharon Katzir-Katchalsky has noted (1972: 249), “... il existe une différence essentielle entre les formes symboliques de l’art et celles de la science. Les symboles de l’art sont uniques, spécifiques et irréductibles, tandis que les symboles de la science sont globaux, reproductibles et susceptibles de généralisation. [There exists an essential difference between the symbolic forms of art and those of science. The symbols of art are unique, specific, and irreducible, while the symbols of science are global, reproducible, and amenable to generalization.]

Having explained the rules of construction used by *Ethniktag*, we now turn to placing this grammar in an interactive space, by studying an example of Web 2.0: the Blog.²

3. *Maddart and Traddam on Web 2.0*

Web 2.0 is a new version of the World Wide Web. According to a definition on the website Wikipedia, Web 2.0 refers to:

... a perceived second generation of web-based communities and hosted services which aim to facilitate collaboration and sharing between users ... [Also] the transition of websites from isolated information silos to inter-linked computing platforms that act like software to the user. Web 2.0 also includes a social element where users generate and distribute content, often with freedom to share and re-use. The result is a rise in the economic value of the Web as users can do more online.

3.1 Interaction

Interaction may occur through a moderator. The user can leave a public comment published on the Blog (by clicking on the “comments” link) or send a private message by emailing the moderator (on the profile web page), or with the aid of other users, via email sent directly from the Blog. Surfers can also use a *Digg*, an on-line tool allowing Internet users to share and promote web pages with other users of the service through a user-based ranking system.

Interaction with the content: with a subscription to the Really Simple Syndication (RSS) feed, the surfer can consult the updated content of blogs without checking them manually. Subscribers to RSS are informed of each new post almost in real time and may read it directly on their aggregator (a web application that assembles together various syndicated Blog contents).

The Blog offers four navigation possibilities. The first is by scrolling through horizontal or a vertical presentations of the main page. This operation transforms the view of the picture by an alteration to its framing.

Secondly, one may consult Tags and archives. The user can display marked posts grouped by a common isotropy (photos, paintings, drawings, videos, text, etc.) or consult the archives of the Blog, a monthly messages classification, by date of publication. Thirdly, one may click on a picture (for instance, on Traddam), thereby increasing its size and/or changing its background colour from black to white.



Picture 20.



Picture 21.

Fourthly, hypertext may be used on the posts. The hypertext is a system containing information connected by hyperlinks, allowing automatic jumps from one piece of information to another, linked one. This new dimension of language involves a hyper-reader that transforms the traditional act of reading by creating an interaction between the reader and the active information medium: the web page. Using hypertext, you can find examples of a possible dynamic organization of information through links and connections:

Painting / pictorial choreographies
29 / 11 / 7 / 18
Monochrome / colour / rotation 90 degrees
Painting / triptych
Triptych / number
To water / water / waterfall / water face
Before / after (diachronic evolution of a painting)
Separated / contact
Black / white (changing background colour)

The hypertext function allows the significant whole to be reached by several anchor points in a network of meaning similar to the “polyphony” of Mikhael Bakhtin, and “la pensée nomade et rhizomatique” developed by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari.

3.2 The contributions of *Ethniktag* and multimedia

There are two categories of viewer: those who are aware of the encoding rules and distinguish the components of the plastic editing, and those who see only one unified picture. Using mathematical, geometric and topological rules, *Ethniktag* allows for different manipulations of paintings so as to proffer a multiplicity of perceptions and evolutionary constructions: real and virtual plastic editing; superimposition of paintings; pictorial choreographies; diachronic genesis,

Multimedia products essentially stand out from traditional supports by a polysensory adjacency between the screen and the user. Indeed, alone in front of the screen, the Internet user experiences the plastic evolutions of the statement in close proximity. The multimedia medium offers the receiver an individualized exchange, which is endowed with an intimacy greater than that of the distanced, even if collective, experience of the television screen.

Thus, multimedia products represent a multiple system: in the same medium we find pictures, active interaction between users and moderators, manipulation of the view of the expression, resulting in a modification of the view of the contents.

4. Conclusion

While it is interesting to play with a painting by reproducing it in different ways, there is ultimately only one work of Art: the original painting, which, subjected to the ravages of time, inevitably becomes degraded in its physical structure (Benjamin 2006: 179):

... à la reproduction même la plus perfectionnée d'une oeuvre d'art, un facteur fait toujours défaut: son *hic et nunc*, son existence unique au lieu où elle se trouve. Sur cette existence unique, exclusivement, s'exerçait son histoire. Nous entendons par là autant les altérations qu'elle put subir dans sa structure physique, que les conditions de propriété par lesquelles elle a pu passer.

[... in even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art, one factor always is lacking: its *here-and-now*, its unique existence at the place where it is found. From this unique existence alone its history unfolds. By that we mean, as many alterations as it could possibly undergo in its physical structure, [were as many alterations] as the conditional properties through which it was able to pass.]

Notes

1. All French-to-English translations by Rick Littlefield.
2. We are working on two others examples of Web 2.0. One is an interactive website Ethniktag.com, which includes the surfer in the reconstruction of signification by a direct application of the aforementioned rules; the other is a virtual world called "Second Life".

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Anastasia Dimitriou*

Children's understanding and use of visual codes in their drawings about environmental phenomena

1. Introduction

Visual communication, i.e. the use of images (visual representations) for the construction of messages, constitutes an autonomous system of meaning making, parallel to language, with its own specific conventions, codes and "grammar" (Kress & van Leeuwen 1996: 2; Lister & Wells 2006: 64; Pintó & Ametller 2002: 333). Specifically science-related texts use visual images as a central rhetoric means for analyzing, describing, and understanding scientific phenomena (Cifuentes & Hsieh 2004: 110; Mathewson 2005: 529; Roth & Bowen 2003: 429), independent of the scientific specialization of the public they address. In such texts, information is visually represented in various forms, such as diagrams, tables, chains, pyramids, circles, etc (Mathewson 2005: 530). These conventions present different aspects of information, highlighting or suppressing particular entities, and organizing individual elements in space, in a manner that represents their interrelations (Kress et al. 2001: 99).

Visual images are currently used as a primary source of information in science texts addressed to students (Ametller & Pintó 2002: 285; Kress & vanLeeuwen 1996: 30; Testa et al. 2002: 235) and are considered as an important tool for understanding scientific concepts and phenomena (Kress et al. 2001: 59; Pintó & Ametller 2002: 333). However, an image is valuable as a teaching and learning device only if the students are familiar with the necessary codes for interpreting it and capable of using the avail-

able semiotic resources in order to understand signs and construct new meanings about the represented facets of reality (Britsch 2001: 153–154).

Nevertheless, the skills involved in reading and producing visual representations are not taught in school (Pozzer-Ardenghi & Roth 2004: 236; Kress et al. 2001: 141; Kress & van Leeuwen 1996: 15). However, the students from an early age, and with little or no systematic support, develop the ability to recognize and use the codes of “visual grammar” in parallel with other available means of communication (Britsch 2001: 153; Kress & van Leeuwen 1996: 18). When asked to produce visual representations (e.g. drawings) about a scientific concept or phenomenon, they are prompted to construct messages to convey ideas and meanings that could not be expressed by other means of communication (Kress et al. 2001: 26–29). Thus, a socio-semiotic analysis of students’ visual representations can reveal a lot about the semiotic resources they use in their drawings for interpreting relationships between objects, concepts, and phenomena (*ibid.*: 118).

Given the significance of images in the construction of meaning in learning science and the lack of systematic training in understanding and producing visual representations, crucial pedagogical questions arise about the types of images that the students can interpret and produce. Previous research has suggested that the students prefer narrative readings, i.e. they tend to attribute a story structure to images and mainly focus on certain elements such as vectors, or synthetic structures (Pintó & Ametller 2002: 334). Moreover, the students need guidance in order to produce visual representations of complex phenomena. In particular, while they seem to be capable of representing concepts, they face significant difficulties in representing relationships between concepts, and hierarchic, antithetic, or causal structures. Therefore, it is suggested that science teaching should engage in familiarizing students with the visual language of science, in order for them to develop the necessary skills for reading and producing visual images (Cifuentes & Hsieh 2004: 132; Mathewson 2005: 538; Pintó & Ametller 2002: 341; Pozzer-Ardenghi & Roth 2004: 237–8; Testa et al. 2002: 251).

At the same time, researchers agree that more research is required concerning the students’ use of visual language in an attempt to educate future citizens for the information and knowledge society (Pintó & Ametller 2002: 341).

The present study presents the results of a socio-semiotic analysis in a pedagogical perspective of primary pupils' drawings about environmental issues. It aims at exploring the pupils' readiness to use the visual language of science and its specialized codes when visually representing the mechanisms involved in particularly important, topical and complex environmental phenomena, such as the stratospheric ozone depletion and global warming due to the enhanced greenhouse effect.

2. Method

The research sample consisted of 40 fifth and sixth grade pupils, who attended primary schools in Greece. The pupils participated in individual, semi-structured interviews. After a preliminary discussion about ozone depletion and global warming, each pupil was asked to produce one or more drawings representing their causes, mechanisms, and consequences. Pieces of A4 paper, pencils, and felt pens of different colours, were given to the pupils, who were invited to use them as they felt most appropriate. After the completion of the task each pupil was asked to explain his/her drawing. The interviews were recorded and consequently transcribed verbatim.

The pupils' drawings were analysed along three axes, which were based on a scheme combining the socio-semiotic, epistemological and pedagogical perspectives developed by Koulaidis, Dimopoulos, Sklaveniti & Christidou (2002: 132–144) and Dimopoulos, Koulaidis, & Sklaveniti (2003: 193–200). These axes include (see Figure 1):

1) The *type*, concerning the degree to which the drawings attempt to represent elements of the environment according to the human visual perception, or adopt conventions of the scientific visual language. Thus, a drawing can be a) *realistic*, if it represents entities as perceived by the eye (e.g. sketches), b) *conventional*, if it involves codified representations following specific conventions of the scientific visual language (e.g. diagrams, maps, etc.), or c) *hybrid* if it includes both realistic and conventional elements.

2) The *function*, according to which drawings are distinguished as *narrative*, *analytical*, *classificational*, or *metaphorical* (Kress & van Leeuwen 1996: 56–112). *Narrative* representations depict events, or processes of change evolving in time and/or space. They involve one or more vec-

tors, i.e. distinct lines indicating the direction of evolution. *Analytical* representations emphasise the constant structure of an object or system, for instance the constituent parts of a whole, by focusing on the relationships between the depicted elements in terms of a part-whole structure. The meaning of an analytical image corresponds to linguistic expressions such as “this is” or “this consists of”. *Classificational* representations involve elements which are interconnected by relations of subordination, i.e. taxonomies. The subordinates constitute one category and their equivalence is visually realised by their symmetrical allocation in the image. The use of classificational images in scientific texts emphasises hierarchical relationships, or unifies entities under a certain, common feature. *Metaphorical* representations imply a symbolic meaning, i.e. different from what is literally represented. The symbolism may refer either to specific elements, or to the whole of the image. Moreover, often it is not possible to attribute a single function to pupils' drawings, since they frequently integrate more than one of the functions described above. Such drawings are recorded in the present analysis as *combinations* of functions.

3) The *formality* of the visual code, that is the degree of its elaboration and abstraction. The “visual grammar” employed in science texts generally uses a high formality code, which aims at downgrading the superficial variability of external features and at representing precisely entities and processes, by eliminating multiple readings. Such aims can be accomplished for instance by the use of symbols for chemical substances, or the restricted use of colour in diagrams. Formality can be estimated using different markers which record particular elements of the representations that contribute to their level of abstraction. In pupils' drawings the elimination of multiple readings is mainly accomplished by controlling the following markers: a) Introduction of *elements of the scientific visual code*, such as symbols (letters or digits), or geometrical shapes. When both symbols and geometrical shapes are involved in a drawing, formality (according to this marker) takes its maximum value. When no such element appears in a drawing, this marker takes its minimum value. b) *Colour differentiation*: This marker is related to the variety of colours used in a drawing. A broad variety of (3 or more different) colours tends to lower the formality, while a restricted use of colour (e.g. exclusive use of pencil) raises the formality of an illustration. Each formality marker can take 3 different values: 1 for low formality, 2 for moderate formality, or 3 for high formality. Accordingly, the overall for-

mality of a drawing is estimated by adding the formality values of the two markers (elements of the scientific visual code and colour differentiation) and is considered as low if its value is 2 or 3, moderate (value equal to 4), or high (value equal to 5 or 6).

3. Results

The analysis of the conceptual content of the drawings reveals mental representations of ozone depletion and global warming similar to those documented in previous relevant research based on other techniques, such as questionnaires (Boyes & Stanisstreet 1993: 533) and interviews (Koulaidis & Christidou 1999: 562). The present analysis focuses on the characteristics of the visual code in the pupils' drawings and not on their conceptions of the two phenomena reflected in their illustrations.

Fifty drawings were collected in total, since the pupils had the opportunity to produce more than one illustration each. In the following paragraphs the results yielded from the analysis of the drawings are presented, according to each of the three axes presented in the previous section (see Figure 1).

3.1 Types of pupils' drawings

The pupils' drawings were in their vast majority hybrids (47 instances, 86%), that is they integrate realistic and conventional representations of entities of the natural world (see Appendix, Figures 2, 3 and 4). The realistic elements typically concern representations of living things (human beings, animals, plants), objects of everyday life (e.g. refrigerators, cars, garbage), or other elements of the natural or man-made environment (e.g. icebergs, clouds, industries). On the other hand, elements that are usually represented conventionally include solar radiation, the location and transportation of pollutant gases in the atmosphere, or the ozone layer and ozone hole(s). Seven drawings (14%) involve exclusively realistic representations. No instance of purely conventional representation has been recorded.




Figure 1. The axes of analysis of pupils' drawings and the relevant percentages.

3.2 The function of the pupils' drawings

As far as the function of the pupils' drawings is concerned, the analysis has indicated that in majority they tend to integrate a combination of different functions at the same time (36 instances, 72%). All of these combinatorial drawings are primarily narrative, i.e. the pupils represent the evolution of events in time and space (see Appendix, Figures 2, 3 and 4). Typical events that are depicted in pupils' drawings include pollutant gases moving into the atmosphere, and solar radiation reaching the earth and being reradiated or reflected back towards the atmosphere and space. A considerable number of drawings, apart from the narrative function incorporate the function of classification, which mainly refers to the juxtaposition of different sources of pollution (e.g. cars, garbage, industries, etc.). When an analytical function is also present, it largely concerns the representation of the globe as a whole composed by different parts (see Appendix, Figure 2), or the depiction of the atmosphere as a mixture of different gases. Elements with metaphorical function in pupils' combinatorial drawings involve monstrous figures representing gaseous pollutants, or magnifying glasses focusing on important components of illustrations.

Thirteen drawings (26%) implemented a purely narrative function, while in one instance a purely metaphorical function was recorded.

3.3 The formality of the pupils' drawings

In their vast majority the pupils' drawings presented an overall moderate (24 instances, or 48%, see Appendix, Figures 2 and 3), or low (20 instances, or 40%) formality in regards to the visual code employed. On the other hand, the number of drawings that systematically introduced an elaborated visual code, presenting a high formality, was rather restricted (6 instances, 12%, see Appendix, Figure 4).

However, this general trend was not equally reflected on the two markers of formality employed here. The pupils typically introduced symbols (e.g. terms corresponding to pollutant gases, or digits), and/or geometrical shapes such as lines, or vectors that denote direction. Thus, in regards to this marker, the pupils' drawings exhibit a high, or moderate formality. Conversely, the majority of the drawings include a variety of three or more different colours, hence lowering the overall formality of the visual code in respect to the relevant marker (see Appendix, Figures 2 and 3).

4. Discussion and conclusions

The results of the analysis presented in the previous section suggest that even before graduating primary school the pupils seem to be familiar with basic rules of the "visual grammar" to which scientific texts are amenable. Therefore, they use codes and conventions of the scientific visual language in order to graphically describe and explain the complex mechanisms underlying stratospheric ozone depletion and global warming. Interestingly, this observation even includes the cases of representations which are not conceptually compatible with the scientific view.

Images play a principal role in teaching and learning science. The present study implies that it is important for science teaching to focus on the development of pupils' relevant visual skills. In this perspective, school science textbooks, which have an extensive influence on teaching and learning science, can have an effective role in regards to the visual messages that they familiarise the pupils with in the school context. Therefore, introducing appropriate visual representations in science textbooks can enhance

and promote the pupils' emergent ability to use codes and conventions of the scientific visual language, hence to understand the meanings expressed through its use.

More particularly, the analysis of the drawings concerning the two environmental issues, has revealed a remarkable readiness of the pupils to use visual and graphic conventions normally used by experts, although these conventions co-exist with realistic elements (in hybrid drawings). This tendency could be supported by enhancing the use of scientific visual conventions in primary school science textbooks, where realistic images dominate (93.3%, see Dimopoulos et al. 2003: 203).

Similarly, the pupils' tendency to produce narrative images –parallel to their preference to read images in a narrative manner (Pintó & Ametller 2002: 334)- could be moderated by decreasing the frequent use of narrative representations (24.5%, see Dimopoulos et al. 2003: 205) and by introducing more systematically classificational and analytical images (8.7% and 64.4% correspondingly, see *ibid.*) in science textbooks. The pupils seem to be quite familiar with these functions, although they use them in combination with the narrative one.

Moreover, a greater emphasis could be given to more elaborated visual codes in school textbooks, where a low formality code is usually introduced (55.5%, see Dimopoulos et al. 2003: 209), since a considerable number of pupils' drawings introduced more specialised visual codes.

In conclusion, visual literacy, and more particularly the skills related to the production and interpretation of visual messages, emerges as a relevant and important challenge for science education. However, more extensive and systematic research is needed in order to determine the pupils' readiness to use the scientific visual language in relation to a wide range of scientific concepts and phenomena. Such an insight would support crucial decisions regarding the inclusion of teaching goals related to visual literacy in science curricula, ultimately aiming at familiarising the pupils with the rigorous, accurate, and abstract world of science.

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Appendix – examples of pupils' drawings.



Figure 2. Hybrid drawing with narrative, classificational, and analytical functions and moderate formality.



Figure 3. Hybrid drawing with narrative and classificational functions and moderate formality.




Figure 4. Hybrid drawing with narrative function and high formality.

Ahn Chul-Sang

From death to rebirth

The misunderstanding of carnivalesque spaces in funerary rites in east Asia

The investigation of carnivalesque spaces in funeral rituals in East Asia sheds light on the differences in cultural perceptions of death and life. Traditionally, funeral rituals in East Asia include music and dancing to please the dead (Yi 1996: 205–206). In Southern China there are death rituals in which hosts and guests perform music, dance, drinks, food (especially rice) and play comic games (Hee 2004: 19–39; Grimes 2000: 241). In Japan, also, music, dancing, drinking and playing games have been part of death rituals since at least the early Yamato period around the fourth century C.E. (Yi 1996: 206). Further, Mongolian and many other minorities in northern parts of East Asia today have such traditions of performing music and dancing, and drinking in death rituals, sometimes near the grave of the dead (ibid.: 207). In Korea, according to historical records, such carnivalesque funerals were practiced from the second century B.C.E. until the 7th century C.E., before Buddhism came to that country. Guests at a traditional Korean funeral ritual still enjoy drinking alcohol, eating food and rice cakes, playing games and telling jokes. Interestingly, the Korean ritual includes a comic play about a monk and a woman giving birth to a baby, a dramatization transmitted in mask dances and theater plays as well (ibid.). This means that spaces of traditional funeral rituals in East Asia were not simply sad and silent spaces for the dead, but rather a kind of carnivalesque space for communities to celebrate the rebirth of the deceased (ibid.: 206; Hee 2004: 22–23). Such traditional carnivalesque spaces in funeral rituals in East Asia differ markedly from current funeral traditions of Buddhists and Confucians, both of which tend to austerity. Instead, such carnivalesque spaces are rather similar to the spaces of death ritual in Southeast Asia, where they also enjoy music and dancing, drinking and games (Huntington and Metcalf 1979: 46–47).

Nevertheless, the identification of carnivalesque spaces in funeral rituals, especially in East Asia, has not attracted much scholarship. Further, the identification of the carnival funeral tradition in Chinese minorities, Japan and Korea has been wrongly treated as a “barbaric” tradition in China-centered historical records and scholarship. Moreover, those Buddhists and Confucians who promote austerity in funerals have refused to acknowledge the significance of the cultural identity of carnival-like spaces in death rituals, even criticizing and prohibiting the tradition as unworthy and a travesty of the Confucian canon (Yi 1996: 206–207). As a result, it is currently practiced mostly by the lower classes, especially in Southern China, Okinawa in Japan and Southern Korea at the level of folk cultures. Thus, the cultural identity of carnivalesque funerals, in Korea and many other areas in East Asia, has been marginalized and misunderstood.

Where did such carnivalesque spaces come from? How did the carnival traditions perceive death differently from Buddhists and Confucians in East Asia? How did carnivalesque traditions become folk traditions in non-official cultures? To answer these questions, this study traces the identification of the carnivalesque funeral tradition in terms of the changing perceptions of the dead body, especially the bones of the dead, through an interdisciplinary view of semiotic changes in burial systems in a cross-cultural context in which Buddhism and Confucianism came into China, Japan and Korea. To trace the identification of carnivalesque spaces of death rituals, I begin with one of the well-known folk carnivalesque funerals, *dashiraegi*. This type of funeral, which was practiced for a thousand years in Korea, enacts a comic play of giving birth to a baby in folk death-ritual which accompanies music and dancing.

Dashiraegi has a long historical background; as noted earlier, it was performed at least since the second century B.C.E. up to the beginning of the Three Kingdom period in Korea. Currently it is performed in Southern regions and islands in Korea. However, until the beginning of the twentieth century, the *dashiraegi* tradition was performed almost nationally. As indicated by the literary meaning of *dashiraegi*, “waiting the proper time”, “enjoying themselves together”, “to be born again” (Lee 2005: 8), the tradition centers on the rebirth of the dead. Interestingly, *dashiraegi*, also has been practiced in a secondary burial system, after a dead body has passed through particular stages of decomposition, called *chobun*

(*Hanguky Chobun* 2003: 226). Then why do they practice both *dashraegi* and *chobun*?

Chobun, a straw grave, refers to a temporary grave covered with straw thatch; it would be used until the flesh of unburied dead bodies, whose coffins were placed over logs, had completely rotted away. Two or three years later, the bodies would be buried after the bones are cleaned. By preparing *chobun*, people acknowledge the death and their hope that the dead person would resuscitate in the other world with a new and “clean” body. The decomposition of flesh normally is allowed to take place from 6 months to three years after death, depending on regional traditions. On the third day of the ritual, they bury the body, after very carefully collecting and washing them. This passage is called the “transitional period” by Anold van Gennep (1960: 148–149). Further, the burial and death ritual tradition of *chobun* is closely related to concepts of *feng-shui* (Chul-Sang 2007: 368–371), such that the bones are believed to possess the soul of the dead, and that a vital energy subsists between the deceased and the living. According to *feng-shui*, the basic principle underlying the relationship between the deceased and the living is the idea of reciprocity; this notion has remained the same since the remote times of antiquity in China (Unschuld 1985: 27). In this burial tradition, just as important as the selection of suitable burial sites is the continued integration of the ancestors in the daily processes of decision-making and exchange of resources among the surviving members of a lineage (*ibid.*). In this burial tradition, ancestors wish to have their bones nourished, in the grave, by influences of good “wind and water” (*feng-shui*); in return, prosperity and health is guaranteed to those descendants who arrange a suitable burial site and who cleanse and rearrange the bones in a proper fashion once the corpse has decayed (*ibid.*). In this way, *chobun* establishes a symbolic connotation of rebirth and prosperity for the family, through a relationship of reciprocity between ancestors and descendants, through the ideas of rebirth of the dead and reverence for the earth. I would further suggest that *feng-shui*, as a tradition in which the dead are believed to return to the Mother’s body, also has a strong connection with the Earth-Mother worship through the idea of rebirth, fertility and reciprocity between ancestors and descendants (Chul-Sang 2007: 371–372).

How, then, did carnivalesque traditions arise in “non-official” cultures? In east Asia, they took shape when the second burial tradition, as Earth-

Mother worship, encountered Buddhism and Confucianism. In Korea, where currently *chobun* is the normal funerary ritual, a secondary burial involves entombment; however, jar burials have been discovered throughout the country, and are believed to have been practiced from the Bronze Age (c. 300 B.C.E) to the Three Kingdom period, 7th century C.E. (Chul-Sang 2007: 371–372). These are also supposed to be the remnants of secondary burial systems, because most of the jars are too small to contain adult bodies. It is acknowledged that after they had been washed, the bones were placed in the jars. The jar burial tradition in Korea has diminished considerably, replaced by newer systems such as the cremations of Buddhism and the single-burials of Confucianism. A secondary, bone-washing ritual was also practiced in Okinawa (Japan), usually one to three years after death. The old system of burial in Okinawa prior to the adoption of Chinese-style tombs was to place the body in a small wooden casket on the beach; then, after washing, the bones were placed in a small urn and secreted in a cave or niche along the beach. They believed this constituted the Okinawan paradise; the latter has been replaced by the paradise of the Buddhists (Lebra 1966: 99). In Southeast Asia such secondary burial has been practiced since prehistoric times, perhaps beginning at the end of the Neolithic period, when individuals were interred in earthenware jars and placed in caves (*South Asia* 2004: 263). In the Bara tradition in Indonesia, a secondary burial custom in a death ritual is strongly connected with the theme of sexual intercourse and rebirth (*ibid.*). In China, when the *feng-shui* of a grave is believed to be detrimental to the fortunes of the family, exhumation is carried out; if this occurs before a new grave has been found, all the bones are placed in an earthenware jar prior to burial (De Groot 1964: 1058).

The decline of carnivalesque funerals in East Asia may signify Earth-Mother worship changing from an official to a non-official culture, with the rise of new burial systems (Buddhist cremations, Confucian single burials system, and the like). This constitutes a case of contextual presupposition and misunderstanding, such that carnivalesque funerals in East Asia have come to represent otherness under the canons of Buddhism and Confucianism.

To sum up: carnivalesque funerals in East Asia include rituals oriented toward the rebirth of the dead in a secondary burial system based on *feng-shui*. Relative to rebirth, *feng-shui* is a tradition in which the dead are seen

to return to the Mother's body, to the womb, in a form of Earth-Mother worship. In semiotic terms, such carnival-like funeral spaces may be considered lexical terms in a system of Earth-Mother worship, which may be drastically misunderstood when viewed through the lens of Buddhism and Confucianism.

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Camelia M. Cmeciu & Doina Cmeciu

Manipulating communication through images

The semiotics of political “taste”

We consider the mere exhibition of some busts on the walls of a modern agora insufficient for the final aim, namely, to be elected. The objects accompanying a candidate are significant parts within the *mise en discourse* of a poster, because they become elements of a narrative link within an implicit story, creating some (non)verbal possible worlds (Biocca 1991: 71).

1. Shaping political promises: Political intertextuality (from manipulation to self-persuasion)

Posters are meant to manipulate the voters through the politicians' intention to communicate a political promise. The discourse of promising opens onto something that refers to the other's desire, which may be suggested through the (conceptual) metaphor of the food.

Any relation of legitimacy between voters and a candidate is built on the verb *to promise*. Being a commissive verb (Austin 1975: 157), *to promise* has a compulsory control over its subject, imposing at least the condition (Searle 1969) of sincerity on the part of the agent. Trying to avoid any possible link between himself and a lie, a candidate builds up his political discourse on some explicit and implicit narrative links. Reinterpreting Greimas's narrative semiotics, namely, actantial model, we will provide a scheme of political intertextuality (Figure 1). Taking into account that our inter-texts (a lollipop, a shaft, and a hot red pepper) have as “raw” materials not only words, but objects as well, we prefer to talk about a process of iconic political intertextuality in election posters.

Some remarks concerning the terminology used and the elements within this scheme of iconic political intertextuality are necessary. The




Figure 1. Political intertextuality: A Greimassian approach.

word *object* is used according to the Greimassian approach, namely, it is an object of value, which is semantically specified as [+/- concrete], [+/- abstract], [+/- human], [+/- animate]. Our final aim is to (re)build the new abstract object (the meaning of iconic power) that is formed of a *helper-object* (positive symbolic position) ↔ the election object (candidate) ↔ a *blocker object* (negative symbolic position).

The relationship between these objects is a *transactional* one, forming what in visual arts bears the name of an eccentric dynamic system (Arnheim 1995) where the two textual “partners”/ centers enter an instance of “give-and-take” relation (↔). The argumentative function of an image, mentioned by Jean Michel Adam and Marc Bonhomme (2004: 281-282), is brought forth, namely, the *conceptual topics* which become the indices of collective knowledge, of some cultural symbolic significances and of an implicit ideology, stored within the voters-citizens’ *memory*. Thus the rule of transfer (Domenach 2004: 83), specific to (self)persuasion, installs itself through the use of some already existing layers, which the two French authors qualify as: archetypal conceptual topics (psychological and mythological structures) and sociocultural conceptual topics (a group’s prejudices and stereotypes). The recourse to the citizens’ memory must be accompanied by the voters-spectators’ *imagination*.

2. Political identity through metaphors

Having as its final result a positive or negative image of at least one of the entities, a *metaphor* (Gr. *metaphora*, derived from *metapherein*, formed of *meta* – “over, across, beyond” and *pherein* “to carry, bear”) becomes, actually, an argument that establishes the structure of reality (Perelman

& Olbrechts-Tyteca 1993), thus, an instance of (re)shaping one's identity. Our empirical data two election posters are formed of some political pictorial metaphors and we will adopt M. Danesi's theory (2002) on metaphors because of its implied relation to Peirce's typology of signs (icon, index, symbol).

2.1. The sweet taste of political promises: A lollipop

We consider that a (non)verbal message launched in the 2004 Romanian election campaign by the J(ustice) T(ruth) Alliance (Alianța DA) is significant for the understanding of a political promise.



Figure 2. *Would you believe in eye candy? (Justice and Truth Alliance.)*

The verbal utterance – *Would you believe in eye candy?* – *Vrei să fii dus cu zahărelul?* – and the image of a *lollipop* are actually the embodiment of Danesi's three layers of metaphorical reasoning, layers governed by a cognitive flow:

- the layer of a metaform: an association-by-inference process: the minimal parts of a lollipop (a stick and a wrapping);
- the layer of a meta-metaform: indexicality in reference in a culture-specific way: idiomatic expressions (*to believe in eye candy and to give the shaft*);
- the layer of a metasymbol: a trace to the historical past of Romanian culture: the *shaft* (as the stick of the lollipop) – Vlad Dracula/ The Impaler.

Within the transactional context implied by the interrogation (*Would you believe in eye candy?*), there is, as well, a third seller who holds the truth and who, through his rational action, seems to downplay the opponent's plans. This is obtained by two discursive procedures: an idiomatic expression and a pictorial metaphor.

A. *An idiomatic expression.* Having as theoretical background Permyakov's process¹ of decoding an idiom, taking into account the linguistic, logico-semiotic and object-image planes and Lakoff's motivational alternative² for the interpretations of idiomatic expressions, our analysis will focus on the meaning of the Romanian idiomatic expression *a fi dus cu zăhărelul* (to believe in eye candy). But the visual metaphor (the stick of the lollipop = a shaft) sends us towards two implicit Romanian idioms *a da țeapă* (to give the shaft: to use unethical methods) and *a trage în țeapă* (to impale).

- *the linguistic plane.* The *Abridged Academic Dictionary* (*Mic dicționar academic*) identifies the two objects as follows: *zăhărel* as the diminutive of *zahăr*/ sugar and *țeapă* as a piece of wood or metal pointed at one end, used in buildings, for haystacks, or as a battle weapon, or as an instrument of torture.

- *the logico-semiotic plane.* The notion/ signified (B – to swindle) is semiotically represented by the idioms (meta-metaforms)/ signifiers (A_{1-2}) built on the explicit objects *shaft* (*țeapă*) and *candy* (*zăhărel*).

A_1 = *to believe in eye candy* (*a duce cu zăhărelul*). It is the first signifier used by the JT Alliance and it has the following signified: to abuse of someone's good faith, using deceiving words and promises.

A_2 = *to give the shaft* (*a da țeapă*). This second signifier is a colloquial expression, has the same signified, but conceptually it implies the syntagm *unethical methods*.

- *the object-image plane.* The fact that the JT Alliance uses two different idioms for the same meaning (B) makes us think of a conceptual synonymy, although a certain conceptual antinomy can be perceived at the level of the structure of the two objects mentioned. The motivational links (L_{1-2}) are based on the functional values of a candy and a shaft, namely, an ingredient used to sweeten and an instrument of torture.

L₁ – The first motivational link, which associates *to believe in eye candy / a duce cu zăhărelul* (A₁) with *to swindle* (B), is centered, in the situational context of elections, on the candidates' speech act of *to promise*.

The negative connotation of this expression, which hides the candidate's intentionality to abuse the voters' good faith using deceiving promises, can be related to the etymology of the word *sincerity* [L. *sincerus*, without wax]. Charles Larson (2003: 261) mentions two ancient meanings of this word. The former is used for "wax layers in order to preserve" and *to be without wax* would mean "to be pure, fresh". The latter sends to the unorthodox habit of the carvers in stone that, in order to hide their imperfections, would cover them with a thick layer of wax that finally will fall down, but unfortunately this will happen when the respective carver is dead so that he might not give account for his action. During the long periods of history, this lasting camouflage instrument has taken the form of a *mask*, that is often associated with negative significances (... a disguise, a pretence). In the 20th century, the word *image* is used, the modern ages turning into that period where everyone strives after showing a self's *image* that should be the most *convincing, interesting* and *seductive*.

L₂ – The second motivational link – A₂ (*to give the shaft/ a da țeapă*) – L₂-B (*to swindle*) – is based on a disastrous extralinguistic reality for which the political opponent party (The Social Democrat Party) is responsible.

For a better understanding of the Romanian idiomatic expression *a da țeapă* (*to give the shaft*), one should associate it with a third motivational link, based on a particular Romanian cultural context, namely, the expression *a trage în țeapă* - *to impale*. Thus, a shaft becomes a *metasymbol* and the encyclopedic knowledge guides us in understanding this conceptual link: historical intertextuality obtained through the implicit image of Vlad Țepeș/ Vlad Dracul/ Vlad the Impaler³. Known for his brutal means of punishing boyars, thieves and criminals, Turks, Saxons and those who conspired against him, Vlad Țepeș/ Vlad the Impaler becomes the sign of justice within the Romanian cultural context.

B. *A visual/ pictorial metaphor*. In order to downplay the strong points of the opponent, in our case the Social Democrat Party, the JT Alliance candidate brings to surface certain implicit axiological markers that are associated with the object *lollipop*.

The presence of a *shaft* instead of a stick creates a metaphor *in praesentia conjoined* based on allotopy (Klinkenberg, 2004: 373-380). The image obtained is actually a violation of combination and selection restriction rules, through the presence of a *stake* (the perceived entity) in place of a *stick* that could have been the right choice as a part of the isotopy of a *lollipop* (the conceived entity).

The visual metaphor of a lollipop hides a synecdoche: the wrapping is the part standing for the whole, the content not being visible to buyers/voters. If we refer again to the sincerity condition stipulated by J. R. Searle, then another conceptual metaphor is created: WRAPPING (source domain) = ELECTION PROMISE (target domain). The wrapping of a lollipop seems to have the same role of the wax in ancient times: the more striking the wrapping/ the promise is, the quicker it will catch one's attention, and finally it will be bought/ voted.

The unwrapping/ decoding process presents a dichotomy between reality and appearance: the content which is hidden within the wrapping does not have the sweet taste of a candy/ promise (lie), but it hurts because of the pointed end of a *shaft* (reality). Using implicit and explicit binary opposed items, the two political actors get the two contrary axiological markers: honest merchant *versus* dishonest merchant. Although the colour blue (Chevalier and Gheerbrant 1995: 79), metonymy for the Social Democrat Party, is considered to be the symbol of hope, in this election poster, it gets a new meaning, being the sign of swindling. The colour orange (ibid.: 122), the metonymy of the JT Alliance and the symbol of equilibrium, becomes the colour of truth in this *mise en discours*. The space occupied by each of the two colours in the geography of this image is significant for the nonverbal representation of the concepts of truth and lie: whereas the "blue lie" of the Social Democrat Party will always be revealed and it will not last forever (a *lollipop* is an object to be consumed during a certain time interval), the "orange truth" of the Justice and *Truth* Alliance will exist forever, because it is identified with the background, metaphorically standing for the Romanian reality.



Figure 3. *Vote for him!* – Traian Băsescu.

2.2. The pungent taste of political promises: A red hot pepper

In the 2004 election campaign for the seat of mayor of Bucharest, Traian Băsescu used a very surprising helper-object as a source domain in the building of his political identity, namely, a red pepper.

The pictorial metaphor (Băsescu = a red hot pepper) is constructed on undercodedness, namely, on the same process of reshaping the cognitive incompleteness/ flow through some cultural-specific connotations. The presence of such a *metaform* (red hot pepper) as an inter-text having a synesthetic effect and belonging to the social code of food in the system of political advertising motivated us to talk about the semiotics of political taste. Jean-Jacques Boutaud (2003: 109) considers that any visual communication of taste is based on a double absence: the absence of a sense of taste in favour of a sign and the complete absence of savour/ flavour in favour of value, based on an axiological calculus. Our analysis, being governed by intertextuality, is supposed to go deeper than the visual image of taste as it is rendered by the signifier /red hot pepper/.

2.2.1. *The macro and micro-semiotic levels of the signifier /red pepper/*

A. *The macro-semiotic level.* At this level, we may talk about a relation of inclusion into the class of vegetables, that is the signifier spices, which becomes the signified for the signifier of this type of pepper. Thus the red pepper is known for its hot, sharp pungency. Its musty flavor combines with floral, spicy and hay-like notes to give red pepper its characteristic flavor profile.

Together with other visual elements of taste (meat, pasta, potatoes etc.), the red pepper forms the paradigm of recipes which brings along cultural dimensions of different cuisines. Hence the macro-semiotic level seems to be narrowing itself when choosing one way of preparing the red pepper, and we would like to mention the ways in which the Romanian cuisine uses this type of spice, namely, the red hot pepper hides a layer of a meta-metaform, imposing a certain convention of a recipe. Our traditional food is considered not to be spicy, and actually the only ingredient to make it hot is *ardei iute* (red hot pepper), used on the side, especially with one type of dish, called borsch (borş), actually a Central Eastern European local culinary heritage. As Claude Lévi-Strauss (*apud* Ashley et al 2004: 30) states that cooking occupies a truly essential place in native thought: “not only does cooking mark the transition from nature to culture, but through it and by means of it, the human state can be defined with all its attributes.” Dishes belong to a ritual of eating, where some etiquette codes are activated because the minimal units (ingredients) of that particular dish and their display constitutes a link between the respective society and its social actors. The mental image of the representation of a plate of borsch and a red pepper on the side stirs a certain topical calculus in the mind of a Romanian: a) the atmosphere of an informal setting of a table; b) any difference of social strata seems to be ignored: the subjects/ social actors may be considered friends, enjoying their meal; c) it stirs appetite/ action.

B. *The micro-semiotic level.* The micro-semiotic level of this signifier turns this [food] source domain into a pictorial metaphor where the minimal units (colour, form and texture) send towards the secondness dimension of metaphorical layering, namely meta-metaform. Thus, the red pepper, which is usually perceived as a relevant element of a recipe isotopy, develops several visual metaphors, belonging to an allotopical rhetoric, through its being part of three different social representations: education, transport, and nature.

Red pepper – visual metaphor. At the level of graphic representation, we observe a visual metaphor *in praesentia conjunct/ conjoint* where parts of the conceived and the perceived objects form a unity. The interpenetration of elements belonging to different entities of reality (food *versus* transport or school), creates a semiotic allotopy: the perceived signifier /red pepper/ takes the place of some relevant parts (a road, a mark, the green colour of




Figure 4. *Red hot pepper – Traian Băsescu.*

traffic lights, and the trunk of a tree) of some conceived elements/ types which become the primary indexical signs of some social isotopies (school, transport, and nature).

These images advertise neither the product /hot pepper/, nor some private or public institutions; hence these minimal units of the plastic sign / red pepper/ constitute only a part of the topical calculus, based rather on some encyclopedic knowledge about this spice, which activates a certain axiological calculus of praising. The question to be answered refers to the beneficiary of this iconic representation of positive valorization. In order to find the answer to this question, the red pepper should be analysed as a conceptual metaphor as well.

Red hot pepper – conceptual metaphor. The Romanian socio-political context is the other part of the topical calculus that should be taken into account: in the 2004 election campaign, the elongated form of a red pepper was compared to Traian Băsescu's lock of hair covering his bald part of his head. Thus, the perceived and the conceived elements of the visual metaphors are the metaphorical parts of an election situational context:

- the conceived elements are the contents of Băsescu's promises: modernized schools, safe and proper roads, a proper management of traffic lights, places for leisure activities.
- the perceived element /the red pepper/ stands for a lock, a synecdoche of the political candidate. Both the red pepper and Traian Băsescu become the domains of a conceptual metaphor, built on an ontological

correspondence (the red pepper and Bănescu's lock share the same minimal unit, namely, the long form) and epistemic correspondences (the red pepper is known for its hot pungency, whereas Bănescu is known as a very active candidate). The above-mentioned signified of progress associated with the conceived elements of the iconic context/ election promise is actually the proper interpretation of the following political portrait: *He is Traian Bănescu. For many people, he is as quick-tempered as a red hot pepper. Because he is quick in his deeds, and cruel in his talk. [...] And everything he touches does he burn!*)

This linguistic message used in the 2004 election for the Mayor of Bucharest has two more interpretations besides the ones already presented:

- on the one hand, it is built on the device of a Romanian homophonic pun: *ardei* (a noun: pepper) and *arde(-i)* (a verb + a 3rd person plural pronoun: burn them/ punish them). This latter word of the pun was used in the election campaign for Presidency in November 2004, in the following syntagm: *Arde-i la vot!* (Burn them with your vote!). This derived political idiom, built on the lexical substitution of the lexeme *bottom* in the expression (a *arde la fund* = to slap one's bottom), has as its signified the concept *punishment*. The cognitive flow between the two parts of this idiomatic expression has as a driving force the strategy of intra-discoursal voices, its cognitive support being the meaning of the word (red) pepper (*ardei iute*). The only change between the political context in June and November 2004 is the rational agent behind this action of punishing (*arde-i*): whereas in *Totul arde!*, Traian Bănescu's punishment takes the form of a process of revealing the corrupted politicians, in *Arde-i la vot!*, the punishment is performed by citizens who are demanded not to vote for the opponent candidates.

- on the other hand, the link between Bănescu and a red pepper can be interpreted considering the social code of table etiquette (meta-metaform layer). When talking about the macro-semiotic level of the signifier /red pepper/, we have mentioned the informal setting of an eating ritual and the lack of a difference between social strata that could be inferred from the cuisine isotopy of the Romanian borsch (*borș*) and the red pepper. These two conceptual implications also apply to Traian Bănescu, a former oil tanker captain, who is known to have an unpolished form of charisma, ready to adapt himself to any social context; be it, to counter-attack his

opponents using informal language, to dance with belly-dancers, or to hold babies in his arms.

3. *Conclusion*

The paper was an attempt to prove that political metaphors having as their metaform/source domain some objects of taste (lollipop, red hot pepper) are actually caught between different levels of intertextuality. They materialize into subjective interpretations which should take into account the situational, cultural and social contexts in order to be decoded.

Notes

1. Being against the grammatical rule of composition, where the whole is formed of its parts, Permyakov (1979: 32-51) mentions three distinctive planes that interact in the process of decoding an idiom: 1) the grammatical/ linguistic plane: idioms cannot be reduced to separable semantic units, 2) the logico-semiotic plane: idioms are signs of objects that send certain concepts; 3) the object-image plane: the realia plane where the ethnic, geographical, historical and other unique features of idioms are manifest. It has an emotional character.
2. Rejecting the classical theory on idioms, where anything that is not predicted from the context is arbitrary, and starting from the theory of cognitive models, George Lakoff (1987: 448) offers the following *motivational alternative*: “The relation between A and B is *motivated* just in case there is an independently existing link, L, such that A-L-B “fit together.” L *makes sense* of the relationship between A and B.”
3. Vlad was called Tepes (the Impaler) only after his death (1476). He ruled in Wallachia between 1456-1462 and in 1476. In 1462, having been defeated by the Turks, Vlad took refuge in Hungary. In 1476, with the help of the Hungarian king Matia Corvin and the Moldavian prince Stephen the Great, Vlad took over the Wallachian throne again for a month. A battle followed, during which Vlad was killed.

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Aurel Codoban

Body of language and body as language

Constituent problems of gesture semiotics

It is said that Friedrich II undertook an experiment through which he was trying to discover the primordial language, spoken in Paradise, by raising children to whom no one has ever spoken. As is well known, the result of this experiment was the death of the subjects. This experiment is absolutely revealing for the way in which the West situates the body outside the sphere of communication. For it is almost impossible for these children not to have interacted with their caretakers, not to have gesticulated, howled or expressed their happiness or sadness. Five centuries after Friedrich's experiment, the story of a miracle with an opposite meaning might have constituted a privileged occasion for making acceptable the presence and importance of the body in the sphere of human communication. We are thinking about the story of Helen Keller who, blind and deaf at birth, still managed to learn to communicate with others and even to write poetry.

Communication has still not been related to the body, even though man's non-verbal communication abilities were scientifically founded by Charles Darwin in 1872 through the observation of the identity of the fundamental facial expressions – joy, sadness, anger, etc. – between different races and their similitude with those of certain superior primates. The universality of emotional expressivity and the innate character of this type of communication should have drawn our attention to the preeminence of non-verbal over verbal communication and to transform the body in a subject of communication.

Modernity has continued to endow the soul or the consciousness with the attribute of communication by considering it essentially verbal, until Freudian psychoanalysis, at the beginning of the twentieth century, shifted our perception of the relationship between body and soul, and the impor-

tance of the former for communication. This shift brought about by psychoanalysis transforms the body into a body of language. Freud observes that hysterical paralysis appears not according to the nervous system but to the description of the body in words (Freud, 1950). When Freud analyzed the atypical paralyzes peculiar to hysteria (Freud 1972) he observed that they appear through projection or representation and ignore the actual anatomy of the nervous system. It is as if the lesion does not affect the trajectories of the nerves but the words denoting different parts of the body: paralysis appears without nervous lesions, but according to the common words denoting different parts of the body.

This means that in hysterical paralysis the body is homogeneous with language, is symbolic, not anatomical. In such cases the “thinking” of the body is guided by reasons such as that of Freud’s patient Elisabeth von R.: “This cannot go like that”. She does not utter it in language, represses it as idea, and paralyzes it according to the meaning of the words. Here we are faced with a body which speaks in its own way, and which, through its movements, bypasses conscious repression and holds the discourse of the unconscious.

But this relationship between the body and language expresses itself at the same time through dreams and different modifications at the level of speaking: bungled actions, metaphors or metonymies, etc. Due to the fact that, essentially, psychoanalytical cure is a spoken cure, it privileges what the patient can say, his verbal discourse, somewhat leaving aside gestures and body language as such. Thus, even though Freud discovered the signifying capacity of the body, he still believed that the verbal cure was the most significant, leaving body language at the periphery of the sphere of communication. Such a solution underexposes the Freudian idea of the body of language and renders ungraspable the idea of body as language, related to the expression of the unconscious through motility and pantomime. This is because in Freud the opposition between the psychic and the biological organism maintains the metaphysical attitude of Western thought, identifiable also in Saussure who distinguishes the signifier and the signified as idea of consciousness and voice of the body.

Until the beginning of the twentieth century Western thought was governed by the hierarchized, metaphysical dualism of soul and body, through which the body was excluded not only from communication but also from the sphere of culture in general. The body has been religiously and philo-

sophically devalued and kept at bay through discipline and will, through the stringency of ritual – starting with the religious ones which see the body as the signifier as such and ending with those of politeness – and through the aesthetical idealization of its artistic representation. Moreover, for a long period of time, it has been considered even the adversary par excellence in our Christian-Platonic Western culture. The metaphysical consequence – apparent in Greek thought and imported into Christianity despite its Jewish background – is the asymmetrical relationship between body and soul: the body is but a container for the soul, which is incomparably much more valuable. Christianity is par excellence a religion of the embodied God, of a God which incarnates as man. Such a representation, with all its extraordinary spiritually human potential, illustrates the Orphic-Platonic idea of a superior soul which comes to inhabit a body that, as container is essentially inferior. Christianity took from Judaism the idea of the resurrection of the body at the end of times, an idea inconceivable for the Greeks although, at the same time, the body was denigrated. And, the whole of Western philosophy has followed Christianity's lead: against practice and reality, philosophy excluded the body from the field of communication.

But in the second half of the twentieth century the body became omnipresent in our civilization's practices and discourses. Now more than ever the body is perceived, theoretically and practically, as the location and the means of numerous signifying systems: the expressiveness of the voice, gestures, behaviors or, from another perspective, cosmetics, clothes, signs of social status, of institutionalized relations, of politeness and etiquette, of feelings and attitudes, related to roles and social positions, signs of arts or of its own vitality. This generalized inversion of the asymmetrical relationship between body and soul is customary of the Western world – for the profit of the body, along with the corporeality of our days determines the body to enter the scene of communication and imposes the idea of body as language.

This is why an explanation of the miraculous story of Helen Keller could be formulated only now within the paradigm of postmodern corporealism, which, at the same time, does not accept an essentialist perspective upon the body but regards it in its becoming. Thus, in the terms of Thomas Sebeok's semiotics, the exchanges between the mother and the child of substances and energy before the birth take place as a biological

communication (Sebeok 2003: 14). This communication continues after birth through direct interaction between the body of the mother and that of the child in the whole sphere of maternal relations. Pupils are educated firstly through gestures and only after that through words. The bodily interaction between the mother and the child appears as the main form of communication and institutes itself as the basis upon which other forms of communication are elaborated. At the beginning of human existence there is a primacy of gestures over verbal language, for the relation is in this case anterior not only to the content of communication but to verbal communication as well. Thus, the explanation of the miracle is that, as in the case of mother-child relationship, Helen Keller has learned body language through physical interaction with her tutor. The mother-child interaction becomes in this way the basis for communication as such, including verbal communication. In the context of this relationship the individuation of language and its individual incorporation as well as the collectivization of the body, through learning a language that belongs to all, takes place.

Society subjects bodily interaction to a strict codification, to a ritualisation which tends to transform the body into a semiological entity by transforming it into a signifier intermingled within a system of communication and exchange (advertising, commercials, music videos, etc.). Cultures go as far as to exchange the meanings of the gestures with completely new ones. Thus Freud considered the gesture of nodding to be the search of the infant for the mother's breast. Upon this primordial corporeal relationship, society constructs its meanings and significations. The cultural over-determination of gestures overturns gestural meanings; in the case of Turkish and Bulgarian culture, nodding expresses negation.

But the situation is not always the same. At the level of anthropogenesis there is presupposed a preeminence of body language over verbal language, which could offer us some hints and explanations for the apparition and evolution of verbal language. The upright posture anchored this relation: by freeing, as Leroi-Gourhan observes (1964: 65), the phonic apparatus, it has freed the hands for gesturing as well. The spreading of verbal language has resulted in the reduction of the communicative utility of gestures, mimicry, and ritualized behaviors in general. And the evolution of man, especially in the Western modern world, has imposed strong norms and tight censure upon the body and spontaneous expression. In this context, verbal language has gained in front of body language and linguistics has

gained the possibility to explain many gestures following the codification of the gestures of the body.

Now, in a civilization that overrates the body and body language in general, the realm of gestures comes to be separated and basically situated at the same level as language. The use of gestures is not that dependent on language, as it was the case in Modernity, and gestures are usually considered just as important as words for the representation of meaning. In our times the body has ceased to be a sub-product when compared to language, or a primitive form of expression; the body is used along with language and can complement it in communication, rendering possible new signifying structures. Thus, touches – from those who use them in place of words, by caressing and massaging – introduce a type of gesture which, ever since the deciphering of Helen Keller's enigma, bring to the attention of the Western world an entire domain of the sensuous that has been completely ignored. The eye and the ear, essentially social senses, are also senses of the soul, and texts are the product of a mixture between the eye and the ear.

Now, with this idea of body as language, with the eye and the ear along the newly (re)discovered senses of smell and taste, a new sense enters the scene of communication – tactility, with its organ, the skin. Skin has the same embryonic origin as the other sense organs and the nervous system: all come from the ectoderm, the third embryonic layer, the one richest in receptors of our sense organs. “After the brain”, says Ashley Montagu, “the skin is undoubtedly the most important of our organs... A being can live blind, without taste or smell but cannot survive a moment without skin.” (in Gérard Leleu 2005: 18) The skin, this sense organ long overlooked in Western culture, is par excellence the sense of the body, the only sense that produces a double sensation, active and passive at the same time, interior and exterior, which gives the mind the possibility to represent its body. The body is truly the ego-skin, as Didier Anzieu notes following Freud.

Such a structural transformation of the spheres pertaining to culture can offer us the measure of the change in Western civilization once the presence of the body is acknowledged in communication. In its distinction from verbal language, which represents the content, and is digital, unmotivated, and arbitrary, body language represents continuity, i.e., the analogical, the motivated. Most often the image of the body constitutes the basis for face to face relationships: starting from it, the Other forms his or her impressions and passes judgments on us. Glances, mimicry, and some-

times gestures and even howls, represent the *phatic* function; they open the channel that renders communication possible. And the body language of the sender has most often a more direct influence upon the receiver than does verbal discourse.

Thus, such signifying intentions or signifying systems, located in the body or passing through it, can express better than verbal language the reactions of the subject; they can impress the co-speaker in various ways and propose or impose a relationship. They can regulate such a relation, engage the symbolism of a ritual or, finally, play a linguistic role by sustaining verbal language (but, in this case too, by privileging the relation). If we differentiate the functions of the communicative relation according to Watzlawick's (1972: 238–252) distinction between relation and content, we observe that the communicative functions that can be realized by the body are those pertaining to relation. In body language the *phatic* function is essential. Even in hysteria – paralysis, deafness – somatization has the function of establishing contact; that is, it engages a relation where it was missing. From this comes the truth of the well-known idea that verbal language normally transmits information, whereas body language expresses interpersonal attitude, which, in connection with the content of communication, functions as meta-communication.

In order to offer a diagnostic of the changes produced by the body for the sphere of communication, it is necessary to bring to light the communicative functions that cannot pertain to body language. The first of these would be the metalinguistic one, which is highly disputed among the specialists. Of course, one can explain a gesture through another, and generally attitudes serve as metacode for gestures – we can determine that a gesture is obscene only from the attitude of the person gesticulating. Thus the metalinguistic function can be viewed as a borderline between body and verbal language: the body can show amazement, but it cannot ask questions – Only consciousness can do that. Primates can learn to sign, but they cannot pose questions. The metalinguistic function is closely related to language and hence peculiar to man. Here the digital aspect of verbal language gets strictly differentiated from the analogical one pertaining to the body, and is superior to this last.

If we insist on making the body a hero at war with the soul, as some authors do, we could say that, against the plural meanings and senses which the body was forced to embody, it has raised the opacity of its own mate-

riality and constantly hijacked transcendence towards immanence, transforming spectacle into the spectacular. But the human body, which differs from the biological organism, can be thought only along with its existence, with its everyday life. The body enters the sphere of communication only because it has become language, just as the soul did centuries ago, and not because of its biological reality. “Society” is what proposes the signifying systems and imposes the “speaking” of certain languages. The problem is, Why is this happening *now*? Why are we *now* interested in the meanings of the body, but were not earlier?

Probably the best answer to this question can be offered by another function of the body in communication – the poetic function. Along with the desacralization of the world, the body, freed from the task of representing other exterior symbols, has constantly grown in its poetic function through its presentation in mass media of the Western world. The poetic function describes the numerous situations in which the body becomes a self-referential object, that is, in which it becomes a poem: make-up art, perfumes and lotions, body painting or dance. The body becomes an artifact as well in the plastic surgeries undertaken by Orlan or in the performances of Stelarc and in other experiments of this type. Of course, in this aesthetical self-representation nothing happens other than the fact that the *phatic* function takes the body as its starting point and thus communication communicates the body, not the soul. Which means that here, in Baudrillard’s terms, we are facing a signifier which signifies itself, a *simulacrum*.

The presence of the body in the public space and the interest in communication as constitution of a relation, not as transmission of information, is the consequence of a profound desacralisation of life in ethics, politics and law. The sacred “principle” of life seems to be filtered through the plurality of the bodies to be reversed in its nudity, stripped of determinations and metaphysical meanings, in the scene of the public space. Still, its key players remain the bodies. Communication as relation is a celebration of pure vitality, the vitality of naked life, of life without determinations. Spectators appreciate communicative force more than the arguments and the content of communication. The triumph of the body in the sphere of public space is the triumph of the analogical (image) over the digital (text), of imagology over ideology, in short, the triumph of ostensive ideology.

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Benedetta Colombo

To what extent might a semiotic approach avoid misunderstanding?

A study of hospital patients

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to investigate if suitable use of signs in communication might improve people's comprehension. It is well known that the exchange of information – *communication* in its widest meaning – can result in problems, resulting in miscomprehension by the addressee. Semiotically speaking, communication can be understood as a way to influence the audience by means of signs, that is, to make them understand where they are supposed to be led. From this point of view signs are indicators with which to start a process of interpretation (Schulz 2004). The advantage of such a conception of the communicative process is that it might explain how misunderstanding and non-comprehension arise: it's mainly about the clarity and distinctiveness of signs as they are uttered by the communicator and understood by the receiver.

We will go deeper into this semiotic model of communication, and introduce the concept of a tailored communication. Moreover, to support our theoretical model, we will report on a study we conducted in Ticino in summer of 2006.

1. A semiotic model of communication

There are of course many definitions of the concept of *communication*, depending on the field and on the perspective we take. For this reason, I shall outline our theoretical starting point.

First, we can say that communication is any intentional behaviour which is enacted with the intent to make something known to someone else. Note that we take intentionality to be a specific characteristic of communication. The sender wants to inform his addressee about something. He wants to say something to him and to create a habit change in him. But intention alone does not suffice. We must provide our addressee with conditions that permit him to understand our message. Therefore it is important to note that communicating is a form of influencing and that this influence can be considered a case of communication only if it is produced by gaining understanding. Thus communicating means *to allow the other to perceive something by which – with his/her knowledge about the respective situation (along with his/her additional knowledge) as well as his/her “Weltanschauung” – s/he can understand where the one communicating wants to lead him/her.*

We can summarize what we have explained till now in the following way:

- I want to communicate to the addressee (A) my intention (I).
- We hypothesize that there are many utterances (U_1 - U_n) in order to realize my intention.
- After having analysed the specific situation, I say that in order to realize my intention the best way is using (for instance) U_3 .
- Therefore I use U_3 .

What does this conceptualization of *communication* have to do with semiotics? When could we start to talk about signs? It is in fact precisely at this point that we could introduce the concept of *sign*. In fact, these utterances we have chosen are nothing other than signs, and they allow the addressee to understand. Therefore, these signs are indicators, which the speaker gives in order to make the addressee understand; thus, understanding happens both because of a correct use of signs and the addressee's (correct) process of interpretation.

Till now we have spoken about how could we make our receiver understand, but as we said, our communications don't always reach always this goal and the interpretation of the message can be problematic. Misunderstanding sometimes occurs. So, starting from our position, where does misunderstanding take place?

Previously, we have seen that understanding happens both because of the right use of signs and the addressee's process of interpretation. In the same way, misunderstanding in communication is due to a mistake in the use of signs and hence in the process of interpretation. Therefore, in this problem, signs play an important role, because they are not merely packages of information, but are more like premises for certain conclusions, and interpreting really means to draw conclusions on the basis of systematic association. To decrease misunderstanding we have to intervene with appropriate use of signs: only if we choose the proper signs can we bring forth correct interpretation.

Let's refer back to the second and the third point of our semiotic model – the two most related with the use of signs. Some signs are more suitable than others for conveying what the sender wants to say. More suitable means also that we have to take into account the differences of people's process of interpretation. There is surely a common structure, but at the same time, every person is different. Hence we can speak of the need for *tailored communication*. Tailored communication has to do with choosing the most proper signs by taking into account the real-life situation of the addressee. When we want to communicate something, we should always analyze a situation, and moreover, the specific needs of that situation must be indicated. We have to recognize and indicate which needs are present, so as to recognize and use the most suitable signs.

This goes particularly in health-care settings, where information is often not understandable by a patient. To apply a tailored communication in such cases, we should first of all identify the needs of the target audience and then give information in a way that respects these needs.

2. Method

To confirm our model, we report the description of a study we conducted for the EOC (Ticino association of hospitals). This study encourages deep reflection about the importance of tailored communication, above all in health settings.

Responding to the growing interest all over Europe about patients' rights, the EOC has constructed an informative leaflet to distribute to its patients. In our study, we evaluated this leaflet as to how well it increased the patient's knowledge about this topic (see Colombo 2006). We first

wanted to know the kinds of patient we were dealing with, according to their age, education, profession, nationality and so on. In this way we could hypothesize a list of their needs, which we used as a term of comparison for our analysis.

We also ran readability and comprehensibility tests on the leaflet, testing it for suitable use of signs. First of all we quote a definition of “readability”: it is a measure of the accessibility of a piece of writing and/or associated page layout, indicating how effectively it will reach a given reading audience (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Readability>). In order to test it, we took some pages of the leaflet as a sample, then evaluated it according to the “Gulpease index”, a typical way of measuring the difficulty of a text written in Italian (<http://www.eulogos.net/it/glossario/default.htm>).

This index is a simple rating between 0 and 100, where 100 means high readability and 0 means low readability. In general:

- < 80 = hard to read by people with an elementary school degree
- < 60 = hard to read by people with middle school degree
- < 40 = hard to read by people with a high school diploma

Figure 1 shows the scale with which we can evaluate a text according to the result of such a formula.

Now let us define what we mean by comprehensibility: it is the level of understanding of a passage or text. In analysing comprehensibility, we chose a functional linguistics framework having the following criteria (Clerehan et al. 2005):

- Organization or structure of the text (generic structure)
- Function of each “move” in relation to the reader (rhetorical elements)
- Technicality of vocabulary used in the text
- Purpose of the text (metadiscourse)
- Role-relationships expressed in the text
- The use of headings
- Density of information in the text (lexical density)
- Validity of factual content
- Visual aspects of text

We submitted some pages from the EOC leaflet to this test, in terms of these nine elements.




Figure 1. Representation of the Gulpease index.

After handing out the leaflet, we tested to see if knowledge was increased and if the text was really understandable. This second study was a Randomized Controlled Study, and its purpose was to understand to what extent the communication channel impacted patients' knowledge about their rights. We tested to see if lack of knowledge, discovered in the first survey, had been remedied and if the leaflet was understandable by patients. We wanted to know, in particular, which channels might our communication and our patients' knowledge. We selected 100 patients

staying at the Regional Hospital of Lugano. The randomization criteria were the same as those of the first study, except of course of the period of hospitalization.

To 50 patients, while they were still hospitalized, we simply delivered the leaflet (control group) and to the other 50 patients we gave the leaflet along with a general introduction by a health professional (experimental group). Then we sent the same questionnaire of the first study to all these patients.

3. *Results*

Regarding the first study: analysis of the questionnaires revealed that an hypothetical target audience of the leaflet was composed mostly by females, between 71 and 88 years old, Swiss, with a medium/low educational level and retired. In response to our questions about patients' rights, we found that the least understood were those concerning informed consent, professional secrecy, the interruption of treatment, and the right to a second opinion. In response to this sample, we may hypothesize some needs:

- The leaflet should use everyday vocabulary
- The leaflet should use an "easy" linguistic structure (syntax)
- The leaflet should use a clear format
- The leaflet shouldn't report too much information

These first results were useful for us, because they permitted us to make a comparison between these needs and those which would result from the second study.

As for the readability test: we have found the index for this leaflet was on average about .57326. As we can see from Figure 1, this means the leaflet was too difficult to read by people with a medium/low education degree. Moreover, the comprehensibility test indicated that the major problems arose from technicality of vocabulary, poor use of headings, density of information, validity of factual content, and visual aspects of the text. These results show that the EOC did not investigate its target readership before writing the pamphlet. The authors failed to consider whether the patients might have problems in understanding it.

We have already asserted that every attempt to communicate is vain if we don't consider people's needs and don't apply a tailored communication. Our second survey gave us effective proof of this assertion. In fact,

knowledge of patient rights was not increased even when the pamphlet was explained by health care professionals. The analysis of data showed that there was no increase in patients' knowledge about their rights.

Conclusion

We hope our study has underlined the importance of tailored communication. It is not enough simply to communicate, without taking note of one's target addressees. In fact, people in the experimental group fared worse than those in the control group; this means that neither the leaflet nor the oral explanation provided by health professionals went very far in educating the target audience. It is not enough simply to dispense information without considering the information needs of patients and their real life conditions. It is not enough just to communicate with signs. In order to communicate in a way leading to better comprehension by the patients, we must use signs that have value for *them*, and not just for the medical establishment.

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Dario Compagno

Misunderstanding or misperceiving?

The issue of authoriality in hypoiconic signs and texts

This is a preliminary study on intentional signs, those called *signa data* by Augustine; more precisely, on the influence that intention to mean has on interpretation. Textual semiotics offers hypotheses on immanent structures operating in interpretation, but reaching the author's will is not its duty, and – more notably – semiotical analysis is independent from any will of the text's producer and consequently from any inquiry on this topic.

If we want to understand the meaning of a text, its *intentio operis*, we should consider the role of its author. This is because what common sense calls "text" is something deliberately produced by someone, and because who thinks to be in front of an intentional expression elaborates that expression differently from a person who does not see any deliberate will to communicate behind it. If we narcotized this difference, adopting the same criteria for the study of both intentional and unintentional expressions, we would risk missing the core functioning of communication. My reflections start from the way Eco (1999: 375, emphasis mine) differentiates an *alpha* and a *beta* mode of interpretation:

To understand a sign as such, we must first bring perceptual processes into play, that is to say, we must perceive substances as forms of expression. But there are signs whose expression plane, in order to be recognized as such, must be perceived (even if by virtue of surrogate stimuli) through basic semiosis, so that *we could perceive them as signs even if we decided we were not dealing with the expression of a sign function*. In such cases I shall talk of alpha mode. On the other hand, there are cases where to perceive a substance as form *I must first of all presume that it is an expression of a sign function, deliberately produced with a view to communicating*. In such cases I shall talk of beta mode.

The alpha mode is basically the way we perceive ordinary objects. We can understand that a bird is a bird, or that a picture of a bird actually represents a bird, before wondering if that bird has a further meaning. Instead, whenever a person hypothesizes a deliberate view to communicate at the root of a phenomenon, he looks primarily for a formal correlation, whatever the substance perceived. And I would like to add that this search for a formal correlation points straight to the communicator's will. To recognize a dove in a photograph is somehow independent from wondering what that dove means; while interpreting a hand-drawn image of a dove often requires to suppose that someone wanted to draw a dove and not some other bird. These phenomena help explain what Eco meant by the two modes of interpretation. But there is more ...

For textual semiotics, a drawing of a dove carrying an olive branch, even if not produced with the aim of expressing a symbol of "peace", nevertheless keeps this conventional meaning. It is not important whether this potential could be given to the image creator or not; the reception of the text determines its meaning more than its production. The dove means peace in our culture, and this social meaning is not just stronger than the author's intention: social conventions are the *only* way a person can mean something.

If this is true, let me highlight the influence that the communicative act in which a sign or text is produced and interpreted has on its semantic potential. By taking a careful look, the connotation of "peace" attributed to a dove's painting can be seen as immanent to it by an interpreter only if he imagines an author establishing that signification. In fact a dove could also mean fertility (as in wedding releases), divine love and forgiveness, hope for resurrection (as in funerals and tombstones). A careful interpreter should wonder if the image's creator really wanted to convey a peaceful message by using the dove; moreover, nobody can take a real, living dove flying with an olive branch in its mouth as a herald of forthcoming peace (but of course in mystical interpretation, where some deity would be the author of the message). Intentional signs are different from natural ones, and they require a quest to find their producer's actual aim: any text presupposes a past production of it, and to this production its meaning is somehow bound. If what is at stake in interpretation is a single deliberate application of an otherwise diffuse semiotic potential, then the

most important element to be looked for in the analysis of a text is the motivation for its production.

Meanings that require a speaker, and meanings that can do without one

Eco (1999) brings back the notion of deliberate signification in semiotics that he himself put aside in the past (1976), when he wrote that natural and intentional signs are signs to the same degree (even if at that time he was already interested in recognized and unrecognized intentions). I am evaluating the possibility that humans adopt a peculiar *interpretative stance* whenever supposing the existence of an intentional producer as source of a sign. Daniel Dennett (1996) writes of an intentional stance that cognitive beings use when they imagine themselves in front of another cognitive being. This notion doesn't require the other being to be really cognitive; it simply describes the way someone thinks about something or someone else. A similar situation is that of an interpreter who is going to read something *as if* it had been deliberately imbued with meaning.

Let us suppose that a person feels something on his shoulder, where he cannot see it, and he thinks it is an insect. He hits it, only to recognize thereafter an harmless leaf. That person has used a general inferential capacity: he gave attention to some information offered to him by his tactile sense; he recalled the Cognitive Type or schema of a generic insect (Eco 1999), and acted accordingly. In this respect we could correctly talk of semiosis here; but it would also be correct to say that there has been no *communication* whatsoever between the leaf and the interpreter. As some cognitivist scholars write, not every acquisition of knowledge can be called communication, and it would be better, instead, to speak of misperception in cases like the one described above (Castelfranchi & Poggi 1998).

On the contrary, if while I am driving a car, the person sitting next to me says "light" and I understand "right" it's no longer just a matter of misperception. My interpretation is driven by a general hypothesis of intention-recognition. If I suppose the existence of an external purpose, I lead my attention to that will, and I interpret the sounds I hear as means for that will to communicate, aside from their signification as objects *per se*. Even if to me my passenger's intention is impossible to reach directly, I never doubt that this intention exists. The word "right" is direct evidence

for the fact that my passenger is not mute and that he apparently speaks English; but it becomes a meaningful clue for my driving only if I suppose a cooperative intention and a capacity to reason in him. In other words, a portion of the world must be caught by the interpreter as *a text produced by an author*. Hjelmslev (1961) talked about *catalysis*, the act of finding immanence through the recognition of a human language. That immanence is different from the visual impression or “taxi” of a thing, the phenomenological organisation allowing me to recognize a leaf. To understand a message requires an intentional interpretative stance.

Luis Prieto (1966) made a strong point that a raindrop is to rain as the sentence “it rains” is to *x*, where *x* is the information that it will rain, and not the rain in itself. Pragmatics differentiates further informative and communicative intentions working at the core of language (Sperber & Wilson 1986). I consider it misleading to say that the sentence “it’s raining” points to rain as a raindrop does, as if we believed the raindrop to speak. In feeling a raindrop falling on me, I take that as a drop, then as a raindrop, and so as evidence for rain to come; in hearing “it’s raining”, I wonder who says this and if he has evidence that I cannot see at the moment.

Recognizing iconic and symbolic representations

Often the interpreter correctly attributes or does not attribute an intended meaning to the phenomenon he experiences. Hence he differentiates properly intentional and unintentional signs, communication and (cultural) perception. But there are also chances that the interpreter will take an object for an intentional sign, or vice versa. Say, if I believe to have heard a voice, but it was only a whiff, or on the contrary I do not recognize someone talking because of a noisy environment, I make a different mistake than a misperception or a misunderstanding. In fact I adopt the wrong mode of interpretation – the wrong interpretative stance.

I would like to return your attention to a curious feature of realistic pictures. If a person sees a realistic iconic representation, and he does not understand it to be a representation, he will *take it for the object represented*. In ordinary life this rarely happens, because we deal with images that are usually somehow different from their objects, and we immediately assign them the correct status of intentional signs; but this fact only increases the effect of surprise arising from an unrecognized reproduction. A very

realistic image or an effective fake can inhibit the interpreter's expectations about a communicative (or deceptive) intention.

Something drastically different happens with words and other forms of arbitrary signification. If an interpreter does not see letters and words on a sheet of paper, he can *by no means confuse them with their object*. He will stop his elaboration at the perceptual substance, failing to see any meaningful form, and he will not reach the sign's object at all.

So there is a huge difference between iconic and symbolic representations, which arises clearly whenever the intention to mean, turning an object into an intentional sign, is not recognized. In front of a picture of an apple, if I fail to recognize its pictorial nature, I still see the apple; furthermore, I perceive it as a *real* apple. On the contrary, in front of the word "apple", if I do not recognize it as a word, I only see a confused ink scratch. For example, not everyone would read a word in the lines and dots sequence in Figure 1.




Figure 1. The word "apple" (in Morse code) and a fly.

On the contrary, someone might try to hit the fly next to it. The word "apple" in Morse could be confused with a *meaningless*, semi-recursive pattern; while the picture of the fly with a *meaningless*, living fly. The word "meaningless" here does not imply that the first substance is not recognized as a black and white pattern, or that the fly is not recognized as a fly. The point is that in both cases they do not mean anything but their existence; the interpreter does not suppose they are being used by anyone as a means of communicating (or in the latter case, for deceiving).

This phenomenon can be explained by saying that the beta modality of interpretation, the fact of recognizing an intentional view to communicating, has *two diverse effects* on iconic and symbolic representations. In the last case it permits one to reach the content of an otherwise opaque expression (but the term "expression" is itself problematic here; it would be better to talk about sensible experience or perceptual substance); in the

first case, it allows a pause before interpretation of the content as a concrete, present object. This implies that the alpha mode of interpretation (the non-intentional interpretative stance) is what permits one to describe the expression of a sign, but it also enables one to be fooled by visual resemblances, mimicry and illusions.

There can also be cases in which the interpreter attributes a non-existing communicative will to a portion of sensible experience. The strangest and rarest – but possible – happens when someone believes an original to be a fake, for example, by questioning the make-up of a gold ingot. Or the interpreter may see codes and messages where he actually should not; for example, by taking a bonfire as a smoke signal. In both situations an object is believed to having been turned deliberately into a surface for inscription. The gold ingot is an ingot-sign; the bonfire is not just a fire, or evidence for past ignition, or a clue for human presence: it was ignited *to be seen*.

Intentio operis and the author

The threshold between what has been consciously communicated or suggested and what the message means on its own, independently from the sender's will, is very thin. In order to overcome this problem, every text in semiotics is studied as if its meaning were not consciously communicated. What is in the text is important, that is, what the reader finds in it because of his cultural competence. But doesn't this approach lead to problems? I am evaluating the possibility that if we detached the text from its sender, if we considered its meaning independently from any possible communicator's intention, we risk losing the chance to give a justified interpretation to texts. Eco (1990) pointed out that what the author wanted to say, *but didn't say*, is of no interest for semiotics, and that we should focus on what the text means by its own codes. This is the well known distinction between the *intentio auctoris* and the *intentio operis*. But strictly speaking, the text in itself has no codes at all – it is a message that must be referred to codes known to the reader: “cane” to an Italian means “dog”, sometimes “sing!”, very rarely “cane”. One must make some hypothesis about the person who wrote the word, to avoid reading what the author could not have possibly wanted to write.

Some studies invite us to look for a reconciliation between *intentio operis* and *intentio auctoris*. Sperber & Wilson (1986) point out that the

receiver of a message must recognize it as such, and this requires finding a communicative intention in it. Besides, the responsibility for letting the reader get the communicative intention of a text must be placed on its producer (communication works thanks to an *asymmetric coordination* weighing on the author). Compagnon (2004) writes that the principle of coherence allowing textual analysis depends on the existence of an author organizing this coherence, and so he argues that it is impossible to get completely rid of the text's producer. The term *intentio operis* itself is an oxymoron, combining what cannot have a will with what cannot be turned into a thing, but to me it expresses greatly the paradoxical nature of words and texts: *means-meaning*, without which a man would not be man.

I believe that what the author of the text wanted to say, and *did say*, is one main interest of semiotics. Between what the text says, despite its author's purpose, and intentions, there is a core of deliberate signification. The New Criticism and Barthes (1977: 15–31) announced the death of the author. But by doing so, the author has been liberated from his duties, whereas we still need him to work for us, at least if we seek to obtain any justifiable reading.*

Note

- * I would like to thank Mirko Della Torre for his helpful suggestions regarding this paper.

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Anna Czekanowska

Real vs. unreal, the literary vs. the musical message

**On the transmission of the Yakut epics,
*Olonkho***

To my close friends Eduard Alekseev and Aiza Reshetnikova

At the far, far and peak
of my long-gone years,
far away on the other side of the ridge
of my ridge
of my old, wreathed years,
far behind the brink
of the turbulent, earthly days
of my sunken years,
behind a line
of deadly ridges
of my past years,
when human tribes who entered into talks did not get to know one
another yet,
when the Yakut tribes,
who exchanged words did not know one another yet, when
my *Uranghai Sakha*
in furs like *Uras* ,
long-footed, loquacious, got together, but did not describe things yet,
when my prophets,
with a marked bone,
(when) the shaman from my country did not foresee (the future) yet,
the Hostess-Mother, my Earth, of the size of a grey squirrel's heel,
was being born
by stretching, expanding, growing;
like a chamois-soft ear of a deer
turned inside out,

spreading wide in all directions,
gradually expanding, as it appears

Noh!

(Translated from the Russian by Z. Przepiórkowska)

My reflections here focus on two Yakut heroic poems edited in two parallel languages, Yakutian and Russian, as elaborated by Nikolay Emelianov, Vasily Petrov and Sardana Oiunskaya, published by the Siberian branch of the Russian Academy of Science in Novosibirsk (1993 and 1996) and, analysed and commented on by ethnomusicologists Eduard Alekseev and Aiza Reshetnikova. I am very pleased to have this opportunity to contribute to the interpretation of these poems and would like to express my gratitude to my friends who delivered this material to me.

The first poem, *Mighty Erb Sogotokh*, is a tale about the progenitor of the Yakut nation; the second, *Kyys Debelye*, tells a story of women-warriors, who distinguished themselves in defending of their tribe. Both poems belong to the *Olonkho* epics, which are highly representative of Yakut literature, and have been studied for more than two hundred years. Yet, they still create many problems for scholarly interpretation, especially in the domain of musical transmission and its relation to poetry.

The first poem blends several, more or less related legends, which allow us to reconstruct the moral-aesthetic system, to reveal the stable plot structure and composition, and to present the poem's main "characters". The whole description is satiated with mythological concepts and images. The poem's main hero, *Erb Sogotokh*, is cast down from the upper world to the middle world, i.e., from the sky to the earth. The main hero of the second poem is a woman *Kyys Debelye*, who when expelled from the upper world to the middle one, settles there with her three sisters, defends them and fights with representatives of other groups. She is, however, not only a warrior but also an organiser of life in peace-time, who fights for the maintenance of moral values against her own children .

The plots of both *Olonkho* poems develop in three to four consistent parts:

1. Introduction, which in the first poem concentrates on description of the earth, and in the second poem, on admiration of the sky.
2. Outline of the basic conflict consisting of struggles between tribes and/or generations; includes the intervention of transcendental powers.

3. Solution of the basic conflict. The final parts of the poems have a happy ending, describing either a return to the south where the Yakuts originated¹ or a transcendental journey to the upper world, where conflicts can be happily resolved (see second poem).

4. The whole cycle ends with a concluding recitative (sometimes with a song).

Proper understanding of the legends requires some acquaintance with shamanistic beliefs, such as the idea of the threefold world: the upper, home of benevolent spirits; the middle, abode of people; and lower world, dwelling of evil spirits. In addition, there is the concept of constant correspondence between these three strata, although the conflicts concentrate mainly on the struggle between representatives of the middle (represented by the *Ayii* tribe) and lower (represented by the *Abaasy* tribe) worlds. The contradiction between two kinds of energy – horizontal (between people) and vertical (between the real and the unreal world) – is crucial to the structure under study. Indeed, the omnipotent power of the upper world dominates other forces, and the heroes, though brave and powerful, clearly remain at the disposal of the upper power. They may be sent to the earth with a special mission or be expelled; they may be brought up to the upper world (by good spirits – the white cranes); they may die and even be eaten by the enemy, but they may also be revived. In more abstract terms, one fights with internal human enemies that remain permanently at the command of the upper world. In more realistic terms, the permanent struggle is reduced to ethnic² and/or family conflicts, although moral aspects are distinguished as extremely important.

Proper analysis of *Olonkho* cannot exclude the musical aspect and its performance media. At the same time, it would be rather difficult to speak about the correspondence between poetry and music, since both kinds of transmission operate with different instruments and fulfill entirely different functions. Rigorous analytical studies contributed by philologists and folklorists help to explain the structure only to a limited extent only, concentrating basically on highly poetic descriptions and on metaphorical interpretations of the basic concepts of earth and sky, space and time, North and South. The verbal message conveys information about particular heroes (important ones and those of the second rank) and specifies their functions, but the characters and the power of their actions are still not

sufficiently articulated. Poetry presents visions and images, and reveals the values of the Siberian cosmological paradigm, namely, the cosmological-geographical orientation (North-South-East-West), which is crucial to the Siberian people. It cannot, however, fully express the dramatic dimensions of the arising conflicts. The verbal message keeps the listener at a certain distance; for it is not enough just to know the content, but one needs to be “taken” by its dramatic power and become really engaged. Music shapes the sequence of the dramatic plot, forms its dramatic axes, and puts the actors in the proper places. Thanks to music the participant can properly experience the dramatic profile of the plot, its points of tension and relaxation; that is, one learns how “to breathe” with the narrated story and participate fully in the event. Indeed, music transforms the listener into a participant.

Initial contact with *Olonkho* music is perhaps disappointing, both to Western-oriented listeners and to those competent in various kinds of Asiatic music. The former have problems in perceiving music created against the background of primary sound qualities such as tessitura, loudness, timbre (see Kondratieva and Mazepus 2002); the latter kinds of listener have difficulty identifying the characters marked by the verbal text. The inexperienced listener has evident problems in discovering correspondences between the verbally exposed content and its musical expression, as well as difficulties in relating the indicated “characters” and/or episodes to concrete musical motifs. The relation between content and music, apparently quite simple, is in fact complex and transmitted in an indirect way.

The first example of divergence between poetry and musical transmission is present in the recited parts of the introduction. The listener is surprised by this recitative, since the way in which the tale is performed differs clearly from what is expressed by the poetry³ for the narrator recites monotonously and quite fast, almost without pauses, while short breaks correlate only with his breathing (this fast way of reciting is called in Russian “skorogoworka”). He does not articulate any repetitions, which are so spectacularly exhibited in the poetic text. His way of performance is closer to recited conjuration than to poetry.

Indeed, it is difficult to correlate this highly poetic text with the way it is performed. *Olonkho* poetry concerns basic ideological concepts of the Yakut belief system, concentrating especially on the opposition between the real and the unreal worlds (see text fragment, below), either conceiving these concepts in abstract terms,⁴ or appealing directly to the senses,⁵ but

always operating with a dynamic that concerns not only the world's creation, but also seasonal changes. Compare the text presented below:

That very,
 primordial Mother-Earth of mine,
 was bound together with roots,
 reinforced with grass,
 wrapped with trees,
 covered with dormant black taiga,
 where the grey bear sets its lair,
 covered with impassable black taiga,
 which a fully grown elk readies before heat, –
 this is how primordial Mother-Earth
 continued to be created, as it appears,
 Created like that?
 with trees which die by falling,
 with waters which shallow when evaporating,
 with cuckoos which lapse into silence after finishing their cuckooing,
 with fish which swim away after shedding their scales,
 with pine trees which shed their needles after turning yellow, with cattle
 herds which grow small after degenerating, with people are born late,
 my central primordial Mother-Earth
 continued to be created and born
 exactly like this, as it appears,

(Nooh!)

(Translated from the Russian by Z. Przepiórkowska;
 see *Erb Sogotokh*, ed. Alekseev 1993: 79.)

The text above poses evident problems for the listener's perception. First, it is really surprising to find poetry appealing to spiritual powers recited in such a monotonous way. The situation totally changes with the emergence of dramatic effects and actors' performances (monologues and dialogues), which operate with much greater emotional engagement. Here music starts playing an important role. It establishes the sequence of the dramatic plot, as well as the consistency of composition (main action, formulae), and classifies particular actors (those of first and second rank). Music also evokes certain associations with the current repertory of folk songs (lullabies, laments), thus helping to stress the difference between the real and the unreal worlds.

According to Yakutian scholars, the most evident contrast lies between the two styles of singing mentioned above: *djiretti* and *degeren* (local terminology). These differences may be seen in the distinguishing of heroes into those with transcendental references (*djiretti*) and those presenting lower-rank, non-transcendent characters (*degeren*). Also noted have been the similarities between *djiretti* singing and shamanistic performance, which is most impressive when it is presented by a Tungus hero, although authentic shamanistic singing is quite different. More important for the *djiretti* style is the contrast of tessitura and manipulation of timbres, by means of strong tremolo and breathing effects.

The difference between the two styles *djiretti* and *degeren* is usually described as that between a recitative (*djiretti*) and a song (*degeren*); and between performance limited to fewer (*djiretti*) or more sounds (*degeren*). This characteristic is, however, evidently too general, and does not reveal satisfactorily the variety of reciting styles. These styles may operate in more or less extended tonal space, additionally developed during execution, and further enriched by a variety of timbres and various degrees of emotional engagement.

The songs performed in the *degeren* style differ by the use of more stable intervals (e.g., perfect fourths). Examples of this style permit one to follow the motifs and their references to concrete characters. This style is widely used for satirical description, allowing specification of the evolution of particular characters.

The phenomenon of the “epic breathing”, a term proposed by Alekseev (1993), is important for the creation of particular moods and feelings; this fascinating phenomenon has still not been thoroughly investigated. Manipulation with halted breath is in these cases crucial. Just as important are the breath pauses in the narrator’s speech, their frequency and context. It goes without saying that these breaks do not correspond with physiological needs only. They appear in certain parts of the text, being absent in others, referring to certain dramatic episodes which also coincide with the projection of form. Most important, however, is the relation of these breaks to the comments complementing them. The variety of such exclamations – “Noo”, “Noo-Yes”, “How excellent!”, “Just that”, “What a magnificent bird!” – deliver additional information and bring the listener and/or participant closer to the evaluation of narrated events. The main question concerns, however, the character and function of these spontaneous “comments” and

manifestations. The explorer would be happy to know not only how they are related to certain moods and connected with concrete situations, but first and foremost, to what extent are they regulated by established rules, and to what degree they are really spontaneous.

Conclusion

At this point, our conclusions cannot lead to definite statements. The study demands still more advanced work, specifically as concerns the musical expression of dramatic effects. This additional work requires more field research and also more specialised analytical instruments. The latter should help to identify particular performance phenomena (timbre effects, way of breathing, manipulation of tessitura) in their cultural context. Indeed, more detailed analysis of performance phenomena should be done in consultation with acousticians (see Kondratieva and Mazepus 2002 ; and Mazepus 2004, who established objective analytic criteria on the basis of spectral analysis). At the same time, local performers should be enlisted to comment on the achieved results, using their own cultural terms. This is exactly an area that needs to be controlled by comprehensive field research.

What is most needed at this moment, is the recorded documentation of the full text (still to be found in archives), possibly with transcribed music, though I fully understand the immense difficulties of such work. This kind of documentation, not limited to singular examples, would make it possible to follow the narration's flow and to investigate better the effects of the "epic breathing" mentioned above.

The simplest interpretation of the *Olonkho* tradition points to historical facts and to the migration of Turkic speaking people to Northern Siberia. This kind of interpretation cannot, however, clarify the vitality of this hybrid (Turk/Tungus) phenomenon. The cohabitation of different traditions being historically superimposed cannot explain its cultural importance. One should turn to belief systems and to their power, in search of the authentic source of consistency between that symbolic thinking so clearly exhibited by poetry, and some specifics of musical performance in the way of narrating and articulating. The shamanistic bias is evident in the both cases, although it is expressed quite differently in each, and operates with different instruments. The divergence concerns basically the level

of the structure's development, which is probably transformed in poetry while remaining closer to tradition in musical performance. The remoteness of the latter is probably an outcome of deeper contact with an area of beliefs and conjuration practices that have long remained unchanged. One may assume that the poetry, preserving the rudiments of shamanistic beliefs, so clearly exhibited by the appreciation of the shaman's energy and subordination to his spiritual power, expresses such beliefs and practices in an already transformed way, maneuvering with sophisticated instruments and treating universal concepts in an abstract manner; whereas the musical performance is still "in the power" of traditional rules. One may assume also, that this kind of "co-habitation" and still-preserved reference to shamanistic practice keeps this tradition alive. It is highly probable that the non-performed verbal text will survive as an archive source only, while the performed practice, though not without evident changes, will continue.

A general interpretation of the *Olonkho* poems, and its inclusion in interdisciplinary discussion (with psychologists and sociologists), may also contribute to better understanding of contemporary motivations for maintaining this art in a globalised world. Yet, what is more important is the proper explanation of the *Olonkho*'s nature, which should help to predict accurately its further development. The historically embedded co-habitation of quite different traditions⁶ needs more investigation and special studies on its shamanistic roots. This kind of exploration should not only explain the durability of the *Olonkho* tradition, but also help us to understand better the essential values comprising the Yakut people's identity.

Notes

1. Confirming the historical fact (7th century AD), namely, that the Yakut migrated from the area of Lake Baikal and Altai Mountains to Northern Siberia.
2. In certain cases it is possible to identify special musical motifs and relate them to the particular groups, either Tungus or Mongols.
3. Comp. musical example nr. 1 in Alekseev's edition of *Erb Sogotokh* (1993), along with the recorded example of it included in this book, and example nr. 11, as heard on the recording *Yakutskije Pesni*; see Alekseev's commentary in *Melodija* 30–39: 765–766.
4. Usually with the help of numbers (the sky has eight levels), and with division and multiplication procedures.

5. Comp. the metaphor, “as soft as the chamois-leather entry of the deer’s ear”.
6. Turkic-Mongolian, Tungus and Russian. These epics provide researchers with excellent material for comparative studies in the very extensive perspective of North-Eastern Asia .

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Ivan Darrault-Harris

Compréhension / Mécompréhension

Un défi pour la psychosémiotique: Les énigmes du comportement adolescent

Notre proposition de communication affrontera (avec les moyens théoriques et méthodologiques de la psychosémiotique que nous avons, en France, avec le soutien de Greimas, fondée dans les années 1980) les redoutables problèmes d'inintelligibilité des comportements et discours de la population des adolescents, l'adolescence étant redéfinie comme une période prolongée de la vie, comprise aujourd'hui entre 11/12 ans et 25/26 ans.

Cette mécompréhension de tels comportements a des conséquences éducatives et politiques graves en ce qu'elle alimente souvent chez les adultes des réactions de rejet, voire de pure répression, réactions interdisant de mettre en place un véritable plan de prévention, une efficace politique de sanction (aux sens juridique et sémiotique) des comportements à risque.

A partir d'exemples de séquences comportementales (conduites à risques, conduites addictives, tentatives de suicide, agressions, destructions gratuites) et de discours adolescents problématiques (tags, injures, agressions verbales amis aussi écrits intimes, autobiographiques), on s'efforcera de construire un modèle sémiotique génératif des comportements et discours adolescents faisant apparaître leur grande spécificité et les raisons éventuelles de leur inintelligibilité.

Une première conséquence de cette analyse amènera à proposer un modèle génératif renouvelé des productions signifiantes en acte et en discours. D'autre part, l'analyse proposée dans notre contribution, grâce à l'effort de modélisation accompli, pourra éclairer, de manière beaucoup plus générale et transférable à d'autres phénomènes sémiotiques, les conversions perturbantes reliant les strates successives du modèle généra-

tif, conversions inattendues, voire “court-circuitantes” qui nous permettent de rendre compte des effets de mécompréhension visibles à la surface comportementale.

Je n’ai plus aucun espoir pour l’avenir de notre pays si la jeunesse aujourd’hui prend le commandement demain. Parce que cette jeunesse est insupportable, sans retenue, simplement terrible... Notre monde atteint un stade critique. Les enfants n’écoutent plus leurs parents. La fin du monde ne peut être loin.
(Hésiode, *Les travaux et les jours*, 720 avant J.-C.)

L’inintelligibilité immédiate caractérise de très nombreux objets sémiotiques: littéraires (ainsi la poésie hermétique – Gongora, Mallarmé – est un genre à soi tout seul), plastiques (l’art contemporain propose régulièrement ses compositions énigmatiques), musicaux, etc.

Dans tous ces cas, l’intelligibilité peut être un gain non négligeable de la description et de l’analyse sémiotiques, dans la mesure même où la sémiotique entend mettre au jour *l’engendrement de la signification* au sein de ces objets.

Le parcours génératif ainsi élaboré pourra faire apparaître non seulement les strates successives de cette génération du sens mais aussi les dispositifs responsables de l’inintelligibilité régnant à la surface observable pour le spectateur/lecteur de l’objet.

On se souvient ici de cette œuvre majeure qui ouvrit le XX^{ème} siècle, la *Traumdeutung* de Freud, où celui-ci montre que le niveau *manifeste* du rêve, incohérent et inintelligible, est le produit d’opérations de déplacement et de condensation à partir du niveau *latent* constitué d’idées parfaitement claires, immédiatement comprises. C’est donc pour tromper la censure de la conscience que ces idées limpides sont transformées en images extravagantes appelant une analyse qui reconstitue le parcours de la signification onirique: le rêve, nous dit Freud, est un *rébus*.

Retenons pour notre part que l’inintelligibilité est un effet sémiotique de surface qui n’hypothèque en rien l’intelligibilité potentielle du parcours génératif sous-jacent. Nous partirons ici d’un fait banal, quasi quotidien, à savoir l’incompréhension qui semble très souvent s’attacher aux comportements des adolescents, à la fois pour les adultes qui en tentent la lecture

interprétative et pour les adolescents eux-mêmes, bien démunis quand on leur pose la question de la signification de ce qu'ils font et/ou disent.

La *psychosémiotique* entend s'attacher à de tels comportements énigmatiques (constitués de séquences d'actions accompagnées d'effets passionnels et, éventuellement, de discours verbaux). Dans la mesure même où ces comportements peuvent mettre en danger la santé, voire la vie même des adolescents, une analyse sémiotique aboutie pourrait alimenter de manière efficace une politique de prévention de ces actes incompris.

Ainsi, contrairement à l'éthologie ou à la psychologie, qui partagent toutes deux le comportement comme objet, la psychosémiotique cherche à modéliser l'engendrement de la signification comportementale et non à en désigner les causes. La *causalité* est donc remplacée par la *conversion* rendant compte du passage d'un niveau génératif à un autre.

La psychosémiotique accorde, suivant en cela la leçon de la phénoménologie, une importance très grande au corps considéré comme *instance de base* du processus d'énonciation verbale et non verbale. Et elle recherche la théorisation de l'articulation entre le corporel et le psychique, au sens où Freud parlait de *réalité psychique*, se séparant par là et de la médecine et de la psychologie.

1. L'adolescence et la double mutation

L'adolescence est une période de la vie humaine caractérisée par la mutation brutale et incontrôlée du corps (la croissance, non linéaire entraîne une dysharmonie de la transformation, avec des paliers et des accélérations quelquefois fulgurantes). Cette mutation corporelle, bien visible, s'accompagne d'une mutation psychique invisible mais tout aussi radicale, avec l'apparition d'affects inédits, le réveil de fantasmes typiques, l'avènement de processus cognitifs nouveaux.

Ce que nous voudrions précisément montrer, à partir de l'exemple privilégié des comportements et discours adolescents, c'est la spécificité des relations que l'éthosémiotique entrevoit, avec l'aide déterminante de la psychanalyse, entre le niveau *a quo*, celui du corps et du psychique en mutation, et le niveau ultime, *ad quem*, des significations manifestées, réalisées dans les discours verbaux et non verbaux – souvent peu intelligibles – que les adolescents nous donnent à voir et entendre.

Nous ne pourrions nous attarder longuement sur la mutation de l'instance de base, le corps, non-spécialiste que nous sommes du processus physiologique de la puberté, d'une extrême complexité et comportant encore de larges zones inexplorées. Nous relèverons toutefois que la révolution qui touche le corps, le rendant sexuellement mature et propre à la procréation, est unique dans l'existence humaine: période, donc, d'exceptionnel intérêt pour travailler les relations corps/productions sémiotiques. Nous apparaît également pertinente, pour la première et la dernière fois dans l'existence de l'individu, la discontinuité du processus de croissance, tant au niveau des décharges hormonales elles-mêmes qu'à celui, par exemple, de la poussée staturo-pondérale (un adolescent peut grandir de quelque 12cm en moins d'une année). La puberté, enfin, produit des effets corporels invisibles et d'autres bien visibles, morphologiques, épidermiques, spectaculaires: ainsi la discontinuité, voire le déséquilibre, de la croissance des membres par rapport au tronc peut produire, on le sait, de curieuses silhouettes transitoires.

Si nous quittons le corps proprement dit pour l'espace psychique, nous rencontrons chez l'adolescent la survenue imprévisible – et souvent détachée des situations effectivement vécues – de bouffées émotionnelles à la fois intenses et inédites, ce qui accroît d'autant leur caractère indicible. Il faudra revenir sur ce problème, aigu à l'adolescence, de la grande difficulté à mettre en discours verbal les affects, les émotions.

D'autre part, il est largement admis que le temps de l'adolescence, psychiquement (mais le lien à la transformation pubertaire est évident) est un temps de quête d'identité sur fond de deuil à faire d'une identité à perdre: celle qui se soutenait du corps et du psychisme de l'enfant. Visant, donc, la construction d'un modèle éthosémiotique des comportements et discours adolescents, notre hypothèse centrale est double: (1) sur le plan de la forme même du modèle, il ne peut s'agir que d'une stratification de niveaux, depuis le niveau de base constitué à la fois par le corps et le psychisme (au sens de la "réalité psychique" freudienne) jusqu'au niveau de surface où se perçoivent les productions sémiotiques non verbales et verbales; les relations entre niveaux superposés – de la profondeur à la surface – ne sont pas des relations de causalité, mais de conversion sémiotique. (2) Sur le plan du contenu modélisable, les niveaux basiques seront donc constitués et du corps et du psychisme, deux entités dont l'articulation restera à définir, constituants qu'ils sont de l'instance d'énonciation. Les niveaux supérieurs

du modèle devront faire apparaître la distribution des “choix” sémiotiques adolescents entre la sphère du verbal et/ou celle du non verbal.

Le modèle devrait permettre la formalisation de l'*engendrement spécifique de la signification* chez l'adolescent, tout en respectant l'infinité des styles individuels et socioculturels possibles. S'y donneraient à lire aussi les aléas, troubles voire pathologies de cet engendrement de signification, selon, par exemple, le court-circuitage de tel ou tel niveau ou bien encore les perturbations de conversion sémiotique entre niveaux: la relative indécidabilité des affects illustrerait ce dernier point.

2. *L'articulation sémiotique corps/psychisme*

Dans la perspective éthosémiotique qui est la nôtre, un premier problème à résoudre réside dans la nécessité d'articuler *corps* et *réalité psychique*, lesquels constituent ce que nous avons appelé l'instance de base de l'énonciation verbale et non verbale du sujet. Si ces entités, on l'a rappelé, sont engagées toutes deux dans un processus de transformation (avec abandon, donc, de la forme et du contenu antérieurs), elles n'en sont pas moins redoutablement hétérogènes, et toute hypothèse d'articulation entre les deux prend le risque de revenir à une étiologie biologique du psychisme et, au-delà, du comportement. Or on sait que la recherche des substrats physiologiques du comportement constitue un trait nodal de l'éthologie, science dont l'éthosémiotique entend se distinguer avec netteté.

C'est ici la psychanalyse qui nous offre l'élégante solution de ce premier problème, avec le concept décisif de fantasme qui permit à Freud, dès 1897, d'abandonner sa théorie initiale de la séduction et de poser simultanément l'existence d'une “réalité psychique”: tournant décisif de la naissance de la psychanalyse. Reconnaissons ici notre dette à l'égard de la lecture pénétrante et si suggestive que P.-L. Assoun (1997) fait de Freud dans le premier tome de *Corps et Symptôme* (la Clinique du corps).

Freud, dans les textes allégués par l'auteur, s'interroge sur les relations entre le symptôme organique (que la médecine réduirait à la maladie organique), les transformations introduites dans le corps à cette occasion et l'écllosion de la névrose, “objet de déni et signe d'impuissance pour la médecine” (34). “Il arrive assez fréquemment que, chez des personnes qui sont disposées à la névrose, sans souffrir précisément d'une névrose déclarée, une transformation corporelle (*Körperveränderung*) – par inflam-

mation ou lésion – éveille le travail du symptôme, de telle sorte que ce symptôme donné par la réalité se fait le représentant de tous ces fantasmes inconscients qui guettent l’occasion de s’approprier un moyen d’expression” (35).

P.-L. Assoun commente: “L’événement du corps organique produit donc l’éveil du symptôme qui ‘sommeillait’. On se souvient de l’image des chiens qui dorment: c’est ici l’événement organique qui produit le déclic et fait sortir la névrose de sa torpeur” (1997: 36). Plus loin: “La maladie (d’organe) fait la névrose, comme l’occasion fait le larron – et le bénéficiaire, ici, c’est le fantasme, dont le commanditaire n’est autre que le ‘désir’ (*Wunsch*)!” (37) Mais comment, nous objectera-t-on, passer d’une analyse de ce que Ferenczi dénommait justement “pathonévrose” à l’éthosémiotique du comportement adolescent, sans tomber dans une injustifiable pathologisation de la période adolescente, en suggérant quelque “névrose de croissance”?

Nous pouvons tout d’abord répondre que pour Freud la névrose, bien plus qu’une pathologie, est une forme d’existence psychique. Puis que s’il n’y a point, à l’adolescence, de lésion, d’inflammation, de déchirure corporelle, interprétées comme “effet de castration réel” (37), il y a bien nécessité d’assumer une perte irrémédiable, celle du corps infantile, d’accueillir et de faire sien un nouveau corps : “... quelque chose de ‘neuf’ qui arrive au corps doit être régulé, qui mérite une position originale, entre ‘névrose de transfert’ et ‘névrose narcissique’”, ajoute Assoun (38).

Ainsi nous sentons-nous autorisé à faire fonds sur l’analyse freudienne de ce drame à trois personnages (le(s) fantasme(s), les symptômes organiques, le travail du symptôme) pour penser la relation fondamentale entre le corps adolescent en transformation et la réalité psychique en l’espèce du *fantasme*, lequel trouve dans la mutation corporelle un plan d’expression inespéré. Et le sémioticien ne peut qu’être sensible

- à la survenue d’une mise en relation dramatique entre ces instances organique et psychique du sujet, sorte de médiation homogénéisante;
- à l’avènement de la sémosis: le fantasme “aux aguets” est une sorte de contenu dépourvu d’expression, une entité sémiotique mutilée et condamnée à l’existence virtuelle. Le fantasme accèdera à la réalisation sémiotique pleine quand, à l’occasion d’une expression corporelle à saisir, il pourra constituer ce tout sémiotique de la névrose.

Freud, rappelle Assoun, se réfère de manière très générique aux fantasmes, sans rien dire de leur contenu. Ne pourrait-on, chez l'adolescent, entrevoir quelque fantasme récurrent s'étant emparé du corps en transformation pour advenir à l'existence sémiotique?

N'oubliant pas la leçon de Freud, qui confère au fantasme une existence transversale (de l'ordre de l'inconscient, du préconscient et du conscient), nous avons rencontré chez l'adolescent, au cours de notre expérience clinique, de multiples manifestations d'un fantasme que nous avons dénommé, "fantasme d'auto-engendrement". Ces manifestations, on le verra, se donnent tant sous les espèces de l'acte que du dire, du non verbal que du verbal, tant la période de l'adolescence est, à nos yeux, un temps où s'impose la prégnance de l'alternative agir/dire.

Le *fantasme d'auto-engendrement* peut donc tout autant constituer la base générative (au sens sémiotique du terme) d'une conduite à risques que d'un écrit auto-biographique intime. Mais le fantasme, encore une fois, doit l'activation de son existence au corps en mutation, dans le permanent "devenir autre". D'où la quête d'identité adolescente qui nous apparaît comme un effort considérable d'assomption, voire de maîtrise des transformations (corporelles, perceptives, émotionnelles, affectives, cognitives, etc.) qui adviennent au sujet.

3. *De l'usage d'un tel modèle*

Il reste à donner quelques brefs exemples de l'opérativité de ce modèle en construction dans la quête de l'intelligibilité des comportements et discours adolescents. On a saisi que l'instance d'énonciation du sujet adolescent est instable, du fait même de la mutation corporelle, de la survenue imprévisible d'affects inédits, des tentatives d'assomption psychique (plus ou moins efficaces) du devenir si peu contrôlable du sujet.

Si l'on accepte l'importance et la pertinence du fantasme d'auto-engendrement chez l'adolescent trouvant expression dans la mutation pubertaire, on peut comprendre, par exemple, certaines conduites à risques de l'adolescent comme un essai de réalisation de la séquence fantasmatique où le couple parental serait détrôné, déposé pour permettre enfin, comme l'écrit une adolescente, "de se faire nêtre (sic)" (Darrault-Harris 1988). La prise de risque mortel constitue une séquence d'actes sur ce point exemplaire: ainsi, par exemple, les adolescents héroïnomanes s'injectaient-ils

quelquefois sciemment une overdose pour la reprendre immédiatement dans la seringue (jeu de la “tirette”): “je me tue, je me ramène à la vie”: on prend ainsi le risque de se tuer pour se donner naissance, pour en quelque sorte “réinitialiser” son existence. Et le franchissement, en mobylette, la nuit, d’un feu rouge, sans lumière ni casque, est un scénario figurativement différent mais syntaxiquement identique.¹ Dans l’un et l’autre cas, le “coup de fouet” de la réinitialisation aura un effet de courte durée et la répétition, en escalade (même en linguistique la synonymie est impossible!), imposera sa loi. Et bien des tentatives de suicide chez l’adolescent nous apparaissent-elles comme la conséquence du désespoir de l’auto-engendrement réalisé: si présider définitivement à sa naissance est impossible, en revanche, mettre fin à son existence est à la portée de tout un chacun.

4. Une autre voie

Fort heureusement, on le sait bien, l’immense majorité des adolescents ne se tourne pas vers l’acte à haut risque pour tenter une impossible résolution de la programmation fantasmatique.²

Il est très frappant que constater, aujourd’hui plus que jamais, que l’adolescence est bien une période de redécouverte de l’écriture sous toutes ses formes, y compris celles que permettent les nouvelles technologies de communication. Ainsi, pour commencer, le goût de se donner une signature, cet idéogramme exprimant toute l’identité, acte d’énonciation quasi sans énoncé qui peut revêtir la forme murale des tags. Passion, aussi, pour l’épistolaire dans ses mutations actuelles: SMS, courriels, interventions dans les forums sur Internet, etc. Et toujours ce goût de l’écrit intime, qui explose littéralement dans la création des blogs, nouveau genre qui permet d’ailleurs de cumuler autobiographie et épistolaire en mobilisant une communication multimédia.

Il existe donc, fort heureusement, un autre parcours possible, une autre *conversion* sémiotique du fantasme d’auto-engendrement, radicalement distincte. C’est bien là que nous plaçons ce phénomène de l’intérêt assez subit et original que porte l’adolescent à l’écriture, ou, pour être plus précis, au discours autobiographique. C’est la découverte de la fonction « miroir » de l’écriture qui fascine l’adolescent, non le miroir bien réel qui lui renvoie les éruptions acnéiques démoralisantes, mais le miroir symbo-

lique qui, comme dans les contes, est un témoin narcissique fiable, euphoriquement déformant.

Si l'on y regarde de plus près, le discours auto-biographique permet à l'adolescent(e) de réaliser symboliquement ce que lui dicte dangereusement le fantasme, si d'aventure s'impose le passage à l'acte: l'énonciateur adolescent, dans l'écrit intime (ou l'oral intime de la si longue conversation téléphonique avec un pair proche³) projette un "je" dont il est le responsable de l'existence, qui est lui-même mais aussi, comme nous l'a appris Rimbaud, un « autre ». Belle dérive symbolique du fantasme accompagnée, cette fois-ci, d'apaisement et de résolution.

Aussi pensons-nous depuis longtemps que l'ouverture à l'écriture, pour les adolescents en difficulté de quête d'identité, dans la tentation de l'acte, est une voie de remarquable résolution, ainsi dans les ateliers d'écriture qui leur sont proposés ici ou là, dans les quartiers difficiles, les foyers, voire l'univers carcéral.⁴

Mais il est aussi patent qu'entre la voie de la conversion sémiotique du fantasme dans le passage à l'acte plein de risques (se mettre en échec scolaire fait partie de cet itinéraire de conversion) et celle qui conduit du fantasme aux pratiques d'écriture existent de multiples formes intermédiaires, transitoires, l'adolescent ayant le génie de se situer, souvent, dans l'entre-deux indécidable.

Ainsi le corps peut-il être lui-même considéré comme une surface d'inscription: tatouages, piercings, scarifications, traces, signes réversibles ou indélébiles seraient les indices d'une écriture qui impose au corps la marque d'une maîtrise, voire d'un asservissement: faire sien ce corps qui mue et quitte l'ancienne enveloppe infantile. Illusion du contrôle d'un corps qui tente de s'échapper de toutes parts.

De l'écriture sur soi au *tag*, il n'y a qu'un pas: le tag est bien toujours, nous l'indiquions, une forme de signature répétée en frises – signe logogrammique que recherche typiquement l'adolescent et qui le dirait tout entier: le tag conjoint l'acte symbolique d'écriture et l'acte presque toujours délictueux, risqué, voire dangereux; le tag ne dit rien du monde ni même du sujet: c'est la trace d'une quête de pure énonciation. Du tag éventuellement rageur, il est aisé de passer à l'*injure*, "taggage verbal" de l'autre, justement *acte de langage* (qui peut aussi constituer un délit) conjoignant magnifiquement le *dire* et l'*agir*.

Ces formes sémiotiques intermédiaires (et tout particulièrement les pratiques d’“écriture” sur son propre corps) sont autant d’exemples du phénomène – pour nous central à l’adolescence – de conversion sémiotique d’une parole souvent impossible en acte d’ostension à l’aide du corps: ponctuation emphatique du piercing, qui souligne les entrées sensorielles du corps (oreilles, yeux, nez, lèvres,...) mais aussi souvent le nombril, par où la vie fœtale entra.

Pour rester dans la sphère du langage et l’illustrer quelque peu, si le linguiste est sensible à l’extrême rareté des moyens d’expression linguistique des affects dans les sociolectes des jeunes – et tout particulièrement en Français Contemporain des Cités (cf. Goudaillier 2001) – il est attentif, a contrario, à la créativité langagière des adolescents, cette créativité étant pour nous un phénomène, là encore, de conversion ultime du fantasme d’auto-engendrement: le sujet qui s’est symboliquement fait lui-même (le self-made man n’est-il pas toujours le grand mythe américain, adolescent, de la réussite?) se doit de se forger un idiome qui dit son identité irréductible aux signifiants de la langue adulte.

Et l’accélération de la mutation corporelle, de la croissance peut se lire convertie dans une extrême accélération du temps de la langue, de la *diachronie*: il faut des décennies, voire un bon siècle pour qu’un mot entre dans la langue, y vive et en sorte pour rejoindre le cimetière des mots, les dictionnaires historiques. Une trouvaille adolescente une verlanisation (dégage de là! > gagedédale!), une expression soumise à l’apocope (“un demtroche” < “démoulé trop chaud”), une métaphore (une fille attractive est peut-être encore, à l’heure où nous écrivons, un “saumon”; on connaissait un “thon”, tout juste le contraire) ont une durée de vie très limitée, au grand désespoir des adultes, condamnés à ne réutiliser qu’une langue adolescente déjà morte!

5. Pour conclure

En résumé, tout se passe donc comme si l’adolescent, confronté à la fois à la révolution corporelle de la puberté et à la transformation psychique du “pubertaire”, vivait aussi et nécessairement une importante perturbation de la production de signification verbale et non verbale supposant des déséquilibres, des lacunes, des impossibilités, des court-circuits, des processus de compensation et de conversion.

Et ce sont bien ces conversions subtiles, inattendues, du corps et du psychisme qu'il faut retrouver dans les comportements et les discours des adolescents au terme du parcours sémiotique souvent inédit, complexe, de leur engendrement.

Cette recherche d'une modélisation comportementale – trop rapidement esquissée – appuyée, de manière forte, sur la psychanalyse, doit à l'évidence servir la lecture, la compréhension des productions sémiotiques multiformes des adolescents. Cette quête prend un sens particulier dans une actualité politique et médiatique souvent entachée de démission sémiotique: à quoi bon perdre son temps à tenter de comprendre l'insupportable, donc l'incompréhensible, ainsi la violence considérée a priori comme dépourvue de sens? Alors qu'il est si simple et rapide et efficace d'organiser répression et punition, en sacrifiant la quête du sens?

Moyennant quoi les adultes se mettent dans l'impossibilité de penser, de concevoir et de mettre en œuvre tant la *prévention*, par exemple, des conduites à risques que la juste *sanction* des actes transgressifs.

Notre psychosémiotique, modestement, entend lutter efficacement contre cette démission sémiotique et rappeler au monde des adultes ce devoir imprescriptible de réception et de lecture des faits, gestes et discours adolescents. Ce devoir de sémiotisation est la condition même de leur admission et intégration dans l'univers de l'adultité.

Annexe

Voici la représentation du *modèle génératif* rendant compte de l'engendrement des significations non verbales et verbales adolescentes, qui met en relief la grande tripartition des "choix sémiotiques": du côté de l'acte, voire du passage à l'acte (tentative de réalisation des fantasmes); du côté, au contraire, de la réalisation symbolique, avec la création des langages adolescents, le goût du discours épistolaire et autobiographique; entre les deux, mêlant l'agir et le dire, la pratique si fréquente de l'injure, y compris dans sa fonction ludique.

Notes

1. Chacun garde en mémoire la séquence du film de N. Ray (avec James Dean), *La fureur de vivre*, où un groupe d'adolescents conduisent des voi-




Diagramme 1.

tures “empruntées” vers un ravin en s'éjectant au dernier moment. L'un d'eux ne peut y parvenir.

2. Il n'est pas inutile de rappeler ici que 80% des adolescents vivent bien leur adolescence, et qu'un très petit nombre, heureusement, présente un tableau réellement psychopathologique.
3. Signe des temps, les adolescents ont abandonné cette pratique de la communication téléphonique interminable pour se tourner vers la communication écrite des SMS ou des interventions via Internet.
4. Nous avons pu mener une réflexion et recueillir une expérience sur les ateliers d'écriture destinés aux adolescents, y compris dans les établissements scolaires, grâce à la collaboration d'écrivains profondément engagés dans cette démarche: François Bon, Jacques Séréna, Valère Novarina.

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Fabio De Leonardis

Erasing the signs of the Other: Zionism and the Palestinians

In a passage in Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* the protagonist, Marlow, recalls his early childhood passion for maps, tracing it back to his vocation for travel: "At that time there were many blank spaces on the earth, and when I saw one that looked particularly inviting on a map (but they all looked like that) I would put my finger on it and say, When I grow up I will go there." (Conrad 1998: 142)

This paradigmatic image pictures iconically the way colonial discourse forms. Colonial discourse would provide the European imperialistic expansion with an ideological and moral legitimation through the myth of the civilizing mission, a myth all the more necessary inasmuch as, in Marlow's words again, "the conquest of the earth ... is not a pretty thing ... What redeems is the idea only" (ibid.: 141–142). Here it is clearly shown how, in order to allow European conquerors to take possession of those lands and "make them exist" through an act of "baptism" (Calefato 2006: 14), it was first necessary to construe them as "blank spaces" and erase the signs inscribed on them by the peoples inhabiting them. Here I shall analyze how signs of the Other were erased in a quite peculiar form of colonialism: Zionism.

That Zionism is a form of colonialism has always been maintained by its main victims, the Palestinians. For the past twenty years, though, this assertion has been confirmed by a new generation of Israeli scholars widely known as "new historians" (Shlaim 1995). Despite that, even now the hegemonic discourse among Western intellectuals and public opinion refuses – sometimes rabidly – to equate Zionism with colonialism. An exemplary epitome of this hegemonic discourse and of the grand narrative which constitutes the Zionist mythology is Jacob Tsur's *L'épopée du sionisme* (the title itself is quite eloquent). Tsur states that not only is Zionism "the Jewish people's movement of national liberation" and that "it constitutes an inte-

gral part of the wider historic process of the emancipation of the nations” (Tsur 1977: 9), but even that “theirs was one of the first rebellions staged against Western imperialism” (14).

Zionism’s colonialistic character has been quite evident ever since the beginning. The “back to Zion” idea indeed was primarily conceived in the chancelleries of Europe’s Great Powers. Napoléon Bonaparte was the first to propose, during his Egyptian Campaign, to settle Jews in Palestine (Weinstock 1970: 39), a project which would later be revived by Alphonse Lamartine and by Ernest Laharanne, Napoleon III’s personal assistant. In the mid-nineteenth century the “back to Zion” idea gained some following also in Britain, where its main proponents were George Eliot and leading politicians such as Henry Palmerston, Benjamin Disraeli and Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, who in 1854 coined the famous slogan “A people without a land for a land without a people”.

In Eastern Europe’s Jewish communities the foundations of Jewish nationalism were laid by two rabbis, Yehuda Alkalai from Bosnia (1798–1878) and Zvi Hirsch Kalischer from Lithuania (1795–1874). Inspired by the national revival of the Balkan peoples, Alkalai and Kalischer conceived the idea – by then quite weird to most of the Jews themselves – that Jewry was a nation, and that in order to anticipate the Messiah’s coming they had to buy land in Palestine and settle there *en masse*. However, an accomplished elaboration of Jewish nationalism had to wait until the 1860s, when a German journalist, Moses Hess (1812–1875), wrote the pamphlets *Rome and Jerusalem: The Last National Question* and *A Colonization Project for the Holy Land*. In Hess’s opinion, hatred of the Jews would prevent their assimilation by European societies, thus the “Jewish question” had to be faced as an unsolved national question, whose only solution would be the establishment of a Jewish State in the Middle East. Such a state – he argued – would prove useful to the European powers, favouring their interests and helping to spread “civilization” in the “barbarous” East. Already in these first theorists’ thinking, then, the Jewish “national revival” was considered viable only through a form of colonization overseas, seen as part and parcel of Europe’s imperial expansion.

The ideas exposed by these early Zionists remained without consequence, however, until the pressure of Russian antisemitism gave them new life. Following the assassination of Alexander II in 1881, rumours spread that Russian Jews were responsible for the killing, fuelling a whole

series of bloody pogroms that plagued many Russian Jewish communities and ended up in atrocious massacres. The czarist authorities encouraged this bloodshed, using Jews as scapegoats for the appalling conditions of Russian masses. Shocked by these tragic events, the Russian surgeon Leib Pinsker wrote in 1882 the pamphlet *Self-emancipation: A Warning to His Folk by a Russian Jew*, wherein he invited his coreligionists to colonize a “Promised Land” and rebuild their nation there. If most of the Russian Jews preferred to emigrate to America or to the British dominions, that same year hundreds of them took seriously Pinsker’s warning and moved to Palestine, where they bought some land and established the first Zionist settlements. Zionism would have probably remained a minority movement of no consequence had it not been for the Austrian journalist Theodor Herzl. Herzl wrote in 1896 the pamphlet *Der Judenstaat*, where he appropriated the idea that Jews were a nation and proposed as a solution to the problem of antisemitism that all Israelites moved to an overseas territory and established there a State of the Jews. From a theoretical point of view Herzl simply repeated Hess’s ideas; the novelty of his contribution was that he elaborated a detailed political strategy based on the *realpolitik* of his time to implement his plans. Herzl saw his project as part and parcel of Europe’s colonial expansion, and he thought that the European Powers would have all the best reasons to favour the establishment of such a State in the Middle East: “We should there form a portion of the rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism” (Herzl 1936: 30). The first settlers to be sent there would be members of the lower classes, as the “poorest strata alone form the strongest human material for acquiring a land” (ibid.: 57), and the masses would be mobilized by the myth of the “return to Zion”. As Herzl wrote in his diary: “If my conception is not translated into reality, at least out of my activity can come a novel. Title: the promised land” (Herzl 1960, vol. I: 3). In 1897 Herzl gathered in Basle the first Zionist Congress, which founded the World Zionist Organization (WZO) and took as its aim the establishment of a Jewish settlement in Palestine. Herzl then began lobbying the European governments to get their support for his project.

In those years, Zionism appropriated Lord Shaftesbury’s slogan “a people without a land for a land without a people”. Reality, however, was quite different. Palestine at the time was inhabited by more than half a million Arabs (mostly Sunni Muslims, but there were also Christian, Jewish

and Druze minorities), 4/5 of whom were peasants living in small villages. After 1858, when an Ottoman reform had introduced private property of land, capitalistic relations of production had gradually taken over the ancient semifeudal regime of production, turning many tenant *fellahin* into hired labourers. Towards the end of the nineteenth century the opening up to foreign markets had brought about an exponential growth of trade, so that in a short span of time subsistence agriculture gave way to export-oriented production, and the increase of demand in turn fuelled the agricultural production and the expansion of cultivated land. Thus, besides developing as a major crossroads for the trade of raw materials coming from Asia, Palestine became a crop supplier for Europe. Far from being an “a thinly populated province of the Ottoman Empire, sadly neglected and backward” (Tsur 1977: 31), as Tsur depicted it drawing on the traditional orientalist stereotypes, Palestine was a country in full economic flourishing, with a developing commercial and agrarian bourgeoisie. In the Arab regions of the Ottoman Empire those developments were at the origin of an Arab cultural and political renaissance which paved the way for the rising of early Arab nationalism (Pappé 2004: 14–49).

Herzl was not unaware that Palestine was inhabited by Arabs. He simply considered them irrelevant, in the same way as European conquerors in Africa saw that continent as made up of “blank spaces”. In order to write the epic of the Jews’ return to the Promised Land, it was first necessary to erase the Palestinian Arabs, to ignore deliberately their presence, so that that land which had been presented as empty could really become so. In his personal diaries Herzl explicitly wrote that Zionism could not succeed without the dispossession and expulsion of the local population: they had to “expropriate gently ... spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit country, while denying it any employment in our country” (Herzl 1960, vol. I: 88).

Several Zionist settlers did indeed arrive in Palestine with the conviction that it was an empty land (Morris 2001: 42–43), and for many of them the discovery that the truth was rather different had a shocking effect. Soon some exponents of the so-called “culturalist” current sharply criticized this attitude (this movement was the only one not aimed at establishing a State but rather at the revival of a “cultural homeland” for Jews). One of them, Ascher Ginzburg, debunked the orientalist image of Palestine propagated by the likes of Herzl: “We abroad are used to believing that Erez Yisrael is

now almost totally desolate, a desert that is not sowed ... But in truth that is not the case. Throughout the country it is difficult to find fields that are not sowed. Only sandy dunes and stony mountains are not cultivated.” (Ginzburg, quoted in Morris 2001: 42)

But such warnings could not be accepted by other Zionists, for they would have had to disclaim the whole premises of their project, which rested – in Edward Said’s words – on the erasing of a concrete reality in favour of a future aspiration (Said 1992: 9). Hence, ever since the beginning the relations between the early Zionist settlers and the local population took the form of a power relation between colonizers and colonized. Frantz Fanon explained, in his *Les Damnés de la terre*, that the colonial world is “un monde manichéiste” in which “le colon fait du colonisé une quintessence du mal” (Fanon 1976: 10). And indeed, in the diaries and letters of the early settlers Arabs are described as “a people in the process of degeneration” (Ginzburg, in Morris 2001: 43), a “hypocritical and false race” (ibid.), a “semi-savage people, which has extremely primitive concepts” (ibid.). “Parfois” – Fanon continued – “ce manichéisme va jusqu’au bout de sa logique et déshumanise le colonisé. A proprement parler, il l’animalise. Et, de fait, le langage du colon quand il parle du colonisé, est un langage zoologique” (Fanon 1976: 11). In the first Zionist settlements indeed the colonisers used to call Arab hired labourers “mules” (Morris 2001: 48), and Ginzburg remarked how the settlers’ attitude towards the tenants was “exactly the same as towards their animals” (quoted in Morris 2001: 48). The orientalist prejudice was mirrored also by their representations of the country; Herzl, for example, described Jerusalem as a heap of “musty deposits of two thousand years of *inhumanity*, intolerance and uncleanness” (Herzl 1960, vol. II: 745, my emphasis), and Chaim Weizmann, who succeeded him as leader of the WZO, depicted the country as come “one of the most neglected corners of the miserably neglected Turkish Empire” (quoted in Said 1992: 85).

As Said remarked (2003: 307), in the Zionist version of Orientalism there takes place a bifurcation of the myth of a consistent, static “Orient”, such that European Jews, once considered of that same “Orient”, now construed themselves as assimilated to the “West”, assuming its position of dominant epistemological subject and leaving to the Arabs the role of “Orientals”, incapable of development and a passive object of knowledge and dominance. Construing the Arabs as uncivilized barbarians and Pales-

tine as a desert waiting for redemption allowed Zionist settlers to perceive themselves as the redeemers of the Land of Israel and the representatives of a superior civilization fully engaged in a civilizing mission. It is revealing that Tsur proudly vindicates this assumption, maintaining that the settlers “bringing with them experience and knowledge acquired during their long generations of exile in Europe, dreamed of making these benefits accessible to their neighbors” (Tsur 1977: 86). In this perspective, as David J. Goldberg remarks, “the white man’s colonial burden and the Jewish mission coincide” (Goldberg 1996: 78).

An analysis of the material bases of colonization also confirms the colonialist character of the Zionist settlement. Gershon Shafir (1996) has shown how the peculiar features of Zionism were simply the result of the particular conditions of its development, and that there were no qualitative differences in comparison with other forms of colonialism. This evolution developed in three different stages. In the early settlements the colonists were not supported by any Power, and the only way for them to acquire land was by purchase. The Zionists’ goal was to install huge Jewish masses in the country, i.e. to establish a “pure settlement colony” (Shafir 1996: 86), a colonial pattern wherein the natives are excluded from the settlers’ society and the labour market. This pattern, however, soon had to be abandoned, as the early agricultural settlements proved economically inviable: the settlers’ enterprises were simply unable to compete with the Arabs, whose salaries were quite lower than those of Jewish immigrant labourers. Initially funded by Rothschild, the first period’s settlements evolved towards the “ethnic plantation colony” pattern (Shafir 1996: 84), wherein a numerically limited settlers’ population owns the land and employs a low-waged native workforce. The problem of these kinds of settlement was that they would never attract huge masses of colonists. A solution was found in circumventing the market through the creation of exclusively Jewish settlements run by a collective of colonists (*kibbutzim* and *moshavim*); these would create the conditions allowing masses of Jewish workers to immigrate to Palestine and gain access to a totally separate labour market which would be protected from the competition of Arab workers. This state of affairs was legitimized by the ideology of the Jewish “conquest of labour”. But such a pattern of colonization required huge funds: since 1909 the WZO had supplied them, in a sort of national pact where Jewish proletarians took the burden of doing the job of colonization while bourgeois

Zionists provided the funding and the diplomatic support. Such were the socio-economical bases of the intensive development of Zionist colonization, which after 1917 could take off thanks to the support of Britain, which meanwhile had laid its hands on the country.

Despite the separate development policy, however, *the pure settlement colony* pattern could not fully succeed, since only a part of the settlers were engaged in *kibbutzim*, and Jews remained a minority throughout the Mandate period. Hence the Arab workforce continued to be employed, at least partially, by Jewish enterprises until 1948. The result was an *ethnic plantation colony* whose aspiration was to evolve into a *pure settlement colony*. As a consequence, the Zionist leadership policy towards Palestinians wavered between ignoring them, thus negating their existence as a people, and considering them “natives” that at most could be recognized as subaltern partners. Here again Fanon’s words are illuminating: “Le peuple colonisé se trouve alors réduit à un ensemble d’individus qui ne tirent leur fondement que de la présence du colonisateur” (Fanon 1976: 215). Precisely this collective depersonalization was the Zionist policy towards Arab Palestinians. The 1917 Balfour Declaration, which rendered official British support to the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, fully endorsed these premises, for it did not recognize any political rights of Palestinian Arabs, guaranteeing only the respect of their civil and religious rights. It is worth highlighting that the political dispossession of Palestinian Arabs went along with their complete linguistic erasure; in the Declaration they were even denied a name; by then 93% of the local population, they were defined as “the non-Jewish communities in Palestine” (Balfour 1928: 19). Several Zionist leaders’ official declarations imply such a depersonalization/erasure of Palestinian Arabs. In 1918 Chaim Weizmann stated that “the present state of affairs would necessarily tend towards the creation of an Arab Palestine *if there were an Arab people in Palestine*” (quoted in Said 1992: 27, my emphasis); Ber Borochov, one of the founders of Labour Zionism, wrote in 1906 that “Palestine’s native inhabitants do not constitute an independent economic and cultural type ... [they] are not one nation” (quoted in Goldberg 1996: 132). In the early Mandate years, though, since the settlers’ community was still far from being numerically relevant, the political attitude that prevailed in the Zionist leadership (at the epoch hegemonized by the so-called “General Zionists”) was that of negotiating with the official Palestinian leadership, but allowing them only a subaltern

status. Indeed, according to a witness, in the 1921 official meeting between Weizmann and Jerusalem's mayor, Musa Qasim al-Husayni, the president of the WZO spoke to the latter as "a conqueror handing to beaten foes the conditions of peace" (Morris 2001: 105). In the following years, however, things changed for the worse, following the considerable demographic strengthening of the settlers' community and the conquest of hegemony over the *yishuv* by Labour Zionists, who were the main advocates of Jewish exclusivism and who rejected direct negotiations with Palestinian Arabs in order not to recognize them as a national community. The very few (confidential) contacts between Labour Zionists and Palestinian notables took the form of sharply asymmetrical power relations, consisting mainly in the corruption of politicians and journalists so that the latter softened their hard stance towards Zionism. The Zionist Right's (the so-called "Revisionists") attitude towards Palestinians was based on the same premises. Its founder and leader Zeev Žabotinskij also espoused the civilizing mission: "We are going to Palestine first of all for our nation's sake, and secondly *to expunge systematically* any trace of the 'Oriental soul' still existing there" (quoted in Gresh 2004: 43, my translation and emphasis). However, he also acknowledged that in Palestine there existed another nationalist movement whose claims were legitimate, thus justifying the "moral superiority" of Zionist claims on the basis of racial theories (Goldberg 1996: 181). His conclusion was that Zionism would have to assert its claims with massive colonization and with the force of arms: "in blood and fire Judea will arise", was his movement's slogan.

Colonization, especially after the endorsement of the "conquest of labour" policy, implied the eviction of the Arab tenants living on the lands bought by the settlers, and consequently their transformation into hired labourers or their emigration to towns, where they would join the unskilled, low-waged workforce. Palestinian *fellahin* realised from the start that the Zionist endeavour would lead to their dispossession, and they immediately showed deep hostility towards the newcomers. In the 1920s the pro-Zionist policy of the British administration and the arrival of tens of thousands of new settlers put in jeopardy the landless *fellahin* (about 30% of the whole). This situation sparked a whole series of peasant uprisings (in 1920, 1921, 1929, 1933 and most of all in 1936–39) whose political and economic goals were totally silenced by the Zionist leadership, which in public tended to minimize the scope of the revolts and to ascribe

them to religious fanaticism, to the action of a handful of agitators or to a presumed innate irrationality of Palestinian peasantry. In Jacob Tsur's paradigmatic account their motive was "intractable hostility" and a "virulent anti-Zionism" (Tsur 1977: 54), and they were not deemed determined by any political or economic causes. In short, as in the tritest Orientalist tradition, Arabs were shown as irrational and prey to ancestral impulses. The process of erasing the signs of the Other passed through a systematic process of emptying his/her signs of all meaning.

The culmination of this process of erasure was the 1948 *Nakba*, the expulsion of 800,000 Palestinian Arabs by Zionist militias during the civil war and the First Arab-Israeli War (see Morris 2004; and Pappé 2004: 123–241). In blood and fire, the slogan "a land without a people for a people without a land" had become a reality.

In his 1882 lecture *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?* Ernest Renan showed how all the factors that from Herder onwards had been proposed as the foundations of a nation – race, language, culture, religion, geography – were not by themselves either necessary or sufficient. On the contrary, he acknowledged that nations were something historical and dynamic, the output of the interaction between "la possession en commun d'un riche legs de souvenirs" (Renan 1882: 11) and "le consentement, le désir clairement exprimé de continuer la vie commune" (ibid.). Jews were not a nation in a cultural, linguistic or geographical sense; but the Zionist movement, elaborating the myth of the return of Jews from the Exile to the Promised Land, turned the Diaspora's vicissitudes and biblical events into the narrative of a nation, giving it material reality through colonization and British support. Anti-Jewish persecutions in Europe and the Shoah served to exhort many Jews, who otherwise would have never considered moving to Palestine, the "consentement" to become Zionists, and the long war of 1947–49 provided the new-born nation "le capital social sur lequel on assied une idée nationale": "un passé héroïque, des grands hommes, de la gloire". Palestine, in the Zionist mythology now sanctioned by the State's ideological apparatuses, was a desert that Jews had made blossom and brought back to History, in perfect accord with a classical colonialist tradition: "le colon fait l'histoire. Sa vie est une épopée, une odyssée. Il est le commencement absolu" (Fanon 1976: 17). The founding myths of the State of Israel fit pretty well Roland Barthes's definition of myth as "*parole dépolitisée ...*, [qui] ne nie pas les choses simplement, il les purifie, les innocente, les fonde

en nature et en éternité” (Barthes 1970: 217). All narratives are necessarily based on ellipsis, and the narration of a nation is no exception. As cleverly stated by Renan, “l’oubli ... et même l’erreur historique, sont un facteur essentiel de la création d’une nation” (Renan 1882: 4). Palestine became a palimpsest from which the previous narration had to be erased so that the myth of the return of the Jews to the Promised Land could be written. On the other side of the coin, it was denied that the expulsion of 800,000 Palestinian Arabs had ever taken place; their flight was attributed either to elusive orders from Arab leaders or to the population’s “spontaneous” will. The numerous massacres committed by Zionist armed groups were not to be talked about – the Deir Yassin massacre being the sole exception, since it had been perpetrated by the opposition militiamen. Part and parcel of erasing the signs (and the bodies) of the Other was the razing of about 370 Arab villages and of entire neighborhoods, so that on their ruins the settlements destined to lodge new Jewish immigrants could be built. The destruction of villages went along with a renaming of all Israeli-controlled Palestine’s toponyms: the country’s place names were “Judaized”. This process of erasing took place also in the legal system, especially in the two juridical pillars of the State of Israel: the Law of Return (1950) and the Law on Nationality (1952). The first granted citizenship to all Jews (and their consorts) who “returned” to Israel; the latter, which established the procedure to gain citizenship, defined the Palestinians still living within the country’s borders *a negativo*, as “those who are not included among the beneficiaries of the Law of Return”. In order to expropriate the land owned by Palestinians a complex juridical system was set up, wherein stood out the Law on Absentees’ Property (1950). This law stated that whoever had not registered in the course of the October-November 1948 census (i.e. almost all the refugees) was to be considered an “absentee”, whose land could be confiscated. If an “absentee” happened to return, he/she was to be considered a “clandestine”, and as such was liable to immediate expulsion. Yet some refugees remained within Israel’s frontiers. To prevent their return home a special oxymoronic definition was coined: they were labelled “*present* absentees”, thus allowing the army to prevent by force their return home and judicial authorities to confiscate their lands (Kimmerling-Migdal 2003: 172–173). Put under military rule until 1966, with their freedom of movement strictly limited, they were confined to reserved areas, in practice becoming “invisible”. Even today, although they number

more than a million, they are not recognized as a national minority. In short, Palestinians became the perturbing element, the stifling of which allowed the Jewish State to present itself as the legitimate result of the long struggle of a national liberation movement.

In his re-reading/actualization of Renan through the prism of psychoanalysis and deconstructionism, Homi Bhabha (1990a) has shown how those who have been marginalized or dispossessed by the narrative of the nation can reappear to disrupt its apparent solidity, creeping into the interstices which inevitably open on its surface. The illusion of having ultimately cancelled Palestinians from history fell apart in the mid-1960s, when the emergence of guerrilla organizations and the founding of the PLO marked their unexpected reappearance. Like Banquo's ghost, they had come back to disturb the sleep of the State that had dispossessed them.

After the 1967 War, when the conquest of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank put under Israeli control more than a million Palestinians, the Zionist leadership again had to face the old dilemma about what kind of colonial pattern to develop. The answer was a mixed one. In order to prevent the 1948 refugees from returning home (the dread of an influx of hordes of colonized has always been a traditional nightmare of colonizers: "cette démographie galopante, ces masses hystériques, ces visages d'où tout humanité a fui", wrote Fanon [1976: 11]) the Occupied Territories, apart from East Jerusalem, were not annexed, but transformed into a protected market to draw on low-waged workforce. The juridical regimes were differentiated: Israel remained a *pure settlement colony*; the Occupied Territories became an *ethnic plantation colony*. New colonizers, prompted by religious messianism, began to settle the newly-conquered lands. To continue ignoring the Palestinians was no longer possible. However blatantly Golda Meir could maintain that Palestinians "did not exist" (quoted in Hirst 2003: 392), her statements were disproved in those same years by the attacks and hijackings of the *fidā'iyyun*, whose faces masked with balaclava helmets or *kefiyah* embodied "the *unheimlich* terror ... of the Other" (Bhabha 1990b: 2); these opposed the materiality of their bodies to any renewed effort of foreclosing on them. The traditional Zionist policy of erasing the Other then took the form of moral delegitimation (the rhetoric on "terror") and of the effort to eliminate physically the PLO, first in the Gaza Strip, in the West Bank and in Jordan in the 1967–70 period and then in Lebanon in 1982. In the mid-1970s, having restored the colonial order in Gaza and the

West Bank, for a brief moment Israel could try again the strategy of co-opting a subaltern local leadership; but the project failed, and the Likud, in power from 1977 onwards, began using the settlers as an instrument to control the Occupied Territories. In 1987, when the Intifada began, the efforts to erase the Palestinians were once again frustrated. The young boys whose sole weapons were a sling and a stone were a sign that Israeli soldiers were able to interpret only through the “terrorist” stereotype, and the consequence was an incredibly violent repression wherein the self-evident asymmetry in power relations shocked the entire world and put seriously into crisis the traditional Zionist discourse. Many soldiers from the reserve refused to serve in the Occupied Territories, and gradually the State’s founding myths (and, in part, Zionism itself) ended up being put into question: it was in this new climate there emerged the “new historians”. Within the ruling class, however, the rethinking of Zionism was fairly limited. The Right clung to the refusal of any concession or negotiation, since it could think of the Other only as absent or non-human; in 1988, for instance, the Likud PM Yitzhak Shamir declared that Palestinians had to be “crushed as grasshoppers ... [and] smashed against the boulders and walls” (quoted in Hirst 2003: 78). But in 1992, Labour’s victory and the subsequent Oslo “peace process” seemed to mark the emergence of a new attitude, apparently based on dialogue and on the assumption of a point of view closer to that of the Palestinians. This new attitude, however, was not based on a rethinking of Zionism’s colonialistic premises, but simply on a strategic revision. Rabin, Peres and later Barak (and also Netanyahu, in his brief interlude) recognized Palestinians as partners in negotiations, but only on a subaltern status: their claims and rights were subordinated to the military, economic and political needs of Israel. Technically, there occurred only a shift from direct control of the Territories to indirect control (see Kimmerling-Migdal 2003: 355–397; Pappé 2004: 243 and following). The limits of such an attitude brutally came to light in 2000, when the Camp David Summit failed and a second Intifada, much bloodier than the previous one, burst out. Since then Barak, and then Sharon and Olmert, have turned again to the old strategy of erasing and dehumanizing the Other. In 2002 the IDF Chief of Staff General Moshe Ya’alon compared Palestinians to a cancer, adding that although “some will say it is necessary to amputate organs”, at the moment he was just “applying chemotherapy” (quoted in Kimmerling 2006: 165). That same year, MK Rafael Eitan pub-

licly described Palestinians as “cockroaches” (quoted in Hirst 2003: 71). Once again, Palestinians either are not human or they do not exist. “There is no one to talk to” has been the catchphrase of recent years, and the several “peace initiatives” which have been proposed have all been based on an asymmetrical definition of reciprocal relations which was even sharper than in the Oslo process. This policy of erasing the Other has also meant more and more ruthless repression. The Israeli governments have continued with a policy of intensive colonization of the Occupied Territories, and have added to that the construction of a wall that will enclose the Palestinian population in tiny *bantustans* planned to stop any aspiration to self-determination and to neutralize the “demographic threat” posed by their high birth-rate. But even these extreme forms of erasing must surrender before the materiality of the Other. An effective solution of the conflict will be possible only by a rethinking of the premises of Zionism, thus making it possible to think of the Other not in terms of absence, but in terms of his/her irreducible, material presence.

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Ledia Dema

Fragmentation discursive et communication littéraire

Comme ce titre l'indique, je souhaite traiter de la communication littéraire et de quelques spécificités de son fonctionnement dans le cas des discours fragmentés. Il convient de souligner que le morcellement discursif peut être envisagé sous différentes perspectives, selon le domaine d'application que l'on adopte. Ainsi, peut-il être considéré comme un phénomène de communication: c'est le cas en narratologie, où le narrateur détient toute l'information et la fait circuler parmi les autres instances, mais la fragmentation discursive peut également faire partie d'un processus de coopération textuelle dans la construction de la signification globale du texte (en sémiotique). Dans ce cas, elle peut être vue comme une "stratégie" de coopération entre l'énonciateur et l'énonciataire d'une œuvre littéraire, car, "il se noue entre le lecteur et le texte une série de relations complexes, de stratégies singulières qui, le plus souvent modifient sensiblement la nature même de l'écrit originaire" (Eco 2004). Dans cette perspective, il s'agit d'examiner la signification de l'organisation discursive du texte dans son rapport à l'instance de l'énonciation. Je souligne que nous sommes ici dans la sémiologie de la signification. Le sens rentre dans un jeu de coopération entre les deux pôles énonciateurs, ce qui peut nous amener à concevoir l'hypothèse selon laquelle l'énonciataire est pris dans des opérations corrélatives à celles de l'énonciateur dans le processus de la construction discursive. Selon L. Panier auquel je me réfère, les textes "sont traversés par l'histoire de leur rédaction qui est tout à la fois celle de leur réception".

Il est clair que, dans mon optique, je dissocie l'instance de l'énonciation de celle de la communication. Si l'énonciation constitue "le cadre implicite et logiquement présumé par l'existence de l'énoncé", l'énonciateur est le destinataire implicite de l'énonciation; il est différent du narrateur, qui, lui, est un actant obtenu par la procédure de débrayage et installé explicitement dans le discours. De même, l'énonciataire correspond au destinataire

implicite de l'énonciation à la différence du narrataire qui est reconnaissable à l'intérieur de l'énoncé. Comme le soulignent les auteurs du DRTL, auxquels je me réfère, "ainsi compris, l'énonciataire n'est pas seulement le destinataire de la communication, mais aussi le sujet producteur du discours, la 'lecture' étant un acte de signifier au même titre que la production du discours proprement dite." En me situant du côté de la réception du texte, je m'interroge donc, sur la manière dont la structuration de l'œuvre (en l'occurrence sa forme morcelée qui présuppose une instance d'énonciation qui se diffracte) contient en germe des postures ou des places à occuper par le lecteur. On peut se demander quelle intensité de coopération postule alors cet éclatement du texte et quels effets de sens produit sur lui une forme, à première vue, chaotique. Enfin, on peut s'interroger sur la façon dont le texte convoque le lecteur à contribuer à l'émergence de la signification. Afin de répondre à ces questions, il faut tout d'abord avoir en vue quelques propriétés de ce que j'appelle un discours fragmenté et le lien qu'il entretient avec l'acte d'énonciation.

Tout texte est, en effet, le produit d'une énonciation qui constitue un acte de structuration du sens. Du moment où il manifeste une signification articulée et mise en discours, le texte témoigne d'un acte d'énonciation. Dans le cas des discours fragmentés, on assiste à une rupture de l'homogénéité énonciative, et par là, à une diffraction et à une position complexe de l'énonciateur. Ainsi, peut-on reconnaître certains observables de la fragmentation comme des collages, des simulacres de coupures, des passages en italiques, des changements de narrateur, des micro récits introduits au sein d'un récit global, des chapitres sans noms ou d'autres formes, plus ou moins complexes, qui créent une hétérogénéité énonciative. Toutes ces marques apparentes de la fragmentation du discours, qu'elles soient ou non manifestées d'un changement typographique, dans les macro éléments d'un discours (division en parties, chapitres ou d'autres formes plus atypiques) renvoient dans leur fonctionnement à des phénomènes de narration que l'on retrouve sous le nom de changements de points de vue, de mise en perspective, de focalisation etc. Or ces ruptures qui peuvent être de différents types: discours rapportés, formes de polyphonie, d'intertextualité, intrusions de morceaux de discours appartenant à une autre temporalité ou à un autre genre, etc., contribuent à construire des effets de sens les plus divers pour l'énonciataire. Elles forment des failles dans le discours et entraînent des changements de types de saisies pour le lecteur

par le montage des figures qu'elles suggèrent. Si l'on regarde du côté de la production, relevant des procédures de la textualisation, ces différents choix se rapportent à l'énonciateur et à l'organisation syntagmatique des programmes narratifs qu'il est obligé de faire, compte tenu des contraintes de la linéarisation des structures narratives. Notamment, la programmation textuelle (disposition des programmes narratifs) et la programmation temporelle (mise en ordre chronologique des divers programmes) relèvent d'une intervention de l'énonciateur et de sa compétence discursive. Elles laissent cependant une marge stratégique dans l'organisation du discours, grâce à l'élasticité de celui-ci. Dans le cas des discours éclatés qui m'intéressent, ces deux procédures, auxquelles on peut également rattacher l'anaphorisation, sont largement exploitées. Aussi bien la programmation textuelle que celle temporelle créent des effets de sens les plus divers chez le lecteur tout en l'interpellant, en le convoquant à établir des liens, à faire des interprétations entre les différents segments de texte qui se dessinent et les figures qu'ils mettent en place. Car ces ruptures créent en même temps une segmentation du texte par le découpage et leur mise en discours. Elles présupposent donc une division préalable du texte en segments ou entités provisoires. Parfois celles-ci constituent des entités à part entière, parfois elles se combinent entre elles en créant des entités plus larges entre lesquelles le lecteur est convoqué à établir des relations pour faire émerger un tout de signification ou discours, au sens donné à ce terme par Jacques Geninasca (1997). D'après cet auteur notamment, le discours est la prise en charge, la saisie/construction qu'effectue l'instance énonciative à partir de l'objet textuel. L'actualisation de certaines virtualités de cet objet et l'organisation discursive que l'énonciataire fait par l'acte de lecture permettent l'émergence d'un ensemble signifiant. Une telle conception du discours a aussi des répercussions sur la communication littéraire. Celle-ci "n'a rien à voir avec la transmission de messages, elle présuppose, en revanche, de la part de l'auteur-lecteur et du lecteur-auteur, l'exercice d'une stratégie de cohérence en même temps que l'expérience d'une cohésion perceptive, ou [...] sensible." La cohérence discursive proprement dite est, d'après Geninasca, davantage "une question d'interprétation qu'une question formelle." En d'autres termes, la signification d'un discours "est tout entière dans l'acte d'énonciation" (Geninasca 1997: 93-94), la composante de l'énonciation étant ici prise du côté du lecteur. Car, en effet, chaque lecture correspond à un parcours interprétatif aux étapes définies: procédure

de découpage; établissement de l'organisation textuelle; interprétation sémantique des relations spatiales; et enfin, instauration des relations propres à la structure discursive (ibid.: 15, 16). Ces considérations qui ont une validité sur le fonctionnement général du discours, sont également valables dans le cas des discours morcelés. Dans ceux-ci, l'effet d'énonciation produit est différent à cause de la fragmentation du discours. De ce fait, les différentes formes de découpages qui présupposent des formes d'agencement des figures constituent un dispositif relationnel préalable à toute interprétation, et fonctionnent comme des propositions de segmentation du tout en parties, d'une part, et d'articulation de ces parties, d'autre part. Tout en déroutant le lecteur, la fragmentation l'amène cependant à trouver une cohérence de sens, à adopter une saisie sémantique au détriment et/ou à côté d'une saisie molaire. Rappelons que la saisie molaire "s'arrête aux grandeurs constituées que définit un savoir associatif, socio-culturel ou idiolectal: figures, configurations, parcours figuratifs d'une sémiotique du monde naturel, concepts, ensembles conceptuels" et la saisie sémantique, "concerne les virtualités relationnelles des propriétés de ces grandeurs" (ibid.: 59). En d'autres termes, par les corrélations sémantiques que le lecteur doit établir à partir de la morphologie textuelle entre différents pôles d'énonciation et des ensembles de figures qu'ils mettent en place, on peut émettre l'hypothèse que la mise en discours des textes morcelés guide le lecteur vers un autre système de sens, non pas linéaire, mais textuel. Par exemple, cela peut amener le lecteur à voir dans les disjonctions et conjonctions successives que provoque la mise en discours des différents découpages un principe paradigmatique d'organisation narrative. Si nous partons du postulat qu'à chaque point du syntagme se profile un paradigme possible, nous pouvons reconnaître dans les différents découpages des projections de paradigmes dans le syntagme, mélangeant par conséquent différentes strates de temps, d'espaces, d'acteurs. Afin d'illustrer ces différents points, nous avons choisi d'analyser un extrait tiré d'un roman d'Ismail Kadaré, auteur contemporain albanais. Il s'agit de *Vie, jeu et mort* de Lul Mazrek (2002).

L'organisation narrative et temporelle de ce roman est intéressante. Des effets de sens sont produits par la mise en place de deux temporalités qui suggèrent une lecture du roman aussi bien diégétique que sémantique. Le découpage, lié à des positions énonciatives diverses, met en place trois formes principales de narration. À partir de l'actualisation des relations

entre ces trois entités, *Vie jeu et mort de Lul Mazrek* met en place l'histoire d'un procès, et par là, l'affrontement d'un certain nombre de Discours et de systèmes de valeurs. En effet, par le recours à des procédés d'intertextualité et des procès énonciatifs mis en scène, l'organisation du texte global permet de percevoir une dimension dialogique qui confronte des voix relevant de divers Discours: ainsi, peut-on reconnaître le Discours officiel du régime communiste, celui de la démocratie naissante et celui mythique, inscrit dans le savoir commun. La lecture paradigmatique à laquelle invite l'organisation textuelle, permet de mieux faire sortir l'incompatibilité de ces Discours.

Les trois formes principales de narration que l'on y trouve concernent tout d'abord un premier récit, chronologique, qui raconte l'existence d'un jeune homme, L. Mazrek, qui rêve de devenir acteur. Pris dans un laps de temps comprenant l'échec de son rêve (pas reçu au concours de l'École d'Art dramatique) et son nouveau statut de soldat (affecté à accomplir son service militaire dans les gardes-frontières), le récit principal raconte donc sa vie, entremêlé à celle d'une jeune fille, V. Morina, et à celle du ministre chargé de la Police secrète en Albanie communiste. Ce récit va prendre des allures d'énigme, de mystère, même si le titre indique déjà comment l'histoire se termine. Le titre raconte, en effet, en raccourci, l'existence de son héros. Ainsi, la fin du récit est dite avant que le récit lui-même ait commencé. Par conséquent, tout intérêt anecdotique est éliminé: le roman se joue dans le remplissage vie-mort et n'est qu'une inscription d'écart et d'énigmes qui ne détruisent pas la certitude de la boucle thématique qui enserré l'ensemble. L'attention est ainsi déplacée vers le deuxième terme de ce triptyque: le jeu. En effet, face à une situation "aussi criante que lourde de conséquences", devant laquelle l'État albanais, le Ministre, le Bureau politique et jusqu'au Guide suprême s'inquiètent: le nombre d'évasions ne cesse d'augmenter – on fera appel à l'acteur. Mazrek devra jouer un rôle de tragédie, son propre rôle, celui que lui-même ose à peine s'avouer. Il est placé au cœur du triangle entre les éléments duquel va se jouer le drame: l'homme, la femme et l'État. Ce dernier est perplexe: doit-il présenter l'évasion comme une faute pardonnable, ou, au contraire, doit-il montrer les dents? Le nœud est là: "Le tout est de savoir quel camp parviendra à décourager l'autre." Lequel gagnera: les fuyards ou l'État? De cette tension entre les deux, surgiront les moyens les plus absurdes, les plus inimaginables: radars, femmes, chiens, jusqu'à folie extrême: travestir le crime ... en

spectacle théâtral. Mais cela ne ressemble-il pas à du déjà vu? “Un cadavre qu’on traîne et des habitants qui le contemplant.” C’était déjà dans l’Iliade des Grecs. Exhiber les cadavres pour faire cesser les évasions, voilà la solution que l’État communiste trouve en réponse aux tentatives des jeunes de quitter le pays, et c’est ce rôle-là que Mazrek devra jouer, sous les yeux de la femme qu’il aime. Tel est le sujet, syntagmatiquement parlant, de ce premier récit.

Or ces crimes travestis en spectacle théâtral, ne vont être élucidés que grâce à un deuxième récit, imbriqué au premier. Logiquement postérieur au programme narratif principal que nous venons de voir, – il raconte le procès qui a lieu dix ans après –, ce deuxième récit n’apparaît pourtant pas dans la même ligne chronologique que le premier. En effet, le roman oppose clairement des espaces de temps disjoints: celui “d’avant” la chute de la dictature auquel appartiennent la plupart des événements du récit principal, répartis en treize chapitres intitulés et celui “d’après” la chute du système auquel se rapportent les “extraits d’instruction ultérieure”, introduits de façon non régulière, mais au fur et à mesure que l’intrigue principale avance. Ces morceaux rompent la chronologie du récit global en introduisant des ruptures dans la narration. La programmation temporelle qui dispose les divers programmes narratifs sur la ligne temporelle selon la catégorie antériorité/postériorité n’est pas suivie ici car nous n’avons pas une représentation chronologique de l’organisation narrative. En ce qui concerne la relation entre les deux récits, il est important de souligner le rôle de sanction que le second joue par rapport au premier en termes de schéma narratif. Ce récit sanctionne les épreuves qui ont lieu dans le récit principal en les qualifiant notamment de “crime contre l’humanité”.

Ensuite, de par les nouveaux éléments qu’il apporte, il joue un rôle déterminant à l’élucidation de l’énigme pour le lecteur. Ce deuxième récit, introduit comme nous l’avons dit plus haut au fur et à mesure que l’intrigue avance, entretient la curiosité, ralentit le rythme, et apporte des témoignages nécessaires à la compréhension du premier. À cause des ruptures introduites par les extraits de l’instruction ultérieure, l’intrigue elle-même gagne en épaisseur. Nous pouvons reconnaître ici le principe du code herméneutique dont parle Barthes (1974). Selon lui, le code herméneutique “doit disposer dans le flux du discours des retards (chicanes, arrêts, dévoitements); sa structure est essentiellement réactive, car il oppose à l’avancée inéluctable du langage un jeu échelonné d’arrêts: c’est, entre la question et

la réponse, tout un espace dilatoire, dont l’emblème pourrait être la ‘réticence’, cette figure rhétorique qui interrompt la phrase, la suspend et la dévie.)” Libérés de la pure succession chronologique qui aurait dû voir se succéder l’ “après” à l’ “avant”, les événements sont donc rapprochés différemment. La valeur du roman réside notamment dans la manière suivant laquelle s’assemble en sa totalité le matériau des événements. Une combinatoire s’opère qui détruit la chronologie de la fiction. En ce qui concerne la narration de ces deux premiers récits, nous pouvons souligner quelques différences: le premier récit est fait dans une narration ultérieure par un narrateur hétérodiégétique (cf. terminologie définie par Génette). Racontant à la troisième personne, il prend en charge ouvertement presque l’ensemble du récit. En revanche, les “extraits d’instruction ultérieure” d’où le narrateur principal est absent, apparaissent comme des récits à la première personne, assumés directement par les actants eux-mêmes. Dans le roman, ils apparaissent notamment dans les chapitres IV, VI, VII, VIII, XII. Ces passages sont notés en italiques et sont clairement indiqués comme émanant de l’instruction.

Une troisième forme apparaît au chapitre IX qui occupe une place à part. Constitué lui-même de trois parties intitulées: Le chœur des ombres, Hector, Komos: Pour une lamentation commune avec les touristes. Ce fragment est cependant singulier et n’apparaît qu’une seule fois dans le roman. Il est clair qu’il appartient à une autre temporalité que celle diégétique du récit principal. On peut attribuer ces fragments à un autre énonciateur, délégué, qui appartient à un récit différent: celui de l’Iliade. Ce n’est pas une citation mais un extrait de mythe qui s’introduit et fait partie de la structure discursive du récit global. On y trouve l’utilisation de la première personne du pluriel (Nous-les ombres) et la première personne du singulier (Je-Hector). On ne peut cependant que s’interroger sur le statut de ces éléments figuratifs qui appartiennent à un discours mythique. À quel titre sont-ils convoqués et quel type de rapport entretient ce discours avec le reste du récit? En effet, une deuxième temporalité se profile si l’on tient compte du rapprochement dans le texte de deux blocs discursifs appartenant aux extrémités de l’axe temporel: l’Antiquité; chapitre IX, et les temps modernes, ceux-ci étant divisés en deux périodes avec un intervalle de dix ans au milieu. Cette forme d’intertextualité que constitue le chapitre IX, et qui consiste dans la convocation d’un récit mythique au sein d’un autre récit, contribue à construire donc un autre type de temporel-

lité qui n'est plus une opposition avant vs après mais passé vs présent. Elle permet en même temps une saisie sémantique du discours. En effet, tout au long du récit se fait sentir en filigrane une superposition parfois partielle, parfois complète de deux histoires: celle du récit principal et une autre, qui relève du mythe et qui est inscrite dans le savoir commun ou l'Encyclopédie dont parle Eco. Si l'on s'interroge sur le type de relation qu'on peut établir entre ces deux récits, on peut constater que sur le plan figuratif, une certaine relation de "continuité" et d'analogie est supposée par le Discours officiel vis-à-vis du récit principal. Continuité de l'espace: dans le texte, Butrint, lieu du récit principal ne serait "rien autre qu'une reproduction de Troie." Continuité également des acteurs: "ses tout premiers habitants avaient été des Troyens en fuite: Andromaque, par exemple, la femme d'Hector, parmi des centaines d'autres." Et enfin, une analogie de l'action elle-même: un cadavre qu'on traîne et des habitants qui le contemplent. Or cette prétendue relation de similitude qui légitimerait le programme narratif du récit premier: travestir le crime en spectacle théâtral au nom d'une "tradition" qui remonterait depuis l'Antiquité, est par deux fois niée: d'abord dans l'extrait de l'instruction ultérieure. Ensuite, par le chœur des ombres et Hector. Sous forme d'un témoignage directement assumé, l'opération de dénégation porte sur le statut attribué à tort par le Discours officiel aux figures du récit mythique: "Nous pouvons être tout ce que vous voulez, sauf une chose: celle que vous imaginez. Nous n'avons jamais quitté Troie. Vous nous prenez pour des Troyens en fuite? Jamais il n'y en eut." À Hector ensuite de démentir à son tour et de rétablir la vérité en utilisant la première personne.

On peut retenir que la convocation d'une autre temporalité hétérogène à celle du récit principal et de l'Iliade comme figure de valeur par le Discours officiel cherche à avoir une valeur de légitimation visant à le placer dans une continuité mythique qui rendrait légitime sa ligne d'action. Or, la convocation de cette même figure par l'énonciateur global produit l'effet l'inverse: une rupture et toute négation d'une quelconque continuité.

En conclusion de notre analyse, on peut dire que l'organisation discursive du récit global, dépendante comme on vient de le voir, de la corrélation établie entre ces trois configurations par l'acte énonciatif: d'une part, celle chronologique racontant l'histoire de L. Mazrek, d'autre part, celle fragmentée racontant le procès des faits qui ont lieu dans ce récit principal, enfin une configuration singulière, faite d'une mise en scène

d'instances énonciatives appartenant à un récit mythique, permet de faire dialoguer trois Discours: celui officiel du communisme, celui de la démocratie naissante et celui mythique, ancré dans le savoir commun. On ne peut que constater que le concours des voix s'installe ici sous le signe de la discordance. Il se développe dans le sens de l'exclusion, par disqualification de l'un des discours (celui officiel du communisme). De l'autre côté, s'agissant cette fois non de jugement mais de reconnaissance, car il n'est toutefois pas d'objet de valeur sans un acte de reconnaissance et de valorisation, une stèle commémorative où est inscrit: La Patrie affligée à ses filles et fils infortunées se rajoute au kommos pour une lamentation commune intemporelle réunissant ainsi le discours mythique et celui de la démocratie naissante.

La signification est, par définition, relationnelle. Aussi ai-je essayé d'en établir quelques-unes, assez au moins, je l'espère, pour comprendre que, face aux tentatives d'altération des mythes, mémoire commune à toute l'humanité, aux déformations que l'humanité fait subir à l'histoire et qui témoignent des mensonges dont le régime communiste s'est servi comme alibi pour justifier ses crimes, la voix de la vérité se fait entendre. Venant de la profondeur des siècles, elle ne résonne que plus fort plus. En conclusion, nous pouvons affirmer encore une fois que la fragmentation discursive, loin d'être uniquement un phénomène de communication, crée des entités de discours capables de faire émerger une cohérence de sens.

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Maria Giulia Dondero

Rhétorique de l'image dans le discours scientifique

1. Introduction

L'enquête sur l'image scientifique me semble très décisive aujourd'hui pour ceux qui visent à se mesurer à des enjeux théoriques et méthodologiques tels l'étude des pratiques productives des textes. La sémiotique des images de tradition greimassienne s'est passée pour un long moment de l'analyse de la *production des textes* pour analyser, en revanche, *l'image en tant que texte*, c.-à-d. en tant que *système* de relations chromatiques, eidétiques et topologiques. La sémiotique greimassienne ne prenant pas en compte la technique de production de l'image, voire le médium et donc le *support* des formes, a étudié les textes photographiques sans faire trop de différences par rapport aux textes picturaux (voir Fontanille 2004; et Basso Fossali & Dondero 2006). Dans les dernières années la sémiotique de tradition gréimassienne a dépassé cette approche et a commencé à enraciner l'analyse des images dans leur contexte et dans leur histoire de production. En effet, pour analyser les images scientifiques on doit forcément partir de leur situation de production et de la diachronie de leur genèse. Les images dans le discours scientifique doivent être étudiées à l'intérieur d'une chaîne de transformations qui vise à construire, étape après étape, une référence. Pour étudier les images scientifiques il serait nécessaire, pour nous les sémioticiens, de suivre toute la chaîne de construction du processus à détecter, comme le font les anthropologues des sciences dans les laboratoires. Comme l'affirme Latour (2001: 78): "La connaissance ce n'est pas explorer, mais *pouvoir revenir sur ses pas* en suivant le chemin que l'on vient de baliser."

De plus, dans le cas de l'image scientifique il est nécessaire de prendre en compte pas seulement la technique et l'histoire de la production, mais aussi les objectifs et les pratiques d'investigation laboratoriale de la

discipline qui les produit. Ce qui est nécessaire si on veut faire une sémiotique du discours scientifique, c'est de considérer les images non comme des *résultats* mais en tant qu'*opérateurs provisoires*, des étapes en succession au cours d'un processus d'investigation qui n'a pas de fin définitive mais différents recueils et alignements de traces et des encadrements qui changent selon les disciplines et les systèmes de pertinence choisis. Ce qui nous intéresse en effet c'est la genèse des images qui génèrent d'autres images, ou d'autres outils de visualisation. Ce n'est jamais une image isolée, l'image scientifique ; l'image isolée on peut la trouver dans les livres des philosophes, ou des vulgarisateurs, mais pas dans un essai scientifique – même si on ne pourrait pas distinguer *à priori* entre images de la vulgarisation et images de la recherche scientifique: il peut s'agir tout à fait des mêmes images, *c'est leur densité d'enchaînement qui change*. C'est sur la correspondance entre modification des paramètres et configuration visuelle qui se joue la vérité de l'image scientifique. La vérité d'une image dépend de réglés de paramétrage, ou mieux encore, la référence se construit à partir *des différentes images qu'on obtient en transformant, d'approximation en approximation, le paramétrage*. On pourrait affirmer, en suivant encore Latour (2001) que "La référence n'est pas ce que l'on désigne du doigt ou ce qui, de l'extérieur, garantit la vérité d'un énoncé, mais ce qui demeure *constant* à travers une série de *transformés*".

2. Analyse des images en astrophysique

Ce que je me propose avec cette recherche c'est d'étudier quelques images des astres en partant de l'ouvrage d'un de plus importants astrophysiciens vivants, Jean-Pierre Luminet, directeur de recherches au CNRS, qui travaille à l'Observatoire de Paris Meudon. Le livre en question s'intitule *Le destin de l'univers* (2006). Ce livre, qu'on peut considérer comme étant un "popular science book" d'un très haut niveau, est intéressant notamment pour son genre discursif hybride. Le genre de cet essai est à considérer comme un compromis réussi entre, d'un côté, l'explication didactique pour des étudiants et, de l'autre, la tentative de développer des études d'avant-garde sur des thématiques que, même les collègues, jugent délicates, comme p. e. les trous noirs et les situations extrêmes de la matière.

Je me propose d'étudier les différentes stratégies de représentation des trous noirs, qui ne possèdent pas encore une iconographie bien établie et

acceptée, et des photos consacrées à la formation et à l'explosion des étoiles qui, au contraire, possèdent une codification représentationnelle fixée depuis longtemps à l'intérieur de la communauté scientifique. Les types d'images et les types d'agencements rhétoriques entre elles qu'on trouve tout au long du livre sont très divers et dépendent principalement des objectifs que ces agencements visent. Ces premières images représentent des phénomènes bien connus et ne posent pas de problèmes de stabilisation iconographique aux astrophysiciens. C'est une série des nébuleuses, astres qui évoluent rapidement et ont une durée de vie très brève, dont la détection à travers différentes longueurs d'ondes visualise leur composition chimique. Leur évolution et leur âge n'ont pas été étudiés seulement à travers leurs compositions chimiques, mais aussi à travers leur vitesses de rotation et leurs diamètres. La stratégie représentationnelle de ces images est bien de rendre "commensurables" de millions d'années, des vitesses de rotation différentes et des transformations chimiques en des rapports




Figure 1. Nébuleuses planétaires.

visuels codifiés. Ces images sont toutes construites sur la base de milliers de photographies qui sont assemblées par le biais d'un système de dispositifs enchaînés qui traduisent des rapports spatio-temporels, des températures et des vitesses en des rapports chromatiques, luministiques, eidétiques et topologiques. Comme on le voit dans cette première image, les nébuleuses planétaires, résidus de gaz éjectés par une petite étoile agonisante, sont les astres les plus spectaculaires; cela est dû justement au fait que leur gaz intercepte le rayonnement émis par la surface incandescente de l'étoile centrale. Ce rayonnement transporte plus d'énergie que la lumière visible, dans ce cas ultraviolet, et ce rayonnement est capable d'*exciter* les atomes de la nébuleuse. Sous le bombardement incessant des photons, les électrons sautent sur des orbites d'énergie supérieur, puis retombent en émettant un rayonnement à la couleur caractéristique: ces parcours et ces sauts sont représentés à travers la fluorescence du gaz. Chaque atome qui constitue ce gaz (hydrogène, carbone, oxygène) absorbe la radiation ultraviolette et la réémet dans d'autres longueurs d'onde dont la couleur est en quelque sorte une signature. En effet, c'est dans les régions internes à la nébuleuse, les plus proches de l'étoile centrale, donc les plus exposées au rayonnement ultraviolet, que l'oxygène et l'azote sont excités et rayonnent dans le vert/bleu. Dans les régions périphériques, le rayonnement ultraviolet est affaibli par l'absorption et ne parvient plus à exciter que l'hydrogène, qui réémet dans la couleur rouge, ici la couleur du refroidissement. On s'aperçoit que *la profondeur spatio-temporelle du ciel est saisissable à travers la mise en image des transformations chimiques*. Plus précisément, en ce qui concerne les couleurs des objets qu'on vise à représenter, elles dépendent des transformations chimiques enregistrées et des longueurs d'ondes affectées. Mais le système de couleurs n'engendre pas un rapport "un à un" avec le système des éléments chimiques. Au contraire, la progression des couleurs dans un spectre du bleu au rouge trouve codification avec les transformations progressives des températures et avec les forces d'excitations des éléments chimiques. Or, la codification n'est jamais fixée entre un élément et une couleur, elle est engendrée par le rapport entre deux transformations sur des échelles, chromatiques et chimiques: une transformation a comme corrélat l'autre. L'hydrogène n'émet pas toujours en rouge; sa couleur dépend de la position relationnelle de l'hydrogène par rapport aux autres éléments concernés et à leurs températures.

On peut avoir aussi d'autres codifications qui p. e. rendent compte des vitesses de rotation; dans le cas de la rotation d'une galaxie le rouge est codifié comme la couleur d'un parcours d'éloignement par rapport au bleu que dans ce cas signifie la "direction la plus proche de nous". La partie d'une galaxie qui est colorée en rouge dans ce système de codage ne peut pas être datée en soi, mais par rapport aux intensités de rotation représentés dans l'image par les configurations topologiques d'autres couleurs. Il apparaît clairement que photographier ici signifie mesurer et aussi dater (en effet l'âge qu'on détermine à travers de calculs dans le domaine de la relativité générale est toujours mise en relation et comparaison avec l'étendue et la dilatation des diamètres des astres qui nous ont été fournies à travers les images – et vice-versa).

On s'aperçoit très vite ainsi qu'il manque un référent visuel à nos images; sur l'image on ne peut pas obtenir de reproduction d'un objet; l'objet est construit par le biais de l'image, où les enregistrements d'émissions et réémissions de rayonnements dans différentes longueurs d'onde témoignent d'une transformation chimique et d'un fonctionnement qui nous permettent de nommer, caractériser et dater un astre.

Pourrait-on encore nommer ces photos des images indicielles, à savoir des images qui stratifient les traces qui les ont constituées, et qui grâce à ces traces deviennent des images "fiabiles"? Oui, bien sûr, mais il faut se rappeler que ces traces ne proviennent pas d'un objet déjà constitué et autonome, mais des filtrages, de démontage, de distribution et de ré-assemblage des processus d'*exploration* et de *réponse* que les images fixent provisoirement. L'indexicalité renvoie donc à une construction qui se fait à travers des processus de démultiplication, distribution et réassemblage de traces diverses.

Dans notre cas, la comparaison et la superposition entre différentes longueurs d'ondes d'émission deviennent un instrument de mesure elles-mêmes; en effet les différentes images captées selon différentes longueurs d'onde s'ajustent dans une même image et forment une *image composite* qui provient de *superpositions de captations* dans différentes longueurs d'onde et sert à visualiser et donc à connaître, reconnaître et à décrire certains fonctionnements que sans elle seront complètement abstraits et sans support. L'image permet aux théories d'être éprouvées, parce qu'elle est produite par des recueils de données qui, grâce à elle, deviennent perceptible et "comparable".

Ces images peuvent montrer – à travers leurs modulations eidétiques, chromatiques, etc. – ce qui va changer au fur et à mesure qu’on manipule les paramètres de détection. Les différentes visualisations croisées, comparées ou superposées, peuvent servir comme instruments de vérification/falsification.

Une autre problématique qu’il me semble intéressant d’aborder est soulevée par l’image de la nébuleuse du Crabe qui pose la question de la *correspondance* entre différentes observations à des moments différents. Le texte de Luminet nous dit que cette image est composée de 24 clichés individuels pris par le télescope spatial Hubble et *superposés* à des clichés du Very Large Telescope de l’ESO au Chili, et qui est donc la plus précise jamais effectuée. La précision et la fiabilité de cette image proviennent paradoxalement du fait qu’elle est un mosaïque qui rassemble des situations différentes (les 24 images de Hubble ont été prises en Octobre 1999, en Janvier 2000, en Décembre 2000 p. e.). Cette image est faite d’une multitude de points de vue différents composés ensemble et superposés, mais tous supposés être des points de vue sur la *même* nébuleuse. Mais on doit bien avouer que la condition de “mêmeté” de cette nébuleuse nous est donnée par l’image elle-même. Elle-même fournit le support et la configu-




Figure 2. Nébuleuse du Crabe.

ration, donc la référence spatiale et temporelle, aux événements divers qui s'assemblent en elle. Comme l'affirme Bordron (2008): "la vérité d'une image n'est pas son accord avec *ce qui est*, mais bien son accord avec *ce qui par elle est fait image*. L'image fournit en effet à *ce qui est* sa condition d'unicité (de 'mêmeté') et, réciproquement, cette unicité ne peut se réaliser que si *ce qui est* devient image".

En ce qui concerne la densité d'enchaînement dont on a parlé au tout début de notre présentation du livre de Luminet, on s'aperçoit que ces images, montrées isolées et abstraites de leur processus de formation, sont enchaînées selon le registre de la vulgarisation (c'est-à-dire pas enchaînées!) et révèlent évidemment des iconographies et des théories bien acceptées dans le domaine. Elles sont présentées dans l'ouvrage de Luminet comme des "images finales" qui interrompent la chaîne de construction de la référence en la fixant.

Les quatre photos du "même" reste de supernova, baptisé Cassiopée A, exemplifient un cas un peu différent. La première est une image prise dans le domaine radio, la deuxième dans celui optique, et les autres deux ont été prises par le télescope *Chandra* aux rayons X. On peut essayer de dater une étoile à partir des relations entre domaines de rayonnement qui la captent; p. e. en ce qui concerne ce reste de supernova, la mesure de sa vitesse d'expansion, captable en radio et en rayons X, permet de calculer qu'elle a dû exploser vers 1680. Une telle explosion devrait laisser un résidu compact de type étoile à neutrons, qui a longtemps été cherchée, en vain, jusqu'à ce que le nouveau télescope X *Chandra* la découvre! On voit bien qu'en changeant de système de détection on arrive à découvrir et/ou à valider des hypothèses, notamment l'explosion que la supernova a subi vers 1680. Cette série d'images qui nous montre diverses étapes du processus de détection rend évident le fait que pour décrire entièrement un processus on doit traduire entre elles toutes les techniques utilisées et tous les différents résultats. Les




Figure 3. Différentes images de Cas A.

domaines de détection fonctionnent comme des *points de vue* et il s'agit donc de trouver les relations entre eux les plus porteuses de sens. Il n'y a pas une astronomie plus puissante que l'autre, chacune a son domaine d'efficacité et le bon domaine on le découvre grâce aux relations entretenues avec les autres domaines. Cette série d'images met en scène le rapport entre les différentes puissances de ces domaines et l'effort progressif pour la détection. Il s'agit ici d'un autre type d'agencement entre images par rapport à celui des premiers deux cas: c'est un agencement qui révèle les ajustements successifs ainsi que, à rebours, les fautes de la détection. Aucune image ne montre l'erreur ou la faiblesse d'une particulière détection: c'est leur mise en succession qui le révèle.

3. *A la recherche d'une iconographie pour les trous noirs*

Tout le système d'agencement d'images change dès qu'on rejoint des objets en train d'être étudiés et dont on cherche à construire une iconographie adéquate. Dans l'ouvrage de Luminet, le système et la typologie des images changent lorsqu'on commence à approcher les sursauts gamma et les trous noirs. Ces images montrent la difficulté du travail de l'astrophysicien: elles ne montrent pas les résultats de la détection, mais les approximations de la recherche. Les agencements entre les images deviennent plus denses et talonnent de près le parcours de l'investigation scientifique. Par exemple, les astrophysiciens ont fait l'hypothèse que les champs gravitationnels très forts dans la formation des trous noirs permettent une grande libération d'énergie dont seulement le domaine gamma pourrait rendre compte. Le problème majeur de l'astronomie gamma est le manque de résolution de ses détecteurs. Pour résoudre cette faiblesse les astrophysiciens consacrés à ces problématiques ont fait l'hypothèse que les sursauts gamma soient suivis d'une émission de lumière dans d'autres longueurs d'onde, un phénomène appelé *rémanence* ou *contrepartie*. En effet, on fait l'hypothèse que, après le cataclysme ayant créé un sursaut, les sources doivent refroidir et devenir visibles d'abord aux rayons X au bout de quelques heures, puis en lumière visible après quelques jours, voire en radio après quelques semaines. Cette image permet la visualisation de la première localisation exacte d'un sursaut gamma aux rayons X. Cette image montre la rémanence du sursaut dans divers domaines de fréquences: le sursaut gamma se produit bien dans le domaine gamma, puis perd son énergie et passe successivement dans le




Figure 4. Première localisation exacte d'un sursaut gamma en rayon x. 27 février 1997.

domaine X, visible et radio. La captation de ces lueurs résiduelles en rayon X permet d'abord de les identifier à des astres précis, puis la mise en œuvre des techniques de la spectrographie dans le domaine optique permet de mesurer le décalage vers le rouge de la lumière émise par les sources lointaines; plus ce décalage (entre le rouge et le bleu/vert) est grand, plus la source est distante et plus le "temps de regard en arrière" est profond. Le rapport entre le bleu et le rouge dans l'image paramétrée montre le temps de refroidissement du sursaut. Cette image montre une véritable cartographie de la sensibilité des différentes longueurs d'ondes à un "même" phénomène. Les sursauts gamma on a pu les considérer comme des sources de mesure et de datation certaines quand les images prises à d'autres longueurs d'onde nous l'ont confirmé.

Dès qu'il s'agit d'expliquer dans les détails la formation d'un trou noir, au tout début, les photos disparaissent. Comme on le voit dans cette image, ce sont les équations de la relativité générale qui permettent de construire des images qui mettent en scène différents points de vue possibles pour explorer l'intérieur d'un trou noir (ici il nous est montré que très près d'un trou noir les concepts d'intérieur et d'extérieur sont inversés en raison de la forte courbure des rayons lumineux). En effet toute explication de ces images est fondée sur des hypothèses sur les rapports entre ondes gravitationnelles et géométrie et toute légende commence avec cette phrase: "Selon la relativité générale...". Il semble impossible de filmer ou de photographier un trou noir puisqu'il ne laisse échapper aucune matière,




Figure 5. Inversion des concepts d'intérieur et d'extérieur très près d'un trou noir.

aucun rayon lumineux. Cependant, un trou noir convenablement éclairé est capable de renvoyer une image grâce aux trajets particuliers suivis par la lumière émise dans son voisinage par une étoile ou par une série d'anneaux matériels en orbite autour de lui. Pour arriver à configurer des iconographies, les spécialistes des trous noirs se sont appuyés non seulement sur les équations de la relativité générale, mais sur des images de quelque chose de bien connu, à savoir les anneaux de Saturne en en calculant les différences en termes de champs de gravitation et de courbure de l'espace-temps. Par rapport aux anneaux symétriques de Saturne, ils ont fait l'hypothèse que la forte courbure de l'espace-temps autour du trou noir manifeste une distorsion importante de l'image du disque. Luminet et son équipe ont donc dû faire du bricolage pour construire une nouvelle iconographie. Cette photo montre schématiquement les contours d'un disque circulaire entourant un trou noir sphérique. Ce qui est étonnant c'est que pour cette figure Luminet ne parle pas du tout de schéma, mais bien au contraire de photographie, d'image "reçue" et "révélatrice" des façons dont les corps, selon leur nature, réagissent aux ondes électromagnétiques. Celle-ci est une image qui représente la dynamique de la formation d'une photographie calculée. Les astronomes considèrent comme des photos non seulement




Figure 6. Distorsions optiques au voisinage d'un trou noir.

les images qui recueillent et mesurent la lumière renvoyée par des astres et traduite enfin en configuration visuelle, mais aussi toute image qui visualise le “recueil” des calculs des équations. Cette figure montre comment des hypothèses sur la géométrie peuvent être traduites en une photo (dans l'image à droite). Entre les deux parties de l'image, au centre, c'est indiqué qu'il y a une plaque photographique. Luminet explique que cette photo “est prise à grande distance”. On s'aperçoit que pour les astrophysiciens, même des expériences de pensée comme celle-ci, peuvent être considérées comme des photos. Enfin Luminet nous montre à nouveau le même résultat dans un autre système projectif, qui est considéré encore une fois une photo. Ces images calculées des trous noirs Luminet les décrit comme : “des photographies calculées point par point dans le cadre de la relativité générale”, et il précise qu'il s'agit d'intégrations numériques les plus exactes possibles.




Figure 7. Apparence lointaine d'un trou noir sphérique entouré d'un disque d'accrétion.

Conclusions

Tout au long de cette étude on a observé différents types d'images et d'agencements rhétoriques entre elles, qui changent en accord avec le niveau plus ou moins expérimental de la recherche. On a pu distinguer:

1) des photos "prototypiques" qui mettent en scène des résultats définitifs et définitoires, présentées "isolées" selon un mode explicatif et didactique. La plupart de ces images sont composites, à savoir des images construites à partir de prises de lumière à des moments différents, qui visent à configurer une mêmeté de l'objet dans le temps;

2) des images en série qui mettent en comparaison les résultats des différents moyens de détection, selon les différentes longueurs d'ondes. Ces images montrent non seulement un objet, mais aussi l'évolution technique d'une discipline, les efforts de la recherche, les parcours construits sur des erreurs et des approximations dont enfin nous sont présentées des possibles solutions. On pourrait affirmer que ces images mettent en scène une *comparaison diachronique* des outils et montrent le développement scientifique comme une suite de problèmes de "production iconographique" à résoudre. On est dans ce cas sur un autre niveau énonciatif par rapport au niveau qu'on vient de décrire dans la première section: il s'agit ici d'un type de communication adressé plus aux collègues qu'à un public élargi. On voit bien que plus on avance dans l'expérimentation, plus on multiplie les images corrélées qui se traduisent l'une l'autre. Dans les articles "pour les collègues", à savoir les comptes-rendus ou les articles "de découverte" les agencements entre différentes images d'un même processus sont encore plus denses.

Dans le volume de Luminet on trouve aussi un autre type d'images, qui ne sont pas agencées entre elles, mais qui diffèrent fortement des images de la première section. Sur ce cas, pour des raisons d'espace, je dois passer très vite (voir Dondero 2007b). C'est le cas des "vues d'artiste", employées très souvent par les astrophysiciens lorsqu'ils doivent expliquer des processus et des fonctionnements des astres qui ne sont pas compréhensibles à travers des images "paramétrées" et "contrôlées" comme celles qu'on a pris en considération jusqu'ici. Pourquoi ils les appellent vues d'artistes?

Si le contrôle de la genèse n'a souvent pas d'importance dans l'image artistique, au contraire l'image scientifique doit être reproductible, justifiée et justifiable. En effet, en partant des distinctions du philosophe Nelson Goodman (1968) entre autographie et allographie j'ai déjà affirmé

(Dondero 2007a) que la photographie artistique est un exemple d'image *autographique* comme c'est le cas du tableau, parce qu'elle ne possède pas une notation, un alphabet de signes, une grammaire, bref, la photo et le tableau ne peuvent pas être "exécutés" et re-exécutés comme c'est le cas, en revanche, de la partition musicale (là on a un alphabet de signes, une notation, des exécutions dont on peut mesurer l'exactitude). Dans le cas de la photo scientifique on a par contre une partition, obtenue par prélèvement et calcul, qu'on doit littéralement *exécuter*. Il existe une contrôlabilité et manipulabilité de l'image scientifique qu'on ne trouve pas dans la photo artistique (en témoignent les pratiques de droits d'auteurs, et l'impossibilité de la moindre modification dans la phase du tirage). La photo scientifique, à travers cette contrôlabilité, se pose de l'autre côté des pratiques de sémantisation de l'image artistique qui joue sur la sacralisation des originaux et sur l'unicité; bien au contraire les pratiques de manipulation de l'image scientifique demandent d'être *partagées, partageables et modifiables*. Il nous semble que les astrophysiciens utilisent les "vues d'artiste" – qu'ici on assimile aux fonctionnements des images artistiques – quand ils sont censés visualiser des phénomènes dont ils ne peuvent pas assurer la manipulabilité et l'articulabilité des propriétés; en effet les vues d'artiste doivent être interprétées comme des "globalités", des blocs fixes *définitifs*. Au contraire, les images scientifiques reçoivent leur efficacité grâce au fait qu'elles peuvent être manipulées transformées, essayées, vérifiées.

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À la recherche d'un temps perdu

Quelques approches sur l'oreille du 21^e. siècle

1. "L'écouteur" de musique

Le 20^e. siècle se caractérise tout d'abord par l'avènement de la schyzophonie (Schafer : 1977), c'est-à-dire, du son écarté de l'espace et du temps de sa production. Il s'agit du son capturé, phonofixé, amplifié, téléphoné (transmis à distance), remodelé (Chion 1994) : du simple enregistrement sonore, on avance vers l'obtention de la haute-fidélité acoustique ; ensuite, à la deuxième moitié du siècle, le son devient portable, en vertu des nouvelles batteries, qui permettent de garder de l'énergie pendant toute une journée. Il fallait ajouter que les plusieurs espèces de médias existants peuvent emmagasiner des informations sonores dans des différents types de support en même temps (le disque noir, le cd etc.). Encore, plus récemment, le support physique habituel – le disque – se subdivise en d'autres formats, de plus en plus minuscules et dont le contenu est devenu quasi "invisible" (ou presque).

Vers la fin du 20^e. siècle, on vérifie une succession des transformations dans le champ technologique, qui se passent dans un temps vertigineux : Dans le cas particulier de la musique, le support matériel "visible" et "tactile" semble disparaître jour après jour. Les gestes qui témoignent le contact direct avec les machines de reproduire de la musique sont devenus assez discrets : l'acte de prendre un disque dans les mains, de le manipuler, de le mettre dans la machine reproductrice (tourne-disque, ordinateur) sont pratiquement éliminés des habitudes quotidiennes. Le fonctionnement se fait par des petites pressions avec un seul doigt. Le rituel de l'écoute n'a

quand même pas disparu, mais la théâtralité des gestes est réduite, sinon, au moins, très distincte.

Par conséquent, l'aura (au sens benjaminien) qui caractérise l'objet matériel (le disque) est sensiblement diluée : Dépourvus du corps qui donne visibilité au média sonore, les nouvelles technologies nous offrent, par contre, d'autres possibilités, comme celle de confectionner l'album soi-même, selon le goût personnel de chacun. (Il faut bien remarquer que, dans ce cas, le projet esthétique de l'auteur ou de l'équipe de production a subi une transformation radicale, pour ne pas perdre sa fonction : Il suffit de rappeler que les jaquettes étaient autrefois un composant très important du produit final : le projet artistique du disque.) Et faire son propre album se traduit, la plupart des fois, par l'acte de capturer des fichiers virtuellement : aujourd'hui une partie considérable des auditeurs de musique s'utilise de l'internet non seulement pour écouter de la musique, mais aussi pour la copier. L'accès aux différents sites et leurs répertoires, appartenant à tous, malgré l'animosité des maisons d'édition de disques. Par conséquent, des nombreux morceaux sont gardés dans l'ordinateur, sans que pour autant ils soient nécessairement écoutés : il y a une disproportion entre le temps de copier et le temps d'écouter de la musique... surtout s'il s'agit d'un ouvrage de longue durée. Il arrive même qu'un fichier soit oublié sans jamais être écouté.

On voudrait également remarquer la prolifération des médias, à tout instant devenues usées et vétustes, remplacées sans cesse par la technologie la plus récente, transforme l'auditeur en "consommateur vorace" : il cherche frénétiquement des nouveaux "hits", qu'il télécharge par Internet. Après avoir fait la copie, généralement en MP3 ou en MP4, de basse définition acoustique, il se promène avec un petit appareil, "collé" au corps, à travers lequel il écoute des morceaux en mouvement, dans un paysage sonore bruyant. Encore, les façons de se répliquer les originaux manquent en qualité technique, même si le travail du studio est le plus sophistiqué et rigoureux.

On vérifie, donc, un éparpillement de signes sonores et musicaux qui n'arrivent jamais à être décodés, puisque la captation elle-même incarne un plaisir plus excitant que la fruition de l'œuvre. Le processus de la communication se convertit en "incommunication", en mal-entendement, en des fragments de sens. Autrement dit, l'auditeur se transforme en "collectionneur obsessionnel" de signes, ceux-ci convertis en gigabits.

Les appareils portables, à chaque jour plus petits et capables de stocker une quantité démesurée de données se révèlent comme la panacée de l'individu qui est obligé de passer sa journée en circulation – ou immobile dans les embouteillages en effet, ce sont les modalités de consommation musicale les plus courantes : la musique d'ambiance – Muzak – et les portables personnels). Cette nouvelle situation de réception quotidienne nous offre des éléments importants, qui contribuent à la réalisation des diagnostics très précis des changements de sensibilité et de comportement face aux différentes musiques, dans un espace-temps prédéterminé.

En ce qui concerne l'écoute dans un endroit fixe (la salle de séjour des maisons) on pourrait dire qu'il a été remplacé par le "home theatre" : l'espace auparavant consacré à l'écoute "hi-fi" de la musique a été converti en salle de cinéma individuelle, sans que pour autant la qualité sonore soit respectée : l'image et la distribution des canaux semblent d'être le plus important que la définition de la bande des fréquences. Encore, le temps qu'on utilisait auparavant pour l'acte ritualisé de fouiller des jaquettes des disques sur les étagères des magasins n'a pas disparu : désormais sont les boîtiers des DVD qu'on cherche frénétiquement.

Ainsi, les possibilités de l'écoute individualisée "à la carte" ont augmenté, si on considère la quantité des sources disponibles (pourvu que l'auditeur connaisse les sites). Des appareils comme I-Pod ou Mini-Disc permettent d'accumuler une quantité gigantesque de fichiers sonores, qui peuvent être écoutés pendant des heures successives, grâce aux nouvelles batteries. Par conséquent, l'acte d'entendre sans interruption peut devenir une habitude, bien que cela ne soit pas conseillé par les médecins... De leur part, les récepteurs "clauriaudients" (Schafer 1977)¹ remarquent une situation curieuse : si, d'un côté, il existe la possibilité de connaître un répertoire gigantesque, d'autre part, l'accès à l'objet matériel devient plus difficile : les magasins de disques disparaissent, petit à petit et les sources qui fournissent les fichiers musicaux (sauf des éditeurs très soucieux) n'offrent pas des renseignements sur les interprètes et moins encore des informations techniques concernant l'enregistrement.

Toutefois, si l'habitude d'écouter de la musique chez-soi a disparu, l'histoire de l'écoute par l'intermédiaire des médias sonores pose toujours des questions. L'étude de l'écoute à travers des anciens médias, comme le disque noir et sa masterisation digitale, nous permettra d'étudier des questions comme, par exemple : De quelle façon et dans quelle mesure certaines

oeuvres musicales demeurent dans la mémoire, plus précisément, dans le contexte d'une culture où le trait le plus marquant est justement l'éphémérité ? Comment se font la fixation et la disparition des genres musicaux, surtout à partir de la fin du 2^e. millénaire ? Pour analyser cette situation, nous prendrons l'exemple du fado.

2. *La vocalité dans la performance*

Bien que l'expression "musique populaire" demeure un concept insuffisant (González 2001), on ne peut pas nier qu'elle conduise à une nouvelle approche théorique : celui de la "performance médiatisée" techniquement (Zumthor 1990),² qui donne origine à la "chanson des médias" (Valente 2003), c'est-à-dire, la chanson composée *pour* les médias, *avec* et *à partir* des médias. La chanson des médias est marquée par la "présentité" de la performance en direct, ou dans le studio (ici, elle est médiatisée par des microphones de captation et des effets électroacoustiques). Elle peut avoir une version écrite, sur partition conventionnelle, bien que la forme la plus courante soit l'enregistrement sonore direct, à partir des schémas ou de l'improvisation.

Il faut ajouter que la performance médiatisée crée de nouveaux modèles d'interprétation et de style, quelquefois très remarquables comme qualités du *son* qui, d'après le compositeur François Delalande (2001), est une catégorie primordiale pour la sémantique musicale : la prise du son, la distance du microphone, des effets d'écho, parmi d'autres peuvent instituer un style personnel ou même d'une époque.

On dirait également que le travail en studio peut renforcer, surtout dans le cas du chanteur, des effets vocaux, des traits distinctifs (respiration, prononciation etc.). La voix, même enregistrée, affirme sa présence, à travers le corps de celui qui énonce le message poétique : "... la présence, non seulement la voix, mais le corps entier est là, dans la performance. Le corps par sa matérialité même, socialise la performance, de façon fondamentale" (Zumthor 1990: 73).

Cet ensemble de traits distinctifs peut créer des références, des modèles, des prototypes, même des "voix-mythes". C'est le cas d'Alfredo Marceneiro ou d'Amália Rodrigues. C'est juste parce que la voix dépasse le langage, comme remarque Zumthor : "Le langage est médiatisé, porté par la voix. Mais la voix déborde le langage : elle est plus large que lui, plus

riche. Il est évident, chacun en fait la constatation dans sa pratique personnelle, qu'en ampleur de registre, en envergure sonore, la voix dépasse de très loin la gamme extrêmement étroite des effets graphiques qu'utilise le langage. La voix, ainsi, en utilisant le langage pour dire quelque chose, se dit elle-même, se pose comme présence" (ibid.: 55).

Ces voix vont constituer le nouveau "vocabulaire" des codes culturels, qui ne s'aperçoit pas consciemment. Dans le cas particulier du fado, tous les petits détails ont, sûrement, des fonctions très importantes pour la préservation du genre musical.

3. *Quelques petits mots sur le fado*

Le fado est un genre musical traditionnel portugais qui prend la forme d'un chant généralement de ton mélancolique dont accompagnement usuel est fait par une guitare portugaise (*guitarra*) et une guitare (*viola*). Le fadiste chante aux "casas de fado" (maisons de fado) ou dans des grandes salles de spectacle. En effet, le fado est connu par un esprit langoureux et triste, mais cela n'est pas une règle : on peut trouver une grande somme de titres dont le thème est satirique, soit l'exemple du "Fado do Olho" (Fado de l'œil), l'une des variations du Fado "Pedro Rodrigues".

Cette chanson qui, selon José Ramos Tinhorão (1994), est née au 19^e. siècle, au Brésil, comme une espèce de danse piquante et, dans le cadre de chanson traditionnelle de Lisbonne, comme elle est connue actuellement, a probablement apparue vers les années 1820 ou 1840 au Portugal. Comme on peut observer, il s'agit d'une chanson presque bicentenaire et qui a survécu des impacts importants, comme "l'invasion" du rock (comment on appelle d'habitude l'avènement genre).

Le fado peut être classé comme un genre "nomade", grâce à sa "mouvance" (Zumthor, 1983), c'est-à-dire, il a des propriétés internes qui lui permettent de se transformer, dans un procès continu de (re)sémantisation constant. Le fado plus ancien, nommé "castiço" (racé) est le fado plus proche de l'oralité : en tant que musique, il n'y a que deux fonctions harmoniques (tonique et dominante). Les textes doivent s'adapter à une mélodie que change où la tessiture est étroite, mais qui accepte l'improvisation et des mélismes. Le fado "castiço" est classé en trois catégories : menor (mineur), corrido (rapide) et Mouraria, d'après le musicologue Rui Vieira Nery (2004).

Il y a d'autres fados "castiços" qui n'appartiennent pas à ce groupe, puisqu'ils acceptent un nombre plus grand de fonctions harmoniques, y incluses des modulations. Quelques-uns sont très fameux, comme le "Pedro Rodrigues", "Fado bailado" (Fado dansé) et admettent des versions "nomades", c'est-à-dire, avec des nouveaux textes quelquefois, très contrastants l'un de l'autre. On peut citer comme l'exemple le plus achevé du "fado castiço" Alfredo Rodrigo Duarte, plus connu comme Alfredo Marceneiro (parce qu'il était menuisier), lui-même compositeur et chanteur.

L'autre variation du fado est le "fado-canção" (fado-chanson), plus récent et qui correspond aux caractéristiques ordinaires de la chanson : des strophes, des couplets, des modulations harmoniques etc. Le fado-chanson n'accepte pas des textes différents (sauf des adaptations à d'autres langues, comme "Avril au Portugal", "La maison sur le port") et des changements de la mélodie ; les orchestrations, par contre, sont bienvenues. Il est bien connu à travers les grands succès d'Amália Rodrigues, comme "Gaivota", "Coimbra", "Foi Deus", "Nem às paredes confesso". En effet, Amália n'est pas seulement l'incarnation du fado, mais l'exemple le plus accompli du fado (et de la chanson, en général).

4. La performance du fado : Un cas très particulier

Parler du fado, c'est plutôt parler du chanteur de sa façon de l'énoncer ; puisque chanter un fado c'est différent de chanter d'autres genres musicaux, comment affirme Camané, l'un des plus réputés fadistes de l'actualité : "Le fado est dans le sang de celui qui le chante et plus tôt ou plus tard va le dominer. ... Chanter le fado, c'est envoyer un message, un sentiment : il faut savoir le type de message qu'on va adresser aux gens... Et chanter un fado traditionnel est précisément le plus difficile, parce que la musique est très simple ; ainsi, il faut bien créer une façon de délivrer les paroles, parce que rien n'est évident . Créer une chanson est très difficile et développer son style peut prendre longtemps"; et ensuite : "le fado est un don, un héritage, un état d'esprit et une forme très portugaise d'être dans la musique" (*apud* Neves 2006: 260–261). Fadiste et chanteur sont des choses différentes, et Camané réclame d'être fadiste et pas un chanteur.

D'autres noms également respectés, comme Mísia et Cristina Branco se jugent chanteuses, qui peuvent explorer d'autres genres. (En effet, Mísia

a enregistré des boléros et des tangos, tandis que Cristina Branco a choisi des compositeurs brésiliens.)

Normalement le fado doit être écouté en plein silence: La séance du rituel fadiste débute juste quand quelqu'un alerte: – “Silêncio ! Vai se cantar o fado !” (Silence ! On va chanter le fado!) et avec des instruments musicaux sans amplification électrique. Il faut reconnaître que la réalité a changé la tradition. Aujourd'hui il est très difficile de trouver des spectacles à vive voix. Les micros sont présents même dans les petites salles. Cela a posé des changements dans la performance, parmi lesquelles, l'expansion du territoire où la séance a lieu. Mais cette condition ne pose pas de problèmes, même pour des fadistes plus puristes : Pour Maria da Fé (Maria da Conceição Costa Gordo, née à Porto, en 1945), une des plus réputées cantatrices de fado de l'actualité, la technologie n'a pas détruit le fado. Les techniques du studio et ses effets spéciaux n'ont fait que permettre l'introduction des “petites” voix dans cet univers : “Avoir une bonne voix n'est pas suffisant pour chanter le fado : il faut absolument savoir chanter, avec toute son âme et cela n'est pas une chose qu'on apprend ; c'est quelque chose qui naît avec nous. Ensuite, la personne saura si elle réussit ou pas à cet art. (Le fado est comme ça : on n'apprend pas, on n'étudie pas, on essaie de faire le mieux, jour après jour...). Pour y arriver, il faut ‘vivre’ le fado. Le fado est ‘un chemin’ que Dieu l'a montrée et l'a fait suivre” (in Castro D'Aire 1996 : 92)

Mais aux débuts de la musique phonofixée, l'acte de capturer la performance était un sacrifice douloureux : Maria Alice, une des premières cantatrices du fado médiatisé se craignait des difficultés de chanter pour les microphones de l'époque : il fallait chanter pendant des heures qui ne finissaient jamais, sans couleurs de la voix : “Je me sentais affligée, parce que j'aimais chanter librement, avec toute la puissance de ma voix et il me disait qu'il fallait moduler la voix, apprendre à respirer et à coordonner les entrées avec les guitares.”³

Quand même, ce sont des vieux enregistrements qui ont fait l'histoire du fado et de leur performance : Si auparavant la transmission orale était le seul moyen de faire passer des morceaux traditionnels aux générations futures, l'avènement du disque – notamment le disque noir, en vinyl, a été l'instrument pour apprendre le fado, à partir des performances emblématiques. Ainsi, Cristina Branco a connu le fado lorsqu'elle fête ses dix-huit ans, quand son grand-père lui a offert un album d'Amália Rodrigues.

Elle est immédiatement tombée amoureuse par Amália et par le fado. Il faut ajouter que pour les générations plus jeunes, le fado était pratiquement excommunié, parce qu'il a été associé à la dictature de Salazar. Autrement dit, après 1974 le fado a quasi disparu du paysage sonore.

Ce qu'on voudrait remarquer ici, c'est le déplacement du modèle oral vers la version médiatisée techniquement ; immuable, certes, mais claire et didactique. Les disques de Marceneiro et d'Amália sont devenus des modèles pour le fado "castiço" et le fado chanson.

Pour n'aller pas très loin, on aimerait finir avec un exemple très inquiétant : les plusieurs versions du fado "Perseguição" (Persécution) et ses performances. Il s'agit d'un fado "castiço" qui date aux environs des années 1920, l'un des morceaux plus préférés par les audiences. Le texte a subi des différentes variations sémantiques et idéologiques, ou même des textes tout à fait nouveaux. La performance, de sa part, rejoint non seulement la déclamation presque libre, comme celle de Maria Alice (1926), l'inflexion mélodique d'Amália Rodrigues, avec toutes les nuances et couleurs du phrasé, mais aussi les mélismes de Maria da Fé, sans oublier les gestes vocaux qui la phonofixation en direct permet, comme c'est le cas d'Eugénia de Melo Castro. Le titre présenté par Camané montre des paroles différentes sans pour autant oublier la référence parodique.⁴

De ce fait, on pourrait conclure les différentes possibilités que la médiation technique du son peut offrir à l'interprète (dans ce cas, les chanteuses) des changements de style, d'énonciation et, par conséquent, permet des changements au niveau esthétique. Ainsi, l'écoute et le langage changent : Si Maria Alice n'était pas libre pour chanter dans le studio comme d'habitude en direct, Amália essayait d'optimiser les ressources technologiques, tandis que Maria da Fé peut se permettre tous les mélismes et effets vocaux, sans se préoccuper avec des conditions techniques.

Après tout ce qu'on a présenté ici, il ne reste que récupérer les mots de Paul Zumthor (1990: 54), qui a bien réfléchi sur le domaine de l'oralité et peut-être aussi sur le fado :

La voix et une chose, c'est-à-dire qu'elle possède, outre les qualités symboliques que tout le monde lui reconnaît, des qualités matérielles non moins signifiantes, qui se définissent en termes de ton, timbre, ampleur, hauteur, registre. Cela est tellement vrai que la coutume, dans les différentes sociétés, attache souvent un sens propre à certaines de ces qualités ... Les sociétés humaines, contrairement (peut-être) aux sociétés animales, ne semblent

caractérisées par le fait qu'elles identifient comme un objet, comme quelque chose qui est là, jeté devant elles, et autour de quoi se cristallise le lien social ... et (dans la mesure où il s'agit du langage) une poésie.

Notes

- * Cette recherche est partie composante du projet *La chanson des médias: Mémoire et nomadisme*, financé par la Fapesp et le CNPq.
1. D'après Schafer, "clauriaudience" est la faculté qui permet d'écouter tous les événements sonores avec clarté, en connaissant tous ses fonctions.
 2. Zumthor ainsi définit l'origine du concept : "Le terme performance s'impose absolument, dans les sens qu'on lui donne aujourd'hui à la suite des Anglo-Saxons: la performance est virtuellement un acte théâtral, où sont engagés tous les éléments visuels, auditifs et tactiles qui constituent la présence d'un corps et des circonstances dans lesquelles il existe" (1990: 61).
 3. Online source : http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maria_Alice
 4. Pour bien comprendre ce panorama, on a sélectionné un ensemble de versions du même fado, *Perseguição* : Amália Rodrigues (1945) ; Camané (2003), *Mais um fado no fado* (*Perseguição*, version Júlio de Sousa) ; Eugénia de Melo Castro (2000) ; Maria Alice; Maria da Fé (1991).

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Jesús Octavio Elizondo Martínez

Stigma and visibility

Iconic representations of indigenous people in the Mexican press

The editorial approach to indigenous issues in Mexico appears to be based on abstract criteria, since the concepts used to refer to them include such terms as “the people”, “cultures”, “poverty”, “violence”, “the fight”, “justice”, “equality” and so on. But we don’t find references to the actual subjects, the real people that through their actions give sense to those abstract concepts. In other words, the journalistic approach is not based on a pragmatist (pragmaticist) approach, but rather on a strictly iconic one.

Let’s define iconic and pragmatist. According to Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) all phenomena can be described through the sign functions defined by Peirce in the framework of the Philosophical categories or “modes of being”. One axis of the scheme is made of the so-called categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. Firstness is for something perceived but without reference to anything else; Secondness is the category where two elements meet in a mutual relation, when something refers to something else as in the world of physical phenomena, where matter smashes into another thing. Finally, Thirdness is a mode of being where it is possible to conceive all phenomena mediated by signs in the frame of culture. From Thirdness, Mankind can describe what happens in the other two categories, because through cultural sign systems we establish a triadic relation between ourselves and objects.

The other axis on the framework refers to the triadic relation of knowledge, which includes (i) the sign, or *representamen*, which deals with what we perceive from reality; (ii) the *interpretant* of signs, which refers to the logical capacity of the subject; and (iii) the referenced object, which we infer from the last two. When we put together these two axes we get a total of nine sign functions: qualisign, sinsign, legisign; icon, index and symbol; rhema, dicisign and argument (cf. Elizondo 2006: 108).

Let us focus on the object at the level of symbol, as social consensus, such as the signs or national flags. The index points at an object, as when we see smoke and relate it with the presence of fire. The icon is that sign which we perceive as somehow resembling its object, as do visual images. It is important to conceive Peirce's classification as formed by elements that are not mutually exclusive, but on the contrary, complement each other in the interpretation and description of phenomena.

The nature of photography may be established such that "photographs are indices (footsteps of light) that can become icons (if the operator decides to maintain a resemblance relation) and/or symbols (when they get sense through a certain consensus)", in the words of Catalan photographer Joan Fontcuberta (1990: 26). The indexical nature of photography is beyond question. What is important here is its editorial usage by those in charge of forming a newspaper, who in their effort to probe the veracity of the facts mentioned in the accompanying text, actually misuse the photographs, by reaffirming the symbolic function of negative values associated with indigenous issues, such as violence, poverty, exclusion, etc. What is questioned here is journalism as a social practice that manipulates objectivity and veracity, values that constitute the very foundations of journalism.

We will use the pragmatist approach as a tool to give sense to abstract concepts (like poverty, marginality, justice). We shall assess the practical effects of these concepts in the world, thus seeing, for instance, both the men and women in poverty, the judges and authorities in charge of enforcing the law, and their fair or unfair actions. In short, it seems that abstract concepts are used in editorial approaches to national social issues to the effect of building a general discourse without any pragmatic platform. Photography is used as such a platform: men and women are shown to illustrate the abstract concept, as is common to propaganda and political discourse.

Up to this point, we have described a well established use of news information in the press. The semio-pragmatist view highlights the correlation between abstract terms and their practical implementations in press photography. Something about this seems contradictory. Think of a photograph that illustrates an article in the press: the level of "expression" allows us to get acquainted with the formal aspects of the photograph: size, shape, place within the newspaper, etc. At the "content" level we see iconographic

representations of people, subjects, objects, landscapes and many other figurative elements. As mentioned before, journalism must provide a reasonably objective panorama of facts. When a photograph of an indigenous woman is used to illustrate the problem of poverty in Mexico, a serious professional mistake is made. It leads to a series of diverse semiosis that will be described next, in the frame of a connotative semiotic analysis.

At the connotation level we can point at the concepts, ideas, values, symbols that we associate through an inferential mental process carried out with the indexical signifieds. It is possible to draw all the sign-thoughts (as in Peirce) with which we associate the message, in order to achieve sense from our experience through the construction of a chain of significations (a specific semiosis). This helps us to understand the sense of the message in a specific context and time. It is important to notice that this specific semiosis is the result of emotions, feelings, memories and the cultural baggage of each individual.

When we see a press article with an accompanying photograph, we tend to relate – through an inferential process – the subject to the content of the iconographic reproduction, since the latter has been put there to accomplish that referential sign function.

The issue is as follows. The referential function of the index takes place when an interpretant perceives a sign and makes an association with the object. That is the process by which we see a photograph and associate it with the subject photographed. So far, everything is fine. It seems, however, that the editorial intention is not to suggest the association as we have described it, but rather to link the elements in the content of the photograph with the abstract and general motif of the news. As a result, what we see in the photographs is read as a culturally constructed social symbol, comprised of a general, ready-made abstract issue. This inference allows the stigmatization of persons photographed, since the semiosis that allows us to give sense to the phenomena, requires our association with social symbols which are culturally learned in order for us to make a reasonable explanation of the photograph. In other words, when photographs are used as an illustrative tool, the indexical sign function inherent to any photograph must be preserved, in the case of a picture of the person mentioned with his/ her name underneath, a landscape of the place mentioned, and so on.

Especially delicate is the case of people photographed as an “example” of what is said in the written text. Most commonly in journalistic practice,

people are treated as things to fit as visual elements of the symbolic function. This function is often fulfilled by the rhetorical strategy of “synecdoche” (to take a part as the whole). Synecdoche works fine for the iconic function, but it is inappropriate for the symbolic one. In visibly representing social actors, the written press must always respect people’s personal identity. This is a fundamental ethic.

Anthropologist and sociologist Irving Goffmann brought the ideas of stigma and visibility from the Greek tradition into contemporary social discourse to define those people that have been marked with a negative sign that determines their personal and social identity. “The Greeks, who were apparently strong on visual aids, originated the term stigma to refer to bodily signs designed to expose something unusual and bad ...” (Goffman 2003: 11). A stigmatized person is no longer an individual with full rights, but a person diminished and rejected. “An attribute of this sort is a stigma, especially when this person produces in the others, as reverse effect, a broad discredit” (ibid.: 12). Stigmas of race, nationality, and religion are particularly unfair since they apply to people that inherited them from their families or communities.

“The term stigma will be used to refer to an attribute deeply discredited; but what is really needed is a language of relations, not of attributes” (ibid.: 13). I propose Semiotics to be that language of meaningful relations and “not of attributes” that Goffman foresees as necessary to approach the study of stigmatized identities. In everyday discourse we use metaphors to refer to them. In Mexico, one of those terms is “Indian”, which is used to refer to all indigenous groups despite the great differences among them. This term was first used – or misused – by the Spaniards around the year 1517, when in the quest for a new ocean route to India they found themselves in America.

One characteristic of the visibility of a stigma has to do with the fact that the stigmatized person tries to hide the signs that may reveal his or her stigmatized identity. In doing so, such persons will gather as much of the information flowing in their context as possible, in an attempt to neutralize it. However, this attempt has terrible consequences, a paradox that the Greeks found most important.

In the next part of the paper a sample of a larger research project entitled “Discrimination against Indigenous People in Mexican Mass Media” will be shown. This project was made by a group of professors under my

supervision during the last semester of 2005, by request of the National Commission for Indigenous Peoples Development, a federal institution of the Mexican government. In 2005, the Mexican population reached 103.3 million, 10% of which was categorized as Indigenous.¹ Mexico is the 11th most populated country in the world, according to the National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Information Technology (INEGI).

The first step of the project consisted in monitoring the press. We identified all words and images related to the indigenous scope. In doing so, the visibility of this vulnerable group was able to be measured according to the registries found in diverse journalistic venues. Our aim was to identify the *sense* of the messages, their *social significance* in the time analyzed, and in the Mexican social context. To do so required putting these messages in their printed context: place on the page, section or journalistic supplement, etc. We identified those words and images referring to Indigenous people and the values associated with them. In other words, we obtained objective information on one hand, and values, beliefs and symbols related to the note, on the other. By means of the analysis, we sought to identify the “clichés” or symbols – functioning as *logical interpretants* – which we found to be associated with the Indigenous people. At a second moment of the investigation, during the qualitative study, we reconstructed the *sense* of the narratives on one hand, and their *social sense* on the other, so as to identify the whole from the isolated messages, and thus to establish their relation with other cultural representations by means of the construction of connotative chains or specific semiosis.

Fourteen newspapers sold nationwide were reviewed during the monitoring work. These are: *Diario de México*, *Diario Monitor*, *El Economista*, *El Financiero*, *El Sol de México*, *El Universal*, *Excélsior*, *La Crónica de Hoy*, *La Jornada*, *La Prensa*, *Milenio*, *Ovaciones*, *Reforma*, *Rumbo de México*, *Uno más uno*.

The volume of the *corpus* shows how little interest the informative agenda gives to issues referring to indigenous affairs in Mexico. In all the newspapers analyzed, practically all the information consisted in informative notes. The natives, either from a personal standpoint or through organizations, were the source of reports related to themselves, although this happened in only a couple of occasions.

In the documents of the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of the UN, one reads the following:

... the expression racial discrimination will denote all distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on reasons for race, color, lineage or national or ethnic origin that it has by object or annular result or to reduce the recognition, we enjoyed or exercise, in conditions of equality, the fundamental human rights and liberties in political, economic, social, cultural the sphere or in any other sphere of the public life.² (Rodríguez Zepeda 2004: 62–63)

Discrimination is, in a fundamental sense, a structural mechanism of social exclusion. Discrimination as exclusion consists of a systematic conduct and even a culturally standardized form of social scorn towards a person or group of people, due to his or her belonging to a group being socially stigmatized, resulting in exclusion from the main sources of rights and well-being of society. (Cf. *Ibid.* 2004: 20.) Rodríguez Zepeda establishes that discrimination is synonymous with limitation of access to rights and opportunities, and that it constitutes a mechanism of social exclusion originating in a framework of cultural representations, stereotypes and stigmas.

When the systematic scorn towards a stigmatized group happens to the facts, a form of specific inequality is fed and reproduced. For that reason, the fight against discrimination is a particular form of the fight by the social equality, because it implies the restitution of the ideal conditions of equality that have been undermined, and for that reason it must articulate politically and discursively as it leaves from the fight by the rights of the person ... under the language of the rights. (Rodríguez Zepeda 2004: 31)

In the case of ethno-cultural differences, for example, the policies against discrimination do not have to look for a right balance between:

the ethnicists' affirmation of the difference and the homogenizing pretension of the blind conceptions to the differences. Policies must offer an alternative to the present debate between the policies that recognize differences, and the universalist's liberal visions, that try an affirmation of rights over the ethnocultural differences, either sexual or of other different

natures ... the logical frame of the non-discrimination is still the national State. (Ibid.: 11)

In the particular case of Mexico, it is expected that the application of the Federal Law to Prevent and to Eliminate Discrimination – approved in 2003 – will introduce important transformations in the debate of a new Federal Law of Radio and Television. The task for us is to take the proper steps, the concrete actions towards a democratic culture, from civil society to the mass media, and to put pressure on government officials to reinforce democratic practices and policies.

The visibility that a social group acquires in mass media depends, to a great extent, on the policy of each medium; more specifically, to the policy on general abstract issues. By means of semiotic analysis, we have seen how when reading photographs of Indigenous people in the national press, we reach out for fixed symbolic elements in culture, like racial stigmatization – linguistic and cultural – of a specific group, in order to give sense to our experience. In the case study, we have presented the results of analysing monitored material, for the purpose of identifying the frequency of the presence of subjects related to indigenous populations in the Mexican press. These subjects, as we have seen, are always referred to with negative connotations; save for a few specific cases, that is the norm. Finally, we have established what we consider to be some basic principles of nondiscrimination, which must serve as a guide for the work to include diverse ethno-linguistic groups in the dominant institutions, in the effort to spread democratic values.

Notes

1. I am grateful to Professor Eva Salgado for the quantitative information presented here.
2. Adopted and opened to signing and ratification by the UN General Assembly in its resolution 2106 To, of 21 of December of 1965. Take effect: 4 of January of 1969, in accordance with Article 19. See Rodríguez Zepeda 2004: 62- 63.

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Drude von der Fehr

Thomas Bernhard's infectious style

A pragmatic use of disease in literature

Introduction

The Austrian author Thomas Bernhard (1931–1989) suffered his entire adult life from a serious lung disease in combination with a heart condition. For many years, his life was prolonged only by means of heavy medication. In this paper I argue that the experience of a fatal disease played a decisive role in the elaboration of his style. The texts I use to argue the importance of disease in the style of Bernhard's prose are his autobiographical novels. I propose that his style has epistemological and ontological implications. Epistemologically speaking, his style is anti-foundationalistic and anti-sceptical. According to Vincent Colapietro (2004), these epistemological positions are typical of "the pragmatic turn". Bernhard's style has important performative aspects as well, and these considerations call for a new way of studying the author with regard to his style. Among literary scholars, the author has long been disregarded. In this paper, I propose that the author ought to be studied again, not as a biographical entity, but as a biological organism with a consciousness. A study of Bernhard's style calls for cooperation with neurophysiology. Accordingly, in this paper I will introduce Antonio Damasio and refer to the elaboration of his neurophysiology by Floyd Merrell.

1. Bernhard's style

When considering Thomas Bernhard's writing, we could speak of a *physiology of style*. His sentences are unnaturally long; the autobiography *Die Ursache: Eine Andeutung* (1975), for instance, opens with these two sentences:

Die Stadt ist, von zwei Menschenkategorien bevölkert, von Geschäftemachern und ihren Opfern, dem Lernenden und Studierenden nur auf die schmerzhafteste, eine jede Natur störende, mit der zeit *verstörende* und *zerstörende*, sehr oft nur auf die heimtückisch-tödliche Weise bewohnbar.

Die extremen, den in ihr lebenden Menschen fortwährend irritierenden und enervierenden und in jedem Falle immer verheerender auf die Verfassung dieser Wetterverhältnissen sich immer verheerender auf die Verfassung dieser Menschen auswirkende Salzburger Architektur andererseits, das allen diesen Erbarmungswürdigen bewusst oder unbewusst, aber im medizinischen Sinne *immer schädliche, folgerichtig auf Kopf und Körper und auf das ganze diesen Naturverhältnisse ja vollkommen ausgelieferte Wesen drückende*, mit unglaublicher Rücksichtslosigkeit immer wieder solche irritierende und enervierende und krankmachende und erniedrigende und beleidigende und mit grosser Gemeinheit und Niederträchtigkeit begabte Einwohner produzierende Voralpenklima erzeugen immer wieder solche geborene oder hereingezogene Salzburger, die zwischen den, von dem Lernenden und Studierenden, der ich vor dreissig Jahren in dieser Stadt gewesen bin, aus *Vorliebegeliebten*, aber aus Erfahrung gehassten kalten und nassen Mauern ihren bornierten Eigensinnigkeiten, Unsinnigkeiten, Stumpfsinnigkeiten, brutalen Geschäften und Melancholien nachgehen und eine unerschöpfliche Einnahmequelle für alle möglichen und unmöglichen Ärzte und Leichenbestattungsunternehmer sind.

As these first two sentences of his autobiography demonstrate, it is impossible to read this text without pausing to draw one's breath in places which are not in accordance with the meaning of the sentence. Thereby, the text eloquently demonstrates the pain and difficulty that a person with serious lung disease must endure. This breathing difficulty is a characteristic of Bernhard's style and is repeated throughout his work.

1.1. What is style?

If we look at style from the point of view of a pragmatic theory of communication, as in Sperber and Wilson's *Relevance. Communication & Cognition* (1995: 217), we could say that style is the regulation of the relationship between speaker and hearer. Pertinent in the communicative relationship is the building of a context which regulates the inferences that a hearer or listener makes. Style is important in building a context, especially with regards to a poetic text:

From the style of a communication it is possible to infer such things as what the speaker takes to be the hearer's cognitive capacities and level of attention, how much help or guidance she is prepared to give him in processing her utterance, the degree of complicity between them, their emotional closeness or distance. In other words, a speaker not only aims to enlarge the mutual cognitive environment she shares with the hearer; she also assumes a certain degree of mutuality, which is indicated, and sometimes communicated, by her style. (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 217–218)

With regards to what the speaker can expect to achieve, Sperber & Wilson say the following:

... a communicator cannot directly present an audience with an assumption. All a speaker or any other communicator can do is present a stimulus, hoping that its perception by members of the audience will lead to a modification of their cognitive environment and trigger some cognitive processes. (Ibid.: 150)

The reader, on his or her part, infers an intention from the context shaped by the style and prefers the inference that takes the least effort.

The aim of the “physiological style” in the opening sentences of Bernhard's autobiography is to regulate and build mental pictures and affective stimuli which might have effects on the representations of the world for the individual reader. The means of communication, however, are not the creation of a primarily cognitive context, but operate by both cognitive and affective means. Sperber and Wilson (1995: 224) maintain that, “Utterances with poetic effects can be used (precisely) to create (this) sense of (apparently) affective rather than cognitive mutuality.”

Thus the style gives the reader a strong physiological and affective stimulus which also has a potential cultural meaning. In semiotic terminology, one could say that the style is indexical; it actualizes the somatic experience of lung disease. But because signs are always dynamic and in movement toward thirdness and cognitivity, the style carries with it the potentiality of cognitions and interpretations.

1.2. Style and respiration

If we view these first sentences in the light of the theme of Bernhard's third autobiography, *Der Atem: Eine Entscheidung* (1978), in which he describes

his stay at a hospital in Salzburg, his experience of being close to death, and his sudden decision to stay alive, breathe and take control of his own spiritual and somatic recovery, we see how the stylistic stimulus performs the central drama in Bernhard's life – the threat of strangulation and the effort to breathe – and we see the importance of this somatic drama in the creative and life-giving effort of Bernhard's writing. To breathe or not to breathe, that is the question in much of Bernhard's writing.

The physician Luis Chiozza, in his book *Hidden Affects in Somatic Disorders* (1998), points out that the lungs allow for a direct transaction between gasses from the environment and the blood. Through the lungs, the body remains in direct contact with the outer world. To focus on respiration is to point to a direct, life-preserving relation which is more fundamental than the lack of identity between verbal language and the natural surroundings. This somatic necessity is elegantly *performed* in the relation established between the verbal utterance and the reader of the text. Thus the reader, during his reading, is put into direct contact with the world. Instead of aesthetic representation or the as-if of dramatic performance, the physiological style of Bernhard acts directly on the perception of the reader.

1.3. Respiration, creation and emotional performance

The meaning potential of a breathing difficulty is large. "In Greek philosophy air was considered the principle of life", according to Chiozza (1998: 30). "Air' or 'pneuma' has meant simply the essential element constituting each thing or even the 'divine breath', the representation of the Holy Spirit, the creator and regulator of the world ..." (31). Thus, from a cultural perspective, the lungs have been the seat of the spiritual since ancient Greek times, and there has always been a close relationship between respiration and inspiration; simply, to breathe means to get poetic inspiration. Thus, the somatic drama involved in having a serious lung problem has a cultural potential; it represents an acting out, a performance, an act of creation of a common environment. The *context* shaped by the style makes such an affective cultural and physiological communality possible.

The effects of the style also points to a similarity between Bernhard's autobiography and *Ecce homo*, the autobiography by Friedrich Nietzsche. In both autobiographies, the somatically diseased author is *infected* by

the climate and the general cultural and social environment of his native country. And in the same manner as in Nietzsche's philosophical autobiography, in Bernhard's autobiographical novel the values are turned upside down and the morally diseased are the seemingly healthy population of Salzburg, while the infected author is the one who is morally healthy. This Nietzschean paradox – the diseased are the healthy – is performed emotionally in Bernhard's style.

*2. Spiritualization and inspiration:
The grandfather and Schopenhauer*

The way that the young patient Bernhard assumes control of his own spiritual recovery has much to do with the influence of his beloved grandfather, who was a patient at the same hospital where Bernhard is hospitalized. The grandfather, an ardent Schopenhauer lover, dies suddenly, just a few days after a series of conversations by Bernhard's bed which are recalled in the text. The grandfather speaks to Bernhard about certain "areas of thought" – disease is such an area of thinking. We make up our diseases in our own interest, he says; existentially, we need diseases such as Bernhard's to enter areas of thought which we would not enter if we had not experienced diseases like this (Bernard 1978: 62). The diseased, Bernhard's grandfather proposes, have the possibility of a creative change in consciousness which a person without a serious disease does not, and this plays a very important role in the way an individual handles his own recovery. The text points to the connection between diseases and the possibility of a change in consciousness. This change in consciousness could be a change towards a more healthy personality in the Nietzschean sense, and my hypothesis is that this was effectuated through the style of Bernhard's writing.

One could say, with Chiozza, that the affective drama that our diseases perform does not say much about the cause of the disease, but to understand what the disease means in the existential and somatic drama of the patient can do much to further recovery (1998: Introduction). Meaning is, pragmatically, something which is constructed or inferred after the fact, in consideration of the effects. Bernhard, through his style and writing, creates a context which builds an emotional and cultural relationship with his public, and which at the same time represents the construction of a self for himself. This action has a healing effect on his somatic disease. In spite

of his breathing difficulties, Bernhard secures the creativity necessary for survival.

3. *Consciousness and intention*

I have used Sperber and Wilson's theory of communication to state that, in order to create a common mutuality through a style, there has to be an intentional act on part of the author as well as an inferential act on the part of the reader. But, as I have also said, the most an author can hope to do is to communicate a stimulus which has a perceptual effect on the reader. To assume an intention on the part of the writer seems very old-fashioned today, but I do not suggest that we should bring back the biographical author. Rather, I submit that every text is caused by a biologically based consciousness. This of course is commonsensical, but nonetheless something that we must again take into consideration. If there is an intention (to make a stimulus and to regulate a context and a possible mutuality with a reader) there has to be a consciousness, and consciousness is caused by the brain, which is part of the human organism. When I argued that Bernhard stimulated his readers in a way that assured a direct communication between them and the outer world, I also asserted that there was an intentional effort behind the style. This intentional effort is an effort of consciousness. According to Searle's *The Rediscovery of the Mind*, all consciousness is intentional, in the sense that consciousness is always a certain way of "seeing as," a certain perspective on the world (1998: 131). Consciousness is a biological phenomenon, caused by activity in the brain (Searle 1994: Introduction); we might conclude that, if consciousness is always intentional, any stylistic effort is also intentional.

3.1. A pragmatic turn

If literature is grounded in consciousness, as I have just suggested, literature is grounded in the biological body of its author. I must stress that such a postulate must be based on a theory of mind which is anti-Cartesian. It must also be based on an epistemology which does not claim any form of biological determinism or foundationalism. Colapietro in "The Pragmatic Turn" (2004) backs up the view that anti-foundationalism, anti-dualism and anti-scepticism are typical of "the pragmatic turn". To evade the dif-

faculties with dualism, foundationalism and scepticism, a pragmatic epistemology and a pragmatic ontology may be useful, especially in combination with, for example, the neurophysiology of Damasio.

3.2. The survival of a conscious self

If we follow neurologist Damasio in *The Feeling of What Happens*, consciousness has to do with the self and is involved in “constructing knowledge about two facts: that the organism (the human body) is involved in relating to some object, and that the object in the relation is causing some change in the organism” (Damasio 2000: 133). Because consciousness involves relations between the organism and objects around it, it also involves the stability and the space necessary for the survival of that organism (ibid.: 137). Thus, the self is caused by the biological need of the organism to survive. I read these facts in relation to a) the textual creation of a context and b) the internal bodily communication in Bernhard and the consequent change in his consciousness. When we consider young Bernhard dying at the hospital, his sudden decision to stay alive might be read as a biological urge to create a surviving self. In his case, the internal bodily communication continued at a low level of consciousness, between two aspects of the organism, the self and the diseased lungs. This change in consciousness could have been what the grandfather meant, and the change had to do with bodily needs. We could ask ourselves, when considering the organism’s need for stability to survive: does this mean that the creation through style of an affective and cultural mutuality between Bernhard and the outer world of his readers ensured the stability necessary for his consciousness to survive?

3.3. The text saves the author

Consciousness, according to Damasio, exists on many different levels: “At its simplest and most basic level, consciousness lets us recognize an irresistible urge to stay alive and develop a concern for the self. At its most complex and elaborated level, consciousness helps us to develop a concern for other selves and improve the art of life” (Damasio 2000: 5). According to Damasio, we have a core consciousness and an extended consciousness, of which there are many levels and grades. Core consciousness provides the

organism with a sense of self about a single moment – now – and about a single place – here. The extended consciousness provides the organism with an elaborate sense of self – an identity and a person – which places the person at a point in historical time, richly aware of the past experienced and the future anticipated, and keenly cognizant of the world beside it (ibid.: 16). Damasio also calls this extended self the *autobiographical* self (ibid.: 17).

The autobiographical self in Bernhard's *Der Atem* can be read in this light. The text performs a life-saving action on the part of the author. It is a pragmatic point of view to see literary texts as actions rather than as objects. The affective drama of the style must be seen as such a performance. Consciousness always represent an effort to stay alive, and behind any textual action, there is a will to live. However, this is usually not as pertinent as it is in the case of Bernhard's writing.

3.4. Consciousness is not one, but many

Damasio has made it a main point to falsify Descartes' dualism between body and mind. In his *Descartes' Error* (1994), he shows how what we know is based on the neurological effects of feelings and emotions. Knowledge, in other words, is based on the function of the nerves. Consciousness, according to Damasio (2000: 4), has a critical biological function that allows us to know sorrow or know joy; to know suffering or know pleasure. None of those personal states would ever be known to each of us without consciousness. In other words, we need the affective underpinnings of consciousness to be able to know something. Merrell points to the three areas of the creation of knowledge: "(1) an emotion, (2) the feeling of an emotion, and (3) awareness of the feeling of an emotion." Merrell then translates this to semiotic terminology:

In Peircean form, feeling itself is the Firstness of Firstness, the qualisign or *image*, ... The becoming of awareness of that emotion in regard to some happening "out there" or in the mind ushers in the Secondness of the *image*, while leaving everything else within Firstness.... Awareness of the feeling as feeling with respect to an *image* and its respective *object* begins happening as the *image* scales the semiotic peak to reach the first level of Thirdness.... (Merrell 2003: 129)

From this we can learn that consciousness (and the cognitive) cannot be separated from feeling and emotion, and that consciousness is not one but many different layers and functions involved in dynamical processes. Thus, to talk about a conscious intention is not to be fundamentalist in an epistemological sense, nor to be causal in an essentialist sense. There is a large difference between biological determinism and a causality based on the “bodymind”:

4. *Causality, epistemology, ontology*

To see poetic writing as something linked causally to biology seems very provocative. This, however, probably also stems from a tendency in literary studies to regard causality as essentialism or epistemological foundationalism. In the future, I believe, it will be most important that poetic writing is not grounded in biological foundationalism. Therefore we must expect that texts treating disease are based not only thematically, but also stylistically, on *ontological realism*.

If we examine medical philosophy, Wulff, Pedersen and Rosenberg state in their *Medicinsk filosofi* that medicine relies on *ontological realism*, combined with a form of empiricism which holds that experience plays a role in the way we see what is real (2003: 48, 54). Empiricism, as a theory of science, emphasizes how we experience the world and, consequently, our observations (Wulff, Pedersen and Rosenberg 2003: 30, 36). Medical thought must rely on ontological realism (that is, the assumption that the world actually exists) and the anti-sceptical thought that it is possible to build knowledge that, when set in action, can have an effect on the outer world as well as the inner somatic world. Without such a grounding, medicine could hardly act curative in any scientific manner.

We could argue that, in Bernhard’s autobiographical novels, the way in which the style ensures a direct and non-representational somatic experience points to a stylistic elaboration of ontological realism. Bernhard’s texts thereby evade scepticism without falling into foundationalism.

5. *Three intentional layers in the style*

In accordance with Damasio’s and Merrell’s understanding of the becoming of knowing, I propose that the Firstness and the Secondness of the mutual

affective and cultural context shared between Bernhard and his readers, as well as the final awareness of the feeling of an emotion, helped Bernhard survive for 40 years. Bernhard's style "infects" his readers with a direct somatic experience of the world which is neither epistemologically sceptic nor fundamentalist, and it made it possible for Bernhard to act politically within Austrian society. By performing his somatic drama in all its multiplicity, his stylistic intention is to force on his countrymen Nietzsche's view that the diseased are the morally healthy. Bernhard secures the health of his native language in the sense that he introduces into it ontological realism, anti-dualism, anti-scepticism and anti-foundationalism. Thus, by acting out his language in public, Bernhard acts politically in his beloved – and detested – home country, and in the effort to save his native tongue from a fascistic foundationalism, he helps to keep himself alive and stable for a long period of time.

6. Conclusion

The study of disease in literature cannot do without examining the style of the writer. By using Bernhard's writing as an example, I have focused on how a pragmatic and a performative use of a mutual communicative context, linked to respiration, can evade representation and anti-pragmatic epistemologies, and act directly on the perception of the reader. At the same time, the study of Bernhard's style calls for a renewed study of the author, not as biography (and the study of Bernhard as a writer has to a great extent been biographical), but as an intention (or *will*, in the terminology of Schopenhauer) linked to the neurobiological phenomenon that is consciousness. If the field of literary studies is willing to open up to contemporary neurobiological knowledge, I expect that we will see a very interesting methodological and theoretical changes in the future.

Note

1. Many thanks to Merja Bauters for making me aware of Merrell's *Sensing Corporeally* (2003). The concept *bodymind* is taken from his book, though, as Merrell himself mentions, the concept was originally introduced by Henry James.

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August Fenk

Inference, reference, and indexicality

1. Introduction and outline

Many misunderstandings of Peirce's ideas can be avoided by adopting the view of the symbol, the index and the icon as different uses, dimensions, or functions instead of distinct classes of sign. The respective "multifunctional" concept of the sign allows a clear distinction between signs realizing either a symbolic function, or an iconic function, or both, as is the case in the typical pictogram (Section 2). But the problems with the *index* remain (Section 3.1): To subsume an almost all-inclusive concept of the *index* under *sign* makes the concept of sign empty. Further problems concerning the relations between form and similarity, on the one hand, and indexicality, on the other, arise in view of cases of "indexical similarity" such as the similarity between imprints in the sand and the toes of a bird indicating that this bird is the causer of these imprints.

Thus I suggest to eliminate indexicality from sign-specific functions (Fenk 1997) and to view indexicality as a fundamental cognitive principle pervading but also transcending the world of sign (Section 3.2). Indexical interpretations of events and utterances with respect to possible causes and consequences and to possible agents and intentions are the essential function of our cognitive system, and this inferential machinery is indispensable for the use of representational and referential systems such as language.

2. Separating functions instead of classes of sign

In his *Monist* article from 1906 Peirce argues that "three things are concerned in the functioning of a Sign; the Sign itself, its Object, and its Interpretant" (p. 497). "The Immediate Object of all knowledge and all

thought is, in the last analysis, the Percept”, and “the Immediate Interpretant of all thought proper is Conduct” (p. 507). An “analysis of the essence of a sign [...] leads to a proof that every sign is determined by its object, either first, by partaking in the characters of the object, when I call the sign an *Icon*; secondly, by being really and in its individual existence connected with the individual object, when I call the sign an *Index*; thirdly, by more or less approximate certainty that it will be interpreted as denoting the object, in consequence of a habit [which term I use as including a natural disposition], when I call the sign a *Symbol*” (p. 495).

The division of the sign into icons, indices, and symbols “is the trichotomy I have most studied”, says Peirce (1976 [1908]: 887). This trichotomy, most frequently mentioned in Peirce, got very popular, together with its misunderstanding as a separation of distinct classes of sign. In Eco (1976), for instance, this division is viewed as irrelevant for a “theory of codes” (p. 121) that tries to differentiate between “modes of producing sign functions” (p. 217), and as an “untenable trichotomy [...] by which signs are classified as *symbols* (arbitrarily linked with their object), *icons* (similar to their object) and *indices* (physically connected with their object)” (p. 178).¹ Peirce may have contributed to such misunderstandings, first of all by his substantial use of “icon, index, symbol”. Such a separation of classes would indeed be untenable, e.g., in view of pictograms being icons and conventional symbols at the same time. But, actually, most of the formulations in Peirce suggest an understanding of his trichotomy as a distinction between “isolate dimensions” (Ransdell 1986), or “different uses” (Pelc 1986), or, following Peirce’s (1906) dictum on the same “perceptible” that may “function doubly” as a sign, as “different functions” of sign (Fenk 1997). The following quotations illustrate Peirce’s idea of a multifunctional sign:

An *icon* can only be a fragment of a completer sign. The other form of degenerate sign is to be termed an *index*. [...] A weather-cock conveys information; but this it does because in facing the very quarter from which the wind blows, it resembles the wind in this respect, and thus has an icon connected with it. In this respect it is not a pure index. (Peirce 1976 [ca. 1904], IV: 242)

But a symbol, if sufficiently complete always involves an index, just as an index sufficiently complete involves an icon (*ibid.*: 256).

The same Perceptible may, however, function doubly as a Sign. That footprint that Robinson Crusoe found in the sand, and which has been stamped in the granite of fame, was an Index to him that some creature was on his island, and at the same time, as a Symbol, called up the idea of a man. Each *Icon* partakes of some more or less overt character of its object. (Peirce 1906: 496)

When separating different sign-functions instead of distinct classes of sign, at least the “naïve notion” (Eco 1976: 178) of the icon can be preserved, even in two different versions (Fenk 1997):

I. Either, in the broader version, as any product of a subject’s simulating (imitating, modeling, picturing, etc.) activity.

II. Or, more restrictively, as any sign realizing both the symbolic and the simulating function. The more restrictive version II seems to be more tractable. And it better meets Peirce’s claim that the icon “can only be fragment of a completer sign” or Ransdell’s (1986: 56) view of the icon as a “coordinate” conception of the symbol. But it also better meets the arguments (e.g., of Eco) foregrounding the all-decisive notion of a “code”, i.e., a convention concerning the use of symbolic signs.




Figure 1. A rather broad (I) and a rather restrictive (II) conceptualization of the icon (adapted from Fenk 1998: 305).

In both versions, compared in Figure 1, similarity is necessary but not sufficient for *iconicity*: The similarity must come about by a subject’s simulating activities. The overlap of the two ellipses in Figure 1 contains those conventional symbols simulating the represented, such as pictograms

or onomatopoeic words. From the point of view of Pelc (1986: 14), the concepts of sign, iconic sign, symbol and the like “are typological rather than classificational, and relative rather than absolute. The corresponding properties, namely, the properties of being a sign, or of being a sign of this or that kind, are therefore a matter of degree.” The conceptualization presented in Figure 1, however, allows two different classifications in the strict sense of the word:

I. A “sign” is either a symbol, or an icon, or both, i.e. an iconic symbol.

II. A “sign” is either a symbol, or a simulation, or both, i.e. an “iconic symbol” = “icon”.

But even if the *icon*, the *index* and the *symbol* are conceptualized as different dimensions or uses or functions of sign, the problems with the index remain. Actually, the simple and clear look on the *symbol* and the *icon* illustrated above only holds if we exclude the index and indexical similarity from the *sign* and from sign-specific functions.

3. *A new look at the index*

3.1 Problems with an all-inclusive concept of sign

If the index exists in its own right as those signs in which there is “a direct dual relation of the sign to its object independent of the mind using the sign” (Peirce 1885, cited in Sebeok 1986: 49), and if “it would be difficult, if not impossible [...] to find any sign absolutely devoid of the indexical quality” (Peirce 2.306, cited in Spinks 1991: 64), then it also “would be difficult, if not impossible” to find any non-sign. If there are no non-signs left, the concept of the sign becomes “all-inclusive” and therewith empty.

In a later study, Peirce is somewhat more cautious in this respect: Although an index functions, like any other sign, only when it is interpreted, the index now remains – and this is “an infallible criterion for distinguishing between an index and an icon” – only “equally fitted to be the very sign that would be if interpreted” (Peirce 1976 [ca.1904]: 256). More generally this would mean that an interpretational act is necessary and sufficient for *sign*.

This is exactly the criterion also used in Keller (1995), but only for the explication of the “symptom”. (The extension of his “symptom” is likely to be the same as in Peirce’s “natural signs and physical symptoms”.) The

symptom and only the symptom is a sign of something only when and only as long as it is the object of someone's actual interpretation, while, say, a word or a picture in a book remains this very same symbol irrespective of whether or not it is interpreted by anybody. In some respects, this boils down to a turnabout of Peirce's system: Now only symbols and icons are signs on their own right, and only the symptoms dependent of a mind using the sign.

In the constructions of Peirce as well as Keller, the index obtains a very special role. This might result from principal problems of integrating the index, the indicator, the indication into a tractable concept of *sign*. The argument developed elsewhere (Fenk 1997): Neither indexicality, nor similarity, nor "indexical similarity" (between the toes of a bird and their imprints in the sand) is sufficient for *sign*. What remains after the respective elimination procedure are the two basic sign-functions presented in Figure 1: simulating and symbolizing.

With the elimination of the index² from the *sign* and from sign-specific functions we not only avoid an extremely broad and rather artificially constructed concept of *sign* including percepts switching between an existence as sign and non-sign. We also avoid problems regarding the relation between the index on the one hand and similarity, form and iconicity on the other: In Peirce (1976 [ca. 1904]: 242) a "pure index simply forces attention to the object with which it reacts [...] but conveys no information." Only "an index which forces something to be an icon", such as the weathercock that is "physically connected with the wind", "or which forces us to regard it as an icon" by nearness and position ("letter attached to a figure", "legend under a portrait") "does make an assertion, and forms a *proposition*." These arguments correspond to his strict definition of a "pure icon" at the end of the following quotation: "The arrangement of the words in the sentence, for instance, must serve as *Icons*, in order that the sentence may be understood. The chief need for the *Icons* is in order to show the Forms of the synthesis of the elements of thought. [...] No pure *Icons* represent anything but Forms; no pure Forms are represented by anything but *Icons*" (Peirce 1906: 513). The problems:

(1) From the point of view of information theory and of cognitive science in general one simply can not accept the existence of a perception that does not convey any information for the perceiver!

(2) And in many cases it is of course the form of what we perceive that indicates how we might interpret it. This applies to “form” in a very concrete sense, as in the “form” of the imprints in the sand indicating a certain causer (a man, a bird, or a worm) and the way it moved, as well as to, e.g., the “form” of sentences indicating a certain meaning and a certain intention of its utterer. In all of these cases it is the form that offers much of the relevant information. A separately functioning “pure index” “forcing something to be an icon” or forcing us “to regard it as an icon” is a superfluous and rather artificial construction. This construction, as well as the construction of an again “pure” icon representing nothing but a “pure” form, is probably a means to sustain a borderline between the *index* and the *icon* at least in a mathematical world behind our perceptual world.

The elimination of the index from *sign* and from sign-specific functions allows, however, to view indexicality as a cognitive principle not only pervading but also transcending the world of sign (Fenk 2004). This principle is also effective at the “interface” between inference, which is the essential function of our cognitive system, and reference, which is the essential function of language (Fenk and Fenk-Oczlon 2007).

3.2 Indexicality within and beyond semiotics

Grice (1957) and Sperber and Wilson (1986) thoroughly investigated the role of inferences in language understanding. But the intimate relationship between inferential and referential interpretation can be shown on even more general and more basic levels: Our cognitive system is an inferential machinery. Its essential function is the extraction and construction of patterns and regularities (Brunswik 1957). Anticipation plays doubly a role in the build-up of such nomological knowledge:

within a hypothesis-testing “method” (evaluation of expectations) in everyday life, and, rather systematically, in empirical science.

as the biologically essential goal of making events better foreseeable (Fenk 1986: 212). Such knowledge is a presupposition not only for the anticipation but also for the reconstruction of patterns of events, within and beyond communication (Fenk and Vanoucek 1992: 20).

Both the development and the application of such nomothetical knowledge requires “indexical” assumptions or interpretations, i.e., interpretations of something as indicating something else, such as associated

features and events, causes and consequences, agents and intentions. Such inferences are enhanced by a referential system that offers prefabricated expressions for specific phenomena such as specific “causes and consequences”, “agents and intentions”, and they are required for developing a “theory of mind” and for efficient “mind-reading”.

Pattern recognition is not only required for the identification of, e.g., icons and the detection of similarities between them and the represented, but also beyond any referential or representational system, such as in the “indexical similarity” between a bird’s toes and their imprints in the sand. The respective inferential machinery is older and more fundamental than language but is even required for the identification of words – the symbols absolute in Peirce! – within the speech record (Zacks and Hasher 2002) and for the extraction of possible rules for the use of these words (Wittgenstein 1933).

Notes

1. In this quotation, the explication of the “symbol” seems to be rather an amalgamation of the *symbol* in Peirce and Saussurean ideas of the arbitrariness of the symbol.
2. To discriminate between artificial and natural indices (as in Langer 1942) and eliminate only the latter from *sign* would not solve the problems since the remaining “artificial indices” in terms of Langer turn out to be nothing but conventional symbols (Fenk 1998, 2004).

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Héctor Fernández Babillo

Understanding mysticism in music

A dialogue between Joaquín Rodrigo and Saint Francis of Assisi

Here I try to investigate the way in which mysticism is musically conveyed in several pieces by Joaquín Rodrigo. It is therefore not an attempt to elucidate the religious convictions of the composer, but simply a descriptive account of the mechanisms he employs to represent the mystic dimension of texts. I will refer to the figure of the Italian, Saint Francis of Assisi (1882–1226) and the several renditions of that figure as portrayed in Rodrigo's vocal works. More specifically, I will analyze the relation between music and text in the following pieces: *Cántico de San Francisco de Asís* (Chant of Saint Francis of Assisi), *Lo violi de Sant Francesc* (The Violin of Saint Francis) and *Sant Francesc i la cigala* (Saint Francis and the Cicada).

As a brief introduction we can provide some notes on the depiction of the different pieces. The *Cántico* is an oratorio based on a poem by the Italian saint; the second and third pieces are part of a trilogy named *Triptic de Mosén Cinto* (Father Jacinto's Triptych). The genesis of the *Cántico* is described in the following:

Father Merino came to visit us at the beginning of 1981. He was a very erudite Franciscan, very nice, and he was accompanied by Juan Ignacio Pombo, the famous aviator, already retired. They told us about the eighth hundred centenary of Saint Francis of Assisi's birth, which was going to take place in the fall of 1982. With that motive, they wanted to commission Joaquín to write an oratorio based on a poem by the Saint. Joaquín accepted almost without any insistence, since both of us felt a predilection for the "poverello" [nickname of the Saint], friend of the forest animals and the country flowers.

Joaquín was very enthusiastic about the poem part of *Floreccillas* – pointed out by Father Merino, and some months later the Oratorio was finished under the title of *Cántico de San Francisco*. (Kahmi: 300, my translation)

By contrast, the triptych was an earlier piece (1936) based on three poems by the Catalan writer – usually referred to as one of the last mystic poets – Jacinto Verdaguer (1845–1902). Nevertheless, he also recreates the life of Saint Francis of Assisi. The first of the three pieces, *The Sacred Harp*, is the most mystical of all the poems, based on biblical content. Although this piece is not specifically related to the Italian saint, it will provide us with a parallel example for the present analysis. The second piece (*The Violin of Saint Francis*) narrates a miraculous event in which the Saint is able to play two pieces of wood as if they were a violin from which great music emanates. The last piece (*Saint Francis and the Cicada*) is more contemplative and relates the dialogue of Saint Francis with a cicada, who symbolically answers with the onomatopoeic sound “zigaluzet” (Chirr... Chirr..., in Catalan).

Therefore, three different renditions of mysticism are represented in these musical characterizations of St. Francis. In parallel, they embody an emblematic leveling that shifts from a transcendental plane into a more ordinary and natural stage. The first piece deals with celestial content (the words of the saint praising the greatness of God) while the second is more down to earth, in a nativity scene (but with a miraculous moment); finally, the third piece takes place on a common day and does not involve any extraordinary element.

Does this gradation have any influence on the musical renditions of Joaquín Rodrigo? To answer this question we will consider the harmonic backdrop of the different pieces. If we analyze the harmonic foundations of the *Cántico*, we realize that the tonality is unclear from the very beginning. The overall key of the piece is D minor, but already in the opening theme, several harmonic options are available (see Example 1).



Example 1. Rodrigo, *Cántico*, opening.

Throughout the piece, we find abundant resources that promote tonal ambiguity or that attempt to evoke ancient styles of composition, in accordance with the time frame surrounding Saint Francis. Examples of these techniques can be found in the use of superimposed chords (as well as complex chords without a clear tonal function), the avoidance of thirds (and fifths) in the construction of chords (see Examples 2 and 3), or imitations in fourths and fifths (Ex. 4).

Example 2 shows two staves of music. The upper staff features a melodic line with eighth-note patterns and a piano (*p*) dynamic marking. The lower staff consists of chords, some of which are superimposed or complex, with a piano (*p*) dynamic marking.

Example 2.

Example 3 displays three staves of music. Each staff contains complex chordal structures, often with superimposed notes, and a piano (*p*) dynamic marking.

Example 3.

Example 4 presents a vocal score with four parts: Soprano (S.), Alto (C.), Tenor (T.), and Bass (B.). The lyrics are in Spanish: "Yel es be-llo y ra-dian-te con gran es-pen-dor; de ti, al-tí-si-mo, be-lloradían-te con". The score includes a forte (*f*) dynamic marking and a common time signature.

Example 4.

In a similar way, we find a parallel treatment in the piece *L'arpa sagrada*, the first in the *Tríptico de Mosén Cinto*. Though not based on the life of St. Francis, it nevertheless bears an intense mystic character, based in biblical content related to the “sacred harp” of David. In this case, modality that plays a more important role in the distortion of harmony, and the general concept of tonal ambiguity accordingly remains as a tool to convey the implications of the text.

Our second piece, *The Violin of Saint Francis*, represents a step down in the development of the image of mysticism we are developing. The general background of the piece narrates an “earthly” nativity scene. The orchestra recreates a festive atmosphere, and the harmony will become tonally centered in the key of E Major. However, the significant point of this episode arrives when the miracle of Saint Francis occurs, a moment in which the saint is able to produce great music from two pieces of wood, playing them as if they were a violin. Only at this miraculous moment does the key change purposefully and drastically, from E Major to Bb minor, responding to the logic of the overall harmonic scheme developed by Rodrigo. In this line, all the tonal instability and modulations begin to take place precisely before the miracle, preparing the harmonic Bb minor climax which will last for just fifteen bars (see Example 5).

The image displays a musical score for a piano piece. It consists of two systems of music. The first system shows a piano introduction with a treble clef staff containing complex chords and a bass clef staff with a rhythmic accompaniment. The second system features a vocal line in the treble clef staff and piano accompaniment in the bass clef staff. The key signature changes from E Major (three sharps) to Bb minor (two flats). The vocal line begins with the lyrics "Lo vi - o - lí des frei - xe, l'ar - quit d'un". Dynamic markings include *mf* (mezzo-forte) for the vocal line and *p* (piano) for the piano accompaniment.

Example 5 a.

17 *poco meno mosso* *rit.*
 brot de pi, mes en ses mans sa - gra - - des gran

(*rit.*) *assai* *pp* 18
 mú - si - ca en sor - tí. ò No n'ha d'ei - xir de mú - si -

arp. lento

Example 5 b.

The final stage in our analysis of Rodrigo's delineation of mysticism will be represented in *Saint Francis and the Cicada*, which stands as the most descriptive of all the pieces. The beginning resembles the sound of the cicada in the early morning, with its infinite tremolo in the woods. In this last piece, the tonality will be very well established, with an unambiguous C Major that the composer uses as a contemplative key for the recreation of nature. In this musical episode, the composer emulates the sound of birds (Ex. 6) and makes use of a rhythmic motive for the cicada chirping (Ex. 7). Despite some animation when the cicada sings the "song of summer", Rodrigo always keeps a meditative atmosphere that is harmonically represented by a lack of tonal modulation.

Even from this brief analysis of the different pieces, we can withdraw some initial conclusions that shed a little light on the resources used by Rodrigo in order to portray mysticism. The most interesting conclusion is the coherent use of tonality as a functional tool that represents attachment



Examples 6 and 7.

to the real world. The disengagement from a focal tonal key represents in the different pieces a voyage towards mysticism while tonal stability links the music to the more down-to-earth scenes described by the text. Consequently, the *Cántico* (as happens with *L'harpa sagrada*) is the most ambiguous in tonal terms. At an intermediate level, *Lo violi de Sant Francesc* is tonally well established, but the key is intentionally changed at the moment of the miracle. Finally, *Sant Francesc i la cigala* stands as the most descriptive and contemplative of all, bestowed with a very stable and consistent tonality. In general, we can appreciate that the text leads the articulation of the music, but the mystic dimension of the texts is intrinsically developed by means of harmony, bringing about an emblematic levelling of the pieces. Although this brief study is a rough draft, it establishes an important foundation for the “dialogue” between Joaquín Rodrigo and Saint Francis of Assisi, providing interesting insights on the coherent construction of the works by the composer and opening the ground for further, more extensive analyses.

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Vladimir Feshchenko

Semiotics and the avant-garde as two ways of sign-making and sense-making

As Eero Tarasti pointed out in the opening speech to the 9th Semiotics Congress, “semiotics has kept itself as the avant-garde of sciences. It has always been looking forward, aspiring for the new, discovering new territories, asking new questions, making new explorations.” In this paper I undertake to unfold this metaphor of *semiotics as avant-garde* and, moreover, go so far as to literalize this metaphor. I will dwell upon some common features of semiotics and the avant-garde as two complementary fields of creative thinking and as two ways of operating with signs.

Whereas semiotics is mainly considered a *science* of signs, the avant-garde represents a particular form of creativity, an assembly of *artistic* practices. In a general sense, the term avant-garde is usually referred to all new and experimental views, ideas, movements, schools and works by individual artists of the twentieth century (the term Avant-Garde is capitalized hereinafter when it refers to this broader meaning). The “avant-garde condition” – a term coined by the contemporary Russian avant-garde poet Gennadiy Aygi – or “avant-gardeness” as such, could be best described by the words of Kazimir Malevich (2003: 132) from the 1/42 *Non-objectiveness* manifesto dating from the 1920s: “Man has shifted to new circumstances and must create a new form of new relationships.” This is a truly semiotic statement, indeed, which correlates with the three semiotic dimensions, the new circumstances standing for semantics, the new form – for syntactics, and the new relationships – for pragmatics. Here the avant-garde way of thinking coincides with the semiotic way of thinking. The Avant-Garde, as Mikhail Epstein has noted (1988: 399), is “the operative semiotics of arts, its decomposition into signifying elements, conceptual patterns ... The avant-garde is the constantly increasing awareness of art in what it might be, the pure

logics and semiotics of possible artistic worlds.” So, creative semiosis is understood here as inherent to an avant-garde act of thinking and creating (see Stepanov et al. 2006; Stepanov 2006; Sirotkin 2006; Feshchenko 2007; Latifić 2007). The same idea – the idea of the semiotic triad – was repeated in a slightly different wording by another avant-garde author, Vladimir Mayakovsky, in his article *Two Chekhovs* (1914). Inquiring into what shifts take place in the new poetry of the Avant-Garde, Mayakovsky (1955: 301) distinguishes three points:

What are the shifts taking place with the laws of words?

- the shift of relation of the word to the object, from the word viewed as a digit pointing precisely at the signified object, to the word as symbol, the word as object-in-itself;
- the shift of relation of the word to the word, a word to another word. The speeding-up tempo of life has laid a road from period as syntactic unit to the ragged syntax;
- the shift of relation to the word. Enlargement of the vocabulary with new words.

In this passage by the Russian futurist poet we can clearly pinpoint the basic semiotic properties of a sign as defined by Peirce and Morris. It is very doubtful that Mayakovsky was aware of semiotic studies originating from the West at practically the same time. Now, all this is not meant to show the originality of Mayakovsky, but rather to draw closer attention to some parallel intellectual trends and techniques which could bring together semiotics and the Avant-Garde. These two disciplines – the Avant-Garde could also be called a discipline in a way – being juxtaposed, at first glance look like an “encounter of a sewing machine and an umbrella on a dissection table”, using Lautréamont’s well-known metaphor. But some deeper insight into the nature of the two fields can reveal some very common frameworks, tools, and procedures. One of these is theoretical activity, the other a practical one; semiotics and the Avant-Garde share some similar or even identical ways of operating with signs.

Many avant-garde art and literary practices of early twentieth century were closely intertwined with theorizing about signs. The Avant-Garde revolution was to a considerable degree a semiotic revolution, or a “semi-quake”. The very grounds of communication and semiosis were undermined, and the categories of sign and language were reconsidered. Julia

Kristeva (1984) calls this the revolution in poetic language, considering the Avant-Garde in Marxist, Freudian and Peircean terms. But what she is doing in her book is analyzing the poetic texts of Avant-Garde from a semiotic perspective. What I would like to do here is to touch upon some semiotic ideas contained in Russian avant-garde writings, on the one hand, and to show the avant-gardeness of some scholarly semiotic writings, on the other.

The so called “linguistic turn” in the late nineteenth – early twentieth century was a crucial factor that influenced greatly the situation in European culture of the latter century. Unprecedented was the interest that many intellectuals at the turn of the century took in the category of language and other sign systems. This interest was reflected in numerous experiments, both scientific and artistic, in language construction and language creativity. This linguistic turn was finalized in Martin Heidegger’s formulation, “Language is the house of being”, enunciated in the opening page of his 1947 *Letter on Humanism*. Thus, a totally new format of thinking and creativity came into being: the format determined by language. Even theological thought could not avoid this linguistic turn. I would like to mention in this regard such Russian thinkers as Pavel Florensky, Alexei Losev, and Sergei Bulgakov. These three authors are considered the major originators of the “philosophy of the name” in Russian thought. And all three contributed much to the semiotic discussions of their time, namely regarding such categories as the term, the image, the symbol and the divine name (Stepanov 1985; Ivanov 1999; Kusse 2007; cf. Ioffe 2007).

This Russian tradition of semiotics was a bright representative of the linguistic turn in humanities and arts of the early twentieth century. And what was specific about this tradition, in comparison with the western mainstream semiotic tradition, was its greater concern for deep and spiritual knowledge rather than the positive knowledge practiced by Pierce, Saussure and others following them. I call this tradition *deep semiotics*, or semiotics of the inner self (Feshchenko 2006). By deep semiotics I mean the extension of the theory of sign systems by way of the personal-logical dimension of sign-making and sense-making. This kind of semiotic approach takes into account the truly human and personal self-determination. Since the self and the mind of the self are the source, the means, and the result of producing sense, this dimension could be called personal, or self-referential. This approach allows to shift from the two-dimensional

consideration of a sign system, to the stereometrical one, which gives that semiosis a depth perspective; hence the term “deep semiotics” (cf. Brandt 1989). This Russian tradition is very poorly known among semioticians. Everybody knows Yuri Lotman and Mikhail Bakhtin, but these two scholars are only the later successors to this line of thought. I would like to refer here to just two major representatives of this covert tradition.

The first is Gustav Shpet (1879–1937) who was a philosopher by education and profession. He was actually educated in Germany, being a disciple of Husserl (see Haardt 1993). He is mainly known for his phenomenological papers. Actually the only book by him translated into English so far is *Appearance and Sense* (Shpet 1991, published in Russian in 1914), which is a study of phenomenology. He also produced some writings on hermeneutics (in German; see Špet 1993), and this is where Shpet becomes interesting for a semiotician. Shpet’s most well-known book is called *Inner Form of the Word* (1927). This book dwells upon the particular importance of inner forms in poetic semiosis. Inner forms, in Shpet’s view, have a direct relation to the subject of semiosis, the creator, or “persona creans”, as he puts it in Latin. What we experience in the language of art, he claims, is the subjective expression. So the artistic semiosphere is primarily a sphere of subjectivity. And semiotic procedures in poetry, for example, constitute a dynamic process, a process of gradual evolution from inner forms to outer forms. This is a very important idea, indeed. It brings us closer to understanding the semiotics of poetry, and semiotics of artistic creativity in general. Shpet was the first Russian scholar to mention the term semiotics, by which he meant (2005: 476) a “general ontological study of signs”. As early as 1916 Shpet used this term in his work *History as the Subject of Logic* (published 1922). Thinking of how the historical cognition operates, he argued the following (1922: 247):

The historical cognition is never exclusively the sensual or the rational cognition, neither it is cognition of inner or outer experience, but it is always cognition presuming understanding and interpretation as the means of understanding. This kind of cognition may be called semiotic cognition.

In Shpet’s main semiotic writing, the book called *Language and Sense*, dating from the 1920s, he traces back the origins of semiotic thinking and lays the foundations for new semiotics, by which he means the science of understanding signs. It is here that Shpet speaks of the ontological study

of a sign, calling this study semiotics, or else “characterics”, and raising the issue of the *semiotic mind*. The sad thing is that many of Shpet’s writings have gone unpublished until recently; for example, the semiotic treatise I am speaking about was published in Moscow only in 2005 (Shpet 2005). So very much is still to discover in his semiotic studies, and I wish these works someday would be translated into European languages.

Another person to be noted in this context is Andrei Bely (1880–1934), a well-known Russian poet representing the symbolist movement, but a less-known semiotician, too. His main work of interest is titled *Thought and Language* (1911). In this essay Bely gives a consideration of symbolism in poetic language. Poetry, according to him, is the transformation of thought through a specific image expressed in the word, or else, it is the creation of an expanded meaning with the help of a single yet complex word symbol (Bely 2006: 206):

The connection between the sound form with the inner form constitutes the lively symbolism of language. The inner form is blossoming in the poetic symbol, it is reflected in a multitude of indirect senses present in the sound of the word, the word becomes here an autonomous symbol.

All these ideas may sound quite trivial today, considering semiotics of literature’s long and successful trek throughout the last century. Why I am dealing here with Andrei Bely’s thoughts, is because he was one of the first people that not only contemplated some semiotic ideas, but also put them into effect in his practice as a poet and prose writer. And he was indeed one of the first avant-gardists, too, being a prominent semiotic thinker at the same time.

I’d like to mention here that the Russian Avant-garde as a whole was characterized by a high degree of theorizing, through manifestos, treatises, autobiographical writings, etc. Moreover, it evidenced a high degree of semiotic consciousness in that the avant-garde writers, painters, filmmakers, theatre performers clearly realized that, while revolutionizing arts and revolutionizing the world, they must take proper care in revolutionizing the old language, and the old semiotic conventions, too (on these matters, see Stepanov et al. 2006). In this respect I can name just a few examples of how avant-garde artists reconsidered the old semiotic conventions.

It is well-known that Roman Jakobson began his scholarly career with studying the poetics of Velimir Khlebnikov (Pomorska et al. 1987; Jakob-

son 1992). But there are few of those who know about the semiotic exercises performed by Khlebnikov himself. His draft materials contain numerous attempts to invent new signs of artistic expression. His “language of the stars” combined the elements of word language, digit language and graphic language. Khlebnikov took a profound interest in artificial languages and based his inventions on semiotic theories of Leibniz and others. His semiotic way of thinking is well expressed in a quotation from *Boards of Fate*, a Khlebnikov opus magnum (2000: 49): “We should look around, look into, measure, and tag the signs of our thinking across the countries of the being, shifting the trenches of knowledge.”

Another key figure in respect of the semiotic Avant-Garde is Wassily Kandinsky, who was, *inter alia*, a prominent theoretician of arts. In his theory he came very close to Gustav Shpet’s ideas of the inner form. He called his main artistic principle the *principle of internal relevance*. A work of art, according to Kandinsky, is a combination of the external and the internal elements, the contents and the form, which are bound together inseparably and relevantly. From this basic principle Kandinsky derives a whole system of basic elements of painting, which form a specific sign system of that art (Kandinsky 2006). The semiotic way of thinking may be well illustrated by Kandinsky’s analysis of a point as a semiotic sign and artistic element. He visualizes, for instance, how a point as a full stop in a written speech sequence transforms itself into a point, as a spot in the language of painting. The point, according to Kandinsky, has the semantics of a nil, or a nought, and at the same time it bears the highest degree of brevity and reservedness, signifying the connection between speech and silence. Thus, we can clearly see how the artist’s avant-garde experiments operate on the two interconnected levels – the semiotic and the metasemiotic.

The last figure I’d like to mention here is neither a poet nor a painter. He is a director and theatrical performer. I’m speaking about Sergei Eisenstein. The recent publication of his previously unpublished materials (2002; 2003) reveal an outstanding semiotician, primarily in his quest for the definition of filmmaking method. In his writings and graphics he experiments with various types of signs; his later writings abound with different signs and his commentaries on them.

To finish, I would like to draw attention to yet one more significant aspect of semiotics and the Avant-Garde. It concerns the topic of this

Congress, that is, understanding and, more importantly, misunderstanding. Making of a sign and making sense as the key semiotic procedures are also the key instruments of creating an avant-garde work of art, as well as the key tools for understanding an Avant-Garde work of art. The two other subprocedures specific to Avant-Garde creativity are making a non-sign (a zero sign) and making non-sense (absurdity). These two latter semiotic techniques are most expressly and radically represented in the work of Alexander Vvedensky, a Russian absurdist poet from the OBERIU circle, and Anton Webern, a musical composer. The non-signs, or “semiotic silence”, as defined by Jakov Druskin (2004: 735), constitute a very interesting semiotic field, which is connected with the problem of misunderstanding as a positive notion, not a negative one. Vvedensky himself calls this kind of misunderstanding the “wide misunderstanding”, or the “wild misunderstanding”. This state of semiotic silence in absurd poetry and music presumes that it is not the meanings that are meaningful, but rather that the gaps and the boundaries between meanings are meaningful. This is what misunderstanding in this sense is about.

Summarizing, I'd like to stress again that the Avant-garde and semiotics could be viewed as different manifestations of similar practices. In avant-garde artistic practices the semiotic consciousness carries considerable importance. At the same time, semiotic theories demonstrate some features of avant-garde thinking. The concept of sign itself, as I tried to show, was approached in the Russian Avant-Garde from different angles but in similar ways, both in artistic practices and academic studies. Thus the Avant-Garde could be thought of as an operational semiotics of arts. Semiotics, in its turn, could be understood not only as a science of signs, but also as semiotic activity in a broader sense, in the sense of Roland Barthes, who thought of it as “activité structurale”, and in the sense of Julia Kristeva who claimed (2004: 55) that “semiotics is always an open research, a critique always referred to itself, in other words – self-critique”.

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Riccardo Fusaroli

The screen and the voice

1. Introduction

The Internet and the Web are valuable tools for making services and information easily available. But if we think of disabled people – the blind, for example – this potential value seems to disappear. How can a blind person browse a website? There is software for reading the screen and translating two dimensional pages into vocal streams. But this is not enough, since the result is often a confusing list of sentences and lexical items without any intelligible order. This paper aims at untangling some of the deep misunderstandings leading to this situation, with the aim of contributing to the formation of good practices in removing barriers to disabled people trying to access web services and information.

From a semiotic point of view this is a fruitful arena for a model of the text not as already shaped, static and crystallized, but as course of semiotic action. Different perceptual, interactive and interpretative practices act in concert on the same informational items, leading to very different meaning configurations and experiences. This paper has thus the double aim of tackling a real problem in web development, by showing how important aspects of communication risk neglect without the semiotic gaze; and by highlighting the fruitfulness of the interpretative approach to semiotics as opposed to other models, in describing the actual development of meaning configurations.

After a brief introduction to issues of disability, a semiotic analysis of the accessibility for blind users of www.europa.eu is presented below. Taking categories from Peirce and theories of semantic perception, the analysis compares the structures of meaning emerging in the browsing practices of sighted and blind users. Two detailed fragments are reported together with the final results of a more comprehensive analysis.

2. *What is at stake with the issue of web accessibility?*

A UN declaration is quite helpful in defining the problem:

The term “handicap” means the loss or limitation of opportunities to take part in the life of the community on an equal level with others. It describes the encounter between the person with a disability and the environment. The purpose of this term is to emphasize the focus on the shortcomings in the environment and in many organized activities in society, for example, information, communication and education, which prevent persons with disabilities from participating on equal terms. (U.N. Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities)

A disability is thus only a potential – not a necessary – handicap. A disability is a functional limitation within the individual caused by physical, mental or sensory impairment, whereas a handicap occurs when there is the loss or limitation of opportunities to take part in the normal life of the community on an equal level with others, because of physical and social barriers. Thus, to avoid a handicap we do not need to negate the disability; rather, we need to ensure an equal, or better, analogous participation, which acknowledges the difference created by the disability. This acknowledgement is important in the avoidance of creating a handicap. Let us take the example of jobs for disabled people in Italy. When the clear handicap of disabled people in finding jobs was acknowledged, laws were issued, forcing Public Administrations and companies over a certain size to employ a certain percentage of disabled workers. Unfortunately, this did not solve the issue. Since the differences created by disabilities were not properly acknowledged, there were (and still are) many problems. Many employed disabled people did not produce value for their employers and in many cases felt useless and unhappy with their jobs. The need arose to find duties both useful to society and adequate to the competences of the disabled.

At last, some programs are starting to deal with the education of disabled people, to ensure a more aware and daily interaction of “normal” people with disabled ones, and thus to inject diversity into the “normal” practices of life. How does this apply to web accessibility? The next paragraph will explain how an acknowledgement of the differences of disabled people is needed in practices of assessment.

3. *Assessment of accessibility*

Most European countries have created laws to ensure the right of disabled people to access public services and information in their online versions. To ensure this right a certain amount of formal requirements are listed, usually based on the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) produced by the Web Accessibility Initiative (WAI, <http://www.w3.org/WAI/>), part of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), whose duty is to produce documentation and recommendations for the development of an accessible web. The immediate effect has been the development of automatic validators: software able to check the formal requisites of accessibility of a given website and to grant the right to exhibit a certification of accessibility.

A better reading of the guidelines would have raised doubts about these certifications. Many instructions had a more discursive explanation, pointing to the qualitative aspects of accessibility. Let us take an example: “Provide a text equivalent for every non-text element”. The automatic validators will thus check to see if every image has a verbal alternative. The problem is that a given image should not simply have a verbal alternative, but given it should have a verbal alternative with an analogous communicational value. This kind of equivalence cannot be checked by any software. In fact, a second version of the Guidelines (WCAG 2.0) has been (and still is) in progress for many years, trying to overcome the limitations of the first guidelines and better consider their reception and application.

WCAG 2.0 bases its instructions on four basic principles: (1) *Perceivability* – Information and user interface components must be perceivable by users; (2) *Operability* – User interface components must be operable by users; (3) *Understandability* – Information and operation of user interface must be understandable by users; (4) *Robustness* – Content must be robust enough that it can be interpreted reliably by a wide variety of user agents, including assistive technologies.

Even if these principles try to be way more qualitative than the ones in the first version, they still carry the seeds of a deep misunderstanding. The four principles are taking for granted an engineer-like model of communication (Shannon and Weaver 1949): there are some informations meant to be codified and transmitted, there is a medium that could distort them, there is a process of decoding. While not having the space here to high-

light the inner limitations of such a model, some weaknesses of its application to this situation can be emphasised. Certainly making a web site accessible requires to make sure that every single piece of relevant information is accessible by the user. But this is by no means enough. The meaning of every single sign, token, word, even morpheme, deeply resonates with the wider meaning configuration that is unfolding in the browsing practice of the user: a local configuration of meaning emerges on a ground of expectations raised by the genre of the website and previously established inferences.

To be fair, this could be implied in the principle of understanding (Guideline 3.1): “Make text content readable and understandable”. Unfortunately, the principle is operatively translated into specifying the language of the page and occasional verbal utterances in different languages; the need is felt to explain unusual words and abbreviations, and to use short words and simple syntax. But a verbal occurrence resonates according to its position on the page, to the connotations created by graphic elements, to its possible echoes with a given image and so on. When a screen reader linearises the page and substitutes images with textual alternatives, its position and its echoes can drastically change, and thus understandability can be compromised.

We need clear criteria, but the ones available are not enough. It is time to put semiotics in action to show how a similar approach to the ongoing practice of browsing of a website can go much deeper into problems of meaning (and misunderstandings).

4. The case study: www.europa.eu




Figure 1. Splash page.



Figure 2. Home Page .

The European Union enthusiastically promotes web accessibility, both through recommendations and campaigns of sensibilisation. The EU website has a team dedicated to making it accessible. Nevertheless, several barriers for blind users browsing the website emerge – barriers that, ironically, can be found even in the alternative “text version” of the website, which is designed specifically for disabled people in general and blind ones in particular.

4.1 The semiotic perspective

Saussure claimed that the value of linguistic elements is always constituted by an internal and an external aspect. Economic value of a coin emerges from the fact that it can be exchanged with other coins (internal value) or used to buy something (external value). Similarly, linguistic (and thus semiotic) values are not simply immanent to language but are also dependent on the way they are used, the way they are embedded in a wider semiotic practice. One perspective, developed in the work of Rastier (2001) and Cadiot and Visetti (2001), does not imply an account of the idiosyncratic experience of the single user, but an account of intersubjectively sedimented practices, or in Peircean terms: concatenations of habits.


Analysing the website, we are taking into account two different semiotic phenomena. On one hand we have the visual version of the website, which is two dimensional, built with a complex mix of verbal and graphic elements and with specific perceptual saliences and kinetic affordances. On the other hand, the vocal stream generated by the screen reader, is developed in the temporal dimension, with different saliences. Moreover, both “normal” and blind users browse the web in different ways and with different expectations. Even if the verbal elements of the website are more or less the same, the meaning experienced is very different. Thus, a multi-component approach should not be an option. Semiosis is a continuous and pervasive process already structuring any emerging meaningful event. This happens through the structuring activity of habits, “general law[s] of action, such that on a certain general kind of occasion a man will be more or less apt to act in a certain general way” (C.P. 2.148).

Thus our analysis required sketching the expectations aroused by the genre of the website (information website, institutional portal); the users’ mind-sets (e.g. in the case of blind people, annoyance at the excessive use

of images); and the competences of users as related to the specificities of the text. Moreover, these established habits and framings are continuously remodulated through the unfolding of the semiotic phenomenon itself, in which local relations are established and new habits emerge to be used as premises of further interpretation processes. Thus, it is possible to describe the local configuration of meaning as a diagram, that is, as a particular configuration of more general relations, which “represents the probable course of experience” (C.P. 2.169) and which can be manipulated for further interpretative action (NEM 4). To quote Visetti and Cadiot (2001): “to perceive [meaning, in our case] is always to sketch a sense that is not developed if not in a path, in an activity of thematisation in which identities are made and unmade.”

A text is not a static entity; it is always already imbued and defined by the interpretative practice in which it unfolds. This conception makes it possible to explain how semiotic configurations continuously modulate a field of interpretative and pragmatic habits, in which semic structures and underlying isotopies are established. For reasons of space, we shall isolate only two fragments of the website, to better display these mechanisms, while remaining aware that processes of meaning emergence involve the whole website.

4.2 The path to become a European citizen

Visual version	Vocal version
 <p>DISCOVER THE EU</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> . The EU at a glance . Europe is fun! . Europe and Young People . Easy Reading Corner . Languages: Europe's asset <p>LIVING IN THE EU</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Your rights . Travelling . Studying . Working <p>INTERACT WITH THE EU</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Your direct line . The EU in your country . Contact the Ombudsman 	<p>Graphic Discover the EU List of six items bullet link The EU at a glance bullet link Learn Europe by playing bullet link Europe and Young People bullet link Read about Europe bullet link Languages [colon] Europe's asset bullet link Speak a new language List end</p> <p>Graphic Living in the EU List of four items bullet link Your rights bullet link Travelling bullet link Studying bullet link Working List end</p> <p>Graphic Interact with the EU List of five items bullet link Your direct line bullet link Contact your MEP bullet link Europe near you bullet link Discussion corner bullet link Contact the Ombudsman List end</p>


Let us start with the visual part. Each list presents itself as a significant *Gestalt* (comp. Geninasca 1997), due also to its colour-configurations. This *Gestalt* has a complex semantic articulation to be deciphered not only in its internal structure but also as resonating wider meaning configurations. Through the first list, a semantic figure of the EU is established as related to youth and being new (“discover”, “playing”, “young”, “new”), where learning about it is positively characterised as easy and funny (“discover”, “at a glance”, “playing”). These semantic configurations play a big role in the following actualizations of meaning. “Living in the EU” does not necessarily imply a positive connotation, but the opportunity is easily seen as positive, due to the semantic habits constructed in the previous sequence, a positivity further established in “rights”, “travelling” “studying”, “working”. The positivity is unfolded in different ways, certainly, but that is the nature of habit – as understood here. From the many that Peirce proposed, we choose a flexible regularity, and not a rule relying on a static type. The isotopies (redundancies of semantic units) thus inferred are not necessarily homogeneous, but can present gradients and variations.

Before analysing the third list, we can observe how the ongoing interpretative practice that defines the development of the website as a semiotic phenomenon continuously modulates between enunciative and enunciated figures, making them emerge from a texturing that keeps them together. On one hand we have: the EU as a semiotic instance of enunciation of the website, the website and the represented EU. Who is giving out the information? The website or the EU? The EU produces the website as its official delegate on the web. Discovering the information on the website is also discovering the EU, and the information disclosed on the website is part of the opportunities given by EU. On the other hand we have: the user as a semiotic instance of interaction and interpretation of the website and the subject represented in her/his potential interaction with EU. The user is seeking information by interacting with the website/EU. There is the representation of a subject getting information and interacting with the EU, and this activity is represented as funny, easy and leading to deeper involvement. Moreover, this subject is sometimes impersonal (“Living in Europe”), sometimes, when more clearly positive, directly identified with the user (“Your rights”). The third sequence pushes this blending further. The interaction is more direct and aware (“interact”, “direct”, “near”, “discussion”). Thus, the evolving characterization of the subject emerge in

a *Gestalt* that we could ironically call a *Bildungsroman*, creating a slight resistance to the completion of this path by the user. From light play and fun, we move to the aware and active embodiment of a democratic European citizenship.

When we take into account the vocal version of the fragment, a similar path can be noticed. If the continuous reference to paratextual elements (“bullets”) can be annoying, it does not make a huge difference in the local configuration of meaning. Even worse is the identification of titles as graphics. A blind user does not know that these elements are titles. S/he has to guess the potential content of the image, and must reconstruct the potential role of thematic title of the verbal equivalents, thus detaching her/his decreasingly effortless experience from the portrayed experience of the subject in interaction with the EU.

4.3 Actuality and media: Sketching the face of Europe

	<p>1000 Debates for Europe Fighting against AIDS José Manuel Durão Barroso, President designate of the European Commission</p>
<p>THE EU DAY BY DAY 17/07/2004</p> <p>Commission adopts decision to pay additional euro forty two million to the Global Fund to accelerate the fight against H I V slash AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria in developing link countries The new instruments for the reformed Cohesion Policy 2007-2013 The Commission proposes new Education, MEDIA, Culture and Youth programmes for 2007-2013</p> <p>▶ All the news...</p>	
<p>Graphic In the spotlight Graphic Indian women reading headlines on AIDS List of three items bullet link one thousand Debates for Europe bullet link Fighting against AIDS bullet link José Manuel Durão Barroso, President designate of the European Commission List end</p> <p>Graphic The EU day by day sixteen slash zero seven slash two thousand four List of three items bullet link Commission adopts decision to pay additional € 42 million to the Global Fund to accelerate the fight against H I V slash AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria in developing link countries bullet link The new instruments for the reformed Cohesion Policy two thousand seven dash two thousand thirteen bullet link The Commission proposes new Education, MEDIA, Culture and Youth programmes for two thousand seven dash two thousand thirteen List end</p>	

These sequences – apparently unrelated to the previously analysed ones – can further highlight the harmonic resonance of the habits established in

the ongoing interpretative practice with the local meaning configurations. Humanitarian issues emerge right away: women related to India related to HIV. The distance and exoticism of India for a European audience, and the importance of the problem of HIV – these clamour for more than an individual involvement, calling for a more social response. This called-for involvement is disseminated on more levels. We have (1) the portrayal of media highlighting the news and (2) Indian women reading it; (3) all this portrayed on the EU website that we are reading (calling for further involvement by the user). To this call to arms, there is also an immediate answer from the EU. First it portrays the emergence acknowledging the problem, the (portrayed) call of the media, then a (portrayed) active role in fighting it. In a way this resonates with the development of the subject in the previous paragraph: first as receiving information and acknowledging the issues, then as discussing and acting. This parallelism is strengthened by the recurrence of previous semantic relations (“debates”, culture and youth related actions) and by references to the democratic nature (and thus the relation with the citizen) of the EU portrayed in the “designate” president.

These mechanisms recur in the structure of the home page of the EU, in its daily metamorphoses. I will give as just one example a list that appeared a few months later displaying analogous structures:

- “bullet link Climate Change bullet link Lisbon Strategy bullet link Justice and Home”
- “bullet link Emission trading: Commission clears eight more plans paving the way for trade to start as planned bullet link High Representative Javier Solana on the worrisome situation in Belarus bullet link Ecofin agrees on developing measurement method for administration burden”

Here it is portrayed not only a blending between the user and the subject involved in the EU, but also a potential blending between the user and the EU.

4.4 Results of the complete analyses

4.4.1 *Visual version*

In www.europa.eu one can trace a careful balance between different strategies: divulgence, specialised information, and call to involvement and action. The latter is balanced by the other strategies – highlighting the

positive aspects of interaction with the EU – such as the complex blending of enunciating figures with enunciated ones, as well as the EU and the user. The construction of the citizen in parallel with the EU, through its constitutive diversity, goes on in the background as the information is exchanged, both as an effect and as a motivation to engage in the exchange, but never in an overly invasive way.

4.4.2 Visual text version

The alternative textual version developed to help disable people is quite pointless. For instance, it contains many images, and the text cannot be easily re-sized so as to accommodate the needs of sight-challenged users.

4.4.3 Vocal version

If the vocal version is meant to have similar communicational strategies, its overall effect is very different. The flux of information – vital in the strategic balance previously highlighted – seems to be subjected to tides. The site describes itself as aimed at communication, as a provider of information; nevertheless, at several points the communication suddenly becomes recalcitrant, the mastering of which requires specific competences (often sight or creative abduction). There is repeated use of images, sometimes without any intelligible textual alternative (the splash page and the header are “European Union”), sometimes with uncertain functions (images used as titles on the menu, individuating thematic sections). Thus, the interpretative path is configured as a series of cognitive trials requiring both patience and humility. There is a need for tricky abductions, with the possibility of achieving the premises often denied, thus robbing the use of his/her legitimacy as interpreter, of active involvement in the information flux, and of progressive constitution as European citizen. The user has to solve implicit riddles and accept the handicaps deriving from her/his disability, such as the need to see and/or use a mouse.

These difficulties are acknowledged on a text version of the site. This could in theory be coherent with the ideas developed in the first paragraphs of this paper: to acknowledge disability in order not to change it into a handicap. The problem is that the aforementioned problems do not disappear. If more information is available, many titles are still images, many of

which do not have an appropriate (vocalized) equivalent. The links are not structured in a way that gives users a map of the page. If a special version is offered, the acknowledgement of the difference should be followed by a satisfactory experience. But the long lists of links, the difficulty of getting a map of contents, the many images and riddles – all these bring out negative traits of the disability, thus transforming it into a salient handicap. The power remains in the hands of the website, creating frustration and conflict. Thus the strategies previously highlighted are made in vain, in that they do not correspond to the experiences of blind users.

5. *Conclusions*

This paper has highlighted how crucial misunderstandings can emerge in the context of web accessibility, how obstacles turning a disability into a handicap can emerge from these misunderstandings, and how it is possible to describe effectively the meanings that emerge from different experiences on websites. In the case of www.europa.eu, we have shown how the passage from the visual to the vocal version risks destroying the communicational strategies, by highlighting the very handicaps that it seeks to ameliorate. It is hoped that our analysis can lead to better means of accessing websites. Such means should take into account the semiotic perspective in order to overcome the relative ineffectiveness of alternative textual versions, by focusing on the meaning configurations that in various ways of browsing the web.

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Hugo García

La ontología de los actos de habla y el problema de los universales

Introducción

El problema de los universales se centra en el estatuto ontológico de las entidades abstractas. Como es sabido, Platón resolvió el problema aceptando que dichas entidades son independientes de las entidades individuales, ya que las considera existentes en el mundo de las ideas. Ésta es la postura conocida como “realismo extremo”. La postura contraria se conoce como “nominalismo”, la cual acepta las entidades individuales, y el menor número posible de entidades no individuales, que además pueden ser reducidas a individuos. Hay otra postura, que trata de ser intermedia entre las anteriores: el “realismo moderado”, que establece que los universales son entidades mentales que encuentran su correspondencia en propiedades que son inherentes a los objetos (Beuchot 1997: 7–8).

El problema de la ontología de los actos de habla es, por otra parte, de más reciente planteamiento. Se puede considerar que aparece desde los inicios de la teoría, cuando el mismo John Austin lo pone sobre la mesa al exponer el proceso de constitución de los actos ilocutivos y observar que a éstos les es necesaria una convención, unas circunstancias apropiadas y un proceso que sea llevado a cabo de manera satisfactoria (1975: 14–15).

En este trabajo me centraré en tres autores del campo de la filosofía analítica del siglo XX que se dedicaron a la elucidación tanto del problema de los universales como del problema ontológico de los actos de habla: John L. Austin, John Searle y Peter F. Strawson. Mi objetivo es mostrar que estos autores plantearon en términos muy similares ambos problemas. Además quiero demostrar que las soluciones que aportan no son del todo satisfactorias. Finalmente, expondré la solución dada por Iturrioz Leza (2004) al

problema de los universales, desde el marco de la lingüística operacional y la lingüística del texto, y presentaré una propuesta de aplicación de dicha solución al problema de la ontología de los actos de habla.

1. Austin y Searle: Los actos de habla existen por convención (y los universales también)

Tanto Austin como Searle son nominalistas respecto al problema de los universales. Austin lo formula de la siguiente manera (Austin 1989: 54, énfasis en el original):

Dado que usamos el mismo único *nombre* en cada caso, debe seguramente haber alguna cosa idéntica “allí” en cada caso; algo de lo que el nombre es el nombre; algo, por tanto, que es ‘común’ a todos los *sensa* llamados por ese nombre. Llamemos a esta entidad, independientemente de lo que pueda ser, un “universal”.

Dado que se admitió que las cosas que sentimos son muchas o diferentes, se sigue que este “universal”, que es uno e idéntico, no es *sentido*.

Austin niega que los universales existan y se pronuncia contra una postura realista ingenua. Para Austin los universales no existen como tales, sino que son una elaboración mental. Sin embargo, aunque el universal no existe en sí mismo, tiene cierta “utilidad” hablar de universales.

En un cierto sentido quizás sea *a veces* inocente hablar de ‘universales’ o de ‘conceptos’; justamente como es *a veces* conveniente hablar de ‘proposiciones’, y es muy frecuentemente conveniente usar el “lenguaje de objetos materiales” ... Pero en resumidas cuentas hay notablemente poco que decir a favor de los “universales”, incluso como una admitida construcción lógica; el hombre llano no la usó hasta que adquirió el hábito de los filósofos, y los errores a los que lleva el hábito son muy comunes y numerosos. (Ibid.: 59, énfasis en el original)

Podemos considerar a Austin como nominalista en cuanto al problema de los universales: no cree que existan en realidad sino que los considera una forma cómoda de hablar. En cuanto a los actos de habla, Austin los considera resultado de un procedimiento convencional, que puede incluir cierta actitud o disposición interna de quien realiza la acción (Austin 1975). El problema de la ontología de los actos de habla lo resuelve Austin de una manera relativamente sencilla: el procedimiento es convencional, la acción

es convencional, por lo tanto, todo está respaldado por una convención, lo que encuentra un correlato con su solución al problema de los universales.

Searle, quien continúa el trabajo de Austin, considera que los universales tienen una naturaleza derivativa. Antes de “amabilidad” existe “es amable”. La predicación es anterior a la constitución del universal (Searle 1994).

No solamente trata el problema de los universales, sino que se sirve de su teoría de los actos de habla para ello. Comienza describiendo el nominalismo como un “rechazo a ‘admitir’ o ‘cuantificar’ entidades distintas de los particulares... un rechazo a contraer cualquier tipo de ‘compromisos ontológicos’ con entidades no particulares” (ibid.: 110–111). Parece buscar un punto intermedio en la disputa nominalismo-realismo, es decir, un realismo moderado.

A postular la existencia de los universales le ayuda el hecho de considerar el lenguaje (y por lo tanto el significado) como un hecho institucional, y no un hecho bruto (el estatuto ontológico de este último es más comprometedor). Tal es el compromiso ontológico que Searle asume al hablar tanto de universales como de actos de habla: Éstos existen como “reglas de juego” sin las cuales la institución no existiría, pero a su vez su existencia sólo tiene sentido frente a la institución.

El argumento de Searle es circular: los actos de habla existen como hecho institucional, en el marco de un fenómeno asimismo institucional: el lenguaje, que se caracteriza por ser un sistema de reglas. Fuera del lenguaje el acto de habla no existe, pero el lenguaje a su vez no puede existir sin los actos de habla. Por lo tanto, cada fenómeno aparece como constituyente y constituido del otro, y no se explica cuál precedente a cuál.

2. Strawson: Instancias de universales y realizaciones de actos de habla

Para tratar el problema de los universales, Strawson busca los correlatos de los elementos oracionales: el sujeto y el predicado. Para este autor, definitivamente no son los universales simplemente una cómoda e inofensiva forma de hablar, como para Austin o Searle, sino que están ontológicamente determinados, pues las cosas generales (los universales) pueden tener instancias, mientras que las cosas individuales no (Strawson 1983). A pesar de que Beuchot (1997) califica a Strawson como un nominalista,

sus concepciones sobre los universales se aproximan al realismo: primero hace una distinción entre el particular como lo que puede ser sujeto y el universal o término general como lo que puede ser predicado, para luego reconocer que “no hay nada de lo que podamos hablar que no pueda aparecer como sujeto lógico” (Strawson 1989: 239), lo que borra la distinción antes expuesta. Finalmente trata de salir adelante proponiendo “otro uso de la palabra ‘existe’”:

Es decir, podemos reconstruir toda tal proposición cuantificada como una proposición de sujeto-predicado en la que el sujeto es una propiedad o un concepto y en la que el predicado declara, o niega, su instanciación. (Esto se aplica tanto a las proposiciones cuantificadas en las que se declara o se niega que existe un único particular, como a cualesquiera otras, pues tal proposición puede interpretarse como si aseverase o negase que cierta propiedad compleja o concepto es instanciado singularizadamente. (Ibid.)

Con lo que terminan igualándose en la práctica los universales y los particulares, ya que ambos pueden ser instanciados. Así, Strawson elude el compromiso ontológico.

En cuanto a la teoría de los actos de habla, Strawson critica el énfasis que Austin pone en el aspecto convencional de los actos ilocutivos. Considera que, si bien la fuerza ilocutiva es convencional en un buen número de casos, no puede decirse que tal sea la regla.

Esto es, parece claro que hay muchos casos en los que la fuerza ilocucionaria de una emisión, aunque no esté agotada por su significado, no se debe a *convenciones* distintas de aquellas que ayudan a darle su significado. Seguramente hay muchos casos en los que decir “El hielo de ahí es muy fino” a un patinador es proferir una advertencia (es decir algo con la *fuerza* de una advertencia) sin que sea el caso de que haya ninguna convención enunciable en absoluto (distinta de aquellas que forman parte de la naturaleza del acto *locucionario*) tal que pueda decirse que el acto del hablante es un acto llevado a cabo conforme a esa convención. (Strawson 1971/1983: 176)

Para Strawson, lo decisivo no es tanto la convencionalidad de las fórmulas para ejecutar el acto ilocutivo, sino – siguiendo a Grice – el reconocimiento de intenciones.

De manera que no todos los actos de habla se basan en convenciones, sino que lo decisivo es que el oyente pueda tener acceso a la intención del hablante. El estatuto ontológico de los actos de habla, en la visión de Straw-

son, subyace no tanto en la convencionalidad, sino en el reconocimiento de la intención que el hablante tiene de realizar ese acto de habla y no otro.

Esta premisa conduce a concluir que los actos de habla de alguna manera siempre preexisten a sus enunciados, puesto que necesitan ser reconocidos como tales para su interpretación, pero Strawson les niega la existencia institucional que Austin y Searle les proveen. Por tanto, no se ve cómo es que la intención puede ser reconocida si nada avala la preexistencia del acto de habla. Strawson no aborda este problema.

El planteamiento del autor sobre el problema de los universales y de la ontología de los actos de habla son muy similares: se puede decir que tanto los universales como los actos ilocutivos “salen de la nada”: unos como sujetos y otros como intenciones del hablante, pero no se aborda el problema de su constitución.

4. Propuesta de solución al problema de los universales y al problema ontológico de los actos de habla desde la lingüística operacional y la lingüística del texto

La disputa entre el nominalismo y el realismo ha sido formulada por Iturrioz Leza (2004) en los siguientes términos:

Todavía en el siglo XX, filósofos, lógicos y lingüistas se dividían en dos frentes, el de los que creen que con la sustantivación la lengua introduce un nuevo tipo de entidades (abstractas) y el de los que ven en ella un fenómeno puramente gramatical por el que adjetivos y verbos acceden a las funciones sintácticas de los nombres. Los dos puntos de vista se complementan, pero por separado, resultan incompletos e inadecuados. El error de los realistas consiste en hipostasiar el significado de los términos generales, el de los nominalistas en negar que la sustantivación tenga algo que ver con la aprehensión de objetos, partiendo de un concepto extralingüístico de objeto que resulta tan inapropiado para los nombres abstractos como para las otras clases de nombres. (Iturrioz Leza 2004: 40)

Iturrioz Leza critica particularmente el tratamiento del problema por parte de Searle, ya que éste plantea la existencia de los universales, pero evade el compromiso ontológico mediante la separación de predicación y referencia, minimizando el problema (observación que, *mutatis mutandis*, también puede aplicarse a Strawson). Específicamente, Searle no está distinguiendo niveles lingüísticos.

El concepto es de naturaleza predicativa en un lenguaje (discurso) de primer orden, mientras que puede ser aprehendido como objeto en un lenguaje (discurso) de segundo orden. La contradicción sólo surge si ambas operaciones se colocan en el mismo nivel, es decir si se pasa por alto el carácter metalingüístico de las nominalizaciones prototípicas: la diferencia entre *rojo* y *rojura* está en que el primer término pertenece en principio al lenguaje de primer orden, mientras que el segundo se origina en el metalenguaje. (Ibid.: 41)

Frente al tratamiento poco riguroso que Searle da a los nombres abstractos, Iturrioz Leza aborda el problema desde un punto de vista funcional:

¿para qué se nominaliza? ¿para qué sirven esa variedad de estructuras en una lengua? Si no son inconexas, sino que por el contrario forman un paradigma de opciones, ¿cuáles son los criterios de elección del hablante y a qué nivel se lleva a cabo la misma? No se puede reducir el fenómeno a los aspectos puramente gramaticales, éstos se inscriben en el marco de una *operación compleja* de condensación de información, que sólo puede explicarse adecuadamente *en el nivel del texto*. Está relacionada con la organización de la información y es regulada por principios pragmáticos de la organización temática: información ya dada vs información nueva, constitución de los tópicos del discurso etc. (Ibid.: 131, énfasis en el original)

La nominalización (que es la operación lingüística que “construye” los conceptos abstractos) constituye objetos de segundo orden con la finalidad de organizar el texto (y el pensamiento), y no por afán de describir el mundo real (89). La reificación que la nominalización lleva a cabo “se da de manera gradual. Desde el punto de vista gramatical, la nominalización no se puede desligar del conjunto de las técnicas existentes en la lengua para conectar proposiciones” (89):

El que los romanos destruyeran Cartago
 Habiendo destruido Cartago los romanos
 El haber destruido Cartago los romanos
 Tras destruir Cartago los romanos
 La destrucción de Cartago por los romanos
 (Ejemplos de Iturrioz Leza: 89–90)

Aparentemente –como también observa Iturrioz Leza– “esta tesis lleva al nominalismo... Pero es precisamente esa nueva organización compleja

del discurso lo que posibilita la aparición del nuevo tipo de entidades” (89).

Ahora bien, si pasamos de los conceptos abstractos en general, a los que específicamente nombran actos de habla, podemos darnos cuenta de que están estrechamente relacionados con los verbos de los que provienen:

Promesa	prometer
Mandato	mandar
Amenaza	amenazar
Insulto	insultar
Etc.	

Los verbos y los nombres que se refieren a actos de habla también forman un nuevo tipo de entidades, ya que al especificar un acto de habla particular, aprehenden y construyen el acto de habla como tal.

Iré
Prometo que iré
Te prometo ir
Iré, es una promesa.
Te hice la promesa de ir

Respecto a esta idea, Austin habla sobre la evolución que pudo haber tenido el performativo explícito en el lenguaje:

Now, one thing that seems at least a fair guess, even from the elaboration of linguistic construction, as also from its nature in the explicit performative is this: that historically, from the point of view of the evolution of language, the explicit performative must be a later development than certain more primary utterances, many of which are already implicit performatives, which are included in most or many explicit performatives as parts of a whole. For example, “I will...” is earlier than “I promise that I will...”. (Austin 1975: 71)

Desde este punto de vista, no es descabellado pensar que, así como los universales son el resultado de una técnica lingüística de aprehensión de objetos que sirve a propósitos de organización del texto (y por ende del pensamiento), así también los performativos son constituidos en el discurso, y no preexisten al mismo. Si esto es así, entonces los performativos serían un punto en la constitución discursiva del acto de habla. La función de los verbos performativos -y de otros verbos que se refieren a actos

de habla – sería reificar y manipular enunciados. Así como los nombres abstractos constituyen objetos de segundo orden, los performativos constituyen enunciados de segundo orden, es decir, enunciados que se refieren a otros a los cuales presentan constituidos como actos específicos. Los performativos serían, como los universales, el extremo de una serie de técnicas de constitución y demarcación de los enunciados como actos de habla.

El error que cometen tanto Austin como Searle y otros respecto a los actos de habla es el mismo error que Iturrioz achaca a los nominalistas: no tomar en cuenta las operaciones metalingüísticas que reifican y aprehenden contenidos proposicionales. Por otra parte, el error de Strawson es hipostasiar los actos de habla como si fueran entidades existentes en sí mismas, independientes de los discursos que las producen.

Austin y Strawson representan dos puntos opuestos pero complementarios en la teoría de los actos de habla. Para conciliarlos, es necesario integrar a la misma los procesos de aprehensión y constitución de entidades lingüísticas

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Pauline Escande Gauquié

L’affiche du film *Pulp Fiction* de Quentin Tarantino en tant que référence à un genre populaire américain: “Le pulp”

L’affiche de film a une fonction clairement définie: donner envie au spectateur d’aller voir un film. Pour ce faire, les procédés rhétoriques utilisés afin de faire émerger autour du film “un monde qui s’accorde à nos désirs”¹ sont multiples. En étudiant l’affiche de film selon le point de vue de l’*intertextualité* il est possible de montrer comment ce texte est travaillé par absorption, et transformation par d’autres textes. Comme l’écrit Roland Barthes (1991): “tout texte est un intertexte; d’autres textes sont présents en lui à des niveaux variables sous des formes plus ou moins reconnaissables. L’intertexte est le langage antérieur et contemporain qui vient du texte.” L’intertextualité s’inscrit ainsi dans une filiation plus ou moins volontaire.

Dans l’affiche du film américain *Pulp Fiction* de Quentin Tarantino (1994), la référence à l’univers du *pulp* – petit roman policier que l’on pouvait acheter pour rien aux Etats-Unis dans les kiosques à journaux entre les années 1920 et 1950 – est volontaire et maîtrisée dans le seul but de créer un imaginaire spécifique autour du film présenté. Dans le cadre de cette réflexion, le terme intermédialité est alors plus juste: il permet d’appréhender comment une culture propre à un média, le pulp, est récupérée par un autre média culturel, le cinéma.

1. *Etude comparative de l’affiche de Pulp Fiction avec trois couvertures des romans pulps des années 30 à 50: Marijuana Girl, The Last Crook, Vous pouvez tous vous l’accrochez (E.g., “Corpus visuel de l’affiche et des trois couvertures de magazines pulps”)*

Pour son film *Pulp Fiction* le réalisateur emprunte délibérément au pulp. Le pulp appartient à la littérature populaire américaine des années 50, plus précisément au roman noir. Magazine bon marché, il est imprimé sur du papier médiocre nommé “pulp” car récupéré de la pulpe de bois. Le pulp est à l’époque une industrie de masse comparable à la télévision américaine actuelle. La plupart des grands écrivains de polars de l’époque y ont publié. Dans la masse des publications se détachait *Black Mask* qui fit connaître au public des écrivains comme Earl Stanley Gardner ou Dashielle Hammett.

L’affiche du film de Tarantino montre des phénomènes d’intericonicité (image à image) et d’interdiscursivité (linguistique à linguistique) évidentes avec cette culture. L’analyse sémiologique comparative de l’affiche avec trois couvertures de pulp met en lumière ces phénomènes d’emprunts délibérés (voir figure 1).

La figure 1 présente une synthèse des éléments formels convergents (Houdebine 1994) entre l’affiche du film *Pulp Fiction* et les trois couvertures de pulp sélectionnées: *Marijuana Girl*, *The Last Crook*, *Vous pouvez tous vous l’accrochez*. La mise en évidence des procédés iconiques, scéniques et linguistiques récurrents et majoritaires entre l’affiche et les couvertures rend compte de l’*homogénéité* structurelle entre les deux corpus. Elle trouve par ailleurs son pendant dans des procédés formels dits divergents et périphériques qui montrent la culture graphique et iconique propres à chaque média. Ce travail formel statistique sert objectivement l’interprétation qui suit en l’étayant.

2. *Analyse des convergences comme phénomène d’intericonicité et d’interdiscursivité entre l’affiche du film Pulp Fiction et l’univers des romans pulps*

L’indexation systématique des éléments formels convergents exposés dans la figure 2 entre l’affiche et les trois couvertures de romans met en évidence le phénomène d’interculturalité entre les deux médias. En effet, au niveau

DISPOSITIF SCENIQUE :						
Eléments formels	Pulp fiction	Vous pouvez tous...	Marijuana Girl	The Last Crook	Total	Conclusion
Construction d'ensemble :						
Plan d'ensemble	-	+	-	+	4/4	Convergence (C)
Plongée	+	-	+	-	2/4	Divergence (D)
Point de convergence au centre	+	-	-	+	2/4	D
Point de convergence milieu gauche	-	+	+	-	2/2	D
Lignes horizontales	+	-	-	-	3/4	C
Couverture ornée ou abîmée	+	+	-	+	2/4	C
Répartition entre image et linguistique :						
Postérite prix	+	-	+	+	3/4	C
Bandeau noir en bus avec nom de la collection	-	+	-	+	2/4	D
Construction binaire : ling. en haut et photo/dessin en bus	+	+	-	+	3/4	C
Premier plan :						
Femme	+	+	+	+	4/4	C
Des accessoires	+	-	+	-	2/4	D
Deuxième plan :	+	+	+	-	3/4	C
Décor	-	-	-	+	1/4	Périphériques (P)
Fond neutre	-	-	-	+	1/4	P
DISPOSITIF ICONIQUE :						
Eléments formels						
Position du personnage :						
Main qui tient une cigarette	+	-	+	+	3/4	C
Assise	-	+	-	+	2/4	D
Jambes qui se touchent	+	+	-	+	3/4	C
Position de séduction	+	+	+	+	4/4	C
A genoux	-	-	+	-	1/4	P
Jambes écartées	-	-	+	-	1/4	P
Mains entre les cuisses	-	-	+	-	1/4	P
Cigarette dans la bouche	-	+	+	-	2/4	D
Main droite à la taille	-	+	-	-	1/4	P
Allongée sur le ventre	+	-	-	-	1/4	P
Main posée sur un livre	+	-	-	-	1/4	P
Visage et cheveux :						
Ne sourit pas	+	+	+	+	4/4	C
Regarde le destinataire en face	+	+	+	+	3/4	C
Longs et abondants	-	+	-	+	3/4	C
Rousses	-	-	-	+	1/4	P
Bouche entrouverte	-	-	+	-	1/4	P
yeux mi-clos	-	-	+	-	1/4	P
Blonde	-	+	+	-	2/4	D

Figure 1. Tableaux des éléments convergents, divergents et périphériques entre l'affiche de film et les trois couvertures de romans pulps.

Éléments formels	Pulp fiction	Vous pouvez lons...	Marijuana Girl	The Last Crook	Total	Conclusion
DISPOSITIF LINGUISTIQUE :						
Construction d'ensemble :						
Tire en haut	+	-	+	-	1/4	P
Tire milieu droite	-	+	+	+	4/4	C
Pastille prix ronde	+	-	-	-	4/4	C
Nom auteur sous titre en plus petit	+	-	-	-	2/4	C
Nom auteur nous titre bas gauche	-	-	+	-	1/4	P
Signature collection bas gauche	-	-	-	+	4/4	C
Signature collection haut	-	+	-	+	4/4	C
Signature collection bas droite	-	-	+	-	4/4	C
Texte d'accroche	+	-	+	-	4/4	C
Couleurs/typo :						
Tire jaune	+	-	+	-	2/4	D
Tire noir	-	+	-	-	1/4	P
Tire rouge	-	-	-	+	1/4	P
Nom de la collection blanc	+	+	-	+	3/4	C
Brune	+	-	-	-	1/4	P
Sensualité	+	+	+	+	4/4	C
Vêtements :						
Décolleté	+	+	+	+	4/4	C
Manchette	-	-	+	+	2/4	C
Tailleur	-	-	-	-	1/4	P
Talons	+	+	-	+	2/4	C
Habits féminins	+	+	-	+	4/4	C
Accessoires :						
Cigarette	+	+	+	+	4/4	C
Pistolet	+	-	-	-	1/4	P
Bracelet	+	-	+	+	3/4	C
Maquillage :						
Rouge à lèvres	+	+	+	+	4/4	C
Noirs autour de yeux	-	+	+	+	3/4	C
Vernis à ongles	+	+	+	+	4/4	C
Couleurs :						
Noir	+	+	+	+	4/4	C
Rouge	+	+	+	+	4/4	C
Vert	-	+	-	+	2/4	D
Blanc	-	-	+	-	1/4	P
Rose	-	-	-	-	1/4	P
Jaune	+	+	+	+	4/4	C
Décor :						
Fond noir	+	-	+	+	3/4	C
Fond rouge	+	+	-	-	2/4	D
Chambre	+	-	+	-	2/4	C
Neutre	-	-	-	+	1/4	P
Ruelle	-	+	-	-	1/4	P

(cont.)

Éléments formels	Pulp fiction	Vous pouvez tous...	Dispositif scénique Marquiana Girl	The Last Crook	Total	Conclusion
Construction d'ensemble:						
Plan d'ensemble:	+	+	+	+	4/4	C
Levres:	+	+	+	+	3/4	C
Couleur: carrée ou abrégée:	+	-	-	+	2/4	C
Répartition entre image et linguistique:						
Pastille noir:	+	-	+	+	3/4	C
Binaire: ligne haut / photodessin bas:	+	+	-	+	3/4	C
Premier plan:	+	+	+	+	4/4	C
Femme:	+	+	+	+	4/4	C
Deuxième plan:	+	+	+	+	1/4	C
Décor:	+	+	+	+	1/4	C
Dispositif iconique						
Position du personnage:						
Main qui tient une cigarette:	+	-	+	+	3/4	C
Jambes qui se touchent:	+	+	-	+	3/4	C
Position de séduction:	+	+	+	+	4/4	C
Visage et cheveux:						
Ne sourit pas:	+	+	+	+	4/4	C
Regarde le destinataire en face:	+	+	-	+	3/4	C
Longs et abondants:	-	+	+	+	3/4	C
Sensuelle:	+	+	+	+	4/4	C
Wendy:						
Découpage:	+	+	+	+	4/4	C
Tableau:	+	+	+	+	2/4	C
Habits féminins:	+	+	+	+	4/4	C
Accessoires:						
Cigarette:	+	+	+	+	4/4	C
Bracelet:	+	-	+	+	3/4	C
Maquillage:						
Rouge à lèvres:	+	+	+	+	4/4	C
Noirs autour des yeux:	-	+	+	+	3/4	C
Vernis à ongles:	+	+	+	+	4/4	C
Coiffures:						
Noir:	+	+	+	+	4/4	C
Rouge:	+	+	+	+	4/4	C
Jaune:	+	+	+	+	4/4	C
Décor:						
Fond noir:	+	-	+	+	3/4	C
Chambre:	+	-	+	+	2/4	C
Dispositif Linguistique						
Construction d'ensemble:						
Titre en blanc:	+	-	+	+	3/4	C
Pastille noir:	+	+	+	+	3/4	C
Non au titre sous titre en plus petit:	+	-	+	+	3/4	C
Coiffures types:						
Titre jaune:	+	-	+	+	2/4	C
Non de la collection blanc:	+	+	-	+	3/4	C

Figure 2. Bilan des convergences : Le code du roman « polar noir » des années 30 à 50 a été repris pour l'affiche de Pulp fiction.

de la construction d'ensemble on relève un phénomène évident d'intericonicité entre l'affiche de *Pulp fiction* et <univers des couvertures des polars noirs des années 30 à 50>.²

2.1. Intericonicité

L'interculturalité visuelle se retrouve à travers quatre processus:

2.1.1. La construction graphique de l'affiche rappelle les couvertures d'un magazine pulp via les éléments convergents suivants: L'effet /cornée/ et /abîmée/, la /construction binaire/, et la /pastille prix/. Les couvertures des pulps *The Last Crook* et *Marijuana Girl* reprennent cette pastille, les effets abîmée et cornée se retrouvent sur les trois couvertures. Par ailleurs, le /bandeau noir/ indiquant le nom de la collection visible sur l'affiche est également présent dans l'affiche *The Last Crook*.

2.1.2. Le personnage de l'affiche *Pulp Fiction* dont l'attitude générale renvoie à l'univers du <polar>. Sa tenue féminine et sexy renforce cette <attitude séductrice> propre au personnage féminin de polar noir: /bas/, /décolleté/, /talons/, maquillage appuyé(/rouge à lèvres/, /vernis à ongles/). Ces tenues provocantes sont également représentatives des personnages des trois couvertures.

La présence d'une femme uniquement, dans une /position de séduction/ avec /les jambes croisées/, /main qui tient la cigarette/, /regarde le destinataire en face/ et /ne sourit pas/. Les femmes de *Marijuana Girl* et de *Vous pouvez tous vous l'accrochez* adoptent également cette attitude très séductrice reprise dans l'affiche *Pulp Fiction*. Cette attitude impassible renvoie au polar car la femme ne s'émeut pas facilement, elle côtoie le milieu de la pègre et dans ce monde montrer ses émotions c'est se trahir. Par ailleurs, son regard franc montre qu'elle n'a pas froid aux yeux.

Le /rouge à lèvres/ que l'actrice porte est un élément d'intericonicité important à souligner. Il est l'élément de séduction par excellence qui symbolise la femme. Le rouge selon Pastoureau (2005) est la couleur de la passion et du danger, du péché et de la chair, de la transgression, des tabous.

Le /noir/ est une couleur très présente en intericonicité. Dans notre culture judéo-chrétienne, il renvoie au deuil donc à la mort et au malheur mais aussi au péché et à la transgression. Il est le symbole de la part d'ombre et de mystère des personnages qui évolue dans un monde dur et violent. Il

renvoie aussi au monde de la nuit. On est loin ici des couleurs pastelées à la “David Hamilton”.

2.1.3. Les accessoires symbolisent la <femme fatale>, personnage systématique et récurrent du pulp. La /cigarette/ est l'élément intericonicité le plus marquant de ce corpus. Elle présente sur l'affiche et sur les trois magazines. En effet, une femme qui fume dans les années quarante et cinquante est symbole d'<émancipation>. Elle revendique le vice car elle a une valeur phallique. Dans *Pulp Fiction* l'actrice exhibe sa /cigarette/ par un geste élégant (similitude du geste avec *The Last Crook*), geste très caractéristique de la femme fatale (dixit l'actrice Rita Hayworth dans le film *Gilda* de Charles Vidor). La cigarette est donc aussi symbole de <glamour> et cette connotation fumeuse est renforcée par la présence dans l'affiche d'autres accessoires comme le cendrier, le paquet de cigarettes et le briquet.

Le /pistolet/ présent dans *The Last Crook* sous forme de logotype est également une icône importante à retenir. Cependant dans *Pulp Fiction* le petit pistolet brillant est un pistolet bijou qui renforce la connotation de <femme fatale>, <femme dangereuse>.

Le /livre pulp /propre à l'affiche de cinéma *Pulp fiction* est une mise en abyme iconique de la culture pulp. Il faut relever ici que la main de l'actrice est posée sur le livre comme pour souligner la référence à cet univers. Par ailleurs, ses talons soulignent les termes *Pulp* et *Fiction* de l'affiche. L'actrice agit comme un relais entre le magazine pulp posé et le titre de l'affiche. Cette hypertrophie connotative du sens pulp peut presque paraître ironique.

2.1.4. Le décor ancre un peu plus le personnage dans cet univers de <polar> car il reprend les couleurs /noire/ et /rouge/ présentes également dans les trois magazines qui sont alternativement les couleurs du <danger> et la face cachée <violente> dans laquelle évolue ce type de personnage.

Le contraste des couleurs dans tous les éléments du corpus est intéressant à relever: dans *Pulp Fiction* les /carnations du personnage/ contrastent avec l'/aspect sombre/ des vêtements. La même remarque s'applique pour *The Last Crook*, le personnage semble se détacher du fond noir. Dans *Marijuana Girl* la peau et la robe claires contrastent avec le fond noir.

Ces contrastes s'expliquent par le fait que les années 30 sont celles de la crise, de la prohibition et de la corruption, des gangsters et de la violence au quotidien. C'est dans ce climat qu'est né le roman noir qui dépeint un univers contrasté et dur. Les parties claires de l'image sont là pour mettre

en valeur les parties sombres. L'ombre n'existe que par rapport à la lumière. Et donc par ricochet le mal par rapport au bien. Enfin le fait que l'actrice soit sur un lit dans une chambre accentue le côté <érotique> et <mystérieux> du personnage.

2.2. L'interdiscursivité

Au niveau du linguistique, la /typographie/ et le choix des termes confirment l'<univers du pulp> (ancrage du linguistique par rapport à l'image). Concernant la typographie, le choix de la /couleur jaune/ est un élément convergent de cet univers. Le choix du monème /pulp/ réfère directement à cet univers et lui rend hommage. Le terme /fiction/ montre que ce que nous raconte ce film est une histoire similaire à celles mises en scène dans ces livres.

3. *Les divergences comme point d'ancrage de l'affiche dans l'univers cinématographique*

L'analyse des divergences permet de déduire que si l'image de *Pulp Fiction* emprunte à l'atmosphère, aux personnages et aux sujets propres aux couvertures de polar des années 30, elle n'en reste pas moins une <affiche de cinéma>. Un premier élément divergent au niveau de la mise en scène du corpus permet de le déduire: le fait que ce soit une /photographie/ et non un /dessin/. Au niveau iconique, même si la mise en scène et l'attitude générale du personnage renvoie à cet univers, des éléments de <modernité> dans sa tenue permettent de déduire que nous sommes à une époque plus récente: /t-shirt/, /perruque au carré/.

Enfin, concernant le linguistique, des éléments formels absents des autres images du corpus confirment la divergence de l'image de *Pulp Fiction* et ancre l'effet de sens <photo-affiche de cinéma>: la signature de la maison de production /Miramax/ et non de la maison d'édition, la liste des comédiens jouant dans le film /John Travolta/, /Uma Thurman/, etc., et du réalisateur /Quentin Tarantino/.

4. Conclusion

Selon Quentin Tarantino les “pulps” désignent des magazines dont l'équivalent cinématographique serait le film de série B. En choisissant de travailler son affiche en intermédialité, Tarantino et son équipe marquent leur volonté d'inscrire le film dans un genre populaire et de masse. Au delà de la volonté marketing de donner envie au spectateur d'aller voir un film, ce choix d'affiche souligne le désir de Tarantino de rendre hommage au pulp genre culturel qu'il affectionne particulièrement. Ce désir se retrouve d'ailleurs tout au long du film dans l'écriture esthétique et la diégèse.

Notes

1. Célèbre phrase attribuée à André Bazin que Godard a placé en exergue de son film *Le mépris* (1962).
2. Convention de présentation: Eléments formels entre barres obliques: /.../; effets de sens et connotations liés à ces éléments formels: <...>

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Carlo Germeshuys and Gerda Dullaart

Film editing and ideology in South African culture

A semiotic investigation

In this paper we intend to show the link between the structuring of signs through film editing and the communication of ideological meaning through a second-order system of signification. We propose a method of analysis for decoding the connotative ideological content of a film text, then apply this method to a South African television advertisement.

First, it is necessary to look at the connection between film editing and myth, or ideology. Eisenstein described the astonishment of early film editors at the fact that, when two pieces of film were placed together, a new meaning was created by that juxtaposition. Eisenstein described this generation of meaning as a natural occurrence, stating that humans are accustomed to making “a definite and obvious deductive generalization” when two separate objects are placed together” (1943: 14). When two filmic images are put in sequential order, a third meaning, greater than the sum of its parts, is created. This third meaning is connotative, since it is not objectively representable.

This concept is similar in function to Barthes’s system of second-order signification. In this system, a sign is given further meaning by attaching connotative meaning to its existing denotative meaning. When a sign is given connotative meaning, it becomes a signifier in a second-order signification system. It now signifies something else, and so produces a new sign. Barthes uses figure 1 to illustrate this effect (1973: 115).

Film editing, which creates meaning by the juxtaposition of signs (i.e., shots), is a functioning manifestation of this process. Figure 2 shows the system of *connotative* meaning that is created by putting two shots next to each other.

1. Signifier	1. Signified	
1. Sign 2. Signifier		2. Signified
2. Sign		

- 1. = primary signification
- 2. = secondary signification

Figure 1.

1. Signifier	1. Signified	1. Signifier	1. Signified
1. Sign 2. Signifier		1. Sign 2. Signifier	
2. Sign			

- 1. = primary signification
- 2. = secondary signification

Figure 2.

In this figure, the two signs made up of the elements labeled “1” are denotative signs. They are created by the combination of the signifier and signified in the primary signification system. In film terms, one can see these two signs as separate shots. The sign labeled as “2” is the connotative sign produced by juxtaposition of the above two denotative signs. It results in second-order signification. Now the sign created by the combination of signifier and signified in the primary signification system has become a signifier in the secondary signification system. In film terms, one can see the sign in the secondary system as the meaning produced by the juxtaposition of the two shots edited together. Of course, a film is made up of a multitude of shots that may be associated one with the other. In this way, a complex connotative meaning is created in a film by the combination of

many denotative signs. An important aspect of this model is that connotative meaning is created *sequentially*. Shots are lined up, one after the other, and the order in which they are placed determines the meaning that is created by their association.

Barthes saw the second-order system of signification as a function of *myth*ideology, which produces meaning that functions at an unconscious level. In doing so, it makes that meaning appear natural, by making its productive process appear as if it is a result of “common sense” (Hebdige 1979: 13). Hebdige states that ideology imposes itself structurally, defining the forms whereby individuals understand and interpret social relations and processes (ibid.). A particular film edit provides a structuring principle for the ordering of images. The images exist, and have a meaning by themselves. The film edit structures the sequence of meaning in a specific way, and in doing so creates a further meaning.

To illustrate this process, we will look at a South African advertisement, and examine the ideological meaning created by the sequential structuring of images. It is a Coca Cola television advertisement, made in 2005 in South Africa. The advertisement’s visual content consists of a series of images of South Africans, accompanied by stirring orchestral music. A voice-over makes a number of statements, each one starting with the words “it’s the Coke of...” and then listing various groups of people.

Unfortunately, a full analysis of the advertisement’s various constituent signs and their rich ideological connotations does not fall within the scope of this paper. For now, let us conclude that there are two broad types of sign at play here. First, there are signs which carry connotations of South Africa’s post-apartheid cultural ideology. These signs are meaningful to a South African audience, and reflect the aspirations of what we call the “Rainbow Nation”. Second, there are signs that carry a consumerist ideology of commodification, or signs of global capitalist ideology. These two sign types are constantly juxtaposed in the advertisement’s sequencing. For example, we see an old black war veteran accompanied by the word “revolutionaries” (Fig. 3), an allusion to the South African Struggle against Apartheid. This is followed by an image of what could be businessmen or statesmen, suggesting the new economy where money and corporatisation form the last chapter of a revolution begun by the Struggle heroes (see Figure 4).



Figure 3. "Revolutionaries".



Figure 4. Heroes of the struggle.

There is also a multilayered sequence of "singers", "movie stars", "the common man", and the "worker" (see Figures 5 to 8). The sequencing of these images suggests a model of aspiration where the ideals of consumer stardom and the sanctity of labor are equally revered.



Figure 5. "Singers".



Figure 6. "Movie stars".



Figure 7. "The common man".



Figure 8. "The worker".

These images are combined and juxtaposed dialectically, thus conveying ideological representations that put South African cultural ideology on a level equivalent to that of an emerging consumer culture. This forms a system of interchangeable ideological signs. However, the various signs are not floating freely in an unstructured system. The advertisement has a storyline of sorts, and builds to a definite meaning at the end: Coca Cola is the drink for all South Africans. The signs are arranged according to a structuring principle. This can be linked to the ideology of the advertisement. What is the structuring principle behind this system of interchangeable signs, this equivalence between signs?

To understand that principle in this ideology of equivalence, let us examine the dominant signs, which contextualize the other signs in the sequence. Our interpretation of the advertisement is mediated through a spokesman. At the start of the advertisement, a young black man looks into the camera and addresses us directly, telling us that, when he picks up a Coke, it is the Coke of various South African groups of people (see Figure 9). This is a textbook example of Althusser's concept of ideological interpellation (1971). When the young man addresses us, we are interpellated as subjects of the ideology of the advertisement.



Figure 9. "When I pick up a Coke".

To define the structuring principle behind this ideology, we may further analyze the young man's position. Through the refrain of "When I pick up a Coke", and its crescendo, he identifies the signs in the ad with himself, through the mediation of Coca Cola. Baudrillard sees the sign-commodity as an element in the global capitalist order of simulacrum (1981). Thus, what the advertisement is selling, is not the Coca Cola product, but the Coca Cola *sign*. This sign's value is determined by its place in the coded system of sign exchange value. This raises an interesting point

about the other signs in the advertisement. If their meaning is determined by the dominant Coca Cola sign, they also fit into the coded system and become sign-commodities. The Coca Cola sign exists as a sign-commodity within the coded system of global capitalist sign exchange. If the meaning of the Coca Cola sign is determined by the structuring principle of this coded system, then so is the meaning of the other signs. Therefore, they are also sign-commodities in the coded system of global capitalist sign exchange.

It would be tempting to stop the analysis here, and claim that all the signs (and the ideologies they represent) are mere sign-commodities in the system of global capitalism.

This proposition is problematic. It might suppose that the South African cultural context is fully integrated into the global economy and the high tech visual mass media cultural machine that disseminates it. It is not. South Africa is still a third world country, where television is less than a generation old. So, perhaps all South Africans do not exist in a world of “hyperreal” sign simulations of reality. Also, South African society is unstable and highly politicized, and very much aware that ideologically loaded signs are not all equivalent and interchangeable. The average South African might even recognize the tension between the everyday use of the signs in the advertisement and the purpose for which Coca Cola uses them here.

An examination of the advertisement’s sign sequence suggests a possible resolution to this tension within the text itself. As shown in the previous examples, there is a tension between the signs themselves. On the one hand, we have the signs of homegrown South African ideology, and on the other, the signs of consumerist ideology. This tension is intensified, instead of resolved, as the advertisement progresses. Many viewers will have noticed that the ideological connotations of the signs are consciously being played with. For example, the word “queens” is accompanied by an image of an Apartheid-era beauty pageant (Fig. 10). This ironic juxtaposition reminds the viewer that the queens of the former upper class have been dethroned by not only the black majority, but also by gay queens. In another sequence, we are shown images that laud “the worker” (Fig. 8) and “all that is hard to achieve”. This is followed by “the dream” (Fig. 11), a representation of consumer aspiration straight out of an American hip hop music video. The juxtaposition of these images and the South African

“dream” they represent is so incongruous with the reality of the man on the street – probably without a car – that they can only be read as irony. This ironic playing with signs enables the juxtaposition of ideologically opposed images.



Figure 10. “Queens.”



Figure 11. “The dream.”

Yet it does not entirely dispel the tension between the signs, which comes to a head in the last list of people. The young man identifies that it’s the Coke of “Che, my father, and me” (see Figures 12–14). These seem to fit into the overall structuring principle that the advertisement has used so far. However, there is one crucial difference: this spokesperson does not contextualize these people according to Coca Cola. He contextualizes himself according to Coca Cola.



Figure 12. “Che...”



Figure 13. “My father...” *Figure 14. “...and me.”*

The sequence starts with the reference to Che Guevara. As noted earlier, Che is by now a sign-commodity in the cultural sphere of global capitalism. The statement “It’s the Coke of Che” must raise a painful heart burn in Cuba. But in this advertisement, it represents a high point in the use of iconic signs to sell Coca Cola. Similarly, the image accompanying “my

father” is a mixed historical reference to Nelson Mandela’s signature shirts, and two hats of his father’s time: one hat from the jazz icons of an apartheid ghetto like Sophiatown, and another hat typical of the ritual dress of modern Xhosa initiation clothing. A further process of interpellation is activated in this shot sequence. The young man is standing in front of a mirror, looking at himself wearing a Che-style beret. This can be seen as a moment of self-reflection on his part, or a Lacanian mirror phase, where he shows us what *his* actual image of himself is. The consequence is that the viewer, as an interpellated subject, is encouraged to identify with this image. However, as Che is a sign-commodity, the viewer identifies with a sign-commodity when she identifies with this image. The same goes for the shot of his “father”. Therefore, the viewer’s image of herself is herself as a sign-commodity.

This is the crux of the advertisement’s ideological structuring principle. The viewer is finally made to see herself as a sign-commodity. The viewer is a sign-commodity, as is everything else in the global system of sign exchange. The interpellative process is complete. Therefore, the only way to understand any object within the system is to see it as a sign-commodity. The most enjoyable way to get any pleasure or value from a commodity is to consume it as a sign-commodity, a simulation in a simulacrum.

Thus, the “message” of the ad is not only that icons of South African cultural ideology function as sign-commodities in the global capitalist system. It is not selling our ideology back to us as a sign-commodity. Rather, it is selling us the sign-commodity of ideology as a sign-commodity. The viewer is “permitted” to engage with any and all ideologies as sign-commodities, unburdened by personal attachment or ideological commitment. An obvious example is the use of Che Guevara. Today many international brands use Che’s face to evoke a romantic spirit of rebellion, like Levis. But in South Africa, Che’s still radical communist ideology has not been forgotten. During the anti-Apartheid struggle, many of our revolutionary cadres were trained by Cuban revolutionaries, who also fought in the Angolan war of liberation. There is presently a vicious ideological battle between the economic liberals and communist workers in South Africa’s ruling African National Congress. During 2007 a series of nationwide union strikes, led by the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South African Communist Party, have seriously disrupted both the public and private sector. In South Africa, using a communist icon to sell a soft drink is no

light romantic nostalgia. However, because of his placement in the advertisement, Che Guevara is turned into a neutral image, a sign-commodity with an equivalent value to a bottle of Coca Cola.

According to the advertising company responsible, this advertisement was very popular in South Africa (Bruyns 2006). Why? There are various hypothetical reasons for this. As South Africa did not undergo a violent revolution, there was not an immediate cultural rupture. The old ideologies were not immediately replaced by new ones. We don't have an Independence Avenue, like our neighbouring states. Rather, South Africans have to juggle the remains of the Struggle ideology and the ideology of the apartheid system it overthrew. This ideological confusion is defused when all ideologies are considered as equivalent. This might explain the appeal of a text that conspicuously communicates ideology as a sign-commodity. South African ideology is something that this generation must deal with. For them, it would be easier to treat an ideology as a sign-commodity rather than as something to engage with or be committed to. It must also be acknowledged that the South African dream of economic liberation and empowerment has not been fully realized. With the high poverty and unemployment rate, racial and class tension, and a high level of senseless violence in South Africa, the dream of peaceful equality is still just a dream. As such, a certain amount of cynicism about focused, constructed cultural ideology might prevail, especially amongst the youth. This advertisement, with its principle of ideological equivalence, allows the cynical youth to buy into both an idealized vision of South Africa and the blatantly consumerist vision of the Coca Cola company.

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Karl Gfesser

Verstehen – Verständigung ist nicht Verständnis

Zweifellos ist, so Charles S. Peirce, jeder Gedanke ein Zeichen, folgt ein Gedanke dem anderen im unendlichen Kontinuum der Zeichen. Zeichen bezeichnen Gegenstände, Sachverhalte, Ereignisse und sollen, soll Kommunikation gelingen, verstanden, wenigstens nicht gänzlich missverstanden werden können. Kommunikation ist Mitteilung: Nur wenn Gedanken – seien sie bestätigtes Wissen oder einleuchtende Vermutung – miteinander geteilt werden, ist Verständigung – nicht Einigung gleich – erreicht, insoweit die Kommunikanten das Strittige verhandeln, nicht bloß das je Genehme sich aneignen und das Störende verwerfen. Verständigung muss beabsichtigt worden sein, es muss gewollt sein, den anderen zu überzeugen, sein Einverständnis zu erlangen. Und weil es mindestens zweierlei Auffassungen eines Strittigen gibt, müssen Zweifel geweckt und zugelassen werden, muss in eine Argumentation eingegriffen, Störendes aufgegriffen werden, damit etwas begriffen werden kann. Einer dieser Eingriffe ist das Bemühen, sich des Gegenstandes zu vergewissern, indem man sich aufs neue an ihm stößt. Denn die Einbildungskraft greift nicht nur zu Zeichen, die dem Gegenstand gerecht werden, langt vielmehr auch nach jenen, die ihn verfehlen oder umgehen: Denkmuster, Verhaltens- und Handlungsgewohnheiten sind beharrlich und dem zeicheninternen Objekt geschuldet. Doch sind auch Verweise auf das zeichenexterne Objekt dem Zeichen verhaftet, sind eingelassen in die vorwiegend symbolische Struktur der Sprache, wengleich sie auf eine zeichenexterne Realität zielen. Wort, Sache, Begriff fallen deshalb leicht ineinander, werden nicht semiotisch als Mittel-, Objekt- und Interpretantenbezug der triadischen Zeichenrelation unterschieden. Das Dingwort wird zum Wortding mystischer Interpretation, zur selbstbezüglichen Wahnidee: Fetischismus vielerlei Art wie Rassismus, Nationalismus, Religionismus. Solchem Verfallene empfinden jeden Eingriff in ihr Selbstverständnis als Angriff auf ihre Identität, stehen

jenseits von Verstehen und Missverstehen; ihnen kann bestenfalls etwas nahegelegt werden, in der Hoffnung, dass einmal darauf zurückgegriffen werden wird. Verstehen fußt auf der Struktur rationaler Begründung, verläuft in Form schlussfolgender Argumentation vermittelt kommunikativer Kompetenz, nicht ungeachtet dessen, dass der logische Interpretant begleitet ist von einem emotionalen Interpretanten. Aufgeblähte Symbolismen und dumpfe Gefühlsaufwallungen aber verstellen den ikonischen und indexikalischen Bezug. Wohl sind unsere Wortsprachen dank ihres Bedeutungsüberschusses offen für weitere Erkenntnis, doch soll diese von Zweifel begleitet sein und retrosemiosisch übersichtlich bleiben. Am Leitfaden der Peirceschen Zeichentheorie kann versucht werden, eine Semiose durch das Dickicht unbezweifelnder Selbstverständlichkeit und unbefragter Zwiefalt zu bahnen, kann Verständnis heischender Einfalt verständig begegnet werden.

1. Vernünftiger Diskurs

Vieles, was sich von selbst versteht, ist unverständlich und bleibt es auch, wenn eine Verständigung gar nicht gesucht ist oder ausbleibt, weil eine Begründung nicht logisch konsistent, semantisch nicht präzise oder ethisch unhaltbar ist. Und Gründe müssen schon angeführt und, sollten sie bestritten werden, ausgeführt und durch weitere Gründe gestützt werden. Eine Begründung oder Argumentation obliegt dem bewussten und gewissenhaften Gebrauch der Vernunft: nach bestem Wissen und Gewissen also, – beides übrigens zusammen begriffen in dem lateinischen *conscientia*.

Darunter, selbst in Ironie und Polemik nicht, sollte man nicht gehen, geht man doch schon gerne darüber hinaus, in zwar weltlich bedingtem, gleichwohl weltabgehobenem Glauben zum Beispiel, wo weder Logik noch Empirie gelten. Sogenannte Glaubenswahrheiten oder Offenbarungen, die nicht argumentativ eingeführt sind, können auch nicht durch Argumente bestritten werden, lediglich abgewiesen werden; doch wird gerade solches hartnäckig, fanatisch vertreten, da es dem Gläubigen als absolut und ewig gilt, kein Zweifel daran rühren soll.

Der Fideist verschließt sich der Einsicht in Gründe, der Erklärung von Ursachen, der Erörterung der Umstände, will seiner beschränkten Überzeugung – ohne jeden Diskurs – uneingeschränkte Geltung erzwingen.

Anders und in reflexionsloser Affirmation doch ähnlich verhält es sich mit dem Kulturalisten. Er lehnt sowohl absolute als auch universale Wahrheiten ab, da er eine Wahrheit nur relativ zu einer Kultur sieht; er billigt kulturspezifische Einschränkungen ethischer Normen, gar Verletzungen von Menschenrechten. Aber nichts kann dadurch gerechtfertigt werden, dass es Spezifik, Charakteristik, schlicht Tradition einer Kultur oder eines Glaubens ist. Hinter Verweisen auf derartiges stecken Neigungen, Verdrängungen, Interessen, Machtstreben, wogegen vernünftige Argumentation einen schweren Stand hat.

Nur Personen, die gewillt sind, die eigene Begründung oder Beweisführung für fallibel, die der anderen für plausibel zu halten, können miteinander diskutieren, unbeschadet dessen, dass man seine Einstellungen verteidigt, – unter Wahrung logischer Stimmigkeit, in Bereitschaft zu ethischer Reflexion und in Anerkennung allgemein gültiger Menschenrechte wie das Recht auf Leben, Würde und Freiheit, nicht zuletzt auf Meinungsfreiheit und, falls erforderlich, unter Berücksichtigung von Kausalität und psychischer und soziopsychischer Bedingtheit: Woher stammen Überzeugungen denn, und ist das jeweils Meinige gemeint, wenn eine Meinung geäußert wird; werden nicht vielmehr Dogmen nachgebetet?

Partner in einem vernünftigen Diskurs sind gehalten, ihre Aussagen zu begründen und Folgerungen daraus zu erlauben, woraus sich ein inferentieller Kontext ergibt, der nicht willkürlich gestört werden soll, allenfalls ironisch, ja polemisch gestört werden kann, dient dies doch dazu, den Partner zu verstören, stutzig zu machen, damit er aus seiner Selbstverständlichkeit aufmerkt. Auch müssen die Inferenzen, da sie gewöhnlich empirisch und implizit erfolgen, expliziert werden, so es verlangt wird.

Vernunft bedarf der Offenheit, strebt nach Freiheit, gebiert Zweifel, ist auf der Suche, hält Maß, unterzieht sich Selbstkritik. Doch ist der Mensch in leib-seelisch-geistiger Einheit nichtsdestoweniger schon mit sich selbst, wieviel mehr mit dem anderen in Widerstreit. Maßlose Aggression, rücksichtsloses Rangstreben, schwächliches Verlangen nach Anerkennung überlagern Selbstkritik und Altruismus, ein Bedürfnis nach Bindung und Sicherheit dämpft Zweifel und verengt Offenheit; Neugier macht sich zwar auf die Suche, versiegt aber mit der Zeit, Liebe kommt ohnehin nur den Allernächsten zu, und dem Spieltrieb, der Suche befördert, entwächst man schnell.

Triebhafte Bedürfnisse sind uns nur zeitweilig und nie gänzlich bewusst; wie auch die Instinkte: das sind biopsychisch verfestigte Vorurteile, deren positives Wirken es ist, impulsive Reaktionen auszulösen, lebensrettend in Gefahr, wenn für bewusstes Überlegen keine Zeit ist, wenn Verhalten durch spontane Assoziationen in einem unbewussten Gedächtnis gesteuert werden muss, Assoziationen, die übrigens weniger Energie brauchen als bewusste Gehirntätigkeit, Assoziationen, die durchaus mit reflexiven Prozessen in Konflikt geraten, nicht immer angebracht und in einigem zivilisatorisch überholt sind, da sie in Situationen, wie es sie ehemals nicht gegeben hat, fehlschlagen oder versagen können.

Andere Vorurteile sind soziopsychischer Art: gegen das andere Geschlecht, gegen fremdartiges Aussehen und seltsame Gewohnheiten, andere Herkunft und Kultur, wurzeln aber doch in den Trieben der Aggression und Selbsterhaltung. Sie sind beharrlich, da Erfahrungen, die sie bestätigt haben, besser in Erinnerung bleiben als solche, die ihnen entgegengestanden haben. Sie festigen sich, wenn sie Interessen dienen, schwächen sich ab in Zusammenarbeit und Verfolgung von Gemeinsamkeiten.

Wenngleich beiderlei Vorurteile phylogenetisch geprägt sind, so sind doch die letzterer Art dank der Neuroplastizität ontogenetisch veränderlich: Nervenzellen im Gehirn verschalten sich unablässig, konsolidieren oder lösen sich, verstärken sich in ihrer Effizienz, je nachdem, was wir denken, erleben und tun; neu geschaffene zerebrale Kapazität ermöglicht reichhaltigere geistige Aktivität und differenziertere körperliche Geschicklichkeit.

Allein die Beobachtung des Verhaltens oder der Tätigkeit anderer kann ein Gehirn zu neuronaler Imitation veranlassen. Es spiegelt also die Aktivität anderer geradezu wider, weswegen die betreffenden Neuronen Spiegelneuronen genannt werden. Sie lassen uns nicht nur sinnlich wahrnehmbare Aktivitäten anderer, sondern – intuitiv – leibliche und seelische Empfindungen anderer verstehen, und zwar über das neuronale Korrelat eines basalen leib-seelischen Selbstgefühls, das in der vorderen Gürtelwindung zwischen linker und rechter Gehirnhälfte sitzt, und also auch Einfühlung, Mitgefühl auslösen kann, Empathie, die allein schon durch einen Bericht über das Befinden eines anderen angeregt werden kann, was zeigt, dass Einfühlungs- und Sprachvermögen neuronal eng verknüpft sind.

Spiegelneuronen dienen, und zwar schon gleich nach der Geburt, der Einstimmung der Menschen aufeinander, der Einübung sozialer Fähigkeiten

ten und wahrscheinlich auch der kognitiven Entwicklung: Anteilnahme drängt zu Teilnahme und Mitteilung auch verbaler Art, die bewusstes Denken voraussetzt. Spiegelneuronen, die Verhalten und Erleben nachzuahmen gestatten, befinden sich in allen Bereichen des menschlichen Gehirns.

2. *Ethische Orientierung*

Vom Selbstgefühl zum Mitgefühl – letztlich entspringen alle Gefühle einer Neigung zu Lust, einer Abneigung gegen Unlust. Gefühle begleiten rationale Überlegungen, bewirken Entscheidungen, sind selbst hervorgehoben durch Wahrnehmungen, Beobachtungen, Erlebnisse oder durch im Hippocampus bewahrte, nicht bewusste Erinnerungen. Vom limbischen System ausgehend treffen sie im präfrontalen Kortex mit Wissen und Erfahrung zusammen, gehen damit einher, liegen mit diesem auch im Widerstreit, in dem sie sich oftmals behaupten.

Gefühle verdichten sich zu Vorstellungen, und diese strukturieren sich zu Sinnwelten, vorwiegend in konträrer Orientierung, wenngleich es oft eher um – nicht durchschaute – komplementäre Verhältnisse geht. So

- beansprucht man kulturelle Einzigartigkeit oder anerkennt eine Vielfalt von Kulturen;
- zehrt man von der Vergangenheit oder schaut eher in die Zukunft;
- bezieht man Selbstwert aus einem dem Kollektiv geschuldeten Ehrgefühl oder aus individueller geistiger Anstrengung;
- ergeht man sich in Homogenität oder ist angeregt durch Heterogenität;
- geht man in Totalität auf oder schätzt Diversität;
- fühlt man sich geborgen in Abhängigkeit oder riskiert und genießt Freiheit;
- verschließt man sich in religiöser Identität oder öffnet sich zivilem Umgang;
- ergibt man sich tradiertem Moral oder bildet sich in ethischer Reflexion;
- kurz: handelt man eher mündig oder unmündig, eher vernünftig oder unvernünftig.

Wer sich einer Tendenz zur jeweils erstgenannten dieser Sinnwelten, zu deren Überschneidungen und Überlagerungen überlässt, begibt sich

einer zivilgesellschaftlichen Verpflichtung auf Werte wie individuelle Menschenrechte, Demokratie, Säkularität. Zwar kann sich niemand einer kulturspezifischen Überformung seiner Vorstellungen, Einstellungen, ja sogar seiner Wahrnehmung entziehen, doch findet der vernünftige Denkende Gründe für einen ethischen Universalismus, der gestützt ist auf die allgemeine psychophysische generische Konstitution des Menschen, und er wird Kritik erwägend hinnehmen; der Gläubige hingegen empfindet Kritik als Zumutung oder Beleidigung, verweigert sich erprobender Übernahme der Argumente anderer.

Zwar scheut sich auch der Aufklärer Immanuel Kant nicht, von Glauben zu sprechen, aber er spricht von einem Glauben, „welcher sich auf keine andere Data gründet als die, so in der *reinen* Vernunft enthalten sind“ (1912: 141). Er erläutert: „Ein reiner Vernunftglaube ist also der Wegweiser oder Compaß, wodurch der speculative Denker sich auf seinen Vernunftstreifereien im Felde übersinnlicher Gegenstände orientiren, der Mensch von gemeiner, doch (moralisch) gesunder Vernunft aber seinen Weg sowohl in theoretischer als praktischer Absicht dem ganzen Zwecke seiner Bestimmung völlig angemessen vorzeichnen kann ...“ (1912: 142).

Das ist, so Kant, nichts anderes als die „Unterwerfung der Vernunft unter keine andere Gesetze als: *die sie sich selbst gibt* ...“, und dennoch oder gerade deshalb die „Freiheit im Denken“, welches Denken nichtsdestoweniger methodisch nachzuvollziehen und schlüssig zu verstehen sein muss. Doch „... wenn die Vernunft dem Gesetze nicht unterworfen sein will, das sie sich selbst giebt“, hat das zur Folge, dass „... sie sich unter das Joch der Gesetze beugen muß, die ihr ein anderer giebt ...“ (1912: 145). „Und so zerstört Freiheit im Denken [...] endlich sich selbst“ (1912: 146).

Was nun ist Vernunft? Was ist theoretische und praktische Rationalität? Jedenfalls, um ein negatives Urteil zu gebrauchen, die Vermeidung von Illusion. Vernunft dringt auf Wahrheit, bescheidener: Richtigkeit. Irrt sie auch, ist sie doch methodisch und logisch kontrollierbar, sodass begreiflich ist, warum die Ergebnisse ihrer Anstrengungen sich als falsch, als Irrtum erweisen. Aber: „Eine Illusion ist nicht dasselbe wie ein Irrtum. [...] Für die Illusion bleibt charakteristisch die Ableitung aus menschlichen Wünschen. [...] Wir heißen also einen Glauben eine Illusion, wenn sich in seiner Motivierung die Wunscherfüllung vordrängt, und sehen dabei von seinem Verhältnis zur Wirklichkeit ab, ebenso wie die Illusion selbst auf ihre Beglaubigungen verzichtet“ (Freud 1926: 434, 440).

Kants Vernunftglaube ist insofern nicht illusionär, als er der Glaube an etwas ist, was sich logisch und praktisch bestätigt hat, zumindest der Bestätigung fähig ist. Vernunft ist sowohl geistiges Streben: *noema*, als auch praktisches Werkzeug: *organon*, welches letztere sich erst in seinem Gebrauch als solches erweist. Vernunft ist, was Menschen vernünftig denken und tun, und darüber muss immer wieder befunden werden. Vernunft ist nach Stimmigkeit strebendes Denken und dessen praktische Bewährung, ist individuelle und kollektive Leistung. Alles andere ist sie nicht, wobei dies unendliche negative Urteil nur dazu dienen soll, falsche kategoriale Bestimmungen zu vermeiden.

Vernunft zeigt sich im menschlichen Werk, in Äußerungen des menschlichen Verstandes, im vernünftig geführten Diskurs. Da Illusion und Glaube nur durch schiere sich selbst bestätigende Wiederholung überdauern können, ist Vernunft, die sich denkend und handelnd reflektiert und weiterführt, kategorial anders zu bestimmen als Glaube und Illusion. Deshalb bestimmt man sie auch besser nicht substantial, sondern prozessual als vernünftiges Denken. Dieses ist logisch jeweils die materiale Negation unvernünftigen Denkens und ist gegenüber und unterschiedlich zu diesem unter Beweis zu stellen.

Das geschieht, wenn es sich um empirische Folgen vernünftigen Denkens handelt, "in einem gemeinsam kontrollierten, offenen Prozess der allgemeinen Wissensentwicklung, die als solche immer zugleich auch Begriffsentwicklung ist" (Kambartel und Stekeler-Weithofer 2005: 254). Nicht nur innerhalb einer Forschungsgemeinschaft, sondern im gesamten öffentlichen Bereich ergibt sich so interindividuell die Chance, sinnlose von sinnvollen Aussagen oder – in kategorialer Ausgrenzung, die aussagt, dass ein Prädikat nicht zum Gegenstandsbereich gehört – relevante von irrelevanten Aussagen zu unterscheiden, und unsinnige Aussagen, die gar nicht wahrheitsfähig sind, dahingestellt sein zu lassen.

Solches Verfahren gilt auch für intelligible "*generische Sätze*" (ibid.: 254) die Gattungen betreffen, aber nicht allquantifiziert empirischer Art sind; sie unterliegen nicht strikter Verifikation, sind aber intersubjektiv konsensuell und insofern auch objektiv, als sie sich auf eine Außenwelt beziehen, deren objektive Erkenntnis uns zwar nur durch Zeichen vermittelt ist, die wir aber leiblich-seelisch subjektiv wahrnehmend erleben – unsere Lebenswelt, unsere Wirklichkeit, weil sie Wirkungen auf uns zei-

tigt. Wirklich spürt man die Welt, und wenn davon die Rede ist, stimmt man schnell überein, wenngleich man subjektiv, ganz bei sich ist.

Jedoch: “Die für eine sinnkritische Analyse des Redebereichs der objektiven Erfahrung bei weitem wichtigste modale Kategorie ist die Möglichkeit. Was, so lautet die relevante Frage, muss erfüllt sein, dass ein Urteil eine *objektive Möglichkeit* zum Ausdruck bringt und nicht bloß eine *rein formale Möglichkeit* artikuliert” (ibid.: 257–258). Formal möglich sind fiktive Wesen und die Zuschreibung ihrer Eigenschaften. Formal möglich, aber auch faktisch funktional ist die logische Konsistenz der Arithmetik; objektiv möglich, weil empirisch bestätigt, sind die Dynamik und Kinetik der physikalischen Mechanik.

Nach Immanuel Kant ist – im empirischen Denken –

1. was mit den formalen Bedingungen der Erfahrung, also der Anschauung gemäß den reinen Verstandesbegriffen übereinkommt, *möglich*;
2. was mit den materialen Bedingungen der Erfahrung oder der Empfindung zusammenhängt, *wirklich*;
3. dessen Zusammenhang mit dem Wirklichen nach allgemeinen Bedingungen der Erfahrung bestimmt ist, *notwendig*, das heißt existent. (1911: 185–186/B 266)

So weiß man, wovon objektiv die Rede ist. Gleichwohl steht auch das subjektiv Mögliche oder Wirkliche nicht außer Rede, doch kann diese nur anderer Art sein als jene, in der es um Objektivität geht. Subjektiv kann durch Glaubwürdigkeit geltend gemacht werden, was dem einen eine Erklärung ist, dem anderen spekulativ zu sein scheint, dunkel, nicht einsichtig ist. Ist aber eine logisch-empirisch sinnvolle Hypothese dazu gefunden, kann abduktiv eine Folgerung gewonnen werden, ein Schluss also von einem vorliegenden Ergebnis auf einen besonderen Fall unter einer angenommenen Regel oder einem Befund, wodurch der Fall vorläufig erklärt ist, – welche Abduktion oder Hinleitung sich dann induktiv bestätigen und deduktiv nutzen lässt.

Nach Charles S. Peirce ist möglich, “was sein könnte; wovon nicht bekannt ist, dass es unwahr wäre: wovon nach einem hypothetischen Stand der Information nicht bekannt ist, dass es unwahr wäre.” Es sei ein elliptischer Ausdruck insoweit als “wir nicht wissen”, ob ein Ding existiere oder ein Ereignis oder eine Tat nicht vorkommen werde; “möglich ist, was sein könnte [may], nicht, was sein kann [can]” (1991: 462). *Wirklich* unterscheidet Peirce von *real*, “weil das, was nur keimhaft *in posse* ist, insofern es

das Vermögen hat, sich zu einer bestimmten Wirklichkeit zu entfalten, real ist und unabhängig davon, was wir darüber denken mögen. Reale Objekte sind entweder außerhalb unseres Geistes, wenn sie nämlich überhaupt von unserem Denken unabhängig sind, oder sie sind innerhalb des Geistes, wenn sie vom Denken, wiewohl nicht vom Denken über sie abhängen” (1991: 468), das heißt, intelligible Realität sind.

Letztere wären nichts anderes als die generischen objektiv reinen Gegenstände, die in Kants Terminologie in den “reinen sinnlichen Begriffen” erfasst werden, “denen nicht Bilder der Gegenstände, sondern Schemata zum Grunde” liegen (1911: 136/B 181), Gegenstände, über die jeweils zu befinden ist. Über subjektiv geglaubte Realitäten, ist nicht einmal intersubjektiv, geschweige denn objektiv zu befinden; bei entsprechender Neigung kann man sich nur in jemandes Befindlichkeit, jemandes Glaube etwa, einfinden. Es ist aber über Glaube mit dem Gläubigen nicht zu rechten, weil dessen Geltung, subjektiv wie objektiv, für ihn von vornherein ausgemacht ist; es gilt ihm nur, seinem Glauben zu folgen, diesen auch zu verbreiten.

Was in Semiose und Retrosemiose, in Herkunft und Fortgang nachzuvollziehen oder zu verfolgen wäre, verschmilzt in Befindlichkeit, Aufwallung, Mystik. Die Kantschen Kategorien und Peirce’ semiotische Differenzierungen greifen hier nicht. In Vermeidung “kognitiver Dissonanz” (Festinger 1989: 31) wird nicht kategorial bestimmt, fallen externes – so es existiert – und internes Objekt ineinander, ebenso wie rhematischer, dicentischer, argumentischer, logischer, emotiver, dynamischer Interpretant.

Es geht nicht um logisch und empirisch zu klärenden Sinn, sondern um überschießende, haltlose Bedeutung, um rituellen Vollzug, nicht um Verständigung, sondern Selbstverständnis, um verschwommene Symbolik, wabernde Metaphorik; das Dingwort wird zum – unbedingten – “Wortding” (Gfesser 1996: 23), dem bedingungslos entsprochen wird, gelegentlich und gern erbarmungslos, obschon allemal ein barmherziger Gott beschworen wird. Wohl hält ihr referentieller und inferentieller Überschuss die Wortsprache offen und geschmeidig für neues; er kann aber auch informationale Geschlossenheit befestigen: Wer nur noch selbiges beschwört, dem fehlt es an Aufmerksamkeit für anderes und andere, der will selbst nur Aufmerksamkeit erregen.

Aufmerksamkeit aber ist eine "geistige Operation, welche eine einzelne Idee von allen anderen Ideen absondert ..." (Robin 1967: 6/MS IIII). Man muss aufmerken, um etwas bemerken, etwas beachten, um etwas achten zu können, muss sich stören, ja verstören lassen, sich auf etwas einlassen, statt sich über etwas auszulassen, aufeinander zukommen und mit Unverständnis auskommen, überlegend innehalten und Widerspruch aushalten können.

Grundlegend dabei bleibt, dass Verstehen nur aus Strukturen rationaler Begründung erwächst, aus abduktivem Vermögen, in inferentieller Argumentation, und kraft kommunikativer Kompetenz, derart, dass man sich angemessener Mittel bedient, um etwas festzustellen, zu erläutern, zu begründen, zu unterscheiden, zu bewerten, dass man über geeignete Prädikate verfügt: für Qualitäten, Quantitäten, Eigenschaften, Gattungen, Zustände, Handlungen, Ereignisse, Beziehungen, Verhältnisse, Zusammenhänge, dass man klarstellt, ob es um eine Handlung geht oder ein Widerfahrnis, einen Wunschtraum oder ein Erlebnis, einen Vorgang oder eine Tätigkeit, ob jemand Handelnder oder Betroffener ist, Urheber oder Nutznießer, Beteiligter oder Unbeteiligter.

3. Differenzierende Performative

Verben wie feststellen, unterscheiden, erläutern, begründen nennt man performative Verben, (Austin 1972: 87–95) weil sie die Intention des Sprechers hinsichtlich der performativen Geltung seiner Äußerung, aber auch die perlokutive Absicht des Sprechers in einer Kommunikation, eben die beabsichtigte Performatio explizit benennen. Sie tauchen meistens erst in einer Redewiedergabe auf, und zwar in der dritten Person, seltener, etwa im Falle einer Bekräftigung, eines Versprechens, einer Entschuldigung, eines Ratschlags, eines Widerspruchs, eines Vorwurfs, oder einer Bitte in der ersten und zweiten Person, sind aber dem Sprechakt implizit. Der Sprecher äußert seine Intention explizit nur, wenn er sie hervorheben will oder meint, missverstanden worden zu sein, oder befürchtet, missverstanden werden zu können. Ansonsten vertraut er darauf, richtig verstanden zu werden, zumal er sich bemüht, dem zur Rede stehenden Sachverhalt und dem Verlauf des Diskurses sprachlich gerecht zu werden.

Man überlege nur, wie viele Performative eine Sprache doch bereithält, um zu ersehen, wie differenziert Argumente vorgebracht werden

können und ebenso darauf eingegangen werden kann. Man kann etwas beurteilen, einräumen, gegenüberstellen, einschränken, mitteilen, benennen, beschreiben, bekennen, unterstellen, fragen, bitten, prüfen, fordern, empfehlen, versprechen, bezwecken, verknüpfen, vergleichen, auseinanderhalten, dafür oder dagegen halten, vereinzeln, verallgemeinern, verstärken, abschwächen, vermuten, erwarten, vorziehen, abwehren, gutheißen, annehmen, ablehnen, einüben, anvertrauen, herausstellen, gewichten, berichtigen, verneinen, bejahen, bestätigen, einbeziehen, ausschließen, kann zustimmen, widersprechen, beharren, drohen.

Weiters kann man etwas ausnehmen, ausschließen, beziehen, berichten, beachten, andeuten, ausführen, bemerken, berücksichtigen, bestimmen, bestreiten, beteuern, bekunden, bezweifeln, darstellen, deuten, einklagen, einwenden, erkunden, erwidern, entgegnen, erwähnen, erwägen, entwerfen, erforschen, entnehmen, kann belasten, bezichtigen, beschuldigen, sich beschweren, bedrängen, abweichen, ausweichen.

Man kann etwas finden, erfinden, folgen, folgern, fühlen, gestehen, gewährleisten, glauben, hervorheben, hinzufügen, hoffen, leugnen, loben, tadeln, meinen, schließen, unterstreichen, verdeutlichen, verlangen, versichern, verwerfen, voraussetzen, vorschlagen, verbinden, wiederholen, aufzeigen, zugeben, hinweisen, verweisen, unterrichten, vorhalten, warnen, täuschen, irren und zweifeln.

Derart unterschiedlich also können die Intentionen der Sprecher sein, die in der Sprechhandlung verborgen vorgebracht, aber selten ausdrücklich zur Sprache gebracht werden. Hinzu kommen Mimik und Gestik, leiblich-seelische Befindlichkeit, geistige Fähigkeit, Wissen, Erfahrung, Kenntnis, Erkenntnis, Motivation und Strategie. Auch Alter, Geschlecht, Status und Rolle, Norm und Regel, Sozialisation und Enkulturation, sowie die grammatische, semantische, kommunikative Kompetenz, auch die Anzahl der Gesprächsteilnehmer, Zeit und Ort, Anlass, Umstand und Situation des Gesprächs bestimmen Sprecher und Sprechakte.

Es trifft zu, was Peirce (1960: 169/5.283) gesagt hat: "When we think, then, we ourselves, as we are at that moment, appear as a sign." Gemäß aktuellen neurologischen Forschungen schließt das reflexive Denken auch zerebrale Aktivitäten ein, die unbewusst bleiben, aber eben unser Denken, unsere Handlungen und unser Verhalten beeinflussen. Die Faktoren und Agenten einer Kommunikation sind also sehr komplex und es leuchtet ein, dass jedes Verstehen von Missverstehen begleitet ist, dass es schwierig ist,

sich verständlich zu machen, dass man etwas eben nur zu verstehen geben kann, in der Hoffnung, dass es aufgenommen wird, dass schwerlich zu verstehen ist, wofür man kein Verständnis hat, dass man für vieles kein Verständnis erwarten kann, und dass dennoch nichts bleibt als der Versuch, sich zu verständigen, um Verständnis erlangen zu können.

Dazu muss man seinem Verstand aufhelfen, wozu es des Verstandes selbst bedarf. Verstehen ist Entwicklung und nicht Stillstand. Und weil es mittels Zeichen vonstatten geht, ist es ein Zeichenprozess in Zeichensystemen, deren umfassendstes unsere Wortsprache ist. Ein Zeichenprozess, eine Semiose, ist immer ein triadischer Prozess, durch den ein Erstes ein Drittes dahingehend determiniert, sich auf ein Zweites zu beziehen, auf das es sich selbst bezieht. Man nennt diese triadische Relation seit Peirce den Mittel- Objekt- und Interpretantenbezug des Zeichens. Nur wenn diese semiotische Logik gewährleistet ist, die Zeichenbezüge nicht verfehlt werden, ist Verständigung möglich.

Vielfältig und vielschichtig verlaufen und gestalten sich die Semiosen in einer Kommunikation. Die dreieitliche Beziehung zwischen einem Bestand an Mitteln, einem Bereich von Objekten und einem Feld der Interpretanten ist dynamisch, also im Gebrauch der Zeichen veränderlich, kann doch jeder der drei Bezüge erweitert, eingeschränkt, abgewandelt werden. Mittel ist prinzipiell jede geeignete Materie, ist sie nur in eine triadische Relation gebracht; Objekt ist prinzipiell alles, was bezeichnet, dargestellt werden kann; Interpretant ist weitestgehend sämtliches Wissen der Welt.

Die moderne Semiotik hat die drei Zeichenbezüge differenziert und praktikabel gemacht, wenn es gilt, ein Mittel zu wählen, um ein reales oder fiktives, physisches oder mentales, konkretives oder abstraktives, individuelles oder kollektives Objekt bezüglich eines intendierten Interpretanten angemessen treffend und präzise, auch prägnant zu bezeichnen. Der Mittelbezug des Zeichens wird an Wahrnehmbarkeit, Aufmerksamkeit, Wirksamkeit gemessen; der Objektbezug daran, welcher Art er bezeichnet: iconisch-abbildend, indexikalisch-verweisend, symbolisch-benennend, eher anschaulich oder unanschaulich; der Interpretantenbezug schließlich wird in seinem logischen, offenen, geschlossenen, vollständigen, emotiven, dynamischen Konnex ermessen.

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Yun-Csang Ghimn

Social studies of science? Semiotic studies of medicine!

A case of positron emission tomography

1. Social studies of scien...tists?

The almost total exclusion of materials from medicine and technology reflects the fact that history, sociology, and anthropology of medicine and technology are large and actively practiced fields whose literature is as sizeable as that of science studies itself.
(Mario Biagioli 1999)

This editor of *The Science Studies Reader* might have made such a decision neither for the sake of size nor for convenience. Intentionally or not, Biagioli's reiterated juxtaposition of "medicine and technology" reflects another fact: Western medicine has been *technology* rather than science ever since the time of, for instance, hepatoscopy, from 3000 to 2000 BC, which was the deciphering of a sheep's liver, into whose *in vivo* nose the sufferer has breathed, and inscribing whatever diagnosis on a hepato-shaped stone in cuneiform. After the Hippocratic aphorism, "Life is short, art (*techne*) long," Aristotle – among other Hellenic rationalists – called medicine a sort of art (*ιατρικη τεχνη*; e.g. *Metaphysics*: 12. 1070a) or productive science (*ποιητικων επιστημων*) whose goal is health; unlike theoretical ones, such as geometry, the aim of which is "to contemplate nature" (*Eudemian Ethics*: 1. 1216b).

I realize that medical science has existed since continental researchers, like Claude Bernard (*Introduction à l'étude de la médecine expérimentale*) and Rudolf Ludwig Karl Virchow, in the mid-19th century, started observing test-animals in laboratories. For me, however, this scarcely equals *sickbed* performances. Scientific studies – fractal physics as well as biology – often deal with isolated, *laboratory* erudition. For example, *Les microbes*

by Bruno Latour pertains to Louis Pasteur, who was hardly a diagnostician; Evelyn Fox Keller's *Making Sense of Life* features no signs of illness; the recent work of Nikolas Rose (2003) has explored the ethical implications of pharmaco-genetic psychiatry (hence following more in the Foucauldian line of *Folie et déraison* than of *Naissance de la clinique*.)

2. *It takes the Dutch*

Half the number of contributors to a *Body and Society* issue (v. 10, nos. 2–3) were Dutch. In fact, the second wave of scientific studies of corporeality is being led by promising Dutch authors. For example, José van Dijck has gathered papers highlighting where the gaze of media interests converges with that of surgical purposes. Since differences between those lenses are still clearly admitted (van Dijck 2005: 11), nothing approaching metaphorical similarity¹ could satisfy readers.¹ Neither is her monograph concerning such a synchronicity as compact discs triggering off the respective progress of music industry and cardiovascular scanning; to say that CAT needs computers would also be a mere tautology. Instead, she discusses how both technological sectors have frequently met: for example, x-ray photographs were made popular to help the promotion for respiratory health, while documented separations of Siamese twins or the Visible Human Project became a spectacle in Guy Debord's sense. Endoscopy hence parallels not so much any communication gadgetry *per se* as it does science fiction.

A chapter where van Dijck compares roentgenography with a Nobel Prize winner by Thomas Mann is unique at certain points. Firstly, her choice of *The Magic Mountain* leads to questioning how broadly she defines media. Then, we realize the contents – rather than materiality – of Mann's novel matter. Third, when van Dijck (2005: 88 & 161 n) wrote, "Part of the X ray's power rested in its ability to 'speak for itself,' [...] Röntgen's device resembles a contemporary technological invention: the gramophone," she cited *Grammophon, Film, Typewriter* [1986] by Friedrich A. Kittler whose inscription theory looks preferred to Bruno Latour's; is van Dijck's exposition shifting from science studies to media archaeology? That seems unlikely, because she invites no such Foucauldian word-before-thing media as Siegfried Zielinski (2006) does some 18th-century remote typewriter which did not exist. *Fantastic Voyage* epitomizes discursive inventions of diagnostic apparatus popularized using media. Another case for Zielin-

ski is Jan Evangelista Purkyně's doctoral thesis apropos subjective vision featuring optical tools like kaleidoscopy, a technology from the same century. If van Dijck found new ideas which ironically appeared to somehow transcend historical contexts as recommended by Erkki Huhtamo (1996), van Dijck would seek any literary attraction before 1895 to non-invasive anatomy or place *Fantastic Voyage*, *Innerspace* and *Osmosis Jones* recurring every second decade vis-à-vis treatment with miniaturized agents that we have never witnessed.

3. *Which semiotics of medicine?*

Whatever acts or shifts actions, action itself being defined by a list of performances through trials; from these performances are deduced a set of competences with which the actant is endowed; the fusion point of a metal is a trial through which the strength of an alloy is defined; the bankruptcy of a company is a trial through which the faithfulness of an ally may be defined; an actor is an actant endowed with a character (usually anthropomorphic). –Madeleine Akrich and Bruno Latour, 1992

Despite those aforementioned rarities, *science studies-ts* (my designation) appear to be sociologists rather than students of science let alone medical technology; hence the label sounds problematic, which is more so because I have never heard of *medicine* – not *medical* – *studies*. Clinical practices may be of no concern unless they appeal to science *and technology* studies. Likewise, social thinkers or anthropologists of the body (e.g. Polhemus 1978; Martin 1992; Featherstone et al. 1993; Shilling 1994) have cared little about diagnostic imaging. When determined to chase laboriously how inequalities are strategically depicted as steady by the power machine, Gordon Fyfe and John Law (1988: 1) continued participating in leftist politics: “To understand a visualisation is thus to inquire into its provenance and into the social work that it does. It is to note its principles of exclusion and inclusion, to detect the roles that it makes available, to understand the way in which they are distributed, and to decode the hierarchies and differences that it naturalises. And it is also to analyse the ways in which authorship is constructed or concealed and the sense of audience is realised.”

Semiotic influences come to mind next, although they are seldom recognized: Bernike Pasveer (1989) exceptionally reveals possible equivocality

of radiography: i.e. people interpret stuff diversely at their discretion. Sociologists of scientific knowledge or actor-network theorists have favoured the Greimassian notion of *actant* that was borrowed from Lucien Tesnière (1976: 102) as referring to any noun (*substantif*) which engages in the predicated event (*procès*) and becomes a human or equivalent actor. This linguist investigated how expressive grammar signifies real-life contents; to *École-de-Paris* semioticians, it matters that Vladimir Propp's (1984) several *dramatis personae* were replaced with fewer categories.




Figure 1. Actantial model (Courtés 1976: 62–68).

Algirdas Julien Greimas proceeded to exclude the bottom row in “La Soupe au pistou ou la construction d’un objet de valeur” [1979] and projected a protagonist on such modal verbs as – since “Les Actants, les acteurs et les figures” was published 6 years earlier – *vouloir* (wanting) *pouvoir* (being able) *savoir* (knowing) and, in “Pour une Théorie des modalités” [’76], *devoir* (having to). Though animals or things such as diamonds are often sought after (Prince 2003: 2), they may not so much assume those heroic positions. Greimassian actants have turned out more of the subject i.e. social agent (in French, *actant*) which science studiests have adopted for longer than it appears to be internationally confirmed (see Lenoir 1994). Latour and Paolo Fabbri in 1977 co-wrote “La Rhétorique de la science: Pouvoir et devoir dans un article de science exacte” that was appreciated by Jean-Claude Coquet (1984), a Parisian scholar. This clan gave birth to sociology of scientific knowledge or *actor-network theory*, if not François Rastier et al’s (2002: 255–260) information semiotics! However, with its three words and the hyphen all intimidating, ANT may be a misnomer of the agency-structure debate², according to which actants themselves achieve society rather than having been within or constructed by it *a priori* (Strum & Latour 1987).

4. *It takes Dutch, and others*

Anne Beaulieu has contrasted three players in positron emission tomography: first, psychological researchers understand that it statistically measures the cerebral functions. Secondly, a lay audience would consume the scan like beautiful paintings or photos so misleadingly realistic some have created ungrounded expectations for clairvoyance while its personality-wise data are enormously difficult to evaluate (Hüsing et al. 2006). Third – and this particularity explains why science (or scientists whom Beaulieu has described as reliant upon numbers and texts rather) studies does not suffice – a clinician requires such rendering of data to communicate with his or her patient (Beaulieu 2002). Here we have Algirdas Julien Greimas' subject, receiver, sender (Figure 1); tomographs are no actantial machinery serving people modestly (cf. Johnson 1995³), but objectified for visual analysis to which – and Hippocrates' symptomatological legacy – I find Charles Sanders Peirce faithful (Ghimn 2003). Let us paraphrase Beaulieu's accounts: PET, comprised of pixels, calculates where and how many isotopes are concentrated *diagrammatically*. Göran Sonesson (1999) considers this cartography (the darker yellow – which corresponds to nothing of that colour – in a map, the hillier) more fulfilling than *image* or *metaphor*⁴, two other kinds of *iconicity* that does not mimic things so much as exhibits how the structure is proportionally arranged (Peirce 1931–35: Volume IV, paragraph 544).

Bruno Latour (1999: 29 & 66) sounds less Greimassian when saying not only “they can point with their fingers to phenomena taken in by the eye [...] the ‘index’ par excellence” but also “Is the diagram [...] more abstract or more concrete than our previous stages? More abstract, since here an infinitesimal fraction of the original situation is preserved; more concrete, since we can grasp in our hands, and see with our eyes, the essence of the forest-savanna transition, summarized in a few lines. Is the diagram a construction, a discovery, an invention, or a convention? All four, as always.” Regarding rhetorically generated credibility, the concepts of “selective” perception – i.e. filtering, uniforming, upgrading, defining – by Michael Lynch (1988) and “homologues” demonstration by Peter Galison (1997), which retains internal relations of what has been represented, seem compatible with Peirce's *diagram* too.




Figure 2. An electron collides with its anti-particle carrying a + charge (i.e. positron) to be annihilated. Two γ rays thereof aim in the opposite directions (Sochurek 1987; reprinted with permission from Dr. Joel Karp, the source).

I have proposed a thesis on diagnostic images to prove the *diagrammaticality* in PET, where science studies is disappointing: it rarely does medical technology justice. Greimas' actant scheme that underlies Latourian sociology of scientific knowledge once comprised in *Sémantique structurale* [1966] personified objects but has soon focused on asking what a subject can, must, wants and knows (how) to do. Henceforth *semiotics of passions* later: this inconclusive project has succeeded to Louis Hjelmslev's mission in *Prolegomena to a Theory of Language* – how to fragment a continuum (Hénault 1992: 116–119). Tomographers act i.e. upon our sensate body (Greimas & Fontanille 1993: xxii) without a scalpel (*τομευς*), PET instrumentation helps wherein patients experience the procedure (Figure 2); yet, tomographs are rather acted or practiced on by those expert agents (Figure 3). Latour would not call such PET inscriptions *actors* either, but *diagrams*.




Figure 3. Actantial model applied to visual diagnosis.

Notes

1. “Indeed, just as medical progress, the possibility of radiography, scanners, and grafts, transforms our body and our relationship to our body, media space, whether we are spectators or actors, in one way or another, implies a profound transformation of the body and of our relationship to our own body,” says Jacques Derrida to Bernard Stiegler (2002: 96).
2. Latour involves “actants” to be humanized while Greimas and Joseph Courtés (1982: 302) expel such automatons without *savoir* from communication.
3. Latour’s anglophone pseudonym; in Parisian semiotics – the door can be open (situation), was not yet so then it has been opened (event) or the door flies open (process), but somebody must still make that happen (action) by opening it (Genot 1979: 20).
4. Why subdivide (*hypo*)*icon* there into those *diagram* and *metaphor* concepts? Firstly, it is a myth that *images* or pure *icons* would amount to the perfect double of whatever they denote. Peircianism has already fought non-semiotic, though ordinary, examples of computer-graphic “icon” which look *symbolic*. Next, just like *indices* are the core sign, *diagrams* characterize a condition termed *iconicity* that some, even decreasing, extent of resemblance could satisfy: the famous triplet went in 1885 without designating *symbol*: “The first is the diagrammatic sign or *icon*, which exhibits a similarity or analogy to the subject of discourse; the second is the *index*, which like a pronoun demonstrative or relative, forces the attention to the particular object intended without describing it; the third is the general name or description which signifies its object by means of an association if ideas or habitual connection between the name and the character signified” (Peirce 1931–35: Volume I, paragraph 369).

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Tiziana Giudice

Metaphors and imagination

1. Introduction

Metaphor, according to Aristotle, is a device for the acquisition of knowledge that relates something known to an abstract, less clear portion of reality or experience. Through metaphor you can imagine what you do not yet know, on the basis of what you already know. This is an “expressive device present in verbal language that connects it to non-verbal language, activating interpretative routes in signification that relate sections that are even very distant from each other in the sign network” (Ponzio 2004: 67–68). It has been demonstrated that metaphor is present in the most different communicative situations. Metaphor has been defined as being endowed with cognitive value: it organizes language, thinking and symbolic expression in general.

The relation between metaphor and imagination has not been an object of systematic investigation, even if it seems fundamental to understanding the function of metaphor. In fact, the production and understanding of metaphor not only presuppose the processes implicated in linguistic elaboration, but also the semiotic and cognitive capacity to create links among even the most disparate elements: this capacity calls on the imaginative dimension.

In this paper I focus on Cognitive Linguistics because it defines metaphor as a “device” used by the mind to (cognitively) re-direct human mental systems and organize thinking (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980). I will analyse Johnson’s perspective of 1987, in which he affirms that metaphor is based on cognitive elements that are not logical-propositional, but imaginative. Starting from the limits and merits of this approach, I will propose some topics concerning the metaphor-imagination relation with reference to both Giacomo Leopardi and Giambattista Vico.

It would be methodologically risky to argue that these authors, who had different languages and knowledge from our own, were forerunners with respect to the issue of metaphor and imagination, or that they even solved it in any way. Instead, by focusing on the history of this issue, my aim is to build and describe the setting from which came the terms of the relation of metaphor and imagination.

*2. Principles of Cognitive Linguistics:
The cognitive role of image schemata*

Cognitive Linguistics affirms that mind is not detached from body; rather, it is *embodied*, in the sense that cognition depends on the body, on its specific characteristics of perception and of motion, as well as on its interaction with the external world. In this perspective metaphor is a cognitive mechanism able to transform what is difficult to represent cognitively into something concrete and simple by individuating the physical-perceptive elements of cognition of what is abstract and lacking in information. More precisely, metaphor is meant as a projection of different material configurations – perceptive, motoric, spatial, etc. – into the linguistic and conceptual level.

This means that projection is not accidental but caused by the materiality of thought and of language: human beings have a body, are able to move, to manipulate objects and, generally speaking, to interact physically and perceptively with the world. These conditions create a series of pre-conceptual *schemata* that constitute the basis of the conceptual system. Johnson (1987: 2) defines these pre-conceptual structures as “image schemata”, which are “dynamic patterns that function somewhat like the abstract structure of an image, and thereby connect up a vast range of different experiences that manifest the same recurring structure.”

Schemata are recurrent models of corporeal experiences, organizing centres of knowledge that structure, in a non-propositional form, a group of salient information which emerges from sensory-motoric activities, such as manipulating objects, orienting in space and focusing perceptive attention on different ends. Examples of these schemata are “up-down”, “front-back – both linked to spatial orientation – and “container”; all of these arise from the fact that we experience our body as the latter. These schemata, metaphorically projected and propositionally elaborated, constitute

our web of meanings; moreover, they motivate a great part of semantics in any language. For instance the “up-and-down” schema is metaphorically projected onto positive abstract domains such as happiness, sadness, health and illness, so that what is correlated to psychical, physical and social well-being is understood as though it had a direction upwards. Negative psychical, physical and social conditions have the opposite direction. For example, *I’m low/ down in spirits* are metaphorical expressions connected to the physical sense of vertical orientation. Both of these derive from the “up-and-down” schema; for example, *to reach the top* that means *to have success*.

Turning to the concept of “imagination”, it appears to be considered intuitively as a creative activity, as synonymous with fantasy. In the cognitivist context, this dimension in relation to metaphor has been neglected with respect to the consideration of image schemata as products of the imagination. In this perspective, the imagination drives the entire cognitive experience; and it activates and coordinates, through metaphorical projection, the schemata from which linguistic activity comes.

3. *Limits and merits of the cognitivist theory of metaphor*

One of the limits of this theory¹ resides in the fact that it is not able to go beyond merely noting that the basis of symbolic expression is given by metaphorical interconnections characterizing human thought (see Ponzio 2001). In fact, this perspective lacks a psychological theory, since Johnson (1987) did not construct a functioning model of mind: without analysing the procedural nature of image schemata, it is not clear if and how these structures are represented in the human mind. This approach, however, has recently received confirmation from that experimental field of cognitive neuroscience which propose neural models that accord with the thesis of embodied mind. Some studies demonstrate the neurobiological plausibility of image schemata: both literal and metaphoric language, related to the body and bodily actions, activate some areas within the sensorimotor cortex, according to image schemata hypothesis (see, e.g., Hauk et al. 2004; Rohrer 2005).

On the one hand, I believe that a notion of imagination as deriving from body-world interaction, and intended as the ability to produce and organize knowledge, is an important *trait d’union* between body-experi-

ence and the gnoseological dimension of metaphor; but on the other hand, such a notion is also reductive. Our linguistic productions are not only covered by body metaphors but also by those more complex metaphors connected to the culture of reference. With the term “experience” we do not just mean the corporeal and motor-perceptive dimensions. The content of language, namely the experience, as Aristotle says, is not made up of only what it is perceived. Experience is, in doing, a specific use of physical entities. Experience brings into what is sensibly perceived, a “utility” and an “end”, which have a cultural matrix. So we could not intend the notion of imagination as just the ability to elaborate sensible data, but also as the ability to connect our experiences – intended in a wider sense – and our background by organizing and structuring them in coherent and meaningful units and also by making them pertinent to our ends. These actions are possible because of the metaphoric mechanism: the human mind moves through a web of interpretative routes made up of associative and metaphorical links (see Ponzio 2001), and it is based on the ability of discovering new cognitive combinations (see Danesi 2001). Moreover, imagination lets words resound, oscillate, evoke, allude and open to the entire range of possible signification exactly because metaphor is not a mere “representative” modality but is a “reconfiguration” of reality that is capable of symbolically structured, abstract and creative processes.

Within this theoretical approach some of Vico and Leopardi’s issues assume a decisive role. These issues demonstrate that the Enlightenment was not simply characterized by the cult of rationality, but that it also gave voice to emotional, imaginative and corporeal elements of life and of knowledge (see Gensini 2002). Both philosophers, though starting from different perspectives, consider imagination as a dynamic, productive and fundamental element of knowledge. The creative dimension of language corresponds to imagination; this creative dimension is made explicit in the metaphoric ability and in its constantly ambiguous and opened way of being. Leopardi’s philosophic reflections in the *Zibaldone* as well as Vico’s in *La scienza nuova* can contribute to placing Cognitive Linguistics in a theoretical frame that can better explain metaphorical processes, and can be an important starting point for explaining, both empirically and theoretically, either the presence or the functioning of associative-metaphorical thought in the formation of new concepts (see Ponzio 2001).

4. *Imagination and metaphor according to Vico*

Giambattista Vico (1668–1744), in *La scienza nuova*, not only highlights the relation between metaphor and body, a strong point of the cognitivists, but he also connects, systematically and indissolubly, the metaphoric ability with that of imagination. When Vico criticizes the mere rational basis of knowledge, he clarifies that language develops when you transfer sensible and corporeal data onto data which are not yet known. In this process metaphor plays a fundamental role. It is by no means a mere embellishment of discourse; it is not “an ingenious invention of poets”. It is an act with heuristic value, an interpretative and gnoseological mechanism that can make something visible, through unpredictable matchings and likenesses difficult to understand and to verbalize. According to Vico, metaphor is able to unify and to join what would seem logically heterogeneous. It is the spontaneous, natural form through which creatures, since the beginning of their intelligence, were able to express a pre-logical and pre-rational vision of the world. In this primitive phase, the human being was directed to what was concrete; he was immersed in the senses and in the corporeality of images, and his relation to what surrounded him was experienced on the imaginative level, which is the level of the fantastic and the affective. This was in opposition to the logical-rational activity which will characterize the next stage.

In *La scienza nuova*, Vico tries to reconstruct the origin of mankind by identifying the original moment when the first human beings started to think as “humans”. His work is based on the reconstruction of the original cognitive state within which language came to life. What initially characterized those “big beasts” – who had strong senses and a lively fantasy – was irrationality; that is to say, the lack of reflection. Instinct, violence, ferocity, the poverty of language, all these clashed with “the need to explain themselves and to make themselves understood”. Through tropes, primitive peoples gave forces of nature the names of gods; frightened by lightning and thunder, they idealised them – through metaphors – as the voice of a god who ordered them to behave well. Primitive mankind needed senses and body in order to become acquainted with anything: not only natural phenomena but objects were named, too, sometimes by reference to parts of the body (“eyes of the grapevine”, “saw’s teeth”, “comb’s teeth”, “first-hand”, “heart of the matter”, “come to a head”, “bowels of the earth”, and so

on). Metaphysics, philosophy and all other forms of knowledge were first born as metaphorical: the transport operation, coming from likeness, is a growing in knowledge; it is an operation that acquires new contents and that implicates imagination. It is imagination, not rational deduction, that opens the path to the comprehension of reality. The human mind, in order to know, first uses the faculties that the body possesses: it is a mind that thinks by feeling. Senses and imagination, then, not only constitute the first moments of human history but they also represent the constitutive moments of human mind (*La scienza nuova*, Libro I, II, LXIII).

Vico not only evidences the notion of imagination connected to corporeality, but specifically affirms that the generating nucleus of language – what Vico calls “the universal principle of etymology” – is metaphor, the construction of which requires a particular, fundamental level of imagination, namely, the *ingenium*. The latter consists in getting close to, and in creating connections among, objects which until then were thought to be unrelated. It is the ability to discern and to realize likenesses, to see what is similar in what is different, to connect what is separated. *Ingenium* is not a passive recorder of the world order; it is the ability that enables one to construct this order, which is inferred by the organizing of apparently disparate elements that experience presents us. In this sense, the *ingenium* is the most refined and creative of human abilities, and it is the most useful to creating metaphors. The *ingenium* consists in the ability to link what is different through the perception of similar elements, and this ability is manifest in metaphor. Metaphor is the *organon* par excellence of *ingenium* (see Gensini 2002); it is an index of the functioning of the *ingenium*, which is the practical use of imagination.

Vico puts metaphor at the heart of “poetic [and imaginative] logic”; it is that level of knowledge of verbal expression that has a relevant function in the ontogenesis and phylogenesis of language. Poetic logic is none other than Peirce and Sebeok’s “play of musement”, namely, the ability to construct different possible worlds. Imagination, *ingenium*, metaphor – all three derive from this innate poetic logic that is dominant in cognition when the latter is creative; it is the condition that makes human symbolical behaviour possible.

Cognitive Linguistics, by focusing on the relation among experience, concepts and language, declares the existence of gnoseological links between metaphor, concepts and language, which converge in Vico’s

notion of “poetic logic”. This notion can, according to Danesi (2001), give a theoretical perspective to the interpretation of linguistic research on metaphor, and of cognitive processes based on metaphorical works. Vico’s poetic logic constitutes an appropriate basis upon which to build adequate Cognitive Linguistics theories, because it constitutes the primal basis of all symbolical and cognitive behaviour.

5. *Imagination and metaphor according to Leopardi*

Leopardi (1798–1837), in his *Zibaldone*, offers important reflections on the relation between metaphor and imagination. Similarly to Vico, Leopardi underlines that the role of corporeality is fundamental in human conceptualization. He affirms that everything in the mind is material and that mental faculties cannot operate without reducing everything to something material (see *Zibaldone*: 1657–1658). It is thanks to the imagination, which has its own productive force, that sensible data are revised. Leopardi attributes to the imagination a melting function within the cognitive process, giving the latter the ability to connect the most heterogeneous things, to discover new points of view on the world, to gaze upon new proportions and relations. Leopardi clearly connects the imagination with metaphor by affirming that words give place to associations that are always variable, depending on the exercise of the imagination. The associative mechanism of ideas is made explicit in metaphor, which allows us to discover relations among unrelated phenomena. In this process the exercise of the imagination is fundamental (*ibid.*: 3717): the imagination has to recover relations and likenesses among things. Leopardi, indeed, considers metaphor as the ability responsible for establishing new and unpredictable relations among heterogeneous data. Crucial to the inventive process, metaphor represents the “linguistic space of imagination” (see Gensini 1989).

The imagination, then, is able to transcend the denotative dimension of reality, and the metaphoric ability also coincides with the faculty of “grasping” (comprehending) relations. In this ability is expressed the power of imagination.

6. Conclusion

Just as something is a sign only if put in relation with something else, namely the interpretant, metaphor consists in the ability of drawing together and relating different interpretants – even the farthest ones – within the web of signs, in order to comprehend one dimension of knowing in terms of another. I'll say more: each sign brings with it a metaphoric element; metaphor belongs to the sign structure; it is an index of the vagueness, the ambiguity, the incompleteness of the sign. Metaphor is the space of never-ending possibilities of creativity, and it is connected to the imagination as an ability to give life to a new reality, of seeing in it something never seen before, of sending relations and analogies, of creating creative associations. These aspects are an indication of the semiotic characteristics of the metaphorical procedure, which does not record what things are, but shows that for human beings each aspect of reality is constructed in an interpretative process. This process is not a given truth, but a process always open to new possibilities.

Note

1. For a discussion of the limits of the cognitivist theory of metaphor and of the image schemata thesis, the reader is referred to Casadei (1999), Glucksberg & Keysar (1993), and Ortony (1993).

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Sandra Grötsch

Pets, fantastic beasts and magical creatures

**The animal world in the *Harry Potter* series
by J. K. Rowling**

This article aims to show the role and meaning of animals and magical creatures in the *Harry Potter* series with the help of representative examples. Some of these creatures are animals from the realm of reality, whereas others are mythical creatures, existing only in the world of fantasy and art. Only some central figures have been chosen for this overview, to show the importance and variety of magical creatures. Fortunately Sabine Wienker-Piepho (2004: 99–102) has already defended this subject, and I thankfully continue it by looking at the animal part of the “*Potter*-world pandemonium”, as she calls it (ibid.: 99).

It is very important to notice the concept of two worlds in *Harry Potter*. They are not separated from each other; rather, one exists inside the other. Care is taken that these two worlds do not interfere too much in the other’s realm. One world is the magical one of witches and wizards; the other is the non-magical world of the Muggles (Rowling 1997: 43), i.e., those who cannot do magic. This circumstance makes the animals all the more interesting and offers an additional point of view for the relationship between humans and non-humans, as well as mixed forms of human and animal. As one example of this point, consider the fact that there are no zoos in the magical world – a world in which “Care for magical creatures” is a subject studied at school. Marion Copeland (2003: 287) notes correctly that non-human animals play roles in *Harry Potter*, but that the story is not about them. Adding to this, I would only remark that the animals and mythological creatures in the books are more than just added spice for this fantasy fiction. They carry history, values and symbolism.

The first animal mentioned in the first book of the series is a tawny owl, which is the most significant natural animal in the series. On the same page a tabby cat appears (Rowling 1997: 8), the second very important animal of the wizarding world. This particular cat in *Harry Potter* is actually a human, as is revealed some pages later (an issue to be explored in another article). Other cats in the first book are the pets of the neighbour Mrs. Figg and the school's caretaker. The value of pets is exemplified when Harry receives the invitation letter from Hogwarts School, in which we learn that pupils may bring an owl, cat, or toad with them to school. Traditional schools normally do not allow animals on their premises; but for wizards, pets are essential. They help the pupils to feel more at home at Hogwarts, and are used for doing homework assignments. Young witches and wizards should learn how to transform objects, and one's own pet can come in handy for practising. Harry's best friend Ron has a rat, Scabbers, and their roommate, Neville, a toad. Magical people have regular pets, but also tarantulas, Nifflers, and other more unusual creatures. There are many regular pets at the school. The caretaker of Hogwarts, Mr. Filch, keeps a cat called Mrs. Norris, who is perhaps too stealthy and nosy but otherwise a perfectly normal cat; the gamekeeper, Hagrid, has a huge dog called Fang, who is gentle like its owner, if not as brave. It seems that just as in the world known to the reader, in *Harry Potter* people freely choose their own pets, according to their own likes and dislikes. There is no need to turn to psychology here; the descriptions in the text of humans and their pets are sufficient to support this point. Pets in *Harry Potter* serve as companions and fulfil small duties for their owners. Additionally, they seem to anticipate the needs of their owners and perform services without having to be asked.

Other animals the reader encounters early in the story are Harry's roommates in the cupboard under the stairs. Small spiders are nothing unusual and Harry does not mind them much. They are at this point merely a decorative item underlining Harry's miserable living conditions at his Muggle home. Spiders are not common as pets in the world of wizards, but Aragog (a giant spider) is an exception, it being Hagrid's pet for a while. At some places in the story spiders have a significant meaning, and Aragog's fate is another example of the attitude of humans towards animals.

Hogwarts's headmaster, Albus Dumbledore, keeps a Phoenix named Fawkes in his office. This mythical bird – a symbol for reincarnation and

hope – does not only help Harry during his fight with a Basilisk but also heals his deadly wound. A powerful moment occurs in the sixth book, when the lamenting Phoenix leaves Hogwarts forever. With him hope leaves, and the whole wizard community becomes gloomy instantly. It is no surprise that it lives with the most powerful wizard, Dumbledore, until his death. Dumbledore's body is then burned to ashes, out of which the mythical Phoenix arose.

Of the many animals the Hogwarts students encounter during their "Care for magical creatures" classes, the most interesting is the Hippogriff. This animal may not quite fit into the category of pets, but nevertheless numbers among the domesticated beasts in the magical world. A mixture of eagle, lion and horse, the Hippogriff most closely resembles the Griffin that one finds on many European coats-of-arms (Rose 2001: 153–154, 174). The Hippogriff can fly and is one of the fastest known. It may be compared to Pegasus in its abilities and companionship to heroes. In *Harry Potter* the Hippogriff Buckbeak is sentenced to death for attacking a pupil. It is interesting that in this magical world, its creatures may be charged and sentenced even though they and their habits are studied and usually well known. The incident brings to mind the witch trials of the Middle Ages, when many innocent people were convicted of sorceries. Buckbeak is saved from his punishment, but shares the fate of exile with Sirius Black, whom he helps to escape. He also saves Harry from a Werewolf, therewith showing his quality as a pet-like animal.

The animals and magical creatures in the series inherit the reputation and function of their ancestors, but are put into a new and exciting story. They get names and personalities, and are woven into the protagonists' fate. An animal quite important to magical people is the owl, because the whole mailing system is based on this creature. Owls do not only transport the mail in the magical world, but they always find the receiver no matter where he is. On top of that, they demand a fee for their services and make sure the payment is made. Owls hunt for themselves and do not need much special attention by their owners. In ancient myths owls are messenger birds, among them the Greek goddess, Athena of Greek. Their high symbolic continues to be valued even today; e.g., an owl decorates the one-Euro coin of Greece, continuing a long tradition as monetary decoration. Owls are mysterious: they move in the night, they make no noise, and their eyes seem to see everything. Their voices are low and eerie,

which has led to the belief that they can foresee terrible happenings. Owls were also believed to predict the future. The eyes of owls are positioned on the front of the face and not on the side, which makes them different from any other bird species. The look of owls and their nocturnal activities make them “*unheimlich*”, a creature from a different “home” (*Heim*) than our own. They represent the life that happens parallel to ours but is unknown and uncanny. The *Harry Potter* books do not reveal much of the life of the owls outside their postal duties. In European folktales, the owl may appear as the companion of witches. Some owl species carry the Latin expression *Strix*, from which derives the Italian word *strega* meaning “witch”. That owls belong to the sinister sphere of witches does not clash with their other attributes; for example, wisdom. Witches are also called wise women, who have gained their wisdom during the night, which makes them different from regular scholars. Rowling, the author, is rather specific about the species of owl we are dealing with. The very first owl mentioned, as noted above, is a tawny owl (*Strix aluco*), a species known to accompany witches. Harry’s owl, Hedwig, is a snowy owl (*Nyctea scandiaca*), a species unknown to the British environment. Harry received her as a birthday gift from Hagrid, after realizing he is a wizard and will attend Hogwarts School for Witchcraft and Wizardry. This gift brings him closer to being a member of the magical society and teaches him the responsibility of caring for an animal. He has a cage for her, but it is only needed when Hedwig is transported in a Muggle environment. Harry’s boarding school, Hogwarts, provides an owlery, with all services needed for the night sentinels. An owl is not a cuddly pet, but Hedwig is able to show affection and also to indicate when she is displeased with Harry’s behaviour or lack of attention. In situations where Harry realises he has failed to care properly for his pet, he gets the chance for self-reflection and improvement. Because of her white colour and majestic look, Hedwig is less likely to have ties to evil. Moreover, she bears the name of a saint and therefore cannot symbolize anything bad. Hedwig ties Harry to both worlds, the magical as well as the Muggle one. She is the only means by which he can exchange messages with his friends, during the times he is not allowed to meet them or to use his family’s phone. Harry talks to Hedwig, and even though she cannot answer, she seems to understand him. She flies all the way to France to pick up a birthday gift for Harry from his friend Hermione, who could not have

otherwise sent it to him in England. Hedwig dies during a pursuit of Harry by his enemies; this leaves him feeling responsible and miserable.

Not all wild beasts or magical creatures are meant to be pets. Nobody would want to keep a Troll or Dragon, but Hagrid, the school's gamekeeper, who is particularly fond of fierce and monstrous creatures, tries to raise a Dragon baby. Harry and his friends convince him that little Norbert, the Norwegian Ridgeback, is better off in the wild and the reader is assured that Dragons do not make good pets. The reader encounters more Dragons in the fourth volume, when Harry and three other contestants have to fight Dragons in a competition. The aim is not to kill the beast, but to steal an egg from its nest. The breeding mother-Dragons in this situation adds a new nuance to the old Dragon-fight scene we know from fairy tales, legends and tales of saints. Dragons in *Harry Potter* cannot talk, but nevertheless seem rather smart. They apparently know about their invincible strength and can outwit their opponents in battle. During the competition, the young challengers are hurt, but Harry lands a small blow and ends up being the best competitor, having used his own special skill – flying at high speed on a broomstick – to win. He was also prepared to meet a Dragon, whereas the others did not know what awaited them. Rowling invented different races of Dragons for her books (2001: 10–15), adding more detail and depth to them in the series, hence making them more like animals than mythical creatures. They are extremely strong and breathe fire, but those are the only points on which they differ from regular animals. The importance of Dragons in *Harry Potter* is made up of two ingredients. One is the long tradition of these creatures in legends, myths and folk tales, harking back to the beginning of time. The other is our attitude towards them, and to their close relative, the snake. Both are chthonic creatures living close to the ground, if not under it. Some dragons can fly, but this is not to be set in opposition to the chthonic feature; rather, it helps to complete the picture of them as being among the oldest creatures with elemental powers. There is hardly any myth without a dragon or snake. They have positive as well as negative aspects, but they usually thrive on chaos and lawlessness, and thus are usually dangerous to both humans and deities. On the other hand, they may be revered and admired as a force beyond human understanding. It is likely that the Christian faith has gone furthest in giving dragons and snakes a fully negative character, associating them with the realm of Satan. This is the point where snakes differ very much from dragons in *Harry*

Potter. Harry's first encounter with a snake happens at the zoo, where he finds himself communicating with a boa constrictor. First Harry talks and the boa uses sign language, but eventually the snake speaks one sentence to Harry. This small but remarkable event is not referred to any more at all in the first book, but later on the reader will find out that Harry's ability to talk to snakes is a very unique and dangerous talent. Only special, enchanted animals are able to talk; for example, Aragog. In the Bible there is only one serpent capable of speaking, and that one is the very embodiment of evil. On the other hand, snakes have a much longer tradition than their Christian interpretation. They are animals combining the underworld with the earth's surface, where humans dwell, and sometimes even with the sky. Harry meets various snakes throughout the series, but the most interesting of them is Lord Voldemort's Nagini. Her name indicates her ancestry from Indian Nagas, a race of ancient serpents representing elemental forces and often fighting against the gods. Nagini is the only pet snake we encounter; all the others are wild animals or mythical beasts like the Basilisk. Snakes in *Harry Potter* have the ability to speak and have their own language, Parseltongue. Speaking that language is a rare gift and commonly believed to belong to the dark side of magic powers. Harry is most uncomfortable with this ability, which he for an unknown reason calls his own, because nobody in his family was a Parseltongue speaker, nor did he learn this language anywhere. In fact, it cannot be learned; one is born with it. The Basilisk, king of snakes, is similar to dragons: it is a wild beast that cannot easily be controlled by any power human or magical. The use of Parseltongue may lure it into action though. Lord Voldemort's snake, Nagini, is the property of her master and does his bidding. One might consider her evil, but there are no signs that this particular snake is such by nature. This snake is merely a container of her master's spirit. It is noteworthy that Nagini is referred to as "she" and hence may represent an older conception of snake than that which exists in Christian tradition, mentioned above. Sabine Wienker-Piepho (2004) makes an interesting point, that to name a creature is to tame it. In *Harry Potter* the animals and creatures with names are mostly pets, but there are also exceptions. Norbert the dragon would be one. Even though he is christened, he refuses to be tamed, and tears apart a teddy bear he got from Hagrid as evidence of his wildness. Neither is Nagini tamed; rather, she is possessed and deprived of her own will.

Important magical creatures are the Centaurs, in animal form with human features. These have roots in Greek and Roman mythology and even a place in the night sky. The Centaurs may have originated in the east, coming to Greece via tales and artefacts. The most popular representative of the Centaurs is Chiron, teacher of Achilles and other heroes (Rose 2001: 77–78). Centaurs are wild, independent, and occasionally cruel, but also wise, helpful, and devoted to reading the signs of the gods in the stars. They are semi-divine, Chiron even becoming immortal before he sacrificed himself. Like Dragons, the Centaurs represent chaos, specifically the human part of it. They have the ability to be almost divine, or at least civilized and wise, but their tendency to violence and misuse of alcohol drive them to unruliness and occasionally mayhem. In *Harry Potter* the Centaurs live in the Forbidden Forest close to the school. They are fierce, independent and particularly fond of stargazing. They give hints to witches and wizards, but do not reveal clearly what they read in the stars. The Centaurs prefer to keep to themselves, hide from non-magical people, and only rarely meet with magical people. One of those living in the Forbidden Forest is less mystical and friendlier to humans. He is called Firenze and is younger than the other Centaurs that Harry meets. He saves Harry from an attack by Lord Voldemort in the first book and later joins the teaching staff at Hogwarts. According to Greek tales Centaurs are very attracted to women, but in *Harry Potter* it is the schoolgirls who are extremely fond of the young and beautiful Firenze. He is described as having “white-blond hair and a palomino body” as well as “astonishingly blue eyes, like pale sapphires”. He ideally combines girls’ craze for horses and their awakening interest in the other sex. Rowling sticks to tradition, and there are no female Centaurs. Firenze makes a sacrifice, like Chiron, when he becomes a teacher for humans. His herd expels him for doing so. Firenze fights alongside humans against the evil power of Lord Voldemort, and stands as a symbol of understanding and trust between different kinds of beings.

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*Robert Hatten – with Richard Littlefield and
Charls Pearson*

(The linguistic concept of) voice in music

Examples from western art music

The grammatical concept of voice in a linguistic context is distinct from recent metaphors of a “voice” that is projected through the music, or inferred from its energies, as explored by Abbate (1991) and Burnham (1995). As the previous papers have noted, different languages offer quite contrasting grammatical means of marking agency, from the not-so-simple distinction between active and passive voice in English, to the even more subtle category of “middle voice” in languages such as Greek, where the focus is on neither agent nor patient, but the action itself (and, as Rick notes, on whose behalf it is being done – hence its importance in earlier languages such as Greek, where the authority and agency of divine forces are constantly being invoked). As Pearson and Littlefield have stated, the unmarked condition of music is to focus on the action itself, which I would interpret as the ongoing flow of intertwined musical events – melodic and motivic, rhythmic and metric, harmonic and contrapuntal, timbral and textural – as these are synthesized to create ever-changing gestural shapes with expressive character.

But subjectivity may play a role in music, as well (see Hatten 2004). The historical shift from the subject-less and seamless continuities of a late 1500s Palestrina Mass, where the focus is on the act of reverent devotion, to the reductive yet highly rhetorical monodies of the Camerata in the early 1600s, with their highly-charged solo declamation, must have had a shocking effect upon listeners (at least, as soon as the monodic experiments of these scholarly neoclassicists began to spread into the newly emerging and more accessible genre of opera). Of course, various kinds of subjectivity have been intertwined with music from the time humans first began to

sing and to devise instruments. Improvisatory performance is inevitably marked with the authenticity of human expressiveness, and can even involve calculated representations of emotional states (these were theorized as early as the Greeks, with their concept of *ethos*). Nevertheless, with the rise of opera, and the concurrent emergence of independently expressive instrumental music in the early Baroque, we find an impressive grounding for claims of subjectivity, and even multiple agencies. Hence, there is the possibility that we may be able to reconstruct the variable focus among agent, patient, and action that a linguistic concept of voice addresses.

Before exploring how such shifts in focus might be cued compositionally, I would like to address the emphasis that Pearson and Littlefield have placed on the intentions of the performers (including conductors). As Pearson notes, voice is triggered at the moment of conversion from type to token, and certainly the performance of a musical work – its manifestation in sound – is a prototypical example of type-token conversion, parallel to that of speech. In each case, the utterer can decide how to “spin” the focus of an event: whether to project the agency of one’s own utterance (what I call Type 4, or performative agency), or whether to perform neutrally within the constraints of the score.

But there is a type-token conversion in the act of composition, as well, in that the composer creates a token of a musical type (such as a form or genre), and the token is manifested through the “once-removed-from-sound” coding of musical notation, which represents – transparently for the composer and perhaps less so for the interpreter – a relatively specific shaping of sound. It is here that the range of options expands, in that the composer can suggest at least three types of agency. I have called these internal (Type 1), external (Type 2), and narrative (Type 3).

The easiest way to distinguish internal from external agency leads to the kind of focus we find in the linguistic concept of voice. When Mahler, in the finale to his Sixth Symphony, inserts three hammer blows, we know from his program that the third “fells the hero”. But even without the program, which Mahler withdrew, we would never assume that the internal agent – that subjectivity with which Mahler identifies, and which is engaged in a tragic-heroic struggle – would be the agent of his own demise. Rather, we would automatically assume that such impressive hammer blows are delivered by an external agent, which we might generically label as Fate, although its identity could be variously construed.

In order to effect a change of focus from internal to external agency, Mahler, in the passage mentioned above, required a startling change in musical parameters – one sufficient to suggest the break from an ongoing identification with the hero to a recognition of an external force. In some performances, the hammer blow is given an “otherworldly” timbral presence by using a heavy mallet on a less-resonant body (for example, a wooden conductor’s podium, which creates a tremendous and sickening thud). Thus, a highly marked opposition or rhetorical gesture is required to cue the shift from internal to external agency, because in this case the music does not possess a grammatical means of effecting the shift of focus, and must instead rely on a contrast that sounds extra-grammatical, hence externally powerful.

Likewise, in order to effect a shift to narrative, or Type 3, agency, a composer must find a way to shift level of discourse (Hatten 1994, 2004), and again, a radical change (of register, style, texture), often unconnected to the previous discourse (by introducing unrelated motivic material), is typically required to support the interpretation of an agency that, as it were, steps out of the discourse to comment upon it.

Many musical contexts exhibit a degree of indeterminacy when it comes to interpreting agency. For example, the opening of Brahms’ First Symphony is monolithic (the throbbing pedal point) and fateful, hence expressive of external agency, but there is also an element of striving in the oblique lines straining against the implacable pedal C. Their linear dissonance, and the intense wedge created by ascending strings against descending winds helps cue an internal agency. This agency is not only tragically heroic, but perhaps the wedge suggests an agency divided in itself, torn by internal conflicts.

When the internal (split) agency of the heroic and the external agency of fate are present simultaneously, should we consider this an example of tensional counterpoint between agential strands in a single musical cable, or should we recognize a *trope* emerging from their counterpoint? Whichever interpretation we choose, a conductor who tried to inflect the focus toward one agency at the expense of the other, perhaps through dynamic foregrounding of the former, would be considered suspect, since both agencies must be heard for the remarkable tension to achieve its full effect. Thus, Brahms has loaded the appropriate focus into his conversion of symphonic-allegro *type* to specific “first movement of Brahms’ First-

Symphony” *token*. It is as though he wanted to convey an equal focus on both subject and patient in this fateful encounter, or grim struggle. And thus, we might speak of a *troping of voices*.

Composers’ very struggles to achieve these types of effects, even without sufficient syntactic or grammatical cues built into their styles, demonstrates the need for a concept of voice in describing music. In the remainder of my paper, I will explore how one composer found an ingenious way to cue such shifts through rhetorical play, even without the grammatical means that language has to accommodate such shifts of focus.

The composer is Chopin, and the work is the Nocturne in B Major, Op. 32 No. 1, in which there is a striking shift in level of discourse right at the point where one would expect a final cadence. Many have noted the sudden rhetorical effect of this “external” coda. Recently, my student John Reef wrote a paper in which he pointed out the gestural continuity of the recitative figure, which maintains a discursive link to the thematic language of the Nocturne proper. But starting in measure 60, the extreme shift in dynamics, the sudden negation of harmonic closure, and the topical shift to dramatic recitative all signal a shift in level of discourse. The problem is whether or not this shift is analogous to a shift in voice. As Rick has suggested in our discussion of the work, the subject (what I call the internal agency) is still active, perhaps more dramatically so than before, and even the treatment of the E# has been prepared in the previous discourse. What strikes me as novel is the sudden intrusion of a very external agency – again, quite fateful – that overpowers the internal agent (despite his heroic-tragic struggle). The ultimate cadence, with its added plagal finality (and perhaps a shift outside the realm of the internal agent altogether), suggests the inexorably tragic ending to this otherwise rather serene Nocturne.

There are two questions to ask. First, is there an *actor-patient relationship*, and if so, who is the actor and who is the patient? If fate is the actor and the internal agency is now the patient, reacting to the sudden intrusion of fate, then the drama of the coda could then be expressed in the active voice: “fate is overcoming the agent”, a familiar enough reversal of agency, but still in the active voice, of: “the hero is overcoming fate”. Second, and equally importantly, is it possible to hear the *focus* being shifted from actor to patient, a passive transformation that would indicate the option of voice is present: “the hero is overcome by fate”. Without evidence for an optional

shift between active and passive voices, the claim for voice in music would be somewhat incomplete.

Consider the following interpretation of the coda (mm. 60-end) as a play of agencies and, from a compositional standpoint, a play of voices:

1. the coda disruptively shifts to an extreme external agency, undercutting the internal agency's closure. Active voice, with fate as actor.
2. there is a sudden rhetorical shift to the internal agency, in dialogical defiance. Active voice, with hero as actor.
3. sudden chords cut off the hero's defiance. Active voice, with fate again the actor.
4. ultimate liquidation of the hero's motive. Passive voice, with focus on the hero as patient.
5. finality of fate in Adagio, with its monophonic voice-leading 7–1, enhanced by a plagal extension (iv-I) and Picardy third. Could we consider the framing finality of this Adagio as evidence of a shift to *middle voice*, with the focus on the act that has just been accomplished? If so, it achieves a certain grandeur and objective sense of remove, fully appropriate to the tragic expressive genre (which has displaced the serenity of the Nocturne, as lyric is wrenched unexpectedly into dramatic mode).

Of course, this is only one of many possible interpretation of the dialogical action in this coda, but the variable options of voice certainly provide for a more nuanced interpretation than one based solely on the conflict between internal and external agency alone. And that alone is a good reason to continue investigating voice in music.

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André Helbo

Sémiotique du spectacle vivant: Le corps du déni

La sémiotique du spectacle vivant occupe, par son questionnement sur la marque (la désignation de soi) plutôt sur que la *communication* spectaculaire, un espace décentré par rapport au thème inaugural du congrès *Communication: Understanding/Misunderstanding*.

La *présence* du corps en scène comme lieu paradoxal de mise à distance de la communication spectaculaire à travers la *dénégation* justifie le titre de notre contribution. Il s'agit de cerner cette présence-absentifiante, cette oscillation, entre la matérialité signifiante et la sémiose, que Peter Brook (1977) évoque dans *L'espace vide*. Trois questions permettent de thématiser la problématique. Elles portent sur:

(1) La légitimité du malentendu produit-reçu lors de la représentation et de sa définition à travers les voltesfaces de la théorie: la *Wirkungsethik* ou effet produit par le théâtre sur la société et le public empirique, la *réaction collective*, confortée notamment par Labeyrie (*perception spectaculaire*), qui touche à la validation de la *communauté d'usages* chère aux sociologues (et notamment du non-public), la *réception* par le spectateur *déchiffreur* chez Barthes, le statut du *spectateur modèle* et les stratégies cognitives *coopératives* d'Eco/De Marinis, voire le *collectif d'énonciation* tel que nous l'avons-nous-même défini (Helbo 2007: 67).

(2) La pertinence de la *communication* dans le champ des arts du spectacle (son extension à toutes les pratiques spectaculaires).

(3) Le cas du théâtre et les modalités d'un réexamen des acquis à la lumière des progrès accomplis pour proposer d'autres opérateurs méthodologiques.

1. *Légitimité de la problématique liée à sa pertinence
dans le champ des arts du spectacle*

La question du malentendu est aussi ancienne que la sémiotique: Buysens (1943) et Mounin (1971: 87) disqualifient la communication théâtrale, sauf dans le dialogue intra-scénique des personnages; les dimensions phatique et conative seraient seules valides au niveau de l'extra-scénique. On sait aujourd'hui, depuis le développement des théories sperberiennes entre autres, que le modèle de communication visé est trop étriqué et que l'approche de Mounin implique un présupposé d'existence de l'avant-spectacle largement remis en cause, notamment par le concept de *postdramatique* chez Lehmann (2002: 45).

1.1 Le film

Certes, la thématique de la communication stricto sensu a été sollicitée en d'autres termes à propos de l'image filmique d'abord chez Casetti (1990: 83) à travers les rôles déictiques permettant de repérer les figures stratégiques liant spectateur, cinéaste et personnage (les "vues"). Metz, on s'en souvient, critique ce modèle à travers le concept d'énonciation *impersonnelle* (Metz 1991: 79) qui privilégie la rencontre entre l'image (sa métadiscursivité) et le spectateur. Fontanille, pour sa part, à travers le non-langage (Fontanille 1995: 24) remonte de l'expression au contenu et remet en cause l'idée d'une deixis préétablie.

On notera cependant une prise de distance par rapport à l'approche bühlienne de la communication. Tant chez Casetti que chez Metz s'opèrent de premiers déplacements à l'intérieur du cadre de la communication:

- de la communication vers l'énonciation: l'accent est mis sur le parcours et le trajet;
- vers la mise en évidence du *spectateur*, concept versatile et tuilé, stratifié et contesté (la même dénomination est utilisée pour le théâtre depuis Mukarovsky); au point qu'on se demandera si le leurre est terminologique ou si l'opérateur recouvre des compétences, des contraintes universelles.

1.2. Les différentes pratiques du spectacle vivant

Les réflexions sur le spectacle vivant nous incitent à écarter la notion de communication au sens entendu supra, et ce pour deux raisons: (1) le caractère colonialiste de la notation/communication, perçue par les acteurs de la performance: il est impossible de reconstituer des processus, des vectorisations, des copies verbales sans passer par le rendu de sa propre perception (vidéo, livret, copie verbale sont indissociables du vécu de l'événement). Jakobson (1963: 78–86) parle de *traduction intersémiotique*: transformation d'un système de signes en un autre système de signes (par l'interprétation du spectateur, du metteur en scène ou du comédien). (2) À cette situation épistémologique s'ajoutent divers facteurs reliant le spectacle vivant au non-communicable: l'absence de reproductibilité technique (MRP vs MRI); la mise en cause d'un avant-spectacle (autre que le texte dans le théâtre français); la notion de présence et de corporéité qui soude production et réception du sens dans la contemporanéité: la surmodalisation du "comme si" (Helbo 2007: 102) conjointe pour scène et salle (le spectateur invente le sens, l'émotion en même temps que l'acteur et sans médiation).

2. Le cas du théâtre: Limites de la traduction intersémiotique

L'événement théâtral comme espace de la traduction intersémiotique offre cependant un lieu de tangence aux théories sur la communication de Jakobson, de Peirce et d'Eco. Chez Jakobson, le *passage* à la scène maintient l'émergence du système de signes, de la production, de la performance qui interprète (au sens de réactualise) un autre système de signes: Jakobson (1963: 78–86) oppose intrasémiotique (traduction) et intersémiotique (adaptation).

L'approche d'Eco est tout entière balisée du côté plus peircien de l'interprétation et des univers de référence de la réception: Umberto Eco (2001) distingue ainsi la déclinaison d'un système *endosémiotique* (intra-système: on reste dans le système, la mise en scène relève du théâtre et est inscrite dans le système expressif qu'elle actualise, il en va de même pour le concert et la musique centrés sur l'interprétation) et le passage à un autre système: *intersémiotique* (en fonction d'une lecture, transformation

de la substance de l'expression, abandon du prototexte, mise en évidence du non-dit: dans sa mise en scène du *Soulier de satin*, Vitez invente un personnage d'annoncier qui représente les didascalies chez Claudel mais qui n'existe pas dans le texte dramatique).

Ces théories font la part belle à l'interprétant si on accepte de maintenir ce concept dans le champ de la promenade inférentielle (relation entre sujet et objet en termes d'hypothèse): chez Peirce, le parcours porte sur l'expérience esthétique. Le cœur du débat porte sur cette limitation, sur le contenu et la nature du processus:

- La traduction intersémiotique peut-elle se limiter au parcours inférentiel: faut-il l'entendre, au contraire, comme reconstruction de la passion, comme reconstitution des affects (la représentation comme *intervalle pulsionnel* cher à Ropars)?

- Qu'en est-il du statut de la corporéité? Barthes définit un nouvel ordre sensoriel, sémio-phénoménologique: les incidents pulsionnels (le grain de la voix, l'écriture à haute voix), annoncent les logiques sensibles de Deleuze (Barthes 1973: 104–105). Au théâtre, nous avons souligné la parataxe linéaire-tabulaire qui participe à la production du sens et à la mise en discours: la proprioception y jouerait un rôle (Helbo 2007: 81). Fontanille (1995) parle de médiation proprioceptive de la sensibilisation du corps percevant.

- Une voie d'articulation se dessine entre sémiotique et phénoménologie, certes très éloignée de Merleau-Ponty mais plus proche de Michel Serres (1986: 181–182): le corps y apparaît comme catégorie cognitive (*tactilité* dont l'opérateur est la peau touchante/touchée, en rapport au monde et suiréférentielle).

- C'est à ce prix que se dessine le rapprochement peircien:
 - avec l'abduction (bio-abduction sensorielle, socio-abduction sur le monde communicable, érotico-abduction: le désir et le rêve de l'autre) (Peirce 1958: 7–8);
 - avec l'interprétant (émotif/affect, énergétique/action, logique): qui ne porte pas sur la transformation du sujet mais sur les modalités de l'expérience émotionnelle.

3. *Les modalités d'un réexamen méthodologique:*
La théorie des seuils

Sur le modèle de l'expression "mise en scène", nous avons proposé le concept de *mise en seuil* (Helbo 2006: 89) pour désigner l'ensemble des processus par lesquels les énonciateurs se mettent d'accord sur l'invention des conditions de mise en discours du corps, s'entendent sur les conditions du déni.

Quel est le contrat ou la promesse (Jost 2002) permettant de produire le *signal spectaculaire* qui va mobiliser un type d'expérience, de cadre, d'observation, de vécu?

C'est un travail dont les repères traversent l'histoire de la dramaturgie. On relèvera:

- la théorie de l'acteur: tantôt simulateur (Stanislavski: traduire l'émotion par des actions auxquelles le spectateur adhère) tantôt stimulateur (Meyerhold: la matérialité antérieure au sens; l'émotion étant déjà traduite dans le corps, l'acteur agit, le spectateur rejoue la biomécanique);

- la théorie de la marque: l'acteur joue à être un autre ou effectue un "travail sur soi": Artaud évoque *l'athlète affectif*, Copeau cerne *l'expressivité du corps*; le travail sur les codes et la sémiotique des seuils: l'articulation avec l'ethnoscénologie peut se révéler pertinente en l'occurrence. Arlequin ou la danseuse de kathakali communiquent d'abord un consensus sur le corps du déni: sur la manière dont regarder autrement le corps, et sur le fait que le comédien change de corps. Arlequin adopte des positions qui éliminent le casuel (cf. la série Frossart); la danseuse de kathakali désarticule son corps et le reconstruit en équivalence/résonance avec les signes de la partie chantée: elle invente et mobilise un véritable alphabet mimique, comprenant code facial, routes musculaires (*navarasa*: neuf saveurs); de même, le costume devient ce qu'il camoufle: l'image vestimentaire est tantôt iconique (renvoie au brahmane) tantôt symbolique. Au théâtre, le problème n'est donc pas de lever le malentendu: l'essentiel consiste à s'entendre sur les conditions du malentendu.

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Sari Helkala-Koivisto

The accentuated signified

Between musical and linguistic signification

A question of my present musicological study concerns how musical and linguistic expressions are correlated with each other, asked so as to gain more insight into how autistics live and communicate with people. The question posed is: Can music (and the other arts) tell us anything about human language and speech? Is there a kind of knowledge that would lead one closer to autistic people and their experiences in dealing with the world?

One sign that might help us in answering such questions is the *prosodic feature* that can be interpreted as an *accentuated signified* within music and language. It has been found in music-therapeutic interactions, where it has worked like an expressive link or or cultural mediator between and within musical and linguistic messages. In researching music or speech, one investigates sounds, words, codes and constructions, contents and forms of human communication. Music and language can be approached as if they were tools of culture. That is actually one part of our common interactive reality. These implements are indeed means of cultural existence. Music and language can be analysed and classified into different categories by type. In the theoretical field one can sometimes overlook their external functions as implements of human individuals. As culturally given things, they have become everyday utterances to non-autistic people. It seems to be an automatic habit to use them around and within our *Dasein*.

“Automatic” generally signifies something non-special. And non-special has reference to non-significant, which seems to express a paradox concerning language and speech. Non-significant here does not refer to the meaning of words or to a grammatical state of signified content, but instead correlates with “unimportant” or “of no notice.” Within the negation of language there has occurred an unconscious decrease of human expressiveness and cultural values. One speaks, but does the language still

contain internal sounds of humanity? Does spoken language have its mirrored sign in the linguistic (bodily) expressions on peoples' faces?

Music (as well as the other arts) and language are signified mainstreams of life situated both outside and inside one's body and mind. Externally they present us with a common, everyday language, being means of linguistic and meta-linguistic communication. If one approaches them from a semiotic viewpoint and signifies them through concepts of inner meaning and symbolic signs, they will change their understood appearance and start to take on an existence as experienced, received and interpreted manifestations. Music and language signified as cultural signs of speech share in an unbroken semiosis, where they have the possibility to create connected signification through their commonly-held signs referring to prosodic features.

The idea of *replacement* includes the *accentuated signified* within an expressive semiosis. It is a question of prosodic features in movement from the *musical* to the *linguistic* semiosphere. In advance of the *replacement* of this movement, prosodic features are thought to have their origin in one's individual corporeality. A prosodic gesture or motion, accentuated by that which is bodily, has reference to a natural core of vital energy that is supposed to guide the developing human consciousness and interactive socialization of man. The energetic core of human life is obviously found in signification when the *natural* moves and unites with the *cultural*. A chain of *replacement* signifies prosodic features as the smallest units of meaning in *bodily*, *musical* and *linguistic* manifestations, and it makes contact with unbroken *becoming*. Sometimes the common *replacement* deviates from cultured signification processes. For example, people with autism express an inner compulsion to choose mostly *natural* instead of cultured ways of development.

Jan Kaaplinski, in his plenary lecture, quoted us in another connection when he posed this question: "Who has power over the meaning of words?" People with autism are perhaps ready to ask, "Why must I come out of my silence?" And autistics might reply: "My communicative intentions continually try to reach the content of prosodic features of your spoken language. So far, however, I have only a developing ability to catch prosody through music. Its non-verbal signification brings me emotional warmth and human light. And I assume you will keep them waiting for me in your prosodic features, to help conquer my inborn silence and speechless

night?” Autistics’ outer speech is generally non-prosodic, but in their inner speech the prosodic qualities probably exist. In inner speech the prosodic features are supposedly *moving* entities in autism’s a-rhythmic chaos.

The prosodic features of existential life and expression are in most cases signified through their non-appearance. They represent an existential sign more often in their absence, situated in the negation of transcendence. Their natural existence within spoken language does not normally refer to the existential sign of their expressive significance. From a meta-linguistic point of view, prosodic features can be seen as the signified in both music and language. The *accentuated signified* in music can create a channel between the overflow of sensibilities between the *linguistic* and *corporeal* realms. Prosodic signs of music become broader in their movement towards the *corporeal* and the *linguistic*.

Human existence can be seen as a communicative chain wherein the developing prenatal, corporeal, musical and linguistic phases follow each other step by step or, when overlapping, adapt to each other. This kind of *expressive semiosis* is constructed in time-oriented movements. These developmental movements have their boundaries (stops and new starts) in representation of *replacements*, such that the accentuated prosodic signs open a new space of signification as early as in the embryo’s prenatal life (Guerra Lisi & Stefani 2006). The same steps will be taken later as well, both within and through one’s sensible body and mind. The prenatal phase, as theorized by Stefania Guerra Lisi and Gino Stefani in their theory of Prenatal Styles, is bound tightly to the *corporeal* as a scene of the senses.

The *corporeal* joins the *musical* in the becoming-conscious of time and space; it develops discrimination, sense perfection, and spatial constructions and codes. The *musical* phase, which occurs before the grasping of a linguistic way of consciousness, is the growing ability to sense a natural development that reflects the transcendental world and signifies experiences in the artistic sense. The musical phase can have elements that signify “being for myself” as described by Eero Tarasti in his theory of existential semiotics. In the latter, “being for myself” has reference to the Greimassian dynamic modality of *pouvoir* (can) and as such refers so to the signified actor of an emotionally progressing, functional life.

Personally felt and translated into words, the psycho-physiological experience of “I can” is one of our deepest feelings. It may be translated forward, for example, into the words “I’m living”. Every non-autistic person

has experiences such as those and can recognize in him/herself this transcendently signified touch of the deep desire for life. It can be signified in existential semiotics by another of Tarasti's existential concepts, "being-in-myself", which is combined in the principal Greimassian modality, the endotactic "will" (*vouloir*). On the level of feeling, the bodily experienced knowledge of "will" makes us feel a joy of life that has a powerful appearance in practice and is signified by the words "pleasure of doing", which refer directly to the sign of functional content in the theory of Prenatal Styles. According to Tarasti (2005: 244), "Being-in-myself represents our bodily ego, which appears as kinetic energy, 'khora,' desire, gestures, intonations, all emerging from the sea of Peirce's First. Our ego is not yet in any way conscious of itself but rests in the naïve *Firstness* of its being." To bring out the existing *linguistic* relationship between the humanly-lived worlds of the non-autistic and the autistic, one will presumably need the signified touched on by the arts with Peirce's *First*, Kristeva's *khora* or Tarasti's "being-in-myself". In this, people with autism are most experienced, and they have a deep ability, through their synaesthetic sensory images, to understand a negation of Greimassian "will" and "can". Lacking the experience of non-autistic *being*, the latter thus represents for them them an alien existential world. Does it have a transcendental contact with our own world?

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Sonsoles Hernández Barbosa

Debussy y la plástica

De la predilección por la pintura a su imaginario creativo visual

De todos aquellos músicos finiseculares que se aproximaron de una manera u otra a las artes, Claude Debussy destaca por el establecimiento de una teoría musical propia y por la rotundidad del planteamiento en relación con su aproximación a otras disciplinas artísticas, especialmente pintura y literatura. La relación de Debussy con la pintura se inicia de joven. Su biógrafo Vallas afirma que de niño tuvo su propia paleta de pintor que guardó hasta su divorcio de Lilly Téchier y con la que llegó a pintar “petits toiles” (Vallas 1958: 12). De esta pasión por la pintura fue cómplice el que fue su tío político, padrino y que acabaría ejerciendo de tutor, Achille Arrosa, amante del arte y coleccionista de cuadros de pintores contemporáneos.

Según el propio Vallas, a Debussy “incluso le hubiera gustado ser pintor” (ibid.: 10–12), hasta el punto de que “regretta toujours de ne pas avoir travaillé la peinture au lieu de la musique”, en palabras de Mme Gérard de Romilly, una de sus alumnas (Nectoux 2005: 14).

Son numerosos los testimonios coetáneos a Debussy que evidencian su interés por la pintura. Una de las reflexiones de Margerite Vasnier expresa este gusto de Debussy por las artes plásticas: “il avait un goût inné pour juger ce qui touchait à l’art, même pour les tableaux et gravures qui, en ce temps-là tout au moins, ne l’intéressaient guère. Quand mon père, grand amateur, le faisait causer, il trouvait dans ses paroles une grande sûreté de jugement et des appréciations tout à fait personnelles et remarquables” (Lesure 1992: 208). Esta atracción de Debussy por la pintura aparece reflejada a través de las numerosas alusiones que le dedica en sus escritos y el entusiasmo que muestra hacia la misma, que puede resumirse en la frase que escribe a Edgard Varèse: “... car j’aime presque autant les images que la musique” (Debussy 2005: 1389).

Ya durante su estancia en Roma en la Villa Medici da muestras de un destacado interés por el arte italiano. Así, cuando Ernest Guiraud le pregunta: “Qu’est-ce qui vous a le plus frappé à Rome?” Debussy responde:

Les Loggie de Raphaël (pas les Stanze!) et la Madone du Rosaire de Sassoferrato à Sainte-Sabine. – Saint-Pierre est une halle pour géants raisonnables et sans goût. J’aime mieux Saint-Séverin. J’adore la Villa Pia qui ne sert à rien du tout. Mais des portiques, des balustrades, des frontons. Mais ça s’encadre dans les verdure du Paradis. À Orvieto, la Résurrection de Signorelli (pas à cause des trompettes! (Lockspeiser 1980: 754).

Así expresa la admiración que le produce la obra de Miguel Ángel: “Certes je me courbe avec humilité devant ces chefs-d’oeuvre, seulement je crois que nous ne pouvons en tirer que des impressions d’œil et non des impressions d’âme, pour tout dire: vivre avec eux” (Debussy 2005: 57). De vuelta a París visita asiduamente museos. Según Mme. Romilly: “il aimait visiter les musées, les expositions de tableaux et avait une prédilection pour les paysages du peintre scandinave Frits Thaulow et pour Claude Monet” (Lesure 1992: 209).

Debussy también estuvo próximo a los círculos prerrafaelitas, al igual que las personas más cercanas a él: Pierre Louÿs, Albert Samain, Raymond Bonheur, Paul Bourget, Jules Laforgue, Gabriel Mourey, Robert Godet o incluso Paul Valéry. Según Nectoux, Debussy mostró un especial interés por el pintor y poeta Rossetti, y gracias a las abundantes traducciones contemporáneas de sus poemas Debussy acabará imbuido por la atmósfera onírica que caracteriza su obra, al modo del teatro de Maeterlinck, introductor del prerrafaelismo en Francia (Nectoux 2005: 100–104).

Otro pintor al que se aproximó Debussy fue Whistler, amigo de Mallarmé desde los años 1887–88 y quien se integró en los martes de Mallarmé a partir del otoño de 1891. El propio Nectoux expone cómo la presencia de Whistler en los “martes” fue más regular entre los años 1892–1894, cuando realizó el retrato litográfico del poeta, en un momento en que Debussy trabajaba en *L’Après-midi d’un faune* (Nectoux 2005: 107). Théodore Duret, primer biógrafo francés de Whistler, le da a conocer los *Nocturnos* de Debussy y le escribe: “Avez-vous entendu parler de Debussy et de ses nocturnes? Après qu’on vous a tant de reproché d’avoir emprunté à la langue musicale pour l’appliquer à la peinture, voilà maintenant la

musique qui vient s'inspirer de votre peinture. Quel retour des choses d'ici-bas!" (Nectoux 2005: 111).

Duret también evoca el entusiasmo de los simbolistas, y particularmente de Debussy, ante la obra de Whistler (Nectoux 2005: 111):

Le côté de fluidité, de rêve, de nuances indéterminées que possédait la peinture de Whistler. ... La musique seule était restée en dehors de l'innovation raffinée, mais elle devait aussi la connaître. L'homme qui lui en donnait la formule, Debussy, admirait tout particulièrement l'art de Whistler. De même que Mallarmé était son poète, Whistler était son peintre. Et sans vouloir pousser plus loin qu'il ne convient l'influence du peintre sur le musicien, on doit croire que les *Nocturnes* de Whistler ont agi, par suggestion, sur Debussy pour l'amener à produire les siens.

Nectoux plantea asimismo la atracción de Debussy por el universo onírico de Redon, quien le mostró una litografía realizada tras asistir a la primera audición de *La Damoiselle élue* en la primavera de 1893 (Nectoux 2005: 180–181). Otros artistas plásticos a los que Debussy se sintió próximo fueron Turner, Gustave Moureau, Arthur Rackham o el pintor y escultor belga Henry de Groux.

Debussy coleccionista

La práctica del coleccionismo supone un nuevo elemento indicador del interés por la pintura, catalizado a través de la concepción del coleccionismo como un acto de creación en sí mismo y simultáneamente expresión de gusto. En este sentido tenemos que señalar la importancia del coleccionismo como un elemento fundamental dentro de la trayectoria creativa debussysta.

La crítica sobre su figura señala cómo ya desde niño mostraba interés por el coleccionismo. Según Vallas "il aimait avec passion les brillantes couleurs des papillons qu'il collectionnait, la beauté menue des bibelots ou des images dont il ornait sa chambre" (Vallas 1958: 12). Desde su etapa de Conservatorio, que se inicia a la edad de 10 años, mostraba una particular atracción por el coleccionismo de estampas y antigüedades (Nectoux 2005: 15).

A partir de 1892, instalado en un apartamento, llenó sus paredes de objetos raros que juntaba por su belleza extraña y cuyos creadores se encon-

traban, en muchos casos, entre sus amigos, lo cual encaja con el interés por objetos raros y extraños que caracteriza a la tradición simbolista. Étienne Destranges se refiere al apartamento que Debussy ocupó a partir del verano de 1893 en el nº 10 de la calle Gustave-Doré dando muestras de su gusto artístico: “C’est tout là-bas, presque aux fortifications, au cinquième étage d’une grande maison neuve, que M. Debussy demeure dans un petit appartement tranquille orné de reproductions de tableaux préraphaélites anglais pour lesquels il semble avoir une prédilection toute particulière” (Destranges 1906: 164–165). La colección de Debussy llegó a incluir *gouaches* en blanco y negro, piezas Art Decó así como pinturas chinas y orientales (Sánchez 1999: 99).

El imaginario creativo debussysta

Junto a su vinculación con corrientes estéticas contemporáneas y su interés por la pintura, el pensamiento sinestésico debussysta aparece fundamentalmente determinado a través de su propia actividad musical.

Al menos en ciertas etapas compositivas la concepción musical de Debussy parte de referentes extramusicales, como él mismo declara en una carta a Paul Dukas, donde expone: “je ne pense plus, ou presque plus, musicalement” (Debussy 2005: 586). También aprecia la actitud de Robert Godet de “voir plus loin que la musique” (Debussy 2005: 1471) y aconseja a su alumno Raoul Bardac “oubliez même toute la musique, de temps en temps” (ibid.: 942).

Estas frases insisten en la valoración de un fundamento más allá del lenguaje musical como referente último de la música a la vez que redundan en la idea de Christian Accaoui según la cual “la plupart des procédés techniques de Debussy ont une origine extra-musicale” (Accaoui 2004: 47). En este sentido resultan clarificadoras las palabras que Debussy dedica a su editor referidas a sus *Images pour orchestre*, cuyo título es en sí mismo revelador al respecto: “Les *Images* ne seront pas terminées à votre retour, mais j’espère vous en jouer une grande partie... J’essaie de faire ‘autre chose’ et de créer, – en quelque sorte – des *réalités* – ce que les imbéciles appellent ‘impressionnisme’” (Debussy 2005: 1080–1081). En el sentido que venimos exponiendo resulta revelador el interés por la búsqueda de “realidades” en Debussy, entendidas como un referente más allá del lenguaje musical al que aspira en su creación.

Este punto de partida extramusical para sus composiciones supone una concepción consciente de valoración de elementos ajenos al lenguaje de la música como referente último de su lenguaje compositivo. Si bien Accaoui relaciona específicamente estos referentes extramusicales con el empleo del símbolo y del mito (Accaoui 2004: 47), en nuestro estudio hemos procedido a vincularlos con un imaginario creativo de tipo visual, donde lo pictórico juega un papel importante; nos alineamos así con Célestin Deliège asociando la expresividad en Debussy a la traducción de la sensación más que a la del símbolo (Deliège 2004: 129).

En sus escritos, el imaginario visual adquiere una importancia considerable, llegando a teñir incluso sus emociones: “les armes et les casques illuminés par les flambeaux”, “la Seine ... comme un miroir terni”, “rythme dansant de l’atmosphère avec des éclats de lumière brusque” (Plantard 2004: 160). De hecho, en la producción teórica de Debussy la concepción imaginaria de Debussy específicamente vinculada a lo pictórico aparece reflejada en la siguiente frase, referida a su entorno simbolista: “Ceux-là seuls peuvent me comprendre à qui la peinture donne des idées de musique” (Lesure 1992: 210). En este sentido su imaginario visual pictórico aparece magníficamente expresado por Satie en una conferencia pronunciada sobre Debussy, donde declara que éste había sido su iniciador a la hora de traducir musicalmente ciertos procedimientos pictóricos: “Pourquoi ne pas nous servir des moyens représentatifs que nous exposaient Claude Monet, Cézanne, Toulouse-Lautrec, etc? Pourquoi ne pas transposer musicalement ces moyens?” El propio Debussy confirma a Jean Cocteau que la estética de *Pelléas* fue inspirada por una frase de Satie: “Il faudrait créer un climat musical où les personnages bougent et causent. Pas de couplets, pas de leitmotiv –se servir d’une certaine atmosphère Puvis de Chavannes” (Delage 1963: 18).

También el pianista Ricardo Viñes en su diario íntimo dejó constancia de la inspiración pictórica debussysta: “Je suis allé [*sic*] chez Debussy qui m’a de nouveau fait entendre ses derniers morceaux, *Pour le piano* dont il m’enverra une copie à la fin du mois; quel hasard, je lui ai dit que ces pièces me faisaient penser à des tableaux de Turner et il m’a répondu que, précisément, avant de les composer, il avait passé un long moment dans la salle des Turner, à Londres!” (Viñes 1903: 226). Aquí se pone de manifiesto no sólo la propia concepción visual de Debussy sino su recepción en este sentido.

En su producción musical uno de los ejemplos más destacados de asimilación a cualidades específicamente pictóricas son sus *Nocturnos*. Su primera versión de la obra *Scènes au crépuscule* (Debussy 2005: 110). Dos años después rebautiza la obra con su título actual, *Nocturnes pour violon et orchestre*, y le otorga la forma tripartita final (Plantard 2004: 159). En 1894 comenta la obra a Eugène Ysaÿe en una carta, expresando sus paralelismos con una obra pictórica (Debussy 2005: 222):

Je travaille à trois *Nocturnes* pour Violon principal et orchestre qui te sont destinés; l'orchestre du premier est représenté par des cordes!; le second par 3 Flûtes, 4 cors 3 Trompettes et 2 Harpes; le troisième réunit ces deux combinaisons. C'est en somme une recherche dans les divers arrangements que peut donner une seule couleur comme par exemple ce que serait en peinture, une étude dans le Gris.

Aquí Debussy establece una referencia colorística clara – “un estudio en gris” –, lo que ha conducido a vincular esta obra con los cuadros de Whistler (Lesure 1993: 133). En este mismo sentido Pierre de Breville a propósito de la interpretación de los *Nocturnes* en los Concerts Chevillard en 1901 expone: “La plupart ont eu recours à des analogies disant: ‘c'est du Whistler musical’ – ce qui se peut tourner, et permettre d'affirmer que Whistler est du Debussy en peinture” (Breville 1901: 214). Refiriéndose a este hecho, Debussy, en una entrevista en la que se le dice: “You are an impressionist, M. Debussy”, declara: “I have been called the ‘Whistler’ of Music” (S / A 1909: 4).

Posteriormente a la carta a Ysaÿe, a propósito de sus tres *Nocturnes pour orchestre*, reorienta la intención del público con el siguiente texto (Plantard 2004: 160; Nectoux 2005: 14):

Le titre de *Nocturnes* veut prendre ici un sens plus général et surtout plus décoratif. Il ne s'agit donc pas de la forme habituelle de Nocturne, mais de tout ce que ce mot contient d'impressions et de lumières spéciales. “Nuages”: c'est l'aspect immuable du ciel avec la marche lente et mélancolique des nuages finissant dans une agonie grise, doucement teintée de blanc. “Fêtes”: c'est le mouvement, le rythme dansant de l'atmosphère avec des éclats de lumière brusque, c'est aussi l'épisode d'un cortège (vision éblouissante et chimérique) passant à travers la fête, se confondant en elle, mais le fond reste, s'obstine, et c'est toujours la fête et son mélange de musique, de poussière lumineuse participant au rythme total.

En cuanto al método de trabajo, Debussy compara su propia forma de trabajar con la de ciertos pintores, buscando las variaciones cromáticas de un mismo elemento. En este sentido expone: “Parce que la Musique a cela de supérieur à la peinture, qu’elle peut centraliser les variations de couleur et de lumière d’un même aspect ...” (Debussy 2005: 942). Probablemente pensaba en experimentos del tipo del último Monet, donde planteaba un mismo elemento visto desde diferentes estados atmosféricos; mientras que la pintura impide un planteamiento continuo, éste sí es permitido por la música (Lockspeiser 1962: 16–17).

Debussy también dedica especial atención en sus escritos al establecimiento de vínculos entre cualidades plásticas y musicales. En este sentido expresa lo siguiente en relación con el Señor Corchea, Paul Valéry (Debussy 1993: 46):

[El Señor Corchea] Enseguida excitó mi curiosidad por su particular visión de la música. Hablaba de una partitura de orquesta como de un cuadro, sin emplear casi nunca palabras técnicas, sino palabras inhabituales, con una elegancia mate y un poco gastada, que parecía sonar como una moneda antigua. Me acuerdo del paralelismo que hizo entre la orquesta de Beethoven, que representaba mediante una fórmula en blanco y negro – que da como consecuencia una gama exquisita de grises –, y la de Wagner: especie de amasijo multicolor casi uniformemente extendido y en el que me confesaba no poder ya distinguir el sonido de un violín del de un trombón.

En su actividad como crítico también plantea paralelismos entre la música de Rameau y Couperin y la de Wateau, así como entre la pintura de Böcklin y la música de R. Strauss: “Il y a de curieux rapports entre l’art de Böcklin et l’art de Richard Strauss ... Même souci d’un dessin préconçu, même goût pour chercher la forme directement dans la couleur, et tirer de cette même couleur des effets de pittoresque dramatique” (Nectoux 2005: 14). En este sentido expresa: “Las *Impresiones* de Italia de G. Charpentier son una orgía de colores y de ritmos plenos de lujuria. G. Charpentier no sueña de la misma manera que R. Strauss que también trajo unas *Impresiones de Italia*. Pero en lo tocante a recrear la impresión de las calles de Nápoles, Charpentier es sencillamente incomparable” (Debussy 1993: 131).

A través de la aproximación de Debussy a la pintura nos hemos acercado a una nueva lectura de su pensamiento y obra fuertemente vinculada a un lenguaje creativo de tipo plástico. En relación con su interés hacia la

pintura, éste aparece reflejado en sus vacilaciones acerca de su dedicación profesional a la misma, su gusto por las artes plásticas evidente en las frecuentes visitas a museos y centros de relieve artístico, y el interés que muestra hacia la pintura en sus escritos, dando testimonio de su familiarización con las técnicas pictóricas y de su sensibilidad plástica que le condujo a la práctica del coleccionismo. Respecto al propio acto compositivo, Debussy declara la búsqueda consciente de un referente extramusical ajeno al lenguaje musical, que hemos visto vinculado al imaginario visual presente en su proceso creador y en el que específicamente lo pictórico adquiere especial relevancia. La lectura que tanto Debussy como la crítica desde finales del s. XIX hasta nuestros días hacen de su música da muestras del fuerte contenido visual presente en la misma, tanto en la evocación de elementos naturales como en la expresión de características de luz y color.

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Drina Hočevar

An existential approach to the analysis of Sophocles' *Oedipus rex*¹

Introduction

The tale of Oedipus Rex, as told in the tragedy by Sophocles, appears from a mythical background. The tragedy starts when Oedipus is already king of the Greek Thebes, and married to Jocasta (queen of Thebes and former wife of King Laius) for having freed the city from the Sphinx. In ancient Greece, myths were part of the common lore, which allows us to suppose that the stories were well known, so that the uniqueness of the play is the expression of Sophocles as an individual artist.

The tragedy itself follows the Aristotelian principles of unity of time, space, and action in its main narrative thread through the voices that are individualized as the main actors of the plot, the tragic hero and principal character being Oedipus. The voices that appear from the Chorus accompany those individualized voices in a musical dialogic interaction, sometimes among themselves as strophe and anti-strophe, or in a dialogue between the coryphaeus, collective actant, and the main actors. It is in the chorus where we find divergence from the Aristotelian principles, since various mythical threads are there woven together.

At the beginning of the tragedy we see Oedipus happily re-united with Jocasta, not knowing that his wife is his own mother. It is the same mother that gave him as a newborn to be killed for fear that the oracles would come true. It was prophesied, as we all know, that Oedipus would kill his father then marry his own mother. It is only when Oedipus unveils the truth, when he understands this circle or endogamy, that the incestuous relation will appear as taboo and, paradoxically, the hero will deprive himself of sight by piercing his eyes at the end of the tragedy.

1. “Understanding” more, “knowing” less

The play starts when the harmony is broken between the citizens of Thebes and their *Umwelt* causing them deep suffering due to infertility and death. The Priest, who represents the religious tradition, and the old men come to Oedipus as supplicants, for they consider him the wisest of all for having solved the riddle of the Sphinx, thus proving his competence in the modality of “knowing”. They also believe him to be the best of mortals, being closer to the gods. Oedipus, in his desire to be “Good” and again to help the community of which he is an integral part, seeks help from the gods through the oracles and promises to act accordingly. Guiding him are two *metamodalities*, that is to say, two moral and epistemic principles: (1) a *meta-will* to act according to the idea of the “Good”;² and (2) to act according to Apollo’s will – to do what is morally correct, in accordance with the divine Apollonian conception of the world – which is interrelated closely with the hero’s *meta-will* to know the truth.

The obstinate search for truth leads the subject on an inward journey from affirmation to negation: subject \cap plenitude (complete happiness in unity with Jocasta) to negation, when Oedipus, unveiling the truth, blinds himself in utter despair. It is interesting that Oedipus, unlike Jocasta, does not take his own life but prefers to prolong his agony as an exile, cast away from his own society where he was living in endogamous relations. We may state that his journey as a subject does not want to stop in the negation, but intends to go further, towards the possibility of affirmation. Oedipus realizes that when he had eyes he “could not see”, when he thought he knew he did not “know”. That is to say, as a “self” (*Soi*), Oedipus was competent in knowledge, so we may infer that as *Moi*³ he puts out his eyes in order to “see” more deeply, perhaps seeking to emulate Teiresias, the blind clairvoyant who foresaw Oedipus’s real situation.

This dramatic text involves readers in its deep *existentiality*. The understanding by which Oedipus uncovers his deeper self (*Moi*) progresses in a dialectic going from “outer” to “inner”. As in a detective story, Oedipus wants to find the criminal, while unaware of the tragic irony that all the evidence will point to him as the perpetrator. The understanding / misunderstanding dialectics, acting as a mirror, allows Oedipus to see his true or “inner” self, which takes him further and further away from his conjunc-

tion with the modality of “knowing”. That is to say, he comes to realize that the more he “understands”, the less he “knows”.

2. *The moral principle in art: The universal sense of Guilt*

It is in his deeper self, or “Moi”, where Oedipus uncovers his Guilt, thus leading readers or spectators into a dimension of *universality* of which the tragedy is only an extreme expression, as the radicalisation of an inner drama that every human being may see, consciously or unconsciously, represented within his / her own deeper self. This much is pointed out to Oedipus by Jocasta, when she tells him not to fear marrying his mother, since many mortals have done so before in their dreams – a fact that drew the attention of Sigmund Freud, as we all know.

By violating the prohibition against incest, Oedipus transgresses *not* against nature but against culture. His existence, his situation or *Dasein*, is determined by fate, wherein resides the resistance to the subject’s activity: Oedipus wants to escape the Oracle’s prophecy, and for that reason travels to Thebes, only to encounter there his tragic destiny. His individual freedom is exercised in fighting against Fate, to which he eventually falls victim.

It seems that Oedipus’s individual choice is in the end the acceptance of his fate: he does not choose to end his life, but to continue living, searching for inner knowledge and for expiation of his unconscious guilt by means of suffering. Since he was intended to die but did not die as a child, he seems to be telling destiny to continue its course; his individual choice is *not to see*, the taboo being what one does not want to see.

The play opens up the existential dimension of guilt as it relates to destiny in opposition to individual freedom. So we may ask, What things depend on fate, and for what things is Oedipus responsible as subject? At the beginning of the play Oedipus does not believe himself responsible, or guilty, but after listening to Teiresias he begins to doubt himself; and this is the existential force that makes his outward search be projected inwards. The doubt first appears in the Chorus, in its dialogue with Jocasta, representing both the “outer” voices of the people and reflecting the inner voices within Oedipus’s own being, Heidegger’s *das Man*; it is the *polis* of which he is an integral part.

3. *The understanding / misunderstanding dialectic*

In the understanding/misunderstanding dialectic, two underlying and opposing energies are in play, we may call them Apollonian and Dionysian forces. The former is the positive, constructive movement that affirms individuality; the latter, a destructive, negative force that tends to dissolve individuality.

The inductive/deductive, detective-like unfolding of the play is Apollonian, but through this movement the individual consciousness paradoxically and progressively fades away, giving rise to the opposing movement, which strives toward a Dionysian dissolution of consciousness; the latter occurs the theatrical ritual as an unveiling of masks, which are superimposed one upon the other. But because this is theatrical representation, individuality is maintained insofar as the characters remain the same. So what we see is a fusion of the two opposing fields of action, a blending of light and darkness, a chiaroscuro scenario wherein conscience appears, revealing guilt (see Diagram 1).




Diagram 1.

The opposing energetic fields blend into each other in a chiaroscuro scenario where guilt is unveiled by conscience. It is a tension between the opposite Apollonian and Dionysian forces.

Legend:

A1: Paradigmatic Axis (R. Jakobson), which is projected into the Syntagmatic Axis.

A2: Syntagmatic Axis.

PE: Plane of Expression (Hjelmslev).

PC: Plane of Content.

MC: Manifest Content of Dreams (Freud).

LC: Latent Content of Dreams.

(I): Individual

(S): Social

We may summarize as follows the “outward” movement of the subject (guided by the Self) seeking for truth in a series of progressive stages:

1.a. Oedipus affirms that he does not know where to find the trace or sign of an ancient guilt; the tragic irony is such that the spectator or reader knows more than the actor, whether him / her is inside or outside the written text. The subject, then, is in disjunction from the “truth”: $S \cup O$.

2.a. The first clue is brought forth, but it is false, and hence the cause of the first misunderstanding. Creon, Oedipus’s brother-in-law, affirms that Laius, previously king of Thebes, died in the hands of several thieves – *not in the hands of one*, but in the hands of many.

3.a. The people then advise Oedipus to consult the wise Teiresias, since advice from the gods cannot be sought directly. Oedipus does not believe Teiresias when he tells him the truth: that he, Oedipus, is the criminal is searching for. His first reaction, which leads to further misunderstanding, is to think that Teiresias is lying in order to discredit him. In proceeding thus, Oedipus pushes further away from his understanding of the sought-for truth.

4.a. Teiresias tells him the truth a second time, but Oedipus does not accept it because he does not understand it. His misunderstanding leads him to suspect Creon of conspiring against him in a plot to seize political power. The Chorus, representing the voice of the people, voice their doubts, torn between their religious belief in the Oracle and their estimation of Oedipus as a trustworthy person. Oedipus in his rage accuses Creon, thus affirming his belief that he, Oedipus, is not guilty, and hence will not be found guilty.

5.a. The Chorus takes part in the confrontation between Oedipus and Creon, advising Oedipus not to make accusations based merely on rumours.

6.a. In Oedipus's search for the truth he encounters three main opponents: Teiresias, the Chorus, and Jocasta try to dissuade him from his search, and to some extent so do the messengers and Laius's former servant.

7.a. A dialogue with Jocasta follows. Here we see Oedipus's negative reaction and rage against Creon, and further misunderstandings which might have been the consequence of the doubt that starts growing in him after he hears the truth as told by Teiresias.

At this point in the narrative the outward search of the subject for his object starts to be projected inwards (guided by the "Moi"), with a cathartic force that can be seen in the rhythmic acceleration of the narrative movement. The importance of the Chorus in this cathartic movement cannot be neglected. Here Sophocles demonstrates his *ars poetica* in his rhythmic skill in composing antistrophes, since each one must imitate the *spontaneous meter* of the preceding strophe.

1.b. New evidence, brought forth by Jocasta, acts as a mirror, making Oedipus seriously doubt his own innocence and be overcome by fear: the mention of the intersection of three roads where Laius was said to have been killed by thieves. Jocasta also explains how the child was tied by the ankles (hence the name *Oedipus*, which means "swollen feet"), thrown down a hill, and left for dead.

2.b. Creon observes the change in Oedipus and inquires about its cause, which makes Oedipus "retrace his steps". This can be thought of as *anamnesis* that refers to the temporal process of recollecting or remembering the past. In Heideggerian terms, the existential past has the function of bringing the being (*Sein*) to its "there" (*da*), thus opening up an existential situation (see Hočevar: 2003). Despite his fear and anguish, Oedipus continues his search for further evidence.

3.b. Jocasta informs Oedipus that only one of Laius's servants survived. Oedipus then wants the witness to be brought to him. She agrees, but observing the visible change in Oedipus, she inquires about the cause of his anxiety. He replies that it stems from the fact that, when he was living with his parents, a drunkard told him that he actually not their child. His parents denied this, but still the drunkard's words affected him deeply,

and he had been tormented by them ever since. That is when he decides to travel to Delphi to learn the truth from the Oracle. Apollo only manifested to him the terrible calamities that he would suffer: he would kill his father and marry his own mother, which union would bring disgraceful offspring into the world. Upon hearing the Oracle, Oedipus turns his back on his home, so as not to encounter his parents and risk his foretold fate. In so doing, the tragic irony appears by which Oedipus will find the very thing he is trying to avoid. He then tells Jocasta what happened: how he encountered a party at the intersection of three roads, in a horse-driven carriage; how, in reaction to aggression, he killed an old man along with the rest of the company.

4.b. In trying to verify a connection between the man that he killed and Laius, Oedipus continues his investigation, not yet that Laius was his father. So he still has some hope, which is echoed by the Chorus, as he awaits the arrival of the witness: the peasant who untied his ankles and saved him from imminent death. Jocasta, believing her son to be long dead, has reason to hope for the best.

5.b. A messenger arrives; it is the same peasant that rescued him, who confirms the fact that Oedipus was not really Polybus's son. He then tells how he found Oedipus, rescued him, and gave him to the childless Polybus, king of Corinth. As the truth begins to be unveiled, Oedipus's understanding grows.

6.b. The messenger can tell no more, so the next witness is sought. It is Laius's own servant, who had received the order to kill him when he was born. Oedipus's last hope remains: to be the son of a slave in the palace. But Jocasta, now totally convinced of the truth, enters the palace and kills herself.

7.b. The last witness appears, and the truth that was hidden is totally unveiled, and with it, *Guilt*. The subject is united with the object of his search. Oedipus, in extreme mental anguish, stabs out his eyes with Jocasta's brooch.

4. *Transcendental dimension of the analysis*

We may understand the transcendental sphere of ideas in connection with temporal processes brought about by the existential movements of the subjects. Transcendental ideas of "the Good" and "the True" function in the

tragedy as pre-signs, in as much as they determine Oedipus's actions or choices, as well as ideals against which he mirrors his being; the same also function as post-signs or post-interpretants (cf. Tarasti 2000: 3). We may further relate these existential semiotic ideas with Heidegger's temporal "ecstasies". The temporal movement of negation in this tragedy is related with the "past", with unveiling the past in the act of anamnesis, as mentioned before. All this is deeply connected with existential *Befindlichkeit* ("state-of-mind" or "attunement") and with "moods" (in this tragedy, those of anxiety and fear), which open up the existential situation, bringing the being to its "there". We may say, in reference to dramatic ritual, that it is the "nothingness" that is found when the last mask is removed and the persona dissolved.

In the play the Chorus develops the theme of the tragic vision of life: the emptiness or vacuity of human existence that is found also in Shakespeare (e.g., in *Macbeth*). The movement of the subject may continue toward "affirmation" through understanding related with existential future. Through existential understanding the temporal, deterministic process may be existentially reversed, thus bringing the being to its "there" in anticipation (see Hočevar 2003: 72–73). This further movement may be guessed in Oedipus's tragedy, as explained earlier in this essay.

Concluding remarks

Oedipus, in his determination to act in a "good" way, as a king should to his people, is guided at first by a religious tradition that determines his course of action. He "must find" the truth; and this modality is also a *metamodality* determined by the Apollonian divinity, as shown by the Oracle. The epistemic principle acts in aid of the moral one, which is to help the citizens of Thebes and to help himself the process. Then when doubt appears within him, his deeper self or "Moi" guides his course of action. The *Self* determines, so to say, Oedipus's outward journey in search of the object, and his *Moi* determines his inward, reflexive journey for the same reason. Oedipus's self-determination, guided by the *Moi*, leads him into a dimension of guilt when he unveils the taboo that he had previously chosen not to see. But it must be emphasized that the taboo of incest is something "learned – it is not a biological constraint. It is clear that Oedipus transgresses against culture, but it seems that he transgresses also against nature,

in connection with the religious dimension: his land and people are punished with infertility, and the Oracle reveals there is a *guilt* that must be expiated.

To what extent, then, is the behaviour of the *Moi* really Oedipus's "own" categorical imperative? When doubts arise and the evidence confirm his suspicions, Oedipus is dissuaded several times from his search for the truth. He is urged to leave things as they are, abandon his quest for the facts, and in doing so could have continued living happily in concealment. Oedipus thus finds that, in helping others, he cannot help himself. It might seem furthermore that life in society – human relations within a culture – is marked by a desire to keep the "dark side" covered or repressed, so that we may remain united as society. Is this "cover-up" or concealment the necessary condition for our social life?

Notes

1. I would like to thank CDCHT University of Los Andes (Mérida-Venezuela) for support in this project, codified as: H-851-05-06-B, which made the present research possible.
2. See Tarasti (2000: 26, 33) regarding the transcendental ideas of the True, the Good, the Beautiful, which function as pre-interpretants or "pre-signs" in his theory.
3. "Soi" and "Moi" are (French) existential semiotic distinctions, explicated at length in Tarasti 2000.

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The musical understanding of literature¹

1. Introduction

The musically signifying dimension of poetry that manifests in sonority and rhythm and in rhetorical figures should be acknowledged as “a new linguistic axis,” according to Lubio Cardozo, a Venezuelan poet and literary critic (2003: 80). In his view, our first approach to a poem is determined by the musicality of its composition (ibid.: 13). The sonorous effects responsible for euphony do not constitute merely a superficial or artificial effect in isolation; rather, they constitute a musical dimension that is meaningful in itself.

Lubio Cardozo’s distinction of two musical dimensions – sonority and rhythm – may be compared with the Russian Formalists’ distinction between *orchestration* (sonorous effects of vowels and consonants) and rhythm. According to Yuri Tynianov (1981), the sound effect of vowels and consonants produce a spatial movement within the text that is predominantly regressive. This movement is explained as the rhyme effect, which “carries backwards”. In contrast, the movement of meter is essentially progressive (ibid.); it is an expectant movement that pushes “forwards”. Both movements as a whole constitute the musical flow of the poem (see Tynianov 1981: 53–54).

The “new linguistic axis” implies, then, a *musical signifying dimension in language*, where sense and conceptual truth of the imagination, manifested in figures of speech, appear in a new space of creative expression. Octavio Paz had already stated (1956) that rhythm, image and sense confirm a signifying whole. What is interesting in Lubio Cardozo is that, according to this author, “musicality” is made conscious; it is not reduced to an unconscious dimension, to the *semiotic* in the Kristevan sense. The oneiric unconscious dimension is known when the dreams are made conscious (Cardozo 2003:

47). How then is the musical signifying dimension communicated to the reader? How is it “understood”?

The reader of poetry should be able to grasp its musical sense; he or she should be a “listener” attentive to the double genesis of the poem: both written and oral. The poem is heard, written and pronounced. It appears on paper through writing and in the air through the voice; it is originally sung: “... upon the trace of beauty as a hidden human impulse, in part intuited, in part rational, mysterious and luminous, unconscious and conscious, under this double energy does the work appear” (ibid.: 11–12).

In our aim to give account of the musical signifying dimension of poetry and of how it is understood, we cannot ignore the double genesis of the poem, as determined by Cardozo. In so doing it is necessary to investigate in depth the signifying relationship between music and language, taking into account the temporal dimension of the sign (see Hočevár : 2003a). That is why we base our model on Martin Heidegger’s (1962) *existential analytic* and in Eero Tarasti’s (2000) *existential semiotics*.

2. Understanding the musical signifying dimension of a literary text

The musical signification of a text is usually pointed out when there is an explicit reference to music. For example, the title of a novel or story may refer to a generic type of musical composition, such as sonata, fugue, rhapsody, and others, that is to say, when one “sees” the literary text as an intertext, in intertextual relationships with “real” musical texts. In these cases some similarities are perceived between text and music: The written text is said to imitate its musical counterpart. Other types of musical references may point to a composer, a musical instrument, a musical quotation or direction. All these references challenge the reader’s musical knowledge and response, and may play a leading role in the understanding and interpretation of a text, as observed by Frédérique Arroyas (2001: 82). References to music may also be obtained from “paratextual indices” or knowledge obtained outside the text; for example when an author in his writings acknowledges being influenced by music, as was the case of the English romantic writer Thomas De Quincey.

Arroyas, in his cognitive approach to the investigation of musical metaphors and analogies in literature, finds that the referential cues to music in

a written text open up a metaphorical space, where two “inputs”, such as the concept of a musical fugue and the idea of a novel, fuse into each other, thus creating a blended or intermediary space that, while encompassing similarities, also has its own emerging structure (ibid.: 98). Thus, signification is sought for in the reader’s mind: ... “it is also in the reader’s mind that we must look for an ontology of music, not only in the text. It is then that we can say that the text’s virtual musicality becomes reality” (ibid.). The problem with this approach is that it does not take into account the fact that musicality is not just an intellectual phenomenon. It is not just something that we understand with the “intellect”. It is not only a “mental space”; it is also “felt” in the “body”, so to say. We shall elaborate on this assertion below.

Arroyas states that “explicit references to music in a text, however, are not a necessary condition for a reader’s investigation of the musical domain and its relevance to the text” (ibid.: 83). He points out two instances where this is so: (1) the case of language’s intrinsic aural and rhythmic qualities, “where sound takes precedence as a mode of expression and often sensitizes readers to a text’s ‘musicality’” (ibid.); as an example, James Joyce’s *Ulysses* comes to mind). (2) There is also the case of narrative structures following or trying to imitate musical forms, as happens in De Quincey’s “Dream-Fugue” (analyzed below).

And yet, when we read a poem, the musical sense is not only “heard”; it is also “felt”. The musicality of language is a reality that may be experienced by the reader/listener. So musical understanding also implies a shift from the modality of “knowing” to that of “feeling” (see Tarasti 2000: 65). Musicality may be felt as the enunciation is projected upon the enunciate, as in the gradual acceleration of the rhythm, allowing us to “to weigh its enunciation” (ibid.: 58). The shift from theoretical knowledge to feeling opens up the existential space of signification and communication that makes itself present in art.

2.1. Existential space of the musical signifying dimension

From the point of view of Heidegger’s existential analytic, “knowing” and “feeling” derive from a deeper ontological level. “Knowledge” is rooted in existential understanding (*Verstehen*), whereas “feeling” is rooted in existential “attunement” or “state-of-mind” (*Befindlichkeit*), where we find

that the existence is opened up mood-wise to the existing subject. Interpretation is considered “visible” understanding, which is an intellectual process, based upon “non-visible” or primary existential understanding as *Being-in-the-World*, where the self is not detached from its “world”, nor from others (see Hočevár 2003b: 167).

Signs produced by the poetic self reflect the transcendental journey of the existing subject via the *enunciant*.² Creative act-signs may be thus interpreted, after Tarasti:

Signified	⇒	<table style="border-collapse: collapse; margin: 0 auto;"> <tr> <td style="border-bottom: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 10px;">Transcendence (reflecting both negation and affirmation)</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px 10px;">Dasein</td> </tr> </table>	Transcendence (reflecting both negation and affirmation)	Dasein
Transcendence (reflecting both negation and affirmation)				
Dasein				
Signifier				

The dividing/uniting line between signifier and signified can be seen to represent the mediation of the body (nature, *physis*). The transcendental dimension that we are seeking to approach is thus not to be identified with Descartes’s or Husserl’s transcendental Ego (as a mind/body dichotomy). The transcendental dimension is given in existence and mediated by the body.

The existential signifying dimension of the sign is opened up when the subject *understands*, and existential understanding is given always with an existential *state-of-mind*. Instead of being considered a “mental” phenomenon, a cognitive process, as something “within” the mind, understanding may be considered rather an *existential* phenomenon; so that when a subject understands, he or she is already “outside” (see Heidegger 1962).

In the open space of the existential dimension of the sign we may find the appearance of the existential phenomenon of *Guilt*, which as an *existential*, is a universal phenomenon. Applying Tarasti’s existential semiotic distinctions between *Self* and *Moi* we find that it is when the self approaches his /her “inner” being (“le moi profond”) that the dimension of guilt may be disclosed in its individualizing self-arousal. The existential movement that discloses, in its root, the ethical dimension that may be present in art, is interrelated with the basic temporal movement of existence (see Hočevár 2003b).

2.1.1 Existential temporality of the musical signifying dimension

The “voice of conscience” that “may be heard” is related to *existential* discourse that discourses in the uncanny mode of *keeping silent*. The call says nothing, but it gives-to-understand. It does not put on trial the Self to which the appeal is made. Rather, it calls *Dasein* forth (and forward) into its possibilities, as a summons to its “ownmost *potentiality-for-Being-its-Self*” (Heidegger 1962: 273).

When the voice of conscience is understood, the basic existentials may be “reorganized”: the call of “conscience” that carries on discourse in the mode of *keeping silent* (“coming at the same time *from me* and yet *from beyond me*”) discloses the Self that is “individualized” through the accompanying state-of-mind (“attunement”) of *anxiety*. The call brings *Dasein* to the “there” of its disclosedness, by means of “understanding”, which comes from the “future”, and by means of “attunement”, arriving from the “past”, both of which push the “them” (*das Man*) into *insignificance* and disclose the Self in the face of “nothingness” (the “leap” into Sartre’s *le néant*). This process is visualized in Diagram 1.




Diagram 1. Temporal movement of the basic existentials.

Understanding the musical signifying dimension of a literary text may be exemplified in Thomas De Quincey’s “Dream-Fugue”.

3. *Understanding through intertextuality and structural analogies*

The reference to music in Thomas De Quincey's "Dream-Fugue" is quite evident already in its title. The "Dream-Fugue" is the third section and climax of *The English Mail-Coach*, wherein De Quincey explores the dream territory of art in the mode of impassioned prose, consciously reconstructing the dream and its remembered causes: "The worst of its symptoms was an uncontrollable stream of fearful dreams, which tyrannized over him not only in sleep but also in the whole of his waking life. And it is in the description of these dreams that De Quincey rises decisively above the prosaic, into his own unique kind of 'impassioned prose'. The style reflects his long and careful study of prose as an artistic medium, above all his sense of its analogies with music" (*British Writers* 1981: 152). De Quincey was not concerned with dream writing for its own sake; rather, it was "the special material on which he founded his study of the growth of the human spirit" (*ibid.*: 153).

Understanding the "Dream-Fugue" as an intertext is not a difficult task. Apart from its suggestive title, further musical reference is found in the musical direction *Tumultuosissimamente* that marks the beginning of the literary fugue's "prelude". Other musical references include instruments like the organ and trumpet, and the voices of the antiphonal singing of holy hymns that refer to religious liturgy. It is perhaps less evident to the literary reader how close the narrative structure follows the structure of the musical form.

Calvin Brown (1938) has shown in his essay, "The Musical Structure of De Quincey's Dream-Fugue", how closely the literary fugue imitates its musical counterpart, notwithstanding the limitations imposed by the use of two different artistic media. Brown finds that the subject of the fugue is not a group of words but rather a group of ideas: speed, urgency, and a girl in danger of sudden death. The variation in settings would perform the function of a shifting, contrapuntal accompaniment. While the subject is identified by its content, the countersubject is identified by its form: a series of participles, constant in form, but varying in words: "There she stood, with hair disheveled, one hand clutched amongst the tackling – *rising, sinking, fluttering, trembling, praying*; there for leagues I saw her as she stood...". According to Brown, this series of participles is one of the

principal structural elements of the piece. In his analysis of the analogies between the two structures Brown shows how the main parts of the musical fugue may be perceived in the literary structure. Three sections are clearly distinguished: Exposition, Middle section and Final section, where subject, countersubject and subject-answer are identified. Also shifts of tonality, the *stretto* and even pedal-point are seen to exist in the tale. In this sense, the De Quincey's "Dream-Fugue" is perhaps the most successful example of literary fugue, at least in the English language.

4. *Understanding: A shift from Knowing to Feeling*

As pointed out elsewhere (Hočevar 2003: 234), the central motif – the endangered woman, identified as the subject of the fugue – is closely related to the basic mood of fear. The corresponding rhythmic gestures, expressed in the series of participles and identified with the countersubject of the musical fugue (Brown 1938), unites and gives directionality to the piece. It is possible to trace back this basic motif to the store of intonations present in the collective memory of the *langue*. We may also identify iconicity in its rhythmic gesture; as an underlying beat that imitates the organic rhythm of the heartbeat. We may also perceive and interpret these rhythmic sounds from the "inside", as the organic *Ich-ton* (essential self, *Moi*) whose presence is felt throughout the piece.

The mood of fear leads through the *Ich-ton* of the inner organic dimension into the "outer" Dasein as being-in-the-world-with-others, where a sound discloses the "there", where Da-Sein "finds" itself, not by "external" perceiving, but rather through "inner" moods. In this literary work we find the existential situation described by Heidegger as fearing-for-others, where the Other need not fear. The first-person narrator fears for the endangered lady, the subject of the dream and the literary fugue. Conscience or sense of guilt is awakened when De Quincey as enunciator reveals the foreseen danger, but also how he is incapable of action: he is unable "to act" to prevent the collision and the terrible accident in which the lady dies.

5. *Understanding is to uncover what is “hidden” or veiled in darkness*

Underlying the conscious/unconscious categories of human existence, we find an existential-temporal dimension of awareness or state of being “awakened”, where the existential Self is able to hear its self as he or she approaches “inner discourse”. The dimension that is “hidden” may be revealed whether one is awake or sleeping (as happens in dreams). The movement of rhythm in poetic creation courses through the non-visible (Dark) and visible (Light) dimensions of the sign, as it relates to the non-visible and visible existential understanding, in its movement toward manifestation in derivative discourse (music, language, etc.).

6. *Temporality of understanding and state-of-mind*

It is possible to trace back the textual rhythmic movements identified by Tynianov, already mentioned in the introduction, to the existential *a priori* movements of *understanding* and *state-of-mind*. Understanding opens up the existential future. This ontological dimension appears in this text as traces of the enunciation felt in the constantly moving flux of rhythm that pushes forward the images in a state of constant transformation and expectation. The existential past that is disclosed mood-wise (as fear for the other, in the case of the “Dream-Fugue”) manifests in the *backward pull* or temporal movement of the sound elements, where *self* and *world* are disclosed.

The rhythmic function of the countersubject, manifested by the series of participles already referred to, is not restricted to bringing-back from the past (memory) into the present, of projecting the paradigm into the syntagm, based on the ordinary understanding of time. The function of recollection or retrieval is realized in connection with the basic mood of fear that discloses the “there” in the mode of “fleeing”, which displays the structure of fugue as the basic existential structure of “falling” into the world. We find that in De Quincey’s literary fugue, the motive, as a *non-hierarchical* musical element, associated with the *existential past* in its “regressive movement”, brings us readers/listeners back – mood-wise – into the “there” of the *existential present*.

Notes

1. I would like to acknowledge support from the CDCHT University of Los Andes (Mérida-Venezuela) in the project codified as: H-851-05-06-B, whose generosity made this research possible.
2. The concepts of enunciant/utterer are interpreted from the viewpoint of Tarasti's (2000) *Existential Semiotics*.

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Volker Hooyberg

Seeing connections

An enquiry into a metaphor of understanding

Introduction

Could the metaphor of “seeing connections” offer glimpses into the process of understanding? The notion of metaphor itself embodies that of a connection – as we are transported (by a metaphorical expression) from one semantic field to another, thereby gaining a new insight. This paper provides a philosophical framework that does justice to this metaphor of understanding.

1. Philosophical framework

Metaphors have the power to redescribe reality. Our concern is to explore an image of the process of understanding that synthesizes two apparently incompatible theoretical perspectives: hermeneutics and semiotics. The metaphor of *seeing connections* already embodies this alliance, this pact between a realist or positivist ontology, appropriate to the natural sciences and hence a semiotic or structuralist approach to texts in the broadest sense, on the one hand, and a (phenomenologically orientated) hermeneutics of the experience of reading or interpreting, on the other. “Seeing” represents the latter, while “connections” represents the former. The seeing of connections as an interpretative model, therefore, jointly engages these two theoretical orientations.

In what follows, attention will be given, both to the concept of the “event of seeing” and to that of metaphor as such. Before we consider seeing as a metaphor of understanding, we will investigate two philosophical orientations towards this key epistemological process of seeing in the literal sense: one inaugurated and developed by Rene Descartes, in terms

of which an isolated, disembodied concept of seeing forms the (mechanistic) foundation of an abstract knowledge; the other as developed in response to the former by way of an embodied seeing as inseparable from the totality of lived experience.

We will then explore two sets of epistemological metaphors as analyzed by Paul Thagard and Craig Beam: *foundation* metaphors (again as typically deployed by Descartes) and *coherence* metaphors, notably, for our context, as utilized by Charles Peirce, for whom reasoning should be depicted as a cable (of intertwined strands of meaning) rather than in terms of a chain of inferences back to a foundation of all knowledge. In terms of the cable image, understanding is more a case of “making connections”, or a coherence of beliefs, than of founding knowledge on some indubitable foundation of certainty.

2. *Two concepts of seeing*

In this section we first trace the domination of vision in our knowledge of the world, or the vision-centred rationality, developed by Descartes, in which the latter’s “idea of a disembodied and rational eye as an instrument of order and control”, to quote Olga Belova (2006: 93), is the focus of our attention. Thereafter, we will consider a radical alternative to this Cartesian paradigm of seeing, that of French phenomenologist, Merleau-Ponty, who developed an embodied, as opposed to a dis-embodied view.

For Descartes (1985: 33), knowledge is sought by “fixing the eyes on a single point, (to) acquire through practice the ability to make perfect distinctions between things, however minute and delicate.” Descartes is careful, however, to qualify this statement by emphasizing that the judgement we think we make with our eyes is actually a *mental* judgement. As Jay (1993: 81) notes, Descartes’s philosophical quest is one of “a spectator rather than an actor”, a distinction being drawn between a passive bodily dimension and an active mental one. Cartesian epistemology cannot be viewed in isolation from this dualism of body and mind. The event of seeing is conceived of as neutral, mechanistic, rationalistic, *detached* from the lived body, which is at best a mere instrument of the active mind.

Against this conception, Merleau-Ponty offers that of seeing as an event of *embodied* being. To quote Belova (ibid: 96): “This perspective allows us to distinguish between ‘the thought of seeing’ or purified vision,

severed from its body and senses, and ‘active vision’, that which happens in the midst of things, ‘squeezed into a body – its own body’, and of which we can have no idea except in the exercise of it” (see Merleau-Ponty 1993: 136). For Merleau-Ponty, visual engagement takes place on the border between seer and seen, in terms of an interconnection he (1968) depicts as *flesh*. According to Waldenfels (1998: 228–229), flesh here is to be understood not as existing between the body and the world, but “functionally, as *texture, articulation, framework, joints*, as an *element* in which we live and move ... An *intertwining* forms between things, others and myself, a *chiasmus*, or a *chiasma*... (where) (w)hat is one’s own and what is not constantly more or less overlap but never entirely coincide with each other.” In Merleau-Ponty’s (1968: 135) words: “The thickness of flesh between the seer and the thing is constitutive for the thing of its visibility as for the seer of his corporeality; it is not an obstacle between them, it is their means of communication.”

Far from being in a relationship of opposition, as in Descartes, Merleau-Ponty brings them into a bond: seer and seen are indivisible. “He who sees is of it (flesh) and is in it” (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 100). We are no longer “in” our bodies, any more than our bodies are “in” the world, for the world itself is flesh! In Merleau-Ponty’s revised epistemology of visual engagement, neither the look nor the thing commands.

3. *Two metaphors of knowledge: Foundation versus coherence*

Thagard and Beam (2004) have traced two master metaphors of knowledge through the history of philosophy – from Plato’s cave to Quine’s web of belief. Essentially, the two images that stand out are those of *foundation* (for all certainty) and *coherence* (of our beliefs).

According to Thagard and Beam (2004: 505): “Many philosophers have sought a ground or base on which knowledge could be erected. To say that knowledge has or needs a foundation is to use a metaphor based on a systematic analogy between the development of knowledge and the construction of a building.” Once again we encounter Descartes (1985, 2: 366), who is found to be an arch proponent of this metaphor and is quoted by Thagard and Beam (*ibid*) as follows: “... I began by taking everything that was doubtful and throwing it out, like sand; and then, when I had noticed

that it is impossible to doubt that a doubting or thinking substance exists, I took this as the bedrock on which I could lay the foundations of my philosophy.”

Two further images used by Descartes (*ibid.*, 2: 324 and *ibid.*, 1: 120) are outlined to defend his method of doubt (that of emptying out a basket of apples, some of which are rotten and then returning only those that are not) and of a chain (of inferences akin to the geometer’s) to defend his epistemology. Other philosophers who have subscribed to the foundation metaphor of knowledge include Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Aristotle and Kant, as well as Frege and Husserl. These thinkers, according to Thagard and Beam (2004: 507), “wanted philosophical knowledge to be an unchallengeable edifice built on an unassailable foundation.”

As for the other metaphor of knowledge – that of coherence – we may first consider Charles Peirce, who in 1860 rejected Descartes’s method of universal doubt. Replacing the latter’s chain image with that of a *cable*, Peirce (1958: 40–41) claimed that:

Philosophy ought to imitate the successful sciences in its methods, so far as to proceed only from tangible premises which can be subjected to careful scrutiny, and to trust rather to the multitude and variety of its arguments than to the conclusiveness of any one. Its reasoning should not form a chain which is no stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibres may be ever so slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected.

Here it is *connections* that count, more than the strength of individual propositions. According to Thagard and Beam (2004: 508), the most influential twentieth century coherentist metaphor was Otto Neurath’s *ship*, used against (empiricist) foundationalism based on protocol sentences. According to Neurath (1959: 201):

There is no way of taking conclusively established pure protocol sentences as the starting point of the sciences. No *tabula rasa* exists. We are like sailors who must rebuild their ship on the open sea, never able to dismantle it in dry-dock and to reconstruct it there out of the best materials. Only the metaphysical elements can be allowed to vanish without trace. Vague linguistic conglomerations always remain in one way or another as components of the ship.

While Peirce was challenging rationalism, Neurath challenged empiricism. W. V. O. Quine (1960: 3–4) extended the boat metaphor: “... if we are to rebuild it (the science boat), we must rebuild plank by plank while staying afloat in it. The philosopher and the scientist are in the same boat...”. The very title of Quine and Ullian’s book, *The Web of Belief*, is a clear case of the coherence metaphor of knowledge. Other prominent philosophers who used this metaphor include Karl Popper, John Rawls and Nelson Goodman, for whom “logical principles are justified not a priori but rather on how well they fit with inferential practice” (Thagard and Beam 2004: 509).

4. *The concept of metaphor*

Recent years have witnessed a revival of interest in metaphor. One study warrants special attention: “The Limits of Literal Meaning: New Models for Understanding Metaphor” by E. Oesch (1996), who distinguishes between a “literal” and a “non-literal” approach. Oesch (1996: 2) notes that “... careful investigation is still needed to show how metaphors actually function in meaning creation processes...”. One approach is in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, where we find his most concentrated treatment of metaphor, in terms of “the ability to make phenomena visible” (Oesch *ibid.*). In Aristotle’s (1982: 1411b2) own words:

We have said that smart sayings are derived from proportional metaphor and expressions which set things before the eyes. We must now explain the meaning of ‘before the eyes’, and what must be done to produce this. I mean that things are set before the eyes by words that signify actuality.

The notion of actuality (*energeia*) here speaks of vividness of representation and is closely related to *dynamis*, which conveys the idea of virtual, as opposed to, actual existence. Oesch (1996: 3) observes that “reflecting these two terms together, it seems that for Aristotle certain properly chosen words have the power to make visible phenomena included in entities as potentiality.” As to the specification of what these entities are, Oesch (*ibid.*) relates Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* to his *Categories*, which, from a logical point of view, deal with the way we think about things and make predictions. She notes that:

In the *Rhetoric* the starting point is explicitly linguistic, which puts these two works in an interesting dialogue with each other, for paying attention to different equivocal expressions, metaphors and other figures of speech, the *Rhetoric* simultaneously endeavours to uncover the potentiality of language to question our settled classifications and to put forward new and unexpected features in reality (Oesch 1996: 3).

Hence, for both Aristotle and Oesch words “have the capacity to reform reality incessantly.” This leads us to Oesch’s (ibid) own definition of metaphor: “Metaphors are expressions which simultaneously both deconstruct old meanings and reconstruct new ones, transforming ceaselessly the boundaries between semantic fields.”

5. *Building (cable) bridges*

In a seminal article, Paul Ricoeur (1982: 197–221) develops a “hermeneutical arc” to incorporate both understanding and explanation within a general process of interpretation in the human sciences. Prior to Ricoeur, Dilthey had rigidly separated the human from the natural sciences, pursuing understanding and explanation respectively. What distinguished the human sciences was their *historical* nature. History remains important, though not within the narrow confines Dilthey envisaged. Ricoeur wants to bridge the dichotomy engineered by Dilthey more explicitly, and starts by analyzing the features of discourse and inquiring into what happens to it when speech is replaced by writing. Four characteristics distinguish the latter; written discourse is: fixated beyond the fleeting moment of speech, set free from a speaker (i.e., externalized), opens up a world beyond that of the author, and is universalized by being made available to anyone who can read.

From here Ricoeur reconceptualizing meaningful action as a kind of text, thereby bringing it within the latter’s methodological paradigm.

Next, he develops a new model of interpretation, consisting of a two-way process: first moving from understanding to explanation, and then (back) from explanation to understanding. The first phase of the process takes the form of *Guessing followed by validation*. We must start somewhere and, subjective as it may sound, this takes the form of a guess. Yet, as soon as this has occurred, it must be validated. This process was already depicted by E. D. Hirsch (1967: 25), who conceded that while there are no rules for

making good guesses, there are rules to validate them. Explanation follows on from understanding.

The second phase – explanation to understanding – utilizes the techniques developed by *structuralism*, as a more natural scientific orientation within the human sciences, conceiving of language as a closed, abstract system of inter-relating signs, worldless and without human interlocutors. These very categories and structures, however, necessarily imply the possibility of (human) *meaning*, according to Ricoeur. The myths analyzed by Levi-Strauss only make sense as (eventually) opening up new meaning, novel insights into the human situation. In this sense, even the scientific rigours of structuralist (and semiotic) analysis, as *explanation*, must in the end move on to the promised land of meaning, thereby facilitating a new *understanding*.

6. *Media aesthetics: Making the visual understandable*

The media aesthetics of H. Zettl illustrates the philosophical principles developed in this paper. Accordingly, aesthetics – aimed at clarifying the *visual* – is for him contextualized. In his ground-breaking *Sight Sound Motion*, he notes the following:

Aesthetics, then, means for us a study of certain sense perceptions and how these perceptions can be most effectively clarified, intensified, and interpreted through a medium, such as television or film, for a specific recipient. Since all media elements interconnect and are ultimately shaped by our perceptual sensitivities, we call the operational field within which we conduct our examination *contextualistic aesthetics* or simply *contextualism*. (Zettl 1973: 2)

A key influence on Zettl was the inductive approach of Kandinsky, whose *Punkt Linie und Fläche* was to help inspire *Sight Sound Motion*.

7. *Conclusion*

In conclusion, two insights of Zettl may be highlighted. The first is his rejection of the absolute. Having dispensed with foundation metaphors of understanding, we can appreciate our own limitations, this being but a consequence of the radical *historicity* of existence. Second, there is his

quest to enrich the wonder of being human. If we can join hands, we can build bridges, which carry us into a fuller understanding of ourselves, each other and our world. And that surely remains the ultimate goal of the human sciences.

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Tomohai Hori

Pentatonicism in the vocal music of Schubert's "Romantic period"

The meanings of *Mi-sol-la*

Introduction

The appearance of the pentatonic scale in a work of classical music may be represented as a singular event. In this regard, Day-O'Connell (2007) has demonstrated the discursive implementation of this scale in the west and cited some 400 musical examples demonstrating how it has been used in association with themes of "nature", "folkishness", or "religiosity" or the "primitive" – from Peircian semiotic points of view (ibid., 6f.). While by definition the pentatonic scale consists of "do-re-mi-sol-la" (in a major scale), Day-O'Connell paid primary attention to the ascending "sol-la-do" progression (ibid., 13–43; 130–142).

In the vocal works of Franz Schubert, we find many examples of pentatonicism appearing suddenly so as to form a *crux*. For example, in the lied "Die junge Nonne" D 828 (1825), a young nun continues to pray, fraught with madness amid the stormy roar. In the course of praying she is led "all-powerfully to eternal heights" (*allmächtig zu ewigen Höhen*) at a moment towards the end of the song. At this moment (m. 78), we encounter an important procedure extensively applied in Schubert's vocal works: the vocal part suddenly doubles the bass (See Ex. 1a). As Leo Black (2001: 100) has observed, such passages of "voice doubling bass" frequently appear in the lieder Schubert composed after 1818, in places where the protagonist loses her- / himself and surrenders to "Übergeordnetes" (superior sublime beings or ideas) or to "innere Stimmen." Corresponding to this crucial event, the downward progression of D (which is repeated just before Ex. 1a) – a kind of "Classical progression of the sixth degree tone" (Day-

O’Connell 2002: 30ff) – abruptly rises three degrees to form a “sol-la-do” (C-D-F) pentatonic pattern. The latter then changes into a “mi-sol-la” (A-C-D) series in the final “Alleluia” section (see Ex. 1b).

Example 1a. Schubert, “Die junge Nonne” (D 828), mm. 77–80.

Example 1b. “Die junge Nonne”, mm. 85–87.

Recent Schubert studies – though in very different ways – have put special emphasis on figures or phrases which make brusque appearances to form a crystallizing moment in a particular work. Marie-Agnes Dittrich (1991: 14; 51, 52), focusing on the “uniqueness of a certain harmony” in Schubert’s lieder, avoids the “functional” frame of reference, in which each harmony is functionalized within the frame of the whole structure. Instead, her analysis shows how meaningfully Schubert assigned unique sounds (e.g., mediant chords) to a single, focusing word. Similarly, Richard Kramer (1994: 86; 90ff.; 112f.) examined moments, such as certain tonal sections in Schubert’s lieder which are often “the most eccentric” or “closed off” from the whole, as forming the “cruxes” of the works. Lawrence Kramer (1998: 1–8) sees such a “crucial point” as a means of “the ‘deviant’ subject’s self-affirmation”. For him, the subjects in Schubert’s songs that are “normal enough to begin with”, sooner or later “venture into ... dangerous, marginal,

or prohibited areas of experience", so as to deconstruct the normative structure and to "explore alternative subjectivities" (ibid.). Furthermore, Robert Hatten (1994: 34 & passim) has applied the linguistic theory of "markedness" to music analysis, by which establishes a foundation for observing the structurally "marked" zones in Schubert's instrumental music (Hatten 2004: 53–67), which serve "to achieve an appropriately balanced (structural and expressive) manifestation of foreground *and* background, melody *and* harmony, yearning *and* fulfillment" (ibid.: 10). Although these studies are varied in their purposes and in some ways incompatible with each other, their points of view have unquestionably led to new ways of revealing the meanings of unusual idioms in Schubert's music.

My study looks at the musical phenomenon of pentatonicism that suddenly appears and foregrounds a particular moment or main theme of Schubert's vocal works. Examining his body of work – 577 German lieder, 6 Masses, other religious works, and surviving operas – I found the usage of pentatonicism to be an important means of creating such a focus, especially in its descending "*mi-sol-la*" form (in "la-sol-mi," "sol-la-sol-mi," etc.). This figure is used extensively to create a pastoral mood; as in the "Fischerlied" D 351 or "Die gefangenen Sanger" D 712; a religious invocation, as in the *Kyrie* of two Masses (D 105, D950) and the *Dona nobis* of another Mass (D 678), or to call attention to something uniquely precious to a given work (as on the words "suer Friede" in the "Wanderers Nachtlied" D 224). In this paper I focus on works from Schubert's "Romantic period"; because it is in this period that a salient *mi-sol-la* figure is used in the most refined manner, and becomes clearly related to three thematic motifs that were highly cherished by the composer: 1) reliance on God; 2) mankind's misfortune at having lost God; and 3) the desire to unite or become one with Nature. To demonstrate the interrelation between the *mi-sol-la* figure and these motifs, I examine the religious drama *Lazarus*, the song cycle *Die schone Mullerin* (briefly) and various of Schubert's lieder.

1. "*Delights of Friendship*": Peaceful death within a reliance on God

The unfinished religious drama *Lazarus* (D 689, 1820) deals with the death of Lazarus, his burial, and his resurrection, as described in the *Gospel of John*. As intended by the librettist Niemeyer, a dual motif runs through-

out the drama: the relationship between two kinds of feeling – “fear” and “solace – experienced by characters as a reaction to the death of Lazarus. As pointed out by Blanken (2002: 199) and Brown (1966), this characteristic libretto led Schubert to adopt a special composing technique: he assigned a few musical motives to the contrary feelings of “fear” and “solace,” and used them in the work to communicate such feelings, in a kind of leit-motif process. In line with this observation, I describe three phases in the first part of this work, which deals with the story up to the death of Lazarus. First, various pentatonic patterns appear in the orchestral part during the songs of Mary (one of Lazarus’ sisters), exclusively when she speaks of “solace” (*der Trost*) and “reliance on God.”² Second, such pentatonic patterns change into the *mi-sol-la* figure in the impressive arioso sung by Lazarus just before his death, this time in the *vocal* part.³ Third, this figure once again appears in Jemina’s aria near the end, thereby crystallizing the suggested theme of this work: “the delights of friendship.”

The work begins with a scene in which Lazarus, sick and preparing to die, bids farewell to his sisters, Martha and Mary. Although Martha is shocked to hear this, Mary remains calm and comforts Martha. Afterwards Mary sings an aria, encouraging Lazarus. In this aria we encounter the first impressive appearance of pentatonicism. In the middle section, Schubert describes the “last struggle” of the dying Lazarus in the parallel minor. But at the last few measures of the interlude – just before the F *major* section (A section) returns, the “mi-sol-la-sol-mi-do” in the clarinet part heralds the return of Maria’s comforting voice (Ex. 2a).

Example 2a. Lazarus (D 689), Mary’s aria, beginning of reprise, mm. 171–181.

Mary always remains calm in this way, a feeling often emphasized by various pentatonic patterns. For example, pentatonicism appears in the cello part, where "das Reich des Lichts" is predicted by Mary's own solace, "der Trost" (Ex. 2b), and returns at the end of her another aria, thus constituting the climax of part one of the entire work. At this point, pentatonicism appears in a reduced "do-mi-sol-la" series, highlighting the theme of this aria: "Gottes Liebe, du bist seine Zuversicht" (Ex. 2c).

Example 2b shows the beginning of Mary's aria. The score includes parts for Clarinet (in B), Violin, Viola, Maria (soprano), and Cello. The key signature is one flat (B-flat major/D minor). The cello part features a pentatonic pattern circled in red. The lyrics are: "Der Trost beglei - te dich hin - u - ber in das Reich des Lichts,"

Example 2b. Lazarus, Mary's aria, beginning, mm. 442-448.

Example 2c shows the ending of Mary's aria. The score includes parts for Clarinet (in C), Bassoon, Cor (in G), Violin, Viola, Maria (soprano), and Bass. The key signature is one flat (B-flat major/D minor). The Clarinet and Bassoon parts feature pentatonic patterns circled in red. The lyrics are: "- ver - sicht, du, nur du bist seine Zu - ver - sicht!"

Example 2c. Lazarus, Mary's aria, ending, mm. 570-581.

The solace felt by Mary finally comes to the dying Lazarus. In his arioso, which gives thanks to the friends who have gathered, the pentatonicism arises in a *mi-sol-la* series in the *vocal* part. This figure vividly foregrounds the words “der Freundschaft Wonne” (the delights of friendship) in F sharp major, which always has an extraordinary meaning in Schubert songs (Cf. Youens 2002: 358) – emphasizing his expectation of a peaceful death, based on his reliance on God and friendship (Ex. 2d).

Example 2d. Lazarus, beginning of Lazarus's arioso.

During the last phase of this work, a young woman named Jemina comes to Lazarus, just before his arioso. In his arioso, Lazarus has asked her to sing “a song of death and resurrection”. In response, she sings of how peacefully she died, having already experienced her own death and resurrection, as described in Table 1. (She is identified as “the daughter of Jairus” described in the *Gospel of Mark*.) During the A section she sings of the death of an innocent woman (“die Unschuld”). In turn, in the B section she sings of her own experience (“So schlummert *ich*”). The *mi-sol-la* figure occurs at the end of the first section, where she calls out “weckt sie nicht”. Although the “innocent woman” must be identified as no one but Jemina herself in this context, the libretto clearly distinguishes two persons, and Schubert also separates them strictly in two respective sections.

Uniquely, in the latter half of the reprise, the text of the middle section is recalled (line 5 of A is immediately followed by line 1 of B); hence the whole aria ends with the text of the B-Section. Christine Blanken (2002: 212) has drawn attention to the radical change of declamation in the reprise, but not tried to explain the composer’s reason for the change.

[A:]	So schlummert auf Rosen, Die Unschuld ein, Wo sanfte Lüftchen säuselnd Mit Blüthen sie bestreu'n. <u>Wie süß sie schläft.</u> Mit Engelsfrieden Im blühenden Gesicht, Weht leiser, Lüftchen, Weckt sie nicht!	Resting on a bed of roses, So sleeps an innocent woman, Where tender quivering breezes Strew her with flowers. <u>How tenderly she sleeps.</u> With that angelic peace On her enraptured face. Rustle softly, Zephyrs, Do not wake her!
[B:]	<u>So schlummert ich, und die Gespielen</u> Streuten die Rosen Sarons über mich!	<u>So I sleep [too]. And companions</u> Would scatter roses of Sharon over me!

Table 1. Text of Jemina's aria (translation by Bob Fogg, slightly modified, italics mine).

Why did Schubert change the text? The answer is clear, if we consider the meaning of the *mi-sol-la* figure: in the reprise, the words "she sleeps..." are immediately followed by the words "so I slept [too]," which suggests a continuity between the death of the third person ("sie") and of Jemina in the first person ("ich"). This procedure enabled Schubert to end the aria with a description of Jemina's own death, and accordingly to assign the *mi-sol-la* figure – previously heard at the death of "the innocent woman" – but this time at the death of Jemina.

To summarize: in this work Schubert assigned to each character various pentatonic patterns, finally refining these last as the *mi-sol-la* figure so as to imbue them with the calm of a "peaceful death within a reliance on God", and to emphasize a primary theme of this work: "the delights of friendship".

2.1. "Now All the Sweet Bonds Are Torn Asunder"

Having observed how the *mi-sol-la* figure works as a *leitmotif* of peace and acceptance, we next look at how it used in the opposite meaning. The lied "Der Unglückliche" D 713 (1821) underwent a long compositional process. Exceptionally for Schubert, there was a sketch phase; moreover, a first version has survived, as well as the final one. These versions demonstrate how the figure has been highlighted gradually throughout the compositional process, as well as how it closely relates to the main theme of this lied-text.

The text, originally taken from a novel written by Calorine Pichler, consists of four stanzas, each of which has eight lines. First the text describes a scene in the brooding night, and goes on to describe an “unhappy man” who has “wounds” in his heart (in the second stanza this man exclaims to himself, “Awaken your sorrows, with cruelly sweet delight”). The last two stanzas relate how “the Golden age” is forever lost, and finally “all the sweet bonds [with the heavenly world] are torn asunder”: the recognition of which is the very reason for his “unhappiness”.

Schubert subdivided this poem and contrasted the brilliant past with the unhappy present more radically. What most draws our attention is his deletion of the last six lines of the original poem. Deleted was the text expressing renewed hope for a bond with the heavenly world, including the line “Im Götterglanz erscheint die heilige Pflicht” (holy duty shines in the brightness of the Gods). In the original, this lied is sung by a princess in front of a gathering of people; however, the protagonist Olivier leaves the room, unable to listen to her song through to the end. This deletion strongly suggests that Schubert intended to finish the song with a cry of despair, thus sympathizing with Olivier as presented in the novel (see Dürr 1991).

The beginnings of the three different versions exhibit a gradual foreshadowing of this mood of hopelessness. In the “Entwurf” (sketch phase), the bass part moves actively (Ex. 3a), and in the “ursprüngliche Fassung” there prevails the dactylic rhythm, well known as Schubert’s “wandering motif” (Ex. 3a, lower right). But this motif completely disappears from the later versions. As Walther Dürr (1991: 228) has pointed out, this motif may be derived from the keywords of the first stanza: “night”, “gentle sleep”, “death’s brother”, and “daily grave”. These words, implying “Hinüber” (the other side), at first prompted Schubert to thematize “wandering to the other side” by his choice of the “wandering motif”. Therefore, the gloomy and newly added introductory chords, which substitute for the “wandering motif”, are a representative factor that is intimately bound up with the final conception of the whole work. In other words, Schubert, realizing the impossibility of wandering to the other side, employs this gloomy introduction to express his main theme: “a return to oneself” (“Zurückwerfen auf sich selbst”, in the words of Dürr).

Here we must realize the importance of the “la-sol-sol-mi” figure migrating, such that it appears only in the last version of the song (m. 12).

Entwurf

Die Nacht bricht an... mit lei-sen Lüf-ten sin-ke-t sie
auf die mü-den Sterb-li-chen her-ab, der saun-te

Langsam

Die Nacht bricht an... mit lei-sen Lüf-ten sin-ke-t sie

Langsam

Die

Nacht bricht an... mit lei-sen Lüf-ten sin-ke-t sie auf die

urspr. Fassung

korr. Fassung

Example 3a. "Der Unglückliche" (D 713): Beginnings of the three versions, respectively: "Entwurf", "first version", "final version", and the primary form of the "Entwurf" (Wienbibliothek im Rathaus, MH187).

In the first version this figure was still in the “la-sol-sol-sol” form; Schubert obviously found no possibility of using the *mi-sol-la* figure \boxtimes in the “Entwurf, given the active bass line. In the final version, this figure appears only two more times: first, at the exclamation in response to the exile from Paradise (Ex. 3b) – in the first version, the text was composed over a mere sequential progression; second, at the lamentation pursuant to the exile (Ex. 3c).

Example 3b shows two versions of the musical score. The first version (mm. 39-40) features a vocal line with lyrics "wor-aus in dei-ner Ju-gend gold-nen Zai-ten die" and piano accompaniment with dynamics "fz p" and "cresc.". The second version (mm. 77-81) features a vocal line with lyrics "wor-aus in dai-ner Ju-gend gold-nen Zai-ten die" and piano accompaniment with dynamics "scen" and "do".

Example 3b. “Der Unglückliche”, the moment of the pronouncement of “exile from paradise”: First version mm. 39–40 and final version, mm. 77–81.

Example 3c shows the final version of the musical score. The tempo is marked "Langsam". The vocal line has lyrics "und dein stil-les Glück, dein all-zu-schö-nes Traum-bildkehr-te wie-der zur bes-tern Welt,". The piano accompaniment is marked "pp".

Example 3c: “Der Unglückliche”, final version: Point of “Lamentation”, mm. 118–125.

We can now draw conclusions about the meaning of the *mi-sol-la* figure in this lied. Corresponding to the deletion of the “wandering motif” and the addition of the introduction, this figure expresses the main theme of the song: “a return to the self, when happiness is forever lost and all sweet bonds with the heavenly world are torn asunder”.

2.2. "Then You Abandon Him to His Agony"

The *mi-sol-la* figure appears along the same line in the lied "Gesang des Harfners" D 480 (1822), a composition based on Goethe's *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre* (see Ex. 4). This poem consists of two stanzas, the first conveying the agony of mankind and the second accusing the heavenly powers. By such dualism Goethe described the fall of mankind in challenging the power of God, as Lorraine Byrne (2003: 305–307) has pointed out. To embody this thematic, Schubert set forth a dual tonal opposition: the first stanza is consistently in the key of A (major or minor); the second is mainly in B flat major or minor – a semitone higher.

Example 4. "Gesang des Harfners" (D 480), second stanza, mm. 34–51.

With vigorous and defiant plucking the old *Harfner* begins the second stanza in B flat (m. 35), which signifies “heaven” in this lied. The turning tone F sharp (m. 41), assigned to the word “Schuld (guilt)”, deviates crucially from the B flat context, and returns the tonality to A major. Via the radical usage of an augmented triad⁴ in measure 44, the second stanza is repeated, but now in B flat *minor*. However, where the words “then you abandon him to his agony” are repeated (m. 49), the tonality suddenly shifts to A flat major – an apparently irrelevant key in this context. Whether we interpret this seemingly unaccountable section as “an awful spot to accuse God without pathos” (Einstein 1952: 189), or a phrase which signifies “the distance of the gods and their indifference to man’s fate” (Byrne 2003: 311), Schubert undoubtedly wanted to give special emphasis to these two measures, which are preceded by a unique pause in the bass line of this work. What does this moment mean? The answer lies in the *mi-so-la* figure, which appears only once during the lied. At this particular, out-of-context moment (both harmonically and melodically), Schubert must have again intended to foreshadow the fall of mankind, by seeking to express poignantly the misfortune of losing one’s God.

3. “*Brook, Beloved Brook ...*”:
The desire to unify with Nature

Lastly we shall examine some examples in which this figure appears when a desire to unify with Nature is evoked. The lied “*Nachtviolen*” D 752 (1822), with text by Mayrhofer, begins by addressing the woman’s violet, with a “*si-do-mi*” tetrachord in C major. Later, at the beginning of the second stanza, it reappears as *mi-sol-la* in G major (Ex. 5). As Charles Rosen (1997: 95) points out, this kind of transfiguration technique in a narrow register is characteristic of Schubert to give some songs “a certain intensity”.

An analysis of the composer’s modification to the original poem will help clarify the association between the *mi-sol-la* figure and the theme of unification with nature. The modification may be summarized in three respects. First, Schubert deleted the first line of the third stanza, including the third person noun “*der Dichter*” (the poet). Second, in the last line of the same stanza he substituted the personal pronoun “*my*” for the original “*his*” (the poet’s). Third, he deleted the last two lines, ending the song at the moment the “*heilige Verbindung*” (sacred union) with the flower is

Langsam

Nacht - vi - o - len, Nacht - vi - o - len!

pp

legato

Grü - ne Blätter stre - ben freudig, euch zu hel - len, e

Example 5. "Nachtviolen" (D 752): Beginnings of first and second stanzas.

achieved. All of these changes suggest that Schubert is expressing his own experience of unifying with the violet, not the contemplative "poet's" experience (cf. Muxfeldt 1997: 135–137). The processes of gradually approaching the violet and making the lied culminate at the "sacred union" are reinforced by the above-mentioned transfiguration of the *mi-sol-la* figure: in short, through this procedure Schubert expressed his gradual exaltation in unifying with the violet.⁵

In *Die schöne Müllerin* this figure is used with great economy. Throughout the song cycle the *mi-sol-la* figure makes an appearance only four times, if we count two or three appearances within a strophic song as one⁶: First, where the young miller communicates to the brook his delight at having found the miller maid, in "Halt!"; second, in the introduction to the following lied, "Dankgesang an den Bach"; third, at the moment he throws himself into the brook saying "Brook, Beloved Brook..." in the last two measures of "Der Müller und der Bach"; fourth, in the last lullaby of the brook in "Des Baches Wiegenlied". In those moments, the miller's desire to be one with the brook is strongly expressed and achieved.

4. Conclusion

I have tried to demonstrate how Schubert assigned the *mi-sol-la* figure to the crucial moment in each of the works examined here. The three meanings of this figure in his Romantic period may be summarized as *a poignant calling out to the precious thing that is forever lost to mankind*. In this paper I have contextualized the *mi-sol-la* figure as consistent with pentatonicism; for, as is shown in *Lazarus*, the appearance of this figure clearly seems derived from pentatonic patterns – a generally marked sound in Schubert’s day. Yet, it must also be asked whether it is possible to specify with complete certainty the stylistic derivation of such an original fingerprint of Schubert. The *mi-sol-la* figure seems to provoke – and answer – such questions about the unique expressive means of the composer.

Notes

1. During the years 1819–23, Schubert took an intense interest in poems written by the “Jener Romantiker”, whose themes of night, longing, and a pantheistic view of nature attracted him more and more. For a theoretical view of the literature of this period, see Dürr (1997: 47); for a brief survey of its influence on compositional procedures, see Hilmer (1997: 32); for a review of relevant “Romantic” lieder, see Dürhammer (1996: 66).
2. A pentatonic pattern also appears when Nathanael (Lazarus’s friend) talks about his “death in peace” (mm. 360; 366); for reasons of space, I go no further in explaining it here.
3. The *mi-sol-la* figure also appears in the preceding *arioso* of Mary (see mm. 506f.; 519f.).
4. This kind of augmented triad is a great invention of Schubert in his “Romantic period”. For a review of its usage, see R. Kramer (1994: 210–213). Other typical examples, which Kramer does not cite, are in the Mass in A flat (D 678): the beginning of the *Sanctus*, and in the “Quoniam” section (mm. 297–299) of the *Gloria*.
5. The same usage of this figure is pursued typically in the lied “Der Knabe”, one of the Friedrich Schlegel lieder-group *Abendröte*; in this song, Schlegel’s pantheistic idea is vividly set to the music. The *mi-sol-la* figure is assigned to the phrase where a boy expresses his desire to fly freely like a bird: “Ach, wie wollt’ ich lustig fliegen!”
6. On the meaning of one particular appearance of a certain figure among parallel ones within a strophic song, see R. Kramer (1994: 33).

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Anne-Marie Houdebine et Ekaterina Nossenko

Texte-image: Relais, ancrage ou complémentarité?

Jalons d'un parcours interprétatif

“Comment le sens vient à l'image? Où se finit-il? Et s'il finit, qu'y a-t-il au-delà?” Ce sont les questions que soulève Roland Barthes en introduction de l'article “Rhétorique de l'image” (1964: 40-51), le texte inaugurant la sémiologie interprétative. Dans ce texte l'auteur s'interroge sur les messages transmis par une image publicitaire, et il en dégage trois: message linguistique, message iconique littéral et message iconique symbolique. Cette décomposition permet de poser deux concepts méthodologiques, issus de la linguistique, *dénotation* et *connotation*. Pour les illustrer, l'auteur choisit d'étudier l'affiche publicitaire Panzani en la soumettant à une analyse sémiologique structurale.



Rappelons qu'à l'époque, en 1964, ce texte produit un effet révolutionnaire: pour la première fois, un universitaire se propose d'étudier un objet trivial en le traitant d'un point de vue scientifique. Le langage iconique se révèle alors aussi structuré que le langage articulé. L'image n'est pas toujours naïve et naturelle, mais construite et culturelle, elle évoque d'autres messages que ceux accessibles au premier abord, elle est accompagnée, en filigrane, des messages idéologiques. Il est donc au sémiologue de les révéler et dénoncer en s'attaquant non seulement à "la bonne conscience petite-bourgeoise" mais au "système symbolique et sémantique de notre civilisation, dans son entier ..." (Barthes 1985: 14).

Avant de s'interroger sur la place et l'opérationnalité de la démarche barthésienne dans le cadre de la sémiologie d'aujourd'hui, revenons rapidement au texte d'origine.

Par la description des deux niveaux, linguistique et iconique, l'auteur démontre la coexistence des signes, dénotés et connotés, au sein de l'affiche étudiée. Le premier message ainsi livré est celui du langage articulé (écrit); ses supports sont la légende et les étiquettes, les éléments prélevés dans le code de la langue française, pour les décoder il suffit d'avoir la connaissance de l'écriture et du français. Barthes montre que le message linguistique ne se réduit pas seulement aux noms des produits et de la firme, mais aussi, au nom même des pâtes, Panzani, qui par son assonance, livre un signifié supplémentaire (celui de connotation), "l'italianité":

Au niveau de l'image pure, sans texte, une autre série de signifiés est dégagée. L'auteur souligne que l'ordre est ici sans importance car, contrairement au signe linguistique, le signe iconique est non linéaire; il est global, discontinu. Ces signes sont puisés dans un code culturel. Barthes en dégage quatre: 1) /filet entrouvert qui laisse s'épandre les provisions/ = <retour du marché, anticipation possible d'un repas>; 2) /tomate+poivron+teinte tricolore de l'affiche/ = <drapeau italien, l'Italie>; 3) /rassemblement de produits frais et conservés/ = <service culinaire total nécessaire pour un plat composé>; 4) /la composition, la mise en présentation des produit sur un fond uni/ = <nature morte>.

En dégageant ces quatre signes de connotation, Barthes insiste sur l'originalité de l'approche structurale en rappelant que le nombre de lectures d'une même lexie (d'une même image) est variable selon les individus. Ou comme le dit l'auteur: "Une même lexie mobilise des lexiques différents" (Barthes 1985: 48). Une même image mobilise alors des imaginaires

différents. L'analyse de l'image de Barthes a fourni des signifiés culturels investis par les savoirs expérimentiels: il s'agit donc des savoirs pratique, national, culturel, esthétique. Ou encore du tourisme, du ménage, de la connaissance de l'art. Mais il en y a certainement d'autres. Comme le langage articulé est composé d'idiolectes (système linguistique individuel) de ceux qui le parlent, l'image prend sens au travers des idiolectes de ceux qui la regardent. Barthes déplace la notion linguistique d'idiolecte en idiolecte culturel. Comme la langue, l'image devient "l'ensemble des paroles émises et des paroles reçues".

Nous reviendrons à cette question des émetteurs et récepteurs dans la deuxième partie de notre exposé et développerons comment certaines étapes de la démarche barthésienne se révèlent problématiques et quelles en sont les défaillances méthodologiques. En les reformulant nous montrerons comment on peut hiérarchiser différents messages linguistiques et iconiques dans un cadre théorique et méthodologique de la sémiologie actuelle, pour nous, *la sémiologie des indices*.

Arrêtons-nous à présent à deux types de rapport qu'établit Barthes entre le message linguistique et le message iconique. En cherchant à définir la structure signifiante de l'image, l'auteur s'interroge sur le rôle du texte qui l'accompagne. Etant donné qu'au niveau des communications de masse le message linguistique est omniprésent, l'auteur tente de définir sa fonction par rapport au message iconique. Il en voit deux: 1) les cas où l'image double certaines informations du texte, par un phénomène de redondance, ou *le relais*; 2) les cas où le texte ajoute une information inédite à l'image, ou *l'ancrage*.

Le cas de relais (équivalent de redondance) ne semble pas poser problème au moment de la réception, car il n'y a pas de confusion au niveau du sens: le texte ne fait que répéter l'image. Dans le cas de Panzani, les couleurs rappelant le drapeau de l'Italie ainsi que le nom de la marque vont dans le même sens: les deux messages permettent de construire le signe dénoté, <cuisine italienne>, <l'Italie>, et le signe connoté, "l'italianité", ce qui est d'après Barthes, "l'essence condensée de tout ce qui peut être italien, des spaghetti à la peinture" (Barthes 1964: 49).

Il est moins évident quand l'image produit une pluralité de sens et que le récepteur peut en lire certains et en ignorer d'autres. Cette polysémie provoque des doutes sur le sens et peut créer un dysfonctionnement. Le texte joue alors le rôle de régulateur; il permet d'ancrer le sens souhaité

par l'émetteur dans "la chaîne flottante de signifiés" (ibid.: 44); il élucide l'image en répondant à la question *qu'est-ce que c'est?* Cette technique, porteur de l'idéologie sociétale, guide l'interprétation du lecteur en empêchant que le sens connoté ne prolifère vers les régions trop individuelles. "Le texte dirige le lecteur entre les signifiés de l'image, lui en fait éviter certains et en recevoir d'autres; ... Dans l'image publicitaire, le linguistique est alors aussi, voire, plus important que l'iconique, car à son niveau s'investissent la morale et l'idéologie d'une société" (ibid.).

Trente ans après ce texte, Anne-Marie Houdebine constate que l'ancrage peut se produire dans un sens ou dans l'autre: du linguistique vers l'iconique comme le pensait Barthes ou inversement: "L'équivoque linguistique peut à son tour être ancrée par l'évidence analogique de l'iconique" (Houdebine 1994: 19–38). L'exemple présent est mobilisé pour illustrer la technicité du rapport texte–image et non sa spécificité discursive (comme le rôle de l'ironie). L'iconique analogique élucide alors les équivoques linguistiques. Autrement dit, chacun (iconique ou linguistique) pouvant servir d'interprétant interne à l'autre.

Bien que les deux techniques, *relais* et *ancrage*, semblent convenablement définies, nous nous retenons de leur réserver une place de droit dans le cadre théorique de la sémiologie des indices. Définis par Barthes en 1964, ces deux outils connaissent aujourd'hui une expansion importante dans le domaine du marketing. Mais, comme nous le savons, la pertinence de la sémiologie de la signification a pour objectif la *praxis critique* et pas le sens informationnel.

Dans le souci de la rigueur méthodologique et de la pertinence sémiologique, Anne-Marie Houdebine inverse la démarche barthésienne et propose de commencer par l'inventaire de l'iconique sans prêter attention, aussi longtemps que possible, au message verbal. Cette approche développée dans le cadre de *la sémiologie des indices*, laisse plus de possibilités associatives si l'on souhaite s'intéresser aux autres sens qu'au seul message publicitaire (Houdebine 1994: 26, 275–282). Pour cette auteure, la sémiologie des indices ou sémiotique indicielle participe d'une sémiologie générale (des indices, des codes ou structurations), se donnant comme objet la culture. Elle a comme enjeu d'en décrire les éléments, leur mode de fonctionnement (phase systémique, descriptive et explicative) et de tenter d'en dégager les effets de sens et les valeurs symboliques, les modes de signifiante (phase interprétative). Elle se définit donc non seulement

comme “science générale de la vie des signes de la vie sociale”, ainsi que l’anticipait Saussure mais aussi “praxis critique” selon la sommation de Barthes ou mise au jour des insus culturels. Il s’agit, en premier temps de mettre au jour les significations qui se dégagent sur le plan iconique. Cela avec rigueur, pour limiter “le trop plein associatif” (Houdebine 1994: 26), cette phase est régie par un cadrage méthodologique, ayant pour principe celui de l’immanence, d’abord restreinte à l’interne. Les formes iconiques sont ainsi décrites selon différentes strates (le dispositif scénique, strate iconique, coloristique, etc.) en s’efforçant de ne pas utiliser le contenu du message verbal, qui, à son tour, sera analysé formellement, syntaxiquement, rhétoriquement, lexicalement, énonciativement.

Cette phase descriptive sera suivie de celle explicative où seront repérés les modes de connexion entre strates et l’impact du message linguistique sur la polysémie significative venue de l’iconique. Au cours de cette modélisation, Houdebine propose de différencier entre *relais* et *complémentarité*, pour réserver cette dernière notion pour la position méthodologique évoluée qui signifie la recherche de la pluralité du sens en acte. Il ne s’agit donc pas de se restreindre au seul message idéologique intentionnel de l’émetteur mais de tenter de dégager les divers messages que peut susciter l’image analysée, ceci en recourant aux savoirs *internes* et *externes* mobilisés par les associations de l’analyste les construisant en *interprétants*. La complémentarité du message sera ainsi construite dans le parcours interprétatif ayant pour objectif la mise au jour des “systèmes sémantiques et symboliques” de notre culture ou de nos stéréotypes, nos figements idéologiques voire nos insus culturels. Pour ce faire le parcours d’interprétance a recours aux *interprétants internes*; tout d’abord de façon immanente, recours aux éléments dégagés dans l’analyse systémique et à leurs entours ou opposition (plans syntagmatique et paradigmatique dans le corpus) puis aux *interprétants externes* dégagés par associations (cf. champs associatifs saussurien ou freudien, recours à la notion d’imaginaire culturel, de carte forcée culturelle, utilisation de relations intertextuelles, intericoniques, intermédiatiques); celles-ci devant être étayées à l’aide de corpus connexes en absence eu égard au corpus initial (Houdebine 2007), autrement dit dans le visuel et hors du visuel.

Houdebine pose ainsi un nouveau cadre théorique qui, issu de la démarche analytique barthésienne, abandonne les concepts de *dénotation* et *connotation* ainsi que ceux de *relais* et *ancrage*, banalisés aujourd’hui

dans les recherches littéraires mais apparaissant moins opérationnels pour des objets sémiotiques actuels. A la place, Houdebine propose de nouveaux concepts qui se révèlent méthodologiquement plus opérationnels et donc adaptés aux objets évolués avec le temps. Ces outils méthodologiques sont *signifiant indiciel* et (repris à Greimas) *effet de sens*.

Rappelons à ce propos que, Barthes, lui-même, évoque la difficulté attachée à la connotation et, en particulier, celle des signifiés de connotation auxquels ne correspond aucun métalangage qui devrait les prendre en charge. Mis de côté le problème de métalangage, Barthes semble préoccupé par un autre souci méthodologique lié à la typologie de différentes lectures: “la variation des lectures n’est pas anarchique, elle dépend des différents savoirs investis dans l’image ... et ces savoirs peuvent se classer, rejoindre une typologie; tout se passe comme si l’image se donnait à lire à plusieurs hommes et ces hommes peuvent très bien coexister en un seul individu ...” (Barthes 1964: 48). Ainsi, l’auteur met en lumière le problème de différents types de récepteurs et/ou d’interprétation; cela sans y répondre.

En s’appuyant sur le cadrage théorique et méthodologique de la sémiologie des indices nous montrerons maintenant comment un circuit externe destinataire/destinataire peut émerger dans la phase interprétative de l’analyse sémiologique afin de construire différents types de récepteurs. L’émetteur de l’affiche (entreprise Panzani) s’en sert pour un message typique (promotion des pâtes). Or le circuit communicationnel permet de construire plusieurs types de récepteur: “un riche”, “un pauvre”, “un gourmand”, “un esthète”, “un touriste”, “une ménagère”, “l’Autre et sa culture” et plusieurs types de compréhension; ce qu’Anne-Marie Houdebine appelle “mise au jour du procès de signifiante”; ce dernier terme venant de Julia Kristeva.

Passons à une démonstration rapide. Le /fond rouge/ de l’affiche peut être considéré effectivement comme <le fond d’une nature morte>, suggéré par Barthes, mais il peut renvoyer également à <la draperie théâtrale> ou au “rideau rouge du théâtre de maintenant”; cela sans oublier qu’à l’interne ce fond renforce non seulement la couleur des tomates, des légumes ou de la sauce mais aussi celle du drapeau italien. Dans tous les cas, cette forme coloristique, /le rouge/ peut être remis en position de *signifiant indiciel* (notion qui selon Houdebine conjoint les notions d’*indice* et de *signifiant* (inspiré de la psychanalyse lacanienne et marquant la filiation saussurienne) parce qu’il devient une forme renvoyant à un <sens> non imposé par un code); ainsi /la couleur rouge/ peut produire plusieurs sens

“l’Art de la peinture”, “le théâtre”, ou bien “le luxe des pâtes” ici présentées (cf. à *l’italienne de luxe*, à *l’italiana di lusso*). Ces effets de sens impliquent une certaine esthétisation du quotidien. La culture ou encore un plaisir esthétique devient la propriété de ce que Barthes a appelé “l’italianité”. Notons au passage que ce terme est né de ses hésitations à propos du métalangage des signifiés connotés. Obligé à exploiter des vocables du langage courant, Barthes finit par créer ainsi l’axe sémique des nationalités du type *l’italianité*, la *francité*. Mais, ce faisant il ne voit pas, ou bien, ne le montre pas explicitement, que Panzani oppose deux cultures: en mettant en valeur “l’italianité”, il refoule “la francité” qui est pourtant présente dans /Parthenay France/. Mécompréhension? Refoulement? Dénî? La France est ignorée en faveur de l’Italie, évoquée par l’assonance de la marque et le syntagme /à l’italienne de luxe/. Le nom de l’entreprise (Panzani) efface celui du lieu où elle se trouve (Parthenay). Ces pâtes, rêvées italiennes dans le discours publicitaire, sont d’origine parthenaisienne; elles viennent d’une petite ville française. D’ailleurs, en toponymie, *-ay*, de Parthenay, est anciennement *-ac*, ou “lieu” (Houdebine 1994: 26). Ainsi “un lieu d’origine” réel et imaginaire est mis en avant dans cette publicité. Mais il en y a un apparemment plus intéressant que l’autre. Ce lieu est d’origine étrangère, l’Italie, la terre de l’art, du luxe, de la culture culinaire de l’Autre. L’axe de nationalité compare alors deux cultures: la culture française s’empare de la culture italienne.

“Origine”, “lieu de l’Autre”, “nationalité”, le parcours interprétatif peut s’arrêter là, mais il peut aussi continuer si d’autres signifiants indiciels s’y prêtent. Et si on s’arrête un peu sur /ce filet ménager tendu/, comme s’il y avait <une main généreuse qui la tient encore>. A qui appartiendrait-elle? Peut-être à celui ou celle qui revient du marché et ferait maintenant la cuisine? Suivons /les contours/ de la rondeur lourde du filet, que découvre cette /forme/? Certains y verront une mammographie, un sein, d’autres une *mamma* prototype de toute mère (Houdebine 1994: 31). La mère qui fait la cuisine mais aussi qui donne l’origine. Nous voilà, de nouveau aux origines. La carte forcée culturelle, en filigrane, nous fait sortir du texte et nous renvoie à l’actualité, au discours sur le communautarisme, l’Europe, l’identité, ou encore au musée du quai Branly pour lequel l’engouement des Parisiens comme celui des touristes croît de jour en jour. Cette attirance pour la culture de l’Autre que cache-t-elle? La curiosité, la culpabilité, la

repentance? “Le retour à l’origine”, explique un journaliste de France-Inter le 9 juin 2007.

En 1964, Panzani donne naissance à “l’italianité”. Aujourd’hui ce texte de Barthes est relu à chaque cours inaugurant l’enseignement de sémiologie. Placer l’axe des nationalités dans le contexte social actuel nous amène, au travers du parcours interprétatif, à la question de l’origine. Pour y arriver certains ont besoin de passer par Parthenay, d’autres de rencontrer une image latente de mère. Laissons-nous donc séduire par “le frisson du sens” qui parcourt cette image, à l’origine de la sémiologie interprétative, ou (comme le disait Barthes) “les surprises” du sens.

Note

1. Conventions de notation utilisées: /.../ = forme du signe, signifiant, soit /Sa/; <...> = sens du signe, signifié ou encore <signifiant indiciel> support pour “...” = effet de sens.

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Preparing the unknown

Semiotic fundamentals of cybercartographical communication

1. Formulation of the problem

By inspecting the cartography textbooks edited at the end of the twentieth century (e.g., Hake et al., 2002; Robinson et al. 1995) it is possible to summarize the subject as follows. Functionally, cartography enables and communicates knowledge of spatial aspects of reality by focusing on the map – generally understood as a plane model (Hake et al 2002: 25) – as its most important form of expression schema. In contrast to this, the rapid development of technology has created numerous alternatives with which to communicate reality (e.g., virtual reality environments, hyperglobes). Nevertheless, cartography remains encapsulated in the map; hence it is facing the necessity of justifying itself. Concretely, these recent alternatives raise the question, Which one of them is most suitable for cartographic matters? Which technology provides an optimal or even ideal framework for expressing cartographic schemata? Despite the potential embodied in these innovative technologies, cartographic textbook theories are not yet able to meet the demands of current digital practice. These deficiencies are caused by cartography's focus on the map during the last decades as well, which has resulted in a situation that Koch concisely describes in the following way: "Undoubtedly technology is currently far ahead of theory" (Koch 2004: 5, my translation).

2. Cybercartographic communication

A current attempt to overcome these theoretical inadequacies has been elaborated under the designation *cybercartography*, to be described as "the organization, presentation, analysis and communication of spatially refer-

enced information on a wide variety of topics of interest and use to society in an interactive, dynamic, multimedia, multisensory and multidisciplinary format” (Taylor 2003: 406). The first part of this definition is largely in accordance with the above-mentioned self-conception of cartography. Likewise the application of interactive (cf. Peterson 1995), dynamic (cf. Dransch 1997) and multimedia (cf. Cartwright et al. 2006) formats is not new to cartography, whereas an extensive commitment to multisensory representation in an interdisciplinary framework marks a specific characteristic of the cybercartographic agenda. Such an extensive integration of multiple senses not only creates new possibilities but also new questions: How are these possibilities to be utilized suitably for communicating spatially referenced information? This suitability can be proved empirically, as cybercartography defines itself through the user and her multisensory interaction.

A precondition for this empirical testing, however, is a common theoretical basis, which ensures that all cybercartographic expression schemata to be tested acquire theoretical and methodological equivalence. Current atlas cartography (Asche 2007) may be cited as an example to illustrate this call for a shared theoretical basis. Principles of visualization that have been elaborated during decades have mostly remained unconsidered for digital atlases. Therefore the comparison of digital with analogue, paper atlases has often resulted in relatively low evaluation ratings of the digital atlases. However, such results are not adequate to estimate the better suitability of analogue atlases, since the objects to be compared are not based on equivalent principles of visualization, i.e., on a common theoretical basis.

3. Semiotic fundamentals

Accordingly, cybercartography too needs a common theoretical basis, so as to make its products comparable and assessable both within and beyond itself, i.e., in relation to analogue products. Special problems arise from cybercartography’s explicit reference to technologies that are currently still in an early stage of development (e.g., an electronic nose; Taylor 2003: 408) or as yet unknown. Therefore a theoretical fundament with a panchronic value needs to be elaborated, that allows a purposive integration of currently known and still unknown techniques. Provided that, first, each cybercartographic product is a system of signs and, second, semiotics deals

with all kinds of sign systems, semiotics can be a comprehensive theory as claimed above (cf. Dressler 1989: 7).

3.1 Applying Peirce to cybercartographic matters

Out of all the numerous semiotic models (Nöth 2000: 59–130), only the theory of Peirce shall be considered here, as it seems to be of particular appropriateness to cybercartographic matters, for the following reasons. First, the triadic structure of the Peircean sign provides an accurate model of the (cyber-)cartographic self-conceptions cited above. In Peircean terms, the cybercartographic *representamen* is a concrete product or part of it. This representamen stands for a single entity or a group of entities, which form the cybercartographic object. Furthermore, the representamen creates an effect upon a user, which effect can be called the cybercartographic *interpretant*. Second, it is substantially the representamen that is open to cybercartographic design. Unlike other triadic models, the Peircean model considers the representamen to mediate between object and interpretant (Nöth 2000: 141). Third, a triadic model, as it seems highly appropriate for cybercartography, and a typology of signs have been elaborated most comprehensively by Peirce (Nöth 2000: 139; Eco 1977: 75). Fourth, Peircean semiotics is not restricted to any particular sign's medium (Morris 1981: 291); thus, it meets the demands of a multimedia and multisensory cybercartography. Fifth, the Peircean theory also considers communicative and cognitive functions of signs (Dressler 1989: 9), which offers various linkages with other theories and disciplines. Hence the Peircean model works well for the interdisciplinary approach of cybercartography. Sixth, Peirce himself integrates his semiotics into a comprehensive division of sciences (cf. Peirce 1998a), facilitating not only interdisciplinary connections, but also providing rich opportunities from the perspective of the philosophy of science, which allows a sophisticated reflection of the self-conception of cybercartography, too.

According to our translation of the Peircean model into cybercartography, the representamen is the central sign-correlate regarding cybercartographic matters. Because the cybercartographic representamen is typically multimedia- and multisensory-based, the key question of cybercartography is, How should a cybercartographic representamen be designed so as to offer optimal usage of these multiple media and senses in terms of a gen-

eral theoretical basis? Answering this question presupposes determination of how a cybercartographic representamen – from a semiotic perspective – actually *can* be designed. Within the framework of the Peircean triadic model, three relations between the representamen and the object can be differentiated, which form the most fundamental division of signs (Peirce 1998b: 273). These three possible modes are iconicity (relation based on similarity), indexicality (relation based on causality), and symbolicity (relation based on convention) (cf. Nöth, 2000: 178–198).

3.2 Towards a semiotic imperative

Accordingly, every cybercartographic representamen can be either the correlate of an iconic, indexical or symbolic sign. Different semiotic qualities are inherent to each of these three types of signs. With regard to the key issue, how a cybercartographic representamen *should* be designed, the qualities of an iconic sign seem to be of particular importance. Peirce defines icon as “... a sign which refers to the object that it denotes merely by virtue of characters of its own and which it possesses, ...” (Peirce 1998c: 291), and describes its qualities as follows: “It will be observed that the icon is very perfect in respect to signification, bringing its interpreter face to face with the very character signified” (Peirce 1998d: 307). Bringing the user face to face with spatially referenced information is exactly what cybercartography intends to do.

The postulated importance of iconic signs is supported by empirical findings of cognitive science. These experiments show that pictures of objects are both better memorized and reproduced than the accordant (rather symbolic) object’s names, such that increasing iconicity improves the results of the tests (Schwarz 1996: 98). Cartographic research corroborates these conclusions. Häberling, for example, presents data in which certain features (e.g., a church or a tree) are to be represented in an iconic way (Häberling 2004: 130). Empirical studies cited by MacEachren found that iconic representamens can be better identified than symbolic ones (MacEachren 2004: 130). This confirms Volli’s statement that icons in general are more easily understood (Volli 2002: 41). Finally, Dressler assesses the icon as the most important type of Peircean sign (Dressler 1989: 13) underlining this assessment with reference to a broad area of different sciences (cf. Bouissac et al. 1986).

The attention given iconicity by different sciences is of particular interest, since cybercartography defines itself as an interdisciplinary approach, and thus calls for fruitful interfaces between the participating disciplines. Returning to our key question, we can conclude the following from the aforementioned arguments: the cybercartographic representamen shall be designated as the correlate of an iconic sign, so that it refers to the object that it denotes by virtue of similarity.

This demand for iconic representamens does not imply that indexical and symbolic signs are irrelevant to cybercartography. On the one hand, indices and symbols surpass icons in important aspects, since they can be found more easily and faster than icons (cf. MacEachren 2004: 130). On the other hand, important cybercartographic criteria, such as scale and perceptibility, set boundaries on iconic representations. However, the demand for iconicity does imply the exhaustion of every representamen's iconic potential, i.e., to design the representamen as iconically as possible. This means, in cybercartographic terms, that every representamen shall look, smell, taste, sound and feel as similar as possible to the object. Not until the iconic potential has been thoroughly exploited can optimal energy between iconic, indexical and symbolic sign-aspects be created.

4. *Prototype theory*

The iconic imperative of cybercartography that has been formulated above faces a crucial difficulty. This difficulty is caused by the subjectivity inherent to a similarity-based understanding of iconicity, since not every user may assess similarity in equal measures. Furthermore, spatially referenced information can be made accessible only in a structured way by means of categories, which are affected by subjectivity as well. Consequently cybercartography needs to know, how the objects to be represented are categorized by the users, so that similarity-based relations between cybercartographic representamen and objects can be established. Due to its empirical approach, prototype theory seems particularly promising concerning this matter. For example, by such a theory one is enabled to understand categories based on a prototype, "which captures the conceptual 'center' of a category, but which might not be associated with any specific instance, or subcategory" (Taylor 2003: 64). Such prototype, as an abstract construct of (proto)typical attributes, serves as a referential point for cat-

egorization of entities. In the sorting process, all entities are more or less ambiguously incorporated into a certain category according to the number of attributes shared with the category's prototype (Kleiber 1998: 38).

4.1 Cue validity

One criterion for determining the prototypical attributes of a category is *cue validity* (Rosch 1978: 5). This probabilistic concept allows us to define how far an attribute may predict a certain entity: "The cue validity of a given attribute M as a predicator of a given category D_i increases as the (subjective) probability $\text{prob}(M/D_i)$ – a numerical value to estimate the frequency with which attribute M is associated with category D_i – increases and decreases as the probability $\text{prob}(M/D_j)$ of an accordant contrast category D_j decreases ..." (Blutner 1985: 99, my translation). The cited consideration of contrast-categories matters to cybercartography insofar as all representaments of a cybercartographic product need to be semantically and sensuously discriminable to an adequate extent. This determinability can be formalized through the concept of cue validity. Concretely, the *cue validity* (*cv*) of a given attribute M for a given category D_i (contrasting category D_j) can be calculated as follows: $cv(M, D_i) = \text{prob}(M/D_i) / ((\text{prob}(M/D_i) + \text{prob}(M/D_j)))$

A disadvantage of the cited formula is that its results lose explanatory power if the attribute is to be found in just one category. Consideration of this shortcoming can be found in Reed's application of weighted probability to a *Cue Validity Model* (Reed 1972: 405). Reed starts from a prior probability of 0.5 for each attribute, since both categories are equally likely regarding any attribute *a priori*. Subsequently, the prior probability gets combined with the concrete sample probability: "The prior probability will be weighted by p and the sample probability by 1 – p, where $p = 1/(1+F)$ " (Reed 1972: 405); F stands for the attribute's frequency. Embedding the above-mentioned formula of CV in Reed's approach, a *cue validity* (*CV*) that depends on attribute frequency and proportion can be calculated in the following way: $CV = p(0.5) + (1-p)*cv$

CV can not only be calculated for a single attribute but also, by summing up individual values, for a whole category (Kleiber 1998: 63). This overall degree of prototypicality is of importance, insofar as the prototype of a category serves as a cognitive reference point, with which other

members of this category are compared. Also, similarity is evaluated using this point of reference: “A prototype is a typical instance of a category, and other elements are assimilated to the category on the basis of their perceived resemblance to the prototype; there are degrees of membership based on degrees of similarity” (Langacker 1987: 371).

4.2 A semiotic imperative based on prototypical attributes

As the prototype of a category (in terms of an intersection of prototypical attributes) is linked to this very category’s members by virtue of similarity, we can now insert this similarity-based relation into the Peircean sign model. In doing so, an iconic relation between representamen and object can be established on the basis of prototypical attributes and formalized via CV as well. In turn, these prototypical attributes have to be translated into a cybercartographic representamen. As a result the cybercartographic representamen would be similar both to the individual object that it represents (e.g., the apple tree in your garden) and to the accordant categorization (e.g., “tree”); in other words, it would be the representamen of an iconic sign.

As a result of this excursus to prototype theory we can now complete the semiotic imperative of cybercartography that has been outlined above with a measure of similarity: A cybercartographic representamen shall be designed as the correlate of an iconic sign, so that it refers to the object that it denotes by virtue of similarity. The maximum possible similarity between representamen and object is specified through the prototype of the object’s category, whose attributes are to be translated into a concrete representamen according to their CV. The author has already tried to demonstrate how such translation of prototypical attributes into a concrete (cyber)cartographic representamen can be done, in the exemplary case of two contrast categories: tree and shrub (Hruby 2006: 21–24).

5. Summary

We have tried to demonstrate that the Peircean theory of signs offers semiotic fundamentals, which conform to the claims on a general theoretical basis as formulated at the beginning of this essay. This basis can serve to guide multimedia and multisensory design of cybercartographic represen-

tamens, and situates those processes within an interdisciplinary context as well. Moreover, a semiotic imperative of cybercartography provides an opportunity to evaluate cybercartographic, as well as traditional-cartographic (e.g., paper map signs) representamens – both within and beyond itself. These semiotic fundamentals are, on the one hand, applicable to all existing (cyber)cartographic representamens *a posteriori*. On the other hand, semiotics is conceptualized independently of any technology, hence allowing one to hypothesize and carry out both known and unknown technologies of cybercartographic design. In concluding we can reformulate the aforementioned statement of Koch into a reversed relationship of technology and theory, which should be more useful to current and future cybercartography: Undoubtedly semiotic theory is ahead of cybercartographic practice *a priori*.

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Dennis Ioffe

***Homo somatikos* and *Homo ludens* in Russian Modernist life-creation**

Sign-systems and the transgressive “plastic gesture”

The conceptual axis of “life-creation” may be uniquely relevant to Modernist culture in its totality (Schmid 1998; Paperno and Grossman 1994). An interesting creative attitude of a very peculiar character becomes evident during the early developmental stages of historical Russian Modernism. This propensity finds expression in different ways of dealing with one’s personal (life) behaviour in the context of a) Symbolism as the movement of *Decadence*, and b) the Avant-Garde, including Futurists, Konstruktivists, Supremacists and others.

The Russian Symbolist Decadents and their successors in the Avant-Garde were taking further the Western (mostly French and English) existing aesthetical paradigms, landing on the remote shores of what I’d like to term as the “new somatics”, focused on building up the “Homo somatikos” of their own culture.¹ As explicated in the ideas brought about by the nascent Russian Revolution, propagating the notions of “life-building” (*zhisnestroitel'stvo*) that were used in order to facilitate the emergence of a New (Soviet) Man (Paperno and Grossman 1994).

The discussion focused on the Russian decadent “life-creation” may be realized through the available memoirs and accounts composed by various immediate contemporaries of the “decadent milieu” (Ioffe 2007). To my mind, the grotesque eccentricity of these personae conveys a sign-bearing organization in its foundation. This point is demonstrated in the variety of Modernist life-creating and self-fashioning practices. Such behavioural patterns may be described vis-à-vis the semiotic idea of universal “play” as

a fundamental cultural concept (e.g., Johan Huizinga) along with some additional components of Modernist creative activity. We enter here into the realms of the total *theatricality* of performative and theatrical “masks”, the turbulent aesthetics of “private theatre” (as developed by Nikolai Evreinov), and more. Special attention has to be paid to the concept of “aesthetics of life” as understood through the prism of a world taken as a universal playground (Ingold 1981: 36–62).

Symbolism as a historical cultural movement differs in some aspects from the Avant-Garde. Symbolist artists and writers were, in principle, more dependent on the previous cultural milieu, namely Romanticism. One of the major primary figures of Symbolism, Charles Baudelaire, may instantly demonstrate some clear post-Romanticist facets in his personal creative outlook. I'd like to take a step further and propose grasping the entire axis of literary history of Modernity – from the classic English Romanticism of Byron (with some interest in German idealist subjects) and the pre-Romanticism of Goethe till the end of the Avant-Garde – as one mega-unit of cultural habitués (or “habitus”) centered around certain common elements such as “explosion”, “experiment” or “dissatisfaction with the surrounding reality”.

The first genuine and successful endeavours, which *en masse* indicated reforming and modifying human life according to the new intellectual and spiritual assumptions, also originate in the age of Romanticism. In agreement with all major Romantic opinion, the primary concern of the Avant-Garde was to radically extend the boundaries of what was then universally accepted as the norm, which accorded with certain conventional definitions of life, art, and culture. This attitude can be seen as relevant to the many-faced activities of the various groups of intellectuals and artists who were articulating all sorts of radical experiments in their creative activities.

The ideas of Russian “Lebenskunst”, however popular, were not in the same way relevant to just everyone. The complex problem of the aesthetical organisation of life-activity enters the operational spheres of a turbulent “cultural hero” (or “ikon”) and comes to its unique realisation with the milieu of the Russian Silver Age culture. I wish to employ the term “cultural hero” in the sense of referring to any particularly “noticeable” or culturally active personality, who operated within the studied historical milieu. This was the time of a common attention to the “idea of the Self”, and the “individuation: process was irreversible and far-reaching (Siegel

2004). In this epoch – the last decade of the 19th and first two decades of the 20th century, Russia's so-called “Silver Age” – there was an unprecedented interpenetration of social and cultural reality, on the one hand, and the personal biographies and identities of writers and artists on the other (Lavrov 1994: 83–121). In a deliberately conscious way, writers and poets of the period were trying to adapt their lives to already existing models or creating new and original biographies, highly aesthetic “artists’ lives”, both in their own works and in real life. Many of them considered their own lives as actual works of art, dressing in a particular way and changing the place they lived into a kind of “theatrical” stage (Schahadat 2004).

I'd like to approach the semiotic nature of symbolist and avant-garde life-creation in accordance with its most characteristic way of constructing literary texts. This “orderly unification” can be represented by the concept of the “plastic suggestive gesture”,² imbued with abundant innuendo and the productive potential of an impulse used to create novel and unique modernist poetics. Evidently the notion of “plasticheskij zhest” has something in common with the theory of “semantic gesture” as developed in the Prague Linguistic Circle in the thirties. I'm referring here to the basic notion of life or “event of life” understood as “text” and imbued with the relevant sign-operation (Ricoeur 1973: 91–117).

In the context of the notion of the “plastic gesture”, two protagonists of Russian modernism in general and of symbolism in particular, deserve special attention – Alexander Blok and Andrei Bely. The former carries on the romantic tradition (much in the way Charles Baudelaire was a romanticist while at the same time being an important part of a modernist canon). The latter – Andrei Bely – already anticipates (and, in many ways, transcends) the tell-tale achievements of the historical avant-garde; his prose is often almost more radical than that of the majority of the proclaimed avant-garde writers – consider, for instance, his works *Glossolalia*, *The Christened Chinaman*, *Kotik Letaev*, and *Masks*, to name but a few (Lavrov 1994: 83–85). It cannot be denied, however, that both belong wholly to the Russian symbolist literary canon, and specifically to its so-called “younger generation”. Especially characteristic of the works of these two authors is the semiotically rich, “plastic gesture” that transcends traditional textual boundaries.

In his scholarly essay “A Semiotic Radical of Blok's Semantics”, the American Slavist, Savely Senderovich, writes:

A sign is viewed as a gesture, resulting in three corollaries with major semantic significance. First, it is produced by a persona, and not necessarily a human one: it can be an esoteric, mystical entity perceived as a person or personified as an element... This means that a sign is seen as the means of a living, active communicational strategy. Second, the sign has a dynamic character – it appears and vanishes, one needs to wait for it patiently and grasp it; its existence is closely associated with time, often as brief as a moment. Third, it exists in the visual modality – all the characteristics of its appearance are visual. In this sense, a sign is the opposite of a spoken word and is akin to a *pregnant silence*.... (Senderovich 1984: 307)

Senderovich aptly points out that Blok often rhymes *znak* – “sign” – with *zлак* – “grain”. This Slavic scholar from Cornell University notices that:

As we can see, *maki* (poppies) and *zlaki* (grains) are not at all interchangeable – for one thing, they belong in different contexts: poppies are being set aflame (beginning to bloom), while grains wilt (die down). This pair of motifs reveals one of the inner dualities of Blok’s “sign”: its ability to both provide a subtle reference to some ancient secret and to aggressively impose dreadful apocalyptic revelations. Nevertheless, even in the latter function the sign retains its mysterious esoteric character: “*Not everyone was reading / The signs at dawn*”. In general, no two signs are alike: while sharing many other common features, signs can play two roles, as though oscillating between the two. Changing the motifs (*maki* – *zlaki*) within a single semantic paradigm means a partial change in the semantic functions: different situations call for different elements of the paradigm. (Ibid.: 308)

It is important to stress here the crucial role of “sign” in Blok’s texts as a *sui generis*, self-sufficient, and independently acting “character”. Especially important is its plasticity, its transcendent capacity to belong in “two worlds”, and its overall existential ambivalence. The inner dichotomy of a symbolic literary gesture as “sign” is vividly represented in Blok’s verbal texts (Minc 2004: 97–98).

The Moscow-Tartu school of semiotics was particularly interested in the sign-systems of the cultural “text of behaviour” (Lotman 1992–1993: 300–319; Lotman 1992–1993a: 369–378). This topic of Russian cultural history may include studies of creative personal behaviour and its possible semiotic ambiance. The analysis of cultural sign-systems explicates the creative patterns of personal, “bodily” conduct belonging to the different cultural

icons of the entire epoch.³ The Tartu-based scientific school, which originated under the guidance of Yuri M. Lotman, gave to this initial impulse the most adequate scholarly understanding of the relevant sign-structures and hidden meanings dwelling within the pragmatics of authorial behaviour. Lotman suggests dealing with a person's "cultural biography" as if it were a common sign-system, a text *sui generis* (1992–1993-a: 369–378). By coming to terms with this historical phenomenon, only certain specific considerations can be formulated with regard to unique cultural types, such as codes of conduct, reputation, and the writer's biography. All these characteristics are bound by their direct relation to the way the creative construction of the author's personal image is being achieved (self-built). These various creative "literary masks" were very popular among these layers of Russian writers and artists (Schahadat 2005; Rippl 1999).

In her short but important pioneering work "The Idea of Text and Symbolist Aesthetics", Zara Mintz writes:

1. Ideas on the nature of the literary text occupy a special place in the views and work of the Russian symbolists ... Reality itself is given the properties of a literary text. 2. The universal Text is realized in the "texts of life" and the "artistic texts." The Unity of the Text is juxtaposed with the infinite number of its particular manifestations. This has much to do with the deeper particularities of the symbolist worldview as a whole. The Symbolist "picture of the world" is always constructed from two divergent tendencies. One consists of the establishment of a system of antitheses, organizing the world in terms of space, value, and so on, while the other is directed at reconciling opposites and establishing a universal isomorphism among all of the phenomena of life ("the world is full of correlations" – A. Blok)... Finally, it is this very conception of the world as an "art-like" text that explains the origin of the symbolist idea of "life-building". The "idea of life-building" combines naïve utopianism with the pathos of the harmonious persona, historicism, and the "preservation of culture".... (Mintz 2004: 98–99)

The philosophy of life-creation, understood in the broader historical sense as "the art of living" (lifestyle), has been discussed in a series of works by the Berlin philosopher Wilhelm Schmidt (1998). The semiotics of some peculiar forms of "masked-behaviour" will frame my discussion of Modernist authorial *Lebenskunst*. One theoretical text by Lotman and Piatigorsky, devoted to the problem of sign-mechanisms in culture (1971:

144–165), has described the primary semiotic rules responsible for management of paradigmatical cultural fashions and corresponding behavioural multi-functions. The degree of operational semiosis may vary considerably among the self-conscious individuals, being engaged in the aesthetic creation of their specific life-texts:

When we speak of the semiotics of behaviour we should have in mind, on the one hand, some creation of a “behavioural text”, which functions as a meaningful sign in relation to any other text, or, on the other hand, gives thoughtful recognition of certain empirical phenomena (of our environment) as sign-constructions. This particularly pertains to some conventional sign-system or to any separate reality that in its turn determines the concrete meaning of these phenomena. In each case, we are entitled to speak, respectively, about the two models of semiotic behaviour: pro-creational and analytical. In both types the semiotics of behaviour might vary considerably among the different living personalities. (Ibid.)

The semiotic nature of one’s behaviour depends, therefore, on the culturally-suggestive way this type of text is perceived by much of the potential audience related to the cultural hero. In the real time of this concretely-happening behaviour, the reception and perception turn out to be possibly as meaningful as is the “embodied action” itself. The way the mask was perceived by its audience is equally important as the author’s original personal intention. The principal point, accordingly, is whether the mask and its creator could in fact be perceived adequately and correctly. And here arises the problem of myth and mask types of consciousness with respect to semiotics.

Lotman and Piatigorsky would go so far as to argue that the self-appearance of each concrete authorial/masked deed (event or action) will be dependent upon the way this individual perceives his I-image and how he is engaged in the self-modeling process of mask-creation. Lotman and Piatigorsky give a good deal of thought to the importance of “mask-conscience” for any process of self-communication of the author and his environments. This particular point might be visualised with the scholars’ own terms, making the idea of “outer-perception” crucially important, elucidating the point of reaching the correct attitude of his/her contemporaries toward the masked-personality:

Evidently, the major characteristics of different types of behaviour are controlled by a distinctive dependence on a concrete individual. It is also evident that the self-understanding, i.e. the comprehending of one's very "I", is determining the general sphere where all the areas of analytical behaviour and, moreover, the generation of this behaviour are cross-meeting and complementing one another. ... The degree of self-awareness may vary considerably from the point of view of a third observer and that of the second or the first. The semiotical nature of this process of the virtual construction of the 'I'-image gives its foremost explication in the problem of personal mask. (Lotman & Piatigorsky 1971: 147–150).

The heterogeneous nature of mask-issue could be crucial to a proper understanding of the inner essence of Russian life-creation subjects. The *duality* of the mask and its complex archaic structure should be named in connection with the mystificational interests of some of the Russian cultural heroes of the Silver Age.

The importance of an indigenous mask rests on how the person's solid self-image can thereby be created: "Evidently, the 'mask' is needed to an individual, first of all, in order to create the sufficient image of its own 'I' in the communication with the Others. The 'mask' is, therefore, depicted as some sort of stabilized static appearance hiding all the ever-lasting changes of the core-'I'. This process resembles the stability of archaic ritual that received its form in all the magnitude of its performing history. Such a ritual and its masks can be seen as a stabilizing element in human society that is regulating all the outer forms of the behaviour of a person inside the community" (ibid.).

This suggestive notion of personal (archaic) mask could be relevant for dealing with Lotman's seminal article, "The Russian Poet-Decembrist in His Everyday Life (1992–1993: 300–319)". This scholarly text presents central considerations with regard to the complex relations postulated between the life-text of the deed (*postupok*) and that of "the implied author". Lotman's analysis provides a basic research framework to analyze many meaningful elements in one's personal behaviour and the way they constitute the case-study for any *Lebenskunst* scholarly effort. Lotman focuses on one of the great Russian poets, Alexander Pushkin, his personal myth and the "private-biography", myth-creating agendas. In the actual behaviour of human beings, the so-called texts of conduct may remain eternally unfinished. He illustrates this further:

The hierarchy of many meaningful elements of behaviour is creating some sort of a *sequence*: the artistic gesture → the action → the text of behaviour. The latter should be understood as a complete chain of the “conscious actions” that is made evident by means of the intention and the palpable result. In the real behaviour of people, the complex and artificially controlled universe of empirical being, these ‘texts of behaviour’ may remain eternally unfinished, transcend their boundaries to merge with some adjacent texts, intersperse with the parallel entities. ... they always, necessarily comprise a sensible and understandable narratives (*sjuzhety*) ready to human perception. ... Every text of behaviour corresponds to a specific “behavioural program” on the level of intentions. (1992–1993: 301–303)

With this theorizing by Lotman comes the important idea of a certain mental gesture (a concept that deserves special attention). Tartu scholars utilize it in cultural sciences to understand the initial state for any cultural event and, in turn, the behavioural text. Possible uses of these ideas (“cultural event” and “artistic gesture”) will be shown in the coming chapters. For the appropriate *sjuzhet* (story or plot) of a person’s self-fashioning is behaviour. Its ideal horizon exists on the background; its farthest *finalizing*, as Lotman takes this point, comes to be crucial for the human behaviour concept and understanding. By “finalizing” I refer to particular notions developed by Lotman’s elder contemporary Mikhail M. Bakhtin – the Russian cultural theorist who had spoken at length on the “non-finishableness” of great works of fiction.

Crucial to any adequate research description used for cultural texts is the virtual opposition between the genre-modules of myth and narrative, a problem not neglected by the structuralists of the Moscow-Tartu school. Yuri Lotman and Boris Uspensky (1972: 282–284) devoted much attention to this topic when they defined this opposition as “descriptive vs mythological”. By “descriptive” they mean the so-called meta-language (such as Modernist experimental literature-about-literature), whereas the “mythological” (in addition to its meta-textual function) was intended to designate some other *text* dealing with the same object by certain auxiliary means: “In the first case [the descriptive account] we have a reference to the meta-language, to its specific category or a concrete element of its structure. In the second case [the mythological account] we have a reference to a meta-text, i.e. a text which operates according to meta-linguistic function. ... Therefore, a mythological description has a mono-linguistic nature, in

principle; the objects and subjects of this system are described via the same system, which is built according to the same rules” (1972: 283).

Reflecting on these notions, the founders of the Moscow Tartu School postulated the mono-linguistic character of a primary, mythological narrative, which laid the foundation for many further scientific elaborations of aesthetic or “creational” philosophies of culture or art. The Moscow-Tartu semiologists insisted on a peculiar “poly-linguistic” character of the non-mythological variants of any narrative description and its direct relation to the idea of a mere technical translation, whereby the transformation process of that sort may be further utilized as a variety of semiotic unfolding for the different, subsequent debates that would deal with the literary, “mythopoetical” descriptions of creative and playful texts of behaviour, which were realized by the physical bodies of their authors.

Notes

- * All English translations in this paper were made by the author.
- 1. On the concept of *homo somatikos*, see Bykhovskaia 2000.
- 2. This notion is partly dependent on the Prague-Circle concept of the “semantic gesture”. See the exhaustive description of it undertaken by Kees Mercks (1986 [2006]).
- 3. For an overview of supplementary approaches, see Bachmann-Medick Doris (ed.) (1996).

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Maria Jodłowiec

Relevance and misunderstanding

1. Introduction

Relevance theory was originally developed by Sperber and Wilson in 1986 and then revised in 1995 and refined in further work by its originators (cf., among others, Sperber and Wilson 1987, 1997, 2002; Wilson 1999, 2004; Wilson and Sperber 2002, 2004) and by other researchers of similar orientation (e.g., Carston 2002, 2004a, 2004b, 2005; Wharton 2003; Žegarac 2006). The main goal of the present paper is to show how relevance theory can be used to account for misinterpretation of the speaker's meaning, in other words, for misunderstanding.

2. Relevance theory: A cognitively-rooted model of ostensive communication

Relevance theory, which models human overt and intentional (ostensive) communication, is rooted in observations about how human beings function, how they interact with the environment and how, from the stimuli that constantly bombard the organism, they select those that are potentially worthy of attention (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 46–48). The originators of the theory assume that the long-term goal of the human cognitive system is to understand the outside world. Since the human senses are capable of monitoring significantly more stimuli than the central cognitive processes can deal with, it is only to be expected that some sort of cognitive efficiency mechanism must be at play. It is believed that cognitive resources “have to be allocated to the processing of information which is likely to bring about the greatest contribution to the mind's general cognitive goals” (ibid.: 48). Sperber and Wilson convincingly argue that, “As a result of constant selection pressures toward increasing efficiency, the

human cognitive system has developed in such a way that our perceptual mechanisms tend automatically to pick out potentially relevant stimuli, our memory retrieval mechanisms tend automatically to activate potentially relevant assumptions, and our inferential mechanisms tend spontaneously to process them in the most productive way” (Wilson and Sperber 2004: 610).

Based on this assumption, researchers postulate the existence of an in-built mechanism of cognitive efficiency, which they define as the Cognitive Principle of Relevance. The latter states that “human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance” (*ibid.*).

Human cognition tends to be relevance-oriented, since in ostensive communication the communicator claims the addressee’s attention and creates certain expectations concerning relevance in the receiver of the message. This is formalised within the relevance-theoretic approach as the Communicative Principle of Relevance: “every utterance conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance” (Wilson and Sperber 2002: 604). As Wilson (2005: 40) contends, while explaining the mechanisms underlying oral communicative exchanges, “the speaker, by the very act of addressing someone, communicates that her utterance is the most relevant one compatible with her abilities and preferences, and [that it] is at least relevant enough to be worth [the hearer’s] processing effort.” This is precisely how the presumption of optimal relevance is defined (see, also, Wilson and Sperber 2004: 612).

On this model, communication is viewed as an interaction involving two information-processing devices, one of which modifies the cognitive environment of the other, which results in the addressee constructing mental representations similar to those of the communicator (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 1). Every ostensive stimulus, that is to say, a stimulus produced in overt intentional communication, is postulated to provide evidence for the meaning that the communicator is trying to convey. This suggests that the communicator’s meaning cannot just be decoded but must be inferred from what has been said through a highly context-dependent, inferential process of comprehension. Restricting the scope of the present analysis to verbal communication only, it should be noted that, according to relevance-theoretic theory, an utterance that the speaker has produced is assumed to initiate the interpretation process. The latter is postulated by Sperber and Wilson (2005) to be constrained, on the one

hand, by the search for relevance and, on the other, by the communicative intention that the hearer attributes to the speaker in a given communicative context (see, also, Ariel 2002; Hamblin and Gibbs 2003; Sperber 1994; Wilson 1999).

The Communicative Principle of Relevance and the presumption of optimal relevance provide the heuristic backbone of utterance comprehension. It instructs the interpreter to “(a) follow a path of least effort in constructing an interpretation of the utterance (and in particular in resolving ambiguities and referential indeterminacies, in going beyond linguistic meaning, in supplying contextual assumptions, computing implicatures, etc.); [and] (b) stop when [the interpreter’s] expectations of relevance are satisfied”, or, we might add, abandoned (Sperber and Wilson 2005: 360). In simple terms, this heuristic mandate directs the comprehender to choose the least costly route in recovering the interpretation which he finds sufficiently relevant and which accords with his assumption that the utterance is to be recognised as optimally relevant. Of, the speaker may, for various reasons, fail to be optimally relevant; the point is that the interpreter is *to treat* the utterance as tagged with a guarantee of optimal relevance (*ibid.*). This means that hearers, constrained by considerations of relevance in their search for the speaker-intended meaning, are justified in applying the least-effort principle in interpreting the linguistic input, and in testing interpretive hypotheses in the order of accessibility. The first interpretive hypothesis that is found optimally relevant in a given communicative exchange is assumed to be the one intended by the communicator, to the exclusion of other potential interpretations of the processed utterance (cf. Žegarac 2006: 1703).

3. Predicting and explaining misunderstanding along relevance-theoretic lines

An utterance, as produced by the speaker, severely underdetermines what is actually being communicated (cf. Ariel 2002; Bach 2004; Carston 2002, 2004a; Jucker et al. 2003; Nerlich and Clarke 2001; Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1997, 2002, 2005, 2006; Wilson 2006; Vicente and Martinez-Manrique 2005; Žegarac 2006). Thus, the hearer’s task necessarily has to do with “fleshing out” the semantic skeleton that is recovered as a result of linguistic decoding. This means that recovering the meaning as intended

by the speaker, which starts with decoding the linguistically encoded meaning (cf. Carston 2006), usually involves a number of inferential, relevance-constrained subtasks that the hearer needs to perform. These, as the originators of relevance theory point out, can be broken down into: (a) constructing an adequate hypothesis about the explicit meaning via decoding, disambiguation, reference resolution, pragmatic force assignment and other pragmatic enrichment processes; (b) formulating an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual assumptions; and (c) forming an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual implications (Wilson and Sperber 2004: 615). These are all pragmatically-motivated inferential processes, which are believed to be happening in parallel as the on-line comprehension process is being performed, and which are postulated to be automatic and unconscious (Sperber and Wilson 2005: 366).

This kind of approach to comprehension makes it possible to predict and explain what happens when communication is not successful, or in other words, when there is “a mismatch between the speaker’s intended meaning and the hearer’s understanding of this meaning in the particular context of interaction” (Tzanne 2000: 34). At each level of interpretation, whether that of recovering the explicit meaning, that of formulating contextual assumptions, or that of formulating implications, the first interpretation found relevant by the interpreter may depart from the meaning intended by the communicator. To illustrate how relevance theory explains the mechanisms underlying misunderstanding, let us analyse an example. Here is an allegedly true exchange between a journalist and a famous American basketball player, Shaquille O’Neil, in which the misunderstanding is quite easy to trace:

1. (a) Reporter: “Did you get to visit the Parthenon while in Greece?”
- (b) Shaquille O’Neil: “I’m not sure about that one ... we went to lots of nightclubs.”

The locus of misunderstanding in the reporter’s question is *the Parthenon*, which in the context of visiting Greece seems unambiguously to refer to the ruins of the famous temple in Athens. That is the kind of interpretation one might expect to be the most highly accessible in the context. To be more exact, relevance theory predicts that the words, as decoded by the hearer processing this (as well as any other) utterance, afford access to background knowledge stored under particular conceptual addresses in

the individual's mind, making it possible for the interpreter to create a context of background assumptions in which a given utterance can be processed. In the context of the most accessible contextual assumptions that the co-text makes highly predictable, the hearer is trusted to identify *the Parthenon* as Athena's Temple on the Acropolis. A relevance-guided interpretation process of (1a) has been schematically represented in Table 1.

The reporter has asked, "Did you get to visit the Parthenon while in Greece?"	The encoded (incomplete) logical form of the speaker's utterance gets embedded into a description of his overt intentional behaviour.
The reporter's question is optimally relevant to Shaquille O'Neil.	The presumption of relevance conveyed by any stimulus produced in overt intentional communication (here: the reporter's verbal behaviour) results in the creation of this expectation.
(c) The reporter's question achieves relevance as a request for information about whether Shaquille O'Neil visited the Parthenon while in Greece.	Expectation raised by (1a), which is most relevant in the context of the interview.
(d) If the question is about visiting the Parthenon, it is about visiting a particular nightclub while in Greece.	First assumption accessible to Shaquille O'Neil; it, together with other adequate premises (e.g., background knowledge about questions reporters ask), satisfies expectation (c), an implicit contextual assumption that Shaquille O'Neil forms.
(e) THE REPORTER HAS ASKED WHETHER SHAQUILLE O'NEIL VISITED THE PARTHENON, NIGHTCLUB WHILE IN GREECE.	First pragmatic enrichment of the logical form of (1a) to have been made by Shaquille O'Neil, which together with premise (d) will lead to the satisfaction of (c). Treated as explication of the reporter's utterance.

Table 1. Schematic relevance-theoretic utterance interpretation process of (1a).

In this example, the culprit was the meaning of the noun phrase *the Parthenon* wrongly understood in the context of the most accessible contextual assumptions brought to bear in the interpretation process by the addressee of the question. The speaker expected the hearer to have accessed

the “Athena’s Temple” reading of the phrase as the most accessible one, and Shaquille O’Neil’s unexpected interpretation gave rise to a humorous outcome.

Another case of misunderstanding, this one from an episode in President Roosevelt’s life, can be explained in a similar way along relevance-theoretic lines.

2. When a fire erupted in the hotel at which Vice President Teddy Roosevelt was staying one day, he was ordered to head down to the lobby along with the other guests. After some time, still unable to return to his room, he protested to a hotel official. “But I’m the vice president!” he exclaimed. “Oh, that’s different”, the man replied, allowing Roosevelt to pass. As he headed up the stairs, however, the other man started after him. “Wait a minute”, he called. “What are you vice president of?” “Why, of the United States, of course”, Roosevelt replied. “Then get the hell back down there”, the official cried. “I thought you were vice president of the hotel!”

In the context of the background assumptions most accessible to the hotel official, *Vice President* is interpreted to mean “the hotel’s vice president.”

Here is another example of misunderstanding borrowed, from Tzanne’s (2000: 63) book. Anderson and McKendrick are academics talking about how McKendrick’s paper was received at the conference at which papers were simultaneously translated for the audience:

3. (a) Anderson: “Was your paper well received?”
- (b) McKendrick: “No, they didn’t get it. I could guess from the questions that there’d been some kind of communications failure.”
- (c) Anderson: “Translation phones?”
- (d) McKendrick: “No, no. They simply did not understand the line of argument.”

Let us focus on the part of McKendrick’s discourse that creates the problems. Analysing the pivot of misunderstanding with the tools that relevance theory provides, we get the following schematic interpretation:

McKendrick has said, “there had been some kind of communications failure.”	The encoded (incomplete) logical form of McKendrick’s utterance gets embedded into a description of McKendrick’s overt intentional behaviour.
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(b) McKendrick's utterance is optimally relevant to Anderson.	<i>The presumption of relevance conveyed by any stimulus produced in overt intentional communication (here: McKendrick's verbal behaviour) results in this expectation.</i>
(c) McKendrick's utterance will achieve relevance by answering Anderson's question about how Anderson's paper was received by the audience at the conference that Anderson and McKendrick are attending..	Expectation raised by (b) and the fact that such an answer would be most relevant to Anderson in this exchange.
(d) If McKendrick claims there were some communications problems that the audience had with understanding McKendrick's paper, then as the papers are being simultaneously translated, the reception through the headphones must have been poor.	First assumption to be accessible to Anderson, which, together with other adequate premises, might satisfy expectation (c). Treated as an implicit premise of McKendrick's utterance.
(e) MCKENDRICK CLAIMS THERE WERE COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS THAT THE AUDIENCE AT THE CONFERENCE HAD WITH UNDERSTANDING MCKENDRICK'S PAPER.	First pragmatic enrichment of the logical form of (3b) to have been made by Anderson, which together with premise (d) will lead to the satisfaction of (c). Treated as explication of McKendrick's utterance.
(f) The reception through the headphones must have been poor.	<i>Inferred from (d) and (e), meeting expectation (c); accepted as an implicit conclusion of McKendrick's utterance (3b).</i>

Table 2. Schematic model of interpretation of the pivot of misunderstanding in (3b).

In this way, the analytic tools that relevance theory provides seem to offer a credible explanation of how the misunderstanding has arisen.

It should be emphasised, however, that relevance theory can not only explain in an *ex post facto* manner how misunderstandings originate; it can predict where they are likely to arise. Since interpretation is postulated to involve a non-demonstrative inferential process of bridging the gap between what is said and what is actually communicated (cf. Sperber and Wilson 1996: 65–71, 81–83), a mismatch can easily occur, between the

contextual assumptions that the interpreter uses in the process of following the least-effort path in recovering the speaker's meaning and those that the speaker intends the hearer to access (cf. Mason 2006). Sometimes this mismatch may not even be traced by the participants in the exchange, and the speaker and hearer may not be aware of the misunderstanding that has taken place. On other occasions, the discourse that follows or the situational clues (e.g., the behaviour of the interlocutor) may lead to discovery of the communication problem. This brings us to another, not yet attested example.

4. (a) A: "Did you enjoy the talk?"
 (b) B: "The talk was about relevance theory."

If question (4a) is answered as in (4b), then (4b) can potentially mean: "Yes, B enjoyed the talk" or "No, B did not enjoy the talk", depending on the background assumptions by which the interpreter of (4b) can be assumed to process the utterance.

4. *Conclusion*

Relevance theory provides a viable framework to account for how interpreters recover the communicator's meaning in overt intentional communication and what happens when communication is unsuccessful. In this frame, utterance interpretation is a highly context-dependent inferential process in which the hearer treats the utterance as evidence of the speaker's meaning, and the relevance-guided search for this meaning forms interpretive hypotheses in the order of accessibility. The first one found to conform to the hearer's expectations of relevance is treated as the intended interpretation.

Most of the time communicators accurately predict the interpretation first accessed in accordance with relevance-guided heuristics and found relevant enough by the interpreter. But there are cases when there is a mismatch between what the speaker thought would be the optimally relevant reading and what the hearer actually accesses as the relevant interpretation. This gives rise to misunderstandings, which can be neatly explained with the help of the analytic tools that relevance theory provides (for instance, Yus 1998). A number of authors have applied the relevance-theoretic apparatus to study different kinds of misunderstanding (cf. online bibliogra-

phy, <http://www.ua.es/personal/francisco.yus/rt.html>), focusing mainly on reasons for pragma-linguistic failure. The present contribution provides an analysis of misunderstanding from the on-line utterance interpretation perspective. As I have tried to emphasise, the framework under discussion has substantial explanatory power, since it can predict under what circumstances misinterpretation of the intended meaning is likely to occur. Relevance theory may thus be worth the while of not only pragma-linguists but also semioticians studying various aspects of human communication.

It needs to be pointed out that the mechanisms postulated for the relevance-theoretic approach have been confirmed by empirical tests (e.g., van der Henst et al. 2002; van der Henst and Sperber 2004). Moreover, relevance theory provides a homogeneous framework, based on a set of psychologically plausible reasoning principles (cf. Wedgwood [forthcoming]). These have already been used, in my estimation successfully, to investigate and elucidate a diverse and multifaceted range of phenomena, such as literal, loose, figurative, poetic, ironic, humorous, and phatic uses of language.

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Enhancing signal strength in later life through technology

1. Background

This paper uses semiotic theory as a framework for exploring how older adults can enhance their social impact and life space by using technology in communication (Eco 1976; Sebeok 1991). We explore access to technology among 490 elder persons living in urban, community-dwelling settings. We consider the extent and types of technology use by those aged persons with access to cell phones, computers, and the Internet. We examine attitudes held by members of our elderly sample toward technology, and particularly toward computer use. Finally, we consider demographic and attitudinal predictors of communication technology use in our sample. Our research is anchored in a theoretical framework of proactive adaptation as antecedent to successful aging (Kahana & Kahana 2003; Kahana, Kahana & Kercher 2003). In this paradigm, technology usage is discussed as an emergent option for proactive adaptation. Taking initiatives to address normative stressors of aging older adults can help ameliorate the adverse effects of stressors on their social and psychological quality of life.

Semiotics is the study of signs and signaling. Anchored in philosophy and communication science, including linguistics, it helps elucidate how individuals may emit different “signal-strengths” based on their internalized perception of the way they are viewed by others (Mead 1976; Eco 1976). As the reach of semiotics has expanded, graphic signs, verbal signs, and computer technology based signs have been increasingly studied in a semiotic framework. However, attention has only recently been directed to the impact of technology in general, and computers in particular, on

the lives of real human beings (Andersen 1990). Humanistic research in information technology is particularly salient to social groups who may be at a disadvantage in “signal strength” based on personal disabilities, social position, or lack of attention by others to the signals they communicate (Eco 1976).

As more individuals live to a very old age, diminished abilities to communicate can pose a problem, especially in cultures that value youth and vitality (Charness & Holley 2004). Age related sensory, cognitive, and motor declines have been established (Salhouse 2000). Changes in physical appearance, loss of memory, and visual/hearing decrements can place older adults at a disadvantage in signaling others, both practically and symbolically. Negative attitudes toward the aged have been based on cultural stereotypes (Palmore 1990). Ageism has been a powerful social force that has served to rob older adults of meaningful social roles, and to minimize contributions of senior citizens to society at large (Butler 1975). There have been few attempts thus far to integrate insights of semiotic inquiry with understanding of challenges faced by aged members of our society (Combe & Schmader 1999). Semiotics affords a new prism for considering weaker signals emitted by the aged on the one hand, and on the other, opportunities to compensate for real or socially constructed diminution of late life “signal strength”.

Semiotics is generally associated with deriving meaning through narratives (Tarasti 2000). Although in this paper we consider technology use in late life from a quantitative perspective, the narrative story of an encounter with one aged respondent in our study illustrates the complex processes whereby technology can serve to transform not only the signal strength but also the presentation of self by the aged and their image in the eyes of others.

After a public lecture given by the lead researcher of this study, a frail elderly lady approached the speaker. She noted, in a halting voice, that she had been a respondent in the study of adaptation to frailty conducted by the researcher’s team. She stated that she had recently been interviewed by a very personable interviewer and noted apologetically, “At my age, I can’t remember her name.” The researcher tried to reassure the aged woman that remembering names is not very important and indicated that she appreciated the elderly woman taking the trouble to attend the lecture. The woman retorted, “Oh my, but it’s important that I tell you about this

fine interviewer.” She reached into her purse, pulled out her Palm Pilot and triumphantly announced the name of the interviewer, along with the date and time of the interview. The image of the old woman was instantly transformed in the eyes of the surprised researcher from that of a frail octogenarian to a vibrant and feisty informant about the competence of the research staff. We can thus view technology as a ticket to independence, personal control, positive self-image, and enhanced quality of life, when it reflects proactive initiatives by older adults (Kahana & Kahana 2003).

Our study explores the use of technologies (e.g., computers and cell phones) that have the potential to open avenues to information for older adults, and enhance their communication and semiotic impact on others. We hypothesize that older adults who hold more positive attitudes toward new technologies, those who are more educated, and who have greater social resources to support access and use of technology, will be more likely to use technology in managing their daily lives (Cotton 2001). Educational background has been shown, in prior studies, to be the single most important factor facilitating the embracing of proactive technology use by older adults (White et al. 1999). Fear of new technologies and negative attitudes about technology have been considered as major impediments to adopting new technologies in later life (Czaja & Sharit 1998).

2. *Methods*

2.1. Sample

Data for this research were collected in 2005 as part of the fourth wave of the Cleveland Health Maintenance Study (CHMS), an ongoing panel study which focuses on late-life adaptation of urban community dwelling elderly persons residing in Cleveland, Ohio (Kahana & Kahana 2003; McDonald & Wykle 2003). Baseline data collection occurred in 1998, and respondents have been interviewed via face-to-face interviews every two years since then. Concerns relating to missing data are minimized owing to the strong commitment of study respondents to remain actively involved in the study. As such, rates of missing data range between 1–3 percent. For the current cross-sectional study, a sample of 490 respondents, age 65 or older was utilized.

Table 1 summarizes sample characteristics. The mean age of the sample is 77 years (SD=7.3). Respondents were predominately female (57.5%),

married (74.6%), Caucasian (81.6%) and relatively well educated, with 62.8% having completed one to two years of college or more.

		Category	N (%)
Demographic Characteristics			
Age in years			Mean 77.1 (7.3)SD
Gender	Male		208 (42.5)
	Female		282 (57.5)
Ethnicity	White		395 (81.6)
	African American		80 (16.5)
	Other		9 (1.9)
Education	High school graduate or less		181 (37.2)
	Some college/technical training		115 (23.6)
	College graduate/Postgraduate		191 (39.2)
Marital Status	Married/Remarried		365 (74.6)
	Widowed		89 (18.2)
	Not married		35 (7.2)
Access to Technology			
Owns a computer			295 (65.7)
Access to a computer			328 (70.2)
Subscribes to Internet service*			220 (84.3)
Access to Internet			247 (67.7)
Owns a cell phone			260 (53.2)
Frequency of Technology Use			
Computer*	Less than once per week		24 (9.1)
	Once per week or more		188 (71.5)
Internet*	Less than once per week		20 (8.2)
	Once per week or more		163 (66.5)
E-mail*	Less than once per week		18 (8.5)
	Once per week or more		154 (72.6)
Cell phone*	Less than once per week		88 (35.9)
	Once per week or more		143 (58.4)

*: indicates subsample of total users of access to technology

^a: Percentages do not include missing responses

Table 1. Sample description (N=490).^a

2.2 Measures

2.2.1. Access to Technology and Technology Use. Access to technology was measured as a binary response (yes=1, no=0) to the following questions: “Do you own a cell phone?”, “Do you own a computer?”, “Do you have access to a computer?”, and “Do you have access to the Internet?”. Technology use was measured with a 5-point scale in response to the following questions: “How often do you use a computer?”, “How often do you use the Internet”, and “How often do you use email”. Response categories ranged from never (0) to daily (4).

2.2.2. Demographic and Attitudinal Predictors of Access to Technology and Use. Demographic characteristics such as respondent's age, gender, race, education, and marital status were included in the analyses as potential predictors of ownership and access to technology and frequency using technology.

Attitudes toward technology were measured as a 5-point scale response to the following questions: "Computers do not scare me", "Feel at ease in computer class", "Feel comfortable working with a computer", and "Computers make me feel uneasy and confused". Response categories ranging from strongly disagree (5) to strongly agree (1). A scale summing these four items was created and had a reliability of .85.

2.3. Analysis

To address our research questions, bivariate analyses were conducted using t-tests for continuous variables and chi-square tests for categorical variables. The analysis was then extended to multivariate regression to determine the relative influence of demographic characteristics and attitudes towards technology on two key outcome variables: access to technology and frequency of technology use. The former, a series of binary variables, was estimated with a logistic regression and the latter, an ordinal variable, was estimated with ordered logistic regression.

Each domain of technology was estimated separately with a binary variable indicating whether or not the older adult had access to a given type of technology (1 = yes; 0 = no). We then estimated the frequency of technology use across four selected domains with ordered logistic regression. Each of these four domains was classified into three categories (0 = never, 1 = less than once per week, 2 = once per week or more). All analyses were conducted using SAS software Version 9.1.

3. Results

3.1. Descriptive results

A majority of respondents owned a cell phone (53.2%) or a computer (65.7%) and 70.2% reported having access to a computer. Just over two-thirds (67.7%) said they had access to the Internet. Frequent use of cell phones and computers was a relatively common activity for respondents in

the sample. For example, 58.4% used their cell phones and 71.9% used their computers on a weekly or daily basis.

Table 2 summarizes the types of Internet use in the study sample. Exchanging emails and using the Internet were at least weekly occurrences for a majority of computer users. For Internet users, the most common information-seeking activity reported was to keep abreast of current events, sports, and weather conditions (41.0%), followed by searching for health-related information (35.6%), and checking product or financial information (31.4% and 27.2%, respectively). Frequent practical uses of the computer included playing computer games (37.2%) and making travel reservations (33.1%).

Type of Use	Frequency	Percent
Information Seeking		
News, Sports, or Weather Information	98	41.0
Health/Medicine Information	85	35.6
Product Information	75	31.4
Financial Information	65	27.2
Community Services Information	50	20.9
Government/Other Organization Information	48	20.1
Legal Information	21	8.8
Email (at least weekly)		
With Adult Children	119	56.7
With Friends	110	52.1
With Business Associates	44	27.8
With Grandchildren	49	26.6
Practical Applications		
Gaming	89	37.2
Travel Reservations	79	33.1
Library Searches	52	21.8
Bill Payment/Online Banking	32	13.4
Discussion Groups	11	4.6
Grocery Delivery	6	2.5
Support Groups	2	0.8

*Subsample of people who had access to the Internet

Table 2. Types of Internet use (N=247).*

Of those older adults who had access to the Internet, email communication was prevalent. The majority reported email correspondence with adult children (56.7%) and friends (52.1%), followed by business associates (27.8%) and grandchildren (26.6%).

Descriptive data regarding attitudes toward computers and learning to use technology revealed that most respondents do not fear technology, and would feel comfortable learning more about computers. Accordingly, 41.5% strongly agreed that computers do not scare them, and 47.5% strongly agreed that they would feel comfortable in a computer class. The mean score on the attitude toward technology scale was 7.3 with a range of 0 to 19, where lower scores reflected more positive attitudes.

3.2. Multivariate results

Demographic characteristics and attitudes towards technology were found to be statistically significant predictors ($p < 0.05$) for all the five binary indicators of access to technology (yes or no), and for all four indicators of frequency of technology use. In summary, greater access to technology and more frequent use of technology was associated with younger age (among these respondents aged 65 or older), those who were single, those who were white, those with more education, and those who had positive attitudes towards technology.

As to the multivariate logistic regression predicting access to each domain of technology separately: higher education, younger age, and more positive attitude towards technology was statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) for all five items that measured access to technology. Being single, other than widowed, was found to be a significant predictor ($p < 0.05$) for three of the five indicators of access to technology (owns a computer, owns a cell phone, has access to Internet).

Finally, we estimated ordered logistic regression models predicting frequency of use for each of four different types of technology. We found that positive attitude towards technology was a statistically significant predictor ($p < 0.05$) for three of the four indicators of frequent technology use (computer use, Internet use, and email use). Findings show that respondents with positive attitudes towards technology were more likely to use technology frequently (more than once per week). Younger age was statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) for computer use and cell phone use, while less strongly associated with Internet and email use. Whites were more likely to use the technology frequently.

4. Discussion

Findings of this study offer encouraging evidence that the majority of older adults have joined the “age of technology” (Czaja & Lee 2003: 113). Furthermore, most of those with access to technology appear to be frequent users of technology, reporting at least weekly, and typically daily, use. The potential of technology to transform signaling ability in late life appears to have become a reality for new cohorts of older adults (Volti 2006). The reported uses of the Internet offer a broad array of links to the social world for older adults. Our data run counter to stereotypes about fears or negative attitudes attributed to older adults regarding technology use (Charness 2003).

Nevertheless, age was a consistent significant predictor for each of the technology access and use outcomes. Younger respondents were significantly more likely to own or have access to technology, and to have higher rates of usage. These findings are likely to reflect the evolution of technology use among different cohorts of elders.

Results suggest that for older adults, technology serves as an important vehicle in maintaining social ties to others (Thomas 1993). The prevalence of computers and cell phone usage demonstrated by this sample also speaks to the proactive adaptive efforts that elders undertake as they face normative losses associated with late life (Kahana & Kahana 2003). In this sense, elders may rely on technology to enhance their semiotic life space. For example, cell phones, while they are primarily for conversation, can also serve as a monitoring system or safety measure for the older person. As a monitoring tool, family and friends can easily check up on the older person and, since cell phones are usually held near or on the person, contact with others is immediate and not dependent upon an older person to walk across a room to answer the phone. As a safety measure, a cell phone could be used to alert someone or to call 911 if an emergency arises. Both of these examples illustrate how even elders with diminished capabilities can maintain and enhance their semiotic life space (Schieber 2003). Electronic mail is used to interact with children, grandchildren, and friends. This reflects both same-generation and cross-generational links forged on the Internet.

Enhanced communication with family and friends can play useful preventive roles in developing availability of support for times of need. Use of

technology can also facilitate obtaining support correctively, thereby helping to deal with caregiver burden and deal with other stressors (Lawhon & Ennis 1995). Communication with family members on the Internet can also serve to integrate the elderly family member who may appear to be “excess baggage” in a culture of parsimony and time consciousness (Dunning 2005). As a result of technology, the aged person becomes an “equal player” in a society geared to quick and goal-directed communication. The older adult can thus create a bridge from the discursive and deliberate communication of their cohort. Seniors using the Internet are signaling that they belong on the playing field of contemporary technology, alongside the young.

In addition to the increasingly common use of cell phones, the use of Internet and email communication has brought about a paradigm shift in older adults’ ability to communicate instantly and effectively, both in maintaining social networks and in conducting commercial transactions. Our findings regarding the prevalence of Internet use by the aged to accomplish business transactions is likely to offer another important way to enhance their self image. The self-presentation of the older adult on the Internet removes the often stigmatizing visual or auditory signs of being aged, and can render age irrelevant in their communications and negotiations.

There are alternative semiotic meanings of different forms of Internet communication in late life (Deely 1990). In the case of business transactions and commercial communication, Internet use can contribute to age irrelevance (Dannefer 2000). The seller of merchandise or bank clerk is no longer aware of the client’s during an Internet based transaction. Thus the Internet becomes a semiotic equalizer. A third distinctive area of Internet use involves leisure communication, including use of the Internet to play games such as chess or scrabble. Use of the Internet for leisure communication with other seniors in a recreational context may help affirm group membership in an age homogeneous circle. Such communication can be age and group affirming (Malcolm et al. 2001). Older adults may also benefit from enhanced status in the eyes of others, since they become an information resources for others. In this sense, the older computer user becomes empowered and can serve as a central source of information for others.

Our discussion has thus far emphasized the prevalence of access to technology and technology use in late life. Nevertheless, we must also acknowledge that significant proportions of elderly in our sample still lacked

access to cell phones and computers. Findings of our study confirmed our hypothesis that lack of sociodemographic resources, as reflected in lower education, limit access to technology. Furthermore, even among those with access, lack of sociodemographic resources such as minority racial/ethnic background limit frequency of technology use. It is also notable that more negative attitudes toward technology also limit participation in the digital world.

The cross-sectional nature of our research doesn't permit conclusions about the directionality of the causal linkages we observed between attitudes and technology use. Thus, it is possible that those with negative attitudes do not invest in cell phones, computers, or Internet services. Conversely, it is also likely that in the absence of access to such technology, there is little opportunity to alter negative attitudes. Notably, for those with access, attitudes are still linked to frequency of usage. An alternative explanation regarding the negative attitudes findings is that those who do not have access or are afraid of the technology may preserve the self by "signaling" a negative attitude. They may actually desire to use such technology, but barriers to access may be embarrassing to one's self image. Thus, those who cannot participate may be the strongest opponents to it.

Technology use is growing exponentially among the aged, and it is an area where dramatic shifts are likely to occur as baby boomers, who are already veteran users of technology, join the ranks of the elderly (Charness 2003). Use of information technology can provide important sources of empowerment for older adults (Thursz et al. 1995).

Use of Internet technology can improve the social and emotional well-being of senior citizens. The opportunity to make friends and bond with online friends through message boards and email exchanges can contribute to psychosocial well-being in old age, especially for those who are home bound and physically limited (Volti 2006). Terminology, such as "cyber-senior", is being increasingly used to describe Internet connected seniors (Post 1996). The Internet has been found to offer new opportunities for communication that can reduce social isolation among community residents as well as residents of sheltered care facilities (White et al. 2002).

In our previous research, we advocated for technology use as a potentially useful proactive adaptation (Kahana, Kahana, & Kercher 2003). In this paper we argue that technology use can serve as a vehicle to increase

semiotic life space. Accordingly, access to cell phones and the Internet can increase the ability to receive and emit signals to others.

The semiotic potential and relevance of technology in the social world of the aged is thus evident. Yet, the concepts of semiotics have not yet become visible in the field of social gerontology. The terminology or even the label of semiotics is almost completely absent in the social gerontological literature. This paper represents an initial effort to link semiotics with our understanding of proactive adaptations used by older adults to insure maintenance of meaningful activities and contributions (Kahana & Kahana 2003). Such enhanced opportunities for increased signal strength through technology comprise an unexplored aspect of quality of late life, particularly for the frail elderly (Lawton 1991).

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Katriina Kajannes

Possibilities of (mis)understanding

**Eero Tarasti's *Le secret du professeur
Amfortas* as a semiotic novel**

Eero Tarasti's (b. 1948) first work of fiction is *The Secret of Professor Amfortas* (*Professori Amfortasin salaisuus*). Here I focus on that work as a *semiotic novel*, and specifically on questions of understanding, misunderstanding and communication as raised in this book. First, I present a brief introduction to Eero Tarasti and to the term "semiotic novel". Second, I analyze acts of misunderstanding described in the novel. Third, I deal with the possibility of deepening one's understanding of human existence in the light of Tarasti's novel.

1. Introduction

1.1 Eero Tarasti and his work

Eero Tarasti is one of the most interesting writers in contemporary Finnish literature. As a novelist he belongs to Finnish postmodernism, together with Henri Broms and Harry Forsblom. Besides their writing careers, they are also scholars, and each one has published studies on postmodernism. The style of their fictional work is synthetic, eclectic and pluralistic, with a narration that unites traits from different periods and different literary genres. They use irony, perspectivism and hybridization. The interplay between quotations from different discourses such as myths and light reading is common in their texts, as well as complex structures, rich intertextual dialogue and many-sided analogies with literary romanticism. They use fragmentation and cliché, parody and plagiarism. They deconstruct grand narratives, and they rewrite tradition and history imaginatively.¹

As a novelist Tarasti belongs, together with Umberto Eco and Italo Calvino, to the cultivated, playful and aesthetically orientated branch of literary postmodernism. *Le secret du professeur Amfortas* contains cultural criticism, but represented with a light touch. Moreover, Eco and Tarasti are among the leading semioticians of the world, and they carry on a dialogue with other semioticians in their prose.

Professor of musicology at the University of Helsinki, Eero Tarasti has developed musical semiotics as an independent discipline. He has renewed the theory of semiotics and also found new ways to use it for analyzing art and literature. In his theory, music is not an object but “a situation comprised of many various elements” (Tarasti 2002: 70). In recent years he has been involved in constructing a theory of *existential semiotics*. This new epistemological model may also be seen to stimulate new methods for studying music.²

As with Eco, for Tarasti *understanding* is an important term. He introduces the reader to the matter in his article “Understanding, Misunderstanding, and Self-Understanding” (2003), in which he investigates the conditions, processes and particular aspects of understanding. Tarasti writes: “One may go on to ask, What, then, is *self*-understanding? To this one may answer: it is precisely existential understanding. I understand myself via objectified signs; that is to say, my aspirations are crystallized into something objective” (Tarasti 2003: 7). In his existential theory Tarasti stresses the role of the subject: existence is opened by a subject who is able to change and re-articulate his being. He “rejects a violent analysis that damages the phenomenon (an ethical-moral principle); the universality of phenomena consists of their being seen as something, and in some light; what is said or expressed may be less important than in what sense or mode it is said; as for temporality: its meaning grows denser over time, and is completed in the moment we know we have to give it up” (ibid.: 197).

1.2 The “semiotic novel”

It is useful to read Tarasti’s novel against the background of his studies, since *The Secret of Professor Amfortas* is metasemiotic in nature, in that it describes scholars and their work, and it discusses various semiotic paradigms (e.g., existential semiotics), including the one given by Tarasti himself.

Tarasti has written and edited many books about art and literature. When creating a new theory and new scientific terms he often analyzes some works of art as an illustration. In Tarasti's essay about the semiotic novel (1996: 215–228), the starting point is a book by Henri Broms. Tarasti describes this work as a fine example of the semiotic novel, comparing it to novels by Goethe, Hermann Hesse, Marcel Proust and Umberto Eco. According to Tarasti, the theme of a semiotic novel is an existential one, giving birth to a semiotic consciousness which poses certain (existential) questions and answers them in a critical way. Tarasti shows that the novels by Eco, Julia Kristeva, and Henri Broms are semiotic in nature. Yet jokingly he maintains that no one has the right to classify a person as a semiotician and another a non-semiotician.

Especially in postmodernism, the characteristics of a semiotic novel include parody, the abandoning of illusions about reality, playing with narrative conventions, frequent allusions to other texts, and often also a polyphonic structure. Tarasti emphasizes that this kind of prose is deeply rooted in European humanities and scholarship. In his book *Esimerkkejä* (*Examples*) Tarasti writes that *Parsifal* by Richard Wagner is semiotic in a particular way, because it is based on meditating about and reproduction of previous things (1996: 255).

Corresponding to Tarasti's article, Henri Broms uses the term "systems novel" (1993a: 33–36). He underlines that this kind of prose work is a metanovel and often an encyclopedic and labyrinthine work about many things at the same time. A systems novel consists of many levels, one of which is the semiotic, and the events are signs pointing to something else (Chesterman 1995: 23). In writing about *Professor Amfortas* as a semiotic novel, Broms (1993b) defines the term as does Eero Tarasti in his article. In addition, Broms maintains that a semiotic novel asserts certain utopian characteristics.

2. *To understand or not to understand*

The Secret of Professor Amfortas discusses and parodies the author's own program for existential semiotics as it was in the year the novel first was published in Finnish: "We have to be able to study the life of signs from within, as well as to study in what kind of factual universe of meanings we live our whole life during its process in time" (Tarasti 1995: 45). The novel

tells indeed about the birth and change of signs and meanings, as well as the processes of semiosis. It also discusses the starting points of semiotics, its representatives and orientations.

The ethical tone of the novel is found behind the parody and laughter. The existential semiotics created by Tarasti is concerned with, among other things, ethical questions and values. In his book *Existential Semiotics* Tarasti considers the basic problems of the human condition – in a nutshell: how to live in the world. The novel shows that to understand is to see the structure of culture and of human existence. It is to see the system of connections between things that are usually believed to be separate. The novel shows these things in a negative way. The reader will see how misunderstanding arises from lack of probity and from the inability to see nuances of meaning. In the fictional world of this novel the situation actually is that of misunderstanding, and the consciousness of the characters is not an existential one in its fullness. On the contrary, we could say it is a false consciousness, *falsches Bewusstsein*, an issue addressed in one of his essays (Tarasti 2004).

In the Professor's fictional world there is a total cultural, spiritual and social crisis, and misunderstanding, caused by excessive materialism and too much faith in science. *The Secret* actually is a story about conditions of understanding – and misunderstanding – in the postmodern world. The existential issue of the novel is this: Where can we find the power to set us free as individuals and as a culture? Where can we find salvation?

Tarasti himself points out that the redemption of the man is the main subject in Wagner's *Parsifal*. He writes (1978: 110): "Wagner's development ultimately encompassed a shift from hero-mythical and nature-mythical categories to the Christian sacred sphere in the musical mystery play, *Parsifal*". Redemption, together with the themes of quest and of human growth, forms one of the general topics in western myths, arts, literature and philosophy from the classical period to the postmodern world. In Tarasti's novel questions of understanding and misunderstanding are involved in these themes.

Professor Amfortas uses and exaggerates themes of utopia and dystopia. The origin of the word comes from the Greek *topos*, and means a "place". The negative prefix changes the meaning; so it is literally "the place that does not exist", or "nowhere". This concept was articulated by the renaissance humanist Thomas More. His work *Utopia* (1516) is one of the best

known in the genre, together with *Città del Sole* (written in 1602) by Tommaso Campanella, George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1949), and Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* (1932). The intertextual dialogue *Le secret du professeur Amfortas* enters into with other utopias gives material for the critique so central in the novel. The most important of these are *The Republic (Politeia)* by Plato and *The Glass Bead Game (Das Glasperlenspiel)* by Hermann Hesse.

The novel is set in future North American Americana. Most of the events take place in a university town to which a few top scientists have moved from Europe, destroyed by a catastrophe, and in which two schools of semiotics are active. The leading position of the scientific community of Professor Amfortas, from Finland, is threatened, and the future of the university is uncertain. Especially two of the students, Sebastian, a relative of the professor, and his friend Felix see him as a saviour of the world of science. To remove the obstacles hindering his work and to solve the riddle connected with him, they collect information about his life and study his writings. In the novel, the most important places are Americana – led by women –, the town of Irokesh, the university, and Europe.

In the utopian literary genre it is possible to represent the clash of two different ideologies or sets of values. Because it is often set in a faraway place, and the time of it is in a past or future which is better than the present, it serves as a means of comparison and for cultural or social critique. This kind of fiction is in many cases also parodistic. The central topic often is an ideal form of society, which does not actually exist. The starting point offers a place for comic misunderstanding, and its dystopias show forth tragic and sometimes frightening elements. It is often the case that most characters of the novel are unable to understand deeply anything important. In fact, understanding itself is the main utopia in Tarasti's novel.

Tarasti offers us critical insight into the present state of European life and thought, while at the same time creating something totally new in his intense dialogue with European writers and scholars. What kinds of (mis) understanding and communication does one encounter in Americana, in terms of rational and irrational forms of consciousness? The starting point of this analysis is the fact that, in the novel, science and art – thinking and imagination – represent different forms of knowing, which illuminate each other. Next, I focus first on the rational and second on the irrational aspect of knowing. For this it is important to understand the educational

system in Americana, because it opens the door to the utopia of understanding in this novel.

3. *The university and the misunderstanding*

The Secret of Professor Amfortas is a university novel, shadowing forth an educational utopia, where the main focus is on education: on its means and goals, as well as the values behind it. The University of Americana is a sign pointing to misunderstanding as a problem of individual human beings and of a community. The sharp critique of the university found in this novel is common in postmodernism. In this novel, the keywords of the university are *competition, obedience, prohibition* and *censorship*. How do these things exist in this fictional Americana?

First, competition: everyone learns that the meaning of life is to be better than the others – not a better human being, but better at all kinds of contests. Also, at school, even at the university level, obedience to the establishment is important. Such extreme obedience is demanded, that the status of the pupils, students and their teachers, too, resembles that of a slave in Plato's republic. As an institution and as a building, the University of Americana is functionally similar to a church. Science has stolen the place that once belonged to religion – intellect has replaced spirituality. In Americana people believe in science, and they search for holiness in it. Science is a form of materialist religion, and as in religious sects, everybody's attitudes are controlled. Many things are forbidden, or at least discouraged, such as the reading of novels, romantic music, wandering in nature, and most of all, criticism of the establishment.

Everyone must work very hard at their studies, but this does not lead to deep understanding. Approved information has been saved in a central computer, and the students are passive receivers. No one notices that somebody has modified and chosen the information for them. It is almost impossible to get any new and valuable knowledge in the university. Because knowledge is disseminated in piecemeal fashion, one cannot comprehend larger entities. Education unifies thought in Americana, where there is strict censorship. At the same time, decision making is said to be transparent. All information is said to be available for everyone. But in reality, information is strictly controlled. In Americana education serves the totalitarian society, as it does in Plato's *Republic*. Furthermore, Ameri-

cana and the university incorporate a model of consensus society. That is why the citizens of Americana are satisfied with the university the novel describes: they do not know about alternative educational systems. So they claim they have the most efficient educational system in the history of the world! To this rejoins a critical voice, through some young students and through Amfortas, who was born in Finland. Amfortas and some students know Americana has reached a dead-end, and that in a way it is an inferno. The university is compared to a pyramid, housing many dead and mummified things, such the languages and literatures of Germany and Finland.

The predominant set of values is a completely and consistent opposition to anything that is normally appreciated in western cultures. In Americana, education is quite different from that in Europe. Americana lives in the here and now, without a past, in a kind of collective amnesia. The vital connection between present and tradition is in fact interrupted in the fictional world of the novel. In addition, obedience to the establishment is what matters, not the following of one's own conscience. The Socratic maxim "Know yourself" is no longer valid here.

For Americanians, Europe is taboo; they know very little about it, and they have been taught to underrate its culture. The history and humanism of Europe are interpreted in a distorted way. Misunderstood signs and concepts point to other misunderstood signs and concepts, and together they give rise to false interpretations. The rich, multi-dimensional culture of Europe can no longer be comprehended. Instead of platonic dialogue, the usual mode of communication is battle. Even semioticians are masters in fighting. Such persons as Grimaldas, Alcan, and Pierce are mentioned, as equivalents of Greimas, Lacan and Peirce. Barthes and Lévi-Strauss appear under their own names. But their doctrines are misunderstood, and their opponents silenced. In fact, the rulers have imposed their language and discourse on the whole country. At the same time, the digital culture strengthens the battle against human culture.

Now it is necessary to remember Tarasti's semiotics, since it gives us new perspectives on questions of cultural memory and the role of post-colonialism in this context. Tarasti writes about "post-colonial semiosis", pointing out that post-colonial theory is intimately related to existential semiotics (2000: 139). Tarasti writes: "One colonizing technique is that of silencing. Pre-colonial practices are suppressed simply by the fact that one no longer talks about them. The colonized subject keeps silent... The colo-

nizing discursive practice has taken the voice into its possession” (2000: 138).

4. *The irrational and the understanding*

Tarasti proves, both in his essays and in his fictional work, that the dilemma of rationalism and irrationalism is most topical in European culture. In order to solve it, men need a kind of inside knowledge and a new way of understanding.

How can ethical and cultural problems be resolved in Americana and elsewhere, or can they be? Some characters in the novel realize that salvation might be found in myth, in the arts, and in the literature of Romanticism. People do not remember the myths about their origin, and the door to real art is shut. Nevertheless, a bridge might exist, from the rational to irrational and even from aesthetics to ethics. Some young students try in vain to find it. The knowledge about both the rational and the irrational aspects of life and of human existence proves to be essential for full understanding.

I would like to point out that the rise of humanism and human rights is only a utopia, if no strong and free persons are making it happen. As Tarasti (2000: 88) writes: “The discovery of ethics seems to be related first to the problem of the subject – and, paradoxically, simultaneously to both the foregrounding of the subject and its disappearance. Without the concept of subject there is no ethical choice. Norms, external *devoirs* can be programmed into a computer or robot, whereas inner ethical ‘will’, i.e., deliberate choice with complicated factors and criteria with their hierarchies, cannot be inserted.”

There are still some areas in which to look for a new humanity. The most important of them is the written and spoken word – literature, narratives, and language. In fact language is the way to understand things. As Hans-Georg Gadamer (1986: 478) writes: “Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache” [Being that can be understood is language]. Because of the dead condition of language, one cannot see the world in its richness. Latin, German and Finnish are dead languages, and only the superficial English remains. Note that the novel is critical of excessive admiration of America and of the Anglo-saxonisms invading our culture and our educational systems.

There is one concrete direction where professor Amfortas and some of his students try to find the solution: they travel to Europe, and to an imaginary Finland, the county of myths and poems. The country that used to be Finland is now an area destroyed by a big catastrophe. The search for Finnish identity proves vain, because they do not find the culture of Finland any more. Professor Amfortas could be a saviour in the situation. He is a personification of those humanistic values that are missing from the superficial and competitive Americana. Those values are justice, equality, respect for individuality, a positive outlook on life, and at the same time, skepticism.

Salvation could be found in the values of European humanism and in a living connection to cultural heritage, especially a respect for one's own language. It is important to be conscious of one's own roots. The stream of personal and collective memories has energy enough to renew mankind, and these will be the bases of a new understanding.

Notes

1. A good guide to postmodernism is Harry Forsblom's (2001) *Concepts of Postmodernism*.
2. Paulo Chagas (2003) has written about Eero Tarasti's recent musical semiotics.

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Ágnes Kapitány and Gábor Kapitány

The interiorization of social events and facts by means of symbols

As cultural anthropologists we have dealt for decades with the analysis of symbols. We analyse symbolic events of various thematic territories, such as objects (2005), human motivation (1993), value systems (1995), adaptive behaviours and so on. We try to summarise those experiences to find a common denominator from this work, from the view-point of *socio-semiotics*. To do so, we must start with the evidence. What is the role of symbols in the society? What kinds of symbolization processes are typical? How do those symbols become important bricks in the construction of society?

Claude Lévi-Strauss (1973), one of the great representatives of cultural anthropology, built on Roman Jakobson's (1972) notion of "binary opposition" and its importance in the development of a symbolic universe of society. We need, however, to return to the beginning of this process. The first stage is the emergence of first notions, first ideas. In the social sciences, the concept "symbol" is generally considered a derived category, supposing the primary status of notional-conceptual thinking. Social scientists argue that ideas are the primary elements of human thinking, and that symbols are born through the linking of two or more different ideas. We, however, agree with those who begin from the other side, arguing that the primary state is one of holistic observation of the world. Those ideas or notions with one or more definable meanings are secondary to symbols, which retain the spirit of holism. Humans need to use ideas and concepts, the basis of which is the so-called law of non-contradiction – "A equals A". It is also the basis of our instrumental behaviour and the point of departure for analytic thinking. In Nature, however, the truth of "A equals A" is inseparable from the truth of the opposing thesis: "A does not equal A".¹ Symbols, and the symbolic thought behind them, retain the simultaneous

truth of both theses. With the help of symbols, people can correct the one-sidedness of notional, conceptual thinking.²

Therefore, the first step is the appearance of notions, emerging from the chaos of the world, as observed by a human being. These first notions are still very confused; like the “symbols”, which come later, they contain a lot of associations. A rock means a hard thing, a being, such as man himself, a concrete place in the landscape, a place where lightning struck, the source of a spring (hence with some characteristics of a mother) and so on. Today we say that this rock can be a symbol for these different things, but the original state is precisely the sum (a holistic unit) of these different meanings. The tightening of the circle of associations, the disambiguation of meaning, is a *result of the development* of notional thinking from this multitude of meanings to well-defined and precise notions, these last abstracted from experiences connected with very real, yet different, rocks. If one of our ancestors used a tiger’s tooth as a knife, that knife meant the power of a tiger, the power of the man’s arm that wielded it, the sharpness of blade, the person who used it, and so on. Later, different knives – those made of bone, stone, or wood or iron, etc. as well as those belonging to different people – all united in the notion “knife”, and this abstract notion lost the associative circle of special, individualized knives. The rock and the knife – things that earlier were inseparable from their surroundings and from the activities carried out with them – became abstract words, that is to say, they became “ideas” of rocks and knives. And from this point we can speak about distinct words, ideas, notions and, on the other side, of symbols. A word, idea, or notion means the abstract essence of a thing, being, or object; “A equals A” means the thing, in and of itself. We build up a world of words, ideas, and concepts, in which everything has a distinct meaning.

We have another world, too: the world of symbols. In the world of symbols, “A equals A” and, at the same time, “A not only equals A, but it equals something else and/or anything else”. Hence symbols have a double character. On one hand the symbolic meanings of words keep their earlier broad association-circle of things; on the other hand, we make newer and newer symbols by connecting different things, events, or phenomena; by connecting different words, ideas, or notions; and by spiritualising the distinct borders between them. In this way, we permanently correct the one-sidedness of our notional thinking.

Up to this point we have noted trivialities. Nevertheless, to do so has been necessary, since, in our view, the distinction between notional and symbolical thinking constitutes the basis of the socio-semiotical functioning of symbols. In what follows, we first examine how society appears in the world of notional/ideational thinking; second, we explain the role of symbols.

In the process of ideation we give names to everything; something is called “tree”, something is called “war”, something is called “power”, something is called “idea”. One of them is more concrete, another is abstract, but all of them are distinct elements of our thinking. But these names, words, and ideas lead their own life in society. We have relations with them. For example, we cut down a tree. This seems to be a very concrete thing to do, but it also presumes a moment of abstraction: we must know that a sequence of movements and the relation between the properties of our axe and the material of the tree will result in the felling of the tree. The notion “cut down a tree” is a result of a serious mental operation, namely, of ideation. But the essence is, that we have a *relation* – in fact, multiple relations – with the tree. We have similar relations to more abstract things, too. We hate (or sometimes we like) “war”, although war is not a tangible thing or person. Ancient man needed to personalise war as Ares or Mars, but today, as a result of a long process of abstract thinking, we can imagine “war” as a complex thing without the need of personalizing it. We can think about and discuss “ideas”, although the idea of “idea” is a very abstract thing. Our relation to different things and to their ideas are very similar: we operate with them as with distinct things.

The next step is very important from the point of view of symbolisation. While notions and ideas become elements of relations (as with real things, and as representatives of these real things in the mind), a lot of associations are connected to them. These associations are based on sign similarities and contrarities to other things, on connections with the surroundings, and on the emotions they produce; they include the past of the respective thing, its functions, its possibilities, and so on. In other words, our mind distinguishes things in separation from their environs; we consider them as distinct things. After this indispensable step, the next one restores the original holistic unit of the perceived world with the help of a wide and always open circle of associations. This very wide circle of associations is condensed in symbols, in the symbolic meanings of the given things.

During the last step, the symbols, in turn, become *elements* for thinking, as did notions. But differing from these last, symbols retain their circle of association and openness of meanings. We now examine this process with the help of three examples.

1. *The rise of “individualism”*

A very important change in European history occurred when the dominant value system of the Middle Ages found itself face to face with that of modern bourgeois society. The main values of the former are centered in tradition and custom, the domination of community – or as Tönnies (1972) calls it, “*Gemeinschaft*” – over individual; the mandate to “be like others”; and so on. The main values of the bourgeois system were antagonistic to those of the former; here one feels the pressure to “be different, be individual, make your own way”, with a high priority put on liberty and personal freedom. Although the welfare of the community remains an important value, the individual holds pride of place in such an individualistic value system. In the more traditional value system, the community is primary and the person is derived from his or her community. In the individualistic value system the community – which Tönnies calls a “*Gesellschaft*” – is considered primarily as a collection of individuals. The battle between these two value systems continued seven to eight centuries of European history, with individualism emerging victorious, having won “souls” to its mood and way of life. The victory occurred first in the economy, then in art; first in private life, then in public – the signs of the new value system appeared as social customs and rules of conduct (cf. Elias 1982), and later in ethics and religion (cf. Weber 1972).

These changes in different aspects of life had a common denominator: the central role of individuality. The different experiences of these changes are condensed in the modern notion of the “individual”. Members of modern society became “individuals”, in their relations to each other, to institutions, to the economy, etc. These relations, with their many associations to the notion of “individual”, crystallize in the symbol “individualism”³ as *the* symbol of modern man.⁴ Like any symbol, this one in turn became another *element* in our world-view. When we analyse modern society, individualism is scrutinized and weighed. We consider the modern man a *complex* of his or her individualism, altruism, rationalism, irrationalism,

and so on. When we analyse someone, his or her individualism is assessed as a *part* of his or her personality. No person can be an “individualist” and nothing else; individualism is only one element of the compound, whether one is speaking of a society or a person. (Take housing as an example: the increasing number of bathrooms in today’s flats is one index of the rise of the individualistic value system.)

To sum up: (1) Symbolisation begins with the appearance of new and separate phenomena; in such areas as value-systems, it is the appearance of new behaviours in different fields of life. (2) Then comes the process of “ideation”, when people recognise a common denominator among the new phenomena (in our case, the notion of “individualism”). (3) The next step is the “fertilisation” of the new notion by a crowd of associations, as when the “individualism” enters the *Lebenswelt* and assumes different forms. (4) During the process of symbolisation these associations condense into a symbol; in our example: when we start to call modern man “individualistic”, it is a *result* of a condensation process. (5) Finally, the symbols become elements of different structures; in our case, individualism becomes an element of society, of personality, of housing, and so on in this manner.

2. *Adaptive behaviours*

Let us take another example. Adaptability is a very important part of being human, enabling us to meet a multitude of different challenges: the dangers of nature, the tyranny of power, family conflicts in our family, etc. First, we learn how to protect ourselves against the storm, against a powerful landlord, or against the machinations of our relatives. Second, we recognize the common denominator of these very different behaviours to be *adaptation*. We create the notion and the abstract idea of adaptation. Third, we fill this category with a lot of concrete experiences: successful escapes, sly tricks, successful violence or polite behaviour, carefully weighing alternatives, and so on. These experiences are very concrete – escape from a storm, tricking a tyrant, settling a family dispute. But fourth, we link these different experiences in the sole notion of “adaptation”, and transform the latter into a symbol, which includes all of these concrete experiences as associations. (There are many distinct experiences in our memory, but we link them together with metaphors, metonymies, synecdoches, personalisations and so on; as we said earlier, precisely this is the difference between the distinct

categories of notional thinking and the open nature of symbolic thought. If notional thinking is a telescope, which enhances the useful essence of a thing, the symbol is a sphere, a ball, an orb, which offers innumerable routes from its skin to the centre). As we link our different experiences of adaptation, we can combine them. This means that the experience acquired in public life will be usable within the family; the adaptation which was successful at home, can be used for defense against the dangers of nature, and so on.) Lastly, in this way the different modes, techniques and sources of adaptation become elements of social life, of personality, and so on.⁵ As we combine them, these special experiences become applicable to the most varied territories of life. This is the role of symbolisation in the process of adaptation: to make the notions open, polysemic and combinable. Here is the basis of the exceptional flexibility of the human being.

3. The power of advertising symbols: The case of Coca Cola

Our third example may be more *tangible* than the previous two. Value systems and adaptation mechanisms are rather abstract, theoretical categories, to which the functioning of simpler symbols is very similar. Our third example is the well-known bottle of Coca Cola.

The first two steps involve the enhancement of Coca Cola. It has a special form, different from the shape of other bottles, and we learn to link this form to a special brand, and to the special taste of a special drink. We taste some cola, we see the unique bottle of Coca Cola at different places in the world, then we create the “idea” of Coca Cola; after the process of ideation we know what it means. Third, Coca Cola “conquers” the world. The advertising suggests a special life-style, gives it a special sense (or a bunch of different senses). We learn where we can or cannot find Coca Cola. Fourthly, Coca Cola becomes a symbol. A symbol of what? It depends on the character and circumstances of the community that creates and/or uses the symbol. For residents of formerly communist countries, for example, Coca Cola was a symbol of the West, the “free world”, or the United States; a symbol of a world not behind the Iron Curtain. For critics of modern capitalism it can symbolize “consumer society”; for a fundamentalist, it may symbolize the world of Evil; for a young person, who drank a lot of cola during childhood, it can symbolize happy years; for a dentist, it is one

of the well-known dangers to teeth. Lastly, the symbol becomes an element of our visual language. If we watch a performance of a young Hungarian or Russian musical group from the fifties or early sixties, and somebody holds up a bottle of Coca Cola, it might mean, “This man is a fan of the west”. Now that the Iron Curtain has been destroyed and the “multi-nationals” and western European and American firms have overrun eastern Europe, Coca Cola has become an element in the stock of symbols of power (the power of money, the power of capital). Hence we find Coca Cola’s emblem everywhere, not just in restaurants or stores, but in school corridors (sometimes taking the place of Lenin portraits), on the notice boards of some churches, and even at an office of the Socialist Party (formerly the Communist Party), the whole show-window of which was covered with Coca Cola advertisements. Coca Cola has become a visual “word”, a part of our visual statements, a simple (symbolic) element of our “visual speech”.

4. Conclusions

Now we will try to summarise the main functions of symbolisation in society. Semiotically speaking, one of its main functions is to correct the one-sidedness of other sign-systems, the system of distinct notions and ideas. The social functions of symbols are endless. Through symbols we can direct, guide and govern others. Symbols are very open in meaning and have many connections to other elements of the world; thus, a directed symbol can create a whole circle of associations, and the whole world of things connected with this symbol will move in that direction. The first theoreticians of the workers’ movement symbolised the relationship of capitalist society as a battle (of classes), and millions of workers and intellectuals followed this symbolic model for one and a half centuries. Newton and Leibniz worked out a world-view of monadic, individualistic units, and both the natural sciences and the social sciences have built on this symbolic doctrine for centuries. Symbols determine the direction of politics, the economy, science, and the entire lives of people; they dominate our everyday thinking. The symbolic doctrine of freedom preserves capitalist society (the free market, free enterprise, free movement of labour, etc.). Symbols are the instruments of different ruling groups and different ruling interests, and lengthy books have been written about how symbolic power

is felt in medicine, the judiciary, the penal system, and more (see, inter al., Foucault 1955, 1972, 1975; Bourdieu 1972; Bourdieu and Passeron 1970).

But symbols can also play an opposite role: they can also be instruments of revolution and innovation. The symbol “freedom” is not a weapon only for representing the interests of the bourgeoisie. The anti-capitalist workers use this symbol, arguing that the freedom of a worker is not the same as the freedom of a capitalist; the freedom to sleep under a bridge is not the same for a homeless person as it is for a bored millionaire. To create a new symbol includes the possibility of changing existing relations, to revolutionise the world. We see how impressionism (as a new way of painting) revolutionised visual culture, how the music of The Beatles revolutionised the culture of generations, how computerisation has revolutionised our whole life. You might reply: but these changes are merely technological. Indeed, these changes do mean technical innovation, but they also have symbolic meaning, which endows them with extra importance and influence. Symbols do not have just a revolutionary function. Sometimes they can be integrative, as instruments of peace. When Sir Walter Scott wrote novels about lovers who were representative of clashing social groups, he was urging society to give up religious and national rancour (Scottish and English); in this way, he built up the symbolic base of a united nationhood of the United Kingdom. Stanley Kramer, director of the *The Defiant Ones* (a famous film of the fifties), inspired a new way of thinking about the relationship between races in the United States, through the symbol of handcuffs, which fastened a white man and a black man together.⁶

We could go on listing the functions of symbols in society, but we think that the most one is the final result of the symbolisation process outlined above. As we have mentioned, symbols eventually turn into elements of the everyday development and structure of society, and elements of the development and structure of individual personalities. Because symbols condense and include a crowd of associations, we can obtain very different experiences through them, and it is precisely by means of symbols that history – and experiences of history – can survive into the present.

Notes

1. Every moving thing equals itself, but it doesn't equal its existence-form in the previous or next minute. This has been a well-known experience

and theoretical problem, from Xeno's *aporia* up to present-day quantum theory.

2. Every metaphor corrects the thesis that A equals A. If a lover says, "You are to my thoughts as food is to life", he says the following: (1) The soul and the body are different things. The soul is not body, the body is not soul. The soul is soul, the body is body. A equals A. Amorous desire and hunger are different entities, and so are the instinct for self-preservation and the instinct for race preservation. A equals A, and A doesn't equal B. (2) But there is also a common denominator to them. There is an equality between A and B. I am not a cannibal, but somehow you are also food to me. And if A (*A'*) equals B (although we said earlier that A doesn't equal B), it means A (*A'*) does not (totally) equal A.
3. We find this "individualism" (and the contradiction of two value systems) at every moment of life. For example, at the table. If the lady of the house follows the rules of the traditional value system and serves you soup, it would be offensive if you were to add more salt to it. It is an offense because, in the traditional value system, all women want to be "like the others", to conform to the norms of a community. To say that her soup has too much or too little salt is to say that her cooking was not adequate, not "normal". In the individualistic value system the basis is not the "norm", but the individual. In the latter system, it is okay to eat the soup as you like it, according to your personal taste.
4. The "binary oppositions" of Lévi-Strauss become important *at this moment*, at the birth of a symbolic meaning. Most symbols are born in tandem with their opposite. Individualism became a symbol of modern man, as compared to a former sense of community. When we use the word "individualism" in a pejorative sense, it takes on an antipathy to "altruism". Still, the word "individualism" has many other possibilities for comparison besides its opposite.
5. We don't have enough space here to enter into details. We have, however, written a monograph in which we consider different types, modes and sources of adaptation as elements of human adaptive behaviour.
6. In our monograph on human motivation (Kapitány and Kapitány 1993), we present how the experiences of an age of human history are built into the personality, serving as an element of an individual's motivational system.

Ágnes Kapitány and Gábor Kapitány

Visual symbols of political system-change in Hungary

A longitudinal study

In this presentation we would like to show the results of our longitudinal research. The first step of our research was taken in 1985 (published in 1989). The research was about visual messages (mainly symbolic ones) of cultural institutions. We used the term “cultural institution” in a broad sense, which means that we analysed not only schools, nurseries, houses of culture, cinemas, libraries (cultural institutions in the traditional, narrow sense); but also institutions of power (party headquarters, local government buildings, council offices); as well as institutions of religion (churches, parishes), and institutions of consumption (restaurants, cafés, pubs, clubs, etc.). Thirty thousand photos were taken in 1985, and we analysed the symbolic visual messages conveyed by three thousand institutions. The main aspects of the analysis were the following:

- symbolic signs of *hierarchy*
- “Potemkin-syndrome” (the difference between the front side and back side of the same institutions)
- *aspects* concerning the degree of civilisation in the institutions (the hygiene, condition of lavatories, etc.)
- the *gardens*, natural surroundings of the institutions
- *design*, visual culture of the institutions
- *proxemic* analysis of the institutions
- symbolic signs of *identities*
- key *values*, transmitted by the institutions
- signs of dominant *ideologies*
- *cultural patterns* transmitted by the institutions
- *social patterns* transmitted by the institutions
- *centre--periphery* distinction
- signs of *creativity* in the institutions
- signs of *intimacy*

In 2005 we repeated the research (see Kapitány and Kapitány 2006), at which time approximately five hundred institutions were analysed and twenty thousand photos taken. By comparing the two states, we can register similarities and differences. Between the two phases of the research there was a change of political system in Hungary, which caused a lot of essential changes even of the general visual impression of the institutions. For reasons of space, we next present only some results of the analysis.

1. Changes in symbolic (visual) signs of hierarchy

Hierarchy of different types of institutions. In 1985 we were able to rate the institutions based on differences in their condition. These differences generally reflected the formal and informal status of the institutions. The ones in the best condition were council houses in bigger cities and county towns; churches, restaurants and nurseries; the ones in the worst condition were village halls, rural primary schools, and cinemas. Council offices are symbolic institutions of political power; restaurants can be symbolic places of financial prestige; the good condition of churches was a manifestation of the compromise between the communist state and the churches in “late socialism”. The good condition of nurseries was a result of the reigning attitude in the eighties, as the expression “investment in the future” shows. The very bad condition of village halls, small schools and cinemas expressed the submissive role of culture and education.

In 2005 the hierarchy of different kinds of institutions was less definite; the differences were expressed more among different items of the same type of institution. While earlier the centralised power determined the possibilities of the institutions, after the system changes several factors of differentiation appeared, and the variability of the condition of institutions has increased.

2. Internal hierarchy of institutions

Another form of hierarchy is internal to institutions. We can recognise the symbolic signs of this hierarchy, if we register the dissimilarity between the level of comfort and the visual state of rooms used by managers, directors, bosses on the one hand, and on the other the rooms provided for white-collar and other workers at the same institutions.

(a) A very important element of the symbolism of power is the wall behind the boss's chair. The symbolic suggestion of this part of the space: *who* or *what* is behind, at the back of the manager (who or what is his/her supporter). In 1985 this symbolism was determined by the one-party system, by communist ideology. There were portraits of the "Fathers", the Marxist "Holy Trinity": Marx, Engels and Lenin, or Lenin alone. Lenin as the embodiment of Soviet supremacy was indispensable. His portraits were rather varied. We could draw up a Lenin-iconography: the more bureaucratic bosses were drawn towards the stern official portraits of Lenin, the more liberal bosses used pictures of Lenin in a less "official" mode (for example, crouching on a staircase). These portraits and the national coat of arms behind the boss suggested that his supporter was the political power, the dominant ideology itself. But there were also other signs of power behind the boss, with many symbolic signs of victory; the signs of successes of the institution (medals, cups, honorary diplomas). These "meant": the power of this boss was also based on his successes; i.e., the authorities recognised his achievements. The bosses used some other symbols on this wall: mostly military symbols and symbols of cultural authority.

After the system changed, so did these signs of power. In 2005 we saw no relics of communist ideology. Instead there are pictures that symbolise cultural-historical traditions. No more symbols of only one ideology: the monolithic party-power was followed by a multi-party system; the one-sided political power was followed by a society governed by different (economic, financial and political) interests. The power of a chief is not based on his or her unilateral loyalty. A significant expression of these changes is that there is "nobody" behind the bosses' back. Sometimes we can see symbols of state authority, such as the Hungarian coat of arms, and Hungarian and EU-flags. (Sometimes the arrangement of these flags copies that of the presidential office in the USA.) But the most typical place for the boss's chair is in front of a window. What is behind the manager? The life of the street. It is a symbol of democratic legitimisation, and of a close connection to reality. Since the window has become the "main wall", the curtain has become one of the most important symbols of prestige.

(b) Some signs of power remained. The objects and pictures, which suggest the atmosphere of history, the measure or the (antique) style of tables and wardrobes, and their ornaments refer to power at any time.

(c) In 1985 almost every boss's room had three parts, three spaces: the writing table, the desk and its surroundings (like the conning tower of a ship); a long conference table with hierarchical seating, and a coffee table with comfortable armchairs for “informal”, “unofficial” communication. In 2005 there was an interesting change: the conference table was generally connected to the desk – this change can express the increasing importance of communication and team-work.

(d) After the system changed, signs of local authority became more important. This is another symbolic sign of decentralisation. In 1985 it was very rare, but in 2005 flags, coats of arms, and local maps were designed for even the smallest villages, and used in different rooms of local council offices; these local signs are imprinted on different objects.

(e) The monopolistic position of managers (and its signs in the manager's rooms) was a further typical symbols of the internal hierarchy. The bosses *monopolised* the objects of *comfort* (refrigerator, comfortable armchairs, divans). The objects of *communication* (newspapers, TV, videos, telephones, computers) and some objects of their rooms suggest *secrecy* (safe, padded door).

There were some remarkable changes in 2005. Namely, objects of comfort also appear in the rooms of subordinates, and bosses have new symbols of prestige. These last (laptop, mobile phone, DVD-player, etc.) express a new, more mobile style, a more independent form of managerial work. The symbolic function of telephones also changed. In 1985 the number of telephones was a symbol of prestige. (Some of the leaders had 4, 5 or 6 telephones on their desks, expressing their importance. It was the main function of this phenomenon, because nobody can use more than two telephones at the same time.) In 2005 traditional phones were changed to mobiles, and now the type, quality, brand, high-tech functions of the mobiles (private mobiles, official mobiles, etc.) have become new symbols of status.

(f) In 1985, in the time of centralised power, the objects representing achievements of the institutions (cups, diplomas, etc.) were also exhibited in the bosses' rooms. In 2005 we observed signs of decentralisation in this respect: the majority of relics of successes can be found in common areas. This suggests that the successes of the leader are not connected only with the leader, but are the results of teamwork; they are achievements of the whole institution.

(g) Lastly, we could observe changes in the proportion of the three types of power (economic, political and intellectual-academic). In the fifties an unambiguous dominance of the political power was significant. In 1985 there was a balance of the three types of power. In 2005 we observed the dominance of economic, financial power. (In the institutions it was expressed, for example, by the multiplication of advertisements, the emphasis on the role of money, the increased importance of sponsors, the thematisation of competitions, and financial results.)

3. *The “Potemkin syndrome”*

The well-known story: Prince Potemkin invited Catherine the Great to show her the development of the county, and a new village was built for the visit. But only the front side, the front walls of the houses were made; behind these walls there was nothing. The essence of this story lies in the contrast between the visible and invisible, the illusion and the reality – such is the symbolic sign of a highly hierarchical world, where the opinion of the authority is the most important factor. This phenomenon is characteristic of different societies and different cultures, and in varying degrees. There is a very lucid analysis by Janos Kleinesel (1981), who compares the Scandinavian type of Protestant tradition with the Catholic culture of the Habsburg empire, and points out the dominance of the “Potemkin syndrome” in the latter. In the first model the exterior of buildings is simple, but the inner parts have an intimate and cosy character; the main values came from Puritanism; in the second model, the exterior has a bigger importance. The main aim is representation; the decoration and the symbolic signs of power are very important; there is a great distance between up and down. The buildings of the second model show everything upward and outward.

The majority of our institutions wear signs of the “Potemkin syndrome”. The changes in the last twenty years were not significant in this area. The “Potemkin syndrome” appears in three relations, three types of contrast: First, there is a sharp contrast between the front of the institution facing the street, and the back of the institution. (The front is in a relatively good condition; renovated, decorated, etc. The back of the building is in a worse condition, the walls crumbling, rubbish accumulating around them.) Second, there is a similar contrast between front gardens and back

gardens. The front gardens are well-kept, with a lot of flowers, while the back gardens grow wild, and are often the place where rubbish and building refuse is dumped. The third contrast is between the visible and invisible parts of the institutions. (Invisible parts are for example cellars, lower parts and landings on staircases, places under counters, and so on.) The contrast appears in most of cases as the difference between order and disorder or as the difference between new or renewed parts and neglected parts. These different signs of the “Potemkin syndrome” were very frequent not only in 1985, but nowadays also, and symptomatic signs can be seen in every kind of institutions (even in churches).

4. Changes of civilized conditions (condition of lavatories, toilets)

As Norbert Elias wrote, one of the main indicators of the development of civilization are the methods of alimentation and excretion. Some years ago the distance between living standards and civilizational development of Western and Eastern Europe was very perceptible in the better and worse condition of toilets.

In 1985 the toilets of Hungarian institutions were generally in very bad condition; many were without running water, and there was a very great difference between cities and villages. Moreover, there was also a rather great difference between the Eastern and the Western parts of Hungary.¹

In 2005 we found much better conditions: running water, drainage, cleanliness, repaired rooms, nice tiles. At schools and nurseries there were separate toilets for boys and girls – as a sign of individualisation. This was not typical twenty years ago. The general effect is very good. But we do not want to hide the fact that in 2005 we were unable to visit as many small villages as we did in 1985, so our sample is not fully representative. Neither do we want to conceal the fact that, while the majority of analysed toilets were in good condition, the conditions of others have declined in a short time because of careless usage.

5. Individualisation – Changes of values

The history of modern societies is marked by the increase of individualism and individualisation. This process became widespread in the 17–18th

centuries in the most developed countries (cf. Habermas 1962). However, in Eastern Europe it happened more slowly; for example, in Hungary individualisation started in the 19th century and became widespread in the 1960s.

In the sixties, individualisation conquered private life. It was very impressive in housing: the building of separate bedrooms, bathrooms, children's rooms are a symbolic sign of individualisation, because the main function of these rooms is in connection with the possibility of having privacy and intimacy. These rooms appear everywhere, when the importance of individuality become one of the main values. In Hungary these kinds of rooms appeared and spread even in small villages in the sixties.

In the eighties, individualisation also contributed to public life. The elements of the individualistic value system became central values in society. Competition (among individuals) became a key value. Individual efforts and results were emphasised versus efforts and results of communities. Private, individual responsibility was emphasised over state responsibility. Neo-liberal ideology reached a dominant position in the economy (and after the system change it penetrated healthcare, education, culture, research funding); the market became the bases for every choice. At the time of the system change, the welfare model of capitalism seemed to have won over communism; but in recent decades the neo-liberal model of capitalism has begun to displace the welfare model.

The individualisation process has positive and negative aspects. Its positive aspects are, for example, the possibilities of having privacy, intimacy, independence. Some of the negative aspects of individualisation are the absence of solidarity, alienation, loneliness of individuals, the generation gap, ruthless competition, frustration, and anxiety.

We can see a lot of symbolic signs of individualisation in our surroundings. For one, we find more and more private spaces in institutions, more and more space for talking, for relaxing, for private meetings, etc. Also, the designers of institutions tend to divide up the large spaces (spaces for masses), replacing them with intimate corners and sitting places. We also find more and more signs of personal achievements on display, and people surround themselves with personal objects (souvenirs, gadgets), thus personalizing their workplaces. They show events of their private life (birth of children, weddings, etc.). If a colleague dies, they create a memorial to his or her memory.

There is a special sign of individualisation at schools. In the sixties a strict line of seats was typical; the school-desks were clipped together. In 1985 the seating was a little less rigid; then a typical form was a table for two persons with two chairs behind it. In 2005 the line of seats sometimes was replaced by a circle of tables and chairs, or a round table. Sometimes we can find a table and chair for one person: everybody has a private – and mobile – sitting place. This particular trend has also spread to churches, where traditional, long seats have been replaced with separate, moveable chairs.

6. Symbolic signs of ideologies

One of the most impressive changes of the last fifteen years was the change of ideological signs. In 1985 the symbols of the Marxist-Leninist ideology dominated the visual effects of the institutions. Five pointed stars (pentagrams), portraits of Lenin or the aforementioned “Holy Trinity” were everywhere; with a lot of formal slogans, and signs of formal official celebrations around them. The militaristic character had lessened since the fifties, but some signs of it remained visible, even at schools. (At that time the main associative circle around socialist ideology was the atmosphere redolent of the “happy days of youth”.)

It is a self-evident fact that the Marxist-Leninist ideology was totally gone in 2005. Some symbols of it might be found in special restaurants, where these relics played a double role; mostly they are a means of irony, a caricaturist reflection of a dead system, but at the same time they could be instruments of nostalgia for believers in “socialism”. We were eager to know which ideology had taken its place in the last decades.

6.1. Religious symbols

We supposed that we would find a lot of symbols of rehabilitated religion. This hypothesis was verified only partially. In 1985 Marxism was the official “religion”, which used many elements of religious symbolism. Communist heroes were portrayed as “saints”, sometimes with a halo of light around their head. Communist slogans were similar to religious slogans such as “Faith, Hope, Love” and the like; the “communist future” had a similar character, something like the Christian “heaven” and similar.

At that time the signs of religion (in the traditional sense) were visible only in churches. After the system change, the official “quasi-religion” disappeared and freedom of worship was restored. Some schools became ecclesiastical (again), crosses (and sometimes Menorahs, as well as symbols of Buddhism and other exotic religions) appeared in public squares. We could find some symbolical signs of traditional religion (crucifix, Bible, angels, saints, Virgin Mary, doves and other symbols) at various places – not only in churches and ecclesiastical schools, but in nurseries, state schools (as themes of children’s drawings or other decorations), in libraries, and even in some restaurants²). But this tendency did not become general.

6.2. Symbols of the “green” ideology

The idea of environmental protection became popular in the last decades of the twentieth century. This “ideology” has a lot of manifestations in different institutions. At schools and nurseries there are green corners; rooms and corridors of institutions are sometimes overwhelmed by green flowers; there are collections of samples of natural beauty (rocks, shells, etc.); many photos of beautiful landscapes; several notice boards, bearing posters with the themes of environmental or health protection. They often thematically portray the danger of pollution, assorted healthy and unhealthy foods; they also contrast the facts of pollution with the beauty of untouched nature. Gardens became organic parts of institutions, and are much better cultivated than earlier. Restaurants set up more and more sitting places in their gardens. In short: Nature became a key value.

6.3. Symbols of national identity

After the system change national ideology and national traditions received greater emphasis. Signs of national identity are found in different institutions. National colours (red-white-green) are emphasised on different objects. National flags fly at almost every institution, but after the system change they also appeared on private houses and in the gardens of private houses, which became a sign of the emphasised declaration of national identity. In institutions the symbols of emphasised national identity are those of ancient Hungary or symbols of Hungarian conquerors (of the

9th century). A frequent symbol of national identity is the old map of the historical “Greater Hungary”, which shows the country before the Trianon decision. (After the First World War, the Trianon Decision caused Hungary to give up two thirds of its former territory.) Glorious events of national history, famous representatives of national art, national sport heroes are also frequent symbols of national identity. We often find their representations at schools and other institutions (nurseries, restaurants and naturally in council offices). Sometimes we can find national symbols (for example, flags) even in churches: religion and national feeling are connected. National identity is also closely connected to tradition. For a long time, it was a guarding of peasant traditions. It is an interesting change that in the last two decades “tradition” has become associated with a higher social status, and the guarding of traditions has been concentrated rather on those of the nobility and the *bourgeoisie*.

6.4. Symbols of the EU

The symbolic signs of the EU are presented as representations of a new (artificial) meta-national identity. In Hungary these symbols are most used by the liberal and socialist parties. The EU has only a few symbols: the obligatory flags, the stars of the EU, maps (showing members of the EU). We can find information posters, about EU tenders, or about different courses, which prepare their participants for accommodation to different expectations of the EU. A special symbol is the “EU-tree”: in some places memorial saplings are planted on the day Hungary joined the EU.

6.5. Symbols of consumption

The ideology of market and consumption has become the strongest of all ideologies since the system change. The main signs of this ideology are as follows: a plethora of advertising;³ cults of money, riches, and celebrities (these cults appear in many elements of everyday life: on posters, in newspapers, on TV, etc.). A typical instrument of this cult of money the slot machine; this instrument of gambling appears in nearly every place of amusement. Symbolic messages of media enforce the idea that the aim of life is amusement, consumption, and hedonistic pleasures.

The “flagship” of the mainstream is the US; hence symbols of the US are closely connected with this ideology. Symbols of the US (and Anglo-Saxon world) have become status symbols, signifying richness and the (successful) market-economy. These have penetrated into various areas of everyday life. Signs of this process include: the prestige of the Anglo-American language; Anglo-American trademarks; the celebration of typical Anglo-American holidays (Halloween, Valentine’s Day, Challenge Day); increasing popularity of typical Anglo-American sports (baseball, golf, basketball); and the successes of American products (such as Coca Cola or McDonalds), which embody a typical feeling and way of life.

If in 1985 we could draw up a Lenin-iconography, in 2005 we could have drawn up one for Coca Cola.⁴ Signs for this beverage appeared everywhere, even in nurseries, party headquarters, etc., and in very different forms. Coca Cola advertisements appear in different sizes, from match-boxes to the bulkheads of multi-storied houses; on different objects (parasols, sunshades, fences, signboards, posters, kitchen counters, on refrigerators, and so on). The “Coca Cola Universe” spans the whole century: there are old advertisements which breathe the atmosphere of nostalgia, and there are pictures of young (dynamic and carefree) men and women, who wear up-to-date clothes and present the signs of fashionable behaviours. Coca Cola sometimes gets into very strange contexts: we can see, for example, a Coca Cola advertisement next to a Che Guevara poster (in a club), or a huge Coca Cola advertisement in the entrance of the office of the formal communist party. Coca Cola has a very wide circle of symbolic associations. It is a symbol of the American way of life; a symbol of the “free world”, the symbol of richness and a high standard of living; the symbol of modernity, the symbol of urban civilisation and sometimes the symbol of uniformity, the symbol of unhealthy life styles, etc.

6. Conclusion

To sum up: the change in the political system provoked a lot of changes in the visual and symbolic sign systems of Hungarian institutions. One part of the changes is a result of the advance of Hungarian society as one of the central countries of the European Union, by making accommodations to a higher civilizing standard and more democratic forms. Other changes reflect the transformation of value systems (individualisation, dominance

of market economy, and so on). The changes of symbolic elements of our visual surroundings are results and – *last but not least* -- instruments of the transformation of society's values, ideologies, and systems of political power.

Notes

1. The reason for this may be explained by the fact that the Danube – the Roman Empire's border – was a demarcation between “civilized” and “non-civilized”; the consequences of this gap, according to one theory, exert an influence on the mentality and the cultural traditions of people who live on opposite sides of the Danube, which flows through the middle of Hungary.
2. It depends on personal leanings: if the owner of a restaurant, or the director of a library is religious, he can (and may) put a cross or an icon on the wall.
3. A bibliography of advertising would fill an entire library. Our main “guides” were Packard (1964), Baudrillard (1984), Pratkanis & Aronson (1992).
4. Coca Cola has become an idol, a product with its own mythology, in the same sense as Roland Barthes (1957) uses this category; hence to draw up its “iconography” would be a normal task for a cultural anthropologist.

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Kim Soo Hwan

Montage vs photogénie

Cinema and mythological language

One of the most dominant topics in semiotics of cinema elaborated in the West in the 1960s and early 1970s was the “verbal-visual nexus” in cinema. The interdependence of the verbal and the visual in cinema has been asserted, denied, and generally critiqued by film theoreticians. The coexistence of iconic and conventional sign-process in a filmic text is an unavoidable theoretical subject for semiotics of cinema.

On the other hand, the dichotomy between the verbal and the visual opens up a host of further, directly or indirectly related problems. Specifically, the opposition between two different aesthetic positions is manifested as “montage” vs “*photogénie*”. Montage theory was based on aesthetic of narrative structure, that is, the *language-based* aesthetic, and thus reflected the rationalistic character of that aesthetic, whereas the term “*photogénie*” implies a dimension which exceeds language and thus embodies the indeterminate character of an *image-based* aesthetic. As is well known, the concept of *photogénie*, generated by the French Impressionists in the 1920s, was designed to account for that which is inarticulable, that which exceeds language and hence points to the (visual) essence of cinematic specificity; it “names a supplementarity, an enhancement, that which is added to an object in the process of its subjection to a photographic medium” (Doane 2003: 89).

From the semiotic viewpoint, *photogénie* is associated with the indexical aspect of cinema, rather than the iconic. Of course, photographic (and cinematic) image has iconicity in that image resembles what it represents, but in respect of sign type it corresponds more to indexical sign. Photographic image, made by mechanical reproduction (by camera) first of all – is a “trace” (imprint) of referent, which is related with the sign not by rule of resemblance but on the principle of contiguity and causality in Peirce’s sense (Peirce 1931–58: 281, 554): *Photogénie* is pure fact of presentation, of

showing – a “here it is”, while montage is always a relation (“collision” for Eisenstein), a connecting of parts; *photogénie*, as a rule, is an autonomous entity, a “for itself.”

But what is more problematic in this concept is its semantic aspect. The concept of *photogénie* as autonomous entity seems to be aiming at a certain level of “beyond” the cultural signification. Paraphrasing Barthes’s terminology, we could say: whereas the iconic sign process in cinema is still regulated by the rule of “cultural code” and for that reason can be regarded as “*studium*”, the photogenic level in cinema seems to verge on the zone of “*punctum*”. It is not the domain of communicative and symbolic meaning, conditioned by cultural context. Rather, it comes to “break through” the complacency of that first. It is what “pricks,” “wounds” and “bruises” me, but at the same time I can’t grasp its meaning clearly – it is a certain “outside (*hors-champs*)” of the meaning (Barthes 1981). As is well known, in another article on cinema Barthes proposed to call this “excessive” level of signification the “obtuse meaning”:

As for the other meaning, the third, the one “too many”, the supplement that my intellection cannot succeed in absorbing, at once persistent and fleeting, smooth and elusive, I propose to call it *the obtuse meaning* ... it already provides us with a theory of the supplementary meaning ... the obtuse meaning appears to extend outside culture, knowledge, information. (Barthes 1977: 54–55)²

It is hard to say what exactly Barthes meant when he called this inarticulable level “the filmic”, but there is one thing we can say with certainty: whatever it might be, it’s not the same as the iconic sign. That dimension of “the other,” which is not fully covered by the process of cultural signification, obviously verges on a zone “beyond” semiotics, so to speak, “outside culture, language and codes”.

We can sum up the main question as follows: how can semiotics of cinema deal with this elusive and ineffable phenomenon, which is extremely hard to manipulate? Two paths might be taken. The first: we can resolutely refuse this “other” dimension of meaning, adhering to the classical position of film semiotics, regarding all iconic level in cinema as culturally coded. The second: we can decisively throw out a few basic assumptions crucial to the semiotics of cinema, already by and large relying on the phenomenological position. While the former asserts that there is no com-

pletely autonomous cinematic image which is outside of cultural codes (Eco 1985),³ the latter insists that cinematic image isn't a sign (system) in origin (Ямпольский 2004).⁴

What I intend to try in this paper is not groping for a final solution for this dilemma. Rather, my question is quite simple. Do ways exist for seeing this specific kind of cinematic phenomenon whose domain cannot seem to be explicated fully by the semiotic model, not just rejecting it altogether or allocating it to a transcendental (mysterious or subjective) realm? Then, will there be any alternative way to explain this, admitting the problematic aspect of this situation? In the following, I will try to demonstrate how U. Lotman's view on cinema, in particular, his thought on the "mythological" essence of cinema, can provide productive insight on this question. In the course of this argumentation I hope that the profound meaning of this important "the other" in modern film theory and its inevitable (supplementary) value for semiotics of cinema can be revealed.

First of all, it is noteworthy that Lotman's interest in mythological essence of cinema is far from being the main part of his semiotics of cinema. On the contrary, we have to say that it is extremely marginal. Naturally, we can't find his interest in myth around such familiar topics as the problem of cinematic language system (montage) or correlation of two different (conventional and iconic) sign processes in cinema. Rather, it is found at the most elementary level of cinematic phenomenon – namely, the problem of (re)presenting humans on the screen. Lotman's idea in relating cinema with myth is originally derived from the question of appearance of a person on the screen.

This question, which is essentially associated with those problematic concepts that I have already mentioned – Epstein's "*photogénie*" and Barthes's "obtuse meaning" – was, as is well known, at the same time the main topic for the film theory of B. Balazs in the name of "visible man" (Balazs 1924). According to Lotman, this question "created a situation which was so new, in a semiotic sense, that it was not a question of mechanical development of some already existing tendencies, but of creating a new language" (Lotman 1976: 85).

Then, in which sense and to what extent does this elementary level of cinematic representation have something in common with "the mythological"? Before answering this question, we have to know what Lotman means by the notion of "myth". Lotman's interest in myth is not about a specific

narrative text or structure of mythological plots. Speaking of “the mythological” he always means myth as a specific “phenomenon of consciousness”, according to which a special (mythological) type of world model is constructed (Lotman & Uspenskij 1977: 234).

In the mythological world, the governing rule of semiosis is quite different from the ordinary type. According to Lotman, “in a mythological world ... a quite specific type of semiosis occurs, which amounts to a process of naming: the sign in mythological consciousness is analogous to a proper name” (ibid.: 235). In myth everything – not only human beings but also all objects – has its own name. An object’s appellative in the mythological world also has its individual proper name (Roland’s sword is *Durendal* and Sigfried’s sword is *Balmung*).

The proper name is itself a quite specific component in our natural language. Name does not mean certain abstract model of object, or conception about it, but only designates the object to which this name is ascribed. As Roman Jakobson has properly commented, “proper name ... takes a particular place in our linguistic code ... there are many dogs called Fido, but they do not share any property of ‘Fidones’” (1971: 131). Owing to its principal individuality (singularity), the proper name is not able to be translated to any abstract generalized sign. It is not a sign, which can be separable from object being signified, but is its indivisible feature.

But an even more important feature of mythological semiosis in relation to the proper name is its supremely “intimate” character. Using proper name does not only mean the principle of “singularity” of the object being referred to. This single object must be directly known to the one who calls it; a name “Mary” can acquire its genuine meaning only for the person who knows the woman called by that name. Therefore, as far as everything (even object-things) has its own name in this world, this world is made up of extremely “intimate” relations. In a world where everything is called by proper names, everything must be extremely well known, familiar and intimate to everyone.

It is not difficult to understand to what extent all of these features characteristic of “the mythological” are also essential for cinema. According to Lotman, presenting everything as something old, kind, familiar and so closely correlated with people, is not just a typical feature of myth, but also of cinema. If a portrait can be regarded as a “proper name in the language of plastic art”, this definition fits even better for cinema. In a certain

sense, cinema is none other than a proper-name world, where we can see a series of images-shots “portraying” someone or something. Just as every common noun in myth can be functionally equated to a proper name, cinema transforms whatever it films into an extremely intimate thing, which is characterized as non-repeatable individuality. And exactly this kind of “mythologizing” role in cinema, according to Lotman, is played by the “close-up”:

The close-up in cinema can voluntarily be associated with seeing a live human face at extremely close distance, seeing – typical for a child’s or a very intimate world. Cinema brings us to the world, where every person appearing on screen – friend and enemy – is interrelated with spectators in an extremely close, intimate relationship. The relationship in this case means not only knowing an actor’s character in detail, but directly seeing wrinkles on his face and the minute pulsing of his veins. (Lotman 1998: 658, translation mine)

Close-up in cinema – it is seeing a human face very closely. In Lotman’s context this can actually mean that in cinema we don’t see a human face as a common name, but as a proper name. What we see in cinema by close-up is not (only) a “role” of an actor, but the “actor” himself as a proper name. He is an individual singularity, which in essence can’t be translated (that is, generalized) into common names.

The problem is that the “face” of an actor, or more accurately, the image of his face on screen, can hardly be completely explained as a “cultural sign”. Of course, his face, his body, and further, all of his “techniques of body” (Буракова 2005) can be regarded as cultural signs and interpreted as such. They can be described in various axiological, ethic and aesthetic categories, and these categories themselves are also changing by cultures and ages.⁵ But is that really all? All together with these, on screen we come to see an actor as a phenomenological object. It is the face of man as *punctum*, which can never be fully “used up” by the *studium*. Quoting J. Aumont, we can say: this face is a book, a “readable text” that demands to be read, but at the same time it is a deeply experienced entity, a “sensible thing” that is to be an object of affection (Aumont 1992: 85).

The human face is the very best site for experiencing “excessive” sensual meaning. As is well known, exactly in this site Epstein, Balazs and Barthes sought to affirm the existence of the problematic “other” level of significa-

tion – an autonomous entity as potential semiotic threat. The close-up, which once had so deeply fascinated Epstein – he called it “soul of the cinema” (Epstein 1977: 9) – was at the same time one of the main topics in the so-called “physiognomic” film theory of B. Balazs (1953).⁶ Just like all common names functionally changed into proper names, the close-up transforms whatever it films into a quasi-tangible thing, producing intense “phenomenological” experience of presence.

What I want specially to emphasize here is the principle of “alterity” of mythological semiosis in Lotman’s concept. According to Lotman, “from the viewpoint of the development of semiosis, mythological consciousness can be interpreted as <asemiotic>” (Lotman & Uspenskij 1977: 236). It must be taken as “asemiotic” exactly – it can’t be “nonsemiotic”, for example, because it refers to the “outside” (beyond the bounds) of semiosis rather than just denying it, as it just goes with the notion of *photogénie*: “Epstein’s *photogénie* – the invocation of an otherwise unknown dimension, a radically defamiliarized alterity” (Doane 2003: 91).

The unquestionable advantage of Lotman’s association of cinema with myth is that in his idea we don’t have to set aside (that is, transcendentalize) this “asemiotic” dimension of signification as some mysterious “thing-in-itself”. In the theoretical framework of Lotman, we could have a chance to admit positively this “other” level of semiosis in the name of “the mythological”. Obviously, it might not be the one which could be reconstructed “as it is” by our ordinary natural language. Nevertheless, we could affirm its undeniable existence and constant influence left in the form of trace: in poetic metaphor,⁷ in children’s child’s semiosis and particularly in the proper name. According to Lotman, the asemiotic level of mythological type is just “another” legitimate side of semiosis, which expresses an essential property of our consciousness – namely, the “heterogeneity” principle of our thought (Lotman & Uspenskij 1977: 239).

Actually, this heterogeneity must be proved in one more important moment – namely, in the “pragmatic” aspect of mythological semiosis. The mythological type of communication is in essence an “I – I communication” (autocommunication) rather than an ordinary type of “I – (s) he communication”. (Myth always speaks about me, and its meaning is tautological in principle.) This aspect would be the key for explication of the indispensable “subjectivity”, crucial to the concept of *photogénie* (and *punctum*). But this will be the subject for another separate article.

So, what Lotman's mythology tells us again in relation to the "another" dimension of cinematic signification is the principle of "heterogeneity" of our consciousness and culture. Apparently, we are still more accustomed to making extinct the dichotomy between various oppositional parts: language vs image, symbol vs icon, the logical vs the sensual and *montage vs photogénie*. A more productive next step must be taken in the direction of finding some "mixed" area, by which we can prove the imperative necessity of their coexistence and interplay. For instance, an attempt to find a "phenomenological" aspect in montage theory or to verify reflection of "proto-logical" thinking in Eisenstein's sensual images (Ямпольский 2004; Yampolsky 1993) would be appropriate examples of this. But in order to do that, first of all semiotics of cinema itself has to develop so that it could meet the quite "unfamiliar self" inside oneself.

Not long before passing away, Lotman expressed his wish for the Moscow-Tartu School as follows. It seems also to be relevant for semiotics of cinema today:

Scientific thought ends up when its bearer starts to make every effort to protect purity of principles. The snake, as symbol of wisdom, grows up, throwing off its skin. The idea also develops, outgrowing itself. (Lotman 1994: 501 translation mine).

Notes

1. "Photographs, especially instantaneous photographs, are very instructive, because we know that in certain respects they are exactly like the objects they represent. But this resemblance is due to the photographs having been produced under such circumstances that they were physically forced to correspond point by point to nature. In that aspect, then, they belong to the ... class of signs ... by physical connection [the indexical class]." Peirce, *CP*: 281, 554.
2. According to Barthes, this third meaning constitutes the essence of cinema, what he calls "the filmic", which "begins only where language and metalanguage end" (Barthes 1977: 64).
3. "A semiotic of film is possible if one accept that semiotics is neither a province nor a byproduct of linguistics. But one should at the same time accept the hypothesis that movie images 'say' something and, since not everybody understands them, there must be semiotic rules governing this kind of communication ... A semiotics of cinema and film is still to be completely

- outlined. But its laws lie outside cinema and film, they are the laws of signification in general” (Eco 1985: 206).
4. “Today, I think, the most important thing is to abandon the assumption that the essence of cinema – whether it is iconic sign or not – is a sign process, and that we must regard it as a specific kind of sign system. In our consciousness we never operate with iconic signs, which are given to us as a representation of something not here existing” (Iampolsky 2004: 10, translation mine).
 5. Oksana Bulgakova’s (2005) latest study on how cinematic “gestures” become signs might be taken as the best example of this position.
 6. “But the camera gets so close to the face that it can show ‘micro-physiognomic’ details even of ... regions of the face which are scarcely or not at all under voluntary control” (Balazs 1953: 74). For Balazs, the close-up image is inherently anthropomorphic; it always represents a face, human or otherwise.
 7. Strictly speaking, poetic metaphor is not mythological. It is “a natural translation of the myth in our habitual forms of consciousness” (Lotman and Uspenskij 1977: 240; hence the fundamental distinction between myth and metaphor.

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Karel Kleisner and Anton Markoš

Mutual understanding and misunderstanding in biological systems mediated by self-representational meanings of organisms

1. Three models in biosemiotics

The key word in our title is *mutual*. We maintain that, for a genuine biosemiotics, it is necessary to develop a model of a biosphere of communicating, semiotic entities. To illustrate this need, we briefly describe three competing models, each in some context labeled “semiotic” by various authors.

(1) At the level of *organic codes* (Barbieri 2003), the task is to produce a reliable translation of one coding system into another, according to a given and finite coding table. Hence, what is given beyond the physical system are rules obeyed by either a sentient being or by *hardware* of a sort. It follows that, at this level, the quasi-semiotic process does *not* require understanding, and no meaning is being extracted during the process. Examples of this level include the genetic code, signaling cascades, and perhaps also the bacterial biosphere. All cybernetic networks are included at this level.

(2) The second level concerns the understanding of signs in one’s Umwelt. The being (animal) recognizes signs in its environment and reacts to them accordingly. The paradigmatic example here is that of the “oak tree”, as given by Jakob von Uexküll (Fig. 1).

The tree is perceived differently in the various Umwelten of different living beings (the forester, the girl, an occasional tramp, the insect inhabitants of the tree, etc.). The tree, however, has no say in *how* it will be present in those Umwelten. It is passive in relation to them as is, say, a stone or a cloud. More precisely: like a stone or a cloud, it also can evoke meanings



Figure 1. Different interpretations of the “same” oak tree in the *Umwelten* of a forester and a frightened girl (after Uexküll 1956).

for all those beings, but without manifesting any interest from its side, nor putting forth any effort to signify something.

(3) Finally, there is a level of shared space and of mutually and deliberately influencing other players in the game, by recognizing them *as* possible receivers of the message. On this level belongs the concept of *biosphere*, the Heideggerian concept of being-together (*Mitsein*), and Portmann’s notion of self-representation (*Selbstdarstellung*). Here, all living beings communicate *actively* with their co-habitants in the environment, and in doing so display the whole gamut of interactions: orders, deceit, mutual warnings, consensus, mimicry, and more. What living beings communicate here is the presentation and perception of likeness; i.e., a gestalt of *some* cues by which a being gives itself to others, and which others will recognize as such. We maintain that deep understanding of one’s partner(s) is a prerequisite of such phenomena. Here, we shall concentrate on this level at which meaning is communicated.

2. Self-representation

Adolf Portmann suggested that the visible surfaces of living organisms represent new kinds of organ; these perform the self-representation of the inwardness of organisms and interactions among organisms: “Such a surface is not merely a ‘border’, not just a barrier for the containment of an inner milieu or for the safeguarding of metabolism, that is, for mechanical

protection. No. This surface becomes an organ with entirely new potentialities. ... The surface display is a part of the presentation of self of a living being” (Portmann 1990: 25).

In line with this view, the expressive pigmentation patterns and integument ornaments on outermost surfaces are conceived as a non-random, active achievement of a specific kind or lineage of organism. These organism surfaces, which may be quite intricate, play a semantic role; and despite their superficial nature, they are as important as other biologically adaptive structures. In what follows, we introduce different types of outermost organization developed by living beings, with special attention paid to the importance of surface ornaments to the mutual interplay between and within various life forms. We restrict our discussion here mainly to instances involving the optic channel of a receiver, though similar reasoning may be easily extended to other modes of perception, such as chemical, electrical, acoustic, tactile, and more.

Various shapes, patterns and colorations have evolved according to how they are perceived by another party, which recognizes them as a sign and interprets them within a specific context. As such, the external appearances of different life forms may be divided into those that play primarily a signaling role and those that do not, or those that take on such a role secondarily. As a good example of the latter, consider the semi-transparent bodies of embryos or of adult animals that inhabit environments where visual perception is confined or disabled (e.g., troglobionts, pedobionts). It is highly probable that the evolutionary transition from nonspecific semi-transparent bodies to intricately structured opaque surfaces (or conversely to full transparency) such as pigment patterns, physical colorations, and integumental ornaments, varies according to the evolutionary appearance of sight. This was an important evolutionary event that led to increase of communicative abilities among organisms.

In Portmann’s view, an aptitude for mutual understanding arises from a living organism’s accentuation of selfhood. The importance of this self-relation is manifested by the vital processes of self-construction, self-maintenance, self-identification and, very clearly, by *self-representation*. These features, which characterize every living being, are precisely those lacking in inanimate nature. An organism’s *self-representation of inwardness* – i.e., the active presentation of the self, in which the very innermost is expressed via the very outermost – represents the keystone of Portmann’s biological

thought. This was aptly expressed by R. B. Carter in his assessment of Portmann's writings: "Thus whereas Galileo said, 'Nature likes to hide,' Portmann saw that nature likes to reveal, but that very revelation quite often hides precisely what it is which makes that revelation!" (Carter 1990: 268). Simply put: mutual understanding among organisms depends on what is exterior, exposed, and hence easily perceptible; it also depends on something internal, something deep down inside, which cannot be discovered in any simple way. In this sense, every mutual understanding is mediated, on the one hand, via the externalization of inwardness in a process of self-representation, and on the other hand, via the internalization of signals that fit meaningfully the inwardness of a receiver, in a process or mode not unlike that of empathy. This inwardness can never be fully unveiled or comprehended by a researcher. It may, however, be partially revealed by study of the outermost expressions of organisms, such as specific features that have emerged in the process of self-representation. One way to understand the innermost is to analyse that which is outermost. Portmann's concept of inwardness (*Innerlichkeit*) may rightly be taken as a parallel to Uexküll's term, *Umwelt*; both of these concepts stand for the *self-experience* of an organism, i.e., for something that cannot be directly apprehended by a human observer. An organism's experience of "self" was the main quarry of both Uexküll's and Portmann's biological research.

3. *Organs of self-representation (semes)*

To conceive of an organism's visible surfaces as *organs of self-representation* allows us talk about these entities in terms of homology and analogy. These last are crucial for comparative biology, which deals with parts of greater wholes, such as body parts, organs and even organic processes (Ghiselin 2005). Therefore, to conceptualize *organs of self-representation* within the context of analogy and homology may help us to understand the manifold diversity of organic surfaces in biological terms, such as function, form, organization, phylogeny etc. Such kinds of biological explanation are of course very important; but they are insufficient if we want to gain a full understanding of organs of self-representational meaning; this is because their nature is not objective but interpretative. These organs are always dependent on the aptitude of the receiver's perceptual world (*Umwelt*).

Nevertheless, if we want to submit these semantic organs to comparison in terms of homology and analogy, we should first specify exactly what we mean by the term *semantic organs of self-representation*. And yet, how can these entities be compared, or even defined, if, as we have said, their performance may change according to the perceptual aptitudes of an interpreter? Any rushed attempt at definition may potentially lead to an inappropriate objectification. Nevertheless, in what follows we shall establish a preliminary definition of semantic organs in animals, using optical examples, that is to say, the semantic organs perceived by the visual interpreter.

Animal surfaces represent organs (or rather, organ systems) which are just *as* real as the internal ones, such as liver, lungs, pancreas, nervous system, etc. This does not mean, however, that the properties of the internal anatomy and molecular constitution of an organism have no effect on its external display. Semantic organs are visible motifs of animal display that are partially dependent on both the outer (skin, coat) and the inner (skeleton, muscles) constitution of a body. As Portmann (1960: 222) has shown, the color of internal organ systems, such as blood vessels and molecular qualities of hemoglobin (redness), may also contribute to the external appearance of an animal. The organs of visible surfaces are co-structured by various constituents, in the same way as the lungs, for example, are interlaced with nerves, blood vessels, integuments, etc. Semantic organs of visible surfaces function meaningfully if interpreted by the seeing eyes of an interpreter. We have proposed that such *semantic* organs of visible surfaces be referred to as *semes* (Kleisner and Markoš 2005). Semes do not represent only the properties of a specific morphological arrangement of certain species, but rather they arise in the process of interpretation by being watched by a second party. Semes are coming into being during an interpretative act, so they are generated and specified in dependence on the Umwelt of an interpreter. Lastly, semes are shaped within the Umwelt of an animal where they are recognized as existent and potentially meaningful. In sum, *semes* as organs of visible (or anyhow perceptible) organic surfaces are, on the one hand, physically anchored in the inherited organization of the body of a living being; and on the other, their high profile is achieved in the act of interpretation within the Umwelt of a “seeing” organism.

4. *Mimicry and homosemiosis*

If self-representation is considered a genuine and important characteristic of living beings, then the acquisition, modification, or loss of a species-specific appearance is not to be counted as trivial, because these changes in the outermost level inform us about the internal changes of an organism. For example, take the numerous cases of mimicry where the appearance (and often the behavior) of a model is imitated by one or more mimicking species. In the case of Batesian mimicry, the model is somehow protected (e.g., by unpalatability, hurtful weapons, poison, etc.), whereas the mimics usually lack such protection. It is apparent that mimic organisms gain a selective advantage by adopting the *semes* of a model. In this respect, we can talk about a kind of *semetic parasitism*. But this great advantage in survival is necessarily connected with a less apparent disadvantage in terms of *self-representation*. That is to say, species-specific *semes* are traded for reproductive success. The self-representation of mimics no longer stands for the presentation of the self, but is rather the presentation of the *semes of a model* on the body of the mimic. In other words, the bodies of the mimics serve as a screen on which are projected the *semes* of the model. So, in fact, the mimic's display stands for the “self”-representation of the model.

The signaling role of a particular organismal display (a wasp-like pattern, for instance) influences not only the receivers; the bearer, too, is often “self-aware” of its “aposematic” vestment in the warning signal it emits; such is the case whether we are talking about the model (wasp) or the mimic (fake wasp), such as various hoverflies, clear-wing moths (*Sesia*), longhorn beetles (*Clytus*, *Plagionotus*, *Strangalia*), and so on.



Figure 2. Two unrelated species of insects displaying a homosemiotic, “wasp-like” pattern. Left: Longhorn beetle *Strangalia maculata* (Central Europe); right: Grasshopper *Phymateus saxosus* (East Africa).

The generation and use of warning coloration presupposes a certain “pre-understanding” on the part of the bearer as to the perceptual faculties (Umwelt) of the signal’s receiver. A trained human researcher can distinguish model organisms from their non-allied imitators. He will also note, for instance, the black and yellow pattern on the wing-cases of longhorn beetles as analogous (non-homologous) to what is seemingly the same pattern on the abdomen of a wasp – the patterns in question have different phylogenetic and developmental origins, despite all superficial similarity and congruence of warning functions. It does not matter, however, whether the wasp is a real wasp from the genus *Vespulla*, for instance, or an imitator from some other group. What matters is that both the real wasp and the fake wasp are interpreted as the same animal by the receiver (e.g., a predator). The mimic relies on the fact that its appearance and behavior will be interpreted by the receiver as wasp-like enough to avoid predation. We cannot say much about the inner characteristics of this reliance; but a lot of indirect evidence suggests that aposematically colored animals behave in ways that differ from the behaviours of cryptic ones (e.g., Wickler 1968). We propose the term *homosemiosis* for situations where signals (*semes*) emitted by model and mimic organisms are taken as the same in the receiver’s perceptual world (Umwelt). Homosemiotic organs are neither analogous nor homologous. Analogy means a correspondence in function (and similarity), but analogous organs are conceived as different organs (non-homologous). Homology is ontological sameness; homologous organs are the same organs because they are theoretically traceable to precursors in their immediately common ancestor, irrespective of function and similarity. Organs, by contrast, are *homosemiotic*, because they are recognized as the same organs in the Umwelt of the interpreting organism, irrespective of whether a human biologist sees them as analogues or homologues.

5. Concluding remarks

The self-presentation of organisms is the generator of semblances (*semes*) that play an important role in the evolution of communicative coupling among and within species. Based on the foregoing discussion, we propose adding a biosemiotic perspective to comparative-biological terminology, by introducing a new term *homosemiosis* (from Greek *homos* = same, *semeion* = sign), to describe phenomena resulting from a congruence of meaning.

The terms analogy, homology and homosemiosis can be defined in the following way: (1) *Analogy*: correspondence of different organs having the same function or being superficially similar; (2) *homology*: correspondence (sameness) of organs that are inherited from their precursors in the most recent common ancestor; (3) *homosemiosis*: correspondence of organs that are interpreted as the *same* organs in the Umwelt of a particular organism or group of organisms under investigation, irrespective of the developmental and phylogenetic origin of the organ.

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Tarja Knuuttila

An absent encyclopedia? Meaning making according to Umberto Eco

1. Introduction

How do we make sense of the signs, sentences and texts that saturate our lives? Quite instinctively, it seems. But a closer look will reveal how much is presupposed even by the simplest acts of understanding. Words do have several meanings, so do sentences and other expressions, depending on the context. What about written texts? Much collaboration is required from the part of the reader to fill in the gaps inherent in a text to give it its flesh, its content. And we are even able to agree on the meanings thus created, often.

How is all this possible? One obvious answer is that understanding builds on the common cultural background which we share. As members of the linguistic community we are supposed to use the same *cultural encyclopedia* which can be formulated as “the shared communal or cultural knowledge about the world, the cognitive background of world-construction and world-reconstruction” (Dolezel 1997: 18). But what insight does the very concept of encyclopedia offer us? Is it only another way of saying, once again – though this time using the metaphor of encyclopedia – that any understanding requires some pre-understanding. Apart from its intuitive appeal, is there anything else that the concept of encyclopedia can tell us about the nature of our meaning making?

In an effort to answer these questions I will study the concept of encyclopedia as presented by Umberto Eco. In the semiotic sphere, Eco is the one who has made most of the concept of encyclopedia. He has also taken seriously the challenge of theoretically explicating it. In his writings the encyclopedia occupies a central position – it forms the very background

of his semiotic and literary theory (see, e.g., Eco 1976, 1979a, 1984, 1997). However, despite the centrality of the notion of encyclopedia in Eco's semiotic theory, it is not clear whether it is the one and the same concept he refers to in his various writings. What is more, in spite of his efforts to stress the physical testability of sign-functions, he has been accused of "an idealist understanding of sign" – by, for instance, John Deely (1997: 83–84). In what follows, I will, on one hand, study the different forms of the notion of encyclopedia Eco invokes, and, on the other hand, inquire why and how Eco, who stresses the materiality of meaning making processes, can be claimed to have an idealistic and abstract concept of encyclopedia.

2. *The dictionary*

The first thing to note about the concept of encyclopedia is that there is a complementary notion of dictionary in contrast to which the notion of encyclopedia is being explained and understood. The idea is simply to distinguish between the knowledge of the semantics of a language and the knowledge of the real world. This idea dates back at least to John Locke, who wanted to know which complex ideas are known to us from experience and which are acquired via other ideas. Thus in line with this idea, encyclopedias relate words to extra-linguistic facts whereas dictionaries relate words to other words. Later, Bertrand Russell made a distinction between *object-words* and *dictionary words*. We acquire the meaning of the object-words by direct association between a word and a thing, whereas we learn the meaning of the dictionary words through verbal definition. However, for Russell, the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description varies between people, depending on their life-experience.

Eco, for his part, wants to show that the distinction between dictionary and encyclopedia is untenable *even* theoretically: linguistic knowledge and world knowledge coincide with each other. Eco launches his argument by examining the possibility of giving a componential analysis to meaning.

In the dictionary, the meaning of linguistic expressions is represented through a finite number of semantic primitives (which can be also called components, markers, units and so forth). In principle, the number of the primitives could also be infinite – but obviously this makes the task of componential analysis impossible. So, at least ideally, the dictionary

should be composed of a limited number of primitives. Then the problems are, first, how to determine the primitives and, second, how to guarantee that their number is finite.

Now Eco proceeds by claiming that the two questions cannot be solved at the same time. As different researchers propose different primitives, one can legitimately ask whether there actually are any primitives that would be intuitively known to all speakers. And if there are not, then the primitives should be interpreted, too. In order to make the primitives interpretable they would need to be considered as an unordered set and having cross-classificatory relations between them. But the only way to limit the number of the primitives is to have the meaning relations hierarchically structured. Consequently, either one has a limited number of uninterpreted primitives or, then, the primitives are interpreted but the meaning relations are unordered and potentially infinite. Thus we have arrived to the encyclopedia. The dictionary was but an encyclopedia in disguise.

3. *The encyclopedia*

The concept of encyclopedia preserves the idea of componential analysis, but denies that signs could be analytically reduced into a limited number of meaning components in any sensible way. In the case of an encyclopedia then, it is not reasonable to talk about primitives any longer. On the contrary, as we saw above, any analysis of meaning is potentially endless. A sign can invoke a limitless number of markers and this Eco explains by using the Peircean notion of *interpretant*. The only way to explain what a given sign means is to give another representation. A sign's interpretant can thus be defined as "another representation, which is referred to the same 'object'" (Eco 1976: 68). And of course the only way to establish an interpretant of the sign is by using another sign, which in turn invokes another interpretant, and so on.

From this insight Eco (1976) proceeds to his idea of *model Q*, which is devised in accordance with M. Ross Quillian's proposal for a model for semantic memory. Model Q is an n-dimensional network, where one can move from a sign (which is taken as a *type*, for example "type A") by employing a series of sign-vehicles to any other place in the network, from the center to the periphery. These sign-vehicles, as interpretants, are included in the model as *tokens*, but each of them becomes, in its turn, a new type,

for example “type B”. One can think of Model Q as an intertextual space or an ever-growing hypertext, where any point can be connected to another in a rhizomatic way.

This universe of meaning-units, the *Global Semantic System*, is one theoretical representation, which Eco (1976) has bestowed to his idea of encyclopedia. In practice, however, no single interpretative process is unlimited, and this Eco explains by the fact that some connections are statistically more probable than others. But the existence, at least virtual, of this Global Semantic System explains – according to Eco – for instance the phenomenon of metaphor. Metaphors are basically metonymical for Eco, instead of long laborious wandering through the encyclopedia one is sometimes able to make shortcuts through this intertextual space. Thus, that what seems to be a genuine invention is already implicated by the complicate networks of Global Semantic System. “The truth is”, claims Eco, “that the metaphor is the tool that permits us to understand the encyclopedia better” (1984: 129).

4. *Encyclopedias and competencies*

As a matter of fact, Eco approaches the notion of encyclopedia in quite a few ways, and it seems that it is not the same encyclopedia he talks about in his various writings (see Violi 1992). I would propose that Eco has principally two kinds of encyclopedias. The first of these is a kind of semantic intertextual space, as described by the Global Semantic System. The second is the encyclopedia of our linguistic or semantic competence. When exposing the encyclopedia as semantic competence, Eco is appealing to such notions as frames and scripts, used in the fields of cognitive psychology and Artificial Intelligence.

It seems questionable, however, whether these two types of encyclopedias are really the different sides of the same coin, as Eco’s texts seem to suggest. The Global Semantic System is decidedly something shared and extra-individual, whereas our competencies are not. Eco appears to claim that the concept of encyclopedia and the concept of encyclopedic competence are synonymous or, at least, they somehow explain each other. For Eco, our encyclopedic competencies consist of the parts of the global encyclopedia which are at our command. It is as if the Global Semantic System

was a common database for all of us, and our encyclopedic competencies consisted of our access to that database.

Still, individual competencies, semantic or other, are very different. So it seems that our abilities to use that database (presupposing that such a database exists) vary considerably. What are our abilities then made of? How are our competencies born? Surely this cannot be explained by the properties of the database only, and therefore, the relationship between our competencies and the Global Semantic System seems to be left in the air.

To be sure, Eco is not describing any individual or empirical competencies with his concept of encyclopedia but rather the competence of a whole (linguistic) community. But how can a *community* have a semantic *competence*? Clearly, the concept of encyclopedia is here at the edge of transforming into a plain metaphor. “In reality”, Eco concedes, “what was called ‘the code’ is the sum of the individual competencies that constitute the code as a collective convention” (Eco 1976: 125). One may wonder what is the status of this “code”? Does it deserve to be called a *hypercode* – as Eco does – if it is just a hypothetical aggregate of individual competencies? To questions like these Eco is careful enough to answer that his encyclopedia is finally only “a semiotic postulate, a regulative idea” (1976: 68). But then one cannot avoid asking why this kind of postulation should be made.

5. Methodological remarks

Why should a proponent of a materialist understanding of semiosis characterize his encyclopedia as an “auto-clarificatory” and abstract semantic system? One reason for this may be that Eco thinks that he is avoiding the *referential fallacy* by claiming that an expression does not designate any real object. In a way, he is justified in asserting that, because “an object” is a product of semiosis. Yet it seems that the relations of sense, in themselves, are useless unless the words are at some point anchored in reality.

One reason for Eco’s desire to avoid the referential fallacy is that he seems to think that the referent must be a single concrete entity. Not wanting to identify the meaning with such a referent, he makes the sign to refer to a cultural entity, a *cultural unit*. In the end, the cultural unit is in Eco’s analysis nothing else than meaning and, consequently meaning swallows the real referent in Eco’s semiotic theory. But if meanings are explained

with the help of interpretants that, according to Eco, circumscribe “cultural units in an asymptotic fashion” (1979b: 198), and the cultural units, in turn, are “the meaning to which the code makes the system of sign-vehicles correspond” (1976: 67) the situation becomes quite hermetic. One cannot help feeling that one is left circulating in the self-referential system of signification with no way out.

This being the case, there appears to be a tension in Eco’s theory between the requirement of “testable” material expressions and the postulation of an abstract, self-referential signification system. Eco is aware of that, too, and attempts to justify his position by appealing to methodological reasons. “Semiotics must proceed to isolate structures *as if* a definite general structure existed”, claims Eco, otherwise it could not be explained how meaning comes into existence (1976: 129, 83).

There are two points I would like to make concerning these methodological claims of Eco’s. The first is philosophical, the second, more practical. There is, actually, a philosophical point of view to which many of Eco’s methodological statements fit: the movement of logical empiricism in the philosophy of science, which was born from the critique of logical positivism, while being also a descendant of that movement. According to logical empiricism, the theories are hypothetical-deductive structures that can be evaluated only through their testable empirical consequences. The Global Semantic Universe of Eco is certainly not a deductive structure, but a hypothetical structure, which is known only through its material incarnations, that is, according to Eco, through testable empirical expressions. Eco’s views on general semiotics also fit this picture. He envisions general semiotics as an attempt to subsume the various fields of semiotics under some very general common concepts. The theory of scientific explanation preferred by the logical empiricists was the covering-law model of Carl Hempel, according to which scientific explanation should, indeed, subsume the various phenomena under a single general law.

There are differences, however. The majority of the logical empiricists were realists and thought that theoretical terms refer to authentic existing entities, even though these are not, at least directly, observable (like atoms). But Eco does not claim that any semantic structure or significative system exists, but more moderately, that semiotics must proceed *as if* such a system existed. Usually *as if* – theorizing is defended on instrumentalist grounds. A theory is a good theory if it is a handy and simple enough

a tool, especially, if it predicts well. But Eco's intention is to explain and describe, not to predict.

Here we come to the second, practical point. Do we really need a hypothetical semantic structure, or network, to explain how meaning making and understanding is possible? There are other alternatives to that kind of explanation too: the Wittgensteinian, Pragmatist or Marxist ones. I think that the crucial question here concerns the relation of individual meaning making to our public conventions. It seems that a signification system of some kind is actually needed if we treat the sign production predominantly in terms of individual work, as Eco does. Otherwise, it would be difficult to explain how we succeed to communicate with each other. But seen from the Wittgensteinian, Pragmatist or Marxist points of view, meanings are born and produced in practical activities and they are publicly shared already from the beginning. These activities, or life forms, are collective and local and only within the sphere of these activities can the created meanings and competencies be explained. (Although words also travel, to other activities, which explain their multiple uses.) Seen from these perspectives there are no such things as meanings existing independently of our life activities, not to mention any abstract hypothetical signification system. Meanings are produced and reproduced, time and again, in the processes of our activities – such is their life.

6. An absent encyclopedia?

Eco's writings on encyclopedia(s) open up a fascinating vision on semiosis as a never-ending process of transformations of meanings in a flux of pictures, words, gestures etc. Moreover, Eco's concept of encyclopedia stresses the importance of inferring and interpreting in meaning making. As such, it provides a corrective to all those semantic or semiotic theories, which try to hypostatise meanings by fixing them onto structures of some kind. Still, paradoxically, Eco ends up also to posit a structure, though a hypothetical one.

This hypothetical encyclopedia is dictionary-like in the respect that it is presented as a self-sufficient semantic space, in which it is possible to move without any referral to real world. Eco reads both the subject and the real world as elements of content. Everything has to be first represented in the language, or with the help of some other (coded) signs, before it can be an

object of semiotic inquiry. Yet, such an encyclopedia is not representable in its totality, a point that Eco readily admits. Perhaps it is not representable even locally (if we are to take seriously John Searle's argument that it is not possible to specify all the background assumptions needed to describe our competencies to act even in the most everyday situations). Are we thus talking about an "absent encyclopedia"?

Not necessarily. Instead of using the concept of encyclopedia metaphorically, we can also take it more literally. One of the (numerous) characterizations Umberto Eco gives to the concept of encyclopedia is the following:

By "Encyclopedia" I mean the totality of knowledge with which I'm only partly acquainted but to which I can refer because it is like an enormous library composed of all books and encyclopedias – all papers and manuscripts, documents of all centuries, including the hieroglyphics of the ancient Egyptians and the inscriptions in cuneiform. (Eco 1994: 90)

The theme of the encyclopedia as a huge arsenal of artifacts, historical and present, is running through Eco's writings on encyclopedia, never quite making its way to the forefront however (although it does that in his fiction). In this, Eco is not alone. Much of semiotic study proceeds *as if* there were "meanings" or "sign systems" that could be perceived and approached somehow directly, like an ideal big book of our collective texts ready for reading. I suggest that the encyclopedia should rather be understood artifactually and materially, including also tools and other instruments. Interestingly, seeing the encyclopedia in the concrete artifacts created by humans has the advantage of explaining how the encyclopedia is both the storage of our knowledge and how it also carries part of our competencies as well as provides an extension of them. This also allows the concept of encyclopedia to be linked to the recent discussions on the distributed knowledge taking place in the cognitive sciences (e.g., Hutchins 1995).

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Tiina Koivisto

Metaphors of energy and force in Brian Ferneyhough's music

The notions of energy and force are an essential part of Brian Ferneyhough's compositional aesthetics. These notions are related to the basic materials of Ferneyhough's music, and are crucial in shaping it. In this paper, I examine the metaphors of energy and force in Ferneyhough's compositional aesthetics and examine ways in which they are related to other features of his compositional idiom. Further, I illustrate with musical examples ways in which energy and force might manifest in his music. I also suggest how the notions of energy and force are related to the syntax of Ferneyhough's music. In doing so, I compare the syntactical qualities of Ferneyhough's music with tonal syntax. In describing the syntactical aspects, I employ the notions of compositional space developed by Robert Morris (1995). The paper concludes by discussing the ways in which energy and force are connected to expression and meaning.

The notions of energy and force are intertwined with other aspects of Ferneyhough's compositional idiom. First, the basic units of Ferneyhough's music are gestures and figures, consisting of various parametric properties. Energy and force are intimately connected with the behaviour of gestures and figures. Second, energy and force are related to temporality, as the lines of force take place between gestures, when music unfolds in time. This evokes the dynamic perspective of the music's formal shaping. On the other hand, we may describe relations among musical objects on a more abstract level, as out-of-time structures, by employing the concept of a compositional space. In such modelling, the relationships based on energy and force are modelled as an abstract system of relationships between objects.

Ferneyhough's music makes acute the question of energy and force. Ferneyhough (1993a: 13) defines energy as being "invested in concrete musi-

cal objects to the extent that they are capable of rendering forces acting upon them visible.” Lines of force are described by him as arising “in the space between objects . . . in the act of moving from one discrete musical event to another” (Ferneyhough 1993a: 13). As the question of energy and force is connected to the music’s gestural material, and their parametric properties, the functioning of the parametric properties in time becomes significant. How wide is the field of resonance of various parametric properties and what kind of processes can be built in moving from one object to another? Ferneyhough (1993c: 37) describes gestures and figures, and processes upon them, as follows:

A gesture whose component defining features – timbre, pitch contour, dynamic level, and so on – display a tendency towards escaping from that specific context in order to become independently signifying radicals, free to recombine, to “solidify” into further gestural forms may, for want of another nomenclature, be termed a figure.

Accordingly, it is through the figural properties of gestures that the lines of force are created. Thus, in this system it is not so much a question of relationships between gestures, but rather a question of an activation of parametric properties within gestures through musical processes. To summarize, parametric properties, that is, the figural properties of gestures, are those that form, as they activate, lines of force between gestures. Gestures are units that contain potential energy.

The distinction between a gesture and a figure is interesting and offers possibilities for nuances of interpretation. Composer Alessandro Melchiorre (1987: 70–71) has discussed how in Ferneyhough’s description the notion of gesture is placed in opposition with the notion of figure. This contrast reflects the more general twofold way of conceiving form. The opposition between gesture and figure reflects, according to Melchiorre, in some ways the distinction between form and energy-force. From this point of view, a gesture is a static element and a figure a dynamic element; a gesture is a vocabulary’s defined element, closed, dead, whereas a figure is open and implies becoming. A figure can be reformed and recombined. A figure is not a moment, where the flux of energies stops, and it does not live in the present time and dimension. A figure is never a figure, but it becomes a figure at the moment when it opens to the future, because it is transitory in nature (Melchiorre 1987: 70–71). In this description Mel-

chiorre captures some characteristic aspects of the ways in which figures are related to lines of force and become components in formal processes.

There are further ways in which energy and force are related to formal shaping. First, context becomes essential: processes based on gestures and figures form lines of force only through the context created for them.¹ That is, as the music unfolds, musical processes create a framework, with which future events will be related. Second, processes based on lines of force evoke the question of the quality of the wider framework within which smaller units are situated. Ferneyhough (1995: 414) has aptly called this more global framework as texture, and has compared it to a background level. In this interpretation, gestures and figures form the middle ground and foreground levels. The description explicates how local events, that is, gestures and figures, receive an added meaning through the ways in which they are related to a wider framework, the texture.

Importantly, the description of the elements of the music as consisting of structural levels evokes the sense of depth. The sense of depth in Ferneyhough's music has a special quality, which is connected to physicality. Energy and lines of force are significant in forming a tactile quality of musical materials. Ways in which the parametric qualities of gestures form a variety of multidirectional and multileveled processes contribute to the sense of depth and physicality of the music. Figural qualities of gestures, their multidimensionality – in comparison to, for example, pitch-oriented musical syntaxes – enhances tactility.²

Finally, an act of performing is intimately connected to energy and force. That is, the performer adds his or her energy to the musical figurations. The virtuosity of Ferneyhough's music, and its rather demanding notation, are vehicles through which the act of performing becomes a part of the musical syntax and expression.

These various characteristics of Ferneyhough's musical idiom enable the forming of different kinds of processes, temporalities, and formal shapes. In Ferneyhough's music, time is molded and manipulated and through this made feel almost like physical material. Importantly, time may be manipulated precisely through regulating and directing the flow of musical energies.

In the following, I will illustrate ways in which energy, force, gestures and figures might appear in Ferneyhough's music, with examples from *Etudes transcendantales*, a song cycle for voice and a small ensemble. The

song cycle is composed between the years 1982–1985 and has been called Ferneyhough’s compositional diary. I provide short examples from three songs, numbers 2, 5, and 8. These songs and their basic affects are very different: the agitated second song is based on strong contrasts, and processes upon them; the fifth song has a calm and undulating texture; and the eighth song is a duet between the voice and harpsichord, where the drama of musical processes is diminished.

In the second song, written for oboe, cello and voice, there are two types of contrasts: first, the vocal and oboe lines contrast with the cello, and second, there are alternating contrasting α - and β -sections.³ This song, with its agitated expression, well illustrates the ways in which the figural properties of gestures contribute to the linear processes. To exemplify this, Examples 1a and b show the oboe gestures in the first and second sections. In the α 1-section, shown in Example 1a, the oboe’s “long-note” gesture consists of sustained notes with a sharp beginning attack. In the *subito agitato* β 1-section, shown in Example 1b, the oboe plays fast *arpeggio* gestures. The properties of these gestures are contrasting, one being a bare sustained note and the other a rapid dense figuration. This juxtaposition between gestures forms a tension, which launches the process that permeates the oboe’s part in the movement. In this process, the figural properties of the two types of gestures become combined, and through this process the oboe gradually eliminates itself.

a)

b)

Example 1a. Ferneyhough, *Etudes transcendantales*, Song no. 2, beginning of α 1-section, oboe.

Example 1b. Ferneyhough, *Etudes transcendantales*, Song no. 2, beginning of β 1-section, oboe.

Examples 1c and d show extracts from the following sections, and the very end of the oboe's line. The figural properties of the two gestures recombine to form new gestural forms. As shown in Example 1c, in these reformations the sustained "long-note" gesture first becomes decorated by grace-notes, thus adapting aspects of the *arpeggio* gesture; Example 1d shows how the *arpeggio* gestures finally evaporate into grace-note figurations through which the oboe fades away.

The image contains three musical staves for oboe (Ob.).

- The top staff is labeled '2.36' and '8'. It begins with the instruction 'passidioso' and a dynamic marking of *ff*. The notation shows a series of notes with grace notes and slurs, ending with a measure marked 'mb. arpeggio'.
- The middle staff is labeled 'd)' and '12'. It starts with 'tranquillo' and a dynamic marking of *pppp*. It features a complex rhythmic pattern with slurs and dynamics ranging from *pppp* to *mf* and *mp*. A 'rall.' marking is present above the staff.
- The bottom staff is labeled '19' and '20'. It begins with a 'rall.' marking and a dynamic marking of *ppp*. It shows a sequence of notes with slurs and dynamics ranging from *ppp* to *pppp*. A '(2.36)' marking is placed above the staff.

Example 1c. Ferneyhough, *Etudes transcendantales, Song no. 2, beginning of α_2 -section, oboe.*

Example 1d. Ferneyhough, *Etudes transcendantales, Song no. 2, end of β_2 -section, oboe; and end of oboe line.*

The second contrast, the simultaneous contrast between the instruments, is introduced at the opening of the song, which is shown in Example 2.

In this section, the oboe and the voice repeat their rather bare, agitated long-note gestures in the middle register, whereas the cello plays several different and parametrically rich gestures in the low register. This contrast

Example 2. Ferneyhough, *Etudes transcendantales*, Song no. 2, opening.

propels the highly dramatic events and processes of the song. In this song, the interactions, recombinations, and also separations of the figural properties of the gestures form the basis of its linear processes. The quality of gestures and the regulation of the flow of energy are significant for temporality, and for the general expression of the songs. This may be exemplified with the fifth song, whose opening is shown in Example 3.

Example 3. Ferneyhough, *Etudes transcendantales*, Song no. 5, opening.

The texture of this *Adagissimo* song consists of rather homogeneous gestures forming an undulating dreamlike atmosphere where the temporal quality is almost static. For example, the opening gestures of the song are extremely soft, beginning from *piano piano pianissimo*, evaporating to *niente*, having space between them, and consequently implicating small and gradual changes. The opening vocal gesture, nine equally spaced,

evenly articulated *pianissimo* tones, adds upon the static quality. In this song, where the forward moving processes are extremely subtle, almost non-existent, prominent becomes the shadings and fluctuations of the overall texture.

The last example is from the song number 8, where the affect is once again different. As shown in Example 4, in this duet for voice and harpsichord, the performance direction is “coldly but much pressure beneath”.

Example 4. Ferneyhough, *Etudes transcendantales, Song no. 8, opening.*

In this song, the aim has been not to form dramatic continuities between the two participants. Indeed, Ferneyhough has employed chance operations in the compositional process to enhance the undramatic quality. The voice and harpsichord parts are kept separate, and their gestures, both locally and more globally, do not form such directional continuities, where the lines of force would pull the events into forward moving processes; rather, events are juxtaposed, placed side by side. In this manner, the lines of force between and within instrumental parts have a non-directional quality. The temporal and formal quality thus created consists of different situations, where the events become juxtaposed kaleidoscopically in novel ways.

As I hope to have suggested, energy and lines of force between gestures are closely related to questions of temporality and timing. Ferneyhough (1993b: 24) writes:

It's clear that, if we have several musical objects following on from another, we will perceive the flow of time differently according to whether (e.g.) these objects are crossrelated, whether they are connected by gradualist transformations in one or more parameters, whether there exist codifiable consistencies in intervening “buffer materials”, and so on.

Thus, energy and force become key factors in the forming of musical continuities, formal shapes, and different types of temporalities.

Processes in Ferneyhough's music can be approached as dynamic multi-directional processes, where musical objects possess potential energy, which activates through figural properties as lines of force. This can be compared to tonal music, where dynamic processes arise through the forces inherent in tonal functionality. For example, in a move from a dominant to a tonic, the dominant can be considered to possess a particular type of energy, which is activated as it moves towards the tonic: a line of force is created between these events. In the same fashion, in functional tonality, various scale steps become energized in different ways and into different degrees. Such energies and lines of forces arise from the properties inherent in functional tonality. In addition to the dynamic chronological processes, we may model functional tonality as an out-of-time compositional system, that is, as a compositional space.⁴ Such space shows functional relationships between the objects of the system. This interpretation models the forces and orientations that underlie progression in tonal music and that are the basis for its forward moving, goal-oriented motions.

In the same fashion as in tonal system, we may consider that the forces and orientations formed through Ferneyhough's compositional idiom could be modelled with a compositional space. Here, however, as also in other types of non-tonal idioms, such a compositional space is more piece-specific because of the lack of a common non-tonal musical language. Further, in Ferneyhough's idiom, the plenitude of parametric dimensions suggests a more multidimensional compositional space than the one modelling pitch relationships.

A similar relationship between communality and contextuality, to borrow Milton Babbitt's (1987) terminology, underlies the question of the expressive meanings of gestures. Because there does not exist a common non-tonal rhetoric language, a post-tonal composer faces the demand to develop his or her own rhetoric vocabulary. Furthermore, this vocabulary, in order to be pregnant with rhetoric expressive meanings, which communicate through actual compositions, necessitates the recognition of the relation between the gestures, and bodily hearing and culturally conditioned listening practices. It is important to remember, however, that in forming expressive meanings, a rhetoric vocabulary interacts with the syntax of the music, and with the ways in which the relationships estab-

lished within this syntax contributes to the conveyance of shadings of moods and expressions.

Ferneyhough adds still further aspects to musical expression. He emphasizes the dynamic and volatile nature of expression, thus relating expression to the notions of energy and force. Ferneyhough (1993: 12) writes: "What, after all, is 'expression' but a sort of passage from one state to another, in which neither the presumptive beginning and end points are primary, but rather the 'no longer' and 'not yet' whose *impression* they bear."

In Ferneyhough's music, all its aspects – from the qualities of its smallest components to its formal shapes, temporality and expression – are tied together under the metaphors of energy and force. This may reveal something specific about Ferneyhough's music and its characteristic qualities. But it also reveals something essential about music in general and about how we approach music. Ferneyhough's compositional idiom invites us to pay attention not only to the qualities of the musical objects and elements, but also, and more importantly, to the invisible energies and forces that are built within and between these objects and elements. It is there that the crucial attributes of the music reside.

Notes

1. Ferneyhough (1993a: 12) writes: "[T]he figure is proposed as an element of musical signification composed entirely of details defined by their contextual disposition rather than their innate, stylistically defined referential capacity."
2. Ferneyhough (1993b) discusses "tactility".
3. The song is also discussed by Richard Toop (1991).
4. The notion of a compositional space is defined in Morris (1995).

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Vassilena Kolarova

Interpictoriality and intermusicality

The interartistic text of Sartre's *Nausea*

*The real life, life finally discovered and enlightened,
the only life really lived – this is Literature.*

– Proust

Textuality in Sartre's *Nausea* is expressed through strange forms that can challenge the careful reader. It is "hidden" in some key words, the analysis of which takes one beyond purely literary discussion and into a quest for philosophical meaning in the general field of the other arts, of which it is a part.

The etymological meanings of names, particularly that of the main character, are extremely important to understanding the novel, since they form one, purely artistic layer of this highly "embossed" text-picture. The name of Roquentin evidences the enormous amount of reading the hero has attempted – Sartre himself in the role of a reader, writer, author – to the point of becoming bookish. The interpretations of the name vary so much that the authors and works we read through him are arranged in literary layers formed around a single center. Lecarme (1986: 196) mentions a number of Maupassant's works that *Nausea* includes as a hypertext. Sartre uses the names of regions in Normandy, among which is *Roqueville* (Rockville), Roquentin's town, its hearty breath of bourgeois spirit penetrating the poisonous atmosphere of *Nausea*. Flaubert's presence is also evidenced by the name of Roquentin. Can we feel the extremely deep scar this realist has left on Sartre's professional life through the direct use of the name of Flaubert? Sartre read and re-read *Madame Bovary* in his early childhood years (Sartre 1968). In *Situations IX* (Sartre 1972) he states: "No philosophy can be made out of *Madame Bovary* because this is one single book.

More single than its author”. Flaubert’s *L’Education sentimentale* acts as another source of names (Lecarme 1986: 195): Père Roque, Louise Roque, and the three old men, the *roquentins*. In *Nausea* the name multiplies; e.g., Rollebon marries Mrs. *Roquelaure*.

The name Roquentin, of unknown origin, has been known since 1630, in its older spelling as *rocantin*. In the seventeenth century, this word denoted a singer of satirical songs as well as the songs themselves. Thus, Roquentin *is* the text itself, a hero without his own personality. One of the best interpretations of the name is found in the Larousse of the nineteenth century: “A name, which was once given to songs made up of other songs’ fragments, patched together, centonized, so that they create strange, interesting effects through a change of the rhythm, [and] funny and scary surprises in the course of the ideas.” Sartre himself knew this meaning of *rocantin*, but stated that it had influenced neither the creation of the text nor the choice of hero. Be that as it may, in *Nausea* *rocantin* closes and shrinks into itself through the hero bearing this name. In this sense, the Roquentin text turns into a *mise en abyme*, a novel within a novel, both within and encircling the *Nausea* text. Villon used the expression *vieux roquart* (*Dictionnaire historique* 1992), meaning a gloomy, sad old man. We may refer the word to the onomatopoeic radix /rok/ denoting the noise objects make when they collide with each other. Metaphorically speaking, in *Nausea*, /rok-/ reflects the collision of the multitude of texts that dwell in it. It is assumed that the noun “rocantin” was made up by the present participle of the verb *roquer* (hit, munch) and the suffix *-tin* (e.g., *ignorantin*, *plaisantin*). We can thus draw up a palimpsest of *rocantin* due to its frequent use by the writers mentioned in Scheme 1.


<i>roquart</i> - Père Roque, Louise Roque, roquentins	–	Roquentin	–	Roqueville
Villon		Flaubert		Maupassant Sartre

Scheme 1. A palimpsest of rocantin.

The list of authors could be continued and a gigantic palimpsest formed. The hero disperses as a text in the quoted, pastiche texts (of Proust, Stendhal, Balzac) in *Nausea* through the trans-textuality of the polysemantic name, which is a mirror image of the authors it contains. In chess, *roquer* – to make exchange as an action – means exchange of the

castle. This move symbolically expresses the spiritual change in Roquentin. In search of the etymology of the name, we find numerous similarities between *rocantin* and Roquentin; for example, the nouns of *roc /rock/ and roche, rocher*. The meaning of *roche* is “a block of mineral material, hard ...”; but also in the eighteenth century: “an assembly of minerals, which serves to make syntagms” (*Dictionnaire historique* 1992).

Physically, *roc* in its indefinite form refers to the structure of the text. Supposing that Roquentin is a text, he bears this indefiniteness in himself in the philosophical sense, as a person with a restless spirit, always in quest of something. The text is a *mineral*, which has not found its shape and looks like a stone that has split naturally off the rock surface; it remains crude, intact, unprocessed. It also reflects the ambiguity of the novel as a genre – both fiction and philosophy. Sartre once compared a piece of art to a mineral. *Nausea* could be a mineral as well (see Scheme 2).



Scheme 2. The “minerality” of Nausea.

The hard root of the derivatives *roc, roche, rocaille* resembles a crab shell, in which Roquentin hides himself from the look of the Other, who turns him into existence-in-himself (*être-en-soi*). *Rocaille*, in the eighteenth century, was part of the vocabulary of decorative arts, and designated a piece of mineral, as well as a work created with materials characterizing the genre of decorative baroque.

He continues to change his personality, sometimes seeing himself as a Descartes man, sometimes as a “novel hero”, which in fact he is. Even the creators of his favourite song, the black singer and the Jew, could be novel heroes.

There is analogy in the name structure of Rollebon (another character in the novel) and Roquentin. The structure of the names with *ro-* expresses the closeness between them. Roquentin tries to keep his Ego and get closer and closer to the marquis’s personality. But Rollebon keeps slipping away, “rolling” (*Collins English Dictionary*: 1995). *Rouler/Roll* – when some-

thing rolls or when you roll it, it moves along a surface, turning over many times. The grapheme *roll* – is contained in the French expression. According to the *Dictionnaire historique*, *rouler* comes from the ancient French *roler* (*roll-er*), “to turn into”.

On the other hand, Roquentin, going through a bout of insanity, “sways from side to side” (to roll – *balancer* – to rock: “il court, il court le furet”. The circle of this game becomes so vicious that it breaks. The verb *to roll* has a double meaning. Roulbon “runs”, “rolling” in front of Roquentin, and Roquentin runs after him. The circular motion symbolizes the difficulty of historic knowledge. At the semantic level, Roquentin embodies this difficulty: a “rocky situation” means an uncertain situation full of difficulties (*Collins English Dictionary* 1995). The onomastic phenomenon, which establishes such a close link between the two names, could be mere coincidence. Still, we can feel rock-and-roll music at the global level of the text, and something which enters the jazz context, even at the level of historical research. What is more, *rock-and-roll* is American music originating from the Blues, which when associated with Jazz, implies an activity free of obligations and restrictions.


The multi-layers of various arts interwoven in this strange and original text reveal its uniqueness. The names in *Nausea* add to these, as in the case of music, which plays a main part in many respects. It exists both as a text and melody, i.e., as inter-text (music as text) and also as an interartistic phenomenon, which is manifested in various ways. The most original and exciting quotation which is enmeshed in the text is the musical one. It refreshes and transforms the profound meaning of the book. The verses of the *refrain* are cyclical, coming back three times: “One of these days, You’ll miss me, honey” (39, 244, 247)

On the one hand, art (music) arouses art (literature) at an interartistic level. On the other hand, there is an intermusical level: music runs like an invisible thread through the novel, influencing the global melody of the text. This is a polyphony created by the numerous types of discourses which live together in the book. Text turns into music. The interference between text melody and the *leitmotif* (Tarasti 2006) of jazz is subordinated to the relationship of the other arts. Tarasti explains from a semiotic point of view the presence of *leitmotif* in the realm of music. Here we have a literary *leitmotif* that fuses with the artistic intermedial realm.

The influence of music, which is obviously of significance for the novel, is expressed mostly through interartistic phenomena. Take painting – *Melancholia* by Dürer – and Literature – *Nausea* by Sartre.

The structure “art in art” becomes clear exactly at this point – music exists in the book, and the book “lies” on the picture: as an *inner* structure, through musical quotation, and as the *outer* urge to create the literary text:

- a/ painting – *Nausea*
- b/ music – book



Scheme 3. Interartistic levels of painting, music, and literature in *Nausea*.

Dürer’s *Melancholia* prompted Sartre to write *Nausea*. Even the publisher initially suggested the book should bear that name. Michelet’s *History of the Fifteenth Century* – to which Sartre often referred, which Ani deliberately reads, is the secret hiding place of the same engraving, which sneaks out of the book with the same transartistic function. And music, as an outer source, triggers Roquentin’s desire to write a book. The interartistic phenomenon appears exactly as the interweaving or interdependence between two or more arts. The picture is a book, and vice versa. Painting and music constantly slip into Sartre’s text in one form or another, as an interartistic phenomenon appearing in different configurations.

Genette, in studying the origin of parody in Aristotle’s time, retraces the term in order to prove that one cannot give an exact definition of its various uses: “Etymologically, by origin: *ôdè* means a song, and *para* means lateral, side, by; *parôdem*, where *parôdia* originates from, will thus mean ‘singing aside’, i.e. falsetto or in another voice, or in several voices, in counterpoint or another tonality: to distort, in fact, or transpose” (Genette 1982: 20). In the quotation “rhapsody” of *Nausea*, doesn’t the tune of the song stand out in relief over the other musical voices?


The replacement of a book by a *picture* occurs many times in the novel. One of them is Emily Brontë's portrait, hung over Ani's bed, which immediately calls to mind *Wuthering Heights*. Also, the pictures at the museum are real *mises en abyme* with intertextual and interartistic functions. Despite their unattractive appearance, these works of art hide real treasures. A whole library of books comes out of a picture – Montaigne, Horatius, etc. Then the *mise en abyme* develops an intertextual function, when the picture showing the dying man and the kitten becomes the distorted vision of another picture – the one by Greuze, which Diderot analyzed in *Les salons* (IDT 1971: 74).

Sartre's text ridicules both the manner of writing and the manner of painting through the presence of the picture. In his capacity as an art expert, Roquentin notes that looking at pictures is "just a psychological analysis, as in novels". Helbo (1982: 113–125) shares: "... the quotation: an unfinished, mosaic of discourses segregates the meaning: the story is penetrated by repeated discourses". And this is what recreates the musical effect of which Helbo speaks, in likening the novel to a sonata.

We find an inverse form of the interartistic phenomenon in its pictorial version (interpictoriality), when writing becomes "embossed", like an Impressionist painting in pastel tones or bright touches: "... nigger in a cream raincoat, yellow shoes and green hat ... small blonde woman under the opal sky ... bonbon colours, beautiful blue overcoat ... light raincoat, red glasses of the lantern ..." (my emphasis).

Bouville, whose background remains mainly dark, apart from the flashing lights, which at certain times illuminate it rather brightly. The name is also very important in its etymology, since it creates an impression of piled up literary layers, which are abstract in terms of the context. The /B/ recalls various relevant terms: book, biblios, babel ...

In the novel, the book is of significant importance. The novel itself is the genesis of a book world. In the biblical book of Genesis, Babylon (Babel in Hebrew), in its purest sense means "disorder". Isn't this novel a "bookish disorder" of thrown in names, pastiches, all overlapping in various paragraphs? (See Scheme 4.) The maze of streets in Bouville calls to mind the maze of bookshelves in a library, where we get lost. Bouville is an anti-biblical and anti-literature town, the notion of book (Bible, biblos) being degraded in its name. According to Borges (1989: 112), the world is a universal library, whose spherical shape symbolizes the unachievable.



Scheme 4. *Bouville: Macro- and microworlds.*

In Scheme 4, the only curved arrow pointing to the right shows that The Bible contains the world. The left arrow going down to the book marks the creation of the future book, which Roquentin will write. And the line turning again upwards symbolizes the cause and consequence link between town and book, a world found in each book. The cycle of the circular motion in the scheme allows for a constant renewal of meaning, letting the poly-semantic search go on forever. We witness how the circle closes due to the future book, and go back following the direction of the arrow. We circle around the letter "bb" with the book, but the world also comes down to one book – The Bible, the book about the creation of the world. The connection between Genesis and creation in its artistic sense is very strong. This is also acknowledged by Butor (1993: 129–130), when looking at the stained glass of a sixteenth-century cathedral. The glass told the story of Cain, whose sons The Bible considers to be the first creators of the towns, industrialists and makers of musical instruments. We have again the symbiosis – Bible, town, music – presented in *Nausea*. The concept of God's Creation and the Creator is not only literal; it can be discussed at a deeper level. When depicting a *muddy town* /*bou* – mud – *ville*/, Sartre gives his concept of the creation of the world, and he becomes a creator himself, taking the place of *the* Creator. The existentialist difficulty of existence and writing is presented not only through the picture of the man

made of mud, but also through the sheets scattered in the mud, denying in a new ironic, way the literary concept. In a way, Sartre has rewritten The Bible, such that *Nausea* is a Bible turned “inside out”. In the year 1223, *bible* meant a big work, which ridiculed society in its various forms, as it is done in *Nausea* as well, though here the concept of negation is given a wider philosophical meaning.

Art touches Roquentin, and with this Sartre asks a question: Can Art give meaning to the human life? The components of this novel – names, town, book – are funneled through a single point: Art. They are no longer real, due to the textual elements they contain, which are an integral part of this spiritual energy, i.e., Art. This is the world as a book, Art in the shape of a sphere, whose ends can never be found, symbolizing the connection between music, painting and literature.

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Nikolay Komedchikov

The evolution of map language

From Italian Renaissance maps of the fourteenth century to the beginning of graduated measurement in the mid- eighteenth century

In my paper I attempt to trace the evolution of map language over the course of almost 400 years, from the mid-fourteenth to the mid-eighteenth century; that is to say, during the flowering of cartography, which resulted from the great geographical discoveries, from the development of trade and sea travels in Europe, and from the rise of economies and military power in European countries. The analysis of map language is one of important issues of the modern cartography. The study of the evolutionary principles of graphical map symbols, and their combination over the centuries and in various countries, facilitate the development of strategies of formulating cartographic symbols today, and no doubt, in the future as well.

The history of the map is well-documented. Extant specimens of early maps exemplify how map language “works” in different human cultures and during various periods, and allow us to distinguish the main stages in the evolution of map language. Of course, the temporal borders of these stages do not always coincide in different cultures, and in some cases, similar stages do not exist. More importantly, the multiple contacts between peoples of various countries and cultures resulted in a powerful mutual influence during the evolution of map language, such that national peculiarities began to disappear from maps.

It is possible to distinguish the following main stages in the evolution of map language:

1. *The map as a system of natural symbols.* Classical examples of such maps are Eskimo maps of Greenland and the stick-charts of the Marshall

Islands made by aborigines. Natural objects, such as sand, stones, small shells, central ribs of palm leaves, serve as map symbols.

2. *The map as a system of pictographic symbols.* Such maps were common, e.g., among Indians of Central America.

3. *The map as a system of iconic signs.* The iconic signs number among those visual (imaginative) symbols that have been the most common in cartography since primitive times. Because of their similarity to the depicted objects, they are easily understood by all users, even those belonging to different cultural spheres. The iconic signs were gradually complemented by symbolic signs which organized all icons into a system, by classifying them into groups and attributing these groups with specific features.

4. *The map as a system of conventional signs.* As civilization evolved, iconic symbols were gradually complemented by signs that are conventional and arbitrary. The emergence of conventional signs made it necessary to explain them. Initially such an explanation could be placed either directly beside the depicted object on the map as a commenting inscription, or separately in the form of a legend. Later the separate explanation of conventional signs in a special legend became a rule. Thus, the legend is a metalanguage that lists all symbols of the system together with the real objects that they depict, thus regulating the possible combinations of symbols and providing a key to their understanding.

There are intermediate stages between the main stages, described above. An interrelatedness of different systems of cartographic symbols and their coexistence on the same map is one of the distinguishing features of map-language evolution. Up to now many modern maps display a sort of “symbiosis” of iconic and conventional signs.

Analyses of cartographic depiction techniques were carried out in some studies (for example, Lynam 1945, Dainville 1964, and others). My paper is devoted to map analysis in terms of the “map language” concept, the development which was greatly aided by the Russian professor A. A. Liouty (1988).

1. Map languages: Sublanguage I

Map language is understood as an objective phenomenon evolved naturally within the social and historical practice of humans, as the core of cartography as a systematic science. A dualism is characteristic of map

language because it consists of two relatively independent sublanguages, which distinguish map language from other languages (script, painting, mathematical graphics, and others). *Sublanguage I* provides a spatial definition of mapped objects – their geographical position, spatial forms, and orientation. *Sublanguage II* provides an essential definition of depicted objects, their qualitative and quantitative peculiarity and structure.

While displaying spatial data in cartographic depictions, primitive peoples retained existing topological relations; in other words, they retained mutual spatial relations of depicted geographical objects without exact mathematical parameters. The first Italian and Catalan portolans also had no strict mathematical base. There were nets of compass lines instead of map graticules. As geodetic measurements evolved and knowledge about the Earth as a globe emerged, a transition took place from topological cartographic depictions to metrical ones.

The Sublanguage I evolution goes on independently, without close connection to the evolution of Sublanguage II. It displays and expresses a diversity of cartographic projections used for showing the surface of the terrestrial ellipsoid on flat maps. Various azimuthal projections are known to have been used as early as in Ancient Greece. There were detailed descriptions of conic and pseudoconic projections in Ptolemy's *Geographia*.

The Renaissance period gave new incentives to the development of map projections. In the second half of the fifteenth century, Donnus Nicolaus Germanus invented a new trapezoidal projection. The number of new projections increased steadily during that century. Some of them were modifications and further developments of Ptolemy's pseudo-iconic projection of the entire globe; for example, in cordiform or heart-shaped projections. Among others, the oval projection designed by Petrus Apianus and Benedetto Bordone should be noted, as well as the Mercator's cylindrical projection, which continues to be the main projection for navigational charts even today.

Thus, the number of known projections reached already twenty by the late sixteenth century (Keuning 1955). There were practically no new developments in the sphere of map projections during the seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth century. As late as in 1650 Nikolas Sanson designed a new pseudocylindrical equal-area projection for the depiction of the entire globe.

The tradition of showing map graticules goes back to the Ancient Greeks. Unfortunately, this tradition was not always held to by some map-makers. As a rule, a network of meridians and parallels is shown on all world maps. On regional maps this network remains sometimes only in the form of numbered ticks at the map's inner border. As a matter of fact, these ticks present a legend made with the help of map Sublanguage I. Some maps have no graticules, or numbered ticks, at all; and this is a break with the established tradition, because the graticule is an obligatory element of any map and one of the main foundation stones of cartographic culture. Since the mid-sixteenth century, the maps' inner borders as well as the equator line have contained divisions into degrees and minutes.

Compulsory elements on Renaissance maps were the Latin designations of the four corners of the earth (North, South, West, and East) in the middle of each inner border line. In fact, the map graticule – a network of meridians and parallels – serves as the core of Sublanguage I. The outlines made in map Sublanguage I are filled with specific contents, which make up map Sublanguage II.

In addition to the graticule, the map *scale* is also a manifestation of Sublanguage I, such that it determines shapes and sizes of depicted features. Graphical scale appeared first on marine navigation charts, or portolans. The place of the scale on maps was rather arbitrary. Map margins have been preferred, but the centers of maps were also used sometimes. One portolan could contain in different places several graphical scales in the form of straight or curved bands. In the first half of the sixteenth century, in order to expand the demand for maps, graphical scale began to be shown not in just one, but in two, three, or more length measures used in different countries. One of the first depictions of the graphical scale in various length measures (Roman and French miles) is given on Georg Erlinger's map of Central Europe issued in 1530.

In addition to graphical scale, since about the mid-seventeenth century, large-scale maps have been provided with a transverse scale for exact measurements and calculation of distances. Later, in the early eighteenth century, numerical scale also appeared on maps.

We have seen how map Sublanguage I evolved, manifesting in the development of various map projections and in compilation of maps on different scales. Let us consider now evolutionary characteristics of map Sublanguage II, which displays the subject matter of the depicted features

and phenomena. Due to space restrictions, I shall consider closely just the evolution of some iconic and conventional signs used for the depiction of hydrographic features (seas, rivers, lakes), topography, vegetation, and settlements.

1.1. Sublanguage II: Depiction of hydrographic features

From earliest times, for the depiction of large expanses of seas, iconic signs were used that resemble water color and sea waves. Seas were painted blue; the only exception was the depiction of the Red Sea, which was traditionally painted in red-and-brown on Portuguese portolans. Most common were special marks that resemble cross-sections of various sea wave types – ripples, simple waves, swell, surfs. The iconic signs for the depiction of the sea's surface were superseded gradually by a conventional sign in the form of specks. By the late sixteenth century, specks were used for the depiction of both sea surfaces and inland bodies of water. Besides that, in order to accentuate the sea/land division, coastal “shading” was used, in the form of straight-line tints. This straight-line tint covered the sea surface along the coast, but on navigational charts it was used to fill in the coastal strip of dry land.

Rivers were also shown with the iconic sign of two lines; therefore their actual width was significantly exaggerated. The space between the side lines was filled with various marks resembling, for example, water flow; or with straight parallel lines, drawn perpendicularly to the riverbanks, or with specks or dashed lines along the current, which was sometimes painted in blue.

Since the mid-fifteenth century, ribands have been used for the depiction of water surfaces (rivers, lakes). This method of graphical depiction indicated water surfaces with the help of lines running parallel to coasts. Wolfgang Lazius was one of the first cartographers to employ this technique, while making the map “*Marchia orientalis*” (1561). These lines running parallel to coasts of water bodies, if considered as map language signs, occupy an intermediate position between iconic and conventional signs.

Perhaps, this method influenced the emergence of such conventional signs as isolines – initially as lines of equal depth, used for the depiction of dry-land topography. Nicolaas Samuel Cruquius was known to have made

one of the first attempts to employ water depth lines on maps, while compiling his isobathic chart of the Merwede River in 1729.

1.2 Relief representation

The representation of mountains is one of the most important problems in cartography. Approaches to solving it have undergone the most radical changes, as compared with methods of mapping other terrain features. Up to the mid-seventeenth century, attention was paid mainly to the representation of mountains and hills. In the iconic signs used for their depiction, it is easy to recognize mountains' profiles. Up to the late eighteenth century, it is possible to distinguish three principal approaches to the iconic representation of mountains on maps.

The first of these was a combination of mountain signs which formed a chain showing the mountain range. Such sign-combinations initially resembled coxcombs. Then depictions of mountain chains became increasingly realistic, more and more resembling mountain ranges from a bird's eye view. Of course, the engraver's skill was the main factor in determining how real the representation of mountain ranges looked. In the second half of the eighteenth century, some map-makers began to depict mountain chains so that they looked like "hairy caterpillars".

The second approach was characterized by the depiction of isolated (not connected into a chain) iconic signs for mountains in the form of simple vertical profiles. As in the first approach, there was great diversity in the artfulness of these iconic signs.

The third approach was the most progressive one. It is a planimetric, perspectival representation of iconic signs for mountains within the whole mountainous area on the map. The topography in such depictions was displayed not in the form of single bodies but as a surface. This type of representation gave impetus to the development of important new methods employed in the orthogonal representation of topography. Drastic changes in mountain representation took place in the early 1640s; it was a transition from perspective pictures to a planimetric (orthogonal) depiction when Johann Morell showed topography with the help of vertical shading on his map of the town of Lindau at the Bodensee (Lake of Constance) in 1642.

This method of topography depiction led to a breakthrough in cartography and map language. There was a transition from iconic signs for mountains to conventional signs in the form of vertical shading, from a random distribution of “hills” on a map to the strictly fixed, localized depiction of topography as a continuous surface. Further development of this method and its mathematical grounding are found in the work of the Saxon map-maker Johann Georg Lehmann (1799) and in the proceedings of the Military Topographical Department of the Russian Army General Staff (1832).

A great contribution to the realistic depiction of sea coasts was made by the Dutch naval surveyor Lucas Janszoon Waghenaer. In the sea atlas “*Spiegel der Zeevaerdt*” (The Mariners Mirror) (1584–1585) all the coasts were depicted for the first time with the help of coast profiles facilitating navigation.¹ Some profiles were given within maps as well. The atlas became so popular that it was issued in different languages. The same technique for coastal depiction was used later by other map-makers. In terms of map language theory, the coastal profiles can be regarded as conventional signs, despite the fact that there was not yet any vertical scaling, and the physical parameters of coasts were presented through such topological indicators as “higher” and “lower”.

1.3 Depiction of vegetation

The representation of vegetation cover on maps primarily concerned the characteristics of forests. Iconic signs were used to resemble deciduous or coniferous trees. These signs were placed either at a distance from each other, touching each other, or locking into each other with crowns in the form of a “forest carpet”, as one would see from a bird’s eye view. These three main distribution patterns of the iconic signs allowed presentation of such forest characteristics as density and accessibility. Besides that, the iconic signs indicated dominant species of a forest and its age. Of course, it was impossible to show forest borders exactly enough with iconic signs, because the size of these signs were rather large. Technically, an engraver was not able to repeat a sign several times identically. For such reasons, a search for new linguistic means to depict forests took place; it was necessary to replace the iconic signs by conventional ones.

One of the first attempts to depict forests by conventional signs instead of iconic ones was made by the German map-maker Nikolaus Person from Mainz. On a map of the district of Erfurt published in 1675, he has used dense hatching to show an area covered by thick beech forest. Unfortunately, this conventional sign for the depiction of forests was neglected for a long time. Its application resumed as late as in the twentieth century, this time in form of colored background (usually green).

1.4 Depiction of settlements

Up to the sixteenth century, settlements were represented on maps without any classification; for example, in terms of their position in administrative hierarchy, type of community, number of inhabitants, dominant religious affiliations, etc. When there was no classification of represented settlements, of course, it was not necessary to explain at length the signs used for their depiction. Settlements were shown by three main types of sign: an iconic sign in the form of a castle, fortress, or church drawing; a conventional sign in the form of a circle; or a sign combining features of an iconic settlement depiction with the conventional sign (circle). Community names confirmed additionally that the signs in question represented settlements. Sometimes, in order to accentuate the size or administrative importance of towns, the iconic sign was enlarged or its drawing supplemented with additional towers, spires and houses. There were also attempts in the sixteenth century to display the size hierarchy of communities through using of profile-plans of settlements, without special explanations in legends. The need emerged for distinguishing settlements on maps according to some classificatory parameters. This resulted in a breakthrough in cartography, in the form of a gradual transition from iconic signs to conventional ones.

Cardinal qualitative changes in the map language were brought about by the need to develop a map metalanguage in the form of a legend. The use of new cartographic symbols, the design of which still made their meanings hard to understand, emerged in the form of explanatory legends on map margins. One of the first legends containing explanation of four settlement symbols was designed by Oronce Fine in 1525; it was placed into the map as a supplementary text. As for a separate legend for settlement signs, it seems to be the German humanist Sebastian von Rotenhan who

first introduced it, on his map “Das Francken Landt ...” in 1533. He used five different signs to depict settlements, explained in a separate legend. These signs were not obviously conventional in character. On the contrary, they looked like common iconic signs used on contemporary maps for the depiction of castles, villages, or towns. The first attempt to apply new conventional signs for the depiction of settlements seems to have been made by Sebastian Münster in Ptolemy’s *Geographia* (1545). He showed on the map the settlements classified according to the prevailing confessions.

With the advent of the map legend, there was spectacular progress in the development of map language as well as in cartography as a whole; new perspectives and opportunities opened up, thanks to virtually unrestricted possibilities to depict any characteristic of geographical features traditionally shown on maps. Moreover, new objects and phenomena with their properties and functions, could be depicted.

Since then, the development of a legend became a necessary, important, and responsible procedure for compiling any map. The legend determines to a great extent the purpose and contents of a map, methods of its use, as well as scientific and applied aims that can be achieved with it.

2. *Conclusion*

I would like to close by emphasizing once more the decisive milestones in the evolution of map language, from the Renaissance to the beginning of extensive graduated measurement in the mid-eighteenth century.

First, there was a gradual transition from topological cartographic depictions without exact mathematical parameters, to metrical depictions on a strict mathematical base. Second, this was a transition from iconic signs for the depiction of topography and settlements to conventional signs. It was the transition from perspective pictures of mountains to a planimetric (orthogonal) depiction of topography with the help of vertical shading, as done for the first time by Johann Morell in 1642, along with the use of water-depth lines by Nicolaas Samuel Cruquius in 1729. Third, the map legend was introduced, initially for explanation of the settlement classifications, as done by Oronce Fine in 1525, Sebastian von Rotenhan in 1533, and Sebastian Muenster in 1545. Later on, legends were used to represent other features as well.

Of course, my review has no pretensions to comprehensive analysis of all means used in map language during this period of some 400 years. Some propositions need further specification and development. Nevertheless, the present map analysis allows us to conclude that map language follows the general laws of evolution of sign systems generated by human society.

Note

1. Earlier attempts to depict coastal profiles can be also found in the book on navigation by Piri Reis, *Kitab-i Bahriye* (1521–1526).

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Evangelos Kourdis

Traductions interlinguale et intersémiotique dans un message publicitaire grec

Rapports entre les messages verbaux et les systèmes non verbaux

1. Publicité et traduction

Le champ du marketing et de la publicité est constitué de multiples univers conceptuels qui posent les fondements d'une sémiotique qui dépasse la sémiotique classique. La publicité, démarche essentiellement communicative et destinée à une lecture publique, s'offre comme le terrain privilégié d'observation des mécanismes de production de sens tant par le message verbal que par l'image. Publicité et traduction sont un excellent exemple de contact entre langues et cultures qui s'inscrit dans le contexte de la mondialisation du texte publicitaire par le biais de la traduction. Notre recherche étudie la *publicité bilingue* d'un nouveau grand magasin d'Athènes (Attica) parue dans la revue *Blue* de la société aérienne hellénique Aegean Airlines (Figure 1).

Barthes (1964: 41) avait distingué dans le langage publicitaire trois types de signes: le signe linguistique, le signe iconique et le signe plastique, ce qui fait le langage publicitaire un monstre sémiotique, amas parfois de signes hétéroclites. D'après Guidere (2000: 40), on ne peut pas parler au sujet de la publicité de trois signes différents, mais d'un seul et même signe que Guidere appelle *publisigne*. Dans notre étude, nous nous appuyerons sur cette triple distinction, en approchant le signe iconique et le signe plastique dans la conception de Jakobson (1963: 78–96) qui a parlé de trois types de traduction. D'après lui, il y a *la traduction intralinguale*, *la traduction interlinguale* et *la traduction intersémiotique*. La première consiste



Figure 1. La publicité bilingue.

en l'interprétation des signes linguistiques au moyen d'autres signes de la même langue. La deuxième cible l'interprétation des signes linguistiques au moyen d'une autre langue et la troisième l'interprétation des signes linguistiques au moyen des signes non linguistiques. Notre étude porte sur la traduction interlinguale qui est l'objet de la Traductologie et sur la traduction intersémiotique qui est celui de la Sémiotique.

2. La traduction interlinguale

Saussure (1972: 100–101) souligne l'importance du système linguistique soutenant que la linguistique peut devenir le patron général de toute sémiologie, bien que la langue ne soit qu'un système particulier. La relation entre

message linguistique et message iconique a fait réfléchir beaucoup de chercheurs sur ces deux systèmes sémiotiques. Barthes (1964: 43) se demandait si l'image double certaines informations du texte, par un phénomène de redondance, ou si le texte ajoute une information inédite à l'image. Barthes n'exclut pas le cas de la traduction intersémiotique telle qu'elle a été décrite par Jakobson. Ce que Jakobson appelle traduction interlinguale dans le cas de la publicité peut être appelé *tradusigne*. Le terme appartient à Guidère qui nomme *tradusigne* le signe qui est déterminé par l'énoncé traduit, mais seulement dans le sens dans lequel il sera interprété. Le tradusigne est l'équivalent du publisigne, mais c'est un faux-semblant car l'équivalence relève de l'interculturalité (Guidère 2000: 40). Cette équivalence apparaît dans le message linguistique de la publicité qui s'articule en deux langues, en grec et en anglais, et où les éléments lexicaux de ces deux langues coexistent à part égale. Le grec constitue le message source et l'anglais le message cible, puisque la compagnie aérienne tout comme le grand magasin sont grecs. Ce type de passage d'une *langue faible* à une langue non seulement *puissante* et *internationale*, mais *hégémonique*, suit le mode de penser des publicistes qui utilisent l'hégémonie de l'anglais pour élargir le groupe cible des consommateurs. Le fait que la publicité examinée est bilingue et non plurilingue montre que la pratique de la traduction publicitaire en Grèce s'oriente vers l'anglais tenant en compte que la Grèce appartient au monde anglophone et Chypre, qui était dans le passé une colonie anglaise, aussi. Donc, la traduction devient un moyen privilégié par les publicistes pour la diffusion de leur message commercial. Le message linguistique s'articule en quatre parties: le slogan, le message principal, le message d'informations complémentaires et l'adresse.

Commençant par le slogan publicitaire, l'utilisation de l'anglais dans le slogan publicitaire d'une compagnie aérienne se fait pour connoter la notion de l'internationalisme et du cosmopolitisme (Holmes 2005: 71-72). Le slogan peut verbaliser un ou plusieurs concepts centraux sur lesquels fonctionne la publicité, il est un moyen efficace pour attirer l'attention (*fonction d'ancrage*) et inviter à l'action et, d'habitude, il contient une devise. Les deux concepts centraux de notre publicité incitent les passagers de la compagnie aérienne à faire leurs achats dans le grand magasin et le profit qu'aura dans cette compagnie aérienne chaque acheteur au cas où il ferait ses achats dans ce magasin. La devise est "volez" (πετάξτε/fly), mais quel est le rôle de la traduction dans cette procédure?

Dans la première partie du message publicitaire nous constatons qu’il y a des similitudes. Les deux verbes *πεταχτείτε* et “fly” (volez) sont des verbes non transitifs, à l’impératif (forme injonctive) et entre guillemets pour annuler le sens dénotatif du mot et de l’énoncé en général. Au niveau du langage, le verbe *πετάγομαι* (voler) est utilisé dans la réalité hellénique pour faire des achats dans une expression du langage quotidien (“*πετάγομαι να κάνω ψώνια*” qui signifie “aller faire des achats”). Par contre, en anglais on dit “go shopping”, pourtant les guillemets et le message iconique dans notre publicité contribuant à la compréhension du message linguistique. Holmes (2005: 8) remarque que les agents de publicité essaient de s’adresser aux consommateurs dans leur langue et que d’habitude les slogans proviennent de la réalité quotidienne. Dans la deuxième partie, la particule “με” (avec) est remplacée par la conjonction “and” (et). En plus, le substantif *δώρο* (cadeau) est remplacé en anglais par le verbe “win” (gagner), fait de transposition qui affaiblie, d’après nous, l’énoncé grec, étant donné que l’emploi de la phrase “με δώρο” (comme cadeau) connote que le billet est gratuit pour tous ceux qui “volent” pour faire des achats au grand magasin Attica, tandis que l’utilisation du verbe “win” ne le définit pas et connote que le client peut gagner le billet (peut être dans un tirage au sort). En plus, l’addition du verbe transitif “win” contribue au fait que l’énoncé obtient une *connotation de dynamisme*.

En plus, il est évident que le slogan publicitaire en grec ne définit pas le moyen de transport auquel appartient le billet (*εισιτήριο*), s’il s’agit d’un billet de cinéma, de théâtre ou de concert. Dans le slogan publicitaire en anglais, il est clair qu’on parle de billet d’avion (“airplane ticket”). Selon nous, le créateur du slogan publicitaire en grec a lié connotativement le verbe “πεταχτείτε” (volez) avec le billet d’avion, tandis que dans le slogan en anglais il semble nécessaire de définir, de donner de l’emphase, qu’il s’agit d’un billet d’avion. Cette addition est la seule qui modifie la symétrie esthétique entre les deux énoncés, puisque le slogan en grec compte neuf mots et le slogan en anglais dix. Nous pouvons ainsi parler d’une *équivalence esthétique* basée sur une symétrie de construction. Il s’agit d’une équivalence qui est aussi basée sur *la dualité du slogan publicitaire* qui est divisé en deux parties presque équivalentes non seulement au niveau esthétique, mais aussi au niveau des incitations connotées (allez→gagnez). Sur ce point nous devons mentionner que la ponctuation (les guillemets et le point d’exclamation) continue dans le slogan en anglais de donner de l’emphase

aux mêmes mots que donne le slogan en grec (*équivalence de ponctuation*). L'équivalence esthétique et l'équivalence de ponctuation, nous donne, d'un premier point de vue, la sensation que les deux langues partagent assez d'éléments communs non seulement au niveau du sens (*équivalence de sens*), mais aussi au niveau de la structure (*équivalence de structure*). Nous pouvons aussi parler d'*équivalence directe*, puisque les formes grammaticales et syntaxiques s'apparentent dans les deux langues et soutiennent la même valeur référentielle (Nenopoulou-Drosou 2001: 50).

Passant à la traduction du message principal, qui est le lieu d'un développement textuel de nature argumentative, nous remarquons dès le début qu'il n'y a pas d'*équivalence quantitative*. Dans notre étude cela est le cas du slogan publicitaire. Pourtant, l'effet d'équivalence n'est pas toujours le souci essentiel de la traduction publicitaire, et parfois, la transposition culturelle ou l'adaptation est inévitable dans ce type de traduction (Au 1999: 105), surtout quand le groupe-cible est plus sensible à l'information comme le sont les Grecs (Sidiropoulou 1998: 202). Le fait que la publicité s'adresse aux clients d'une société aérienne précise montre que le groupe-cible est défini, puisque la publicité ne s'adresse pas à tous les passagers de l'aéroport d'Athènes, et que le groupe-cible partage certaines caractéristiques d'un mode de vie aisé comme, par exemple, faire des achats de bonne qualité rapidement et dans des magasins réputés. Cet effet connote une nouvelle tendance paradoxale parue dans les publicités. Cette tendance montre que la publicité n'est pas toujours une communication ouverte, mais qu'elle commence à cibler un public spécifique.

Nous voyons dès le début des deux messages publicitaires principaux qu'il n'y a pas d'*équivalence de forme et de sens*. Le message grec "ετοιμάστε βαλίτσες" (préparez vos bagages) est traduit en anglais "make your purchases". *Le code de voyage* connoté en grec est remplacé en anglais avec *le code de marché*. En plus, dans le message en anglais, il y a omission non seulement de la firme du magasin (*omission linguistique*), mais aussi du point d'exclamation (*omission extralinguistique*). Il est à remarquer que le verbe "χαρείτε" (jouissez) disparaît dans le message principal de la langue cible, malgré une tendance à l'humour dans les messages publicitaires (Sidiropoulou 1998: 193). Nous voyons aussi que l'impératif est fréquent dans le message anglais. Il a fait son apparition dans le slogan aussi (le verbe "fly"), mais dans le message principal ce n'est pas seulement le verbe "make" qui continue de donner l'impression d'incitation, mais aussi le fait que l'ex-

pression “σας κάνει δώρο” (vous fait un cadeau) qui est traduit en anglais par un verbe à l’impératif “get for free”. D’habitude, en grec, on évite l’impératif et la première et la deuxième personne (Sidiropoulou 1998: 199), tandis qu’en anglais l’utilisation de l’impératif est assez fréquente dans la publicité (Dryer 1982: 139). En plus, la phrase en grec “που έγινε ποτέ” est traduit en anglais “in Greece”, c’est à dire *le code du temps* est remplacé/ traduit par *un code toponymique*, fait qui connote une tendance de diminution de la valeur de l’énoncé grec et cela n’est pas dû au hasard. L’utilisation de la langue anglaise dans le message publicitaire, une langue qui constitue la lingua franca dans le monde économique, connote l’universalité du produit de la publicité. Si la phrase grecque était traduite en équivalence directe, la traduction produirait un fait qui est faux, parce que Attica n’est pas le plus grand magasin au monde. Donc, la traduction peut être utilisée pour séduire un plus grand nombre de consommateurs, mais la séduction n’est pas synonyme de mensonge. C’est pour cela que les agents de publicité évitent ce type d’hyperbole. Un autre point intéressant du message publicitaire principal est qu’il connote l’*indivisible* de la grécité parlant de Grèce et de Chypre, même dans le message traduit. Une société aérienne hellénique a comme point de référence la capitale de l’état, Athènes, donc l’allusion à Chypre serait bizarre pour un anglophone qui ne connaît pas l’histoire de Chypre. En plus, ce consommateur anglophone ne pourrait pas comprendre pourquoi dans la parenthèse est mentionné le nom d’une ville (Larnaca), autre que la capitale de Chypre, Nicosie. La traduction dans ce point du message est fidèle au texte original et le traducteur évite de poser le problème de l’occupation de l’aéroport de Nicosie par l’armée turque. Donc, parfois, malgré le désir des agents d’orienter la publicité vers la mondialisation, la traduction peut servir l’idée ethnocentrique, ce qui est une contradiction. Dans notre cas, le message original grec ne pose pas de problème pour les consommateurs grecs, mais sa traduction en anglais peut inciter le consommateur anglophone à s’informer sur ce problème politique.

En ce qui concerne la traduction du message d’informations complémentaires nous voyons que les deux messages sont équivalents, sauf la présentation de la firme de la compagnie aérienne (Aegean Airlines) dans le texte en anglais. Cette addition est jugée nécessaire probablement pour rappeler la compagnie aérienne aux anglophones, puisque cette firme est assez connue en Grèce. Il est à remarquer aussi que la dernière phrase de

ce type de message “Πληροφορίες στο 211 1802600” (Informations au 211 1802600) est en caractères gras (*équivalence graphique*), fait maintenu aussi dans la traduction de la phrase en anglais. Pourtant la traduction anglaise “For more information 211 1802600” comprend l’addition “for more” qui est en accord avec l’*équivalence culturelle* des messages anglais qui sont considérés comme plus polis et qui incitent plus les lecteurs à chercher des informations. Enfin, la traduction de l’adresse, dernière partie traduite du message linguistique publicitaire, comprend des éléments additionnels et des éléments explicatifs. Ainsi, l’appellation ancienne de la rue Panepistimiou et l’addition de l’abréviation “sq” qui montre que “Syntagma” est une place, ce qui est déjà connu pour les Grecs et ce qui justifie son absence dans le message linguistique en grec. En plus, en anglais il est mentionné que le siège du grand magasin est à Athènes, dans un effort de rappel pour les consommateurs.

4. La traduction intersémiotique

D’après Eco (2003: 302), la définition de Jakobson pour la traduction intersémiotique ne contient pas les transmutations dans des systèmes autres que la langue, au contraire de l’utilisation du terme par ses successeurs. Pourtant, la pratique de la traduction intersémiotique aujourd’hui inclut la transmutation entre des systèmes sémiotiques non verbaux. Dans notre cas, toutes les transmutations en systèmes non verbaux ont comme point de départ le message linguistique de publicité, fait qui correspond à la première définition de l’expression traduction intersémiotique donnée par Jakobson. L’universalité des images constitue un obstacle dans le processus traductionnel, c’est pourquoi il est nécessaire d’accorder une attention particulière au système iconographique lors de la traduction, afin de renforcer le transfert des connotations d’une langue à l’autre. C’est *la technique de supplément* (Beguin-Verbrugge 2006: 175) selon laquelle une branche du savoir se développe plus particulièrement sous forme d’images.

Ainsi, en ce qui concerne la traduction intersémiotique au niveau iconographique, nous remarquons que les verbes “πεταχτείτε” et “fly” dans le message linguistique en grec et en anglais sont visualisés à travers la présence du message iconique de l’avion ayant la marque de la société aérienne Aegean Airlines, un élément qui ne passe pas inaperçu puisque l’avion laisse des traces pendant son vol. En plus, cet élément iconique se trouve,

du point de vue de la localisation, près du logo du grand magasin Attica (*code de proximité*). En plus, *la valeur antonomastique* (Eco 1972: 244) des femmes présentées dans la publicité connote que le message publicitaire s'adresse à tous les passagers de Aegean Airlines qui font des achats d'un certain montant. Le fait que l'agent de la publicité utilise seulement des femmes (ce qui n'est pas clair du point de vue du sens dans le message linguistique, ni en grec, ni en anglais) montre que les spécialistes de la publicité s'adresse à un pouvoir d'achat considéré comme *fort*, celui des femmes. Mais, si le message visuel constitue un signe basé sur la valeur antonomastique, les deux logos celui de Attica en haut de la publicité et celui de Aegean Airlines, constituent un autre signe basé sur *la valeur onomastique*, puisque les deux logos sont dotés d'identité commerciale. En outre, ce n'est pas par hasard que les deux logos avec leur valeur onomastique clorent la valeur antonomastique, parce que cela peut être traduit par "n'importe qui peut gagner en faisant des achats, mais en participant à une réalité établie seulement par la société aérienne Aegean Airlines et le grand magasin Attica". La valeur antonomastique perd de son efficacité si nous prenons en compte que les femmes présentées sont des femmes belles, élégantes et bien habillées. Donc, l'agent de publicité limite la valeur antonomastique de son message étant donné que nous parlons des femmes qui sont *citoyens du monde* et non des femmes qui vivent, par exemple, dans la province et veulent faire leurs achats dans le grand magasin de la capitale. Cependant, ni le message linguistique de la langue source, ni celui de la langue cible, n'implicite que la publicité s'adresse seulement à une catégorie de consommateurs.

Au niveau du chromatisme, dans notre publicité, nous pouvons voir qu'il y a un symbolisme des couleurs qui permet d'associer les messages linguistiques "Aegean Airlines" et "Attica" avec les couleurs bleu, rouge et gris clair qui dominant au niveau iconique. Ces couleurs sont les couleurs synthétiques du logo de ces deux entreprises, un autre système sémiotique non verbal qui traduit les messages linguistiques en les connotant.

5. *Pour conclure*

Au niveau de la langue, le message linguistique en grec qui connote la grécité devient à l'aide de sa traduction en anglais un message qui connote la mondialisation. La structure du message publicitaire traduit s'adresse

au consommateur international sophistiqué qui est bilingue, voire trilingue, cosmopolite et très mobile. L'hyperbole dans le slogan de la publicité et la simplicité du discours et les couleurs vives semblent être des moyens efficaces pour persuader et inviter le consommateur (Shakir 1995: 69). Si l'utilisation des comparatifs peut paraître superflue, il y a cependant une préférence pour ce type de comparaison par rapport à d'autres structures à cause de la nature compétitive de cette activité (Sidiropoulou 1998: 201). Pourtant, cette fonction ne se reproduit pas dans le système sémiotique du chromatisme et du graphisme. La notion d'équivalence reste centrale dans la réflexion traductologique. L'équivalence littérale, par exemple, entre les deux slogans publicitaires de notre étude, est un phénomène de traduction assez rare, si on tient compte que c'est l'adaptation qui est associée au genre de publicité (Bastin 2001: 6).

Au niveau iconographique, la présence des consommatrices non reconnaissables connotent la mondialisation, mais la présence des deux logos limitent cette perspective nous rappelant que dans un message publicitaire l'image littérale est dénotée et l'image symbolique connotée (Barthes 1964: 43). La traduction du message linguistique représente plutôt une expression symbolique qu'une expression structurale ou sémantique, fait assez fréquent dans la publicité (Eastman & Stein 1993: 200). Ainsi, la traduction intersémiotique n'a pas une valeur complémentaire, mais une valeur fortifiante du message linguistique en reproduisant les connotations de celui-ci dans un effort de bombarder le lectorat de la publicité des mêmes connotations. Ainsi, le message linguistique ne fait alors que confirmer les dispositions de l'image qui porte la plus grosse partie de la charge sémantique. L'image publicitaire a très rarement un caractère d'essentialité ou d'urgence, comme peut l'avoir la transmission d'un message linguistique (Bertin 2002: 172). Il ne s'agit pas de faire savoir, mais généralement de faire valoir et l'état d'attention du destinataire potentiel est plutôt faible face à ces multiples images communicationnelles qui l'entourent. Cette position affaiblit l'efficacité de la traduction intersémiotique, pourtant nous pensons que la présence de la traduction interlinguale valorise l'efficacité communicationnelle de la publicité connotant que le fait de la traduction interlinguale est aussi un fait de traduction intersociétale, au moins pour le monde occidental.

Enfin, le fait que tant la traduction interlinguale que la traduction intersémiotique se caractérisent d'une sorte d'équivalence montre la notion

de l'harmonie choisie inconsciemment par les agents de publicité. Effort d'équivalence dans la traduction interlinguale et intersémiotique, effort de créer une harmonie dans toute la publicité. D'après nous, la présente publicité respectant l'équilibre entre tous les systèmes sémiotiques synthétiques gagne les impressions connotant un nouveau mode de vie, celui de la mondialisation, qui est beaucoup critiqué de nos jours.

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Peter Kravanja

Intermédialités proustiennes dans *Rendez-vous à Bray*, un film d'André Delvaux d'après la nouvelle *Le Roi Cophetua* de Julien Gracq*

Le narrateur du *Roi Cophetua*, la nouvelle de Julien Gracq dont le cinéaste belge André Delvaux s'est inspiré pour son film *Rendez-vous à Bray* (1972), a été décrit comme un "guetteur de l'instant". Invité par un ami, Jacques Nueil, compositeur et, par ailleurs, aviateur au cours de la Grande Guerre, à quitter le Paris de 1917 pour le rejoindre dans sa villa La Fougeraie à Bray-la-Forêt, ce personnage qui dit "je", que la nouvelle ne nomme pas et que le film baptise Julien Eschenbach, goûte, tout le long d'un après-midi et d'une soirée, le "singulier silence de l'heure qu'il est". Seul, quoiqu'entouré par les soins discrets d'une servante, Julien attend un événement qui ne se produit pas: l'arrivée de son ami Jacques – sur lequel plane le soupçon de la mort. Le tableau de Burne-Jones qui donne son nom à la nouvelle lui fait comprendre la nature des rapports qui existent entre Jacques et cette femme silencieuse, énigmatique. La nuit, cette attente à La Fougeraie culmine, avec la précision et la rigoureuse logique d'un problème mathématique, dans une substitution subtile, qui laisse le sentiment étrangement inquiétant que le narrateur n'a fait que coller à un "scénario" orchestré par Jacques Nueil, "affectueusement de loin", comme un rituel initiatique.

"L'absence n'est-elle pas pour qui aime, la plus certaine, la plus efficace, la plus vivace, la plus indestructible, la plus fidèle des présences?" (Marcel Proust, *Les Plaisirs et les Jours*). Si le narrateur gracquien vit "tout à l'heure à travers maintenant", le film de Delvaux évoque le passé de Julien par des *flash-back* associatifs (comportant, bien sûr, quelques distorsions de la mémoire): l'attente solitaire éveille en lui des souvenirs de ses rencontres,

“à des intervalles irréguliers”, avec Jacques, comme pour combler l’absence de son ami qui ne vient pas au rendez-vous.

Quel souvenir gardons-nous d’une amitié, d’un paysage, d’une époque disparue à jamais, mais aussi d’une église, d’un quatuor, d’un tableau, d’une poésie, d’une nouvelle, d’un film? Comment ces expériences résistent-elles au temps ou sont-elles déformées par lui? Lorsque se posent de telles questions, la rencontre avec Proust et son cycle romanesque *À la recherche du temps perdu* devient inévitable. *Rendez-vous à Bray* frappe en effet par les multiples allusions à la vie et à l’œuvre du grand écrivain. Notre analyse sera tout particulièrement guidée par ces résonances proustiennes.

1. Burne-Jones, Vermeer

La nouvelle de Julien Gracq accorde une place importante à une peinture d’Edward Burne-Jones, *King Cophetua and the Beggar Maid*. Ce tableau apparaît à la plume de la nouvelle comme du film. Le protagoniste l’aperçoit accroché au mur situé en face de sa table pendant le dîner préparé et servi par la servante (dîner dont le menu, dans le film, est identique à celui du repas organisé par Julien pour Jacques et son amie Odile à l’auberge de campagne).

Proust et Burne-Jones? Une étude récente a tenté de déterminer l’influence du peintre anglais préraphaélite sur l’auteur de la *Recherche* (Maya 2001). S’il est certain que Proust connaissait Burne-Jones par les articles que John Ruskin lui avait consacrés, notamment dans son livre *The Bible of Amiens* (que Proust a traduit), l’artiste anglais n’est nulle part nommé dans la *Recherche*. Néanmoins, on ressent son atmosphère (médiévale, mystérieuse, brumeuse...) autour de certains personnages féminins, surtout ceux de M^{me} de Guermantes et M^{me} de Stermaria.

Mais c’est surtout en évoquant l’œuvre de Vermeer que *Rendez-vous à Bray* assure la rencontre picturale entre Gracq et Proust. L’admiration de Proust pour les tableaux du peintre hollandais et surtout pour *Vue de Delft*, le “plus beau tableau du monde”, est bien connue. Gracq admire Vermeer comme Proust. *Le Roi Cophetua* ne contient qu’un seul passage (ou peut-être deux) qui fasse allusion à Vermeer. La référence est subtile, mais elle semble s’imposer, car c’est à l’aide d’une *camera obscura* que le peintre composa la plupart de ses œuvres (et notamment *Vue de Delft*): “Les menus objets de la pièce s’y reflétaient avec cette même netteté de chambre noire

qui envoûte les tableaux des intimistes hollandais” (Gracq 1970: 219). Un peu plus loin, la servante est décrite ainsi: “La lumière du flambeau qu’elle avait posé devant moi sur la table accentuait bizarrement le caractère rituel de ces ornements blancs qu’elle semblait avoir revêtus plutôt que noués à son front et à sa ceinture” (ibid.: 221). Ce passage souligne d’abord, bien sûr, l’aspect initiatique que prennent progressivement les rapports qui unissent le narrateur et la servante, mais, comment ne pas penser, devant cette description, aux femmes immortalisées par Vermeer. Par ailleurs, tout comme la servante du *Roi Cophetua*, elles semblent presque impassibles, non pas par pauvreté des sentiments ou apathie, mais davantage par leur dissimulation des émotions qui ne doivent pas être communiquées au spectateur. Les séquences situées à La Fougeraie baignent dans cette atmosphère, en culminant par le plan de la servante, qui, assise au coin d’une table de cuisine – on voit même un bord de carrelage de couleur “bleu de Delft” –, la figure cachée dans la paume des mains, lève, surprise, le regard vers Julien.

Ces allusions à l’œuvre de Vermeer donnent encore plus de relief à la présence de la peinture de Burne-Jones. En effet, dans maints tableaux du peintre hollandais, l’on voit, sur le mur du fond, telle une clé permettant de comprendre l’idée exprimée par le tableau, des toiles qui ont un lien sémantique apparent avec les personnages. Le tableau de Burne-Jones a même plusieurs fonctions. Au niveau diégétique, il permet au protagoniste de saisir que la servante est en même temps la maîtresse de son ami. Plus subtilement, la peinture est présentée par Gracq comme une “annonciation” (à l’envers). La servante est aussi l’Étrangère, l’ange étant par définition celui qui vient d’ailleurs, le messager du *tout autre*. Cette femme permet au narrateur gracquien (et à Julien) de franchir ce “rideau de silence un peu initiatique derrière lequel l’oreille déjà se disposait, se tendait vaguement vers un *autre* bruit” (Gracq 1970: 192)/

2. *Du côté de Marcel*

L’intérêt pour l’œuvre de Marcel Proust s’est toujours accompagné d’une curiosité quasi insatiable pour les détails de sa vie. Roland Barthes, qui parla souvent de Proust lors de ses conférences données au Collège de France, l’a formulé ainsi:

Marcel, être singulier, à la fois enfant et adulte, *puer senilis*, passionné et sage, proie de manies excentriques et lieu d'une réflexion souveraine sur le monde, l'amour, l'art, le temps, la mort. J'ai proposé d'appeler cet intérêt très spécial que les lecteurs peuvent porter à la vie de Marcel Proust (l'album des photographies de sa vie, dans la collection de la Pléiade, est épuisé depuis longtemps) le *marcellisme*, pour le distinguer du *proustisme*, qui ne serait que le goût d'une œuvre ou d'une manière littéraire. (Barthes 1982: 830)

Rendez-vous à Bray cède quelque peu à ce *marcellisme* en parsemant, ça et là, des allusions à la vie de Proust. Citons quelques exemples (tout en veillant à ne pas tomber dans le piège d'une interprétation abusive).

Le dédain de Jacques pour le cinéma, "un divertissement d'ilotes, un passe-temps d'illettrés, de créatures misérables ahuries par leur besoin et leurs soucis" selon l'expression tristement célèbre de Georges Duhamel, est aussi celui de Proust. La plupart des intellectuels de son temps – Appollinaire était une exception – partagent d'ailleurs, on l'a assez répété, ce credo anti-cinématographique.

Comme dans la famille de Proust, le père de Jacques mourut avant son épouse. La mère du compositeur ressemble d'ailleurs physiquement à la mère du grand écrivain, telle que nous la connaissons par la célèbre photographie qui la montre, assise, entourée de ses deux fils. L'engouement de Proust pour la photographie est bien connu. Il attachait toute sa vie une importance extraordinaire à la possession de photographies. Il en avait toute une collection, la plupart étant dédicacées. Son acharnement à obtenir un portrait de personnes qui répugnaient à s'en dessaisir est un trait de caractère qui donne toute la mesure de sa passion. Les photographies de la famille de Jacques ou de ses proches, qui ornent le salon de La Fougeraie, évoquent subtilement cette passion proustienne.

Quelquefois, le film se réfère explicitement à la vie de Marcel Proust. Par exemple, Illiers et Cabourg font partie de la litanie de "noms de pays" que Julien et Jacques s'amuse ensemble à aligner, lors d'une promenade. De même, au moment de la déclaration de guerre, on entend, *en voix off*, la mère de Jacques s'écrier: "Odilon! Marcel!"

Le 26 février 1913, à la salle Pleyel, Proust écouta le quatuor Capet jouer les quinzième, seizième et dix-septième quatuors (ou Grande Fugue) de Beethoven. Entre 1914 et 1917, il invita plusieurs fois chez lui, 102 boulevard Haussmann, les quatuors Capet et Poulet pour entendre Mozart,

Ravel, Schumann et surtout Fauré, Franck et les derniers quatuors de Beethoven. À cette époque, la musique était son principal aliment spirituel. Dans le film, Julien continue la chronique musicale que Jacques tenait avant le début de la guerre. (D'emblée, la substitution est au cœur même des liens qui unissent les deux amis.) Le pianiste discute avec son rédacteur en chef du compte rendu qu'il a écrit d'un concert donné par le quatuor Capet. Au programme: des œuvres de Debussy et de Franck. De ce dernier, Julien joue le *Prélude, Choral et Fugue*, lors du récital qu'il donne chez les Hausman (*sic*).

3. Franck, "La communication des âmes"

César Franck a été novateur dans le domaine de la musique de chambre en introduisant le principe de la *forme cyclique* qui, par la résurgence des thèmes, d'un mouvement à l'autre, et par leur superposition dans le volet final, assure une grande cohérence à la structure de la composition. Selon Alfred Cortot, *Prélude, Choral et Fugue* "est l'un des dix plus grands chefs-d'œuvres de la littérature de piano". C'est aussi une page d'une étrange et forte nouveauté lorsqu'elle est publiée en 1884. Le film en fait entendre un extrait de plusieurs minutes. Par ailleurs, *Prélude, Choral et Fugue* constitue l'unique accompagnement musical d'un film de Luchino Visconti, *Vaghe stelle dell'Orsa* (*Sandra*, 1965). Or, dans ce film, comme dans celui d'André Delvaux, une relation triangulaire entre deux hommes et une (ou plusieurs) femme(s) occupe une place primordiale. Le morceau de Franck est caractérisé par une composition ternaire indiquée d'emblée par le titre en triptyque; le passage du diptyque (voir un "prélude et fugue" à la Jean-Sébastien Bach) au triptyque, par l'introduction du choral intermédiaire, accentue une figure dramatique présente dans le film de Visconti: à chaque couple s'ajoute un troisième élément. La même conclusion est valable pour *Rendez-vous à Bray*: entre Jacques et Julien s'interpose (si l'on peut dire) la mère, à Odile et Jacques s'ajoute Julien, l'absence de Jacques plane sur les rapports qui existent entre Julien et la servante.

La musique est le lien privilégié qui unit Jacques et Julien; elle ressuscite le passé et restitue au pianiste la personne de son ami. Inspiré par la tonalité du dernier Brahms (une imitation qui n'aurait sans doute pas déplu à l'auteur des *Pastiches et Mélanges*), le nocturne que le compositeur a dédié à Julien ponctue les moments-clés du film. L'élément musical assure

la communication des âmes. Ainsi Proust: “De même que certains êtres sont les derniers témoins d’une forme de vie que la nature a abandonnée, je me demandais si la musique n’était pas l’exemple unique de ce qu’aurait pu être – s’il n’y avait pas eu l’invention du langage, la formation des mots, l’analyse des idées – la communication des âmes” (*La Prisonnière*). Si les photographies de Jacques et de ses proches, qui décorent le salon de La Fougeraie, affirment visuellement *le ça a été* barthésien, la musique accompagne les souvenirs de Julien, les déclenche parfois, et en est une trace audible qui persiste au présent.

4. *Un rendez-vous proustien*

Julien Gracq note: “L’enchaînement des séquences dans *À la recherche du temps perdu* ressemble souvent – plutôt qu’à l’articulation habituelle en chapelet des scènes romanesques selon l’écoulement du temps – à la multiplication cellulaire par dédoublement des noyaux. Dès qu’un foyer d’intérêt inédit ou inattendu se densifie suffisamment sur les marges d’un des tableaux animés qui constituent la *Recherche*, il centre sur lui l’attention et le regard du narrateur et devient le noyau d’une séquence neuve, laquelle organise aussitôt son autonomie” (*En lisant en écrivant*). Cette remarque portant sur l’architecture de la *Recherche* s’applique aussi à la structure (musicale) de *Rendez-vous à Bray*. C’est là encore un aspect proustien du film. Nous avons déjà évoqué un certain nombre d’allusions à la vie de l’écrivain. Citons maintenant quelques références à son cycle romanesque (sans perdre de vue, répétons-le, les hasards d’une lecture *proustifiante* par trop enthousiaste).

Commençons par les références proustiennes liées à la Grande Guerre, toile de fond du *Temps retrouvé*. Les interventions de la censure, les blancs dans les journaux que lit Julien, évoquent les exclamations de M^{me} Verdurin, qui constate avec regret que “l’on a encore *caviardé* toute la fin de l’article de Norpois”. Quant à la qualité des informations fournies par la presse, le narrateur proustien les commente à plusieurs reprises. Le tremblement qui secoue un instant la solitude et l’attente de Julien à La Fougeraie n’est d’ailleurs pas sans rappeler l’effroi du narrateur devant la “rapidité avec laquelle le théâtre de ces victoires [annoncées par les journaux] se rapprochait de Paris”. De même, l’incitation du rédacteur en chef de Julien: “Si vous avez une opinion personnelle sur Wagner ou sur la guerre, dites-la!”

rappelle la germanophilie de M. de Charlus et de son neveu, Robert de Saint-Loup. (“Il faut décidément l’arrivée des Allemands pour qu’on puisse entendre du Wagner à Paris.”) Comme ce dernier, Jacques part à la guerre “comme on part à une fête”, une guerre dont les deux hommes prévoient qu’elle sera “l’affaire de quelques semaines” seulement. Contrairement à son ami, Julien ne part pas au front: étranger (il est luxembourgeois), il est exempt de toute obligation militaire vis-à-vis de la France. Son statut évoque celui du narrateur de la *Recherche*, qui, souffrant, ne participe pas non plus à la guerre.

D’autres éléments rapprochent Julien du narrateur proustien: un certain détachement des événements et, surtout, le fait que le passé soit ressuscité à travers lui, comme vu par ses yeux. Au salon de La Fougeraie, la caméra se focalise sur lui, elle s’attarde sur son visage; l’espace du salon n’est jamais montré d’un point de vue qui permettrait au spectateur d’en saisir la globalité.

Si Jacques ressemble par moments quelque peu à Charlus ou à Saint-Loup, Julien partage certains traits avec Morel: lors de la soirée chez les Hausman (dont les mondanités évoquent les réceptions chez M^{me} de Sainte-Euverte ou chez les Guermantes), le pianiste est le protégé du compositeur – un rôle contre lequel il se révolte. Les deux musiciens, Morel comme Julien, ont d’ailleurs obtenu un Premier Prix de Conservatoire et sont d’origine modeste.

Les noms de lieux (Toutainville, Cabourg, Criqueville, Criquebœuf etc.) que Jacques et Julien s’amuse ensemble à aligner, lors d’une promenade, font penser au goût du narrateur pour la toponymie – un goût qu’il partage avec le curé de Combray – et aux stations balnéaires desservies par le petit train de Balbec.

Tout aussi proustien est le mécanisme associatif, ébranlé par des impressions sensibles (perçues par l’ouïe, la vue, le goût etc.), qui provoque les réminiscences de Julien. Ainsi, la saveur du vin, du repas entier que goûte Julien, est semblable à celle du repas qu’il avait commandé, à l’auberge de campagne, pour Jacques, Odile et lui-même (à la Fougeraie, les rôles sont inversés: c’est Jacques qui a commandé le (même) repas pour Julien); et cette saveur ressuscite cette évasion à trois. Significativement, les images ressurgissent de façon palpitante, d’abord par bribes et détails, pour ensuite prendre forme et consistance dans la durée. Proust: “Quand d’un passé ancien rien ne subsiste, après la mort des êtres, après la destruction des

choses, seules, plus frêles mais plus vivaces, plus immatérielles, plus persistantes, plus fidèles, l'odeur et la saveur restent encore longtemps, comme des âmes, à se rappeler, à attendre, à espérer, sur la ruine de tout le reste, à porter sans fléchir, sur leur gouttelette presque impalpable, l'édifice immense du souvenir" (*Du côté de chez Swann*).

La comparaison avec la *Recherche* a toutefois ses limites: dans le cas de *Rendez-vous à Bray*, on ne peut parler de mémoire involontaire. En effet, la madeleine, les clochers, les pavés, la serviette, le bruit de la cuillère ou d'une conduite d'eau, ces impressions sensibles sont comme le signe d'un tout autre objet, à déchiffrer, à interpréter (Combray, les jeunes filles, Venise...). Un pareil travail de décryptage ne s'impose pas à Julien. Son parcours n'est pas celui du narrateur proustien, qui perçoit, à travers les éclats de la mémoire involontaire, une image instantanée de l'éternité, la joie du temps retrouvé, "un peu de temps à l'état pur", et qui reçoit, à la fin du roman, la révélation de la rédemption par l'Art.

5. Conclusion

Quel est alors l'itinéraire de Julien? La nouvelle de Gracq suggère discrètement que la servante n'est pas seulement la maîtresse de Jacques, mais aussi la prêtresse d'un rituel initiatique, conçu par lui pour le jeune pianiste. En route pour Braye-la-Forêt, le narrateur gracquien s'exprime ainsi: "On traversait alors, après le vacarme parisien, ces forêts nobles et vides qui barricadaient les avancées de la vie civile comme un rideau de silence un peu initiatique derrière lequel l'oreille déjà se disposait, se tendait vaguement vers un *autre* bruit" (Gracq 1970: 192).

Dans le film, la communion (la communication) avec la Mort – la quête de Julien Eschenbach rejoint celle d'Orphée – est assurée non seulement par la musique, mais aussi par le repas (que, significativement, Julien mange seul, ce qui en affirme le caractère sacré) et par l'union charnelle de Julien et de la servante – *Eros et Thanatos*. Le lendemain, après cette "nuit transfigurée", le narrateur gracquien (percé par le contact avec l'au-delà?) repart pour Paris; dans le film, Julien demande un journal à la gare de Braye-la-Forêt et constate qu'aucun avion n'a pu décoller depuis 48 heures, en raison du mauvais temps – Jacques serait-il encore en vie? Julien reprend le chemin de la villa de son ami.

Les questions de langage et d'identité sont au centre de l'œuvre de Delvaux. À plusieurs reprises, le film insiste sur le fait que Julien est un

étranger; on se méfie même de lui à cause de son accent luxembourgeois (qui est donc d'une sonorité plutôt germanique): dans le train, le soldat veut savoir s'il est alsacien et, à Bray-la-Forêt, les deux enfants auxquels le jeune homme demande le chemin de La Fougeraie se taisent et l'observent avec suspicion.

On peut penser au statut de *metoikos* ou *resident alien* que revendiquait T. S. Eliot pour les poètes. Ou aussi à Gilles Deleuze et son "devenir-minoritaire", la recherche d'une langue mineure à l'intérieur d'une langue. Ou encore, à un ange de Rilke qui effrayerait Julien par sa beauté et son mystère, ce Julien candide, dont la volonté de ne pas compromettre une certaine idée de pureté qu'il se fait de lui-même transpire à travers les discussions qu'il a avec Jacques.

Et Proust, nous permettons-nous de demander une dernière fois?

Dans le film comme dans la nouvelle, le protagoniste s'annonce à La Fougeraie par un coup de sonnette qui paraît "étrangement hors de saison" à l'oreille du narrateur gracquien: "La main levée déjà vers la sonnette de la grille, hésitant à m'annoncer, j'écoutai une fois encore, intimidé, une saute de la rafale coucher les arbres de la venelle. Le tintement de la sonnette au fond de cette cépée morfondue me paraissait étrangement hors de saison" (Gracq 1970: 197).

Un indice infime, certes, mais comment ne pas penser aux visites de M. Swann à la famille du narrateur, un soir de Pâques, à Combray? Il y a peu d'idées sur lesquelles Proust ait autant insisté que sur la composition de son livre, dont la structure circulaire est apparente. Dans la mesure où la sonnette de Combray, au bruit "ferrugineux, intarissable et glacé" et dont le tintement est décrit comme "rebondissant, ferrugineux, intarissable, criard et frais", ouvre et ferme la *Recherche*, le "rendez-vous urgent avec moi-même" du narrateur qui décide, à la fin du *Temps retrouvé*, de ne vivre désormais que pour son œuvre, le renvoie au village où, enfant, il passait les vacances de Pâques chez sa tante Léonie; et c'est une expérience *initiale* mais aussi *initiatique* (la tasse de thé, la madeleine) qui "lance" le roman en faisant resurgir Combray. Le rendez-vous à Bray-la-Forêt est donc – peut-être – aussi un rendez-vous avec Combray – d'où la disparition de la lettre "e"? Bray, Bray, Combray.

* Ce texte est dédié à la mémoire de Francis Ramirez.

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Grigory Kreydlin

Nonverbal communication in dance, theatre and art

1. Introduction

In oral communication a speaker must not only be heard, but seen as well. Communication includes gestures and facial expressions, body and eye movements, etc., all of which function both as units of separate sensory channels and as a part of one integrated whole.

Corporeal signs are always rooted in a particular type of thinking and culture, which provide for the existence and realization of nonverbal meanings and ideas that an individual may want to communicate. Culture is a specific system of representations. People live in the culture and reproduce it not only in their speech and language, but also in different semiotic activities that they perform in everyday life, in special rites, and liberal arts. People also codify culture in a rhythmic magic of dancing and singing, in theatre and cinema – in any important human act.

2. Dancing

Artistic subsystems of nonverbal languages of ballet theatre and dances, such as the language of Indian classical dance *abhinaya* (LaMeri 1941), occupy a special place in culture. Hands and arms perform the main role in this dance, which has been known for more than 2000 years. The specific meaning is attributed to various positions of hands and their movements, *hasta*, and to their orientation relative to the head and body of a dancer. Some researchers distinguish two separate sublanguages in the language of *abhinaya* – one of the sign movements made by one hand, *asamyutta*, and one of paired sign movements made by two hands, *samyutta*. Especially significant among gestures that are incorporated in *abhinaya* is the sign behavior of fingers, which is similar to *mudra* movements. The positions

of fingers including the way and degree of their deviation from the vertical axis, the character of finger movements, the presence/absence of space among the fingers, and even their position in relation to the thumb, are semantically loaded.

Abhinaya dance is extremely complex in its form and meaning, but the system of ball tango, simple at first sight, also represents a specific domain of culture with its own nonverbal semiotic code, etiquette and ceremonies. At the tango-dancing parties called *milongas*, popular in many big Russian cities, men invite women for a dance with a special glance or a nod. And a slight nod of a woman partner without any accompanying words means agreement to dance. The blocks of *milongas* consist of four musical parts, and according to the dance etiquette, you should speak to your partner about something and only then proceed to dancing. Following the canons of tango and *milonga*, a couple dances in full silence not touching other dancing couples. If after the dancing tour a man thanks his female partner with words or with a nod, it means he does not want to dance with her anymore.

In Russia dance and ballet played a very special role starting from the nineteenth century up to the beginning of the twentieth century. “Dancers played in drama performances, tragic actors danced” (Krasovskaya 1958: 82). Dance was regarded as one of the social skills necessary for moving up the stairs of the empire bureaucratic hierarchy. William Todd (2005) relates symbolic dancing elements with the Russian environment of the nineteenth century. It is the choreography that helps to restore the evolution of Pushkin's characters and to understand relations among them and the outside world. For example, Eugene Onegin is experienced in worldly activities of noble people. He easily dances a rather difficult dance *mazurka* and performs difficult movements such as bows, not just casual nods. In Russia of 19th century young people belonging to high society learnt the art of bowing together with the art of dancing. Dance teachers worked out special rules of beautiful positions of the body, head and legs for bowing. The instruction written by a dance teacher dated 1825 says that two things – walking and bowing – are among the most important in the high society. “When seeing a stranger in public, people pay attention to his/her appearance and movements before learning the social position. There are many kinds of gait and bows. They depend on the character, status and educational background. A passionate character can be spotted through agitated

gait and bows. If a person holds a high position in the society, his rank prevents him from excessive liveliness. Finally, a well-educated person knows where and what kind of bow to perform. One cannot expect anything pleasant from those who have never learnt to walk, sit and bow correctly.”

In a Russian village of the 19th century, the gentry and landowners, balancing between the culture of their serfs and the culture of urban aristocracy, had an opportunity to follow both traditions. A folk dance – a reel – in the juvenile lyrics of Pushkin meant any circle dance, either real (Greek, Circassian) or imaginary. But later, in *Eugene Onegin*, for example, the word *reel* (Russian *khorovod*) means already only a Russian folk dance. It is not accidental that the landowners Larins keep up some features of folk peasant dance: a reel is one of the habits of sweet olden times in their peaceful life.

Thus, a dance is the reflection of conventional process of generation of nonverbal text according to the given meaning. Being both a semiotic system of art and a type of nonverbal sign of meaningful social behavior, a dance can embody many of the highest values of the prose – creativity, beauty, stamina and poetry, perceived as the unity of meaning and technique.

3. *Theatre*

Staging in theatre is always done within a tradition and presumably presents the following things: (a) authentic reproduction of material elements of cultural traditions – the objects of everyday life, rites and technical devices, such as furniture, clothes, weapons, contemporary cars, etc., i.e. the stage-property of theatrical culture; (b) attention to space and body aspects -- features of theatre which will be of particular interest to me. Below I will discuss space issues and space behavior of actors in theatrical staging.

In his guide to proxemic behavior, Edward Hall writes: “The study of culture in its space aspect is the study of how people in different emotional states, environments and contexts, how people performing different actions and entering different relations use their ability to perceive space” (Hall 1974: 3). While directing staging, a theatre director should realize that every nation has its representation of space organization of life, the representation that can be called the national space conceptualiza-

tion (Kreydlin 2002). The notion of space and communication of people within this space are always reflected in staging a play.

For example, Korean beliefs and an unusual (for Europeans) notion of space organization are reflected in the Korean theatre. A spectator in Korean theatre should know that (a) if there is a house with rooms on the stage, then in every position of the house there are living spirits who help in everyday activities, take care of people who live in the house, protect them from troubles, disasters, etc. Thus, in the hall with wooden floor *maru* lives a spirit *Songdgu*, and in the female part of the house lives the spirit called *Samsin*. In the kitchen lives *Jovang*, in the yard – *Todgu*, etc. Each of the spirits performs his own role: *Songdgu* guards the house, *Samsin* governs the childbirth; *Todgu* protects the yard from evil spirits, etc. A spectator should also know that (b) *maru* is the most important place in the Korean house. The word *maru* supposedly originates from Evenki word *malu* (holy place). That is why it is not surprising that *maru* is always in the centre of the stage.

Body aspect of action and theatrical gestures are also highly important. The theory and history of culture, and following them nonverbal semiotics, distinguish two clearly opposite attitudes to human body. These are: (a) apophetic attitude, or non-disclosure of the body. This attitude tries to present the body as concealed, undistinguished and at the same time, so to say, ideal, in particular, it desires to make a male body undistinguishable from a female one, and

(b) the attitude that can be called attracting attention to the body. The stereotypical means to attract attention to the body, besides verbal manifestations, are somatic signs – gestures, postures, etc, as well as perfumes, clothes and accessories.

From the 16th to the end of the 18th century, European theatre presented a bodiless performance. Directors and actors had only words and several rare elements of stage property. European dramatic art did not allow assimilation to something or to somebody in body masks, so that it would not affect the uniqueness and unity of a man. It was only at the end of the second third of the 18th century when the apophetic attitude changed for attentive attitude to the body. Now the audience not only heard the voice of the actor but also saw the body of the actor and his actions with the body and performed on the body. This dual perception of the actor by a spectator is very important. First, owing to such perception

all signs expressed by the actor become true. Secondly, the dual perception emphasises that the actor performing a role cannot be identified with the character of the play, that we cannot equate the actor with the person he represents, that his costume and mask, as well as the gestures of the actor, are only signs of represented performance (Bogatyrev 1975: 20).

Partners exercise various body contacts, master new gestures and perform different actions with objects and over objects, with people and over them. Characters point with their hands and eyes to each other, touch one another (these gestures probably gave birth to new attitude to a body and corporeality in Russian theatre). Characters take each other's hands, hug, kiss, put their head on the knees of their partner; slap, fight, assume new postures and later they come off the stage space and go in the house.

Strange as it may seem, theatrical gestures and theatrical space have been studied separately so far, though it is very important to tell a story in the theatre using actively the languages of proxemics, touching and gestures all together. Quite often a gesture performed in a certain part of the space impresses more than words said or a static posture assumed by an actor in another part of the space. Moreover, pauses and silence, combined with gestures and postures, can also reinforce the impression during particularly significant parts of the performance.

The leading theorist of theatre in the 20th century, Konstantin S. Stanislavsky, divided theatrical actions into three components: outer, or body action, verbal action and inner action, a thought or feeling. Peter Brook saw paralinguistics and kinesics as sign systems, which can follow the verbal code or contradict it. In a lifeless monotonous, or, according to Brook, dead theatre, gestures of actors often contradict the playwright's intentions expressed in the text or director's ideas on how to interpret an event. A Macedonian researcher Sasho Ognenovsky, a specialist in drama studies, writes in his "Paralinguism in Theatre and International Theatre Festivals" (manuscript), "In the middle of the 20th century the fact that Molière's *Tartuffe* is hypocritical can be seen only in nonverbal, paralinguistic and gesture structures, which all reveal the nature of *Tartuffe*." Shakespeare's Hamlet is not a man who does not know what to do when confronted with the tragedy of his own and of his family. If one replaces whisper for cry, sorrowful sign movements performed by Hamlet for the indignant though at the same time passive gestures for furious and energetic ones, then a spectator will see quite a new Hamlet, the character who perfectly

understands his lot. Indeed, Hamlet has to work out a plan to achieve his aims – this results from his nonverbal behavior, thus gestural reincarnation becomes possible.

Chinese culture presents a typical example of using features of appearance in theatre productions. The Chinese divided the face into 3 zones. The upper zone, forehead, shows a person's course of life from 15 to 30 years old and in extreme old age; the middle zone, from eyebrows to the tip on the nose, – from 35 to 50; and the lower zone, from upper lip to chin, – from 51 to 77. An ideal forehead (considering its form and complexion) denotes a perfect condition of body and spirit. Harmonious middle zone witnesses balanced mind, regular lower part – balanced character.

In traditional Chinese theatre the presentation of face and make-up play a special semiotic role. Red face (red paint for make-up) means loyal, devoted man, a pink one means an old person. Black face meant fair and just man, white – a cunning and sly one. A married woman worn-out by constant heavy work had a yellow face, which was considered ugly, and an ill person had a gray face. The color of the face means emotions as well. And a face without any color does not mean “colorless”; a colorless face also always reflects emotion, e.g. the meaning “he is death-pale from fear, sorrow, fatigue” in ancient Chinese is communicated with the words *mjn' y zhen'se*, which means literally “face without human color”.

In many other cultures the color of face and facial expressions are also very significant. The Jesuit missionary Sanches Labrador described how enthusiastically kaduveo tribe people from the Southern America spent whole days painting the faces and bodies. Claude Levi-Strauss (1983: 229) writes that *kaduveos* believed that a non-painted man was simply silly.

A director and actors staging a play of Russian classical writers have to master nonverbal instruments used in everyday life and coded in modern Russian. They should know, for example, that rubbing or scratching of an ear in the language of Russian gestures and culture imply, besides other things, a subconscious desire to isolate oneself from words, to close one's ears.

A relaxed position of the body reveals trust towards a partner. If American people prefer, even in a private conversation, standing a little bit sideways to one another, Russians will regard this position as disrespectful. Scratching the neck or somewhere near the earlobe while communicating means in the Russian body language, “I'm thinking, because I'm not

sure I can eagerly agree with you". A Russian yawn means that a person is bored, while an Italian yawn, for example, can mean that a yawning person is hungry. Arms crossed on the chest during the conversation mean not only protection and concealment of a body, but also a passive resistance to what the partner is saying.

And how can silence be shown in the Russian theatre? How is it possible, for example, to stage the famous Pushkin's remark *narod bezmolvstviet* (people keep silence)? Zinovij Korogodsky in Leningrad Theatre for Young Spectators found, I think, a brilliant scenic solution: on the stage a huge bell is being rocked, but one can not hear any sound. Moris Meterlink, a writer and a theorist of drama pauses and mute (silent) drama, believed that speech should reflect only historical, actual and temporal human relations, that verbal communication and the expression of inner state verbally is only possible on the surface of human existence, while eternal elements stay silent. Silent lips and tongue can explain the soul. Indeed, true life, which is the one that leaves some trace on the Earth, is woven from silence. We keep silence on the first shy date, we keep silence when we read or watch something interesting, when we reflect about something important. We fall silent at the threshold of parting, in great joy or sorrow, at the wedding, funerals or at the deathbed, we keep silence being amazed by the beauty of nature or generosity of human deeds. Meterlink, with his disposition to surprising and nice paradoxes, remarked once that the words pronounced have some sense only thanks to silence which surrounds them, and that if the first man met the last inhabitant of the planet, they both would keep silence when kissing, being frightened or crying, when feeling something that should be clear without lies.

The language of gestures and voice reflected in art, and sometimes in life itself, becomes a text, a subtext, a parable, a hint, a metaphor or a realized metaphor, both a riddle and a solution. Let us take a smile on stage or in painting. They are gestures, a body cipher that has to be solved. When the author of a play writes something like "smiling" in a remark, the type of smile is usually hidden in the text and it is necessary to recognize its form and meaning.

4. Painting

Various art schools differ not only in their attitude to space and aesthetics of its perception, but also in special nonverbal languages of its representation. Special attention is given to structural and informative organization of space, to semantics and pragmatics of spatial forms, to discovery of cultural universal and specific spatial components, notably specific both for the given artist and this or that art school. Nonverbal semioticians are interested also in how artists and sculptors represent time, how time interacts with space, its apposition and superposition with space.

The correlation between time and space, presented on the canvases or in sculptures, is not trivial. The masters of realism, particularly those of Russian art school, communicated time and its flow with the change of colors and hues, as well as with static positions of objects and bodies, their bends and turns. French impressionists, in their own words, were ready to sacrifice space to triumph the continuity, for the sake of “the thrill of the moment” and “hour of life”. One should not be an art expert to feel the air, space and movements on the canvases of the best Impressionists of the French school, such as Pissarro, Monet, Degas, or Cézanne. Their language of painting reflects temporal relations. The boats and steamboats are sailing in blue-grey distance; we can feel the fog in the field, the blue dancers circling in a dance, and people moving on the Montmartre Boulevard. We can see the reflection of fading light on the walls of the cathedrals and flowing sun specks on the rocks. The units of time for impressionists were the symbols of nature and life, and light combines many important features of time and space.

Futurists tried to express time in another way in their paintings, namely with the help of spatial relations of forms. They often depicted time by including some objects and their parts into other objects. To convey temporal meanings on the canvases, futurists used different intersections, overlaps and shifts of forms. In this relation, we can remember biblical and folklore plots on the pictures of Mark Chagal with images of people, houses, chairs, etc., bending, overlapping or being inserted one into another. Chagal himself said once that these signs were dreams and memories of the past times. In such an artistic language he depicted his native town Vitebsk, the events and images of his childhood, in which houses, people, animals, and fish are freely flying and creeping during the flight one into another. In one of

his numerous interviews the painter stressed, “I always wanted to solve the riddle of time, to catch its magic. Long ago, when I started depicting a man and his memories, his reflections as something both existing and visible, my pictures were considered mere eccentricity. But this is the time of a person as (s)he is. Isn’t our memory a form of time? Our memory is always with us, our past is always with us. And our thoughts... They look like one whole entity. And I depict it. This helps me to understand a person.”

Supremacists pictured time in some absolutely different way. The most famous of them, Kazimir Malevich, deemed that time as such did not exist at all, it was shrunk into one point. The structure of paintings of supremacists, who were so different in their personalities and creativity, was extremely spatial-geometrical. Good examples of these time-space images are the famous “Black Square” by Malevich, “Life in a Big Hotel” and “The City” by El Lysitskiy.

5. *Conclusion*

There is a vast amount of evidence that different sorts of movements, manual gestures, postures, facial expressions and spatial signs play a highly important role in human communication. They have a certain pragmatic effect on the audience and govern aesthetic perception of people and objects. Further semiotic studies analyzing in detail the contents and form of aesthetic nonverbal signs are necessary to present the complete and precise description of these units in gesture and language dictionaries, grammar descriptions and databases.

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Katalin Kroó and Peeter Torop

Dialogue of Estonian and Hungarian literary semiotic approaches

**The legacy of Russian classics and the
Lotmanian critical heritage as “Our text”**

Introduction

The issue of “*our text*” was very important for Lotman’s semiotics of culture. As he wrote in one of his last publications, “Theses towards a Semiotics of Russian Culture”: “The study of Russian culture from a semiotic perspective may take two directions. On the one hand, the researcher may utilize the broad achievements of semiotic studies and describe Russian culture on their foundation. The other approach implies a certain dissatisfaction with existing semiotic studies of culture and a desire to find a basis for other methods and approaches in the material of Russian culture. Our approach is precisely the latter. We propose that the study of the material of Russian culture from this angle may provide new impetus to the general methodology of the semiotics of culture. *The dynamism, instability and persistent internal contradictions of Russian culture cause it to be a sort of historical and theoretical proving ground*, leading both to unavoidable losses and, at times, prophetic insight into this inherently experimental field of study” (Lotman 1994: 219, our italics).

In the context of this article, *our text* also means the specificity of dialogue between the empirical research object and theory created for the analysis of this object. Lotman’s theoretical system mostly rests on the literature of the late 18th to early 19th century. We try to create a new dialogue with Lotman’s semiotics of culture using new material, analysing the works of Dostoevsky.

This article comprises two case studies given in a theoretical framework partly rooted in the Lotmanian principles of his *ad hoc* semiotics and, on the other hand, his general semiotic theory. Here we turn – in the context of Fenno-Ugric literary semiotics – to some aspects of cultural and, in a narrower sense, literary *meaning-emergence*, involving these aspects in the scope of the semiotic interpretation of Dostoevsky's novel *Crime and Punishment*, a novel which has quite a broad and rich tradition of semiotic explanations in critical literature (e.g. Toporov 1995). The two approaches to the problem of cultural (literary) meaning-emergence examined in the first and second parts of the paper are presented below as conclusions emerging from works belonging to two spheres of separate, individual investigations into cultural/literary theory and the question of the legacy of Russian classics in these fields (e.g., Torop 1997, 2000, 2003; Kroó 1994, 2002, 2008, and forthcoming). They are connected here by both putting into focus the concepts of dynamic complementarity in the complex processes of semanticization (meaning-generation and meaning concretization) in the literary text integrating various cultural (sub)texts.

In the first part of our paper the question of the *complementarity of cultural languages* will be treated, the accent being on the interrelation of discrete narration and pictorial depiction, with a reference to the structure of manuscripts, i.e. a (quasi) pre-verbal state of the final literary text. In the second part, *complementarity as a dynamic semiotic correlation* will be examined in two dimensions from the point of view of semiosis generated in certain (sub)semiopheres. One is the context of the double systematization of the sign in certain semantic referential processes ensuring the dynamics of meaning-evolution and thus giving it a dimension of internal historicity. The second is inseparable from the aforementioned theoretical aspect and concerns meaning-emergence as a process of semantic reconstruction, meant in a special way in which discrete vs. non-discrete languages are interpreted in terms of explicitness and implicitness.

The term *dynamic complementarity*, so intimately connected to the Lotmanian interpretation of the semiosphere and also embracing the concepts of *own text* and the *alien text*, consequently, in this paper is scrutinised from various angles, all of them elucidating the nature of the interrelation of traditional narration with other semiotic languages. On the one hand, we address the interrelation of verbal narrative with pictorial depiction and/or performance and with meaning-structures generating implicit

meanings. On the other hand, all this is put into historical context, such that we interpret history by splitting the concept into history in the sense of the genesis of the text (e.g. manuscripts, the interiorization of external cultural texts) and into the internal history of meaning-generation within the text (e.g. the evolution of implicit meaning-structures, intertextual and intercultural semiosis, etc.).

Returning to the Fenno-Ugrian context in which our common lecture at the Symposium of IAFUSS within the 9th International Congress of IASS was originally presented, it is necessary to underline that realizing methodological complementarity as a semiotic tool for examining theoretical problems in the realm of cultural semiotic studies goes far beyond being a method. In fact it embodies a practical interpretation of the semiotic essence of dynamic complementarity within the semiosphere of the exchange of Estonian–Hungarian critical thought and approaches investigating cultural semantics. It is an active mode of giving a metaconceptual orientation to the interpretation of the concept which stands in the centre of our paper. Fenno-Ugrian literary semiotics as representing a multicultural semiosphere itself contributes to fulfilling the most important function Lotman attributes to semiospheres when evaluating them by their capacity for engendering and creating new ideas and meanings. Hence the main topic of our paper, *meaning-emergence and meaning-generation*,¹ through the various aspects of theoretical grounding and the two case studies, will we hope be given a twofold interpretation – one concerning meaning-evolution as an object-concept, and another conceiving it as a meta-concept.² The sense of the latter one can easily be interpreted as an element of the self-reflexive definition given by us to the cultural phenomenon of Fenno-Ugrian semiosphere.

Part I (Peeter Torop)

Simultaneity of two languages and two types of text-generators

In order to understand the concept of meaning-generation and the emergence of meaning in Lotman's semiotics of culture, his typology of cultural languages proves to be very important. In 1978, Lotman wrote an article, "The Phenomenon of Culture", where he created a typology distinguishing between statics and dynamics (cf. Lotman 2000a). The basis for this

typology is the distinction of the static and dynamic aspects of cultural languages. From the static aspect, cultural languages divide into the discrete and the continual (iconic-spatial), and for Lotman this forms the primordial semiotic dualism. In discrete languages, the sign comes first, and meanings are created through the meanings of signs. In continual languages, text comes first and meaning emerges through a holistic text that integrates even the most heterogeneous elements. These are the two languages between which it is difficult to create translatability and which are understandable as a complementary whole.

On the level of text we can find an identical logic: “Thus both the individual, and the collective consciousness, contain two types of text-generator: one is founded on discreteness, the other is continuous. In spite of the fact that each of these mechanisms has a self-contained structure, there is a constant exchange of texts and messages between them. This exchange takes the form of a semantic translation” (Lotman 2000b: 36).

In the case of Dostoevsky, we can analyze this binarity in two aspects. From one side, it is possible in the context of word and picture, narrative and performance; and from another side, in the context of two ideologically different worlds – anthropocentric and theocentric. For example, we have some symbolical frame by joining the first sentence and the two last sentences of *Crime and Punishment*: “On a very hot evening at the beginning of July a young man left his little room at the top of a house in Carpenter Lane, went out into the street, and, as though unable to make up his mind, walked slowly in the direction of Kokushkin Bridge. [...] But that is the beginning of a new story, the story of the gradual renewal of a man, the story of his gradual regeneration, of his gradual passing from one world to another, of his acquaintance with a new and hitherto unknown reality. That might be the subject of a new story – our present story is ended.” (Dostoevsky s.a.: 19, 559). These two worlds exist continuously in the novel and have different features (see Scheme 1).

Chronotopical levels

To speak seriously of an authorial agent or concept of work, it is necessary to specify the interrelations of plot and narration, beginning and end: any story concerns events and human movements (or states) in space and time, or more exactly, in *chronotopes*, because these notions are complementary.

SEMIOSPHERE			
LEVELS	ANTHROPOCENTRIC WORLD	THEOCENTRIC WORLD	
TOPOGRAPHICAL CHRONOTOPE HOMOPHONY	STUDENT THEORIST (ARTICLE)	RASKOLNIKOV	NAPOLEON, LAZARUS, CHRIST.
PSYCHOLOGICAL CHRONOTOPE POLYPHONY	THEORETICAL BEHAVIOUR CRIME	RASKOLNIKOV RASKOL: SPLIT	NATURAL BEHAVIOUR SAVED CHILDREN, GIVING MONEY
METAPHYSICAL CHRONOTOPE HETEROPHONY	PROFANATION SOURCES OF THEORY: STIRNER, CARLYLE, NAPOLEON III, MILL, BENTHAM	RASKOLNIKOV BALANCE	SACRA- LIZATION SOURCES OF DREAMS: NEKRASOV, PUSHKIN, LERMONTOV, VOLTAIRE)

Scheme 1. Levels and worlds in Crime and Punishment.

First, we can specify the *topographical chronotope* that fixes the succession of events and the real world, more or less recognisable to the reader. The reader comes into contact with real time and space. In this chronotope moves the man (hero), whose language, behaviour and costume reflect his subjective attitude to time and space. A man (hero) is the centre of the *psychological chronotope* which conveys the character aspect to the reader: self-evaluation and evaluation of other people and events. The author produces a novel from certain aims or conceptions, the main purpose of which is to create a whole, to communicate the conception to the reader in an individual form. This is possible by means of the *metaphysical chronotope*, i.e. the conceptual chronotope, its authorial interpretation.

In *Crime and Punishment*, on the topographical level we have a story and a proto-story; a story about a young student and theorist, Raskolnikov. As Scheme 1 suggests, the proto-story is a neo-mythological device for creating parallelism between the hero and his existential and symbolic roles (Napoleon, Lazarus, and Christ). On the psychological level, we have a character and a proto-character, or self-consciousness and sub-consciousness. On the metaphysical level, we have two types of sources: the theory of Raskolnikov consists of profane texts, and his dreams have sources in literature and the Bible.

SEMANTIZATION			
LEVELS	NARRATIVE WORD	PERFORMANCE PICTURE	
TOPOGRAPHICAL CHRONOTOPE HOMOPHONY	STORY	POSSIBLE WORLD INTERTEXTUALITY STRUCTURE OF MANUSCRIPT	EVENTS
PSYCHOLOGICAL CHRONOTOPE POLYPHONY	NARRATION	POSSIBLE CONFLICT SELF AND OTHER	PERFORMING
METAPHYSICAL CHRONOTOPE HETEROPHONY	VERBAL DESCRIPTION	IDEOLOGICAL CONCEPTION, GROUNDS OF HISTORY, NEOMYTHOLOGISM	PICTORIAL DEPICTION

Scheme 2. Narrative and picture worlds in Crime and Punishment.

Dynamic complementarity

On the topographic level there is one world, whereas the psychological level hosts many different worlds, because the space of every character is in accord with his mental world. On the metaphysical level, however, there are two worlds, and the greater part of the novel's symbolism serves to differentiate between those worlds.


In regard to Dostoevsky's poetics, we can speak of meaning-generation (or semanticization) simultaneously in both cultural languages in a Lotmanian sense. From one side, we can analyse a discrete story, structure of narration and verbal description. From other side, we can analyze events where picture (pictorial depiction) or performance – not narrative – is the most important. We can also see some similarity between the structures of the different events (performances) and the structure of the manuscript. The manuscript page structure is a reflection of the writer's style and mode of thinking (especially in the intersemiotic relationship between picture, drawing, calligraphy and word).

For example, in one event – Svidrigaylov's suicide – we can find some intertextual world: "A little man wrapped in a grey *soldier's coat* and with a *carved Achilles helmet* leaned with his shoulder against the large closed

gates of the house. He cast a drowsy and cold glance at Svidrigaylov. His face wore that everlastingly peevis and webegone look, which has been so sourly imprinted on *all the faces of the Jewish race* without exception. Both of them, Svidrigaylov and *Achilles*, stared at each other in silence for some time. *Achilles* at last thought it highly irregular for a man who was not drunk to be standing three feet away from him and staring at him without uttering a word. ‘Vot you vont, pliss?’, he said, without stirring from his place or changing position. ‘Nothing at all, old man,’ replied Svidrigaylov. ‘Good morning!’ ‘*Dis ain’t no place.*’ ‘I’m going *abroad*, old man.’ ‘*Abroad?*’ ‘*To America.*’ ‘*America?*’ Svidrigaylov took out the revolver and cocked it. *Achilles* raised his eyebrows. ‘Vot you vont? Dese shokes (jokes) *no place here.*’ ‘And why not, pray?’ ‘Cos it ain’t de place.’ ‘Why, old man, it makes no difference to me. The place looks all right. When they ask you about it, tell them he’s gone to America.’ He put the revolver to his right temple. ‘*You can’t do dis here – it ain’t de place!*’ *Achilles* gave a violent start, his eyes growing bigger and bigger. Svidrigaylov pulled the trigger.” (Dostoevsky s.a.: 522–523, italics mine).

The scene of Svidrigaylov’s suicide takes place simultaneously in different spaces: the actual St. Petersburg, as well as Troy and Jerusalem. It is a symbolic intertextual event where Svidrigaylov–Hector–Napoleon III–Jesus Christ and Achilles–Napoleon I–Ahasverus, the eternal Jew, are operating simultaneously (Torop 1997). The page of manuscript with the first characteristics of Svidrigaylov is an intertextual picture. In this case, on the page where he drew a portrait of Napoleon III, Dostoevsky wrote Buonaparte, Pozzo di Borgo and Capodistria calligraphically. Pozzo di Borgo and Capodistria were Russian diplomats who organized an anti-Napoleon movement in Europe. As a result, we have different conflicts on the level of manuscript and on the level of finished text, but the intertextual nature of this conflict is the same (Torop 2000).

Dynamic complementarity is very important for understanding the movement of the writer’s idea from the first pages in the manuscripts to the finished text. This page contains first and last the names of Pozzo di Borgo and Capodistria. But after understanding the mechanism of intertextuality it is possible to understand, via Capodistria and his role in Greek history and Adrianopol’s peace, why Svidrigaylov started his last journey from “Adrianopol”, a non-existent hotel in St. Petersburg.



Part II (Katalin Kroó)

Why Crime and Punishment?— Semanticization at the level of plot thematics

One may wonder what prompted the choice of this particular novel to illustrate the different semiotic modes of meaning-emergence in Dostoevsky's text and the nature of theoretical and metamechanical discourses on it in the framework of Fenno-Ugrian cultural semiotic studies. In answering this question we cannot avoid realizing the peculiarity of the novel; in its plot sphere, we can discern the activation of certain paired notions – often given even in thematic formulations – such as *the own* vs. *the alien*,

part vs. whole, dialogue and translation – all being conceptual elements of the thematic interpretations of the idea of *semiosphere*. Apart from these, one of the most important semantic attributes relevant to the notion of semiosphere is placed at center stage by a large range of motif variants of the frontier/ border(line). We could even risk stating that one of the main thematic concerns of this novel is the formulation of a meaning which is very close to the concept of the semiosphere. *Crime and Punishment* seems to represent predominantly a novel *on* the problem of semiosis; on the question of how to formulate new signs, how to articulate a “new word”; on aspects of the productive and fruitless interaction of old texts and new texts; on problems of translating the content of the own’s life-sphere into the content of the contrasting, alien life-sphere; etc. The crucial motif of the novel, the frontier, not only conspicuously engenders a plot organization as designated by the title of the novel (cf. in the Russian original “Преступление” standing for *Crime*, with its hidden sense of etymological connotation: “stepping over”). Here, the protagonist has to encounter his own problem of crossing the border (his crime). This can only be done under the condition that Raskolnikov is constantly reflecting on other persons’ crossing of the border, trying to grasp intellectually the interrelation of the alien act of stepping-over and his own deed. He also has to interpret the reciprocal relationship of his own word (his own text) and the alien text, the two of which are permanently transformed into one another as the plot evolves. This problem is also given nuanced poetic elaboration at a higher level of text construction, within the framework of the intertextual poetics of the novel, and also at a level where the process of an intensive meta-poetical self-interpretation continuously evolves in the text.

*Semanticization in light of meaning-evolution:
The principle of double systematization*

Interpreting the notion of meaning and meaning-evolution within the problematics of the frontier, we must remember one of Lotman’s definitions from *The Structure of the Artistic Text* (Lotman 1977), according to which the event in the text is the movement of the literary character over the border of the semantic field. It is evident that semanticization itself is meant here as an *event*, i.e. a semantic stepping-over, representing a process of certain transformations. If we are now referring to Juri Tynyanov’s inter-

pretation of literary evolution projecting well ahead of his time, it is only to remember Tynyanov's accentuation of the dynamic aspect of meaning-formation viewed in a historical context. The essence of this dynamism is revealed by the scholar's suggestion that literary evolution results from a kind of systematization as a consequence of the sign's belonging to two different systems at the same time: one consisting of the internal components of the text at different levels, and another that defines the meaning of the sign in its relation to literary tradition, that is to say, literature construed as a whole system (Tynyanov 2002). The sign acquires its poetic meaning from its belonging to both systems, i.e. to the text-internal and text-external components. The *double systematization* in which the sign is involved (in fact the double orientation of its semanticization) conveys the characterization of the nature of a certain kind of literary evolution. Evolution in this sense is defined in terms of semantic relations, more precisely: in terms of the complex semanticization of these relations. Tynyanov's concept of literary evolution harmonizes with his differentiation of two kinds of *sjuzhet* (сюжет), two kinds of semantic formation which can in fact be interpreted in terms of events in the text: one is identified with *fabula* (Tynyanov says: "сюжет как фабула", which in a simplified interpretation refers to the initial, "aboriginal" plot, but it can also mean a developed plot-construction); the other is the semiotic work, embodied in the text, that makes the semantic plane dynamic. In Tynyanov's interpretation of Pushkin's *Evgenij Onegin*, this is connected to the poetic phenomenon of the text's orientation towards the plane of verbal expression, i.e. the plane of word formulation ("установка на словесный план", according to contemporary uses: *semantic sjuzhet*; cf. Tynyanov 1977: 60–61). This second orientation – as stated above – covers *semantic activation*, engendering and representing the type of semantic event which evolves in the text as a process. Here, we consider it important to underline that what in fact constitutes the semantic *sjuzhet* is the result of a kind of double systematization: meaning at the level of plot construction ("сюжет как фабула", cf. Tynyanov: *ibid.*) as related to meaning at the level of artistic verbal formulation taken as a semantic event. We have arrived at nothing other than the dynamic complementarity of fiction (plot, the narrative itself) and narration. It is not at all a static binary opposition, but rather a dynamic relation which guarantees semantic evolution within the text. Without the reference of one system to the other, a significant part of the

poetic message would be lost. But if the semiotic act of constant reference of one system to the other – i.e. the constant stepping over the border of the two semiospheres – is not neglected, the process of meaning-evolution may become conspicuous to the reader.

Hence meaning-evolution for us brings forth the idea of a kind of *double* systematization leading to the semiotic act of placing systems into meaning-relations with one another (whether the relationship between Tynyanov's synchronic and diachronic aspects, or the relationship of previously described *sjuzhets* 1 and 2). The permanent and mutual, semantically referential acts, as a chain of mutual references, constitute the process of meaning-evolution conceived as a semantic event. (Here we return to Lotman's definition, and more specifically, to our notion of dynamic complementarity taken as a source of meaning-emergence.)

Semanticization as semantic reconstruction

We now must ask the following question: What does meaning-evolution, understood as meaning-emergence, have to do with the concept of semantic reconstruction? First of all, we must state that semantic reconstruction has a very concrete, contemporary meaning in the above-defined critical context of possible interpretation of a semantic *sjuzhet*, in the sense of the text's orientation towards its artistic word formulation. It thus represents a methodological procedure which, in its full-fledged form, may be found in Vyacheslav Vsevolodovich Ivanov's and Vladimir Toporov's works dedicated to etymological reconstruction. In his Dostoevsky scholarship, Toporov had recourse to etymological reconstruction so as to reveal certain kinds of semantic motivation in the writer's works. We must likewise mention a certain trend of linguistic investigation made in this field, the essence of which was characterized and concisely summarized in the 70s in Dmitrii Segal's great overview, *Aspects of Structuralism in Soviet Philology*: "Research into diachronic semantics and the reconstruction of the underlying situations (mythologemes and ritual complexes) is believed to be an integral part of the structural analysis of language" (for all quotations from this work, see Segal 1974). As the most important feature of this kind of research, which also held a place in comparative linguistics, "the inclusion of semantics in the field of structural reconstruction" is evaluated. This involves the reconstruction of certain semantic situations which fit

logically into the study of cultural typologies. In other words, this method covers the concentration on the semantic motivation of linguistic forms. According to Segal, in Toporov's research into *Crime and Punishment* we find a combination of "structural analysis of contextual meaning with the general semiotic orientation provided by the general semantic model inherent in the text." "Thus – Segal goes on to say – "concrete lexical observations go side by side with interpretations derived from the overall conceptual model". And this conceptual model has much to do with the idea of the "typological applicability of mythopoetic thinking" also manifested in *Crime and Punishment*. The presentation of this model in this work presupposes the reconstruction of a "universal semiotic complex". Linguistic analysis of Dostoevsky's text gains meaning in this context.

Semantic reconstruction from another point of view

It is obvious that the notion of semantic reconstruction presupposes the idea of bringing to light meanings and meaning-relations which have sunk into oblivion (e.g. meanings in archaic systems that are not conveyed or understood in present experience, that is, not "given in immediate experience"; Segal 1974). In the previously mentioned overview, however, reconstruction is used in another sense, when the author of the article speaks about "enciphered allusions" that entail the reader having to "reconstruct all additional meanings". Taking into consideration these two aspects implied in the notion of semantic reconstruction – i.e. reconstructing something which is (a) forgotten or (b) which is indicated, yet enciphered, its additional meanings nevertheless having to be reconstructed – we can conclude that semantic reconstruction may be used as a more flexible notion. The term may lend itself to a broader usage, turning into part of our theoretical and methodological foundation. On this basis, semantic reconstruction is used in our work as an analytical tool for the semiotic reading of literary texts. What has to undergo semantic reconstruction has a semiotic presence in the text. However, its structuring semantic motivation is left either without direct explanation, or is given with reduced, enciphered, or in a broader sense: implicit explanation. This explicitness vs. implicitness makes it possible to interpret the notion of semantic reconstruction in the context of semantic evolution. As we argued above, meaning-evolution presupposes a kind of double systematization, the constant dynamic

reciprocal reference of one meaning system to the other. The same holds true for semantic reconstruction, which also embodies a kind of meaning-evolution. Double systematization appears here as the sign having a double semantic orientation, in the sense of its belonging to two systems, one of which has an explicit meaning, the other one being semantically implicit. The implicitness of the meaning reveals itself owing to the reciprocal reference of one system to the other. If this is so, semantic reconstruction as a specific case of meaning-evolution realized in the text itself can be understood as the *turning of implicit meaning into explicit meaning*, which can only be the consequence of reciprocally referential acts, whereby the implicit sign system gradually acquires a kind of completion. In this sense, semantic reconstruction belongs to the semiotic practice of the literary text. The external reconstruction of this process of internal semantic reconstruction belongs to critical metadiscourse (and as a meta-concept it is very close to the notion of interpretation).

A short case study

We shall finish this part of the paper by giving a brief illustration of the semiotic work of semantic reconstruction in *Crime and Punishment*, indicating two realms of meaning-emergence where semantic reconstruction may evolve: one concerning the process of metaphorization, and the other relevant to intertextuality. Semantic reconstruction always and necessarily involves a significantly higher degree of abstraction than explicit semantic formations usually do.

We are taking a look at the scene in which Katerina Ivanovna, Sonia's stepmother, with whom Raskolnikov, the protagonist of the novel, becomes connected in the final moments of her life, goes out into the street with her children, forcing them to beg for money by singing and dancing. Then she dies in Sonia's room. Nothing can be simpler when describing a death – one would think. We know that Katerina Ivanovna suffers from an incurable illness and that she acts as if she were in the delirium preceding inevitable death. And death comes. We could enumerate many other elements at the level of the plot-construction to reveal a clear message at the level of narrative. Following the long process of semantic reconstruction, however, the evolution of some implicit meaning units in the text of the novel leads us to the conclusion that, in the description of Katerina Ivanovna's death, we

can discern Sonia in the role of a figure depicted in Lermontov's poem, *The Dream* (Lermontov 2007). In the poem, this role is assigned to the young girl who, in the dream of the lyrical hero, is sitting in the evening feast among young women crowned with flowers, and who, in the midst of merry talk, is immersed in deep thought. In the "melancholy dream" in which her soul is immersed, she can see "the corpse of one she knew" – who is without doubt the lyrical hero of Lermontov's poem.

What does Sonia have to do with Dagestan "in noon's heat" and what does Ekaterina Ivanovna have to do with her children in the street, with Lermontov's lyrical hero, who is lying with lead inside his breast as a soldier in Dagestan? At the plot level, the most explicit message of the scene seems to contradict the mentioned identifications or at the very least, does not seem to prove that they are true. The less explicit or purely implicit facts, however, do so all the more. They form a semantic chain, which, in the end, results in a semantic reconstruction, at the same time furnishing the reader with additional meanings and revealing for him/her their more abstract sense. Without going into much detail, we shall mention only the following: Katerina Ivanovna herself quotes two lines from Lermontov's *The Dream*, even reciting the first line twice. This quotation, which conspicuously signals the emergence of an important intertext in the Dostoevsky novel, is structured in a peculiar way. It is built into Katerina Ivanovna's sequence of utterances before her death, and is in fact placed very close to her last words, which culminate in the dying woman's most intimate confession to Sonia. In it, she finds a metaphor to express her crime of destroying Sonia's life by making her a prostitute. In this way, the Lermontov-intertext becomes part of Katerina Ivanovna's awakening before her death, which covers the formulation of a kind of self-accusation. The last moment before death outlines the peak of self-understanding, Katerina Ivanovna's coming to terms with herself (the *own*), which is inseparable from the act of coming to terms with the other, Sonia (metaphorically speaking: the *alien*). It is very telling how Katerina Ivanovna becomes endowed here with the semantic attribute of Sonia, who is a *gentle*, meek creature: "Sonia! Sonia!" she said, *gently* and affectionately, as though surprised to see Sonia before her. 'Sonia, my dear [...]' (Dostoevsky s.a.: 448; our italics). It is equally important to note here that Lermontov's poem also develops the process of self-awakening and self-recognition, which totally merges with the idea of the validity of love that the elegiac dreamer, the young girl, dedicates to

her lover in her dream. In the death scene, Sonia does not have a dream. In a metaphorical reading earlier in the novel, however, Sonia, as if delirious, foresees her stepmothers's death. And we cannot forget that the very name of the heroine contains the phonic chain *Son(ia)* with its meaning, *dream*. The motif of *dream* (сон) has a rich circle of variations in *Crime and Punishment*. Taking all this into consideration, we can conclude that, although Sonia is not dreaming in "noon's heat, in a dale of Dagestan", and physically is not equal to Lermontov's young girl seeing the lyrical hero's corpse, her *semantic figure* is nevertheless formed by the motifs of love and the ability to give all her heart and soul to those she loves. She is also characterized by gentleness within the motif-evolution associated with the emergence of the sense of dreaming. In a semantic sense, this Sonia must be actively analogous to the figure of the girl-dreamer in Lermontov's poem, *The Dream*. And if this is so, it means that the Lermontovian intertext is in fact developed in the novel.

From another point of view, this also means that semantic reconstruction works in the novel as well. That which is given implicitly forms a semantic pattern; we witness the emergence and evolution of meaning at a metaphorical level. This has more to do with the level of the text which Tynyanov called the level of verbal formulation, distinguishing it from *sjuzhet* as *fabula*, i.e. from the explicit plot-construction (narrative). However, the lack of permanent reference by the implicit semantic units to the explicit plot or thematic elements would make it very difficult to identify the process of semantic reconstruction. It is within this double systematization that new semantic patterns evolve, with and without various intertexts. The system of the explicit and the implicit semantic structures can also be conceived as belonging to different realms operating in the semiosphere of the text of *Crime and Punishment*. The explicit is regarded at once as belonging to the text in its own capacity, while the implicit seems to be alien from the text for a time. However, the reciprocal acts of cross-reference motivate reconstruction of the entire range of implicit meanings, transforming them into a definite semantic pattern. When this process of meaning-evolution is realized, the pattern proves to be the text's own message and not the interpreter's personal input.

Notes

1. For a broader context of Estonian and Hungarian interdisciplinary investigations into the problem of meaning-emergence, see the project directed by Peeter Torop: *Meaning-generation and Transdisciplinary Methodology of Semiotic Analysis of Culture* (target financed theme 2006–2011) and the Hungarian special issue (compiled by Katalin Kroó and Mihály Szívós) focusing on the thematics of *Emergencia* in *Semiotica* 2008(2) – forthcoming. The present research was supported by the European Union through the European Regional Development Fund (Center of Excellence CECT) and Grant No. 7594 of the Estonian Science Foundation.
2. On the interpretation of “semiosphere as simultaneously an object- and a meta-concept”, see Torop 2005: 164. “Semiosphere is what is being studied in or as culture and semiosphere is the means that is used in studying culture” (ibid.).

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W. G. Kudzus

Friedrich Nietzsche's late notes and Wilhelm Roux

Microlinguistic performance and microphysiology

In Nietzsche's late notes, the linguistic impetus thrives on risk, failure, and that scattered illumination which defies definition and concerns emergent thought. At times, a lettered, hardly perceivable substratum appears. In this elemental zone, sounds acquire particular intensities, begin to speak on their own, away from their semantic assignments. In this shift toward a microlinguistic underground, Nietzsche's readings of *Der Kampf der Theile im Organismus* (*The Struggle of the Parts in the Organism*) by the contemporary anatomist Wilhelm Roux (1881) play a decisive role. Power struggle, disease, and seminal motility, physiologically inflected and linguistically cast, animate – and fracture – Nietzsche's late notes.

It is likely that Nietzsche acquired the anatomist's book soon after its first publication in February 1881: a copy exists in his personal library (Müller-Lauter 1978: 192), and first responses to Roux occur in the notebooks and on various sheets from spring to fall 1881. Nietzsche notes: "The freest human being has the greatest *feeling of power* over himself [...], the relatively greatest *independence* of his individual forces, the relatively greatest *struggle* in himself; he is the *most discordant* being, and the *most alternating one*, and the *most long-lived* and abundantly desirous, self-feeding one – the being who is the most *excreting* and *self-renewing*" (Nietzsche 1988: IX, 488').

Change, desire, food, and intestinally resonant activity dominate an extended, dramatically unfolding sentence. The physiological metabolism, which Roux discusses at some length (Roux 1881: 69), acquires philosophical significance in Nietzsche, and one that reflects a dynamic of intake and digestive productivity. Nietzsche's rhetoric narrows the gap toward its

subject matter: repetitions, superlatives, and a quick pace – unencumbered by subordinate clauses and final stops, rich in enumerative conjunctions – signal a vitality not unlike that of the rapidly regenerating physiological entities in Roux (1881: 69). In the course of Nietzsche's entry, the present participle arises ever more strongly, in tandem with the ever-present struggle of the parts. These parts acquire a pronounced and combative presence: fiercely "discordant" and incessantly changing, they aggressively excrete and regenerate in instantly sequential formulations.

In Nietzsche's physiologic-philosophical discourse, reason (*Vernunft*) is associated with an erroneous belief in harmony. In a further passage from the period of his first encounter with Roux, Nietzsche notes:

Reason! *Without knowledge* it is something entirely foolish, even with the greatest philosophers. [...] The belief in harmony and in the absence of struggle is a *fundamental error* – this would be death! Where there is life, there is associative formation, where associates struggle for [their] nutrition [their] space, where the weaker ones attach themselves meekly, live shorter lives, have fewer offspring: difference rules in the smallest things, in sperm [*sic*] eggs – equality is great madness. Countless beings perish in struggle – a few rare cases sustain themselves. – Whether reason so far has been more sustaining than destructive overall, imagining to know it all, to know the body, to "will" – ? Centralization is not at all that perfect – and *reason's imagination to be* this center certainly constitutes the greatest lack of this perfection. (Nietzsche 1988: IX, 490)

Nietzsche sharply critiques the centrality (Babich 1994: 6) of reason: in the struggle of life with its physiological processes, difference and inequality, far from responding to signals from a central, let alone reasonable, core are indispensable.

In this decentralized environment, Nietzsche emphasizes "the smallest things", and connects them with seminal entities, sperm and eggs. Productivity in its extreme smallness immediately involves language: behind sperm a flow ensues with the comma lacking; eggs appear without delay, followed by a dash and a reference to the major madness of an equality associated with a realm insulated from struggle. In critiquing reason and equality viscerally, Nietzsche's language loosens its hold on itself, begins to forego elements of punctuation and syntactical order. Nietzsche engages in a process whose greatest energies and strongest statements occur close to

its demise as an instrument of reasoned communication, and in the proximity of a physical, regenerative force.

Resonant with microphysiological struggle, there is pressure on syntactic space in this environment: the comma between “nutrition” and “space” evaporates in Nietzsche’s above-quoted notation. “Thus already each sperm and each egg is different from the other [...], Roux” (1881: 71) preformulates in a comparatively distanced manner.

Nietzsche’s first encounter with Roux, which is richly reflected in the former’s notes (Müller-Lauter 1978: 192), energizes his philosophical work with physiologically inspired formulations that tend to enact his reading in his writing. In the microphysiology presented by Roux, Nietzsche engages a generative power before and after the word and its syntactically confined configurations. At heightened moments in Nietzsche’s notations, a visceral linguistic motility animates a strongly expansive spatial dynamic.

In the spring and summer of 1883, Nietzsche again reads Roux (Müller-Lauter 1978: 192). Nietzsche notes: “Relative independence of the parts even in the highest organisms Roux p [*sic*] 65” (Nietzsche 1988: X, 274). Roux on that page refers to Rudolf Virchow having written on “the independence of cells” and on cellular transplants from one organism to another. Linguistically, this independence of small units resonates with various passages in Nietzsche’s subsequent notations where particular sounds and letters proliferate.

Departing from Roux, Nietzsche’s writing approaches a sphere of linguistic fluidity and emergence: semantic constrictions begin to dissolve, and particularities set out to supersede conceptions of wholeness. Parts proliferate in Roux and in Nietzsche, but the latter moves toward letters, sounds, and flows before and beyond distinctions. Nietzsche’s notational stylistics, time and again, takes off from microphysiological investigations, toward microlinguistic tones and dynamics. A visceral linguistic motility appears in which performance in its minute manifestations turns paramount. Exceedingly multivalent and phonologically alive, Nietzsche’s notational runs turn delirious, sick with insight past willful restrictions, productive in conjunction with physiological states that defy organic containment.

In a fragmentary passage of spring 1888, Nietzsche privileges disease in artistic states that incorporate sound and the language of the letter, such that a linguistic physiology begins to appear. A wide-ranging significance

of bodily phenomena energizes Nietzsche's vision. A strongly expansive movement sets in – an “*intoxication*” or even “*rapture*” (Nietzsche 1988: XIII, 356) – in which a “heightened feeling of power” at first operates in a large dimension. Such power is associated with an “inner compulsion” to turn “things” into a “reflex of one's own abundance and perfection” (ibid.). “Things” react in the manner of a largely autonomous physiological occurrence, a reflexive response before cognitive intervention.

As “physiological states” unfold in the notational body of Nietzsche's prose – from “intoxication” via an “*extreme sharpness* of certain senses” to “vascular changes” and bodily “secretion” (ibid.) – they they resonate with the dynamics Roux discusses with regard to cellular and molecular units that incessantly influence, impact, destroy, and supersede each other. In Roux (Müller-Lauter 1978: 203), Nietzsche finds a countermovement to Darwin's “nonsensical” emphasis on large developments in the outer world (Nietzsche 1988: XII, 304; cf. Pearson 1997: 85-122; Babich and Cohen 1999: 272; Gayon 1999: 154-97, Moore 2002: 27-28; Brobjer 2004: 23). Of cells, Roux writes:

As specific processes ... are not firmly standardized as such, and as from the beginning not all cells of the same tissue will have exactly the same vitality, there must be struggle among the cells during the time in which the cells of a particular tissue still multiply: for those cells that under the given circumstances are most favorably disposed toward multiplication will multiply more quickly than the others and thus – given the limitation regarding space – will more or less take away the locus of the others' offspring, thereby impeding their further development and multiplication. (Roux 1881: 88)

Cells in Roux struggle in the context of the same “tissue,” a constellation of parts not far from “texture” and a textuality sensitive to its spatial limitations. Roux refers to a spatial scarcity that has cells struggle for their places. Nietzsche's texts under the sway of “physiological states” (1988: XIII, 356) show phonetic pressure, syntactic strain, and a dynamics of excess that challenges given frameworks of linguistic communication. Cellular struggle in Roux relies on procreation and its rapidity. The faster cells multiply, the more effectively do they occupy space that would have been available for competing offspring. Time as well is limited here. Roux invokes procreative phases whose passing marks moments of cellular vic-

tory and defeat; the time during which cells “still” (Roux 1881: 88) multiply is crucial for spatial conquest. Nietzsche’s texts are energized by exuberant, powerfully extended, trans-syntactical exhalations.

Roux formulates the spatial infringement one cell imposes onto another as *Hemmung* (Roux 1881: 88). In Nietzsche’s passage, a “Hemmungsapparat” (Nietzsche 1988: XIII, 356), “constrictive apparatus,” figures prominently. Once this apparatus is disabled, subjected to interruption as well as to a certain exhibitionistic emphasis, namely: “ausgehängt” (as on a bulletin board), Nietzsche’s physiologically imbued prose accelerates and deepens, immeasurably.

An unrestrained wildness, *Hemmungslosigkeit*, also lurks at the fringes of the struggle Roux envisions. Pathology, a theme present in Nietzsche’s passage from its onset, enters into cellular analysis in terms of observational proof. Roux refers to “pathological occurrences where cells grow into others, thus for example in the lacunar depletion of muscle fibers by sarcoma cells” or where there are “wandering cells as a consequence of a temporary suspension of blood circulation” (Roux 1881: 94).

Cellular struggle in Roux is an encompassing process that, like the exceptional artistic states in Nietzsche’s notation, is not circumscribed by notions of pathology or health, but surpasses both. The close proximity of destruction and regeneration in cellular strife relates to Nietzsche’s both destructive and creative exuberance, particularly in his physiological engagements. Once again, a realm of fluid transitions appears.

Regarding “normal processes in the regeneration of the epithelium,” Roux emphasizes a “pressure” (*Druck*) in cellular interactions, which lead to the “atrophy” and “expulsion” of old cells in epithelial tissue via “breaches, partitions, and dismemberment” (Roux 1881: 94). Normal processes in cellular interactions thus include violence, as do pathological occurrences. Is it a coincidence that the word “Druck,” “pressure” here, but elsewhere also meaning “print,” denotes the energy at work in the regenerative destruction of tissue that covers bodily surfaces, and lines most anatomical cavities? Print language in the context of Nietzsche’s self-reflective notations: a linguistic surface across cavernous terrain.

On a visceral level, Nietzsche’s late notations resonate with the struggle of parts that in their microphysiological processes encourage microlinguistic explorations. Time and again, such explorations occur in Nietzsche’s efforts to formulate an elementary “will to power” (e.g., Nietzsche 1988:

XIII, 360). Nietzsche's notational style serves him well in these efforts. At the same time, as a consequence of his microlinguistic precision, a philosophically cohesive inquiry into the human condition turns increasingly elusive. It is no coincidence that this human condition itself, to the extent that it relies on its linguistic coinage, is a major issue in Nietzsche's language critique: most saliently with regard to microperformative transgressions of semantic boundaries.

The proximity of "Menschen" and "überhaupt" (Nietzsche 1988: XIII, 356) in the "human being in general", for example, touches upon an expansive linguistic movement that simultaneously pushes the limits of human integration. While the *Übermensch* is absent here semantically, a vertical component associates with *Menschen* and is amplified in the subsequent "rapture" with its "heightened feeling of power". In the microphonetic manifestations of this passage, the "ü" turns increasingly active and becomes part and parcel of the artist's emanation. There is an overflow across rudimentary sentences and notations, a sense of excess that generates the words and – they themselves part of an excessive mobility – loosens their semantic adherence. The "ü" expands from "Künstler" (twice) via "gezüchtet" and "Machtgefühl" to "Fülle", in which the "füh" reappears in a more focused phonetic form: feeling, powerful emotion creates, or rather – less mentally, closer to physical activity – "makes" (from *machen*) abundance (Nietzsche 1988: XIII, 356).

In a further fragment from spring 1888, Nietzsche's notations regarding "power quanta" (*Machtquanta*) traverse the general rubric of a "critique of mechanism" (Nietzsche 1988: XIII, 257). Specifically Nietzsche critiques "necessity" and "law" (Douglas 1999: 324). In necessity, he emphasizes a component of coercion; in law, a "false freedom" – as if one could discern and impose rules and regulations in quantum activities. "Things", as Nietzsche envisions them, do not follow paths of regularity; they are superficially stabilized, fictional entities (Nietzsche 1988: XIII, 257).

These notions of *Machtquanta* correlate with linguistic features in Nietzsche's late writings. The power of his language in its microcosmic manifestations embodies his quantum theory. Bodily elements come into linguistic play and reflect the physical and physiological sphere of *Machtquanta*. Such quanta do not occur in a realm of "mere semiotics" (Nietzsche 1988: XIII, 258): referential signs, Nietzsche implies here, operate at surface levels, even if "the human language of senses" is involved

(Nietzsche 1988: XIII, 258). Sensuality is mediated, transposed into secondary communications from pretranslative phenomena; although sensually inflected, it is ultimately mechanistic in its fictional cohesiveness.

In their formulated presence, *Machtquanta* partake in semiotic signification; but it is their indirect appearance only, cast in words of effect, that enters into such form: “A power quantum is characterized by the effect that it exercises [*übt*] and that it resists [*widersteht*]” (Nietzsche 1988: XIII, 258). These words stand at a distance from quantum forces themselves: they mostly signify rather than embody. Their rhythmic quality in the flow between “*übt*” and “*widersteht*” may indicate a certain back-and-forth before signification, a movement of “effect”; but that quality remains contained within Nietzsche’s argumentative statement.

At times, however, Nietzsche’s language moves about beyond and before “mechanistic” configurations (ibid.: XIII, 259). In its quantum energetics, language undercuts and supersedes subjective control. A powerfully embodied language announces itself; quantum sounds and minuscule transformations in which a linguistic physiology asserts itself immediately and with ultimate consequence.

Quantum zones elude authorial delimitation. Insight there occurs beyond the chains of law: “There is no law: each power at each moment realizes its final consequence” (ibid.: XIII, 258). While this in itself is a syntactically structured and semantically conventional statement, it formulates the unruly force of quantum power.

Nietzsche is engaged in departing from, “thinking away” (*weggedacht*, *wegdenkt*) mechanical order, character, and referential language. In this process thought itself loses its argumentative force vis-à-vis power quanta whose effects engage and transform language into something other than one’s medium: “Subject, object, a doer of the doing, the doing and what it does, separately: let us not forget that this refers to a mere semiotics and not to something real” (ibid.).

In related passages Nietzsche further affirms the universally interconnected nature of power quanta, whose “essence consists in exercising power over all other force quanta” (Nietzsche 1988: XIII, 261). At outer horizons of Nietzsche’s “will to power,” in spring 1888, this dynamic begins to sound Freudian at the time when Freud’s thinking begins to approach psychoanalytic horizons. “If the innermost essence of being is will to power,” Nietzsche writes, “if all growth of power is lust, and all feeling, not to be

able to resist and to dominate, is lustlessness: may we then not posit lust and lustlessness as cardinal facts? Is will possible without these two oscillations of yes and no? But *who* feels lust? ... But *who* wants power? ... Absurd question: if essence itself is will to power and consequently a feeling of lust and lustlessness" (ibid.: 260).

Affirmation and negation oscillate in micromovements before will, and will to power, might occur. Lust and lustlessness are posited here before any notion of subjective agency. In such affectively charged micro-oscillations, language – not Nietzsche's anymore – reflects a rapture in which physiologically imbued letters outperform their assigned roles, turn colorful, secretory, hot, and cold.

In Nietzsche's physiological notations, then, science – with physiology in particular rapidly developing at his time (Moore 2002: 1-111) – and philosophy break apart together, engendering decompositions and possibilities. The micromovements performed in Nietzsche's late entries concern primary force and incessant fluidity. Sounds and movements emerge in trans-sentential rhythms. Physiology and philosophy, thus recast, speak of lust and *Aushängung*. Nietzsche's quantum notations engage and embody physiological analysis in a project of boundless – groundless – emergence.

Note

1. All German-to-English translations in this essay are my own.

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Pirjo Kukkonen

Women in semiotics

The Finnish tradition in semiotics of the 1970s and 1980s

1. Global semiotics – The semiotic web as an international institution

Semiotics became global at the end of the 1960s mostly thanks to the Hungarian-American semiotician Thomas A. Sebeok, who instituted the Centre of Semiotics and Linguistics at Indiana University. Nowadays chairs of semiotics departments can be found all over the world, and the subject is taught at most institutions of higher learning. Sebeok himself discusses the beginning of the institutionalizing of semiotics in the following way:

Interestingly, it was only in May 1962, starring at yet another transdisciplinary conference of more than sixty participants, that Mead had a spur-of-the-moment sweeping insight: to apply the term *semiotics* “to this whole field ... which in time [would] include the study of all patterned communication [that is, institutionalization] in all modalities. I am not enough of a specialist in this field to know what word to use”, she continued, “but many people here, who have looked as if they were on opposite sides of the fence, have used the word “semiotics”. It seems to me the one word, in some form or other, that has been used by people who are arguing from quite different positions. (Sebeok 2001: 150)

Further, we can say that “Global Semiotics”, the semiotic web (launched by Sebeok in 1975; cf. Sebeok 2001: 1–2), and the institutionalizing of semiotics began with congresses such as those held in Bloomington and Moscow. The International Association for Semiotic Studies / Association Internationale pour la Sémiotique (IASS/AIS) was founded in 1969, and *Semiotica – Journal of the International Association for Semiotic Studies – Revue de L’association Internationale de Sémiotique* was launched in 1969.

The first world congress of semiotics was held in Milan in 1974. With this historical context, and with global, international semioticians as Victoria Welby (1837–1912), Susanne K. Langer (1895–1985), Margaret Mead (1901–1978), Ethel M. Albert (1918–1989), and Irmengard Rauch (b. 1933) in mind as pioneers in semiotic studies (cf. Sebeok with Susan Petrilli 1999; 2001), I will discuss the local national Finnish semiotic tradition as it was presented by women in early Finnish semiotics (cf. Tarasti 1990; 1991a; 1991b); e.g. Satu Apo (1974; 1986), Johanna Enckell (1974a; 1974b), Marja-Liisa Honkasalo (1988), Anna Louhivuori (1988), Päivikki Suojanen (1982; 1984); Pirjo-Maija Toivonen (1986), and Sinikka Tuohimaa (1986; 1988; 1991). I will outline semiotic approaches, theories and methodologies advanced by women who have contributed to the development of semiotics from their own perspective in the Finnish semiotic tradition, as presented in linguistics, literature, folklore studies, anthropology, arts, musicology, and medicine, the first semiotic fields of Finnish semiotics.

It is remarkable that in 1979, The Finnish Academy offered a grant for the project *The Semiotics of Finnish Culture* led by Henry Broms, Hannu Riikonen, and Eero Tarasti, and later on, the quarterly *Synteesi*, a journal for interrelations of arts was published in 1982 (2–4/1982: 11–47) with articles including Finnish semiotics by Henry Broms, Eero Tarasti, Matti Kuusi, Oscar Parland, Hannu Riikonen, and Päivikki Suojanen, the only woman among them. The semiotics of the 1960s and the 1970s was already defined as communication, i.e. as a message from A to B that presumes semiotic means, i.e. signs and languages, which can exist only in the use and production of signs and exchanges of information (cf. Lévi-Strauss in anthropology). From the very beginning, semiotics has had an integrative approach, an interdisciplinary view toward combining disciplines. For instance, Victoria Welby ([1903] 1983; [1911] 1985), a pre-semiotician, who corresponded with Peirce (cf. Welby 1977), discussed in her early “significs” issues of axiology, sense, meaning, and significance, becoming an early forerunner of semiotics. Semiotics continues to deal with studies around *semioethics* (Ponzio, Petrilli, Deeley, Tarasti), as the 9th World Congress of Semiotics shows; the primary aim is to promote understanding and self-understanding in order to avoid local and worldwide conflicts, and to promote peace and understanding. Says the patron of the 9th World Congress of Semiotics: *Communication: Understanding / Misunderstanding* in Helsinki and Imatra: “Semiotics studies all forms of communication. By

analyzing cross-cultural misunderstandings it promotes the self-understanding of mankind” (President Martti Ahtisaari, Patron of the Congress 2007).

The *existential semiotics* advanced by Eero Tarasti (2000) is also a science of the new millennium, in Finland and worldwide, resulting in applied research presented by both male and female researchers. Semiotics, whether it is a scientific discipline or a world-view, always involves signs. Semiotics is the study of signs, what they represent and signify, and how we act and think in their universe. As Tarasti states, much of the power of semiotic enterprise lies in its phenomenal ability to adapt to various changes of scientific paradigms and technological innovations, trends and schools of thinking, and also national traditions (Tarasti 2007).

2. *First World Congress of Semiotics in Milan 1974*

Amidst the linguistic turn and structuralist developments in the 1960s and 1970s, the First International Congress of Semiotics was held in Milan on June 2, in 1974. In his opening address Roman Jakobson (1896–1982) summed up things in this way:¹

We deal with language as a universal invariant with respect to varied local languages which are variable in time and space. In the same order of things, semiotics is called upon to study the diverse systems of signs and to bring out the problems which result from a methodical comparison of these varied systems, that is to say, the general problem of the *sign*: sign as a generic notion with respect to the particular classes of signs. (Jakobson 1987: 436)

Jakobson (1987: 436–454) discusses the question of the sign from Antiquity, the Middle Ages, and of the Renaissance, and around the end of the seventeenth century, i.e. John Locke’s *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690) and Jean Henri Lambert’s *Neues Organon* (1764) as a background for the development of semiotics into modern semiotics at the beginning of 19th and 20th centuries. Jakobson covers the philosophical study of signs from ancient Stoic philosophers continuing through the Church fathers in the Middle Ages, and later from John Locke to the great semiotician of the Anglo-Saxon world, philosopher and polymath Charles S. Peirce (1834–1914) and the linguistic study of signs by

the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), from whose writings so-called European “semiology” originated. Empirical semiotics was launched by the medical science of antiquity: a physician who explored symptoms (signs) of a disease was a “semiotician”. Today, empirical study of the sign covers many fields, from neurosciences and cognitive studies to applied research of various sign practices such as media sciences. The latest branch of empirical semiotics is “biosemiotics”. Founded by members of the von Uexküll family, biosemiotics studies the life of organisms in relation to their environment, or *Umwelt*. Biologists today claim that every living organism functions as a sign system in relation to the environment. Thus the verbal signs of spoken and written language – texts – no longer form the main concern of semioticians, who have widened their vision to include the non-verbal activities of people and animals. (Tarasti 2007.) The fourth major type is cultural semiotics. This school of thought, formulated by scholars who followed and developed the teachings of Jurij Lotman in Tartu, examines cultures as texts, comprised of all the signs that make up the content of that culture’s *semiosphere* (total store of cultural signs; cf. Petrilli 2003).

The semiotic web of the 1960s and the 1970s was of a *structural* and *semiotic* nature. Internationally, and in Finland, linguistics (my research field) featured structural, i.e., syntactic, analyses of language (cf. Chomsky 1957 and 1965). The semantic structure was in fact “a problem”, when we remember Greimas ([1966] 1980: 14) who characterizes in 1966 semantics as “the poor relative of language” in his *Sémantique structurale*. But in linguistics there were also attempts in the 1960s to describe the semantic structure of language (e.g., Katz & Fodor 1965) in terms of binary features, semantic components, phonological models, and paradigmatic analysis of semantic structures (cf. Kukkonen 1989; Greimas 1966). In folklore and anthropology especially, structural and semiotic ideas were applied rapidly. Jakobson (1987: 454) concludes his opening address with a definition of semiotics:

By way of concluding, we can propose a tautological formula: Semiotics, or put otherwise, *la science du signe et des signes*, the science of signs, *Zeichenlehre*, has the right and the duty to study the structure of all of the types and systems of signs and to elucidate their various hierarchical relationships, the network of their functions, and the common or differing properties of *all* systems. The diversity of the relationships between

the code and the message, or between the signans and the signatum, in no way justifies arbitrary and individual attempts to exclude certain classes of signs from semiotic study, as for example nonarbitrary signs as well as those, which, having avoided “the test of socialization”, remain individual to a certain degree. Semiotics, by virtue of the fact that it is the science of signs, is called upon to encompass *all* the varieties of the signum. (Jakobson 1987: 454)

In the foreword to their *Language in Literature* (1987), Pomorska & Rudy quote V. V. Ivanov, who describes Roman Jakobson as a scholar in the following way:

Jakobson belongs to that powerful trend in our culture that is larger than just linguistics and literary studies, one to which the names of Bakhtin and Vygotskij also belong. Roman Jakobson ... always thought about the most general matters in concrete terms, with reference to particular examples, and always spoke about this clearly and understandably. We shall always remember Jakobson as the man who proved that one can do scientific work with joy, without pedantry or routine, that one can do it as something great and meaningful, under any circumstances, even in the face of catastrophes – and successfully (Ivanov 1983: 56–57; Pomorska & Rudy 1987: 10)

In this quotation Jakobson’s heritage can also be seen as a parallel to semiotics, a tolerant interdisciplinary allowing various theoretical and methodological views, a discipline which deals with global and local issues; it has many schools and has gone through many phases. Nowadays, we can speak, as Tarasti (2007) writes, of “neosemiotics”, which is not bound with any national or other school, but freely exploits the long tradition of semiotics in order to elucidate current phenomena of modern society and sciences. Semiotics is a wide-ranging theoretical, methodological, and also practical discipline, one that is innovative, interdisciplinary and universal in scope. It has become a global language of scholars (Tarasti 2007).

3. *Global ideas in structuralism and semiotics in Finland*

In Finland, the history of semiotics dates back to, among others, folklorists and the so-called Finnish school of semiotics, starting with the school of folklore studies at the end of the nineteenth century. Scholars in this field founded a method of classifying folk tales and songs which was later

adopted by Vladimir Propp. Their methods also influenced research in narratology, story-telling, and folk music. The background of Finnish semiotics consists in other human sciences, ranging from anthropology to philosophy to the existential semiotics founded by Eero Tarasti (2000). The first semiotician in Finland was the Finland-Swedish writer and essayist Henry Parland (1908–1930) who, among other things, championed the ideas of Russian formalists among Finnish intellectuals in the 1920s and the 1930s. Finnish semiotics naturally forms part of the European state of the art, while remaining open to disciplinary trends in Estonia, Russia, and the United States. Though a “Finnish School of Semiotics” may not yet exist, Tarasti (1991b: 198) writes, Finland at the least has a semiotic tradition with its own history, reflecting a multiplicity of projects and ranging from explicitly national issues to quite universal themes (cf. Tarasti, ed. 1999). Nowadays Finland is home to all manner of classical and post-structuralist semiotics, from Greimassians and Peirceans to deconstructionists and Lacanians. What accounts for the extensive semiotic studies going on in Finland and elsewhere? According to Tarasti (1990: 37–38), it is the changeable nature of semiotics, its ability to engage with a variety of theories, including formalism, structuralism, post-structuralism, and de-constructivism. All these international ideas were reflected in the semiotics in Finland in the 1960s and 1970s and on. Moreover, Finland as a bilingual country had research contacts with Sweden, where, for instance, the linguist Bertil Malmberg (1959; 1972; 1973; 1977) and others presented Roman Jakobson’s linguistic and structuralistic ideas. The anthology of Roman Jakobson’s writings, *Poetics and Linguistics (Poetik och lingvistik)*, was published in Swedish in 1974; the Swedish anthology, *Form och struktur*, appeared in 1971, discussing ideas from formalism to structuralism. After semiotics had become established in the international scientific world in the 1960s, in Finland it became a central issue, especially in the humanities and political sciences since the 1970s. In the 1980s and 1990s semiotics gained momentum both nationally and internationally, due to cultural exchanges and the ample flow of texts.

4. *Women in Finnish semiotics –
The tradition of the 1960s and the 1970s*

The “*Structuralism Group*” at the University of Helsinki was established in 1971 with Eero Tarasti and others. To this group belonged such women scholars as Satu Apo, Elli Kögäs Maranda, Maija Lehtonen, and Johanna Enckell. Semiotic interest in Finland started to grow even more, thanks to Eero Tarasti’s contributions and his dissertation in musicology in 1978, *Myth and Music*. On March 7, 1979 Eero Tarasti, Aatos Ojala, Osmo Kuusi, and Pertti Karkama, founded the Semiotic Society of Finland, along with Henri Broms, Hannu Riikonen, Erkki Pekkilä, Matti Kuusi, Pentti Leino, Pentti Malaska, Tarmo Malmberg, Lauri Routila, and Olli Välikangas – of these 15 persons only 3 were women. The society nominated the following semioticians as members of honour in 1979: Umberto Eco, A. J. Greimas, Roman Jakobson, Jurij Lotman, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Thomas A. Sebeok. Julia Kristeva, however, was not among those honoured in 1979; she did become a member of honour in 1995, Jean Umiker-Sebeok in 1994, Sinikka Tuohimaa in 2004, and Pirjo Kukkonen in 2006. (Tuovinen 1988.)

In 1980 (August 28–29) the Semiotic Society of Finland arranged its first symposium at the University of Helsinki with the theme *Suomalaisen kulttuurin semiotiikka – Semiotics of Finnish Culture* (30–60 participants) with papers by Eero Tarasti, Eila Tarasti, Henri Broms, Vilmois Vogt, Kari Aronpuro, Tarmo Malmberg, Osmo Kuusi, Lauri Routila, Aatos Ojala, Pirjo-Maija Toivonen, Kari Salosaari, Erkki Peuranen, Hannu Riikonen, and Erkki Pekkilä – only two women semioticians took part. In Tarasti’s publications (cf. 1990: passim; 1990: 35–40, 1991a; 1991b), we can follow international history as well as the national Finnish history of semiotics (see also, *Semiotica* 87: 3–4 (1991), a special issue on semiotics in Finland; and *Synteesi* 1982; 1986; 1988).

Semiotics in Finland began with Finnish folklorists who developed a typology of tales; their efforts profoundly affected the work of Vladimir Propp, and hence extended to later semiotic studies of literature. In the philosophical analytic school represented by George Henrik von Wright’s modal logics and Jaakko Hintikka’s theories, Eero Tarasti’s semiotics of music and study of myth and music have contributed to the development of semiotics, both in Finland and worldwide. Among the instructors of the

first courses in structuralism at the University of Helsinki was professor Irma Rantavaara (1908–1979), and at the University of Jyväskylä, professor Aatos Ojala (Tarasti 1990: 35–36). Important also was the Finnish folklorist Elli Köngäs Maranda (1932–1982), whose research from the 1970s reflects the early Finnish structural and semiotic tradition (cf. Köngäs Maranda 1971: 189; Maranda & Köngäs Maranda 1971: Introduction, ix–xxxiv). But Finnish semiotics actually began, as mentioned above, with the little “structuralism group” at the University of Helsinki at the beginning of the 1970s; in 1979 it became the Semiotic Society of Finland, starting with 5 members, and growing to a membership of 100 in the 1980s.

A central semiotic figure and pioneer since the 1970s has been Eero Tarasti, professor of art education (1979–1983), and professor of musicology (1983–1984) at the University of Jyväskylä, and professor of musicology at the University of Helsinki since 1984. The Structuralist group arranged annual meetings first in Helsinki, then in Jyväskylä, and from 1988 on, in Imatra, which housed the International Semiotics Institute (ISI), a global institution for promoting semiotics. Many doctoral dissertations from the 1980s show the development and establishment of semiotics in Finland; still, as Tarasti (1990: 37) states, we cannot yet talk about “a Finnish semiotic school of semiotics” because the approaches are so different (Peircean, Greimassian, Lotmanian, etc.). Of the doctoral theses from the 1980s, 14 are on structural-semiotic topics, six of them written by female researchers which I will discuss later on.

5. *Structuralism, semiotics, and poetics*

In 1974, the first Finnish anthology of semiotics appeared: *Strukturalismia, semiotiikkaa, poetiikkaa* (*Structuralism, Semiotics, Poetics*), edited by two women, Satu Apo and Johanna Enckell, and two men, Osmo Kuusi and Eero Tarasti. In this anthology Aatos Ojala’s was entitled “What do structuralist methods have in common?” Ojala (1974: 239–240) states that the structuralism sweeping France, with Paris as a centre, became familiar also to Finnish scholars. The common feature of *structuralism* is that it takes its model from Saussure’s linguistic theory (1916), which signaled a transition from substantial to relational thinking (*system*), relations, the sign itself, its *value*, and syntagms/paradigms. Saussure’s considered his model adaptable to human culture in general, and by the 1970s structural-

ism was indeed turning into “semiology”. In this field, Lévi-Strauss’s (1955; 1958; 1964; 1967) method was the most stringent in its adherence to the linguistic model.

The folklorist tradition was strong in Finnish semiotics, as mentioned above. In her dissertation, *Ihmesadun rakenne juonien tyypit, pääjaksot ja henkilöasetelmat satakuntalaisessa kansansatuaineistossa* [*The Structure of the Fairy Tale*] (1986), the Finnish folklorist Satu Apo presents a vast study of Finnish folktales with a structural method. Vladimir Propp’s *Morphology of the Folktale*, published in Russian in 1928, is one of the oldest and best-known models describing the syntagmatic structure of stories, with its structural model of 31 functions. After 1958, when an English translation of the work was made, it began to influence the study of tale structures, especially among folklorists and literary researchers of the 1960s. Lévi-Strauss, Greimas and Bremond were not interested in describing the concrete folk-tale material; rather, they developed Propp’s analysis and function-model, paying attention to logical-semantic relations that dominate in it. A model describing the syntagmatic structure of fairy tales was developed by Greimas on the basis of ideas that Lévi-Strauss had presented in his critique of Propp’s *Morphology of the Folktale*. Today Apo’s structural studies remain at the very core of Finnish folklore (Apo 1974: 43–68, 241–242; 1986).

Structuralism in literary studies reached Finland as an international fashion in the 1960s, especially due to French scholars – the anthropologist Lévi-Strauss and his studies of myths, the linguist A. J. Greimas, and critic Roland Barthes, among others. Structuralism and semiotics both aim to study the world, man, and art as a whole, i.e., to phenomena and their meanings in terms of structures and systems. After the structuralist fashion came the post-structuralist period. Linguistics, semantics, and discourse became central also in literary studies. For instance, Jonathan Culler’s *Structuralist Poetics* (1975) deals with the relation between language and literature; if a literary work is language, we can apply linguistic methods to it as a system, with its own rules and formal grammars. If literature as a whole is the *langue*, then literary works are its “parole” (cf. Lehtonen 1989: 95–127).

Johanna Enckell’s (1974a: 129–156, 245–247) contributions to the above mentioned anthology were also important in applying ideas from French structuralism to the study of literature. She begins with the aesthetics of structuralism of the 1960s in France, which combines different lines

of thought and various sciences, including among others Saussure's linguistics, Freudian psychoanalysis, Marx's social analysis, French literary and philosophical tradition, the Russian formalism of the 1920s and the Czech structuralism of the 1930s. All these were precursors to French structuralism as it manifested in literary research, which in the 1970s surfaced as "poetics" and narratology, grounded in Propp's methods. Jakobson's and Lévi-Strauss's famous structural analysis of Baudelaire's "Les Chats" generated extremely complex grammatical structures. Enckell (1974a: 129–156, 245–247) discusses this very complicated method in literary communication, suggesting that a hermeneutic method might better serve in such cases. Roland Barthes combines a structural technique with a hermeneutic reading method in his analysis of Balzac's short story "Sarrasine", using five codes to depict the interaction between material and thought, *signifiant* and *signifié* (cf. Enckell 1974b: 224–235, 250–252, her interview with Lucien Goldmann).

After Tarasti's dissertation of 1978, structural-semiotic dissertations in various fields were published, starting at the beginning of the 1980s. Within a music-anthropological and hymnological framework, Päivikki Suojanen's (1984) study examines the content and contexts of hymn singing, conceptions of hymn singing, the production and functions of hymn singing in the main Evangelical-Lutheran revival moments in Finland: Pietism, Laestadianism, Evangelism and Besecherism. The research is a general synchronic and inductive survey of folk hymn singing in Finland, and a basic case-analysis examination of the folk-hymn singing tradition of Western Finnish Besecherism in particular (from 24 localities, mostly in Western Finland during the period 1968–1982). Hymn singing is religious, ritual, symbolic and musical behavior which in Finland has retained its original form. Suojanen's theory and methodology is based on text analysis, speech act theory (Searle 1969), and thematic content analysis. As Suojanen (1982: 43) writes, it is "a kind of semiotic description of hymn text structures" that tries to catch their dynamism and cohesion. She (1982: 44) studies various action relations and illocutionary nuances (description, thanking, requesting, wanting, wishing, etc.), and other textual functions. However, it is not clear what the term "semiotic" actually is in Suojanen's (1984: 59) analysis; there is no explicit semiotic model in use, except a mention of Ogden's & Richard's model from their influential book, *The Meaning of Meaning* (1923), with its triadic relations showing *symbol* – *referent*

– *thought*. In my view, her eclecticism of method was intended to describe hymn singing as a creative event (Suojanen 1982: 42). Despite the vague definition of semiotics, however, Suojanen’s research is an important presentation of the structural ideas from the 1980s.

In 1981, Tarasti (1991a: 32) wrote in his reports from the Semiotic Society of Finland that Pirjo-Maija Toivonen had published the booklet *Johdatus kirjallisuuden semiotikkaan* [*Introduction to the Semiotics of Literature*] (1981) which also showed how semiotics might influence teaching at the university level. Some years later, Toivonen (1986), in her doctoral thesis, examined the aesthetics and history of modernism. She focused particularly on the relationship between modernism and existentialism, using a structural-semiotic method and theory by which to examine the early lyric poetry (1946, 1952) of the Finnish female author Aila Meriluoto (b. 1924), with its mix of modernistic and existential characteristics (in her work, one encounters the metaphor of the eye, as with Rainer Maria Rilke). Themes dealing with the philosophy and aesthetics of modernism are found in Toivonen’s investigation of the superordinate oppositions of texts, and she uses many semiotic-structural theories and methods.² She (1986) combines these various semiotic approaches with existential philosophy (e.g. Heidegger, Husserl), drawing on semiotic ideas from the 1960s and 1970s, and applying them in Finnish literary research especially in the 1980s.

In her dissertation, Sinikka Tuohimaa (1986) discusses reflection symbolism in the poetry of Finnish author Eeva-Liisa Manner (1921–1995). Tuohimaa’s model is largely hermeneutic, but notes that she “took advantage of her interest in semiotics”, with references to Lotman (1972: 89–91) in her discussions of poetic imagery, especially as regards mirroring and reflection as verbal expressions (cf. also Greimas [1966] 1980: 27, 32; Jakobson 1960). With references to Kristeva (1969: 255, 332–333; 1974: 83–86) and the process of intertextuality, Tuohimaa shows that a text may have more than one code (e.g., allusions to a mythical, scientific or political contexts) and how a phenotext produces the genotext; e.g., in Eeva-Liisa Manner’s poetry there are intertextual connections to myths and philosophers. In her discussion of the “mirror” theme, Tuohimaa (1986: 40) references Lacan’s (1966: 93–100) notion of the mirror stage. In problematic areas encountered in her analysis of poems, Tuohimaa (1986: 22–23) applies Greimas’s models ([1966] 1980: 27, 32), showing how meaning is usually manifested through binary oppositions (Greimas [1966] 1980: 260). She

analyzes the poems' lexemes into abstract semes (op. cit. 28–30), and also makes use of Greimas's *modalities* (33).

In 1988, Tuohimaa published her book *Nainen, kieli ja kirjallisuus* [*Women, Language, and Literature*] in which she discusses such French poststructuralists as Julia Kristeva (1969; 1974; 1977; 1980), Luce Irigaray (1979), and Hélène Cixous (1975). Using Barthes's and Kristeva's theories (cf. Tarasti 1991a: 169), Tuohimaa analyzes the output of certain Finnish authors (see, also, Tuohimaa 1991: 371–379). Taking a feminist-poststructural approach to literature, she discusses aspects of poetic language and comes up with a coherent theory of language and subject. Tuohimaa's articles and studies in feminist criticism, post-structural theories, and Finnish poetry deal with questions of language, world, and subject (Althusser, Foucault, Derrida), showing how different languages produce meaning in different ways. Traditional linguistics used a correspondence model, i.e., a link between words and objects of reality, whereas these later authors pointed up the constructive aspects of language as a creator of realities (cf. de Saussure's theory of language as an abstract system consisting of chains of signs). In poststructural thought, language is considered the place where actual and possible forms of social and political organizations are defined; on this view, language is the place where our subjectivity is constructed – subjectivity is not genetically determined, but socially produced. Language carries within it ideologies and value systems that are inherently sexual, as Tuohimaa (1991: 372–373) has showed in her research since the 1980s. Psychoanalytic theory can account for aspects of the semiotic and the feminine, this last predominating in the pre-Oedipal period, when the child is still connected to the maternal body. This Tuohimaa (1991: 375), in her semiotic analysis of the poetic language of Finnish female authors, has followed Kristeva (1974: 23–30, 44), positing the Lacanian mirror phase as the first step of the subject – now detached from the semiotic *chora* – into the symbolic order. The *chora* will be repressed and found only as a pulsating pressure (cf. *sujet en procès* Kristeva 1974: 37, *la chora pulsionnelle* p. 96–97) on symbolic language, manifesting itself as contradictions, silence, and absence.

Kristeva's "speaking subject" (cf. Välimäki 2005) is one that is divided between unconscious and conscious motivations, between psychological and social processes. In the production of meaning there are two types of signifying process: the *semiotic* (Lacan's "imaginary", 1966) and the *sym-*

bolic (ibid.). The semiotic is related to the *chora*, whereas the symbolic process refers to the establishment of signs and syntax; this last, as Kristeva states, embodies the paternal function, as manifested in grammatical laws and social constraints. Tuohimaa, following Kristeva, demonstrates how the semiotic is manifested in *poetic language*, in its heterogeneity of meaning and signification, as particular articulations between the symbolic and semiotic disposition of rhythms and intonations which are prior to the first phonemes, morphemes, lexemes, sentences, etc. Tuohimaa (1991: 374–375) has discussed such issues in her post-structuralist and semiotic analysis since the 1980s. Her publications also show how feminine textual politics are manifested in contradictory elements at the level of both discourse and themes, where there is a conflict between masculine and feminine values. These conflicts are reflected in style, rhythm and musicality that break with syntax so as to present hidden symbolisms of a text. Symbols act, as Freud has shown, as a bridge between soul and body, psyche and nature. French post-structuralism also figures into Tuohimaa's book *Kielen kapina [Revolution in language]* (1994) which reflects the idea of Kristeva's "la révolution du langage poétique", and points up the creativity of feminine poetic language.

6. Semiotics of medicine: Studying symptoms and applying Peirce

In 1989 Tarasti (1991a: 96, 168, 182–183) writes that the teaching of semiotics in Finland really began as early as 1988 in the medical field, with Marja-Liisa Honkasalo's courses on diagnostics, the psychoanalytic aspects of symbols, Kristeva's theory of depression, death as an act of semiosis and more. In her groundbreaking moves into semiotics and interdisciplinary fields, Honkasalo (1988: 11–25; 186–192) analyzed the language of symptoms and signs in medicine (cf. Tarasti 1991a: 96, 168, 182–183), as an alternative to mainstream medical concerns (such as cell structure and behaviour). She analyzes symptoms as signs having both indexical and symbolical meanings. Many such meanings have relations to specific sicknesses and other biological processes, as well as to the social and cultural world. Communication between people involves both mental and cultural processes (cf. Eco 1976). Cells and physiological processes, Honkasalo (1988: 20) writes, are not part of communication in this sense. Rather, a human

being can be seen as a system comprised of information on the biological level. Honkasalo (ibid.) combines semiotics with the system-theoretical approach (Bertalanffy 1968), i.e., the study of wholes and wholeness. Thure von Uexküll (*Semiotica* 38 1982; 1984) had already studied the concept of sickness from a semiotic point of view, and developed a system theoretical approach, for example, by “translating” various biological processes and their semiosis as “biosemiotic” processes. This was to form an important aspect of Honkasalo’s (1988: 24) theoretical framework in her dissertation.³

If in the 1970s symptoms were studied as signs in the French tradition – as the language of psychoanalysis – in Peircean semiotics, by contrast, they have been seen as indexical signs. Eco (1976) argued that only psychiatric symptoms are conventional and symbolic signs, whereas for Sebeok (1976: 124) the symptom is “an automatic, natural sign”, embodying signifier and signified. Honkasalo’s (1988) semiotic work presents a conceptual and empirical analysis of the polysemous character of symptoms. It is a study on basic social medical research, concentrating primarily on problems intrinsic to this discipline. She used two methods of data collection and analysis, based on the assumption that the different levels of the symptom involved different domains, thus requiring systemic and semiotic inquiries. The systemic aspect pointed up the hierarchical realities of the symptom. Honkasalo’s research (1988: 192), based on Peircean semiotic theory, revealed the polysemous essence of the symptoms on different levels and in multiple relations.

In a special volume of *Semiotica* (no. 87, 3 and 4, 1991) there are 14 contributions by Finnish semioticians, two of them women: Honkasalo in medicine, and Tuohimaa in literature. The volume, edited by Eero Tarasti, is divided into socio- and cultural semiotics, semiotic theory of art, semiotic analysis of art, and gender analysis. These articles date from different periods, the oldest from 1984, and the more recent one from 1989. As Tarasti notes in his Foreword (1991b: 198–199), the articles are not meant to provide an “overall or exhaustive paradigm of Finnish semiotics, but simply to introduce in an international context some of our strongest areas in semiotic research. Therefore, for example, such fields as folklore, anthropology, linguistics, and musicology are not adequately represented”. Honkasalo (1991: 251–268) uses medical semiotics and socio-semiotics (Peircean theory) to study symptoms as a language in a community of

female factory workers. In this article, Honkasalo discusses the symptom as a sign, explaining problems of psychosomatic and psychological symptoms and especially the social meanings, along with the communicative functions attributed to them in her research based on empirical fieldwork (cf. Honkasalo 1988). She demonstrates how a Peircean semiotic perspective (cf. CP 1–8 1931–1958; EP 1 1992; EP 2 1998), using his categories *Firstness*, *Secondness*, and *Thirdness* (cf. Honkasalo 1991: 252), can form a relevant approach to the semiotics of medicine. Honkasalo has demonstrated quite systematically that, for medical semiotics, symptoms are essentially polysemous and multireferential, hence requiring semiotic and other interdisciplinary methodological approaches.⁴

7. *Semiotics of art – Applying Peirce*

The last dissertation I will discuss is Anna Louhivuori's (1988) *Myths as Images: A Structural-semiotic Interpretation of Marc Chagall's First Paris period, Works 1910–1914* (ten paintings and one gouache). Her interpretations of visual signs emphasizes art education, and is based on Peirce's phenomenological categorization of modes of being (Louhivuori 1988: 12–13). The *Firstness*-phase represents the level of qualitative possibilities of the works of art, as well as the phase of perception and emotion, based also on the recipient's non-cognitive pre-knowledge. The *Secondness*-phase represents the actual facts related to the work of art and the deductions made on the basis of these facts. The *Thirdness*-phase forms a synthesis of the former two, also constituting the criteria for judging the work of art.

In her theoretical and methodological section, Louhivuori (1988: 12–13, fn 150) writes that the semiotics of art in 1988 does not have solid traditions in the same vein as the semiotics of literature and musicology. One premise of Louhivuori's study was the profound *mythic dimension* in Chagall's work during the period in question. In her analysis of myths, Louhivuori used an interdisciplinary method drawn from semiotics (Greimas, Barthes), philosophy and anthropology (Eliade, Bachelard), psychology (Jung), and Hassidism (Buber, Wiesel). It was during the first Paris period that myths gained their strongest manifestation in Chagall's works. Another period with strong mythical elements occurred toward the end of his long life, evincing poetic visions based biblical texts. In semiotic terms, the central issue in Louhivuori's study is the relationship between Cha-

gall's modes of expression and other modes of artistic expression of this period, focusing on the mythical content of Chagall's works compared to that of other contemporary art. Her semiotic analysis shows ample interactions between Chagall's work and various common trends of the period. Quite unique and influential, however, were the content (*signifié*) of the works analyzed. In Louhivuori's analysis (1988: 16) Etienne Souriau's four existential dimensions of art are employed: *physical, phenomenological, fictive* and *transcendental*; the first two belong to the plane of expression (signifier), the other two to content.

As a summary, it can be stated that early semiotic analysis in Finland took various forms: Greimassian, Peircean, Kristevian, etc. We would agree with the linguist and philosopher Esa Itkonen (1982: 74–82) that, if the main aim of a semiotic analysis is to reveal structures, the concept of “semiotic structure” has remained unclear and partly controversial. According to Lévi-Strauss (e.g., 1955) and Eco (1976), it is axiomatic that modern semiotics has been developed on the basis of linguistic theory. Like natural language, society ought to be seen as a huge complex of communication processes, and every communication process implies a certain code, or several synchronic codes. Itkonen (1982: 74) argues that it was therefore “natural” to presume that the concept of linguistic structure could shed light on the concept of semiotic structure and thus affect the scientific status of semiotics. In Finnish structural-semiotic dissertations from the 1980s, the definitions of “semiotics” and “semiotic” are not always very explicit; the theories and methodologies are eclectic and various, displaying a richness of interdisciplinary aspects. These studies have often applied (all) the main structural and semiotic ideas from the 1960s and 1970s in the same dissertation. Despite such eclecticism, the publications from this time meant a new period in the scientific community in Finland – the start of semiotic research in Finland. The women semioticians presented above were pioneers in such fields as folklore, literary studies, linguistics, anthropology, musicology, medicine, and socio- and cultural studies.

8. Semiotics in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries: Finnish trends and traditions

Tarasti (1990: 5–6) defines semiotics, using a metaphor from Hermann Hesse's *Glasperlenspiel* (1943), as a union of arts and sciences. In *Semiotica*

Volume 87 in 1991 Tarasti (1991b: 197) argues that the development of semiotics in Finland in recent years (since the 1970s) has been, “without exaggeration, surprisingly rapid”. It all began with the small student circle in 1971 called the “Structuralism group”, consisting of students from various disciplines who gathered for regular sessions where they read difficult French and Italian texts. From there, and almost overnight, Finnish semiotics developed into a national and international semiotic and scientific community. Ten years later this group gave birth to the Semiotic Society of Finland, which began to organize international colloquia culminating in the International Semiotics Institute in Imatra in 1988. Since then, development has been very rapid, and has included female semioticians with backgrounds in 1960s structuralism, 1970s post-structuralism, and the semiotics of the 1980s and the 1990s (see Figure 1). These names are central also in the teaching and education of students.

Name	Time	Field
Apo, Satu	1970s–	Folklore studies
Bauters, Merja	1990s–	Art studies
Enckell, Johanna	1970s–	Literature
Hannula, Erja	1990s–	Linguistics, Roman philology
Hartama-Heinonen, Ritva	1990s–	Translation Studies, Swedish translation and interpretation
Honkasalo, Marja-Liisa	1970s–	Medicine, Women studies
Knuuttila, Tarja	1990s–	The Philosophy of science and technology
Knuuttila, Sirkka	2000–	Literature
Koivunen, Hannele	1990s–	Systematic theology
Kukkonen, Pirjo	1980s–	Linguistics, Scandinavian languages and literature, Translation Studies
Köngäs Maranda, Elli († 1982)	1970s–	Folklore, anthropology
Lehtonen, Maija	1970s–	Finnish literature
Lehtovuori, Eeva	1980s–	French literature, Linguistics
Louhivuori, Anna	1970s–	Art studies, art education
Rantavaara, Irma († 1972)	1970s–	Art studies, aesthetics
Sivenius, Pia	1990s–	Psychosemiotics, Women studies
Sivuoja-Gunaratnam, Anne	1980s–	Musicology, Women studies

Sorvali, Irma	1990s–	Linguistics, Scandinavian languages, Translation Studies
Suojanen, Päivikki	1980s–	Music anthropology, hymnology
Tarasti, Eila	1970s–	Musicology
Toivonen, Pirjo-Majja	1970s–	Finnish literature
Tuohimaa, Sinikka († 2004)	1970s–	Finnish literature, Women studies
Uotila, Minna	1990s–	Fashion
Vihma, Susann	1990s–	The semiotics of design
Välimäki, Susanna	1990s–	Musicology, psychoanalysis

Figure 1. Women in Finnish semiotics 1970s–.

Women semioticians in Finland represent the fields of art, literature, and linguistics; also, translation studies is a rapidly growing area of research today, along with the semiotics of science and technology.

Finnish semiotics, which began with “the linguistic turn” as a background, has grown into a field that embraces such different areas as philosophical speculation, biosemiotics, global semiotics, and semioethics. Semiotics is a tolerant research field, accommodating a wide variety of perspectives on the central issues of human life. The women scholars surveyed above were not only influential in Finnish semiotics – their work, and that of their students and adherents, holds a well-earned place in the global semiotics of today.

Notes

1. Jakobson’s opening address to the First International Congress of Semiotics, Milan, June 2, 1974 was first published in French in 1975 by Indiana University Press under the title *Coup d’oeil sur le développement de la sémiotique* (Bloomington 1975); cf. Pomorska & Rydy (1987: 531).
2. For instance, Barthes 1980; Eco 1972; 1976; Greimas 1966, 1970–1983; Hjelmslev 1969; Jakobson 1960; 1972; Kristeva 1972; Lotman 1972–1980; Morris 1971; Ojala 1953–1982; Posner 1972–1978; Tarasti 1974; 1976; 1980; Toivonen 1974–1984; Tuohimaa 1969.
3. *Translation Translation* (2003) ed. with an introduction by Susan Petrilli shows how translation concerns not only verbal texts and their relations among different languages, but also the entire biosphere or biosemiosphere, as evidenced by research in biosemiotics.

4. There are arguments from Barthes (*Eléments de sémiologie*, 1964), Eco (*A Theory of Semiotics*, 1976), Foucault (*The Birth of the Clinic*, 1973), Freud (*Inhibitions, symptoms, and anxiety*, 1926), Greimas (*Semiotics and Language*, 1982), Kristeva (*La révolution du langage poétique*, 1974), Lacan (*Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis*, 1981), Peirce (CP = *Collected Papers*, 1931–1958; *Semiotic and Significs: The Correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby*, 1977), de Saussure (*Course in General Linguistics*, [1916] 1966), Sebeok (*Contributions to the Doctrine of Signs*, 1976), Shands (*Semiotic Approaches to Psychiatry*, 1970), Staiano (*Interpreting Signs of Illness: An Ethnosemiotic Study*, 1981; *Medical semiotics: Redefining an ancient craft*, in *Semiotica* 38 (3/4)).

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Non-communication systems: Signification and referent

*1. Semiotics of the system and semiotics of discourse
on the system*

The purpose of this paper is to propose a theoretical, methodological, and technical framework for the semiotic delimitation and analysis of semiotic systems of material objects and practices which do not belong primarily to the sphere of signification. We call such systems, for the purposes of this paper, non-communication systems. By their very nature, the study of such systems does not fall wholly within the domain of semiotics, a domain that we consider as coextensive with the study of cultural attitudes and practices. Thus, these systems differ structurally from communication systems, such as language, literature, and the arts, whose primary function is to be used for communication between members of a society and whose structure is primarily semiotic.

The means for identification and analysis of non-communication systems is a communication system into which they are transcribed, and the most frequent and powerful such system is natural language in its written or oral form, i.e., the main means for the analysis of non-communication systems is the use of linguistic texts. Due to this transcription, the communication system becomes the vehicle of the non-communication system and four structural characteristics come to surface: a) the field of the non-communication system, what is 'out there', becomes the referent of the communication system, a referent demanding its own, separate analysis; b) the semiotics of the non-communication system is intermingled with the semiotic structure of the communication system; c) the communication system may incorporate elements of other systems, communication systems or not, related to a greater or lesser degree to the non-commu-

nication system; and d) the communication system integrates both the semiotically relevant and the semiotically non-relevant aspects of the non-communication system. In other words, when the transcription is made using natural language: a) purely linguistic elements entailed by the use of language, b) elements of natural language referring to the non-semiotic aspect of the system being transcribed, and c) those which are relevant to its semiotic aspect, as well as d) elements belonging to some other system or systems, that is, four different aspects having the linguistic system as vehicle are all mixed together, confusing the semiotic analysis of the target-system as such.

Considering this difficulty in the semiotic delimitation of a non-communication system and the ambiguities which may follow from it, the above theoretical framework is needed in order to allow us to differentiate between these various aspects. The first step in such a differentiation is easily understandable, since what distinguishes the elements of the linguistic system as such, and those of the other system(s) it may integrate, from the elements of the non-communication target-system that it also integrates is the referential function: the references to the non-communication system, and only these, are relevant to its analysis. Even within a poststructuralist and postmodern context, according to which the reality of an object referred to by a sign is only an effect of signification (e.g., Baudrillard 1972), there is still reference (though no referent). Then, a second step is needed, which is to differentiate between semiotically relevant and non-relevant aspects of the non-communication system.

However, an analytical comment is necessary here. What is semiotically non-relevant in the context of the second step, is semiotically relevant from the very beginning, since it was assumed by the transcribing linguistic system. If, for example, the non-communication system, as delivered by the linguistic text, is analyzed using the concept of isotopy (see Greimas and Courtés 1979: *Champ sémantique, Classème, Isotopie, Micro-univers, Sème*), both the semiotically relevant and non-relevant aspects are given this form. This general “semiotization” of the non-communication system delivers a *semiotics of the discourse on it*. This is not the same as the whole of the text, which also includes the aspects (a) and (d) above, and which concerns general semiotic theory rather than specifically the semiotics of the particular non-communication system. Needless to say, while the semiotics of the discourse on a particular non-communication system gives a semi-

otic investment to that aspect of it that is not of a semiotic nature, it cannot claim to be a scientific analysis of this aspect, since this is a task assumed by specialized scientific fields other than semiotics. In addition, the semiotics of the discourse *on* the system does not yet allow us to identify the *semiotics of the system*, which presupposes the second-step procedure.

If the use of the concept of isotopy leads, in respect to the non-communication system, to a classification of the semiotic units, the differentiation between semiotically relevant and non-relevant aspects of the system offers a new and more general classification. We just saw that the aspect of a non-communication system that is semiotically non-relevant in comparison to the semiotic aspect *par excellence* of the system becomes semiotically relevant for the semiotics of the *discourse* on this system, that is, for another relevancy, perhaps of secondary importance, but not without interest. However, the *object* of this semiotized-in-or-by-discourse aspect cannot be investigated by semiotics, as we mentioned above, because its relevancy corresponds to an approach to the object as *referent*, and remains *external* to the semiotics of the non-communication system. On the other hand, the semiotic treatment of the semiotically relevant aspect of the system delivers semantic elements which are *internal* to the system. With reference to systems of objects of whatever kind, whether constituted by cups, trees, or cities, we may consider that at the very foundation of such a non-communication system lies a primary system focused on its signifiers, which are accompanied by immediate signifieds of a nature particular to the system, midway between direct (cultural) *perception* and linguistic formulation (*conception*). This primary system could be investigated by scientific fields other than semiotics, such as psychology, but still the linguistic system may offer access to it.

The differentiation between semiotically relevant and non-relevant aspects of a non-communication system offers the general guidelines for the desired classification, a classification that is theoretically based, but that should also be given an operational form, since its aim is to be able to lead to the actual semiotic delimitation of a non-communication system. As we shall see, we also need to proceed to a classification internal to the semiotics of the non-communication system according to its strata.

2. *The components of urban discourse*

We shall use as a test case for the study of non-communication systems the urban system, which represents an extreme case, since because of the nature and extension of the substance of its expression it is probably the “hardest” of all the non-communication systems. This hard materiality is in striking opposition to the “soft” materiality of the linguistic system, especially in its oral aspect, so soft that it frequently deceives us into thinking of this system as immaterial. There are theoretical discourses by specialists concerning the production of urban space and excellent studies on this matter are due to Françoise Choay, who turned to the role of written discourses for the semantic and formal constitution of a theoretical urban space, a space aiming to be a model for actual planning. According to Choay, these discourses which have urban space as their specific object constitute a specific genre, a discursive class. Choay distinguishes two major and different types of discourse, two different “structural modalities”, which have constituted the foundation of these specialized Western urban texts ever since the Renaissance, when she considers that these discursive types emerged (Choay 1973 and 1980: 9–17). The first type, the architectural treatise, derives from Leone Battista Alberti and consists in the application of principles and rules; the second, the utopia, is due to Thomas More and proposes the reproduction of a model.

To illustrate the problems that appear when we want to analyze the non-communication system of urban space through its representation in language, we propose to apply the four different aspects coexisting in an urban text as posed in the beginning of this paper to the seven constitutive features that allow us, according to Choay, to classify a text as a utopia. These are (Choay 1980: 46): (a) the utopia is an eponymous text; (b) it is written in the first person, by the author or his spokesman, visitor and witness of utopia; (c) it has the form of a narrative, describing in the present indicative a model society; (d) the model society presented is opposed to an historically real society, to the criticism of which it is indissolubly related; (e) the model society is supported by a model space, which is a necessary part of it; (f) the model society is located ‘elsewhere’; and (g) this society is not constrained by time and does not change.

These seven features can be homogenized and situated on one and the same level only when seen as parts of a linguistic text, but from the

viewpoint of the semiotics of the urban system, i.e., urban semiotics, they belong to different aspects (cf. Lagopoulos 1997: 364–365). Features (a), (b), and partly (c) belong to the aspect related to the linguistic system, both in its narrowly linguistic and its textual form, which is the communication system acting as a vehicle for the non-communication system of urban space; features (d), (f), (g), and partly (c) belong to the aspect concerning a system other than the urban system, namely the sociological system; and only feature (e) is related to the aspect(s) derived from references to urban space, but is ambiguous as stated, because it may cover semiotically relevant and/or non-relevant elements.

The simultaneous treatment of all these aspects may deliver a textual class, constituted on the occasion of a discourse on urban space, but this class is attached to the undifferentiated discourse as a whole and, as we already stated, it is of interest to general semiotic theory, but does not belong to urban semiotics. Only the feature (e) leads to the latter, and if it covers both the relationship between the semiotically relevant and non-relevant aspects or only the latter, it leads more specifically to the semiotics of urban discourse, but still not to the semiotics of urban space.

To recapitulate: in texts about space, the linguistic system assumes the urban system, and we shall call this kind of vehicle “urban text” and its semiotic analysis “semiotics of the urban text”. The semiotic analysis of this text delivers the semiotics of the semiotically relevant aspect of the urban system, that is, the semiotics of the urban system, or *urban semiotics*, together with the semiotics of its semiotically non-relevant aspect, both constituting the *semiotics of urban discourse*. Following the delimitation of the semiotics of urban discourse, a second procedure, referred to in the first section of this paper, is needed in order to achieve the new delimitation leading to the semiotics of urban space as such. This procedure must be founded on the rule of relevancy (*loi de la pertinence*), which demands the definition of the perspective on urban space that is relevant to semiotics. The relevant viewpoint of semiotics in general is convincingly argued by Umberto Eco, who also integrates into this perspective the relevancy for the semiotics of architecture, a perspective which is also valid for the greater scale of urban space. Eco considers it of central importance to approach social and spatial phenomena semiotically, “*sub specie communicationis*”, that is, from the viewpoint of signification (Eco 1972: 25–30 and 1979: 6–7, 26–27, 158).

The semiotic relevancy in respect to urban space, a semiotic “vertical” view on it, delivers three successive strata, “vertically” connected: the stratum of the urban signifiers, the stratum of the denotative urban signifieds, and that of the symbolic, connotative urban signifieds (see Eco 1972: 274–281 *passim*). There is also a parallel vertical view on urban space, covering the semiotically non-relevant aspect of it. The above three strata, which are integrated within the semiotics of urban discourse, deliver a classification internal to the semiotics of urban space, and constitute the semiotics of urban space *par excellence*. Together with the parallel aspect addressed to the semiotically non-relevant elements of urban space, which also forms part of the semiotics of urban discourse, they constitute the matrix for the organization of the units of urban discourse, i.e., for the classification of these units. Such a classification is founded on linguistic *parole*, not *langue*, irrespective of the fact that the semiotically relevant units may allow the identification of the *langue* of the urban system.

We should clarify that we are using here a narrow definition of urban discourse, as discourse referring only to the isotopy of *physical* space, which has been the traditional focus of the semiotics of space. As an example of each of the four components above in respect to this isotopy, consider the following references to the same urban entity, the grid pattern. (a) A statement such as “the grid pattern creates traffic problems, because for every city block there is a street crossing” is an example of the semiotically non-relevant aspect of the grid pattern. (b) For the three semiotically relevant strata of the grid pattern appertaining to urban semiotics, (i) “the grid pattern is a figure consisting of a set of parallel lines crossed perpendicularly by another set of parallel lines” illustrates the grid pattern as an urban signifier; (ii) “the grid pattern facilitates the understanding of the general city plan” uses the grid pattern as a denotative signified; (iii) a possible connotative signified of the grid pattern, typical of Greek and Roman antiquity, would be “the grid pattern reflects the organization of the universe.”

3. The aspects of urban discourse, the epistemology of urban space, and the epistemology of sciences

Undoubtedly, the matrix of isotopies constitutes a semiotic classification of urban units, but our central argument focuses on the four-component matrix discussed above, as offering a wider framework for the basic clas-

sification of these units. We believe that this classification is fundamental for urban semiotics and of a general validity. Doubts about its well-foundedness can be overcome, because, as we shall argue, it has much wider epistemological affiliations. Actually, these affiliations do not derive from all four components, but from the two opposed aspects of the semiotically relevant and semiotically non-relevant elements of the urban system, the two aspects that may be considered as the contribution of the present paper to semiotic theory and as radically challenging the received wisdom in the semiotics of space. We shall discuss these affiliations on two levels of generalization, the first concerning the whole of the domain of spatial studies and the second the epistemology of sciences in general.

The nucleus of spatial studies is human geography and we shall try in few lines to give a schematic overview of its development after World War II. The “new geography” of the 1950s is based on the positivist hypothetico-deductive approach and seeks to formulate specifically spatial and formal (“morphological”) universal laws, applicable to both physical space and the natural environment, by using quantitative data and model-building. Marxist geography was propagated and extremely successful in Anglo-Saxon geography from the beginnings of the 1970s, but originated in France, where its landmark was May ’68. Marxist geography, the political-economy approach to geographical space, is radically opposed to new geography. For it, space is social and a social product, i.e., socially produced; thus, there are no spatial laws but only sociospatial ones and, consequently, these laws are not universal: capitalism, for example, as a socioeconomic system shapes space in its own image. In spite of the great distance separating the paradigms supporting these two geographies, their common object is space as *referent*.

An earlier reaction to new geography appeared in the early 1960s and came from behavioral geography, also of positivist orientation. For behavioral geography, spatial organization and movement are due to geographical conception: the cognitive representations, “cognitive maps”, “mental maps”, or “mental images” held by people. About a decade later, humanistic geography introduced a new philosophical paradigm for the study of spatial signification, phenomenology. Finally, toward the end of the 1980s, postmodern geography entered the scene as a forceful current. Its foundation is French poststructuralism and its fundamental thesis is that space is

a text. In spite of their differences, all three of the above geographies focus on space as *signification*.

The domain of spatial studies is not constituted by human geography alone but also by a whole series of subfields of sciences with objects other than space, as well as by the applied fields of architecture and urban and regional planning. In this vast domain, a split has appeared, similar to the one we distinguished in human geography, between the study of space as *referent* and its study as *signification*.

This split is well formulated by humanistic geography. This geography does not want to have as its object space as a physical reality, but approaches it as a meaningful entity, a turn that moves away from *physical space* as a referent and selects as its object *semiotic place*. Space is seen as the result of an abstract and neutralizing manner of indirectly and intellectually looking at geographical entities from a distance, while *place* is related to intimate, subjective, direct, and profound experiences in consciousness; place is invested with signification, feeling, and value. For humanistic geography, this experiential recuperation of space as place contains its original nature; it is place that shapes architecture and the urban environment (see, for example, Tuan 1977: 5, 17; Saarinen and Sell 1980: 531).

Geographical approaches having as object space view it externally and as a material entity, independently from the semiotic world of the social subjects. They constitute together what we may call the *materialist, objectivist, (super)paradigm* (this latter term is used here in a very loose sense). The other approaches, which have as object place, view it as a semiotic entity, a part of the experiential world of the subjects. They compose as a whole what we may call the *conceptual, subjectivist, (super)paradigm*, which is semiotic in nature.

We see that the dichotomy traversing spatial studies corresponds exactly to our typological differentiation between semiotically non-relevant and semiotically relevant aspects of the urban system in urban discourses. We need not be confused by the fact that the focusing on the referent, space, excludes the corresponding scientific approaches from semiotic interests, while we have considered that references to “space” constitute part of urban discourse, that is, of a semiotic entity. The reason is that the four aspects we detected *within* an urban text – the aspect relating to the linguistic system as such, that relating to systems other than the urban system, that of the semiotically non-relevant elements of the urban system, and

finally the aspect of the semiotically relevant elements of the urban system – are all aspects of an initial general relevancy, which is semiotic. This initial relevancy reflects the decision to treat the object of analysis as a text, i.e., as a semiotic object, and not as a source of information on the referent. It is, of course, absolutely legitimate, but it cannot eliminate the existence of a non-semiotic relevancy in this object. To take the extreme case, we can do a semiotic analysis of *scientific* discourses on *space*, but this cannot change the fact that they are about space and it does *not* transform them into discourses on *place*.

It is true that the extreme postmodern approaches in geography reject the differentiation between space and place in the name of the poststructuralist rejection of the referent. But this position is just a local, if fashionable, position, coexisting with the position opposed to it, and indeed may lead to a logical misunderstanding. The reason is that, even if *actually* the referent were totally inaccessible, ordinary people and the majority of scientists nevertheless treat it as an existing entity. Thus, the logical deduction from the poststructuralist premises should be that there are two different semiotics: one semiotics of meaningful space and another of space (wrongly) considered as referent.

So far, we have discussed the first-level generalization following from the affiliations of the differentiation between semiotically relevant and non-relevant aspects of the urban system. The second-level generalization, into which the first-level generalization is integrated, is far-reaching and concerns a radical split in the epistemology of sciences. According to their epistemological position in respect to reality, scientific theories are classified into two major categories: *realist* and *anti-realist* theories. Realist theories assume that it is possible to identify the really existing objects in the world and their states, relations, and processes (ontological realism) or at least the structures ruling them (structural realism), consequently to know the essence of the world as such, independently from the observing scientist, with the result that realism is an essentialist realism. For realism, scientific theories are true, at least approximately, in the sense that they correspond to an external reality. They re-present a real preexisting referent, of which they are a kind of duplicate, although an incomplete and imperfect one. Due to this *semantic realism*, they are theories-reflections and their truth is truth-correspondence.

Contrary to realist theories, anti-realist theories exclude truth-correspondence. For instrumentalism, the main body of anti-realism, scientific theories are not to be taken literally, because they are just instruments for classifying, predicting, and acting on phenomena. Instrumentalism states that scientific theories build, that is, invent, entities and processes, which are simply useful intellectual fictions. Contrary, then, to the theories-reflection of realism, the theories of anti-realism are generally theories-instruments. For anti-realism, truth-correspondence is not valid, because truth depends on an, individual or collective, subject and the means at its disposal; truth is not a reality, but a constructed event.

The two major tendencies within anti-realism hold a different view on the referent, or (which is the same thing) a different relation to essentialist realism. They either retain a contact with the latter – in which case we have a “mild” anti-realism – or reject any contact whatsoever, whence they tend to idealism. For the first tendency, while the extralinguistic referent, as part of the world-as-such independent from humans, cannot be represented, it nevertheless exerts pressures on the content of theories. In this framework, a scientific theory cannot be just anything. The second tendency does not retain any connection to the referent. Thus, for radical conventionalism, observations do not pose any constraints on the researcher and science is a purely human creation, totally disconnected from any referent. This extreme relativism holds that the scientist is completely free to formulate whatever s/he chooses in respect to his/her object, thus discrediting scientific views and, ironically, its own views (on the above observations concerning the epistemology of sciences, see Soler 2000: 43, 109–126). We recognize in this last tendency the epistemological stance of poststructuralist and postmodern theorizing.

To conclude, we can relate the opposition *space* vs *place* first to the epistemological opposition *scientific realism* vs *scientific anti-realism*, and then to both the current professional urban discourses and the spontaneous approach to urban space by the ordinary individual. The approaches that study *space* necessarily adopt the viewpoint of scientific realism, though this did not prevent the existence of one approach within realist human geography (namely behavioral geography) and another one within realist psychology (namely environmental psychology) which are oriented towards place. But, in this last case, a kind of anti-realism enters through the window, with the dominant idea that place, and no other factors

(such as socioeconomic processes), is the factor creating space. On the other hand, scientific anti-realism in spatial studies is by definition turned towards *place*, while there are also instances, found among humanistic or postmodern geographers, in which the existence of space is acknowledged, but is given a secondary position.

However, urban *discourses*, whether professional or ordinary, reveal that individuals approach geographical entities *simultaneously* as space and as place, as a neutral material object and as a signifying object. We may manifestly generalize this conclusion to every non-communication system, and even generalize it further to communication systems, keeping in mind that in this case their material part is a secondary quality and not a primary quality as in the non-communication systems. We would suggest that these two fundamental modes of our connection to the world do not lose their value even within the anti-realist camp. Though in that case there may be no referent, there is still *reference*, and these two major modes of reference are not without importance, even if the referent were, as this camp maintains, just a semiotic construct.

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Timo Laiho

Post-structuralist insight and the time-dependent structure of the sign

Towards sub-semiotic analysis

1. Sign and structure

It is hard to speak about semiotics without any reference to the concept of *sign*, which was the key concept of the whole movement of structuralism dating back to the mid-twentieth century. But nowadays we may ask: what structuralism? Or even: what structure?

Of course we may remember that structuralism started from linguistics – Saussure's famous lectures were published in 1916 – and spread to many other scientific disciplines (anthropology, philosophy, psychology, psychoanalysis, politics, musicology etc.) until the late 1960s, when it was confronted by something called post-structuralism. And of course we still in the semiotic field acknowledge the structure of the sign as a mutually defined, oppositional pair between expression and content (or signifier and signified), although it is gradually more and more (and rightfully!) questioned by Peirce's famous three-level classification of signs (Peirce 1955). But contrary to our present post-modern attitude, the arousal of post-structuralism was *not* simply a rejection of structuralism. After all, Peirce's general classification of signs was developed independently of linguistic based movement of structuralism and influenced in Europe later on after the breakdown of structuralism since 1970s. So we may ask, what – if not the sign-structure as such – was the main target in post-structural critique of structuralism and what new possibilities does Peirce's three-level definition of sign offer us?

As an answer to these questions it is important to consider the role of *structure* in the realm of signification and meaning production in gene-

ral. This means that we have to take account of the *temporal* and *spatial* aspects, which are connected with *direct perception* of any sign or sign-function. To do this, we will first concentrate on philosopher Gilles Deleuze's essay "How do we recognize structuralism?" (Deleuze 1998),¹ which as a post-structuralist interpretation of the whole structuralistic movement is at once unexpected and fascinating, giving us possibilities to find connections to many other fields of scientific inquiry. Deleuze's interpretation enables us also to make short contacts with the dynamical theories of classical mechanics and further to more recent ideas concerning quantum physics, information, and especially physicist David Bohm's concept of *implicate order* (Bohm 1980 and 1993). And it is precisely these contacts, which show us the power of Deleuze's astonishing framework and give us possibilities – somehow still hidden in his essay – to define better what is meant by the concept of structure, its role in perception, and its relations to the concepts of space and time. Finally at the end of the article the above considerations will lead us to suggest a new approach of semiotic analysis, which will be here outlined as *sub-semiotic analysis*, creating future possibilities of art research especially in the field of music analysis.² This sub-semiotic level has also some connections with Peirce's three-level classification of signs.

2. Deleuze's definitions of structuralism

2.1 The symbolic order

Deleuze's definitions of structuralism start by the delimitation of three orders, which are central to our conscious awareness. He points out that the first criterion or dimension of structuralism is the discovery of a third order – that of the *symbolic* – not to be confused with *real* and *imaginary* (Deleuze 1998: 260). This idea to extract structure from concepts of real and the imaginary is aiming to define a structural object, which already in the field of linguistics is placed "beyond the word in its reality and its resonant parts" and "beyond images and concepts associated with words" (ibid.). But this division between the real, the imaginary and the structural is not without relations between different levels, nor it is an abstract conceptualization. We could clarify Deleuze's first criterion by saying that there cannot be anything real without a certain relation to structure, and that in

every structure we find already the minimal conditions of the symbolic order. This is why the real and the symbolic cannot be imaginary, because before any imagination, structures and reality have to “make sense”: they must be perceived (Figure 1).




Figure 1.

So the idealistic notion that we can imagine whatever we want does not hold, because imagination needs its counterpart of “what it is not”, the real, which can only appear to us by actualization of sensible structures. According to Deleuze, this was the reason why the whole movement of structuralism in the twentieth century gained its revolutionary character in diverse fields of inquiry: it bridged the gap between the real and the imaginary. As Deleuze puts it: a structural object formed a third realm of being, “at once unreal and yet not imaginable” (ibid.: 261). So already in the first chapters of his essay Deleuze gives us something unexpected, which becomes clear to us only after a deeper contemplation: three states of mind, surely different in modes of existence, but necessarily related, and the idea, that in the realm of structures we already find the minimal conditions of symbolic order.

2.2 Spatial relations and the production of sense

Deleuze’s first criterion of structuralism has many consequences (and although he deals with seven distinct criteria in his essay, I will summarize the most important ones here in a more compact manner).

Firstly, if structural elements cannot be defined by pre-existing forms of reality, nor by any imaginable figures derived from them, what do symbolic elements consist of? Although the above-described division between real, imaginary, and structure sounds reasonable, we might have some doubts about Deleuze's insistence that the "symbolic element and the corresponding structure have no relationship with sensible form" (ibid. 261). But once again Deleuze refers, by "sensible form", to pre-existing, autonomous reality, which as a whole – or Gestalt – *cannot* form the ground for definition of structural elements and their role in perception. On the contrary: it is precisely the interplay of structural elements and their relationships, which are responsible for the formation of wholes and for the variation of their parts. This reversal enables Deleuze to conclude (in accordance with Lévi-Strauss's definitions) two important aspects concerning the nature of structural elements: first (1), that "they have nothing other than a *sense*: a sense (which literally refers to meaning and direction) that is necessarily and uniquely 'positional'" (ibid. 262); and second (2), that "sense always results from the combination of elements that are not themselves signifying" (ibid. 263). These conclusions have several far-reaching implications.

(1.) As Deleuze points out, "the scientific ambition of structuralism is not quantitative, but topological and relational" (ibid. 262). The interplay of structural elements is always occurring in a concrete level of direct perceptions, which are necessarily connected with time-dependent spatial relations concerning *proximity*, *conjunction/disjunction* and *placement/displacement*. These spatial relationships put the emphasis on the importance of the geometrical description of any sign production and create further possibilities for Deleuze to define the basic framework of structuralism. The necessity of geometric and topological levels of descriptions in sign-function – with special stress on the *iconic* level in Peirce's classification of signs – has more recently proposed by mathematician René Thom (1985).

(2.) If sense – as Deleuze defines it – is always a result of the combination of structural elements that are not themselves signifying, then all concepts and all those entities connected with them in our surrounding world cannot exist "ready-made". This was already evident earlier in Deleuze's interpretation, where the interplay of structural elements were understood to be responsible for the formation of wholes and for the variation of their parts. But following this line of argumentation, we logically confront inevitably the post-structuralist critique of the concept of (self-)

identity (notably in Derrida's deconstruction and especially in his concept of *différance*; see Derrida 1982) and end up defining structural relationships by *infinite differentiation*. Although the key idea of differentiation leads Deleuze once again to define ever more subtle levels of structural elements and their functioning, it is interesting to point out that by Deleuze's definitions, the critical attitude towards closed, finitely definable entities was already a central aspect in the movement of structuralism since 1950s.

(3.) While it is evident that the idea of differentiation and the concept of difference became the main figures of so-called post-structuralist philosophy and can even be traced back to the simple dualities and binary oppositions that influenced the whole movement of structuralism and structural semantics in general (e.g., the binary oppositions in famous Greimas's square), there was still a deeper line of thought in Deleuze's definition of sense. He points out the following:

There is, profoundly, a non-sense of sense, from which sense itself results. Not that we return in this way to what was once called a philosophy of the absurd since, for it, sense itself is lacking, essentially. For structuralism, on the contrary, there is always too much sense, an overproduction, an overdetermination of sense, always produced in excess by the combination of places in the structure. (Deleuze 1998: 263; see also, Deleuze 1990: 71.)

So we can see more clearly now that it is not anymore *only* a question of the importance of the above-described spatial relationships (localities and positional placements) between structural elements, but something concerning every structural element itself. Deleuze draws our attention to another important aspect concerning a structural element: structural elements cannot have definite boundaries – or identity of itself – because *when producing sense it is always necessarily related to something which it is not: to non-sense*. And this necessary relation of a structural element to “what it is not” cannot be reduced to simple, equally defined binary oppositions, because there is always an excess of sense: “an excess produced and overproduced by non-sense as a lack of itself” (Deleuze 1990: 71). We shall see further implications of this relation especially in sign- and meaning-production and their connection with direct perception later on in this article. It is also interesting to notice here that Deleuze's definition of structural elements – which are not based on well-defined, closed entities – points towards structurally *invariant* relationships, which have been

considered the most important carriers of *information* in perception (in optics, see Gibson 1966, 1979; in physics, see Bohm 2003.)

(4.) But Deleuze's idea of infinite differentiation leads us to consider still two other important consequences.

First: if infinite differentiation leads us unavoidably to overproduction of sense with all its multiple relations to non-sense, it follows that structuralism is necessarily linked with "certain games and a certain kind of theatre, for certain play and theatrical spaces" (Deleuze 1998: 263). But this is not to suggest the impossibility of analysis. It is just pointing out that investigation of structures, which form the basis of any sign or meaning production, it is not a question of absolute quantities but multiple relations of structures, which as a play (or theatre) are always revealed to us as differentiation qualities. So it is qualities that are perceived as positional, occupying a certain location – and it is qualities, which are due to formations of sense in relation to non-sense. The idea of game (or play) as a *strategic* mode of analysis is also similarly illustrated by Derrida in his description of the concept of "différance" (Derrida 1982: 7, 11).

Second: the previous discussion of elementary structural process, in its relation to differentiation including spatial aspects and formations of non-identical sense, makes it evident that structuralism is in a certain way "inseparable from a new materialism ... [or] a new anti-humanism" (Deleuze 1998: 264). But this is not suggesting anything against humanity. As Deleuze explains (ibid. 264):

For if the place is primary in relation to whatever occupies it, it certainly will not suffice to replace God with man in order to change the structure ... the death of God surely means the death of man as well,^[3] in favour, we hope, of something yet to come, but which could only come within structure and through its mutation.

So as a final consequence of preceding considerations we end up with a new line of analysis, which necessarily goes far beyond the anthropic level of structural formations, and touches more profoundly the totality of all organic existence – even towards spaces, which are commonly understood as inorganic or inanimate. So it is not anymore only a question of zoo-semiotics operating on an animal level, not even a doctrine identified as bio-semiotics. This kind of new line of analysis as Deleuze's "something yet to come" will be suggested in the end of this paper as *sub-semiotic analysis*.

2.3. Differentiation as an operation of the differential and the singular

In the preceding section we have been rushing forwards quite rapidly. As a matter of fact, we have used only Deleuze's first criterion of structuralism to define at least the next three following ones and by further implications pointed out many important aspects of the remaining criteria. But there is one central issue left untouched: we don't yet have a clear idea how infinite differentiation is operating. To understand this, we need to explain Deleuze's concept of *differential*.

Once again Deleuze defines the term differential by his first criteria, in relation to the real, the imaginary, and the structural, now in a mathematical context. If different whole numbers (e.g., 2 and 3) and their relations as sums, products, or even their divisions, can be said to be real, we can always change that reality to imaginary by introducing a variable x (or y), which can have whatever value we can imagine (e.g., $x+3$ or even $x^2+y^2-R^2=0$). As a consequence we have two types of relation: (1) In the first type, the different elements and their relations as sums, products, and divisions are real; (2) in the second type the different elements can be unspecified as variables, but the outcome of relations "in each case, must however have a determined value. Such relations can be called imaginary" (Deleuze 1998: 264–265; see Figure 2).




Figure 2.

But the differential, as Deleuze points out, has a profoundly different nature. It constitutes again a third type, which structurally and symboli-

cally mediates between the real and the imaginary. This is due to the fact that the differential as a relation has *no* specific values for variables x and y until the moment they interact and determine each other reciprocally, producing a specific outcome, which in mathematics is called a derivative of differential equation. So the most crucial point here is that it is no longer a question of giving variables imaginary values; nor is it the case that they are real, predetermined entities. Rather, it is the case that in the differential, variables are in continuous change. This is mathematically expressed as a relation between dy and dx (defined as dy/dx), and only their interaction and reciprocally defined relationship gives the differential a specific, *singular* value (ibid. 265; see Figure 2).

But the above-described mathematical definition, given by Deleuze, still leaves us some doubts. By its nature, we can surely infer that structures cannot be point-like entities, but some kind of *extended properties* in continuous inference with each other. But what kind of properties are we dealing with? The answer, in connection with the mathematical formulation is a striking one: We are dealing with a certain property (Δy), which can be perceived changing in time (Δx ; see Figure 3).




Figure 3.

By this clarification it becomes more evident that Deleuze's definition of differential is not simply a mathematical one. If we consider it more deeply from the structural point of view, we notice that it is not based only on abstract formulation and value of differential calculus, where the time change (Δt) is considered to be infinitesimal (as infinitely small), which causes the *relation* between the perceived change of a property and time to *reduce* to a (zero!) point. As Deleuze points out, while the mathematical origin of structuralism must be sought in the domain of differential

calculus, it has to be liberated “from all reference to the infinitely small” and integrated “into a pure logic of relations” (ibid. 265). But even beyond the pure logic of relations, Deleuze’s concept of differential is connected with something much more concrete: as an extended structure it defines *movement* (see Figure 3). This definition leads us to some final conclusions about Deleuze’s definitions of structuralism.

First: the relation between the concept of differential and definition of movement is highly influential, because it is precisely the definition of movement, which has been the most important concept in classical physics since Galileo and Newton, defining the existence – or absence – of *perceived force*. This underlines the ontological status of Deleuze’s concept of differential.

Second: differential defined as movement describes Deleuze’s structural element, which is necessarily related to *spatial localizations* (proximities, conjunctions and placements) and moreover to *temporality*.

Third: although movement can be defined abstractly by reference to measurements between stationary, fixed points, it is by its nature an *extended structure*, which cannot concretely be measured (according to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle) by exact positions of a moving object. This is also the reason why its definition as *sense* (and not as an identified entity) is always related to the background of *non-sense*.

Finally: Deleuze’s concept of differential and its necessary relationship to singularity leads to the question: What is it that coexists in the structure? Answer: For Deleuze the surrounding world exists to us as enormous “virtual reality” constituted by *infinite differentiation*, which in a time-dependent and necessarily singular manner becomes *actualized* to us differentially by our sense organs (Figure 4).




Figure 4.

In the next and last section of this paper, we will see that this double aspect, which in Deleuze's terms is composed by virtual totality as different[*t*]iation and its actualization as different[*c*]iation (ibid. 268), has interesting connections to quantum physicist David Bohm's theory of implicate order. The preceding discussion connected with Deleuze's definitions of structuralism points also towards the re-evaluation of the sign-structure and especially to the investigation of its relation to the continuous movement of time.

3. Further reflections

In brief: Bohm's idea of *implicate order* relies totally on the possibilities to define movement as an ordering principle of perceived structures. And it is precisely the idea of movement that relates it to Deleuze's definition of the structure as constituted by differentials. If we consider the fact that perceived structures – as defined by Deleuze's criteria of structuralism – are necessarily extended, it follows logically that we are, in our perceptions, somehow in the middle of the things. This is based on Bohm's theory of the idea that structures are necessarily *enfolded* within each other (see Figure 5).




Figure 5.

So it is never a question of something being in itself, but that structural elements are temporarily enfolded within each other, and it is by this enfoldment as related to implicate order that they can become *explicated* by our perceptions (Bohm 1980: 141–213). This kind of structural enfoldment points also straightforwardly to the idea of recent quantum physical innovation: we meet the idea of *quantum information* (qubit), where we

find the same structural conditions. It is true that, in the quantum information, the opposite structural elements (for example, electrons spins up and down) prevail simultaneously in an *entangled* (or enfolded) situation of oppositions during a certain time-period; as a result they make up the organizational situation, which is no longer disordered, but in fact totally organized (von Bauer 2004: 183–192). So we find that differentials described as changes of movement can also be understood as fundamental differences (or even binary oppositions, which refer to Deleuze's idea of sense and its relation to non-sense), but only if we consider their nature in relation to time. This stresses once more the role of temporality, which is more clearly seen even in Peirce's three-level classification of signs, where *firstness* describing the iconic level of signs is more connected with temporal and concrete aspects of direct perceptions, and where *thirdness* as abstract and time-independent symbolic-level can be understood as gradual formation mediated by *secondness* of indices. The importance of the iconic level of signs was indicated earlier in connection with Deleuze's definitions of structuralism and the central role of spatial relationships in sign production.

The above considerations lead us to a final reflection, which concerns the role of any study (for example in semiotics): the tendency to concentrate on the future much more in relations of concrete structures changing in time. As a matter of fact we have to do with a kind of *sub-semiotics*, which should be investigating the structural features in a context of the unity of space and time. It is precisely temporality which gives us the idea that our reality is not constituted by ready-made, closed entities but is necessarily related to extended and complex structures evolving in time. As a consequence, we cannot rely anymore on static structural oppositions (like expression and content), but must concentrate on structural features in a content level in order to understand the formation of any possible expression (see Figure 6).

Therefore these structural features can only be described by differences (or differentials) even in situations where those differences turn out to be invariant. This will lead us finally to a better understanding of the time-dependent structure of the sign.




Figure 6.

Notes

1. This essay was written in 1967 but was published not until six years later; see Deleuze 1973.
2. Because of limited space, I am not dealing here with concrete applications of music analysis, which will be the subject of my forthcoming Ph.D. dissertation.
3. For more on the “death of man” and its relation to Foucault’s philosophy, see Deleuze 1986: 124–132.

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Jussi Lassila

Semiotic commodities or nationalistic pathos?

Mediating between interpretations of pro-Putin youth organizations

1. Introduction

My aim here is to conceptualize some key features of the language use of two pro-Putin youth movements, Idushchie Vmeste (henceforth IV) and NASHI in the context of post-communism. The analysis is based on tensions that emanated from the language use of those movements. This tension has two dimensions. First, various texts and announcements of the movements emphasize certain a nationalistic pathos and monopoly of truth. In addition, they often stress the importance of both individual and plural values. The following quotations, from the key text of IV, the Moral Codex, illustrate this contradiction in content:

Cuss – and you will never receive respect from the people of high culture and intellectual. Cuss – and you will be never employed in a serious and responsible job. Cuss – and you will never get out from the circle of people [who are always] drinking beer, doing and reading nothing, listening to moronic detstlas.^[1]

If you only listen to Russian popular songs, then try to listen to the best pieces of Western ones, too. If you only listen to serious contemporary music, try to orientate yourself with classical tradition, ethnic or spiritual music, though only once. If you are a student of a university of technology, then listen to what serious students of humanities are talking about, visit a conference or exhibition. And vice versa.

The second tension concerns the stylistic aspects of this contradiction. Quite often the “pathetic” style of the movements exhibits a certain playfulness. Here I concentrate on this aspect of the language use of the

movements. Playfulness and other “tongue in cheek” elements – which I call “semiotic commodities – are not treated as argumentation strategies but as semiotic aspects of the sociocultural space, as realized by the two pro-power Russian youth organizations. In this respect, the term “semiotic commodity” refers to a condition of communication in which the meaning of the message is based on principals of form and a certain hybrid content (meaning). The notion of “nationalistic pathos”, in turn, refers to the view according to which these movements are regarded more or less as “puppets” or “rubber stamps” of Kremlin.

The concepts of “semiotic commodity” and “nationalistic pathos” can be understood as two sides of the same coin. Repetitive use of national topics (for example, recalling “The Great Patriotic War”²⁾ can be easily recognized as promoting a kind of nationalistic pathos. The aesthetic side of this pathos activates the “semiotics” of the movement’s social activity, in which various signs are used to create a nationalistic rhetoric. In this sense, the title of this paper could well read “semiotic commodities” and “nationalistic pathos”, or “two sides of the coin called pro-Putin youth”. A question could be asked here: Why not just “nationalistic rhetoric”? Especially in a case where the traditional, ancient Greek template of logos and ethos will not be applied? My answer is that, by putting “semiotic commodities” and “nationalistic pathos” as presumed alternatives to each other, we can fruitfully complement but also criticize the rather superficial critique often found in western media, wherein these movements are seen as mere puppets of the Kremlin. I am not saying these movements are not related to the Kremlin – in many ways they are puppets – but the puppeteers “who pull their strings” should not be characterized in an overly one-sided fashion. Thus, the term “pathos” in my title refers to the general Western interpretation of these movements. Let us look at a provocative example of this:

Putin Channels Lenin: A Translation of the Nashi “Manifesto”

For the first time, the ideological “manifesto” issued by the Kremlin youth cult known as “Nashi” (“us Slavic Russians”) is made available in English. Read the full horrifying details as the Kremlin’s ideologists lay out the foundation for a neo-Soviet state, starting with the indoctrination of young people just as in Soviet times (Publius Pundit).

My argument is that quotations like these, strongly underlining the political instrumentality of the pro-Kremlin youth organisations – Nashi and its predecessor, IV – maintain and construct an understanding according to which these movements act only under such organizational names. On this view, the movements themselves do not carry any specific importance, but instead follow orders from “the top” (i.e., from the parent party). Although the quotation from the *Publius Pundit* is overtly radical in its “western individualism”,³ it shows a basic trend to illustrate the role of the pro-Putin youth movements as completely subordinate to the Kremlin’s commands. For example, here is a quotation from the *New York Times*:

Nashi’s opponents, in fact, deride the organization as a modern manifestation of Komsomol, the youth wing of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The colors and symbols are similar; members carry red books to record their participation in rallies and lectures. And, like the Komsomol, membership in Nashi is viewed as a stepping stone to jobs in government and state corporations. (*The New York Times*)

My semiotic-constructivist and discursive approach is not a counterpoint to the account of political instrumentality seen in the quotations above. Rather, my aim is to question simplistic reductions of these movements to fit certain ready-made political frameworks. It is thus my goal to point up some embedded values of these movements, i.e., their “symbolic capital” in a special social field.⁴ In this field, the key issue is that of analysis of “semiotic attractiveness”.

2. The exchange of books of Idushchie Vmeste

In 2002 *Idushchie Vmeste* conducted an action called “The Exchange of Books” which was targeted against those writers and books regarded as morally and culturally harmful to Russian culture. The movement’s website made the following announcement concerning the accomplishment of the action:⁵

THE EXCHANGE OF BOOKS

THE ACTION OF THE EXCHANGE OF BOOKS ACCOMPLISHED

Approximately 6600 books were collected altogether. For more information, see our press-release.

According to the news: during the first day of the action 1922 books were collected whose authors are divided as following:

- 564 - Marinina
- 97 - Serova
- 92 - Polyakova
- 84 - Dashkova
- 48 - Doncova
- 21 - Marx
- 18 - Pelevin
- 998 - other authors who include, for example, such as Neznanskii, Karenyi and Malysheva.

February 6th at 2 pm in the information agency “Interfax” a press conference was held, devoted to the current action.

At the same time, [on February 6th] the action “The Exchange of Books” was restarted, to continue till Sunday, February 10th. The books may be exchanged for classical works [by approved authors].

The places of exchange, listed below, are open from 11a.m. till 6p.m.

MAIN PLACES OF THE EXCHANGE:

Monuments: A. S. Pushkin (metro station (ms) Pushkinskaya), AP Chekhov (ms. Okhotnyi ryad), K. Marx (ms. Teatralnaya), F.M. Dostoyevskii (ms Biblioteka im. Lenina).

Book stores: “Young Guard”.

CONDITIONS OF THE EXCHANGE:

1. Each person can exchange books, including the mentioned authors.
2. Each person can exchange any amount of books.
3. Books will be collected in any condition [...]
4. Only those books whose authors are listed below are accepted for exchange.
5. Each person has the right to complete the list of the exchange of contemporary writers only at the address Zemlyanoy Val 56/4, Moscow.
6. In your presence the given books will be labelled with the stamp “To be returned to the author” in order to prevent another exchange.

List of authors: Pelevin, Sorokin, Marx

- Footnotes: The list of authors has been compiled according to their social damage to our society and culture in general.
- The books of Pelevin will be exchanged with coefficient 2, i.e., for two books of Pelevin, one classic will be given.
- The works of Marx will be sent to the writer's homeland, Germany, to the town of Karl Marx Stadt.
- No exchange will be give for books not mentioned on the list, but we will accept them as a gift.
- Books given to us as gifts are not thereby assessed to be of low quality.

The essential point in this announcement is the combination of different discourses, or more precisely, “discursive practices” (see Fairclough 1992) that form part of a larger discourse type. This larger discourse type can be arguably recognized as official because of its informational content, its rather systematic arrangement (heading and subheading), its its relatively formal prose style.⁶ However, the topic semiotized in the announcement – the exchange of books – may also arouse a question about the seriousness or playfulness of the topic. From the western point of view, this sort of provocative action against writers is easily interpreted as an attack on freedom of speech. This interpretation also caused a crisis for the movement, and was partly responsible for the establishment of a new “official” youth movement by Kremlin authorities.⁷ However, relying on my points earlier, I would argue that this interpretation pays little attention to the hybrid features seen in the announcement of IV as well as to symbolic and semiotic practices, and struggles over these practices, in Russian society. Although the whole action of IV is clearly symbolic (including the exchange of concrete things in concrete places), it would be overly generalizing to see the symbolic dimension only as a reference to a particular dictatorship or to the hegemony of certain, canonized culture. This hegemony, indeed, is present in the announcement, but only as part of a larger discursive practice. For example, besides the aspects of playfulness,⁸ the account of individual choice is clearly highlighted in the part “the conditions of the exchange”, and in this light the action is actually constructed as “a matter of choice”. This discursive element has some point of contact, at least on the surface, with certain neo-liberal discourses of global dimensions (see Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999). Moreover, the individual's choice to

dispense with certain literary works is compensated for by their receiving other books in exchange. In brief, the notion of “nationalistic pathos” may be justified – especially in the context of Russian history where freedom of expression has been heavily impugned – but the semiotic wholeness of this pathos is more complex than a straightforward, dictatorial imposition of particular or “approved” cultural values. Furthermore, this semiotic complexity – a mixture of various discourses – implies those aspects which are drawn together into the nation-building process by this pro-power, political youth movement. I next illustrate some concepts of this semiotic play in the Russian context.

*3. Styob as discursive practice:
The removal of the Estonian embassy*

Because of their close relationship to the political power (i.e., Kremlin), the basic tension which comes about in the case of IV and Nashi is related to their communicative role: they need to issue legitimation in at least two directions at the same time: to the political power and to the “common” youth. This point refers to my earlier notion of the importance of semiotic attractiveness for these movements. In the space of post-communism, more precisely in the case of nostalgia for the past,⁹ a certain rapport must be maintained with Soviet discursive tradition. However, it would be too simplistic to assume that formal and informal (or anti-formal) elements of the previous example by IV would work on a simple axis of “formal Soviet” and “informal post-Soviet” discursive practises; rather, these elements are complexly interconnected.

Mikhail Bakhtin (in Yurchak 2005: 250) points out that “men who composed the most unbridled parodies of sacred texts often sincerely accepted and served religion”. This statement is made in reference to his famous concept of carnivalesque parody in different cultures, such that features of carnival cannot be understood simply as a form of resistance to authoritative symbols, but also involve a feeling of affinity and warmth toward those authorities and symbols (ibid). This element is vividly present in the announcement of IV above, but as a discursive practice rather than merely a carnivalesque parody. In other words, the action of IV is not a carnival, but evidently a well planned, social and political action conducted by a semi-official youth movement that supports the official policy of the Kremlin.

In addition to the formal discourse of their actions, however, informal elements also played a key role. In this respect, the carnivalesque elements in the IV announcement come close to the concept of *styob* (Yurchak 2005), which is a special realisation of parody in Russian culture. *Styob* functions in broader array of contexts, literally as an everyday aesthetic of living. In Yurchak's words:

The aesthetic of *styob* was based on grotesque “overidentification” with the form of an authoritative symbol, to the point that it was impossible to tell whether the person supported that symbol or subverted it in a subtle ridicule. In the best examples of *styob* these two positions were merged into one, and the authors themselves did not draw a clear line between them. In addition to the act of overidentification with the symbol, the *styob* procedure involved a second act: the decontextualization of that symbol. (Yurchak 2005: 252, his italics)

Yurchak points out that the aesthetics of *styob* was not limited to esoteric artistic groups,¹⁰ but on the contrary became truly widespread among the last Soviet generation (people who lived their youth in the last decades of the Soviet Union). Nevertheless, we need to place reservations on that aesthetic as applied to pro-Putin youth organisations. Most importantly, the social context in which these youth movements act is no longer totally political, as was Soviet communism, but is rather one of post-communism. In other words, the movements themselves, as well as the political power they support, are not hegemonic actors in the Soviet sense; rather, they seemingly aim to be just actors among various other actors in the political field. Hence, although we can read the IV announcement above in terms of *styob* as defined by Yurchak, we can justifiably characterize IV as a promoter of Putin, who is not a common citizen, and certainly not a political dissident. Hence to read the whole “Exchange of Books” as a form of “subtle ridicule” is out of the question. It works, instead, as symbolic capital (semiotic commodities) in the communicative repertoires of pro-Putin youth organisations. Let us take an example from the successor of IV, the youth movement Nashi:

The removal of the building of the Estonian embassy decided

Federal Commissar of the movement “NASHI”, Vassili Yakemenko, announced the date of the removal of the headquarters of the Estonian

embassy in Moscow – 12.6.2007. As stated in the official announcement of the movement “NASHI”: According to the juridical framework, it is necessary to remove the embassy of fascist Estonia to another place, one that is more proper for it. (Opredelena data)

This announcement follows from the rally against Estonian embassy in Moscow in April-May 2007, due to the removal of the statue of the Bronze Soldier in Tallinn by Estonian authorities. In my view, hardly anyone really assumed that this announcement would be realized, i.e., that the Estonian embassy building would be actually removed.¹¹ Instead, this announcement perfectly shows the overidentification of the topic: highly formal discourse in the context of the Bronze Soldier, as a semiotic response to potential official announcements by the Estonian government and authorities concerning the removal of the statue; the announcement also exhibits a decontextualisation of this formality so as to apply it to the Estonian embassy building. In this light, I would argue that the real information of this announcement has more to do with its value in the social field of youth activity, than it does with the literary meaning of this message.

4. Conclusion

Both the IV “Exchange of Books” and Nashi’s announcement about the Estonian embassy illustrate the fact that the intense political implications of the actions and the language-use of these two pro-Putin youth organisations include many elements.¹² Moreover, it appears that the contradictory features in the language-use of IV and Nashi are not limited just to those groups, but are general discursive practices in post-communist Russia, which may be used in a variety of contexts. Ongoing nation-building processes in Russia – including nostalgia for the Soviet past as well as adoption of various western discourses – are not working as they might do in the west. In addition to the mix of pluralist values with authoritative elements (for example, in the Moral Codex), one may note various affective or “pathetic” elements that are connected with discourses of parody (for example, the use of *styob*). All this points to the variety of cultural values in the space of post-communist Russia. Hence, the language-use of the movements is not only based on their “pathetic” content, but also on their engagements with various, culturally recognizable forms which I call “semiotic commodities”.

It is likely that the value of these last is based more on their socio-cultural “image” and “sound” than on their strictly defined meanings.

Notes

1. The term carries pejorative associations related to the Russian pop star Detsla.
2. This is the generally used term for World War II in Russia. The term, established in the Soviet era, is strongly emphasized by Nashi, as well as other patriotic actors in contemporary Russia. For example, Nashi’s actions against Estonia due to the Bronze soldier issue is related to the sacred interpretation of this war as “great” and “patriotic”.
3. According to the web site, Publius Pundit was “founded in January, 2005, by Robert Mayer as a manifestation of a developing political ideology based on small-government libertarianism and liberal democracy as a means by which to improve the lives of everyone and end all major conflicts in the world.”
4. These terms refer to Pierre Bourdieu’s (1991) sociological theory according to which language-use is one, essential resource for multiple social distinctions as forms of symbolic capital in the social reality where individuals and groups live.
5. This announcement includes two drawings: scales loaded with books, showing that one book (seemingly a “good” classic) is clearly heavier than two books (seemingly “worthless” contemporary works); and a pile of books, of which one bears the text “Pelevin”. In addition to these, there are links to photographs of this action. See the original “Obmen knig”.
6. This aspect of officialdom is closely linked to the Soviet tradition of formality, especially its specific linguistic features as realizations of authority (see Yurchak 2005; Romanenko 2003; Gorham 2003; Guseynov 2004).
7. According to Tatyana Stanovaya (2005) The Democratic Antifascist Youth Movement – Nashi was established in early 2005 as the main youth organization supporting the political course of the Kremlin. The moment of establishment was not a coincidence. After the cultural-political rallies in 2002–2003 against some well known Russian writers, at the head of which was Vladimir Sorokin, the pro-Putin youth movement Idushchie Vmeste achieved almost the opposite effect for which they had hoped: the sale of Sorokin’s works skyrocketed, casting doubt on Idushchie Vmeste as a model of the official state youth movement. In late 2004 the leader of Idushchie Vmeste, Vassili Yakemenko, was called to the Kremlin in order re-establish a new, less marginal “political motivation system” for youth. This was necessary in order to motivate the majority of Russian youth to

- get behind the Kremlin's political course to block the "orange danger" in Russia. (See Stanovaya 2005; also, Savelyov 2006: 76–112.)
8. "Playfulness" refers to the interactions between "official-sounding" semiotic and discursive elements (arrangement, exact numeral listing, formal style) with topical and content elements: books instead of necessities, which were in short supply (food or gasoline, for instance); as another instance, the request to send the works of Karl Marx to Karl Marx Stadt is clearly sarcastic, as the town no longer exists.
 9. Nostalgia for the Soviet past is widespread in contemporary Russia; see, for example, Dubin 2001 and 2004; Gudkov 2002; Sabonis-Chafee 1999.
 10. Yurckak pays great attention to an esoteric group realizing various forms of *styob* in Leningrad in the 1980s (Yurchak 2005: 238–243).
 11. This announcement was dated May 1st. On June 12th, when the embassy building was scheduled to be removed, Nashi announced that although they had sent out various pleas for the removal of the embassy, it was still standing. (Pust stoit. Poka, <http://nashi.su/news/19015>)
 12. Schmid (2005) points out carnivalesque features in the rhetoric of Nashi, although his account strongly relies on an analogy between Nashi and Komsomol, the official youth organisation of the U.S.S.R.

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Yunhee Lee

Symbolic mediation and dialogical communication

1. The sign as a medium of communication

I would like to begin with a captivating expression which appeared in a Sunday School textbook (M. Wilson, Foreword to Young 1995): “Jesus was a good Christian boy who went to church every Sunday/” A very interesting aspect of this expression stems from an intertwined relationship between interpretation and representation. As one commentator has pointed out: first, “Christian” should be replaced with “Jewish”; second, “church” should be replaced with “synagogue”, and third, “Sunday” with “the Sabbath”. The disparate representation and interpretation of Jesus by the Sunday School textbook extend to the issue of representation and interpretation in daily cognitive activity.

Apparently, one purpose of the Sunday School text was not successfully transmitted to the commentator, insofar as there was a major discrepancy between representation and interpretation. This aspect involves a semiotic activity of interpretation for communication. The symbolic representational Sunday School textbook is a medium for communication between an utterer (intentional interpretant in Peirce’s term) committed to representing, and an interpreter (effectual interpretant in Peirce’s term) entitled to interpret. The Sunday School textbook functions as common interpretant, as something to be transmitted between the two.

According to Litzka (1996: 89), three formal conditions are prerequisites to communication based on Peirce’s definition of it: (1) There must be an utterer and an interpreter. (2) There must be something transmitted between utterer and interpreter. (3) What is transmitted between utterer and interpreter must be something which is capable of establishing “common interpretants” in both utterer and interpreter.

The last of those three – common interpretants – are actualized as symbolic cultural forms to be transmitted in communication (as in my paper). Based on Peirce's doctrine of sign, and focusing on symbol as a Third in connection with Vygotsky's cultural-historical theories, this paper focuses on two key concepts for communication, namely, symbolic mediation and dialogical interaction. This approach to communication has the merit of showing how meaning is generated by symbol-mediated interpretative activity. In this activity, interpretation and representation are considered as one act of communication, and compound act of interpreting and representing is a purpose-driven activity for constructing a symbol-mediated representational system. Interpreter and utterer interact indirectly by symbolic mediation in order to transmit cultural ideas and concepts.

2. *Vygotsky's psychology meets Peirce's semiotics*

2.1. Why sign?: Mediation

Many Vygotsky scholars agree that this his cultural-historical theory of psychology is quite non-traditional. One scholar in particular, D. B. El'konin, has connected human consciousness with signs, and realized Vygotsky's contributions in this area. He writes:

The primary forms of those structures of human consciousness that are the repositories of feelings and meaning exist objectively external to each individual: they exist in human society in the form of works of art, or in some other material creations of people, i.e., these forms exist prior to the individual or subjective structures of feeling and meaning.... I call this a non-classical approach to psychology.... One can truly understand and evaluate Vygotsky's genuine contribution to the formation and development of the problems associated with the role of sign and symbol systems in the genesis of human consciousness (and with the definition of the content and functions of operations with signs in this process only if one fully appreciates what, precisely, this psychology entails). (El'konin 2002: 10)

The quote claims that Vygotsky's cultural-historical theory is necessarily involved in signs for mediation. This leads to the idea that human consciousness requires a Third to mediate between subject and object.

For Peirce as a semiotician, consciousness is also a great subject in his phenomenology, in which three categories of consciousness are based on

the ideas of First, Second, and Third. The ideas also connect consciousness with his doctrine of Sign based on the three types: Icon, Index, and Symbol.

Perhaps both Vygotsky and Peirce consider the concept of mediation in their attempts to objectify and explain subjective psychological phenomena as taking place by virtue of mediation of signs. The semiotic “self” may be explained in terms of cultural-historical psychology.

2.2. Why activity? – Thirdness

Vygotsky’s cultural-historical thought opened the way to activity theory, though Vygotsky himself did not develop one. Nevertheless, according to his views on the psyche as a methodological unit, activity plays a major role in higher psychological processes. The psyche and action are fused one with the other by mediation of a Third.

Both Peirce and Vygotsky used the concept of a Third as mediation or process. Coincidentally, both thinkers used “giving” to illustrate their ideas. First, Peirce:

... you will convince yourself thoroughly that every genuine triadic relation involves thought or *meaning*. Take, for example, the relation of *giving*. *A gives B to C*. This does not consist in *A*’s throwing *B* away and its accidentally hitting *C*, like the date-stone, which hit the Jinnee in the eye. If that were all, it would not be a genuine triadic relation, but merely one dyadic relation followed by another. (Peirce 1956: 92)

Peirce described the Third as thought or meaning. For him, a Symbol is also a Third. According to Peirce’s description, a symbol as thought mediates between indexical signs and iconic signs. In my view, the Third is actualized in Symbol or symbolic forms in relation to two types of sign, Icon and Index in cultural contexts. The Symbol, as a Third, involves an iconic-indexical relation on the surface structure.

The example of a relation of giving is similarly interpreted by El’konin, who places emphasis on the function of the sign as a modeling system in society, stressing the sign’s social nature. Interpreting Vygotsky’s sign, El’konin writes:

The sign is a kind of gift. A gift serves as a reminder of the giver. That is why a sign is social, and that is why it organizes behavior. A sign has the same

sense and meaning in the history of culture (ritual, myth, and even religion)... (None of the examples that he [Vygotsky] gave in connection with the problem of the organization of behavior is interpreted and understood in this way at all!). (El'konin 2002: 11)

The idea of “gift” as a metaphor of sign is remarkably helpful for understanding both a genuine triadic relation in Peirce’s sign theory and a sign’s third-character in modeling human behavior in Vygotsky’s cultural-historical approach. Moreover, it is notable that the Third may be understood as both a process and a purpose. This brings us to the topic of “activity”.

3. Features symbol-mediated interpretative activity

Two important aspects of activity theory are mediation and the study of consciousness through psychological processes. Based on these two, I have a model of symbol-mediated interpretative activity (SMIA). In this activity, we can observe psychological processes by virtue of the Peircean Symbol. The Symbol as a Third, in my definition, functions firstly as mediator between two opposing entities, Icon and Index; secondly, it serves as an interpretant through which the human interpreting agent becomes embodied in the semiotic structure as, for instance, the expressive self, virtual self, and concrete self with respect to the Symbol, Icon, and Index. As Peirce states: “Every symbol must have organically attached to it, its Indices of Reaction and its Icons of Qualities” (CP 5.119); a Symbol entails Index, and Index entails Icon. The expressive self, as a Third, mediates between the virtual self and the concrete self in the interpreting mind, and the symbolic cultural text, as a Third, mediates between utterer and interpreter.

In the SMIA, psychological process within semiotic structures is important, enabling dialogical processes between two selves or two minds, positioned as the virtual self and the concrete self, or utterer and interpreter, interacting on the surface level through psychological interactions so as to internalize the process at a deeper level through intrapsychological interaction in the course of communication. In this sense, a process of outer and inner activity comes to determine the ultimate goal of symbol-mediated interpreting activity, which appears as transformations of culture and the individual.

4. Features of dialogical interaction

4.1. Interpsychological dialogue: In the case of 2 and 3

Basically, Peirce's semiotics is described as the dialogical in a relational structure. Applying the dialoguing situation of the Peircean semiotic, it is understood that the utterer communicates cultural concepts to the interpreter by virtue of sign. In an interpreting community, utterer and interpreter cooperate so as to construct common knowledge in the process of interpreting activity. Otherwise, successful communication would not be feasible.

This aspect becomes clear when we see dialogical interaction between an adult, as the social self, and a child, as individual self, in the activity of learning. According to Vygotsky, in the development of a child's concepts, there is a genetic line of cultural development which transits from the interpsychological plane to the intrapsychological plane (Vygotsky 1986: chapters 5 and 6). The trajectory of this process is shown in Figure 1, where the child is positioned in 3 and the adult is in 2 at the outset; however, as dialogical process proceeds, the child constructs capacities so as to take the place of 2, by representing what he received on his own.




Figure 1. Dialogical interaction in interpreting mind.

4.2. Intrapsychological dialogue: The case of 1

This type of dialogue takes place between one and the self, taking a form of inner activity for internalizing outer activity. For example, the child inter-

nalizes the learning activity by virtue of internalized dialogical interaction between the social self and the individual self.

4.3. Cultural-historical psychology of dialogue: The case of 1 and $2 + 3$

Based on Lotman's asymmetrical dialogical mechanism, I will attempt to describe interpsychological dialogue on the cultural level according to two types. Interaction between the social self and the expressive self is placed in the central position, (2), where it assumes the role of utterer in the communication and interaction between the expressive self and the individual self. By contrast, 3 is situated on the periphery, taking the role of interpreter in communication. However, the roles are not fixed, but dynamic in semiotic space.

The change of role is affected by a deep structure in which interaction between the social and the individual (1) is based on a causal relationship. That is, the social self appears as effect, and the individual self appears as cause.¹ This causal relation of a deep structure on the temporal dimension affects the expressive self on a spatial dimension of culture. At this point, historical factors from remote contexts play a role, being suffused with cultural aspects from contemporary contexts in the expressive self.

In addition, the concrete self, which is situated in an actuality of Secondness, provides a source of determination in two ways. First, the concrete self determines the virtual self by causality in the historical dimension; second, the concrete self determines the expressive self, in the cultural dimension, by its "presentational immediacy" (Sherburne 1966). All these dialogical characteristics of interaction contribute to communication in an interpreting community, aiming to function as symbolic forms in cultural mediation, and connecting culture and the self. More importantly, the role and function of the interpreting subject as the concrete self serve to determine a cultural system.

5. On the goal of an interpreting community as it pertains to cultural development

In communication, utterer and interpreter are united in a cultural form that Peirce called the "cominterpretant". The very term implies a dialogical

situation; however, this does not necessarily suggest “communality”, since no actors or agents are involved in the functioning of autonomous roles. If it precludes the trait of culture as a dynamic and heterogeneous force (see Lotman 1990 and Randviir 2004), then the notion of cominterpretant as ultimate goal of communication in a discourse community cannot adequately describe the aims of that community’s semiotic activity.

To avoid the cominterpretant lapsing into nominalism, it is essential to bring in interpreting agents: the utterer and interpreter, which function in dynamic cultural texts. Pertaining to cultural identity, actors execute or perform a goal-directed activity in the semiotic structure. The way I see the culture as having an identity requires acting bodies, namely, an utterer and an interpreter. Put differently, interpreter’s determination should function in the individual, personal domain from which subjective determination arises.

An organism’s subjective determination in the real world is intertwined with objective determinations in a sign system, which means that, without social consciousness, it would not be possible for a human organism to have cognitive ability. Therefore, an interpreting community, composed of objective and subjective determinations, tends to unify the whole community in a dynamic way. This occurs precisely through the Symbol’s ability to reconcile opposing entities on the surface level.

From this perspective, the symbolic structure of form and reference is analogous with indexical reference in a proper name, where a name does not have a nominalistic feature since the name-bearer exists in actuality. In actual existence, the proper name functions as Symbol and thus models, in the most felicitous way, the person who bears the name.

Symbolically speaking, the objective of an interpreting community is to keep the proper name in the right place. Eventually, the resultant phenomena will be seen in cultural modeling in an interpreting community where culture and individual develop in a dialectic way through interpreting activity.

Note

1. Whitehead’s notion of symbolic reference has two pure modes of perception: presentational immediacy and causal efficacy. In my argument, it is related to two directions of determination of the concrete self: determin-

ing the virtual self on causal efficacy and determining the expressive self on presentational immediacy (see Whitehead 1927; Sherburne 1966).

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Otto Lehto

Humanism, existentialism, semiotics

1. Humanism and history

Why humanism, still/again? The very same question was asked – not for the first time, nor for the last – by Sartre, in a rhetorical mood, in his 1946 landmark treatise, *L'existentialisme est un humanisme*, a work which propounded many of the topics and doctrines that were to become the core of the new French existentialist movement in philosophy and literature. In differentiating “his” philosophy from the other humanist traditions of the time – from those allied with it, like Marxism, to those hostile to it, like Christianity – he chose to define “existentialist” humanism as radically distinct from “essentialist” or “classical” humanism (basically everything pre-Sartre or pre-Existentialism). Humanism he defined as “une theorie qui prend *l'homme comme fin* et comme valeur supérieure” (1970: 91, my emphasis). In his reading of history, this pre-existentialist humanism of his forebears, as represented by Enlightenment’s offspring, unduly emphasized such things as “human nature”, “human rights” (god-given or natural) and social law-likeness – all essentialist, anti-individualistic theories of the human condition. Existentialism wanted to strip away the last vestiges of any essentialist salvaging of the absoluteness of Man’s condition: “l’homme est libre, l’homme est liberté” (36–37); “Nous sommes seuls, sans excuses ... l’homme est condamné à être libre” (37). Instead of history or the social condition being the sculptor of man, it is *man himself* who is the author of his own destiny and of the course of history. Under the subsection “l’homme invente l’homme”, he quotes the poet Francis Ponge: “l’homme est avenir de l’homme” (38), to which Sartre adds: “C’est parfaitement exact” (ibid.).

This “becoming” (cf. Nietzsche), this “liberty” (cf. Liberalism), this “end-in-itself”, this “condition of no excuse”; all this is Man. Following

the Protagorean maxim of “man is the measure of all things”, the existential subject (without essence) makes (without compulsion) an act (without hesitation) that defines him as Man; “[L]’existence précède l’essence” (1970: 17).

Like humanism, he divides existentialism itself into two “schools”: the theological or “Christian” school (K. Jaspers, G. Marcel) on the one hand, and the “atheist” camp on the other, exemplified by “Heidegger, et aussi les existentialistes français et moi-même” (1970: 17). This is an oversimplification; what about the theological training of the “atheist” Heidegger, for example? At any rate, the passage – “Heidegger, et aussi ...” – clearly pinpoints the importance of the German thinker at the root of existentialism. Indeed, a humanistic rendering, or interpretation, of Heideggerian philosophy is found, most perceptibly, in Sartre’s *L’être et le néant*, at the basis of whose “phenomenological ontology” is Sartre’s reading and re-reading of *Sein und Zeit* (and Husserl); more on Heidegger later. Sartre himself, a devout non-believer, professes an atheism close to Secular Christianity, not only in utilizing the language of “fallenness”, “bad faith” and “existential Angst” (via Heidegger) and by relying on Kierkegaard and others, but also in Sartre’s re-appropriation of the epistemology and ontology of the transcendental subject: “Il n’y a pas d’autre univers qu’un univers humain, l’univers de la subjectivité humaine. *Cette liaison de la transcendance, comme constitutive de l’homme ... et de la subjectivité ... [C]’est ce que nous appelons l’humanisme existentialiste*” (1970: 93, my emphasis). This “univers humain” is the Humanist Weltanschauung. The humanity of *homo humanus*. “Transcendence”, too, is just another name for Existence. Incidentally, this more or less “Christian” hermeneutic of *existential transcendence*, utilized by Kierkegaard, Dostoyevsky, Jaspers and Ricoeur, finds its way ultimately to Tarasti (2000), who emphasizes transcendence as the movement of Dasein’s self-negation and self-affirmation. Now, while Sartre’s atheism is rather theistic and his existentialism is rather essentialistic, his humanism, too, is rather anti-humanistic, in the vein of Nietzsche and Heidegger; his Marxism, however, is authentically Marxist – as authentic as his failure to critically *overcome* humanism’s promises, programmes and pogroms (cf. Stalin and Mao’s “humanist” statesmanship).

So, this Sartre-inspired “existentialist-humanist” post-war Zeitgeist formed loose alliances and sympathetic relations with such traditions as Classical Liberalism, Marxism (later: Maoism), Anarchism, Libertinism

and, yes, even Christianity. For example, Dostoyevsky, whose Christianity is only eclipsed by his Pessimism, is quoted by Sartre: “‘Si deux n’existait pas, tout serait permis.’ C’est là le point de départ de l’existentialisme. En effet, tout *est* permis ...” (1970: 36, my emphasis). But if everything is permitted, what *must* be done? In an ambiguous irony he failed to articulate, Sartre emphasized the (objective) necessity for a Socialist solution – a total revolution – and a clear commitment (“free” and “subjective” as much as “necessary”) to its cause. He thus tried to reconcile the seemingly incompatible “facts” of 1) absolute human freedom and 2) class struggle; this process of dialogue and interchange is crucial to understanding Sartre’s life’s work, its failures and successes. Ultimately, in lived life, Sartre’s “existence” entailed a modern, nihilist “essence”: “an essence-*less* essence”. This new human essence was free, empty and absolute.

We have seen that existentialism relates to, and is in dialogue with, other “Humanisms” of our time, both Spiritual and Materialistic. Sartre craftily synergized Marxism, Existentialism, Modernism & Christianity; a historical alliance of Humanist traditions in a new philosophy of man’s ethical self-empowerment through “authentic” actions & “free” choices. In the end, in his failure to clearly delineate and explicate Humanism as an ideology, a historical tradition and “an attitude”, Sartre’s analysis of Humanism forces him to conclude, in an honest admission of faithfulness and subscription to a doctrine, that “tout le monde est humaniste” (1970: 118); this includes the Liberals, the Christians, the Marxists, the Capitalists, the Artists, the Scientists, the Politicians ... *and* the Existentialists – whom Sartre has already, by now, branded as followers of “l’humanisme existentialiste” (1970: 93), a universal doctrine of liberty. “Tout le monde”: the humanistic worldliness of homo *humanus* as homo *universalis*. (Hu) man(ism)=world(wide).

Humanism is the theory that man is an end in itself, for itself and through itself.

With this in mind, how are we to situate Sartre’s, or Jaspers’, or Kierkegaard’s existentialist humanism in the history of humanism as such? I would propose that we need to understand Sartre’s “break” with classical humanism as just another phase or facet of the slow unfolding of the historical understanding of man as *homo humanus*, exemplified by the classical authors of philosophy and tragedy, the Renaissance visionaries, artists and inventors, the Enlightenment poets and politicizers, the Modern

philosophers of exactitude and progress and the countless other self-made men whose ideals and value reflected man's "essence-less essence" as "free becoming" towards a cosmopolitan, humanitarian and humane social order of humanity.

2. *Humanism, existentialism, semiotics*

We have seen that Sartre's ("humanist-existentialist") transcendental subject, free and absolute, exists in a world of human action, supported by man's neo-humanist "essenceless essence" as the semiotic Umwelt's ethical and social "beginning" (ground) as well as its "end" (meaning). There are no values but those we assign to things as signs. This very same process of semiosis, enacted by the ethical-epistemological transcendental subject, is ascribed by Heidegger (1991) already to Leibniz, in whose rationalism it is the (rational) "humans who determine objects as objects by way of a representation that judges" (118–119). This he relates to "the principle of reason ... *nihil [est] sine ratione*" (118), i.e. Leibniz's "*principium reddendae rationis sufficiens*" (ibid.). Although pre-semiotic, we are able to render this in terms of sign theory. A form of the idea that "*omnes ens habet rationem*" (117) and that "*nihil fit sine causa*" (ibid.) grounds semiotics as "science". Signs, as representations and judgements, belong to the subject-object metaphysics of calculative reason, even in attempting to overcome or supersede this very tradition. Semiotics, you see, *is also a humanism*.

We may now expand our Sartrean-Humanist presupposition, or doctrine, Man=World, into a wider ontological framework: Man = World = Language = Being. Heidegger's anti-Sartrean treatise, *Über den Humanismus* (written in 1949), denies the French claim that existentialism is (or *should* be) a humanism, an ideology which, for him, appears as a Roman interpretation, or loan, of Greek *παιδεία* (see also, Sarsila 1998: 204); "In Rom begegnen wir dem ersten Humanismus" (Heidegger 1975: 11). Extolling "eruditio et institutio in bonas artes," the virtues of the Republic, "homo humanus setzt sich dem homo barbarus entgegen" (10). The Renaissance was a "renascentia romanitatis", and consequently of "humanitas" and "*παιδεία*" (11). Opposing the Dark Ages and Scholasticism, Renaissance itself was subject to the opposition between *homo humanus* and *homo barbarus*.

To understand Heidegger, understand Language: “Die Sprache ist das Haus des Seins. In ihrer behausung wohnt der Mensch” (1975: 5). For Heidegger, Being is the ontological question; Truth is found in/as the horizon of Being’s self-revealing; Language is the “House of Being” and as such as a medium, a (“the”) locus, for Being’s self-revealing; Man “exists”, authentically and transcendently, in this horizon of Being’s self-revelation as Truth. This process is linguistically mediated, or rather propagated or *illuminated* (in the *Schein* of *Erscheinung*). This *im*-mediate connection between Man and World, Truth and Being, is perhaps conducive to an anti-semiotic reading (“our” field being so heavily dependent on mediation), but we should remember the connection between language and semiosis: In understanding, not language in a limited sense (e.g. German, or poetic diction), but language as a system of man’s semiotic structuring in the horizon of Being’s truthful self-revelatory opening, we come closer to (re-)framing the process of Semiosis *as that which mediates and as such establishes an abiding presence*, an abode, for (a framework) of Being. The semiotic relationship, between subject and object, between a thing and the awareness of it, is established *in* language, *via* language, *as* language (here defined as any representational system of signs). Man’s existential role is in the ethical-aesthetical locus of assigning, acting out and re-assessing such representationalist connections and frameworks. For a semiotician, act is always based on semiotic interpretation; consequently, as in Sartrean “literary” existentialism, a “semiotic” existentialism presupposes an acting subject, always-already *transcendentally abiding in semiosis*. This, I venture to say, is implicitly presupposed by most semioticians whenever they utilize the traditional frameworks of representation, relation (dyadic/triadic), the subject-object dichotomy, human interpretation and so on. Furthermore, in emphasising the role of the observer (who is seen as “critical”, “active”, “free”...), the semiotic orthodoxy is in line with humanist orthodoxy.

Even the greatest “heresies” of humanism – masquerading as anti-humanisms – such as Positivism, Fascism and Post-Structuralism, retained some versions of the myth-structure of *homo humanus* (positivism its “irrefutable fact” and “irreducible event”; fascism its “heroic individual”; post-structuralist theory its “liberation of desire” etc.). As for the dominant and “accepted” forces of Western civilization, the uniformity is all the more breath-taking; the Humanist Brotherhood – an organization into which we are born – shares, protects and nurtures notions of progress,

human rights, freedom, technological development (on the “Right”), community life (on the “Left”), human potential, personal achievement, universal education, spiritual fulfilment and so on. Life, today, becomes the fulfilment of the dream and promise of the ennobling of Man, in/as/via Man’s humanistic world-building. I do not intend to say that our whole Civilization is a “sham”; no, we are born into it, we enrich it, and we are enriched by it; but, in the same token, the Western project, one of whose main branches is the Humanist tradition, has to be seen as a *particular* semiotic system and edifice, one with its own unquestioned assumptions and metaphysical drives, structures and programmes. Our Faith in it, perhaps, *is* “Fate”; yet, faith-in-Reason (or Progress etc.) or the so-called “reasonable faith” of Common Sense is no substitute for *the absolute freedom* of the “essence-less essence” that Man as the opening of Truth *is*. In our effort to become a project of Reason/Progress/Humanity/Civilization, we trade off perhaps something (essential) of the (existential) human nature, to the detriment of our *own* equilibrium and of Life on planet Earth.

Existence precedes Essence; Presence precedes History (i.e. Present the Past); Semiosis precedes Structure. The unquestionable need to appropriate the concept of “freedom”, however problematic it may be, lies in the fact that *we have none*. The Humanism of the Tradition holds but the *promise* of Freedom. Freedom *from* what? Freedom *of* what? Freedom of existence, truth, beauty, life, action, belief, thought, expression, representation, work, play, experience ... But also freedom *from* other kinds of experiences, truths, forms of beauty etc. This double-edged promise is “structurally managed” and “essentially manifest” (i.e. existentially absent); we need to be able to *free ourselves even of this (promised-conditioned-absent) “freedom”*. The criticism of Humanist Metaphysics does not work “against” Humanism but above and beyond it. Humanist freedom is simply too limited – but also it’s just one possibility among many. The very best of humanism is also the very worst of humanism; the very best of *humanity* is also the very worst of humanity. Riches bring sorrow, knowledge ignorance and progress stagnation ... Even without accepting Heidegger’s fatalistic notion of “Seinsgeschichte”, History of Being, we can now venture to look at some persistent Humanist fantasies and question their justification and future.

3. *The crisis of science – The crisis of humanism*

A major confusion threatens to persist with the distinction made between the so-called Sciences and Humanities. This might lead one to suspect (“hard”) Science of being anti-humanist. And, indeed, the main trends in Science today are certainly materialistic (strictly speaking *a-humanist* or *non-humanist*) when not “trans”-humanist. But science, as an enterprise of power and knowledge, asks the question of “Man” as an end-in-itself (the subjective position of the observer) and interrogates nature (Bacon: “rapes” Her) in search of her secrets (the objective position of the observed). Science investigates man, *for* man, in the service of humanity, progress and civilization. Knowing this, and the crisis of modern science and the “modern way of life”, one might want to look for the humanities, with their reflective and ennobling progressivist discourse, for an answer. But the so-called “humanities” are, too, what Feyerabend called “special interest groups” (1987: 91) in the struggle for funding and legitimacy, tied up in their role as enterprises for the humanistic science of modernity. Furthermore, what monstrous, naïvely construed wall separates “semiosis of the mind” (Humanities) from “semiosis of matter and *tekhne*” (Science)? Whatever the reason for that edifice of mutual rejection, the gaping *hole* in that wall – the uniting belief-system between the Letters and the Crafts – is the belief in Progress-as-such, Freedom-as-such and Humanity-as-such.

Beliefs and trends may come and go, but the undying eternal flame of these humanist principles illuminates our nocturnal voyages into the unknown – and isn’t it Leonardo da Vinci himself holding our hands in the dark? With Pico della Mirandola sharing hands with Kant and Voltaire in a resonant chant of “freedom for all and let no man be a slave to no-one but himself” ...

Yet, when all is said, I cannot but agree wholeheartedly with the sentiment expressed in Feyerabend’s exasperation, which I will thus appropriate as a sentiment, statement of my own: “[The] difficulties and debates I have just mentioned shrink into insignificance when compared with the *steady expansion of Western civilization* into all areas of the world.” (1987: 120, my emphasis) His criticism is against “Reason and ... Objectivity” (5); he still supports a kind of relativistic humanism. The effects of mono-culture, largely driven by a banalized form of humanist libertinism in defence of the “progress” and “liberation” of Man, are visible in the world around

us as well as in the world hidden from us. Genocidal wars, atom bombs, bureaucracy, stress, cancer, pollution, global warming; the problems of/in/by Western civilization are clear. Twentieth century environmental catastrophes of global magnitude manifest spiritual decay of unprecedented proportions. What has become of Man's self-empowerment? A massive, endless orgy of conspicuous consumption? Yet focusing on the negative isn't *accurate* enough; we still have – *because this is what we want* – authentic beauty, truth, love, power and achievement – but to what end? If the end is man, then the end of man may be near. What has become of alternative worldviews and realities? What has become of the shamanistic, mystical and spiritual traditions of ancient cultures? What has become of deep self-knowing? What of man's ability to intuit and sense world's endless array of wonders? What of our ability, in Blake's immortal rhymes, "to see a world in a grain of sand / and a heaven in a wild flower / hold infinity in the palm of your hand / and eternity in an hour"? Not only what *has* become, but what *will* become: what is the future of humanity, above and beyond humanism?

In seeing the modern condition, with its many related "issues" – not as something to be "saved by" Humanism but as something largely *created* by it, we may liberate ourselves from the mono-cultural illusions of the status quo and overcome the distinctions between the Arts and the Sciences. Wasn't this, already, the point of Renaissance Humanism – to liberate man from the particular into the lure and majesty of the universal? Humanism, despite its problems, remains an important tool and ally of the emerging new framework of consciousness. In combatting death, misery, war, oppression, boredom and the tyranny of banal randomness, humanism *has* a role, but its status, at best, is that of an ally, not a conductor or a dictator. Humans *are* significant and fundamental: But, what exactly – in saying this – do we expect (and treat as if it) *isn't*? Juhani Sarsila, too, has aptly characterized the humanist orthodoxy: "Humanists are pluralists. Nothing gets under their skin (and they cause everybody problems). They were instrumental in setting up the framework of empirical science, which has led humankind on the edge of a precipice. We need to be vocal about this; humanists themselves are silent about their inconvenient history" (1998: 204, my translation). The movement away from humanism, for me, means a movement towards existential semiosis and the life sciences. For others it might mean other directions and avenues. The important thing is to *allow*

ourselves this leap and this freedom. Our existential condition is one of regaining our ground as thinking, feeling, acting, free beings in a universe rich in interlocking semiotic systems. Humanism is, of course, a synthesis, but one that cannot see(k) beyond itself.

Among scholars who have come to question the viability of the current trends of Western metaphysics we have, too, analytical philosophers like Georg Henrik von Wright, Wittgenstein's successor at the University of Cambridge, who turned in his later years (1970's on) to a reappraisal of the technological-scientific enterprise of "Progress". He embraced "Humanism" as the solution. This, in my mind, is not enough; the fundamental problem is *not* "Science", nor even "Humanism", but the underlying epistemology of subject-object metaphysics. Toulmin (1990), too, fails to go beyond humanism in his otherwise brutally accurate depiction of Cartesian modernity. Neither nostalgia, nor more deconstruction, is needed, but new metaphysics! David Bohm (1980), the quantum physicist, has written on the ways in which "Western" science can enter into dialogue with "Eastern" modes of thought, against "fragmentation". On the issue of the possibility of intercultural context, consult Fritjof Capra's *Tao of Physics* and the works of Alan Watts, Gregory Bateson, Jiddu Krishnamurti, Robert Anton Wilson, Terence McKenna and Carl Jung.

As Heidegger put it: "Does the ... determination that humans are the *animal rationale* exhaust the essence of humanity? Does the last word that can be said about being run thus: being means ground/reason? ... That is the question. It is the world-question of thinking. Answering this question decides what will become of the earth and of *human existence* on this earth" (1991: 129, my emphasis). This interconnection between "earth" and "human existence" is, as always, at the crux of the matter, and both the problem and the salvation of our metaphysical conundrum. We must learn to experience our own *conditio humana* and Heidegger's "Angst", Marx's "alienation", Sartre "nausea", Bohm's "fragmentation", Kafka's "bureaucracy" and Feyerabend's "hegemony of Reason" as side-effects of the experiences created by our existential condition as rational, free, thinking animals. Our Dasein exists for humanity. The "existentialism" of "semiotics" must learn to deal with its Humanist legacy as *a beautiful burden*. Only then will the radical freedom promised (*pro-missus*: "sent forward") to us become actual, true and real; only then will Renaissance spirit envelop anew our conscious being by its purifying-illuminating *Aufklärung*, god in human form.

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Sara Lenninger

In search of differentiations in the development of a picture sign

1. Introduction

The differentiation between expression and content is fundamental to the concept of sign. Even if notions of signs are often revised, due partly to the attraction of a semiotic approach from markedly disparate objects of study, a common apprehension of the distinctive character of meanings by sign is its dual nature (Saussure 1968; Piaget 1951, 1966; Vygotsky 1999; Sigel 1978; DeLoache 2000). Signs can be understood as objects of meanings, to someone, which also extend their perceptual expressions or sensations. All signs imply sign processes; the sign function is due to a mental capability or inclination in the sign user. But meaning is not equivalent to sign function, and it is an important issue in the study of semiotics to investigate the differences and conditions between meanings that are due to sign relations and meanings that are not (Sonesson). To study the development of a sign function in the child does not only tell us something about child development, but also about signs.

To understand pictures involves mastering sign relations. From my studies of how child becomes sign-minded, and particularly how he or she learns to understand pictures, it has become clear that the differentiation between expression and content is too broad of an outline to be informative. In the perspective of child development, the generic distinction between expression and content in the mature sign needs more specific distinctions to capture the emergence of such a delicate cognitive competence as the ability to master sign functions.

2. *How to study the development of signs?*

At birth, the child is not endowed with the capacity to use signs, but it will learn. Within a Piagetian theory, this cognitive growth is explained in terms of epigenetic, constructive, development, while Vygotskian tradition stresses socially driven mechanisms. Both traditions relate mental processes to the generative constructions of systems that sustain development, i.e., to culture or to the individual interacting with its environment (Wozniak 1996). The development of the picture sign in the child is, like all sign use, related to the emergences of several cognitive and social competences. The apparent obviousness to the adult that the picture is *about* the depicted scene must not be taken for granted in the child. To understand pictures presupposes, but is not equivalent to, identifying depicted objects.

My standpoint is that picture comprehension is a semiotic function, or one of its appearances in behaviour in a Piagetian sense (Piaget 1966: 42). Yet, Piaget does not list picture comprehension among the five manifestations of semiotic function. Drawing is one of them, and is of course related to picture comprehension, not identical with it. Perhaps even Piaget took the understanding of pictures too much for granted. While he argues for a stage related development of the mind, others (Liben 1999) argue for sequential processes and reduce the importance of demarcating thresholds, but maintain the assumption of a general succession of mental competences. Which, then, are the decisive faculties to make the individual sign-minded in general, and for picture understanding in particular? This is an open field for investigation. As noted above, I have become convinced that referring to the ability to differentiate the expression and content in a sign relation, based on a semiotic apprehension of the mature sign, too broad a differentiation to be informative in studying the development of sign function in the child. I think it more feasible to investigate the development of sign function on a general level in terms of its lines of development in the different appearances of its manifestations; for example, in pictures, gestures and language. General outlines may be found within variations of emergent sign functions and with a Vygotskian insight: one also has to consider the means as crucial for the cultural line of cognitive development. This, I argue, opens the way for a theory that draws up implications for development of different streams of thought grounded on different

resources for meaning, that is, different systems of signs affording different structures for streams of thought (Lenninger in press).

At this time I will briefly discern three or four basic differentiations on a general level of developing signs. I do not take it as implausible that the sequences, if there are such or perhaps relations between differentiations, vary in their developmental lines between different semiotic resources, since different semiotic resources afford different constraints on the level of differentiation. One also has to take into account cultural and individual differences. The general differentiations are, in brief, (1) to make a rudimentary differentiation between expression and content (i.e. between related objects); (2) to differentiate a self; and (3) to differentiate the relation of signification. A fourth differentiation that the child has to discern might be to differentiate some categories (objects or events) as superior tools in social interaction. If this be a fourth differentiation in ontogeny it would antedate the differentiation of relation. My belief is that you can find support for these differentiations as not yet “merged”, in studies on the child becoming sign-minded (Piaget 1951; Robinson 1994; Liben 1999). Since sign use primarily is a cognitive-social-ecological project and only secondarily a formal one, I presume three general circumstances for developing sign functions in the child: (1) the child is born into a sign-using social environment but is not yet taking part in it (Vygotsky 1999; Reed 1996); (2) adults introduce the child to the social universe of signs (Vygotsky 1999; Colapietro 1989); (3) the child may be predisposed to social interaction of a special kind (Tomasello 1999; Colapietro 1989).

With these rough differentiations and considerations in mind, I will now return to the investigation of an early picture-understanding. At the 9th IASS conference in Helsinki I tried to stress the complexity of picture-understanding in the child and to point out some indications of different levels of differentiation in the growing child.

3. Retrieval tests, using the picture as guide for action

Since the late 1980s Judy DeLoache has made empirical studies on young children becoming sign users. In a series of retrieval tests she has argued for a rapid change in the ability of children between 2.5 and 3 years of age to use “symbols” (i.e. signs) as guides for action (DeLoache 2004, 1999, 1994, 1987). These findings confirm the idea of a cognitive change as a semiotic

function. My studies have been highly influenced by hers, but I have introduced some decisive variations in the paradigm. My aim is not to argue against DeLoache's assumption of a rapid change in picture-understanding, but to distinguish specific differentiations involved in the latter, and to avoid ambiguity in sign relations within the test proceedings. Next, I present the method of the test in my version, followed by a discussion of some of my observations.

3.1 Method

The children in the test are between 24 and 36 months old, both sexes. Only photographic pictures are used. The test is performed at primary school by an experimenter, with assistance from preschool teachers (or from parents if requested). The supporting adult was informed not to intervene in the test. The test, which in all takes about 20–25 minutes, includes a warm-up phase comprised of match-to-sample tests. On the one hand, the warm-up phase is intended to direct the child's attention to the pictures, and on the other hand, to provide the test with bases of comparison between different levels of basic (or proto) picture-understanding, with or without the necessity of using true sign relations. The warm-up phase is composed of a matching-to-sample trial in an object to picture condition (OP), followed by a recognition task in a picture to picture condition (PP). In matching-to-sample test (OP) the child should choose one out of three pictures, photographs 4x7 cm, matching one object (such as a toy) no larger than 20 cm. in size.

The main test is a retrieval test: the child is asked to retrieve a toy after having seen it depicted at a place well known to the child but not in immediate sight. The target toy, on the other hand, is only known to the child by its pictorial representation. Every child has three warm-up matching-to-samples and four retrieval trials with different locations and different target toys. All retrieval trials are introduced by the picture to picture question (PP) (warm-up part two), "Can you see if this cuddly toy shown in this picture [handing over a picture, 4x7 cm, of a specific toy only, to the child] is also shown in this other picture? [handing over the picture, 11x15 cm, showing the target in context] Point at it!" In the succeeding test the child is told that the cuddly toy "is placed by me at the same place in the nursery school as you can see it in the picture" and "The cuddly toy is at

the same place in the room as you can see it in the picture. Can you go and get it for me?”

Prompting: in the matching-to-sample test (OP), if the child points out the wrong picture, the child is asked a second time, something like “do you really think that this picture shows that thing?” and the correct choice is confirmed. If the child needs help with the PP recognition, the experimenter points to the target toy in the context picture and asks the child a second time. The prompting in the main test goes in three steps; the first one is to return to the picture, the second is again to return to the picture and to ask the child to take the picture along while looking for the right place. In the second prompting the experimenter also asks the child if it could *tell* which room or what place is shown in the picture. The third prompting is to show the place: in front of the right place, the experimenter asks if he or she can see the target. If the child is successful in the third prompting, then it has managed a picture to object recognition (PO).

3.2 Summarizing and observation

The test contains an object to picture recognition (OP), a picture to picture recognition (PP), a picture to object recognition (PO), and if the child finds the toy using the pictorial information, a picture sign condition (S). It is also worth noting that distractors are placed close to all target toys.

The outcomes of the test, so far, are in keeping with DeLoache’s results concerning a change in performance from about the age of 30 months. From that age the children learned between the trials. During the first and perhaps second trial they needed prompting, but in the third and fourth they found the target toy without help. When close to the age of 3, their performances almost never failed. Since the tests are still going on, final results will be presented later. It will be interesting at this phase of my investigation, then, to discuss some observations. At the age of 22 to 24 months the children manage the OP but have difficulties with the PP and PO and have no clue about S. At about 26/28 months of age they pass OP, PP and PO but not S. After the age of 30 months they easily pass OP, PP, PO and they start to learn S. Most astonishing were the performances of the 26–30 months old children who clearly handled the OP, PP, PO and were very keen on finding the target but could still not relate the “picture

situation” to the “reality situation”. They failed, despite prompting and even after they had correctly told the experimenter in which room or at what place they could see the cuddly of the picture, and the experimenter had once again said that “ I have put the cuddly at the same place in the room as you can see in the picture”.

4. *Taking the discussion further*

4.1 A situation in the picture and in the room

According to Josef Perner (1991) the understanding of external representations, like pictures, is parallel with the understanding of one’s mind. Now, these children are “situation theorists”. They keep the situation in the picture apart from the situation in the room. Perner argues that not until the child is about four years old does he come to think about his mind as representational and becomes a “representation theorist”. To coordinate the picture situation with its referent situation requires *metarepresentation*, which is the capacity to take “a cognitive, representational stance when needed” (Perner 1991: 284). Elizabeth Robinson (1994) does not agree; a consequence according to her would be that the three years old children “treat pictures as alternative situations that can match or mismatch reality rather than as representations which can misrepresent” (Robinson 1994: 167). The children tend to operate with assumptions of veridicality for beliefs as well as pictures, but do not relate the two (Robinson 1994; Zaitchik 1990). Robinson suggests that, to the child, the relation between reality and picture is asymmetric but not differentiated. But how can something be asymmetric but not differentiated? To the child, according to Robinson, the relation between the picture and reality is asymmetric but not differentiated since the child presupposes the reality as primary and stable, and *at the same time*, the picture as secondary and unstable (the picture will change if the world changes). Robinson argues that the 3-year old child has constructed belief in the picture-thing as about something, but they misconceive the relation between picture and its referent and therefore also misconceive properties of the picture-thing as well as the picture-sign. Robinson’s principal critique of Perner goes to his assumption on such a close parallelism between the understanding of representations that have physical reality (like pictures) and understanding the mind.

Sabbagh, Moses, and Shiverick's (2006) findings on false belief and false photographs may support Robinson's critique. In their study, understanding of false photographs antedates understanding of false belief in the child. Their hypothesis is that judgements about false beliefs might pose greater executive demands relative to false photographs.

But what about "my" children, not finding the target toy? At 2.5 years old they seem to be "situation theorists", according to Perner; they do not relate the situation in the picture to the situation in the room. But at 3 years old they do.

4.2 Differentiations in the development of a picture-sign in the child

Lynn Liben (1999) suggests a six-level developmental sequence on the emergence of cognitive and perceptual competencies in understanding pictures. The levels proposed by Liben imply differentiations within the child. The levels indicate focal competence for each phase, but the phases also intermingle. Capacities on one level are prepared for on preceding levels and will continue to develop on the next. Ambiguities in earlier phases may cause backlash, triggering "misconceptions" in picture-understanding in later ones. This can, for example, be the case for the child, 21 months old, which by margin passed the difficulty of separating a three-dimensional object from its picture, when he tried the picture object with his mouth.

Liben's assumption is that perception of space is crucial in recognizing depicted objects, since pictures are more or less flat, but the scenes recognized (i.e. understood) are three-dimensional. And in some respect children seem to be sensitive to depth and distance in environment at birth or very soon thereafter (Spelke 1998: 338; Bremner 1993). But sensitivity to depth-specific, pictorial, two-dimensional surfaces, emerges later. According to Yonas & Granrud (1985), responsiveness to "depth cues" in pictures appears when the child is about 5 to 7 months old, contemporary with early recognition of the depicted object, according to DeLoache (1994). Lately Bertin & Bhatt (2006) have argued for this competence to emerge already at 3 months. The point, however, is that in the child, sensitivity to spatial information in the dynamic, three-dimensional, physical world occurs before sensitivity to spatial information in the static picture.

In Liben's sequence of competencies, the first phase is a non-picture category that occurs in the first year of life. This is the case when the young child identifies the referent but appears to confuse the picture with what is depicted; for example, by trying to pick-up, or chew on, the depicted object. Liben calls this level of competency "referential content" but in semiotic terminology this is confusing, since "referential content" implies sign function and this phase antedates the sign. I suggest instead the term "analogon", inspired by René Lindekens (1976) or more simply, "pattern recognition".

The next phase is *global differentiation*, and it emerges in the latter part of the first year. This is when the child begins to differentiate the picture from its image, and responds to them differentially but does not reflect on the correspondence between the two. The third competence, Liben argues, is *representational insight*; the child interprets or assigns a "stands for" meaning to the picture object. This implies that the child assigns a direction, vital to sign functioning, to the relation between expression and content. Passing the retrieval test above can be an indication of representational insight. *Attribute differentiation* is when the child appreciates that some, but not all attributes of the picture are motivated by attributes of the referent, and that some, but not all attributes of the referent motivate attributes in the picture. Liben expects this competence to occur in late preschoolers. The fifth phase is the growth of a system. In *correspondence mastery* the child comes to understand formal and informal rules in the medium. Correspondence mastery is understood within a specific medium while *meta-representations*, the final competence, is the coordination of understanding variations among different representational media. This is a capacity to reflect on the semiotic resource itself, to choose between systems or combinations of systems, and to provide different means of communicating different visions to others. Liben ascribes the last phase to adolescents and adults, but perhaps this also can count for correspondence mastery.

The studies referred to above concern the three earliest phases, so I will focus my discussion on these. But first I will briefly comment on phases III-IV: attribute differentiation, correspondence mastery, and meta-representation. Returning to the assumptions of three basic differentiations in the development of sign use generally (above), it is my suggestion that the emergence of attribute differentiation in picture-understanding also indi-

cates a new shift of focus in development, onto the differentiation of signification generally. This new turn of focus is to differentiate the relation of signification “from the vehicle conveying it and the object it conveys” (Deely 1990: 37). From now on this will be successively more clear, more socially shared, and more sophisticated. This of course highly influences the differentiation of the self, but the differentiation of self and others has already begun in earlier phases.

The first competence, *analogon*, presupposes a former state that lacks the faculty to perceive pictorially rendered information about space relations. Perhaps it is too much to say that there already is a world taken for granted in the child, but there does seem to be a perception of a 3-dimensional world (in constant flux) from which another world, frozen and 2-dimensional, will be differentiated. Thus it already forms a prerequisite for a hierarchy in later phases. Manipulation of objects is surely important for global differentiation, as Liben indicates, but so is social interaction. From 9 months old the child tends toward joint engagement and after that joint attention, according to Tomasello (1999). Paying attention to the picture brings importance to it. There are also studies indicating that infants may imitate or model actions that others take towards pictures prior to having understood the referential function in the picture (Callaghan et al. 2004). In the construction of the picture as a social “tool”, the child may learn more about the picture *thing* as a category, than construe it as mediated information about the referent.

When the child finds the target toy (see above), this is an indication of representational insight: the child understands that the picture shows something about a situation “outside” the picture. In this case the child must relate the situation in the picture to the situation at his nursery school at that moment. Passing OP, PP, PO does not necessarily involve this confrontation between reality-situation and picture-situation, because comparative mapping will do. But still, it is intriguing to find that children at about 2.5 years old so convincingly can tell that in the picture the cuddly is “on the sofa”, but they will not go to the sofa to get it. It seems that at this phase the child has expectations that the picture thing will involve the display of known objects, but he has no expectation that the picture will be involved in his real world, here and now.

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Massimo Leone

Iranian *ta'ârof* and Italian *cerimonie*

On the semiotics of politeness

This paper stems from a broader research project concerning hospitality and its different conceptions and manifestations throughout time, space and cultures. Such a project is meant to elaborate a semiotic model of hospitality in order to reframe conflicts which might arise between individuals, groups or larger communities, when they face the necessity of sharing mutual resources.

The main hypothesis which underlies this paper is at the heart of a semiotics of understanding/misunderstanding; it can be formulated as follows: in studying, describing and analyzing semiosis, signification and communication, many models, from Shannon and Weaver (1949) through Jakobson (1963) to Eco (1977) and beyond, have been guided mostly by the idea that human semiotic interactions are successful if understanding is maximized, i.e., if the semiosis behind the manifestation of some signs resonates with the semiosis behind the reception of these same signs. This paper suggests that such an idea of what successful semiotic interaction is might be biased by what can be tentatively defined as an “individualistic” conception of humanity, prevalent in those societies and cultures where the major semioticians of the last century lived and worked. Further, I suggest here that an alternative conception of humanity, more common in other societies and cultures, might give rise to a completely different idea of successful semiotic interaction, which, paradoxically, would be achieved when misunderstanding is maximized, so as to reach a state where there is no way to determine whether the manifestation of some signs and their reception is underlain by comparable semiotic processes.

This hypothesis has been elaborated upon a thorough ethnological observation and phenomenological analysis of some semiotic interactions

that fall under a typology which natives from Italy and Iran would respectively call "*cerimonie*" and "*ta'ârof*". Probably, the most appropriate English translation for these two terms would be "ceremony", as in the expression "to stand on ceremony".

Proposing an abstract definition of what "*cerimonie*" and "*ta'ârof*" are from a semiotic point of view is intended to be the arrival point, not the departure point, of this paper; as a consequence, it is probably better, in the first instance, to give an idea of what kind of semiotic interactions fall in these typologies through some narrative examples. A typical Italian *cerimonia* takes place when I pay a visit to a relative of mine. I sit in this relative's living room, and this relative offers me a cup of coffee and a piece of cake. When I have eaten my piece of cake, the relative will ask me if I want one more piece. At this point I shall not accept, but stand on ceremony, and refuse. However, the relative too will stand on ceremony: he will not accept my refusal and will reiterate the offer, so giving rise to a rapid exchange of offers and refusals which might end either with me accepting the offer or with the relative accepting my refusal. Iranian *ta'ârof* semiotic interactions are, from many points of view, similar to *cerimonie*, but often take place in such contexts and with such modalities which are startling even for individuals familiar with *cerimonie*. A typical *ta'ârof* interaction arises when I pay a compliment to an object belonging to someone else, for example, a scarf. This person will say to me "*ghaabel nadaareh*" ("it is not worthy of you"), then will add "*maal-e to*" ("it is yours") or "*bardaar*" ("take it"). At this point I shall not accept, but continue the *ta'ârof* interaction by saying "*be tan-e to ghashangeh*" ("it looks good on you"); in this case too, the person who owns the scarf might repeat the offer so giving rise to another rapid exchange of offers and refusals.

A first significant difference between *cerimonie* and *ta'ârof* lies in the fact that, whilst Italian *cerimonie* are now practically absent from economic transactions, Iranian *ta'ârof* still characterizes them in most contemporary Iranian communities: when I ask a shopkeeper the price of an object, for example, the first answer will commonly be, again, "*ghaabel nadaareh*" ("it is not worthy of you"), and the shopkeeper will propose a price only upon my repeating the question.

Discovering what kind of semiosis takes place in these interactions is probably fundamental to penetrating the dialectics between understanding and misunderstanding, as well as the ways in which different cultures,

in different societies, shape a specific equilibrium between individuals and groups through this dialectics.

Although relatively few semiotic studies have been devoted to ceremony interactions (Haverkate 1987), such an abundant scholarship on this topic exists in linguistics, and especially in socio-linguistics, pragmatics and linguistic anthropology, that it has recently resulted in an independent field of investigation, called “politeness studies”. Definitions of politeness by different scholars in this field may vary considerably, and most of these definitions consider only the verbal dimension of ceremony interaction; yet, they are probably the most relevant and promising starting point for a semiotic investigation on this topic.

Very briefly, current politeness studies stem from two roots. The first of these is the work of H. Paul Grice. In describing the Cooperative Principle as a limited set of conversational maxims (Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner) Grice also mentions, in passing, that this set might be augmented by some further maxims, one of which might be that of Politeness (Grice 1975). From a reconsideration of Grice’s suggestion, Robin Lakoff defines politeness as something “developed by societies in order to reduce friction in personal interaction” (Lakoff 1975: 64). However, it would be hopeless to attempt to use this definition to understand the semiotic interactions of ceremonies, especially in the absence of a clear definition of what is meant by “friction”. For paradoxically, in many circumstances, *ta’ârof* as well as *cerimonia* seem to *increase* conflict in personal interaction, instead of reducing it. For example, consider the following account given by French ethnologist Anne-Sophie Vivier-Muresan, in a recent article on *ta’ârof* interactions that she observed in a village in the Kermân region of central Iran. She describes the play of offers and refusals of food between a host and a guest:

L’invité se doit en effet de refuser au moins une fois, voire deux ou trois fois, selon ses propres habitudes de *ta’ârof* et celles de son hôte. Ce dernier insiste en retour autant de fois qu’il est nécessaire. Le jeu atteint parfois une telle ampleur qu’on ne sait plus si l’on assiste à une séance de politesse ou de bras de fer, l’hôte posant de force la nourriture dans l’assiette de l’invité qui la remet à son tour dans le plat. (Vivier-Muresan 2006: 127)

Iranians are generally aware of this potential conflictive dimension of *ta’ârof*, as is evident in a sketch by performed by Iranian comedians Mor-

taza Aghili and Bahman Mofid, frequently aired by Iranian TV channels: two people in front of a door yield each other the right of way so insistently, that finally they end up stabbing each other.

Also deriving from Grice's work is Geoffrey Leech's definition of politeness as "strategic conflict avoidance", which "can be measured in terms of the degree of effort put into the avoidance of a conflict situation" and "the establishment and maintenance of comity" (Leech 1980: 19); but as Grice, Leech neither defines "conflict situation" nor solves the problem of polite interactions like *ta'arof* sometimes *cause* conflicts rather than avert them. For example, when an Iranian taxi driver replies "*ghaabel nadaareh*" ("it is not worthy of you") to a passenger who asks him the price of a fare, this does not mean that the passenger will get out of the taxi without paying. On the contrary, after the passenger's request is reiterated, the taxi driver will most probably propose a very high price and a very harsh negotiation will ensue.

As concerns the semiotic aspects of *cerimonia* and *ta'arof*, more useful definitions of politeness can be found in scholars who have tried to combine Grice's pragmatics with Erving Goffman's concept of "face" (Goffman 1955, 1956, 1967, 1971, 1981). In one of the milestone essays of politeness studies, Penelope Brown and Stephen C. Levinson define politeness as the series of strategies employed by interlocutors in order to guarantee: (1) the universal need of individual human beings to be valued, respected, appreciated in social groups, i.e. that the self-image that an individual has constructed of her/himself should be accepted and supported by others; and (2) the universal right of individual human beings to relative freedom of thought and action, i.e. to perceive "territory" in both the literal and metaphorical senses of the term (Brown and Levinson 1978). Nevertheless, this definition lends itself to two main objections. First, Richard J. Watts has shown that, whilst "for Goffman face is a socially attributed aspect of self that is on loan for the duration of the interaction in accordance with the line or lines that the individual has adopted for the purposes of that interaction" (Watts 2003: 105), Brown and Levinson distinguish between a positive and a negative face, but seem to overlook Goffman's emphasis on the impermanence of both; as a consequence, what is missed in their analysis is perhaps a thorough understanding of the theatrical, playful dimension of politeness, which has such an important role in semiotic interactions such as *cerimonia* and *ta'arof*. For example, as Vivier-Muresan

points out, Iranians sometimes pass from the interactive level of *ta'arof* to a sort of meta-level of interaction, called "*shukhi*" (more or less, "humor") where they can have fun by pretending that some *ta'arof* rules have been violated: "Un homme peut ainsi, en entrant dans une maison, se plaindre qu'on ne le fasse pas asseoir à la meilleure place, ou qu'on ne lui offre pas assez de pâtisseries" (Vivier-Muresan 2006: 135).

The second controversial point in the model of politeness developed by Brown and Levinson is their universalist approach to politeness phenomena, postulating that their definition of positive and negative face is appropriate for every interlocutor in whatever culture or society. It is therefore not surprising that objections to this assumption have been formulated, mainly by Asian linguists, such as the Japanese socio-linguist Sachiko Ide (1989, 1993) and the Japanese pragmaticist Yoshiko Matsumoto (1988, 1989, 1993). These scholars argue that division between positive and negative face is not adequate in those cultures in which the individual *qua* individual is less important than the social group with which the individual is affiliated. Furthermore, these scholars claim that Brown and Levinson's model of politeness is Eurocentric insofar as it focuses on a volitional conception of politeness, whilst in some non-European societies and cultures, such as the Japanese one, for example, politeness is mostly practiced as *wakimae*, as a form of discernment. Whereas volitional politeness is adopted regardless of the features of the social context in which individuals are involved, discernment politeness is embraced through a continuous assessment of the lines expected in different types of social interaction.

Japanese objections to Brown and Levinson's definition of politeness can perhaps be generalized: many scholars have proposed universalistic models of politeness, yet these models were biased by a particular idea of the relationship between individuals and societies, an idea mainly based on these scholars' experience of such a relationship. Therefore, politeness has been mostly conceived as a series of strategies meant to affirm willfully a certain personality in its interactions with other personalities. In such a conception, polite semiotic interactions are successful insofar as they result in a complete understanding of the shape and limits of all the personalities involved in a certain interaction.

Yet, ethnological and phenomenological analysis of semiotic interactions such as *cerimonia* in small villages of Southern Italy, and even more evidently, *ta'arof* in small Iranian communities in the USA seem to support

the idea that they are characterized by a communicative attitude which is closer to Japanese *wakimae* than to the volitional conception of politeness. These interactions seem to embody a conception of the relation between individuals and societies where politeness mostly consists in a series of strategies meant to wrap personalities with a layer of impersonality. In these “wrapping cultures” (Hendry 1993) polite semiotic interactions are successful insofar as they result in a complete misunderstanding of the shape and limits of all the personalities involved in a certain interaction.

Inferential semiotics is very suitable in for detailed analysis of the kind of semiosis which takes place in these interactions. I am paying a visit to a relative of mine, and I have already eaten the first slice of cake which I was offered. A first limit of linguistic models of politeness consists in the fact that they understand politeness as something resulting from what the relative or I might say at this moment. But the fact is that, before any word is pronounced, politeness is already “in the air”. In the situation described just described, for example, it would be wrong to think that the relative and I *voluntarily* decide to stand on ceremony; rather, the socio-cultural setting in which we are placed has already decided for us. As a consequence, a thorough understanding of politeness requires scholars not to sever verbal from other kinds of discourse that contribute to creating a situation of politeness. The relative and I interact through encyclopedias which do not include only verbal interpretants, but also interpretants activating the signification of degrees of kindred, distance between bodies, presence of these bodies in a certain space, postures, gestures and facial expressions, paralinguistic features, characteristics of the object exchanged between host and guest, social and cultural status of host and guest, and so on.

Given this semiotic setting of politeness, when the verbal exchange starts, its result will be paradoxical if politeness is understood as a way to maximize the affirmation of one’s personality in a social context. The relative offers a second piece of cake to me; at this point, I can interpret the offer in two opposite ways: A) the relative is standing on ceremony, the offer is fake; B) the relative is not standing on ceremony, the offer is true. If I refuse the offer, as the politeness setting requires me to do, the relative too will be able to interpret my refusal in two opposite ways: A) I am standing on ceremony; I am refusing but I actually want a piece of cake; or B) I am not standing on ceremony; I am refusing because I actually do not want a piece of cake.

Usually, when a refusal is reiterated, its expression is intensified. For instance, the refusal will be emphasized both verbally (repetitions: “I don’t want it, I don’t want it ...”; intensifications “I *really* don’t want it!”; argumentations “I am full”) and non-verbally (I change my tone of voice; I make gestures to reject the offer; I touch my stomach to express my fullness; I cover the plate with my hands; in Iranian *ta’arof* I even remove the piece of cake from my plate and put it back on its tray). However, this does not increase the intelligibility of *cerimonie* or *ta’arof*, since the emphasis of the refusal is commonly followed by a symmetrical emphasis of the offer, both verbally (repetitions: “take it, take it!”; intensifications: “*please* take it ...”; coaxings: “it is such a little piece ...”) and non-verbally (the relative’s tone of voice changes; his/her face expresses sadness at my refusal; in Iranian *ta’arof* the relative even takes a piece of cake and rapidly puts it in my plate). My last resort in order to communicate a refusal to my relative is a meta-communication about politeness itself. In Italian I would say “*senza complimenti*” (“without ceremonies”), while in Farsi I would say “*ta’arof nemikonam*” (“I am not doing *ta’arof*”). Nevertheless, even this move will not break the circle of offers and refusals, since this meta-communication about the fact that I am not doing any *ta’arof* can be interpreted by my relative as a subtle form of meta-*ta’arof*.

In sum: at no stage of these interactions can I be sure whether I am interpreting the relative’s offer correctly; conversely, at no stage of these interactions can the relative be sure whether my refusal is being interpreted correctly. The situation of politeness is such that ambiguity and potential misunderstanding are maximized during the entire interaction, so that both the relative’s offers and my refusals get entangled in a virtually unlimited chain.

Obviously, at some stage this chain will be interrupted: either I accept my relative’s offer or the relative accepts my refusal. Yet, even after an act halts the politeness exchange, there is no way to establish whether its conclusion was determined by a series of correct interpretations.

I would propose the hypothesis that the ambiguity, the lack of clear understanding, the potential misunderstanding which characterize semi-otic interactions such as *cerimonie* or, even more, *ta’arof*, ought not be considered as failed communication; on the contrary, these interactions are successful communication insofar as they *result* in this ambiguity, in this lack of understanding, in this potential misunderstanding. Most

European and American scholars conceive politeness as a set of communicative strategies which maximize the impact of an individual personality in a certain social context; yet, such a conception would be misleading in the observation, description and analysis of societies and cultures where politeness seems to be used, on the contrary, in order to minimize the impact of an individual personality in a certain social context. This opposition between personality and impersonality of politeness must not be considered as Manichean, but rather as running along a continuum which contains two polarities: on the one hand, cultures where societies are seen as environments in which individuals can affirm their personal aims; on the other hand, cultures where societies are seen as environments wherein individuals *cannot* affirm their personal aims. In the first case, politeness will be effective insofar as it increases the transparency of communication; in the second case, on the contrary, politeness will be effective insofar as it increases the opaqueness of communication (as is the case in small communities of Southern Italy or Iran).

It would be simplistic to try to understand the rationale of *cerimonie* or *ta'ârof* by adopting a semiotic model inspired by globalized communication, i.e. by an economic idea of effectiveness. Rather, politeness in social and cultural contexts where the individual is seen not as dominating its social environment, but rather as dominated by it, is better explained in comparison with another kind of semiosis: *gambling*. At each step of the interaction, participants mutually interpret their representamina, yet they know in advance that this interpretation may be false as well as true. This structural ambiguity, though, is not experienced as a limit, but frequently as a source of aesthetic pleasure, as in *cerimonie* or *ta'ârof* when individuals are gratified by their awareness of the theatrical, farcical nature of social interactions. What most “Eurocentric” scholars do not grasp is precisely this playfulness, the irony intrinsic to some situations of politeness, where the purpose of participants is to conceal personality more than to reveal it, where the usefulness of communication is replaced by the purposelessness of ritual.

Most existing analyses of *ta'ârof*, though from different methodological points of view, seem to reach similar conclusions (Beeman 1976; Hillman 1981; Betteridge 1985; Koutlaki 2002; Eslami-Rasekh 2005). For example, in an article devoted to face-keeping strategies in reaction to complaints, Zohreh Eslami-Rasekh points out that Iranian speakers are more sensitive

to contextual factors and vary their face-keeping strategies accordingly, whereas English speakers mostly use one apology strategy and intensify it based on contextual factors (Eslami-Rasekh 2004). He also suggests that “politeness theory, in its present form, is not enough to explain such differences, since they stem less from universal norms of politeness but more from culture specific values and attitudes (ibid.: 192).

I have tried here to demonstrate that linguistic politeness can be understood only if placed in the broader framework of a semiotics of politeness, one that is able to pinpoint relations between societies, cultures and “communicative styles”.

In this regard, semiotic research on specific politeness situations such as Japanese *wakimae* and Iranian *ta’ârof* can push scholars to reconsider the universality of semiotic models mostly formulated in Europe and Northern America, wherein the effectiveness of semiosis, signification and communication is generally conceived, consciously or unconsciously, by attributing a positive value to understanding. Inter-cultural comparison might reveal that such a conception is actually based on a particular idea of the relation between individuals and societies ultimately modeled on the economic concept of the market, i.e. a social structure where human beings freely interact in order to maximize their individual aims.

In a lucid ethnographic description of economic interactions in Marrakech, Elias Canetti points out that a “bazaar” is not a “market” (Canetti 1964). In a market, objects have specific prices, and communication is effective when it minimizes ambiguity about the relation between individuals, prices and objects. In a bazaar, on the contrary, objects do not have specific prices, since prices depend on the relation between individuals: there is one price for the tourist, one price for the local, one for a friend, etc. In this context, where social structure prevails on its members, communication is effective when it maximizes ambiguity about the relation between individuals, prices and objects. As a conclusion it can be argued that, while mainstream semiotics has mostly understood communication in terms of the disembodied interactions of the market, investigation of phenomena such as *cerimonie* or *ta’ârof* should encourage us to develop a deeper awareness of our cultural biases and to consider that, in some social and cultural contexts, communication might be better understood as a bazaar.

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Saihong Li

Semiotics and lexicography

A survey of cognitive approaches to pedagogical lexicography

1. Introduction

Semiotics is “concerned with everything that can be taken as a sign” (Eco 1976: 7). Semiotic signs can be represented in the form of words, phrases, sentences, images, sounds, gestures and objects. Lexicography, as the “art and craft” of compiling dictionaries (Laudau 2001: 1; Ooi 1998: 3), is represented by semiotic signs and their relationships.

Cognitive linguistics studies the linking of language with mind in the study of the brain and provides a dynamic perspective on language. Cognitive linguistics analyzes natural language as an instrument for organizing, processing, and conveying information. A cognitive approach to language, according to Langacker, can also be a “pragmatic approach, for cognition figures crucially in linguistic behavior, social interaction, and contextual understanding” (Langacker 1995). Recent developments in semantics, pragmatics and cognitive linguistics are widely used in lexicographical studies today (Pruvost 2004; Cowie 2004; Cock 2002; Thomas 1995; Stensen 1993). However, John Sinclair (1985: 81) claims that dictionary-making has to strive to “fit into the established lexicographic formats” or “fit into the whole conceptual background of lexicography.” At the same time, the discipline of lexicography strengthens linguistic theories, especially those concerning language use (Atkins 1996; Hartmann 1996). If the first aim of dictionary work is “to exhibit the actual variety of usage” (Murray 1888: x) and “capture meaning potentials rather than meaning” (Hanks 1994: 2), then the integration of cognitive approaches to lexicographic study is one of the most important methods in compiling dictionaries in order to cater to users’ needs. Cognitive linguistics offers “a number of advantages over some other linguistic frameworks, particularly in relation to the range

of language phenomena it can address and in relation to researchers' need to communicate their results" (Janda 2000). Pedagogical dictionaries, if designed to cater to users of a language, ought to suit to the users' patterns of thought; therefore, dictionary compilation should also include the study of patterns of conceptualization (cf. Coulson & Matlock 1995). Pedagogical lexicography is "linguistic in orientation, interdisciplinary in outlook and problem-solving in spirit" (Hartmann 2001: 33). However, according to Croft & Cruse (2004: 30), dictionaries normally "describe only the concept profile, or at best a very simplified version of the concept frame implicit in a concept profile". Therefore, in order to meet the user's need, lexicographers ought to take the learning and cognition process into consideration.

In light of these points, I propose to address the following questions: Do lexicographers pay attention to the cognition process for learners of a language? Can the users acquire enough information in dictionaries, and how does this information influence their learning and cognition processes? Are users satisfied with the information given by the dictionaries?

What are the user's own evaluations of such information as it might relate to learning and cognition? I shall address these questions and from the perspective of a Chinese learner.

2. Cognitive approaches to lexicography: Present and past

Cognitive linguistics, a subfield of linguistics, was developed in the 1970s. Although it is a relatively new field, it has developed dramatically during the last thirty years. Wallace Chafe, Charles Fillmore, George Lakoff, Ronald Langacker, and Leonard Talmy were the most influential linguists to focus centrally on cognitive principles and organization.

A cognitive approach to lexicography is developed from cognitive approaches to lexical semantics. Although usage information in learners' dictionaries is one of the major components in definitions, a systematic and standardized method in dealing with the usage of information still remains to be studied. The general claim is that the "pioneers" in the area of lexicography were reacting against an approach to linguistics which was strongly biased towards meaning in the abstract rather than meaning in use. Research on lexical semantics from the perspective of cognitive linguistics has traditionally "taken the position that lexical items, i.e., words,

constitute conceptual categories” (Croft & Cruse 2004: 109). The cognitive approaches to polysemy and metaphors in dictionaries are such cases in point.

Cognitive Exploration of Lexicography by YanChun Zhao (2003) was the first attempt to advocate cognitive approaches to lexicography in China. Zhao investigated how cognitive linguistics can be used in analyzing meaning, metaphors, morphology and grammar. However, his study is just a general introduction offering suggestive ideas for lexicography in China; it contains no detailed explanation of how and what kinds of cognitive approaches might be used. My own study of literature on lexicography (Saihong Li 2005) also showed a lack of consensus about appropriate approaches to pedagogical lexicography.

3. *Research design and methodology*

In investigating cognitive approaches to learners’ dictionaries and give advice on further research, I did three, small scale think-aloud experiments. These last are one of the most successful methods of observing how large groups of language learners actually employ dictionaries or glossaries. To get more reliable data about learning and cognition satisfaction from learner’s perspectives in regard to the information given in dictionaries, I designed 3 different tests, which were followed by evaluation questionnaires.

3.1. Participants

The participants in the study were 10 overseas Chinese scholars and 20 overseas students. Among the 20 overseas scholars, two are English teachers at a university in inland China, the rest all passed the EPT (English Proficiency Test); there were 10 PhD students among the overseas students and 10 MA students. Their ages ranged between 23 to 51 years old. Overseas scholars will study in Denmark from 10 months to one year. Overseas students had studied in Denmark more than a year. Thus, I can say that all the participants were advanced English learners. They had had at least eight years of English both at secondary schools and universities. All the participants in the study have completed the test.

3.2. Instruments

The dictionaries used in this preliminary study were the *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English* (hereafter LDOCE), the *Oxford Advanced Learners' Dictionary of Current English* (hereafter OALD) and the *MACMILLAN English Dictionary for Advanced Learners* (hereafter MEDAL). These dictionaries are the three most popular learners' dictionaries in China, and they also represent the new developments in learners' dictionaries of the twentieth century.

3.3. Procedure

The participants were allotted 25 minutes for the test and 25 minutes to fill out the questionnaires. The 30 persons were divided into three groups. Each group was given a copy of one of the above-mentioned dictionaries, and each person was provided with a tape-recorder. Group1 was given OALD; Group2, LDOCE; and Group3, MEDAL. The tests were conducted three times, due to limited space and time. Each time 10 persons participated, and evaluation questionnaires were given out immediately after the tests.

4. *Data analysis and discussion*

4.1. Results of Test 1

The results of test 1 showed that 76% of the participants in Group1 with OALD had the right answers for the five questions; 72% of the participants with LDOCE answered correctly for those questions; and 78% of the participants got the right answers in group 3 with MACMILLAN. The percentage of correctness can be seen in Table 1.

	Question1	Question2	Question3	Question4	Question5	Total
Group1	80%	70%	100%	70%	60%	76%
Group2	40%	100%	100%	70%	50%	72%
Group3	70%	70%	100%	90%	60%	78%

Table 1. Rate of correctness for test 1.

The satisfaction of learning process and cognition by using the dictionary from the perspective of the ten participants for each group is shown in Chart 1.




Chart 1. Assessment of the learning process and cognition from the user's perspective.

The above chart shows that the participants were satisfied with the information given for some words in the dictionary and believe that that information is also useful for their learning process and cognition. Participants in group 1 found 24% of the information to be very clear and useful; 48% think it is fairly clear and useful; 18% believed the information unclear and not very useful; 4% found it to be very unclear and useless. I leave it to the reader to peruse Chart 1 in more detail.

The results indicate that there is much room for improvement in regard to providing more useful information, better suited to users' learning processes and cognition. Some participants argued that the respective dictionary simply did not provide enough information.

4.2. Results of test 2

Test 2 was designed mainly to 1) investigate how usage labels are provided in learner's dictionaries and 2) how such information influences the participants' learning process and cognition. Four out of ten words tested in OLAD have no usage labels or explanation about the use of words in proper pragmatic situations; the same holds for three out of ten in LDOCE, and four out of ten in MACMILLAN. Once again, the test showed that learner's dictionaries could use improvement. To put it another way: pedagogical lexicography has not made use of the best approaches to the cogni-

tive learning processes of the users. Chart 2 shows the degree of satisfaction among participants of test 2.




Chart 2. Degree of user-satisfaction with regard to learning process and recognition.

As indicated by Chart 2: the LDOCE received the best assessment in regard to usage of labels for learning and cognition. Overall, it is indicated that learner's dictionaries should provide more useful information and less linguistic and/or etymological meanings.

4.3. Results of test 3

Test 3 was designed to survey how cultural words are provided in learner's dictionaries and how this information influences the learning process and cognition. This test is very difficult for the participants. Some of them said they could understand the meaning of the words, but did not know for sure how to translate them into Chinese. The results are shown in Chart 3.




Chart 3. Degree of satisfaction with regard to cultural meanings.

Chart 3 shows that the LDOCE has the most satisfactory degree of cultural information as compared with the other two dictionaries.

5. *Conclusion*

In sum: the above study shows that the three learner's dictionaries have both strengths and weaknesses, proving up the truism that any dictionary will have "its own limited means ... therefore it is impossible to convey everything in it" (Hartmann 2003 III: 83). According to the 30 participants, all the dictionaries under consideration would be improved by providing more pragmatic, and less theoretical, meanings. Lexicographers must, at some point, realize that learner's dictionaries should incorporate linguistic meanings adapted to the readers' individual cognitive processes and cultural situation. Although mine is just a small scale study, with limited samples and number of participants, I hope this paper will be of help to formulators of future lexicographical work, especially learners' dictionaries.

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Youzheng Li

Semiotics and ancient history

Two major areas of semiotic studies are the semantic structures of texts and the institutional mechanisms of textual formation. These are also related to the main interests of current historical theory. Historical discourse is notable for its semantic complexity, which requires elaborate clarification. Institutional formation of historical discourse is also very complicated and requires structural analysis. Like semiotics, historical theory is strongly interdisciplinary, tending to run contrary to the professional status quo of historical studies. Finally, the operative range of both semiotic theory and historical theory are related to the entire field of social and human sciences.

General semiotics has two main theoretical sources: the scientific/philosophical and the linguistic/literary. The present paper is meant to encourage renewed attention to a third source: historical theory. Unlike the two main theoretical modes, historical theory refers to both the intellectual and the social dimensions. If global semiotics literally means a cross-cultural one, the latter contains its non-western others in both the social and the historical dimensions. Non-western social and historical reality must broaden, deepen and multiply human knowledge of history. The globalization of semiotic studies requires an empirically and positively more homogeneous object and method.

Moreover, history consists of a series of dichotomies, such as process/structure, scientific/literary, past/future, disciplinary/interdisciplinary, western/eastern, practice/theory, recognition/action, meaning/referent, as well as faith/reason. History, then, provides a typical forum for profound epistemological and ethical reflection on human knowledge and future design in terms of hermeneutic and semiotic approaches.

1. Operative restrictions in single disciplines and the holistic ideal in interdisciplinary epistemology

Interdisciplinary and cross-cultural studies strive for a scientific holism that would be theoretically linked to all social and human sciences. General semiotics is accordingly related to the total range of academic scholarship. However, individual scientific projects are mostly arranged according to various, single disciplines.

Modern, holistic-leaning, general semiotics shares the same range of integrative developments as do modern social and human sciences, helping to promote semantic clarification and effective communication among the latter. The integrating tendency of these two academic practices reflects the need to promote all-round communication among various elements in academic, cultural, historical dimensions.

Historiography is highly interdisciplinary, typically a mix of classical and modern modes. As a traditional discipline, history has reaped the theoretical fruits of many modern social sciences, especially sociology, anthropology, archaeology and psychology. The post-war French structural stream in historiography has displayed the most ambition, particularly in the theoretical evolution of the *Annales* school over almost one century. As we know, it once tried to make the range of historiography equivalent to that of the entire social sciences; accordingly, history was ambitiously posited as a kind of scholarly totality for the future, the sum of all disciplines. The *Annales* school had reasons for expressing such an idealistic wish, feeling it to be an epistemological necessity in their historical practice. But we also know that the holistic claims of that school could not be sustained or justified. The fact that the *Annales* school selects their subject matter from the medieval European period indicates a self-contradiction in practice. As we know, ever since ancient times a “universal history” has been a common ideal of many traditional historians. That means the idea of total history should cover as many historical-geographic territories as possible. Moreover, the *Annales* school, in its downplaying of political history, imposes a serious self-limitation on their historical horizon. On the other hand, we should note that the ideal of total history of the *Annales* is especially characterized by its emphasis on methodological integration (interdisciplinary methodology). We may therefore say that the *Annales* school’s adventure is especially characterized by an epistemological and methodological holism,

which has had a substantial influence on the integrative development of human sciences. This tendency is further combined with French structuralism guided by a similar spirit but touching on much wider domains in culture and sciences. As a result, we see a double integration in the ideal of postwar historical theory or historical thought with respect to both methodology and subject matter. Since then “historical theory”, or the theoretical practice in historiography and historical thought, seemed to overlap all the social and human sciences. On the other hand, however, this scientific ideal can hardly be carried out actually. The reason is similar to what we said above about general semiotics. How can we really pursue a holistic project to include many subjects and methods from many disciplines?

Here we are faced with two different aspects in our epistemological reflection: desirability at the general theoretical level and possibility at the concrete practical level. As regards the range of subject matter, history has a reason to expand its conventional range, so as to include in practice the truly universal, namely, everything of spatial and temporal existence of mankind. Yet in fact, we can hardly carry out this integrative operation. Regarding methodological instruments, history has the right to be related with all relevant knowledge of social and human sciences in its projects. Both materials and tools applied for processing materials should operate within certain historiographical procedures formed in the existing disciplines. However, not only in history, but also in other interdisciplinary-directed academic practices, doubly integrative tactics can and to some extent must be applied in projects designed this way. Consequently, to overcome the contradiction involved in interdisciplinary practices, we should distinguish between strategic and tactical categories in present-day historical theory. At the ideal level this new and expanded historiography should share its operative range with all the social and human sciences; at the practical level it can only be carried out in quite relative terms. There may exist a reasonable intellectual gap between epistemological perspective and methodological design in historical theory. In the former, historical theory will share a similar holistic intellectual strategy with the humanities as well as with general semiotics, in order to explore the possible theoretical results; while at the practical level all actual scholarly projects must be arranged to work through tactical combinations of all kinds of knowledge and techniques. Nevertheless, the distinction between the theoretical ideal and the practical workability is due to a technical reason only, namely,

because we still lack sufficiently objective conditions to attain this scientific idealism.

The integrative ideal of contemporary historiography has been gradually shaped over the course of modern history. Only in the era of modernity could we reasonably begin to shape a conception of total history, owing to ever-advancing intellectual and methodological developments. On the other hand, there are obstacles to conceiving a total history for the twentieth century. In fact, so-called total history today, far from being a task for a single discipline, should cover all the different sections of modern society and culture. This new historical reality in the expanded sense is the concern of all professional historians. The modern historian, however, with a much richer source of documents and more advanced research techniques available today, can only be satisfied in writing a special history about his contemporary times. He can no longer write a truly universal history of his time. This contradiction in historiographical practice is also caused by the above-mentioned tension in historiographical theory. For example, a genuine, total history of the last century would amount to a quasi-encyclopedia about history, society and culture. How can we follow a traditional way to write such a total history? On the other hand, many present-day debates about historical theory are still restricted to the category of traditional historiographical works, regardless of various intellectual tensions prevailing in the total historical horizon of our times

2. Epistemological rationality and methodological possibility

In light of the above discussion we can see there is an operative inconsistency in contemporary historical-theoretical debates. Historiographical practice in the twentieth and twenty-first century is completely different from that in pre-modern times with respect both to the range of available materials and the level of research techniques. The research conditions of traditional and contemporary historiographies differ radically, hence so do the scholarly possibilities of both. So we cannot apply the same set of concepts to treat them, as professionals used to do. For earlier history, especially ancient history, we have only a limited number of written texts as proper objects; whereas for modern or contemporary history we have an almost unlimited supply of textual objects. In light of this divergence,

how can we deal coherently with concepts like truth, objectivity, representation, fiction, falsification and more? Whether pursuing causal analysis or axiological evaluation of historical events and situations, historians of modern and ancient times have very different capacities to performing their tasks; in fact, they belong to different categories of academic agents.

Again we confront the distinction between epistemological and methodological (strategic and tactical) levels. A historiographical epistemology based on present-day academic conditions makes contemporary historians more capable of dealing with historical problems – both ancient and modern – than were their former counterparts. Aside from postmodern, nihilistic rejections of historical truth, the objectivity of a historical event can be fixed precisely, at least in principle, by modern scientific and technical tools. For example, the same news item on a TV program offers limited flexibility for different reports made by different journalists from different angles, because there exists some shared external objectivity that can be positively checked. If the same cannot be said about the checking of historical events in the past, the reason is only technical in nature. But actual accessibility to a related truth depends on the accessible technology and on current political conditions. Nowadays, no so-called epistemological obstacle blocks our access to historical truth, as some extreme relativists would lead us to believe. Just the opposite: this basic distinction between historical knowledge of modern and ancient times presents a positive verification of historical theory; namely, “historical objectivity” in the epistemological sense may exist on the basis of modern human knowledge and social conditions. Of course, this positive statement can hardly be applied to present-day studies of traditional history. In short, we should deal with epistemological problems in light of present-day conditions of human knowledge, rather than in terms of the past historiographical works and documents.

3. Epistemological grades of conceptual precision and predictive efficiency in human knowledge

Among natural, social and human sciences, the rigorousness of related concepts and measures must be differently defined, although natural sciences provide the standard models for fixing conceptual precision in different scientific systems. Regarding historical theory the same thing can be said

about such basic concepts as observation, verification, truth, objectivity, prediction etc. We have already noted that historiography-theoretical concepts are still taken as empirically valid; the writing of history adopts a relatively less rigorous definition of the used scientific concepts. Strengthening our rational attitude toward applying historical science is also related to how to improve studies of traditional historiography. So-called historical truth, or the true picture of historical situations, depends strongly on the historian's intellectual operations. It is a pity that many modern historians mainly choose only traditional historical works, such as literary pieces or artistic remnants, for appreciation and enjoyment. But on the other hand, they also tend to confuse those classics with works finished in the modern period, on the basis of the seemingly same discipline of historiography, accordingly relaxing the scientific requirements for the both. By dealing with both traditional and modern historiography in the same way, historians are confused by their different operative procedures.

Therefore, we face a new task in historiography: how do we confront old documents with modern operative procedures, if the latter can hardly be used for the former in a directly positive way? Furthermore, a distinction should be made between modern historiography and traditional historical discourse. In general, there are two categories of historiography: the modern and the traditional. They have different operative systems with respect to their conceptual precision and predictive efficiency. After all, social and political practices for the present and the future are organized by means of empirical rationality. Without empirical rationality human beings could not longer exist normally. Semiotic knowledge, too, should be employed to strengthen the rational and intellectual potential of mankind. Without naively trusting in the logic of progress, we human beings should still cherish the same wishes for a better future as those people did in the Enlightenment era. Most historiographical work falls in this domain, hence especially the related ethical dimension in historical processes. The explicit historical operation and its implicit deep mechanism should be separated. Interaction between history and ethics also leads to a special emphasis on the historical causality between inner motive and external result.

4. The classification of historiography and the status of ancient history

Traditional historiography – prehistoric, ancient, modern – can be classified according to its respective chronological periods. The classification of historiography is regularly defined by presumably corresponding historical realities. Conventionally it is supposed that different modes of historiography represent their corresponding historical processes with respect to certain aspects. Although modern historical theory rejects this naïve view of representation, traditional historiography is still classified according to the various represented periods, even if the extent of related representation is far from being complete or satisfactory. From a historical-semiotic point of view, however, we maintain that historiography should be classified more in terms of the related “productive modes” or mechanisms of doing historiography than by chronological references. In fact, historiographical works are better defined by the ways they are made, i.e., by the means of collecting and processing documents. Both documents and their processing are made by intellectual and technical methods mastered by “historians” living in their periods. The point is that different periods or conditions provide different mechanisms for producing their historical discourses. Hence, the meaning of historical discourse is first defined by the meaning-producing mechanism that can set up a model for producing historiography; the related interpretation emerges accordingly. Of course it is not easy for us moderns to get access to production mechanisms of the past. First, the latter can hardly be traced back to their original situations, and second, modern people are not in a position to grasp the line of transmission of historical texts and related changes. This technically-fixed gap between contemporary readers and original writers creates a big obstacle to reaching the true situation of past production of historical texts. There is no easy way for modern historians to form their judgment of the genuineness of historical texts and the related historical truth. Therefore, so-called reconstruction of historical reality is almost impossible. Hence we reach two conclusions:

- We can hardly grasp so-called historical reality or historical truth, for the reasons given above.
- That difficulty is not epistemological but technical in nature.

In other words, we can appeal to two main reasons to relax our efforts to obtain historical truth, especially that about ancient history. First, the original conditions for producing and transmitting historical texts must have been too weak to allow past historians to attain this scientific level. Second, current scientific conditions provide us with much easier access to historical truth about modern history, the fact of which would indicate why we should relax our expectations when investigating the positive aspects of past and ancient history.

Now we have another reason to recognize that historiography is a mixture of the scientific and the literary: that is because most, if not all, ancient historical works are pseudo-literary works. Because of ancient text-producing conditions the epistemological problem of reference becomes less important and even less relevant with respect to ancient historical production. In ancient times, there could have been a distinction between legend and history in the mind of the reporters. Ancient historians did indeed aim to describe more what is true than what is fictive (stories); that's why story-telling developed from myth to history, as we see in ancient times. Ancient historians could collect historical documents (oral and written) from their direct and indirect experience as positive materials. We can thus assume that their historical snapshots include many true details.

On the whole, however, ancient conditions did not allow for sufficient representation of causal connections explaining historical events. As a result, many imaginative and fictive creations were added to the materials so as to form the pseudo-causal links necessary to establish any intelligible account. The essence of historical reality, or truth, lies in the qualified formation of its causal networks, rather than in the mere piling up of facts. These last, without reliable causal structures, have nothing to do with historical truth. For the essence of a story rests on its lines of causal logic rather than on the mere material of that logic. In the case of the narrative, the true origin of the used material becomes less relevant; how the author collected narrative details is not relevant to historical understanding. Whether from personal experience, from memory or imagination, how observations were collected and described doesn't matter, as long as the selected details function in an effectively semantic way in the narrative.

"Effective" here can mean that the used material seems realistic, similar to what we see in real life. Realism in literary description is not logically related to the true process of its production, but rather to verisimilitude

as a storytelling artifice. For this empirically intelligible, real-like requirement in historiography, as we point out above, both objective observation and creative imagination can play an equal role in the persuasiveness the reading. Compared with the mythical text, the historical one is more realistic because its discourse reads more empirically intelligible, rather than because of its possibility of being verified.

The most essential part of historical narratives relates more to their organizing capacity to construct suitable or acceptable causality among events and details, without which piled-up details lose their empirically acceptable effects in textual reading. The causal network amounts to “the steel structure” of the story building; as such, it is the very essence of historical reality. In truth, ancient historical works should be taken as literary creations having certain quasi-realistic elements. Recognizing the historical picture from ancient historical works means to find the causal relationship among elements and events; historical descriptions refer to what is embodied in causal representation. But how can we moderns trust in the causal representations made by ancient people?

We may present a “statistical” or probable truth about the general profile of life in a given period or society. The historian seeks to record and describe historical truth according to his own standard; but, as we said above, because of technical restrictions in ancient history, he can hardly create an accurate picture, given the modest intellectual and technological state of his times. Indeed, we probably obtain a more accurate picture of the spirit and behaviors of an era through vivid stories created by a great fiction writer who desires to impart historical truth to his writing.

Traditional historical discourse functions essentially as the intellectual source for inspiration of mind and design of action. This important function, however, has been largely decreased since the scientific era. This is also the main reason why we should distinguish between the traditional and modern historiographies regarding their different functions.

*5. Ancient versus modern:
Reconsiderations for a new intellectual history*

The human capacity to know historical truth depends on both subjective and objective conditions. Therefore we infer that, from an epistemological point of view, ancient history is knowable on principle, but almost

unknowable in practice. This double conclusion leads us to ask, What is the meaning of ancient historiography for us today? No doubt, all historiography prior to modern times belongs to intellectual history, which varies in degree of mental and spiritual aspects. Yes, modern sociology and anthropology provide us with a lot of useful scientific models for dealing with historical subjects. On the other hand, the scattered and fragmented documents, as well as limited technology, narrows the range of effective observations made by ancient historians as to historical reality. Also, this kind of sociologically-directed study no longer has its object in clear view. Maybe this is one of the main reasons why the *Annales* school cannot effectively continue to pursue their research goals: they lack an actual sociological object of study. Nevertheless, sociology and anthropology help us to strengthen our investigations of historical backgrounds and conditions as the stages on which historical activities can be performed more or less fruitfully.

On the other hand, whether original historical discourse or modern investigations of the past, works of intellectual history are valuable in a broad sense, in as much as they are valid records of beliefs, faith, wishes, instincts, desires, knowledge and morality – that is to say, the subjective parts of mankind's life. Abandoning the quest for objective social and political truth about ancient and remote history, we can focus more intently on those so-called "subjective truths".

Unlike many previous intellectual and spiritual histories, ours is concerned with faith and attitude *as such*, apart from their causal relations with external factors. All sociological and anthropological models are used as ways to shape the modes of effective appearance of those mental tendencies only. Among all traditional historiography, the mode of ancient history, because of its special discursive construction, is even more important to our study of historical subjectivity than are the more primitive texts of myth and legend and the more-developed medieval historical discourse. It presents a medium grade of social representations that might prove more suitable for presenting the original and purest expression of subjective truth. Ancient historiography, rather than preceding mythical texts, expresses better the original mentality of historical races and individuals. This primitive, racial national mentality or historical faith has been transmitted to later generations as the main psychological and spiritual source of later historical developments. The identity of the original his-

torical mentality can help outline the spiritual aspect of its existence and development. The discourse of ancient history, which is less restricted than the earlier mythical-fictive type and by the later institutional-ideological kind, presents a more original expression of national beliefs and mental inclinations. In this light, the status of a historical social reality is in essence different from that of a historical mentality. The history of a national mental attitude has a relatively autonomous existence and continuity, in its engagement with other historical factors. It is hard to grasp exactly the reality of that social interaction because of insufficient knowledge of the latter; but we can grasp the reality of the mentality itself, as it appears in its interactions with increasingly more accessible social contexts in later historiography. Here we adopt a doubly directed operation for ancient historical discourse: avoidance of positive inquiry into socio-historical reality, and hermeneutically positive inquiry into the mental reality embodied in historical discourse. Social-causal reality calls for a description of external actions that is very difficult to realize in dealing with ancient historical discourse; by contrast, the basic mental reality can present itself directly by verbal expressions.

On the one hand, we can obtain important and reliable knowledge about ancient mentality *per se*; and on the other, we can get rid of misleading explanations based on faulty or unreliable documents about causal relations, which could present a misleading view of the historical mechanism determining ancient faiths. Thus, traditional faiths should be taken as coming from empirical sources that can be traced back historically from a positive method, as we attempt to do here. In other words, we can more positively trace back the primitive modes of human nature and instincts through studying those earlier historiographical narratives. To gain access to the truth of historical human nature, we should first relax our study of external, causal realities of ancient history, which can hardly be pursued positively today. We should lay more emphasis on the psychological and ethical truths embodied in the historical process. In both practices, semiotics will play an active role in constructing the anatomy of the complex semantic composition of historical discourse.

Historiography is essentially oriented to the future. Still, living in modern contexts we have to reorganize our historical experience. In doing so, we should first remember to keep a reasonable distance from traditional historical accounts that are largely based on unreliable observations

and broken causal analysis, which can hardly be used to guide our future projects. We should organize our historical knowledge more “horizontally”, that is, in terms of modern social and human sciences, rather than basing it on the traditional wisdom left by old historiography, which provides us with less reliable knowledge about historical objectivity.

Our new, positive Enlightenment will be embodied in three main intellectual systems that are organized holistically and mutually connected: general semiotics, historical theory, and social/human sciences. In brief, let us distinguish between history in the narrow or regular sense, and history in the broad sense. In our the three scientific endeavors just listed, semiotics plays a central organizing role in guiding and coordinating with the new historical knowledge. Historiographical epistemology is no longer the concern of historians only. Rather, it is a new territory for strategic operations shared among all our interdisciplinary projects.

Supplement: A theoretical sketch

- (1) HT (Historical theory) in a broad sense can designate theoretical thought about doing history. HT implies the following important aspects:
- 1. Total knowledge 1 (in its classical sense, namely that prior to modern sciences): stressing the wide *range of object*
 - 2. Total knowledge 2 (that since modern sciences): indicating both the *range of object* and the completeness of *methods* or theories, with the latter as more characteristic
 - 3. Combination of *theory (knowledge)* and *practice (action)*: learning of this synthetic nature involves human fortune and behavioral choices; hence *political history (past)* and political selection (*future*)
 - 4. HT shares the same range with *social-human sciences*; total knowledge or *total theory*
 - 5. HT’s emphasis will be more on present and future than on the past. Or HT₁ (*mental history-literary*) turns to the past while HT₂ (*historical science-scientific*, including political history) turns to present and future. The status of history and historiography will be changed or mixed with SHS.
 - HT as the triple combination of cognition (past), inspiration (present) and design (future)
- (2) SHS (social-human sciences): The HT problem leads to the SHS problem, involving the following aspects:

- HT depends on or is equivalent to SHS, with the result: $HT + SHS = \text{new HT} = \text{NHT}$
 - NHT leads to remodeling of present historical knowledge of the past, making the latter more empirically-scientifically organized
 - NHT or SHS leads to remodeling current historical knowledge of the present and the future, namely forming a new historical perspective: genuine total history about the present, which makes historical knowledge more empirical-positivist
 - NHT or SHS is conducive to the formation of new studies of political history (past, present and future); and new political history is related to the formation of political pragmatics for the future
- (3) GS (new general semiotics): GS will be more organically connected with NHT and SHS, resulting in new scientific human knowledge
- (4) HP (human practice): NHT will pay more attention to HP. HP needs more scientific methods of organization. Despite contemporary western theoretical elaborations, the obvious flaw of it rests on the structural gap between theory and practice. Many theories regarding human practice have proved to be irrelevant to the changing social, political and historical reality. Social and human sciences must be orientated to a more relevant recognition and explanation of social reality. Semiotics should organize its scholarship along the same lines.

Anna Löfström

A model of written miscommunication

This paper applies certain semiotic principles to a study of classical Japanese literature, with the production and reception of writing as the centre of attention. I will introduce two main theses, and then elaborate on a simple example.

1. Sign and movement

I define writing as relation of language and movement in (material) space. A written sign emerges in the movement between these two poles. To prevent any possible confusion of these two kinds of movement, I will from now on refer to movement in material space as *material text*. The hypothetical moment when a written sign becomes one with either of these poles renders the written sign dead. By “dead” I mean that the sign has no signifying power as writing, but only a latent possibility of signification. A written sign is alive only when it is on the move between these poles of death. What makes the sign alive by putting it on the move is a subject that encounters the sign, uses it, thus producing and re-producing it.

I have adopted my main idea for this model from Eero Tarasti’s writings on existential semiotics. Tarasti pays attention to the moment “before and after” a sign, introducing the concepts of *pre-sign*, *act-sign* and *post-sign* (Tarasti 2000: 33). A sign that seems to be crystallized or fixed, or when a “sign is the same as its concept” as Tarasti puts, is in fact only in a temporary state; most of the time signs are “in flux” (7). According to Tarasti, first, a subject has “in itself” an essence, which he actualizes or concretizes into an “act-sign”, followed by a “post-sign” interpretant. “After all, the sign itself proves to be a rather ephemeral entity lying between these two ‘transcendences’”, states Tarasti (33). This movement is carried out by the operations of negation and affirmation. So what actually happens in the course

of a sign's life cycle is the negation of a pre-sign in favour of an act-sign, and the negation of an act-sign while affirming the post-sign. (31)

What I would claim here is that a written sign is alive only when the acts of negation and affirmation are incomplete, and tension remains. A sign like this is always ambivalent, on the move towards something but still in touch with its former state. A living, written act-sign is the material text being written or read at the moment. There is a "dead moment" present in the possible life-cycle of a sign when it exists in the material, containing only the possibility to transcend the material and attain to transcendental ideas. The tension between linguistic and material on the one hand, and pre-sign or post-sign and act-sign, on the other, must be present for a sign to signify, that is, to be alive.

Roy Harris, in his book *Signs of Writing* (1995), claims that the underlying nature of all writing is not visual, but spatial (45). I want to go even further and claim that the underlying nature of writing is not only spatial organization, but *movement*, and in the case of an actualized material text, *organizing movement in space*. This means engaging in the writing-movement, be it "handwriting" motions in the air, leaving a graphic trace on a paper with a pencil or a brush, or hitting the keys of a keyboard. The act of writing that starts from emergence of a pre-sign sends the written sign into action. I call this movement the *downward movement*, which is aimed toward death in the material text. Observing the material text brings the written sign back to life, sending it towards death in language. This act of reading consists of *upward movement*.

So there is a break in the act-sign, as noted before. Before the act of writing there is a pre-sign which is negated in favour of the "bare objectness" of the material text. And after the act of reading, the material text is negated in favour of the post-sign. I will call these two *pre-written* and *post-read* signs. If the act-sign is not yet in process of being affirmed or is already fully negated, these signs are dead. What I think is essential to writing is the role of a subject in acts of writing a reading. A subject basically takes some linguistically comprehensible essence as his pre-(written-)sign and starts to reach towards the material, bringing a written sign to life. The written sign is now on the move downwards in his act of negating a pre-written sign and affirming an act-sign. But when the subject abandons the material text produced by his act of writing, by not writing or not reading it, the written sign dies.

In the event of reading, meaning is brought back to life. Grasping the organization of space through the senses (visual, haptic) and realizing or understanding it as meaningful revives the meaning. Movement is not just present here physically – say, in eye-movement, the movement of fingers on Braille-script and so on – but also in the reader’s active, cognitive reaching towards the meaning, i.e., the post-read sign. In this process, the sign is sent upward. When the act of reading is over, the material text is likely to be abandoned again, detached from the subject, and thus dead. The post-read sign has also lost its connection to the material and is drifting towards realms of meaning that transcend linguistic (and written) comprehension. On this side, too, the written sign is dead, since it has lost its connection to the material.

To conclude my point here: A written sign is alive only when it is moving, that is to say, when it is connected to a subject engaged in the act of writing or reading, when acts of negating or affirming the pre- act- and post-signs has started but is not wholly concluded, hence leaving the sign in a state of ambivalence. Thus, the “vitality” of a written sign is dependent on the tension between linguistic and material poles on the one hand, and on the other, the ambivalence resulting from the still-incomplete acts of negating and affirming the pre-, act-, and post-signs. The sign that is alive is able to signify (see Figure 1). Because the abandoning of the written sign, resulting in death, is in a central position here, “breaks” in the process of reading (what-is) written are bound to occur. A subject encountering a written sign left to die can only imagine what it might have been when it was alive, like a palaeontologist figuring out how dinosaurs were during their prime. So, some serious miscommunication is bound to happen.

2. Signifying functions in a written sign

But what is the written sign, that is alive with and within the subject, actually like? Is it divided in signifiers and signifieds? What kinds of signifying processes are central to it and how are they connected? Elaborating on this aspect will reflect my interest in Japanese writing, especially its earlier stages.

My first point here concerns signifiers and signifieds: in my view a written sign cannot be permanently divided into signifier signified (which is perhaps true of any sign). A written sign is a complex whole and its ele-




Figure 1. *Reading (what is) written.*

ments are bound together by the signifying tension. Whichever part of it is actualised first in *Dasein* will play the role of the signifier. The rest of the sign, the not-yet-existing signifying potential, is dragged along with it and by it, being affirmed or resisted by the subject. The affirmation of and resistance to the moving, living signifying element is always partial, contributing to the upward or downward movement of the sign. In this sense, my view of the written sign resembles what Julia Kristeva, in her *Sense and Nonsense of Revolt*, describes as the “thing-presentation/word-presentation heterogeneity” (1996: 33–34). I quote Kristeva:

For example, if I imagine the thing “train”, the sound level, visual level, tactile level, and so on of this representation constitute a complex, stratified set, which I will call a *layered* representation of the object or thing. ... The word “train” comprises not only its acoustic representation but also its reading-image, for “I” know how this word is spelled; the spelling of “train” is added to the sound “train.” “I” must also consider graphic representation, because “I” can write, and therefore the representation of my motivity comes into play.

Though her emphasis here is not on writing, Kristeva binds it closely to language. In a similar way the written sign can be seen as a layered complex composed of series of representations with no real clear division into a signified and a signifier.

My second point is about signifying functions. Let’s imagine that “I” was living in tenth-century Japan. What kinds of layers and levels would “I” imagine a written sign to have? There would be the “style” of the

graphic organization of a written sign: complex, simple, whole, simplified, cursive and so on. These would have a connection to more or less established writing-systems, which in use becomes something I call metasemiotic index. A writing-system used by officials gains a metasemiotic index referring to “officiality”; another, used by females writing their diaries, starts to signify “femininity” and “unofficiality”. There would also a precise, organizing movement employed in a single graph and accompanying the graphic trace. There would be elements that are pictorial or related to corporeality, transcending the language and the symbolical (rendered outside the symbolic order in the Kristevan sense) and thus transcending writing. There would be a sound, in itself and as part of a pronouncing-system (at least when referring to a Chinese character). There would be a word, as a part of spoken discourse, and in the case of *Kanji* (discussed below), there would be also a “meta-word” or a meta-linguistic function; a linguistic element or function not bound to a certain language (hence the possibility of pronouncing the same graph in Chinese and Japanese); and last, an ideographic connotation transcending concepts. (I by no means want to deny the latter, just to strip away the central position given them in typical western thinking.)

The main signifying functions are presented in Figure 2. In this figure the elements placed outside the triangle – defined as material, metasemiotic and linguistic – transcend writing. We can now see how the “metasemiotic” pole is dragging some of the elements (that is to say, signifying functions with meta-semiotic interest) aside from the line defined by the material and linguistic poles.

My third point is about resisting and affirming. While encountering the signifying functions at work or as potentials in a written sign, the reading or writing subject can resist them or affirm them. This is the contribution of the subject to the vitality of the written sign.

3. *An example: Encountering written sign in Tosa Nikki*

To conclude I will introduce and elaborate on an example taken from classical Japanese literature, namely, the famous first sentence from Kino Tsurayuki’s *Tosa nikki* from the tenth century. But before going into to the analysis I will summarize some general points about Japanese writing of the time, as these are central to the following discussion.




Figure 2. *The main signifying functions in classical Japanese writing.*

In classical Japanese culture there is a dichotomy between Chinese writing (writing with Chinese graphs, *Kanji*, in Chinese word-order) on the one side, and Japanese writing (a cursive simplification of *Kanji* used phonetically, the *kana* writing) on the other. This view has been challenged, for example by Thomas LaMarre (1994: 254–255), who renders the whole dichotomy as “stylistic”. The use of Chinese writing was during Tsurayuki’s time considered masculine, since learning Chinese was restricted to males.¹ Women would write their diaries in Japanese (*yamato kotoba*) using the *kana* writing, whereas official writings were done in Chinese. *Kanji*, due to its visual complexity and ideographic functions, could be classified as a kind of ideo-visual writing; *kana* would be conceived as less visual, leaning more towards recording to spoken language.² The diary recording Tsurayuki’s voyage is written from the perspective of a woman and thus in *kana* to facilitate discussion of feminine topics, to give the text a broader audience, and so forth. This explanation has been countered, however; for example, by claims that Tsurayuki’s intent was to create fictionality, or a space to discuss poetry in Japanese, or to create a revolutionary, gender-bending text (cf. Miyake 1996: 42).

I will set aside for now such traditional views on visual-male-official and phonetic-female-unofficial linger, and analyse the first sentence of *Tosa nikki* as a subject’s encounter with a written sign. And I will try to let

the fictional, writing subject resist and affirm the signifying functions she will encounter.

Tsurayuki writes: おともすなる日記といふものを、おむなもしてみんとてするなり。

I'm not a native speaker so I will not try to translate this into English, but will settle for citing a few translations. The first is by Helen Craigh McCullough: "I intend to see whether a woman can produce one of those diaries men are said to write" (1990: 73). The next one is from Earl Miner: "It is said that diaries are kept by men, but I shall see if a woman cannot also keep one" (1969: 57). And last, the version of William N. Porter, printed in full cursive as a kind of subtitle: "It is generally a man who writes what is called a Diary, but now a woman will see what she can do" (1981: 13). My own translation in Finnish goes like this: "Kun kuulemma miehetkin pitävät päiväkirjoja, katsotaanpa, voisiko myös nainen sellaisen kirjoittaa". Since all these translations have their pros and cons, I feel it is necessary to keep them all in mind.

Let's start with a simple overview. The writing subject states: "I am a woman. I am writing in Kana. I am writing in my mother tongue." The connection between the *Kana*-writing, Japanese language, and femininity is affirmed. The writing subject is actualising her idea in graphic movement producing a material text. The graphic qualities of *Kana*-writing are present. Also affirmed is the connection between the visual image of *Kana*-writing and the meta-semiotic index referring to femininity and unofficiality. "I will write a diary, as men do." The comparison between masculine and feminine is posited by the use of a particle も connecting the words おとこ, male, and おんな, female. The particle も binds two things of slightly uncertain nature together. Thus, a mild doubt is resisting the act of writing, resulting in ambivalence: "Men write diaries. I can do what men do. I can write a diary. I'm not sure ... do men write diaries? I am not sure ... can I write a diary?"

But from where does this uncertainty stem? The female writer states that she has not yet completed her act of writing, so the outcome that she is poised to see by herself is still uncertain. Literally, she states that she is intending to observe the outcome of this undertaking. So only the successful act of creating a material text, a *post-written* sign, can convince her of her capacity to write a diary. The writing subject is referring to a completed act of writing, thus implying that what she aims at is *not* that the text be

read, or in my terminology, what she aims at is not a living written sign but a sign of completed action that does not primarily work as a written sign *per se*. So the main focus is moved away from written signification, transcending it, probably in the direction of the meta-semiotic: “I, as a woman, was able to write.” This lack of interest in reading the written gets support from the final sentence: “After all, I suppose the best thing to do is to tear up these sheets at once” (McCullough); “It really is best that I should tear up these papers and end at once” (Miner); “Well, well, – this must be torn up at once” (Porter).

The 知る connected to male writing activity refers to something that is general knowledge of an uncertain nature, or as commonly translated, to hearsay (the Nihon Koten edition also supports this interpretation) as to the uncertain status of male diary-writing. This brings me to the last point I wish to make about this example: knowledge of diaries written by men in Chinese is (at least implicitly) modalized auditorily, as resistant to the visuality and un-auditorality of Chinese writing. At the same time, *Kana*-writing has strong visual presence, and an implicit reference to visual modality can be traced in the 見る connected to female writing activity, as discussed before. This implicit “seeing” is present in all four translation I have presented (“I intend to see”; “I shall see”; “will see”; “katsotaanpa”), and the auditory nature of information on male-writing is present in three of the four (my own included: “men are said to write”; “It is said that”; “kuulemma”). So, the writing subject is resisting the visuality of *Kanji* and at the same time affirming the auditivity of *Kanji* and the visual nature of *kana*. The only visible *Kanji* in the sentence are present in the spelling of the word 日記 (a diary), which in this sentence is attributed to male writers. So male diaries and their writing gain a small, yet existing visual presence, in a kind of citation and implied to be something uncertain, thus on the side of the presence of female writing.

Notes

1. Tomiko Yoda (2000), for one, challenges these views.
2. Conflicting views are presented by Thomas LaMarre and Marshall J. Unger. LaMarre (2000) questions the visual/auditory division of Japanese writing. For his part, Unger (1990) challenges the whole idea of “ideogram” and thus the exceptional importance often accorded the visuality of Chinese script.

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Maarja Lõhmus

On publicity and reflexive journalism

The socio-semiotic longitudinal analysis of media

1. Publicity

A continuous change of socio-political structure is going on in society, which we are able to follow and understand to a greater or lesser degree. This change of structure includes both more universal and more specific elements. The indicators of structure and structural change include *public texts* that are freely and widely distributed in large numbers. Structural changes can be observed, for example, through the *public text flow* – the structure and essence of texts that are emphasized during various periods and in different forms of communication (e.g., newspapers, TV).

I would argue that the most universal philosophical functions of public texts are unchangeable. Bühler (1934) and Jakobson (1960) determined the parts and functions of textual presentation. Lasswell (model 1948) theorized communication as a dynamic process, where every preceding situation affects the following one. Different communication models stress different aspects of system and process. One aim of process models has been to predict the behaviour of the participants in communication (Wii 1994: 19). This approach can be extended to public texts as well: on the basis of flows of texts, supported by media examples, one can determine the kinds of behaviour that are accepted and produced in a society (Lõhmus 2002).

In the field of journalism and media, the principle of the “public” is pertinent, since it seems to make a difference in distinguishing between important and unimportant topics. The importance of *publicity*, which is not a separate feature but a central property of media, continues to grow society – politics and culture are directly dependent on it in different

aspects. The *space of publicity* includes the whole or totality of possibilities. The understanding of *public values and principles* has been a subject of scientific research since Jürgen Habermas published his *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* in 1962 (in English, 1989). According to Habermas, there are different “spheres”, including the public spheres of culture and politics. During some periods, there has been a certain balance between different “public spheres” (for example, in Estonia during the transitional period 1987–1991); at other times, the political and cultural public spheres clash (e.g., in Estonia, 1970–1987).¹ Habermas’s concept is a valuable one for the analysis of media coverage.

Our longitudinal research has focused on the *principle of the public*, *value systems* and *agents* (heroes) in newspapers. This research is based on the understanding that public values may differ in countries of different historical backgrounds. Our approach is comparative in nature, since we are attempting to show differences between the evolution of Western and Eastern types of public. In doing so we can ask how the *public* has been cultivated, how it has been *covered* in media, and how it has been presented as *a construction for the public*.

One way to proceed is by analysing the structural changes in the ways society has been communicated. What are the main variables, or “cultural indicators”, that are used to characterize the “public”? What are the main topics of discussion? How are stereotypes clarified? What are the basic values presented? Etc. We attempt further to elaborate theories of the public sphere and public text by studying media texts as public practices on a longitudinal scale. It is important to stress that reference to the “public sphere” in terms of “public text values” (and vice versa) is a new approach in the social sciences. A typology of “indicators for public values” allows us to compare on an inter-cultural level the roles of media, media-presented value systems, as well as the agents and reflexiveness of media. In addition to linguistics and semiotics, it is also important to consider social practices, social capital, and “fields of practices”, as investigated by Pierre Bourdieu. Those are key questions at the level of the individual, of a society, and of an entire regional structural (EU). Communication between agencies at those levels influences meanings, resources and general processes.²

2. *Sociopolitical myths*

We may start by identifying the main elements of a social system and its media practices, then analyse the functions of these elements. I have used this method in my research on the Soviet political system and Soviet media practices (Lõhmus 2002: 64). But the structure of the model is universal, and may be applied more globally. Since media publicity as a vital domain symbolically features the whole system, I propose the following indicators/elements on three main levels: 1) *political sphere – sustenance of the political structure*: how that structure, its institutions and functions are defined and how dominant/collective ideas are conceptualised; 2) *the sphere of practices*, such as collective participation and other social, material and practical actions: the motivations and roles available to individuals for action in society; 3) *the personal sociocultural sphere*: how individuals and their identities are defined.

I have used this approach in my study of censored media texts. These provided empirical proof for the assumption that different transformations of texts, in the process of their being adapted to political norms, enable us to infer a typology of changes (Lõhmus 2002: 63–65). It was my conclusion that the background for the typology is that of the general societal-hierarchical structure.

3. *Expectations and reflexive journalism*

Previously, similar basic questions have seldom been jointly asked (see Schramm 1954; Gerbner 1969; Merrill 1977). Sketching the general picture is one of my main aims: an attempt to visualise the entirety of the systems behind these media issues and, through media practices, to describe the general, underlying logic of systems. The key-word for “reflexive journalism” is *expectations*. We should mention the fact that *publicity* and people’s *expectations* don’t necessarily match. *Expectation* is no longer a reflexive term but part of a socio-political construction. Expectations are the main field of struggle for meaning between different political constructions and the reflective culture. In public, and as publicity, something is put forward to justify *imaginary expectations* (officially defined as *general expectations*); at the same time, the real expectations of real people are either ignored or have not been considered at all. Thus, a situation may occur where public-

ity does not take expectations into consideration but, rather, misuses the readiness for expectations. This principle – *misusing public attention* – is the basis of advertising, politics, and ideologies. Through the construction of publicity – mental publicity – it is possible to mould the thinking and behaviour of people and to impose different habits and new expectations.

To understand the structural changes in publicity, both theoretically and in practical terms, it is necessary to observe public texts over a more or less extended period of time. This treatment attempts to give an integral view of “publicity” in a post-structural paradigm, that is to say, to remove academic discussion from its dominant, normative status. Research dealing with longer periods of time has been rare in Europe (see Becker et al. 2000). For example, in the framework of the international research project “The Formation of National Identities in Post-war Europe”, patterns of identity-construction were studied in seven European countries (see Luostarinen 1998). The project centered only on media analysis, however, hence producing an insufficient interpretation by the omission of many other sources.

4. *Model for longitudinal analysis*

Two lines of analysis serve as the basis of the present research: 1) First is the analysis of media over a relatively long period of time, which provides a general overview and indicators for understanding what has happened. 2) Second, analysis of already completed sociological research, which provides the context for media analysis. We have chosen to study Estonian journalism during the period 1940–2005.

A difficulty in coding the essence of a long time-period arises from the fact that changes in society take place quicker than do changes in media. Despite the widespread belief that journalism calls forth new situations and determines our understanding of them, we take the opposite view as our point of departure: we understand *journalism as a stable structure*. The stability (or stasis) of journalism’s main elements forms the background against which it is possible to study essential changes in sociocultural practices, in how they are presented, and in the essence and focus of texts that are spread throughout society: the sociocultural environment that reflects and/or shapes reality.

Quantitative methods make it possible to answer the question “What is the situation?” But such methods are limited when it comes to explaining the causal reasons of a phenomenon, that is to say, “*Why* is as situation as it is?” Using texts as objects of research requires answers to both questions. The text as a research object is qualitative, as it includes cultural meanings, signs and codes. Thus, a methodology is needed that will open these meanings; qualitative text analysis is inevitable. The research becomes richer by a comparison of different periods and different objects, and analysis of chronological moments can be conducted with textual materials as well as questionnaires. In our research, a distinction is made between main dailies and “yellow” newspapers, so as to reflect as wide a circle of opinions as possible. Thus the analysis should include texts that consider readers as a *public* as well as those that consider them as a *crowd*.

Our aim has been to gather an ordinary and typical sequence of common newspapers, a general treatment which includes few exceptions that would influence the overall view. Every fourth year, starting from 1941, was chosen for analysis, as well as the year 1940 (1941, 1945, 1949, 1953, 1957, 1961, 1965, 1969, 1973, 1977, 1981, 1985, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2001 and 2005). The interval is neither too short nor too long. Every decade is represented by two years, and some decades by three years. For complicated crossover times, we have also coded the in-between years. Thus, we have coded the year 1940 – when a fundamental change occurred (occupation) in the structure of Estonian society – as well as the year 1991 (from the period 1989–1993), when the Estonian Republic was officially restored. The analysis interval is somewhat biased, because the time-period was set so that it would contain years considered important by Estonian sociologists.

The choice of newspapers includes: 1) a national, centrist paper (*Rahva Hääl*); 2) a local-level but similarly centrist newspaper that had a more reflective-critical role, *Postimees* (previously *Edasi*); 3) an even more localized paper, featuring aspects of everyday life, *Tee kommunismile/ Sakala*; 4) a national newspaper for young people, *Eesti Päevaleht* (previously *Noorte Hääl*); 5) a “yellow” newspaper, *SLÕhtuleht*; 6) the Russian daily *Sovetskaja Estonija*, representative of the official direction on the local level; 7) *Sirp ja Vasar/Sirp*, a cultural newspaper, established in 1940, mainly for publicity purposes. Only the main issues of these newspapers were selected, with supplements omitted. Not all material prescribed by the *coding instruction* was dealt with; only that from the first workday of

the week (Tuesday issue) and the weekend issue (Saturday). As for other issues, we started from page 3 of the instruction – we analysed only the essence. The same was done in the case of the first and last issues of the year. For the issues for other days, scrutiny began with on the second part of the coding instruction (“Article: General characteristics”). The percentage of material left out of the analysis (% of the whole newspaper) was determined only for two issues (Tuesday and Saturday). The materials left out of the analysis were those with formal content; for example, short news items and notices, advertising, PR materials, obituaries, official notices, TV and radio programming, pictorial news, weather predictions, etc. In the case of these materials, we determined what percentage of the paper they constituted. Approximation was used in determining this proportion – the basis of calculation was a percentage division of the paper into number of pages (how large a percentage one page made up). If the material omitted from analysis consisted of notices and news, then those items’ headings, page numbers, columns, genres and sources were mentioned. The unit of analysis was the article: a written work with a heading and clearly determined beginning and ending. If the piece was accompanied by illustrating materials (picture captions, tables, figures etc.), these were considered part of the article.

In deciding about the inclusion or omission of articles, it was essential to have knowledge of the coding instructions. I would like to emphasize that the whole newspaper was read. If it didn’t include more than five articles that were suitable for coding (including all criteria needed), it was considered unwise to add another five articles to get 10. The golden rule of coding was: code only the things available, don’t invent anything. All the formal and essential characteristics mentioned in the coding instructions were coded in the article. From each issue, articles with the following genres and themes were coded: 1) the central article of the newspaper (the one considered most important by the issue itself, determined by position, emphasis, etc.); 2) editorials; 3) letters from readers; 4) opinion articles (including humour and satire, if they remarked on society); 5) articles on political direction and action; 6) cultural identity articles; 7) articles on social problems; 8) human-interest articles; 9) articles on society and publicity; 10) other articles dealing with how people had changed, the duty of people towards other people/society, the shaping of collective thinking or

the action of the state/system in favour of a person, and other complicated topics; 11) other articles.

5. *Coding principles*

1. For the coding of a newspaper the whole newspaper was to be read. In coding, it was not necessary to search for all the meanings that might be in the text; only those that were *evident* were coded. In the case of the essential categories, coding could be more interpretative, but had to lead back to the text.

2. We departed from the *minimum* programme; that is, from the guideline that only the most important items should be noted.

3. The use of *latent class analysis* (Lazarsfeld & Henry 1968) allowed us to determine more general meanings in the text. Assumptions didn't have to be expressed exactly according to the coding instruction, but they had to have the same idea. For example, take this quotation from an article: "On some questions the reader receives less information than he would like to receive [...] what the future of our city, our country would be like. But also some international events need explaining. [...] That there has been little discussion about these problems isn't necessarily due to a lack of interest on the part of readers" (Soontak, *Edasi* 27.12.1968). At the base of this passage, claim No. 209 is coded from the instruction: *People are interested in politics*.

4. *Choice of coders and validation of coding*. Coding was complicated because in many cases it dealt with meanings and interpretations beyond those specifically stated in a text. This set high requirements for the six women coders, five of whom were Estonian and one Russian (who coded the Russian issues only), all of which started their work simultaneously.

5. *Table of coding*. The table of coding included both formal and content parameters of the issues, which had been categorized structurally. Explanation of the processes and changes in various category-indicators made it possible to survey changes in the structure and essence of publicity and, through this, also the general changes in the meaning process (see Table 1).

LEVEL	CODED INDICATORS
1. ARTICLE: GENERAL FEATURES	o) Ordinal number of the article a) Edition b) Date..(e.g.: 01.10.90.) f) Placement of article. <i>Write the page/pages number/s on which the article is placed; if placed on two or more pages the article is indicated by both numbers, separated by a comma.</i> g) Importance, decided on by article's placement and length h) Location of article i) Emphasized elements of the article. j) Rubric of article, coded in accordance with the newspaper definition k) Title of article (write out) l) Characteristics of article's title m) Keywords of article n) Genre of article o) Formality of article (how official, relationship to individual) p) Emotionality of article q) Character of expression r) Subject of event s) Proceedings and functions of article t) Author of article t.1. Author's name and reference (write out in mode written in the text). t.2. Gender of the author t.3. Status of the author u) Used info sources u.1. - u.3. Personal info sources u.1.1. - u.3.1. Name and reference of the source u.0. Gender of the personal source u.1.2. - u.3.2. Status of the source u.1.3. u.3.3. Source's origin u.4. Impersonal sources u.5. Sources mentioned in the article are in harmony or in conflict v.1. Institutions and organisations mentioned in article v.1.1. Evaluation the author gives to institutions and organisations
2. CATEGORIES OF CONTEXT	A. ROOM B. TIME D: VALUES. <i>The list below shows the measure of the features and and how they are valued. If in the list there is no value presented in the text, it should be written below the suitable level. If it is possible to define the value only on an abstract level, only a common category will be indexed (level 1.1 – 5.5.). NB! The values are not arranged in a hierarchical way, but according to how they are presented in the text; they are indexed in each common category: D.0. In this list the predominant value in the article/or defined as the most essential is determined (write the code). D.1.1. - D.1.3. Mark those which are valued (write the code)</i>
3. THEME AND MESSAGE	E. FIELD OF THEMES E: 1.1. - E.3.1. Fields of themes E:1.2. - E.3.2. Problems/dangers/casualties named in the field of themes (write out which ones) E:1.3. - E.3.3. In this field, achievements and success/victories are named (write out which ones) E.4. If shown in the text, what is considered to be useful (write out) E.5. If shown in the text, what is considered to be unprofitable (write out) F. CHANGES F.1. Is any ideal, hope or wish named in the article? F.2. In the article is there any mention that the situation has changed in comparison with earlier times? F.3. What changes have been mentioned in the article (the estimation of changes)? F.4. Is it stated in the article that the present situation must change? F.5. In the article, are there any suggestions on how the situation should change? F.6. What is presented in the article as progress, something worth achieving? (write out) G.1. Necessity of article for publicity at present moment (this is coded according to the coder's self-knowledge) G.2. Article's resonance and common interest in publicity at present moment (a coder estimates it according to self-knowledge) H. The size of the report is determined I. It is marked on the basis of whom to believe in the report.
4. NARRATIVE	A) Argument(s) presentation, balance and extension of argumentation B) Intertextuality of article – does the article point to earlier published reports? C) Article's symbolic context D. CAST-Characters D. Number of essential characters in article D.0. Me-character D.1. - D.3. Name and reference of acting person. D.1.0. Gender of character D.1.2. - D.3.2. Status of character D.1.3. - D.3.3. Origin of character, if it is clearly in the text or if it's inferred D.1.5. - D.3.5. Estimation given to the character by the author D.1.6. - D.3.6. The main indication of the character (write out) E. Groups. F) Kind of application to reader G) Roles given to reader H) Essential quotation if present in the text .I) Commentary on the text (show double-entendres if present in the text)
5. LCA	1. Publicity and its subjects 2. Political publicity and history 3. The Culture 4. Social structure and state's role 5. The individual and the society 6. Public media 7. Power 8. Individual <i>THEMES ANALYSING PUBLICITY DISCUSSIONS Arguments expressed in the text!</i>

Table 1. Table of coding: List of variables (Lõhmus & Kõuts-Klemm 2005).

6. Conclusion – Towards an analysis of the global media sphere

In conclusion, we created a typology of main indicators that could be used to describe changes in the public sphere. Applying these indicators to the content analysis of media, we described changes in the public sphere during different political regimes. Although the present database allows us to point out the most influential cultural indicators, it is important to

clarify whether they are unique or can also be applied in similar circumstances in different cultures. The *typology of cultural indicators* is universal in nature; it allows us to compare the role of media in creating the public sphere in different cultures. Second, we focused on the question of whether the reflectivity of media can be measured (for instance, via frequency of topics or intensity of attention paid to certain areas of life). Third, we questioned how the “public” is construed in mass media. Fourth, the fundamental aim of our project was to analyse the “public” as a representation of *collective reflectivity* and/or as a *construction*.

We focused on policies towards media as a sphere of interpretation in the twentieth century, the construction of social reality in different media cultures, and the comparative mapping of topics that represent the public in different countries (topics such as the economy, history, power, social stratification, journalism, “high” culture, popular culture). It is believed that the results of our efforts, based on practical-data analysis, will produce a new theoretical and critical/practical approach to the study of the mass-mediated public. The database will also be used for student projects that concentrate on several aspects of the evolution of the Estonian public sphere, as well as for international comparison.

Notes

1. Estonia was restored as an independent state in 1991. At the end of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s, Estonian media suddenly enjoyed a high level of autonomy. It was freed from externally defined functions set by a totalitarian regime and became regulated by the rules of the media themselves. The comparison of different media practices – totalitarian, autonomous, and liberal – could provide valuable material for future studies. Self-reflexive media with an active organisational role in social processes are in themselves something extraordinary.
2. On the other hand, there is an important question about the *reception* of texts and the *expectations* regarding public texts; on this matter, see Lõhmus 2007.
3. This article is part of a scientific project entitled “The Role of Media in Creating the Public Sphere of Estonia and the ‘Public’ in Estonian Media: 1954–2005” (ETF5854).

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Mobile communication: The misunderstood user

1. Introduction

In recent decades the digital revolution has reshaped habits and processes born with the Industrial Revolution, leading to the establishment of an advanced service-based society. Information and communication technologies (ICT), in particular the Internet and mobile phones, have become essential tools of everyday life and represent the enablers of a human-centric Information Society, in which citizens can actively participate through their communication capabilities (Viherä 1999). At the same time, ICT is also the engine of the global economy based on the paradigm of continuous economic growth, which favors a concept of user-consumer rather than citizen. Understanding the needs, wishes and orientation of users should be the starting point for the development of future technologies and Information Society policies. Human-computer interaction (HCI) and user psychology (Saariluoma 2004) represent suitable frameworks for the investigation of user behavior. Scientific knowledge and theories should be applied to create a convergence of perspectives on the identity and role of users, overcoming the current conflicting views of the main stakeholders. Through cooperation, human-centered strategies reconciling economic and social development could be outlined and implemented. In order to understand the current situation, knowledge is needed about users' needs and practices connected to the adoption of converging technologies. Important insight comes from the analysis of newspaper stories, which mirror the social consequences of political decisions and the market strategies of enterprises; in addition, they also reveal interesting initiatives suggested by citizens and negative social trends which should not be ignored. This article consists of two parts: in the following section,

we present data and methods of our analysis. Next, we illustrate and compare the main results, discussing their relevance for the development of the Information Society.

2. Data and methods

We investigated what kind of stories appear in newspapers about mobile communication and how users are described by journalists. Since the cultural dimension plays an important role, we decided to collect data from the online versions of “La Repubblica” and “Helsingin Sanomat”, the most popular newspapers in Italy and Finland. These two countries have different cultural backgrounds, but both are European Union members. We browsed the online archives of the newspapers searching for articles in which mobile communication had a central role. Due to the blurring boundary between the telephone, television, Internet and radio, we have often considered relevant such stories where mobile communication was implied though not explicitly quoted. Our search was restricted to a period of four months (September-December 2006). The huge number of articles was reduced to a subset by filtering the archive with a set of keywords connected to our search. In this way, we obtained 83 articles, 18 from the Finnish newspaper and the remaining ones from the Italian paper. In our investigation, we tried to identify the users described in the story, classifying them according to the role they played in the article (car driver, student, worker, consumer, etc.). The resulting categories are partially overlapping, and in some stories more actors were identified. In the analysis, we also tried to uncover the goal or task of the user, by interpreting the journalist’s point of view. The original versions of the articles were written in Italian and Finnish, hence the English text fragments reported here are free translations from the original texts done by the authors of this article.

3. Results

3.1. Mobile users as described by the Italian media

In the Italian corpus there were 10 main categories of users involved in stories of mobile communication (Fig. 1). Originally, there were more groups, but some have been aggregated; for instance, “mobile industry”

includes stories about telecom operators' strategies, phone manufacturers' new releases and other companies entering the mobile market. Similarly, the "consumers" category includes stories of different type of users, such as players of mobile games (6%).

Being creative innovators and early adopters of new technologies, the employment of mobile services by the young can indicate positive or negative trends, which should be carefully taken into account by both policy makers and enterprises. Stories about students represent 16% of the whole corpus; out of ten articles, nine highlight a negative use of mobile phones in schools and only one shows a positive example of cooperation between universities and the private sector to boost innovation. The following fragments illustrate the common practice of filming scenes of violence or sexual abuse during school hours using mobile cameras.




Figure 1. User categories in the Italian corpus.

[1] "Every student had a well defined role. The first one was kicking his schoolmate, the second writing Nazi-symbols on the blackboard, and finally, the third recording the scene with a mobile phone. The clip was some months later uploaded on the Internet." (16.11.2006)

[2] "Using video-phones (students) filmed violence on a 13-year old girl and sent the images to their friends, celebrating their bullying." (17.11.2006)

[3] "Five schoolmates were raping her in a park. A sixth person arrived during the violence, took out his mobile phone and filmed the scene." (18.12.2006)

Related articles discuss opinions of school directors, families and politicians about the need to increase control or ban mobile phones from schools.

[4] “*A thirteen-year-old student sharing indecent images or videos of other schoolmates is not capable of realizing what kind of problems his mistake can cause in the future, for instance, difficulties in career development or trouble in personal life.*” (12.12.2006)

Happily, students were also mentioned for their contribution as young innovators in the field of information and communication technology. Every year, the Nokia University Program gives awards for the best student project:

[5] “*Three students of the University of Pescara invented the holographic mobile phone, which is capable of displaying images, presentations and videos in 3D. [...] Their project could be commercially developed in a few years.*” (1.11.2006)

When the public and the private sector cooperate in a similar manner with citizens, advances can be made in the development of the Information Society. Unfortunately, most companies, and especially telecom operators, seem to be interested only in the average revenue per user (ARPU). Articles about the mobile industry represent 19% of the whole corpus, and 9% of them are about accusations of illegal operations committed by Italian operators, namely Vodafone and Tim. So far, the fight between mobile operators has had no winners. There is no doubt that the end-users are the real losers, as companies try to gain market shares through massive advertisement campaigns rather than developing and launching innovative services. In 5% of the stories, end-users are described as malicious hackers or crackers trying to take advantage of system security holes for gaining individual benefits. However, there are also stories about citizens’ initiatives seeking public good. For instance, mobile users had to pay a special tax each time they recharged their credit. In April 2007 the “re-charge tax” ceased to exist thanks to a political decision. However, the initiative for abolishing this tax, in use only in Italy, is due to Andrea D’Ambra, a student who set up a web-site, gathered almost 1 million signatures, and sent them to the European Commission. This result shows that self-organized individuals can and should have an impact on the development of the

Information Society. The significance of users has been acknowledged by American media, which often reports creative uses of ICT, in particular concerning the activity of bloggers and the Web2.0 phenomenon. For this reason, *Time* magazine has elected the ICT user as “person of the year 2006”. According to *Time* editorialist Lev Grossman, this is “an opportunity to build a new kind of international understanding, not politician to politician, great man to great man, but citizen to citizen, person to person” (Grossman 2006). Italian media have not ignored this important trend: 8% of the articles were about blogs and other Web2.0 technologies, while 13% were about citizens. In this context, the economic impact of grassroots innovations was often mentioned, but there were also many ordinary stories of disparity, with unskilled users presented as victims of the modern society.

[6] “*User-generated content will offer new opportunities to the economy and to the media, and will increase participation of individuals in public life. [...] The Web3 congress has confirmed the interest of enterprises for the Web 2.0, in which technology supports the active contribution of the user.*” (14.12.2006)

[7] “*A thirty-year-old person will have to pay a bill of 50 thousand for three movies downloaded online through a mobile connection. The user was connected for hours to the Internet, certain of having purchased a flat-rate contract with his mobile operator. On the contrary, the contract allowed 600 megabytes of monthly traffic at the fixed cost of 35 euros. Every extra downloaded kilobyte would be charged 0,2 cents.*” (19.12.2006)

3.2. Mobile users’ attitudes and practices in the Finnish media

In the Finnish corpus, there were 5 main categories of users involved in 18 different stories about mobile communication (see Fig. 2).

Most stories (26%) described mobile users as clients, customers or consumers, suggesting that individuals are considered only as a source of income. This type of thinking reflects a superficial view of users, who are also depicted as a large and homogeneous group of individuals, without different needs, wishes, capabilities or other distinctive features. This orientation towards a “faceless” user was found in 39% of the sample articles, which aggregate two categories: consumers and special groups, the last




Figure 2. User categories in the Finnish corpus.

including people who cannot communicate in the Finnish language, such as immigrants and some of the disabled. In 11 articles (61%) the journalists clearly describe the positive or negative user attitude and behavior towards mobile technologies.

[8] “*Finns have received fake bills via SMS. [...] Tricksters have sent fake bills to mobile phone users.*” (5.9.2007)

[9] “*The mobile phone is harmless – or is it? [...] Consumers are worried about the radiation emitted by mobile phones. [...] Studies don’t show any evidence that radiation could be harmful, but worried consumers are advised to use hands-free sets.*” (1.11.2006)

The selected fragments clearly show how users are presented either as victims or as guilty of dubious actions. For example, in the case of SMS loans, people are seen as unable to make their own decisions. Similarly, in the fraud concerning fake bills, users are described as easy to cheat. In contrast, mobile users who are concerned of radiation are advised to use hands-free systems, although studies are quite reassuring as to the safety of mobile phones. All in all, users are described in a rather negative, patronizing manner, being judged incompetent to make reasonable decisions.

[10] “*An online video shows a guard hitting a man lying on the ground. An outsider recorded the video in secret by mobile phone and uploaded it to the Internet, and it clearly showed maltreatment. Police used it as evidence.*” (15.11.2006)

People are still unaware of their rights or what is considered as suitable behavior. In this case, the video clip helped in the investigation of the case. But that does not justify the secret recording and uploading of the video to the Internet. There is an urgent need for clear rules about video recording in public places and showing them online. The story does not tell if the person who recorded the video received any punishment for having shared the clip online without any permission.

[11] “*Consuming service betrays background of products. [...] Ecological and ethical consuming is difficult. [...] A new service is under development to help selected consumers. [...] Upon request, detailed product information could be displayed on the cell phone.*” (20.9.2006)

In the last example, a new mobile service has been developed for consumers who want to verify the origin of products they are going to purchase; in particular, users are concerned about ecological and ethical product information. Volunteers collect information in public databases, so knowledge can be shared and spread via word of mouth. This is a good example of how technology can support social innovations and create a sustainable society, in which users can self-organize, thus playing an active role in content creation and promotion.

4. Discussion and final remarks

Our investigation shows that we are already experiencing the social consequences of digital convergence, which will become even more evident in the years ahead. As Marrone (2004: 198–201) showed in his socio-semiotic investigation of meaning and practices of mobile users in Italy, the mobile phone has a dual nature, positive in some cases and negative in others, which reflects the nature of the owner. This multiplicity, which is common to every technological innovation, leads to analogies between the mobile phone and the handgun. Both are small, portable, and to be hidden in the pocket. In addition, they both bring a sense of power and security to the user. In order not to use them wrongly, caution and responsibility are required. Like portable multimedia computers, modern mobile devices offer the user a wide choice of functions, and these will be even more various when ubiquitous technologies become available. The increasing complexity of understanding the interplay between ICT, users and society

make decision-making a real challenge. The goal of increasing the quality of life and social cohesion implies the finding of proper solutions to major challenges, which are human rather than technical.

Our analysis opens only a small window to the problem, but hopefully reveals some interesting ongoing trends. All in all, there are no major differences between Italian and Finnish stories, although media interest and type of articles are influenced by cultural background and journalistic tradition. Concerning the way users are conceptualized by enterprises, both Italian and Finnish stories of mobile communication agree on the idea of “faceless” users, valued only for their ARPU. In addition, because of marketing strategies and the digital divide, some users either cannot participate in the Information Society or become victims of services that should improve their lives. Our analysis has also shown the drawbacks to conceptualizing the user in a simple way. Moreover, the utilization of mobile cameras in Italian schools shows the need for technologies to provide freedom, but also a degree of control. Strategies should not be too strict or centralized, because that might prevent grassroots innovation and open circulation of ideas. So far, enterprises and institutions have adopted two different user conceptualizations: the former derives its models from marketing, and labels users mainly according to their consumer habits; the latter emphasize education, current issues, and preferences of the citizens. A unified view of the user is needed as a starting point for a convergence of policies; in this context, social capital theory (Portes 1998:1–24) could present a suitable framework, since it suggests that economic growth might arise from investment in strategies focusing on people and their social interactions. Because mobile communication is inherently social, our future research will investigate suitable design methodologies for mobile and other services aiming at reconciling social and economic development.

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Pentti Määttänen

Secondness and the limits of conventionality

Linguistic meanings are conventional. A string of letters can, in principle, mean anything. In practice, however, we cannot change linguistic meanings arbitrarily. We must accommodate our linguistic behaviour to prevailing practices, to certain conditions of using language. The question is what these conditions actually are.

The answer to this question depends on the concept of meaning. If the source of all meanings is language, the only limits of conventionality seem to be cultural traditions and historically formed discursive practices.

In Peircean semiotics, however, the notion of meaning is wider. Peirce writes that “what a thing means is simply what habits it involves” (*CP* 5.400).¹ Elsewhere he writes that “the meaning of any sign for anybody consists in the way he reacts to the sign” (*CP* 8.315). In other words, meanings simply are our habitual reactions to different sign-vehicles.

There are different sorts of habitual reactions. In classical pragmatism the emphasis is on non-discursive reactions. In semiotic terms this becomes apparent in Peirce’s notion of interpretant. It is often pointed out that the chain of interpretation may be endless, at least in principle if not in practice. Sign-vehicles are interpreted with interpretants. These interpretants may be new sign-vehicles which are interpreted with further interpretants and so on.

Peirce has, however, a special kind of interpretant, the final logical interpretant, which is a habit of action. “The deliberately formed, self-analyzing habit – self-analyzing because formed by the aid of analysis of the exercises that nourished it – is the living definition, the veritable and final logical interpretant” (*CP* 5.591; see also, 5.494). So the chain of interpretation is not necessarily endless. It may end in a habit of action, and a habit of action is realized in actual action. We act upon our interpretation, that is, we act according to a habit.

The perceived world is ultimately interpreted with our various habits and practices that take place in the same world. The mediating interpretative chain may be long, twisting, and multilayered. Many strands of this chain are not supposed to have much to do with our concrete practices. But this is not our concern here. We are dealing with meanings of non-linguistic sign-vehicles. From the viewpoint of Peirce's wide notion of meaning, ordinary objects of perception like trees, tables and buildings are meaningful entities in their own right, and these non-linguistic meanings exist as the habitual practices that are related to these objects.

When interpretation gets down to final logical interpretants, to habits of action, the perceived objects may be also objects of action. It is important to note that in Peirce's pragmatism action is not just something that follows from experience and deliberation. His concept of experience is wider (*CP* 1.336). Mere sense experience is not enough. The world is also experienced through action, where the dyadic resistance of Secondness has an effect on habit formation, that is, on the formation of beliefs and interpretations of the world. Generally speaking, the perceived world is also the world in which we act, the world of objects of action. This can be analysed with the following semiotic triangle (Määttänen 1993: 42).




Figure 1. The semiotic triangle.

In Figure 1, **S** stands for sign-vehicle, **O** for object and **I** for interpretant. The triangle illustrates the fact that for Peirce signs are three-place relations; they belong to the category of Thirdness. This also holds for non-linguistic meanings. The three-place relation, illustrated by the triangle, consists of two-place or dyadic relations. This denotes, among other

things, that in non-linguistic bodily practices we meet the resistance of hard facts. This resistance belongs to the category of Secondness.

Dyadic resistance limits the conventionality of non-linguistic meanings. This is pointed out by Horst Ruthrof, who distinguishes between base constraints and constraints imposed by community. Base constraints are necessary conclusions drawn from situations where signification systematically fails quite independently of the discursive practices of the linguistic community. For example, one cannot act consistently on the basis of the idea that people can drink quicksilver and stay alive (Ruthrof 1997: 24).

The Peircean approach allows for a more specific analysis. The meaning of a hammer differs from the meaning of a pen, and this difference in meaning is precisely the difference in the ways of using these objects. And this difference is based on the physical properties of these sign-vehicles. There are things we can do with a hammer but not with a pen, and vice-versa. In other words, the physical properties of non-linguistic sign-vehicles typically restrict the possible habits that can be related to them and, by the same token, the possible meanings of those sign-vehicles. The signifying processes are modified by the physical properties of these sign-vehicles or, to be more exact, by the dyadic resistance we meet in dealing with these sign-vehicles. This is slightly more sophisticated than in Ruthrof's example, where erroneous signification simply ends abruptly if realized as actual action.

The basic difference between Ruthrof's approach and the Peircean one concerns the way in which the non-linguistic base constraints (to use Ruthrof's term) may affect signification. Ruthrof speaks about situations where signification systematically fails, where one cannot act according to a text, and where it is better to modify the interpretation of perceptions (Ruthrof 1997: 24). The terminology suggests that signification is linguistic, based on text. What is missing in Ruthrof is an explicit account of how non-linguistic sign-vehicles could be meaningful in their own right, independently of linguistic meanings.

A similar example is Umberto Eco's way of speaking about prelinguistic meanings as common dispositions of signification which have an effect when we step into language (Eco 1999: 144). Independent lines of resistance give some limits to discourse (*ibid.*: 50), but the dynamical object that makes us create sign-vehicles will always remain a thing-in-itself (14).

In Peirce's view the dyadic resistance of hard facts is experienced through actual action. This resistance does not have the status of a Kantian thing-in-itself that cannot be experienced. The resistance is experienced as objective conditions of action to which action must be accommodated if it is to be successful. In other words, resistance shapes the habits of action; that is, it shapes the meanings associated with objects of habitual action.

In sum, every object of perception functions as a sign-vehicle provided some habits are associated with it. The shaping of meaning by virtue of dyadic resistance depends on the nature of the sign-vehicle; the latter's physical character restricts the habits (meanings) that can be associated with it. The meaning of linguistic sign-vehicles can be analysed along similar lines. The usage of things like words, tools and instruments surely belongs to the habits that they involve.

Ludwig Wittgenstein's famous theory, according to which meaning is use, is therefore closely related to Peirce's thinking. However, Wittgenstein's definition of meaning is often interpreted as applying only to linguistic expressions, and his examples of using tools and instruments are only an analogy from this point of view (Wittgenstein 1953, I: sec. 11, 14). Wittgenstein's notion of language-game can be interpreted, crudely speaking, in two ways. It is possible to maintain that language-games contain only linguistic moves and that the relation between language and world is no longer an issue. Linguistic expressions have relations to other linguistic expressions, and that is all there is to it. Another line of interpretation stresses, however, that the use of linguistic expressions takes place in the context of non-linguistic practices; that there are also non-linguistic moves in language-games. This is how Wittgenstein puts it: "I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the 'language-game'" (Wittgenstein 1953, I: sec. 7).

This latter interpretation fits well in with Peirce's definition, which is certainly more than an analogy. Tools and instruments are sign-vehicles, and their meanings are the habitual ways of using these instruments. As already pointed out, this notion of meaning can be pushed further to entail that objects of perception in general are meaningful entities which are ultimately interpreted in terms of habits of action, although we don't "use" all these objects in the same sense as we use tools and words. The crucial difference between linguistic and non-linguistic sign-vehicles boils down to the fact that the physical properties of letters and words are required

only for the possibility of distinguishing between letters and words. It is enough to see the difference between them. These physical properties do not restrict the meanings (uses) of them. But in the case of non-linguistic sign-vehicles the habits of using them are shaped by objective properties of the sign-vehicles and by agents as biological organisms. In other words, the dyadic conditions of this interaction, namely brute force and hard facts, muscular effort and resistance, shape the meanings that can be associated with non-linguistic sign-vehicles; but this is not the case with language.

If we are to be consistent, however, linguistic meanings are not independent of non-linguistic ones. Non-linguistic meanings are not conventional in the same sense as linguistic meanings can be, in principle. Thus even if it is possible to have meaningful thoughts independently of non-linguistic meanings, it is not possible to act upon those thoughts if they are not consistent with the non-linguistic meanings. In this sense, the conventionality of linguistic meanings is restricted by the same dyadic constraints as non-linguistic meanings. The constraints set up by the physical environment can, of course, be changed with the help of tools and machines. It is possible, then, to change the objective conditions of action in many ways, but this does not remove the fact that dyadic resistance is always involved in concrete interaction with the environment. Hard facts cannot be avoided. The dyadic resistance of Secondness also restricts linguistic meanings.

Linguistic and non-linguistic meanings form a multilayered system in which linguistic meanings are based on non-linguistic meanings – not the other way round. Of course, natural language is a powerful tool for writing poems and fairy tales, not to mention science fiction. But if the purpose is to discuss the relation between world and language, then linguistic meanings must be adapted to non-linguistic ones. The semantic relations from language to the physical world proceed through non-linguistic, meaningful practices.

Linguistic meanings are based on non-linguistic hard facts, but it is still possible to maintain that the experienced world is inevitably interpreted and meaningful. From the viewpoint of Peirce's wider notion of meaning, this does not entail that language carves up the world into meaningful objects of experience. The basic vehicles of interpretation and signification are given already by our corporeal interaction with the natural environment.

The basic requirement of non-linguistic signification is our embodied existence as living biological organisms. The categorization of the world into middle-sized everyday objects is given by this precondition of signification, and this categorization is an *interpreted* categorization by virtue of non-linguistic meanings; that is, by virtue of habits of action related to these everyday objects.

Linguistic signification is based on non-linguistic meanings, and they, in turn, are based on our embodied existence as living organisms. There is not much evidence for disembodied signification. Conscious human beings tend to be living bodies. Proponents of hard naturalism sometimes refer to the fact that categorization of the physical world is studied by the science of physics, which has not yet resolved the problem of the ultimate structure of matter (see Määttänen 2006). However, the distinction between liquids, solids and gases has not ceased to be a scientific distinction, and such a distinction will continue to be made in the foreseeable future. Indeed, it is hard to imagine what sort of scientist (after investigations that are equally hard to imagine) would try to convince us that this distinction is unscientific, outdated and abolished. The same fate would concern the existence of the hypothetical scientist as a human being.

Cartesian arguments in favour of disembodied consciousness will not do, either. It is a fact that one can doubt the existence of one's body, but one cannot doubt the doubt. However, mere doubt does not really annihilate the body. The conceptual difference between doubting the body and doubting the doubt does not imply an ontological difference between *cogito* and body. The problem is the same as in hard naturalism. There is not much evidence for the existence of *cogito* without a body, but, unfortunately, there is an enormous amount of evidence for the existence of bodies without *cogito*. The positive conclusion is that our embodied existence as living organisms is a permanent condition and a prerequisite of cognition based on meanings, linguistic or non-linguistic.

Note

1. Reference to Peirce's papers are designated *CP* followed by volume and paragraph number.

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Juan Magariños de Morentin

Los bordes de la semiótica

La pregunta central que construye al temática de nuestra Mesa Redonda puede formularse en los siguientes términos: ¿En qué tiene que cambiar la semiótica, para seguir siendo (¿o para llegar a ser, de una vez por todas?) un instrumento eficaz para explicar la producción, interpretación y transformación del significado de los fenómenos sociales?

Como un comienzo de respuesta posible, me animaría a decir que la semiótica, si pretende llegar a explicarlos, antes que referirse al resultado logrado y al concepto construido, tiene que acompañar, sistematizar o incluso promover la dinámica de los concretos procedimientos según los cuales, en determinado momento de determinada sociedad, se considera que se producen, se interpretan y se transforman los significados que, en ese momento de esa sociedad, se atribuyen a los múltiples, diversos y dispersos fenómenos que constituyen el universo de lo social. O sea, habría que explicar el proceso de su producción para poder llegar a comprender el valor semántico diferencial del resultado; lo que implica admitir al significado como un resultado históricamente situado y no como una sustancia esencial y universal.

Según esto, la primera tarea de la semiótica, desde el punto de vista lógico, consiste en explicar, no ya el significado de los fenómenos sociales, sino, antes que nada, el proceso de *producción, interpretación y transformación* de tal o de tales significados. O sea, la semiótica tiene que poder explicar, siempre en el sistema de la racionalidad vigente en determinado momento de determinada sociedad, cómo se producen, se interpretan y se transforman, en ese momento y lugar, los significados, para, así, poder llegar a explicar adecuadamente (o sea: según la racionalidad del momento histórico y de la comunidad en el que formula sus enunciados y dando cuenta eficaz del fenómeno que está en condiciones cognitivas de percibir) por qué a determinados fenómenos se los percibe como portadores de determinados significados posibles.

Así que, por el momento, voy a irme refiriendo, preferentemente, a las condiciones de *producción, interpretación y transformación* del o de los significados, antes que a las características específicas constitutivas del *valor* del o de los significados de algún determinado fenómeno social, en su correspondiente sistema semántico.

También propongo, a la reflexión conjunta con el lector, considerar si corresponderá (como lo pretendo) establecer que, de estas tres condiciones, la fundamental es la de *transformación*. Porque el significado que, en determinado momento de determinada sociedad, permite percibir la existencia de un determinado fenómeno, *es un estado de tránsito*, que se hizo posible por haber existido un antes, desde el cual el significado que en él tenía ese fenómeno, contenía también, en sus bordes, la posibilidad de que se formulara el que tiene ahora. Constatación de una inaprensible actualidad, porque apenas comprendida y, en cuanto tal, percibida, ya se desborda hacia un después que, parafraseando la cita que Foucault hace de Althusser (1969: 12), revelará a este presente, cuando ya sea pasado en el futuro inmediato, como ideológico, ya que ese futuro consistirá tan sólo en la posibilidad de formulación de significaciones diferentes, dialécticamente superadoras, que harán ver otros fenómenos, en el mismo espacio donde está el que se percibe en el presente, el cual también así lo había hecho con los que se percibían en su pasado.

Éste es el sentido de *la interacción constructiva* a la que me refería antes y en función de la cual consideraba que, en el borde de los pensamientos posibles en un determinado momento, están, todavía *borrosos*, los nuevos pensamientos que requerirán de las nuevas formas semióticas que sonaban, todavía, como *furia* expresiva en el borde de las semiosis disponibles en este momento, al que, en lo fugaz de su transición, consideramos presente, de modo que esas nuevas semiosis permitan percibir, en un mundo futuro, fenómenos a cuya existencia no accede nuestro conocimiento presente, por encontrarse todavía en el borde *entrópico* de lo indiferenciable. En definitiva, sólo digo algo tan viejo como que el objeto de conocimiento de la semiótica consiste en explicar la transformación histórica del significado, entendiéndose aquí historia como la emergencia *del cambio*. La cuestión es asumir su dinámica, su racionalidad (actual y transitoria) y construir los modos fugaces de explicarlo.

He centrado la problemática de la semiótica en la exploración explicativa de las condiciones de producción, interpretación y transformación de

los significados, tal como estos existen en un momento determinado de un grupo social determinado y reclamaba, para la transformación, la calidad de ser fundamental respecto de las otras dos condiciones. La transformación construye la historia y, a su vez, la historia es una característica constitutiva del ser humano: no hay hombre/mujer si no es como una transitoria función entre lo que fue y lo que será, nunca detenida en el presente de algún ser definitivo, hasta que llega su muerte y, aún entonces, sometido a la historia de las interpretaciones que de ese ser continúen haciéndose.

Pero ahora, lo que propongo a los lectores es que me acompañen en la exploración de la interpretación, en cuanto trabajo necesario para la producción de la transformación. Una *interpretación transformadora* habrá de consistir en la producción de otro significado derivado del anterior, que ya no será el mismo, y, por tanto, en otra posibilidad de percepción del anterior fenómeno social, que ya no será el mismo. Si la transformación, como he tratado de plantear, se proyecta en una *dialéctica cronológica*, la interpretación, como espero que lleguemos a ver, se proyecta en una *dialéctica mental* (e incluso cerebral, o sea, neurológica, así como también situada (Suchman 1987). De este modo, propongo ubicarnos en un borde del concepto de interpretación, para explorar su comportamiento dinámico o sea transformador. En este sentido, considero que existen dos direcciones, relativamente autónomas, de investigación semiótica.

Por una parte, un nuevo, cronológicamente, estímulo perceptual (por ejemplo, algo visto o tocado u oído, etc., en determinado momento, en el mundo) solicita, en la memoria asociativa, la posible identificación de un atractor, en cuanto residuo de la significación identificadora de otra percepción ya histórica, que, ahora, se propone como interpretación de ese nuevo estímulo; o sea, se propone a tal significación histórica como la significación atribuible a la configuración existencial que se está percibiendo.

Por otra parte, en un recorrido inverso al anterior, la actualización, en la memoria asociativa, de la significación de una percepción histórica, permite, en el órgano sensorial afín a la significación de esa percepción, la recuperación actualizada de determinados estímulos sensoriales históricos (en su estado coyuntural de transformación) que originan, en el órgano sensorial involucrado, una configuración imaginaria.

La primera situación es aquella en la cual se percibe algo y, además, se sabe qué es lo que se percibe; en un sentido semejante, Peirce diferencia entre el “perceptum” en cuanto sensorialmente activador pero sin inter-

pretación que lo identifique y el “juicio perceptual”; por ejemplo en CP 7.630, siendo esta primera situación ya el caso del juicio perceptual. Esta capacidad de identificación de algo en el mundo depende de los resultados que aporte la comparación de la imagen sensorial registrada (visual, táctil, olfativa, etc.) con el atractor o registro mnemónico, o sea, con las imágenes sensoriales anteriormente registradas y almacenadas en la memoria y en función de las cuales la interpreta de alguna de estas tres maneras: (1) o coincide totalmente: vuelve a verse lo ya visto; (2) o se ve a lo que se ve como una modificación de algo ya visto; (3) o no hay registro que coincida en parte alguna con lo que estaría propuesto a la percepción; imposibilidad, esta última, de saber que se está viendo (no ya qué sea lo que se ve, sino que se anula la posibilidad de ver lo que se está viendo, ya que ver es identificar e identificar es reconocer). El proceso de *conocer*, en este sentido, consiste en la posibilidad (o en ser capaz) de percibir lo diferente, mientras que el proceso de *reconocer* consiste en reconducir lo diferente propuesto a la percepción a lo ya conocido, lo cual es desconocer lo que de nuevo tiene lo percibido (y algo recupero en esto de la reflexión del althusseriano filósofo argentino Saúl Kars [1971]). En el caso (1), la interpretación de lo percibido duplica lo ya conocido (lo reconoce sin incrementar el conocimiento). En el caso (2), la interpretación de lo percibido expande lo ya conocido (permite conocer a lo que se percibe como una posibilidad antes desconocida, por inaccesible, en el registro de la memoria asociativa; lo que implica expandirlo hasta llegar a sus bordes). En el caso (3), no hay posibilidad de conocer lo que se percibe, salvo (a) a costa de negar la existencia de lo percibido o (b) a costa de producir una ruptura que reestructure la memoria asociativa según reglas y relaciones diferentes a las que hasta entonces estaban disponibles, lo que implica producirlas a partir de los bordes de aquellas previamente disponibles; ruptura necesaria para generar una nueva forma de conocer, en la que tenga cabida la interpretación de lo percibido como un nuevo conocimiento (o sea, ya bien (a) se niega la percepción, ya bien (b) se niega el sistema con el que se la pretendía interpretar; lo que implica la presencia de un nuevo sistema como sucesor del precedente).

La segunda situación es *aquella en la cual alguien imagina algo*. La capacidad de imaginar depende de la posibilidad de actualizar recuerdos de efectivas percepciones sensoriales precedentes. Se mezclan, se transforman para construir un imaginario posible, pero en definitiva su materia prima

(mnemónica) preexiste. Con esto se rechaza el tradicional argumento de Z. W. Pylyshyn (1973), cuando niega la existencia de imágenes mentales (sustituyéndolas por secuencias proposicionales) por considerar absurda la presencia, en el cerebro, de una “pantalla” a la que alguien esté contemplando desde su asiento. Ironías y metáforas al margen, considero que las terminales sensoriales (retina, papilas gustativas, tímpano, etc.) son no sólo el receptáculo (la “pantalla”) que registra y transfiere, a las localizaciones específicas del cerebro, la entrada de los estímulos sensoriales externos (percibir), sino también la “pantalla” sobre la cual, desde la memoria asociativa, en una segunda función de estimulación, se proyectan las huellas perceptuales de estímulos sensoriales históricos ya internalizados (imaginar), las que son “contempladas” (como en un rebote) por la misma memoria asociativa, en su primera función de reconocimiento.

Tanto al percibir una entidad del entorno, como al imaginarla, nos ubicamos en el borde, en el primer caso del conjunto disponible de las variaciones efectiva e históricamente percibidas, para poder percibir lo diferente en lo efectivamente existente (percibo a partir de lo que conozco), y en el segundo también en el borde del mismo conjunto disponible de las variaciones efectiva e históricamente percibidas, para reproducir, en el órgano sensorial correspondiente, las huellas dejadas en el registro neuronal por percepciones anteriores (imagino a partir de lo que he percibido). Todos los órganos sensoriales son “de ida y vuelta”: proyectan en el mundo lo que pueden identificar por correlación y contraste entre lo efectivamente percibido y la información registrada en la memoria asociativa; y proyectan sobre el órgano sensorial (sin necesidad de percepción efectiva) configuraciones perceptuales (imaginería), por activación cerebral de la información registrada en la memoria asociativa.

La realización de esta doble tarea de registro: percibir/proyectar (lo que ya no es lo percibido) y doble tarea de estimulación: proyectar/imaginar (lo que ya no es lo proyectado) es la que encuadra las posibilidades transformadoras de la operación de interpretación. Sobre ella, tras atender a la producción enunciativa de las semiosis socialmente vigentes/posibles en una determinada sociedad y en un momento histórico determinado de esa sociedad, volveré más adelante, para, en definitiva, tratar de identificar y describir las operaciones semióticas, que desde los bordes de la semiótica histórica, permitan explicar, en su dialéctica cronológica, mental-cerebral

y enunciativa, el proceso de la producción dinámica de la significación de los fenómenos sociales.

Y éste sería el *borde de la semiótica*: a partir del campo propio, construido con la explicación del significado de los fenómenos sociales (su estado vigente de representación/interpretación) se alcanzan sus bordes, como delimitación originada a partir del límite a la vigencia de las operaciones de producción, interpretación y transformación, en el campo propio, de las significaciones disponibles.

En diversas oportunidades he hecho alusión al mito adánico como metáfora de la primera producción semiótica (en nuestra cultura occidental) y, con ella, primera proyección, desde la estructura conceptual del ser humano (ver Ray Jackendoff 1983: 135–159), de la existencia ontológica de las entidades del mundo: “... y Yahveh Dios formó del suelo todos los animales del campo y todas las aves del cielo y los llevó ante el hombre para ver cómo los llamaba, y para que cada viviente tuviera el nombre que el hombre le diera. El hombre puso nombres a todos los ganados, a las aves del cielo y a todos los animales del campo ...” (Génesis 1, 19–20). Dejo para otra oportunidad el tema del fracaso de esta primera tarea semiótica, con la que Dios pretendía que el hombre dejara de estar solo; lo que se revirtió cuando el hombre se encontró con lo que Dios, en un segundo intento, le había preparado especialmente y completó aquella primera producción semiótica nombrando a esa nueva presencia: “entonces éste [el hombre] exclamó: ‘... ésta será llamada mujer [varona] porque del varón ha sido tomada’”; con lo que, además, se instaura al varón como punto de referencia en nuestra historia (occidental). Lo que propongo a la reflexión es esta muestra de la eficacia de la producción semiótica (en este caso, del discurso): todas las aves del cielo y todos los animales del campo adquieren existencia ontológica al ser nombrados por el hombre, y lo mismo ocurre, en este relato, con la mujer. Antes de que el hombre los hubiera nombrado, en virtud de haber sido nombrados por Dios, todos tenían existencia óptica, pero la posibilidad de identificarlos, o sea, de atribuirles significado y sentido en función de la identidad diferencial de cada uno, sólo se da a partir de que el hombre les hubo atribuido un nombre. Hay, en esta metáfora, una cómoda situación inicial: nada tenía nombre y ningún nombre había sido usado previamente. La semiótica (discurso verbal, en este caso) no tenía historia y, por eso mismo, el mundo tampoco; hasta que, mediante la generación de un femenino, se transforma la semiosis, lo que hace posible la identifi-

cación de una nueva presencia, que se diferencia de las preexistentes dando lugar al primer cambio y con él a la historia.

Pero, al pasar de la sorpresa retórica a la pretensión explicativa, se enfrenta una situación diferente. El mundo que percibe (reconoce/conoce) el ser humano consiste en un conjunto de entidades, que resulta determinado, a cada momento de su historia, por las posibilidades enunciativas (reproducción/producción) verbales, visuales, táctiles, etc. proporcionadas por el conjunto de semiosis de las que dispone en ese mismo momento de su historia.

Si reproduce lo que antes ya podía enunciar, reconoce lo que podía percibir y tal como ya antes podía percibirlo; si produce nuevas formas enunciativas que antes no podía enunciar, conoce lo que no podía percibir y como antes no podía percibirlo. Hay una correlación fuerte entre lo enunciable y lo percible. Y este orden sería también ineludible e inalterable: tengo que poder enunciar para poder percibir y no a la inversa. No es la nueva percepción la que produce la necesidad de una nueva enunciación (aunque ello resulte contraintuitivo); para estar en condiciones de percibir algo diferente, el hombre tiene que saber que lo puede percibir; de lo contrario, lo negará como percepción, negándose a percibirlo. Inversión de otra metáfora religiosa clásica: la que relaciona a Santo Tomás con el Cristo resucitado; no se trata de que si lo viera lo creería, sino que deberá creer para poder ver.

Si está dispuesto a modificar la estructura de su conocimiento, por intuir que puede nombrar otras entidades a cuya percepción no accede, es que ya se situó en el borde de sus posibilidades semióticas y, será en función de los contenidos y relaciones de transformación enunciativa que pueda proporcionarle ese borde como aceptará modificar su estructura cognitiva para poder ver lo que supone que está dejando de ver. De alguna manera, esto implica una teoría de la creación, que es en lo que consiste la interpretación transformadora.

Entonces, podríamos ir dejando el campo de la epistemología semiótica (pese a todo lo que queda por establecer y explicar) e irnos introduciendo en el de una metodología semiótica. En función de lo vengo diciendo, tenemos dos accesos posibles a la problemática metodológica, según que dirijamos nuestra investigación al momento previo o al momento posterior respecto del momento en el que se produce el cambio.

(1) En el momento previo, si me interesa proponer (crear, producir) una enunciación semiótica (en cuanto signo) que transforme una determinada percepción semiótica (en cuanto objeto semiótico): ¿Cómo puedo conocer y utilizar las nuevas características que habrá de tener la nueva semiótica? ¿Cómo identificar los contenidos y las relaciones que constituyen los bordes de la semiótica actual para, desde allí, descubrir los contenidos y las relaciones que constituyen el núcleo de la nueva semiótica, que todavía no existe? ¿O todo lo que haga continuará siendo, tan sólo, una duplicación o una expansión de la actual?

(2) En el momento posterior, si me interesa explicar de dónde proviene una determinada enunciación semiótica (en cuanto signo) a la que atribuyo la eficacia de haber transformado determinada percepción semiótica (en cuanto objeto semiótico): ¿Cómo puedo identificar las características y la forma de utilización de la semiótica de donde proviene la enunciación semiótica en estudio? ¿Cómo identificar los contenidos y las relaciones que constituyen el núcleo de la semiótica actual para, desde allí, descubrir los contenidos y las relaciones que constituyeron los bordes de la semiótica precedente de la que provino la nueva enunciación? ¿O la enunciación semiótica en estudio resulta ser, tan sólo, una duplicación o una expansión de la precedente?

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Charalampos Magoulas

Figures rhétoriques: Obstacle ou facilitation de la communication ?

Introduction

L'objet du troisième livre de la *Rhétorique* (*Περί Λέξεως*) d'Aristote est destiné à l'étude des mots, des jeux de langage et des formes particulières qu'un orateur utilise dans un discours persuasif. Les *enthymèmes*, les *lieux*, les *métaphores* font partie du vocabulaire spécialisé d'Aristote et se décrivent comme des codes ou des signes d'une valeur esthétique et sémantique. Ce sont des formes d'expression facilement reconnaissables et d'une efficacité donnée, lorsqu'il s'agit des schémas répétés dans la majorité des discours.

Il est évident que la structure et la forme de l'argumentation ne peuvent que suivre les courants intellectuels et culturels de chaque époque. Les *enthymèmes*, les *lieux communs* et les *exemples* évoqués appartiennent à la connaissance encyclopédique de l'auditoire. Les *métaphores* et les autres figures rhétoriques, comme les *anaphores*, les *prolepses*, les *hyperboles* doivent être formulées conformément aux schémas conceptuels de la société ; si non, ils n'atteignent pas leur objectif (*Rhétorique*: 1404b 11–20).

Par schémas conceptuels s'entendent les modalités d'interprétation des significations dans une certaine société et pendant une certaine époque. Bien que l'interprétation d'un énoncé soit une affaire plutôt personnelle, il y a des normes collectives qui indiquent grosso modo les limites des sens littéraux et l'obligation de l'interpréter métaphoriquement. Cependant, dans le même passage de la *Rhétorique* le philosophe, après avoir averti les auteurs que les schémas originaux (*ξενικά*, étrangers) introduits dans le discours, peuvent ne pas être compréhensibles et, par conséquent, éloigner les auditeurs, propose aux rhéteurs l'utilisation des schémas métaphoriques.

Une métaphore bien amenée élève le niveau esthétique du discours et surprend agréablement le récepteur en élargissant le cadre cognitif de la communication. La question qui se pose alors dès l'analyse préscientifique du discours dans l'Antiquité jusqu'à l'analyse sémiotique de toute espèce de discours est si les figures rhétoriques constituent effectivement un facteur qui facilite la communication ou un obstacle qui crée un terrain favorable pour des malentendus.

1. *Les cadres théoriques*

1.1. Aristote et Perelman

La génération et l'interprétation de la métaphore sont un exemple de l'interaction entre les interlocuteurs pendant la communication. Le degré d'intégration de la signification de la métaphore par le récepteur, en tant que figure qui se réfère à une autre situation – transport de sens et de propriétés –, indique le degré de sa participation mentale et sentimentale aux événements décrits. Si le récepteur est en position d'interpréter correctement une métaphore et saisir le nouveau sens attribué aux mots, il est en position de concevoir l'énoncé comme un ensemble. La vertu à propos de l'utilisation de la métaphore réside en trouver la similarité ou l'analogie entre deux choses ou deux situations et départager seulement les propriétés qui rendent cette analogie légitime et par conséquent acceptable (*Poétique*: 1458a 25–31 et 1459a 4–8 ; *Rhétorique*: 1405a 9–13). La théorie, sur laquelle Aristote fonde ses observations sur le style, se récapitule dans le fait incontestable que le discours, en dehors de son attribut cognitif, en tant qu'énonciation d'une connaissance de caractère informatif, provoque chez le destinataire une modification de son état sentimental. En termes de rhétorique, le discours fonctionne en tant qu'un acte d'énonciation à la fois comme porteur d'un cadre de connaissances et comme le stimulus qui place les auditeurs dans une situation émotionnelle. L'information et la passion sont incontestablement deux logiques du discours chez Aristote.

Selon Perelman il y a une certaine correspondance entre le niveau de l'orateur et ce des auditeurs (1958: 20). La parole doit être ajustée aux besoins, intérêts et connaissances du public; autrement, le rhéteur développera une argumentation inaccessible et peu intéressante, alors moins convaincante. À chaque ensemble social, correspond un mode différent

d'expression. Hors des intentions qui déterminent l'argumentation sur un sujet quelconque, il existe toujours l'interaction de l'orateur avec son audience, qui doit être adaptée aux particularités des destinataires pour que l'approche préalable soit achevée. C'est une thèse déjà exprimée chez Aristote où le philosophe a fait allusion aux formes propres à certains groupes sociaux.

1.2. Les fonctionnements du langage chez Austin

Pour qu'une communication soit réussie, il doit y avoir un minimum des présuppositions: une langue commune et en plus un usage de cette langue par le locuteur, compréhensible pour son audience. Austin parle des trois fonctionnements du langage: la locution qui se réfère à l'action de parler, l'illocution qui se réfère à la manière avec laquelle s'utilise un idiome et la perlocution qui se réfère aux conséquences psychologiques que l'utilisation du langage entraîne pour les auditeurs (1976: 119). En apparence, ce qui est important quant à l'acte de communication est la perlocution, parce que ce fonctionnement du langage dévoile ce que le locuteur veut susciter chez le destinataire, le comportement qu'il veut provoquer. Nonobstant, comme les intentions d'un locuteur ne sont pas toujours évidentes et comme les moyens qu'il utilise pour atteindre ses objectifs ne sont pas toujours efficaces et parfois échouent, ce qui vraiment conditionne les résultats de la communication est le fonctionnement illocutoire du langage, ce que le locuteur inévitablement exprime (incitation, conseil, interdiction, invective, désapprobation). Dans ce point, on peut évoquer l'approche d'Eco sur l'interprétation des signes selon le comportement qu'ils introduisent chez le récepteur et sur la classification des intentions qui créent le champ des suggestions dans la communication (auctoris, operis et lectoris). Dans ce cas, le fonctionnement illocutoire, qui est fondamentale pour la détermination des conséquences du discours, dépend primordialement de l'intentio operis et en second lieu des autres intentions.

1.3. Intentions et thymique

Comme on a déjà remarqué, Aristote présente dans la *Rhétorique* la clarté de l'énoncé en tant que condition essentielle pour que le rhéteur arrive à persuader son auditoire. Eco, bien qu'il ait, lui aussi, parlé d'un lectorat

concret, lequel va «consommer» son œuvre et par conséquence conditionne sa génération, a exploré la question de l'ouverture de l'œuvre sous les perspectives à la fois d'un message qui transmet une information et d'une création esthétique. La différence entre les deux penseurs se trouve dans l'objet cognitif qu'ils explorent: Aristote étudie le discours (argumentatif), tandis qu'Eco étudie le texte (littéraire).

Fontanille dans la *Sémiotique et littérature* (1999: 16) explique pourquoi il est nécessaire de distinguer méthodologiquement le discours du texte. Le discours présente une cohérence sémantique qui se fonde sur l'unidimensionnalité de l'énoncé. Il a un objectif concret, et, pour qu'il soit atteint, toute ambivalence est exclue. Tout au contraire, le texte, en admettant des significations diverses selon le contexte sémantique, présente une pluridimensionnalité qui lui permet d'encadrer l'aspect sémantique d'un certain discours. La signification d'une phrase ne peut pas être l'addition de la signification des mots qui la composent. Par conséquent, la signification d'un discours ne peut pas être l'ensemble de la signification de ses parties. L'univocité du discours est assurée par le fait que son interprétation finale ne s'effectue pas en examinant chaque partie indépendamment de l'autre, mais comme un ensemble organiquement lié.

Chez Fontanille, la signification et l'objectif du discours constituent un principe conformément auquel se forment les logiques du discours: l'action, qui se base sur la production de simulacres, la passion qui est le résultat de l'évocation d'un événement dans l'espace-temps du discours et la cognition qui est la connaissance du monde cognitif du discours, produit de l'entendement des récepteurs (1998: 256–257). Il partage alors la triple fonction du discours comme elle est proposée par Aristote: présenter une action (imitation de la réalité, mimésis, enthymème), susciter l'état sentimental du spectateur (terreur, pitié, psychologie de l'auditoire du discours argumentatif) et transmettre une connaissance ou un mode de pensée (dialectique et argumentation).

Le style selon la pensée de Greimas et de Fontanille est un passage à la signification de l'énoncé, qui en termes de génération du message peut assumer la configuration de la forme du contenu et de la forme de l'expression. La question du style est étroitement liée à la théorie des passions. La passion se manifeste en tant qu'un produit d'un idiolecte ou d'un sociolecte. Autrement dit, l'auteur emploie les schémas qui, quoiqu'ils soient une partie de l'ensemble des schémas que l'époque et les circonstances de

la communication proposent, créent un style personnel, qui à la fois le distingue des autres auteurs et se révèle convenable pour servir son idéologie. Pour cette raison, les schémas narratifs utilisés pendant la communication littéraire, rhétorique ou quotidienne, sont un choix parmi les possibilités que langue courante et/ou tradition offrent. L'esthétique est un agent qui provoque des sentiments positifs ou négatifs chez le spectateur, mais il n'est pas le seul: Aristote a traité la distinction entre le fait esthétique, en tant que produit de la forme, et les émotions suscitées par le contenu d'un énoncé. Cependant, il y a toujours le cas – et Aristote le connaît bien – où un schéma ou une figure à la fois orientent vers un cadre cognitif et contribuent au résultat esthétique, comme la métaphore, qui introduit une analogie, ou l'intrigue, qui véhicule la succession des événements.

Néanmoins le principe qui détermine la signification du discours est son instance. D'une part, l'émetteur construit le message en tenant en considération les logiques du discours: pratique, cognitive et émotionnelle. Il utilise certains signifiants qui vont à la fois fournir au destinataire un réseau de connaissances, qui admettent des significations selon son intention, et susciter son monde sentimental. D'autre part, le destinataire, selon les logiques du discours qu'il rencontre, va attribuer les significations qui lui semblent propres. La passion est alors le résultat d'une synthèse entre la tentative réussie de l'émetteur de suggérer un état émotionnel et la réponse du destinataire qui, après avoir conçu ou construit la signification de l'énoncé, commence à manifester des sentiments. Fontanille affirme que les systèmes philosophiques (celui d'Aristote parmi eux) qui ont traité la passion, sont ancrés dans une certaine époque et culture et pour cette raison, ils ne conservent pas leur valeur analytique hors des cadres spatio-temporels spéciaux (1988: 211).

2. *La métaphore*

Aristote insiste sur le fait que la métaphore nous transmet une information: quand on dit que «Achille fonce sur l'ennemi comme le lion bondit sur sa proie», on apprend que le héros est un grand et vaillant guerrier. En fait, il s'agit du transport de deux propriétés du lion (puissance et vaillance) au héros homérique et non de l'ensemble des propriétés. Selon Peirce, ce transport de propriétés présuppose une abduction. C'est donc la découverte d'une proportion entre les deux termes de la métaphore

sans laquelle le schéma serait inacceptable. Aristote considère que ce processus est l'usage des éléments que la langue préexistante offre pour créer une nouvelle, expression dont les règles se posent conformément à l'interprétation de la métaphore. Sur ce point se focalise la fonction didactique et informative de la métaphore: la proportion entre deux choses à la fois dévoile une certaine propriété ou une certaine fonction d'elles et enseigne un mode de penser.

Par conséquent, la métaphore peut être vue comme une méthodologie d'observer le monde: la découverte d'une proportion entre deux choses ou deux êtres vivants est une approche qui permet des corrélations sur la substance et les propriétés des choses. Cependant, il s'agit des proportions qui ne sont pas toujours visibles ou compréhensibles. Ce cas est commenté par Eco qui se réfère de nouveau à Aristote. Une proportion qui s'exprime dans un énoncé métaphorique doit être soit la répétition ou la reformulation d'une proportion déjà communément acceptée, soit très bien posée, de façon à être si évidente que personne ne puisse la récuser (2001: 160).

La métaphore présuppose donc une fonction cognitive depuis que l'analogie résulte de la connaissance profonde de la nature et des propriétés des choses. Fontanille explique pourquoi la mise en valeur de la médiation du domaine sensori-moteur pour analyser la fonction cognitive, permet à l'homme la construction des métaphores. Il utilise l'exemple de l'humeur (bonne et mauvaise) en mettant en évidence ses aléas renvoyant à une structure spatiale (en haut et en bas) (1999: 8). Eu égard à la structure de la pensée humaine une telle proposition est légitime, lorsque cette métaphore est bien reconnaissable et habituelle dans plus qu'une ambiance culturelle (par exemple en France et en Grèce).

Selon Eco, comme la métaphore ne se réfère pas à un monde fictif, ni au monde réel, elle reflète la conception personnelle de l'auteur sur les phénomènes (1992: 161–165). L'interprétation de la métaphore propose au lecteur une image différente du monde, qui représente les expériences intérieures et le système cognitif de l'émetteur. D'autre part, il est possible qu'un récepteur conçoive un énoncé comme une métaphore, sans que l'auteur ait l'intention d'y attribuer une signification métaphorique. Le niveau encyclopédique du destinataire joue un rôle primordial dans la réussite de l'analogie constatée. Une dernière observation qu'Aristote cite sur la fonction de la métaphore, est le fait que l'usage d'une chose à la place d'une autre a comme conséquence la négligence de propriétés du terme comparé

(2001: 154). Le créateur d'une métaphore doit toujours prendre en considération le fait que le transfert ne peut pas concerner l'ensemble des propriétés. Dans l'exemple d'Achille il est légitime de penser que le poète fait allusion à la puissance et à la vaillance. Il est hors de question d'envisager une interprétation qui se base sur le rôle du lion dans le royaume des animaux. Achille est sans doute le meilleur guerrier des Achaïens. Mais, il ne peut en aucun cas avoir dans la guerre le rôle du roi. Il est à Agamemnon.

L'évocation d'un exemple de la recherche sémiotique va éclairer l'emploi pertinent de la proportion qui conduit à la réussite de la communication. Fontanille analyse le vers des *Feuillets d'Hypnos* de René Char "Connaissance ineffable du diamant désespéré (la vie)". L'usage d'un mot qui dénote un être vivant (désespéré) pour qualifier un mot qui ne le dénote pas (diamant), crée dans un premier temps une difficulté dans l'interprétation. Cependant le mot "vie" fonctionne comme un métalangage qui explique la signification de l'énoncé. La vie établit une proportion entre le diamant et le désespoir, lorsqu'elle est précieuse et peut être désespéré (1999: 177).

Conclusion

En conclusion, Eco reconnaît ce qui, depuis Aristote, est évident dans les discours oratoires: l'utilisation d'expressions d'une efficacité persuasive déjà vérifiée, ne renforce pas seulement la vigueur argumentative du discours, mais elle influence l'émotion de l'auditeur, fait qui le rend plus réceptif aux thèses du rhéteur. Ces "formules" sont des codes acquis et augmentent la valeur esthétique du message et, par conséquent, influent sur le thymique du récepteur. Une espèce de formules sont les preuves extra-techniques, selon la terminologie aristotélicienne, lesquelles se basent sur les principes méthodologiques du signe (1972: 160–161). Ces preuves représentent une image absente qui désigne les proportions que l'auteur veut mettre en œuvre pour décrire une situation, une idée ou un objet présent. Il s'agit alors des signes qui, transmettant le cadre d'information que l'auteur veut émettre, canalisent un réseau de passions, qui consolide ou, selon le cas, bouleverse l'état émotionnel du destinataire.

Finalement, un dernier exemple du rôle capital des figures dans la communication est leur application dans les textes visuels. La classification des figures rhétoriques en tant que tropes possibles d'expression faite par

Aristote peut également être appliquée dans le cas des codes visuels (cas de transposition des concepts). Eco parle de cette potentialité par rapport à l'analyse de la publicité iconique. Il se réfère aux figures, aux exemples et aux arguments de la rhétorique classique en tant que répertoires de techniques de l'expression verbale correspondants aux répertoires de l'expression visuelle (1972: 236). Une illustration de cette observation d'Eco se donne à propos de *topoi* verbaux et visuels: comme selon lui le processus de la codification des messages esthétiques et des cadres cognitifs n'est pas différent, il est légitime de traiter les iconogrammes en tant que signes qui connotent un champ topique.

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Leena Mäkelä-Marttinen

Fatal misunderstanding in Timo K. Mukka's short story *Tabu*

1. Tabu: Parody of the Holy Family

This article concerns Timo K. Mukka's large short story or short novel, *Tabu* (published in 1965), which is a parodic tale of the Bible's holy family.¹ This text is based on my dissertation, which concerns problems of Timo K. Mukka's prose mainly in the light of Mikhail Bakhtin's theory of the novel.

Mukka's *Tabu* has been translated into French, Polish, Estonian and Hebrew, and a movie version of it exists in Poland. The story is about a 12-year old girl, Milka, who lives with her widowed mother in the countryside of Lapland. The story time is in the 1920s and discourse time in the 40s. Their peaceful everyday life changes for good when the mother starts a relationship with an unstable wanderer, Ojanen, who is also called Kristus-Perkele (Christ-Devil). The dramatic turn in the story happens when the mother finds out that Ojanen is also having a sexual relationship with Milka. The mother notices that her daughter is pregnant and realizes who the father of the unborn child is, although Milka denies having a sexual relationship with anybody. Ojanen leaves the village and young Milka gives herself as a wife to the old parish clerk, Malmström, who has earlier proposed to the mother. The parodic holy family is formed.

I will study the themes of the story in the light of Sigmund Freud's (1913) thoughts about taboo and totemism. My focus is on the taboo of incest (clearly the theme of pedophilia is present also). The ambivalence of Milka's feelings, the love-hate relationship with Ojanen who suddenly disappears, is very interesting in the light of Freud's thoughts of repression, neurotic denial and defence mechanisms. Also the mother and daughter

relationship, which turns unnatural and causes the madness of these both women, is important to the interpretation of the story. Some objects and spaces in the story are clearly those of totemism, as kinds of chronotopical and mythical elements of secrecy, as well as a parody of the Immaculate Conception. The story is told twenty years later, from Milka's point of view. She is now a bitter and odd woman, who hates her God (who clearly is Kirstus-Perkele).

In the story one can identify many genres. The most important genre change is between ballad-like archaism and romantic prose-poem style, this last appearing in sublime, sometimes even grotesque expressions. This tension between ballad and naturalistic prose, sublime and grotesque, characterizes the discourse of genres and personages in the story.

2. Genre change

The most important structural element in Mukka's prose production is that of genre change. In Mukka's prose one finds realistic expression, ballad form and lyricism, a naturalistic way of emphasizing certain shocking elements in the story, letters, and even autobiographic material (he quotes from his other texts), parody, newspaper style, stylistic borrowings from other writers, and more.

As Mikhail Bakhtin has observed, novelistic form embraces all the other forms of literature inside itself, and Mukka's prose is in many ways a living example of this. For Bakhtin one of the most important characteristic features of novelistic form is genre memory. The novelistic form of literature (prose form) has absorbed different genres from the history of literature, in this way developing into new and vivid literary form. In this way, too, the novel is inherently a form of parody, since it absorbs other genres into itself (Morson & Emerson 1990: 93).

In Mukka's prose, genre changing allows for the expression of different points of view, which in turn make it possible to show the chronotopical situations in the story. In those situations the problems and dilemmas of the characters (usually the main character, "the abject hero") can be shown in a multi-stylistic, dialogical way.

According to Bakhtin, chronotopes in literature have a very important, even determining role in the plot of the novel, by capturing especially

important places and moments in the characters' lives – those peculiar moments where time slows down and the plot thickens. As Bakhtin says:

[Chronotopes] are the organizing centres for the fundamental narrative events of the novel. The chronotope is the place where the knots of narrative are tied and untied. ... Time becomes, in effect, palpable and visible; the chronotope makes narrative events concrete, makes them take on flesh, causes blood to flow in their veins. ... It is precisely the chronotope that provides the ground essential for the showing worth, the representativity of events. ...

The chronotopes ... provide the basis for distinguishing generic types; they lie at the heart of specific varieties of the novel genre, formed and developed over the course of many centuries.... (Bakhtin 1990b: 250–251)

How this plot-thickening place and slower than usual time (of life) are created and shown, how the chronotope is expressed stylistically – all this depends on the genre. Ballad tells the story differently than naturalistic genre does. And when these two are mixed together, the effect can be quite powerful, as I will show later on.

In *Tabu* the most important chronotopes are those which Bakhtin calls “threshold situations”, those special moments which change the main character's life and propel the story forward. In *Tabu* these chronotopes of transition are represented in situations of seduction and marriage proposals. Perhaps the most important threshold is the so-called “moment of truth”; in this case, it is when the mother comes to understand that her daughter is pregnant, thus discovering the truth about the relationship between Milka and Kristus-Perkele. This fatal misunderstanding leads to deep and life-changing events. A little later I will show how the style of communication changes between mother and daughter after this crucial moment.

It is also important to notice the spaces or settings of these chronotopical thresholds. In *Tabu* these are an open hay field and a barn (these places are often repeated in Mukka's prose in general). Another such space is inside the house, a secure place, away from wild nature, and the place where offers of matrimony are made.

The old parish clerk first proposes to the mother in the old main room of the farmhouse, but the mother refused, waiting instead for the proposal of her lover, Kristus-Perkele. Later, another proposal occurs, in another room, this time with the world turned upside down. After Kristus-Perkele

has betrayed and left both women, Milka makes proposes to the old parish clerk, and they spend their wedding night in the new room, made by Kristus-Perkele, who has changed the lives of both women. This irony is important, because in it we can hear the sound of muffled laughter, such as that provoked by parody (cf. Bernstein 1989, 1992), where old values are made to appear in a new light. In this story, what was once considered upside down has now become reality: the parodical “Holy Family” is formed in the room made by Christ-Devil. In quite a cruel way the reader is shown both the madness of this situation and of the world. We can hear laughter behind it all, but perhaps of nervousness rather than good humour.

3. *Incest: Mukka’s story and Freud’s Totem and Tabu*

The revelation of the importance of incest in neurosis has met with universal scepticism by adults and so called normal people (cf. Freud 2003: 20). But it is important to notice how much the theme of incest has interested creative writers and artists (e.g., novelist William Faulkner). There are countless variations of the theme in art, and Mukka’s story is one of them. While I am giving an interpretation from Mukka’s story, I am also opening up Freud’s ideas about totemism and taboo:

Tabu is a story about two women, but at the same time is a very masculine story. It tells of the effect of masculine power over these two women, how the power of the false God of sexuality destroys peaceful living, and ruptures the natural mother and daughter relationship. When By “masculine power” I mean (in the Freudian light again) that these two women live under the same totem. If village women had to live their lives as a wife, daughter and widow, those roles are always somehow related to a man, usually a husband or father. The relationship between Milka and her mother is broken by Kristus-Perkele. As the lover of the mother, he is forbidden to be the lover of the daughter as well. In this system of totemism, that kind of relationship is against the law of exogamy. As Freud says: The worst way to break the totem, is to have a sexual relationship with all the women who belong under the totem.

Kristus-Perkele’s presence in the village is in itself ambivalent. On the one hand, he is truly like a god, in that he rules over the lives of both women; on the other hand, he is not a member of the tribe, but an outsider. He exercises marital rights with both women, but does not take on

the tribal responsibilities for doing so. He is above and outside of everything, and at the same time he is deep inside these two women's minds. The taboo of incest has been transgressed when Kirstus-Perkele's relationship with Milka becomes more or less like a father-daughter relationship.

From the perspective of totem denial, the scene just described is like an upside down situation. As Freud says, amongst so-called primitive tribes (although the people in Mukka's story aren't "primitive" in the Freudian sense) totem denial goes against the incestuous desires of son and brother. In Mukka's novel the daughter has these desires for an older man. In practice young Milka seduces Ojanen, who first tries to prevent a sexual situation from developing. There can be room for a negative Oedipus complex as well (see Silverman 1988: 118–126).

According to Freud (again amongst primitive tribes) the punishment for breaking this taboo of totemism is death, but in Mukka's story it is the madness of these both women and the death of a living relationship with God. This is shown most powerfully in the story by the change of style and meaning of Milka's prayers (the genre of praying is in Mukka's prose in generally important).

It is also very interesting in the light of Mukka's story what Freud says about the ambivalent relationship between son-in-law and mother-in-law. The taboo is very strong against a relationship between these two "in law" relatives. And because of the deep, collectively subconscious denial of tender feelings to the son-in-law, hostile feelings rise to the surface in the mind of the mother-in-law. In Mukka's story this relationship, too, has been turned upside down, even twice. First the mother has two suitors, but suddenly both of them find themselves in the position of sons-in-law; the older one properly so (through marriage), and the younger and dearest one, as father of her daughter's baby. In this story Mukka thus shows clearly why it is so important to follow the law of exogamy.

In this connection it is very interesting to read what Freud says about the mother-in-law's sadistic relationship against the son-in-law, which seems to come directly from Mukka's story, as if Freud were talking about Milka's mother (I quote Freud):

A woman whose psycho-sexual needs should find satisfaction in her marriage and her family life is often threatened with the danger of being left unsatisfied, because her marriage relation has come to a premature end

because of the uneventfulness of her emotional life. A mother, as she grows older, saves herself from this by putting herself in the children's place by identifying herself with them; and this she does by making their emotional experiences her own. – A mother's sympathetic identification with her daughter can easily go so far that she herself falls in love with the same man her daughter loves; and in glaring instances this may lead to severe forms of neurotic illness as a result of her violent mental struggles against this emotional situation. (Freud 2003: 17–18)

As we remember, Milka's mother was widowed years ago, and she is in love with Kristus-Perkele, the same man her daughter loves. It is difficult to say which one felt love first; maybe it happened at the same time. But it is clear that after these events the mother became enraged. The fatal misunderstanding is perhaps at the same time the fatal sameness, the crazy-making, parallel identity of mother and daughter.

3.1 Holy dread

First a few more words about the ambivalent nature of the concept of taboo. Even the word "taboo" has two meanings: it means "holy" and "untouched" in that holiness; and it also means dangerous, dreadful (*unheimlich*), impure and forbidden. The first meaning binds it in my literary example to the unity of the sublime (and on the generic level, to ballad form and lyrical style). The second meaning joins it to the grotesque (and on the generic level, to naturalistic expression and style). To find these connections is of course important in the study of genre change and genre memory of the story.

There is yet another concept, which is the combination of the holy and the dreadful, namely, *holy dread*. It is something you can't reach, which is not in your hands or under your will. You can't control it and that is why it is covered by denials and forbidden. When Milka and her mother became like objects of holy dread by breaking the taboo, they have to solve their crime. This solving is endless, because the two women have taboo nature themselves. But the fact is "that the violation of a taboo can be atoned for by a renunciation shows that renunciation lies at the basis of obedience to taboo" (Freud 2003: 41). These women have, in the deepest way, the holy dread against themselves and their unbearable and irresolvable situation.

The ambivalence of their situation is total, and it is also strongly both sublime and grotesque.

3.2 The wooden ball

In the story is one particularly interesting object, the interpretation of which deepens both the chronotopical point of view and the object of taboo. After their first love-making, Kristus-Pekele gives Milka a silver coin, which is a treasure for the girl. Just before the man leaves the village and both women, he makes a hollow wooden ball for Milka, and inside it he puts this silver coin. Only Milka knows the hidden truth of the wooden ball.

In the light of Freud's theory, these kinds of symbols of the taboo are common in primitive cultures. The ball is a symbol of the world. Inside of it is a coin, which is like one of those thirty silver coins the Jewish leaders paid Judas for betraying Jesus. It is a coin of betrayal, payment for the virginity and pure mind of the young girl. Inside the ball it is also like the embryo Milka is carrying. The ball is the world and the womb. Both round spaces keeps their secrets inside for those who do not want to see the truth. The daughter knows what is inside the ball, but at that point the (already crazy) mother does not understand. Rarely speaking to Milka any more, she sits on a rocking chair and turns the ball in her hands, saying to herself:

... what might be inside... here? It rings nicely. He knows. He has put the secret inside. Let anybody try to find out the truth. Miraculous is his dispensation. Nobody knows what inside – is it even necessary? The punishment will follow from... curiosity. Miraculous are his works... The ways of God are inscrutable. (Mukka 1966:106, translation mine)

The mother is also clearly speaking to God and to Kristus-Perkele, who is like God for both women.

The wooden ball is clearly a symbol of the forbidden, in some way even incestuous relationship, as well as the pregnancy. Both mother and daughter have something bad to hide. Like Freud says: "The source of taboo is attributed to a peculiar magical power which is inherent in persons and spirits and can be conveyed by them through the medium of inanimate object" (Freud 2003: 24). The power of the taboo has migrated from Kris-

tus-Perkele to Milka through this magical wooden ball. The carrier of the taboo is forbidden, a scared and envied person, who becomes as a taboo to him- or herself. Milka becomes a taboo person and the wooden ball symbolizes this change. On one side is veneration, on the other, horror, just as a taboo person is two-sided.

*4. The story of denial and speechlessness –
The discourse of madness*

As mentioned before, in this crucial threshold situation in the sauna, at this moment when mother understands the wholeness of the deception, the discourse between mother and daughter changes: the way of speaking, the expressions of tenderness, the whole communicative system.

It is also important to notice that the deepest misunderstanding happens when the mother doesn't realize that her child has grown up (the mother has underestimated her daughter's sexual maturity), and now it should be the time to change the discourse. At first the mother has no code for talking to her child in the proper way, in the way that she could protect the girl. Sexuality is a taboo for the mother, too; even she has no verbal instruments to deal with the subject of sexuality. So Milka is "tabula rasa" in the field of sexuality: on the tabula is not even one word of warning, no alert to what will be. And when the worst thing happens, these two women find no way to speak to each other, because their situation has changed in such a strange and unnatural way.

How does this happen in the story? In the chronotopical situation in the sauna, denial comes between the mother and the daughter. Because the mother has never provided insight into adult living, Milka has no correct words for explaining the situation. What she has is a very strong feeling of sin, which she is denying: Milka denies being with anybody (maybe at first she doesn't even understand how she got pregnant), so her pregnancy becomes sinless, like the biblical "immaculate conception". In this denial, she refuses to see the truth.

Not only is this denial a corruption of the biblical story, but there is also transference in it. Freud says: "The ease with which the prohibition can be transferred and extended reflects a process which falls in with the unconscious desire and is greatly facilitated by the psychological conditions that prevail in the unconscious. The instinctual desire is constantly

sifting in order to escape from the *impasse* and endeavours to find substitutes – substitute objects and substitute acts – in place of the prohibited ones” (Freud 2003: 35). That is precisely what happens to Milka: she keeps living in the unresolved situation, with her psychic fixation, which is a consequence of the constant changing of overwhelming desire and the denial of this desire. Very strong ambivalence rules Milka’s life.

Milka is transferred from her mother’s arms to Kristus-Perkele’s arms; hence she doesn’t have time to grow up and become familiar with her adult body. What happens, as Luce Irigaray says: “She regresses to the level of need” (Irigaray 1993: 126–127). After Kristus-Perkele has disappeared, and Milka can’t offer her body to her lover, she gives herself as payment for the work of a young village boy, Auno, and finally offers herself as a wife for the old man to compensate her sin. Thus, when Kristus-Perkele gives Milka the wooden ball, it is also like the biblical fruit of sexual knowledge (sin). Masculine power takes over in the symbiotic female house, in the world of mother and daughter. Suddenly the two women become competitors, when the masculine will and desire starts to define their female being. The originally harmonious life of these two women falls under patriarchal power and definition, and the monster of sin starts to grow.

5. Conclusion

Because the narrator is always Milka, and she is telling from the point of view of the young girl, the style of narration is naïve and a bit infantile. The style is romantic, distant, proud, archaic (very old fashioned), and there is at the same time something hidden and something naively open about it – the style of a lyrical ballad. The prayers (clearly the sign of obsessive neuroses), which Milka repeats and which really are denials of God, constitute Milka’s silent revenge on Kristus-Perkele for leaving her. And the meaning of what she tells through the story is quite terrible and horrifying, very naturalistic. Again: the sublime and the grotesque are unified in this very special way of story telling, which underlines Milka’s demoralization and fall into madness.

In the story are certain very characteristic features of naturalistic style; one of them is inevitably the erotic and bodily openness. It is possible to think that Milka’s story is in many ways a typical naturalistic novel (or short story) of inner individual development, like a modern *Bildungsro-*

man. Yet here, too, the meaning is again turned upside down, because it is a story of collapse, of individual catastrophe. Milka's growth, as a human being and as a woman, stops; she turns to madness. And cruel and ironical is that the same negative development happens also to Milka's mother; their destinies become parallel.

Maybe because of the genre variation and stylistic ambivalence *Tabu* is one of the most confusing and interesting of Mukka's stories. The dialogue between genres works effectively. As Freud says on the first page of *Totem and Taboo*, "In the beginning was the deed." The same may be said of Mukka's *Tabu*: The deed is foremost, and it is expressed in the most interesting and vivid way.

Note

1. Timo K. Mukka (who was also a painter) began writing at a young age (around 12 years old), and he also died very young (29 years old). Within ten years he created his entire literary production, which includes 17 short stories, a collection of poems, and 5 novels.

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Katya Mandoki

A war of symbols in the political arena

The Mexican post-electoral campaign of 2006

1. Introduction'

Politics is by definition a sphere of action and decision. Politicians are supposedly hired only to execute, to the best of their ability, the will of those they represent. It is quite remarkable, then, to note the intensive use of symbols in various areas of government. One would expect government representatives to be more interested in establishing and guarding citizens' well being – as *object* – rather than in using *signs* (crudely put in Peircean terms). Yet, politicians seem to aim more at producing propagandistic effects than social effects.

As you may know, in 2006 Mexico endured the most hotly debated electoral competition in its history. The winner of the election was decided by a scarce margin of 0.5% of the votes cast. This narrow difference made the post-electoral campaign all the more intense, and the Federal Electoral Tribunal had to decide who was to become president. In these circumstances, the (initially) most popular and almost certain winner of the elections during previous years, then Mexico City's mayor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, deployed a more forceful post-electoral campaign than any of those during his six years in office. His objective in the post-electoral crisis of 2006, was to press the Tribunal to decide in his favor. This he did by taking over the main Avenue and major streets to the Central Square, the Zócalo, for forty five days. And here begins the case I address in this paper: the intensive deployment of symbols, used for legitimation purposes, during this post-electoral presidential campaign, from July 30 to December 1, 2006.

I analyze this symbolic maneuver according to a model presented 13 years ago, at the 5th International IASS Congress at Berkeley University, which proved to be quite enlightening when applied later to various other contexts.² I then proposed the possibility of addressing semiosis in terms of two different orders: (1) the *signic order* produces signifying effects by (strictly Saussurean) oppositions and differences to produce; (2) the *symbolic order* functions through charges of time, energy and material accumulated to produce significant effects. The signic was understood in a sense akin to Peirce's symbol; the symbolic resembles Peircean indexes, in that both assume an existential, motivated link or material contiguity with the object.³ This distinction between signification and significance was of course proposed by Charles Morris (1964).

The symbolic order, of which I speak today, differs from the signic precisely because it is based on a metaphorical projection (in Lakoff and Johnson's 1980 sense) taken from economy as source and targeted at producing meaning. The association between semiosis and economy comes up in the thought of various authors, from Marx to Saussure and onward, when speaking of value, and particularly in Jean Joseph Goux's (1990) work on symbolic economies. Yet, it was Ferruccio Rossi-Landi (1968) who specifically addressed and understood language and economy jointly through the concepts of "linguistic work" and "linguistic market".

Allow me to refine the idea: signs *signify* by relations of oppositions and differentiations in their position within a code, a paradigm and a syntagm; whereas symbols are *meaningful* in proportion to the storages of time, material and energy (affective, labor-oriented) associated with them. These storages that make symbols significant depend on at least six parameters: time, space, sound, verbal, corporeal and physical objects, all operating jointly in the production of what is significant to a particular interpreter.

2. *Symbolism in time*

The two main contenders during this campaign were the conservative candidate, Felipe Calderón, from the PAN party with affinities to Christian Democracy, and the populist Andrés López Obrador from the PRD, a derivation of the PRI, the political origin of most of its leaders. The two candidates deployed totally different strategies in the symbolic use of time and

space. After Election Day (July 2, 2006) López Obrador chose all dates with historical or political value on which to make his political moves, and hence capitalize on their storages of time and emotional weight. He and his party thus picked the following:

- September 1: Presidential Speech at Congress, to block the Congress Tribune.
- September 15: anniversary of Hidalgo's call for independence, to impede the presidential ritual at the main city square (Zócalo).
- September 16: Independence Day, for his self-proclamation as "legitimate president" in front of the people gathered at the Zócalo.
- November 20: Anniversary of the Mexican Revolution, for his swearing-in ceremony as "legitimate president".
- December 1: the newly elected president's avowal ceremony, used for blocking the Congress Tribune.
- March 21: Anniversary of Benito Juárez's birth, used for his political convention and show of power to the million or more gathered at the city square.

On his part, the newly elected Felipe Calderón was, by law, to become president automatically on 1 December 2006. By the signic order, no additional step was required. He nonetheless deployed an equally symbolic stratagem. At midnight, between November 30th and December 1st, national television aired a ceremony staging Calderón as president of Mexico. This strategy was taken because Congress was controlled by the opposing party and it was doubtful whether he would be able to perform the full customary ritual the next day at the podium. This *ad hoc* invented ceremony was literally out of place, but inside time.

3. *Symbolism in space*

All acts performed by Obrador took place at the main square of the country, the Zócalo, whose symbolism dates back to Aztec times, with the mythical foundation of Tenochtitlan, now Mexico City. During his campaign, great importance was given to his declarations and aspirations that he would make his residence at the National Palace, as a century before the Mexican hero Benito Juárez did, a place where no president has resided for about fifty years. The National Palace is a highly charged, symbolical site (cf. Mandoki 1998), as it was home to Moctezuma, the last Aztec emperor,

and to Hernán Cortés, the Conquistador. We see here the charge or storage of time and affective energy associated with it from historical facts; in addition, there is the symbolic charge of the material itself, since it was probably built, at least in its foundations, from the very stones stolen from Aztec pyramids and temples. As I have argued elsewhere (Mandoki 2004), the place endows power to the occupant.

Other symbolic uses of space were blocked for 48 days by Obrador's people, who were camping in the streets: Paseo de la Reforma, calle Madero, and Avenida Juárez, these being the greatest names in the official history of Mexico. During his tenure as mayor, Obrador invested important resources in twice redecorating the symbolically charged Paseo de la Reforma. It was first constructed in 1860 at the initiative of the Mexican emperor Maximilian of Habsburg, who called it the "Avenue of the Empress" in honor of his wife Carlota; it was renamed Reforma in honor of Juárez, the anti-Maximilian protagonist and elected president of Mexico, a Zapotec Indian who fought the conservatives' imperialist dreams.

The symbolic chiefly functions by connotation (the signic by denotation), hence the taking of these streets worked semiosically as if these great historical figures voluntarily joined López Obrador's movement, while for others it seemed as if they were kidnapped by it. As for the other presidential candidate, Calderón, the symbolism of space required the deputies of his party to sleep for three consecutive nights at the Congress hall, so as to secure the podium for the President's swearing in, since López Obrador's party had declared it would do everything to thwart it.

4. *The symbolism of words*

What was peculiar in this campaign was precisely the replacement of the signic order by the symbolic, and thus a symbolic use of words. López Obrador declared the elections "a fraud", called Calderón a "spurious president" (notice the onomatopoeic and corporeal effects of the term), and referred to himself as the "legitimate president". He utilized the word "legitimate" to oppose, by a strict Saussurean mechanism, the "legal" (which, *ipso facto*, would mean illegitimate), yelling "to hell with your institutions!"

In politics, some take the word "symbolic" to mean "harmless". For example, the governor of Michoacán declared, with respect to Lopez Obrador's self-proclamation as legitimate president: "It is symbolic, I see

no seriousness in it". Yet, not only were words replaced here, but also numbers. The fact that he lost the election by almost 240 thousand votes was replaced by a discursive construct of "the people" (*el pueblo*), symbolized by the throngs of gatherers at the Zócalo. Additional symbolic work was performed by attempts to stigmatize this number as irrelevant by the affixing to it the word "fraud".

5. *The symbolism of sound*

Who shouts louder became the favorite game played by then president Vicente Fox and López Obrador during the week that preceded the symbolic ceremony of Independence Day. The ceremony traditionally consists simply in the tolling of the bell at the Presidential Palace, flagwaving, and shouts of "Long live the heroes that gave us the fatherland!", "Long live Hidalgo, the father of the country!", "Long live Mexico! Viva Mexico, Viva México!" This ritual is simultaneously repeated by governors and municipal presidents throughout the whole country, but the main site and symbolic center of this ritual is the Zócalo.

As a newspaper reported, both López Obrador and Fox attempted to perform the ritual scream at the same time and at the same place, the Zócalo, where a fierce battle ensued over whose scream would sound loudest. This tantrum in fact *symbolized* the six-year period of these two politicians' office: rather than focusing on the serious problems of a country with more than half of its population below the poverty line, these two exhibitionist politicians used each other to play agonistic games of declarations. Fox diminished his position by responding to a lower status of politician, while López Obrador erred in attacking Fox, since in Mexico reelection is unlawful and Fox was no competition at all to his presidential ambitions, thus underestimating the real opposition candidate.

6. *Symbolism of bodies*

During his pre-campaign López Obrador exhibited, in Bourdieu's terms, huge *social capital* ("the people", namely millions of sympathizers, especially among older people), greater *political capital* (80% during his pre-campaign), and an enormous *economic capital* (vast government resources for the administration of Mexico City, this time not stolen and hidden

for functionaries' private benefit, but exhibited for the mayor's public and electoral image). López Obrador's chief advantage over his opponent was deployed by the corporeal exhibition of his followers, namely, their physical, bodily presence (not only in the ballots, in which they counted by the signic order and became simply numbers) at street gatherings, by setting up camp, by blocking avenues, and other mass assemblies.

Calderón would never have obtained such sacrifice from his supporters; these last are generally more well off economically, and would never have slept for a month and a half in the streets on his behalf. On the symbolic axis, this total mass of bodies that, in López Obrador's boasting words were "enduring cold hail, shaking and freezing", whether a million people or thousands, eloquently expressed by corpo-real symbolism López Obrador's real material support, some of it genuine, other negotiated by crooked deals.

A plan was designed to take the site by surprise and make Calderón appear, in Houdiniesque style, at the Congress Tribune from behind the monumental flag, at the very last minute, and to perform the swearing-in ritual. This also entailed a corporeal symbolism: the president presiding the presidium.

7. Symbolism of objects

On national television, flanked by the army during the ad hoc ceremony at midnight of December 1st, Mr. Vicente Fox was shown removing his Presidential band and giving it to a soldier. When the ex-president came into sight the next day during Calderón's Houdini-like appearance at the Congress, a funny mistake in continuity occurred: he was clumsily carrying the ribbon again, then took it off out of camera range, carried it as if it were a Ming porcelain jar to the Congress, and tried to put it on Calderón's chest; but moving rapidly, the president of the Congress did the job. Quite aware of the symbolism, and despite the fact that ex-president Fox had also received the band from his predecessor, Calderón preferred to avoid it, as if accepting it would be symbolically infected by Fox's relatively meek intervention.

This type of symbolic object – a red, white and green, silky fabric with a golden eagle embroidered in the middle – was well suited for López Obrador, and conferred by another symbolic figure in Mexican politics, Rosario

Ibarra de Piedra, the bereaved mother of one of the many victims of the dirty war that went on during Diaz Ordaz and Echeverría's regimes.

Four objects had particular relevance in this ceremony that depended wholly on symbols: the presidential band, the national emblem (an older version recycled for López Obrador's ceremony), a podium, and the supposed "presidential chair", this last another curious myth, as if there really existed "a" particular chair for the president to sit on, one exclusively designed to make López Obrador appear "presidential" one the day of his self-proclamation as such.

8. Conclusions

We can conclude that symbols are relatively more flexible than signs. For that reason López Obrador used them to *replace* the following: (1) forty million voters of the 2006 election by the few thousands present in his "democratic national convention"; (2) more than 78 % of the Mexicans who did not vote for him, by the bodily presence of his followers⁴ (41% abstention, with more than 37% going to other candidates); (3) the Supreme Tribunal's decision by his self-proclaimed "legitimate presidency"; (4) the Political Constitution of Mexico by an interpretation of one of its Article of context; (5) evidence and rational arguments at the Congress, by deputies' physical brawls at the podium.

The formula by which to replace signs with symbols is quite simple: conflate the legal and the legitimate (this also reflects the symbiotic relation between the two orders), making the illegal appear legitimate by associations of the symbolic order. Illegality would disappear under the weight of symbolism and magically be transformed into a new signic construct.⁵

Notes

1. This paper is a translation of part of my recently published book (2007b: 86–90).
2. See Mandoki 1997; I then called "semiotic" what I now term "signic". See also, Mandoki 2007a.
3. Saussure's conception of symbols was quite vague, somewhat similar to Peirce's icons.

4. 55, 557,012 votes and non-votes out of a nominal list of 71,374,373 is to 100% what 55, 557,012 is to 77.83%. http://www.ife.org.mx/documentos/Estadisticas2006/presidentet/gra_nac.html
5. In the case of the “Democratic National Convention”, the signic was replaced by the symbolic. See Mandoki 1999, for more regarding this tactic of “convenient” and systematic substitutions; such as the substitution of religion by the instrumentalization of art, replacing art with propaganda, and propaganda with indoctrination, culture with monumentalism, etc.. These tactics of substitutions are symptomatic of authoritarian tendencies.

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Culturomes and negentropic processes

Following Schrödinger from a biosemiotic perspective

Once upon a time, sometime during mid-fourth century B.C.E., as Aristotle strolled in his garden “through the worlds of animals and men”, he was wondering whether a certain continuity might exist within the animal species. Two millennia later, this observation reappeared in Darwin and Wallace’s natural evolution theory, followed by a century in von Uexküll’s cross-species *Umwelten* and Sebeok’s firmness about a semiotic continuum. This continuity, however, does not seem to be linear, since the variety of existing species has changed in discreet jumps and mutations through evolutionary drifting. We now know that creatures do not emerge once and for all, complete and whole, like a Minerva out of Zeus’s head or Adam’s animals in the Garden of Eden. We have learned that there is a gradual assemblage from the simple to the complex, from carbon chains to amino acids amalgamated by peptide connections to form proteins that would allow the construction of a cell’s structure assimilated to multi-cellular tissues, multi-tissue organs, multi-organelle organisms and multi-organismal biomes that constitute the biosphere, materializing, to use Lovelock’s term, in our great Gaia.

Please allow me to designate, for symmetry and brevity’s sake, the other side of this process – namely, the inert, physical world – with the term “plerome” (following Bateson 2000: 26–31), for its resonances with “biome”. The new scientific cosmology points to the idea that the world began at a Big Bang explosion in the plerome, generating space-time through the expansion of matter-energy, even if we do not know whether this spreading out will eventually implode and contract or whether there were previous Big Bangs (or tiny bings). Ruling the plerome as one of its fundamental

principles is the Second Law of Thermodynamics, implying that matter and energy tend towards macroscopic homogenization and microscopic disorder. This process, known as “entropy”, could also be interpreted as the law of universal irreversibility.

At another level, that of live systems, or biosphere (we’ll call them “biomes”, which by *Webster’s Dictionary* means “major ecological community types, as tropical rain forest, grassland, or desert”) there seems to be an equally vigorous, but opposite tendency towards self-organization or “autopoiesis” (cf. Maturana and Varela 1992), marking a clear directionality to diversification, macroscopic heterogeneity and the production of order. What appears to occur here is, in Schrödinger’s term, *negentropy* or negative entropy in evolutionary processes. The materials for biomes basically come from the plerome: energy and matter, muons and leptons, oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen atoms, carbon molecules and so on. The question that compellingly arises is, How can a general law in physics be so radically contradicted in live systems, since these all (supposedly) emerge from the same components of the physical substrate?

Swenson (1999) proposes an explanation to this discrepancy when arguing that live systems are, in effect, the most efficient trajectories for the dissipation of energy in agreement with this Second Law, thus justifying continuity between biome and plerome. The story, however, does not end here; live systems tend to create further order at “third order units”, namely, social organizations (in Varela and Maturana’s 1992 terms, “collective conglomerations” as among termites, ants, bees or human groups). I will denote this level as “culturomes”, to denote local forms of culture socially integrated into specific biomes. How does this third order stand in relation to entropy?

PLEROME	BIOME	CULTUROME
<i>Res extensa</i>	<i>Res significans</i>	<i>res cogitans</i>
Information (qubits?)	signification (DNA?)	Conceptualization (logic?)

Table 1. Plerome, biome, and culturome.

Following Bataille’s (1987) idea that excess tends to destroy itself or attack the organism when not dissipated and wasted, one could assume that perhaps some kind of entropic process is at work in rituals like the potlatch or *mayordomía* and other forms of ceremonial dissipation, which

could suggest some continuity in the entropy law through these collectivities. What is a constant and an absolutely defining feature of a culturome is that it is a procedure for ordering the world and the relations within a group, an order which depends on conventions, negotiations, habits, and common codes. Thus a culturome is basically a negentropic process generating finer and finer distinctions and differentiations (even among ants or bees, which practice a division of space and labor within their community).

If laws of randomness in the *pleroma* tend to disorder, entropy and dissipation of energy, the new creatures emerging everyday in the biome (in addition to novel forms of flora and fauna hybrids, virus mutations, prions) point in the opposite direction, i.e., toward order, evolution, natural selection, heredity, intentionality, and diversification, in short : negentropy. While disorder needs no explanation – we see it as the natural tendency of everything – the opposite tendency certainly requires it. Jakob von Uexküll conceived the idea of a master plan to explain the order of nature. Bateson (1972, 1991) proposed the concept of “the sacred”, the “spirit” or “ecological mind” in live systems, believing evolution to be a mental process. From the point of view here taken, “the sacred” could be defined in a secular sense, as nothing other than semiotic networks passing from one system to another, from one scale or level to another, since any order depends on some kind of code. Situated exactly between Descartes’s *res extensa* of inert matter or plerome and *res cogitans* of human mental processes at the culturome, something is at work, namely semiosis, or Peirce’s (1977) “perfusion of signs”, which we could properly call *res significans*. Evolution depends on this semiotic *res significans* beginning with the detection and absorption of what is significant to the organism at the basic protozoic level of the plasmodium, as solar energy, nutrients and water by plants and of food by animals, fungi and bacteria. *Res significans* is woven by each and every creature through continuous processes of action-perception (Uexküll’s 1982 functional circles between perceptor and effector) at all the levels for only 4 billion years on earth.

One could suppose that such processual continuity is rhizomatic, reticular, and multidimensional, in a similar manner to synaptic connections in the brain operating by intermittent jumps and contacts or flows of information. This makes us wonder about the action of semiosis through which deviations, regressions, iterations, saturations, thickenings and weaken-

ing unpredictably occur, increasing or decreasing the density in clusters of meaning. These semiotic rhizomes emerge in several directions and have different weights (in Edelman's 1992 sense) related to food, danger or mating, activities that are crucial to the survival of the organism.

The "master plan" to which von Uexküll referred (something like a code that could explain the wonderful patterns of order found in the lifestyle and development of several organisms for their survival) raises the question of its determinist consequences. The point here is that Uexküllian *Umwelten* or Batesonian "ecological minds" or Lotmanian "semiospheres" all involve processes that necessarily depend on the plerome which appears to build up, in our world, towards biomes developing into culturomes. This question was partly addressed by Kalevi Kull (1998) from a Lotmanian perspective a decade ago, in regard to the semiosphere as the system of all interconnected *Umwelten* which, according to Rothchild's third biosemiotic law of domination (cited by Kull 1999), does not seem to follow a pre-established pattern in this process. Semiotic activity is open, flexible and able to face novelty; but due to the law of continuity and repetition, order settles down with each act.

Self-similarity and iteration in semiotic action could help us understand how this sense of order arises, probably according to Peirce's idea of habit as a process of sedimentation. Interestingly, Schrödinger envisages the emergence of consciousness on the opposite end, not as a result of order and habit, but of novelty. Consequently, one might conceive consciousness as feeding on disorder to create order at the level of the culturome.

Related to repetition is *replication*, a repetition that doesn't circle but spiral, changing the result in reproduction. The more complex the organism in which repetition takes place, the more novel the replication appears to be, bringing about a new creature in many aspects similar to, but different from, its begetters. The plerome, on the other hand, does not replicate, nor diversify (or does it?), but perhaps only fissions or fuses. Replication may thus be the basic negentropic mechanism at work in biomes and culturomes, because every product is new and limited, tending to reproduce itself and create further differences (an idea found in *Selfish Gene*, 1976). In the biome, *replication* is biological procreation, while in the culturome it takes the form of schooling, propaganda, indoctrination, proselytism, rhetoric, and the like, all mechanisms to replicate ideas and cultural practices by two opposite mechanisms: entropic desire for homogenization

(everyone should think the same) and negentropic differentiation of a group by its opposition to the “others”.

Moreover, life, like snails, always leaves traces: a book, a worm’s path within a pea, a symphony, a spiderweb, a cocoon, an egg, a pyramid. The index, the most material of all signs, seems to be at the very roots of evolution. This fact forces us to consider if, in effect as Sebeok affirmed (1963, 1996: 22) and Peirce implied, semiosis only happens in live beings from the cell on, at the biome level, or could exist in the plerome as well. The plerome also leaves traces: the Hubble telescope detected traces of the Big Bang, as black holes are traces of dead stars. Are we the only interpreters of these phenomena? Further questions arise which are at the core of biosemiotic approaches: Are DNA molecules purely mechanical assemblage processes or are they interpretants? What about antibodies in relation to antigens? Being live creatures or second order units (pluricellular individuals), do we undergo an ontogenetic big bang from our cygotal conception, all flowing towards dissipation at death in strict accordance with the law of entropy? Ashes to ashes ... but where exactly does semiosis begin?

If, for Gregory Bateson, information “is a difference that makes a difference”, for contemporary physicists information appears to relate to the condition of matter-energy, for example, the spin of an electron. For Lloyd and Ng (2004: 31), “each elementary electron, photon and other particles store bits of data, and whenever such two particles interact, those bits are transformed. The physical existence and the content of information are inextricably linked.” They claim that a physical system can be explained using a finite number of bits in which each particle of the system acts like the logical door of a computer. When the particles interact, a change of spin or axis can be caused. The Cartesian syntagm for *res extensa* would now be enunciated as *computo ergo sum*, understanding the universe as a great cuneiform tablet: wherever there is matter, we can find information (perhaps finally the total information needed to make Newton’s mechanical system exact). So now in addition to *meaning* (when a signifying agent or interpretant triggers a semiotic process) at the organismic cellular level of a paramecium’s membrane or ants’ chemical communication, there is also *information* not only in the brain’s chemio-electro-synaptic connections and molecular DNA codes or antibodies’ recognition of antigens, but perhaps also at the atomic scale. Therefore we may well go from qubits,

bits, bytes, molecular DNA codes, signals, signs, syntagms, paradigms, *Umwelten*, semiospheres and epistemes.

Every cultural process begins by an act of distinction, separating, as God did, day from night, light from darkness, macrocosm from microcosm, quarks from muons, always cutting through the “mass of thought” with sharper signifier/signified differentiations. Culturomes are thus constructed by these cuts or distinctions which constitute the very bricks with which human organisms construct culture, namely, the edifice that carries out autopoietic processes as third-order units: we and them, sacred and profane, nature and culture, body and mind, good and evil. Mental distinctions appear to be a law in both phylogenetic and ontogenetic developments through semiotic disambiguation generating, at an exponential speed, new terms and colonizing new cognitive fields. New artifacts, brands, names, ideas, pictures, gadgets, scientific fields and concepts are exploding in this negentropic cultural big bang. Can we apply Swenson’s conjecture here as well, and say that culture is an efficient energy dissipation device in agreement with the Second Law? Or are we producing culture to slow down organic replication (procreation) by sublimation, as Freud would say, and thus also the entropic? Could it be that this incessant and accelerated cultural production ultimately tends to dissipation and disorder in some sort of cultural entropy by informational noise and saturation, when difference will no longer make any difference? What disorder do cultural organisms or third-order units export to the environment? Are culturomes enabling the return of entropy with a vengeance as in nuclear pollution buried in the Mexico-USA borders or cell phones’ toxic waste, which, unless exported to the moon, will eventually contaminate everything surrounding it?

For Schrödinger (2001: 71), “What an organism feeds upon is negative entropy”. Negative entropy or negentropy is, for this Nobel prize physicist, the key element in metabolism, rather than the common held view of energy absorption and exchange of materials within the environment. In other words, as live creatures we crave for order and absorb it while expelling disorder. We are not nourished by proteinic materials so much as from their organization. Is this also the case of collective organisms? Does flora create vegetative order (sugar, oils, and vitamins) from the plerome, as fauna creates animal order (proteins, fats) from the flora and other fauna, while we create culturomic order from the former? Does this neural

order of the third level (Edelman's [1992] "neural maps") equate perhaps to Semon's *mnemes* or Dawkins' (2006: 189–2001) *memes*?

Not only a matter of scale, this problem implies as well the very texture with which culturomes, semiospheres, *Umwelten*, mnemes, percepts and signs are assembled, perhaps in a similar manner to electrons, carbon chains, amino acids, proteins, tissues, muscles and so on. The increasing complexity of these three levels seems to imply that each one keeps the structure of the previous but adds further order in an apparently irreversible process: biomes retain pleromatic elements (such as atomic order) but add further order (from molecular order on, more stable than atomic randomness), as culturomes keep part of pleromatic and biomatic orders but are irreducible to them. The human body turns to ashes; its biomatic properties dissipate at death, obeying entropy; but it nevertheless manages to bequeath the order it created and learned to newer generations by a cumulative cultural heritage. I have presented you more questions than answers, hoping to find some help in figuring these problems out.

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Russ Manitt

At the crossroads of significance and insignificance

***Winterreise*, meaning and alienation**

1. Introduction

Given that Wilhelm Müller's poem-cycle *Die Winterreise* is presumably about an alienated wanderer, the question remains whether Schubert's music to these poems is independently able to express alienation, or to convey meaning of any kind. In these so-called postmodern times, where musical hermeneutics is, at best, suspect, and where, at worst, there is no longer any hope for common agreement, my choice to examine the possibility of a *shared* musical understanding of alienation is anything but a methodological error.

First, I will give a very brief history (up to Hegel) of the word *alienation*, a word that, as a result of its semantic overload, the late philosopher Paul Ricoeur describes as "ill" and that, as such, needs a little spring cleaning. I will be following Ricoeur's typically erudite encyclopedic article for the purpose (Ricoeur 2000: 47–60). Second, I will mention several passages in the poems of *Die Winterreise* that resonate with the different aspects of philosophical alienation. Third, I will discuss the signifying potential of the music itself with regards to the alienated experience of the modern individual.

2. Alienation

A genealogy of *alienation* starts with the Latin origins of the word. *Alienatio* refers to business and collection, whereby one relinquishes one's right to a property. Hobbes expands this meaning of *alienatio* to the renunciation of one's liberty (*I give up my right...*) which is made in favor of a non-contracting third party, i.e. the sovereign. Rousseau argues that this renun-

ciation is made for the good of all. In this sense, his concept of *aliénation* becomes a founding act of the political body and, by doing so, moves from a juridical to a political realm, a move which Hegel will later refuse.

Appropriation, according to Hegel, is only legitimized by an *exterior* will. The State – which is founded on the assembly of people sharing a common language, common customs and traditions – cannot, according to Hegel, rest on contractual relationships. A contract, in fact, pits wills against each other. In addition, Hegel remarks that the act of cession not only alienates the subject from the surrendered object, but, especially, alienates oneself from one's arbitrary *will* over that object.

Two different words are used by the philosopher of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* when discussing alienation: *Veräußerung* and *Entfremdung*. *Veräußerung* suggests exteriorization. This specific type of alienation, through its association with Gnosticism, conceptually bridges the gap between the absolute One and the contingent Other. It ensures “a passage from the immediate to the mediate, it introduces confusion into what is indivisible, paving the way for contradictions to be surpassed” (Ricoeur 2000: 55, my translation). In other words, it is the necessary evil on the road to reconciliation.

Entfremdung, Hegel's second term, emphasizes the estrangement that comes with alienation. It is the rift with *oneself*, a feature of Hegel's unhappy consciousness. With *Entfremdung*, the individual mind faces God, or the absolute Other, in front of whom the individual is reduced to *almost* nothing. In this case, there is no reconciliation.

3. *Alienation and Winterreise*

Wilhelm Müller wrote his cycle of twenty-four poems, *Die Winterreise*, in 1822. The plot of the cycle, known to most, is simple enough. A young man, suffering from a failed relationship, leaves his home, renouncing his work, his city, and God, seeking answers, seeking death, and finding neither. However, one *could* wax psychoanalytical and question whether or not this disastrous love affair is the cause or the *consequence* of the wanderer's oddities. *Strangeness* is, in fact, the problem. The first lines of the very first poem tell us as much: “Fremd bin ich eingezogen/ Fremd zieh ich wieder aus” (“A stranger I arrived, A stranger I depart again”). By the second half of the cycle, the journey itself takes precedence. The *idée fixe* is

displaced from his beloved to himself. “I have done no wrong that I should shun mankind. What senseless craving drives me into the wilderness?”, he asks in “Der Wegweiser”. The answer is in a preceding song. While he roams the streets at night (in “Im Dorfe”), he remarks, as the villagers sleep: “They dream of much that they have not, find refreshment in good and bad things. And tomorrow all is vanished”. At last, the journeyman finds solace in the organ-grinder, however one may interpret this figure. In short, the wanderer of the *Winterreise* seems to be caught up in a particularly Hegelian sort of alienation. (Whether in the sense of *Veräusserung* or *Entfremdung* is another matter.)

It is equally worth mentioning the authoritative and extremely bureaucratic regime in which Schubert lived, a reality that was doubtless alienating for many reasons. At the very least, it produced a dissonance. David Gramit notes: “... by becoming government officials, teachers at state-supported institutions, and the like, ... most of Schubert’s friends also were or eventually became part of the same repressive apparatus whose incursions they resented” (Gramit 1997: 69). While the practice of the arts was at times refractory, self-cultivation was highly regarded. But cultivation also provided some respite from Austria’s oppressive and alienating bureaucracy: the escape into an inner artistic world was the only way out. But the question remains: How was this done *musically*? Rosen, in a discussion about Schubert’s three-key expositions, suggests the following:

Both the half-step shift and the harmonic field and the technique of using the space outlined by the motif as basic rather than its interior shape, work toward the same end: they diffuse the urgent rhythmic impetus implied by motivic or harmonic structure and turn the *music inward into more intense but less focused effects of contemplation* (Rosen 1997: 97, my italics).


Christina Muxfeldt echoes Rosen’s comments by remarking that Schubert’s skillful modulations and the “plodding steps of the poet-wanderer” both participate in the “representation of an inner experience” (Muxfeldt 1997: 125–131). Susan Youens, in her book *Winterreise: Retracing a Winter’s Journey*, also talks of this same plodding “journeying figure” (that permits structural cohesiveness and signifies the journey’s inexorable impetus). Youens equally observes the presence of other topoi that signal “a change of place *within the wanderer’s mind*” (Youens 1991: 83–95).

Although these interpretations may ring true to some, they are far from being indisputable. Youens herself disavows any claims to objectivity in the preface to her book. But objective or not, the evocation of an inner space certainly seems, for all authors, to be the key to understanding the *Winterreise* and Schubert in general. Is this a universal truth of Schubert's music? Or a topos of Schubert scholarship?

4. *Winterreise and Analysis*

I am neither adverse to analysis nor am I unfavorable to interpretations that may come from analysis or, for that matter, from any other form of *criticism*. However, I do perceive at least two pitfalls in the search for musical meaning. First, many analysts bent on revealing *what* a piece of music means – or even, to borrow Kofi Agawu's phrase – *how* the music means, seem to hope for a much too univocal equivalence between signifier and signified. Walter Everett's position in his 1990 article on "Grief in *Winterreise*" is one example: "My aim in the following pages is to show that ... the decoration of the fifth scale degree with its semitone upper neighbour note, is Schubert's principal means of portraying the wanderer's grief." (Everett 1990: 157) Two interpretative constraints raise some suspicion here. First, the wanderer's grief is, according to Everett, a consequence of his estrangement from his beloved. While this is certainly true to some degree, I believe the problem is much more deeply rooted, as expressed by my earlier comment on the cycle's first line. The wanderer's feeling of alienation *predates* any problems in his relationship, and may have in fact contributed to them. Second, although Everett's able analysis aptly demonstrates the pervasiveness of the figure, the figure's signifying authority remains dubious. One feels the impulse for a strong conclusion. The example – although infinitely less complex – of the descending minor third of a doorbell signifying a visitor's arrival comes to mind. In Everett's case, this exhibits grief over a lost love (Ex. 1). Everett's assertion that the semitonal figure is the "principal means" of portraying meaning, thus implying that there *are* others, does little to alleviate the impression that the author is envious of the certainty scientific proof claims to offer.

This brings me to the second pitfall. It seems to me that, instead of allowing for a multiplicity of interpretations, many analysts and critics debate over issues that may, ultimately, not hold that much significance.



Example 1. Everett's Schenkerian analysis, beginning of "Einsamkeit", from Winterreise.

Often, it is the debate itself which is most revealing. One thinks, for example, of the often discussed Lied "Auf dem Flusse" by no less eminent musicologists such as David Lewin, Anthony Newcomb and Richard Kramer, without even mentioning Schenker's famous analysis of the song. That said, it seems fairly obvious that the hottest point of contention involves the presence of the G# bass in measure 11 (Ex. 2) at the contested modulation to D# minor and, *in extensia*, to the G# minor episode of measures 48ff (Ex. 3).

Example 2. Schubert, "Auf dem Flusse", mm. 8-13.

Lewin (1982: 47-59) considers the G# of m. 11 as simultaneously related to the "optimistic" future E major (mm. 23ff) and the "pessimistic" E minor tonalities. The resulting ambivalence suggests, in his view, that the wanderer is in fact asking an honest question: "Is there any capacity for flowing torrential warmth left under the frozen exterior of the heart?" There exists, in fact, ample evidence elsewhere in the poems of the cycle to

suggest that the wanderer is genuinely concerned that once the pain (or numbness) subsides he will have lost his beloved for good.

Newcomb (1986: 153–174) takes a more straightforward approach and considers the tensions between G# minor and E minor more locally and as signifying, thereby, the frustrated passions of our dearly despondent devotee. And Newcomb also makes a good case.

Finally, Kramer (1994: 153–159), like Lewin, perceives a contradiction in the use of the G# at m. 11. However, for Kramer, the problematic G# creates a “dissonant ambivalence” between E minor and D# minor which, says Kramer, allows the music to go beyond simple image making. In fact, this gambit, what Kramer calls a “chill motion”, is “universally admired as the musical mimesis of an inner psychological stirring” (1994: 153). The “chill motion” is a half-step shift – which, of course, recalls previous commentaries about Schubert’s psychology.

er - kennst du — nun dein Bild? Ob's un - ter dei - ne

49 Rin - de wohl auch so rei - Bend schwilt ?

Example 3. Schubert, “Auf dem Flusse”, mm. 44–51.

So who is right? (I cannot help wondering if my question is undecided, rhetorically frustrated, or the result of some deep psychological stirring). The honest – and perhaps expected – answer is : everyone. It is my contention that these interpretations, and the analyses upon which

they are founded, all have their merits and although, as the authors themselves admit, they prove nothing, they succeed at least in persuading...to a degree. Of course, it is this ... to a degree ... that remains disturbing. Why? Because, as Carolyn Abbate remarks,

[m]usical gestures are understood as signifiers when we consult intention, or reconstructed historical and cultural surroundings, or our own individual and accidental associations, or the emotional dictionaries set up by operas and movies, or caprice and fantasy, and they mean anything one person wishes, or nothing at all. (Abbate 2005: 357)

If music does not have *one*, but two, or six, or six *billion* meanings, then it runs the risk of becoming meaningless. At the very least – and I am borrowing here from Ricoeur’s comment on the semantically overloaded term “alienation” – a semantically overloaded music runs perhaps the risk, too, of becoming “ill”. But it is difficult to maintain Abbate’s point of view, which argues that it is the free, live performance that really matters. Whether that is true or not makes little difference: people attribute meaning to music everyday. It is also difficult, of course, to maintain the view that music means only one thing, like a message awaiting the breaking code.

So, if there is more than one possible interpretation of “Auf dem Flusse” and less than an infinity of possibilities, how many are there? Are there limits to the interpretations we give? Suppose I admit that one of the things that limits these interpretations, the work itself (whatever that may be), is also the very thing that challenges them and is challenged *by* them. I would contend that what Schubert succeeds in doing, even today, by flirting ever so closely with the *limits of conventional modes of musical discourse*, is to actually make us experience – critically – the same questions with which his wanderer struggles. As such, I would agree with Richard Kramer who states that “eccentricity that cannot be understood to be grounded in some coherent language is without expressive meaning” (Kramer 1994: 15). Precisely *because* it is grounded, Schubert’s music allows for ungroundedness. But would this mean that all “eccentric” musical moments – or, as with the case of “Auf dem Flusse”, all tonally ambiguous moments – are expressive of alienation?

In a way, yes. Because they invite us to perceive critically. They *provoke* a dialectic, they *encourage* exteriorization. (Plus, as we saw with Hegel’s *Veräußerung*, not all types of alienation need even be left divided.) And,

in a way, no. Because, as we observed during the conference, tonal ambiguity can also signify angels, humour, and so on. So my attempt to subsume Lewin's, Newcomb's and Kramer's interpretations into a synthetic gesture of *tonal ambiguity* as a strong signifier of alienation is a failure, for much the same reason Everett's attempt to subsume all semitonal figurations into a signifying gesture of grief was a failure. The failure, as it is, was determined from the outset. The assumption was wrong: this is not a case that can be closed. However, in recognizing that failure, one can finally start to hope for success. One can hope to find, if not a *clear* understanding, a *shared* understanding.

In fact, as Lydia Goehr's article on form and exile makes clear, "the real failure of philosophical form wouldn't necessarily be one that left a space for an unresolved ending, but one precisely that did not leave such a space" (Goehr 2005: 336). The same could be said about music and its meaning. Does this unresolvedness, then, permit a countless number of possible interpretations? Not exactly. The number of interpretations may be immeasurable, but it is not infinite. But, if there is no common topos, how can we find our way home? How can we hope to achieve something resembling a *shared* musical understanding if, because of this openness, we are condemned to live in interpretive exile? Because exile is *not* isolation. Because a "perpetually exiled state [...] is precisely the way not to isolate the subject from society, but, rather, to maintain its dialectical play with it" (ibid.: 335). To put it in terms of this conference: communication does not end with misunderstanding but relies on it to exist. It is the intersubjectivity of this communication, finally, that imposes the limits on interpretation while, at the same time, allowing for its freedom. Interpretations are never impervious to judgment. An individual's eccentricities are always subject to be measured up to the norm. The norm is always subject to be contested by the individual.

This game, itself, is our common ground. How meaningful it is depends largely on how we engage it.

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Dario Martinelli

Notes on the theoretical program of biosemiotics; or, “What exactly am I doing here?”

It is no mystery that the theoretical foundations of biosemiotics have been exposed to a significant amount of criticism, from both semiotic insiders and outsiders (typically from other biological sciences). Although it is true that part of such criticism is due to a die-hard conservative scepticism within academic environments, and after all, as the proverb says, “many enemies bring much honour”, it is also true that a number of those remarks are really worthwhile to take into account.

Being in the peculiar and ambivalent position of a) often having to explain (when not defend) my own zoosemiotic research to entire squads of sceptical (or simply inquisitive) colleagues, and b) having myself been pretty critical towards biosemiotics in more than one occasion (with an emotional participation that denotes most of all care and affection), I feel it is in my own interests to reflect upon the issue. As the title of the congress this paper is written for is “Understanding and misunderstanding”, I shall humbly illustrate a few points about biosemiotics I think I understood and others I fear I misunderstood.

Point number one: Consider an essay collection of, say, 20 articles, or a symposium of 20 papers. How many articles/papers out of 20 you think you should be interested in, in order to buy the book or participate to the congress? And how many you should have some competence about, in order to contribute to that book, or present a paper to that congress?

Let us go by degrees. Let us say I am a comics artist, and I am hoping to become the next Charles Schultz. To a strict degree, I am of course interested in articles or papers like “Stylistical traits and evolution in *Peanuts*,

from the origins to nowadays”, or “The role of Charlie Brown in the depiction of American Society”. To a slightly larger degree, also essays on Stan Lee or Walt Disney are very fine. And, of course, I would not mind learning something about media, satire, newspapers. I should be happy also with something about drawing in general. Maybe painting too. Sculpture? Probably not. Architecture? Not really. Interior design? Good grief!

So, would I buy a book with 5 articles about LeCorbusier, 6 about ceramics decoration, 4 about Baroque churches, 3 about French impressionism, and 2 about Superman? Probably not. Still, this is my status as zoosemiotician, inside the biosemiotic circle.

My interests include the human-animal semiotic relationship, the concept of “animal”, animal aesthetics, play behaviour, deceiving behaviour, several ethical and methodological issues, the cultural representation of the animal, interspecific communication, the concept of language, and of course zoomusicology. Also, give me anything that pertains to animal signalling behaviour or the way we humans semiotically interact with them, and I am happy. It does not look a restricted range of interests to me. We count some 1,250,000 animal species on this planet, and they *all* do many interesting things with signs. Yet, in those occasions where I attended biosemiotic congresses, symposia or sessions, I could consider myself lucky if one, sometimes two, scholars would speak of any of those topics.

My colleagues send me articles to review, and they are called things like *The Physics and Metaphysics of Biosemiotics*; *Biosemiotics as a Mode of Thermodynamics in Second Person Description*; *Beyond Bioinformatics: Can Similarity Be Measured in the Digital World?* What am I supposed to know about these things?

Make no mistake, I have profound and absolute respect for these topics, and even more for the people that deal with them. I do not know what they talk about, but I am sure it all makes sense. My problem is different. I wonder: am I the only one who feels so lost in this huge galaxy of topics? Biosemiotics seems to deal with all kinds of things, and all sizes: from the infinitely small (DNA, for one) to the infinitely big (the Cosmos). And all that stays in the middle: cells, molecules, plants, animals, ecosystems, light, virtuality, you name it. It is all possible. Why? Probably because *Bios* is a Greek word for *life*. And, *Six Feet Under* TV series excluded, is there anything we can talk that is not about *life*? In taxonomy, before reaching Life, you need 9 steps: Species, Genus, Family, Order, Class, Phylum, Kingdom,

Domain, and finally Life. Human being, the subject of most semioticians, is just a species, i.e., the first step.

That makes me think: What is exactly biosemiotics? Is there such a thing like *one* biosemiotics? After all, Sebeok anticipated it, there is cytosemiotics, phytosemiotics, zoosemiotics, micosemiotics, endosemiotics; and let me add chosmosemiotics. Etcetera. Do we seriously think that talking about mushrooms has to happen in the same context where the next paper is about subjectivity, the one after that is about vervet monkeys, and the previous was about the origins of the universe? Why not a paper on Paul McCartney, then? He is alive, he is vegetarian and he wrote “Blackbird”.

It is very hard to find anything that is *not* life, but it is exactly when something is about everything that it becomes about nothing. Are all these topics belonging to the same discipline? If yes, what is the advantage? Having more people in a conference (if that is really the case, because I do not see why a specialist on any biological topic should find so attractive a place where hardly anybody speaks about his/her things)? And what are the costs? Is it healthy for a discipline to be so generic? How can I give helpful feedback to my mushroom colleague? And how can s/he be helpful for my whale songs? Of course, there will anyway be interesting discussions: but how deep, how precise and how precious, that is a bit tricky.

If I can humbly propose a challenge for the near future of biosemiotics, that is to decide whether we want this label to be an umbrella term, and then everybody is welcome, former Beatles included, or a discipline with a strong – and strong often means limited – paradigm. If we are for the latter option, and I believe we are, judging from the theoretical efforts of those I consider the main scholars in the field, then we need to trace a path that goes towards choice, distinction, and specialisation. This, I believe, is what distinguishes a scientific community from a crowd of scholars.

Also, such an action is called for because, and this is probably my main fear (or misunderstanding), I have the feeling that more often than not biosemiotics is experiencing something similar to a metaphysical drift, or – to put it mildly – an empirical support to the interpretation of given life processes does not always seem to be a priority. I shall not go into details here, because that would require examples that some colleague or friend might easily consider offensive, and there is no whatsoever intention here to do so. I trust anyway that most colleagues know what I am talking

about, and – if yes – I humbly invite all of us to put this picture in relation with the not amazingly positive reputation that biosemiotics has in other scientific fields.

But let us not underrate the McCartney issue. So, all of us know perfectly that a paper on a pop-rock singer-songwriter would hardly be accepted at the Gatherings, or in similar contexts. Now, the ex-Beatle and the vast variety of topics I just mentioned are two sides of the same problem. The problem is that when biosemiotics looks at its left, it sees no limits whatsoever, while, when it looks right, it sees the Pillars of Hercules (or the other way round, if you are not politically satisfied of this arrangement). Biosemiotics sees its analytical potentials as unlimited, but only (if only is the word) when it does not interfere with the untouchable dualism Nature-Culture: Nature allowed, Culture not. Culture is not a living process, apparently. It has no biological basis, and has no part in detecting the meaning of life. Yet, it would not be so difficult to prove otherwise. Both rhetorically and scientifically. Not to mention that scholars that like so much Peirce should be anxious to support the notion of synechism. But, thankfully, at least human culture was left out. Now, that seems to me not the result of a pondered scientific decision, but more an ideological one. In an environment, the semiotic one, dominated by scholars that deal with human matters, biosemiotics came to cover just everything that is not human. Which, evidently, is a definition by negation, rather than by affirmation. Take humans out, and what remains is biosemiotic. But, I am afraid, this is not the kind of specialisation I was hoping for. Because if we accept once again, although in disguised form, and pretending we are doing something else, the Cartesian dualism, then I find it hard to identify myself with this community. Let alone how against this I am ideologically, the thing is that I see most of my academic interests falling into the category of cultural processes. Or where else should I reasonably include such topics as zoomusicology, the human-animal relationship or the notion of language?

Given the nature of this paper, I cannot avoid referring also to Prof. Kristian Bankov and his famous notion of “Bankov’s Razor”. Although controversial in many aspects, that notion had for me the great merit of shaking the coconut tree of biosemiotics, forcing me, for one, to seriously reflect upon the scientific role of biosemiotics, its weaknesses and its strengths. There has been quite a hype around the razor in the last 2 or 3 years, within

the semiotic circle, or – better – within *our* semiotic circle, i.e., the circle of those semioticians that move around the same area of knowledge exchange. *Our* circle is the circle that meets often here in Finland, particularly in Imatra, and then in Tartu, in Copenhagen and in other European places in the occasion of the Gatherings or similar meetings.

In one of the main points of his argument, Bankov notes that a certain “scientific humility” that he expects from biosemiotics is, I quote, “not present in the majority of biosemiotic papers I have read” (Bankov 2005: this article, presented during the 2004 ISI congress in Imatra, is forthcoming as a publication, therefore I cannot provide page numbers for my quotations, that come directly from the unpublished manuscript that Kristian kindly handed me). Here I have to agree, although, probably, for reasons that are not necessarily the ones indicated by Bankov. He says: “Biosemiotics is totally dependent not only on the existing data, achieved within certain sciences. It is entirely dependent on the very scientific worldview, on its articulations and categorizations of the surrounding world, on the biological terminology, on the theory of evolution and the like. Biosemiotics would be nothing without them, whereas they, the conventional disciplines, have existed, exist and will exist totally unaware of biosemiotics” (*ibid.*).

Although there is a certain form of dependence, in the way above described, I really do not see it as an exclusive problem of biosemiotics at all. *All* disciplines depend in some form from those that came before them and dealt with the same issues. Did not musical semiotics depend on musicology and music theory? Did not classical semiology depend on linguistics? Of course they did, except that, exactly like biosemiotics, they were able to develop an identity of their own, autonomous enough to enable us to consider them “something else”. I may agree with Bankov that the autonomy of semiology from linguistics, when it comes to specific analysis, is somewhat superior to that of biosemiotics from biology. But then again, semiology is older. Give biosemiotics some time.

More importantly, however, Bankov’s statement seems to ignore that biosemiotics *did* propose a consistent number of novel theories and methodologies, maybe even too many, and these have just nothing to do with those “other” sciences, starting from the principle itself that animates the entire biosemiotic idea, i.e., identifying the biosphere with the semiosphere, with all the thousands consequences and the shift of mentality

implied. And that, like it or not, is something that biologists never even thought of. I shall also, and proudly, bring my own zoosemiotic research as an example of a genuinely semiotic study that needs, is enriched and characterised by the use of semiotic tools. A configuration of aesthetic phenomena, the way I constructed it in my writings (see Martinelli 2004, for instance), would never have been the way it is now without the application of the Jakobson model on communication, the Peircean notion of firstness-secondness-thirdness, and Eco's reflections on the ambiguous and multi-layered nature of the aesthetic codes. Anybody, semiotician or not, who went even superficially through my writings can notice that. So, if the razor has to shave somebody on that point, that is certainly not me. But, really, I could say the same for a lot of other colleagues whose work I am familiar with.

Another cup of tea is to browse through all these innovations provided by biosemiotics, and put in a separate box 1) those that are probably not necessary, as they reformulate with different terminology what has already been known for a while; and 2) those that risk exposing biosemiotics to an excessive amount of criticism, given their purely speculative basis, which sounds a bit out of tune in a discipline that after all aims more to improve biology than philosophy. I am not very worried about the first point, as it is a sport practiced in nearly all fields of research, but, as I expressed already, I am deeply concerned about the second one.

Having said that, I still see Bankov's concern as legitimate to a certain extent. I still see this lack of humility as something worthwhile to discuss, being in fact one of the aspects that puzzles me the most about the current state of biosemiotics. I must say that, yes, a certain arrogance has indeed been displayed in quite a few occasions, when it comes to both the foundations of the discipline, and its theoretical – so to say – heritage. The above-mentioned metaphysical drift is already something that speaks for itself, but let us see other instances.

Firstly, we have the so-frequently experienced presumption of many biosemioticians to have finally discovered the ultimate answer to all problems. You can see them, happy and proud, reminding you how the biosemiotic revolution has turned the obsolete knowledge upside down, for better and for good. I am sure the biosemiotician colleague who is reading this article will understand what I mean here, and if s/he does not it means s/he is one of them. The thing is, I also secretly think that biosemiotics

offers a more consistent view of natural phenomena, I also stand for a semi-otic interpretation of them. *But*, we do not have the reputation to say that openly, this reputation being completely to be achieved. And in fact, even if we did have it, I would still find such an attitude unpleasant. We all agree that biosemiotics has to face prejudices, incomprehension, conservative and reactionary feedback. But I really would not subscribe on boldness as an appropriate response.

Another example of this arrogance lies on the luckily-just-occasional tendency of refusing, or at least underrating, the contributions to semi-otics provided by those semioticians that were never BIOsemioticians, or that anyway refer to completely different fields of inquiry (provided that there is such a thing: see above). The obvious instance is the strong stand in favour of the Peircean sign paradigm, to the detriment of the Saussurean or the Greimassian one (and, make no mistake, I am also for number three in defining sign and semiosis). Yet, I would not mind witnessing a kinder response to those that dare presenting papers that are not necessarily Peircean. Never mind the wasted occasion for confrontation, at least let us not label those papers as “a step backwards in scientific research”, as occurred few years ago in Imatra during a biosemiotic session. And, to say it all, a few remarks should be made also about Peircean approaches *in se*. However, I shall keep them for another occasion, except perhaps a few hints here and there.

Anyway, from time to time, this rejection for extra-biosemiotic approaches may become a momentary lack of memory. A couple of years ago, I was asked to review an article on Modeling Systems, written by a very famous semiotician. The article certainly provided a comprehensive account of the state of the art of the theory on Modeling Systems, very efficiently summarising the main issues related to the concept. I was naturally in favour of its publication.

However, one aspect I found surprisingly approximate, and that was the total – and I mean total – lack of mention to the enormous contribution that Tartu-Moscow semiotic school in general, and Yuri Lotman in particular, gave to the concept. To maintain, as the author of the article did, that, quotation, “modeling systems theory *blossomed* forth as a comprehensive theoretical and methodological framework *only* in the pivotal work of Thomas A. Sebeok” was a complete neglect to the contribution of Tartu-Moscow school, which is even more ironic when we think that

Sebeok himself repeatedly expressed his debt to Yuri Lotman on this account. Is this the Orwellian case of “all semioticians are equal, but some (i.e., biosemioticians) are more equal than others”?

Two more questions are left to discuss, in relation to Bankov’s Razor: one is, Does biosemiotics have an ethical paradigm?, and the other is, How to react to accusations of anthropomorphism and reductionism? Now, these are topics that I discussed at length in a few of my writings (most extensively in Martinelli 2007: 154–216, and 275–288). But there is a difference. My arguments on anthropomorphism and reductionism were already articulated in form of response to a number of critical remarks moved against bio- and zoosemiotics. The fact itself that in that book I formulated a notion called Martinelli’s canon, suggests already an, at times ironic, awareness of both the Morgan’s canon and the Bankov’s razor. As I do not feel I have anything to add to those reflections, at the moment, I shall kindly invite the readers interested in my views on the subject to browse the pages of the mentioned monograph.

On the contrary, my views on the ethical paradigm of biosemiotics have always been formulated *a priori*, as part of the construction of my own theoretical program, and not as the result of a need to fight back anybody’s remarks. Prof. Bankov, once again, was able to summarise these remarks with very efficient rhetoric (and I mean rhetoric in the noblest sense of the term). There is no room for discussing all the several implications of Kristian’s argument, so I shall here limit myself to the most evident one, not before reassuring that I will discuss at length *all* of them in a forthcoming article for the Journal of Biosemiotics (in 2008). Here is an important quotation from Bankov’s article:

When biosemiotics introduces in the scientific agenda ideas helping the better understanding of the interaction among living beings, this is not only praiseworthy in itself, but it also contributes a lot the interdisciplinary prestige of semiotics. ... What I find wrong in the whole enterprise is the claim that to be more conscious in that way we need to overcome anthropocentrism. (Bankov 2005)

Here, Bankov proceeds by quoting my own words:

Finally, to study other animals from the perspective of human sciences is the result of a very clear historical course in the human evolution, i.e. – borrowing the expression from Johann Galtung – enlarging the centre and

including more and more periphery. Who are WE? Nowadays, “we” corresponds to a larger number of individuals than just one century ago. “We” also means Australian aborigines, African pygmies, people with mental deficits, women, etc. A long time ago, “we” corresponded to a very limited amount of beings. In years to come, “we” will also cover other animals, and this future has already begun, if we, for instance, think about New Zealand and the so called Animal Welfare Act, which ascribes to Great Apes (chimpanzees, gorillas, bonobos, etc.) the same basic rights to life as human beings enjoy. (Ibid., originally in Martinelli 2003: 2).

Bankov then comments:

It is the typical, politically correct program, which any responsible person, me included, would subscribe. But for the hundredth time the undervaluation of the burden of our human condition makes the promises unsustainable by the premises. What about the marriages? First THEY, the potential candidates for marriage, were limited by their social state, by the class, the noble origins, and the like. Then THEY became larger group, overcoming at the end even the racial differences. Then THEY started to include even human animals from the same gender. What is the next step? Should we start to share the mutual right with non human animals to marry each other? Although some undeniable advantages of marrying a cow, there will be a constitutional blackout when the “marriage right” rumor start to spread in the phytosphere. Or we should decide to exclude the plants from the party? More generally, what about the fundamental right of not being eaten? Who will have to enjoy this right and who should not? How could living Nature work with prohibitions within its nutritional chains? Sure, “anyone who places himself out of Nature will feel out of place”. But anyone who places Nature inside culture, thinking that he won anthropocentrism, it’s an underestimation of its complexity! (*ibid.*)

It was in the news sometimes in June 2006 that an Indian woman named Bimbala Das had married a cobra snake, in a small village called Atala. She claimed she was able to communicate with the snake on a very spiritual level, and the entire village took the event as a sign of good fortune. No less than 2000 people witnessed the ceremony, celebrated with a Hindu ritual, except that the groom did not show up, possibly foreseeing the decrease of passion that many experience in married life. Now, how did I react to the news? Did I see my biocentric hopes finally achieved? Of course not: I first laughed heartily, and then I simply took the event for what it is: something that has nothing to do with the ethical program

I am talking about. Moreover, the entire issue is heavily connoted from a religious point of view, a particular that makes it not only different, but nearly opposed in principle to my own, explicitly and proudly secular, ethical suggestions.

To maintain that the basic right of life equals the right of two persons to get married if they wish is as appropriate as equaling the brain of Leonardo da Vinci to that of Silvio Berlusconi. Marriage, as an institution and as an event, *is* a cultural, human, species-specific event. Bringing to an extra-human level something that happens only among humans is of course silly. If anybody sees a way to communicate, discuss, demand, validate and invalidate the notion of marriage with/to other animals, and sees also a reason why on earth would we need that, then please tell me.

However, the right of not being exercised violence and not being violated the basic right to life, *is not*, by all means, a human exclusive. The construction of this right, at legal level (never mind the ethical one), occurs once we acquire the knowledge that a given individual receives pain and damage by such violations. Not only. It applies only when we are not sure that this would be the case (which is why, to mention a couple of examples, euthanasia is illegal, and a pregnant woman cannot be incarcerated). By now, we have decades of knowledge and research that reassure us, with no doubt whatsoever, that non-human animals fall into the category of those who receive pain and damage by the violation of their safety.

Therefore, the argument of those, like myself, who maintain that – to certain extents – anthropocentrism *can* be overcome, applies only (again, if “only” is the word) to those areas of ethics where a *clear continuity* between the human being and the other animal species can be detected. Nobody will ever see me collecting signatures to, say, grant unemployment benefits to all those animals that do not have a job. But if you see a spectacled, slightly overweight Italian demonstrating in favour of an improvement of the Directive 86/609/EEC (the one about animal experimentation), there are good chances that might be me. I hope the difference is clear.

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Rita Mascialino

The *dynamic spatiality* of understanding and misunderstanding

This paper outlines an evolutionary hypothesis about understanding and misunderstanding at a linguistic level as a basis for a more objective analysis of the meaning expressed by language. The study is introduced by a short outline of the scientific background (1). The specific topic of the hypothesis (2) deals with the “endo- and exospatial schemes” concerning the “dynamic spatiality” of understanding and misunderstanding at a linguistic level. An exemplification of the hypothesis (3) is given by an analysis and interpretation of the meaning of two pieces by Shakespeare: his Sonnet LXXIII and King Lear’s famous monologue (*King Lear*, Act V, Scene III). The paper ends with a short conclusion (4).

1. Scientific background

The broad scientific background of the hypothesis outlined in this paper is given by evolution and semiotics. Obviously, evolutionary and semiotic backgrounds do not eliminate historical points of reference in which humans have been living since the beginning of their history. On the contrary, evolution and semiotics set the historical level within larger horizons and provide it with deeper roots, which can avoid more misunderstandings in the comprehension of events in general and of sophisticated abstract symbols in particular. In the scientific evolutionary background, semiotics takes a central position for the hypothesis at issue, particularly American semiotics. Evolutionary semiotics appears as a most appropriate link between the history and prehistory of meaning, specifically at a linguistic level. As a historical phenomenon, language arises more or less suddenly, like a mushroom without roots, often as a divine gift to humans, whereas

language, within the evolutionary and semiotic frame, exhibits connections with all preceding sign systems, from biosemiosis to anthroposemiosis, including the most sophisticated evolutionary semioses of language.

Neurophysiology and neuroscience also belong to the scientific background of this paper, especially studies about the nature of space processing, of unconscious and conscious intentionality and comprehension of reality (Rizzolatti 2006; Lacquaniti 2007). In the light of more recent studies, space processing does not arise as a simple sensorial or executive phenomenon, but arises as a coordinated act endowed with unconscious motivation and intention. In other words, motivation and intention are not produced somewhere in the brain separately from motion, as believed until recently, but are consciously and, above all, unconsciously intrinsic to motion or motor acts themselves, i.e., to the production of consistent space configurations.

2. *The hypothesis*

At the core of the present hypothesis about understanding and misunderstanding at a linguistic level there is at the primal shaping of meaning a kind of space processing. Space processing obviously started with life itself, not only with the presence of reptiles on Earth or with the right hemisphere of the brain. As the youngest born into the evolutionary and semiotic world, language cannot disown its ancestors, among which the spatial system and the chemical channel stand in the foreground. Language does not replace spatial processing, nor can it exist separately from it; language only comes after those, and it always carries with itself the spatial unconscious and conscious configurations of which it is the most articulated expression (Mascialino 1997).

Let us now come more specifically to the technical terms of hypothesis. The concept of “spatiality” refers to the whole set of spatial configurations unconsciously and consciously processed by the different motor areas of the brain. The attribute of “dynamic” refers on the one hand to the nature of experience, which is essentially connoted by motion and actions, and on the other hand to the nature of every different motor brain area, which in parallel processes and re-processes each sensation and perception, each motor act, each experience, by continually producing spatial schemes for adaptation to life. The eyes themselves are continually moving and produc-

ing different space configurations even when they are seemingly fixed on a motionless object.

The concept of *endospacial scheme* concerns both activities reduced to the goal-directed motions laying at the basis of the actions expressed by verbs, as well as global spatial configurations of objects with approximated contours. The concept of *exospacial scheme* concerns both actions expressed by verbs and provided with all related objects, as well as detailed spatial configurations of objects with precise contours. As for the organ of sight, for instance, the endo- and exospacial schemes at issue match with the images built at low and high frequencies, respectively. With the term *endoplot* is intended the whole set of motions carried out by a body of linguistic expressions; the *exoplot* is intended as the whole set of verbal actions carried out by a body of linguistic expressions.

Dynamic spatiality with its endo- and exospacial schemes reflects in languages. Since these are the most recent sign systems produced by the human neuronal network, they necessarily root upon the preceding, non-speaking, significant, and essentially spatial sign systems, which cannot avoid being reflected in words and syntax (Mascialino 2006) as both deep and superficial structures of experience.

Since unconscious brain processing precedes the conscious process by at least half a second, the reconstruction and consideration of endo- and exospacial configurations implicitly carried out by words and syntax help to the identify unconscious and deep meaning. This is important, because conscious and superficial meanings base themselves on the unconscious meaning. Therefore, if the spatial schemes in which the skeleton and the dress of events are identified, a more objective understanding of the world is achieved, as well as a more objective understanding of misunderstanding. The present hypothesis about spatial schemes provides language analysis and also psychoanalysis with an objective spatial frame or grid by which to avoid most misunderstanding, which arises due to subjectivity in processes of understanding and producing experience.

3. *Examples*

To exemplify the understanding and misunderstanding of meaning according to the above spatial evolutionary hypothesis, we turn to an analysis and interpretation of two well-known pieces of literature: (1) Shakespeare's

Sonnet LXXIII, *That time of year thou mayst in me behold*, and specifically the image in the last verse: “To love that well which thou must leave ere long”; (2) the king’s monologue/dialogue (*King Lear*, Act V, Scene III), specifically the image “... and we’ll wear out/In a wall’d prison” (lines 11–12). Both pieces will be analysed through the identification of their dynamic spatiality, and the resulting novel interpretations will be compared with current, traditional ones as to meaning and coherence. An analysis and interpretation of every detail of the whole sonnet and monologue on the basis of the dynamic spatiality may be found in two past studies (Mascialino 2002).

Let us start with Sonnet LXXIII, the whole text of which follows in order to contextualize the image to be analyzed (my italics):

That time of year thou mayst in me behold,
 When yellow leaves, or none, or few, do hang
 Upon those boughs which shake against the cold,
 Bare ruin’d choirs, where late the sweet birds sang.
 In me thou seest the twilight of such day,
 As after sunset fadeth in the west,
 Which by and by black night doth take away,
 Death’s second self, that seals up all in rest.
 In me thou seest the glowing of such fire,
 That on the ashes of his youth doth lie,
 As the death-bed whereon it must expire,
 Consum’d with that which it was nourish’d by.
 This thou perceiv’st, which makes thy love more strong,
To love that well which thou must leave ere long.

The image chosen for exemplification is contained in the last verse and emphasized in italics. Traditional interpretations and translations, not based on the dynamic-spatiality view, see a protagonist who is about to die, speaking to a beloved person, this last most probably a young man (for detailed explanation, see Mascialino 2002). The protagonist asks the beloved to love him well, i.e., to love him as strongly and as well as possible because he, the protagonist, is near death and will be soon gone forever. In other words, current interpretations describe an ill, no longer young protagonist who is going to leave the Earth forever, and a beloved young person who will remain on Earth alone following the protagonist’s death. But this interpretation does not stand the falsification brought by appli-

cation of the spatial schemes of our hypothesis: the protagonist is in the same situation as that of the beloved; i.e., the protagonist, being close to death, should love his sweetheart because he will soon be leaving. We must therefore ask, Why does the protagonist want his sweetheart to love him, but does not ask the same of himself, i.e., to reciprocate in such love? Current interpretations do not answer this question, and they misunderstand the image in at least two aspects which are relevant to understanding the meaning.

The first misunderstanding concerns the relative pronouns, “that-which”. According to the dynamic-spatiality view, both pronouns used together can be spatially connected with things or abstract concepts, but not to persons; i.e., they have no spatial matching with persons, just things. Consequently, the protagonist cannot directly refer them to himself or to another person, either concretely or metaphorically, but can only refer them to some object or to some abstract concept. Therefore, if we follow the spatial channel, specifically the exospatial schemes, the pronouns can only refer to events described in three stanzas: (1) the hanging down of the leaves, or the lack of life in the leaves, and more indirectly in the protagonist, since he is metaphorically compared to this event; (2) the setting or disappearing of the sun, and of the protagonist metaphorically compared with that event; (3) the flame going out on its “death-bed”, or the dying of the flame and the protagonist metaphorically compared to the event. It would be scandalous for the young protagonist to abandon that which is indicated by the correlation “that-which”, the request of love by the older and ill protagonist. And things do not go this way in the sonnet. Let us see more in detail.

The spatiality of the three stanzas, respectively, concerns leaves which are hanging down, a sun which is going down, and a flame which is going down; i.e., there are three motions downwards and three phenomena happening in three different and precise locations. If we consider the spatiality of the three quatrains and that of the last hemistich, particularly the endospatial schemes (schemes of the motions), we perceive a jump. It is as though there were two different conceptual and emotional landscapes with no conscious or unconscious connection with each other. In other words, the spatiality intrinsic to the verb “to love” and to the adverb “well” in the last verse do not have any connection in the context with natural phenomena nor with motions downwards or in whatever direction. But since we know that one of the central mechanisms of the brain is given

by the unconscious association system, we must take into consideration that there should be a coherent, parallel or opposite, connection of the last two verses with the preceding, downwards spatiality. As we can see, the two last verses are intended as the conclusion which follows the preceding premises. We have just seen that through the spatial channel, it is his death, his agony, and not himself as a person who can be loved; and if things stayed that way, then the sonnet would be ridiculous, because the young man would be invited to love well the illness and agony of a dying person projected in the images of dying leaves, of a dying sun, of a dying fire.

This very concrete, spatial way to analyse and interpret a literary text may appear too schematic, but it is not so. This schematicism refers to a most primary level of meaning which cannot be eliminated by successive phases of processing, and therefore this process is also carried out by words, thus becoming the most solid basis for understanding the real meaning beyond any possible misunderstandings. Before we come to believe Shakespeare as unintentionally ridiculous, as if one saying, "Hurry up and love my oldness, my illness and do your best because all this will last a very short time", let us examine more attentively the spatial network intrinsic to the image.

Following the spatial channel, we are now more easily aware that there is a space or location to which the relative pronouns can be coherently and successfully matched. It is the place represented by the substantive "well". With this, we have come to the second misunderstanding. The word "well" can have at least two different meanings, each of a different spatiality: one meaning refers to the adverb as in traditional interpretations, another refers to a place for an underground water source to come up to the earth's surface. In this perspective, the endospacial schemes carried out by the word "well" represent a most coherent continuation of the endospacial schemes underlying the actions around which the three quatrains are built: the source of water is deep underground; i.e., one must go downwards to find the source. But the spatiality of the word "well" is specifically intrinsic to the upwards direction. The water source goes from the deepness of the underground up to the surface of the earth, where year in and year out it flows over the soil, nourishing it and refreshing animals, humanity included.

Thus, we have obtained an utterly new and meaningful landscape introduced by the motions underlying the main actions of the poem. What does it mean? In the context of the whole poem, the last motion downwards

into the ground recalls the burying of a corpse, which is consistent with the situation of the protagonist, who is near to death and presents himself as continuing the direction of motion existing in the three preceding stanzas. The motion downwards relates to the near death of the protagonist, and the upwards motion of the source presages a new coming of the protagonist to Earth, as an everlasting water supply which is to be seen as a perennial balm for humanity, water being indispensable to life. Since the protagonist is a projection of Shakespeare and therefore an artist, specifically a poet, it is the poetry of the protagonist – and the protagonist with it – which after the death of the body will remain on Earth as a perpetual balm for humans. In this new spatiality, the person who remains will have no possibility to love the protagonist *qua* well – as a water source springing up from the deep, as poetry which wells up mainly from the deepest, most unconscious circuits of the brain. The beloved young man, who is apparently not a great poet, will vanish into nothing after death, whereas the poetry of the dying protagonist will last for ever and with it the protagonist too.

Let us now analyse two hemistichs of the monologue of King Lear from Shakespeare's tragedy of that name (Act III, Scene V), the whole text of which consists in the twelve blank verses that follow (my italics):

(Lear:) No, no, no, no! Come, let's away to prison;
 We two alone will sing like birds i' the cage:
 When thou dost ask me blessing, I'll kneel down,
 And ask of thee forgiveness: so we'll live,
 And pray, and sing, and tell old tales, and laugh
 At gilded butterflies, and hear poor rogues
 Talk of court news; and we'll talk with them too,
 Who loses and who wins; who's in and who's out;
 And take upon's the mystery of things,
As we were God's spies: and we'll wear out,
In a wall'd prison, packs and sets of great ones
 That ebb and flow by the moon.

The images chosen for analysis are contained in the verses emphasized in italics. Traditional interpretations and translations not based on the dynamic-spatiality view. In general, they see King Lear and Cordelia going courageously if not happily to prison, because there they will solemnly cancel from their all the bad persons, all the noble ones who have condemned them to jail and death. If Shakespeare had meant such an action

for his protagonists, it would have been a comic situation indeed: King Lear solemnly invites Cordelia to go with him to jail and death, so that they can forget the past. But the past could have been forgotten somewhere else and in some other way/ Jail and oblivion are hardly a victory, to be announced in the tone of a triumphant counter-attack! There is a strong crescendo between the parallel declaration “so we’ll live”, of the fourth verse, and “and we’ll wear out” of the third-to-last verse, prepared by the six actions introduced by the conjunction “and”, which hints at a piling up of actions which thereafter burst into the greatest attack and revenge. If we compare the tone of this powerful crescendo with the goal to be achieved, i.e., the forgetting of all, past, present and future, we have a disillusionment which leads to a ridiculous absurdity of the Shakespearian text. Besides, it is not they who have decided to go to jail; they must go because others oblige them. In addition and not least, they will forget because they will soon die, which represents their definitive defeat, and not a victorious counter-attack. Within the context of this interpretation, the invitation of King Lear is not such a solemn action as the general crescendo built by Shakespeare implies. Current interpretations misunderstand the image at least in two points relevant to the meaning of the piece.

The first misunderstanding to be dealt with here concerns the image “In a wall’d prison”. Currently, a “wall’d prison” is considered a prison with four walls, and the critics speak of it as such: little, four-walled rooms with a door for going in and out and a big lock, and sometimes a small window. But the linguistic form chosen by Shakespeare does not explicitly express the spatiality of a room with four walls; it only implies it. It explicitly expresses the spatiality of a room, the entrance of which has been walled up and therefore has no lock; i.e., one cannot go out once one has gone in, because the door is walled up.

The spatiality of this room, rather than resembling a normal prison, matches more with that of a burial niche. It is a room with four walls but with the entrance walled up. King Lear has thus invited his daughter to live with him in a burial niche, where they will survive all others, however powerful they may have been during their life. A clarification of this meaning will soon follow.

The second misunderstanding regards the spatiality carried out by the verbal form “and we’ll wear out”, normally interpreted as *we’ll cancel from our memory*. We have already emphasized the ridiculous aspect of the situ-

ation, if that is the meaning. Therefore, before we ascribe to Shakespeare a fall into absurdity, we must look for other possible meanings which may be more coherent. We can see that the last verse concerns persons, the great ones, whose power goes up and down like the waves of the sea according to the phases of the moon. Now, if the endoschemes connoting these powerful nobles refer to going up and down as the sea waves do, i.e., if there is a very rapid rising and a very rapid vanishing as if by moon phases, and if the tone of King Lear's speech is that of a conqueror in front of them, then this implies that King Lear, together with Cornelia, is sure to survive in some way. The way King Lear will survive with Cordelia lies in the spatiality which the dead have in the grave: they lie without going up and down; they show a material and metaphorical firmness which is opposite to the up and down motion of the great ones. As a consequence of this posture, there is the meaning intrinsic to the verb *to wear out*. This verb has several meanings, all of which centre on the main meaning: the action of consuming. Within this significant area, it also means to consume the other by persistence, to overcome them (*New Short Oxford*), to survive them, to wear them down or, more precisely, to wear them out. But how can Lear and Cordelia, condemned to prison and death, survive anyone? To answer this question we must consider the dynamic spatiality of the first verse. Lear invites Cordelia, his daughter, to go to prison with him. Implicit to his invitation is a gesture which has the spatiality of a man who invites a woman to go with him as a bride. Let us clarify the situation. At first, Lear says "no" four times, concerning the other two daughters, the other two women. The repetition is an emphasis of his refusal, which presupposes a gesture of rejection, for instance, an arm over his eyes so that he does not see the refused objects, the refused persons, for him to remove them from his sight. Then he changes his mind and enters a psychological state of acceptance of the third daughter, Cordelia. Thus, as he refuses the other two, he now stretches his arm towards Cordelia for her to give him her hand, and he also changes his tone. Lear is no longer in front of his daughter, he is in front of a woman he wants to raise to the dignity of a bride, *his* bride. Lear will live for ever with her, but he must die and Cordelia too. As flesh and blood persons, they are going to prison, to die. But Lear is triumphant. Has he gone mad from suffering? A verb which he repeats twice, in the second and fifth verses – *to sing* – makes us not accept this conclusion. They will sing together and live. His daughter, contemporarily his bride,

is now the truest companion of his life, a companion after death, for eternity, as no mortal daughter and bride can be: she is the personification of poetry. Therefore, Cordelia will live with Lear after death, and both will “wear out” or down those who will not last after their death because they cannot do so. Shakespeare/Lear is a great artist and knows it; he will survive after death thanks to his companion, his poetry, which after the death of the body will last forever. This way they will survive the others who now condemn them to death and who will disappear for ever after their short life. It is in death, as the walled prison hints at, that Shakespeare/Lear will survive with his most beloved companion, beloved as a daughter, as a bride, as the truest bride. Hence the triumphant tone, the outstretched arm, the calling to her, the promise of eternal love and life together. If we follow the spatiality of the piece, we reach the truest and deepest meaning of the speech of Lear. As to the falsification of Freudian interpretations, which fail every comprehension of the piece, see my study (2002). The dynamic spatiality has shown that there is a Leitmotif in Shakespeare’s personality and message to humanity: his consideration of poetry as the most important companion of man and his total devotion to it.

4. Conclusions

The identification of the above “endo- and exospatial schemes” within the above evolutionary spatial hypothesis has resulted in a novel interpretation of Sonnet LXXIII and of the monologue from *King Lear*. We have seen how the identification of the dynamic spatiality intrinsic to the linguistic level can give a more objective comprehension of the meaning intrinsic to the surface and to the deep structures of understanding and misunderstanding. Viewed through the dynamic-spatiality frame, psychoanalysis itself obtains a means by which objectively to verify and falsify its interpretations of symbols carried by language, which it too often fails to do when it analyses literature and art.

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Apostolos Matsagkos

Ludisme et violence dans les conversations entre jeunes gens en Grece

Le courant d'études communicatives qui se développe depuis les années 70 porte de plus en plus sur les échanges communicatifs quotidiens dans des disciplines et des perspectives différentes. Nous allons, dans un premier temps, présenter quelques notions et outils qui nous permettent ensuite d'aborder nos propres données d'analyse. A ce stade, et dans un deuxième temps, nous allons nous occuper des objets présents dans le titre.

1. Les problématiques communicatives

Les approches communicatives, et notamment le courant de l'ethnographie de la communication (Bachmann et al. 1981), ont centré l'attention sur les *situations* et les *interactions quotidiens*. Le dispositif de *Speaking* proposé par Hymes (1991) nous permet d'intégrer dans l'analyse les différents paramètres de la *situation*: le *cadre* (setting), les *participants* (participants), les *buts* (ends, goals), les *actes*, la *tonalité* (key, mood), les *codes* (instrumentalities), les *normes* et les *genres*.

La notion de *situation* se trouve plus largement au centre de la problématique sur le contexte culturel appréhendé dans sa dimension dynamique. Ainsi, les *normes* sont renégociées et réadaptées à chaque fois en fonction d'un ou plusieurs des paramètres ci-dessus mentionnés. Par exemple, les mêmes participants n'auront pas la même conversation dans deux cadres différents, le bureau de l'un d'eux et la cantine ; ou encore, une conversation dans un cadre donné, la cantine, n'aura pas la même teneur ni la même tonalité selon la présence ou l'absence de tel ou tel participant habituel.

La démarche ethnographique constitue donc une étape importante pour appréhender les situations de communication ordinaires dans leur

spécificité socioculturelle. Elle constitue d'autre part une source d'inspiration majeure pour les travaux de la linguistique interactionnelle qui se développe actuellement. Les linguistes qui se réclament de ce nouveau champ d'investigation développent une problématique et une méthodologie d'analyse des corpus de type conversationnel. On parle d'*analyses conversationnelles* en se référant au nouveau courant des travaux linguistiques qui au cours de ces vingt dernières années a élaboré des propositions et des hypothèses pour décrire des objets comme les différents types d'interactions (Cosnier & al. 1987; Bange 1987; Cosnier & al. 1988; Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1990; Vion 1992). Les typologies des interactions établies par la linguistique interactionnelle nous fournissent des concepts pour caractériser telle interaction ou tel moment interactionnel soumis à l'analyse.¹ En ce qui concerne l'interaction qui nous intéresse, à savoir la conversation, l'analyse interactionnelle définit celle-ci en tant que type d'interaction particulier : une problématique proprement conversationnelle ne se contente pas de décrire des comportements dans l'épisode interactif considéré, mais pose nécessairement une typologie des diverses interactions observées au sein d'une culture donnée. Les linguistes se référant explicitement ou implicitement à Erving Goffman retiennent sa tentative de donner un sens plus restrictif au terme de conversation, qui dans les travaux sociologiques pionniers recouvrait à peu près toute interaction en face à face. En effet, l'auteur distingue un type d'échange particulier qu'il appelle "bavardage", "causette" ou "conversation": "Ce type de langage suppose un échange facile des rôles de locuteur et d'auditeur et implique un petit nombre de participants qui ont peut-être décidé de passer ensemble un bon moment, plus ou moins long, où ils prendront plaisir à ne rien faire, ou qui s'accordent un court instant de diversion" (Goffman 1991: 488). R. Vion (1992) relativise l'aspect "gratuit", "anodin" de la conversation, parce que ce point de vue risque de compromettre la définition de celle-ci comme "instance sociale de base". Il souligne même que la conversation, "échange spontané et convivial", est aussi une sorte d'obligation sociale:

La fonction de la conversation consiste à affirmer et confirmer l'existence de liens sociaux privilégiés entre individus. Les personnes avec lesquelles nous conversons relèvent donc de la constellation de ceux avec lesquels nous entretenons des relations sociales généralement suivies. Chaque fois que nous rencontrons l'un d'entre eux nous sommes donc dans l'obligation de lui manifester ce statut particulier et d'engager une conversation.

Le sujet qui veut alors éviter l'échange doit s'en excuser, donner des raisons apaisantes et valables de ce refus et, dans bien des cas, verbaliser son regret de ne pouvoir satisfaire ce rituel de consécration réciproque. (Vion 1992: 127)

Retenons ici que, la *conversation* étant considérée comme une instance sociale de base, il convient de la distinguer de la *discussion*, dont la dimension argumentative est beaucoup plus marquée. La *discussion* est en effet définie en ces termes par C. Kerbrat-Orecchioni: "Il s'agit pour les partenaires en présence d'essayer de se convaincre les uns les autres à propos d'un objet de discours particulier" (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1990: 118). Plus largement, R. Vion rapproche la *discussion* et la *conversation*, dans lesquelles il voit des formes de communication essentielles:

Conversation et discussion pourraient alors être considérées comme les deux piliers de la communication: la première centrée sur le consensus et la coopération, la seconde sur l'expression de la divergence et l'affirmation d'une compétitivité. Solidarité et différenciation pourraient être les ressorts les plus profonds de la vie sociale, de sorte qu'on pourrait vouloir sortir ces deux types et les placer en exergue d'une sous-catégorisation des autres interactions. (Vion 1992: 138)

Cette tradition récente des travaux linguistiques communicatifs et la définition de la notion de conversation constituent une nouvelle donne pour l'approche de certains usages particuliers de la langue et leur signification, sur lesquels nous allons à présent nous pencher.

2. *Les données de l'analyse*

Nous allons évoquer d'abord quelques aspects méthodologiques concernant notre corpus.

2.1. Le lieu

Nous avons effectué l'enregistrement d'une conversation entre jeunes Grecs dans un bar. On peut évoquer à propos des rencontres dans des lieux publics un contexte de vie méditerranéen qui, par ses conditions climatiques et un certain mode de vie en extérieur, favorise les rencontres régulières ou aléatoires. On peut ainsi penser ces rencontres comme des épisodes

de vie que partagent ces personnes,² et qui se tissent essentiellement dans des lieux publics, lors des sorties diurnes et nocturnes. Signalons que le bar en question est fréquenté par un public relativement jeune, amateur de musique moderne étrangère ou d'une musique grecque inspirée largement du rock anglo-saxon.

2.2. Les participants

Le groupe des conversants est constitué par deux femmes (Véta et Thénia) et deux hommes (Andréas et Apostolos). Ils ont tous un âge qui s'échelonne entre vingt-trois et trente ans et ont tous fait des études supérieures.

2.3. Le "paradoxe de l'observateur"

Nous nous sommes demandé dans quelle mesure la présence du micro avait pu induire certains comportements des personnes que nous enregistrions. Nous nous heurtons là au "paradoxe de l'observateur", pour employer le terme de Labov, qui consiste à tenter de "découvrir comment les gens parlent quand on ne les observe pas systématiquement; mais la seule façon d'y parvenir est de les observer systématiquement" (Labov 1976: 290). Ce "paradoxe" est relevé dans de nombreux travaux sur l'interaction, car le problème se pose dès qu'on entend travailler sur des corpus conversationnels. Il est difficile de le résoudre, mais il apparaît néanmoins que pour la majorité des gens la dynamique de l'échange contribue à faire oublier le micro.

3. *Remarques sur le caractère dynamique de l'interaction étudiée*

3.1 Un moment ludique

L'enregistrement commence alors que la conversation a déjà été entamée entre Βέτα (Véta), Ανδρέας (Andréas) et Απόστολος (Apostolos). Véta exprimait son appréhension à l'idée du jour de son mariage qui approchait.

Extrait (a)

- 1 Véta : το σιχάινομαι το σιχάινομαι μα το Θεό το σιχάινομαι
je déteste je déteste je te jure je déteste
- 2 Andréas : κι εγώ το σιχάινομαι κι εγώ το σιχαινόμουνα στην αρχή
moi aussi je déteste je détestais au début
- 3 αλλά τελικά είναι εύκολη υπόθεση γιατί όλα είναι σκέψη
mais finalement c'est une chose facile parce que tu penses
à tout ça
- 4 και μια μέρα που γίνεται ο γάμος είσαι φυτόλας εντελώς
(γέλια)
et le jour où ça a lieu le mariage tu es un légume carrément
(rires)
- 5 φυτό ρε μαλάκα (γέλια) φυτό δηλαδή τη μέρα του γάμου
un légume un légume tu sais le jour du mariage
- 6 που είναι η κρίσημη είσαι φυτόλας εντελώς
qui est crucial tu es un légume carrément
- 7 Véta : δεν ενεργείς
tu ne fais rien
- 8 Andréas : μόνο σε ποτίζουνε στ'αρχίδια σου (γέλια)
on t'arrose seulement tu t'en fous (rires)

Dès le début le thème du mariage a été abordé par Véta, qui exprimait son angoisse. On était donc dans la confidence, dans l'évocation de sentiments personnels, plaçant les trois personnes en situation de complémentarité, l'une (Véta) verbalisant ses émotions tandis que les deux autres lui renvoyaient une écoute bienveillante. A l'intérieur de ce moment confidentiel Andréas donne un tour ludique à l'échange grâce à ses choix argotiques *φυτό* (fito), *φυτόλας* (fitulas) (= légume) (4), (5), (6), (8).

Dans les travaux récents sur la "langue des jeunes",³ on constate que l'argot ne remplit qu'accessoirement une fonction cryptique et que son utilisation devient de plus en plus ludique contribuant ainsi à renforcer la connivence dans le groupe. Toutefois, nous remarquons que, dans notre cas, cette fonction ludique et convivencielle se manifeste et se négocie dans le déroulement de l'échange.

3.2. Un moment de dispute

Nous assistons en effet au changement de cette ambiance joyeuse à la suite d'un moment de querelle entre Andréas et sa femme, Thénia. Andréas provoque la dispute en décochant une réflexion très vexante à Thénia, et quand elle veut obtenir de lui réparation il tente de lui faire croire que ce n'était qu'une plaisanterie. On retourne alors à du conversationnel, un peu comme si rien ne s'était passé. Mais nous verrons qu'en fait cette escarmouche a laissé des traces. En effet, Andréas revient régulièrement à la provocation.

Extrait (b)

- 313 Andréas : δε μου λες γουστάρησες που τη ψώνησες μωρό μου
dis moi ça t'a plu de te mettre en rage ma chérie?
- 314 (γέλια) με μισείς
(gires) tu me détestes?
- 315 Thénia : άσε με ρε Αντρέα
lâche-moi Andréas
- 316 Andréas : και να σ' αφήσω και να και να μη σ' αφήσω δε τρέχει τίποτα
que je te lâche ou que je ne te lâche pas ça change rien
- 317 τη ψώνισες πολύ
tu t'es vraiment mise en rage ?
- 318 Thénia : ναι τη ψωνίζω κι'όσο θα με πιέζεις ακόμη πιο πολύ θα τη
ψωνίζω
oui j'ai la rage et plus tu m'embêtes et plus ça me rend
furieuse
- 319 Andréas : ψώνισέ την δυνατά βάρα με και καμιά σφαλιάρα να
γουστάρω
mets-toi en colère fort donne-moi une gifle pour que je
prenne mon pied
- 320 έτσι βάρα με έτσι να την ακούσω μια δυνατή έτσι καλή
comme ça frappe-moi pour que je m'éclate mets m'en
une forte comme ça une bonne

Depuis le début, Andréas se positionne par rapport à son image de drôle, de désinvolte. Il fait celui qui ne respecte rien (le mariage, par exemple), qui est revenu de tout (et le fait qu'il soit le plus âgé du groupe renforce et facilite ce positionnement). Son irrespect généralisé se traduira

dans son vocabulaire, par l'emploi massif de termes argotiques, branchés, souvent injurieux. Pour plaire, il doit à la fois se conformer à une image attendue, mais aussi la cultiver par des nouveautés: il fera donc aussi des choix linguistiques surprenants et même s'efforcera d'inventer des formules nouvelles. Comme tous les rôles, celui de drôle ne se conçoit pas sans un public. Il s'agit pour Andréas de faire rire les autres et ainsi de se concilier leur faveur. Dans cette configuration, ceux-ci sont placés en situation de spectateurs: c'est une relation inégalitaire, mais que le public accepte sans difficulté. C'est ce qu'on constate particulièrement dans le premier tiers de notre conversation, où l'humour caustique d'Andréas remporte un vif succès et entraîne les autres à l'imiter. Andréas se conforme à une image attendue, mais en même temps celle-ci est le produit de l'interaction, elle se négocie constamment et on note qu'elle évolue de celle de bouffon plaisant vers celle de bouffon déplaisant.

4. *Constats*

Ce que nous retenons au terme de cette analyse, c'est l'aspect de liberté qui caractérise le déroulement de l'échange considéré. Cette liberté se manifeste linguistiquement, et précisément par la présence dominante d'un lexique hétérogène. Précisément, nous avons distingué certains choix lexicaux particuliers en rapport avec la construction d'une relation variée qui va jusqu'à la distorsion. Et par là même nous considérons un type d'unités lexicales dans leur finalité discursive, qui est interne dans ce cas précis. À travers ces unités lexicales, les sujets présents ont pu gérer leur échange autrement que d'habitude et, en tout cas, autrement qu'ils ne le pensaient initialement. Notre analyse se propose alors comme un mouvement qui va de la théorie exposée au début vers la considération des données dans leur spécificité. Ainsi, d'après sa définition la conversation constitue un type d'interaction fondamentale pour la coopération et l'intercompréhension humaines. Dans cette étude nous avons choisi d'aborder une conversation où l'on joue beaucoup avec les mots, et où cela peut provoquer le malentendu et la distorsion. Ainsi, notre étude contribue à l'éclairage d'une pratique sociale importante qui est partagée par tous, celle de parler pour le plaisir de parler en tant que jeu de langage particulier qui n'est pas forcément dissociable de la violence.

Notes

1. Voir les typologies des interactions dans Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1990); Vion (1992).
2. Rappelons à ce propos les notions d'histoire *conversationnelle* (Golopendja 1988) et d'histoire *interactionnelle* (Vion 1992).
3. Pour le domaine anglo-saxon: Eckert (1989), Andersson & al. (1990), Eble (1996); pour le domaine francophone: François-Geiger & al. (1991), Boyer (1997); pour le grec: Iordanidou & al. (1997).

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Jean-Claude Mbarga

Entente/mésentente dans le cadre de la diversité culturelle à l'ère de la globalisation

Le phénomène de la Globalisation est un véritable signe des temps. Le fait que la plupart des congrès de sémiotique s'en préoccupent est symptomatique de son importance. Il s'agit d'un terme, pour ainsi dire, *up to date*, non seulement en tant que slogan, mais aussi par rapport à la problématique de l'effectivité de son applicabilité. A l'heure actuelle, nous ne pouvons en aucun cas évoluer en marge de la mouvance actuelle qui fait du Monde un village, le fameux Village Planétaire auquel nous appartenons tous. Le monde étant donc un mouchoir, comme disent les espagnols, nous ne pouvons rester indifférents face à ce phénomène que nous subissons ou que nous consommons quotidiennement, et que nous devons pourtant éclairer et questionner de temps à autre comme c'est le cas aujourd'hui.

A mon avis, il s'agit d'une notion complexe dont la compréhension est multidimensionnelle. Plusieurs sont les définitions de la notion de Globalisation. Entre autres, le *Globalization Guide* (www.globalizationguide.org) nous signale par exemple que sur le plan économique ce vocable désigne "l'interaction croissante ou l'intégration des systèmes économiques nationaux par la croissance du commerce international, de l'investissement et des mouvements de capitaux"; ce terme se réfère aussi à la croissance rapide de l'échange social, culturel et technologique (cf. aussi Dagorn 1999: 188–201).

A l'ère de la Globalisation, la notion de *diversité* apparaît comme l'un des thèmes majeurs du discours humain. Il s'agit d'une notion à tout le moins complexe dont la compréhension peut être multidimensionnelle. Cette notion peut être cernée, entre autres, dans ses aspects interdisciplinaires, interculturels et internationaux. C'est pourquoi, pour des raisons de fourchette temporelle, et si tant est que "qui trop embrasse mal étreint",

je me dois de préciser que je vais limiter mon champ d'analyse à la dimension culturelle.

Quel regard, pour ainsi dire, actuel et proleptique, le sémioticien que je suis, jette-t-il sur la diversité culturelle dans le contexte mondial actuel de la Globalisation? Quelles relations d'assonance et/ou de discordance existe-t-il entre les deux concepts? Telle est mon entendement de ce thème que je m'en vais immédiatement développer en guise de plaidoyer pour un monde meilleur.

Parler de "diversité culturelle" c'est reconnaître implicitement l'existence d'une identité individualisante, entendue ici, dans le sens du Père Engelbert Mveng (1985: 67), comme, je cite:

ce qui fait qu'un être est lui-même et se distingue de tous les autres. [L'identité] est constituée par l'ensemble des caractéristiques qui rendent cet être différent des autres, et le constituent à la fois comme "ipséité", c'est-à-dire comme lui-même, et comme "altérité", c'est-à-dire comme différent des autres.

C'est-à-dire, pour parler comme Charles Morris (1948), le "Self", qui se manifeste dans les relations entre les personnes, lesquelles relations constituent encore tout un continent assez inexploité. La formulation des identités est circonstancielle et dynamique, car tributaire du discours dominant du moment, essentiellement différentialiste et qui de ce fait même rend compte de l'effectivité du phénomène de la diversité. Comme le constate si bien David Simo (2006: 51), on désigne des peuples par les notions de race, nation et ethnie, chaque terme renvoyant à un degré d'unité, et j'ajoute à la suite de Simo que ce phénomène va s'accroissant, entraînant tous les *ismes* dont souffre l'humanité aujourd'hui (tribalisme, nationalisme, intégrisme, fanatisme, ethnocentrisme, racisme, etc.), qui ne font que rendre compte de l'égoïsme de l'être humain. Cet égoïsme se manifeste sur le plan idéologique, entre autres, à travers le darwinisme social et le capitalisme.

En effet, dans le monde actuel, qui est fondamentalement capitaliste, les relations entre les individus ou les états se caractérisent essentiellement par le darwinisme social. On dirait que l'œuvre de Charles Darwin *The Origin of Species* (1859), confère une certaine garantie scientifique aux défenseurs du fameux processus inévitable de la sélection naturelle dans laquelle le fort anéantit le faible dans la lutte pour l'existence. En sorte que le monde actuel est beaucoup plus un véritable règne de l'arbitraire, où la

force sous toutes ses formes (physique, économique, politique, etc.) a la primeur sur le droit. Cet état de choses explique aussi, dans une certaine mesure, le véritable darwinisme culturel qui est imposé par certains sous des formes parfois déguisées, parfois à peine voilées. A ce sujet Gianna Pallante (2003: 11) déclare avec raison:

Un autre aspect de la mondialisation est l'homogénéisation culturelle à travers la circulation des marchandises qui véhiculent des modèles de vie. Tous boivent Coca-Cola, s'habillent en *jeans*, mangent du *fast-food*. De plus la mondialisation tend à homogénéiser et donc à détruire la diversité culturelle. La publicité propose une culture homogénéisée qui s'aplatit sur les valeurs de la culture économiquement plus forte, ce qui aboutit à l'uniformisation des valeurs plutôt qu'à la rencontre des valeurs différentes.

A tout cela j'ajouterai, entre autres, les impérialismes linguistique et cinématographique nord-américains, l'arrimage du monde entier au système éducatif anglo-saxon, appelé en Europe système LMD, devenu le Modèle à suivre avec grand M dans le monde entier, la tendance à la disparition des cultures dites traditionnelles au bénéfice des cultures dites modernes, et j'en passe.

L'égoïsme de l'être humain comme signe de manifestation du "Self" explique aussi la série de maux que nous vivons au quotidien, par exemple, les guerres et le terrorisme qui constituent, s'il en était besoin, la preuve de ce que en ce début du XXI siècle, la violence, malheureusement, ne peut pas être considérée comme une diplomatie périmée. A ces maux on pourrait ajouter la misère humaine, l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme, signes d'une injustice sociale et d'un égoïsme certains.

Le capitalisme, parlons-en. A la suite de la chute symbolique et significative du mur de Berlin, le capitalisme entend affirmer permanentement son hégémonie en tant que système mondial ou universel à l'échelle planétaire. Il y a lieu de relever sur les plans idéologique et politique, une contradiction entre le discours universaliste du capitalisme qui a la prétention d'être un système mondial, c'est-à-dire, globalisant, et la réalité quotidienne de ce que produit son expansion en termes d'inégalités sans cesse croissantes entre les peuples de la planète. Au dire de Gianna Pallante (2003: 10), l'une des caractéristiques de la mondialisation est qu'elle "augmente l'injustice sociale, parce que la richesse est poussée vers le haut à l'intérieur des pays et vers le Nord dans le cadre des relations entre les pays".

A ce sujet, il n'est pas inutile de citer l'observation suivante du *Globalization Guide*:

Rising inequality is the inevitable result of market forces. Given free reign, market forces give the rich the power to add further to their wealth. Hence, large corporations invest in poor countries only because they can make greater profits from low wage levels or because they can get access to their natural resources.

Par conséquent, la déclaration suivante de Margaret Thatcher – également citée dans le *Globalization Guide* – n'est pas du tout surprenante: "It is our job to glory in inequality..."

Depuis ce prisme d'appréciation, on peut dire que le capitalisme apparaît comme la manifestation constante d'un certain impérialisme à plusieurs ramifications du point de vue des relations humaines. La recherche effrénée du profit et de la puissance symbolisée par l'argent, qui passe d'un simple moyen à une fin en soi, sont autant de mobiles qui ne permettent pas de respecter la diversité, le "Self". C'est avec raison que Karl Marx disait que l'argent est la cause de toutes les discordes, et moi j'ajoute, dans ce monde qui prétend être globalisant. Shakespeare observe à propos dans *Timon d'Athènes*, en se référant à l'argent: cite:

Cet or suffirait à rendre blanc le noir, beau le laid, juste l'injuste, noble l'infâme, jeune le vieux, vaillant le lâche... Cet or écartera de vos autels vos prêtres et vos serviteurs; il arrachera l'oreiller de dessous la tête des mourants; cet esclave jaune garantira et rompra les serments, bénira les maudits, fera adorer la lèpre livide, donnera aux voleurs place, titre, hommage et louange sur le banc des sénateurs; c'est lui qui pousse à se remarier la veuve explorée. ... Allons, métal maudit, putain commune à toute l'humanité, toi qui mets la discorde parmi la foule des nations... O toi, ... cher agent de divorce entre le fils et le père, ... toi dieu visible qui soudes ensemble les incompatibles et les fais se baiser.

Force est donc de constater que l'être humain a deux caractéristiques essentielles: la générosité et l'égoïsme, qui constituent de véritables dynamiques dans ses entreprises et qui se manifestent dans la société dont il est membre, en influant sur la vie interne et sur l'action de la société dans ses relations avec l'homme et avec les autres sociétés. L'identité culturelle de chaque individu, de chaque peuple, de chaque pays, et de chaque nation est sous-tendue par ces deux caractéristiques de l'homme. Dans un monde

qui se veut désormais globalisant, la cohabitation des identités culturelles est-elle possible, ou alors la Globalisation implique-t-elle l'anéantissement de ces identités? On ne peut pas nier que le capitalisme à outrance que nous vivons aujourd'hui est l'une des causes majeures de la déshumanisation du monde, en sorte que l'avenir de la dignité humaine ne peut qu'être obscur, à plusieurs niveaux: relations entre individus, entre peuples, entre états, entre continents, etc., relations caractérisées d'une manière générale, par le mépris, l'abandon et la négation d'un certain nombre de valeurs universelles, telles que le respect de la diversité, du droit à la vie d'autrui, avec tout ce que cela suppose comme exigences, par exemple: lutte contre la pauvreté, respect du sang humain, santé et bonheur pour tous, même si paradoxalement le principe même de la diversité, dans son sens vicieux et manichéiste, voudrait aussi qu'il y ait un peu de tout pour faire un monde, s'entend: des riches et des pauvres, des forts et des faibles, des oppresseurs et des opprimés, des traditionalistes et des modernistes, etc.

Sans être pessimiste, je pense que cet état de choses rend utopique, ou à tout le moins difficile, l'édification du fameux Village Planétaire, un slogan qu'affectionnent les partisans de la Globalisation et qui, de ce prisme d'appréciation, a toutes les allures d'un marché de dupes. La Globalisation, que je considère comme une intégration respectueuse dans un cadre respirable pour la diversité et la complexité, doit s'entendre comme la recherche du bien de tous. Nous ne pourrions pas atteindre la Globalisation – véritable idéal, vu sous certains angles – tant que nous n'apprenons pas à partager, et la Globalisation ne pourra être un succès que si elle profite à tous. Mais malheureusement, l'univocité de la pensée, à travers le capitalisme qui est une doctrine fondamentalement égoïste, ne favorise pas la perception optimiste du monde dans la perspective de la Globalisation. Car, à y regarder de près, la Globalisation, en tant que rendez-vous du donner et du recevoir, s'accommode mal de la pensée unique. C'est pourquoi il ne serait pas superfétatoire de rêver en guise de solution – pourquoi pas – d'une redéfinition de la société planétaire dans le sens d'une plurivocité idéologique.

En ce début du 3^e millénaire, nous devons faire face à trois défis majeurs qui sont dans une certaine mesure des conséquences de ces caractéristiques. Le premier c'est la paix, le second c'est la pauvreté, et le troisième c'est la gestion adéquate de l'environnement humain. Pour que la mondialisation ou la Globalisation ait un sens, nous nous devons de l'humaniser en acceptant la diversité comme une réalité inévitable dans les relations humaines.

Pour ce faire, nous devons réfléchir sur la manière dont nous pouvons promouvoir l'essor d'une culture de la paix et de la tolérance, synonyme d'acceptation d'autrui. Ainsi nous ne pouvons pas exclure l'hypothèse d'une redéfinition de la société planétaire. Nous devons signer un tout autre contrat social à l'abri de tous les appétits capitalistes, en vue de reconstruire une société basée sur la coopération, afin d'éradiquer la pauvreté et de réduire les disparités scandaleuses qui ne conduisent qu'au désespoir et à l'exclusion.

La culture en tant que ensemble des manières d'agir, de penser et de sentir, est un signe important d'identification d'un groupe social déterminé. Ainsi donc, l'identité culturelle renvoie à tout l'héritage culturel d'un peuple, d'un pays, dans ce qu'il a de riche ou de pauvre, dans sa variété, dans son originalité, dans ce qui précisément le rend différent des héritages culturels des autres peuples. C'est pourquoi l'historien africain Ki-Zerbo observe à raison que la culture constitue la dimension la plus immédiate et la plus importante de l'indépendance. Il n'y a pas de nation consciente sans culture nationale.

Dans un monde divers, ambigu et paradoxal caractérisé à la fois par le protectionnisme culturel, le darwinisme culturel, le libéralisme culturel dans un contexte de globalisation, l'interculturalité, *stricto sensu*, est-elle possible?

Le phénomène de la Globalisation ne doit pas supposer l'anéantissement d'une culture par l'autre, par exemple, la culture traditionnelle par la culture moderne, la culture africaine par la culture occidentale, la culture occidentale ou asiatique par la culture américaine, mais plutôt la réception compréhensive et tolérante de la culture d'autrui en vue de l'exposition, pour ainsi dire, de toutes les cultures dans la tour du Village Planétaire, à la disposition du citoyen planétaire qui, conformément aux droits que lui confèrent le libéralisme culturel – et non le colonialisme culturel –, condition *sine qua non* du Peuple culturel, peut opérer librement son choix ou ses choix, en fonction des paramètres ponctuels ou permanents qu'il juge axiologiques (esthétiques, éthiques, psychologiques, etc.). Ainsi, je suis parfaitement d'accord avec Gianna Pallante (2003: 11) qui pense que la destruction des cultures au bénéfice d'une homogénéisation culturelle "appauvrit le genre humain qui, à travers la dialectique des différences, crée le progrès des idées et la dignité".

En effet, ce dont il s'agit bien ici c'est d'une intégration des cultures. Rendre intelligible chaque réalité culturelle pour le reste du monde, en respectant et en préservant leur essence, ainsi que leurs différences par rapport aux autres. Depuis ce prisme d'appréciation, la notion d'interculturalité doit donc être entendue, non pas comme le règne des *diktats*, mais comme un rendez-vous du donner et du recevoir, étant donné que chaque culture en tant que reflet d'une identité est une valeur en soi; il n'y a pas de sous-culture, et parce que chaque culture est une valeur, toute culture dans un contexte de Globalisation ne doit pas s'enfermer sur elle-même, elle doit s'affirmer et chercher à séduire autrui. Cela est possible. Il s'agit simplement de la bonne gestion des relations d'assonance et/ou de discordante entre les diverses identités nationale et l'intégration planétaire. A mon avis, la nécessaire construction des diverses identités individuelles et collectives ne devrait pas conduire à l'identité fermée et excluante de tant de nationalismes et tous les ismes que nous avons déjà mentionnés (le tribalisme, l'intégrisme, l'ethnocentrisme, le racisme, etc.), qui ont de tous temps été des sources de division et de violents conflits.

Quel Village Planétaire voulons-nous? Aujourd'hui le Monde est un grand village en devenir constant, qui prêche la Globalisation qui devrait s'entendre comme l'intégration respectueuse dans un cadre respirable pour la diversité et la complexité. Cela suppose le refus de certaines attitudes de résistance par rapport à autrui. Je soutiens *mordicus* que l'intégration planétaire ne sera un succès que par la culture, en passant par des arguments humains, et en ne se servant de la matière et de la technologie que comme des moyens de rapprochement et non d'éloignement des êtres humains, et en tenant compte de ce que les technologies opèrent des transformations matérielles, fonctionnelles et relationnelles qui peuvent être négatives ou positives.

Pour terminer, on peut dire par exemple que tant que nous continuerons de trouver étrange la culture de l'autre ou que nous manifesterons des attitudes de résistance ou de mépris vis-à-vis d'elle – même si par ailleurs il faut reconnaître ici que les africains sont plus globalisants que quiconque, ne serait-ce que pour avoir déjà adopté, bien que malgré eux, diverses cultures étrangères – l'intégration culturelle à l'échelle planétaire sera toujours un mot, demeurera un vœu, et la réalité nationale règnera triomphante, cloisonnant la construction du Village planétaire dans un discours qui s'usera au fil des temps.

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Marga Van Mechelen

The sign-ificance of showing in-sign-ificant pictures

Two exhibitions caught my attention last year as having two things in common: (1) The representation of war and (2) what may at first appear to be insignificant images. Why was it important to use these last, and what made them *significant* in the end?

The first exhibition was entitled *Breaking the Silence*, an exposition of snapshots made by Israeli soldiers, accompanied by their written and spoken remarks. No “art” pictures, no press photos, but just ordinary, not to say trivial pictures of their lives as soldiers and their daily confrontations and/or meetings with Palestinians. The second exhibition was not really an exhibition but a two-part installation, assembled by the well-known artist, Aernout Mik.¹ The first part, called *Raw Footage*, was a two-channel video installation for which Mik used documentary footage made during the Balkan War. This footage had been stored in media archives but was considered either too trivial or technically not good enough for broadcasting. The second part was also a video installation, entitled *Scapegoats*, which consisted in the screening of a fictional film that showed a wartime situation staged by the artist (see Figure 1).



Figure 1.

On the performance/film set there were around 90 people, some of them in uniform, armed or unarmed, some civilians, who in a few cases also carried weapons. Contrary to traditional iconography, the attributes were not very helpful in identifying the actors: “In fact, as Mik masterfully destabilizes the meaning of the narrative that unfolds on the set, we further lose our bearings both about who is who and about what exactly is occurring” (Hlavajova 2006: 19). Though we can hardly say that the aggression between some individuals on the set is insignificant, the impossibility of naming what is going on makes the things we see at the same time *in-sign-ificant*.

In both *Breaking the Silence* and *Raw Footage/Scapegoats*, questions arise: “What do the things we see symbolize?” “In what way do the images speak?” Though they have things in common – the use of insignificant images and the representation of war – the displays differ considerably. One is made by soldiers, the other by an artist; the first is a photo exhibition of so-called static pictures, whereas the second is a topical installation with moving images. Mik showed his material without any comment; the photo exhibition, on the contrary, used additional “texts” in explaining the subject of the pictures while at the same time keeping us from misunderstanding.² The photos showed things you normally wouldn’t see on television; they speak of things one usually is silent about. As one of the former soldiers notes: unlike the images one sees on television, these pictures are not *about* us or *about* our enemies, but “we are part of the scene one is looking at”.³ At the exhibition one could see a variety of pictures, photos of soldiers made by and of themselves, sometimes with prisoners, as well as pictures of the landscape and of “normal” life during war, and of people, both adults and children (Figure 2). As one of the soldiers explained, these photos show normal surroundings and not extreme things. Yet certain photos might shock the average visitor; for example, the one of a dead body surrounded by ammunition, a so-called terrorist pictured as the soldiers’ prey. For me the most significant example was a photo of soldiers shown with a Palestinian family. All of them are smiling at the camera, as if wishing to preserve the memory of their encounter. The first impression is that of friendliness. But the interpretation of an Israeli soldier, who explained the picture in a television program, takes another direction. According to him these smiling, polite Palestinians in fact had given up hope; the joy we see masks a feeling of “surrender” (*EénVandaag*, October 17, 2006).



Figure 2.

Both the soldiers and Mik try to present the story of war in an unusual manner, probably because such a tale is too often told in the same way. We have become immune to all the “same” war images. The Israeli soldiers of *Breaking the Silence* express their particular moral and political goals. Mik’s engagement is more general, and could be seen as part of an art historical tradition that started with Goya, of artists who took an independent position as critical observers.⁴ However impressive and effective the “format” of *Breaking the Silence* is, Mik’s *Raw Footage* holds much more interest from a semiotic point of view – which is further reason to concentrate on this installation and address the questions “what makes this installation significant, and what does it signify?”

1. Aernout Mik

Aernout Mik (born 1962, Groningen) is known internationally from his video installations that recall strange realities, or better said, that make realities strange. They always show something familiar to everyone, for example a kitchen or a sports hall, but what happens in these familiar surrounding makes things strange or even uncanny. In the video called *The Kitchen* two elderly men are doing something together, but it is hard to identify precisely what. Are they fighting, either seriously or jokingly? Are they dancing? In another video called *3 Laughing, 4 Crying* (1998) we see seven people, and it is hard to tell who is laughing and who is crying (Figure 3). As in most of Mik’s work, one has to accept this ambiguity and the fact that some things remain unidentifiable. In most of his videos the camera

watches events from a distance. And – as in reality – it is not always clear if the things that are happening will come to seem important. Meaningful and meaningless images are not clearly distinguished one from the other. Though Mik sometimes has in mind a certain development of the action, as in his latest installation for the Venice Biennale, the viewer usually gets the impression that things can go in all kinds of directions. In *Scapegoats*, for example, it is hard to tell which of the simultaneous actions is the most important and which character one should follow. The viewpoint of the camera is somewhat comparable to the position of a schoolteacher watching kids at play, but having no personal knowledge of them. As a result, the viewer is placed in a here-and-now position.



Figure 3.

Mik's videos usually move much slower than do films on television or in the cinema (such slowness being not unusual in contemporary video art). Also the role of sound differs from what we are used to. Often it plays a minor role while at other times it is left out completely.

The Kitchen is a video about two men, but most of Mik's videos are about large groups of people with different backgrounds and positions. In these videos Mik directs their behaviour, not by prescribing it but rather by creating its conditions. One such example is *Training Ground*, part of his installation in the Dutch pavilion in Venice, where one is invited to watch

an imaginary training of policemen to deal with illegal refugees. In *Training Ground* the roles of refugee and policeman are at first quite clearly separate, but as time passes they become more and more blurred, until suddenly the policemen are arresting each other and the refugees temporarily take over. The training exercise takes on a life of its own, and consequently positions become destabilized.

In general Mik does not rehearse scenes. The actors receive some instructions, but room is left for interactions between the groups or individuals. Of course, in a video such as *Training Ground* they have their own idea of what such training should entail. Although things are not “under the control” of the director, the overall impression is one of repetition, ritual behaviour, imitation of realities and ambiguity as to what is real and what is not. For this reason Mik often mixes existing footage together with subsequently recorded material, actors with real victims, or staged video with a “documentary” film. This was the case in Venice and also in the combination of *Raw Footage* and *Scapegoats*.

Raw Footage

Most of Mik’s video installations are shown in a loop, but that is not always how the video is conceived. In *Training Ground*, for example, Mik wanted to work towards a certain situation (Braidotti 2007: 35). Whether the viewer notices this depends on the moment he starts watching the piece or the time he is willing to spend looking at it. For the signifying process it therefore makes a big difference whether one starts in the middle or at the beginning of the video (not knowing, of course, where the starting point is). In a way I was lucky when I entered the room where *Raw Footage* was shown. I did not realize it at that time, but what I saw in the first few minutes was near the beginning of the video. I found this out much later, when I got a DVD of *Raw Footage* and found that the sequence of scenes was the same as in the video I had seen. In fact there were two screenings, but when I entered one of the screens was blank. People were nevertheless sitting on the ground and attentively watching both screens. Though I realized that it was a two channel video, I at first neglected to compare one screen with the other. When I did, I saw no spectacular images. It was not even clear what I was looking at, though I knew from the publicity information that it was all about the Balkan War. The images moved slowly, and if one

isolated them from their context they would probably be quite boring. Yet, the audience was not bored at all, so apparently the installation as a whole offered something more. After a few minutes I began to compare the screens, a semiotic behaviour that is not reserved just for semioticians. The comparison of images projected one after the other on one screen seemed to be relevant. A crucial moment occurred when I saw the image of a tractor behind some military machinery (Figure 4).



Figure 4.

A biblical expression came to mind: and the peasant (farmer) he kept on plowing. I realized immediately that this expression could have been applied to things I had seen a few minutes before. It was a repeated, cogent image that seemed to have a metaphorical meaning. So I constructed one narration: Life continues, even during wartime. Later images were also connected to this narrative; for example, the scene of girls drinking something on a sunny terrace and images of children playing with guns (Figure 5). It became obvious that these formed a kind of paradigm, either intentionally or not.

Other images drew my attention because they seemed to form a different group. These were images of animals, such as a cow, a wounded pig, a horse and a goat in the city (Figure 6). The narration of this second paradigm I would state as follows: Animals get lost in wartime and are therefore victims of war too. I am not sure if this second message would have come to mind had I not formulated the first paradigm, but of course the



Figure 5.



Figure 6.

repetition of the images of animals was striking and therefore significant. Both of these story lines were based on chains of images seen at irregular intervals.

Another comparison was made by a simultaneous viewing of both screens. There emerged a dominant image of people and groups of people. Often these images were close-up shots, so that one could see how people were dressed, if they were armed or not, if they were shackled or not. In other cases they were filmed from a longer distance, and identifying the group was difficult, either because of the distance or because of the morning fog (Figure 7).



Figure 7.

These images were surely the most alarming ones, not because of what one could actually see but because of the association which, I think, most Dutch viewers made: the association with the deportation of men from Srebrenica, a black page in the history of the Dutch Bat. I also made a second association, namely, the relation to the treatment of groups in Mik's other video-installations. Taking this into consideration, it was no surprise that one could not easily identify the groups of people. Were they filmed in a day to day situation or in the midst of wartime? Were they hostages or refugees? Were they civilians or unarmed soldiers? These kinds of questions continually came to my mind, but an answer was seldom possible, at least not for a foreigner like me, nor for the audience to whom the installation was addressed. As in Mik's other installations, indecisiveness and ambiguity had to be accepted as its signifying features. Though most of the footage Mik used had not yet been broadcasted, similar images could have been seen on television – images that were not by definition less ambiguous nor more significant. Those images were *made* unambiguous only by their contextualization.

One means of contextualizing images on TV is the voice of the war reporter, who stands in front of the camera and tells us what to notice in the following pictures, or the voice-over of a man or woman in the studio, who situates the images and tells us what we are viewing. Mik's images,

however, pass by without any voice. There is some ambient sound, such as the noise of gunfire, but it does little to establish context. If there is any resemblance to footage seen on TV, it is with the live images on CNN, after the reporter has told everything he knows and, like the viewer, is waiting for what will happen next. Mik is able to generate this sensation in his videos in spite of the fact that he applies a “hard” montage of images, which leaps from one place and time to another. We, the onlookers, are anxiously waiting for something to happen because there is neither a guiding voice-over nor a predictable structure.

2. *The signifying process*

In traditional iconography the signifying process is reduced to identification of the signified form, motives, figures and themes based on ordinary experience as well as knowledge of art history and literary sources. The first step is one of which we are hardly conscious; for example, the identification of a person as a woman or man. Our daily experience is in most cases sufficient. But to identify a woman as Judith or Salome we have to look at the attributes of these women or to the different stories in which they play a part. Still, even that may not always be enough. We also have to be informed about the history of character-types. As soon as we are able to combine certain figures we are able also to construct stories or allegories. This method of identification and interpretation was developed by Erwin Panofsky, once called “the Saussure of Art History” (Argan 1975) and “a great structuralist” (Lévi-Strauss 1965: liii).⁵ As I argued in my book, *Form and Signifying Process* (Van Mechelen 1993: 74), the relation of the first steps to the later step can be related to the difference between denotation and connotation as made by Roland Barthes in his *Éléments de sémiologie* (1964). The artistic motive derived from what is identified on the first level becomes the signifier of the second level, and so on. In the discussion of Mik’s *Raw Footage* we saw that the first level, the identification of what we saw, was sometimes possible only in this most rudimentary way: a group of people and not a “group of hostages” or “group of soldiers”. For the signifying process this indecisiveness appeared to be relevant. Questions like, Who are they? What are they doing? What is going to happen?, could not be and didn’t have to be answered (Figure 8).



Figure 8.

I thus associated some of these images with those of Srebrenica, the way I remembered them, long before knowing what happened to the Muslim men of that Bosnian town. This indecisiveness also had to do with the fact that we were looking at images of a civil war, where it is very hard for an outsider to distinguish one party from another, even soldiers from civilians. Despite problems of identification, the signifying process continued through the construction of paradigmatic as well as syntagmatic relations. It became clear that those relations helped constitute the semiosis. Courtés (1986) argued that such relations, though paradigmatic more than syntagmatic, were also important for Panofsky's iconographic analysis; for example, the latter's interpretation of three versions of *Et in Arcadia ego*: one by Guercino, and two by Poussin. The second painting of Poussin differs from the first in that it no longer features the motifs that made the first painting (and also that by Guercino) a *memento mori*. Also, the element of surprise is missing. His interpretation is based on paradigmatic correlations, which are of course fundamental for interpretation. Courtés, however, is not satisfied with the analysis of these kinds of relations, for one reason, because Panofsky's interpretation is restricted to the expressive content of the figures – their emotions and behavior – and the role of attributes (such as the skull) that were omitted from the second painting of Poussin. Courtés thinks that there is more to say, and also faults Panofsky for paying

no attention to the syntagmatic relations in-between the pictures, which Courtés claims are of more importance.

Though I would support Courtés in his criticism of Panofsky's method, I also realize the difficulties involved, especially when one is looking at moving images that operate on two levels at the same time: the level of substitution and selection, and the level of combination. The first is a metaphorical process based on paradigmatic relations, the second a metonymic process based on syntagmatic relations, as Roman Jakobson argued (and after him, Lacan amongst others). Looking back at the image of the tractor and the military machinery, it appears that the syntagm was one of two things behind and above each other: the machinery, in front and below, the tractor and the field, above and behind. (We speak of below and above when we consider the picture plane of the image and in front and behind from the perspective of a represented space.) Before viewing this particular condensed image, and even later on, we could see more "analogue" images; for example, those of soldiers walking through a field, but now in a diagonal line or in one that followed the their movements (Figure 9). Either way, two "worlds" are combined into one space. In the later images of girls sitting at an outdoor café, the war attribute was technically missing, but it was substituted by me, the viewer, who had previously seen and interpreted the image of tractor and machinery. This is somewhat similar to what Lacan argued, namely, that through the paradigmatic relations war is also present in the images of the girls (Lacan 1966: 507, 70; see also, Mooij 1975: 116).⁶ However, precisely because war attributes are not depicted, a new association comes to the fore: innocence, and the ability of youth to forget about the war or to see it as a game (one recalls images of young boys playing with guns or around tanks).

Are we talking about associations or connotations? In either case, we see how paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations intervene in the end. We can follow the same procedure with the chain of animal images. The similarity between these images was identified as "Animals get lost in wartime and are also victims of war". However, the images also display differences. One animal, a pig, is wounded; another animal, a horse, is standing calmly; cows are wandering about, not knowing the difference between a road and a canal. In a way, all these pictures tell us something that can easily be associated with the character or functional role of the animal. Although they have lost their way, the animals retain some identifying traits.



Figure 9.

3. Symbol, metaphor, association and connotation

I described above the crucial moment of seeing in one image a tractor and military machinery. To me this became a metaphor for one story line in the video. But is the word “metaphor” the right word? Both Ricoeur’s and Kant’s definitions of symbol bring “the symbol in close proximity to the metaphor” (Nöth 1995: 119), but is this particular image a metaphor or a symbol? To follow these authors we would have to replace metaphor with symbol. A symbol is defined here as a sign that keeps its primary senses and also has a deeper layer of meaning that it has acquired by association. In the interpretation of a metaphor, however, the literal sense must be abandoned and replaced by the figurative sense (*ibid.*). There is another argument in favor of calling it a “symbol”: it refers to an inexpressible and invisible content, which is neither defined nor explained by the symbol itself. “Symbol” in particular seems to be quite an elastic concept, certainly with Freud, who distinguished between two types of symbols. For one type, he said, we can give constant translations; for the other, there are no such fixed translations. Yet, the problem with these definitions of symbol, also in comparison with the concept of metaphor, is the ambiguity as to whether the deeper layer of meaning is a connotation embedded in the work or a subjective association made by the viewer. In the former case, one could use the word “symbol”; but in the latter, the term “metaphor” is more appropriate.

Semioticians, especially in the line of Roland Barthes, have tried to abandon the psychological concept of association, which, though still used, is hardly compatible with the Saussurean semiology. Other semioticians, certainly those advocating psychosemiotics, thought it impossible to avoid the notion of association in semiotic vocabulary; such a position was held even by a Greimassian such as Courtés (1986: 30). In my examples I used the concept of association twice without any doubt about its necessity: the association I had with images of the deportation of men in Srebrenica and the association with other installations of Mik. Both are connected to (partially emotional) memories that I identified with these new experiences and observations. In the other examples I hesitated, first between connotation and association, and second between metaphor and symbol. There is one important argument for using the concept of metaphor: the fact that it is the result of a creative effort that can be inspired by the work itself. In the case of the documentary images, this obtained both in the person who selected them and the creativity of the viewer. I do not deny that the expression “and the peasant he kept on plowing” was a very personal association, whereas the idea of “life continues even in wartime” represents a more universal reaction, which more people had or would agree on, based not particularly on “my” image but possibly on other images in the video. Here both concepts – association and connotation – touch upon one another. Here, we encounter a complex problem that has a long history in semiotics, too complex to deal with in this limited space. Nevertheless, I do hope that this article has set forth the complexity involved in perceiving moving images that are selected (not made!) by a visual artist, as well as the signifying processes involved in such perceptions.

Notes

1. Aernout Mik represented the Netherlands in the Dutch pavilion at the Venice Biennale of 2007. His prize-winning work is shown worldwide, especially in Europe and the USA. See also Guldemond and Mik (eds.) 2000 and Braidotti et al. (eds.) 2007.
2. During the opening hours of the exhibition there was always someone present who could explain the pictures. Moreover, the pictures were accompanied by texts.
3. The quote is from the documentary about the exhibition *Breaking the Silence* put out by *EénVandaag* (Avro/Tros) on Tuesday October 17, 2006.

4. Goya is considered to be the first artist who stressed the evil of unbelievable violence, while not taking sides with any of the parties involved. Mik's imagery, however, bears more resemblance to Manet's painting of the execution of Maximilian of Mexico.
5. The first publication was in 1932 (Hariolf and Verheyen 1974), and the best known that of 1939 (Panofsky 1939).

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William D. Melaney

Kristeva's subject-in-process: From structure to semiotic criticism

As presented in the early work, *Revolution in Poetic Language*, Julia Kristeva's "subject-in-process" can be interpreted as a semiotic alternative to older conceptions of the philosophical subject. However, although previous discussions of Kristeva's early work have centered around the break with structuralism, the feminist implications of the early work as well as the application of semiotics to cultural analysis, we require a somewhat different exposition to see how the theory of a "subject-in-process" involves a departure from received notions of subjectivity. This discussion will attempt to demonstrate how Kristeva (i) opposes Fregean logic to Husserlian phenomenology and (ii) adopts a Lacanian view of negativity and exclusion in displacing the traditional philosophical subject, while (iii) employing Hegelian dialectics to introduce a "textual" conception of cultural practices that (iv) allows actual works of art to be used as the material basis for a critical analysis of social reality.

1. Subjectivity in Husserl and Frege

Kristeva's early work is immediately concerned with the task of clarifying the possible role of phenomenology within the semiotic context. Phenomenology in its 'classical' form evokes a thematic of subjectivity and argues that experience is brought to light through intentional acts of ego-consciousness. Its notion of constitution is based on a conception of the ego that tends to privilege the results of normal functioning, rather on modes of awareness associated with non-intentional mental activity. Hence, while acknowledging that phenomenology provides a source of insight into the importance of constitution to verbal experience, Kristeva challenges the

tendency of 'classical' (Husserlian) phenomenology to identify linguistic research with the operations of the ego as such. The genesis of the ego is more crucial than the issue of how the ego consolidates the space of signification. In Kristeva's account, the genesis of the ego is related to the positioning of the subject, rather than to its phenomenological constitution. While phenomenology suggests that the "speaking subject" can be interrogated and linked to various horizons, Kristeva claims that the conditions that *produce* the subject cannot be examined within the scope of phenomenology (1984: 36).

Kristeva discusses Frege in order to develop an alternative to a phenomenological conception of the speaking subject. The analytical tradition, dominant in Anglo-Saxon countries for nearly a century, has drawn upon the contributions of Frege as an epistemologist, and, more recently, as a philosopher of meaning. Kristeva attempts to establish the internal difference between predication and meaning through a new reading of Frege that replaces the traditional subject with an inherently divided structure: "By straddling these two 'levels,' Frege's *Bedeutung*, in our view, designates, precisely, the break that simultaneously sets up the symbolic thesis and an object; as an externality within judgment, it has a truth value only by virtue of the scission" (53). Thus, rather than attribute the bestowal of meaning to the activity of a philosophical subject, Kristeva examines the structure of judgment from within and identifies the emergence of the Thetic with "the pre-condition for both enunciation and denotation" (53).

Nevertheless, Kristeva does not completely invalidate the oppositional framework in which Frege operates. While citing "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" as a key source, Hans Sluga has argued that "empirical objects as items of acquaintance" should not be posited as the primary concern of Fregean logic (Sluga 1980: 159). Comparisons have been made to the medieval theory of supposition and also to J. S. Mill's distinction between connotation and denotation, but Sluga contends that an originally Kantian background is essential to an understanding of Frege's thought: "My suggestion here is that Frege's distinction is to be found in neither of these sources but that it lies in the Kantian distinction between objects and concepts" (154). According to Kristeva, however, Frege demonstrates how a break occurs within the structure of judgment, instead of foregrounding transcendental unity. This new approach to judgment would allow Kristeva to re-articulate Foucault's "empirical-transcendental doublet" as

a divided subject, and to transform a Kantian opposition into a linguistic one (Foucault 1972: 303–343). At the same time, the break that occurs within the structure of judgment itself explains the emergence of the symbolic as an unstable foundation.

2. *The Lacanian turn in psychoanalysis*

Kristeva agrees with Freud as revised through Lacan in stressing the role of repression in clarifying the break with the semiotic in the formation of symbolic consciousness. Repression can be interpreted psychoanalytically through the myth of castration, which can be read as an attempt to explain the blockage that invariably accompanies the rise of symbolic thought. From the structuralist standpoint, Lacan employs a notion of Law that accentuates the radical nature of the symbolic break presiding over the repression of the imaginary that occurs in mature ego functioning. The *chora* of castration in Lacanian analysis would mark the site where the semiotic ceased to intrude on symbolic awareness. Kristeva, however, argues that the *chora* of castration does not refute the importance of the semiotic *chora* but sustains the possibility of achieving new (and less repressive) ego positions: “castration may have been a problem, a trauma, a drama, so that the semiotic can return through the symbolic position it brings about” (Kristeva 1984: 51).¹

Moreover, Kristeva translates the opposition between the semiotic and the symbolic into a distinction between the genotext as a “pre-subjective” process and the phenotext as an essentially “communicative” structure in the new semiotic theory (86–89). The opposition between spoken and written Chinese articulates the functional difference between a continuous field and a discrete action (87). This difference situates semiotic mobility in the space of writing rather than on the sidelines of an analytic structure. Nonetheless, we should proceed cautiously: writing is not a new ground, nor does it function in a “space” that is entirely separate from the utterances of the speaking subject. Moreover, the inexorable movement toward communication in psychoanalysis is a reminder that speech is not simply “the shadow of something that was once alive” (Lacan 1981: 254). Hence, in this new situation, the phenotext continues to assume the form of a linguistic structure, while the signifying process as a whole now includes a

new dimension insofar as “language” (as something that exceeds structure) *is not limited to the role of speech in the scene of transference.*

Kristeva's special view of psychoanalysis becomes defensible insofar as Freud himself often made use of figures and metaphors in order to convey his most provocative hypotheses. For instance, while attempting to clarify the concept of repression in *A General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis*, Freud at one point suggests that the dynamic structure of almost every mental process can be compared to the development of a photograph (Freud 1943: 259–260). His use of a topological metaphor allows the Unconscious to be compared a photographic negative, and also to explain how most thoughts must pass through a psychic dark-room before they can become conscious. This *textual* metaphor even illustrates how thought can remain unconscious (or undeveloped) while continuing to possess psychic importance. The possibility that a “textual” conception of the human mind could deepen the psychoanalytic structure requires a separate exposition, which will cast light on what is unique about the new semiotics.

3. *Semiotics and Hegelian dialectics*

Kristeva's understanding of “textual” difference provides us with the outlines for a new reading of Hegel that sheds light on semiotic theory itself. Jacques Derrida has suggested in *Of Grammatology* that Hegel's philosophy could be re-read as a meditation on writing, rather than as a mere eschatology (Derrida 1976: 26). Hence Derrida supplies an “archeological” index to the emergence of writing itself: “Spacing as writing is the becoming-absent and the becoming unconscious of the subject” (69). Derrida implies that writing cannot be thought under the category of the subject but always refers to a self-same presence, or identity in difference, and thereby eludes the closure of metaphysics. Writing is what “produces” differences, not as an external cause but as the effect of language in a situation that cannot be stabilized with regard to its final outcome.

Hegel becomes a semiotic resource to the extent that “the first thinker of writing” can be linked to an encounter with the text in a manner that has precise implications (68–69). Kristeva's suggestion that negativity is “the fourth term of the dialectic” allows us to grasp triplicity as the non-dialectical appearance of rational experience. Negativity enables us to relate semiotic motility to a highly developed conception of (philo-

sophical) Reason (Kristeva 1984: 109–113). In opposition to Kant's logic of judgments, Hegel's logic refuses to maintain the unity of the subject outside the element of negativity and the dialectical process. The element in which the subject dies occurs in a phenomenological drama or 'text' whose meaning implies the despair of consciousness as well as the preservation of an alien presence in the dialectical context. The Hegelian subject cannot be grounded in a single moment of consciousness but acquires its features in an extended narrative in which truth and error intermingle, just as two speakers are sometimes surprised to learn what can be revealed only through an extended conversation.

The dialectical conception of negativity provides a key to Kristevan semiotics in at least two respects. First, Kristeva specifies the importance of negativity to semiotics by citing the "Introduction" to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which emphasizes how the *experience* of negativity profoundly disturbs natural consciousness: "Whatever is confined within the limits of a natural life cannot by its own efforts go beyond its immediate existence; but it is often driven beyond it by something else, and this uprooting entails its death" (Hegel 1977: 51). Kristeva presents the death of consciousness in the light of this uprooting (*Hinausgerissenwerden*) to emphasize the disturbing qualities of dialectical experience (1984: 185). Hegel's often neglected discourse on language provides Kristeva with the second aspect of a new conception of negativity. In the "Preface" to the *Phenomenology*, Hegel distinguishes the usual interpretation of subject/predicate relations from an understanding of linguistic unity that is no longer based on the identity of grammatical forms. The true form of the proposition entails a movement between expression and subjective fading that can be grasped according to the musical analogy of rhythm (Hegel 1977: 38). For Kristeva, therefore, the emergence of negativity as well as the formation of "subjective" unity in dialectical thought casts light on the symbolic break that occurs in the semiotic process.

The concept of experience inscribed in Hegel's phenomenology requires a theory of mediation to explain how the object as in-itself can be transformed into a being-for-consciousness. The practical confrontation with heterogeneity performs a more theoretical role in Hegelian dialectics than it does in Kantian thought. At the same time, practices are dialectically meditated only because the role of the negative can emerge in terms of conscious experience: "It comes as no surprise, then, that Hegelian experi-

ence leads to a practice; the latter is not only a subordinate moment of theoretical synthesis, it must also be a test – a confrontation with heterogeneity” (Kristeva 1984: 197).² Knowledge in this framework would involve an interpretation of cultural practices that constitute a limitless “text” that cannot be identified with a single, unequivocal meaning.

Readings of Hegel commonly assimilate the movement of the negative to dialectical results. Of course, the possibility that adequacy may not be the ultimate dialectical goal at least suggests that Hegel’s thought is compatible with the limitless “production” of cultural texts. If texts are capable of registering the movement of the negative in the signs of rejection itself, cultural practices might be interpreted in Hegelian terms. However, this special understanding of Hegelian thought would not allow us to assimilate practical experience to a purely logical conception of the dialectic: “Although Hegel was the first to identify and put so much emphasis on this movement and its negativity, he subsumes it under the *presence of consciousness*, which Heidegger in turn over-emphasized, by reducing the essence of the dialectic to it” (184).

Kristeva readily admits that the problem of presence necessarily haunts Hegelian discourse. Heidegger argues that Hegel allows us to read phenomenology as a path that runs “in-between” what connects natural consciousness and knowledge (Heidegger 1989: 53). Kristeva partially concurs, suggesting that Hegelian phenomenology tends to confuse the presence of consciousness with the meaning of the dialectical process itself. Nonetheless, Heidegger’s critique of dialectical ontology is clearly “overstated” when it argues that the Hegelian Subject is simply a more recent version of the Cartesian Subject (Kolb 1989: 213–232). The identification of Hegel’s thought with an “egological determination of being” leaves little room for what exceeds metaphysics (Heidegger 1988: 126). In contrast, Kristeva conceives of the dialectic as a movement whereby human beings can confront the alienated majesty of the past and achieve mediation with what would otherwise escape the boundaries of conscious experience.

4. *Semiotics and cultural practices*

Kristeva develops the notion of *texts* as signifying practices that are inseparable from the situation of speakers engaged in actual language use. The possibility of understanding is inseparable from our ability to identify the

text as the vehicle for a new sort of practice: “In calling the text a practice we must not forget that it is a radically new practice, radically different from the mechanistic practice of a null and void, atomistic subject who refuses to acknowledge that he is a subject of language” (Kristeva 1984: 210). The semiotic text that emerges in this way functions in a general economy of signs as a mediatory link, drawing together signifying practices that are conscious and other practices that occur on the threshold of unconscious, or, more loosely, “natural”, processes. As the bridge between spirit and nature, the semiotic text provides a space in which signifying practices can begin, just as it marks the limit of what can be achieved by an ego that continually strives for higher levels of cultural awareness.

Kristeva helps us see that art cannot be limited in meaning to momentary aesthetic experiences (215). Art both supports a critique of the subject and opposes the idealistic dissolution of the subject that occurs in most speculative thinking. Moreover, while separating us from direct experience, art has the capacity to present the semiotic in a mimetic guise: “Mimetic verisimilitude does not, therefore, eliminate the unique break Frege saw presiding over signification. Instead it maintains that break and, within, a certain object” (58). In offering us a *critique* of mimetic realism, Kristeva claims that the work of art is neither “true” nor “false” but the locus of semiotic possibilities (58). The work of art is a *text* that provides the “space” of illusion that opens up after an epistemological break has occurred, just as it offers legible signs of being connected to the world that exists “outside” the break. What this means in semiotic terms is that the work of art constitutes the space of a non-true “presence” that testifies to both an inside and an outside, just as it opens up the possibility of *untruth* (and *misunderstanding*) while testifying to the virtual possibility of societal knowledge.

Notes

1. Kristeva derives the term, *chora*, from Plato’s *Timaeus* to denote “a non-expressive totality” that pre-exists the speaking subject as an unstable foundation of semiotic drives (1984: 25). The *chora* is part of the field of language, rather than a fixed abode, since “it can never be definitively posited: as a result, one can situate the *chora* and, if necessary, lend it a topology, but one can never give it axiomatic form” (26).
2. The importance of Hegel to early pragmatism is reinvented in Kristeva’s semiotic approach to cultural practices. A partial explanation for this

might be that the Peircean *interpretant* is analogous what motivates Hegelian Reason, which dispenses with the Kantian thing-in-itself in opening the human subject up to a new sense of the Infinite.

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Kerstin Mickelsson

Entrepreneurship and communication

Understandings/misunderstandings as means for adventure

Introduction

Some theorize entrepreneurship as a hermeneutic dialog of learning while others connect it to a social construction of identity where boundary crossing and boundary spanning are pursued by engaging participants. Common to these two positions is the acceptance of reality as social constructions created in ongoing socializations, institutionalizations, and sense-making interaction between women and man; wo/men. Writing this text my ambition is to discuss entrepreneurship from these two positions in association with communication focusing performance. I will present entrepreneurship within a semiotic perspective and make the suggestion that understandings/misunderstandings can be interpreted to play a meaningful role in entrepreneurship. I will try to show that, sometimes and in some places, people can believe they understand the entrepreneurship as they emotionally experience on-going events as I portray how (mis)understandings can make wo/men take part in an adventures business. Thus, I state that in theories of entrepreneurship, (mis)understandings must be expressed as means for entrepreneurship.

The business venture I've been studying and am about to put in the picture as a sign of entrepreneurship is named "Wij Trädgårdar i Ockelbo", which is located at an old forest and steel estate in a sparsely-populated area in the Swedish country-side. The study is part of my PhD studies and I've been at the location as a researcher from January 2004 to April 2005. Following on-going actions and engaging people as close as possible during this time I've made observations, participating observations, and comple-

mentary interviews. I have read about 430 news items and paper articles concerning the venture (published 2001–2003) and different kinds of internal documents (minutes of meetings and quarterly reports) produced from autumn 2003 until summer 2004. I also permanently resided in the municipality for one year (April 2004 to April 2005).

Here I will first briefly introduce the notion of the *relational sublime* (Gergen 1996a) and address some cornerstones of the social construction of reality (Berger and Luckman 1967). Thereafter I will tell, in somewhat non-academic fashion, a narrative story (Czarniawska 2004). I first present a social background of the settings of the storyline, then proceed to the plot of the harvest celebration at Wij Trädgårdar i Ockelbo in late summer 2004, a moment in time when I am surrounded by many actions and a lot of people: a living (Dutton 2003) and moving collage of eye-catching events and folks taking part in entrepreneurship. All parts presented are chosen because they are significant for the establishment of Wij Trädgårdar i Ockelbo and therefore helpful to understanding entrepreneurship in practice. After the narrative, I return to theories, presenting three discussions; the first, on entrepreneurship as performance of learning and identity; the second on actantial interaction and communication; the third, on the adventurous force of (mis)understandings, in which I share my impressions of that day at the harvest celebration of 2004 at Wij Trädgårdar i Ockelbo. Suggestions are made that both understandings and misunderstandings, under certain circumstances, can play a meaningful role in entrepreneurship.

1. *The relational sublime*

Gergen (1996a) addresses social construction in a realm of the *relational sublime*. To enable elaborations on human relatedness as fundamental to understanding wo/men, the author unfolds a semiotic space in which both languages and articulation are understood to form the boundaries of peoples' relational worlds. Gergen writes: "It is language that furnishes the capacity to distinguish this from that, me from you, up from down, in from out. 'There is' ... is a move in linguistic space" (1996a: 8). He goes on to state that relationships are formed where "the source of 'awe', 'inspiration', or 'terror' is not to be found in nature ... or in persons..., but within unfathomable processes of relatedness which make meaning possible" (9)

The sublime is increasingly present in our daily experiences, relational to and associated with a powerful force. Acknowledging the power of inter-related emotions, Gergen presents a wo/man who is comprised both by “normal” feelings, such as fear, anger and sadness, and by “extremes”, for instance, overwhelming melancholy. He states that, even though emotions and emotional expressions can be acknowledged as ontologically connected blueprints, emotions can also be interpreted as relational experiences closely connected with the conditions in which they are experienced and expressed. Thus, internally emotions are experienced as mere commonly known feelings, but “tears shed at a funeral are indicative of sadness ... the same tears at a wedding or the presentation of an award are indicators of joy” (1996a: 3). Gergen also claims that, in theories of psychology, feelings of love are mostly left out of the picture and suggests that this is so because the term has been used to index so many different and varied actions over the centuries – from adoration to avoidance, suicide to homicide, the trivial to the profound – that it has lost its scientific respectability as a term (*ibid.*). Widening the perspective to include social psychology, Gergen argues that “scientists can offer society enormous riches in terms of principles of human interaction” (1996b: 2). In using the word “principles”, the author again stresses ontological and relational implications when identity is understood in relation to inter-relationally expressed and experienced emotions, as well as with internally experienced feelings. In real life, social constructions are most effectively deployed in studies that illustrate interesting and challenging ideas, and/or those which trace patterns of manners deemed generally to be of significance to the society. Bits and pieces gathered “out there” can dramatize and illustrate provocative ideas about how people live, and give rise to intriguing and important questions concerning “the power of social influence, and the needs and problems of both belonging to social groups and remaining independent of them.” (*ibid.*: 5)

2. *Settings*^t

Wij Trädgårdar i Ockelbo as a commercial venture dedicated to gardening and garden design, as well as recreation, handicraft, ecological and locally produced food, and a variety of musical and cultural events. At the time of the harvest celebration (12th of September 2004) it was said that the

business would open “for real” in spring 2006, but such things as a rose garden, a kitchen garden, a shop for handicrafts and souvenirs, and a restaurant had already opened for business. The main business idea is articulated in the mission to build a national and international centre for plants that can grow and flourish in cold climates, and this is to be done in a way “the world has never seen before”.

This sort of entrepreneurship dates back to the late twentieth century, initiated by some officials and politicians at the local government-office in Ockelbo, together with some local business owners and a well known Swedish gardener. The gardener, viewed as the head acting entrepreneur, is acknowledged as one of the most knowledgeable gardeners in the country and an extraordinarily skilful garden designer. He is also well recognized as one of the initiators of Rosendahls Trädgårdar at Djurgården in Stockholm, a success story still in the telling.

Also involved with *Wij Trädgårdar i Ockelbo* are a large number of other people, such as approximately 100 local inhabitants and people from surrounding villages and cities. Most signed up to take part in the venture after an information meeting held at the Free Church in late autumn of 2000. Many of them are middle-aged women taking time off from other off-work duties. Others are professionally related to different parts of the planned venture, who seek an opportunity to work with and learn from the gardener. It is my belief that many of them also participate in hopes of contributing to something they believe will, in the long run, prove a benefit for the municipality. Pure curiosity as well as the joy of participation in different happenings might also explain the high number of participants. The concept of “engaged participants” is used to label individuals whom I interpret as part of this group.

The location, land, and buildings have a long and glorious history of almost 400 years of steel and forestry business. Buildings and other facilities built in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are currently owned and maintained by a foundation. The estate was bought at the price of one Swedish krona from the local government of the rural district and municipality of Ockelbo; the last private owner of the manor was STORA ENSO AB, a business that most of the population in this part of Sweden either historically or currently have some kind of professional and/or familial connection to. Financing currently comes mainly from the county administrative board and EU-grants.



Photo 1. The location, July 27th 2001 (photo by Thomas Grönberg).

The Harvest celebration was announced in e-mailed newsletters sent to subscribers (on July 28 and August 2004). Judging from conversations heard on planning of the day, it seemed to me that the celebration could very well speed up the progress of the business venture. On the 12th of September 2004 festivities were arranged for the first time, with plans to make the Harvest celebration an annual tradition.

3. The harvest celebrations

On the 24th of September 2004, the weather is slightly cool but quite pleasant; the sun is shining and only some light clouds appear in the sky. Here I am, standing in a field, gazing across the premises of Wij Trädgårdar i Ockelbo, a place that usually would be described as silent and serene, but that now exudes an air of excitement.

Some distance away and slightly to the left, on the avenue, I see a horse and wagon where people are invited to go for free rides up and down the road. It's only a few hundred meters, but the trip will take you down the avenue to the pond and the old, long-closed factory that presently serves as a steel-works museum open to the public. Then it's back to the manor house again (photos 2 and 3).



Photo 2. Avenue and Manor house.



Photo 3. The pond.

To the right of the steel-works museum, far off in the field, I can see an old and very noisy reaper churning up large clouds of dust, and still further down, in the middle of the field some horses are being used for the same purpose, which is to demonstrate different ways of harvesting (photos 4 and 5). Even further down, to the right, I see three men working together, building a hay-drying rack.

I recognise two of them, Tobias and Klas, gardeners and employees highly engaged in the realization of the venture (photo 6). Just behind my back a sheep racetrack has been erected and a flock of sheep is currently being restrained by a shepherd at the starting line; all of them have a large number painted in black on their back. Someone is walking around with a bucket and taking bets from people gathering along both sides of the fence,



Photo 4. Horses in a field (12-09-2004).



Photo 5. Hay-drying rack (September 2004).

many of them trying to get a good position near the finish line. There is a lot of laughter and some intense discussions; it looks as though they're having fun. I stay there for a short while watching the race and then decide to take a short walk, passing the open space, the gravelled square, in front of the Mansion between the north and the south wing, and slowly stroll up to the kitchen garden and the Rosarium, and finally end up in the Garden House.



Photo 6. The avenue and one of the gardeners (July 2004).

Today the square is turned into an old market, where a lot of visitors, including myself, are slowly moving along the lines of market stalls where different kinds of merchandise are exhibited and put up for sale by local producers (see photos 7 and 8).



Photo 7. Visitors on the Market Square (12-09-2004).

Most of the stalls offer free samples of products for sale. Some of the engaged participants of the venture are selling vegetables, probably some of the harvest from the kitchen garden (photos 9 and 10).



Photo 8. The Market Square and the Mansion (12-09-2004).



Photo 9. Local producer selling honey (12-09-2004)

In the centre of the square a large tent has been erected for the harvest exhibition, where a contest which has been arranged in cooperation with one of the local morning newspapers. In its shade participants display their entries for the competition (photos 11 and 12).

I walk along the gravelled garden path across the shady school yard, past red-painted houses, where actions are taken to start an education in gardening at college-university level. Today Lars, the head acting entrepre-



Photo 10. Woman selling harvest from the kitchen garden (12-09-2004).



Photo 11. Entry for the harvest competition (12-09-2004).

neur and well-known gardener, stands there preaching, sharing his skills of how to create great compost out of kitchen- and garden-leftovers (photo 13). Many have stopped to listen, pleasantly amused at his way of using gardening terms in different metaphorical moods.

I cross the asphalt thoroughfare and wander onto the sidewalk and up to the kitchen garden, the Rosarium, and finally enter the Garden House (photos 14 and 15).



Photo 12. Harvest on display (12-09-2004).



Photo 13. Lars, one of the initiators and head acting head gardener (undated).

I enjoy a cup of coffee and a piece of cake, baked either by Monika or any of the numerous others who have joined the group in charge of the kitchen at Wij Trädgårdar.



Photo 14. The Kitchen garden and Garden House (August 2004).

4. Entrepreneurship as performance of learning and identity

In business economics, theories of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurs have often been concluded that the latter are a special kind of people who are motivated by performance. It has been explained that (wo)men (Ogbor 2000) who start a business are task-oriented, have an interest in business growth (Miner et al. 1994; Miner 1990), and feel a need for achievement (McClelland 1961, 1987). Delmar (1996) has measured the effects of entrepreneurial behaviour in business progress and survival; in assessing quality of performance, he considers the environment, the psychological characteristics of the entrepreneur, present competition, attitudes among co-workers, motivation, ability and emotional responses. Entrepreneurial performance is seen at its best if motivation and ability result in a persistent and expanding venture organization. Situations at hand demand some sort of (modest) risk-taking, responsibility and anticipation of the future.

Performance has also been expressed as a concept in interpretations that engage features of entrepreneurship in quite a different discussion. This discussion is in search for knowledge of entrepreneurship as on-going organizing processes. In this regard, Gartner et al. (1992) declared that entrepreneurs have to “act as if”, in order to motivate and persuade other people to contribute and willingly engage in (seemingly crazy) ideas. In



Photo 15. The rosarium (August 2004).

this line of theory some researches have set out to express entrepreneurship and the acting of entrepreneurs as constant performances. Today Johannisson (2005) makes an attempt to formulate a life-long research achievement and presents a theoretical contribution in an “acting as if”-related essay exposing reflections on the essence of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship is vividly exposed as an event-driven “staging”, continuous performances where relational struggles are expressed and experienced emotionally as successes and failures, where doubts and convictions are endured.

Perhaps less spectacular but highly related to staging is the theoretical translation and representation of entrepreneurship as common narrative learning. Here, Steyaert (1995) theorizes entrepreneurship as a dialogue among different actors. Entrepreneurs and other actors who engage in a venture are placed in a central position where knowledge can (and must be) put up for option. To perpetuate and conceptualize new ventures as social constructions created in interactions among people, Steyaert and Bouwen (1990) describe how people narrating can transform social settings and structures; the authors metaphorically portray the movements of entrepreneurship as “a warp and weave” and argue that entrepreneurial stories change social settings and structures, the history, the “context”. Entrepreneurial weaving discloses disparate knowledge and intertwining personal relations, and in this way an attractive, diverse, and unique social (construction) of the environment can be created (Steyaert and Bouwen

1997). Anderson (1995) describes the attraction of entrepreneurship in a rural context as communication and transformation of temporal and spatial features. Entrepreneurial performances and rural attractions can develop gravitations that turn periphery into center. New business ventures awake bright and colourful textures of hopeful thoughts of days that are yet to come and nostalgic shimmers over the good old days that are long gone. Attention is gained, “off” turned into “on”, and “cold” into “hot” as new meanings are communicated and created.

Wählin (1999), as does Steyaert, makes a vigorous effort to combine entrepreneurship with social constructions among humans, but instead of using an epistemological lens, directs the theory of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship to ontological issues. Combining theories of identity creation with theories of entrepreneurship in search of how “the actor’s imaginative actions are constructed within networks” (1999: 115) he argues that in order to enact entrepreneurial changes, self-confronting questions constantly have to be put up for examination. Identity, then, is not seen primarily as a fixed or fully matured entity, but is assumed to be open-ended and lifelong, a “continually socially constructed and subject to contradictions, revisions and change” (ibid.). In this way Wählin’s unfolds a self-reflexive construction, and entrepreneurs are injected into an “individual” that moves both in and out of “different institutional environments” and through “time and space” (ibid.). To express the entrepreneurial organizing and to capture the entrepreneur as a traveller, a tourist, Wählin formulates the concepts of “boundary spanning” and “boundary crossing”. The spanning and crossing of boundaries summarize how entrepreneurs travel both inward, through self-reflexion, and outward, through the change of environment and through narratives expressed to others (Lindgren and Wählin 2001). Unlike the pilgrim, who travels to reach a predetermined and final destination, the entrepreneur is always on the move and does not belong to places she/he might come to visit. This way the entrepreneur is able to keep some objective distance. During the movement and in interaction with others, boundaries are expressed between here and there, now and then, and I and you. But in order to understand life and “authentic feelings and experiences”, these boundaries are constantly crossed in ongoing narratives, by which entrepreneurs, as actors, give voice to something beyond “institutionalised identities” (Wählin 1999: 125).

I would argue that in entrepreneurship learning and identity, creation is a cooperative activity. In theories of entrepreneurship and in the light of social constructions, *performance* is a useful concept for describing entrepreneurial wo/men in their various interactions. In the following section I therefore discuss interacting in terms of concepts connected to human performance, which enable a semiotic reading of entrepreneurship.

5. Interacting actants, canonical mediation, and recursive communication

Recognizing features of constraints and relations of provocation, Greimas (1982/1990) theorizes performative interrelations among actants, in which articulations and seductive manipulations take part. Things and people are put forward as object-and-subject, sender-and-receiver. Challenges may be accepted or rejected. By their actions, wo/men connect to other peoples' interpretations and to stories and discourses. Here, things that can be known are explicit and exposed whilst the known is implicit and semantic. In between things that can be known and the known a space of interpretations appears in people's need to search for understandings. Life involves interpretation, a struggle that is born of a will or a need to understand. Opportunities to interpret, as well as manipulate, appear at the intersection of previously assigned mandates and/or sanctions of cognition (Greimas 1983/1990). This way, the ability to interpret is manifested in feelings of desire. This way, and in the concept of the *actant*, bodily personified semantics and signifying become features of discursive expressions/impressions. Through actions and reactions people become part of a polemic held through interpretation and knowledge. By unveiling convictions and tensions that trigger our desire and need to respond, one action is connected with other actions. The progression, or trajectory, of interactions is expressed as a dynamic movement of perspectives from one space and time to others. The subject embraces "beings or things that participate in processes in any form whatsoever, be it only a walk-on part and in the most passive way ... which precedes any semantic and/or ideological investment" (Greimas and Courtés 1982: 5).

In the legacy of Greimas, and in the light of laboratory-life (Latour and Woolgar 1986), Latour (2000) describes scientific mediation as a circulatory system that can project a canonical process. This process is described

to involve five conceptualizing practices: *mobilization of the world*, *autonomization*, *alliances*, *public representation*, and *links-and-knots* (Latour 2000: 98 passim). Mobilization of the world refers to when and how objects are used and charged with meaning. Autonomization is when and how actions are taken to release particularities of a context. Alliances refer to long-term cooperations where participants anticipate gained mutual benefit. The concept of public representations covers activities that communicate and give information on on-going actions and happenings in the system. Public representations are propagated through media in connection with “the man and the woman on the street” (ibid.: 105). The final practice, links and knots, describes evolving associations. Together these associations represent an understanding that develops over time as coherent actions are taken to create mobilization (of the world), autonomization, alliances and public representations. Latour (2000) argues that macro-actors of truth are organized in practises that disclose space for content; experiences of personal, internally located situations and happenings; and externally comprehended institutionalized circumstances. A circulatory system is built as human actants (people), non-human actants (artefacts), and quasi-objects (routines) are connected and negotiated in relation to one another and in company with a super-actor, a common spokesman and or a purpose (Callon and Latour 1981; Latour 1987). Latour (2000) emphasizes that super-actors do not evolve only from these five practises or from the actants. Super-actors are literary and linguistic articulations that derive from the translations of actions and actants in practice. Latour writes: “In its linguistic and mediation connotations, it [translation] refers to all the displacement through other actors whose mediation is indispensable for any action to occur. In place of rigid opposition between context and content, chains of translation refer to the work through which actors modify, displace, and translate their various and contradictory interests” (2000: 311). He goes on to emphasize that the canonical power of a super-actor can be comprehended chiefly in the articulation of links and knots. The power of a super-actor is never stronger than associations concerning actions and actants (Latour 1999).

Viewing all this from a semiotic perspective, it can be stated that all people have the desire and will to interpret. Interpretations are coloured by an ontological striving, since in order to survive people need to interpret. In semiotics, interpretation is connected to interactions effected by

passions and manipulations. In interaction, interpretations contain stuff already known and things yet to be discovered. The known can be more implicit, producing a bodily experience in feelings closely connected to established norms and cognitive sanctions, as memories of other times and other places. The unknown, so as to be known, can be made explicit and shared in emotions closely connected to on-going actions and happenings in the here-and-now. Things as well as people become objects of contents merely by being there and participating in a given moment. Interactions can release distinctive and autonomous parts of a context. Alliances, media and “men and women on the streets” promote associations – links and knots – that weave interpreted bits and pieces together into an understanding. Associations and interpretations promote canonical forces and movements.

Krippendorf (1994) suggests that communication is constructed in language as practiced, concluding that mutually acceptable understanding/misunderstanding constitute qualities of interacting people. In his recursive theory of human communication Krippendorf states that “everything said is communicated to someone understanding it as such” and “assert that anything is what it is because someone understands it that way” (1994: 80). “To say” refers to all kinds of communication, spoken, pictures, and gestures and so on. Understanding is not only local to the listener or the observer but also to the speaker or the expressive context. Krippendorf also states that “the awareness of something being said and communicated ... must be located *within* one’s horizon of understanding” (81). Communication can only arise in cognitive participations and judgments that make communicated things exist, and norms of understanding can only be set by one who “knows”. This doesn’t mean that understanding is something total subjective and free from circumstantial input. Instead it suggests a reflexive loop guided by knowledge and practical experiences of actions taken in the environment and disrupted by objections, challenges, and disruptions. Nobody can be forced to understand; how someone else understands can never be directly observed or accessed. Still, human communication somehow takes place, constituting itself “in the recursive unfolding of communication constructions, held by participants (inclusive of each other) into intertwining practices that these participants recognize and explain in terms of being in communication” (ibid.: 85). When practices joined together, without disrupting or challenging one another, then

understandings “resonate”. To avoid objections, communicating people try to shape others to fit into one’s own construction of reality. These invented others are understood to have the same capacity to understand and communicate as oneself. The invented other can also, in terms of its respective conception of communication, understand things that arise. This theory of communication proposes a “recursive frame *whose space can be filled* by any construction which participants happen to bring to it or develop in the process of communicating with each other” (ibid.: 90). Participants in communication have the ability to move within “the virtual space of their known” ... to position themselves in their own construction of reality” (91) in relation to other people. Furthermore, they can “see and understand themselves through these others’ eyes” (91). Krippendorf stresses that communication can not be reduced to “a monologue, neither to a performance for an audience, nor to the mere production of messages” (ibid.), emphasizing that “in a recursive theory of communication, individuals are *invited* to include themselves in their own knowledge and [they] are able to take different positions within the realities they construct” (94).

6. *Concluding a tour de force of entrepreneurship*

In viewing Wij Trädgårdar i Ockelbo and the harvest celebrations as part of entrepreneurship, a semiotic perspective on which includes all kinds of words, pictures, bodily gestures, and so on. Understandings are here not merely local to the listener but also to the speaker, the performer. The awareness of things being said and communicated is located *within* people’s understanding. At the harvest celebrations nobody could be forced to understand, and someone else’s understandings could never (and by no one) be directly observed or accessed, nor ever be completely finished. The on-going communication provided spaces for anyone to enter into the action. These spaces could therefore be filled by any construction that happens to be brought in or develop in the communication among the men and women participating in the event. Even though the event was planned and executed by those engaged in the business venture of Wij Trädgårdar, communication on that day could not (and should not) be reduced to “a monologue, a performance for an audience, or to the mere production of messages” (Krippendorf 1994: 91). Instead, the interaction among every participant can be expressed as performing the parts of entrepreneurship.

At the harvest celebration, people and things were assigned features of provocation, as challenging proposals were put up for acceptance or rejection. But there was also a risk (or a possibility) that propositions made in the name of Wij Trädgårdar i Ockelbo would be met with a negative response. Mistrust and disappointment among the visitors and other participants could not be averted altogether. Nevertheless, visitors and other participants anticipated making alliances where both gained mutual benefits, as in the market stalls handled by local producers and the engaged participants of the business venture. The collaboration with media, in the harvest competition, the contestants, jury, and visiting onlookers resulted in both a public representation of the harvest celebration as well as a pre-view of business to come.

At the harvest celebration, this relatively unknown business-to-be was exposed. Ongoing activities during the day created a positive atmosphere of expectation. There were eye-catching motions of people and on-going events at the site: watching and betting on the sheep races, riding on the wagon up and down the avenue, working in the field, participating in the harvest contest, dissertating on the art of compost, putting products up for sale. Not as moving but still quite eye-catching were the flowers and other things planted in the Rosarium and the kitchen garden, and growing to become part of the Wij Trädgårdar in Ockelbo. Visitors justified the future business by their high numbers (said to be about 3000). At the same time and place, more implicit, but constantly present, things also took part and interacted in the entrepreneurship. The surroundings and the landscape, the old trees and the horses and wagon in the avenue, the old reaper and horses harvesting in the field, the hay-drying rack, the gravel market square and the stalls, harvest goods on display. All of these things created a somewhat nostalgic mood, by recalling the positive values of the simple, good old days.

The explicit features (actions associated with the unknown business to be) and implicit features (the well known history of the place) opened the way for different interpretations. There was a *will* and *desire to interpret* both the actual goings-on as well as plans for the future. But the unknown explicit and the implicit known also provided possibilities to create a *need to search for understandings*. As interactions took place between gardeners, engaged participants, local producers, and visitors, not only did opportunities to interpret arise, but also to manipulate. On that day and on that

site the ability to interpret was connected to passion and manifested in feelings of amusement and joyful experiences. Visitors and others were encouraged to embrace beings and things in any form whatsoever, be it in a highly active form as the performance made by one of the initiators, the head gardener, or in the most passive form, such as an entry in the harvest competition or goods on display. Objects and people could be interpreted, but they also changed in meanings as emotions and feelings varied. The semantic history and signifying business-to-be became features of expressions/impressions. and through their interactions, people became embodied in communication and part of the ongoing polemics on whether or not Wij Trädgårdar in Ockelbo was something to have confidence in.

I have suggested that theoretically and in a semiotic perspective, entrepreneurship gives birth to desires, a will to interpret, and a need to understand. Entrepreneurial interpretations are coloured by ontological and epistemological striving, for as previously mentioned, to be able to interact in entrepreneurship always involves interpretations. In entrepreneurship, interpretation is connected to interactions affected by passion and by manipulations. Interpretations contain stuff already known and things yet to be discovered. In entrepreneurship the known can be more of semantic, implicit, and bodily experienced in feelings closely connected to established mandates and cognitive sanctions, memories of other times and other places. By contrast, the unknown can be signifying, explicit and shared in emotions closely connected to on-going actions and happenings then and there. In the on going interpretations of entrepreneurship things as well as people can become objects of contents merely by being the and participating, if only for a moment. The various interactions reveal and release distinctive and autonomous parts of a context. Business alliances, media, and “men and women on the street” promote association; these are the links and knots that connect interpreted bits and pieces of the entrepreneurship and the “business to be” together in an understanding. To operate, communication always constitutes a mutually acceptable level of understanding/misunderstanding. In theories of entrepreneurship, understandings/misunderstandings can be expressed as a force and means in ongoing interaction between interpreting men and women. My experiences from the field and from the harvest celebrations at Wij Trädgårdar in Ockelbo, tell me that sometimes and in some places understanding/mis-

understandings make people more than ready to take part in an adventurous journey into mankind's destiny in the unknown future.

Note

1. Photographs presented are all copied from homepage <http://www.wij.se/Fotoalbum/>, 21-09-2006 to demonstrate the settings, experiences and sights of the Harvest celebration 2004.

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Anneli Mihkelev

Literary dialogue in the literary text

The play between understanding and misunderstanding

1. The components and functions of literary communication

The author, the text and the reader are the three components which make up the literary dialogue in Mikhail Bakhtin's work. All the components of the dialogue work together and constitute the meaning of the text, and every component has its own function in the dialogical process. The interaction between all three components is dynamic and the meaning of the literary text is created in the process of communication.

At the same time, the dialogue – the literary communicative process – is not the same as that in everyday life, when two or more people communicate with each other: the author does not reveal to the reader a definitive meaning, but rather meaning is created in the process of interaction – that communicative process is associated with Bakhtin's theory.

Literary dialogue and communication also maintain distance, both spatial and temporal, between the author and the reader: the author and the reader do not stay in the same room and usually they do not have contact with each other, because the literary communicative process is mediated through the literary text, which is written beforehand. In other words, the author and the reader have no physical contact in the literary dialogue; the communication takes place through the text. This means that, first, dialogue takes place between the author and the text, or between the creator and the creator's object. The third component, the reader, comes into play a bit, sometimes much, later. The distances, both spatial and temporal,

are different, varying from reader to reader. It is possible that there is only one author, whereas many readers communicate through the text.

According to Mikhail Bakhtin, every communicative process includes not only direct verbal signs, but every communicative process, every dialogue, also includes all the discourses or (social) contexts with their different sign systems and they exist around the utterance or the text; not only verbal signs take part in the dialogue, but also different sign systems. And the author and the reader are usually involved in different discourses. That fact also influences the text, which consists of verbal signs: the text is surrounded by different sign systems in discourse (Bakhtin 1987: 212–234).

The text itself usually contains only verbal signs (though sometimes it may contain other kinds, for example, visual signs), but the discourses surrounding the text contain different sign systems: verbal, visual and aural. The written text may indicate or allude to different worlds around itself: fictional worlds (verbal or visual signs) or illustrations and pictures (visual signs), other literary texts (verbal signs), mass-media (a combination of different sign systems), etc. Different sign systems are always mixed in the processes of writing and interpretation.

In a poetic text, the poetic function of communication dominates. Poetic language refers to itself, but at the same time we can see that in a poetic text there is also a referential function, a referring not to the poetic language itself but to something beyond the text (cf. Jakobson 1960: 350–377). For example, the Estonian poet in exile, Kalju Lepik, writes about the Tartu (the city in Estonia) of Soviet times in his poem, “The Shadow of the Stone Bridge” (“Kivisilla vari”), published in 1985 in the collection *Kadunud külad* (*The Lost Villages*). In the poem, he enumerates and personifies the characteristic buildings and other objects of Tartu. The ruins of the Stone Bridge, the shadow of Lake Peipsi, other ruins and other objects become indexical signs that point to the occupation and the war. He uses almost all elements of the material substratum of the text of Tartu: Jaani Church, red brick ruins of the Dome Church, the conglomeration of the Kaubahoov shops, Barclay Square, the Observatory, Toomemägi and Ema-jõgi. All these objects acquire the function of indexes in relation to Tartu, as being as signs in an immediate relationship with the objects they signify. At the same time they also form a metonymy, depicting the atmosphere of the Tartu of Soviet times, and it is also a political allusion (Mihkelev 2002: 431–454).

The author may lead the reader in the proper direction. Or he may use rhetorical acts to manipulating the reader. Lepik does this in the poem titled “Mõru mõte” (“A Bitter Thought”), published in 1958, in the collection *Kivimurd* (*Stone Quarry*). Lepik imitates the style of the epic in this poem, but it is in fact a parody of the epic:

Lend me your zither, Vanemuine,
A bitter thought comes to my mind:

When Kalev one day comes home
to drink home-made beer from a piggin
to hang his own children.

(Lepik 2002: 173, tr. by Jüri Talvet)

Lepik’s text, written during the Soviet occupation, ends on an optimistic note, when Germans occupy Estonia in the thirteenth century: “Kalev certainly will return home/ to bring happiness to his children, / to create the new life in Estonia” (Kreutzwald 2003: 341, tr. mine). It is possible that the message of Lepik’s text is a prophetic threat or a fine political allusion, because the last verses are far too serious to be simply a playful or nonsensical song. The allusion that leads the reader to the deep structure of the text makes several interpretations possible, as well as misunderstandings, since the author allows the reader to interpret with relative freedom.

The existence of authorial functions in the text suggest that the author is definitely not dead, as some interpretations of Roland Barthes’s famous essay “The Death of the Author” (1968) would seem to indicate, but that the author’s intentions live in his/her text. It is possible that the author leads the reader, through the text, to connotative meanings. It is also possible that the author manipulates the reader’s memory or collective memory of the nation.

In terms of the three components of the literary dialogue, the central one is still the text, which is created by the author and interpreted by the reader. Lotman refers to the text as a personified phenomenon, which has its own very important, and at the same time very specific, function(s) in the literary communicative process. The text, for Lotman, also operates as a very active, communicative person, who activates other parts or components in the literary communicative process. Lotman has written about these functions of the literary text: “Artificial languages model not lan-

guage as such but one of its functions – the ability to transmit a message adequately; because semiotic structures, when they achieve this function to perfection, lose the capacity to serve other functions which are inherent to them in the natural state” (Lotman 2000: 13).

The first textual function that Lotman mentions is the creative one. The sign systems which are able to transmit the message “not only transmit ready-made messages but also serve as a generator of new ones” (ibid.). The inside of the text is a heterogeneous phenomenon: the message is received from input as a result of simple transformations from one language to another; the languages may be more than verbal and visual. It is important that, in an artistic translation, the transmitter and receiver use different codes, which overlap but are not identical; then the result of the message or translation is a third text or third meaning (Lotman 2000: 14-15). That part of the meaning which it is not possible to transmit precisely has a semantically creative potential in language. It is the translation of untranslatable meaning that has the potential to create some new meaning. It is possible to change the meanings in the poetic text – that is the normal creative function of the poetic text.

The third function is memory, which is very important to both normal and poetic language: “The text is not only the generator of new meaning, but also a condenser of cultural memory. A text has the capacity to preserve the memory of its previous context. [...] The sum of the contexts in which a given text acquires interpretation and which are in a way incorporated in it may be termed the text’s memory” (Lotman 2000: 18).

The last function is connected with the social-communicative operations of the text/ First, the text functions as a message between author (addresser) and reader (addressee) in the communicative process. Second, the text functions as a memory, both creative and informative, between the public and the cultural tradition. Third, the reader communicates with himself/herself and the text influences the personality of the reader. Fourth, the reader communicates with the text. Fifth, the text communicates with the cultural context. (Cf. Lotman 2000: 63–81.)

The cultural context itself is a heterogeneous and complicated phenomenon, because the same text might relate to different levels of context; it is also possible that the text can move from one context to another. Then a new literary communicative process begins and new, “foreshadowed” contexts come into being.

If the text communicates, creates meaning and provides information, a specific space is needed where all these processes can take place. This place includes different spheres around the text: social meanings, different texts, external reality and collective cultural memory. It is a place where bridges are created, where poetic and rhetorical languages mix and where the meanings – which have originated from both the author and the reader – are created. Renate Lachmann has named that place the mnemonic space (Lachmann 1997: 4-24). Joseph Pucci, an Italian researcher, calls this mental location the “allusive space” (Pucci 1998: 43). So, it would be the mnemonic and allusive space where the connotative meanings have created (Fig. 1).




Fig. 1. Allusion and dialogical relations between author, text and reader.

It is also the space where playful interaction takes place between the author and the reader, as well as the play between understanding and misunderstanding. The aspect of play is very important for Lotman, as well as for Roland Barthes. According to Lotman, the interaction between different codes creates playfulness in the text. Barthes emphasizes the dynamic character of the text and also the experience of marginal readings, because the text is paradoxical and can be read in a different way and with different meanings each time. At the same time, Barthes presupposes that the reader is an active reader and interpreter (Barthes 2002: 126–139). A similar idea is stressed by both Lachmann (1997: 31) and Pucci, who describes a “full-knowing reader” (Pucci 1998: 28).

The author also has his/her own intentions, which live in his/her text. We can say that the author's intentions depend on the reader's competence and capacity to understand them. The most important role of the reader is to discern and recognize those intentions. The reader constitutes meaning according to the text created by the author, and the dialogue requires a balance between author, text and reader.

The author may lead the reader through the text to the connotative meanings that exist beneath the surface level of the text. Or the author may manipulate the reader's memories or the collective memory of the nation, as has occurred in different periods in Estonian literature. It depends on the intention of the author. How free the reader is to interpret the text depends on the text's "openness". Some kinds of texts are more "open" than others. Concerning the play between understanding and misunderstanding in the dialogical process of the literary text, we must say that it is a question of new meanings in the text and also the latter's creative potential.

2. *Examples from literature*

Our theoretical explanations can be illustrated through an analysis of two texts from Baltic literature: Emil Tode's *Piiririik* (*The Border State*) and Nora Ikstena's novel *Dzīves svinēšana* (*Celebration of Life*). The former work, published in 1993 and translated into several languages (14), may be considered one of the symbols of Baltic identity (Baltic Assembly Prize in 1994). Ikstena's novel *Dzīves svinēšana* was published in 1998, translated into Estonian in 2003 by Ita Saks, and into Lithuanian in 2005. The author was awarded the Baltic Assembly Prize in literature in 2006. Both novels are significant in Baltic cultures, and these prizes also create a social, even political, context for these books. The structures of these novels are modern and innovative, rich in creative meanings and, at the same time, "open".

We are familiar with both authors. Each comes from a Baltic State, one from Estonia and the other from Latvia. Each of the authors has his or her own cultural memory, which they put to use in their works. The next question is, Who are the readers? The answer is, we presume the readers are mainly from the Baltic States, and hopefully also from Europe and elsewhere. If we remember the social context of these books, the readers, as well as the context of Europe, are most important for both works.

An important potential of these texts is the creation of a common Baltic identity. On the one hand, these texts realize the goal of the Baltic Assembly Prize; on the other, they can help to create a Baltic identity also through the textual contents and structures.

A common idea runs through both novels: Baltic countries occupy a peripheral position between the East and the West. This is something special which separates us from other regions. The special characteristic of the Baltic memory and identity is the balance between West and East, between the Russian Empire and western European culture, and between the experience of freedom and the loss of it. This is the tragedy of the Baltic countries, but it is also our joy – we know the price of freedom. This tragic, historically ambivalent cognisance is the foundation on which to interpret Tode's and Ikstena's novels, and in these texts exist the experience of the borders and the strong potential to create and play with meanings related to that experience.

These novels examine closely, and for the first time, the oppositions between East and West, and perhaps between Estonia, or the Baltic States generally, and Europe. If this is so, then it is also a new layer of experience of the Baltic identity which is different from the one we have from the Soviet period, or even from earlier times.

The tragedy of Eastern Europe and the Baltic States becomes manifest when national borders are open and it is possible to compare life in the East with that in the West. It is also significant that the novel is set in Paris, a place of neutrality in the history of the Baltic states. Paris has no border with Estonia and Latvia; it is the centre of Europe. In the novel, there is an interesting and very semiotic movement: a man from East Europe, from a peripheral border state, moves to the centre of Europe, the very centre of the semiosphere. He brings new information to the centre, and in return gets new information from that area. The centre and periphery are always in opposition. Life in the periphery is more active and variable, containing more information; life in the centre is concentrated but at the same time more static. The man from East Europe needs the help of an older man from central Europe. He receives the help and a better if more sterile life, but he must also do what the older man wants. It seems that the border between freedom and prison is still delicate even in the free world. Who is exploited here – the man from East Europe or the one from West Europe? They both need each other, but the man from East Europe kills the man

from West Europe. It is a symbolic act; from the borders comes new information, and a fresh lifestyle that is wilder and more arrogant. East Europe disturbs the life of the West, which is comfortable and problem-free. East Europe is inconvenient and a mystery to the West European man. It seems that we can take these two protagonists as the symbols in this novel.

In speaking of Baltic identity, we cannot ignore history. The latter is one of the main constituents of that identity, and the memory bank of all three components of the literary communicative process. I am not referring to the history of wars and deportations, but to the history of a little town by the river, with streets full of holes, where there is a little flat with wood heat, a pile of kindling, and a foul-smelling outhouse. This is a history without comforts, but it is in some ways more free than a welfare society. Again, the boundaries between freedom and prison are ambivalent and delicate. This is also a story of dreams and reality: what is beautiful in our dreams is not beautiful once we have attained it.

This history also includes a grandmother who is a figure from the past, connecting the world of the deceased with that of the living. The motifs of death and the past are very important if we speak of the Baltic identity: our history has been complicated and tragic, and it still obsesses us.

Tode's novel also revolves around the boundaries between sexuality and gender. In the Estonian language the grammatical gender is absent, and the writer plays with that linguistic fact. The ambivalence of gender in his novel also represents a new experience and meaning in Baltic countries. The young homosexual man who has escaped from East Europe seems to belong to West Europe because homosexuality was a crime in Soviet times, and the phenomenon itself was downplayed and kept secret. In Paris, however, gender is not the problem. Rather, the problem is the freedom that so strongly attracts Franz. Still, the boundaries between gender and sexuality are ambiguous in this novel. The homosexual man does not want to accept the stereotypes of gender, he wants to be gender-less, androgynous, or just angelic (Hennoste 1998: 70). The sexual status of this young man is truly ambivalent: he stands on the border.

The same ambivalence also appears concerning the nation of the young man. We may suppose that he is Estonian, but actually the country is not mentioned and his nation is not important to him. It seems that this will be our new identity in the European context: it will be absolutely new and will attempt to overcome national borders and frames.

His East European past constantly manipulates the young man – it is not possible to break free of history and the past, and perhaps not from gender either. Maybe such freedom is impossible, according to the new rules, if you have a tragic history and tragic memories.

Nora Ikstena's book, showing aspects of the traditional novel, consists of a series of short stories. All the travelling in this novel takes place in the memories of the storytellers; the real setting, where a funeral is taking place, is very small and quiet. It is the framed space of a room in which different trips into the past take place. And through the past, Eleonora's life will be celebrated.

The semantic and creative potential is very great in this novel, because the author plays on the border between understanding and misunderstanding. The situation is very mystical and mysterious, and the seven people invited to the funeral are very odd. The text is full of quotations from the Bible. The atmosphere is solemn and horrible at the same time, similar to the biblical situation imposed by the New Testament. As we know, Estonians and Latvians have read Ikstena's novel differently. Estonians interpret the story more optimistically, as a celebration of life. Latvians see in it more of tragic history and past.

Perhaps West European readers will add new meanings to these texts if they interpret them through their own memory and historical experience. Both novels indicate that the Baltic identity will undergo change, perhaps fusing together into a European identity in future. As for now, it seems the essential and most important question in contemporary Baltic literature is, Who are we?

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Valentina Miraglia

Effets de sens qu'un objet singulier a d'un point de vue sémiotique sur la réalisation d'un film dit de genre historique

Introduction: Semiose entre objet filmé et objet filmant

Partant du postulat qu'un film, du point de vue des pratiques, peut être interprété aussi comme un acte performatif entre celui qui filme et l'objet filmé, cette recherche accomplit un travail sur l'analyse de la construction d'une matière non-langagière (l'image mentale d'un plan) constituée par tous les éléments variables qu'un réalisateur doit maîtriser pendant le tournage.

“C'est par elle (l'image) qu'est retenue une sensation de l'infini exprimée à travers des limites: le spirituel dans le matériel, l'immensité dans les dimensions d'un cadre” (Tarnovski 1989: 47). Les plans, dans un film, ces “énoncés et narrations ne sont pas une donnée apparente, mais une conséquence qui découle de cette réaction” (Deleuze 1983: 45), dans notre cas, il s'agit d'énoncés spécifiquement cinématographiques appartenant à un système de production, fruit d'une intelligence collective (équipe image, équipe artistique, équipe machiniste, etc.). Comme Andrei Tarkovski lui-même le déclare: “la création artistique n'est pas découverte mais construction” (Tarkovski 1989: 47), le fait de nous approcher d'une oeuvre filmique à travers ces pratiques, qui témoignent de la préparation sur la performance, permet de percevoir la réalité cinématographique sur son plan d'immanence.

1. *Pour une approche sémiotique de la prise de vue sur la "scène du cinéma"*

Ce travail s'insère au cœur des études sur l'iconicité textuelle, ici est fait "un usage assez extensif du terme 'image'" (Bordon 1998) et tant qu'il est utilisé, textuellement parlant, les images auront de multiples fins et se révèlent être de précieux indices pour remonter aux structures de signification, au discours derrière "l'iconicité des événements" (Cerami 1992: 48) qui préside à la construction d'une image film. Puisque nous devons nous confronter avec une œuvre cinématographique, ce sont les photogrammes en tant que "traits", qui nous permettent de remonter au film comme "unité de ces traits au niveau supérieur", il faudra ainsi articuler la question des différentes strates énonciatrices "correspondant aux divers masques dont le spectateur revêt l'émetteur du film". Dans cette perspective, François Jost (1991: 11) distingue: (i) l'*énonciation cinématographique* produite par un supposé-réalisateur qui parle cinéma, avec un style propre, une "manière"; (ii) l'*énonciation narrative* renvoyée à un narrateur qui raconte les événements; (iii) l'*énonciation filmique* ancrée dans un sujet empirique (caméraman, preneur de son, etc.). Si la "scène du tournage" est l'espace englobant où prennent forme ces "images particulières", où l'on perçoit la synthèse de ces trois moments, alors, à plus forte raison, la caméra comme "machine énonciative" sera le dispositif à l'intérieur duquel la réalité filmique nous apparaît, car, comme l'écrit Merleau-Ponty non seulement "toute pensée ne se détache pas tout à fait d'un support" (Merleau-Ponty 1964: 91), mais aussi "cette procession de ce qui est sur ce qu'on voit et fait voir, de ce qu'on voit et fait voir sur ce qui est, c'est la vision même" (ibid.: 87). L'intuition générique et infinie de l'espace des phénomènes naturels à cause de la limite spatiale donnée par la géométrie du cadrage se dévoile à l'observateur comme un ensemble d'objets-signes qui attendent d'être iconisés à l'intérieur du plan énoncé, unité minimale de sens par rapport à la scène d'énonciation mise en place pour tourner. A ce propos, les recherches de Cerani sur "comment le sens vient aux images" comme celles de Bordon (1994: 33). "sur la limite d'une grandeur extensive" et sur les "multiples interprétations iconiques" des images sont centrales pour réfléchir sur la manière de lire les isotopies sous-jacentes aux intentions picturales et cinématographiques où "l'expression est ce qui est perçu directement tout en

étant thématique, tandis que le contenu est thématique, alors même qu’il est donné d’une manière indirecte” (Ceriami 1992: 46).

2. *Pour une logique interprétative de la prise de vue:*
Marie-Antoinette de Sofia Coppola

Étant intéressée d’un point de vue sémiotique à l’objet caméra et aux différentes inventions techniques utilisées dans les scénarisations d’un film. Dans ce cadre, le concept de scénarisation désigne l’organisation des représentations, toujours déterminée par des conceptions philosophiques implicites (conception du monde, de la connaissance, de la narration, du spectateur; Faroult 2003: 27). Ce texte met alors en lumière dans quelle mesure une étude sur l’objet caméra en tant que “machine énonciative” peut contribuer à reconnaître: a) l’influence que la technique a sur la réalisation de la prise de vue lors du tournage d’un film comme celui de Sofia Coppola, *Marie-Antoinette* (2006), d’après le livre de ce titre d’Antonia Fraser, qui, malgré son thème, est tout autre chose qu’un film historique ou d’époque; b) dans quelle mesure on peut expliquer la présence de la caméra film Aäton 35 III mm dans un film historique qui scénarise “le passage à l’âge adulte” d’un personnage public. En effet, un directeur de la photographie, initié à cette caméra, n’ignore pas son “utilisation moyenne”, c’est-à-dire l’utilisation de type documentaire pratiqué sur les tournages.



1. *Photogramme du plan du film Marie-Antoinette de Sofia Coppola, (image tournée en pellicule Kodak). Le plan: l’énoncé de la prise.*



2. *Photo de tournage. À l’intérieur de la scène énonçant la caméra Aäton 35 III, utilisée par la seconde équipe image lors de les prises en configurations particulières.*

La façon de filmer laisse *des traces* de la présence réelle du corps-caméra sur la situation filmée. Par rapport à l’Arricam, la caméra silencieuse, utilisée par la première équipe image sur le tournage, l’Aäton 35 III, utilisée

par la seconde équipe image, historiquement elle se distingue de la production de Caméras allemande, par trois principes que l'ingénieur Jean-Pierre Beauviala lui-même, définit fondateurs pour comprendre la morphogénèse de cette "invention technique" face à la culture cinématographique :

Premièrement, la plus haute qualité d'image possible. Deuxièmement, avec un magasin instantané lorsqu'on doit recharger la caméra on ne coupe pas la relation qui s'est créée entre la personne qui filme et les personnes qu'elle est en train de filmer. Troisièmement, ce qui est fondamental et qui a été la caractéristique même de l'Aâton c'est que c'est une caméra qui – à l'épaule – se met très en arrière sur l'épaule du cadreur (c'est la première d'ailleurs à être ainsi). C'était la première caméra à vraiment faire corps – profondément – avec le caméraman et qui ne s'interposait pas entre lui et les gens qu'il filmait. (Beauviala 2005: 61–62)

Il suffit de réfléchir sur certains éléments signifiants de l'image dans ce film, sur les aspects techniques intrinsèques à l'utilisation de cette caméra lorsqu'elle décrit à la manière du documentaire, une sorte de "cahier secret et ludique" des moments intimes de la vie de Marie-Antoinette, pour remarquer ainsi, le saut de "régime sémantique" auquel le film parvient. En effet, la mise en scène préfère un registre sémiotique d'actualité de type psychologique et contemplatif à une approche historique "tout court".

La façon de tourner certaines configurations comme les intérieurs carrosse, la promenade en bateau sur le lac, les extérieurs jours dans le jardin privé du Petit Trianon, les extérieurs nuit, le bal masqué, la fête d'anniversaire à Versailles, montrent comment les modalités du "dire" et du "faire" au cinéma sont strictement liées à l'outil avec lequel on capte cette réalité. Cependant, l'étude du dispositif cinématographique nous révèle que les appareils *transforment* la réalité plus qu'ils ne la restituent, car chaque choix technique est un choix de représentation, les caméras mettent en jeu un code perspectif qui n'est donc pas neutre. Il ne s'agit pas ici d'affirmer que, tout choix de mise en scène est soumis aux appareillages techniques utilisés dans un film, il est plutôt question d'étudier la restitution "transparente" des effets de sens que ce corps *filmant* met en jeu dans le processus de composition du plan. Le corps filmant ne doit donc pas être considéré uniquement comme un "appareillage filmique" ou d'enregistrement par rapport à l'objet filmé. Bien au contraire, il doit nous apparaître comme un macro-actant complexe qui résulte tantôt de la somme d'un corps d'éléments: spatiaux-temporels-actoriels qui sont hors et dans le cadre, tantôt

de “l’image mentale” du plan composée par le réalisateur, et à laquelle le directeur de la photographie fait toujours référence au moment de la mise en place de la caméra sur le lieu de tournage.



3. *La caméra Aäton 35 III, portée à l'épaule dans le décor très affolé du bal masqué, grâce à sa légèreté favorise ce genre de configuration du plan en mouvement. La caméra recule tandis que Marie-Antoinette avance dans la salle (photogramme tiré du making-off du film).*

4. *Photogramme du plan du film tiré de la séquence d'anniversaire de Marie-Antoinette. Les prises de vues privilégient une relation d'intimité avec les personnages (Scène énoncée).*

5. *Scène énonçant la prise de vue du plan rapproché sur les deux actrices. Remarquons les deux caméras : la Aäton sur l'épaule de l'opérateur de bout en train de chuter des plans et l'Arricam sur l'épaule du cadreur assis.*

Les “situations filmées” citées peu avant, “mettent en image” le monde et le temps intériorisés par la reine. En ce qui concerne la praxis de tournage, les longues séquences en extérieur, les scènes de foule, ainsi que les poursuites ou les plans rapprochés en configuration épaule et steady-cam sur Marie-Antoinette témoignent d’un style de tournage qui connote la façon de capter la réalité propre à un “style” Aäton. Ainsi s’imposent deux esthétiques de tournage pour deux caméras différentes. L’Arricam pour des configurations plus installées et construites à l’avance, les cas de figure les plus communs voient cette caméra installée sur une autre machine. Voici certains exemples: I) le réveil de la future reine ; II) la descente des escaliers de Marie-Antoinette en compagnie de la comtesse Polignac au bal masqué; III) la scène imaginaire où Marie-Antoinette prononce la mythique phrase “qu’ils mangent la brioche”.

En revanche, la Aäton se prête davantage à être utilisée dans des configurations difficiles à contrôler, elle laisse plus d’espace à l’improvisation, ses chorégraphies sont à l’unisson avec des mouvements de Marie-Antoinette dans le but “d’exprimer visuellement la psychologie du personnage” (cité par Coppola 2006: 9) combattu entre ces deux mondes.



6. Scène énonçant la conception de la prise de la descente par les escaliers de Marie-Antoinette. La caméra Arricam est posée sur des rails. Le machiniste donne la vitesse au mouvement du travelling en arrière.

7. Scène énonçant l'installation d'un plan toujours tourné en Arricam. (Photogrammes tirés du *Making-off*).

8. Photogramme du plan du film illustrant à la manière d'un clip la scène imaginaire.

9. Configuration de la prise de vue: lourde installation de la caméra Arricam nécessaire pour cadrer ce plan. (Photo tirée du *Making-off*).

Pour mettre en évidence l'asymétrie entre ces deux univers mis en scène, nous pouvons dire que: si d'un côté il y a la cour, fondée sur la tradition, les règles, une scène en quelque sorte, sur laquelle il faut "paraître" et où prédominent des "images citations" remplies d'une iconographie historique, de l'autre "il y a son monde à elle, privé, qu'elle peut transformer, de façon à ce qu'il lui ressemble plus", et qui iconisent l'axe de regard de Marie-Antoinette contrastant avec les regards de la cour qui sont pointés sur elle.



10 – 11 – 12. Plans vraisemblablement tournés en très longue focale (135 mm) qui pour leur conception du cadre iconisent toute une esthétique iconographique de tableaux historiques.

La réalisatrice, tente de traduire en langage cinématographique l'isotopie de la "transition" existentielle vécue par la jeune héroïne au moment où elle devient une femme mûre. En cherchant à rester fidèle à la construction passionnelle et cognitive de Marie-Antoinette, deux moments narratifs semblent émerger: a) le dépassement de la frontière culturelle autrichienne

(pays natal) pour aller vers la culture française (état contractuel) ; b) son accession au trône, où s'exaspère le conflit existant entre le rôle social acquis et un "moi – intérieur" encore inexprimé. Tous deux sont fondamentaux pour pénétrer l'univers iconique du film, rempli de plans de façon inhabituelle, que nous pourrions baptiser des "icônes de la vie post-moderne".



13 – 14 – 15. Images-icônes qui renvoient à l'interprétation moderne de la vie de Marie-Antoinette proposée par la réalisatrice.

La représentation du véridique à l'écran conduit à nous pencher seulement en apparence sur le genre historique, stade désormais dépassé cinématographiquement (La reine Margot, les films de cape et d'épée, Pirates des Caraïbes) de par le langage utilisé et la liberté prise pour filmer. Toutefois, en ce qui concerne la représentation à l'écran de la reine Marie-Antoinette, un « imaginaire visuel d'étiquette » a toujours été respecté pour ce qui est des longs-métrages ayant traité certains moments de sa biographie. Voici quelques cas de personnages: la Marie-Antoinette de la *Marseillaise* (1937) réalisé par Jean Renoir, la *Marie-Antoinette* réalisée par W. S. Van Dyke (1938), la Marie-Antoinette de *L'affaire du collier de la reine* (1946) de Marcel l'Herbier, celle de Sacha Guitry dans le film *Si Versailles m'était conté* (1953), et enfin la *Marie Antoinette reine de France* (1956) réalisé par Jean Delannoy, pour ne pas parler de la grotesque et lamentable *Autrichienne* (1990) de Granier-Deferre. Dans le film de Sofia Coppola, sur le plan expressif, les décors et les costumes conduisent aussi à un type de cinéma véridique. Pourtant, ce n'est que la partie visible de l'iceberg, ce propos est en effet trahi et servira uniquement comme prétexte pendant le film. La question est donc de poser le problème à l'envers. Il s'agit plutôt d'un pacte que la réalisatrice signe avec le spectateur lorsque sa caméra devient l'outil pour "anecdotiser" délibérément son histoire et l'Histoire de France à travers un destin brisé. L'illusion des situations est dépassée dès que la réalisatrice peut sortir de l'Histoire pur pour raccrocher son récit au monde actuel, car tout le langage de la caméra est en symbiose avec la comédienne qui trahit ce propos.

3. *Expérience du monde cinématographique*

Si "l'image est une existence située à mi-chemin entre la chose et la représentation" (Bergson 1939: 17), alors, cette relation fonctionnelle valide la proposition que ce travail tente de mettre à jour. Essayons de la reformuler en l'appliquant au champ des pratiques sémiotiques ouvertes aux formes de représentation cinématographique se souciant tantôt de la nature polysémique de l'«image» tantôt de la nature apparemment insaisissable des "choses" et des "objets" qui contribuent à sa réussite. Au moment de la réalisation d'un film se mêlent étroitement questionnements techniques/scientifiques et questionnements esthétiques. La spécialité du matériel utilisé influe sur les praxis de tournage et sur la réalisation d'un film contribuant à renverser les imaginaires visuels préconçus.

Au niveau de l'énonciation filmique, le directeur de la photo Lance Acord, décrit la performance de la caméra face à une scène toute particulière:

As the young queen matures, most of the film's exteriors are set at Le Petit Trianon. The camerawork de la photographie, Lance Acord, décrit la performance de la caméra face à une scène toute in these sequences is more impressionistic and personal, with looser, handheld shots contrasting with the straightforward and often locked-off approach to the interiors. (Acord 2006: 71)


La réalisatrice elle-même raconte à ce propos (entretiens avec la réalisatrice 2006: 10, 27):

J'ai une idée de ce que va faire la caméra, et j'en discute avec les techniciens, ... ce n'est que sur le plateau qu'on peut voir la façon la plus efficace de filmer une scène. Je crois que je sais à peu près ce que chaque scène doit exprimer, et que chaque plan s'y intègre, en conformité avec cette idée.

Elle déclare avoir: "une intuition assez précise de la manière dont il faut filmer: ... pas de grands plans-tableaux comme souvent dans les films historiques, pas de mouvements caméra tape-à-l'œil".

C'est pourquoi, au niveau de l'énonciation cinématographique, les prises de vue relativement longues, les plans rapprochés sur la peau, les visages, les acteurs, privilégient surtout cette "relation d'intimité" envers les personnages où culmine l'entière construction poétique de l'auteur. Mettre en images l'espace/temps de la *vision*, afin de lui donner la forme et

le contenu esthétique envisagé, veut dire tenir compte de tous les aspects signifiants et variables censés construire le sens que préside l'énonciation cinématographique. Si l'œuvre filmique est une "opération syncrétique plurisémiotique" (Jost 1991: 15), alors la conception de la prise de vue doit être pensée en sémiose avec la création de l'image. L'image moderne, que certaines séquences tournées avec la caméra Aäton donnent de Marie-Antoinette, la saisissent sur le point de courir librement dans le jardin du Petit Trianon, son espace réservé, lieu d'évasion de la cour. De cette réalité, il ne reste qu'un puzzle de sensations, un temps subjectif vécu en synesthésie avec les éléments de la nature, des détails et des nuances éphémères.



16 – 17 – 18 – 19. Pour le style de prise de vues, ces plans tournés en extérieur témoignent d'un discours de type documentaire. La caméra, libérée de tout empêchement spatial, chorégraphie le mouvement imprévu en révélant des fragments d'une réalité hors cadre en complète sémiose avec la nature et avec le texte de Diderot que Marie-Antoinette lit.

D'un point de vue sémiotique, ces plans-énoncés donnent forme à une énonciation narrative où monde extérieur et intérieur de l'héroïne coïncident. Dans cette spirale performante, l'esthétique de l'image et la manipulation de la caméra sont des éléments de continuité dans l'inter-espace entre celui qui filme et la situation filmée. C'est pourquoi nous parlons d'un cinéma quadridimensionnel, car il tient compte de l'improvisation, du facteur humain, "variable collective" de celui qui manipule depuis l'en-deça et de ce qui est manipulé dans l'au-delà, face à la caméra.

4. "Scène énoncant" et "scène énoncée"

Dans sa "matérialité spatio-temporelle", la prise de vue est une "construction dynamique en acte ... qui comprend tout ce qui est présent dans l'image, décors, personnages, accessoires" (Deleuze 1983: 23). C'est donc pendant la prise de vue, non avant en phase de découpage ni ensuite pendant le montage, que le rôle performatif de l'outil entre en sémiose avec la création de l'image. Au moment de filmer la promenade en bateau, la

“caméra embarquée” est la solution qui se prête le mieux à recréer cette atmosphère d'intimité qui unit la nature extérieure des décors au sentiment intérieur de la protagoniste: l'isotopie *aquatique* exprime bien le “flottement” mélancolique de la reine sur l'époque qu'elle traverse et sur son repli vers la nature. La lecture du texte de Rousseau souligne ce comportement et explicite la métaphore naturaliste de la scène: “Si l'homme a été corrompu par la civilisation artificielle, quel est l'état de nature? L'état de nature auquel il a été soustrait. Imaginons-le vagant çà et là dans la forêt sans industrie sans discours et sans foyer.”



20. Photogramme du plan tourné avec une caméra Aäton 35 III.



21. Scène énonçant la prise de vue du plan. Configuration caméra embarquée (photogramme tiré du Making-off du film).

Essayons d'analyser la scène filmique de ce moment du tournage, que nous segmentons en scène énoncée (le plan tourné) et en scène énonçant (tout ceci concerne l'appareillage sans lequel le plan manquerait de support physique). Dans une configuration circonstancielle de ce type à contre-jour et en pleine nature, la Aäton 35 III est pratique pour obtenir l'éloquence de l'image recherchée, l'emboîtement des accessoires sur le corps caméra est minime, l'outillage léger. Notre approche étant de type morphologique, elle permet de reconnaître les parties reliées au corps-caméra où alternent, pendant les différentes phases, les accessoires (Bordron 1991: 22, fn. 21). Une séquence de ce type requiert une configuration de tournage munie des accessoires essentiels, en observant la scène énonçant, la distance entre l'objet filmant et l'objet filmé (x) est de quelques mètres. Les dimensions du décor (y) par rapport aux proportions du bateau où Marie-Antoinette est étendue (x) n'apparaissent pas trop réduites, l'objectif utilisé est donc une focale moyenne ou légèrement longue entre un 50 mm ou un 75 mm.

Il en résulte que la caméra n'est alourdie ni par l'interface objet de l'objectif ni par le pare-soleil, qui introduit des fonctions auxiliaires au moment de "filmer" la scène. En outre, les batteries de la Aäton étant déjà incorporées, elles n'entravent pas les techniciens pendant la prise de vue. Une main assure la stabilité du bateau, tandis que les sacs servent à stabiliser la position du chef opérateur et à permettre d'amortir les secousses maritimes qui seraient agrandies dans le cadre. À droite du cadreur, le premier assistant caméra, sujet empirique responsable de la bonne mise au point du plan, interagit uniquement avec la monture de l'objectif en mesurant à l'oeil la distance entre le foyer de la caméra et l'objet filmé. L'équipe-son accompagne l'équipe image sur la barque. La situation inter-énonciationnelle tient ensemble objets et sujets en-deça de la caméra avec les objets et sujets au-delà de la caméra, comme deux mondes tenus ensemble par leur force d'attraction. Il ne s'agit pas de considérer l'image comme un langage autonome, dans la description de la réalisation de la prise de vue sur le bateau, les contraintes techniques influent sur la manière de composer le cadre et simultanément elles suggèrent les solutions de mise en scène pour des configurations particulières.

5. *Conclusion*

L'univers visuel du réalisateur documente et/ou reconstruit la réalité à partir du support choisi pour s'exprimer. En effet, si la toile permet au peintre de "penser en peinture" la caméra est alors l'outil qui permet au réalisateur de "penser cinématographiquement". La durée de la prise détermine les modes de perception d'un plan cadré. L'étendue de la prise de vue par sa forme temporelle est susceptible de servir le film en vue de la signification à créer.

Mais l'image d'un film est aussi un plan énoncé géométriquement et physiquement qui, excluant une portion du monde, donne un sens au fragment de la vision sélectionnée. Le corps filmant de la scène, existe uniquement "au-delà" du cadre, ancré dans une réalité empirique sur un autre niveau de pertinence que l'organisation visuelle du plan, même si c'est justement pour sa réalisation que le corps filmant modèle la réalité et la "met en image". Au moment de la réception d'un film, de la présence de la caméra, il ne reste que le mouvement iconisé d'un style d'écriture et de sensibilité filmique. Entre l'image de l'écran (le plan énoncé du

film) et l'image performante élaborée au cours de la prise de vue (la scène énonçant) se réalise un moment important du sens. Mon travail a mis en évidence, à partir des analyses des effets de réalisation de la prise de vue, combien la frontière entre le cinéma de fiction et le cinéma documentaire est peu marquée dans le cinéma contemporain, cette brèche est de plus en plus invisible. Avec l'arrivée du cinéma léger et du son synchrone, le documentaire est entré dans la fiction, un nouveau canon s'est établi, celui de la fiction documentée. Actuellement, pour citer Jean Luis Comolli (2007: 119), "il me semble que l'essentiel du cinéma se joue dans cet entre-deux de la fiction et du documentaire".

Note

1. Pour un approfondissement de la relation sémantique entre "les chose" et "les objets" nous renvoyons à Zinna 2005: 161.

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Misunderstandings in ethnomusicological research

Reflections on fieldwork in Cantabria

1. Ethnomusicology and communication

The process of communication can be approached from different disciplinary perspectives. Specialists in the study of communications point out that

the great strength of communications as a field of study is that it is an *interdisciplinary* space where a range of existing academic disciplines meet, bringing their own particular questions, concerns and intellectual traditions with them ... to puzzle out how best to make sense of the complex connections between communications systems and the organisation of contemporary social and cultural life. (Deacon et al. 1999: 3)

As an ethnomusicologist, one of my main concerns is the understanding of the ways in which communication takes place in cultural systems and everyday life. I am particularly interested in communicative processes that involve cultural practices, knowledge, values and meanings that are transmitted through verbal discourse and through expressive culture in which music plays an important role.

Ethnomusicology can be defined as the “study of social and cultural aspects of music and dance in local and global contexts. Specialists are trained primarily in anthropology and in music, but the multidisciplinary nature of the subject leads to different interpretations” (Pegg et al. 2001: 367). Among the main concerns of the discipline are the relationships between music and culture, musical processes as symbolic and signifying forms of expression, and the ways in which music contributes to the construction of society and history.

The main methodological strategy of Ethnomusicology is field research which involves human interaction, and therefore different kinds of communication between the researcher and the community studied. Ethnomusicological interest in communicative processes has increased since the 1980s, especially as a result of the influence of post-modern thought with its concern about discourse on social phenomena. The “crisis in representation” and the rise of “reflexive ethnomusicology” stimulated scholars to explain how they are epistemologically positioned and reflect upon their relationship with the culture analysed, given the importance of the researcher’s subjectivity in the construction of the research object and in the production of ethnographic discourse (see, e.g., Barz et al. 1997; Baumann 1992; Keil and Feld 1994).

The analysis of communicative processes in my fieldwork experience draws upon current theoretical and methodological perspectives in ethnomusicology. As Coupland et al. (1991: 16) point out: “... the goals of academic inquiry itself predispose characteristic lines of interpretation ... particular traditions and disciplines may themselves contribute a dimension of miscommunication ... and *the same* communicative acts are open to interpretation in highly *diverse ways*.” The concept of miscommunication is problematic, and “... has usually been applied, very loosely, to any sort of problem that might arise interactionally, and typically to local processes of misunderstanding ...” (ibid.: 1–2). However, in their particular review of that concept from a more general perspective oriented towards the study of language, those authors opine that an “important starting point is the observation that language use and communication are in fact pervasively and even intrinsically flawed, partial, and problematic. To this extent, communication is itself miscommunicative ...” (ibid.: 3).

In this paper I use the concept of *misunderstanding* to refer to “... a retrospective recognition that one person’s intentions have not been ‘read’ accurately by another participant, and that future actions or opinions of the participant will be predicated on the inaccurate reading ...” (Banks et al. 1991: 104).¹

2. *Fieldwork in Cantabria: (Mis)understandings*

In preparing my doctoral dissertation, I carried out in fieldwork in Cantabria (Fig. 1), a region on the north coast of Spain, from 2000 to 2006 (Moreno Fernández 2006).



Figura 1. The Cantabria region of Spain.

My focus was on the revival movement of the musical practice of the *rabel*, a bowed lute, traditionally used to accompany songs, ballads and dances (Fig. 2).



Figure 2. Rabelista Antonio Morante playing the rabel in the Certamen de rabel, “Valle de Polaciones” (Pejanda, Cantabria, 2004).

My fieldwork involved observation and ethnographic interviews with different generations of *rabel* players (*rabelistas*) and promoters, as well as my own participation in local events as a *rabelista*.

The issue of misunderstanding was very relevant to my research. I was born and raised in the region that I studied. Several factors such as my social background, age and gender conditioned my field research. In reflecting upon my experience, I shall revise the concept of misunderstanding to extend beyond its common connotation as an “error”, “problem”, or communicative “deficiency” which undermines the development of a research project. Here I would second Eero Tarasti’s view:

... paradoxically, it is in misunderstanding where a possibility of understanding the other lies ...because misunderstanding often develops into a conflict, it makes the latent situation manifest and thus enables one to correct the misunderstanding. It opens the possibility for dialogue, since ego has to listen to alter-ego...” (2003: 6).

Clarifying misunderstandings in field research can contribute to the understanding of basic issues, thus providing new theoretical and methodological perspectives. As some authorities observe, there is a need “... to rescue ‘miscommunication’ from its theoretical and empirical exile, and explore its rich explanatory potential in very diverse contexts” (Coupland et al. 1991: 1–2). It is likely that several of the problems I faced during my field research are common in the research experience of other ethnomusicologists and scholars in related disciplines.

In my research experience, some misunderstandings were inevitable, partly because of the attitudes of my interlocutors, who were themselves involved in the revival process. As is common in such situations, revivalists defended contradictory and conflicting positions and aims regarding the contemporary musical practice of the *rabel* in Cantabria. For that reason, they would sometimes refuse to communicate among themselves, or with me, thinking that I might reveal information which they did not want to share. I will now turn to some misunderstandings that occurred during my fieldwork and evaluate their possible causes (see also, Coupland et al. 1991: 9).

First of all came “problems” in conversation. Though I share the same language with the community I was studying, that did not always assure successful communication. I did not share the same knowledge or cultural,

social or historical referents with my interlocutors, and was often unaware of the meanings of the messages transmitted by them. For example, when I interviewed elderly *rabelistas* who were active during Franco's dictatorship, they would talk about their repertoire including song texts with veiled political meanings. Not having shared their political experience, I did not initially realise that my interlocutors had been politically engaged and that these songs communicated their opposition to the regime. This is an example of "deceptively adequate talk" (Coupland et al. 1991: 6), what Habermas refers to as "pseudo-communication":

On the other hand, some collaborators in Cantabria, who were themselves collecting local repertoires, felt that I was intruding on their territory. This fact, and our different ages, sociocultural and educational backgrounds sometimes had negative consequences for my interactions with them. This was especially true in the case of elderly interlocutors with a low level of literacy, who came from remote rural areas of the region and used local accents and vocabulary which sometimes made it difficult for me to understand their discourse. This experience resonates with the observation that "... some semantic 'slippage' is common in the management of meaning transfer..." (Coupland et al. 1991: 5), which can in turn block the process of understanding.

In fact, interviews as a basic methodological strategy sometimes proved problematic, mainly because most of my collaborators were not used to being interviewed. The musical practices of the *rabel* in Cantabria had not been studied in depth before, hence locals would occasionally feel intimidated by the expectations placed on them as interlocutors.

Miscommunication became more evident as regards musical concepts, such as style and playing techniques. In fact, several ethnomusicologists have pointed out the difficulty of using language in communicating about music (e.g., Seeger 1962; Merriam 1964). Musical lore concerning the *rabel* is mainly transmitted mainly orally among different generations of players, all of whom rely on various musical notions of repertoires and playing techniques. Hence, unlike in western music theory, diverse concepts and terminologies come into play as regards the "same" musical phenomena.

The exotic imaginary that the revival movement constructed of the *rabel* as a medieval and bucolic instrument also had implications in my fieldwork. In my interlocutors' discourse, most of them revivalists, there were a number of recurrent ideas about the origin and musical practices

of the *rabel* in Cantabria; these were used to legitimize and add value to the musical practice, and to reinforce the musicians' identity as performers and promoters of the instrument. For example, they attributed to the *rabel* a remote Arab origin and, in the early twentieth century, associated the instrument with shepherds and with picaresque (comic, ironic and satiric) lyrics.

However, these characteristics are not sustained by historical data. The *rabel* combines characteristics of medieval chordophones with the *rabâb*; and the *rabeles* played nowadays in Cantabria have little to do morphologically with medieval instruments of the same family. The association of the instrument with Cantabrian shepherds cannot be verified ethnographically; a romantic construction, both the "pastoral" and the "picaresque" are only part of a large corpus that deals with many themes such as love, daily life, historical events and myths, or songs in praise of the region.

Many of my interlocutors had their own revivalist agendas, which were reflected in their discourse. In response to some of my questions, they selected the information transmitted, often omitting important aspects of their experience in the revivalist movement, or even offering slanted answers.

Following three years of fieldwork, I began to share the results of my analysis with my main interlocutors, both through discussion and by showing them parts of my written work. In this I employed the strategy of *dialogic editing* (Feld 1994: 240), which involves negotiations and interactions between the researcher and the community studied. I realised that I had occasionally misunderstood (misinterpreted) some of the data. For example, I had first classified the *rabelistas* – taking into account their relationship with different stages of the revival process – as *antiguos*, *nuevas generaciones*, and *de transición*. As a result of discussions with the revivalists, however, it became clear that the movement was much too fluid to be captured in such terms, its protagonists moving across generations and approaches to *rabel* practices.

3. Concluding remarks

In my field research in Cantabria, my attempt to clarify misunderstandings in the communicative process with my interlocutors enabled me to understand some of the main issues that characterize the revival movement of

the *rabel*. In addition, using dialogic editing as a methodological strategy allowed a level of communication which was not possible through verbal discourse alone. Finally, by adopting a reflexive approach, I was able to gain a fuller perspective on (mis)understandings in my overall field research.

Notes

1. Banks et al. (1991) refer to this concept as *miscommunication*: “Popular synonyms for miscommunication include such terms as *misunderstanding ... error ... trouble ... problem ...*” (1991: 104).
2. As others have noted: “... the very sharing of a common language code is itself deceptive, since it falsely suggests a common ground and a ‘naturalness’ of communication that binds communicators to their actual misalignments ...” (Coupland et al. 1991: 7).

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Audrey Moutat

Vertus et limites de la mécompréhension dans le processus d'interprétation des commentaires œnologiques

Introduction

La mécompréhension trouve sa rigueur herméneutique avec Schleiermacher selon lequel elle doit être méthodologiquement postulée pour que le sujet interprétant puisse procéder à une reconstruction complète du sens du texte. En faisant abstraction de toute compréhension immédiate, elle impose une procédure interprétative rigoureuse du contenu textuel et conditionne en permanence les parcours interprétatifs des lecteurs. Dans la mesure où comprendre un texte n'est pas seulement se rapporter à un savoir objectif mais à un "autre" qui l'a énoncé, la mécompréhension relève tant du langage que de la torsion que cet autre lui a imprimé. Cependant, on ne saurait limiter la compréhension à un simple usage de la langue sans tenir compte de ce à quoi elle réfère. En l'occurrence, dans le cas du commentaire de dégustation, on peut ajouter que la mécompréhension résulte en partie du genre textuel duquel il relève et de la nature de son référent: le commentaire de dégustation ne décrit pas un objet concret et palpable mais rend plutôt compte d'un rapport perceptif entre un sujet et un objet (comme la critique à l'égard de la musique). La description porte sur les effets produits par le vin sur le corps du sujet percevant, ainsi que sur les rapports qu'ils entretiennent lors du procès de dégustation. Il s'agit là de rapports de forces avec, d'une part, un objet qui se laisse appréhender plus ou moins facilement, et de l'autre, un sujet qui veut en saisir un maximum de propriétés. Par conséquent, le commentaire de dégustation, avec son vocabulaire imagé et les procédures discursives qu'il préconise, se présente comme le lieu d'expression de cette tension perceptive entre source

et cible; ce qui n'est pas sans conséquence sur la compréhension souvent aléatoire des lecteurs.

1. *Mécompréhension et commentaires de dégustation*

1.1. Rôle de la mécompréhension dans le parcours interprétatif

Bien que le commentaire de dégustation dispose de son propre lexique renvoyant aux techniques de viticulture ou à des impressions sensorielles mesurables, il a souvent recourt à des termes plus usités dont l'emploi dans le domaine de la dégustation perturbe le sujet interprétant non averti: "La robe est profonde, brillante et nette. Au nez comme en bouche, il s'exprime dans un style flatteur, velouté, déjà ouvert et néanmoins construit pour tenir, comme le rappelle la finale charpentée, sur les amers de jeunesse du mourvèdre (70%)" (*La Revue du vin de France* 2004: 72)/

On constate ici que ce sont souvent les mots, en apparence les plus simples, qui sont à l'origine de la mécompréhension du commentaire. Celle-ci se traduit par une incomplétude interprétative, générée par une rupture isotopique liée à la coexistence de deux isotopies génériques:

a) Première isotopie mésogénérique: le //vin//:

Elle est définie par la récurrence de sémèmes appartenant au domaine du //vin// et s'organise selon trois taxèmes correspondant aux phases de la pratique de dégustation:

- /propriétés visuelles: "robe", "profonde", "brillante", "nette";
- /propriétés olfactives/: "nez", "ouvert";
- /impressions gustatives/: "bouche", "velouté", "finale", "charpentée", "amers".

b) Seconde isotopie mésogénérique: //bâtiment//

La seconde isotopie se caractérise par la récurrence de sémèmes relevant du domaine du //bâtiment//: "profonde" (profondeur des pièces, de la structure), "style" (architectural), "ouvert" (espace procuré par les fenêtres et les portes); "construit", "tenir" (à propos des murs soutenant la structure d'ensemble); "charpentée".

c) Détails du parcours interprétatif:

La première isotopie mésogénérique est celle qui permet de déterminer l'impression référentielle; cette reconstruction du *fond isotopique* étant renforcée par le genre textuel auquel le commentaire de dégustation appar-

tient (scansion du commentaire en fonction des phases de dégustation) mais également par le contexte de production de l'énoncé, notamment son entour textuel (ce texte intègre un magazine dédié au vin et compile divers commentaires de dégustation). La seconde isotopie se présente alors comme métaphorique, les sémèmes indexés étant employés afin de décrire les propriétés organoleptiques du vin.

Par conséquent, en dépit d'une impression référentielle déterminée par l'isotopie dominante, il subsiste des zones d'opacité interprétative correspondant à des sémèmes polyisotopes tels que "ouvert", pouvant s'indexer sur des isotopies génériques très diverses, et à des sémèmes relevant d'un tout autre domaine sémantique, le //bâtiment// (cf. 'construit'). Ces derniers s'inscrivent au sein d'une connexion métaphorique qui met en évidence une analogie sous-jacente entre les deux domaines sémantiques: "Le vin est profond, ouvert, construit, charpenté comme une construction architecturale." C'est précisément sur ces coexistences isotopiques, traduisant sémantiquement des correspondances expérientielles, que le travail interprétatif va opérer: il consiste à identifier les sèmes spécifiques des sémèmes comparants indexés sur i_2 car, communs aux sémèmes comparés de i_1 , ils permettront de reconstruire l'intégralité de l'isotopie dominante.

Sémèmes sur i_2	Sémèmes sur i_1	Sèmes spécifiques communs
'profonde'	'intense'	/intensité/
'ouvert ₁ '	'ouvert ₂ '	/étendue/ - /non résistance/
'construit ₁ '	'construit ₂ '	/multiplicité/ - /assemblage/
'charpentée'	'équilibrée'	/multiplicité/ - /cohésion/ - /équilibre/

Figure 1. *Correspondances sémiques et opérations interprétatives.*

La reconstruction des sémèmes sur i_1 s'effectue grâce à deux types d'opérations interprétatives:

a) Réécriture sur une isotopie des sémèmes lexicalisés chacun sur une isotopie différente:

"profonde" → | "intense" |; "charpentée" → | "équilibrée" |

b) Flotaison d'une molécule sémique:

L'opération de réécriture ne pouvant s'effectuer pour ces sémèmes, on constate l'existence d'une molécule sémique en flottaison. Tel est le cas des sémèmes "ouvert" et "construit" dont les sèmes spécifiques inhérents sont strictement identiques sur i_1 comme sur i_2 . Par conséquent, en l'absence de termes propres, l'interprétant est contraint d'accepter l'existence d'un "ouvert₂" et d'un "construit₂". Ces nouveaux sémèmes intègrent la molécule sémique extraite de i_2 et s'enrichissent sur i_1 des sèmes contextuels et afférents liés à la pratique de la dégustation.

On remarque alors que les connexions entre ces sémèmes procèdent à un transfert sémique d'un concept existant sur un concept nouveau qui était jusqu'alors dépourvu de termes propres, traduisant de ce fait la véritable vertu de la mécompréhension.

1.2. Vertu de la mécompréhension

Ce transfert de sens opéré par le dégustateur fonctionne comme une passerelle sémique qui permet au sujet interprétant d'élaborer des impressions référentielles vineuses partielles. Elle instaure une connexion entre deux savoirs distincts: l'un dit "courant", partagé par l'ensemble de la communauté d'une société donnée, et l'autre, savoir "spécifique", acquis par un groupe plus restreint (et, en l'occurrence, lié à la pratique de la dégustation). Le passage du premier au second est garanti par la molécule de sèmes spécifiques extraite du sémème connu et renvoyant à des propriétés analogues à celles de l'objet vin.




Figure 2. La passerelle sémique.

C'est l'élément dissonant, foyer de mécompréhension, qui, une fois identifié, engage la procédure interprétative. Cette reconstruction, qui débute par la reconnaissance d'une coexistence isotopique, va déterminer le lien dialectique entre degré perçu et degré conçu: après avoir sélectionné les éléments sémiques compatibles entre ces deux degrés, le sujet interprétant effectue une projection sur le second de toutes les représentations qu'il aura du premier afin de créer un degré conçu complet. On saisit ici le rôle que joue la mécompréhension: si l'intrusion d'un de ses foyers va, dans un premier temps, "violenter" le lecteur, la passerelle sémique qui lui est sous-jacente va faciliter la médiation entre ces deux domaines sémantiques. En ce sens, la mécompréhension permet de rendre compétent un lecteur novice grâce aux sèmes nucléaires partagés par les deux domaines sémantiques. D'autre part, on constate qu'à l'issue du parcours interprétatif, bien que le sens tropique des sémèmes polyisotopes s'actualise, leur sens non tropique se virtualise mais ne s'efface pas: il reste présent, comme gardé en mémoire. Ce "spectre" du sens non tropique souligne une autre particularité de la mécompréhension, à savoir son influence constante au sein du parcours interprétatif. Par conséquent, si la mécompréhension accompagne le parcours interprétatif et le conditionne en permanence alors la variation de ses foyers aura une influence sur les opérations interprétatives employées dans la reconstruction du sens. C'est ce que montre l'exemple suivant de *La Revue du Vin de France*: "Riche, suave, très gras et chaleureux, mais isolément sec: c'est un édifice à la charpente haute mais encore en cours de stabilisation. Le temps va fortifier sans faille les fondations de ce vin d'artisan d'art. A oublier au moins 5 ans en cave" (Hors-Série n°4 novembre 2003: 134).

Ce commentaire se distingue du précédent par la nature des relations inter-isotopiques: le premier manifestait des isotopies entrelacées tandis que celui-ci présente deux isotopies génériques superposées; d'où un parcours interprétatif différent.

a) Interprétation intrinsèque: isotopie mésogénérique 1

Une première lecture naïve permet d'identifier une isotopie générique dominante, celle du //bâtiment//, encouragée par la prolifération de sémèmes relevant explicitement de ce domaine sémantique (huit au total: *édifice, charpente, haute, fortifier, sans faille, fondations, artisan d'art, cave*) et qui permettent d'identifier le topic du texte comme étant celui d'une description des propriétés architecturales d'un bâtiment. Cette isotopie

peut être enrichie de nouveaux sémèmes tels que: *riche, gras, suave* ou *chaleureux* car, polyisotopes, ils sont compatibles avec le domaine /bâtiment/, leur indexation s’effectuant par contagion sémique. Cette première phase dans la reconstruction du sens correspond à l’opération d’interprétation intrinsèque dont le rôle consiste à mettre en évidence les sèmes (inhérents et afférents) dans une séquence linguistique.

Cependant, cette interprétation immédiate est rapidement contestée par l’identification d’un élément allotopique, le sémème “vin” qui, en introduisant un nouveau domaine sémantique, engage un nouveau travail interprétatif.

b) Interprétation extrinsèque: Isotopie mésogénérique 2

Il s’agit de l’interprétation extrinsèque qui procède à une réévaluation de l’interprétation intrinsèque en convoquant l’entour textuel et les connaissances encyclopédiques liées à la pratique de dégustation. Dès lors, le sujet interprétant peut procéder à des inférences et reconstruire la seconde isotopie en vertu des sèmes spécifiques que ses sémèmes partagent avec ceux de la première. Il s’agit du fonctionnement de base de la mécompréhension identifié précédemment à travers la notion de passerelle sémique.

Sémèmes sur i_1	Sémèmes sur i_2	Sèmes spécifiques communs
'riche'	'riche'	/multiplicité/, /mélioratif/
'suave'	['moelleux']	/douceur/
'gras'	['moelleux']	/douceur/, /quantité/
'chaleureux'	['alcooléux']	/intensité/
'sec'	'sec'	/manque/
'édifice'	['(grand) vin']	/multiplicité/, /volume/, /force/, /mélioratif/
'charpente'	['équilibre']	/multiplicité/, /cohésion/, /équilibre/
'stabilisation'	'stabilisation'	/durativité/, /équilibre/, /maintien/
'fortifier'	'fortifier'	/force/, /évolution/
'faille'	['défaut']	/faiblesse/, /altération/
'fondations'	['composants']	/fondamental/, /robustesse/, /complétude/

Figure 3. Correspondances sémiqes et opérations interprétatives.

2. Mécompréhensions et modes de reconstruction du sens

Bien qu’ils articulent des domaines sémantiques identiques, ces deux commentaires requièrent des modalités de reconstruction du sens bien diffé-

rentes, elles-mêmes engagées par une mécompréhension préalable dont la nature varie de l'un à l'autre. Si l'on compare leurs parcours interprétatifs, on constate que la mécompréhension joue un rôle différent sur la détermination des opérations interprétatives. Bien que, dans les deux cas, nous soyons en présence d'un énoncé polyisotopique, la nature des relations inter isotopiques est différente, ce qui conduit à un changement de nature des foyers de mécompréhension: dans le premier exemple, ils sont multiples tandis que dans le second, il s'agit d'un foyer unique: le sémème dissonant 'vin'. Par conséquent, l'incomplétude du sens, qui traduit le phénomène de mécompréhension, revêt elle aussi une nature différente selon les relations inter isotopiques manifestées.

Dans le premier cas, il s'agit d'une compréhension *entravée* où la détermination complète de l'impression référentielle /vin/ est contrecarrée par la présence répétée d'éléments allotopiques empêchant une lecture continue du texte. Le travail interprétatif est ici un travail de *réajustement isotopique* impliquant une coopération, une négociation entre les isotopies, afin de convertir cette discontinuité isotopique en un ensemble cohérent grâce à un recours répété à la passerelle sémique.

Dans le second, l'incomplétude du sens se présente comme une compréhension *erronée*: le sujet interprétant est déjà parvenu à construire une représentation mentale du contenu textuel à l'aide d'un premier travail interprétatif; il en a saisi la thématique générale ainsi que ses différentes spécificités, néanmoins remises en question par l'introduction du sémème "vin". A la différence du cas précédent, la mécompréhension fonctionne à rebours: c'est l'élément allotopique "vin" identifié en fin de texte qui contraint le sujet interprétant à engager un nouveau travail interprétatif, travail de *réévaluation isotopique*, qui ne porte plus sur des localités (lieux de rupture), mais sur la totalité du texte. Il ne vise donc pas à isoler des unités sémiques communes entre sémèmes mais consiste à rabattre un ensemble sémantique construit sur un autre.

Le changement de nature de la mécompréhension implique alors deux types de parcours interprétatifs: local et global. Dans le premier cas, la mécompréhension porte sur des sémèmes en rupture isotopique, renvoyant à des propriétés spécifiques de la thématique: robe, nez, bouche. Dans le second, en revanche, c'est une phase précise de l'examen de dégustation (la bouche) qui est entièrement décrite en termes d'une autre isotopie; la mécompréhension portant davantage sur une représentation mentale liée

à un ensemble sémantique que sur des unités sémi-ques éparses. Alors que dans le premier cas, la mécompréhension focalise l'attention du sujet interprétant sur des particularités spécifiques de l'objet, ici elle oriente le travail interprétatif sur un "bloc" expé-rientiel. D'où l'hypothèse selon laquelle la mécompréhension manifesterait une certaine *intentionnalité* à l'égard du sujet interprétant: à travers l'usage varié de ses foyers, elle occuperait des degrés de présence différents et imposerait, de ce fait, des parcours interprétatifs orientés qui traduisent sa visée particulière dans le mode de compréhension qu'elle préconise. Elle fonctionnerait comme une stratégie interprétative, au service d'une compréhension précise et ciblée, corrélative à une stratégie énonciative du dégustateur.

Foyer	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Relations inter isotopiques <div style="text-align: center;">↓</div> Foyer simple ou multiple
↓	
Mécompréhension	= Tension discursive <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Degrés de présence ▪ Impression référentielle (= compréhension préalable) ▪ Doute (spécifique vs générique)
↓	
Travail interprétatif	= Résolution de la tension discursive <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Local vs Global ▪ Opérations de conversion ▪ Variations intentionnelles } Moments interprétatifs

Figure 4. Fonctionnement de la mécompréhension.

2.1. Mécompréhension et temporalité des parcours interprétatifs

Dans la mesure où elle détermine les opérations interprétatives et influe sur la complexité des parcours, la mécompréhension va corrélativement exercer son influence sur leur temporalité.

Le premier commentaire pose d'emblée le problème de la mécompréhension par l'actualisation de deux isotopies associées au sein d'une relation prédicative. Par conséquent, le travail interprétatif visant à résoudre la tension discursive s'engage immédiatement et se conclut rapidement (deux moments), comme le montre le tableau suivant:

<i>Moments du parcours</i>	1. Tension discursive = mécompréhension	2. Résolution de la tension
<i>Percepts thématiques</i>	VIN /BATIMENT	VIN
<i>Interprétatifs</i>	Coexistence i_1 et i_2 dans une relation prédicative ; Allotopies intrasyntagmatiques	Interactions isotopiques i_1 et i_2 (passerelle sémique) ; Isotopie dominante /vin/

Figure 5. *Temporalité du parcours interprétatif (commentaire n°1).*

Or, dans le second exemple, le doute sur le contenu textuel apparaît un peu plus tard, une fois que le parcours interprétatif ait bien été engagé. C’est l’identification de l’élément allotopique “vin” en fin de texte qui déclenche le travail de réévaluation isotopique et engage un nouveau moment dans le parcours interprétatif.

<i>Moments du parcours</i>	1. Interprétation intrinsèque	2. Identification de la tension discursive	3. Interprétation extrinsèque
<i>Percepts thématiques</i>	BATIMENT	BATIMENT OU VIN ?	VIN
<i>Interprétatifs</i>	Dominance isotopique i_1	Allotopie intrasynagmatique ; Contexte équatif	Relations inter isotopiques ; Connaissances encyclopédiques

Figure 6. *Temporalité du parcours interprétatif (commentaire n°2).*

Par conséquent, plus la mécompréhension est structurée, plus son degré de présence est faible, plus le parcours interprétatif se complexifie en multipliant les moments interprétatifs.

3. *Limites de la mécompréhension*

C’est précisément cette notion de temporalité qui, selon les moments qu’elle recouvre, permet de soulever les limites de la mécompréhension. L’exemple suivant permettra d’étayer ce point: “Le nez de l’altesse trône au milieu des arômes exotiques avec une petite pointe miellée, entourée de fleurs” (*Cuisine et Vins de France* 2003: 75).

3.1. Moments du parcours interprétatif

La particularité de ce texte, c'est qu'il induit une mécompréhension très structurée, celle-ci résultant d'une torsion profonde opérée sur le genre textuel du commentaire de dégustation, aussi bien sur l'aspect tactique que thématique: il ne présente pas le découpage canonique en phases robe/nez/bouche mais se focalise uniquement sur l'une d'entre elles. En outre, les isotopies génériques sont parfaitement superposées si bien que le sujet interprétant ne parvient à saisir aucune allotopie. Enfin, dernière spécificité macrosémantique: le sens de ce texte réside essentiellement dans les connexités entre isotopies génériques et spécifiques; dès lors, le parcours interprétatif ne doit pas se contenter d'identifier les isotopies du texte mais doit également déterminer leurs connexions: ici, l'impression référentielle se construit à partir du corrélat de l'isotopie générique princière i_1 et de l'isotopie spécifique de la spatialité i_2 : le topic n'étant pas celui d'une simple figure princière mais plutôt la mise en scène de cette dernière au sein d'un jardin exotique. A cela, s'ajoute une seconde isotopie spécifique, celle de la /saillance/ indexant les sémèmes: "nez" (partie la plus saillante du visage), "altesse" (titre honorifique indiquant une supériorité hiérarchique), "trône" (place d'honneur/position dominante), "au milieu de" (valorisation la position centrale), "pointe" (extrémité la plus fine du sceptre), "entourée" (valorisation de la position centrale). Cette nouvelle isotopie spécifique s'articule avec la première au sein d'un rythme sémantique $a\bar{a}a\bar{a}$ (où a renvoie à l'isotopie de la saillance, notamment au sème /intensité/ et \bar{a} renvoie à l'isotopie de la spatialité, en particulier au sème /étendue/) matérialisant ainsi un ajustement entre une forme et un fond. D'ailleurs, les acteurs dotés d'un fort degré d'intensité relèvent de l'isotopie générique /princière/; ils se présentent alors comme des formes qui se détachent, selon des variations d'intensité, sur le fond de l'isotopie spatiale.

Ces variations dans le champ de présence, mesurables en termes d'intensité et d'étendue, correspondent en fait au principe d'ajustement focal, opéré par l'observateur de la scène qui procède à des mouvements de zoom et de dézoom. Ainsi, le topic n'est plus celui d'un prince dans un jardin mais devient celui d'un ajustement focal opéré par un observateur extérieur (passage du noème à la noèse perceptive).

Toutefois, un recours à l'entour textuel ainsi qu'aux connaissances encyclopédiques sur la pratique de dégustation permet de soulever une nouvelle

isotopie générique, celle du vin, objet de dégustation, dont le sémème 'nez' en est un interprétant direct. Poly-isotope, il permet de connecter les deux domaines sémantiques au sein d'une relation métaphorique. S'engagent alors des conversions isotopiques liées au changement d'isotopie générique: l'isotopie spécifique de la spatialité est alors convertie en l'isotopie spécifique de la temporalité, permettant de dégager une nouvelle thématique du texte, celle de la succession temporelle des arômes émanant du vin. Cette seconde conversion isotopique entraîne une transformation des relations entre isotopies spécifiques qui se traduisent par un rapport forme/ intervalle temporel où les formes de la saillance se détachent sur des intervalles temporels précis, selon l'alternance āāā du rythme sémantique qui, lui, reste maintenu. Etant données ces multiples conversions, le rapport global entre les isotopies du texte est lui aussi modifié et permet d'identifier un nouveau topic: les variations intentionnelles du dégustateur, en particulier le double mouvement de visée et de saisie, dans l'appréhension des propriétés olfactives du vin.

En bref:

Périodes du parcours	Période 1			Période 2			
Moments du parcours	1. Isotopie princièrè + spatialité	2. Isotopie spatialité + saillance	3. Interrelations isotopiques	1. Conversions isotopiques	2. Isotopie temporalité + saillance	3. Interrelations isotopiques	
Percepts	PRENRE DANS UN JARDIN	RAPPORT FORME/FORME	AJUSTEMENT LOCAL OBSERVATEUR	SUCCESSION TEMPORELLE D'AROMES	RAPPORT FORME/ PRESENCE / INTERVALLE TEMPOREL	VARIATIONS INTENTIONNELLES DU DEGUSTATEUR	
Interprétants	Complémentarité de i, et i;	Interaction i, et i; intensification de i,	Forme tactique āāā; interactions i, et i; interaction i, et i;	Erreur textuel; Connaissances encyclopédiques; Polyisotopie de 'vin'	Interaction i, et i; intensification de i,	Rythme sémantique; interaction i, i et i	
Méta percepts	NOÏME	→	NOÏME	→	NOÏME	→	NOÏME

Figure 7. Temporalité du parcours interprétatif (commentaire n°3).

3.2. Complexité de la mécompréhension et conséquences sur le parcours interprétatif

Ici, la mécompréhension se présente comme une représentation hautement structurée du contenu textuel, ce qui a pour conséquence un redéploiement temporel des interprétations intrinsèque et extrinsèque qui ne se réduisent plus à de simples moments mais deviennent des périodes interprétatives,

elles-mêmes recouvrant plusieurs moments. De plus, la torsion affectée au genre textuel renforce le pouvoir de la mécompréhension, l'absence de structure tripartite ne permettant plus l'ancrage référentiel dans la pratique de dégustation. Dès lors, la mécompréhension se présente comme auto suffisante car, en l'absence de contexte immédiat ou de situation de communication identifiable, le topic de l'ajustement focal d'un observateur externe aurait été suffisant, le rabattement de la seconde isotopie sur la première n'étant pas possible. C'est là que se situe le véritable danger de la mécompréhension: en l'absence d'élément allotopique, elle est moins saisissable et le contenu inféré peut facilement être entendu comme le véritable sens du texte. Si dans nos deux premiers exemples, la résolution de la tension créée par la mécompréhension est à proprement parler interne, facilitée par différents indices, ici, faute d'élément allotopique identifiable, la résolution de la tension discursive n'est possible que par un recours à l'entour textuel ainsi qu'aux connaissances encyclopédiques sur le vin. La passerelle sémique reste donc inefficace. Par conséquent, le travail interprétatif repose exclusivement sur une image mentale activée par la métaphore vive, la reconstruction du sens s'effectue uniquement sur le rabattement d'un ensemble expérientiel hautement structuré sur un autre. Il ne s'agit plus d'une simple conversion sémantique opérant à la réécriture de sémèmes mais d'une conversion sémantico-gestaltique où le sujet interprétant, guidé par des transformations isotopiques, procède à des transferts expérientiels. On en déduit alors que le phénomène de la mécompréhension ne se réduit pas simplement à des entorses faites au langage et/ou au genre textuel du commentaire, ces dernières pouvant également se présenter comme la manifestation discursive du mode de conceptualisation du dégustateur à l'égard des éléments qu'il perçoit. En l'occurrence, il s'agit de son système conceptuel personnel, lié à son propre vécu ainsi qu'à son ressenti lors de la dégustation. Par conséquent, le contenu textuel devient difficilement saisissable, faute d'une communauté conceptuelle avec l'énonciateur.

En conclusion, si la mécompréhension vise à guider et à faciliter la compréhension du lecteur en se référant à des connaissances ainsi qu'à un contenu expérientiel communs, elle peut néanmoins s'avérer dangereuse lorsque l'énonciateur recourt à un système conceptuel personnel et non plus partagé par la communauté des dégustateurs. Dès lors, la mécompréhension peut s'avérer fort structurée et déroutante, engageant le lecteur dans un travail interprétatif fastidieux; elle peut alors nuire à ses vertus

communicationnelles en se réduisant à un simple enjolivement textuel, dépourvu de contenu et uniquement destiné à séduire une cible marketing peu avertie.

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Josep Muntañola

The hidden semiotic- chronotopic core of architecture

1. The semiotics of space and the hidden dimensions of culture

Thirty years have passed since my first semiotic investigation of architecture (Muntañola 1973), and a lot of other semioticians have written excellent works on the topic since then (Pellegrino 2000; Levy 2003; Boudon 1981). They have designed what I have called an *Architecture of the Semiotics of Space and Time*. Tchertov (2002) has analysed with precision the special characteristics of the semiotics of space in general, and I agree with his vision of a peculiar code of communication in space, a “palette-like-code”, where a lot of meanings can be simultaneously working at different speeds, locations and intensities.

However, the distinction between linguistics and communication that led the late Professor Jose Luis Prieto to define a double sense in the semiotic systems (Prieto 1986) points to a very serious problem.¹ Architects have solved this problem with so-called “architectural autonomy theories” of the profession, a new formalism in which form and content are totally separated in architectural practices and theories. Architects build the same building everywhere, and the only “codes” that are accepted are those defined by architectural practices as such, with no discussion of contextual constraints, and without historical and social considerations. All this is a perfect example of the formalistic approach that Mikhail Bakhtin tried to fight in the early years of his life, although his writings were not published until after his death (Bakhtin 1990).²

I have tried to explore poetics and rhetoric, along with hermeneutics, dialogics and developmental cognition, in order to articulate design prac-

tices and theories to semiotics (Muntañola 1996). In doing so I have found what a lot of philosophers, sociologists and psychosociologists are analysing now (Valsiner and Van der Veer 2000; Searle 1995): our mind has a strong social dimension, which is hidden much of the time, but which can be detected in developmental psychology (Langer et al. 2003: 141–172), in psychosociological studies, and in developmental and anthropological sociology and cognition (D’Andrade 1995). This hidden social dimension, pointed out in the seminal work by E. T. Hall (1966), is a perfect “alibi” for professionals such as architects, educators and legislators, allowing them to “practice” without theoretical justifications.

In fact, what we find at this point is a “conversational”, or dialogical, structure of human space and time, an “order of coexistence” between subjects and objects, as Leibnitz stated some centuries ago. What we see of this psycho-socio-physical “order of coexistence” is just the tip of the iceberg – not all the hidden content. It is similar to the diagnosis of the genesis of madness: we clearly notice the signs of madness, but the origin of it is very hard to figure out, and we still know little about it. Still, as an art of interpretation of signs as symptoms, we should be able to explore this invisible, spatial-semiotic underground world of communication.

2. The dark side of the semiotics of space: Theory and methodology

Paul Ricoeur is one philosopher who wanted to invent tools for exploring the dark or hidden aspects of mankind: the unconscious, fascism, manipulation of memories, poetic deep structures and so on (Ricoeur 2000). He, among others, encouraged me not to be afraid to peer below the tip of the iceberg.

Although the concept of the unconscious is important, as Deleuze’s writings prove, the unconscious is not enough; we should be able to build up a semiotic account of what Jaan Valsiner calls “the social mind” (Valsiner and Van der Veer 2000). The concepts of equilibrium and disequilibrium are useful tools, as Jonas Langer has shown, and, of course, the concept of *chronotope* by Bakhtin is important to architectural theories and to the semiotics of space, as Ricoeur himself insisted (in a personal conversation in Barcelona).

The key concept is the mental “embodiment” of objects and subjects by virtue of a semiotic (invisible and mute) spatial link. For this reason, Plato insists that place-ness can only be understood when “all the senses are absent, and we use some kind of spurious reason, that is neither ideal nor real, but somewhat in the middle and like a dream-like knowledge”. Children express exactly this when they associate (at three years of age) the genesis of empty spaces (void) with sleeping inhabitants. How should this strange semiotics be analysed? One way is, of course, to probe the imagination, as Kevin Lynch and many environmental psychologists have done. But, again, this remains far from architectural design itself. The concept of “schemata”, both in the mind and in culture, is another good starting point (cf. Rapoport 2007).

Much more promising can be the combination of dialogics with the chronotope concept, “points of view” and “voices”, with the “natural logic” developed by Borel, Grize, etc. in the Neuchâtel group, which was very active in the Piagetian institute in Geneva. In both cases the key concept is the logic of dialogue, and the structural conditions to achieve it. They define this logic in the following way: “We define a non-formal argument when it includes implicit knowledge, and its conclusion is not the output of implementation of a rule. In this way, the output of a non-formal argument contains new elements that are different from the premises” (Grize 1984: 21).

It is not difficult to relate this “natural logic” with Ricoeur’s call for a semiotics of text that can describe the “configurative” dimension of any work of art, literary or otherwise. Let us reproduce some arguments related to this point by Jean Blaise Grize:

The actions of schematization must assume the equilibrium inside the organization of a whole where the objects move. They associate objects and make transformations. All these actions are controlled by the principals of coherence. These principals of coherence participate on the transformations of the objects. Coherence and cohesion are interdependent, in such a way that the organization of the objects constrains the context where the objects move. (Grize 1984: 214)

On the other side is Bakhtin, who rejects the autonomy of the text produced by “codes” as indifferent to the contextual qualities of the communicative process itself: “The linguistic code is a killed context” (Bakhtin 1996: 147).

3. *The semiotic link between architecture, education and society: Sigfried Giedion revisited*

A few years before his death, Sigfried Giedion was living in a neighborhood near Zurich, very close to the Jean Piaget residence. It is not strange then that in his last work as an historian and theorist of modern architecture he uses Piaget's ideas in the book published after his death, *Architecture and the Phenomena of Transition*, a book for which I wrote the foreword of the Spanish translation in 1970 (Muntañola 2007: 107–123).

This strange and ambitious book is a theory of architecture that follows exactly the same dialogical paradigm that Mikhail Bakhtin defined in the 1920s, plus Piaget's idea of a developmental and structural psycho-social genesis. The changes between Greek architecture and Roman architecture, and between Roman and modern architecture, are defined by Giedion as "phenomena of transition" or sociophysical (human) developments. The key character of these changes is "sociophysical", that is, "chronotopic", because it implies new links between social dwellings and built forms. The parallelism with the development of Bakhtin's theories in the literary field (for example, the novel) is striking, because in both cases the cultural object – books or buildings – increases the capability of representing the inner and outer dimensions of our social lives, and new chronotopes are produced. Environmental changes and social changes are linked chronotopically, and new "cultures" arise.

Developmental cognition is also exploring this "heterochrony", which differentiates human beings from other living species (Langer et al 2003). The conclusion is inevitable: the hidden semiotic dimensions of the human species (the huge hidden part of the iceberg), as manifest in education and social interaction, constitute the most fundamental aspects of human life: gender identities, the body's own image, psychosocial rhythms of space and time (celebrations, etc.), social expectations of prestige and power. A specific kind of social interaction blends ontogenetic and phylogenetic development, thanks to a heterochronic (and chronotopic) synchronization between human bodies and places.

Andy Clark has recently theorized this process of "mutual reciprocity", which characterizes natural logic. According to Clark, the "reciprocity between minds" is a key factor for mental development, but it is neither a "computation" nor a "neurological process" (Clark 1998: 103–128); rather,

it points up the simultaneous production of individual and social, shared meanings, such that there are no differences between conventional and non-conventional (or intentional) meanings.

4. *An example: Children's conceptions of places to live in*

Drawing upon my work on children's conceptions of places to live (Muntanola 1973), I offer an example of chronotopic semiotic analyses. Diagrams 1 and 2 represent cities conceived by children from two different international schools in the city of Barcelona in experiments carried out recently by a PhD student. The results are consistent with similar experiments realized ten years ago in 100 schools in the same city (Muntanola 2007: 41–54). Generally speaking, all these experiments found the same basic features:

a) Each school has unique kinds of “ideal cities” conceived by children aged 4 to 12 years.

b) When a child changes school, he or she either changes his or her “ideal city”, in order to interact with the new social environment, or he/she will have huge difficulties in socializing.

c) This “ideal city to live in”, built with wooden blocks by teams of 5 to 10 children, reflects the dialogical and physical characteristics of the social life of the school, all following the dialogical and chronotopic notions defined by Bakhtin.

d) A close look at the “videos”, in order to follow the “design process of the city”, can even detect the “heterochronic” qualities of the process, in a way analogous to the “embryo” space and time rules of development, as a “bridge” between ontogenetic and phylogenetic development (or psychosocial synchronization).

e) Another confirmation of this fact is the total identification between the key factors of these psychosocial bridges and the human qualities that, according to Linneo, are lacking in “wild” children: clear sexual identity, control of sleeping and waking rhythms, correct bodily posture, the recognition of one's own image in the mirror, the control of language, drawing, etc. in order to communicate. That is: the cognitive chronotopic qualities discovered by Jonas Langer and followers, and analysed above as “human”.

f) The chronotopic-semiotic qualities of these cities (diagrams 1 and 2) are precisely the rules of the “natural logic”, or configurative semiotic

structures, which I was looking for. Of course, they are simply the developmental roots of these configurative structures; and yet, like the “space syntax” analyzed by Hillier (1996), they can be progressively used in town planning and in architecture.

g) Special attention should be paid to the “dialogical” character of these structures, as a chronotopic, life-and-death synthesis, between boys and girls, grandparents and grandchildren, nights and days, private and public spaces, etc. Building and dwelling are, then, chronotopically interrelated, through poetic, rhetorical and semiotic links, or “habits”.

Diagrams 1 and 2 show two different architectonic structures. These structures affect the aesthetic, political and cognitive relationships between children, as well as those relationships between children and adults.




Diagram 1. Monological cities.

The specific geometrical forms of each of those two different structures are not arbitrary; but of course, these forms are neither logically nor naturally universal, nor are they inevitable. They are simply conventional. Nevertheless, these conventional social rules constrain our way of moving, living and thinking. They are chronotopically specific, and children use

them as an intersubjective structure of communication. The correlation between social behavior and physical forms is the key architectonic dimension of our environments.

Diagram 1 shows cities with clear semiotic differences from the cities pictured in diagram 2. Space is made of individual houses built by one child (boy or girl) individually, in opposition to the places of the other children. In between these individual places, space does not exist; it is simply a meaningless void, owned by nobody. Often, girls are pushed into a corner of the table, such that male power can be easily detected. Articulation between language and architecture does not exist, only attitudes of aggression and/or defense between the owners of the houses. There are no public buildings or public open spaces. The geometry has one main role: to define the limits of “my” property. The bigger the building, the bigger is my power in the city.

Spatial syntax relates to fragmented individual places located in an indifferent environment: no connections with behavior or with history are made. Physical partitions of space coincide with individual partitions, but there are no conventional social rules in play, only frontiers and limits between “my” place and others’ places. There are no signs of hospitality or intersubjective behavior (social interaction). I call these cities *monological cities*.




Diagram 2. *Dialogical cities.*

Diagram 2 tells a different story. Here the cities have conventional intersubjective rules and representations, where language and architecture are interrelated. There are public buildings, which play specific social roles, and open public spaces, with specific uses. There are different geometries for different kinds of buildings, public or private.

There are “schemata” and “design rules” accepted by all the children. The child (boy or girl) ultimately can explain the city, because it is a social event, not a disordered mass of individual places. Each child builds the city in relation to the others’ task, in a much more “organic” way of building compared to that of the monological cities. Inside spaces and outside spaces are interrelated in a way that allows for social interaction in specific cultural manners. These cities I call *dialogical*, and each one has a different chronotopic structure, responding to the specific rules and representational tools behind their construction.

The semiotic differences between the cities in diagram 1 and those in diagram 2 are represented in diagrams 3 and 4. In diagram 3 we find a “monologic chronotope” where inner spaces and outer spaces are indifferent to each other, and physical partitions do not imply social interactions, but simply social defense or isolation. Each child is a “competitor”, not a friend. Language is not related to architecture, there are no “verbal stories” related to the buildings, only phrases such as: “this is my tower” (boys), “this is my flat” in which to look after my children (girls). Private property is the key factor; public, “shared” property does not exist, but is replaced by “empty” and “non-significant” space and time locations.

Subjects	Objects	
S ₁ —————	O ₁	Physical space and time and “social” space and time are only related at individual level. Relations between objects have not correlations with relations between subjects. Norms for objects are independent from norms for subjects. Objects are context free. Subjects are context free.
S ₂ —————	O ₂	
S ₃ —————	O ₃	
“Points of view” and “voices” are independent of each other		
There does not exist a configuration between subjects and objects		

Diagram 3. Monologic semiotic architectural core (configurative chronotope).

Windows and doors are not needed, only walls, flats and roofs. Forms are almost indifferent to functions: they all look alike and can be used indifferently, so there is no way to verbalize them. The logic here has only one rule: the bigger my own private tower, the better it is for me. *There is no difference between construction and communication.* With 5 or 6 items all the cities can be built. Text and context are the same, and we can say that there is no need for communication at all, only the need for construction. In brief, there is a “zero-semiotic” chronotopic architectural link. All places look alike; there is no need for traveling. This monological chronotope is the best representation of a completely social and liberal capitalistic world. There are neither different voices nor different points of view (except for some sex differences). Geography and social history are always and everywhere interrelated by the same universal autistic forms.

These are the most usual cities: almost ninety percent of schools in Catalonia have this kind of “ideal city” culturally inhabited by children. However, this monological chronotope, as diagram 3 shows, is not socially indifferent. Rather, it forces a concrete interpretation of ideal social interactions where girls are “inside” and boys “outside”, where power is used to destroy the places of others (we have seen violent terrorist actions that destroy the tower of competitors). Social rules are abolished in order to build the biggest tower without restrictions. Public spaces disappear because rules disappear. Beauty is totally subordinated to these “social rules”; there is no way to be original outside the big towers and the symbolic, spectacular power of size. Deviations are aggressively destroyed if they break the rules (if somebody intends to build public spaces or different forms).




Diagram 4. Dialogic semiotic architectural core (configurative chronotope).

The chronotopes in diagram 4 are very different. Here each city has different chronotopical structures. Thus each city has its own “story” and its own “history”. Children “built” the intersubjective and social reciprocity that they have in the school, they built a place for the culture they have, with more than 100 elements. Hence the chronotope varies with the specific kind of social interaction that each school “produces” during the years that children are there. It is not only the “real” interaction that is in the city, but the “ideal” interaction the schools believe they should have, and this is reflected and built into the city. “Points of view” on the physical constructions and “voices” of the subjects using these constructions, are chronotopically related in each city in a specific manner. There is a structural and semiotic affiliation between the city and the verbal description of it.



Diagram 5. *Visual order of the Middle Ages.*

Diagram 5 reproduces a socio-physical network, or chronotope, from the Middle Ages in the south of France. It shows that the chronotopic structure of architecture is by no means a new invention.

5. Conclusion: New architecture for a better environment

Instead of looking for a semiotics of architecture, I use “architecture” as a way to uncover a general semiotics of men’s life and communication. Amidst this “tower of Babel”, as Rita Messori describes it, (Muntañola ed. 2006), it is easy to get lost. However, if children’s efforts succeed (in a

healthy sociophysical school environment) in producing nice, useful, and dream-like cities dreamlike, adults should be able to surpass them.

Men have a remarkable ability to survive in the face of climate changes, social wars, environmentally hostile conditions, destructive planning processes, etc. – like the child’s ability to change friends, school and cultures. But this flexibility has psychological, sociological and “architectural” limits and huge costs in terms of money, mental health and social peace. Perhaps we can arrive at an “ethical and political semiotics of space and time” sooner than expected, a semiotics of environmental design, that may result in a new architecture for a better environment.

Notes

1. The difference between “communication” and “language” has long been debated. For example, Bakhtin began writing against “formalism” in linguistics almost one hundred years ago.
2. Bakhtin aims to build up a “dialogical” theory against any kind of formalistic understanding of human art and human communication. For an analysis of his writings, see Muntanola 2004 and 2006.

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Volker A. Munz

Language and misunderstanding

1. Introductory remarks

The so called “linguistic turn” around the beginning of the twentieth century shifted both methods and contents within the philosophical discourse. According to this new paradigm philosophical problems only arise because we cannot get a clear overview of the grammar of our everyday language. This assumption is closely connected to a particular approach in dealing with metaphysics. Metaphysical questions are thereby identified as purely conceptual misunderstandings and therefore “pseudo-problems” (“Scheinprobleme”). As a consequence of another paradigmatic turn towards the natural sciences at the end of the nineteenth century, propositions that did not fit into the synthetic/analytic scheme were regarded as nonsensical and irrelevant for further philosophical analysis, as was argued by members of the Vienna Circle.

In his *Philosophical Investigations*, Ludwig Wittgenstein maintains that a grammatical investigation of our language would clear away misunderstandings concerning the use of linguistic expressions. Those misunderstandings are due to certain analogies between particular forms of words or sentences in various fields of language.

I shall briefly focus on Wittgenstein’s concept of a grammatical rule and its connexion to metaphysical and empirical statements. It is thereby particularly important to see the semantic ambiguities of linguistic expressions in metaphysical, grammatical and empirical contexts. And as we will see Wittgenstein’s approach quite differs from the views held by Vienna Circle members and their philosophical predecessors.

2. *Dominating tendencies*

In the second part of the nineteenth century we can identify a paradigmatic shift in the philosophical discourse. In his *Analysis of Sensations* Ernst Mach postulated the complete elimination of metaphysics from any scientific investigations, particularly Kantian “things in themselves” (*Dinge an sich*). Another important figure, Franz Brentano, maintained that the only true philosophy is that of the natural sciences and the early Ludwig Wittgenstein argued that to express propositions of natural sciences is the only right method in philosophy.

Now, particularly Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell caused another turn of the discourse at the beginning of the twentieth century by focusing philosophical investigations on the analysis of language. The concepts “sense” and “meaning” became crucial for the question whether we should eliminate a particular sentence as scientifically irrelevant.

The Vienna Circle members understood themselves in the tradition of Mach, Frege, Russell and the young Wittgenstein. Their philosophical direction is usually associated with the terms “logical empiricism”, “neopositivism”, or “logical positivism” which already implies the paradigmatic shift towards a fusion of classical positivistic doctrines with elements of logic and mathematics. As opposed to empiricists like Comte or Mach, who regarded metaphysics as useless or superfluous, the Circle argued that *propositions* of metaphysics are strictly speaking not false but meaningless. The purpose of philosophical investigations is therefore the clarification of the meaning of propositions and the elimination of all meaningless pseudo-propositions (cf. Blumberg and Feigl 1931: 282). Here we can see the paradigmatic shift that was introduced by the linguistic turn at the beginning of the new century.

Furthermore, the idea of a clarification of our ordinary language by means of logical analysis alone counts as one of the central doctrines in Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* (Wittgenstein 1989: 3,25), which was intensely read and discussed by the Circle members during the twenties. According to their conviction, propositions that are neither analytic a priori nor synthetic a posteriori have to be rejected from any kind of philosophical analysis. Or as Hans Hahn, a prominent member of the Vienna Circle, puts it: “The scientific world view only knows empirical propositions

about objects of all kinds and the analytic propositions of logic and mathematics” (Mach 1929: 18, my translation).

In principle, synthetic propositions are verifiable by experience, and a statement only has sense if it either empirical or else tautological in the sense that its truth is solely determined by the meanings of the concepts contained in the particular statement. The only two relevant questions are: “What do you mean?” and “How do you know?” (cf. Feigl 1981: 409). The meaning of an empirical proposition consists in the method of its verification and a sentence has sense when it is verifiable that is, when we possess a method to ascertain its truth. This approach led to the famous Verifiability Principle: “The sense of a sentence is the method of its verification” (Waismann 1978: 47, my trans.).

Now let us turn to Wittgenstein, who proposed a way of dealing with empirical and metaphysical propositions that quite differs from approaches of the Vienna Circle although he was held to represent a similar position with respect to the problem of verification at the beginning of the 1930s.

3. Wittgenstein’s alternative

All of Wittgenstein’s philosophy was dominated by the relation between language and the world which he regarded as internal throughout all his writings. In the *Tractatus* he proposed his famous picture theory, based on the assumption that a proposition having sense is a picture of a possible state of affairs if both are of the same logical structure. Because the logical form of a proposition is hidden by our everyday language use, only logical analysis within a truth-functional calculus can unfold the general form of elementary propositions i.e. truth arguments for any propositional function. And in his introduction to the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein writes that philosophical problems were only based on misunderstandings of the logic of our language.

Now, although Wittgenstein did reject some of his early *Tractatus* positions in the *Philosophical Investigations*, he nevertheless adhered to the assumption that philosophical problems are genuine problems of language. Those problems only arise because we cannot overview the grammar of our language. His concept of a rule, which he introduced in the beginning of the thirties, was supposed to prevent misunderstandings in language by defining the meaning of a word within a language game, which is no more

the very object it represents or stands for but instead solely determined by its use.

Philosophical investigations were still investigations concerning our language, although Wittgenstein regarded certain of his *Tractarian* assumptions as erroneous. In the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein remarks: “We feel as if we had to *penetrate* phenomena: our investigation, however, is directed not towards phenomena, but, as one might say, towards the ‘*possibilities*’ of phenomena. We remind ourselves, that is to say, of the *kind of statement* that we make about phenomena. ... Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language ...” (Wittgenstein 2005: §90). Similarly, in another context, Wittgenstein claims that the main source of misunderstandings lies in the fact that our grammar lacks perspicuity and that we do not oversee our language use (cf. Wittgenstein 2005: §122).

Now, to what kind of problem is Wittgenstein referring in these two remarks? First of all, it seems to hang together with the fact that a proposition is ambiguous with respect to its meaning. In the *Tractatus*, the meaning of a word or name was clearly fixed by the object it names and a proposition having sense expresses a possible state of affairs. This semantic relation Wittgenstein replaced by the famous remark that the meaning of a word is its use in language (cf. Wittgenstein 2005: §43). And here the trouble starts, because it is quite obvious that we can use one and the same proposition in order to make rather distinct statements.

Despite the fact that we always have to take into account the particular context, within which something is said, we generally can distinguish two essentially different kinds of contexts and that is a metaphysical – Wittgenstein sometimes says “philosophical” – and an empirical one. About the relation between grammar, a metaphysical statement and an empirical proposition, Wittgenstein makes the following interesting remark: “... it is particularly difficult to discover that an assertion which the metaphysician makes expresses discontentment with our grammar when the words of this assertion can also be used to state a fact of experience” (Wittgenstein 1972: 56–57). Thus when, e.g., someone enters a doctor’s surgery, claiming that only he has real pain, he probably just wants to point out that

other patients may suffer less pain than he, that he should be the next to be treated, etc. A solipsist, however, who states that only his pain is real pain, does not want to make any empirical assumptions about the physical or mental states of other persons, e.g., that he has good reasons to assume that they are only cheating or are exaggeratedly sensitive with respect to pains. What he wants to say is that it is *inconceivable* to imagine that anyone except him could be in pain. And this conception of what is possible to imagine and what makes sense to say is already found in the *Tractatus*. A proposition that has sense expresses a possible state of affairs, a state that is imaginable in the sense that the statement that expresses it does not contain a contradiction or concepts excluding each other (cf. Wittgenstein 1929: 162–171). And the distinction Wittgenstein draws between empirical and logical possibility and impossibility is crucial for the whole understanding of metaphysical, grammatical and empirical propositions. It seems, however, quite obvious that every metaphysician would agree to the statement that when she is maintaining something metaphysical, she is not interested in claiming anything empirical. And this leads us to the question of how to treat such statements, and here we also find Wittgenstein's position towards metaphysical claims.

Generally speaking, and as already mentioned, for Wittgenstein philosophical problems are purely conceptual problems and what is essential to metaphysics is that it blurs the distinction between such investigations and factual ones (cf. Wittgenstein 1992: 381). But what is this supposed to mean? Logical positivists argue that any metaphysical statement has to be rejected from philosophical investigations. Although some propositions that are neither empirical nor analytical may have some use, it is certainly not one of philosophical interest. Expressions that do not fall under these categories are in any case meaningless or nonsensical, whether they are semantically or syntactically ill-formed.

But Wittgenstein's approach seems quite different and this hangs together with his understanding of metaphysical and empirical statements. First of all, it is important to notice that empirical propositions are justified by reality with respect to their truth and falsehood. The meaning of the concepts involved is governed by particular rules and the sense of propositions is related to a particular state of affairs. Particularly in his discussion of mental concepts it becomes clear that Wittgenstein regards our semantic rules as the justifying authority for the right use of such terms and

not as we may assume a particular mental state we refer to when applying a mental expression. In one of his lectures we find the following remark: “Supposing I look at the colour of these shoes and say ‘I now see brown.’ I am very inclined to say that there is something which made me say ‘brown,’ – just me, now – namely, that I had a peculiar impression. The idea of this justification would be roughly this: – Not a justification derived from a rule but a justification by intuition. ... It seems as though I pointed privately and informed myself of the fact that this impression justified me. ... ‘This impression suggests to me I should say “brown.”’ There isn’t so far mentioned a language game. You would have to specify” (Wittgenstein: forthcoming). And in another series of lectures Wittgenstein remarks that if someone says that he is in a particular state of pain it is “entirely correct to say in the description of a language game, the mention of an experience as the justification of what he says does not enter” (Wittgenstein, forthcoming).

Now, the rules or grammatical propositions that constitute the meaning of our everyday usage of language are themselves *not justified* by anything in reality. Wittgenstein regards them as absolutely arbitrary. Therefore, any rule or system of rules is as good as any other and we are open to introduce any kind of conceptual frame that shall govern the future application of a particular language game. And since rules are not justifiable by anything in reality Wittgenstein regards them as nonsensical.

But the semantic ambiguity of linguistic expressions causes another source of possible misunderstandings, in cases where we not clearly distinguish between grammatical rules that constitute meaning and empirical propositions, claiming something to be true or false. Or as Wittgenstein puts it: “[We are] likely to muddle statements of fact, which are undisputed with grammatical statements. Statements of fact and grammatical statements are not to be confused” (Wittgenstein 1979: 18).

We may ask, What is the relation between a metaphysical and grammatical proposition? With respect to metaphysical statements, Wittgenstein argues that the metaphysician makes a fundamental mistake, that is: What the metaphysician wants to say is something about the nature or essence of things and the necessary and absolute truth of such statements she sees justified by the particular phenomenon, the statement is about. So, e.g., to say that “I can’t feel his pain” is justified by the nature of human pain, belonging to one and only one substantial being, as the bearer of that

particular quality. In other words: the essence of pain is of such a kind that it can only belong and must necessarily belong to the one person, who is uttering such a statement, provided that she is not lying, play-acting etc. Even if I had pain in another person's body it would still be my pain and not his. Generally speaking, an object and its nature guarantees the necessary truth of a particular metaphysical claim, or as Wittgenstein puts it: "It seems as though it would be not false but nonsense to say 'I feel his pains', but as though this were because of the nature of pain, of the person etc. as though, therefore, the statement were ultimately a statement about the nature of things. So we speak for example of an asymmetry in our mode of expression and we look on it as a mirror image of the essence of the things" (Wittgenstein 1993: 208–209). In contrast, Wittgenstein argues that such statements are not about the nature of pain but are grammatical remarks about the use of the concept "pain". If we are in a metaphysical context, what we really want to state, when applying such an expression, is that we do not want the expression "pain" used in a way that allows attributing my pain to another person. And this is what he means by arguing that philosophical problems are purely conceptual and that they can only be dissolved once we apply conceptual frameworks, consisting of rules that would forbid such uses as "I have his pain", "Two persons can have the same pain", etc. Sticking to a system of rules that determines the meaning and thereby the use of expressions in a particular context or language game will prevent misunderstandings due to possible semantic ambiguities that arise without such a catalogue of governing guidelines.

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L’image de l’Autre

Entre fantasme et réalité dans *al-Hayy al-Lâtîni* (Le Quartier Latin) de Suhayl Idrîs

Introduction

Commençons par dire qu’il s’agit, dans *Le Quartier Latin*,¹ de l’histoire d’un voyage qui a pour point de départ l’Orient, pour point de transition l’Occident, et enfin pour point de retour l’Orient. Si ce voyage est appelé par Elias Khouri “structure circulaire” (1990: 104), l’Orient étant à la fois point de départ et de retour, il est, à nos yeux, avant tout, une quête d’identité. En effet, le départ, à ce niveau, correspond à la volonté de chercher un nouvel espace, propice à l’émancipation d’un système omniprésent en Orient; à un niveau plus profond, il s’agit, pour le héros, de partir à la recherche d’un nouveau système de valeurs après avoir rompu avec le système autochtone.

1. La femme occidentale dans l’imaginaire du héros

Nous allons analyser l’attitude adoptée par le héros pour décoder la réalité occidentale à laquelle il va être confronté durant son expérience parisienne. En ce qui concerne l’Autre, précisons dès maintenant, qu’il s’agit, dans le roman exclusivement, de la femme occidentale, représentée par plusieurs acteurs (la fille du cinéma, Zînâ, Liliane, Marguerite, Jeannine, etc.), car à travers l’itinéraire de son expérience parisienne, le héros recherche continuellement la femme absente de sa vie en Orient. D’ailleurs, nous constatons que l’absence quasi-totale, tout le long du roman, des acteurs masculins occidentaux, est compensée par la présence diversifiée de la femme occidentale. L’image de celle-ci nous est dévoilée lorsque le héros se lance dans une expérience et accepte l’invitation de son ami Kâmil à une surprise party. Au cours de cette première soirée typiquement occidentale, il fait

la connaissance de quelques filles françaises. Bien qu'à ses yeux, Suzanne, Jeannette et Hélène soient belles, il trouve Zînâ aguichante. En lui serrant la main, il sent qu'elle la lui serre très fort. Embarrassé, il ne comprend pas ce que signifie cette manière de saluer: "En la saluant, il avait senti que Zînâ pressait sa main comme si elle désirait la retenir dans la sienne, ou peut-être était-ce lui qui ne savait pas saluer chaleureusement" (20).

2. La poignée de main ou l'incompréhension gestuelle

Voilà une incompréhension qui mérite d'être examinée. Constatons que l'intensité du geste (serrer très fort la main) fait de la part du héros l'objet d'un faire interprétatif qui manifeste son incapacité à décoder correctement le message culturel contenu dans ce geste. Tantôt, il considère que l'intensité de ce geste exprime le désir de Zînâ, tantôt il l'interprète comme normale, et considère que c'est lui qui ne sait pas serrer la main d'une fille de manière chaleureuse. En effet, le geste de se donner la main peut avoir diverses significations sociales, en fonction du contexte culturel dans lequel il s'inscrit. En l'occurrence, la différence entre les deux cultures mises en communication (orientale et occidentale) fait du décodage de cette gestualité une opération complexe. D'autant plus, que le fait de se serrer la main est, dans la plus part des sphères sociales orientales, réservée aux hommes. Certes, ce geste commence à se répandre dans les milieux citadins et surtout là où la mixité est omniprésente "on y voit souvent un homme qui serre la main d'une femme", mais il n'en a pas pour autant acquis une signification unique et demeure, par conséquent, ouvert aux interprétations qui varient avec les individus et les situations. C'est cet écart culturel, séparant l'univers du héros et celui de Zînâ, qui provoque la double interprétation dont nous venons de faire état.

3. De la danse à la jalousie ou du gestuel au passionnel

Une autre manifestation de cette incompréhension des comportements occidentaux est illustrée par le fait que le héros hésite à inviter Zînâ à danser, de peur que cela ne provoque la jalousie de son ami Kâmil. Cette hésitation ne va pas durer longtemps, parce que Zînâ prendra les devants et parce qu'un nouvel acteur, qu'on appellera arbitrairement la voix intérieure, intervient et rappelle au héros qu'ici, à Paris, toutes les filles dansent

avec tous les garçons et que le sentiment de jalousie n'a pas de sens dans ces conditions, si bien qu'il se laisse faire: "Regarde-la, elle désire danser avec toi, non, ne crains rien et ne sois pas stupide. Ici, il n'y pas de place pour la jalousie. Tous les garçons dansent avec les filles" (23).

Ceci dit, il convient d'analyser le rapport imaginé par le héros entre la danse, en tant que faire gestuel réunissant deux participants – lui même et Zinâ – et le sentiment de jalousie que cette conjonction est susceptible de provoquer chez l'ami Kâmil en tant que spectateur.

4. La jalousie dans la sémiotique des passions

Nous commençons par l'analyse de la jalousie amoureuse, en ayant recours à Greimas et Fontanille qui, au vu des dictionnaires, retiennent que "la jalousie, en tant que passion, se situe à l'intersection de deux sentiments; l'attachement à un sujet humain, et la rivalité" (1991: 191). Dans notre texte, nous retrouvons ces deux sentiments: d'une part l'attachement de Kâmil à l'égard de Zinâ, de l'autre la rivalité possible entre Kâmil et le héros. Or, dans la définition même de la jalousie, l'attachement correspond au "désir de possession exclusive" (ibid.: 200–205) et si la notion de possession nous renvoie, à son tour, à l'idée d' "avoir" jouissance de ..." il s'en suit que le jaloux éprouve de la souffrance, du fait que son rival, non seulement est en possession de l'objet/sujet aimé, mais, de surcroît, en jouit. Nous allons voir que c'est bien cette définition de la jalousie qui est en cause dans notre texte. Pour vérifier cette hypothèse, nous allons procéder à l'analyse de la conception que le héros se fait de la danse.

5. La danse et la conjonction sexuelle

En examinant la scène de danse qui réunit le héros et Zinâ, nous constatons que:

a) La danse, parce qu'elle permet le rapprochement, voire le contact somatique des deux participants, est jugée par le héros comme équivalent à la conjonction d'ordre sexuel: "En la serrant contre lui, il sentait ses seins qui frissonnaient" (24).

b) Cette conjonction, illustrée par l'expression "avoir une fille dans les bras", est vécue par le héros comme une possession: "Une femme dans

ses bras, plein les bras.... Une femme qu'on désirait. Une femme qu'on en embrassait follement sur les lèvres" (24).

c) Le héros, en tant que sujet de la prise de possession, n'est pas seulement un sujet de faire qui vise la conjonction avec Zînâ, mais un sujet qui, en étant conjoint, vise à satisfaire son désir sexuel. Une telle conception de la danse ne fait qu'orienter l'imagination du héros vers une scène où sa conjonction avec Zînâ ne peut que provoquer la jalousie de Kâmil. C'est pour cette raison que le héros renonce à inviter Zînâ à danser, de crainte que Kâmil souffre, en le voyant jouir de sa conjonction avec elle. Or, cette souffrance n'est autre que la jalousie. Cela nous donne le droit de dire que le rapport entre le faire pragmatique et imaginaire "danser" qui met en scène le héros et Zînâ et l'état passionnel virtuel la jalousie de Kâmil trouve aisément son explication dans l'image que le héros s'est construite de la femme occidentale. A ses yeux, celle-ci correspond à un sujet dont le corps, les seins et les lèvres n'ont d'autres fonctions que de donner du plaisir à l'homme. Mais, la réalité qui définit Zînâ comme un sujet libre qui dispose de son corps intervient et lui démontre l'illusion de l'image qu'il a de la femme occidentale. En fait, au cours de la danse qu'elle va lui accorder par la suite, Zînâ, et d'une manière inattendue, se détache de lui et regagne Kâmil dans la cuisine. Le héros découvre, avec amertume, que la femme occidentale représentée par Zînâ, ne correspond pas à l'image qui la réduit à un objet sexuel. Mais cette déception ne l'empêche pas de se lancer dans une nouvelle aventure qui aura pour lieu une salle de cinéma.

6. Fantômes sexuels d'Orient et réalité occidentale: De la manipulation sexuelle à l'amour passionnel

Après l'échec survenu au cours de la surprise party, une réflexion vient à l'esprit du héros:

Une longue semaine passée à Paris, et tu ne rencontres que déceptions en ce qui concerne la femme, n'importe quelle femme. Une longue semaine durant laquelle un feu brûle dans ton corps, et dans ton imagination mille images de femmes nues, allongées sur le lit qui piquent ton esprit et ton corps de mille langues de feu. (28)

C'est dans ce contexte que s'inscrit l'aventure de notre héros avec la fille du cinéma: il décide d'aller voir un film qui s'intitule *Demain, la vie*

commencera. Pendant qu'il regarde le film, une fille accompagnée d'un homme, s'assoit à côté de lui. Après quelques minutes, elle enlève sa veste. En la regardant, le héros ressent un frisson qui envahit tout son corps. Tout à coup, sans être conscient, il allonge sa main vers la fille pour lui toucher la main. Alors, elle tente de s'en débarrasser. Cependant, le héros n'hésite pas à lui serrer la main plus fort, et la fille se résigne et le laisse faire:

Il continuait à serrer cette douce et tendre main comme s'il s'agissait d'un trésor. Puis, elle remuait légèrement ses doigts, alors, il lui pressait la main avec un peu de dureté. Et voici qu'elle se résignait à cette dure emprise (33).

Tout à coup, une transformation située sur le plan passionnel, met le héros dans un état d'amour-passion; il découvre qu'il commence à aimer cette fille, qu'il n'a même pas vue, et suppose qu'elle commence, elle aussi, à l'aimer:

Mais était-ce vraiment possible? J'avais le sentiment étrange que je commençais à aimer cette fille que je n'avais pas vue et que je ne connaissais pas. Cette fille qui avait accepté de me donner sa main sans me connaître; cela ne prouvait-il pas qu'elle commençait, elle aussi, à avoir un penchant à mon égard. (34)

Pour un lecteur occidental, ce passage brusque du sexuel au passionnel demeure incompréhensible, surtout que le texte se contente de donner la description du faire interprétatif du héros sans expliquer ses origines culturelles. Pour surmonter ce genre de difficulté d'interprétation, nous proposons une procédure complémentaire de lecture, consistant à confronter le faire interprétatif du héros au système de valeurs oriental auquel il se réfère.

7. L'approche du corps féminin et l'amour en Orient

Il s'agit de voir comment l'approche du corps peut produire l'amour chez un Oriental. En fait, le système de valeurs oriental considère le corps de la femme, non seulement comme provocateur de scandale, mais encore comme sacré. D'où le devoir de protéger la femme et de la remettre à l'homme apprécié de la famille, lors d'une cérémonie de mariage accompagnée de tout un rituel (as-Saadaoui 1983: 296). La société orientale, pré-

occupée par le souci de protéger la femme, a instauré la séparation entre les deux sexes, ce qui entraîne une restriction de l'espace de rencontre, donc de la communication entre l'homme et la femme.

Mais cela n'a pas empêché le développement d'un autre genre de communication non-linguistique, d'une communication gestuelle dont le regard, comme nous l'avons vu, est le moyen par lequel cette relation se noue. "D'où cet amour à distance, fondé presque exclusivement sur le regard ou sur l'ouï-dire et qui se nourrit de phantasmes de l'imaginaire, puisque la moitié de la société passait son temps à dissimuler l'autre moitié à sa propre vue, tout en cherchant à l'imaginer. L'amour peut naître d'une description, d'un portrait" (Bouhdiba 1986: 54). Et comme l'amour peut naître d'une communication gestuelle à distance, il est plus probable encore, qu'il naisse d'une communication gestuelle rapprochée entre un homme et une femme. C'est le cas de notre héros et de la fille du cinéma, surtout que celle-ci accepte que le héros lui touche la main et ne manifeste aucune résistance.

8. *La passivité de la fille vue comme signe d'amour*

Une telle approche permet de constater que pour comprendre l'attitude de l'Autre, en l'occurrence la passivité de cette fille, le héros ne peut que se référer à son propre système de valeurs qui y voit la preuve d'un amour-passion. Vu sa conception globale de la fille occidentale, notre héros ne peut que lui faire confiance, en tant que sujet contraint de respecter le contrat imaginaire qui consiste à /devoir satisfaire l'homme/. D'autant plus que ce minimum de confiance lui était indispensable pour l'établissement de sa communication avec la fille (Saadaoui 1970: 122).

Après quoi le héros lui glisse une carte dans laquelle il lui propose un rendez-vous, devant l'entrée du cinéma, le lendemain à 8h du soir. Mais le fait que la fille ne donne pas suite au rendez-vous fixé nous montre qu'elle a laissé faire le héros, non parce qu'elle était amoureuse de lui, mais pour d'autres motifs que nous ne connaissons pas. Ce constat nous permet de surmonter la difficulté qu'il y avait à analyser les gestes de la fille et nous montre qu'il existe deux sujets que celle-ci assume en même temps: (1) *sujet réel* qui produit les gestes; (2) *sujet imaginaire* que le héros a créé, et auquel il attribue ses propres interprétations concernant cette gestualité. Com-

ment réagit le héros lorsqu'il découvre que l'idée de "la fille amoureuse" n'est qu'une illusion?

9. De l'humiliation à la vengeance

Suite au rendez-vous fixé, le héros se présente devant le cinéma à l'heure prévue.

Il l'avait entendu chuchoter (oui). Alors, il avait compris qu'elle acceptait le rendez-vous qu'il lui avait fixé." (36) Après avoir attendu la fille une quarantaine de minutes, il se rend compte qu'elle ne viendra pas. Le voilà qui quitte le cinéma, déçu et humilié:

Et lorsqu'il décida, désespérément, de quitter la place, il marcha à pas lents vers le boulevard St Michel, tout en ayant un sourire stupide qui ne tarda pas de contracter son visage et de se transformer en une rage... Humilié et convaincu [qu'elle l'avait trompé], il poursuivit son chemin, puis soudain, furieux, il s'arrêta. Non, je n'ai pas besoin de pitié. Je suis plus fort que la pitié et je m'en moque... Mais qu'est ce que tout cela veut dire, et à propos de quoi? N'est-ce pas pour justifier ta déception? (40-42)

10. Déception ou l'aboutissement négatif d'une attente

Or, nous savons que toute déception n'est, en fait, que l'aboutissement négatif d'une attente. En l'occurrence, l'attente de notre héros n'est pas un simple souhait qui se réduit au plaisir sexuel, mais tout un programme virtuel qui consiste à se libérer de l'emprise du système de valeurs oriental. Notons également que cette attente est liée à l'idée de confiance; le héros pense pouvoir compter sur la femme occidentale. Dans son imaginaire, elle est, comme nous l'avons vu, la femme qui voue sa vie à satisfaire l'homme. Et la fille du cinéma n'est autre qu'une fille occidentale, il lui fait confiance et ne peut admettre qu'elle peut manquer son rendez-vous avec lui. Or, ce simulacre qu'il s'est construit de la femme n'a pas résisté à la réalité des faits. Déçu, le héros perd confiance en la fille du cinéma, et d'une manière générale en la femme occidentale: "Ne convient-il pas que tout jeune homme qui rencontre l'une d'elles, s'en méfie, dès les premiers instants? Car, elle le trompera au tournant de la rue." (42)

11. Humiliation ou perte de confiance en soi

Par ailleurs, l'humiliation, en tant qu'offense, perturbe l'image que le héros a de lui-même. En effet, il n'a plus confiance en lui, en tant qu'homme indépendant. Dans les deux cas (déception, humiliation), il s'agit d'une crise de confiance, dans le sens où le héros perd confiance aussi bien en lui qu'en la femme occidentale. Alors, pour liquider ce manque de confiance provoqué par le rendez-vous manqué, le héros décide de se venger de la femme occidentale et de la punir.

Est-ce qu'elles méritent respect toutes ces filles françaises qui mènent une vie frivole et vide? ... Ce qu'il convient d'en faire, c'est de la [une fille française] prendre dans ses bras, de la presser, d'en sucer la douceur et ensuite de la jeter comme l'on jette un noyau. Et il verra après que c'est elle, la pauvre, qui fait pitié. (42)

12. La vengeance ou la recherche d'un équilibre

La vengeance, formulée ainsi, est non seulement le désir de se venger, mais une action qui implique deux sujets et qui cherche à rétablir entre eux un équilibre perturbé à la suite de l'offense (Greimas 1970: 122). En fait, le héros veut faire souffrir la femme occidentale, incarnée par la fille du cinéma, comme il a souffert; il veut l'humilier comme elle l'a humilié, en lui faisant croire qu'elle l'aime. Ceci dit, il convient de nous interroger sur la nature de cette vengeance. Celle-ci consiste, comme la définit le héros, à prendre la femme occidentale dans ses bras, la presser pour en sucer toute la douceur, et la rejeter ensuite comme on rejette un noyau. Autrement dit, en la comparant à un noyau, le héros décide de dévaloriser la femme occidentale. Ainsi, elle sera dépréciée par le premier acte sexuel, et les suivants accéléreront cette dévalorisation jusqu'au moment où elle sera comme un noyau qu'on jette, après avoir mangé le fruit. Non seulement le héros fait de cette vengeance son propre programme, mais il veut en faire un programme canonique qui doit régler toute relation entre l'homme oriental et la femme occidentale.

13. *L'acte sexuel et la contre-agression*

Dès lors, l'acte sexuel, source de plaisir, devient pour le héros, une contre-agression et prend la forme du combat et de la guerre. Notons que cette notion de "combat amoureux" n'est pas nouvelle, dans la mesure où elle est l'un des thèmes principaux de la littérature érotique. En effet, la relation entre l'amour et la guerre est étroite, car, comme le constate Pierre Guiraud:

il y a un parallélisme évident entre les deux situations; dans les deux cas, nous avons: a) deux adversaires, deux individus placés l'un en face de l'autre; b) une agression au moyen d'un instrument pénétrant; c) une pénétration de l'arme dans le corps, ou autre thème; pénétration de l'attaquant dans la place de l'attaqué, avec invasion, prise de possession ou/et soumission de cette dernière. (Guiraud 1978: 119)

Ajoutons que l'itérativité de l'acte sexuel, pris par le héros comme un acte de guerre, a pour but d'anéantir l'adversaire qu'est la femme occidentale. Certes, cette vengeance conçue comme une contre-agression, comporte, de ce fait, une activité somatique – acte sexuel – mais cela n'empêche qu'elle se définit, tout de même, par les effets passionnels éprouvés par l'adversaire (ibid.)

En ce qui concerne le déroulement du programme de vengeance, nous allons voir si ce désir de vengeance restera à l'état de rancune, sans que pour autant ce programme virtuel conduise à un faire, ou bien s'il se déroulera dans les faits. En fait, le héros ne tarde pas à prendre sa revanche, en se dirigeant vers Pigalle, il rencontre une prostituée. Avant l'acte sexuel, il affiche son intention de mettre son programme de vengeance à exécution.

Il prit le métro vers Pigalle. Et lorsqu'il descendit à la place Pigalle, il aperçut, non loin de lui, une fille qui se déhanchait [...] Mais, tu ne vois pas? Elle est l'une des filles de la rue, une fille de trottoir, comme on l'appelle ici. Peu importe. Il lui adressa quelques paroles, l'emmena au bar où ils burent du vin. Puis elle le conduisit à un hôtel. Oui, je la presserai, et je la presserai, puis je la jetterai comme un noyau. (43)

En conclusion, en réalisant son programme de vengeance, le héros a voulu créer chez son adversaire l'état passionnel d'humiliation, donc de douleur. Du moment que nous avons reconnu que cette vengeance est d'ordre passionnel, la liquidation de la souffrance éprouvée par le héros

ne peut être que la douleur qu'il inflige à la femme occidentale représentée par cette prostituée. Une fois cette vengeance assouvie, le héros poursuit sa quête de liberté à travers l'aventure sexuelle. En analysant le parcours du héros, tout au long de ces séquences, nous avons constaté qu'en dépit des déceptions qu'il connaît lors de ses aventures amoureuses et qui trouvent leur explication dans l'incompatibilité entre la réalité de la femme occidentale et l'image qu'il fait d'elle, le héros réalise un progrès significatif sur le plan de sa libération sexuelle. Cette émancipation à caractère sexuel une fois réalisée, nous relevons le premier tournant dans le roman: de purement sexuelle qu'elle était, l'émancipation recherchée par le héros se veut désormais aussi passionnelle et acquiert ainsi un contenu nouveau. Ce qui méritera une autre analyse qui pourrait faire l'objet d'une autre intervention dans l'avenir.

Note

1. Toutes les citations, traduites de l'arabe, sont tirées du roman *al-Hayy al-Lâtîni* [*Le Quartier Latin*], 10^e éd. (Beyrouth: Dâr al-Adâb, 1989).

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Lina Navickaitė-Martinelli

Semiotic identity of a performer

Endo- and exo-signs in the art of interpreting music

In this article I apply the theory of existential semiotics to the field of musical performance, to show that analysis of many socio-musicological issues can be significantly expanded and enriched by approaching them from a semiotic perspective. Issues concerning artistic *Umwelten*, authenticity, and the semiotic subject already proved to function well in relation to musical performance. But the concept most capable of broadening discourses on music performance practices, and the new meanings they create, is that of the *Semiotic self*.

Here, the concept of Semiotic self is applied in analysing the balance between artistic subjectivity and culturally-determined standards in the art of music performance. It is combined here with the code, or principle, of *Me-Tone (Ich-Ton)*, borrowed from Jakob von Uexküll. By determining the characteristics – the identity and individuality – of a particular organism, the concept of *Me-Tone* suggests further revelations concerning the performer's art. We assume that each interpreter of music has one or more characteristic features, a kind of "semantic gesture" (*Me-Tone*), which dominate his or her interpretation and distinguishes it from others' performances. Despite having these immanent personal qualities, however, an artist is significantly influenced by the full social and cultural background forming his or her social identity. Moreover, a person may accept just certain parts of his/her environmental norms, and refuse, or resist, the others. Thus, a continual dialogue is established, between the inner self and the outward identity, the spheres of a performer's *Moi* and *Soi*, the individual and collective subjectivities.

Using Eero Tarasti's theory of the performer's subjectivity as a model, and his four logical cases derived from Hegel and Fontanille (see Tarasti 2005), I examine the standards and subjectivity of twentieth-century Russian pianists interpreting music of Ludwig van Beethoven. Three *Me-Tones* are involved in this artistic discussion: the composer himself, the prominent Russian piano school (with the standards it has set for its practitioners), and the individual performers. To start, let us briefly reflect upon what might have been considered in music history as the inner identity, the *Moi*, of Beethoven's music, and how it was perceived in Soviet Russia.

1. *The composer: Beethoven in Russia*

Although the reception of art is always political and ideological at some level, the history of Beethoven reception has been especially distinctive by the explicit social appropriation of his music and the ideological monumentalising of his figure as a spiritual hero. Such was especially the case in twentieth-century Russia, a country where art and politics were so intertwined and ideological viewpoints so dominant that a separation of the issues was virtually impossible. The question particularly important here is how Beethoven, being the representative of, first, a German nationalism, and, second, the bourgeois era, has functioned in a country that has just experienced such enormous cultural and political shock. How was it possible that this composer was allowed to remain in the repertoires of Soviet musicians, and was so much admired in this country? Russia's attitude towards Beethoven had been rather unique since the nineteenth century, when Russian musicians were absorbed with Beethoven studies. After the Revolution, a new element was added – the identification of Beethoven's personality and music with revolutionary ideals. Boris Schwarz observes in his key study on musical life in Soviet Russia: "The idolisation of Beethoven as a revolutionary hero became a Soviet obsession, stimulated by Lunacharsky, Asafiev, and many other authors" (Schwarz 1972: 93).

There is no need to discuss here all the subtle changes in the political circumstances of the Soviet era. Perhaps it would be enough to mention that the most important aesthetic doctrine in the country since the year 1934 was that of Socialist realism. Espousing revolutionary aims in the socio-political sphere, and yet adopting a conservative canon of aesthetic values, in musical terms this doctrine resulted in the favouring of such

forms as the program symphony, the dramatic cantata and similar “narrative” genres, that could range from private suffering to reaffirmed social values. Naturally, a connection could be made with the Promethean works of Beethoven’s middle period. “Naturally” because for a long time, and not only in Russia of course, the dispute over meaning in Beethoven’s instrumental music has centred on a single issue: whether or not it has any “extra-musical” significance. In the course of time, as Scott Burnham argues, the original teller of a heroic story (Beethoven himself) has become *the protagonist* of a similar story – “a romantic hero”. Beethoven-reception treated him as the subject of his heroic-style works, bringing him through a similar trajectory of struggle and renewal to a point of apotheosis. The understood meanings of the *Eroica* and the act of its creation have merged, establishing a symbolic conjunction of the work and the artist (see Burnham 1995). Thus, no wonder that the meaning firmly conferred on Beethoven’s personality and his music in Soviet Russia was that of a revolutionary hero. How important the existential values embodied in Beethoven’s music were to certain ideologies can be seen from the fact that the symphonies and other works by Beethoven have been repeatedly used at various political events, and always perceived as occupying a moral high ground. In semiotic terms, it is possible to state that the features of Beethoven’s music accepted by Russian music theorists and practitioners were entirely taken from what they imagined to be his *Moi*, so deeply dominated by the Greimassian modality of Will, and rejecting anything related to societal norms, the *Soi*, all the Know and Must that Beethoven mastered so well.

In writings by the most influential music critic and theorist of the post-revolutionary period, Boris Asafiev, another interesting point emerges, something particularly suitable for the Bolshevik ideology. In one of his numerous articles Asafiev argues that Beethoven was perhaps the first composer-individualist, composer-citizen, i.e., not dependent on the church or on any aristocratic patronage. Emphasis is put on the assumption that only this individualism could raise music to such heights of psycho-realism and pictorial potential (these are all terms that Asafiev used in his writings, referring to Beethoven’s creative output). In other articles, the sense of “collectivity”, of patriotism in music (especially in a mass song, which was one of the most important genres at that time), is said to have its roots in Beethoven. Moreover, the sources of inspiration for Beethoven’s “mascu-

line rhythmic images” and melodies are the songs and theatrical life of a revolutionary in Paris (see Asafiev 1957).

Here I shall examine two phenomena that were accomplished amid this passionately ideological atmosphere: the ongoing Russian political and theoretical admiration of Beethoven, and the formation of the strong and distinctive Russian piano school through the course of the twentieth century. The impact of the strong ideological-aesthetic-pedagogical environment on the interpreter, and on the latter’s individuality, is of particular interest when one analyses performance practices from a semiotic point of view.

2. *The school: Russian piano performance tradition*

However vague the question of a national school might be nowadays, the idea of “the Russian piano school” is definitely not a term coined for the sake of this article. Even though the notion of the “school” has changed over the course of time, as has its influence on individual pianists, this term is still widely used, especially in the case of the Russian tradition. Due to the country’s comparative isolation through more than half of a century, Russian pianists were following a tradition with roots in the Romantic era, thus forming a highly specific school, in contrast with western pianism of the same time. Moreover, in Russia, the bonds of the student-teacher relationship are much stronger than anywhere else. Unlike American piano students, for example, who are encouraged to add as many names of teachers as possible to their resumes, Russians rarely have more than two teachers, and sometimes only one. Moreover, the concept of the “Russian school” still serves well as a commercial label, for instance, in the series of CDs issued by the Russian company Melodiya.

However, defining the *Me-Tone* of a certain school might indeed be considered the most dubious point of any research, and this is so for several reasons. Most of all, it is difficult to specify fundamental features of an “organism” that is so heterogeneous and that changes constantly. How does one define the *Moi* of a “school”? Does it depend on the mentality of the people living in a certain geographical space, under certain specific social or cultural circumstances, or is it their immanent physical qualities? We might assume that there exist several specifically “Russian” features,

immanently characteristic to pianists born, or – what I consider much more important – trained in this part of the world.

Subjective penetration into the inner world of music, beauty of sound, extraordinary melodiousness and extension of piano sound, a wide range of emotional and dynamic contrasts – all these features constitute the distinction of the Russian piano school. A somewhat mysterious, “Russian technique” has been posited; but even so, I would say that the artistic image, creative hearing and intonation, and embodiment of a certain idea in one’s performance have always been more important to Russian performances. Also, extremely important in the Russian pedagogical system, from a purely technical point of view, are ways to use the natural weight of the arm, to hold the body in a relaxed state to create phrases – these, too, may make Russian pianists sound “different”.

What is the *Soi* of this school? Its surrounding ideology? A particular kind of training? Traditional training of young Russian players has indeed proved to be highly beneficial and successful. The fact that each virtuoso in the school was expected, in turn, to devote part of his time to teaching insured the continuance of tradition. In addition to the aforementioned technical aspects of the teaching, the cultural context is extremely important for Russian teachers. A great deal of literature, art, and cinema examples is always used in their lessons, and this undoubtedly contributes to creating imaginative minds in future virtuosos. We should also not forget the impact of prominent theorists on the art of performers. Boris Asafiev’s writings on “intonation” come to mind. Indeed, a very precise intoning, close attention to every phrase, a singing, “vocal-expressive” style are among the features of the Russian school. As also evident there is the reception of Beethoven as “powerful”, “enthusiastic”, “massive”, “gigantic”, “flying onwards”, “stormy”, “passionate”, “revolutionary”... these are all the terms by Asafiev used to describe Beethoven’s creative output (see Asafiev 1957).

In what follows, we shall see how concepts borrowed from existential semiotics contribute to the analysis of musical performance. The third *Me-Tone*, the one of the individual performer, is discussed below, through a semiotic approach to the subjectivity of a performer.

3. *The performer: Semiotic self*

Many authors have dealt with the concept of Semiotic self, which consists usually of two aspects of the subject: an inward and an outward side. Among these dualities, we have, for instance, the “I” (self as such) and “Me” (“I” in the social context), as used by George Herbert Mead; *Moi* and *Soi* by the French authors (Ricoeur, Sartre, Fontanille); Controlling, deeper self versus Critical self, by Charles S. Peirce; or the Bergsonian differentiation between the “superficial” and the “deep” ego. In the domain of semiotics of musical performance, Naomi Cumming has reflected deeply upon what might constitute a performer’s identity, in terms of “an outward and an inward face”.

The process of musical semiosis (also in the art of musical performance) is affected by many cultural, social and psychological factors. Artistic identity, interpretative choices, mental and physical selfhood of a performer are determined by various circumstances such as personal background, the artist’s physical characteristics, stylistic requirements of a musical work, constraints of a particular tradition, etc. As stated above, every performer possesses a certain “semantic gesture” that distinguishes his or her interpretations from other performances. On the basis of this semantic gesture, the performer’s *Me-Tone* as it is called in this article, we can speak of two kinds of signs: endo-signs and exo-signs, inner and outer characteristic features that dominate one’s interpretative choices and constitute a performer’s semiotic identity.

To provide these reflections with a more structured shape, a semiotic model is employed here, which serves as an illustration of the inner and outer influences, individuality and standards underlying the creative work of a performer. The scheme in Figure 1 is elaborated from Tarasti’s semiotic square of performer’s subjectivity and his four logical cases in the light of Hegel and Fontanille. The *Moi* side of the performer’s self is related here to the Greimassian internal (endogenic) modalities Will and Can, while the *Soi* part of one’s identity is reflected by the external (exogenic) modalities Know and Must, thus encompassing all the spheres and categories through and in which the performer’s art is communicated.

Being-in-myself (Greimassian modality of “will”) means an inner identity (*Moi*) of a performer. This part might include a personal (family)




Figure 1. Individuality and standards in the performer’s art (after Eero Tarasti’s theory of subjectivity).

background, tastes or religiousness, if any. It also encompasses the person’s musicality, together with a distinctive “performer’s charm”, or charisma.

Being-for-myself (“can”) embraces the performer’s technical capabilities, “psychophysical harmony”. Virtuosity, corporeal reality, a certain quality of sound, realised in performance, are also included here.

Being-for-itself (“know”) or the *Soi* of a performer, consists of pre-established social codes, stereotypes of the given performance tradition (school); usually, manners of playing are rated according to certain criteria, with some adjudged better than others.

Being-in-itself (“must”) means the composer’s intentions as put in the score, the work’s immanent modalities. It is something called out by the requirements of a musical work – the subjective potentialities of its style which, if absent, would not allow the work to “live”.

It is relevant here to apply this scheme to the art of performers, in reference to some specific circumstances and tastes during Soviet times.

It is surely difficult to categorise the manifestations of the “will” modality – this would be possible only by discussing individual artists. In general, however, this modality, and in principle the *Moi* side of a performer’s art, forms the core of the Russian piano tradition. Indeed, a highly Roman-

tic approach to performance is a characteristic of the mentality of Russian pianists – many of whom may be considered “magnetic” individualists. Further analysis of this first angle of the semiotic square would also consider ethnic and ideological identities of the Soviet performers.

The modality of “can”, which embraces the performer’s technical capabilities, also receives much emphasis in the Russian piano school. A rather athletic perception of professionalism is evident in the case of Russian pianists, as is the fact that a large sound and tempo extremes prevail in their performances. Specific features of a particular instrument also belong to this modality, and they are important for the Russian piano tradition, which especially pursues a *cantabile* quality of the piano.

This brings us to the third modality, that one of “know”. Varied as the individual pianists of this school were and still are, they tend to follow the Romanticist piano tradition. Consequently, they concentrate on tone and timbre, on deep, swelling, and as mentioned above, *cantabile* sound. Conveying extra-musical meaning is important, representing the illusion of romantic mystique. Depending on the artist, the latter ranges from powerful emotionalism to meditative contemplation, from profound reflections to extrovert brilliance. The “know” modality represents also the idea of the institutional school itself. And in Russia, the bonds of the student-teacher relationship are especially strong, perhaps overly so.

Finally, we reach the modality of “must”, and this is the angle of the square where the composer’s identity comes to the fore. The analysis of this semiotic aspect of performance surely has to take into account particular works of music. Ideological and theoretical idolisation have undoubtedly contributed to the highlighting of romantic and heroic values in Russian-school performances of works by Beethoven. And this is rather related to another modality absent from the scheme, namely, that of “believe”, the importance of which I would like to emphasise. Of extreme importance to interpretations of his music by Russians, is precisely the epistemic value of Beethoven’s music, its persuasiveness in reception, the implicit extra-musical meanings that this music has been believed to carry to performers and listeners. It is this value that prompted Asafiev to describe Beethoven’s music as “true speech”.

4. Further steps

Having acknowledged the existence of a certain “collective identity” and assuming that it may affect the process of performative signification, a further step may be taken by empirical research, which is most of all related to the “subjective identity” of the individual performer. It requires registering carefully all the subtle differences among various interpretations, finding each interpreter’s particular ways of modalising, and trying to find the connections between this modalisation and the internal semiotic paradigm of certain musical works. In this way, it is possible to reveal how, in the case of this “Russian Beethoven”, the uncompromising Beethovenian *Moi*, his individual subjectivity, interacts with both the subjective and collective identities of a performer.

And, finally, of particular interest in the case of the “Russian Beethoven” is that conjunction of musical, personal and existential qualities needed for communication to become possible between the endogenic aspects of the several *Me-Tones*. Thrown into the flow of passionately Romanticised interpretations, the *Moi* of this creator, in belonging to a certain cultural and ideological context, has gained a remarkable universality. A mystical and powerful aura, adoration, and the constructing of doctrines or beliefs that mould our imaginations about this artist have kept evolving, from his lifetime up to our days. This has enabled interpreters of various ideological and aesthetic concepts and trends, and from different cultural epochs and performing styles, to claim this music and the extra-musical meanings surrounding it as being *theirs*.

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Leopoldo Neri de Caso

An approach to the poetics of the guitar

The influence of Lorca's poetry in Regino Sainz de la Maza's *Petenera*

Spain became important to artists at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century. This influence had its musical parallelism when composers of romantic nationalism looked for melodic and rhythmical material in music for Spanish guitar. That exogenous vision of the instrument was another element that allowed Spain to be considered an *imagination colonizer* (cf. Tarasti 2001: 155). Antonio Machado (1975: 128) synthesized this situation in these verses:

Tu eres alma que dice su armonía
solitaria a las almas pasajeras ...
Y siempre que te escucha el caminante
sueña escuchar un aire de su tierra.

In this article, I make no claim to an exhaustive study of guitar references in the music of that period. Rather, I shall investigate, from a semiotic musical analysis, certain guitar-narrative elements, how they are used, and the musical contexts in which they appear.

1. Context and circumstance

Carlos Mainer (1999: 9–16) chronicled the Silver Age in Spanish letters between 1902 and 1930. This cultural exuberance had its negative counterpart in a debilitated political and economical situation, as well as in an unbalanced society. Nevertheless, for the first time, the music was integrated actively within Spanish artistic and intellectual society. Music came to be admired and enjoyed by the intellectual elite. Manuel de Falla's

musical legacy influenced young composers, whose main member was the musical critic Adolfo Salazar. The influence of the new European musical aesthetic yielded revolutionary and substantial nationalistic compositions. Sainz de la Maza became a fundamental piece of that sonorous puzzle, and numerous works for guitar were dedicated to him.¹

2. Conceptual frame: *The symbolic guitar*

The piece I look at here was composed as a result of the friendship between the guitarist Regino Sainz de la Maza and the poet Federico García Lorca (Neri 2006: 95–106). To understand better the meaning of this work, it is necessary to consider the concept of the “written guitar”, that is to say, the dimension of the instrument as it appeared within Lorca’s poetic universe. The relatively brief period in which the guitar flourished, as well as its subsequent renaissance, were noted by García Lorca (1996: 1281–1282): “No es posible que el hilo que nos une con el Oriente impenetrable quieran amarrarlo en el mástil de la guitarra juerguista”. The poet contributed to the Spanish musical restoration in several ways. His poetry was used by numerous composers, and Lorca himself was a promoter and entertainer of musicians of that period. Thanks to him the music was heard by a general audience; he moreover created one of the best examples of folkloric music with his *Trece canciones españolas*. That “written guitar” had already appeared in Lorca’s early poetry, *Fantasia simbólica* (1917), which includes various *clichés* from the end of the nineteenth century:

El color de todo era azul, plata y rosa.... Unas guitarras, sonaban desgarradas y sublimes. Sus bordones eran gitanos de amor y pasión. Las flores de los balcones estaban abriéndose y los gallos hablaban unos con otros. (Lorca 1996: 40)

The “adivinanza de la guitarra”, integrated in the *Seis caprichos* dedicated to Sainz de la Maza and included in the *Poema del cante jondo*, is seen as a new poetic trend because it includes flamenco canto hondo, traditional children’s riddles, and Góngora’s “culteranismo”. The guitar appears metaphorically, as a poetic nucleus, according to the dictates of the Ultraism and Creationism. After the “Poema de la saeta”, sung without instrumental support, comes “Gráfico de la Petenera”. The guitar is found in almost all the poems, from the first, “Campana (bordón)”, in which the death knell

is related to the bass string of the guitar, to “Muerte de la Petenera”. The guitar is a decisive element in the poem “Las seis cuerdas”, in which each metaphor is “a small enigma about desire” (Soria 2004: 266).

Las seis cuerdas

La guitarra
hace llorar a los sueños.
El sollozo de las almas
perdidas
se escapan por la boca
redonda.
Y como la tarántula
teje una gran estrella
para cazar suspiros,
que flotan en su negro
aljibe de madera.

(García Lorca 1996: 322)

Dobrian (2002: 115) considers that, in this assonant rhyme, García Lorca endows the guitar with the capacity to capture and express human pain. Lorca wrote an analogy comparing the movement of the right hand on the strings of the guitar to a tarantula: “Y, como la tarántula/ teje una gran estrella/ para cazar suspiros”. At the intertextual level, it is necessary to emphasize the metaphor of the instrument’s resonating box, seen from above, in which the “tarraja” of the guitar is the mouth of a wooden rain tank where sobs and memories well up: “que flotan en su negro/aljibe de madera”. In this sense, these verses recall the tragic image of the gypsy in the rain tank, as sung by the poet in the “Romance del sonámbulo”.²

3. *Musical analysis*³

3.1. Morpho-syntactic dimension

I try at this level to relate the formal elements of the musical text to semantic values. The piece has three interrelated *endocentral* syntagms (Ogas 2002: 37).

A. Gypsy syntagm. This 12-bar unit opens the piece with a semantic-symbolic motif that is repeated twice. It is composed of two moments of tension-release, coordinated with the rhythm of the *petenera*. This Gypsy syntagm is written on a basis of long-short “tribaco” rhythms. According to Benavente (1983: 18), these rhythms appear frequently in the Spanish song lyrics and, in particular, in Andalusian folklore, where a particular kind of triplet is often used. Both structures are combined by the composer in the well-known hemiola rhythm 6/8 and 3/4. The harmonic language is tonal, Mi Minor, displaying classic-romantic harmonic syntax and using traditional harmonic progressions. To this mix Sainz de la Maza adds the ninth chord, an impressionist influence, as a colouration of the functional harmony.



Example 1. Gypsy syntagm: semantic-symbol motif, measures 1–4.

B. Jondo syntagm. This unit, consisting of sixteen bars, uses the same rhythmical elements as the Gypsy syntagm. The term Jondo tries to express a sung song in intimacy, in which the flamenco singer attains a special state of mind, evoking the tragedy of the gypsy world. The melodic element sung in the second voice is the most important. This melodic line ascends from tonic to dominant in the main tonality; but it can also be understood as a distorted or inverted use of the Andalusian cadence (La-Sol-Fa-Mi), the lower Dorian tetrachord, the rhythm arranged in augmentations: the dotted quaver (m. 13) corresponds to crotchet and quavers (m. 15), and the crotchet (m. 14) with the half note (m. 16).



Example 2. Jondo syntagm: Semantic-symbol motif, measures 13–16.

C. Andalusian syntagm. This 16-bar unit displays rhythmical, melodic and harmonic coherence with the previous syntagms. All this reinforces

the unit of musical text. The word “Andalusian” expresses that popularly-perceived atmosphere invoked by the melodic material. Here the melodic range is reduced and the notes arranged as neighboring tones projected in anapestic rhythm (m. 36).



Example 3. Andalusian syntagm: semantic-symbol motifs, measures 33–36.

Unit I	
c.1	Gypsy Syntagm a
c.6	G. S. a'
c.12	
Unit II	
c.13	Jondo Syntagm a
c.17	
I. S. a'	
c.21	
I. S. b'	
c.25	
I. S. a'	
c.28	
Unit III	
c.29	Gypsy Syntagm a
c.32	
Unit IV	
c.35	Andalusian Syntagm a
c.39	
A. S. a'	
c.43	
A. S. b'	
c.47	
A. S. a'	
c.50	
Unit V	
c.51	Gypsy Syntagm a
c.56	

Table 1. General scheme of the petenera.

3.2. Semantic dimension: Intersyntagmatic relations

I attempt to define the semantic content of each syntagm, according to the previously explained, semantic-symbolic motifs. For this I have used Narciso Yepes' recording (1989: 423–699) of the piece, made for Deutsche Grammophon, as well as the notated score.

3.3. Pragmatic dimension: The semantic-symbolic motifs in situation

To peer further into the relations between the different semantic-symbols motifs that make up the musical text, I make several divisions. The first one is related to the register of the guitar, that is to say, the scope of three and half octaves from the sixth to the first string of the instrument. The

<i>Petenera</i> by Regino Sainz de la Maza	
Textual sequence	Concepts
Gypsy Syntagm	Energetic/Lively/ Spirited
Jondo Syntagm	Calm/Meditative/ Contemplative/ Gloomy
Andalusian Syntagm	Popular/Vivacious/ Broad

Table 2. Intersyntagmatic relations.

composer has not indicated any articulation signs, but I will delimit them using Narciso Yepes recording (1989: 423–699). Nuances not indicated in the score have been obtained from contextual characteristics, as well as from the mentioned above recording. From these I have established the following table:

Syntagm	Register	Articulation	Nuance
Gypsy Syntagm	Low	<i>Legato</i>	<i>P/misterioso</i>
Jondo Syntagm	Middle	<i>Legato</i>	<i>mf/dolce cantado</i>
Andalusian Syntagm	Treble	<i>Legato</i>	<i>f/cantado lírico</i>

Table 3. Semantic-symbolic motifs in situation.

3.4. Interpretation

In the last part of this analysis, I attempt to relate the musical text to Lorca's poetry, specifically his "Gráfico de la petenera"⁴ from the *Poema del cante jondo* (García Lorca 1996: 321–325). In the narrative-musical sequence, there is a predominance of the Gypsy syntagm, which is the substratum of the entire work. This syntagm is integrated harmonically into the rest of the syntagms. Each one of them, with its semantic-symbols motifs, tries to characterize the profile of the Andalusian gypsy, not in an exotic way, in the

manner of many composers from the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century (e.g., Glinka, Rimsky Korsakov, Ravel). These syntagms fuse together three branches of musical art: flamenco, popular music, and highbrow music. In addition, this poetic-musical characterization of the gypsy is based on four concepts: dance, social protest, death and Andalusia.

The feeling of the Gypsy syntagm is expressed poetically in the first verses of “Danza”: “En la noche del huerto/ seis gitanas,/ vestidas de blanco/ bailan” (García Lorca 1996: 322). The dance, as a vehicle of gypsy expression, is accompanied by *cantaor* (singer) and guitar. Lorca enhances the dance through the poetic contrast of the night with the white clothes of the gypsies; in addition, there is a parallelism between the number of dancers (six) and the meter of the petenera, as well as the number of strings of the guitar. Sainz de la Maza translates the dance into music with rhythms that endow the piece with force when they are played, on the ictus parts, as a recreation of the *taconazo* (kick with the heel) of an imaginary gypsy dancer. The resultant poly-rhythm outlines the typical misfortunes associated with gypsy witchcraft.

The subhuman life of the gypsy makes him protest loudly. This protest appears as a song, and the mournfulness that surrounds it is expressed by Lorca in his poem “Falseta”, and by Sainz de la Maza through the Jondo syntagm. In the gypsy repertoire of “Cante Jondo”, the petenera is classified among the “cantes grandes” (Rios Ruiz 1972: 5–40). The melody, interpreted by the guitar, finds its poetic expression in these verses: “Ay, Petenera gitana!/ Yayay Petenera” (García Lorca 1996: 324). The constant moaning expressions are translated musically with the repetition of the same note, Mi. On the other hand, the ascending scale, typical of the flamenco petenera, culminates with a melisma on the letter “a”, translated musically by dotted half note with a chord and harmony added. This complaint connects with the recurrent subject of death: “Tu entierro fue de gente/ siniestra./ Gente con el corazón/ en la cabeza, que te siguió llorando/ por las callejas” (García Lorca 1996: 324). Death is represented musically with the minor mode, used in all syntagms, but swinging with the modal harmony symbolic of the gypsy. The life/death duality that permeates the fateful destiny of gypsy life, extends to all the poem, and to all the score.

Andalusia is the fourth subject that matches music and poetry. Lorca expresses the deep reality of the gypsy using specific elements resonant of

Andalusia: cities, like Cordova, Seville or his native Granada, “Ni Granada la que suspira/ por el mar” (García Lorca 1996: 321); the scent of orange blossoms “¿Dónde irán/ los cien jinetes andaluces del naranja?” (322), the feminine guitar and the Mediterranean sea. The poet ends up personifying Andalusia with the blood flowing in his veins: “Andalucía tiene/ largos caminos rojos” (324). Sainz de la Maza takes the Andalusian guitar, in turn, as the main vehicle of expression of the gypsy reality. And as we have seen, the composer adopts a completely Andalusian form, the *petenera*. Finally, he modifies popular melodies of the cities evoked by the poet, and collected in the *Cancionero* by Felipe Pedrell, to elaborate the Andalusian syntagm.

4. Conclusions

In the analysis of the *Petenera* by Sainz de la Maza, two interpretative approaches may be combined to obtain a more complete vision of the work. The first approach analyzes the musical language in a traditional way, which allows me to focus more deeply on the symbolic aspect. This last relates the piece to the Lorca’s poetry and inserts it within the Spanish musical culture of the first half of the twentieth century. The musical structure of the *petenera* features rhythmic, melodic and harmonic elements from Spanish folklore. Phrases are articulated by rhythms of the *petenera* (alternation of 6/8 and 3/4), which forms the basis of later melodic development. The musical text uses tonal language, complemented by modal and impressionistic influences, such as those that arise when you strum the implicit harmony in the tuning of the guitar. In the symbolic level, there is a connection between Lorca’s “Gráfica de la petenera” and Sainz de la Maza’s *Petenera*. Both works synthesize concepts-syntagms that define the Andalusian gypsy: dance, social protest, death and Andalusia, all of which complement each other. The union of both discursive levels, the musical and the symbolic, emphasizes the *jondo* art in the Spanish culture, as Manuel de Falla describes it (Falla 1988: 15–36). *Jondo* art is an element of the *imagination colonizer*, which made Spain the model to follow in Europe during the first half of the twentieth century (Fernandez [forthcoming]). Given all this, I conclude that, at the symbolic level, the Spanish values in Sainz de la Maza’s score and Lorca’s poetry become universals, constituting an indissoluble unity of cultural sources.

Notes

1. The most important scores are: *Giga* by Rodolfo Hallfiter, *Elegía-Homenaje para la tumba de Murnau* by Gustavo Pittaluga, *Homenaje a Mateo Albéniz* by Gustavo Pittaluga, *Española* by Rosa García Ascot, *Preludio y Danza* by Julián Bautista, *Toccata* by Joaquín Rodrigo.
2. “Sobre el rostro del aljibe/ se mecía la gitana/ Verde carne, pelo verde, con ojos de fría plata. Un carámbano de luna la sostiene sobre el agua” (García Lorca 1996: 420–422).
3. I have followed the semiotic methodology of Julio Ogas (2002: 35–74). In his own study, Ogas analyzes the *Sonatas* for piano by Alberto Ginastera.
4. This group of poems were selected because the “Las seis cuerdas” was dedicated, on first writing and with the title “Guitarra”, to Sainz de la Maza in the Henar Café in 1923. In his final elaboration, Lorca integrated this poem into “Grafico de la Petenera”, dedicated to the poet Eugenio Montes (Neri 2006: 104).

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Hiroyuki Nishina

Capturing bodily actions by modal predicate logic

1. Modeling of a human skeleton

When an individual, a human or an animal performs an action, it takes a sequence of postures by moving its part(s). By selecting from the possible names for the set of movements in an action, we can verbalize that action. Those movements are highly dependent upon the physical construction of the parts of its performer. To more deeply understand the human modes of recognizing and verbalizing actions, we made a proposal to specify the relevant motions involved in its actions in terms of the rotations/turns around the joints of the human skeleton (Nishina 1999). When modeling the physiological joint structure into a skeleton model, we borrow a limited number of actual joints and endpoints and subsume both types of vertex under the “content vertices” of the model skeleton. With respect to an arbitrary individual, its content vertices set is the union of those of its simplified joints and endpoints: $C=J\cup EP$, where C is the set of constituent vertices(c), J is the set of joints (j), and EP is the set of end points (ep).

2. Support structure, and rotations and turns around joints

From a physical point of view, when an individual makes a motion, there remain one or more stable parts that “support” the moving part(s). When a motion is made by a body part, some joints cause other vertices to move, on that part. A whole action consisting of the movements on the relevant parts contains such causations. For one joint to cause another content vertex to move, the former needs to be supported by a third vertex, which, in turn, may be supported by a fourth, and so forth, finally grounded on the earth or its equivalent. Each movement transmits to the endpoints via

a support path from the supporting center of the skeleton, which is supported via a support path by the earth. Thus, a “support “relation underlies a motion, acting as the basis for transmitting movements to the point of operation, at which the outer causation on the referent of the object begins. We define the relation “a supports b” on an ordered pair of vertices $\langle a, b \rangle$. As a unit of movement, a “direct support” set of ordered content-vertex pairs is defined based on the notion “support” as follows: $\{\langle c_i, c_j \rangle \mid c_i \text{ “supports” } c_j, \text{ and there is no } c_k \text{ such that } c_i \text{ “supports” } c_k \text{ and } c_k \text{ “supports” } c_j\}$. Assuming that direct support is a transitive relation, we have an indirect support set by transitively connecting pairs from the direct support set. The union of the “direct” support set (dS) and the “indirect” support set (iS) is the “total” support set (tS): $tS = dS \cup iS$, where $dS \cap iS = \emptyset$

Real human joints are subcategorized into five groups or more by their modes of rotation (Zatsiorsky 1997; Köpf-Maier 1997). We, however, reduce their number and also abstract the variety of rotations into three simplified kinds of “rotation”: rotation, turn and turn’. We simulate real rotations by using the simplified types and their combinations (Nishina 2003). The connected support pairs $\{\langle A, B \rangle, \langle B, C \rangle\}$ simplify rotations as:

Rotation is the type of rotation in which the rotating vertex C, its center vertex B and the vertex A, which supports B, belong to the same plane. In this type of rotation, we say that C rotates around center B.

Turn is the type of rotation in which the rotating vertex C forms a circle whose center is always at some vertex on the edge $\langle A', B' \rangle$ extended bi-directionally from the edge $\langle A, B \rangle$, where A supports B, which supports C. Thus, C turns around axis $\langle A, B \rangle$.

Turn' is the type of rotation in which the rotating vertex C is always on the edge extended from the edge $\langle B', B \rangle$, which is virtually extended backwards from the edge $\langle B, C \rangle$, where B supports C. C turns' around axis $\langle B', B \rangle$. Thus, turn' is a special case of turn having $\langle B', B \rangle$ as its virtual axis.

One or some union of these three types is expected to cover complex cases of real rotations by the human joints. We can capture the nature of these types, by describing their definitions as (i), (ii), and (iii) in their function

- (i) B “rotates” C by acting as the center of C’s rotation. \implies (i’) iff C rotates around center B, its center B causes C to move.
- (ii) $\langle A, B \rangle$ “turns” C by acting as the axis of C’s turn. \implies (ii’) iff C turns around axis $\langle A, B \rangle$, we its axis $\langle A, B \rangle$ causes C to move.
- (iii) $\langle B', B \rangle$ “turns’” C by acting as the axis of C’s turn’. \implies (iii’) iff C turns around axis $\langle B', B \rangle$, its axis $\langle B', B \rangle$ causes C to move.

Adopting Talmy’s causative (1976), Jackendoff’s conceptual semantics (1983, 1990) and Parson’s event logic (1990), which are accommodated from Lakoff (1967) and Davidson (1967), we rewrite the transitive verbs in (i), (ii), and (iii) into “the center of rotation (the axis of turn) cause to move” and get (i’), (ii’) and (iii’). Connecting support units into a graph leads to a whole skeleton.

3. *Skeleton as a support structure and its home position*

Each body part of our skeleton is represented a set of connected support pairs, which consist of joints or a joint and an endpoint. In the skeleton’s home position, when it stands still, each joint has its default angles relative. We comment on the center of rotation. As was defined, rotation has, not an axis, but a center, which is on the line vertical to the plane containing the moving vertex, the center vertex causing it to move and the vertex supporting the center, so the center is taken as the axis of rotation vertical to that plane. Turn and turn’ have their axes, as were defined. The orientation in which these three axes are built in the skeleton is of three kinds. We categorize them as vertical (vr), seen from a person occupying the skeleton’s position, between the left and the right (lr), seen from the same person looking forward, and between the front and the rear (fr) seen from a third person standing beside the skeleton. The type of each joint with its orientation on our skeleton is as follows:

Head (He): endpoint; Top of Cervical Vertebrae (N): connecting vertex; Bottom of Cervical Vertebrae (V): joint[R/T]; Shoulder Joints ($Sh_{L/M}$): joints [R(fr)/T(lr)/T’(vr)]; Elbow Joints ($E_{L/M}$): joints [R(lr)/T(vr)]; Wrist Joints ($W_{L/M}$): joints [R(lr)/T(vr)]; Fingers ($F_{L/M}$): endpoints; Pair of Sacro-iliac Joints (S): joints [R/T]; Hip Joints ($H_{L/M}$): joints [R(fr)/T(lr)]; Knee Joints ($K_{L/M}$): joints [R(lr)]; Ankle Joints ($A_{L/M}$): joints [R(lr)/T(vr)]

Here, note that $\langle A_{L/R}, B_{L/R} \rangle$ is short for $\langle A_L, B_L \rangle$ and $\langle A_R, B_R \rangle$. From the above joints and endpoints, we construct a simplified skeleton as: $\{ \langle S, V \rangle, \langle V, N \rangle, \langle N, He \rangle, \langle V, Sh_{L/R} \rangle, \langle Sh_{L/R}, E_{L/R} \rangle, \langle E_{L/R}, W_{L/R} \rangle, \langle W_{L/R}, F_{L/R} \rangle, \langle H_{L/R}, S \rangle, \langle S, H_{L/R} \rangle, \langle H_{L/R}, K_{L/R} \rangle, \langle K_{L/R}, A_{L/R} \rangle, \langle A_{L/R}, T_{L/R} \rangle \}$.

We need to fix the angles of rotation, turn and turn' at each joint of our skeleton in their home positions and also their ranges. Here, we concentrate ourselves to the relevant joints, S, H, K and T. The pair of sacro-iliac joints is simplified as one vertex S, which has three types of rotation. In the case of rotation, vertex S, shared by $\langle H_L, S \rangle$ and $\langle H_R, S \rangle$, doubly causes vertex V to move. In the case of turn, both $\langle H_L, S \rangle$ and $\langle H_R, S \rangle$ cause V's to movement. In the case of turn', $\langle S', S \rangle$ causes V's movement. One can tilt one's backbone to the left and to the right. So, V rotates around center S of $\langle H_L, S \rangle$, with this and edge $\langle H_R, S \rangle$ fixed as if one connected edge. Likewise, V also rotates around center S of $\langle H_R, S \rangle$. V rotates from 90° counterclockwise through 180° and clockwise through 0° . One can bend our upper body forward, but not backward. So, in our terms, V turns around both axes $\langle H_L, S \rangle$ and $\langle H_R, S \rangle$, simultaneously. Seen from the left side of the skeleton, V lowers forward around $\langle H_L, S \rangle$ from 90° counterclockwise to 270° . Seen from its right side, V lowers forward around $\langle H_R, S \rangle$ from 90° clockwise to 270° . As one can twist our waist both left and to right, we simulate this action in terms of the turn' at S, where, V of $\langle S, V \rangle$ turns around the virtual axis $\langle S', S \rangle$, which is attained by extending the original $\langle S, V \rangle$ from S in the opposite direction. Thus, the rough angle ranges of S in its rotation, turn and turn' are: $\langle r: 0^\circ \leq - = 90^\circ = + \Rightarrow 180^\circ, t: 90^\circ = + \Rightarrow 0^\circ \ \& \ 270^\circ \leq - = 270^\circ, t': 180^\circ \leq - = 90^\circ = + \Rightarrow 180^\circ \rangle$, where the angles are the default values, those when the skeleton is in its home position, that of standing still. Second, the hip joints have also three types of rotation. The ranges of each are, for H_L : $\langle r: 180^\circ \leq - = 270^\circ = + \Rightarrow 360^\circ, t: 270^\circ = + \Rightarrow 90^\circ, t': 0^\circ \leq - = 90^\circ = + \Rightarrow 180^\circ \rangle$ and for H_R : $\langle r: 180^\circ \leq - = 270^\circ = + \Rightarrow 0^\circ, t: 90^\circ \leq - = 270^\circ, t': 0^\circ \leq - = 90^\circ = + \Rightarrow 180^\circ \rangle$. Third, K's have only r 's as their own rotations. Thus for K_L : $\langle r: 90^\circ \leq - = 270^\circ \rangle$ and for K_R : $\langle r: 270^\circ - + \Rightarrow 90^\circ \rangle$. Fourth, for A_L : $\langle r: 315^\circ \leq - = 0^\circ = + \Rightarrow 45^\circ \rangle$ and for A_R : $\langle r: 135^\circ \leq - = 180^\circ = + \Rightarrow 225^\circ \rangle$. The pairs of toes are simplified as endpoints ($T_{L/E}$).

4. Rotation and turn function as simplified transition functions

We discuss the method for describing how each vertex transfers its movement to another one on the support path. Focusing on a joint's (or a pair of joints)'s causation of another vertex to move, involved in the rotations, turns and turns', we define a function which, having one content joint vertex c_j accompanied by its transition in location $\langle L_{c_j}^i, L_{c_j}^{i+1} \rangle$ over an interval $[i, i+1]$, takes another vertex c_k and returns its transition in location $\langle L_{c_k}^i, L_{c_k}^{i+1} \rangle$ over that interval as its value. We define *location transition function* as $F^{[i, i+1]}(\langle c_j, \langle L_{c_j}^i, L_{c_j}^{i+1} \rangle \rangle, c_k) = \langle L_{c_k}^i, L_{c_k}^{i+1} \rangle$, where c_j directly supports c_k . To implement each joint's angles for rotation, turn and turn' at both of the endpoints of each interval where a relevant movement in the action is being made, we attach the transition of state $\langle S^i, S^{i+1} \rangle$ to both of the input and output vertices, having *posture transition function* as: $M^{[i, i+1]}(\langle \langle c_j, \langle S_{c_j}^i, S_{c_j}^{i+1} \rangle \rangle, \langle L_{c_j}^i, L_{c_j}^{i+1} \rangle \rangle, \langle c_k, \langle S_{c_k}^i, S_{c_k}^{i+1} \rangle \rangle) = \langle L_{c_k}^i, L_{c_k}^{i+1} \rangle$. The pairs $\langle S_{c_j}^i, S_{c_j}^{i+1} \rangle$ and $\langle S_{c_k}^i, S_{c_k}^{i+1} \rangle$ attached to the causer and caused joints designate their angles for rotation, turn and turn', at the initial and final time points of the relevant interval, respectively.

Comparing the pair of values in each of the input and output locations in the location transition function enables us to see whether the relevant joint has moved or not by their nonequivalence or equivalence. So, if we represent their nonequivalence or equivalence simply as moving (μ) or staying (σ) and differentiate functor F into three types, R , T and T' , in this function, we have three "rotation" function. We define *Rotation Function* as: $\pm R^i(\langle c_j, \sigma/\mu \rangle, c_k) = \sigma/\mu$, where c_j directly supports c_k . In this function, its polarity "+/-" distinguishes the counterclockwise (+) turn and the clockwise (-) turn as are seen forward, downward and from center. Having c_j as the axis of rotation in its saying (σ) or moving (μ) state, it takes c_k as its input, and as its output returns " μ " if it is moving and " σ " if it is not moving, during period "i". We keep each interval distinct from its adjacent interval as its member. Furthermore, we define *Turn Function* and *Turn' Function* as: $\pm T^i(\langle \langle c_j, \sigma/\mu \rangle, \langle c_k, \sigma/\mu \rangle \rangle, c_l) = \sigma/\mu$. Here, c_j and c_k directly support c_l and c_l respectively. Turn function is a bit different from rotation function. The "axis" of a turn is an edge, an ordered pair, not as a vertex as was seen in rotation. The polarity " \pm " distinguishes the counterclockwise (+) turn and the clockwise (-) turn as are seen forward, downward and

from center. This function, with the edge $\langle c_j, c_k \rangle$, each of whose member is in the state σ or μ , as the axis of *turn*, takes c_k as its input and returns μ , if it has moved during the interval i , or returns σ , if it hasn't, as its output.

5. Action of kicking and its rotations and turns at each interval

When describing bodily action verbs, we face and other cases where even all the motions are not sufficient. The kicking action is one case where only a few of the involved motions are sufficient for description, its partial description providing the sufficiently distinctive information to define the meaning of the verb denoting it. For this sake, we utilize the lower half of the skeleton. The total support set for kicking is as follows:

$$\{ \langle c_{SL}, c_V \rangle, \langle c_{SR}, c_V \rangle, \langle c_{SL}, c_{HL} \rangle, \langle c_{SR}, c_{HR} \rangle, \langle c_{HL}, c_{KL} \rangle, \langle c_{HR}, c_{KR} \rangle, \langle c_{KL}, c_{AL} \rangle, \langle c_{KR}, c_{AR} \rangle, \langle c_{AL}, c_{TL} \rangle, \langle c_{AR}, c_{TR} \rangle, \dots \}$$

Here, c_V is the connecting point standing for the bottom part of the cervical vertebra, $c_{SL/R}$ the connecting points simplified from the pair of sacro-iliac joints, $c_{HL/R}$ the left or right hip joint, $c_{KL/R}$ the left or right knee joint, $c_{AL/R}$ the left or right ankle joint, and $c_{TL/R}$ the left or right endpoint standing for the simplified left or right toes. Look at the following postures in Figure 1, showing kicking with the right side leg and foot:




Figure 1. Action of Kicking.

Whether the moving parts is predominantly on the left or right side is not specific to the definition of “kicking”. We will concentrate ourselves

to the left side, omitting the inferior L-marks to be attached to the vertex symbols. The verbal description of kicking at each interval is as follows: at interval 1 (t_0-t_1): the right foot is being pulled up backward, while the right knee is being raised; at interval 2 (t_1-t_2): the right leg and foot are being pushed forward, as the right thigh is being pushed forward; at interval 3 (t_2-t_3): the right thigh and leg continue to be pushed forward, with the right foot kept a fixed position relative to the right leg.

We can calculate the movements involved in the kicking action in terms of rotation and turn. Note that hereafter we will omit the subscript L representing the left side of the body at each symbol and follow this convention. At its 1st interval, we have two cases of simple (direct) rotation: $(\text{IKA}) + R^1(\langle c_K, \mu \rangle, c_A) = \mu$ and $(\text{IAT}) - R^1(\langle c_A, \mu \rangle, c_T) = \mu$. In the former, as the center of counterclockwise rotation, c_K , which is moving, causes c_A to move. In the latter, as the center of counterclockwise rotation, c_A , which is moving, causes c_T to move. We also have a turn function: $(\text{ISHK}) - T^1(\langle \langle c_S, \sigma \rangle, \langle c_H, \sigma \rangle \rangle, c_K) = \mu$. Here, edge $\langle c_S, c_H \rangle$, whose members are staying at their own places, as the axis of clockwise turn, causes vertex c_K to move. Let us assume that a turn is equivalent to the union of the two rotations the axes of which are the endpoints of the turn. So, $-T^1(\langle \langle c_S, \sigma \rangle, \langle c_H, \sigma \rangle \rangle, c_K) = \mu$ is decomposed as $(\text{ISK}) - R^1(\langle c_S, \sigma \rangle, c_K) = \mu$ & $(\text{IHK}) - R^1(\langle c_H, \sigma \rangle, c_K) = \mu$. Note that in the resulting rotation functions, the direction remains the same, clockwise. Embedding a direct function into another by substitution leads to an indirect function. Substituting the left side of (IKA) for μ of (IAT) under the identity of " c_A ", which mediates these functions, we have an indirect rotation: $(\text{IKT}) + R^1(\langle c_A, -R^1(\langle c_K, \mu \rangle, c_A) \rangle, c_T) = \mu$. Here, one rotation function is embedded in another rotation function. Note also that substitution often leads to a hybrid case, where a rotation and a turn are mixed in the involved motions. By substituting the left side of (ISK) , which is the one component of the pair decomposed from (ISHK) , for μ of (IKA) and that of (IHK) , the other component decomposed from (ISHK) for μ of (IKA) , we have indirect rotations (ISA) and (IHA) respectively: $(\text{ISA}) - R^1(\langle c_K, +R^1(\langle c_S, \sigma \rangle, c_K) \rangle, c_A) = \mu$ and $(\text{IHA}) - R^1(\langle c_K, +R^1(\langle c_H, \sigma \rangle, c_K) \rangle, c_A) = \mu$. Furthermore, substituting the left side of (IHA) for μ of (IAT) and the left side of (ISA) for μ of (IAT) , respectively, under the identity of " c_A " in both case, we have the "doubly indirect" rotations: $(\text{IHT}) - R^1(\langle c_A, -R^1(\langle c_K, +T^1(\langle c_H, \sigma \rangle, c_K) \rangle, c_A) \rangle, c_T) = \mu$ and $(\text{IST}) - R^1(\langle c_A, -R^1(\langle c_K, +T^1(\langle c_S, \sigma \rangle, c_K) \rangle, c_A) \rangle, c_T) = \mu$. Look at the second interval of kicking.

The turn around the hip-sacroiliac axis in this interval is the same as that at the first interval, where (2SHK) is decomposed as the union of (2SK) and (2HK): $-R^2(\langle c_S, \sigma \rangle, c_K) = \mu$ & $-R^2(\langle c_H, \sigma \rangle, c_K) = \mu$. The directions of the rotations around the knee and the ankle at the second interval are reverse of those at the first. So, we have the following functions: (2KA) $-R^2(\langle c_K, \mu \rangle, c_A) = \mu$, (2AT) $-R^2(\langle c_A, \mu \rangle, c_T) = \mu$, (2HA) $-R^2(\langle c_K, -T^2(\langle c_H, \sigma \rangle, c_K) \rangle, c_A) = \mu$, (2SA) $-R^2(\langle c_K, -T^2(\langle c_S, \sigma \rangle, c_K) \rangle, c_A) = \mu$, (IKT) $-R^2(\langle c_A, -R^2(\langle c_K, \mu \rangle, c_A) \rangle, c_T) = \mu$, (2HT) $-R^2(\langle c_A, -R^2(\langle c_K, -R^2(\langle c_H, \sigma \rangle, c_K) \rangle, c_A) \rangle, c_T) = \mu$ and (2ST) $-R^2(\langle c_A, -R^2(\langle c_K, -R^2(\langle c_S, \sigma \rangle, c_K) \rangle, c_A) \rangle, c_T) = \mu$. Finally, look at the third interval, where the hip and the knee joints work as the axis/center of turn/rotation in the same manner as those do at the second interval, though there is no more rotation around the ankle. (3SHK) is decomposed as (3SK) & (3HK): $-R^3(\langle c_S, \sigma \rangle, c_K) = \mu$ & $-R^3(\langle c_H, \sigma \rangle, c_K) = \mu$. We also have: (3KA) $-R^3(\langle c_K, \mu \rangle, c_A) = \mu$. As for indirect rotations by substitution, we have: (3HA) $+R^3(\langle c_K, +T^3(\langle c_H, \sigma \rangle, c_K) \rangle, c_A) = \mu$ and (3SA) $+R^3(\langle c_K, +T^3(\langle c_S, \sigma \rangle, c_K) \rangle, c_A) = \mu$. Note that at this interval we can see no (AT), which holds at the second interval.

6. Valuation of modal predicate formulas based on rotation and turn functions

We construct a sequence of models from the moving structures of the skeleton performing an action. The modal structure attained represents the propagations of the movements caused by joints and axes at the intervals. In modal predicate logic, in each of the possible worlds between which an accessibility relation is defined, formulas are multiply valuated for its particular domain and the valuated formulas are re-valuated in each world from which the worlds where they hold are accessible (Gamut 1991: 53–66; Hughs & Cresswell 1996). On our skeleton, the joints acting as a center of rotation or an axis of turn are worlds. Each world has as its own domain all the joints and endpoints directly and indirectly supported by the joint co-indexed to that world. In the domain of each joint defined as a world, the exhaustiveness of the vertices it directly causes to move is quantified by the existential formula “there is a moving vertex in this world” and its universal equivalent. There are cases one active joint directly or indirectly supports another active joint, which may cause another joint or an endpoint to move. To connect these causations, we define an accessibility relation

between worlds as: a world (active joint) is accessible from another world if and only if by rotation or turn, the latter directly or indirectly causes the former to move.

Let us consider how we value the existential and universal movement formulas with respect to the rotation/turn functions describing the relevant motion of a vertex around another as its center or around a pair of vertices as its axis. If and only if a rotation function with the causer joint j returns μ , as its output, for some input content vertex from its domain, the existential movement formula is valued as true in the relevant world. Otherwise, the formula is valued as false: $\forall wj(\exists x: C(x) \ \& \ \text{MOVE}(x)) = 1$ iff for some $c \in D_j$; $\pm R^i(\langle c_j, \sigma/\mu \rangle, c) = \mu$, otherwise $\forall wj(\exists x: C(x) \ \& \ \text{MOVE}(x)) = 0$. If and only if a rotation function with the causer joint j returns μ , as its output, for all the input content vertices from its domain, the universal movement formula is valued as true in the relevant world. Otherwise, the formula is valued as false: $\forall wj(\forall x: C(x) \rightarrow \text{MOVE}(x)) = 1$ iff for all $c \in D_j$; $\pm R^i(\langle c_j, \sigma/\mu \rangle, c) = \mu$, otherwise $\forall wj(\forall x: C(x) \rightarrow \text{MOVE}(x)) = 0$. We must add that as a rule of inference, the existential formula is validly inferred from the universal formula.

7. Propagation structure of kicking action

We apply the model discussed in section 11 to the movements in the kicking action described by the postures in Figure 1. Out of the skeleton performing this action at interval 1, $\{c_s, c_{HL}, c_{HR}, c_{KL}, c_{KR}, c_{AL}, c_{AR}, c_{TL}, c_{TR}\}$, we find the active joints, which act as causer joints, at interval 1 as in: $\{c_s, c_{HL}, c_{KL}, c_{AL}, c_{TL}\}$, where c_s and c_{HL} act as the axis of turn jointly, but this case is decomposed into the union of two cases of rotation, as was discussed in section 10. We count causations in each world, which is defined as an active joint and as having, in its domain, all the vertices it directly and indirectly supports. For lack of space, we will hereafter write U for “ $\forall x: C(x) \rightarrow \text{MOVE}(x)$ ” and E for “ $\exists x: C(x) \ \& \ \text{MOVE}(x)$ ”.

Let us first look at the causations at the first interval. Focusing on the vertex c_s , it directly support c_H , and indirectly support c_K, c_A and c_T . All in all, c_s supports $\{c_H, c_K, c_A, c_T\}$, which forms the domain of the world with the same index as the supporting vertex c_s . Thus, in w_s , the joint c_s , causes c_K , in its domain $\{c_H, c_K, c_A, c_T\}$, to move, which case is described in terms of rotation as: for some $c \in D_s$: $-R^i(\langle c_s, \sigma \rangle, c) = \mu$. Here, this c falls on c_K .

There is only one vertex c_K out of its domain moved by the joint. So, by the existential validation, we have $\forall w_s(E)=1$. Likewise, we can value the formulas in the other worlds as follows. In w_H , the joint c_H causes c_K , in its domain $\{c_K, c_A, c_T\}$, to move. In w_K , the joint c_K causes c_A , in its domain $\{c_A, c_T\}$, to move. In w_A , the joint c_A causes c_T to move in its singleton domain $\{c_T\}$. Thus, we have in each world: $E=1$ in w_S, w_H, w_K , and w_A , so $(U)=1$ in w_A . Remember that the direct and indirect causation by the active joints is the accessibility relation of our model: $\{<c_H, c_K>, <c_S, c_K>, <c_K, c_A>, <c_H, c_A>, <c_S, c_A>\}$. With this, we value modal formulas. First, in all the worlds, w_K and w_A , accessible from w_H , the existential formula holds true. The formula is necessarily true in this world. Thus, $[\Box]E=1$ in w_H . In only one, w_A , of the worlds, w_K and w_A , accessible from w_H , the universal formula holds true. So, the formula is possibly true in this world: $<>U=1$ in w_H . Second, in all the worlds, w_K and w_A , accessible from w_S , the existential formula holds true. Thus, $[\Box]E=1$ in w_S . In only one, w_A , out of the worlds, w_K and w_A , accessible from w_H , the universal formula holds true. So, we have $<>U=1$ in w_S . Likewise, we have: $[\Box]U=1$ and $[\Box]E=1$ in w_K ; $[\Box]U=1$ and $[\Box]E=1$ in w_A . Also, the only worlds accessible from w_H are w_K and w_A , where $[\Box]U$ and $[\Box]E$ hold. So, we have $[\Box][\Box]U=1$ and $[\Box][\Box]E=1$ in w_H . We also have: $[\Box][\Box]U=1$ and $[\Box][\Box]E=1$ in w_S . At the second interval, the modal formulas do not reflect the polarity of the rotations, because the former only pick up the moving or un-moving of joints and endpoints. We keep the same set of modal formulas for this interval. Look at the third interval of kicking, where we have $\{w_S, w_H, w_K\}$ as the worlds. The accessibility at this interval is: $\{<w_S, w_K>, <w_H, w_K>\}$. So, we have the following valuations: $E=1$ in w_S, w_H and w_K ; $U=1$ in w_K . We also have: $[\Box]U=1$ in w_S ; $[\Box]U=1$ in w_H ; $[\Box]U=1$ and $[\Box]E=1$ in w_K . We have: $[\Box][\Box]U=1$ and $[\Box][\Box]E=1$ in w_S ; $[\Box][\Box]U=1$ and $[\Box][\Box]E=1$ in w_H . Let us put the valuated formulas together in each world (joint) at each of the three intervals, using a parenthesis convention. $A(i)B$ represents AC or ABC at interval i , and ABC at the intervals but i . We apply this convention to the formulas, also using shortened forms N and P for $[\Box]$ and $<>$ operators, respectively. So, we have the following representations at each world, where each bracket subscribed 1, 2 or 3 represents the total span of the intervals:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{At } w_S : & [{}_{1/2/3}({}_{1/2/3}({}_{1/2}N)N)E], [{}_{1/2/3}PU], [{}_{1/2/3}({}_3N)NU]; \\ \text{At } w_H : & [{}_{1/2/3}({}_{1/2/3}({}_{1/2}N)N)E], [{}_{1/2}PU]; [{}_{1/2/3}({}_3N)NU]; \end{aligned}$$

At w_K : $[_{1/2/3} (_{1/2/3} N) E]$, $[_{1/2/3} (_3 N) U]$; At w_A : $[_{1/2} (_{1/2} N) E]$,
 $[_{1/2} (_{1/2} N) U]$;

In the first complex of formulas at w_S , the outer parentheses shows that both of the first N and the second N attached to the existential formula E can be omitted in any of the first, the second and the third intervals, and the inner parentheses shows that the second N can be omitted in either of the first and the second intervals. In its third complex, the first N attached to the universal formula U can be omitted in the third interval, etc.

As the result of the adopted definition of the frame, as we go up a path from an endpoint toward the center of the skeleton, the number of the joints counted from it increases, so a world more distant from that endpoint has a higher dimensionality of modality (more of the necessity and possibility operators attached to the formulas valued in the world) than the worlds nearer to that endpoint. We can see this from our example. Furthermore, in general, the universal quantification is more unlikely to hold in more distant worlds, because they support indirectly and directly supports more vertices than nearer ones do, in which case more distant worlds have to cover more vertices to attain universality. Our example does not reflect this. The worlds w_S and w_H , more distant from the endpoint, have the universal formulas as well as the less distant worlds. This is due to the order of causation in the kicking action, where the vertices nearer as well as those more distant to it act as an axis and a center even from interval 1 in the whole process, leading to the universal formula not only in the near worlds w_K and w_A but also in distant ones w_S and w_H .

8. *Concluding remarks*

In this paper, we have shown a method of representing the extensional meaning of a bodily action verb by calculating from the skeleton simulating that action, based on the frame with the joints acting as centers or axes as worlds, the relevant joints' causing other joints and endpoints to move as accessibility and the rotation functions (and their unions as the equivalents to turn formulas) as valuations. The order of these causations involved in that action is represented as a set of, not only modal existential formulas such as were used in our previous framework, but also newly-introduced universal formulas, in each interval, which represent the rota-

tions and turns of vertices on others as their centers and axes. Each modal formula is valued in a world representing an active joint directly or indirectly causing the quantified vertices in the rotation and turn functions.

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Eilish O'Donohoe & Howard Riley

A systemic-functional semiotic model for the analysis of image/text works

1. Introduction

In offering a systemic-functional model for the analysis of painting, Michael O'Toole (1994: 4) stresses that

... semiotics – the study of sign systems – can assist us in a search for a language through which our perceptions of a work of art can be shared. I believe that we should start with the impact the particular work has on us in the gallery, or even in a book of reproductions....

This is in reference to much gallery viewing emphasising other discourses surrounding our perception of visual works; provenance, the voice of the expert, art theory, history and the social, economic and political factors which can preclude a direct, primary engagement with the visual work, leading to a sense of estrangement rather than recognition.

The impetus of this study shares O'Toole's concerns, but from a pedagogic point of view and from within the art-school context.

It aims to demonstrate the efficacy of applying a systemic-functional semiotic model to the domain of image-text works which empowers the student, as a viewer, to consider such works without necessarily having the cultural references already mentioned, even though these references would obviously benefit perception. Engaging with the work in the gallery or in reproduction *or at a website*, which is the ubiquitous, current form of engagement, the student / viewer can be faced with an enormous amount of information and theory which can be confusing, and which can often lead to aberrant interpretations.

The model provides a way of talking about what one sees, what one is perceiving in the act of looking and how to engage in an immediate anal-

FUNCTION of → COMMUNICATION	INTERPERSONAL	COMPOSITIONAL	REPRESENTATIONAL
LEVEL ↓			
Work in Physical Context	Environment Atmosphere	Framing Scale	Public / Private
Work as a Whole	Rhythm Frame Light Scale Perspective Mood Position Gaze	Proportion Geometries Scale Diagonals Rhythm Line Horizontals Verticals Colour Pattern Framing	Portrayal Theme; ideology, e.g. social, cultural, political, economic etc.
Relations between sections of Composition	Relative Prominence Centrality / Marginality Scale Presence Range of Moods: e.g. Heavy/Light: Hot/Cold	Relative Position Alignment / Symmetry Interplay / Harmony Coherence	Static / Dynamic Permanent / Impermanent Order / Disorder Word connotation Image connotation
Combination of Elements	Gaze Stance Contrast: scale light line colour	Relative Position Materiality: material chosen Process of making: cast/painted Process of inscription: carved/ photocopied	Weight Pattern Rhythm Size Scale Depth
Element	Stylization Range of Moods: Engaged / Disengaged	Shape Tone Texture Line Colour	Mark: Word /denotation Image /denotation

Figure 1. Systemic-functional semiotic model for multimodal visual compositions.

ysis and discussion of the work in question, in a rigorous and sustained manner.

The model is also in the process of being analysed as an enabling tool in the production of the student's own work and helps clarify the process of creativity itself and the creation of meaningful work. This methodological process acts as a platform from which to conduct further research and from which to become familiar with the academic critiques and discourses surrounding the relationship between image and text in visual works.

The systemic-functional model presented here (O'Donohoe 2004) is also influenced by Howard Riley's (2001) matrix for drawing. It is based on a synthesis of linguistic and visual communication theories and facilitates the domain of *typographics* as a semiotic process. The work in question, the IASS9 web page, provides an ideal platform for analysing dual-coded work, in particular, the nature of the relationship between the image and the concrete visible form of the word, the typographic semiotic.

In this study, the nature of pictures and words, as a composite form of communication within the visual arts, is inflected by W. J. T. Mitchell's contention (1994: 3) "that the tensions between visible and verbal representation are inseparable from struggles in cultural politics and political culture". In tracing relations between linguistic meaning, visual represen-

tation and aesthetic principles a systemic-functional semiotic analysis of the artists' works explores and reveals not only dominant readings but also alternative interpretations of the designer's work.

The study also includes the signifying processes of the social contexts of dual-coded works and stresses the *social semiotic* as vital in determining the relationships between image and text in visual works and that social semiotic theory allows for meaningful debate as to what constitutes representation in such works.

2. *Social semiotics*

Social semiotics is a way of construing how the relationship between codes of communication and the (social) contexts in which they are used, construct meaning.

Michael Halliday's (1978) seminal systemic-functional linguistic model has inspired research in visual semiotics by O'Toole, Gunther Kress and Theo Van Leeuwen, among others. A social semiotic approach to negotiating meaning assumes that the social context of the text is all-important. For Halliday,

a text is embedded in a context of situation... an instance of a generalised social context or situation type...a semiotic structure... This presupposes an interpretation of the social system as a social semiotic; a system of meanings that constitutes the reality of the culture. (In O'Toole 1994: 216)

Kress and Van Leeuwen (1996: 32) extend Halliday's linguistic model to visual language and stress its semiotic nature:

Visual communication is always coded. It *seems* transparent only because we know the code already, at least passively – but without knowing what it is we know, without having the means for talking about what it is we do when we read an image. A glance at the “stylized” arts of other cultures should teach us that the myth of transparency is indeed a myth.

Visual sign-making is never arbitrary and motivation should be seen in terms of the sign-maker and the context in which the sign is produced. Sign-makers choose the signs most apt for producing their referents. (Inscribed words are visual signs.)

Kress and Van Leeuwen (1996: 11) also contend with the nature of subjectivity as being the “transformative productive stance towards sign-making” and sign-making “rests on the interest of the sign-makers, which leads them to select particular features of the object to be represented as criterial, at that moment, and in that context”. They have also included the concept of the materiality of the signifier in their work.

3. Materiality

Kress and Van Leeuwen (1996: 231) argue that the material aspects of representation, to include surfaces, substances and tools in the making of artworks cannot be ignored, so that “a real distinction appears between the linguist’s concern and the semiotician’s.” For the signmaker / artist, the choice of material is significant, whether to use brush or knife, canvas or paper, computer or camera is part of the signifying process. The particular context is another vital signifier; “signs as materials are fully motivated though as always the motivations are those of a particular culture and are not global” (ibid.: 232).

The materiality of the sign and its significance as more than a vehicle for other signifiers, be it oil, newspaper print or found objects, and first considered by the Russian Formalists, was taken up later by Yuri Veltrusky in 1973 who emphasised; “the materiality of the significant (signifier) affects considerably the specific way in which the picture conveys meaning” (in Drucker 1994: 32)

Johanna Drucker (1994: 43) in advocating materiality as a facet of an analysis for typographical manipulation contends that:

Invoking the term materiality begs two questions immediately; that of matter, with all the self-referential attention to questions of production... and second, that of materialism and the discourses of cultural theory which index the analysis of social conditions, contexts, and claims for the political effects of signifying activity.

Drucker also insists on the materiality of the typographic sign as central in the process of making meaning.

The force of stone, of ink, of papyrus, and of print all function within the signifying activity – not only because of their encoding in a cultural system of values whereby a stone inscription is accorded a higher stature than a

typewritten memo, but because these values themselves come into being on account of the physical, material properties of these different media. Durability, scale, reflectiveness, richness and density of saturation and color, tactile and visual pleasure – all of these factor in – not as transcendent and historically independent universals, but as aspects whose historical and cultural specificity cannot be divorced from their substantial properties. (Ibid.: 45)

Materiality and cultural context are inseparable from the signifying process; making meaning and assigning value are culturally specific. It is also argued that not only the cultural context but the physical context in which meaning is assigned to an image-text work, is part of the signifying process.

4. The work In physical context

It is inevitable in this kind of study that the work being discussed here cannot be seen in its original form or context. This can be said about a discussion of the *Mona Lisa* as much as about the conference *Web Page*. In the main, the vast majority of people who recognise images of the *Mona Lisa*, could be said to have never seen the original painting, or if they have, their experience of it might well be disappointing. Less imposing and duller than in reproductions, the *Mona Lisa* could be seen as diminished in stature by comparison to its high status as a symbol of Western European artistic achievement.

Experiencing a work of art in its original context, perhaps in a public gallery or museum, produces a range of connotations different to experiencing the same work in a coffee-table book. The positioning of both viewer and work in the context of the privacy of the book format, an aspect of the Interpersonal function of communication identified in the model (Fig 1), the quality of the reproduction, the absence of the original scale, the absence of the aura of the space it is presented in, must contribute to a range of inflected meanings, different to those invoked in the original setting.

The analysis of the web page in this study takes place in two-dimensional form; a printout of the digital design. The systemic-functional semiotic model facilitates alternative meanings to be constructed depending on

the context in which the works are engaged with, in this case, the reproduced form.

5. A systemic-functional semiotic model for image/text works

As the nomenclature suggests, the model in this research is a matrix of systems and functions which provide a mapping facility for decoding image-text works. In Figure 1, the Interpersonal Function positions the viewer in terms of mood and attitude towards the work being analysed. It enables the viewer to engage with the work, and the work in its physical space, through a range of choices from each system.

The Representational function deals with the information conveyed and the meaning of the work. It functions to represent our experience of the world.

The Compositional function, which is the “design” range of choices, what might be called the tool-kit of the artist, and caters for the media, processes and surfaces chosen by the signmaker, conveys “more effectively and more memorably the represented subject and to make for a more dynamic relation with the viewer” (O’Toole 1994: 22). The three functions are interdependent.

Each function is divided into a means of ordering and structuring information as one travels the matrix. There is an escalation of the depth of meaning constructed from the basic level of a single element, to the whole work, so that for instance the external rectangular box in remains at its basic denotative level of *element* if isolated from the other elements of the work or from the work as a whole. Its connotative meaning comes into play at the level of interaction with the rest of the work.

The systemic nature of the matrix allows for a synchronic reading of the works. The model is laid out in a format which is familiar to Western reading protocol, from left to right and top to bottom, or from column to column. In practice however, when looking at a visual work such as the one being discussed here, they are seen in their entirety – as opposed to reading a book or watching a film – and so the systems functioning in the production of meaning operate synchronically, or simultaneously.

In applying the model to the following case study, the conference web page, (with grateful thanks to the designer, Dario Martinelli) not all sys-

tems are necessarily employed at all levels, nor are they applied in a particular sequence. The sign reader can move around the model in whatever direction desired, in no apparent sequence other than what the viewer deems fit. Unlike in conventional reading, the viewer can “hop” from box to box diagonally, from right to left or from bottom up. The subjective viewer chooses particular systems, relative to one’s own experience, in order to negotiate meaning. The range of the semiotic resources the viewer can call upon will determine the depth of meaning acquired.

To this extent, as the viewer can come to the work with little or no knowledge of extraneous detail of history, provenance or academic critique, equally, the viewer can engage with the work with due experience and a portmanteau of cultural references. This does not preclude debate or disagreement. Indeed, this is the ideal site for such fruitful discussion. One viewer’s experience of the work could result in another’s diverse response. This is the where the negotiation of meaning comes into play.

In analysing the conference web page, the functions, systems and individual cells of the matrix are italicised in order to identify them as such, and in order to differentiate the semiotic nature of the terminology from everyday language.



Figure 2. Case Study: IASS Conference Web Page, 2007.

In demonstrating the efficacy of the systemic functional model, it needs to be said that the conference web page was designed for digital media to be accessed online. This demonstration of the analysis is of the printed ver-

sion of the web page. The physical context of viewing the static, printed page is a completely different experience to that of interacting with the web page.

At the Level of the *Work as a Whole*, identified in the model, the viewer is engaged by the visible and visual tensions between image and text. Compositional devices of *framing*, *rhythm* and *perspective* activate Interpersonal systems of *centrality* and *marginality*, invoking a sense of motion. The combination of the linear elements which form the central framing grid connote movement with the diagonals representing a direction from left to right. The blurred background, which might represent Finnish woodland, further signifies movement or travel as if at speed, but without necessarily complying with the direction of the grid.

This ambiguity of direction represented between the background and the foreground is compounded by the immobile imagery. The dynamism of the background and the diagonals is questioned by the still images. Although these images are static, the viewer is allowed to adopt a variety of positions in terms of distance of viewpoint. From the symbolic image of the bus stop to the indexical sign of the map the connotations of travel, *in any direction*, are evoked.

Each of the images is a metonym for travel, but which way to turn? Map reading can be a fraught exercise, one can become lost in the wilds. The reliability of taking public transport is undermined by an iconic national symbol, a deer, which seems in a rush to go in the opposite direction.

Relations between sections of the compositions are tense, a possible metaphor for the historic tensions between image and text. The centrality and prominence of the grid and the images in the grid, is undermined by the position of the text scoring the work as a whole, and dictating the individual cells of the grid. What might be a rhythmic progression from left to right is abruptly disrupted by the arrhythmic diagonals, leading to a certain visual dissonance. The pattern represented at this level is a disjointed one. Images are seemingly randomly dissected and undermined by something more powerful, something which seems to take precedence.

The Compositional device of visual framing at the level of *relations between sections of the work* is subordinated to the length of the written word. The historical dominance of the word over the image is acknowledged and upheld. The need to maintain the integrity of the written word overrides the integrity of the visual devices that would otherwise support

the connotations of rhythmic movement to represent travel. It is the length of the words in the grid which dictates the visual rhythm and the framing of the images. Instead of a smooth journey, the traveller is in for a bumpy ride.

These tensions in the graphic layout may be interpreted as metaphoric of tensions between the visual / verbal factions of semiotic research. The contradictions and contra-visuals of the conference web page also serve to relay the theme of the conference: Understanding / Misunderstanding.

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Paolo Odoardi

Text, interpretation and memory: What semiotics can say about remembering a tale

Memory is one of the more challenging issues both for the humanities and for the exact sciences. Human beings are able to collect and save experiences and information and, when necessary, the appropriate knowledge is available for them. Trying to understand this phenomenon is a fascinating field of research. The retention capacity of memory deeply concerns the human attitude of living in a meaningful world. The sense phenomenon is strictly linked to recognition processes, and moreover signs are one of the basic external devices for memory, from ancient Egyptian papyrus to the shopping list. It seems clear that semiotics, as a science of signs and meaning, is intensely interrelated with this issue. Memory is a huge research topic and it is possible to outline many distinct approaches to this field, for a survey see Pethes, Ruchatz (2001). There is a difference, that is often underestimated, between *direct* and *reported* memory (Larsen 1988). It arises out of the fact that we have direct experience with just a little part of the events that happen in the world. Most of the information we receive has already been treated, and comes to us in an act of communication, through a semiotic mediation. This happens continuously when we read a book, go to the cinema, or watch the news on television. The difference between direct and reported memory is critical for semiotics because this discipline has the conceptual tools to describe the semiotic artefact, or text, involved in the communication process. Beside this, we have to consider the activity of a subject when he understands and memorizes a text. Many studies that explore this sphere of action have been presented within the field of cognitive sciences. Therefore a dialogue between a semiotic approach to the texts, and a cognitive perspective on the mental operations that allow

understanding and remembering, should lead to a better scientific knowledge of the memorization of the texts.

The present article consists of two sections, one of theory and one of analysis, according to the empirical feature that characterizes semiotics. First I will outline, from a theoretical point of view, the issue of the memorization of texts, showing how several semiotic concepts concern memory, starting a semiotic approach to this topic. Second, I will analyze a single case of the remembering of a tale, presenting the results that this methodology can give, and describing the possible research paths that arise from this perspective.

1. Theoretical framework

Cognitive psychology has developed a framework to study memory. According to this view, every act of remembering is characterized by two main components: encoding and retrieval. From one side the text (or the stimulus) has to be elaborated towards its storage in memory, and on the other side, symmetrically, what has been stored is recalled and restructured towards the production of a new text, the remembrance. According to this view stored information has a mental organization. From a semiotic side it has to be noticed that the starting point of an encoding (in the case taken into consideration in this article) is a text, and the result of the remembering process is a text again. A further comment that has to be made is that memory is not an empty space but is already full of information and past experiences, therefore the knowledge that is present interacts with both processes of encoding and retrieval.

Within this framework it is possible to state a definition of memory, and I suggest considering a very convincing description proposed by Charles Bartlett in his pioneering book, *Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology* (Bartlett 1932). He is considered one of the fathers of experimental psychology and he was the first to use meaningful materials, such as texts or images, in his experiments on memory. He argues, as a conclusion of his research, that “remembering is not the re-excitation of innumerable fixed, lifeless and fragmentary traces. It is an imaginative reconstruction, or construction, built out of the relation of our attitude towards a whole active mass of organised past reactions or

experience, and to a little outstanding detail which commonly appears in image or in language form” (Bartlett 1932: 213).

This definition states something crucial: memory is not static, but it is intrinsically dynamic, it always depends on a process of interaction between many factors. The idea of a possible recalling of an original experience as it was has to be abandoned immediately: remembering is always a production, a dynamic construction of something new. This creation of memory has obviously something to do with our past experiences, and they appear as a *whole organized active mass*. Bartlett introduces here, in the cognitive tradition, the concept of schema: the relationship with what is stored is interactive, but the past is organized and schematically structured. This topic has been richly developed in the cognitive sciences under the label of knowledge representation, recovering a philosophical and a logical tradition dated back to ancient Greece. Many models of knowledge (and memory) have been produced, such as schemata, scripts, frames and semantic networks; it is not possible to elaborate the issue in the present article. I will refer to the concept of the semantic network, understood in a broad sense, and I will use it to model the process of remembering presented in the following analysis.

A semantic network is a “a graphic notation for representing knowledge in pattern of interconnected nodes and arcs” (Sowa 2003: 1082). The nodes are the concepts represented by the net, and the arcs express the relationships between the nodes; nodes and arcs are therefore labelled as peculiar concepts or relationships. The idea of drawing models of knowledge is not far from semiotics; Charles Sanders Peirce is indeed regarded as the starting point of the modern theory of semantic networks. “Let us construct a diagram to illustrate the general course of thought; I mean a System of diagrammatization by means of which any course of thought can be represented with exactitude” (C.P. 4.530); this exhortation conducted him to the formulation of the *existential graphs*, a theory of diagrammatic or visual notation for logical expressions. This theory is based on his previous *logic of relatives* whose basic idea is that logic (and knowledge) deals with groups of related elements, the relatives. It is a model that Peirce borrows from chemistry, as it states: “a chemical atom is quite like a relative in having a definite number of loose ends or ‘unsaturated bonds’, corresponding to the blanks of the relative in a chemical molecule, each loose end of one atom is joined to a loose end, which it is assumed must belong to

some other atom ... thus the chemical molecule is a medad, like a complete proposition. ... The proposition 'John gives John to John' corresponds in its constitution, precisely to ammonia" (C.P. 4.469) whose chemical formula is NH_3 .




Figure 1.

This idea has been further developed in the field of artificial intelligence by the *conceptual graph theory* (Sowa 2000). According to this theory a statement like *John is going to Boston by bus* can be visually represented by a conceptual graph with four concepts, namely (Go), (Person: John), (City: Boston), and (Bus); and with three conceptual relations: (Agency) that relates (Go) to the agent John, (Destination) that relates (Go) to the destination Boston, and (Instrument) that relates (Go) to the instrument bus. I have presented a short example because I will use this modern notation in the following analysis of the remembering of a tale.

The issue of knowledge representation comes back strongly in semiotics when Umberto Eco describes the format of a semantic system and how it works. He argues that every sign has a meaning "thanks to the interconnection with the universe of all other signs that function as interpretants, each of these ready to become the sign interpreted by all the others" (Eco 1976: 122). To model the human semantic universe (that becomes semiotic in his view) he borrows a pattern developed within the cognitive tradition by M. Ross Quillian. The Q-Model, as Eco named it, is a semantic network, and Quillian drew it up to describe memory: it is a cognitive representation to illustrate how semantic memory is structured. It is very interesting to notice the parallelism between the model of an inter-subjective system, the semantic one, and the model of the individual storage of information and experience. There seems to be a link between individual memory and the social dimension of meaning, they seem to work in the same manner. In fact every semiotic meaningful act is possible because of the existence of an underlying system that guarantees its intelligibility. The competence

in dealing with such systems is shared by the speakers of that semiotic language. From a semiotic point of view we have to recognize that the inter-subjective systems underlying every kind of language are real devices that store a social memory. This knowledge is shared by the competent users of a sign system, but it is not totally owned by anyone: it is partially stored in everyone's individual memory. Argued that memory is not an individual affair but deeply dependent on a social dimension, it is interesting to show how the inter-subjective side influences the individual capacity of saving information in memory, and remembering it in a correct manner. This is what I will display in the analysis of a single recollection of a tale.

2. *Remembering a tale: An analysis*

One of the experiments carried out by Bartlett consisted of the presentation of a written tale to many subjects whose task was to reproduce it exactly after a period of time. I will try here to produce a new analysis of one of these experiments applying a semiotic approach instead of a psychological one. The tale involved belongs to the American Indian tradition and it is entitled *War of the Ghost*. Here is the complete text:

One night two young men from Egulac went down to the river to hunt seals and while they were there it became foggy and calm. Then they heard war-cries, and they thought: "Maybe this is a war-party". They escaped to the shore, and hid behind a log. Now canoes came up, and they heard the noise of paddles, and saw one canoe coming up to them. There were five men in the canoe, and they said: "What do you think? We wish to take you along. We are going up the river to make war on the people." One of the young men said, "I have no arrows." "Arrows are in the canoe," they said. "I will not go along. I might be killed. My relatives do not know where I have gone. But you," he said, turning to the other, "may go with them." So one of the young men went, but the other returned home. And the warriors went on up the river to a town on the other side of Kalama. The people came down to the water and they began to fight, and many were killed. But presently the young man heard one of the warriors say, "Quick, let us go home: that Indian has been hit." Now he thought: "Oh, they are ghosts." He did not feel sick, but they said he had been shot. So the canoes went back to Egulac and the young man went ashore to his house and made a fire. And he told everybody and said: "Behold I accompanied the ghosts, said I was hit, and I did not feel sick." He told it all, and then he became

quiet. When the sun rose he fell down. Something black came out of his mouth. His face became contorted. The people jumped up and cried. He was dead. (Bartlett 1932: 60)

In the book are presented many recallings of the tale, and I will focus on a particular one. “The following version was obtained six and a half years after the original reading ... he volunteered to try to remember the story. He recalled it in steps, with some pondering and hesitation, but on the whole with surprising ease. I will give his version exactly as he wrote it: 1. Brothers – 2. Canoe – 3. Something black from mouth – 4. Totem – 5. One of the brothers died. – 6. Cannot remember whether one slew the other or was helping the other. – 7. Where going on journey, but I cannot remember. – 8. Party in war canoe. – 9. Was the journey a pilgrimage for filial or religious reasons? – 10. Am now sure it was a pilgrimage. – 11. Purpose had something to do with totem. – 12. Was it on a pilgrimage that they met a hostile party and one brother was slain? – 13. I think there was some reference to a dark forest. – 14. Two brothers were on a pilgrimage, having something to do with a totem, in a canoe, up a river flowing through a dark forest. While on their pilgrimage they met a hostile party of Indians in a war canoe. In the fight one brother was slain, and something black came from his mouth. – 15. Am not confident about the way brother died. May have been something sacrificial in the manner of his death. – 16. The cause of the journey had both something to do with a totem, and with filial piety.- 17. The totem was the patron god of the family and so was connected with filial piety” (Bartlett 1932: 77).

It is immediately clear that this is another story, and the mnemonic performance after such a long time is amazing. The hypothesis that memory is a dynamic production is completely verified, and this kind of behaviour can be checked in many other experiments of the same kind. The interesting thing is to give a theoretical account of the procedure responsible for the construction of the new story. Bartlett’s psychological approach focuses mainly on the individual subject, on his attitudes and appetites; according to this view the memory of a text can be explained only considering the individual variability of behaving. This approach is unsatisfying, and semiotics can offer a different account of the production of recalling a text. The main thesis that is possible to state, from a semiotic point of view, is that the remembering process presents many regularities, autonomous

from the single individuality. The regularities instead depend on the structure of the texts, on the procedure of interaction between text and reader, namely the interpretation, and on the logic of production of a new text. All these aspects have been totally dropped within the cognitive psychological tradition. In the following paragraphs I will try to give a new analytical account of this experiment, that could show how, using semiotic tools, it is possible to stress and explain many mechanisms of the remembering process, giving a better scientific account of it.

First of all, analyzing the list presented, it can be noticed that there is a difference between the first four elements (points 1 to 4), that are absolutely new, prompted only by the request of remembering the tale, and all the following elements (points 5 to 17), that are in some way derived or referable to the former ones. One of the four, the totem, is not present in the tale, and the two protagonists are not brothers; this demonstrates a strong interaction with the contents already present in memory. These first four elements are what Bartlett calls, in the definition of memory presented above, outstanding details, namely the items that commonly come to mind immediately after the request of remembering. They are critical because they drive the process of remembrance, and the new text produced is built around them. The challenge for semiotics is to define and specify the nature of these details. The single detail remembered in one process of recall is just a surface element of a specific text, but from a semiotic point of view we can state it as belonging to a specific deep structure of the text. We can classify it as narrative, figurative, pathemic, thematic, actorial, and so forth. This permits a comparability between different recall processes of some texts, and allows us to state some hypothesis about which kind of semiotic textual structures are better remembered than others. It seems possible to single out a topic of research about the *memorability* of texts that, in a general account, should compare the *texts to be remembered* with the *text remembered*, focusing on what survives, and on what instead disappears. Are some kind of semiotic structures better remembered than others? Does it mainly depend on the configuration of a single text? How is it related to the activity of comprehending and memorizing a text? To answer these and other questions of the same kind a broader research is necessary, that analyzes many processes of remembering. It should show if there are trends in the memory of the texts that we can describe with semiotic concepts.

Starting from the four outstanding details, the remembering process spreads out following an expansive logic that is possible to model using semantic networks. Every item is then a concept, a node of the net, and it is rich of unsaturated bonds. New elements come from memory to saturate these free valences becoming immediately new nodes, and the same process is repeated until all the bonds are filled, or no items can be retrieved from memory any more. The main logic that forces the formation of new links is the propositional one: a verb, that represents an action, develops links towards a possible subject of this action, a purpose, an instrument, a place, a result or theme, and so forth. In the present case this phenomenon is very clear: the *brothers* are *agents* of a *journey*, the *journey's purpose* is a *totem*, the *instrument* of the *journey* is a *canoe*, the *canoe* has a *river* as a *location*, in a *forest* too that has the *attribute* of being *dark*, and so on. It is possible to read the 17th step of the list as a progressive spreading of the terms in a complex semantic network. I attempted a full schematization of this recollection using Sowa's conceptual graph. It is not possible, in the present article, to give a full explanation of the schema. The words used by the subject become nodes and the link between these nodes are those proposed by Sowa (2000: 492–510) following a *case semantics*.




Figure 2.

According to Eco's view we observe the unfolding of several *sememes* (Eco 1976: 105–110) in many of their potential semantic features. It is interesting to notice, in the particular case of remembering a text, that the developing of the net has a *centripetal trend*. In the case of creativity, for instance, the inferential activity moves freely on these semantic networks. In this case, however, there is a sort of unsaid constraint, a trend, a force, that induces the net to a closing: all valences have to be saturated, if possible, with the elements already available, or with others not so far from them. This phenomenon can be explained turning to the semiotic opposition between *manifestation* and *immanence*, between *surface* and *deep structure* of a text. In the recalling observed there is a progressive developing of the surface of a text, driven by a propositional logic, as already described. At the same time a deep dimension is developed that underlies the meaning of the tale as a whole, and that is part of the competence of the producer of the text. I assume that this immanent side acts in the recalling process driving it to produce a surface text which should possibly be close, complete, stable, and coherent. Semiotics has a strong thesis about this, namely that a deep narrative macro structure (Greimas 1979) rules the global meaning of a text at its root. The centripetal force that rules the recalling should then be explained with the need of the construction of such a macro narration, which gives coherence to the whole text. Moreover, using the idea of a deep dimension, we can properly compare the *new* text of the recalling with the *original* one, questioning what kind of deep structure of the text are favoured by this surface logic.

In conclusion: I hope to have shown that memory is an interesting research issue and that semiotics is involved in the scientific challenge to explore this field. Furthermore, there is a topic that is purely semiotic: the memorization of texts. This undertaking consists in studying the capacity of a text to be remembered or forgotten in connection with its structure and with the cognitive activity of remembering. The exploration of this field with semiotic tools, in the present article, has led to some results: first of all, that memory is a dynamic construction, and its unfolding is organized according to a logic that can be represented with the tool of the semantic networks. Such a constraint shows clearly the action of an inter-subjective social dimension, located in the systems of signs, on the individual side of memory. This pressure is exerted on some items that first come to mind in the recall; the semiotic effort should specify the structural nature of these

elements, if a trend can be verified. The general perspective of the research should then move in the direction of a theory of text in terms of *memorability*, with the contribution both of semiotics and cognitive sciences.

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Ulla Oksanen

How pictures address us

A social semiotic view of adolescents' art-education products

I will deal with the adolescents' idea of the present Knowledge society, or rather with its "landscape" in 2015, portrayed in their art education products. Though my study on one hand is aimed at considering the dimensions of rational 'knowledge', I will on the other hand also outline the "softer" aesthetic aspects of it. The fact that many abstract concepts are structured and represented mentally as metaphors implies that they are fundamental to comprehending, representing, as well as to learning concepts. From the point of view of education, the central role of metaphors is to constantly expand people's experience and to add to the available resources. This idea is also supported by Bruner (1996) who views metaphors and narratives as the earliest and the most natural way of organising new information and comprehending the world.

The important theoretical and methodological basis of my study is semiotics, according to which I view *signs* as fundamental mediating elements between perception and cognition. I will focus on *social semiotics* and particularly on the *critical discourse analysis methodology* developed by Kress & Van Leeuwen (1996, 2001), and, especially in the field of visual arts, O'Toole (1994) & O'Halloran (2004), who have emphasized the *multimodal analysis* of texts and pointed out the importance of the literacy for the reading of these texts.

In this connection I will deal with some theoretical issues related to the "functionalist" background of social semiotics and particularly the "modal metafunction", as well as with the concepts of sign and *experiential metaphor*. In conclusion I will illustrate these ideas with the aid of some pictorial examples of my empirical data depicting the "landscape of the knowledge

society”. I will take an interdisciplinary approach that will benefit from concepts and views originating in semiotics, education, and art research.

1. Landscape of the knowledge society

The idea of a surrounding area, understood as a landscape, has in principle been defined in many fields, such as geography, aesthetics, architecture, agriculture and forestry. In this article I approach the landscape mainly from the viewpoints of students’ art education products. I consider these last from the point of view of social semiotics, and particularly, from Halliday’s “interpersonal” and O’Toole’s “modal” perspectives. The main issue how the students’ landscapes address us, the viewers, and whether this (modal) perspective can add to the interpretation of the pictures. By “landscape” in the title I mean the pictorial representations of the so-called knowledge society’ in 2015, which is the way (16- to 17-year-old) Finnish upper-secondary school students have come to understand the present megatrend: the learning society and an economy based on knowledge.

Eero Tarasti (1990: 156) has suggested that we view the landscape as a kind of border zone, as a part of both nature and culture, a space in which the culture both “looks” back on and projects forward its structures and attitudes. Thus the concept of landscape is based on the dialectics between culture and nature, where it can be seen as the “humanization of nature” and thus, above all, as converting nature into culture. That is to say, cultures do not only define the landscapes, but they also express their points of view concerning which landscapes are beautiful and favourable, or ugly and unfavourable. An example of this is romantic landscape painting, where nature often appears as untouched, sublime, sometimes threatening, whereas in the realist period landscapes were rendered tame, a segment of nature in man’s possession (see Tarasti 1990: 156–159). The landscape of the knowledge society shares in this type of dynamics. As the Copernican revolution and baroque gardens, in their worship of solar centres, reflected organizations and hierarchies of an autocratic time, one would expect students’ drawings of “the landscape of the knowledge society” also to contain signs of the knowledge society as they construct it from their own starting points (cf. Mumford 1970: 28–39).

As stated earlier, the “landscape of the knowledge society” is to be perceived as an imaginary space, a locus, a landscape of the mind charged with

meanings, which people construct on the basis of what they know and their experiences of their Umwelt. These experiences may be represented as pictorial metaphors, metonyms, synecdoches or other tropes. This “mindscape”, which we view “as if” from the inside, may appear as a physical location (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 2003) or as conceptual metaphors of location (Turner 1996: 45). A mindscape is also capable of describing the object by bringing out new aspects and visions of its future. In my study, the reference to the near future, the year 2015, is connected to the objective of the assignment: to look at an imagined future at the present, which is more difficult to shape since it is always in flux. The future, as stories and visions (2000: 17) about utopias or dystopias, may also shed light on the present.

2. *Functionalism in social semiotics*

Social semiotics, from the perspectives of multimodal communication and social sciences, offers an extensive ground for considering students’ visions of the knowledge society. The social semiotic concept of sign can be traced back to the structuralist tradition of the Prague and Paris Schools. The fact that signs can be understood as fundamental elements of, and mediators between, perception and cognition also links up ontologically to Peirce’s pragmatism, which I view as an integrating basis for my study. The primary interest of social semiotics, however, is human communication, viewed as semiosis whose resources, functions, contexts and effects are socially constructed phenomena (Hodge & Kress 1988). A primary focus of social semiotics is how social meanings emerge in different semiotic modes as texts and practices and how they vary in different societies at different times in the past.

The British linguist Michael Halliday has argued that “language is both about what we do and what we mean ...” (Van Leeuwen 2005: 72). Van Leeuwen considers this kind of functionalism as part of societal and cultural development at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, drawing a parallel to functionalist architecture and visual design (“form follows function”), sociology, anthropology, linguistics, and semiotics. He supposes a variety of “functionalist” ideas in the background, criss-crossing different areas of society and influencing many fields of theory and practice (ibid.: 71–89).

In studying language development in young children, Halliday concluded that even though they were not adept at using language itself, they nevertheless did learn its functions. On the basis of 7 “protofunctions”, he developed three basic metafunctions: the *experiential* (ideational) function, the *interpersonal* function, and the *textual* function,² which always act simultaneously in language and correlate “function in language” with “function in society” (Van Leeuwen 2005: 76–77). This grounding idea by Halliday later exceeded the limits of linguistics and became the basis for further development and research in social semiotics. Some researchers have become convinced that all semiotic systems can fulfil these metafunctions (e.g., Kress and Van Leeuwen 1996). Thus systemic-functional linguistics can be seen to act *multimodally*, that is to say, in respect to all modes of representation: speech, writing, pictures, sounds, theatre, cinema, etc.

Since the issue in this paper is the visual image, I turn now to the (functional) semiotics of images, as theorized by O’Toole (1994) and O’Halloran (2004). According to O’Toole (1994: 5), the “linguistic” terms of Halliday’s functional “grammar” are not particularly suitable to describing such activities as painting, sculpture and music; he thus suggests replacing Halliday’s three basic metafunctions with the notions of *representational*, *modal*,³ and *compositional* functions. Since the empirical material of my study consists of adolescents’ pictorial products, I shall use O’Toole’s terms to designate semiotic functions.

3. *How pictures address us: The modal function*

Voloshinov has emphasized that the “form of signs is conditioned above all by the social organization of the participants and also by the immediate conditions of their interaction” (in Hodge & Kress 1994: 37). The fact that social semiotics calls attention to the *context* of the production of signs indicates a withdrawal from the universal meanings of structuralism. It also brings us closer to the pragmatist ideas of C. S. Peirce, according to whom each sign always appears in its temporal or spatial context. According to Hodge and Kress (1988: 40), the concept of context also crucially comprises the “logonomic systems”, which are the accrued effects of ideological codes residing in the structures of a society. These effects are always mediated through messages and manifested in the behaviour and positions of the interacting parties. As basic effects associated with social status and

identity, the writers point out, e.g., those of “power” and “solidarity”, which function in inverse relation; i.e., more solidarity means less power, and vice versa (Hodge & Kress 1988: 40, 56). Such modal (pictorial) meanings can be traced back to ideological structures are e.g. the transactions in space (e.g. social distance and proximity). Like Kress & Van Leeuwen (1996; 2001), Van Leeuwen (2005), and O’Toole (1994), I view logonomic systems not as “determined” actions, but rather as constructions and structurings that are “motivated” by social and cultural interests.

Despite the simultaneous interaction of the metafunctions in semiosis and the problems in distinguishing these “fields” from each other, it is possible, according to O’Toole (1994: 189) possible to view them as “analytical tools” of a shared “grammar” and consider their meanings separately. Since I consider O’Toole’s representational (Halliday’s experiential) and compositional (textual) functions as aspects of traditional art history (and Panofsky’s iconography) and art education, I will concentrate on O’Toole’s *modal* (Halliday’s interpersonal) metafunction, which is particularly interesting from the point of view of semiotics. At the same time I will focus on how pictures as modes⁴ “address” us, or how we are attracted to and become involved in their world. I will return to the representational and compositional dimensions in connection with the picture examples.

3.1 Gaze positions: The viewer in space

According to Kress & Van Leeuwen (1996: 121), social meanings in pictures are perceivable on the basis of imaginative face-to-face interaction and spatial positions of the producer of the picture and the viewer. One of the essential transactions in this space is the *gaze*, which seems to position the viewer and affect his or her point of view. In his outline of the “functions and systems in painting” O’Toole (1994: 24) presents some crucial concepts of the modal function as regards the other metafunctions of the work itself: rhythm, gaze, frame, light, perspective and modality, which all have more or less importance in addressing the viewer and provoking his/her interest in the picture. In the following, I consider some of these notions in detail and illustrate them in connection with my own empirical study: drawings of the “Landscape of the Knowledge Society in 2015”. While discussing them generally in terms of social semiotics, and particu-

larly in terms of the modal metafunction, I also consider the potential of these ideas to bring new perspectives to the semiotic analysis of pictures.

4. *Some examples of the case study*

4.1 The information flood

The picture shown in Figure 1 represents an enormous “information flood”, which proved to be a useful (conceptual) metaphor, subsequent to the “tsunami” flood, the (time) context of which was closely related to the catastrophe in Thailand – the pictures were made only four months after the tragedy in 2005. In terms of the *modal* dimension, the viewer is positioned in front of a tap and a fast-flowing “flood”, detached from its background. The attention is at first drawn to the oblique dynamics of the composition, which direct the *gaze* to the wave-like *rhythm* of the spin-drift, which originates in the tube of the tap. Opposite the viewer, addressing her directly, is a faceless figure imprisoned by a water bubble, a mediator, whose *gesture* appeals to the viewer as if asking for or *demanding* help. As explanation for the information flood, the author of the picture, on one hand, seems to suggest the determinist natural force, the tsunami, whose destructive power is increased by a transaction from the upper right corner down to the left, a *vector* towards the “eternal separation” behind the “bars”. On the other hand, the motion directed to the right, “upstream” towards the source of the flood, also reveals a mysterious tap, behind which one can discern traces of a cross-like symbol. There is an obvious tension between the two: the user of the tap, the one with the *power*, and the drifting “imprisoned” figure in the bubble, for whom the viewer may feel sympathy and solidarity. In the student’s own words: “knowledge will steamroller everything”, even religions, the symbols of which are hidden in the whirlpools of the flood. Also the dynamics of the compositional function directs attention to the right top corner (the motion towards the right in the picture space is experienced as a culturally motivated, “natural” temporal change). The user of the mysterious tap, the actor of the mimetic plane, is absent. To the question in the interview “Who uses the tap?” the cryptic answer was: “A power higher than man”. Does the student thus refer to “God” or other supernatural powers (cf. the Christian symbol behind the tap), or could there be other interpretations for the message of the picture? One possible explanation is

offered by bringing in the *modal* dimension of the picture and by positioning the viewer relative to the tap. The viewer, directed by the perspective of the water tap, is then positioned to adopt a slight high-angle stance in respect to the tap and is thus brought within its reach as the user – and thus one having power over it. Also the figure in the bubble, though smaller in size, appeals to the viewer. The arrangement from this standpoint could then shift to speculation concerning the information-flood metaphor: do we also have a share in the origin or control of this flood, and do we have the power to protect people from falling victim to it?




Figure 1. “The Flood of Information”.

4.2 The boxes

The picture shown in Figure 2 may also be approached first from the position of a viewer watching the “landscape” from above, so that the horizon is high above the frame of view. Louis Marin (1993) speaks of landscapes as seen from skyscrapers, and of the “ubiquitous gaze” through which the onlooker identifies him-/herself with the building and thus experiences feelings of visual possession, control – and power. The horizon, especially, seems to produce metaphorically such sublime ideas as “infinity”, “freedom”, “utopia”, “transcendence”. In the context of highly industrialized Western countries, such ideas can easily be associated with economic growth, geographical expansion, and a “victorious future” (as the aerial bombardments of Kuwait and Iraq were represented in press photos and video clips) (Lukkarinen 2004: 40; Marin 1993; Kress & Van Leeuwen




Figure 2.

1996: 146–148). The present picture, however, conjures up no such future; rather, the scenery may be characterized as a gloomy urban “wilderness”. The author has presented the viewer with imaginary power, but over what? The vectors of the rows of boxes in the central perspective seem to indicate a vanishing point outside the picture, which, together with the progressively darker shading, connotes destruction or solipsism. The picture is totally lacking in social interaction, and according to the author, members of the knowledge society no longer need face-to-face contact with other people. The pessimistic attitude of the author is accompanied by experiential metaphors⁵ of angular quadrangles of the “box-rows”, which in this context appear to acquire tones of lifelessness, coldness and machine-likeness in the picture. All seems “mechanistic” here: a root metaphor which philosopher Stephen Pepper (1942) considers to be one of our basic cognitions or presumptions as to the nature of the world. To whom does the author offer this desperate gaze? There is no doubt that, as in the previous case, the viewer is encouraged to view the picture “from on high”, and hence share in this ubiquitous and frightening vision and compelled to consider the possibility of this totalitarian dystopia.

4.3 Anxiety

In the last picture to be analyzed (Fig. 3), the author describes a conflict into which the main character has been driven amidst an urban milieu. The sex

of the figure, as well as of those running away, has been dissolved. Emphasized is a background resembling a corner of the street or a wall or other obstacle, which emphasizes the anxiety of the main character. This figure's gesture reflects the difficulty and ambivalence of making a decision: hands raised to the ears, feet turned inwards. In this pose, the figure stands still and addresses the viewer positioned opposite it, as if "demanding" participation in the solution of a problem. What *is* the problem? We may answer this in two ways. (1) If one considers the modal "truth value" of the depiction, and particularly the articulation of details and modulation of colour, between the main character and the rest of the characters, it seems that the figures running away are represented as less complex and less defined than the main character. Hence the main character can be viewed as more realistic and "plausible" (more truthful, modally speaking), corresponding to the dominant naturalistic or "common-sense" coding orientation, which makes it appear more familiar and acceptable, thus encouraging viewers to feel solidarity with it. (2) On the other hand, if one compares the abundance of detail and colour (the leaves) in the greenish thought-bubble at the top right corner of the picture, to the cold blue "wall" representing the city, it is likewise possible to view the portrayal of nature as having high modality, and accordingly, as being a more desirable choice in this context.

Since the subject of the picture is "the landscape of the knowledge society", the essential tension and anxiety of the main character are not linked solely to the nature-culture contradiction nor to problems of the urban milieu. A parallel and equally plausible interpretation arises from the expression of the "nature" area, which emphasizes biological details




Figure 3.

(green-veined leaves, the bark of the tree trunk), sensuousness (the calmness of the figure lying at the base of the tree, the waterfall in the background), and richer colors than in the rest of the picture. The key issue here is the safe, heavenly atmosphere, characterised by leaves tenderly covering the sleeper and the trees arching protectively over the figure. In terms of functional semiotics, these “movements” may be seen as transactions directed towards the resting figure, the meaning of which is sensuous closeness and soft caring. In comparison with the episode at the corner of the street or wall, it offers a new kind of explanation for the mood of the main character and introduces a social dimension to it. Accordingly, the overall message to the viewer is one of anxiety at the unnaturalness and lack of sensuousness of the knowledge society, as well as the superficiality and facelessness of social contacts obtainable, say, through the “net” – the retreating figures referring to the lack of interpersonal contact.

Notes

1. The information / knowledge society is commonly understood as a new form of society, into which the present one will be transformed, raised to a higher level by the development of information and communication technologies. Particularly from the technological point of view, the concept implies strong optimism and reliance on the capacity of information and communication technologies to resolve societal problems.
2. The *experiential* or ideational function (corresponding to Jakobson’s referential function) refers to constructing representations of what is going on in the outside world (Van Leeuwen 2005: 278). In pictures the relation of two objects may, e.g., be represented as involved in a process of interaction, which visually could be realized in terms of narrative structures and/or analytic ones (Kress & Van Leeuwen 1996: 40–41). The *interpersonal* function (corresponding to Jakobson’s conative function) refers to the establishment of communicative interactions (Van Leeuwen 2005: 279). A depicted person in a picture may, e.g., address the viewer directly, or turn away from the viewer (Kress & Van Leeuwen 1996: 41). The *textual* function refers to the creation of texts, as complexes of signs, and to the context in and for which they are produced (Van Leeuwen: 288).
3. By modal function O’Toole means the various devices used to engage the viewer’s attention, drawing him or her into the world of the picture (O’Toole 1994: 5). Semantically these expressions vary within the range of the necessary, the possible, and the impossible.

4. The “mode” is the material resource (quality, expression) used in recognisable, stable ways as a means of articulating discourse (e.g., speech, writing, picture, moving image). A discourse is realised through a mode, which functions as its “carrier” (Kress & Van Leeuwen 2001: 25).
5. In social semiotics the concept of experiential metaphor is a constitutive one: these metaphors have an important role in sign processes, where they function as “tools” for semiotic innovation. (Van Leeuwen 2005: 29–34).

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Guillermo Olivera

Mediatización y vanguardias estéticas: Los (anti)happenings argentinos (1965–68)

La propuesta de este artículo es leer las experimentaciones estético-conceptuales de los (anti)happenings realizadas en el marco del Instituto Di Tella (Buenos Aires, 1965–68) como un indicador o catalizador, fuertemente conciente y reflexivo, del proceso de mediatización (Verón 1984; 1992; 1997) en la Argentina. En efecto, estas experiencias y sus teorizaciones elaboraron un verdadero “discurso de la mediatización”, el cual puso en primer plano la categoría de “medio/s” en tanto que conjunto de *condiciones materiales* (canales) y *formales* (códigos) para la producción/recepción de mensajes. En la medida en que introduce un nuevo sistema conceptual que hace posible a la vez que imposible la oposición forma/contenido, el término “medio” viene, así, a desplazar el plano de inmanencia de dicha distinción estética y la clausura metafísica de las oposiciones derivadas o asociadas a ella. De modo tal que el concepto ditelliano de “mediatización” prefigura elaboraciones postestructuralistas tales como la propuesta por el teórico canadiense contemporáneo Ian Angus (2000: 135–136; 141–147) sobre el “medio” en tanto que “Materialidad Externa” capaz de desplazar oposiciones metafísicas tales como contenido/efecto, dialéctica/retórica, contenido interno/efecto persuasivo (contexto institucional), o verdad/retórica, es decir adentro/afuera (o interior/exterior). En términos de la experiencia (anti)happenista ditelliana, se trata del desplazamiento de la oposición contexto real/contexto imaginario, y de la serie de oposiciones asociadas a ella: contexto real/medio, contexto/texto, realidad/representación, realidad/ficción, etc.

Un concepto de mediatización así entendido remite a la noción derridiana de artefactualidad o escritura teletecnológica (Derrida y Stiegler 1998). La tecnicidad o archiescritura, parece demostrar la experiencia

argentina, es la *condición estructural* (*material y formal*, en nuestra lectura de Masotta) que hace posible el sentido. Si bien en las reflexiones teóricas ditellianas no se reconocen referencias a la deconstrucción, el desplazamiento que produce este tercer término “mediatización” es deconstructivo en la medida en que reenvía las oposiciones conceptuales antes mencionadas al problema de los medios: los medios no como instrumentos de contenidos o intenciones preexistentes sino como *materialidades configuradoras de las relaciones sociales y constitutivas de sus propios emplazamientos*. Dos ideas centrales, entonces, en la conceptualización ditelliana sobre el proceso de mediatización: a) su espesor *material* significante, y b) su carácter *configurador* o *constitutivo*, y no simplemente representativo, respecto del mundo y de las relaciones sociales.

A partir de un análisis exhaustivo de sus (anti)happenings y obras comunicacionales (Olivera 2004), he detectado cuatro aportes fundamentales de las experimentaciones estéticas ditellianas a una teoría de la mediatización: (1) materialidad artefactual, (2) configuración del mundo, (3) discontinuidad/ ambientación, y (4) diferenciales materiales intermedíaticos.

1. La mediatización como materialidad artefactual y sus procesos de desmaterialización

Respecto de la mediatización en tanto que condición *material* de posibilidad e imposibilidad del sentido, quisiera insistir sobre el énfasis ditelliano en la materialidad mediática y sus procesos inmanentes de desmaterialización. En este punto, es interesante observar su crítica a cierto reduccionismo estructuralista que sólo consideraba las estructuras – códigos o condiciones formales – pero que era insensible a la materialidad del medio (a las condiciones materiales de la mediatización). En este sentido, la concepción de Masotta fue más allá del horizonte del estructuralismo y de la crítica ideológica marxista, esbozando una noción de mediatización particularmente sensible a su dimensión específicamente material y configuradora del mundo (para lo cual se inspira parcialmente en McLuhan). Esta contribución de Masotta en 1967 prefigura la concepción postestructuralista de la mediatización, sobre la Externalidad radical del medio (de comunicación) como superficie de inscripción material (Angus 2000: 97) o escritura teletecnológica (Derrida y Stiegler 1998).

Con ejemplos tomados de los (anti)happenings, de las tendencias *pop* en las artes visuales, de las historietas y del cine argentino contemporáneo, Masotta reivindica la *conciencia estética sobre los medios* por parte de la vanguardia artística argentina de los sesenta. Las búsquedas fundamentales de los happenistas y del grupo *pop* no habrían estado orientadas, así, a la forma ni directamente a los contenidos, sino a los *medios* en tanto superficies *materiales* que hacen posible la transmisión de esos contenidos, es decir en tanto que *condiciones de posibilidad* de la comunicación. Es precisamente esta suerte de *conciencia artefactual* sobre los medios aquello que conduce a las operaciones de desplazamiento y descentramiento antes aludidas (Jacoby 1967: 128). Es de destacar, en esta “reflexión radical sobre las características materiales” de los “medios” estéticos (Masotta 1968: 223), que el proceso de mediatización esta intrínsecamente asociado a un momento de *hibridez* en el campo del arte: la mediatización como aquel tercer término y como aquel vector de hibridación que hoy podríamos llamar deconstructivo.

2. Configuración del mundo en la mediatización

Conjuntamente a esta puesta en primer plano de la materialidad significativa, el otro gran aporte de las experimentaciones y conceptualizaciones ditellianas radicó en el carácter *configurativo* (antes que reproductivo o representativo) de la mediatización respecto del mundo y respecto de la constitución simbólica de los grupos sociales. Lo que esta operación teórica produce como efecto, en el plano de la reflexión sobre los medios, es un desplazamiento respecto del problema de la alienación (de los contenidos o representaciones alienantes).

Es decir: sabemos que, contra el carácter alienante de las representaciones reificadas por la forma-mercancía, los happenings de Lebel aspiraban a ser “un medio de expresión directa y sin intermediarios” (Páez 1967: 35). Nada más lejos de las experimentaciones formales del Di Tella, focalizadas sobre, precisamente, el proceso de mediatización. Lo que parece sugerir la experiencia argentina es cómo los medios – sus condiciones materiales y sus operaciones formales – son capaces de producir un mundo (sus condiciones), y no simplemente de alienar contenidos de conciencias y representaciones sociales. Los (anti)happenings ditellianos fueron, así, en lo esencial, experimentos que pretendieron demostrar los fundamentos materiales y formales de la comunicación y de la constitución del sentido en los grupos

sociales en el marco de una sociedad de masas. Esto es especialmente claro en *El helicóptero* (Masotta, 1966) y *Happening de la participación total* (Costa, Escari y Jacoby, 1966).

3. *La mediatización como discontinuidad y ambientación*

Los ditellianos hacen suyo el interés de la estética contemporánea por el proceso de mediatización. Dicho interés conceptual puede, en Masotta, condensarse en dos términos – *discontinuidad* y *ambientación* – referidos, respectivamente, a los polos de producción y recepción de las obras. Es decir, el proceso de mediatización atraviesa los (anti)happenings ditellianos tanto mediante la producción de discontinuidad (simultaneidad, sucesividad, etc.) como mediante la inducción de efectos de ambientación en sus espectadores-participantes. Discontinuidad “en producción” y ambientación “en reconocimiento”; (Verón 1987) definen, así, las operaciones de los (anti)happenings.

Según el régimen visual de la estética tradicional (pintura figurativa, expresionismo abstracto, teatro convencional), “sólo hay saltos y discontinuidades entre el campo de objetos reales, al que abre la percepción, y los objetos irreales de la actitud imaginante” (Masotta 1967: 59), esto es, entre percepción e imaginación. Es decir, sólo se admiten rupturas, fronteras y discontinuidades entre contexto real y contexto imaginario, entre marco y cuadro, entre teatro y escenario, pero nunca en el interior de los segundos términos. Pero, a partir de la obra de Rauschenberg, Masotta (ibid.) señalará dos movimientos u operaciones:

a) Por un lado, una perturbación que produce discontinuidad en el interior mismo del contexto imaginario: éste ya no aparece como un “campo cerrado” que permitiría “una lectura continua del sentido”; este efecto de discontinuidad se logra mediante operaciones combinatorias (los “combine” de Rauschenberg o la técnica happenista de la “estructura compartimentada” que aísla parámetros y compartimentos).

b) Por otro lado, la borradura de la discontinuidad entre el contexto real e imaginario de la obra; esta operación se manifiesta en los happenings como participación envolvente.

Combinatoria de elementos discontinuos (yuxtaposición simultánea y sucesiva de componentes y parámetros en los happenings) y *borradura de*

la discontinuidad entre contextos (participación envolvente) serán los dos momentos constitutivos de una estética de la discontinuidad. Si la primera operación produce discontinuidad allí donde sólo había continuidad (el interior del contexto imaginario, la escena), la segunda operación generará una continuidad y un principio de unidad entre dos contextos tradicionalmente separados (imaginario/real; escena/teatro; cuadro/marco). Procedimiento de inversión, entonces, de aquellas convenciones de la representación que distribuyen lo continuo de lo discontinuo para fundar una escena.

En los happenings, la *inversión* es una operación de lectura del sentido que interviene en el propio proceso de producción de las obras: se propone una lectura discontinua allí donde debería haber sentido continuo (escena) y se inducen continuidades entre contextos que deberían permanecer separados y discontinuos. Es decir, las operaciones de inversión se efectúan en el vínculo mismo entre texto y contexto, o contexto imaginario y contexto real, y se manifiestan como “invasión” textual del contexto, y contaminación del contexto imaginario (escena) por el contexto real (participantes, sala teatral).

La estética ditelliana de la discontinuidad se manifestó, entonces, como experimentación analítica con la materialidad de los “parámetros” y con la permanente hibridación entre elementos del contexto real y del contexto imaginario. En las reflexiones de Masotta hay una conclusión fuerte sobre el vínculo entre, por un lado, el “pasaje a la discontinuidad” del arte contemporáneo y, por otro lado, el proceso de mediatización. Es decir, entre una ruptura estético-epistémica y un proceso socio-tecnológico. Dicho vínculo es intelectual y se presenta como visibilidad: la experimentación y la reflexión estética hacen visible el hecho de que las relaciones entre los hombres están “irremediablemente mediatizadas por la técnica y por las cosas” (Masotta 1967: 53). Mediatización y discontinuidad, entonces: esta estética del objeto que “se fabrica” con “materiales discontinuos” apunta a una *conciencia artefactual de fabricación* capaz de desafiar el mito de la continuidad de la obra, “el mito de la vida misma” como continuidad (Barthes, citado por Masotta 1967: 72).

La *ambientación*, por su parte, será la categoría estética a partir de la cual los ditellianos elaboraron el polo del reconocimiento del proceso de mediatización. Y otra vez, la categoría de ambientación remite precursoramente a la teoría mediática postestructural de Angus. En efecto, el

crítico canadiense entiende la Externalidad material de los medios como el “media environment in the social formation: the plurality of media of communication, their interactions and the translations ‘in’ and ‘out’ of the medium in question” (Angus 2000: 139). Los términos de esta definición son más que sugerentes: la mediatización es, en lo fundamental, un “media environment”, un ambiente mediático o, más bien, un ambiente siempre ya mediatizado. No es otra cosa lo que Marta Minujin intentó demostrar en su ambientación *Simultaneidad en simultaneidad* (también elocuentemente denominada por ella misma *Señal de ambientación*).

Recordemos aquí que en la ambientación “simultaneidad en simultaneidad”, el proceso de mediatización se elabora como invasión textual-mediática del contexto real, en aquello que Verón (1967) lee desde la teoría estructuralista como neutralización de la oposición medio/contexto (es decir, en la terminología happenista: neutralización de la oposición contexto real/contexto imaginario). La mediatización se presenta así como invasión mediática del contexto (real): el contexto (real) está siempre ya mediatizado, parece sugerir el happening de Marta Minujin.

La dimensión de la ambientación es fundamental en la experimentación ditelliana sobre la mediatización en la medida en que hace visible el polo de los efectos de los medios no como mero contexto o accidente exterior, sino como condición de posibilidad inherente e interior al accionar significativo de los propios medios. Los (anti)happenings ditellianos intentaron mostrar precisamente el carácter siempre ya mediatizado del contexto real: es decir, en la terminología de Angus (2000: 146–147), el carácter mediáticamente construido del “horizonte”, del mundo.

4. *Los diferenciales materiales intermediáticos y la mediatización*

En estrecha relación con el concepto estético de “discontinuidad”, otro aporte sustantivo de los (anti)happenings ditellianos a la reflexión sobre el proceso de mediatización es la noción de *diferencial* intermediático. Tomando la concepción estructuralista del lenguaje y del sentido como diferencia, los ditellianos trasladan y reinscriben dicha noción de diferencial a la materialidad y externalidad significativa de los medios. Esto es, el sentido es diferencia y negatividad no sólo formal (como nos lo enseña la concepción estructuralista de “código”) sino material: los emplazamientos

o superficies de inscripción de esa diferencialidad material son los medios. Las experimentaciones con los diferenciales de comunicación entre medios – claramente visibles en *El mensaje fantasma*, *El Helicóptero* y *Happening para un jabalí difunto*– conceptualizaron los medios como espaciamentos o superficies materiales de inscripción (escritura teletecnológica). Es decir, los medios como externalidades materiales y como productores de un horizonte/mundo en la interacción y traducción intermediática.

(Anti)happenings mediáticos realizados en el marco de las actividades del Di Tella como *El mensaje fantasma*, u otros en los que no intervienen medios masivos como *Entre en discontinuidad* de Raúl Escari, experimentaron sobre la “discontinuidad” o *diferencia* existente en un mismo contenido transmitido o ambientado, discontinuamente, por distintos medios.

Pero el concepto de diferencial no se puso en juego solamente en la singularidad de los happenings antes mencionados: estuvo presente, como horizonte teórico, en el programa estético antihappening sobre un “arte de los medios de comunicación de masas”. La estética ditelliana antihappening fue una estética de los diferenciales y de las mediaciones, y supuso, de un modo original, operaciones de inversión respecto del horizonte de inmediatez característico de los happenings y de las ambientaciones europeos y norteamericanos. Es decir, si el happening buscaba una comunicación sin mediaciones, el arte mediático se sustentará en el principio inverso, esto es, en el carácter primario del proceso de mediatización: “el medio masivo de comunicación es un medio de lo que de inmediato hay en la mediatización del objeto”. (Masotta, citado por Jacoby 1967: 131)

En este punto el proceso de mediatización conecta con la estética de la discontinuidad: desmaterialización y “desrealización de los objetos” (Jacoby et al. 1967: 122). De allí que, en su arte de los medios, Jacoby esté apuntando precisamente a una estética “anti-happening”, a un arte de las mediaciones que supone siempre, necesariamente, una distancia espacial o diferencia/diferancia, entre las audiencias que reciben la información y los objetos o acontecimientos referidos o representados por ésta.

En esta línea de reflexión sobre los diferenciales intermediáticos, y a manera de original aporte teórico en el campo, Masotta (1968: 271) propone un estructuralismo “ensanchado” cuyo campo sean “las diferencias ... y semejanzas entre los medios de comunicación”. En semejante campo diferencial, la especificidad de cada medio reside en su materialidad puesto que

cada medio de comunicación extrae su potencia de significar de la presencia de otros medios. ... se trata de pensar la comunicación masiva como definiéndose no tanto en el interior de los límites trazados por cada medio, sino siempre *afuera de esos límites*, en un campo donde la comunicación sólo encuentra sus vehículos a condición de no proceder nunca sino a través de *desvíos*. (Masotta 1968: 272; enfatizados míos).

Masotta propone entonces complementar el análisis estructural de los mensajes (códigos) con la “descripción del campo diferencial de los medios de comunicación *en cuyo interior los mensajes se sitúan*” (ibid.), es decir con la especificidad de los medios en tanto que emplazamientos o superficies de inscripción material de los discursos. Con lo cual, las experimentaciones y teorizaciones ditellianas sobre los diferenciales intermediáticos prefiguraron lo que unos treinta años más tarde las teorías postestructurales de los medios llegaron a formular (Angus 2000: 145).

En conclusión, puede afirmarse que la noción de *mediatización* (discontinuidad/ ambientación; materialidad artefactual/poder configurativo), tal como aparece delineada por Masotta, Jacoby y demás intelectuales vinculados al Instituto Di Tella en sus textos críticos de los sesenta, constituye un verdadero *protoconcepto*: anticipa el concepto homónimo que Eliseo Verón (1984, 1992, 1997) desarrollará durante los años ochenta y noventa a propósito de la interfaz entre política y medios, entre discurso político y discurso de la información. Supone, además, un alto grado de conciencia (estética) artefactual, lo cual aproxima las operaciones críticas masottianas al concepto derridiano de “artefactualidades” (Derrida y Stiegler 1998).

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Bruno Osimo

Translation as misunderstanding

1. What is translation?

According to Aleksandr Lûdskanov, translation can be defined as replacement of the signs encoding a message with signs of another code, preserving (so far as it is possible in the face of entropy) invariant information with respect to a given system of reference (1975: 7). This definition recalls another very well-known statement that was not devoted to interlingual translation: “A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign.” The resemblance of the two sentences emphasizes that every “translation” is an interpretant, or a translant, of another text. This has obvious consequences for translation science, where the importance of the semiotic, Peircean approach is apparent. But it has also consequences for semiotics, where the importance of the translational approach should appear evident.

1.1 Why translation is a misunderstanding

According to a dictionary, “misunderstanding” is “a failure to understand or interpret *correctly*” (my emphasis). But in *Universe of Mind*, Lotman is very clear about the fact that no such thing as a ‘correct translation’ can exist outside artificial languages, where “the correct solution of mathematical problems does not create new texts”. If we agree that translation cannot be tautology, then we agree that translation creates new texts. Interlingual translation is a creative process (“*Translation $L^N \rightarrow L^{N'}$ is a creative process, consisting in the transformation of the units of language RC, in which the*

sender's message M is encoded into units of another language RC ; reproducing a constant information $I=I'$ so far as possible"; Lûdskanov 1975: 6), after which nothing – within or without the text – is any longer the same. Translational misunderstanding is something that diminishes the proto-text meaning, and at the same time increases it, as can be said of any misunderstanding:

Since in this case the meaning is not only the invariant remnant which is preserved under all manner of transformational operations, but also what is altered in the process, we can state that there is an increase of meaning in the process of such transformations.

And this is what does happen in general communication: Someone tries to say something to someone, that is taken partly from the semiosphere (outer influences), partly from inner creativity. What he wants to say is partly coded, partly uncoded (missed, lost), so that the receiver cannot wholly perceive it. What he finally does say is partly understood, partly misunderstood, so that the receiver doesn't wholly receive even what is finally coded by the sender. But the receiver attaches meanings to the messages that were not meant to be meant by the sender. So the message, in the receiver's terms, has less meaning than the sender meant, but has also more meaning than the sender meant.




Figure 1. *Difference of thought content as a consequence of a normal act of communication (not interlingual translation).*

As Levý used to say about translation as a game, signification (and decoding) is a multiple-choice process having a single input and several possible outputs. Every interpretant is a multiplier of sense translating the prototext (initial sign) into many different metatexts. The logical line of the speaker's (writer's) mind chooses given signs while having in mind a given meaning, but the logical line of the listener's (reader's) mind chooses given meanings while having in mind a given interpretation. In this way – through what can be named a continuous “misunderstanding” –, meaning evolves.

Specification and generalization play a fundamental role in the evolution of meaning; it is peculiar, though, that their main explicit features do not imply any semantic change at all: specification should only condense, synthesize the general meaning of a sign, and generalization apparently extends, amplifies the meaning to many more objects, but, seemingly, without changing it.

These two mechanisms, which are key in interlingual verbal translation too, are continuously at work in normal semiosis: “Peirce’s semiotic doctrine is the only sound basis for a strictly linguistic semantics. One can’t help but agree with his view of meaning as translatability of a sign into a network of other signs and with his reiterated emphasis on the inherence of a ‘general meaning’ in any ‘genuine symbol’ [Peirce CP 2.293], as well as with the sequel of the quoted assertion: A symbol ‘cannot indicate any particular thing: it denotes a kind of thing. Not only that, but it is itself a kind and not a single thing’” [Peirce CP 2.301] (Jakobson 1956: 118).

We also know that there is another expressive potential depending not on generalization/specification, but on the use of tropes. Metaphor and metonymy, tropes in general, and different kinds of similarities are not embellishments peculiar to artistic texts; they are basically the fundamental mechanisms of meaning construction, together with generalization and specification.

1.2 Context

The continuous translation process of semiosis is due to the continuous change of context: in every context, a more or less slightly different sub-code is used. And every time that a text moves from one context to the next, there is a reciprocal adaptation of the text to the context and of the

context to the text. And the text is read (decoded) in a more or less slightly different light. During such a passage from one context to another, it may well happen that specification and generalization work in the direction of translating words into terms and vice versa. This also is a mechanism of meaning shift: “The ways in which *per translationem* a *nomen* turns in discourse into a *terminus* were intently explored, with many still valid and suggestive linguistic finds, and with a rigid delimitation of *suppositio formalis* (object language) and different varieties of *suppositio materialis* (metalinguage), neatly discerned by Shyreswoode” (Jakobson 1968: 195).

Interlingual verbal translation and general semiosis have a very similar course, and they can be used for a reciprocal checking of each other’s functioning. Here we see how the invariant can be defined in Jakobson’s (and Shannon’s) terms: “The semiotic definition of a symbol’s meaning as its translation into other symbols finds an effectual application in the linguistic testing of intra- and interlingual translation, and this approach to semantic information concurs with Shannon’s proposal to define information as ‘that which is invariant under all reversible encoding or translating operations’, briefly, as ‘the equivalence class of all such translations’” (Jakobson 1961: 578).

Jakobson himself sees the affinity between tropes (metaphor and metonymy) and usual meaning production in ‘normal’ (non-artistic) texts. The shared assumption between the two researchers is the existence of a part of meaning that is expressed, and another part that is not expressed, and may be – arguably – guessed in different ways by different decoders: “Each and every sign is a *referral (renvoi)* (following the famous *aliquid stat pro aliquo*). The parallelism alluded to by the master and theoretician of poetry, Gerard Manley Hopkins, is a referral from one sign to a similar one in its totality or at least in one of its two facets (the *signans* and the *signatum*). One of the two ‘correlative’ signs, as Saussure designates them, refers back to another, present or implied in the same context, as we can see in the case of metaphor where only the ‘vehicle’ is *in presentia*” (Jakobson 1974: 215).

In this process of decoding, the presence/absence of elements means that what is absent in the text must be present in the context. Such problem of presence involves referral to different times. Peirce attributes three different times to the three types of signs (symbol-future, index-present, icon-past). Jakobson holds that artifice (*priëm*) as a fourth dimension of

signification is a bridge over times: “Parallelism’ as a characteristic feature of all artifice is the referral of a semiotic fact to an equivalent fact inside the same context ... allows us to complement the system of times which Peirce includes in his semiotic triad The artifice retains the *atemporal* interconnection of the two parallels within their common context” (Jakobson 1974: 216).

Translation is transportation of a text from one context into another. And, on the other side, communication is the ability to decide what is necessary to express and what can be taken/given for granted since it is suggested by the context, with all the consequent problems of redundancy and loss.

2. *Limits of translational misunderstanding*

Any translation may be a misunderstanding, but not every misunderstanding – from a pragmatic point of view, at least – is a translation. There are many ways in which a text is rejected as a translation (on the market, at school), and there are many types of limit separating translation from what I would call a “delusion”. Delusions are false or “incorrect inferences about external reality” (Spitzer 1990); from this definition one can see that the notion of “delusion” is culture-specific, not absolute. There is a relation between the overcoming of all the three types of limit and a delusional or exceedingly self-referential attitude.

2.1 Voluntary *versus* involuntary misunderstanding

There are two possible types of misunderstanding: involuntary misunderstandings, due to the interpreter’s competence, or to the anisomorphism of codes, and voluntary misunderstandings, due to the wish to manipulate a text. If the problem is considered from the point of view of translation criticism, such a difference is neglectable, since it is often impossible to tell which the case is. But from the theoretical point of view we can distinguish the two different types.

In translation criticism, misunderstanding (translation shift) is seen from the point of view of the text’s reception. In semiotics, misunderstanding is seen from the point of view of communication, the communicative node where loss occurs. For this reason, grids usually used to classify trans-

lation shifts (e.g. Osimo 2004) cannot be used to comment misunderstanding from a semiotic point of view.

2.2 Group culture

This refers to the knowledge of the two different cultural contexts in which the prototext and the metatext are originated.

2.2.1 Source group culture

Knowledge of the source group culture can be defective (and difficult to decode; involuntary misunderstanding), or there may be a manipulative wish not to decode it into the target culture (voluntary misunderstanding).

2.2.2 Involuntary source group culture misunderstanding

Source contextual culture as limit for understandability (i.e. for the interpreter it is difficult to decode the functioning of the source group culture, and she/he misunderstands it); for example:

[mis]assumption:	prototext	metatext
"Samovar" is Russian for "teapot".	"Please, bring me the <i>samovar</i> ."	"Please, bring me the <i>teapot</i> ."

Voluntary source group culture misunderstanding: Source contextual culture as limit for misunderstandability (i.e. the interpreter is not willing to transfer her knowledge of the functioning of the source group culture); for example:

[mis]assumption:	prototext	metatext
"Samovar" is not the Russian for "teapot", because it refers to a different cultural tradition, but for the purpose of this communication this is not significant.	"Please, bring me the <i>samovar</i> ."	"Please, bring me the <i>teapot</i> ."

2.2.3 Target group culture

Knowledge of the target group culture can be defective (and it may be difficult to recode the message in it; involuntary misunderstanding), or there may be a manipulative wish not to recode the source group culture into the target culture (voluntary misunderstanding).

Involuntary target group, cultural misunderstanding: contextual culture as limit for understandability (i.e. for the interpreter it is difficult to recode the message of the source group culture in the target group culture's terms); for example:

[mis]assumption:	prototext	metatext
"moca" is the Italian for "coffee maker".	"Please, bring me the <i>coffee maker</i> ."	"Please, bring me the <i>moca</i> ."

Voluntary target group, culture misunderstanding: Target contextual culture as limit for misunderstandability (i.e. in a given culture it is "socially unbecoming" to overcome given interpretive limits); for example:

[mis]assumption:	prototext	metatext
"moca" is not the Italian for "coffee maker" because it refers to a different cultural tradition, but for the purpose of this communication this is not significant.	"Please, bring me the <i>coffee maker</i> ."	"Please, bring me the <i>moca</i> ."

3. Personal culture

The emitter's and receiver's idiotextual cultures (where one's own culture is "I", and other's culture is "they") poses limits for understandability and, consequently, misunderstandability. The knowledge of the emitter's personal culture can be defective (and difficult to decode; involuntary misunderstanding), or there may be a manipulative wish not to decode it into the receiver's culture (voluntary misunderstanding).

The knowledge of the emitter's culture can be defective (and difficult to decode; involuntary misunderstanding), or there may be a manipulative wish not to decode it into the target group culture (voluntary misunderstanding). Emitter's culture as limit for understandability (i.e. for the interpreter it is difficult to decode the functioning of the emitter's culture, and she misunderstands it):

[mis]assumption:	prototext	metatext
In a text by Umberto Eco, “Diario” is just the name of a personal register of annotations, not the Italian name of a book by the author.	“I once wrote in my <i>Diario</i>”	“I once wrote in my diary.....”

The emitter’s contextual culture may be a limit for misunderstandability (i.e. the interpreter is not willing to transfer her/his knowledge of the functioning of the emitter’s culture); for example:

[mis]assumption:	prototext	metatext
In a text by Umberto Eco, “Diario” is the title of a book (<i>Diario minimo, Misreadings</i>) by the author, but the translator chooses to ignore the fact.	“I once wrote in my <i>Diario</i> ...”	“I once wrote in my diary.....”

The knowledge of the receiver’s personal culture can be defective (and it may be difficult to recode the message in the target culture; involuntary misunderstanding), or there may be a manipulative wish not to recode the receiver’s personal culture into the target culture (voluntary misunderstanding).

The receiver’s personal culture may be the limit for understandability (i.e. for the interpreter it is difficult to recode the message of the receiver’s personal culture in the target culture’s terms).

The receiver’s personal contextual culture may also be the limit for misunderstandability (i.e. for a given receiver it is “socially unbecoming” to overcome given interpretive limits).

The knowledge of the translator’s personal culture can be defective (and it may be difficult to recode the message in the target culture; involuntary misunderstanding), or there may be a manipulative wish not to recode the translator’s personal culture into the target culture (voluntary misunderstanding).

Translator’s personal culture may be a limit for understandability (i.e. for the editor it is difficult to recode the message of the translator’s personal culture in the target culture’s terms).

The translator’s personal contextual culture may be a limit for misunderstandability (i.e. for a given editor it is “socially unbecoming” to overcome given interpretive limits).

4. Intratextual culture

This refers to the knowledge of the two different intratextual cultures: the prototext and the metatext have peculiar microstructures and intratextual links and references.

The knowledge of the source intratextual culture can be defective (and difficult to decode), or it may be impossible to recreate it into the target text (involuntary misunderstanding); or there may be a manipulative wish not to recode it into the target intratextual culture (voluntary misunderstanding). Source intratextual culture as limit for understandability: for the interpreter it is difficult to decode the functioning of the source intratextual culture, and she misunderstands it; or, for the interpreter it is difficult to recode the microtextual source structure into the target microtext, and she fails to do so; for example:

[mis]assumption:	prototext	metatext
In a text by Anton Chekhov, “garden” is just the name of a place with trees and bushes, not the English name of the wild cherry tree garden.	“I wrote that story having the <i>Garden</i> in mind”	“I wrote that story having the garden in mind”

Source intratextual culture may be the limit for misunderstandability (i.e. the interpreter is not willing to transfer her knowledge of the functioning of the source intratextual culture); for example:

[mis]assumption:	prototext	metatext
In a text by Anton Chekhov, “garden” is the English name of the wild cherry tree garden, but I don’t think that this is important for the translation.	“I wrote that story having the <i>Garden</i> in mind”	“I wrote that story having the garden in mind”

The knowledge of the target intratextual culture can be defective (involuntary misunderstanding), or there may be a manipulative wish not to reproduce the target intratextual culture into the target culture (voluntary misunderstanding). Target intratextual culture as limit for understandability; for the interpreter (editor) it is difficult to recode the message of the target intratextual culture in the target culture’s terms. Target intra-

textual culture as limit for misunderstandability; i.e. for a given receiver it is “socially unbecoming” to overcome given interpretive limits.

5. Intertextual culture

This refers to the knowledge of the two different intertextual cultures: the prototext and the metatext have peculiar microstructures and intertextual links and references. The knowledge of the source intertextual culture can be defective (and difficult to decode), or it may be impossible to recreate it into the target text (involuntary misunderstanding); or there may be a manipulative wish not to recode it into the target intertextual culture (voluntary misunderstanding). Involuntary source of intertextual culture misunderstanding: the source intertextual culture as limit for understandability: for the interpreter it is difficult to decode the functioning of the source intertextual culture, and she misunderstands it; or, for the interpreter it is difficult to recode the microtextual source structure into the target microtext, and she fails to do so. Source intertextual culture as limit for misunderstandability: i.e., the interpreter is not willing to transfer her knowledge of the functioning of the source intertextual culture.

The knowledge of the target intertextual culture can be defective (involuntary misunderstanding), or there may be a manipulative wish not to reproduce the target intertextual culture into the target culture (voluntary misunderstanding). Target intertextual culture as limit for understandability; for the interpreter (editor) it is difficult to recode the message of the target intertextual culture in the target culture’s terms. Target intertextual culture as limit for misunderstandability: i.e. for a given receiver it is “socially unbecoming” to overcome given interpretive limits.

6. Translator’s style as preferred misunderstanding

We saw that every translator is subject to two different patterns. The first one, i.e. involuntary mistranslation, involves one’s own culture, education, perspectives, idiosyncrasies; but in the translation process there is also a voluntary implication connected to one’s own translation policy, that is the translator’s views on particular aspects concerning translation. The two patterns are, so to speak, at the opposite ends of Peirce’s “bottomless lake”, the latter being on the surface, the former somewhere in the depth of the lake.

All these aspects are subject to aging, and in the course of time our views of these elements change, thus determining the aging of translations. Every translator chooses – consciously or unconsciously – his own preferred misunderstanding, i.e. variance-invariance combination, and this determines different versions and their aging. But often for the time being the present version of a translator looks like the most ‘appropriate’ and ‘natural’ to him; it is sometimes difficult for him to recognize that a given sentence or footnote implies a general strategic vision of the relationship between the prototext and the receiving culture. (This is why some translators maintain that there is no need for any theory: they don’t realize that they actually do use one.) So it sometimes happens that translators perceive their own strategy only when confronted to the feedback produced by the input of their metatext into the semiosphere. They realize that their originally intended interpretation has been re-interpreted by their readers in ways that they had not foreseen. In other words, they experience the mistranslation of their own (*svof*) when they see the others’ reaction to their mis-discourse.

Two contradictions emerge as characterizing translation: Lotman says that “the meaning is [...] also what is altered in the process”. In other words, a translational strategy aims to devise a text that has an invariant plus a gain, a meaning added. The task of the translator as a cultural mediator does not consist in selecting the informational content that deserves to be transferred into the receiving culture; it consists in selecting – among the different possibilities offered by the concrete means of expression of the receiving culture – the set of meanings to be added in the metatext.

Another contradiction is that even if translation stands for the “culture of the border” (Lotman), such culture cannot be fully aware of its own (personal) borders, or limits. Once again, these have to do with the bottomless lake. It would be very important for research to focus on translational self-awareness and to rationalize the unconscious aspects of the translation process.

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Gustaf Östberg

Eclectic reflections on incompatibilities in sociotechnical systems

In the present context, the term “sociotechnical” is used for describing a system to signify that it is an assembly of functionally interrelated technical and social entities. These entities differ from each other with respect to the characteristics of their concepts and paradigms. Hence the corresponding incompatibilities that may occur between them have to be taken into account in considerations of the functioning of such systems.

Accordingly, an understanding of the role and importance of incompatibilities cannot be obtained by simply regarding the nature of different entities in isolation. Instead, the sociotechnical systems have to be observed from the inside, as it were. Thus the scope of the present review is to describe such observations and to make an attempt to interpret them from a sociological perspective. Admittedly, the approach is pragmatic in the sense that the aim of these reflections is to shed light on the incompatibilities from non-technical and non-economic points of view.

1. Sociological aspects

One key element in sociological considerations of systems is the communication taking place, within them as well as with their social surroundings, among humans as individuals or in groups and organizations. This refers not only to mental transfer of information and signals but also to communication by other means, for instance by the flow of money in technoeconomic systems or by the exertion of power in political systems. According to this principle, a particularly well-functioning type of systems, with respect to internal communication, are those that have been developed by self reproduction, or autopoiesis. However, what is crucial for the function of many systems is the effectiveness of their communication with their surroundings.

In order to really understand a system, the observer has to be a participant in it. Obviously then, the evaluation of the communication is dependent on the nature of the observation system applied, since this determines the perception obtained. Furthermore, the dynamics of communication means that the contingencies of the system introduce a variability that may either be an option for the communication or a threat to the stability of the system.

2. *Cases*

The first example is the incompatibility between, on the one hand, materials specialists who develop computerized databases and the designers and manufacturing engineers for whom these bases are aimed on the other. It would seem that such computerization of data should present a perfect means for supporting those who are selecting and evaluating materials for constructions. However, most of the many projects working towards this development have failed (Östberg 1990: 127–138).

The basic reason for this failure has been that the difference in perspective of materials between the two parties has been neglected. The education of materials specialists makes them focus mainly on micro phenomena, while the users of materials are less interested in such scientific aspects than in the performance of materials on a macro scale.

The next case is the danger of radon in homes. Radon emitted from some common kinds of building materials as well as from the radon-producing ground in some areas in Sweden may be a cause of lung cancer for the inhabitants in such homes. This is a risk of societal concern. Therefore, national agencies responsible for protection against radiation are making efforts to persuade those affected to take measure to reduce the emission of radon.

However, these appeals have met with limited response only. The reason for that seems to be a lack of understanding on the part of the authorities of the attitudes and values of people threatened by this danger. The common procedure of government agencies to approach the public in such situations is to distribute information on scientific technical and medical aspects by mail in official language. This method does not take into account the perspective of ordinary people, who do not regard their houses as neutral technical artefacts but as their personal homes.

A similar issue is the danger of the possible effects on the safety and reliability of sensitive sociotechnical systems of changing habits of alcohol consump-

tion. This risk has been considered by a Swedish national agency for public health in the context of the entry of this country into the European Union. Hence a study of the risk as such and of the means to cope with it was initiated. Again, the orthodox approach of government authorities was found to be unrealistic. Simply collecting statistics on the consumption of alcohol and correlating this with absence from work on Mondays was the usual method of studying such phenomena in the past. However, this came to be considered less suited to provide a true understanding of the problem (Östberg 1997: 163–167). When more refined investigations on conditions on the shop floor were recommended, they could not be accepted by the conventional sociomedical community. Obviously, they did not realize the difference and incompatibility between the micro and macro situations in this case.

Another example of insoluble incompatibilities between an established professional community and a sociologically oriented project occurred a few decades ago in Sweden. As in some other countries, the steel industry was in need of reorganization and reconstruction in order to be able to maintain its competitiveness. This would mean that certain small steel works would have to be phased out. Most of these were located in parts of the country where no other major industries existed that could employ those who would be made redundant. In order to explore the possible options for replacing the threatened steel production with metallurgical enterprises better suited for the particular conditions, a project that also took social aspects into account was launched for a review of the situation. For this study, specialists with metallurgical competence were engaged as well as experts from non-technical disciplines, including persons with experience of community planning, entrepreneurial work, etc. Yet, despite the dedicated efforts of all the parties involved, it soon became apparent that the holistic approach adopted could not be maintained. In particular, there was a reluctance on the part of the iron and steel establishment to associate themselves with activities of this kind. Clear signs of incompatibility between the roles assumed by the different participants could be noted, indicating that the systems in question suffered from a general lack of communication among the parties in what should have been a team.

Some sociotechnical systems of interest from an incompatibility point of view are composed of smaller ones that are related to each other by similarities in certain respects, but not in all individual regards. One example of incompatibilities between overall macro systems and the systems on a micro level is an industry composed of a number of firms. The changes in various aspects of such

an industry are described by macro economists as “general trends”. In the firms within the industry, the changes in question take place at different points in time. In the statistics making up the trend, their individual contributions are hidden by being balanced against each other. Hence it is a difficult task for the management of an individual firm to decide when it should make the change and follow the trend of the industry. The obvious dilemma of this decision is the fact that the characteristics of the micro system of a firm are determined by the particular individual conditions for its existence, which makes it incompatible with the general pattern of the industry as a whole. In order to shed light on the ways of dealing with this dilemma, a number of experienced industrialists were once interviewed about their understanding of it. Without guidance from the information provided by the statistical evidence of the trend, the decision-making process appeared to become somewhat of a game between representatives of different interests in the firms, who often argued with reference to the incompatibility between their particular firm and the industry in general. What one party involved might consider highly significant might be totally irrelevant to the others.

External incompatibilities in sociotechnical systems due to differences in mentality are even more difficult to handle. One conspicuous example is the case of conflicting views on nuclear safety issues between East and West (Östberg 1993: 35–41). After failing to understand one another in projects on cooperation among respective parties concerning, among other things, nuclear reactors of the Chernobyl type, a seminar was once arranged in Moscow about the impact of differences in mentality in considerations of major accidents. The discussion was hastily brought to an end by a statement that Russia had lost more people than any other country in the world by violent death during the last one hundred years, namely some 140 million. In comparison, the Chernobyl catastrophe was considered to be a minor accident only. Apparently the different attitudes in this case can be related to the corresponding mentalities. These, in turn, are rooted in values that have been cultivated in the respective civilizations by tradition, which makes the incompatibilities in question difficult to handle.

3. General discussion

The common feature of the cases described that will be dealt with below is the imperfections of the communication. Thus the main cause of failure of computerized materials databases was the conceptual misfit between, on the one

hand, materials science and technology and the industrial design and manufacture on the other. It is true that these two parties may have been able to communicate about each other but not with each other.

In the case of the risk of radon in homes, the situation is analogous. From the public health authority's point of view, its communicative functional system fulfilled all the so-called rational requirements that can be placed on presenting the medical and technical aspects of the risk, as defined in accordance with current scientific concepts of risk. Unfortunately, this does not permit sufficient consideration of the mode of perception of the risk by the persons living in the houses. The fact that their rationality is of a different kind makes it necessary to also take personal values into account to the extent that the issue becomes an existential one.

The dilemma of dealing effectively with the risk associated with possibly changing alcohol habits share the difficulty of communication observed in the previous case. Again, the health authority in question works efficiently as far as its method of investigation is considered only from the point of view of scientific rationality and disregards the personal aspect of the systems phenomenon to be examined, including the imprint of values on the attitudes of the individuals concerned.

Another analogy applies to the neglected need to direct communication with those concerned by contacting them individually instead of treating them as statistical numbers. An additional complicating factor is the contingency of the system with respect to the interrelation between, on the one hand, excessive alcohol consumption and the affected individuals' importance for the safety of the system on the other. Furthermore, the reluctance of the sociotechnical community to engage in the unorthodox kind of study recommended indicates that their means of communication with others outside their professional system are inadequate or limited. Apparently, there was also a fear of losing authority involved.

The same incompatibility phenomenon occurred in the project aiming at developing a new sociotechnical system for future steel production. In fact, a great deal of the efforts of the management of the activities was devoted to establishing true communication between the different parties, but eventually their professional interests carried greater weight. Once it became evident that the prospects for certain disciplines to dominate were not as large as expected, their representatives initiated a kind of power game. In such a situation, "soft" subjects have difficulties in vindicating their positions

against “hard” ones. The tendency for the latter to govern the communication by determining the language for the communication is part of the explanation. This, in turn, creates incompatibilities even where they were not present from the beginning.

The case of making decisions in a firm about adapting it to a general trend in the industrial branch to which it belongs differs from the previous ones, since most of the attention here is on communication with the surroundings of the firm regarded in a systemic perspective. Accordingly, the focus is on the conceptual incompatibility between the external macro system of the industry as a whole as opposed to the micro system of the industrial firm, where decision-making concerns the point in time when the contemplated change is to take place. Thus external communication provides part of the basis for the firm’s decision-makers, who have to identify relevant similarities and differences between their enterprise and others in the same industry. Their problem is the fact that the information they can obtain in this way is of a nature that may make it largely incompatible with the characteristics of the system of the firm. In this situation, they are hampered by having to resort to the observation system that they use in their activities in the firm.

One further difficulty in comparison with the previous cases of incompatibilities is the existence of a relatively large number of contingencies to take into account. As a consequence, the functioning of the system of the firm cannot be predicted and evaluated in this case solely on the basis of the communication partners as such. Sometimes the variety of options in the decision-making process may lead to seemingly more or less chaotic situations. However, effective rationalities can be recognized by analysts in economic history (Östberg 2001: 288–294).

Similarly, the impact of the observation system on the perception of a sociotechnical system is very obvious in the case of differences in mentality between East and West in considerations of nuclear risks. While the communication networks in both camps may largely be developed according to common principles and practice, it is the eclectic use of them that gives rise to conflicting opinions due to the corresponding incompatibilities. The importance of the nature of the observation system for the perception of sociotechnical systems is a common denominator in most of the cases referred to. One crucial aspect of this is the social position of the observer. As has been indicated in some contexts above, the role of observers as representatives of authorities or other bodies associated with power may have had a decisive aggravating influ-

ence on the occurrence of incompatibilities in certain situations. Coupled to an inclination for maintaining prestige, this can endanger any effort aiming at bridging gaps between the parties involved.

4. *Final remarks*

The reflections that can thus be made about incompatibilities in sociotechnical systems prompt questions about what could possibly be done in order to make these systems function in ways that may render them not only internally efficient but also externally effective. Unfortunately, in the particular perspective adopted in the present review, sociological systems theory does not seem to provide any simple answers to such queries. On the contrary, the basic concept of communicatively functioning social systems excludes, in principle, the possibility of steering them, at least by intervention from the outside.

The only way of resolving the dilemmas of these systems, as they have been described in the cases discussed in the present review, is for them to transform themselves internally in a creative manner. Again, this is not an easy process for which precise rules or recommendations can be prescribed. In principle, what could be done is to stimulate the evolution of a change of mind.

There are, of course, limits to what can be achieved even by clear insights into the nature of the incompatibilities in question. We have to realize that they are not occasional or irrational, but inherent characteristics of sociotechnical systems. Therefore, the best we can do is to accept this state of affairs and to avoid anything that could make it worse. After all, as Kierkegaard says: "A logical system can be given, a system of existence cannot" (Kierkegaard 1992: 109).

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Nanta Novello Paglianti

Les parcours de la compréhension et de la mécompréhension dans les œuvres de l'Art Brut

1. La problématique de la mécompréhension

Le dictionnaire de Greimas et Courtés (1993: 56) dit à propos de la compréhension : “en sémiotique la compréhension peut être identifiée à la définition du concept, assimilé lui-même à la dénomination. Dans ce cas, il est légitime de partir de la compréhension d’un sémème, en précisant toute fois qu’il peut comprendre des sèmes négatifs (les propriétés absentes), du fait que la signification réside dans la saisie des différences, ce que le concept n’admet pas dans sa compréhension.” Reste au sémioticien la tâche de dévoiler ces différences à l’aide du parcours génératif. La conception qui est à la base du parcours considère tout objet sémiotique selon le mode de sa production. Normalement en partant des structures profondes on peut arriver à celles de surface. Le Dictionnaire même dit (ibid.: 158): “les articulations qui interviennent dans ce processus [de production] s’articulent les unes avec les autres selon un parcours qui va du plus simple au plus complexe, du plus abstrait au plus concret.

D’où viennent les problèmes d’incompréhension du texte? Il faudrait dégager des structures et la signification comme parcours à travers les différents niveaux de pertinence et, par conséquent, le sens même du texte devait affleurer à la surface. On a vu que les problèmes ne sont pas tous résolus. J. Fontanille dit (2001: 107–131):

on voit clairement comment “travaille” une théorie générative: en jouant à la fois sur l’effectif et sur l’homogénéité de chaque niveau de pertinence, ainsi que sur la place des variables dans la hiérarchie de ces niveaux, elle tend progressivement à réduire chaque niveau à un “noyau dur” uni-caté-

goriel et homogène, par un tri progressif qui élimine les catégories “parasites” ou résiduelles appartenant à d’autres niveaux de pertinence.

Et dit Greimas (1993: 111–112): “Concevoir la théorie sémiotique sous la forme d’un parcours consiste alors à l’imaginer comme un cheminement marqué de jalons, certes, mais surtout comme un écoulement coagulant du sens, comme son épaissement continu...”

Ce dynamisme qui caractérise la sémiotique reste présent aussi dans la théorisation la plus récente de Fontanille (2007) sur les niveaux de pertinence. Le déploiement des différentes et successives manifestations du plan de l’expression et leur progressif enchaînement, permettent aussi d’élargir la compréhension, niveau par niveau, de l’objet étudié.

Comment agir quand les passages à un niveau successif sont problématiques? Pourrait-on envisager la mécompréhension comme un blocage du sens d’un niveau à l’autre et entre les mêmes niveaux? Ce qui serait donc incompréhensible serait un saut logique ou peut-être simplement un brouillement du sens d’un niveau à l’autre.

On va prendre en considération des œuvres picturales du mouvement artistique de l’Art Brut qui semblent justement poser des problèmes dans leur déroulement. Les difficultés sont des plus variées et les obstacles se posent à différents niveaux.

D’abord, rappelons qu’il s’agit d’un mouvement qui comprend des artistes “outsiders”, malgré eux. Ce sont des créateurs qui ont passé la plus grande partie de leur existence, internés dans des hôpitaux psychiatriques sans presque aucun échange avec l’extérieur. On a déjà un problème de définition ambiguë du statut, de la position de l’artiste à l’intérieur de ce courant. Ensuite vient le problème du “déchiffrement” des œuvres produites. Comment s’y prendre quand les signes sont obscurs? Que faire face à une co-présence de mots, de formes iconiques et plastiques, de chiffres, de couleurs et de traits les plus disparates? Comment réagir face à un détournement, voire un cryptage de ces signes visuels et graphiques, accessibles à leur seul créateur?

En restant au niveau du signifiant, on voit réunis ensemble différents langages sémiotiques : iconique, graphique, plastique; leur union engendre des signes nouveaux appartenant certes à ces différentes composantes mais s’en dégageant ensuite de manière autonome. Les différentes grilles de lecture comme les stratégies les plus diverses d’approche du texte ne

parviennent pas à rendre compte du parcours de sens de cette production artistique. Et le spectateur-lecteur semble être confronté à un véritable court-circuit sémantique. Inévitablement, la difficulté de traitement de certains textes pousse le lecteur à chercher dans l'espace environnant ces derniers (con-texte, co-texte, pratique textuelle), des éléments qui puissent contribuer à la construction d'un parcours plus structuré et cohérent.

En outre, l'ambiguïté du message est présente aussi au niveau du contenu: pas de signification évidente, opérations de masquage à la limite du non-sens.

Enfin, l'énonciation se manifeste sous différents aspects: elle est polyphonique, morcelée, contradictoire, incomplète et semble émaner de différentes instances énonçantes qui donnent vie à des expressions iconiques variées et indéfinies. On va se centrer en particulier sur un peintre italien qui invente, à sa manière, des rapports nouveaux entre mot et image. Le traitement de l'expression graphique et de celle iconique suscitent des effets de mélange, de patchwork intéressants.

2. Le cas de Carlo Zinelli: En quoi consiste l'incompréhension?

L'auteur naît dans un petit village à côté de Vérone en 1916. Il fréquente quelques années de l'école primaire et ensuite il est contraint à travailler à la campagne. Ensuite il exerce pour un certain temps comme boucher dans une boutique de la ville. En 1936, il part comme volontaire pour la guerre d'Espagne où il est engagé comme chasseur alpin. À la moitié de la guerre, il est renvoyé à cause de troubles hallucinatoires. Il est interné dans l'hôpital psychiatrique de S. Giacomo alla Tomba. Surpris par le personnel infirmier à gratter des murs et à les couvrir de graffitis, il est invité à participer à l'atelier de peinture de l'hôpital. Il commence son activité de peintre avec une régularité exceptionnelle. Il produira plus de 3.000 œuvres jusqu'à ce que l'hôpital soit transféré dans un autre établissement. Là bas son activité commencera à décliner jusqu'à sa mort en 1972 (cf. Andreoli & Marinelli 2001).

Le parcours artistique de Zinelli commence avec la peinture à la gouache sur des feuilles données pas la structure de soin. On peut retracer le début de sa création avec l'apparition d'icônes de très grand format qui petit à petit se rétrécissent pour laisser de l'espace à l'écriture. D'abord elle

se concentre dans les petits coins de la toile où l'image prédomine encore. Ensuite, elle est "protégée" par des formes circulaires à travers lesquelles elle gagne beaucoup plus d'ampleur. Enfin, la période la plus remarquable comprend une phase de stabilisation où les liens entre mot et image se diversifient et se compliquent. La phase de la maturité entre 1967 et 1970 voit deux manifestations précises: d'une part, on retrouve l'icône encore dominante et l'écriture qui est disposée tout autour, de l'autre part, le graphème et l'icône qui ont la même taille et interagissent entre eux.

La particularité de cet auteur est qu'il expérimente des relations nouvelles. Une créativité particulière qui bouleverse l'union de mot et image. On retrouve des liens pas clairs. On ne comprend pas pourquoi des mots semblent se référer à une image sans une suite logique.

Commençons, par l'exemple de la toile n° 824b, 1970, qui est comprise dans la période finale dont on parlait précédemment.



Image 1. Carlo Zinelli, « Pinocchio » pesce e figure a più colori, n° 824 b, 12 juin 1970, pastelles à cire et crayons colorés sur papier, 50x70, collection privée, Vérone, Italie.

D'abord les images ne sont pas claires. Il s'agit de quoi? En suivant de plus près le parcours artistique de l'auteur, on peut mettre en relation cette œuvre avec son recto (image 2).




Image 2. Carlo Zinelli, « Pinocchio » e figure a più colori su sfondo a scritte, 12 giugno 1970, n° 824 a, pastelles à cire et crayons colorés sur papier, collection privée, Vérone, Italie.

L'artiste avait l'habitude, pour certains tableaux, de peindre le recto et le verso de la feuille.

On s'aperçoit d'une homogénéité de couleur et des formes qui occupent le centre de la composition. La reconnaissance des formes du monde naturel, pratiquées avec des pastels, devient déjà plus ardue. Des personnages, plus ou moins humanisés, se déploient au centre de la feuille, entourés d'autres formes animalesques et d'autres encore moins définissables. Les personnages semblent être surpris en train d'accomplir une action; le mouvement n'est pas vivant mais au contraire figé et rigide. On pense que ces formes seraient liées entre elles à cause d'une ressemblance chromatique mais on n'en comprend pas la raison.

La substance écrite, tracée par le crayon, s'éparpille dans tous les espaces laissés libres par l'image. Elle n'est pas seulement composée par des graphèmes mais aussi par des petites icônes, des initiales décorées placées au

début des mots, des chiffres et des répétitions de lettres. On s'éloigne donc d'une définition étroite d'écriture. On peut parler de "polyvalence" des substances expressives ou des "polysignes" qui paradoxalement rejoignent leur équilibre dans ce statut incertain de "l'entre deux". Il s'agit de signes qui vivent à la frontière entre mot et image et qui prennent leur force du rapprochement et de la presque soudure entre les deux substances. C'est le cas de la lettre "g" du mot "falegname" (menuisier) qui est montrée soit par son signifiant soit par son signifié (image 3).



Image 3. Carlo Zinelli, « Pinocchio » *pesce e figure a più colori*, n° 824 b, 12 juin 1970, pastelles à cire et crayons colorés sur papier, 50x70, collection privée, Vérone, Italie (détail).

L'écriture semble rester suspendue dans l'air et d'autre fois s'appuyer à quelques traits graphiques. On peut noter comment, par exemple dans la partie en haut à gauche, un trait commence "sous forme" d'icône et se transforme tout au long de la feuille dans une autre icône pour ensuite devenir un mot.

C'est le cas du nombre "11" (image 4) qui devient une fleur pour puis va se camoufler dans des mots incompréhensibles. Les relations de transformation peuvent être envisagées; toutefois le sens reste obscur.

Chaque image garde du texte à côté d'elle mais avec lequel les liens ne sont pas nécessaires. La proximité ne veut pas dire similitude, continuité, lien sémantique. Ensuite, pour ce qui concerne le contenu, on ne retrouve pas de relais directs avec l'image. Certaines fois l'image explique quelques aspects de l'écrit mais dans la majorité des cas les deux substances restent étrangères l'une à l'autre. Pour l'aspect signifiant, mot et image peuvent



Image 4. Carlo Zinelli, « Pinocchio » pesce e figure a più colori, n° 824 b, 12 juin 1970, pastelles à cire et crayons colorés sur papier, 50x70, collection privée, Vérone, Italie (détail).

avoir des ressemblances visuelles mais qui n'entament pas le contenu. Par contre le statut du mot et de l'image est bouleversé, inventé et entièrement remanié.

On a parlé à ce propos "d'écriturisme" (Thévoz 1978: 152) d'un type d'écriture qui prend en considération aussi l'aspect plastique des mots. Les

mots sont bâtis comme des objets mais ils ne sont pas, dans ce cas, peints. Ils sont écrits à la main avec un crayon.

Le mot est manié, retourné en conservant un aspect de continuité et d'alignement comme dans une phrase. Les mots sont unis comme les perles d'un collier mais ils ne gardent pas ni d'homogénéité, ni de succession logique. Leur enchaînement est fictif. Ils se suivent comme dans une succession logique de phrases mais sans que leur sens les suive. L'écriture semble devenir partie intégrante de la texture de l'image par contre en restant sur la surface. L'effet de profondeur est totalement absent. Au contraire elle semble envelopper les formants figuratifs, plus marqués et évidents à cause de leur diverse texture. Le paradoxe est évident: ce qui est tracé d'un geste et d'un trait fin et suspendu (l'écriture à la main), entoure ce qui saute aux yeux pour ses couleurs et sa force gestuelle, l'image. On pourrait y retrouver donc un certain ordre qui, par contre, ne réussit pas à placer les éléments iconiques et graphiques dans une perspective. Une attention particulière devrait être réservée à la modalité sensible, polysensorielle de ces traits graphiques.

En outre, l'importance du geste met en scène les traces du faire et différencie les traces de l'énonciation en acte. La partie en haut à droite est caractérisée par une écriture plus marquée que le reste du tableau. Elle se distingue par une certaine homogénéité par contre caractérisée par une intensité dysphorique de base. L'écriture semble ressortir de la feuille blanche pour s'imposer, dicter une direction de lecture (du haut vers le bas) et rivaliser avec les icônes du tableau. L'apport ressort du support qui le contient provoquant un effet de premier et d'arrière plan. Un effet "à cascade" des mots et une accélération de la lecture s'imposent (image 5).

Sur le plan de l'énonciation, on retrouve le même phénomène. Les instances énonçantes se multiplient sur la feuille. D'abord, l'auteur s'exprime à la 3^{ème} personne au singulier quand il parle de lui-même. Il effectue un débrayage, un éloignement du sujet de son énoncé. Il ne prend pas en charge son acte d'énonciation. L'énoncé semble être extérieur à son énonciateur. Le nom de Carlo est répété plusieurs fois dans différents coins de la feuille (image 6).

Le même traitement est réservé à d'autres noms propres (Bepo, Nino, Aldo, Andrea, Danilo, etc.) qui se suivent dans une liste continue. D'autres phrases traitent des descriptions du monde (pommes de terre, la grenouille, la fontaine) sans aucun critère qui les unisse sauf le fait d'être énoncés.




Image 5. Carlo Zinelli, « Pinocchio » pesce e figure a più colori, n° 824 b, 12 juin 1970, pastelles à cire et crayons colorés sur papier, 50x70, collection privée, Vérone, Italie (détail).



Image 6. Carlo Zinelli, « Pinocchio » pesce e figure a più colori, n° 824 b, 12 juin 1970, pastelles à cire et crayons colorés sur papier, 50x70, collection privée, Vérone, Italie (détail).

On retrouve ensuite des références à la condition historique de l'Italie pendant la guerre. C'est le cas du mot "mitraille" ou simplement on note

des références à des lieux géographiques italiens comme la ville de Vérone même, Saint Candido, la “bassa”, terme en patois de Vérone qui signifie la partie sud de la région Veneto. D’autres phrases encore cherchent de se construire selon une suite grammaticale qui, le plus souvent, est inachevée ou incorrecte.

On peut constater que l’artiste met dans ses toiles des fragments des discours quotidiens, du vécu personnel, des morceaux de phrases qu’il peut avoir entendus à l’intérieur de l’hôpital. En plus la référence au milieu de soin est présente du début de son parcours artistique. Les mots comme “docteur, infirmier, seringue” envahissent les toiles tout au long des différentes périodes. On note aussi que tout ce qui englobe l’univers affectif et émotionnel est éloigné, tenu à l’écart. Par exemple les bribes des discours qu’on retrouve, ressemblent à des prières ou à des litanies répétées sans aucun lien à un contexte bien précis.

L’ensemble du discours est caractérisé par l’impossibilité d’ancrage dans le subjectif et par le collage des instances énonçantes. Il semble que la réalité extérieure envahisse le sujet qui l’organise sur l’espace vide de la toile. Ce qui manque au sujet est la bonne distance entre l’extérieur et l’intérieur. Il n’arrive pas à filtrer les stimuli externes et à ré-élaborer cette matière étrangère.

L’énonciation, donc, n’est presque jamais assumée mais on peut y noter des exceptions. Deux phrases sont remarquables à ce propos: “parlo” (je parle) et “ho veduto due suore” (j’ai vu deux bonnes sœurs). L’énonciation change, quelque chose a été prise en charge par l’énonciateur. On est dans le mode aspectuel duratif pour la première. La formule pourrait s’explicitier ainsi: “Je suis conscient que je parle et je continue à le faire en écrivant ce que je raconte verbalement”. L’autre formule se réfère à un temps passé, mais marqué par une nuance aspectuelle au présent. Le sujet est déjà passé ailleurs.

3. *Conclusions*

La compréhension et l’incompréhension, d’où peuvent-elles surgir? On peut partir du parcours génératif.

Dans le cas de Zinelli, la mécompréhension surgit d’une interruption entre niveaux à l’intérieur du parcours. Par exemple quand on réussit à reconnaître des sèmes ou des nœuds de signification, leur déploiement au

niveau successif reste obscur. Il s'agit d'une césure, d'une coupure entre les passages logiques. Ces "sauts" de signification restent problématiques pour l'interprétation des niveaux ultérieurs. On réussit à concevoir des parcours qui restent par contre inachevés, incomplets et interrompus. Voilà donc apparaître les ambiguïtés de formants, les hybrides, les suspensions, les incohérences dans les relations entre icône et graphème.

Cela dit, nous devons reconnaître que ces hybrides ont leur stabilité en restant à la frontière entre mot et image et qu'ils peuvent subir des évolutions successives à l'intérieur de la production artistique de chaque peintre. Il s'agit par exemple de certains formants qui évoluent dans le temps et auxquels le créateur attribue des significations différentes jusqu'à arriver à une certaine stabilité et cohérence. Ce phénomène nous permet de trouver quelques ancrages dans la compréhension du texte mais les définitions classiques de cohérence, unité et complétude (clôture) qui devraient caractériser sa structure restent floues.

La notion plutôt d'inter-texte et d'un parcours génératif plus étendu qui s'ouvre aux dialogues transversaux à l'intérieur de la production d'un artiste semble plus adapté à ces formes de création artistique. Un parcours exhaustif qui permet la génération des liens entre les différents plans de l'expression (texte, objets, formes de vie) et les contenus qui ces plans véhiculent. Une particulière attention devrait être réservée aux transformations formelles qui, loin d'être simplement des variations, soulignent les étapes de changements significatifs des rapportes entre le créateur et son parcours de vie.

Quand on ne peut pas s'appuyer directement sur les formants (figuratifs et plastiques) à cause de leur statut ambigu et illisible, on peut s'appuyer sur les traces énonciatives laissées par le corps sous forme de coups de pinceau, de hachures, de griffonnages, de déchirures et de déformations plastiques. Le geste du peintre, à ce propos, est le médiateur entre les signifiés et les signifiants véhiculés. Un corps peut énoncer de façon très différente mais laisse son énonciation énoncée sur sa toile comme une empreinte qui évoque à travers sa présence, l'absence du corps dont elle provient. L'istance corporelle donc serait à la base d'un parcours génératif qui prendrait appui sur le corps comme premier échelon de la signification et qui devra être étudié dans tous ses développements et manifestations à niveau des formes de l'expression.

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Ana Paixão

Art poétique musical, art compositionnel littéraire

Les œuvres de théorie littéraire et musicale, produites entre les XVI^{ème} et XIX^{ème} siècles au Portugal, nous proposent des modes de (mé)comprendre la musique, par le regard des théoriciens littéraires, et la littérature, par le biais des conceptualisations musicales. Les œuvres théoriques en analyse, que nous désignerons par *les arts d'écriture*, comprennent un vaste champ de genres différents qui vont du traité à la méthode, en passant par le dictionnaire ou par l'essai.




Figure 1. Les arts d'écriture en analyse.

Ces œuvres, comme tant de textes produits ailleurs à la même période, partagent un espace commun créé par l'intersection des systèmes des deux arts. Les traces de la relation entre les règles du discours musical et celles du discours parlé ou littéraire, particulièrement les rapports entre la musique et la rhétorique, furent l'objet de nombreuses études surtout depuis la dissertation de H. Brandes (1935) et le célèbre article de W. Gurlitt (1944), "Musik und Rhetorik: Hinweise auf ihre geschichtliche Grundlageneinheit".

Au-delà d'autres travaux qui analysent les applications concrètes de la rhétorique à la musique, l'étude de la production théorique d'auteurs qui

lient les deux arts devint aussi prolifique; il suffira de rappeler les publications autour de la production de H. Faber, de G. Dressler ou, surtout, de Joachim Burmeister et de ses prédécesseurs (Praetorius, Mattheson, ou Tinctoris, parmi d'autres) qui transposent les principes rhétoriques pour le système musical. Les *arts musicaux* portugais de la période mentionnée ne présentent pas de transpositions si nettes du système de la rhétorique pour les cadres théoriques de la musique à la manière de traités tels que la *Musica poetica* (Rostock, 1606) de Burmeister. D'ailleurs cette absence est aussi constatée par G. Valle (1988: 96) et A. Zaldivar (1993: 47) dans la théorie musicale espagnole des XVI^{ème} et XVII^{ème} siècles.

L'objectif de cette communication est de dévoiler la présence de principes, de techniques et de terminologie musicale dans *les arts littéraires* portugais des XVI^{ème} –XIX^{ème} siècles, et, en suivant le chemin inverse, de présenter l'importance accordée par les théoriciens musicaux, non seulement aux règles du discours littéraire, mais aux principes de la rhétorique appliqués au discours musical. Les *arts d'écriture* portugais présentent fondamentalement trois types de rapport entre le discours, les principes et la théorisation de la littérature et de la musique: des parallélismes, des comparaisons / références, ou des appropriations / intégrations.

1. *Vt musica uerbi*

Le premier pas de la littérature vers la musique est accompli autour de réflexions sur le parallélisme des parcours historiques des deux, sur les œuvres chantées qui font cheminer les signes littéraires et musicaux les uns à côté des autres, ou alors sur des genres qui les rassemblent. L'origine commune entre la musique et le verbe est repérée par plusieurs auteurs du XIX^{ème} siècle. Francisco Carvalho, par exemple, souligne que "la Musique et la Poésie ont eu, toutes les deux, la même origine, parce qu'elles sont nées dans les mêmes circonstances. Les premiers poètes chantaient leurs propres compositions" (1840: 11). La réunion et les modes de complémentarité entre les textes chantés font aussi l'objet d'analyse d'un nombre important d'*arts littéraires*. Manuel do Cenáculo souligne ce dont le compositeur de musique religieuse doit tenir compte, lorsqu'il écrit ses œuvres: "la Musique doit être grave, ajustée aux paroles sacrées, et digne des fins altissimes des Divins Mystères" (1791: 40). La musique doit s'accorder aux mots qui deviennent les maîtres des sons. Dans un contexte profane, les réflexions

de Cândido Lusitano soutiennent celles de Manuel do Cenáculo, dans une critique des modes de complémentarité établis entre les deux arts à son époque. L’auteur souligne justement que “la Poésie aujourd’hui sert la Musique, pas comme anciennement la Musique [servait] la Poésie, (que) c’est ce que l’art prône” (1748: 241). Lusitano met en évidence un changement de paradigme dans la relation entre les textes littéraires et musicaux, un changement que l’auteur critique: “Dans ce siècle tout le soin est de délecter les oreilles, et la Poésie devient donc esclave de la Musique” (ibid.: 240). D’autres auteurs d’*arts littéraires* analysent les genres embrassés par les deux discours. Des commentaires critiques à propos de l’opéra et de la cantate sont fréquents dans les œuvres du XVIII^{ème} siècle. L’union entre les textes littéraires et musicaux et les effets produits par leur jonction, la vraisemblance et bien d’autres questions autour de ces genres occupent les pages de ces œuvres pendant le siècle mentionné. Par exemple, João Chaves parle de la cantate: “Poésie variée de Récitatifs, Airs, Duos reçoit en soi les plus grandes beautés Poétiques, et Musicales; et même ce sera le genre de composition, où les deux Arts unis se rejoignent le mieux pour le plaisir de l’esprit humain” (1784: 41).

Les comparaisons avec la musique ou les références au discours musical sont aussi un sujet de relief dans les *arts littéraires*. Dans un traité anonyme du XVII^{ème} siècle intitulé *Orphea rhetorices cithara*, les différentes phases d’écriture rhétorique sont comparées aux cinq cordes d’une cithare (cf. Anonyme, 16--). Pour un autre auteur du XVIII^{ème} – António Pereira – la musique est considérée comme un champ privilégié d’intersection avec la littérature, notamment avec la rhétorique. L’auteur souligne justement que: “l’Éloquence est une Musique Articulée, et la Musique est aussi une Éloquence Inarticulée” (1787: 3). Les citations d’auteurs musicaux et d’œuvres de théorie musicale dans les arts littéraires sont aussi fréquentes. Parmi d’autres exemples, il est possible de citer: *Harmoniques* de Ptolémée et *L’Istitutione harmoniche* de Zarlino (Cenáculo 1791: 38); *Arte de Musica* d’A. Fernandes ou *Arte minima* de Nunes da Silva (Bluteau 1712–1728); *Musique* de Plutarque (Lusitano 1748: 238).

Les arts littéraires présentent aussi des exemples d’intégration ou d’appropriation de principes ou de terminologie musicaux. João de Barros (1540: 4) soulignait déjà au XVI^{ème} siècle des espaces d’intersection et des principes musicaux sous-jacents à la langue, en affirmant que:

Toute syllabe a trois accidents: Nombre de lettres, Espace de temps, Accent haut ou bas. ... L'espace de temps – puisque quelques-unes sont courtes et d'autres longues, comme dans "Bárbora", où la première est longue et les deux autres sont brèves; puisqu'il faut le même temps pour la première, comme pour les deux suivantes ... Le troisième accident de la Syllabe, c'est le chant haut ou bas: car comme les musiciens haussent ou baissent la voix en chantant, ainsi nous gardons le même ordre.

Au delà de la musicalité des langues, il est possible de repérer du vocabulaire musical fréquemment présent dans les œuvres littéraires. André Christo met en évidence le "Rythme" de la poésie (1667: 3), João Castro parle du "rythme" et de "l'harmonie" du discours (1734: 27).

La profusion de rapports possibles repérés entre la littérature et la musique motive les auteurs des *arts littéraires* à conseiller les écrivains et/ou les interprètes à bien connaître la musique. L'apprentissage musical acquiert un relief particulier pour l'orateur dans une œuvre de G. Bandeira où l'auteur suggère des tonalités spécifiques pour chaque moment du discours: "Thème – Ut; Narration – Ré; Confirmation – Mi; Exclamation – Fa; Exhortation – Sol; Admiration – La; Epilogue – Ré" (1745: 35). Ensuite nous analyserons le contrepoint de ces aspects dans les *arts musicaux*.

2. *Vt verbum musicae*

Le rapprochement de la musique vers les arts du discours se fait par le biais de la grammaire, de la poétique et, surtout, de la rhétorique. Les parallélismes établis entre le parcours historique et les signes des deux discours sont aussi présents dans les *arts musicaux*. La musique est liée à la littérature, notamment à la poésie, depuis son origine. António Fernandes explique la naissance de la poésie lyrique, justifiant que cette désignation est due au fait qu' "anciennement les poètes chantaient leurs vers au son de la Lyre ou de la Cithare" (1626: 3). Francisco Solano réaffirme l'origine commune et ajoute même que "les anciens plaçaient le Poète dans la classe du Musicien, et faisaient entrer le musicien dans celle du poète" (1780: 13).

Surtout la rhétorique et la grammaire pourvoient des éléments de comparaison et de vocabulaire aux *arts musicaux* portugais. P. Thalesio décrit une "mesure grammaticale" (1618: 67) appliquée au chant des psaumes. A. Fernandes justifie le besoin d'élaborer son œuvre en systématisant des règles qui permettront d'établir un cadre théorique solide, comme ceux

de la grammaire et de la rhétorique: “Le Grammairien, le Rhétoricien, et tous les autres ne s’écartent jamais d’un seul point de ce que commande et prescrit l’Art. De même dans la Musique il y a eu les nombres, les voix, et les modes, et à cause de cette confusion l’Art a été inventée par les savants” (1626: 7). Francisco Solano établit une comparaison entre ces deux dernières disciplines et la musique, en affirmant: “Si par la Grammaire on apprend à parler avec des périodes ajustées, la Musique Métrique répond de la même manière aux siennes. Si la Rhétorique consiste en Tropes, et en figures, et apprend à parler de manière appropriée et élégante, le Chant avec sa variété de Figures, et de Temps, exprime, et explique vivement la même chose avec ses harmonieux accents” (1780: 7). Hygino da Silva crée un cadre conceptuel pour l’enseignement de la musique basé sur les principes de la grammaire: “La musique est le langage des sons avec lesquels nous exprimons nos affects: ainsi considérée, elle a une grammaire qui nous apprend le son des lettres, la combinaison de celles-ci formant des syllabes et des mots et enfin l’accord de la phrase mélodique” (1854: 7). Raphael Machado établit même un rapport comparatif entre la ponctuation et les cadences (1851: 80; cf. Fig. 2).

Figure 2. Machado montre des cadences qui ponctuent le discours musical: “Cadence parfaite – termine le sens final” et “Cadence imparfaite – délaye le sens final”.

Les *arts musicaux* présentent aussi des intégrations ou des appropriations de la littérature, notamment de la rhétorique. Sur le plan de l’expression, quelques-unes de ces œuvres utilisent des principes de configuration oratoires, comme la construction en dialogue. Ce procédé de production textuelle est utilisé dans les *arts musicaux* depuis l’*Art de musique* d’A. Fer-

nandes, en 1626, jusqu'en 1883, le *Nouveau livre facile de musique* d'Amélia Ramos. Le recours de la théorie musicale à cette méthode montre le désir d'adapter l'efficacité de l'enseignement oratoire à l'apprentissage musical.

Dans d'autres *arts musicaux*, la rhétorique est aussi patente dans l'utilisation de techniques argumentatives tout au long de l'œuvre musicale. Ce sont surtout les prologues, les préfaces, ou d'autres moments textuels dans lesquels l'auteur présente ses motivations, justifie ses choix ou souligne ses priorités, qui sont marqués par l'utilisation de ce type de techniques. Un exemple significatif de ce fait (c'est un texte du roi portugais João IV qui répond à une lettre de l'évêque Franco concernant "l'impropriété des Musiciens modernes dans leurs compositions des Messes, et du Chant Ecclésiastique" (1654: 13). La réponse du roi suit les différentes parties de la disposition d'un discours oratoire. Le texte présente: Exorde – João IV se propose de montrer que la proposition de Cirillo Franco est fautive; Narration/Énumération – le roi présente les effets de la musique ancienne et moderne; Confirmation – des exemples d'œuvres de compositeurs 'modernes' où ces effets sont présents; Réfutation – João IV prouve que Cirillo Franco ne connaît pas la musique de son époque; et Péroration – le roi résume son discours et rabat ironiquement les arguments de Franco (ibid.). Le rapport entre la musique et la rhétorique passe aussi par le recours à d'autres éléments caractéristiques du discours oratoire, comme *l'unité et la variété*. Par exemple, E. d'Almeida applique le principe mentionné à la musique: "La variété est l'âme de la musique; c'est pour cela qu'il est nécessaire de bien distinguer l'unité de la variété, et ne pas croire qu'une très grande variété puisse détruire l'unité. Tout ce qui permet d'éviter la monotonie appartient à la variété, et tout ce qui relie les idées d'une façon évidente, franche et naturelle, appartient à l'unité" (1868: 62). Il est aussi possible de trouver des appropriations d'aspects de la poétique. Le même auteur, E. d'Almeida, présente des "pieds mélodiques" créés à partir des pieds poétiques (1868: 70).



Figure 3. Les "pieds mélodiques" de Almeida: "La trochée", "L'iambé", "Le dactyle", "L'amphibrae", "L'anapesté".

3. *VerbUMUsica*

Multiplés sont les espaces de jonction entre la littérature et la musique établis dans les *arts d'écriture* portugais analysés. Les parallélismes dressés, les comparaisons / les références établies entre les deux discours, et l'appropriation / l'intégration d'éléments ou de propriétés deviennent trois modes de (mé)comprendre l'autre. Dans cet espace partagé, les principes de la littérature et de la musique se fusionnent fondamentalement autour de la rhétorique ou de disciplines qui lui sont proches comme la poétique et la grammaire. Les procédés rhétoriques, créés, développés et plus au moins stabilisés depuis l'Antiquité Classique, constituent un cadre théorique établi et normatif auquel la musique aspire. Ce cadre, au-delà de la consistance de ses principes et de son organisation, est aussi l'un des modèles les plus propagés par les systèmes d'enseignement depuis l'antiquité. En passant par le *trivium* médiéval, il connaît sa pleine expansion au Portugal au XVIII^{ème} siècle, fait confirmé par la profusion de traités de rhétorique publiés pendant cette période en territoire portugais. Dans les arts littéraires, notamment rhétoriques et poétiques, l'établissement de parallélismes, de comparaisons et d'appropriations / d'intégrations musicales atteste de l'élan centrifuge qui attire les arts du discours vers la musique. La reconnaissance d'une origine commune, l'adéquation entre les textes des œuvres chantées, les éléments de comparaison, l'appropriation de vocabulaire, de techniques ou les conseils donnés à l'écrivain ou à l'interprète pour qu'il apprenne de la musique illustrent les capacités de lecture, de sélection et de production théorique des auteurs d'*arts littéraires* à partir du cadre conceptuel de la musique. Les œuvres de théorie littéraire et musicale sont ainsi des espaces de connaissance et d'appréhension de l'autre, des espaces où l'*Art poétique* est simultanément musical et l'*Art compositionnel* devient littéraire.

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Maria Papadopoulou

Knowing and guessing: In what ways do children approach the meaning of signs?

A teaching intervention with 9 year-old children about weather report signalization

1. Children as sign makers

Our world is full of signs, which are constantly formed and reformed over time and place, in order to fulfill their makers' specific social needs; thus, signs are constantly in a process of re-construction and their meaning can only be understood within a system and through its social use (Bakhtine 1977: 30). In our everyday communication, we are all sign makers, as we combine signs that can create in our interlocutor's mind the interpretations that we wish him/her to produce in order to understand what we really mean (Deledalle 1979: 117).

Symbolic thought is developed in children from a very early age. Piaget points out that, by their second year, children are able to represent things. Objects, facts or even cognitive structures are transformed to signs (Piaget 1967: 133-134; Piaget 1976). Children's symbolic competence is created as they enter the social environment; this competence is dynamic, and is developed and extended throughout their lives. While playing, children use language and objects to convey meanings, converting, by this procedure, concrete objects of their reality into signs (Kress & van Leeuwen 1996: 7-11; Kress 1997). This meaning making process, based on their symbolic competence, entails a process of understanding and constructing signs.

1.1. Visual signs

In our “visually oriented age” (Lowe 2000: 1), a great amount of information is transmitted by virtue of visual signs. Visual language, unlike common beliefs, is not easier than language (ibid.) nor transparent and universally understood (Kress & van Leeuwen 1996: 3). A special kind of literacy is needed for the appropriation of visually transmitted information, meaning the visually literacy, which is defined as the “ability to construct meaning from visual images” (Giorgis et al. 1999: 146).

By 3 years of age most children can use visual symbols to denote things (Bamford 2007: 2), but in order for them to be visually literate in this visual world, they need to further develop skills to interpret visually transmitted information and to produce visual messages.

Weather charts – like all maps – constitute a specific field of semiosis, meaning that they allow procedures of production and transfer of information by means of visual signs. Visual signs used in weather predictions are not firm and standard, unlike signs in other semiotic systems (e.g. road signalization or meteorological maps) where visual signs have a conventional status and whose interpretation is based on strict prescriptions. They can only be interpreted if one already knows the signs used in each and every weather prediction – a task out of reach – or if their semiotic principles are clear to their users.

2. *Methodology*

2.1. Hypothesis and material of the research

The aim of this research was to reveal which ways 9 year-old children use to interpret the meaning of visual signs used in weather report predictions. The research material consisted of visual signs that appear on the site: www.meteo.gr. Prior to the research, the children had no access to the site, so they weren't familiar with this particular kind of semiosis. Visual signs used in the site were classified according to the second trichotomy of the Peircean semiotic theory, meaning that each sign was classified in relation to its dynamic object as an icon, an index or a symbol (Peirce 1978: 138–166).

Although all signs are visual, meaning that they appear in two-dimensional space and are captured by vision, iconicity is not a property com-




Figure 1. Classification of the visual signs used for weather forecasting on the site: www.meteo.gr

monly shared by all the signs. In fact, only three signs can properly be characterised as icons (and especially images) bearing relations of similarity to their objects (the signs for: thundery showers, cloudy weather, wind force 9+ Beaufort over sea areas; the sign for snowy showers shares common properties with its object which, although not obvious at first glance, can appear when a snow flake is seen through a microscope). Four signs share an indexical ground, two of them being pure indexes (the signs showing the direction of the wind) and two of them having indexical as well as iconic properties (the signs indicating speed of the wind) – although the first is the prevailing property for an accurate interpretation. The double quality of these signs permits interpretations based on physical resemblance – similarity – than indexical properties (in this case the causality principle). Finally, four of the signs were classified as symbols, although only one is a pure symbol (the temperature sign). The other three signs (the night and day time signs and the sign for wind force from 0 to 2 Beaufort over sea areas) share arbitrary – conventional – as well as iconic properties, but these are not sufficient for an accurate interpretation of the signs. In order to interpret the meaning of every sign the children had either to

“transfer” general knowledge about visual signs used in weather forecasting or to “guess” the meaning of each sign by some kind of “technique”.

The hypothesis of the research was that in order to interpret these visual signs correctly, children have to reveal the semiotic system they are part of and then, discover the semiotic principles behind the formation of every sign or group of signs. In the case of hypo-icons (images), the children can guess their meaning by the similarity between the sign and its object, meaning they had to depend on the sign’s appearance (shape, color etc). In order to interpret indexes correctly, the children have to find out the relation (either of contiguity or of causality) between the sign-vehicle and its object. Thus, the interpretation of indexes was based on the discovery of this principle, rather than on the knowledge of each separate sign. Finally, the children could only interpret symbols on the basis of prior knowledge. As this knowledge is acquired by social use, the interpretation of symbols evolves over time and with social interaction. Finally, when signs are mixed – which is the case for many signs –, children have to reveal their primary function and then take any other semiotic principle into consideration. Not having discovered the primary function, a false interpretation may occur.

2.2. Participants


Nine boys and seven girls, all 4th Grade students, participated in the research, which took place in February and March 2006. Their school is located in a semi rural region, nearby the city of Volos (a medium sized city in Central Greece).

2.3. Method

The research presented here is part of a wider project, which comprised six class activities and a personal interview with each child. The results of this part are the conclusions arrived at from the first two activities which aimed at investigating the children’s knowledge or accurate guesses of the meaning of visual signs used in weather prediction. The personal interview, conducted with each child separately, aimed at investigating the techniques used by the children in order to reveal the meaning of the visual signs.

During the first activity the children were given the list of the visual signs presented above and were asked to write down each sign's meaning in a two column table (a blue and a red one). In the cases in which they were sure about their answers, these were to be written down in the blue color column, if the children thought they could guess an interpretation by some kind of "clue", they were asked to use the red column. Having completed the table, the children were separately asked, by two interviewers, about the way they had revealed the meaning of each sign. The second activity consisted of finding correspondences (see Figure 2). The children were given both the visual signs and their verbal interpretation, and were asked to find which sign stands for each meaning.

•Put the right number in the box underneath every sign



□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □

1. Northerly winds
2. South Easterly winds
3. 02.00 a.m.
4. 15.00 hours
5. Wind speed from 9+ beaufort over terrestrial areas
6. Wind speed from 4 to 6 beaufort over terrestrial areas
7. Wind speed from 0 to 2 beaufort over sea areas
8. Wind speed from 9+ beaufort over sea areas
9. Thundery showers
10. Snowy showers
11. 6 degrees temperature on the Celsius scale
12. Cloudy weather

Figure 2. Correspondences between the verbal and the visual (2nd activity).

3. Results

All students discovered easily the semiotic system the signs were part of, through being exposed to weather forecasts daily. Nevertheless, while writing down the meaning of each sign – during the first activity – they weren't

always consistent in their answers, as in the case of the indexes which were interpreted, by a small number of children, as belonging to the road sign system.

The results of the first activity indicate that most children either knew or correctly guessed all images and the temperature symbol (see Figure 3).












	known	correctly	guessed	correctly	sum
	16	14	2	0	14
	16	16	-	-	16
	8	8	8	7	15
	13	13	3	2	15
	4	0	8	1	1
	4	0	9	1	1
	9	6	7	2	8
	10	2	6	2	4
6°C	12	12	3	2	14
	4	0	11	1	1
	3	1	11	1	2
	7	1?	8	0	1?

Figure 3. Numerical data from the 1st activity: Visual signs known or guessed by the children.

Furthermore, almost half of them interpreted correctly the sign for wind speed 9+ Beaufort over terrestrial areas (which can also be interpreted by virtue of its appearance). All other signs were misinterpreted by the children. Results were radically improved in the second activity where the children's answers were more guided (Figure 4). Wrong answers were given only for the sign for wind speed 9+ Beaufort over sea areas.

The children mainly used descriptions when interpreting signs. This happened because –as they indicated when being interviewed– the main technique they used in order to understand the meaning of every sign was its appearance. This technique was used for almost all signs (the snow showers and the temperature sign were not included) by the majority of the children (see Figure 3). This led to almost correct answers as far as the

Results: 1st, 2nd activity












	14	16
	16	16
	15	8
	15	16
	8	8
	8	9
	1	11
	1	10
6° C	14	14
	1	9
	2	9
	1?	5

Figure 4. Numerical data from the 1st and 2nd activities.

images were concerned (e.g. “clouds” as the sign of cloudy weather; “thunderstorm”, “bad weather”, “rain and thunderstorm” for the sign of thunder showers; “waves”, “gale”, “rough seas” for the sign of wind speed 9+ Beaufort over sea areas), but inappropriate answers were given for almost all signs with indexical value, either pure indexes or iconic indexes (e.g. the northerly winds sign was interpreted as “an arrow”, “a sign to go”, “a sign for direction” and “south wind”; the sign for wind speed 9+ Beaufort over sea areas was often interpreted as “a broken tree”, “a palm tree”, “a tree on an island beach” etc). Almost all the children failed to reveal the role of causality in the formation of the pure indexes, namely that this sign represents visually the action of the wind over an object (in that case, over an arrow). Subsequently, the arrow shows the Northerly winds or the South Easterly winds because it moves in the direction of the wind. Even when the children realized that the two signs are used in order to demonstrate wind direction, they thought that these showed the exact opposite direction, providing visual (it “points to”) instead of indexical value (it “is pushed by the wind”) to the signs.

The signs with symbolic value were also misinterpreted by the children while using the same technique (e.g. the night hour sign was interpreted as “a clock and a moon”, “time is changing at night”, “night” etc). Most children were simply describing what they saw.

Additionally, six out of twelve signs were recognized by many children, because they have seen similar signs in television weather report predictions (the signs for snow and thundery showers, the sign for strong winds over terrestrial areas, the night hour and the temperature sign). Although the system was not exactly the same, they were able to efficiently ‘transfer’ their knowledge in most cases. School knowledge was correctly used only for the temperature symbol. On the contrary, this “technique” led to misunderstandings as far as the sign for calm seas was concerned (e.g. “water level”, “water evaporation”, “glass of water” etc). An experiment conducted in the school class the on the previous day, was the cause of this misinterpretation.

The presence of mixed signs is quite usual in weather report predictions. Considering the classification of the signs used in the research (see Figure 1), the results are very good even for images with conventional value – as in the case for snow showers. Interpretation of indexes with iconic value, like the signs for wind speed over terrestrial areas signs (see Figure 3), were more easily understood than pure indexes. As, in some cases, these signs were approached comparatively to each other, the more obvious iconicity of the sign for strong winds over terrestrial areas guided the interpretation of the other similar sign. In the case of symbols – like the night and day hour sign- the iconic elements (color and figures) didn’t facilitate the sign’s interpretation. Major misinterpretations also occurred for the sign of the calm seas, where the iconic character wasn’t sufficiently obvious to the children.

5. Conclusion

In order to interpret correctly visual signs used in weather maps, the children have to reveal the semiotic system these signs belong to and discover the semiotic relation that each sign has with its dynamic object, whether a hypo-icon (in that case images), an index or a symbol. Following that, the children have to interpret hypo-icons based on the resemblance to their dynamic objects and the indexes by revealing the causal connection to

their objects. Symbols can be interpreted only if the children already know the arbitrary relation between the sign's signifier and signified.

In the research, most hypo-icons were correctly identified because the main technique used by the majority of the children for the interpretation of all signs was based on the signs' appearance. Guesses based on similarity to the depicted phenomenon were appropriate for the interpretation of images, but as this technique was over-generalized in the interpretation of other kinds of signs, major misinterpretations occurred. The children failed to realize the causal relation by virtue of which the indexes represent their objects, and inappropriate interpretations based on the signs' appearance were given. Alike were the results for the interpretation of the symbols – only the pure symbol (the temperature sign) excluded.

Although interpretation based on resemblance between the sign and its object is not a sufficient technique for an accurate interpretation of every sign, it is the main technique used by the children as they try to convey the meaning of visual signs. Differentiated techniques should be proposed to the children, according to the relation that every sign has with its object, in order for them to avoid misinterpretations. Provided that a guided approach of some kind is needed, visual signs' recognition – as part of visual literacy – should be incorporated into the school curriculum.

Acknowledgments

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Gabriel Pareyon

A fractal conjecture of language

Proposal for a cognitive frame of linguistics

I would like to start with some intriguing images representing what mathematicians call fractals. In the figure below, you can see very different objects: fern fragments, a literally burned DVD, animal vessels and tissues, electric storms, the moon's surface, flowers and cauliflowers. These forms are so different among themselves that we could presume that practically any object can be displayed here as an example of what a fractal is. Nevertheless, not every object is a fractal.




Figure 1. Romanesco Broccoli.

A fractal is a shape whose basic form reappears in different scales, and it is defined by a recursive process that generates self-similar structures, inde-

pendently on a specific scale, combining at the same time structural irregularity and consistency (Mandelbrot 2004; Devaney 1992). The term was coined by the mathematician Benoît Mandelbrot in 1975 (I like to think that it combines the concepts of *fragment* and *total*, but actually the term came from Latin *fracturatus*, broken or fragmented). We can add to this, that scientists distinguish between two large classes of fractals: the natural and the artificial. Although personally I do not believe that natural/artificial is a valid categorization of things, but very provisional interpretations, I use this separation just to depict quickly the kinds of fractals found in what we call *nature*, and the fractals discovered within mathematical models.

This lecture proposes that language as a whole, belongs to the group of what we recognize as *natural fractals*; and the consequences of this involve a new definition of language, as well as the construction of new tools for its investigation. Although the term fractal was occasionally used for the first time by Gall and Irvine in 1995, restricted to the context of sociolinguistics, the application of fractal theory to linguistics has been rather poor. To knowledge, the present paper seems to be a first attempt at a general frame for language investigation, derived directly from fractal principles.

In the early 1990s, fractal theory had already become popular and successful applications of it were made in explaining the nature of dynamic systems. I wonder why it has not been used in linguistics, but at some point semioticians and language experts would do well to start a discussion on this issue. It seems to me that there is a need for semiotic studies to better understand fractals, and for more thorough research about linguistic structures as fractal patterns. From this perspective, a closer cooperation between mathematicians, philosophers and linguists might lead to a renewal of strategies for language investigation. In principle, it is important to point out that the features of verbal languages match very well the five main qualities or requisites to being a fractal. This close affinity between language and fractal qualities explains why the latter may serve as a referential frame for measurement, comparison and representation of the linguistic matters.

Looking for an equivalent affinity between fractals and non-verbal languages, we can observe that their level of structural complexity matches with their potential development as fractal objects. This means that in a long-term construction, fractal qualities also arise here. Some examples

	Fractal quality	Linguistic manifestation
I	<i>structural autosimilarity</i>	<p>Irvine and Gall identify this feature in pragmatics as a “sociolinguistic recursivity”. However, <i>structural autosimilarity</i> is also present in modular iteration in syntactic and semantic levels.</p> <p>This suggests that words and sentences repeat basic models in all languages, independently of the scientific paradigm we use, dealing with linguistic universality (e. g. the chomskian one, <i>matrical</i>, or the Terrence Deacon’s <i>autonomism</i> of language).</p> <p>There are many examples of this in linguistic cases, conjugation and declination, that follow some structuration like (prefix)root-addition-suffix, in the paradigmatic form, and (supplement)subject-verb-complement, in the syntagmatic one.</p>
II	<i>scalar relativity</i>	<p>Sequential development.</p> <p>Languages are composed by arrangements that gradually are more complex: sign projection into phonemes, phonemes into words, words into sentences, sentences into speech, speech into cultural systems.</p> <p>Rush Rhees proposed another kind of scalar structuration, according to grammatical contents: name-rule-correct-incorrect-concept-intention-comprehension-communication-language institution-social life. This one, like the previous organisation, can be described by its cyclic composition.</p>
III	<i>surface irregularity</i>	<p>Irregularity into verbal sequences, speech considered as a continuum: (everything in time and space can be considered as continuum or discontinuum. For example, a straight line can be conceived as a indivisible-infinite line, or as a sequence of specific points. It depends on the focus to the subject, as analysis or synthesis).</p> <p>This means that if we represent verbal language as a set of connected items, the final shape of the whole would expose an arrangement of irregular patterns stochastically structured.</p> <p>This applies particularly to intentional and pragmatic patterns of language.</p>
IV	<i>formal consistency</i>	<p>This concerns grammatical functions such as consistency of the construction rules. While verbal sequences are irregular in their continuum representation, at the same time they are consistent because of their grammar and their pragmatic constraints.</p>
V	<i>fractal dimension</i>	<p>As every linguistic complex in use has an irregular continuum surface, there is a particular dimension for every complex, that should be measurable considering the different constructive parameters of each linguistic object. As the linguistic matter is dynamic, it is very plausible that the fractal dimension of languages is constantly changing.</p>

Table 1. Linguistic manifestations of fractal qualities.

might be apes' usage of gestures and the sound patterns in whales and dolphins, as well as the employment of haptics, hastics, oculusics or paroxemics used by different living communities. Although this is a very attractive line of research, I shall stop on two eminent questions: where do fractal properties come from? And where do the fractal properties of language come from?

In mathematical models, fractal complexity comes from the recursive association of values (series), with a particular dimension resulting from a collection of elements (points) which are not forming part of a linear system represented by integers. In models from nature – Romanesco broccoli – fractal structuration comes from the molecular layers related to the cellular plot, following general laws of structural economy and efficiency towards the environment.

Fractal properties of language may arise from a path to that of other, natural fractals. In general, living organisms reveal elements that commonly are related to specific functions interacting with the environment (Kaandorp 1994). These elements are close fractal structures, and can be noticed even by observers not involved in modern mathematics or physics. Friedrich Engels, for example, described vertebrate organisms mainly as a form of life with limbs grouping around the nervous system (Engels 1883). The nervous system is an excellent image of fractal structuration, specially when one considers the formal relationships between axons, neurons and limbs (Cohn & Tickle 1996). Some theorists claim that the shape and functions of the nervous system are unrelated, and even they believe that this shape would be far to do something with language. I believe, however, that the relationship between the nervous system and the brain, together with their response to the environment, are responsible for most of the linguistic structure.

Moreover, there is another level of coincidences between the nervous system and languages, which can be accepted as a combination of structural autosimilarity, scalar relativity and superficial irregularity. This level is engaged in *hierarchical agreements* between implicative and subordinated components in biological structures. In the mid-nineteenth century, Engels had already imagined this sort of subordination, which was later confirmed by clinical studies published by Ramón y Cajal, Sherrington and Lloyd (cf. West 1990). However, these hierarchies or successive subordinations seem to be more complex than a linear chain of progressive




Figure 2. Linear complexity of correspondences: Intercellular to tissue and organs.

tasks, because they are present in very different manifestations of biology, from intracellular to tissue and organ correspondences, as the scheme in Figure 2 shows.

This kind of subordination, or “collaboration”, as biologist Lynn Margulis calls it, might be relevant also for linking fractals to biosemiotics, because it comprises an iterative pattern of signification, bonding endo-signs to exo-signs at very different levels of information. Relations between implicant and subordinated seem to have an active-passive character, but not in the simple sense in which one element imposes rules and the other one follows them. On the contrary, the link between them occurs in a functional way, in order to systematically achieve and complete excitation-inhibition processes which are indispensable to the development and transmission of biological models. Actually, there is no submission of any one element to another, but a *symbolic understanding* for coordination.

This is a core issue that, coming from symbiotic theory, can also contribute to the enrichment of biosemiotics.

According to the biosemiotician B. C. Goodwin, genetic material and tissue structure are of a symbolic nature. The meaning of the relationship between implicant and subordinated is the process itself of complex and ordered development against entropy. And this process directly participates in the construction of the biological structure. Thus we can conceive a symbolic understanding between nucleus and mitochondrion within an endosymbiotic cohabitation inside the same cell (as Margulis suggested in 1998). This sort of “understanding” or coordinative agreement, contrary to entropy, characterizes living processes in their wider variety.

Thus, there would be not just one presymbolic level of language, but a complex stratification of presymbolic relationships ordering the structures of molecular information, and performing the transmission of genetic information being developed through symbolic understanding. The organizing biostructure would use, by this means, its accumulation of energy to liberate or retain it, working into processes of excitation-inhibition, as a constructive principle. In general terms: it is unlikely that linguistic structures would be formed by levels of disorder, as in Markov chains, but rather by iterative order and structural consistency.

In an interview Mandelbrot (2004) explained: “Basically, a fractal is any pattern that reveals greater complexity as it is enlarged. Thus, fractals graphically portray the notion of ‘worlds within worlds’ which has obsessed Western culture from its tenth-century beginnings.” I would like to finish with a question: are not languages worlds within worlds?

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*Charls Pearson (with Robert Hatten and
Richard Littlefield)*

Applying the USST–2000 to a semiotic theory of voice

1. Background

Pearson and Hatten jointly discovered the presence of *proposition*, *tense*, and *aspect* in music. These discoveries were made at different times and reported in different venues, the latest being that of *aspect* in this same venue in 2001. Pearson's Universal Sign Structure Theory of semiotics (USST–2000) was used in making both discoveries. The discovery of *tense* and *aspect* in music and the semiotic relations between *tense*, *aspect*, and *voice* suggests that voice is also present in music, despite its counter-intuitiveness in a language without lexemes, thus demanding our search for it in actual musical phenomena.

In 2002, Littlefield joined the project and a decision was made to begin searching for evidence of *voice* in music. The same semiotic methodology was used and has proven successful. The discovery of voice in music can now be reported. In coordination with Littlefield and Hatten's grammatical analysis of *voice* in linguistics and music, this paper shows how to generalize the linguistic definition in order to develop a semiotic definition of voice. The *semiotic definition* is developed in such a way as to make its application practical to as wide a range of uses as possible. The articles in this collection by Hatten, Pearson, and Littlefield show how to specify phenomena of *voice* in Western art music.

This paper is developed within the Semiotic Paradigm (Pearson 1977, 1979, 1981, 2004, and forthcoming), and uses the 2000 version of the Universal Sign Structure Theory (USST–2000) (Pearson 2000), the Theory of Operational Semiotics (TOS) (Pearson 1998: 140–158), and the observational methodology of listening to music with an “understanding” ear.

2. Preliminaries

Voice is a well known, but little analyzed property, of many natural languages. Most languages have a very small inventory of voice resources. Standard American has two – active and passive – while Greek and other, ancient Indo-European languages had a third – the middle voice. Most linguistic definitions of voice are in terms of the particular lexical items in the one language under analysis. But this clearly will not work for a semiotic definition in general, nor for a system, such as music, that contains no lexemes.

Our analysis is for the purpose of generalizing the definition of voice to any arbitrary semiotic system with the hope that it would then be applicable to music. Our methodology uses Peirce's general theory of relations in the setting of Pearson's Semiotic Paradigm. In particular, it involves the interaction of the USST and the TOS, the two theories of that paradigm, with phemes as expressed in terms of general relations. Our goal is to find evidence of voice in music.

Most definitions of voice in current grammars are in terms of an actor/object-of-action relation of directionality between the subject and the predicate of a sentence. The subject/predicate sentential form is a simplification that applies strictly only to thing-oriented languages using sentences involving monadic relations. Nulladic relations are not phemes. They are pure terms, i.e., only names, and thus just rhemes. Higher adicity relations – dyadic, triadic, etc. – cannot be placed in a subject/predicate form in any clear, totally unproblematic way, thus creating additional problems for both the expression and analysis of voice.

3. Analysis

A. Logical analysis

Linguistic analysis can be divided into modern (analysis of thing-oriented subject/predicate languages), and postmodern (analysis of process-oriented relational languages). In a subject/predicate language (S/P-language) Aristotelian logic (logic of the syllogism) prevails. When interested in the action expressed by the proposition, such languages can focus attention on the subject as actor (active voice), the predicate as actor (passive voice),

or on the action itself (middle voice). What happens to voice (attention to agency) in relational languages (R-languages)? Is it possible that voice exhibits a more subtle form, or is even missing altogether, in R-languages?

In Russian, a fairly large and well-defined set of verbs fails to undergo passivization because: 1) they have a more static and symmetrical meaning; and 2) because Russian verbs have a complicated and all-pervasive aspectual system, sensitive to the distinction between telic (goal oriented) and non-telic (teleology-free) activities. This implies that the voice operator may reside inside the pragmatic operator, somewhere near the tense and aspect operator.

In S/P-languages, the action of interest in the concept of voice is the action expressed by the *V* in the proposition, and thus lies within the semantic operator. The **NP** and the **VP** also lie within the semantic operator. Not contained within the semantic operator is the decision involving where to place the focus of interest: on the **NP**, the **VP**, or the *V* itself, and then to transform that into the subject. This is part of the source interpretation process and is created at type-token conversion time as part of the process of creating the token. It is thus part of the pragmatic operator. In fact it enters in the same place in the operator string and from the same place in the USSD as the mood operator – as part of the linkage between the source interpretation and the body of the sign (see Figure 1). Thus voice may very well be part of the mood operator, which is itself inside of the pragmatic operator.

For a conjecture of what the details of the **I_s – P** linkage may look like, see Figure 2.




Figure 1. Interpretation-level linkages for the pragmatic structure.

Indicative sentence 1) has 2) as its semantic proposition. The status of its subject is active. But if the source interpreter decides to focus interest on the ball, this is done by means of inserting a passive marker into the deep structure which signals to the syntactic operator to perform a pas-




Figure 2. Conjectured details of source-interpreter linkage to the body of the sign.

sive transformation, thus changing the status of the new subject to that of patient. Since insertion of the passive marker is under the influence of I_s at T/K Conversion Time, the insertion is done by means of an action/focus operator within the pragmatic operator. The marker then stays in the process string until operated on by the passive transformation operator within the syntactic operator.

- 1) Tom hit the ball.
- 2) {Tom's hitting the ball}

Since the \mathbf{NP} , \mathbf{V} , and \mathbf{VP} markers are all present in the semantic operator, and the source interpreter may still want to direct the focus of interest under other than indicative moods, passive transformation of other moods should be easy to handle. It appears, then, that voice applies to the sentence in any mood.

- 1) Johnny hit the ball. (Active Voice/ Indicative Mood)
- 2) The ball was hit by Johnny. (Passive Voice/ Indicative Mood)
- 3) Did Johnny hit the ball? (Active Voice/ Interrogative Mood)
- 4) Was the ball hit by Johnny? (Passive Voice/ Interrogative Mood)
- 5) If only Tom had hit the ball ... (Active Voice/ Subjunctive Mood)
- 6) If only the ball had been hit by Tom ... (Passive Voice/ Subjunctive Mood)
- 7) Let's suppose that Tom were to hit the ball. (Active Voice/ Optative Mood)
- 8) Let's suppose the ball were to be hit by Tom. (Passive Voice/ Optative Mood)

The only mood that causes any difficulty whatsoever, is the imperative mood, and then only because of the subject deletion transformation.

- 9) (You) hit the ball! (Active Voice/ Imperative Mood)
 10) Endeavor to make the world so that it can be described by: the ball being hit by you! (An attempt to express the Imperative Mood in the Passive Voice)

Example 10), above, is simply the expansion of the imperative mood operator, and even it has undergone a second person subject deletion transformation. Both 1) and 3) are active, while 2) and 4) are both passive. This implies that voice refers to markers that occur inside of the semantic operator, i.e., to the right of Π_{sem}

$$\Pi_{\text{TA}} : \Pi_{\text{M}} : \Pi_{\text{V}} : \Pi_{\text{S}} : (\Pi_{\text{sem}} : (M_{\text{NP}}, M_{\text{V}}, M_{\text{VP}}))$$

where Π_{sem} contains the propositional operators, the propositional attitudes, and the abstract proposition, and Π_{V} is the voice operator. In particular the voice operator occurs to the right of both the tense and aspect operator and the mood operator (Pearson 1998).

B. Linguistic analysis

1. Inventory of voices in natural language

- a) Active Voice: seems to require focus of attention on the subject rheme as actor. In an expansion from transformational grammar:

$$S \Rightarrow \text{NP} + V + \text{VP}$$

which implies focus on the **NP**.

- b) Middle Voice: seems to require focus of attention on the action itself, i.e., the main predicate pheme. This implies focus on the V in the TG expansion.
 c) Passive Voice: seems to require focus of attention on the object rheme as actor. In the TG expansion this would imply focus on the **VP**.
 d) Antipassive Voice: there is some suggestion for the presence of an antipassive voice in language, but the evidence is not clear.

2. Focus of attention

What is this “focus of attention” that figures so prominently in all linguistic analyses of voice? It is a decision made at utterance time, i.e., Type-Token

Conversion time, (T/K/CT), by the source interpreter of the sign as to the most important part of a complex semantic proposition of the sign, i.e., subject rheme, predicate rheme, or primary predicate pheme itself. This gives us three possibilities for emphasis.




Figure 3. Focus Structure of the Semantic Proposition.

3. Other hints

While change of voice alters the subject of the surface structure, it does not alter the roles of agent and object. This is because agent and object are in the propositional operator, which in turn is inside the semantic operator itself, while voice is inside the pragmatic operator.

To paraphrase Nakhimovsky (1983: 59), voice is an asymmetric relation between a pheme and the proposition contained in the semantic structure of that pheme.

In previous investigations, we have shown that music contains propositions (Pearson T/Aa; Pearson and Hatten 1994; and Hatten and Pearson 1994). If expansions from TG possess any semiotic reality at all, they hold for any arbitrary system of signs structured in the form of a textual string, and thus music can be shown to distinguish between tones (in the semiotic sense of syntactic category), such as noun phrases, verbs, and verb phrases.

*If, therefore, it can be shown that music differentiates in any manner between the interest placed on any one of these and any of the others in any particular situation, we will have identified a concept of **voice** for music, even though music lacks the lexemes of natural language.*

4. Definitions and operator expansions

It thus appears that *voice* acts very much like *mood* and in other ways like *tense* and *aspect*. **Mood** is the belief attitude, as coded in the syntactic structure of the sign, of the source interpreter, i_s , in the pragmatic structure of the sign, towards the semantic proposition of the sign (Pearson 1995, T/

Aa; Pearson & Hatten 1994, 2001; Hatten and Pearson 1994, 2001). We therefore attempt the following definition:

VOICE is the focus attitude, as coded in the syntactic structure of the sign, of the source interpreter, i_s , in the pragmatic structure of the sign, towards the three components of the semantic proposition of the sign.

Voice results from the process of an action/focus operator which places a deep structure marker on one of the three components of the top-level propositional expansion in the semantic operator. The action/focus operator is under control of the source interpreter – in music, called the performer, conductor, or sometimes even composer – who decides at T/K/CT which of the three propositional components should be emphasized.

5. Musical evidence for selective emphasis on the three propositional components.

Unlike natural language where the default attention is placed on the \mathbf{NP} , resulting in active voice as the standard, in music, the default attention is placed on the \mathbf{V} , resulting in middle voice as the standard. However, there are several rather outstanding examples where attention is focused on the first of the three propositional components, the \mathbf{NP} .

Two of these are especially among my favorite passages of music. The first, is the opening clarinet glissando of George Gershwin's *Rhapsody in Blue*, which serves to focus attention on the opening note and the activity involved in getting from it to the full opening chord. By opening the piece in the active voice, rather than the default middle voice, Gershwin serves notice that the purpose of the *Rhapsody* is to set a whole new level of vibrancy for American music.

The second example is far more subtle than Gershwin's blatant American jazz sound. It is the organic flow of a Brahms symphony, for example, his *Symphony No. 1*. Instead of passively passing quietly from the 1st movement into the 2nd, it grows organically like a rosebud unfolding into a flower so that no other 1st movement could cause that 2nd movement and no other 2nd movement could grow out of that 1st movement.

There is no mistaking the organic growth, but there is also no mistaking the fact that Brahms wants you to be aware of the organic growth. He has

used voice to emphasize the organic growth of the 1st movement, including the organic growth into the 2nd movement, and even the organic growth of the 2nd movement itself.

6. Conclusions

Music manages to use and take advantage of voice even without the aid of lexemes. However, unlike natural language, the default voice for music is the *middle voice* rather than the active voice.

Voice results from the process of an action/focus operator which places a deep structure marker on one of the three components of the propositional expansion in the semantic operator. The action/focus operator is under control of the source interpreter – in music, called the conductor, performer, or sometimes even composer – who decides at type/token conversion time which of the three propositional components should be emphasized.

The Type-Token Conversion operator thus appears to have a rather complex structure, containing as it does the Mood operator, the Tense&Aspect operator, and the Voice operator.

This definition implies that any sign that contains a proposition or propositional function and arrays its text in a linear string, will exhibit the phenomena of *voice* in some way or another. Music is one example of primary interest to us, but this also includes such other languages as mathematics, propositional logic, predicate logic, and poetry. But it does not include such languages as terministic logic. In other words, terministic logic may or may not possess voice.

This result also suggests other interesting questions in the semiotics of music, such as: “During a key change, does the first key go passively as if totally dominated by the new key, or does it actively generate the new key?” The interested reader will no doubt pose others ...

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[Forthcoming in: *Acta Semiotica Fennica.*]

Osmo Pekonen

Le Lion de Finlande: Communiquer l'identité d'une nation nordique

Commençons par quelques vers patriotiques du poète Veikko Antero Koskenniemi de 1917, l'année de la déclaration de l'indépendance de la République finlandaise:

Sua, Suomen Leijona, tervehdän:
miten säilässäs aurinko palaa!
Ylös vapauden päivähän
sinun voimasi vangitut halaa.

Oi, Suomen Leijona, nähnyt oon
sinun kunnianpäiväsi koiton.
Sinä johdat ihanaan taisteloon,
sinä annat vaaran ja voiton!

Ô lion de Finlande, à toi je rends hommage.
Oh! vois comme en ton épée a flambé le soleil!
Un vent de liberté anime ton courage,
de ta force enchaînée, c'est le jour du réveil.

Ô lion de Finlande, dans le ciel ténébreux
j'ai vu que se levait l'aurore de ta gloire.
C'est toi qui mèneras au combat lumineux,
c'est toi qui donneras et péril et victoire.

(Traduction par Yves Avril)

L'héraldique, la sigillographie et la vexillologie sont des sciences très voisines de la sémiotique (Ragen 1994). Le blason est l'*idéogramme iconique* correspondant à ce qui est *blasonné*, c'est-à-dire peint, dessiné, brodé, gravé, sculpté, représenté selon les règles propres à l'art héraldique.

Le lion est l’emblème traditionnel de la Finlande. Le roi des animaux est partout présent dans les représentations symboliques du pays: dans les armoiries nationales, sur les timbres, les pièces de monnaie, et aujourd’hui dans d’innombrables objets commerciaux: sur les tee-shirts, logos, objets kitsch, etc. Une étude des subtiles variations du statut du Lion de Finlande à travers les siècles permet d’analyser les différentes étapes de la construction et de la communication d’une identité nationale finlandaise.

Rien d’extraordinaire, pourtant, dans ce choix d’emblème parce que le lion fait aussi partie de l’héraldique de dizaines d’autres pays et régions de l’Europe. L’Empereur et le roi de France mis à part, pratiquement toutes les dynasties de la chrétienté occidentale ont, à un moment donné ou à un autre de leur histoire, porté un lion dans leurs armes. Un dicton héraldique médiéval affirme même: “*Qui n’a pas de blason, porte un lion*”.

Le lion est devenu le roi des animaux après le retour des croisés de Terre Sainte, avec Richard Cœur de Lion à leur tête. D’innombrables grandes familles ont choisi alors le lion comme emblème. Jusque-là, on considérerait plutôt l’ours comme le roi des animaux en Europe. L’ours a perdu son statut à cause d’une véritable campagne de diffamation orchestrée par l’Église catholique au Moyen âge (Pastoureau 2007: 181–207).

Le lion est un animal biblique par excellence ; la Sainte Écriture le mentionne environ 150 fois. Pour les juifs, c’est le lion de Juda; pour les chrétiens, un symbole du Christ. Dans l’iconographie chrétienne, le lion devient aussi l’attribut de Saint Marc et de Saint Jérôme.

En Europe du Nord, le lion fut l’emblème de la première famille royale suédoise, les Folkunga. Le lion comme symbole royal et féodal incarne le pouvoir et la justice, la morale et la loyauté; il représente aussi la puissance, la vigilance, l’immortalité et bien sûr le courage.

La Finlande n’a jamais été un royaume. De toute façon, s’il y avait des rois finlandais avant la conquête suédoise du pays, ils n’ont laissé aucune trace historique. La Finlande a été annexée au royaume de Suède à partir de la première croisade suédoise en 1155. Il peut y avoir une connotation liée aux croisades dans le symbolisme léonin qu’on attache à la Finlande depuis cette époque. On trouve un lion parmi les ornements du sarcophage de Saint Henri, le patron de la Finlande, l’évêque missionnaire martyrisé pendant la première croisade. Il y a des lions aussi dans les peintures murales de certaines églises médiévales finlandaises (Hattula, Lohja, Taivassalo).

La première représentation du Lion de Finlande date des années 1560. Elle se trouve au-dessus de la porte principale du château de Turku, le siège des grands-ducs de la Finlande. C'est Gustaf Wasa, roi de Suède qui fit de la Finlande un Grand-Duché. Son fils, le futur roi Jean III (1568–1592), fut la première personne à porter ce titre. Son emblème familial contient à la fois l'ours de la province de Satakunta et le lion. Le projet original (1562) du blason de Jean III se trouve à la Bibliothèque Nationale à Paris. Le texte dit: "*Jean, par la Grâce de Dieu, Dauphin de la Suède et Duc de la Finlande*". Une version des années 1580 représente la couronne ducale, très précisément, en couleur pourpre.

La première grande représentation du blason de la Finlande qui a été déterminante pour son évolution se situe au sarcophage de Gustav Wasa à la cathédrale d'Upsal en Suède. Il a été créé par l'artiste flamand Guillaume Boyen en 1562–1591. Ce grand monument de la Renaissance suédoise contient les armoiries de toutes les provinces de Suède, y compris la Finlande. Le blason de la Finlande est si bien réussi qu'il a obtenu un statut normatif jusqu'à nos jours. Une description du blason du 16^e siècle dit: "Un lion d'or dont la patte droite est armée, qui porte une épée occidentale et qui piétine le sabre russe." Il s'agit d'un lion *rampant*, c'est-à-dire dressé sur ses pattes de derrière.

Cependant, dans le drapeau d'un régiment militaire finlandais en 1686, on trouve aussi un lion qui ne piétine pas le sabre.

Dans un ouvrage de prestige *Suecia antiqua et hodierna* par Erik Dahlbergh imprimé en Suède en 1716, on remarque l'introduction d'une vieille convention de l'art héraldique: la queue fourchue du lion. On peut constater, néanmoins, que le lion de Dahlbergh n'a pas une allure aussi noble que celui de Guillaume Boyen.

Après l'accord de Tilsit entre Napoléon Bonaparte et Alexandre 1^{er}, en 1807, et après une guerre, en 1808–09, la Finlande fut annexée par la Russie. Cependant, cette annexion ne fut pas pure et simple, comme dans le cas de la Pologne, mais l'Empereur de toutes les Russies octroya à la Finlande le statut d'un Grand-Duché autonome. La Finlande fut "désormais placée au rang des nations" selon la célèbre formule du discours de l'Empereur.

Le 13 mai, le jour de Flore, en 1848 lors d'une manifestation devenue célèbre, le corps des étudiants de l'université d'Helsinki (Université Impériale d'Alexandre) a brandi un drapeau-lion tout en entonnant le nouvel hymne national *Vårt land* (Notre patrie) écrit par Johan Ludvig Runeberg.

D'où soudain un problème héraldique pour les autorités: comment accommoder un lion qui a l'audace de piétiner le sabre russe?

L'administration russe prendra la version de Dahlbergh comme point de départ pour créer un nouveau blason pour la Finlande en 1857. On y voit un lion plutôt apprivoisé dont l'épée a été raccourcie, dont le bras n'est plus armé et qui ne piétine pas tout à fait le sabre russe. De surcroît, le blason est surmonté de la couronne impériale russe, avec l'aigle à deux têtes. On peut voir dans la juxtaposition des deux animaux un message héraldique: le lion est traditionnellement, certes, considéré comme le roi des animaux terrestres, mais il est sans autorité sur les oiseaux, d'où la suprématie de l'aigle impériale. Les Finlandais n'ont pas apprécié leur nouveau blason; ils l'ont baptisé, avec dédain, "le lion caniche".

Une étape importante dans l'émancipation de la Finlande fut l'affirmation de sa langue principale, le finnois, comme langue administrative du pays à côté du suédois. L'Empereur Alexandre II octroya à la Finlande ce privilège en 1863 après un entretien avec Johan Vilhelm Snellman, sénateur et philosophe hégélien, à Parola. Le lieu de la rencontre fut aussitôt orné par une statue du Lion de Finlande.

En 1886, Karl August Bomansson, directeur des Archives Nationales Finlandaises, a présenté sa version dite "normalisée" des armoiries de la Finlande où il est largement revenu au projet original de Guillaume Boyen. Notamment, la couronne impériale, qui est ouverte, a été remplacée par une couronne ducal fermée qui est en couleur rouge. Pour ne pas trop déplaire aux autorités russes, le lion ne piétine pas la poignée du fameux sabre russe. Ce blason n'est pas devenu officiel mais les Russes ont fait preuve d'une certaine souplesse ce qui a permis à la version de Bomansson d'être utilisée sur les billets de la Banque de Finlande.

Les Expositions universelles de 1889 et 1900 à Paris ont été très importantes pour le développement du sentiment national finlandais. En 1889, la Russie n'a pas participé à cause du centenaire de la Révolution française tandis que le Grand-Duché autonome de la Finlande a répondu présent. Fièrement, les Finlandais brandirent un drapeau grand-ducal rouge où l'on voit bel et bien le lion piétiner la poignée du sabre russe. En 1900, les Russes ont participé à l'exposition universelle et l'usage du drapeau-lion a été moins prononcé.

Entre-temps, de plus en plus souvent, on commença à personnifier la Finlande sous les traits d'une "demoiselle Finlande" en armure et flanquée

d'un lion, une figure très voisine, à la fois, de Pallas Athéna et de Jeanne d'Arc. Cette représentation qui mériterait un exposé à part devient répandue notamment à travers des cartes postales.

Les représentations les plus célèbres de la Demoiselle Finlande avec son lion sont dues au sculpteur Walter Runeberg, fils du poète national Johan Ludvig Runeberg. Il a créé en 1894 la grande statue de l'Empereur Alexandre II, dit le "czar libérateur", qui domine encore aujourd'hui la place du Sénat à Helsinki.

Les autorités russes furent très touchées de ce geste de piété filiale des Finlandais envers leur Empereur. Mais quand on regarde de plus près, on aperçoit sur le piédestal de la statue impériale une représentation de la Demoiselle Finlande avec son lion, portant un bouclier avec l'inscription LEX, d'où l'appellation populaire "Lex" de la statue. Une copie fut aussitôt installée au Palais de la Diète. Une deuxième copie du "Lex" se trouve aujourd'hui dans la salle des fêtes du Palais du Président de la République. Les chefs d'Etat qui visitent la Finlande se font souvent photographier devant cette statue.

En février 1899, les relations finno-russes se sont détériorées à cause d'un manifeste répressif proclamé par l'Empereur Nikolaï II. Le Czar a révoqué une grande partie de l'autonomie du Grand-Duché et a entamé une campagne de russification du pays ce qui a conduit aux multiples protestations artistiques et culturelles à travers l'Europe. Une pétition internationale, ornée par le Lion de Finlande et signée par des grandes personnalités européennes, a été adressée au Czar pour soutenir la cause finlandaise. Par exemple, en France, on trouve parmi les signataires Alexandre Dumas, Anatole France, Ernest Lavisse, Henri Poincaré et Émile Zola.

En signe de résistance, les Finlandais se sont mis à fleurir massivement la statue du bon czar libérateur Alexandre II. Bien entendu, en même temps, les Finlandais déposaient des gerbes aux pieds de la Demoiselle Finlande et de son lion; un subtil geste patriotique que les autorités russes ne pouvaient pas interdire.

Après la déclaration de l'indépendance de la Finlande le 6 décembre 1917 eut lieu un soulèvement populaire contre l'occupant russe. Malheureusement, une atroce guerre civile qui a opposé les gardes rouges à une armée blanche dirigée par le général Mannerheim en a résulté aussi. Le camp blanc est sorti victorieux du conflit; c'est la droite politique qui a pu déterminer le symbolisme national. La Finlande indépendante pavoisa

d'abord avec un drapeau-lion mais sa couleur rouge ayant déplu à la droite, un nouveau drapeau bleu et blanc, avec la croix dite scandinave, fut adopté en 1918.

Pendant la Seconde guerre mondiale, en 1942, un Ordre du Lion de Finlande a été créé. Cette décoration continue à être décernée pour des grands mérites civils ou militaires et les étrangers peuvent la recevoir.

Aujourd'hui, le symbolisme léonin est partout en Finlande: l'armée et la police l'arborent, comme aussi plusieurs ministères, associations et partis politiques. Le lion a sa place d'honneur dans les armoiries nationales, sur les timbres et sur les pièces de monnaie. Sans oublier la passion nationale: le hockey sur glace. L'appellation populaire de l'équipe nationale de ce sport est "les lions de la Finlande".

Le lion est un animal *polysémique*. Par exemple, dans la Bible, il représente parfois aussi le Diable. Son appropriation comme animal héraldique par excellence de l'Europe chrétienne est le résultat d'un long développement guidé d'abord par l'Église, puis par plusieurs États-Nations. Le cas de la Finlande est un exemple intéressant de ce processus.

Remerciement: Plusieurs images de cet article ont été tirées du catalogue d'une exposition sur le Lion de Finlande organisée au Musée National à Helsinki en 1997–98 (Talvio 1997).

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Illustrations



1. La première représentation du Lion de Finlande (avec l'ours de Satakunta) au château de Turku dans les armoiries de Jean III, duc de la Finlande, dans les années 1560.




2. Le projet original pour les armoiries de Jean III. Manuscrit de 1562. Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.



3. Le blason de la Finlande, surmonté d'une couronne ducale. Manuscrit des années 1580. Bibliothèque Royale, Stockholm.




4. Le blason de la Finlande dans le tombeau de Gustav Wasa à Upsal, Suède. L'œuvre de l'artiste flamand Guillaume Boyen des années 1560-90.



5. Le drapeau d'un régiment militaire finlandais en 1686.



6. Le blason ducal de la Finlande dans l'ouvrage *Suecia antiqua et hodierna* par Erik Dahlbergh en 1716.



7. Le drapeau du corps des étudiants finlandais de l'Université d'Helsinki en 1848.



9. Le blason russe de la Finlande en 1857. « Le lion-caniche ».



8. Le lion de Parola, érigé en statue en 1868 pour commémorer la rencontre d'Alexandre II avec le philosophe et l'homme politique finlandais Johan Vilhelm Snellman en 1863.



10. Le blason dit « normalisé » de Karl August Bomansson en 1886.



11. Le drapeau du Grand-Duché de Finlande à l'Exposition universelle de Paris en 1889.



12. La « Demoiselle Finlande » avec ses symboles léonins. Carte postale fin de siècle.



13. La Demoiselle Finlande flanquée du Lion de Finlande dans le piédestal de la grande statue d'Alexandre II. Sculpture de Walter Runeberg 1894.



14. La statue « Lex » au Palais du Diète.



15. La Finlande indépendante pavoisa d'abord avec un drapeau-lion.



16. Un timbre typique de l'époque russe (1875).



17. Un timbre typique de l'époque de l'indépendance (1954).



18. Les insignes de l'Ordre du Lion de Finlande.



19. Le logo de la Défense nationale.



20. Le logo de la Police.



22. Le logo de l'équipe nationale d'hockey sur glace.



21. Le revers d'une pièce de monnaie finlandaise.



23. Les armoiries de la Finlande. Version moderne.

Elena Penskaya

The semiotic characteristics of Russian fine art

Literary mayhem in the second half of the nineteenth century

Many humanitarian disciplines have taken up the study of scandal as a cultural phenomenon. The different approaches to the problem together make up a kind of theory of *scandal*. Scandal presupposes the choice of a topic and a person, and demands the involvement of the interested parties in drafting its scenario and dramaturgy, which needs its own scandalous discourse. Scandal is based on circulating information about conduct outside the norm. The staging of scandal relies on a circle of passive and active participants spurring on the developments, and on an observant audience. Just as a play, scandal demands a structure, with its plot, development, denouement and resolution (cf. Land 1983: 274; Pochepcov 2004: 246; Proskurin 2000: 367).

The dramaturgy of scandal demands of the suspect justification of his action – or scandal dies if its drama does not develop and new information does not come in.

Scandal is the surest way to penetrate the public mind. It is a peculiar analogue of a thriller, of second-rate crime fiction.

Journalists and literati are key personages in the scandal domain of Russian culture. The Russian “press inferno” is a stage production, with actors dashing to and fro to the verbal accompaniment of an emcee. Indicatively, the lampoon became the principal genre in magazines of the 1850s–60s. It ruled the press and monopolised the comic theatre. Turning to sensation, gossip, the trivia of life, and “expressive and easily recognisable portraiture of our contemporaries”, it legitimised the entertainer’s manner in print, on stage, and in the news-thirsty public.

Understandably, Russian lampoons of the 1840s–60s were a sequence of denunciations, which readers eagerly anticipated. Scandalous lampoons fed on evil and offence of propriety. The lampoon is of a dual genre – it simultaneously depicts and provokes scandal. Journalism, in its turn, also proceeds from sensation and crime, that is to say, everything that trespasses the established norm.

The orientation of democratic literature on exposing social evil was largely based on similar denunciations and irrefutable proof of the opponent's guilt and his weakness and doom. The Russian literary circle, epitomised by Dostoyevsky was to a great extent inspired by the same complex of ideas. Two different aspects of culture – one concerning landmark events, and the other daily routine – clash in a striking juxtaposition. Accepted linguistic standards are profaned. The thirst for destruction clashes with the paralyzing fear of chaos. Two basic Russian types – the saintly crank and the criminal revolutionary, with his provocative conduct – are experimentally brought together. The public and the hidden modes of life blend. History and man come under study in a tragic crisis. Such are the metaphysics of scandal.

We see all this, for instance, in the scene of Nastasya Filippovna's birthday party in the novel *The Idiot*, when Ferdyschenko proposes a game in which everyone present recounts their worst wrongdoing. True, he found the stories unsatisfactory, since as they were not what he expected; nevertheless, the game stirred up a scandalous atmosphere in which cynical plots were exposed, and the personages' fates made a U-turn. In another example: scandal seethed in the drawing-room of Varvara Petrovna Stavrogina, in *The Possessed*, with the mad lame girl and Captain Lebyadkin, the appearance of Pyotr Verkhovensky, the exposure of Stepan Trofimovich, Liza's hysterics and fainting fit, Shatov boxing Stavrogin's ears, and so on.

Dostoyevsky's novels diagnose the advent of all-penetrating journalism fed by the essay and the lampoon – a system with an elaborate set of tools: confession, exposure, denunciation, and penitence. That was when scandal developed into a classic genre – on the order of drama or comedy – which oddly enough imitated government ideology and structure. Thus, Faddei Bulgarin, a *littérateur* and notorious secret-police informer, wrote a scandalous message to Dubelt, the chief of gendarmes, in 1846. It reads as the paragon of an informer's apology: "By the will of fate, I have been mixing with people from every walk of life for 25 years now. Day in, day out, they

come to me as a kind of priest, to make their confessions ... Thank God, people believe me because I have never deceived anyone or let anyone down. I try to console some, advise others to be patient, and intercede for still others. Such contacts help me to keep *au courant* and know the public opinion” (cited in Lemke 1909: 317).

Information is necessary for public denunciation, discussion and intervention. The style of Bulgarin’s manifesto fully coincides with the vocabulary of denunciatory Russian literature: “The system of hushing up all evil, and the fear of one being held responsible for all gave birth in Russia to a horrible system of ministerial despotism and gubernatorial tyranny. This evil threatens tremendous disasters to the monarchy and the country, and embitters people of all social estates to the utmost” (in Lemke 1909: 3). Bulgarin’s programme of denunciation turns into the mission of journalism as the Russian democrats of the 1860s formulated it: bring dirty secrets to surface, and make public any and all abuses of the social norm. The radical democratic press aimed to establish a network of public correspondents-*cum*-informers, whose contributions appeared in the rubrics: “Our Mail”, “The Searchlight”, “The Ray”, “The Lantern”, and “Voices from the Province”.

To some extent, the mission of bitter denunciation turned the spy, the detective and the agent provocateur – the entire range of the government’s servants – into the social double of *littérateur* and journalist. With all its outward sublime mission of fighting the regime, Russian literature took shape within the limits of government agencies to re-create them subconsciously again and again. Russian authority was developing from the very start in the situation of never-ending scandal.

The government-literature interchange proceeded in the crucial era of social and political catastrophes, with the personal and historical biography receding far into the background, in between two giant historic scandals: the Crimean War and World War One.

The professional conduct and public reputation of *litterati* and journalists made scandal the basis of the new historical dimension and the new chronology. Here are several examples. In 1861, Pyotr Weinberg established the magazine *Vek* together with Druzhinin, Bezobrazov and Kavelin, then immediately tarnished its reputation with his own lampoon, “Russian Curiosities”, in which he tactlessly came down on women’s emancipation activists. Scandal followed scandal as every new person joined the discus-

sion, especially the zealots Mikhailov and Pisarev. The events received a description of gripping interest in Weinberg's later article, "The Ugly Misdoing of *Vek*" (1900: 214–215).

Vsevolod Krestovsky, with his shocking novel *The Slums of St. Petersburg* (1864), written with the help of known Russian detective Ivan Putilin (Leskov regarded it as the most socialist of all Russian-language novels), launched a scandal that lasted thirty years, expanding to involve ever new social groups and movements. From 1867 on, the satirical magazine *Iskra* lived off Krestovsky for many years by publishing its scathing travesty with cartoons such as "The Slums of St. Petersburg, Drastically Abridged, Verified and Illustrated by A. M. Volkov" (it even appeared in book form). And more: Krestovsky fought a duel with Minayev due to a scandalous press discussion of his novel. The author scandalously broke with the magazine *Russkoye Slovo* and entered into long polemics with Blagosvetlov. Further: news was circulated that the plot of the novel was plagiarised from Pomyalovsky (this rumour appeared in the newspaper *Syn Otechestva* on January 28, 1895, after Krestovsky's death).

The list is by far not exhaustive. The scandal was too big contain. It bloated, mouldered, and dragged on ad infinitum. Dostoyevsky wrote (1983: 55): "I was terrified by the sudden rumour of Lev Kambek giving up his literary pursuits ... because the *Vek* and himself were the means of sustenance for a swarm of our progressives with their big families for many years." Lev Kambek, the indomitable protester known as the "scandal magnet", was on all occasions both the scandal-monger and victim at once. "A failure, a sudden end, frustration, and ensuing silence – all that is so typically Russian!" wrote Sergei Reiser (1950: 18). Kambek, the editor and publisher of *Peterburgsky Vestnik*, embarked on a sensational venture: he indiscriminately published everyone's contributions in the Publicity Rubric, charging fees at his own discretion. Kambek appeared everywhere disheveled and unshaven, dressed as a man from the lowest walk of life.

Playwright Alexander Ostrovsky might be the only one who did not fit into the scandalous environment of Russian literature and journalism of the nineteenth century's second half. Public attention to him all too often brought him petty vengeance from journalists and the people flocking round them. Persevering toil led him to fulfil his ambitious cultural mission. The character and outward appearance of Ostrovsky clashed with the lampoon image of him that the press was busily creating. He never stooped

to justifying himself or to denying the repeated calumny of plagiarism. His aloofness extinguished all scandal brewing round him.

The practice of Russian scandal rested on impassioned humanism. Scandal rises against the order of things and the common paradigm of existence. The artist true to life and fact would not put up with such low behaviour, even during a time when the entire literary world appears to be involved in and based on scandal, so much so that the very idea of artistry is identified with the scandalous.

Discussion and condemnation are the two poles that determine the range of public response to facts, ideas, or comments which the community denounces and regards as alien and downright dangerous. Personal reputations are prominent here as reflecting the extent to which the public is willing to delegate to a particular member the right to express opinions different from those that are universally accepted and thus able to restructure the available value system.

Scandal comes as the natural and indispensable lever to delimit the established standards and the vector of their emergent change. It is like a volcano, reshaped with every eruption. It is impossible to forecast its new shape, but the very realization of the inevitability of change saves one from pain with every reshaping.

Today, the majority of scandals are mighty PR weapons and so a prominent economic factor in making a book a best-seller and its author a media darling. Whatever its fate might be, scandal is part and parcel of debates on the moral paradigm dominant at a given time. In that, scandal not only makes it easier to express politically incorrect opinions but also helps to make such opinions public. Censorship, whether open or secret, and self-censorship presently exist in many countries. In this situation, such an opportunity is extremely welcome.

Scandal occasionally brings its participants tragic fruit. In the final analysis, however, it is a cultural remedy able to thoroughly change the intellectual situation. Scandal gives rise to new ethical and social norms, which penetrate every sphere of life, from humanitarian knowledge to practical politics.

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Susan Petrilli and Augusto Ponzio

Adam Schaff: From semantics to political semiotics¹

Premise (by Augusto Ponzio)

Adam Schaff is a pivotal author in my research, an indirect master, along with Mikhail M. Bakhtin, Emmanuel Lévinas, Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, and Thomas A. Sebeok. I am happy to be able to boast having made a significant contribution as editor, interpreter and in some cases as translator, to the diffusion of the ideas of these masters. I have also authored monographs on these thinkers. From them I have developed what they share in spite of their differences, which is the idea that the life of the human individual in his/her concrete singularity, whatever the object of study, and however specialized the analysis, cannot abstain from involvement in the destiny of others. Concerning Adam Schaff, I published a monograph, *Persona umana: Linguaggio e conoscenza in Adam Schaff* (1974b), which I have reworked over the years and presented in a new, enlarged edition (Ponzio 2002) that includes an interview with Schaff held in Bari in 2000, specifically for that volume. In my books on semiotics and philosophy of language whole parts are dedicated to this author (for example, Ponzio 1977, 1990, 1992b, 1993, 1999, 2003a, 2004, 2007). Moreover, I have developed his analysis of the human individual and of globalisation in today's world in recent books, also in collaboration with Susan Petrilli (see list of References).

*1. Adam Schaff: Philosopher and semiotician
(by Augusto Ponzio)*

According to Schaff, language is both a social product and a genetic phenomenon, and is functional to human praxis. Language is the basis of the “active role” carried out by the human subject in terms both of cognitive

processes and practical action. Language is not only an instrument for the expression of meaning, but also the material which forms meaning without which meaning cannot exist. Consequently, Schaff criticizes the reductive innatist and biologicistic interpretation of language as proposed by linguist Noam Chomsky and biologist Eric H. Lenneberg. According to Schaff, we must get free of what he calls the “fetishism of signs” echoing Marx’s “fetishism of commodities.” Sign fetishism is reflected in the reified conception of the relation among signs and between signifier and signified. Sign relations must be considered as relations among human beings who use and produce signs in specific social conditions. In Schaff’s opinion, we must recognize the superiority of language theories that stress the active function of language in the cognitive process and the connection between language and *Weltanschauung*, between language and the “image of reality,” by contrast with naive materialism. The human being is described as the result of social relations, and language as inseparable from social praxis. In studies of human signs and language, this approach leads to a new way of looking at issues related to signs and language: the problem of the connection between language and knowledge, language and consciousness, language, ideology and stereotypes. Consequently, theory of knowledge appears as a theory in need of support from studies on language. Moreover, the connection between language studies and theory of knowledge contributes to a better understanding of the concepts of “choice,” “responsibility,” “individual freedom,” and of such issues as the “tyranny of words,” “linguistics alienation,” etc., in the field of the humanities (see Petrilli 1986, 1996, 2007).

Another direction in Schaff’s research concerns methodological issues in the social sciences in relation to Marxist theory. His most important publications in this domain are: Schaff 1947, 1949, 1955, 1970, 1975b.

A third aspect focuses on problems relating to the human individual, society and social movements. Schaff’s principle publications in this domain are: Schaff 1961a, 1977a, 1974, 1982, 1988.

We will refer to Schaff’s philosophical interests in political semiotics further on, in particular his interest in the “symptomatology” or “semeiotics” of economic, political and international social relations in the current production system. His works from the beginning of the 1990s to his last years (he died on 12 October 2006) focus specifically on the symptoms of individual and social unease of our time.

From 24 to 29 January 2000 Adam Schaff was in Bari to work with Augusto Ponzio on the draft of his book of 2002 on Schaff. This book includes two conversations with Schaff, one in October 1976, the other in 2000. In this last, held in French, Schaff answered the following questions:

Quelles sont les phases de ta recherche? Quelle sont les relations entre le periods de ta recherche et les événements historiques du siècle XX? Comme peut tu appeller la phase actuelle de ta recherche? Je crois qu'elle remonte à les premières années '80. Quelles sont les événements personnels (événements personnels publiques et non personnelles-privés, selon ta distinction) et les événement historiques qui l'ont déterminée? Nous pouvons certainement établir une relation entre tes livres des années '60 (*Humanisme et existentialisme, Le marxisme et l'individu humaine, L'alienation comme phénomène social*) et tes livres de la phase actuelle. Mais quelles sont-elles les différences d'engagement interpretatives et de perspectives? Pouvons nous dire que l'entier parcours de ta recherche se déroule sous la bannière du socialisme? Pouvons nous dire que l'entière ton œuvre est marxiste? Les changements à l'intérieur de ta recherche ne sont pas des "changement de peau", je crois, mais des changements substantiels dûs à des exigences d'ordre scientifique et à la transformations des objets analysés. Peux tu être d'accord avec cette interpretation?

Schaff's answers are reported in Chapter 7 of *Individuo umano* (Ponzio 2002). The table of contents of this book is now available on Ponzio's website (www.augustoponzio.com). The present paper develops some of the problems relating to these questions.

2. Political semiotics and semeiotics of social symptoms (by Susan Petrilli)

As President of the European Co-ordination Centre for Research and Documentation in Social Sciences (Vienna), Adam Schaff during the 1980s promoted a series of meetings in different countries throughout Europe to analyze the *Helsinki Final Act* (1975) from a semiotic point of view: Budapest, January 1985; Prague, November 1985; Trieste, May 1986; Moscow, November 1986; Pécs, May 1987; Dubrovnik, October 1987; Leipzig, May 1988; Sofia, November 1988, Rotterdam, January 1989. The title of the project was established during a meeting in Dubrovnik 1984: *La sémiotique*

dans la recherche comparative: Le vocabulaire des relations internationales: l'acte Final de la Conférence d'Helsinki. Participants from twelve different countries included: Adam Schaff, Honorary President of the European Co-ordination Centre, Christiane Villain-Gandossi, Adjunct Director of the European Co-ordination Centre, Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, Paolo Facchi, Klaus Bochman, Momir Milojevic, János Kelemen, Christina Schäffner and Augusto Ponzio. The results of the project included: a new edition of the *Helsinki Final Act* (1990), by the European Co-ordination Centre for Research and Documentation in Social Sciences, enlarged with the addition of the results of a scientific analysis from a semiotic perspective of the concepts and notions proposed in it; and the volume *The Concept of Europe* (Villain-Gandossi et al. 1990).

Schaff developed his analysis in political semiotics in his most recent books (1992–2001) which are dedicated to such issues as structural unemployment, migration, and the end of work understood as work-merchandise. These books include: Schaff 1992, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001. In *Mi siglo Veinte*. (1993: 131–145, my italics), Schaff says:

Hay síntomas de un posible colapso y, algunos de ellos nos hablan de la posibilidad de una catástrofe total para la vida en la Tierra. Se trata – y recogemos aquí visiones de la Revelación de San Juan – de imágenes propias del Apocalipsis. El Evangelio habla de sus cuatro Jinetes, y hoy, nosotros, ya podemos discernirlos con claridad.

El primero es el peligro de una *guerra nuclear* y de la destrucción, como consecuencia, de la vida en la Tierra. ... El Segundo Jinete del Apocalipsis es la *amenaza ecológica* que ciernen sobre el mundo. ...

Human “contamination” does not only concern the planet, the atmosphere, river water, seas and oceans, but the whole cosmos:

El hombre ya ha llegado con su contaminación hasta el cosmos. En su zona más próxima a la Tierra ya hay un auténtico “cementerio” de artefactos y elementos de cohetes inservibles.

The third rider symbolizes the *demographic explosion*. With regard to this topical problem Schaff stresses that

Al terminar el siglo XX la población de los países industrializados ascenderá apenas al 15 por ciento del total de la población del planeta. El restante (85% por ciento de la especie humana estará condenada a la pobreza o a

la miseria. Esa desproporción entre los dos grupos de la población, si sus causas actuales no cambian, registrará un agravamiento y el grupo de los pobres será cada vez mayor.

On this topic we find previsions in Schaff's book of 1993 concerning scenarios such as new forms of terrorism, attacks to big metropolis, as in the case of the destruction of the twin towers in New York, and war on terrorism. The fourth Apocalypse rider is the rider of *structural unemployment*, therefore the end of work as a consequence of today's Industrial Revolution, the decline of global labour force, and the dawn of post-capitalist issues also examined by such authors as André Gorz, Jeremy Rifkin, etc. Schaff transforms the image of the four riders of the Apocalypse:

En cualquier caso hay que tener presente – y ésta es mi contribución personal a la visión dada por San Juan – que los Jinetes del Apocalipsis jamás cabalgan en solitario, que siempre van acompañados de un ombre que simboliza las relaciones interhumanas que generan el Apocalipsis. En el sentido de que lo crean, dirigen y regulan su ritmo.

Analysis of the end of commodified work announced by today's structural unemployment recurs in all Schaff's recent texts, and especially in the above-mentioned essay, "Structurelle Arbeitslosigkeit". Present-day unemployment is structural to the global system of production, and not a momentaneous, transitory phase in a cycle. Unemployment represents a decisive turning-point in the social relations of production. Structural unemployment is the beginning of the end of "free-labour," the end of exchange between labour and salary. Automation operates to the detriment of *human* labour, producing human excesses and systemic unemployment. This is not simply a question of treating the relation between worker and machine in isolation from other factors. The relation between worker and machine must be viewed in the broader context of social relations in general, especially economic relations. The maximization of profits has of course always been the motor of capitalism, but capitalist production nowadays more than ever before with communication operating as an integral part in the *production* process itself, reveals its insatiable drive for maximal profitability. Live, variable capital must be sacrificed for fixed capital – all for the sake of capitalist development. In other words, the quantity of personnel working in a company must be reduced by continually renewing and updating machines which gradually replace human beings, even when

a question of operations of the intellectual order. Development of the interactive relation with the intelligent machine is accompanied by a reduction in the number of people necessary to make the machine function. The competencies and services required from the worker are complex. But complexity on a qualitative level calls for simplification on a quantitative level, which is expressed in terms of a reduction in the number of people necessary to the production process. Like the automation of physical work the automation of intellectual work also leads to reduction, even elimination, of human labour for vast numbers of human beings.

Eine soziale Folge des Prozesses [of structural unemployment] ist die Notwendigkeit, sich um neue Arbeitsformen für alle “überflüssigen Menschen” zu bemühen ..., indem man für sie eine entsprechende “Beschäftigung” findet, die von der Gesellschaft organisiert und finanziert wird. (“Strukturelle Arbeitslosigkeit”, p. 16) [One of the social consequences of the process, discussed above, is the need to commit to new forms of work for all the “superfluous human beings,” the “excesses” ... finding a relative “employment” for them organized and finalized by society].

Whoever promises employment in the traditional sense, a return to employment based on traditional work, says Schaff, either does not understand the economic-social situation or is consciously lying basing his/her political career on deception.

... Die soziale Situation diktiert uns heute die Notwendigkeit einer weltweiten *Grossen Transformation*. Wir machen eine neue industrialen Revolution durch, und infolge der Automatisierung und Robotisierung wird die Arbeit (im Traditionellen Sinne des Wortes) absterben, als weitere Folge wird nicht nur die heutige Arbeitklasse, sondern auch die Kapitalistenklasse absterben (“Strukturelle Arbeitslosigkeit”, p. 17) [The social situation today imposes the need for a great transformation involving the whole world. In fact we are experiencing a new industrial revolution. As a consequence of automation and robotization, work (in the traditional sense of the term) will come to an end, and as a further consequence not only will the working class disappear but also the capitalists].

As theoreticians who are not left-wing (for example, Rifkin) also admit, post-capitalism has already appeared and with it market post-economy. Paradoxically, the development of capital produces the conditions of liberation from commodified labour, alienated labour, but today in the

negative form of unemployment – in the context of the capitalist system of social relations extended to a global level. So it then becomes a question of imagining new forms of social relations and new occupations where social wealth does not identify with labour-time, with development in productivity functional to profit, but with freetime, with development of the single individual's personality, with development of the human person.

Ich möchte ... eine Beschäftigung ankündigen, die ... in der Zukunft sicherlich eine enorme Rolle spielen wird – es geht mir die *kontinuierliche und permanente Witterbildung* (ibid.: 26) [I wish to indicate ... an occupation that ... will no doubt play an enormous role in the future: I am referring to continuous and permanent education].

Only a *cognitive dissonance* (Festinger 1957) or a *closed mind* (Rockeach) prevents us from seeing the present metamorphosis of work as a result of the new Industrial Revolution and job-killer machines. Our world needs a bit of sound human reason that can guide the transition from the civilization of work to the civilization of occupations. New occupations include individual permanent education independent from job marketing, which is finishing, and functional to personal development.

3. *Human essence or human being? Problems of translation* (by Susan Petrilli)

Connected with the publication of *Marxism and the Human Individual* (1965) is the discussion concerning the translation of “Theses on Feuerbach” by Karl Marx. This debate took place between Adam Schaff and Lucien Sève in the French journal *L'homme et la Société* in 1971 and 1972 (Schaff 1975a; It. trans by A. Ponzio). It evidences the relation between ideology and translation (see Petrilli 1992). This debate concerns the official translation in French of the theses and involved numerous French intellectuals (in addition to Schaff and Sève, other scholars either directly or indirectly involved were Louis Althusser, Auguste Cornu, Roger Garaudy). However, the debate also referred to official translations in Polish, Russian, Italian and English, and in addition to the scholars mentioned the international community at large interested in Marxist theory was also involved. In German, Marx's text reads as follows:

Feuerbach löst das religiöse Wesen in das menschliche Wesen auf. Aber das menschliche Wesen [*Human essence or human being?*] ist kein dem einzelnen Individuum innenwohnendes Abstraktum. In seiner Wirklichkeit ist das Ensemble des gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse.

Even though this issue may seem rather specialized and restricted, it is in fact of central importance considering its determining role in the global interpretation of Marxist theory – many scholars believe that the “Theses on Feuerbach” are the key to Marx’s thought, even though they often give rise to different interpretations, even misinterpretations, given their elliptical nature and at times metaphorical nature. Furthermore, and for what concerns us more specifically here, discussion of this particular issue is important because it signals the existence of a close relation between translation and ideology: to translate in one way rather than in another, as in the case of this text by Marx, is full of ideological and political implications. In fact, the solution to this particular controversy is significant at the philological, philosophical and political levels. For the case under discussion, it is crucial in establishing the validity of Sève’s overall interpretation of Marxism and of his criticism of existentialism, structuralism, of Althusser’s theoretical anti-humanism, etc. Sève considers Schaff’s translation of Marx’s sixth thesis to be wrong, the result of his misinterpretation of Marxism, of his reading of Marx in a humanistic-speculative key, involving consequences at the political level also. The whole debate ultimately concerned the relation between Marxism and humanism: interpretation of thesis VI may be viewed as a reflection of the general attitude towards the relations between Marxism and humanism, ideology and science, scientific socialism and Marxist humanism, Marx’s youthful writings and his mature works. All this concerns the meaning and value of Marxism generally. As Schaff observes, the debate (though centred upon the translation and interpretation of just a few expressions in the Theses) extends beyond “words” and can only be fully understood by looking “behind the screen,” by inquiring into the history of left-wing political movements, and by relating the consequences of this debate to controversy on the humanist contents of socialism, on the means of overcoming the effects and consequences of Stalinism in the Communist movement, etc.

The immediate object of discussion and controversy concerns the correct translation of certain propositions in “Theses on Feuerbach”, all

of which contain the German word *Wesen* as in the key expression *das menschliche Wesen* in thesis VI. Schaff contends that recurrent translation of this expression with “the essence of man”, generally consolidated by tradition, is wrong. The German word *Wesen* is ambiguous: it counts up to eleven distinct groups of meanings, each with numerous semantic nuances. Two of these meanings are relevant in relation to the debate in question and correspond, respectively, to the Latin “ens” and “essentia,” English “being” and “essence,” French “être” and “essence,” Italian “essere” and “essenza,” intended as “living being” on the one hand, and “essence of things,” “that which is essential” as opposed to incidental, on the other. These languages then do not dispose of a single and ambiguous term corresponding to the German “Wesen”, though this word does have an equivalent for polysemanticism and plurivocality in the Russian “suchtchestwo” (sucestvo) and in the Polish “istota”. Consequently, as opposed to such languages as Russian and Polish which have just as ambiguous an equivalent to the German “Wesen,” in French, English or Italian translations, a decision must be made: the meaning of the word “Wesen” must be decided each time it occurs in a given context, its sense determined for it to be appropriately rendered in the target language.

Most official translations of the “Theses” in different languages derive from the original Russian translation. Strangely enough, in 1892 the Russian translator Plechanov chose to render the German “Wesen” with the unambiguous Russian word “suschtschnost” (that is, “essence,” “Wesenheit”), instead of “suschtschestwo.” Similarly to the Polish “istota” the latter has multiple meanings and consequently is analogous to the German original in terms of polysemy. Having made this particular lexical choice, the Russian translator – an authority in the field, observes Schaff – was in fact to condition this text’s future philosophical and political interpretations. In French, as in Italian and English, the same word cannot be used indifferently as in the case of “Wesen”, “istota”, “suschtschestwo”. Influenced by the original Russian translation, “Wesen” is translated prevalently with the equivalents of “essentia”. This solution was refused by Schaff in favour of the equivalents of “ens”. He made the decision by combining the results of a grammatical analysis with analysis of the philosophical context. In the face of such an ambiguous word as “Wesen”, Schaff solves the interpretive and translative problem by appealing to the rules of German syntax. If the expression “das Wesen” is followed by a noun in the geni-

tive, it means “essence”. Therefore, “das Wesen des Christentums”, which is also the title of a work by Feuerbach, means “the essence of Christianity”. Correspondingly “das Wesen des Religion” means “the essence of religion”, “das Wesen des Menschen,” “the essence of man”. “Wesen” followed by “of something” or “of somebody” functions in the sense of “essence”. By contrast, if “Wesen” is preceded by a qualifying adjective, it means “being”. Therefore, “das christliche Wesen” means “the christian being”, “das religiöse Wesen” means “the religious being”, “das menschliche Wesen” “the human being”. In all these cases, as syntax reveals, we are dealing with “being” that is respectively Christian, religious, human.

*4. Theory of language and theory of knowledge
(by Augusto Ponzio)*

Linguistic analysis is particularly useful in the study of the historical social structure of the human individual, given that it is especially through language that the historical and social conditioning inherent in the shaping of the individual is made possible. Language is a social fact and constitutes the social background to consciousness, thought and speech. Language is a social product as well as being a genetic phenomenon and is functional to human praxis. This is at the basis of the historical-materialistic and dialectic character of the “active role” of the subject both at the level of cognitive processes as well as of practical action. The individual is able to act upon the historical social situation which is pre-existent to him conditioning him from the outset, through his use of language (it too a social product). Language is not only an instrument for the expression of meanings, but it is also the material which goes to form meaning and without which meaning could not exist. Consequently, what we call the “subjective” does not at all mean the abstractly individual or absolutely autonomous, but rather it is the concretely individual and that which is conditioned, that is, a social product with a social function: the “subjective has an objective and social-historical character”.

The linguistic sciences are able to grasp the socio-historical nature of language thus ridding themselves of both biologicistic, innatistic, conventional prejudices on the one hand, and of related mechanistic and idealistic conceptions on the other, merely by reconsidering the human individual in the perspective of historical-dialectic materialism. It follows that language

is neither wholly natural nor wholly unnatural and conventional. Like any human fact, it is first of all a socio-historical phenomenon resulting from historically determined needs, mediating between needs and the satisfaction of such needs. An innatistic and biologistic interpretation of language, as that formulated by Chomsky and Lenneberg, can only be maintained by reducing the human person to the status of mere product of natural evolution, as if her/his biological history was not influenced by her/his social history. From such a perspective, s/he is viewed as “the human being in general”, as the abstract human being, rather than as a historical and social being conceived in her/his concreteness, in her/his special historical specification according to the social system, the specific division of labour, class and level of productive forces to which s/he belongs. Furthermore, many authors agree that what is innate in language is only the *capacity of learning how to speak* (which undoubtedly depends upon the hereditary structure of the brain, the vocal apparatus, and so forth), while the concrete realization of language is determined by *social relations*. Though true, this explanation is insufficient for it does not eliminate the dangers of a biological interpretation of language: in Lenneberg’s work, for instance, social relations and the relations among individuals of the same species are placed at the same level. They are considered to be the same as relations existing in the animal kingdom at large.

It is absolutely necessary to found the theory of language on interpretations of mankind and of interhuman relations which are free of any tendency towards naturalistic positions with respect to the scientific achievements of historical-dialectic materialism. From a Marxian perspective, social relations are characterized by relations of production; they represent a particular form of production, they are historical, nonnatural relations. If we wish to free ourselves of what Schaff called the “fetishism of the sign” referring to the Marxist notion of the “fetishism of goods”, we must view the analogy and typology of signs in connection with the issue of the human individual and social relations. In fact, to give up a reified conception of the relations between signs as well as between signifier and signified, it is necessary to take the social process of communication as the starting point of our analysis, and to consider the sign relation as a relation among human beings who use and produce signs in specific social conditions. All analyses should start from the “social condition of the individual” and from the notion of the individual as a social product. This

would prevent us from considering communication as a set of relations among originally separate and abstract subjects, while removing idealistic and materialistic mechanistic explanations of the communication process.

The question of the relation of language to reality is closely connected to both the theory of knowledge and to the conception of the human individual. Does language create our image of reality? Or does language reflect and reproduce reality? Does language have an active, creative function in the cognitive process? To answer these questions implies taking a definite stance as regards the three fundamental models of the theory of cognition: idealism, mechanistic materialism, dialectic materialism. The latter two refer the problem of the relation between language and reality to the theory of reflection. All three concern the role of the subject in the cognitive process and consequently the problems related to the human individual. The subjective-idealistic and materialistic-dialectic models differ from each other in their interpretation of the active role which both, in contrast to mechanistic materialism, assign to the subject and consequently to language in the cognitive process. In Schaff's opinion, in comparison to naive materialism, materialistic-dialectic theory recognizes the superiority of language theories which stress the active function of language in the cognitive process (even if from an idealistic point of view) and the connection between language and *Weltanschauung*, between language and the "image of reality" (think of Humboldt, Sapir, and Whorf). However, in the perspective of a Marxian interpretation, the human being should be considered as the result of social relations, and language as the product of social praxis. This interpretation recognizes the active function of the cognitive subject and, at the same time, maintains that far from being the starting point of the cognitive process, the subjective element is the result – and a complex one at that – of specific social influences. In a certain sense, the subject may be considered as the resultant construction of cognitive processes. The concept of "reflection" is closely related to the concept of the "human individual", and it is precisely on the basis of interpretation of such notions that we mark the difference between dialectic and mechanistic materialism in connection with the theory of knowledge. As Schaff writes in *Language and Cognition* (1964): "the specific interpretation of the theory of reflection in the Marxian system is directly related to the interpretation of the concept of the human individual."

The connection between the theory of language and the theory of knowledge is evident if we acknowledge interaction between language and thought, as well as the indivisibility of meaning and concept. Schaff (1967) maintains that:

... when in accordance with the materialistic analysis of the cognitive process we consider thought and human consciousness as linguistic thought, as thought made of language (Marx maintained that language is “my consciousness and that of others”), it is evident that any analysis of the cognitive process must also be the analysis of the linguistic process, without which thought is simply impossible.

Unity of thought and language highlights the active function of language in the reflection upon reality, as well as the social character of individual thought, its status as a social product. On defining the sign in general (that is, at the semiotic level), and on dealing with semantics, it is impossible to leave the theory of knowledge out of consideration. For example, to consider the problem of the referent, or the material object, as irrelevant to a semiotic point of view does not mean separating semiotics from the theory of knowledge and, therefore, allowing semiotics to remain neutral as regards such a theory, as certain authors believe. On the contrary, it means assuming a specific standpoint in relation to the theory of knowledge, which would be described as conventional-idealistic for the insistence upon the autonomy of the code and of the message with respect to material reality. Semantics and the theory of knowledge are both implied whenever we ask the following questions: “what is meaning?”; “what is the relation between meaning and the sign-vehicle?”; “what is the relation between meaning and object?”; “what kind of existence do we refer to when we say that meaning exists?”; and so forth.

On the other hand, all problems dealt with by theory of knowledge imply semantics, insofar as they are problems concerning language. This does not mean that the theory of cognition should be exclusively a semantic analysis or that language should be the sole object of any philosophical research, as maintained by Semantic Philosophy. The Marxist theory of reflection clearly demonstrates all the implications existing between semantics and the theory of knowledge, rejecting any schematic attitude typical of conventional and idealistic relativistic standpoints. Certain philosophical trends such as Cassirer’s neo-Kantism, neo-positivism, Rus-

sell's logical atomism, the linguistic philosophy of the school of Oxford connected to Wittgenstein's later production, the semantic analysis of the school of Warsaw and so forth, deserve recognition for having maintained and demonstrated that language is not merely the instrument, but also the object of philosophical research.

The theory of knowledge is not the only theory in need of support from studies on language. The philosophy of the human individual – to the extent that it deals with the function of the individual in social relations and with problems of traditional ethics (which does not imply moralism) – must inevitably consider that individual behaviour is conditioned by society mainly through the influence of language. This leads us to a new vision of issues related to language: the problem of the connection between language and ideology, concept and stereotype, language and social praxis. On considering the concepts of “choice”, “responsibility”, “individual freedom”, we need to take account of the “tyranny of words”, of the problem of “linguistic alienation”. We should reject the idealistic and conservative point of view which refers contradictions and individual alienation to a semantic origin and maintain, similarly to the young Hegelians, that the human being can be “set free” by simply clarifying the meaning of words and by substituting false ideas with true ones (see Petrilli 2004b).

5. The concept of contradiction in formal logic and dialectic (by Augusto Ponzio)

The relation between Marxist dialectic and formal logic demonstrates the connection between the theory of knowledge and the analysis of language. Schaff shows how the word “contradiction” has two different meanings depending on whether it is considered from a Marxist dialectical, or formal logical point of view; this implies that Marxist dialectic does not exclude the logical principle of non contradiction. From the point of view of formal logic, the term “contradiction” signifies a relation between two sentences, or utterances, one of which maintains that something is in a given relation with an object at a given moment, while the other denies this. On the contrary, from the point of view of Marxist dialectic “contradiction” means “unity of antithesis”, that is, unity of contrasting tendencies, aspects and forces; in this way, dialectics is the constitutive element of every phenomenon. When Marx maintains that at a certain level of their

development the productive material forces of society are in contradiction with the existing relations of production, the word “contradiction” does not express the relation between a positive and negative judgement (as in formal logic), but rather the juxtaposition between opposed and yet complementary tendencies which form the unity of a certain system, and which are, at the same time, the mainspring of its transformation. In this case, the word “contradiction” – notwithstanding the misunderstandings it can give rise to – when intended as an objective rejection of the logical principle of non-contradiction, has a specific meaningfulness which justifies its use. In this particular case, the word “contradiction” stresses a contrast characterized by inadequacy and discordance such as to interfere with the functioning of the social mechanism to the point of causing its collapse.

A central point in Schaff’s analysis of the relation between dialectics and the principle of non-contradiction is his demonstration that consideration of movement as a confutation of the logical principle of non-contradiction, is unfounded. Engels too fell into this trap. In Plechanov’s opinion we must face the following dilemma: either we acknowledge the existence of the fundamental laws of formal logic and we deny movement, or, on the contrary, we acknowledge movement and deny these laws. Schaff observes that this is a false dilemma. It arises from the interpretation of movement as an objective confutation of the logical principle of non-contradiction, as something which is and is not at the same time in the same place. This interpretation which the Marxist classics derive from Hegel, in reality originates from the ancient Eleatic philosophers:

Die Eleaten bejahten den Satz vom Widerspruch und negierten folglich die Objektivität der Bewegung; Hegel stand umgekehrt auf dem Standpunkt der Objektivität der Bewegung und verwarf infolgedessen die Gultigkeit des Satzes vom Widerspruch in der Beschreibung der Bewegung. (Schaff 1975: 26) [The Eleats asserted the principle of contradiction and consequently denied the objectivity of movement. On the contrary, Hegel took the point of view of movement and consequently rejected the validity of the principle of contradiction in the description of movement].

Hegelian interpretation of movement (as something which both is and is not in the same place at the same time) and the level of develop-

ment of the mathematics of the time, in particular of differential calculus, Newton and Leibniz's conception of the infinitesimal entity, considered to be a quantity equal to and different from zero, strengthened the influence on Marx and Engels, of the Eleatic-Hegelian principles concerning movement.

As far as the relations between Marx and the mathematics of his time are concerned, the situation today is different from Schaff's description of 1955. Thanks to the publication of Marx's *Mathematical Manuscripts* (Moscow 1968; It. trans. from German by A. Ponzio 2005), we are now familiar with Marx's critical analyses of Newton's and Leibniz's "mystical" differential calculus, of D'Alembert's and Euler's rationalistic method, and of Lagrange's purely algebraic method. In criticising Newton's and Leibniz's differential calculus, Marx highlighted the presence, in their theory, of metaphysical notions and of the use of procedures which contradict the laws of mathematics. Though making use of Lagrange's work, through such criticism Marx independently reached positions attained by such nineteenth-century mathematicians as Cauchy and Weierstrass, who accomplish the transition from a simpler to a more profound and scientific stage of calculus. Schaff's considerations can certainly be referred to Engels but not to Marx. What Engels wrote in his *Anti-Dühring* about the differential relation gives the impression that he accepted exactly that kind of interpretation of differential calculus which Marx defined as "mystical". Marx maintained that differential calculus is mystical in character; in fact it attains exact results by means of algebraically inexact procedures, as Marx says, it makes use of exceptional laws, that is, it confers contrasting properties to the terms employed; it resorts to devices devoid of any mathematical rigour, it resorts, that is, to "conjuring tricks". In Marx's opinion, calculus is to be dealt with in strictly mathematical terms, and in this sense he kept account of Lagrange's contribution for the attempt of founding calculus on pure algebraic grounds. If procedures not founded upon demonstration were employed in differential calculus, this was not due to the dialectic character of such procedures, as Engels seemed to believe when he explained that the lack of understanding, on the part of contemporary mathematicians, of Leibniz's differential calculus was caused by the impossibility of understanding the principles of calculus on the basis of formal logic. On the contrary, it was due to the fact that differential calculus was based on metaphysical and non-dialectical definitions.

6. *Semiotic structuralism in the Marxist frame*
 (by Susan Petrilli)

An important semiotic structuralist method which should be mentioned is Karl Marx's "protostructuralist" analysis of capitalist economic relations. We shall not refer to French Marxist structuralism (Louis Althusser, Lucien Godelier – the Marxist structuralism of Lucien Sebag, follower of Lévi-Strauss, is a "discours à part"), but directly to Marx given that his approach is typically semiotic, even if we must connote it as "cryptosemiotic". The study of communication is pivotal in the Marxian critique of political economy. In fact, Marx analyzes commodities as messages and concentrates on explaining the "language of commodities" and the "commodity's arcanum" (Marx, *Capital*, I). As a result of this approach, his critique of political economy overcomes the fetishistic view of things according to which the relation among commodities appears as a natural relation among things and not for what it really is, that is, a specific type of relation among people. As such, Marxian critique is effectively a semiotic analysis which studies the structure of goods as messages not only at the level of exchange but also of production. A commodity is a commodity not when a product is produced and consumed in its use-value but when it is produced and consumed as an exchange-value, that is, as a message. All this makes economics a sector of semiotics. The structure of the market emerges as a structure of human relations, precisely the humans relations of social production. From this point of view, the Marxian approach to structure is exemplary for semiotics. It indicates that what Marx achieved in his analysis of commodities and capital we must achieve in anthroposemiotics: structures of relations among human individuals must be identified in the place of mere relations among things and individual reduced to things.

Vice versa, the semiotic approach permits an appropriate use of the notions of structure and superstructure in a Marxist framework. In fact, recurrent difficulties in the study of the relations between structure and superstructure derive from the lack of a mediating element. This mediating element is provided by the totality of sign systems, verbal and non-verbal, operative in all human communities. The pieces in the game are not two, but three: to the modes of production and to the ideological elaboration of the superstructure must be added *sign systems*. From a semiotic perspective, the structures of non-verbal communication, i.e. the circulation of

commodities, and the structures of verbal communication, i.e. the circulation of messages, appear as different structures of the same social process, i.e. the communication process.

This means that all cultural phenomena may be viewed as a communicative phenomena based on sign structures and systems, and that human non-verbal communication must be placed alongside verbal communication. Therefore, a general theory of society coincides with general semiotics. This becomes clearer when we consider that in the case both of verbal and non-verbal messages semiotics addresses the same problems – the work that produces them and that makes exchange and communication possible. For example, Claude Lévi-Strauss (cf. 1958) used the categories of linguistics in his studies on the rules of matrimony and kinship systems, offering a truly formidable example of the application of conceptual frameworks elaborated in relation to verbal communication to non-verbal communication. Lévi-Strauss's reasoning is questionable when he justifies his application of categories proper to language to his studies on non-verbal communication in terms of "recurrent hymns to the *esprit humain*". This implies reference to a universal unconscious activity and universal structures of the *esprit humain*. Schaff criticized the ontological character of structures: instead, structuralism is an interpretive approach, inseparable from human understanding (see Petrilli 2005). Any scientific approach considers the world, reality, as being in constant movement and transformation and in view of this formulates its hypotheses and laws. The formulation of laws is possible because movements and transformations present constants, states of balance, systematic and essential aspects, which belong to "reality", to the "world". This balance or stability in phenomena and in relations among the elements of reality (in organic or inorganic nature and in culture) together with relatively autonomous and isolated systems of elements have an objective existence and consequently constitute the potential objects of our knowledge.

Therefore, we must discover and determine not only the laws of the dynamics of movement and development in reality, but also the structural laws of relatively isolated systems in relative balance. We must study the structures of dynamics and the dynamics of structures. Not only is the study of both types of law founded, but such a complementary study contributes to a global image of reality. If we wish to study the (genetic, causal) laws of something's development, we must establish what this "something" is; and,

therefore, it becomes necessary to know the laws of its structure (coexistent, morphologic structure). This gradual knowledge of structure is just as essential as knowledge of the genesis and development of the objects under study. This is why knowledge of coexistential, morphologic laws is among the most ancient in human history: it dates back to when human beings learnt to differentiate between a plant and another, an animal and another, that is, when they learnt to articulate reality on the basis of the capacity to recognize signs, to identify coexistent features which differentiate things. In this sense, as a semiotic animal the human being is also, as maintains Schaff (conversation with A. Ponzio, 1976; in Ponzio 2002), a *structuralist animal*. Structuralism not only indicates a trend among semioticians, but also among humans as humans. Schaff stresses the complementary relation between structure and history, synchronic approach and diachronic approach:

Il suffit d'écouter le simple bon sens pour comprendre que les méthodes synchronique et diachronique son complémentaires. Seule la connaissance de la structure de l'objet, grâce à la découverte des lois coexistentielles (structurelles) permet de pratiquer avec succès les études génétiques et vice versa – la connaissance de la genèse et de l'histoire d'un système permet de progresser dans l'étude de la structure. (*Structuralisme et marxisme* 1974: 30) [It suffices to listen to plain good sense in order to understand that synchronic and diachronic methods are complementary. Only familiarity with the structure of the object, thanks to the discovery of coexistent (structural) laws, allows for success in genetic studies, and vice versa – familiarity with the genesis and the history of a system allows for progress in the study of structure].

Man is a *structuralist animal*. Schaff critiques ontological structuralism, and the opposition between structure and history, synchrony and diachrony.

7. Language, ideology and stereotypes (by Augusto Ponzio)

Linguistic analysis and the sociology of knowledge together with Marxism, contribute to demonstrating the social character of thought and consequently its social and ideological nature. Concept and meaning are two faces of the same phenomenon: this phenomenon is thought-language.

Meaning does not subsist outside natural language or independently of linguistic signs. However, the verbal sign is not only closely connected to concept, but also to what Schaff calls the stereotype. It is related to beliefs, established opinion, emotional tendencies, group and class interests, and so forth. The stereotype is a specific reflection of reality related to specific linguistic signs; but since it involves emotional, volitional, and evaluational elements, not only does it play a particular role in relation to cognitive processes, but also in relation to praxis. The stereotype is not simply a category of logical thought, it is also a pragmatic category. From language we receive concepts as the product of a certain society in the course of history, in the same way we receive stereotypes which carry with them specific tendencies, behaviour patterns and reactions. This means that speech is always more or less ideological since it is connected to social praxis.

Schaff maintains that reflection upon the stereotype is characterized by a high degree of “intrusion of the subjective factor” in the form of emotional, volitional and evaluational elements. This “subjective factor”, however, is social and not individual in nature, it is linked to interests of social groups (social classes, ethnic groups which speak the same language and so forth). Seen in these terms the “subjective factor” is present in any form of reflection upon reality as well as in scientific knowledge. Schaff says:

Science and ideology are closely connected to each other, in spite of those pedants who would like to separate them. In any case, since social praxis, which produces and promotes the development of language, is the common basis for both the relatively objective knowledge of the world, and for attitudes of evaluation, a genetic link exists. (*Essays in the Philosophy of Language*, 1967; It. trans., 1969: 127)

Schaff singles out the following relation between stereotype and ideology: “it is not possible to directly identify the stereotype with ideology but the latter could not subsist without the stereotype”. We may also deal with problems concerning ideology and the “subjective factor” of human knowledge – where the subject, as we have seen, is viewed as a social rather than individual product from the viewpoint of the sociology of knowledge. This discipline, in fact, acknowledges the subject as a socially produced and conditioned individual. As Schaff frequently stresses, the sociology of knowledge derives from Marxism and particularly from the structure and superstructure theory, it is also directly related to epistemology and to the

theory of knowledge. Schaff divides the definition of the concept of ideology into three groups so as to avoid any ambiguity and misunderstandings: a) the genetic definition which examines the conditions of development of ideology; b) the structural definition, which attempts to define the specific character of ideology, and therefore to establish the differences, from the logical point of view, between the structure of ideological discourse and the structure of scientific discourse; c) the functional definition, which underlines the functions fulfilled by ideology in relation to social, group, and class interests, etc.

Furthermore, Schaff believes in the necessity of distinguishing between the problem of the definition of ideology, on the one hand, and the problem of the value of ideology in relation to objective truth, on the other. Though related, these problems are different and should not be confused: the definition of ideology is one thing, while its value in relation to the question of objective knowledge is another. Therefore, though apparently a definition, the statement “ideology is false consciousness”, is not, in fact, a definition, but is rather an answer to the question of the value of ideology. The main error made by Mannheim in his theory of ideology and in his criticism of Marxism, lies in his having mistaken the statement “ideology is false consciousness” for a definition of ideology.

We also need to distinguish between the meaning Marx and Engels gave to the word “ideology”, and the meaning it was given in the Marxist tradition (especially from Lenin onwards). Such expressions as “bourgeois ideology” and “ideological science” are very much in use. They characterize ideology on the basis of its function. In Schaff’s opinion, therefore, we may give the following functional definition of ideology: by ideology we mean a system of opinions related to the aims of social development which are founded upon a system of values; these opinions are at the basis of specific attitudes and behavioural patterns in the different objective situations. Marx and Engels employed the word “ideology” in a narrow sense, that is, in reference to the “ideology” of the bourgeois class. Leading class ideology aims at the preservation of a society divided into classes. Consequently it aims at concealing those contradictions which reveal the necessity of transformation in the current structures of productive relations. Bourgeois ideology was thus characterized by Marx and Engels as false consciousness with respect to objective consciousness. Marx and Engels considered ideology as false consciousness because they use the word in a narrow sense,

that is, in reference to the ideology of the bourgeoisie, and not in the broad sense where the reference is to the “ideology of the proletariat,” to “scientific ideology,” and so forth. When Mannheim stated that if ideology is generally false consciousness, then Marxist ideology is also false, he made a mistake for he identified ideology in the narrow sense with ideology in the broad sense (cf. Schaff 1970, *Historia i prawda* [*History and Truth*]).

We may summarize what we have said with the following points: 1) the statement “ideology is false consciousness” is not a definition; 2) when we speak of ideology as false consciousness we are referring to bourgeois ideology which aims at the reproduction of class society and of social inequalities; 3) use of such expressions as “ideology of the proletariat” and “bourgeois ideology” is now frequent. In Schaff’s opinion, by considering these points we become aware of the necessity of defining the word ideology in such a way as to explain its different meanings, on the one hand, and so that it suits the Marxian perspective, on the other. In this sense, ideology may be defined as either all those opinions formed under the influence of the interests of a specific class (genetic definition), or, as those opinions useful to the defence of the interests of a specific class (functional definition). It is by considering ideology in relation to its genesis and to its function that we are able to more properly face the problem of the value of ideology as related to the objective and scientific knowledge of reality.

It must immediately be said that according to Schaff this problem cannot be dealt with on the basis of a linguistic-structural definition. Ideological discourse does not have a specific structure which distinguishes it from scientific discourse. It is an error to maintain that the difference between science and ideology lies in the structure of their propositions. According to such an opinion, ideological discourse would mainly consist in evaluative and normative propositions, whereas scientific discourse would consist of descriptive propositions. Schaff severely criticizes the neopositivistic dichotomy between judgements of facts and judgements of value. This dichotomy appears in Marxism in the forms of the division between science and ideology. The difference between science and ideology does not consist in the fact that the “subjective factor” (which, as we have seen, is social and not individual) is present in science and absent in ideology. It consists, rather, in the diversity of the role of the “subjective factor” which is present in both science and ideology. Scientific analysis and the sociology of knowledge have made an important contribution to

destruction of the myth of the *pure objectivity* of scientific propositions. Given that both science and ideology are conditioned by society, both are in a certain sense subjective (at least because language without which human thought is impossible, introduces subjective elements in every form of human knowledge). Therefore, in Schaff's words: "By contrast to the thesis which sets science against ideology, another thesis is represented here. It maintains that not only are the propositions of science and ideology linked to each other, but in some cases they are identical." All this to the point of being able to speak of "ideological science" and of "scientific ideologies".

Schaff stresses that to recognize that any discourse is more or less ideological because of social and historical conditioning, does not imply that all ideologies are distorted and to be placed, therefore, at the same level. We need to distinguish between true ideologies and ideologies as distortions of reality; between scientific ideologies and forms of false consciousness. This distinction is determined by the different genesis and the different function of ideologies.

Translated from the Italian by Susan Petrilli

Note

1. Adam Schaff, a renowned Polish and Jewish philosopher, was born on 10 March 1913 in Lwów (part of Austria until 1918, after then it went to Poland) to a lawyer's family. He died just recently on 12 October 2006 in Warsaw. Of his numerous books (a partial list has been included in the References), several treat problems of semantics, philosophy of language, logic, theory of knowledge, ideology, and the social sciences. Schaff should be remembered for his important contribution to the problem of understanding and to the critique of misunderstanding in the domains of philosophy of language, semiotics, the social sciences, politics, interpretation of Marxism and actualization of socialism. He completed his secondary and university studies (in Law and Economics, two diplomas) in Lwów, and then continued at the Ecole des Sciences Politiques et Economiques in Paris. His interest in methodological issues led him to study philosophy (in Poland and in the Soviet Union). In 1941 he took his degree as candidate of philosophy (equivalent to a doctors degree in Western Europe) and his doctors degree (equivalent to a habilitation in Central Europe) from the Institute of Philosophy at the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Moscow.

In fact, during the German occupation of Poland Schaff had emigrated to the Soviet Union. After liberation he returned to Poland where he taught at various Universities from 1945 onwards (he acted as Assistant Professor of Philosophy in Łódź until 1948 and subsequently as Full Professor at the University of Warsaw). He was elected Member of the Polish Academy of Sciences in 1952 and became Director of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the same Academy. In 1969 he shifted to Vienna where he became President of the Board of Directors of the European Center of Comparative Research in Social Sciences (UNESCO), which he headed for 20 years, acting at the same time as Honorary Professor of Philosophy at the University of Vienna. His social activities during those years were concentrated on his participation in the work of The International Institute of Philosophy, The International Federation of Philosophical Associations (in both as a member of their Executive Committees) and The Club of Rome (he was member of the Executive Committee until 1990). From 1931 until its dissolution in 1989 he was member of the Polish Communist Party (then transformed into the United Workers Party); from 1955 until 1968 he was a member of its Central Committee. During his lifetime Schaff published about 20 books and pamphlets, as well as about 300 articles in philosophy and sociology. Many of these books were translated into several foreign languages. Adam Schaff received an honorary degree from the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor, USA, 1967); the Sorbonne (Paris, 1975) and the University of Nancy (France, 1982). He became Member of the Polish Academy of Sciences, of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (1952) and of the Royal Spanish Academy of Political and Moral Sciences (Madrid, 1987). As a philosopher Adam Schaff specialized in epistemology, logic and philosophy of language.

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Susan Petrilli and Augusto Ponzio

The semiotic animal

1. Understanding global communication in today's world: Global semiotics and semioethics (by Augusto Ponzio)

With Thomas A. Sebeok and from the perspective of global semiotics and research in the domain of biosemiotics, we may posit that life and semiosis converge, that semiosis coincides with life – indeed may even extend beyond life, a hypothesis for the future to explore. Global semiotics has taught us that semiosis is a phenomenon that extends across the entire planet and that human semiosis is part of this global context (see Sebeok 2001; Danesi et al. 2004).

For an adequate understanding of human semiosis, the globality of context must be taken into account with an attitude that is critical, creative and propositive. Attention must be focused on the life of reflection as much as on the life of action and values, with a view to the human propensity for responsibility, social planning and programs. From the perspective of human semiosis signs, actions and values are inextricably interconnected. Only in this global context can human semiosis be understood in a critical key, similarly to the special semioses produced in the sphere of anthroposemiosis, or more specifically anthroposociosemiosis.

Global semiotics provides us with the conceptual instruments that are necessary for a better understanding of global communication today.

The human being is part of the great biosemiosphere and as such is a semiotic animal like all other animals. However, the human being is also part of the anthropo-socio-semiosphere. Therefore in addition to being a semiotic animal the human being is also a semiotic animal. Differently from all other life forms, the human being is capable not only of semiosis but also of metasemiosis, of suspending the immediate flow of semiosis and deliberating. Thanks to a primary modeling device endowed with syn-

tactics, also called language, the semiotic animal is endowed with a capacity for criticism and creativity.

Consequently, the human being, a semiotic animal as such is capable of taking responsibility. Responsibility is understood here as responsibility for the other as opposed to responsibility connected with the egotistical interests of identities in the present context of socio-economical globalization.

Globalization understood in socio-economic terms is limited and short-sighted given that it is functional to sectorial and egotistical interests, paradoxical as this may seem. Instead, the semiotic perspective evidences the condition of reciprocal involvement and interrelatedness of all life forms over the planet. And the condition of interrelatedness implies that indifference towards the other, the tendency to oppress the other in the long run can only backfire on the oppressor.

Human beings are endowed with a capacity for responsibility understood as responsivity and answerability towards the other – the other that in social, biological, ontological, and phenomenological terms may be more or less close, more or less distant. The semiotic animal is capable of a global perspective on semiosis and as such is responsible for the health of semiosis in its plurality and diversity over the entire globe.

As stated, global semiotics provides the conceptual instruments necessary for a *better understanding* of the global phenomenon that is communication today. However, with the expression “better understanding” we wish to indicate not only understanding in theoretical terms but also involvement of moral conscience.

We propose the term *semioethics* (Petrilli and Ponzio 2003; Caputo et al. 2006) to name an approach or attitude we consider necessary today more than ever before in the context of globalization, for a better understanding of semiosis today – its implications, perspectives, the risks involved and responsibilities. By *semioethics* we understand the propensity in semiotics to recover its ancient vocation as “semeiotics” (or symptomatology), with its focus on symptoms. A major issue for semioethics is “care for life” in a global perspective according to which semiosis and life coincide.

The semiotician today must be ready to interpret the symptoms of semiosis and its malfunctioning as produced by globalization in today’s global communication-production society (see Ponzio 1999, 2003). The world of global communication is the world of communication for pro-

duction, profit, and reproduction of the same socio-economic system with all necessary means available, including war. The destructive character of global communication (“the destructive character” is an expression used by Walter Benjamin [1931] to describe the capitalist socio-economic system at the dawn of Nazism) is evident in the destruction of the environment, in the increase of poverty, in structural unemployment, in exploitation of the South of the world by the North, and in the unjust distribution of wealth between a quarter of the world population (in the developed world) and all the rest of the world population (in the underdeveloped world). The most powerful expression of the destructive character of capitalistic competition in its global communication-production phase is war. The world of global communication is the world of *infinite war*, of war to war. Life on the planet is in serious danger.

As global semiotics, general semiotics today must carry out a detotalizing function. In other words, general semiotics must conduct a critique of all (claims to the status of) totalities, including global communication. If general semiotics is not critical and does not adopt a detotalizing method it will be no more than a syncretic result of the special semiotics, a transversal language of the encyclopaedia of the unified sciences, prevarication of philosophy suffering from the will to omniscience with respect to the plurality of different disciplines and specialized fields of knowledge.

What we propose to call *semioethics* must take the current phase in historico-social development as its starting point and proceed to analyze today’s society rigorously and critically, therefore communication-production social structures, the communication-production relationships forming today’s world. And given that the social forms of production in the current communication-production system have been mostly homogenized, semioethics is at an advantage. We could go so far as to make the claim that the whole planet is regulated by a single type of market, by a single form of production, by a single form of consumption, so that not only behavior, habits, fashions (including “dress fashion”), but the imaginary, our capacity for the play of musement have all been severely homogenized. In today’s dominant communication-production system difference understood in terms of otherness is substituted ever more by difference understood in terms of alternatives.

In the present situation of monologism, of closure of the universe of discourse, the critical task of semioethics is rendered extremely difficult, even

impossible. The conceptual instruments necessary for the work of critique are not readily available. Semioethics needs categories that are not those of dominant ideology that contribute to misunderstanding our reality. The working hypotheses of semioethics do not derive from common sense or common knowledge and consequently cannot be taken for granted.

An understanding of world-wide global communication-production requires a perspective that is just as global, which the special sciences taken separately cannot provide. On the contrary, a global perspective is offered by global semiotics, the general science of signs or *semiotics* as it is taking shape today on the international scene thanks particularly to the work of Sebeok.

Global semiotics begins with the hypothesis that semiosis and life converge and focuses on the interconnection among signs. Its gaze moves from the protosemiosis of energy-information to the overall processes of the complexification of semiosis in the evolution of life over the planet. Interconnection and interdependence among signs consists in a *network* which, following Sebeok, extends from the Lilliputian world of molecular genetics and virology, to the man-size world of Gulliver and finally to the world of Brobdingnag, the gigantic biogeochemical ecosystem called Gaia.

A full understanding of global communication today implies a full understanding of the risks involved by global communication, including the risk that *communication itself may come to an end*. With this statement we are not just alluding to the risk of the subjective-individualistic phenomenon known as “incommunicability”, amply theorized and represented in film and literature, but far more radically to the risk that life itself may come to an end if we agree that life and semiosis, therefore life and communication converge. In light of the enormous potential for destruction in today’s society by contrast with all other earlier phases in the development of the social system, the risk that life may come to an end on the planet earth should not be undervalued.

When analyzing communication today our approach must be as global as the problem under analysis. A global approach must not limit its attention to partial and sectorial aspects of the communication-production system as dictated by internal perspectives functional to the system itself; it must not be limited to psychological subjects, that is, to subjects reduced to the parameters imposed by the social sciences, subjects measurable in terms of statistics. Global communication-production calls for a meth-

odological and theoretical perspective that is as global as the phenomenon under observation. Such a perspective will favour a better understanding of the logic of global communication-production and, therefore, our capacity for a *critique* of the system of social reproduction constructed upon such logic.

2. Globalisation in socio-economic and in biosemiotic terms (by Susan Petrilli)

Global communication in today's social reproduction system, in other words, global communication understood in the socio-economical sense connected with progress in technology and with the market, is only one aspect of communication in the great communication network involving life over the entire planet. All life forms may be analyzed in terms of dynamic sign systems. From a global semiotic perspective human life forms may be considered in the fundamental terms of biosemiosis. This approach, as stated, evidences the relation of interdependency among all life forms, therefore of human life with all other life forms on Earth. And while evidencing the condition of global interrelatedness, this approach also evidences the specificity of human life in terms of socio-cultural semiosis.

Globalization was already a fact of life well before the advent of global communication as understood in today's capitalist, or post-capitalist society, that is, well before the spread of the communication network at a world-wide level thanks to progress in technology and to the global market which supports this network in socio-economic terms. In other words, globalization may be understood reductively as a corporate-led phenomenon characteristic of modern capitalist society, which now invests the entire reproductive system globally in its various phases – production, circulation and consumption –, and has wide-ranging (and most often devastating) effects over the entire planet. But globalization may also be understood in biosemiotic terms, as globalism, that is, as a tendency that characterizes the evolution of life from its origins (Petrilli and Ponzio 2001).

In fact, globalization in this second acceptance is the structural condition provided by the processes of evolutionary development for the proliferation of life itself over the planet, in its multifarious and interconnected manifestations, which are sign manifestations. As a specific form of life, the human, we are born into a sign network that is preexistent with respect

to specific ontogenetic, even phylogenetic phenomena, presumably as a potential contribution to the further development of this network in evolutionary terms. The sphere of anthroposemiosis appears relatively late on the evolutionary scale and develops interrelatedly with the other spheres of semiosis, which coincide with the superkingdoms – microsemiosis, phytosemiosis, mycosemiosis, zoosemiosis of which anthroposemiosis is a specification. Together these different spheres of semiosis form the global biosemiosphere. Of course, in the light of global semiotics other spheres of semiosis have also emerged ranging, for example, from endosemiosis to cybersemiosis. These are studied by as many branches of semiotics. And new spheres of semiosis continue to emerge with ongoing progress in the development of life and technology (see Posner et al. 1997–2004).

Global communication, understood as globalism, indeed detotalized globalism, is a fact of life. And the interrelation between global communication and life must not be forgotten if life – including human life – is to continue flourishing globally as inscribed in the nature of sign activity. On the contrary, globalization, as understood in terms of today's global socio-economic system, that is, as corporate-led globalization, is neither inevitable nor desirable, and even threatens to destroy life on earth as we know it.

Global communication in today's social reproduction system is only one aspect of the great web of communication formed by life over the entire planet Earth. All life forms may be analyzed in terms of dynamic sign systems. From our own perspective, human life forms are considered in the fundamental terms of biosemiosis, which evidences the relation of interdependency with all other life forms on Earth, therefore, the condition of global interrelatedness. Also, human life is put into focus in its specificity as human socio-cultural semiosis.

Our emphasis is on this double modality of existing in the world characteristic of semiosis among human beings. Firstly, human beings exist as biological organisms flourishing interconnectedly with other organisms populating the great *biosphere*. According to recent findings in biological research the biosphere coincides with the great *semiosphere*. Secondly, human beings exist as a specification of this vital sign network.

Furthermore, thanks to the human species-specific capacity for *meta-semiosis*, or *semiotics*, or so-called *language* and differently from other non human life forms, human beings are endowed with the capacity to survey

and tend to the overall good functioning of the general biosemiotic network. As such human beings may be defined as “semiotic animals” (Deely et al. 2005). As used in the present context, the terms “metasemiosis”, “semiotics”, and “language” refer to a modeling capacity specific to human beings, the only “semiotic animals” on the planet. Therefore these terms have more than one meaning: semiotics is not only the name of the science of signs. It is also the name of a specifically human capacity for semiosis, or “metasemiosis”. The term “language” does not only refer to verbal language or to other human sign systems with communicative and expressive functions, it also indicates the specifically human capacity for modelling, primary modelling. (For all these aspects see Sebeok 1986, 1991; Petrilli and Ponzio 2002a, 2002b).

The metasemiotic or semiotic capacity also implies a third modality of being-in-the-world reserved to human beings, what we propose to call the *semioethical* modality. This implies our capacity for creative awareness of the other, which presupposes the global condition of interrelated and intercorporeal dialogical otherness to which we are all subject as living organisms (Petrilli [forthcoming]).

This third modality of being-in-the-world, the semioethical, is the key to a full understanding of the extent of our responsibility as human beings for the health of semiosis over the entire planet. And our allusion is to semiosis in all its forms – whether a question of the semioses of other human beings or of other nonhuman life forms, which flourish interconnectedly with the nonliving forms of existence and together engender the great geobiosystem called Gaia (see Petrilli and Ponzio 2003, 2005, 2007).

All life forms as such are endowed with a capacity for *modeling, communication* and *dialogism* (see Petrilli 2003a: chap. 1; Deely et al. 2005). Modeling determines worldview. However, differently from other life forms, the human animal, that is, the “semiotic animal”, is endowed with a special modeling device which may also be called *language*, as anticipated, or *writing*, and is characterized by *syntactics* (see Sebeok and Danesi 2000). (The term “writing” should not be confused here with writing understood as the transcription or translation of oral verbal signs into written verbal signs. With respect to transcription or translation, writing or language as we are now using these terms is an a priori.)

Thanks to syntactics the human being is able to construct, deconstruct and reconstruct an infinite number of worlds and worldviews on the basis

of a finite number of elements. This capacity distinguishes human beings from other animals where the relation between modeling and what the biologists call *Umwelt* is univocal, unidirectional (Uexkull 1909, 1992; Hoffmeyer 1996). Non human animals are born into a world which they are not programmed to modify, if not according to an original *Bauplan* as established by the genetic patrimony of the species they belong to. On the contrary, thanks to syntactics human beings are endowed with a capacity for creativity and metasemiosis, consequently, the human being may be defined as a *metasemiotic* or *semiotic animal* (see Petrilli 1998: 8 and 181–182).

Metasemiosis entails a capacity for the suspension of action and deliberation, therefore, for critical thinking and conscious awareness. The immediate implication is that by contrast with other animals the human being is invested biosemiosically and phylogenetically with a unique capacity for responsibility, for making choices and taking standpoints, for creative intervention upon the course of semiosis throughout the whole biosphere. In this sense the semiotic animal is also a “semioethical animal”. Human beings are invested biologically with the capacity for the assumption of responsibility, therefore for caring for semiosis in its joyous and dialogical multiplicity (see Petrilli and Ponzio 2000, 2001, 2002a).

From a biosemiotic perspective modeling, communication and dialogism are interconnected and presuppose each other. From this point of view communication is not understood in the oversimplifying terms of message transmission from emitter to receiver (though this of course is one of its possible manifestations). Far more extensively communication coincides with semiosis and therefore with life: sign activity tells of the universal condition of interrelatedness and interdependency, in this sense sign activity is synonymous with communication and as such is dialogical. Here too dialogism does not refer reductively to the exchange of rejoinders among speakers but far more radically and vitally it refers to the permanent condition of intercorporeal involvement and reciprocal implication among bodies and signs throughout the semiotic universe. Modeling, communication and dialogue together form the foundation and condition of possibility for the engenderment of life in its multiplicity and its specificities, including human life. As stated, human life is endowed with the species-specific trait called syntactics, therefore with the species-specific capacity

for metasemiosis beyond the less complex level of semiosis in its direct and immediate forms.

Metasemiosis, or semiotics understood as metasemiosis and not simply as the name of the theory or science or doctrine or discipline that studies sign activity, has determined the course of homination through to the present phase of development in evolution. Semiotics thus described is the biosemiosical a priori of the anthropological and cultural necessity for responsible and polyphonic living.

Responsible and polyphonic living implies the capacity for *listening* and *hospitality* towards differences, towards the other in each and every one of us, as well as towards the other beyond self (see Sebeok et al. 2001; Petrilli 2005; Ponzio 2003, 2006). Otherness is not a condition we concede with an act of generosity towards the world. On the contrary, otherness is structural to life itself, a condition for life to flourish, intercorporeity. Dialogic otherness is connected with the nonfunctional.

A global and detotalizing approach to semiotics demands openness to the other, the extreme capacity for listening to the other. Therefore, it presupposes the capacity for dialogic interconnection with the other. Accordingly, semiotics as we conceive it must privilege the tendency towards detotalization rather than totalization. Otherness opens the totality to infinity or to “infinite semiosis”. Such an approach leads beyond the cognitive order or the symbolic order to enter the ethical order, creating the condition for infinite involvement with the other, therefore for the assumption of responsibility towards the other.

Semiotics thus conceived is not the result of some ideological plan (see Copley 2007). On the contrary, considered in such terms semiotics concerns behaviour and awareness of our capacity for responsibility as a semiotic animal. Properly understood, the semiotic animal is a responsible actor capable of signs of signs, of mediation, reflection, and conscious awareness in relation to semiosis over the entire planet. In this sense global semiotics must be adequately founded in cognitive semiotics, but it must also be open to a third dimension beyond the quantitative and the theoretical, that is the ethical. Since this third dimension concerns the ends towards which we strive, we propose to designate it with the neologism *semioethics*.

Semioethics is not fixed upon a given value or preestablished end, an ultimate end or *summum bonum*, but rather is concerned with semiosis in

its dialogical and detotalized globality. A special task for semioethics is to unmask the illusory character of the claim to the status of indifferent differences and to evidence the biosemiotic condition of intercorporeity and dialogic compromise among signs. The gaze of semioethics transcends the totality, a given being, a defined entity within a totality and accounts for infinite semiosis, desire of the other, unending movement towards the infinite.

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*Massimo Bonfantini, Susan Petrilli and
Augusto Ponzio*

Semiotics and dialogue between logic and ethics

AUGUSTO: Let's begin by asking Susan to read the abstract we originally proposed for this new "trialogue." It explains the sense and orientation of our research as we have been developing it together over the past twenty years...

SUSAN: Thanks Augusto, well here it is then: This three-voiced dialogue, this "trialogue", between Massimo Bonfantini, Susan Petrilli and Augusto Ponzio discusses the conditions of dialogical argumentation, continuing a tradition we began over ten years ago with our first "trialogue" on lying and truth (1996b).

Beyond the question of the relation between dialogue and inference, our dialogue-presentation focuses on the conditions that make dialogical argumentation possible. Our problem concerns foundations and therefore involves a discussion that connects the study of *logic*, *dialogue* and *semiotics* from a "semiodialogic" and "semioethic" perspective.

In this context the expression "semioethics" underlines the relation between semiotics and axiology, signs and values, dialogical argumentation and otherness. And fundamental points of reference for the development of our discourse include Charles S. Peirce, Mikhail M. Bakhtin, Victoria Welby, Emmanuel Lévinas, Charles Morris.

Our triialogue develops a dialogue on dialogue which actually began in 1986 with publication of the monograph *Dialogo sui dialoghi*, co-authored by Massimo Bonfantini and Augusto Ponzio (Bonfantini and Ponzio 1986) and which has now developed into a monograph published in 2006 under the title, *I dialoghi semiotici. Sul dialogo, sulla menzogna e la verità, sui nuovi mass-media, sulla retorica e l'argomentazione, sulla testualità e la discorsività, sull'ideologia e l'utopia*, with Susan Petrilli as co-author.

Keeping account of the “dialogical nature of sign” (Ponzio 2006a), and of the structure of action, therefore, verbal action, a typology of dialogue is proposed relatedly to a typology of signs and of action. In dialogical argumentation signs respond dialogically to other signs in inferential processes, which develop according to different degrees of otherness ranging from low to high degrees of otherness and dialogicality, and which imply taking a stand, making choices, referring to values, habits, norms, stereotypes, and ideologies.

AUGUSTO: Susan, what a great summary! I’d like to start from our typology of dialogue. This was our first important invention or abduction concerning dialogues. It goes back to 1982...

MASSIMO: When Susan was still a child! But just let me describe our dialogue triad from a recent version by Susan, rather than from our original *Dialogo sui dialoghi*. As a specific discourse genre dialogue is verbal action which similarly to any verbal action, is either an end in itself or instrumental to something else. If the latter, it is a means to an end, or – a third possibility – it can aim to determine and evaluate ends and means. Consequently, we may propose the following triadic typology of dialogue:

(1) *Dialogue as an end in itself*, that is, as *conversation or dialogue for entertainment*. This kind of dialogue involves speaking for the sake of speaking, that is, for the sheer pleasure of speaking. This is dialogue with a *phatic* function which can, in turn, be divided into:

- (1.1) *conformative-repetitive dialogue*; and
- (1.2) *di-verting dialogue*

(In Italian, the expression “di-vertente” evokes the idea of diversion, dialogue as *divertissement*, as pleasure and having fun).

An example of the variant (1.1) is offered by certain forms of television entertainment which tend to be repetitive and obey predetermined compositional-instructional rules. This type of entertainment works on the basis of predetermined decodification processes.

- (2) *Dialogue functional to attainment, to achieving something*.

This can be divided into:

- (2.1) *exchange dialogue*
- (2.2) *competition dialogue*
- (3) *cooperative or reflective or investigative dialogue*.

With reference to the degree of “substantial dialogism” as the criterion for differentiation, this type of dialogue may be classified (on an increasing scale in degree of dialogism) as:

- (3.1) *re-discovery and revelation dialogue*,
- (3.2) *research and construction dialogue*,
- (3.3) *exploration and problematization dialogue*.

SUSAN: With your dialogue of 1982 you propose a tripartition of dialogue on the basis of logical analysis, that is to say, applying the three categories proposed by Peirce. But I think that the axiological and ethical-political orientation of your discourse also emerges...

MASSIMO: And in fact it is made explicit immediately after, in the dialogue with Augusto dedicated to the novel, *1984*, by Orwell.

AUGUSTO: Yes..., the praise of eroticism in life and writing, against the negative utopia of neo-language – an absurd and impossible attempt at eliminating dissent, innovation, discussion, the capacity for making projects in discourse and communication of the *polis*.

MASSIMO: Just as language neither flourishes nor flows in the terms imagined by the theoreticians of what we have identified as “code semiotics”.

AUGUSTO: In a “commodified society” like our own, where attainment dialogue is dominant, where brutal competition and greedy exchange on the basis of self-interest are the rule, lying and deception have become so common that they don’t surprise us any more, they’re not a scandal any more!

SUSAN: This is the subject of your dialogue of 1993, *Il dialogo della menzogna (Dialogue on Lying)*. In that dialogue you maintained that lying belongs to the “second type of dialogue” (Bonfantini and Ponzio 1993).

AUGUSTO: If we distinguish lying from similar behaviours such as simulation, pretence, falseness, ideology, lying belongs to dialogue of the second type in our classification, attainment dialogue, that is, dialogue with a practical aim – to attain or achieve something. Instead, pretence (an ambiguous term because it can also signify deception and lying in the artistic sphere, for example, the literary) belongs to dialogue of the first type, that is, entertainment dialogue. And “simulation” belongs to dialogue of the third type, that is, research dialogue, when of course simulation is not used for deception and lying, but as modelling with a cognitive function. The aim of simulation understood as belonging to research dialogue, is

truth. As to the relation between lying and ideology understood as false consciousness, today at table we mentioned how lying is “extroverted” deception, while instead ideology is “introverted” (Bonfantini, Petrilli & Ponzio 1998, 1999, 2000, 2003; see also Ponzio 2006b).

MASSIMO: Lying, extroverted deception, introverted deception, the will to deceive and the will to delude oneself subtend publicity and propaganda, indeed all rhetorical discourse. Rhetoric is the enemy of logic and dialectic (see Bernard et al. 1994; Bonfantini 1984). It is the vile and opportunistic enemy of truth, as the three of us agreed in a “trialogue” of 1997.

SUSAN: “Rhetoric versus argumentation”. The three of us agree that rhetoric and argumentation can be juxtaposed. Negativity of rhetoric and positivity of argumentation. This seems to be a classical standpoint: very much *à la* Plato. But I do agree. Indeed, it’s sound common sense to accuse discourse of being *rhetorical* when it is not sincere, when it is confused on a logical level, when it is self-seeking, opportunistic, and when in the face of all this it still expects to persuade (Petrilli 2006). Rhetoric is something one hears in the texture of discourse, a trick or a trap one perceives before actually identifying it. But, Massimo, how do we trace the signs of rhetoric?

MASSIMO: Ah, yes, an example comes to mind: it goes back to a few years ago when Craxi was still around and publicity was favouring his political party during the administrative elections in Capitalia-Italia. At the time a poster was withdrawn because of furious protests by feminists and democrats. It pictured a bare chested girl who says in a balloon, “I vote PSI, and you?” while coolly sipping coca-coca from a bottle with a straw – a great example of the tricks of rhetoric, of ideological and deceptive discourse. In this case the trick consisted in combining the psychological impression of the example (the bare chested girl) with quick and allusive mental associations. This strategy provokes suggestive and efficient reasoning that resists *so long as it is not called to issue* (Bonfantini, Petrilli & Ponzio 2006a).

AUGUSTO: What do you mean by that? Don’t you think that the logic of rhetorical or deceptive discourse is different from the logic of efficient reasoning? Or are you implying that in the context of logic we can make improper, uncontrolled discursive transformations with the power to seduce thanks to the charm and desirability of the prospective conclusion?

MASSIMO: Hmm! The bare chested girl communicates by showing, therefore by offering herself, even if immaterially. She appeals to the imagination and arouses appetites, at once formulating a question that is obviously rhetorical: “I vote PSI, and you?” She communicates through an associative-argumentative chain that runs something like this: “I want you to vote PSI, like me, so we can be friends, or better still, *companions*; if you are my *companion* (that is, companion insofar as we belong to the same political party), you’re also my *partner*, and I’m attractive, desirable and uninhibited; therefore if you want me and want to stay with me, even if only in your day-dreams, symbolically (which these days everyone seems to think is more real than reality), etc., etc., then vote me, I mean, vote with me, vote PSI”. This kind of reasoning is fun and efficient until dialectics analyzes and ridicules it. But rhetoric maintains its charm, even after it has been unmasked.

AUGUSTO: Well good friend, my impression is that you’re making things sound simpler than they really are. What I mean is that rhetorical discourse understood as encomiastic and eulogistic discourse is not simply transgressive, fake and deceptive discourse similarly to commercial publicity. On the contrary, this kind of rhetoric is an essential part of the rhetoric of institutions, the rhetoric of keeping a good and clean conscience and of defending certain values. This kind of rhetorical discourse safeguards the conscience through alibis. A conscience with alibis justifies itself by appealing to axiomatic foundations, that is, by appealing to identity, to association with some sort of community, by appealing to roles, the nation, *esprit de corps*, by appealing to duties established by contract, civil convention. All this serves to tranquillize us, to keep us in our places, protected by our reassuring guarantees and responsibilities. Rhetoric is pleasant and reassuring because it defends the “fixing of beliefs and habits”, as your Peirce says in his famous essay.

MASSIMO: Ah, yes, you’re right Augusto. But we need to add that since Peirce’s time, other media have hit the scene. With hypnotic and authoritative rhetoric, as presented by TV (Bonfantini, Petrilli & Ponzio 1996a), we have the owner’s voice and the dream machine together, in one package. The continuous flux of mass media doesn’t leave space for reflection. You can’t talk to mass media, discuss things. Yet people are deceived into thinking they’re participating in the discussions and dialogues that are represented (Bonfantini et al. 1998; Bonfantini, Petrilli & Ponzio 1997).

SUSAN: ... as you already highlighted in your early analyses of 1984 in *Semiotica ai media* (Bonfantini 1984). But now let's return to your typology of dialogicality, which I think fits in well with our discussion.

If we focus on communicative channels with special reference to television media, we can immediately identify three different modalities in the dialogic relation:

(1) *Interpersonal dialogicality*, (1.1) in praesentia, or (1.2) in absentia, the latter in the form of written, telephonic communication.

(2) *Dialogicality with replica*, as in *television dialogicality between emitter and spectator*, therefore not one-to-one, but one-to-many, (2.1) foreseen as part of the communicative game, or tolerated, or conceded, or (2.2) indirect or unforeseen.

(3) *Metatextual dialogicality*, involving small groups in praesentia, with respect to the basis-text at disposal.

MASSIMO: Yes, the basis-text is there available to us, it doesn't disappear as do instead programs on television channels. The basis-text defines which is a characteristic of texts, and as such the basis-text is an object characterized by persistence and incisiveness bearing countless signs, printed and recorded, which can be read, heard and/or seen an indefinite number of times. The basis-text can be analysed socially and discussed by a group of people sitting in a room somewhere, it can be a parable from the *Gospel* or Marx's *Manifesto*, but also a documentary film by Spike Lee or Michael Moore, or anything that can act as a text or stimulus for discussion or political action, or something found somewhere on internet.

SUSAN: Massimo, you mention the potential relevance of communication and discussion of new docufilms or "committed" documentaries, or as you also like to call them, "videoessays", to action. This opens our conversation to the problem of dialogue between text and discourse, textuality and discursivity (see Bonfantini, Petrilli & Ponzio 2001), which is the subject of one of our most recent *dialoghi semiotici*. But while you were speaking of films by Spike Lee and Michael Moore, Ermanno Olmi's latest film came to mind *Cento chiodi*. Here the thesis is that more important than all the sacred texts in the world, of all possible basis-texts for action, as you would say, are words, gestures, the caresses of love and friendship in a dialogue where contact and proximity are constitutive of sense. Therefore, in the spirit of the title of today's dialogue we praise corporeality and sentiment by contrast with logic, and ethics by contrast with politics.

These days communication with the other, especially on a sentimental level, is largely thought to be based on having something in common, on sharing common tastes, interests, on affinities, to the very point of believing that encounter with the other is reached in fusion. And communities too are conceived in terms of communion, unity, identity. But the truth is that without alterity, without estrangement, without absence in presence, communication cannot take place because dialogue is lacking.

Communication is also clash, conflict, opposition, while dialogue is involvement with the other, not on the basis of respect that one has decided to observe towards the other, but in many cases in spite of all the efforts made to ignore the other, eliminate the other. People generally believe that they must encounter each other on the basis of a third term, a term that is external to them and that unites them, makes them similar, a term in which they find a common identity. This search for a third – ethnic group, religion, language, territory – is widespread these days and particularly ill-fated, evil, as testified by presentday events in history. In amorous relations, Catullo's "I hate and love him/her" has been replaced by the idea of love as total and totalizing understanding, without clash, without suspicion, without search, without distance, without absence, without alterity. In his paper "The Other in Proust" (in Lévinas 1976) referring to the characters from *A la recherche du temps perdu*, Lévinas observes that Marcel did not love Albertine if love is fusion with the other, the ecstasy of a being in front of the perfection of the other, absence of conflict, security in the presence of the other, peace of possession. But the point is that this non-love is true love; solitude is communication; struggle with the elusive is movement towards the other; absence of the other is its presence as other.

MASSIMO: Brava Susan, good girl Susan, well said! Joking aside, it is important to remember that contradiction is necessarily an a priori for us, contradiction of desire and nondesire: between the the instinct of life and the instinct of death, between eros and aggressiveness, between the pleasure principle and the principle of reality.

We sometimes think computers can simulate human thought processes, or even go further. For example, by correcting iniquities or conciliating human conflicts and contradictions in the light of some superior design, as in the suggestive science fiction novel by our friend Giampaolo Proni (1989): *Il caso del computer Asia*.

But thinking is contradictory in itself. And not even love is synthesis or elimination of contradictions, rather love too accepts and even welcomes contradictions. Computers don't feel, don't think, don't hate or love. They don't reason dialogically. They don't think. They calculate. This is the point. We all know this.

In reality, whoever claims that computers simulate human beings is really thinking that human beings simulate computers, by becoming cold, still, static, free of problems, monodirectional.

To think means to be capable of lying and deceit, of dialectics and of diairetics. One divides into two and two conjugate and/or oppose each other and/or devour each other. They don't melt or fuse into each other. Through exercises of displacement, struggle and problematic conjugation of contradictory perspectives, we work towards moments of increasing harmony.

But, Augusto, let me ask you a question. How can dialectics in the plural escape what would seem to be the recurrent destiny of hierarchies and totalitarianisms?

AUGUSTO: This problem brings us back to the question of the centrality of dialogue in argumentative reasoning, that is, reasoning that has not stiffened into defending and reproducing identity, that does not serve identity but is open to the other.

Bakhtin evidenced how rectilinear and unilateral dialectics produces ossified discourse and derives from sclerotized dialogue. Monological, unilinear and totalizing dialectics is necessarily orientated towards a synthesis and a conclusion. As such it calls for a *critique of dialogical reason*. From this point of view Bakhtin is an important point of reference. All his research (including his most recent paper of 1974 on the methodology of the human sciences) focuses on the same problem faced by Sartre in *Critique de la raison dialectique* (1960) – whether knowledge and understanding of humans by humans not only implies specific methods but *New reason*. However, new reason does not imply a new relation between *thought* and its *object*, as Sartre believed. And, in fact, Sartre's dialectics remains closed in the limits of monological dialectics, for he reduces the relation of otherness to a relation of identity and of reciprocal objectification: dialectics between being-*for-self* and being-*for-others* continues to be the dialectics of totalizing consciousnesses, where the tendency is to reaffirm one's own objectifying view of the subject, of self.

The critique of dialogical reason is the critique of the category of Identity which dominates Western thought and praxis. From the perspective of identity, where sense converges with partial and limited interests, mystification alone is possible: this is true whether a question of the identity of a single individual, or of a group, nation, language, cultural system or even a larger community such as the European Union, the United Nations or the entire Western world.

The category of Identity dominates today not only because of the *concrete abstractions* constructed upon it, but even more radically because the global system of social reproduction today is grounded in the logic of identity.

Concrete abstractions form *reality* as we experience it: Individual, Society, State, Nation, Truth, Knowledge, Equality, Justice, Freedom, limited Responsibility, Need, Equal exchange, etc. These are *internal* to the general system of social reproduction. But, as just stated, the system itself in its globality is grounded in the category of Identity. Identity tends to assert itself structurally and constitutively as Universal in relation to a production, exchange and consumption circuit that is now worldwide. And the logic of concrete abstractions in social reproduction today is the logic of Identity: the categories of Individual with its rights, obligations, responsibilities; of Society with its self-interests; of State with its Politics converging as far as possible with Reality; of Equal exchange with its needs, all obey the logic of Identity.

The places of argumentation internal to the order of discourse are the places of the logic of identity. Reason includes the reason of war, even if in the form of *extrema ratio*, presenting war as legitimate, just, legal; Reason that includes the reason of exclusion – from marginalization and segregation to extermination – of the other, is the Reason of Identity. The logic of identity is asserted by barricading, isolating, expelling or exterminating the other, through recourse to the concrete abstractions which are founded on such logic. And as anticipated, concrete abstractions include the single Individual who must firstly sacrifice its own otherness to itself in order to assert itself as identity.

The critique of Reason and argumentation thus described requires *a point of view that is other*. This requires preliminary *recognition of the other*, or, rather, recognition of the fact that recognition of the other cannot be avoided. Therefore, recognition of the other is not a concession, a free

choice made by the Individual, the Subject, the Same, but a necessity. In other words, the subject is forced to recognize the other, as an imposition. Such recognition is imposed by a situation of alienation, loss of sense, in the last analysis by the situation of *homo homini lupus*. However, the situation of *homo homini lupus* does not precede concrete abstractions such as State, Politics, Law, which is a real myth, a mystification – Hobbes' fallacy! This situation which involves a situation of fear of the other, is a consequence of the logic of identity and the concrete abstractions constructed upon it.

SUSAN: It seems to me that we must aim at overcoming specialized separations that give rise to deception in the form of omitting to say something, which is an indirect form of lying and concealing. No doubt all discourse has a provisional conclusion, a conclusion that can never be definitive or exhaustive.

MASSIMO: I remember being struck several years ago by Aldo Capitini's critique of the specialism and antidemocratic formalism of institutions, his critique of corporations and their closed reasoning, and of those who capitalize on knowledge and power.

He was referring to those socially oriented centres which teach the art of discussion and administration, of eliminating and putting all presuppositions out of play. And everyone participating in the discussion does so without prohibitions and self-limitations, therefore without keeping silent and lying.

However, in situations like these decisions are put into parentheses. Instead, to make or at least propose a decision implies being able to count on a reliable procedure, ensuring a conclusion, a provisional and not a totalizing conclusion, but peremptory.

SUSAN: So what do we do, Massimo? Deal with everything? If specialisms, separations, self-limitations are forms of lying and deceit, on the one hand, isn't the claim to dealing with everything a form of (vain) pretence, typical of totalizing and systematizing knowledge, on the other?

MASSIMO: Argumentation and/or dialogic procedure should evidence what is relevant in communication, even resort to exaggeration, and aim at effective local action: this is communication understood as a way of acting on the spot.

The criterion that must dominate is expressed in the word *now*. I know there's a lot to be done, so much evil in the world, decisions to make, dis-

cussing them first. The task is overwhelming, but I also know that I must struggle now and do my best to address those evils I think most need to be addressed.

No doubt the Kantian maxim concerning the universal validity of the principle regulating action is still valid. But it needs to be turned upside down and set into pragmatic terms. Nor can we begin with fixed principles. The starting point is the moment we make a choice, exemplary possible action. We must ask ourselves: what are the consequences if nobody intervenes in a given situation? if everybody follows my inertia? or instead, if the style of my decision and my action is repeated?

Therefore, to proclaim and apply the motto “the end justifies the means” is hypocritical (an idea wrongly attributed to Machiavelli), a deferral destructive of both the present and the future.

In reality, “the means justifies the end”. To focus on the fleeting moment reinforces the habit of industriousness and legitimizes the utopia of the future polis without ossifying it or transforming it into a consolatory and ideological end of (hi)story.

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Susan Petrilli

Symbol, logic, and signification

A semiotic perspective on Welby, Boole, Langer

This paper briefly presents three women who have contributed to the development of semiotics from their own original perspective: Victoria Welby, Mary Everest Boole and Susanne K. Langer. The first two were friends and developed an interesting written correspondence. Their roads never crossed with Langer, who came later. Sebeok (2001: 145) described Langer as one of the “illustrious twentieth-century trailblazers” in semiotics. Welby he described as “the legendary foremother and prime mover of ‘significs’ and ‘sensifics,’ species of turn-of-the-century (and subsequent) semiotics” (*Ibid.*). On Boole Sebeok is silent, but she too deserves attention among women in semiotics concerned with problems of language and meaning, sign and subjectivity.

1. Victoria Welby: significs, mother sense, and logic

Victoria Lady Welby (1837–1912) was an independent scholar, the originator of significs, now considered the founding mother also of “modern semiotics” (cf. Petrilli 2005b). Born into the highest circles of English nobility, she was not educated in any conventional sense. In her early years she traveled widely with her mother (cf. Hardwick 1977: 13–14), and published her travel diary in 1852. After her marriage to Sir William Earle Welby in 1863, she began her research fully aware of her exceptional status as an open-minded female intellectual of the Victorian era. Between 1894 and 1896 Victoria Welby introduced the neologism “significs” for her theory of meaning, which examines the relation among signs, sense and values, as well as its practical consequences for human behaviour.

Her main publications on such issues include her monographs *What is Meaning* (1983 [1903]) and *Significs and Language* (1985a [1911]), which, in the second edition, is included in a volume collecting a selection of her writings amongst which her essays “Meaning and Metaphor” (1893) and “Sense, Meaning and Interpretation” (1896). Important moments of official recognition for Welby’s research are represented by publication of the entry “Significs”, co-authored with J. Baldwin and F. Stout (1902), in Baldwin’s *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (1901–1905); and the entry “Significs” in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, in 1911 (now in Hardwick 1977: 167–175). Initially, her interest was directed towards theological questions, which led to her awareness of problems of language, meaning and interpretation. In 1881 she published *Links and Clues*, considered unorthodox by official opinion in religious circles. In it, she reflects on the inadequacies of religious discourse which, she believed, was cast in outmoded linguistic forms. In her examination of language and meaning she found a pervasive linguistic confusion that largely stemmed from a misconception of language as a system of fixed meanings, which she overcame by showing that language must grow and change as does human experience generally. She proposed a critique of figurative language (cf. Welby 1891, 1893, 1897, 1898), and studied the sciences with special reference to biology and evolutionary theory (which she read critically). Her conviction was that important scientific discoveries supplied the new experiences in the light of which all discourse, including the religious, could be updated and transformed into something more significant. To promote her line of research, the Welby Prize was announced for the best essay on significs in the journal *Mind* (1896b), and awarded to Ferdinand Tönnies in 1898 (see 1899–1900).

Welby wrote regularly to over 450 correspondents, developing a vast epistolary network through which she developed her ideas and exerted her background influence – as in the case of Charles K. Ogden – over numerous intellectuals of her times. Charles S. Peirce reviewed *What is Meaning?* for *The Nation* in 1903, alongside Russell’s *Principles of Mathematics* (cf. Hardwick 1977). The correspondence thus begun lasted until 1911, influencing the focus of Peirce’s research during the last decade of his life. Indeed, some of Peirce’s best semiotic expositions are in letters to Welby (cf. Fisch 1986; Hardwick 1977). Part of her correspondence was edited and published by her daughter (see Cust 1929, 1931). Exchanges are included with B. Russell, C. K. Ogden, J. M. Baldwin, H. Spencer, T. A. Huxley,

M. Müller, B. Jowett, F. Pollock, G. F. Stout, H. G. Wells, M. E. Boole, H. and W. James, H. L. Bergson, M. Bréal, A. Lalande, J.-H. Poincaré, F. Tönnies, R. Carnap, O. Neurath, H. Höffding, F. van Eeden, G. Vailati and many others. Welby's manuscripts, correspondence and unpublished writings are available in the Welby Collection, York University Archives and in the Lady Welby Library, University of London Library (cf. Schmitz 1985; Petrilli 1998 and 2009).

Having written on her theory of meaning and significance as well as on her theory of translation and communication in various papers (see References), here I wish to briefly signal Welby's work on the original concept of "mother sense" and its very interesting implications for semiotic theory, elaborated in a series of unpublished manuscripts (essaylets, notes, letters), written at the beginning of the twentieth century, between 1904 and 1910, and grouped together in a file entitled "Mother Sense" (Welby Collection, Box 28, Subject File 24). The expression "mother sense" was formulated approximately in 1890. It was subsequently replaced with the term "primal sense" and its variant "primary sense" to avoid misunderstanding, though Welby privileged the expression "mother sense". This concept played an important role in the architecture of her thought system, in particular in her theoretical work on the human capacity for signifying processes, experience, knowledge acquisition, on the development of consciousness, subjectivity, and worldview.

Welby distinguished between "sense" or "mother sense" and "intellect" or "father reason" in her effort to delineate two principal modalities in the engendering of sense, which in fact cut across sexual difference. Mother sense is an inheritance common to humanity, without gender limitations. Welby did not establish a net separation between the sexes on the basis of the concept of mother sense. The male and female *principia* are not considered as divided and separate elements. As a cross-gender specification mother sense is not exclusive to women, just as father reason is not exclusive to men. "Mother sense" and "father sense" must be recovered in their original condition of dialectic and dialogic interrelation on both the phylogenetic and ontogenetic levels. And whilst these two modalities in the generation/interpretation of sense may be singled out on a theoretical level by abstraction, in practice they are strictly interrelated and contribute to sense producing praxis – where "sense" is inclusive of "meaning" and "significance". Mother sense is the generating source of sense and the capacity

for criticism; it is oriented by the logic of otherness, and corresponds to the capacity for knowing in a broad and creative sense through sentiment, perception, intuition and cognitive leaps. Evoking Charles S. Peirce, it is the idea intuited before it is possessed or before it possesses us. Mother sense may be understood in the double sense of *sapio* and *scio*. Mother sense already knows and is “savored”, so to say, by what the intellect, instead, must work for. That is, what the intellect must strive to discover, the body already knows. For full development, the work of the intellect must be nourished by mother sense, the condition for developing the capacity for argumentation and criticism. As the capacity for knowledge and interpretation, mother sense may be related to the Peircean concept of *agapic or sympathetic comprehension and recognition*, or the Bakhtinian concept of *answering comprehension*. In terms of logic and argumentation, “intellect” or “father-reason” is associated with induction and deduction, that is, with inferential processes where the logic of identity dominates over the logic of otherness; in semiotic terms, with the symbolic and indexical dimension of signs. Instead, “mother sense,” or “racial sense,” involves signifying processes dominated by otherness. It alludes to the creative and generative power of sense resulting from the capacity to associate things which seem distant from each other but, in reality, are mutually attracted to each other. In terms of argumentation, “mother sense” may be associated with logical procedures of the abductive type insofar as they are regulated by the values of otherness, creativity, dialogism, freedom and desire; in semiotic terms it corresponds to the iconic dimension of signs. For full development, knowledge and expression must be grounded in “mother sense”. Moreover, mother sense is the condition of possibility for the development of the ethical dimension of human signifying practices beyond the capacity for cognitive knowledge. And that mother sense pertains to human beings does not imply anthropomorphism, but far more extensively *organomorphism*, on the one hand, and *cosmomorphism*, on the other.

The implications of the concept of “mother sense” may be developed in the light of the concept of “language” or “modeling device,” as theorized by Thomas A. Sebeok. The “primary modeling system” is described as an innate simulacry modeling device present in all living species. On this basis, all species simulate their worlds in their own species-specific ways. The primary modeling system specific to humankind is called by Sebeok “language” (Deely 2007), distinct from speech and antecedent to it. This

aspect of the primary modeling system is present in the mute hominid and acts as the departure point for a new course in evolution leading to the rise of *homo sapiens sapiens* (cf. Posner, Robering, Sebeok 1997–2004, Art. 18, §5 and §6; Sebeok 1986, 1991a, b; Sebeok and Danesi 2000). Similarly to mother sense, the primary modeling device, or language, is the condition for the acquisition of knowledge and for communication through sign systems constitutive of human behaviour, verbal and nonverbal. The “secondary modeling system”, in part now redefined as “tertiary modeling system” (cf. Sebeok 1991b: 58), and described as derivative signifying behaviour characteristic of human culture, including “speech” (which arises specifically for communication and intellectual work generally), presupposes the “primary modeling system,” “language,” or with Welby, “mother sense”, “primal matter”. Secondary and tertiary modeling systems are also endowed with a capacity for high degrees of creative modeling in the sphere of anthroposemiosis. Thanks to such interconnection, humans, differently from other animal species, can engender a potentially infinite number of alternative worldviews (Deely, Petrilli and Ponzio 2005). As a modeling capacity, mother sense is regulated by the logic of dialogic otherness wherein creativity is the condition for the generation of infinite new worlds in a potentially unending variety of possible articulations and signifying processes. As articulate, signified, already configured realities, human derivative worlds are at once the projection, interpretation, and development of primal sense, on the one hand, and its reduction and simplification, on the other. Similarly to language, theorized as a primary modeling system by Sebeok in revising the Moscow-Tartu school, racial, primal, or mother sense (Welby also proposed the term “matrical” sense, from matrix) is a necessary condition for the evolution of the human race both ontologically and phylogenetically and, therefore, for the development of human social practice (Petrilli 2006a, b, 2007a,b).

2. The correspondence between Welby and Mary Everest Boole: love, logic, and subjectivity, for a critique of the identical

Mary Everest Boole (1832–1916) was mostly a self-taught philosopher, mathematician, educationist and writer in her own right after having assisted her husband, the famous logician and mathematician George

Boole (1815–1864), as his secretary, for nine years (cf. Cust 1929: 86, n.1). She was fascinated by the psychic sciences and presented an early book on mental health entitled, *The Message of Psychic Science for Nurses and Mothers* (written in the 1860s, but published only in 1883, and again in 1908). About this time she also wrote a work on her husband, *The Mathematical Psychology of Gratry and Boole*, 1897, in which she proposed a psychological interpretation of his work in light of August Gratry's mystics. She wrote such pioneering books as *Lectures on the Logic of Arithmetic*, 1903, and *The Preparation of the Child for Science*, 1904, and published regularly until her death. Much of her work appeared posthumously and is now available in four volumes, published in 1931, under the general title *Collected Works* (see Boole 1931; see also Creese 2004). Boole wrote under her own name, which put her at a disadvantage, given the prejudice of the Victorian era against women. In addition to those just mentioned, her publications include such challenging titles as: *Logic Taught by Love: Rhythm in Nature and in Education*, 1905, *Symbolic Methods of Study*, 1909 (presented as an introduction to psychic science), and *The Forging of Passion into Power*, 1910. These books all appeared during her lifetime, and were signaled by contemporaries as precursors in the domain of studies in psychoanalysis.

Boole is one of the several women populating Welby's correspondence which reveals an intriguing world in the feminine: a consistent community of women variously involved in public life and in writing. At a time when the idea of female emancipation and feminist movements were still in their dawn, these writing companions suffered the discrepancy between a woman's capacity for critical reflection and social change, on the one hand, and opportunities to act in public and official worlds, on the other. However, despite any prejudice of the times and similarly to Welby, Boole's London home became a meeting place for men and women with varying interests, sometimes even eccentric personalities, from different professions and walks of life.

A recurrent theme in the correspondence between Welby and Boole is their appreciation of the multiform nature of the existent and potential expressivity of a plurilingual world, contrary to the myth of Babel and the biblical malediction. Communication, understanding, and progress in knowledge are only possible on the basis of the logic of dialogue and mutual understanding among differences. The growth of knowledge is the result of interpretive-translative processes across different sign systems

and languages. Even more, the criterion for the verification of knowledge and truth is their “translatability” into different languages and fields of discourse. Thanks to translation processes, it is even possible to tell the author-creator, the artist, things yet unknown about one’s own thoughts, to discover *meaning import*, significance beyond *meaning intention*. Literary writing is recognized as the place where creative interpretation reaches its expressive potential to the highest degrees. Boole and Welby discussed theological issues, were committed to the problem of values and to theorizing about the problem of understanding and misunderstanding. They critiqued prejudice and dogmatic approaches to scientific research, and promoted dialogic reflection at a community level. Other topics include the laws of mind, the interconnection between love, logic, passion, and power (cf. Cust 1929; Boole 1931). Boole was particularly interested in logic and signifying processes. Reflecting on her commitment to teaching logic, she stated: “I shall try to make the men realise that rhythmic pulsation is a stronger force than an explosion” (cf. Cust 1929: 156). To this provocation, Welby responded that “woman” is neither a “sex” nor a “creature,” but rather “within undivided humanity” a guardian of “differences” or “distinctions,” of “what makes logic possible.” Femininity is described as the condition for the development of logic, where differences and distinctions do not imply separation, the cause of discord and idolatry, but dialogical interrelation. In fact, differences and distinctions must interrelate dialogically, but never be confounded. Similarly to the eternal with respect to the temporal, femininity resists all attempts at reduction or assimilation according to the logic of homologation and identity (cf. Cust 1929: 159).

Another recurrent theme in the correspondence between Welby and Boole is the problem of subjectivity. This problem was a constant focus of reflection for Welby from the very beginning of her research, and is at the centre of her unpublished writings from the last decade of her lifetime (cf. Petrilli 1998), providing the context of the discussion with Boole. Welby proposed to distinguish between “self” and “I,” or what she called “Ident” (cf. Petrilli 2005b). She related the problem of subjectivity to her conception of signs, language and meaning, orienting her studies in the direction of what with French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995) has been indicated as the “humanism of otherness,” by contrast with the “humanism of identity” (see Levinas 1974). Welby criticized egocentric identity insofar as it is based on sacrifice of the other to self, denial of the other, and the-

orized, instead, the structural role of otherness in the constitution of the subject. Subjectivity is generated through the logic of otherness, through the dynamics of the relationship between “self” and “other.” In her letters to Welby, Julia Wedgwood describes the condition of the subject in terms of the “dislocation of self.” This approach highlights the importance of difference or distinction among the various expressions of identity (where boundaries are never delimited once and for all), while criticizing the tendency to division and separation which provoke no less than the death of self. Welby herself used the expression “multiple” personality to indicate the subject’s identity understood as a “plurality,” as a community of selves in dialogue with each other and which may even contradict each other, whether reference is to the identity of a small community (for example, the single individual) or to the extended community of a social group. With Boole and with writer Vernon Lee (pseudonym for Violet Paget) the concept of “community” is described as a plurality of components dialogically interconnected by relations of “mutual understanding” – which do not imply relations of “mutual neutralisation”. In addition to mutual understanding, Boole also joined forces with Welby in the appeal for fusion of interests, social harmony, critique of prejudice, and dialogical reflection. They critiqued the generalized monologic dogmatism of official exponents of Christianity, and in reasoning generally, often the cause of conflict, and even war. According to Boole and Welby, subjectivity is generated in the relation among a plurality of selves in dialogue, so that individual identity can only be conceived in the relation with the other. Boole and Welby also shared a common interest in pedagogical and educational issues, and theorized the need to improve reasoning processes through appropriate educational methods from early childhood (Petrilli 2006b).

3. *Susanne K. Langer: signs, symbols and significance in a new key*

Susanne Katerina Langer (1895–1985) (née Knauth) was born in Manhattan, New York, 20 December 1895, to German immigrant parents, Antonio Knauth, a well-to-do lawyer, and Else M. (Uhlich) Knauth. She died in Old Lyme (Connecticut) 17 July 1985. She dedicated most of her intellectual work to constructing a general theory of sign, in part using analytical categories which she creatively developed from such thinkers as Alfred

North Whitehead, Ernst Cassirer, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and others still. *Philosophy in a New Key. A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art* (1942), became a best-selling paperback, making her into something of a campus celebrity. Yet this book remained outside the mainstream of semiotic studies. Sebeok commented (1995: 167) that, “Clearly, Langer’s semiotic work merits detailed reconsideration in the near future, especially in its implications for music and the whole range of the fine arts – the creation of symbols of value, of apparent forms expressive of human feelings – in short, aesthetics.” In addition to Sebeok, the general neglect or ignorance of Langer’s work is signaled by such scholars as Ann E. Berthoff as a loss not only for philosophical-semiotic theory but also for feminist theory (cf. Sebeok 1991a: 43; 2001: 149; and Berthoff 1999). In her assessment of Langer’s work, Berthoff motivates the former’s loss of influence thus: “... her enterprise of developing an aesthetic consonant with Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic form, a biology of feeling, and a philosophy of mind ran counter to the scientism which in the post-war years was everywhere on the rise – in structural linguistics, in ethology, in both behavioural and cognitive psychology, and in all other disciplines of which ‘the end of ideology’ was the slogan” (1999: 113).

In “Women in Semiotics” (co-authored with Susan Petrilli), Sebeok claims that “Langer deserves to be reinstated without further delay into the welcoming annals of semiotics, a restoration which, in my view, is even more pressing in the light of her foresighted sensitivity to biological issues and therefore to the soundest of contemporary frames of reference (Sebeok 2001: 149). Sebeok defined himself as a “biologist manque” (Deely 2005); Jane Oppenheimer described Langer as “one of those rare practitioners of systematic philosophy who is able to master the literature of biology” (1985: 331). On delineating this trend in research on signs and meaning, where philosophy and biology enter into dialogue, we must remember that Welby also kept account of biological research, which she considered as foundational for an understanding of signifying processes. In fact, in Sebeok’s description she anticipated certain leading ideas of what is now known as biosemiotics (1995: 166–167).

Repeating a point she had already made in her book, *Philosophical Sketches*, Langer, in her paper, “The Great Shift: Instinct to Intuition” (now in Einsenberg and Dillon 1971: chp. 10), asserts that language begins with “symbolic utterance”: “...speech is not derived from animal commu-

nication; its communicative and directive functions, though all-important today, are secondary; its primary function is the symbolic expression of intuitive cognition” (Langer 1962: 325–26). On Sebeok’s account, this position was sharply at variance with views maintained by exponents of simplistic physicalism who insisted on comparing language and animal communication systems to the illusory end of evidencing an intimate interconnection between the two (cf. Demers 1988; Lieberman 1988). However, in Langer’s time, physicalism enjoyed a wide platform of consensus, which provides a clue for a better understanding of Langer’s equivocal position in American semiotics (Sebeok 1991a: 44). Sebeok believed that her position was in line with his own, and traced a common intellectual lineage variously involving the impact of the neo-Kantians via such figures as Wilhelm von Humboldt, Charles Peirce, Jakob von Uexkull, Cassirer. Similarly, Robert Innis, in his volume, *Semiotics. An Introductory Anthology* avers that “Langer’s formulation and treatment of the issues leads us to reflect upon the unity of semiotics as a science that, with an integrated set of categories, can go beyond any one domain of sign-constituted objects to encompass them all” (1985: 89; see also by Innis, his recent paper, “The making of the literary symbol: Taking note of Langer,” 2007).

Langer dedicated most of her intellectual work to constructing a general theory of sign. She analyzed symbolic systems, that is, symbolisms, or the “grammar” of articulate forms, distinguishing among them on the basis of syntactic and semantic characteristics in her search for their semiotically relevant philosophical foundations. She researched the syntactic and semantic conditions for understanding feeling as manifested in “presentational forms”, and aimed to identify the “limits of articulation,” together with a “semantic” beyond the linguistic realm. Langer distinguished between “presentational form” – an articulate form proper to art, that is, verbal and non-verbal (plastic, musical, etc.) symbolic systems – on the one hand, and “discursive form,” an articulate form proper to language, that is, verbal symbolization, on the other. Her chief analytical category is the distinction between “saying” and “showing”. In the realm of art “symbols” have content and meaning in “presentational forms,” a “logical form” different from the discursive. Art has a logic of its own, whereby “art” is understood a relational structure (1967, p. 84). She critiques those trends in sign studies that apply to art forms the linguistic model, that is, the categories of verbal language. “Discursive forms” are linear, consist of

isolable signifying units, syntax, and admit the possibility of translation; “presentational forms” are perceived as a whole *Gestalten*. Presentational forms are not composed of signifying units that are relatively context-free, and sense cannot be separated from form. Therefore, Langer critiques the search for parallels between linguistic units and their non-linguistic analogues. “Artistic import requires no interpretation: it requires a full and clear perception of the presented form, and the form sometimes needs to be construed before one can appreciate it. [...] the vital import of a work of art need not and cannot be derived by any exegesis. Such a process, indeed, destroys one’s perception of import,” she says, stating that a cardinal error in musical hermeneutics is “the treatment of the art symbol [that is, sign] as a symbolism” (*Ibid.*). “A work of art is a single symbol, not a system of significant elements which may be variously compounded. Its elements have not symbolic values in isolation. They take their expressive character from their functions in the perceptual whole” (*Ibid.*).

In *The Practice of Philosophy* (1930) she had already distinguished between *understanding* and *insight* (two Kantian terms), that is, between “systemic interpretation” and “direct intensive symbolization” (1930: 149–51, 163–64). The concept of “direct intensive symbolization” may be read in light of Welby’s concept of “mother sense” or “primary sense”, and, vice versa, the implications of “primary sense” can be read in light of Langer’s understanding of the concept of “direct intensive symbolization”, or “insight”. Langer continued working on the difference in *Philosophy in a New Key* (1942), explaining how symbolization is expressed differently in reason than in rite and art. The new terms are “discursive” and “non-discursive”, or “representational” and “presentational”. The terminology was not satisfactory, not least because verbal art forms, such as poetic discourse, had to be classified as “non-discursive”. The distinction between “representation” and “figuration” or “picturing” (cf. Petrilli and Ponzio 1999) is useful to disambiguate and develop the categories proposed by Langer. Peirce’s triad of symbol, index, icon – which the distinction between “representation” and “figuration” presupposes – also throws light on Langer’s work: her “representation” can be associated with symbolicity and indexicality; “presentation” with iconicity.

A propos the distinction between “signs” and “symbols,” Langer in *Philosophy in a New Key* (1942) identifies two aspects of meaning, the psychological and the logical, which are always co-present: “Obviously, a word

– say, ‘London’ – does not ‘mean’ a city in just the same sense that a person employing the word ‘means’ the place” (*Ibid.*: 53). In psychological terms, something to have meaning must be *employed* as a sign or symbol, that is, it must be a sign or symbol *to* someone. In logical terms, it must be *capable* of conveying meaning, that is, it must be something that can be thus employed. The interplay between the psychological and the logical aspects of meaning produce a great variety of different meaning-relations. Langer searches for a “prime form” or “archetype”, what we may call a “general model”, capable of explaining the distinctions between special classes and of relating sub-species to each other in definite ways. She examines various inventories of so-called “symbol-situations,” together with the various attempts at defining the meaning of meaning. She was as critical of Peirce’s classification of signs – “a terrifying order of icons, qualisigns, legisigns, semes, phemes, and delomes”, as she was of the approach adopted by Husserl – who “ended with as many theories as there are ‘meanings’” (*Ibid.*: 54). On Langer’s account, the different types of meaning are related by the general principle that meaning is a function, not a property, of terms. She maintains that meaning is a set of relations, a meaning-pattern, where the terms are always three, co-present, and interrelated – symbol, object, subject (or interpretant) (*Ibid.*: 55–56). The set of relations, or meaning-pattern, can be described from the point of view of any term in it, and the description will differ accordingly. Distinguishing between *sign* and *symbol*, Langer presents them as woven together in the production of what she calls “fixed realities” or “facts” (*Ibid.*: 280). Signs can be complicated, can form chains, and are linked into situations to which we react with steady, intelligent behaviour. In the series of responses that comes to be created, the interpreter’s response to the preceding sign becomes, in its turn, another sign of a new situation where the meaning of the first sign becomes the context for the next sign. This is the warp of reality. On this basis human interpreters develop their symbols and symbolisms, the connecting and transforming woof-threads of conceptions. Langer in fact uses the metaphor of an elaborate tapestry for the relation between signs and symbols described as being intricately interconnected and interdependent. Language is a symbolical system, but in communication it does not only express conceptions (that is, it does not only describe), but it also points. The pointing function is what Langer calls the “signific function” – where there is no allusion whatsoever to Welby or what Welby understands with

“significs” (cf. *Ibid.*: 280) –, which she considers structural to language. No doubt, Langer’s concept of symbol and the distinction she draws between symbol and symbolism can also be interpreted in the light of Peirce’s triadic distinction between symbol, index and icon. Langer’s “signific function” corresponds to what she herself understands by “sign,” and Morris by “signal”. In Peirce’s terminology, we propose that, in the case of the signific function, the indexical and symbolic dimensions of signs prevail. Langer distinguishes the “signific function” from the “symbolic function” of language, that is, the descriptive or conceptual function of language. In Peirce’s terminology, we propose that what Langer understands by the “symbolic function” may in fact be characterized in terms of the iconic dimension of sign processes. And, indeed, the claim made by Innis in his 1985 anthology deserves reflection: “Langer could also be looked upon as contributing to clarifying Peirce’s distinction between icons and symbols” (Innis 1985: 88). In signifying behaviour and communicative interaction these functions, relations and dimensions are interconnected and co-present to varying degrees.

Welby, Boole and Langer all work towards developing an appropriate theory of mind and meaning capable of highlighting achievements and limits, illusions and errors of the signifying and interpretive function, in their common concern for the progress of humanity in all its aspects, ultimately in their quest for what we may call the properly human.

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Lidia A. Mazhul & Vladimir M. Petrov

Understanding communication and the wealth of the mental world I

The rise of language (information approach)

Perhaps, before one's lips was born a whisper,
In a pre-forest air were whirling leaves ...
– Ossip Mandelstam, *Octaves*

The last two decades have been marked by a great shift in the paradigmatic basis of human sciences: a transition from “sensual” character of models – to “abstract” ones, or from “geometrical” to “algebraic” representations of processes described. This transition can be seen everywhere (see Petrov 2006b).

For instance, in historical and cultural studies, until recently “sensual” representations were dominant, such as the concept of “images of the world” (elaborated by the French “School of Annals” in the 1930s). And much attention was paid to various details of the “culture of everyday life”, and so forth. Now rather abstract and generalized descriptions of the reality appear, especially in historical investigations (e.g., Turchin 2003). In cultural studies we see transition to some fundamental parameters, deduced theoretically (see Petrov 2006a), which describe the whole world outlook, such as the degree of inclination towards “analytic” or “synthetic” styles of thinking (Maslov 1983), the degree of internal self-consistency of the world outlook, etc.

In psychology, the mental world of the personality has been treated as a certain space of parameters where the confrontation among all objects takes place. Example of such “spatial” models is the interpretation of experimental results after the processing of primary data by means of semantic differential techniques introduced by Charles Osgood: really, the so-called

“three principal components” which are usually obtained, are nothing else but the axes of a certain three-dimensional space of perception. Now the movement towards models involving neural nets is observed (e.g., Martindale, Locher & Petrov 2007). In some investigations the “knots” of a neural net are considered to be responsible for interactions which result in various mental innovations, and first of all, creative discoveries.

In linguistics researchers until recently dealt with so-called “deep parameters” (structures) and their projections (signs) which are supposed to reflect the reality of speech perception (Noam Chomsky and others). But now we see a movement towards probabilistic models of sense formation – as in the growth of links between morphemes (Golitsyn & Petrov 1995, 2007). Precisely this last approach is realized in the present paper, though it deals not only with objects ascribed to linguistics.

The main idea of the theoretical construction to be presented, is the “evolutionary assumption” that all the essential properties of information structures (such as language mechanisms) are nothing else but the results of “self-organization”: the constantly growing efficiency of information reception, storage, and processing realized by any system. In addition to this assumption, we used the so-called “principle of succession”; i.e., we suppose that every new step (“invention” of evolution) had as its base the “shoulders” of the appropriate previous step, its most progressive achievements (devices, procedures, etc.). In other words, it seems impossible that a rather complex device (or procedure) could arise in a void, without any predecessors. For instance, a bird’s wing could appear only on such a base as an arm; a system of color vision became possible only on the base of monochrome photo-detectors; etc. This kind of “step-by-step” evolution can be seen as one of the most important conditions for the progress of the system’s self-organization.

Earlier studies have shown that, for various informational tasks, the three-channel procedure seems to be the most economic and reliable (see Petrov 1994b; Golitsyn & Petrov, 1995, 2005, 2007); for instance, the identification of the spectral color of an object in conditions of changing light intensity, the economic storage of information using certain sets of “non-motivated” parameters, etc. Taking into account the above-mentioned principle of succession, we should consider three fundamental pre-communicative mechanisms of information processing which in future may, one hopes, become the cornerstones of communication. What could these

three mechanisms be? (The logic of our further considerations is illustrated in Table 1.)

First channel	Second channel	Third channel
<i>Pre-language stage:</i> Reflection of the surroundings	Relationships within the world of objects and phenomena	Generalization of the reflections and connections found
<i>Language stage:</i> Associative mechanism	Correlational mechanism	Grammatical mechanism

Table 1. Principal mechanisms realizing understanding of the communication.

N₁) Of course, the simple reflection of surroundings is the first of such mechanisms. This quite ancient mechanism leads, in the case of human perception, to sensual images of objects. Its archaic nature can be proved by its localization in the right cerebral hemisphere.

N₂) The next phase in the evolutionary progress of information structures, was the determination of relationships in the realm of objects and phenomena. The most widespread kind of such determination is nothing but a correlation between definite objects: between the color of an apple and its taste, between lightning in the sky and accompanying thunder, between going to the forest and gathering mushrooms, and so forth. (Maybe somebody remember an appropriate discussion on this topic in the play *La cantatrice chauve* by Eugene Ionesco: if a bell rings, is anybody behind the door?) Many such correlations were studied as so-called “conditional reflexes” in the framework of a scientific school by academician Ivan Pavlov.

The mechanism for determining such connections (correlations) is also rather ancient. Both mechanisms mentioned are inherent to the pre-human stage of evolution and are localized in the right cerebral hemisphere. Both mechanisms operate with concrete sensual images of objects to be reflected, and all the opportunities of concrete sensual reflection of the surroundings are limited by these two mechanisms.

N₃) Finally, the next step of evolution deals with another invention in the technology of information processing: the generalization of found connections. For instance, let us take a combination of several features: an

approximately round form, size in centimeters, green or pink or red color, etc. – all these lead to a concept, such as “an apple”. Then this combination, apart from many other concrete properties of each given apple, is stored in the subject’s memory as a whole, for different needs (e.g., looking for food). This way of keeping information is quite useful. In the process of evolution, it participates in forming a multi-level structure of information processing (Maslov 1983; Golitsyn & Petrov, 1995, 2005, 2007). Within this structure, information is processed at different levels, each level receiving it from the previous one, the criteria of choice (concerning the information to be transmitted to the next, higher level) being formed at each level. These criteria need “concepts” like those mentioned above, and the appropriate concepts serve as “instruments” in this kind of information processing. In sum: generalization is one of the most important mechanisms of information processing.

In evolution, due to self-organization, it becomes possible to combine these three mechanisms of information processing (NN 1, 2, 3). As a result, a structure arises capable of serving for communication, in particular, for forming language. Naturally, each of these mechanisms would be slightly modified to suit the needs of communication (in particular, to form language). Nevertheless, the main (immanent) traits of each mechanism must be maintained. Let us combine these three modified mechanisms with each other.

While perceiving a flux of discrete signals (e.g., in speech communication, a sequence of words or morphemes), the first (N₁) mechanism can lead to the appearance of definite sensuous images, evoked by each discrete element of the flux (e.g., by different morphemes) or by some of them together. For instance, the element /table/ can evoke associations concerning an object with a flat surface and four legs. When applied to speech communication, this can be called the *associative mechanism*.

At the same time, the second (N₂) mechanism can give rise to a special kind of correlation, like the coexistence of some definite elements (e.g., morphemes), i.e., the facts of their joint appearance in a previous perceptual experience of a given perceiver. For instance, this mechanism can check whether the combination of signals – such as /table/ + /big – has occurred in previous communications, or whether it is new for the perceiver. This mechanism can be called the correlation *mechanism*.

But when we receive a flux containing many different signals (e.g., separate morphemes), what pairs of them have to be checked in such a way? To answer this question one has to draw upon the third (N_3) mechanism. Specializing in generalization, this mechanism can assign each signal (e.g., each word) to a definite abstract category, among which there can be some stable links (interrelations). For instance, in the Russian language there are grammatical rules connecting words to one another, depending on their grammatical categories: an adjective can occur with a given noun only if they are identical in relation to such categories as gender, number, and case. So, first of all a subject has to assign each signal (e.g., each word) to the appropriate grammatical category (part of speech, etc.). In many languages it is necessary also to take into account the word order within the sentence; e.g., the fact that a predicate always follows the subject.

Only after this can a subject check the appropriate pairs, these pairs being determined by certain grammatical rules. Hence grammatical rules help a subject to look for the appropriate pairs of signals (words) to be checked, and this is the function of the third (N_3) mechanism of the communication. That is why this mechanism can be called *grammatical*. It should be noted that the model describes not only speech communication, but can be applied to any other kinds of communications, e.g., musical or visual.

How can this complex of mechanisms present the *content* of a communication? Each communication (if it is not simply noise) contains links between its different signals (e.g., between different words indicated with the help of the third mechanism), which have to be compared with the existing links in the realm of the previous experience of the perceiver. It is evident that in this relation, *three situations* are possible in principle (see Fig. 1).




Figure 1. Three variants of possible links between two perceived signals A and B: a) trivial communication; b) communication containing sense; c) absurd communication.

a) A given pair of signals (carried by the given communication) has been connected earlier in the previous experience of the perceiver. This means that the link between these two signals (responding to two mental elements) carries no news, hence this fragment of the flux corresponds to trivial communication. An example of a communication containing such a pair of signals (words) is “Wadding is made of cotton.” Such a communication probably will stir no specific emotion connected with the content of the communication. An emotion in this case may be caused only by the fact of this trivial communication, this emotion being negative (something like annoyance). Due to the absence of a specific emotion, no special activity is provoked to deal with the re-building of a network of links within the subject’s world of mental elements.

b) Connection between elements of the given pair has not occurred earlier in the previous experience of the perceiver, but these two elements can be connected by a certain third element, which has links with both of the two. This situation responds to the emergence of closed chains involving links among three or more elements. This process can be interpreted as the perception of the so-called sense of a communication. It can lead to positive emotional reactions in the perceiver – due to the additional ordering of his mental structure and, hence, to the increase of information contained within it. So the growth of knowledge (received by means of the communication) – and, moreover, the growth of the entire mental world of a perceiver – is nothing else but the emergence of new connections within more and more pairs of elements, together with a possible increase in the nomenclature of elements. The resulting growth of links within the net of elements is illustrated with Figure 2.




Figure 2. Growth of the network of signals’ links as a result of the communications.

The situation of the “formation of sense” can be illustrated by the following example. In the phrase: “An oak is growing in the professor’s garden” – the statistical connection has to be checked between the elements (words) “oak” and “garden”, as well as between “oak” and “growing”; and probably these pairs were already joined together in the previous experience of the given perceiver. By contrast, the words “professor” and “garden” may never have been linked together. Nevertheless, they are linked via an absent (in the given phrase) word, “man” – because in the subject’s experience there are links between “professor” and “man” and between “man” and “garden” (the relationships responding to the fact that a garden may belong to a man). But words of the pair “professor” and “growing” (as well as the words “professor” and “oak”) were never joined together in the perceiver’s previous experience. So because of the known previous connections and the perception of the given message (phrase), some new links are forming, and all the main words used (“oak,” “growing,” “professor,” “garden”) appear to belong to the same network (because of the phrase above, the word “professor” now becomes part of this network). In this way, the so-called “sense” of the communication is formed, as the expansion of the network (Fig. 2) during the perception of a series of speech signals, in this case, words.

Thus the simplest condition for sense being carried by the communication, is the presence of three elements (implicit or explicit). This property, known to researchers long ago as something like a riddle, was an object of numerous discussions. So it is not without reason that the great Russian physiologist of the nineteenth century, Ivan Sechenov (1953: 216), wrote about this property: “Among all nations of all times, all tribes and all steps of mental development, the simplest form of the verbal representation of the thought, responds to our three-member sentence. Due to this, we equally easily understand the thought of an ancient man impressed in manuscripts, the thought of a savage, and thought of a contemporary.”

c) Finally, it may happen that no connection within a given pair of elements has occurred earlier, nor can the two elements be connected by a third element. This situation corresponds to senseless (absurd) communication eliciting a negative emotional reaction in the perceiver (the negative reactions force him/her to search for connections).

Such are the results of our deductive construction of the process of *understanding* and the formation of sense in a perceiver’s mind upon the

reception of a communication. This process may refer not only to verbal language, but to any kind of signals: musical, pictorial, etc.

The most remarkable feature of the process described is that it is the result of systemic self-organization, as something like its “by-product”. Quite similar are other by-products which arise due to immanent regularities of evolution, e.g., various devices used by different kinds of art (Golitsyn & Petrov 1995; Petrov 1994a, 2005), the phenomenon of woman’s beauty together with appropriate erotic and aesthetic criteria (Mazhul & Petrov 1999; Petrov 1999), and many others. These processes are evidently a part of the entire systemic enhancement (Golitsyn 2000; Petrov 2002), which is probably the key to the “antropial principle” constituting the main riddle both of our culture and of the very existence of our world.

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Vladimir M. Petrov

Understanding the communication and wealth of the mental world 2

Devices to “cure” language (information approach)

Having “constructed” a three-mechanism system of language, we now turn to its functioning. Our system of information processing for understanding, as any complex multi-component system, is inevitably subject to possible damages that may cause misunderstanding and other disturbances in the entire system. Yet, there should exist certain informational means and devices that can “cure” such malfunctions. In addition, every system needs certain means and devices capable of improving its functioning. It seems that the appropriate “informational drugs” were elaborated in the process of cultural evolution. We shall enumerate some of them, considering mainly examples borrowed from the achievements of geniuses, i.e., outstandingly creative persons. We start with the most general devices and then turn to more particular ones. All the means considered are summarized in Table 2.

One of the most general potential damages is the false decoding of information by different mechanisms (channels). This may result in the construction of a contradictory or fragmentary worldview; in extreme situations, such false decoding may cause psychological deviations. Signals from different channels may not be coordinated appropriately, causing distorted mental images of the world.

For instance, the famous Russian prose-writer of the nineteenth century, Nikolay Gogol described fragments of such wrong pictures in his short story *Diary of a Madman*. Among the numerous paradoxical thoughts of its main personage there appears the following: “Usually the Moon is fab-

ricated in Hamburg”, the text going on to describe the procedure of this fabrication). Evidently, this wrong picture comes about from at least two sources: (1) the visual image of the Moon and its resemblance to cheese; and (2) verbal data concerning the technology of cheese fabrication, as well as the good quality of cheeses made in Hamburg.

Reason for introducing the device	Essence of the device	Examples of practical realization
The need to support self-consistency of the worldview	Exercising information processing by means of humor	Juxtaposition of data relating to different types of channels
The need to bridge large gaps between rational and emotional components of perception	Vivifying perception by constraining and ordering the flow of sensual associations	1) Modeling based on a 24-hour cycle (Pushkin’s “ <i>To Chaadayev</i> ”) 2) “Gluing” of textual fragments by means of sensual associations (stanzas in Pushkin’s <i>Eugeny Onegin</i>)
“Enhancement” by elimination of the sensual component of perception	Realization of “transparent” (“empty,” association-free) communication	1) High concentration of verbs 2) Verbs at phrase endings 3) Random sequences of events
Providing uncertainty during perception	Making communication “vague”	Juxtaposition of meanings relating to associative and “formal language” mechanisms (“ <i>Over the hills of Georgia</i> ” by Pushkin)
Perfecting the entire language of the communication	Uniting sensual perception of the communicative devices with theoretical reflexion on them	1) Meta-arts (Lotman 1977) 2) Constructive conceptualism (Gribkov & Petrov, 1997) 3) “Sots-art” (paintings by Komar and Melamid)

Table 2. Means of perfecting the system of understanding: Several situations.

To allay such misunderstandings, special “instruments of mental training” were elaborated in the course of cultural development. Perhaps the most interesting is humor. The essence of this device is the deliberate juxtaposition of two (or more) signals of a different nature. If their combined

result is perceived as evidently absurd (e.g., the Moon fabricated in Hamburg), and the “feeling of strangeness” about the situation becomes very sharp, it would prevent the recipient from wrongly combining the various signals. In most cases, “training” of the recipient’s system of information processing enables the proper combining of left-hemispheric activity and with that of the right-hemisphere, focusing on possible juxtapositions of conceptual and sensual components, respectively.

Another “dangerous situation” can appear simply because of too large a gap between the two principal constituents of mental activity, that is, conceptual (left-brain) and sensual (right-brain) processes. This gap can have especially negative consequences when the perceiver is dealing with texts of rather abstract content (see Petrov 1994a; Golitsyn & Petrov 1995: 115–131). Typical examples of such texts are poetical works devoted to abstract matters. In such cases, it is desirable to “vivify” perception to operate in accordance with their intended effects. The bringing to life of abstract ideas helps bind together perceptual processes that may be related to different channels.

This kind of “associative glue” can be used to provide a holistic perception of a communicative whole, though each fragment has a certain integrity of its own. An example of this situation is found in the large novel (in verse), *Eugeny Onegine*, by Alexander Pushkin, in which many stanzas are made to cohere by sensual, formally non-motivated associations (on experiments concerning this perceptive device, Petrov 2003.)

Quite the opposite situation obtains when the sensual content of the communication is to be “annihilated”. For instance, psychic processes may be enhanced by their being distanced from earthly, “flesh and blood” reality (see, e.g., Golitsyn 2000; Golitsyn & Petrov 2005; Petrov 2002). This amounts to increasing the transparency of the communication, such that it generates no (or almost no) sensual associations. Certain devices are used to accomplish this purpose. For example, at the level of diction, rather many verbs are used in comparison with the number of nouns and adjectives (the evolution of this device may be traced during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Russian prose, from Alexander Pushkin to Andrey Bely). At a “higher” level, verbs are frequently used at the endings of phrases. At the level of the total narration – a random sequence of events may be described in the reality depicted (this device may be seen in Ivan Bunin’s prose). Moreover, this kind of “associative emptiness” can be

attained through the unorthodox combining of nouns and verbs (e.g., in Platonov's prose).¹

Sometimes it is desired that the communication create an indefinite or vague feeling and/or impression. This situation is close to the previous one, yet without eliminating reality completely. In such cases, the perceiver may not know precisely what to do with the communication provided. To realize the intended vagueness, one should "switch on" opposite (contradictory) mechanisms – information channels that normally work against each other. This occurs, for instance, in Pushkin's poem, "Over the hills of Georgia" (1829), where two waves of meanings are directed against each other: (1) a "genuine associative" flow evidencing the poet's troubles, anxiety, and so on; (2) the flow of "formal" meanings (grammatically and logically correct), proclaiming calmness, absence of troubles, etc. The overall result of the poem being one of ambiguity or vagueness. As a result, the feeling of vagueness is generated, being the main goal of this poem (see also, Petrov 1984).

As is known, there has been for some time a growing tendency toward "meta-arts": meta-painting (i.e., painting about painting), meta-theatre (theatre about theatre), meta-poetry (poetry about poetry), etc. All of these have been theorized by Yuri Lotman (1977), among others.

In addition to the above, we should mention the concept of "constructive conceptualism", its essence consisting in uniting sensual processes and theoretical reflection during the perception (see, e.g., Gribkov & Petrov 1997). A variant of this concept may be found in the (purportedly mimetic) stylistic features of "socialist realism". Here the perceptual aim is achieved due to "interference" of the "true" content of the picture, and its ironic interpretation in the framework of the "socialistic worldview."

Various other devices exist for increasing the reliability of our perceptive understanding – and one hopes that more will be invented in future. These enrich the wealth and diversity of our mental world, suppleness of thinking, and creative potentialities. Elaboration of such means and devices leads to social, cultural, and mental progress.

Note

1. On the logic of such devices and experiments on their perception, see, e.g., Petrov 1994c, 2002, 2004.

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Vesa Matteo Piludu

Songs and rituals of the bear hunt in Karelia and Savo

Introduction

Finnish ethnographers have collected a huge quantity of ritual songs and oral narratives about the bear and bear hunt in all the regions of Finland. The songs have been published in the volumes of the collection Suomen Kansan Vanhat Runot (Ancient Poems of the Finnish People, henceforth SKVR).¹ By contrast, the majority of the folk narratives about the bear are still unpublished, but it is possible to find and study them in the Folklore Archive of the Finnish Literature Society.²

Unfortunately, the scientific literature about the Finnish bear rituals is not as rich as the folk materials collected in the last three centuries. Scientific works on the bear in the Finnish tradition are still few. The scholars and collectors of the songs and narratives in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries wrote only a few pages about the bear-hunt rituals. Some of the best Finnish anthropologists and specialists of comparative religion have written short articles or brief treatises about this topic, but a thorough-going scientific monograph is still to be written. For this reason I resolved to produce a doctoral thesis on Finnish bear folklore and bear-hunt rituals and songs. When I started the research, I noticed how rich in challenging and fascinating details the folk poems and narratives collected in Savo³ and Karelia⁴ were, and how little had been written on them. In order to try to fill this gap, I decided to write this article, focused on the description and the analysis of the bear-hunt folklore collected in these two neighbouring areas.

1. Sacred forest, sacred masters, sacred bears

In the previous two centuries the small villages of Savo and Karelia were surrounded by endless, deep, dark and wild forests. It is no surprise that the imagery of the people was dominated by speculations about the “real nature” of the forest and its “hidden powers”.

The forest was really considered another world, full of wonders and mystery. As the folklorist Lotte Tarkka states in one of her best articles, the forest itself was sacred (*pyhä* in Finnish) and all its inhabitants were filled with its sacredness (Tarkka 1988: 92–97). In the woodland there also lived various sacred supernatural beings: Tapio, the master of the forest, his wife, Mielikki, and a great number of “maidens of the forest”, called often “sacred servants” (*pyhät piikat*).

Obviously the bear, the most impressive wild animal of the *taiga*, participated in the sacredness of the forest. Bears were the “sacred cattle” of Tapio and the female spirits of the forest, and they were protected by their magical forces.

In the village of Pärnämäki in the South Savo parish of Mäntyharju, the people believed that during hibernation the bear was nourished and protected by a female “master spirit” (*baltija* or *baltia*): “When I was young, I heard that a man was encircling the bear’s sleeping place, but he fell in the den. This man stayed in the den for a long time. He saw that every night the master spirit brought the bear a kind of white beverage” (SKS Karhu 1936: 3271).⁵

The hibernation of the bear was strongly associated with the mystery of the cyclical loss and rebirth of the generative powers of the forest: when the bear was sleeping in its den, the trees were leafless; when the bear woke up in the spring, the woods became full of life and splendour.

The bear was considered one of the most powerful sources of the dynamic spiritual forces of the woods, the “spirit folk of the forest” (*metsän väki*). The bear itself was also called “forest” (*metsä*, *mettä*), “great forest” (*iso metsä*, *iso mettä*), “king of the forest” (*metsän kuningas*), “apple of the forest” (*metsän omena*), “luck of the forest” (*metsän onni*).

The sacredness of the bear included several magical powers: the bear had supernatural senses of sight and hearing. It could see from a distance the action of the hunters, and it could hear human speech from his den. The bear did not like people uttering its real name (*karhu*), and became

enraged when anyone pronounced it. The bear preferred humans to call him by “honourable names”, such as “honey-paw” (*mesikämmen*) or “flower of the forest” (*metän kukka*).

2. *Innocent bears and sinful sorcerers*

Because the forest and bears were sacred, they were also considered “clean” (*puhdas*), innocent. The folk believed that a normal bear was always innocent, unable to “do something wrong” to people. A bear who attacked cattle or a person must have been roused, i.e., “conjured” (*nostettu*) and, hence, a bewitched bear. The bear itself was innocent; the party that was really responsible, the hidden wrong-doer, was another human being: an execrable sorcerer (*noita*), concealed somewhere, maybe in the nearest village. The informant Anterus Kousa of Pärnämäki relates that “The bear didn’t do wrong unless he was conjured” (SKS, Karhu J. 1936: 3254). Another informant, the hunter G. V. Karhu of the Mäntyharju parish village of Outila, stated that: “The people usually believed that the bear was a jolly and playful animal of the forest, if sorcerers or malevolent men didn’t enrage it with magic. Bears had been seen eating hay from the same hummock as the cows, and tinkling the bells hanging from the cows’ throats too with their paws and such like without hurting the cows. But if some sorcerer or grudge-bearer became angry with his neighbours, he could send the bear to do some ill, and even destroy all the cattle of the neighbouring village” (SKS, Karhu J. 1936: 3254).

An old spell (*loitsu*) used by a sorcerer to summon the bear was probably collected in Savo during the eighteenth century:

<i>Karhun nostaminen</i>	<i>To summon the bear</i>
Nouse karhu kankahasta,	Rise, bear, from the forest,
Hiedasta hevoisen syöjä,	Horse eater, from the sands,
Viiasta vihainen kissa,	Angry cat, from the wild wood,
Korvesta kovero-koura,	Hollow hand, from the deep wood,
Karvahassu[!] halmehista,	Funny fur, from the fields,
Mullikoita murtamahan,	To tear apart the young bulls,
Vasikoita vainomahan,	To stalk the calves,
Hevosia haastamahan,	To assail the horses,
Karjan laumaa kaatamahan!	To kill the herd!

(SKVR VI 2.5414)⁶

The unknown sorcerer used the word *karhu*, the real name of the bear. The wizard intentionally pronounced this name to enrage the bear and exploit its fury against the cattle. The singer uttered other names, too, that are somewhat offensive (“angry cat” and “funny fur”): it is clear that the wizard wanted to drive the bear mad.

In Savo and Karelia the cattle owners and herdsmen lived in fear, convinced that envious sorcerers were always “at work”. To protect the cattle during the grazing season, they sang a protection spell to “calm” the bewitched bears. In 1894 the informant Ukko Timonen from Kitee (North Karelia) revealed the words of a protection spell to the collector Lönnbohm:

Missä ohto synnytelty,	Where was Ohto (the bear) given birth,
Mesikämmen kiännätelty?	Where was the honey paw turned around?
Tuolla ohto synnytelty,	There was Ohto given birth,
Mesikämmen kiännätelty:	The honey-paw turned around:
Ylähällä taivosessa,	High up in the sky,
Otavaisen olkapäällä.	On the shoulders of the Great Bear.
Missä se alas laskettiin?	How was it brought down?
Hihnassa alas laskettiin,	With a thread it was brought down,
Hihnassa hopiisessa,	With a silver thread,
Kultaisessa kätkyssä,	In a golden cradle,
Sitte läks saloja samuumaan,	To roam in the woodland,
Pohjanmoata poloylakemaan.	To wander in the Northland,
Elä sorra sontareittä,	Don't oppress the dung-thigh (cow)
Koa maion kantajoa,	Don't kill the milk holder (cow),
Enemp' on emoi(yla)lla työtä,	There will be more work for the mother,
Suur(i) vaiva vanhemmalla,	A great suffering for the parent,
Jos poikonen pahan teköö.	If the boy does wrong.

(SKVR VII 5, loitsu 3932)

In this incantation the bear is said to have celestial origins. A similar myth is typical of the tradition of other Finno-Ugric peoples (such as the Mansi). Why did the singer include the episode of the bear's birth in the sky in the spell? According to unwritten rules of traditional Finnish magic, if someone knew and sang the origins of an animal or an object, he could “control” it by magic.

The quiet style of this protection spell distinguishes it from the rough and wicked one of the previous conjuring spell. The names used to call the bear are respectful and honourable (such as honey-paw). The “innocence”

of the bear is indicated by terms that recall the purity and innocence of childhood: the bear is called *poikonen*: a boy, a childish one, who should not create problems for the mother. A sort of maternal sweetness is present in all the verses.

3. *The epic structure and ideological basis of bear-hunt songs*

What if the protection spell did not work and the bear attacked the cattle? In this case, it was necessary to hunt and kill the bear. But the killing of a sacred animal of the holy forest, of an “innocent one”, was a very dangerous task. It was necessary to perform a sequence of rites and sing many ritual songs in order to appease the bear and please the masters of the forest who protected the wild animals. The bear-hunt rituals included several phases: the purification rites to enter the forest, the songs to describe the entrance into the forest, the songs to please the masters of the forest and the female forest spirits, the rousing of the bear and its slaying, the explanation of the cause of the bear’s death, the skinning, the transport of the corpse to the village, the bear feast, the procession of the bear’s skull and the placing of the skull in a sacred tree.

The songs were formed by long chains of verses sung mostly by the same hunters. Many scholars, including Juha Pentikäinen, consider the bear-hunt songs a kind of “epic of the hunt”. If we speak of an epic, we have to note the differences and the similarities between the Finnish hunt verses and the classic epic. The philologist Domenico Comparetti, in his essay *Il Kalevala o la poesia tradizionale dei Finni* (1891), stated that the classic epic was based on a war-like ideology: the heroes were soldiers and the main plot of the epic itself was the opposition and the struggle between two peoples or between the forces of good and evil. By contrast, the Finnish epic songs concentrated their attention on magic and magic spells (Comparetti 1989: 195–196). Comparetti presupposes that the “shamanic background” of the Finnish folk beliefs has influenced the ideology of the Finnish epic poems. He defined the Finnish epic as an “epic of spells”.

The observations and the comparative methods of Comparetti are relevant for the analysis of the bear hunt songs. The classical Greek epic (for example, the *Iliad*) glorified conflict, dualism, oppositions, patriotism, struggles and fights. In contrast, the bear-hunt songs expressed the

necessity of a true conciliation and peace between the villagers and the “people of the forest”. The real heroism of the hunter is demonstrated in his effort to avoid the conflict between people and the forces of nature. He is more a “magician-diplomat” than a vainglorious warrior in search of glory. His “epic diplomacy”, expressed by singing and “whispering with a golden tongue”, maintained the right balance between humans and the forest powers.

The ideal of conciliation and harmony between humans and the forces of nature was typical of the Arctic and sub-Arctic peoples, where the shamans had an important religious and social role. These were the same cultures where the bear-hunt rituals and the bear feast evolved in a complex cultic series of events.

Another important epic theme found in the Finnish bear-hunt songs is the “journey to another world”. If in the *Odyssey* the Mediterranean sea is the “great other” in which the heroes meet supernatural beings (gods, monsters, sirens and other mythological figures), in the Finnish hunt songs the otherness is represented by the forest itself, inhabited by Tapio, Mikilikki and other spirits. As the shamans had to sing in the shamanic language to communicate with the spirits during their spiritual flights to the heavens, the Finnish hunters had to sing in their own ritual language to communicate with the forest beings.

In the following section I will explain how the conciliatory ideology and the narrative pattern of the “journey to another world” appeared throughout the verses of all the various phases of the bear-hunt ritual.

4. *Entering the enchanted forest*

The concept of the forest’s otherness is highlighted by the fact that purification was required to enter the realm of the forest spirits: in some villages it was imperative to go to the sauna and put on clean clothes before leaving. The rituals required that the hunters, “impure and sinful human beings”, in order to enter the pure and clean forest, should change their status, and became pure, clean and innocent like the sacred forest. The surprising element is that also the forest changed its status at the exact moment when the hunter entered its sacred space. During the time of hunting, all the forest became “enchanted”:

Tuolla korpi kuumottaapi,	There the forest shines,
Mehtä siintääpi sininen.	The wood becomes blue.
(SKVR VI 4.4886)	

In these verses, collected in Viena Karelia, the “blue” is not a colour as such: it has a clear magical meaning, connected to the awakening of the dynamic spiritual power of the forest (*metsän väki*).

In some marvellous verses from the village Niemelä, near Rautjärvi, the hunter clearly asks the master of the forest Tapio to enchant the forest:

Tapio isäntä itse, Tapio,	the lord himself,
havuhattu, naavaturkki!	Pine hut, beard-moss fur.
Pane nyt metsä palttinoihin,	Wrap the wood in a flax sheet,
Salo verkahan vetäse,	Drag the wild wood in a drape,
Haavat kaikki haljakkoihin	All the poplars in an azure-blue wool jacket,
Lepät lempivaattehisin,	The alders in their favourite clothes,
Hopeoihin hongat laita,	Forge the pines with silver,
Kuuset kultihin rakenna	Build the firs with gold
(Häylä 1982: 381)	

These images full of colours, beauty and magic depicted the alterity of the forest, and were deeply related to the conciliatory ideology of the hunt: during the hunt everything must be filled with harmony and sweetness.

For this reason it was also important that the enchanted forest vibrate with the power of musical magic. Without music, it is impossible to establish true harmony. In Viena Karelia a hunter asked the forest itself to play the *kantele*, a five-stringed Finnish instrument:

Soita, metsä, kanteloj(a),	Play, forest, the <i>kantele</i>
Lähtiessäni metsälle!	When I leave to the forest!
(SKVR I 4.1211)	

In the village of Niemelä, another hunter asked a forest maiden to play a whistle:

Metsän piika pikkarainen,	Small servant of the wood,
Simasuu, Tapion neiti!	Honeyed lips, maid of Tapio,
Soitellos metinen pilli,	Sing the honeyed whistle,
Simapilli piipahuta	Blow the honeyed whistle
Korvalle ehon emännän,	For the ears of the fair mistress,
Mieluisan metsän emännän	Of the lovely forest mistress
(Häylä 1982: 380–381)	

5. *Mielikki, the Pure Lady*

After entering this enchanted world, the hunter was to make contact and communicate with the supernatural spirits of the forest. Use of the right, respectful words to the forest mistress Mielikki, the wife of Tapio, was fundamental for a successful hunt. Bears were the favourite “cattle” of the mistress of the forest. If she was pleased, she would “open the granary of Tapio” (give prey to the hunter). The hunters of Niemelä asked Mielikki to free a bear with these sweet words:

Mielikki metsän emäntä,	Mielikki, mistress of the forest,
Puhdas muori, muoto kaunis,	Pure lady, beautifully shaped,
Pane kulta kulkemaan,	Put the gold (the bear) in motion,
Hopea vaeltamaan	The silver (the bear) to wander
Miehen estävän etehen	In front of the searching man,
Anelijan askelille	On the steps of the supplicant!
Ota kultaiset avaimet	Take the golden keys,
Renkahalta, reideltäsi:	From the key ring, from your thigh:
Aukaise Tapion aitta,	Open the granary of Tapio,
Metsän linna liikahuta	Move the castle of the forest
Minun pyyntipäiväni	On that day when I go hunting,
Erän etsoaikoinani!	When I search for the prey!

(Häylä 1982: 380)

In these beautiful verses the hunter presents himself as a humble “supplicant” and a poor and desperate wanderer: submission and purity were the key with which to open the heart of the Pure Lady.

6. *Take me, forest, as your husband*

In many songs the hunter shows a desire to become physically “part of the forest”. This process of identification with the forest was extremely erotic. The hunter affirmed that he courted the maidens of the forest and made love with them. The famous Karelian singer Arhippa Perttuine sang this song full of sensuality before Elias Lönnrot:

Mieleni minun tekisi	The desire is growing in me
mieli käyä Metsolassa	To leave for the Forestland,
metsän neittä naiakseni,	To make love to the forest maiden
metsän mettä juoakseni,	To drink the forest honey,
lihoa lehen alaista,	Flesh from under the leaves,
kuuta kuusen juureihista	Grease from the spruce's root
[. . .]	[. . .]
Ota, metsä, mieheksesi,	Take me, forest, as your husband,
urohiksesi, Tapijo,	As your virile man, Tapijo,
korpi kolkkipojkesi!	As your arrow boy, savage wood.
Metsä haisuo havulta,	The forest smells of pine,
Mies haisee meen maulta.	The man smells of the taste of honey.

(SKVR I 4.1095)

In these verses the hunter declares not only the desire to have a sexual adventure with the forest maiden, but also his desire to marry her. Sexual intercourse and marriage were also ways to become a relative of the forest, part of the family of the forest. If the hunter became a sexual partner and a relative of the forest spirits, he could easily obtain from them the desired prey. The connection between eroticism and hunting is typical of many cultures, but the Finnish songs are extremely explicit.

7. *Wake up, sooty maiden*

When the hunters had honoured the master spirits and so pleased them, they reached the bear's den. But it was strictly forbidden to kill the bear as it slept. In Viena Karelia it was necessary to wake up the bear, singing these verses:

Nousep' pois, nokiñe(n) neit'[i],	Wake up, sooty maiden,
Nokiselta nuotiolta.	From the sooty fire place
Havuselta vuotielta,	From the bed of pine needles
Hakoselta peänalalta;	From the pine pillow;
Jo olet viikon moassa moannun',	You have slept in the earth for a week,
Kauvon lehtossa levännyñ,	You have rested in the grove a long
	time,
Viikon kuuluit, kauvon viivyit	A week passed, a long time you've
	spent
Viron moata käyessäsi.	On your travel to Estonia.

(SKVR I 4.1206)

The hunter awakens the bear with kindness. The circumstances were extremely dangerous: if the bear was awakened roughly, it became enraged and attacked the hunters. Lovely words were chosen: the bear was portrayed like a bride, or a little girl, who has overslept. The verses brought to mind beautiful images of childhood or romantic love.

8. The explanation of the bear's death as an accident

Analysing these verses, it is important to understand that the hunter was aiming to spotlight a deep spirit of conciliation not only with all the forest spirits, masters and maidens, but also with the bear itself.

The conflict represented by the killing of the bear was totally negated. When the bear was killed, it was necessary to vindicate the hunters. The hunter claimed that he had not killed the bear. It was as an accident: the bear killed itself by falling from a tree. The hunters of Juva in Savo sang:

Empe mine ole sinua pañut,	I didn't shoot you,
Eike toinen toveri,	The other fellow didn't shoot,
Ite pa harjaiti havolta,	You yourself slipped from the pine,
Ite vierit vempeltä,	You yourself rolled down from a collar tree,
Kuavut koivun konkeloita	You fell from a fallen birch tree,
Halko marjaisen mahais,	You split your berry-filled belly,
Halko kultaisen kupuis.	You slit your golden stomach.
Kätke kynet karvoihis!	Hide your claws in your fur,
Villa on suus, villa on piäs,	Of wool is your mouth, wool your head,
Villa on visi hamastais.	Wool your five teeth.

(SKVR VI 4.4885)

In Viena Karelia, even the skinning of the bear was depicted as a useful exchange, with a clear advantage for the bear:

Anna kättä, käyrän poika,	Give me your hand, curved boy,
Hongan oksalla ojenna,	Hold out the hand on the pine's branch,
Vaihtakaamme paitojamme,	Let's change our shirts,
Nurikaamme nuttujamme,	Let's swap our jackets,
Anna mulle villa paita,	Give me the wool shirt,
Ota multa rauta paita,	Take from me an iron shirt,
Rautanen risuissa lujempi,	The iron one is tougher in the underbrush,
Kuusikossa kestävämpi.	It last longer in the fir wood.

(SKVR I 4.1244)

The “iron shirt” offered to the bear was probably a reference to the knife used to skin the bear.

Whatever the case, if the bear was not convinced about the real benefits of the “exchange”, sometimes it was a good idea to explain that the knife was not forged by the hunters:

Ei ole veitsi minun tekema	The knife isn't a work of mine,
Eikä toisi kumppailini,	Nor of the other fellow,
Virossa on veitsi tehty,	The knife was forged in Estonia,
Saatu Saksan kaupungissa	It was purchased from a German city.

(SKVR I 4.1244)

9. *The bear feast*

In the next phases of the ritual the hunters continued to talk to the dead bear as if it was alive: the dead bear was now considered a guest of honour, and in Viena Karelia it was invited to the village with sweet words:

Lähe nyt, ohto, kulkomah,	Leave now, ohto, to roam
Hopie, vajeltamah,	Silver, to wander,
Rahakarva, koalamah	Money fur, to amble
Uroisehe väkeh,	To the heroic people,
Miehisehe joukijoh	To the virile company,
Kullaista kujoa myöti,	Following a golden path,
Hopijeista tietä myöti	Following a silver way

(SKVR I 4.1203)

The mistress of the village welcomed the arrival of the hunter and the bear with these words:

Terve, ohto, tultuosi,	Welcome is your arrival, Ohto,
Mesikämmen, käytyysi!	Your visit, honey paw!
Jo on teälä pantu pöyvät,	Here the tables are already set up,
Jo on tehty viikon viinat,	The spirits were made a while ago,
Kauvon ostraset oluot	The barley beer brewed long since.

(SKVR I 4.1250)

During the “visit” of the bear the villagers organised a great feast and wedding between a boy and a girl. The feast and the false wedding were both strategies to join the bear to the kin of the village and to fuse the forest’s spiritual forces to the kinship of the community.

During the hunt a sexual relationship and marriage between the hunters and the forest maidens were required to join the hunter and the people of forest. During the bear feast the celebrations and the false wedding were useful in bringing together the bear and the people of the village. In both circumstances, we find a deep desire to join the village kin with the forest clan. This fusion is well represented in the following phase of the bear feast, when the villagers ate the meat and the head of the bear, singing:

Korvampa otan Oholta	I'll take the ear from Ohto,
Itse korvin kuullakseni	To hear with the same ear,
Silmänpä otan oh(olta)	I'll take the eye from Ohto,
Itse silmin nähäkseni	To see with the same eye.

(SKVRI 4.1242)

This was clearly a magical procedure to transfer the bear's powerful senses to the people and to symbolise a real bodily fusion between the bear and the villagers.

10. The bear-skull ritual

In the last part of the bear ritual, a procession carried the bones and the skull of the bear to a sacred grove of pines. Quite often the grove was situated on a small island (see Picture 1).⁷ When the villagers reached the grove or the island, the bear's bones were buried below the roots of a pine, and the skull was hung on a branch. When the last rite was performed, the hunters of Ilomansti (North Karelia) sang:

Minne saatit saalihisi,	Where did you bring your prey?
ennätit hyvän eräsi,	Where did you rush your good prey?
ootko jäälle jättänynnä,	Have you left it on the ice?
vaanko tiehen tellännynnä,	Have you chucked it on the path?
uhkuhun upottanunna?	Have you sunk it in the slushy snow?
En oo jäälle jättänynnä,	I haven't left it on the ice,
uhkuhun upottanunna,	I haven't sunk it in the slushy snow,
enk' oo tiehen tellännynnä;	I haven't chucked it on the street.
panin puuhun puhtahasen,	I hung it up on a clean tree,
petäjähän pienimmähän[!],	On the smallest of the pines,
honkahan havusatahan,	On a coniferous old pine,
panin kuuta kahtomahan,	I hung it up to watch the moon,
otavia oppimahan,	To learn the stars of the Great Bear,
päiveä tähystämähän.	To observe the sun.

(SKVR VII 5,3396)

Performing the last ritual, the bear “returned” to its birthplaces: the woodland and the sky. The circle of life of the bear could start anew. The skull ritual was probably the prelude to the bear’s future resurrection in the skies, “on the shoulders of the Great Bear”.



Picture 1. Pines on the island of Karhunpääsaari (“Island of the bear head”) on Lake Korpijärvi (Mäntyharju) at sunset. Bear skulls were hung on the branches. Photograph: Vesa Matteo Piludu, 2006.

Notes

1. All 33 volumes of the SKVR were published in Helsinki by the Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura (Finnish Literature Society) from 1908 to 1948. It is now also possible to read the 86,084 folk poems of this collection on the web pages of the Finnish Literature Society at <http://dbgw.finlit.fi/skvr/skvr.phtml> and <http://www.finlit.fi/skvr/>.
2. The Folklore Archives are located on the first floor of the building of the Finnish Literature Society. The purpose of the archives is primarily to document oral traditions and to provide folklore material and help for researchers and institutions. Website: <http://www.finlit.fi/english/kra/index.htm>.
3. Savo is a region of east-central Finland, traditionally divided into North and South Savo.

4. Karelia is a wide and complex area, divided into several regions. Today only the region of North Karelia and a small part of South Karelia are located in the Republic of Finland, all the other Karelian regions (Viena Karelia, Olonets, Ladoga Karelia and Southern Karelia) are situated in the Republic of Karelia and in the (still so called) Leningrad oblast, both parts of the Russian Federation.
5. References to the unpublished material include the archival abbreviation (SKS stands for the folklore archives of the Finnish Literature Society), the collector's name (e.g. Karhu J.), the year of the field work (1936) and the text or manuscript number (3271).
6. References to the songs and poems published in SKVR include the code of the volume (VI 2) and the number of the poem (5414).
7. In the summer of 2006, during the archaeological and ethnographical field work of the Repovesi project, with the help of the excellent informant Jaakko Outinen and the national park's guide Paula Niskala, I was able to find and photograph one of these islands, the small Karhunpääsaari ("Island of the bear head") on Lake Korpijärvi, in the territory of Mäntyharju (South Savo). The island was mentioned in the oral narratives collected by Juho Karhu in 1936 in the same parish. A few days later Jaakko Outinen, during a boat trip on the same lake, found another island connected with the bear-skull rites, the even smaller Ykspetäjänsaari ("One bear-pine island"). This island, too, was mentioned by the informants of Juho Karhu.

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Augusto Ponzio

On communication

I wish to start by denouncing *a fallacy* concerning the communication process.

When we consider the concept of “communication,” we generally think of a process of exteriorisation through which an interior content is made manifest. On this account, communication is an e-mission that starts from a being, the e-mitter, and takes place between the e-mitter considered as a *terminus a quo* and another being (the receiver) considered as a *terminus ad quem*. Communication is what happens *between one being* in the role of emitter and another being in the role of receiver. According to this model we have a being that communicates, that *first is* and *then communicates*, a being that *exists prior to and independently of its acts of communication*.

This conception of communication is not only widespread at the level of ordinary opinion, but is also shared by different theoretical positions which contrast with each other on other aspects, such as innatism and empiricism, mentalism and behaviourism. In any case, the conception of communication as the e-mission from a being which another being receives remains unquestioned.

This conception of communication is obviously connected to a given conception of being, to a given ontology. Just as communication in general is considered as a process beginning from a being, as an e-mission of being, being in general is considered as the presupposition and foundation of communication. Communication theory and ontology are in general closely connected: all communication theories have their ontologies, whether explicit or implicit; conversely, all ontologies have a theory of communication, even if it is not explicated.

Against this fallacy, a different conception of the communication/being relationship is now emerging: it may be summarised with the statement that “communication is being.” This statement can also be inverted as “being is communication.” But the first statement, “communication is being,” concerns communication theory – the object of analysis of this

presentation. The second statement, “being is communication,” concerns general ontology. In relation to the latter, “being is communication,” here we can only state that it concerns the inevitable connection between communication theory and ontology.

That communication is being is evident in two main sectors of knowledge and praxis, the scientific and the economic.

In scientific investigation, particularly important under this regard is the complex of disciplines concerning communication which focus on the organic world in its multiple aspects, from the great kingdoms to micro-organisms, collectively identifiable under the name of *biosemiotics*. In this sphere of scientific investigation, life and communication converge. *Communication* is not only the condition of life but also the criterion for its identification: a live being is a communicating being. Life = semiosis, that is, a process in which there are signs (to be precise “signs of life”).

Obviously, communication is not the externalisation of the living being, from bacteria or prokaryotes to cells with a membrane and nucleus or eukaryotes, from micro-organisms to organisms belonging to the three (or four) great kingdoms. Communication is the living being itself. In the organic world, to communicate is to be, and vice versa. To communicate is to persist in being, to maintain being, to confirm oneself as being, *conatus essendi*.

In the current phase of capitalist production, economy confirms identification between being and communication. This phase is characterised by the industrial revolution of automation, globalisation of communication and universalisation of the market. Such universalisation is not only a quantitative fact of expansion, but above all a qualitative transformation represented by the fact that anything can be translated into goods and by the continuous production of new goods-things. In the present day and age communication is no longer just an intermediate phase in the reproduction cycle (production, exchange, consumption). Far more radically, communication now represents the constitutive modality of production and consumption processes themselves. Not only does the *exchange* phase involve communication, but *production* and *consumption* too are communication. So the whole reproductive cycle is communication. This phase in capitalist reproduction can be characterised as the “*communication-production*” phase.

Communication-production means persevering in being, insisting on being, persisting, *conatus essendi*.

But *conatus essendi* of today's communication-production contrasts with *conatus essendi* of communication-life.

Persistence of communication-reproduction is *persistence of the same social form*, the capitalist. Capitalist society with its continual adjustments and metamorphoses functional to reproduction of this same type of society contrasts with *social reproduction* and with reproduction of life on the planet.

Reproduction of the same production cycle destroys: machines which it replaces with new machines because of competitive needs; jobs, to make space for automation with a consequent increase in unemployment; products on the market, stimulating consumerism; existing products, realising new similar products which immediately make the former obsolete; goods and markets, which cannot resist the competitiveness of global communication-production.

In spite of identification in ideological terms between the *conatus essendi* of communication-production and the *conatus essendi* of social reproduction, the *conatus essendi* of communication-production destroys those productive forces that cannot be contained within the boundaries of the current production system. Human intelligence, inventiveness, creativity are humiliated as such qualities in the human person are subjected to market trends, "to market logic."

The destructive character of the today's production system is also evidenced by the fact that it produces ever greater areas of underdevelopment as a condition of development, areas of human exploitation and misery to the point of nonsurvival. Communication-production is destructive because it is the communication-production of war. Moreover global communication-production is destructive not only with regard to social reproduction, human life, but life over the entire planet.

Another fallacy must now be mentioned. I am alluding to the fact that communication is mostly separated from modelling and dialogism. The terms "model" and "modelling" are used here as understood by Sebeok and his global semiotics. Sebeok developed the concept of modelling from the so-called Moscow-Tartu school, though he further elaborated it by relating it to the concept of *Umwelt* as formulated by Jakob von Uexküll. Modelling is the foundation of communication in all living beings. Communica-

tion necessarily occurs within the limits of a world and its characteristics as modelled by a given species, a world that is species-specific.

Jakob von Uexküll speaks of invisible worlds to indicate the domain which englobes all animals according to the species they belong to. What an animal perceives, craves, fears and predated is relative to its own world.

Human communication is the most complex and varied form of communication in the sphere of biosemiosis – the human animal is capable of modelling a potentially infinite number of possible worlds.

In light of Sebeok's biosemiotics, the concept of dialogism may be extended beyond the sphere of anthroposemiosis and applied to all communication processes.

But all communication processes are based not only on *modelling* (Sebeok), but also on *dialogism* (Bakhtin). We believe that modelling and dialogism are at the basis of all communication processes. The theory of autopoietic systems is incompatible with dialogism only if dialogism is understood reductively, that is, in terms of a communication model that describes the communication process in terms of a linear, causal process. Here dialogue is conceived as based on the conversation model governed by the turning around together rule. However, as suggested by Maturana another form of dialogic exchange is possible which is different from communication conceived as a linear process from source to destination, or as a circular process in which participants take turns in playing the part of sender and receiver. From this point of view, the dialogic model conceived by Maturana can be described in terms of pre- or anticomunicative interaction.

Modelling and dialogism are pivotal concepts in the study of semiosis. Communication is only one kind of semiosis and together with *semiosis of information* and *semiosis of symptomization*, *semiosis of communication* it presupposes the semiosis of modelling and dialogism. This emerges very clearly if in accordance with Peirce and his reformulation of the classic notion of *substitution* in terms of *interpretation*, the sign is considered firstly as an interpretant, that is, as a dialogic response foreseen by a specific type of modelling. Moreover, let us remember that Bakhtin's concept of dialogue also contributes considerably to extending this concept beyond the human world connecting dialogism with semiosis from Sebeok's biosemiotic perspective, namely according to the point of view of *global* semiotics

Translation from Italian by Susan Petrilli

Augusto Ponzio

Sémanalyse et sémiotique chez Julia Kristeva

Dans son livre *Le langage, cet inconnu* (1969a), Julia Kristeva trace le champ de la linguistique en indiquant les limites, notamment son incapacité à inclure et à considérer certains aspects du langage. Il s'agit de limites dues à l'histoire même de la linguistique et à ses liens avec la culture européenne, avec le phonocentrisme, avec la priorité ou l'exclusivité accordée à l'écriture alphabétique, etc. Il est nécessaire de souligner l'inscription de la linguistique dans une certaine tradition dont le développement est la grammaire générative, qui, à travers Chomsky, s'est définie comme une grammaire cartésienne (Ponzio 1992).

Depuis ces trente dernières années, la linguistique a approfondi son analyse en intégrant la réflexion sur le langage proposée par la philosophie du langage et la sémiotique. Nous pouvons retrouver dans la linguistique actuelle une réflexion épistémologique à laquelle a contribué, parmi d'autres, Julia Kristeva. Cette interrogation épistémologique s'est développée en même temps que la linguistique de l'énonciation. À la linguistique de la langue s'ajoute la linguistique de l'énonciation qui tient compte du discours comme acte et par conséquent du locuteur, du destinataire, de leurs intentions explicites ou implicites, du non-dit.

Mais, comme Julia Kristeva à plusieurs reprises l'a remarqué, si ce développement est certainement très enrichissant, il ne déplace toutefois pas les cadres épistémologiques de la tradition philosophique qui a présidé à la naissance de la linguistique. La linguistique de l'énonciation qui implique la notion du sujet ne s'interroge pas à fond sur cette notion.

Voilà pourquoi Kristeva a essayé déjà dès 1969 dans *Semeiotiké* d'opérer une sorte de court-circuit par la connexion de l'approche linguistique et sémiotique avec l'approche psychanalytique, en proposant sa "sémanalyse." Aussi bien l'ego cartésien que l'ego transcendantal de la phénoménologie husserlienne et le sujet de la linguistique de l'énonciation sont

tous confrontés avec le dédoublement du sujet que Freud a mis en forme lorsqu'il a proposé sa théorie de l'inconscient. La prise en considération de l'inconscient modifie fondamentalement l'objet de la linguistique parce qu'elle implique qu'on décrive la signification comme processus hétérogène.

Dans *Le langage, cet inconnu* une grande place est consacré aux écritures non alphabétiques. Dans la seconde édition a été ajoutée une note qui fait référence au concept d'écriture chez Derrida et à la question de la prédominance de la trace par rapport au vocal. Mais ce qui intéresse Kristeva c'est l'écriture au sens stylistique du terme, l'écriture littéraire: Mallarmé, Céline, Proust. Dans l'écriture littéraire se manifestent certaines composantes qui sont éclipsées dans l'usage quotidien de la langue. Il s'agit des composantes qui dans la théorie freudienne pourraient s'appeler des pulsions aux frontières entre le biologique et le symbolique. Le style «poétique,» au sens où les formalistes russes employaient le mot, c'est à dire le langage littéraire, peut être envisagé comme une modification du discours des genres quotidiens sous l'effet des pulsions ou des «processus primaires»

La signification comme processus hétérogène se manifeste dans l'écriture littéraire, qui est donc une expression plus complète du sujet parlant et de son hétérogénéité. Dans *La Révolution du langage poétique. L'avant-garde à la fin du XIXe siècle. Lautréamont et Mallarmé* (1974) Kristeva introduit une distinction entre le *symbolique* et le *sémiotique*. Le symbolique désigne le langage tel que le définit la linguistique et sa tradition, le langage dans son usage normatif. Le sémiotique renvoie aux processus primaires et aux pulsions qui entrent en contradiction avec le symbolique. C'est précisément dans le conflit entre le symbolique et le sémiotique que se produit l'écriture littéraire, ou comme nous le dirons simplement dorénavant: l'écriture.

Pour Kristeva l'écriture est une manière d'approcher le sémiotique et de lui trouver une traduction – une traduction verbale – dans le symbolique. On peut dire que l'écriture est un approfondissement du sémiotique; elle lui donne la parole. Sa valeur consiste précisément à approfondir l'expérience de l'hétérogénéité du procès de la signification. De ce point de vue, l'écriture est un élargissement de la rationalité. Elle produit une extension de l'horizon des interrogations sur le langage. Et ces interrogations engagent la dynamique du sujet parlant.

Si on prend en considération dans l'écriture la contradiction entre symbolique et sémiotique, on peut atteindre, dans l'interprétation d'un texte littéraire, un niveau sémantique décidément plus profond que celui qui est accessible aux approches traditionnelles. Le texte, dans son rythme même, véhicule parfois des messages hétérogènes par rapport à ce qui est explicite. Le repérage du sémiotique – l'attention au rythme mais aussi au découpage des lexèmes figés dans le signe linguistique, qui met à jour un autre agencement possible, une autre signification – permet à Kristeva de déchiffrer, dans *La révolution du langage poétique*, les textes littéraires, notamment Mallarmé.

Nous pouvons donc comprendre le double intérêt de Kristeva pour l'écriture et pour la psychanalyse, cette dernière envisagée aussi bien au niveau théorétique et méthodologique que thérapeutique. Aussi bien l'écriture que l'analyse, concernent les états-limites du langage. À partir de *La révolution du langage poétique*, Kristeva développe sa distinction entre sémiotique et symbolique dans un cadre analytique. Dans la cure analytique on se trouve face à des difficultés de parole ou de sens qui attestent une difficulté de vivre. De ce point de vue, entendre le sémiotique dans une situation où il est étouffé ou neutralisé dans le symbolique, c'est une manière pour l'analyste de redonner vie au patient. Ces situations d'hétérogénéité de la signification, dont la pratique analytique donne l'expérience directe, sont analysées par Kristeva dans ses livres *Folle vérité* (ouvrage collectif, 1979), *Pouvoirs de l'horreur. Essais sur l'abjection* (1980), *Histoires d'amour* (1983) et *Soleil noir, dépression et mélancolie* (1987). Dans des situations qui ne sont pas celles de l'écriture poétique mais celles de la cure analytique, l'attention à l'intonation et au rythme a autant d'importance que dans l'écriture. Dans *Soleil noir* nous pouvons trouver des exemples d'attention à l'égard de la parole psychotique, à un niveau du langage suprasegmental – diraient les linguistiques – c'est-à-dire à un niveau qui n'est pas celui des signes du symbolique mais qui implique le pré-langage qui, pour Kristeva, relève du sémiotique. Nous retrouvons ici la question, centrale dans *La révolution du langage poétique*, du repérage du sémiotique au moyen de l'attention au rythme mais aussi au découpage des lexèmes. À travers l'analyse du discours littéraire, mais aussi de celui des patients, Kristeva essaie de se tenir au plus près de la parole, en repérant des singularités à travers des indices très spécifiques (l'emploi de tel terme, le phonétisme du lexème, la construction syntactique, etc.) pour déceler la réelle relation entre sujet

et langage. Cela signifie aussi que l'on prête attention aux caractéristiques concrètes de la langue que certains linguistiques ont tendance à négliger. Par conséquent, la sémiotique, telle que Kristeva l'entend, est une discipline qui ne veut pas contourner la vie concrète de la langue.

La relation entre le symbolique et le sémiotique est envisagée par Kristeva dans son inhérence au contexte historique et social. Dans la conclusion du *Langage, cet inconnu* la sémioticienne soutient qu'on ne peut pas faire de la linguistique une science de la signification sans une théorie de l'histoire comme interaction de la pratique signifiante. La *Révolution du langage poétique* montre en effet en quoi les questions portant sur la pratique littéraire visent le contexte politique où se situe cette pratique, bien qu'elle échappe à ce contexte par sa capacité *exotopique*, ou si l'on préfère, *révolutionnaire*. L'écriture, en particulier celle de certains courants historiques comme le symbolisme, le surréalisme ou encore la poétique de la textualité de *Tel Quel* – les expériences qui intéressent Kristeva – prend on eux des comportements stylistiques et idéologiques qui sont des comportements critiques. Mais l'écriture, indépendamment de la position idéologique à laquelle elle peut être ramenée, est, en tant que telle, critique. Cette attitude critique a certainement aussi une précise origine historique. Nous l'avons héritée d'une civilisation qui a produit le droit des individus, ce qu'on appelle les droits de l'Homme. Or, l'aboutissement le plus exquis des droits de l'homme, c'est la reconnaissance de la singularité des sujets. Dans l'énonciation, cette singularité des sujets se manifeste à des degrés très différents. Kristeva analyse cette singularité dans deux types de parole distincts: celle des écrivains dans la littérature et celle des patients dans l'analyse. Pour Kristeva, il faut que la théorie du langage qui prend en considération ces sujets singuliers se demande, au préalable, comment élaborer une théorie suffisamment subtile pour rendre compte de ces inflexions singulières. Il s'agit donc d'une singularité historique, celle du sujet occidental. Aussi bien dans la lecture du texte littéraire que dans la pratique de l'écriture littéraire, on a affaire à une parole qui demande l'écoute. C'est une relation que Kristeva envisage en tant que relation d'hospitalité et d'accueil. Donc cette interrogation sur la singularité de ces sujets présente, selon elle, une dimension éthique.

Une autre situation dans laquelle se manifeste la signification comme processus hétérogène est celle du sujet qui ne parle pas sa langue maternelle mais une autre langue, qui, étant la sienne, résonne néanmoins comme

étrangère, tandis que sa propre langue vit dans la mémoire nocturne du corps, en tant que langage d'autrefois qui se fane sans jamais le quitter. Kristeva analyse cette situation dans une partie de *Étrangers à nous mêmes* (1988) intitulée «Le silence du polyglotte.» Le sujet qui parle une nouvelle langue peut se perfectionner dans le maniement de cet autre instrument, comme on s'exprime avec l'algèbre ou le violon, et ce nouvel artifice peut lui procurer d'ailleurs un nouveau corps, une nouvelle peau, mais sa parole reste parole des autres. Dans cette situation du sujet parlant entre deux langues, dans «cette anesthésie de la personne happé par une langue étrangère,» dans ce «mutisme polyforme» du polyglotte, l'hétérogénéité du procès de la signifiante apparaît aussi bien que dans la parole psychotique ou dans l'écriture, en mettant en évidence elle-même l'existence du dédoublement du sujet «unique» et «unitaire» de l'usage normatif de la langue.

Le titre du livre de 1969, *Le langage, cet inconnu* comporte, précisément dans l'adjectif «inconnu,» un motif qui se retrouve dans la recherche ultérieure de Kristeva sur l'«étrangeté.» Inconnu/étranger; ce motif est un aspect de la conscience linguistique et concerne les rapports entre le locuteur et sa langue, entre la langue et une autre langue, une culture et les cultures autres. Il s'agit de l'inconnu de/dans le langage qui concerne aussi notre conscience d'Européens, d'Occidentaux aujourd'hui plus que jamais à cause des récents événements historiques.

La question des étrangers, qui se pose aujourd'hui dans toutes les cultures et en particulier dans la culture européenne, est une question qui concerne l'identité. Or, le sujet individuel ou collectif, tels une communauté, un peuple, une nation, en tant que conscience des signes en quoi il consiste, est fondamentalement sa relation avec sa langue, avec ses langues. Donc son identité est fondamentalement linguistique. Par conséquent, le problème qui se pose à la veille du deuxième millénaire, qui s'est toujours posé mais qui prend aujourd'hui des formes violentes, celui de la définition du même et de l'autre, de l'identité nationale et de l'étranger, ne peut être abordé uniquement à travers la sociologie, la jurisprudence et la politique. Il s'agit d'une question qui met en cause le linguiste et le sémioticien dans leurs compétences spécifiques et à laquelle ils ne peuvent se soustraire en déléguant le politique, le sociologue, le juriste, l'expert en droit constitutionnel ou international et, à l'occasion, le stratège militaire.

Cela est vrai à plus forte raison s'il s'agit de la sémiotique qui, telle du moins que Kristeva l'entend, poursuit le but d'approfondir l'expérience de la signification comme processus hétérogène. De ce point de vue, ce qui est en question, c'est l'identité du sujet parlant, l'identité du sujet signifiant en général. Se rendre compte de l'hétérogénéité du procès de la signification, c'est entendre l'altérité dans l'usage du langage. C'est un entraînement à l'écoute, à l'accueil, à l'hospitalité que les sémioticiens peuvent communiquer et répandre. Nous considérons le livre de Kristeva *Étrangers à nous même* comme une remarquable contribution à cette tâche.

Suivant Kristeva, nous pouvons donner au problème de la définition du national et de l'étranger qui, comme nous l'avons dit, prend aujourd'hui des formes violentes, la formulation suivante: comment concilier le mélange des nations dans les États et la sauvegarde des cultures nationales? L'affirmation de la différence linguistique et culturelle peut se transformer en arrogance identitaire (la «boria delle nazioni» de Vico). Un exemple caricatural de cette morgue est donnée par Kristeva lorsque, en se référant à son expérience de romancière, elle affirme que le français peut accepter éventuellement un discours tendant un miroir à la société comme celui des *Samourais* (1979), mais qu'il perçoit celui qui manifeste une subjectivité écorchée, douloureuse, révélant une sorte d'enfer, comme une atteinte au bon goût.

Pour Kristeva, le sémioticien et le linguiste, ou toute personne qui s'intéresse à la vie de la langue, doit prêter aujourd'hui une plus grande attention à la fois au développement des idiomes et des cultures nationales – à leurs traditions, à la valorisation de leurs richesses – et à la possibilité d'évolution de ces dernières au contact des autres. Il ne faut pas que l'on perde l'accès à la culture antérieure, sans quoi la langue elle-même s'appauvrit, se banalise et frise le cliché.

Lorsque Kristeva écrit dans *Le Vieil Homme et les loups* (1991) que nous sommes dans une civilisation qui rappelle la fin de l'Empire romain, elle pense non seulement à la crise morale mais aussi à la perte de la tradition linguistique et culturelle qui la caractérise. Kristeva croit qu'il incombe aux littéraires, aux humanistes et surtout aux linguistes et aux sémioticiens non de transformer ce passé en musée en fonction d'une identité immobilisée par ses racines mais de le ranimer et de le revisiter. Il s'agit d'une source de richesse expressive offerte au sujet pour exprimer sa singularité. Plus le code à travers lequel l'individu s'exprime est restreint, plus l'éventail de la

créativité du sujet singulier est réduite. La valorisation de la tradition va de pair avec le métissage. Les implants de sensibilité étrangère, les greffes sur le «génie» de la tradition d'autres expériences, idéologiques, sensorielles, psychologiques qui peuvent paraître des entorses à cette tradition, représentent, en réalité, un enrichissement.

Étranger: rage étranglée au fond de ma gorge, ange noir troublant la transparence, trace opaque, insondable. Figure de la haine et de l'autre, l'étranger n'est ni la victime romantique de notre paresse familiale, ni l'intrus responsable de tous les maux de la cité. Ni la révélation en marche, ni l'adversaire immédiat à éliminer pour pacifier le groupe. Étrangement, l'étranger nous habite: il est la face cachée de notre identité, l'espace qui ruine notre demeure, le temps où s'abîment l'entente et la sympathie. De le reconnaître en nous, nous nous épargnons de le détester en lui-même. Symptôme qui rend précisément le «nous» problématique, peut-être impossible, l'étranger commence lorsque surgit la conscience de ma différence et s'achève lorsque nous nous reconnaissons tous étrangers, rebelles aux liens et aux communautés (Kristeva 1988: 9).

Étrangers à nous-mêmes analyse la présence et le destin de l'étranger dans la civilisation européenne, en soulignant le métissage de son passé et son avenir cosmopolite. Kristeva recherche le rôle de l'inquiétante «étrangeté» chez différents auteurs (Rabelais, Montaigne, Érasme, Montesquieu, Diderot, Kant, Herder, jusqu'à Camus et Nabokov) et à différents moments de l'histoire: les Grecs avec leurs «Métèques» et leurs «Barbares»; le Juif inscrivant Ruth la Moabite au fondement de la royauté de David; saint Paul qui choisit de prêcher en direction des travailleurs immigrés pour en faire les premiers chrétiens, etc.

La question de l'étrangeté traverse aussi un des derniers ouvrages de Kristeva, *Le temps sensible. Proust et l'expérience littéraire* (1994). Kristeva ne manque pas, quand l'occasion se présente, de relever le rôle que joue l'étrangeté (raciale: le juif; sexuelle: l'homosexuel) dans la *Recherche*.

Mais surtout *Étrangers à nous-mêmes* est une contribution à l'analyse critique de ce fantasme de l'étranger menaçant qui est en train d'envahir l'Europe aujourd'hui. Il s'agit, certes, d'une contribution apparemment modeste et microscopique, mais qui constitue, sans aucun doute, un modèle pour qui s'occupe de signes, de langues et de cultures et entend assumer ses responsabilités sans recourir à l'alibi de la spécialisation.

L'écriture, c'est-à-dire le langage littéraire, peut enrichir la compréhension de l'étrangeté, par son lien avec l'hétérogénéité dans la signification et l'altérité. Le texte littéraire se produit dans un contexte antérieur et synchronique avec lequel il est en dialogue.

Kristeva a contribué à faire connaître Bakhtine (cfr. «Une poétique ruinée,» présentation à la tr. fr. de Bakhtine, *La poétique de Dostoïevski*, 1970); et «Le mot, le dialogue et le roman,» in Kristeva 1969b). En se rapportant directement ou indirectement à Bakhtine (on peut voir Kristeva 1977), Kristeva a montré comment fonctionnent le dialogisme et la polyphonie dans le texte littéraire. L'écriture est nécessairement dialogique, nécessairement polyphonique, même si certains genres littéraires et certains textes rendent le dialogisme et la polyphonie plus évidents que d'autres: par rapport au dialogisme et à la polyphonie de Dostoïevski, Tolstoï semble un auteur monologique; Balzac ne présente pas la polyphonie de Joyce, mais on peut toutefois étudier le dialogisme du texte balzacien.

L'écriture nous permettant d'entendre l'altérité dans l'usage du langage peut contribuer à nous rendre plus capables d'aborder l'étrangeté. Plus nous nous reconnaitrons étrangers à nous-même, plus nous pourrions accueillir l'étrangeté d'autrui. En effet, comme Kristeva nous le dit, l'étrangeté d'autrui, qui provoque notre violence, est très souvent une mise en fantasme de l'altérité qui travaille les langues, les cultures, les énonciations, les rêves, c'est-à-dire quelque chose qui est en nous, qui nous échappe et que nous ne voulons pas regarder en face parce que nous le redoutons.

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Mihaela Popescu

Une forme de citation atypique dans la presse écrite roumaine

1. Considérations préliminaires

Dans notre étude, on a isolé une forme de citation spéciale, identifiée dans la presse écrite roumaine, et on a essayé de la caractériser. On a nommé cette forme *atypique*, parce qu'elle se distancie, par certaines caractéristiques, aussi bien du discours direct que du discours indirect. Théoriquement, elle représente un discours inséré, émis antérieurement par une autre instance que l'auteur de l'article. De plus, on ne sait pas précisément si ce discours est reproduit tel quel ou sous une forme modifiée. En rapportant cette forme aux caractéristiques (syntactiques, sémantiques et pragmatiques) du discours direct et du discours indirect, on a constaté qu'elle ne correspond entièrement à aucune de ces deux modalités. Le teste de la ponctuation n'a pas réussi non plus à résoudre le problème concernant l'appartenance des exemples identifiés à un type de discours ou à un autre.

2. Repères terminologiques

On a choisi le terme général *forme de citation* pour désigner toute modalité de transférer le discours ou le message d'autrui dans le discours propre (de l'auteur de l'article) par l'intermédiaire de la modalité directe, par la modalité indirecte, ou par une reformulation du message de la source, à condition que la source soit indiquée explicitement. On a procédé ainsi, en réunissant toutes ces formes parce que: a) la citation, en tant que transfère d'un message dans un autre est commune aux deux types de discours (direct et indirect); b) dans les textes journalistiques, la source est indiquée explicitement, soit qu'il s'agisse du discours direct ou du discours indirect; c) de plus, étant donné les exemples atypiques, on ne pouvait pas anticiper leur appartenance à une modalité discursive ou à l'autre.

Toutes ces raisons nous ont conduit à choisir, pour nos exemples, le terme neutre *forme de citation*. Chaque exemple extrait des journaux quotidiens de la presse roumaine centrale constitue une forme de citation composée obligatoirement d'une séquence cadre et d'une séquence insérée. *La séquence cadre* est la séquence linguistique qui représente le contexte immédiat du discours inséré; elle appartient à l'auteur de l'article. Cette séquence peut précéder ou succéder le discours inséré et contient, obligatoirement, un verbe déclaratif (proprement dit ou secondaire). *La séquence insérée* est représentée par le discours cité directement ou indirectement; elle appartient à la source et non pas à l'auteur de l'article. On a nommé *émetteur* l'auteur de l'article de presse (l'instance communicative à laquelle appartient la séquence cadre), et qui ne se confond pas avec l'*archilocuteur*, instance qui représente *la voix du journal* (Mouillaud & Tetu 2003: 140). Il est celui qui émet le message de l'article, message par lequel on apprend que *la source X a affirmé quelque chose*. On a nommé *source* l'instance qui émet le deuxième message (le premier de point de vue chronologique) présent dans la séquence cadre (ce que X a affirmé), qu'est à dire celui dont les opinions ont été citées par l'émetteur, d'une manière directe ou indirecte.

3. Entre le discours direct et le discours indirect

Avant de continuer la démarche descriptive et argumentative, on va reproduire deux exemples dans lesquels la séquence insérée (appartenant théoriquement à une source citée) est soulignée et la séquence cadre (appartenant à l'émetteur) est représentée par le fragment linguistique non marqué. Dans le deuxième exemple, on a reproduit aussi entre parenthèses le contexte qui précède le fragment qui nous intéresse, pour rendre le contenu du message plus clair.

Exemple 1. *Les chefs des districts administratifs recevront 40 milliards lei du Ministère des Transports pour réaliser les mappes de risque naturel de chaque localité*, a annoncé le ministre délégué pour les Travaux Publics et l'Aménagement du Territoire, Laszlo Borbely. (G, 19 août, 2005: 5)

Exemple 2. [Deux plages de la proximité d'Athènes ont été polluées avec du pétrole, mais les autorités n'ont pas réussi à en établir la source, en soupçonnant que celui-ci pourrait provenir de Liban]. *La tache de pétrole*,

mesurant au moins 50 m en largeur, est apparue samedi à l'ouest d'Athènes, a précisé le ministre grec de la marine commerciale. (CB, 7 août: 5)

Pour démontrer que dans des exemples comme ceux d'en haut on rencontre une modalité de citation atypique, qui présente des similitudes aussi bien que des différences par rapport au discours direct et indirect, on va inventorier les propriétés syntactiques, sémantiques, pragmatiques et de ponctuation des deux types de discours, en les rapportant à nos exemples. La validité d'une telle façon d'aborder un type de discours, en le comparant avec un autre, dont les caractéristiques sont bien définies a été prouvée par Oswald Ducrot et Jean Marie Schaeffer (1996: 463) pour la description des propriétés du discours indirect libre.

3.1. Les propriétés du discours direct

La séquence insérée est indépendante du point de vue syntactique par rapport au verbe déclaratif. Entre la proposition incidente (qui appartient ou fréquemment se confond avec la séquence cadre) et la proposition principale, qui constitue la séquence insérée il n'existe ni un rapport de coordination, ni de subordination syntactique. De ce point de vue, la forme de citation identifiée par nous se comporte identiquement au discours direct. De plus, aussi bien que le discours direct, notre forme de citation n'implique la présence d'aucun connecteur, d'aucune conjonction de subordination.

La position de la séquence cadre est mobile par rapport à la séquence insérée. Des trois descriptions formelles possibles, notre forme de citation actualise seulement la suivante (dont les termes sont fixes): [*séquence insérée*] + [,] + [(*verbe déclaratif*) *séquence cadre*], comme dans l'exemple suivant:

Exemple 3. La confiance réciproque dans les relations sino-russes va s'augmenter exponentiellement à la suite de ces exercices [militaires] communs, soutiennent les officiaux de Kremlin et de Beijing. (G., 19 août, 2005: 9)

Si on renverse l'ordre: séquence insérée / séquence cadre, on obtient un fragment de discours indirect, mais alors cette chose entraîne une modification importante, c'est à dire la présence d'un élément de subordination, la conjonction *que*:

Les officiaux de Kremlin et de Beijing soutiennent *que* la confiance réciproque dans les relations sino-russes va s'augmenter exponentiellement à la suite de ces exercices [militaires] communs.

Dans le discours direct, les verbes ou les expressions déclaratifs peuvent parfois manquer (lorsqu'il s'agit des certaines formes de dialogue), pouvant être récupérés du contexte. La forme de citation étudiée ici ne peut pas se dispenser de la présence du verbe déclaratif. En l'absence de celui-ci et, implicitement, de la séquence cadre, le message semblerait appartenir à l'émetteur (l'auteur de l'article) et non pas à la source.

La classe des énoncés qui constituent la séquence insérée est typologiquement diverse, incluant des énoncés assertifs, exclamatifs et impératifs. La forme de citation qui apparaît dans nos exemples se réalise seulement par que des énoncés assertifs.

Dans les séquences insérées du discours direct on rencontre souvent des marques discursives orientées vers un allocutaire, telles: *enfin, vous savez, si vous voulez*, etc. Cette propriété ne se retrouve pas dans la forme de citation investiguée dans notre étude.

La séquence cadre du discours direct n'admet pas tout verbe déclaratif. La sélection est opérée en fonction la situation de communication. Notre forme de citation présente aussi des restrictions concernant le verbe déclaratif, mais il ne s'agit pas de mêmes verbes. D'un côté, la sélection de certains verbes déclaratifs se produit sous la pression du style: les exemples appartiennent au langage journalistique, étant des textes de la catégorie informative, qui exigent au moins une prétendue objectivité. De toute façon, l'objectivité absolue est bien discutable, étant contestée par beaucoup d'auteurs. Selon Fiske (2001: 113), on est ce qu'on dit être et le monde est ce qu'on prétend être. Alors, comme on a déjà observé (Charaudeau 1997; Preda 2006: 21), la presse mime plutôt l'objectivité qu'elle ne la pratique. De l'autre côté, la sélection de certains verbes déclaratifs est imposée par l'absence des structures conversationnelles dans les textes qu'on étudie (on ne s'occupe pas des articles interviews). Alors, l'incidence des verbes qui expriment des stratégies conversationnelles est pratiquement nulle dans notre forme de citation.

La séquence insérée est marquée par des signes de ponctuation spécifiques (guillemets, crochets ou ligne de dialogue). La forme de citation qu'on étudie ne présente jamais ni de guillemets, ni de lignes de dialogue,

fait qui la distancie du discours direct. Elle réclame seulement la virgule, qui sépare la séquence insérée de la séquence cadre, et ce trait est commun aussi au discours direct. Pourtant, si dans nos exemples on ajoute à la séquence insérée des guillemets, on va obtenir des fragments de discours direct cité:

Exemple 4. La génération baby-boom promet de changer encore plus profondément la définition du vieillissement, a dit Louis Kincannon. “Jusqu’à la retraite, ils seront les vieux les plus instruits de toute l’histoire de l’Amérique”, a continué celui-ci. (EZ, 11 mars, 2006: 10)

Dans la première phrase on rencontre la forme de citation qui fait l’objet de nos préoccupations. Dans la deuxième, il s’agit de la reproduction d’un fragment du discours direct. Théoriquement, si on élimine les guillemets de la première phrase, on obtient une structure identique à celle de la première phrase. Pourtant, à cause du verbe déclaratif *continuer*, qui ne peut pas être sélectionné par la forme de citation qu’on étudie, la transformation ne peut pas être menée à bonne fin. Au contraire, si on entreprend l’opération inverse, en appliquant les guillemets à la séquence insérée de la première phrase, on obtient, indubitablement, un échantillon de discours direct. Autrement dit, la transformation du discours direct cité dans la forme de citation dont on parle peut rencontrer des difficultés, tandis que l’opération inverse est plus simple. Excepté les signes de ponctuation, cette transformation n’entraîne aucune modification (comme il arrive lorsqu’on transforme le discours direct en discours indirect ou vice versa). On remarque la même chose dans les exemples suivants:

Exemple 5. La génération actuelle de personnes à la retraite, qui représente 12% de la population des États-Unis [...] ne ressemble plus aux générations précédentes, montre un rapport du Bureau pour le Recensement de l’Institut National pour le Vieillissement. (EZ, 11 mars, 2006: 10)

Exemple 6. “Les Américains vieux d’aujourd’hui vivent plus, ont moins de problèmes de santé, sont des gens qui ont étudié plus, et le nombre de ceux qui vivent dans la pauvreté est plus petit qu’auparavant” montre le rapport. (EZ, 11 mars, 2006: 10)

Si on éloigne les guillemets de l’exemple 6, le fragment devient similaire à l’exemple 5, parce que, pratiquement, les deux ont la même structure, qu’on a décrite en haut: [séquence insérée] + [,] + [(verbe déclaratif) séquence cadre]. Le seul élément qui nous permet de considérer que seul

l'exemple 6 représente un échantillon du discours direct est la ponctuation, plus précisément les guillemets. Encore, la présence de la proposition incidente (la séquence cadre) ne représente pas un élément différenciateur entre les deux exemples, sinon un élément qui les approche.

3.2. Les propriétés du discours indirect

La séquence insérée est dépendante du point de vue syntactique par rapport au verbe déclaratif de la séquence cadre; la dépendance est marquée par des connecteurs syntactiques tels: *că, să, dacă* (*que, de, si*). Or, dans notre forme de citation, la séquence insérée est indépendante de point de vue syntactique par rapport à la séquence cadre et au verbe déclaratif et ne comporte aucun connecteur, aucune conjonction de subordination. Pourtant, si on supprime la séquence cadre, contenant le verbe déclaratif, l'opération entraînera une modification majeure. Ce qui représentait la séquence insérée appartenant à la source semblerait maintenant appartenir à l'émetteur, produite par lui-même, un fragment de son discours direct. Alors, éliminer le verbe de déclaration serait supprimer la séquence cadre et affecter l'instance productrice de l'ancienne séquence insérée (devenue discours indépendant).

Le verbe déclaratif se trouve toujours avant la séquence insérée. A ce point, la forme de citation repérée dans nos exemples diffère aussi par rapport discours indirect.

La séquence insérée du discours indirect présente des restrictions dans la sélection du verbe déclaratif de la séquence cadre; tous les verbes déclaratifs qui apparaissent dans la séquence cadre de la forme de citation qu'on étudie sont admis également dans la séquence cadre du discours indirect.

La séquence insérée du discours indirect n'est pas marquée par des signes de ponctuation spécifiques (guillemets ou lignes de dialogue). La séquence insérée de la forme de citation discutée ici n'en est pas marquée non plus.

4. Conclusions

Le discours journalistique actuel développe une forme de citation atypique, dont la structure peut être décrite par la formule suivante:

[séquence insérée] + [,] + [(verbe déclaratif) séquence cadre].

Le rapport entre les traits syntaxiques de la forme de citation investiguée et l'inventaire des traits syntactiques du discours direct montre qu'entre les deux il y a à la fois des similitudes et des différences: les deux se comportent identiquement en ce qui concerne la relation entre la séquence insérée et la séquence cadre (qui sont indépendantes dans les deux cas). C'est l'argument le plus fort en faveur du rapprochement des deux types de discours.

Quant à la position de la séquence cadre la ressemblance ne fonctionne plus; à la différence du discours direct, dans notre forme de citation celle-ci occupe uniquement la position finale.

Toujours de point de vue syntactique, la forme de citation rencontrée dans nos exemples diffère nettement du discours indirect par la position de la séquence cadre (qui occupe toujours la première place dans le discours indirect), par le manque du rapport de subordination et, implicitement du connecteur spécifique.

Ni de point de vue sémantique ou pragmatique, la forme de citation ne présente pas une ressemblance parfaite au discours direct ou indirect.

Concernant la ponctuation, la seule similitude entre le discours direct et notre forme de citation est l'isolation par virgule de la séquence cadre (qui fonctionne comme une proposition incidente, indépendante).

L'absence des signes spécifiques qui marquent la séquence insérée constitue un argument solide et visible qui rapproche notre forme de citation au discours indirect.

La forme de citation étudiée se distancie donc également par rapport aux formes consacrées de citation du discours direct et indirect, en conservant des traces spécifiques.

Considérer cette forme de citation plus proche d'une certaine forme de discours que de l'autre nous oblige aussi à la reconsidérer l'émetteur réel de la séquence insérée.

Par conséquent, notre recherche conduit aussi à la conclusion qu'on ne peut pas affirmer catégoriquement que la séquence insérée appartient entièrement à la source ou à l'émetteur.

Cette observation impose une distinction (obligatoire dans nos recherches à partir de ce moment), entre la forme de citation qui représente, en fait, le discours de l'auteur de l'article (qui cite seulement le message, le contenu de ce que la source dit) et les formes de citation en discours direct ou indirect.

Entre les deux derniers il y a des différences sur lesquelles on ne va plus insister. Mais entre la première forme de citation et ces deux derniers il y a encore une différence: l'auteur de l'article peut transmettre le message de la source par l'intermédiaire de ses propres mots ou seulement en "collaborant" avec celle-ci, tandis que la reproduction en discours direct n'admet aucune immixtion dans la séquence citée; quant au discours indirect, les modifications sont limitées, prescrites par les grammaires.

D'un cas à l'autre, il est possible que la source ait émis la séquence insérée telle quelle et que l'émetteur ait omis seulement les signes de ponctuation spécifiques à la citation directe ou, par contre, que la séquence insérée eut été transmise par l'émetteur, en supportant certaines modifications de la part de ce dernier.

Les exemples discutés ici ont été extraits de textes de presse, basés sur des enregistrements ou des interviews; en conséquence, on ne peut pas avoir un contrôle absolu sur la variante initiale de la séquence attribuée à la source. Alors, on ne peut qu'observer la distance de la forme de citation analysée ici par rapport au discours direct et indirect (on ne sait pas si l'auteur a reproduit en tant que tels les mots de la source, s'il y a ajouté ses propres mots, s'il en a supprimé, s'il les a transposés en discours indirect, en opérant les modifications permises etc.).

On peut signaler également la probabilité majeure que cette forme de citation soit, en fait, une production discursive de l'auteur de l'article, qui a maintenu le message et une bonne partie des mots de la source.

Cette ambiguïté maintenue en ce qui concerne d'un côté l'émetteur réel de la séquence insérée et, de l'autre côté, l'appartenance de la forme de citation étudiée ici à un type de discours ou à un autre peut indiquer: a) le refus de l'auteur de l'article d'assumer ses propres mots (en les attribuant à la source); b) la distance qu'il prend par rapport à ce que la source affirme; c) une façon d'imprimer certaines nuances au message transmis, en manipulant le lecteur.

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Carlos Prieto y Andrea Magnasco

Cuando el cine va a la tapa: Un recorrido por las revistas del siglo XX

Este trabajo se propone caracterizar los distintos procedimientos discursivos a través de los cuales el cine y lo cinematográfico se hacen presentes en las tapas de las revistas argentinas del siglo XX, establecer períodos en función de los procedimientos predominantes en cada etapa y analizar el lugar que ocupan esos discursos dentro del universo cinematográfico.

¿Por qué, entre la infinidad de temas llevados a las tapas de revistas, elegir el cine para observar los procedimientos discursivos? Por un lado porque su presencia en las tapas recorre prácticamente todo el siglo: en el ejemplar de *Caras y Caretas* del 18 de Enero de 1902 ya se puede encontrar en la ilustración de tapa un local de kinetoscopios. Por otro lado, desde mediados de la década de 1910, la sostenida popularidad del cine hizo de él un tema de tapa recurrente. Esta permanencia – corroborada en el corpus utilizado – permite considerar al cine y a lo cinematográfico como una invariante referencial a partir de la cual estudiar los cambios en la construcción de los enunciados-tapa durante el período. Además, el cine es un tema de particular interés dado que el atractivo que ejerce sobre el público excede la sala cinematográfica e impacta sobre el imaginario social. En este sentido, por ejemplo, Traversa ha analizado cómo ciertos avisos de la prensa gráfica del período de entreguerras recurren a las estrellas de cine y a la escena misma de expectación cinematográfica como instrumento persuasivo (1997: 95–102).

1. ¿Cuándo el cine está en la tapa?

El corpus analizado¹ está compuesto por tapas de revistas argentinas de gran circulación de distintos géneros (femenino, interés general, deportes,

humor, infantil, etc.), con una base de dos ejemplares por año de cada una escogidos al azar. Hemos excluido del análisis las revistas especializadas en cine o espectáculos debido a su especificidad genérica: la presencia del cine en esas tapas es más o menos obligatoria. Y lo que nos proponemos en este trabajo, en cambio, es observar cómo es presentado el cine en aquellas tapas en las que, a priori, puede o no estar presente (y de hecho, no lo está siempre).

Del análisis inicial del corpus surgió la necesidad de delimitar en qué casos se puede considerar que el cine está presente en la tapa. Sería incompleto considerar únicamente aquellos enunciados-tapa en los que se lee la palabra “cine”, o se ve la ilustración o fotografía de algún elemento fuertemente identificado con lo cinematográfico (una cámara, sala o proyector, etc.). De aplicarse este criterio debería considerarse que, por ejemplo, no hay presencia del cine en la tapa de *Gente* del 18 de Mayo de 1967, en la que se lee “En Hollywood con Vittorio de Sica” y se reproduce una fotografía de De Sica.

La solución a esta dificultad es incluir en el análisis, además de los casos de presentación del cine en “grado cero”, aquellos en los que se lo lleva a la tapa mediante alguna operación retórica. Metz propuso para el estudio de las operaciones retóricas en el cine un modelo que entendemos es aplicable, al menos con fines heurísticos, para analizar dichas operaciones en las tapas de revistas, ya que los enunciados de las mismas están contruidos a veces sólo con textos, otras sólo con imágenes, y otras con texto más imagen. Los cuatro figuras básicas propuestas por Metz (1979: 162–163) se caracterizan por los encadenamientos a) *Comparabilidad referencial + Contigüidad discursiva*; b) *Comparabilidad referencial + Comparabilidad discursiva*; c) *Contigüidad referencial + Comparabilidad discursiva*; d) *Contigüidad referencial + Contigüidad discursiva*. De acuerdo a este modelo, en el caso mencionado, el cine se presenta en tapa mediante un encadenamiento de contigüidad referencial – De Sica es parte del cine – y contigüidad discursiva – no se menciona al cine, pero sí “Hollywood” y “De Sica”, y se ve la foto del director.

Esta opción metodología nos lleva a incluir en nuestro análisis los enunciados-tapa que remiten a films específicos, a sus protagonistas, a las reacciones de los espectadores ante una película, etc., así como aquellos en los que el cine se hace presente en la tapa a través de citas de afiches, de títulos de films, de elementos icónicos fuertemente identificados con un

género (tapa que imita un cartel de “Wanted”), reproducción de fotografías, etc.

En algunos de estos enunciados-tapa el cine o la persona, actividad o institución ligada a lo cinematográfico son *aquello de lo que se habla*; en otros, el cine aparece en el plano del discurso como parte de una operación retórica para *hablar de otra cosa*, como de un hecho político o social, de personajes no ligados a la actividad cinematográfica, etc.

Consideramos que en ambos casos existe una presencia del cine en tapa. En uno, porque el enunciado remite a personas y hechos ligados con la realización y expectación de films. En el otro, porque se apela a la enciclopedia cinematográfica culturalmente compartida por una parte de la comunidad -como mínimo la de los potenciales lectores/compradores de la revista- indispensable para entender el enunciado.

2. *¿Cómo el cine está en las tapas?*

Desde 1917, año a partir del cuál el cine es tema de tapa frecuente, se pueden distinguir tres periodos en función del modo predominante en que es llevado a la tapa.

2.1. 1917–1960: Las Estrellas

Hasta pasada la primera mitad del siglo, las tapas donde el cine está presente se caracterizan por la exhibición de fotos o ilustraciones de actrices. Las imágenes ocupan la mayor parte de la tapa, a veces acompañadas por textos breves, habitualmente impresos en tipografías muy pequeñas. Esos textos – cuando existen, en muchos casos están ausentes – suelen indicar el nombre de la estrella y el del estudio con el que tiene contrato. En algunos casos hay, además, alguna leyenda que permite identificar a dicha tapa como perteneciente a una serie por ejemplo “Las estrellas del cine”. En otros, la tapa está desprovista de textos salvo por el nombre de la revista, los datos del ejemplar (número, año, etc.) y, en algunos casos, la firma del ilustrador (figura 1).

Este tipo de tapa no es exclusivo de los casos en los que se hace presente el cine: es largamente el predominante en el período. Grow (2004) la ha definido como *tapa póster*, y la describe como “una en la que no hay títulos o temas anunciados y la imagen generalmente no está cubierta por el logo



Figura 1.

(de la revista) ... Incluye aquellos casos donde hay pequeños títulos”. Sin embargo, esa generalidad no impide observar que existe una fuerte relación entre el nacimiento y expansión de la tapa póster y el cine, ligada al *star system*. Como señala Taylor (2006: 19–21):

el embrionario star system de Hollywood catalizó la tapa de revista moderna y el fenómeno de la celebridad contemporánea ... como el medio tapa de revista, la celebridad es un fenómeno del siglo XX ... la transformación de la mera fama ... en la instantaneidad e inmediatez de la celebridad dependió del nacimiento de los medios de comunicación de masas dentro del periodo 1890- 1910.

Por otra parte Benjamín ha señalado que en el periodo de expansión del cine “a la atrofia del aura” del cuerpo del actor y de su personaje “el cine responde con una construcción artificial de la *personality* fuera de los estudios; el culto a las ‘estrellas’” (1982: 39). En síntesis: las estrellas de cine fueron las primeras personalidades que ocuparon las tapas póster; luego, a lo largo del siglo, la noción de celebridad se expandió a otras áreas como el deporte, la política, etc. y sus protagonistas encontraron también su lugar en las tapas.

Otra característica de la tapa póster de este período apuntada por Grow es que en la mayoría de los casos “ni siquiera se relacionan con un artículo dentro de la revista”. Cingolani (2005) señala que recién después de mediados de siglo la tapa establece una promesa sobre lo que el lector encontrará en el interior de la revista. Para Cingolani, *exhibición, lectura* y una tercera instancia a la que llama *almacenamiento* (aquella que se corresponde con la interrupción de su uso y el estacionamiento del ejemplar), “operan como condiciones de producción que marcan las diferentes propiedades de construcción de la tapa”. Si se analiza la tapa póster con estrellas de cine en relación con la instancia de almacenamiento y se conjuga, con el hecho de que Grow (2004) al describir estas tapas afirma que “se trata de arte, muchas de estas tapas consisten en espléndidas ilustraciones o fotografías cautivantes”, puede pensarse que esas tapas tendían a facilitar la visualización de cada ejemplar como parte de una colección. Este aspecto en algunos casos se encuentra reforzado por la continuidad de una leyenda de presentación a lo largo de una serie extensa de números como ocurre en el caso de las tapas de *Mundo Argentino* y la leyenda al pie “Las estrellas del cine”, que fue habitual durante no menos de 15 años.

2.2. 1960 – Primera mitad de la década de 1980: El universo cinematográfico

Al final de la década del 50 se produce un cambio de tendencia en el modo predominante de presentación del cine en las tapas que se consolida en las décadas siguientes. Los enunciados que ponen al cine en tapa se refieren a filmaciones, entrevistas a figuras, estrenos, situaciones personales ocurridas a celebridades del medio, hechos de censura, éxitos o fracasos de taquilla, etc. En algunos casos hasta es posible encontrar en la misma tapa más de un enunciado ligado a lo cinematográfico. Este cambio notorio es posible porque paralelamente se producen en un nivel general importantes transformaciones en el diseño: la tapa póster es desplazada por otro tipo de portada en la que los títulos y subtítulos cobran creciente importancia. En palabras de Grow (2004) “las imágenes en las tapas de muchas revistas comienzan a ceder un espacio significativo a los títulos”. La importancia creciente de los títulos se manifiesta no sólo por su cantidad, sino también por la variedad de tipografías y colores y el aumento de su tamaño. Las tapas de este período dan cuenta de una búsqueda de integración entre la

imagen (por lo general única) y los títulos. Respecto de estos últimos, aún es posible identificar el título principal porque es aquel que forma con la imagen un enunciado mixto. En este tipo de tapa, cuando el cine está presente, la mayor parte de las veces comparte el espacio con otros temas; en algunos casos es presentado en el enunciado principal y en otros, en uno de los enunciados secundarios.

En este período, los enunciados cuyo tema es el cine tienen un carácter doblemente específico; por un lado se refieren a films, hechos y/o personas de manera puntual, si el cine aparece en la tapa a través de uno de sus protagonistas lo hace bajo la forma del anuncio de una entrevista o un suceso ocurrido a esa persona o, si los enunciados aluden al cine como actividad, mencionan la filmación o estreno de una película, un hecho de taquilla o de censura específico, etc. Pero además cada uno de estos títulos está directamente conectado a una nota que se despliega dentro del mismo ejemplar. Estas dos maneras en que los enunciados apuntalan su especificidad están directamente relacionadas. Como señala Cingolani (2005), después de la mitad del siglo XX “en la instancia *exhibición* la tapa establece una promesa sobre el interior ... en la instancia *lectura* esa promesa se torna realizable”. Y es esta misma condición la que hace que esos títulos se refieran a hechos actividades y personas modos más puntuales: si se anticipa que el lector da por sentado que la relación entre el título y el interior de la revista es similar a la que la punta del iceberg tiene con el iceberg, el título está obligado a dar cuenta de lo que el lector encontrará si accede al interior del ejemplar. En este sentido, Oscar Traversa, al analizar la tapa como dispositivo señala que ella debe dar cuenta de otro espacio, el del interior de la revista con el cual guarda alguna relación de consistencia. Por ejemplo si en la tapa de la revista *Gente* del 20 de abril de 1967 el título da cuenta de que los actores Luis Sandrini y Malvina Pastorino están rodando una película con el futbolista Silvia Marzolini, y la imagen de tapa los muestra a los tres (figura 2), dicho enunciado es interpretado como la promesa de una nota que tratará sobre el rodaje de dicha película.

2.3. Segunda mitad de la década de 1980–2000: El cine para decir el mundo

Si bien en la parte final del siglo el modo de presentación que caracterizamos para el periodo de *El universo cinematográfico* mantiene su vigencia,



Figura 2.

paralelamente se vuelve relevante otro modo. Se trata de un procedimiento que tiene unos pocos antecedentes en tapas de períodos anteriores, y que recién comienza a ser empleado con frecuencia en la década del 80 en las revistas humorísticas, y en la siguiente se extiende a publicaciones de interés general. Se caracteriza por la puesta en tapa de elementos de lo cinematográfico (títulos de películas, fotogramas, elementos icónicos ligados a un género, etc.) como parte de enunciados referidos a otros temas. En los términos de Metz discutidos anteriormente, en estos casos el cine o lo cinematográfico está presente en el discurso pero no en el referente; lo cinematográfico forma parte de una operación retórica caracterizada por la comparabilidad referencial, mientras que en el nivel del discurso puede haber contigüidad o comparabilidad.² Un ejemplo puede observarse en la tapa de *Noticias* del 27 de septiembre de 1992 (figura 3). El título principal, en tipografía de gran tamaño, es “Buenos Muchachos”; y sobre él una volanta reza “Lescano, Cavalieri: El sindicalismo hedonista”; la bajada enumera algunos gastos de dinero de ambos dirigentes sindicales, su afición al juego y ciertas denuncias judiciales de las que son objeto. Este enunciado se completa con una imagen de fondo que abarca prácticamente toda la superficie de la tapa: una ilustración de los dos dirigentes sindicales alrededor de una mesa de juego, de tapete verde, en la que se ven, entre otros objetos, fichas, naipes y una botella de alcohol. Cavalieri – su representación – está vestido con una camisa blanca con brazaletes negros, chaleco a rayas, y moño; Lescano, también de camisa blanca, tiene tiradores, sombrero de ala y corbata. En conjunto, sus atuendos no se corresponden

con hábitos vestimentarios contemporáneos a la publicación de la revista. Este aparente desajuste está justificado en el interior del ejemplar con el siguiente texto: “La tapa de este número de NOTICIAS fue concebida ... como si se tratara del afiche publicitario de un filme ambientado en el Chicago de los años de la ley seca”.



Figura 3.

En este caso el procedimiento se verifica a nivel del enunciado mixto (texto+imagen) aunque también se encontraron en el corpus casos donde es posible verificarlo en el nivel del texto solamente, como en la tapa de la revista *Veintiuno* del 16 de julio de 1998: “Ascenso, cuelgue y caída del Windows 98. Tócala de nuevo, Bill”.

Queda claro que en ambos casos el título de tapa funciona como un anticipo del contenido de una nota interior. Su característica diferencial reside en el tipo de construcción que realizan de la figura que Sophie Fisher y Eliseo Verón (1986), siguiendo la teoría de las modalidades de Culioli, denominan co-enunciador (imagen del destinatario construida por el enunciado). Al igual que en los enunciados del segundo período,

los de este construyen un co-enunciador poseedor de algún tipo de saber acerca del cine (background). Pero además, le atribuyen al co-enunciador un cierto saber acerca de otro tema, aquel al que se refiere la nota en el interior de la revista, indispensable en estos casos para comprender la operación retórica.

Estos enunciados aportan a la tapa más de un plus. Por un lado llaman la atención sobre el título, lo espectacularizan. Grow (2004) afirma que desde mediados de los 70 se producen progresivamente modificaciones en el diseño de las tapas por las cuales “el periodismo (lo informativo) va cediendo lugar a la persuasión”; el empleo de operaciones retóricas como las que caracterizamos puede pensarse así como una estrategia persuasiva. Por otro lado este tipo de enunciados reúnen una de las características de lo que Fisher y Veron (1986) designan como *estrategia de la complicidad*, “el enunciador y el destinatario se parecen: comparten un estilo de vida”. Puede decirse que enunciador y destinatario comparten no sólo una competencia cinematográfica sino además una actitud burlona, irónica, distanciada respecto del referente.

Freud (1979), observa que en “el chiste hallamos un innegable placer al trasladarnos por el uso de una misma palabra o de otra análoga de un círculo de representación a otro muy lejano”. Entendemos que este tipo de placer que Freud adjudica al chiste se produce también cuando el actor social lector reconoce la operación retórica propuesta por el enunciado-tapa.

Finalmente, el empleo de estas operaciones retóricas no es un únicamente un recurso estético; aquello que se dice mediante una operación de comparabilidad referencial no podría ser dicho sin recurrir a ella. Como ha señalado Eco (1991: 398): “el proceso retórico se convierte en una forma autorizada de conocimiento o, por lo menos, en un modo de poner en crisis el conocimiento adquirido”.

3. *Las tapas y su lugar en la actividad cinematográfica*

Analizaremos ahora qué lugar ocupan los enunciados tapa correspondientes a cada uno de los períodos señalados dentro de la actividad cinematográfica. Partiremos del concepto formulado por Traversa (1984: 41-43) de *estado no filmico del film*: este termino denomina “globalmente el universo heterogéneo de producciones significantes que se intercambian socialmente a propósito de los filmes”. Este conjunto de discursos (la prensa, la

radio, la TV, el afiche callejero) constituyen una “segunda existencia del film”, se trata de “discursos de contacto” entre la producción y el consumo.

La gran mayoría de los enunciados de nuestro corpus correspondientes al segundo período integran ese conjunto de discursos llamado “estado no filmico del film”. En efecto hacen referencia a filmaciones, estrenos, éxitos, escándalos, protagonistas, ligados a películas en cartel al momento de la publicación de la revista.

Otros enunciados pertenecientes al mismo período hacen referencia a hechos “privados” ocurridos a personas ligadas a la actividad (ej. “Los asesinos de Sharon Tate”, *Gente* 11 de diciembre de 1969). Estos enunciados tienen un doble anclaje: se refieren cuestiones que serían igualmente de interés periodístico si estuvieran ligadas a celebridades no cinematográficas, o hechos en sí mismo “periodísticos” cuando les ocurren a personas no famosas; pero la inclusión en ellos del nombre de una celebridad cinematográfica, los relaciona también con el cine.

Hay un tercer tipo de enunciados que no hacen referencia puntualmente a ninguna película pero sí a cuestiones ligadas a la actividad cinematográfica en general (ej. “Argentina. Agoniza el cine”, *Gente*, 13 de noviembre de 1969). En este sentido, guardan un parentesco con los enunciados predominantes del primer período, en los que no se hacía mención de ningún film en particular. Para estos casos – tanto el tercer tipo de enunciados del período de *El Universo cinematográfico* como los característicos del período *Las Estrellas* – entendemos que podría emplearse la noción de *estado no cinematográfico del cine*: se trata también de discursos de contacto entre las instancias de producción y consumo, y pertenecen al conjunto de producciones significantes que se intercambian socialmente a propósito del cine en general y no a propósito de films particulares.

Por último, en el período *El cine para decir el mundo*, encontramos que permanecen los tres tipos de enunciados enumerados para el período anterior. Pero además, se vuelven relevantes los casos en los que el cine es parte del enunciado pero no del referente. La especificidad de estos enunciados está dada porque en este modo de presentación del cine, al empleársele para decir algo acerca de otra cosa, se desatiende su carácter de industria (y en parte, su carácter de relato). Siguiendo el modelo propuesto por Verón (1988: 124–133), en todos los otros tipos de enunciados analizados, el cine es el *objeto* de los discursos. En cambio, en los casos en que el cine sólo es parte del enunciado, está entre las *condiciones de producción* del discurso

que lo pone en tapa. En este sentido, podría pensarse que estos discursos no funcionan como contacto entre las instancias de producción y consumo (aunque necesariamente la cita de un título o una escena convoca al film mismo).

Notas

1. Este trabajo forma parte del proyecto de investigación “Modalidades de figuración de las tapas de semanarios argentinos del siglo xx”, y el corpus es común a todos los trabajos que integran el proyecto.
2. En el nivel del discurso, en los términos de la retórica clásica, la contigüidad podría homologarse con la comparación, y la comparabilidad con la metáfora en el segundo.

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Eric Prince

Narratives of crime without punishment: How to value rules

[I]t seems to me that while in esthetic enjoyment we attend to the totality of Feeling – and especially to the total resultant Quality of Feeling presented in the work of art we are contemplating – yet it is a sort of intellectual sympathy, a sense that here is a Feeling that one can comprehend, a reasonable Feeling.¹

– *Charles Sanders Peirce*

1. Introduction: The worried community

To many people it seems that, in today's world, rules have lost their strength. Among so much diversity and so many competing aims, it is unlikely that rules can bind a community together. Some call for their strict reaffirmation and forceful application. They might wish for the rise of applied ethics. Others talk about the collapse of traditional ethics and aesthetics in a postmodern world. Both views co-exist and depend on one another. It appears that we live in a worried community.

This notion of a “worried community” surfaces often in interpretations of what we may call “narratives of crime without punishment”. The narratives of films like Woody Allen's *Crimes and Misdemeanors* (1989) and *Match Point* (2005), Clint Eastwood's *Mystic River* (2003), and (to a certain extent) Alejandro González Iñárritu's *21 Grams* (2003), adopt the principle that the traditional moral laws no longer apply. With *Crimes and Misdemeanors* and *Match Point* as the forerunners, these films depict men who commit a serious crime and then await a sentence that never arrives. These characters slowly realize that they can return to their previous lives without suffering feelings of guilt for their deeds. Moreover, neither do they have to fear punishment based either on some transcendental principle (Kant) or some Great Other (Lacan).

Such narratives offer a revision of Dostoyevsky's *Crime and Punishment*. Maybe it's just that they are postmodern, relativist narratives. As such, these films appear to differ completely from their Classical Hollywood predecessors. In the classical system, the hero appears infallible. He works toward upholding the law in harmony both with the community and with his own feelings. One might think of Humphrey Bogart in many of his roles. By comparison, the contemporary situation is incommensurably different. Yet perhaps our view of the differences between classical cinema and contemporary cinema is founded on a basic – and reductive – dualist division between feelings and rules and conventional rules and natural laws. If we look again at what is at stake in classical films from a non-dualist perspective, a different picture of narratives of crime without punishment emerges.

The pragmatist philosophy of American semiotician Charles Sanders Peirce offers just such an alternative approach. In his work on what he called the “normative sciences”, Peirce suggests that logic should be understood as based on ethics and that in turn ethics should be based on aesthetics. Since thinking is a kind of action, the question “how should we think?” (the question of logic) is embodied within the larger question “how should we behave or live?” (the traditional question of ethics). In addition, he holds that, “We cannot know how we are deliberately prepared to aim to behave until we know what we deliberately admire” (MS L75, version D, 9). To understand aesthetics as the study of what we deliberately admire is a matter of taking it seriously. This yields to a conception of aesthetics that is not sensualist and subjective but Realist, not opposed to rationality and rules but part of them (Indeed such a conception solves problems related to a whole stream of dualism that we find in varying degrees and in numerous philosophical guises in Deleuze's vitalism, in Ricoeur's nominalism and in cognitivist formalism).

I propose to look at a sequence of the *The Maltese Falcon* in order to examine some characteristically dualist interpretations. I will then briefly explain how aesthetics are related to ethics within a pragmatist perspective. Finally, I will return to *The Maltese Falcon*, and, with this renewed understanding, I will suggest a way to read narratives of crime without punishment.

2. The Maltese Falcon

The Maltese Falcon was John Huston's first film, made in 1941. It was adapted from a 1930 novel by Dashiell Hammett. The film gave rise to a plethora of different interpretations; I will investigate three of them before giving my own. Let me just note for now that the film involves three kinds of judgment or behavior.

The story revolves around the character of Detective Sam Spade. His purpose, one might say, is the application of the rules agreed to by the members of the community. To act toward this goal, he must first uncover the facts of the case, the truth of the matter, but he must also judge how he should apply to it the rules he seeks to uphold. We can note that, as a private investigator, he ensures that justice is served without relying on the methods of regular police officers. Spade is also a Romantic hero. The scene is set when Brigid O'Shaughnessy arrives at the detective agency looking for help. She is later revealed to be a traitor. Spade will eventually find out, but, in the meantime, he falls in love with her. As a result, the detective's feelings become entangled in his judgment and decision making.

Depending on our understanding of the relationship between rules of behavior (ethics), feelings, and thought, the film's moral stance can be interpreted in a number of different ways. In the last sequence before the film's conclusion, Spade tells O'Shaughnessy that despite his love for her, he will have to send her to jail. Here are a few lines from the dialogue:

O'Shaughnessy: You know in your heart that in spite of anything I've done, I love you.

Spade: I don't care who loves who! I won't play the sap!

I won't walk in Thursby's, and I don't know how many others' footsteps!

You killed Miles and you're going over for it.

O'Shaughnessy: How can you do this to me, Sam?

[...]

Spade: Listen.

This won't do any good. You'll never understand me, but I'll try once and then give it up. When a man's partner is killed, he's supposed to do something.

It makes no difference what you thought of him.

He was your partner, and you're supposed to do something about it...

... And it happens we're in the detective business.

Well, when one of your organization gets killed, it's...
... It's bad business to let the killer get away with it...bad all around, bad for every detective everywhere.

O'Shaughnessy: You don't expect me to think that these are sufficient reasons for sending me...

Spade: Wait till I'm through. Then, you can talk.

I've no earthly reason to think I can trust you.

If I do this and get away with it, you'll have something on me...

...That you can use whenever you want to.

[...]

If all I've said doesn't mean anything to you...

... Then forget it and we'll make it just this: I won't, because all of me wants to regardless of consequences...

So why did Spade send O'Shaughnessy to jail? Let us zero in on this one question. For Virginia Wright Wexman (1978: 47), Sam Spade is an arrogant, vindictive neurotic seeking only control and to hide his insecurity. He represses his feelings by appealing to duty. Indeed, Spade does appear, at least superficially, to prioritize his duty over his emotions. This principle of favoring duty over feelings defines the deontologist position in ethics, in which the rules of the community are in opposition to individual satisfaction. In this conception, there is communal truth and there is subjective truth, and the two are distinct and opposed. The upshot of this view is a conception of the film as yet another manifestation of American culture understood as individualism tempered by community. This idea was understood by some to lie at the heart of Classical Hollywood films, which embodied this conflict structurally through the combination of two plots: one revolving around the protagonist and one involving the community. From this perspective, rules of ethics are conceived as a limitation to individual freedom (as opposed to, say, the scaffolding that makes identity construction and sociality possible).

For Keith Cohen (1994: 136), the film is committed to crass materialism. The Maltese Falcon statuette is, as we know, a forgery. Spade, quoting Shakespeare's Prospero, describes it as "the stuff that dreams are made of". For Cohen, the emblem of the statuette underlines the film's message that dreams are only appearances and that what counts in the end is the truth found in facts. This interpretation presents a more classical, Cartesian

dualism between language and dreams on the one hand, and the realm of brute facts on the other hand.

Lesley Brill (1997) offers a more sophisticated interpretation. For him, the film's main point is to propose theater as a metaphor for lying. Huston shows O'Shaughnessy as someone who plays a part. He films her in settings that recall theatrical productions (curtains for instance). For Brill, Huston's conclusion suggests that there is a reality after all, but it is inter-subjective; hence the couple "discuss" whether O'Shaughnessy's transgressions warrant her going to jail. Discuss? It does not seem to me that much discussion takes place in this scene. Yet the notion of discussion is loaded since it invokes Habermas's vision of a community with no transcendental conception of truth and justice. For Habermas (1990), since ethical judgment cannot be rationally fixed by logical principles, we need an ethics of inter-subjective discussion. Brill's vision of the film arises from this perspective.

All these views involve in their ways a dualism, *an opposition between values and rules and also an opposition between rules and natural laws*. Are rules of justice merely conventional limits imposed on individuals? What in fact is a convention? This dualism leads to the additional problem of understanding how human thought can be more than merely an illusory dream that runs parallel to the external world. It is such questions that the philosophical account of the normative sciences sought to resolve.

3. Peirce and the normative sciences

Peirce's approach to aesthetics, ethics and logic as normative sciences is an attempt late in his career to further demonstrate his conception of pragmatism. Peirce overtly rejects Kant's transcendentalism, according to which there are principles of logic that transcend experience and are truly *a priori*. Applied to ethics, the idea is that rules of ethics also need to be founded on principles that are out of our reach. Peirce thought that logic is not distinct from experience but is a way to extract generalities from experience. His conception of experience makes room for what he calls "feelings" or the qualities of experience. That is, among other problems, what his conception of categories and signs addresses. I have sometimes found useful, in the context of film studies, to lay out Peirce's conception of semiotics by

saying that a sign is a medium. Peirce himself often described signs this way (MS 283: 125, 129, 131).

From an abstract point of view, *medium*, as suggested by the Latin etymology, is a middle. A middle necessarily involves three points. The two end points are in relation to one another and it is based on this relation that we can conceive of another relation and place a point in the middle. Without the previous relation, a middle cannot be conceived. In the same way that the middle is a relation founded on a previous relation, mediation can be defined as a *relation of relation*. For example, if I rest on a chair, it involves two things in relation: action and reaction. If I push the chair, the movement is the mediation (a relation of relation) between two positions. Another example is the gift. Let's say that David gives a book to Sue. He does not only leave a book at a place where Sue later picks it up. We need something of the nature of a general sign (something understood and shared among the members of a community) that does the mediation and allows us to make the distinction between something found and something given. David and Sue must indeed share the idea of gift. This is why, properly speaking, my right hand couldn't give something to my left hand. As we see, mediation can never be reduced to something causal or to a mere mechanical action (as in action-reaction). For Peirce, mediation is always on the side of intelligence, habits, and customs. Mediation is how he described signification and also thought. A medium is always something through which something is said or done.

Let us explore this claim with an example. I see somebody exiting a building shouting, sweating, and gesticulating. This is a brute fact. I say to myself, "she is escaping". I understand brute action through the mediation (the medium) of rational human conduct. Note that it is precisely such a mediation that is performed by a narrative structure or schema of action. A narrative structure is a *rule* by which to understand behavior. To understand something narratively is to understand something by way of its finality. This mode of thinking is called teleology. For this reason, Peirce thought that ethics is not in the first place about good or bad – morality – but about the question "how can one give oneself rules of action?"

I look at the agitated woman again and say she is afraid. I am now adding attributes in the medium of human emotion. She is not only escaping, she is also afraid. I give qualitative color to her escape in order to explain her spontaneous behavior. This interpretation assumes that emotion is not a

private event in the life of an individual but a way to give meaning to what would otherwise be purely causal. What spontaneously moves this woman might move anyone in the same way. In that sense we could say that emotion is not what causes behavior but what would explain its spontaneous quality. For Peirce, this is the starting point of aesthetics, which asks, “How do we place a value on an action?” and “What habit of feeling does a habit of behavior usually entail?”

This notion of aesthetics as a habit regulating and explaining behavior brings us to conceive genre as a mediation between habits of feeling and habits of behavior. From this perspective, pragmatic aesthetics is not the study of feelings conceived as some psychological and subjective first principle, in opposition to facts, but rather, pragmatic aesthetics studies habits of action grounded in habits of feeling. Without such a grounding, action is merely mechanical – and narrative is merely a recipe. Aesthetics attempts to answer questions about what in general is valued, admired.² The object of aesthetics is discovering what gives spontaneous action its purpose. We can thus talk about feelings as embodied thoughts. Ethics, as the principles that rule action cannot be only a matter of blindly following a categorical imperative that is by definition unchallenged. Peirce thought that if we cannot disregard conscience, all moral maxims are idle. Instead, he claims that if we clarify sufficiently what is praised and admired, then a rule of conduct inevitably emerges. This connection is made possible by the fact that aesthetics is not the study of subjective taste but of possible habits of feeling that participate in ethics and logic.

Searching for a basis for logic other than transcendentalism, Peirce found that we can rely on common sense given that we have the means to criticize it. Common sense, as conceptualized by Peirce, includes instincts, shared habits of feeling, and rules of behavior and of thought. These same components are all part of what Wittgenstein called a “form of life”. As such, aesthetics cannot be, as Jacques Rancière (1982: 237–238) suggested, a utopia, a joyful nirvana. Rather, the idea is that it is rational to rely on instinct, beliefs, and common sense. Such shared elements of a form of life are the hinges without which ethics and logic would not turn. It is also the expression of the fact that our thoughts are always situated. Approaching feelings in this way is to supersede dualism (not only of the Cartesian stripe, but also regarding facts versus human rules and human rules versus feelings).

This brief summary does little justice to the whole of Peirce's philosophy, but I think it serves a heuristic function in helping us understand Spade's options in dealing with O'Shaughnessy.

4. *Return of The Maltese Falcon*

I do not agree that the problem raised by *The Maltese Falcon* is that Spade represses his feelings to serve his sense of duty. I also don't think it interesting to view Spade as a neurotic seeking only control. Such a conventional psychoanalytic interpretation does not respect the complexity of the character and its importance for American culture. These interpretations lead to an understanding of American cinema as simplistic as that which claims that the whole of Classical Hollywood cinema is based on a narrative opposition between individuals and community. Neither do I think it productive to interpret the film as a claim for vulgar materialism. We certainly could not indict a detective for being aware of facts. I also don't think the point of the film is moral inter-subjectivity, and I don't see that there is any real discussion between Spade and O'Shaughnessy regarding her fate, unless one means by "discussion" what happens in some of Plato's dialogues where the interlocutor is confined to merely answering "yes, of course".

So what does Spade actually say to O'Shaughnessy in this scene? I find it uninteresting to reduce Spade's stance to something as base as, "You did things that deserve my application of the rules in a blind way." Rather, I think he says, "If I close my eyes to what you've done because of my feelings for you, then my feelings would no longer be related to the facts and my detective skills would become worthless. I would lose the most important thing that a heroic detective has: his instinct. And without this capacity to rely on my spontaneous reactions – i.e., the task of aesthetics – then the rules I use to govern my actions would have no conscious purpose anymore. And then the rules of logic and of ethics would lose their measure. To put it differently, I would be aesthetically lost, applying rules blindly.

5. *Conclusion*

Detective stories explicitly question the value of spontaneity, qualitative judgment, and instinct in the world. The ability to rely on instinctual

judgment is what is at stake in *Match Point*. Near the end of the film, the detective wakes up at night with a strong conviction about the murderer's identity. Faithful to the nocturnal rumblings that have so often been fruitful, he provides a full explanation to his colleague of how the events might have transpired before he learns that someone else has already been charged with the murder. His colleague adds, "but your dreams are fascinating and you could see what a jury might think".

Perhaps it is precisely when one loses touch with one's instincts that one is condemned to mechanically and blindly follow the rules of a given *doxa*. This proposition offers new possibilities for understanding "narratives of crime without punishment" as a whole. The problem may not be that the rules have lost their magical power but that the rules of action have lost touch with their qualitative purposes and values. Though not, properly speaking, a detective story, Iñárritu's *21 Grams* offers a striking example of this kind of aesthetic aberration. Throughout the film, born-again Christian Jack Jordan pledges his faith to some kind of transcendental or categorical imperative he hopes will guide him. However, under such condition, his attempts to adhere to his rule of conduct can only fail: one cannot legislate one's own rule-following behavior. Perhaps the problem was not, as we often say, that the gods fell silent but – and I would grant that this is a more exact way to express the same thing – that Jack is aesthetically lost. It appears that several films that involve narratives of crime without punishment rest on such aesthetic aberrations. And if we accept my argument for the importance of aesthetics for thought in general, we can analyze more precisely what appears to have become a real social problem.

This discussion of pragmatic aesthetics allows me the opportunity to invoke the recent work of philosopher Richard Shusterman. Shusterman proposes a renewed aesthetics that takes into account the body as a medium of aesthetic qualities. He calls this discipline somaesthetics and defines it as "the critical, meliorative study of the experience and use of one's body as a locus of sensory-aesthetic appreciation (*aisthesis*) and creative self-fashioning" (Shusterman 1999: 302). Shusterman wants to reintegrate the body as a medium of cognition, thereby rescuing it from its marginalized position in traditional philosophy. In this schema, knowledge of the world is improved not by negating bodily awareness but by enhancing it. Somaes-

thetics must face “the possibility of assessing individual body tastes and practices in terms of more general somatic values or norms” (1999: 300).

As presented here, pragmatic aesthetics undoubtedly investigates the processes and perfectibility of spontaneous reactions and instincts and encourages renewed attention to the body’s signals. Even more central to the discipline, however, is the study of signs. These signs are that without which the body would be mute and could not act as a medium for knowledge of the world and humanity. The body would then become a simple support for spontaneous reactions (or we could almost say a burden). Talking about the body as a medium offers potential for describing characters that, like Spade, like the detective in *Match Point*, know how to form an image from the multiple indications of their instinct. In this process, the knowledge the body acquires runs through minimal marks that indicate the regularity of a habit.

When problems generated by dualism become old problems, to talk about the body or to talk about signs with which we identify what we feel is the same thing or to say it in Peirce’s fashion, “men and words reciprocally educate each other” (C.P. 5,313).

Notes

1. C.P. 5,112. In accordance with standard citation practices, C.P. refers to the *Collected Papers*. The first number indicates the volume and the number after the decimal point indicates the paragraph. MS refers to the “Annotated catalogue of the papers of Charles S. Peirce” by Richard S. Robin.
2. To be more precise, we should add that for Peirce aesthetics is concerned with what is admired without reference to anything else; it studies what is absolutely simple. In the course of his demonstration, Peirce asks himself if pleasure in the moment can be absolutely simple. He notes that such satisfaction involves a gradation, it occurs in time and therefore cannot logically be absolutely simple. Peirce concludes that only reason can be absolutely simple and that means that it is the fact, for any reason, to be interpreted and to grow that can be admired without reference to anything else, which is also the fact for a feeling (even the most spontaneous) to be intelligible.

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Kirsten Marie Raahauge

The landscape, the city, and the house

Magical landscapes and designed cities

This paper deals with perceptions of urban landscapes. From a general view over the city, I zoom into certain of its green areas.

In Aarhus, Denmark's second largest city, I conducted fieldwork in its two most exclusive neighbourhoods: *Skåde Bakker* and *Fedet*. From the perspective of the inhabitants, an important type of space is the *landscape*, to which the attraction of the neighbourhoods is connected. The intense ambience is made even stronger, because you are brought close to *the central district*.

The landscapes are well kept and preserved, entwined with intense personal feelings concerning freedom, health, and "something beyond"; in the recently renovated central district, historical sites have been reconstructed in brand new disguises, which relate to experiences of social relations, consumption, and the feeling of being Aarhusian. Both areas seem to be part of an urban lifestyle.

1. The landscapes of Aarhus, Denmark

Skåde Bakker, south of the central district, is a hilly area surrounded by "The Marselisborg Woods". The sea is nearby, but you see it way below, as the terrain rises with steep slopes and old beech-trees. Some houses were erected there around 1900, but most of them are younger, the parks surrounding the older houses having been parcelled out. Now a parcel is rarely sold to give space for a new house. The beeches and hills induce a romantic feeling of being in a nineteenth-century, Golden Age painting: quiet, balanced, calm, seemingly static, and with idyllic views of the *Baumschlag* and slopes.

Fedet lies north of the central district, bordering the sea. The vegetation is meagre, the former tidal meadow suitable for cherry plum trees, not beeches. About 50 years ago this part of town was a district of colony gardens. These last have become fewer and fewer, but the expensive housing district is still under transformation. Especially large are the houses facing the sea. From the houses in the second row you can only see these enormous, first-row houses. Here is a hasty feeling of dynamic energy, shaping, transforming, due to the continuous building and rebuilding.

The inhabitants represent these landscapes in two ways, which may be described as *cosmological* and *praxis-oriented*. The cosmological landscape is connected to contemplation, loneliness, and beauty. You go there on your own in order to sense the intensity of the landscape, be it the sea or the woods, and you feel quietness and simplicity, just by sitting there or walking slowly into the landscape.

The praxis-oriented landscape is connected to sports. Here you jog, surf, swim, row, mountain bike, or perform other kinds of activity in order to keep your body fit. Many of the inhabitants get up early in order to jog for half an hour before they go to work by car. You feel that you “recharge your batteries” by being active, and you go there with a purpose, motivated to become healthy.

These two sides of the landscapes seem to be in conflict with each other when seen from the outside: quiet and contemplative as opposed to active and motivated. The inhabitants feel a connection between their early morning exercise and the contemplative mood, which might contradict both the traditional romantic perception of nature and the prosaic perception of fitness culture.

Other features ascribed to the landscapes are their status as a site for: *nature*, as opposed to culture, noise, people, traffic, deadlines; *disconnection*, since normally the cellular phone is switched off before going there; *public space*, for taking a walk and meeting someone by chance, without privatizing elements such as stores and advertisements or the personal space of cellular phones. Instead of being “online” or wired to the rest of the social world, you feel a connection to something important. This is not just recreation, it is an encounter with healing power; it is something precious, that we all need.

2. *Magical landscapes*

The art historian Nicholas Green has examined the formation of the landscape in France, and he argues that the gaze on the countryside as a landscape emerges in the early nineteenth century, simultaneously with Paris becoming a metropolis. For city dwellers the countryside is not associated with hard work or the perils of dangerous animals; it represents social experiences. In Aarhus today the landscapes have come closer – they are part of the city – but still they represent experience, be it as an idyllic tableau or a possibility for jogging.

The less definable landscape-qualities are often stressed. When the inhabitants talk about these qualities, most of them use the term "nature". It is untamed and potentially dangerous (e.g., in case of a flood) or irritating, as when deer come out of the woods and eat the garden flowers. Most of all it is something we need deep down. It gives something other than nice view or fitness room. It is qualitatively different.

The inhabitants talk about the calming effects of this obscure phenomenon. It gives them "peace of mind", and it "clears their thoughts", two often heard expressions. A man in his mid-30s gets a relaxing feeling every day, when he drove home to Fedet from work, turns down his street, and sees the sea through the front window of his car. A man from Skåde Bakker, aged 60, tells of quiet moments of sensing nature when he was jogging in the morning. The landscape becomes a container for nature; it is not explainable, but desirable, and it has an effect on you.

3. *Mana in anthropology*

In *A General Theory of Magic* (1902) Marcel Mauss explains the Melanesian notion of *mana*: it is quite difficult to grasp, since it is both action and force; in fact it is even more complex. Mauss writes:

The idea of *mana* is one of those troublesome notions which we had thought to have discarded; we therefore experience difficulty in grasping it. It is obscure and vague, yet the use to which it is put is curiously definite. ... Its primitive nature – that is, its complexity and confusion – resists any attempt at a logical analysis, and we must remain content to describe the phenomenon. (Mauss 2001 [1902]: 134)

And later: “The idea of *mana* consists of a series of fluid notions which merge into each other. At different times it may be a quality, a substance or an activity” (ibid.).

In his introduction to Mauss’s *Oeuvre* (1987 [1950]), Lévi-Strauss takes the argument further: it is precisely the contradictory and fluffy nature of the idea that makes it outstanding. It is a “floating signifier” of “zero symbolic value”. He writes:

I see in *mana*, *wakan*, *orenda*, and other notions of the same type, the conscious expression of a semantic function, whose role is to enable symbolic thinking to operate despite the contradiction inherent in it. That explains the apparently insoluble antinomies attaching to the notion of *mana* ... force and action; quality and state; substantive, adjective and verb all at once; abstract and concrete; omnipresent and localised. And indeed, *mana* is all those things together; but is that not precisely because it is none of those things, but a simple form, or to be more accurate, a symbol in its pure state, therefore liable to take on any symbolic content whatever? (Lévi-Strauss 1987 [1950]: 63–64)

Lévi-Strauss gives an example: “when ‘the French’ [by using the term ‘truc’] say of a person that he or she ‘has something’; and when American slang says that a woman has got ‘oomph’, it is not certain ... that we are very far from the meaning of *mana*” (ibid.: 55).

4. *Mana sites and experience fields*

Coming from outside ourselves, floating, indefinable, but a force that does something to us, when we meet it: The Aarhusian landscapes might be interpreted as *mana-sites*. “Nature” in the landscapes might have a similar position as a “floating signifier”, a “zero symbolic value”.

These expensive, exclusive, well-manicured urban landscapes have an abundance of ascriptions as “nature”; ironically, rural landscapes, far from the city, do not. What is the context of this perception of urban landscape? Or, to paraphrase Lévi-Strauss: Which specific parts of symbolic thinking, by means of the notion of “nature”, are enabled to operate despite inherent contradictions? It might have to do with “experience” as an over-arching idiom for perceiving and representing the city, and an important prism for the inhabitants’ gaze on both the central district and the landscape.

The central district, with its newly renovated streets, is a well-defined space for the experience of reconstructed authenticity, consumption of objects, history, culture, and identity – and for meeting people. You go there, experience the pleasant possibilities, then leave. As such, it is a space for liminality, a ritualized area. Contrary to traditional rituals, you go there without being initiated into something new, feeling pain, being scared, meeting something strange or out of control. You participate in liminal performances only if they are part of a well-designed, secure, and controlled experience. For the same reason, you are not transformed by going there. You just go home again.

The landscapes are spaces for the experience of social meetings, sport and fitness, and also of a less defined “nature”. Of course, hard work, transportation, family life and other elements are part of how the inhabitants of the two neighbourhoods perceive their city, but the central district and the landscapes are definitely oriented towards experience; and these areas are important for the overall representation of the city.

There are much pleasures to be had by living in a practical, smooth-running, and well organized city, and by using a newly improved central district, where everything has its place, from the dustbin to the articulation of authenticity. These also have background phenomena that do not “fit in”. These indefinable aspects are not something you can see; but you can sense them in the (sometimes forced) way people speak about “nature”. This important, if vague, element possibly arises from the zero symbolic value of the notion of “nature” in the landscapes – something that is out of step with the well-defined cityscape.

5. *Framings*

At a generalised level both the central district and the landscapes represent the notion of experience. But they are framed in different ways. The aesthetization of everyday life, the “experience society”, the wired-up-ness, and the number of pre-designed leisure-possibilities frame the traditional redesign of the central district. By contrast, framing the landscapes are the genuine experience of something different, the chance to be alone, in secret, not wired up, and the lack of pre-arranged possibilities.

If the central district is a place with an explicit framing of experience, the landscapes are framed implicitly. The well-kept woods and neat

beaches for promenades are shaped as the recreational zones of an urban environment. As part of the city, the *tableaux* of landscaping are intensified; furthermore, the city stages itself through these spaces. The lack of an explicit frame enforces the implicit framing, and makes this a perfect place for perceiving “nature”. You could say that, in the experience economy of the city, there is a space for *mana* exchange.

In the inhabitant’s interpretation, the landscapes represent the opposite of planning, staging, designing. At the same time, every body knows that these landscapes only achieve this feeling because they *are* planned, staged, and cultivated by the municipality-architects and city gardeners. They are designed to appear un-designed, as “natural”. Still, the *mana* qualities ascribed to the landscapes might solve the contradiction between the designed surroundings and out-of-place elements that cannot fit into the order of the city.

6. Mana – or order?!

The inhabitants of *Skåde Bakker* and *Fedet* like their landscapes; they like to talk about the fantastic “something” out there, hidden in “nature”. They sense its healing power for the spirit, soul, and body.

At the same time, they like to live their everyday life in neatly ordered spaces. The time manager organizes time, the means of transportation organizes movements, and the astonishingly clean cityscape is well designed for the smooth operation and experiences of consuming objects, culture, history, and social relations.

Aarhus is a city that is especially well ordered and manageable. Most of the inhabitants emphasize this as a positive feature: “We have it all, but on a smaller scale than Copenhagen; this is manageable, because here you can find your way, you never get lost, and you meet friends in the street. There are so many identical shops in Copenhagen. Here we have got one of each.”

The intensity of a smaller, orderly place is in fact what the Aarhusians love most about their city. They like to talk *mana*-talk, and live their daily life in the orderliness of the social city. Moreover the landscapes themselves are two-faced: represented through *talking*, they become the container of the indefinable *mana* thing; when a scene for *acting*, they become the stage for social relations, public space-*flaneurisme*, engaging in healthy

habits, and the rigorous discipline of staying fit. You can have access to both worlds, though: the orderly cityscapes and the strangeness of the landscapes. Such are the privileges of wealth in landscape-suburbia.

The *mana* feeling might be dependent on its shadowy position: it only works when not in the spotlight. The question is whether the tendency towards “experientification” works against the hidden ways of *mana*; or on the contrary, if the idiom of *experience* gives way to such shadowy phenomena.

7. *Thymic perceptions of mana*

In their *Semiotic Dictionary* (1989 [1979]) Greimas and Courtés distinguish between three thymic categories: *euphoric*, *dysphoric*, and *aphoric*. The thymic perception of *mana*, as described by Mauss and Lévi-Strauss, is *aphoric*. In Aarhus “nature” is a *euphoric* force. *Mana* containers could have any of the three valorisations. For example the notion of *ghosts*, my research project at present, is a *dysphoric* thymic category that might work as a pure symbol.

Whatever the case, the *euphoric* valorisation of “nature” might have consequences for the landscape. In descriptions of the surrounding environment, this *euphoric* category is opposed to *ambiguous* categories such as “society”, “culture”, or “city”. These nature-containers become moral landscapes: per definition good; and since they represent *mana*, this *euphoric* valorisation is beyond your control. Maybe it is also a “Disneyfication” of the landscapes, since the neat city landscapes are especially invested with “nature”.

This could have implications for the landscape as a *mana* site. The importance of *mana* derives from its zero symbolic value. The realms of this quality might be reduced, not by its *euphoric* valorisation, but by the conversion of the landscapes from a feel-good attitude to a search for bodily fitness. Those moral overtones in the woods and beaches of Aarhus are attracted by, but not compatible with *mana*.

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Literacy in Baroque society

A cultural-historical approach

1. Introduction

Our aim in this article is to illustrate how semiotic media (or communication technologies) influence the ways of thinking of populations and, therefore, social issues and problems. We study that relationship by a historic-cultural analysis of the development of different semiotic means in different religious traditions (Reformation and Counter-Reformation), centring our analysis on the use of baroque art and technology by the Counter-Reformation in Latin countries. These two technologies of communication used by Reform and Contra-Reform involve different persuasive strategies that lead to different mentalities or ways of thinking. In the historical context mentioned, written language mainly searches for *rational* persuasion; however, iconography mainly seeks and reaches *affec-tive* persuasion. Different examples of these will be provided below.

Our analysis seeks to give some historic explanation to illiteracy in many countries of Southern Europe and Latin America. Illiteracy has been an endemic problem in many countries of southern Europe and Latin America. In that sense, the case of Spain is very representative. At the end of the seventies, in the period of the Democratic Transition, after 38 years of Franco's dictatorship, in Andalucía alone there were more than five hundred thousand illiterate people in a population of 7 million. Communities such as Canarias, Extremadura and Galicia presented a similar circumstance.

But the case of Latin America is even more dramatic. The transition to democracy in many countries of Central and South America has not promoted better living conditions (education, health, etc.) for the majority of their population. The crisis, as a result of a combination of political and

institutional corruption and globalization, has impoverished many of their citizens and deteriorated public services such as educational systems.

There are several reasons to try to explain this problem from the perspective of social sciences (social, demographical, economical, etc.). In the context of cultural psychology (Cole 1996) and other social sciences related to education, since the 1920s, several theoreticians have employed cultural history as a way to explain and understand the genesis of educational processes and literacy. Following Vygotski (1978), Luria (1966), and other researchers using a cultural-historical approach to psychology, social sciences and education (Cole 1988; Cole & Scribner 1974; Olson 1979; Ong 1982; Wertsch 1989, 1990), the explanation for illiteracy as an endemic problem can be found in the cultural-historical domain, one of the four theoretical and methodological domains named by Vygotski. In dialectical relationship with other domains like phylogenesis, ontogenesis and microgenesis, this can explain human development as a whole and specifically the transition of human mental functions from the rudimentary to the higher level. However, only one study carried out by the fathers of the cultural historical approach was done to analyze the role of cultural history in mental development (expedition to Uzbekistan and Kirguizia). After that, the rest of the studies developed from this approach were done by a comparative methodology in the frame of cross-cultural studies.

The social sciences, extremely relevant to present issues, has usually forgotten to study its links with the past. Scholars in that area have not focused significantly on some topics, such as religious questions; another one is semiotic means and communication technologies. But most problematic is the lack of knowledge about the interrelationship between some of those areas. In this article we focus on the conflict between religious ideologies (Reformation vs. Counter-Reformation), between communication technologies (oral communication vs. literacy; imagery vs. texts), and the dialectical relations among those ideologies and technologies (Reformation plus literacy and text; Counter-Reformation plus oral communication and imagery). The different technologies fostered by different ideologies have played a role in the development of different social arenas in present times.

From our point of view, in the actual panorama of social sciences, the explanations for many topics of study, mostly related to education, tend to be based on a short-term approach. This methodology might be good for

solving problems in economics, but it must be supplemented by a long-term approach to studying issues such as technologies, especially communication technologies, and the mentalities related to them. For the French historian Ferdinand Braudel and the Annals School (Febvre 2001; Chartier 2002, 2004), the factors conditioning mentalities are always located in the long-term and demand a historical analysis as a preceding step to other considerations.

Next we will state our historical view about the origins of illiteracy in Latin countries, focusing on religious issues by considering the breakdown between Catholics and Protestants as a result of the Reformation.

2. *Long-term cultural history*

The story begins located in the sixteenth century with the Protestant Reformation (1517).

According to Stephen Toulmin (1990) in his book *Cosmopolis*, there are historians that consider 1517 as the birth of Modernity, the year in which the Augustinian monk, Martin Luther, hung his theses on the main door of Württemberg Cathedral. To establish the direct knowledge of the divine Word, in place of Tradition and (Roman) Church authority (the ground for medieval Christianity) as the right way for believers in their relation to God, Luther opened a new window onto just about everything. To sacralise the act of reading the Bible, Luther was taking a great step toward wider literacy in Western countries.

Now let us skip ahead to the other story, which on the one hand is a continuation of the first one (the reaction against Protestant Reformation), and on the other hand, is the start of a new history. This could also be considered a new era, but not modernity, because it represents the continuation of medieval religion, with its dominant emphasis on collectivism. I am referring to the Counter-Reformation, a religious ideology promoted by the Roman Catholic Church in order to re-establish tradition and stifle the expansion of the Reformation. The beginning of this other narrative is not on a particular date but a period of time between 1545 and 1563, during which the Council of Trent was convened.

If the Reformation promoted issues like these:

- A new believer-God relationship focused on the knowledge of divine words through reading Holy Writ.

- Reading as a new communication technology (potentially applicable to other texts with other topics).
- Technology learning and internalizing reading habits transforming cognitive processes such as control of attention, semantic memory, etc.
- Use of vernaculars for religious texts and practices.
- A form of religion centred in privacy, as a personal and individual experience.
- Explicit rejection of religious images (biased towards paganism-iconoclasm).

The Counter-Reformation moved in the opposite way:

- Re-establishing Tradition (Church as mediator between believer and God).
- Latin used for religious texts and ceremonies (literate clergy).
- Use of vernaculars for sermons (directed to illiterate people).
- Icons and imageries used for pedagogical purposes and propaganda.
- Exuberant church decoration recreating heaven in this world.
- Collectivism in religious practices and ceremonies.

Summarizing, it is possible to say that in a clear opposition to Protestantism, Catholicism, after the Council of Trent (1545–1563), made imagery along with the voice of priests the only legitimate ways for Church authority to relate to believers. Literacy had to wait for a better moment to spread to the rest of Christianity, when the process of secularization started in the West.

The following historical event can exemplify the rigid position of the Church in relation to literacy and the sacred texts. Fray Luis de Leon (1528–1591), a monk, poet and professor of rhetoric at the University of Salamanca, was imprisoned by the Inquisition for four years, on the charge of translating the *Song of Songs* into Spanish. Other examples are the translator of the Bible into Spanish, Casiodoro de Reyna (1520–1594), and the commentator, Cipriano de Valera (1532–1602). Both of these monks of the Gregorian Monastery of Saint Isidoro del Campo (Sevilla) were prosecuted by the Inquisition and died in exile.

3. *Baroque: Art and society*

At the same time as the Counter-Reformation started to rule the life of the Catholic world, a new art style, as a continuation of the Renaissance, began

to grow in literature, plastic arts and music. Its name was Baroque, and it originated in Italy.² The use of art for persuasion had been developed in the context of the *Accademia Fiorentina* sponsored by the powerful Medici family. The *Academy* joined plastic artists with historians, grammars and *rhetors*. The contacts between them were explicitly promoted in its program under the influence of Manuel Crisolora, ambassador of Byzantium in the Republic of Venice and other courts in Italy (Baxandall 1971). So, the groundwork to combine art and propaganda was created before the Baroque and the Council of Trent.

Imagery was probably used for pedagogical purposes, as a complement to sermons, a form by which to show sacred history and promote Christian values for illiterate believers. Traditionally narrative has been associated with the *Art of Word*, as part of primary oral communication (e.g., “once upon a time...”) and as written text (literacy). Following Vygotski’s (1978) concept of *semiotic mediation*, at that time, images become a semiotic *prosthesis* for recalling biblical events, lives of saints and martyrs, and other important events for the Roman Catholic Church. However, imagery does not have the semiotic autonomy to perform narrative in all cases of oral and/or written story. It could be considered a tool of the second order, given its dependence on a tool of the first order placed in discourse.

Among plastic arts, painting was the main aesthetic means by which to represent the significant events of Christianity. When the religious Baroque was dominant under the rule of the Counter-Reformation, there were two ways to represent stories that provisionally I shall call *explicit* and *implicit* narratives. By explicit narrative I mean a group of pictures as altar-pieces comprising a narrative sequence where the most important events of a story are represented. In the implicit narratives, a single picture projects a complete story, in a sophisticated and indirect way. These are two forms that show what stories existing in oral and written discourse have in common.

Figure 1 is an example of explicit narrative. If we forget the solemnity of the story we are in front of the clearest antecedent of the modern comic. Here the intention to tell a story is explicit, with pictures recounting each of its events.



Figure 1. Anonymous, altarpiece, Iglesia Santa María, Castilla León, Spain (15th century).

An interesting illustration of an implicit narrative is presented and commented in the next picture.



Figure 2. Caravaggio, The Call of Levi (1600).

The Call of Levi, painted by Caravaggio in 1600, is a paradigmatic example of art for pedagogy and even for propaganda. The narrative contained in the Gospel of Matthew (Levi) is represented in analogical and symbolic form, without the use of words. Illiterate people could understand the narrative and meaning of the story, especially, with the help of a sermon. In this picture, Jesus is pointing at Levi with his index telling him: “*Follow me*”. And Levi is pointing at himself, surprised. The story is very clear.

However, it is important not to forget that when reading the only possible contrast is between black and white. The black ink makes figures on white paper (ground). Further, a picture is holistic, not linear, hence Caravaggio could manipulate it in order to introduce more symbolism accompanying his story. This painting can be divided into four parts, so as to focus on the way Caravaggio combines light and dark in each of them, and how each part can be interpreted. First of all, Jesus Christ appears in darkness, having his face and hand illuminated, because both of these are important signs in this story. The tax collector Levi and other colleagues are in the opposite corner involved in very mundane business matters. Over Jesus’s head a shaft of light is illuminating part of scene. It is interesting to observe how the window on the higher part of the picture is open and its shutter separated from the wall. It seems that this management of light is a trick used by the painter to enhance the face of Levi face, a man called to the service of God. Jesus brings light into the darkness, and Levi is called to pass from the kingdom of darkness into the kingdom of light.

The two examples illustrate how two technologies of communication used by the Reformation and Counter-Reformation involve different persuasive strategies that lead to different mentalities, or ways of thinking. In the historical context mentioned, while written language mainly searches for rational persuasion, icons mainly seek – and achieve – affective persuasion.

Notes

1. We would like to thank Miguel Macías Gómez-Stern and Pamela Miller-Macías for revising the English of this article.
2. We must distinguish between the religious and the civil Baroque. The former was exploited for ideological purposes in the service of Catholic propaganda. But, there were Baroque artists such as Vermeer working in

portraits, landscapes, and, especially, still-life. This style was developed in The Netherlands and other Protestant areas where the representation of sacred themes was prohibited.

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Understanding agricultural terminology

Defining concepts and practices associated with sustainable agricultural systems

Sustainable agriculture is similar to the type of agriculture that was practiced in the early 1900s and involved purchasing few inputs and marketing little of the outputs. Understanding agricultural terminology means thinking about it and using concepts to deal adequately with it; or being able to apply it to situations likely to be encountered, to recognize significant deviations, and to carry out the research necessary to arrive at reasonable solutions. This includes using concepts and bringing individual cases under them. Reasoning and making judgments relating to its applicability are of utmost importance for students in agricultural science who need to classify, describe, discuss, explain, identify, locate, paraphrase, recognize, report, select, and translate ideas or concepts.

Specialised terminologists have noticed that most of the concepts and practices associated with sustainable agricultural systems defy definition: they do not delimit or describe the meaning of a concept or term by stating the essential properties of the entities or objects denoted by the concept.

In this paper we try to analyse the causes of this defiance, identifying the different kinds and techniques of definition distinguished so far by both linguists and philosophers involved in the definitions of these agricultural concepts and practices.

We have inventoried 79 concepts and practices in Mary V. Gold's reference compilation *Sustainable Agriculture: Definitions and Terms (1999)*, associated with sustainable agricultural systems in usage (and abuse) nowadays, concepts and practices witnessing that both agricultural practices and the terms denoting them are still developing. Eighteen of these con-

cepts and farming practices not labelled as conventional modern farming are given tentative definitions. We have analysed these definitions in an attempt to see why they are misunderstood by our students (and, sometimes, even by our colleagues teaching agricultural subjects).

“If nothing else, the term ‘sustainable agriculture’ has provided ‘talking points’, a sense of direction, and an urgency that has sparked much excitement and innovative thinking in the agricultural world”, says Gold in the Introduction to her compilation (1999). She could not be more right, and the analysis below is but an example.

1. Of the eighteen definitions, sixteen (88%) are definitions by genus and difference or genus-differentia definitions, i.e., intensional definitions (definitions that specify all and only the properties required of something in order that falls under the term defined, i.e., its necessary and sufficient conditions), in which a word or concept that indicates a species (a specific type of item) is described first by a broader category it belongs to, the genus, and then distinguished from other items in that category by differentia (i.e. specific properties): alternative agriculture / farming is “[a farming method encompassing] a vast array of [agricultural] practices and enterprises, all of which are considered different from prevailing or conventional agricultural activities ...: nontraditional crops, livestock, and other farm products; service, recreation, tourism, food processing, forest / woodlot, and other enterprises based on farm and natural resources (ancillary enterprises); unconventional production systems such as *organic farming* or *aquaculture*; or direct marketing and other entrepreneurial marketing strategies” (Grudens, Shuck et al., in Gold 1999); biodynamic agriculture / farming is “[a farming method encompassing] specific [agricultural] practices and preparations that enable the farmer or gardener to work in concert with [the forces within living nature]” (Gold 1999); bio-intensive gardening or mini-farming is “a production system that makes it possible for one person to grow all of his or her family’s food using truly sustainable methods that maintain the fertility of the soil without relying on non-renewable resources like petrochemicals or imported organic matter” (Jeavons, in Gold 1999); biological/ecological farming is “[a farming method encompassing] various and more specific practices and techniques of farming sustainability, e.g., organic, biodynamic, holistic, natural” (Gold 1999); biological farming is “a system of crop production in which the producer tries to minimize the use of ‘chemicals’ for control

of crop pests” (Pesek, in Gold 1999); do-nothing farming or natural farming is “a farming method involving no tillage, no fertilizer, no pesticides, no weeding, no pruning, and remarkably little labor ... by careful timing of his seeding and careful combinations of plants (polyculture)” (Gold 1999); Kyusei nature farming “[is a farming method that] often employs technology involving beneficial microorganisms as inoculants to increase the microbial diversity of agricultural soils, which, in turn, can enhance the growth, health, and yield of crops” (ibid.); low input agriculture “[is a low input farming system that] seeks to optimize the management and use of internal production inputs (i.e., on-farm resources) and to minimize the use of production inputs (i.e., off-farm resources) such as purchased fertilizers and pesticides, wherever and whenever feasible and practicable, to lower production costs, to avoid pollution of surface and groundwater, to reduce pesticide residues in food, to reduce a farmer’s overall risk, and to increase both short- and long-term farm profitability” (ibid.). The term is “somewhat misleading, we underline, and indeed unfortunate. For some it implied that farmers should starve their crops, let the weeds choke them out, and let insects clean up what was left. In fact, the term low-input referred to purchasing few off-farm inputs (usually fertilizers and pesticides), while increasing on-farm inputs (i.e. manures, cover crops, and especially management). Thus, a more accurate term would be different input [agriculture] or low external input [agriculture] rather than low-input [agriculture]” (Norman 1997); nature farming is a farming system utilizing “the inherent power of the soil” and focusing on “analyzing and building soil through composting, green manuring, mulch, and various other soil management techniques” (Gold 1999); organic farming is a production system which avoids or largely excludes the use of synthetically compounded fertilizers, pesticides, growth regulators, and livestock feed additives. [It relies] upon crop rotations, crop residues, animal manures, legumes, green manures, off-farm organic wastes, mechanical cultivation, mineral-bearing rocks, and aspects of biological pest control to maintain soil productivity and tilth, to supply plant nutrients, and to control insects, weeds and other pests (ibid.).

Permaculture (from *permanent agriculture*) is “one of the many alternative agriculture systems described as sustainable on design; that is, the location of each element in a landscape, and the evolution of landscape over time, (whose goal is) to produce an efficient, low-maintenance inte-

gration of plants, animals, people and structure applied at the scale of a home garden, all the way through to a large farm” (ibid.); precision agriculture / farming or prescription farming or site-specific management is “a MANAGEMENT STRATEGY that employs detailed, site-specific information to precisely manage production inputs” (ibid.); regenerative / sustainable agriculture or low-input sustainable agriculture is defined as “a farming system that is capable of maintaining its productivity and usefulness to society indefinitely. Such systems must be resource-conserving, socially supportive, commercially competitive, and environmentally sound” (ibid.); or as “an *integrated system of plant and animal production practices having a site-specific application*” (ibid.); or as “a way of practicing agriculture which seeks to optimize skills and technology to achieve long-term stability of the agricultural enterprise, environmental protection, and consumer safety” (ibid.); or as “a *whole-systems approach* to food, feed, and other fiber production that balances environmental soundness, social equity, and economic viability among all sectors of the public, including international and intergenerational peoples” (ibid.).

2. Only one (6%) of the eighteen definitions is a dictionary or lexical definition, i.e., a definition that reports the meaning of a word or expression as it is normally used, usually by supplying an approximately equivalent expression in which the original word does not occur: biological farming “often refers to organic farming (in Europe, e.g. in the Netherlands)” (Norman 1997).

3. Only one (6%) of the eighteen definitions is an extensional definition, i.e., a definition formulating the meaning of a concept or term by specifying its extension, that is, every object that falls under the definition of the concept or term in question: ecological agriculture / farming “refers to organic farming plus environmental considerations such as on-farm wildlife management (i.e., the relationships between parts of the agroecosystem)” (ibid.).

From a teacher’s point of view, it is good that 88% of the definitions of concepts and practices associated with sustainable agricultural systems are definitions by genus and difference or genus-differentia definitions, since this is the natural thing to do if you are to explain the meaning of a particular word to someone. Again, the fact that 6% of the definitions of concepts and practices associated with sustainable agricultural systems represent a dictionary or lexical definition is not a problem, since it relies

on reporting the meaning of a word or expression as it is normally used by supplying an approximately equivalent expression in which the original word does not occur. A lexical definition is usually the type expected from a request for definition, and it is generally expected that such a definition will be stated as simply as possible in order to convey information to the widest audience.

As for the only extensional definition representing other 6% of the definitions of concepts and practices associated with sustainable agricultural systems, it should not be perceived as a burden, since they address students in agriculture. Extensional definitions are used when listing examples would give more applicable information than other types of definition, and where listing the members of a set tells the questioner enough about the nature of that set.

The problem is that fifteen (83%) of these definitions are not pure definitions. Thus: Of these fifteen definitions, fourteen – thirteen definitions by genus and difference and one extensional definition – could also be ranged among precision definitions, i.e., definitions that extend the dictionary / lexical definition of a term for a specific purpose by including additional criteria that narrow down the set of things meeting the definition: biodynamic agriculture / farming is “[a farming method encompassing] specific [agricultural] practices and preparations that enable the farmer or gardener to work in concert with [the forces within living nature]” (Gold 1999); biointensive gardening or mini-farming is “a production system that makes it possible for one person to grow all of his or her family’s food using truly sustainable methods that maintain the fertility of the soil without relying on non-renewable resources like petrochemicals or imported organic matter” (Jeavons, in Gold 1999); biological / ecological farming is “[a farming method encompassing] various and more specific practices and techniques of farming sustainability, e.g., organic, biodynamic, holistic, natural” (Gold 1999); biological farming is “a system of crop production in which the producer tries to minimize the use of ‘chemicals’ for control of crop pests” (Pesek, in Gold 1999); do-nothing farming or natural farming is “a farming method involving no tillage, no fertilizer, no pesticides, no weeding, no pruning, and remarkably little labor ... by careful timing of his seeding and careful combinations of plants (polyculture)” (Gold 1999); ecological agriculture / farming “refers to organic farming plus environmental considerations such as on-farm wildlife management (i.e.,

the relationships between parts of the agroecosystem)” (Norman 1997); Kyusei nature farming “[is a farming method that] often employs technology involving beneficial microorganisms as inoculants to increase the microbial diversity of agricultural soils, which, in turn, can enhance the growth, health, and yield of crops” (Gold 1999); low input agriculture “[is a low input farming system that] seeks to optimize the management and use of internal production inputs (i.e., on-farm resources) and to minimize the use of production inputs (i.e., off-farm resources) such as purchased fertilizers and pesticides, wherever and whenever feasible and practicable, to lower production costs, to avoid pollution of surface and groundwater, to reduce pesticide residues in food, to reduce a farmer’s overall risk, and to increase both short- and long-term farm profitability” (idem); nature farming is a farming system utilizing “the inherent power of the soil” and focusing on “analyzing and building soil through composting, green manuring, mulch, and various other soil management techniques” (idem); organic farming is “a production system which avoids or largely excludes the use of synthetically compounded fertilizers, pesticides, growth regulators, and livestock feed additives. [It relies] upon crop rotations, crop residues, animal manures, legumes, green manures, off-farm organic wastes, mechanical cultivation, mineral-bearing rocks, and aspects of biological pest control to maintain soil productivity and tilth, to supply plant nutrients, and to control insects, weeds and other pests.” (idem); permaculture (from permanent agriculture) is “one of the many alternative agriculture systems described as sustainable [emphasising] on design; that is, the location of each element in a landscape, and the evolution of landscape over time, [whose goal is] to produce an efficient, low-maintenance integration of plants, animals, people and structure applied at the scale of a home garden, all the way through to a large farm” (idem); precision agriculture / farming or prescription farming or site-specific management is “a MANAGEMENT STRATEGY that employs detailed, site-specific information to precisely manage production inputs” (idem); regenerative / sustainable agriculture or low-input sustainable agriculture is “a farming system that is capable of maintaining its productivity and usefulness to society indefinitely. Such systems must be resource-conserving, socially supportive, commercially competitive, and environmentally sound.” (idem); regenerative / sustainable agriculture or low-input sustainable agriculture a “whole-systems approach to food, feed, and other fiber production that balances

environmental soundness, social equity, and economic viability among all sectors of the public, including international and intergenerational peoples” (idem).

Of these fifteen definitions, one definition by genus and difference could also be ranged among enumerative definitions, i.e. definitions that formulates its meaning by specifying its extension, that is, finite sets of objects that fall under the definition of the concept or term in question: alternative agriculture / farming is “[a farming method encompassing] a vast array of [agricultural] practices and enterprises, all of which are considered different from prevailing or conventional agricultural activities ...: nontraditional crops, livestock, and other farm products; service, recreation, tourism, food processing, forest / woodlot, and other enterprises based on farm and natural resources (ancillary enterprises); unconventional production systems such as organic farming or aquaculture; or direct marketing and other entrepreneurial marketing strategies” (Grudens, Shuck et al., in Gold 1999).

In fact, this is what confuses our students in their approach of specialised texts on sustainable agriculture: too many terms to define types of agriculture and/or sustainable agriculture concepts and practices that are sometimes very difficult to differentiate; there is lack of consequence in defining these concepts and practices, identified as farming methods (1), farming systems (2), production systems (2), agriculture systems (1), arrays of agricultural practices and enterprises (1), integrated systems of plant and animal production practices (1), low input farming systems (1), management strategies (1), systems of crop production (1), ways of practicing agriculture (1), or whole-system approaches (1); and 83% of the definitions are hybrid ones: thirteen definitions are 50% definition by genus and difference + 50% precision definition, one definition is 50% definition by genus and difference + 50% enumerative definition, and one definition is 50% extensional definition + 50% précising definition.

Though specialised definitions should be rigorous, unambiguous, conventional, prescriptive or stipulating (Bidu-Vrânceanu 1968), we wish to stress one point: since “sustainable agriculture is a dynamic rather than static concept” (Norman 1997), we have to admit that, at any point in time, in any society, the definition of any of the concepts above is going to be a compromise among differing world views, sets of values, etc., no one of which has any way to prove the other wrong, or illegitimate. Therefore,

despite any interdisciplinary (specialists in agricultural systems and linguists) effort, the “definition” of something like the concepts and practices associated with sustainable agricultural systems mentioned above is going to remain fluid (poly-semantic and poly-referential), driven by changes in community values, ideology, politics, science, etc.

The question we always ask ourselves is: Do we really need to spend much more time and effort attempting to define all these concepts? And here is a possible answer: Maybe agriculturists have sufficient commonality among their different understandings of these concepts to continue moving in the right general direction, even if they are not yet all moving toward precisely the same destination by the same route: they may never have generally accepted definitions of these concepts, and perhaps, they don't need any, but people involved in teaching others (this is our case) certainly do.

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Schizophrenic narration

1. Introduction

The topic of our paper is an analysis of the schizophrenic patient Caroline Ebbesen's (1852–1936) collection of texts, which offer a look inside the fabulous and twisted world of a schizophrenic. We want to show that Caroline controls the act of enunciation almost perfectly, until the topic becomes the “self”, at which point she starts using 3rd person expressions. The problem concerning the “I” is expressed in the language by a failure in deixis (Fillmore 1967), metonymic glides and a lack of semantic coherence, all of which contribute to the instability in the act of enunciation. With reference to Henrik Jørgensen's and Frederik Stjernfelt's discussion of “Narrative fable in the schizophrenic text” (in Allingham et al. 2002), we want to show that due to her lack of self-consciousness, Caroline attempts to create a fully coherent cosmological narration with herself as the sender, topic and receiver in order to cure herself. This attempt fails, however: she is not cured of her schizophrenia, but by means of the narration, which counteracts her disruption, she has succeeded in creating a stability around herself, which helps her find peace.

In a broader literary perspective, Caroline's texts show many similarities with the modernistic prose exemplified by the Danish author Henrik Bjelke. In this modernistic prose the perception of the self and the world resembles the perception seen in Caroline's work. One of the similarities is the difficulty in finding adequate frames of comprehension. This is due to the fact that the signifier apparently dominates the signified. If in Bjelke's literature it is a word-puzzle, for Caroline it is an unconscious extension of the language that makes it possible for her to gain a broader perspective and thereby create her cosmological narration.

2. Caroline Ebbesen (1852–1936)

Caroline, diagnosed with schizophrenia, was hospitalized at the Sankt Hans psychiatric hospital from 1885 until her death in 1936. During her hospitalization Caroline was very prolific: she produced texts, drawings, paintings and needlework. Her written language has many special features; it is almost phonetic, and you can hear the regional dialect. In addition she has created her own ornamental alphabet. Despite this the language is stable at the level of letter and sentence, and as we wish to show, the problems only arise when the “I” becomes the thematic centre.

3. *The non-conformity of the language*

In very few cases Caroline uses the word “I”, but never as the thematic centre. She uses it about a special constructed “I”, as something big, religious or universal. For instance:

”And/ I am the angel/ and/ Sing/ To my Angels/ Little/ above/ Shepherd Stable” (Storm 1987: 26).

Caroline often refers to herself in the 3rd person as:

Caroline, Caroline Æbesen, Karoline, Kallroline, Kaolysinenæs, Karolysines, Kaaåroline, Kaårooline, Kaålysine, Kaaårååline, Karååline, Karål-ien, Dine, Deine eller Deidne. (Reisby 1985; Storm 1985 and 1987)

All of the names are derivatives of Caroline based on similarity, and all are 3rd-person expressions. This illustrates that the sender of the text is multiple, and that stable anchoring in the “I” is missing. Caroline lacks a clear consciousness about how she functions as an “I”. She lacks self-consciousness in perception, which according to Jørgensen and Stjernfelt (2002: 83) is one of the basic elements of schizophrenia. This is made clear through the 3rd person expressions, and also in relation to her own will. The problem is expressed in this short text: “Deine given / her will to what it wants” (Storm 1985: 60). By virtue of such 3rd person expressions, Caroline expresses her fundamental problem, which is the lack of self-consciousness. She communicates that she is controlled from the outside – that is that she lacks a stable “I”. Because she is both the 1st and the 3rd persons, she also constructs herself as the 2nd person (*deine*) of the text. She thereby emerges

as sender, subject and receiver, and the central part of her narration can be said to be herself and how her “I” figures in the texts.

Problems concerning the nonconformity of the language also emerge as a failure in deixis. We define deixis as according to Rosenbaum and Sonne:

Lexical and grammatical forms, which can only be interpreted, when the sentence in which it appears is understood as anchored in some sort of social context. The following aspects define the social context: the participants in the communication or the situation of speech have to be mutually introduced, and they have to be located firmly in time and space in connection to the act of communication. (Rosenbaum & Sonne 1979: 38)

The most extreme example of Caroline’s failed deixis follows:

Sat there a little star/ right under the moon/ once and see you watch out for our – it goes to your little/ soul watch out I am the moon – watch out for me I/ can take you. You cannot catch me I can talk with/ you take on you O-think of you Watch/ me I can shine for you – little sunbeam/ sat and watched the moon and least he suspected it was/ the moon which in the evening lights upon his little dog... (Storm 1985: 25).

The first problem is the switch from the told story in past tense, “Sat there a little star”, to the present tense and the imperative “See you watch out”, then back: “sat and watched the moon”. These switches happen without logical transition or justifiable connection. Secondly, it is not made clear who is being addressed. First it is the sun, but then a change appears: “Sat and saw the moon and least he suspected”. The previously addressed sun is suddenly mentioned as “he”, and this “he” has a little dog, which is highly unlikely if he is the sun. Thirdly, the moon is referred to in the 3rd person, even though it has been the speaking 1st person in the first part of the text.

In other texts, there is a failure of the relation between the enunciation’s time and space, on the one hand, and on the other, its actual instances, persons, institutions, powers, times, places, and so on. The local and the global are intermixed, and the parameters between time and space tend to decline.

An examination of the metonymic relations in the text illustrates that metonymic glides to some degree emphasize the vagueness in phraseol-

ogy and anchoring, thereby setting the language into a system. Metonymic glides are found in all the textual levels, both semantic and syntactic:

Jaeid/ va glad *åå* øndskede/ kimeren/ kemlen *åå* klengeren/ penge/ er ale
meneskernes/ glæde lile ana me/ Bøn og Sang påå/gaderne/tel hemerige
me/ maske påå *åå* lile/ jååhanes. (Storm 1985: 78)

(I/ was happy and wanted kimeren/ kemlen and klengeren/ money/ is
every human's/ joy little Ana with/ prayer and song in/ the streets/ to
heaven with/ a mask on and little/ Johannes.)

This example shows (in the Danish edition) metonymic glides at the level of letter- and phonetics: K's and Å's. But thematic metonymy is also present: "kimeren kemlen" and "klengeren" have a rattling sound, like money jangling in someone's hand. The metonymic glides illustrate how the signifiers dominate the signifieds. The language feeds on itself and creates a false reality which partly causes the failure of semantic coherence. But the metonymy creates a system. Even in the worst cases where semantic coherence is lacking, you still find metonymic coherence, which restores the lost anchoring and creates more stable terms of enunciations, thereby having a stabilizing and healing function.

Self-consciousness fails in the schizophrenic text due to the register of discourse. Everybody has a register of discourse as a precondition to being able to use a language that is socially acceptable and understandable. In schizophrenic language, the register of discourse sometimes gains control of the act of enunciation, thereby preventing the subject from controlling the enunciation. When Caroline doesn't control her register, she emerges as different characters. She becomes the medium of God, a child, or a great and powerful person. In her pictures a large hand often appears, it symbolises Caroline as the medium of God. This can also be seen in this short text:

"God has anchored his hand/ in the little Deidne/ this is in its house"
(Storm 1987: 33). She becomes king as well as archbishop: "with little
golden orb/ my sceptre/ and/ my/ crown and a little golden cross/ upon
my little/ golden/ archbishop/ hat" (Storm 1985: 74)

One can debate whether or not Caroline hallucinates. It seems, however, that she experiences thing that others don't see, for instance, the "light" which appears in both texts and pictures. But the elements of hal-

lucination are often used as abstract concepts or orchestrated theatrically in her fantasies of greatness: “Deidnes room number 10 and theatre first act. Living room Sorø Academia” (Reisby 1985: 59). But many signs of hallucinatory behaviour also appear where it isn’t part of theatre or use of symbols; for instance, she becomes: “Virgin Maria Magdalene Queen Caroline Ebbesen has born Jesus 1891 years ago of her quivering heart” (Reisby 1985: 73).

4. *The narrative project of the “I”*

This corpus of narratives is characterized by thematic recurrences which serve a stabilizing function. Caroline attempts to strengthen the weakened “I” by creating thematic coherence. This is made clear in the example above, in which she refers to herself as Virgin Maria Magdalene Queen Caroline Ebbesen. By doing that she inscribes herself in history as queen – a person with the highest possible secular power – and as Virgin Maria she also obtains religious power; and as Maria Magdalene she even becomes a sexual religious being. By creating herself as the sender, the receiver and the thematic centre of the text, Caroline enrolls herself in a continuing time and space. She tries to create coherence in history and include herself in history, thereby trying to escape the breakdown of the “I”.

5. *An attempt at healing*

When Caroline attempts to reconstruct her “I” by ascribing herself status and power, she uses institutionalised power connected to high social status. Kings, queens and archbishops all have a socially accepted space for their “I”, and this is exactly what Caroline needs; therefore her desire to gain power is her desire to stabilize her “I”.

As Jørgensen and Stjernfelt (2002) have argued, the manoeuvre of reparation is the central part of schizophrenic language. Reparation of the act of enunciation is an attempt to restabilise and heal the subject, by the means of a narrative created relation in the life story. This is exactly what Caroline attempts to create: a cosmological narration, with herself as the focal point of attention and a recreated self-consciousness. Her narration becomes an attempt at healing. But it is not limited to a spectacular, cosmological project; her narration works on several levels: the linguistic, the

cosmological-universal, and the familial level; in this last she writes about her family, her wishes and her crushes, which she integrates into the cosmological narration. The narration is an attempt to create a consciousness about historical identity, because in such a consciousness an “I” is created, which functions as a historical foundation.

Despite her efforts, the healing attempt fails. The narration is a compensation figure pressed upon the enunciation to make it work. It tries to tell how the patient can regain the regular and functional space of communication, but the only protector of such a space is the patient itself. But even though Caroline remains schizophrenic, she, by means of the cosmological-historical identity, succeeds in finding a peace that allows her to function in her everyday life.

6. *The literary status of schizophrenic texts*

Many of the traits characterising schizophrenia are found in poetry, intoxication, in religious or erotic delights and in different suggestive conditions. Therefore it is possible to see a reflection of the self and the world in art that is similar to the one we find in Caroline’s production. But despite similarities, it is necessary to be able to separate “sick language” from that of art. Nevertheless, Caroline’s production can be institutionally anchored as art, as it possesses many artistic qualities. The only thing that keeps her production from being interpreted as art is our knowing she is schizophrenic; it is first and foremost our knowledge of her that makes us judge the texts as “sick language”. Therefore we find it necessary to discover if there is a difference between, say, modernistic prose and schizophrenic language within textual boundaries. As an example of modernistic prose, we use Danish author Henrik Bjelke and his short story *Første person Ental* (*First-Person Singular*).

In Bjelke’s text you immediately sense the similarity with Caroline, primarily because of the challenge the reader faces in determining frames of understanding. The problem arises, in the modernistic language, because of the experimental frame, but also because of the deliberate attempt to break with known literature and create new forms of expression. When Bjelke constructs a literature that does not make use of already known stylistic forms, he complicates understanding and recognition, because the known is no longer usable as an approach to literature.

Caroline uses the known – history and religion – to create a coherent narration, but in spite of this she does not avoid problems concerning understanding and recognition. Even though she creates a coherent narration across several centuries, including all of her personalities, thereby actively attempting to counteract the weakening of the “I”, it doesn’t change the fact that the “I” is still weak, which is implicitly expressed in her texts. Therefore the narration does not lead to healing.

In Bjelke’s texts you see how the initiative apparently is left to the words, and how the signifier apparently dominates the signified:

Det hele er et stort eksperiment dækket af tusind små hårde hjerter. Silen-
tium. Polio et non. Bakles Nofelet Telefon Selskab. *Linge*. *Ingen* mister
Ingelminster. *Ingensinde*. *Sind*. *Ingens sind* eller for at gå over til. *Lang*.
Angle. *Mand*. *Mangler*. *Angelmanster* i Arkhangelsk eller Memel. *Yngst*.
Blomst. *Youngster*. *Engelmanster*. *Leng*. *Lem*. *Engel*. *Mennesker*. *Mønster*.
Yngel. *Ung* mand. *Ungelmunster*. *Ongelmonster*. *Orgelmonster*. *Orgel*.
Montre. *Ond*. (Bjelke 1968: 177–178)

(It is all a great experiment covered by a thousand little hard hearts. Silen-
tium. Polio et non. Bakles Nofelet Telephone company. *Linge*. Nobody
looses *Nominster*. *Nomind*. *Mind*. Nobody’s mind or to go to. *Long*.
Angle. *Man*. *Missing*. *Angelmanster* in Arkhangelsk or Memel. *Young-*
est. *Flower*. *Youngster*. *Englemanster*. *Leng*. *Limb*. *Angel*. *Human*. *Pat-*
tern. *Brood*. *Young man*. *Youngmunster*. *Ongelmonster*. *Organmonster*.
Organ. *Showcase*. *Evil*.)

This example (the Danish edition) is characterized by metonymic glides at all textual levels; e.g., gliding of the letters “ing”, “ind”, “ang”, “st”, “eng” and “ung”, which creates a connection to “ong” that ends with “ond”, which is Danish for “evil”.

This tendency in language is also found in Caroline’s texts. But the dominance of the signifier is only a narrative technique for Bjelke, a play on words and language, which contributes to a metafictional dimension as a linguistic self-reflection. In Caroline’s texts, the same technique is an unconscious extension of the language that makes possible a broader perspective. The language in both schizophrenic and modernistic literature will always be compared to well-defined, regular language. “Sick language” is therefore recognized by its break with the norm.

The breaking of norms is part of modernistic literature's experience of indefiniteness, as a testing of the boundaries of language and understanding. Bjelke and Caroline both circle around this indefiniteness, and in both of their texts this is founded in knowledge of the "I". The flowing "I" is the indefiniteness of the texts, and this causes an unpredictability in the language. This means that it is possible to understand a fragmented modernistic text, such as Bjelke's, in the same manner as Caroline's weakened act of enunciation. Both reveal the space of the fragmented "I" in narration and in the world.

This illustrates the fact that you can find clear parallels between a first-person perspective on schizophrenia and experiences in modernistic literature. But Bjelke and modernistic literature do not attempt or intend to create coherence and fight the fragmentation and the indefiniteness as Caroline does. Bjelke describes an unstable and fragmented "I", but the "I" finds itself in a life that seems hopeless and impossible to repair because of a world that seems evil with its emptiness, technology, mushroom clouds and alcohol.

I looked like a man who could cry because of this form of activity, a place in the houses [with] inhibition total. Language without words. It has nothing to do with music in spite of your own life. His letters ever since technically and rationally ... In addition found in relation to mushroom that shoots as observers on people a female author. Shoot themselves to get a warm experience ... Drives out in the air to the nearest bar and walks down. Blue pale young boys' faces through blue glassed alcohol. (Bjelke 1968: 107)

The portrayed universe emerges as fragmented, and there seems to be a causal link between the fragmented subject and the fragmented world. Caroline's world also appears incoherent, but the difference is, that her fragmentation doesn't happen because of the world. Of course, environmental factors might have triggered her disease, but she doesn't depict the world as guilty of such. Her text is fully concerned with the "I" and how it functions in an accepted world.

7. Conclusion

There are several similarities between the schizophrenic text and modernistic literature. Metonymic glides, where the language seems to feed on itself and dominate the contents, appear in both cases and in both cases they are narrating techniques; these being conscious in modernistic literature, but not so in the schizophrenic text. Similarities are also found in the description of the fragmented subject. But in the modernistic language you do not find the urge or drive to create coherence and understanding, as you find in the schizophrenic texts. When the schizophrenic patient tries to heal her/himself by means of narration, in the attempt at creating a coherent cosmological story, it is an attempt to counteract – not create – fragmentation. In this way, the schizophrenic text separates itself from modernistic literature and the modernist worldview.

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Dagmar Rieger

***Inşallah* – As God wills**

Paths through the jungle of productive misunderstandings

Jacques Lacan mentions that communication is the positive or negative effect of productive misunderstandings (Roudinesco 1999:120). This gets a new dimension when one considers Muslim countries and their languages, because the misunderstandings might have political relevance.

I'd like to take Turkey and Turkish as an example, since I've been living and working there for some time. This country is seeking membership in the European Union, and the people of Europe are becoming aware of Turkey's rich traditions, on the one hand, while not understanding the aims of this country, on the other.

Although Turkey is a fully secular state, everyday language indicates otherwise. There is widespread use of religious terms, especially statements considering God in many different forms. These common phrases are used on many occasions. If you take the first word I learned – *inşallah* – and related words (*maşallah* and *Allah, allah*) you will see that the meanings and the ideas related to these words cover quite a wide range.

Inşallah means, according to the dictionary, *Redline İngilizce-Türkçe* (2006), “so God wills”, to hand yourself over to God's decision. It includes the idea of waiting for anything or anybody, and it also includes the idea that you can't do anything against what is happening. It is used in many different situations, as when a worker is hopefully doing things right, when someone is late for an appointment, has an accident, when one is waiting for better times, etc. In discussions of politics this word becomes essential to some people, because all is God's decision and you can't influence it; you just have to take it as it is. So also political decisions seem to be made in heaven or hell, depending on the political and religious position of the speaker.

The word *maşallah* has a clearer proposition, meaning hope as regards an impending event. It includes good and bad sides, but mainly expresses hope for a positive ending. It is also used in the sense of “good luck” following a bad experience. It is used when a beautiful woman passes by a group of men, in the sense of “wow” (good) and the related temptation (bad), as well as in situations that mean bad luck in the sense of “what a pity!” and you wish you could have done something about the situation. It is an expression of wishing and hoping that can be influenced by one’s own will or doing. It contains God’s name, similar to *inşallah*, but here people are forced to make their own personal decisions as well.

“*Allah, allah*” is a phrase that turns to God directly. It is mostly used when bad events have already happened or one strongly expects them to happen soon. You are powerless against the effects, and you hand yourself over to God in the moment of speaking. The phrase is mostly used in acknowledging events with bad effects, such as an accident, an earthquake or the daily traffic jam in Istanbul. You don’t have too many possibilities to influence the result, so you just take it as it is, at the same time registering the fact that you would prefer not to be in such a situation.

Turkish is a language rich in images and metaphors and extremely hard for a European to learn. Not many languages allow for such a broad spectrum of interpretation. You don’t just talk; you don’t just state your mind or express your intentions directly. Rather, they are wrapped in endless layers of stories, images and similes. Parables, such as those in the Bible, are extremely common. Moreover, a person’s identity (both “private” and “public”) will help determine what this person really might want to say.

The words and phrases mentioned above show quite well how misunderstandings may come about in speaking, and especially hearing, Turkish. It is not so much the dialect or the broadly used short forms, it is the intention behind speaking that is much more important than, for example, in my language (German).

My identity in Turkey is that of a stranger, female, teacher, intellectual, living in a city, European, non-Muslim. Thus, I am restricted by my identity as well as my meagre knowledge of Turkish and Muslim traditions.

Still, I would like to introduce two terms for describing the differences between most European languages and Turkish: *fact-based* and *fiction-based*. In *fact-based languages* like German or English you say what you think and you compare the facts with reality. Of course you use metaphors,

but you don't give them so much importance. Nor is your identity so relevant to what you say, although your social status might influence which words and phrases you choose.

By contrast, *fiction-based languages*, such as Turkish, find their orientation in story and in metaphor. You do not say outright what you think, but wrap it up in a story about someone who is said to know the facts. Which story you choose depends on your social status – identity is crucial in Turkish. The language one uses in Turkish shows more a *belief* in reality than a *comparison* with it. Such language has stronger ties to the symbolic than to reality and the real. In sum: whatever you talk about could very well end up in the “hands of Allah.”

How to translate or better interpret the Turkish language will be essential for negotiations with the European Union. You have to “feel” what people want to say, since it is not always what you hear them say that matters. Turkish people are extremely proud and are especially aware of their social identity. They know how to negotiate, and they do not always treat people equally; for example, one who cannot cope with their language may be considered inferior. Both men and women use their stories and their bodily presence to impress you and to convince you of the rightness of their opinion. Both secularists and sacralists commonly turn to Allah:

In both Turkey and Europe, there is unease and ambivalence. ... The irony, of course, is that the avowedly secular Europeans ... have been equivocal, whereas the Muslim party leading the governing coalition in Turkey expresses no reservations about relinquishing sovereignty to the European Union in return for closer economic ties. ... Few people imagine that it is possible for a state to be Muslim in cultural and religious identity and also be a full participant in the global economy. (Karabell: 282–283)

Being in the European Union will not be like buying a carpet in the bazaar; people will probably have to find a new way of communicating with each other. The “jungle of Allah's garden” must be negotiated. And as we have noted, the use of language is not only to relay information, but to express social status, religiosity, which region you are from, which identity you have taken, what your educational level is. There is also a difference between spoken and written language. All these points have to be put into consideration if one is trying to understand what Turkish people are talking and writing about.

In concluding, I'd like to state that productive misunderstandings might be nice in literature or satire, but politics and human rights are nothing to play around with, no matter if your language is based on facts or on stories. You have to find a way to clearly define what you want and what you do not want. Misunderstandings are productive only as long as they don't mean including or excluding someone because of his/her language.

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Pärtyli Rinne

Towards a philosophy of love: A philosophical defense

1. Introduction

The fundamental question in my thought is, What should be done? My hypothesis is that it is best to love. Thought conditioned by this hypothesis is a philosophy of love. By love I mean the non-violent action that reduces suffering and/or promotes well-being (cf. Oord 2004). I distinguish between three major types of love:

1. The Love of Truth (Science, Philosophy)
2. Sexual Love
3. Altruism

In the Western tradition, one is also tempted to accept the classical distinction between *eros* and *agape* as two different forms of love. I believe the former is based on lack (-), the latter on surplus (+). For a general theory of the subject, I accept the concepts of negation, hesitation and affirmation as forming the conceptual groundwork.

In what follows, I start with a brief exposition of realism in the philosophy of science. Then I move on to discuss Eero Tarasti's concepts of negation and affirmation in his theory of existential semiotics. Then I point out what I consider to be the most serious problems with regard to love in the discipline of psychoanalysis, discussing the work of Alain Badiou as a prominent reworking of the psychoanalytic heritage. Lastly, I point out that Jacques Derrida, Richard Rorty and Gianni Vattimo all defend love as the highest principle of thought.

2. Realism

For scientific research, I accept the position of realism as my guiding background assumption (e.g. Niiniluoto 1999). For me, realism means that to a

certain extent there exists a mind- and theory-independent world/reality, of which knowledge (truthlike or not-so-truthlike) is attainable. As I see it, a version of realism can be compatible with moderate interpretations of schools of thought such as pragmatism, constructivism, existentialism, hermeneutics and phenomenology. The latter orientations all share in common the conviction that thought and research participate in the world. This could be a serious problem for some, even many scientific realists. Many scientists hold that a description of reality does not alter the reality it describes, whereas others argue that scientists and philosophers are corporeal beings, and since their bodies think and exist in relation to reality, their being necessarily alters the reality in which it participates. These views are compatible with scientific realism, as long as one maintains that not all of reality is humanly made or theory-laden, just as all human actions are not reducible to science, and that thought does not simply describe reality with theories, but also participates in the shaping of reality outside scientific discourse. Within science, however, one is obliged to discard strong versions of pragmatism (truth is simply a matter of utility/power) and social constructivism (reality is a matter of social construction). For now, on the basis of Ilkka Niiniluoto's philosophy, I would term my own position as that of critical constructive realism.

In any case, it is clear that the stronger basis a philosophy of love can attain, the stronger the theory will be. In the philosophy of science, this will mean a search for the strongest positions. In other words, one is to affirm the positions that are the easiest to defend with rational argumentation. In this article I can go no further than that. I would suspect, however, that the theory that is able to give the most profound, comprehensive and convincing account of the concepts of the negative and the positive will be the hardest theory to refute.

3. Negation and affirmation in existential semiotics (Tarasti)

In Eero Tarasti's theory of existential semiotics, negation and affirmation are transcendental acts of the subject. In negation the subject (an individual) experiences Sartrean Nothingness or the Hegelian *das Nichts*. The subject experiences the void of the world. In affirmation the subject experi-

ences the plenitude of the world, the world as rich and full of meanings. (See Figure 1; Tarasti 2000: 10–12)




Figure 1. *The transcendental act* (Tarasti 2000).

The scheme in Figure 1 is Tarasti’s model of the two transcendental acts of the subject. In my opinion, Tarasti attempts a systematic, yet non-reductive account of negation and affirmation, of their inter-relatedness, based on Kant’s idea of transcendence and Hegel’s idea of dialectical progress of thought. Tarasti argues that, basically, transcendence is “what is away, but present in our minds”. Tarasti holds that a scientific theory of transcendence is possible. In my view, and from a broadly Kantian perspective, a theory of transcendence would be the same thing as a general theory of externality (the world, reality), that is to say, of that which we hold to be “outside our bodies”.

From the perspective of existential hermeneutics, I claim that negation and affirmation are not only transcendental acts, but are also the two modes of existential pre-understanding or pre-openness to the world. Arguably, negation and affirmation are pre-predicative conditions of thought, communication and understanding – the first obviously negative, the second positive. Negation and affirmation relate the subject with the world. In speaking of “relation”, I follow Peter Hallward’s definition: “By ‘relation’ I mean a process that operates between two or more minimally discernible terms, in such a way as to condition or inflect (but not fully to generate) the individuality of each term” (Hallward 2006: 152). Since relations are processes, we may conjecture that negation and affirmation are also the two strong modes of temporality (see Figure 2). I hold that there is also a weak mode between them and preceding them, which I term *hesitation* (discussed below, section 5).




Figure 2. Temporal status of negation and affirmation.

Negation and affirmation are the two formal categories of singular temporal events. Negation separates, subtracts, closes, disconnects and excludes; affirmation unites, adds, opens, connects and includes. As consistent pre-openness (such as faith, attitude, orientation and so on), negation and affirmation form the logic of consistent subjective action. Negation forms the logic of exclusion and decreases the number of open relations/connections in the individual's world; affirmation forms the logic of inclusion and increases the number of open relations/connections in the individual's world. Negation as the consistent pre-openness of subjective action operates as forcing relations, as is the case, for example, in the psychological phenomenon of narcissism (where others are negated by not taking them into account). Violence in the corporeal world of social relations is a paradigmatic example of negation, as is the critical attitude in discursive philosophy (e.g., the doctrine of falsification). I conceive violence as the primary form of evil whereas the critical attitude, in my opinion, is a virtue. Affirmation as the consistent pre-openness of subjective action operates as liberating relations, as is the case in the phenomenon of altruism (neighbour-love) where others are cared for and helped. In science, affirmation appears as discovery or invention (of new facts, of new interpretations – and their possible verification).

4. *The heritage of psychoanalysis (Freud, Lacan, Badiou)*

During the last century, philosophical discussion about love was dominated by psychoanalytic discourse. Before presenting my critical argument, I want to emphasise that my aim here is not to undermine the revolutionary influence of psychoanalysis or the relevance of such concepts as the sub-conscious or the libido, which have become a part of our everyday vocabulary and thus have undeniably been extremely fruitful. I will however concentrate on the points on which I disagree with psychoanalysis. In my opinion, the two most distinctive features of Freudian discourse and its follow up in the work of Jacques Lacan were a masculinizing theory of sexual desire and a dogmatic, non-scientific attitude toward research. From the perspective of critical research on love, the third distinctive feature in both Freud and Lacan is their denial of the possibility of altruistic love. I will go through these points one by one.

4.1. The most notorious concept in psychoanalysis is undoubtedly that of the phallus. In my opinion to insist on the supremacy of the phallus, as Lacan and Freud both do, deserves critique. Why? First, because to insist on the supremacy of the phallus upholds and strengthens an unjustified inequality between the sexes, still present in all corners of the globe. Second, because both Freud and Lacan defend the phallus with logically fallacious arguments, and that is philosophically unacceptable. With both of them, the supremacy of the phallus is established through the classical fallacy of circular argumentation (*petitio principii*). For a good exposition of Freud's circular argument as regards the phallus, see Judith Butler's critique in her essay "The Lesbian Phallus" (Butler 1993, esp. 57–62). Lacan repeats Freud's logic in his text "The Significance of the Phallus" (in Lacan 1977) where he argues primarily that the phallus is a signifier. However, it is not just any old signifier, but a signifier that grounds the whole of the language system. A critical reader must ask: how can one signifier ground the whole language system? This is a logical fallacy, in so far as a signifier is a unit of language and classical logic is accepted as a valid form of criticism in ordinary language. Logically, a unit of language cannot be the basis of language.

4.2. My second criticism concerns the position of psychoanalysis as a science. Usually, when psychoanalysts are accused of circular argumentation, they respond with the following claim: what seems a circular argu-

ment to those criticising the psychoanalytic discourse, is in fact due to the critics' own repression of their subconscious. This leads soon enough to a "chicken or egg" type of debate. Thus, I shall only point the reader to what in my view are quite reasonable and informed critiques of psychoanalysis as dogmatic thinking. With regard to Freud, I refer to the critique of his contemporary Karl Popper in his book *Realism and the Aim of Science* (Popper 1983: 163–174). Popper shows in convincing detail how Freud deals theoretically with the problem of so-called "anxiety dreams". We remember that according to Freud's theory, all dreams are fulfilments of wishes. This maxim struggles, however, with the problem of anxiety dreams, for how could a dream of anxiety be a fulfilment of a wish? Freud himself notes this problem, but continues, rather than making the necessary alterations to his theory, by sweeping the problem under the mat. Later on, he defends his theory as if the problem had never existed. Popper calls this an example of dogmatic thinking, where subjective coherence is forcefully upheld, even as it starts to contradict the facts. The case is somewhat similar with Lacan, as Francois Roustang (1990) points out. Roustang shows how Lacan's attempt to find a "Science of the Real" is ultimately taken to the limits of madness, since Lacan himself has defined the Real as impossible, yet tries to establish it as the object of rigorous, "mathematical" science (for a critical account of Lacan's use of mathematics, see Sokal & Bricmont 1998). If the ground of Lacan's position (transcendental idealism) is understandable, its complications are obvious enough, as Roustang shows. Furthermore, the realist position can in most cases be quite easily defended against idealisms. As a defence of Lacanian psychoanalysis, I mention a book edited by Leupin (1991), although I admit that given my current knowledge, the psychoanalytic project, as influential as it once was, seems to be essentially non-scientific.

4.3. Lastly, based on what I have read, it seems that psychoanalysis is unable to give almost any kind of account of altruism. Both Freud and Lacan dismiss the very notion on grounds of sheer opinion (i.e., without evidence). They both insist that the negative relations of aggression and cruelty are foundational to human interaction (Freud 1969: 46–50; Lacan 1992: 179–190, 198). Whether this is or is not the case, remains a matter for further enquiry. Here however, I must say quite frankly that I hope Freud and Lacan could be proved wrong – or else we should find better passages to quote from their work.

I will continue by presenting in more detail the work of a philosopher, who by no means is reducible to psychoanalysis, but whose theory of love nevertheless carries on the psychoanalytic heritage: Alain Badiou. His most important book, *L'être et l'événement* (1988), has been translated into English as *Being and Event* (Badiou 2005a). This work has recently (2006) received a sequel under the title *Logiques des mondes*.

According to Badiou, mathematics is ontology. This means that mathematics says what can be said of being as such. Badiou's discourse of "meta-ontology" is based on set theory, originally invented by Georg Cantor. Most importantly Badiou's theory is based on Paul Cohen's demonstrations of the so-called continuum hypothesis. Cohen invented a technique called "forcing" with which he was able to show that the continuum hypothesis cannot be proved within set theory. Earlier, Kurt Gödel had shown that it cannot be falsified either. The hypothesis is thus independent of the other axioms of set theory and has to be decided upon through an act of faith. Paul Cohen's theory of "generic sets" is the ontological correlate for Badiou's theory of subject. Badiou's notion of subject is related to the notion of event. An event is a break or a rupture in a situation (a world). The individual encounters the event as the void or the inconsistent multiplicity of the situation. Through a sort of decision, the individual becomes faithful to the event, and this fidelity lures the subject, which starts to force the situation. According to Badiou, fidelity as forcing produces truth. A truth is a radical novelty in a situation; it is that which previously was nothing for/in the situation. There are four types of truths in Badiou's system: scientific, political, artistic and amorous. As novelties, truths are thus always sorts of "immanent revolutions", taking place in the mentioned four fields of subjective action (Badiou 2005a).

For a thorough critique of Badiou's philosophy, I point to Peter Hallward's book *Badiou: A Subject to Truth* (2003). According to Hallward, Badiou's subject is constituted once an individual has been subtracted from the regime of relations it has with other individuals. Hallward says his own guiding assumption is "that an individual has no being outside of its relations with other individuals, so what matters is the conversion of oppressive relations into liberating ones" (Hallward 2003: 322). The operation Hallward terms "subtraction" could perhaps be called a negation of "incoming" social relations, such that the subject is indifferent to others. This leads to a situation where others are marked with either (+)

or (-), on the basis of their reaction to the subject supporting the event. They either join the subject and form a positive connection with it (+), or they don't, in which case the connection is negative (-). The gist of Hallward's critique thus far has been that it is ultimately unconvincing to hold insistently that individuals are non-related (as do both Lacan and Badiou), or that the event constitutes a subject whose relation with the rest of the situation is that of pure binarism, without hesitation or negotiation (both of which would make the thought of gradual reciprocal conversions possible). It is not a coincidence that Badiou's new book attempts to address the problematic of appearing and relations. Even though I am not yet in a position to discuss the argument of Badiou's latest book, I must note that in so far as the relations he discusses remain ontologically secondary to the event in such a way that the event precedes the unfolding of these relations, Badiou, in my opinion, has failed to address Hallward's criticism. Since what Hallward has pointed out is that the event causes individuals to attempt to "subtract" themselves from others and force the nothing/pure novelty in to shared being, it does not necessarily help that much to describe the relations unfolding under the condition of this event, if the basic logic of the event itself remains the same. In this case, the logic of appearing would still remain under the law of subtraction. But could we go the opposite route and conceive of a distinctly positive event? Could we envisage an event leading to multiplication of discernible differences (see Hallward 2006: 81) instead of one leading to subtraction? Might there be events that bring human beings closer together instead of separating them from each other? Can Badiou's thought be stretched to include events that bring forth the rainbowlike plenitude of particular identities instead of the "stellar abstraction" of pure equality?

Before discussing Badiou's theory of love, I will show an alternative way to back up Hallward's reading. It has to do with Badiou's claim that mathematics is ontology. This position is very hard to hold, in view of Paul Cohen's convincing argument that mathematics is not a matter of pure and objective, Platonic being (see Popper 1992: 26). As there are axioms in mathematics, the truth of which cannot be deduced but has to be decided, we can well argue that at least for these important parts, mathematics is not the science of "pure being", but rather belongs to that part of being which is of explicitly human construction. In other words, it seems that mathematics is an emergent property of being, the sort that no longer automati-

cally refers back to anything objective (in Popperian terms, mathematics belongs to “world 3”). If, as it seems, there are parts of mathematics that are clearly subjective, then it is incorrect to deduce that the whole of being must be correspondingly subjective, according to some decision one makes in mathematics. This would bring us to the classical Parmenidian equation of being and thought. The Parmenidian position can be contested, since we have good evidence that human thought appeared rather late in the history of our universe. Therefore, because being obviously precedes human thought, it cannot be reduced to human thought. Furthermore, Badiou uses circular argumentation (with echoes of Lacan) to assert his notion that mathematics is ontology (e.g. Badiou 2005a: 11, 21–22; cf. 2005B: 138; also, Hallward 2006b: 233). Since the circular argument is an argumentative structure closed from external evaluation, it is also a form of subtraction from inter-individual relations in Hallward’s sense.

In *Being and Event* Badiou writes the following: “Philosophy is thus at the service of art, of science and of politics. That it is capable of being at the service of love is more doubtful ...” (Badiou 2005a: 341). Fortunately, this doubt has not prevented Badiou from writing about love. His theory of sexual love is indebted to Lacan, in that Badiou insists that the individuals in love have no relation with each other. Love takes place as the disjunction of two sexual positions, the “man” and the “woman”. The sexed positions come into being through an amorous encounter between two individuals. The individuals’ fidelity to this event constitutes love as truth procedure. For Badiou, love is not a matter of mutual recognition but of absolute disjunction: nothing is the same for these two non-related positions. Furthermore, in Badiou’s text “*Quest-ce que l’amour*” (in Badiou 1992) the essence of Badiou’s love is conflictive. For both positions, the other position appears as a “sophism that needs to be refuted” (ibid.: 270). This conception of love is essentially negative and undoubtedly linked to the operation of subtraction.

Badiou discusses love also in his book *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism* (Badiou 2003). The concept of love in this book is somewhat different from his sexual theory. In classical terms, his Lacanian sexual theory refers to love as *eros*, whereas the term at stake in *Saint Paul* is *agape*. In his reading of Saint Paul, Badiou (2003: 92) states that love is the name for a general medium through which faith works with regard to all singular truths: “Truth for Paul is never anything but ‘faith working through

love' (Galatians 5.6)." According to Badiou (ibid.), love thus means that a singular truth is for all. "The subjective process of a truth is one and the same thing as the love of that truth. And the militant real of that love is the universal address of what constitutes it." Badiou's interpretation is based on the assumption that, in Paul's discourse, truth (*aletheia*) is greater than love (*agape*). Badiou also writes that the translation of the word *agape* as *charity* "no longer means much to us". I am sceptical of both of these notions, and wonder whether they are based on Badiou's own system, where truth is above all else. Because of the emphasis on truth, Badiou, in my view, confuses faith and love. He represents the theological position that emphasises the aspect of *agape* as "love of God" over the aspect of *agape* as "love of neighbour". With Badiou, truth subsumes the neighbour as a consequence of the subtraction discussed previously. In Badiou's discourse love is submitted to a faith that is militant and, in my opinion, always singular (subjective) rather than universal (objective). In my opinion, truth must never dominate love, which also means: faith must never dominate love. Faith is singular, and must not be forced onto others (misunderstandings of this principle are abundant). Love can be thought as "the universal address of faith" only when the intention of faith is to liberate the other even when truths collide. *Agape*, as the love of neighbour, concentrates on liberating specific others regardless of faith. Henceforth love, as a matter of course, ceases to be militant. This notion, however, restores the meaning of charity as the conversion of oppressive and exclusive relations into liberating and inclusive ones.

In any case, Badiou's writing on love is an admirable rarity, as he subjects love to systematic treatment and gives it an ontological position in his system. Indeed, for Badiou, love is a matter of truth. Badiou's general notion of fidelity opens up a fresh horizon of thought oriented toward changing the world. His concepts are solidified in mathematical background, and his overall project serves as an exceptional inspiration to contemporary philosophical thought raising the question of what is to be done.

5. From hermeneutics of love to politics of love (Derrida, Rorty, Vattimo)

I will end with a brief discussion of hermeneutics, hesitation, affirmation and love. I take up these notions through the philosophers mentioned in

the title of the section. I will show hesitation in Derrida and Rorty, and affirmation in Derrida and Vattimo. My main aim is simply to point out certain passages of writing that show that all these philosophers hold love as the highest principle of thought. Even as these passages on love are singular, I argue that they are so central and unambiguous that an interpretation can be made on their basis as regards the philosophical projects of these thinkers on the whole. The problem for further discussion seems to be mainly what is meant by love.

What is hesitation? Hesitation is weak temporality. Hesitation means that the status of a singular relation is undecided and that negation and affirmation are both possible. In hesitation strong temporality as negation or affirmation is suspended or postponed. Hesitation as consistent pre-openness is the mode of hermeneutic thought (by which I mean the endless movement of discursive analysis in the hermeneutic circle). In deconstructive hermeneutics, hesitation forms the logic of metonymical transformation or distortion and appears as weak thought (e.g., Rorty, Vattimo) or as the dissemination of meaning as *différance* (Derrida). The limit of consistent hesitation is the concept of the impossible or the undecidable, the hermeneutic aporia. Logically, hesitation precedes negation and affirmation. Therefore hesitation also means that any logic in thought can be converted.

The French philosopher Jacques Derrida's thought exemplifies an individual's conversion (or return) from hesitation to affirmation. Hesitation is what Derrida (1999) means when he says: "Beneath it all, I don't know what I should do." Not to know what to do is an existential thought-event of hesitation. In Derrida's philosophy the principle of hesitation operates as the endless postponing of the vertical conjunction between the signifier and the signified in the metonymical chain of signifiers. The principle of *différance* postpones meaning and thus constructs an eternal before: time as not yet. As Hallward puts it: "Deconstruction is the constructive orientation of thought turned against itself" (2003: 161). For Derrida, however, hesitation was hardly reducible to "not knowing what to do". For the deconstructionists, hesitation is a rigorously upheld ethical programme. The deconstructionist argues that all positive stances, all affirmative action in defence of a principle, already contains a seed of fanaticism or fascism. Therefore, one is to withdraw from any simply definable position. For a detailed analysis that shows hesitation as an ethical project of Derrida,

upheld with much rigour, I point to Simon Critchley's book *The Ethics of Deconstruction* (2002). Critchley shows the ambiguity of the Derridean affirmation, as it is "unconditional" on the one hand, but manifests itself only in hesitation, on the other. According to Critchley, the decision not to decide is what is crucial in Derridean ethics. He argues that insisting on the undecidable constitutes an impasse for deconstruction with regard to political thought (ibid: 236). The sphere of the political seems to remain out of reach for deconstruction, unless supplemented with decisions.

In the end Derrida had obviously converted his thought from hesitation to the affirmation of appearing relations in the social reality. A Finnish philosopher, Susanna Lindberg, told me that at Derrida's funeral, his son, a poet, read the following note (which I have now translated to English from the Finnish version that I heard), which Derrida had written just before his death (Derrida 2004): "Smile. I too am smiling, because I love you." The text is unpublished, and therefore is not a probative source in the scientific world. Yet to me personally, on the level of "personal thought", it is the meaning of Derrida. My reading of Derrida's philosophy can then be compressed to the following argument: The one who hesitates must smile in order to grasp the meaning of love. In his last unpublished text, there is no question of hesitation as Derrida's discussion of smiling and love is given in the form of an imperative, a command: smile.

In a recent discussion with Vattimo, Richard Rorty said the following: "The hermeneutical ... attitude is in the intellectual world what democracy is in the political world. The two can be viewed as alternative appropriations of the Christian message that love is the only law" (Rorty and Vattimo 2005: 74). In his essay "Anticlericalism and Atheism", Rorty writes: "My sense of the holy ... is bound up with the hope that someday ... my remote descendants will live in a global civilization in which love is pretty much the only law." But then he continues: "I have no idea how such a society could come about." If Rorty has "no idea" how to pursue a society of love, which he hopes for, then his position is obviously weak.

In his essay "Age of Interpretation" Gianni Vattimo writes: "... our only chance of human survival rests in the Christian commandment of charity." There is not much weakness in this position, since charity seems to be a matter of obeying a commandment.

I accept Rorty's and Vattimo's notions on the hermeneutics of love. If love is the only law of hermeneutics, then the task of hermeneutics is

to be the conversation of love. I believe, however, that hermeneutics as interpretative conversation is not enough. As long as history is interpreted and not affirmed, thought cannot move forward to the construction of an affirmative agenda concerning appearing relations (see Figure 3). Hesitating thought moves within the cyclic form of the hermeneutic circle. It programmatically rejects decision-making that would convert thought into linear, forward motion. This is why Rorty's thought cannot account for the question of how to actualise the content of hope, which in Rorty's case is "the global civilization of love".




Figure 3. *The subject's transition to love.*

If all thought participates in the being of the world, then one cannot separate the intellectual world from the political world, or interpretation from production. Thus, the construction of an affirmative agenda of a politics of love is necessary. From my point of view the biggest problems in the world are the destruction of the planet's environment, economic exclusion as poverty and suffering, sexual exclusion as the oppression of women, and ethnic or religious exclusion as war and murder. The conversion of exclusion into non-violent inclusion can only start in the heart of individuals. We must stop excluding others from our hearts. I believe that love will unfold as a rational and sustainable long-term solution to many important problems with which the human species struggles.

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Mayra Rodrigues Gomes

The writings of censorship: An exercise in implicitation

This article presents partial results of a research project about censored words in stage plays. In order to understand the censor's point of departure, this study applies concepts of implicitation, thus pointing out a special kind of writing, created by the censor, about desire and power.

1. Research and method

I coordinate a research line, called *Power and Speech in São Paulo*, which is part of a larger study of the contents of the Archive Miroel Silveira.¹ The Archive is made up of 6,203 censorship proceedings concerning stage plays, issued by the Department of Public Amusements of the State of São Paulo, Brazil, from 1925 until 1970. Our studies concentrate on the stage plays "approved with cuts", hence those from which passages, expressions or words have been censored. The Archives contain 1,304 stage plays in this condition.²

Many authors have already pointed out the role of repression in making history and fixing specific world views. They understand this process as related to nourishing and supporting the established power. Equally, studies on speech restrictions have noted the points on which, because they are vital to social organization, censorship falls. Michel Foucault said that, generally, desire and knowledge will be the objects of attention. Knowledge merits concern because it is of interest to power and its correlated organization. Desire will be supervised because it infuses scenes with affects, thus fixing them firmly in the mind of the spectator.

These considerations have oriented us in a study that tries to isolate the subjects privileged by censorship, the censor's *modus operandi* and the production of sense that has its origin in the strategy of power maintenance, which censorship materializes as tactics. When we work with forbidden

expressions, we are in effect reading the censor's reading, and we understand that these interdictions compose a kind of writing of its own.

For this purpose, it was imperative to consider the censor as circumscribed by social and historical conditions that both legitimate and orient the censor in his/her work. For this purpose, discourse analysis was used, because it incorporates the concepts of dialogism and inter-discourse, which help us to understand the cultural stratifications that cross over and through a text.

On the other hand, our reading of the censor's reading brings to light a game of interpretations/inferences. In relation to this condition, another methodological approach invites us: the theory of *implication*. The censor reads the implicit meanings, such as allusions and insinuations, on which he bases his interferences. As it happens, the censored word, by itself, would not be found objectionable. But in its context, which conveys other meanings, it turns into an object of prohibition based on an implication. The work of Oswald Ducrot has helped us in this line of inquiry. According to Ducrot, presuppositions are related to the logical and existential conditions of an enunciative act. Although presuppositions often apply to larger discourse formations that often sustain as imaginary both the author's and the censor's discourses, the two are not necessarily equivalent. The censor engages in discourse having a legal dimension, with the State apparatus to support him. The latter charges the censor with preserving such things as good habits and manners, the family, the feminine image, the figures and institutions of government, etc.

In turn, the implied meanings present themselves as implications produced by the relations between enunciate and context. The implications are effects of sense, arising from an interpretative operation by the spectator. These may be produced from the enunciated text or from the context of a phrase, and, in the case of staging, by voice intonation, gesture, and facial expression.

The censor, in his own interpretative work, accomplishes a complex reading operation with the logic of implication that demands construction of a calculus of the text and that we may categorize as contextual inference. This calculus has to consider the possible readings of spectators of the stage play, in order to judge the implications that a meaning may carry. Thus, there is work on two levels of implication: one, on the level of the

text itself, and the other of possible readings by the spectator, according to socio-temporal coordinates.

This calculus is combined with the one of situational inference, because it ponders the projections of different interpretations given by the actors. It is further combined with one of inter-discourse inference, since it considers the dominant discourse formations that subsume valorized social habits – a common understanding of the world as an already-given organization to be preserved by the constituted power.

Based on all these readings, the censor will make his judgment about whether the play is to be allowed or not. Our study of forbidden words and passages must therefore retrace the censor's reading trajectory, and follow the play between presupposition and implication, in order to throw light on the process.

After two years of working with our corpus, and oriented by the methodology presented above, we have verified that the major part of the censor's cuts may be classified as being of moral order. As censorship of moral order we understand the prohibition of obscene words, of expressions and words related to sex, of offenses to the family institution – in short, of words against good behavior.

We work with a broad censorship typology, divided into four major *topoi*: censorship of moral order, political order, religious order, and social order. It is an operational division. From the classical opposition between State and People, the two last classifications converge, respectively, into the first ones. From the first play in the Archive until the last, we observed this type of intervention, appearing in 53 % of the studied plays. When combined with religious censorship, we arrive at 62%. As a demonstration of our procedures as well as of the cases, we now analyze the first and the last plays.

2. *On moral censorship – On disciplinary measures*

The first case is the vaudeville *It Is Time*, written by Goulart de Andrade and censored in 1925. It consists of a satire about Adam and Eve in paradise. It begins playfully with Eve, climbing on a banana tree and peeling bananas, when the Censor Angel arrives and commands her to use leaves from the waist down. Among the various censored words of a moral order, there is the moment in which Eve says “I only climbed the stick” – a phrase

that was forbidden.³ The polysemic conditions of the word “stick” motivated the censor’s cut, since it may refer to the masculine sexual organ as well as the tree. Thus, the action described may indicate that Eve climbed the tree and/or had sexual intercourse. However, in the malicious context of the vaudeville, the sexual relationship between Adam and Eve is constantly insinuated. This fact certainly authorizes the censor to read in the phrase an implied meaning to be materialized in the spectator’s interpretation. As it happens, the implied meaning refers, beyond the alluded sexual relation, to the masculine organ in slang or vulgar language. This motivates the censor’s action in defense of good habits, now viewed as a vocabulary matter.

The historical insistence on proper speech reveals the assumption that words lead to acts. This insistence is confirmed by the fact that 43 years later, in 1968, we still find the same type of moral intervention. Also a vaudeville, *The World Is Boiling*, written by Alberto Vinar and censored in 1968, was allowed to play, but with some cuts. It is composed of several short acts. The first of them defines the name of the play, since two show-girls talk and sing about how mankind is in a difficult situation; hence “the world is boiling”. Because of this, they say that “the stick is going to eat” and narrate situations in which they heard this expression being used. This popular expression, in Portuguese, signifies that there will be fights, rows and beatings. At the same time, it also may indicate a sexual relation in “double feature”, so to speak, because stick refers to penis and eat to copulation.

Expressions using the word “stick” were censored in diverse situations. Here is one example that clearly shows the censor’s reasoning. A dating couple is caught kissing on a park bench by the girl’s mother. She sends the daughter home, saying that there “the stick is going to eat”, after which the boyfriend tries, insistently, to enter her house. The police are called and the boyfriend explains: “Her mother saw us kissing and said that the stick was going to eat inside the house. *I thought it was an invitation.*”

The last part of the boy’s explanation was prohibited by the censor because it defines one signification within the expression’s double sense. Without the censored phrase, the implied meaning is erased, the boyfriend seems to say that he tries to enter the house to protect the girl from the fight with the mother. The censor works on the text’s implied meaning, not interfering in the expression itself, but on the indexical operation that takes away the double sense of the game.

We must point out that, between these two stage plays, which open and close the Archive, we have works manifesting a rich and varied cultural multiplicity. There is a preponderance of comedies, such as the ones we just examined; but there is also a strong presence of drama and socially engaged plays, some of them by Brazilian authors, but many of them translations of successful foreign authors. Such is the case of *An Enemy of the People*, by Henrik Ibsen, which underwent censorship in 1963. This very controversial play, crossing politics and ethics, was staged at a moment of crisis in Brazil, under Jango Goulart's government; it went almost entirely untouched by the censor, with the exception, again, of a moral-order prohibition. The censor applies himself in the elimination of the word "shit" in the phrase "*Shit!* Oh... sorry. This changes everything". This word is employed as an interjection and, in colloquial language, it expresses an unpleasant surprise. The character, the publisher Aslaksen, reacts this way when he understands the financial consequences of publicizing the contamination of the waters described by the mayor. Aslaksen goes on to apologize after using the censored word.

Given the preponderance of moral censorship applied to the plays, we should ask about the reason for it. We remember that the Archive Miroel Silveira covers two extended authoritarian governments in Brazil. In this period, we have stage plays that criticized and mocked the dishonesty and incompetence of leaders. Nevertheless, it is not censorship of a political order that prevails, but rather that of a moral order, within which expressions related to sexuality especially fall prey to the censor's eraser.

3. Morality and politics, desire and power: An exercise in implicitation

Seduction and coercion have a role as disciplinary processes that reinforce accepted coordinates of conduct and legitimated moral attitudes. The censor seizes on and removes words that may imply possible alternatives to those accepted by the community. From this point of view, censorship is a tactic, within a larger strategy of containment and control, orchestrated by disciplinary measures. Hence censorship is always of a political character, even when it is treated as of a moral order. Therefore, we should inquire about the political role of the moral censorship incidents that we have presented.

To this effect, we shall remember that moral censorship falls on bodies and their ways of being, such as gestures, speeches, public demeanor. We shall also remember that censorship impinges on the exercise of sexuality. Nevertheless, the way a body must be enjoyed supposes a way life that accords with social dictates, with prevalent rules in a culture, and with a social group at a specific time. If not, the door is opened to the formation of inadequate subjectivities, in other words, dysfunctional and unproductive individuals from the point of view of the social order.

All considered, it is understandable that moral-order censorship falls mainly on sexuality, since it directs the manner of social being, the subject positions to be lived, positions that may or may not be in the best interest of the social scene. From the forbidding of words that refer to the body, it is a small leap to attempts to control all undesirable conduct and references thereunto.

At this point, we shall return to the initial thematic distinction of censorship of moral order and censorship of political order, now in view of our findings. As we said before, from the point of view of power relations, all censorship has a political character, in the basic senses this concept conveys. Censorship is always political because it is a system of rules that feed the State, because of its conformity to government program, its relation to the administration of public business, and its use as an instrument by those in politics. Moreover, censorship as a disciplinary agency is intrinsically political in its educative function. It is very clear that the disciplinary role of censorship is one tactic for retaining power. And the fields of its incidence emerge as zones that become propitious to its exercise. The fields of morals and politics recur often as the sites of censorship. Pertinent here is Foucault's observation:

We only would note that, nowadays, the regions where the grille is more tightened, where the black holes multiply, are the regions of sexuality and politics: as if those discourses, far from being a transparent or neutral element in which sexuality disarms itself and politics is pacified, was one of the places in which they themselves exert, in a privileged manner, some of its most fearful powers. (Foucault 1971: 9–10)

As thematic fields in the Archive Miroel Silveira, sexuality and politics belong to the same regime when it comes to censorship: social adminis-

tration, by way of the supervision of subjectivities in which they are both inscribed.

In the writings of censorship, sexuality and politics are inseparably blended together. The main reason for this mingling lies in the fact that the censor's intervention is based on presuppositions of a political order, which always signalize implied meanings of moral order. As such, the writings of censorship tell the tale – a parable – of ways of living submitted to ways of power.

Notes

1. Thematic Project *The Scene Paulista – A Study of Cultural Production in São Paulo from 1930 to 1970 based on the Archive Miroel Silveira of ECA/USP*. Sponsored by FAPESP. Electronic address www.eca.usp.br/censuraemcena.
2. In the list of references, “DDP” plus a number is the code name of the process that contains the stage plays mentioned in this publication.
3. In the excerpts from plays, we have italicized the expressions that were censored.
4. In the English translation of this play this passage usually appears as: “But, damn it all – I beg your pardon – this is quite another matter, Mr, Hovstad!” Only in the Brazilian translation does the word *shit* appear.

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Nathalie Roelens

La censure comme un cas de méprise communicationnelle

Introduction

Mon objectif n'est pas de donner un aperçu historique de la censure, préventive à ses débuts, répressive dès l'invention de l'imprimerie, etc. Je me propose d'interroger le phénomène "censure" comme un objet sémiotique, voire médiologique. J'évoquerai la casuistique qu'elle met en jeu (œuvres diffamées, interdites, passées sous silence, saisies, brûlées, épurées, filtrées, caviardées, falsifiées, et, dans le cas des images, retouchées, maquillées, floutées), mais également les instances, les discours de justification, les pratiques, les dispositifs, les axiologies, les implications éthiques, juridiques ou sémantiques qu'elle engage et, partant, les effets-retours (négociation, clandestinité, contournement, dissidence) qu'elle suscite.

1. Censure comme rupture

1.1. Le terme "censure"

D'emblée la "censure" apparaît comme un *joker*, un signifiant qui se remplit au gré de celui qui le détient, au gré du contexte. Elle accompagne en effet les *passations de pouvoirs*: époque des guerres de religion, Ancien Régime, Révolution. Une tendance se dessine toutefois : de religieuse au début, la censure devient morale au 19^{ième} et au 20^{ième} siècles, condamnant l'outrage aux bonnes mœurs, pour ensuite redevenir religieuse depuis peu.

Or, non seulement la censure est l'arme-joker des pouvoirs en place, mais fonctionne elle-même comme une *passation de pouvoir*, ou plutôt, en termes communicationnels, comme une série de *tours de parole* où chacun s'évertue à avoir le dernier mot. Il suffit de penser aux *Fleurs du mal* de Baudelaire, où la parole poétique publiée le 25 juin 1857 sera aussitôt relayée

par d'innombrables discours qui vont s'emparer du sujet: l'éreintement dans *Le Figaro*, le dossier de notes présenté par le poète lui-même au tribunal correctionnel, le réquisitoire d'Ernest Pinard, avocat impérial, qui insiste sur l'outrage fait à la morale publique, la plaidoirie de l'avocat de Baudelaire, le jugement qui condamne l'auteur à une amende et l'oblige à expurger le volume, etc.

On le voit, l'ouvrage devient une parole parmi d'autres, un *dire* qui émerge à peine d'une rumeur, d'un bruit qui se substitue à la parole première. La fin de la censure coïnciderait sans doute alors avec le *silence*, un silence d'approbation. Pour Baudelaire celui-ci fut acquis en 1949, lorsque la cour de cassation annula le jugement de 1857.

Dans ses fluctuations historico-juridiques il faut cependant distinguer une constante: la censure se prétend toujours dotée d'une légitimité, valorisée positivement et, partant, détentrice du dernier mot. Au lieu d'être une *nég-ociation*, la censure est un acte unidirectionnel qui se revendique d'une vérité absolue. Ce qui fait que la *Zensur* freudienne comme refoulement semble encore à l'œuvre dans le geste de censurer. Car on pourrait appliquer ici ce que Michel Foucault avait appelé "dénégation théorique" dans le domaine pénal: "L'essentiel de la peine que nous autres, juges, infligeons, ne croyez pas qu'il consiste à punir; il cherche à corriger, redresser, 'guérir'; une technique de l'amélioration refoule, dans la peine, la stricte expiation du mal et libère les magistrats du vilain métier de châtier" (Foucault 1975: 17). Une même logique sous-tend la censure: elle est euphorisée par les censeurs qui, par là, censurent la possible perversité de leur acte. Ce qu'il vont déceler dans les œuvres c'est toujours une intention malveillante, une allusion perfide, bref le Mal qu'il faut extirper comme un *mauvais germe*. Or Robert Netz a raison de montrer sa stupéfaction devant ce postulat: "L'idée même de la censure implique que Sade mène aux turpitudes et que Paul Claudel conduit à l'angélisme. Illusion! ... N'importe quel livre risque d'entraîner une corruption. D'innombrables vies ont été marquées par des romans anodins. Et que de crimes commis par des hommes qui hier brandissaient la Bible, et aujourd'hui le Coran" (Netz 1997: 122). Une même mise en garde régit la thèse de Marie José Mondzain quant à une possible violence intrinsèque des images: "Culpabilité et responsabilité sont des termes qui ne sont attribuables qu'à des personnes, jamais à des choses. Et les images sont des choses" (Mondzain 2002: 13)

1.2. Terminologie religieuse, médicale, guerrière

Les *Fleurs du mal* avaient été taxées “d’hôpital ouvert à toutes les démences de l’esprit, à toutes les putridités du cœur...”. La censure témoigne dès lors d’une incompréhension face à la sémiotique de l’objet censuré. D’où l’afflux de métaphores stigmatisantes, d’où le recours à une terminologie religieuse ou médicale: purification, épuration, purge. Emile Zola a mis le doigt sur cette fougue métaphorique dans l’affaire du “Salon des Refusés” de 1863, peintres novateurs que les jurés du Salon officiel avaient non seulement refoulés et conspués mais encore “tués” (Zola 1866) par l’accrochage défavorable dans la salle voisine que Napoléon III finit par leur allouer. On peut distiller ici une forme de censure sournoise qui consiste à couper de l’attention, à escamoter ou, au contraire, à exhiber sans ménagement et par dérision comme ce fut le cas de *La jeune fille en blanc* à la chevelure dénouée de Whistler. Zola restitue parfaitement “ce pêle-mêle carnavalesque” dans son roman *L’œuvre* de 1886. Ce fut *Le Déjeuner sur l’herbe* qui provoqua le plus d’indignation parmi la foule des spectateurs: “Emmenez ma fille, dit la pâle Mme Margaillon à l’oreille de Dubuche. Il se précipita, dégagea Régine, qui avait baissé les paupières; et il déployait des muscles vigoureux comme s’il eût sauvé ce pauvre être d’un danger de mort” (Zola 1983: 155).

Or, même si Zola critique d’art s’était vu contraint d’entamer lui-même un combat contre le conservatisme esthétique, il n’empêche que 30 ans plus tard, en 1896, Zola mesure la vanité de son combat de l’époque, désenchanté par les abus des épigones du plein air, “convertis” avec “trop de ferveur” (Zola 1896) au luminisme. On le voit, la lutte appartient donc autant à celui qui milite, se bat pour, qu’à celui qui interdit, combat, refuse. Autrement dit, c’est parce que la censure est belliqueuse qu’il faut s’armer pour s’y opposer. On retrouve la logique des *tours de parole* qui deviendra de la *surenchère*. Zola a dû s’armer pour défendre les peintres du plein air, allant jusqu’à la croisade: “Ah ! Seigneur, ai-je rompu des lances pour le triomphe de la tache!” (Zola 1896). On l’a traité de fou. Tandis que c’est maintenant lui qui sévit contre les épigones.

1.3. Rupture de la communication

Couper de l'attention, mettre à l'écart, stigmatiser, tous ces gestes peuvent se résumer comme une rupture, ou du moins une perturbation, du circuit communicationnel dont les ciseaux d'Anastasia se font l'emblème. Censurer serait alors un acte de parole particulier: où le *dire* qui implique un *faire* est conçu pour couper la parole à l'adversaire, pour le *museler*, le *bâillonner*, le *faire taire*, pour *inter-dire*. A la fois c'est un *inter-dire* qui a besoin d'être *public*, même s'il gagnerait à être *privé*, discret, à être un *faire sans le dire*, car en disant publiquement qu'il interdit, il provoque un effet contraire à celui escompté, attire l'attention sur l'objet interdit, le met sur un piédestal, bref en fait la *publicité*.

Si le concept de censure est un concept mouvant, contingent, qui "épouse, dans sa diversité, la diversité de l'Histoire" (Netz 1997: 122), le censurable change dès lors également de visage, de même que toute la nébuleuse des droits, des devoirs et des infractions. Finalement, on se rend compte que la censure n'est qu'une histoire de tabous. Les seuils du *devoir* et de la *désobéissance* fluctuent dès lors en fonction des degrés de tolérance du *droit* et de la rigidité de l'*interdiction*.

DROIT
pouvoir faire/dire

INTERDICTION
ne pas pouvoir faire/dire

DEVOIR
ne pas pouvoir ne pas faire/dire

DESOBEISSANCE
pouvoir ne pas faire/dire

2. Censure comme ingérence

Ce qui est considéré comme une *désobéissance* par les instances censurantes peut être considéré comme un *droit* tout à fait légitime par l'instance censurée. La censure porte ainsi souvent atteinte à l'autonomie de l'art, impose le littéral au figuré. Dans ce sens elle est méprise car elle lit une *désobéissance* dans l'art et dans la fiction, de tous temps dotés de *licence poétique*. Pourquoi légiférer dans un domaine de liberté, dans une sphère privée qui possède un droit au fantasme qui lui est inhérent – les personnages de Dostoïevski n'étaient-ils pas des fous ou des assassins?

Les régimes qui ont nié la souveraineté de l'art et de la littérature, qui ont prôné le réalisme ou calomnié les avant-gardes, ont d'ailleurs souvent été totalitaires. Dans les régimes absolutistes la censure est en effet le corollaire direct de la propagande, car toutes deux politisent les images et les textes, les dépossèdent de leur droit à la fiction, exigent que toute lecture soit une lecture officielle et que tout art soit glorification du régime. D'où le rejet de toute forme de subversion plastique. Ainsi, dans l'exposition "Entartete Kunst" (*Art dégénéré*), que le 3^{ème} Reich organisa à Munich en 1937, les artistes d'avant-garde comme Kandinsky ou Klee furent exposés aux sarcasmes du public par leur rapprochement avec la collection des dessins d'aliénés du docteur Prinzhorn et, partant, par l'équation entre licence créatrice et maladie mentale.

Si le régime totalitaire ou religieux est réfractaire à la fiction, à la nouveauté, à l'humour, ou même à l'amour, comme le montre Milan Kundera dans *La plaisanterie* de 1967, c'est que ceux-ci pourraient ébranler le conformisme des foules dont le régime a besoin pour s'imposer. Plus on censure dans le domaine privé de l'art ou de la littérature et donc de l'appropriation solitaire, plus on est dans un régime totalitaire, qui d'ailleurs annule l'espace privé pour lui préférer les *grandes messes* des tribunes publiques où l'éloquence verbale a un pouvoir de fascination proche de la communion. Mais un même raisonnement explique, à une époque où la censure redevient religieuse, l'affaire Rushdie, Tasleema Nasreen, Theo Van Gogh, ou encore le tollé soulevé par certaines affiches de cinéma qui sont le fruit d'une création originale, par exemple celle pour *The People vs Larry Flynt* de Milos Forman (1997) ou celle pour *Amen* de Costa Gavras (2002). Le montage photographique entre connotation chrétienne et altérité (en l'occurrence le nu ou la croix gammée) a été perçu à tort comme une assimilation, une équation. Mais c'est surtout en tant que geste artistique que le montage semble choquer. On n'aime pas la fiction sur la place publique. L'homme de la rue lit les images au premier degré, sans la désinvolture nécessaire pour apprécier la fiction. Contrairement aux photos des campagnes Benetton où le scandale est obtenu par l'énoncé, ici c'est au niveau de l'énonciation, du "bricolage" artistique que s'installe l'hérésie (voir Roelens 2007).

3. *La censure relève d'une juridiction temporelle et spatiale*

Tantôt, c'est le décalage entre l'horizon d'attente et l'œuvre qui choque: telle œuvre a pu être perçue à un moment donné comme “non simultanée, inactuelle, prématurée, attardée (Nietzsche dirait intempestive)” (Ricoeur 1985: 253). La censure est alors une réponse à une attente trop restrictive, voire intolérante: les esprits n'étaient pas mûrs au moyen âge pour l'héliocentrisme, en 1664 pour *Tartuffe*, ni en 1857 pour *Les Fleurs du mal* ou *Madame Bovary*. Gallimard n'était pas prêt en 1954 pour *Histoire d'O* de Dominique Aury (d'où les stratégies de contournement: publication chez Jean-Jacques Pauvert, recours de la part de l'auteur à un pseudonyme, Pauline Réage, etc.), ni en 1955 pour *Lolita* de Nabokov. N'importe quel écart par rapport à un canon esthétique souffre d'ailleurs de cette intempestivité. Aussi ne s'étonnera-t-on pas que l'urinoir de Duchamp ait pu secouer l'habitus esthétique des organisateurs du Salon des Indépendants à New York en 1917. Citons également l'exemple de Malevitch qui, brimé par le dirigisme du régime soviétique et du retour à la figuration qu'il imposait, se présente dans son dernier autoportrait de 1933 en prince de la Renaissance, avec un carré noir dans l'angle inférieur droit, “allusion miniaturisée” (Edeline 2006: 47) à son œuvre suprématiste de 1915 censurée.

La consécration dans l'après-coup, la sanction rétrospective – le Salon des Refusés devenu le mouvement impressionniste – montre la précarité de ce type de censure comme incompatibilité entre émetteur et milieu récepteur. L'intempestivité de l'œuvre se heurte donc à ce que Thierry de Duve appelle le “tribunal de l'histoire” (de Duve 1989: 36). Mais ce tribunal de l'histoire doit s'appuyer sur une jurisprudence, sur le droit coutumier et non pas sur un *Jugement dernier* irrévocable, susciter des différends et non pas des litiges.

Tantôt, le décalage est synchronique, l'écart étant cette fois territorial: la culture laïque qui défend la “doctrine” de la liberté d'expression offusque les cultures religieuses frileuses en matière d'ironie ou d'humour et vice versa. Les deux méprises se fondent finalement en une seule: celle qui ne distingue pas la césure entre fiction et pratique quotidienne.

Il faut reprendre la distinction entre espace *civique* et espace *public* telle qu'elle est développée par Régis Debray dans son ouvrage *Ce que nous voile le voile*. Tant l'intime, le privé, que le communautaire ont pour Debray

voix au chapitre dans espace public. Dans un lieu public (le musée, la rue, la salle de cinéma), la liberté est de rigueur. Il n’y a que dans un lieu civique (la commune, l’école), que la censure soit possible et même souhaitable. A supposer que des textes ou des images véhiculent des convictions, à quel titre devrait-on les confiner au domaine privé? “Aucun croyant ne peut, de son côté, s’estimer ‘bafoué’ ou ‘offensé’ par un livre ou un film qu’il n’est pas contraint de lire ou de voir. ... Le conflit des convictions est inhérent au pluralisme et au tohu-bohu d’une vie démocratique” (Debray 2004: 32). Comme je l’ai développé ailleurs (Roelens 2005), il y aurait néanmoins une gradation de susceptibilité de la part du public précisément selon les espaces investis: *la peinture ou la lecture* (confinées dans un huis-clos) jouiraient de plus de liberté que le *cinéma*, médium plus accessible aux masses, et le cinéma de plus de liberté que l’*affichage*, dès lors que l’affiche, s’exposant sur la voie publique, est perçue comme véridictoire, redevable de ses prises de position. Un autre élément préjudiciable serait la contemplation collective qui engendre des jugements hâtifs.

4. *La censure dans les sociétés libérales contemporaines*

Certes, le nouveau code pénal (1994) ignore désormais l’outrage aux mœurs par la voie du livre! En revanche il introduit un article peu univoque: “Le fait de fabriquer, de transporter, de diffuser, par quelque moyen que ce soit et quel qu’en soit le support un message à caractère violent ou pornographique ou de nature à porter gravement atteinte à la dignité humaine, soit de faire commerce d’un tel message, est puni de trois ans d’emprisonnement et de 500 000 francs d’amende lorsque ce message est susceptible d’être vu ou perçu par un mineur” (Netz 1998: 17). Soulignant le flou des termes (“message”, “violent”, “pornographique”) Jean-Jacques Pauvert rappelle que “contrairement à ce qu’on pourrait penser, l’efficacité d’une disposition de censure croît, non pas en raison de la précision de son énoncé, mais au contraire du flou de celui-ci” (Pauvert 2004: 123). Le vague des expressions permet en effet toutes sortes de dérives.

Dans les sociétés modernes, où la liberté d’expression est désormais un acquis incontesté, la censure et la propagande demeurent en effet sournoisement conjuguées: la censure devient souvent autocensure par soumission à l’orthodoxie médiatique. La pensée est mise au pas par l’embrigadement dans la culture du divertissement. Celle-ci s’impose à l’opinion et bâillonne

un patrimoine culturel soi-disant désuet. La censure devient *sensure* car elle régule le droit à la polysémie, au double-sens, voire au non-sens.

5. *Nouvelles formes de censure engendrées par les nouvelles technologies*

Tout comme l'invention de l'imprimerie avait généré une censure répressive et non plus préventive, Internet engendre une manipulation de l'accès aux sites Web. Bien que la *Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme* (adoptée par l'ONU le 10 décembre 1948) fasse de l'accès à l'information un droit inaliénable, certains Etats régulent Internet, par blocage ou filtrage de sites étrangers, falsifications de sites dissidents, captures d'écran dans les cybercafés, emprisonnement de cyberdissidents ou de blogueurs, amendes pour consultation de sites pornographiques ou politiques prohibés, contrôle de communications électroniques, le tout régenté par une cyberpolice qui filtre les contenus *subversifs* sur la Toile. La terminologie médicale abonde: "assainir le Web", "aseptiser le Réseau", "le purger de toute information critique".¹

6. *Censure et surenchère*

Plus les moyens de communication auront une diffusion étendue – une tribune publique d'une amplitude planétaire dans le cas d'Internet –, plus importante sera la surenchère, par laquelle j'entends soit une dénégation ironique de la part du censuré (Milos Forman muselant par un cache sa nouvelle version de l'affiche pour *Larry Flynt*), soit une réplique amplifiée de la part des censeurs à l'égard de ce qu'ils réprouvent: l'organisation d'une exposition porno-chic à Milan par Dolce & Gabbana en riposte au retrait de leur affiche en Espagne (2007), le journal publié de Robert Redeker *Il faut tenter de vivre* dans lequel raconte sa réclusion forcée suite à la fatwa lancée contre sa tribune libre du 19 septembre 2006 dans le Figaro "Contre les intimidations islamistes, que doit faire le monde libre?" etc. Corollairement, plus importante sera l'autocensure pour éviter cette surenchère.

Dans le cas des caricatures de Mahomet, publiées le 30 septembre 2005 par le quotidien danois *Jyllands-Posten*, les dessins incriminés – surtout celui où le prophète porte un turban en forme de bombe amorcée ou celui qui représente des musulmans recevant des vierges dans l'au-delà comme

récompense d'une vie exemplaire – sont déjà présentés en amont comme une réplique, comme une tentative de contribuer au débat critique sur l'Islam et l'autocensure. En 2005 l'écrivain Kåre Bluitgen ne trouva pas d'illustrateurs pour son livre pour enfants *Le Coran et la vie du prophète Mohamet*, ceux-ci craignant les représailles. La surenchère est ainsi déjà à l'œuvre en amont. En aval, la "Cartoon Intifada", à savoir: des commentaires, des republications, des plaintes, des excuses, des gestes de solidarité: comme le dessin de Plantu à la une du *Monde* (le 2 février 2006) qui reprend le dessin danois le plus controversé mais sous forme calligraphique avec la phrase "je ne dois pas dessiner Mahomet, je ne dois pas dessiner Mahomet, etc." en forme de Mahomet coiffé d'une bombe-turban, respectant ainsi ironiquement l'interdit de représenter le prophète; mais encore, des falsifications, des manifestations, des boycotts, des menaces de morts, des procès, et, enfin, une revanche en l'occurrence incommensurable avec le geste d'origine: à savoir, l'*International Holocaust Cartoon Competition* qui fut lancée en Iran le 6 février 2006 en riposte aux douze caricatures "infamantes" de Mahomet, sponsorisée par le journal ultra-conservateur iranien, *Hamshabri*, dont une qui montre Hitler au lit avec Anne Franc, une qui nie la Shoah ou, la gagnante, qui fait l'amalgame entre Israël et le nazisme (en représentant la construction d'un mur couvert d'une photo du camp d'Auschwitz entre le Dôme du Rocher et Jérusalem).

Tous ces cas de surenchère connaîtront une prolifération aussi diffuse que peut l'être le médium Internet. La censure n'est plus rupture de communication mais engendre une communication sans fin. Mais là encore il faut être vigilant, une nouvelle forme de censure se profile, salutaire cette fois. Lorsque les Iraniens lancent leur riposte en organisant un concours de caricatures sur l'Holocauste, l'*Israel News Agency* trouve une parade: en republiant ces caricatures (flanquées d'un avertissement en bandeau "Six Million Jews were Gassed, Shot and Hung During the Holocaust") et en lançant un SEO – *Internet search engine optimising marketing contest* – pour prévenir les sites d'informations des groupes terroristes iraniens et islamistes d'accéder à des positions importantes dans Google. De sorte que lorsqu'on cherche les mots clés "Iran holocaust cartoons" on tombe sur la *Israel News Agency* en première position.

Plantu avait mis le doigt sur le fait que, quoique médiocre esthétiquement, il faut ranger ces caricatures dans la catégorie de la fiction, de la parabole, du montage, de la métaphore (Mohamet est *comme* un islamiste

lanceur de bombes). La réplique des Iraniens se range cependant dans la négation des faits historiques, à savoir l'Holocauste, et n'a donc plus droit à l'immunité de l'art. L'humour est totalement entaché de malveillance, voire de négationnisme. La surenchère est ici disproportionnée au geste primitif. Or, les Israéliens vont rectifier cette disproportion en réintégrant la caricature dans le domaine de l'humour. En effet, le 14 février 2006 un groupe israélien annonça un concours de caricatures antisémites ouvert aux seuls Juifs.

La surenchère semble aller de pair avec une confusion des axiologies morales et religieuses. Tout acte est guetté, tout est susceptible de faire l'objet d'une fatwa même sur un territoire où la liberté de presse est de mise. L'Organe censurant n'est plus l'Eglise ni l'Etat mais soit l'économie de marché qui s'aligne sur les censures pour en tirer profit, soit la *political correctness*, à savoir les associations de minorités comme les laïques, les catholiques, les musulmans, les juifs, les créationnistes, les noirs, les homosexuels, les non-fumeurs, les handicapés, les enfants, les obèses, les étudiants, les banlieusards, les scientifiques, etc., bref, l'*opinion*. Foucault dans *Surveiller et punir* a déjà montré ce renversement du "panoptique", où la société entière peut contrôler l'exercice du pouvoir: "En fait toute institution panoptique, fût-elle aussi soigneusement close qu'un pénitencier, pourra sans difficulté être soumise à ces inspections à la fois aléatoires et incessantes: et cela non seulement de la part des contrôleurs désignés, mais de la part du public" (Foucault 1975: 241).

Conclusion

Tout ceci soulève une réflexion qu'on pourrait qualifier de "médiologique": le médium Internet suscite le dialogue sans fin, l'entropie communicationnelle. Entre la *rupture de communication* et l'entropie ubiquitaire, la censure est vouée à subir encore de nouvelles mutations, inconnues à ce jour. Qui aura le dernier mot dans la blogosphère? LEAVE A REPLY ...

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José Romero

Análisis de las caricaturas publicadas por El Diario El Universal durante el período noviembre 2002 – febrero 2003: Una mirada antropológica

En momentos en los que sectores en el mundo hacen frente a la arremetida colonizadora occidental, motorizada por estrategias dirigidas a resemantizar a diario una realidad que ubica a nuestros pueblos en lugares de enunciación desprovistos de legitimidad, se hace necesario antropologizar occidente; desnaturalizar los discursos y las prácticas que han servido de base para el despliegue de la dominación colonial/moderna.

Así, pues, la investigación fue realizada en el marco de la discusión modernidad/colonialidad/de-colonialidad en América Latina; esto implica entender la modernidad como una máquina generadora de desigualdades que oculta su cara colonial; constituida por la imposición de una clasificación racial de la población mundial, clasificación que constituye los cimientos para la configuración de un patrón de poder que opera en todas las escalas de la existencia cotidiana.

Se enmarca dentro de la actual coyuntura política venezolana. Se trabajó con una muestra que corresponde a las caricaturas elaboradas por Rayma Suprani, publicadas en el diario venezolano El Universal durante el período diciembre 2002 a febrero 2003, el cual corresponde a uno de los momentos de mayor confrontación en el país, el llamado “Paro Petrolero”.

El objetivo fue explorar los complejos procesos de construcción de identidades a través de las caricaturas. Entendiendo así, la identidad como el

discurso sobre la diferencia, se pretende recrear el imaginario desde donde se enuncian las mismas, dando cuenta de la realidad que estas construyen.

El abordar la identidad como una forma discursiva implica entender que su lugar de enunciación es la diferencia, la diferencia colonial, que se establece en términos de un yo, un tú y un él. El yo se refiere a la identidad mientras que tú y él se refieren a una alteridad cercana y una alteridad lejana respectivamente.

Esto hace posible introducir en la problemática de la identidad/alteridad las herramientas que nos facilita la semiótica para dar cuenta de los signos que constituyen la identidad en tanto discurso sobre la diferencia. Esta perspectiva permite abordar la problemática de la identidad desde una mirada semiótica entendida, "... no ya como un estudio de los signos, sino como una indagación con vocación científica de los sistemas y los procesos de significación ..." (Fabbri 1999: 56), es decir, entender que los signos no están fuera de la realidad, sino que la conforman, la constituyen y la modifican.

Es así como, la aproximación a dichas caricaturas parte de entenderlas como formas de construcción de una realidad social cuyos referentes simbólicos y de sentido están inmersos en un proceso de globalización "... caracterizado por la hegemonía de la cosmovisión liberal, la cual naturaliza su modelo de vida, no sólo como el único deseable, sino como el único posible" (Lander 2000b: 57) y articulados con el patrón colonial de poder y las jerarquías raciales que lo componen.

Este modelo se enmarca en un momento histórico donde el poder económico y militar corresponde a Estados Unidos; por lo que se ha de naturalizar no el modelo capitalista, en sus diferentes formas, sino una experiencia en particular, es decir, el que ha tomado forma en Estados Unidos en las últimas décadas (Lander 2000b). Este hecho no implica que la fórmula estadounidense es la única, sino que gracias a su posición dentro de la geopolítica planetaria y, específicamente para el caso de Latinoamérica, dicho modelo se presenta como El Modelo, e impone un velo que impide ver más allá del Océano Atlántico.

Bajo esta coyuntura, la hegemonía liberal presenta al mercado no como aquel que organiza el ámbito económico de la vida social, tal y como se plantea en la tradición liberal clásica, sino que se presenta como: el organizador de la totalidad de la vida social; con lo cual queda de lado la econo-

mía de mercado para dar paso a la sociedad de mercado e ir en busca de la utopía del mercado total (Lander 2000; 2000a; 2000b; 2002).

Un modelo que, a través de los procesos de desregulación de los capitales, ha hecho más profunda la brecha entre los que más tienen y los que no tienen; ya que en vez de dirigir a las poblaciones del planeta a mayores niveles de bienestar colectivo, ha elevado el número de desigualdades y exclusiones, tanto entre los países como en el interior de los mismos. Un modelo que no sólo amenaza a la biodiversidad, sino que amenaza también con acabar con “... la rica herencia de recursos culturales y conocimientos de pueblos aborígenes, campesinos y demás poblaciones que todavía no han sido plenamente colonizados por Occidente” (Lander 2000b: 55).

La investigación surge, entonces, no sólo como resultado de la preocupación por la coyuntura política existente en el país, sino del interés generado por un contexto global del cual Venezuela forma parte; así, se busca trascender el inmediatismo que ha circunscrito el análisis del proceso venezolano limitándolo a lo local, dejando a un lado sus implicaciones, articulaciones y posibilidades dentro del *sistema – mundo europeo/euro-americano/moderno/colonial capitalista/patriarcal* (Grosfoguel 2007).

En este sentido, se plantea dar cuenta no sólo del imaginario local, sino hacer visible la articulación de éste con el imaginario de la modernidad/colonialidad, en el cual se evidencia la construcción de una alteridad bárbara del colonizado y una identidad civilizada por parte del colonizador, es por esto que “... el problema del ‘otro’ debe ser teóricamente abordado desde la perspectiva del proceso de producción material y simbólica en el que se vieron involucradas las sociedades occidentales a partir del siglo XVI” (Castro-Gómez 2000: 206). Es decir, dar cuenta de las características sociales y materiales que hacen posible que el proyecto moderno/colonial se erigiera como discurso hegemónico, es decir, como “... el conjunto complejo de normas e imposiciones diversas que operan contra lo aleatorio, lo centrifugo y lo que se desvía” (Angenot 1989: 22 – 23).

En este sentido, el discurso de la modernidad/colonialidad señala los temas aceptables y las maneras de tratarlos, con lo cual establece quien puede decir qué y bajo qué circunstancias. La configuración del discurso moderno como discurso hegemónico, implica la saturación de todo el proceso de la vida social por la lógica que impone el mercado. El proyecto moderno/colonial y la identidad/alteridad que éste construye, se otorga el papel de enunciador legítimo y “... el derecho de hablar sobre las alteridades

determinadas con relación a él. El enunciador legítimo, que se dirige a un destinatario, igualmente legítimo, tiene derecho de mirada sobre quienes no tienen derecho a la palabra: los criminales, los niños, las plebes campesinas, los salvajes y otros primitivos” (Angenot 1989).

El proyecto genera una identidad universal, un deber ser, que no es más que la imposición de la imagen del centro sobre la periferia. Dicha imagen presenta a Occidente como el ser natural de la humanidad, y a su historia como el camino a recorrer de todas las sociedades del planeta para alcanzar así, el ideal moderno de progreso. La identidad construida por el discurso moderno/colonial implica la existencia de un sujeto ideal, representado como hombre blanco, mayor de edad y heterosexual, con lo que todos aquellos que no cumplan con estas características (negros, mujeres, indígenas, homosexuales) son construidos como alteridad bárbara y atrasada. Siendo así, entonces, la Modernidad “... una maquinaria generadora de alteridades que, en nombre de la razón y el humanismo, excluye de su imaginario la híbrididad, la multiplicidad, la ambigüedad y la contingencia de las formas de vida concretas” (Castro-Gómez 2000: 201).

La modernidad es, entonces, una forma de ordenamiento social, un discurso, una identidad que parte de un lugar legítimo de enunciación otorgado por articulación a un poder hegemónico, una forma de construcción global del mundo. Así pues, este mundo y esta realidad construida socialmente implican una mirada eurocéntrica/racista del mundo; que se presenta como proyecto emancipador de la especie humana, “... una salida de la inmadurez por un esfuerzo de la razón como proceso crítico, que abre a la humanidad a un nuevo desarrollo del ser humano. Este proceso se cumpliría en Europa, esencialmente en el siglo XVIII ...” (Dussel 2000: 65).

Es así, la modernidad, un proyecto dirigido a “someter la vida entera bajo el control absoluto del hombre bajo la guía segura del conocimiento” (Castro-Gómez: 2000: 203). Bajo este principio, queda desplazada la figura de Dios como personaje que decide los hechos de la vida individual social, erigiéndose al hombre como ser capaz de descifrar las leyes de la naturaleza y ponerlas a su servicio a través del uso sistemático de la razón, para alcanzar el control de toda forma de vida.

En el marco de la investigación se trabajaron un total de 50 caricaturas, de un universo de 115 que corresponden al total de caricaturas publicadas en el mencionado periodo (noviembre 2002 – febrero 2003); fueron abordadas a través del modelo de análisis denominado Teoría de la Integración

Conceptual o de mezclado (Fauconier 2001); cada caricatura es abordada como una unidad susceptible de análisis a través de segmentaciones de sentidos y como unidades mínimas de significación que permite abordar tanto el ámbito visual como el escrito de las mismas, abriendo así una vía de acceso a los sentidos que en ellas se ponen de manifiesto y se construyen. Dicha teoría, parte de que la producción de nuevos signos se da por asociación, es decir, se debe al proceso mediante el cual dos signos ya existentes entran en contacto a través de la asociación, generando así un nuevo signo.

La propuesta consiste en una figura romboidal cuyos vértices están formados, en primer lugar, por el espacio fuente (Source Space) y el espacio destino (Target Space), que son la base del análisis metafórico y son tratados como insumos dentro del proceso de elaboración de un nuevo signo. Los otros dos vértices de este modelo se ubican de forma vertical y se denominan espacio genérico (Generic Space) y espacio mezclado (Blended Space).

El espacio genérico es aquel que permite la asociación entre el espacio fuente y el espacio target. Es decir, es el espacio común de significación que ocupan, tanto el espacio fuente como el target, es el que garantiza la asociación, la existencia de un lugar de encuentro entre estos dos espacios, gracias al cual es posible la concreción de la metáfora y con esto la concreción de un nuevo signo. El propósito del espacio genérico es definir en un nivel muy alto la naturaleza de las estructuras internas de los tres otros espacios, en otras palabras, posee un papel unificador. El otro elemento, es el espacio de mezclado, que es donde ocurre la metáfora. En sí mismo es un espacio emergente que surge como producto de la asociación entre dos signos previos que tienen una relación en común.

A continuación, se presentaran caricaturas por cada dicotomía, para ejemplificar y mostrar el análisis. En primer lugar, tenemos una caricatura publicada el cinco de diciembre de 2002, la cual da cuenta de la dicotomía Civilización/barbarie, que presenta a un grupo de animales conformado por leones, culebras, conejos, sapos, cerdos, entre otros; quienes se encuentran reunidos frente a un televisor, observando una competencia y uno de los animales pregunta “¿Cómo va el partido?” y otro le responde “Civilización 3, Barbarie 1”.

En el espacio fuente encontramos a un grupo de amigos, quienes están reunidos viendo una competencia por televisión, en la cual hay un equipo que va ganando y, por supuesto, otro que va perdiendo; mientras que en el

espacio target aparecen un grupo de personas reunidas, quienes siguen a través de los medios de comunicación el desenvolvimiento del paro y de la confrontación entre la oposición y el gobierno que se traduce en la tradicional batalla entre la civilización y la barbarie respectivamente.

En el espacio genérico tenemos, pues, una reunión de amigos en busca de entretenimiento a través de la confrontación entre dos equipos/bandos contrarios; mientras en el espacio mezclado se presenta a una oposición garante de los valores de la modernidad, la civilización y la democracia, la cual aventaja, a través de las acciones llevadas a cabo en medio del paro nacional, a un gobierno bárbaro y, por supuesto, antidemocrático.

La siguiente caricatura da cuenta de la dicotomía Progreso/Atraso, fue publicada el trece de febrero de 2003, presenta la evolución del automóvil y por tanto de la industria automotriz. Aparecen cuatro fechas, 1953, 1973, 1993 y por último 2003; en cada una aparece un modelo de carro diferente que marca los cambios ocurridos en la industria a través del tiempo, con excepción del año 2003 en el cual aparece un burro y la frase “Modelo coupe...”.

En el espacio fuente encontramos la evolución de la industria automotriz desde 1953 hasta el 2003; mientras en el espacio target se aprecia historia de Venezuela, primero un convertible (1953), después un deportivo (1973), seguido de un compacto (1993) y por último, gracias a Chávez un burro (2003). En el espacio genérico aparece la historia, la cual sigue un proceso lineal y progresivo a través de una evolución que lleva a la especie humana de la barbarie a la civilización; mientras lo que se expresa en el espacio mezclado es que gracias a Chávez, Venezuela tomó el camino de la barbarie, alejándose del progreso y de la civilización.

La caricatura modelo de la dicotomía Democracia/Dictadura, fue publicada el veintiocho de enero de 2003; presenta a un hombre sin camisa y sin zapatos, totalmente despeinado, con los bolsillos vacíos, colgado de las manos por medio de cadenas; quien dice “La peor dictadura es la económica...” En el espacio fuente aparece la dictadura y sus brutales y bárbaras prácticas tales como la tortura física; mientras en el espacio target tenemos a Chávez quien ha convertido al pueblo en víctimas de torturas generadas en sus bolsillos a través de una dictadura económica. En el espacio genérico tenemos al totalitarismo como una forma bárbara de dominación que tiene como producto gran cantidad de víctimas; mientras que en el espacio mezclado se expresa que entre todas las dictaduras, la de Chávez es la peor,

porque se trata de una dictadura económica y como tal no permite el libre desenvolvimiento del mercado y de los beneficios que éste trae consigo. En este sentido, la de Chávez, es una dictadura que al cercenar la cristalización de la sociedad de mercado, secuestra las libertades individuales, la propiedad privada e imposibilita el acceso del país a la civilización.

La caricatura publicada el 21 de diciembre de 2002, da cuenta de la dicotomía Libertad/Represión, presenta a un joven vestido con los colores de la bandera venezolana, quien se encuentra montado sobre una patineta y exclama con la bandera en la mano “El único combustible para la democracia es la libertad...”. En el espacio fuente tenemos al petróleo como el combustible que mueve al mundo; mientras en el espacio target la libertad es presentada como el combustible que mueve la democracia. En el espacio genérico se ubica una fuente de energía que sirve como combustible para poner en funcionamiento una forma de transporte; mientras el espacio mezclado se construye la idea de que la libertad es el combustible que enciende la democracia y la democracia es el medio de transporte hacia la civilización, siendo que la represión es el combustible para la dictadura y por tanto, para la barbarie.

El veintiuno de febrero de 2003 es publicada una caricatura que da cuenta de la dicotomía Paz/Guerra; la cual presenta dos imágenes en contraste, la primera se titula “Discurso del gobierno” y consiste en un par de personas en uniformes militares, quienes cargan con un misil. La segunda imagen está titulada “Discurso de la oposición” y aparecen en ella dos personas vestidas con ropas hechas con los colores de la bandera, muy al estilo de los hippies en los años 60, quienes cargan una flor gigante. En el espacio fuente tenemos la relación existente entre la paz y la guerra; mientras en el espacio target encontramos la relación existente entre la oposición y el gobierno; articulados a la paz y a la guerra respectivamente. En el espacio genérico tenemos, la violencia asociada a la barbarie y la paz asociada a la civilización; mientras, en el espacio mezclado se expresa que el discurso del gobierno es un discurso violento que llega como un misil a la sociedad venezolana, propio de la barbarie; y por otra parte, se presenta al discurso de oposición como pacífico, civilizado cargado del colorido y la belleza de las flores.

La dicotomía Cultura/Naturaleza es representada a través de la caricatura publicada el veintitrés de Noviembre de 2002 y presenta a un cochino habitando en su ambiente, es decir, en una porqueriza entre moscas y

excrementos, quien realiza la siguiente afirmación: “La situación está esplendida...”. Así, en el espacio fuente, encontramos a un cochino totalmente satisfecho por el estado de su vivienda, la porqueriza; mientras que en el espacio target aparece un chavista totalmente satisfecho de vivir en tiempos de la Quinta República. En el espacio genérico aparece un animal completamente satisfecho por estar en su hábitat. De esta forma, el espacio mezclado queda conformado por la idea de que el chavista, cochino, cerdo, animal, al no tener cultura su mundo es “naturaleza” por lo que se siente feliz, satisfecho de vivir en una porqueriza llena de excremento, así como un chavista está satisfecho de vivir en la Quinta República. Es decir, los cerdos son felices viviendo entre moscas y excrementos, los bárbaros de vivir en la barbarie, los chavistas en la Quinta Republica.

La caricatura que da cuenta de la última dicotomía, Sujeto moderno/ Sujeto no Moderno, fue publicada el diecinueve de febrero de 2003, presenta un maniquí con ropa típicamente africana, una lanza y un escudo, esta imagen aparece acompañada de la leyenda: “Nueva temporada primavera – verano 2003. En el espacio fuente aparece un diseñador, quien presenta su colección de ropa para la temporada primavera – verano de 2003; mientras en el espacio target aparece Chávez, quien presenta al país su plan de gobierno correspondiente al año 2003. En el espacio genérico encontramos a un sujeto quien presenta su propuesta para el futuro, en el espacio mezclado se expresa que los planes de Chávez para el año 2003 son la africanización del país, lo cual devela el contenido racista de la caricatura, refiriéndose al prototipo que define a África como un continente poblado por tribus negras que viven en la miseria y en la pobreza, ocultando que el estado actual de esta parte del planeta es producto de siglos de intervención colonial por parte de los países europeos.

Al realizar el análisis de cada una de las caricaturas se logra establecer la existencia de una conexión entre la realidad social construida a través de las caricaturas de Rayma y una realidad social construida por el imaginario del sistema mundo moderno/colonial, la cual se expresa en los términos descritos por medio de la dicotomía civilización/barbarie; dividiendo al mundo en dos secciones, los países que están al norte, quienes son garantes de los valores modernos/coloniales de la civilización y los que están al sur.

Se puede señalar que dentro de la conflictividad en la cual se encuentra sumergida la sociedad venezolana, la caricaturista Rayma Suprani se hace partícipe de una de las realidades enfrentadas, en este sentido, al tomar par-

tido, sus caricaturas se convierten en un mecanismo para construir, legitimar y relegitimar una realidad social que se enfrenta a la realidad social que se construye y legitima desde los sectores afectos al gobierno del presidente Hugo Chávez. Las caricaturas construyen y legitiman identidades/alteridades que corresponden a las impuestas por el patrón de poder y con el discurso de la Modernidad/Colonialidad; es así, como presenta identidad/alteridad eurocentrada, occidental, civilizada, blanca, invisibilizando su articulación con dicho patrón de poder (Estados Unidos, Inglaterra, España), como es expresión de los valores modernos y por demás deseables, un deber ser natural y universal.

Esta identidad/alteridad contrasta con las identidades/alteridades enfrentadas en el conflicto venezolano; en este sentido el sector que se opone al gobierno del presidente Hugo Chávez, miembros de la elite blanca que ha ostentado, históricamente, el control del estado, es construido como una identidad/alteridad cercana a la civilización. Así, la oposición es presentada como el sector garante de los valores civilizados y de los valores modernos en la sociedad venezolana. Mientras la oposición es presentada como una alteridad pacífica y democrática, cercana a la civilización, Chávez, el chavismo y la Quinta República se construyen como una alteridad lejana a la civilización, cercana a la barbarie, o la barbarie misma, expresada a través de un régimen dictatorial, terrorista y hasta de corte nazista, el cual se opone abiertamente a quienes desde el centro, desde la razón abogan porque la libertad reine en el planeta.

Libertad que es la del hombre blanco, un valor Occidental que se aplica al resto del planeta como la expresión natural de la vida humana, libertad que impone sobre expresiones culturales de diversa índole valores universales, para juzgarlas, etiquetarlas y condenarlas a la desaparición, sólo por el simple hecho de no compartir las formas institucionales del mundo moderno.

En este sentido, Chávez representa para las caricaturas una alteridad que implica la llegada de la oscuridad a donde antes había luz, la llegada de la barbarie a donde antes había civilización. Una alteridad caracterizada por la represión del sujeto histórico impuesto por el mundo Occidental. Obviando que la oscuridad del sistema-mundo moderno es su cara colonial, es su colonialidad.

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Paolo Rosato

Pertinence and competence levels in understanding/ misunderstanding music

Each day people make different kinds of judgement on musical facts: composition teachers tell their students if a piece or a passage within it is correct or incorrect; composers ask themselves whether their new work is satisfactory or unsatisfactory; critics write that some new work is aesthetically interesting or not; listeners say what they liked or disliked about it; directors decide if some piece music is suitable to a theatrical performance or not; and so on. Everyone can either keep or change their first judgement, and even have other people suggesting they got the wrong first impression. Although these kinds of judgement are often expressed immediately, all of them involve a very complex and variously articulated thinking process. Judgement can in fact be pertinent from a syntactic point of view (for example, “this chord is wrong”), but not pertinent from a semantic or semiotic one (as “through such ‘wrong’ chord the composer expressed something”). The same goes for every level at which a musical fact can be defined. Again, a competent listener might hear and/or say that a chord is wrong, but this does not mean it is “bad” neither for her/himself, nor for a common listener. It follows that understanding/misunderstanding can act in different and contradictory ways, at different levels, within a same musical piece.

1. Tonal harmony

I am going to discuss just one aspect of such complex matter: tonal harmony and its related field of meanings. The starting point of this work is that tonal harmony can be regarded like a parameter-system governed by a centripetal force, within which an intrachordal hierarchy operates.

As Fulvio Delli Pizzi writes, “the complete and correct string of diatonic chords moving towards the tonic is claimed to be as follows: III-VI-IV-II-V-I. ... all movements from left to right are possible, but only the I can be followed by any of the other chords” (Delli Pizzi et al. 2004: 6–7).

Provided with this simple knowledge, even an inexperienced music student, or a student unfamiliar with the Western tradition, can write and/or play some strings of chords that will sound like tonal ones. In Raymond Monelle’s words, the student – even if not a native speaker – will be able to distinguish what is tonally “significant, and what is not, in the phonetic continuum of the language” (Monelle 2000: 5).

“Yet we know that the reality of music is not quite so dismal as the previous remarks may suggest, because a great number of morphological and syntactic swerves can interfere with chordal stability and centripetal forces” (Delli Pizzi et al. 2004: 7). Delli Pizzi defines the parameter-rhetoric as a cluster of “institutionalised swerves”, that is to say deviations which have been conventionalised by means of repetition through time, like the *topics* studied by Monelle (2000: 80). The most common swerves are the so-called deceptive cadence – the most common deviation “from the inevitable finality of a cadence” – and the possibility to introduce “at any point of the harmonic course ... one or more dominant chords whatsoever” (Delli Pizzi et al. 2004: 8). But what is important for this work is that these harmonic swerves are clearly recognisable, and not thought of as incorrect progressions.

Let us see just one of the six cases discussed by Delli Pizzi, namely the centrifugal step from V to III. V-III is possible “only in the progression V-III-VI-II (occasionally without II, and most often with VII in place of V)” (ibid.). Notice that this centrifugal swerve is counterbalanced by the introduction of the strong and tonically orientated progression of fourths and fifths. In this case, the centripetal logic is not completely neglected.

Our inexperienced student is now able to recognise several harmonic strings as tonally pertinent and significant. But what happens when an incorrect string features a tonal context? If it is featuring a piece composed by an inexperienced student or from one belonging to the not-tonal/post-tonal age, we’ll have an *unintentional* sign, a mistake caused by a mere lack in grammar: the student isn’t totally able to understand or misunderstands the tonal system (see Tarasti 2000: 71). But if the piece is by some experienced student, or by a composer from the tonal age, we’ll have to describe

it as an *intentional* sign, therefore a swerve from the system. We cannot describe it as a mistake, because “native speakers” fully possess their own language, even if not in a rational and conscious way. We are now entering the field of hermeneutics and semiotics. Moreover, according to Jurij Lotman (1977: 17), if we are dealing with artistic, fictional texts, we know *a priori* that nothing within such texts is casual or wrong. This swerve could reveal its meaning – or better, its sense – with respect to other features and processes within the text-system. Or it could have a connotative value, as in the case of V-III discussed above, of some “ancient modal” atmosphere. An analysis of the global text is needed to give an answer to the previous questions.

Let us now discuss some cases. As first, let’s consider a Renaissance piece where harmony is not built on intrachordal hierarchy. Example 1 shows a section from Jacques Arcadelt’s “Il bianco e dolce cigno” (from *Il Primo Libro di madrigali a 4 v.*, Venezia 1539), on the words “strana e diversa sorte, ch’ei more sconsolato, et io moro beato”. I have boldfaced the harmonic links out of any tonal logic: V-III (at measure 3), and II-III (between measures 6 and 7). In the first case, the reading in A minor reconstructed in square brackets is not possible as, in order to obtain a tonic different from the starting one (F in this case), a cadential chord is needed – that is, a V, a IV, or a II, but not a III. In the second case, the interpretation in D minor is once more impossible because a “minor dominant chord” is a self-contradictory concept. We can remark that some strings of chords resemble the tonal ones. From the middle of the seventeenth century on, the strings we call not tonal were less and less used. Through repeated listening sessions, we are able to recognise the harmonic links we define as modal.

a: [III II] bII I IV I III-I bII I VI
 F: I IV I II V I VI I V III IV [III II] II III I
 d: [III IV Vm] III-VI IV V †

Example 1. Jacques Arcadelt, *Il bianco e dolce cigno*, mm. 16–24.

Example 2 shows the middle section of Schumann's Walzer from *Albumblätter* Op. 124. At the beginning of the second line we find a V, and properly a VII, that moves to the III. This is the case mentioned by Delli Pizzi, with the harmonic progression moving towards the tonic. In this case, V-III does not sound as a modal link because of the tonal strength of the progression of fourths and fifths discussed above.

F: I IV II V (+6 6/4 6/5) I IV

F: V (VII) III VI II V

progression

Example 2. Robert Schumann, *Walzer* Op. 124 No. 4, *mm.* 17–28.

Example 3 is again from Schumann, the “Ritter vom Steckenpferd”, from *Kinderszenen* Op. 15. The piece is very fast, but at this level of the analysis we must distinguish between abstract parameter-systems and their actual realisation within the text-system. However, a III harmonic degree seems to appear after the V (between measures 1 and 2): in our interpretation, there are two passing tones, A from B flat to G in the bass line, and A from G to B flat in the middle voice on the right hand. The stress over this passing chord pertains to the semiotic level: in fact, the text shows a tendency to stress the last weak beats of each measure on chords that

become progressively more intense, imitating a child playing with a stick serving as his horse.

P P (+6 6/4 6/5)

F: V [III] [I] H
 d: V IV V I II I6/4 V I
 g: H I6/4

G: V
 C: H V

P = passing tone

Example 3. Robert Schumann, "Ritter vom Steckenpferd" Op. 15 No. 9.

Another case of deceptive chords, created by non-harmonic tones with a consequent shift of meaning, can be traced in Brahms' Intermezzo in A minor Op. 118 No. 1. Example 4 shows the first ten measures of the piece with two different tonal interpretations. The correct one, according to Delli Pizzi's criteria, is as follows: I – VI – H – (V/V) in A minor – H (V/V) – V – I – V – I in C major (see Delli Pizzi et al. 2004: 210). If the beginning of the piece was in F major, the tonally incorrect progression V – III – I would mark it. But we can notice that both *B flat* and *G*, respectively at the first and third measures, which could sound as sevenths with respect to the bass line, are actually *appoggiaturas*, as confirmed by the absence of the fifth within the presumed seventh chord, and also by the E (at measure 5) following the same melodic pattern. Neither analysts nor listeners with adequate competence level in tonal music would misunderstand this situation. Being a model both for listening and analysing, tonal logic allows us to recognise the correct denotative function of each chord. But getting the correct tonal interpretation, that is the correct harmonic progression in the piece, does not mean dispersing its ambiguity, that is the complexity characterising artistic texts. Moreover, ambiguity is possible only with reference to codified and conventionalised systems. This means that inexperienced or unfamiliar listeners are not able to understand the

harmonic sense of Brahms' piece. They would just hear a mere sequence of more or less indistinct and meaningless sounds.

JOHANNES BRAHMS

Harmonic analysis for the first system (measures 1-5):

a:	I			VI	
F:	V	III		(III)	I

Harmonic analysis for the second system (measures 6-10):

G:		V			
e: V					
C:		II	V	I	V
a: II					
F:					I

Example 4. Johannes Brahms, Intermezzo in A minor Op. 118 No. 1, mm 1–10.

2. *Meaning in music*

I agree with Monelle that “music cannot be described without reference to its meaning”, but what is meaning in music? Up to now, we have spoken of musical signification and sense without any reference to external and/or referential meanings. The tonal meanings we have dealt with, and all the presumed or actual deviations from tonal system, can be well understood only with reference to history and culture, the same way Monelle discussed musical topics (Monelle 2000). Following Tarasti’s terminology, let’s distinguish two kinds of semantics within musical objects and facts: interoceptive and exteroceptive semantics. Both of them need a common approach, using methods borrowed from human and natural sciences.

An analysis of a piece in terms of topics, or exteroceptive semantics, without any reference to parameter-systems and text-system, is an abstract analysis. The same goes for certain analyses of musical scores: here the problem is not the score, but what criteria the analyst adopts in her / his analysing it.

Eero Tarasti considers “the difference between these two questions: Do you like Brahms? Do you understand Brahms? One can *like* music; it can be enjoyed without being *understood*” (Tarasti 2002: 16). I agree with him when he affirms that “there is not such thing as one ‘correct’ way to understand music” (ibid.). Brahms can be enjoyed even by listeners inexperienced in tonal music, and, reversely, one can understand Brahms’ tonal strategies even if disliking his music. There are manifold ways to understand Brahms. Nevertheless, a hermeneutic approach is always possible. We can try to fill in the linguistic, cultural, social, and psychological gaps – due to the historical distance – between Brahms and his listeners until today. The problem of the distance between the author and the reader or listener is a common feature in artistic communication. To better understand Dante’s *Divina commedia* one has to know that in the Middle Ages the wolf – which Dante meets within the *selva oscura* (dark wood) – was not only a symbol for malice, but for voracity too. In the same way, when we listen to some musical pieces, we have to know in what kind of dance they were originally used, and so on.

We must consider also that semantic transformation occurs with time. In a famous poem, Dante writes: “Tanto gentile e tanto onesta pare la donna mia” (so polite and honest my woman is appearing), where the terms “pare” means “to become visible”, “to come into sight”. But in modern Italian, the verb “pare” is a dubitable term, meaning “to seem”, in opposition to “to be”. One misunderstands Dante’s thought if she/he gets that Dante’s woman just *seems* to be honest! The same goes for music: we would misunderstand most of the music from the twentieth century if we connected its chromaticism to the *pianto* topics mentioned by Monelle (2000: 66–73). Moreover, within the artistic text, a figure, a *topic*, a linguistic unit, can be subject to different operations, like in Bach’s work, where he freely inverts “a figure, even if this contradicts the topical reference” (Monelle 2000: 69). Artistic texts rely on basic denotative meaning in order to construct sense, but sense is more than a sum of meanings!

Therefore, if we lose the semantic competence with respect to literary work, we also lose most of its meaning. But in music we have two different, contradictory results, whether we lose the exteroceptive semantic competence or the intrareceptive one. In the first case, even without knowing the *pianto* figure – and its implication in expressing sorrow – we can enjoy Bach’s *Saint Matthew Passion*. In the second case, without knowing tonal

system, we cannot understand most of the text strategies used both in Bach's and Brahms' music. Again, a critical difference between interoceptive and exteroceptive semantics is that we can understand the latter only via information external to the text. Contrariwise, by means of repeated listening sessions of tonal pieces, we can reconstruct most of the rules of the tonal system, because – although they are the result of a historical process – they are regulated by an internal logic, as Delli Pizzi pointed out.

3. *Mistakes or intentional swerves?*

It seems like it is then impossible speak of a “mistake” in the production of artistic texts: what today seems to wrong and consequently bad and ugly, could totally change in the future, as in the case of the “torn jeans” nowadays so in fashion! Or, as seen above, a syntactic harmonic mistake can be regarded as an error only at a level of beginners in musical studies. What is then the role of rules within artistic musical texts? They seem to be needed only to allow some swerves or deviations, as in the case of the tonal system: it seems to be unproductive to adopt a law only for predicting the conclusion of a piece, because all of us know that in tonal music the tonic will be sooner or later achieved. What is interesting in music is not “that” but “how” a *unique* piece will get to its end. For this necessity, covering laws play a relative role, as in explaining historical facts, or, according to William Dray's words: “The sub-law is part of the explanation of the gross event, although it does not *cover* it; the same law covers the sub-event, although it does not *explain* it ... Satisfactory explanation, if it employs laws at all, employs laws only of the lower level” (Dray 1957: 70). In other terms, if we can regard a musical piece as a complex of parameter-systems, each one provided with its own specific, more or less compelling laws, no law covers the global explanation of that piece: the sub-competences related to each musical parameter – each one endowed with its pertinent signs – must fit an upper, more general level where a competence related to the “logic of the situation” is to be brought into action. With this approach we can enter the field of interpretation, or better, that of semiotics in its ultimate sense.

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Andy Ruddock

We're glad it's all over: Binge-drinking cultures

1. Introduction

Writing a book on critical audience research in the winter of 2005/6, it struck me that if I was going to tell people how to engage with audiences, perhaps I should do some empirical work of my own. The chapter I was writing at the time used Jenny Kitzinger's *Framing Sex Abuse* (2004) to argue that prosaic questions of how publics could be induced to change unhealthy habits, or at least think about changing them, were more intriguing than critiques of 'administrative' research would allow. At that time, I had noticed a number of interesting drink awareness messages across the city of Liverpool, where I then lived. Curious, I contacted Sandra Roscoe, Community Safety Officer for Liverpool City Council. I wondered if anyone had researched public reactions to these campaigns, and if not, was she interested in supporting such a venture? Several studies followed from that conversation, but this paper will focus on a student "alcohol diary" project. In this period, Liverpool City Council and South Liverpool Primary Care Trust were particularly concerned with youthful binge drinkers. Yet they acknowledged 'youth' covers a multitude of habits, tastes and living conditions. Their response to this differentiation was a branding exercise. Here "Pssst!" (which is both a sound used to discretely attract someone's attention and a common slang word for drunk) was adopted as the umbrella strapline for a number of campaigns that would use different themes to appeal to various groups of young people.

Student drinkers had been identified as a key focus for 2007, for even a casual glance at the city's bar scene showed how aggressively they were targeted by the drinks industry. The design team responsible for "Pssst!" however, were concerned by two things. First, they feared that the necessity to blend their messages with the 'brand image' of Council partner institu-

tions, such as the Police and Fire Services, shackled their instinct that what was needed were controversial and daring messages that could compete with the sort of material produced by the drinks industry. Second, they worried that design decisions were being made in the absence of insights on the whys and wherefores of student drinking.

Although the diary project aimed to provide this information, it was informed by recent developments in scholarly thinking on the place of media, and media studies within both health and youth policy. Combining a cultural industries perspective with an audience view that moved from “reception” to “participation”, the project offers ideas on how critical media studies can engage with public policy. The topic of alcohol is appropriate, since on a cosmetic level it appears nothing could be further from the truth. Even some communication scholars argue that media have little power one way or the other in binge cultures (Young 2004). In fact, the “Pssst!” study demonstrates the argument, that I have developed elsewhere, that this is an exciting time when media scholars can establish all sorts of research connections unimaginable in years past. However, barriers remain. Anyone attending health communication and audience panels at 2007’s International Communication Association conference would have seen the old theory/method divide in plain view; the former paid admirable attention to how key variables could be defined with a precision that made them applicable in the field; the latter continued to ask what “the field” is, and why anyone would want to go there. But neither spoke to each other. My own feelings emerging from this was that health communication scholars need to take a wider, more interconnected perspective on public discourses, while critical researchers need to construct a contingent yet relatively coherent methodological canon. Situated in the latter field, this paper will take baby steps toward this goal. Its bulk will consider the mechanics of the methods used in the “Pssst!” research, thereafter considering why its results should be reported at a semiotics conference, of all places. As befits the setting, the conclusion will consider the role “the text” might have in critical engagements with public health.

2. The “Pssst!” Project

34 students were asked to produce a “diary” that recorded alcohol messages encountered in everyday settings. These included flyers promoting

drinks and drinks offers; billboards; events sponsorship; advertisements from newspapers and magazines; radio and television ads; images of people drinking across all sorts of media and public health campaigns. Where possible, students were asked to make a “scrapbook” of such materials. The diaries also noted perceived lines of appeal.

When completed, the diaries were digitized and circulated among the cohorts. The students were then asked to write a report on the symbolic background to their drinking habits that suggested potential themes, messages and media for an alcohol awareness campaign.

The method was designed to overcome the marginalization of media in the binge drinking debate. Much is lost in reducing this role to the question of advertising effects. So framed, critics in both the UK and Australia have implicitly argued that media studies has little to say about problems mostly caused because alcohol is cheap and easy to come by. Communication scholars have, in some instances, contributed to their own fate by not considering how influence, or better significance, can be re-thought within the recognition that advertising cannot be thought of as a force that simply “does” things to consumers.

One place where this became evident was the 2004 OFCOM review on alcohol advertising in the UK. Against the background of calls for a ban, the media regulator commissioned studies on the effect such advertising has on children. Ultimately, OFCOM chose to side with Brian Young's experimentally based conclusion that advertising does little more than tap into the sensibilities of already alcohol soaked cultures. Given that drinks ads have at best a secondary, reinforcing role in alcohol consumption, it makes little sense to expend the energy needed to affect a ban (Young 2004).

This was, of course, a gross simplification of social communication processes. Nevertheless Young may well have been right that within the current OFCOM regime, where national media regulation is framed by economic rather than cultural principles (Hesmondhalgh, 2005), banning alcohol ads may be neither practical nor effective. In a media world where it is difficult if not impossible to prevent content access, perhaps it is better to encourage audiences to read the messages they do receive more critically. But this includes reflecting not only on messages, but on the industries that create them, and what their motivations are for doing so (Lewis & Jhally 1998). The diary method was designed to encourage these

activities, and to improve our understanding of how alcohol promotions work in Liverpool by contextualising advertising within the wider field of marketing and interpersonal communication.

3. Results

Campaign ideas emerging from this exercise, based on readings of student drink cultures and the role of marketing and advertising therein, tended to fall into two camps. Many suggested event, point of action strategies, such as offering free “Psst!” brand ice pops to drinkers which would (a) introduce the message, (b) physically stop them from drinking and (c) aid in rehydration. Others featured more traditional information campaigns that would play on typical student fears; assault, penury and failure.

All were based on the general sentiment that although it was preposterous to think that alcohol advertising made them consume products that they didn’t like, marketing did influence how much and how often students drank. The process perceived was not reinforcement, but amplification. If bingeing has always been a part of the UK student experience, it appeared to the people in this study that alcohol had now invaded every student space to the point where the “fun” they were supposed to be having was constantly drink related, often in dangerous ways. This was particularly the case around sex. As one student put it:

On 90% of the flyers and posters mentioned, sexual language, innuendos or suggestive images were used. An example of this would be at the “Mischief!” club night, where alcohol was given cheaper to “naughty nurses” or to students who took part in “Bikini wrestling”.

Implicit in the events focus was the idea that any effective strategy had to consider space as well as text. Although the content of alcohol advertising and promotional material was worrying enough, the “where” was just as important, in the students’ view. Many of the participants identified freshers week as a key action point, as it was here, in their opinion, that the agenda was set for the synthesis of “student” and “drinking”.

4. Conclusions: Culture, text, alcohol

So what are the conclusions from all of this, and why present them at a semiotics conference?

The paper opened with disparate fields: health communication and critical media studies. Seth Noar's review of the state of the art in the former (2006) indicates that scholars who use traditional social science methods are sympathetic to reconciliation. Noar argues that in truth, even well designed public health campaigns will miss most of their targets most of the time. Pragmatically, the solution is multidisciplinary approaches to studying and formulating communication policies, where qualitative techniques are welcome. His broad point is that success is maximised if projects have a clear theoretical foundation that acknowledges and takes steps toward investigating the diversity within audience groupings in a manner that makes those audiences participants in the development of health messages, and the conversations that surround them. Conversation is important, as messages have a better chance of being effective if they cross the media divide into everyday speech. Campaigners must spend more time with audiences, dissecting the things they worry and care about by any means necessary. This knowledge must be blended into campaign design, thus creating a dynamic relationship between lay and expert discourse. The idealised health text therefore becomes the product of a public, rather than an industrialized or technical process. Implicit in this argument is a useful reconfiguration of textuality that re-asserts the validity of critical media perspectives by rejecting the idea that health messages are externally produced and experienced objects that either succeed or fail in doing something to audiences.

Staying on an experiential level, texts remain relevant as a common point of origin for dialogues about alcohol cultures. In the work I have done in the last two years, conversations with colleagues, students and health care professionals normally begin with the phrase "have you seen ...". Wider public fears over products such as alco-pops similarly locate advertisements as points of origin in discussions over whether youthful drinking is a product of choice or seduction.

Beneath this lies a point of some substance: Situating advertising as resource rather than problem methodologically invokes the benefits of longitudinal & therapeutic research by drawing on recent audience theory

centred on the question of textual power. My argument begins with the work of Cornel Sandvoss. Sandvoss (2005) argues that this power does not begin in meaning, but the *absence* of meaning. The democratic potential of the text lies in its ability to offer the reader an external point of reference; much as in psychoanalytic discourse, where the therapist is the conduit through which the self can adopt an alternative view of thoughts and behaviours that appear entirely rational from within (Apel 1977). In contrast, the ideological power of the commodified text lies in its “mirror” status. Semiotically, agnostic texts allow audiences to read themselves through media in a way that guarantees they never have to confront or consider difference.

Sandvoss’ critique justifies the diary method in this study, which in many ways violated a number of the arguments made about naturalistic research. A frequent criticism made of the experimental work upon which Young based his conclusions is that we cannot hope to grasp the significance of advertising through techniques that abstract texts from their everyday contexts. Although the diary method had its roots in the everyday, the diaries themselves clearly represented a similar form of abstraction.

This can be justified on a number of levels. First, Kitzinger’s work, mentioned earlier, is an exemplar of an action orientation in audience research which participates in rather than observes the generation of health discourses. Applied here, this study began from the commitment that the narrow consumer perspective used in the regulation of commercial speech around alcohol allows the drinks industry to disingenuously claim that they do not force their products onto the public at the same time as pursuing marketing strategies where this is precisely the goal (see, for example, Carlsberg’s UK activities around the World Cup, as covered by Cooper 2006).

However, this abstraction reinscribed itself in the everyday in producing accounts that focussed on the spatial location and circulation of drinks promotions; this was important as it is very often the placement of texts that determines the extent to which they can be seen as controversial or offensive (Ruddock 2007), and because space is central in the politicization of youth cultures. Abstracting flyers and the like from their everyday context, thus stripping them of their common sense appeal, grounded critiques of “binge cultures” that also disrupted the entrepreneurial logic shaping neo-liberal educational policy (Kelly 2003). The idea that, in the

absence of compelling evidence for negative effects, consumers should be allowed to make sense of commercial messages about alcohol without state intervention, sits comfortably beside educational policies that define young people as individual consumers and beneficiaries of training regimes with no intrinsic *social* value, and thus no rationale for centralized support (Lantz 2005). That the young people in this study demanded the eviction of alcohol from some of their social spaces speaks to the potential of research that ejects text from context with the aim of provoking reflection on how, why and with what effect those texts are made and circulated. In the process, the research became about more than alcohol; it was also about the nature of the university's economic geography, and objections to the dominant framing of that space as a site of consumption rather than learning. Through this dialogue, students framed themselves as people with rights that extended beyond product choice. In asserting that alcohol be removed from some university events, the students resurrected the idea that education has a social dimension and value, in contrast to the consumerist polarity of educational policy.

Perhaps more importantly, these arguments were fed *back* to institutions who had some power to act on this. Design professionals at South Liverpool Primary Care Trust were, from a social marketing perspective, open to any insights that critical theory might bring. The failure of traditional effects research to provide an effectively nuanced view of the role media play in binge cultures creates a vacancy that critical researchers can fill, especially given developments around the ideas of "text" and multiple forms of media literacy that allow for non determinist views of communicative power. To capitalize on this situation, however, we must concentrate on how our methods can answer the question of "what works" while remaining true to values of critical reflexivity.

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Antonella Russo

Writing utopias: Imagining other worlds

Utopias now appear to be much more realizable than they were once thought to be. And we find ourselves faced with a truly disturbing question: how can they be prevented from taking shapes definitively? [...] Utopias can be achieved. Life moves towards utopias. And it could be that a new era is beginning, an era in which the intellectuals and educated people will be thinking of ways of avoiding utopias and returning to a freer, less “perfect”, non- utopian society.

– N. A. Berdiaeff, *The End of Our Time*

The expression “Out of place” refers to the singularity of each and everyone of us, the self which cannot be reduced to the I, to the status of individual, to identity. [...] U-topia with respect to roles, social position, the community, belonging, identity. [...] U-topia in the sense of beyond being, otherwise than being, out of being, beyond being and non being.

– A. Ponzio, *Fuori luogo* [Out of Place]

This paper deals with utopia as seen from the point of view of literary writing and understood in terms of “excess”, “non-functional”, “other”. I first discuss the main characteristics of positive and negative utopias (these last also called dystopias), in particular with reference to Thomas More, Aldous Huxley and George Orwell’s novels, and the aim of this kind of writing as a narrative reaction genre. Second, we will underline the writer’s propensity for the “play of amusement”, for imagining a society which is other, either better or worse, than the existent one, on the one hand, and the writer’s capacity for excess, criticism and stance, on the other.

Each perfect city described over the centuries – from Thomas More’s *Utopia* to H. G. Wells’ *A Modern Utopia* – is impossible to find on a real map; it floats in a sea of ink and can be reached by travelling and exploring through the pages of a book. The reader should be able to immerse

him/herself in writing as well as to read “raising his/her head”, as argued by Roland Barthes (1984: 23). To raise one’s head while reading is not for lack of interest, but because of an infinite flow of ideas, together with the ability of analysis, critique and thought which are at the basis of utopian writing.

When we consider utopian thinking, we have to consider Ernst Bloch’s distinction between “abstract” and “concrete” utopias. The first are fantastic: they are generated out of desire and function as wish-fulfillment, they do not offer practical programs for social change, nor do they pretend to be “prophetic” in William Blake’s sense, according to whom “every man is a Prophet. He utters his opinion both of private and public matters. ... A prophet is a Seer not an Arbitrary Dictator” (Blake 1965: 607). Concrete utopian thinking, on the other hand, has a practical social purpose. It tries to portray a potentially realizable world, to define precisely the nature and the origin of social ill in the world in which the author lives. Concrete utopian fiction are satires: they define a moral vision, set either in the future or the past, that functions implicitly as a critique of present society.

The term Utopia goes back to the publication in 1516 of Sir Thomas More’s *De optimo reipublicae statu deque nova insula Utopia*. It shows a double meaning: out-opia and eu-topia. *Outopos* is the place, the society which does not exist, not because it is unreal, but because it is good, that is, *eu-topos*. *Outopos-eutopos* refers to the city which is too positive to exist as compared to the existent one, which is negative and distorted.

The last is the city which More criticizes as a horrible picture in the first and second books: he begins pointing out the irrational barbarity of capital punishment for theft, and satirizes the unscrupulous behaviour of the average king, especially his habit of starting aggressive wars and his dishonest methods of raising money. Finally he contrasts the unhappy state of European society with conditions in an ideal country, where human life is organized in the best possible way. Against the negativity of the society he lives in, at the end of the book he underlines the desire, the need of Utopia rather than the hope. Utopia has no place because it does not yet exist. Yet, according to More, it is a necessary project in order to get free of wrong and inhumane conditions.

The attitude which is at the basis of the utopian genre is the inclination to search for the absolute good, which the utopian writer shows by the rejection of the entire world. This is the necessary condition in order to realize the comparison between the “to be” (reality) and the “must come

to be” (utopian construction). Oscar Wilde, in *The Fortnightly Review*, writes that “a map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at, for it leaves out the one country at which Humanity is always landing”.

Moreover, in order to show, in the clearest way, the differences between the ideal world and our, H. G. Wells, in *A Modern Utopia*, performs a narrative creation: he describes a world which is the double face of the earth, whose inhabitants have the same names and physical characteristics, but whose way of living is different. And in order to stimulate our imagination and critical capacity, the fiction is narrated by a Voice, which is not that of the author, so that we may have the impression of watching a picture.

Once every place has been explored, Utopia loses its spatial dimension and achieves the temporal one. An ideal present place can no longer be thought. Writers look at the future, where they find nothing better than everyday life: Dystopia, the society of the future is born. It is the twentieth century, between the first and second world wars, characterized by the oppressive social control of totalitarianism.

The writers cannot describe an ideal perfect society, but a pessimistic world-view, with a catastrophic vision of dangerous and alienating future societies. Aldous Huxley and George Orwell, through their novels, take their place as alarm bells against the restriction of freedom, due to industrialization and to the fact that the media start becoming tools of political propaganda for dictatorship.

It's the epoch of capitalism and globalisation. As Max Weber notes, capitalism makes everyday life worse: it is considered worthy only if it is profitable, hence damaging individual creativity. He compares the Nation States to a steel cage, from which it is impossible to escape and in which it is impossible to live, given the depersonalization of human relationships.

John Stuart Mill writes about the risks and the power of the control system:

If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. Were an opinion a personal possession of no value except to the owner; if to be obstructed in the enjoyment of it were simply a private injury, it would make some difference whether the injury was inflicted only on a few persons or on many. But the peculiar evil of silencing the

expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error. (Mill 1998: 19–20)

Then he concludes, pointing out the importance of freedom:

The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. (Ibid.: 27).

Dystopic writing evidences the fear of the conscience's levelling: the idea to manipulate and homogenize the masses for political or scientific aims is at the basis of the twentieth century's science fiction writing. The will to control everyone implies lots of changes linked to the biopolitical sphere. Biopower is the most useful tool in the hands of totalitarian societies, since its aim is not only to impose discipline upon behaviour, but also to govern and create desires, hopes, fears, that is to create *subdued beings* (see Foucault 1994).

Huxley and Orwell describe two kinds of society where human beings are deprived of individuality and of freedom of thought, with no possibility to choose their own life, that is, who to be and what to be. Huxley is satirical from the beginning, since he entitles his book *Brave New World*, echoing Miranda's words in Shakespeare's *The Tempest*, who says "O, wonder! How many goodly creatures are there here! How beauteous mankind is! O brave new world, that has such people in't!" (Shakespeare 1987: 55).

The writer is ironic towards a society which has no beauty. Unlike in Orwell's scenario, in the world depicted by Huxley the masses' foe is not directly shown. Here no Big Brother's Eye watches everyone, but people have everything they need, since they have been trained, in their biological, social and private lives, to desire nothing more. In his novel, Huxley foretells Nazism's dream of creating one ruling race on earth, and he supposes the birth of a biological society, selected from among those with the best genetic traits.

Huxley writes *Brave New World* in 1932, when consumerism is widespread. As Harvey rightly notes in his work, *The Condition of Postmoder-*

nity (1989), the passing fashion during the seventies was not only linked to the waste of material goods, but also involved a degeneration of values as human relationships and bonds of affection were subjected to a process of dehumanization.

In *Brave New World* there are two kinds of world: the first, the World State, is perfectly organized thanks to scientific and technological progress; its motto significantly is “Community, Identity and Stability”. Illness and old age no longer exist; people live in a kind of individualized and extreme hedonism. The second world is the Reservation, where natives live, and a place that is considered a relic of the past. John the Savage, who lives there, will be brought in the New World. At first he is astonished, then offended, and finally disgusted with the new, perfect society. The Savage flies into a rage against the New World, claiming the right to be unhappy and the freedom to choose his own life:

But I don't want comfort. I want God, I want poetry, I want real danger, I want freedom, I want goodness. I want sin. [...] I'm claiming the right to grow old and ugly and impotent; the right to have syphilis and cancer; the right to have too little to eat; the right to be lousy; the right to live in constant apprehension of what may happen tomorrow; the right to catch typhoid; the right to be tortured by unspeakable pains of every kind. [...] I claim them all. (Huxley 1996: 246)

Huxley stresses the importance of choosing one's own life without conditionings by those who have, or claim to have, our “best interests” in mind.

Orwell in *1984* shows a society that is put on the same level as material goods. The human being has become a victim of alienation due to work in the factory. He is in the hands of the ruling class who controls the production system. In *1984* life has no value: only consent and faithfulness to the party counts. The party dominates the masses through the power of broadcast media. There is no freedom, only homogenization and mind's control. There is no literature, nor knowledge about human history. This society must not know to be better dominated and controlled.

Brave New World and *1984*, apart from being novels of prediction and of reaction to an ideological and political conception, are novels of *intransitive writing*, rather than of transcription, since they represent writing as a stance towards the order of discourse. Both are novels which describe

the consequences of inhumane societies, once Utopia has been eliminated. John the Savage, Winston and Julia, are characters out of place, since they are guilty of Utopia.

At the same time, the writer represents the voice of reaction and the desire to show, freely, ironically and extremely, the contradictions which exist in society and which haven't been shown yet. It is his/her duty, since s/he has a responsibility towards the whole world. Rossi-Landi (1994) underlines the role played by the writer, with his/her capacity to criticize and take a stand in front every kind of social and ideological construction. This implies the creation of "unproductive works", in comparison to the logic of profit, which is the core of capitalism.

In Bakhtin's terms, the utopian writer is capable of "exotopia", that is, "of distancing", of looking at his own reality from the corner of the eye, critically, with detached participation, but at the same time not indifferent to it, from the perspective of a deeply felt sense of responsibility. To look at one's own reality from the corner of the eye affords a finer intuition of it. Bakhtin claims that the writer as a writer can say nothing. The writer is s/he who has the gift to speak indirectly, and who wears the clothes of silence. To be "silent" means to be capable of ironic, detached and allegorical writing (see Bakhtin 1979).

The writer does not write imprisoned in a given role or social position, but is generally responsible for the other. Lévinas points out that responsibility means the exposure and proximity of one person to another. To speak not only means to speak with the words of others, but also to keep account of the other in a relation of inevitable involvement and implication, so that to speak is always to answer: in the sense of to *answer to*, in the first place, that is, to hold oneself accountable; and secondly, to *answer for* or justify oneself (see Ponzio 1994).

Positive and negative utopian writing requires a vivid imagination and joy in creating and inventing. Peirce defines this propensity as the "play of musement"; for Thomas Sebeok it is the main quality of language as a modelling device. It's a species-specific inclination to plan, invent, create, and imagine an infinite number of Other possible worlds. The human propensity for musement implies the ability to carry out such operations as predicting the future or "travelling" through the past, that is, the ability to construct, deconstruct and reconstruct reality, inventing new worlds and interpretive models.

Every species is endowed with a model that produces its own world, and language is the model belonging to human beings. The distinctive feature of human language is what linguists call *syntax*. Thanks to syntax hominids have not only one “reality”, one world, but are also able to create an indefinite number of possible worlds. In this sense, language as modelling device is writing. It is writing *ante litteram*, as Ponzio asserts, which exists before the invention of writing as phonetic transcription. This kind of literary writing, unsuitable for mere communication, can be found in every human practice and product. It goes beyond pragmatics and the established order, for the sheer joy of invention and alterity.

Literary writing rejects any sort of power that can represent an obstruction. It only claims the power of imagination, which is non-functional (non-instrumental), unproductive and freely creative. The Utopian world is a literary world of “indirection”, “excess”, “the Other”, and innovation.

Utopian writers aim to spur mankind to change and improve their living conditions, but above all to persuade the reader to motivate his/her thought in the direction of an ideal construction that is the result of human reflection:

Utopia has long been another name for the unreal and the impossible. We have set utopia over against the world. As a matter of fact, it is our utopias that make the world tolerable to us: the cities and mansions that make people dream of are those in which they finally live. The more that men react upon their environment and make it over after a human pattern, the more continuously do they live in utopia; but when there is a breach between the world of affairs and the over world of utopia, we become conscious of the part that the will-to-utopia has played in our lives and we see our utopia as a separate reality. (Mumford 2003: 11)

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Antti Salminen

Sign of the impossible – Semiotics of paradox

1. Why impossible?

Entities that cannot exist in the actual world can be named and depicted. To claim that square circles or female popes are impossibilities makes perfect sense. Also, impossible or self-contradictory pictures can be easily represented; they are common for example in M. C. Escher's impossible scenes. Impossible representations show the primal gap between beings and representation.

For some reason, most of us prefer the possible to the impossible. This attitude they call pragmatism. Despite this, the question of the impossible has recently emerged in disciplines such as aesthetics, theology, comparative literature and language studies. Thus far, however, little attention has been paid to semiotics of impossibility. Yet the idea of impossibility is valuable, since it is what marks the boundaries of communication, representation and semiosis in general. At its best, thinking about the impossible could be considered as a new awareness of the limits of language.

In what follows, I claim that paradoxical structures are on the borderlines of semiosis and thus are a sign of the impossible. Paradoxes might provide us with an excellent way to understand possibilities of the impossible.

2. Impossibility as a new transcendence

It goes without saying that the notion of impossible carries a heavy metaphysical burden. For example, in his *Critique of Pure Reason* Immanuel Kant notes: "The supreme concept with which it is customary to begin a transcendental philosophy is the division into the possible and the impossible". Thus Kant's system was greatly based on this distinction. Kant's is

only one example of how impossibilities are inferior to possible worlds. In neglecting impossibility, one dismisses the fact that impossibilities depend on historical situation and different contexts. That is why the limits of the impossible are not absolute but rather processes.

The actuality of impossibility stems from an intellectual tendency that may be linked to a late-modern conception of transcendence. After an era of radical relativity and methodological pluralism, when anything went and nothing mattered, revisited impossibility has once more become significant. Its connection to the revival of transcendence is obvious. From the immanent view, impossibility and transcendence are structured the same way: the postmodern sphere of transcendence is impossible, but this impossibility is of significance. Transcendence is making a comeback as the Other of immanence, but without gods, afterworlds or other metaphysical beings (see Schwartz 2004). That is to say, postmodern transcendence is a transcendence of impossibility.

While maintaining the total impossibility of the absolute, metaphysical totalities and original signifiers, contemporary (continental) thinkers do not give up the idea of impossibility. Both hermeneutic and deconstructive thought share a common interest in the idea of the impossible as a limit of textuality.

In the hermeneutic view, especially during the last two decades, impossibility has manifested as an endlessness of interpretation and the otherness of textuality itself. For instance, the hermeneutic circle, as a spiral, is an endless construction, in many ways reminiscent of another representation of impossibility, namely, the Möbius Strip, which has only one side despite being a three dimensional object. The Möbius band is created when a strip of paper is twisted 180° before its ends are joined together. The odd property of a Möbius band is that it has only one side and one edge. As an impossible representation, the Möbius Strip symbolizes the impossibility of total and finite interpretation. The Strip has no inside or outside. It marks a boundary that, in being followed, can be transgressed.

In Jacques Derrida's deconstruction, the impossible has a special place. As Derrida has stated: "... deconstruction can be defined as the very experience of the (impossible) possibility of the impossible, of the most impossible" (Derrida 1995: 43). In *Of Grammatology* he writes that "*différance* produces what it forbids, makes possible the very thing that it makes impossible" (Derrida 1974: 143). Similarly, in Maurice Blanchot's response

to the question of the possibility of the art work (and literature) is paradoxically that art is only possible insofar as it is *impossible* to complete. That is, the possibility of art and literature is found in their very impossibility (see Critchley 1997: 36).

In fictional texts, impossibility manifests at the moment the reader interprets the fictive world as contradicting its own bases and ending up in paradoxical situations without any meaningful answer. Regardless of this, fictive texts can sustain their own impossibility. As Umberto Eco notes: “In verbal texts the representation of impossible possible worlds can be taken superficially as conceivable for pages and pages before the contradiction they display is realized” (Eco 1978: 78). In other words, worlds furnished with impossibility or internal contradictory situations are fully representable, especially in fictional texts.

Like the Möbius strip, signs of the impossible are transcendental, that is to say, they transgress classical conceptions of representation and point towards textual and linguistic transcendence, the sphere which is beyond every means of representation. Still, the limits formed by impossibilities are not early-Wittgensteinian restrictions only, because those limits connect semiosis to new potentialities of forming meaning, to things, and to meanings yet to be. Hence signs of the impossible could play an important role in late-modern aesthetics, which no longer appeal to metaphysical ideals, like everlasting truth and beauty or the uniqueness of an artwork, but to move towards new kinds of semiosis.

3. *Paradox: Sign of the impossible*

It could be claimed that paradox contains the same dynamic structure as textual limits formed by the impossible. As Roland Barthes points out, “today’s paradox is tomorrow’s *doxa*: A *doxa* (a popular opinion) is formulated, intolerable; to free myself of it, I postulate a paradox; then this paradox turns bad, becomes a new concretion, itself becomes a new *doxa*, and I must seek further for a new paradox” (Barthes 1977: 71). Following Barthes, paradox gives us the insight that what is paradoxically inexpressible is inexpressible in relation to a certain system of expression and situation.

Paradoxes can be considered as manifestations of the impossible. Actually, paradoxes are signs for impossible, and through them impossibility

can take discursive forms. In the text, paradox and impossibility intermingle in at least two ways. First, paradox is a discursive situation that is impossible to solve in that specific situation. Second, representations of the impossible take usually the form of paradox. Paradoxes are representations which oppose their own representability. Paradoxes are in-between being and nothing, written and unwritten, voice and silence, possible and impossible. They do not necessarily transgress boundaries between these dualisms but actually construct or even move them.

Ben-Ami Scharfstein has claimed that the informality of a natural language makes its paradoxes harmless (Scharfstein 1993: 157). Paradoxes further allow us to think unthinkable and impossible situations (for example, *Russell's paradox* or Zeno's *Achilles and Tortoise* paradox; see Clark 2002). Thinking paradox is thinking the impossible and the very limits of the thinkable. As Søren Kierkegaard formulated it: the ultimate paradox of thought is the desire to discover something that thought itself cannot think (Kierkegaard 1985: 37).

Arthur Gibson writes (2003: 54): “It can be proved that paradoxes have logical relations to each other, whether or not they all share essential properties. If, following classical bivalent logics, we assume that the consistent limits to expressibility are marked by the outer boundaries of paradoxes.” That is to say, paradoxical expressions could give us valuable insights when limits of semiosis and boundaries of language are concerned.

Paradox raises the issue that a language system is never total, nor is it thoroughly propositional and logical. Language always contains expressions which point beyond meaning or which cannot be expressed at all. Arising on the borderlines of semiosis, paradoxes are meaningful ways to understand the possibilities of the impossible. According to Gibson (2003: 55), the relation of transcendence to paradox is that “the former tears through the boundary of formal consistent limit to the totality of expressions using semantic properties within that totality and applying some of them outside that limit”.

As transcendental entities, paradoxes have ostensive power to point towards the impossible, beyond text and beyond distinct understanding. Often their message can be grasped only intuitively. In spite of their semantic obscurity – or actually, because of it – paradoxes show that the non-appearance of a sign can be a sign too. Therefore the impossible is

never encountered without a context, but this context could ultimately be formed by a lack of present meaning.

Paradoxes blend *impossible signification* and *impossibility of signification*. Thus they open up possibilities to criticise conventional limits and boundaries of representation. Ultimately, the paradox as a sign of the impossible transcends the limits of texts and of the language system to which it belongs.

In his preface to *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* Ludwig Wittgenstein states that “In order to draw a limit to thinking we have to be able to think both sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be thought)” (Wittgenstein 1988: 3)/ By the means of paradox and other impossibilities of semiosis, Wittgenstein`s hard demand could be made a bit easier. The way of paradox is a *via negativa* towards boundaries of semiosis.

4. Promising the impossible

As a textual principle, the impossible avoids reducing language to the closed system of signified and signifiers. Instead it establishes and transgresses a borderline between language, meaning, and thinking, on the one side, and silence, nonsense, the unthinkable, on the other. Thus it opens up the other side of language.

That is why the impossible, as it manifests in language, could be called *immanent transcendent*. Paradoxically, it is at the same time present and absent, significant and meaningless. It thereby deconstructs ontological dichotomies, which are based on the hegemony of the possible. Thus when the impossible presents itself in language, the limits of semiosis become temporarily visible and flexible.

To conclude: the sign of the impossible, like paradox, leads to somewhere else, beyond rule-governed use of language, and maybe towards utopian possibilities of semiosis. Impossibility opens up the possibility that transcendence in language can be grasped immanently and experienced in different readings. Then then limits of discourse become more visible and crossable. Therefore impossibility also could be a concept for textual critique – a blind spot that allows us to see.

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Mathieu Schneider

De la non compréhension comme catégorie de l’humour romantique

Les “humoresques” de Mahler

Parmi les vingt-quatre lieder que Mahler a composés à partir du recueil *Des Knaben Wunderhorn* d’Arnim et Brentano, nombreux sont ceux dont le poème repose sur une structure dialoguée faisant interagir entre eux des personnages qui ne se comprennent pas, ou qui refusent de se comprendre (*Lied des Verfolgten im Turm*, *Trost im Unglück*, *Der Schildwache Nachtlied*, *Starke Einbildungskraft*...). L’un de ces lieder va même jusqu’à thématiser la question de la compréhension dans son titre: il s’agit de *Lob des hohen Verstands* (Éloge de l’intelligence suprême, pour lequel Mahler a transformé l’intitulé original du recueil d’Arnim et Brentano, “Wettstreit des Kuckucks mit der Nachtigal [*sic*]” (Concours entre le coucou et le rossignol), en “Lob der Kritik” (Éloge de la critique), puis finalement en “Lob des hohen Verstandes” (La Grange 1979–84: 1008–1009).¹ C’est donc Mahler qui a mis en avant l’importance de la catégorie de la compréhension dans le poème, ce qui montre à quel point cette grille de lecture peut avoir sa pertinence.

1. La non compréhension thématisée:

Lob des hohen Verstands

Il est en effet question, dans le texte, d’un concours de chant entre le rossignol et le coucou, dont l’âne est l’arbitre. Or le choix de l’âne est absurde, car l’âne est incapable de porter un jugement, c’est-à-dire incapable de comprendre ce que chantent les deux oiseaux et de déterminer, en fonction de critères appropriés, lequel des deux est le meilleur. Il n’importe en effet pas seulement de percevoir le chant, mais aussi de l’analyser et de le juger.

Là réside la différence entre perception et compréhension. Cette dichotomie entre perception et compréhension se retrouve dans la formulation du texte qui insiste lourdement sur les verbes liés à la production et la perception (*sprechen, singen, hören, erzählen*) et leurs organes (les oreilles de l'âne notamment: "*denn er hat zwei Ohren groß*"). En revanche, les termes gravitant autour du thème de la compréhension sont soit niés ("*ich kann's in Kopf nicht bringen*"), soit tournés en ridicule par le contexte ironique de la saynète ("*Das sprech' ich nach mein' hob'n Verstand*"), soit remplacés par des expressions qui substituent à la compréhension raisonnée le plaisir esthétique ("*Dem Esel g'fiel*"). L'ironie du titre n'en est que plus criante, et le choix du titre paradoxalement plus éloquent.

Comment la musique parvient-elle à thématiser, dans sa forme, cette absence de compréhension? Essentiellement dans les discours des quatre protagonistes: l'âne, le coucou, le rossignol et le narrateur (on notera toutefois que le rossignol ne parle pas dans le texte). Si Mahler ne tient pas compte de la réalité "parlée" du texte, c'est-à-dire que, dans la partie vocale, il ne change ni de motif ni de tonalité ni encore de registre, lorsqu'il y a changement de locuteur dans le poème, il rend parfaitement compte de la réalité "chantée". Tant qu'aucun oiseau ne chante, c'est-à-dire jusqu'à la fin du troisième vers de la troisième strophe, la musique adopte le ton de la narration épique, et donc une forme quasi strophique, qui prend clairement ses distances de l'histoire en lui servant simplement de cadre. Les deux premières strophes sont rigoureusement identiques pour ce qui est de la mélodie du chanteur, et très similaires pour ce qui est de l'accompagnement de piano (la différence principale tient à la transposition de l'accompagnement une octave plus bas dans la deuxième strophe). Seul le début de la troisième strophe est légèrement modifié par une modulation en *fa* majeur, mais l'impression de strophisme n'en est pas altérée. Lorsque le rossignol se met à chanter, Mahler rompt le strophisme, en faisant entendre son chant au piano,² à savoir un motif léger et ornementé de broderies (mes. 64–65), qui contraste fortement avec le rythme de bourrée du thème principal. Ce motif est suivi de tout un thème en *ré* majeur (mes. 66–73), composé de dactyles et de doublures de tierces, dont le caractère, opposé au thème de bourrée, découle du motif précédent. Lorsque, juste après (mes. 80–81), l'âne intervient pour commenter la prestation du rossignol, Mahler ni ne reprend le thème "neutre" des deux premières strophes, ni ne compose une nouvelle mélodie qui serait le discours de l'âne. Au contraire,

il choisit simplement de reprendre le thème du rossignol en *fa* dièse mineur et en lui ajoutant la mention : “*barsch*” (avec brusquerie). Ce détail peut paraître anodin, mais il est en fait d’une grande importance. Le fait que l’âne ne soit capable que de reproduire le chant du rossignol, et non de produire un jugement à lui dans une langue qui lui soit propre, prouve bien qu’il n’a rien fait d’autre que percevoir et répéter le chant, là où il lui était demandé de le comprendre pour le juger.

Le même procédé est utilisé pour le chant du coucou auquel Mahler confie un thème (mes. 88–91) également différent de celui des deux premières strophes, mais très proche de celui du rossignol par l’usage qu’il fait du rythme dactylique et de nombreux mouvements conjoints. Lorsqu’aux deux vers suivants l’âne intervient pour annoncer qu’il va rendre son verdict, Mahler ne lui compose pas de thème propre, mais reprend successivement 1) la fin du thème du coucou (mes. 94–95), 2) sa tierce caractéristique (mes. 96–97) déjà entendue dans l’introduction, et enfin 3) le thème principal des deux premières strophes (mes. 98–100). Une nouvelle fois, l’âne ne fait que percevoir et reproduire, au lieu de comprendre en produisant un discours qui lui soit propre. La dernière strophe ne fait que confirmer cela, en reprenant, probablement aussi pour des raisons de symétrie, le thème des deux premières strophes.

L’incapacité de l’âne à comprendre, celle-là même que Mahler avait ironiquement choisie de mettre en avant dans son titre *Lob des hohen Verstands*, est donc placée au cœur du processus d’élaboration de la forme musicale. Le choix d’une forme non entièrement strophique s’explique par la volonté de rendre audible le chant des oiseaux, celui d’une forme reposant simplement sur deux groupes thématiques – et non trois, c’est-à-dire un par animal – par la bêtise de l’âne qui l’empêche de raisonner dans un langage qui lui soit propre. L’acte de communication avec l’âne en reste ici au stade de la perception et n’accède jamais à celui de la compréhension. En ce sens, la musique et la forme thématisent l’absence de compréhension revendiquée par le texte.

Lob des hohen Verstands ne constitue cependant pas un cas isolé. Comme je l’ai dit, d’autres lieder du *Wunderhorn* utilisent, sur un ton ironique, comique ou humoristique, une forme dialoguée dans laquelle la communication entre les personnages semble problématique. Faut-il y voir un trait humoristique? Cette hypothèse n’est pas à rejeter, car Mahler nous a laissé deux indices importants allant dans ce sens: 1) les cinq lieder (dont

trois dialogués) composés quasiment d'un seul jet par Mahler en janvier et février 1892 étaient intitulés *Humoresken* (Mahler 1993: XIII-XIV; voir également La Grange 1979–84, I: 996); 2) les huit lieder suivants, dont la composition s'étala jusqu'en 1898, furent regroupés sous l'appellation *Lieder, Humoresken und Balladen* (Mahler 1993). Autrement dit, sur les vingt-quatre lieder, treize ont de près ou de loin été influencés par l'esprit de l'humoresque. Il semble donc pertinent de s'interroger sur le lien entre humour et non compréhension, en faisant un détour par les théories romantiques que Mahler connaissait bien, en particulier celle de Jean Paul – l'auteur auquel font référence les titres primitifs de la *Première symphonie* (voir Schneider 2005: 130–131) – dans son *Cours préparatoire d'esthétique*.

2. *L'humour romantique, ou la non compréhension revendiquée dans la parataxe*

Cet ouvrage, dont la première édition est de 1804 et la seconde, légèrement augmentée, de 1813, comporte deux "programmes" sur l'humour et un sur le trait d'esprit, le trait d'esprit dont on connaît, depuis les fragments de l'*Athenäum* des frères Schlegel, le lien étroit avec l'humour.³ Ces trois programmes, assez systématiques dans leur exposé, sont aussi les plus longs du cours dont ils représentent en tout plus d'un quart de la longueur. La définition que Jean Paul donne de l'humour est relativement simple: il oppose dans sa théorie l'humour au sublime, en définissant le premier comme l'inverse du second. Partant du postulat que la poésie romantique se situe dans l'espace de l'infinitude du sujet, il définit le sublime comme un "infini appliqué" (Jean Paul 1979: 112–113), c'est-à-dire comme l'application de l'infini à un objet sensible qui lui donne un aspect inhabituel, "spirituel" (ibid.: 113). Il avoue donc implicitement sa dette à Kant qui situait aussi le sublime dans l'infini, littéralement "au-delà de nos sens" (Kant 1993: 127). Est alors sublime "un oiseau de proie planant haut et sans bruit" (Jean Paul 1979: 113), en ce qu'il désigne un espace imaginaire infini que nos sens ne peuvent se représenter.

L'humour est, pour Jean Paul, l'exact inverse du sublime, puisqu'il s'occupe à "glisser et insinuer [la] finitude comme contraste *subjectif* sous l'idée (infinité) prise comme contraste *objectif*", c'est-à-dire qu'il est, au lieu d'un infini appliqué, "une sorte de fini appliqué à l'infini" (ibid.: 129). En ce sens, "l'humour anéantit non pas l'individuel, mais le fini, par le contraste

avec l'idée" (ibid.). Ce principe de l'anéantissement du fini par l'idée est ensuite développé (§33 du programme VII) et étayé d'exemples tirés des domaines littéraire et musical (ibid.: 134). Et là, c'est d'Haydn dont il est question: "Quelque chose d'analogue à l'impertinence désinvolte de l'humour anéantissant, l'expression en quelque sorte d'un mépris du monde, apparaît dans l'œuvre de certains compositeurs, Haydn par exemple, lorsque des phrases musicales entières vont s'anéantir dans un motif différent, et lorsque alternent impétueusement pianissimo et fortissimo, presto et andante" (134). L'anéantissement dont parle ici Jean Paul a en fait à voir avec l'*attente*: c'est parce que le discours musical implique logiquement une suite qui n'arrive pas et à laquelle on substitue un élément antithétique, ou de nature radicalement différente, que l'idée initiale est réduite à néant par l'humour. En d'autres termes, c'est parce que l'attente est déçue et qu'elle l'est de manière inopinée et décalée, que le discours – littéraire ou musical – prend un tour humoristique. Le sens de l'idée en est changé, et avec lui, le mode de compréhension. La compréhension linéaire et exclusivement rationnelle du discours classique est remplacée par une compréhension fractionnée, imprévisible, qui peut aller jusqu'au non-sens, c'est-à-dire jusqu'à provoquer volontairement l'absence de compréhension.

Cette première caractéristique de l'humour, que l'on peut qualifier à la suite de Jean Paul d' "anéantissante", débouche sur une seconde qui lui est directement liée et que l'auteur du *Cours* expose un peu plus loin (§35, "Sensibilité de l'humour"): il s'agit de la parataxe. Jean Paul l'explicite comme suit:

Le sensible, qui est déjà indispensable au comique, ne saurait dans l'humour, où il est l'exposant de la finitude appliquée, être trop riche en couleurs. L'exposition doit déborder d'images et de contrastes prodigués tant par le trait d'esprit que par la fantaisie, c'est-à-dire déborder de groupes et de couleurs afin de gorger l'âme de sensibilité et de l'embrasser de ce dithyrambe qui, face à l'idée, dresse et oppose le monde des sens devenu, dans le miroir concave, anguleux et démesurément allongé. (1979: 139)

L'humour réside donc non seulement dans l'anéantissement de l'idée par le fini, mais dans la répétition de ce processus, qui crée une succession d'images humoristiques indépendantes les unes des autres. C'est cela qui détermine l'humour comme discours parataxique, c'est-à-dire comme discours juxtaposant, sans lien logique, des concepts, des idées ou des images.

Jean Paul donne ensuite un exemple si vraisemblable qu'il aurait pu le tirer d'un de ses romans; il s'agit d'un habitant de Friedrichstadt, "qui, installé sous une cloche de plongée, sans un seul camarade de chambre ni de cloche, écrit dans la mer froide à la lumière de sa lampe, et n'est relié au monde à bord de son bateau que par le tuyau respiratoire qui prolonge le tuyau de sa respiration. 'Et c'est ainsi, conclut [l'auteur comique, ici Jean Paul], que le Friedrichstadtien n'éclaire que lui et son papier et méprise monstres et poissons autour de lui'" (1979: 140).

Le comique réside bien évidemment dans la chute (le mépris des monstres), l'humour en revanche dans la situation grotesque et dans la construction de la phrase. L'idée du Friedrichstadtien qui écrit à la lumière de sa lampe est anéantie par la finitude des détails le décrivant, contre toute attente, dans une cloche de plongée. Mais plus encore, la phrase est absurde parce qu'elle accumule, dans sa parataxe, une foule de détails qui confèrent à la scène un impossible réalisme. Cette juxtaposition d'éléments hétérogènes est un point tellement essentiel de l'humour romantique, que Jean Paul lui consacre un paragraphe tout entier dans son programme sur le trait d'esprit (§44, "Le trait d'esprit non figuré"). Il y dit en substance que "le trait d'esprit esthétique [est] ce prêtre travesti qui accouple tous les couples" (ibid.: 172). Aussi l'humour jean paulien se conçoit-il comme l'action médiatisante du trait d'esprit, qui rapproche, dans la parataxe, des éléments dont le lien semble inexistant ou incongru et qui, ce faisant, anéantit l'idée par le fini. Le discours, quant à lui – fût-il musical ou littéraire –, abandonne la syntaxe et la logique pour la parataxe et le chaos.⁴ Et de ce chaos résulte une nécessaire incompréhension interne à la phrase, qui se répercute ensuite sur le lecteur/auditeur.

3. Verlorne Müh'!: *Une humoresque musicale*

Si l'on s'en tient à la définition de l'humour donnée par Jean Paul, beaucoup de lieder de Mahler tirés du *Wunderhorn* peuvent à juste titre être qualifiés d'humoristiques.⁵ *Rheinlegendchen* ou *Des Antonius von Padua Fischpredigt*, par exemple, reposent sur des textes utilisant volontairement ces accumulations parataxiques et absurdes que mentionnait Jean Paul: les carpes et leurs petits, les brochets aux museaux pointus, les morues séchées, les crabes et les tortues constituent autant de détails descriptifs annihilant le contexte sérieux du sermon d'église. Stylistiquement, ce lied

est construit comme la description du Friedrichstadtien. D'autres lieder revendiquent plus ouvertement l'humour. C'est le cas de *Verlorne Müb'!* pour lequel Mahler a donné comme indication de caractère: "Mit Humor, gemächlich" (Avec humour, tranquillement).

L'humour dans ce lied réside principalement dans son texte qui met en scène un garçon et une fille, cette dernière essayant de séduire le garçon en lui proposant toujours plus. Ce genre de saynètes dialoguées, au nombre de strophes variable et au contenu énumératif, existe en grand nombre dans la littérature populaire, et particulièrement dans la littérature alémanique, à laquelle appartient *Verlorne Müb'!*. Le chant traditionnel alsacien *Müeter, i well ä Ding*, par exemple, est construit à partir du même principe: une fille confie à sa mère qu'elle veut quelque chose, mais n'en précise pas la nature. La mère fait à l'envi toutes sortes de propositions (un parasol, une crinoline, un chapeau, etc.) jusqu'à ce qu'elle lui propose un homme et que la fille accepte.⁶ *Verlorne Müb'!* reprend entièrement les canons du genre, à la différence près que jamais la fille n'arrive à satisfaire le garçon, ou pour dire les choses autrement: que jamais le garçon ne cède. Et c'est dans cet anéantissement de la chute par la dernière réplique du garçon ("*Närrisches Dinterle, i mag es bolt nit*") que réside l'humour du poème. Mahler le renforce du reste, en répétant le "*nit*" final, ce qui prouve qu'il avait très bien ressenti ce qui faisait l'originalité du poème.

Il n'est de ce fait pas étonnant de trouver des traits humoristiques dans la musique, où Mahler fait un large usage de l'humour "anéantissant". Celui-ci concerne en premier lieu le caractère populaire de la mélodie, qui est soit nié par l'harmonie (comme aux mesures 7–8 où la simplicité des sauts de tierce et de sixte à la voix ne laisse pas supposer l'arrivée, en fausse relation chromatique, du *do* bécarré et de l'harmonie de *la* mineur à la mesure 8, soit par l'insertion de tournures mélodiques et harmoniques empruntées au genre savant de l'opéra (Exemple 1). Ceci est notamment le cas aux mesures 89–95 (Exemple 2), où le chant répète, dans une emphase "plaintive" (*kläglich*), le motif de seconde descendante entendu sur "[ge]denke" (mes. 86). Cette répétition culmine à la mesure 94 sur un accord de septième diminuée avec tierce diminuée [X] dont la sonorité et la structure sont aux antipodes de la simplicité harmonique des *Volkslieder*. Tout ceci contribue à souligner l'importance de l'adverbe "*immer*" et à renforcer l'insistance la jeune fille dans la dernière strophe. Mais c'est surtout

la destruction du caractère populaire de la mélodie par la théâtralisation grandiloquente de cette phrase qui frappe.

Exemple 1. Verlorne Müh! Mes. 7–8).

Exemple 2. Verlorne Müh! Mes. 89–95.

Mahler utilise également l'humour à l'encontre des canons de la forme musicale. Ceci est particulièrement visible dans les cadences dont la fonction conclusive est niée à deux reprises. La première fois, à la fin de la première strophe (mes. 30–33; Exemple 3), le garçon termine la phrase "geh dir holt nit" par une formule qui pourrait être conclusive, si le piano et la voix finissaient par une progression cadentielle V-I. Or il n'en est rien : l'harmonie prend le contre-pied de la mélodie, en faisant entendre la progression cadentielle V-I une mesure avant la fin de la mélodie et en frappant l'accord du VI^e degré sur "nit", là où l'on attendait la tonique. La cadence attendue n'arrivera finalement pas, et Mahler conclut la strophe plus loin sur une dominante (mes. 37) qui enchaîne directement sur la deuxième strophe (On notera également que Mahler a utilisé le même procédé de détournement de la cadence à la fin de la phrase de la jeune fille (mes. 27–29). La

seconde fois, aux mesures 102–108, lorsque le garçon claironne pour la dernière fois son refus (Exemple 4), Mahler ne mène pas la ligne mélodique à son terme: l'harmonie et la mélodie progressent cette fois-ci ensemble vers une cadence en *la* majeur, mais la mélodie s'arrête de manière imprévue sur la sensible *sol* dièse au deuxième "nit" (mes. 106–108) sans conclure sur la tonique *la*. Le piano conclura bien entendu à la fin du lied par une cadence parfaite (mes. 111–112), mais le geste mélodique reste bel et bien inachevé. Là encore, l'humour met en jeu ses facultés anéantissantes pour ôter à cette fin sa nature et sa fonction mêmes.

30

f

När - ri - sches Din - ter - le, ich geh dir holt nit!

f

II V I VI

formule de cadence

vers V, mes. 37

Exemple 3. Verlorne Mühe! Mes. 30–33.

102

f

När - ri - sches Din - ter - le, ich mag es holt nit! Nit!

p

ff

#IV V #IV V

(?)

(?)

Exemple 4. Verlorne Mühe! Mes. 102–108.

Ce détour par l'humour doit permettre, en conclusion, de mieux revenir sur la question de la compréhension, ou plus exactement de la non compréhension. Celle-ci semble en effet aller de pair avec l'humour,

voire en constituer une des conséquences les plus directes. Dans *Lob des hohen Verstands*, l'humour s'exprime essentiellement dans le discours musical simplement imitatif de l'âne qui vient ironiquement contredire la "suprême intelligence" qu'annonce Mahler dans son titre. La négation de l'acte cognitif se fait ici toutefois à l'intérieur du lied. Dans *Verlorne Müb'*, le texte procède sensiblement de la même manière: l'humour joue avec les attentes du genre et impose la non compréhension comme élément constituant du dialogue entre le garçon et la jeune fille, le premier refusant de comprendre, et du coup d'accéder, aux demandes de la seconde. La musique, en revanche, ne traduit pas cette incompréhension entre les deux protagonistes, mais thématise la non compréhension dans sa forme. Les attentes formelles, liées aux conventions du langage tonal (cadences notamment) et du genre du *Volkslied* auquel Mahler fait clairement référence au début de la mélodie, sont systématiquement déçues, si bien que la non compréhension ne se joue ici plus en interne entre les différents discours musicaux, mais en externe avec l'auditeur. En effet, ce dernier croit entendre un *Volkslied*, mais immédiatement l'harmonie dissonante du piano vient contredire cette première hypothèse. De même, il croit entendre une cadence, mais Mahler en détourne soit la progression harmonique, soit le *telos* mélodique.

L'humour peut donc s'appliquer à différents niveaux de la forme et, de ce fait, nier ou biaiser la compréhension de celle-ci de diverses manières. Quoi qu'il en soit, le lied humoristique romantique est certainement le seul genre musical dans lequel le rapport normal de communication repose sur une compréhension déformée. Là où la musique et la littérature cherchent en général la syntaxe, c'est-à-dire le discours articulé, cohérent et univoquement signifiant, l'humour – et plus généralement la poésie romantique – vise la parataxe et le décalage. C'est certainement là que se trouve l'élément le plus novateur du langage romantique et, ici, des *Wunderhorn-Lieder* de Mahler.

Notes

1. On sait très bien que Mahler a pris d'assez grandes libertés avec les poèmes du *Wunderhorn* qu'il a souvent remaniés (Vill 1979: 34–108; Finson 1987: 102). Ceci n'est toutefois pas le cas de ce poème, car Mahler n'en a que légèrement modifié la quatrième strophe en y supprimant deux vers ("*Und thät die Noten brechen / Er lacht auch drein nach seiner Art*").

2. Nous citerons ici la version pour voix et piano. Toutefois, en effet, notre analyse se basant sur la structure et l'harmonie des lieder, elle n'a rien à gagner à prendre en compte la version pour orchestre.
3. Le fragment 305 de l'*Athenäum* dit en effet: "L'humour a à faire à l'être et au non-être, et son essence propre est la réflexion. De là son affinité avec l'élégie, et avec tout ce qui est transcendantal; mais de là aussi sa superbe, et son penchant pour la mystique du Witz" (Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy 1978: 143). Mais on peut aussi lire au fragment 237: "L'humour est en quelque sorte le Witz de la sensibilité" (1978: 132). Si humour et Witz ne peuvent être considérés comme synonymes, le Witz est indéniablement à considérer comme un des organes de l'humour romantique.
4. Sur l'importance du chaos dans les théories des premiers romantiques allemands, voir Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy 1978: 72–73.
5. La question de l'humour chez Mahler et de son lien avec Jean Paul a certes déjà été traitée dans Schadendorf 1995, mais les exemples qui y sont cités ne concernent que les lieder intégrés aux symphonies. La présente contribution entend à la fois réinterpréter les textes de Jean Paul à la lumière de la question de la compréhension et traiter du cas des lieder non intégrés aux symphonies.
6. Principe même de ces chansons est que le nombre de strophes peut être augmenté à l'infini, au gré de l'imagination du chanteur. Aussi n'existe-t-il pas une version du chant, mais de multiples, chaque village ayant souvent la sienne.

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A walk in the invisible city

I focus here on the reality of one of the biggest metropolitan areas in the world – greater Mexico City – through the mirror of urban interventions by the conceptual artist Francis Alÿs. During the 1980s, postmodernist urbanism in cities like New York and Los Angeles shaped the paradigm for critical analysis of the fragmentation and multiculturalism of the global city. Globalized North American and European cities became paradigms of the post-modern experience of the impossibility to make a coherent image out of the multiplicity of signs, the loss of historical identity and the fading ability to map conceptually our position in the urban totality. Interpretations of this post-modern unreadability projected a vision of the future city as an anonymous “no-place” or as a chaotic, local reinvestment of multicultural difference and estrangement. In spite of this melancholy diagnosis, many Western cities experienced, by the end of the century, a certain renaissance that accompanied economic recovery, control of population growth, and modestly successful urban reforms. At the same time, urban problems only seemed to increase in Latin America. Though we can detect partial reform initiatives in some Latin American cities, like Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires, stimulated by the democratic process and economic stabilization, we continue to experience strong social segregation. There is increasing inequality in living standards between the upper middle-class areas and miserable shanty-towns on the periphery, these last haunted by the lack of the most basic services and resources, such as electricity, water, sanitation, public transport, education, together with increasing unemployment and organized crime.

The Argentinean sociologist Nestor Canclini (1994) suggests distinguishing four cities, or four main layers of city, within the Mexican capital. First, there is Mexico City as the *historical* and territorial centre of the nation, founded in 1324 by the pre-Columbian Aztec culture, which defines a great many of the historical monuments in the centre of the city.

Second is the *industrialized city* that caused the enormous growth of the urban territory due to expanding population during the second half of the twentieth century. In 1940, Mexico had around 1,600,000 inhabitants; today the population is close to 20 million, incorporated into more than fifty municipalities. The resulting image is of a multi-focal and polycentric structure, where formerly neighboring towns now are the palimpsest of a disseminated city, such that one can no longer experience the city as a totality, that is, from a centred point of view. Most of the population circulates in a very limited area, has no knowledge of other parts of the city, and relies on simulations of unity offered by media surrogates (for instance, weather and traffic reports). Third, we have the *informational city*, or *global city*, built by connections between the physical city structure and other cities through a complex network of communicational circuits. Huge parts of Latin American cities are excluded from these networks, since they lack access to such means of communication as telephone, Internet, cable television and fibre-optic wiring. Finally, as a fourth layer, Canclini suggests the recognition of an *imaginary city*, outlined by physical and historical patrimony, but also by symbolic investments in all kinds of artistic, literary and cultural representations. The result is a city without clear frontiers between centre and periphery, urban and non-urban, global and local; the result is a simultaneous experience of distinct historical levels in pre-modern, modern and post-modern references, as an archaeological landscape to be explored and reinvented.

In the work of Francis Alÿs (1959), the multicultural city experience is intertwined with a scenario of anthropological encounters. The artist is a trained architect from Belgium, who came to Mexico after the great earthquake in 1985, where he settled and soon after began to experiment with conceptual artistic intervention in the city, always in close collaboration with local Mexican artists. For him, the city centre became a space of cultural and social discovery, a kind of open installation, an artistic happening, and a way to rethink urban concepts. The street becomes a place of invigorating possibility and confluence, where the complexity of popular life collides and interacts with the practice of making art. Since 1991, going on “paseos” (walks) has been the focus of Alÿs’s artistic practice, especially those in the centre of Mexico City. His works in photography, painting, video, drawing or other mixed media are a result of his walks. Often he invents a pretext that defines a certain route, pattern or behavior; on other

occasions, the walk itself will dictate the artistic results. He records the path and the results of his walk, collects objects and artifacts, and stores images, all of which he later uses in his drawings and paintings. His first experience was *The Collector* (1991–92), in which he strolled through the streets of Mexico City pulling a small metal “dog” by a leash, its magnetic wheels collecting debris in its wake. Later, he had a similar experience in the historical part of Havana, Cuba, this time walking through the historical centre with magnetic shoes. In *Paradox of Praxis* (1997), the artist pushed a large block of ice down the streets for hours until it evaporated into a misty trail in the dirt. Similar interventions were made outside Mexico; for example, in producing *The Leak* (1995) he roamed the streets of Ghent with a punctured can of paint, leaving a trail back to a gallery space, where he finally mounted the empty paint can to the wall. In 1998 he crossed Stockholm with a thread unraveling his sweater, and in the project *Narcotourism* (1996), he recorded seven days strolling around Copenhagen each day under the influence of a different drug. His walks have been executed under various circumstances and in different political contexts. In Los Angeles, for example, during an exposition of his work, he would each day take one of his paintings from the gallery wall and walk it through the downtown area where the Rodney King demonstrations took place, and at the end of the day put it back in the gallery.

It is obvious that with all this Alÿs makes a humorous re-enactment of the *flâneur* figure invented at the dawn of modernity by Charles Baudelaire and later projected as a heuristic figure by Walter Benjamin and Michel de Certeau in our comprehension of the modern city. Restaging the *flâneur* character in contemporary mega-cities may seem rather quixotic, or even a melancholy lament on the loss of individual autonomy and impossibility of restoring affective relationships between city-dwellers and the urban space. Nevertheless, it is at the same time a journey of discovery, where the aimless wandering of the artist’s body connects with the city landscape, with no maps and no pre-established routes, only the drive – *le dérive* – of a body exposing itself to urban influences of all kinds. Alÿs does not deny the importance of the curiosity of the foreigner, the tourist, the gringo, the outsider and the *voyeur*, all hoping to glimpse a secret side of street life. For example, his slide show *Ambulantes* (1992–2002) shows “street people” scratching together an existence by gathering and selling all kinds of goods from little trolleys; and the *Sleepers* (1997–2002), made up of

slides showing homeless people lying on the streets together with images of sleeping dogs. The exposure of this miserable border-zone in the city landscape is an obscene reminder of the breakdown of one of the modern city's fundamental distinctions: the private and the public. "For the homeless the street is the living-room", the artist remarks. You could say that Alÿs giving priority to pictures of deterioration, but as the Mexican writer Carlos Monsivais points out, this is not

with a view to extracting any kind of "poverty aesthetic" or projecting the hidden beauty lurking in these territories of neglect; but rather something more tangible, something that portrays a certain condition, a state of affairs, a refashioning of the Centre of the city of always unexpected energies, and more exactly, a portrayal of the artistic journey that combines town planning, sociology and resident's experience to obtain unique pictures. (Monsivais 2006: 53–54)

The neighborhoods around the main plaza, El Zócalo, in the heart of Mexico City, have been the scene of a long series of Alÿs's interventions, as recorded in the recent retrospective exposition, entitled *Walking Distance from the Studio*. Typically, his attention is focused on the centre of the city, within ten blocks of El Zócalo Square, the most important historical site in Mexico. El Zócalo was the centre of Tenochtitlán, the pre-Hispanic city of the Aztecs, and has been an important place for manifestations of, and protests against, public power in representative buildings. Here you find the archaeological remains of a magnificent indigenous past in the *Templo Mayor*, the *Palace of Moctezuma II*, the *Sun Temple* and the *Serpent Wall*. The plaza is flanked by the *Metropolitan Cathedral*, on one side, and the *National Palace* on the other, and in the middle is a gigantic flag, called *Madre Patria*. These characteristics make the plaza a perfect stage for all sorts of propaganda spectacles. Today, it is a vital focal point in an otherwise sprawling Mexico City – a vast public space that is at once local and global, a microcosmic mixture of human existence. In his *Patriotic Tales* from 1997, Alÿs led a flock of sheep into the plaza and around the flag, blindly following the leader. The critical meaning of that video, enhanced by digital manipulation, was quite evident. In the later video *Zócalo, May 22*, from 1999, Alÿs filmed life in the square from high above it, following the comings and goings of everyday social encounters. At the centre the shadow of the flagpole progresses like a huge sun-dial. Unaware of Alÿs

and his camera, people come and go, and always a considerable crowd following the shady retreat in the shadow of the flag. Slowly they move round with the sun in order to stay in the shade, thus creating a sort of human clock in the centre of this inhospitable meeting place.

In certain installations Alÿs's art is more explicitly political, as for instance in the 1994 project, *Vivienda para Todos*, where he built a house in the middle of the city out of the signs, posters and other propaganda materials from the general election, the result being an ironic statement about party-political promises. Also his strolls have sometimes been marked by a political edge, as in the *Re-enactments* video from 2000, where his alter ego appears as a "turista". In this video we see Alÿs, the worried *estrangero*, buying a 9-mm Berretta pistol, which he later holds in his hand as he walks through the streets. He doesn't try to hide the gun, and passers-by are shocked by the sight of a man with a pistol. As the tension mounts, we begin to wonder how long Alÿs' journey will last and what will happen as a consequence of his "performance". After twelve minutes he is arrested and taken away in a police car; we as spectators are left both relieved and amused by his brave if foolish provocation. From a Latin American point of view this was a very stupid action, and in Brazil his life would have been in serious danger. Of course, the provocation puts the finger on the presence of crime and violence, as well as the need urgent need for security in the streets.

One may ask if this kind of artistic intervention is adequate to catch the complexity of today's urban reality. You might argue that the centre of the city is not representative of the reality lived by the great majority of the population, both the modern urban housing of the middle class as well as the shantytowns on the periphery. Nevertheless, the artist's choice of city centre as the location for intervention is a way to read the unreadable, to reduce the 1500 square-kilometers of urban sprawl, yet still account for diversity of experiences in human itineraries. Perhaps there is no way to regain mental control over the urban space, no way to map the totality of the city in its chaotic dynamics, but by focusing on the centre, Alÿs goes against those currents of history that have reduced the city centre to a "historic landmark", a place of dramatic melancholy, a territory of public neglect which has been abandoned by the city planners for half a century. Unlike in most western mega-cities, where gentrification took place through reforms and well-planned valorization real estate in older urban

areas, never really succeeded in Mexico City. Here the golden age of the centre – La Merced, the Student Area, las Vizcaínas, Meave and Santa Cruz, Plaza Garibaldi and Alameda Central – are now melancholy ruins of an unrecoverable history. In the past, Mexico City was the center of gravity for the country, sustained for centuries by its ceremonial functions, religious and political, a place where symbols and reality were inseparable. The historical process of abandonment and decadence of the centre is long and complex but, as Carlos Monsivais points out, two main factors can be identified. The transferral of the national university during the sixties, from the original historical buildings to the North American-style campus of UNAM, interrupted the cultural importance of the centre. A second stage can be marked by the opening of the metro-system opened in the seventies, which succeeded only over-crowding the streets of the central neighborhoods without offering any real reform or renovation. So what is the centre of Mexico today? What remains of it? What became of its past greatness? Let us listen again to Monsivais (2006: 68), the most prominent writer and commentator on contemporary Mexican culture:

A vast array of shops, superb museums, little factories, bookshops, neighborhoods, museums, public offices, law firms, medical clinics, inns, restaurants, dance halls, refreshment stalls, schools, burlesque theatres, the mariachera square, locksmiths, pastry shops, remodeled temples, fashion stores, first- and third-class hotels, hostels, ballrooms, the Alameda... And dives to cater to practically every taste (barring a few exceptions, those targeting widows in their nineties and honorable gangsters), dives for young trainee lawyers and professionals, gays, workers, the unemployed, students keen to find out how their predecessors lived it up, groups of friends not entirely convinced of the risk that is synonymous with tipsy dawns.

Viewing the city through the fragmented mirror of the centre is one way of restoring its symbolic value and showing how development in Latin America often is synonymous with neglect and abandonment of history, heritage and tradition. Here the artist finds material for criticism but also for an imaginary fabulation and prophecy of the future city; here he frames human relationships and invisible structures that no map can catch. Strolling around local neighborhoods close to his studio is at the same time a way of reinventing the voyage of discovery in a city where traveling has become a daily endurance test for millions. One of the main problems in Latin American mega-cities is the distance from home to work; and it

is estimated that in Mexico City around 30 million persons travel daily either by public or private means. Five million people use the subway every day, and more than 3 million cars flow through the streets. These statistics show a huge infra-structural problem, but also point to where most multicultural encounters actually happen, in streets and where desire and fear catalyze the imaginary outline of the city. Walking the streets is no longer a statement of modern autonomy and personal freedom, but the last resort of an underprivileged population.

Invited to the third Biennial Iberoamericana of Lima, in 2002, Alÿs made a contribution in the spirit of his *Paradox of Praxis* series, as a dialogue between land-art, conceptual art and his city interventions. The project, called *When Faith Moves Mountains*, makes a statement about the Peruvian capital, focusing on a desolate area, called Ventanilla, just a few kilometers from the city limit where spontaneous occupation is happening as a result of the enormous growth in urban population (about 9 million inhabitants). The dimensions of the project were epic: a group of some five hundred volunteers armed with shovels formed a line at the end of a massive, 500 meters long and 200 meters tall sand dune; they moved the sand about ten centimeters from its original location. Nothing was actually achieved; nothing was added to the landscape and nothing taken away. The result was not really important. What mattered was the potential for allegoric fabulation and myth in this collective act. Just as the artistic walks in the centre of Mexico City restored the symbolic layers of the urban map, the action in Lima underlined the indexical resistance of geography and landscape to iconic projections in urbanization and city planning. In both cases, the goal was a critical intervention by performance, which in turn became an intervention in the modern dissociation of time, social group, and culture, and at the same time an attempt to restore their unity in imagination and art.

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Marc-Oliver Schuster

Understanding bi-paradigmatic irony as postmodern signification

Given that the goal of communication is the successful delivery of intended meaning, ideally the sender and receiver grasp the same meaning on the basis of a common code of understanding. Irony is a precarious form of communication prone to misunderstanding if the receiver does not perceive its signals. Contrasting a “meant” and a “said” meaning in a single expression, this trope presents two contrasting signifieds in one signifier. If misunderstood the intended order of meanings is ignored: the meaning that is actually “meant” is either not perceived or ranked lower than what is “said.”

For stating an underlying “meant” meaning, irony is said to be characteristic of postmodern signification. Discourse on postmodernity itself is replete with misunderstood ironies, for instance in the use of Paul Feyerabend’s phrase *anything goes*. Feyerabend himself did not understand this phrase as a motto of his own but rather formulated it ironically as the exclamation of a narrow-minded rationalist who is overwhelmed by the messy course in the history of science (1991: vii). Since the late 1980s, the affinity between irony and postmodernity has been addressed in studies combining semiotics and postmodernity, be it in applying semiotic approaches to postmodernity or for advocating a postmodern version of semiotic analysis.

One of the better-known examples of postmodern irony was presented by Umberto Eco in his chapter on “Postmodernism, Irony, the Enjoyable” in his *Postscript to The Name of the Rose*. He locates the quality of irony in the risk that “[t]here is always someone who takes ironic discourse seriously” (Eco 1984: 68). Eco is concerned about the postmodern attitude as an attitude towards history, or more specifically, towards those cultural-

historical codes which we see as ideologically loaded and can no longer take seriously.

I think of the postmodern attitude as that of a man who loves a very cultivated woman and knows he cannot say to her, “I love you madly”, because he knows that she knows (and that she knows that he knows) that these words have already been written by Barbara Cartland. Still, there is a solution. He can say, “As Barbara Cartland would put it, I love you madly.” At this point, having avoided false innocence, having said clearly that it is no longer possible to speak innocently, he will nevertheless have said what he wanted to say to the woman: that he loves her, but he loves her in an age of lost innocence. If the woman goes along with this, she will have received a declaration of love all the same. (Eco 1984: 67)

By means of quotation, this postmodern irony solves the man’s problem on how to attract a cultivated woman into bound language and feelings. For cultivated and ideologically sensitive readers, Eco recommends postmodern irony since its quotational shape can be as equally communicative as non-quotational signification. Love, a supreme kind of communication, is the issue at stake here, and two different declarations of love are involved around the same communicative goal of not only stating one’s feelings, but triggering a positive response. While there is a serious will to communicate, the ironic quotation of the Cartland-code of romance novels introduces a playful element and enables intellectuals to maintain ideological credibility. Whether taken literally (and thus misunderstood) or ironically (and thus understood), Eco’s declaration of love occurs within the same norm of communication.

But what if what is at stake is not love as a pleasurable form of communication, but the sign or signification as such? What if we do not have an alternative between different codes of love, but between different codes of signification, different models of the sign? In that case, we are dealing with different theories of signs and signification. If we group semiotic theories into more general theory formations, we can speak of paradigms such as Saussurean semiology or Peircean semiotics. This raises several questions: Are there types of irony which present different semiotic paradigms in an ironic contrast that is played out between a “meant” and a “said” meaning concerning the topic of signification as the issue at stake? If there are such types, does it make sense to classify some of these types as postmodern?

And, finally, can we find concrete examples for these postmodern ironies in theory and practice?

I view Saussure's distinction of diachrony and synchrony as paradigmatic perspectives of signification. The term "synchrony" is here understood as "static synchrony" in contrast to Roman Jakobson's concept of "dynamic synchrony" (1990: 54). On this occasion, I ignore the poststructuralist critique of the clear-cut, analytical character of this distinction as well as proposals to mediate the two perspectives, for instance in the form of a dialectic panchronicity. As used in the static sense only, synchrony is a perspective according to which signs are displayed in co-presence, simultaneously, at no time at all, or at a given point of time irrespective of their historical dynamics.

The opposition between synchrony and diachrony is an opposition between two paradigmatic perspectives and generates the opposition between 3 paradigmatic ideologies of signification, three ideal-typical ways to understand signification as the use of signs: these semiotic ideologies will be called *communicationism*, *poststructuralism*, and *structuralism*. These ideologies are understood as views on how to produce, present, and understand meaning. Whereas both communicationism and poststructuralism employ diachrony for dealing with the dynamics of signs, structuralism works only with synchrony for regarding signs in a static format. Communicationism has stronger and more restrictive premises governing the way signification is to be narrated, whereas both poststructuralism and structuralism are best conceived in contrast to communicationism insofar as both weaken or abandon the defining features of the latter.

According to communicationism, communication is or should be the norm of the action of signs. In the ideal communicative scenario, the text remains within the framework set up by sender and receiver. The text is not supposed to get lost while traveling from the terminal of departure to the terminal of arrival, figuratively speaking. Among the examples we find Jakobson's model of communication, Eco's notion of postmodern irony as applied in the above postmodern declaration of love, or E. M. Forster's concept of plot, which will be applied later. Poststructuralism is the second ideology applying diachrony. It rejects communication as the norm, although communication remains a possibility among other modes of dynamic signification, of how signs can travel, so to speak. The claims of poststructuralism are weaker and less conformist than they are in the case

of communicationism. Analytic distinctions are rendered problematic as well, for instance, those between world and text, synchrony and diachrony, literary and figurative (metaphorical), text and context. Poststructuralism stresses those features that are suspect in or obstructive to communication; it is more interested in the marginal, the eccentric, the undermining, and the less controllable. Unlike both communicationism and structuralism, poststructuralism dislikes the idea of a text being fully confined by a context. Codes and contexts are preferably broken, only partially binding, or never to be fully determined. As in the case of Barthes's *punctum* experience, the code may simply vanish completely. Other examples for this semiotic ideology include Barthes's poststructuralist works and Derrida's notions of dissemination and *différance*. Finally, structuralism is the ideology governed by synchrony; it conceives of the sign by abstracting it from the process of signification and by proposing a synchronic view as modeled after Saussure's semiology and linguistic structuralism à la Hjelmslev or the early Barthes, whose notion of *studium* is the structuralist pendant to the poststructuralist notion of *punctum*.

For further investigation, the above characterization of semiotic paradigms must be expanded, also in order to account for possible mixtures of ideologies, as in the case of Peirce's semiotics. For the current purposes, the classification of two perspectives and three ideologies must be sufficient, and if this is granted for now, then 6 types of bi-paradigmatic irony are possible among the three ideologies: communicationism (as the "meant") targets poststructuralism or structuralism (as the "said"); poststructuralism (as the "meant") targets communicationism or structuralism (as the "said"); structuralism (as the "meant") targets communicationism or poststructuralism (as the "said").

Because there are always two paradigmatic ideologies involved in this type of irony, I speak of bi-paradigmatic irony as in contrast to mono-paradigmatic irony. Eco's postmodern declaration of love demonstrates mono-paradigmatic irony insofar as the two codes of love involved both belong to communicationism, governed by the norm of communication as specified in the topic of love. This type of irony establishes its ironic contrast within the same paradigm, whereas in bi-paradigmatic irony, the "said" and the "meant" meanings belong to different paradigms.

For the sake of brevity and understanding, I limit myself here to three comparable examples of bi-paradigmatic irony, which all deserve to be

called *postmodern*. The first two cases represent the type of poststructuralist irony targeting communicationism and are taken from Derrida and Barthes; the third example is a novel by the Austrian writer Christoph Ransmayr and demonstrates the type of structuralist irony targeting communicationism.

Derrida renders a poststructuralist targeting of communicationism in “Signature Event Context” from *Margins of Philosophy* (orig. 1972). He starts from Austin’s analysis of the signature concerning presuppositions about the “the presence of the ‘author’ as the ‘person who does the uttering,’ as the ‘origin,’ the source, in the production of the statement” – but, as Derrida continues, “in order to function, that is, in order to be legible, a signature must have a repeatable, iterable, imitable form” (Derrida 1982: 328). Thus the signature “must be able to detach itself from the present and singular intention of its production” (ibid.) and thus precisely from the event-like presence associated to it, from a “moment of presence to consciousness which is the origin of subsequent obligations or other effects” (Culler 1994: 126). Derrida’s critique of the signature is part of his broader critique of the notion of communication. According to him, “[a]s writing, communication ... is not the means of transport of sense, the exchange of intentions and meanings,” and he sees an “historical unfolding of a general writing of which the system of speech, consciousness, meaning, presence, truth etc.” (Derrida 1982: 329) are only an effect that he likes questioning in terms of logocentrism. The notion of communication is punctured by writing, by the intervention of dissemination; the notion of signature, too, is deconstructed on the grounds of writing as dissemination.

As Derrida points out repeatedly, this deconstruction of the notion of communication is delivered in an oral communication of a paper, of which the printed version was sent to the organizers beforehand, with his signature attached. The right side at the end of his essay presents the reproduction of his handwritten signature in the form of “J. Derrida,” above a printed “J. Derrida” (1982: 330). To the left of this signature, Derrida adds, in brackets, the following remark:

(Remark: the – written – text of this – oral – communication was to have been addressed to the Association of French Speaking Societies of Philosophy before the meeting. Such a missive therefore had to be signed. Which I did, and counterfeited here. Where? There. J.D.)

The signature that we encounter at the end of his essay also functions as a countersignature or counterfeit for the original signature placed on the written version sent in before his talk. Derrida deliberately employs an ironic structure here: On the level of the ironically said, he continues to use the term “communication” and conventional assumptions about communication in the sense of the transmission of meaning; in addition, the ironically said includes the conventional use of his own signature at the end of his text. On the level of the ironically meant, we can locate everything Derrida says critically in deconstructivist manner throughout his essay against the conventional ideas about communication and signature, basically against the metaphysics of presence and origin, against the idea of an authoritative “presence to consciousness of a signifying intention at a particular moment” (Culler 1994: 125). In sum: in this ironic structure of postmodern signification, the notion of signature as a type of sign functions as the issue at stake between the communicationist and poststructuralist paradigms of signification.

Barthes’s use of his own handwriting is another example of a post-structuralist irony targeting communicationism. On the back cover of an English edition of his autobiography *Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes* (1994), the last review quotation is a statement by Hayden White according to which this book “is a genuinely postmodern autobiography”. Some of the studies on Barthes’s book describe its asserted postmodern features in more concrete terms, mentioning heterogeneity, frame breaks, narrative coherence, intertextuality, parody, self-reflexivity, narrative discontinuity, playfulness, and, most importantly, the critique of concepts of subjectivity and authorship. However, instead of locating the book’s alleged postmodernity within the main text, one can place it in the form of bi-paradigmatic irony in the relation between the main text and the preliminary epigraph, which reaches out to the reader in paratextual function. As an epigraph, Barthes uses a facsimile reproduction of his handwriting, which, in the original French, reads as follows: “Tout ceci doit être considéré comme dit par un personnage de roman” (1995: 5). This is translated in the English edition as “It must all be considered as if spoken by a character in a novel” (1994: 1). The original 1975 edition distinguished Barthes as the book’s subject from its producer by capitalizing the former: “Roland Barthes par roland barthes.” This noted difference indicates the book’s insistence on irrevocable splits between Barthes as the writer, Barthes as

the narrator, and Barthes as the narrated subject. Barthes even wrote a review about his own book, according to which he claims, in general, that “the subject who writes acquires reality only in the act of writing and that in any case, it is impossible truthfully to speak about oneself,” and he adds that he himself is “the only person who cannot speak truthfully of himself” (quoted in Brée 1978: 4). If this is the case, then letting a character in a novel speak about the actual Roland Barthes in the third person could again come closer to autobiographical truth. Instead of introducing, at the outset, a specific novel-character, who speaks the entire text that follows, Barthes imposes on us a reading strategy: he wants us, on a meta-level, to think of his text as framed by such a narrative voice. This reading-device hardly suits Lejeune’s idea of the autobiographical pact (1975), according to which the autobiographer guarantees that the writer, the narrator and the protagonist are *one and the same*, and that the factual events are truthfully recorded. Still, Barthes appeals to us to adopt the idea of the imagined narrator who simply enters a more complex pact that binds us as readers in a communicative gesture. Despite all the problematization of autobiography within the main text, this framing device introduces some formal closure, comparable to those enclosing bubbles in comic-strips that are drawn around spoken words and point to their speakers. The epigraph re-appears within the main text with a more disturbing ending: “All this must be considered as if spoken by a character in a novel – or rather by several characters (1994: 199). If we look at Barthes’s talk about such novel-characters, we are lead to believe that we are dealing with a somewhat traditional kind of character, the sort of nineteenth-century realism to be found in Balzac and the kind of novels containing an “image-repertoire” as “the fatal substance of the novel” (1994: 119). The appearance of this epigraph within the main text belongs to the set of passages that can be read as comments about the preliminary epigraph, for instance, passages about handwriting, proper names, signature, inscription, and the like.

Given what Barthes critically writes, in the main text, about his book and the genuine impossibility of autobiography, the epigraph does not follow these insights and instead strongly requests us to read the main text as a unified spoken account coming from a single source. The handwritten shape of this imposed reading device makes this request personal and pressing, and it can be linked to Derrida’s idea that speech implies presence and writing absence. All the critical comments on autobiog-

raphy within the main text must be considered as utterances by a more traditional novel-character, and to see it this way seems to be the writer's primary will delivered in hand-written shape. With this epigraph, we get an ironic device that remodels the genre of autobiography, but instead of delivering an avantgarde-like version, we read the main text as a quotation. Similar to the case of Eco's sophisticated declaration of love, Barthes want us to adopt a meta-level which then enables him to write – and us to read – some autobiographical pieces while constantly being aware of all its theoretical troubles.

If one applies the concept of bi-paradigmatic irony, one can say that the main text, with all its problematization of subjectivity and autobiography, establishes poststructuralism as the ideologically last word. The epigraph, however, imposes at the paratextual outset in the shape of a strong reader-address a communicative device that frames the poststructuralist content with communicationist ideology. Both paradigms are co-present throughout the book in this ironic opposition, where the "said" communicationism works like a formal operator on the ironically "meant" poststructuralism, in order to set up a new kind of autobiography without innocence.

The third example to be discussed as postmodern signification, a novel by Christoph Ransmayr, demonstrates the type of structuralist irony targeting communicationism. *Die letzte Welt* (orig. 1988), translated as *The Last World* (1990), is recognized as a postmodern novel, and the notion of bi-paradigmatic irony applies well to this book, which (ab)uses communicative actions and narrative strategies to construct plots in order to arrive at a fictional setting that is emptied of any communicative human agency. What happens, in short, is this: The narrator called Cotta attempts to discover traces of the poet Ovid in Ovid's exile in Tomi at the Black Sea. Instead of finding the poet, Cotta realizes that he, like all the other figures he meets in Tomi, have been narrated by the poet in advance; they undergo transformations and become non-humans in the form of stones, plants or animals. By the end, Cotta is the sole survivor on the scene, but he, too, has been narrated ahead by Ovid and ceases to exist as a human being. His disappearance marks the end of human history and narrative plots about humans in this setting; it marks the end of human communication within the setting and between the narrator and the reader. This state of non-communication based on the absence of human consciousness is presented as the telos, the final state towards which the entire narrative drives. This state

is not described as a frightening apocalypse, but as a desirable, peaceful eradication of human consciousness as a prerequisite for communicative-narrative plotting in the sense of E. M. Forster, according to whom the plot narrative ties events by means of causality (Forster 1974: 60). Basically, Ransmayr constructs a plot by means of communicative actions involving Ovid's poetic narration and the interactions between Cotta and the other people in *Tomi*. These means of plotting signs and ultimately the ideology of communicationism occur on the level of the ironically "said," whereas the ironically "meant" consists of ideological structuralism in the version of an anti-human, or better, an a-human state of affairs assembled in synchrony. If the understanding of bi-paradigmatic irony as postmodern signification has any merits, additional examples for the other types of bi-paradigmatic irony must be found in both theory and practice, apart from refining the classification and characterization of ideologies involved.

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Klaus Schwarzfischer

The semiotic attractors that determine recognition in advertising

One important aspect of semiotic research is the problem how to deal with meaning. Designers often underestimate the dimensions of meaning, when they focus primarily on form. The “intradisciplinary designer” deals only with syntactical aspects of signs and aims to solve syntactical problems caused by syntactical errors. But even in marketing the situation is more complex. To communicate a cultural or subcultural pattern (and to link it to an institution or a company) requires a deeper understanding of the reconstruction of meaning in the recipient. To decide whether an offered advertisement is favorable, we have to understand the audience and what this audience (or subculture) finds attractive. We think, attractiveness cannot be understood without understanding attractors. At this point the empirical and the speculative perspective of research are touching each other. Understanding an effect means to be able to produce the effect (Bense 1971). This is what we did: We took an existing empirical study and tried to reproduce the results using a system semiotic model of attractors, which we developed. The two essential steps were: First we developed the model by using the stimuli of the Czaia (1998) study. In the second step we tested the quality of the predictions, which is our model able to provide, using an other study (Stern 2001). This is important, because the model with its coefficients was tuned to the stimuli of the Czaia (1998) study. So it would be rather trivial that the model was able to reproduce this results. But it was not trivial to reproduce the results of the Stern (2001) study, what our model did in an astonishing accuracy.

So, how does it work? Our expert system is an approach to deal with semiotic attractors using a rather simple visual interface. Therefore it is usable even for designers who do not have any statistically education.

The aim was to reproduce the recognition values of advertising elements (according to D. Starch, in Stern 2001) in the studies of Czaia (1998) and Stern (2001). Due to Stern's discriminating between male and female, we decided to aim at the average of both (see Figure 1). This is in accordance with the values of the study of Czaia.




Figure 1. A double-page advertisement of Volkswagen from Stern (left), and a quarter-page advertising of BMW from Czaia (right); both ads in colour.

To reproduce the empirical observed Recognition values we developed a model that contains the assumed most relevant factors as they appear in the literature (e.g. in Kroeber-Riel 1993; or Lachmann 2004). In order to keep the model as simple as possible, we tried to reduce the number of factors. But we reduced the number of factors not as far as possible, what would have been possible by a statistically operated factor analysis. More important to us was the usability of the model. And this is driven by an intuitive approach much more than by abstract accuracy.

The tested model was inspired by semiotics, and so the factors are of three groups: Syntactic, semantic and pragmatic factors. Each factor is implemented as an extra layer over the stimulus. In each layer the areas are manually marked by an operator, where the aspect is true. The user just marks the area for example where the factor "Text" is true. This is done as a binary differentiation (true, false) without any need to quantify the extent (more or less of extent). In the first step the weights of each factor of the model were adjusted to match the results. Further usage of the expert system is free of such concerns.



Figure 2. Phases of our analysis demonstrated through the BMW ad from Czaia (1998); from left to right: original ad, manually added binary markings, weighted markings, and the masked ad.

To show the principle, Figure 2 offers the whole process in a simple example (from left to right): on the left side is the original BMW advertisement (approx. 1/8 page of a local newspaper; Czaia 1998). Then (center-left), all the areas where one factor is true are marked: just black, where one factor (whichever) is true, and white, where no one is true. The third stage (center-right) shows the results after application of the weighting coefficients, which are of course different for each factor. All the layers sum up to the values of the predicted recognition, at which every single layer has a different opacity (coefficient of relevance). In the weighted view the percentage of grey tone is exactly the percentage of the predicted recognition value, which you can read directly from the graphic. Additionally, the resulting map of recognition values can be used as visualizing mask to show how efficient the elements will be recognized. These visualisations can be done in different ways. A very simple alternative is shown (right).

Now, what are the semiotic factors to be marked and analyzed in detail? The four syntactic factors are Size, Colour, Convexity and an additional layer for the Focus Periphery. You see that the syntactic factors are given with the stimulus. The semantic factors are represented by four layers, which denote the Biological Codes, Cultural Codes, Scriptural Codes and the Individual Codes (which are Sub-Cultural Codes). In contrast to the syntactic factors, which can be found in the stimulus (in our case, the advertisement) the semantic factors cannot be analyzed without additional information. We have to know about the observer and the audience, he is

embedded culturally. Because we have to “walk in their shoes” by observing their construction of world by using their codes. And of course, this has speculative aspects if the analyzing user does not know the audience properly. The pragmatic factors are four again, which correspond with the Schema Affiliation (the Action Script in the situation of observing), the Transactional Style (which element is used rhetorically to provoke, show or hide emotions), the factor of Broken Taboos (which has to consider the situation and the subculture), and fourthly the signs for the Sender/Origin of the message (who addresses me).

LAYER-MODULE 1	WEIGHTING-MODULE 1
12 semiotic parameters as a binary decision on a own layer	weighting the layers due to the particular coefficient of relevance
1: element bigger than X?	Value 1: element bigger than X? 18%
2: coloured?	Value 2: coloured? 17%
3: simple/good shape?	Value 3: simple/good shape? 10%
4: in sight direction?	Value 4: in sight direction? -%
5: a biological item?	Value 5: a biological item? 30%
6: is it text? (code 1)	Value 6: is it text? (code 1) 23%
7: is it an artefact? (code 2)	Value 7: is it an artefact? (code 2) 25%
8: subcultural? (code 3)	Value 8: subcultural? (code 3) 9%
9: a broken taboo?	Value 9: a broken taboo? -%
10: indicates sender/origin?	Value 10: indicates sender/origin? 17%
11: rhetorical element?	Value 11: rhetorical element? 13%
12: matches action script?	Value 12: matches action script? 13%

Summary of Weighting-Module 1 values:

- Value 1: 18%
- Value 2: 17%
- Value 3: 10%
- Value 4: -%
- Value 5: 30%
- Value 6: 23%
- Value 7: 25%
- Value 8: 9%
- Value 9: -%
- Value 10: 17%
- Value 11: 13%
- Value 12: 13%

Grouped totals:

- Values 1-5: 45%
- Values 6-9: 87%
- Values 10-12: 43%
- Total: 175%

Figure 3. System-semiotic factors as binary questions; answers weighted.

As shown in Figure 3 the syntactic factors sum up to only 45% recognition, whereas the maximum value through all the factors is 175%. The semantic factors are dominant with 87%. And the pragmatic factors with 43% are almost as important as the syntactic ones. (Two factors are set to zero in this scheme, because they did not appear at all in the analyzed print advertisings.) But, by the way, it seems quite clear that information aesthetics had to fail, if ignoring three quarter of the relevant factors and focussing only on syntactic factors (Bense 1971; Sprinkart 1982; Frank & Franke 1997). And, of course, there is the problem of including the observer – not only the observed. Our model needs to be calibrated to a given culture.

The coefficients were adjusted with a set of 5 ads (with 43 elements) from Czaia. Then we tested two other sets of advertisings (from Czaia and Stern) without changing the weights of the factors. All in all our model was applied to a set of 23 advertisements (with 146 elements), which were tested concerning the recognition values of the single graphic elements in

advertising. And these recognition values were reproduced by our model even better than we expected. We achieved a correlation of 0.945 (Pearson) between the empirically obtained values (Czaia 1998; Stern 2001) and the predicted values from our model. This was not obvious, because of the simplicity of the model: We did not need to discriminate elements due to their individual shape or colour (Espe & Krampen 1986) – with the exception of the factor “simple/good shape”, which indicates a high-contrasted closed shape in general, which is also known as “goodness of gestalt” (but does not care about the shape in detail).

Our model uses pragmatic and semantic factors. And both are not independent of culture. At least in two ways this influences the results of a model like ours: every observer has structurally determined pragmatics, capabilities and limitations. A mechanical observer like an OCR-system will use other codes for other aims. And even humans are quite different. A typical citizen of Central Europe will observe the same advertisement differently from, say, an “African illiterate” from the savannah. We tried to simulate an analysis of an advertising (the one from Figure 1, on left) by three very different observers with our model (results are shown in Figure 4). The “Average-European” and the “Savannah Illiterate” use different codes and have different pragmatic aims. But they share the same “hardware” (the biological system determinants). The technical OCR-system (on the right in Figure 4) however is interested in text and nothing else. But it is to be seen immediately that the weights do not work for this intercultural approach. The weights have to be fixed for every main culture. We can see this clearly in the fact that the simulated OCR-system would have much higher relevance for text (probably 100%). And from this we can also conclude the “ethnocentric distortion” of the simulated “Savannah Illiterate”.



Figure 4. Different observers (from left): Central European, African “Illiterate”, and technical OCR-system.

We try in our current research to derive a narrative analysis from this method (which is patent pending) by using the masked ads (as in Figure 2, right). Considering the recognition value and the size of the corresponding element, we think it is possible to predict the “semiotic fixations” analogous to “visual fixations”. This way we hope to predict the narration of the recognition, which is the remembered story of an advertising. For marketing and advertising the perception is only the vehicle for the higher goal of getting “the story” in the audience’s minds. Therefore it is of less interest to predict the visual path of perception than to predict the semantic path of recognition and remembrance.



Figure 5. Construction of Semiotic Path as basis of Narrative Analysis.

Our model and method permits optimizing the design of an advertisement in several aspects. Of course we can enhance the recognition of the design of an advertising by adding or changing (or eliminating) elements. Additionally the visual path can be optimized by making it shorter and by reducing the angle between the lines, which connect the fixation points. But the narration itself can also be made more salient by optimizing the goodness of gestalt. And finally, the semiotic path can be designed by making it less complex, easier to read and, in that way, easier to learn and to recognize, respectively.

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Rachel Seh Andem

Entente / mésentente au Cameroun entre l'homme et la femme par rapport à *La Journée Internationale de la Femme*

Introduction

Au Cameroun, la *Journée Internationale de la Femme* constitue un véritable ressort visant à mettre en exergue l'importance de la Femme comme être humain à part entière au sein de la vie sociale. Mais cette journée du 8 mars s'avère très polémique au regard de l'Entente et/ou de la Mésentente qu'elle suscite entre l'Homme et la Femme, non seulement par rapport à sa catalyse, mais aussi à l'agencement et la pragmatique des diverses festivités qui la marquent.

Dans notre communication, qui est loin d'être un plaidoyer aveugle pour la réhabilitation de la femme, nous ferons un examen froid de la réception critique de cette journée par l'être humain de sexe masculin et pourquoi pas, une autocritique de la femme.

Pour ce faire, nous mettrons de l'emphase sur l'historique de la Journée Internationale de la Femme, l'importance de la Femme, et l'organisation de la Journée, l'entente et la mésentente entre l'Homme et la Femme par rapport à la journée en question. Et enfin nous ferons quelques suggestions.

1. Historique de la journée internationale de la femme

Sous l'instigation de Clara Zetkin, une militante allemande d'un mouvement socialiste, l'organisation d'une Journée de la Femme fut décidée

en 1910 à Copenhague au Danemark. Clara Zetkin soutenait “qu’il faut supprimer tout ce qui empêche La femme comme l’Homme de créer, de produire, chacun selon sa particularité d’être humain différencié”. Cette journée sera célébrée dans le monde entier au mois de Mars et, dès 1911, des millions de femmes vont se rassembler à travers l’Europe et plus tard, l’Organisation des Nations-Unies en fixera la date le 8 Mars en 1977, après avoir proclamé 1975, Année Internationale de la Femme.

Les Nations-Unies, en fait, ont pour objectif d’attirer l’attention de la communauté internationale sur la nécessité de lutter contre les discriminations faites aux Femmes et promouvoir leurs capacités de citoyennes et d’actrices du développement social, économique, politique et culturel. Dans plusieurs pays, la Journée du 8 Mars est déclarée fériée et chômée. D’une manière générale, chaque pays organise des manifestations pour commémorer cette journée qui suscite ainsi à travers le monde entier une prise de conscience générale sur la condition de la Femme.

Pour ce qui est du Cameroun, sa première célébration remonte à 1986. Dans certaines régions, la femme camerounaise subit plusieurs formes de discriminations. Par exemple, elle n’a pas le droit de parler aux hommes en public car, semble-t-il, “les urines d’une femme ne peuvent jamais traverser un tronc d’arbre jeté par terre”. Certaines entreprises sont réticentes au recrutement des femmes du fait de leur maternité et de la nature des travaux (gardiennage, docker, etc.). La femme camerounaise a des difficultés d’accès au crédit et à la propriété foncière. Elle reste une mineur qui doit obtenir l’autorisation ou une procuration du mari pour tous ses actes d’achat ou de vente des biens immeubles. Dans certaines régions, les mariages sont précoces et forcés. Au Nord Cameroun, on pratique encore les mutilations génitales féminines. Une préférence est donnée en matière d’éducation aux enfants de sexe masculin. Beaucoup de jeunes filles ont dû abandonner leurs études pour s’occuper de leurs frères. En matière de santé de la reproduction, c’est le parent ou l’époux qui donne l’autorisation et choisit la méthode de contraception.

Par ailleurs, les femmes sont victimes de plusieurs types de violences psychologiques. En effet, selon l’annuaire statistique sur la situation de la femme au Cameroun (Décembre 2004):

- 23% de femmes n’ont pas la confiance de leur mari en matière d’argent.

- 51.3% de femmes ont un mari qui veut savoir à tout moment où elles sont.

- 14.1% de femmes n'ont pas le droit de voir leur famille.

- 25.6% de femmes n'ont pas le droit de nouer des amitiés avec d'autres femmes.

- 67.2% de femmes ont un partenaire qui est jaloux quand elles causent avec d'autres hommes.

- 10% de femmes n'ont jamais vu leur époux nu, pourtant, ils ont des enfants.

Ces violences psychologiques se suivent généralement d'actes qui peuvent porter atteinte à l'intégrité physique de la femme. Elle peut recevoir des gifles, des coups de pied, coups de poings, être jetée par terre, étranglée, brûlée, menacée avec une arme ou subir des violences sexuelles.

2. Importance de la femme et organisation de la Journée internationale au Cameroun

Le Cameroun accorde une très grande importance à la Femme. Le Chef de l'Etat, Son Excellence le Président Paul Biya, œuvre activement pour l'amélioration des conditions de la Femme. En témoignent par exemple les créations par divers décrets présidentiels des Ministères de la Condition Féminine, des Affaires Sociales et de la Condition Féminine (Fusion de deux ministères), de la Condition Féminine, et enfin de la promotion de la Femme et de la Famille. Ce dernier ministère a pour objectif d'élaborer et de mettre en œuvre des mesures relatives au respect des Droits de la Femme Camerounaise dans la société, à la disparition de toute discrimination à l'égard de la Femme et à l'accroissement des garanties d'égalité dans les domaines politique, économique, social et culturel.

Depuis 1994, il est organisé une semaine de la Femme camerounaise afin de susciter une prise de conscience générale de la condition de la Femme. L'Organisation des Nations-Unies, chaque année propose un thème qui est développé, exposé et débattu sous forme de séminaires, de conférences par des experts à travers les villes et les compagnes. Ces cinq dernières années, les thèmes retenus sont les suivants:

- 2003: "Egalité des Genres et Développement Technologique du 3^{ème} Millénaire"

- 2004: "Femme et HIV/SIDA"

- 2005: “Egalité des Genres au-delà de 2005: Construction d’un Futur plus sécurisant”
- 2006: “Femme dans le processus de prise décision”
- 2007: “Violence contre les femmes et les Filles: Briser le silence, agir”.

En fait, les thèmes choisis ont pour centre d’intérêt, la femme. Ils véhiculent un message ayant une portée didactique et sensibilisent non seulement les femmes, mais aussi les hommes sur la condition de la Femme. Les femmes reçoivent ainsi des enseignements et peuvent par conséquent poser leurs problèmes.

A partir du mois de janvier, un pagne en coton aux couleurs vives est mis en vente sur toute l’étendue du territoire national. “FEMME” ou “8 MARS”, c’est ainsi que l’on nomme communément ce pagne, illustre non seulement les idéologies politique, économique, social et culturel du Chef de l’Etat, Monsieur Paul Biya mais aussi le thème de l’année. Le 8 mars, le jour de la fête proprement dite, est marqué par un grand rassemblement de femmes dans toutes les localités.

A Yaoundé, la capitale du Cameroun, dès 8 heures, les femmes se retrouvent au Boulevard du 20 Mai en tenue avec des pancartes et des banderoles où on peut lire des messages de félicitation, et de remerciement adressés à la Première Dame, Mme Chantal Biya qui préside le défilé après un discours solennel qui tient à conscientiser la femme de sa condition.

Les femmes défilent au rythme des mélodies traditionnelles qui louent et vantent les mérites de la femme, mère, épouse, agent de développement économique et social et partisane de la paix. Elles font une exhibition de leur connaissances, et de leurs activités. On peut voir une femme sur un tracteur, des cultivatrices avec des fruits de leur champ, des femmes militaires, enseignantes, des infirmières, des musiciennes, des danseuses, des sportives etc. Mme Chantal Biya, ce 8 Mars 2007, a défié le service du Protocole et est descendue de la Tribune Présidentielle pour aller défilé avec les femmes. La Journée se termine par des agapes populaires dans les Ministères, les Résidences, les Restaurants, les Bars et les Quartiers. Cependant, nous notons qu’au Cameroun, la problématique de la Journée Internationale de la Femme n’est pas encore assez bien définie d’où l’entente et/ou la mésentente entre l’Homme et la Femme.

3. Entente entre l'homme et la femme par rapport à la Journée internationale

Une petite enquête auprès des populations nous a permis de relever qu'au Cameroun, tous les hommes et toutes les femmes pensent que le 8 Mars est un grand Jour qui met en exergue la valeur de la femme. Ce jour, la femme est à l'honneur et peut tout se permettre (aller au restaurant, au cinéma, aller danser, aller rendre visite à sa famille, à ses amis, etc.). Ils pensent que la femme devrait exploiter ce jour pour revendiquer ses Droits, mais que malheureusement, la majorité de femmes ne sont même pas intéressées par les thèmes de réflexion proposés par l'ONU.

Pour beaucoup de femmes, La Journée Internationale de la Femme connote simplement l'obtention du pagne du 8 Mars, le défilé et les festivités populaires. Ils regrettent aussi le fait que beaucoup de femmes ne puissent même pas faire une lecture du message véhiculé à travers le pagne, elles discutent plus sur les différents tons mis sur le marché. Cette année, nous avons 3 tons: le vert, l'orange et le bordeaux. A côté des points sur lesquels l'Homme et la Femme s'entendent par rapport à la Journée Internationale de la Femme, on relève aussi quelques points qui suscite de plus en plus de mésentente entre eux.

4. Mésentente entre l'homme et la femme par rapport à la Journée internationale

Plusieurs aspects font l'objet d'une mésentente entre l'homme et la femme. Par exemple, le pagne modifié chaque année entraîne beaucoup de discordes dans les familles et même dans la société. Quand un homme ne peut pas offrir le pagne du 8 Mars à son épouse ou à ses filles, son autorité est bafouée, il est chosifié par ces dernières qui, parfois, vont se prostituer pour en avoir un. La plupart des hommes rencontrés se sont dit déçus par les femmes. Elles ne mettent pas en application les enseignements reçus, ne revendiquent pas leurs Droits, et ne sont malheureusement "qu'une foule qui ne crie pas son vrai cri" comme disait Aimé Césaire.

Beaucoup d'hommes pensent que la Journée Internationale de la Femme est inutile, on bloque les activités économiques pour rien. Cette Journée devrait même être abolie car elle est devenue un jour de "débauche", un jour de "délinquance féminine", et d'immoralité. Le 8 Mars 2007

par exemple, les femmes, sans distinction d'âge, de rang social ou de niveau d'instruction, se sont faites remarquer par des attitudes déshonorantes. On a noté que plusieurs femmes sont rentrées chez elles très tard (minuit-1 h) beaucoup ont découché, commettant ainsi l'adultère. Il y a eu des abus d'alcool.

Beaucoup de jeunes filles, ce jour là, ont leur premier rapport sexuel, s'exposant ainsi au Sida et aux grossesses non désirées, fument leur première cigarette, boivent leur première bière sous prétexte de l'émancipation de la femme. Le 08 Mars est devenu un jour qui occasionne des divorces, car l'absence de tolérance des hommes génère des conflits plus ou moins violents qui peuvent déboucher sur des bagarres.

Les femmes quant à elles, se justifient en affirmant que le 8 Mars est un jour où la femme peut se venger, un jour où elle peut aussi faire comme les hommes, c'est-à-dire boire librement dans les bars, se faire courtiser librement quand elles-mêmes ne font pas la cour aux hommes ou même à d'autres femmes.

Les hommes pensent aussi que le gouvernement accorde trop de Journées aux femmes. On peut citer, par exemple, celles-ci :

- 08 Mars: Journée Internationale de la Femme.
- 31 Juillet: Journée de la Femme Africaine
- 15 Octobre: Journée Mondiale de la Femme Rurale
- 06 Septembre: Journée de l'Égalité des Genres

Ils se moquent de toutes ces journées. La Femme a les 365 jours de l'année, mais elle l'ignore. Elle peut s'affirmer tous les jours, mais elle sera toujours le sexe faible qui a besoin de protection, d'autorité masculine pour ne pas s'égarer.

Pour les hommes chrétiens, l'homme et la femme se complètent. Ils ont chacun un rôle dans la société. Chacun a sa morphologie et ses capacités. L'Homme peut procréer tous les jours et la femme a une période bien déterminée pour concevoir. Cependant l'homme malgré sa puissance, ne peut jamais porter un bébé dans son ventre. Dieu seul sait pourquoi il a créé l'Homme et la Femme différemment, et c'est lui seul qui peut changer la condition de la Femme.

5. Conclusion et suggestions

Quoi qu'on dise, les femmes ont un rôle important à jouer dans la société. L'attitude désinvolte de ces dernières est tout simplement l'expression d'individus privés d'un certain nombre de droits.

A regarder de loin, la femme donne l'impression qu'elle passe à côté de ses problèmes. Elle semble hésiter entre l'être et le paraître, entre ce qu'elle est au plus profond ou au plus secret d'elle-même et ce qu'elle fait paraître. Certes, l'illettrisme des femmes et la persistance de certaines pratiques et coutumes restent un handicap qui empêche le plein épanouissement de la femme, mais le Ministère de la promotion de la Femme et de la Famille, quant à lui, reste optimiste et espère bien atteindre son objectif: *l'amélioration de la condition de la Femme*.

L'épanouissement de la Femme dans les domaines politique, économique, social et culturel serait un atout dans la lutte contre la pauvreté et l'insalubrité. En général, la femme africaine a encore beaucoup à apprendre: la notion de "globalisation" est complètement ignorée de beaucoup de femmes, elles n'ont ni connaissance, ni maîtrise, du Droit de l'Homme, des Systèmes Economiques et des Nouvelles Technologies d'Information et de Communication. En dehors de leur langue maternelle, beaucoup de femmes ne parlent aucune langue étrangère, quand bien même celle-ci serait une langue officielle de leur pays.

Au regard de tout ce qui précède, nous pensons donc qu'il faut redoubler d'effort dans la conscientisation de la Femme sur sa condition.

La femme est un pilier indispensable à la construction de l'humanité. C'est elle qui donne la vie, c'est elle qui éduque l'Homme. La phalocratie est un frein pour le développement de l'Humanité. L'homme et la femme sont tous "un animal *rationalis*", leur éducation devrait avoir pour "point de départ et point d'arrivée la personne humaine", car ils sont tous des individus autant égaux et différents possédant des qualités et des valeurs égales et jouissant des mêmes droits.

Nous proposons que les Nations-Unies, à travers le Ministère de la Promotion de la Femme et de la Famille, révisent leur programme d'action en proposant par exemple, un thème quinquennal ayant des objectifs bien déterminés. En outre, le thème de l'année devrait être annoncé solennellement à partir du 09 Mars et pendant 12 mois, il sera développé et exposé à

travers les villes et les campagnes, dans les associations féminines, les maisons de la Femme et même au sein des familles.

Par ailleurs, la semaine de la Femme devrait plutôt être une semaine d'évaluation des enseignements reçus, où, non seulement les femmes, mais aussi les hommes pourraient exposer les améliorations et les difficultés rencontrés. Le 08 Mars, le jour de la fête, serait donc le jour de la clôture des activités féminines.

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Farouk Y. Seif

Communication in the age of the “Great Turning”

Understanding the role of analog and digital modes in liberating imagination

1. Introduction: Communication in the digital world

We live in an epochal transition where the purpose of communication can hardly be overestimated. Understanding or misunderstanding communication has far-reaching consequences. But our inability to imagine and communicate new possibilities is beyond understanding; and this inability can lead to the demise of our humanity. Observing current world affairs and events, it is evident to me that there is a growing need to go beyond what we are conventionally able of transmitting into what we are imaginatively capable of communicating. There has never been a time in history when it has been more significant for societies to communicate a transformational process that would lead to global well-being and an imaginative sustainable way of living. Equally troubling is that we live in an age so infatuated with new digital communication and analytical verbal thinking that it is easy to overlook the significance of the analog mode in accessing the realm of imagination.

By *digital mode*, I mean systems that represent the complexity and richness of life by breaking it down into discrete bits or packets of information so it can be managed efficiently. *Analog mode*, on the other hand, is direct representational or analogous systems of continuous undifferentiated whole experiences. An analog recording, for example, is where the characteristics of the original sound are represented directly in the groove of a gramophone album. Digital recording is where the original sound is converted into bits of information that can be easily compacted and stored as well as mass-produced in a compact disk (CD). A clock with hours,

minutes, and seconds is an example of the digital mode,¹ whereas an hour-glass represents analogically the time of the day through the continuous flow of sand, or as humans experience time through the undifferentiated movement of the sun and stars.

Ever since societies acquired alphabet literacy, we have seemed to rely heavily on a rational, digital sequential thinking process. In fact, the fictitious notion that logical, linear thinking is better than intuition and holistic perception is a fallibility written by left-brainers. Thousands of years of left-brain dominance have encouraged digital dependency, and may have led to numerous world conflicts and the devastating experience of Hiroshima. Even with all their intrinsic worth, “abstract science, linear words, and sequential equations had led the world to the brink of extinction” (Shlain 1998: 409). It is not unusual for language to dominate and monopolize the mind to a degree that thought is rendered a slave to words (Koestler 1964) and imagination is trapped in digital analytical boxes. It is obvious that the mass rush to digitization and analytical thinking comes with a high price. When the shocking events of September 11, 2001 took place, the US government concluded that they were due to the intelligence failure of the Central Intelligence Agency. But 9/11 was not a failure of intelligence; it was a lack of imagination. Digitization is becoming our addictive path to maximization. But this is the antithesis to the nature of life, where “life tends to optimize rather than maximize” (Hawken 2007: 183). Digitization, while it is an advantageous technological achievement in speed, accuracy and efficiency, it impoverishes the role of the analog mode in simultaneously capturing whole and infinite imaginative possibilities.

Certainly, the division of knowledge into fields and domains is the consequential influence of rational analytical thinking and digital efficiency. While specialized jargons and linguistic obfuscation – which are mediated efficiently by the digital mode – have contributed to the advancement of human knowledge, they have rendered professional domains and fields more isolated. Consequently, “each domain is becoming increasingly specialized not only in its vocabulary but also in the conceptual organization of its rules and procedures” (Csikszentmihalyi 1996: 338). While the tendency toward specialization has made professional mastery and precision possible, it has also created rigid boundaries accessible only to those qualified practitioners who are well trained to play *within* those established boundaries. However, as Thackara (2005) argues optimistically, if we were

once able to create our way into this disarray, we can certainly design our way out of it.

With the growing complexity of domains and fields, the digital mode with its influential precision and efficiency has become the state-of-the-art means of communication. Although the digital mode of communication has been around for nearly 800 years, its technology has recently accelerated with amazing speed where time, space, and energy have been divided into bits of information. Despite the fact that these bits of information are very helpful in communicating *information*, they do not provide sufficient qualitative significance or meaningful *knowledge*. The digital mode seems to be ideal for disseminating and retrieving information; on the other hand, the analog mode is indispensable for creating new knowledge and imagining new realities.

In this paper, I explore the possibility of making deliberate connections among disparate domains and fields by playing with their boundaries. Yet more significantly, I offer what I call a *conceptualization process* for understanding and integrating digital and analog modes which has the potential to intentionally make the fundamental shift needed to kindle the time of the “Great Turning”,

2. *Experiencing the “Great Turning”*

What is the “Great Turning”? And why do we need it? There is strong evidence that our global community is experiencing unprecedented movement, cognitive revolution, and spiritual awakening. It is an extraordinary global movement. Although David Korten (2006) circulated the term widely through his book: *The Great Turning: From Empire to Earth Community*, it was Joanna Macy (1998) who coined the term “The Great Turning”. Paul Hawken (2007), in his most recent book *Blessed Unrest*, also describes this massive happening as “the movement with no name” which “doesn’t merely advocate recycling, it actively *imagines* a system of human production that is as elegant, frugal, and abundant as what we observe in nature” (Hawken 2007: 179, italics mine). The Great Turning, as Joanna Macy (1998: 17) describes it, “is a transformation from the industrial growth society to a life-sustainable society.” It is, to borrow a phrase from William McDonough (2002), a shift from *efficiency* to *effectiveness*. It is a transformational process that goes beyond the need for speed and

accuracy into meaning making and holistic living. We need this transformational process to move beyond the perceived limitations and illusionary barriers, and their unintended consequences, that we have constructed for ourselves.

Why do we need both digital and analog modes for communication in the age of the Great Turning? According to Joanna Macy, there are three dimensions of the Great Turning: “1) action to slow the damage to Earth and its beings; 2) analysis of structural causes and creation of structural alternatives; and 3) a fundamental shift in worldview and values” (Macy 1998: 17). However, action without analysis is a mindless task, and analysis without a major shift is a paralyzing effort. A brief look at the first two dimensions of Macy’s idea reveals a process that can occur through currently available problem-solving methods, as well as cause-and-effect models. This process triggers minor changes that are described by systems theorists as a “first order of change” (which fixes what already exists), whereas meaningful change is a “second order of change” and is attained through cognitive shift.

Granted, we can approach a problem with thoughtful analysis and even sensible action to achieve remedial goals or objectives; such being the case, we still perform within established boundaries. But without a shift in our perception and thinking process, social and environmental problems will remain the same even though their appearance might change. Only by reframing social problems – seeing them from a fresh vantage point and playing with their boundaries – can we make truly meaningful changes. How, then, can we creatively reframe social problems and not simply accept their common appearance by analyzing and rushing to fix them?

It is in Macy’s third dimension – a fundamental shift in our worldview and values – that we find a promising point of departure. A fundamental shift in our worldview and values implies a transformation in our consciousness, a cognitive revolution, and use of imagination. Such a transformational change, as I mentioned earlier, is a “second order of change” which can best be attained by a *design approach*. A design approach makes use of design principles, including the expectation of surprise, guiding intention, and seeking not a prescribed solution but a desired outcome that is limited only by our imagination. This cognitive leap is essential for intentional and sustainable social and environmental change as it provides the lens through which we come to imaginatively interpret the context within

which these changes will take place. I believe the third dimension is fundamentally significant for such a transformational change, and consequently requires that we make a major shift in our way of thinking.

3. *The nature of change and our way of thinking*

We know that change is the fundamental nature of *reality*. Changes can be triggered by different causes, among them intentional design by human agents; necessity, inevitable condition, or circumstantial need predetermined by universal law; chance, an accidental event, an unintended act, or luck (flip of a coin); chaos and disorder as a result of systems bifurcation and randomness; evolution and genetic reconstruction; and a cosmic event or act of God (Figure 1). When looking at these various causes for change, it becomes apparent that other than intervention by intentional design, there is really little or no interference by humans in these causes. Only through the coping mechanism of a problem-solving strategy can we handle changes imposed on us by other causes. On the other hand, animating and leading change can only be accomplished intentionally by design. Interestingly however, changes made by human intention and changes made by divine intervention (or a cosmic event) complete the full loop of changes (Seif 2005). This is a revealing proposition, which I shall return to later.




Figure 1. Causes of change.

If we accept the premise that a transformational change requires a different way of thinking, we could begin by engaging in a process that has the potential to stimulate such a shift, which in turn would create the second order of change. An intentional change at the second-order level will not take place without imaginative thinking, augmented by a high level of abstraction. Undoubtedly, language offers us resources for thinking abstractly. Ironically, however, while language makes it possible for us to think abstractly, we seem to “abandon the use of images and are able to carry on without resorting to them” (Shlain 1991: 18). Since imagination involves more than logical, linear operations and depends on the acquisition, interpretation, and manipulation of images and nonverbal codes, it does not fit neatly into the mainstream, conservative understanding of abstract thinking. This is the paradox of language. As Shlain puts it, it is “the majesty and the tyranny of language” (ibid.).

4. *The paradox of language: Analog-digital polarity*

In order to develop an appreciation for the paradox of language, perhaps it is helpful to briefly revisit and locate language within the larger scope of semiotics. Under this large umbrella, there are three major semiotic systems: linguistics, kinesics, and objects. As we can see, language is only one of three major systems of signification in almost any sociocultural setting (Figure 2). While language is one of our systems of communication and signification, it is not our highest ability. A considerable portion of our mental activity is of a nonverbal character.




Figure 2. *The place of language within the realm of semiotics.*

As we know from C. S. Peirce (1955), semiotic signs in relationship to their entities or objects are three types: icon, index, and symbol. An iconic sign and its object have an isomorphic relationship of strong resemblance; that is, some qualities of the object are represented or perceived in the icon – e.g., photos of persons, drawings of buildings. An indexical sign is one where spatial-temporal contiguity or concurrence defines its link to its object. In other words, it has a physical relationship with its object, but this relationship is not defined by shared qualities or resemblances – e.g., smoke and fire, window and view. A symbolic sign relates to its object only by an association of an idea, which has to be created and learned within a social or cultural context. Convention sets the random link between a symbolic sign and its object or entity. In this type, signs and their entities are related by virtue of an agreement and convention, not by virtue of any quality intrinsic to either the entity or its sign (Figure 3). Though Peirce noted that there is an inclusion of the three sign types in any given representation, words in all natural languages are *predominantly* symbolic signs.




Figure 3. Semiotic signs.

The fact that we often use gestures and facial expressions in our communication strongly indicates our disparate efforts to include more iconic and indexical signs, and overcome the limitations of language. Words, as symbolic signs, are effective systems for describing life experiences and cognitive events, but they are not the experiences or events themselves.

Words are “vehicles of thought, but the vehicle should not be confused with the passengers” (Koestler 1964: 600). Even with its magnificence and robustness, language is not indispensable to our thought. Mere verbal thinking is the prototype of “thoughtless thinking” in which the habitual recourse of the mind retrieves connections from stored memories. In this sense, language is useful but unimaginative. Language is helpful to thinking; however, thinking is not in words. “It must be the help that words lend to thinking while it operates in a more appropriate medium, such as visual imagery” (Arnheim 1969: 232). While linguistic abstraction and symbolic representation could be perceived as limitation, it has, as we shall see shortly, the capacity to be manipulated freely through random association, a quality that is essential for conceptualization. This paradox of limitation and advantage of language is in the core of imaginative thinking.

5. Abstractions and imaginative thinking

“Abstraction” is one of the most ambiguous words in language. Because of its many interpretations, it may be helpful to describe what I mean by abstract thinking. First of all, we should be cautious viewing abstraction as the opposite of concreteness. The terms “abstract” and “concrete” are neither antonyms nor synonyms. As Arnheim argues persuasively, “concreteness is a property of all things, physical or mental, and many of these same things can also serve as abstractions” (Arnheim 1969: 156). He goes on to say, “generalization presupposes abstraction” (161). Being not mutually exclusive, abstraction and concreteness are connected perceptually through the notion of generalization. Both abstract and concrete concepts, then, are conditions for generalization.

As stated earlier, abstraction is the human brain’s highest function. It is an indispensable attribute of thinking. When we think of concepts such as freedom, justice, *or* peace we are not thinking in physical or visual images, rather we are thinking abstractly and in a digital mode. When we make imaginative connections among freedom, justice, *and* peace we are also thinking abstractly but metaphorically and in analog mode. Only when we reflect, muse, play, and imagine, do we revert to images and metaphors, and experience the analog mode. Due to the erosion of images by words at an early age, “we forget that in order to learn something radically new, we need first to imagine it” (Shlain 1991: 18). Not only does imaginative

thinking depend on a high level of abstraction, it also must exist within a different type of conceptualization. Unlike the digital mode of thoughts and sequential order of language, the analog mode, with its undifferentiated and seamless perception and experience, offers interpretations of numerous ensembles of images.

Imaginative thinking is a multi-dimensional encounter with the subconscious and engages multi-sensory perception. The experience of “synesthesia” involves all senses; in this experience, the perception of one sense is based upon stimuli received by another sense. In order to function properly, “the imagination must be rendered capable of remaking whole aspects of life, that is, of performing genuinely poetic or hypothetical operations” (Grudin 1990: 52). As Kant asserts, the imagination reveals “an idea of the whole” to transform what is lacking in the existing situation (Makkreel 1990). However, revealing the “whole” doesn’t mean elaborate and extensive laboring over a situation; it is more spontaneous, what Malcolm Gladwell (2005) calls “thin-slicing”, extracting and making sense quickly of the most meaningful characteristics or qualities of the situation.

To imagine is to make an image. The act of *making an image* is a “philomorphic”, or form-loving, act (Grudin 1990). James Hillman also reminds us of the connection that “when we fall in love, we begin to imagine: and when we begin to imagine, we fall in love” (1992: 9). Imagination is intimately interconnected with love, a connection that is exhilarating. In view of this, an act of making an image is really a *lovemaking* process. And in this process we experience holistic, synthetic, undifferentiated seamless reality; it is an experience that takes place in the analog mode *par excellence*. In the vein of God’s creation, the act of making an image is giving life to form, or what Hillman (1992) calls *ensouling*. Imaginative formation, as Kant perceives it, “raises from an activity of the soul” (Makkreel 1990: 15). This idea recalls what I introduced earlier: intentional design and God’s creation complete the loop of changes. By implication, this idea also reveals the splendor of imagination where “the thought of the heart and the soul of the world” (Hillman 1992) reconnect humans with the “numinous” or the divine.

Ever since the Neolithic age, we seem to have lived in what Erick Jantsch (1975) calls a “conceptual space” where our thoughts, feelings, and imagination reside, urging us to create new realities. Although analog con-

ceptual space has been in human consciousness for millennia, it has been overshadowed by the information and digital age. This trend has certainly prompted a few writers to encourage us to adopt a different way of thinking and acting in a more human sustainable global society (McDonough 2002; Thackara 2005). Others declare that we are moving from the Information Age to the Conceptual Age (Pink 2005). But the conceptualization cannot truly be divorced from the information. Therein lies our challenging polarity. There must be a process through which one can access imaginative thinking that relies on holistic, undifferentiated, and seamless experiences associated with the analog mode without rejecting (or even compromising) the efficiency, speed, and accuracy of the digital information mode. In other words, we need a process where conceptualization is at ease with the paradox of language.

6. Making the shift through the conceptualization process

As we have seen, imaginative thinking does not rely on the digital mode and sequential syntax of language. This idea raises challenging questions: Can we experience the analog mode in a digital world? In a sense, how do we engage in imagination using language, which is sequential and linear in nature? How do we use the digital mode of language in an analog manner to conceptualize the imaginable and sustain the age of the Great Turning? How do we access imaginative thoughts that hover in some subliminal space waiting to be linguistified? To bear fruit, imaginative thinking must be communicated to self and others through some sort of efficient articulation. But in what way can we effectively communicate the concept of that which is *yet-to-be*?

In order to formulate the concept of that which is *yet-to-be*, the conceptualization process is designed to trigger the fundamental shift needed for our thinking and perceiving. Generally, concepts can be invented, discovered, or revealed. In the spirit of image making, the conceptualization process depends primarily on what Paul Laseau (1980) calls “concept formation”, which is unlike “concept recall” or “concept attainment”. I should add that concept formation is synthetically formed, imaginatively interpreted and reinterpreted, and playfully cogitated. And it is apparent that “interpretation can begin only when we have some sense of a whole” (Makkreel 1990: 37). In concept formation there are no preconceived ideas

or fixed answers to be remembered or discovered – concept formation is truly *expecting the unexpected*.

The conceptualization process begins by identifying known and important categories. These categories are essentially boxes of digital information represented predominantly by linguistic symbolic signs; and as I mentioned earlier, symbolic signs and their degree of abstraction are easily manipulated and deconstructed into qualities, attributes, or characteristics. The next step of the process is to list as many characteristics or qualities as possible under each category or entity. Without any analysis or debate, the listing evolves very quickly through, what Gladwell (2005) calls “thin-slicing”, where first impression is essential in identifying more characteristics or qualities in the blink of an eye than labored scrutiny. My experience with graduate students has shown that the habit of relying on the digital mode and analytical thinking often leads to fixation on one particular category. This fixation often disappears when I suggest moving in non-sequential order and diving freely into other categories (Figure 4).



Figure 4. Examples of different entities sharing similar characteristics.

Following the creation of various categories and then the identification of their qualities, attributes, or characteristics, we use free play to integrate or combine them into phrases. It is important that we not be critical about the syntax or semantics of these phrases at this point in the process. The mind operates on the spur-of-the-moment, making unconscious associations among these characteristic words. Since words are mostly symbolic signs in natural languages, they also lack explicit qualities intrinsic to what they signify. However, as symbolic signs, and because of their random association and convention, they can be interpreted and manipulated much more easily than other sign types. And because characteristics or qualities are the very essence of categories and entities, countless possible phrases – which share the same characteristics or qualities – can be formulated. Often interpretation and manipulation of the identified characteristics

reveal a metaphor, an analogy, a similarity, or a profound isomorphism. When two or more characteristics seem to share conceptual structures on some level of abstraction, magical things can happen. That is why abstraction is one of the most valuable tools in this process.

It follows that these phrases in turn be integrated into a comprehensive statement or an inclusive inquiry question that guides our design endeavors and provokes action in the world. Ultimately, by deconstructing the familiar symbolic and digital categories or taxonomies into unfamiliar iconic analog mode – in the form of qualifiers (adjectives, adverbs, active verbs) – infinite imaginative connections are formulated that give birth to breakthrough (Figure 5).




Figure 5. Conceptualization process.

It should be noted that while the conceptualization process utilizes words as vehicles of thought, imaginative thinking does not rely on the digital sequential syntax of language. In this process, aesthetic composition, philomorphic act, and free play are weaved seamlessly in our experience into an imaginable whole. Due to the high level of abstraction and generalization, conceptualization operates metaphorically as a *crystallization* process “by which the vague or fluid play of the imagination and

the understanding is suddenly captured in a form” (Makkreel 1990: 64). Consequently, out of the disorderly array of explored characteristics or qualities, an orderly whole emerges. Without any connection with logically constructed words, qualities and characteristics seem to attract us to a mysterious zone. It is then fair to say that despite the fact that imaginative thinking can be accessed *analogically*, it has to be communicated *digitally*. Therefore, a fundamental shift is accomplished by using new formulated qualities of a *desired reality* to modify the representations of the *present reality*.

Additionally, whereas the act of reading and writing is generally a solitary endeavor (Shlain 1998), the conceptualization process requires camaraderie, dialogue, intimacy, and collaborative efforts. In this context, conceptualization always takes place in a collaborative fully engaged small group,³ where individual members perform as crystals coming together through the crystallization process to actively envision the emergent new. This distinctive collaborative grassroots quality is, in fact, congruent with Paul Hawken’s lucid description of the Great Turning as a movement without a leader, sage, or ideology, which emerges locally in small, discrete endeavors and enormous numbers (Hawken 2007).

7. Conclusion: Is it a duck or is it a rabbit?

The imaginative shift needed for the age of the Great Turning is accessible linguistically through the use of both digital and analog modes. Interestingly, some technologists have been converting digital and analog systems into each other in the process of achieving quality recording, and others are making efforts toward a “hybrid” approach to telecommunication. Also, an interdisciplinary approach to learning has been at the cutting edge in education, where learners have overcome the limitation of language. Language as a system of arbitrary rules binds us together socially through communicating our thoughts and feelings. But through the conceptualization process, language is also our means to communicate the significance and meaning of the imaginable.

In a highly digitized world, the television and computer greatly increase the power of images, and iconic representations have superseded alphabetic representations as the single most significant cultural influence of our time. In fact, the influence of written word “has been declining for the last

fifty years, counterbalanced by the increasing power of the image” (Shlain 1998: 411). Ironically, as the television and computer (both of which are products of the digital mode) become dominant forces in our lives “the supremacy of the left hemisphere dimmed as the right’s use increased” (Shlain 1998: 408). This contradictory, yet complementary, relationship between the digital and analog modes cannot be resolved, but in fact, can only be experienced. Some can perceive only the “duck” of the left hemisphere; others can see only the “rabbit” of the right hemisphere! A few individuals have acquired the capacity to experience both modes. Albert Einstein, Marie Curie, Leonardo da Vinci, Queen Elizabeth I, Thomas Jefferson, William Shakespeare, Mother Teresa, among many others, demonstrated their capacity to operate freely within these two polarities.

I have attempted to offer a way to understand and engage with both the analog and the digital modes with “a new whole mind”, and to experience wholly their intriguing paradoxical relationship. Imagination is thus accessible linguistically through the use of both the digital and analog modes, in a kind of creative dance. With a clear intention and within the appropriate context, the kaleidoscopic flexibility of the conceptualization process is certainly the most effective intra-communication and inter-communication tool we have in an age we experience as the Great Turning. My experience reveals that students and professionals learn to master the conceptualization process and inevitably access the realm of imagination needed for transformational changes. Perhaps the wise words of Black Elk can best articulate this profound experience of engaging in the digital and analog modes together and liberating our imagination: *I saw more than I could explain; I understood more than I saw.*

Notes

1. Conventionally, digital watches go from one numeral to the next without displaying the intermediate values between numbers. Watches with hands moving around the face have been viewed as analog. However, the two types can both be viewed in the context of this paper as digital, particularly if we compare the two with the hourglass, or a human experience of time.
2. “Synesthesia” from the Greek *syn* + *aisthanesthai*, which means to perceive together. Interestingly, the meaning of synesthesia is also similar to that of the word “synthesis”, one of the leading principles in all design fields.

3. My experience in conducting numerous sessions involving a conceptualization process indicates that a group of 7–13 participants is the most appropriate and efficient size.

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The semiotics of Bollywood movies

Analyzing iconic images of heroes in contemporary Hindi cinema

1. Introduction

Reading iconic images and symbolism in Bollywood movies (Hindi cinema) could enlighten us about the current state of Indian popular culture and society in the twenty-first century. Iconic images projected on the silver screen by the filmmakers of Bollywood movies often reveal cultural and social trends along with the features of the dominant ideology and cultural values in the new evolving Indian society.

In this paper I explore the significance of iconic images in contemporary Bollywood films. I look at the evolution of iconic images of film heroes in post-independence India, evaluate well-known iconic images selected from a few contemporary Bollywood movies, and derive relevant meanings from those images.

2. Ideology of Hindi cinema

The narrative mechanism of film by which the national imagery gets allegorized can be framed within the context of nationalism and modernity, positivism and westernization and socialism and late capitalism, reflecting the dominant ideology and cultural values of the times. The feudal aristocratic ideology has a strong hold on the narrative in Bollywood cinema, so much so that a growing middle-class ideology opposed to the feudal family structure still involves an elaborate conflict between feudal and democratic values. Post-independence Bollywood narrative cinema has been predominantly “feudal family romance”. This form survived along with

the realist and melodramatic aesthetic modes. In an independent India, the dominant status of this form reflected the power-base which was an alliance between a colonial elite with a pre-capitalist socialist base and an aspiring bourgeoisie to be a partner in the coalition. The configuration of the “feudal family romance” is directly in conflict with the new realism and melodrama of today’s cinema. It is not really a conflict between tradition and modernity but rather a “conflict between two ideologies of modernity, one corresponding to the conditions of capitalist development in the periphery, and the other aspiring to reproduce the ‘ideal’ features of the primary capitalist states” (Prasad 1998: 55).

In the six decades since India’s independence from Britain, Nehru’s nationalist, populist government, rooted in socialist ideals, has given way to neoliberalism, globalization and turbulent capitalism. Raj Kapoor, the iconic hero of the 1950s and ‘60s made himself at home on the streets of Bombay (Mumbai), where the street belonged to the ordinary and the underprivileged, and they lived their lives with optimism and hope despite the squalor, filth, overcrowding and crimes. Rochona Mazumdar, film and cultural historian at the University of Chicago, points out that in the film songs of those days one saw “the dreams of the socialist come to life” (Gibson 2007).

Globalization and late capitalistic values, on the contrary, have made the same streets of Bombay dark and threatening. Consequently, Bollywood films have started reflecting the new realities: there is more emphasis on the individual rather than on universal experiences, and movies with exotic locales rather than domestic settings have become more prevalent. For domestic consumption filmmakers are producing gritty gangster movies with lots of violence and raunchy dance numbers. Shot and produced in Bombay, Bollywood films reflect the growing disillusionment in politics and public life and as Mazumdar says, the movies portrayed “the web of crime and corruption that welds India into an informal global economy of crime” (Gibson 2007). Politicians, criminals and dishonest businessmen are all presumed to be a part of the corrupt system. With an increase in murder rates and random violence in urban areas the public believe that there is a “nexus between the underworld smugglers, terrorism and anti-nationalist elements.”

3. *Iconic images and symbolism in films*

Any symbol, iconic image, or set of symbols/iconic images communicates a concept, a general idea, pattern or a form. Philosopher Susanne Langer saw meanings derived from symbols or iconic images as a complex relationship between the symbol, the object and the person perceiving both. Meaning derived thus can be construed as having both logical and psychological aspects (Littlejohn & Foss 2005: 101). Consequently, iconic images could reveal the underlying symbolism of the narrative in a film. Films can reveal meanings from apparent signs and images which manifest themselves, at the micro level, in characters' mannerisms, behavior, looks, dress and gestures, as in the film *Julius Caesar* (Barthes 2001: 27–28). At the macro level, iconic images may reveal the status and character of the society, culture and a nation's dominant ideology via symbolic associations, references and alliances. If a symbol makes us think about religious, cultural or political alliances and associations, then so do iconic images.

The usual way of describing an iconic image in Indian cinema or painting is that the figure in the image is frontally placed with the body and face or only face and its features in full view. Rajadhyaksha (1987) and Kapur (1987) argued that images of actors facing the camera and looking towards or right into the camera are similar to the traditional iconic images. Iconic images have their source in past materials and so they are already familiar to the audiences/spectators either in the form of narrative or as a discourse. An iconic image is an image which the spectators have already conceived and stored in their minds; but when used in a film, such an image acquires new meanings and a new story is initiated by the use of an icon in the narrative through the process of editing. When an image is preceded or followed by another image, the aspects of time and motion mobilize the inner narrative of the visual icon (Chatterjee 2005: 93).

Iconic images in Bollywood films are largely derived from religious and traditional cultural images from the past. Religious iconic images contain either single or dual figures. For example, Radha and Krishna can be represented singly or together; these Hindu gods might look out towards the viewer or they might be looking at each other. The iconic image of a couple prevails in Indian cinema as a two-shot composition. In *Devdas* (1935), for example, the movie's hero and heroine are never filmed in a shot-counter shot manner but always in a single or in a two-shot format. The woman

worshiper's iconic image has its antecedents in miniatures and other medieval Indian paintings and art. Most common are iconic images of the goddess Parvati worshipping Shiva. These iconic etchings and photographs were first found in the serialized novels of early twentieth century, which later found their way into cinema (Chatterjee 2005: 97).

Rajadhyaksha (1987) traced the source of iconic images in cinema to calendar art and to painters like Raja Ravi Varma who influenced early filmmakers. From print images to cinematic images was a natural progression – prints were available in a great many styles and in a wide range of sectarian and secular topics, covering iconic figures of gods and goddesses to natural scenery, ordinary people, cityscapes, architecture, national leaders and “Mother India”. With the coming of cinema, movie posters promoted iconic images of heroes and heroines from the films (Chatterjee 2005: 97).

4. Iconic images of Bollywood heroes

The iconic image of the hero in Bollywood movies have evolved over a long period of time – from religious-spiritual figures (Raja Harishchandra) to the post-independence hero exemplified by Raj Kapoor's comic Chaplinesque figure, filled with socialist and nationalistic enthusiasm, to the “angry young man” of the 1970s and '80s. Each period with a different set of political and economic circumstances yielded a particular iconic image of the hero. In the pre-independence India, feudal and colonial attributes and attitudes dominated all facets of society.

Raj Kapoor (1924–1988) was the first of the post-independence actors/directors who left a distinctive mark on the Bollywood film industry. His movies *Awara* (1951) and *Shree 420* (1955) are partly romances but they carried the nationalistic and socialist messages embodying the dominant ideology of the post-independence India. The first ten years of Indian independence, transformed into sentiment and song, belonged to Raj Kapoor. Scholars point out that the dominant genre of Bombay cinema may be called “sentimental melodramatic romance”, and this melodrama also incorporated the nationalistic and socialist aspirations of the new India (Mishra 2002: 98–99).

In the new socio-political environment of the '70s, the growing middle-class had become impatient with the governing socialist ideology and

was searching for new roles to identify with, at the same time the commercial Bollywood cinema was experimenting with a gradual reform of the textual form that could preserve the star as the main attraction. Into this breach steps in Amitabh Bachchan, who becomes identified with the down-trodden and the proletariat – an iconic figure of resistance who appeared to speak for the working classes and other marginalized groups (Bannerjea 2005: 135).

The beginning of the “angry young man” evoked new set of codes and marked a clean break from the romantic persona of the former superstars. The brooding inward looking, yet outwardly searching, anger was symptomatic of its time. Personified by Bacchchan, his dialog delivery, sense of timing and restraint in acting ushered in a new kind of anger hitherto unseen on the Indian silver screen. The new language of control in many ways operated in reverse to some of the existing melodramatic codes of the existing Bollywood formula. His ability to absorb and transmit both the “modern” and the “transitional”, the “western” and the “eastern”, through a new body language was the most important reason for his status in Bollywood. He was a hybrid of two cultures and forms and it was said that he could not be compared to any other actors from the past and in present (Mazumdar 2000: 243–244).

5. *New Bollywood heroes*

The iconic image of the “angry young man” as a hero gave way to a whole array of heroes representing different shades of cultural values and ideologies currently prevalent in today’s Indian society. Using a few recent films as examples I have tried to locate iconic images of heroes who currently dominate the Indian screen.

The iconic image of a superman as a hero, in the mode of Superman, Spiderman and Batman, entered the Indian consciousness in the form of *Krrish* (2004). For the first time an Indian superman made its mark in the Bollywood cinema. The gangster movies have a big hold on the Indian audiences’ imagination. Movies like *DON* (2006) and *Omkara* (2006) have become major hits in recent times. The iconic image of the gangster as a hero has made a strong comeback with the advent of an ideology promoting free market capitalist system. In *Don*, the Indian gangsters have gone global, operating not only in India but also in Paris, Rome, Kuala

Lumpur and in other parts of the world with all the high-tech gadgets available to them.

An iconic image of a businessman who makes it really big, from rags to riches, in the business world is one of the latest offerings from the Bollywood cinema. In the movie *Guru* (2007), a village youth hankers to leave his small parochial community and make it big in the world. In *Guru*, the image of a business tycoon, coming from one of the thousand villages in India to become one of the biggest industrialist in the country, shines like a lighthouse for the common Indian man.

Reflecting the zeitgeist, the “terrorist” as a hero has emerged as another of the iconic images to jar the Bollywood silver screen. In *Mission Kashmir* (2002), the hero as a boy was rescued by the Indian forces when his entire family was wiped out in an encounter with the “terrorist” in Kashmir. As he grows up he finds out who his adoptive father is, rebels against him and goes and joins a Kashmir terrorist group. In *Fanaa* (2006), the hero is a tourist guide in a city in India but secretly he is a terrorist who is working for an insurgent organization. In the end, the “terrorist” heroes in both movies are killed, re-emphasizing Bollywood’s vigorous stance against terrorism.

With terrorists and gangsters making appearances as heroes on the screen, it is no wonder that the Indian audiences took to the appearance of Mahatma Gandhi with great enthusiasm in *Lage Raho Munna Bhai* (2007). Even though Gandhi is not the main character in the movie, he is the wise sage who counsels a reformed gangster into behaving in a non-violent and forgiving manner in order to win over his adversaries and the hand of the lady radio announcer with whom he had fallen in love. A gangster full of love and forgiveness is not what an audience normally would expect, and this takes audiences by total surprise. The resurgence in patriotism and morals and values from earlier times is another facet of the transitory Indian society. The iconic image of Gandhi gracing the Bollywood screen gives an additional dimension to contemporary Bollywood cinema.

A resurgence of patriotic movies with military themes are gaining popularity among Indian audiences. The confrontation and battles with Pakistan over Kashmir and terrorism has given impetus to movies depicting soldiers and officers of the Indian armed forces performing heroic feats at the battle front (*Kargil, Watan Saathiyo, Border, 1971, Lakshya, Mission Kashmir, Veer Zara*). The iconic image of a hero as a soldier or an officer of

the Indian military has gained significant popularity in people's imagination, and these films have become the new voice of the people (Mazumdar 2000). The plethora of patriotic films was to a large extent initiated by *Lagaan* (1998), a tale about a village in Northern India fighting the British from imposing unfair taxation on their annual crops. The taxation issue is settled by a cricket match where eleven villagers play against the British team. The match is wholly unfair because none of the village members know how to play cricket, a quintessentially British game. The fight against the British was again shown from a Gandhian non-violent perspective and not as direct confrontation, thus reflecting the undercurrent of Gandhian ideology which persists in Indian society.

6. *Conclusions*

Bollywood now offers a variety of iconic images of heroes that were not available in earlier times. By analyzing an array of iconic images it becomes apparent that iconic images tend to reinforce the dominant ideology and values of the society and nation. Even though in the liberalized free-market, the power is wielded by those who have the capital, in a transitional society like India, feudal values are still represented by corrupt politicians, businessmen and landlords who rule their domain via threats, bribes and gruesome violence. However, the transitory nature of the ideology and values is apparent in the interplay between the traditional cultural values, political authoritarianism and economic stagnation of Nehru years, and the free-market forces of today. The outcome is still undecided and the forces are pulling in all directions. Nothing demonstrates the flux, the transitory nature of the ideology, as much as the pantheon of iconic images of heroes projected on the silver screen in contemporary Bollywood cinema, the so-called mediator of the Indian national consciousness. Democracy, market liberalization, pluralistic society and diversity of cultures, languages, religions and ethnic groups in the nation seem to have opened up a Pandora's box of cinematic representations of heroes.

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Elena and Alexei Shmelev

Understanding and misunderstanding of Russian canned jokes

Joke-telling is an important part of social interaction in Russian society. Joke-tellers are socially popular and those who lack sense of humor are not in high esteem. That is why every proficient native speaker of Russian knows how to tell jokes and how to react to them.

There are some formal means of introduction of a forthcoming canned joke into discourse: the speaker may use such clichés as *Znaesh' anekdot?* (Have you heard this one? Lit., “Do you know this joke?”). It may be observed that such cues never introduce spontaneous jokes. If the speaker sees that the hearer took a spontaneous joke at face value, s/he often adds an overt statement such as *Eto shutka* (This is a joke).

In a regular Russian joke, the setting of context is a narrative sentence which starts with a verb in present tense (or a perfective verb in past tense) followed by its subject:

- (1) *Sidit Stirlits v restorane...*
Is-sitting Stirlitz in restaurant
“Stirlitz is sitting in a restaurant...”
- (2) *Edut v poezde russkii, ukrainets i evrei...*
Are-traveling in train, Russian, Ukrainian and Jew
“A Russian, a Ukrainian, and a Jew are traveling on a train...”

That is why when Russians translate French or American jokes into Russian they usually change the word order of the first sentence: *A man and his wife are talking...* would be rendered as

- (3) *Besedujut muzh s zhenoj...*
Are-talking husband with wife...

Joke-telling is a cooperative enterprise; so, if the hearer fails to get the joke or gets it too late, mutual frustration is a result. The understanding of jokes requires not only high linguistic competence and “humor competence” (Raskin 1985) but also background knowledge of social and cultural life, ethnic and gender stereotypes. Consider:

- (4) *In the Olympics, a Soviet hammer thrower set a new record. Correspondents interviewed him. “How did you manage to hurl that hammer so far?” “If it were together with a sickle, I would send it twice as far.”*

This joke will fall flat if the audience does not possess the necessary knowledge that Soviet State emblem was a hammer and a sickle.

Comprehension of jokes needs also the inner knowledge of the conceptualization of the world in Russian jokelore, that is, what is taken for granted in Russian jokes and what one needs to know to understand them. To understand a joke, the audience often must be able to recognize the main characters that act in the fictitious world of the joke. Characters of Russian jokelore are recognizable by their appearance, way of behavior, clothes and other accessories. For example, the description *a short, bald man with beard wearing a kepka* (a leather cap with peak) would be inevitably understood as referring to the Communist leader Lenin; if a male joke character wears a red jacket, gold chain and speaks on the cellular phone all the time, he is recognizable as a “new Russian”.

By way of illustration, let us consider the following Russian joke cited (in Draitser 1998: 38) as an illustration of “the Georgian stereotype”:

- (5) *With his very last ruble, a student buys a dozen walnuts. He cracks one of them. It’s empty. He cracks another one – again, it’s empty. When he comes to the last one, a worm wearing a cap crawls out and says: “It hurts, doesn’t it?”*

It is hardly plausible that one may conclude from the English version that the “voracious worm” represents a Georgian. Certain background knowledge is required here (e.g., that Georgians as fictional characters of Russian jokes usually sport oversized caps). What is more important, in the original version of the joke, the worm speaks with a Georgian accent (easily recognized by the Russian audience) and uses the “tag-particle” *da?* attributed to Georgians of Russian jokes (*It hurts, doesn’t it?* stands for *Obidno, da?*).

Even more important, the hearer often has to recognize the “behavior masks” of joke characters, which correlate with their “linguistic masks” (linguistic clichés, accent, typical grammar mistakes, etc.). Thus, the Chukchi, a popular character of Russian ethnic jokes, is a naive outsider, who knows nothing about modern civilization and looks around in bewilderment. This attitude correlates well with the use of the particle *odnako*, which is typical of the Chukchi and expresses bewilderment and perplexity. Georgians of Russian jokes aim at contact and mutual understanding with other people, which correlates with their overuse of the “tag-particle” *da*?

In order to understand the following Russian jokes, the hearer must know not only that (1) in Russian clinics, they normally announce the newborn baby’s weight in grams (because of the metric system), and 3500 is a synonym of general normalcy; (2) Volga is the name of a great Russian river and is also an expensive Russian car brand; and (3) that in the world of Russian jokelore, new Russians are rich and ignorant while their behavior expresses aplomb and self-assurance:

- (6) *A New Russian is waiting in a maternity home lobby to hear news about his wife, who’s presently at labor. A radiant orderly exits the maternity ward and says: “Congratulations, sir! You have a boy, and it is 3500!” “3500 is no problem for a man like me”, says the New Russian with all the self-assurance he can muster, reaching for his wallet and producing cash.*
- (7) *“Can you afford buying Volga?” a New Russian is asked. “Of course I can”, he replies, “but what shall I do with all those boats and water?!”*

If the audience does not possess the required background knowledge, the jokes would be seriously affected or even entirely collapse.

When different jocular views of the world are compared to each other, one can discover substantial differences between them. For example, American and Russian marital jokes are very similar. They have the same characters (*husband, wife, lover*, etc.) and same plots – sexual life, family budget, housekeeping, shopping, children, in-laws, etc. But stereotypes of family life in Russian and American jokes are different. For example, in American jokes the husband earns money, he has a bank account and credit card, and the wife spends family money buying diamonds or fur-coats; by contrast, in Russian jokes the wife is responsible for family budget, the husband

should give all money to her, and he does his best to hide some money from his wife. The “standard” husband as presented in Russian jokes usually tries to get out of making love with his wife; he prefers to drink vodka with his friends; whereas in American jokes it is the wife who always tries to avoid making love with her husband. Consider:

(8) *A man asks, “Doctor, tell me, what can I do to help my wife. The best hospital in the world, best doctors, the most expensive drugs, I can afford it.” Doctor answers, “Nothing helps. If you want her to live, you will have to make love to her three times a day.” The man comes back to his wife. She asks him, “So what did the doctor say?” The husband answers, “What did he say? He said you were going to die.”*
(Translation of a Russian joke.)

(9) *Woman: So give it to me straight, Doctor.
Doctor: Very well. Your husband is in terrible shape, and if you want him to live, you’re going to have to make sure he’s well fed and comfortable and happy at all times, and you’re going to have to make love to him three times a day.
Woman: Three times a day?
Doctor: Three times a day.
Husband: So what’d the doctor say?
Woman: He says you’re going to die.*
(American joke; in Danforth and Voeltz 2001: 147).

Russian and American jokes also have different stereotypes of wife’s and husband’s duties to keep the house clean, to wash dishes, etc. Consider the following two jokes:

(10) *A French woman, an American woman, and a Russian woman were sitting around discussing their new husbands. The French woman said that just after the wedding she had told her husband she would not do all the cleaning, the dishes and the cooking. She said that the first day she did not see him, the second day she did not see him, but on the third day he came home with a housemaid and the house was clean, dishes washed, lawn mowed, laundry done and hot meals were on the table. The American woman said that just after wedding she had also told her husband she would not do all the cleaning, the dishes and the cooking. She said the first day she did not see him, the second day she did not see him, but on the third*

day he came home with a vacuum cleaner, a dishwasher, a washing machine, a dryer, etc. And the house was clean, the dishes were done, and they had a huge dinner on the table. The Russian woman said that just after the wedding she had told her husband the same thing. She said the first day she did not see him, the second day she did not see him, but by the third day she could see a little out of one eye.
(Translation of a Russian joke)

- (11) *Three men were sitting around bragging about how they had given their new wives duties. The first man had married a Catholic woman and bragged that he had told his wife she was to do all the dishes and housecleaning that needed doing at their house. He said it took a couple days, but on the third day he came home to a clean house and the dishes were all washed and put away. The second man had married a Mormon woman. He bragged that he had given his wife orders that she was to do all the cleaning, the dishes and the cooking. He told them the first day he didn't see any results, but the next day it was better. By the third day, the house was clean, the dishes were done, and he had a huge dinner on the table. The third man had married a Jewish girl. He boasted that he told her that her duties were to keep the house clean, dishes washed, lawn mowed, laundry done and hot meals on the table, every day. He said the first day he didn't see anything, the second day he didn't see anything, but by the third day most of the swelling had gone down and he could see a little out of his left eye.*
(<http://www.azarajokes.com/forum/default.asp>.)

There are a lot of jokes based on allusion to a popular novel, poem or movie, a popular advertising or TV show. Allusive jokes fall flat when the audience does not possess the necessary knowledge to which the jokes allude. For example:

- (12) *Pilots are trying to land a plane at Sheremetyevo airport near Moscow but because of engine trouble can't do it. They repeat their attempt twice with no result. The second pilot asks the first one: "Do you have an idea as to what we shall do?" – "No idea" – "So, no idea, no IKEA."*

To understand this joke hearer must know that (1) IKEA is a big store chain; (2) one of the IKEA stores is situated near airport Sheremetyevo; (3) its advertising slogan is “New Idea from IKEA”.

In many jokes the allusion is further complicated by the presence of another phenomenon:

- (13) *The Armenian Radio was asked, “What did Tatiana tell Onegin after their first intercourse?” The Armenian Radio answers, “Onegin! I’m not getting out of bed” [Onegin, ia s krovat’ – ne vstanu].*

The answer of the Armenian Radio is a take-off on a well known line from the libretto of Tchaikovsky’s opera *Eugene Onegin*: “*Onegin, ia skryvat’ ne stanu*” (I won’t hide my love) rendered with an “Armenian” accent. It is worth noting that Emil Draitser (1999) cites a version of this joke but fails to recognize the object of parody. He is under the impression that “*Onegin, ia skryvat’ ne stanu*” is a line from Pushkin’s *Eugene Onegin* (Draitser 1999: 123), when in fact the line only appears in the libretto by Pyotr Tchaikovsky and Konstantin Shilovsky. Further, he writes that the sentence “*Ia s krovat’ – ne vstanu*” is used “instead of the grammatically correct *Ia s krovati ne vstanu*” because “in order to make the parody fit the rhythm of the original, the lines of Tatiana’s letter to Onegin are rendered with a stereotypical Jewish distortion of the Russian grammatical norm” (Draitser 1999: 277). First, the cue should be pronounced with an Armenian rather than Jewish accent; second, such a “distortion of the Russian grammatical norm” is typical both of Armenians and Jews (as characters of Russian jokes); third, and even more important, *Onegin, ia skryvat’ ne stanu* is not a line in Tatiana’s letter to Onegin, but rather in her husband’s aria.

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Linguistic sources of misunderstanding in cross- cultural communication

Misunderstanding in cross-cultural communication is to a great extent linguistically determined. At least two linguistic sources of cross-cultural miscommunication should be mentioned.

The first one is of a purely semantic nature and consists in the idiosyncratic semantics of numerous language-specific linguistic units. The meaning of such linguistic units includes implicit semantic components that are lacking in their counterparts in other languages. The worldview encoded in a language is usually presented in non-assertive components of meaning (that is, connotations, presuppositions, etc.); therefore, the speakers of that language often tend to take it for granted and get the illusion that life in general is arranged in this way (cf. Shmelev 2002; Zalizniak et al. 2005). But when different linguistic pictures of the world are compared to each other, one can discover substantial differences between them.

Thus speakers of Russian (as well as many other European languages) tend to take for granted that the psychic life of an individual can be classified as an intellectual and emotional life. Intellectual life is associated with *head* and *brain* while emotional life is associated with *heart*. The Russians use such expressions as *svetlaia golova*, bright intellect (literally, “bright head”) or *dobroe serdce*, kind heart; they use *head* for thinking and memorization while *heart* specializes in emotions and, in particular, love. They take this conceptualization of human inner life for granted and would be surprised if they knew that it is far from being universal. Thus, Hebrew (as well as Chinese) does not put emphasis on the distinction between “rational” and “emotional”; the *heart* is the right organ for both. While kidneys

do not participate in psychic life for the speakers of most European languages, some emotions are localized in kidneys for the Chinese speakers.

The words that have idiosyncratic non-assertive components of meaning can open a clue to the worldview encoded in a language; they may be referred to as the *key words* of that worldview. They tend to cluster together; more often than not, they occur in discourse together. The semantic components that reoccur in an implicit form in the meanings of many lexical units are of special interest; they may be considered *key ideas* of the language-specific view of the world. In other words, the linguistic conceptualization of the world (unique for every given language) is shaped by a system of key words and invariant key ideas that connect them and reoccur in an implicit form in the meanings of many lexical units.²

Thus, the significance of heart in the Bible is in complete agreement with the view characteristic of the Hebrew linguistic conceptualization of the world. In line with this picture, it is in the heart where all our thoughts and desires have their origin; the heart is the organ of understanding in the same sense that ears are organs of hearing and eyes are organs of seeing. Hence, if some people are described as having a *fat heart* or the *heart* that is *waxed gross* or *hardened heart*, this means that they will encounter a difficulty in solving intellectual problems and understanding parables, signs, etc. as in the following passage: “Make the heart of this people fat, and make their ears heavy, and shut their eyes; lest they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart” (Isaiah 6: 9, 10). Jesus quotes Isaiah: “this people’s heart is waxed gross, and their ears are dull of hearing, and their eyes they have closed; lest at any time they should see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and should understand with their heart” (Matthew 13: 15); “He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart; that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their heart” (John 12: 40). Likewise, Paul’s Letter to the Ephesians (4: 17–18) unambiguously shows that the image of *blind heart* or *hardened heart* involves “darkened understanding” and ignorance: “This I say therefore, and testify in the Lord, that ye henceforth walk not as other Gentiles walk, in the vanity of their mind, Having the understanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their heart” (King James Version); “This I say therefore, and testify in the Lord, that ye no longer walk as the Gentiles also walk, in the vanity of their mind, being darkened in their under-

standing, alienated from the life of God, because of the ignorance that is in them, because of the hardening of their heart” (American Standard Version). However, since the word for “heart” as it is used in the Scripture is translated directly into most of European languages, many speakers of those languages tend to take the image of people with a *hardened heart* as callous, insensible or stubborn (cf. the English word *hard-hearted*). In other words, they take the concept of “hardened heart” as referring to inability to feel while in the original text it has to do with the lack of understanding.

In the case of ideological terms, poor translation may cause long-lasting consequences. This is what happened to Karl Marx and his Russian interpreters. We mean the problem of the Russian translation of Marx’s central concept, *der Wert* (roughly, “value”). The Bolshevik leader Lenin called the *surplus value* doctrine “a corner stone of Marx’s economic theory”. The *surplus value* (*Mebrwert* in German) is the value that the exploiter or the capitalist takes away from a worker, so the proletarians should get it back.

The first Russian edition of *Das Kapital* (*Capital*), published in 1872, has *stoimost’* as the translation of the term *Wert*. In 1899, Peter Struve published a new translation of *Kapital*, where he replaced the word *stoimost’* with *tsennost’*. In fact, *stoimost’* and *tsennost’* are close in meaning, but differ in connotations, and Mr. Struve argued that the word *stoimost’* was misleading. He insisted that the Russian word *tsennost’* conveyed the meaning of the German term *Wert* well enough. In contrast, the connotation of the Russian word *stoimost’* is closer to the idea that is normally associated with another root in the German languages (cf. the English word *cost* or German *Kosten*). Mr. Struve succeeded in convincing a certain part of the Russian Marxist movement. Lenin, however, only used the term *stoimost’*. When the Bolsheviks came to power, the term *stoimost’* prevailed. The connotations of this translation placed emphasis on the role of costs, charges and expenses and cost-based pricing.

Soviet students had to study Marxism as an all-triumphant doctrine. They learned that, according to Marx, goods have “consumer value” (*Gebrauchswert* in German) and “exchange value” (*Tauschwert* in German). The Russian counterparts for these terms are *potrebitel’naia stoimost’* (which is closer to “consumer cost”) and *menovaia stoimost’* (roughly, “exchange cost”). However, the combination of the words *potrebitel’naia* and *stoimost’* makes very little sense in Russian since their non-assertive components are

incompatible. So the whole theory of Marx, which was originally intended to be clear and transparent, was perceived as doctrinaire and confusing.

The second linguistic source of misunderstanding in cross-cultural communication that may lead to a communication failure is related to the difference in conversational strategies used in different cultures. It is common knowledge that what the speaker “means” often does not coincide with what s/he “says”. Any utterance has a “hidden meaning” and is made in order to convey this “hidden meaning”. It is of fundamental importance that the “hidden meaning” cannot be missing: if the speaker attempted to make explicit as much of the “hidden meaning” as possible and to explain in all cases, “I am saying this in order to...”, the latter utterance would in its turn pursue some objective and thus have a “hidden meaning”, so that the hearer would end up asking him/herself, “Why?”

It should be recognized that the Gricean proposition that the “hidden meaning” of an utterance can be derived from universal conversational maxims has been challenged by modern cross-cultural pragmatics. What the hearer infers from an utterance does not necessarily coincide with what the speaker implied (cf. Bybee et al. 1994: 285). The rules for inferences are language-specific and culture-specific. Different cultures use different conversational strategies and accordingly different principles for retrieval of “hidden meaning”. The difference between the conversational strategies used by the speaker and the hearer is a widespread source of communicative failures in cross-cultural communication (cf. Visson 2003).

Thus, some Russians who have immigrated to the United States have misinterpreted denials or refusals as some kind of acceptance: refusals of employment, of publishing a paper, of making a grant for a project. This is because Americans tried to “sweeten the pill”, saying something like “we will get back to you”, “we will be in touch with you again”, etc. In general, American culture seems to have many prohibitions on saying unpleasant things to people (and probably even stronger “prescriptions” for saying pleasant things). It might seem that the prescription for saying pleasant things requires the willingness to say something that is not true if truth-telling might be painful. Yet in some situations – e.g., in communication with the authorities – the Russian culture shows greater tolerance for telling a lie (*vran'e*) than does Anglo culture does (for more details, see Shmelev 2005).

Addressing the hearer by name in the middle of a discourse is quite common in Russian, but very rare in Finnish, except for purposes of securing someone's attention unambiguously in questions and commands. Names may be used as fillers of pauses in Russian conversation, whereas Finnish conversations show a great tolerance for silence, which does not cause any discomfort among the interlocutors. Addressing the hearer by name in the middle of the discourse may sound extremely personal in Finnish, and conversely, addressing the hearer by name in utterances referring to some negatively evaluated situation would sound pushy in Finnish, as if the addressee were held responsible for the state of affairs. Or, again, if a Russian addresses his/her Finnish interlocutor in accordance with his/her conversational habits, the latter interprets it as a hidden accusation of lack of attention (Leinonen 1985).

In cross-cultural communication, an interlocutor who speaks the language of his/her interlocutor faces an alternative: Should s/he use conversational routines of the language of communication (which would often be inconsistent with his/her communicative intention)? Or should s/he put into the focus what would be kept in the background if s/he spoke his/her native language. In other words, if someone uses the conventions of the "other" culture in cross-cultural communication, s/he does not circumvent the possibility of misunderstanding, since the other person is not in the position to determine whether the interlocutor respects the conventions of his/her own culture or the culture of the other. This may pave the way to paradoxical situations, such that techniques of understanding become the cause of misunderstanding. Massimo Leone (2007), in this same collection, illustrates this point by a comparative analysis of different cultures of hospitality, with special focus on the tradition of Italian *cerimonie* and Iranian *taarof* (cf. also Levontina 2000).

Both of the above-mentioned mechanisms can work simultaneously. In her paper presented at the 7th ICCEES World Congress in Berlin (July 2005), Ludmila Stern discussed challenges that court interpreters faced at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Multilingual courtroom communication at ICTY involved a predominantly English-speaking judiciary and counsel, on the one hand, and Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian-speaking witnesses from the former Yugoslavia, on the other. Dr. Stern demonstrated that interpreting/translation techniques did not adequately deal with certain aspects of communication between

two strikingly different cultures. Interpreters were faced with the problems of conveying language- and culture-specific legal vocabulary and “frozen language” of the Anglo-Saxon court, which, from a linguist’s point of view, they distorted by using accepted interpreting techniques such as loan-words, cultural adaptations, paraphrases, etc. In addition, the simultaneous interpreting mode allowed a certain loss of information and a reduced level of accuracy. Similarly, interpreters could not always adequately convey the counsel’s strategic questions routinely used in the Anglo-Saxon court and unfamiliar to the witness from the Civil Law system. The problem went beyond the interpreters’ competence when interpreters were faced with the Yugoslav witnesses’ cultural script, as the witnesses made references to their culture-specific customs, way of life, values and relations, not to mention their perception of giving evidence and replying to questions (Stern 2005).

Along the same lines, an inquiry aiming at deducing the index of happiness for different nations uses the question *Are you happy?*, which is usually translated into Russian as *Vy schastlivy?* (lit., “Are you happy?”). This translation, however, is totally misleading, both for lexical as well as communicative reasons. First, the Russian word for “happy” is generally reserved for rare states of profound bliss, or total satisfaction of serious things such as love, family, the meaning of life, etc. (Wierzbicka 1992; Zalizniak 2003). The Russian translation of sentences like *We’ll be happy to come* would not include the Russian equivalent of *happy* (Shmelev 2003). Second, Russian conversational strategies do not encourage claims that the speaker is fine; such claims might be perceived as a kind of boasting. Therefore, the answer “Yes” in the inquiry is much less probable for Russian speakers than for speakers of many other languages, regardless of the level of “happiness” they experience; hence the results of such an inquiry provide the wrong picture of the “Russian character”.

Notes

1. Acknowledgement: The present work was supported by RFBR (grant #05-06-80215).
2. A tentative list of key ideas of the vision of the world encoded in the Russian lexicon was suggested in Shmelev 2002; for a revised version of the list, see, e. g., Zalizniak et al. 2005.

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Katriina Siivonen

Culture as anthroposemiosis

1. The basic flow of culture

The definition of culture has been a constant topic of discussion during the whole history of ethnological and anthropological research. Researchers have since the 1960s questioned the use of culture as a concept, which defines certain cultural wholes with clear borders. However, the question of the ontology of culture is still topical. First, it concerns questions of whether culture exists as a whole that is independent of observers and researchers; second, whether culture exists only as a flow of individual, heterogeneous and partly contradictory phenomena; third, whether culture is just different constructions describing different cultural wholes and produced for various purposes in human interaction. (See, e.g., Hannerz 1992; Borofsky 1994: 243; Gerholm 1994: 15; Moore & Sanders 2006: 5; Åström 2006: 82.)

My aim in this article is to give one answer to these questions by defining culture primarily as a signification process, in which exist different cultural wholes, both conscious and unconscious. I start with individuals and the possibilities they have of interpreting their surroundings and acting within them. At the end of the article, I touch more closely on questions of different cultural wholes.

In every situation in which a human being perceives something and interprets that perception, (s)he uses a sign. According to the semiotics of Charles S. Peirce, our possibilities of knowing anything about the surrounding world is based on sensations, which are organised with the help of signs, leading to perceptions, interpretations, and understanding of the world (Peirce 1992/1868). A sign is “something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity” (CP 2.228). A sign is a whole comprised of three interrelated elements, illustrated in Figure 1 with three interlinked segments of line (Merrell 1995: 41–43; see also, CP 1.347; and Bergman 2004: 176–177).




Figure 1. An illustration of Charles S. Peirce's concept of sign.

In human interaction in the totality of a sign, an interpretant is a sign in the mind of a human being, a representamen, which is a material or immaterial manifestation of the sign, and the object of the sign (CP 2.228: 274–302). In front of an unfamiliar phenomenon, one searches his or her thoughts and formulates an interpretant that can organise the perception in the best possible way. After the perception, the experience of it with the interpretant functions already as a part of the following representamen, with the help of which it is possible to pass on information concerning the perception to someone else. One might also think the perception to herself/himself and interpret it as a new interpretant in her/his mind with a representamen presented for oneself. The new interpretant is in relation to its own representamen and its own object, and includes the understanding that the first interpretation brought about the perception. In this way a complementary, dynamic interpretant grows in the mind of a human being. With one can interpret new, similar kinds of perceptions. Interpretants and signs form chains, that is, processes of presentations and interpretations of signs. In every situation human beings have at their disposal a number of interpretants for organising the richness of perceptions. In every situation interpretants grow according to the available possibilities and form a number of chains of interpretants and signs (Deely 1990: 22–49; CP 2.303; Deely 1994: 94–96.)

Perceptions might also concern immaterial and/or material phenomena presented by other human beings, or natural phenomena. In the whole of the sign, the interpretant is connected to these perceived phenomena from outside of the mind of the perceiver and is completed in interaction

with them in the process of semiosis in interpretants following other interpretants. In other words, human beings remolds their understanding of the world of their mind in such a way manner that it becomes part of their understanding. At the same time, one's understanding and activities based on this understanding remolds the external world. This happens with all human beings, and the external world of all of them consists of signs containing thoughts expressed by other human beings and material surroundings. This is the basis of cultural change, creativity, learning and memories. (Deely 1994: 30–2; CP 7.536: 587.)

In the interaction between human beings, their chains of interpretants are linked to the chains of other people, the combined chains forming a network. One dimension of this network is time. John Deely writes about semiosis as a network that covers the whole *universum*. One part of this network is an interactive network between human beings and their surroundings. This Deely calls anthroposemiosis (Deely 1994: 22–31). I understand anthroposemiosis as a constantly changing relationship between human beings and their surroundings. In this network contacts between different individuals and their surroundings are composed of signs based on sensations. In this network signs are in a state of perpetual change, because the network consists of the chains of interpretants and signs, wherein one sign following another is never identical to the previous one.¹ In the process of semiosis, single, immediate interpretants become parts of dynamic interpretants, which are always wider than any single interpretant used in whatever situation. At the same time, dynamical interpretants change continually and grow through single, immediate interpretants (Bergman 2004: 401–402).

Through the process of semiosis, it is somehow possible to discern dynamical interpretants of a human being always at a certain stage of life. These are matters that one has learned, remembered and produced; in other words, it is a person's life experience and life work. Through semiosis, it is also possible to discern the life work, life experience and memories of mankind, from which the semiosis of the individual person can not be disconnected. But it is more difficult to discern the particular semiosis of any group of people that one may define as the possessed culture of that group. This is difficult, whether the group is defined according nationality, ethnicity, locality, ideology or, for example, some organisation. Human fields of interaction are not limited to any border in time, space or social

organisation. People are always connected to other people, and these last are connected further to other people, until the whole world is encircled many times. Hence semiosis is a global process, as is obvious in the global world of our time.

The anthroposemiotic network consists first of the physical world with nature, people and a material environment produced by people, that is, artifacts, buildings and cultural landscape.² Second, this network consists of concepts, thoughts and stories, which people exchange with each other.³ So, in this network both material and immaterial elements are equal and have a mutual impact on each other. Change is a basic quality of the network, since people, their thoughts, perceptions, and so on are constantly changing. The creative core of culture varies and changes continually in the process of anthroposemiosis. It is impossible to prevent changes in culture.

The process of anthroposemiosis gives one form of existence to culture, and in my understanding, this is the basic form of culture. According to this, culture is a global, constantly changing diachronically and synchronically varying process, including both material and non-material elements. As a part of all this, both internal and external matters of the human mind vary and change. This happens in the interaction between human beings and their surroundings, which includes social interplay. The basic element in culture is the human individual. The wholeness of culture exists as an interactive network between individuals and their surroundings, in which they have a mutual impact on each other. This kind of wholeness is never total in the sense that it would be possible to find some part of semiosis that all individuals involved would know, remember and recognise as the same kind of whole. But it is a totality in the sense that nobody can live separated from it.

2. *The creative skill of habits*

Besides being something that changes, culture has been seen as habitual, homogeneous, and having the ability to resist change (see Borofsky 1994). It is possible to attain these qualities of culture with the help of the concept of the sign. In *firstness* the sign is *iconic*. In the purest form it is just a sensation, without any conceptual form. In *secondness* the sign gets its form. Its physical elements are organised in relationship to each other and

form a whole as an *indexical* sign. In *thirdness* the experience of qualitative, iconical elements of the sign and the indexical relationships between them are combined to become a whole with an interpretant. In other words, the experience of the representamen is combined with the human and cultural understanding of the world. The symbolic sign in thirdness is the conscious and manifested rule that explains the sign. All people compile their iconic, indexical and symbolic understanding of the world in the process of anthroposemiosis in interaction with their surroundings. (CP 2.243–264; Deely 1994: 27, 53–58.)

Peirce has expressed the conformity of a sign and an interpretant with the concept of *habit* (CP 1.530–536). Every sign in the present moment is connected to coming signs and also to previous signs, that is, to past time, habits, memories, experiences or, as it could also be expressed, to traditions. I see traditions as dynamical interpretants, which have perhaps already grown for a long time in the process of semiosis. The chain of immediate interpretants forming a dynamical interpretant can also be short; equally, the processes of compiling experiences and memories or the process of traditions can be short (see Bringéus 1981: 122–130).⁴ In the same manner, interpretants are always habitual and reproduce something from their previous interpretants. In the chain of interpretants, one interpretant following another can differ from it by a smaller or greater amount, but it cannot be totally separate from it. So, anthroposemiosis consists of both changing and stabilising elements, which create faster or slower change in its different parts.

Habituality is one characteristic of the interpretant. This brings a tendency of stability to the process of semiosis. In this process, one sign following another is very close to the previous sign, but always deviates slightly from it, according to the basic nature of the sign. A habit is no longer a conscious symbol in the mind of the perceiver and interpreter of the environment. It does not actualise as interpretant to thirdness. It is also possible that the person in question has never had it in mind in thirdness. (See CP 1.530–536; Deely 1994: 57; Merrell 1995: 106–108.)

Some concrete actions and skills, even if highly sophisticated, are habits of this kind. They are very strong in firstness or secondness, and it is sometimes difficult to express them as symbols in thirdness. For instance, certain kinds of manual labor, involving tacit knowledge of a work community and the ability to act according to it, are not easy to verbalise com-

prehensively. Silent, non-verbal signs come across from one human being to another without argumentation in firstness and secondness, as with experimenting and imitating. However, it is possible to raise this kind of knowledge partly to thirdness and make it more visible and conscious with argumentation. (See Merrell 1995: 106–108; Polanyi 1969; Borofsky 1990: 78–104.)

Consciousness of habits raises conformities to thirdness and to reasoned thoughts and speech, and at the same time opens the way to changes and creative solutions. Consciousness is aroused by facing up to something different and unconventional. Art is one cultural activity that plays with conventionality and makes it visible by releasing habits from everyday routines and putting them into objects of conscious perceptions and interpretations. In fact, everyday routines themselves consist of creative and changing power. Maarit Knuuttila has analysed this in her empirical research concerning home meals and cooking. According to her, cooking is the imaginative combining of food ingredients which every now and then creates new and fresh elements in life (Knuuttila 2006: 253–260).

3. *Cultural wholes*

In addition to the basic cultural process of anthroposemiosis, there are two different ways in which cultures exist. First, all people are connected to the global whole of anthroposemiosis through their own surroundings, both material and non-material. All persons form part of the process of anthroposemiosis, which they are constantly re-creating, but also constantly repeating and remembering throughout their whole life. When some people form relatively homogeneous elements of anthroposemiosis through mutual interaction, it is possible to make visible a relatively homogeneous culture with some kind of wavering borders. Connective, but not totally common, memories and traditions guide perceptions, interpretations, actions and productions of new things in somewhat similar ways. Interactions can occur in a place, which may also be on the internet, or through common interests, media, international organisations or international trade, with intertwining chains of both local and global signs. Common traditions exist in homogeneous condensations of this kind, although they are not conscious events and people are not aware of the homogeneous condensation.

Second, cultures exist as a shared consciousness about their own cultural distinctiveness in relation to other kinds of distinctiveness, be they national, ethnic, or local. In this way, cultures are seen as distinctive wholes with a common cultural heritage (see, e.g., Hall 2003; Barth 1969a and 1994). In these situations, consciousness about specific cultural originality is argued in thirdness, and specific features are presented as symbols that tell about proper distinctiveness. It is possible for an organisational power to support symbolic originality of this kind. Nations, regions, ethnic groups, ideological groups, organisations, for example, have their own supporters who create and uphold their own spirit. But symbolic originality also exists in everyday life.

Consciousness about one's own cultural distinctiveness grows through cultural interaction when people encounter something different, as Fredrik Barth remarked long ago (Barth 1969a; see also, Barth 1994).⁵ This symbolic distinctiveness can be expressed as single and clear symbols, such as national flags or songs. The distinctiveness of a culture is, however, also expressed as a symbolic sign or story about its originality.

It is interesting to observe that symbolic stories about certain cultures, with their original, symbolic traits, are not necessarily the same as common and noteworthy phenomena in the relatively homogeneous condensations of the same people. But the symbolic cultural wholes and relatively homogeneous cultural condensations of the same people cannot be totally separated (Barth 1969b and 1994). In the global process of anthroposemiosis, in the process of everyday habits and actions, argued symbols and silent knowledge, cultures argued as symbolic wholes can never be totally separated from other, corresponding cultures, and the homogeneity of a symbolic cultural whole is never total on the level of everyday life. All stories and symbols telling about distinctive cultures are eventually subordinate to and subsumed in the global process of anthroposemiosis. As symbols always do, they are unavoidably changing and varying, growing and becoming unconscious habits in the local and global process of semiosis. Still, individual creativity intervenes in these collective symbols, as it does with other cultural phenomena.

Notes

1. Peirce writes that an interpretant can be equivalent or perhaps more developed than a representamen: “A sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign” (CP 2.228, original emphasis). Deely clarifies Peirce’s view of the nature of signs as constantly growing and changing elements in the process of semiosis (Deely 1990: 23). See also Bergman (2004: 401–402) on change as a central part of Peircean semiotics.
2. Because the physical world has become a part of human perceiving and conceptualising, it can be described with Jakob von Uexküll’s notion of *Umwelt*. This last is that form of the world that can be perceived by the human senses and cognized in human concepts. (See Deely 1994: 42–46; Uexküll 1981).
3. In the entire process of semiosis the mental parts of signs, that is interpretants, chains of interpretants and networks of interpretants, are in constant interaction with the external matters of the human mind, that is with *Umwelt* (Deely 1994: 42–48).
4. “Tradition” is seen here as cultural products that vary and change in the interactive human process, not necessarily as cultural phenomena of a particular and distant past (cf. Anttonen 1993).
5. Barth points out that culture and ethnicity are so closely connected that it is possible to use them side by side (Barth 1994: 176). Ethnicity, if an excellent example, is not the only definer of cultures.

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Tom Sjöblom

Palaeolithic cave-paintings as cognitive maps

1. Introduction: The nature of cave paintings

In 1879, Marcelino Sanz de Sautuola, a Spanish amateur archaeologist, began to explore the Altamira caves on his property in the Spanish Cantabria in search of prehistoric artefacts and pieces of portable art. One can only imagine how he must have felt, when his five-year old daughter Maria asked him to lift his gaze from the floor and look up at the cave walls. According to his own testimony, he was dumbstruck with awe, when he realised that he was staring at hitherto unknown kinds of ancient paintings representing images of bison. After a careful investigation of the evidence together with Juan Villanova y Pierra, a Professor of Palaeontology in Madrid, Sautuola came to the conclusion that the paintings must originate from the late Palaeolithic period and, thus, be over 10, 000 years old (Lewis-Williams 2002a: 30–33).

His bold claim was strongly opposed and ridiculed by professional archaeologists of his time. Sautuola was even accused of forgery. However, new discoveries soon followed from other parts of Southwestern Europe; finally, in 1902 the claims of Sautuola got official academic recognition, and the search and interpretation of these earliest known examples of human produced art could really begin. Indeed, by now around 150 sites with Palaeolithic cave-paintings – dated between 40 000 and 15 000 years ago – have been found in Europe alone, and additional sites in South Africa and Australia provide further evidence that we are dealing here with a universal phenomenon (Mithen 1996:178; Soffer & Conkey 1997: 2; Clottes 1997a: 205).

With the growing amount of new finds it has become quite evident that Palaeolithic cave-paintings – even if we confine ourselves to Franco-Cantabrian evidence only – is very diverse in form and nature. For exam-

ple, while some of them are situated deep inside the caves, others can be found near the entrances of caves or even in open rock shelters and open-air vertical rock surfaces. In addition, the caves and shelters are unique in the sense that they differ in form and size, so that no common features are easily identified between them (Clottes 1997a: 203–204; Lewis-Williams 2002a: 28).

Also, as pointed out by R. Dale Guthrie in his recent work *The Nature of Palaeolithic Art*, the level of skill and concern used for producing individual images varies greatly, from highly artistic expressions by expert hands to casually and undisciplined images painted hastily, maybe by youngsters, and often left uncompleted (Guthrie 2006). We should also keep in mind that that Palaeolithic cave-paintings were produced from around 40,000 years ago until about 15,000 years ago, covering a period of 25,000 years. This is a very long time period for any cultural practice to survive, so some variability in the production of cave-paintings is only to be expected (Mithen 1996: 178).

At the same time, there are some intriguing common features shared by most or all of the known sites. To begin with, the motifs of cave-paintings can be categorised into four clear groups. The earliest figures produced by the Palaeolithic artists appear to have been the hand-prints. These were produced simply by applying paint to the palm and fingers and then pressing the hand against the rock. Alternatively, a hand was placed against the rock wall and then paint was blown from the mouth over it so that when the hand was removed, its outlines survived on the painted cliff wall (Davidson 1997: 148–150; Lewis-Williams 2002a: 29). Second, there are the occasional and highly stylistic anthropomorphic images. Indeed, anthropomorphic representations are less common than others and they occur mostly in later sites. When they are present, they are more stereotypical than animal representations and often nothing more than crudely drawn iconic symbols (see Humphrey 1999: 121–122).

The third group consists of abstract signs and markings, such as circles, dots, grids and other types of geometric forms. Interestingly, though there are numerous different abstract signs in the material, certain forms – some of them quite complex – recur in the ethnographic evidence. According to Lewis-Williams and Dowson, these include nested catenary curves, sets of parallel lines and expanding hexagonal patterns (Lewis-Williams & Dowson 1988: 201–245). Finally, there are the highly naturalistic

animal images, primarily of terrestrial ungulates like bison, horses, deer and aurochs (González Morales 1997: 193–194). These images outnumber those of other categories, clearly being the most common motif (Hayden 2003: 105; Trompf 2005: 225).

A second common feature of the sites is that the casual, less ornate cave-paintings are mostly found near the entrances of the caves, whereas fine carvings and paintings are mostly represented deeper inside caves. This might be explained by the fact that few people went to the end of caves; those were the true craftsmen of the trade, who painted figures that were not meant to be seen by many people if at all (Clottes 1997a: 212–213). This takes us to the third shared feature of Palaeolithic cave-paintings, which is that the image makers used special features in the rock surfaces in their work. Many of the paintings follow the natural features of their surfaces, and sometimes an undulation in the rock becomes the dorsal line of a painted animal in suitable lighting. Indeed, in the light of a flickering torch, the moving shadows gives an impression that the walls are alive, and it becomes very easy to see animal shapes in the rocks. It appears that in such instances the image-makers simply added legs and other features to such shadow animals. One can argue with Lewis-Williams, that there is a real interaction between the image and its surface (Clottes 1997a: 211–212; Lewis-Williams 2002a: 210–223).

Indeed, while it might be too much to argue that Palaeolithic art is “animalist” in the sense that it is all about animal representations, we cannot ignore the fact that these play a major role in the repertoire of Palaeolithic image-makers (see González Morales 1997: 194). Thus, in what follows I focus on these animal representations and refer to the other categories only when they have some relevance for understanding my main topic.

2. Explaining animal representations in cave-paintings

Close study of the animal representations is of course nothing new. On the contrary, it has been the preferred strategy by most scholars dealing with Palaeolithic cave-paintings. Thus, in order to make clear what I want to argue here, we must start by taking a look at how animal representations have been dealt with by these previous writers.

Historically speaking, the first response of modern scholars was to take animal representations as purely decorative. Our Upper Palaeolithic

ancestors were thought to be too primitive to possess any capacity for symbolic thought; so what we have in animal representations is “art for art’s sake”, which our ancestors produced simply in order to pass time between hunting missions (Bahn & Vertut 1997: 170–171). It soon became obvious that this claim could not be true. From other types of evidence, such as portable artefacts, we now know that Upper Palaeolithic populations were quite capable of symbolic thought (Dickson 1996; Mithen 1996: 171–210). Even so, this approach has experienced a recent revival in the works of some contemporary scholars, who argue that the driving motivation for the creation of cave paintings is aesthetic experience and that, in this task, the image-makers – living in hunter-gatherer societies – used as models the motifs they found in their everyday experiences (see Humphrey 1999; Guthrie 2006).

Even this weaker formulation of the art-for-art’s-sake argument is, however, not that appealing, for two reasons. First, heuristically speaking it lacks potential for provoking further questions and research. Second – and more importantly – as anthropological and historical research clearly demonstrate, the aesthetic emotion was not considered a crucial element in art until eighteenth-century Europe. That was the birth time and place for art in the modern sense of the word. Before then, and in most traditions and cases even today, art is produced for certain purposes, usually to serve the interests of the community in which it is created (Dissanayake 1992: 39–42; Coe 2003: 64–66). This takes us to the second and most popular approach to explaining cave-paintings, which is to decipher their meaning and function.

The most widely held interpretation of cave-paintings has been that they were produced as part of rituals of hunting magic. The images, it is argued, were intended to give hunters power over their prey. The argument is backed by the fact that most of the animal images depict game animals, many of which seem to have spears or other projectiles sticking into them. Most recent scholars find this suggestion unconvincing, however; for example, Margaret Conkey, among others, notes that modern ethnography seems to indicate that hunter-gatherers were not necessarily “anxiety-ridden about food and the hunt” (Conkey 1981: 24; see also, Dickson 1996: 126–129; Lewis-Williams 2002a: 45–48).

This is why other functional explanations have been proposed as well. In the early decades of the twentieth century, one favoured idea was to

interpret the animal images as totemic. However, no real evidence has been adduced to support this argument (Dickson 1996: 124–125). A stronger case is made by scholars who claim that animal images depict spirit-beings connected with a shamanistic cult. This view is consistent with what we know about the religious practises of modern hunter-gatherers. It also seems to explain why images and the surfaces on which they are painted interact with each other as described above. Maybe the Palaeolithic people envisioned the caves as entrances to the spirit world. But simply because animal images are associated with shamanic practises in historic times, does not guarantee that they were so associated in the Palaeolithic – at least all of the known images (Dickson 1996: 129–137; Lewis-Williams 2002a; Hayden 2003: 105–108; Trompf 2005: 224–234).

The most important thing we have learned from functional explanations is how difficult it is to discover the meaning of signs that lack ethnographic, ethno-historic or textual anchors. Indeed, today we have nearly as many explanations of the meaning of cave-paintings as we have scholars addressing the subject (Dickson 1996: 123–158; Soffer & Conkey 1997: 6). More recently, this has led to a third strategy for explaining animal images: not through their function, but as signs of world-views or cosmological maps drawn on cave walls (Bahn & Vertut 1997: 189–197; Lewis-Williams 2002b: 73–93). This approach is heavily influenced by structuralism. Thus, it has been argued that cave-paintings' structures are grounded in the structures of the human mind; hence analysing the patterning of the images also reveals the structuring of the Palaeolithic mind. The main methodological weakness of this approach is that it takes as a given that individual images are parts of larger, integrated compositions. As demonstrated by Jean Clottes, among others, this is clearly something that we can neither assume nor demonstrate (Clottes 1997b: 37–52). Indeed, according to Clottes, modern techniques of paint analysis demonstrates that sometimes similar looking images situated close to each were actually painted thousands of years apart. This finding in effect ruins the argument for cosmological maps.

Finally, influenced by modern information theory, cave-paintings have been approached in terms of media for transmitting information. In this approach the idea is to view the animal images as vehicles carrying information between the image-maker and his audience. In other words, through cave-paintings the image makers could signify their power and

social influence beyond face-to-face contacts (Soffer & Conkey 1997: 7; Gamble 1999: 382–383). For this approach the motifs of cave-paintings are of secondary importance, and the main question is why cave-paintings in general were created by the Palaeolithic peoples.

While much can be said in favour of this approach, the insights it provides are severely attenuated by the fact that so little is known about the referential social context of cave-paintings (Soffer & Conkey 1997: 7). Moreover, as art historian Ernst Gombrich points out, images convey information poorly. What they do well is to evoke emotions. Thus, as information-carrying vehicles, cave-paintings work best as triggers for emotional memories (Gombrich 1982). Without more detailed information about the Palaeolithic culture and the image-makers as individuals, the social function of cave-paintings remains as much a speculation as the explanations of the previous approaches. Nevertheless, it does open some interesting avenues – especially when combined with insights from the other approaches – and to explore one of them is the aim of the present article.

3. Cave-paintings and emotional communication

In my view an information-theoretical framework may possess great heuristic value for gaining understanding about cave-paintings. Yet, following the suggestions of archaeologists like Steven Mithen and David Lewis-Williams, I suggest that, instead of turning our attention to the contextual social environment, we follow the structuralist method and approach cave-paintings in terms of human cognition.

My suggestion, therefore, is that we examine cave-paintings – not as signs of power, nor as expressions of cosmology – but as cognitive maps. More precisely, animal images functioned as cognitive tools used in Palaeolithic society for transmitting and transferring emotional markers (see Liben 2001: 45–47). By creating shared emotional environments, they enabled the birth of culturally shared meaning for whatever cultural information was attached to them by the society.

It has long been known, that humans use animal images in symbolic communication. In the words of Stanely Walens:

Wherever they appear, animal symbols are used to convey the deepest and most abstruse dimensions of human existence. They are symbols of core values and categories, representations of the most fundamental ideas and images of a culture. As core symbols, they are multivalent, complex, anti-monic, used simultaneously to capture and display many different image and meanings at many different levels. As core symbols, they also serve to link other domains of symbolic discourse, creating juxtapositions and contrasts of images from which people derive meaning and from which they generate narrative forms. The natural realm of animals is an important part of the way in which people project their knowledge and experience through symbolic discourse. (Walens 1987: 291)

Nevertheless, animals do not only symbolize core values, neither are they by any means restricted only to religious communication. As a group, animal images seem to overshadow all other types of motifs in general. In the words of the famous French anthropologist, Claude Lévi-Strauss, animals simply are good to think about (Lévi-Strauss 1969: 89). By this he means that the use of animals for symbolic communication is due to the fact that they enable us to make abstract ideas more concrete. This is because animals, in contrast to abstract beliefs and ideas, belong to our natural environment. This way empirical representations of animals ground abstract representations in our everyday experiences and make these last easier to grasp and remember (Lévi-Strauss 1969: 92–104).

What I argue here, instead, is that animal images are used for symbolizing – not because of their concreteness – but because they evoke emotional responses in us. They are tools for creating meaning and relevance through emotional contagion. Animal symbols are especially suitable for this purpose, because we humans seem to have an innate affinity to react emotionally to living beings and life-like processes. Following the biologist E. O. Wilson, I will refer to this affinity as *biophilia* (Wilson 1984). Biophilia evolved in our species because it enables us, in any given situation, to make appraisals of what is relevant for us and what we can ignore. According to Richard Lazarus, emotions are manifestations of such appraisal processes (see Lazarus 1991: 134–135). Moreover, while emotions do play this role in all kinds of interactions, their role is highlighted in cases where we interact with animals or humans, where the nature of interaction is often fast and quite literally connected with survival (see, e.g., Jerison 1991; Guthrie 1993; Buss 1999: 312–314).

My suggestion then is that the Palaeolithic animal images are symbols used to convey emotional signals. An immediate objection to this view is that if the strength of emotional responses is based on the strategic importance of the situation at hand, then why do we not always represent religious ideas and entities in human form? After all, it is generally agreed that it is the social realm which is the most basic for us, and that emotional communication with other individuals in our social group is what really matters to us. Wouldn't humans be an even better symbol for creating emotional responses? Human images in Paleolithic art, however, are few and highly stylized.

Indeed, we do frequently represent gods and other counterintuitive entities in human form, so the anthropomorphic tendency is certainly present (e.g., see Guthrie 1993; Boyer 2001: 142–144). But when we are trying to create a shared emotional environment, where all members of the community hold similar emotions towards specific issues, the use of anthropomorphism might not actually be the best strategy. This is because we tend to deal with humans on the individual or group level. There seem to be no evolved emotional responses to humans as a species. Indeed, since we ourselves belong to this species, how could there be? This means that emotional responses to other humans are situational and conditioned locally. It also makes them untrustworthy as markers of emotionally conduced meaning.

With animals the situation is totally different. In most cases, when we see an animal we react to it first as a representative of a certain species and only secondarily as an individual in its own terms. In short, animals signify to us as representatives of their species, and we represent them in our minds as such (Baker 1993: xvi; Shepard 1993: 275–300). In evolutionary terms this makes sense, because in our interactions with representatives of other species it is their shared characteristics (such as, they are usually dangerous to us, we can eat them, and so on) that provide the basis of our relationship with them. Indeed, our emotional responses to some species appear to be of very ancient origins, going back to the time when we shared an ancestor with our closest relatives, the primates (Mundukur 1983: 218–23; Shepard 1993: 278–279; Jones 2002: 25–54). Such responses are deeply rooted and universal for all humankind. This makes it rather easy for us to manipulate them in symbolic communication, because reactions to certain symbolic cues are everywhere the same. It is this combination of strong and stere-

otypical emotional responses that makes animals, or at least some species or types of animals, optimal for symbolic communication of meaning.

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Abraham Solomonick

Why language sign-systems are the most popular of all sign-systems

1. Classification

Languages occupy the middle position among the various types of sign-systems.

1.1. In my system of classification, I divide sign-systems into five categories (stages) based on their types and on the degree of abstractness of the signs they contain. This classification scheme has a hierarchic structure that reflects both the progressive phylogenetic development of the human race and the ontogenetic growth of each individual.¹ The hierarchy, and the basic signs contained in each type of sign-system in the hierarchy, is summarized in the following diagram:




Figure 1.

This classification scheme is most easily understood when the basic signs of each type of sign-system are explained sequentially, beginning with the lowest level of the hierarchy, as follows:

1.1.1. Natural signs, the basic signs of natural sign-systems, are things in and of themselves – visible (or audible) elements of an item that represent the whole item. These objects allow us to conjure up the whole item when

we cannot sense it directly. For example, a visible pillar of smoke may tell us that a fire is burning, when that fire is not otherwise within the scope of our senses. Similarly, a light coming from a window may suggest that the inhabitant of the room is at home.

1.1.2. Images, the basic signs of iconic sign-systems, are not parts of a real object but a reflection of it; they represent the things they signify because they resemble the forms of those things. Clearly, images are more removed from the things they signify than natural signs, which are themselves parts of the objects.

1.1.3. Words, the basic signs of language sign-systems, are generally arbitrary signs, having no intrinsic resemblance to the things they signify. As such, they are more distant from the things they signify than images are, because, unlike images, they do not resemble those things. Yet words do have an extra-systemic relationship to the things they signify, in that they represent actual things that exist in reality, beyond the bounds of the language sign-system to which they belong. For example, the word “table” represents an actual thing that exists outside of the English language.

1.1.4. Hieroglyphs, the basic signs of notational sign-systems, only exist within specific sign-systems, and only in relation to the other signs in the sign-system. Their purpose is to represent something within a sign-system in graphic form. For example, the letters of the alphabet are hieroglyphs that represent sounds in graphic form. Although hieroglyphs are more abstract than words, they nevertheless maintain a constant relationship with the things they represent. Thus, the written form of the word “table” is always “t-a-b-l-e”, and the individual letters that compose the word “table” continually represent the sounds assigned them by the particular language whose alphabet contains them.

1.1.5. Symbols, the basic signs of mathematical sign-systems, are more often than not chance notations for dealing with ad hoc situations. For example, “z” may mean weight in one situation and something entirely different in another. Thus, symbols are signs with the remotest possible connection to their referents. These are the most abstract of the basic semiotic signs.

1.2. As the descriptions of the various types of basic signs show, the degree (quantum) of abstractness rises as we move from the bottom of the hierarchy of sign-systems to the top. That is to say, as we move up the hierarchy from one type of sign-system to the next, the basic signs become

more and more distant from their referents and, consequently, more and more abstract in their nature. This increased degree of abstraction is also reflected in the process by which people become aware of each type of sign; both in terms of individual cognitive development and in terms of collective human development, each type of sign is introduced to our minds in succession, one type after the other, from the least abstract to the most. This sequence is apparent in the histories of various sciences and also in studies of human psychology (Jean Piaget and others). Parents can also observe this progressive development in their own children's growth.

It is important to note that the linguistic stage is situated exactly in the middle of the hierarchy. That is, words, the basic signs of language sign-systems, are intermediate in their quanta of abstraction, equidistant from the extreme ends of the continuum. I will return to this point later in my discussion.

2. *Four different functions of signs*

2.1. Most discussions of semiotic signs attribute only one distinctive feature to semiotic signs: denotation. That is, according to the standard point of view, the function of signs is to denote their referents. By contrast, I identify four distinct primary functions of semiotic signs when they are grouped in sign-systems. Denotation is of course the most prominent function of a semiotic sign, since it is the *raison d'être* of the sign, but in my view denotation is only a single element of an entire constellation of functions. Besides denoting their referents, signs also characterize them in some fashion and represent them in sign transformations. In addition, some signs are used to explain other signs and their transformations. Whereas the functions of characterization and representation are present in any sign, explanation is generally limited to linguistic signs, and usually occurs in one of the registers of human language.

2.2. Characterization – identifying the characteristics of a referent – is very prominent in natural signs, where it takes the form of sign connotations. In natural signs, connotations accompany and are incorporated into the denoting element of the sign: while a footprint denotes the imprint of a foot, its connotations may reveal whether it was a human foot or a paw that left the imprint, whether it was produced by a child or an adult, whether it is fresh or old, etc.

With natural signs, all the characterizations are produced through natural occurrences, and are only identified by people later. In all other types of signs, the characterizations are usually developed and implemented by people, and are essentially syntactical components of the signs. For example, in the sign denoting a benzoic molecule, some bonds between the atoms of hydrogen and carbon are expressed by two dashes, and some, by a single dash. These dashes characterize the valences of the atoms they denote and the relations between the atoms. Unlike the characterizations of natural signs, the characterizations of this sign were produced by humans using special designations (dashes). In this case, the dashes characterize the sign by designating its syntactic components.

The more abstract a sign is, the greater the role played by its syntax. As we move up the hierarchy of abstraction, syntax gradually comes to occupy the dominant position in the construction of signs. At the highest hierarchical level, the denotational components of signs are minimal; symbols are chosen to represent their referents at random, either at the whim of the sign-system user or in accordance with the accepted forms used in the relevant construction (i.e., the algorithm). For example, we can use algebraic signs randomly to denote their referents, as long as we abide by the accepted rules of algebra. Nevertheless, we must be careful to use the algebraic signs that represent the syntactic features of algebraic constructions in ways that reflect the actual relationships between the referents – that is, according to the real, substantive characteristics of the referents.

2.2.1. Note that connoting traits are found only in natural and iconic sign-systems, while syntactic characteristics are extant at the highest levels of our classification. These two types of characterizations are distinguished by their origins: connotations develop in nature, whereas syntactic characterizations are human inventions. In language sign-systems, which occupy the middle level of the hierarchy, these origins are merged. For example, in everyday language, common words are used also as characterizations; this trend can be viewed as a natural process because it is not planned deliberately by anyone. On the other hand, language that is used by specialists in a particular field (e.g., scientific language) relies on characterizations that are designed purposely by its users.

2.3. Representation – replacing referents in sign transformations – is the primary function of signs in systems of higher abstraction. These sign-systems are formed not only to aggregate signs together, but to process

them in accordance with the metalinguistic rules of the systems – that is, to transform them.

We can understand this function better if we consider how the use of signs and sign-systems developed. People noticed very early on that they could make use of designees in place of the things they designate, of signs instead of their referents. By doing so, they were able to obtain new knowledge in many situations in which working with natural objects was impossible or ineffective. Over time, this kind of investigation became accepted and came to be viewed as completely normal. Eventually, people began to actively build sign-systems with the express purpose of investigating things through processing their signs instead of processing real-life objects. Sign-systems of this latter type are composed of signs with very high degrees of abstraction. Because their purpose is to enable the processing of the signs they contain, syntactic traits usually appear in processing their signs, the function of representation in them takes on far greater significance than the denotational components of the signs.

2.3.1. Still, the processing of signs takes place in all of the types of sign-systems. In natural sign-systems, the processing of the signs is defined by their connotations. That is, the guidelines for handling signs are fixed in advance and built-in. For example, in the case of the footprint mentioned above, we behave differently depending on whether the footprint was made by a child or by an adult, whether we know the make of the footwear, etc.

In iconic systems, the guidelines are set up mostly by the sign-system user. Thus, a sculptor who receives an order for a particular sculpture, including specifications, nevertheless produces the sculpture largely in accordance with his own tastes and preferences.

Only in the systems of higher abstractness are our processing options defined exclusively by the rules of the system. And the stricter those rules are (they become more and more rigid as the system's abstractness increases), the less we are permitted to deviate from them. That is why it is possible and even necessary in the notation and mathematical systems for guidelines to relate primarily to syntactic content, such that the denotational components only fill secondary roles.

Processing guidelines of language systems contain both denotational and syntactic components, in balanced, equal measure. Although the syntax in languages is rather rigid (we learn its rules and regulations for many years), it nonetheless allows us to utilize many alternative construc-

tions to express one and the same idea. Thus, this is another case in which language systems occupy a central and balanced position in the range of sign-systems.

2.4. Signs cannot exist without props that help us understand and use them. Some signs obtain their props from their affinity and resemblance to the things they designate, as in the case of a photo and the object it represents. Other signs, being remote and detached from the things they designate, obtain their props from the systems that contain them. The props of these more abstract signs are controlled and guided by the syntactic guidelines of their systems.

2.5. Explanations are props that make use of language to help the users of abstract sign-systems keep their bearings. When people deal with highly abstract sign-systems, they are surrounded by intangibles and can quickly lose track of their connections to the real world. In such cases, the users need something to moor them to their common sense and to familiar surroundings. For this purpose, they can find support in linguistic explanations.

Of course, different types of people require different linguistic props to help them decipher particular abstractions. Specialists may find a few hints sufficient, and highly-educated people may be satisfied with less detailed explanations than those required by a relatively uneducated audience. But language, being such a powerful and all-encompassing system, can fill all of these needs (see below). It can explain the intricacies of every system to every kind of observer.

2.5.1. For the sign-systems that are lower than languages on the scale of abstraction, language is used to raise the level of abstraction to its own level; for systems whose level of abstraction is higher than that of language, explanation lowers the quantum of abstraction. Thus, we usually accompany photos with inscriptions to explain their contents; in this case, we elevate the iconic level of abstractness to the linguistic one. Similarly, we supply pictures and sculptures with names, and when we deal with natural systems (in overviews, in collections, etc.), we always furnish users with written or oral instructions. By contrast, when we explain scientific transmutations by using words, we lower their high charges of abstraction. Thus, language functions as an equalizer, bringing the results produced in other systems to its own level of abstraction, and thereby helping us understand and interpret them.

2.5.2. Words are frequently included in the transformations of other signs, interrupting the transformations with explanatory remarks and instructions. In mathematical calculations and chess notations, for example, we come across words and even full sentences whose purpose is to clarify the abstract transmutations. The words that are inserted can also serve to provide the structure for the next stages of transformation. We also insert words in medical and demographic schematics to help make them intelligible to ordinary readers; without these linguistic insertions, these schematics would remain empty syntactic devices. More often than not, we sum up such transmutations with linguistic explanations. Sometimes, we follow these up with additional schematic summaries that rely entirely on words. Figure 2 illustrates this type of linguistic schematic summary, presented in the form of a table that, to my mind, contributes to my explanations in words, making them clearer and more intelligible:




Figure 2. Functions of signs according to their quanta of abstractness.

2.5. We see in Figure 2 that it may sometimes even be necessary to mitigate the abstractness of linguistic explanations themselves. This can occur when we are using the higher spheres of a language. In these situations, we either employ language or an outline or drawing (like my figure above) to reduce the abstractness. This is done quite often in popular texts

aimed at non-specialists or poorly educated people. Because language explanations can be made as concrete as necessary, they are sufficient props for most signs.

3. *Summary*

At this point, I think it will be helpful if I summarize the various functions of signs I have identified:

Denotation: The main and decisive function of all signs is denotation – designating referents.

Characterization: Another function of signs is to characterize their referents – to identify the specific characteristics of their referents. In natural signs, the characterization function is implemented through sign connotations; in signs of higher abstraction – in their syntactic features. This function is present in signs of all levels.

Representation: A third function of signs is representing referents in sign transformations that are implemented in accordance with the rules of the relevant sign-system. This function is also present in signs of all levels.

Explanation: A final important function of signs is the explanation of other signs, of sign processing, and of its results. This function is concentrated mostly in language signs, since language systems are in the middle of the hierarchy of abstractness.

4. *Conclusions*

I cannot visually or in computational terms prove the existence of degrees of abstractness in signs – this is my theoretical conjecture. But this conjecture explains a lot of what occurs with various signs and sign-systems. This concept enables me to elucidate the features of languages that make them so powerful in explaining what occurs in other types of sign-systems.

4.1. Languages are powerful because they are the broadest sign-systems, intended to be able to express everything, both in ontology and in our thoughts. It should be possible to adequately reveal any shade of meaning, any nuance of our feelings and attitudes, in the words of any extant language. And if the existing words are not sufficient for articulating something, we may conjure up new ones, new signs in the language, because linguistic systems are open-ended systems. See, for example, *Ulysses* by James

Joyce; you will find new words on every page. And within the context of the novel, these new words are comprehensible and expressive.

4.2. As was already mentioned, there are many registers in each language, and these registers are of different strata of abstractness. There are, for instance, many languages of science; in fact, a distinct language exists for each branch of science. In each of these languages, common words are intermingled with technical terms and special concepts that are relevant to that particular science. In addition, linguistic strata exist for higher-level conversations (lectures and official communiqués), while other languages are defined for ordinary communication among various audiences. You can toy with all these levels of signs to make your message understandable. If you are not satisfied with the results, you can always apply to other strata and to non-linguistic back-ups in order to solve the problem. No other sign-system has such a variety of different means for conveying messages.

4.3. I have already pointed out that languages have very rich and flexible syntaxes. This allows us to build innumerable variations for expressing one and the same idea – innumerable alternatives for each sentence. No other sign-systems offer such opportunities: in lower-level sign-systems, syntax is restricted by external (out-of-system) constraints; at the higher levels of abstraction, syntax is intentionally made rigid to facilitate the most efficient transformations of signs.

4.4. Last, but not least, some of the power of languages derives from the fact that words can be altered during their syntagmatic formations to a much greater extent than signs belonging to other levels of abstractness. This concept requires some explanation. Signs are frequently changed in the course of their use; initial forms of signs are defined in dictionaries and legends, but these “dictionary” forms give rise to various derivatives in actual sign applications. Imagine all forms of a noun or a verb in various paradigms of a natural language, and you will understand my point.

4.4.1. The actual degree of deviation from the basic form of a sign can vary greatly; in some cases, it may not change at all, while in other cases it can even be changed to the point of becoming entirely unrecognizable. For example, in English, the verb “to be” is unrecognizable in the forms “was” and “were.” In other languages, cases of this sort are even more common. The changeability of the forms of signs becomes more apparent in sign-systems with higher levels of abstractness. In natural signs, deviations are normally close to nil. Thus, for example, evidence in criminal cases is

meticulously preserved throughout the proceedings. At the highest level of abstractness, changes in sign form become very prominent. Imagine any mathematical transformation, even the simplest one, and you can see how the form of the equation changes between the initial and the final expressions – modifications that occur even though all parts of the equation are connected by an equals sign throughout.

4.4.2. When it comes to form alterations, languages are once again in the middle position, balanced midway between sign-systems of minimal abstraction and those of high abstraction. Although alterations to words may be quite extensive, words are almost always recognizable in all their transmutations. This is necessary to ensure that we are always aware of what we are speaking about, so that we can immediately correct ourselves, respond with new arguments, and make meaningful amendments. By contrast, we are greatly deprived in this respect when we are involved in performing computations or other sign mutations in systems of higher abstraction, in which we are guided only by rules and instructions that are specified in advance. In these cases, we can only verify our procedures after we reach the end of a calculation, either by repeating the process anew or by implementing the established procedure for verification.

4.4.3. Our discussion of the functions of signs in general and of language sign-systems in particular leads us to the conclusion that languages are the most efficient systems for explaining the transmutations of other systems. This does not mean that languages are the most basic type sign-system, or that all other sign-systems developed from them. Nothing of the kind! It is my belief that the various types of sign-systems came into existence sequentially, beginning with those of the lowest abstractness and continuing with sign-systems of gradually increasing abstractness. Language developed in its turn, after the sign-systems of lower abstraction came into existence. It is not because of how or when languages developed that their current central function of explaining other signs became established, but because of their intermediate position in the hierarchy of sign-systems, and all that that position implies.

Note

1. I recently began dividing mathematical sign-systems into two subgroups, but this does not affect the current discussion.

Song Hyosup

Mythical thinking and anti-mythical thinking: Two semiotic models

1. Introduction

Dangun has been thought by most Koreans to be the progenitor of the Korean people. His story is found in the ancient document *Sam-guk-yu-sa* (*Stories of Three Kingdoms*) as follows. A bear was transformed into a woman by staying in a cave and eating only garlic and wormwood for 21 days. She gave birth to Dangun, who became the founder of Ancient-Chosun. In the modern era, this story was changed and memorized by Koreans such that the woman gave birth to Dangun, who became the *ancestor of the Korean people*. We can see mythical thinking operating in this change. In this case, a change of story is due to a change of thinking about that story.

The story itself is the *mythos*, while thinking about the story is called *logos*. A thinking of *mythos* is mythical thinking, that is, having a faith in the story itself, whereas a thinking about *logos* is anti-mythical thought, which provides the story with logical explanation. Generally, human thinking consists of these two opposite sides, but these two appear interwoven in real thinking situations. Starting from the assumption of two semantic terms, *mythos* and *logos*, this paper proposes two semiotic models of these opposing sides of human thought.

2. Mythos and logos

The opposition of *mythos* and *logos* is shown by the semiotic square in Figure 1 (after Greimas 1970: 136–140).

Mythos is a story, and a story consists of sequential actions. That the story is regarded as *mythos* means that it is believed to be an absolute truth, regardless of its logicity. Generally, it is told as heard from someone




Figure 1. *Opposition of mythos and logos shown by the semiotic square.*

without any doubt. In this case, the story is not thought reflectively but accepted as a transcendental message.

By contrast, *logos* is the logicity of story, the reasoning by which the story is validated. Logicity is always dubious in nature. It is destined to ask if the story is valid. The logicity of a story can be considered from two sides. One is whether the units of the story are combined with necessity and/or motivation, and the other is whether the story world has a valid relation with real world outside the story. The former is the problem of *plot*, which is mainly discussed in narratology. The well-composed story is accepted by virtue of its persuasiveness; while the story not so composed leads to suspicion of its truth value. The latter is the problem of *reality*. Criteria of estimating whether the story is plausible or not are found in the real world.

These two problems are deeply interrelated. For example, in the previous story, one may think that there is no logical necessity between the fact that a bear stayed in a cave just eating garlic and wormwood and the fact that the bear became a woman. It is because everyone thinks that such an event cannot happen in real world. Therefore, the logicity of story has to be estimated by criteria inferred from the real world. Such criteria of logicity are always variable, due to the variability of situations where stories are told. This means that there needs to be a certain compromise among different ways of thinking about stories whenever they are told. We can assume a discursive field of *logos* where conflicts of different interpretations of stories are compromised.

On the basis of these descriptions of *mythos* and *logos*, we can present a semantic relation between these two opposite terms. *Mythos*, that is, story itself, simply consists of actions, and hence can be represented as the modality *to do*. Every occasion of *to do* happens just once, so it can be described in terms of Peircean *Secondness* (cf. CP 1.322–336). However, if two *to dos* are combined, a certain logicity, Peircean *Thirdness* (CP 1.327–353), emerges

between them. This last cannot be represented as *to do*, but rather as *to be*. From this distinction, I suggest the semiotic square shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2. Opposition of *to do* and *to be* shown by the semiotic square.

Though the opposing relation between *to do* and *to be* is shown clearly in this figure, the two modalities are interwoven in complex ways in real storytelling situations. There is no absolutely pure story in the real world. Since stories always have to be told, logicity is inevitably given to them. In a word, *mythos* can only exist with *logos* in the real world.

Figures 1 and 2 show not only static relations of each term but also the dynamic operations among them (cf. Greimas 1970: 164). Movement from *mythos* to *logos* and its inverse are shown.

In order to pursue the analysis of these complex relations, some semiotic methods will have to be used. One of these concerns modalization. As shown in Figure 3, a narrative program inferred from mutual modalization between *to do* and *to be* can be a starting point (see Hénault 1983: 65)

manipulation		competence	/	performance		sanction
To do-doing		To be-doing		To do-being		To be-being

Figure 3. Narrative program inferred from mutual modalization between *to do* and *to be*.

In this process, the stages of *competence* and *performance* correspond to *mythos*, while stages *manipulation* and *sanction* correspond to *logos*. The whole process – from the planning of actions to estimating their results – is one of constructing the logic of the story. Even if the purpose of telling the story is to show *mythos*, the story always appears as *logos*, in that it is intended for or affected by someone (see Figure 4).

Logos appearing as a logic of story embraces not only linguistic reasoning (syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic) but also reasoning inferred from relations between story and real world (social, cultural, and histori-




Figure 4. *Mythos and logos shown in narrative program.*

cal). The subject of manipulation and the subject of sanction in Figure 4 respectively correspond to sender and receiver of messages in Jakobson's communication model (Jakobson 1987: 66). But in a real storytelling situation, they are revealed by means of various inferences. For example, in the Dangun story, the sender can be the author of a document containing this story, the original author cited in this document, or a large number of tellers of this story over the ages. It is same in the case of the receiver. Therefore, we can only describe the *discursive* sender and receiver according to an assumed communicative situation.

A *cognitive* dimension incorporating manipulation and sanction is always realized together with a *pragmatic* dimension embracing competence and performance (cf. Hénault 1983: 65). If we suppose a discourse consisting purely of manipulation and sanction, it may not be story but pure argumentation by means of which someone suggests a hypothesis and proves it. Even if it is proved, it may be questioned by others. Such doubtfulness is a typical characteristic of *logos*. If the cognitive dimension is complemented by the pragmatic dimension, its doubtfulness can be overcome in some degree. This shows the power of story.

In the cognitive dimension, the stage of sanction has more obvious characteristics of *logos* than does the stage of manipulation. In the stage of manipulation, someone acts in order to make someone act. But in the stage of sanction, someone does not just act, but acts so as to give sanction to the action already done. In this stage, there is no possibility to change the situation by action. Still, there may be a lot of other possibilities, as shown in Figure 5 (Greimas 1987: 71–73; Hénault 1983: 62).

Besides these semiotic possibilities, many pragmatic possibilities may also be realized in real situations where stories are told. This means that the stage of sanction can be the field of *logos* where many different interpretations of *mythos* collide.




Figure 5. Veridical modalities shown by the semiotic square.

I have already said that the logicity of *logos* becomes stronger with the help of *mythos*. If just one, among the many possibilities of *logos*, is realized, what happens next? Pragmatically, there occurs the making of belief, which may be a general process of human thinking. The change in the Dangun story shows the same process. It definitely shows a strengthening of *mythos*, but on the other side, a weakening of *logos*. The crisis of *logos* results from *mythos* drawn in order to support *logos*. As *mythos* becomes stronger, *logos* becomes weaker. This paradoxical situation is shown in Figure 6.




Figure 6. Strengthening of mythos shown in narrative program.

Logos becomes stronger as the subjects of manipulation and sanction reflect a whole storytelling situation. As new stages of manipulation and sanction add to the existing situation, the pre-existing territory of *logos* becomes the territory of *mythos*. Such a change brings about a strengthening of *mythos*, which, paradoxically, comes from a strengthening of *logos*. If the Korean people think about the Dangun story from a nationalistic perspective, many debatable issues become transformed into clear facts in their minds, crystallizing into a firm belief in which *mythos* and *logos* are no longer distinguishable. This clearly demonstrates the process of mythical thinking.

3. Mythos-logos *interaction*

We cannot make clear the point where mythical thinking arises, which indicates that *mythos* and *logos* are not distinguished clearly in human thinking. In real thinking situations, Figure 1 has to be changed into Figure 7.




Figure 7. *Interactive-creative process between mythos and logos.*

This shows an interactive, creating process between mythos and logos. *Mythos* is created from *logos* and vice versa. However, this figure still does not show the real direction of human thinking. The terms *mythical* and *anti-mythical* imply certain directions, respectively. It is not enough only to say that *mythos* comes from *logos* or *logos* comes from *mythos*.

When a human being begins to think, *mythos* and *logos* in the human mind begin to work together. A thinking stirred by *logos* creates *mythos* in order to support the existing *logos*. For example, someone may suggest a hypothesis and show several cases in order to prove it. If it is proved, cases drawn are also invested with truth values. If these cases appear as stories implying concrete situations, stories drawn here also may be invested with truth values. This shows a kind of *deductive* thinking. If someone makes a hypothesis from many cases, the hypothesis created may be invested with truth value by means of generalization. In spite of the fact that hypotheses here are only plausible, they may be invested with absolute truth values. It is a matter of *inductive* thinking. Both ways of thinking raise the value of *mythos* owing to an increase of *logos*. In other words, human beings create *mythos* incessantly as long as they live and think. However, even when one has to create *mythos* perpetually, if one tries to think about it reflectively, he can prevent the infinite increase of *mythos* owing to a strengthening of *logos*. Someone may suggest a hypothesis from cases that he experienced, but he can guess about cases by means of the hypothesis inversely. If he finds something in a hypothesis that does not accord with cases, he

modifies his hypothesis carefully. This is a kind of *abductive* thinking (CP 2.619–625; Eco 1986: 40), where making belief and breaking it are connected as shown in Figure 7.

Such an interaction between two opposite terms *mythos* and *logos* shows the most typical figure of commonsensical thinking. Mythical thinking and anti-mythical thinking, that is, two opposite sides of human thinking founded on *mythos* and *logos*, respectively, seem to be similar in that both have a certain direction, but different in that their directions are definitely opposite.

I propose two models of this thinking process, beginning with a fundamental situation that shows human thinking implying two opposite terms, *mythos* and *logos* (see Figure 8).

(*mythos* ————— *logos*)

Figure 8. Human thinking implying two opposite terms, *mythos* and *logos*.

On the basis of Figure 8, we can create two opposite thinking models, which proceed in two opposite directions. First, let us assume the stages according to which mythical thinking is created. As I have said, the creation of mythical thinking is a strengthening of *mythos* accompanied by a strengthening of *logos*. In the first stage, a human being regards his mind as implying both *mythos* and *logos* as a *logos* (see Figure 9).

(*mythos* ————— *logos*)
logos

Figure 9. Human thinking, implying both *mythos* and *logos*, regarded as a *logos*.

Developing thinking means strengthening *logos* and also means beginning to make belief. Even if we do not know the point where it ends, at a certain extreme point, *logos* may be changed into *mythos*. This is the point where hypothesis becomes story, or doubt becomes belief (see Figure 10).

Figure 10. Incessant process of creating myths.

The dotted arrows in Figure 10 show that the process of creating *mythos* cannot be articulated clearly. At a certain extreme point, *logos* becomes *mythos*, and these newly created *mythos* and *logos* also create new *mythos* and *logos* by the same semiotic operation. It results in an unlimited and unceasing proliferation of *mythos*. Thought proceeds spirally toward a certain point but never reaches it. It seems like a figure of Peircean unlimited semiosis (CP 5.484), which shows that human thinking is in progressive form. Hence, I suggest a final model of human mythical thinking, beginning with Figure 11 (cf. Song 2005: 54–56).




Figure 11. Model of mythical thinking.

A semiotic model of anti-mythical thinking is also created from Figure 8. Anti-mythical thinking is a thinking that recognizes my thinking is mythical (see Figure 12) and ceaselessly tries to eradicate mythicality from my thinking.




Figure 12. Human thinking, implying both *mythos* and *logos*, regarded as a *mythos*.

This kind of thinking proceeds not to strengthen *mythos* but to weaken it. Anti-mythical thinking reduces the power of *mythos* by help of *logos* (see Figure 13).




Figure 13. Incessant *mythos*-reducing process.

The process of anti-mythical thinking that denies equalization of *mythos* and *logos* cannot be articulated clearly. Anti-mythical thinking that minimalizes *mythos* also takes on a spiral shape, as in Figure 11; however, it appears not as outward proliferation but as inward reduction (Figure 14).




Figure 14. Model of anti-mythical thinking.

4. Conclusion

A little bit of thinking can induce a lot of stories. Thinking does not exist without story. By means of story, doubt becomes faith in human thinking. It is the reason why thinking has to be analyzed on the basis of a story model.

As I have emphasized, mythical thinking and anti-mythical thinking are universal phenomena of the human mind, and cultural values arise from these two opposite ways of thinking. The two models proposed here can be either a first step or a last step of such an anthropological work.

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Irma Sorvali

Can dolls communicate? Some semiotic aspects of dolls and their clothing

1. Introduction

Playing with dolls is a kind of communication. Children and dolls together form a social unity, “a family”, where they communicate with each other, and a reciprocal relationship develops between the dolls and the players. The playing with dolls means a complex of social and visual semiotics. The dolls discussed here are mostly used as toys by Finnish children in Finland. The descriptive analysis is an attempt to show how the children and the dolls along with their clothes communicate with each other. A paper doll, called Cinderella, is further discussed in a case study.

Roland Barthes’s famous study of the “fashion system” (1984) has been an inspiration for the analysis, though my study focuses on the communication with the dolls and their clothes, not on written texts. Nevertheless, to illustrate the gender of the players I use literary texts written by Oscar Parland.

2. Communication

Communication, understood as semiosis (cf. Nöth 1985: 124–125, Tarasti 2004: 9–11), takes place between a sender and a receiver, which in this case are children and their dolls. The message is formed by them, the dolls, and their clothes together. In case of one player only, which is not so unusual either, he or she is both sender and receiver in the same game. Through the player, even a doll can the roles of both the sender and the receiver, and consequently, communication is (theoretically) possible internally,

between the dolls. The children are characters in the dolls' games of make-believe.

As to participation, a difference is usually made between the players and the onlookers: "Participants consider the rules or principles of generation to apply to themselves. Onlookers, observing the game from without, do not think of themselves as subject to its rules ..." (Walton 1990: 209). The children sometimes have imaginary companions in the communication in their playing (cf. Taylor and Mannering 2007: 235), but usually they are themselves "props, reflective ones: they generate fictional truths about themselves" (Walton: *ibid.*). In this study, the role of an onlooker is played by me.

Dolls have a long history, possibly being the oldest playthings of mankind, but the play between dolls and children did not appear very early on (cf. Urbancic 1998: 94–95). The communication is implicitly included in the definition by means of the words "child" and "toy": "a child's toy modeled, however crudely, in human or animal form" (EB Micropædia, Vol. III: 606). The dolls represent generations of people, among which can be found babies, children, teen-ages and grown-ups. All of them have clothes, and the reality is described by means of the clothes in plays with the children as participants. Sometimes even the dolls have dolls. These last do not have very important roles in the game playing; still, there are examples of a coffee party, in which the dolls' dolls are participating. In a communication between dolls, one doll has the role of the mother of the family; the other one is her child, who also has a doll.

The communication here involves an exchange of words and clothes between individuals in each other's presence, the "individuals" meaning both players and dolls. The playing takes place here and now: it has neither a future or a past. The communication in playing is actually similar to that which occurs between two or more individuals. The players are talking with each other and intervening or participating in the communication between the dolls. However, the oral talk in the playing is not possible to study here, due to lack of material. Hence my focus here on the dolls' clothes, seen as signs, with the play being the object, and the player with make-believe action the interpretation (cf. Peirce 2007: *passim*).

Even mechanical toys can communicate, but initially, the player must use them before they start to function. Mechanical dolls may sing, cry, play piano, etc., and may move its eyes up and down, its head from side

to side, say “mama” and “papa”, and the like (King 1996: *passim*). Even though communication between mechanical toys is not a trivial issue, it is not addressed in the present study. Also not discussed here are dolls in their functions as souvenirs and/or decorations.

3. Dolls, clothes and players in communication

It is a well-known fact that the clothes give information about the person wearing them, and the same is true for dolls. A simple jacket “says” something other than slippers with golden embroidery do. The dolls’ clothes reflect the clothes worn by people, both male and female, a fact which actually belongs to the culture of clothing. The dolls’ clothes are in that way a miniature of the social environment, but they can be changed into unreal ones as needed when played with. The clothing is changeable, hence a doll often has a variety of clothes during one game. It is through the set of clothes that communication takes place. Special clothing and certain kinds of behavior are associated with specific times and places (cf. Lotman 1989: 125). Moreover, dolls are often kept for many years, “not only as totems of childhood but also as practical items, such as purveyors of fashion” (Urbancic 1998: 93). Dolls and their clothing can bring back memories with strong emotional force. This appeared to be quite obvious in my interview with a lady who played with dolls in the 1950s and now is a collector of them.

After the Second World War, there was a great lack of every kind of material in Finland. The dolls and doll clothes were a dream for Finnish children during those times, and to have beautiful clothes meant the realization of that dream. Many kinds of materials came from Sweden to Finland after the war. Periodicals from Sweden had pages with sheets of paper dolls, which had plenty of beautiful, even royal clothes. The clothes partly represent real time; and they can also be partly unreal, luxurious, even fantastic. In playing with dolls, the players imagine that it is spring, summer, winter or autumn. When playing everyday life, they imagine morning or evening, bath, work in the kitchen, meals and festivities such as christenings, weddings, funerals and many kinds of parties. The clothes are chosen according to the needs of the situation. The dolls can also temporarily be used as, say, a witch on Halloween, as the child Jesus at Christmas (alternatively as the Virgin Mary or Joseph), donned with suitable clothes for these

roles. Barthes suggested that appropriate clothes for given contexts may be compared with the syntax of language (cf. Barthes 1984: 213–221), though no attempts have yet been made (Eco 1985: 242). In reality, the collection of doll clothes restricts the choices of the situation. This restriction can easily be overcome, however, if one has the ability to design, sew or draw clothes. This process, too, is part of the communication.

4. *Cinderella, a paper doll*

In this case study, special attention is paid to paper dolls. Paper dolls came to Finland in the nineteenth century, at first of German origin, then imported from other countries. Sheets of paper dolls could further be found in magazines. The production of paper dolls started in Finland at the beginning of the twentieth century, often for educational purposes (Lehto 2007).

A paper doll called Cinderella is represented here in two different prints (pictures 1 and 2, below). Sheets of Cinderella were sold in Finland, the older one in the 1950s, and the newer one in the 2000s. The divergent features of these two prints are compared in this case study. Both of the dolls represent the fairy-tale character of Cinderella, the poor girl with a mean stepmother and malevolent sisters. The dancing slipper that Cinderella loses when leaving the ballroom is the central sign in this fairy tale. The slipper is found by the Prince, and Cinderella is the only girl whose foot fits it. The older doll has more obvious fairy-tale characteristics than does the newer one. On the older sheet, there is a print of a paper doll in shape of a prince, whose accompanying page shows him with the shoe resting on a pillow in his hands. The clothes of the older Cinderella and her shoe are apparent signs of the old fairy tale, while the newer Cinderella has “normal” clothes without any clear allusions to this tale. Still, Cinderella’s slipper is highlighted, isolated at the bottom right on the sheet. On it also is a good fairy godmother, a cleaning implement, a number of pigeons, and a little mouse. These details are placed by the side of Cinderella in Picture 2. All of them are signs with obvious allusions to the tale of Cinderella, but all of them may easily be lost when the paper doll is cut and separated from the sheet, in which case they have no communicative function at all.

When the clothes of the paper dolls are directly printed on the dolls on the sheet, they are of course not changeable, which is not regularly the case.

As for the 1950s Cinderella, the clothes she wears for cleaning are directly printed on her, but she also has a separate, “princess” dress. Apparently, she needs that dress because she will get married to the prince, who stands beside her on the same sheet. Of course, these paper dolls cannot speak for themselves, which means the children must add the voices when they play with them.

The slipper motif has been researched by Norvill (1986), who points out that the fairy tale of Cinderella contains an allusion to the ancient Egyptian myth of Osiris, king of Egypt and husband of Isis. Norvill writes: “... consider, for instance, the comparison between Cinderella’s foot fitting the slipper where all others had failed, and the body of Osiris being the only one to fit the casket. The themes are identical” (Norvill 1986: 56). Cinderella’s shoe, printed on the sheet of this paper doll, is a long-lived sign of this old story.

5. Reflections on life

Play is an essential part of the activities of a child. However, children’s toys have often been neglected in scientific analyses (cf. Munthe 1991). Playing with dolls can easily help the child to learn to live in the society. In fact, one can speak about the world of the dolls, existing both in reality and fantasy. Playing with dolls with changeable clothes teaches the players something about the relations between persons in social life (as in a family, for example). Dolls like Cinderella and Sleeping Beauty recall the fantasy worlds of old and well-known fairy tales, but we also talk about “real-life Cinderella stories”. There comes a time, though, when girls who play with dolls become interested in clothes and fashion, and the dolls are no longer relevant; i.e., there is no longer any communication between the girls and the dolls. On the other hand, it has been argued that the playing follows the players all their lives, assimilating in different kinds of social and psychological processes (Lotman 1989: 125).

The dolls are often associated with glamour and female image. Dolls and doll collecting have been seen as a predominantly female activity (Urbancic 1998: 93), but boys, too, sometimes want to play with them. When children are playing Cinderella or Sleeping Beauty with dolls, a boy doll is needed to take the role of the prince. In the fairy tale of Cinderella, there are culturally sanctioned gender roles as there are in real life, where a

girl, simply by changing her clothes – as the dolls do – can be transformed into a princess, and a boy into a prince.

Leaving behind the fairy tale world, it is in doll games like “family” or “doctor” the child comes nearer to social life. Both girls and boys are needed in this kind of playing. A good example of a boy playing family with dolls is given by Oscar Parland, a Finnish writer and semiotician, in his autobiographical novel *Den förtrollade vägen* (1953). In one passage a girl, his cousin, with whom he is playing, suggests that he will be her man, and they will get married when they grow up (Parland 1953: 150). In another passage, the boy and girl are playing, when she suddenly suggests that both she and the boy take the role of mother. At first this does not work so well: the boy-mother has plenty of children to deal with. However, he and his doll-character gradually get used to cooking food and feeding the children, and finally becomes quite interested in playing this role (ibid.: 160).

We should also mention the world of advertising and marketing dolls. Children can nowadays get a new virtual combination of clothes via the internet. The clothes can be selected from a variety of alternatives, for dolls representing both females and males, for example actors, actresses, singers, models, royals, superstars and athletes. The players are able to choose the color of the eyes, hair style, and the whole “personality” of the doll. In other words, there is great variety in the ways one can play with dolls, which in many respects reflects the multiple means of communication in modern life.

6. Summary

The analysis above is an attempt to understand playing with dolls and doll clothing as forms of communication. Oriented to real-life “games” such as family interaction, such play is both social and developmental. In more fantastic realms, such as those of fairy tale, the players with dolls are immersed in a fantasy world of cultural and literary features, as we have seen in the case of Cinderella. In sum: Dolls can communicate, but only with the help of human players.

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Picture 1. Cinderella, a paper doll (Finland, 1950s).



Picture 2. Cinderella, a paper doll (Finland, 2000s).

Wojciech Stępień

Understanding Rautavaara's angels

In the history of music, Einojuhani Rautavaara (b. 1928), a Finnish composer of the older generation, is probably the only one who has dared to put angels in the titles of his instrumental works; for example: *Angels and Visitations*, *Angel of Dusk*, *Playgrounds for Angels*, all dating from the 1970s and 80s. The composer gave his *angelic* compositions titles and commentaries, but claims there are no programmes, stories or fixed imagery involved.

How, then, should these angelic titles be understood? Perhaps the *angel* is in the music itself, as a musical symbol. Here I first discuss the term *angel* and what it conveys symbolically in Rautavaara's music; and second, how these angels in music can be read and understood in light of the composer's comments.

1. Angels in religions

The word angel comes from the Greek *aggelos*, meaning "messenger". Though angels are probably most often linked to the Christian faith and tradition, one finds divine messengers in many earlier religions as well. They mediate between the visible and invisible worlds, Gods and man, the living and the dead. One may suppose that the Christian angel-messenger model was formed over the ages in various ancient cultures: Assyrian, Mesopotamian, Hindi, Chinese, Egyptian, Greek, as well as in pagan mythology. This symbol is universal and deeply rooted in mankind's desire for spirituality. Despite numerous representations of angelic creatures, their ontology is always the same – the angel is a spirit or an invisible creature, whose function is to mediate between the physical and spiritual planes. Angels and archangels are said to be divine messengers who transmit the word of God to humankind (Tresidder 2004: 33). In the Middle Ages, Saint August-

tine provided the best definition of an angel: “Angel’ is the name of their office, not of their nature. If you seek the name of their nature, it is ‘spirit’; if you seek the name of their office, it is ‘angel’: from what they are, ‘spirit’, from what they do, ‘angel’” (see Catechism of the Catholic Church, verse 329). The best characteristics of angels are given in The Bible, in both the *Old* and the *New Testament*. From these we may discern two general types (Oleschko 2003: 17–18): (1) *Anthropomorphic* – a young, handsome man, well-dressed or almost naked, with items in his hand; e.g., a sword, keys, chain, trumpet, crown, cranium or cane. Here, their similarity to people is so precise that actual characters in The Bible (Tobias, Abraham, St. Peter) didn’t recognize they were in the presence of angels. (2) *Symbolic* – fire, a cloud, light, shining body, fantastic winged creatures with human or animal faces, sometimes reminiscent of a moving bronze or copper statue and sometimes emitting strange voices and other sounds. The appearance of such an angel is a frightening experience for every Biblical figure. Meetings between angels and men are described closely in The Bible and other sacred writ, where they are called “visitations”. Eero Tarasti (2007) has noted that the term visitation leads to the term *apparition*, which thus signifies the “appearance” of something surprising to the spectator.

2. *Angels in music*

In music of the past, “angels” and “archangels” appeared only in great vocal scores, such as Heinrich Schütz’s *Histories* (proto-oratorios), Bach’s cantatas, and the oratorios of Handel and Haydn. In such cases, the role of the angel was sung by a singer or by a choir. Angels were treated as people – as concrete actors in the action or as commentators. In opera, good spirits are cast as God’s messengers, as heroes, or as symbols of a phenomenon or sensation. Similarly, there are also angels in ballets where the plot is expressed through dance and gestures (e.g., Prokofiev’s *A Fiery Angel*). Other examples of angels in twentieth-century music include the one, a soprano, in Messiaen’s *Saint François d’Assise* (1975–83); Hindemith wrote the symphony *Mathis der Maler* in which the first movement is entitled Angelic Concerto, but this work also alludes to an opera with the same title. Some examples of instrumental music with angelic titles are the string quartet *Black Angels* (1970) by George Crumb, some pieces in the great Messiaen cycles: *La nativité du Seigneur* (1935), *Les corps glorieux* (1939),

Quatuor pour la fin du temps (1941), *Visions de l'amen* (1943), *Vingt regards sur l'enfant Jesus* (1944), and a composition by Tomaso Marco from 1971 entitled *Angelus novus*.

The best exemplification of an angel's visitation in music is that of the Commandatore at the end of Mozart's opera *Don Giovanni*. Although this is an opera and in it the representation of the spirit is anthropomorphic, it is probably the best exemplification of musical visitation and thus deserves examination. Of course, the Commandatore is the spirit of a dead person – a ghost; however, its representation as a moving statue comes close to that of an angel. The ghost's visitation to Don Giovanni breaks the linear time of the music and its harmony: D minor is introduced and the tempo slows. The contrast between the two planes – the living and the dead – becomes evident (Example 1a and 1b).

Example 1a. Mozart, *Don Giovanni*, end of scene XIV, mm. 424–432.

2. Symbol of the angel in Rautavaara's music

How is it possible to find an angelic figure in Rautavaara's instrumental music? Are all such significations merely due to the angelic titles? They are very important for Rautavaara, since as a pre-idea for the ensuing com-

Andante

Fl. *ff* *p*

Ob. *ff* *p*

Clar. (in Si_b) *ff* *p*

Fag. *ff* *p*

Cor. (in Fa) *ff*

Cl. (in Re) *ff*

Trbn. alto *ff* *p*

Trbn. ten. *ff* *p*

Trbn. basso *ff* *p*

Timp. (in Re-La) *ff*

V. I. *ff* *p*

V. II. *ff* *p*

Va. *ff* *p*

C. IL COMMENDATORE
Don Gio-van - ni, a ce-nar te - co m'in-vi - ta - sti,

W. e B. *ff* *p*

Example 1b. Mozart, *Don Giovanni*, beginning of scene XV, mm. 433-441.

position he often uses repeated mantras for inspiration. These last, as the composer has said, are words radiating energy, the starting point for his music, and ultimately become the title of the entire composition (Finch 1996: 24).

I shall examine three pieces: the orchestral overture, *Angels and Visitations* (1978); the concerto for double-bass, *Angel of Dusk* (1980); and a work for brass ensemble, *Playgrounds for Angels* (1981). The main musical

feature of these three pieces is a technique which the composer calls “disturbance”. The aim of this technique is to break or interrupt the natural musical process with strong, dissonant outbursts from the brass ensemble. The role of this technique is especially evident in these three compositions. In *Angels and Visitations*, dissonant outbursts disrupt the main diatonic melody. In *Angel of Dusk*, everywhere the outburst from brass ensemble appears, the double-bass solo is suspended on long notes and afterwards continues or stops completely. In *Playgrounds for Angels*, the situation is different. The intrusive, mechanistic elements played by trumpet, trombones and tuba seek to disturb a free and open melody played by a single horn (Example 2).

Example 2. Rautavaara, *Angel of Dusk*, *mt. 1*, contrabass solo, *mm.* 12–52. Printed by permission of Fennica Gehrman Oy, Helsinki © Warner/Chappell Music Finland Oy.

In all three compositions, the trumpets and trombones play the role of the angel in an analogy to the disturbing visitation of Il commandatore in *Don Giovanni*. Single instruments or groups are like actors in Greimas's mythical model, where the main situation lies in the relationship between *subject* and *opponent* (Tarasti 1994: 106). A similar opposition occurs in Rautavaara's operas – *Thomas, Vincent, Aleksis Kivi* and *Rasputin*; the *hero* is always in conflict with his environment (*opponent*), and this relationship is fundamental to the overarching plot. Anne Sivuoja Gunaratnam has discovered that the musical subject (*hero*) in these operas is always enunciated by the cellos in a register that lies within the baritone range (1997: 191). This instrumental “voice” belongs to the main soloist and could be regarded as a musical representation of it (Cone 1974: 81–114). Here the situation is the same. The trumpets and trombones represent the *opponent* (*angel*); they disturb the natural process of the melody of the subject (*hero*) and thereby become musical symbols (see Figure 1).




Figure 1. Abridged model of mythical actants in Rautavaara's angelic pieces.

In the Peircian view, the symbol is always a sign under a specific convention; the relationship between sign and object is arbitrary (Tarasti 2002: 11). According to Paul Ricoeur, every symbol (including musical ones) has three dimensions: *cosmic* (religious), *oneiric* (psychical), and *poetical* (1986: 13–17). In light of Rautavaara's comments on his three compositions with angelic titles, it is not difficult to find these dimensions. The most essential comments for us are the composer's program to his *First Duino Elegy* (1994) for mixed choir and statements made in the documentary film on Rautavaara, *The Gift of Dreams* (1997). Concerning the first of these works, the composer wrote (1994):

From that time onwards I continued to carry with me – both mentally and in my suitcase – the *Duino Elegies*, Rilke's seminal work. Over the years I would take it out, finding myself particularly drawn to the first elegy, whose angel figure took on the role of a personal *animus*. My orchestral works *Angels and Visitations*, *Angel of Dusk* and *Playground for Angels* are all musical personifications of this figure.

And in 1997:

... I realized that it is so much about angels and I found out that his [Rilke's] angels had something very special. He says "Every angel is terrible". It was exactly what Jacob in the Bible does with his angel: He has to wrestle with it. And then I thought probably everybody must wrestle with his angel.

In the comments above the composer provides us with possible keys to understanding the figure of the angel: The Bible, Jung's *theory of archetypes*, Rilke's *Duino elegies*, which furthermore correspond to Ricoeur's distinction of the three dimensions of every symbol: *cosmic*, *oneiric*, and *poetical*.

2.1. Poetical dimension – Rilke's *Duino elegies*

Rautavaara remarks that his angel was created under the strong influence of Rilke's work. Rautavaara always carried with him a copy of Rilke's elegy while in Vienna (1955), the United States (1955–57) and later in Switzerland. He explained that he "was just waiting for the right time to turn them into music" (Cutts 1998: 22). In *Duino Elegies*, Rilke develops the concept of the transcendental function of his own poetry – "transforming the visible earthly world into the invisible". Rilke advises looking for the new in material things, and turning them into internal, hyper-subjective substance. In the *Elegies*, Rilke aims to develop a new image of the universe, without the division of past and future, being and non-being, or the physical *versus* spiritual dimension; and the principal medium of this universe is the angel myth (Antochewicz 1991: 204–205). Hans Georg Gadamer explains the sense of Rilke's *Elegies*:

[The Angel] represents a greater ability of heart than that of Man; it is the power on account of which a Man's heart fails and cannot cope with it. Thus a Man is conditioned in various ways, and in terms of feelings he is unable to give oneself unconditionally and explicitly. (Gadamer 1979: 238)

The angel is neither human nor divine; it represents a constancy of feeling which man will never attain. Contact with angels terrifies man and makes him aware of his imperfection. In their greatness, angels are beyond man's reach, overshadowing his minuteness and imperceptibility. The great world of angels is dark and sinister for man. Rautavaara has always said that his angel, as Rilke's, is a terrifying one.

2.2 Cosmic dimension: *Old Testament* and *Quran*

Some scholars argue that Rilke's *Elegies* took this "terrifying angel" figure from the presentation of Mohammed's call to prophecy in the *Quran*, while ultimately giving it new significance and putting it into the different context of his own poetry (Campbell 2003: 191). The first religious dimension of the angelic symbol is linked with Rilke's poetry: man terrified during the angel's visitation in the Bible and the *Quran*. In the Bible, Jacob had to wrestle with his angel opponent, the prophet Daniel was overcome by an appearance of the angel Gabriel, and creatures with four faces and eight wings terrified the prophet Ezekiel (Rautavaara 1995: 113–114). Similarly, the archangel Gabriel gave Mohammed a scroll and ordered him to read it. This religious dimension of angelic symbolism in Rautavaara's compositions is limited only to the terrifying representation of angels.

2.3. Oneiric dimension: Jung's archetype

Although the Jungian view is sometimes rejected by scientists and semioticians, here it remains necessary to examine the theory of archetype not only from the viewpoint of the composer's comments, but also because Rautavaara, in my private conversations with him, admitted his fascination with Jung's theories in the 70s and 80s. By most accounts, the angelic pieces were composed during this period.

In Jung's theory, the human psyche is the sum of consciousness (the thoughts and actions under control of the will) and the unconscious, this last divided into the personal and the collective. The personal unconscious is a reservoir of individual memories to which we occasionally gain access through dreams or sudden flashes of recollection. The collective unconscious is a deep level of our psyche in which lie instinctive patterns of thought and behaviour common to all civilizations throughout the ages. These patterns can be examined only in symbolic form as images projected by our minds – *archetypes*. Through the analysis of dreams, archetypal symbols can be used to explore the boundaries between the conscious and unconscious mind (Fontana 1994: 8–13).

Rautavaara interpreted the angel figure as his personal *animus*. But during a personal conversation he instead qualified this archetype as a *shadow*. This term captures the interior nature of this archetype. All

humans have a personal shadow, an alter-ego, the dark and evil side of their personality. It is a disruptive force, the inner terror and antisocial desires of which we are ashamed and attempt to bury within the unconscious (Fontana 1994: 16–17). The *shadow* is a moral problem for human nature, a “potentially terrifying experience, so much so that we usually protect ourselves from such disturbing awareness by making use of ego-defence mechanisms: we deny the existence of our shadow and project it onto others” (Stevens 1990: 44). It is obvious here that the shadow archetype is also very similar to the first and second dimensions of the symbol.

3. Conclusion

Rautavaara’s *angel* symbol joins factors of the shadow archetype with the terrifying angels of the *Old Testament*, *Quran* and Rilke’s *Duino Elegies*. The role of shadow is also similar to Rilke’s poetic analysis of dreams through the conscious use of oneiric images to discover the hidden, invisible world (unconscious). The process of self-knowledge through the *shadow-angel* symbol is the act of uniting unconscious and conscious feelings, and is compatible with Rilke’s conception of the universe without the division of past and future, being and non-being, or physical and spiritual. Rautavaara created the musical angel-symbol through a disturbance technique which could be understood as a transference of Greimas’s mythical actants models to instruments.




Figure 2. Three dimensions of Rautavaara’s angelic symbol.

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Mihaly Szivos

The role of externalisation of tacit knowledge and the problem of reference in an antique philosophical debate: The cradle of Stoic semiotics

The philosophical debate between the two Athenian philosophical schools, the Stoa and the Academy, dominated the philosophical scene for more than two hundred fifty years. That debate was very important from the point of view of the development of semiotics because a new theory of signs emerged in the Stoic school, whereas a strong criticism of it appeared in the other camp, at the skeptic Academy.

Actually, this debate started with the birth of the Stoic school founded by Zeno of Citium (c. 334–262 B.C.E.) about 300 B.C.E. He was a pupil of several masters, but first and for a long time studied at the Platonic Academy under the guidance of Polemo, the fourth head of Academy. After having founded his own school, Zeno took over many ideas from the Academy, changing the categories. That is why Polemo (c. 355–270 B.C.E) said to him: “It did not escape my observation, my dear Zeno, that you trespassed through the garden gate to steal our doctrines from us in order to put Phoenician robes on them” (Diogenes Laertius 1972: VII 25). In that way Polemo, who was most competent concerning this affair, also indicated that he was aware of Zeno’s appropriating and transforming academic doctrines by changing the names of categories. The expression “Phoenician robes” clearly refers to the use of another language, which is probably the Cypriot version of *koiné*. The repeated accusations in the literature about Zeno using academic doctrines make it probable that this process really took place.

1. *The linguistic change caused by the koiné,
and the consequences of that change*

The question comes up as to how Zeno could nevertheless find an audience to his lectures, the content of which was borrowed from the Academy. The background of his success with these lectures can be highlighted by the interpretation of a linguistic change. In the era of Alexander the Great and during Hellenism, a new, simplified version of the Greek language, the so-called *koiné* (literally, “shared”), came into being in the Middle East, and spread in the polis states, too. The spread of this new language pushed the classical and more sophisticated Attic literary language into the background, even in Athens, which resulted in a lot of interpretation and reference problems in the philosophy as well. It was necessary to reinterpret many philosophical and other terms, and that paved the way for the discussion of reference. This prepared the way for the Stoic reference and sign theory, which opened a new chapter in the history of semiotics. The present paper aims at revealing the prehistory of this Stoic semiotic theory by involving the theory of tacit knowledge as well.

In the time of the establishment of Zeno’s school, the so-called *koiné*, a simplified version of the Greek language coming from the territories of Hellenistic realms, arrived in Athens, too. A version of the Attic dialect, *koiné* contained Ionic words and grammatical elements, as well as a lot of new words coming from other Asian languages; the spread of this new, so-called “common tongue” made it necessary to write guides for interpreting classical works, first of all the Platonic dialogues. Young Greek students speaking the *koiné* as mother tongue could understand Plato’s dialogues only by means of these commentaries. There is no doubt about the linguistic commitment of Academy to the Attic dialect in the epoch of the spreading of *koiné*, because three of the first four heads of it, including Zeno’s teacher, Polemo, were born and educated in Athens. After Plato, who was himself a classic writer of the Attic literary language, another Athenian philosopher, Speusippe, took over the leadership. The only exception was Xenocrate, the third head of Academy, who had lived from his early youth in the city and thus could easily master the new dialect. It is typical, however, that he, the foreigner, started to deal with linguistic issues at the Academy, perhaps because he had the knowledge to compare the two dialects. For Polemo, Plato’s high-level texts, written in the literary version

of the Attic dialect, posed no problem; whereas young people, like Zeno, coming from territories of the *koiné* to Athens, certainly had difficulties learning the more complex Attic dialect, especially as it was used in serious philosophical debates. Zeno came to Athens from the small seaport city of Citium (today Larnaca) in Cyprus, a place very near the sources of *koiné* (namely, the diadochos states remaining from the empire established by Alexander the Great). Zeno's encounters with classical Greek indicated to him his own limits, which he surmounted by building up a philosophy in his mother tongue, the *koiné*. His several speeches against rhetoric, quoted by Diogenes Laertius (1972: VII 16–28), give evidence of his unpleasant experience with the requirements of beautiful oration. Zeno discovered a “market” among young people who had difficulties with the interpretation of Platonic and other texts written in the classical Attic literary dialect. Young students with similar linguistic problems turned to him and his school because they did not speak fluently the original Attic dialect preferred at the Academy, and they considered the simplest solution was to change to Zeno's school where the language of teaching was more understandable to them. That is why Zeno's audience was recruited from the circle of young people coming from cities using the *koiné*, who had the same problems with the philosophical language of the Academy. In this context, it is understandable why none of Zeno's important disciples was of Athenian origin (Diogenes Laertius 1972: VII 36–38).

Thus the change of names of philosophical categories can be highlighted from the point of view of this linguistic change. Because of this change of language, a break occurred between the philosophy of contemporary problems and the philosophical heritage. That put in the forefront the problem of the meanings of certain philosophical terms, and it became obvious that the content of philosophical terms and their linguistic form can be well separated. This resulted, on the one hand, in the elaboration of a philosophical problem very important for semiotics, in the problem of reference, and, on the other, for Stoic logic.

From the philosophical schools, one of the biggest losers due to the linguistic change was in all probability the Academy itself. That is why those who were born into the classical Attic dialect and who were excellent stylists and orators became the natural opponents of this development in Athenian philosophical life. The later generations under Polemo's guidance were also closely attached to this dialect because it could guarantee

the direct interpretation of the former works written by the heads and other members of the Academy. The emergence of the Stoic school at first did not seem to pose any danger to the Academy, but thereafter, Zeno and his disciples began to vindicate the title of the real interpreters of the Platonic philosophy.

2. The first topic of the controversy between the Stoa and the Academy

After the Academicians' initial criticism of the Zenonian appropriation and transformation of their doctrines, the controversy soon centered around the question of whether practical ethical behavior can be taught and, if so, to what extent (Sedley 1999: 151). In addition to the linguistic change, ethical life was also transformed due to the multicultural character of the Hellenistic states and their influence on the Greek city states. Thus the source of the above-mentioned debate between the new Stoic school and the Academy headed by Polemo, as well the current of linguistic change, issued from the same series of historical processes. The ethical debate and the quarrel about the terminological innovations of Zeno (who borrowed a lot of philosophical categories from the Academy in order to create his own new vocabulary of philosophy) were only two different sides of the same coin. In the controversy about the teaching of practical ethics, the position of the Academy was more flexible and closer to real life. The Academicians denied the possibility of a strict externalization and categorization of every ethical aspect of social life (Sedley 1999: 151), whereas Zeno compiled ethical canons, claiming that it is enough just to teach them. According to the Academy, the teaching of ethical behavior includes non-communicable elements, patterns, feelings which can be transferred only by personal contact and personal, exemplary behavior, as well as by texts representing persons of high ethical standards. They were convinced that the high level of style and high ethical standards are fused together in Plato's dialogues; thus, it is also necessary to master this language in order to be virtuous. It seems to be clear, on the other hand, that Stoic teaching of obligations also contains *ab ovo* a reference problem, namely, the problem of the exactitude of knowledge transfer. At this point we are already very near a typical twentieth century problem, that of *tacit knowledge*.

3. The theory of tacit knowledge and its role in explaining the different standpoints in the Stoic-Academic debate

The theory of tacit and personal knowledge, as elaborated by the Hungarian philosopher Michael Polanyi, is a combined result of psychology and philosophy. According to the theory of tacit knowledge, the overwhelming majority of human knowledge, including the semiotic one, is tacit. This sort of knowledge cannot be transferred in explicit forms, in writing, in propositions, but only via personal contacts, through the observation and imitation of the other person's activity. Entering debates, people also have explicit and tacit knowledge and presuppositions. The tacit ones also come from their intellectual background, personal experience, education, social dispositions, and constitute part of cultural codes. In the course of debates, the opposing parties discover a considerable part of their own tacit presuppositions and those of their counterpart. A semiotic approach to explaining these presuppositions can shed new light on the emergence of hidden components of discussions.

One of the main propositions of the present paper is that tacit knowledge played a very important role in controversy between the Academy and the Stoa. The standpoint of the Academy in the above-quoted ethical debate proves it. In addition, the participants in controversy cannot always make clear the roots of their standpoints without revealing the secondary and tertiary conditions, which are in fact tacit preconditions. On the basis of the theory of tacit knowledge, it is possible to discover new areas of argumentation for the participants. As points of debate, conflicts can also be caused by differences in the tacit knowledge of the participants, even if they remain hidden for them for a certain time. The investigations into the history of the debate, including an efficacious self-criticism of the debating parties, can reveal these tacit preconditions and conditions of the standpoints formulated explicitly.

As the research into tacit knowledge went on, the problem of externalization became more and more important. It seems that regular communication on topics connected to tacit knowledge is one of the most important preconditions of externalization. If in any debate, the possibility of this regular communication is given, the externalization process can more easily start. As for the controversy between the Stoa and the Academy, the efforts that went into solving linguistic problems contributed to

the tacit, and later, the explicit emergence of referential problems. Parallel to the spreading of the *koiné*, a new ethical thinking began namely to evolve which, in the same manner, made it necessary to externalize the moral norms embedded in social relations and language. The ethical canon elaborated by Zeno contains the concept of obligation used firstly by him, according to Diogenes Laertius (1972: VII 25). The concept of obligation includes a problem of reference: the individual “ought” to do something specific, and not just be virtuous in general. In Zeno’s practical ethics, action and obligation are connected to each other by a referential relationship.

4. The beginnings of academic criticism and the unfolding of the reference problem

The Zenonian ethical canon to be learned in the Stoic school was very problematic for the academicians, who began to criticize it. According to a cautious reconstruction, academicians were committed to the ideal unity of moral behavior and linguistic capacities before the outburst of the controversy. They emphasized, for instance, the moral teaching capacity of the introductory parts of the Platonic dialogues, denying the necessity of the explicit formulations of the moral rules described in them. Although they were far from discovering the tacit knowledge itself, they nevertheless understood in an intuitive way the importance of the non-explicit components in the teaching of practical ethics. Academic criticism of Stoic practical ethics emphasized the importance of living context in the teaching of practical ethics.

In the next phase of the great controversy, Zeno broadened his philosophical theory to include such areas as the description of human cognition and the theory of signs. He created a new theory of human cognition, thinking and ethical behavior, mostly based on contemporaneous medical research and other sciences. Academic skepticism searched for and found the weak points in the theories of Stoic philosophers, and pressed them to take into consideration and to make explicit their secondary and tertiary presuppositions. On their part, Stoic philosophers pointed out the internal contradictions in Academic tenets.

Zeno made explicit the reference problem with the notion of “cognitive phantasia” (*phantasia cataleptiké*), which meant a sense impression

able to guarantee exact cognition. This Greek concept, which is not identical with the modern concept of fantasy, originally signified the internal picture remaining at once after the sense impression. Zeno used the example of the seal and the melted wax to illustrate the function of cognitive *phantasia*. According to the logic of this illustration, the external object, the seal leaves its traces, its picture in the sense organ, that is, in the melted wax. This is a typical iconic sign relation (Szivos 2000: 366) because the mental picture – the sign – preserves some features of the external object. This sign relation constituted the central element of Stoic epistemology for the next fifty years and led to Stoic sign theory.

Following the old generation strongly attached to the Platonic heritage, a new generation of philosophers emerged at the Academy under Arcesilaos's guidance, thus opening the skeptic period of the Academy (c. 268–264 B.C.E.). On this battlefield between the Stoa and the Academy, Arcesilaos (c. 315–241 B.C.E.), the seventh head of Academy, elaborated new arguments, based partly on the Socratic-Platonic traditions, partly on the results of other Socratic schools, and partly on the achievements of the contemporary philosophers. In the field of ethics, Arcesilaos emphasized the importance of *eulogon*, which means practical ethical rationality serving as a kind of guideline in everyday matters. In this matter he maintained the academic heritage according to which it is not possible to completely externalize the internal relations, contents, norms and obligations of ethical life. In light of the above-mentioned, hidden reference problem in ethical matters, that standpoint counterbalanced the Stoic externalization efforts aimed at giving a finalized collection of ethical rules and obligations which suppose a very clear reference relation between obligations and acts.

At the level of epistemology, Arcesilaos tried to prove that the so-called cognitive *phantasias* cannot afford solid cognition because they cannot leave exact imprints, due to the disturbing environment, and that Zenonian theory does not take into consideration the change of the perceived external objects. The academic arguments considerably weakened the initial Stoic conception of the reference between the external object and its corresponding imprint in sense organs and mind. Due to this criticism, which unveiled the simplifying materialism of Stoic epistemology, the concept of *lekton* (a non-material being in Stoic epistemology and logic) appeared in the renaissance of Stoic philosophy made by Chrysippe

(c. 280–206 B.C.E.) This last proved to be a very important step towards Stoic sign theory and the understanding of meaning.

5. *Conclusions*

Due to the extension of the Greek world by Alexander the Great and the initial period of Hellenism, a new version of the Greek language came into being in Middle East, slowly becoming dominant in the city-states as well. This shift had consequences for the world of philosophy, exemplified in the best way by Zeno's transformation of academic doctrines and his inventing new names for philosophical categories for an audience refusing to learn and use the sophisticated academic version of the Attic dialect. Parallel to this phenomenon, the ethical world also changed, inspiring Zeno to externalize the moral obligations embedded as a kind of tacit knowledge in the everyday world and to create a canon of practical ethics. Both changes fostered the problem of reference which became explicit in the Zenonian epistemology based on the concept of cognitive phantasia.

The Academy represented a standpoint which displayed the intuitive understanding of the importance of non-explicit or tacit factors in both the debate on practical ethics and the epistemological controversy. The criticism of the Academy forced the Stoic school to improve its theories as well as to abandon the simplifying materialism in both ethics and epistemology, as well as in logic and sign theory.

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Mieszko Tałasiewicz

Geach's program and the foundations of categorial grammar

1. Contemporary categorial grammar allows for two kinds of syntactic rules: "multiplying-out" rules and "type-change" rules. Multiplying-out rules, as Geach called them (1970), are the engine of the syntactic calculus. They say how to combine syntactic categories and enable calculation of the overall syntactic category of a compound expression. The classic one was proposed by the founder of categorial grammar, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, in (1935/1967); let us mark it (MP):

$$(MP) \alpha/\beta \beta \Rightarrow \alpha.$$

This rule says that concatenation of an expression belonging to syntactic category α/β (regarded as a functor) and of an expression belonging to category β (regarded as the functor's argument) yields a syntactically coherent (SC) expression belonging to category α . For example a one-place predicate /sings/ (S/N) and a proper name /Mary/ (N) form a sentence: "Mary sings" (S).

Type-change rules have the general form $\alpha \Rightarrow \beta$. They say that the syntactic role played by expressions belonging to category α can be also played by expressions belonging to category β ; henceforth every expression belonging to α belongs simultaneously to β . Usually the wording refers to the notion of type: it is said that type α can be raised (or lowered) to type β . Among the most popular type-change rules are (Division) and (Raising):

$$(Division) \alpha/\beta \Rightarrow (\alpha/\gamma)/(\beta/\gamma);$$

$$(Raising) \alpha \Rightarrow \beta/(\beta/\alpha).$$

Type-change rules make the grammars a good deal more flexible and help them to accommodate linguistic data from particular native lan-

guages. That is why grammars containing such rules are often labelled Flexible Categorical Grammars (FCG's). It has been commonly understood that FCG's are natural improvements of Classical Categorical Grammar (CCG), designed to fit better the needs of empirical linguistics (such as automatic natural language processing), compromising little if anything as the logical form of language.

Peter T. Geach has been regarded as the father of FCG, due to his famous seminal "Program for Syntax" (1970). The standard interpretation of this paper suggests that some type-change rules were introduced there for the first (or, at least, most influential) time; Division is even sometimes called the "Geach Rule". Recently this standard interpretation was challenged. For example, Humberstone (2005) convincingly argues that none of the type-change principles can be rightly ascribed to Geach: they do not appear in Geach's paper explicitly and, further, they are simply inconsistent with important statements made in that text. The flexibility of Geach's grammar, Humberstone argues, arises not from type-changing, but from nonstandard (compared to classic Ajdukiewicz's grammar) ways of multiplying out categorial indices (types). Types themselves remain unchanged. The classical Ajdukiewiczian rule (MP) is supplemented by Geach with the following recursive rules:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{G1} & \frac{\alpha \beta \Rightarrow \gamma}{\alpha \beta / \delta \Rightarrow \gamma / \delta} \qquad \text{G2} \quad \frac{\alpha \beta \beta \Rightarrow \gamma}{\alpha \beta / \delta \beta / \delta \Rightarrow \gamma / \delta} \end{array}$$

In contemporary FCG's, the above rules are often replaced by a slightly weaker principle following from G1, called Composition: $\alpha / \beta \beta / \gamma \Rightarrow \alpha / \gamma$.

Humberstone, however, seems to indulge too much in the tradition he criticizes. He breaks the alleged concordance between Geach's actual text and contemporary FCG, and rightly so; but when they clash, he often takes the side of FCG against Geach. Admittedly, Humberstone tries to justify Geach's ideas and to show that Composition without Division is not "a distinction without a difference" (2005: 299). As the justification he gives a very valuable observation that the functor type shows not only how the functor takes arguments, but also how it behaves as an argument itself, when "taken" by another functor. But this observation, however valuable, is far from being exhaustive as to Geach's motives; and generally, Humberstone tries to avoid direct evaluation of Geach's proposal or of later FCG,

and limits himself to establishing historical facts and analyzing logical relations.

One goal of the present paper is to show that Geach's objections against type-change rules, as noticed by Humberstone, have deep theoretical reasons and cannot be easily dismissed. It is true that Geach's proposal encounters some serious problems, which perhaps could be *avoided* by adopting the incriminated principles. But they cannot be *solved* by such a move. If we face them, they will lead us into the core of categorial grammar.

2. Let us begin with Raising. Humberstone quotes the fragment from Geach in which the latter complains about lumping together the categories of (proper) names and quantified phrases,¹ and therefore rejects the possibility of accepting Raising. Humberstone in his commentary suggests that Geach rejects Raising too hastily: the rejection of Raising "leaves Geach at something of a disadvantage in several later parts of his discussion" (Humberstone 2005: 287).

Geach's complaint and Humberstone's commentary shall inspire us to examine one of the very basic ideas of categorial grammar. Humberstone perhaps would be right if CG were only a formal calculus intended to express a variety of linguistic patterns and fit empirical evidence. But certainly it is more than that. CG – at least CCG – is in the first place a metaphysical and epistemological enterprise, based upon profound insights of Frege, Husserl and Leśniewski, and all these insights demand the rejection of Raising for fundamental reasons.

To see why, let us ask first what a syntactic category is. Humberstone distinguishes categories (as classes of expressions) from types ("labels" denoting such classes). He admits that two labels may denote the same category (Humberstone 2005: 282). This is a lot, compared to a common standard, but not enough. We shall remember that in CCG syntactic categories are not mere classes. They are classes determined by a certain property of expressions – the ability to play a specific syntactic role. This potentiality must be distinguished from the fact that in a given context a given expression actually plays such-and-such role. Accordingly, there are two different levels of syntactic analysis, confronted by Ajdukiewicz in the following passage (1960/1978: 281):²

I have used the term "operator" in place of the term "functor" ... since the latter is ambiguous. The term "functor" has two different meanings in the

contexts: “the expression f is a functor (simpliciter)”; “the expression f is a functor (performs the role of a functor) in the expression W ”. In the contexts of the first type “functor” is the name of an (absolute) property of some expression; while in the contexts of the second type it is the name of a relation between the particular expression and another one. The use of the term “functor” in both senses results in “the expression f is a functor which is not a functor in the expression W ”. To avoid this ambiguity and such paradoxical statements, I have introduced here the term “operator” for those cases where we deal with a relation between the given and another expression.... The term “functor” may be then used as the name of an absolute property of some expressions.²

This resolution, as well as other points that will be discussed below, stems directly from the Husserlian and Fregean idea that the distinction of basic and derived (or functor) categories is of greatest importance, and that it works on absolute properties of expressions. The analysis of the idea of functoriality – and the notion of incompleteness, “unsaturatedness” of functors – comes mainly from Frege. It is Husserl however, who examined thoroughly the other part of the distinction: the “basicness”. It is basic categories which directly express our intentionality, regarded as the foundational property of language. Functors are needed to unify many atomic expressions into a single, compound expression. But they don’t have independent meaning. Expressions can have a full-fledged meaning only when ascribed a basic category. And there are as many such categories as there are kinds of intentional acts. According to Husserl, there are two: propositional acts and nominal acts. Thus, there are two basic categories: sentences and names.³

This consequence, at least implicitly accommodated in CCG and observed both by Ajdukiewicz and Geach, immediately undermines FCG, where without a word of informal justification different numbers of basic categories are “declared” according to formal needs and tastes of the authors (e.g., Casadio 1988). Furthermore, it should be quite clear that orthodox CCG grammarians would strongly object to any principle that changes a basic category into a functor category. And that is exactly what Raising does.

What speaks for Raising, then? Of course, it can help to solve some technical problems. But from a little distance this argument looks very *ad hoc*, unless there is a good theoretical connection with the core of the gram-

mar. Apart from this, just one observation stands behind Raising; namely, that both names (N) and expressions of the category $S/(S/N)$ combine with a predicate (S/N) to yield a sentence (S). Upon this observation an argument is built that therefore expressions of both kinds are interchangeable and thus belong to the same category.

The observation itself is correct. But not the argument. The argument refers to something that could be called a “common” definition of category: syntactic category is a class of expressions that are interchangeable in any context except meaningfulness. This definition is a shortcut, however, which in the present case reveals its limitations. Originally, it was said that “the structure of [the context within which the change takes place] remain[s] the same” (Ajdukiewicz 1935: 208). This remark is worth emphasizing, being so often forgotten or neglected. For Ajdukiewicz it is perfectly understandable that in a meaningful context we can exchange a word with another word belonging to a different syntactic category, and the context remains meaningful – on condition that it changes its structure. This is exactly what is going on in the case of Raising: it is true that both names (N) and $S/(S/N)$ -s combine with a predicate (S/N) to yield a sentence (S). But they are not interchangeable, because the structure of the sentence categorizable as $(S/(S/N) S/N)$ is completely different from the structure of the sentence (S/N N). Both categorizations are syntactically coherent, but they are different kinds of sentences with different patterns of syntactic roles.

3. The case of Division is a bit different. Humberstone is right in saying that it has been wrongly ascribed to Geach. But Division is not so fundamentally at odds with CCG as is Raising.

Suppose we have an expression of category β/γ as an available argument, and we want to modify it by applying a functor, in order to get something belonging to category α/γ . Of what category must this functor be? Well, $(\alpha/\gamma)/(\beta/\gamma)$ – as says MP. Or α/β as well – as says Composition. According to pure syntactic reasoning, everywhere where we need $(\alpha/\gamma)/(\beta/\gamma)$, (α/β) would do as well. Therefore $(\alpha/\gamma)/(\beta/\gamma)$ is superfluous. We can get by with having only α/β serving as α/β with β -s, or as $(\alpha/\gamma)/(\beta/\gamma)$ with β/γ -s. We can, so to speak, make $(\alpha/\gamma)/(\beta/\gamma)$ out of (α/β) . Is that not Division? Perhaps that is why so many commentators have so clearly seen Division in Geach (1970).⁴

But it wasn't there. Geach aims at showing on syntactic grounds an "incommensurability", so to speak, of two kinds of verbs. For an intuitive example Geach gives the words "presumably" and "probably" for one side, and "passionately" and "sincerely" for the other side. The former can be categorized as $S/S-s$; the latter cannot. They must be $(S/N)/(S/N)-s$; or in this case, $(S/NN)/(S/NN)$. That they are not interchangeable is attested by the absurd conjunction, "presumably and passionately". Division, which changes "presumably" type S/S into "passionately" type $(S/NN)/(S/NN)$, would blur this distinction.

However, this argument does not reach so deeply into the foundations of categorial grammar as do the arguments against Raising. Division, unlike Raising, does not mix basic and derived categories and does not change the syntactic positions of the remaining parts of the context. It is just that it obscures possible distinctions in meaning analysis, which makes Division implausible for Geach. And as we will see in the next sections, much the same could be said about Geach's program itself.

4. So far, we have seen why Geach didn't want – and couldn't want – either Raising or Division. Humberstone is right, however, in pointing out that, without these principles, Geach's program runs into trouble. Let us consider what really made Geach formulate his program, and whether it is possible to reach the intended aims in a different way without these troubles. Or is it, perhaps, that some of these aims are not worth reaching?

Geach wants *de facto* two things: (1) to accommodate a medieval intuition that the negation of the main functor is the negation of the whole sentence; and (2) to preserve the Aristotelian insight that a phrase of the kind "not every man" is: (a) syntactically coherent (SC) and (b) a constituent of a sentence "not every man flies". In his opinion the standard rule of multiplying out (MP) is not sufficient for that, and that is why he feels a need for his G_1 (and G_2 , for two-place functors). This resolution may be challenged: these aims could be achieved entirely within CCG, by admitting only the multiple type assignment to lexical items; for instance, negation would sometimes be S/S , and at other times $[S/(S/N)]/[S/(S/N)]$. Indeed, such a possibility may be "not in keeping with the spirit of Geach ... except in the case of genuine ambiguity" (Humberstone 2005: 287), which brings about the question as to what counts for genuine ambiguity.

Must we really ascribe clearly distinct meanings to all possible categorizations in order to claim that there is a syntactic ambiguity? And must we employ a calculus such that all versions of analysis of a given expression, for which we failed to find separate meanings, turn out to be syntactically equivalent? The traditional answer, such that Ajdukiewicz would have given, and Geach, says: Yes, we must do this.

My claim is that this answer should be re-examined and eventually changed. The starting point for this enterprise is the observation that the distinction between genuine amphibolies and mere variants of syntactic categorization is vague; and that the borderline is very broad. Any grammar flexible enough to cover the needs of natural language would allow for a great number of different categorizations of given strings.⁵ And whether these categorizations would be counted as amphibolies or variants depends heavily on pragmatics, broadly understood, and especially on how precise we intend to be. For at least a decade (i.e., since van Deemter & Peters 1996), it has been widely recognized that the meaning of the expressions of natural language is (and most probably must be) underdetermined to some extent. We adjust the required precision to given circumstances, and “purely” syntactic ambiguity can help us to be more specific when necessary. In brief: if we do not want to be extremely precise, we count certain categorizations as mere variants; however, we do assign to them real difference, if need be. Let us take for an example the sentence *Łukasiewicz died in Dublin*. This is a special case of the general problem with two approaches to adverbial phrases. We have two plausible categorizations (in CCG):

[in ((S/NN)/(S/N)) died (S/N) Łukasiewicz (N) Dublin (N)]
 [in (((S/N)/(S/N))/N) Dublin (N) died (S/N) Łukasiewicz (N)]

Is there any difference in meaning? Well, that depends on how much we want to say by saying this. Without context, probably there would be no semantic difference, just mere variancies. But according to the theory of questions this syntactic difference would reveal a difference in the question to which our sentence is an answer (this is not exactly what topic/focus issues are about, but it is not far away, either). According to the first categorization, *Łukasiewicz died in Dublin* is one of the possible answers to the question *How are Poland and Ireland related to each other* – “died in” is one of the relations between something Polish (Łukasiewicz) and something Irish (Dublin). According to the second categorization, the question

could be *What were the circumstances of Jan Łukasiewicz's death?* – that is, “in Dublin” modifies “died”.

The flow of examples could be endless. Virtually every compound expression can have different categorizations, such that in some circumstances we would rather not expect any difference in meaning corresponding to these categorizations, and in other circumstances these differences would serve as a tool to convey certain subtleties of meaning. Indeed, one of the categories most difficult to connect with different meanings is perhaps the negation. That is why since the Middle Ages it has been commonly assumed – and repeated forcefully by Geach – that negating a sentence and negating its main functor is mere variancy. However, even here we can find apt subtleties, if only we dig in sufficient depth. For instance, *It is not the case that Mary went to the movies yesterday* and *Mary didn't go to the movies yesterday* can have a slightly different implication, if not a purely semantic difference. Namely, if we talk about three, clearly distinguished groups of people – (a) those who surely went to the movies yesterday (they were seen there); (b) those who surely didn't go (were seen somewhere else); and (c) those who declare they didn't, but about whom we are uncertain (we do not have relevant evidence) – then using the first form of negation (negation of sentence) would suggest that we count Mary among group (c), whereas using the second form (negation of predicate) would suggest that we count her in group (b).

In fact, if only we deliberately use two different forms in one discourse, there will be a difference – at least in implication – imposed on them. That is due to the pragmatic principle of contrast, analyzed by Eve Clark: “Speakers assume that any difference in form signals a difference in meaning” (2003: 144). This makes the whole program of unifying categorizations to which we cannot (without context) ascribe different meanings – the “program for syntax” advocated by Geach – subject to endless counterexamples. Geach wanted to have variancies (such as sentential and predicate negations) unified into one form. But since for every variancy we can have, in certain circumstances, a separate meaning (we must have, as Clark says; if we don't have, we will make one), any Geach-like, unifying principle (saying, “there is no difference between...”) would be contradicted. And in fact much of the criticism that Humberstone levels against Geach amounts to such counterexamples.

What is the moral of all this? Humberstone says, Let us have Raising and keep trying to separate variancies and amphibolies. I would rather say, Let us give up this separation; let us count syntactic differences as variancies at one time and as amphibolies at another time, according to our communicative needs. And let us keep away from Raising, because it destroys the most fundamental ideas of categorial grammar.

5. What about Geach's other goals? Let us pause now to examine the phrase "not every man". Should it really be an SC-string? Geach refers to a respectable tradition answering "Yes". But there is another tradition, not entirely unworthy, of saying otherwise. To this latter tradition belonged Ajdukiewicz (1935), who suggested that quantifiers be analyzed as sentential operators (S/S), although very special ones. In that case designations such as "a man" would count as proper names on a par with "Socrates".

Long after Ajdukiewicz this view was commonly neglected, due to serious modeling and theoretical difficulties which would follow from it in semantics (cf. Simons 2006). One can hardly blame Geach for doing so in the 1970s. Later, however, circumstances changed, due to the situational semantics introduced so forcefully by Jon Barwise and John Perry in their famous *Situations and Attitudes* (1983). This book as such does not refer particularly to categorial grammar. But the semantic resources it provides can be used to re-establish Ajdukiewicz's view of quantifiers and nominal phrases. In Fregean model-theoretical semantics, sentence denotations and truth values were the same things; in situation semantics they are separated. This allows for the dissection of truth values apart from operations on sentence denotations (i.e., situations).

Roughly, the idea would be this: the rules of syntax and semantic interpretation work on simple sentences with nominal constants (proper names), in which case they determine so-called elementary situations as the semantic correlates of sentences. Or the rules in question would work on simple sentential functions (atomic formulas with free variables), in which case they determine as correlates the non-elementary situations, being sets or families of sets, of elementary situations. For example, elementary situations can be represented as <kisses, Mary, Fred> (denoted by *Mary kisses Fred*); and non-elementary situations, for example, as {<kisses, Mary, Fred>, <kisses, Mary, John>, ..., <kisses, Jane, Fred>, <kisses, Jane,

John>, ...}; that is to say, as $\{s: s_{ij} = \langle \text{kisses, girl}_i, \text{boy}_j \rangle\}$, denoted by the sentential function *girl kisses boy*.

Of course, this raises the problem of how to get to truth-values from such defined denotations. Clearly the Truthmaker Principle, revived by David Armstrong (1997) and by subsequent discussion in recent literature (mainly in the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*), does not hold. We cannot say that a sentence is true if, and only if, the situation corresponding to it is a fact. Non-elementary situations corresponding to most sentences are neither entirely factual nor entirely counterfactual.

My answer to the problem is that different sentences have different formulations of truth conditions. Particular truth conditions for a sentence are determined by Boolean operations (negation, disjunction etc.) and quantification. For instance, the sentence *Mary kisses Fred or Jane beats John* is true if and only if the elementary situation corresponding to the simple sentence *Mary kisses Fred* is a fact or the elementary situation corresponding to the sentence *Jane beats John* is a fact. The compound sentence itself has no specific, single correlate. Similarly for negation: *Mary doesn't kiss John* denotes the situation $\langle \text{kisses, Mary, John} \rangle$ and is true if and only if this situation is *not* a fact (this solves neatly the problem of negative situations, which have permeated discussions about the Truthmaker Principle). As to the quantifiers, the sentence *A girl kisses a boy* has the same correlate as the sentence *Every girl kisses every boy*, or as the sentence *Every girl kisses a boy*, or *A boy is kissed by every girl* and so on: $\sigma = \{s: s_{ij} = \langle \text{kisses, girl}_i, \text{boy}_j \rangle\}$. Now: *A girl kisses a boy* is true if and only if at least one of the elementary situations included in σ is a fact: $\exists i \exists j [s_{ij} \text{ is a fact}]$; *Every girl kisses a boy* is true if and only if at least one elementary situation in every subset of σ containing all elementary situations in which the same girl kisses different boys is a fact: $\forall i \exists j [s_{ij} \text{ is a fact}]$; *A (some) girl kisses every boy* is true if and only if in at least one such subset all elementary situations are facts: $\exists i \forall j [s_{ij} \text{ is a fact}]$; *Every boy is kissed by a girl* is true if and only if at least one elementary situation in every subset σ containing all elementary situations in which the same boy is kissed by different girls is a fact: $\forall j \exists i [s_{ij} \text{ is a fact}]$; *A (some) boy is kissed by every girl* is true if and only if in at least one such subset all elementary situations are facts: $\exists j \forall i [s_{ij} \text{ is a fact}]$; *Every girl kisses every boy* is true if and only if all elementary situations included in σ are facts: $\forall i \forall j [s_{ij} \text{ is a fact}]$.

Thus, quantifiers don't have any syntactic value at all. They could be easily dismissed altogether from the analyses, or given the category in which Ajdukiewicz saw them: sentential operators (S/S). Such operators, we should add, denote the identity function, since applying a quantifier to a situation yields the very same situation.

This idea is far from being forged into a theory, though. I realize that this would be a big task, because it is at odds with the mainstream and much prejudice must be overcome. Nevertheless, I feel this is the right direction for a new program for syntax, and semantics as well.

Notes

1. Humberstone uses the term “quantifier phrase”. This can be misleading. It means “a phrase that contains a quantifier”. One may not know whether it should be understood as “a phrase in which a quantifier is connected with what is quantified” – this is the intended meaning – or perhaps “a phrase that simply is a quantifier”. It seems that Humberstone makes such a mistake himself (in 2005: 292): Geach's quantified phrase “John or James” he describes as simply a “quantifier”, which is syntactically incorrect. In order to show why, let us resort for a moment to predicate calculus and a typical formula $Qx[x \text{ is } P]$. As quantifier we can count here “Q” or at most “Qx”, whereas a quantified phrase, as understood in Geach (1970: 6), is the unsaturated string $Qx[x\dots]$.
2. For example: “loves” is a functor of category S/NN, but not a functor in “John passionately loves Mary”, where the functor is either “passionately loves” (according to MP) or merely “passionately” (according to G₂).
3. For a detailed discussion of the two, and arguments for their mutual irreducibility, see Husserl 1913, Investigation V, § 28–36.
4. Among the latest instances of ascribing Division to Geach are Casadio et al. (2005: xv) and Simons (2006: 243).
5. For a good, if pessimistic, account see Marciszewski 1987.

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Kumiko Tanaka-Ishii

Structural humans *versus* constructive computers

1. Uncontrollable computers

HAL in *A Space Odyssey* and Speedy in *I Robot* are examples of computers becoming uncontrollable. Such stories may be fiction, but they are based on a real problem for many people. Becoming frustrated with difficult to control computers is a common experience for any computer user. Occasionally, your computer hangs up and ignores your commands. In such cases, you may have to reboot the computer, and if the computer fails to obey even then, you might have to refresh the whole computer system; you might feel like literally kicking the computer. Why are computers so hard to control, even after decades of research and development history?

Both machine calculation and human thought are based on the processing of signs. Some might say that human thought includes processing of things apart from signs, such as emotions. However, if we consider logical circumstances, as when we wish to control computers (until we resort to kicking one), human thought is based on signs, usually signs of natural language. Indeed, Charles Sanders Peirce presented a drastic idea “the fact that every thought is a sign, taken in conjunction with the fact that life is a train of thought, proves that man is a sign” (Peirce 1931). On the other hand, every calculation on computers is controlled by signs, at the lowest level of bits of one and zero to the higher level of description of the calculation in a programming language. As a whole, both machine calculation and human thought are based on sign processing.

The sign worlds of computers and humans are totally different, though, which is one reason why humans and computers sometimes fail to get on well with each other. The difference between these two sign worlds is due to the difference in how we humans and computers handle self-reference, i.e., expression referring to oneself. The most famous self-referential expres-

sion is Descartes's "Cogito ergo sum", in that it defines the self referring to the self.

In ancient Greek mythology, there is a famous story of Narcissus, who became immobile while looking into his own reflection in the water (see Figure 1). As shown in such examples, even for humans self-reference has been an issue since ancient times in philosophy, logic and language. Self-reference highlights the limitation existing within human thought and/or human recognition.



Figure 1. Caravaggio, Narcissus.

But while humans do get puzzled, they seldom become uncontrollable because of one self-referential expression. In contrast, for computers self-reference is the major and most frequent source of malfunction. The problem is that such an expression cannot be avoided within a sign system.

2. Sign and self-reference

With any given language and corresponding interpretation system, the language is used for generating expressions which should be interpretable

in the system. Some expressions are situated at the border of interpretability, among which are self-referential expressions.

A self-referential expression here is first defined as an expression that refers to itself. An example in natural language is “The target is to realize the target”. Here, the sign “the target” is introduced and defined self-referentially as “realizing the target”. Another self-referential sentence is “This sentence is a lie”, where “this sentence” refers to the whole sentence.

In addition to such direct self-reference, mutually self-referential expressions are included among self-referential expressions in this article. Mutually self-referential expressions are multiple expressions which can be rewritten into a directly self-referential expression. For example, take the two sentences “A chicken is born from an egg” and “An egg is laid by a chicken”. These can be reduced to a single sentence using self-reference: “A chicken is born from something that is laid by a chicken.”

Some self-referential expressions can be interpreted easily. For example, the definition of a factorial value is

(1) Factorial of N : if N is 1, then 1; otherwise, N multiplied by the factorial of $(N-1)$.

This is no more than the recurrent definition of a factorial that one learns in junior high school. As N gets smaller and smaller in the recursion, finally reducing to 1, the factorial is no more than calculating the following value:

(2) Factorial of N is $N \times (N-1) \times \dots \times 2 \times 1$.

This example of the factorial shows that some self-referential expressions can be resolved into an expression that does not use self-reference. However, such cases are limited and the interpretation of a self-referential expression in general is problematic, because the content could be hollow or even contradictory. For example, the previous expression of “target” is hollow, because what exactly is targeted is not present. Also, an expression such as “This sentence is a lie” is contradictory.

Such self-referential expression easily appears when a new sign is introduced in a language system. The point is that the new sign is usually introduced with its exact value being undefined at the beginning and then consolidated in the future. In programming language, a new sign is often defined as a combination of other signs, and its exact value in bits

will be defined upon execution of the program. Such prior introduction of signs also happens in natural language, where an ambiguous target is often named before what the name signifies becomes concrete. This nature of signs is enhanced in natural language by the fact that the content of a word tends to change over time.

A sign is thus introduced prior to its concrete definition of values, so that it can be referred to from some other expression. Self-reference is then introduced when a sign is introduced, because the expression which refers to the newly introduced sign includes expressions about the sign itself. This occurs in both the content and the usage of the sign .

As for the content: when a sign is newly introduced, it can be defined relative to some existing real-world objects, but at the same time it can also be defined by means of other signs. In this case, a sign A is typically defined by another expression B, in the form “A is B”. In natural language, such definition by words is commonly made in an encyclopedia, and in programming language, “is” is usually considered as assignment and often described as “A: = B”, which means to assign the same value as that of B. This expression B can refer to the sign A; for example, “A is X Y A Z”.

Nor can usage be free from self-reference. For example, suppose we introduce a sign /xytplun/, and it is used as “A xytplun is extraordinary”. This usage will restrict /xytplun/ as a sign, such that “Xytplun is used as a xytplun is extraordinary”. Thus, we see that usage self-referentially defines /xytplun/.

Note how content and usage become mingled. “A is X Y A Z” is another usage of A, and “Xytplun is used as a xytplun is extraordinary” is another definition of /xytplun/, since it has the form “A is B”. Since a sign is always introduced to be referred to, introduction of the sign cannot avoid its value being defined self-referentially through its usage. Thus, introduction of a sign, to be defined by means of other signs, inevitably introduces self-reference.

3. Natural language: A structural system

Given any expression, humans always have the choice to abandon any attempt to interpret, if the interpretation process stalls. For example, “The target is to realize the target” is hollow, and the interpretation is limited; but we do not stop thinking about all other things because of this expres-

sion. Humans have the choice to give up, switch the context, or continue. In the future, another expression will perhaps provide more information, such as “The actual target is related to my study”, and the person can then return to the problematic expression and continue with the interpretation process. Such a feature allows one to choose dynamically when to suspend interpretation, such that a human can start processing any self-referential expression.

Robust processing of self-referential expressions inevitably generates a sign system where many concrete values of signs are left ambiguous, but still exist within the language system. The process is expressed through a generative model as follows. A sign is introduced with its value still being ambiguous. This ambiguity is clarified by language through additional usage and additional definition. Self-reference introduced through such a process cannot be resolved as was the case in a factorial, because usage usually changes over time. The value of a sign thus exists within the system, inexplicit among the network of signs which are used in expressions which refer to the sign. The sign is referred to from an expression consisting of signs referred to from many other expressions, whose signs are likewise referred to, and so forth; hence the value of the first sign relates to the whole system.

Consider the definition of the sign /project X/ as the name of some research project. Usually, the true content of a research project is defined in little detail at the beginning because a “project” refers to a future result. Yet, a name is needed for reference even if its content is not clear, because when we set up a project, there is much discussion about among many people. The project starts, runs, and ends, and at this ending point people finally (might) realize what the project really was. During the time the project runs, the sign /project X/ will be referred to through statements such as “Project X is not interesting” or “Project X has had its budget doubled”. Such usage self-referentially defines the term “project X”. Thus, the sign /project X/ forms the kernel onto which usages and contents will attach.

As a result, it is sometimes difficult to precisely define a sign in a system like natural language, even a sign that seems simple. For example, the first definition of the word “house”, a word that even a five-year-old child knows, is “a structure serving as a dwelling for one or more persons, especially for a family” (*American Heritage Dictionary*). However, a larger building where multiple families “dwell” is usually called an apartment building rather than

a house. What can be called a “house” ultimately depends on the context in which “house” is used. We see here that learning a word means far more than knowing what physical object it represents, and requires learning the usages of the word. This is even clearer when we learn an abstract term (without physical correspondence) or a foreign language. The content of a term can be learned from a bilingual dictionary, but the contour of two signs in each language differs depending on the culture. For example, the most common Japanese translation of the word “water” should never be “hot”, whereas in English “hot water” is relevant. Many such differences are expressed in the form of the usage of a term.

The value of a sign is everything that is related to the sign, which functions as the kernel around which usages and contents accrue. Thus, it is the sign which articulates the meaning: it is not the case that the meaning is named by a signifier. Moreover, usages and contents change over time, and the whole represented by the sign changes. Since this happens to every term in the language system, the system itself becomes self-referential.

Such a view of natural language has been previously presented in many philosophical speculations concerning natural language. It can be summarized in the Quine’s (1960) famous remark: “Our language, which embeds every human theory and belief, is like Neurath’s ship, which we continue to build and modify while being afloat.”

The origin of such a view that emphasizes the value of an element existing within a holistic system lies within the purview of Saussurean structuralism (Saussure 1993). Although the meaning of the term “structuralism” has diversified greatly (Domenach 1967; Sturrock 2003), in this article it is defined as a system where the value of an element exists within the holistic system. The core concept of structuralism is present in the following quotation from Saussure (1993):

We must not begin with the word, the term, in order to construct the system. This would be to suppose that terms have an absolute value given in advance, and that you have only to pile them up one on top of the other in order to reach the system. On the contrary, one must start from the system, the interconnected whole; this may be decomposed into particular terms, although these are not as easily distinguished as it might seem.

In Saussure’s lectures, this structural aspect of the system is explained without specification of any explicit relation as to how a signifier articu-

lates the signified. The generative model explained previously shows how necessarily they are related: how the initial existence of a signifier generates a signified as an ensemble of content and usages, and thus forms a structural system.

4. Programming language: A constructive system

Every computer is driven by a program written in a programming language which contains self-referential expressions. In programs, too, signs are often initiated to acquire values in the future. Computation is an action to obtain exact data in bits in machine memory, where these bits are previously represented by a sign (called an identifier in the programming domain). For example, in a simple calculation program,

$$\begin{aligned} X &:= 1 \\ Y &:= 2 \\ Z &:= X + Y \end{aligned}$$

the programmer introduces Z , which is to be calculated as the addition of X and Y . However, when the user writes this program, Z 's content as bit data is not defined until the program is run and the calculation is made. Such separation of a sign from its final value makes a self-referential definition possible, which is expressed as

$$Z := \dots Z \dots$$

Computers and humans process self-referential expressions totally differently. A computer risks falling into endless loops when interpreting self-referential expressions, since the interpretation of a self-referential expression requires the interpretation of itself. A computer will not distinguish between a program that ends within a minute and one that will never end, even after countless years of computation.

Perhaps, then, a computer could judge whether the processing of a program halts or not before it starts the actual calculation. However, it has been logically proved that any computer based on a Turing machine is incapable of such a procedure (Cutland 1980), and this problem is known as the halting problem. Namely, there will be no computer program that is able to judge whether or not a given program halts. Without the ability to judge whether a given program halts, once a computer starts running any calculation it risks falling into an endless cycle.

Programmers therefore have to write a halting program by manipulating signs that might be self-referentially defined and thus might not be halting. In this sense, a programming language is a language which inherently contains a flaw that could result in unhalting computation. Programmers should take care when writing programs to ensure they avoid this flaw.

Recent programming language systems incorporate various ways to help programmers write properly halting programs. First, theoretical support can be provided by clarifying the general features that executable self-referential definitions possess (Tennent 1991; Gunter 1962). For example, the definition of a factorial, as shown in expression (1) in Section 2, is halting. Very roughly speaking, if a problem recursively defined through self-reference forms a sub-problem of the original problem, then a self-referential expression is halting. For example, the factorial of N is reduced to the sub-problem of the factorial of $N-1$.

Second, linguistic restrictions can be introduced. This means restricting sign usages by disallowing the occurrence of some expressions. One way is to classify signs hierarchically by type. For example, it is known that considering the set of all sets as a set will lead to a logical contradiction (Dalen 2004). Such a case can be avoided by introducing types among data, and considering the set of sets to be a different type from a set.

Another means of aid is the notion of scope; i.e., the range in which a sign is valid. A sign defined within a smaller scope is usually prohibited from use within a larger scope that contains the smaller scope. This has the advantage of encapsulating signs within the appropriate scope and enabling a thorough administration of signs. Such a notion of scope exists in natural language, too, and people are aware of the scope of signs. For example, English terms are generally only valid within an English-speaking community; technical terms are only meaningful to practitioners within a specific domain. In natural language, the scope is usually formed naturally, and the border of the scope is vague.

The notion of scope helps the user to better administer signs. If a sign's introduction, usage, and extinction is thoroughly administered, it is unlikely that a global sign will be badly used by forming an unpredicted self-reference. Further, self-referential signs can be suppressed through the use of scope in a radical way, such as in the lambda calculus framework (Hankin 2004), but this sacrifices the introduction of global signs. Lambda

calculus is therefore incorporated into some programming languages, but it is seldom used alone for large-scale programming. The design of a programming language still consists in finding a balance between allowing free and natural manipulation of signs, and restricting sign usages to help programmers avoid producing non-halting programs.




Figure 2. Structural system (left) and Constructive system (right).

Such programming features encourage an attitude of generating programs in a constructive manner. By “constructive system” we mean one in which a larger element is generated as a combination of smaller components, which are guaranteed to be executed safely and then halt. Any programming language system has basic data and functions, where values are predefined within the system when it is designed. They consist of numbers, characters, Boolean values, decimals, and basic operations applicable to them. Basic data and functions are represented by signs; for example, “1” means the integer value of one and “+” means to add two numbers. The programmer’s responsibility is to write a program so that any sign can be reduced to a combination of such basic data and operations. Such a bottom-up production process is supported by libraries attached to a language; i.e., a collection of components and functions which are guaranteed to work. This definition also applies to self-referential expressions, since halting self-referential expressions are reduced to sub-problems. To write a program is to describe the constructive view of the target calculation.

This term “constructive” is related to the philosophy underlying constructive logic, mathematics and programming: if a mathematical object exists, then it should be possible for it to be constructed (i.e., found or explicitly described). This philosophy began with Brouwer and his intuitive logic (Dalen 1984), which has developed into the form of constructive mathematics of Bishop (Beeson 1985). Intuitive logic is known as a logical framework that does not rely upon *reductio ad absurdum*, and thus elimi-

nates the indirect proof which explicitly avoids showing the existence of the mathematical formula. The sophistication of such theory led to the programming method called constructive programming, where the specification of a software application is formally expressed and programs are formed as proofs.

5. *Structure versus construction*

Note how different a sign system formed of programming language is from one formed of natural language. Constructive and structural are both terms, each containing the morpheme /struct/, but the underlying philosophy of each is the opposite of the other as regards the relation between the system and its elements as signs. By analogy to Saussure's quote, in a constructive system, we should begin with the word (the term), in order to construct the system. In contrast, within a structural system, we should not begin with the word or term but should start from the system. The difference between the two types of system is illustrated in Figure 2.

The relation between a structural system and a constructive system is that the former may include the whole of the latter, whereas the latter may include only part of the former. The self-referential factorial function may be included in both systems, but many terms of natural language, when defined self-referentially, can work in a structural system but not in constructive systems. Moreover, a programming language is founded on a theory which eliminates the *reductio ad absurdum* which is part of natural language. Such a difference appears to be based upon the difference in how humans and computers interpret self-referential expressions.

Such a difference affects the robustness of a system. In a structural system, because any value of a sign is not completely defined, the sign is always ambiguous to some extent, so the value of a sign might overlap that of another. Thus, various expressions can signify almost identical contents. Also, the elimination of one sign will not affect the system, the system will continue to work. In contrast, in a constructive system, a sign is defined so that its content is explicit. Thus, the content of a sign is unlikely to overlap that of another and there is no ambiguity. Elimination of a single sign could be disastrous.

Thus, when writing a program, the programmer – a human being accustomed to using a robust structural system as natural language – is forced

to think in a constructive way. Even though every sign is introduced with its content to be defined in the future, the programmer must generate a halting program, using self-reference, while knowing exactly how the sign will acquire the final value. Programmers must fully administer all signs, remaining completely aware of how they are related. Since computer systems are generated through programs, naturally, the users of current computers face a similar challenge. Neglecting one sign could instantly lead to disastrous computer behavior. Many software applications have safeguards against unhalting executions, and sign manipulation is restricted. Such measures, however, may cause users to feel awkward or inhibited when working with computers.

Still, computers are unlike previous machines in that their behavior can be changed by changing the program (Hofstadter 1979). Thus, computers and certain types of hardware are “thirdness” beings (Tanaka-Ishii and Ishii 2006). Such essential thirdness indicates a potential for structural computation. Devising a “structural computer” would be the key to stopping HAL or Speedy, and would lead to a more natural computing environment, including the creation of more “natural” artificial beings.

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Eero Tarasti

What is existential semiotics? From theory to application

Background

During the past fifteen years I have been elaborating a new theory of semiotic inquiry, starting from its philosophical and epistemic premises. I have called this project *Existential semiotics* due to its roots in continental philosophy – following the line Kant-Hegel-Kierkegaard-Jaspers-Heidegger-Arendt-Sartre-de Beauvoir-Marcel-Wahl – and in the history of semiotics via its various generations: classic, structuralist/post-structuralist, and postmodern thinkers. In fact this enterprise has led me almost to the borderlines of semiotics, since the new configuration of knowledge that I propose has become so strongly philosophical and so close to certain hermeneutical and phenomenological approaches, that it may be at first difficult to see its link to the whole tradition of semiotic studies.

As to the latter, my new theory does not aim to show that “classical semiotic thought” has become outdated; rather, it is still valid, but within the limits of a new, more encompassing theory. Coming from Claude Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism (I was his only Finnish student, having studied with him in Paris in 1973–1975, then doing research in Brazil in 1976 following his ideas) and from the Paris School of semiotics founded by Lithuanian born semiotician and linguist Algirdas Julien Greimas, I remain faithful to those classic authors. On the other hand, I am forging an independent theory that can no longer be confined within the framework of Parisian semiotics. In the semiotic context and tradition I would call my theory a “neosemiotics”. It is no longer a “post-” phenomenon (like poststructuralism or postmodernism) but something new, in that it purports to represent 21st-century thought and, as a philosophy of our time, engages with challenges of the present era.

My new theory is not a return to “existentialism”, as its title might suggest. Rather, I am reconsidering and rethinking the foundations of semiotics in the light of certain philosophers, who have paid attention to such notions as subject, *Dasein*, transcendence, situation, existence and value. Basically what this involves is a scrutiny of “semiosis”, the process of production of signs and meaning, from the inside, so to speak. I am interested in how signs become signs and, particularly, how they are preceded by what I call “presigns”, i.e., virtual, transcendental entities. In the most abstract form these presigns are values, axiological entities; in more concrete form, they are “ideas” which, say, an artist may have, prior to their being actualized, transformed, or transcribed into what I call “actsigns”. Moreover, when actsigns are performed or received by the community in which signs are conveyed, they become “post-signs”; i.e., they are realized and exercise their “real” impact upon the destinates.

Such a theoretical scheme is essentially based on two fundamental categories of an ontological nature: *Dasein* and *transcendence*. The first term (literally, “Being-there”) I leave untranslated from the German, because of its subtle meaningfulness. It is simply the world in which we as subjects live, surrounded by other subjects and objects with which we try to come to terms. In structuralist narratology, a primal “desire” to be conjoined/disjoined was viewed as the “initial force” behind narrative processes, and this holds true also in existential semiotics, within the limits of *Dasein*. Note that here *Dasein* is not only “my Being-There”, as it was for Heidegger, but also covers other subjects and objects. Still, we feel our *Dasein* to be incomplete, lacking something, and this catalyses our wish and longing for the transcendent. That is how Sartre explained the notion of transcendence – i.e., as a lack in *Dasein* which forces us to go beyond its borderlines – as did phenomenological sociologists such as Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann.

Transcendence is the realm beyond the concrete world of *Dasein* which our subject can reach via two acts, negation and affirmation. In the first case the subject realizes “Nothingness” in the Hegelian or existentialist sense, with its anguishing psychic reflections; in the latter, as “plenitude” (Gr., *pleroma*; Lat., *plena*), understood as an archetypal experience of the universe as full of meanings rather than devoid of them – an experience endorsed by the Gnostics, and described as well by modern philosophers (e.g., Vladimir Soloviev) and semioticians (e.g., Eco 1990).

Already this theoretical outline seems to stray from common semiotic thought, but when we return to sign studies we will notice how radical the consequences are for the latter. Namely, entirely new sign categories emerge from the traffic of signs between Dasein and transcendence. These are new categories of sign – to use the term by C. S. Peirce – and thus far I have been able to enumerate at least the following ones: presigns, actsigns, postsigns, endosigns, exosigns, transsigns, as-if-signs, genosigns, pheno-signs. But even more fundamentally, we can now reinterpret the entire classical semiotic approach as a kind of transcendental science (in the Kantian sense). Traditionally semiotics has been considered to consist of two great inquiries: one dealing with *signification*, the other with *communication*.

Every sign is, in fact, a transcendental unit, in light of the classical medieval definition of sign as *aliquid stat pro aliquo* (something standing for something). This means the following: by signs we talk and think of objects which are absent. The most serviceable definition of the transcendental might be as follows: the transcendent is anything that is absent, but present in our minds.

The second essential field of semiotics is communication, i.e., how we use signs to transmit meanings and content to others. In Saussure's classical model of dialogue (1916), Mr A says something to Mr B. Yet we might say that a huge gap separates A from B. Mr B is a "transcendent entity" to Mr A, since Mr B represents what might be philosophically called the alien-psyche (*Fremdseelig*). The only certain thing, phenomenologically, is Mr A's stream of consciousness, which may be called "self-" or "auto-psyche" (*Eigenseelig*). Therefore in every act of communication Mr A risks being misunderstood by his partner in dialogue. And yet the space between them is not empty, but filled by what Greimas called *modalities*. In the theory of existential semiotics I distinguish traditional linguistic and logical modalities, which concern life in Dasein, from metamodalities, which portray communication between Dasein and transcendence.

A theory of subject

All this leads us to reconsider the role of the subject in communication and signification, the aspect so strongly criticised and denied by structuralist semioticians ever since Lévi-Strauss's *The Savage Mind* (1962), which rejected the Sartrean theory of subjective "dialectics". Yet the subject re-

entered semiotics in its poststructuralist phase in the 1980s, in the work of many scholars, from Julia Kristeva to Michel Foucault and, in a certain sense, Roland Barthes and A. J. Greimas, with his “third semiotic revolution” – which meant nothing other than the (re)discovery of values and of the modalities, as the ways in which speakers provide their utterances with emotions, expectations, and psychic contents.

If we want to understand the basic problem of every society – namely, why individuals obey its rules and become “socialized” by it – we see this is made possible only by the fact that social rules and laws are somehow “internalized” into a subject’s mind. The society must be “inside”, otherwise it would have no impact but remain a matter of indifference to the subject. How can we explain this process of internalisation and clarify its mechanisms?

There has been much talk about subjects and subjectivity in many neighbouring areas of semiotics, such as psychoanalysis, gender theories, social sciences, philosophy, arts research, etc. Yet, without a more articulated vision of how the subject appears in the fields of communication and signification, such theoretical views stop short of their goals, as laudable as their efforts might be.

To do so requires a short excursion to the roots of existential semiotics, which means going back to Hegel and his logics. For some semioticians Hegel is mere “conceptual poetry”; to others, he is acceptable only after a “Marxist turn-around”, but to still others, like Hannah Arendt, he was the most central thinker of Western philosophy, one who compiled phenomena of nature and history into a homogeneous construction – but as Arendt notes, whether prison or palace, we cannot say. For Arendt, Hegel was the last word in Western philosophy. All that came after him was either imitated him or rebelled against him. Contemporary schools of thought, which in Arendt’s case were Husserl, Heidegger and Jaspers, constituted mere epigones of Hegel.

I take as my starting point only one detail from Hegelian logic, the principle by which we may construct further our theory of subject; namely, his categories of *an-sich-sein* (being-in-itself) and *für-sich-sein* (being-for-itself). In the Hegel dictionary edited by Michael Inwood there is an entry entitled “In for, and in and for, itself, himself ...” (Inwood 1992: 133–136). The third person reflexive pronoun in German, *sich*, is both singular and plural, and covers all three genders. It may thus mean one-, him-, her-, or

itself; themselves; each other. It may be either accusative or dative, but not nominative or genitive. It accompanies German's numerous reflexive verbs, and can also be preceded by several prepositions. For example *für sich* (for oneself, himself, etc.) occurs in such contexts as "He needs a room *for himself*", "She lives *by herself*", and "That is a problem *in itself*", that is to say, apart from its connections with other matters. In ordinary usage *an sich* (in itself, etc.) often differs little from *für sich*: to consider a matter *an sich* is also to consider it apart from its connections with anything else; and if something is certain *an sich*, its certainty is IMMEDIATE, and not dependent on anything else. In both these contexts, *an und für sich* is simply a more emphatic equivalent of *an sich*.

In ordinary German such expressions usually do not have a single, well-defined usage, but a range of uses overlapping those of other expressions. The only one that had acquired a settled philosophical use by Hegel's day was *an sich*. In Plato it meant the form or idea; e.g., the form of beauty is "the beautiful *itself*", or *an sich*. For Kant a thing *an sich* is something apart from its relation to our cognition and the way it appears to us. Thus *an sich* contrasts not with *für sich* but with *in uns* or *für uns*.

Hegel used the terms *an sich* and *für sich* in their ordinary senses, but also provided them with contrasting meaning. As finite, a thing has a determinate nature only in virtue of its relation with other things, its negation of, and by, them. This is true not only of items in the world, but also of Kant's thing-in-itself, since it, too, is cut off from our cognition. Thus a thing as it is *an sich* has no overt determinate character; at most, it has *potential* character, which will be actualized only by its relations to other things. For example, an infant *an sich* is only potentially rational, not actually so. A tailor is a tailor *an sich* in the sense of having certain innate skills that suit him for this role, and of having certain overt features which distinguish him from, say, a sailor. Being a tailor, or musician, thus involves an interplay between being *an sich* and being for another. But a person is not simply a role occupant. He is also an individual, an "I", and as such can distance himself from his role and think of himself just as *me* or *I*. When doing so, he is no longer for others, but *for himself*. For instance, consider a bus driver who has already left but notices one person still running to the stop. Against the rules he stops and takes on the passenger, since he feels compassion for the late arrival. Although his self-consciousness may

presuppose recognition by others, an *I* is not just one in a system of contrasting roles: everyone is an *I*.

Furthermore, the idea that “if something is for itself, it is aware of itself”, leads to the notion that an entity may have in itself certain characteristics that are not *for itself*. A slave is, as a man, free in himself, but he may not be free for himself. The student is a future doctor and professor, but he does not know it. Finally, the terms *an sich* and *für sich* start to mean potential and actual, and may be applied to the subject’s development: when a person becomes “for himself” what he is “in himself”, he usually recognizes his identity: he becomes meaningful to himself (to use semiotic terms).

The preceding linguistic excursion was probably necessary in order to understand the next reasoning, in which we proceed toward a theory of individual subjectivity. But before we turn Hegel to existential-semiotic use, let us look what Søren Kierkegaard did with the notions of *an sich* and *für sich*. In him they turn into subjective and objective being. In the chapter “Becoming a subject”, in his treatise *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (Kierkegaard 1846/1992), he speaks about an individual who is said to be a subject, or such an individual “who is what he is because he has become like it.” In existential semiotics, such a subject who has become himself may be considered a genosign. The advent of a subject from *an sich* being to *für sich* being, corresponds to his becoming a sign to himself, or the emergence of his identity. Kierkegaard sees the task of a subject as “more and more to take off his subjectivity and become more and more objective.” The objective being is the same as observing and being observed. In his theory, this observation has to be of an ethical nature.

The next careful reader of Hegel (and of Kierkegaard) was Jean-Paul Sartre, whose *L'Être et le néant* (1943) was largely based upon Hegelian concepts of *an sich* and *für sich*, or in Sartre’s terms: *être-en-soi* and *être-pour-soi*. According to Sartre, being simply *is*; it cannot help but *be*. But it has as its potentiality the fact that it becomes aware of itself via an act of negation. In Kierkegaardian terms, the being becomes an observer of itself and is thus shifted into being-for-itself. This is precisely transcending. The *pour-soi* as the outburst of negation forms the basis for identity. It appears as a lack. This, according to Sartre, is the beginning of transcendence: human reality strives for something which it lacks (Sartre 1943: 124–125). Man starts to exist when he realizes the incompleteness of his being. Also

via this effort, value enters human life. Value is that to which one aspires. Being-in-itself precedes every consciousness; Being-in-itself is the same as what Being-for-itself was earlier. The essential change in Sartre's theory, as regards Hegel, is the movement between these two categories, and a kind of subjectivisation of them considering existence.

We need still one more "modernisation" of Hegel and his categories. It has been offered by Jacques Fontanille in his study *Soma et séma: Figures du corps* (Fontanille 2004). The author deals with corporeal semiotics, but presents the distinction between categories of *Moi* and *Soi* in a fresh manner.

As a Greimassian semiotician Fontanille starts from the *actant* and his/her body. He distinguishes between body and form. We speak of body as such or "flesh" (*chair*), which is the center of everything, the material resistance or impulse to semiotic processes. The body is the sensorial, motor fulcrum of semiotic experience (Fontanille 2004: 22). Yet, on the other hand there is a body in the proper sense, which constitutes the identity and directional principle of the body. The body is the carrier of the "me" (*Moi*) whereas the proper body supports the "self", or *Soi* (ibid.: 22–23). The *Soi*, or "self", builds itself in discursive activity. The *Soi* is that part of ourselves which the "me" (*Moi*) projects out of itself in order to create itself in its activity. The *Moi* is that part of ourselves to which the *Soi* refers when establishing itself. The *Moi* provides the *Soi* with impulse and resistance whereby it can become something. In turn, the *Soi* furnishes the *Moi* with a reflexivity which it needs in order to keep within its limits as it changes. The *Moi* resists and forces the *Soi* to confront its own alterity. Hence, the two are inseparable.

Although Fontanille is a semiotician (and here quotes Paul Ricoeur), his reasoning fits well with the above-mentioned Hegelian categories. What is involved is a new interpretation of *an sich* and *für sich*, the first one corresponding to bodily ego and the latter to its stability, identity, and aspiration outwards – that is, to Sartrean negation. The self (*Soi*) functions as a kind of memory of the body (*Moi*); it yields form to those traces of tensions and needs which have been inserted in the flesh of the "me", or *Moi*.

In light of Fontanille's concepts, we could change the Hegelian Being-in-itself or Being-for-itself, the *an-sich-sein* and *für-sich-sein*, into *an-mir-sein* and *für-mich-sein*, i.e., Being-in-myself and Being-for-myself. But before we ponder the consequences this has for our existential semiotics,

let us scrutinize the principles of *Moi* and *Soi* as such, and in music particularly. Anything belonging to the category of *mich* (me) concerns the subject as an individual entity, whereas the concept of *sich* has to be reserved for the social aspect of this subject.

Let us take Uexküll's (1940) principle of *Ich-Ton*, which determines the identity and individuality of an organism. In it we can distinguish two aspects: *Moi* and *Soi*. In "me" the subject appears as such, as a bundle of sensations, and in the "self", *Soi*, the subject appears as observed by others, as socially determined. These constitute, respectively, the existential (individual) and social (communal) aspects of the subject.

The *Moi* of the artist is the pure source of ideas. But we can also say that transcendence lives within a man. The *Moi*, however, is surrounded by the sphere of the *Soi*, that part of the ego which is social, coded and community-bound – not existential. Together they form the phenomenon that Thomas Sebeok called "the semiotic self". This concept coined by Sebeok is determined by the physical and virtual body. Some identify the semiotic moment either with social codes (the Saussurean tradition) or with the kinetic energy of the ego (Julia Kristeva). These theories also have their supporters in musical semiotics.

My colleague in musical semiotics, Raymond Monelle, adheres to the first one when he says that the semiotic appears particularly well in the socially codified forms of eighteenth-century music (Monelle 1992: 5). The latter is exemplified by the "new musicologist", Richard Taruskin, who speaks of the "semiotic" in Russian music; his description as such of the undulating gestures of Polovetsian girls in Borodin is a typically Kristevan "semiotics" of music (Taruskin 1997: 152).

In my theory, both are necessary: they together form the *Ich-Ton* of an organism, which is surrounded by the Other. Insofar as this Other is another subject-organism, one can presume that it is construed in the same manner of *Moi* and *Soi*. Thus the point and surface in which one *Ich-Ton* touches the Other (*Dich-Ton*) and its organism, is of course the sphere of *Soi*. Only on this level does language function as a codified set of rules, which enables communication in the proper sense between these organisms.

Above I asked whether one's *Moi* can directly communicate with the Other's *Moi*. The answer is: mostly, no. *Moi* must first transform into *Soi*

within one's organism. *I* must become *Me*, in the sense of G. H. Mead, before one subject reaches another one.

But correspondingly, if *Sois* were only communicating between themselves, we could never be sure if what Others express, via gestures and words, *really* represents what they intend in their noemas. Intention always covers both *Moi* and *Soi*.

The *primus motor* of art history is the becoming of *Moi* in relation to *Soi*; or rather, the constant rebellion of the *Moi* against the communal, conventional world of the *Soi*. In sonata form, the appearance of the *Moi* was at first permitted only during the development section, amidst harmonic and motivic instability. Then Wagner elevated this principle, as "continuous transition", into the constructive principle of his operas, or their *Soi*. Later came the shift to atonality and serialism, giving total dominance to the *Soi*. Yet even it was negated, since it is impossible to repress completely the *Moi*. The sphere of *Soi* forms a perpetual resistance to the being of the *Moi*. Correspondingly, the existence of *Moi* prevents communication from becoming the mere domain of the *Soi*, a field comprised exclusively of *langue*.

Paradoxically, however, if the *Moi* is left to realize itself freely, the results are not a rich tapestry of modalities, but their scarcity and suppression. In Nietzsche's musical compositions, the modalities of will, know and can do not develop into anything, since they do not take shape in forms codified by the *Soi*. Only with such forms can one create a hierarchical, structured work. Although Nietzsche's inner resolve was tremendous, and although he scatters German performance indications everywhere, in his writings emphasizes the principle of will, and resorts to extra-musical programs in *Ermanarich* and other works, his musical 'will' does not develop to its climax, and neither does 'know' nor 'can'. They lack the 'must' of the *Soi*. Modalities favored by the *Soi* are precisely 'must', 'know', 'can' and 'will', in that order, in such a way that their amount and cogency diminishes towards the end of the list. Conversely, the modalities of the *Moi* go from heaviest to lightest: 'will', 'can', 'know', 'must'.

Of the modalities of the *Moi*, 'will' is the most important; it conveys the inner pressure of movement, the stability of the work. 'Will' does not necessarily appear solely as 'want-to-do', but may manifest also as want-to-be or want-not-to-do or want-not-to-be (this holds true also for other modalities). The second important modality for the *Moi* is 'can', or power

(*pouvoir*), often even a corporeally important category. Next most essential is ‘knowing’, which concerns the memory of the *Moi*, a kind of “profound ego” (*le moi profond*) in the Bergsonian sense. The concept of “intellectual effort” as it relates to Bergson (see Bankov 2000) is interesting since it seems to be based upon the modality of ‘know’, and at the same time on ‘do’ and ‘can’. For instance, a musical or literary composition delivers information only via an effort, not by itself. With the help of the memory of the *Moi*, the composition, as an “organism”, remembers its earlier solutions during its enunciation. Finally, even the *Moi* possesses its own inner obligation, its particular ‘must’ – one cannot go against the laws of *Moi*. Whoever does so, subdues his own expression.

In the modalities of the *Soi*, ‘must’ comes first, as normative forms and communication structures: styles, techniques and topics (musical-rhetorical figures). If a writer calls his literary work a “novel” or “comedy”, or if a composer designates his work as a sonata, symphony or fugue, then he commits himself to a certain ‘must’ or obligation of the *Soi*. Second important is the modality of ‘know’ or the penetration of elements from the store of intonations (Eco would say, from the encyclopedia of knowledge), which are transcendent to the work. For instance, the beginning of Beethoven’s last piano sonata (Op. 111) displays not only the topics of *Sturm und Drang*, but also the French *ouverture* of the Baroque era, with its dotted rhythms (see, e.g., the first movement of Handel’s Suite in G minor). Therefore, when we say that the *Ich-Ton* of an art work determines which elements it accepts from its surroundings, taking them into its organism and transforming them into endosemiotic entities, what is involved is precisely the modality of ‘know’.

The third important modality for the *Soi* is ‘can’, understood as the adoption of certain techniques and resources whereby the aforementioned ‘must’ and ‘know’ can be realized. Least important to the *Soi* is ‘will’. Yet even it appears as a kind of collective wanting; for instance, when a composer expresses the voice of his community, when a painter like Rubens praises his ruler Maria di Medici, when Clara Schumann writes variations on the Emperor Hymn, or when Wagner writes *Mastersingers* in the atmosphere of the Franco-Prussian War. The ‘will’ of the *Soi* is thus of collective origin.

These reflections can be put into the following model, which has three circles:




Diagram 1.

The diagram shows transcendence is filtered via *Soi* to the sphere of *Moi*.

Is the production of an art work mostly an affair of *Moi* or mostly of *Soi*? If one writes a fugue it is an event of *Soi*, without doubt. If one provides it with a little tinge of expressivity, in the line of Mozart-Beethoven-Franck-Brahms, it has a little bit of *Moi* as well. But if one writes a fantasy or an aleatoric work, it is certainly more an activity of *Moi*. In literature, Charles Mauron spoke about obsessive myths of a writer. In films by Kaurismäki or Renoir or Eisenstein we see certain personal themes recurring and being elaborated. Yet *Moi*, left all to itself, is most often helpless, a fact exemplified by musical improvisation. When the performer has full freedom in performances, the probable results are outworn clichés and mannerisms: either as techniques stemming directly from the unconscious of the *Soi*, or as such forms of the *Moi* which our subject supposes the audience wants to hear. What is involved is the artistic *das Man: man schreibt so, man malt so, man komponiert so...*

We can now put together the most important ideas of this essay. My intention was to specify, among other things, the category of 'being', by providing this basic modality with new flavours from Kant and Hegel, and by following the phases of this concept further, from Kierkegaard to Sartre and Fontanille (of course, the project of existential semiotics need not stop here). When one aims for more subtle tools in semiotics, one can still find radical innovations in the classics of philosophy. The Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself became Being-in- and Being-for-myself in existential semiotics. When these notions are combined on Greimas's semiotic square of logical oppositions, one gets the following cases:




Diagram 2.

They can be interpreted as follows:

1) Being-in-myself represents our bodily ego, which appears as kinetic energy, *khora*, desire, gestures, intonations, Peirce's First. Our ego is not yet in anyway conscious of itself but rests in the naive Firstness of its being; modality: endotactic, 'will'.

2) Being-for-myself corresponds to Kierkegaard's attitude of an observer. Sartre's negation obtains, such that mere being shifts to transcendence; it notices the lack in its existence and hence becomes aware of itself and transcendence. The mere being of the subject becomes existing. This corresponds to the transcendental acts of my previous model, negation and affirmation. Ego discovers its identity, reaches a certain kind of stability, permanent corporeality via habit; modality: endotactic, 'can'.

3) Being-in-itself is a transcendental category. It refers to norms, ideas and values, which are purely conceptual and virtual, they are potentialities of a subject, which he can either actualize or not. What is involved are abstract units and categories; modality: exotactic, 'must'.

4) Being-for-itself means the aforementioned norms, ideas and values as realized by the conduct of our subject in his *Dasein*. Those abstract entities appear here as applied values, choices and realizations, which often will be far away from the originally transcendental entities; modality: exotactic, 'know'.

The essential aspect of the model is that it combines the spheres of *Moi* and *Soi*, the individual and collective subjectivities. It portrays semiosis not only as a movement of the collective Hegelian Spirit, but also the presence of a subject, via the addition of Being-in- and -for-myself. Crucial

is not only the distinction of these four logical cases, but also the movement among them, the transformation of a chaotic corporeal ego into its identity, the becoming of ego into a sign to itself; furthermore, the stable and completely responsible ego impacts the actualisation of transcendental values, such that the ego becomes a sign to other subjects. In this phase, the Being-in-myself and for-myself meets Others; i.e., you, or Being-in-and Being-for-yourself. Behind this social field looms the realm of transcendental and virtual values and norms: signs which have not yet become signs to anyone.

In the classical sense, the semiotic sphere consists only of the fields of Being-for-myself and Being-for-itself. The extremities of the semiotic square are the field of pre-signs, which surround from two sides the semiosis, properly speaking. These are totally “concrete” and “sensual” qualities on the one hand, and on the other, they are entirely abstract, “intelligent” norms and values (recalling Lévi-Strauss’s distinction into *le sensible* and *l’intelligible*). However, this semiosis, the process of act-signs, cannot be understood without going outside of it, to transcendence. Hence, in these two phases existential analysis becomes a Kantian, transcendental analytic.

Ultimately we can formulate our semiotic square as follows:




Diagram 3.

Most recently I prefer to speak of two different directions or movements among coordinates of the semiotic square portraying a subject’s mind. This movement goes from the concrete and corporeal towards the abstract and “intelligible”: *Moi* gradually unfolds, developing a *Soi*, and reaching even the most abstract categories of a society. In this development, the weight of

Moi gradually diminishes, of course, but a tiny trace of it remains in even the most extreme case of *Soi*. The other direction starts from the *Soi*, with its norms and values, and leads towards their enactment in certain institutions and practices, and their impact on an individual's behaviour on a personal level, reaching into the tiniest subtleties and nuances of his corporeality. For purposes of analysis, let us call these moments *Moi*₁, *Moi*₂, *Moi*₃ and *Moi*₄, and correspondingly *Soi*₁, *Soi*₂, *Soi*₃ and *Soi*₄. We can easily see how in this model these two movements coincide. Both “streams” can have their own particular signs, and the interesting and provocative point in this theory is the encounter of these two types of signs:




Diagram 4.

Each phase of subjectivity appears to itself as specific and characteristic signs (endosigns, as we called them earlier); whereas when the subject enters into activity and signifying action, he/she produces again its own signs which are quite overt (exosigns). These two attitudes – observing oneself and realizing oneself – correspond to two basic attitudes in Schelling's system of transcendental idealism: *anschauen* and *handeln*.

From postcolonial analysis to a theory of resistance

The new theory of existential semiotics, presented above in a nutshell, has two important venues for application. First, for a theory of arts and culture we may sketch new ways of analysing artistic texts of any nature: music, theater, film, painting, poetry, and more. The processual character of the model enables us to employ it particularly for a theory of the performing aspects of arts, that is to say, how signs are actualized from their pre- and virtual state into actsigns.

Second, the applications also cover the social field of values, communities, ideologies, axiologies. I have already done two experiments in this direc-

tion in my essays on “Postcolonial Analysis” and “A Theory of Resistance”. This aspect is important since it shows that the existential theory has the capacity to account for the *condition humaine* in our globalized era – and to do so in a responsible fashion. Existential semiotics is an epistemic theory, yet it illuminates quite pragmatic problems of our own world. It comes close to what has been called “semioethics” by some scholars (such as Augusto Ponzio, Susan Petrilli and John Deely). Looked at another way, as Bulgarian semiotician Kristian Bankov has done, and with slight modifications, existential semiotics is occupied with the “knowledge-based” and “value-based” society in which we live, at least in Europe. What, then, are the central issues of these two fields of socially oriented, existential semiotics?

In postcolonial semiotics we ponder a situation in which there are two subject positions: the *dominant* and the *dominated*. My proposal started from my reading of anthologies on postcolonial analysis in general, and mostly focusing on the typical cases of, say, the British Empire – India, France – Algeria, Spain – Latin America, Portugal – Goa, Macao, etc. It was easy to notice, however, that the postcolonial situation prevailed even *within* Europe itself, among its “central” and “peripheral” countries. Ultimately, every nation has, inside its borders, certain minorities which it colonizes. Many kinds of semiotic discursive mechanisms are used to maintain such a distinction. Yet they were all essentially based upon a rather simple theoretical scheme: the two actantial roles, as said, of dominant and dominated; i.e., those retaining power and those accepting it and subordinated to it. Moreover, concerning postcolonial discourses themselves one needs only the old Saussurean notions of *langue/parole* and *signifier/signified* in order to explain their functioning. The “grammar” is set by the dominant; the dominated are allowed to adopt and apply it, sometimes even brilliantly, but they are not permitted to change it. If the dominated want to communicate, they must accept what the dominant *Soi* dictates, as I would say now. Yet very often even that is impossible, and the dominated are simply “silenced”, deprived of using their voice in any audible or effective manner. Representatives of the periphery – those who are dominated – are forbidden to speak out about their wishes and aspirations, neither in politics nor in the arts. In the latter case, they are often presented as something “picturesque” and “exotic”, which only strengthens the central/peripheral dichotomy. This kind of repression may occur in the most innocent-looking ways, such as praising the national values

and qualities of a composer, writer, painter, movie maker, and so on. In fact, however, his real message is quite universal, displaying Music, Poetry, Painting as such.

Still, the dominated do have the possibility to rebel, within the sign practices themselves, letting their *Moi* emerge and break the norms, topics, and standards of the “official” grammar that forces signifiers into preestablished, precodified forms. The signified (content) can be so new and radically alien, but at the same time convincing, that it “explodes” the chains of the signified and forces the destinee to receive the message. This process is similar to what Roland Barthes recommended long ago in his classical essay on the “fascism of language”, which we may resist by “cheating” language in literature, which cares little about the rules of everyday communication. The same was said even earlier by the Russian formalists, with their idea of *ostranenie*, “estrangement”.

The relationship of colonialism and nationalism is also interesting since the latter very often emerges as a reaction against the former, and hence relies upon its suppressive power. But it depends very much upon whether we have to do with a benevolent nationalism conveying some new quality, or an aggressive, repetitive, iconic nationalism with subordinating tendencies.

A theory of resistance likewise emerges from certain epistemic premises, though even they are closely linked to and motivated by certain social practices. Again, we are aiming for a more “universal” theory to be applied in the most varied cases of “resistance” in our contemporary world and society. In fact, typical of existential semiotics, which also includes an inbuilt semioethic program, even a theory of resistance has two sides and two starting points. On the one hand, it was launched by a criticism of certain forms of globalisation, which already have been much debated by some intellectual semioticians. Existential semiotics does not just look at the world from a distance but elaborates models and discourse whereby the subjects, living in their *Daseins*, could improve their situation. Hence it shares with structuralism the aspiration to serve as a kind of “social therapy”.

On the other hand, we need a theory that is challenging by its purely logical and intellectual qualities, in order to intervene in the course of the world. Such a theory may open by reversing the ordinary course of semiosis, which we normally think of as going from “left to right”, that is, from sender to receiver. What if there were a countercurrent of signs? That is,

what if the signs were to go from right to left? This would require that we stop for a while, in the process of sign production and emission, so as to reflect on categories such as Being, Memory and History. The first mentioned is by itself central to existential semiotics, as we saw above in the varieties of Being based on Hegelian logics. But it has also been treated richly by Umberto Eco in his comments on Heidegger in his *Kant e l'ornitorinco* (1997). Moreover, Memory, in the sense of Henri Bergson in his *Matière et mémoire* (1941), means that we compare the present, “now” moments in the temporal course to the store of previous events in our memory. This eventually leads to a theory of counterfactuals, i.e., pondering “what might have happened”. If, on its surface level, reality consists of chains of events, there are alternatives which *might* have happened, which at a deeper level constitute a network of possible but not-realized events. According to Georg Henrik von Wright, we can imagine something as possible only if it has happened at least once earlier in History – our third category – and only if we can remember it. Yet, the other, more “existential” view would say that mankind has imagination and that we can figure out possible worlds creatively – something that has never existed before, but which becomes a reality. Altogether, these three mechanisms form the theoretical basis for resistance, in the term’s largest purport.

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Eila Tarasti

Signs of *Impressionism*

The art of miniature in the piano works of Finnish composer, Carl Hirn (1886–1949)

1. Semiotics of Impressionism

Impressionism has not been the musical style most favoured by semioticians of music, despite the fact that one of the early works in the history of this discipline, namely *Langage, musique et poésie* (1972) by Nicolas Ruwet, analyzes the Prelude to Debussy's *Pelléas* and that J.-J. Nattiez's perhaps best known analysis dealt with the same composer's *Syrinx*. Musical impressionism was dealt with more richly at the Colmar congress on music analysis in 1989, which even commissioned a series of analyses using varied semiotic methods on Debussy's piano prelude *La terrasse des audiences de clair de lune* (in the journal *Analyse musicale* 16 and 17, 1989). Still, the problem often is that the emphasis remains on the new method and not so much on the object itself and its unique features.

Among the earlier semiotic efforts to approach impressionism in music one has to count Michel Imberty's empirical studies on meanings evoked by Debussy's *Préludes* (Imberty 1981), which interestingly ends – after a very strict statistic analysis of listeners' reactions – with quotations from Jankélévitch (1961) and his very traditional aesthetic insights on “life and death” in Debussy's imagery. Elsewhere, Gino Stefani, in his book *La competenza musicale*, analyses Debussy's prelude *Des pas sur la neige*, in which the rhythmic essence of the music is shown to balance between accents (*scansioni*) and durations (*durate*) (Stefani 1982: 103–105).

Nevertheless, what Nattiez concludes in his study of *Syrinx* seems to be the best approach: in order to define what is “pertinent” within a single piece, one has to study the whole output and stylistic framework of the composer (Nattiez 1982). Therefore, in order to study Debussy or any, so to

say, “impressionist” composer, we have to first study on a deeper theoretical level the nature of semiosis in this style period.

“Is there anything like a general theory of impressionism which would not only cover the painting but music and poetry as well?” asks Eero Tarasti in his book *Musiikin todellisuudet* in the chapter on “Impressionism” (Tarasti 2003: 91). He continues:

The first step in this direction would be to note that obviously impressionism is *not* an art of *representing* the reality. This has to be said in spite of the fact that impressionist music most often seems to be quite programmatic. Yet, what is involved is not the object of the sign, and therefore iconicity, but a sign in impressionism is rather a sign of the act of perception. Signification here is thus quite opposite to the usual course of signifying. In this last case, a sign is like an arrow or bullet which hits the target and finds its signified with certainty. By contrast, with the impressionist sign, the signified is the sensation of the artist himself. Therefore impressionist art is not narrative in as much as it is not subordinated to a plot. (Tarasti 2003: 93–94.)

Basically the new working method of impressionist painters consisted in going out with a canvas and filling it with dots and flashes of colour, dimly and quickly and always guided by first impression (Keller 1979: 36). Atmospheric impressions, light, and air were the determining factors.

What can be said about a general interartistic theory of impressionism? At the least, it emphasizes the act of creation, the “enunciation” and not the message, or “enunciate”. The visual or musical message is only a sign of this act, not of the reality itself. Accordingly an art work is a sign of the meeting of our senses and the surface of the reality – *Firstness*, to use Peirce’s term. It is also essential for impressionist art that the sign go “outward”, that its focus be exteroceptive rather than interoceptive (Tarasti 2003: 93–94).

An impressionist act of painting is always unique, emphasizing a quick and impulsive working method, not slow elaboration, planning and constructing. The artist does not want to force the phenomenon into any vision or preestablished scheme. The subjects of impressionism are often found in nature, but they are generally euphoric, evoking pleasure, not naturalistic *à la* Zola. They do not contain social criticism or existential *Angst*, but dwell in the happiness of the moment, apart from which nothing else matters. It is clear that a society which produces such art is stable, *La belle époque*, members of which have time to immerse themselves in such impressions.

For an impressionist writer “one page or one phrase should fascinate the reader more than the entire book”, as Paul Bourget says somewhere. This technique is realized by Proust and *chez* Debussy. For impressionists it was crucial to portray “the atmospheric” – which which did not mean any Heideggerian *Stimmung* but rather vibrating air. Such a “semiosphere” consists of signs quite different from those of realist art.

As said above, the signs of *Impressionism* are not signs of the object of representation but of the artist’s sensation. Nevertheless, real objects – a haystack, a flag, people in a Parisian street – have caused these signs. In semiotic terms, they are indexes of such real situations, objects and events. However, they do not aim for faithful representation of their objects by penetrating into them, revealing their structure or that which is beyond the reality. The movement of an impressionistic sign stops earlier than that: upon immediate contact with the phenomenon that gives rise to it. The sign then turns back to its perceiver and transmits to us the existential moment – or rather, a moment which has not even had time to become existential, since it is not compared to anything transcendental. The receiver of an impressionist work of art remains in these signs, within the impressions of a moment. The receiver is there totally present, but at the same time rid of all bonds with the reality surrounding such a moment. Yet sometimes into this world of impression there intrude – like glimpses of previous events in the subject’s life – nostalgic reminiscences or longings (Tarasti 2003: 95). So it is often in Debussy and Ravel.

Next, we have to ask which musical techniques were apt for depicting or producing such a sign and sensation. Certainly not the Germanic principle of methodical *Durchführung*, nor by any other kind of teleological, “symphonic” music. Listeners can easily find their way out of a development by music that is “atmospheric”, such as that of Ravel’s *Vallée des cloches* or Debussy’s *La Cathédrale engloutie*.

Strictly speaking, this music does follow a musical logic based on certain intervallic premises, the so-called “planing” of harmonies, such that “sonority and line, rather than specific tonal function, are the important idea” (Baur 1985: 195). The opening of *La Cathédrale*, for instance, with its spacious setting of distant registers, depicts the vastness of such an edifice, with bells heard in the motive D-E-B (Example 1). Together with pedal effects, tertian harmonies, fragmentary and motivically constructed melodies, based on scales other than major/minor (modal, pentatonic and

X...

Profondément calme (*dans une brume doucement sonore*)

pp

doux et fluide

Example 1. Debussy, *La Cathédrale engloutie*, *mm.* 1–7.

whole tone) and textures that are either fairly thick or extremely thin and emphasizing extreme ranges of the piano – all this creates the impression of the atmosphere and setting of an ancient cathedral.

An impressionistic sign is atmospheric in the sense that it refers to that space which remains between the signifier and the reality. The message of such a sign is always that the real is not “real” but an impression, which varies according to the perceiving subject and the moment in question. In an impressionistic “enunciation” the existential “journey” of the subject has been stopped for a while. The Other – the reality – is far away. In impressionist art we are in the intermediate state of vibration and atmospheric signs that have no driving force or compelling direction. The existential process stops for a moment; however briefly, we are immortal for a while. We can neither force these signs of impressions nor consciously elaborate them. And although they need to emerge as an “indexical impulse” given by the reality, they also require the rearrangement of these impulses, a detachment from normative constraints, so that they manifest in sensually tempting sensations. Is *Impressionism*, then, a particularly sensual and hedonistic art? Yes, *le plaisir est le règle*, as Debussy said, but the desires and intentions of the subject appear also in their mediated forms.

The techniques of enunciation which were able to manifest such an “impressionist world view” have been summarized by Michel Fleury (1996: 62) in his *L'impressionisme et la musique*:

- the dissolution of line;
- supremacy of color;
- fragmentation in the detail and of the whole text, leading to brief and free forms; a search for new symmetries;
- hedonism, pleasure;
- suggestion preferred over description, nuance over strong contrasts;
- love for the momentaneous, suspension of time;
- a dream-like quality, and the call of faraway places.

2. *Carl Hirn, Finnish Impressionist*

Into this general and theoretical context, I next want to introduce a Northern European composer of the period of Impressionism, but one who passed a major part of his creative life in Paris, Vienna and Berlin. To bring an almost completely unknown, “national” composer to this framework first prompts the question whether there can be “Paris” outside Paris itself, or “Berlin” outside Berlin. True, this formulation might contain a seed of colonialism, that is to say, the suggestion that such a more or less “universal” style of impressionism centers in Paris, and what happens in peripheral areas is only a distant reflection or echo of it. If, however, we define *Impressionism* in such broad, almost epistemological and semiotic manner as above, we can break free of such “nationalist” ideologies and approach the case of Carl Hirn as no less than a pioneer of this musical style. Although to say one is “forgotten” may also prove to be relative. I remember, for instance, how once in Brazil a pianist and director of the African Music Institute in Rio de Janeiro, Aloysio de Alencar Pinto, mentioned that he knew of one Finnish impressionist, the composer Selim Palmgren, whose music he had played in Paris. This case shows above all that, if a composer is at least printed and published by a renowned publishing house, one can never know how “forgotten” a composer truly is. In our case, Carl Hirn was lucky enough to be published by several leading German companies; hence it is hard to say precisely how often his works figured into the repertoire of his time.

Hirn was born in Finland, at Säkkijärvi (famous for the polka of the same name), close to Viipuri (St. Petersburg), on November 11, 1886 and died in Finland on February 16, 1949. He spent most of his life abroad, in big European metropolises. After primary studies in piano at his home town with Alice Silfvast-Furuhjelm, he moved to the Music Institute in Helsinki, which was not yet called the Sibelius Academy. He studied Richter's composition guide on his own and at spring examination performed his first piece: a rhapsody improvisation. The committee, Hirn relates, politely asked him which Russian composer had written the piece. Recommended by Jean Sibelius himself to his own theory teacher Robert Fuchs, Hirn left to begin serious musical study in Vienna, where the light musical atmosphere fitted well to his temperament. He attended marionette theater performances accompanied by piano at the same time as he was studying Professor Kaffka, who told Hirn: "Well, I see that you want to write miniatures, but first you have to pursue basic studies" (Hirn 1945: 461, translation mine).

After passing several years in Vienna he moved to Berlin, where his teachers included Paul Juon, Hugo Kaun, Robert Kahn, Xaver Scharwenka and E. v. Reznicek – the last of whom he characterized as "congenial" and with whom he studied orchestration for two years. Hirn's talent was soon noticed by major publishing houses. It was the triumphal age of the piano, and music for bourgeois homes was needed all over Europe in big quantities. Simrock first printed Hirn's piano works *Schmetterling*, *Kasperl geht zum Tanz*, *Grotesque*, *Ein kleiner Regengott*, *Schwüle Nacht*, *Pierrette*, *Arabeske* up to opus 50. Then he was awarded the Brahms grant, which did not amount to much economic support, but opened still more doors at various publishing houses such as Zimmermann in Leipzig, Hansen in Copenhagen, as well as Ries und Erler, which published his orchestral piece *Bauernhochzeitszug*, a "grotesque with peasant topics". Also his *Indisches Intermezzo* for women's chorus and orchestra was published, as well as his songs (by the Parisian Maison d'Édition Maurice Sénart).

Hirn lived in Berlin for 15 years then moved to Paris where he stayed for 6 years before moving back to Finland. He would not have remained in his homeland, but war broke out and forced him to stay. Thoroughly bohemian in character, he lived in extremely difficult conditions. He was supported by friends such as the pianist Martti Paavola, and pianist (later professor) Timo Mikkilä, who related how Hirn's friends would secretly

put money into his empty pockets. Martti Paavola, a close friend of Viennese professor Bruno Seidlhofer, described Hirns' music as having a "beautiful pianistic sound ..., truly inspired musical insights, sophisticated aesthetic culture and sense of humour" (Paavola 1946: 4–6). Yet, in the context of our study we can say that he wrote miniatures just because he was completely saturated by the "impressionistic" world view, as described above.

In spite of the fact that he lived amidst a German culture of musical "Durchführung" and counterpoint, as well as in Finland where any composer to be accepted had to write at least one symphony, he gained professional appreciation from his colleagues. In Germany, for example, in the *Musikpädagogische Blätter* of July 15, 1911, professor Hans Rothardt wrote the following about Hirn's first collection of piano pieces, just published by Simrock: "They show an unusual independence in inventiveness and form. They are all written in a personal style. They do not seem to have any models except the *Elfendanse* which evokes Edvard Grieg. His composing mostly refers to Max Reger, albeit it does not have this composer's harmonic oddities and over individualist devices. He is more conservative but also modern in the best sense of the word. His phrasing is clear, simple and flowing, which makes his pieces easy to perform" (HBL 22.11.1911, Sibelius-Museum, Turku). Then the writer comments on each piece, as does the head of Berlin's Kaiserliche Library, Wilhelm Altmann, who praises the musical architecture and form and authentic individual musical language of Hirn's work. In the *Schlesische Zeitung* Dr. H. Seliger wrote about Hirn's piano pieces:

They are characterized by originality of invention and an easily sketching hand. Trivialities which often occur in beginners' work are avoided although he always sounds modern. A little outworn are the use of diminished seventh chords as a sequence in the *Scherzino*, and the harmonies in *Valse der Marionettes* which make tonality unstable. But otherwise the small pieces are always engaging and tasteful. They show a talent in gracious and pleasant expression. (July 17, 1911)

His Finnish colleagues generally wrote positively about him, although it was said that "he – as typical of miniature composers ... is not a profound, striking composer regarding both his content and devices, but he captures momentary associations in a charming manner, polishing them into a salon

style. The very titles of his pieces, like *Danse primitive*, *Aquarelle*, *Valsette Capricieuse*, reveal the nature of his art". (*Helsingin Sanomat*, December 13, 1946). The composer Sulho Ranta, one of the modernists of the prewar years, wrote about Hirn: "His miniatures are fresh and graceful – even if they sometimes display the *coqueties* of a music salon – which is not harmful in our region of austere tones ... his collection shows that we try to increase the repertoire of our own music alongside German 'kuck-kuck Stücken' and 'Zändlereien'" (*Iltasanomat*, February 13, 1948). One of his colleagues, Olavi Pesonen, wrote:

Hirn is one of the modest artists who is not yet so well-known as his output would justify. Hirn did not dwell on large scale musical forms, but has written a venerable amount of smaller orchestral pieces, piano works and songs. As to the sound these sensitive miniatures are very successful ... stylistically they belong to French impressionism. He masters musical formation altogether perfectly and has put them to use for artistic intentions. It is a special delight to note that he in spite of the slightly cosmopolitan character of his music, he is able to inject a particularly Finnish flavour.

Nor did the Finnish "media" of the time overlook him, as personal interviews in *Suomen Kuvalehti* (17, 1929) and *Helsingfors Journalen* (no. 17) prove. The latter published an interview in Swedish, Hirn's mother tongue, during his Parisian years. He tells about his bohemian life at Montparnasse, from where he had to move to Pont d'Orleans, where one could live on 7 francs per day. But mostly he lived in tiny apartments under "mansards", i.e., on the highest floors, in "holes" which were so small that he could rent only a miniature piano to fit in them. A typical headline about him, in the *Helsingfors Journalen* cited above, reads: "Carl Hirn komponerar och lever bohémeliv: En äkta konstnärssjäl" (Carl Hirn composes and leads the bohemian life: A genuine artist's soul). Hirn made his living by writing small piano pieces and melodies which were then performed by small orchestras on the streets of Montparnasse. He also wrote reviews on Parisian musical life for German magazines

Close study of his work reveals how various signs from his musical *Umwelt* penetrate into his otherwise classical piano texture. In fact, the mundane street life appears just once in his music, as Charleston rhythms, but even there stylized in the same manner as Debussy used "cakewalk rhythm" in his preludes. One encounters five main aspects or "isotopies" in Hirn's piano pieces: 1) flawless voice leading, the Germanic *Satz* (little

wonder he was likened to Max Reger); 2) idiomatic piano gestures, a certain skill in using “tactile signs” in music, so-called *Spielfiguren* – although some of his pieces make virtuosic demands on the performers; 3) corporeal gesturality in the form of dance rhythms; 4) various national and aesthetic styles, as in his *Danse primitive*, the “primitive” sense evoking the non-periodic rhythmic formations of Stravinsky, Spanish guitar-like accompaniment figures à la Albeniz, and the “orientalism” of Indian topics, these last as seen through French eyes (e.g., Debussyan whole tone scales and harmonies); 5) programmatic contents, i.e., external and “exteroceptive” signs (in the Greimassian sense) (cf. Tarasti 2004: 100–102).

How does the composer strike a balance among such varied strategies? In Hirn’s case, it is provided by the basic aesthetic of an “impressionistic” worldview. It is always the euphoric, “small world” of the bourgeoisie (as Hungarian musicologist Janos Marothy once characterized it). Carl Hirn’s personality gradually finds its forms and true identity in miniature musical expressions; there it meets the existential world of “being-for-itself”. That is to say, the musical genres he used ultimately derive from the style norms of his time, in the European cosmopolitan context of the first half of the twentieth century. We can distinguish these levels in all of his piano pieces.

Il pleut sur la terrasse

Allegro quasi alla breve Carl Hirn, Op. 60 No 1.
sempre legato

col Ped.

cresc. *dim.*

Example 2a. C. Hirn: *Trois miniatures op. 60, no. 1: “Il pleut sur la terrasse”.*

Aquarelle

Alla barcarola **Carl Hirn, Op. 60 No 2.**

p *col Ped.* *un poco marcato* *dim.*

un poco marcato *pp* *mp*

la melodia marcato 8

Example 2b. Carl Hirn: Trois miniatures op. 60, no. 2: "Aquarelle".

Danse primitive

Presto **Carl Hirn, Op. 60 No 3.**

p **Presto** *mp*

mp

pp *mp*

Example 2c. Carl Hirn: Trois miniatures op. 60, no. 3: "Danse primitive".

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Leonid Tchertov

Semiology of sign-means as a theory of the general conditions of human understanding

1. Semiotics: Semiography, semiology and semiosophy

Semiotics is now understood as the entire sphere of knowledge about signs, including their partial descriptions, general theories explaining the nature of the sign connection, as well as the philosophical foundation of these theories. This heterogeneity in the field of semiotic research allows the distinguishing of semiotics as a “science of signs” on at least three levels of generalization: the semiographical, the semiological, and the semiosophical.

Semiography would include all descriptions of single semiotic units, constructions built from them and rules of their formation and interpretation. Such descriptions can take a normative form or be properly descriptive investigations of what norms are used in definite areas of semiotic practices. Semiographical researches are often performed within the frames of other spheres of knowledge, such as grammars of distinct languages, heraldry, numismatics, hieroglyphics, systems of musical or mathematical notation, descriptions of etiquette, meaningful behaviour, etc. Moreover, they can even be realized apart from any relation to semiotics.

On a higher level of generalization, descriptions of specific signs and sign systems are superseded by explanations of the ways in which signs are connected, how these connections are built, under what conditions something can perform the functions of a sign, what the structure of a “sign situation” is, etc. This level of semiotics can be conveniently called *semiology*, which in this event is no longer a synonym for “semiotics” but rather a term denoting its theoretical part separated from semiography as more descriptive part of semiotics (cf. the difference between “descriptive” and “pure”

semiotics in Morris 1971: 24). Semiology generalizes specific semiographical studies and identifies universal properties common for various semiotic means; it constructs theoretical models describing structural organization and functioning of these means. The semiological level also includes comparative analysis of sign-systems organization of various types and investigations of possible forms of their interaction, when heterogeneous sign constructions are built.

Any semiological theory has explicit or implicit premises related to definite philosophical views on its subject and research methods. These views form a field which can be generally described as the sphere of *semiosophy*. It includes, first of all, various versions of the philosophy of language, sign, name, etc. Various aspects of other divisions of philosophy – such as ontology, epistemology, logic, philosophy of culture, etc., which are employed as bases of semiology – also are “semiosophical” in character. Unlike semiography or semiology, semiosophy is not restricted to the sphere of scientific knowledge, and it may contain elements of specific ideologies as systems of values.

Neither semiography nor semiosophy necessarily claims to be a sphere of knowledge directly related to semiotics. This relation is quite often revealed only to a view directed from some center, from the standpoint of semiology, whence both semiography and semiosophy are seen in the semiotic perspective. In this interpretation, semiology is extracted from semiotics as its “core”, around which semiotic studies are concentrated.

In this system of relations semiology, on the one hand, is crystallized in relations to semiosophic discourse as a more concrete theory of signs. On the other hand, it is developed as the result of generalizing the “semiographical” material in respect to various “-graphies” – descriptions of signs in such disciplines as linguistics, ethnography, history of culture, art, etc. The term “semiology” itself was proposed by Ferdinand de Saussure as a result of linguistic generalization. Despite the fact that in the current paper this term is framed into a different system of concepts, it nevertheless preserves Saussure’s to consider semiology as a discipline, which “would show what constitutes signs, what laws govern them” and to separate it from more special descriptions of definite sign systems, such as national languages, systems of notations, symbolic rites, polite formulas, military signals, etc. (Saussure 1960: 16).

2. *Semiotics and hermeneutics*

Semiotics on the whole, and semiography especially, has much in common with hermeneutics. Both of them study signs and texts, their connections with meanings and senses, their relations to texts' creators and interpreters. Nevertheless, they are non-coincident spheres of knowledge, because they have different aims. The purpose of hermeneutics is interpretation of diverse objects as texts expressing definite senses treated by definite interpreters and, often, in definite conditions. This purpose is common for both theological and philological hermeneutics, and philosophical hermeneutics is developed for "deciphering" the world-as-text as well. The broader the subject of hermeneutic researches is, the more these researches need a general theory of connections between senses and signs used for their expression, and the closer they come to semiotics (for example, see Meier 1757). The subject of semiotics is just the uniform norms of correlation between significant constructions and some unifying ways of interpreting them. Semiotics describes as its subject not particular senses of certain texts, but the norms of interpreting them and general conditions of sign connection.

This purpose to research general conditions of sense-forming and understanding differs and even opposes semiotics to hermeneutics, which always preserves the aim to identify specific qualities of concrete texts and individual acts of interpreting them. Taking no notice of specific contexts, semiotics, on various of its levels, makes generalizations and identifies more or less uniform ways of sign-formation and sign-construal. Hermeneutics sticks to its individualizing disposition even when it has to rise to the level of philosophical generalizations; semiotics, on the contrary, preserves its generalizing disposition even when it deals with specific norms of partial sign systems on the level of semiography and, especially, when it investigates the general principles of creating signs and their meanings on the level of semiology. Identifying systems of such norms and rules, the semiotic scholar endeavours to find reproducible signs and symbols as regular units of semiotic systems – languages or codes whereby meanings are expressed. As a result of applying such systems, semioticians also consider specific texts, but treated in the same generalizing spirit, including verbal and any other sign constructions, where identification of more or less uniform rules of structuring and interpretation is possible.

This generalizing orientation of semiotics, as has already been mentioned, is the common property of all its levels. In this sense, it can clarify semiosophic studies of the grounds of sign theory. Particularly, such a unifying approach is appropriate for logical semantics, where signs are considered only as the means of representation, apart from their communicative functions. For example, Frege's conception of sign connects the latter with a constant meaning (Sinn), which differs not only from the object it denotes (Bedeutung), but also from subjective images of this object (Vorstellungen); unlike various images arising in the minds of different people, the meaning of sign is a unifying and invariant way of representation, independent of the subjects it uses (see Frege 1962: 41–42). In a similar way, the semiotics of Charles S. Peirce, which was formed on the grounds of logic, considers the sign as a member of a triadic relation, where it functions as a “representamen” of an object for an “interpretant” (see Peirce 1931: §§ 541, 564). The representative function of sign is also not necessarily connected with the performance of a communicative function.

Unlike the logical concept, connecting the sign mainly with the representative function, linguistic models to a greater degree consider the communicative function of signs. At the same time, semiology, developed on the grounds of linguistics, is also oriented generatively, considering its task to be the research of a stable “sign function” between semiotic “forms” of expression and contents, independent of a changeable “substance”, and therefore regards signs of language as constant units, where the connections between *signified* (*signifié*) and *signifier* (*signifiant*) are unifying norms preserved in diverse individual acts of speaking (cf. Saussure 1960: 14, 113; Hjelmslev 1963: 47 ff.).

The tendency to generalization is obvious enough for semiology in all its versions, directed as they are to general principles of sign connection (Peircean semiotics), organization of sign systems (Saussurean semiology and Hjelmslevian glossematics), or to the clarifying of relations between diverse semiotic systems (e.g., Barthes, Benveniste, Eco, Lotman, and others).

Finally, semiographical investigations also aim to identify reproducible *conditions*, on which something functions as a sign. Like semiology, semiography studies more or less uniform norms of creating and interpreting certain concrete types of signs and symbols, rather than their specific treatment in particular cases. Multifarious branches of semiography are occu-

pied with the identifying of systematic relations between signs and their meanings, between the “plane of expression” and the “plane of content”, even if these invariant relations are limited to the frames of particular sign systems.

Another important difference between semiotics and hermeneutics is connected with the subject of understanding. Hermeneutics, which originated as an “art of understanding”, is directed to revealing ways sense is presented to the subject. From the point of view of hermeneutics, the research of objective “mechanisms” of constructing and reconstructing senses via signs serves as a supporting, subordinate investigation. The semiotic approach is essentially different: semiotics intends to reveal precisely those objective “mechanisms” of sign action which can be performed independently of whether the subject conceptualizes these mechanisms or uses them only subconsciously. The objective conditions of sign connection are of more interest to semiotics than are the subjective ways of sense interpretation, just as the means-providing processes of communication and understanding are more interesting than the result of those processes in individual cases.

3. “Small” and “large” semiospheres

The versions of semiology do not differ in their purpose to identify general conditions of sign connection, but rather in how broadly they consider this connection to be and in the way they view those conditions. Various versions of semiotic theory define these limits in different ways. If the sign theory of logical semantics is limited to signs used in rational thinking (see, for example, Carnap 1946: 13–14), semiology in its Saussurean project focuses more on “the life of signs within society” (Saussure 1960: 16). Considering verbal language as a model, this project of semiology aimed to extend linguistic concepts to research of other sign systems. Saussure supposed that “linguistics can become the master-pattern for all branches of semiology although language is only one particular semiological system” (ibid.: 68). Such a “linguocentric” approach was developed by Louis Hjelmslev, who suggested that many disciplines – logic, mathematics, literature, art, and music – all be studied from a common point of view, as “concentrated around a linguistically defined setting of problems” (Hjelmslev 1963: 108).

Such a semiological project approaches the realm of “symbolic forms” researched by Ernst Cassirer, who set out to transform the Kantian “critique of pure rationality” into a “critique of culture”, and who considered the human to be not only an “animal rationale”, but more importantly as an “animal symbolicum” (Cassirer 1923–1929, 1944). The sphere of Cassirer’s “symbolic forms” is close in scope to Lotman’s concept of “semiosphere”, which is also broader than the sphere outlined by logical semantics or linguistics, and which includes all means of human communication, generalized in culture (see Lotman 1984). This concept of the semiosphere outlines roughly the same program as that of Umberto Eco, who connects the limits of semiology with the sphere of communicative means supported by certain cultural conventions (Eco 1976: 19).

Eco’s “semiotic threshold”, however, has also been crossed by other semiotic programs, first of all, by the general theory of signs suggested by Charles Peirce and developed by Charles Morris, which despite its logical bias assumes as its subject a much larger sphere, including that of biological processes (see, particularly, Morris 1971: 67, 83). According to Winfried Nöth, “Peirce’s semiosphere certainly includes the whole biosphere” (Nöth 2001: 16; see also, Nöth 2000: 57). Such optimistic treatment of semiotics allows it include “natural signs” among its objects, i.e., phenomena not created deliberately to express someone’s ideas but nevertheless able to point out some peculiarities of a presented situation by virtue of “naturally” arising regularities; we are reminded here of Husserl’s opposition between “Ausdrucke” and “Anzeichen” as two ways of explaining the concept of “sign” (Husserl 1984: 30 ff.). The investigation of signals and natural indexes used in information processes within and between living beings constitutes such domains as “phytosemiotics”, “zoosemiotics”, “biosemiotics” and even “physicosemiotics” (see Krampen 1981; Sebeok 1972, 1999; Nöth 2001). There are thus reasons to understand the concept of “semiosphere” in a broader sense, expanding it to include the realm of every living thing (Hoffmeyer 1996).

Despite their differences, Lotman’s and Hoffmeyer’s conceptions of semiosphere can be coordinated with each other; the former as a “small” sphere of human communicative means developed in culture, and the latter a “large” sphere of information, admitting other communicative means and including mediators of natural processes and technical vehicles. One can speak about *semiology of nature* as well as *semiology of culture* and

even about their mutual interaction in case of the human as “animal symbolic”, who is involved in both of these spheres and hence their interdependence, and whose communicative activities cannot be formulated in terms of just one of these two semiologic directions.

At the same time, the “small” semiosphere cannot be subsumed within a “big” one, because the sign-means, intentionally created in a culture for communication between members of a group and for representation of objects of their activities, cannot be reduced to naturally arising signals and indexes. These “natural semiotic means” are not “sign-means” in this sense. Semiology, as a scholarly discipline, may not ignore the principal difference between these types of mediators; at the same time, it cannot ignore many common properties of informational means functioning in the “small” and “large” semiospheres.

In view of the similarities and differences among information mediators, semiology may be divided into a “general” domain. This last is occupied with fundamental principles of mediation, investigated by the comparison of various means of information-connection in both “large” and “small” semiospheres, a branch of which specializes in the research of sign means intentionally created in the process of human activities.

4. *Semiology of sign means*

A “semiology of sign-means” builds conceptual models of sign connection, which is produced and reproduced in culture and mediates both subject-object and inter-subject relations. Because these sign-means differ from other types of semiotic means, such as natural signals and indexes, the name is not tautological: the “semiology of sign-means” may be distinguished from “general semiology” and from other “partial” semiologic branches by virtue of specific *genetic*, *functional*, and *structural* properties of its subject of inquiry.

First of all, sign-means differ in genesis from other ways of informational connection. Unlike naturally formed signals and indexes in bio-systems, these sign-means arise in culture as human activities that are deliberately produced, reproduced, and applied in acts of communication between subjects, in order to represent objects of their cognition, evaluation or transformation. The interpretation of signs as consciously used means of activity in part allows us to understand its characteristically arbitrary

nature – arbitrary connections between the sign and its meaning, arbitrary selection of sign vehicles and their combination in sign constructs, arbitrary use of signs in specific contexts, arbitrary reactions to signs, etc.

The sign-means created in human activity differ from natural bearers of information also by their *functions*. Unlike signals or indexes arising in nature on various levels of biological processes, signs are able not only to *present* an object within a current context, but also to *represent* objects missing from a current situation, and to *express thoughts* about them, regardless of how distant they may be in time or space. Hence, sign-means make it possible to determine the results of learning, the evaluation or projection of material of communication; and vice versa, the use of communication means in any of these acts.

The combination of *communicative* and *representative* functions is an essential peculiarity of the sign-means, which perform both functions by virtue of the same mechanism. A basic element of this mechanism is a necessary reference of meanings constructed and reconstructed in communicative acts. Whether an object exists in reality or not, whether it is presented in the situation of meaning-expression or has nothing to do with it – meanings expressed by signs are always intended to relate a thought to a certain object. Correspondingly, signs which express these meanings always have an object-correlation, which is the property of signs themselves rather than the context in which they are used. The context and specific referents of signs may vary, but the intention of a sign to relate a thought to some referent is its inherent property.

The sign connection performed through a special “mechanism” of relations forms a specific *structure*. This structure is constituted as a net of connections between different components of a sign situation, where one subject of activity can express to another subject a thought about an object, represented by the sign constructed according to a definite scheme, connected with a scheme of thought formation by a code accepted in the culture. These two types of schemes are reproducible and invariant members of the “expression” and “contents” planes, respectively, and are connected by the relation of *signification* (Hjelmslev’s “form of expression” and “form of content” as two “functives” of a relation identified as “sign function”; 1963: 48).

The relation of signification is a key element in the whole structure of sign connection and should be included in the class of *semantic rela-*

tions together with relations of *reference* between the sign vehicle and the object it denotes, of *expression* between ideas of object and of its sign in the mind of a sender, and of *interpretation* between corresponding ideas in the mind of the recipient. The complete structure of the “mechanism” of sign connection can be represented by a spatial model, the “sign prism”, which shows the way these semantic relations are included in the structure of human activity and allows combining models of diverse aspects of sign connection developed in logical, linguistic and other ways (for more detail, see Tchertov 1993: 313–326; Čertov 1999).

Semiology of sign-means is not reducible to a theory of sign mechanism. The concept of sign-means includes all sign systems (of codes and languages) and sign constructions (texts). Accordingly, there are the reasons to consider within frames of the semiology of sign-means also *the theory of the sign systems* (of codes and languages), the theory of *sign constructions (texts)*, as well as the *general theory of “small semiosphere”*, which considers the mutual connection and interaction of codes functioning in culture and texts created and interpreted by them. Such a theory of semiosphere can be considered also as a *semiology of culture* researching the ways of cooperation between various kinds of sign-means from diverse forms of culture (myth, ritual, religion, art, science, technique, social life, etc.).

5. Semiology of sign-means and inter-subject understanding

Semiology of sign-means, as distinct from general semiology as well as from “partial” semiologic branches, may be interpreted as a theory explaining how and on what conditions *understanding* between subjects is possible. Such theory is based on a presupposition that might be formulated via a “semiosophic” thesis: “Understanding between people is possible”. This optimistic presupposition is not obvious in a world where misunderstanding accompanies almost all joint actions, and where understanding seems to be an unachievable goal. Nevertheless the reasons for its acceptance seem more convincing than its negations. If understanding between subjects was impossible, then any cooperation aimed to achieve common goals also would be impossible. This is equally true for agreements between friends or colleagues, for the general existence of culture as a system of knowledge, values or skills shared by members of a collective and concentrated in

the collective memory of that society, and for the united subject. And vice versa: if a common project is planned, buildings proposed, trains scheduled, and so on, then the fact that such plans were performed would make it evident that minimal understanding among the planners has taken place. If a certain understanding is a condition of any mutual activity of people at all, it is even more necessary to inter-subject communication. Indeed, a communicative act could not have this property without understanding as a result – if not, it would turn into just a huge number of strange sounds or motions.

Understanding, in the semiological sense, relates not only to cases of mutual agreement and cooperation, but also to the cases of opposition and conflict. Even opponents have something in common, relating to the object they are struggling about; moreover, they should have a common language to express the disagreement. A duel cannot take place, if an opponent does not understand he has been challenged.

Focusing its attention on the sign-means of understanding, semiology extracts the mechanism of sign-formation and sign-functioning out of the ways they are used by participants of the communication process. Individual differences mastering these means, the readiness to apply them in various situations, etc. are not taken into consideration by semiology, which only pays attention to the capacity of diverse subjects to use uniformly the same system of meaning-expression.

Signs, sign systems, and sign constructions are treated in a semiology of sign-means as the products of joint activity of subjects communicating with regard to certain common objects. This concerted work of communicating includes some unifying ways of mental treatment of objects involved in cognitive, normative or projective forms of activity. The uniform modeling of these objects is performed by reproducible meanings of signs.

Considering communication between subjects as a joint activity in which any of them can construct and reconstruct meanings on the basis of the same “standard” semiotic means, semiology thereby treats signs and sign systems not only as external mediators between communicating subjects but also as means necessary for the internal processes of *sense-creation* and *sense-expression*. Conscious expression of senses using signs includes acts of constructing these senses by uniform meanings. In turn, any sense-creation by signs is at the same time an initial stage of sense-expression, regardless of whether it is continued in external acts of communication or

just stays at the level of “internal speech” (or its analogs in non-verbal semi-otic systems). Therefore, sense-creation on one hand and sense-expression on the other hand are treated by the semiology of sign-means as two sides (internal and external) of the same sign-mediated activity.

In a semiology that accepts such a supposition, the process of communication between subjects would be seen as the usage of a system of means which, on the one hand, allows the “transmitter” of a message to *construct* senses expressed in the texts by unifying meanings, and which, on the other hand, permits the “receiver” of the texts to *reconstruct* their senses using the same meanings of signs. Such a joint activity of “transmitter” and “receiver” of texts, in constructing and reconstructing senses using a common system of semiotic means, is usually called “transmission”. This metaphor is admissible until it begins to be understood literally, as a transfer of any object independent of acts of construction or reconstruction.

Whereas signs and meanings belong to a semiotic system of “language” and have a universal character, the texts and senses constructed by these language units belong to “speech” and can express certain individual intentions (cf. Saussure 1960: 19). An understanding of these individual senses supposes knowledge not only of the general rules of the semiotic system, but also of the concrete context and individual conditions of generation of the particular text. Such understanding is possible for a receiver who is involved in the same context and knows these special conditions; in other cases it becomes a matter for hermeneutics, as an “art of understanding”. However, the interpretation of sense in both of these cases is based on the ground given by a semiotic system, with its units of expression and of contents. The usage of this common system of codes, like Saussurean “language”, is a necessary minimal condition of understanding, even if it is not enough for a complete understanding.

Semiology studies these necessary, minimal conditions of understanding. From its point of view, understanding appears as a correct *reconstruction* of a sense based on the rules of a pertinent code, with its standard sign units and their uniform meanings. Such reconstruction does not include non-semiotic conditions of understanding – psychological, sociological, ideological or other grounds whereon one subject may or may not be ready to understand the internal intentions of another subject. Semi-otic conditions are responsible only for the correct “delivery” of a message to the mind of the receiving subject, rather than the receiver’s subsequent usage

of it. This correct reconstruction of a meaning may be juxtaposed to its *destruction* or to its borderline case – deconstruction – understood as a deformed reconstruction which is not based on the rules of the code on which the text is built, thus causing a shift in meaning or even changing the text. Diversions of correct interpretations are interesting to semiology only so as to find out, in a situation of incomplete understanding, what is missing that would create semiotic conditions for understanding. *Constructively* oriented semiotics can accept a deconstructed text as an object for analysis only if the research recreates a system of rules to which such a text is correlated, i.e., the code whereby new meanings could be correctly reconstructed.

6. *Concluding remarks*

The semiology of sign-means, unlike other semiotic branches, limits its topic to ways of information-connection that are created in culture and used in human activity. These means differ from signals and indexes generated in nature by a necessary correlation of at least three semiotic functions. These serve together as (1) the means of representing objects to a subject, (2) the means of internal mental activity of this subject, and (3) the means of communication between the diverse subjects. Such superposition of mediative functions in complex subject-object, inter-subjective, and intra-subjective relations is a proper quality of sign-means created and used in human activity. Due to this quality these means can serve for construction and reconstruction of senses. In this way they become the means of expression and understanding available to different people.

This peculiarity gives us reason to consider the semiology of sign-means as a theory that researches the conditions of sense expression and correct understanding of a message by diverse subjects. Such a theory admits that, in the real process of interpretation, complete understanding is hard to achieve and that correct reconstruction of senses is usually accompanied, to a greater or lesser extent, by the destruction and misunderstanding of texts. Overcoming these difficulties is the task of hermeneutics as an art of understanding, which intends to reveal specific features of texts and their senses, by taking into account individual peculiarities of sender and receiver. Unlike hermeneutics, the semiology of sign-means is interested in the general rules of construction and reconstruction of texts and their

senses. It treats the application of semiotic systems, common to members of a communicative process, as a necessary initial condition for successful communication. Thus, the semiology of sign-means can be treated as a theory of general conditions that must necessarily obtain in order for human understanding to be possible.

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Morten Tønnessen

Where I end and you begin

The threshold of the self and the intrinsic value of the phenomenal world

[A]s you arrogate all mind to yourself, you will see the world around you as mindless and therefore ... yours to exploit.
Gregory Bateson (2000: 462)

Through semiotic agency, all living beings are sign utilizers and therefore ontological subjects, i.e., subjects of the phenomenal world (see Tønnessen 2003). The reason why it makes sense to regard all semiotic agents as moral subjects is that, in respect to these entities, our actions make a difference. Only for semiotic agents can our actions ultimately appear as signs that influence their well-being. As meaning-utilizers, all semiotic agents, even the simplest creatures, can distinguish between what they need and what is irrelevant or harmful to them.

But why regard higher-level living systems, such as species, ecosystems and landscapes, as moral subjects? Because a living being is not an isolated incident. In a profound sense, a subject *is* what it relates to. The network of relations that it takes part in do, largely, define what being this subject is all about. The individual self branches off into the society of phenomenal subjects and into the phenomenal world; it is already social, already worldly, already more-than-individual. In the end, you cannot really value a subject without at the same time valuing the web of relations in which it takes part.

1. A relational concept of nature

According to Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944), all beings partake in subject-object relations characterized by a mutual correspondence between the two entities. The known phenomenal world consists of various kinds

of individual phenomenal worlds that, through the interconnectedness of diverse relations, comprise what we call “nature”.

The *ontological niche* of a being can be defined as the set of relations that it takes part in at a given point of natural history. The ontological niche of a being, in other words, delimits the “area” that this being occupies in the phenomenal world. Simultaneously, through its ontological niche, the phenomenal world of a being is intertwined with other phenomenal worlds, thus integrating it into the society of phenomenal subjects.

2. The implicit self and the explicit self

As a first, more thorough approach to the self, I introduce a distinction between an *implicit* self and an *explicit* self. The implicit self is the (somatic, social and ecological) self which is embodied in the behaviour of a being, and can be taken to be an ontological entity where the being in question is considered as an instance of relational being. Each and every living being has (or is) a more or less complex, implicit self.

The explicit self, on the other hand, is the self which manifests itself in the identity (or subjectivity) of a being. The explicit self can be taken to be a phenomenological entity in the sense that it entails a (self-reflective) representation of this being’s subjectivity. There follow four theses on the interaction between the implicit and the explicit self

(1) The implicit self is the ground of the explicit self.

(2) In so far as the behaviour of a being is guided by its identity, i.e., by its self-reflective subjectivity, the explicit self serves as the ground of the implicit self.

(3) In the case of simple (non-social) creatures, the implicit self and the explicit self converge.

(4) In the case of complex (social) creatures, the implicit self and the explicit self diverge, to an extent that broadly speaking corresponds to their level of semiotic freedom.

3. The human explicit self

As Donald Favareau (2002: 84) writes, “we can situate the deeply internalized, seemingly ubiquitous concept of “self” [in the human context] as a product of the uppermost symbol level of our “biological inner sem-

iosphere”. This is a level which, by definition, includes and yet exceeds (in abstraction and in semiotic freedom) the supporting iconic and indexical levels of the never-ending, sign-exchange activity mediating cell, brain, body and world. Following David Agler (2006) and his reading of Peirce, it seems reasonable to stress that “a symbol [such as, in my words, the human explicit self] is always a sign of expectation and memory; it always needs further development”. The human self, in other words, is deeply indeterminate. “If there is no indeterminacy with regard to the conception of the self”, Agler reminds us, “then there is no room for the conception to grow.”

4. *Næss on identification and the self*

“Traditionally”, deep ecologist Arne Næss states (1987: 35), “the maturity of self has been considered to develop through three stages, from ego to social self, comprising the ego, and from there to the metaphysical self, comprising the social self. But Nature is then largely left out in the conception of this process.” Næss tentatively introduces a concept of ecological self. “The ecological self of a person”, he writes, “is that with which this person identifies” (cf. my definition of explicit self). “Because of an inescapable process of identification with others, with growing maturity, the self is widened and deepened. We ‘see ourselves in others’. Self-realization is hindered if the self-realization of others, with whom we identify, is hindered.”

We discover that parts of nature are parts of ourselves. “This becomes the root of the most powerful application of ecosophical thinking to specifically environmental conflicts. We must see the vital needs of ecosystems and other species as our own needs”, David Rothenberg (1989: 10–11) claims, and perhaps somewhat too optimistically: “there is thus no conflict of interests.”

Attempting to combine a biosemiotic understanding of the self, from the Peircean tradition, with a view from deep ecology, I arrive at the following table:

5. *A critique of a critique*

In *Semiotics Unbounded*, Susan Petrilli and Augusto Ponzio (2005) offer a fairly thorough presentation of their *semioethics*. While I agree with several

ASPECT OF SELF	TYPE OF RELATIONS	TYPE OF IDENTIFICATION	MEANS OF IDENTIFICATION
Indexical	Physical (causal)	Functional	Inter-dependence
Iconic	Phenomenological (qualitative)	Immediate	Similarity
Symbolic	Habitual (conventional)	Abstract	Analogy

Table 1. Three aspects of the explicit self, and of human identification.

of the foundational statements of a semioethics proper, I have some critical remarks as to its present manifestation.

First, despite repeated statements that “signs and life coincide”, as Winfried Nöth points out in a paper in process, assertions are made that computers are sign machines which effectively “extends semiosis to the inorganic” (Petrilli & Ponzio: 505). This is an obvious contradiction. Second, it is asserted that the global “communication-production” system is “a danger for communication itself” (ibid.: 230); also, the “risk of the end of communication refers to nothing less than the risk of the end of life on this planet” (538). Such assertions lack a proper scientific grounding. What might be about to occur is a sixth extinction comparable to five instances of massive loss of biodiversity recorded through natural history.

Third, by speaking about ecological destruction and destruction of social systems in the same terms, it is asserted – mistakenly – that the current developmental patterns of those systems converge. They do not. While the semio-economic growth system performs much of its work by inducing a reduction of natural complexity, it would be a mistake to make an equally general assertion concerning social systems.

Fourth, while references to destruction of social systems are well represented, growth in cultural diversity taking place within that very same “communication-production” system is neglected. In contrast I suggest that higher-level cultural diversity, such as the number of languages and cultures worldwide, seems to be declining, whereas many kinds of lower-level cultural diversity seems to be growing at an exponential rate, some-

what corresponding to economic growth. Some examples: The number of works of art and scientific works (and scientists and artists), scientific (sub)-disciplines, artistic genres (at least musical ones) and the number of professions. I propose that these two diverging macro-developments taken as one complex pattern are characteristic of globalization.

Fifth, the authors state that the “productive cycle destroys ... jobs, because it makes way for automation, which further increases unemployment” (555–556). There is no general, long-term global tendency towards increased unemployment.

Sixth, it is stated that “the expanding phenomenon of migration” is underpinned by the fact that the production system “produces growing areas of underdevelopment as the very condition for development” (556–557), whereas in fact migration to rich countries is first of all a result of the combination of the emerging globalization of wealth and the growth in communications and infrastructure for transportation.

Seventh, as points above show, contrary to the claim that Petrilli and Ponzio’s approach “does not orient semiotics according to any specific ideological plan” (540), it has a (too narrow) ideological bias.

Eighth: Semioethics as depicted in *Semiotics Unbounded* does not seem to allow for paradoxes – and where paradoxes disappear, dogmatism tends to crop up. In real-life socio-political development, paradoxes of various kinds are inherent. For instance, the very same “destructive” semio-economic growth system that leads to ecological devastation worldwide has also resulted in a global human life expectancy that is today about twice as long as before the emergence of a growth economy. How do we account for such contrasting effects?

Finally: according to Petrilli and Ponzio “[g]lobalization implies that communication is omnipresent throughout the entire productive cycle” (555), and they relate this to the appearance of computers and the so-called information society. The perspective should be more long-term. Communication is not a recent phenomenon; nor is work, trade, growth or globalization. Former OECD economist Angus Maddison proposes a suitable modern categorization when he characterizes 1500–1820 as a proto-capitalist and 1820– as a capitalist era. By “capitalist” economies we should understand semio-economic systems that aim at indefinite growth by means of advances in technology. This 500 year-perspective also coincides with the European discovery of the Americas and all that jazz.

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Jean-François Trubert

“Playing with signs”: Le théâtre instrumental de Mauricio Kagel

C'est grâce à une bourse que le compositeur argentin Mauricio Kagel, élève de Borges, a pu s'établir à Cologne à partir de 1957. Il fréquente alors les séminaires de Darmstadt, en se frottant à la nouvelle génération: Stockhausen, qui venait alors de terminer *Zeitmaße*, mais aussi Pierre Boulez – dont il avait déjà fait la connaissance à Buenos Aires,¹ John Cage et Ligeti. Après avoir achevé la réalisation de la pièce *Anagrama*, il met au point le terme de “Théâtre instrumental” pour la pièce *Sur scène*: les techniques compositionnelles acquises entre 1952 et 1958 sont étendues à la scène, les attitudes et les gestes devenant de nouveaux paramètres pour l'écriture.

Cependant, le *théâtre instrumental* n'a pas de connotation dramaturgique en liaison avec un genre particulier, comme le théâtre musical par exemple. Kagel revendique un statut de compositeur à part entière (Kagel 1993: 13): “Je n'ai jamais écrit de ‘musique de scène’ ou d'accompagnement pour une action scénique quelconque. Je considère plutôt que j'ai fait de la musique absolue *avec* la scène.”

Kagel fait ainsi de la partition un espace où le caractère polysémique de l'œuvre impose ses zones de conflits, en piégeant non seulement l'auditeur mais aussi l'interprète lui-même: les limites entre texte musical et paratexte vacillent. Pour en saisir éventuellement le sens, il faut explorer les modalités d'écriture de ces pièces, habiller le chaos apparent de la seule réalité tangible: celle du geste. Trois zones conflictuelles peuvent être mises en évidence: celle du texte, celle de la technique de composition, et enfin celle de la forme, en parcourant sous forme d'allers-retours trois œuvres significatives, *Anagrama* composée en 1957/1958, *Antiithese* (1962) et *Staatstheater* (1967/1971).

1. *Mauricio Kagel: Les conditions de la représentation*

Les œuvres de Mauricio Kagel, en particulier celles qui touchent au genre du *théâtre instrumental*, se distinguent avant tout par leur nature hétérogène, voire franchement extra-musicale, et par leur dimension humoristique et iconoclaste. Le spectateur ou l’interprète deviennent les otages captifs d’énigmes à tiroir où de multiples niveaux d’interprétations coexistent. Les titres des pièces en sont d’ailleurs le reflet. Elles laissent présager, comme dans une œuvre à programme, des éléments constitutifs ou des structures de l’œuvre où la dimension ludique n’est d’ailleurs jamais totalement absente – comme le montrent ces quelques titres accompagnés de leur sous-titres: *Sur Scène, pièce de théâtre musical de chambre* (1958), basé sur une triple jeu de mot; *Journal de Théâtre, ensemble de situations pour instruments, Interprètes et Accessoires* (1960), qui vient de l’allemand *Requisiten*: terme propre au vocabulaire du théâtre; *Le Bruit, invective pour toute sorte de sources sonores et expressions injurieuses* (1960). L’assemblage de termes incongrus a pour effet de désorienter le spectateur en instaurant un jeu sur le sens, qui se résout dans une dialectique de la présence et de l’absence de connotation: *Die Umkehrung Amerikas, Hörspiel épique*; ou encore *Blue’s Blue, Reconstruction ethnomusicologique pour quatre participants* (1979); *Der Tribun, Hörspiel pour orateur politique, sons de marche, et haut-parleur* (1979). L’astuce de *Zwei-Mann Orchester, für zwei ein-Mann Orchester* (1973) repose quant à elle sur un isolexisme. Dans certains cas, les titres semblent livrer des clés structurelles, et dans d’autres cas, le titre semble tout à la fois se soumettre et se dérober à la lecture de la représentation: comme pour *Antithese*, où le spectateur piégé cherchera vainement quel est le terme antithétique. Dans d’autres situations, ces titres permettent d’établir une typologie concrète de la représentation comme par exemple *Sur scène*, qui se passe ... sur scène, ou encore *Acustica* (1970) qui propose un inventaire de sonorités et d’instruments.

Le caractère pseudo-dadaïste de ces aphorismes vient pourtant masquer un deuxième niveau de lecture: le titre de ces représentations remplit une fonction qui est historique. Ainsi, le *Concerto pour piano n°5 en mi♭ Majeur* de Beethoven est un titre purement descriptif de l’œuvre, qui présage déjà d’une certaine structure et d’un instrumentarium précisé à l’avance ainsi que d’une certaine élaboration du matériau – il commencera et finira sur un accord de *mi♭ Majeur*. Dans ce cadre, les titres chez Kagel

renvoient à une tradition similaire, qui n'est pas – paradoxalement – une tradition théâtrale, mais bien une tradition musicale. Ils renseignent ainsi sur une *réalité tangible* de ce que l'on va voir et entendre, accompagnée de la composition instrumentale et/ou de l'effectif présent sur scène: *Anagrama, pour chanteur soliste, chœur parlé et ensemble de chambre* (1957); *Antithese, Jeu scénique pour un interprète avec sons électroniques et [sons publiques]* (1962); *Phonophonie, quatre mélodrames pour deux voix et autres sources sonores* (1963); *Match, pour trois "interprètes"* (1964); *Prima vista, pour appareil à diapositives et nombre indéterminé de sources sonores* (1964); *Staatstheater Composition scénique* (1969–70); *Exotica pour instruments extra-européens* (1972).

De son côté, l'exécutant est mis au défi de jouer la partition, comme dans *Exotica* (1972), dans laquelle il est demandé à des interprètes de la musique occidentale savante de jouer avec des instruments extra-européens. Cette problématique est transcendée par l'aspect visuel et performatif du jeu, qui dépasse les contraintes techniques. La partition devient alors une zone de conflit, car le résultat est à la fois visuel et sonore. Elle nécessite des descriptions et des instructions de jeu dont le mode opératoire s'appuie sur des paramètres hétérogènes (instruments, gestes, sons). Le livret joue alors un rôle de premier plan, comme dans *Anagrama* (Kagel 1965a: IV et V):


Les parties vocales de l'œuvre (caractères majuscules – mots isolés et phrases cohérentes; symboles phonétiques – combinaisons de sons parlés ou chantés) sont composées par les voyelles et consonnes – ou par leurs variantes phonétiques – du palindrome anonyme (du moyen âge?):

IN GIRUM IMUS NOCTE ET CONSUMIMUR IGNI

Il devient nécessaire de disposer des indications sur la structure "figurée" de la pièce pour l'exécution, ce qui renvoie à une problématique de la perception:

Les endroits libres dans le texte vocal, indiqués par des parenthèses doivent être remplis par l'interprète. Les voyelles et les consonnes du palindrome, ainsi que les symboles phonétiques donnés dans l'appendice I serviront comme matériel de base pour la formation des textes manquants (donc, ne pas employer: A, B, D, F, L ou P). L'exécutant doit remplir les places libres le plus individuellement possible, afin d'éviter une réalisation homophone de l'ensemble.

Dans tous les cas de figures, le texte de la partition va jusqu’à se confondre avec son livret ou sa préface, ce que l’on appelle en littérature le paratexte, comme c’est le cas dans *Staatstheater*.



Exemple 1. Mauricio Kagel, Staatstheater : Repertoire. © Wien, Universal Edition, UE 15197 LW, 1975.

D’après Elizabeth Zawisza (Zawisza 2000: 14–15), cette “zone intermédiaire” qui entoure le texte (titre, livret de partition, etc.) forme des “zones de passage parfaitement perméables qui départagent moins qu’elles n’unissent divers systèmes de signes, de formes d’écriture et de pratiques artistiques”. Ces systèmes de signes aux limites imprécises deviennent ainsi le corps même de la partition qui peut alors relever du carnet de théâtre dans la définition qu’en donne Anne Ubersfeld (2000: 277), c’est-à-dire en tant que *projet* de réalisation: “Le paratexte théâtral [ici les carnets de représentation] est toujours riche, plus riche sans doute que celui de tout autre texte littéraire, puisqu’il s’agit d’un genre inachevé, et que seule la représentation précipite l’œuvre dans ... la relation à l’autre.”

La représentation est donc comprise selon une perspective dialectique: elle est à la fois réglementée et irréductible à son “texte”. C’est le cas notamment de la pièce *Antithese*, où le celui-ci ne fait qu’un avec celui du livret explicatif nécessaire à l’exécution de l’œuvre. Saisir son essence passe alors

par un travail à la fois génétique et analytique, où comme le précise Werner Klüppelholz (2003: 8), “il n’est pas facile de comprendre une œuvre sans jeter un coup d’œil aux esquisses”.

2. Représentation: Les conditions de Mauricio Kagel

Mauricio Kagel est un compositeur qui a su, de manière remarquablement précoce, maîtriser le langage sériel dans les multiples prolongements qui ont été évoqués durant les séminaires de Darmstadt dans les années 50. Les esquisses et les brouillons montrent que dès la réalisation de *Anagrama*, Kagel a utilisé des techniques de composition sérielle lui permettant une prolifération du matériau, mais en laissant ouvert les possibilités d’agencement, en faisant coexister divers modes de structuration. La pièce *Anagrama* constitue en cela une œuvre clé, au sens philologique, car on trouve dans les documents d’archives un véritable inventaire de techniques de composition, qui reflètent les nombreux essais auxquels Kagel s’est livré.²

Dans cette pièce, un palindrome original IN GIRUM IMUS NOCTE ET CONSUMIMUR IGNI, sert de prétexte à la composition vocale et instrumentale en définissant un champ de proportions. Ainsi, des relations entre notes, sons, rythmes sont déduites de l’analyse du palindrome de base, notamment du nombre de lettres à l’intérieur de chaque mot, ce qui permet par exemple d’engendrer des proportions: 2 4 5 4 2 10 4. Puis il procède de même avec les syllabes: 1 2 2 2 1 4 2. Ceci permet à Kagel d’obtenir une sorte de sérialisation des différents paramètres, en associant par exemple une lettre à une note, en établissant des rapports de proportions rythmiques (Kassel 2004: 19–20). Il superpose alors ces structures – en canons, par augmentation ou par réduction – afin de donner une certaine fluidité à la forme musicale.

Mais Kagel *joue* sur l’hétérogénéité elle-même, comme une sorte de défi lancé à l’auditeur. La série qui est utilisée dans de nombreux documents d’archives ne correspond pas du tout à celle qui est exposée dans sa présentation de 1960 (Kagel 1997: 361). Il n’y a pas d’indices ou de clés de lecture dans le résultat sonore: les événements musicaux ne sont plus perçus de manière unilatérale mais comme résultantes de multiples réseaux échappant à la perception, car les structures qui permettent d’engendrer le matériau sont trop nombreuses. Seule compte la définition d’un champ d’espace et de durées – une idée exposée par Stockhausen (1988: 26–27)

à Darmstadt dans “... Comment passe le temps ...” – utilisé afin de “séri-
liser” un ensemble de constituants. Ainsi, dans *Staatstheater*, au sein du
mouvement *Einspielungen*, tous les intervalles et leur renversement sont
exécutés de manière libre par les musiciens (ou les haut-parleurs), à partir
de trois schèmes rythmiques qui servent à jouer des combinaisons d’inter-
valles choisis.


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Exemple 2. Mauricio Kagel, Staatstheater : *Einspielungen*. © Wien, Universal Edition, UE 15197 LW, 1975.

Il est indiqué d’ailleurs sur la préface que le musicien doit se servir
d’un crayon afin de noter et de repérer les notes qui composent les trois
fragments rythmiques. C’est la sérialisation d’un champ diatonique de
hauteurs qui sert ici de point de départ à l’organisation structurelle d’un
espace de hauteurs et de durées indéterminés.

On peut enfin observer une technique de permutation d’un rythme
dans les pages qui composent *ensemble*. Une des sections de la voix de
Soprano 2 est formée par une cellule rythmique de trois temps, dont la
structure est invariante, mais dont la manifestation est à chaque fois renou-
velée par élision ou par remplissage des durées.

Le travail de composition de Mauricio Kagel s’attache à transposer les
méthodes qui sont présentes dans son discours musical aux dimensions



Exemple 3. Mauricio Kagel, *Einspielungen. Musik für Lautsprecher* (1970) de Staatstheater (1967–70), brouillon (Sammlung Mauricio Kagel, Paul Sacher Stiftung).

extra-musicales de l'œuvre. Le point de vue adopté est résolument structuraliste. Comme le remarque Eero Tarasti (1995: 436), la musique “contient des formes et des figures” incluant “des éléments ‘anthropomorphiques’”, or ici Kagel joue justement sur la composition de ces mêmes éléments, mais selon une structure qui leur est étrangère. L'idée fondamentale est ici de jouer sur des *ratios* et de créer des proportions de différences: c'est ainsi qu'il est possible de créer un mouvement dans la forme de l'œuvre.

3. Représentation des conditions: Mauricio Kagel

Revenons à la pièce *Antithese*. La forme de la représentation se trouve ici directement liée au choix des actions par l'interprète. Non seulement ce choix permet de réaliser un “Aktionschema” spécifique, mais encore, il a une incidence directe sur la durée de la représentation – ainsi qu'il est stipulé dans le livret – et sur le trajet spatial de l'interprète.

Une page d'esquisse³ montre comment les différentes actions sont déterminées par un rapport de différence entre chacune d'elles: il s'agit

**ENSEMBLE:
SOLO SOPRAN 2**

Aktion: $\downarrow = \text{ca. AM 126}$ * $f = \text{ff}$; $p = \text{pp}$


HOCH
TIEF

MANA ANA NANA NAMA MAMA TAKAPU MOTO
MAIU TOKAPO TAKAPO MANA TSAMA TAKAPO TSAMA
TOKOPO HOKO TUKUPU MANANANA TUKUPU TOKOPA TAKAPA TUKO
PU MANA MANANAMA NAMA TO KOTOKOMA KOTUKOPO
MANATUKO TAKAPOKO MANA ANOKO AMAU MAUIU IUIUIUMA

Aktion → ⑧: * Jede Wiederholung etwas höher

Exemple 4. Mauricio Kagel, Staatstheater : Ensemble. © Wien, Universal Edition, UE 15197 LW, 1975.

toujours de faire se confronter des situations dénuées de tout contexte théâtral, même à un niveau fondamental, et à établir un différentiel de structures. Dans le film de Kagel – qui n'est qu'une des formes des réalisations possibles de l'œuvre – tous les mouvements de l'interprètes sont réglementés à l'aide d'une répartition des mouvements et des positions du corps dans l'espace scénique. Le sens des situations montées les unes à la suite des autres échappe irrémédiablement au spectateur, et seule l'absurdité de la situation générale fait émaner de ce chaos apparent un topos sémantique implicite: l'homme aliéné face à sa propre réification, lutant



Exemple 5. Mauricio Kagel, *Antithese*. © 1965, Henry Littolff's Verlag.

contre les bobines qui menacent de l'asphyxier, et tuant sa propre image télévisuelle.

Staatstheater constitue quant à elle une pièce à part, du point de vue de sa taille comme de sa forme. Réalisée entre 1967 et 1970, elle a été commandée par Rolf Liebermann, alors intendant du Staatsoper de Hambourg. Le compositeur s'est emparé du lieu à tous les niveaux, des décors à la scène, en mettant en situation l'Opéra lui-même (Kagel 2003: 402-403). *Staatstheater* réinterprète toute cette histoire, mais aussi l'Histoire de l'Opéra comme genre. Kagel se livre par conséquent, afin de constituer les différentes sections, à une *composition* des différents événements liés à une représentation d'opéra:

- Répertoire: Morceau de concert scénique
- Einspielungen, Musique pour haut-parleurs
- Ensemble, pour seize voix
- Debüt, pour soixante voix
- Saison, jeux chanté (jeux de mots sur *Singspiel* en allemand) en 65 tableaux
- Spielplan, Musique instrumentale en action
- Kontra-danse, ballet pour non-danseurs
- Freifahrt, Musique de chambre glissante
- Parkett, pour scène mesurée concertante

Chacune de ces parties vient donc décomposer le titre général: *Staatstheater, Composition scénique*. Les différentes sections définies par Mauricio Kagel forment autant d’angles et de points de vue différents selon lesquels l’objet principal – le Staatsoper – est à la fois grossi, inventé, et ré-interprété. Les différents éléments des sous-titres qui décomposent le tableau font appel à des situations historiques du théâtre ou à des sections constituantes d’un spectacle: ainsi *Saison, Spielplan* pour évoquer le carnet de mise en scène, *kontra->Danse* pour les ballets, *Debüt* pour évoquer les apparitions scéniques. Les sections sont alors combinées, pour créer la représentation, selon une logique qui est décrite dans la préface de la partition (Kagel 1975: 5): “Une choix parmi les sections est possible. ‘REPERTOIRE’ sera toujours joué au début d’une représentation. Si cette partie ne figure pas dans le choix, alors on peut commencer comme on veut. La durée d’une représentation doit tenir dans une limite de 100 minutes, la pièce doit être jouée sans pause.”

Ainsi, la section *Repertoire*, qui inventorie un instrumentarium, modifie la perception de la scène en la décomposant en autant de figures sémantiques qui sont données sur la partition, et évoquées pour le spectateur. Si bien qu’il existe – malgré l’absence apparente de tout espèce de dramaturgie – une attitude dramatique dans laquelle évolue l’interprète, et qui est appelée *Modell*. Mais cette situation est comprise comme objet, et c’est la somme de chacun des éléments isolés qui définit alors la forme de la section ainsi que son mouvement général. Seuls les mouvements des interprètes donnent une cohérence formelle à l’ensemble : les situations cocasses et absurdes renvoient à un autre niveau de signification: la présence humaine donne sa seule justification à l’œuvre d’art.

Enfin, *Anagramma* – entre glossolalie et pseudolanguage – consiste en une certaine forme de “théâtralisation”, ou plutôt devrions-nous dire en une certaine “gestualisation” de l’œuvre. Malgré l’emploi de structures complexes, comme nous l’avons vu, la pièce se construit sur une cohérence: celle du geste vocal. Ce sont les phonèmes, utilisés dans l’intonation du palindrome, qui sont dévidés en un grand anagramme sonore, et qui cimentent la forme de l’œuvre. Une typologie vocale s’instaure alors, un mouvement, qui va du palindrome latin aux phrases reformées de la dernière section. Ce parcours sur cinq parties fait entendre tous les stades d’un langage ou d’un pseudo-langage en formation, depuis les sons du palindrome latin, en passant par les phonèmes, jusqu’à la formation des mots dans une typolo-

gie syntagmatique sans aucun sens, ce qui n'est pas sans rappeler les jeux littéraires surréalistes. Le sens final est donné par ce que Kagel appelle une "bizarre dramaturgie" (Kagel 1997: 367) liée à la répartition des mots tout au long de la pièce, où le principe fondateur est la *non-répétition*.⁴

L'écriture des pièces de Mauricio Kagel est fondamentalement liée au geste tout en s'appuyant sur une organisation des événements, quel qu'ils soient. Ces événements sont agencés en fonction de différentes structures qui sont définies par des champs temporels qui les contingentent. Ainsi, dans le théâtre instrumental, c'est le geste de l'interprète qui définit ce champ, et par là, qui donne la durée et qui *sédimente* la forme temporelle de l'œuvre, la partition reflétant moins une réalité acoustique qu'une description minutieuse des événements *en dehors* du temps. C'est en ceci que l'on pourrait ramener Kagel à Brecht: la représentation n'est plus pensée comme un divertissement, mais plutôt comme un objet dont il appartient au spectateur d'interroger le sens, et dont les clés se situent déjà en amont de la représentation (Schnebel 1970: 282).

Raymond Monelle exprimait ainsi l'activité sémiologique (1992: 10): "The semiologist, like Hanslick, is more interested in the *system* of signification than the material signified; he sees systems as empty webs of relations, 'without positive terms' (the phrase is Saussure's but it sets the theme for all structuralist study)."

Effectivement, dans les pièces du théâtre instrumental, les objets scéniques, les gestes, les situations sont extirpés de leur contexte car les structures qui les régissent échappent à toute connotation et les vident de leur sens. Mais la perspective structurale qui voudrait ne parvenir à la compréhension de l'œuvre que dans la justification que l'œuvre donne elle-même de l'apparition des éléments se trouve ici mise en défaut. Lorsqu'il existe une "grammaire" d'un système musical, il est possible d'interpréter toute variation du paradigme fondamental de ce système en relation avec une signification ou un topique éventuel. Mais ici, l'œuvre ne s'y soumet pas, car son système paradigmatique change sans cesse, et sa forme ne suit aucun axe syntagmatique préétabli : elle est œuvre et métalangage d'elle-même.

Mais en renversant sans cesse ces fonctions Kagel ne dessine-t-il pas une nouvelle isotopie? Celle-ci dépasserait les situations de surface dans sa dimension anthropologique et politique: celle de l'aliénation humaine et de la place de l'individu dans la modernité.

Notes

1. En fait, Kagel et Boulez s’était rencontré à deux reprises à Buenos Aires. La première fois en 1950, lors d’une tournée du théâtre Renaud-Barrault en Amérique, où Kagel était figurant dans la pièce *Le procès* de Kafka interprétée par la compagnie. La deuxième fois ce fut en 1954, où Kagel a pu montrer la partition du sextet de cordes à Boulez, qui lui aurait alors fait ce conseil: “Ne restez pas là. Vous devez partir” (Rebstock 2007: 352–353).
2. Les esquisses sont conservés à la Fondation Paul Sacher à Bâle (Suisse) sous la cote Sammlung Mauricio Kagel, Anagrama. Les dossiers 1/17 à 5/17 contiennent les brouillons et esquisses ayant servis à l’élaboration de la pièce, basée sur l’expérimentation: correspondance série des lettres et série des notes, découpage de la partition et tirage au sort des segments obtenus.
3. Sammlung Mauricio Kagel. *Antithese*. Paul Sacher Stiftung, Basel, Switzerland.
4. Dans les esquisses d’*Anagrama* se trouve également un important appareil textuel qui correspond à des descriptions parfois assez précises de l’effet esthétique recherché.

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Hsiu-chih Tsai

The return of the forgotten in Wong Kar-Wai's *2046*

This paper addresses the issue of misunderstanding with an attempt to equate the vestiges of lost love and desire with an impressive and repressive mechanism that keeps people lingering around the repetitive dream scene of the forgotten. Mieke Bal's model of the interaction of the narrative function and visual images in a cultural context, especially her theory of focalization (Bal 1997: 142–161), is applied here to interpret the tangled fragments of various love affairs and memories of the male protagonist, Chow Mo-Wan, and the narratives in Wong Kar-Wai's movie *2046*. The fragmentary love affairs, though bearing a quite distinguished aesthetic style aimed at the representation of Hong Kong's culture in the 1960s, not only heightens Chow's recollection of sentiments but also combines cultural significance with the aesthetic depth that the movie's special and complicated cinematography contrives to bring forth.

Through Chow's narrative, Kar-Wai's *2046* tries to preserve a person's life and hope in a world that never changes, as if it were the key to salvation, and consequently brings forth the question of misunderstanding of love and mischief, all of which emerge through a highly seductive and protective series of gestures between the two lovers. This intriguing point is 2046, both a year and a place, where everything remains unchanged. Playing with the year of historical significance to Hong Kong people as the last year that everything could remain unchanged – fifty year promise made by Deng Xiao-Ping to Hong Kong, Wong Kar-Wai shifts the question the natural state of love, and creates *2046* as an answer to his own queries in his movies, while distorting the political significance of this number. The journey to the never-changing place/year 2046 brings the Japanese time traveler Tak, under Chow's pen, to a moment of star-crossed love with the android on a high speed train departing from 2046. He cannot find his answer in 2046, for the past cannot be found there, and he is to suffer once again for the

android wjw1967, who, as his girlfriend did in the past, refuses to answer his questions. With retrospection on all the fragmentary love affairs he had in Hong Kong and Singapore, Chow cannot find his answer in either *The Mood* or in *2046*. Both Chow – the narrator of the story *2047* and in the film *2046* – and the director of the movie *2046* adroitly record and transcribe their love stories through fragments from past experience and memory, yet without any lack of deliberate contradiction and leeway. In this way they succeed in creating a de-contextualized arena to entrap their characters and allow the movie viewers/readers to focalize in different ways on the fragmented love stories and the (im)possible love objects.

2046, as the last of Hong Kong director and producer Wong Kar-Wai's serial movies set within the decade of 1960s Hong Kong, brings forth once again an obsessive sense of being lost in glamorous shifts of beautiful faces and dresses. In it, the past has never really left us and one's desire, never to be recognized as true love, is always more about a mood than about a woman. The repeated amorous experiences of Chow Mo-Wan (Tony Leung Chiu-Wai), who becomes entangled with various women in Singapore and Hong Kong, only prove to the audience that romances are treasured and worthy of repetition, because Chow cultivates every romance to satisfy his desire and lust, and moreover, to use every failed romance in commemoration of his unrequited love and desire for Su Lizhen (Maggie Cheung Man-Yuk), whose glaring image from *In the Mood for Love* keeps returning to the present and haunting Chow's memory. One misunderstanding (in *The Mood*) broods on more misunderstandings (in *2046*), not because one cannot learn from past failures, but because one refuses to learn at all. Chow's failed romances prove to be a demonstration of this sad truth in *2046*.

When compared with the premiere at Cannes, the Asian version of *2046* can be said to be a better version of a much too self-obsessive indulgence in one's past (for Chow) and in one's works (for Wong Kar-Wai). However, frustrated at Cannes, Wong has to let go of this indulgence, and he allows some fresh air into the dark and damp context of an imagined Hong Kong of the 60s. The Asian version reveals the light of change, by figuring as its main characters Tak (Takuya Kimura) the Japanese time traveler who tries to trace back to his lost love in 2046, where, as rumor has it, nothing changes, and wjw1967 (Faye Wong), the android on the high speed train to-and-from 2046. Applying Mieke Bal's method in ana-

lyzing the focalization in some shots in *2046*, I would like to suggest that it is because of this rearrangement in the plot, the sequence of events and parts of the narrative that that some transformation is finally possible for Chow (and for Wong).

1. *The hole to past memory*

2046 begins with Lu-lu/Mi-mi (Carina Lau Kar Ling) seductively and exaggeratedly swinging her body, while at the same time peeping into a giant, yellow-brownish hole which spreads wide open in a way that threatens to devour her at any second. This swinging is only supposed to be viewed by the audience in a shot taken from behind the character. And since what is inside the big hole should not be seen by the audience, this gigantic yellow-brownish, Gothic hole emits a strange sense of mystery to the audience, despite Lu-lu's seemingly entranced empathy with it. This mystery will soon be swept under the rug, as Lu-lu lies bloodily murdered on the bed in Room 2046 of the Oriental Hotel. The metaphorical function of this hole will immediately be re-oriented to the last scene, where Chow Mo-Wan, in *The Mood*, kept his secret behind a hole in the wall of the ancient edifice at Angkor Wat, Cambodia; it will later to be re-linked to the hole in the wall of Room 2047 in the Oriental Hotel, from which Chow kept peeping at Bai Ling (Ziyi Zhang), a prostitute living next-door to him, and later, peeping at the hotel owner's daughter Jingwen (Faye Wong) rehearsing her lines of a non-existent dialogue. In Chow's novella "2047," the hole appears once again, when the android wjw1967 circles her fingers to form a hole for Tak to let out his secret. Finally, this hole becomes related to Tak's mouth, when wjw1967 seduces her so as to channel all his sorrows into that orifice. The relation between the female bodies and the gigantic hole-like mechanism points to the secret of *2046*: the impossibility of lost love despite the haunting vestiges of it that keeps the subject in question allured in everlasting mourning.

The symbolic meaning of the hole and all the similar, metaphorical signs have the same function – to signify the secret of yearning and the obfuscation of lost love. The obsession of an unrequited love retains in this movie a very stubborn merit shared by Chow, his alter-ego Tak (in "2047"), and even the director of *2046*, Wong Kar-Wai. They let the undying image of their past and unquenched desire return to the present and

haunt their reality as a ghost. They would rather indulge in their melancholy than live out of their traumatic experience. In the version played at Cannes, the romances shown in *2046* are confusing repetitions where only the women and their dresses change; these hold no great significance for most of the audience since they cannot tell one woman from the other. Because themes of elusive love and the haunting images of the past are Kar-Wai's favorite subjects, there is not much new here for the audience to see. It is like a closed loop that encloses and imprisons not only Wong, Chow, and Tak, but also the audience. However, the changes in the Asian edition, which was completed after the premier at Cannes, re-opens the loop and prepares for the audience a new way of interpretation. The following discussion analyzes some shots from the Asian version, applying Mieke Bal's distinction between the *focalizer* and the *focalized*.

According to Bal, "when events are presented, they are always presented from within a certain 'vision.... Perception, however, is a psychosomatic process, strongly dependent on the position of the perceiving body" (1997: 142). Since a vision can be viewed from various perspectives, "striving for objectivity is pointless". With this understanding, Bal emphasizes the importance of the study of focalization, which will distinguish the vision from the narrator. "Focalization is," Bal explains, "the relation between the vision and that which is 'seen,' perceived" (ibid.). Traditional theory of narration does not "make a distinction between those who see and those who speak" (ibid.: 143); however, when dealing with visual narrative, it becomes important that what the speaker says might not be what the camera presents to the movie viewer. What makes the difference is focalization, "the relationship between the 'vision,' the agent that sees, and that which is seen" (ibid.: 146).

In several vision in Wong's *2046*, the study of focalization helps to uncover what is hidden or misunderstood. Usually, the visual perception of a scene is assumed to be commensurate with the scope of the narrator's domain; hence little attention is paid to the possible alternative readings and interpretations that are neglected in the perspective of the narrator. The "hole", as the major metaphor of Chow's secret and a unifying thread for the whole film, will be a good place to start for the analysis of focalization.

In 1966, Chow was seen covering a hole on the wall at Angkor Wat with mud after telling the hole his secret. The film *2046*, as a follow-up to *The Mood*, picks up the secret and makes it a leftover, a remainder, a vestige

of a love that dares not be spoken out loud and that is doomed to decay. The secret thus becomes the initiating sign of all the later ones, which keep returning to the scenes and directing them toward various different significations. The longing of love and desire is buried in the hole of a tree, as Chow would make us believe in *The Mood*, but it proves to be inextinguishable when the signifying function of this tree hole can be found in *2046* in various different signs which are plainly created as substitutes. What is buried can never be forgotten, and it comes back time and again, haunting the one who buried it. A modern day love story, *2046*, in worshipping the sublimity of love, also becomes a ghost story. Reminders of the impossibility of love always turn up, to interrupt the romances Chow encounters in *2046*. Thus all the romances will recur one by one, all of them vulgar replications of this lost love, which torments Chow Mo-Wan. A love that cannot be retrieved becomes the faint image, a memory reminding Chow of love's bittersweet taste. A love that ceased because of misunderstanding creates more misunderstanding later on.

*2. Haunting remnants of love:
Repetition and compulsion*

The romance fragments of repetitive failure in *2046* can on the whole be seen as the result of unresolved issues in *The Mood*. Chow Mo-Wan's inability to cope with his experience of lost love in *The Mood* is further developed into a series of fruitless romances that demand an explanation. I would like to view the whole event from the perspective of lost love and desire as impressive and repressive mechanisms that keep Chow lingering around the repetitive dream-scene of the forgotten. Mieke Bal's model of the interaction of the narrative function and visual images in a cultural context may be applied to interpret the tangled fragments of various love affairs and memories of Chow Mo-Wan's remembrance and narratives in Wong Kar-Wai's movie *2046*. The fragmentary love affairs Chow that experienced in reality, and those created by his pen, are taken and cut according to Wong Kar-Wai's peculiar taste and critical eye. The latter, in his distinctive aesthetic style and characteristic exuberance, aims to depict Hong Kong culture in the 60s. This approach amplifies the emotional poignancy of his the protagonist's experience, an effect compounded by Kar Wai's meticulously sensual cinematography.

In *The Mood*, Chow and Su Li-Zhen (Maggie Cheung) were neighbors in the same apartment building in Hong Kong in the 1960s. Su and Chow usually encountered each other when walking up and down the stairs to buy their meals; in these meetings, a sense of desire and love was secretly transmitted between the two. However, they found out that their spouses were seeing each other, and finally left them to get together. Chow and Su began seeing each other in order to find out the reasons why their spouses would do such a thing to them. They began imitating the situation and rehearsed their spouses' behavior every time they met each other. They even rented a hotel room (number 2046) in which to write martial arts novels together. Finally Chow fell in love with Su, but was rejected by her. He left Hong Kong for Singapore; on his way to Cambodia, he buried his secret in a tree hole. In *The Mood*, Chow can not understand why he was rejected. In reality, Su would never marry him because she was determined not to fall into the same fault as her husband did, and she despised her husband for his immorality and deceit. She is a woman who so highly values morality and chastity in marriage that she sacrifices personal desire and true love to preserve her reputation, even though she and Chow had already crossed the line of pure friendship. She detested what her husband did to her and would rather live alone to celebrate her independence from men, than share the same bed with Chow. Without the sensitivity to speculate on Su's inner heart, and not understanding her ambivalent feelings toward a love that resembles too much the one that broke her heart, Chow could never figure out why he was rejected. They could only keep a relationship that imitated their spouses; marriage was something Su would never deign to accept.

Chow buried his secret in the tree hole in Cambodia but kept the failure of love in mind. He lived in Singapore as a gambler, before returning to Hong Kong as a freelance writer and womanizer. His misunderstanding of Su's true feelings and love becomes the trigger of his later failure in later romances with a second Su Li-Zheng in Singapore (Gong Li), Bai Ling (Ziyi Zhang), and the hotel owner's daughter (Faye Wong). The previous experience of failure in love results from his misunderstanding of Su. By allowing this past failure/secret to visit his present, Chow inscribed the impossibility of lost love in his memory, worshiping the latter as a precious commemoration of his true love for Su (Maggie Cheung).

Through Chow's narrative, Wong Kar-Wai's *2046* tries to represent attempts to preserve one's life and hope in a world that never changes, as if that were the key to salvation. In consequence, he poses the question of mis/understanding of love, in a highly seductive performance by two lovers. Chow – the narrator of the story *2047* and also in Wong Kar-Wai's *2046* – and the director of the movie *2046* dexterously record and transcribe their love stories through fragments from past experience and memory. They successfully create a de-contextualized arena in which to entrap their characters and allow us, the viewers, to apply different kinds of focalization to the fragmented stories of forlorn love.

As a follow up to *The Mood*, Kar-Wai's *2046* cannot abandon the previous story and make a new start, but, as a haunting drama, it continues and further develops the theme of failure in love. The love affair between Chow and Su Lizhen in *The Mood* could have been a sweet, if sad, memory, but the story of *2046* turns it into a defeating blow that limits Chow's chances of starting a new love life. A haunted man, a beautiful image, the memory of an impossible love, and a few heart-broken women all get together to commemorate Chow's lost love. *2046* never tries to tell a new story; instead, it seduces all of the possible future to celebrate the impossible return of a woman's love. Lu-lu, lingering over the great hole-like object, can experience her own sorrows and delights; but she need not wish to learn more. The remnants of love and desire cannot be found – they can only haunt. The mysteries kept within the hole cannot be directly revealed. There is no need for language as Lu-lu dances seductively in front of the gadget.

In another fragmentary story, Chow peeps into Room 2046 and there finds the daughter of the Oriental Hotel's manager. This time, there is no moving torso in the next door, but the delicate and smooth gliding of a pair of legs and shiny shoes send out their own kind of invitation. Chow, the focalizer/peeper, enjoys peering at this excellent performance. Gingwen, the focalized, is so obsessed with her fantastic mimicry that she has no idea anyone is eavesdropping and gazing on her rehearsal of a non-existent dialogue with her Japanese boyfriend. The slow gliding movement of the feet and shoes hint at some story of her own, where desire and love have to be repressed, thus recollecting *The Mood*. From the very beginning of *2046*, Gingwen's identity is always closely related to that of Su Lizhen. In fact, she finally becomes Su's surrogate, who helps Chow write novels, and receives the love and admiration – originally for Su – which Chow

now projects onto Gingwen. After that, Bai Ling, a young call girl, moves into Room 2046. Bai Ling, as the focalized, bares her body, unaware that anyone is looking at her. If Gingwen shares with Su the spiritual love of Chow, then Bai Ling surely represents the physical part of their love. For Su Li-Zhen's sake, these four women in *2046* begin their love dances and receive the praises and sacrifices of Chow's love for Su.

The plot of *2046* is simple. The subject (material) of the story is a collection of four segments of love affairs. Three of them are Chow's personal experiences, and one is a story written by him to recount the impossible love of Su Gin-wen, his proprietor's daughter, who falls in love with Tak (Takuya Kimura), the Japanese. *2046* is in fact a movie constructed of three romances that happened to Chow and one to Tak. However, these four romances perform a quite similar function, since all the episodes indicate the impossibility of love.

Chow voluntarily re-experiences all four fruitless romances. Only through the traumatic repetition of love can Chow regain his virility and a sense of control. As Freud's grandson playing the *fort-da* game, he transfers the loss of love into a game of power. When he can control the comings and goings of the desired object/Maggie Cheung in his fantasy, he proves to be the controller, not the controlled. Maggie's leaving and her rejecting of his gift cause his traumatic experience of love. Chow's resolution and recuperation of his trauma is the total indulgence in various kinds of romances with different women, in whom he finds temporary sanctuary from the onslaught of his emotions.

Maggie Cheung thus becomes a sign of the irrecoverable loss of an impossible love and of Chow's defeat. The symbolic nature of Maggie Cheung, however, grows big and invincible as Chow refuses to admit and face his defeat but instead chooses to run from the real problem behind their break-up. The longer he refrains from admitting that he did not truly understand Maggie Cheung, the more he amplifies the defeat; and finally Maggie Cheung grows into an image icon that chases Chow everywhere. In Singapore he tries to erase memories of her by running to Gong Li, another Su Li-Zhen with the same name. He tried to find her character represented in the personality of the hotel owner's daughter; and ultimately he tried to squander any chance of ever having sex with a woman again.

3. *Escape from traumatic failure*

Singling out “anxiety” as the key tone of *2046*, Nathan Lee contends that “Su Li Zhen’s absence vexes the narrative” (2005: 32). The image of Su Lizhen (Maggie Cheung) continuously returns to the present, mixing with Chow’s fragmentary romances, like some home base to which Chow could return to once he ended an affair. Chow is only too happy to get accustomed to this kind of flashback, and learns to render it into a certain kind of reservoir, where he regains and recharges his energy and belief every time he needs to cut short a romance.

If in *The Mood* Chow was beaten badly in the battle of love because he misunderstood Su Lizhen’s attitude towards marriage and miscalculated her moral judgment towards the distinction between her own love affair and her husband’s adultery, now, in *2046*, he has learned all too well how to play this game of love and power. Chow is a transformed man in *2046*. He cares not so much about love and marriage; when he tires of a relationship, he retreats. His attitude can thus be understood as that of a soul consigned to repressing the past. We can transcribe these emotions into a Greimasian square, as shown in Figure 1 (after Greimas 1987: 121–139).




Figure 1. *A Greimasian square of emotions.*

Because of his indulgence in his love for Su Lizhen in *The Mood*, Chow could not but help but try to repress his nostalgic desire. However, this locked up memory refuses to be repressed and keeps returning to the present as an involuntary repetition that reminds Chow of Su. Chow’s present dalliances results memories about the sadness and emptiness of unrequited love in the past. Though he later tried to seal this secret into the hole at Angkor Wat, it turned out a failure, because this sexually loaded motif is just as ubiquitous as it is obvious, showing up again and again in many similar signs: on the wall of his hotel room, as the void in the circled

finger of wjw1967, in the metaphoric hole on this android's body in his novella "2047".

Bai Ling could not understand this. She did not know his past. Not knowing there was a Su Lizhen and that she was just a substitute for this treasured lady forever lost to Chow's memory ultimately proves fatal to her. There is no chance for her to outshine this everlasting Woman living in Chow's heart. Every time the camera catches Bai Ling's delicate dresses and every movement of her hands and limbs, the audience, as well as Chow, is supposed to remember immediately certain things that were long past, namely, the shot in *The Mood* that reveals the beautiful Su Lizhen in her glorious dress climbing up and down the stairs. It is this secret desire, transmitted through eye contact between Chow and Su, that sealed the moment with its irrepressible pain of Chow's lost love in the context of a new romance with Bai Ling. What the focalizer (Chow and the audience) of this scene sees in Bai Ling is more than Bai Ling herself. However, the woman that is seen on the screen, the focalized, does not have this kind of knowledge. Bai Ling's (mis)understanding of Chow's affection and love makes her too dominant a woman, with whom Chow would finally find an excuse to break up. The focalization of these scenes depicting Bai Ling and Chow's amour, along with the seductive body movements in the bedroom, thus reveals more than what Bai Ling or Chow believes they know.

The relationship between the focalizer and the focalized in this case goes beyond the amour itself (what Bai Ling would believe), and also beyond the mixture of present sexual pleasure with the remembrance of past love (what Chow would consciously or unconsciously think of during the busy enactment of his desire). What the scene reveals in the relationship between this focalizer and focalized is the very theme of 2046 – the impossibility of love. Under the haunting flashbacks from past memory, Chow tries to outgrow his past failure by indulging in incessant romances. He does successfully reverse the power relationship in the various romances in 2046. By having the power to say yes or no to a prostitute and, afterwards, to romance in general, Chow becomes a man who can finally determine his fate. The anxiety of the refusal of the departed Su Lizhen, which triggers the involuntary memory of Su, is now repressed and replaced by the power to start or stop an affair.

Freud, in "Beyond the Pleasure Principle", tells about a "fort-da" (gone-there, i.e., back and forth) game played by his grandson. Suffering the anxi-

ety of the absence of his mother, the little boy tries to use a wooden reel to compensate himself and to master his powerless situation. In throwing out the wooden reel, the boy imitates his mother's disappearance, and while bringing it back again, he imitates the return of his mother. Counteracting one's anxiety through this kind of imitation and control system transforms a helpless child into a master of the situation. In *The Mood*, Chow was just like this powerless child. He cannot help being frustrated by Su's refusal of his marriage proposal and her sudden departure. In *2046*, he takes hold of his power through his ability to manipulate, and he mitigates his anxiety by transforming it into a power game. Freud's interpretation is that the child gains a certain kind of relief and pleasure through forcing himself to face the situation repeatedly, because "by repeating it, unpleasurable though it was, as a game, he took on an *active* part" (Freud 1977: 16). Moreover, by repressing his anxiety and enduring the sense of loss, the child can gain much more pleasure and "revenge himself on a substitute" (ibid.: 17). Chow, similarly, gains a certain pleasure from mastering the situation. However, this kind of mastery cannot be claimed as a victory or recovery from what happened to him in *The Mood*. Without true knowledge and understanding of Su and her situation, Chow's mastery is but a repetitive invocation and commemoration of traumatic love. This is not recuperation, but a kind of narcissistic and abject indulgence. The focalization, in whose acting-out both Bai Ling and Chow participate, tells a story that deepens the anxiety and sorrow which lurk somewhere behind the secret hole.

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Hsiu-chih Tsai

Geling Yan's *White Snake*: Understanding the misunderstanding

Sexuality is never an easy topic for discussion in traditional Chinese society. Female sexuality is even more so, and has even been compared to the lethal power of a devouring snake. As early as the Tang Dynasty, there was already a recorded story of how a big snake once transformed itself into a beautiful woman in white to seduce man by the roadside to kill him through exhaustive intercourse. This story relates the fear and anxiety of the ancient Chinese about female sexuality and the seductive yet destructive power it carries. Sixteen hundred years later, this same terror still looms in the worst dreams of many a man in China, reminding them of the impending death that accompanies desire and lust. *White Snake* (1999), a novella written by a woman, the modern Chinese modern writer Geling Yan, remodels this traditional fear of man by adding a twist in the direction of this sexuality, and thus successfully ridicules man's anxiety and reveals the sad suppression and denial of female sexuality and sexual identification. No longer lying dormant and suppressed consciously, female sexuality in Geling Yan's *White Snake* awakens to find its outlet in another direction. It no longer desires man, but woman.

This paper addresses how the Chinese attitude toward female sexuality is questioned and challenged by Yan's novella *White Snake*. Adopting a Greimassian semiotic square in analyzing the narrative of the intertwining issues of gender and desire, I argue that female sexuality and the gender problem are masked and regulated through the Chinese traditional concept that regulates and represses a woman's sexuality and her burgeoning desire through the inculcation of an imaginary and monstrous female image created in the traditional story of "White Snake". But the homosexual tendency of a woman is not to be treated as a terrible abnormal-

ity and can usually be tolerated by the public, for it does less violation to the society. In this paper I demonstrate that by adopting a similar title to the famous traditional Chinese monster story, which told of a white serpent which transformed herself into a pretty lady to pursue and experience human love, Geling Yan's novella replicates the theme of the female monster's love and desire, and furthermore, portrays her protagonist, the middle-aged dancer, as a serpent-embodying woman whose sexual power is deemed abnormal and monstrous. Yet, after her experience with a young woman, this dancer finally grows up with a sympathetic understanding of homosexuality and female sexual identification.

In the light of the Greimassian model of the narrative semantics and semiotic analysis of passion and sexual relationships, *White Snake* reveals the Chinese way of demonizing and vilifying female sexuality. Through Yan's tale, the imprisoned woman is portrayed as a monstrous other, whose sexuality is furtively glimpsed, desired and mocked by the public, and is given the queer chance to be seduced, re-initiated, re-directed and unleashed behind the traditional cultural prison-house, not as the un-human, but as the crossroads where social and cultural anxiety encounter the fear of desire and aberration.

1. *The convention that chastises female sexuality*

The novella in question dates back to "The Story of White Snake", a *chuan-qi* (short, grotesque story) from the Tang Dynasty. This story has been rewritten with its plot slightly or greatly changed in many different forms and genres, ranging from *chuan-qi* to novella to drama. The main concern of this transformation/metamorphosis is the impossible love between man and snake. In her quest to experience human love, the white snake transforms herself into a beautiful woman. Although she had had her sexual desire fulfilled, and enjoyed the sweet conjugal married life with her husband Xu Xian, her secret of metamorphosis is never to be forgotten nor her desire and sexuality forgiven. In some versions of the white snake story, Lady White's origin is found out by a great Buddhist monk Fa-hai. To save Xu Xian from being eaten by this big white snake, Fa-hai fights violently with Lady White and her servant Blue Snake. Lady White is finally forced to change back to her original figure – a big white snake – and is kept imprisoned under the Thunder Peak Pagoda. The moral taught by

this story is quite clear: the vicious and demonic nature of female sexuality should never be overlooked. To keep man's life from being threatened by a monstrous race and also to protect the constructed legitimacy behind it – society's righteousness in its patriarchy – it is necessary to stay on guard against female sexuality and to repress her strong sexual desire. Female sexual desire is to be chastised – that is how Chinese men are admonished of the lethal power of a woman, insofar as their life, property and patriarchal legitimacy are concerned. In fact, it is female sexuality and desire that are condemned and buried together with Lady White under the Thunder Peak Pagoda.

Even during the time of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), which sought to destroy all past conventions and archaic, deteriorating traditions as its main concern, conventional ideas and prohibitions about marriage between two races/ethnic groups still prevailed, and the heterogeneity expressed in the mixture of blood in marriage was all the more questioned as the ethnic and racial concepts of one's culture and identity were fervently exalted. These conventions serve to establish a wide gap to ensure further that the male linearity will preserve its superiority by way of emphasizing the inferiority of the female/other side. Moreover, the exclusion and abomination of the female/other is less a question of love or inferiority but more of an identification. Fortifying the mixture of blood, the story at once treats and proscribes the notion of merging with the heterogeneous other through marriage. Such traditional Chinese regulations and prohibitions can be illustrated in the following Greimassian model (after Greimas 1987: 169):




Figure 1. A Greimassian model.

In Geling Yan's *White Snake*, however, the awakening of female sexuality and the desire for woman are described as natural forces that have nothing to do with filthy or abnormal concepts or deeds. In the narrative, even in a society that abhors the strong sexual desire of a woman and compares

it to the demonic power of a serpent, the female desire of homosexuality is not so horrible an issue as to invite vehement reprimand and ignominy. The long repressed female sexuality and desire are delineated in Yan's tale as forces which could never be forgotten even under social repression. Nor will homosexual desire forsake its existence when relegated to a normalized marriage. According to the narrative, even when an arranged marriage is made possible to help Shan-shan, a homosexual, to re-direct and normalize her sexual identification, her homosexual identification may be temporarily hidden and repressed, but never will be buried under the regulations and teachings of a patriarchal society. But Sun Likun, initiated by Shan-shan to same-sex love, might develop a further understanding of the nature of homosexuality. It is significant that at the end of the narrative Geling Yan makes the point that sexual identity is not fixed and that female sexual identity is even more revolutionary in a society where social conventions and regulations repudiate women's strong sexual desires and condemn their overt and frequent sexual activities, a society in which the authorities dismissively reduce the issue into one of reproductive health and its societal importance.

In *White Snake*, a woman's sexual desire will always revive and regain its power even if she finds herself imprisoned in an obscure corner. Detention and exhaustion cannot destroy it, no matter how much derision and contempt such a desire incurs in Chinese society. Sun Likun, a famous, once-imprisoned Sichuan dancer who developed the "White Snake" story into her signature ballet, is the desired object of the burgeoning and repressed female sexuality that Shan-shan suffered. It is the time of China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–76). Sun is targeted and denounced by the Revolutionary Masses in 1966. Before the Revolution, Sun was notorious for her licentiousness, which went against the conservative Chinese tradition that demanded a woman preserve her chastity always. She was marked particularly because of her affair with a Soviet ballet dancer – a sexual activity which transgressed both racial and national boundaries – so that in 1969 "Sun was classified as a decadent bourgeois element, a suspected Soviet-trained spy, a seductress and a counter-revolutionary snake-in-the-grass. She was officially placed under investigative detention" (Yan 1999: 3–4). As a famous and beautiful ballet dancer playing as White Snake on stage, Sun is already too alluring as a femme fatale to her audience, not to mention that she kept seducing as many men as possible in

her bed from one province to another as her ballet played in every famous theater in China. The desire and anxiety of men for her body, however, does not wane even when she becomes a corpulent woman in her middle age, locked up in the small room at the scenery warehouse of the provincial Performing Arts Troupe in Chengdu, Sichuan Province. The construction workers, young and old, while on their break like to pass the time by singing dirty songs to her and take great pleasure in peeping and gazing at her disfigured body, imagining the allurements of her sexuality on bed.

The display of this former ballet dancer's body arouses the lust of the construction workers whose construction site just located adjacent to Sun Likun's place of detention. For a free bag of cigarette butts, passed by the construction workers to her through the barred window, Sun demonstrated her famous leg by putting her foot on her head for them to see. These men's unquenched desire teased out by the sight of sudden revelation of corporeality and sexuality nevertheless immediately became mixed with the ancient myth of "White Snake". Soon these construction workers' fantasy became both alluring and dangerous. In their debauched fantasy, female sexuality is never a pure demonstration of naked desire but a mixture of life and death. The men desire the female body and yet are forced away by the ancient myth's admonishment that the seductive allure of female sexuality is the embodiment of Thanatos itself, and is thus best left alone. To quench their lust and save themselves from the risk of death, a fantasy that put the coiled legs of Sun Likun around the furry Soviet dancer's body satisfies their need for a scapegoat for the sacrifice of this unregulated desire. In their fantasy, they find their furry foreign enemy a suitable scapegoat. Meanwhile, they can enjoy a safe fantasy of debauchery while avoiding lethal danger.

Sun Likuen, a great dancer and actor, who obtained her fame by editing, directing, and playing Lady White on stage in the 1960s, found herself unable to escape accusations of being a rotten capitalist, an anti-revolutionist, and even a trained Soviet agent. Several hundred years after the white snake story was invented, the dancer who plays Lady White receives no better treatment than the monstrous White Snake. Sun Likuen, this snake-like woman, is laughed at and ridiculed by the girl guards; however, she is popular among the construction workers who appear outside her room window.

But these construction workers were ambivalent in their behaviors and thoughts. They thought her to be a woman with strong sexual desires, which do not make her a woman of merit, but of lethal power. They liked to take advantage of her body by teasing her and gazing at her. Sun Likuen could not escape the moral and conventional judgment of a conservative people who would cast aspersions on any woman who affirms her sexual desire, actively pursues love and indulges in lust. Women of strong sexual desire are compared to a White Snake whom men ought to avoid. She is taken as the inferior, monstrous other that kills. The embodiment of White Snake in a woman is always the worst nightmare for any Chinese man who dares to go to bed with a charming woman of strong sexual desire.

2. *The love that contaminates*

The appearance of Xu Qunshan changes this male and female thing outside and inside the construction workplace and Sun Likun's jail room in Geling Yan's *White Snake*. The young commissar's visit rekindles Sun Likun's desire for love. It has been a long time since Sun Likun had an inspector from higher up investigate her case. This young commissar, who appears in front of her window, looking inside while the construction workers tease her, has attracted her attention at the first sight. The first day he came to see her, he immediately made Sun conscious of her vile appearance and comportment. She knew that she must have presented the young man with "the sight of an unbearably ugly naked body" (Yan 1999: 20). Ashamed of her ugliness, the former dancer practices everyday in her small room late at night so as to look thin and young in front of him. She was accustomed to being coquettish with men, but this young Xu Qunshan shows no interest in her teasing manners. The indifference he expresses in his looks and his mysterious daily visits has obsessed her. "In her thirty-four years of life, this was the first time she felt that the most comforting part about being together with a man was not his body but his heart" (Yan 1999: 37). She fell in love with this Xu Qunshan. And what puzzles her even more was that "he had never been like other men she had experienced, no full-bodied, nose-penetrating desire" (ibid.: 40). She had never received any kind of spiritual love and respect, only lust. However, Sun Likun could never know that this nonchalance, this delicate scene of wooing should not be compared with that of ordinary courtship. She would not discover that Xu

Qunshan was a young woman until it was too late for her to retreat back to her deserted corner.

It happens when Xu has paid his last visit to her in the warehouse of the provincial Performing Arts Troupe. She was taken out for the first time after her detention. In the room of the guest house at the outskirts of the city, she offered herself to him: “She took off long outmoded cardigan blouse of India red, letting out the sculpted flesh of her dancer’s body” in front of this young man. It was too late. “The truth importuned her, confronted her, so close it could be touched” (*ibid.*: 47).

After all the expectations “[d]uring these thirty-odd days and thirty-odd nights”, the process of seduction has gone too far to be stopped. The desire is aroused, and the love is there to be proved and realized. Sun had to find out that Xu Qunshan was a young woman. However, GelingYan does not let her protagonist fully wake from her dream of desiring this young man’s love, but lets her half endure, half enjoy the caresses of a young woman’s fingers that rekindle her desire yet at the same time disillusion her. Sun Likun has never experienced this kind of love. She has even despised it. But at that moment she lets herself sink into the illusion and act as a partner of this plan:

Xu Qunshan’s cool fingertips ran over her entire body as if it were a thin shell of delicate porcelain. All the fidgeting and impatience in his fingertips were gone. Each elliptical, well-defined fingernail carefully swept over her silky skin, as if deathly afraid of snagging a thread.... Again and again, she blocked her intuition from trying to tell her a secret. (47–48)

Instead of letting out the secret, Sun Likun chooses to play her role to the end. But her reaction to this kind of love is typically heterosexual. She cannot appreciate it but had to go on pretending as if she had been in a play, otherwise, “[s]he would be left with nothing”:

Through the mist of her tears she could see a hint of wickedness and ferocity in that boyish elegant face. She had already offered herself up. She could not give in to nausea. Before the finale, before she could pass this last day in perfection, everything had suddenly been revealed in all its paradox and sorrow. (48–49)

If she determined to keep the secret, she could not but feel that she was cheated. The narrative plainly states: “the pining body of a thirty-four-year-old woman had been humiliated, toyed with, defiled by Xu Qunshan” (48). Humiliation is what Sun Likun felt for all this play – play she had to

continue acting, although she could only feel exhausted and emptied by participating in it: “[t]he conventional love between the sexes Sun Likun had once understood was now sapped of all meaning, had become emptiness itself” (54). At this stage, same-sex love to Sun Likun was merely a fraud that Xu Qunshan enacted upon her. Her traditional ideas about homosexual relations keeps Sun Likun looking at the whole event as a plot sketched to mock her. It was a laughter that condemned her to humiliation – humiliation at her own sexual desire, and at not being able to see through this vicious scheme. Here, through Sun Likun’s humiliation, the traditional regulations and admonitions about homosexual relations are emphasized. Female self-realization and realization of sexual desire, whether it is Xu Qunshan’s same-sex love and desire or Sun Likun’s heterosexual desire, are ridiculed and deprecated by way of Sun Likun’s repressed dissatisfaction and humiliation in the love relationship. Once again the burgeoning sense of a female’s sexual desire and the righteousness of her sexual potential are to be repressed and humiliated in a sinuous way through Sun Likun’s disappointment in her sexual expectations.

If the direct and coarse revelation of the construction workers’ lust and desire for her obese and disfigured body is shamelessly obscene, the concealed love and care Xu Qunshan expressed is abnormal but paradoxically touching. Through the bewilderment of Sun Likun, Geling Yan transcribes a veiled sense of sympathy with the growing sense of female sexual identity in Chinese society and towards the reawakening of the self-willed female desire that demands its own fulfillment in same-sex love.

If at first the revelation of this female desire and homosexual identity could not be understood and appreciated by Sun Likun, the later development of this female sexual identity and desire will be more or less recognized and welcomed by her, for she has the need to be loved and cannot afford to give up this adoration. Although it could never quench her lust, it could at least partly relieve the loneliness of her imprisonment in the mental hospital in Shanghai.

Nevertheless, conventional regulations on and aversion to homosexuality are not so easily relinquished. Therefore, after experiencing this same-sex relationship with Xu Qunshan, Sun Likun begins to show symptoms of mental illness. She could not bear this loss and the trick played by Xu Qunshan. She is moved to Joyous Song Mountain Hospital in Chongqing, and later, to Shanghai. During Sun’s stay at Shanghai, Xu Qunshan

reappears as Shan-shan, a young woman this time, and without any disguise. During this period, Sun begins to show signs of accepting Shan-shan and her homosexual identity: “When they’d walk around in the courtyard, they would always have their arms around each other’s waists or shoulders or else be walking hand in hand” (52). But it is interesting that everybody in the hospital begins to suspect that Shan-shan is a transvestite, who wears woman’s clothes simply to get close to Sun Likun. Only when they pull open Shan-shan’s clothes do they find out how wrong they were. “After that, everybody completely lost interest in the two of them.... What was so interesting about a couple of women?” (53) Although conventionally Chinese people chastise a woman who shows strong sexual desire and lust towards men, homosexual desire of a woman and the same sex relationship are not so much admonished. It did not even arouse public interest at the mental hospital. People’s attitudes here towards same-sex love and lesbian relationships prove that homosexuality between women is not so much an issue and, therefore, not so proscribed.

When marriage is sanctified in society because of the profitability it can bring to the future productive power, the male homosexual relationship has to be prohibited for its barrenness and the harmfulness it might bring to the patriarchal society. Still, the female homosexual relationship is not so stigmatized, as it is categorized as non-profitable. This is the situation described in the narrative of Yan’s *White Snake*. The close relationship between Sun Likun and Shan-shan can only be of interest if Shan-shan were a man, for this would once again prove that Sun is a snake-like woman, full of lust and lethal power to seduce men and ruin them. But once people at the mental hospital find out that Shan-shan is a woman, they lose interest in them and their relationship, for there is nothing directly harmful to society in it, nor is there anything alluring in the case itself. Thus, Sun and Shan-shan are for a certain time left in peace, which encourages Sun’s further understanding of Shan-shan and homosexual love and desire.

3. *The gift that ridicules*

Through misunderstanding, Sun Likun falls in love with Xu Qunshan. But in the mental hospital at Shanghai, she starts to love Shan-shan again, and again, not without a layer of misunderstanding. In fact, Sun can never become habituated into the same-sex love which Shan-shan practices so

naturally and sincerely. It is partly out of her need for love and care, and partly from the illusory love projected on the non-existent Xu Qunshan, that she half admits and enjoys the love Shan-shan pours upon her. If Shan-shan pursues her love with all her might and is true to her own feelings in all her labor, Sun Likun is a perfect artist, a wonderful dancer who really forgets herself while she dances on stage, playing a role that she would never fully become, yet in her delirium, ambiguously touches the true feelings and passions that permeate the space on the stage. The feelings and passions are real when she dances; however, when the music stops, not all those touching rhythms of passion can be completely forgotten.

Shan-shan knows that Sun Likun cannot be changed into a person of her kind. Sexual identity is seldom that malleable. That is the reason why when Sun Likun is exonerated in the end, and regains her glory with a new appellation, “Formerly Famous Dancer”, and Shan-shan disappears from Sun’s life. There is no room for Shan-shan to continue with Sun, since she will once again be adored by many fans and loved by many men. The result of their relationship could only end like this in a time when Sun could never be a lesbian, and when everything should follow the lead of the normal, rational guide of the supreme leaders, who always take into concern the best welfare of both the country and the people in the 1960s and 1970s. Geling Yan emphasizes the positive side of Shan-shan’s confirming her sexual identity and her will to pursue her love in courting Sun Likun. However, juxtaposing Shan-shan’s courage to reveal her homosexual identity with her later suppression of it with marriage, Yan paints at the end of the narrative a faint sense of sympathy towards Shan-shan’s journey of sexual self-discovery and even attaches a bit of revolutionary color to Shan-shan’s natural tendency to behave like a homosexual, to be like Xu Chunshan.

It is imaginable that Sun Likun would get married as soon as she finds the right man. What is surprising is that Shan-shan tries to get married before Sun does. This really annoys Sun Likun. She gets a little mad, as if she were once again being deceived by Shan-shan. What will Shan-shan do with her homosexual identity? Sun Likun might like to know this unconsciously. This intention is shown by the gift she gives to the newly wedded couple – an intricate jade carving that depicts the drama of *White Snake* and *Blue Snake*. In the Sichuan version of the opera *White Snake*, Blue Snake is in love with White Snake and asks for White Snake in marriage.

But White Snake makes Blue Snake a wager. If Blue Snake wins, she will be his consort; if White Snake wins, then Blue Snake will turn into a female and become White Snake's maidservant. It is quite obvious that in the Sichuan version of the opera, the relationship of the two female snakes and Blue Snake's sexual identity are full of ambiguity and signification. Sun Likun does not notice that she has unconsciously bought Shan-shan and her husband such a gift until Shan-shan sends her a look of suspicion and reproach. This is the ridicule that Geling Yan finally brings forth to end this queer relationship between Sun Likun and Shan-shan with nuance. She scorns Sun Likun's doubly treacherous deeds: to bracket and enjoy freely Shan-shan's homosexual love and care, on one hand, and on the other, to fancy herself uninitiated in homosexuality. Sun goes even a step further, in assuming that Shan-shan would ask her to keep this secret, believing that "Shan-shan herself understood that she had a fatal need for correction" (61).

With this reproach, Sun Likun questions Shan-shan implicitly about the value of homosexual love and refuses to give justification to homosexual identity. Sun Likun utilizes social and conventional regulations as a way out of the ambiguity Shan-shan's marriage incurs, and she even tries to persuade herself into thinking that Shan-shan needed "correction". This unvoiced criticism reveals a lot about Sun Likun's own mental state. Through Sun Likun, Geling Yan ridicules traditional mores. However, it is also through Sun Likun, through her unconscious buying of the marriage gift and her last glance at Shan-shan, that female trust and understanding in a homosexual relationship are confirmed. Shan-shan, standing near a bus stop on the deserted street, "hands in pockets, her shoulders hunched up like a street kid's," reassures Sun that she is not denying her sexual identity. The reader is given a dose of relief at the end of the story. Shan-shan could always be what she wants to be, for Sun Likun's last glance at her reveals the potentiality for both women. Shan-shan's sexual identity will never be completely suppressed, and Sun Likun will never forget completely her initiation in this queer journey to love. Looking appreciatively at the standing figure of Shan-shan, Sun climbs aboard the bus as if once again she were seeing Xu Qunshan's shadow in the girl. After everything, her heart cannot help crying out: "Xu Qunshan!"

The narrative of *White Snake*, with this lyrical ending, could thus be transcribed into a Greimassian square which models the "explosion"

/“transformation” process of a love that finally finds its way to expression, from the opposition of nature and social conventions, to the opposition of camouflaged sexual identity and bi-sexual identity. With this ending, Geling Yan frees Shan-shan and Sun Likun from the bondage of fixed sexual identity, and opens new possibilities for the future of the two. The narrative, from beginning to end, makes a fixed female sexual identity both possible and touching.

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Hsiu-chih Tsai

Literary meaning and the metonymic function in *A Song of the Sad Coffee Shop*

This paper deals with the metonymic function in literary texts. This function is taken as a strategy for construing textual meanings and philosophical implications in *A Song of the Sad Coffee Shop* (1996), a novel written by Taiwan's woman writer Shao-ling Chu (b. 1966). Given Roman Jakobson's understanding of the literary function of metonymy as the expression of the synchronic relationship, I would like to apply that understanding to Chu's novel and read the latter as a narrative strategy for creating literary meanings in the wanderings and travels of a divorced Taiwanese woman who eventually dies in Madagascar. This is a story about a divorced woman's quest for freedom, which in the end proves to be a quest for identity, a sense of belonging to a social group that one could call a home and homeland. This is a quest and a process of forming identity, where geographical root/route replaces and surpasses social and cultural roots/routes. The narrative deals with this woman's childhood memories of various places she called home, her problematic identification with her ex-husband's home, the Sad Coffee Shop where she finds temporary shelter for her troubled mind and the spiritual home she finally discovers for herself during her trip to Madagascar.

I suggest that the metonymic function adopted in this novel can be analyzed in different layers of literary meaning. I demonstrate its uses in Chu's novel, as a means of structuring the significance of "home" by the geographical juxtaposition of places and the co-relationships of mind and body, as the main character learns to practice and cultivate a sort of ascetic-philosophic space.

1. *The functions of metaphor and metonymy in narrative texts*

In his essay “Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances”, first published in 1956, Roman Jakobson picks up the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic as a distinctive pair of binary oppositions that constructs and covers the two realities of language (Jakobson 1990: 115). He advances the oppositional terms “metaphor” and “metonymy” as prototypical figures in studying two types of aphasic disturbances, and his definition of the two terms henceforth changed the way the two terms were used in literary circles. Emphasizing the characteristic element of contiguity in the function of metonymy, Jakobson separates this rhetorical trope from metaphor, another trope, whose major function in the sign relationship, according to Jakobson, is to index relationships of similarity. Any impairment of the metaphorical or the metonymic function would lead to aphasic disturbances, since “[s]peech implies a selection of certain linguistic entities and their combination into linguistic units of a higher degree of complexity.” (1990: 117)

Adopting Jakobson’s definitions of metaphor and metonymy, I would apply them to the study and analysis of the social disabilities of the fictional character, Mathi, in the novel *A Song of the Sad Coffee Shop*. I do so not at the very basic linguistic level of phonemes, lexemes, or sentence combination, but on the higher, more discursive level of the narrative, where contextual and cognitive dimensions start to matter. Mieke Bal, in trying to establish a method of studying the narrative text, suggests that we take it as composed of three layers: fabula, story and text (Bal 1997). Textual meaning, thus understood, is never constructed simply by the primary level of fabula nor the second level of story, but also at the textual level, which is constructed within the contextual and cognitive dimensions that take place both inside and outside the text. Through various interpretive tracks within the network of the text, a semantic system of plural quality can be established. The value and efficiency of these are crucial in interpreting a text, as Barthes has shown in his analysis of Balzac’s *Sarrasine* as a “writerly text” (Barthes 1990).

My main premise here, framed in accordance with Jakobson’s functionalism and narratological study, is that the cognitive concept which makes the referent object domain of a person’s linguistic performance possible

cannot be separated from the person's recognition of his social context, since the construction of one's cognitive understanding of the living world, a concept that one's life is related to in the real living condition of existence, cannot be isolated from inter-human relationships; neither can one's interaction with the environment be excluded. This interactive relationship with the environment and the linguistic "interpellation" (Althusser 1993) or hailing that arouses one's concept of the I-other relationship are both proofs that one cannot live entirely alone in a society. The cognitive understanding of one's being in the world is always tantamount to recognition of one's status in a social space where a group identity is established. This understanding of one's relation to his/her existence and community is at the root of one's cognitive understanding of one's environment and group identity. The narrative events in a text, therefore, form an accumulated semantic field of a contextual world. With this understanding, the narrative about Mathi's personal experiences in the city of Taipei forms the linguistic material of the text. The experiences pictured through Mathi's eyes in the narrative help construct a contextual world in the text. The realization that Mathi finally obtains in Madagascar provides a broader epistemological understanding which Mathi believes and recognizes as the guiding principle for both the living and the dead on earth.

When applied to the novel, the daily events that Mathi encounters in the real urban space definitely figure on the first level of Barthes's scheme. At this level, the narrative characterizes Mathi in her suffering as a lonely, wandering soul that loses its home; and so the textual narrative is formed. At the denotation/metalinguage level, Mathi's loneliness becomes a symptom of the general pathology endemic to an over-competitive society. Mathi's sufferings are thus the consequences of the disorder and disaffection that permeates a highly modernized and capitalistic world. On the level of symbolic connotation, the illness of Mathi and society, in Mathi's understanding, turn into a disease whose only cure is freedom. Yet, this is just part of the hypothesis. The premise needs to be re-examined and re-evaluated as Mathi, toward the end of her journey, gets to Madagascar.

Mathi, the fictional character in the novel, though desiring to be free from the bondage of the society she came from, has to admit to herself that no matter how far she tries to flee from and ignore this tie, she, like everyone on earth, can never sever herself from the geographical environment; neither can she resist the interactive relationship that this geographical

contiguity necessitates. Nevertheless, Mathi never becomes accustomed to social interaction (e.g., as a conversationalist).

Heidegger would have us believe that any text is a question posed by the speaker to the reader, and the reader's task is to answer it. Following this reasoning, the primary question raised by Mathi in the novel becomes more clear when the narrative analysis focuses on the core social and communication problems of Mathi and, in turn, allot them into the two opposite axes of linguistic behaviors – metaphor and metonymy.

As mentioned earlier, Jakobson argues that aphasia as a language disturbance should be studied first “with the question of what aspects of language are impaired in the various species of such a disorder,” and “[t]o study adequately any breakdown in communication we must first understand the nature and structure of the particular mode of communication that has ceased to function” (Jakobson 1990: 116). I would like to suggest that the main structuration of the novel is a process that goes from metaphoric elements to metonymic elements. The basic structure of the novel is separated into two different epistemological-cognitive frameworks. The first one delineates Mathi's life in Taiwan, where she floats aimlessly, carried along by the trends of the capitalistic world. In the second part of the novel, Mathi journeys to Madagascar seeking an epiphany of transcendent revelation, a sudden understanding of the logos on earth. In the first part of the novel, Mathi examines herself through the perspectives and judgments of others around her. What happens around her would finally become just one event among a pool of others. She sees the world through individualist spectacles, as if any event is but a single event acting as an index of the inhuman world that she inhabits. In the second part of the novel, Mathi learns to broaden her view and interpret events, thus bringing in the contiguous elements that help one to construe a contextualized worldview. The combination of contiguous spaces and places turns the whole structuration of the novel into a metonymic schema. And only when the focus and emphasis of Mathi's mental concepts shifts from the schema of single events to that of context can she rediscover the road to salvation. Where cultural routes and contextual spaces meet, the exclusive and mandatory power of self-righteousness and self-pity reveals its narrow-mindedness and pusillanimity.

The social space of communication that Mathi encounters can thus be viewed as constructed by the two linguistic axes of metaphor and meton-

ymy, which together make possible a higher-level cognitive construction of sociability and identity formation. I would take the social space of a communal group as a reference field of the language level. In this field the sign functions of the linguistic/behavioral axes of metaphor and metonymy take place. If disturbances in language formation are an index to the linguistic problems of aphasia, then the disturbances (external) to and disabilities (internal) of constructing metaphoric or metonymic substitution and combination in a social space may be seen as an indication of the problems of disintegration of character in society. Hence, the more one is impaired in selecting and combining data received from his/her environment, the more one is hindered from the identifying with the environmental social space. Following this understanding, we may study a character's propensity for mixing or remaining in a social group, namely, the ability to keep company with a group or community as an index of one's sociability, and further, as an index to the problem of this character's social and cultural identity formation. This is the case because social-cultural identity formation is always related to the Other – that is to say, to the person or the group that one stays close with. To examine a character's conversation and communication with others, then, would give us good reason to believe that language disturbances in communication or a character's disabilities to communicate shown in the conversation might also be viewed, if not as aphasia, as nevertheless a similar kind of disorder in sociability.

Feeling herself a loner and an outsider, Mathi's dissociative propensity shows that her problems might lie in the metonymic domain, where a member's interactive relationship in a society or community must function normally. With a strong protest against highly modernized urban life and a desire to seek out real spiritual freedom, Mathi begins her poetic wandering and self-questioning of the concept of home and identity. She thus travels to Taiwan and Madagascar, and ends her journey with a sudden understanding of the significance of life and existence. Before she begins her trip to Madagascar, Mathi was already trying to find freedom from enslaving concepts of success, represented by the listless, hard-working people around her. She desires and imagines a spiritual freedom that would help her abandon the shallow cultural and social identity of a highly capitalistic city. She despises this kind of spatial and economic identity: "In this city, if you want to live like a human being, you need to have a job,

money, and a dwelling place. To make it simple, you need to have an identity, and then, you become a human being, a Taipeiian.” (Chu 1996: 35)

That is what Mathi learns through experience. By refusing to associate with those around her, however, Mathi loses the chance to build an identity that everyone else considers necessary and proper. With further details provided by the novel, I would like to suggest that this is caused partially by her lack of security, which originates from her having no “home”. This kind of unsociability is a habit Mathi has gradually cultivated since she was a child. As a child she found neither shelter nor home to protect her. First, she has no home of her own. When she was three year old, Mathi’s mother left her husband and took Mathi with her. Mathi was always left alone in a dark rented room while her mother went out to work. When she was twelve, her mother died and her father brought her to a “home” where she had a new mother and two brothers. Later, she lived with her boyfriend, who left her for another girl, and later, with her husband, who left her to work in Bolivia, not long after their marriage, and finally asked for a divorce. Both her experiences of being abandoned more than once and the repeated failure in love and trust strongly affect Mathi’s cognitive understanding/imagination of a social space where selfish strangers struggle to eliminate each other in an alien environment.

Money is the only measurement of success, and Mathi knows this axiom of her society well. But Mathi has no money. She always changes jobs whenever she feels bored; however, with no goal in life and no particular relationship with any special group or persons, she is doomed to feel lonely and bored all the time. She has no “home” and no close relationship with anyone around; gradually, she loses any identity of her own. Eventually, she turns her sense of insecurity and her lack of trust into an outward discontent that finds the social space hardly bearable, due to its tenacious thirst for success, power and money. Taipei is too modernized and the people there so ambitious to make money that they only measure people and life in terms of success. For Mathi, Taipei is too small a place to enjoy freedom, and only those who turn themselves into money-making machines can compete with each other for more wealth and higher social status. Even high-school students are pressured by this blind capitalistic force to move forward, and those who want to fight back and resist it can only express their hatred by hitting violently the buttons of the arcade machines on the street until, their fingers are raw and bloody. The outside

social space (Taipei, Taiwan) is thus for Mathi a terrible, inhuman system that tears apart one's soul and body.

But she secretly believes that she can find her answer in Madagascar. Since she first learned of the Madagascar in her high school class, Mathi has dreamt of visiting that island. She fantasizes that Madagascar has the answer to all her questions. This island has a shape similar to that of Taiwan, and, just like its brother in the Pacific Ocean, Madagascar grows rice and enjoys its geographical distance from the continent of Africa. The homeless Mathi looks to Madagascar as if it were the cure-all that will save her from her troubled life. This cognitive fantasy makes Madagascar the counterpart, the mirror image, that holds to opposite values from Taiwan. If Taiwan is the place that stifles every possibility of true feeling and personal development, Madagascar is the place where freedom grows and where no traces of urbanization, modernization and capitalism can be found.

Through geographical contiguity, Mathi collects and construes her experience of a soul-less place in terms of "bondage" – bondage of soul, true feelings and freedom. With all the experiences she goes through, she maps out her understanding of Taiwan. The metonymic, geographical relations between all Mathi's experiences help form the concept of Taiwan as a place where no one can escape the inhuman space of money-making and modernization. The metaphorical, substitutable relations that these experiences demonstrate confirm for Mathi that Taiwan is the very embodiment of capitalism and modernization. Conversely, Madagascar, in Mathi's dream, provides release from this kind of confinement. It is there that freedom dwells. Finally Mathi sets out for Madagascar, strongly believing that Jesus – a mysterious hippie undergoing self-mortification in the barren landscape of Madagascar, a god-like figure for the aboriginal people there, because of his curing them of their diseases – becomes the object of her quest.

2. The Other as a mirror reflection that exceeds the bounds

In *A Song of the Sad Coffee Shop*, the narrative is divided into two parts. As mentioned above, the first part is set in Taiwan, and the second in Madagascar. By making Madagascar Taiwan's counterpart, Chu prompts her character Mathi to travel thousands of miles to find out the true meaning

of life. For Mathi, this is a quest for freedom, a trip to free her body and soul from mundane constrictions – including the need for identification. But Mathi’s experiences and trip to freedom do not end until she realizes that the living nourish the dead, and that the principle of interdependence forms the very foundation of life, that identification is based upon trusting each other on earth, and that one’s death can nourish and enrich the other’s life.

As two sign systems, Taiwan and Madagascar become each other’s counterparts for Mathi. This broader view of how life could be reveals to Mathi a different worldview, which triggers her wandering and restlessness on earth; it strengthens her confidence and makes bearable the idea of returning to where she belongs. Mathi’s quest for freedom finally turns out to be a quest for the meaning of life and for identity. The long journey that takes Mathi to Madagascar proves to be a quest for “home-coming”. Mathi finally finds her “home” in death. But before she returns to death, she sees clearly what a “home” really means. This new understanding lies in the world of co-existence and rewrites the concept of identity with the realization of what it is that binds us, and of the false images that the concept of identity might bring forth. She needs to prove to herself that tearing away the lies and revealing the bare truth underneath in reality does not always bring forward unbearable shame but may also call forth relief. She needs to live her whole life to prove that it is a thing worthy of laborious effort. The quest for one’s own identity, for understanding the meaning of home, and sometimes the sacrifice of one’s life – all these demonstrate the attainment of a true and clear understanding of life.

Searching for a place where one belongs and claiming one’s own identity are the two basic motifs of this novel, relating Taiwan to Madagascar, and the concept of freedom to the bondage of friendship and fraternity. Taiwan and Madagascar, freedom and fraternity, are two pairs of signs help give form to the semiosis of the elementary significance of living, and constitute the schema of identity formation in Chu’s novel. The syntagmatic and paradigmatic construction of these two pairs of signs function as the pivotal core of the concept of identity.

When will a woman begin to realize that she actually has no home on earth? Will she finally create one for herself? Will she be doomed to find none at all, just because she was bereft of the chance when she was a little girl? Chu’s *Song* raises these questions at the very beginning of the novel

through the female protagonist Mathi. She is a woman in her mid-thirties, who suffers living unhappily with her husband's parents. Mathi's husband left her for South America several years ago to avoid fulfilling his obligation as a husband. She keeps this a secret, even though her father- and mother-in-law know, or at least have ample suspicions, that her marriage is broken and that she has no right to keep living with them as a daughter-in-law. This is a married woman who can claim no home of her own. The story starts with Mathi's realization that her run-away husband's former home will never be a place she can call her own.

Mathi's impossible dream is to live a life of one's own and to have a home where warm and tender feelings overflow. She seeks a place into which one would like to project oneself with all one's heart. She is a lost soul, a vagabond, a woman of no real interest in life. Her husband avoided then deserted her, as does her husband's family and the world around her. She has nearly lost her sense of identity when the narrative begins, at the wedding feast of one of her college girlfriends, where the atmosphere is buoyant and lively social greetings and conversations.

Born in Taiwan, an island that borders the great Pacific Ocean and is separated via the Taiwan Straights from mainland China, Mathi finally makes her decision and begins her mental wanderings to Madagascar. At the surface level, Mathi worries much about her losses, a worry that manifests itself in unsociability and self-retreat precisely when the situation demands an interactive relationship. More than the loss of her husband, it is the loss of identity that has greatest impact on her pitiable situation in life. Before she travels to Madagascar, Mathi views everything that happens as single events which reveal to her time and again that she is unfit for society and that her life is meaningless. It is the society and the haunting presence of capitalism and modernization that best characterize Taipei. They are also the target of Mathi's blame and source of her discontent.

During this period, all the events are placed on the paradigmatic axis and function as metaphors. They appear one by one, yet, they all point to a meaningless life and spiritless, inhuman urban space. Hence their functions as metaphors of life are interchangeable. There is no interrelationship nor contextual meaning to them. However, the mixed image of the dying out of a whole village and the vibrant life-force shown by the green plants outside the village pulls her out of her shell and reveals a brand new significance. The power of death is horrible. Yet, when viewed from afar, it is

never the only force that exists on earth at any moment. Right next to this enormous, devastating power, the force of life is spreading its own message of resolution and tenacity. The juxtaposition of the two forces makes the ravaging of life, the annihilation of the whole village, so significant and its impact so devastating. Through the interrelation and contextualization of various concomitant events, through the contiguity that the various concomitant events build-up, humans and entities on earth stop existing solitarily and secluded from each other, and begin the transformation from a single, isolated event/entity to a part of a co-related, growing organism. The substitutable metaphor-events, when projected to the syntagmatic axis of contiguity, begin to form a combination, and the projection of these metaphors becomes the initial germ of metonymic significance.

Taiwan and Madagascar, in Mathi's fantasy, are like two brothers who reflect to each other the same, characteristic traits. In Mathi's fantasy, Taiwan becomes the metaphor that could be substituted for the terrible results of modernization – de-humanizing, mechanical routines, high pressure and sense of loss. Through metonymic combination, Mathi paints Taiwan as a capitalistic society that deprives all its members of the true meaning of life and existence. On the other hand, Madagascar becomes the trope for leisurely tribal life and freedom, and Jesus, a free soul on this land, the sign for this kind of spiritual freedom. In her understanding and fantasy, the metonymic, geographical contiguity with Madagascar, the land itself, embodies Jesus's transcendental power to act and think above the material level. It is also through this kind of geographical-metonymic link that Mathi joins with her social space, and thus transforms her own understanding of her society as a highly modernized and materialized lost world. The geographical-metonymic contiguity only provides Mathi with a reminder of the possible interaction between two subjects, whether they are beings or non-beings. This is only the preliminary step toward combining one with the other on the basis of individual living beings. The contextual, intersubjective relationship has not yet germinated; nor can ontological significance yet emerge.

She habitually observes the relationship between herself and her dog in this way, so as to think of the dog as company in the barren land. She even feels pity for it when she has to forbid it from following her. This is also true when she begs Jesus to ask a fisherman to spare the life of a big fish, and again later, when she implores Jesus to help save the lives of the

dying villagers. Jesus rejects both entreaties. She cherishes lives but overlooks the interrelationship which the geographical contiguity might at the same time help combine and motivate. Only when she looks down from high above the rocky mountain near the dead village, does she find out the sinewy power of interrelation and symbiosis that the geographical contiguity clearly represents. When the village dies out, it enriches the land, and turns into nourishment for the fast-growing green plants nearby. Life and death closely intertwine and embrace the other, and finally become each other's catalysts. It is this broader view and realization of the meaning of life and death that frees Mathi from the bondage and pressures of humanity. This is the first time that Mathi can really face her own identity problem and see it from another perspective. She no longer envies the Madagascar aborigines and Jesus, and she knows that she needs to go back home again to go through sufferings and pressures and learn to look at the whole situation from a higher and broader vision. Identity is never a tag stamped on one from the outside, but a determination that grows from inside. Therefore, what is personal and individual will never be erased as long as one builds up the interrelationship and admits that the contextual view is never a force that triggers the abuse and eliminating of the self. "Home", the basis of identification, is where the interrelational and contextual dimension is established. Identity formation points out the route one should take. The *route* is always in need of re-building and re-connecting; the *root* is always in need of re-founding and re-cognition. Because of this understanding, Mathi can give up her life trying to rescue Jesus from the bullet of a tribal militiaman. Mathi's death gives life to Jesus. She does not die in vain. She finally learns her lesson and gives a noble performance. From Taiwan to Madagascar, the story of Mathi proves to the reader that the quest for freedom is not really so different from the quest for identity. It is the loss of home, the root, that threatens the formation of identity. Home is where one establishes interrelationships, but the way back to it proves that "home" to be imaginary. Though she would never be able to go back home again, what Mathi learns – that the loss of the villagers' lives lead to nourishment of the green plants outside the village – serves her as a precious lesson about life and death and the issue of identification.

Through the application of geographical similarities of Taiwan and Madagascar, Chu deftly juxtaposes the two as counterparts and plays on the concept of home and identity through Mathi's quest for freedom. Chu

creates a powerful narrative through combining and contrasting geographical identities, and prepares a complex turning point, which justifies all the events that go contrary to Mathi's expectation and which emphasizes the opposing characteristics of another possible route. The author succeeds in combining Mathi's misconception and realization in a layered domain of the ontological. The development of the function of geographical contiguity further strengthens the linkage of the various routes by which to reach home.

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Anna-Riitta Tunturi

Attention, rhetoric, and values

Immanuel Kant *versus* Anglo-American philosophy

Komm! Hebe dich zu höheren Sphären;
Wenn er dich ahnet, folgt er nach.
– Goethe, *Faust*

1. Introduction

In Finland we have the law, Finnish law, which, as either a positive or negative regulation, directs citizens how to behave as law-respecting people. In this paper I search for a Law that, as a metaphysical entity, is superior to Finnish law, criminal law, and all other “horizontal” regulations. I argue that moral law is the unwritten regulator of state law – a code that guides the human being in his everyday life.

My claim here is that the deontic moral theory of Immanuel Kant continues to have serious implications even for the present day. One might begin a defense of Kant with, say, something from the Middle Ages. In medieval logic there was a rule of modal consistency: *Ab esse ad posse valet, ab posse ad esse non valet consequentia* – to argue from actuality (or reality) to possibility is permissible, but not from possibility to reality. One may also draw a conclusion from possibility to obligation, but not from obligation to reality. At some point in Scholastic philosophy the inverse relation between those sentences became disqualified. Nevertheless, it has always been problematic to reach a conclusion by arguing from description to normativity. In Kant’s moral philosophy is a sentence that one reads in history class: *Du kannst, denn du sollst*. This sentence was translated into the Finnish as, *You can, because you must*. But probably more accurate is: *You can, for you must*. This conclusion – from possibility to obligation – also “passes” the rule of Medieval logic, while emphasizing the thought

that, if someone is charged with a duty, he also receives the mental abilities to fulfill it.

In what follows I offer some arguments in response to Kant's ethics, while also looking briefly at his conception of philosophy. How did Kant connect his theoretical philosophy to his practical philosophy? Were some basic elements not sharply defended in his theoretical philosophy?

Of pertinence here are two Finnish philosophical articles by Katri Kaalikoski and Marjaana Kopperi about Anglo-American moral philosophy. Kopperi's "From Metaphysics to Rhetoric, or Justice in the Postmodern Way" (1996) summarizes the new American moral philosophy, primarily John Rawls' theory of justice and its newest turns concerning the relationship between community morality and that of the individual. Katri Kaalikoski's article, "Iris Murdoch: Moral Realist", sketches British ethics of the early 1990s as theorized by Murdoch. If Kopperi's article makes a clean break with the argument of deontic ethics, Kaalikoski's essay in turn describes a possible essential quality that links morals as a theory with some claims of psychology.

Next, I describe arguments advanced by two opponents of Kant's philosophy, Friedrich Schiller and Moritz Schlick, then close with a look at German poet Botho Strauss's ideas about publicity and Nicolai Hartmann's "ethics of values".

2. *Kant's path from theoretical to practical philosophy*

2.1. Central points of the theoretical philosophy

Kant poses the main question of critical philosophy in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. How are synthetic sentences *a priori* generally possible? Take, for instance, the analytical proposition "The sun is yellow"; on both sides of "is" there is a tautology. By contrast, a synthetic proposition, along the lines of Kant might read as follows: " $7 + 5 = 12$ ", but could also be read as " $6 + 6 = 12$ ".

How can our concept of reality be equipped *a priori* with faculties of analysis?

With Kant it is not necessary to justify Newton's physics with empirical explanation. Rather, an answer must be found to the question, "How are experiential data generally possible?" Kant's main effort went to dem-

onstrating the conditions of possible experience that are identical to the possibility of the target of experience. This means an object exists only if it can be experienced. Kant's revolutionary move was to transfer interest from empirical study, and toward investigation of the realizing subject, i.e., toward human reason. This last must be structured in such a way that it can receive data before experiencing anything external. In Kant, such an external *datum* consists of "given variety" from the outside and of two factors inside the human being: (1) sense elements – that is to say, a conception of time and matter; and (2) the categories of pure reason – these last being the capacity to define *a priori* any impulses coming from the outside. Among these categories are, for example, those of quality, relations of causality, and modality. To investigate the transcendental is for Kant an investigation directed at these conditions prior to the possibility of their being experienced.

Kant seeks a categorical imperative – moral law – as a counterbalance to the laws of (Newtonian) physics. How does the human being differ from the empirical world? As a thinking creature, the human being must be subject to its own law, one above that of reality: "Act so that the maxim of your will is regulated to the principle of the general law". The essential content here is that of universalizing one's own law. Earlier Kant had expressed the law of virtue as follows: "Act so that the maxim of your will should become the general law of nature". Or another, earlier version: "Act so that you use yourself as a purpose and never only as a tool". How does Kant justify his "law of virtue"?

First, his theory of knowledge, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, is in itself an investigation of the phenomenal world. In this first critique he is a sheer materialist. But in the second critique he creates a noumenal world, a world we know nothing about.

So Kant – in his own words – in hiding (*aufheben*) knowledge, leaves place for belief, in other words, for ideas of God, immortality of the soul, and free will. In dealing with the freedom of the will he uses "the concept of causal relation which contains freedom", in other words, that is not determined by a natural law. Any creature who has free will is a *causa noumenon*, a theoretically empty concept. He cannot, however, even begin his *Critique of Practical Reason* before explaining the foundation of his moral philosophy. The concept of freedom is with Kant the *ratio essendi* of the law of virtue, and the latter is the *ratio cognoscendi* of freedom. Free will

appears because there is a moral law, and moral law because there is free will. Moral law in Kant is “the only fact” of practical reason; but we must notice that its foundation is a *circulus vitiosus*. So Kant builds his practical philosophy “as if” there were a free will.

In moral law it is only necessary to universalize one’s own actions. In Kant, there is an important difference from the old regulation, “what you don’t want done to yourself, do not do to others – a maxim we meet in different written sources (e.g., Tobias 4: 16: “*Quod tibi non vis fieri...*”). But the difference is based on the speculation in this sentence that someone “could be free not to do good works to others”, Kant writes. I shall return later to this term, “good”.

One of the most important matters in deontic ethics is “the aspect of intellectual poverty”. To moral decision-making some educational knowledge, or “worldly wisdom”, must be added. Moreover, one must continuously observe one’s actions, so that regrets are never necessary, in the form of “I could have acted otherwise”.

3. *Attention, reason, emotion and reality*

Katri Kaalikoski (1996), in a lively and engrossing article, has discussed the moral philosophy of the English philosopher Iris Murdoch. With Murdoch, moral development begins when a human being is directed outwards, away from the self, and so practices a genuine *attention*. It is intuitively clear that, when one begins to attend to the surrounding world after “reducing the self”, then development in a certain direction begins. But why should that development lead in a “good” direction? Why does Murdoch suppose as self-evident that such attention would contain virtuous and elevated moral values? Murdoch’s concept of *attention* has its equivalent in natural science. For example, in physics – as in all behavioural sciences – a researcher follows and observes his scientific object, the phenomenon. This observation has the function of verifying the reality of some objective facts.

The experience of beauty is, for Murdoch, one way to “reduce the self”.)To this I should add the experience of harmony in general.) But how does one go about this? Can I direct my attention towards that which is “good”? Human consciousness is perhaps the consciousness of morality; but the

fact is that there are many other consciousnesses. Is observation, already and in itself, a kind of value-giving?

Is not the semantics of the word “value-giving” already a kind of moral valuation? Kaalikoski claims that “the use of a word is its meaning” that language develops through attention, and that development is expressly *moral* development. The key sentence in Kaalikoski’s article is: “The seeing of reality is a cognitive condition”. Moral concepts are seen as deeply moral forms. “Behind them there are no facts that could be defined as wrong”; as opposed, say, to a scientific intuition. Here, then, is the ontological ground of Murdoch’s morality, something axiomatic that cannot be contradicted. If someone thinks in such and such way, then it is so. But what kind of human being has the ability to rise from the entropy of life, to such an extent that the other party is something or someone other than the self?

For Murdoch, the seeing of reality is thus a cognitive condition that leads to moral choice. It is a continuous wakefulness. But reality cannot always be seen as it is: as a totally other being, and as events that exists regardless of whether we do.

4. *The will*

Iris Murdoch writes: “Both in science and in morals, the attention and the will to development are needed.” Murdoch emphasizes that the human being need not be divided into two parts – that of impersonal, rational thinker and that of personal will. What kind of will is it? Kant’s will – between reason and drives – is a good will. Schopenhauer’s will is like someone who sits on the shoulders of a blind and deaf man. It is a will of reason and drives, leading to Freud’s will as “das Ich” between “das Es” und “das Über-Ich”. Here we have again the old problem of monism *versus* dualism, the solution to which was sought in the dialectic.

5. *Kantian critique*

Kant divided the mind into two parts – the rational and the irrational – by justifying the categorical imperative. Rational man obeys the laws of Newtonian physics. When he encounters a moral problem, he obeys moral law. Thus the human being jumps from the arena of physical obedience to that of moral free will.

A contemporary of Kant, the poet and philosopher Friedrich Schiller, disapproved of Kant's rigorous moral law, arguing that the quality of consciousness could be developed by increasing knowledge and exerting aesthetic understanding. In his main philosophical work, *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen*, Schiller distinguishes between the "voice of reason" and "natural drives", positing "den Spieltrieb" as a mediatory ground.

From the modern perspective, Kant's theory of morals appears to be founded on aristocratic ethics. In 1930 the Austrian Moritz Schlick, in the spirit of the logical-empiricism, put forth an ethics that answered aggressively to Kant's moral demands. In Schlick's meta-ethics, happiness is the main goal, and the psychological truth is that the human being is motivated to all action mostly in order to attain the greatest feeling of pleasure, the best preconditions to happiness. Among the various drives, Schlick points to the "emotion of motivation" and elsewhere to an "emotion of success"; the result of right cooperation of these drives is a feeling of delight and pleasure – the best guarantors of happiness. To be able or ready to feel happiness, there is need for wholeness, without internal conflicts. Schlick's hedonism culminates in the thought that altruistic social "drives" may guarantee the most durable feeling of pleasure. A human being is by nature disposed to pleasing his fellowmen and hence derives the greatest pleasure from doing so. Among secondary duties are work and hobbies, or science and art, which produce their own delights. When the emotions are in balance, then no moral fight is needed. Schlick's ethics thus conceives the human being as somehow beyond good and evil.

6. Rhetoric as moral justification

Marjaana Kopperi's article (1996), "From Metaphysics to Rhetorics, or Justice in the Postmodern Way", also deals with modern Anglo-American philosophy, primarily the moral theories of John Rawls and Thomas Bridges. Kopperi describes how, instead of goal-directed thinking, as in ancient teleology, or instead of thinking about the good life, as occurred from the later Middle Ages on, the ground of ethics is no longer the concept of the good but the concept of the right.

Kopperi also argues that, even during the Enlightenment, ethical norms were conceded, just re-situated in the human being. Human quali-

ties, abilities, and needs defined ethical convictions. Kopperi summarizes meritorious “postmodern” theories and theorists, who have called into question “modern” ethics in terms of both its metaphysical and deontic character. John Rawls’ *Theory of Justice* (1971), claims Kopperi, is the starting point of these thinkers. For these last, as for communists, there are no universal moral norms, since they are metaphysical and hence cannot serve as objective facts. Kopperi summarizes these researchers’ arguments about the contextual character of morals. The value that fits one environment may not fit that of another group or individual. Such theories allow for anything, if it can be shown to serve a necessary advantage in its proper context.

On the other hand Kopperi describes Rawls’ later thought as the kind of ethical “consensus thinking” typical of Anglo-American trends. Rawls divides morals into two categories: those of the political arena, and those pertaining to the “rest” of life. Hence people obey two different moral systems, as political members of society and as private persons (e.g., as members of ethical or religious organisations). According to Rawls, the same moral positions can be reached by different philosophical justifications. The metaphysical thinking that leads to such positions reached doesn’t matter; what matters is that those positions be accepted by the community. Rhetoric and consensus replace metaphysics.

If the acceptance of the community is the sufficient ground, I would ask, Who first accepts the moral dictum that later will be accepted by the others? Who constructs our opinions for us, such that we accept them by consensus? How can new moral contents and new convictions be born?

For Rawls, the rhetorical justification of morals is enough, if it can effect a consensus.

Thomas Bridges criticizes Rawls for his substitution of truth with post-modernist rhetoric. In Bridges’ view, political morals are more than just a means to secure “peaceful coexistence”. For him, political morals must have “independent value”, secured by deontic-teleological reality.

6.1. A critique of the consensus

Bridges moves in two areas: the human being as a citizen and as a member of a community. At both levels, life is communal. Most attractively, this community is ethnically capacious, unbiased toward gender, and open to

any religion not harmful to its members, who in turn derives his or her sense of context from this group. Without such communities – ethnic, gendered, and religious – the life of the individual would have neither direction nor meaning. *Desire* is the central conception of Bridges.

But this philosophy can be asked difficult questions: When is the desire of a human being leading to right, and when to wrong? If Bridges operates only with the conceptions of “citizen” and “small community”, then how can he claim “to describe the modes of thought that [all of] western civilization traditionally has accepted”? To generalize this dilemma, let us turn to Heidegger, with his conception of “das Man”. Heidegger writes in *Being and Time*:

Being-with is such that the disclosedness of the Dasein-with of Others belongs to it; this means that because Dasein’s being is Being-with, its understanding of Being already implies understanding of others. ... The Other would be a duplicate of the Self. ... If self is not, its Being has been taken away by the Others. ... In this inconspicuousness and indeterminacy, the real dictatorship of the “they” is unfolded. ... Being-with-one-another concerns itself as such with averageness.

The German author Botho Strauss has expressed his opinions in the essay *The Swelled Goat Song*. In ancient Greek drama, the goat song was a tragic one about “the public intelligentsia”, “the cultural majority”, and “the supervisor of the conscience”, which, in shaping public opinion, runs to the nearest microphone or talk-show panel, and tries to establish, with all kinds of nationalist arguments, why the moral sentences he pronounces are the right ones.

In Strauss’s dark, oracular text, the intellectual lodestars never change. He has a bone to pick with the term “liberation”, observing that the “subversive kitsch of pleasure” never can be done away with because of the endless continuity of technical reproduction. The receiver of Strauss’s text is “a walker of his of own road”, a searcher, a rare creature who turns away from following the mainstream.

It takes courage to follow this road of *difference*. Moreover, much non-understanding, or misunderstanding, is necessary to maintain a general system of understanding. Strauss goes on: “The world is suffering from the tyranny of passing transience, and no instance on earth can revolt against it”. This transience will be made available, like so many editions; but unlike

the latter, there will be nothing to cut out, because everything has to be in touch with everything in order for this kind of “permanent” transience to exist.

According to Strauss, in the press everyone who has an opinion understands *a priori* another who has an opinion. No explanations are needed; in public opinion, only conclusions matter. This means that a work of art only needs an interpretation; it means nothing special.

7. Nicolai Hartmann's materialistic ethics of value

Hartmann's materialistic moralizing is directed against Kant's ethics of “Tun-Sollen”. According to Hartmann, behind every goal there are real values. Hartmann asks, How is the relationship between the will and value to be understood? A value is “das Seinsollende”, and a moral request speaks to the will.

Kant undoubtedly gives the most comprehensive answer to the basic question about how the occurrence of evil can be harmonized with the concept of an all-knowing, all mighty Providence. Goethe expressed an opinion against Kant: the human being is monistically disposed. The fundamental difference between Kant and his contemporary Goethe may be the work of the Russian philosopher Lew Shestow (1866–1938), entitled *Athens and Jerusalem*. Ancient monism, *aletheia*, was intended to develop a good, harmonic life; as opposed to religion, which consisted in the finding of the self after the Fall. Here we have a contest between two conflicting forces, good and evil. Jerusalem belongs to Kant, despite his wearing the greatcoat of a philosopher. Kant's God is the same as that of Thomas Aquinas, isn't he?

Nicolai Hartmann thinks about the fundamental questions of Kant's morals. Which comes first: a value or the categorical imperative? What is the contradiction between a value and the will?¹ Hartmann explains it this way:

Value is that which formulates the commandment, the “moral law”, the thing that ought to be. The will is that for which the commandment has validity. The good will is therefore “determined” by the law; it conforms itself to the law. It therefore receives the commandment from beyond itself; the commandment is not its own. For in regard to the law the will is indeed free to act contrary to it. So, at first glance, Kant seems to present

the matter. But this is not his real meaning. Such a receiving of the law from beyond, a taking over of its authority, would be “heteronomy”. Kant draws the opposite conclusion: the moral law must be a law peculiar to the will itself, the expression of its true, innermost tendency. The “practical reason” must be autonomous; it must give its law to itself. The metaphysical essence of the will is precisely this legislation. But here the relation of the ought to volition is reversed. The ought, as the objective reality, shows itself to be something that is subordinate.

Hartmann thus brings up Kant’s paradox: if there are two wills – on the one hand, the empirical will with different drives and hypothetical imperatives, and on the other hand, a pure and only “good” free will, which acts in accordance with the categorical imperative – then which of these wills is exactly free? The empirical will has the freedom to choose between good and evil. The categorical imperative, the pure good will, cannot choose evil.

Hartmann was one of the last great system-builders. His *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis* came out 1921 and his *Ethics* in 1926 (in English, 1932). Hartmann, though not a “Kantianer”, nevertheless swam upstream. His philosophy moreover aligns with Kant’s saying: “Wenn Könige bauen, haben die Kärner zu tun” – When kings are building, the cartdriver has a job.

8. *The highest good*

Both morals and philosophy, like all sciences, ought to discuss and develop something new. But as we can see, old streams of thought return under new labels. In all speaking there is rhetoric: in politics, in lectures, in scholarship, in relationships between people, and so on. But rhetoric as an acceptable ground of moral argumentation is doubtful, which is why philosophy has always looked for an individual ground of morals – morals that place the judgement of a human being first.

The interests of the whole critical philosophy of Kant culminate in three questions: “What can I do?”, the theoretical philosophy, “What shall I do?”, the practical philosophy, and “What may I hope?” This last question presupposes a final goal: “Act in a way that you become worthy of happiness”. The “highest good” unites virtue and happiness, and free will brings out the highest good. The goal to become worthy of happiness obtains in

a relationship with the observance of moral law. Those readers who agree perhaps will find it suitable for me to close with a quotation from Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*: "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and more steadily they are reflected on: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me."

Note

1. It is to be noticed that in the Middle Ages, reasoning about morals, which I spoke about at the beginning, did not consider the will (*wollen*) at all, a circumstance that is perhaps explained by the naturalistic fallacy.

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Anna-Riitta Tunturi

On the historical background of Martin Heidegger's metaphysics

Jürgen Habermas (1983) has described Martin Heidegger as a killer of philosophy and spirit, whose metaphysical achievements are epochal in character. On the one hand, Heidegger propounded a metaphysics that located the place of logical empiricism and neo-positivism in philosophy; on the other hand, he sowed the ideological ground of World War II, as it led to Nazism.

I begin by explaining the irrationality of German philosophy since the *Sturm und Drang* as one thread alongside that of the classical influence. Between 1780–90 a so-called “pantheistic debate” took place, born out of correspondence between J. G. Herder, J. W. von Goethe and F. Jacobi. The issue centered on the possibility of justifying reason and experiencing God. Jacobi denied Spinoza and pantheism in seeking an extra-worldly God, with free-will, non-determinism and Utopia. Jacobi hopes to solicit Lessing's help against Spinoza, but he is in fact Spinozist with a new conception of God as *Ἐν καὶ Πάν*, “the one includes the all”. Also Kant's theoretical philosophy has some irrational features, and it is Kant who ends the Enlightenment.

I adduce also the Russian philosopher Lew Shestov's division of knowledge and belief into “Athens and Jerusalem”. I further touch on Schopenhauer, Freud, Nietzsche and Johann Jacob Bachofen before narrowing in on Heidegger's inaugural address, *Was ist Metaphysik* (1929) and a later article, *Ueberwindung der Metaphysik* (1939–40). In spite of the title of this later article – “Overcoming Metaphysics” – for Heidegger it is only thinking and poetry that will protect the philosophy of the future.

Heidegger's critique culminates in an argument against Nietzsche's “will to power”. Responding to one of his critics, the logical-empiricist

Rudolf Carnap (who in 1931 attacked Heidegger's inaugural address with an article *Ueberwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache*), Heidegger argues that only technology will remain if metaphysics is overthrown. And if technology is joined with the will to power, then only the "uni-form" remains, the principle of work-performance, or the will-to-will. Technology is the organizing of lack. The human being is made into a work animal, and the will-to-being is *nichts*. Before *Sein* can arise in its primal force, this moment of the will must be undone.

1. *The pantheistic debate*

During whole decade of the 1780s a so-called pantheism debate raged in Germany, which hinged on the possibility of stating reasons for the experience of God. Johann Georg Hamann (1730–1788), a mystic thinker of the Enlightenment, inspired the *Sturm und Drang* movement and, in opposition to Kant held to the creative power of the mind and the senses, which he saw especially in language, in "the mother tongue of the human race".

The pantheistic debate unfolds in correspondence between Herder, Goethe and Jacobi, who in 1785 publishes a book entitled *Die Lehre des Spinoza im Briefe an Herrn Moses Mendelssohn*. Years later he begins to criticize Kant, then Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, and then all of German idealism. Jacobi sees in philosophy only two possible ways. The first is rationalistic, whose path goes from pantheism to Spinozism, from God and Nature being identical, such that God can be eliminated; the consequence is atheism. From this materialism follows naturalism, then fatalism and determinism, which is causal law in nature. The second way is Theism, which proposes a supra-mundane God that also takes up residence in mankind. It is to this extra-worldly conception of God that human freedom being belongs, with it indeterminism and Utopia. The third possibility would be a God who is not out-of-the-world, and this is what German idealism is searching for.

During the so-called age of Goethe, a "world piety" shows itself in Germany, which lasts until Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872), up to the years 1836–40. For this reason, Germany lagged somewhat behind the thought of the time. In France this kind of piety lasted until the middle of the eighteenth century and in England till the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

1.1. En kai pan

In 1780 Jacobi tries to solicit G. E. Lessing (1729–1781) as a comrade-in-arms against Spinoza, and they discuss Goethe's poem *Prometheus*, in which there appears the atheistic and humanistic tendency of *en kai pan*, "the one includes the all". But Lessing is a Spinozan. Lessing believes, on the authority of Leibniz, in a transcendental God, which is a new understanding of the deity. *En kai pan*, as such, is an indicator of atheism. Hamann's reaction is to propose a symbolic, meta-idea: God manifests in the world, in opposition to the extramundane God that exceeds time and space. The Greeks had God and heaven, and the Christian religion adopted this idea of such a space.

Herder, too, had Leibniz as his starting point, and came out against of Jacobi's idea of an extramundane God, which was an unnecessary *salto mortale*, as the concept was. God is in the world, thus also in space, and beyond the world there is no space. Herder corresponds with Jacobi and neither of them understand Hamann. Herder saw the difficulty of the idea that God is not "in" the world, but surpasses it.

The initiators of this German idealism were Hölderlin, Schelling and Hegel in Tuebingen, and their motto was *en kai pan*. For them, joy and love are the wings of great acts. Hegel's (1770–1831) conception of God, after he parted from Kant's philosophy, goes in this order: identity of the identity as at first. This puts philosophy, not identity, in the absolutely highest place, with religion second and art third. Then creation is the abstract identity of the created and of the Almighty.

Creation requires an extramundane God, whose identity is wholeness and oneness. Jacobi goes along with this, adding that whatever is rational is necessary. So Jacobi's two-part system has moved to oneness. Jacobi levels his argument against Kant, since the latter's notion of freedom and necessity are not in congruence, because he only supposes there is a *factum* – freedom. And the ground of this fact is irrational. Kant's *salto mortale* is grounded by Spinoza, for whom freedom is necessarily a jump into the irrational. With his real idealism of this practical philosophy, Kant ends the Enlightenment.

1.2. The rational belief of Kant

In 1786 Kant enters the pantheistic debate with his article *Was heisst sich im Denken zu orientieren?* In it he departs only from epistemological starting points, and hence is given the epithet *Alles Zermalmer*, “the breaker of everything”, by Moses Mendelssohn. In this paper Kant divides the faculty of reason into three parts: (1) *Einsicht*, “opinion”, in place of Mendelssohn’s absolute rationalism. Metaphysics here has its own world, which it rules as the “Queen of science”. (2) *Eingebung*, “impulse”, Jacobi’s philosophy, where the concept is important only as an intuition, and the third is the belief, however so, that it is against this reason of this impulse. The categories of Kant’s pure reason are constitutive, but reason is also the ability to create ideas. (3) The last level of rational belief is the categorical imperative, which opens the way to metaphysics. But because this “*factum* of the reason” can not be justified, rational belief is, thus, something irrational, comparable to Jacobi’s *salto mortale*. In German, belief (*Glaube*) is stronger; the philosopher Georg Jánoska translated it as *Ergebnis-Zwang*, the compulsion to submit.

2. *On the relationship between knowledge and belief*

If Jewish-Christian philosophy presents a macrocosm, we can approach it “microcosmically” by way of Russian philosopher Lew Shestov’s perception of two sources of knowledge: Athens and Jerusalem. Athens, Plato and Aristotle mean experience and reason. Jerusalem stands for the New Testament (Christian) and Old Testament (Jewish). There is a strong tendency to connect Athens with Jerusalem, which can happen only by going against the Testaments. Speculative reason must interpret Jerusalem such that there are no conflicts. Hence Aristotle is applied to Christianity, the best example of which is Thomas Aquinas, who built his Christian theology on Aristotelian grounds. The connection of Athens with Jerusalem implies the primacy of the former, since reason must have primary status. Reason lights the way to theology, and Athens is the torchbearer.

During the Enlightenment there was an emancipation of reason, with belief and religion subordinated to it, and Hegel’s philosophy as the culmination. In Hegel, philosophy is on a higher level than religion and God

– an arrangement that led directly to the thought of Ludwig Feuerbach and Karl Marx.

After this, there are no more great systems. The abandonment of attempts to connect philosophy and religion also marks the end of the great systems of philosophy. During Goethe's lifetime, both nominalism and irrationalism made great gains. At the same time, in England there was skepticism, with David Hume's dualistic separation of theory and practice; in France there was revolutionary atheism. Characteristic of Goethe's time, "becoming" (*werden*) took the main position, as a new conception of the philosophy of history. Here God becomes (*Gott wird*). This was a holistic experience, and the human being was not allowed to divide, as did Kant and English empiricism. We must also remember the great influence of Shakespeare at that time, championed by Shaftesbury (1671–1713), which was another turn to aesthetic understanding of the wholeness of nature.

Johann Herder wrote in his *Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769* that instead of culture he

sought to lead the natural life, with the world understood as a historical entity. Herder's Faustian sentiments range from resignation to joy. His diary illustrates the dramatic genius of youth and the break-through of Rousseauism. He met Goethe in Strasbourg in 1770, and that was the beginning of *Sturm und Drang*. In this period, Herder was the giver and Goethe the receiver. The *Sturm und Drang* was a movement of young men. Kant, who was already old, never understood it.

3. Arthur Schopenhauer

Schopenhauer was yet another thinker behind Heidegger. The concept of "pity" in his thinking was influenced by Rousseau. In the preface to the first edition of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* Schopenhauer mentions his sources as being Kant, Plato and the Vedas. Schopenhauer continues his thought directly from Kant and thus denies the whole of German idealism. He remembers having read that in Kant's flat there was only one work of art: a portrait of Rousseau. The latter's "volonté générale" – the will to community – not only influenced Schopenhauer but also Kant's notion of the categorical imperative in the latter's practical philosophy.

Schopenhauer was born in 1788 in Danzig to a patrician family. In 1809 he began studies in Göttingen, got to know G. Schulze, and criticized the

Ding-an-sich. In 1813 Schopenhauer publishes his thesis *Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde*, then goes on to gain reputation as a philosopher. He criticizes Kant's philosophy on two important points.

The first is transcendental idealism, such that only phenomena are to be recognized, and science extends only to possible experiences. Causality is the ground of phenomena in the world of *Ding an sich*. Second, he criticizes the separation of material and form in epistemological theory. Material is given, and the forms are already in the receiver: "reason orders itself to natural law". But Schopenhauer asks, "Who gives the material?" It was a logical mistake to hold causality as a category of reason that can only be used in the sphere of possible experience. If causality is chief, then the material must also have its cause.

As did Goethe and Hegel, Schopenhauer also comes out against the *Ding-an-sich*. In the appendix of the *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* is a critique of Kant's thought. There Schopenhauer explains that, in Kant's philosophy, there is first a fancy, then an object of the fancy, and then the *Ding-an-sich*. He claims that the object of a fancy must also be a fancy. The *Ding an sich* has been presented only to prove the existence of ideas, and these have no influence on theoretical philosophy.

4. Sigmund Freud

Sigmund Freud, a major force at the beginning of the twentieth century in the German world and a competitor of Schopenhauer, always claimed that he did not get to know the latter's philosophy until very late in life, and then only in piecemeal fashion. One must question this claim, because Freud's teachers at Vienna knew Schopenhauer very well. (For example, Ernst Mach was admiring Schopenhauer as early as the 1880s.) Freud said later there was no question of priority, but we must remember that, if you deny a fact, you are admitting it in the best way. For his conception of *das Es* Freud borrowed Grodeck's work of that title (*Das Es*, 1923).

5. Johann Jacob Bachofen

Also a source of Heidegger's thinking was the ethnologist, archaeologist and philosopher of religion, Johann Jacob Bachofen, who belonged to what

Thomas Mann in the novel *Doktor Faustus* called a “district in Munich”. For example, Friedrich Engels, in his initial paper on Communism, points to Bachofen. As a patriot Bachofen searched out the Ancients. One of his main works is *Mutterrecht*, the “mother-law”, and another is *Tanakil*, which treats of Orientalism in Italy. Bachofen befriended Nietzsche, but had no influence on the latter's production. The two were united by their mutual scorn for neo-liberalism.

Bachofen interprets all of Nietzsche's “Dionysian” as a feminine character. The Greek mentality is feminine. But for Nietzsche it was masculine because of the rejection of the mother. Bachofen criticizes this overemphasis on the masculine in Nietzsche's thinking.

Though barely noted in the history of philosophy, Bachofen stands out in the philosophy of history, in the part that treats of gender. He researched myths and symbols, and was thus one of last of the Romantics. These symbols have a genuine emotional resonance, which cannot be framed in terms of “ideas” or “concepts”.

According to Aristotle (986a), manliness obtains in boundaries, form, spirit, peace, being, unity, light, the right and the good. Femininity is unlimited, formless, material, being in movement, coming, variety, chaos, darkness, left, unconsciousness, the wrong and the bad.

The Romantics and Bachofen stood against this polarity of Aristotle. Bachofen divides Plato's allegory of the cave (State) as stretching from the earth to the moon, and from there to the light, the sun. The earth is the cave: femininity, life and death; the moon is hermaphroditic: a femininity that radiates the sun's reflection to the earth; the sun instances manliness. The earth is a mix of chthonic tellurism, sensualism, *gynaikokratie*, promiscuity and initial communism (along the line of Engels). The sun is spirituality, paternity, the role and rights of the father, private ownership. Bachofen's thought aligns with Hegel's concerning the progressive nature of the spirit of the man.

6. Heidegger's inaugural address of 1929

Thus far we have surveyed aspects of German philosophy which are in the background of Heidegger's philosophy. Schopenhauer, Freud, and Bachofen established the spiritual space in which Heidegger's inaugural address settles.

Heidegger begins his address carefully. A year earlier he had published his main work, *Sein und Zeit*, which deals with language. In the present lecture he must demonstrate that he had not gone too far in playing with linguistic terms. Heidegger argues that Science, in every science, is the first and last authority. I quote the leading principle of the whole inaugural address:

Es geht um das Seiende und sonst nichts.

One ought not to speak about this Other (*nichts*) but about this *Seiende*. So:

Erforscht werden soll nur das Seiende und sonst – nichts; das Seiende allein und weiter – nichts; das Seiende einzig und darueber hinaus – nichts.

Heidegger here defends his point in a footnote referencing Hippolyte Taine, a natural scientist from the end of the nineteenth century, who used the word “nothing”.

Then Heidegger, using quotation marks, downplays “logic”, in which the basic rules issue from the law of non-contradiction. He asks, Is reason not the Master of itself, supralogical, capable of thinking about that Nothing? And concludes: *Das Nichts ist die vollständige Verneinung der Allheit des Seienden.*

So: Erforscht werden soll das Seiende und sonst nichts; das Seiende allein und weiter – nichts; das Seiende allein und darueber hinaus – nichts. Wie steht es um das Nichts? Das Nicht selbst vernichtet.

What Heidegger holds as nothing is *Angst*, which embodies both fear and anxiety. The inaugural address has been made to flourishing scientists. If for some reason or other they become anxious or depressed, this frustrates their working, the seeking for the new, *es vernichtet*.

7. Overcoming metaphysics and returning to it

Heidegger’s work *Ueberwindung der Metaphysik* (1936) contains a critique of positivism, which is viewed as only “technique”. Another line of the critique leads to Nietzsche’s “will to power” (*Wille zur Macht*) and from there to the Nazis. When metaphysics is overcome, there remains

only technique, which when joined with the will to power leaves only the principle of performance, the will to will.

The metaphysical human being is turned into an animal-worker. Against the will-being of the will there is nothing but nothing, das *Nichts*. Before das *Sein* in its primordial force can express itself, this moment of the will must be demolished. Metaphysics belongs to the character of the human being. Heidegger, as an ontologist, is a supporter of transcendental philosophy, which is our basic epistemology. In one sentence he declares the empiricist-positivist epistemology to be a logic of misunderstanding. Nietzsche's will-to-power would transform life into pure psychology. Heidegger goes on to criticize Nietzsche's thinking as "artistry" (Wagner), which merely inflames the feelings. Heidegger invites us to think of being as matter. Objects are *there*, where the human being becomes a subject,

Philosophy after metaphysics has become pure anthropology, Juergen Habermas says. In the willing of the will there is first technique, which has become the highest form of rationality. Heidegger distinguishes between the "right" and the "true". The right of the will to will is not true; the right masters true being and pushes truth to the edge. Kant's conception of practical reason about the being of the will as a pure will, is the will of the being, and that is why its contents are formal. Its only content is the categorial imperative.

With Heidegger the will of time (1939–40) radiates in only one direction. Heidegger condemns *Fuehrerschaft* and the *Übermensch*. The rest of his text is a return to poetry. Shepherds live in the wilderness of a destroyed country and think about what is and is not important for life. The imperceptible law of the earth rises and falls in its measured circle. A birch never exceeds its own possibilities. The will, expressed in technology, tires out the earth. Illumination comes to the human being, who by seeing it follows the way of building and poetry.

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Francisco Umpiérrez Sánchez

Constitución y cambio de significado en los fenómenos sociales

La inmigración africana en Canarias

Como figura en el resumen, mi participación en esta Mesa Redonda se desarrollará en dos vertientes. Por una parte, analizaré un fenómeno social concreto: la inmigración africana en Canarias. Pretendo con este análisis hacerme con una idea clara de qué debo entender por significado de un fenómeno social, cómo se establece y cómo cambia. Y por otra parte, reflexionaré sobre algunos conceptos básicos que usaré para representarme científicamente el fenómeno social en cuestión.

1. Aspectos metodológicos

Sobre cualquier cosa como sobre cualquier concepto se pueden decir muchas cosas. No se trata de decir todo lo que se sabe de las cosas y de los conceptos, sino lo que viene al caso y es necesario al caso. Y lo que viene y es necesario al caso lo llamaremos pertinencia.

Toda investigación o análisis teórico siempre se encuentra en un determinado estadio de desarrollo. De manera que habrá fundamentos previos no explícitos en el análisis y habrá aspectos todavía sin desarrollar. Supongamos que tenemos un grupo de albañiles que tiene como tarea hacer los cimientos, levantar las columnas y construir los techos y las paredes de un edificio. A este grupo no se le podrá pedir cuenta de cómo han sido elaboradas las materias primas que ha empleado en cubrir sus objetivos, el cemento, el hormigón y los bloques, como tampoco se le podrá pedir cuenta de aquello que corresponde a otro estadio de desarrollo más avanzado: montar las ventanas o hacer la instalación eléctrica.

Así que dos aspectos deben ser considerados bajo el punto de vista del método en la evaluación de los trabajos teóricos: la pertinencia de los aspectos destacados y el estadio de desarrollo en el que se encuentran las ideas.

2. Sobre el significado

El significado lo entenderé como Saussure, esto es, como concepto. Por concepto entiendo, entre otros contenidos, la visión de conjunto de las cosas. Cualquier cosa, por ejemplo, un edificio, tiene muchos lados. Y es misión del concepto reflejar esta multiplicidad de lados de las cosas. Del mismo modo entenderé el significado de un fenómeno social: compuesto de múltiples contenidos significativos.

Trato de este modo de evitar un error muy corriente. Supongamos que tenemos una fotografía del frontis de un edificio y otra fotografía de uno de los laterales del mismo edificio. Nadie dirá que son dos edificios o que los fotógrafos ven edificios distintos. Esto sería pensar de forma muy ligera. Diríamos sencillamente que cada fotógrafo captó un lado distinto del mismo edificio. Igual ocurre con los fenómenos sociales: no es que para cada agente social el fenómeno social en cuestión tenga un significado distinto, sino que capta un contenido significativo distinto. De ahí que el significado del fenómeno social lo entendamos como el conjunto de los contenidos significativos expresados por la totalidad de los agentes sociales.

3. Sobre la percepción

Mientras que la sensación constituye un reflejo de indicios aislados del mundo, la percepción constituye un reflejo de objetos o situaciones objetivas. El mundo no está sólo compuesto de manchas de colores, sonidos y olores, sino de objetos o totalidades objetivas. Y es misión de la percepción el reflejo de los objetos o de las totalidades.

La percepción supone además la participación mancomunada de todos los sentidos y la síntesis de sensaciones sueltas en sistemas de conjunto. De las naranjas, por ejemplo, conocemos su apariencia cromática, la textura de su piel, su olor y su sabor. De manera que cuando sólo la vemos, se produce

una síntesis de todas las sensaciones sueltas que tenemos de la naranja en un sistema de conjunto.

Vemos que hay proximidad esencial entre percepción y concepto, ambos se refieren a la totalidad y a la visión de conjunto. ¿Qué diferencias hay entonces entre percepción y concepto? Las siguientes: Por medio de la percepción identificamos a un objeto y lo incluimos en determinada categoría, mientras que por medio del concepto elaboramos dicha categoría.

Sabemos además que hay una relación de mediación entre percepción y concepto. La percepción de un objeto está mediada por el concepto del que dispongamos de dicho objeto, y el concepto de un objeto se elabora con las percepciones y representaciones que tengamos de dicho objeto.

4. *Bañistas solidarios*

El 31 de julio de 2006 en *La Vanguardia* se podía leerse la siguiente noticia: “Por encima de leyes y papeles, la inmigración es un terrible drama humano que hoy en día se ha convertido en una aventura a vida o muerte”. Los bañistas que se encontraban disfrutando ayer de un día de playa en La Tejita, en el municipio tinerfeño de Granadilla, parecieron plenamente consciente de ello y no se quedaron indiferentes ante la situación cuando vieron llegar un cayuco repleto de inmigrantes a la orilla. La mayor parte de los presentes corrió a socorrer a los recién llegados, dado el estado del desfallecimiento que presentaban muchos de ellos, entre los que se encontraban menores y al menos una mujer. Los bañistas les ayudaron a salir del agua y les socorrieron sobre la arena, ayudándoles a beber y extendiendo y manteniendo las toallas de playa sobre ellos para procurarles sombra.

Algunos de los presentes llegaron a introducir sus vehículos todoterreno en la playa para ayudar a trasladar a los inmigrantes que se encontraban en peor estado. Tras la primera ayuda de los bañistas, efectivos de la Cruz Roja, Policía Nacional y Guardia Civil acudieron a la playa de la Tejita para hacerse cargo de los inmigrantes. Según testigos presenciales, una vez que la Cruz Roja se hizo cargo de la situación, las personas presentes en la playa estallaron en un aplauso y se felicitaron entre sí por la acción realizada.

5. Percepción práctica y percepción contemplativa

Compararé la percepción de los bañistas solidarios con la percepción de un miembro de la clase media, de ideología conservadora, que contempla el mismo hecho sentado en el salón de su casa viendo la televisión. La percepción que tienen los bañistas del cayuco aproximándose a la orilla los mueve a la acción, mientras que la percepción que tiene el miembro de clase media de las imágenes televisivas de los mismos emigrantes no lo mueve a la acción. Estas dos percepciones no se distinguen por sí mismas, por ser modalidades subjetivas distintas de percibir, sino por la modalidad distinta de existencia del objeto percibido. En el primer caso los inmigrantes existen en carne y huesos, mientras que en el segundo caso sólo existen como color. Y esta distinta forma de existencia del objeto percibido es la que hace que en el primer caso la percepción mueva a la acción y en el segundo caso no.

6. Multilateridad y unilateralidad del conocimiento sensible

Los bañistas no sólo ven a los inmigrantes africanos, sino además los huelen, oyen sus voces y tocan sus manos y sus frentes. En este ámbito la percepción se presenta de acuerdo con uno de sus rasgos esenciales: la participación mancomunada de todos los órganos de los sentidos. Observemos ahora la clase de percepción que experimenta el miembro de la clase media que sentado en el salón de su casa contempla la escena por televisión: sólo puede participar su órgano de la vista; sólo percibe a los inmigrantes como color, ni los oye, ni los huele, ni los toca. Así que dependiendo del modo de existencia del objeto percibido, así será la modalidad de la percepción: como participación mancomunada de todos los sentidos o como participación de un solo sentido.

7. La percepción colectiva y la percepción privada

La percepción de los bañistas es una percepción compartida, social, colectiva. La percepción despierta en ellos sus sentimientos humanitarios y corren sin pensarlo a ayudar a los inmigrantes. Los mueve los sentimientos, no la razón. Sólo piensan en sacarlos del agua, en darles de beber y comer,

y en darles sombra. Se sienten conmovidos y afectados por el drama de estas personas. Y cuando ellos ya no están, cuando la Cruz Roja y la Policía Nacional ya se los han llevado, rompen en un aplauso. Se sienten unidos y por una buena causa.

Pensemos ahora en la percepción del miembro de la clase media. Esa noticia de la que le informan, que unos inmigrantes llegaron a la playa de la Tejita, es un momento pasajero, detrás de esa noticia vienen más. Y su acto es un acto de privacidad. No se siente unido a nadie ni vive la unidad con nadie. Esta división de la percepción en colectiva y privada es una determinación social.

8. Percepción e impresión

Al bañista la experiencia que ha tenido le ha impactado, le ha dejado una honda huella, y cuando ha llegado a su casa se lo ha contado a sus familiares, y ha llamado a sus amigos y también se los ha contado. Ha cenado y ha seguido hablando de los inmigrantes africanos. Ha exclamado con hondo sentimiento: ¡Es una injusticia que esa gente muera de hambre mientras nosotros tiramos comida a la basura! ¡Habría que hacer algo! Y por la noche, mientras dormía, no cesó de invadirle la experiencia: las imágenes de aquellos pobres negros desfallecidos. Mientras que al miembro de la clase media la noticia no le impactó, apenas le preocupó, y la información que dieron después sobre el fútbol borró o cubrió la pequeña y leve huella que le dejó aquel drama. Esta distinción entre percepción con impresión y percepción ausente de impresión es una distinción psicológica.

9. El significante

Pensemos en el significante /mesa/ y pensemos en todas las mesas existentes en la actualidad y en las que han existido durante los últimos cien años. Comparemos ambos seres: el significante /mesa/ y las mencionadas mesas. El significante /mesa/ es uno y el mismo, mientras que las mesas son muchas y variadas. Esta es la contradicción que quiero presentar: la existente entre el significante, que es uno y el mismo, y el objeto significado, que son muchos y distintos.

Quiero trasladar la misma reflexión al ámbito del fenómeno social que investigo: la inmigración africana en Canarias. Debo preguntarme si hay

una imagen que pueda cumplir el papel de ser una y la misma y así convertirse en el significante de dicho fenómeno social. Debe ser una imagen que se repite mucho, que es regular, casi habitual. Y existe esa imagen: es la de un cayuco llegando a las costas canarias repletos de inmigrantes africanos. Le formulé a mi hija y a mi pareja cuál sería para ellas la imagen más representativa de la inmigración africana. Y ambas respondieron lo mismo: los negros con cara de asustados en las pateras o cayucos. Esa imagen, la del cayuco lleno de inmigrantes africanos, se ha convertido en el significante icónico de la inmigración. Cumple la condición esencial del significante: ser uno y el mismo frente a la multiplicidad y variedad de los objetos significados.

10. Los contenidos significativos en los agentes prácticos y contemplativos

Hemos hablado de dos clases de agentes sociales: aquel que vive directamente la experiencia de la llegada de los inmigrantes y aquel que la percibe en el televisor. En función de esta diferencia de vivencias, en el primer agente social se produce aceptación y acogimiento, mientras que en el segundo se produce rechazo y demanda de expulsión. Y en base a esta diferencia de sentimientos, los contenidos significativos también son distintos: para el primer agente el inmigrante africano significa pobreza y necesidad, mientras que para el segundo significa inseguridad y preocupación.

11. Los contenidos significativos mediados por la concepción

La inmigración africana constituye uno de los problemas económicos y políticos más importantes que enfrenta la sociedad española. De hecho la inmigración figura como el segundo problema más importante para los españoles. La inmigración africana supone no sólo la llegada de las pateras a las costas canarias, sino la búsqueda de un puesto de trabajo y de una vivienda, y su asistencia sanitaria y su asistencia escolar en el caso de que tengan hijos.

La izquierda y la derecha tienen una concepción distinta de la inmigración africana. La persona de izquierda concibe que la pobreza de África es un resultado histórico del colonialismo europeo occidental y, en con-

secuencia, piensa que Occidente está obligado a reparar el daño causado. De ahí que defienda que los países ricos deban hacer inversiones en los países pobres y condonar la deuda. Por el contrario, la persona de derecha concibe que la pobreza de los pueblos africanos es culpa de sus propios gobernantes y que Europa occidental no tiene ninguna deuda histórica con ese continente.

Esta distinta concepción provoca que la persona de izquierda mire con buenos ojos a los inmigrantes africanos y la persona de derecha con malos ojos. También los contenidos significativos destacados son distintos: la persona de izquierda ve en el inmigrante africano la consecuencia de la política colonial e imperialista de Occidente, y la persona de derecha ve a unos pobres desgraciados que no saben gestionar los recursos que han tenido y tienen.

12. Los cambios de significados

Los cambios de significados en el fenómeno social de la inmigración que estamos analizando se pueden producir por tres causas: una, porque cambie la relación entre el pueblo inmigrante y el pueblo receptor, dos, por experiencias ocasionales en los agentes del pueblo receptor con miembros de los pueblos inmigrantes, y tres, por cambios en los conceptos en los agentes del pueblo receptor.

Primera causa de cambio. El pueblo receptor tiene una determinada capacidad de acogida. Si el número de inmigrantes que llega a las costas canarias supera el número razonable y hace imposible una vida estable, el pueblo receptor cambiará su percepción. A partir de ese momento los inmigrantes empezaran a significar algo distinto a lo que significaban: de ser signo de pobreza a ser signo de inestabilidad y preocupación.

Segunda causa de cambio. Puede suceder que uno de los bañistas de la playa de la Tejita tuviera un mal concepto de los inmigrantes africanos. Pero al verlos de cerca, al verse impelido a ayudarlos, al percibir su sufrimiento y desgracia, su percepción cambia. De manera que ahora los inmigrantes africanos pasan a ser signo de desgracia y necesidad de auxilio. También puede suceder que una persona que ha simpatizado de siempre con los inmigrantes africanos tenga con alguno de ellos un episodio violento. A partir de ese momento su percepción cambia y los inmigrantes africanos empiezan a ser signo de inseguridad.

Tercera causa de cambio. Supongamos que una persona tiene una concepción de derecha sobre los inmigrantes. Supongamos ahora que esta persona lee un libro sobre la inmigración y la relación entre los pueblos ricos y los pueblos pobres de un autor marxista. Queda impactado y sorprendido de cómo los países ricos explotan a los países pobres y cómo esto sólo genera infelicidad y un mundo no humano. A partir de entonces, y por causa de un cambio de concepción, empieza a percibir a los inmigrantes africanos de otro modo. Ahora los inmigrantes africanos se han convertido en signos de pobreza y de explotación.

13. *Los nombres*

Coincido con Magariños que poner nombre a las cosas debió ser el primer acto semiótico. Así al menos ocurre cuando enseñamos a los niños a hablar. Le señalamos con el dedo el objeto y le decimos: “mesa”. El niño vincula la percepción de determinados objetos con los nombres. Tal vez el nombre va sustituyendo progresivamente al dedo. Al principio el niño señala el objeto con el dedo sin capacidad de nombrarlo. Después lo señala y lo nombra. Hasta que por último sólo lo nombra. Con este último paso diremos que el niño ha liberado al nombre de la percepción. Este es el nombre aprendido en su modalidad ostensiva.

Hablemos ahora del nombre como objeto del concepto. Aquí ya no decimos como se llama el objeto que tenemos delante de los ojos sino qué es dicho objeto. Por ejemplo, ¿qué es una mesa? Nos vamos al diccionario y leemos: mueble compuesto por un tablero horizontal sostenido por uno o varios pies y que sirve para comer, estudiar, etcétera. Este es el nombre aprendido en su modalidad de objeto del concepto.

Pero analicemos el papel de los nombres en el ámbito de los fenómenos sociales. Patera y cayuco son los nombres de las dos clases de embarcaciones que utilizan los inmigrantes africanos para arribar a las costas canarias. Si preguntáramos a los canarios cuáles serían para ellos la palabra más hegemónica e identificativa, tal vez la más regular, de los inmigrantes africanos, la mayoría dirían cayuco y patera. Hay varias razones que lo explican, pero con una de ellas no basta en principio. Cuando por la radio o la televisión nos informa de estos eventos, los periodistas dicen: en el día de ayer dos cayucos con inmigrantes subsaharianos llegaron a la playa de Arguineguín

en la isla de Gran Canaria. O esto otro: dos pateras con inmigrantes subsaharianos fueron interceptadas cerca de la isla de Lanzarote.

Tanto la palabra “patera” como la palabra “cayuco” podemos entenderlas al principio como nombres en su modalidad ostensiva y en su modalidad de objeto del concepto, pero también puede ser entendida en su papel específico en el fenómeno concreto de la inmigración africana en Canarias. Podemos entenderla como puertas que nos abren un universo léxico, una red de relaciones semiológicas, un conjunto de imágenes de la inmigración africana.

14. Ver y representar

En el capítulo II del libro I de *El Ingenioso Hidalgo Don Quijote de la Mancha*, puede leerse lo siguiente:

Estaban acaso a la puerta dos mujeres mozas, destas que llaman del partido, las cuales iban a Sevilla con unos arrieros que en la venta aquella noche acertaron a hacer jornada, y como a nuestro aventurero todo cuanto pensaba, veía o imaginaba le parecía ser hecho y pasar al modo de lo que había leído, luego que vio la venta se la representó que era un castillo con sus cuatro torres y chapiteles de luciente plata, sin faltarle su puente levadiza y honda cava, con todos aquellos adherentes que semejantes castillos se pintan.

Dos ideas claves me interesan en este texto: una, que a Don Quijote todo lo que veía le parecía ser hecho y pasar la modo de lo que había leído, y dos, que viendo una venta se la representó que era un castillo. Cómo quiero analizar estas ideas desde la perspectiva de la Semiótica de los bordes, recordemos lo planteado por Magariños. En la página 4 de su ponencia puede leerse lo siguiente:

Pero ahora, lo que propongo a los lectores es que me acompañen en la exploración de la interpretación, en cuanto trabajo necesario para la producción de la transformación. Una interpretación transformadora habrá de consistir en la producción de otro significado derivado del anterior, que ya no será el mismo, y, por tanto, en otra posibilidad de percepción del anterior fenómeno social, que ya no será el mismo.

Y en la página 5 puede leerse esto otro: “La segunda situación es aquella en la cual alguien imagina algo. La capacidad de imaginar depende de la posibilidad de actualizar recuerdos de efectivas percepciones sensoria-

les precedentes. Se mezclan, se transforman para construir un imaginario posible, pero en definitiva su materia prima (mnemónica) preexiste”.

En el caso de Don Quijote podemos decir que en su persona se da, por una parte, el imperio de la representación sobre la percepción, y por otra parte, que esa representación está alimentada fundamentalmente de libros fantásticos de caballería en vez de por percepciones del mundo real y existente. De manera que sobre una percepción actual se edifica la representación de un objeto inexistente: sobre la percepción de la venta se edifica la representación de un castillo. Estos cambios son sólo de naturaleza fenoménica, sólo ocurren en la subjetividad de Don Quijote, no en la realidad exterior. Esta distinción entre mundo real y mundo imaginado o representado lo expresa Cervantes cuando en la página 83, después que Don Quijote llamara doncellas a las mozas, dice lo siguiente: “Mirábanle las mozas, y andaban con los ojos buscándole el rostro, que la mala visera le encubría; mas como se oyeron llamar doncellas, cosa tan fuera de su profesión, no pudieron tener la risa”. Se reían de Don Quijote justamente porque el mundo que él se representaba no existía como exterioridad, y para sostener y mantener ese mundo inexistente era fundamental las operaciones nominativas: llamando doncella a una mujer de partido (prostituta).

15. Nombre y representación

Sobre este respecto haré dos pequeñas reflexiones. La primera reflexión atañe al quehacer de los escritores: hay un sector de ellos que se esmera en una descripción pormenorizada de lo que relatan, y hay otros que no lo hacen. En el primer caso el lector tiene una representación dirigida y detallada del lugar donde ocurren los hechos, mientras que en el segundo caso el lector debe representarse por sí mismo el lugar donde ocurren los hechos. No sabríamos decir en principio en cuáles de los dos casos la representación es más rica: depende del conocimiento del lector. Tal vez cuando estamos pendientes de las acciones de los protagonistas, la representación al detalle del lugar donde ocurren los hechos es muy secundaria. De hecho si le pedimos a alguien que nos cuente una película que haya visto, en general se centrará en las acciones de los protagonistas y no en la descripción del lugar donde ocurren los hechos. Hago esta pequeña reflexión por qué no sé en principio cómo podría afectar al cambio en el significado de los fenómenos sociales la correlación existente entre nombre y representa-

ción. Debemos preguntarnos cuánto dejamos atrás cuando describimos un fenómeno social y que correlación existe entre los agentes sociales de dicho fenómeno social y el lugar o espacio donde ocurren los hechos. Tal vez, como ocurre en el caso de la inmigración africana en Canarias, el elemento físico geográfico, la determinación espacial, sea esencial en la descripción del fenómeno.

La segunda reflexión tiene que ver con el problema de cómo llamar a Don Quijote: ¿Alonso Quijano o Don Quijote de la Mancha? Podríamos decir en principio que el nombre de Alonso Quijano es el nombre real del personaje de la historia contada por Cervantes y se corresponde con la percepción, mientras que el nombre de Don Quijote es el nombre inventado por Alonso Quijano y se corresponde con la representación que él se hace de sí mismo. Se trata sencillamente de observar que hay esa dualidad en la nominación: hay un nombre para la percepción y otro para la representación. Hemos supuesto que en la subjetividad de Alonso Quijano se daba el imperio de la representación sobre la percepción, de ahí su afán por cambiarle el nombre a todo el mundo, mientras que para quienes lo conocían y sabían de su locura se imponía la percepción sobre la representación y veían en Alonso Quijano sólo a Alonso Quijano y sólo bajo ese nombre lo reconocían. También en este caso la reflexión sobre el significado de los fenómenos sociales me lleva a pensar sí en la representación que de los mismos tienen ciertos agentes sociales se hace necesario un cambio de nominación o no. O tal vez debo pensar que sólo cuando esto ocurre, cuando hayan cambio de nominación, es cuando realmente se ha producido un cambio de significación en el fenómeno social en cuestión. No dispongo de más tiempo para ahondar más detalladamente en estas dos últimas cuestiones. Así que doy por acabada mi intervención. Muchas gracias por la atención prestada.

Carlos Emiliano Vidales Gonzáles

La semiótica como matriz de estructuración de las teorías de la comunicación

1. Particularidades de la relación entre semiótica y el estudio de la comunicación

La semiótica tiene sus propias particularidades, es un espacio en el que convergen, al igual que en muchos otros, más de una sola línea explicativa, más de un modelo y, por supuesto, más de un objeto de estudio. Las dos grandes matrices conceptuales, la lingüística-psicológica y la lógico-filosófica, implican rupturas y diálogos, no todo sigue una misma ruta y no todo se reduce a los signos y los significados. Además, como cualquier ciencia o disciplina científica, la semiótica se mueve, dialoga con otras ciencias e incorpora elementos nuevos, así que elegir un autor o autores implica alejarse de algunos otros. Sin embargo, el problema se genera a partir de la relación de la semiótica con otras ciencias o espacios reflexivos, siendo el que nos interesa, el del estudio de la comunicación, pues en esta relación el movimiento y particularidades del pensamiento semiótico desaparecen y se construyen a su alrededor una serie de premisas, de lugares comunes sobre la semiótica cuyo fundamento epistemológico no es claro y, en algunas ocasiones, es inexistente. El punto central es que la semiótica llegó a producir sus propios modelos sobre la producción de sentido, pero al plantear como uno de sus ejes centrales a la comunicación, estaba implícitamente construyendo un puente con otras ciencias que de alguna manera trabajaban con el objeto comunicación, como la biología, la física, las matemáticas, la psicología y, por supuesto, con el estudio de la comunicación.

El vínculo es entonces la reflexión sobre el objeto comunicación de la que devienen modelos explicativos, tanto de la semiótica como del campo de estudio de la comunicación. Pero lo que sucede con el campo de estudio

de la comunicación es que no sólo ignora las particularidades de la semiótica, sino que cuando importa modelos lo que hace es incorporar conceptos aislados de sus contextos teóricos de enunciación, lo que ha tenido como consecuencia principal, investigaciones donde se mezclan autores, teorías y conceptos que la semiótica mantiene, por criterios epistemológicos, separados. Hablar de semiótica es hablar de signos y significados, un primer lugar común. El problema se hace mucho más complejo cuando el estudio de la comunicación ve a la semiótica como un método capaz de identificar la producción y circulación de significados en los mensajes (casi siempre mediáticos). Por lo tanto, cualquier interpretación, de la naturaleza que sea, encuentra en la semiótica una justificación epistemológica posible para sus propias interpretaciones. Así, lo que se tiene en el estudio de la comunicación son muchas veces términos y no conceptos, un conjunto de autores y no un principio teórico, lugares comunes y no una fundamentación epistemológica.

Cuando John Peters (1999) hace su recorrido deconstructivo sobre la noción de “comunicación”, lo que deja en evidencia es que históricamente tanto el objeto (comunicación) como su estudio (metalenguaje) han variado a lo largo del tiempo. Este primer recorrido arroja pistas y alguna claridad sobre la dimensión de la historia de la comunicación como concepto y objeto, aunque no tanto sobre la dimensión de su estudio. Ahora bien, esta parte del problema corresponde al estudio de la comunicación, es decir, es sólo uno de los dos componentes que construyen el problema. El otro componente emerge propiamente de la reflexión semiótica. Lo que ha sucedido en este espacio es que la comunicación ha sido un elemento de organización y de estructuración dentro de la teoría semiótica, visible principalmente en los trabajos de Thomas Sebeok, Umberto Eco y en los de Iuri Lotman, los representantes de tres genealogías históricas en los estudios semióticos. El punto es simple, mientras desde la semiótica se conceptualiza a la comunicación y se la convierte en un elemento capaz de organizar el mundo biológico y social, lo que sucede con la semiótica dentro del campo de estudio de la comunicación es algo diferente, es un principio metodológico.

Las primeras reflexiones que hemos desarrollado (Vidales 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007) estuvieron centradas en dos ejes fundamentalmente: en la forma en que la semiótica entiende y “usa” a la comunicación y en la forma en que la comunicación entiende y “usa” a la semiótica. Con base en lo

anterior, una primera aproximación al elemento comunicacional dentro del campo semiótico permitió establecer tres características específicas: a) la semiótica supone trabajar con materialidades centrales para el campo de la comunicación: los signos y los procesos de significación; b) la semiótica, en algunos casos, ha estudiado los procesos semióticos como procesos comunicativos e inclusive a propuesto sus propios modelos de comunicación y; c) la comunicación en el campo de la semiótica es un elemento de estructuración, de organización, es un concepto constructor.

La segunda posición, la indagación sobre la naturaleza de la semiótica en el campo de estudio de la comunicación es mucho más precisa y limitada. La comunicación ha usado a la semiótica únicamente como método de análisis a través de la importación de algunos conceptos y elementos metodológicos por medio de los cuales elabora algunos de sus análisis. En este sentido, no podemos hablar de un pensamiento semiótico de la comunicación, sino únicamente de la utilización de algunos conceptos devenidos del campo semiótico. La comunicación, por tanto, no se piensa semióticamente. Podemos plantear varias cuestiones en torno a la configuración de la comunicación, sin embargo, lo más importante parece ser su configuración posterior a un primer recorrido histórico. El primer escenario es el que tiene que ver con lo que dice la comunicación que es la semiótica, al ser ella misma la que plantea a ésta como matriz científica posible. Este primer escenario se mueve entonces desde el campo de la comunicación hacia al campo semiótico, lo que implica la revisión de los conceptos que el mismo campo sugiere como centrales de la teoría de la comunicación. El segundo escenario es lo que dice la semiótica sobre la comunicación. Con base en lo anterior planteamos una primera hipótesis, pues consideramos que hay una comunicación en el campo semiótico y una comunicación o elemento “comunicacional” en el campo de estudio de la comunicación que no se relacionan y que parten y operan de matrices conceptuales diferentes. Este primer marco modifica algunos de los supuestos iniciales sobre la comunicación y la semiótica, y nos lleva a preguntarnos ¿qué semiótica es la que está en el campo de la comunicación? Y, ¿para qué o con qué fines?

Consideramos que las potencialidades de la semiótica son precisamente sus propiedades epistemológicas y no tanto sus formulaciones metodológicas. Pensar la comunicación semióticamente implica no sólo el uso de algunos conceptos devenidos de la teoría semiótica, sino el uso de marcos mucho más generales. Pensamos, al igual que Mario Bunge (2004:

47), que “toda ciencia utiliza, además del lenguaje ordinario, expresiones y transformaciones de las mismas que no tienen sentido sino en el contexto de alguna teoría”. Así, pensar la comunicación semióticamente implica partir de sus marcos epistemológicos y no sólo de la formulación de algunos de sus conceptos. Es con base en estas reflexiones que consideramos que ningún concepto funciona fuera de un marco teórico específico y por tanto, la correcta utilización de los conceptos en comunicación devinidos del campo semiótico parte necesariamente del reconocimiento de sus contextos teóricos. Aquí el elemento clave, aunque reconocemos que no es el único, son los conceptos, a lo que hemos definidos como signos. El proceso que planteamos entonces es doble. Planteamos que es necesario recobrar la naturaleza epistemológica de los conceptos de la semiótica para el campo de la comunicación y esto lo planteamos a través, precisamente, de la semiótica. Este punto se desarrolla a continuación.

2. Pensar semióticamente a la comunicación y a su estudio

La idea de una ruta conceptual implica una forma de aproximación que parte del acuerdo en su constitución. Una primera tesis sugiere que los objetos conceptuales no son materiales ni mentales, ni procesos cerebrales o sucesos que ocurren en una mente inmaterial, sino que son objetos que poseen una naturaleza peculiar e irreductible y que existen en la medida en que pertenecen a ciertos contextos, como son, por ejemplo, las teorías. Para Mario Bunge (2004), los objetos conceptuales o constructos son una creación mental de los que se distinguen cuatro tipos: conceptos, proposiciones, contextos y teorías. En este sentido, los conceptos son los átomos conceptuales, las unidades con las que se construyen las proposiciones, las cuales satisfacen algún cálculo proposicional y que, por añadidura pueden ser evaluados en lo que respecta a su grado de verdad, aún cuando de hecho no se disponga aún de procedimientos para efectuar tal evaluación en algunos casos. Por su parte, el contexto es un conjunto de proposiciones formadas por conceptos con referentes comunes y, por lo tanto, una teoría es un conjunto de proposiciones enlazadas lógicamente entre sí y que poseen referentes en común. Los conceptos están, por tanto, en lugar de algo más, no son meras figuras retóricas, sino elementos que sustituyen a ideas, sensaciones, nociones, colores, formas, etcétera, en síntesis, los conceptos son

signos y, a final de cuentas, su poder estriba en su capacidad de representar las ideas por las cuales los usamos. Por lo tanto, si el concepto es la unidad de pensamiento y es a la vez un signo, por lo tanto, un signo es una unidad de pensamiento. Pensamos en signos. El mismo Peirce ya había contemplado este hecho.

La idea de la semiótica como marco epistemológico para el estudio de la comunicación es una idea que ya se ha venido explorando, como lo muestra el trabajo realizado por Klaus Brhun Jensen (1997), el cual tiene por objetivo analizar y explicar la necesidad de un retorno a la semiótica y el pragmatismo de C. S. Peirce, con la finalidad de generar un nuevo desarrollo de la teoría social desde esta perspectiva y plantear así una teoría sociosemiótica integradora de la comunicación de masas. El punto de partida de Jensen es la idea de que la sociedad del significado es el resultado de la semiosis con la que los agentes sociales informados se comprometen mientras llevan a cabo las necesidades cotidianas de la vida, por lo tanto, una crítica a la filosofía del pragmatismo que se originó a partir de Peirce, identifica dos líneas del desarrollo de su semiótica, a decir, (a) una teoría de la comunicación o semiótica de primer orden y (b) una teoría de la ciencia o semiótica de segundo orden. Esto implica, a su vez, el desarrollo del Pragmatismo como epistemología y filosofía política para la comprensión de la comunicación de masas en tanto que acción semiótica.

Lo anterior es una propuesta, que al igual que la de Thomas A. Sebeok (2001) y John Deely (1990), ubican a la semiótica como una matriz epistemológica posible para la teoría de la comunicación, puesto que se extiende no sólo a la posibilidad de pensar semióticamente la comunicación, sino a la generación de una matriz constructiva general para pensar *desde* la comunicación no sólo al complejo mundo de lo social semióticamente, sino, de manera general, a las diferentes manifestaciones de lo comunicativo en la naturaleza (Sebeok 2001). Es en este sentido que nos parece fundamental reconocer la diferencia entre a) la estructuración, lectura, análisis, definición o configuración de un determinado proceso comunicativo u objeto propio de la comunicación a través de la semiótica, lo que implicaría “pensar” la comunicación semióticamente y, b) el empleo de terminología semiótica en un estudio comunicativo sin que por esto se pueda entender una fundamentación semiótica. Este doble escenario complica una clara lectura del punto que exponemos, pero nos permite apuntar que lo que

encontramos en el estudio de la comunicación es más lo segundo, una relación *terminológica* y no conceptual o teórica.

Como se puede apreciar, la idea de la extensión del marco semiótico como matriz científica general no es nueva, sino que se ha venido planteando hace por lo menos dos décadas atrás e inclusive podríamos extenderla hasta los inicios de la propia disciplina semiótica, pero lo que quizá si sea nuevo sea la pregunta por su pertinencia y por la forma de su fundamentación. El punto de partida es el objeto o materia de estudio de la investigación semiótica, el cual no se reduce al estudio de los signos sino a la acción de los signos o *semiosis*, por lo tanto, la semiótica “contrasta con la semiosis como el conocimiento contrasta con aquello que es conocido” (Deely 1990: 105). Al trasladar el centro de una entidad conceptual (signo) hacia una configuración de relaciones conceptuales (semiosis), la semiótica se expande naturalmente hacia todo aquello que implique relaciones de este tipo. Pero la semiosis, como el complejo sistema conceptual de la semiótica, depende de un elemento que la hace pertinente para cualquier ciencia en general, es decir, la *interpretación*, pues ningún signo existe si no es interpretado por alguien o por algo. De esta forma, como explica Veikko Rantala, dado que la noción de interpretación juega un papel explícito en campos de estudio como la lingüística, la lógica, la filosofía, la teoría de la comunicación, la teoría de la información, la estética, la teoría literaria y la medicina; la semiótica está necesariamente relacionada con todas ellas, pero por otro lado, casi cualquier campo puede ser estudiado desde una perspectiva semiótica, dado que casi cualquier cosa puede ser interpretada como un signo (Rantala 1992: 8).

Entre la semiosis y la interpretación aparece un tercer elemento, la *significación*. Para Charles Sander Peirce el proceso o la relación del signo por medio de la cual es atribuido su *significado* es precisamente la semiosis, es decir, una acción que envuelve la relación y cooperación entre tres elementos: el signo, el objeto y el interpretante. Sin embargo, nuestra intención no es profundizar en la teoría peircena, sino explorar el por qué de la pertinencia de la semiótica como marco epistemológico para el estudio de la comunicación. Este punto se sintetiza partiendo de las nociones de semiosis, signo, significación e interpretación de los que hemos hablado, dado que debajo de todas ellas subyacen preguntas explícitas que la teoría semiótica plantea para su propia fundamentación y que pueden ser extendibles para cualquier sistema conceptual o ciencia en particular a partir de su propia

historia que, para el caso concreto de la semiótica, será, según John Deely (1990), la historia de los intentos por dar cuenta de aquello que subyace a la semiosis y la hace posible, es decir, el signo, partiendo de una pregunta fundamental, a saber ¿qué es un signo, tal que él hace posible la semiosis? La semiótica es ese intento por explicar teóricamente lo que distingue al signo de su entendimiento como tal, de aquellos estudios que lo tienen como objeto.

Esta premisa básica le da forma a un campo de investigación específico, al campo semiótico. Pero la pregunta es obligada, ¿cómo es o fue este proceso en el campo de estudio de la comunicación? El principio de extensión analítica de la semiótica la ha llevado al centro de varias propuestas científicas y la podrían llevar al centro de la propuesta en comunicación, sin embargo, en este punto la complicación es doble, pues por un lado se puede entender la ausencia de un objeto y su conceptualización histórica o, en el lado opuesto, una multiplicidad de objetos históricos. La segunda hipótesis parece ser el caso del campo de la comunicación. Lo que sucede es que el campo de estudio de la comunicación recurre a todas aquellas aproximaciones científico-discursivas que han tratado al objeto comunicación sin importar su matriz histórico-conceptual, las cuales también pueden desarrollar su propia semiótica o bien, ser leídas semióticamente, lo cual complica grandemente el asunto porque implica no una lectura semiótica del estudio de la comunicación o lo que ha sucedido históricamente con él, sino que implica algo distinto, el establecimiento de un marco epistemológico desde el que se conceptualiza no sólo al estudio de la comunicación, sino al objeto comunicación de una forma específica.

Las implicaciones son serias, pues enfrentan en el proceso de construcción de un sistema de pensamiento a la semiosis y a la comunicación, discusión que Dario Martinelli resuelve a partir del cuestionamiento por la propia naturaleza de la investigación semiótica. Según Martinelli, “lo que normalmente sucede es que nosotros tendemos a identificar la semiosis con la comunicación, sólo porque ésta última es la más evidente y predecible manifestación de la primera. Pero en el fondo, la comunicación es *una* forma de semiosis, no el todo de ella” (Martinelli 2007: 20). Esta postura hace emerger la pregunta final, a saber, ¿cuál es la diferencia entre semiosis y comunicación? Aunque por ahora no es posible dar una respuesta definitiva, por lo menos podemos afirmar que en la medida en que podamos dar respuesta a esta pregunta estaremos mirando necesariamente en alguna de

las siguientes direcciones: a) en el pensamiento y fundamentación semiótica de la comunicación o, b) en la fundamentación de la propuesta científica de la comunicación.

Por otro lado, es importante aclarar que las dos direcciones no están peleadas sino que pueden ser integradas, sin embargo, esta integración requiere que las propuestas, para poder ser comparadas, den cuenta de su estructura, especifiquen su sistema conceptual, aclaren su genealogía y evidencien su objeto de estudio, sólo en esta medida se puede vislumbrar un verdadero diálogo entre el campo de investigación semiótico y el campo de estudio de la comunicativo. La tarea consiste, por tanto, en buscar esas propuestas teóricas en el campo de estudio de la comunicación o “completar críticamente” aquellas que ya existen. Esto supone un extenso trabajo del que sólo se puede especular sobre el impacto de su recorrido y sobre la acogida que tendrá en el campo de estudio de la comunicación en este momento actual, pero del que no se puede objetar la necesidad apremiante y la pertinencia de su realización.

3. A manera de cierre

Lo que aquí hemos mostrado es apenas una insinuación de las posibilidades epistemológicas de la semiótica para el estudio y pensamiento de la comunicación, pero lo que debe quedar claro es que este programa es una tarea que recién se está llevando a cabo y de la que queda aún mucho por decir y hacer. De igual forma, lo que hemos intentado dejar en claro es que hay serios problemas en el campo de la comunicación sobre la libertad de la utilización de los conceptos semióticos. Quizá este es apenas un apunte de una tarea mucho más amplia que implica una revisión sistemática de lo que ha pasado en la convergencia entre ambos campos de estudio, y la semiótica, a través de su lógica y su método pragmático, pueden resultar una herramienta de pensamiento eficaz en esta y en otras tareas reconstructivas.

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Elina Viljanen

Deconstructing Soviet aesthetics and Soviet artistic consciousness

At the time Stalin called me almost every day and ask me to destroy Shostakovich [...] I want to ask everyone who still wants to talk nonsense: “What was I supposed to do? Should I have gone to Stalin and told him that he is a total ignoramus and that he is surrounded by poor advisers? Would that have helped Shostakovich?” (Khrennikov in *Pravda*, 27.1.1999)

This paper considers problems related to the study of Soviet musical culture. It consists of three parts that attempt to bring some new insights into Soviet cultural history, its aesthetical development, and the literary legacy of the musicologist and composer Boris Asaf'ev (1884–1949).

The first problem brings us to personal letters and memoirs used as research material. I consider the reputation of two official figures in music, Tikhon Khrennikov (1913–2006) and Boris Asaf'ev, in the light of statements made by Dmitri Shostakovich. In reevaluations of Soviet culture, some charismatic cultural figures, such as Shostakovich, have grown into cultural icons, not only in Russia but also in the West. Their accounts of Soviet culture and people have played into many scholarly works and have influenced the formulation of research questions concerning that historical period. Memoirs and letters form an important and bountiful contextual source for such study, providing us with valuable documentation of Soviet culture as such, as well as unique experiences and interpretations of a given period of time. However, their use also causes many challenges in terms of the overall interpretation. People change with surrounding society and politics, influenced by subconscious reasons and individual circumstances – this applies to both the sources as well the scholar and makes reevaluation of cultural history an endless process.

In the second part of this article I endeavor to deconstruct some conventional myths in Soviet tastes by reconstructing Asaf'ev's aesthetics. By reviewing the "unofficial" in "official" aesthetics, I try to indicate that traditional confrontation is only one way of perceiving Soviet culture, which is far from being a clear cut classification. The third part of the article suggests some new ways to pose questions about Soviet cultural history.

1. Flammable personalities

The death of composer Tikhon Khrennikov (1913–2007) was reported in various newspapers. His memory was met with a flourish in Russia, but in the west his passing was treated rather abruptly and in a biased manner. The western media made a reference to the 1948 formalist campaign and to the fact that Khrennikov served as one of the party's mouthpieces at the time. Khrennikov inherited the position of Boris Asaf'ev at the end of the 1940s not only as a scapegoat, but by a resolution of the Politburo was made the new chairman of the Composers' Union. He enjoyed high official recognition as a composer and served as the head of the Composers' Union up until the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Few people in the west know how much music he composed, what activities he was involved in, and that he wrote the popular song "Moskovskie okna". Khrennikov's bad reputation was mainly due to the memoirs of Shostakovich to more general works by Western musicologists (see Fay 1980; also, Brown 2004). Shostakovich, for his part, has enjoyed recognition as a highly ethical person and an authority among ranking personalities in the Soviet Union. He is still the most important symbol of Soviet repression, although recent studies have criticized his official side and ties with the party.

The aging Shostakovich disliked Asaf'ev, calling him a "protean" in its negative meaning (Volkov 1979). If that statement is true, his disdain has long roots in an early episode that took place at the Leningrad Conservatory. "Mitja's" moods and attitudes are documented in letters from 1925 sent to a respected Muscovite musicologist Boris Javorski (1877–1942) (see Bobykina 2000). At the beginning of the 1920s Asaf'ev's radical, modern, but partly nationalistic views about future teaching methods in music caused some splits at the traditional Conservatory. In 1928 Aleksander Glazunov wrote from Paris: "It is very hard for me to part with faculty members of the performing division with whom I have never had any

friction, but the prospect of being in the hands of the composers' faction headed by Asaf'ev is not to my liking" (quoted in Schwarz 1983: 99).

At first, Shostakovich was a keen admirer of Asaf'ev. He had just completed his first symphony and hastened to present it to Asaf'ev:

I started respecting the conservatory more now when Asaf'ev works there. I have always respected Asaf'ev as a musician and his spontaneous passion for music. I feel sorry that I couldn't go to him earlier. After showing him the score of my symphony I feel like the ice broke between us and I can now talk to him. I value him more than any other musician in Leningrad. Can you imagine what they would think of me at the conservatory if they knew my opinion about him? (Shostakovich, letter to Javorski 16.12.1925, in Bobykina 2000: 49)

Soon this all changed, however, because Asaf'ev offended the twenty-year old composer by not attending the premier of his symphony. Shostakovich then wrote to Javorski: "Because he did not come, he pushed me away for good. His is a filthy intriguer and nothing more. I cannot write more. I have a headache" (ibid.: 65). Asaf'ev did not come to the concert organized by the Leningrad Association of Modern Music (LASM) most likely because he had some disagreements with its leadership, especially with Julija Wejsberg. Nevertheless, Shostakovich's first symphony was given a warm reception by Asaf'ev and many others. Asaf'ev dedicated many positive articles to his music afterwards. Shostakovich's attitude towards Asaf'ev was rather emotional, but understandable, considering his young age and the excitement that he felt over the first performance. The fact that Asaf'ev did not appear at the performance was a huge disappointment to him, since Asaf'ev was by then a well established authority in musical circles, and his presence was important. However, Asaf'ev played a big role in helping Shostakovich to get his first teaching position at the conservatory, since he was aware of the composer's financial difficulties and tried to help him in every way.

Shostakovich's epithet of Asaf'ev as a "protean" suits him well. However, it is not very convincing to use the above-mentioned statements by Shostakovich as proof that this quality was inherent to Asaf'ev's character. Shostakovich certainly had very personal and subjective reasons for his characterization. Moreover, Asaf'ev *was* a protean, perhaps even an intriguer in some respects, not only as a person but also as a theoretician,

as his philosophical concepts open themselves to so many different interpretations. This chameleon-like quality was needed especially in order to survive in the complex cultural political climate of the Stalin period; but even after Stalin, it was precisely this feature that enabled Asaf'ev's writings to stand the test of time. Khrennikov inherited Asaf'ev's position mainly as a balancer between the pressure and demands that came from the Party side, on the one hand, and the creative needs of artistic society on the other. Indeed, many artists respected (and still do) in Russia for what he did for their benefit. However, Khrennikov became quite reluctant in giving interviews to western scholars in his later years. He was most likely tired of provocations and polarizing questions about whether he was more loyal to the Party than to his fellow-colleagues, and was wearied of all the confrontations that had shadowed his career (see *Pravda* 27.1.1999, "Ne delajte Shostakovicha muchenikom!"; Khrennikov 1994).

The study of Asaf'ev has suffered the same treatment. Many scholars like to speculate whether he was a "good" or a "bad" guy in relation to Party-mindedness. Some scholars, such as Boris Schwarz (1983), Andrey Olkhovsky (1955) and Robert Craft (1982), seem to think that Asaf'ev was more or less a victim of Soviet "mental misprision". Others, such as Fay and Taruskin, have more critical opinions about his double standard in dealing with the Soviet government.

Whatever his involvement was with the government or his personal moral status, Asaf'ev – who was never Party-member himself – was one of the official aestheticians who experienced interesting mutations and ingenious variations from his encounter with modern western thought and Russian modernism. He did not accept traditions of tsarist Russia as such but reinterpreted and advanced them. In my research, I have focused mainly on Asaf'ev's philosophical and intellectual roots and the development of his aesthetical terminology, as it took place between the years 1916–1949. One of my main areas of interest lies in the kinds of interpretation that can be brought to his many-sided, sometimes contradictory literary output. His career started in the highly modernist context and culminated in his election to the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, earning him the name "father of Socialist Realist theory in music" (ANSSSR 1951; see also, Viljanen 2006). What do his aesthetical vision and main work, *Musical Form as a Process* (1930 and 1947) tell us about the overall phenomenon of socialist realism in music, its philosophical basis and its development?

More importantly, what is Asaf'ev's place as a theoretician in the western history of aesthetics and music? What do his writings have to offer us other than an expression of official Soviet nationalism? I will next address this question and discuss some of Asaf'ev's contacts with the west, as well as influences on his philosophical concepts.

2. *Contacts in Europe*

Asaf'ev's life is quite well documented in the archives. He even wrote lists about the content of his bookshelves. At the early stage of his career he tended towards a cosmopolitan eruditeness and endeavored to maintain close contacts with European culture. He spent the summer of 1910 studying at museums in France, Germany and Italy (see Asaf'ev's curriculum vitae 1919–1927, in Krjukov 1981: 20–28). In 1911 Asaf'ev spent time in France (in Paris) and Austria and also in Italy as a guest of the Italian conductor Riccardo Drigo (1846–1930), with whom he worked with at the Marinski Theatre (Kjukov & Orlova 1984: 67–71). Between 1914–1916 and 1925–1930 he went abroad every spring also traveled the length and breadth of Russia. In the period of 1920 and 1930 he corresponded regularly with his friends, the émigrés Pjotr Suvchinkij, Arthur Lur'e and Sergei Prokof'ev, as well as with leading foreign music specialists and composers in Germany, England, France and Italy (see Korabel'nikova 1999: 163–164). Among those were the Austrian musicologist Guido Adler (1855–1944), teacher of Ernst Kurth (1886–1946), and the modernist composers Alban Berg (1885–1935) and Franz Schreker (1878–1934). Asaf'ev apparently wrote very good German. He also wrote letters in French and English and could understand Italian. In 1927 he was accepted into the French Musicological Society and appointed their associate correspondent in Russia. He sent his books and articles all over Europe and received musical scores and books in return (see Asaf'ev's letters in Krjukov 1981: 67–165).

Asaf'ev also wrote out lists of new books and musical scores that the Leningrad public library should obtain, and in 1927 helped to organize the premier of Alban Berg's opera *Wozzeck* in Leningrad. Later Berg wrote to him from Austria that nowhere else had *Wozzeck* been received as warmly as in Leningrad. Except for Berlin, no other theatre in Germany or Austria dared to stage the work: “Mr. Asaf'ev, you should know how much you did for me and how thankful I should be to you” (letter from Alban Berg

to Asaf'ev 11.5.1928, in *ibid.*: 136). According to Asaf'ev's personal memoirs, which he wrote at the height of Stalinism, these trips abroad enabled him to continue the broad intellectual and aesthetic development which he had begun at the university and under Vladimir Stasov's instruction. His letters and aesthetical development, however, from that period do not reflect Stasovian spirit. He is much less "black-and-white" and appears as an open-minded scholar who is absorbing everything that he could get from Europe.

The extent and quality of notes that Asaf'ev wrote regarding what he had perceived and obtained from different European sources draw a picture of an extremely ambitious and conscientious scholar (cf. Notebooks of B. V. Asaf'ev in RGALI, f. 2658 op. 1, d. 444). In the article "We and the Musical West" (1927) he wrote: "Acquaintance with the best examples of Western music will help the development of Soviet music, will liberate it from the amateurishness and speculation of 'revolutionism,' will lead towards the exploration of new forms and new means of musical expression. To show the masses the musical art of the West will provide criteria for the evaluation of Soviet musical creativity." One of his promoters at the time was the People's Commissar of Enlightenment Anatoli Lunacharski (1875–1933), who supported Asaf'ev's travels abroad and spoke on his behalf (Krijukov 1981: 16–17.)

Asaf'ev's philosophical background stood in clear conflict with official Soviet Marxism (Marajev 2006: 125). He saw reality as continuously changing, a multifaceted philosophical position that he derived from Nikolai Losski's interpretation of Henry Bergson's intuitive philosophy (see Losski 1914). Asaf'ev was influenced by Bergson's concept (and that of modernists in general) of a "living reality", subject to constant change, whereby a purely intellectual perception cannot fully grasp the individuality of an object. He founded his premise of art on the continuity of evolution and on the intuitive contemplation of living reality. Following Hegel, Asaf'ev's reasoning held that not just music, but apparently the fine arts and the whole phenomenon of art, that reflect the history of ideas in a very subtle manner, within the peculiar intonational vocabulary that is summarized by a given epoch (Asaf'ev 1976: 936). According to Asaf'ev, masterpieces of genuine art were somehow able to reflect universal ideas of humanity and the mysteries of eternal life (Silvenius 1998: 368). He applied Wilhelm Worringer's interpretations of Theodor Lipps's theory of

Einfühlung (empathy), and answered Worringer's call to write about the universal psychological basis of art history in the Russian context (Harrison & Woods 1992: 69). Asaf'ev's organicist view of art led to the conclusion that it could be served by no idealized abstract scheme; there could be no proven recipe for beauty, because the world was subject to constant motion, which meant that art as a language of life was also under constant development. This development needed to be natural, without artificiality. Thus socialist realism was, according to Asaf'ev, far from an artistic trend or a set of methodological principles of artistic creativity, the way nineteenth century realist aesthetics was. It was rather a philosophical conviction that beauty lay in the truthful portrayal of reality, no matter what this may mean in different times, at one or another moment in the existence of a world constantly in a flux. "The overcoming of statics, the discarding of the absolute, is the main thrust of modern time..." wrote Roman Jakobson in his article on Futurism in 1919 (Jakobson 1987: 30). As for Jakobson, Asaf'ev's theories were written amid intense contact with artists. Both of scholars were also artists themselves; Asaf'ev as composer and Jakobson as a poet were "insiders". Together with scholars the competitive but interrelated artistic groups of the 1920s searched ultimately new appearance and a format for what is real. Jakobson stated in 1921 "We no longer see a picture. The ideogram needs to be deformed" (ibid.: 22).

3. *Deconstructing Soviet aesthetics*

As Andrzej Walicki has pointed out, "the originality of Russian philosophy is not easy to define, whereas its dependence on Western European thought is obvious. Its striking originality can only be perceived when we examine it within the context of Russian intellectual history ..." (Walicki 1979: xvi). I consider this to be the key to understanding what kind of interesting ideas were born in the former Soviet Union and how to understand current Russian aesthetical thought.

There are two tendencies that I have tried to avoid: first, to romanticize Asaf'ev, which is often typical for current Russian musicological articles; and second, to try to find someone to blame for the narrow-minded artistic atmosphere, a search that has held particular interest to western scholars. As mentioned above, even Shostakovich did not escape this type of speculation. Furthermore, I have been struggling with the issue of what

would be the most fruitful and least polarizing way to pose questions related to Asaf'ev's theoretical development and its allegiance to European philosophy, aesthetics and musicology in order to reveal what was peculiarly Russian in the intellectual and cultural features of his output. Many articles emphasize that Asaf'ev's texts proceeded from abstract Romanticism and Symbolism to socialist demands. "... Vital, creative thought of the scholar and critic desperately opposed to escalating pressure from the outside and that the struggle between gifted thinker and the demands of the current situation continued with variable success in the course of Asaf'ev's whole life" (Valkova 1999). I do not share this idea. Even if official Marxist-Leninist and socialist-realist demands of the party did not exist, Asaf'ev would probably have not continued on the road of a romantic symbolist, as he appears in his early production and which is clearly pronounced, for example, in the religious and all arts synthesizing the aims of the journal *Muzykal'naya Mysl'*. Moreover, I hold that Asaf'ev's thought developed quite logically towards the Russian school of formalists and in a semiotic direction, following the common linguistic trends coming from Europe. One reason for that was his interpretations of Ernst Kurth's theory, which Eero Tarasti has called "proto-semiotic" (Tarasti 2002: 51). Tarasti was among the first to place Asaf'ev mainly in the history of music semioticians. According to him, the theory of intonation, as it appears in its final form (1947), is firmly semiotic in its aim to unite musical signifiers (sound) and signifieds (sense) (Tarasti 2002: 54.)

I contend that from today's perspective it is interesting to approach Soviet musical culture and aesthetics by looking at how the official cultural figures interpreted the old tsarist Russian intellectual tradition, Russian modernism and European intellectual trends in the new Soviet "forum", i.e. how the old ideas were sovietized, and what new connotations they gained in that process, and further, how these ideas became new concepts that started to live their own life in the Soviet cultural consciousness. This is related to a question about what is a peculiar Russian tone and what are the special characteristics of Soviet cultural space or web of symbols and meanings. Furthermore, it endeavors to approach the contemporary Russian musical aesthetics not as an underdeveloped modernism that socialist realism violently interrupted, but as something logically and pluralistically complex with developmental stages and artistic values on a par with those in the western history of art.

4. *Final remarks*

Studies of Soviet musical culture have long been dominated by various individual narrators: ambiguous articles that appeared in the official Soviet press releases, as well as post-Soviet-published memoirs and letters that bemoan the cultural-political situation in which countless artists struggled. As presented above, the social world of Soviet artists was full of strong personalities with their individual creative needs and demands that usually led to conflicts with one other. None of this indicated at all one's moral decadence and loyalty to the Party or disloyalty towards their fellow-colleagues. The social realities of the Soviet people, the symbols and concepts they used, as well as the rituals they practiced, were very complex in terms of interpretation. Asaf'ev is a good example of the overlaps of official and unofficial; and so is Shostakovich. The unofficial (western-oriented and modernist) and official (Soviet and realist) were not clear-cut divisions in that society, but peculiarly interwoven. Still, binary metaphors are important as abstract tools and as one level in understanding the differences between eastern and western cultures, if they are phrased and treated carefully, so as to reveal the paradoxes and conflicting structures of which reality is made.

In the first decade after the 1917 revolution Asaf'ev had all the doors open to him. Even the possibility of his emigration to West is speculated in the letters of Suvchinki and Prokof'ev (see Pol'djaev 1999: 102). At that time, however, Asaf'ev was already deeply involved in developing Soviet musical culture, and he obviously enjoyed his position. He was also a nascent patriot who aimed to put his native musical culture into frames, to write about the peculiarity of Russian artistic thought, and to indicate a new path for the development of Soviet artistic culture. He was apparently ready to make great efforts to help composers in Russia to create new music that he passionately admired. Asaf'ev admitted once that he himself lacked the innate ability as a composer that was present in his friends Mjaskovski and Prokof'ev (Tull 1976: 7). But during the formalist campaign he did not raise his voice in order to help his friends. Yet, was there any chance that Asaf'ev could have saved Mjaskovski and Prokof'ev from formalist accusations during high-Stalinism, even if he had tried to? Asaf'ev the patriot wrote in his memoirs that Russia was his fatherland and if he was to stay there it was his primary responsibility to try to act honestly in order to

fulfill his obligations to it, even though he might not always be able to understand the policies of the government (Asaf'ev 1974: 474, 506).

I understand well why his close friend Pjotr Suvchinski wrote to Maria Yudina in 1960: "I agree with you that Asaf'ev's book on Stravinsky contains many true and sincere thoughts but unfortunately after that he started to write something extraordinary rubbish." In 1961 Suvchinski wrote to the same address: "Thank God! Supposedly the influence of Asaf'ev has come to an end" (in Bretanickaja & Kuznecov 1999: 357). Asaf'ev's philosophy lost its original flavour when it was dogmatized and made into an official doctrine with all its narrow-minded interpretations. This is one of the contradictions that my forthcoming study on Asaf'ev's philosophy of music will illuminate in more detail.

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Bangyan Wen

The elimination of the Liar Paradox and a discussion of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem

This article concludes that the Liar Paradox is a pseudo-paradox. People who regard it as a paradox find in it a self-reference and substitution proposition. Therefore the contradiction is accomplished by substitution. Moreover, the former violates the Law of Identity, and the substitution may result in a possible violation of the Law of Contradiction. Consequently, self-reference and substitution propositions should be prohibited.

This article also indicates the doubly contradictory criteria in the self-reference and substitution propositions which are constructed in Gödel's proof of the Incompleteness Theorem. Hence it is incorrect. "The undecidable propositions" in the conclusion of Gödel's incompleteness theorem are often mistakenly explained in three ways: (1) as an indistinguishable proposition which includes three states: right / wrong / not right and not wrong; (2) as an uncertain but distinguishable proposition which includes two states: right or wrong; (3) as a random proposition A, such that neither A nor not-A are provable. None of these is supported by the proof of Gödel's theorem. Thus, the conclusion of "loss of truth" or "loss of mathematical certainty" cannot be reached on the basis of that theorem.

1. Elimination of the Liar Paradox

Theorem: The Liar Paradox is a pseudo-paradox.

Proof: Let \mathcal{L} denote "the proposition"; \mathcal{U} denotes "the proposition is not true".

\mathcal{T} denotes the set of true propositions. Thus: $\mathcal{U} = (\mathcal{L} \notin \mathcal{T})$

\mathcal{L} and \mathcal{U} here are employed to designate two distinct levels of language, and then no confusion will arise. (The underlining, which is equal to “non-”, is used for ease of typing.)

1.1. The judgment of “The proposition is not true” will not lead to a contradiction:

$$1.1.1 \quad \mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{T} \leftrightarrow (\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{T}) \in \mathcal{T} \leftrightarrow \mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{T}.$$

Provided that “The proposition is not true” is true: $\mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{T}$; the result is that “the proposition” is not true: $\mathcal{L} \notin \mathcal{T}$. No contradiction will arise between them.

$$1.1.2 \quad \mathcal{U} \notin \mathcal{T} \leftrightarrow (\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{T}) \notin \mathcal{T} \leftrightarrow \mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{T}.$$

Provided that “The proposition is not true” is not true: $\mathcal{U} \notin \mathcal{T}$; the result is that “the proposition” is true: $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{T}$. No contradiction will arise between these either.

Conclusion 1: The Liar Paradox is a pseudo-paradox (cf. Wen 2005).

1.2. Analysis of reasons for the paradox.

The reason is that people confuse different levels of thinking, wrongly formulating the equation: $\mathcal{U} = \mathcal{L}$. And they construct the self-reference and substitution proposition: $\mathcal{U} = (\mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{T})$, which implies that “The proposition” means “The proposition is not true”. Furthermore, in the process of reasoning, the substitution finally leads to contradiction:

$$\mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{T} \leftrightarrow (\mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{T}) \in \mathcal{T} \leftrightarrow \mathcal{U} \notin \mathcal{T}, \quad \mathcal{U} \notin \mathcal{T} \leftrightarrow (\mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{T}) \notin \mathcal{T} \leftrightarrow \mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{T}.$$

So far a clear and detailed explanation has been given for the reasons causing the Liar Paradox.

Conclusion 2: The reasons lie in the construction of self-reference and substitution propositions and the substitution of “the proposition” with “The proposition is not true”, which finally results in the seemingly inexplicable contradiction (Wen 2002).

Note that in the self-reference and substitution proposition, “the proposition” means that “the proposition is not true”. This difference between the former and the latter violates the Law of Identity, and this substitution violates the Law of Contradiction. It should be prohibited; if introduced into reasoning, such an error should be corrected.

2. Discussion of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem

In 1931, Gödel proved that: an undecidable proposition A exists in any consistent first-order arithmetic formal system, such that neither A nor \underline{A} is provable in this system. (Gödel adopted \bar{u} -constant, later omitted by J. B. Rosser later.)

The inference from this theorem is: for any such system the statement “This system is consistent” is unprovable within the system. It is designated Gödel's second Incompleteness Theorem.

2.1. Gödel's original notation: Analysis and commentary.

Gödel's original notation is hard to understand, and the symbols and proof of it appear confused. Hence an analysis of and commentary on the original text is in order so as to clarify matters.

2.1.1 Gödel defines relations: Let c be any given recursive \bar{c} -consistent class of formulae. It defines the relation: $Q(x,y) \equiv x \bar{B}_c [Sb(y \bar{1}9|z(y))]$.

Notice that Gödel gives a formula used for expression of substitution $Sb(y \bar{1}9|Z(y))$, which means “ $\bar{1}9$ in y can be substituted by $z(y)$ ”. $x \bar{B}_c y$ expresses that x is a provable sequence of y . Meanwhile, Q carries a negative meaning. Because $x \bar{B}_c y$ and $Sb(y \bar{1}9|Z(y))$ are recursive functions, they get the relation-sign q with free variables $\bar{1}7$ and $\bar{1}9$. q is a summary of all relations Q ; it therefore carries a negative meaning as well. Gödel holds that q meets the relations as follows:

$$\bar{x} \bar{B}_c [Sb(y \bar{1}9|Z(y))] \equiv \bar{B}ew_c [Sb(q \bar{1}7|Z(x) \bar{1}9|Z(y))].$$

$$\bar{x} \bar{B}_c [Sb(y \bar{1}9|Z(y))] \equiv \bar{B}ew_c [NegSb(q \bar{1}7|Z(x) \bar{1}9|Z(y))]$$

$\bar{B}ew_c [u]$ denotes that u is a theorem in c . Here Gödel means that if the provable sequence of formula $Sb(y \bar{1}9|z(y))$ in c does not exist, it can be expressed as that even Gödel's number does not exist: $Sb(q \bar{1}7|Z(x) \bar{1}9|Z(y))$. Please notice that q carries a negative meaning. In contrast, if the provable sequence of formula $Sb(y \bar{1}9|z(y))$ exists in c , it can be expressed as “Not every Gödel's number does not exist”: $Neg Sb(q \bar{1}7|Z(x) \bar{1}9|Z(y))$.

2.1.2 Gödel constructs self-reference and substitution propositions:

$$\text{Let: } p = \bar{1}7 \text{ Gen } q; \text{ and } r = Sb(q \bar{1}9|Z(p)) \quad (12)$$

$$\text{From this he gets: } Sb(p \bar{1}9|Z(p)) = Sb([\bar{1}7 \text{ Gen } q] \bar{1}9|z(p)) = \bar{1}7 \text{ Gen } Sb(q \bar{1}9|z(p)) = \bar{1}7 \text{ Gen } r \quad (13)$$

$$\text{And: } Sb(q \bar{1}7|Z(x) \bar{1}9|Z(p)) = Sb(r \bar{1}7|Z(x)) \quad (14)$$

According to (12), if substituting y for p , according to (13) and (14), he gets:

$$\exists B_c(17 \text{ Gen } r) \sqcap \text{Bew}_c[\text{Sb}(r \ 17|Z(x))] \quad (15)$$

$$\exists B_c(17 \text{ Gen } r) \text{Bew}_c[\text{Neg Sb}(r \ 17|Z(x))] \quad (16)$$

Please note that the definition of r derives from the negative meaning of q , so r carries a negative meaning. Through complex defining, Gödel obtains self-reference and substitution propositions: $17 \text{ Gen } r$, which is the generalization of r by means of the variable 17 . $17 \text{ Gen } r$ equals to U in this article, and its meaning is that “all Gödel’s numbers of provable sequences of $17 \text{ Gen } r$ in c do not exist”. Therefore we arrive at (15) and (16), above. If the provable sequence of $17 \text{ Gen } r$ does not exist, it can be expressed as “every Gödel’s number does not exist”, to wit: $\text{Sb}(q \ 17|Z(x) \ 19|Z(y))$. (15)

If the provable sequence of $17 \text{ Gen } r$ exists, it can be expressed as “not every Gödel’s number does not exist”: $\text{Neg Sb}(q \ 17|Z(x) \ 19|Z(y))$ (16).

However, Gödel directly expresses the formulas $\text{Sb}(r \ 17|Z(x))$ and $\text{Neg Sb}(r \ 17|Z(x))$, which represents whether Gödel’s number exists or not, as a theorem in c . Such kind of expressibility owns problems referring to self-reference and substitution propositions, as we have pointed them out.

2.1.3 The proof of theorem by Gödel.

Here we only discuss the proof of the second conclusion. $\text{Neg}(17 \text{ Gen } r)$ is not *c-provable*.

Proofs:

(i) As shown above, $17 \text{ Gen } r$ is not *c-provable*. Viz. according to the first conclusion, $17 \text{ Gen } r$ is not provable in c .

(ii) i.e. (according to 6.1) the following holds: $(n) \neg B_c(17 \text{ Gen } r)$. Viz. any natural number n is not the Gödel’s number of provable sequence of formula $17 \text{ Gen } r$. Please heed that the basis from (i) to (ii) is provable syntactic criteria (I).

(iii) Whence it follows, by (15), that $(n) \text{Bew}_c[\text{Sb}(r \ 17|Z(n))]$. Viz. The formula $\text{Sb}(r \ 17|Z(x))$, which does not exist in Gödel’s number of provable sequence, becomes the theorem in c .

Please note that the step from (ii) to (iii) is wrong for self-reference and substitution propositions, because Gödel’s meaning of $17 \text{ Gen } r$ is $\text{Sb}(r \ 17|Z(x))$. By substituting the meaning of $17 \text{ Gen } r$, “ $17 \text{ Gen } r$ is provable in c ” is obtained. This contradicts precondition (i).

(iv) Which together with $\text{Bew}_c[\text{Neg}(17 \text{ Gen } r)]$ would conflict with the \square -consistency of c .

Viz. According to the Law of Contradiction, it should come first to obtain that $\text{Neg Sb}(r \ 17|Z(x))$ is not a theorem in c . However, Gödel's reasoning bypasses this step and directly obtains that $\text{Neg}(17 \text{ Gen } r)$ is not a theorem in c by using \square -consistent.

(v) $\text{Neg}(17 \text{ Gen } r)$ is not c -provable.

Please note that the step which Gödel bypasses employs the semantic criteria (II), and Gödel substitutes formula $\text{Neg}(17 \text{ Gen } r)$ which is formula \underline{U} in this article; otherwise, he could only obtain that $\text{Neg Sb}(r \ 17|Z(x))$ is not a theorem in c . Apparently, Gödel's proof depends on doubly contradictory criteria and, thus, is wrong.

Furthermore, the symbol system Gödel adopted is complex and hard to understand. Gödel's supporters give a number of explanations under the implicit assumption that the theorem is right, but they still cannot make their story sound plausible. For further understanding, the author introduces some simple and explicit new symbols below.

2.2 Explicit new symbols for analysis (cf. Wen 2006).

2.2.1 General conventions of symbols

Let \mathcal{N} be the first-order arithmetic formal system. \mathcal{L} is any formula in \mathcal{N} . $\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{N}}$ is the set of theorem in \mathcal{N} .

Set: It is clearly demarcated, whether the formula \mathcal{L} is provable or not,

Thus \mathcal{L} is provable in \mathcal{N} , if and only if, \mathcal{L} is a theorem in \mathcal{N} ; expressible as $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{N}}$;

\mathcal{L} is not provable in \mathcal{N} , if and only if, \mathcal{L} is not a theorem in \mathcal{N} ; expressible as $\mathcal{L} \notin \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{N}}$.

Gödel has set provable syntactic criteria (I); therefore:

There exists a Gödel's number of provable sequence in \mathcal{L} ; expressible as: $g_{\mathcal{L}}$.

It is clearly demarcated, whether the $g_{\mathcal{L}}$ exists or not.

Assume $g_{\mathcal{L}}$ exists; then it is expressible as $g_{\mathcal{L}} \in \hat{\delta}$.

Assume $g_{\mathcal{L}}$ does not exist; then it is expressible as $g_{\mathcal{L}} \notin \hat{\delta}$.

Therefore, the provable Syntactic criteria (I) are: $\mathcal{L} \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{N}} \leftrightarrow (g_{\mathcal{L}} \in \hat{\delta})$;
 $\mathcal{L} \notin \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{N}} \leftrightarrow (g_{\mathcal{L}} \notin \hat{\delta})$.

There shall be and must be one of the above two cases.

2.2.2 Self-reference and substitution proposition \mathcal{U} .

Set the meaning of \mathcal{U} as “Gödel’s number $g_{\mathcal{U}}$ does not exist”:

$$\mathcal{U} = (g_{\mathcal{U}} \in \delta)$$

Then the provable semantic criteria (II) is from the meaning of \mathcal{U} :

$$\mathcal{U} \leftrightarrow (g_{\mathcal{U}} \in \delta)$$

However, Gödel has constructed the provable syntactic criteria (I):

$$\mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{N}} \leftrightarrow (g_{\mathcal{U}} \in \delta)$$

Therefore, there is a negative self-reference and substitution proposition: $\mathcal{U} \leftrightarrow (\mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{N}})$

However, these double criteria contradict each other.

If $\mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{N}}$, substituting the meaning of \mathcal{U} , the $(g_{\mathcal{U}} \in \delta) \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{N}} \rightarrow (g_{\mathcal{U}} \in \delta)$ can be obtained. It therefore contradicts with criteria (I). Because Gödel has set $(\mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{N}}) \leftrightarrow (g_{\mathcal{U}} \in \delta)$,

The meaning of $\underline{\mathcal{U}}$ is not dependent on the judgment of whether Gödel’s number $g_{\underline{\mathcal{U}}}$ exists or not. The author opposes the method of Gödel to construct a negative self-reference and substitution proposition. The reason for this opposition is that such kinds of propositions themselves exist as doubly contradictory criteria.

2.2.3 The proof of conclusion 2 of Gödel’s theorem.

(i) From conclusion 1: $(\mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{N}})$; i.e., \mathcal{U} is not the theorem in \mathcal{N} .

(ii) From syntactic criteria (I), $(g_{\mathcal{U}} \in \delta)$ is derived; i.e., Gödel’s number $g_{\mathcal{U}}$ does not exist.

(iii) It can be expressed as $(g_{\mathcal{U}} \in \delta) \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{N}}$; i.e., “Gödel’s number $g_{\mathcal{U}}$ does not exist” is a theorem in \mathcal{N} .

(iv) According to the Law of Contradiction, $(g_{\mathcal{U}} \in \delta) \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{N}}$; i.e., “Gödel’s number $g_{\mathcal{U}}$ exist” is not a theorem in \mathcal{N} .

(v) According to semantic criteria (II), the conclusion is $(\underline{\mathcal{U}} \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{N}})$; i.e., $\underline{\mathcal{U}}$ is not a theorem in \mathcal{N} either.

Analysis: Apparently, from (iv) to (v), if only syntactic criteria (I) are adopted, it must first be proved that Gödel’s number $g_{\underline{\mathcal{U}}}$ of provable sequence of $\underline{\mathcal{U}}$ does not exist. $g_{\underline{\mathcal{U}}}$ is completely different from $g_{\mathcal{U}}$. It has never appeared and cannot be judged. Therefore, this step is reasoned according to the meaning of $\underline{\mathcal{U}}$. Viz., semantic criteria (II), which contradict with syntactic criteria (I), are adopted. The reference therefore is wrong.

Furthermore, from (ii) to (iii) – $(g_{\mathcal{U}} \in \delta) \rightarrow (g_{\mathcal{U}} \in \delta) \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{N}}$ – referring to the self-reference and substitution proposition, it is wrong. Because substituting the semantic $\mathcal{U} \leftrightarrow (g_{\mathcal{U}} \in \delta)$ of \mathcal{U} into (iii), $(\mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{N}})$ is obtained, and

this consequence will contradict with the precondition i) $(\mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{T}_N)$, and this contradiction comes from the self-reference and substitution proposition itself. Let us combine the four steps of the whole reference together:

$$(\mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{T}_N) \leftarrow (\mathbf{g}_U \in \hat{\delta}) \rightarrow (\mathbf{g}_U \in \hat{\delta}) \in \mathcal{T}_N \leftarrow (\mathbf{g}_U \in \hat{\delta}) \in \mathcal{T}_N \leftarrow (\mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{T}_N)$$

The first and fourth steps are according to syntactic criteria I and semantic criteria II, respectively. They contradict each other. The second step gives the wrong expression. Although the self-reference and substitution proposition is adopted, if only one criterion is used, under the condition of clear demarcation of the existence of Gödel's number \mathbf{g}_U , it will be:

$$(\mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{T}_N) \leftrightarrow (\mathbf{g}_U \in \hat{\delta}) \in \mathcal{T}_N \leftrightarrow (\mathbf{g}_U \in \hat{\delta}) \in \mathcal{T}_N \leftrightarrow (\mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{T}_N)$$

In other words, under the same condition, it only be derived as $(\mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{T}_N)$ from $(\mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{T}_N)$.

As to the \square -consistent: it does not relate to the proof of Gödel's theorem, because it is a concept; whereas infinite objects involved and the recursive functions have the convention of infinity. It also can achieve a clear demarcation of the existence of Gödel's number.

The author only uses simple symbols to analyze the proof process of Gödel's theorem. In so doing, the author has explicitly shown that Gödel has accomplished his proof by adopting the contradictory double criteria. Apparently, his proof is wrong.

2.3 Analysis of the conclusion of Gödel's theorem.

Gödel's theorem has been very significant over the history of logic, despite the serious logical problems that exist within the theorem. Why has this error not been rectified during such a long period of time? One of the interesting reasons is: irrespective of the process of proof and only taking the conclusion of the theorem into consideration, we may interpret "undecidable" in an another way, so that Gödel's theorem holds true.

2.3.1 "Undecidable" is often misinterpreted as the indistinguishable third object, which is not right and not wrong.

When categorizing objects, people hope to classify them into two kinds: those which are in this category and whose which are not in this category. However, in reality, some constraints prevent us from doing that. For example, the criterion of classification may not be definite or the criterion may be definite but not feasible in reality. This happens especially when something infinite is involved and the classification can't be finished.

There often exists the third kind of object for which we cannot put into any of the two categories. Those are called “the indistinguishable”.

If “undecidable” is interpreted as “indistinguishable” in the above sense, then neither the positive proposition nor the negative proposition is provable. Under this condition, the conclusion seems to be interpreted as correct.

The most important thing to note is that the proof of the theorem by Gödel doesn’t support the conclusion under this interpretation.

2.3.2 “Undecidable” is often misinterpreted as referring to “uncertain”.

In distinguishable cases, objects must be in the category or not in the category. However, we are not sure whether it is in or not. For example, without knowing the content of “this sentence”, both “this sentence is right” and “this sentence is not right” are unprovable. Furthermore, so far we are only entitled to assert that positive proposition which refers to the “Goldbach conjecture is established”, is not provable. On the other hand, the negative proposition, which refers to the “Goldbach conjecture is not established”, is not provable either. If “undecidable” is interpreted as “it is uncertain whether a proposition belongs to the positive kind or the negative kind”, then the conclusion of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem seems right. In the same vein, note that the proof of the theorem doesn’t support the conclusion under this interpretation.

2.3.3 The “undecidable” propositions in Gödel’s theorem do not refer to arbitrary propositions but only to self-reference and substitution propositions.

Gödel’s incompleteness theorem has only “proved” that the negative self-reference and substitution propositions U and \underline{U} are not provable. Therefore, the “undecidable” propositions in Gödel’s theorem only refer to negative self-reference and substitution propositions. It should not be extended to apply to other propositions. However, now many people interpret it as “There exist other propositions which are not provable”. Apparently this conclusion is not supported by Gödel’s proof. Apart from this, what can Gödel’s theorem explain?

2.3.4 The meaning of “undecidable” in Gödel’s theorem is definite, but the conclusion is utterly wrong.

The meaning of “undecidable” in Gödel’s theorem is definite: neither the proposition U nor the proposition \underline{U} is provable. Moreover, Gödel

number g_U either exists or does not exist. Furthermore, recursive functions are always expressive. Whereupon, the provability of $\mathcal{U} = (\mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{T}_N)$ or the provability of $\underline{\mathcal{U}} = (\mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{T}_N)$ must be one and only one. It is impossible that both of them are unprovable. Obviously the conclusion of Gödel's theorem is wrong. We have already pointed out the reason: the self-reference and substitution propositions constructed violate the Law of Identity and the substitution may lead to a possible violation of the Law of Contradiction.

2.3.5 There is a simple method to check whether the interpretation of “undecidable” complies with Gödel's original meaning.

The assertion in this article – that Gödel's theorem is not correct – is bound to evoke oppositions from many people. A simple way to oppose the author is to adduce a practical example which advocates Gödel's theorem. Here the author would show you a simple method to determine whether we could derive “ $\underline{\mathcal{U}}$ is not provable” from “ \mathcal{U} is not provable”. Furthermore, whether “The Goldbach conjecture is not established is unprovable” and “The Goldbach conjecture is established is unprovable”. If these two conclusions provide evidence that Gödel's Theorem is correct, then please check whether it is possible to derive that “The Goldbach conjecture is established is unprovable” from “The Goldbach conjecture is not established is unprovable”. Apparently, it is impossible to derive one from the other in the examples above. Therefore, they do not support Gödel's theorem. Proofs and explanations of Gödel's theorem are both doubtful and misleading. Apparently, the “loss of truth” and “loss of certainty” purportedly established by the theorem are false (cf. Zhu 1987).

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Julian Woodside

When soundscape becomes music: A semiotic approach to sampling

A *soundscape*, which Murray Schafer (1977: 7) defined as “an acoustic field of study”, can be analyzed from a semiotic perspective just as any other text in society. Filled with narrative, rhetorical, and social conventions, a particular soundscape reflects characteristics of the society that generates it. The activities a community practices define its soundscape, and at the same time it becomes part of the sonic collective memory of that group of persons. Basically, a soundscape can be all the sounds (music included) in a particular place, in a song, or even a virtual environment such as the sound design for film and video games.

But what happens with *schizophonia*, “the split between an original sound and its electroacoustical transmission or reproduction” (ibid.: 90), and the possibilities of recontextualizing and modifying existing sound objects into different contexts? A sound object, as Pierre Schaeffer (1988: 49) defines it, is “what the ear listens to, not the source of the ‘sound’ but the real sound objects, in the same way as the eye doesn’t see the source or the ‘light’ but the luminous objects.” What happens, then, when we mix codes such as the sonical and the musical? Music is part of a soundscape, but it is also built by the soundscape by way of stereotypes, conventions, genre and style.

Sampling, the musical technique that has been defined as “the insertion of previously recorded and traceable sound objects inside a musical composition” (Woodside 2005: 21), answers these questions and helps us to understand how sound objects signify in a society. This technique was officially conceived in the 1940s with the development of magnetic tape and the transmission of a “Concert des bruits” by Pierre Schaeffer in 1948, even though there are similar proposals in the work of John Cage,

Ottorino Respighi, George Antheil. The same ideas of insertion and intertextuality can even be traced in Tchaikovsky's *1812 Overture* and in quodlibets such as those of J. S. Bach. In the end, these are the sound objects, or signs, transposed from a soundscape to a musical context. Hence analysis of sampling both opens paths for studies in sound semiology, and complements musical semiology.

When a soundscape becomes music through sampling we perceive two codes simultaneously, the sonic and the musical. And since music is also part of soundscape, this raises the issue: would it be more appropriate to approach music first as a sound structure with social conventions and then as a musical code? One notion that needs to be considered in this study is that the distinction between "high" and "low" music is useless: in the end, it's all music and sound. Music is a convention of a group of sounds that each individual decides to define as music or not (as now can be demonstrated with the creation of genres like *Glitch* and *Noise*). That is why one should approach its study first as a sound object with musical functions and particular codes, and then as a musical object. For some persons (e.g., in cases of generational differences or a very particular musical encyclopedia) a particular genre can or cannot be considered as music; however, it still keeps sound qualities and a particular structure that the listeners perceive in one way or another.

Studying how composers perceive sound objects and reinterpret them in a musical context through sampling will help explain how music and sound have particular meanings. This is because sampling sources can either be vocal sounds (with a human character), musical sounds (previous musical compositions) or paramusical sounds (any other sound in the soundscape).

Murray Schafer has explained that "the general acoustic environment of a society can be read as an indicator of social conditions which produce it and may tell us much about the trending and evolution of that society" (ibid.: 7). *Ergo*, studying sampling will allow us to do the same through a musical and sonical approach, finding relations, for example, between *Gangster Rap* and *Mexican Narcocorridos* (which both use gunshots and police sirens) or identifying "common sonical places" for a society like "organilleros", "merolicos" and traffic sounds in Mexico's usage of sampling or inserting the sound of kids playing, modified with a delay effect, to represent nostalgia.

Some sound objects have been identified as the basic sonic signs in soundscape and music. But Schafer argues that it is also necessary to identify sounds that are important because of their individuality, numerousness or domination in a soundscape. He calls them *keynotes* and *soundmarks*: “The keynote sounds of a landscape are those created by its geography and climate: water, wind, forests, plains, birds, insects and animals. Many of these sounds may possess archetypal significance” (9–10). He identifies soundmarks as “a community sound which is unique or possesses qualities which make it specially regarded or noticed by the people in that community. Once a soundmark has been identified, it deserves to be protected, for soundmarks make the acoustic life of the community unique” (10). An important thing to be considered is that music, particularly folkloric (but not necessarily) can also be a soundmark because it is found in particular places (or represents those places), as in the case of *Son*, *Mariachi*, *Norteño* and *Huapango* in Mexico, *Tango* in Argentina, *Flamenco* in Spain, or *Tarantella* in Italy (although they are not played throughout the whole country); while some places have characteristic music as part of the soundscape (discotheques, nightclubs, raves, weddings, elevators, etc.). Also the voice of popular characters can be considered soundmarks, like those of politicians and entertainers.

As said before, the source of sampling is soundscape, and it works at the level of sound and music at the same time. Because of its nature, sampling is intertextual. It is the one and only true quote in music and has a very particular aesthetic complexity even though other musical practices (that don't use prerecorded sounds) have similar meanings and uses: quodlibets, leitmotifs, the insertion of “non musical” objects, as occurs in compositions of Tchaikovsky, Respighi, George Antheil and Leroy Anderson; the imitation of or allusion to sound objects in Prokofiev, Messiaen, and King Crimson, which relate to Philip Tagg's “sonic anaphones” (1992, 1994) and the insertion of other compositions inside new ones, like the *Marseillaise* in Tchaikovsky, Debussy and The Beatles. We should not forget the work with noise, gramophones and silence by John Cage and the vocal and sonic explorations of Futurists and Dadaists like Luigi Russollo in the manifesto, *Art of Noises* (1913). All these explorations are related to the “essence” of sampling. So, when a sound object, like a phone ringer, is inserted in a musical composition, or when it is created based on such sound, the listener will decide to give it musical or sonic sense. Although certain rules in

its structure will help one understand if it is inserted as a musical or sonic element, the code in which it is built is nevertheless a musical one.

Different notions and concepts from musical semiology can be applied to sampling, like the anaphones, genre synecdoche, episodic marker and style indicator developed by Phillip Tagg (1992, 1994); moreover, ideas from general semiotics, such as encyclopedia and competence, apply. It is also useful to incorporate concepts developed in other disciplines, such as collective memory (soundmarks are collectively identified) and “orality”: although the sound is recorded, there is an oral experience, which I have elsewhere defined as “registered orality” (Woodside 2007) and which has to do with the recovery of the term “acousmatic” by Pierre Schaeffer (1988: 56). Intertextuality and historicity (keynote sounds and soundmarks change through time) also help us to understand that a soundscape and its insertion in a musical code are both socially influenced.

To sum up the discursive origins of sampling, it can be said that three major artistic movements helped develop its aesthetic values and have a relation with sampling sources (voice, sounds and music):

- Sound Poetry (with Kurt Schwitters’ Audiopoems, Futurist manifestos, Dadaists, and Henri Chopin’s Sound Poetry with magnetic tape).
- Concrete and Electroacoustic Music (which idea can be traced to Russollo’s *Art of Noises* manifesto and later explored in compositions by Pierre Schaeffer, Edgard Varèse, Karlheinz Stockhausen and Steve Reich, just to mention some composers).
- Bastard Music and Musical Collage (which is based on quotation of and reference to other compositions with examples like Bill Buchanan’s and Dickie Goodman’s *The Flying Saucer*, John Cage’s *Imaginary Landscapes*, John Oswald’s “plunderphonics”, electronic music, bootlegs, megamixes, mashups, remixes, medleys, etc.)

Although it is important to understand the origins and motivations of sampling, as well as how to approach it for analysis, the most interesting part of studying soundscape comes when music through this technique exerts all its signifying possibilities and becomes part of a sonic narrative. A sample is a sign, and as any other sign in any text, it can be an icon an index or a symbol. But also because of the complex relation soundscape-music, many different functions have been identified:

Rhetorical Function. A sample can become a metaphor (dogs barking = “persecution”), metonymy (traffic noise representing a city) and even

“sonomusical motifs” (Woodside 2007), which occur when a sound object surpasses its original source and becomes a “commonplace”, like the shrieking violin motif in Alfred Hitchcock’s *Psycho* (1960) or Wagner’s *Ride of the Valkyries*, becoming part of a sonic universe or macro-discourse.

Intertextual Function. As explained before, sampling is the only true quotation in sound and music; other such musical expressions are merely simulations, references and allusions. Analyzing the characteristics of intertextuality can enhance the accumulative meanings; for example, if the source is an audiovisual product, it will stimulate a mental remembrance of the image, recycling, resignifying, recontextualizing and rejuvenating the original meanings inside the sonic macro-discourse, by linking past and present, one generation to another, and various cultures. Music and soundscape have historicity, producing an accumulative stimulation of memory, and they exist side by side with a society.

Mnemotechnical Function. For Maurice Halbwachs, collective memory “extends all the way it can reach thanks to the memory of the groups it’s established by” (quoted in Vázquez 2001). This memory has different characteristics, like the ability of constructing itself in a generational way (Candau 1996), or any other intersubjective form. Studies in collective memory help one to understand how sound conventions are built, in addition to how meanings circulate through a society. Sound and music evoke experiences associated with the source – Pierre Nora’s *lieux de la mémoire* – and sampling modifies the context but stimulates remembrance and accumulative recollections.

Oral Function. Vocal sampling stimulates an oral experience (further than the relation between the loudspeaker and the listener). Walter Ong (2002: 77) explains: “spoken word comes from human interior and makes humans communicate as conscious interiors, as persons. Spoken word helps humans to form tightly united groups”, an idea that Michel Chion defined as “vococentrism” (1999: 5–6). If the possibility of editing the speech is conceived, many different interpretative levels are added, stimulating the recognition either of the orator’s timbre, or at least that it comes from a human source, and also the message itself contained in the speech. In other words, it is important *who* is saying it, *how* he is saying it, and *what* he is saying. And with editing the message can be modified; for example, from “*I-love-you*” to “*You-love-I*”.

Historical Function. A sample, as any quote, is a reference, and can be considered a “mnemotope” or “*lieu de la mémoire*”. The sound object is semiotized, and makes reference to other contexts (it can become an index). At the same time, it is an historical sonic document, because it leaves tangible traces of a sonic temporality and either the modification of the source or its perception can be studied from an historical perspective. As Murray Schafer (1977) did, one can study, for example, the modification of a soundscape by industrial revolution, but one can also identify and trace important historical moments through recordings in music, like the Martin Luther King Jr’s “I have a dream” speech or the impact of technology on the aesthetics of sound. It can be also said that sampling takes and returns meaning through the history of the sonic macro-discourse of a community, helping to build a collective or intersubjective sonic identity (generational, national, cultural, etc.).

Conclusions

Nowadays we are approaching semiotic globalization. Keynote sounds and soundmarks in sampling – like any other sound objects from a soundscape – are signs that composers use to reinforce their sonic identity in more or less explicit forms (like the fusion between electronic or rock and folkloric music), or when a sound object transcends the frontiers of its soundscape and is adopted by different communities around the globe (like Martin Luther King Jr’s or Subcomandante Marcos’s speeches). Some sound objects are recurrent in a community, others become part of History, while others are completely forgotten. But there is still a registry kept in different cultural expressions – film, literature, TV, radio, music – for historians to search out, understand, and trace how a soundscape has evolved through time and imagination.

Sampling is not merely an insertion inside a composition, but an extremely complex sound object that can give a lot to musical semiology as a means of identifying signifying units. It also helps to build what can be called a sonic semiology, which can be applied not only to music, but sound design in audiovisuals, radio and multimedia, besides the now obvious approach of studying a society’s sonic environment. The distinction between what is music, sound and noise is completely subjective, and it is

part of an intersubjective convention (what is noise for some can be music for others).

Some sounds signify more than others do, and there are different ways for identifying them. The study of sampling offers more tools and theoretical fundamentals for the study of music and sound as well as soundscape, while directing the study of musical semiology further away from the score. It should not be forgotten that music is appreciated mostly by a huge majority that doesn't know a thing about composition, but that experiences music in everyday activities, rites and traditions. Musical meaning is given in a specific time and space and is part of a soundscape; music is ephemeral and accumulative, just as History.

Music and sound objects are ephemeral conventions based on constant exposition and accumulative signification. In this regard it is important to remember Pierre Schaeffer's (1989: 61–74) advice to “listen (*écouter*), hear (*ouïr*), understand (*entendre*) and comprehend (*comprendre*)”, rather than look for specific structures and notations.

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On language communication from a logical point of view

1. Introduction

Logical pragmatics is not, in general, the study of how people do communication. It does not describe the psychology or the sociology of communication. It pre-describes when sign communication is correct.

What the question about correctness of language communication requires in the first place is the differentiation of the *act of communication* from the *language of communication in general*. The aim of this paper is to outline a logical theory *TLC* of language communication in which the above-mentioned notions of communication are defined and the problem of their logical adequacy is considered. The theory indicates some general conditions of verbal understanding and general causes of verbal miscommunication and misunderstanding.

The theory *TLC* is here outlined in a possibly non-formalized shape. In Section 2 some preliminary assumptions are discussed. In Section 3 foundations of syntax theory are presented and in Section 4 the basis of the theory *TLC* as an expansion of syntax theory into semantic-pragmatic theory is described. The paper ends with Section 5, a summary.

2. Preliminary Assumptions

Although the theory *TLC* will concern communication by means of expressions of any language, it will take into consideration, to a certain degree, the following three aspects:

(i) the cognitive-communicative function of natural language, according to its genesis;

(ii) the so-called functional approach to logical analysis of this language, and, relating to it:

(iii) two understandings of a manner of using and a manner of interpreting language expressions in communication.

Let us expand on these aspects. Concerning (i), the genesis of natural language, one can easily observe that it was formed in the process of cognition and communication between people who made use of material, concrete signs. Accordingly, we make the assumption that the primitive linguistic entities applied in communication acts between their senders and recipients are material creations, e.g., given sounds, written signs, physical objects somehow placed in time and space, concrete objects which have some referents attributed to them, and which are called *tokens*. We assume that sign-examples (tokens) are primitive linguistic entities. According to the well-known *token-type* distinction made by Peirce (1931–1935), we differentiate *token-signs* from *type-signs*, which are abstract, ideal linguistic objects, and whose physical representations are just tokens.

(ii) In order to explain the notion of communicating we have to introduce the terms *using* and *interpreting*, which entail the use of concrete entities, i.e. *tokens*, and the inclusion of situational contexts accompanying them. This shows how *tokens* function in communication acts. Even though we are not going to refer to situational contexts in our theoretical considerations, the context is always present in such acts. In the proposed theory *TLC*, the basic semantic-pragmatic notions, including the notion of *language communication* and related concepts – *meaning* and *interpretation* – are defined by means of *expression-types*, and yet their definitions involve such primitive notions of the theory as *using* and *interpreting expression-tokens*.

Our formal conception of language communication has some connections with the understanding of meaning as a *manner of using* expressions and interpretation as a *manner of interpreting* expressions. Speaking about the functional approach to natural language analysis, we have to take into consideration the manner of using and manner of interpreting language expressions. The latter is a special case of the former.

(iii) After Pelc (1971, 1979), we distinguish two understandings of the terms “manner of using” and “manner of interpreting”. (a) In the first, the *manner of using* (*use*) and the *manner of interpreting* (*int*) occur only in given circumstances, in specific language-situational contexts, and concern

expression-*tokens* only. (b) In the second, the *manner of Using* (*Use*) and the *manner of interpreting* (*Int*) characterize the *meaning* of the expression and the *interpretation* of the expression, respectively; these manners are somehow built into this meaning and this interpretation, respectively. In this case an expression can be treated as isolated, static, out of context, e.g., as an entry in a dictionary. It is then an expression-*type*, a class of its concrete occurrences, a distributive class of expression-*tokens* used either to represent a given object, or in concrete acts of communication in specific linguistic-situational contexts, with reference to only one, broadly conceived object or to more objects of the same kind.

The relation *use* and its sub-relation *int*, as concerning all the relations of physical object-based reference of expression-*tokens* made by users of language, will be primitive notions of the theory proposed here. The relation *Use* (resp. *Int*) is, on the other hand, a relation defined by means of the relation of *use* (resp. *int*) and applied by users of language for expression-*types*. The difference between these relations is explained by the fact that two persons can *Use* the same expression-type by means of its two different tokens.

The notion of “expression” is a syntactic one and must be defined on the basis of a theory of syntax. To this we now turn.

3. Language syntax: Theory *T*

3.1. Two levels of formalization of the syntax of language

Theory of syntax *T* is formalized on two levels: *token*-level and *type*-level. According to the *token-type* distinction by Peirce (1931–1935), any language *L* is characterized as a construct of double ontological nature, both as (a) a language of expression-*tokens* (at the *token*-level) and as (b) a language of expression-*types* (at the *type*-level).

The theory *T* is first formalized on the token-level as the theory of *token*-syntax describing *L* as a language of expression-tokens, and then, on the type-level, as the theory of *type*-syntax describing *L* as a language of expression-*types*. The theory of *type*-syntax is an extension of the theory of *token*-syntax.

Tokens are primitive objects of the theory *T*. They are intuitively understood as concrete, material, empirical objects, enduring through time-

and-space and perceived by sight. They are usually, but do not have to be, inscriptions. They can be on paper, a notice board, a blackboard, a computer screen, a stone, etc. They may be configurations of such things as jigsaw-puzzle pieces, leaves, stones, stars, smoke signals, illuminated advertisements, and so on.

Types are derived objects of theory *T* defined by means of *tokens*. They are understood as sets (classes) of tokens bearing an *identifiability* relation to each other; i.e., *types* are ideal, abstract entities.

3.2. Identifiability of linguistic tokens

The *identifiability relation* of tokens (a primitive notion of theory *T*) is determined by pragmatic factors, not by physical similarity, and it is understood very broadly. Consider, for instance, the following three word-tokens:

HELSINKI	H	e	l	s	i	n	k	i
<i>Helsinki</i>								

Printed in different types but consisting successively of the same letters of the alphabet, these tokens are *identifiable*.

We assume that the *identifiability* of tokens is an equivalence relation.

The *expressions* of language *L* are defined separately on the *token*-level and on the *type*-level. They are suitable *concatenations* of *tokens* or *types*. The *relation of concatenation of tokens* is another primitive notion of the theory *T*.

3.3. Concatenations

Concatenations of tokens are complex words of language *L* obtained from two words of the *vocabulary* of language *L* – the next primitive notion of the theory *T*. Concatenations on the token-level may be, but do not have to be, sequences of two tokens. Intuitively, a concatenation of two written tokens *p* and *q*, for example in a European language, is a written token *r* that is made up by adding the written *token q**, identifiable with *q*, to the token *p**,

identifiable with p , on the right. For example, take the concatenations of the following word-*tokens*:

C	SEMIOTIC
o	
n	
g	
r e s s	

the second and the first, is the name-*token*:

Semiotic Congress

and any name-*token* identifiable with it, in particular the token aligned vertically:

SEMIOTIC
CONGRESS

Thus, the relation of concatenation defined on tokens is not a set-theoretical function, and the relation of identifiability is not a relation of physical similarity. These two relations and the *vocabulary of tokens* are primitive notions of the theory of words which is included in the theory of syntax T . They are formalized on the token-level. All of them satisfy specific axioms of the theory.

3.4. Well-formed expressions

The most important notion of T is the notion of a *well-formed expression* (*wfe*) of language L . The theory T can be built as a theory of language syntax (see Wybraniec-Skardowska 1991). In the latter, all *wfes* are generated by a *categorial grammar*, a notion originated by Ajdukiewicz (1935), shaped by Bar-Hillel (1950, 1953, 1964), and developed by many other authors. On the basis of the theory T we can reconstruct such a grammar.

The notion of a *wfe* is defined first on the *token-level* and then on the *type-level*. Each *wfe-type* P is defined as a non-empty set of *wfe-tokens identifiable* with a *wfe-token* p .

Having the notions of *wfe-tokens* and *types* we can extend the conceptual apparatus of the theory T on some semantic and pragmatic components and outline the theory TLC of language communication.

4. *A theory of language communication – Theory TLC.*

4.1. *Token-level*

4.1.1. *Primitive notions of TLC*

Because the formal theory *TLC* on the token-level should explain, at least to a certain theoretical degree, the phenomenon of language communication among people, its conceptual apparatus has to include the notions of *using* and *interpreting token-expressions* by users of *L*, and the notions of a *communication act* and *understanding* in this act, as well as notions connected with its non-adequacy: *misunderstanding* and *non-understanding*.

Thus, we accept the postulate that in communication acts the sender, in order to send the message, applies the function *use* connected with the object reference of a *wfe-token*, whereas the recipient, in order to receive the message, applies another function – the function *int*.

Primitive notions of the theory *TLC* are: the set *User* of all users of a given language *L*; the set *Ont* of all extra-linguistic objects described by *L*; the *two-place function use* of using the wfe-tokens of *L*; the *two-place function int* of interpreting the wfe-tokens of *L*.

The first two primitive notions are understood very broadly. The set *User* can be composed of current as well as former or future users of the language *L*. We do not make any assumptions about the nature of objects of the set *Ont*. They can be not only material objects, but also, for instance, fictional or abstract creations described by language *L*. Of course, we postulate that the sets *User* and *Ont* are nonempty sets.

We understand the function (relation) *use* as an operation producing, calling, using, exposing or interpreting *wfe-tokens* in order to refer them to corresponding objects of the set *Ont*. We can also call this operation a *function of object reference of wfe-tokens by users of language L*. Formally the operation *use* is a partial set-theoretical function defined on ordered pairs $\langle a \text{ user, a token } \rangle$ with values (*referents*) in the set *Ont*. We assume that every user *uses* at least one *wfe-token* of *L* to refer to an object. Not every *wfe-token* must have a referent.

The operation *int of interpreting tokens* emerges when we speak about communication by means of expression-*tokens*. The function *int* is a restriction of the operation *use*. So, *interpreting tokens* is a particular case of *using tokens*. This is because the pair $\langle a \text{ user, a token } \rangle$, which has a referent, may

have no corresponding *interpretant* when, for instance, this *token* cannot be received or was used with the intention of being interpreted by a recipient, but he/she cannot interpret it. The fact is, however, that each pair that has an interpretant also has the same referent. Of course, we assume that there exists at least one user of L who *uses* and *interprets* a *token* in a given act of communication by means of this *token* as the same object.

4.1.2. Act of communication

An *act of communication* is defined in *TLC* as a triple $\langle s, e, r \rangle$ satisfying the following conditions (see Figure 1): The first element s (*sender*) and the third of its elements r (*recipient*) are users of the set *User*. The second element e is a *wfe-token* of L , and there exist objects o, o' of the set *Ont* such that the sender s of the expression e *uses* the expression e to refer to the object o – the *referent* (i.e. $use(s, e) = o$) and the recipient r of the expression (e) *interprets* this expression as a sign-token of the object o' – the *interpretant* (i.e. $int(r, e) = o'$).

Communication acts can be carried out by means of two different expression-tokens of the same *wfe-type* if the sender *uses* a *token* e and the recipient *interprets* another *token* e' but the *token* of the same expression-type. This is the case in e-mail, microphone or telephone communication. So, the more general definition of an act of communication is in accordance with Figure 2.

COMMUNICATION ACT




Figure 1

COMMUNICATION ACT




Figure 2

It is easy to see that any act of communication by means of one *wfe-token* is also an act of communication by means of two expression-tokens.

Examples of communication acts include: making an announcement, the present paper, a specific question, e.g., in a discussion, etc.

4.1.3. Adequacy of communication acts

The problem of adequacy of an act of communication by means of a *wfe-token* consists in its effectiveness. A communication act is effective if using the *wfe-token* by its sender and interpreting the *token* or a *token* identifiable with that *token* by its recipient are in agreement, i.e. the referent to which the sender *uses* the *token* and the interpretant as an object of interpreting the *token* or a *token* identifiable with that *token* by its recipient, are the same. In other words, a communication act is effective when an *understanding* takes place between its sender and its recipient.

Two definitions of an act of communication by means of *wfe-tokens* will bring us to two definitions of the notion of *understanding*. They are illustrated by means of Figure 3 and Figure 4, respectively.




Figure 3




Figure 4

It is quite obvious that if there exists understanding in the first sense, then there exists understanding in the second sense. It can also be justified by *TLC* that there exist communication acts in both senses, and that there exists at least one user of the language L which takes place in a communication act by means of an *expression-token* simultaneously as the sender and as the recipient and understanding take place in this act. So, we have a corollary: the sets of all acts of communication, in both senses, are non-empty.

4.1.4. Miscommunication

If, in an act of communication by means of a *wfe-token*, understanding does not take place between its sender and its recipient, then the act of communication is not adequate and we may speak about *miscommunication*. The latter occurs if *misunderstanding* takes place in this act or if an attempted act of communication fails because of *non-understanding* between the sender and the recipient.

From two definitions of a communication act, we obtain two definitions of *misunderstanding* and two definitions of *non-understanding*. They are illustrated in Figures 5–6, and Figures 7–8, respectively.




Figure 5.




Figure 6.




Figure 7.




Figure 8.

If the sender of the *wfe-token* *e* uses this expression to refer to an object *o* and the recipient interprets this or another expression-*token* *e'* of the same type as another object *o'*, then there exists a *misunderstanding* between the sender and the recipient in the act of communication by means of the expression *e* (see Figures 5 and 6).

If the sender of the expression e uses e to refer to a referent o but the recipient is unable to interpret the expression e or an expression e' identifiable with that expression, then there follows a non-understanding (see Figures 7 and 8).

4.2. Type-level

4.2.1. Language communication

Empirical communication by means of expression-*tokens* has to be distinguished in a given community of *Users* from communication by means of *wfe-types*. On the *type-level* we expand the conceptual apparatus of the *TLC* with new notions. The most important one is the notion of *language communication by means of wfe-types*. It is determined as a value of an operation communication C defined on expression-*types*. The value $C(E)$ of the function C for every expression-*type* E is called *language communication by means of the expression-type* E .

Communication $C(E)$ by means of the *wfe-type* E is the set consisting of all ordered triples in the form $\langle s, e, r \rangle$ such that the first element s (the sender) uses the *wfe-token* e of E and the third component r (the recipient) interprets a *token* of E in an act of communication. So, communication $C(E)$ by means of the expression-*type* E is the set of all communication acts, in the second sense, by means of expression-*tokens* of the *type* E .

Communication $C(E)$ includes the set of all communication acts by means of only one *token* of the *type* E . Moreover, it follows from earlier corollaries that there exists a *wfe-type* E such that communication $C(E)$ by means of the *type* E is a nonempty set.

4.2.2. Using types and interpreting types

Users that participate in acts of communication belonging to language communication by means of an *wfe-type* E are also *Using* the expression-*type* E : senders *Use* this *type* while recipients *Interpret* it.

The relation *Use* of *Using wfe-types* and its sub-relation *Int* of *Interpreting* expression-*types* are new notions of *TLC*. They are binary relations satisfying some axioms and defined by means of relations *use* and *int* for *tokens*, respectively. They are defined as follows: the user u *Uses* (resp. *Inter-*

pretends) the *wfe-type* E if and only if the user u uses (resp. interprets) a *wfe-token* of the *type* E to refer to some referent (resp. interpretant).

Because the relation *int of interpreting tokens* is included in the relation *use of using tokens*, the relation *Int of interpreting types* is included in the relation *Use of Using types*, however it follows from an axiom in *TLC* that the user who *Uses* a *type* does not need to be the one who *Interprets* it.

Because communication $C(E)$ by means of the *type* E is a nonempty set, the above definitions lead to justification of the first sentence formulated at the beginning of this subsection.

4.2.3. Notions referring to language communication

Adequate, effective, successful communication in a community of *User* by means of the expression-*type* E is based on the agreed *meaning* $\mu(E)$ of the expression-*type* E used by users who are senders of tokens of E in acts of communication, and based on the correlation $\mu(E)$ with the *interpretation* $\iota(E)$ of the expression-*type* E interpreted by users who are recipients of these *tokens* in the acts. A disagreement between the *meaning* and the *interpretation* of the expression-*type* leads to *misunderstanding*, while ignorance of the *interpretation* of the expression-*type* leads to non-understanding.

So, the conceptual apparatus of the theory *TLC* has to be enhanced by incorporating notions concerning *meaning* and *interpretation* of language expression-*types*.

Interpretation indicates the *meaning* or *meanings* of a given *wfe-type* and cannot be identified with its *meaning*.

The notion of *meaning* is defined by means of the relation \cong of *having the same manner of Using wfe-types* and the notion of *interpretation* – by means of the relation \cong_i of *having the same manner of interpreting (understanding) wfe-types*. The definitions of these relations are as follows:

Two *wfe-types* E and E' have the same manner of *Using* (resp. of *Interpreting*) *wfe-types* if and only if every user of language L uses (resp. interprets) the other one every time he/she uses (resp. interprets) either of them, and every object is a referent (resp. an interpretant) of some *token* of the *type* E (used/interpreted by the user) if and only if it is a referent (resp. an interpretant) of some *token* of the other type E' (used/interpreted by the user).

The relation \cong_i is a sub-relation of the relation \cong , and it can easily be proved that it is a nonempty relation. We can also state that the relations \cong and \cong_i are equivalence relations in the set of all *wfe-types*.

Meaning $\mu(E)$ and *interpretation* $\iota(E)$ of the *wfe-type* E is the equivalence class of all expressions having the same manner of *Use* or, respectively, *Interpreting* (*understanding*), as the expression E , and can be intuitively understood as a common property of all *wfe-types* having the same manner of *Using* or, respectively, *Interpreting* as the expression-type E . The property can be called the *manner of using* or, respectively, the *manner of interpreting* of the expression-type E . In this way, we are referring here to ideas originating from Wittgenstein (1953) and Ajdukiewicz (1931, 1934), that is to understanding of the *meaning/interpretation* as a manner of its *Use/Interpreting* (see Wybraniec-Skardowska 2007).

It is easy to prove that the notion of *meaning* is stronger than the notion of *interpretation*. By means of the notions of *meaning* and *interpretation* we can define the notion of *adequacy of language communication*.

4.2.4. Adequacy of language communication

As already mentioned, in language communication, interpretation indicates the meaning or meanings of the expression-type which intermediates in this communication. An expression-type may have more than one meaning. If it has more meanings, they are determined by subtypes of the expression, as for example, for the terms “key” or “logic”.

We adopt the following definition of adequacy of language communication:

If E has n ($n \geq 1$) meanings determined by its subtypes E_1, E_2, \dots, E_n then $C(E)$ is an *adequate language communication* if and only if for every $k = 1, 2, \dots, n$, E_k has determined interpretation and $i(E) = m(E_k)$.

4.2.5. Some conditions for adequate language communication

From the definition of adequacy of communication by means of *wfe-type* we obtain the following corollaries:

Let E be a *wfe-type*. Then

- a. If E has n ($n \geq 1$) meanings determined by its subtypes E_1, E_2, \dots, E_n , then

- $C(E)$ is not an *adequate language communication* if and only if there exist such $k = 1, \dots, n$, that E_k does not have a determined interpretation or $i(E_k) \neq m(E_k)$.
- b. If E has an established meaning and E has a determined interpretation then $C(E)$ is an *adequate language communication* if and only if $i(E) = m(E)$.
- c. If E has an established meaning and E does not have a determined interpretation, then $C(E)$ is not an *adequate language communication*.
- d. If E has an established meaning, E has a determined interpretation and $i(E) \neq m(E)$, then $C(E)$ is not an *adequate communication* (i.e. there holds *misunderstanding*).

We see that the accordance of *meaning* and *interpretation* is a necessary condition of *adequate language communication* by means of expression-type of L . The following theorem of *TLC* provides us with some sufficient condition for adequacy of communication by means of *wfe-types*:

Theorem: If every user of community *User* Uses the *wfe-type* E if and only if he/she Interprets the *wfe-type* E and E has an established meaning and a determined interpretation then $C(E)$ is an adequate language communication.

5. Final remarks

(1) The main objective of the work presented was to provide a conceptual apparatus of a general logical theory of language communication. The outlined axiomatic theory explicates the key notions of contemporary syntax, semantics and pragmatics.

(2) The theory is described on two levels: *token-level* and *type-level*. As such, it takes into account the dual – *token* and *type* – ontological character of linguistic entities.

(3) The basic notions of the theory: *language communication*, *meaning* and *interpretation* are introduced on the second, *type-level* of formalization, and they required prior formalization of some of the notions introduced on the first, *token-level*; among others, the notion of an *act of communication*.

(4) Owing to the theory, it is possible to address problems of adequacy of both empirical acts of communication and of language communication in general.

(5) All the conditions of adequacy of communication, discussed in the presented paper, were shown as if they were valid for one-way communication (sender-recipient); nevertheless, they can also apply to the reverse direction of language communication (recipient-sender). Therefore, they concern the problem of two-way understanding in language communication.

(6) The conceptual apparatus of the theory can be enhanced through the introduction of notions concerning some specific forms of communication, such as discourse and dialog.

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Florence G. H. Yap

The semiotic matrix of politics and power in Singapore

1. Introduction

Ernst Cassirer regarded symbols and myths as the foundation of all knowledge. In the *Myth of the State*, he maintained that myth could take on the role of political action. Cassirer saw in modern political myth a form of thought that could be regulated and organized. It is a means to a concrete political end. On the other hand, human beings often mythologize their political existence rather than embracing a rational basis for the state. The role of myth has been transformed from a passive state to assume an active role, having definite shape and becoming an active process. The technique of myth is rationalized and controlled through the setting of what constitutes knowledge. Political myth is the continual process of work on a common narrative by which the members of a social group can provide significance to their political conditions and experience. Therefore, the complex relations between discourse, power, and politics can be better grasped if myth acts as the vehicle of interpretation. By reconstructing the mechanisms through which this myth works in the Singaporean context, this paper will show how the conceiving of “shared values”¹ and the central political concept of “meritocracy” can turn into a successful political myth. This paper argues that this understanding of political myth can throw light on important aspects of contemporary politics

2. Myth as a vehicle of interpretation

Societies orientate themselves to an imaginary referent rather than to a manifest condition. Indeed, the concept replaces the “reality” in endless reproduction and message intensification. I argue that the concept of myth

is useful in capturing the complexity of the links between discourse and power. Myth is the “vehicle” to specific translation.

I employ, therefore, a specific conception of the nature and role of myth. First, myth is not “irrational”. *Per contra*, “myth”, is a form of hyper-rationality. Second, myth does not mean “untruth”. True myth “presents its images and its imaginary actors, not with the playfulness of fantasy, but with a compelling authority” (Frankfort et al. 1946: 15). Third, myth does not oppose modernity. Modernity has its own exclusionary, powerful, and quasi-religious myths. Indeed, as Blumenberg has argued, “That the course of things proceeded ‘from mythos to logos’ is a dangerous misconception ...” (Blumenberg 1985: 27).² Myth is not merely something borne only in pre-modern theology. Emancipation from divinity has not reduced the pervasion of myth. Myth is basic to the human condition, pervading all societies, so that: “Historically we find no great culture that is not dominated by and pervaded with mythical elements” (Cassirer 1946: 5). Yet this need not imply a crude form of structuralism.

With these in mind, I want to introduce the political philosophy of Ernst Cassirer. In Cassirer we find the first systematic interrogation of the links between language, symbolism, culture and technology, and the centrality of mythical thought in the contemporary world. “Symbolic forms”, he argues, “function as techniques of ordering, setting the parameters of knowledge and identification” (Cassirer 1955a: 190–197). For Cassirer, myth in particular was to be seen as “permanent”. There is no danger, he argues: “... that man will ever forget or renounce the language of myth. For this language is not restricted to a special field; it pervades the whole of man’s life and existence” (Cassirer 1979: 245). Cassirer, therefore, shared the insights of Schelling and Goethe, amongst others. Here, it was argued that: “... language, poetry, art, religion, even metaphysics and science are in their origin bound up with mythical elements and interpenetrated with mythical imagination” (ibid.: 235). This was contrasted with the philosophers of the Enlightenment for whom myth was of the lowest rank. In the modern episteme the triumph of reason was taken to entail the defeat of myth. Man was deemed to have passed from the age of magic to the age of technologies. Cassirer questions this simplistic notion. “Myth”, he writes, “is always there, lurking in the dark and waiting for its hour and opportunity” (Cassirer 1946: 280).

In his later political writings, in particular the *Myth of the State*, his focus shifted from symbolic forms to “modern political myth”. In doing so Cassirer added to the Romanticist notion of “myth” a role for political action. For Cassirer, myth itself had transformed. No longer operative exclusively in the realm of the “unconscious”, Cassirer saw in modern political myth a form of thought that could be regulated and organized: “... adjusted to political needs and used for concrete political ends” (Cassirer 1979: 235). “Magic” had been fused with “technique” in a mix of “deep human emotions” and “social passions” (ibid.: 253). In another sense, however, myth was something more. As Cassirer remarks: “... myth cannot be described as a bare emotion because it is the expression of emotion. The expression of a feeling is not the feeling itself – it is the emotion turned into an image. This very fact implies a radical change. What was vaguely felt assumes a definite shape; what was a passive state becomes an active process” (Cassirer 1946: 43). Defined by Cassirer as the “technique of myth”, this mode of mobilization is similar to the meaning I put to appropriation. The modern political myth was for Cassirer an awakened residual energy. In this sense, even though the myth itself may be “irrational”, the technique of myth is “completely ‘rationalised’” (Cassirer 1979: 236). The production of myth is controlled through the setting of what constitutes knowledge. The modern political myth, therefore, unlike religious struggles of consciousness, works beyond ubiquity. As Cassirer argues, the “myth of the twentieth century ... did not begin with demanding or prohibiting certain actions .. [but] ... undertook to change the men, in order to be able to regulate and control their deeds. The political myths acted in the same way as a serpent that tries to paralyse its victims before attacking them. Men fell victims to them without any serious resistance. They were vanquished and subdued before they had realised what actually happened” (ibid.). In a similar way to Foucault’s conception of governmentality, myth is a dialogue, a circularity. Myth does not dominate the “subject”, because myth is part of the subject. This is not to say that forms of subjectivity do not operate. On the other hand, the forms of subjectivity inherent to myth are more precise for their being from “within the object”. As technologies of the self, myths, in this sense, pervade a multiplicity of social practices and experience. Myth sets the “limits of the possible”. In a Gramscian sense, myth becomes an “historical necessity” to which social formations react. These limits are not “fixed and immutable”, but rather in constant move-

ment, existing temporarily within the context of a given social structure of accumulation, truth, power, and ethics. The modern political myth is a labyrinth of metaphysical meanings, contradistinctions, truisms and meta-beliefs. Therefore, “[a] knowledge, of what the myths contain in the way of details which will actually form part of the history of the future is then of small importance; they are not astrological almanacs; it is even possible that nothing they contain will ever come to pass ... ” (Sorel 1999: 116). What is important to the study of myth is effect. Social myth mobilizes popular consciousness, engineering emotion, fever, and the will to power. For Sorel, “[m]yth must be judged as a means of acting on the present; ... *It is the myth in its entirety which is alone important*: its parts are only of interest in so far as they bring out the main idea” (Sorel 1950: 116–117).

I argue that several elements of this analysis are mirrored in what I understand to be in the semiotic matrix of politics and power. These elements central to my analysis are: conceiving of the five shared values and the central political concept of meritocracy.

3. *The conceiving of shared values*

First conceived in 1988 by the then First Deputy Prime Minister Mr Goh Chok Tong, the “Shared Values” incorporate elements of Singapore’s cultural heritage – attitudes and values that have helped it survive as a nation. It was meant to be a blueprint for the development of a national ideology that all Singaporeans could subscribe to and live by. The five shared values are: (1) Nation before community and society before self; (2) Family as the basic unit of society; (3) Community support and respect for the individual; (4) Consensus, not conflict; (5) Racial and religious harmony.

They are adapted from basic early Confucian values and principles that are not only compatible with democracy, but also well-suited to the basic values of the other ethnic groups in Singapore. Early Confucianism considers “the people’s will” as the direct representative of “Heaven’s will”, with which it legitimizes political power. Confucian theory of “human nature is good” endorses equal potential good for every man. These principles can be used in reasoning towards a system of democracy. In terms of decision-making, the Confucian “Doctrine of the Mean” accords with certain democratic principles. The independent personality and committed individualism advocated by early Confucianism is a required civic merit

in a democratic society. These fundamental Confucian principles, through contemporary hermeneutics, may provide a philosophic grounding for democracy and support the construction of a democratic system with an Asian-Chinese dimension. The “technique of myth” is placed into appropriation by the specification of the five values.

4. *The central political concept of meritocracy*

Meritocracy is a central political concept since Singapore’s independence, with its emphasis on identifying and grooming bright young citizens for positions of leadership. There is also a strong emphasis on academic credentials; these are seen as objective measures of both *intelligence* and *effort*. However, not all elites in the Singaporean case take an academic route. Some travel a different road. And examples include entrepreneurs Ron Sim, Elim Chew, and George Quek, and film-maker Jack Neo. The Prime Minister said that if the elites have a sense of mission and social responsibility, and use their talents and power to promote the interests of the country as a whole, then the society will prosper.

However, he also warns that the society must also guard against the elite entrenching themselves and, over time, becoming exclusive. If not, tensions would develop and the social order would break down. Ostentation in lifestyle, dress and social norms should be discouraged. The political leaders set the tone – they dress down and eat in hawker centers. An informal tone must be maintained in order to keep Singapore an egalitarian society. On March 19, 2005, in a speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the National University of Singapore Society, entitled “An Elite Dedicated to Serving One and All” (*The Straits Times*, March 21, 2005), he defines the role of elite in the Singaporean society. His definition of the elite here: an inclusive group with members from all walks of life, regardless of social and family background, and from a wide spectrum – be it business, sports or government. He defined them as “a core group of people who occupy key positions of power and influence, and set the direction for the whole society and country”. Singapore’s future depended on renewing and enlarging their numbers, and ensuring they continue to see themselves as being responsible for the whole society.

Now we know that in sociology as in general usage, the elite refers to a relatively small, dominant group within a larger society; as such, the elite

enjoys a privileged status which is upheld by individuals of lower social status within the structure of a group. Elite are the result of economic and political forces within a social structure. Upon formation, societies have always had the tendency to stratify due to a combination of politics and ability. The position of elite at the top of the social strata almost invariably puts it in a position of leadership and often subjects the holders of elite status to pressure to maintain their position as part of the elite. In spite of the pressures borne by its members, however, the existence of the elite in the social strata is usually unchanged.

Therefore, to belong to the elite is to exclude. This is contrary to the idea of openness and inclusiveness. The significance of the issue of the elite is more controversial if we were to look in retrospect. This is because meritocracy is a central political concept in Singapore. Specifically, Singapore is seen to have been “expelled” from neighboring Malaysia in 1965 as a result of the unwillingness of its majority immigrant groups (especially the ethnic Chinese) to accept the special position of the indigenous communities (especially the Malays). The Federal Malaysian government had argued for a system which would give special privileges to the Malays as part of their birthright as an indigenous people. In time, the federal government came to implement an affirmative action policy that favoured the numerically preponderant but economically backward indigenous groups.

The Singapore government led by the present Prime Minister’s father, Lee Kuan Yew, argued for the equality of all citizens of Malaysia, with places in universities, government contracts, political appointments, etc., going to the most deserving candidate, rather than to one chosen on the basis of connections or ethnic background. In the ensuing conflict between State and Federal governments, Singapore was expelled, and became an independent country. Therefore, the Singaporean government can be viewed as adopting an “anti-elitist policy” right from the start of nation-building. If we look, however, at how the dichotomy of exclusion and inclusion is resolved in the debate, we find that: first, “elite” is redefined. It functions as the technique of ordering, setting the parameters of knowledge and identification. Second, “elite” is redefined as an “inclusive elite” which the adjective “inclusive” modifies “elite” not to create a paradox but to neutralize the dichotomy of exclusion and inclusion. The inclusive nature of meritocracy promotes merit as a route to the elite. This is a form of mythical imagination. In this sense, even though the myth itself

may be “irrational”, the “technique of myth” is completely rationalized. It is controlled through the definition of “elite” in the Singaporean context and constitutes knowledge.

Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has been addressing these issues at length. His vision of “a land of opportunity” includes “a nation where each citizen has a part to play, and everyone, rich or poor can live with dignity and fulfillment”. Thus, the touchstones of inclusiveness and participation are being applied to more and more public sector endeavors. Realists would not have been under any illusions that Singapore is on the threshold of becoming a liberal democracy, or a classless society. Mr. Lee addressed this point squarely, explaining why certain fundamentals will not change. His theory of democratic elitism argues that ordinary citizens’ minds are better equipped to deal with certain issues than others, which are best left to professionals. The future of democracy depended on societies being realistic about their capacities.

5. Conclusion: Mythical thought as a latent force in the political matrix

To illustrate the relation between myth and the political power, we may perhaps view it as a fight in a dreadful combat in the beginning. The battle is won by political power by vanquishing and subjugating myth to give order. The order is enforced and practiced, creating a harmonious society. This social order could not arise until the darkness is fought and overcome. Still, the forces of myth are not entirely destroyed. They are checked and subdued by superior forces. As long as intellectual, ethical, artistic forces, etc., are in full strength, myth is tamed and subdued. But once they begin to lose their strength, chaos returns. Mythical thought then starts to rise anew and to pervade the whole of man’s cultural and social life.

Singaporean society is at that crossroads where it can no longer deny the fact of growing income disparity as an inescapable cost of globalization and advanced capitalism. That reality is reflected in the stories in the newspapers that carry as a mirror to the community it serves. In Singapore, the Government has always insisted that nobody should be confused about who’s in charge of the national agenda. Even as the elite becomes less monolithic, therefore, it is unlikely that the political executive will be content with being just one of a number of competing elites. The politi-

cal elite will need to resist the tendency to ossify, and to work instead for the larger good. However it is achieved, Singapore's challenge is to ensure that it gets those with ability and talent to rise, while resisting a culture of exclusivity or entitlement.

The key to diffusing conflict is to reach a consensus that is congruent with the national ideology of Singapore to establish a harmonious multiracial, multicultural, and multilingual society, one of "consensus not conflict", which is one of the five shared values of Singapore. As Singapore matures politically as well as economically, the need arises for a broad understanding of what democratic participation can and should mean in the context of an unequal society.

Notes

1. First conceived in 1988 by the then First Deputy Prime Minister Mr Goh Chok Tong, the "Shared Values" incorporate elements of Singapore's cultural heritage – attitudes and values that have helped it survive as a nation. It was meant to be a blueprint for the development of a national ideology that all Singaporeans could subscribe to and live by.
2. Vernant (1990: 204) has argued that the supposed opposition between mythos and logos is itself a historical construction whose origins lie in a "multiplicity of differentiations, breaks, and internal tensions within the mental universe of the Greeks" between the eighth and fourth centuries B.C.

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Igor M. Zatsman

A three-level communication model for electronic filing

1. Introduction

Information and communication technologies (ICT) are the pivot for the knowledge-based society. To bring ICT closer to people the technology must be functional, easy to use, available and affordable; new solutions must be found and services must be reliable and adaptable to multiple users' contexts. The Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community (7FP) defines top priorities for ICT design and development as: semantic systems; *capturing and exploiting knowledge*; bio-inspired artificial systems that perceive, understand, learn and evolve, and act autonomously; learning by convivial machines and humans based on a better understanding of human cognition (Decision 2006: 14–15).

The development of future and emerging ICT requires new approaches to provide reliable access to knowledge assets, in which *knowledge parts are produced locally, but exploited globally*. More than that, they must be endowed with “a sense of time and context” to make them robust against aging, diversity of use, and *evolving semantics* (Work Programme 2007: 63).

The design of future and emerging ICT meant for capturing knowledge parts produced locally and exploiting globally requires semiotics to invent new communication models and sign-like twofold entities for personal knowledge representations and their conventional integration in the computer network medium. In this paper the following two sign-like entities will be described:

- a *semcode* integrating a concept and a coupled digital object;
- a *formcode* integrating an information object and a coupled digital object.

The semcode and formcode are in some respects analogous to the sign viewed as a twofold entity. However, according to McArthur, “there is a general trend amongst scholars and experts to equate sign-use and social communication [...] it is more useful to think that the sign (and sign-like twofold entities – *I.Z.*) can have a range of functions, social communication being only one of these functions” (McArthur 1997: ix).

For future and emerging ICT an essential function of the sign and sign-like twofold entities is to represent knowledge in a computer network medium. Thus it is necessary to make a distinction between social communication and electronic communication domains. A content plane (the first level) and an information expression plane (the second level) characterize social communication between humans. The information expression plane contains sign forms of knowledge representations that are sensory perceived and comprehended by humans. Electronic communication between humans has a content plane (the first level) and two expression planes – an information one in a social network medium (the second level) and a digital one in a computer network medium (the third level). The digital expression plane consists of digital objects. Humans cannot straightforwardly perceive digital objects. However, they can see their representations in an information expression plane. Consequently, in electronic communication technologies, special attention should be paid to the valid transition from digital objects to screen-oriented or/and paper-based documents in a social network medium and vice versa.

To find good solutions for knowledge representations in a computer network media, the relationships between human knowledge, information, and digital objects must be thoroughly studied. First, we should specify some terms. Everywhere, where the notion of knowledge activities occurs, if not specified otherwise, it is interpreted as a human ability to cognize material and ideal objects, and to create *concepts*. In a social network medium, the notion of *information objects* is proposed to be interpreted as verbal and/or non-verbal forms of knowledge representations. In a social or institutional system, the notion of *sign* is considered in terms of the dyadic model as a conventional twofold entity integrating expression (signifier) and meaning (signified). Humans create signifiers to exchange information in a social network medium including sensor perception and human comprehension of signifiers.

The notion of the *digital object* is defined as a computer equivalent of binary digits. As mentioned by McArthur (1997: 86), the computer equivalent of a binary digit can be magnetism/non-magnetism, electric current or absence of electric current, reflection of light or non-reflection of light, etc. depending upon the nature of the computer.

Concepts, information objects, and digital objects constitute the following three planes for each sign system:

- *a content plane* in a knowledge medium;
- *an information expression plane* in a social network medium;
- *a digital expression plane* in the computer network medium.

This paper proposes a new framework within which a digital expression plane for each sign system can be studied. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the interfaces and the main processes of an electronic communication. A digital semiotic triangle for ICT is defined in Section 3. Section 4 discusses social functions of digital objects as well as their electronic communication functions, followed by conclusions in Section 5.

2. Interfaces and processes of electronic communication

Figure 1 shows knowledge, social network, and computer network mediums. These three mediums have two interfaces: “concepts – information objects” and “information objects – digital objects”. In future and emerging ICT there are two major categories of digital objects in electronic communication (Zatsman 2003: 48–52):

- *digital codes* applied only to *electronic communication* entities that have a human emitter;
- *digital data* applied only to communication entities that do not have a human emitter.

Digital codes are divided into three types: the first type stands for digital objects linked with signifiers, the second type stands for digital objects linked with signifieds, and the third type stands for digital objects linked with denotata. The notion of digital data can be applied to electronic communication entities generated by automatic gauges, etc.

In this section, our purpose is to couple digital codes in the computer network medium with signifiers in the social network medium. The analysis of such elementary concepts as signifieds, elementary information

objects as signifiers, and digital codes as elementary information object representations in the computer network medium is restricted (Figure 1). Thus we simplify the analysis and consider any screen-oriented or/and paper-based message as a set of sign forms (signifiers) while the significance of the paper-based message is qualified as a set of elementary concepts (signifieds), and any digital messages from humans are characterized as sets of digital codes.




Figure 1. Two interfaces: “concepts – information objects” and “information objects – digital codes”.

The interface “concepts – information objects” is studied in virtually all the disciplines of the humanities and social sciences. Signs are essential to explore this interface. The ‘information objects – digital codes’ interface is studied in computer science. The twofold entity coupling a signifier and its digital code has still been largely ignored. Therefore, this twofold entity has no conventional name yet. It was proposed to be called *formcode* (Zatsman 2003: 107–120).

Rules for coupling any signifier with a digital code must meet the legal requirements of an institutional system based on electronic communica-

tion. An example of such requirements for information objects being concatenations of letters can be found in the Decision of the President of the European Patent Office dated 7 December 2000. Article 2 of this Decision has brought in the technical standard which defines tables of coding system based on international standard ISO/IEC 10646:2000 (Decision 2001: 23–30). It should be stressed that this Decision defines encoding of letters only. However, a concatenation of letter codes can be considered as a code of the information object being concatenation of these letters.

In terms of computer science, any digital code can be attached to a signifier. The formcodes differ from these attachments by the following features:

(1) Any formcode can be defined as an identical and stable interconvertible relationship between a digital code and a signifier in different computers of an institutional system using electronic communication/

(2) There must be a long-term access to the formcodes of the institutional system.


(3) There are legal requirements for formcode retention under any computer system changes.

(4) Any formcode is an element of the formcode system with an explicit rule for coupling any signifier with a digital code in any computer of the institutional system.

A three-level communication model (3LCM) with a formcode system for electronic communication between a human emitter and a receiver will be described below.

Figure 2 shows three mediums, two interface lines (dashed and dot-and-dashed lines), an emitter and a receiver. The emitter creates a screen-oriented visible message, then converts it into a digital form, and after it sends the digital message to a receiver.

The operation of creating digital codes of the first type is designated on the left side of Figure 2. The creation of digital messages is based on a formcode system. Digital codes of the first type (i.e. formcode digital codes) may be received from a table “SR ↔ DC1”. In the middle of the bottom of the figure, we can see a transmission of digital messages. The reconstruction of the visible message containing signifiers is designated on the right side of the figure. The operation reconstruction of visible messages is also based on the formcode system.



DC1 - digital code of the first type for a signifier; SR - signifier.

Figure 2. Illustration of 3LCM with a formcode system.

Formcodes must ensure that the emitted and received visible messages are equal and transitions from information objects in the social network medium to digital codes in the computer network medium and vice versa are interconvertible. It must be emphasized that the receiver's semantic interpretation of a received visible message need not correspond to the emitter's concepts represented in a screen-oriented visible message in the 3LCM with a formcode system.

2.1. The digital semiotic triangle

Figures 1 and 2 show three mediums and two interfaces. However, the three mediums generate the following three interfaces: "concepts – information objects", "information objects – digital codes" and "concepts – digital objects" (Figure 3). A new twofold entity, referred to as *semcode*, was proposed. The semcode is meant for coupling a signified and a digital code (Zatsman 2003: 107–120). This twofold entity was suggested for the study of the interface "concepts – digital objects" between the knowledge medium and the computer network medium. Signs and new twofold enti-

ties (formcodes and semcodes) can be very helpful in studying future and emerging ICT.




Figure 3. Signs, formcodes, and semcodes.

Formcodes and semcodes help us to define a new concept of a digital semiotic triangle (Figure 4). The triangle that will be described below is different from the classical semiotic triangle. The point is that in the digital semiotic triangle all three vertices belong to the computer network medium.

The formcode function is evoked when a signifier is coupled to a digital code of the first type. As it was stated above, in the computer network medium, digital codes of the first type stand for signifiers. Both coupled entities are placed in different mediums: either the social network medium or the computer network one.

The semcode function is evoked when a signified is coupled to a digital code of the second type. Digital codes of the second type stand for signifieds in the computer network medium. Both coupled entities are placed in different mediums: either the knowledge or the computer network one. Digital codes of the third type stand for denotata. Three digital codes for

a signifier, a signified and a denotatum compose a triangle in the computer network medium.




Figure 4. Digital semiotic triangle.

The 3LCM with formcode and semcode systems for electronic communication between the human emitter and the receiver is described below.

Figure 5 shows three mediums, three interfaces (dashed, dot-and-dashed and double lines), an emitter and a receiver. The lady creates a screen-oriented visible message, then she converts it into a digital form, after it she sends the digital message to the receiver. The process of creating digital messages that contain digital codes is designated on the left side of Figure 5. The creation of digital messages is based on formcodes and semcodes. Formcode digital codes may be received from the table “SR ↔ DC₁” (see Figure 2). Digital codes of the second type may be received from a thesaurus as identification numbers of descriptors. Consequently, digital messages contain digital codes of two types. The table “SR ↔ DC₁” is not shown on Figure 5.

In the middle of the bottom of the figure, we can see a transmission of digital messages. After the transmission digital codes of the first type are withdrawn from digital messages. The reconstruction of the visible message with signifiers is designated on the right side of the figure. The recon-




Figure 5. Illustration of 3LCM with a formcode and semcode systems.

struction of visible messages is also based on digital codes of the first type (formcode digital codes). Formcodes must ensure that the emitted and received visible messages are equal and transitions from visible messages in the social network medium to digital messages in the computer network medium and vice versa are interconvertible.

Digital codes of the second type are also withdrawn from digital messages. As it was stated above, these digital codes stand for signifieds as identification numbers of thesaurus descriptors. For the visible message, the receiver implements the operation of semantic interpretation. However, the receiver can also access the thesaurus. To understand an emitter's interpretation of the visible message, the receiver can obtain the same descriptors from the thesaurus, which the emitter has used. Now two important details must be noted.

First, as stated above, we simplify the analysis and consider any screen-oriented message as a set of sign forms (signifiers), the significance of a message as a set of elementary concepts (signifieds), and any digital message as a set of digital codes. Thus we reduce the semantic diversity of relationships between signifiers, signifieds and their digital codes.

Second, in future and emerging ICT based on the 3LCM with a form-code and semcode systems, the receiver can accept the same descriptors from a thesaurus that the emitter has used. These descriptors allow the receiver to understand the emitter's interpretation of visible messages.

2.2 Social functions of digital objects

The design and development of future and emerging ICT require a deep understanding of relationships between concepts as human knowledge representation and articulation, information objects in the social network medium and digital objects in the computer network medium. In other words, it is necessary to study the relationships between entities of one content and two expression planes.

Digital expression planes contain digital objects, which began to fulfill some economically and socially important functions after a legal framework for electronic signatures had been adopted and introduced into practice. For example, Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council asserts the following:

Electronic signatures will be used in the public sector within national and Community administrations and in communications between such administrations and with citizens and economic operators, for example in the public procurement, taxation, social security, health and justice systems; ... Member States shall ensure that advanced electronic signatures ... satisfy the legal requirements of a signature in relation to data in electronic form in the same manner as a hand-written signature satisfies those requirements in relation to paper-based data; ... (Directive 2000: 12–20)

Hence, human interests, jobs, rights, and duties may be connected with such digital objects as signed data in an electronic form. An important point here is the perceptive demarcation between signed data in an electronic form in the computer network medium and signed paper-based data in the social network medium. Electronic signatures may satisfy the legal requirements of a signature in relation to data in an electronic form, but humans are not directly capable to perceive these digital objects in a sensory way. This conclusion holds true for any types of digital objects. Consequently, special attention should be paid to the transition from

visible messages in the social network medium to digital messages in the computer network medium and vice versa.

As Eco (1976: 20–21) has noted:

The proper objects of a theory of information are not signs but rather units of transmission [including digital objects – *I. Z.*] which can be computed quantitatively irrespective of their possible meaning, and which therefore must properly be called “signals” and not “sign”. To assert that these *signals* [or digital objects – *I.Z.*] are of no importance for a semiotic approach would be rather hasty. One would then be unable to take into account the various features of the linguistic “*significant*” face of a sign, which, although strictly organized and competitively detectable, can be independent of its meaning and only possesses an opposition value.

This conclusion is important for all types of ICT including electronic filing. The main problem is how to organize electronic communication within which the specified digital objects can possess sign forms and their meanings? We suggest that these electronic communication technologies should be based on the 3LCM with formcode and semcode systems. In an institutional system, formcodes and semcodes can possess sign forms and their meanings respectively.

Below we describe the 3LCM with a formcode systems of electronic filing technologies for patent applications (Figure 6). In electronic filing technologies, applicant’s interests and rights are closely connected with digitally signed patent applications. Applicants of inventions cannot straightforwardly perceive digital codes of digital patent applications in a sensory way. However, applicants can see their representations in screen-oriented applications. The creation of a screen-oriented visible application and a digital patent application with an electronic signature is designated on the left side of Figure 6. The creation of the digital patent application is based on formcodes.

At the bottom of Figure 6 we can see a transmission of the digital patent application with an electronic signature. After the transmission the receiver checks whether the electronic signature is valid. If it is valid and the formcode system on the right side equals the formcode system on the left side, then the visible application on the right is identical with the visible application on the left.




Figure 6. Illustration of 3LCM with a formcode system for electronic filing technologies.

However, if the electronic signature is valid, but the formcode system on the left side isn't equal to the formcode system on the right side, then the visible application on the right need not be identical with the visible application on the left. In other words, on the right side of Figure 6 we can receive a *wrong reconstruction of the visible application*. Consequently, the *valid transmission of the digital patent application with an electronic signature* doesn't guaranty the *correct reconstruction of the visible application* on the receiver's computer.

3. Conclusion

We conclude this paper with the following basic remarks. First, electronic signatures will be used in the public sector more and more. Human interests, jobs, rights and duties will be connected with signed digital messages in the public procurement, taxation, social security, health and justice systems on a social or institutional time scale and not within a computer system life-cycle.

Second, electronic signatures will satisfy the legal requirements for an electronic signature in relation to digital messages. However, humans are not capable to perceive these directly. This conclusion holds true for any digital message. Consequently, special attention should be paid to a thorough study of the transition from visible messages in the social network medium to digital messages in the computer network medium and vice versa.

Third, the essential function of signs and sign-like twofold entities is to represent knowledge in the computer network medium. As exemplified by our study of the digital semiotic triangle and the $\mathfrak{3}$ LCM with two expression planes, a creation of economically and socially important technologies and systems require a new semiotic framework to research and develop future and emerging ICT.

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Jörg Zeller

The Danish Mohammed cartoons

Freedom of speech or communication terror?

... practical discourses like all argumentation equal islands in the sea of practice threatened by inundation where the pattern of consensual settlement of practical conflicts doesn't dominate. The means of understanding become again and again superseded by instruments of violence.

– Habermas 1983: 116

1. Information exchange versus communication

The basic idea of my paper is that the Mohammed cartoons of the Danish newspaper *Jyllands Posten* from September 30, 2005 are part of a degenerate form of communication that I call *information exchange*. Participants in this kind of communication don't want to give each other a share in or to participate in each other's beliefs or attitudes. They only want to inform each other about their view of things.

Representatives of the right-wing political scene in Denmark pronounce in the cartoon campaign their idiosyncratic interpretation of the democratic right of freedom of speech. In short, they claim that freedom of speech is only realized if it is applied ruthlessly towards the addressee of its application. The violent Muslim reactions to the cartoons, culminating in the boycott of Danish commodities in Islamic countries and the burning of the Danish embassy in Damascus and the consulate in Beirut in February 2006, are also transmissions of messages of a *demonstrative* rather than a *communicative* kind.

Communication of any kind, however, is an exchange of meaning between a sender and a receiver. The sender encodes an idea or a thought in a (structure of) sign(s); the receiver decodes the (structure of) sign(s) as

meaning a certain idea or thought. Meaning formation and meaning re-formation or interpretation can be more or less complex, divisible into three layers of complexity: syntax, semantics and pragmatics. Syntax provides recognizable sign structures; semantics is responsible for understandable meaning-relations; pragmatics furnishes a basis for rational, i.e. justifiable, interpretations.

My claim is that degenerate communication confines itself to the syntactic and semantic dimensions of meaning formation and re-formation, and suppresses the pragmatic dimension. As a consequence, this kind of restricted communication operates with standardised or stereotyped forms of meaning. Standards and stereotypes are immunized against alternative interpretations – i.e. the unlimited process of semiosis, as Peirce 1994 called it. Especially, degenerate communication impedes or prohibits the moral interpretation of the exchanged information. Let's therefore have a look at the moral background of the Danish Mohammed-cartoons, an example of which follows here:



2. *Moral background of the Mohammed cartoons*

This background is liberalistic and says that a natural right to freedom should conduct man's actions. The Danish Prime Minister since 2001, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, leader of the Danish liberal party, formulated this right to freedom in his programmatic, neoliberal book, *From Social State to Minimal State*, in this way:

Liberalism is not an ism-ideology. ... It is not a time-conditioned or time-dependent ideology that becomes outdated because of changes in technol-

ogy, worldview or way of life. The sociological view that man is doing fine if everyone takes responsibility for his own life is grounded on a view of man that is timeless and thus essential for all times and under all circumstances. (Rasmussen 1993: 9, my translation)

By naturalizing freedom Rasmussen immunizes the concept of liberal moral and politics against any challenge of its fundamental status. The natural cannot be doubted.

The minor partner in the Danish ruling coalition, the conservative party, represents traditional middle class politics, i.e. essentially a worldview governed by capitalist market economy and traditional bourgeois values. The ruling coalition's support-party, the Danish People Party, supplements the liberal and conservative trait of the Danish government. The success of this right-wing party, founded in 1995, is based on its populist play with xenophobic resentments. The main target of this xenophobia – not surprisingly against the background of Islam-fundamentalist terrorism in the recent years – are Muslim immigrants. Generally speaking, xenophobic propaganda claims that immigrants threaten the native people's welfare and cultural identity. In the case of Muslim immigrants this native fear of economic and cultural loss is deepened by the ideologically fuelled fear of fundamentalist terrorism and alleged Islamic intentions to re-establish the Caliphate, i.e. a worldwide Islamic empire (cf. Jespersen & Pittelkow 2006).

Against this ideological background and in the wake of the US-President Bush's "War against terror", which the Danish government felt called upon to support militarily, politicians and other public representatives of the Danish bourgeois and right-wing mentality understand themselves as defenders of human rights and democracy. Xenophobic resentment and the rich world's war of terror against the poor's reactions to oppression and disdain thus become reinterpreted as a fearless defense of freedom and basic democratic values.

The ideological stance of the newspaper *Jyllands Posten* is in agreement with the politics of the ruling parties and their right-wing support-party in Denmark. In the fall of 2005, the features editor of that newspaper, Flemming Rose, had the bright idea to support the Danish government's fight against the enemies of western free-enterprise democracy by starting a campaign against Islam-fundamentalist oppression of free speech. Rose

invited 40 Danish newspaper cartoonists to draw cartoons visualizing the prophet “Mohammed’s appearance”. Rose informed the cartoonists that it was his intention to publish those cartoons in the *Jyllands Posten* under that heading. In this way, wrote Rose (2005), he wanted to demonstrate the newspaper’s full backing of the democratic right of freedom of speech.

Twelve cartoonists answered the invitation. The rest, as Rose informed the readers of the *Jyllands Posten* in the article accompanying the publication of the 12 cartoons (September 30, 2005), either didn’t answer at all or excused themselves by referring to other, urgent jobs.

The basic idea of the cartoon publication comments on the well-known Islamic prohibition of making any image of Allah or the prophet Mohammed. According to Islamic law, visualizing the holy is blasphemy and one of the heaviest violations of the divine commands revealed in the Koran. These commands are in turn the foundation of the whole system of Islamic ethics and juridical system. To disdain the prohibition against visually representing the prophet Mohammed thus means to disdain the ethical basis of Muslim identity and dignity. It is very unlikely that Flemming Rose and the twelve cartoonists did not know that they were going to demonstrate their contempt of one of the most basic ethical principles in Islam.

Of course, it is questionable why the allegedly most important things or persons in the world should be disguised. But this is a question about how to interpret the world and not how to treat other people. In my opinion Flemming Rose and the twelve cartoonists confused two things: their personal disagreement with the Islamic worldview and the ethical question of how to treat people with of an ethnic and cultural background different from one’s own. It is the latter question that is critical for any chance of men living together – despite ethnic and cultural differences – in peace.

In other words, the Mohammed cartoons – understood as part of the ongoing global communication between different social systems and cultures – are a demonstration of the initiator’s xenophobic motives rather than a morally justifiable communication about different worldviews and ways of life. The Danish neo-liberal, neo-conservative and neo-nationalist defenders of democratic values don’t want to *communicate* with people of different ethnic or cultural background; rather, they want to show the superiority of their own world-view and way of life. In order to make my point more clear I will make several propositions in the next section.

3. *The natural right of freedom:
A confusion of right and ability*

The earlier noted confusion of informing *versus* communicating is based on another, deeper confusion of two concepts: the *right* and the *ability* to act in a certain way. A right presupposes ability, but not the other way round. We can be able to act in a certain way without a right to do so. This is important because the confusion is about natural and moral law. A moral law allows or prohibits acting in a certain way. A right is something a human community grants to its members by law. I will argue that there are no such things as *natural rights*. Especially there is no natural right of freedom.

My argument runs as follows: If the freedom to act as the actor likes to do would be a natural *right*, then there has to exist a “natural” moral authority with the power of granting or denying this right to the actor. But a “natural moral authority” is an absurdity. Morality is bound to conscious beings, i.e., beings equipped with sensitivity, sensibility, memory, imagination, rationality, and the ability to act. In short, morality is bound to *subjects or persons*. “Nature” as understood in the framework of modern, scientific ontology since the Renaissance has been defined as a “purposeless spatio-temporal world of extended, material bodies dominated by a number of universal laws” (Lübcke 1996: 306). Nature in this sense is no person and not able to think up practical laws or to grant rights to anybody. Practical laws and rights presuppose the existence of conscious beings able to imagine and choose between alternative possibilities to act. To act freely presupposes actors equipped with the *ability* to act freely.

Humans thus have no natural right of freedom, but they do have a natural ability to imagine alternative possibilities to act, and to consider which possibility is the best to achieve a wanted end, and to decide to realize this possibility by action. This ability is, if you like, the natural basis of morality and of moral laws and rights of whatever kind.

Human rights thus presuppose the ability of free will. On the basis of this ability a human community can consider and decide which actions shall be allowed and which shall be forbidden to the members of this community. The community can grant or deny rights to individual members, specific groups, or all of its members. From this point of view, rights are something the community agrees on to grant or deny its members. If

“community” is understood as the totality of its members, then rights are something the members of the community agree on to grant or deny to each other. Rights presuppose therefore a consensus between the members of a community. To grant a person a specific right means to accept that this person freely decides to use or not to use this right on a certain occasion.

To summarize: it is not the nature of man but the different communities of interacting and communicating men that decide what is right or wrong. There is no “natural right of freedom”, i.e., no objective freedom, but only different laws and codes that different communities grant or deny their members.

4. *The incommensurability of morals*

Another assumption concerns the difference between values and rights. Habermas (1983: 113) distinguishes between the good, or valuable, and the right, or just. The former asks for evaluation and the latter for justification. On this background he argues that cultural values, being connected with particular ways of life, cannot claim normative (i.e., universal) practical validity. As a consequence values (goods) cannot (directly) be transferred from one culture to another. Values are *incommensurable* between different cultures.¹

The same, however, doesn't hold for norms – they are transferable from one culture to another. Norms are rules of action, i.e., action *models* or *prototypes*. If I want to ride a bicycle I have to do certain things, no matter where and when and under which circumstances I try to do these things.

Applied to my case, the Mohammed cartoons, this means that it is a bad moral strategy to argue about the values of the cultures in question (western and Islamic). It is, however, a good moral strategy to argue about the normative preliminaries for communication and interaction between different cultures.

If the initiators of the cartoons had wanted to prove that freedom of speech is a better moral basis for interaction and communication among men than are the commands of an invisible and unquestionable moral authority, then they should have applied the principle of freedom of speech to Danish, or more generally, the western system of values; for example, by questioning the moral basis for the co-existence of Christian charity and a free-enterprise economy.

To declare freedom as a natural and thus unquestionable right of man is to allow man to act inconsiderately towards other men or living beings. Freedom understood as the founding moral principle of liberal politics and values is unethical. Only the combination of free action with its considerate performance towards other human and living beings – as for example, formulated in Kant’s categorical imperative – supplies the formal rationality of free will with an ethical, i.e. existential and social, meaning or content. As a consequence, to apply the unconstrained, liberal principle of freedom to a system of values that is morally constrained to the commands of a divine moral authority, as in Islamic societies, is to claim that all systems of values (morals) should be the same as the “unholy” liberal combination of Christian charity and free enterprise in western societies.

On the other hand, as exemplified by the Islam fundamentalist-governed reactions to the Danish cartoon campaign, the founding of existential and social values on the alleged commands of an imperceptible and unquestionable moral authority is to incapacitate man as a moral being. If people are not allowed to ask and to search for reasons why to act in a certain way, then their ability to think rationally and act freely is denied. As a consequence, the members of a fundamentalist culture – from a moral point of view – never act on behalf of themselves. They act in a certain way because they have the duty or the permission to act in this way, i.e., because the community, on behalf of a “higher authority”, claims or allows acting this way. Let us call such communities *authoritarian*. Anyone who is bound to do what an unquestionable moral authority – human or allegedly divine – demands is in an ethical sense not free. As a consequence, people in fundamentalist cultures and political systems are prone to not feeling responsible for the actions they perform on behalf of an authoritarian community.

The morals and values of a human community are the historical result of how that community has tried to make the existence of its members meaningful and valuable. Morals guide the real life of a community – by defining the best its members have been able to make out of their lives. The identity and dignity of the members of a culture are based on the habits, customs and traditions operative in this culture. To question the system of values of a culture is to question the identity and dignity of its members. To do this is certainly not to communicate with the members of this cul-

ture about the most rational and responsible ways men are able to discover in order to realize purposes desirable for all men.

I summarize: Relying on Habermas's 1983 considerations about the difference between morality and morals, it seems that different human systems of values or cultures are incommensurable. You can't (directly) translate or transfer one system of values to another. Instead of being translated, one system of values can be *adapted* to another system of values. That way, it is possible for different cultures to learn from and enrich each other. The concept of integration of immigrants from another culture into a new culture has to take this into account. All the conflicts about Muslim women wearing a veil and headscarf in non-Islamic countries are idle if both cultures are unable or unwilling to understand the incommensurability of values.

5. *The commensurability of morality*

On the other hand, the incommensurability of cultures doesn't imply the incommensurability of different systems of morality. Morality – the ability to act responsibly – is a human universal. It is, according to Blackburn, “a property or relation that can be instanced, or instantiated, by a number of different particular things” (1996: 387). Man, defined as a rational animal, is that living being that is able to sense, feel, remember, imagine, think, and, on the background of these abilities, to act freely. Morality, then, consists of the ability to act rationally, i.e., to act on the basis of considerations about the most purposeful and, at the same time, the most responsible way, in relation to other people and living beings, to reach a wanted end. However, rationality, the ability to draw conclusions from premises, is not an isolated faculty of the human mind. It works only in cooperation with all the other functions of consciousness – sensation, memory, imagination, feeling, and the ability to connect the experience of one thing with the experience of something other. Let us call this ability to operate an *interpretant*, as Peirce 1994 called it, or an intention within semiosis. However, the intentional or semiotic formation of meaning is, according to Wittgenstein, not a job that can be accomplished by consciousness in privacy. To be sure we mean what we believe to mean, we have to *communicate* with other people.

In other words, man, the rational and moral being, is a communicating being. Human communication, the sign-based exchange of messages between communication partners, is a way of human action. As all kinds of human action, it is sensitive to moral considerations.

Final summary: if humans in community with other humans and living beings are to make their existence, on the background of evolution and history, as meaningful and valuable as possible for as many people and living beings as possible, then they have to communicate with other people and living beings. And “communicate” means to participate in other people’s way of making life meaningful and valuable and to allow other people to participate in one’s own way of making life meaningful and valuable. It means not to question morals, i.e. the freedom of humans to create values and to find meaningful ways of life, but to question the morality of one’s own as well as other people’s morals. Morality is about the reasons why we act as we act.

If I am right in my analysis of the morality of the publication of the Danish Mohammed cartoons and of the violent reactions of offended Islamic fundamentalists, then neither the former nor the latter represented a morally justifiable contribution to communication between western and Islamic cultures. Neither was the publication of the cartoons a meaningful defense of fundamental democratic values; nor were the violent demonstrations of Islamic offense-taking a morally justifiable attack against western recklessness. Both attitudes toward communication between different cultures show, in my opinion, clear signs of misunderstanding of human rights and values on the one hand, and human abilities to think rationally and act freely on the other hand.

The religious fundamentalist physical terror that burns down a Danish embassy corresponds thus – from a communicative and moral point of view – to the communication terror of a fundamentally misunderstood moral liberalism that misuses democratic freedom of speech in order to offend people of Islamic cultural background.

Note

1. Habermas, by the way, specifies his consideration about the non-transferability of values. The latter, he says (114), may be suggested as *candidates* for their incorporation in norms of general interest.

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