



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Mašhad, Kitābhāna-i Āsitān-i Quds-i Raḡawī 300, f. 1v
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La tradizione siriana e araba delle cosiddette Divisiones Aristoteleae

*Analisi e commento della versione siriana (ed. Brock)
e delle due traduzioni arabe (ed. Kellermann-Rost)*

Tiziano Dorandi e Issam Marjani*

scheint es sich um eine bisher unbekannte islamisierte Überlieferung der *Divisiones* zu handeln
W. Heffening, *Zum Aufbau der islamischen Rechtswerke* (1935), p. 108 n. 1

Abstract

This paper is devoted to the Syriac and Arabic translations of the *Divisiones quae dicuntur Aristoteleae* (*DA*). The discovery and publication of some fragments of an anonymous Syriac translation of the *DA* shed new light on the two translations into Arabic, by Theodorus Abū Qurra and Ibn al-Ṭayyib, transmitted in revised and interpolated redactions. The Greek model of the three Oriental translations was close, and possibly identical with that of the *Recensio Laertiana*. However, the two Arabic translations are attested in a form that prevents the philologist from confidently use them to restore the corrupt passages of the Greek. These translations attest the circulation in late Antiquity of a collection composed of several Greek writings in the form of a “textbook” in all likelihood with didactical purposes. This collection included, under the name of Aristotle, not only the *DA*, but also abstracts of Peripatetic ethics, among others the treatise *De Virtutibus et vitiis*. The presence of the *DA* in this collection shows that the application of the dihairetic method was practiced also in Syriac and Arabic philosophy. The paper is supplemented by the edition of the anonymous Syriac text and English translation of the *DA* published in 2014 by S. Brock, as well as by the Arabic text of the two versions of Abū Qurra and Ibn al-Ṭayyib edited by M. Kellermann-Rost, here accompanied by the brand-new translation into Italian by I. Marjani.

1. Premessa

Diogene Laerzio e sei manoscritti bizantini tramandano almeno quattro redazioni differenti di un medesimo *corpusculum* in greco di brevi testi, variabili per numero, estensione e contenuto, conosciuti come *Divisiones quae dicuntur Aristoteleae* (= *DA*). Diogene non dà un titolo alla raccolta; nei codici bizantini il titolo varia fra la forma singolare Διαίρεσις Ἀριστοτέλους e quella plurale Περί διαίρεσεων senza il nome di Aristotele. Questi testi si presentano, almeno nelle redazioni in cui sono oggi pervenuti, nella forma di brevi e schematiche classificazioni degli elementi di concetti filosofici a fini dialettici e retorici. La loro origine risale probabilmente fino al IV sec. a. C. e si colloca

* L'articolo è il lavoro congiunto di un ellenista e di un arabista. T. Dorandi ha scritto i §§ 1-5 e le note finali (§ 9). I. Marjani ha preparato la traduzione italiana e le note del testo arabo dell'edizione di M. Kellermann-Rost (§§ 7-8). Il § 6 riproduce, il testo e la traduzione inglese della *Translatio Syriaca* curati da Sebastian P. Brock e pubblicati per la prima volta nel suo studio “An Abbreviated Syriac Version of Ps.-Aristotle, *De Virtutibus et vitiis* and *Divisiones*”, in E. Coda - C. Martini Bonadeo (éd.), *De l'Antiquité tardive au Moyen Âge. Études de logique aristotélicienne et de philosophie grecque, syriaque, arabe et latine offertes à Henri Hugonnard-Roche*, Vrin, Paris 2014, pp. 94-101 (© Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris 2014, www.vrin.fr). Il testo siriano e la traduzione sono riprodotti con il gentile permesso di Sebastian P. Brock e della Casa Editrice Vrin che qui ringraziamo cordialmente.

nell'ambito dell'Accademia di Platone nel momento in cui la frequentava ancora il giovane Aristotele. L'esercizio consisteva nel presentare divisioni (διαίρεσεις) logico/dialettiche, fisiche, etiche, politiche, retoriche. All'interno di ciascuna di esse, erano sviluppati ulteriori divisioni e suddivisioni dei concetti, seguendo uno schema tipo più o meno variabile delle classificazioni e degli esempi: 1. Indicazione dei membri della divisione (διαρῆται ... εἰς τρία, τέσσαρα); 2. Enumerazione di questi membri; 3. Spiegazioni relative a ogni membro, spesso con una serie di esempi introdotti da οἷον; 4. Ricapitolazione, che riproduce, in linea di massima, l'enumerazione di 2.

Le quattro redazioni lasciano presupporre l'esistenza di due modelli distinti, ma che risalgono a un lontano esemplare unico costituito in un momento imprecisato, non si sa da chi né in quale forma e con quale contenuto. Esso si presentava come una raccolta di unità testuali che, in quella fase redazionale, non risalivano a un solo autore né erano estratte da una sola opera. Un nucleo di queste divisioni è senza dubbio riconducibile fino a Aristotele; altre tramandano materiale che deriva da tradizione scritta o orale relativa a Platone e a membri non identificabili della Academia antica; altre, infine, sono interpolazioni più tarde (talora cristiane) o il risultato di rimaneggiamenti nati in ambienti e epoche differenti.

Ho già avuto modo di discutere, in diverse occasioni, dell'insieme di questi problemi e in particolare della formazione, della struttura e delle peculiarità salienti delle quattro redazioni greche finora identificate. In particolare, mi sono occupato delle difficoltà ecdotiche che esse pongono e della necessità di pubblicare le singole redazioni una accanto all'altra senza cadere nella tentazione irrealizzabile e inopportuna di ricomporre (se non in casi specifici e limitati) un ipotetico *Urtext*.¹

Ho appena pubblicato nuove edizioni delle quattro redazioni. Il testo di quella che ho chiamato *Recensio Laertiana* si legge nella mia edizione dei dieci libri delle *Vite dei filosofi* di Diogene Laerzio, alla fine della *Vita di Platone* (III 80-109) dove Diogene trascrisse appunto un *corpusculum* di 32 *DA*.² L'edizione delle restanti tre redazioni (da me intitolate *Recensio Marciana*, *Recensio Florentina* e *Recensio Leidensis*), restituite dai codici bizantini (in *corpuscula* rispettivamente di 69, 63 e 47 unità), è apparsa nel volume di questa rivista dell'anno passato.³ Nel caso delle *Recensiones Marciana* e *Florentina*, ho potuto integrare precedenti operazioni editoriali con l'apporto spesso significativo di ulteriori testimoni manoscritti. Nel caso della *Recensio Leidensis*, ho prodotto, invece, una vera e propria *editio princeps*.

Delle *DA* esiste anche una tradizione in lingue orientali finora mai studiata nel suo insieme. Essa consiste in una traduzione in siriano e in due in arabo alla cui origine è da supporre verisimilmente un unico esemplare greco perduto che tramandava un *corpusculum* assai simile, se non identico, a quello delle 32 *DA* della *Recensio Laertiana*.⁴

Anche la tradizione orientale, vedremo, non è unitaria nel senso che, con il trascorrere dei secoli, essa fu a più riprese e da più anonimi manipolata e riadattata alle mutate condizioni storico-geografiche e culturali, dando a sua volta vita ad almeno due 'redazioni' fra loro distinte.

¹ T. Dorandi, "Le *Divisiones quae dicuntur Aristoteleae*. Storia del testo e edizione delle *Recensiones Marciana, Florentina e Leidensis*", *Studia graeco-arabica* 6 (2016), p. 1-58.

² *Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, ed. T. Dorandi, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge 2013 (Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries, 50), p. 282-96.

³ Dorandi, "Le *Divisiones quae dicuntur Aristoteleae*" (cit. n. 1).

⁴ Ne avevo dato una prima notizia in Dorandi, "Le *Divisiones quae dicuntur Aristoteleae*" (cit. n. 1), p. 2 n. 2. Qui e altrove, per indicare il modello greco delle traduzioni, utilizzo la formula di comodo *Recensio Laertiana* nella piena consapevolezza che questo modello poteva essere non un codice delle *Vite laerziane*, ma un altro esemplare che tramandava il *corpusculum* delle 32 *DA* (forse quello al quale attinse lo stesso Diogene) in una redazione che non doveva comunque molto discostarsene. Vedi *infra*, p. 9.

La piú antica è una traduzione in siriano difficile da datare, ma anteriore al X secolo, della quale si conservano pochi *excerpta* in un solo codice. Sulla *Translatio Syriaca* ancora integra venne condotta almeno una delle due *translationes Arabae*. L'altra risale, apparentemente *recta via* al modello greco. Le traduzioni arabe sono trasmesse, a quanto mi è finora noto, ognuna da un unico manoscritto.

Lo studio delle tre traduzioni in lingue orientali si rivela utile da piú punti di vista. Da un lato, esse attestano la circolazione, già in greco, di un "manuale" utilizzato forse a uso 'didattico' e composto non solo delle *DA*, ma anche di altri testi di etica peripatetica (e, in particolare, l'opuscolo *De Virtutibus et vitiis* da taluni attribuito a Aristotele). Dall'altro, esse provano l'interesse nel mondo di lingua siriana e in quello di lingua araba per questo tipo di produzione letteraria e, di conseguenza, l'applicazione con le *DA* di strategie specifiche del metodo diairetico nel discorso filosofico. È probabile che la diffusione e la recezione delle *DA* (e degli altri testi pseudo-aristotelici) nel mondo e nella cultura siriana e araba siano state ben piú vaste di quanto inferiamo oggi dalle tre traduzioni e da sporadiche testimonianze finora emerse piú per caso che a seguito di una ricerca sistematica in testi arabi di letteratura filosofica.⁵ Infine, le traduzioni possono qua e là contribuire al restauro di luoghi corrotti del testo originale dell'una o dell'altra di quelle opere perché condotte su un esemplare molto piú antico di quelli conservati nel mondo bizantino.⁶ Limitatamente alle *DA*, i codici greci della *Recensio Laertiana* non scendono al di là dell'età Comnena (XI-XII s.).⁷

2. Un modello greco unico e tre traduzioni

Tutte e tre le versioni, in siriano e arabo, delle *DA* presuppongono un modello greco, diretto o indiretto, che non conteneva solo quel *corpusculum*, ma che si presentava come una raccolta di almeno tre unità distinte riunite sotto il comune denominatore dell'autorità (pseudo-)aristotelica. Questo esemplare era il risultato dell'accorpamento, non sappiamo quando né da parte di chi, di testi all'origine separati fra loro e trasmessi probabilmente in maniera indipendente in distinti testimoni manoscritti sulla cui qualità testuale e sulla cui cronologia ignoriamo tutto.

La prima parte del *corpusculum* di testi greci che dobbiamo presupporre a monte delle tre traduzioni corrisponde al trattatello pseudo-aristotelico *De Virtutibus et vitiis* (1249 a 26 - 1251 b 39).⁸ La seconda era costituita di due brevi sezioni. Una, il *Mesotes-Abschnitt*, per riprendere la terminologia di M. Kellermann-Rost,⁹ presentava in maniera sommaria la dottrina aristotelica della *μεσότης* riunendo insieme estratti ispirati dai *Magna Moralia* (I 20, 1190 b 9-33, 1193 b 20) attribuiti a Aristotele. L'altra, che Kellermann-Rost denomina *Diairesis-Stück*,¹⁰ era costituita da alcune divisioni dei beni. La questione delle fonti è stata indagata, a seguito delle ricerche di Pines¹¹ e di Kellermann-

⁵ Vedi *infra*, p. 18 e n. 57.

⁶ Per il *De Virtutibus et vitiis*, vedi P. Eleuteri, "I manoscritti dell'opera pseudo-aristotelica *De virtute*", *Scripta* 9 (2016), p. 73-88. Contengono materiale utile anche gli articoli di Daiber e Zonta citati *infra*, p. 18 e n. 57.

⁷ Vedi Dorandi, *Diogenes Laertius* (cit. n. 2), p. 2-3 sui due manoscritti B (Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale, III B 29, XII sec.) e P (Paris, BnF, *Paris. gr.* 1759, XI-XII sec.), con ulteriore bibliografia.

⁸ Considero il trattato pseudoepigrafo nonostante i tentativi, anche recenti, di difenderne la paternità aristotelica. Vedi la bibliografia raccolta da Eleuteri, "I manoscritti dell'opera pseudo-aristotelica *De virtute*" (cit. n. 6), p. 73 n. 2.

⁹ M. Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend. Edition und Übersetzung der arabischen Fassungen des Abū Qurra und des Ibn at-Tayyib*, Diss. Erlangen 1965, p. 5, 77-9 e 106-7.

¹⁰ Kellermann-Rost (cit. n. 9), p. 5-6.

¹¹ Sh. Pines, "Un texte inconnu d'Aristote en version arabe", *Archives d'Histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 23 (1956), p. 5-43, in part. p. 5-6, 35 (l'articolo è ripreso in *The Collected Work of Shlomo Pines*, II, The Magnes Press, The

Rost,¹² da Cacouros.¹³ La terza parte infine – quella che ci interessa più da vicino – aveva la forma, all’origine, di un *corpusculum* di 32 *Divisiones Aristoteleae* simile (se non identico) nella struttura e nella forma alla *Recensio Laertiana*.

Solo le due traduzioni arabe trasmettono con qualche lacuna e spesso con consistenti varianti l’insieme dei tre testi del compendio originario. Nei resti conservati della *Translatio Syriaca* non c’è traccia della parte centrale (*Mesotes-Abschnitt* e *Diairesis-Stück*) che venne, con buona probabilità, volontariamente trascurata al momento della preparazione della raccolta degli *excerpta*. Poiché la *Translatio Syriaca* fu il modello diretto di almeno una delle due traduzioni arabe (quella di Ibn al-Ṭayyib),¹⁴ che tramanda questa sezione, se ne deduce che, all’origine, anch’essa doveva essere completa.¹⁵

2.1. Le tre traduzioni

Tutte e tre le traduzioni sono già state pubblicate nella loro integralità in siriano e arabo e in una versione annotata in lingue moderne (inglese per quella siriana, tedesco per quella araba). La riproposizione dei resti del testo siriano e dei due testi arabi, affiancati da una traduzione e da note critico-esegetiche, completa questo articolo e facilita l’accesso a quei documenti.

Per quanto riguarda la sezione sulle *DA*, le recenti e rinnovate edizioni critiche moderne del testo delle quattro redazioni in greco e, in questo caso particolare, della *Recensio Laertiana* consentono inoltre di meglio definire le caratteristiche formali e contenutistiche delle traduzioni in lingue orientali e di ricomporre alcune tappe della loro trasmissione. Finora, tutti gli editori delle due versioni arabe e di quella siriana si erano basati sull’edizione invecchiata e difettosa, non solo perché parziale e fondata su una tradizione manoscritta incompleta, di Mutschmann.¹⁶

2.2. La traduzione siriana anonima

La traduzione siriana è conosciuta solo sotto forma di *excerpta* trasmessi dal manoscritto Sinai *Syr.* 14 (X sec.), che tramanda un’antologia monastica di testi di contenuto ascetico e etico.¹⁷ Nel codice, sotto il titolo *Da Aristotele il sapiente*, leggiamo (ff. 133r-135v) estratti delle traduzioni dello pseudo-aristotelico *De Virtutibus et vitiis* (I 3-VI 6. 1249 a 31 - 1251 a 16; ff. 133r-134r) e delle

Hebrew University - Brill, Jerusalem - Leiden 1986, p. 157-195, in part. p. [157]-[158] e [187]). V. anche *infra*, n. 57.

¹² Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 5-6, 79-81 e 107-8.

¹³ M. Cacouros, “La divisions des biens dans le compendium d’éthique par Abū Qurra et Ibn al-Ṭayyib et ses rapports avec la *Grande Morale* et le *Florilège* de Stobée”, in A. Hasnawi - A. Elamrani-Jamal - M. Aouad (éd.), *Perspectives arabes et médiévales sur la tradition scientifique et philosophique grecque*, Peters, Leuven 1997, p. 289-318 e Id., “Aristote de Stagire: Le traité pseudo-aristotelicien *De virtutibus et vitiis* avec quelques considérations sur la diffusion des listes de vertus dans le monde grec antique, byzantin, post byzantin et arabe”, in R. Goulet (éd.), *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques, Supplément*, CNRS-Éditions, Paris 2003, p. 506-46, in part. p. 540-2.

¹⁴ S.P. Brock, “An Abbreviated Syriac Version of Ps.-Aristotle *De Virtutibus et vitiis* and *Divisiones*”, in Coda - Martini Bonadeo (éd.), *De l’Antiquité tardive au Moyen Âge. Études de logique aristotélicienne et de philosophie grecque, syriaque, arabe et latine offertes à Henri Hugonnard-Roche* (cit. n. 1), p. 91-112, in part. p. 102-3.

¹⁵ Cf. Brock, “An Abbreviated Syriac Version”, p. 102. Non è inutile fin da ora sottolineare che la scoperta di altri manoscritti potrebbe rimettere in discussione i risultati di questa ricerca e in particolare le edizioni dei testi e le conclusioni che ne derivano.

¹⁶ *Divisiones quae vulgo dicuntur Aristoteleae*, ed. H. Mutschmann, Teubner, Leipzig 1906. Cf. la recensione di K. Praechter in: *Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift* 30 (1910), p. 390-3.

¹⁷ Brock, “An Abbreviated Syriac Version” (cit. n. 14), p. 91-2 con bibliografia.

DA 12, 13, 16, 17 e 29 (ff. 134r-135v) secondo la successione della *Recensio Laertiana*. Mancano, come ho segnalato, tracce della seconda sezione del modello greco.

I resti della *Translatio Syriaca*, accompagnati da una traduzione inglese, sono stati solo di recente pubblicati da Brock.¹⁸ Lo studioso ha così qualificato la traduzione:

Fairly free, with many dynamic as opposed to formal renderings, and it shows none of the characteristics of the text-oriented translations typical of the later sixth and the seventh centuries.

È probabile che la versione dal greco dei due opuscoli sia opera della medesima persona, come confermerebbe l'identica resa dei termini delle virtù comuni a entrambe le opere, fatta eccezione per τὸ λογιστικόν.¹⁹

2.3. La traduzione araba di Teodoro Abū Qurra

La prima traduzione in arabo, in ordine di tempo, è quella del vescovo di Ḥarrān Teodoro Abū Qurra († tra 825 e 830). Essa comprende le tre sezioni del compendio originario (allo stato attuale, qua e là lacunose).²⁰ È tramandata dal codice

Istanbul, Köprülü Kütüphanesi, 1608, ff. 66r-73r (XVI s.) ff. 70r-73r (DA).²¹

Nel manoscritto, l'intero compendio è presentato (f. 66r) come un libro del filosofo Aristotele *Sulle virtù dell'anima* tradotto da Abū Qurra, vescovo di Ḥarrān, per Ḍū l-Yamīnayn Ṭāhir ibn al-Ḥusayn. *Incipit* (f. 66r): "Aristotele ha detto". La traduzione delle DA non ha un titolo a sé.

È verosimile che Abū Qurra avesse tradotto tutto il *corpusculum* delle 32 DA, ma attualmente si conservano solo le DA [1]-[6], [8]-[11], [13]-[18], [20]-[24], [27]-[28]. Resta incerto anche se Abū Qurra avesse avuto accesso direttamente al greco oppure fosse passato attraverso un intermediario siriano e, in questo caso, se esso corrispondesse alla traduzione anonima da cui derivano gli estratti del codice Sinai Syr. 14.²²

L'edizione critica di riferimento del testo arabo di tutto il compendio, accompagnata da una traduzione tedesca annotata, è quella di M. Kellermann-Rost.²³

¹⁸ Brock, "An Abbreviated Syriac Version" (cit. n. 14), p. 98-101. L'articolo è arricchito di un "Select Glossary: Syriac-Greek, Greek-Syriac", p. 106-12.

¹⁹ Brock, "An Abbreviated Syriac Version" (cit. n. 14), p. 102.

²⁰ Cf. Cacouros, "Le traité pseudo-aristotelicien *De virtutibus et vitiis*" (cit. n. 13), p. 539 con bibliografia sulla cronologia del personaggio.

²¹ Il codice (21x12,5 cm) è composto di ventitré unità cartacee (la traduzione del compendio è in n° VIII) e conta 194 fogli. Una descrizione, dopo Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 13 e D. Gutas, *Greek Wisdom Literature in Arabic Translation. A Study of the Graeco-Arabic Gnomologia*, American Oriental Society, New Haven, Conn. 1975, p. 42-50 (46 n° VIII), si trova nel *Catalogue of Manuscripts in the Köprülü Library* (in arabo) prepared by R. Şeşen - C. İzgi - C. Akpınar, Presented by E. İhsanoğlu, Research Centre for Islamic History, Art, and Culture, Istanbul 1986, II, p. 342-5. Ringrazio Teymour Morel (Université de Genève) per una fotocopia delle pagine del catalogo e una loro traduzione.

²² Brock, "An Abbreviated Syriac Version" (cit. n. 14), p. 103.

²³ Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 32-46 (testo arabo) e 97-118 (traduzione tedesca). Le DA alle p. 32, 4-38, 15 e 109-18.

2.4. La traduzione araba di Ibn al-Ṭayyib

La seconda traduzione è quella del filosofo, medico e teologo nestoriano Ibn al-Ṭayyib († 1043).²⁴ Comprende l'insieme dei tre testi e è tramandata dal codice

Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, *Petermann* I9 (Sachau, *Syr.* n.º 88), ff. 142r-162r (1259/1260), ff. 159r-162r (*DA*).²⁵

Nel manoscritto, il compendio nel suo insieme è presentato come una traduzione dal siriano di un'opera del "principe dei filosofi" Aristotele intitolata *Sulla virtù* e preparata da Abū l-Farağ 'Abdallāh ibn al-Ṭayyib (f. 141v). *Incipit*: "Aristotele ha detto". La traduzione delle *DA* non è introdotta da un titolo a sé.

Per quanto riguarda le *DA*, Ibn al-Ṭayyib tradusse dunque tutto il *corpusculum* dei 32 testi conosciuti da Diogene Laerzio non dal greco, ma attraverso un intermediario siriano che è da identificare con il modello da cui derivano anche gli estratti del codice Sinai *Syr.* 14.²⁶

L'edizione critica di riferimento dell'intero compendio, accompagnata da una traduzione tedesca annotata, è quella di M. Kellermann-Rost.²⁷

3. I rapporti fra le traduzioni

La recente pubblicazione degli estratti della *Translatio Syriaca*, nonostante la quantità assai limitata di testo, consente di avere un'idea più chiara della trasmissione delle *DA* nelle traduzioni arabe di Abū Qurra e Ibn al-Ṭayyib di quella che era stata proposta di M. Kellermann-Rost.²⁸

3.1. La tesi di M. Kellermann-Rost

Attraverso uno studio delle caratteristiche delle due traduzioni arabe, Kellermann-Rost era giunta alle seguenti conclusioni, che in parte restano tuttora valide. Il modello (diretto o indiretto) dei due traduttori era un identico compendio greco di etica 'aristotelica' composto di tre parti: la prima corrisponde al *De Virtutibus et vitiis* attribuito a Aristotele, la seconda si compone dei due testi composti che la studiosa definisce rispettivamente *Mesotes-Abschnitt* e *Diairesis-Stück*; la terza, infine, è il *corpusculum* di 32 *DA* in una redazione simile (se non identica) a quella conosciuta come *Recensio Laertiana*.²⁹

²⁴ Il nome completo è Abū al-Farağ 'Abdallāh ibn al-Ṭayyib. Cf. Cacouros, "Le traité pseudo-aristotelicien *De virtutibus et vitiis*" (cit. n. 13), p. 539 con bibliografia e C. Ferrari, "Ibn al-Ṭayyib", in H. Lagerlund (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Medieval Philosophy. Philosophy Between 500 and 1500*, Springer Science & Business Media, Dordrecht-Heidelberg-London-New York 2011, p. 528-31; Ead., "Abū l-Farağ ibn al-Ṭayyib", in U. Rudolph - R. Würsch (ed.), *Philosophie in der islamischen Welt. Band I. 8.-10. Jahrhundert*, Schwabe Verlag, Basel 2012 (Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie), p. 346-52.

²⁵ Il codice (26,5 x 17,5 cm) è composto di trentotto unità cartacee (la traduzione del compendio è la n.º 25) e conta 238 fogli. La data 1259-1260 è registrata al f. 36r e al f. 112r dove è indicata anche la corrispondenza con la data Seleucide a. 1571. Dopo E. Sachau, *Verzeichnis der syrischen Handschriften der Königl. Bibliothek zu Berlin*, Archer, Berlin (ristampa anast. Olms, Hildesheim 2006), n.º 88, p. 321-35 e Kellermann-Rost (cit. n. 9), p. 8-12, il manoscritto è accuratamente descritto S. Aydin, *Sergius of Reshaina: Introduction to Aristotle and his Categories, Addressed to Philotheos. Syriac Text, with Introduction, Translation and Commentary*, Brill, Leiden, 2016, p. 83-7. Una riproduzione digitale del manoscritto è accessibile al seguente indirizzo: <http://resolver.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/SBB0000144400000005> — ultimo accesso in data 23.10.2017.

²⁶ Brock, "An Abbreviated Syriac Version" (cit. n. 14), p. 102-3.

²⁷ Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 47-66 (testo arabo) e 67-96 (traduzione tedesca). Le *DA* alle p. 56, 7-66 e 82-96.

²⁸ Ivi, p. 26-9.

²⁹ Vedi *supra*, p. 3-4. Nel seguito, considero solo i dati relativi alle *DA*.

Per quanto riguarda le *DA*, il testo delle traduzioni, nello stato attuale, si allontana in maniera significativa rispetto a quello dei codici greci della tradizione di Diogene Laerzio. Se, in generale, il senso delle singole divisioni non è in sé falsato, il loro testo è spesso interpolato con glosse esplicative proprie all'arabo, in diversi punti riscritto; frequenti sono anche le omissioni.³⁰

Più in particolare, un errore comune alle due traduzioni arabe nella *DA* [10] (divisione della nobiltà, εὐγένεια) proverebbe, secondo Kellermann-Rost, che entrambi i traduttori abbiano avuto accesso allo stesso modello greco. Qui viene proposta una divisione della nobiltà in tre specie (τρία εἶδη) invece che in quattro come nei manoscritti greci della *Recensio Laertiana* (διαιρεται ἡ εὐγένεια εἰς τέτταρα εἶδη).³¹

La presenza di numerose differenze non solo formali fra le due traduzioni porta comunque a presupporre che Abū Qurra e l'anonimo traduttore siriano modello di Ibn al-Ṭayyib abbiano utilizzato due redazioni differenti del medesimo originale del compendio. Kellermann-Rost ne indica una prova nel fatto che tutte e due le traduzioni omettono per lo più, seppure in maniera diversa, le ricapitolazioni presenti nella *Recensio Laertiana* alla fine delle singole *DA*.³² Nella traduzione di Ibn al-Ṭayyib le ricapitolazioni, a parte quella delle *DA* [1] e [10],³³ sono rimpiazzate da una breve frase riassuntiva del tipo: “Quindi i tipi di x (nome del oggetto della divisione: beni, amicizia, giustizia ecc.) sono y (numero delle divisioni del medesimo oggetto: due, tre, quattro ecc.)”. Nella traduzione di Abū Qurra manca ogni traccia delle ricapitolazioni.

3.2. Nuovi elementi dalla traduzione siriana

La pubblicazione del frammento della traduzione siriana (limitato alle sole *DA* [12]-[13], [16]-[17] e [29]) getta nuova e inaspettata luce sulle questioni appena esposte. Grazie a esso, possiamo riformulare e affinare le conclusioni di M. Kellermann-Rost e di conseguenza avere un'idea assai più chiara della struttura e della forma del modello greco delle *DA* e dello stato attuale delle traduzioni arabe.

Un'analisi dei resti della *Translatio Syriaca* per quanto riguarda le sole *DA* prova che questa traduzione era assai fedele al dettato del testo greco della *Recensio Laertiana* che conosciamo. Nelle sezioni conservate, non ci sono né veri e propri cambiamenti nella forma e nella struttura delle singole divisioni né le omissioni o le aggiunte peculiari delle due traduzioni arabe. In più, tutte e cinque le *DA* superstiti presentano anche la ricapitolazione finale che, abbiamo visto, è sensibilmente ridotta e rimaneggiata nella versione di Ibn al-Ṭayyib e assente da quella di Abū Qurra.

Questo lascia presupporre che³⁴

The Syriac version in Sinai Syr. 14 must be closely related to the Syriac text used by Ibn al-Ṭayyib (whereas it bears no relationship to the other Arabic translation, by Abū Qurra).

Il confronto degli estratti sinaitici con la traduzione di Ibn al-Ṭayyib e soprattutto lo studio delle glosse siriane che accompagnano il *De Virtutibus et vitiis* nel codice di Berlino confermano che gli *excerpta* e il testo siriano tradotto da Ibn al-Ṭayyib derivano dalla medesima fonte siriana che, a sua

³⁰ Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 28.


³¹ Ivi, p. 26.

³² Ivi, p. 27.

³³ Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 27 segnala solo la *DA* [1].

³⁴ Brock, “An Abbreviated Syriac Version” (cit. n. 14), p. 92.

volta, discende da un modello greco comune anche alla traduzione di Abū Qurra. Brock rappresenta il tutto sotto forma del seguente schema:³⁵



3.3. Un unico modello greco e due recensioni arabe

A partire da queste conclusioni e da un confronto fra la *Translatio Syriaca* e le traduzioni arabe riusciamo a progredire in maniera consistente nella comprensione della struttura attuale delle *Translationes Arabae* e più in particolare di quella di Ibn al-Ṭayyib della quale la *Translatio Syriaca* fu modello. Sulla base di questi risultati si può ulteriormente ampliare l'indagine alla traduzione di Abū Qurra a partire dal presupposto che il modello greco originario fosse il medesimo per tutti e tre i traduttori.

Cominciamo con la versione di Ibn al-Ṭayyib. Costui tradusse in arabo l'intero compendio di etica "aristotelica" sul fondamento di una precedente versione siriana che è da identificare con quella di cui restano estratti nel codice Sinai Syr. 14.

Se confrontiamo il testo siriano delle cinque *DA* superscritti con quello arabo di Ibn al-Ṭayyib quale trasmesso dal codice Petermann I 9, appare subito evidente che le due versioni presentano fra loro differenze considerevoli e intriganti.

Per spiegare queste divergenze, una volta ammesso che la *Translatio Syriaca* riproduce assai fedelmente l'esemplare greco e che questa è, a sua volta, il modello sul quale Ibn al-Ṭayyib preparò la propria traduzione, si prospettano due possibilità. Prima: Ibn al-Ṭayyib restò vicino al dettato del testo siriano al momento in cui intraprese la sua opera versoria in arabo. Di conseguenza, tutte le variazioni, interpolazioni, aggiunte o omissioni rispetto al testo siriano sarebbero state

³⁵ Ivi, p. 102-3.

introdotte successivamente e diacronicamente fino a dare vita alla redazione che leggiamo oggi, almeno nel codice di Berlino.³⁶ Seconda: Ibn al-Ṭayyib introdusse lui stesso una parte almeno delle modifiche già al momento della traduzione dal siriano e altre ne seguirono indipendentemente negli oltre due secoli che separano la sua traduzione (X-XI sec.) dalla confezione di *Petermann I 9* (ca. 1260).

In teoria, non è nemmeno da escludere una terza possibilità e cioè che talune modifiche si siano potute produrre in un momento successivo alla preparazione della *Translatio Syriaca*, forse prima, forse dopo la redazione degli estratti di Sinai *Syr.* 14 (X sec.), e che esse siano state recepite in una maniera o nell'altra nella traduzione di Ibn al-Ṭayyib. In questo caso, tuttavia, bisognerebbe altresì pensare che Ibn al-Ṭayyib abbia utilizzato un testimone diverso dal modello del codice sinaitico.

Quanto finora detto parte dal presupposto che il testo greco del *corpusculum* delle *DA* modello della traduzione siriana sulla quale venne esemplata quella araba di Ibn al-Ṭayyib (e lo stesso vale per quella di Abū Qurra che risale apparentemente *recta via* al greco) fosse la *Recensio Laertiana*, intesa come un esemplare di una 'edizione' delle *Vite dei filosofi* di Diogene Laerzio il cui testo poteva ovviamente presentare qualche variante (quali e quante non è possibile dire) rispetto a quello dell'archetipo dei codici laerziani a oggi conservati.

Non possiamo tuttavia neppure escludere *a priori* che il modello greco della tradizione orientale non fossero le *Vite* laerziane in se stesse, ma piuttosto un manoscritto che trasmetteva uno stadio testuale precedente alla loro redazione e cioè all'esemplare (o a uno degli esemplari) che tramandavano il *corpusculum* delle 32 *DA* e che era stato utilizzato (anche) da Diogene. In altre parole, l'esemplare che ho indicato con la sigla α nello schema della formazione e trasmissione del *corpusculum* delle *DA* che accompagna la mia precedente edizione delle recensioni greche di quell'opera.³⁷

La *Recensio Laertiana* resta comunque la sola redazione in greco che possiamo attualmente utilizzare per ogni tipo di confronto con le versioni orientali.

Per chi giudichi diversamente, sarebbe necessario postulare l'esistenza di una redazione diversa (o piuttosto due, tenuto conto anche delle differenze cospicue fra la versione di Ibn al-Ṭayyib e quella di Abū Qurra) di quel *corpusculum* di *DA* alternativa α , e assai diversa da, quella della *Recensio Laertiana*. Il che se non è, ancora una volta, da rigettare *a priori*, avrebbe lasciato tracce concrete solo nelle ventisette *DA* non conservate nella *Translatio Syriaca* modello di Ibn al-Ṭayyib.

Lasciamo da parte le speculazioni e cerchiamo di interpretare i dati effettivi di cui disponiamo.

Un elemento sicuro per quando riguarda la forma e la struttura della redazione greca delle *DA* nel compendio modello delle traduzioni orientali è che questa aveva le frasi di ricapitolazione alla fine di ogni divisione. Ne è prova tangibile il fatto che le ricapitolazioni sono presenti in tutte le *DA* conservate della *Translatio Syriaca* nonché nella traduzione delle *DA* [1] e [10] di Ibn al-Ṭayyib. I brevi riassunti delle ricapitolazioni che le rimpiazzano nelle restanti *DA* non avrebbero inoltre avuto ragione di essere se dietro di essi non ci fosse stato il testo completo delle medesime. La loro omissione nella versione di Abū Qurra (almeno nella redazione che leggiamo oggi) è con tutta probabilità volontaria, chiunque sia all'origine di quella scelta e in qualunque momento essa sia stata operata.

³⁶ Scrivo "almeno del codice di Berlino" perché è il solo testimone che oggi conosciamo. Va da sé, lo ripeto, che le conclusioni potrebbero cambiare in seguito alla scoperta di un altro o più manoscritti della medesima traduzione.

³⁷ Dorandi, "Le *Divisiones quae dicuntur Aristoteleae*" (cit. n. 1), p. 12. Esso sarà parzialmente riproposto più in basso (*infra*, p. 14) integrandovi gli ulteriori elementi derivati appunto dalla mia ricerca sulla tradizione orientale delle *DA*.

Sono ovviamente del tutto consapevole che il materiale di confronto sul quale si fonda la mia ricostruzione è limitato a sole cinque *DA* su trentadue della *Translatio Syriaca*. Il fatto comunque che esse presentino caratteristiche identiche e che queste siano coerenti con quelle della tradizione greca della *Recensio Laertiana*, mi conforta, fino a prova contraria, quanto alla plausibilità dell'ipotesi.

Più difficile esprimere un giudizio preciso per quanto riguarda la traduzione di Abū Qurra. Innanzitutto non è provato che questo dotto abbia avuto accesso alla *Translatio Syriaca*; anzi è possibile che abbia tradotto dal greco. Inoltre, non ci sono elementi concreti che mettano in evidenza un rapporto fra la sua traduzione e quella di Ibn al-Ṭayyib, che appaiono dunque indipendenti l'una dall'altra, nel senso che Ibn al-Ṭayyib sembra non avere avuto conoscenza o accesso alla versione di Abū Qurra di qualche secolo precedente.

Tuttavia, se la traduzione siriana e le due arabe utilizzarono il medesimo modello greco (la *Translatio Syriaca* e Abū Qurra in maniera diretta; Ibn al-Ṭayyib in maniera indiretta), il confronto della versione di Abū Qurra con quanto resta di quella siriana è altrettanto valido per provare che il manoscritto greco da lui utilizzato, almeno quello delle *DA*, trasmetteva uno stato testuale che non doveva essere molto differente da quello che leggiamo nei codici della *Recensio Laertiana*. Il che conferma, tra l'altro, che nella traduzione originale di Abū Qurra le singole *DA* erano completate dalle ricapitolazioni finali.

L'accettazione di queste conclusioni si fonda, lo ribadisco, su due presupposti che è necessario dare per scontati. Il primo è sicuro: l'anonimo redattore della *Translatio Syriaca* aveva tradotto il testo greco originale in maniera assai fedele. Il secondo è assai probabile: Abū Qurra ha utilizzato il medesimo modello greco della *Translatio Syriaca*. Ne consegue che lo stato testuale della versione di Abū Qurra doveva essere, almeno all'origine, ben diverso da quello che leggiamo oggi nell'unico codice Köprülü 1608 e che la sua trasmissione dovette aver seguito un cammino non molto dissimile da quello che ho cercato di tracciare per la traduzione araba di Ibn al-Ṭayyib.

3.4. Per la storia del testo e la trasmissione delle due versioni arabe

Detto questo, possiamo riprendere, tenendo conto degli elementi fin qui raccolti, le considerazioni di Kellermann-Rost appena esposte e cercare di ritoccare alcuni aspetti e integrarne altri che si riveleranno utili a ricomporre i rapporti interni fra le tre traduzioni fra loro e con il modello greco comune.

Abbiamo già visto che la traduzione siriana conferma che nel modello greco e quindi probabilmente anche nell'esemplare primitivo delle due versioni arabe le *DA* erano completate dalle medesime ricapitolazioni che leggiamo nella *Recensio Laertiana*. Il fatto che esse siano per lo più condensate sotto forma di formule stereotipe nel codice di Ibn al-Ṭayyib e assenti in quello di Abū Qurra, non dipende pertanto dall'utilizzazione di modelli greci diversi, ma dalle traversie della trasmissione di quei testi una volta tradotti in arabo.

Poiché la *DA* [10] manca nel codice sinaitico della *Translatio Syriaca* non possiamo esprimere una valutazione oggettiva degli argomenti di M. Kellermann-Rost relativi alla quadripartizione o tripartizione della divisione nel modello greco originario. Quello che possiamo semmai dire è che la riduzione (come d'altronde l'aggiunta) di un membro di una delle διαίρεσεις non ha valore probante in questo tipo di letteratura. Le *DA* sono testi aperti e come tali soggetti a continue mutazioni e variazioni. Nel caso della *DA* [10] è inoltre interessante notare che la *Recensio Laertiana* è la sola che presenta una divisione quadripartita della nobiltà; nelle altre tre *recensiones* trasmesse dai codici bizantini ritroviamo una tripartizione (διαίρεται ἡ εὐγένεια εἰς τρία) e un testo assai diversamente

formulato.³⁸ Poiché la struttura del testo nelle traduzioni arabe non si discosta da quello della *Recensio Laertiana*,³⁹ escluderei comunque che la tripartizione della εὐγένεια sia nata per una qualche forma di contaminazione (a un momento imprecisato della tradizione) tra il modello del *corpusculum* tradotto e una delle altre *recensiones* greche.

Piú significativo è invece un errore congiuntivo comune almeno alle due traduzioni arabe (la divisione manca di nuovo nella *Translatio Syriaca*). Il soggetto della *DA* [20] nella tradizione greca è la φιλανθρωπία ('socievolezza'): τῆς φιλανθρωπίας ἐστὶν εἶδη τρία ("Della socievolezza vi sono tre specie ...").⁴⁰ In entrambe le traduzioni arabe si legge invece "L'amicizia ha tre specie" (Abū Qurra) e "L'amicizia si suddivide in tre classi" (Ibn al-Ṭayyib), il che lascia presupporre che il modello greco avesse φίλια e non φιλανθρωπία. Una divisione dell'amicizia (φίλια) a questo punto non ha senso perché alla φίλια era già stata consacrata la *DA* [2]. Il fatto che in entrambe le traduzioni arabe il termine φίλια in questa divisione sia stato reso da con 'amore' e non con 'amicizia' non è un elemento dirimente. La presenza del presunto sostantivo φίλια invece di φιλανθρωπία nell'esemplare greco dei traduttori arabi (e probabilmente di quello siriano) della *DA* [20] si spiega con verisimiglianza supponendo che nel codice greco (se in maiuscola o già traslitterato in minuscola poco importa), modello della traduzioni, la parola φιλανθρωπία era scritta ricorrendo al compendio del *nomen sacrum* ἄνθρωπος e cioè φιλαν(θρωπ)ία e che risultando incomprensibile in questa forma (o per semplice distrazione) era stato corretto, interpretato o letto nella forma piú comune φίλια.⁴¹

Una volta ammessa l'unicità del modello greco delle traduzioni orientali, almeno per quanto riguarda le *DA*,⁴² restano da spiegare le innegabili divergenze testuali delle *DA* nelle due versioni arabe rispetto alla *Recensio Laertiana*.

Le considerazioni che ho appena esposto, e in particolare l'apporto che viene dalla *Translatio Syriaca*, consentono di ribadire che all'origine delle due traduzioni arabe non si deve postulare l'esistenza di modelli con redazioni diverse in greco o eventualmente in siriano, ma che siamo di fronte a una serie cospicua e continua di interventi, rimaneggiamenti o riscritture per lo piú volontari che si sono prodotti, a quanto pare in maniera perlopiú indipendente, nell'una o nell'altra versione nel lungo cammino della loro trasmissione.

³⁸ Dorandi, "Le *Divisiones quae dicuntur Aristoteleae*" (cit. n. 1), p. 19 (*Recensio Marciana*), p. 35 (*Recensio Florentina*) e p. 49 (*Recensio Leidensis*).

³⁹ Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 86 n. 10 e 112 n. 12.

⁴⁰ Le traduzioni italiane delle citazioni della *DA* nella *Recensio Laertiana*, sono, dove non indicato altrimenti, quelle di C. Rossitto, *Aristotele e altri autori. Divisioni. Testo greco a fronte*, Bompiani, Milano 2005². Si noti che Rossitto numera le *DA* seguendo l'ordine della *Recensio Marciana* che si distingue in piú punti da quello della *Recensio Laertiana* qui registrata. Vedi la sua tavola di concordanza alle pagine 51-2. Le traduzioni dei testi arabi riproducono quelle di I. Marjani (p. 22-39) che seguono nel presente articolo. Per la *Translatio Syriaca* cito quella inglese di Brock, "An Abbreviated Syriac Version" (cit. n. 14), riprodotta *infra*, p. 20-21.

⁴¹ Il fatto che Ibn al-Ṭayyib traduca "amicizia" lascia presumere che tale doveva essere anche la resa della *Translatio Syriaca* della *DA* [20] oggi perduta. Abū Qurra e il traduttore siriano caddero indipendentemente nella stessa "mélecture" della parola di φιλανθρωπία scritta appunto con il compendio del *nomen sacrum*.

⁴² Per il *De Virtutibus et vitiis* si tenga conto, per il momento, degli errori comuni rilevati da Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 26-9. Una valutazione piú precisa di tutto il materiale sarà disponibile quando saranno concluse le ricerche di Eleuteri con l'aiuto dell'orientalista di Berlino A. Pirtea. Vedi Eleuteri, "I manoscritti dell'opera pseudo-aristotelica *De virtute*" (cit. n. 6), p. 73-4 n. 8.

La *Translatio Syriaca* lascia intravedere un modello greco che non differiva (almeno nelle parti conservate), se non in pochi dettagli, da quello della *Recensio Laertiana*. L'anonimo traduttore siriano aveva reso questo testo in maniera assai fedele, rispettoso della sua forma e della sua struttura. Su questa versione, Ibn al-Ṭayyib aveva esemplato la sua traduzione che, almeno nella fase originaria, non doveva verosimilmente discostarsi molto da quella siriana, e doveva presentare eventualmente solo qualche ritocco formale o contenutistico. Quali, è impossibile oggi determinare. Abū Qurra, se risaliva direttamente al greco, era apparentemente, anche lui, restato aderente al testo del suo modello o l'aveva al massimo ritoccato qua e là con interventi che è impossibile, ancora una volta, definire.

Il lasso di tempo trascorso fra la confezione della traduzione araba di Abū Qurra (tra VIII e IX secolo) e quella di Ibn al-Ṭayyib (durante il secolo X-XI) e la copia dei due soli codici che le tramandano (quello di Abū Qurra nel XVI sec.; quello di Ibn al-Ṭayyib verso la metà del XIII sec., forse nel 1259/1260) è abbastanza ampio da ammettere molteplici interventi diacronici di ogni genere, anche massicci.

Questa realtà appare ancora più palese nella traduzione di Abū Qurra, il cui unico esemplare dista quasi otto secoli dal modello originale. Un esempio concreto di tali manipolazioni è qui evidente nell'omissione sistematica delle ricapitolazioni finali delle *DA* e accanto a questa nella perdita, che riterrei accidentale, delle *DA* [7], [12], [19], [25]-[26], [29]-[32]. Le ricapitolazioni presenti nella *Translatio Syriaca*, nelle *DA* [1] e [10] di Ibn al-Ṭayyib e presupposte per le restanti, erano di sicuro nel modello greco.

Per quanto riguarda le nove *DA* mancanti appena elencate, anch'esse dovevano essere nell'originale greco utilizzato da Abū Qurra, visto che almeno la *DA* [29] si legge ancora nei resti della *Translatio Syriaca* e che Ibn al-Ṭayyib le aveva tutte tradotte. Una spiegazione differente sarebbe troppo macchinosa. Abū Qurra avrebbe di sua propria volontà deciso di non tradurle (e in questo caso per quali ragioni?) oppure sarebbero mancate già (perché perdute o ancora una volta per ommissione volontaria) nel suo modello che si era corrotto o era stato modificato (dopo la traduzione in siriano?). Questo porterebbe di conseguenza, visto che l'esemplare greco era con tutta probabilità il medesimo, a supporre che la *Translatio Syriaca* – finora non datata – precedesse quella di Abū Qurra. Il che se è a priori possibile, non è provato e, se anche lo fosse, non sarebbe da solo una *condicio sine qua non*.

Un esempio interessante a riprova delle continue riscritture e riadattamenti del testo di almeno certe *DA* è infine offerto da un passo del trattato *Taḍhīb al-ahlāq wa taḥīr al-a'rāq* (*Il raffinamento del carattere o La purezza delle disposizioni*) di Abū 'Alī Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Ya'qūb Miskawayh († 1030) richiamato all'attenzione per la prima volta da Heffening⁴³

Miskawayh si ispira qui largamente alla *DA* [4] (*La giustizia, δικαιοσύνη*) che egli cita senza esitazione col nome di Aristotele in una redazione che si distingue in più punti dalle due traduzioni arabe conosciute e ancor più dal modello greco.

⁴³ W. Heffening, "Zum Aufbau der islamischen Rechtswerke", in W. Heffening - W. Kirfel (Hrsg.), *Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des nahen und fernen Ostens Paul Kable zum 60. Geburtstag überreicht von Freunden und Schülern aus dem Kreise des orientalischen Seminars der Universität Bonn*, Brill, Leiden 1935, p. 101-18, p. 107-8. Il trattato è stato in seguito edito e tradotto in due volumi distinti da C.K. Zurayk, *Miskawayh. The Refinement of Character*, American University of Beirut Centennial Publications, Beirut 1966. Il testo è tradotto in francese anche da M. Arkoun, *Traité d'éthique. Taḍhīb al-ahlāq wa taḥīr al-a'rāq*, Vrin, Paris 2010² (1967¹).

Per dare un'idea piú chiara della situazione, cito su quattro colonne le due traduzioni arabe della *DA* [4] di Abū Qurra e di Ibn al-Ṭayyib, il passo di Miskawayh (IV 7), nella traduzione di Zurayk,⁴⁴ e infine la medesima *DA* [4] nella traduzione di Rossitto:

Abū Qurra	Ibn al-Ṭayyib	Ibn Miskawayh	<i>DA</i> [4]
Le specie di giustizia che è necessario da parte nostra praticare sono tre: verso Dio, verso le persone e verso i defunti e i trapassati. La cura delle tradizioni e delle leggi e la loro conservazione, il servizio delle moschee, delle chiese e dei luoghi di preghiera fanno parte della giustizia che pratichiamo verso Dio. Il saldo dei debiti e la restituzione dei depositi fanno parte della giustizia che pratichiamo verso le persone. Quanto allo scavo delle tombe e al seppellimento dei morti, essi fanno parte della giustizia che pratichiamo verso chi di noi è trapassato e morto.	La giustizia si suddivide in tre specie: la giustizia verso Dio, eccelso è il Suo nome; la giustizia verso gli antenati, con la quale operano coloro che portano offerte ai defunti secondo la loro legge e le loro usanze e si dedicano al servizio dei templi rende evidente che mirano a Dio, eccelso è il Suo nome, con il loro atto di giustizia; così anche quelli che pagano i debiti e quelli che restituiscono ciò che è stato loro affidato mirano con questo alla giustizia verso la gente, e quelli che sono occupati nel servire i cimiteri, le tombe e i morti, è risaputo con ciò che intendono praticare la giustizia verso i loro predecessori. Ne consegue che le specie di giustizia sono le tre menzionate sopra.	Resuming our discussion of justice, we say: Aristotle divided justice into three categories. The first is what people perform towards God, the Lord of the universe. It consists in one conducting himself towards the Creator (mighty and exalted is He!) in the right way, according to his obligations to Him, and in the measure of his capacity. For, since justice consists indeed in giving to the right person what ought to be given in the right way, it would be inconceivable that men should not owe God (exalted is He!) who granted us all these immense goods, an obligation which they should fulfill. The second is what people perform, one towards another, such as the payment of what is due to others, the honoring of chiefs, the discharge of trusts, and fairness in transactions. The third is the discharge of obligations towards ancestors, such as the payment of their debts, the execution of their wills, and the like. This is what Aristotle said.	Della giustizia poi vi sono tre specie: l'una, di essa, è infatti nei confronti degli dèi, l'altra dei vivi, l'altra ancora dei defunti. Coloro che fanno sacrifici secondo le leggi e si prendono cura dei templi evidentemente sono pii nei confronti degli dèi; coloro che restituiscono i prestiti e i pegni si comportano in maniera giusta nei confronti degli uomini; coloro che si prendono cura delle tombe evidentemente si comportano in maniera giusta nei confronti dei defunti. Della giustizia dunque, l'una è nei confronti degli dèi, l'altra dei vivi, l'altra ancora dei defunti.


È assai probabile che Miskawayh abbia recuperato quella *DA* da un esemplare di una delle due traduzioni arabe, ma la riscrittura che egli ne fece rende impossibile di stabilire da quale delle due.

⁴⁴ Zurayk, *Miskawayh. The Refinement of Character* (cit. n. 42), p. 106. Arkoun, *Traité d'éthique* (cit. n. 42), p. 186-7 traduce: "Aristote distingue trois sortes de justice: 1° [Celle] dont les hommes s'acquittent envers le seigneur des mondes et qui consiste, pour chacun, à observer dans toutes ses relations avec le Créateur ce qu'il faut, conformément à l'obligation qui pèse sur lui e dans la mesure de son possible. (...) 2° [Celle] dont les hommes s'acquittent les uns envers les autres en respectant leurs droits [mutuels], en rendant les honneurs aux grands, en restituant les dépôts, en se montrant intègres dans les transactions. 3° [Celle] qui consiste à faire face aux obligations vers les [parents] défunts, en payant par exemple, leurs dettes, en exécutant leurs dispositions testamentaires, etc. Ainsi a parlé Aristote".


La conoscenza delle *DA* da parte di Miskawayh è ulteriormente provata da altre coincidenze nel medesimo trattato *Il raffinamento del carattere o La purezza delle disposizioni* con la seconda sezione del compendio di etica “aristotelica” che contiene appunto anche le divisioni.⁴⁵

3.5. Ritorno ai rapporti ‘stemmatici’ delle recensioni delle *DA*

A partire da questi risultati è possibile integrare con i nuovi elementi delle traduzioni in lingue orientali il ramo della *Recensio Laertiana* nello schema che rendeva conto dei rapporti dell’insieme delle quattro *recensiones* greche indipendenti delle *DA* quale avevo precedentemente tracciato.⁴⁶



In maniera alternativa, lo schema potrebbe essere così tracciato:



⁴⁵ Vedi Cacours, “Le traité pseudo-aristotelicien *De virtutibus et vitiis*” (cit. n. 13).

⁴⁶ Dorandi, “Le *Divisiones quae dicuntur Aristoteleae*” (cit. n. 1), p. 12. Con α viene indicato il modello perduto della *Recensio Laertiana* (= DL). Σ indica la *Translatio Syriaca*; Sin il codice Sinai Syr. 14 (X sec.); Ar^Q la *Translatio Araba* di Abū Qurra, Ar^T la *Translatio Araba* di Ibn al-Ṭayyib. Le date sono talora indefinite.

4. Quale apporto delle traduzioni in lingue orientali alla constitutio textus della Recensio Laertiana?

Non resta che affrontare la questione spinosa dell'apporto che dalle versioni orientali può venire alla *constitutio textus*, in diversi punti ancora incerta, della *Recensio Laertiana*.

Fin da ora, posso affermare che i risultati sono deludenti. La *Translatio Syriaca* esemplata sul greco era assai fedele al suo modello e quindi avrebbe potuto risultare di grande interesse per gli ellenisti, ma nelle scarse porzioni che se ne conservano non si rilevano varianti testuali significative rispetto a quelle dei codici greci di Diogene Laerzio. Ancora meno ricaviamo dalle due traduzioni arabe, perché nello stato attuale di conservazione esse sono troppo contaminate e interpolate per determinare quale sia stata la loro forma testuale originaria che doveva riflettersi nelle redazioni iniziali di Abū Qurra e di Ibn al-Ṭayyib.

Qualche piccolo progresso non sembra tuttavia mancare. All'inizio della *DA* [16], nell'elenco delle quattro divisioni, la traduzione siriana "That a person should say the things that are right ... and that he should speak", lascia intravedere un testo greco τὸ ἄ δεῖ λέγειν ... τὸ ἄ δεῖ λέγειν, invece di ἐν μὲν ἄ δεῖ λέγειν ... ἐν δὲ ὅσα λέγειν. Questa lettura rivaluterebbe una congettura che Mutschmann propose in apparato per rendere il testo conforme a quanto leggiamo nel seguito della divisione.⁴⁷

Nella *DA* [17], le parole "A person brings benefit" e "to him compassionately" della traduzione siriana mancano in greco. Il testo di Diogene Laerzio (§ 95, 1042-3) qui non è esente da dubbi soprattutto alla fine del passo in questione: τοῖς μὲν οὖν χρήμασιν, ὅταν δεομένῳ παραβοηθήσῃ (BP: βοηθήσῃ F) τις εἰς χρημάτων λόγον εὐπορήσῃ (εὐπορήσῃ F). Wendland⁴⁸ considerò dubbie le parole εἰς χρημάτων λόγον εὐπορήσῃ "εἰς χρημάτων λόγον et εἰς τὸ εὐπορήσῃ *olim varias recensiones fuisse cense(o)*". Richards⁴⁹ propose di integrare <ὡς> εἰς (lo segue Marcovich), mentre I. Casaubon aveva suggerito la correzione εὐπορήσας. Nella mia edizione ho stampato il testo sopra citato, che intenderei, ispirandomi alla traduzione latina di Cobet:⁵⁰ "(Si benefica) dunque con le ricchezze quando qualcuno porta aiuto a chi ha bisogno di essere sollevato dalla miseria". Rossitto traduce:⁵¹ "(Si benefica) con le ricchezze, dunque, qualora qualcuno porti soccorso a colui che ha bisogno di essere rifornito in termini di ricchezze". È difficile dire se il traduttore siriano (messa da parte l'aggiunta "to him compassionately") avesse davanti un testo greco diverso da quello di cui disponiamo oppure se non cercasse di dare un senso a una frase un po' ostica traducendola con una qualche libertà. La traduzione siriana nel suo insieme "A person brings benefit by money, then, when he helps a person who is in need of money, and he extends [it] to him compassionately" (in particolare le parole "and he extends [it] to him compassionately"), esclude comunque l'ipotesi di Wendland della doppia redazione.

In altri casi, le versioni orientali, e in particolare la *Translatio Syriaca*, sembrano confermare lo stato testuale della *Recensio Laertiana*, quale trasmesso dal subarchetipo Ω, capostipite della tradizione dei *codices integri antiquiores* (BPF) delle *Vite dei filosofi* di Diogene Laerzio.⁵²

⁴⁷ Vedi Mutschmann, *Divisiones quae dicuntur Aristoteleae* (cit. n. 16), p. 21.

⁴⁸ *Apud* Mutschmann, *Divisiones quae dicuntur Aristoteleae* (cit. n. 16), p. 22.

⁴⁹ H. Richards, "Laertiana", *The Classical Review* 18 (1904), p. 341.

⁵⁰ "Pecuniis quidem beneficium constat, quum quis egenos, ut inopia liberentur, pecuniis iuvat". Cobet sceglie βοηθήσῃ di F (*Laurent.* 69.13, XIII sec.), una lezione che non influisce sul senso generale della frase.

⁵¹ Rossitto, *Aristotele e altri. Divisioni* (cit. n. 40), p. 175.

⁵² La sezione delle *DA* manca nell'altro ramo della tradizione che risale a Φ (Vaticanus gr. 96, prima del 1152). Vedi

Un esempio interessante è ancora nella *DA* [16] τὸ ὀρθῶς λέγειν (“Il dire rettamente”). Nei codici greci della *Recensio Laertiana* (BPF), la terza divisione relativa al πρὸς οὓς δεῖ λέγειν (“a chi bisogna dire”) è così trasmessa (DL III 95):

<p>τὸ δὲ πρὸς οὓς δεῖ λέγειν, ἂν τε πρὸς πρεσβυτέρους ἀμαρτάνοντας διαλέγη, ἀρμόττοντας δεῖ τοὺς λόγους διαλέγεσθαι ὡς πρεσβυτέροις· ἂν τε πρὸς νεωτέρους, ἀρμόττοντας δεῖ <δια>λέγεσθαι (Cobet: λέγεσθαι codd.) ὡς νεωτέροις.</p>	<p>L’ “a chi bisogna dire”, poi (consiste in questo:): se (uno) parla ai piú anziani deve fare discorsi che si addicono ai piú anziani che errano; e se parla ai piú giovani deve fare i discorsi che si addicono ai piú giovani.</p>
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Nella *Translatio Syriaca* leggiamo:

A person speaks to those that it is right to speak to when he says to the elderly what needs to be said to elders who are doing wrong, and [when] a person says to young people what needs to be said to young men when they sin.

“Who are doing wrong” corrisponde senza dubbio al greco ἀμαρτάνοντας. Alla fine, “when they sin” lascerebbe tuttavia presumere che il participio ἀμαρτάνοντας fosse ripetuto accordato questa volta con πρὸς νεωτέρους. La frase appare ridondante e non escludo pertanto che il traduttore siriano abbia lui stesso aggiunto le parole “when they sin” indipendentemente dalla presenza del presunto participio nel modello greco per controbilanciare l’effetto della versione e forse perché i giovani ancora piú dei vecchi appaiono soggetti a errore.

Per quanto riguarda le traduzioni arabe, la situazione è molto meno chiara a causa delle incertezze della tradizione e delle difficoltà testuali.

La versione di Abū Qurra è corrotta e lacunosa in questo punto:⁵³

Dire ciò che serve è come quando [...] consideriamo che un uomo tenga il suo discorso correttamente, nella posizione di un anziano, mentre lo considereremmo errato se si trovasse nella posizione dei giovani.

Le parole “mentre lo considereremmo errato” potrebbero far presupporre la presenza del participio ἀμαρτάνοντας, ma la lacuna e l’incertezza del contesto invitano alla prudenza.

Ibn al-Ṭayyib traduce in maniera succinta:

“A chi serve” vuol dire parlare con i virtuosi di ciò che si addice a loro e con gli ignoranti e bambini di ciò che si addice a loro.

Se “con i virtuosi” può forse corrispondere al greco πρὸς πρεσβυτέρους, quello che segue “e con gli ignoranti e bambini con ciò che si addice loro” lascia perplessi.⁵⁴ Si ha l’impressione che il

Dorandi, *Diogenes Laertius* (cit. n. 2), p. 21-31. Le differenze che la *Translatio Syriaca* e soprattutto le due *Translationes Arabae* presentano rispetto al presunto modello greco che è da presumere a monte, saranno registrate nelle mie note alla traduzione delle tre versioni.

⁵³ Vedi la nota di Marjani *ad loc.*, p. 27 n. 69.

⁵⁴ Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 89 traduce “und die Dummen” invece che “e con gli ignoranti” e ritiene (*ibid.* n. 6-6) queste parole un “Zusatz im Arabischen”. Vedi *infra*, la mia nota *ad loc.*, p. 45.

participio greco ἀμαρτάνοντας non sia stato preso in considerazione; a meno che non si celi nelle parole “con gli ignoranti”.

Nella *Recensio Laertiana*, il participio ἀμαρτάνοντας (riferito ai πρεσβυτέρους) venne soppresso da Ménage supponendo che si trattasse di una dittografia di ἀρμόττοντας che segue. E questa sembra la soluzione migliore, seguita dagli editori di Diogene Laerzio.⁵⁵ Il participio è conservato, se ho ben visto, solo nell'edizione delle *Divisiones* di Mutschmann.

Per il resto, ho preferito non tenere in conto di quei casi in cui i traduttori arabi omettono parole o frasi, in base al principio per cui la loro origine può essere imputata a atto volontario, pur non mancando esempi sicuri di omissioni dovute a semplici errori meccanici.

Così nella *DA* [4] nella traduzione di Ibn al-Ṭayyib:

La giustizia si suddivide in tre specie: nella giustizia verso Dio, eccelso è il Suo nome; la giustizia verso gli antenati.

Dopo il secondo “verso” che precede ora “gli antenati” è senza dubbio caduto il secondo elemento della divisione che diviene così bipartita invece che tripartita. Manca qui qualcosa come “verso la gente (che corrisponde a ἐν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους)”. Che nel modello (sicuramente in quello greco, ma forse anche nel siriano) ci fosse qualcosa di simile appare provato dal seguito della divisione (“mirano con questo alla giustizia verso la gente”) e dal confronto con le prime linee della traduzione di Abū Qurra: “Le specie di giustizia ... verso Dio, verso le persone e verso i defunti e i trapassati”.

Per le stesse ragioni, non ho preso in conto nemmeno i casi nei quali, nelle liste che presentano l'elenco delle suddivisioni di un concetto, troviamo inversioni nella successione dei membri rispetto a quanto segue. Anche qui la possibilità di interventi volontari è spesso la spiegazione più semplice e economica.

Se le tre traduzioni orientali (quella siriana, a dire il vero, assai limitata) non hanno quasi in niente migliorato lo stato testuale greco della *Recensio Laertiana* delle *DA*, forse diverso sarà l'apporto delle medesime alla *constitutio textus* del *De Virtutibus et vitiis*, per il quale la *Translatio Syriaca* potrà rivelarsi più consistente e più ricca di risultati appetitosi.⁵⁶

5. Una tradizione islamizzata delle *DA*?

È lecito, a questo punto, domandarci: come possiamo caratterizzare le traduzioni in lingue orientali del *corpusculum* delle *DA* e, più in particolare, quelle in lingua araba, almeno nelle redazioni di cui disponiamo?

Se l'apporto di queste tre traduzioni alla *constitutio textus* relativamente alle *DA* è estremamente limitato, ci sono altri elementi che fanno dell'operazione di diffusione in lingue orientali dell'intero compendio di etica “aristotelica”, che include le *DA*, un momento culturale significativo e importante. Grazie a queste traduzioni, abbiamo infatti una prova concreta della recezione dell'insieme di quei testi nel mondo siriano e arabo. Per quanto riguarda le *DA*, viene altresì provata

⁵⁵ D.W. Triller, *Observationum criticarum in varios Graecos et Latinos auctores libri quattuor*, ap. F. Warrentrapp, Francofurti ad Moenum 1742, p. 93-4 lo corresse in un insoddisfacente in ἀμαρτῆ ὄντας, che intendeva nel senso di “una congregatos”.

⁵⁶ A questa impresa, resa ancora più difficile dall'imponente massa di testimoni manoscritti dell'opuscolo (non solo greci, ma anche in armeno e in latino) e dalla sua complicata tradizione indiretta, lavorano Eleuteri e Pirtea (vedi Eleuteri, “I manoscritti dell'opera pseudo-aristotelica *De virtute*” [cit. n. 6]).

l'importanza che in quegli ambienti assunse l'applicazione e l'utilizzazione del metodo diairetico allo studio della filosofia.

La "citazione" della *DA* [4] di Miskawayh sopra discussa (p. 13-14) è solo un esempio isolato dell'utilizzazione nel mondo arabo delle due traduzioni di quel testo. È probabile che la presenza del *corpusculum* delle *DA*, letto nell'una o nell'altra traduzione, fosse molto più vasta e capillare e una ricerca approfondita meriterebbe di essere condotta dopo l'indagine pionieristica di Heffening che aveva già segnalato tracce di 'citazioni' della medesima *DA* [4] in altri trattati di etica arabi dove questa viene attribuita a Aristotele o a "un antico sapiente" oppure lasciata anonima.⁵⁷

Un altro esempio significativo è possibile aggiungere dal trattato anonimo pseudo-platonico intitolato *Sulla sussistenza delle virtù dell'anima*, che mostra consistenti punti in comune con lo scritto di Miskawayh.⁵⁸ Alla fine del § 2 viene riferita una divisione della virtù in quattro specie:⁵⁹

Indessen gaben alle Pythagoreer – einer von ihnen ist der angesehene Sokrates – zusammen mit dem erfahrenen Platon, bei welchem Aristoteles in die Schule ging, vielmehr die Definition, daß die Tugend und die Glückseligkeit allein in der Seele seien. Daher definierten sie, daß alle Tugenden in vier Arten (zerfallen): die eine wird Weisheit genannt; ihre Grundlage ist der Verstand. Die zweite wird Enthaltbarkeit genannt; ihre Grundlage ist die Begierde. Die dritte wird Vermögen genannt; ihre Grundlage ist der Zorn. Die vierte wird Gerechtigkeit genannt; ihre Grundlage liegt im Ebenmaß der Seelenvermögen – dieser drei (oben erwähnten) – und in der Hingabe der Begierde und des Zornes an das Denken und ihrem Gehorsam ihm gegenüber.

La divisione corrisponde alla *DA* [2] (*La virtù, ἡ ἀρετή*) della *Recensio Marciana* (= *DA* [13] della *Recensio Laertiana*, con un testo affatto diverso).⁶⁰ Se ne distingue solo nella presentazione delle quattro specie della virtù che nella traduzione araba (e forse già nel suo modello greco o almeno siriano) sono invertite (saggezza, temperanza, coraggio, giustizia) rispetto alla tradizione dei codici bizantini (saggezza, giustizia, coraggio, temperanza):⁶¹

⁵⁷ Un primo e embrionale tentativo è quello di Heffening, "Zum Aufbau der islamischen Rechtswerke" (cit. n. 43), p. 107-8. Aggiunte importanti in Sh. Pines, "Un texte inconnu d'Aristote en version arabe" (cit. n. 11), p. 5-43 e Id. "Addenda et Corrigenda" *Archives d'Histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 32 (1957), p. 295-9 (= *The Collected Work of Shlomo Pines*, cit. n. 11), p. [157]-[195] e [196]-[200]) e in Cacouros, "La divisions des biens dans le *compendium* d'éthique par Abū Qurra et Ibn al-Ṭayyib" (cit. n. 13), p. 289-318, i cui risultati sono sintetizzati e aggiornati da Cacouros nell'articolo "Le traité pseudo-aristotelicien *De virtutibus et vitiis*" (cit. n. 13), p. 506-46 (part. p. 511-3 e 538-42). Contiene elementi rilevanti per le questioni qui discusse anche H. Daiber, "Ein bisher unbekannter pseudoplatonischer Text über die Tugenden der Seele in arabischer Überlieferung", *Der Islam* 47 (1991), p. 25-42 con gli *addenda et corrigenda* pubblicati nella medesima rivista 49 (1992), p. 122-3. Daiber segnala altre tracce significative di una lettura delle versioni delle *DA* nel trattato anonimo pseudo-platonico trasmesso in una traduzione araba (attraverso un intermediario siriano) intitolato *Maqāla fī iḥbāt faḍā'il al-naḥs* (*Sulla sussistenza delle virtù dell'anima*). Un paio di esempi tratti da questo scritto riporto di seguito. Ulteriori integrazioni nell'articolo di M. Zonta, "Iwānnīs of Dārā On Soul's Virtues. About a Late Antiquity Greek Philosophical Work among Syrians and Arabs", *Studia graeco-arabica* 5 (2015), p. 129-43.

⁵⁸ Segnalati da Daiber, "Pseudoplatonischer Text" (cit. n. 57), p. 28, 35, 37-39, 41.

⁵⁹ Cito la traduzione di Daiber, "Pseudoplatonischer Text" (cit. n. 57), p. 33, fondata sul testo da lui edito, p. 30.

⁶⁰ Daiber, "Pseudoplatonischer Text" (cit. n. 57), p. 38-39.

⁶¹ Il testo greco è quello di Dorandi, "Le *Divisiones quae dicuntur Aristoteleae*" (cit. n. 1), p. 18.

<p>διαίρεται ἡ ἀρετὴ εἰς τέσσαρα· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐν μὲν φρόνησις, ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνη, ἐν δὲ ἀνδρεία, ἐν δὲ σωφροσύνη. ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν φρόνησις ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις τοῖς μέρεσι γίνεται, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία ἐν τῷ θυμικῷ, ἡ δὲ σωφροσύνη ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ.</p>	<p>La virtù si divide in quattro [specie]: di essa, infatti, una [specie] è saggezza, una è giustizia, una è coraggio ed una è temperanza. La saggezza risiede nella parte razionale [dell'anima], la giustizia si genera in tutte queste parti, il coraggio nella parte irascibile e la temperanza nella parte appetitiva.</p>
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Poiché nel medesimo trattato pseudo-platonico sono evidenti anche altri elementi che richiamano da vicino lo pseudo-aristotelico *De Virtutibus et vitiis* e una utilizzazione anche delle *DA* nella redazione della *Recensio Laertiana* ne possiamo inferire che l'anonimo redattore greco del modello da cui deriva il testo arabo *Sulla sussistenza delle virtù dell'anima* avesse avuto presente anche il compendio di etica peripatetica tradotto da Abū Qurra e Ibn al-Ṭayyib e che fosse autore di una probabile interpolazione fra le due recensioni delle *DA*.

Heffening⁶² era giunto all'interessante conclusione che era esistita una tradizione islamizzata delle *DA* parallela a quella 'cristianizzata' della *Recensio Marciana*:

nach den für die drei Punkte angeführten Beispielen scheint es sich um eine bisher unbekannte islamisierte Überlieferung der *Divisiones* zu handeln (änlich der christianisierten im Codex Marcianus), aus der die islamischen Schriftsteller schöpften.

I risultati fin qui raggiunti confermano l'intuizione di Heffening. Nel mondo arabo circolò una recensione islamizzata delle *DA* che si presentava sotto forma di riscritture spesso autonome, che trovavano la loro origine lontana, ma concreta e tangibile, nelle due (o in una delle due) traduzioni di Abū Qurra e di Ibn al-Ṭayyib.⁶³

La nascita della "islamisierte Überlieferung" si situa in momenti e ambienti diversi e trova il punto di partenza nelle due traduzioni arabe da Abū Qurra e di Ibn al-Ṭayyib sempre piú liberamente riscritte e riadattate e sempre piú lontane dal loro modello greco. Di questa tradizione che si era formata piú o meno lentamente nel corso dei secoli per addizioni, sottrazioni e contaminazioni successive, e che chiamerei *Recensio Araba* (o meglio *Recensiones Arabae* viste le differenze anche notevoli fra le due versioni finora conservate di Abū Qurra e di Ibn al-Ṭayyib), conserviamo oggi il risultato cristallizzato nei due codici di Istanbul e di Berlino.

Questo è quanto è possibile dedurre dai dati di cui disponiamo oggi, e si tratta, lo ripeto, di risultati aperti. L'eventuale scoperta di nuovo materiale manoscritto (greco, siriano o arabo) potrà apportare ulteriori modifiche alla ricostruzione del processo di stratificazione delle *Recensiones Arabae* attraverso l'opera di riscrittura e di riadattamento del testo e dei contenuti delle traduzioni delle *DA*.

⁶² Heffening, "Zum Aufbau der islamischen Rechtswerke" (cit. n. 43), p. 108 n. 1, da cui la citazione che segue.

⁶³ Là dove ho forti dubbi è invece sulla individuazione nella *Recensio Marciana* di una tradizione cristianizzata. Ci sono in questa, come nella *Recensio Florentina* e nella *Recensio Leidensis*, tracce tangibili di interpolazioni e ritocchi di mano di cristiani, ma non tali da giustificare da soli l'appellativo di "tradizione cristianizzata". Un esempio significativo in tutte e quattro le recensioni di un intervento "cristianizzante" è nella *DA* [10] (εὐγένεια). Qui la presenza del nome proprio Νεῖλος accanto a quello di Senofonte (τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ σπουδαίων καὶ δικαίων, οἷον ἀπὸ Ξενοφῶντος καὶ Νείλου καὶ τῶν τοιούτων, "un altro [tipo di nobiltà] è l'esserlo da onesti e giusti, per esempio da Senofonte e da Nilo e simili"), è stata a piú riprese, dopo V. Rose, *Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus*, Teubner, Lipsiae 1863, p. 678 e Mutschmann, *Divisiones quae dicuntur Aristoteleae* (cit. n. 16), p. XXXIII, intesa come una interpolazione di un cristiano che aveva rimpiazzato il nome del figlio di Senofonte, Grillo (Γρύλλος), con quello di San Nilo. Vedi Rossitto, *Aristotele e altri. Divisioni* (cit. n. 40), p. 282-3.

[12] The soul is divided into three parts; for part of it is deliberation, part of it is the desiring, and part of it is the irascible. Of these, therefore, deliberation is the cause of counsel and thought and reflection, and of all such things. The desirous part is [the cause of] desire for foods, and of cohabitation, and other such things. And from the irascible [part], too, [comes] the cause of courage and enjoyment and grief and anger. So then, part of the soul is deliberative, part desiring, and part irascible.

[13] Also, of perfect excellence there are four kinds: one, sagacity, another justice, the third, strength, the fourth, temperance. Of these, then, sagacity is the cause for the correct use (made) of affairs, justice is the cause for a person being righteous in all his business dealings, and fortitude, again, is the cause for a person's not turning his back in danger and in fearsome affairs. Temperance, again, is the cause for a person's holding himself [back] from lusts and not ministering to them at all, but being alive in a discreet way. Therefore part of excellence is sagacity, and part of it justice, and part of it fortitude, and part of it temperance.

[16] That a person should speak correctly is divided into four kinds; that is, that a person should say the things that are right, and say all that is right; and that he should speak directed towards the people that he should be; and fourthly, that he should speak when it is right. Things that it is right that they should be spoken are: when they benefit the person who speaks <and> all who have heard. As much as it is right to say, is when a person says neither more nor less than what is sufficient. A person speaks to those that it is right to speak to when he says to the elderly what needs to be said to elders who are doing wrong, and [when] a person says to young people what needs to be said to young men when they sin. A person correctly speaks when it is right, when a person speaks neither before nor after the needful time nor after [that] time. And if he does not [do so] he is doing wrong and does not speak correctly.

[17] Benefit, too, is divided into four kinds. For either by money someone brings benefit, or by [means of] the body or by knowledge, or by words. A person brings benefit by money, then, when he helps a person who is in need of money, and he extends [it] to him compassionately. And people benefit others by [means of] the body when they turn up for them when they are being wronged by someone, and they are for them a [source of] assistance. Now those who educate and those who heal, and those who teach something good, all these benefit by [means of] knowledge. One person benefits another in word, when they enter a law court and a person speaks on behalf of his companion, and helps him by means of a discreet word: such a person assists by word. So, [part] of benefit occurs through money, part through the body, part through knowledge, and part through speech.

[29] Counsel is divided into three, for part of it belongs to times that have passed, part of it to present times, and part again to future times. From times that have passed, therefore, counsel is taken as though by means of demonstration, as (when) someone should say, 'Thus did it happen to the Lacedaemonians, who held others to be true'. From present times [counsel] is taken in short, as when someone counsels and says, 'The wall is weak, but the populace are many, and the food is scarce'. And again, from future times counsel is taken, as for example, from a supposition, as [when] someone should say, 'It is not right for us to do wrong to the ambassadors lest our country be reviled'. So, part of counsel belongs to times that have passed, part from those present, and part from those to come.

7. Testo e traduzione della versione di Abū Qurra⁶⁵

[1] وقد نرى من الخيرات في النفس ومنها في الجسد ومنها خارجه بائنة منها فالعدل واللب والصلاية والعفة هن من خيرات النفس فأما الحسن والصحة والبراعة والقدر فمن خيرات الجسد فأما جمع الإخوان وخصب البلدان وكثرة اليسار فمن الخيرات الخارجة عن النفس والبدن جميعا.

[2] للمحبة أنواع ثلاثة منها كيانية ومنها خدنية ومنها أجنبية فالكيانية حب الآباء والأبناء والقربة بعضهم بعضا وذلك موجود في الحيوان وأما الخدنية فالتى تكون من الألفة والمجاورة كحب بلاديوس لاريسطيس والأجنبية كالتى تكون عند المصافحة والمواجهة وفي المكاتبه والمواصله وقد زاد ناس نوعا رابعا وهي المحبة العشقيه.

[3] لسنن المدينة أنواع خمسة منها سياسة العامة ومنها ولاية الأشراف ومنها ولاية الصعاليك ومنها إرث الملك ومنها ولاية القهر فأما ولاية العامة فكالوالي العظيم الذي يولي الولاة ويسن السنن وأما ولاية الأشراف فليس ولاية الأغنياء ولا الفقراء ولا إمارة الأشراف بل إمارة ذوي الفضل على أهل المدن وأما ولاية الصعاليك فالتى تشتري بالثمن وأما توارث الملك فعلى وجهين منه بالسنة ومنه بالحسب فملوك القيليعدونية إنما ملكهم على سنة بلادهم يتوارثونه الأبناء بعد الآباء لأنه لا يتبايعونه كتبايع غيرهم من ملوك الأعاجم ملكهم بينهم وأما ملوك اللقادونية فإما يتوارثونه أهل الأحساب وذوا البيوتات وأما ولاية الجبر فهي المأخوذة بالقهر وذلك إما بغتة وإما خديعة.

[4] أنواع العدل الواجب علينا فعلها ثلاثة لله وللناس ولمن مات منا ومضى فالعناية بالسنن والشرائع والمحافظة عليها وخدمة المساجد والبيع ومواضع الصلوات من العدل المفعول منا لله وأما قضاء الديون وردّ الودائع فهو من العدل المفعول منا للناس وأما حفر القبر ودفن الموتى فهو من العدل المفعول منا لمن مضى وهلك.

[5] للعلم أنواع ثلاثة منه صانع ومنه فاعل ومنه عالم فأما العلم الصانع فكالناجر والصانع الموجود فعله عينا قائما بعد فراغه منه وأما العلم العالم فكالنجوم والمساحة ومعرفة الفضائل والمنطق فليس يتولد من هذا العلم غير قائم كالعلم الصانع ولا يبطل ما يتولد منه كالعالم الفاعل ولكنه يقيم في نفسه العالم تعلم ما يريد منه وأما العلم الفاعل فكالمتغني والزامر اللذين لا يبقى فعلهما بعد فراغهما شيء.

[6] للطب أنواع خمسة منه بالعقاقير ومنه بالبط ومنه بالغذاء ومنه بالعلامات ومنه بالمسئلة فطب المسئلة يكون لمعونة المريض للمتطبب وصدق قوله وطب العلامات شفاء الأوجاع بالدلالات الغامضة من المواضع المحتقنة التى لا يعرفها المريض وإذا أراد أن يخبر بها.

⁶⁵ A differenza di M. Kellermann, seguendo la cronologia dei due autori, la traduzione di Abū Qurra è presentata prima di quella di Ibn al-Ṭayyib. Viene riprodotto il testo della Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 32, 4-38, 15. La traduzione italiana e le note alla traduzione sono di I. Marjani.

[1] Vediamo che fra i beni ci sono quelli che si trovano nell'anima, quelli che si trovano nel corpo e quelli che sono esterni e diversi da questi. La giustizia, l'amore, la tenacia e la moderazione appartengono ai beni dell'anima. La bellezza, la salute, l'ingegno e la grandezza appartengono ai beni del corpo. Invece l'unione tra fratelli, la fertilità delle terre e l'abbondanza di benessere fanno parte dei beni che sono esterni sia all'anima che al corpo.

[2] L'amore è di tre specie: innato, di amicizia ed estrinseco. L'innato è l'amore condiviso tra padri, figli e parenti, e questo esiste (anche) negli animali. L'amore di amicizia è quello che esiste grazie all'abitudine e alla vicinanza, come l'amore di Pilade verso Oreste. Quello estrinseco, invece, è come quello che avviene nella stretta di mano, nell'incontro, nella corrispondenza e nella comunicazione. La gente ha inoltre aggiunto un quarto tipo, che è l'amore sessuale.

[3] Le leggi della città sono di cinque specie: il governo della gente comune, il potere dei nobili, il potere dei banditi, l'eredità del re e il potere dell'oppressione. Il potere della gente comune è come un grande governatore che designa coloro che devono governare ed emana le leggi. Il potere dei nobili non è né il potere dei ricchi né dei poveri e nemmeno del principato dei nobili, ma è il governatorato di coloro che possiedono la virtù per gli abitanti della città. Il potere dei banditi è quello che si compra per denaro. La trasmissione del potere per eredità è di due specie: per tradizione e per nobiltà d'origine; il potere dei re Cartaginesi, ad esempio, avviene secondo la tradizione del loro paese, dove i figli ereditano dopo i padri, perché essi non ricorrono alla proclamazione come fanno gli altri popoli stranieri per i loro re. Presso i re dei Lacedemoni, invece, la trasmissione del potere appartiene ai nobili e a coloro che possiedono le casate. Quanto, invece, al potere per costrizione, è quello posseduto per mezzo dell'oppressione, e questo si dà o di sorpresa oppure per mezzo dell'inganno.

[4] Le specie di giustizia che è necessario da parte nostra praticare sono tre: verso Dio, verso le persone e verso i defunti e i trapassati. La cura delle tradizioni e delle leggi e la loro conservazione, il servizio delle moschee, delle chiese e dei luoghi di preghiera fanno parte della giustizia che pratichiamo verso Dio. Il saldo dei debiti e la restituzione dei depositi fanno parte della giustizia che pratichiamo verso le persone. Quanto allo scavo delle tombe e al seppellimento dei morti, essi fanno parte della giustizia che pratichiamo verso chi di noi è trapassato e morto.

[5] Il sapere è di tre specie: poietico (artigianale), pratico e teoretico. Il sapere poietico è come il mercante e l'artigiano il cui atto esiste in modo visibile e sussistente. Il sapere teoretico è come l'astronomia, la geometria, la conoscenza delle virtù e la logica: da questo sapere non si genera qualcosa di sussistente come nel sapere poietico, e il suo risultato non è immateriale⁶⁶ come nel sapere pratico, perché il sapiente fissa dentro di sé ciò che cerca e desidera imparare. Il sapere pratico, invece, è come il cantante e suonatore del flauto: quando smettono, non rimane nulla del loro atto.

[6] La medicina è di cinque specie: i medicinali, la chirurgia, la nutrizione, i sintomi e le domande. La medicina della domanda consiste nell'aiuto che dà l'ammalato al medico e la verità in ciò che dice. La medicina dei sintomi (è) la cura dei dolori con indicazioni non chiare dei luoghi infiammati, che l'ammalato non conosce anche qualora volesse darne informazione.

⁶⁶ Lett. "vano".

[8] للكلام خمسة أنواع فمنه المستعمل في المحافل والمجامع وهو النوع السياسي ومنه المستعمل من الخطباء والشعراء في الشعر والبلاغة ويسمى النوع الخطبي ومنه المستعمل من الرعاع والسوقة ويسمى النوع السوقى ومنه النوع الذي يكون به الحجج والمحاورة والمناظرة ويسمى النوع الحجاجي ومنه الذي يتكلم به الصناع في صنائعهم وتسمية أدواتهم ويسمى النوع الصناعي .

[9] لصناعة الألحان أنواع ثلاثة منها بالفم وذلك كالمزامير والمغني ومنها باليد كضرب العود ومنها بالفم واليد جميعا كالمغني والأرغن والمتحرك أيضا على ضربين إما بالكلية كالراقص وإما ببعضيته .

[10] للشرف أنواع ثلاثة فمنه من الآباء المشرفين المسودين عند العوام المفضلين عند الجماعات ومنه من الأفعال المكتسبة كسياسة الحروب وولاية الجيوش ومنه من أفعال النفس التي بها يستوجب الرجل أن يكون شريفا حرا مثل أفضال الرجل عند ذلك إلى الشرف .

[11] للجمال أنواع ثلاثة فمنه المدح والتمجيد كبهاء الوجه وجمال الصورة ومنه الاستعمال كالأنيّة والبيوت والمنازل ومنه المنفعة كالفرائض الحسنة والشرائع التي استوجب اسم الحسن من طريق منفعتها .

[13] للفضل الكامل أنواع أربعة اللب والعدل والعز والعفة فباللب تكون استقامة الأشياء وبالعدل صحتها وبالعز والصرامة والوفاء والمحاماة وبالعفة ردع الشهوة المردية وباستقامة وذلك كله كمال الفضل وتماه .

[14] للرئاسة أنواع خمسة بالمشيئة بالطباع بالعادة بالقهر بالحسب فالمسلط بعد اختيار العامة إياه هو الرئيس بالمشيئة وأما رياسة الطبيعّية فكرياسة الذكور على الإناث وأقل ما يكون غير ذلك وأما رئاسة العادة فكرياسة المعلمين على المتعلمين والمؤدبين على المتأدبين وأما رئاسة الحسب فكرياسة ملوك اللقادمونية الذين تناسلوا الملك على أحسابهم وأما رئاسة القهر فكالكائنة بالغضب والخديعة .

[15] للخطبة وجوه ستة فمنها المحرض والناهي والمعير والمبرئ والهاجي والمداح فأما المحرض فكتحريضنا الناس على الغزو والمغار والنجدة لأهل الثغور وتعريف العامة ما في ذلك من الفضل وأما الناهي فكمخالف لهذا كله وأما المعير فكذكرنا في كلامنا ما فعل بأهل بمدينة كذا وكذا وقبيلة كذا وكذا وذكرنا رجلا ركبت منه فاحشة وأتى إليه أمر عظيم فتحرّك الناس لذكر ذلك ونشره وإذاعته وأما المبرئ فكتبرئتنا الرجل في كلامنا من كل تهمة وأما المداح فكوأصف الفضائل وأما الهاجي فكالذاكر للفوايحش .

[8] Il discorso è di cinque specie: quello impiegato nelle feste e nelle riunioni, ed è il discorso politico; quello impiegato dai retori e dai poeti nella poesia e nell'eloquenza, detto retorico; quello impiegato dalla plebe e dai mercanti, detto discorso pubblico;⁶⁷ quello che comprende le prove, il dialogo e la disputa, detto discorso argomentativo;⁶⁸ quello che impiegano gli artigiani nelle loro arti e quando indicano i loro strumenti, detto discorso tecnico.

[9] L'arte dei suoni è di tre specie: mediante la bocca, come i suonatori di flauto e i cantanti; mediante la mano, come suonare il liuto; mediante la bocca e la mano, come il cantante e l'organo. Inoltre, chi si muove è due tipi: o si muove per intero, come il ballerino, oppure con una parte.

[10] La nobiltà è di tre specie: gli antenati nobili scelti dalla gente comune e considerati dalla comunità; le azioni compiute, come la politica delle guerre e la gestione degli eserciti; le azioni dell'anima che fanno sì che l'uomo sia nobile e libero, come le virtù che (portano) l'uomo alla nobiltà.

[11] La bellezza è di tre specie: l'elogio e l'esaltazione, come la purezza del volto e la bellezza dell'immagine; l'utilità, come il recipiente, le dimore e le case; le (cose) utili come gli obblighi buoni e le leggi, per descrivere la cui utilità si impiega il termine "bellezza".

[13] L'onore perfetto è di quattro specie: la ragione, la giustizia, la gloria e la virtù. Con la ragione abbiamo la rettitudine delle cose, con la giustizia la loro esattezza, con la gloria e il rigore la fedeltà e la difesa, con la virtù il rigetto degli appetiti cattivi nel modo corretto e tutto ciò è la perfezione dell'onore e il suo completamento.

[14] Il governo è di cinque specie: per approvazione, per natura, per consuetudine, per oppressione e per nobiltà. Il governante è il capo per approvazione dopo la sua designazione da parte della gente comune. Il governo naturale è come l'autorità dei maschi sulle femmine, ed è raro che avvenga qualcosa di diverso da questo. Il governo per consuetudine è come il governo dei docenti sui discenti e degli educatori su quelli che devono essere educati. Il governo per nobiltà è come il governo dei re lacedemoni, che hanno ereditato il potere dai loro nobili. Il governo con l'oppressione è quello che si dà con la violenza e l'inganno.

[15] Il discorso pubblico è di sei specie: l'incitamento, il divieto, l'ingiuria, la giustificazione, l'invettiva e l'elogio. Il discorso che incita è come l'incitamento della gente nell'incursione, nell'attacco e nel soccorso della gente del porto, e la definizione da parte delle persone di ciò che c'è di virtuoso in questo. Il discorso che vieta è il contrario di tutto ciò. Il discorso ingiurioso è come quando diciamo ciò che è successo alla gente di una determinata città e ad una determinata tribù, oppure quando parliamo di un uomo che ha fatto un'azione detestabile e viene colpito da una grande disgrazia, cosicché la gente si è affrettata a parlare di questo fatto e a diffonderlo. Il discorso della giustificazione è come disculpare un uomo nel nostro discorso. Il discorso elogiativo è come colui che descrive le virtù. Il discorso dell'invettiva è come colui che menziona cose oscene.

⁶⁷ Lett. "del mercato".

⁶⁸ Lett. "probatório".

[16] لتسديد الكلام وسعادة الناطق أربعة أنحاء من ذلك القول بالحقّ والكلام بما يجب والنطق بما ينبغي واللفظ بما يحسن الكلام فيه وذلك في وقته وموضعه وعند أهله وفي حدّه فأما القول بالحقّ فهو النَّافِع للقائل والسَّامِع وأما القول بالواجب فهو الواقع بالقصد مع استجلاب المنفعة وأما النَّطق بما ينبغي فـكـو*** تقديم الكهل عند تسديد منطقته إلى مرتبة الشيخ وحطنا إياه عند خطئه إلى منزلة الشباب وأما اللفظ بما يحسن فالكلام في وقته وعند أهله وفي موضعه فأما الكلام في وقته فهو كالخطبة بعد الصلوة وأما عند أهله فكإنشاد الشعر عند أصحاب الغريب وأما في موضعه فكقراءة العهود في بيوت المساجد وأما حدّه فكالمتوسّط بين الفرط والتقصير.

[17] للمنفعة أربعة أنواع منها بالمال كإعطاء الدراهم في الصلوات وغيرها والمنفعة بالبدن كالعلاج باليد والمشى بالرجل والمنفعة بالعلم كمنفعة العلم للمتعلّم والمنفعة بالقول كمنفعة الرجل صاحبه عند قاض أو سلطان بكلمة أو كلمات.

[18] لتمام الأشياء أربعة أنواع منه بالمشيئة ومنه بالطبيعة ومنه بالصناعة ومنه بالجدّ فأما التمام بالمشيئة فكتمام الشيء المجتمعة عليه العامّة وأما التمام بالطبيعة فكتمام النهار إذا غابت الشمس وأما التمام بالصناعة فكتمام النجار السفينة والبناء البيت وأما التمام بالجدّ فالآتي على خلاف الظنّ ورجاء الأمل.

[20] للمودّ ثلاثة أنواع أولها بسط الرجل كفّه لمن يلقاه والثاني معونة ذي الحاجة والثالث المؤانسة بالأخ في المنطق والحديث والمطعم والمشرب.

[21] للسعادة خمسة أنواع الفكرة على صواب المشورة ومنها ذكاء الحواسّ وصحّة الجسم ومنها التوفيق في الأمور ومنها المدح عند الناس ومنها وجود المال مع تتابع الحياة.

[22] للصنائع ثلاثة أنواع أوّل ووسط وآخر فأما النوع الأوّل من الصناعة فكإخراج الحديد من المعادن وقطع الخشب من الغاب والغياض وأما الوسط فكتهيئة السلاح من الحديد والعود والطنبور من الخشب وأما الثالث فكالفروسيّة المستعملة للجسم والألحان للعيدان والطنابير.

[23] للفضل ثلاثة أنواع منه العدل والعفّة وما أشبههما ومنه الأطعمة النافعة والأشربة الملائمة الموافقة للأبدان ومنه الزمر والغناء والتلذذ بأصناف اللّهُو على اختلاف الآلة الموسيقية فإنّ هذا موصوف من النعيم والمتلذذون به يسمّون الفاضلين المتنعمين.

[24] من الموجود خير ومنه شرّ ومنه متوسّط بين ذلك فأما الشرّ فنقول إنّهُ الشيء الضارّ في كلّ وقت مثل البله والشبق والغشم وما أشبه ذلك فأما المخالفة لهذه موصوفة بالخير وأما المتوسّطة بين ذلك التي تكون خيرا وشرّا فكالمشي والقعود والمطعم والمشرب.

[16] L'adeguatezza del discorso e il successo di colui che parla si hanno in quattro modi: dire il vero, parlare di ciò che è necessario, parlare di ciò che serve e nel modo che renda gradevole il discorso. Tutto ciò deve verificarsi al momento giusto, nel luogo appropriato, davanti alle persone adatte e senza eccesso. Dire il vero è ciò che è utile per chi parla e per chi ascolta. Parlare di ciò che è necessario è ciò che avviene con l'intenzione e che porta all'utilità. Dire ciò che serve è come quando [...] consideriamo che un uomo tenga il suo discorso correttamente, nella posizione di un anziano, mentre lo considereremmo errato se si trovasse nella posizione dei giovani.⁶⁹ L'uso di ciò che rende gradevole è il discorso fatto al momento giusto, davanti alle persone adatte e nella sede giusta. Il discorso nel momento giusto è come il discorso pubblico dopo le preghiere. Davanti alle persone adatte è come recitare la poesia davanti a persone curiose di fatti insoliti. Nella sede giusta è come la lettura dei patti nelle moschee. Quanto al suo limite, è come la medietà tra l'eccesso e la manchevolezza.

[17] L'utile è di quattro specie: per il denaro è come dare i soldi nelle preghiere ed altro; per il corpo è come la cura con le mani e il camminare con i piedi; per la scienza è come l'utilità della scienza per il discente; per il discorso è come quando un uomo si rende utile a un suo amico davanti a un giudice oppure ad un sovrano con una parola o con più parole.

[18] La perfezione delle cose è di quattro specie: attraverso la volontà, la natura, l'arte e lo sforzo. La perfezione attraverso la volontà è come una cosa condivisa da tutti. La perfezione attraverso la natura è come la fine del giorno quando tramonta il sole. La perfezione mediante l'arte è come il completamento della nave da parte del falegname e della casa da parte del costruttore. La perfezione attraverso lo sforzo è come ciò che avviene diversamente da ciò che si crede e si spera.

[20] L'amicizia è tre specie: il primo è quando l'uomo tende la mano a chi ne ha bisogno; il secondo è l'aiuto di chi ha bisogno, e il terzo è essere socievoli con il fratello nel discorso e nel racconto, nel cibo e nel bere.

[21] La felicità è di cinque specie: il pensiero secondo la correttezza del giudizio, l'acutezza dei sensi, la salute del corpo, la concordia nelle cose, la buona fama presso le persone e essere benestanti quando si va in là con gli anni.

[22] Le arti sono di tre specie: un inizio, uno stato intermedio ed una fine. Il primo tipo di arte è come estrarre il ferro dalle miniere e tagliare la legna dal bosco e dalla boscaglia. Lo stato intermedio è come la costruzione delle armi a partire dal ferro e quella del bastone e del liuto a partire dal legno. Il terzo è come l'equitazione che utilizza la briglia, e la musica che utilizza i pifferi e i flauti.

[23] L'eccellenza è di tre specie: la giustizia, la rettitudine e cose ad essi simili, i cibi utili e le bevande adatte per il corpo, il suono e il canto, il gusto per le diverse forme di divertimento con i vari strumenti musicali. Questo è descritto come benessere, e coloro che ne godono sono chiamati "gente che se la passa bene".

[24] Fanno parte dell'esistente il bene, il male e ciò che sta nel mezzo fra questi due. Diciamo che il male è ciò che nuoce sempre, come la stupidità, la lussuria, l'ingiustizia e cose simili. Il contrario di questo è descritto come "bene". Le cose intermedie tra ciò che è bene e ciò che è male sono come il camminare, il sedersi, il mangiare e il bere.

⁶⁹ La lacuna segnalata da Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 115 n. 4, è forse responsabile della difficoltà di questa frase, che ho tradotto liberamente.

[27] للمتضادات أنواع ثلاثة أمّا الأوّل فكقولنا الخير ضدّ الشرّ والعدل ضدّ الغشم واللبّ ضدّ البلاهة والثاني كضدّ الشرّ للشرّ كضدّ الرغبة للشيخ في *** كضدّ الرزانة للخفّة والعجلة للإبطاء والبياض للسواد وليست هذه وإن كانت متضادةً كتضادّ الخير والشرّ.

[28] من الخيرات مملوكات ومنهنّ مشتركات ومنهنّ ثابتات فأما المملوكات فالتّي تطبق أن يملكها الرجل وذلك كالعدل والصحة وأمّا المشتركات فالتّي لا يملكها بل يشترك فيها وذلك كالخير الذي لا يملكنا ملكه بل الشركة فيه وأمّا الثابتات فكالخيرات المخصوصة بالرجل الواحد التي لا يمكن غيره ملكها وشركته فيها.

تم الكتاب . والحمد لله كثيرا . تمّ

8. Testo e traduzione della versione di Ibn al-Tayyib⁷⁰

[1] والخيرات منها ما يختصّ بالنفس ومنها ما يختصّ بالجسم ومنها ما يكون في الأشياء التي من خارج فالعدالة والحكمة والشجاعة والعفة والأشياء المشاركة لهذه فهي من الخيرات الخاصة بالنفس فأما الحسن واللياقة والصحة والقوة فإنّها من الخيرات الخاصة بالجسم وأمّا الأصدقاء وخصب الوطن والغناء فهي من الخيرات المتعلقة بالأشياء الخارجة فيتحصّل من ذلك أنّ الخيرات منها ما يختصّ بالنفس ومنها ما يختصّ بالجسم ومنها ما يكون في الأشياء التي من خارج.

[2] وأنواع المحبة ثلاثة محبة طبيعية ومحبة تحدثها العشرة والصداقة ومحبة تحدث وإن كان المتحابان على البعاد فأما المحبة الطبيعية فهي بمنزلة محبة الوالدين لولد ومحبة الأقارب بعضهم بعض وهذه المحبة موجودة فيما كان من الحيوان غير ناطق والمحبة التي تحدثها العشرة والصداقة والألفة هي التي تستعاد من العادة وإن لم يجتمع المتحابان بنسب واحد بمنزلة محبة فولبيذيس لأرسطيس والمحبة التي تكون على التباعد هي التي تكون بالمكاتبات والملاطفات وقوم آخرون يزيدون المحبة فهي المحبة الكائنة بين المتعاشقين فتحصّل أنواع المحبة أربعة .

[3] وسياسة المدن وتديرها ينقسم إلى خمسة أنواع إلى التي من شأن المدبر لها أن يختاره جماعة أهل المدينة وإلى التي من شأن المدبر لها أن يختاره أفاضل المدينة وإلى التي يتولاها القليل من الناس وإلى التي يتولاها من جرت عادته بذلك وإلى التي يتولاها كراهة من أهل المدينة أمّا التي يتولى اختيار المدبر لها جماعة أهل المدينة فهي سياسة أهل المدينة التي من شأن سائر أهلها الاجتماع على إحسان مدبرها ووضع سننّها وأمّا التي يتولى الاختيار فيها الأفاضل فهي المدينة التي لا يتولى

⁷⁰ Viene riprodotto il testo di M. Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 46, 8-56, 7. La traduzione italiana e le note sono di I. Marjani.

[27] I contrari sono di tre specie: il primo è come quando diciamo che il bene è il contrario del male, la giustizia è il contrario dell'ingiustizia e la ragione è il contrario della stupidità. Il secondo è come un male che è contrario a un male, come la volontà dell'anziano di [...],⁷¹ come il contrario della pesantezza rispetto alla leggerezza, della velocità rispetto alla lentezza e del nero rispetto al bianco. Questi, anche se sono contrari, non sono come i contrari del bene e del male.

[28] Fanno parte dei beni quelli posseduti, quelli condivisi e quelli stabili. I posseduti sono quelli che toccano all'uomo, come la giustizia e la salute. Quelli condivisi sono quelli che egli non possiede ma condivide, e questo è come il bene che non possediamo ma che condividiamo. Quelli stabili sono quelli specifici di un uomo, che nessun altro può possedere o condividere.

Termina il libro, e molta lode a Dio. Fine.

[1] Appartiene ai beni ciò che riguarda l'anima, ciò che riguarda il corpo e ciò che è esterno. La giustizia, la saggezza, il coraggio, la temperanza e le cose associate a queste sono beni che riguardano l'anima. La bellezza, la buona costituzione, la salute e la forza sono beni che riguardano il corpo. Gli amici, la fertilità delle terre e la prosperità, invece, sono beni legati alle cose esterne. Ne consegue quindi che appartiene ai beni ciò che riguarda l'anima, ciò che riguarda il corpo e ciò che sta nelle cose che vengono dall'esterno.

[2] Le specie di amore sono tre: un amore naturale, un amore che nasce dall'essere in compagnia e dall'amicizia, e un amore che si manifesta anche se i due amanti sono lontani. L'amore naturale è come l'amore dei genitori verso un figlio e l'amore dei parenti gli uni verso gli altri; questa forma di amore esiste (anche) nell'animale irrazionale. L'amore che si manifesta dall'essere in compagnia, dall'amicizia e dalla familiarità è quello che deriva dall'abitudine, anche se i due amanti non sono uniti dallo stesso nome, come l'amore di Pilade verso Oreste. L'amore, invece, che sussiste (anche) nella lontananza è quello che si manifesta con scambi di lettere e gentilezza. Altra gente aggiunge l'amore che è l'amore esistente tra gli innamorati. Ne consegue quindi che le specie di amore sono quattro.

[3] L'amministrazione delle città e il loro governo si suddividono in cinque specie: quella in cui chi la governa viene scelto dalla comunità degli abitanti della città; quella in cui chi la governa viene scelto dai più virtuosi della città; quella che è retta da poche persone; quella in cui chi la regge lo fa secondo la consuetudine; infine, quella in cui chi la governa lo fa contro il volere degli abitanti della città. Quello in cui la scelta di chi la governa viene fatta dagli abitanti della città è il governo dei cittadini della città in cui tutti i cittadini si accordano per avere il governo migliore e per stabilirne la legge. Quella in cui la scelta spetta ai più virtuosi è la città in cui la scelta del sovrano non spetta

⁷¹ Come segnala Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 118 n. 1, c'è una lacuna in questo punto del testo.

اختيار سلطانها لا أغنياءها ولا فقراءها ولا من يتقع الإشارة إليهم فيها لكن فضلاءها وذوي الرأي من أهلها وأمّا التي يتولاها القليل من الناس فهي التي يبتاع سلطانها ابتياعا وذلك أنّ الذين يتمكنوا من ذلك هم الأغنياء وهؤلاء قليلون وأمّا التي يتولاها من جرت عادته بذلك فعلى ضربين أحدهما على سبيل الابتياع والآخر على سبيل الإرث فإنّ ملك القرليدوني جرت العادة بابتياعه وأمّا ملك القدامونين والماقيدونيين فالابن يرث فيه ملك أبيه وأمّا الذي يكون على سبيل الإكراه فهي التي يتولاها الإنسان بالاضطهاد والعنف من المرؤوسين فتحصل من ذلك أنّ سياسة المدن على خمسة أضراب المذكورة.

[4] والعدالة تنقسم إلى ثلاثة أنواع إلى العدالة التي يراد بها الله جلّ اسمه وإلى العدالة التي يراد بها السالفون والمقربون القرابين في المذابح المائتين على سنتهم وعاداتهم والحريصون على خدمة الهياكل فظاهر من أمرهم أنّهم يقصدون بفعل العدالة الله جلّ اسمه والقاضيون الديون والرادون الودائع فقصدهم بذلك العدل مع الناس والمتشغلون بخدمة التراب والمقابر والأموات فمعلوم من أمرهم أنّهم يقصدون بفعل العدل أسلافهم الحاصلين فيها فيتحصّل أنواع العدالة ثلاثة المتقدّم ذكرها.

[5] وأنواع العلم ثلاثة علم الصنائع وعلوم السياسة وعلوم الأمور فعلم صناعة البناء والنجارة من العلوم الصناعية وما يفعله الصانع مما شأنه أن يكون ثابتا يدركه الحواسّ وتدبير المدن وصنائع الموسيقى والزمر والرقص وما تصدر عنها ليس ثابتا كلها لكن الموجود منه شيء بعد شيء والهندسة والتنجيم من علوم الأمور وهذه ليس بفعل شيئا محسوسا ثابتا ولا موجودا شيئا بعد شيء لكن غرضها علم الحسب وإذا علمت كيف فإنّ صناعة الهندسة موضوعها الخطوط وغرضها علم المناسبات التي بينها والمنجم فموضوعه الكواكب وغرضه علم حركاتها وأنواع العلم ثلاثة وهي التي تقدّم ذكرها.

[6] والصناعة الطبية تتوصّل إلى إفادة الصّحة على خمسة أضراب فهي الأدوية والأغذية والآلات وتعرّف الأمراض ومعاونة الطبيعة فأما الأدوية فبأن يمزجها ويخلطها مزجا وخلطا يشفى معه المرض وأمّا الأغذية فبأن يعطى منها ما يتحفّظ به قوة المريض وأمّا الآلات فبأن يستعمل فيها القطع والكي والبطّ وأمّا تعرّف الأمراض فمن قبل أن من الإغراق في تعرّف طبيعة المرض يستنبط الطريق في إزالته وأمّا المعاونة فمن قبل أن بمساعدة الطبيعة وإنهاضها كثيرا ما يقع التخلص من الأمراض وأنواع إفادة الصّحة هي هذه الخمسة المذكورة.

né ai ricchi né ai poveri e nemmeno a coloro che vengono indicati per questo ufficio, ma spetta ai suoi abitanti più virtuosi e dotati di giudizio. Quella che è retta da poche persone è la città il cui sovrano è proclamato, e coloro che hanno la possibilità (di proclamarlo) sono i più ricchi, i quali sono pochi. Quella in cui chi la governa lo fa per consuetudine è due tipi: uno avviene mediante la proclamazione e l'altro in modo ereditario. Il re dei Caldei viene proclamato per consuetudine, mentre nel caso del re dei Lacedemoni e dei Macedoni il figlio eredita il regno del padre. Quanto invece a quello che avviene contro la volontà, si tratta della città in cui l'uomo che la regge lo fa per mezzo della persecuzione e della violenza nei confronti dei governati. Quindi, da questo consegue che le specie di governo delle città sono le cinque sopra menzionate.

[4] La giustizia si suddivide in tre specie: la giustizia verso Dio, eccelso è il Suo nome; la giustizia verso gli antenati, con la quale operano coloro che portano offerte ai defunti secondo la loro legge e le loro usanze e si dedicano al servizio dei templi, rende evidente che mirano a Dio, eccelso è il Suo nome, con il loro atto di giustizia; così anche quelli che pagano i debiti e quelli che restituiscono ciò che è stato loro affidato mirano con questo alla giustizia verso la gente, e quelli che sono occupati nel servire i cimiteri, le tombe e i morti, è risaputo con ciò che intendono praticare la giustizia verso i loro predecessori. Ne consegue che le specie di giustizia sono le tre menzionate sopra.

[5] Le specie di scienza sono tre: la scienza artigianale, la scienza della politica e la scienza delle realtà.⁷² La scienza dell'arte delle costruzioni e della falegnameria fa parte delle scienze artigianali. L'opera dell'artigiano deve essere concreta e colta dai sensi. Il governo delle città, le arti della musica, di suonare il flauto e del ballo e altre originate da queste non sono tutte cose concrete, ma ciò che ne risulta è una successione.⁷³ La geometria e l'astronomia fanno parte delle scienze delle realtà: non producono una cosa sensibile e concreta e nemmeno qualcosa che esiste in successione, perché il loro fine è la scienza del calcolo. Se riesci a capire come ciò accade, allora vedrai che l'oggetto della geometria sono le linee e il suo fine è conoscere le relazioni tra queste; l'astronomo ha per oggetto i pianeti e il suo fine è conoscerne i movimenti. Pertanto le specie di scienza sono le tre che abbiamo menzionato prima.

[6] L'arte medica è legata all'utilità per la salute ed è di cinque specie: i medicinali, il nutrimento, gli strumenti, la conoscenza delle malattie e il sostegno della natura. Con la mescolanza e la fusione dei medicinali avviene la guarigione dalla malattia. Del nutrimento deve essere dato (solo) ciò conserva la forza del malato. Gli strumenti si devono utilizzare per amputare, bruciare e tagliare. La conoscenza delle malattie avviene con una ricerca approfondita per conoscere il tipo di malattia, con cui escogitare la via per sopprimerla. Quanto al sostegno, è a partire dall'aiuto della natura e dal suo sollevamento che avviene la liberazione dalle malattie. Le specie dell'utilità per la salute sono le cinque citate.

⁷² Il termine arabo *al-umūr* (pl. di *al-amr*) corrisponde qui, come segnalato da Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 170, a τὰ ὄντα in *DA* [31] (DL III 107, p. 295, 1178 e III 108, p. 295, 1188 Dor.) e in *DA* [32] (DL III 82, p. 295, 1191 Dor.). Su *amr*, *mašdar* del verbo *amara* (significato di base: 'comandare') di uso vastissimo in arabo e adottato nelle traduzioni greco-arabe con una grande varietà di significati, cfr. *A Greek and Arabic Lexicon (GALex). Materials for a Dictionary of the Mediaeval Translations from Greek into Arabic* ed. by G. Endress and D. Gutas, vol. I (...), compiled by R. Arnzen - G. Endress - D. Gutas with the collaboration of K. Alshut - Ch. Hein - O. Overwien - S. Pohl - M. Schmeink - J. Thielmann, Brill, Leiden - New York - Köln 2002 (Handbook of Oriental Studies, Section One, The Near and Middle East, 11), p. 362-95. Partendo dalla corrispondenza più letterale, gli autori elencano esempi in cui *al-amr* rende *πρόσταξις*, *ἐπιταγμα* e simili, e dedicano poi spazio ai casi in cui *al-amr* rende *πράγμα*, *πρόξις*, *χρῆμα*, e anche (al plurale), come qui, τὰ ὄντα. L'esempio della resa di τὰ ὄντα attraverso *al-umūr* è tratto appunto dalle *DA* nella traduzione di Ibn al-Ṭayyib, in cui compare di nuovo nella resa della frase τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ μεριστὰ, τὰ δὲ ἀμεριστὰ in *DA* [31] (DL III 107, p. 295, 1178 Dor. = p. 39 [trad.]).

⁷³ Lett. "una cosa dopo l'altra".

[7] والسنة تنقسم إلى قسمين إلى السنة الطبيعية وإلى السنة التوفيقية والسنة التي بها نسوس بلداننا فهي سنة توفيقية وأما الطبيعية فهي التي من العادة بمنزلة الامتناع من المشي في الأسواق بغير ثياب أو الترتي برأي الإناث فهذان وإن كانت السنة التوفيقية بمرتبة عنهما فنحن لا نستعملهما لأن العادة لم تجر بهما فالسنة أنواعها هذان المذكوران .

[8] والأول منها نوع القول المسموع به في مجالس السلاطين وبحضرة الملوك وأرباب الدول ويدعى كلاما في السياسة والثاني نوع شأن الخطباء استعماله والانبساط فيه لكيما يظهرون به اقتدارهم وهو مركب من المدح والذم والاعتذار واللوم وهذا النوع يدعى خطابيا والثالث الذي يستعمله العوام والسخفاء بعضهم مع بعض ويدعى كلام السخف والجهل والرابع القول الذي يورده السائل والمسؤول على سبيل الرفق والخديعة والتلطف والحيلة ويدعى كلاما جدليا والخامس القول الذي يستعمله أرباب الصنائع والعلوم ويدعى كلاما صناعيا وأنواع القول هذه الخمسة المذكورة .

[9] وصناعة الموسيقى تستعمل على ثلاثة أضراب بالفم كما يفعل عند التلحين وباليدين كما يفعل عند الزمر والرقص وباليدين حسب كما يفعل عند الضرب بالعود وعلى هذه الثلاث أضراب تستعمل صناعة الموسيقى .

[10] وشرف النسب يكون على ثلاثة أضراب إما بأن يقع الانتماء إلى آباء مشهورين في التقى والصلاح وإما أن يقع الانتماء إلى آباء آخرين مشهورين في الشجاعة ومتقدمين في الصنائع وإما أن يكون الإنسان في نفسه شريفا بالغا إلى المعالي بسعيه ويدعى أيضا شريف النسب يعني لأن متقدميه شرفوا به فشرف النسب يكون إما من الإعتزاز إلى الأبوين أو إلى الشجاعين أو باقتناء الفضيلة .

[11] والحسن ينقسم إلى ثلاثة أقسام إلى الحسن الذي يستفيد صاحبه منه المدحة كحسن الوجه والصورة وإلى الحسن الذي يقترن به منفعة ما كحسن البيت والمتاع وما أشبهها وإلى الحسن الذي يقترن به لذة ما بمنزلة النواميس والصنائع فإن هذه من أجل الالتذاذ بها يدعى حسنة فهذه الثلاثة فهي أنواع الحسن .

[12] والنفس ينقسم إلى ثلاثة قوى إلى القوة الفكرية وإلى القوة الشهوانية وإلى القوة الغضبية والفكرية هي تتنوع المشورة والرأي والفكر وما أشبه ذلك والشهوانية هي السبب في الانعطاف على المأكول والمناكح والغضبية فهي تتنوع الغم والسرور والفرج والشجاعة والغضب وأقسام النفس هي هذه الثلاثة المذكورة .

[13] والفضيلة تنقسم إلى أربعة أقسام إلى الحكمة والعدالة والشجاعة والعفة والحكمة فهي علم الأمور على حقائقها والعدالة هي المفيدة للإنسان استعمال الحق في أخذه وإعطائه والشجاعة فهي فضيلة تفيد الإنسان الأنفة في الانهداء عن الحروب والأمور المفزعة وتشجعه على الصبر عليها والعفة تفيد الإنسان ضبط نفسه عن الشهوات الرديئة والامتناع عن الغشم والظلم وأن يحيا حياة سليمة من الرذيلة وأنواع الفضيلة هي هذه المذكورة .

[7] La legge si suddivide in due tipi: la legge naturale e la legge per accordo. La legge con la quale vengono governati i nostri paesi è una legge per accordo. La legge naturale è quella della consuetudine, come evitare di andare in giro nei mercati senza indumenti oppure farsi vedere vestiti da donna. Questi due [comportamenti], anche se la legge per accordo sta su un piano superiore rispetto ad essi, non li usiamo perché la consuetudine non li ammette. Dunque, le specie di legge sono queste due menzionati.

[8] [...].⁷⁴ La prima tra esse è la specie di discorso che si ascolta nelle riunioni dei sovrani, alla presenza dei re e dei capi delle nazioni, e si chiama discorso sulla politica. La seconda è un modo con il quale l'uso e l'espansione dell'argomento⁷⁵ è (opera) degli oratori, poiché in questo modo essi mostrano la loro abilità; si compone di lode, di calunnia, di discolpa e di biasimo; questa specie si chiama retorica. La terza è quella che impiega la gente comune e gli sciocchi tra di loro, e si chiama discorso futile e ignorante.⁷⁶ La quarta è quella del discorso che impiegano sia colui che interroga sia colui che è interrogato attraverso la cordialità, la frode, la gentilezza e la furbizia, e si chiama dialettico. La quinta è il discorso che usano i maestri delle arti e delle scienze e si chiama discorso artigianale. Le specie del discorso sono queste cinque citate.

[9] L'arte della musica si utilizza in tre modi: con la bocca come fanno i cantanti, con la bocca e le mani come quando suoniamo uno strumento a fiato e balliamo, e con le mani come quando suoniamo il liuto. L'arte della musica si utilizza in questi tre modi.

[10] La nobiltà di origine ha tre modi: o per il legame con antenati famosi per il loro timore di Dio e la loro rettitudine, oppure per il legame con altri antenati famosi per il loro coraggio ed esperti nelle arti, oppure quando l'uomo è lui stesso nobile e raggiunge l'eminenza per volontà propria: si chiama anch'egli nobile di origine, perché chi l'ha preceduto lo ha reso nobile. Quindi, la nobiltà di origine esiste o perché la propria origine risale ad antenati, oppure a persone coraggiose, oppure grazie al possesso della virtù.

[11] La bellezza si suddivide in tre classi: la bellezza per cui chi la possiede è lodato, come la bellezza del volto e dell'aspetto; la bellezza legata ad una certa utilità, come la bellezza della casa e della proprietà e cose simili; la bellezza legata ad un certo piacere, come le leggi e le arti, che vengono dette "bellezza" per il fatto che per loro tramite si prova piacere. Queste dunque sono le tre specie di bellezza.

[12] L'anima si suddivide in tre facoltà: la facoltà intellettuale, la facoltà appetitiva e la facoltà irascibile. L'intellettuale comprende il consiglio, la riflessione e il pensiero; l'appetitiva è la causa dell'inclinazione verso l'appetito e l'accoppiamento; l'irascibile comprende l'angustia, la felicità, la serenità, il coraggio e l'ira. Le classi dell'anima sono queste tre menzionate.

[13] La virtù si suddivide in quattro modi: la saggezza, la giustizia, il coraggio e la rettitudine. La saggezza è il sapere le cose secondo la loro verità. La giustizia è ciò che è utile per l'uomo nell'utilizzare la verità verso di sé e verso gli altri. Il coraggio è una virtù che sostiene l'uomo nell'affrontare le guerre e i fatti spaventosi e lo incoraggia nell'avere pazienza. La rettitudine aiuta l'uomo a tenersi lontano dalle cose cattive desiderabili, nell'evitare l'oppressione e l'ingiustizia e nel vivere una vita sana e lontana dal vizio. I tipi di virtù sono questi menzionati.

⁷⁴ Le prime parole di questa Divisione mancano nell'arabo ma sono attestate in siriano: v. Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 86 n. 1.

⁷⁵ Lett. "nella loro cosa".

⁷⁶ Lett. "della futilità e dell'ignoranza".

[14] والرئاسة تنقسم إلى خمسة أقسام إلى الناموسية والطبيعية والتي من العادة والتي من الجنس والتي تكون بالقهر فالجارية على الناموس هي التي يجتمع عليها أهل المدينة بأسرها والطبيعية بمنزلة رئاسة الذكور على الإناث وهذه الرئاسة ليست في نوع الإنسان وحده لكن في كثير من أنواع الحيوان مثل العتروس وغيره والتي من العادة بمنزلة رئاسة المدبر على الصبي والمعلم على المتعلم والتي من الجنس بمنزلة رئاسة الابن بعد الأب على العادة الجارية لأهل مقدونيا والتي تكون بالقهر هي التي توجد بالعنف وأنواع الرئاسة فهي هذه الخمسة المذكورة.

[15] والخطابة تنقسم إلى ستة أقسام إلى التحريض كما تفعل في العساكر مع الجند في تحريضهم على الإقدام وإلى الكف والردع كما تفعل مع الذين يكفون عن الشرور والحروب وإلى اللوم كما تفعل مع القوم الذين يكونون هم السبب في أرش الناس والدخول في المحذورات معهم وإلى الاعتذار كما يفعل الرجل البار التقي وإلى النفي كما تفعل مع الرجل الشرير وأنواع الخطابة هي هذه الستة المذكورة.

[16] وقول الحق ينقسم إلى أربعة أقسام القول بما يجب والمقدار الذي يجب وفي الوقت التي تجب ولمن يجب فالقول بما يجب فهو القول الملد للقاتل وللسامع أيضا واستعماله بمقدار ما يجب يكون ما لم يورد منه زائدا ليجتاج إليه أو ناقصا لا يكتفي به والمعاوضة به لمن يجب مثل أن يخاطب الفضلاء بما يليق بهم والجهال والصبيان بما يناسبهم وفي الحين الذي يجب فيه أن يقال في أوانه لا قبله ولا بعده.

[17] والاتصال ينقسم إلى أربعة أقسام إلى الاتصال بالمال وإلى الاتصال بالعلم وإلى الاتصال بالقول وإلى الاتصال بما يكسب الجسم راحة من ألم يطرقه فأما الاتصال بالمال فبمنزلة ما يعين الإنسان ابن الجنس بشيء من فاضل ما بيديه ويتراءف بذلك عليه والاتصال بأمر تتعلق بالجسم كتخليص الإنسان للإنسان يناله مكروه من جسمه من آخر مثله والاتصال بالعلم بمنزلة إفادة العلوم والصنائع وطرق الآداب والتخرج والاتصال بالقول بمنزلة إعانة الرجل اللسن للرجل الألكان في مجلس الحكم بالحق فأنواع الاتصال فهي هذه الأربعة.

[18] والغاية تنقسم إلى أربعة أقسام إلى الغاية الناموسية والطبيعية والصناعية التي تتفق بالبخت والغاية الناموسية فهي التي يبلغ إليها بالرأي الثاقب والغاية الطبيعية فهي التي يبلغ إليها في زمانها والغاية الصناعية فهي مقصود الصناعة كصورة البيت وصورة السفينة اللتان هما غاية الصناعة البناء وغاية الصناعة النجارة والغاية التي تكون بالبخت فهي التي يقتاد فيها الإنسان من غير إن كانت قصده فالغاية تنقسم إلى هذه الأربعة أقسام.

[19] والإمكان والقوة تنقسم إلى أربعة أقسام أحدها الذي في النفس على الأفكار السديدة والثاني الإمكان الذي في الجسم على الحركة والأخذ والعطاء وما أشبه ذلك والثالث القوة على الغلبة والقهر بقوة المال والخدم والرابع التي بها يقتدر على أن يفعل الإنسان الخيرات والشرور أو ينفعل بهما فأقسام القوة والإمكان فهي هذه الأربعة.

[14] Il dominio si suddivide in cinque modi: legislativo, naturale, consuetudinario, della stirpe e quello che si pratica per mezzo dell'oppressione. Il dominio secondo la legge è quello che trova il consenso degli abitanti di tutta la città. Quello naturale è come il dominio dei maschi sulle femmine, che non riguarda solo la specie dell'uomo ma anche numerose specie di animali, come il caprone e altri. Quello secondo consuetudine è come il dominio del tutore sul fanciullo e del maestro sul discepolo. Quello secondo la stirpe è come il dominio del figlio dopo il padre, secondo la consuetudine in vigore nel popolo dei Macedoni. Il governo per mezzo dell'oppressione è quello che sussiste con la forza. Le specie del dominio sono le cinque menzionate.

[15] La retorica si suddivide in sei classi: l'incitamento, come si usa nei campi militari con i soldati incitandoli all'attacco; la rinuncia e l'arresto, come si usa per far cessare di praticare le malvagità e le guerre; il biasimo, come si usa con quelli che sono causa di eccitamento alla discordia fra le persone entrando con loro in faccende spiacevoli; la discolpa, come fa l'uomo timoroso di Dio; il rifiuto, come fa l'uomo malvagio. Le specie di retorica sono queste sei menzionate.

[16] Il dire la verità si suddivide in quattro classi: dire le cose che servono, nella misura che serve, nel momento opportuno e a chi il discorso serve. Dire le cose che servono è il dire piacevole sia per il parlante che per l'ascoltatore. L'impiego della misura che serve avviene quando non vi è eccesso in ciò che serve né manchevolezza che lo rende insufficiente. "A chi serve" vuol dire parlare con i virtuosi di ciò che si addice a loro e con gli ignoranti e bambini di ciò che si addice a loro. "Nel momento opportuno" indica ciò che deve essere detto nel momento adatto, né prima di questo né dopo.

[17] Il legame si suddivide in quattro classi: il legame con il denaro, il legame con la scienza, il legame con il discorso e il legame con ciò che fa sí che il corpo ottenga sollievo da un dolore che lo colpisce. Il legame con il denaro è come l'uomo che aiuta un suo simile con ciò che possiede nelle sue mani di buono, provando compassione nei suoi confronti. Il legame con cose legate al corpo è come quando un uomo libera un uomo da un danno corporeo apportatogli da un altro uomo. Il legame con la scienza è come l'utilità delle scienze, delle arti, delle lettere e dell'educazione intellettuale. Il legame con il discorso è come il sostegno dell'uomo eloquente all'uomo balzubiente nella seduta del processo. Dunque, le specie di legame sono queste quattro.

[18] Il fine si suddivide in quattro classi: legislativo, naturale, artigianale e quello che si accorda con la buona sorte. Il fine della legge è quello che si raggiunge con la riflessione perspicace. Il fine naturale è quello che si raggiunge a suo tempo. Il fine artigianale è l'oggetto dell'arte, come la forma della casa e la forma della nave, che sono il fine dell'arte della costruzione e dell'arte della falegnameria. Il fine che si determina con la buona sorte è quella che in cui l'uomo è guidato senza che abbia la propria intenzione. Dunque, il fine si suddivide in quattro classi.

[19] La possibilità e la potenza si suddividono in quattro modi: il primo è ciò che è nell'anima secondo le idee giuste; il secondo è ciò che è nel corpo secondo il movimento, il dare e il ricevere e cose simili; il terzo è la forza nella vittoria e nella conquista grazie alla forza del denaro e della servitù; il quarto è quello che rende l'uomo capace di fare o subire il bene e il male. Dunque, le classi della potenza e della possibilità sono queste quattro.

[20] والصدقة تنقسم إلى ثلاثة أقسام الصداقة الساذجة التي تكون عند السلام في الملتقى وإلى الصداقة التي يتكلف لها الإنسان معاونة صديقة عند شدائد وإلى الصداقة التي يكون سببها الاجتماع والحديث والسرور والفرح ومداومة الأكل والشرب .

[21] والسعادة تنقسم إلى خمسة أقسام إلى الرأي الثاقب وإلى الإحساس الصحيح وإلى التأني في الأمور وإلى الطلاقة والبشاشة والسامحة مع الناس وإلى الغناء في جميع الأمور النافعة في العالم فالرأي الصحيح يكون من تقدّم الارتياض في الأدب ومن معاناة التجارب الكثيرة والإحساس الصحيح يتم بأن تكون الأعضاء سليمة فيدرك البصر مبصوراته والسمع مسموعاته والشم مشموماته والذوق مذاقاته على الجهة المحموده اللائقة الحسنة والتأني هو أن يقترن النجاح والسداد بجميع ما يتولى الإنسان ويفكر فيه والبشاشة وطلاقة الوجه ومحبة الناس فهي على أن الإنسان يجتمع على ذكر الإنسان بالجميل .

[22] والصنائع تنقسم إلى ثلاثة أقسام إلى الأولى والثانية والثالثة فالأولى بعدما يدعو الحاجة إليه بمنزلة الصناعة المخرجة الحديد من المعدن والصناعة التي تشقّ الخشب والثانية هي الفاعمة في هذه كصناعة الحدادين والنجارة وصناعة الحدادين تفعل من الحديد سلاحا والنجارة تفعل من الخشب زمرا وعودا والثالثة هي المستعملة لهذ كصناعة الفروسية المستعملة للجم وصناعة المتصلة المستعملة للسيف والسكين والموسيقية المستعملة للعيان والنايات فهذه هي أقسام الصناعة .

[23] والخير ينقسم إلى أربعة أقسام إلى قنية الفضيلة والمقتنى للفضيلة يدعى رجلا خيرا وإلى العدالة والتقوى وإلى رياضة الجسم بالأغذية والأدوية الموافقة وإلى الصنائع كصناعة الزمر والرقص وغيرهما فإن المقتنين في هذه الصنائع يدعون أختيارا وأجناس الخير فهي هذه .

[24] والموجودات تنقسم إلى المحمودة والمذمومة والعامدة للأمرين جميعا والمذمومة فهي التي تثمر الأذية والشر كالحمق والغشم وما أشبه ذلك وأضدادها التي تفيد الخير والمتوسطة بينهما فهي التي تارة تكون محبوبة وتارة تكون مكروهة كالحركة والسكون وما أشبه ذلك من التصرف وبالجملة جميع الأشياء التي في نفوسها لا محبوبة ولا مكروهة ولا محمودة ولا مذمومة لكنها فهي كذلك بالقياس إلى بعضها بعض فهذه أقسام الموجودات .

[25] والتدبير بحسب السنة ينقسم إلى ثلاثة أقسام الأول التدبير بحسب سنة حسنة في نفسها شأن أهل مدينة ما استعمالها فإنه ماذا امتثلوا مراسيمها جرت أمورهم وأمور مدينتهم على الصواب المستقيم والثاني التدبير بحسب سنة جرت في مدينة بالعادة والمتابعة فأهل كل مدينة إذا أخذوها عاشوا بها عيشة مرضية والثالث التدبير الذي يكون بحسب عادة سديدة جميلة حميدة جرت لأهل مدينة عند عدم السنة فيها فأهل تلك المدينة إذا ساروا بحسب عادتهم جرى أمرهم على الأمر المستقيم والسداد والصالح وأقسام التدبير على حسب السنة فهي هذه الأقسام الثلاثة .

[20] L'amicizia si suddivide in tre classi: l'amicizia sincera che si manifesta in pace, nei luoghi d'incontro; l'amicizia che prevede il sostegno dell'uomo all'amico nelle difficoltà; l'amicizia che nasce dalla riunione, dal dialogo, dalla felicità, dalla serenità e dalla condivisione del cibo e delle bevande.

[21] La felicità si suddivide in cinque classi: l'opinione perspicace, la sensazione corretta, la prosperità nelle situazioni, la cordialità, il sorriso e la generosità nei confronti delle persone, e la ricchezza in tutte le cose utili nel mondo. L'opinione perspicace avviene attraverso l'allenamento nelle lettere e la fatica delle numerose sperimentazioni. La sensazione corretta si ha attraverso la salute degli organi, cosicché gli occhi possano cogliere le cose visibili, l'orecchio le cose udibili, l'olfatto le cose odorate e il senso del gusto le cose assaporate, secondo la maniera adatta e corretta. L'essere paziente si ha quando successo e fortuna si associano a tutte le cose che l'uomo intraprende e alle quali pensa. Il sorriso, la cordialità del volto e la filantropia si manifestano quando l'uomo ha l'attitudine a pensare bene degli altri uomini.

[22] Le arti si suddividono in tre classi: la prima, la seconda e la terza. La prima riguarda ciò di cui si ha bisogno, come l'arte che produce il ferro dalla miniera e l'arte che fende il legno. La seconda è il completamento della prima, come l'arte dei fabbri e della falegnameria; l'arte dei fabbri produce le armi dal ferro e l'arte della falegnameria produce il flauto e il liuto dal legno. La terza è quella che impiega la seconda, come l'arte dell'equitazione che usa la briglia, l'arte connessa che richiede l'uso della spada e del coltello, o quella della musica che usa i pifferi e i flauti. Dunque, queste sono le classi dell'arte.

[23] Il bene si suddivide in quattro classi: possedere la virtù, e chi possiede la virtù si chiama uomo buono; la giustizia e il timore (di Dio); la buona salute del corpo (ottenuta) con cibi e medicinali appropriati; le arti, come quella di suonare e di ballare e cose simili: coloro che possiedono queste arti si dicono "buoni" (artisti). Quindi, i generi del bene sono questi.

[24] Le cose esistenti⁷⁷ si suddividono in lodevoli, biasimevoli e nell'assenza di queste due cose. Le (cose) biasimevoli sono quelle che producono il danno e il male, come la pazzia e l'ingiustizia e cose simili a esse; contrarie a queste sono quelle che portano al bene. Le cose mediane tra le due talvolta sono lecite e talvolta non lecite, come il movimento e la quiete e cose simili a ciò in relazione al comportamento. In generale, tutte le cose di per sé non sono né lecite né illecite, né lodevoli né biasimevoli, ma sono così nella relazione tra le une e le altre. Dunque, queste sono le classi delle cose esistenti.

[25] Il governo in base alla legge si suddivide in tre classi. Il primo è quello che si basa su di una legge di per sé buona e usata dagli abitanti di una determinata città: se essi seguono le sue prescrizioni, le loro faccende personali e quelle della loro città seguiranno un percorso giusto. Il secondo è il governo basato su una legge praticata nella città seguendo la consuetudine e l'imitazione: se gli abitanti di tutta la città la seguissero, vivrebbero in modo soddisfacente. Il terzo è il governo che si basa su di una consuetudine adeguata, bella e lodevole, che gli abitanti della città seguono (anche) in assenza della legge: se gli abitanti di questa città seguono la loro consuetudine, le loro faccende procedono in modo retto, giusto e corretto. Le classi di governo secondo la legge sono queste tre.

⁷⁷ A τὰ ὄντα del greco corrisponde qui *al-mawǧūdāt*.

[26] والتدابير بخلاف السنة تنقسم إلى ثلاثة أقسام إلى التدبير المؤدي إلى ارتكاب الطرق القبيحة وغشم الضعفاء وإلى التدبير المؤدي إلى مخالفة سنة المدينة التي جرت بها العادة وإلى التدبير الذي لا يلتفت معه إلى سنة وإلى شريعة .

[27] والمقابلات تنقسم إلى ثلاثة أقسام إلى مقابلة الشر للخير بمنزلة العدالة للرجوع والعلم والجهل وما أشبه ذلك ومقابلة الشر للشر كالشره لكلال الشهوة وإلى مقابلة ما ليس خيراً ولا شرّاً كالثقل للخفة والسرعة للإبطاء والسواد للبياض والمقابلات فهي هذه .

[28] والخيرات تنقسم إلى ثلاثة أقسام إلى الخيرات المقتناة وإلى الخيرات الموجودة في الأمور وإلى الخيرات القائمة بنفوسها فالخيرات المقتناة كالعدالة والصحة والخيرات الموجودة في الأمور فهي الخيرات التي لا تمكن أن توجد مفردة من المقتنى لها كالتقي والخير نفسها والخيرات القائمة بنفوسها فهي التي لا تمكن أن تكون موجودة في غيرها ولا مقتناة بغيرها بل تكون مفردة بذواتها كالرجل البار والتقى فهذه أقسام الخيرات .

[29] والرأي ينقسم إلى ثلاثة أقسام إلى رأي يتعلق بالزمان الماضي وإلى رأي يتعلق بالزمان الحاضر وإلى رأي يتعلق بالزمان المستأنف فالرأي المتعلق بالزمان الماضي يكون بالمقايسة كقول القائل إن القلائن عرض لهم عارض ما لما فعلوا فعلا ما والرأي المتعلق بالحاضر كقول القائل القوة الطبيعية ضعيفة والمدة طويلة والمادة قليلة والمتعلق بالزمان المستأنف كظن الظان أنه لا ينبغي أن يصغي إلى الرسل لئلا يجتلي على ضعفنا فهذه أقسام المشورة .

[30] والصوت ينقسم إلى قسمين إلى صوت ذي نفس وإلى صوت غير ذي نفس فصوت ذي النفس كأصوات الحيوان وصوت غير ذي النفس كالتصفيق والقارقر وصوت ذي النفس منه ما يكتب ومنه ما لا يكتب فأصوات الناس تكتب وأصوات باقي الحيوان لا تكتب .

[31] والأمور بأسرها منها متقسمة ومنها غير متقسمة فالمتقسمة منها متشابهة الأجزاء ومنها غير متشابهة الأجزاء وغير المتقسمة كالنقطة والوحدة والنغمة والمتقسمة المتشابهة الأجزاء فهي التي الجزء منها ولكل واحد إلا في العظم كالذهب والماء وسائر الذائبات والجاريات والغير المتشابهة الأجزاء كالبيت والسفينة فهذه أقسام الأمور .

[32] وقد تنقسم قسمة أخرى على هذه الصفة الأمور منها ما هي قائمة بنفوسها ومنها ما تقال بالقياس فالأمور القائمة بنفوسها فهي التي لا يحتاج العقل في فهمها إلى شيء آخر بمنزلة الإنسان والثور وما في الحيوان والتي تقال بالقياس هي التي تفهم بالقياس إلى غيرها كالكبير والصغير وما أشبه ذلك فإن الكبير فإمّا يقال كبيراً بالقياس إلى الصغير والصغير بالقياس إلى الكبير فالأمور إلى هذين القسمين تنقسم . تمت .

[26] Il governo contro la legge si suddivide in tre classi: il governo che porta commettere azioni ingiuste e opprimere i deboli; il governo che va contro la legge della città stabilita dalla consuetudine, e il governo che non osserva né la legge (umana) né quella divina.

[27] I contrari si suddividono in tre tipi: la contrapposizione tra il male e il bene, come la giustizia all'ingiustizia e la scienza all'ignoranza e cose simili; la contrapposizione tra male e male, come il mangiare quando non si ha più fame per ingordigia; la contrapposizione di ciò che non è né bene né male, come la pesantezza rispetto alla leggerezza, la velocità rispetto alla lentezza e il nero rispetto al bianco. Dunque, i contrari sono questi.

[28] I beni si suddividono in tre classi: i beni procurati, i beni esistenti nelle cose e i beni sussistenti di per sé. I beni procurati sono come la giustizia e la salute. I beni nelle cose esistenti sono quei beni che non possono esistere in modo isolato da chi li procura, come il timore di Dio. Il bene in sé e i beni sussistenti di per sé sono quelli che non possono esistere in altro e nemmeno possono essere procurati da altro ma esistono esclusivamente per essenza propria, come l'uomo onesto e timorato di Dio. Queste sono le classi dei beni.

[29] L'opinione si suddivide in tre classi: l'opinione legata al tempo passato, l'opinione legata al tempo presente e l'opinione legata al tempo futuro. L'opinione legata al tempo passato è come il discorso di colui che dice che i Lacedemoni incontrarono una certa difficoltà quando fecero una certa azione. L'opinione legata al presente è come dire "la forza naturale è debole, la durata è lunga e la materia è poca". L'opinione legata al futuro è come la convinzione di colui che pensa che non sia necessario seguire incondizionatamente gli ambasciatori,⁷⁸ e questo affinché non si veda la nostra debolezza.⁷⁹ Queste sono le classi del consiglio.⁸⁰

[30] La voce si suddivide in due classi: la voce degli esseri animati e la voce degli esseri inanimati. La voce degli esseri animati è come la voce dell'animale; la voce degli esseri inanimati è come il battere delle mani e i tuoni. Della voce degli esseri animati vi è ciò che si scrive e ciò che non si scrive: la voce degli uomini si scrive e la voce dell'animale non si scrive.

[31] Le cose nel loro insieme sono o divisibili oppure indivisibili. Appartengono alle (cose) divisibili sia quelle che hanno parti simili sia quelle che non hanno parti simili. Le cose indivisibili sono come il punto, l'unità, il suono. Le cose divisibili che hanno parti simili sono quelle in cui la parte (è uguale) al tutto salvo che nella massa, come l'oro, l'acqua e altre cose che si dissolvono e si disperdono. Le (cose) indivisibili che hanno parti non simili sono come la casa e la nave. Queste sono le classi delle cose.

[32] Le cose, inoltre, possono seguire un'altra suddivisione come la seguente: vi sono quelle sussistenti di per sé e quelle che si dicono per analogia. Le cose che sono sussistenti di per sé sono quelle per capire le quali l'intelletto non ha bisogno di altro, come l'uomo, il toro e il resto degli animali. Quelle che si dicono per analogia sono quelle che si capiscono in relazione ad un'altra cosa diversa da esse, come "grande", "piccolo" e cose simili a ciò. Il "grande" si dice per analogia al "piccolo" e il "piccolo" per analogia al "grande". Dunque, le cose si suddividono secondo queste due classi. Fine.

⁷⁸ "Ambasciatori" è traduzione letterale dell'arabo *rusul* (pl. di *rasūl*, comunemente usato nel senso di 'profeta').

⁷⁹ Kellermann-Rost, *ibid.* (cit. n. 9), p. 95 n. 7, segnala la difficoltà di questa frase.

⁸⁰ Il termine usato è *al-mašūra*: a differenza di tutti gli altri casi, non viene ripreso nella conclusione il termine usato all'inizio (*al-ra'y*).

9. Note critiche

Le note che seguono accompagnano, sotto forma di succinto aiuto alla lettura, la *Translatio Syriaca* e le due *Translationes Arabae*. Per queste ultime, esse sono spesso ispirate da quelle redatte da M. Kellermann-Rost,⁸¹ ma se ne distinguono in più punti. Non solo ho sistematicamente aggiunto il testo greco della *Recensio Laertiana*, accompagnato dalla traduzione italiana del medesimo (che riproduce, se non indicato altrimenti, quella di C. Rossitto), ma ho anche integrato là dove necessario i dati riuniti da M. Kellermann-Rost con altri elementi utili alla comprensione di quei testi. Ho insistito, in particolare, sulle numerose e consistenti differenze fra il testo a oggi conservato delle *DA* nelle due *Translationes Arabae* e quello greco della *Recensio Laertiana* quale restaurato attraverso la testimonianza dei codici bizantini delle *Vite dei filosofi* di Diogene. Queste divergenze, come spero di avere provato, non possono, se non in casi isolati, essere interpretate come ‘varianti’ specifiche a un presunto modello greco diverso dall’archetipo dei codici laerziani. Esse sono piuttosto il risultato delle successive fasi di riscrittura, revisione e manipolazione nel mondo arabo del modello greco lontano attraverso (almeno per Ibn al-Ṭayyib) un intermediario siriano corrotto sempre di più nel corso della sua trasmissione plurisecolare.

*Translatio anonyma Syriaca*⁸²

[17]

Vedi *supra*, p. 15.

[29]

Part of it (the counsel) belongs to times that have passed, part to present times, and part again to future times] In greco (§ 106, 1163-4) leggiamo ἐν μὲν ἐκ παροισχυμένων χρόνον λαμβανόμενον, ἐν δὲ ἐκ τῶν μελλόντων, ἐν δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεστώτων, “di esso, infatti, una [specie] si trae dal tempo passato, un’altra dal futuro, un’altra ancora dal presente”. L’inversione si ritrova anche nella traduzione araba di Ibn al-Ṭayyib.

Le parole “is taken in short” nella frase “from present times [counsel] is taken in short, as when someone counsels and says” sono un’aggiunta rispetto al greco (§ 106, 1166), che tramanda solo τὰ δ’ ἐκ τῶν παρόντων, “un’altra ancora dal presente”. Anche la frase “as when someone counsels and says” manca in greco e l’omissione si spiega facilmente supponendo che si tratti di una glossa esplicativa per rendere più chiaro il testo.

⁸¹ Ogni divisione è indicata in testa nella forma [1], [2] ecc. I lemmi delle traduzioni sono stampati in corsivo e delimitati da una parentesi quadra chiusa (]). I rimandi al testo greco, che nelle edizioni di Brock e della Kellermann-Rost erano fatti alla vecchia raccolta di Mutschmann, seguono qui la mia edizione (cit. n. 2) della *Recensio Laertiana* trasmessa nel III libro delle *Vite* di Diogene Laerzio (III 80-109). Il sistema di citazione della *Recensio Laertiana* prevede il rimando al paragrafo di quel libro seguito dal rigo (o dai rigi) della mia edizione. Il che dà (in un esempio fittizio): § 81, 870 (Dorandi). Le citazioni da una delle tre *recensiones* indipendenti da quella di Diogene riproducono l’edizione di Dorandi, “Le *Divisiones quae dicuntur Aristoteleae*” (cit. n. 1) e sono indicate con il nome della specifica *recensio* seguito dal numero della *DA*, dalla pagina e dal rigo (o dai rigi). Esempio (anch’esso fittizio): *Recensio Marciana* [1], p. 18.3. Poiché riproduco il testo greco, ho ritenuto inutile aggiungere un rinvio alle (o una concordanza con le) pagine e rigi dell’edizione di Mutschmann indicate da Kellermann-Rost e Brock.

⁸² A differenza di Brock, “An Abbreviated Syriac Version” (cit. n. 14), p. 95 n. 13 che stampa in corsivo le parole che mancano nel greco della tradizione laerziana, ho preferito, per uniformità con il metodo seguito per le *Translationes Arabae*, segnalare qui di seguito queste poche differenze eliminando i corsivi dalla traduzione.

Translatio Araba Abū Qurra

[1]

In arabo leggiamo “l’unione fra fratelli”, in greco abbiamo φίλοι, “gli amici” (οἱ δὲ φίλοι) invece di “fratelli” (ἀδελφοί). È possibile che si tratti di una traduzione *ad sensum* più che di una variante οἱ δὲ ἀδελφοί per οἱ δὲ φίλοι.

La frase “dei beni che sono esterni sia all’anima che al corpo” è un probabile ampliamento esegetico rispetto al greco che ha solo τὰ δὲ ἐκτός, “altri (beni) sono esterni”.

Come in tutte le restanti *DA* in questa traduzione manca la ricapitolazione finale. A differenza di Kellermann-Rost, ho evitato di ripetere ogni volta alla fine delle singole *DA* questa indicazione. Maggiori dettagli sull’importanza di questo dato, *infra*, p. 47 (comm. alla *DA* [1] nella traduzione di Ibn al-Ṭayyib).

[2]

L’amore di amicizia è quello che esite grazie all’abitudine e alla vicinanza, come l’amore di Pilade verso Oreste In greco (§ 81, 876-9) ἐταιρικὴν δὲ καλοῦμεν τὴν ἀπὸ συνηθείας γινομένην καὶ μηδὲν προσήκουσαν γένει, ἀλλ’ οἷον ἢ Πυλάδου πρὸς Ὀρέστην, “chiamiamo poi [amicizia] sociale quella che nasce dalla consuetudine non dalla stirpe: per esempio quella di Pilade verso Oreste”. L’inizio è rimaneggiato e vi manca almeno la traduzione di καὶ μηδὲν προσήκουσαν γένει, ἀλλ’ (877).

[3]

Qui e più avanti, con “il potere dei banditi” viene tradotto l’aggettivo ὀλιγαρχικόν (*sc.* εἶδος) del greco: la terza specie (εἶδος) della costituzione (πολιτεία) è quella “oligarchica” (τρίτον ὀλιγαρχικόν).

Il potere della gente comune è come un grande governatore che designa coloro che devono governare ed emana le leggi In greco (§ 82, 885-6) δημοκρατία μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ἐν αἷς πόλεσι κρατεῖ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τοὺς νόμους δι’ ἑαυτοῦ αἰρεῖται, “la specie democratica è in quelle città in cui la moltitudine domina e sceglie da sé i magistrati e le leggi”.

Il potere dei nobili non è né il potere dei ricchi né dei poveri e nemmeno del principato dei nobili, ma è il governatorato di coloro che possiedono la virtù per gli abitanti della città In greco (§ 82, 887-9) ἀριστοκρατία δὲ ἐστίν, ἐν ἧ μὴθ’ οἱ πλούσιοι μὴθ’ οἱ πένητες μὴθ’ οἱ ἐνδοξοὶ ἄρχουσιν, ἀλλ’ οἱ ἄριστοι τῆς πόλεως προστατοῦσιν, “aristocrazia è quella in cui né i ricchi né i poveri né coloro che godono di alta reputazione comandano, ma i migliori reggono la città”. La frase è giudicata corrotta di M. Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 109 n. 7-7: “Der arabische Text ist an dieser Stelle nicht in Ordnung. Der griechische Text legt es nahe, die Stelle so zu verbessern, wie ich es versucht habe”. La studiosa traduce (p. 109-10): “Was die Herrschaft der Edlen anlangt, so ist sie nicht eine Herrschaft der Reichen, auch nicht der Armen und ebensowenig die Macht der Edlen, sondern die Macht der Vortrefflichen über die Staatsbürger”.

Il potere dei banditi è quello che si compra per denaro Il testo è rimaneggiato rispetto al greco. La frase “che si compra per denaro” è in greco riferita alla descrizione del potere monarchico che segue e che è esemplificato con l’esempio dei re Cartaginesi (vedi *infra*). La traduzione “che si compra per denaro” è comunque interessante dal punto di vista della costituzione del testo greco. Essa lascia infatti presupporre πωλωτῆ γάρ ἐστιν dei codici laerziani e esclude pertanto la congettura πολιτικῆ di Cobet. M. Gigante, *Diogene Laerzio. Vite dei filosofi*, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2002⁵, p. 498 n. 207 aveva corretto il raro πωλωτῆ nella forma più usuale (ma con lo stesso senso) ὠνητῆ.

La frase che segue in greco (890-1) ἐλάττους γάρ εἰσιν οἱ πλούσιοι τῶν πενήτων, “infatti i ricchi sono meno numerosi che i poveri” manca in arabo, omessa forse volontariamente.

Il potere dei re Cartaginesi, ad esempio, avviene secondo la tradizione del loro paese, dove i figli ereditano dopo i padri, perché essi non ricorrono alla proclamazione come fanno gli altri popoli stranieri per i loro re] Il testo greco (892-3) è molto più breve: ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐν Καρχηδόνι κατὰ νόμον· πωλητὴ γάρ ἐστιν, “infatti a Cartagine esso [il regno] è per legge: infatti è in vendita”. Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 110 traduce la seconda parte: “wobei die Söhne sie (die Herrschaft) nach den Vätern erben; denn sie tätigen nicht untereinander einen Verkauf, so wie andere Könige der Fremden die Königsherrschaft unter sich verkaufen” e nella n. 3-3 *ad loc.* commenta “Im Griechischen steht das Gegenteil: πωλητὴ γάρ ἐστιν”. Ma si veda quanto ho sopra osservato.

Nella traduzione araba manca καὶ Μακρηδονία (§ 83, 893: ἡ δὲ ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι καὶ Μακρηδονία).

La trasmissione del potere appartiene ai nobili e a coloro che possiedono le casate] In greco leggiamo ἀπὸ γάρ τινος γένους ποιοῦνται τὴν βασιλείαν, “infatti [i cittadini] istituiscono il regno in base alla stirpe”.

[4]

La frase “che è necessario da parte nostra praticare” è un’aggiunta in arabo.

La cura delle tradizioni e delle leggi e la loro conservazione, il servizio delle moschee, delle chiese e dei luoghi di preghiera fanno parte della giustizia che pratichiamo verso Dio] In greco (§ 83, 901-2) οἱ μὲν γάρ θύοντες κατὰ νόμους καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι δῆλον ὅτι περὶ θεοῦς εὐσεβοῦσιν, “coloro infatti che fanno sacrifici e si prendono cura dei templi evidentemente sono pii nei confronti degli dèi”.

Quanto allo scavo delle tombe e al seppellimento dei morti] In greco (§ 83, 904) οἱ δὲ τῶν μνημείων ἐπιμελοῦμενοι, “coloro che si prendono cura delle tombe”.

Per la recezione di questa *DA* nella lettura filosofica araba vedi *supra*, p. 13-14.

[5]

Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 111 n. 7 nota: “Der ganze Abschnitt stimmt mit dem Griechischen (7a12-9a6 Mutsch. = § 84, 908-20 Dor.) wenig überein”.

Nella traduzione araba, nella presentazione della divisione delle tre specie della scienza – pratica, poietica e teoretica –, la successione diviene: sapere poietico, pratico e teoretico.

Il sapere poietico è come il mercante e l’artigiano il cui atto esiste in modo visibile e sussistente] In greco (§ 83, 909-10) ἡ μὲν οἰκοδομικὴ καὶ ναυπηγικὴ ποιητικαὶ εἰσιν, “la scienza di costruire case e quella di costruire navi sono poietiche”.

La conoscenza delle virtù e la logica] In greco (915) ἀρμονικὴ, “l’armonica”.

Da questo sapere non si genera qualcosa di sussistente come nel sapere poietico, e il suo risultato non è immateriale come nel sapere pratico, perché il sapiente fissa dentro di sé ciò che cerca e desidera imparare]

La frase in greco ha tutt’altra struttura e senso (915-9) ἡ δὲ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἀρμονικὴ καὶ ἀστρολογικὴ θεωρητικαί· οὔτε γάρ πράττουσιν οὔτε ποιοῦσιν οὐθέν· ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν γεωμέτρης θεωρεῖ πῶς πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἔχουσιν αἱ γραμμαί, ὁ δ’ ἀρμονικὸς τοὺς φθόγγους, ὁ δ’ ἀστρολογικὸς τὰ ἄστρα καὶ τὸν κόσμον, “la geometria, l’armonica e l’astronomia, poi sono teoretiche: infatti non agiscono né producono alcunché; ma il geometra (la geometria, Rossitto) indaga come le linee stanno in rapporto fra di loro, l’armonico indaga i suoni, l’astronomo gli astri e l’universo”.

Dopo “il cantante”, manca la traduzione di πολιτικὴ (911), “l’altro fa politica”.

[6]

Anche questa divisione è assai manipolata. L'elenco delle cinque specie della medicina (farmaceutica, chirurgica, dietetica, diagnostica e del pronto soccorso) è seguita dalla descrizione delle ultime due soltanto: diagnostica (νοσογνωμονική) e pronto soccorso (βοηθητική), invertite nell'ordine (pronto soccorso e diagnostica) e completate da un'aggiunta all'otria al greco.

La medicina della domanda consiste nell'aiuto che dà l'ammalato al medico e la verità in ciò che dice] In greco (§ 85, 926-7) ἡ δὲ νοσογνωμονική διὰ τοῦ γνῶναι τὸ ἀρρώστημα, "la diagnostica col conoscere la natura dell'infermità".

Con indicazioni non chiare dei luoghi infiammati, che l'ammalato non conosce anche qualora volesse darle informazione] Questa frase è una aggiunta della traduzione araba.

[7]

La traduzione di questa *DA* non è conservata.

[8]

Nella redazione attuale la divisione è abbreviata rispetto al greco.

Discorso politico] "Politico" è correzione di M. Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 112 n. 1, a partire dal testo greco (λόγος) πολιτικός, per "seconda specie" del manoscritto, che farebbe presumere un'impossibile lezione greca δεύτερος.

Il testo greco della prima parte della divisione è corrotto. Si veda la mia nota *ad loc.* alla traduzione di Ibn al-Ṭayyib (*infra*, p. 49).

E dai poeti nella poesia e] Aggiunta della traduzione araba.

Qui e poco più oltre, "plebe e mercanti" e "pubblico (lett.: del mercato)" traducono οἱ ἰδιῶται e ἰδιωτικός del greco.

Quello che comprende le prove, il dialogo e la disputa, detto discorso argomentativo] In greco è tramandato (§ 87, 946-8) ἑτέρα δὲ διαίρεσις λόγου, ὃν οἱ κατὰ βραχὺ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι τοῖς ἐρωτῶσιν <διαλέγονται> (*add.* ed. Frobeniana), "un'altra divisione del discorso è quella di cui si servono coloro che brevemente domandano e rispondono alle domande".

E quando indicano i loro strumenti] Aggiunta della traduzione araba.

[9]

I suonatori di flauto] Aggiunta della traduzione araba.

"Mediante la mano" è correzione a partire dal greco della Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 112 n. 9 per "mediante la voce" del manoscritto, che lascerebbe presupporre una lezione greca διὰ φωνῆς invece di διὰ χειρῶν.

Il cantante e l'organo] In greco (955) ἡ καθαρωδία, "il canto accompagnato dalla cetra".

La frase finale "Inoltre, chi si muove è due tipi: o si muove per intero, come il ballerino, oppure con una parte" è una aggiunta della traduzione araba.

[10]

Per la questione delicata del numero dei membri della divisione, vedi *supra*, p. 10-11.

[11]

La purezza del volto e la bellezza dell'immagine] In greco (§ 89, 972) solo ἡ διὰ τῆς ὀψεως εὐμορφία, "la bellezza di forme alla vista".

[12]

La traduzione di questa *DA* non è conservata.

[13]

Con la giustizia la loro esattezza] In greco (§ 91, 990-1) ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη τοῦ ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις καὶ τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δικαιοπραγεῖν, “la giustizia è causa del comportarsi in maniera giusta nelle relazioni sociali e nelle transazioni”.

Con la gloria e il rigore la fedeltà e la difesa] In greco (§ 91, 991-2) ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία τοῦ ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις καὶ φοβεροῖς μὴ ἐξίστασθαι ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ μένειν, “il coraggio è causa del non indietreggiare, ma del rimanere fermi, nelle situazioni di pericolo e di paura”.

Con la virtù il rigetto degli appetiti cattivi nel modo corretto e tutto ciò è la perfezione dell'onore e il suo completamento] Come mi fa notare I. Marjani, la sintassi della frase è complessa, ma è da escludere la proposta di traduzione suggerita dalla Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 113: “durch die Besonnenheit die Zurückweisung der schlechten Begierden, ebenso durch Rechtschaffenheit. Dies alles ist Vollkommenheit und Vollendung des Vortrefflichen”. In margine a questa traduzione, la studiosa osserva (n. 7-7) che per “ebenso durch Rechtschaffenheit” della traduzione araba il greco (§ 91, 994) ha ἀλλὰ κοσμίως ζῆν, “bensì del vivere ordinatamente” e aggiunge inoltre (n. 8-8) che la frase “Dies alles ist Vollkommenheit und Vollendung des Vortrefflichen” rimpiazza la ricapitolazione finale della *DA* che è d’abitudine omessa in questa redazione.

[14]

Gli ultimi due termini dell’elenco delle cinque parti del comando (ἀρχή), “secondo stirpe” e “secondo violenza” (κατὰ γένος e κατὰ βίαν) sono invertiti nella traduzione araba dove leggiamo “per oppressione e per nobiltà”.

Ed è raro che avvenga qualcosa di diverso da questo] In greco (§ 92, 1001-02) abbiamo un testo differente: οὐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις, “non solo negli uomini, ma anche negli altri animali”.

Dopo “il potere dai loro nobili”, è apparentemente omessa la frase che segue in greco (1008-09) καὶ ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἄρχουσι, “anche in Macedonia comandano nello stesso modo”.

Dopo “con la violenza e l’inganno”, mancano le parole (1010) ἀκόντων τῶν πολιτῶν, “(comandano) sui cittadini che non vogliono”.

[15]

La divisione, quale conservata oggi, è completamente riscritta rispetto al testo greco della *Recensio Laertiana*.

Le frasi “l’incitamento, il divieto, l’ingiuria, la giustificazione, l’invettiva e l’elogio” e “e nel soccorso della gente del porto, e la definizione da parte delle persone di ciò che c’è di virtuoso in questo” sono aggiunte della traduzione araba.

È il contrario di tutto ciò] In greco (§ 93, 1016-7) leggiamo ὅταν δ’ ἀξιῶσι μὴ πολεμεῖν <ἢ> μὴ συμμαχεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδός ἐστιν ἀποτροπή, “qualora invece si richieda di non fare guerra o di non stringere alleanza, ma di stare in pace, tale specie è dissuasione”. La traduzione della Rossitto è stata leggermente ritoccata per adattarla al nuovo testo greco da me stabilito.

È come quando diciamo ciò che è successo alla gente di una determinata città e ad una determinata tribù, oppure quando parliamo di un uomo che ha fatto un'azione detestabile e viene colpito da una grande disgrazia, cosicché la gente si è affrettata a parlare di questo fatto e a diffonderlo] In greco (§ 93, 1018-20) leggiamo ὅταν τις φάσκη ἀδικεῖσθαι ὑπό τινος καὶ πολλῶν κακῶν αἴτιον ἀποφαίνη· τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον εἶδος κατηγορία ὀνομάζεται, “qualora uno dichiari di avere subito ingiustizia da qualcuno e mostri che è colpevole di molti mali: tale specie è denominata accusa”.

È come discolorare un uomo nel nostro discorso] In greco (§ 93, 1021-3) leggiamo ὅταν ἀποφαίνη αὐτὸν μηθὲν ἀδικοῦντα μήτε ἄλλο ἄτοπον μηθὲν πράττοντα· τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἀπολογία καλοῦσι, “qualora uno mostri che lui stesso non ha commesso alcuna ingiustizia né ha compiuto alcun'altra azione inammissibile: tale specie la chiamano difesa”.

È come colui che descrive le virtù] In greco (§ 93, 1023-5) leggiamo ὅταν τις εὖ λέγῃ καὶ ἀποφαίνῃ καλὸν κάγαθόν· τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον εἶδος καλεῖται ἐγκώμιον, “qualora uno parli bene [di qualcuno] e provi che è di nobile virtù; tale specie si chiama encomio”.

È come colui che menziona cose oscene] In greco (§ 93, 1025-6) leggiamo ὅταν τις ἀποφαίνῃ φαῦλον· τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον εἶδος καλεῖται ψόγος, “qualora uno mostri che [qualcuno] è cattivo; tale specie si chiama biasimo”.

[16]

Il confronto con la versione siriana è interessante per avere una idea dell'evoluzione della trasmissione di questo testo nelle traduzioni arabe.

Le frasi “è il successo di colui che parla” e “tutto ciò deve verificarsi al momento giusto, nel luogo appropriato, davanti alle persone adatte e senza eccesso” è aggiunta della traduzione araba.

È ciò che avviene con l'intenzione e che porta all'utilità] In greco (§ 94, 1033-4) leggiamo τὸ δὲ ὅσα δεῖ λέγειν, μὴ πλείω μηδὲ ἐλάττω τῶν ἰκανῶν, “(il “quante cose” bisogna dire) è [dire] né di più né di meno delle cose sufficienti”.

Consideriamo che un uomo tenga il suo discorso correttamente, nella posizione di un anziano, mentre lo considereremmo errato se si trovasse nella posizione dei giovani] In greco (§ 95, 1034-8) leggiamo τὸ δὲ πρὸς οὓς δεῖ λέγειν, ἂν τε πρὸς πρεσβυτέρους {ἀμαρτάνοντας} (del. Menagius) διαλέγῃ, ἀρμόττοντας δεῖ τοὺς λόγους διαλέγεσθαι ὡς πρεσβυτέροις· ἂν τε πρὸς νεωτέρους, ἀρμόττοντας δεῖ <δια>λέγεσθαι (Cobet) ὡς νεωτέροις, “l' ‘a chi’ bisogna dire, poi [consiste in questo:] se [uno] parla ai più anziani deve fare i discorsi che si addicono ai più anziani; e se parla ai più giovani deve fare i discorsi che si addicono ai più giovani”. Per i problemi connessi con il restauro del testo greco e sull'apporto della *Translatio Syriaca*, vedi *supra*, p. 16-17.

L'uso di ciò che rende gradevole è il discorso fatto al momento giusto, davanti alle persone adatte e nella sede giusta. Il discorso nel momento giusto è come il discorso pubblico dopo le preghiere. Davanti alle persone adatte è come recitare la poesia davanti a persone curiose di fatti insoliti. Nella sede giusta è come la lettura dei patti nelle moschee. Quanto al suo limite, è come la metà tra l'eccesso e la manchevolezza] In greco (§ 95, 1038-9) leggiamo soltanto πηνίκα δὲ λέγειν ἐστὶ, μήτε προτέρω μήτε ὑστέρω· εἰ δὲ μή, διαμαρτήσεσθαι καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐρεῖν, “il ‘quando’ dire infine, è né prima né dopo: se non si farà così, si sbaglierà e non si dirà correttamente”. “Die letzte Definition ist sehr ausgeschmückt” secondo Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 115 n. 6-6.

[17]

L'utile è di quattro specie] “Die Aufzählung fehlt im Arabischen”, afferma Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 115 n. 7.

È come dare i soldi nelle preghiere ed altro] In greco (§ 95, 1042-3) leggiamo ὅταν δεομένων παραβοηθήσῃ τις εἰς χρημάτων λόγον εὐπορήσῃαι, “(Si benefica) dunque con le ricchezze quando qualcuno porta aiuto a chi ha bisogno di essere sollevato dalla miseria”. Sul passo, vedi *supra*, p. 15.

È come la cura con le mani e il camminare con i piedi] In greco (§ 95, 1043-4) leggiamo τοῖς δὲ σώμασιν εὖ ποιοῦσιν ἀλλήλους, ὅταν παραγενόμενοι τυπτομένοις παραβοηθῶσιν, “col corpo, poi, fanno del bene tra di loro, quando [alcuni], essendo presenti, portano soccorso a quelli che vengono colpiti”.

È come l'utilità della scienza per il discente] In greco (§ 95, 1044-6) leggiamo οἱ δὲ παιδεύοντες καὶ ἰατρεύοντες καὶ διδάσκοντες ἀγαθόν τι, οὗτοι δὲ τὰς ἐπιστήμας εὐεργετοῦσιν, “coloro che educano, che esercitano la medicina e coloro che insegnano qualcosa di buono, costoro beneficiano con le scienze”.

È come quando un uomo si rende utile a un suo amico davanti ad un giudice oppure ad un sovrano con una parola o con più parole] In greco (§ 96, 1046-8) leggiamo ὅταν δ' εἰσέλθωσιν εἰς δικαστήριον ἄλλος ὑπὲρ ἄλλου βοηθῆς καὶ λόγον τινὰ ἐπεικῆ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ εἴπῃ, οὗτος δὲ λόγῳ εὐεργετεῖ, “qualora poi uno si presenti in tribunale per fare il difensore di un altro e pronunci un qualche discorso conveniente in favore di lui, costui benefica col discorso”.

[18]

Attraverso la volontà, la natura, l'arte e lo sforzo] Aggiunta della traduzione araba.

E come una cosa condivisa da tutti] In greco (§ 96, 1052-3) leggiamo ὅταν ψήφισμα γένηται καὶ τοῦθ' ὁ νόμος τελέσῃ, “qualora vi sia un decreto ed una legge porti a compimento quest'ultimo”.

La frase “quando tramonta il sole” è una aggiunta della traduzione araba. Nel seguito, manca la traduzione delle parole (1054-5) καὶ ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς καὶ αἱ ὄραι, “l'anno e le stagioni”.

[19]

La traduzione di questa *DA* non è conservata.

[20]

Per la genesi dell'errore (*φιλία* per *φιλανθρωπία*), vedi *supra*, p. 11.

La frase “il terzo è essere socievoli con il fratello nel discorso e nel racconto, nel cibo e nel bere” traduce il greco (§ 98, 1077) φιλοδειπνισταὶ εἰσι, “alcuni che amano offrire pranzi”. Una traduzione simile leggiamo in Ibn al-Ṭayyib.

[21]

La divisione è trasmessa in una forma assai ridotta rispetto al testo dell'originale greco.

[22]

Dopo “legna dal bosco e dalla boscaglia”, manca la traduzione delle parole (§ 100, 1100) παρασκευαστικὰ γὰρ εἰσιν, “esse infatti sono preparatorie”.

[23]

La giustizia, la rettitudine e cose ad essi simili] In greco (§ 101, 1107-10) leggiamo ὧν ἐν μὲν λέγομεν εἶναι τὸν τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντα ἰδίᾳ ἀγαθόν· ἄλλο δὲ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην λέγομεν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, “di questi l’uno [è quello per cui] diciamo che è bene colui che possiede la virtù di per sé; un altro [è quello per cui] diciamo che sono beni la virtù stessa e la la giustizia”.

Dopo “per il corpo”, manca la traduzione delle parole (1110) καὶ γυμνάσια τὰ πρόσφορα, “e gli esercizi fisici adeguati”.

Le parole “e il canto”; “con i vari strumenti musicali” e la frase “questo è descritto come benessere, e coloro che ne godono sono chiamati ‘gente che se la passa bene’” sono aggiunte della traduzione araba.

[24]

Per la traduzione di τὰ ὄντα, vedi Marjani, *supra*, p. 31 n. 72 e p. 37 n. 77.

Alla fine, dopo “il mangiare e il bere” manca la traduzione della frase greca (§ 102, 1122-5) <ἢ> ὀλως μῆτε ὠφελῆσαι μῆτε βλάψαι δυνάμενα, ταῦτα γοῦν οὔτε ἀγαθὰ οὔτε κακὰ ἐστὶ, “oppure che non fanno danno né procurano vantaggio affatto”.

[25]-[26]

La traduzione di queste *DA* non è conservata.

[28]

Quelli stabili sono quelli specifici di un uomo, che nessun altro può possedere o condividere] In greco (§ 105, 1157-60) leggiamo un testo più lungo: ὑπαρκτὰ δέ, ὅσα μῆτε μετασχεῖν μῆτε σχεῖν ἐνδέχεται, ὑπάρχειν δὲ δεῖ· οἷον τὸ σπουδαῖον εἶναι <καὶ> (*add.* Stephanus) τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι ἀγαθόν ἐστὶ· καὶ ταῦτα οὔτε σχεῖν οὔτε μετασχεῖν ἐστὶν, ἀλλ’ ὑπάρχειν δεῖ {σπουδαῖον εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι} (*del.* Basileenses), “sussistenti, infine sono quanti non è possibile né possederli né parteciparne, ma bisogna che siano sussistenti; per esempio l’essere onesto (schiavo [*sic*], Rossitto) e l’essere giusto sono beni: e queste cose non è possibile né possederle né parteciparvi, bensì devono essere sussistenti”. È probabile che il modello greco non fosse corrotto dalla presenza della glossa finale (σπουδαῖον εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι) che manca anche nella traduzione di Ibn al-Ṭayyib. La presenza in quest’ultima traduzione di tracce dell’esempio (“come l’uomo onesto e timorato di Dio”) esclude la possibilità che la frase che comincia con ὑπάρχειν δὲ e contiene l’esempio fosse caduta nel modello greco comune per *saut du même au même* (ὑπάρχειν δὲ – δεῖ ὑπάρχειν δεῖ).

[29]-[32]

La traduzione di queste *DA* non è conservata.

Translatio Araba Ibn al-Ṭayyib

[1]

Solo qui e in *DA* [10] sono ancora conservate le ricapitolazioni finali. Per l’importanza di questo dato, vedi *supra*, p. 7-10. In tutte le altre *DA* la ricapitolazione finale è fortemente ridotta a poche parole di riassunto del tipo: “Quindi i tipi di x (nome del oggetto della divisione: beni, amicizia, giustizia ecc.) sono y (numero delle divisioni del medesimo oggetto: due, tre, quattro ecc.)”. Kellermann-Rost in maniera meno precisa scrive d’abitudine “Die Einzelaufzählung fehlt”. In realtà, la ricapitolazione non manca, ma è riassunta. A differenza della studiosa, non ho ritenuto necessario ripetere alla fine di ogni divisione l’indicazione del fenomeno.

[2]

Altra gente aggiunge l'amore che è l'amore esistente tra gli innamorati. Ne consegue quindi che le specie di amore sono quattro] La frase finale rielabora con alcuni ampliamenti le parole conclusive della divisione (§ 81, 880-1) προστιθέασι δέ τινες τετάρτην ἐρωτικήν, “alcuni però aggiungono [come] quarta [l'amicizia] amorosa” con l'aggiunta finale “Ne consegue quindi che le specie di amore sono quattro”, di cui non è traccia in greco.

[3]

Ire dei Caldei] Caldei per Cartaginesi (ἐν Καρχηδόνι) – presente greco, ma anche in Abū Qurra – è un errore banalizzante introdottosi con buona probabilità nel corso della trasmissione del testo arabo.

[4]

Eccelso è il Suo nome] Aggiunta in arabo.

Nell'elenco manca la seconda specie della divisione della δικαιοσύνη, quella relativa agli uomini (§ 83, 900), ἡ δὲ περὶ ἀνθρώπους, caduta probabilmente per un errore meccanico (non sappiamo a quale livello della trasmissione) come prova il fatto che questa seconda specie è discussa nel seguito nell'ordine trasmesso dai manoscritti greci.

Le parole “eccelso è il Suo nome” e “verso i loro predecessori” sono un'aggiunta in arabo.

Per la recezione della *DA* nella lettura filosofica in lingua araba, vedi *supra*, p. 17-19.

[5]

La successione delle prime due specie della divisione (“la scienza artigianale, la scienza della politica”) è invertita rispetto al greco che ha τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ πρακτικόν, τὸ δὲ ποιητικόν, “una specie è pratica, l'altra poetica”.

La scienza delle realtà] Le parole corrispondono al greco τὸ θεωρητικόν, “la teoretica”. Vedi la nota *ad loc.* di Marjani, p. 31 n. 72.

Dopo “ma ciò che ne risulta è una successione”, manca la traduzione della frase (§ 84, 913-4) ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐλεῖ καὶ κιθαρίζει, ὁ δὲ πολιτεύεται, “l'uno infatti suona l'aulo e la cetra, l'altro fa politica”.

La geometria e l'astronomia fanno parte delle scienze delle realtà: non producono una cosa sensibile e concreta e nemmeno qualcosa che esiste in successione, perché il loro fine è la scienza del calcolo. Se riesci a capire come ciò accade, allora vedrai che l'oggetto della geometria sono le linee e il suo fine è conoscere le relazioni tra queste; l'astronomo ha per oggetto i pianeti e il suo fine è conoscerne i movimenti] La traduzione araba rende in maniera assai libera (forse riscrive) il corrispondente testo greco (§ 84, 914-9) ἡ δὲ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἀρμονικὴ καὶ ἀστρολογικὴ θεωρητικαί· οὔτε γὰρ πράττουσιν οὔτε ποιοῦσιν οὐθέν· ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν γεωμέτρης θεωρεῖ πῶς πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἔχουσιν αἱ γραμμαί, ὁ δ' ἀρμονικὸς τοὺς φθόγγους, ὁ δ' ἀστρολογικὸς τὰ ἄστρα καὶ τὸν κόσμον, “la geometria, l'armonica e l'astronomia, poi, sono teoretiche: infatti non agiscono né producono alcunché; ma il geometra (la geometria, Rossitto) indaga come le linee stanno in rapporto fra loro, l'armonico indaga i suoni, l'astronomo gli astri e l'universo”.

Dopo “l'astronomia”, manca la traduzione delle parole καὶ ἀρμονικὴ, “l'armonica”, che potrebbero essere cadute già nel modello greco per omoteleuto dopo ἡ δὲ γεωμετρικὴ, “la geometria”, che precede.

[6]

Le parole “è legata all’utilità per la salute” sono una aggiunta in arabo.

Il nutrimento] In greco, la dietetica (διαιτητικόν) occupa il terzo posto nell’elenco delle cinque specie della medicina.

Del nutrimento deve essere dato (solo) ciò conserva la forza del malato] In greco la definizione della dietetica (διαιτητικόν) segue quella della chirurgia (χειρουργικόν).

Bruciare] Aggiunta in arabo.

La conoscenza delle malattie avviene con una ricerca approfondita per conoscere il tipo di malattia, con cui escogitare la via per sopprimerla] In greco (§ 85, 926-7) ἡ δὲ νοσογνωμονικὴ διὰ τοῦ γνῶναι τὸ ἀρρώστημα, “la diagnostica col conoscere la natura dell’infermità”.

Quanto al sostegno, è a partire dall’aiuto della natura e dal suo sollevamento che avviene la liberazione dalle malattie] In greco (§ 85, 927-8) ἡ δὲ βοηθητικὴ διὰ τοῦ βοηθῆσαι εἰς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀπαλλάττει τῆς ἀλγηδόνος, “il pronto soccorso libera dal dolore del momento”.

[8]

All’inizio, le parole “le specie del discorso sono cinque” sono in siriano: Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 86 n. 1-1.

Il testo greco della prima parte della divisione è corrotto. Nella mia edizione ho stampato (accettando il suggerimento di R. Kassel) ἑτέρα δὲ διαίρεσις λόγου, ὃν οἱ ῥήτορες {γράφουσιν εἰς ἐπίδειξιν} (secl. Kassel) προφέρουσιν εἰς ἐγκώμια καὶ ψόγους καὶ κατηγορίας <καὶ ἀπολογία> (add. Wendland, *qui participium velut γράφοντες desiderat*). τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον εἶδος ἐστὶ ῥητορικόν, “un’altra divisione del discorso è quella che i retori proferiscono in vista di encomi, di biasimi e di accuse e di difesa; tale specie è retorica” (trad. Rossito riadattata al mio testo). Per la *constitutio textus*, vedi T. Dorandi, “Notes critiques et exégétiques aux livres III et IV des *Vies des philosophes* de Diogène Laërce”, *Eikasmós* 19 (2008), p. 248-9. Nella versione araba di Abū Qurra quale conservata, questi righe non sono tradotti. Nella traduzione di Ibn al-Ṭayyib, le parole “con la quale essi si divertono” potrebbe presupporre la presenza nel testo greco del suo modello di qualcosa di simile alla paradosi dei codici laerziani (γράφουσιν εἰς ἐπίδειξιν B: γρ. εἰς ἐπίδειξιν τε P: γρ. καὶ εἰς ἐπίδειξιν F), peraltro insostenibile (vedi l’apparato *ad loc.* di Dorandi, *Diogenes Laertius* [cit. n. 2], p. 285).

Qui e poco più oltre, “la gente comune e gli sciocchi” e “discorso futile e ignorante” traducono οἱ ἰδιῶται e ἰδιωτικός del greco.

Le frasi “attraverso la cordialità, la frode, la gentilezza e la furbizia” e “i maestri delle scienze” sono un’aggiunta in arabo.

[9]

Come quando suoniamo uno strumento a fiato e balliamo] In greco (§ 88, 955) κιθαροῦδία, “il canto accompagnato dalla cetra”.

[10]

Per la questione del numero dei membri della divisione, vedi *supra*, p. 7, 10.

[11]

La bellezza del volto e dell’aspetto] In greco (§ 89, 972) solo ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως εὐμορφία, “la bellezza di forme alla vista”.

La bellezza della casa e della proprietà] In greco (§ 89, 972) οἶον ὄργανον καὶ οἰκία, “per esempio, uno strumento, una casa” con inversione dei termini di confronto.

In greco (§ 89, 975 e 977), qui e più avanti, “piacere” traduce ὠφέλεια (πρὸς ὠφέλειαν, “rispetto al vantaggio”).

[12]

La felicità, la serenità] endiadi nell’arabo.

L’angustia, la felicità, la serenità, il coraggio e l’ira] In greco (§ 90, 984-5), la successione dei termini è θαρρεῖν καὶ ἠδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ὀργιζέσθαι, “essere coraggiosi, provare piacere e dolore e andare in collera”.

[13]

La saggezza è il sapere le cose secondo la loro verità] In greco (§ 91, 989-90) τούτων ἡ μὲν φρόνησις αἰτία τοῦ πράττειν ὀρθῶς τὰ πράγματα, “di queste la saggezza è causa dell’agire rettamente”.

La giustizia è ciò che è utile per l’uomo nell’utilizzare la verità verso di sé e verso gli altri] In greco (§ 91, 990-1) ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη τοῦ ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις καὶ τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δικαιοπραγεῖν, “la giustizia è causa del comportarsi in maniera giusta nelle relazioni sociali e nelle transazioni”.

Il coraggio è una virtù che sostiene l’uomo nell’affrontare le guerre e i fatti spaventosi e lo incoraggia nell’aver pazienza] In greco (§ 91, 991-2) ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία τοῦ ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις καὶ φοβεροῖς μὴ ἐξίστασθαι ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ μένειν, “Il coraggio è causa del non indietreggiare, ma del rimanere fermi, nelle situazioni di pericolo e di paura”.

La rettitudine aiuta l’uomo a tenersi lontano dalle cose cattive desiderabili, nell’evitare l’oppressione e l’ingiustizia e nel vivere una vita sana e lontana dal vizio] In greco (§ 91, 993-4) ἡ δὲ σωφροσύνη τοῦ κρατεῖν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ὑπὸ μηδεμιᾶς ἡδονῆς δουλοῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ κοσμίως ζῆν, “La temperanza è causa del dominare i desideri e del non essere schiavi di alcun piacere, bensì del vivere ordinatamente”.

[14]

Il dominio secondo la legge è quello che trova il consenso degli abitanti di tutta la città] In greco (§ 92, 999-1001) οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄρχοντες ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπὶ ἀίρεθῶσι, κατὰ νόμον ἄρχουσιν, “coloro dunque che comandano nelle città, qualora siano eletti dai cittadini, comandano secondo legge”.

Come il caprone e altri] Aggiunta in arabo.

Quello secondo la stirpe è come il dominio del figlio dopo il padre, secondo la consuetudine in vigore nel popolo dei Macedoni] La traduzione araba dà un testo abbreviato rispetto a quello greco (§ 92, 1005-09) κατὰ γένος δὲ ἀρχὴ τοιαύτη τις λέγεται, οἷαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι βασιλεῖς ἄρχουσιν· ἀπὸ γὰρ γένους τινὸς ἢ βασιλεία. καὶ ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἄρχουσι· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἀπὸ γένους ἢ βασιλεία καθίσταται, “qualcuno dice che comando secondo stirpe è tale quale quello che esercitano i re lacedemoni: il regno, infatti, deriva da una qualche stirpe. Anche in Macedonia comandano nello stesso modo: anche là, infatti, il regno è stabilito da una stirpe”.

Il dominio del figlio dopo il padre] Aggiunta in arabo.

Il governo per mezzo dell’oppressione è quello che sussiste con la forza] In greco (§ 92, 1009-11) leggiamo οἱ δὲ βιασάμενοι ἢ παρακρουσάμενοι ἄρχουσιν ἀκόντων τῶν πολιτῶν· ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ κατὰ βίαν λέγεται εἶναι, “vi sono infine coloro che comandano sui cittadini che non

vogliono, dopo averli costretti con la violenza e con l'inganno: tale comando si dice che è secondo violenza”.

[15]

Nella lista delle sei specie dell'oratoria, manca la quinta, l'encomio (ἐγκώμιον). Le definizioni inoltre delle singole specie sono assai abbreviate e riscritte (almeno nella redazione che conserviamo) rispetto al greco della *Recensio Laertiana*. In greco leggiamo (§ 93-4, 1014-26) τῆς ῥητορείας εἶδη ἐστὶν ἕξ· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ κελεύωσι πολεμεῖν ἢ συμμαχεῖν πρὸς τινα, καλεῖται τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος προτροπή. ὅταν δ' ἀξιώσῃ μὴ πολεμεῖν <ἢ> μὴ συμμαχεῖν, ἀλλ' ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος ἐστὶν ἀποτροπή. τρίτον εἶδος τῆς ῥητορείας, ὅταν τις φάσκη ἀδικεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τινος καὶ πολλῶν κακῶν αἴτιον ἀποφαίνῃ· τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον εἶδος κατηγορία ὀνομάζεται. τέταρτον εἶδος τῆς ῥητορείας {ἀπολογία καλεῖται}, ὅταν ἀποφαίνῃ αὐτὸν μὴδὲν ἀδικοῦντα μῆτε ἄλλο ἄτοπον μὴδὲν πράττοντα· τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἀπολογίαν καλοῦσι. 94 πέμπτον εἶδος ῥητορείας, ὅταν τις εὖ λέγῃ καὶ ἀποφαίνῃ καλὸν κάγαθόν· τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον εἶδος καλεῖται ἐγκώμιον. ἕκτον εἶδος, ὅταν τις ἀποφαίνῃ φαῦλον· τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον εἶδος καλεῖται ψόγος, “dell'oratoria vi sono sei specie: qualora infatti si inciti a fare guerra o a stringere alleanza nei confronti di qualcuno, tale specie si chiama esortazione; qualora invece si richieda di non fare guerra né di stringere alleanze, ma di stare in pace, tale specie è dissuasione. Una terza specie dell'oratoria vi è qualora uno dichiari di aver subito ingiustizia da qualcuno e mostri che è colpevole di molti mali: tale specie è denominata accusa. Una quarta specie dell'oratoria vi è qualora uno mostri che lui stesso non ha commesso alcuna ingiustizia né ha compiuto alcun'altra azione inammissibile: tale specie la chiamano difesa. Vi è una quinta specie di oratoria: qualora uno parli bene [di qualcuno] e provi che è di nobile virtù; tale specie si chiama encomio. Una sesta specie vi è qualora uno mostri che [qualcuno] è cattivo: tale specie si chiama biasimo”.

[16]

Nell'elenco delle quattro parti in cui si divide “Il dire rettamente”, la terza (“a chi' bisogna dire”) e la quarta (“quando' bisogna dire”) sono invertite rispetto al greco.

E gli ignorantanti] Aggiunta in arabo.

Alla fine della divisione, manca la traduzione della frase (§ 95, 1039) εἰ δὲ μή, διαμαρτήσεσθαι καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐρεῖν, “se non si farà così, si sbaglierà e non si dirà correttamente”.

Sulla divisione, vedi *supra*, p. 15-16.

[17]

Nell'elenco iniziale dei quattro tipi di beneficio (εὐεργεσία), la successione della traduzione araba differisce da quella del greco della *Recensio Laertiana* – ricchezze, corpo, scienze e discorsi (ἢ γὰρ χρήμασιν ἢ σώμασιν ἢ ταῖς ἐπιστήμασις ἢ τοῖς λόγοις, “infatti [si benefica] o con le ricchezze o con il corpo o con le scienze o con i discorsi”). Contrariamente a quanto scrive Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 90 n. 2, le altre *Recensiones* (*Marc.* [44] p. 26, 1-2; *Flor.* [43] p. 42, 2-3; *Leid.* [44] p. 55, 1-2), non hanno la medesima successione della traduzione araba – ricchezza, scienze, discorso e corpo –, ma piuttosto: discorso, scienza e tecniche, ricchezza e corpi. Nel seguito della divisione, la versione araba segue comunque la successione iniziale della *Recensio Laertiana*.

Ottenga sollievo da un dolore che lo colpisce] Aggiunta in arabo.

È come l'utilità delle scienze, delle arti, delle lettere e dell'educazione intellettuale] In greco (§ 96, 1044-6) οἱ δὲ παιδεύοντες καὶ ἰατρούοντες καὶ διδάσκοντες ἀγαθόν τι, οὗτοι δὴ ταῖς

ἐπιστήμας εὐεργετοῦσιν, “coloro che educano, che esercitano la medicina e coloro che insegnano qualcosa di buono, costoro beneficiano con le scienze”.

È come il sostegno dell'uomo eloquente all'uomo balbuziente nella seduta del processo] In greco (§ 96, 1046-8) leggiamo un testo differente: ὅταν δ' εἰσέλθωσιν εἰς δικαστήριον ἄλλος ὑπὲρ ἄλλου βουηθὸς καὶ λόγον τινὰ ἐπιεικῆ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ εἴπη, οὗτος δὴ λόγῳ εὐεργετεῖ, “Qualora poi uno si presenti in tribunale per fare il difensore di un altro e pronunci un qualche discorso conveniente in favore di lui, costui beneficia col discorso”.

[18]

Legislativo, naturale, artigianale e quello che si accorda con la buona sorte] Aggiunta in arabo.

È quello che si raggiunge con la riflessione perspicace] In greco (§ 96, 1051-3) leggiamo ἐν μὲν κατὰ νόμον τέλος τὰ πράγματα λαμβάνει, ὅταν ψήφισμα γένηται καὶ τοῦθ' ὁ νόμος τελέσῃ, “in un caso le cose raggiungono il compimento secondo al legge, qualora vi sia un decreto ed una legge porti a compimento quest'ultimo”.

Il fine naturale è quello che si raggiunge a suo tempo] In greco (§ 96, 1053-5) κατὰ φύσιν δὲ τέλος τὰ πράγματα λαμβάνει, ἢ τε ἡμέρα καὶ ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς καὶ αἱ ὥραι, “le cose, poi, raggiungono il compimento secondo natura, [per esempio] il giorno, l'anno e le stagioni”.

Come la forma della casa e la forma della nave, che sono il fine dell'arte della costruzione e dell'arte della falegnameria] In greco (§ 96, 1056-7) κατὰ τέχνην δὲ τέλος τὰ πράγματα λαμβάνει, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομική· οἰκίαν γὰρ {τις} ἐπιτελεῖ· καὶ ἡ ναυπηγική· πλοῦα γάρ, “le cose, ancora, raggiungono il compimento secondo arte, per esempio l'arte di costruire case: essa infatti porta a compimento una casa; [come] anche l'arte di costruire navi: infatti [essa porta a compimento] le navi”.

[19]

La possibilità e la potenza] Endiadi dell'arabo. La stessa forma di endiadi si ritrova alla fine della divisione, ma con i termini invertiti (“della potenza e della possibilità”).

Dopo “della servitù”, manca la traduzione della frase greca (§ 97, 1065-6) ὄθεν καλεῖται <ὁ> πολλήν δύναμιν ἔχων βασιλεύς, “per cui si dice di un re che ha molta potenza”.

Dopo “il male”, manca la traduzione della frase greca (§ 97, 1067-8) οἷον ἀρρωστεῖν καὶ παιδεύεσθαι δυνάμεθα καὶ ὑγιεῖς γίνεσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, “per esempio possiamo essere infermi, essere educati, diventare sani e tutte le cose di questo tipo”.

[20]

“Amicizia” presuppone un testo greco φιλία invece di φιλανθρωπία. Per la genesi dell'errore vedi *supra*, p. 11.

Dopo, “luoghi d'incontro”, manca la traduzione della frase greca (§ 98, 1074-5) καὶ τὴν δεξιὰν ἐμβάλλοντες χαιρετίζουσιν, “li salutano porgendo la destra”.

Dalla riunione, dal dialogo, dalla felicità, dalla serenità e dalla condivisione del cibo e delle bevande] Traduzione ampliata del semplice sostantivo greco (§ 98, 1077) φιλοδειπνισταί εἰσι, “alcuni che amano offrire pranzi”. Una traduzione simile leggiamo in Abū Qurra.

[21]

La cordialità, il sorriso e la generosità nei confronti delle persone] Traduzione del greco (§ 98, 1082-3) εὐδοξία παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, “buona reputazione presso gli uomini”. In seguito, la parola εὐδοξία,

“buona reputazione” (§ 98, 1084) è tradotta “Il sorriso, la cordialità del volto e la filantropia si manifestano”.

Nel mondo] Traduzione del greco (§ 98, 1084) εἰς τὸν βίον, “(cose utili) alla vita”.

Dopo le parole “alle quali pensa”, manca la traduzione della frase greca (§ 99, 1090) ἃ δεῖ πράττειν τὸν σπουδαῖον, “che deve realizzare l’uomo onesto”.

Alla fine, manca la descrizione della εὐπορία, “abbondanza”.

[22]

Riguarda ciò di cui si ha bisogno] In greco leggiamo (§ 100, 1100) παρασκευαστικαὶ γὰρ εἰσιν, “esse infatti sono preparatorie”.

Dal legno] Manca nel codice e è reintrodotta a partire dal testo greco (1102-03 ἐκ τῶν ξυλῶν) da Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 92 n. 5-5.

L’arte connessa] In greco leggiamo (§ 100, 1104) πολεμική, “l’arte della guerra”.

Della spada e del coltello] Endiadi in arabo per ὅπλα, “le armi”.

[23]

La giustizia e il timore (di Dio)] In greco (§ 101, 1109) ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην, “La virtù stessa e la giustizia”.

La buona salute del corpo (ottenuta) con cibi e medicinali appropriati] In greco (1110-1) τρίτον δέ, οἷον σιτία καὶ γυμνάσια τὰ πρόσφορα καὶ φάρμακα, “ve ne è un terzo, per esempio i cibi, gli esercizi fisici adeguati e i farmaci”.

Le parole “Le arti” e la frase “coloro che possiedono queste arti si dicono “buoni” (artisti)” sono un’aggiunta in arabo.

[24]

Le cose esistenti si suddividono in lodevoli, biasimevoli e nell’assenza di queste due cose] Nella redazione greca (§ 102, 1117), la divisione degli enti (τὰ ὄντα) in “mali” precede quella degli enti in “beni”: “Degli enti, gli uni sono mali, gli altri beni, gli altri ancora nessuno dei due”.

Per la traduzione di τὰ ὄντα, vedi le note di Marjani, *supra*, p. 31 n. 72 e p. 37 n. 77.

Che producono il danno e il male] In greco (§ 102, 1118-9) κακὰ μὲν ταῦτα λέγομεν, τὰ δυνάμενα βλάπτειν αἰεί, “di questi diciamo che sono mali quelli che possono sempre recare danno”.

Le cose mediane tra le due talvolta sono lecite e talvolta non lecite] In greco (§ 102, 1120-1) τὰ δὲ τούτοις ἐναντία ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ. τὰ δὲ ἐνίοτε μὲν ὠφελεῖν, ἐνίοτε δὲ βλάπτειν, “i contrari di questi, poi, sono beni. Quelli che, infine, a volte possono procurare vantaggio, a volte fare danno”.

E cose simili a ciò in relazione al comportamento] In greco (§ 102, 1122), καὶ ἐσθίειν, “e il mangiare”.

Ma sono così nella relazione tra le une e le altre] Aggiunta in arabo.

[25]

Le frasi “se essi seguono le sue prescrizioni, le loro faccende personali e quelle della loro città seguiranno un percorso giusto”; “seguendo la consuetudine e l’imitazione” e “se gli abitanti di questa città seguono la loro consuetudine, le loro faccende procedono in modo retto, giusto e corretto” sono aggiunte in arabo.

[26]

Il commettere azioni ingiuste e opprimere i deboli] In greco (§ 103, 1135-6) διαιρεῖται ἡ ἀνομία εἰς τρία· ὧν ἓν ἐστὶν, ἐὰν ὧσιν οἱ νόμοι μοχθηροὶ καὶ πρὸς ξένους καὶ πρὸς πολίτας, “l’illegalità si divide in tre [specie]: di queste una vi è se le leggi sono malvagie sia verso gli stranieri sia verso i cittadini”.

Che va contro la legge della città stabilita dalla consuetudine] In greco (§ 104, 1137) ἕτερον δέ, ἐὰν τοῖς ὑπάρχουσι μὴ πείθονται, “un’altra se non si ubbidisce a quelle esistenti”.

[27]

Dopo “per ingordigia”, manca la traduzione della frase greca (§ 104, 1144-5) καὶ τὸ ἀδίκως στρεβλοῦσθαι τῷ δικαίως στρεβλοῦσθαι, “e il subire una tortura ingiustamente al subirla giustamente”.

[28]

Nella classificazione, dopo “i beni procurati”, manca la traduzione della frase greca (§ 105, 1152-3) ὅσα ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν, “quanti è possibile possedere”.

Che non possono esistere in modo isolato da chi li procura] In greco (§ 105, 1154-5) ὅσα ἔχειν μὲν μὴ ἐνδέχεται, μετασχεῖν δὲ αὐτῶν ἐνδέχεται, “quanti non è possibile possedere, ma è possibile partecipare di essi”.

Dopo “il timore di Dio”, manca la traduzione della frase greca (§ 105, 1155-7) οἷον αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχειν μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, μετασχεῖν δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐνδέχεται, “per esempio, il bene in sé non è possibile possederlo, ma è possibile partecipare di esso”. Si tratta con buona probabilità di una perdita nata per *saut du même au même* (ἐνδέχεται – ἐνδέχεται) già nel modello greco.

Come l’uomo onesto e timorato di Dio] In greco (§ 105, 1157-8) οἷον τὸ σπουδαῖον εἶναι <καὶ> τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ, “per esempio l’essere onesto e l’essere giusto sono beni”.

[29]

L’opinione legata al tempo presente e l’opinione legata al tempo futuro] In greco (§ 106, 1163-4), ἐν δὲ ἐκ τῶν μελλόντων, ἐν δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεστώτων, “di esso, infatti, una [specie] si trae dal tempo futuro, un’altra ancora dal presente”. L’inversione si ritrova anche nella traduzione siriana. Vedi *supra*, p. 40.

Come il discorso di colui che dice che i Lacedemoni incontrarono una certa difficoltà quando fecero una certa azione] In greco (§ 106, 1156-7) οἷον τί ἔπαθον Λακεδαιμόνιοι πιστεύσαντες, “per esempio ciò che i Lacedemoni patirono per essersi fidati”.

La forza naturale è debole] In greco (§ 106, 1167) τείχη ἀσθενῆ, “le mura sono deboli”.

La durata è lunga] In greco (§ 106, 1168) δειλούς ἀνθρώπους, “gli uomini [sono] vili”.

L’opinione legata al futuro è come la convinzione di colui che pensa che non sia necessario seguire incondizionatamente dei profeti, e questo affinché non si veda la nostra debolezza] “Die Lesung dieser Stelle ist unsicher, da sie sehr flüchtig geschriben ist. Sie soll 37 a 7-9 [= § 106, 1168-9 τὰ δ’ ἐκ τῶν μελλόντων, οἷον ταῖς ὑπονοίαις μὴ ἀδικεῖν τὰς πρεσβείας, ὅπως μὴ ἄδοξος ἢ Ἑλλάς γένηται, “ciò che si trae dal futuro è per esempio non commettere ingiustizia verso le ambascerie a causa dei sospetti, così che l’Ellade non perda la reputazione”] wiedergegeben” Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend* (cit. n. 9), p. 95 n. 7-7. La studiosa traduce: “(Die mit Zukunft verbundene (Meinung) ist wie der Glaube dessen, der meint, daß es nicht nötig sei, den Gesandten gegenüber lauter zu sein, damit nicht auf unsere Schwäche geblickt werde”.

[30]

Ciò che si scrive] Traduzione per il greco ἐγγράμματος, “(voce) articolata”.

Ciò che non si scrive] Traduzione per il greco ἀγράμματος, “(voce) inarticolata”.

[31]

Prima di “come il punto”, manca la traduzione della frase greca (§ 107, 1180-1) ἀμερῆ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὅσα μὴ ἔχει διαίρεσιν μηδὲ ἕκ τινος σύγκειται, “composti di parti, invece, sono tutti quelli che sono composti di qualcosa”.

Dopo “il suono”, manca la traduzione della frase greca (§ 107, 1182-3) μεριστὰ δὲ ὅσα ἕκ τινος σύγκειται, οἷον αἶ τε συλλαβαὶ καὶ συμφωνίαι καὶ ζῶα καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ χρυσός, “quelli che sono composti di qualcosa, per esempio sia le sillabe, sia gli accordi, sia gli animali, sia l’acqua, sia l’oro”.

Le cose divisibili che hanno parti simili sono quelle in cui la parte (è uguale) al tutto salvo che nella massa] In greco (§ 108, 1183-5) leggiamo ὁμοιομερῆ <μὲν> ὅσα ἐξ ὁμοίων <μερῶν> σύγκειται καὶ μηδὲν διαφέρει τὸ ὅλον τοῦ μέρους εἰ μὴ τῷ πλήθει, “omeomeri sono tutti quelli che sono composti di [parti] simili e [in cui] il tutto differisce in nulla dalla parte se non per la grande quantità”.

Dopo le parole “che hanno parti non simili”, manca la traduzione della frase greca (§ 108, 1187) ἀνομοιομερῆ δὲ ὅσα ἐξ ἀνομοίων μερῶν σύγκειται, “anomeomeri sono invece quelli che sono composti di parti dissimili”.

Sono come la casa, la nave] In greco (§ 108, 1188) leggiamo καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, “e simili”.

[32]

Il toro] In greco (§ 108, 1193) εἰς ἵππος, “cavallo”.

Dopo le parole “il resto degli animali”, manca la traduzione della frase greca (§ 109, 1194) τούτων γὰρ οὐδὲν δι’ ἐρμηνείας χωρεῖ, “nessuno infatti di questi progredisce per mezzo di una spiegazione”.

Quelle che si dicono per analogia sono quelle che si capiscono in relazione ad un’altra cosa diversa da esse, come “grande”, “piccolo” e cose simili a ciò. Il “grande” si dice per analogia al “piccolo” e il “piccolo” per analogia al “grande”] In greco (§ 109, 1195-9) il testo è strutturato in maniera diversa e più dettagliata: τῶν δὲ πρὸς τι λεγομένων ὅσα προσδεῖται τινος ἐρμηνείας, οἷον τὸ μεῖζόν τινος καὶ τὸ θᾶττον τινος καὶ τὸ κάλλιον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· τό τε γὰρ μεῖζον ἐλάττωνός ἐστι μεῖζον καὶ τὸ θᾶττον <θᾶττόν> (add. Cobet) τινός ἐστι. τῶν ὄντων ἄρα τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ καθ’ αὐτὰ λέγεται, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι, “sono invece detti in relazione a qualcosa quanti mancano ancora di una qualche spiegazione, per esempio ciò che è più grande di qualcosa, ciò che è più veloce di qualcosa, ciò che è più bello [di qualcosa] e simili: infatti sia ciò che è più grande è più grande del più piccolo, sia ciò che è più veloce è più veloce”.

Menander in Syriac: From Euthalian Apparatus to Scholia on Gregory of Nazianzus

Yury N. Arzhanov*

Abstract

The collection of moral maxims known as the “Syriac Menander” has much in common with the new Christian educational models of the fourth-fifth centuries, which established the Bible, especially the books of Proverbs and Jesus Sirach, as alternatives to the gnomic collections attributed to Menander. The Syriac reception of the “Euthalian apparatus” adopted for the study of the orations of Gregory of Nazianzus gave birth to new collections of sentences, which were closely connected with the name of Menander. The evidence presented in the article helps us to better understanding the reception of the figure of Menander in Syriac literature.

1. Educational background of the “Syriac Menander”

“Syriac Menander” refers to three collections of moral sentences that differ in volume and in some minor details but in general contain the same version of the text:¹

(A) The florilegium in BL *Add.* 14658 (ff. 163vb-167vb)² dated to the seventh century is the earliest and largest collection of sentences bearing the title “Menander the Sage said ...”.³

(B) A selection from A is found on the fly-leaves of BL *Add.* 14598 (ff. 1v-3r) under the name “the Greek philosopher Homer”.⁴ The codex was copied in the seventh-ninth centuries, but the script of the flyleaves is later and may be dated to the tenth-thirteenth centuries.⁵

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¹ The sigla are taken from: Y. Arzhanov, “Amrus Philosophus Graecus: A New Witness to the Syriac Sentences of Menander”, *Le Muséon* 130.1-2 (2017), pp. 71-121.

² Cf. W. Wright, *Catalogue of Syriac manuscripts in the British Museum, acquired since the year 1838*, vol. 3, Longmans & Co. - Asher & Co., London 1872, pp. 1154-60.

³ The text of the anthology was published for the first time in J.P.N. Land, *Anecdota Syriaca*, t. 1, Brill, Leiden 1862, pp. 64-73. Cf. A. Baumstark, “Lucubrationes Syro-Graecae”, *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie* 21, *Supplementband* (1894), (353-524) pp. 473-90. English translation: T. Baarda, “The Sentences of the Syriac Menander”, in J.H. Charlesworth (ed.), *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, vol. 2, Hendrickson Publishers, New York 1985, pp. 583-606. A new edition with an English translation: D.G. Monaco, *The Sentences of the Syriac Menander: Introduction, Text and Translation, and Commentary*, Gorgias Press, Piscataway 2013. Cf. W. Frankenberg, “Die Schrift des Menander (Land *anecd. syr.* I, S. 64ff.), ein Produkt der jüdischen Spruchweisheit”, *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* 15 (1895), pp. 226-77; J.-P. Audet, “La sagesse de Ménandre l'Égyptien”, *Revue biblique* 59 (1952), pp. 55-81.

⁴ Published in: Arzhanov, “Amrus Philosophus Graecus” (above, n. 1).

⁵ Cf. Wright, *Catalogue* (above, n. 2), vol. 2, pp. 731-2; Arzhanov, “Amrus Philosophus Graecus” (above, n. 1), pp. 76-8.

(E) An epitome of A is found in BL *Add.* 14614 (ff. 116r-117r) dated to the eighth century.⁶ It was included in a composite anthology of excerpts that comprises ff. 114r-121v of the codex and bears the general title “Select Sayings of the Philosophers on Upright Conduct”. The full versions of the fragments inserted in the collection are to a large extent found in BL *Add.* 14658, i.e. in the codex containing A.

The collection of B ascribed to Homer is a remarkable witness to the combination of the two names in Syriac. Homer is the only figure besides Menander that appears in A in the *chreia* included in the florilegium, and that could have served as an impulse for the scribe of B to attribute the whole anthology to Homer instead of Menander. The association of both authors is characteristic of the Egyptian papyri that have preserved school exercises used in literary education.⁷ A visual expression of this association may be found in double herms from the Roman period.⁸

The scholastic background⁹ becomes evident in the following passage of the Syriac florilegium ascribed to “Menander the Sage” (collection A):¹⁰

If your son goes forth from his childhood humble and wise, teach him writing and wisdom.
For writing is something that is good to learn.
It means enlightened eyes and excellent tongue.

The motive to learn writing (τὰ γράμματα) is predominant in two Greek-Coptic collections of *Menandrou gnomai*, which probably derive from a Coptic monastery and include not only the *monostichoi*, but also quotations from the Book of Proverbs.¹¹ The combination of these two sources is characteristic of the Syriac florilegium which bears the name of Menander.¹² It reflects the educational program established by the writings of the Cappadocian Fathers in the late fourth-early fifth centuries¹³ and adopted in Syriac monasteries. The “Syriac Menander” as product of this cultural development may probably be dated to the fifth-sixth centuries, although this gnomic

⁶ Cf. Wright, *Catalogue* (above, n. 2), vol. 2, pp. 745-6. The text was published in: E. Sachau, *Inedita Syriaca: Eine Sammlung syrischer Übersetzungen von Schriften griechischer Profanliteratur*, Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Halle 1870, pp. 80 [ⲁ] - 81 [Ⲃ].

⁷ Cf. T. Morgan, *Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds*, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge 1998, p. 69.

⁸ One of the double herms combining the heads of Homer and Menander may be seen in Rome in the Palazzo Massimo alle Terme that belongs to the Museo Nazionale Romano: cf. S. Nervegna, *Menander in Antiquity: The Contexts of Reception*, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge 2013, pp. 201-2.

⁹ On rhetorical structures in the sentences of the Syriac Menander see especially A.K. Kirk, *The Composition of the Sayings Source: Genre, Synchrony, and Wisdom Redaction in Q*, Brill, Leiden 1998 (Novum Testamentum, Supplements, 91), pp. 137-40.

¹⁰ Syriac text: BL *Add.* 14658, f. 164ra, lines 6-12 (Monaco, *Sentences* [above, n. 1], p. 60). The English translation is mine.

¹¹ D. Hagedorn - M. Weber, “Die griechisch-koptische Rezension der Menandersentenzen”, *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 3 (1968), pp. 15-50; cf. W.E. Crum - H.G. Evelyn-White, *The Monastery of Epiphanius at Thebes*, Part 2, Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York 1926, pp. 320-1.

¹² Cf. Y.N. Arzhanov, “Archäologie eines Textes: Die Menander-Sentenzen in syrischen Spruchsammlungen”, *Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum* 19.1 (2015), pp. 69-88.

¹³ The Christian pedagogical program designed for the monasteries is found in the “Long Rules” of Basil of Caesarea, which are dated to the late fourth century. Cf. L.I. Larsen, “On Learning a New Alphabet: The Sayings of the Desert Fathers and the Monostichs of Menander”, in S. Rubenson (ed.), *Early Monasticism and Classical Paideia*, Peeters, Leuven 2013 (*Studia Patristica*, 55.3), pp. 59-78.

anthology certainly relied on a number of earlier sources.¹⁴ It expresses the idea of the “fear of God”, which became central for the educational program expressed in various monastic sources, including the collection of discourses (*memre*) of Philoxenos of Mabbug (d. 523).¹⁵

The B version of the Syriac Menander (ascribed to Homer) has come down to us on the flyleaves of the codex containing the discourses of Philoxenos.¹⁶ The bishop of Mabbug addressed his writings to the West Syriac monasteries suggesting a pedagogical system for gradual progress in spiritual life, which involved stages of faith, simplicity, and fear of God. The *memre* included a large number of biblical quotations, intended to serve as short exemplary texts and illustrations to the main ideas of the discourses.

The collection of sentences of the Syriac Menander on the flyleaves is not the only additional element to supplement the main text of the BL *Add.* 14598. Most of the biblical passages coming up in the discourses of Philoxenos are marked in the margins with special signs of angular brackets and dots (• >).¹⁷ Near some of these “quotation marks” we find short notes referring to the origins of the passages cited by Philoxenos.

The word ܡܘܨܝܘܢ points to one of the Gospels as the source of the quotation, the note ܡܘܨܝܘܢ to the Book of Acts, ܡܘܨܝܘܢ to the epistles of Paul, etc. We encounter the names of the biblical figures that also serve as references to the books associated with them: “David” serves as a synonym to the Psalms, “Jacob” and “Rebecca” remind us about the stories of the book of Genesis, and “Elia” and “Elisha” bring us to the stories of the two prophets in the historical books of the Old Testament.¹⁸ A number of didactic remarks (e.g., ܡܘܨܝܘܢ “look”, ܡܘܨܝܘܢ “pay attention”, ܡܘܨܝܘܢ “listen”, and ܡܘܨܝܘܢ “write”) bring the attention of the readers to particular topics, quotations, and short exemplary stories appearing in the *memre* of Philoxenos.

What is significant in the marginal notes of this codex is the fact that they are written in the same negligent cursive script as the sentences of the Syriac Menander on the flyleaves and obviously belong to the same hand. Apparently, the scribe was interested in those elements of the discourses of Philoxenos that derived from other sources and could be identified and treated separately from the main text. In several cases the marginal notes in the codex have the form of short sentences which could easily be remembered.¹⁹

¹⁴ The dating of the “Syriac Menander” remains a debated issue; cf. the useful summary in Baarda, “Syriac Menander” (above, n. 3), pp. 584-5.

¹⁵ Cf. A. de Halleux, *Philoxène de Mabbog: sa vie, ses écrits, sa théologie*, Impr. Orientaliste, Leuven 1963. Cf. D.A. Michelson, “A Bibliographic Clavis to the Works of Philoxenos of Mabbug”, *Hugoye* 13.2 (2010), pp. 273-338.

¹⁶ E.A.W. Budge, *The Discourses of Philoxenos Bishop of Mabbogh, A.D. 485-519*, 2 vols., Asher & Co., London 1894. A new English translation: R. Kitchen, *The Discourses of Philoxenos of Mabbug*, Cistercian Publications, Collegeville 2014 (Cistercian Studies, 235).

¹⁷ According to Aristonicus Alexandrinus’ *De Signis Iliadis*, critical signs have been used in the mss. with the text of the *Iliad*, cf. Aristonici *Περὶ σημείων Ἰλιάδος reliquiae emendatiores*, edidit L. Friedlaender, Dieterich, Göttingen 1853. The signs included the διπλή probably looking like >, i.e. similarly to the “quotation marks” in Syriac manuscripts. The practice of marking particular passages in the works of Plato is described by Diogenes Laertius in the *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* III.65-66 (cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of eminent philosophers*, ed. T. Dorandi, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge 2013, pp. 276-7). He writes about using the διπλή for marking τὰ δόγματα καὶ τὰ ἀρέσκοντα Πλάτωνι, “doctrines and opinions characteristic of Plato”.

¹⁸ The references to the folios of the manuscript, where these marginal notes are found, are given in: Arzhanov, “Amrus Philosophus Graecus” (above, n. 1), pp. 78-80.

¹⁹ Cf. Arzhanov, “Amrus Philosophus Graecus” (above, n. 1), pp. 80-1.

The scribe's interest in the gnomic material resulted in adding a collection of moral sentences on the flyleaves, probably intended to serve for pedagogical purpose. Toward that end, the sentences of the Syriac Menander focus on the idea of the fear of God. The concept of the fear of God played a central role in the pedagogical system of Philoxenos, and the sentences of the Syriac Menander must have served as a useful supplement to the discourses.

The codex containing the B version provides us with an insight into the function of the gnomic sayings in the educational context. Several strategies may be identified based on the examples listed above:

- 1) Marking of "exemplary texts" (from the Bible) with signs of quotations inside the treatises used for educational purposes;
- 2) identifying of the sources of the "exemplary texts" cited anonymously;
- 3) writing down short sentences in the margins of the authoritative texts, deriving either from the texts directly or from other sources;
- 4) adding collections of gnomic sayings attributed to non-Christian authors (Homer/Menander) on the flyleaves.

This practice of transmission of moral maxims in the context of study of the authoritative texts goes back to the tradition that is associated with the name of Philoxenos whose treatises became the object of the scholarly interest in the codex containing selections from the Syriac Menander.

2. *Gnomic Sayings in the Euthalian Apparatus*

In 508/509 Philoxenos commissioned a new translation of the New Testament which was prepared by Chorepiscopus Polycarp but became associated with the name of the commissioner and is known now as the "Philoxenian" version. The Greek manuscripts that were used for that purpose included the so-called Euthalian material, a scholarly apparatus attached to the Acts of the Apostles, the Pauline Epistles, and the Catholic Epistles.²⁰ Nothing is known for certain about the supposed author of the work or his life. Since he made use of the texts of Eusebius of Caesarea, he probably lived in the fourth century and was familiar with the rhetorical tradition of dividing books into fragments for the sake of reading and scholarly work.²¹ Euthalius himself referred explicitly to an earlier tradition on which his work was based, and his own material was probably also an object of transformation.

The Euthalian apparatus was usually transmitted as an addition to the biblical text. It enjoyed a huge popularity in the Middle Ages and has been preserved in hundreds of Greek mss.²² Translations

²⁰ On the work of Euthalius, see J.A. Robinson, *Euthaliana: Studies of Euthalius, Codex H of the Pauline Epistles and the Armenian Version*, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge 1895 (Texts and Studies III.3); H. von Soden, *Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments I.1*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1911, pp. 637-82; L.C. Willard, *A Critical Study of the Euthalian Apparatus*, W. de Gruyter, Berlin-New York 2009 (Arbeiten zur neutestamentlichen Textforschung, 41).

²¹ Cf. G. Zuntz, "Euthalius = Euzoius?", *Vigiliae Christianae* 7 (1953), pp. 16-22.

²² The "Euthalian material" was published on the basis of nine Vatican mss. by L.A. Zacagni, *Collectanea monumentorum veterum Ecclesiae graecae ac latinae quae hactenus in Vaticana bibliotheca delituerunt...*, vol. 1, Typis Sacrae congreg. de propag. fide, Romae 1698, pp. 401-708. The text of Zacagni was reprinted in *PG* 85, pp. 627-790. Ernst von Dobschütz used nine additional mss. in his most valuable study: "Euthaliusstudien", *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 19 (1898), pp. 107-54. Louis Willard (cf. n. 20) reportedly based his study on ca. 400 mss. that were available to him in the microfilm collection at Münster. For an English translation of some sections of the Euthalian apparatus see V. Blomkvist, *Euthalian Traditions: Text, Translation and Commentary*, W. De Gruyter, Berlin-New York 2012 (Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der alchristlichen Literatur), p. 170.

have been made into Armenian, Syriac, Gothic, and Church Slavonic. The Euthalian apparatus included three prologues (to Pauline Epistles, Acts, and Catholic Epistles), lists of chapters (κεφάλαια), and summaries (ὑποθέσεις) of individual books. Additionally, the apparatus included six collections of testimonies (μαρτυρίαι), referring primarily to Old Testament quotations used in the Acts and the Apostolic Epistles with references to their origin in the biblical text. In five cases these lists were preceded by short summaries explaining the system of references in the longer sections.²³

The six collections of testimonies by Euthalius provide us with an early example of transmission of sentences of Greek philosophers in context of the study of Christian authoritative texts. Besides the OT quotations, which clearly dominated in the lists of μαρτυρίαι, these lists included some references to the “non-canonical” writings, including the “Apocrypha” of Elia, Moses and Jeremiah, and several classical Greek authors, who are well-known to us from gnomic anthologies: Menander, Homer, and Demades.

A scholion to Acts 17:28 in the apparatus was based on the two proverbs introduced by the Apostle Paul with the words: “As some of your own poets have said ...” The Greek scholiast (known as Euthalius) found it necessary to identify the sources of these quotations and stated that their possible authors were “Aratus the Astronomer and Homer the Poet”.²⁴

A sentence attributed to Menander appears in the part dealing with the Pauline Epistles. The admonition of the Apostle in 1 Cor. 15:33 implemented a hidden quotation from the *gnomai monostichoi* of Menander:

μη̄ πλανᾶσθε· φθείρουσιν ἥθη χρηστὰ ὀμιλίαι κακαί

Do not be deceived: “Bad company ruins good morals”.²⁵

It was probably the rhetorical education of the scholiast that helped him to correctly identify the source of the words of the Apostle, which is combined with another identification connected with the preceding verse of 1 Cor. and presented as a “Laconian proverb”:²⁶

ΔΙΙΙ. ξβ´. Λακωνικὴ παροιμία α´, Φάγωμεν, καὶ πίωμεν, αὔριον γὰρ ἀποθνήσκομεν.

ΔΠ. ζγ´. Μενάνδρου κωμωδιογράφου γνώμη α´, Φθείρουσιν ἥθη χρηστὰ ὀμιλίαι κακαί.

XIV (62) First Laconian proverb: “Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die”.

XV (63) First maxim of the comic writer Menander: “Bad company ruins good morals”.

²³ On the system of references in the Euthalian lists of quotations cf. Robinson, *Euthaliana* (above, n. 20), pp. 18-20; Willard, *Critical Study* (above, n. 20), p. 30.

²⁴ Zacagni, *Collectanea* (above, n. 22), p. 420. The first proverb quoted by Paulus is found by Stobaeus in a fragment attributed to Aratus (Stob. I.1.3: Joannis Stobaei *Anthologii libri duo priores*, vol. 1, rec. C. Wachsmuth, Weidmann, Berlin 1884, p. 23.16).

²⁵ The text of the Bible is quoted according to the *Revised Standard Version*. The Greek text: B. Aland *et al.* (eds.), *Novum Testamentum Graece*, 28th Revised Ed., Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, Stuttgart 2012, p. 550. Menander, *Gnomai monostichoi*, No. 808: S. Jaekel, *Menandri Sententiae. Comparatio Menandri et Philistionis*, Teubner, Leipzig 1964 (Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana), p. 79.

²⁶ Zacagni, *Collectanea* (above, n. 22), p. 558. Cf. the preceding short summary: Μενάνδρου γνώμη I ιε. Δημάδου λακωνικὴ παροιμία I. ιδ. — “One sentence of Menander (testimony No. 15); one proverb of Demades the Laconian (testimony No. 14)” (Zacagni, *ibid.*, p. 543). Another summary: Μενάνδρου γνώμη α´. Λακωνικὴ, καὶ ἀρχαῖα παροιμία α´. — “One sentence of Menander; one old Laconian proverb” (Zacagni, *ibid.*, p. 546).

The Euthalian apparatus has come down to us in several Syriac mss. containing the biblical text and in diverse anthologies.²⁷ The Bible-mss. are BL *Add.* 7157 (eighth century, East Syriac)²⁸ and Oxford *New College* 333 (dated to the eleventh century).²⁹ The Euthalian materials included in them differ from one another, and the analyses of Dobschütz and Brock have demonstrated that the BL codex contains a revised version (which appeared during its transmission in the sixth century) of the “Philoxenian” translation of the NT.³⁰ The version of the Euthalian scholia in the Oxford codex reflects the later Bible translation, which was made in 615/616 by Thomas of Harkel. There, in the margin near 1 Cor. 15:33, we find the short note:³¹

ܘܟܘܨܐ ܕܥܘܩܘܒܐ ܡܘܢܐܢܕܪ ܕܘܨܘܢܐ

(This is) a proverb of the comic writer Menander (found in) *Thais*.

The “pagan testimonies” included in the Euthalian apparatus are transmitted separately in two ninth century Syriac mss.: BL *Add.* 17193 (ff. 3v-4r)³² and Saint Mark’s Monastery of Jerusalem (*SMMJ*) 124 (ff. 5v-6r).³³ The BL codex represents the earlier version of the materials going back to the translation arranged by Philoxenos of Mabbug and later associated with his name.³⁴ The title of the collection makes apparent that it is extracted from the “Philoxenian” NT³⁵ and contains a selection of *μαρτυρίαι* taken “from pagan sages and apocryphal books”.

The Jerusalem codex includes the same selection of “testimonies” based on the Euthalian apparatus. This selection is not separated from other materials but forms part of the larger section containing “sayings of the pagans that were included by the teachers in their works”. This ms. contains another version of the Euthalian apparatus which is very close to the one preserved in Oxford 333, going back to the Harklean version of the NT.³⁶

Transmission of a similar collection in both mss. demonstrates a constant interest of the Syriac scholars (starting with the Philoxenian work at the beginning of the sixth century) in the quotations from “pagan authors” as transmitted by those texts that were sanctioned by the Church and thus legitimized for use.

²⁷ Cf. Dobschütz, “Euthaliusstudien”, *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 19 (1898), pp. 107-54; S.P. Brock, “The Syriac Euthalian Material and the Philoxenian Version of the NT”, *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* 70.1-2 (1979), pp. 120-30; B. Aland - A. Juckel (eds.), *Das Neue Testament in syrischer Überlieferung*, vol. II.1: *Römer- und 1. Korintherbrief*, W. de Gruyter, Berlin 1991 (*Arbeiten zur neutestamentlichen Text-forschung*, 14), pp. 67-9.

²⁸ J. Forshall - F.A. Rosen, *Catalogus codicum manuscriptorum orientalium qui in Museo Britannico asservantur. Pars prima: codices syriacos et carshunicos amplectens*, Impensis curatorum Musei Britannici, London 1838, pp. 15-18.

²⁹ H.O. Coxe, *Catalogus codicum mss. qui in collegiis aulisque oxoniensibus hodie adservantur. Catalogus codicum MSS. Collegii Novi*, Typ. Acad., Oxford 1852, p. 119.

³⁰ Dobschütz, *Euthaliusstudien* (above, n. 27), p. 136; Brock, “Syriac Euthalian Material” (above, n. 27).

³¹ Ms. Oxford, *New College* 333, f. 228v, between the columns.

³² Cf. Wright, *Catalogue* (above, n. 2), vol. 2, pp. 989-1002.

³³ Cf. the description in the database of vHMML (<https://www.vhmml.org/>) where this ms. has the number SMMJ_00124.

³⁴ Cf. Brock, “Syriac Euthalian Material” (above, n. 27).

³⁵ The BL version of [1] beginning with ܘܟܘܨܐ is not supported by the quotations of this verse by Philoxenos, who has ܘܟܘܨܐ (as in *SMMJ*) or ܘܟܘܨܐ. Cf. Aland-Juckel, *Das Neue Testament*, vol. II/1 (above, n. 25), p. 298.

³⁶ Published as “E²H” in: Brock, “The Syriac Euthalian Material” (above, n. 27).

Synoptic edition of the two versions:³⁷

BL Add. 17193 (E¹)

SMMJ 124 (E²)

Euth. App. (Zacagni)

ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ
ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ
ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ

[1] ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	[1] ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	Ἡλία ἀποκρύφου α'. Ἄ ὀφθαλμὸς οὐκ ἶδεν, καὶ οὐς οὐκ ἤκουσε, καὶ ἐπὶ καρδίαν ἀνθρώπου οὐκ ἀνέβη, ἃ ἤτοίμασεν ὁ θεὸς τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν αὐτὸν. [556 b 16-20]
ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	Λακωνικὴ παροιμία α', Φάγωμεν, καὶ πίωμεν, αὐριον γὰρ ἀποθνήσκομεν. [558 b 6-8]
ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	(Λακωνικὴ, καὶ ἀρχαῖα παροιμία α'. [546 b 14-15])

[2] ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	[2] ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	Μενάνδρου κωμωδιογράφου γνώμη α', Φθειρουσιν ἤθη χρηστὰ ὀμιλῖαι κακαί. [558 b 9-11]
ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	
ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	

[3] ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	[3] ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	Μωϋσέως ἀποκρύφου α'. Οὐτε γὰρ περιτομὴ τί ἐστίν, οὔτε ἀκροβυστία, ἀλλὰ καινὴ κτίσις. [561 a 22-25]
ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	
ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	

[4] ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	[4] ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	Ἐν ἀποκρύφῳ Ἱερεμίου τοῦ προφήτου α'. Ἐγειρε, ὁ καθεύδων, καὶ ἀνάστα ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν, καὶ ἐπιφαύσει σοὶ ὁ Χριστὸς. [561 a 22-25]
ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	Ἐν τῇ πρὸς Φιλιππησίους, καὶ πρὸς Κολασσαεῖς, καὶ πρὸς Θεσσαλονικεῖς πρώτη τε, καὶ δευτέρᾳ οὐδοπόθεν ἐμνημόνευσε ῥήτου Παῦλος ὁ Ἀπόστολος. [562 b 8-12]
ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	Ἐπιμενίδου Κρητὸς μάντεως χρῆσιμος α'. Κρητὲς ἀεὶ ψεῦσαι, κακὰ θηρία, γαστέρες ἀργαί. [567 a 23-25]

[5] ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	[5] ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	
ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	
ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	

[6] ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	[6] ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	
ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	
ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	

[6] ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	[6] ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	
ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	
ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	ܐܘܢܝܢܐ ܕܠܗ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ ܕܡܢܐܢܐ	

³⁷ Cf. the edition of BL Add. 17193 (E¹) in Brock, "Syriac Euthalian Material" (above, n. 27).

Translation of the two Syriac collections:

BL *Add.* 17193*SMMJ* 124

Of the holy Philoxenos: The sayings that Paul quoted from pagan sages and apocryphal books.

Sayings of the pagans that were included by the teachers in their works (...)

[1] From an apocryphal book: “What no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived, what God has prepared for those who love him” [1 Cor. 2:9].

[1] From the Revelation of the prophet Elijah: “What no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived ...” and the rest.

[2] An old Laconian proverb: “Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die” [1 Cor. 15:32]. It is also used by Isaiah [cf. Is. 22:13].

[2] An old Laconian proverb: “Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die”.

[3] Proverb of Menander the diviner in *Thais*:³⁸ “Bad company ruins good morals” [1 Cor. 15:33].

[3] Proverb of the comic writer Menander: “Bad company ruins good morals”.

These are in the Epistle to Corinthians. And a little further: In the Epistle to Galatians.

[4] Words from an apocryphal book: “For neither circumcision counts for anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creation” [Gal. 6:15].

[4] From the Revelation of Moses: “For neither circumcision counts for anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creation”.

Further in the Epistle to Ephesians:

[5] From an apocryphal book: “Awake, O sleeper, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give you light” [Eph. 5:14].

[5] From the Revelation of the prophet Jeremiah: “Awake, O sleeper, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give you light”.

In the Epistles to Philippians and Colossians, and in the First and Second Epistle to Thessalonians, Paul did not mention any saying from another source.

A quotation from the Epistle to Titus:

[6] Oracle of Epimenides, a diviner from Crete: “Cretans are always liars, evil beasts, lazy gluttons” [Tit. 1:12].

[6] Oracle of Epimenides, the Cretan diviner: “Cretans are always liars, evil beasts, lazy gluttons”.

The Syriac translation of the Euthalian apparatus transmitted to the Syriac readers the only sentence of the “comic writer Menander” (who in the BL codex is called surprisingly a “diviner”) that we may directly associate with the Greek corpus of his sentences. The version of the BL codex (first column; cf. the note in Ms. Oxford 331) even gives the title of the comedy (*Thais*) where it could be found.

³⁸ The form ܡܢܪܝܢ is most likely a corruption of ܡܢܪܝܢ.

Elements in the BL codex attest to their provenance from the Euthalian apparatus. This version includes accurate references to the NT books, increasing the likelihood that the collection of the BL ms. derives from a larger corpus of Euthalian material.

The Jerusalem codex version stands closer in many respects to the Euthalian text known to us from the edition of Zacagni, although it lacks those elements which clearly associate it with the Euthalian tradition. The Jerusalem codex integrated the “pagan witnesses” taken from the Euthalian apparatus in the larger collection of “pagan witnesses” found by the Christian authors. The anthology includes the “Prophecies of Greek Philosophers about Christ”, mythological scholia on the writings of Gregory of Nazianzus, and selected sayings of Greek authors found in the orations of Gregory (cf. below). The Jerusalem anthology points thus at the afterlife of the Euthalian method that was applied by the Syriac scholars to the writings of the Church authorities, first of all to those of Gregory of Nazianzus.

3. *Gnomic sentences among scholia on the orations of Gregory of Nazianzus*

Gregory of Nazianzus (330-390) played a decisive role not only in the development of the Christian theology of the fourth century (the role which brought him the epithet “Theologian”) but also in the Christian reception of the Late Antique system of education. Having received the full scope of the *enkyklios paideia*, Gregory provided the Church with the Christian works shaped after classical rhetorical models and including plenty of explicit quotations from and anonymous references to the ancient authors.³⁹ The works of Gregory, especially his poems and orations, became for Christian readers vehicles of transmission of the Late Antique gnomic materials.⁴⁰

The monostichs of Menander turned out to be an important source of quotations for Gregory.⁴¹ One of the Menandrian sentences is found in *Carmen* I.2.39, and the poem “On virtue” (I.2.10) contains large blocks of quotations taken from *gnomai monostichoi* and other gnomic anthologies, known to Gregory through his rhetorical education.⁴² The short *Carmen morale* 30 was composed as a stylization of the *gnomai monostichoi* and in the Arabic tradition was transmitted as an anthology of sentences of Menander.⁴³

A large corpus of writings of Gregory of Nazianzus was translated into Syriac, some of them several times.⁴⁴ His orations were translated twice,⁴⁵ and the Syriac mss. containing them⁴⁶ reveal a close interest of Syriac scholars in the quotations from “pagan” authors included in the works of “the

³⁹ Cf. K. Demoen, *Pagan and Biblical Exempla in Gregory Nazianzen: A Study in Rhetoric and Hermeneutics*, Brepols, Turnhout 1996 (Corpus Christianorum, Lingua Patrum 2).

⁴⁰ Cf. H.L. Davids, *De gnomologieën van sint Gregorius van Nazianze*, Dekker en Van de Vegt, Nijmegen-Utrecht 1940.

⁴¹ Cf. S. Azzarà, “Fonti e rielaborazione poetica nei *Carmina moralia* di Gregorio di Nazianzo”, in M.S. Funghi (ed.), *Aspetti di letteratura gnomica nel mondo antico* I, L.S. Olschki, Firenze 2003, pp. 53-69.

⁴² Azzarà, “Fonti e rielaborazione poetica” (above, n. 41), pp. 56-9.

⁴³ Cf. M. Ullmann, *Die arabische Überlieferung der sogenannten Menandersentenzen*, Steiner, Wiesbaden 1961 (Abhandlung für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 34.1), pp. 74-80.

⁴⁴ On the Syriac reception of Gregory of Nazianzus cf. C. Detienne, “Grégoire de Nazianze dans la tradition syriaque”, in B. Coulie (ed.), *Studia Nazianzenica I*, Brepols, Turnhout 2000 (Corpus Christianorum Series Graeca [CCSG] 41, Corpus Nazianzenum 8), pp. 175-83; A.B. Schmidt, “The Literary Tradition of Gregory of Nazianzus in Syriac Literature and its Historical Context”, *The Harp* 11-12 (1998-1999), pp. 127-34.

⁴⁵ Cf. W. Lüdtkke, “Zur Überlieferung der Reden Gregors von Nazianz”, *Oriens Christianus* 3 (1913), pp. 263-5; A. de Halleux, “La version syriaque des Discours de Grégoire de Nazianze”, in J. Mossay (ed.), *II. Symposium Nazianzenum*, Schönningh, Padeborn et al, 1983, pp. 75-111.

⁴⁶ Cf. A. Van Roey - H. Moors, “Les discours de Saint Grégoire de Nazianze dans la littérature syriaque” I-II, *Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica* 4 (1973), pp. 121-33; 5 (1974), pp. 79-125.

Theologian". A Greek series of scholia on Gregory's references to Greek mythology in *Orations* 4, 5, 39, and 43 ascribed to a certain Nonnus were translated into Syriac twice and usually attached to the orations.⁴⁷ The early versions of both orations and scholia have been preserved only in fragmentary form; the second translation was made in 623/624 by the prolific scholar Paul of Edessa.⁴⁸

The gnomic elements found in the writings of Gregory became objects of special attention of Syriac readers, resulting in marginal notes referring to the origins of the quotations, in scholarly notes, and finally in excerpting them with the purpose of building new gnomic collections.⁴⁹ Commentaries and scholia on the orations of Gregory turn out to have much in common with the method of treatment of the "pagan testimonies" in the Euthalian apparatus and they were probably based on the same scholarly tradition.

Ms. BL *Add.* 14549 dated to the eighth/ninth centuries contains a collection of the discourses of Gregory of Nazianzus in a translation by Paul of Edessa.⁵⁰ In the margins of this codex we find notes referring to the Greek mythological figures, philosophers, and scholars (which appear also in the scholia of Ps.-Nonnus): Euclid, Palamedes, Daedalus, etc.⁵¹ These figures are found in *Oration* 28, where the "Theologian" attacks with harsh words the Greek non-Christian philosophy.⁵² The series of critical remarks is interrupted several times by few positive examples of Greek philosophers who remained anonymous in the oration. Similar to the "pagan *exempla*" in the Euthalian apparatus, these anonymous references were identified in the marginal notes attached to the text of the oration in BL *Add.* 14549:

In the opening section Gregory refers to "one of the theologians of the Greeks" (τις τῶν παρ' Ἑλλησι θεολόγων) who stated the impossibility of defining God in words.⁵³ The same passage quoted anonymously in *Oration* 28, is ascribed to Hermes Trismegistos by Cyril of Alexandria and Stobaeus.⁵⁴ A marginal note suggests the same authorship in the Syriac codex: ~~ⲙⲉⲗⲉⲩⲱⲛⲁⲛⲁⲛⲁⲛⲁⲛⲁⲛⲁ~~ (*sic*).⁵⁵

⁴⁷ J. Nimmo Smith (ed.), *Pseudo-Nonniani in IV Orationes Gregorii Nazianzeni Commentarii*, Brepols, Turnhout 1993 (CCSG 27, Corpus Nazianzenum 2). English translation: J. Nimmo Smith, *The Christian's Guide to Greek Culture: The Pseudo-Nonnus Commentaries on Sermons 4, 5, 39 and 43 by Gregory of Nazianzus*, Liverpool U.P., Liverpool 2001 (Translated Texts for Historians 37).

⁴⁸ Cf. S.P. Brock, *The Syriac Version of the Pseudo-Nonnos Mythological Scholia*, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge 1971.

⁴⁹ Cf. A.de Halleux, "Les commentaires syriaques des Discours de Grégoire de Nazianze: Un premier sondage", *Le Muséon* 98.1-2 (1985), pp. 103-47.

⁵⁰ Cf. Wright, *Catalogue* (above, n. 2), vol. 2, pp. 428-31; Van Roey-Moors, "Les discours de Saint Grégoire II" (above, n. 46), pp. 108-13.

⁵¹ BL *Add.* 14549, f. 24r-v.

⁵² PG 36, 25-74; J. Barbel (ed.), *Gregor von Nazianz, Die fünf theologischen Reden*, Patmos Verlag, Düsseldorf 1963, pp. 62-126; P. Gallay (ed.), *Grégoire de Nazianze, Discours 27-31 (discours théologiques)*, Éditions du Cerf, Paris 1978 (Sources chrétiennes 250), pp. 100-74. English translation: Ch.G. Browne - J.E. Swallow, "Select Orations of Saint Gregory Nazianzen", in Ph. Schaff - H. Wace (eds.), *A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, Second series, vol. 7, The Christian Literature Company, New York 1894, pp. 288b-301a. Two Syriac versions of the oration were published in *Sancti Gregorii Nazianzeni Opera. Versio Syriaca IV: Orationes XXVIII, XXIX, XXX, XXXI*, ed. J.-Cl. Haelewyck, Brepols, Turnhout 2007 (CCSG 65; Corpus Nazianzenum 23).

⁵³ Θεὸν νοῆσαι μὲν χαλεπὸν· φράσαι δὲ ἀδύνατον, ὡς τις τῶν παρ' Ἑλλησι θεολόγων ἐφιλοσόφησεν (PG 36, 29C = 106-108 Gallay = 70 Barbel). English translation: Browne-Swallow, *Orations* (above, n. 52), p. 289b. The Syriac version: Haelewyck, *Sancti Gregorii Nazianzeni Opera. Versio Syriaca IV* (above, n. 52), p. 17.

⁵⁴ Cyril Alexandrinus, *Contra Julianum* I.43 [P. Burguière - P. Évieux (eds.), *Cyrille d'Alexandrie. Contre Julien, tome 1: livres 1 et 2*, Éditions du Cerf, Paris 1985 (SC 322), p. 190]; Stob., *Antol.*, II.1.26 (Wachsmuth, vol. 2, p. 9).

⁵⁵ BL *Add.* 14549, f. 17r.

An unnamed Greek author is praised twice in the oration as a “foreign” (ἀλλότριος) philosopher who expressed ideas which are closest to Christian teachings on God as Creator of the universe. In both cases Gregory must have been thinking of Plato,⁵⁶ and these references were made explicit by a Syriac commentator, who wrote Plato’s name in the margins.⁵⁷

The marginal notes in the Syriac codex attached to *Oration* 28 were probably based either on some oral tradition or on commentaries to the writings of “the Theologian”. In the same ms., the provenance of the attribution in the marginal note to *Oration* 26⁵⁸ is not quite clear:

At the beginning of the oration, the author quotes an anonymous aphorism: “Thus we are slow to desire what is within easy reach, as one of the ancients has said”.⁵⁹ A commentator added in the margin near this passage: “This (saying) belongs to Socrates”.⁶⁰ No other instances of this attribution are known.⁶¹

The quoted commentaries in the margins of BL *Add.* 14549 focus on those quotations by “the Theologian” that remained anonymous and transmitted sayings and ideas of non-Christian authors whose works were absent from the Christian schools. The method of selection and identification of the quotations remind us of the few non-Christian testimonies (μαρτυρία) included in the Euthalian apparatus.

The similarity to the Euthalian method becomes even stronger in those mss. that transmit scholia on the orations of Gregory. One of these collections is found in BL *Add.* 17147 dated to the eighth/ninth centuries.⁶² The scholia include fragments of the orations, commentaries on difficult terms, and lists of biblical quotations, which bear the title ܩܕܡܘܬܐ, a Syriac equivalent to the Greek μαρτυρία. With few exceptions, the “testimonies” in these sections derive from the Bible, as is the case in the Euthalian apparatus. In the list of “testimonies” extracted from *Oration* 26, the first one is the sentence quoted above, which in this case is directly attributed to Socrates.⁶³ This example demonstrates how a gnomic saying found and identified in the writing of Gregory begins to take a life of its own.

Another collection of scholia to the writings of Gregory produced in the school of Rabban Benjamin (whose activity is dated to the ninth century)⁶⁴ is found in the BL *Add.* 14725 (ff. 100-215, dated to the tenth/eleventh centuries).⁶⁵ Among the scholia to *Oration* 2 we find the first Hippocratic Aphorism.

⁵⁶ Thus the modern commentaries to the oration, cf. Gally, *Grégoire de Nazianze, Discours 27-31* (above, n. 52), p. 134, n. 1; Barbel, *Gregor von Nazianz* (above, n. 52), p. 96, n. 44.

⁵⁷ BL *Add.* 14549, f. 21v (ܩܠܠܐ) and f. 26v (ܩܠܘܠܐ).

⁵⁸ PG 35, pp. 1227–1252; J. Mossay (ed.), *Grégoire de Nazianze, Discours 24-26*, Éditions du Cerf, Paris 1981 (SC 284), pp. 224-72. English translation: M. Vinson, *St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Select Orations*, Catholic University of America Press, Washington 2003, pp. 175-90.

⁵⁹ Οὕτως τὸ ἐτοιμον εἰς ἐξουσίαν, ἀργὸν εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν, ὡς τις ἔφη τῶν πρὸ ἡμῶν (PG 35, 1229B = 228 Mossay). The English translation is taken from Vinson, *Select Orations* (above, n. 58), p. 176. Syriac (f. 32v): ܩܘܠܠܐ ܕܩܪܝܫܐ ܕܩܪܝܫܐ ܕܩܪܝܫܐ ܕܩܪܝܫܐ ܕܩܪܝܫܐ ܕܩܪܝܫܐ ܕܩܪܝܫܐ ܕܩܪܝܫܐ ܕܩܪܝܫܐ ܕܩܪܝܫܐ ܕܩܪܝܫܐ ܕܩܪܝܫܐ.

⁶⁰ BL *Add.* 14549, f. 32v, right margin: ܩܘܠܠܐ ܕܩܪܝܫܐ ܕܩܪܝܫܐ ܕܩܪܝܫܐ ܕܩܪܝܫܐ.

⁶¹ In later Byzantine *florilegia* this sentence is ascribed to Aesop, cf. B.E. Perry, *Aesopica*, vol. 1, University of Illinois Press, Urbana 1952, p. 280 (No. 103).

⁶² Cf. Wright, *Catalogue* (above, n. 2), vol. 2, pp. 438–440.

⁶³ BL *Add.* 17147, f. 116r, line 15.

⁶⁴ Cf. A. de Halleux, “Rabban Benjamin d’Édesse et la date du ms. B.L., Or., 8731”, in *IV Symposium Syriacum 1984: Literary Genres in Syriac Literature* (Groningen-Oosterhesselen 10-12 September), ed. by H.J.W. Drijvers, Pont. Institutum Studiorum Orientalium, Roma 1987 (Orientalia Christiana analecta 229), pp. 445-51.

⁶⁵ Wright, *Catalogue* (above, n. 2), vol. 2, pp. 441-3.

This curious compendium combines elements of several collections that must have served as reference works for Syriac readers about classical Greek literature. The aphorisms from the orations of Gregory fulfill the role of gnomic sentences ascribed to famous poets, orators, and philosophers. The ascriptions in this collection are rather unique and seem not to be based on any known tradition:

- ܘܢܘܘܫܘܝܗܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ
ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ
- ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ
- ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ
- ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ
- ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ
- ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ
- ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ
- ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ
- ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ
- ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ
- ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܘܢܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ ܕܘܚܪܝܢ ܘܚܘܚܘܪܘܢ

The sayings derive from the orations of Gregory in the translation of Paul of Edessa.⁷¹

[1] *Or.* 2, §27: καὶ τὸ ἐπ' ἀλλοτριῖαις συμφοραῖς ἰδίας καρποῦσθαι λύπας, ὡς ἔφη τις τῶν παρ' ἐκεῖνοις σοφῶν — “they will reap a harvest of pain for themselves from the distresses of others, as one of their wise men said”.⁷²

The Syriac version of Paul:⁷³ ܐܝܬܘܢ ܡܫܢ ܥܠܝܢ ܡܫܘܠܝܢ ܥܠ ܡܫܘܠܝܢ ܕܠܗܘܢ ܥܠ ܥܠܝܢܝܗܘܢ, ܕܗܘܐ ܥܠܝܢ ܕܠܗܘܢ ܥܠܝܢܝܗܘܢ.

The maxim goes back to the beginning of the Hippocrates' tract *De Flatibus*,⁷⁴ where physicians are described as persons who bear the sufferings of their patients. It is probably the motive of suffering for the sake of the others that led some Christian authors to apply it to Jesus,⁷⁵ though Gregory's use of it does not imply this meaning. No association of it with Archigenes of Apamea may be traced.⁷⁶

[2] *Or.* 2, §47: ἐν πίθῳ τὴν κεραμείαν μαθηθάνειν, τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον — “to learn, as men say, the potter's art on a wine-jar”.⁷⁷

The Syriac translation of Paul:⁷⁸ ܐܝܬܘܢ ܕܠܗܘܢ ܥܠܝܢܝܗܘܢ ܥܠ ܡܫܘܠܝܢ ܕܠܗܘܢ ܥܠܝܢܝܗܘܢ.

The proverb goes back to Plato's *Gorgias*, where it is already quoted as a well-known maxim.⁷⁹ It was used in rhetorical exercises,⁸⁰ and this is probably how Gregory learned it as an anonymous maxim. No reason of attributing it to Menander may be established except the association of the latter's name with the gnomic genre.

⁷¹ I am most grateful to Bastien Kindt (Université Catholique de Louvain, Institut Orientaliste), who provided me with the access to the database of the Syriac versions of Gregory of Nazianzus, prepared in the project “GREgORI”. It was due to the database GREgORI that I was able to check my identifications and find parallels to sentences [6], [7], and [12], which until then had remained a mystery for me.

⁷² PG 35, 436B = 124 Bernardi. English translation: Browne-Swallow, *Orations* (above, n. 52), p. 210b.

⁷³ *Or.* 2, § 27.2-4, *versio nova* (67 Haelewyck).

⁷⁴ Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἰητρὸς ὁρῆι τε δεινὰ, θιγγάνει τε ἀηδέων, ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίησί τε ζυμφορῆσιν ἰδίας καρποῦται λύπας (ed. É. Littré, *Œuvres complètes d'Hippocrate*, vol. 6, Baillière, Paris 1849 (repr. Hakkert, Amsterdam 1962), pp. 90-114, see 90.5-6). It is quoted as a maxim of Hippocrates in the commentary to Homer's *Iliad* of the twelfth century Byzantine scholar Eustathius, archbishop of Thessalonica, who probably drew this knowledge on the earlier Homeric commentaries. See M. van der Valk (ed.), *Eustathii archiepiscopi Thessalonicensis commentarii ad Homeri Iliadem pertinentes*, vol. 4, Brill, Leiden 1987, p. 410.16-18.

⁷⁵ Eusebius of Caesarea (fourth century) quotes this passage in *Historia Ecclesiastica* X.4.11 referring to Jesus who is presented as a doctor who takes upon himself the sufferings of people, “handles their four sores, and reaps pain for himself from the miseries of another (θιγγάνει δ' ἀηδέων ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίησί τε ζυμφορῆσιν ἰδίας καρποῦται λύπας)” (Eusebius, *Werke*, ed. E. Schwartz, vol. 2.2, Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, Leipzig 1908, p. 866.8-9).

⁷⁶ Galen often refers to Archigenes (Ἀρχιγένης) of Apamea as an authority, especially in issues of the pulse. This may explain the attribution as association with a medical issue.

⁷⁷ PG 35, 456B = 152 Bernardi. English translation: Browne-Swallow, *Orations* (above, n. 52), p. 214b.

⁷⁸ *Or.* 2, § 47.11, *versio nova* (99 Haelewyck). The two Syriac versions differ in only one letter (ܐ) which marks the beginning of a quotation in *versio nova*. This particle ܐ is quoted in the sentence among the scholia, which speaks again for the *versio nova* as the basis for the scholia.

⁷⁹ *Gorgias* 514E: τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ πίθῳ τὴν κεραμείαν ἐπιχειρεῖν μαθηθάνειν — “they should, as the saying is, try to learn pottery by starting on a wine-jar”. It was quoted by many authors and included as a common proverb without attribution into the collection “Proverbia Alexandrinorum” ascribed to Plutarch (Ps.-Plutarch, *Παροιμίαι αἴτις Ἀλεξανδρεῖς ἐχρῶντο*: F.G. Schneidewin - E.L. von Leutsch [eds.], *Corpus paroemiographorum Graecorum*, vol. 1, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1839 [repr. Olms, Hildesheim 1965], pp. 321-42, see p. 338 [No. 12]).

⁸⁰ Cf. Theon, *Progymnasmata*, p. 59.12 Spengel (*Rhetores Graeci*, ed. L. Spengel, vol. 2, Teubner, Leipzig 1854).

[3] *Or.* 2, §49: λῆρος πλατύς τὰ ὄνειρατα — “Dreams are utter drivell”.⁸¹

Syriac:⁸² ܠܗܪܘܟܐ ܠܗܪܘܟܐ ܠܗܪܘܟܐܘܬܐ.

The sentence is not explicitly characterized as a proverb by Gregory. It is not found in this function by other Christian or non-Christian authors, and its attribution to “the same author”, i.e. Menander, seems to be unfounded.

[4] *Or.* 23, §6: καὶ γὰρ τὴν σιωπὴν συγκατάθεσιν εἶναι, διδάσκει καὶ ἡ παροιμία. — “As the saying goes, ‘Silence is assent’”.⁸³

Syriac:⁸⁴ ܠܗܪܘܟܐ ܕܐܪܘܫܐ ܠܗܪܘܟܐܘܬܐ, ܡܘܫܐܘܬܐ ܝܘܠܐ ܠܗܪܘܟܐ.

As in [2], Gregory quotes these words as an anonymous proverb, and its popularity both in antiquity and in the modern time found expression in numerous references to it by different authors. Its attribution to Menander found in the margin of one of the mss.⁸⁵ containing the oration and in the collection of *SMMJ* 124 remains quite unique.

[5] *Or.* 18, §7: τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ δοκεῖ καὶ τοῖς ἔξωθεν· εἴπερ ἐκείνων τὸ, Γυναικὸς ἀνὴρ χρῆμα’ οὐδὲν ληϊζέται κάλλιον ἐσθλῆς, οὐδὲ χεῖρον τῆς ἐναντίας. — “Even those outside are of the same mind, if they say that a man can win no fairer prize than a good wife, nor a worse one than her opposite”.⁸⁶

The Syriac version of Paul:⁸⁷

ܘܥܠ ܠܗܪܘܟܐ ܠܗܪܘܟܐ ܕܐܪܘܫܐ ܕܐܪܘܫܐ, ܘܥܠ ܠܗܪܘܟܐ ܕܐܪܘܫܐ ܕܐܪܘܫܐ. ܘܥܠ ܠܗܪܘܟܐ ܕܐܪܘܫܐ ܕܐܪܘܫܐ.

The saying goes back to Hesiod⁸⁸ and it was included in both Christian and non-Christian gnomic anthologies.⁸⁹ Its attribution to Demosthenes is found in the margins of the Syriac mss. containing this oration⁹⁰ and it appears also in the collection of *SMMJ*.

[6] *Or.* 27, §5: ὡς Σολομῶντι κάμοι δοκεῖ, καὶ τὸ καλὸν οὐ καλόν, ὅταν μὴ καλῶς γίνηται — “As it seems to Solomon, and also to me: Something good is not good unless it happens at the right time”.⁹¹

The Syriac version:⁹² ܠܗܪܘܟܐ ܕܐܪܘܫܐ ܕܐܪܘܫܐ, ܕܐܪܘܫܐ ܕܐܪܘܫܐ ܕܐܪܘܫܐ.

The allusion to Salomon by Gregory evidently implies the passage about the proper time for every activity in Eccl. 3:1. The specific expression used by Gregory is identified as a maxim by the Syriac

⁸¹ *PG* 35, 457C - 460A = 156 Bernardi. English translation: Browne-Swallow, *Orations* (above, n. 52), p. 215a.

⁸² *Or.* 2, § 49.22, *versio nova* (105 Haelewyck).

⁸³ *PG* 35, 1157B = 292 Mossay [Grégoire de Nazianze, *Discours* 20-23, SC 270, éd. par J. Mossay, Éditions du Cerf, Paris 1980]. English translation: Vinson, *Select Orations* (above, n. 58), p. 135.

⁸⁴ *BL Add.* 14548, f. 58v8-9 = *BL Add.* 12153, f. 49vb12-14.

⁸⁵ *BL Add.* 14548, f. 58v, right margin: ܠܗܪܘܟܐ ܘܥܠܘܬܐ ܘܥܠܘܬܐ ܠܗܪܘܟܐ.

⁸⁶ *PG* 35, 993A. The English translation (with small modifications) from: Browne-Swallow, *Orations* (above, n. 52), p. 256b. The Syriac version of the oration remains unpublished.

⁸⁷ *BL Add.* 14548, f. 90r21-23 = *BL Add.* 12153, f. 83va26-30.

⁸⁸ Hesiod, *Opera et Dies* 701-702: οὐ μὲν γὰρ τι γυναικὸς ἀνὴρ ληϊζέτ’ ἄμεινον τῆς ἀγαθῆς — “For a man wins nothing better than a good wife” (Hesiodi *Opera*, ed. F. Solmsen, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1970, p. 79).

⁸⁹ Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromateis* 6.2.13 (Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata*, vol. 2, ed. O. Stählin, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 1960, p. 432.6-7); Eusebius, *PE* 10.3.18 (Eusebius, *Werke*, ed. K. Mras, vol. 8.1, 2nd ed., Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 1982, p. 565.4-5).

⁹⁰ It is found both in *BL Add.* 14548 and *BL Add.* 12153 near the corresponding passages.

⁹¹ *PG* 36, 16B-D = 80 Gally. Cf. Browne-Swallow, *Orations* (above, n. 52), p. 286a.

⁹² *Or.* 27, §4.20-21 *versio nova* (15 Haelewyck).

4. Conclusion

The evidence listed above adds new details to the image of Menander in Syriac literature. It closely associates the name of the Greek poet with the scholastic environment. The Syriac reception of Menander and the gnomic materials associated with his name reflect the change of educational models that took place in Syria and Palestine in the Late Antique and early medieval periods.

This development may be roughly summarized as follows:

1) The comedies of Menander were known in the Syriac urban centers that were influenced by the Greek education and culture, e.g. in the Antioch on Orontes, before the fourth century¹⁰⁷ and could have been present even in Syriac monastic libraries.¹⁰⁸

2) The collection of moral maxims which became known as the “Syriac Menander” was the product of the introduction of educational models in the late fourth-early fifth centuries expressed in the monastic rules of Basil of Caesarea, which established the Bible, especially the books of Proverbs and Sirach, as alternatives to the gnomic collections attributed to Menander.

3) The Syriac translation of the Euthalian apparatus in the early sixth century gave Syriac scholars examples of non-Christian gnomic sayings (including a sentence of Menander) in the context of the Bible. The separate transmission of the few “pagan *exempla*” from the Euthalian apparatus in Syriac mss. bears witness to the importance of this channel.

4) The Euthalian method of identification of non-Christian “testimonies” inside the New Testament books was applied to other authoritative texts, e.g., to the biblical quotations in the treatises of Philoxenos, which in BL *Add.* 14598 were supplemented by the sentences of the Syriac Menander.

5) The application of the Euthalian method to the orations of Gregory of Nazianzus in the context of the Syriac schools in the seventh-ninth centuries produced a corpus of gnomic materials identified in the writings of Gregory and transmitted in the form of gnomic collections. The collection of sentences in *SMMJ* 124 taken from the orations of Gregory included five sayings attributed to Menander. In one of these sayings, the name of the Greek playwright is associated with the biblical wisdom literature, revealing the channels of transmission of Menander’s image in Syriac literature.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. K. Gutzwiller - Ö. Çelik, “New Menander Mosaics from Antioch”, *American Journal of Archaeology* 116.4 (2012), pp. 573-623.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. F. D’Aiuto, “*Graeca* in codici orientali della Biblioteca Vaticana (con i resti di un manoscritto tardoantico delle commedie di Menandro)”, in L. Perria (ed.), *Tra Oriente e Occidente: scritture e libri greci fra le regioni orientali di Bisanzio e l’Italia*, Dipartimento di filologia greca e latina Sezione bizantino-neoellenica Università di Roma “La Sapienza”, Roma 2003 (Testi e studi bizantino-neoellenici, 14), pp. 227-96.

Nuovi frammenti del Commento di Filopono ai libri V-VIII della Fisica

Andrea Rescigno

Abstract

The aim of this study is to show the existence of a new *testimonium*, the manuscript *Parisinus Coislinianus* 166, of Philoponus' *Commentary* on Aristotle' *Physics* 5-8, which currently survives only in the fragmentary compilation of Girolamo Vitelli in the series *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* XVII. The manuscript represents a significant increase in the knowledge of Philoponus' *Commentary* because it contains, in addition to those published by Vitelli, a large number of fragments not attested in his edition. In this paper I first select some of these fragments, whose authorship is established through comparison with the Arabic tradition and through the *usus auctoris* respectively. The study contains also a critical list of fragments departing from their counterparts in Vitelli by virtue of their almost always greater completeness.

I.

La nostra conoscenza del commento di Giovanni Filopono ai libri 5-8 della *Fisica* di Aristotele si affida alla frammentaria tradizione scolastica raccolta da Girolamo Vitelli¹ in margine ai mss *Parisinus gr.* 1853,²

¹ Ioannis Philoponi *In Aristotelis Physicorum libros quinque posteriores commentaria* ed. G. Vitelli, Reimer, Berlin 1888 (*CAG* XVII). I due gruppi di *excerpta* costituiscono due serie scolastiche distinte; la prima, che forma gli *excerpta Parisiensia*, compresa a p. 787.1-851.18, è quella desunta da Vitelli dal *Parisinus gr.* 1853; la seconda, che forma gli *excerpta Veneta*, contenuta a p. 852.1-893.21, è quella ricavata dal *Marcianus gr.* 227. Gli *excerpta* che Vitelli sporadicamente derivava dal *Neapolitanus* III E 1 sono saltuariamente aggiunti a partire da p. 825, ad integrazione della prima serie. Non esiste, che io sappia, alcuna traduzione in lingua moderna della compilazione di Vitelli, né, come a precederla, alcuno studio dedicato alla formazione di questo *corpus*. Anche P. Golitsis, *Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la "Physique" d'Aristote*, De Gruyter, Berlin - New York 2008 (*CAGB* 3), e M. Rashed, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise. Commentaire perdu a la "Physique" d'Aristote (Livres IV-VIII): Les Scholies Byzantines*, De Gruyter, Berlin, New York 2011 (*CAGB* 1), p. 18, n. 45, toccano solo lateralmente l'argomento.

² Ioannis Philoponi *In Aristotelis Physicorum libros tres priores commentaria*, ed. G. Vitelli, Reimer, Berlin 1887 (*CAG* XVI), p. XI-XII. La bibliografia in merito è ricca, ma vanno senz'altro segnalati gli interventi più significativi rispetto all'interesse del presente studio, vale a dire la complessa presenza della tradizione scolastica sul ms: P. Moraux, "Le *Parisinus graecus* 1853 (Ms. E) d'Aristote", *Scriptorium* 21 (1967), p. 17-41; M. Hecquet-Devienne, "Les mains du *Parisinus graecus* 1853. Une nouvelle collation des quatre premiers livres de la *Métaphysique* d'Aristote (folios 225v-247v)", *Scrittura e Civiltà* 24 (2000), p. 103-71; M. Rashed, *Die Überlieferungsgeschichte der aristotelischen Schrift 'De generatione et corruptione'*, Reichert, Wiesbaden 2001 (Serta graeca, 12); F. Ronconi, "Le corpus aristotélicien du *Paris. gr.* 1853 et les cercles érudits à Byzance. Un cas controversé", *Studia graeco-arabica* 2 (2012), p. 201-25; Ch. Brockmann - V. Lorusso, "Zu Bessarions philologisch-hermeneutischer Arbeit in seinen *De caelo*-Manuskripten", in Ch. Brockmann - D. Deckers - L. Koch - S. Valente (hrsg.), *Handschriften- und Textforschung heute. Zur Überlieferung der griechischen Literatur. Festschrift für Dieter Harlfinger aus Anlass seines 70. Geburtstages*, Reichert, Wiesbaden 2014 (Serta graeca, 30), p. 85-111.

*Marcianus gr. 227*³ e *Neapolitanus III E 1*.⁴ Scopo del presente studio è dimostrare e aggiungere l'esistenza di un altro testimone di questo *corpus*, il ms *Parisinus Coislinianus 166* (da qui in poi *Pcsl*),⁵ che, se molto spesso si trova a registrare, con minore o maggiore pienezza, stralci già presenti

³ Philop., *In Phys.*, p. XII-XIII Vitelli; D. Harlfinger, "Einige Aspekte der handschriftlichen Überlieferung des *Physikkomentars* des Simplikios", in I. Hadot (éd.), *Simplicius. Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie*, Actes du colloque international de Paris (28 sept.-1^{er} oct. 1985), W. de Gruyter, Berlin - New York 1987, p. 269; 275-8; D. Harlfinger, "Autographa aus der Palaiologenzeit", in W. Seibt (hrsg.), *Geschichte und Kultur der Palaiologenzeit*, Acti del convegno Vienna, 30 novembre-3 dicembre 1994, Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 1996 (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Byzantinistik, 8; Denkschriften der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse, 241), p. 45; I. Pérez Martín, *El patriarca Gregorio de Chipre (ca. 1240-1290) y la transmisión de los textos clásicos en Bizancio*, Consejo superior de investigaciones científicas, Madrid 1996, p. 21-2; M. Menchelli, "Un nuovo codice di Gregorio di Cipro. Il codice di Venezia, BNM gr. 194 con il *Commento* al *Timeo* e le letture platoniche del Patriarca tra Sinesio e Proclo", *Scriptorium* 64.2 (2010), p. 227-50, in part. p. 228-9, n. 5; 232; 248; P. Golitsis - Ph. Hoffmann, "Simplicius et le 'lieu'. À propos d'une nouvelle édition du *Corollarium de loco*", *Revue des études grecques* 127 (2014), p. 119-75, in part. p. 127-8.

⁴ Una rapidissima descrizione è contenuta in *Codices Graeci mss. Regiae Bibliothecae Borbonicae* descripti, atque illustrati a S. Cyrillo, vol. II, Ex Regia typographia, Napoli 1832, p. 431; maggiori dettagli ovviamente in Philop., *In Phys.*, vol. I, p. X-XI Vitelli; D. Harlfinger, *Die Textgeschichte der Pseudo-Aristotelischen Schrift Περὶ ἀτόμων γραμμῶν. Ein kodikologisch-kulturgeschichtlicher Beitrag zur Klärung der Überlieferungsverhältnisse im Corpus Aristotelicum*, Hakkert, Amsterdam 1971, p. 109; 412; M. Formentin, "Uno Scriptorium a Palazzo Farnese?", *Scripta* 1 (2008), p. 97. Il codice, tuttavia, va senz'altro riesaminato. È infatti lo stesso Vitelli, Philop., in *Aristotelis physicorum libros tres priores*, p. XI, a ritenere insufficiente la propria ispezione. Insieme al *Parisinus Coisl.* 166 e al *Vaticanus gr.* 2208, il ms *Neapolitanus III E 1* potrebbe costituire il terzo testimone di una comune silloge filoponea a *Fisica* 5-8. Segnalo a questo punto la presenza nel ms *Laurentianus* 87.7, f. 55r, di uno scolio a *Phys.* V, 3. 226 b 28 che sembrerebbe nominalmente attribuito a Filopono e privo di riscontro sia in Vitelli che nel *corpus* del *Parisinus Coisl.* Inutile ricordare come la tradizione scolastica presente nel *Laur.* sia stata ampiamente studiata da M. Rashed soprattutto a proposito del *De Generatione et corruptione* e degli scolii empedoclei: cf. Rashed, *Die Überlieferungsgeschichte* (cit. n. 2), p. 142-5; M. Rashed - G. Vuillemin-Diem, "Burgundio de Pise et ses manuscrits grecs d'Aristote: *Laur.* 87.7 et *Laur.* 81.18", *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 64 (1997), p. 136-98; M. Rashed, "La Chronographie du système d'Empédocle: *addenda et corrigenda*", *Les Études philosophiques* 3 (2014), p. 315-342.

⁵ Si tratta, come è noto, assieme a *Parisinus Coisl.* 161, *Parisinus gr.* 1921, Jerusalem, Βιβλιοθήκη τοῦ Πατριαρχείου, Μετόχιον (Sancti Sepulcri), 150, di uno dei testimoni dell'attività dell'*Anonymus* nell'allestimento di una edizione del *corpus philosophicum Aristotelicum* poco dopo la prima metà del XIV s. Cf. R. Devresse, *Bibliothèque nationale. Département des mss. Catalogues des mss grecs. II. Le fonds Coislin*, Impr. Nationale, Paris 1945, p. 148-9; Harlfinger, *Die Textgeschichte* (cit. n. 4), p. 55-7; Ph. Hoffmann, *Recherches sur la tradition manuscrite du Commentaire de Simplicius au De caelo d'Aristote* (sous la direction de M. Jean Irigoin), vol. I (298 pp.), vol. II (notes: 193 pp.), Université de Paris IV, Paris 1981, p. 176-81; I. Hadot, "Recherches sur les fragments du commentaire de Simplicius sur la *Métaphysique* d'Aristote", in I. Hadot (éd.), *Simplicius. Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie* (above, n. 3), p. 225-45, in part. p. 242-5; Harlfinger, "Einige Aspekte" (cit. n. 3), p. 282; M. Cacouras, "Néophytos Prodromènos copiste et responsable (?) de l'édition *quadrivium - corpus aristotelicum* du 14^e siècle", *Revue des études byzantines* 56 (1998), p. 193-212, in part. p. 197-8 (per la descrizione, su cui ritorneremo, dei sistemi di rinvio utilizzati dal copista all'interno del *corpus*); p. 202 (per la differenziazione di tali richiami in *Pcsl* rispetto agli altri testimoni prodromeniani); B. Mondrain, "La constitution de corpus d'Aristote et de ses commentateurs aux XIII^e-XIV^e siècles", *Codices manuscripti* 29 (2000), p. 11-33, in part. p. 20; M. Decorps-Foulquier, "La tradition manuscrite du texte grec des 'Coniques' d'Apollonios de Pergé (livres I-IV)", *Revue d'histoire des textes* 31 (2001), p. 61-116, in part. p. 72; Rashed, *Die Überlieferungsgeschichte* (cit. n. 2), p. 226, per la descrizione del codice; p. 229-32, per la questione che riguarda l'identità dell'*Anonymus Aristotelicus* e il *milieu* entro il quale collocarne l'impegno editoriale; D. Bianconi, "La biblioteca di Cora tra Massimo Planude e Niceforo Gregora. Una questione di mani", *Segno e testo* 3 (2005), p. 391-438, in part. p. 402, n. 29; Philoponus, *On Aristotle On Coming to be and Perishing 2.5-11*, Engl. transl. by I. Kupreeva, Duckworth, London 2005 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), p. 16, p. 23, nn. 104-11; C. Luna, "Mise en page et transmission textuelle du commentaire de Syrianus sur la *Métaphysique*", in C. D'Ancona (ed.), *The Libraries of the Neoplatonists. Proceedings of the Meeting of the European Science Foundation Network "Late Antiquity and Arabic Thought. Patterns in the Consti-*

nell'edizione di Vitelli, non meno spesso documenta materiale assolutamente inedito.⁶ In realtà, che altrove potesse ancora celarsi, sotto forma di *marginalia*, una parte sopravvissuta del commento di Filopono ai libri 5-8 della *Fisica*, era già stato utilmente indicato.⁷ Che questo fosse il caso di *Pcsl*, sembrava invece imperativamente escluso dalla formula che Vitelli aveva impiegato nel considerarne il valore di testimone: “in libris V-VIII Philoponea nulla esse puto”. Tale sentenza⁸ poteva trovare parziale giustificazione nel carattere estremamente fitto e caotico dei *marginalia* che corredano su *Pcsl* il testo di *Fisica* 5-8.⁹ In realtà, la paternità è solo apparentemente inestricabile.¹⁰ Come si

tution of the European Culture” held in Strasbourg (March 12-14, 2004), Brill, Leiden 2007 (Philosophia Antiqua, 107), p. 121-34, in part. p. 125; M. Cacouros, “Survie culturelle et rémanence textuelle du néoplatonisme à Byzance. Éléments généraux - éléments portant sur la Logique”, in D’Ancona (ed.), *The Libraries of the Neoplatonists*, p. 177-210, in part. p. 195, n. 71; G. Wöhrle, “Ein bislang unpubliziertes Testimonium zu Thales”, *Hermes* 141 (2013), p. 351-4.

⁶ Mi è occorso di notarlo, impegnato tuttavia nello studio della tradizione scolastica al *De Caelo*, documentata in questo come in altri mss, i cui risultati spero di pubblicare a breve. Il libro V è contenuto ai ff. 57v-65v; il libro VI ai ff. 66r-79r; il libro VII ai ff. 79v-87r; il libro VIII ai ff. 87v-109r.

⁷ Rashed, *Alexandre d’Aphrodise. Commentaire* (cit. n. 1), p. 18, n. 45. Lo studioso anticipava in quell’occasione l’individuazione, nel ms *Vaticanus gr.* 2208, di alcuni scoli al libro VIII esplicitamente attribuiti a Filopono e privi di parallelo nella raccolta di Vitelli, così come di altri perfettamente coincidenti con tratti presenti nella stessa, promettendone la pubblicazione. Guidato da questa preziosa indicazione, ho collazionato il codice in vista di un possibile riscontro con i frammenti di *Pcsl* scelti qui quali *specimina* inediti del commento di Filopono, riscontro che è avvenuto quasi sistematicamente, a conferma dell’origine in qualche modo comune delle due raccolte scolastiche. Mi sono quindi permesso di indicare, in corrispondenza di quei frammenti e degli altri casi significativi, la foliazione di riferimento nel *Vaticanus gr.* 2208. Purtroppo solo quando questo articolo era ormai completato e già sottoposto a *Studia graeco-arabica*, sono venuto a conoscenza che appena qualche mese prima, tra gli articoli che integrano la nuova edizione del suo *L’héritage aristotélicien. Textes inédits de l’Antiquité. Nouvelle édition revue et augmentée*, Paris 2016, Marwan Rashed aveva mantenuto la sua promessa in uno studio, “Fragments inconnus du commentaire à la *Physique* de Jean Philopon”, p. 751-77, che presenta alcuni *specimina*, 36 per l’esattezza, tratti dal ms *Vaticanus* 2208 e relativi al commento di Filopono al libro VIII della *Fisica*. Lo studio può quindi dirsi in qualche modo complementare rispetto al presente articolo e spiace che la contemporaneità dei nostri interessi non abbia consentito di giovarmi di molte delle osservazioni di Rashed.

⁸ Fondata per altro sull’autorità di Hermann Diels, cf. Philop., *In Phys.*, vol. I, p. X Vitelli, se la formula “codicem examinavit H. Diels” deve indicare anche la conclusione cui l’editore tedesco sarebbe pervenuto.

⁹ Si consideri, per fare solo un esempio, a f. 89r, l’ultimo scolio filoponeo senza parallelo: lo scolio, a cornice del testo della *Fisica*, è preceduto da sistema segnaletico che rinvia al lemma di riferimento (VIII 1, 252 a 11), ed è seguito, dopo chiusura, da altro segnale che avverte della prosecuzione dello scolio in interlinea. Oppure si consideri il caso del f. 103v, dove il copista, servendosi, in prima cornice, di sistema segnaletico sullo scolio di commento di Simplicio, *In Phys.*, p. 845.5-15 Diels (*CAG* X, Berlin 1895), avverte, in seconda cornice, che quello scolio costituisce il senso del commento di Alessandro indicato da Simplicio (ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ σχολίου τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου ὡς φησι Σιμπλικίος); commento che viene poi rielaborato e inserito senza segnalazione poco più in alto tra la prima cornice e il testo della *Fisica* (*ibid.*, p. 844.29-31 Diels): Ἀλέξανδρος· οὐ γὰρ χαρακτηρίζεται κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ἢ οὐσία τῆς γραμμῆς· πολλὰ γὰρ ἄλλα συνεχῆ, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἡ οὐσία αὐτῆς μῆκος ἀπλατέες.

¹⁰ Può avere contribuito alla decisione di negare la presenza di Filopono dagli ultimi quattro libri della *Fisica* il fatto che, salvo sei eccezioni prive di riscontro in Vitelli, il quinto libro contenga solo estratti dal commento di Simplicio, sia a margine che in interlinea del codice, e che l’impiego costante di materiale filoponeo si cominci a registrare solo a libro sesto inoltrato. E tuttavia la consultazione degli scoli risulta oggettivamente impegnativa. Vi sono, per esempio, casi in cui il singolo scolio consiste nella giustapposizione, se non nella fusione, non segnalata in alcun modo, di estratti di diversa provenienza (Simplicio, Filopono): a questo proposito, vale a dire a proposito della complessità stratigrafica di taluni *excerpta*, possono valere le avvertenze generali in M. Cacouros, “La philosophie et les sciences du *Trivium* et du *Quadrivium* à Byzance de 1204 à 1453 entre tradition et innovation: les textes et l’enseignement, le cas de l’école du Prodrome (Pétra)”, in M. Cacouros - M.-H. Congourdeau (éd.), *Philosophie et sciences à Byzance de 1204 à 1453. Les textes, les doctrines et leur transmission*. Actes de la Table ronde organisée au XX^e Congrès International d’Études Byzantines (Paris, 2001), Peeters, Leuven 2006 (*Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta*, 146), p. 1-51, in part. p. 35-6.

avrà occasione di mostrare, infatti, una ricognizione sistematica consente di imbattersi, almeno in qualche caso, in attribuzioni addirittura nominali degli *excerpta* a Filopono¹¹ e suggerisce, quindi, di riconsiderare l'intero *corpus* per distinguere quanto indica una derivazione dal commento di Simplicio da quanto può senz'altro escluderla.

Ciò premesso, mi sembra di potere affidare alle pagine che seguono, oltre che una piú laterale segnalazione degli scoli filoponei su *Pcsl* che integrano quelli desumibili dalla tradizione accolta da Vitelli, soprattutto l'individuazione di alcuni degli *excerpta* propri al solo *Pcsl* e riconducibili, in assenza o meno di esplicita rivendicazione, al commento di Filopono.¹² È infatti solo una possibilità che il materiale scoliastico di *Pcsl* non desunto dal commento di Simplicio debba *ipso facto* presumersi come filoponeo. In realtà, l'intervento del suo estensore non si è limitato a stralciare, con maggiore o minore libertà, dai due commenti.¹³ Una serie di scoli, in verità, documenta come egli abbia giustapposto le due fonti in una sorta di terzo commento.¹⁴ Neppure il sistema di riferimento utilizzato dal copista di *Fisica* 5-8 sembra ubbidire ad un criterio ordinativo degli scoli tale che possa consentire la distinzione di una fonte esegetica dall'altra, nel nostro caso evidentemente del commento di Simplicio da quello di Filopono. Non vi è, in altre parole, alcuna alternanza nei segni

¹¹ Oltre quelli in cui Filopono è ricordato insieme a Simplicio, in altri casi ad essere citato è solo Filopono: cf. *Pcsl*, f. 96r, ad VIII, 5. 257 b 2 (f. 136v nel *Vat. gr.* 2208), cui è premessa la formula διαίρεσις τοῦ Φιλοπόνου, che riproduce, piú o meno alla lettera, p. 834.10-14 Vitelli (ma cf. anche p. 886.7-8 Vitelli); *Pcsl*, f. 97v, ad VIII, 5. 258 b 3 (f. 138v nel *Vat. gr.* 2208), cui è premessa la formula ὁ Φιλόπονος λέγει, con estratto corrispondente a p. 837.25-30 Vitelli. A queste occorrenze vanno aggiunti altri casi in cui è il solo *Pcsl* ad introdurre riferimento al commento di Filopono: una volta, f. 84v, ad VII 4. 248 a 20 (f. 125r nel *Vat. gr.* 2208), attraverso la formula ἡ ὡς Φιλόπονος ἐξηγεῖται, in un estratto privo di riscontro nella tradizione scoliastica a noi nota; una seconda, f. 99v, ad VIII, 6. 260 a 6, grazie al giro di frase τὴν γραφὴν οἶδεν ὁ Φιλόπονος, nel compendio di uno scolio che si legge per esteso a p. 894.8-16 Vitelli. A f. 93r, inoltre, ad VIII, 4. 254 b 24 (f. 132v nel *Vat. gr.* 2208), che riproduce un estratto diversamente documentato in Vitelli (p. 829.20-25; 884.30-34), lo scolio è anticipato dall'attribuzione a Filopono: Φιλόπονος· θέσεις, φησίν, ὡς ὅταν ἐναλλάξ τοὺς πόδας ἐν τῇ βαδίσει κινῶμεν καὶ μεταφέρωμεν τὴν τῶν ποδῶν θέσιν, τῶν ποδῶν τὸν δεξιὸν ἀριστερόν ποιῶντες κάκεῖνον δεξιόν· τρόπους δὲ κινήσεως, ὡς ὅταν ὀπισθοφανῶς βαδίζωμεν· οὐ γὰρ πέφυκεν ὁ ποὺς κινούμενος ἀπὸ τῆς πτέρνης ἀρχεσθαι. διὰ χειρῶν δὲ βαδίζοντες καὶ τῇ θέσει καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ παρὰ φύσιν ἔχομεν τὰ μόρια· οὕτε γὰρ κάτω εἶναι πεφύκασιν αἱ χεῖρες ἄνω δὲ οἱ πόδες, οὕτε αἱ χεῖρες βαδίζειν ἀλλ' οἱ πόδες. Lo stesso capita a f. 95v, ad VIII, 5. 256 b 23 (f. 135v nel *Vat. gr.* 2208), anch'esso privo di riscontro nella tradizione nota: Φιλόπονος· εὐλογον καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον. οὐπω γὰρ ἀποδέδεικται εἶναι καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ὁ κινεῖ μόνως οὐ κινεῖται δὲ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ. ἐντὸς γὰρ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀέρος καὶ τοῦ μέσου εὐλογον καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἄηρ εἶναι. Qualcosa di molto simile, infine, nel f. 99v, ad VIII, 6. 259 b 33 (f. 141r nel *Vat. gr.* 2208), dove il commento di Filopono, citato dopo quello di Simplicio, è introdotto dalla locuzione Φιλόπονος εἰς τὸ αὐτό (con doppio riscontro in Vitelli: p. 839.24-30; 894.16-23): Φιλόπονος εἰς τὸ αὐτό· πρὸς βορρᾶν γὰρ γινόμενος ὁ ἥλιος ἢ πρὸς νότον, ἢ ψυχὴ ἢ θερμαίνει τὰ ἐνταῦθα τῶ εἰς ἐναντίους τόπους γίνεσθαι ἐναντίας καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιούμενος. εἶτα ἐπειδὴ οὐκ εἰσὶν οὗτοι κυρίως ἐναντίοι τόποι, τὸ βορεῖον καὶ τὸ νότιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω, διὰ τοῦτο ἐπιδιορθούμενος εἶδη αὐτὰ ἐναντία καλεῖ, ὡς ἐναντίων εἰδῶν ποιητικά, θερμότητος καὶ ψυχρότητος. εἶτα ἐπειδὴ αἱ ἐναντία κινήσεις ἡρεμιά λαμβάνονται, ὡς δεῖξει, εἰκότως καὶ τῆς ἡρεμίας τῶν τῆδε τὰ οὐράνια αἰτιαταί.

¹² Si tratta, in entrambi i casi, solo di *specimina* rispetto al complesso di scoli presente nel *Pcsl*. Si attende ancora uno studio pieno sulla trasmissione in forma di scoli del commento di Filopono a *Fisica* 5-8.

¹³ Per dare ragione di alcune tecniche di compendio del commento di Filopono in forma di scoli nel *Pcsl*, si può leggere utilmente quanto notato da Rashed, *Die Überlieferungsgeschichte* (cit. n. 2), p. 208-13, a proposito degli scoli al *De Generatione et corruptione* presenti nel *Parisinus Coislinianus* 169 e desunti dal commento di Filopono; ma cf. anche Cacouros, "Survie culturelle" (cit. n. 5), p. 198-210.

¹⁴ Cf. Philop., *In Phys.*, p. 825.2-14 Vitelli (composto a partire da Simpl., *In Phys.*, p. 1195.1-6 Diels, piú Philop., *In Phys.*, p. 825.8-14 Vitelli), cui corrisponde identico scolio in *Pcsl*, f. 91r; p. 826.13-15 Vitelli (composto a partire da Simpl., *In Phys.*, p. 1196.35-36 Diels, piú Philop., *In Phys.*, p. 826.14-15 Vitelli), cui corrisponde identico scolio in *Pcsl*, f. 91v. Ci sono altri casi in cui l'accostamento non esplicito tra Simplicio e Filopono in una sorta di coalescenza delle fonti è riconoscibile solo per mancanza di confronto di una delle fonti con il commento di Simplicio.

di riferimento che rifletta alternanza nella paternità degli scoli.¹⁵ E tuttavia, se solo in qualche rara circostanza è il riferimento nominale a Filopono a documentare la paternità degli *excerpta*, in altre occasioni è la fortunata sopravvivenza di una sorta di sommario arabo del commento di Filopono¹⁶ ad offrire indubbia conferma di attribuzione. In tutti gli altri casi la rivendicazione degli scoli è subordinata ad una, si spera, non meno attendibile considerazione dell'*usus auctoris*.¹⁷

¹⁵ A f. 87r, per esempio, che chiude il libro 7 della *Fisica*, il sistema segnaletico è l'unico utilizzato nella *mise en page* degli scoli, e introduce regolarmente sezioni scolastiche tratte dal commento di Filopono, ma alla fine è premesso ad un estratto simpliciano (*In Phys.*, p. 1111.12-24 Diels); nel foglio successivo, 87v, che apre il libro VIII della *Fisica*, sulla prima colonna di *marginalia* che inquadra il testo di Aristotele, il primo scolio, da Simplicio (p. 1117.3-14 Diels), è introdotto dall'intitolazione *Συμπλικίου φιλοσόφου εις τὸ Θ τῆς Φυσικῆς ἀκροάσεως*, cui seguono inizialmente altri due scoli da Simplicio (p. 1118.14-1119.2 Diels; 1119.5-10), indicati da sistema alfanumerico, un quarto da Filopono con sistema segnaletico – ma il copista, che limitatamente alla sua parte iniziale lo aveva riprodotto anche in interlinea, con ulteriore rinvio ammonisce sotto il testo della *Fisica* di riferimento *ὄρα τὴν ἐξήγησιν* (uguale invito, per esempio, ai ff. 86v, 87v, 88r, 89r, variante ridotta della più estesa indicazione *ὄρα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σημείῳ τὴν ἐξήγησιν* che si legge a f. 424r e che fa esplicita menzione del sistema di rinvio, *σημεῖον*)–; un quinto, di nuovo da Simplicio (p. 1119.32-1120.3 Diels), indicato da sistema segnaletico, un sesto con sistema segnaletico da Filopono, un settimo con sistema segnaletico da Simplicio (p. 1123.3-6 Diels), un ottavo con sistema segnaletico da Filopono, un nono, infine, con sistema segnaletico da Filopono e con parallelo nella tradizione a noi nota grazie all'edizione di riferimento. Questa serie più interna è tuttavia incorniciata da un'ulteriore sequenza di scoli esteriori tratti dal commento di Simplicio e a loro volta differentemente indicati: il primo (p. 1119.3-5 Diels) insieme segnaletico e abbreviativo *Συμπλί(κιοσ)*; il secondo (p. 1119.17-20 Diels) è anch'esso combinatamente segnaletico e abbreviativo *Συμπλί(κιοσ)*, ma il copista traccia una linea che lo unisce al testo della *Fisica* di riferimento; il terzo (p. 1120.18-19 Diels), come i primi due, risulta dalla combinazione di sistema segnaletico e abbreviazione *Συμπλί(κιοσ)* e una formula sul testo della *Fisica* di riferimento, raggiunto da una linea tracciata a partire dallo scolio, avverte *ὄρα τὸ σχόλιον ἔξω* (sul tipo di altre locuzioni simili accanto al segno di rinvio, come ai ff. 58r, 60r, *ζῆτε ἔξω*, ai ff. 69v, 94r, *ὄρα ἔξω*, a f. 104r, *ὄρα τὸ σχόλιον*); l'ultimo (p. 1123.3-6 Diels) che inizia con *θένται* è la pressoché insospettabile continuazione di uno scolio interlineare lasciato in sospenso per mancanza di spazio e a cui si lega con un altrettanto insospettabile tratto orizzontale di richiamo. Se a questo si aggiunge che il sistema segnaletico degli scoli esteriori è, salvo che per un caso, rappresentato da un unico simbolo e che altri scoli interlineari, di cui uno con abbreviazione di paternità *Συμπλί(κιοσ)*, sono preceduti da identica segnalazione, ci si può fare un'idea dell'estrema complessità di consultazione del testo e di come, almeno nel caso di questa sezione della *Fisica*, il sistema prodromeniano, come generalizzato da Cacouros, "Survie culturelle" (cit. n. 5), debba considerarsi costantemente violato.

¹⁶ I primi quattro libri del commento di Filopono furono tradotti in arabo da Quṣṭā b. Lūqā, gli ultimi quattro da Ibn Nā'ima al-Ḥimsī. Il testo arabo del commento di Filopono agli ultimi quattro libri è sopravvissuto in forma di sporadici scoli ovvero estratti assemblati assieme ad altro materiale esegetico di varia provenienza a cornice della cosiddetta *Fisica* di Bagdad, codice conservato alla Leiden University Library (Leiden *Or.* 583). Cf. ora soprattutto E. Gannagé, "Philopon (Jean-). Tradition arabe", in R. Goulet (éd.), *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques*, CNRS-Éditions, Paris 2012, Va, p. 503-63, in part. p. 518-31, per il commento alla *Fisica* nella tradizione araba. Una tavola delle corrispondenze tra gli scoli trasmessi sotto il nome di Yaḥyā in Leiden *Or.* 583 e i passi del commentario di Filopono fu stabilita inizialmente da G. Endress, *The Works of Yahyā ibn 'Adī. An Analytical Inventory*, Reichert, Wiesbaden 1977, p. 36-8, cui hanno fatto seguito gli studi di E. Giannakis, *Philoponus in the Arabic Tradition of Aristotle's Physics*, PhD thesis, University of Oxford 1992, p. 152-82 (con traduzione inglese dei frammenti del commentario di Filopono ai quattro libri posteriori della *Fisica*, p. 185-394), di P. Lettinck, *Aristotle's "Physics" and Its Reception in the Arabic World. With an Edition of the Unpublished Parts of Ibn Bājja's Commentary on the Physics*, Brill, Leiden - New York - Köln 1994 (Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus, 7) e di P. Lettinck, *Philoponus, On Aristotle Physics 5-8*, tr. P. Lettinck, with *Simplicius. On Aristotle on the Void*, tr. J.O. Urmsom, Duckworth, London 1994 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), p. 11-17, che costituisce nel nostro caso anche l'edizione di riferimento per il confronto con i frammenti greci.

¹⁷ Il che in qualche caso può voler dire che alla base di un estratto ci sia, inizialmente e seppure inquinato, anche materiale filoponeo. Si può invece senz'altro escludere che i *marginalia* di *Pcsl* ospitino quanto ulteriormente conosciamo dell'attività interpretativa sulla *Fisica*, vale a dire la *Parafraasi* di Temistio (Themistii *In Aristotelis Physica paraphrasis*, ed. H. Schenkl, Reimer, Berlin 1900 [*CAG* V.2]); anche quello che ora costituisce il residuo del commento alessandrista ai libri 4-8, in Rashed, non sembra trovare, se non in un caso (cf. *infra*), alcun riscontro puntuale nel nostro *corpus*.

II.

VI 3, 234 a 14-15: ἄμα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἂν καθ' αὐτὸ
f. 69v

λέγεται τὸ νῦν τοῦτο τὸ πεπλατυσμένον [καθ' αὐθό] οὐ καθ' αὐθό, ἀλλὰ δι' ἕτερον ἦτοι διὰ τὸ 1
κυρίως καθ' αὐθό νῦν τὸ ἄτομον ὅπερ ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ· παντὶ γὰρ χρόνῳ ὑπάρχει τὸ νῦν τὸ ἄτομον.¹⁸
1 *seclusi*

Questo presente esteso è detto non in senso proprio, ma in senso derivativo ovvero in forza del presente inteso realmente in senso proprio, quello indivisibile che gli appartiene. Ad ogni tempo, infatti, appartiene il presente indivisibile.

È un esempio di come possa configurarsi complessa la vicenda esegetica affidata alla tradizione scolastica e di come risulti altrettanto inagevole decidersi e risalire alla sua fonte. Nel tratto della *Fisica*¹⁹ di cui lo scolio costituisce breve commento, Aristotele assume che ciò che definiamo presente in senso proprio, in senso primario, va concepito come un istante indivisibile, non come sequenza estesa di tempo, come *nunc fluens*; bisogna pensare ad un istante limite del passato e ad un istante limite del futuro, senza che il τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ νῦν costituisca una sorta di prolungamento temporale tra di essi, quanto invece un punto privo di durata; altrimenti andrà ammesso che questa estensione, divisibile, debba riguardare anche quello che intendiamo per presente in senso primario, vale a dire il presente indivisibile.²⁰ Lo scolio sembra presupporre la linea interpretativa documentata in un frammento alessandrino:²¹ ἀντὶ τοῦ οὐκ ἔσται τὸ κυρίως νῦν εἰλημμένον ἀλλὰ τὸ πλατικὸν καὶ καταχρηστικόν.²² Preoccupato di chiarire che cosa si debba intendere per τὸ νῦν καθ' ἕτερον privato del suo carattere indivisibilmente istantaneo, il responsabile dello scolio lo interpreta come τὸ πλατικόν, vale a dire come presente impropriamente esteso. Nonostante sia stata denunciata l'assenza di equivalente in Simplicio,²³ in realtà, nel commento di Simplicio,²⁴ per

Che il criterio dell'*usus* possa orientare nella scolastica anonima con origine nei commentari filosofici, è dimostrato da C. Luna, *Trois études sur la tradition des commentaires anciens à la Métaphysique d'Aristote*, Brill, Leiden 2001 (Philosophia Antiqua, 88), p. 58-66; M. Rashed, "Vestiges inconnus d'un commentaire alexandrin au *De caelo* d'Aristote", in Id., *L'héritage aristotélicien. Textes inédits de l'Antiquité*, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 2007, 2016², p. 219-67.

¹⁸ *Vat. gr.* 2208, f. 106v.

¹⁹ VI, 3. 234 a 14-16: ἄμα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἂν καθ' αὐτὸ εἴη τὸ νῦν, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἕτερον· ἡ γὰρ διαίρεσις οὐ καθ' αὐτό.

²⁰ Cf. W.D. Ross, *Aristotle's Physics: A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary*, Oxford U.P., Oxford 1936, p. 645; R. Sorabji, *Time, Creation, and the Continuum. Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages*, Duckworth, London 1983, p. 347; 369-70; S. Waterlow, "Aristotle's Now", *The Philosophical Quarterly* 34 (1984), p. 105-7; D. Bostock, "Aristotle on Continuity in *Physics* VI", in Id., *Space, Time, Matter, and Form: Essays on Aristotle's Physics*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2006 (Oxford Aristotle Studies), p. 168 (ripreso da L. Judson [ed.], *Aristotle's Physics: A Collection of Essays* Oxford, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1991); M. Inwood, "Aristotle on the Reality of Time", in Judson (ed.), *Aristotle's Physics: A Collection of Essays*, p. 151-78, in part. p. 160-1; U. Coopé, *Time for Aristotle Physics IV.10-14*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2005, p. 23, n. 11.

²¹ Cf. Rashed, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise. Commentaire* (cit. n. 1), p. 335.

²² Cf. la traduzione di Rashed, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise. Commentaire* (cit. n. 1), p. 367: "à la place de: 'ce ne sera pas le maintenant pris au sens propre, mais celui qui est étendu et improprement désigné'".

²³ Rashed, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise. Commentaire* (cit. n. 1), p. 368.

²⁴ *Simpl.*, *In Phys.*, p. 958.21-24 Diels: ὅτι δὲ οὐ καθ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ νῦν ἐστίν, οἷον χρὴ εἶναι τὸ κυρίως μετὰξὺ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος, δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ διαιρεῖσθαι· ἡ γὰρ διαίρεσις οὐ τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ νῦν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐν πλάτει καὶ καθ' ἕτερον λεγομένου. Cf. la traduzione di D. Konstan, *Simplicius. On Aristotle Physics 6*, Duckworth, London 1989 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), p. 53-4: "that the now is not (the now) in its own right, such as that

indicare che la divisione può riguardare solo il presente esteso, al posto di τὸ πλατικόν compare l'espressione affatto sinonimica τοῦ ἐν πλάτει.²⁵ E tuttavia, anche a prescindere dal parallelo forse meno evidente di Simplicio, l'equivalente del frammento alessandrino si trova in un *excerptum* vitelliano del commento *ad l.* di Filopono:²⁶ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, φησὶν, οὐ τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ νῦν, ὅπερ προέκειτο ἡμῖν ζητῆσαι, τοῦτο ἀνεφάνη, ἀλλὰ τὸ πλατικόν, ὅπερ οὐ δι' αὐτὸ ἀλλὰ δι' ἕτερον ἐστὶ νῦν. τοῦτο δὲ συνέβη διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐν καὶ ταῦτ' οὐκ ἔστι καθ' αὐτὸ νῦν, ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι καθ' αὐτὸ νῦν, δῆλον ἐξ ὧν διαιρεῖται. πᾶσα δὲ διαιρέσις κατὰ τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ νῦν γίνεται, οὐκ αὐτὸ διαιρεῖται, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν γραμμῇ κατὰ σημεῖον ἢ διαιρέσις καὶ ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ κατὰ γραμμὴν καὶ ἐν στερεῷ κατὰ ἐπιφάνειαν. Ora, è importante innanzitutto avvertire che l'impiego dell'espressione τὸ πλατικόν, per tradurre il concetto di presente esteso e καθ' ἕτερον, è caratteristico solo di Filopono;²⁷ in secondo luogo che essa si trova altrettanto frequentemente congiunta ad altre esclusive di Filopono, che traducono l'idea di presente in senso primario (καθ' αὐτό): τὸ νῦν τὸ ἄτομον, da una parte,²⁸ τὸ ἀκαριαῖον, dall'altra.²⁹ Se ora torniamo al nostro scolio, non sarà difficile scorgervi l'opposizione presente esteso e derivativo/presente puntuale e indivisibile, ottenuta grazie ad una coppia tipicamente filoponea (τὸ πεπλατυσμένον οὐ καθ' αὐθό/τὸ κυρίως καθ' αὐθό νῦν τὸ ἄτομον) e, dunque, poterlo ricondurre al suo commento.³⁰

which is in the strict sense between the past and the future must be, is obvious from its being divided. 'For the division is not' of the now 'in its own right', but rather of the (now) that is (so) called in a broad (sense) and by virtue of something else".

²⁵ L'espressione ricorre con uguale funzione, vale a dire per differenziare presente proprio da presente improprio, anche in Philop., *In Phys.*, p. 803.30-31 Vitelli; 864.11-18, che costituisce una sorta di versione semialternativa di *In Phys.*, p. 804.16-23 Vitelli, e per cui cf. *infra*: πρόκειται νῦν δεῖξαι ὅτι τὸ νῦν, ὅπερ πέρας μὲν ἐστὶ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος ἀρχὴ δὲ τοῦ μέλλοντος, καὶ ἐν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀδιαιρέτον τὸ αὐτὸ τῶν μὲν πέρας ὄν τῶν δὲ ἀρχή. τὸ γὰρ νῦν τὸ ἄτομον τοῦτο καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ πρώτως λέγεται νῦν, τὸ δὲ ἐν πλάτει οὔτε πρώτως οὔτε καθ' αὐτό· διότι γὰρ πλησιαιτέρον τοῦ κυρίως νῦν, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὸ νῦν λέγεται. οὔτε οὖν καθ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, διότι [γὰρ] συμβεβηκεν αὐτῷ πλησιαιτέρον εἶναι· διότι γὰρ ἐκεῖνο νῦν, καὶ τὸ πλησιάζον αὐτῷ βραχὺ τοῦ χρόνου διάστημα καὶ αὐτὸ νῦν.

²⁶ *In Phys.*, p. 804.16-23 Vitelli, anch'esso sfuggito a Rashed. Il suo quasi doppione nel *Marcianus gr.* 227, che tuttavia ha qualcosa in più e di maggiormente vicino al nostro scolio (cf. *In Phys.*, p. 864.13-14 Vitelli: τὸ γὰρ νῦν τὸ ἄτομον τοῦτο καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ πρώτως λέγεται νῦν, τὸ δὲ ἐν πλάτει οὔτε πρώτως οὔτε καθ' αὐτό), è a p. 864.11-18 Vitelli.

²⁷ Cf. *In Phys.*, p. 764.23-27 Vitelli (ὅτι ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ πλατικόν νῦν χρόνος τις ἐγγὺς τοῦ ἀκαριαίου νῦν καὶ κατὰ τὸν παρεληλυθότα χρόνον καὶ κατὰ τὸν μέλλοντα, οὔτε δὲ τὰ πάλαι γενόμενα, οἷον τὰ ἐν Ἰλίῳ, οὔτε τὰ μετὰ πολὺν ἐσόμενα, οἷον εἰ ἔσται κατακλισμός, νῦν λέγεται γεγονέναι ἢ γίνεσθαι, καίτοι συνεχῶς ὄντος εἰς αὐτὰ τοῦ χρόνου, διότι μὴ σύνεγγυς εἰσι τοῦ ἀκαριαίου νῦν); p. 760.21-22 (πρῶτον δὲ περὶ τοῦ νῦν διαλέγεται, καὶ φησι διττὸν εἶναι τὸ νῦν, τὸ μὲν ἀκαριαῖον τὸ δὲ πλατικόν); p. 762.16-20.

²⁸ Cf. *In Phys.*, p. 803.30-31 Vitelli; 864.13-14.

²⁹ In nessun altro commentatore l'espressione, già di per sé non frequente, rientra in contesti in cui, come in Filopono, sia in discussione il presente inesteso e puntuale: *In Cat.*, p. 46.18-19 Busse (*CAG XIII.1*, Berlin 1898) (τὸ τε γὰρ σημεῖον ἐν γραμμῇ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι πέρας ὄν γραμμῆς καὶ ἀρχή, καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐν χρόνῳ· ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ πέρας χρόνου καὶ οὐ χρόνος· νῦν δὲ λέγω τὸ ἀκαριαῖον, οὐ τὸ πλατυκῶς λεγόμενον); *In Phys.*, p. 760.21-22 Vitelli; 761.17-20.

³⁰ In che relazione si trovasse con la coppia di scoli editi da Vitelli (*In Phys.*, p. 804.16-23 Vitelli; p. 864.11-18), è meno facile stabilirlo, ma potrebbe, per il suo carattere più puntualmente esplicativo della formula οὐκ ἄν καθ' αὐτό, costituire *incipit* della *lexis*. Si può aggiungere anche il caso di uno scolio a *Cael.* III 1, 300 a 14, contenuto a margine del f. 95r del ms *Parisinus gr.* 1853, che riprende indubbiamente l'*usus* fino ad ora considerato e che, come molti altri presenti nel codice, dimostrerebbe evidente discendenza filoponea: ὡς ἀμερές καὶ αὐτό. ὡς γὰρ στιγμή πέρας γραμμῆς οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἀκαριαῖον νῦν πέρας τοῦ χρόνου.

VI 9, 240 a 33: οὐδένα χρόνον

f. 78r

πρῶτον μὲν, φησι, ψευδὸς τὸ λέγειν ὅτι τὰ μέρη ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνον τινὰ μένει· οὐδένα γὰρ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνον· ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ μὴ τὸν τοῦ ὅλου τόπον ἀμείβει, ἀλλ' οὖν τὸν ἑαυτῶν ἀμείβει ἀντιπαραχωροῦντα ἀλλήλοις· εἰ δὲ μηδένα χρόνον εἰσὶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, κινεῖται ἄρα. ἔπειτα, φησί, καὶ τὸ ὅλον εἰ καὶ μὴ τῆς φύσει τὸν τόπον, ἀλλ' οὖν σχέσει ἀμείβει καὶ αἰεὶ ἄλλον ἐξ ἄλλου τόπον καταλαμβάνει· τῆς γὰρ περιφερείας ἄλλη μὲν ἐστὶ τῆς σχέσει ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ᾱ λαμβανόμενη οἷον ἀπὸ κριοῦ καὶ ἄλλη ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ β̄ ἀπὸ τινος ἄλλου ζωδίου, καὶ πάλιν ἄλλη ἀπὸ τοῦ γ̄. αἰ οὕτως οὖν λαμβανόμενα περιφέρεται, λέγω δὴ τῆς σχέσει, οὐκ αἰεὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον ἔχουσι· γίνεται γὰρ καὶ τὸ ᾱ ὅπου τὸ β̄ καὶ τοῦτο ὅπου τὸ γ̄ καὶ τοῦτο ὅπου τὸ ᾱ ἢ τὸ β̄. ὥστε ταύτη οὐδὲ ἡ ὁλότης ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ.³¹

5 ἄλλη *scripsi*: ἄλλο *PcsI*

Innanzitutto, dice, è falso affermare che le parti rimangono per un certo tempo nello stesso luogo. Per nessun tempo infatti rimangono nello stesso luogo. Ma se anche non cambiano il luogo del tutto, cambiano però il proprio trasferendosi a turno tra di loro. Ma se per nessun tempo sono nello stesso luogo, allora si muovono. Poi, aggiunge, anche il tutto, seppure non secondo natura, cambia il luogo almeno secondo la relazione e occupa senza interruzione un luogo dopo un altro. Rispetto alla circonferenza, infatti, secondo la relazione altra è quella considerata a partire da A, per esempio dall'Ariete, altra quella a partire da B, da un altro segno dello zodiaco, e ancora altra quella a partire da C. Dunque le circonferenze considerate in questo modo, voglio dire secondo la relazione, non sortiscono sempre lo stesso luogo. Infatti anche A giunge dove è B e B dove è C e C dove è A o B. Ragion per cui in questo modo neppure la totalità si trova nello stesso luogo.

Anche in questo caso l'attribuzione a Filopono si dimostra sicura, se non altro perché una brevissima traccia dello scolio (2-3: ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ μὴ τὸν τοῦ ὅλου τόπον ἀμείβει, ἀλλ' οὖν τὸν ἑαυτῶν ἀμείβει ἀντιπαραχωροῦντα ἀλλήλοις) si poteva già leggere tra gli *excerpta Parisiensia*,³² seppure con qualche minima variazione.³³ Si aggiunge, però, a questa considerazione già di per sé determinante, la presenza, altrettanto decisiva, del tecnico ἀντιπαραχωροῦντα, impiegato nello scolio per la dislocazione reciproca delle parti e che nella tradizione esegetica è affatto esclusivo di Filopono, anche in riferimento alle parti del tutto, con una ricorrenza per altro altissima di costruzione reciprocativa (ἀντιπαραχωρεῖν ἀλλήλοις).³⁴

VI 10, 241 b 14: μὴ μιᾶς μὲν γὰρ γιγνομένης οὐθὲν ἴσως κωλύει

f. 79r

εἰς ἄπειρον, φησί, γίνεσθαι κίνησιν μὴ μίαν κατ' ἀριθμὸν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συνέχειαν ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης. ἴσως, φησίν, οὐδὲν κωλύει, οἷον ἐβάδισέ τις εἶτα βαδίσας πρὶν ἡρεμῆσαι θερμανθείη καὶ ἄμα

³¹ *Vat. gr.* 2208, f. 116v.³² *Philop., In Phys.*, p. 818.24-25 Vitelli.³³ F. 49r: εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὸν τοῦ ὅλου τόπον οὐκ ἀμείβει, ἀλλ' οὖν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἀμείβει ἀντιπαραχωροῦντα ἀλλήλοις.³⁴ Cf., per esempio, *Philop., In Phys.*, p. 566.20-26 Vitelli (πῶς δὲ καὶ φαμεν ἐν τῇ κινήσει ἀντιπαραχωρεῖν ἀλλήλοις τὰ μόρια τοὺς οικείους τόπους; εἰ γὰρ ἐκάστου μορίου τῆς ἀπλανοῦς τὰ περιέχοντα μόρια τόπος ἐστὶ, κινουμένης δὲ τῆς ὅλης σφαίρας ὀρθῶς λέγεται ὡς ἀντιπαραχωρεῖ ἀλλήλοις τὰ μόρια τοὺς οικείους τόπους, διαρεῖσθαι τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνάγκη καὶ ἄλλα τῶν μορίων ἄλλην σχέσιν ἴσχειν πρὸς τε τὴν ὁλότητα καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτά, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον ἀδιαιρέτου τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ὄντος); p. 594.7-9 (ἐν γὰρ τῇ κύκλῳ κινήσει τὸ μὲν ὅλον ὡς ὅλον ἀκίνητόν ἐστι, τὰ δὲ μόρια τὰ ἀντιπαραχωροῦντα ἀλλήλοις τοὺς ἰδίους τόπους).

τῷ θερμανθῆναι ἄρξεται λευκαίνεσθαι καθ' ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ νῦν, τῆς μὲν παυσάμενον τῆς δὲ ἄρξάμενον, εἴτα μετὰ τὸ λευκαίνεσθαι μανθάνειν ἄρξεται· ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλην ἄλλην ἐπισυνάπτειν καὶ ταύτη ἐπ' ἄπειρον εἶρειν τὴν κίνησιν, ἀλλ' οὐ μία ἐστὶν κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἀλλὰ 5
πολλὰ συνεχεῖς τῷ χρόνῳ· νῦν περὶ μιᾶς κατ' ἀριθμὸν ὁ λόγος· ἐνδέχεται ταύτην ἄπειρον εἶναι τὴν ἔκτασιν. μόνῃ οὖν ἐνδέχεται ἄπειρον εἶναι κίνησιν τὴν κύκλω, αἰδίου ὄντος τοῦ κόσμου, καὶ ταύτην τῷ χρόνῳ καὶ τῷ γίνεσθαι οὐ τῷ εἶναι καὶ οὐ μίαν κατ' ἀριθμὸν, ἀλλ' ἀπείρους καὶ 10
συνεχεῖς εἰ μὴ ἔχει ἀρχὴν τὸ πᾶν· εἰ δὲ ἀρχὴν μὲν ἔχει κατὰ Πλάτωνα, πέρας δὲ οὐ, πεπερασμένας, ὁμοειδεῖς δὲ ὡς μίαν γίνεσθαι τῷ εἶδει πάσας καὶ οὐ τῷ ἀριθμῷ.³⁵

5 an κατὰ τὴν ἔκτασιν?

Dice che si produce all'infinito movimento non unico di numero, ma per continuità, l'uno dopo l'altro. Dice 'probabilmente nulla impedisce', per esempio se qualcuno abbia preso a camminare, poi, dopo aver camminato, prima di fermarsi, si riscaldi e assieme a riscaldarsi cominci a divenire bianco in uno stesso istante, cessando dall'uno e dando principio all'altro; poi, dopo essere divenuto bianco, inizi ad apprendere. Ma se anche fosse possibile che ciascun movimento si congiunga all'altro e in questo modo il movimento si prolunghi all'infinito, tuttavia non vi sarebbe un movimento unico di numero, ma molti movimenti continui secondo il tempo. Ora, il discorso riguarda il movimento unico di numero. È possibile che questo sia infinito per estensione. Dunque il solo movimento che possa essere infinito è quello circolare, dal momento che il cosmo è eterno, e questo movimento (sarebbe infinito) secondo il tempo e il divenire, non secondo l'essere e non unico di numero, ma (vi sarebbero) movimenti infiniti e continui, se l'universo non ha principio. Se invece, secondo Platone, ha bensì principio, ma non termine, (vi sarebbero movimenti) finiti, ma uguali, di modo che sarebbero tutti uno secondo la specie e non di numero.

Fondamentalmente diversa nel suo impianto dal corrispettivo commento di Simplicio,³⁶ sia per l'esemplificazione³⁷ attraverso la successione cinetica κατὰ συνέχειαν cammino riscaldamento/ imbiancamento apprendimento, sia per il riferimento all'universo e all'ipotesi generazionista di Platone, questa sezione scoliastica, assai probabilmente sfuggita a rimaneggiamenti di sorta, può anch'essa essere ricondotta al commento di Filopono e questo, oltre che per la presenza della locuzione καθ' ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ νῦν esclusivamente filoponea,³⁸ anche sulla base di un altro *excerptum* da Filopono³⁹ che ha tutta l'apparenza di costituire, con trasferimento dalla *theoria* alla *lexis*, la naturale prosecuzione del nostro:⁴⁰ καλῶς τὸ ἴσως προσέθηκεν, ὅτι οὔτε ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνδέχεται ἐπ' ἄπειρον ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης μεταλαμβάνειν κίνησιν φθαρτοῦ ὄντος τοῦ κατ' εὐθεῖαν κινουμένου, οὔτε, εἰ καὶ ἦν αἰδίον τῶν οὕτω κινουμένων τι, ἐνδεχόμενον ἦν οὕτω κατὰ συνέχειαν ἔχεσθαι ἀλλήλων τὰς κινήσεις, καὶ μηδένα χρόνον ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ εἶναι τὸ κινούμενον· συνεχεῖς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἶεν οὕτως, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀπτόμεναι⁴¹.

³⁵ *Vat. gr.* 2208, f. 118r.

³⁶ *Simpl.*, *In Phys.*, p. 1031.15-29 Diels.

³⁷ *Phys.* VI, 10. 241 b 15-16 (οἷον εἰ μετὰ τὴν φορὰν ἀλλοίωσις εἶη καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν αὐξήσις καὶ πάλιν γένεσις).

³⁸ *Philop.*, *In Phys.*, p. 681.18 Vitelli; 690.17.

³⁹ *Philop.*, *In Phys.*, p. 821.6-11 Vitelli.

⁴⁰ Sul procedimento esegetico di Filopono, cf. Golitsis, *Les Commentaires* (cit. n. 1), p. 56-7.

⁴¹ Ma cf., già prima, *Philop.*, *In Phys.*, p. 820.30-821.4 Vitelli, con parallelo anche nella nostra collezione, f. 79r.

VII 1, 241 b 34: ἅπαν τὸ κινούμενον

f. 79v

ὅπερ προτίθεται ἐν τῷ παρόντι βιβλίῳ διδάξαι τοῦτο ἐκ προοιμίῳ ἀνακηρύττει.

Quanto si propone di insegnare nel presente libro (Aristotele) lo annuncia fin dall'esordio.

Brevissimo stralcio, evidentemente collocato in apertura di commento al libro 7, ma sufficiente per attribuirlo a Filopono, che è l'unico tra i commentatori che usi la particolare formula ἐκ προοιμίῳ ἀνακηρύττειν.⁴²

VII 1, 242 a 15-16: ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον

f. 80r

τὸ προκείμενον διὰ τούτων δεῖξαι ὅτι τὸ πρότως κινοῦν ἀνάγκη πᾶσα ἀκίνητον εἶναι καὶ οὐ πᾶν τὸ κινοῦν κινούμενον καὶ αὐτὸ κινεῖ.⁴³

L'assunto, vale a dire che è assolutamente necessario che il primo motore sia immobile e che non ogni motore che muove un corpo mosso anch'esso si muova, è possibile dimostrarlo in forza di queste cose.

L'attribuzione è fondata in questo caso sul particolare giro di frase, probabilmente incipitario di commento, τὸ προκείμενον διὰ τούτων δεῖξαι (nella sua forma *plenior* τὸ προκείμενον διὰ τούτων ἐστὶ δεῖξαι), esclusivo di Filopono.⁴⁴ Se si aggiunge la ricorrenza della locuzione avverbiale ἀνάγκη πᾶσα frequentissima solo in Filopono e del principio πᾶν τὸ κινοῦν κινούμενον καὶ αὐτὸ κινεῖ, che in questa sequenza e forma è solo in Filopono⁴⁵ e che costituisce prospettiva esegetica diversa da quella adottata in comune da Alessandro⁴⁶ e Simplicio,⁴⁷ l'attribuzione diviene inevitabile.

VII 3, 247 b 22: ἡ δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς λήψις

f. 84r

κινουμένων τῶν αἰσθήσεων ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν κινεῖται καὶ τὰ πάθη· ἀλλ' ὅταν μὲν κινῶνται τὰ πάθη ὑφ' ἐκάστου αἰσθητοῦ καθ' ὃ ἐστι, τότε ἀρετὴ γίνεται· ὅταν γὰρ τοῦ ὄρατοῦ ὡς ὄρατοῦ ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καθ' ὃ ἕκαστόν ἐστι, τότε κατὰ λόγον τὸ πάθος κινεῖται καὶ ἀρετὴ τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. ὅταν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄρατοῦ κινουμένη μὴ ὡς ὄρατοῦ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀπτοῦ ἀντιλαμβάνηται, τότε παρὰ φύσιν ἡ κίνησις γίνεται <καὶ> κακία τὸ τοιοῦτον καλεῖται· τὴν γοῦν Ἑλένην εἶδε καὶ ὁ

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⁴² *In Cat.*, p. 16.15 Busse (ιστέον δὲ ὅτι εὐθὺς ἐκ προοιμίῳ τὸν σκοπὸν τοῦ βιβλίου ἀνακηρύττει), *In An. pr.*, p. 10.3-4 Wallies (*CAG* XIII.2, Berlin 1905) (τὸν δὲ σκοπὸν ἐκ προοιμίῳ ἀνακηρύττει τοῦ βιβλίου, ἀπόδειξιν αὐτῶ παραδοῦναι τὸ προκείμενον εἶναι λέγων).

⁴³ *Vat. gr.* 2208, f. 118v.

⁴⁴ *Philop.*, *In An. pr.*, p. 263.17-18 Wallies (τὸ προκείμενον διὰ τούτων δεῖξαι ὅπως ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλας κατὰ τὸν ἀριθμὸν οἱ τε ὄροι καὶ αἱ προτάσεις καὶ τὰ συμπεράσματα); *Philop.*, *In Phys.*, p. 872.2-3 Vitelli (τὸ προκείμενον διὰ τούτων ἐστὶ δεῖξαι ὅτι τὸ ἰστάμενον ὅτε ἴσταται κινεῖται, ἰστάμενον δὲ φησι τὸ ἡρεμιζόμενον, ὥσπερ καὶ πρῶην εἴπομεν).

⁴⁵ Cf. *Philop.*, *In Gen. et corr.*, p. 150.14-17 Vitelli (*CAG* XIV.2, Berlin 1897) (τὸ μὲν οὖν πρότως κινοῦν, φησὶν, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐν τῷ κινεῖν ἀκίνητον εἶναι, ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δὲ ἐσχάτως καὶ προσεχῶς κινοῦν ἀνάγκη κινούμενον καὶ αὐτὸ κινεῖν), *Philop.*, *In Phys.*, p. 886.4-5 Vitelli (εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, ἀδύνατον ἄρα πᾶν τὸ κινοῦν κινούμενον αὐτὸ κινεῖν).

⁴⁶ Cf. fr. 437 Rashed.

⁴⁷ *Simpl.*, *In Phys.*, p. 1042.14-18 Diels.

Ἰδομενεὺς καὶ ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Ἰδομενεὺς ὡς ὄρατοῦ μόνον τοῦ κάλλους αὐτῆς ἀντελάβετο, ὁ μὲντοι Ἀλέξανδρος πέπονθε ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄρατοῦ οὐχ ὡς ὄρατοῦ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀπτοῦ καὶ ἐνόμισε τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν εἶναι τοῦ ὄρατοῦ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὄραῳ, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ἅπτεσθαι· ὅθεν καὶ κακία τὸ τοιοῦτον.⁴⁸

5 καὶ *addidi*

Quando i sensi sono mossi dagli oggetti di senso, sono mosse anche le affezioni. Ma quando le affezioni sono mosse da ciascun oggetto di senso per quello che è, allora si genera la virtù. Quando infatti desidera un oggetto visibile in quanto visibile e gli altri (oggetti) secondo quanto essi sono, allora l'affezione si muove secondo ragione e ciò costituisce virtù. Tuttavia, quando è mossa dall'oggetto visibile non in quanto visibile, ma lo percepisce in quanto tangibile, allora si genera un movimento contro natura e questo si chiama vizio. E in realtà sia Idomeneo che Alessandro hanno visto Elena, ma Idomeneo ha percepito la sua bellezza solo come visibile, Alessandro ha provato passione del visibile non in quanto visibile, ma in quanto tangibile e ha stimato che il piacere del visibile non consistesse nel vedere, ma nel toccare. E così questo è vizio.

Si può essere certi che a questo frammento corrisponda un tratto del commento arabo che ne è, eccettuati pochi particolari, sostanzialmente speculare.⁴⁹ La divergenza per noi più significativa è rappresentata, nel ragguaglio arabo, dal riferimento astratto a due uomini che siano affetti dallo stesso oggetto sensibile, ma uno dei quali lo percepisca, in quanto visibile, per quello che è, vale a dire visibile, l'altro, per quello che non è, vale a dire tangibile. Ora, nell'*excerptum* greco il riferimento, meno generico, si specifica col ricorso al caso di Idomeneo e Paride Alessandro, affetti dallo stesso oggetto dei sensi, Elena, che l'uno percepisce, in quanto visibile, visibile, l'altro, pur in quanto visibile, tangibile. È plausibile che l'esempio si trovasse già nel commento di Filopono e che la tradizione araba l'abbia trascurato conservando solo la funzione astrattamente argomentativa

⁴⁸ *Vat. gr.* 2208, 123v.

⁴⁹ Cf. p. 769.8-14 (123 Lettinck): "Thus when the senses are altered by some sense-object, they move the imagination, and the imagination moves the desire and the nerves, and by this pleasure and pain arise. If the soul moves towards sense-object, not insofar as it is that sense-object, it is a vice, such as when the soul at the sight of a visible object moves towards it, not insofar as it is visible, but insofar as it is tangible. When it moves towards the sense-object insofar as it is that sense-object, it is not a vice. For example, when two men look at a visible object, and one of them is affected insofar as it is visible, whereas the other is affected and moves towards it insofar as it is tangible, then that is a vice". In realtà, non di rado la corrispondenza stabilita da Lettinck tra il commento arabo e i frammenti greci è solo molto astrattamente documentabile e non assicura che ci si trovi in presenza di un solo *testimonium*, quanto piuttosto di *excerpta* che, se da una parte rinviano ad uno stesso contenuto, dall'altra possono non essere rappresentativi di una stessa sezione esegetica. Si consideri il caso di p. 787.1-3 (129 Lettinck): "Yaḥyā: rectilinear motion is one in species and not further divisible into subspecies. Thus the motion of flying and walking are not different in species; they only differ in respect of the kind of instrument". Lettinck senza esitazione stima che l'estratto arabo corrisponda a Philop., *In Phys.*, p. 878.32-879.2 Vitelli: ἡ τε βᾶδισις καὶ ἡ πετῆσις κατ' εὐθειᾶν κινήσεις, ταῦτα δὲ εἶδει οὐκ εἰσὶν εἶδη, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐχ ἑτεροειδεῖς. καὶ τίς οὖν ἡ διαφορά; ἡ κατὰ μόνα τὰ τῶν ὀργάνων σχήματα· τῆ μὲν γὰρ πόδες, τῆ δὲ πτέρυγες. διὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲ ἕτερον εἶδος κινήσεως γίνεται. In realtà la corrispondenza, neppure *ad litteram*, si può istituire solo tra "thus the motion-instrument" e ἡ τε βᾶδισις-σχήματα, dove ricorre un'indubbia prossimità. Accade, tuttavia, che *Pcsl* registri (f. 85v; nel *Vaticanus gr.* 2208, f. 126v) uno scolio (*ad VII*, 4. 249 a 17: ὅτε δὲ ἐὰν ᾧ) che costituisce, sebbene più pieno, modello per qualche aspetto più vicino al commento arabo: ἕτερον ζητεῖ νῦν μήποτε παρὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τοῦ ὀργάνου δι' οὗ ἡ κίνησις ἑτεροειδῆς γίνεται κίνησις. κινουῦνται γὰρ τὰ μὲν διὰ ποδῶν, τὰ δὲ διὰ περῶν, ὧν ἡ μὲν τῶν κινήσεων καλεῖται βᾶδισις, ἡ δὲ πετῆσις. ἄρα οὖν, φησὶν, ἑτεροειδεῖς αὐται αἱ κινήσεις; οὐδαμῶς. εὐθυφορικὰ γὰρ ἐκότερα. εἰ δὲ ἐπ' εὐθείας ἐκότερον φέρεται, ἡ δὲ εὐθεῖα οὐ διαιρεῖται εἰς εἶδη οὐδὲ αἱ κινήσεις ἄρα τούτων ἑτεροειδεῖς. τίς οὖν τούτων διαφορά; οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ, φησὶν, ἢ τοῖς σχήμασι τῶν ὀργάνων ὅτι διάφορα. σχήματος δὲ ὀργάνων διαφορὰ οὐ ποιεῖ ἕτερον εἶδος κινήσεως.

(i due uomini) del testo; nemmeno, però, si può escludere che il richiamo ai protagonisti del mito sia successivo e, in quanto tale, ignoto alla fonte araba, e che dunque la sua comparsa sia dovuta ad un rimaneggiamento posteriore del commento di Filopono. In un caso o nell'altro la prossimità dei due tratti è fuori discussione come anche, di conseguenza, la loro congiunta paternità filoponea.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Un caso abbastanza simile a questo è quello di Philop., *In Phys.*, p. 877.2-6 Vitelli, e del commento arabo, p. 769.25-770.2 (123 Lettinck), la cui prossimità risulta già denunciata da Lettinck. L'*excerptum* che Vitelli desumeva dal *Marcianus gr.* 227 è registrato, infatti, anche da *Pcsl*, in una versione, tuttavia, più piena, tale che da una parte permette di confermare la particolare indicazione topografica contenuta nel frammento arabo (ma non nel greco del frammento Vitelli), dall'altra di correggerla parzialmente. Il testo greco, a f. 84r di *Pcsl* e a f. 123r del *Vaticanus gr.* 2208, costituisce scolio a *Phys.* VI 3, 247 b 20 e riproduce, fatte poche eccezioni (ἐρεθιζόμενος ὑπὸ τούτων: ἐρεθιζόμενον V; αὐτῆ: αὐτῶ V; λόγους: λόγους ὑπὸ τούτων V; οὐκ εἶδε: οἶδε οὐκ V) quello offerto da Vitelli: ὅταν γὰρ ἄρξῃται κρίνειν τόδε τὸ λευκόν, ὅτι διακρίνει τὴν ὄψιν, εἴτα καὶ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, οἷον ἐρεθιζόμενος ὑπὸ τούτων πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους καὶ συμπεφυκότας αὐτῆ λόγους, ὅτι πᾶν λευκὸν διακριτικὸν ὄψεως, καὶ ἀποφαίνεται καὶ περὶ ὧν οὐκ εἶδε λευκῶν τῶν ἐν Ἰνδία καὶ ἐν Σκυθία, ὅταν ἡ διάνοια ἡρεμήσῃ καὶ στῆ μῆκετι σφόδρα ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὀχλουμένη ("quando infatti comincia a riconoscere che questo bianco dilata la facoltà visiva e anche quest'altro e quest'altro, come spinto da questi verso idee familiari e connaturate ad essa, (riconosce) che ogni bianco dilata la facoltà visiva e può concludere (lo stesso) anche a proposito dei bianchi che non ha visto in India e in Scizia, considerato che ormai il pensiero è tranquillo e saldo, non più scosso troppo da quelli"). Le differenze, si diceva, sarebbero davvero marginali, se non fosse che le parole τῶν ἐν Ἰνδία καὶ ἐν Σκυθία sono presenti solo in *Pcsl*. Si potrebbe, per giustificarle, ricorrere all'ipotesi di una singolare aggiunta posteriore al testo base dello scolio, se non fosse per il parallelo arabo, che non lascia dubbi sulla loro autenticità: "for example, when the soul gets to know that the white of Zayd scatters the visual rays and that the white of 'Amr and that of Kālid and of others do the same, then he knows the universal thing, namely that white scatters the visual rays, and than he may establish the same property for the white in China and India". Non poche le difficoltà legate al passo. L'assenza, per esempio, di soggetto esplicito per ἄρξῃται κρίνειν che neppure la declinazione del successivo participio contribuisce a chiarire: maschile (ἐρεθιζόμενος) in *Pcsl* con mutamento di genere nel pronome di riferimento (αὐτῆ); neutro in Vitelli (ἐρεθιζόμενον) seguito coerentemente da αὐτῶ. Considerata l'evidente coincidenza tra commento arabo e scolio, si potrebbe decidere di ricavare il soggetto non espresso di ἄρξῃται a partire dal testo arabo ("soul") e integrarlo con ψυχῆ, il che troverebbe parziale giustificazione nel femminile αὐτῆ. Anche la traduzione della formula διακριτικὸν ὄψεως, che definisce la proprietà del bianco, nonostante la sua frequenza, è resa problematica dal modo regolarmente diverso con cui è intesa dagli editori. Quanto alla presenza di Zayd, 'Amr e Kālid nel commento arabo, che specifica, esemplificandola, la sequenza τόδε τὸ λευκόν... καὶ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, appare probabile l'intervento di uno dei membri della scuola di Bagdad, come si ricava da altri luoghi in cui il commento di Filopono subisce uguale rimaneggiamento: cf. l'esempio riportato in P. Adamson - R. Wisnovsky, "Yahyā ibn 'Adī on the location of God", *Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy* 1 (2013), p. 205-28, in part. p. 213-14. Infine, la mancata corrispondenza tra il toponimo greco, ἐν Σκυθία, e quello arabo, "in China", ma è ovvio pensare ad una corruzione del primo nel secondo se solo si considera la lunga serie di luoghi in cui Filopono, unico tra i commentatori, associa, come nello scolio, il bianco alla Scizia (i.e. alla sua popolazione): *In Cat.*, p. 64.29-32 Busse; *In An. pr.*, p. 59.14-16 Wallies; 82.11-13; 107.8-11; 162.16-17; 169.7-9; 203.25-26; *ap. Simpl.*, *In De Cael.*, p. 157.26-31 Heiberg (*CAG* VII, Berlin 1894), che corrisponde a Philop., *De Aeternitate mundi contra Aristotelem*, fr. 82 Wildberg; cf. U.M. Lang, *John Philoponus and the Controversies over Chalcedon in the sixth Century. A Study and Translation of the Arbitrator*, Peeters, Leuven 2001 (Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 47), p. 73-4. Le uniche eccezioni a Filopono sono costituite da Amm., *In De Int.*, p. 91.34-92.1 Busse (*CAG* IV.5, Berlin 1897); 110.26-27; e da Ascl., *In Metaph.*, p. 293.17-18 Hayduck (*CAG* VI.2, Berlin 1888), ma questo evidentemente conferma solo la provenienza dell'esempio dall'insegnamento di Ammonio: cf. F.A.J. de Haas, *John Philoponus' New Definition of Prime Matter. Aspects of Its Background in Neoplatonism and the Ancient Commentary Tradition*, Brill, Leiden 1997 (Philosophia Antiqua, 69), p. 230. Si spiega, inoltre, proprio con Filopono l'intercambiabilità Αἰθιοπία/Ἰνδία: cf. D. Goldenberg, "Scythian-Barbarian: The Permutations of a Classical Topos in Jewish and Christian Texts of Late Antiquity", *Journal of Jewish Studies* 49 (1998), p. 87-102, in part. p. 100, che riprende le indicazioni di A. Sanda, *Opuscula Monophysitica Johannis Philoponi*, Beirut 1930, p. 29 e 55.

VII 4, 248 a 19: ἄτοπόν τε γὰρ

f. 84v

ἄτοπον, φησίν, εἴ τις φαίη ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἔν τι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἰσοταχῶς ἐπὶ τε εὐθείας κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ κύκλου, ἀλλὰ δέοι πάντα ἐν μὲν τῷ ἐτέρῳ θᾶττον, οἷον ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ, ἐν δὲ τῇ εὐθείᾳ βραδύτερον τὸ αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι. εἰ οὖν μὴ οὕτως ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ κύκλον καὶ κατὰ εὐθεΐαν, ἀλλὰ δυνατὸν τὴν ἴσην διάστασιν ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ χρόνῳ ἐπὶ τε κύκλου καὶ εὐθείας κινηθῆναι, συμβληταὶ ἄρα αὐταί.⁵¹

5

Sarebbe assurdo, dice, se uno affermasse che è impossibile che una sola e identica realtà si muova di uguale velocità sulla retta e sulla circonferenza, ma che bisogna che tutte le realtà percorrano lo stesso spazio su di una, vale a dire la circonferenza, piú velocemente, sull'altra, la retta, piú lentamente. Se dunque le cose non stanno cosí rispetto alla circonferenza e alla retta, ma è possibile che sia percorsa sulla circonferenza e sulla retta la stessa distanza nello stesso tempo, allora esse risultano comparabili.

L'accertamento della paternità filoponea dell'estratto è in questo caso legato allo scolio successivo. Siamo all'interno della dimostrazione che l'alterazione non è paragonabile al movimento e il movimento rettilineo non a quello rotazionale sulla base del fatto che linea retta e cerchio sono specificamente differenti. Filopono intende l'ἄτοπον come riferito ad una sola realtà (ἐν τι καὶ τὸ αὐτό) che dovrebbe muoversi lungo la circonferenza e lungo la retta, differenziando su questo punto la sua dalle altre interpretazioni.⁵² Lo scolio in realtà anticipa il successivo che ne riprende l'esegesi attribuendola però esplicitamente a Filopono, in questo modo, dunque, confermando a un tempo anche la paternità del nostro che lo precede: τὸ ἐπὶ κύκλου ὑποτεθὲν κινεῖσθαι ἰσόογκα καὶ ἰσοταχῆ ὀφείλει εἶναι τοῦ κατ' εὐθεΐαν κινουμένου ἢ ὡς Φιλόπονος ἐξεγεῖται ἐν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἰσοταχῶς ἐπὶ τε εὐθείας καὶ κύκλου κινεῖσθαι.⁵³

VII 4, 249 a 22: οὐχ ἔν τι

f. 85v

ἡ γινώσις, φησί, τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν κινήσεων διδάσκει ἡμᾶς ὅτι τὸ γένος τῶν κινήσεων τουτέστι ἡ ἀπλῶς κινήσις οὐκ ἔν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ πολλά. τὸ δὲ οὐχ ἔν εἶπεν ἢ ὅτι ἡ κίνησις ἡ ἀπλῶς ὁμόνυμός ἐστι φωνῆ καὶ οὐ κοινόν τι γένος, ἢ ὅτι καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ κυρίως γένη οὐ καθάπαξ ἔν τι πρᾶγμα εἰσι· διὸ καὶ τὴν εἰς τὰ εἶδη διαίρεσιν ἐπιδέχεται.⁵⁴

⁵¹ *Vat. gr.* 2208, f. 125r.

⁵² Da quella di Simplicio (*In Phys.*, p. 1083.30-32 Diels: πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἄτοπόν φησι τὸ ἀδύνατον νομίζειν ὁμοίως καὶ ἰσοταχῶς τοῦτο μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς εὐθείας κινεῖσθαι, τοῦτο δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ κύκλου), se non altro, che sdoppia gli oggetti in movimento, cf. la corretta traduzione di Ch. Hagen, *Simplicius. On Aristotle Physics 7*, Duckworth, London 1994 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), p. 63: "first he asserts that it is 'absurd' to believe that it is impossible for this thing to be moving over a straight line and that thing over a circle 'similarly', i. e. with equal speed".

⁵³ F. 84v (nel *Vaticanus gr.* 2208, f. 125r). Si noterà nello scolio il difetto di accordo nel numero che imporrebbe di correggere ἰσόογκα καὶ ἰσοταχῆ nel piú atteso ἰσόογον καὶ ἰσοταχῆς. Non mi pare che questa parte iniziale di scolio possa dipendere dal precedente di Simplicio né da quello di Temistio. È piú facile che costituisca una prima formulazione della proposta interpretativa di Filopono e che l'ἢ ἢ di ricordo abbia valore epesegetico. In realtà anche lo scolio successivo (f. 84v; nel *Vaticanus gr.* 2208, f. 125r), assente in Vitelli, contiene lo stesso riferimento e da una parte serve da conferma, dall'altra diviene a sua volta per converso documento filoponeo (*ad VII, 4, 248a22*: οὐδὲ διαφέρει): κἂν τις, φησίν, ἀξιώσει μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ τὸ ἴσον διάστημα κινεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τε τῆς εὐθείας καὶ τῆς περιφερείας, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἀνάγκη ἐν τῇ ἐτέρᾳ μὲν θᾶττον οἷον ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ, ἐν δὲ τῇ εὐθείᾳ βραδύτερον κινεῖσθαι, οὐδὲν ἡμῖν διοίσει πρὸς τὸ δεῖξαι καὶ οὕτω συμβλητάς τὰς κινήσεις.

⁵⁴ *Vat. gr.* 2208, f. 126v.

La conoscenza della diversità dei movimenti, dice, ci insegna che il genere dei movimenti, vale a dire il movimento in senso assoluto, non corrisponde ad una sola realtà, ma a molte. Ha detto ‘non una’ o perché il movimento in senso assoluto è un termine omonimo e non un genere comune; oppure perché anche i generi in senso proprio non costituiscono assolutamente una sola realtà. Per questo ammettono anche la divisione in specie.

Esempio di netta prossimità, se non di piena identità tra gli scoli di *PcsI* e il commento arabo. Anche in questo caso, sebbene limitata alla prima parte del frammento, la corrispondenza⁵⁵ si impone come netta e letterale: “Yahyā: he says that from the knowledge of the specific differences for motion we learn that the genus of motion, i. e. motion in the absolute sense, does not comprise one thing”. Per altro è assai probabile che quanto segue nel frammento greco, vale a dire la prima delle due ipotesi interpretative offerte, documenti la dipendenza di Filopono dal commento di Alessandro nel definire il movimento termine omonimo e non genere comune. È lo stesso Filopono, infatti, che si richiama ad Alessandro in merito, in un passo precedente del suo commento alla *Fisica*,⁵⁶ dove gli attribuisce la frequente definizione del movimento come termine omonimo e non genere comune. Se poi il confronto con il commento arabo non dovesse stimarsi sufficiente per l’attribuzione dello scolio a Filopono, risulterà senz’altro utile il suo accostamento ad un frammento vitelliano compreso tra quelli al libro quinto della *Fisica*,⁵⁷ dove ritorna lo stesso giro di frase:⁵⁸ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἓν τι κοινὸν γένος κινήσεως ἀπλῶς ἐπαναβεβηκὸς καὶ κατηγορούμενον [μὲν] κατὰ τῶν τριῶν κινήσεων, ἀλλ’ ἐκάστη γένος ἐστὶ γενικώτατον, ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ κατηγορίαι ὑφ’ ἃς ἀνάγονται. ὥστε ἀπλῶς ἡ κίνησις οὐκ ἐστὶ γένος, ἀλλ’ ὁμώνυμος φωνή.

VII 4, 249 a 25: πότε οὖν ἕτερον τὸ εἶδος

f. 86r

πότε, φησί, γνωσόμεθα ὅτι ἕτερον ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς κινήσεως εἶδος; ἄρα ἐὰν ἓν τι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα ὑπάρχη ἐν διαφόρῳ ὑποκειμένῳ; εἶτα ὡς ἐπικρίνων φησὶν· ἢ ἂν ἄλλο τι πρᾶγμα καὶ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ ὑποκειμένῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ ὑπάρχη τότε ἕτερον τὸ εἶδος; ὡς γὰρ ἤδη εἶπεν ἐν ἐνόσ ἐστὶ δεκτικὸν καὶ οὐ δυνατὸν μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν ἐν διαφόρῳ ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι.⁵⁹

Quando avviene, dice, che riconosciamo che la specie del movimento è diversa? Forse quando una sola e medesima realtà si trova ad essere in un soggetto differente? Poi, come decidendosi, dice: oppure, quando realtà differenti si trovano ad essere in soggetti differenti, allora la specie è diversa? Come infatti ha già detto, un solo (soggetto) è ricettivo di una sola (specie) e non è possibile che una sola e medesima natura si trovi ad essere in un soggetto differente.

La corrispondenza tra lo scolio, che non ha parallelo in Vitelli⁶⁰, e la tradizione araba è praticamente *ad verbum*. Se si eccettua, infatti, la considerazione accessoria εἶτα, ὡς ἐπικρίνων, φησὶν, con la

⁵⁵ Cf. p. 787.11-14 (130 Lettinck).

⁵⁶ Philop., *In Phys.*, p. 349.3-6 Vitelli: ὥστε καὶ ἓνα ὄρισμὸν ἀποδοῦ τῆς κινήσεως, ὁμώνυμος ἐστὶ καὶ οὗτος καὶ τῶν πολλαχῶς λεγομένων. καὶ πολὺς ἐστὶν ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος αὐτὸ τοῦτο κατασκευάζων, ὅτι ἡ κίνησις οὐκ ἐστὶ γένος, ἀλλ’ ὁμώνυμος φωνή.

⁵⁷ Arist., *Phys.* V 4, 227 b 4.

⁵⁸ Philop., *In Phys.*, p. 793.9-12 Vitelli.

⁵⁹ *Vat. gr.* 2208, f. 126v.

⁶⁰ Anche il brevissimo estratto (Philop., *In Phys.*, p. 879.12 Vitelli) ἐὰν τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα ὑπάρχη ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ ὑποκειμένῳ, riprodotto ugualmente da *PcsI* in interlinea e che sembra lieve variante di quanto è nello scolio (ἐὰν ἓν τι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα ὑπάρχη ἐν διαφόρῳ ὑποκειμένῳ) potrebbe provenire da un’altra sezione del commento di Filopono, evidentemente la *theoria*.

quale Filopono introduce la seconda alternativa, non esiste alcuna distanza tra il frammento greco e il suo corrispettivo arabo:⁶¹ “Yaḥyā: he asks when one knows that the species of two motions are different. Is it when the same thing is in two subjects, or when different things are in the different subjects? It is such as we have said just before: it is not possible for one nature to exist in different subjects, but one form is always received by one subject”.

VII 4, 249 b 11: ὥστε ληπτέον
f. 86r

ἐπειδήπερ, φησίν, ἐδείξαμεν ὅτι μόναι συμβληταὶ αἱ ὁμοειδεῖς ἀλλοιώσεις, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα διελεῖν τὰ εἶδη καὶ τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως καὶ τῆς φορᾶς ἕν' οὕτω γινώμεν ποῖαι ἀλλοιώσεις συμβληταὶ εἰσι καὶ ποῖαι φοραί.

Dal momento che, dice, abbiamo dimostrato che sono comparabili solo le alterazioni che appartengono alla stessa specie, è assolutamente necessario distinguere sia le specie dell'alterazione che quelle della traslazione, per riconoscere quali sono le alterazioni e quali le traslazioni comparabili.

Pochi dubbi che anche in questo caso il commento arabo⁶² rappresenti la traduzione piú o meno fedele dello scolio: “Yaḥyā: knowing that an alteration is not comparable to just any other alteration, we must distinguish the different kinds of alterations in order to know which ones are comparable to which. Aristotle has explained this matter”. Le minime divergenze tra i due frammenti non impediscono, infatti, di ricostruirne il modello comune.

VII 4, 249 b 23: εἰ ἔστιν ἀριθμὸς ἡ οὐσία
f. 86v

ἀριθμὸν δὲ λέγει ὅτι κατ' ἀριθμούς τινὰς καὶ τάξιν τούτων συνίσταται· τοῦ μὲν πρώτου συνισταμένου αἵματος εἰ τύχοι τοῦ δὲ δευτέρου καρδίας πάλιν ἐὰν οὕτω τύχη καὶ οὕτω τοῦ τελείου εἶδους συνισταμένου. [διὸ δὲ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων τεχνῶν τὴν ὅλην δημιουργίαν μιμουμένων οὐδεμία δύναται χωρὶς ἀριθμοῦ συστῆναι]

(Aristotele) chiama numero la sostanza perché si realizza secondo alcuni numeri e la loro successione. All'inizio si realizza per esempio il sangue, poi il cuore e in questo modo si realizza la forma perfetta. [Per questo nessuna delle tecniche umane che pure imitano l'intera demiurgia può realizzarsi senza il numero].

È il caso piú complesso tra quelli che evidenziano indubbia analogia tra il commento arabo e la tradizione scoliastica che si desume da *Pcsl*. Innanzitutto perché l'*excerptum* greco risulta dalla giustapposizione non segnalata di due diverse fonti esegetiche: la prima (ἀριθμὸν δὲ λέγει–συνισταμένου), che piú ci interessa, non riconducibile ad alcun modello e quindi presumibilmente filoponea; la seconda (διὸ–συστῆναι), ripresa *ad verbum* dal commento di Simplicio,⁶³ dove però non si legge nulla che possa giustificare anche la presenza di quanto precede. Ora, il primo estratto, non simpliciano, ha il suo strettissimo parallelo nel commento arabo⁶⁴ e, dunque, non può che risalire a Filopono: “he further says that it is also possible that he mentions numbers because a thing may proceed in a numerical order, as in a man first the blood is generated, then the heart as the second

⁶¹ Cf. p. 787.20-25 (130 Lettinck).

⁶² Cf. p. 797.16-19 (131 Lettinck).

⁶³ Simpl., *In Phys.*, p. 1102.24-26 Diels.

⁶⁴ Cf. p. 800.9-15 (134 Lettinck).

thing, and then the other things”. A ciò si aggiunge il fatto che nell’estratto arabo è registrata l’autorità di Alessandro, richiamato immediatamente prima, la cui iniziale proposta interpretativa prevedeva un’allusione ai pitagorici: “Alexander says that he mentions number here following the opinion of Pythagoras and his school, namely that the principles of things are numbers”. La stessa considerazione anche in Simplicio,⁶⁵ dove però il riferimento ai pitagorici non si lega ad alcuna esplicita ripresa dell’esegesi di Alessandro.⁶⁶ L’ipotesi alternativa che costituisce la prima parte del nostro scolio, offerta in subordine e introdotta dalla formula “he further says”, riproduce poi simmetricamente la seconda allegata in Simplicio, che a quella dell’arabo e dello scolio filoponeo, pur rispecchiandone in astratto il contenuto, tuttavia non corrisponde nello specifico degli esempi e dei termini.⁶⁷ Ci troveremmo così in Simplicio di fronte ad una citazione anonima da Alessandro, circostanza non rara nel neoplatonico. Resta da decidere se il parallelo resoconto documentato nell’arabo e nello scolio riproduca quanto Simplicio tralascia di registrare dal commento di Alessandro, oppure se esso costituisca l’integrazione esemplificativa di Filopono (la successione sangue, cuore, realtà completa) del precedente alessandrino e per questo preferita dallo scoliaste al meno didascalico commento di Simplicio.⁶⁸ Quella che rimane certa, nondimeno, anche in questo caso, è la paternità filoponea dello scolio.

VIII 1, 250 b 14: οἷον ζωὴ τις οὐσα

f. 87v

τὸ γὰρ παντελῶς ἀκίνητον κατὰ πᾶσαν κίνησιν νεκρόν τέ ἐστι καὶ τελέως ἄζωον. διὸ καὶ ἐπειδὴ ὁ κόσμος ζωῆς καθ’ ὅλον ἑαυτὸν μετέχει· οὐδὲν γὰρ εἶναι δύναται ἂν μηδαμῆ μηδαμῶς ζωῆς μετέχον· διὰ τοῦτο ἐν ἅπασιν ἐστι τοῖς φυσικοῦς ζωὴ οὐσα αὐτῶν καὶ ἀρχὴ κινήσεως καὶ ἡρεμίας

⁶⁵ Simpl., *In Phys.*, p.1102.17-20 Diels: ἀριθμὸν δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶπεν ἢ τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις ἀκολουθῶν ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων λέγουσιν τοὺς ἀριθμούς, κέκλυθη, κύδιμ’ ἀριθμῆ, πάτερ μακάρων, πάτερ ἀνδρῶν καὶ ἀριθμῶ δέ τε πάντ’ ἐπέεικεν.

⁶⁶ È fin troppo evidente come la corrispondenza letterale tra Filopono (nel commento arabo: “following the opinion of Pythagoras and his school, namely that the principles of things are numbers”) e Simplicio (τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις ἀκολουθῶν ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων λέγουσιν τοὺς ἀριθμούς) escluda la citazione dei versi celebrativi del numero, dovuta senza dubbio all’iniziativa di Simplicio che vi si era già riferito in *In Phys.*, p. 453.10-12 Diels, limitatamente al primo, e nel commento a *In De Cael.*, p. 580.14-17 Heiberg, anche in questi casi in relazione ai pitagorici, ma che può ricondursi a tradizione orfica (fr. 698 Bernabé; fr. 705 Bernabé), e che nel neoplatonico si giustifica proprio in forza della συμφωνία tra rivelazioni orfiche e dottrine pitagoriche che non raramente si rintraccia nei suoi commenti, cf. Ph. Hoffmann, “Les catégories aristotéliennes ποτέ et πού d’après le *Commentaire* de Simplicius. Méthode d’exégèse et aspects doctrinaux”, in M.-O. Goulet-Cazé et alii (éd.), *Le Commentaire entre tradition et innovation*. Actes du Colloque international organisé par la Fédération de Recherche 33 du CNRS (Paris et Villejuif, 22-25 septembre 1999), Vrin, Paris 2000 (Bibliothèque d’histoire de la philosophie), p. 355-76, in part. p. 364. Può essere indicativo il fatto che il fr. 698 Bernabé, inteso come celebrativo dell’*e-nade*, si trovi citato anche da Ascl., *In Metaph.*, p. 38.18-19 Hayduck, e dunque ricavato dall’insegnamento di Ammonio il suo riuso in Simplicio; cf. K. Verrycken, “The Metaphysics of Ammonius Son of Hermias”, in R. Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and their Influence*, Duckworth - Bloomsbury Academic, London - Ithaca 1990, p. 199-231, in part. p. 221-4; E. Tempelis, *The School of Ammonius, son of Hermias, On Knowledge of the Divine*, Ekdoseis Philologikou Syllogou Parnassos, Athen 1998, p. 60-1, 106-11; I. Hadot, *Athenian and Alexandrian Neoplatonism and the Harmonization of Aristotle and Plato, Studies in Platonism, Neoplatonism and the Platonic tradition 18*, Brill, Leiden 2015 (Studies in Platonism, Neoplatonism, and the Platonic Tradition, 18), p. 41-6. Sui luoghi citati di Simplicio cf. rispettivamente: I. Mueller, *Simplicius. On Aristotle On the Heavens 3.1-7*, Duckworth, London 2009 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), p. 129, n. 123; J.O. Urmson - P. Lautner, *Simplicius. On Aristotle Physics 3*, Duckworth, London 2002 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), p. 157, n. 193.

⁶⁷ Simpl., *In Phys.*, p. 1102.24-26 Diels: ἢ ὅτι κατ’ ἀριθμούς τινὰς ὀρισμένους τῶν τε στοιχείων καὶ τῶν μερῶν ἀπάντων γενέσεις καὶ συστάσεις ἐπιτελοῦνται.

⁶⁸ E tuttavia sullo stesso foglio, sebbene nel margine più esterno, il commento di Simplicio è citato per esteso (*In Phys.*, p. 1102.2-26 Diels) e preceduto da abbreviazione nominale Σιμπλι(χιος).

ἡ φύσις· καὶ γὰρ εἴπης τὴν γῆν ὅλην, οὐδ' αὐτὴ κινήσεως ἄμοιρος, εἰ καὶ μὴ κατὰ τόπον· κινεῖται γὰρ ἀλλοιωτικὴν κίνησιν, ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὴν ζωογόνον καθ' ἣν αἰ βλάσται.⁶⁹

5

Ciò che in realtà è affatto immobile rispetto ad ogni movimento risulta morto e assolutamente privo di vita. Per questo motivo, anche dal momento che il cosmo partecipa interamente della vita (nessuna realtà, infatti, potrebbe esistere se non partecipasse in nessun modo alla vita), in tutte le realtà naturali la natura si trova ad essere per loro vita e principio di movimento e di quiete. Infatti, anche se si facesse riferimento a tutta la terra, neppure essa risulterebbe priva di movimento, seppure non di quello locale. Si muove infatti di un movimento alterativo, ma possiede anche quello generativo, in forza del quale (nascono) i germogli.

Anche questo scolio, che risulta senz'altro autonomo rispetto a quanto si legge in Simplicio⁷⁰ e in Alessandro,⁷¹ può essere facilmente ricondotto a Filopono, se solo si richiama un precedente tratto del suo esteso commento a *Phys.* II 1, 192 b 8,⁷² in cui l'esegeta discute la definizione di φύσις quale ζώη, e che rappresenta, per coincidenza di idee e impiego di termini, una sorta di doppiopone del nostro: ὥστε ἡ ἐν αὐτοῖς φύσις οὐ μόνον κινήσεως αὐτοῖς ἐστὶν αἰτία, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ἡρεμίας τοῦ αἰεὶ ἐν τέλει εἶναι καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἡρεμεῖν. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν δὲ στοιχείων, λέγω δὴ τῆς ὀλότητος τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν, εἰ καὶ μὴ κινεῖται ὡς ὅλα ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς φύσεως κατὰ τόπον, ἀλλ' οὖν τὴν ἀλλοιωτικὴν κίνησιν κινοῦνται θερμομαίνόμενα ἢ ψυχόμενα, ἔτι τε βλαστάνουσα ἡ γῆ.

VIII 1, 250 b 23: εἰ δὴ ἐνδέχεται ποτε
f. 87v

εἰ δυνατὸν, φησὶν, ἀπὸ τίνος χρόνου τὴν κίνησιν ἀρχεσθαι καὶ μὴ αἰδίον εἶναι, διχῶς τοῦτο ἀνάγκη ὑποτίθεσθαι· ἢ τὸν μὲν ἄπειρον αἰῶνα μηδὲν εἶναι κίνησιν, ἀπὸ τίνος δὲ χρόνου ἀρξασθαι, ὡς δοκεῖ λέγειν Ἀναξαγόρας ὅτι ἀπὸ τίνος χρόνου ὁ νοῦς ἤρξατο κινεῖν <κατὰ> τὴν διάκρισιν τὰς ὁμοιομερείας· ἢ μὴ εἶναι αἰδίαν τῆ συνεχεία, ὡς εἶναι μὲν αἰδίον, μὴ κατὰ τὸ συνεχές δέ, ἀλλὰ διακόπτεσθαι ἡρεμίας ὡς ποτε μὲν κίνησιν εἶναι ποτε δὲ ἡρεμίαν, ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει, διακρίσει μὲν ἐκ τοῦ σφαίρου γίνεσθαι τὰ στοιχεῖα, συγκρίσει δὲ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων τὸν σφαῖρον.⁷³
3 *supplevi* 5 ἡρεμίας *scripsi*: ἡρέμα *Pcsl*

5

Se è possibile, dice, che il movimento inizi a partire da un certo tempo e non sia eterno, bisogna supporlo in due modi, o che per un tempo infinito non vi sia stato per nulla movimento, ma che sia iniziato a partire da un certo tempo, come sembra dire Anassagora, secondo cui l'intelligenza prese a muovere per separazione gli omeomeri; oppure che (il movimento) non è eterno per continuità, nel senso che sarebbe bensì eterno, ma non per continuità; sarebbe invece interrotto da una pausa, di modo che talvolta vi sarebbe movimento, talvolta pausa, come dice Empedocle, che gli elementi nascerebbero per separazione dallo sfero, lo sfero per aggregazione dagli elementi.

In questo caso è un rapidissimo *excerptum* che Vitelli⁷⁴ desumeva dal *Marcianus gr.* 227 a provare l'attribuzione dello scolio: τουτέστιν εἶναι μὲν αἰδίον, ἀλλὰ τῆ διαδοχῆ διακοπτόμενον ἡρεμίας,

⁶⁹ *Vat. gr.* 2208, f. 127r.

⁷⁰ *Simpl., In Phys.*, p. 1119.3-1120.3 Diels.

⁷¹ Fr. 537 Rashed.

⁷² *Philop., In Phys.*, p. 198.30-35 Vitelli.

⁷³ *Vat. gr.* 2208, f. 127r.

⁷⁴ *Philop., In Phys.*, p. 882.3-4 Vitelli.

καὶ οὐ συνεχῶς ἔχον τὴν αἰδιότητα. L'espressione τῆ διαδοχῆ διακοπτόμενον ἡρεμία è infatti ripresa da quella uguale contenuta nel nostro scolio di cui l'estratto documentato nel *Marcianus* costituisce in qualche modo un'estrema riduzione.

VIII 1, 252 a 1: καὶ τὸ φθαρτικὸν

f. 89r

ἕτερον ἐπιχειρήμα ὅτι ἄφθαρτος ἡ κίνησις· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ φθειρόμενον ἢ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου φθίρεται ἢ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου, καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου μὲν ὡς τὸ θερμὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ ὁμοίου ὅταν τὸ ἔλαττον ὑπὸ τοῦ πλείονος, ὡς τὸ λυχνιαῖον φῶς ὑπὸ τῆς μεγάλης λαμπάδος. εἰ τοῖνυν τὰ φθειρόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων φθίρονται, καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἄρα εἰ φθίρεται ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων φθίρεται. εἴτε οὖν ὅμοιον ἢ τὸ φθεῖρον τῷ φθειρομένῳ εἴτε ἐναντίον, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ φθεῖραν φθαρῆναι· κἄν τε γὰρ ὅμοιον ἢ τὸ ὅμοιον δηλονότι ὁμοίως καὶ φθαρτόν, κἄν τε ἐναντίον, ἐστὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου φθίρεται. δεῖ οὖν καὶ τὸ φθαρτικὸν τῆς κινήσεως φθαρῆναι· ἀλλ' εἰ φθίρεται, πάλιν ἢ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἢ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου καὶ πάλιν τὸ ἐκείνου φθαρτικὸν ὁμοίως· καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ἄπειρον· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, καὶ τὸ φθαρῆναι τὴν κίνησιν καθόλου ἀδύνατον.⁷⁵

Altra prova che il movimento è incorruttibile. Tutto ciò che si corrompe, infatti, o si corrompe in forza del simile o in forza del contrario; e in forza del contrario come ciò che è caldo (si corrompe) per via di ciò che è freddo, in forza del simile quando ciò che è minore (si corrompe) per via di ciò che è maggiore, come il lume di una lucerna per via di una grande torcia. Se dunque le realtà che si corrompono si corrompono in forza di simili o di contrari, allora anche il movimento, se si corrompe, si corrompe in forza di simili o di contrari. Dunque, sia che ciò che corrompe risulti simile a ciò che viene corrotto, sia che risulti contrario, è assolutamente necessario che anche ciò che produce corruzione si corrompa. Se infatti risulta simile, è evidente che il simile sarà allo stesso modo corrottibile; se è contrario, il contrario si corrompe in forza del contrario. Dunque diviene necessario che anche ciò che produce corruzione del movimento si corrompa. Ma se si corrompe, di nuovo (si corrompe) o per via del simile o per via del contrario, e di nuovo questo sarà ugualmente il caso di ciò che produce corruzione di quello. E questo all'infinito. Ma se ciò è impossibile, allora risulterà in generale impossibile anche che il movimento si corrompa.

Lo scolio sembra ispirarsi inizialmente ad un suggerimento esegetico che sappiamo dovuto ad Alessandro e che può essere ricostruito a partire da Simplicio⁷⁶. È Alessandro infatti che a commento della formula καὶ τὸ φθαρτικὸν introduce la distinzione tra corruzione ὑπ' ἐναντίου ἢ ὑπὸ ὁμοίου indicando l'ultima come quella che avviene κατὰ μάρανσιν καὶ σβέσιν e che Simplicio, forse ancora seguendo Alessandro, spiega come l'estinzione di una fiamma ad opera di una fiamma

⁷⁵ *Vat. gr.* 2208, f. 128v.

⁷⁶ Da due sezioni del suo commento: *Simpl., In Phys.*, p. 1171.8-14 Diels (ἐπισημαίνομαι δὲ πρὸς τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου ῥηθὲν ἐν τούτοις, ἐν οἷς φησιν ὡς γινομένης μὲν τῆς φθορᾶς ὑπ' ἐναντίου ἢ ὑπὸ ὁμοίου, ὡς ἡ κατὰ μάρανσιν καὶ σβέσιν γινομένη. λέγει μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἔοικε τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῆς ἐλάττονος φλογός τῆς μαραινόμενης καὶ σβεννυμένης ὑπὸ τῆς πλείονος· μαραινεται δὲ καὶ σβέννυται οὐχ ὡς φλόξ ὑπὸ φλογός, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐλάττων ὑπὸ πλείονος, ἄπερ πάλιν ἐναντία ἐστίν), integrata con *In Phys.*, p. 1175.11-16 Diels (cf. Philop., *De Aet. mundi contra Arist.*, fr. 130 Wildberg): εἴτα ἐφεξῆς συμπεφυρμένως, ὡς οἶμαι, καὶ πρὸς τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην ἀντιλέγων εἰπόντα καὶ τὸ φθαρτικὸν δὴ δεήσει φθαρῆναι, ὅταν φθίρη, καὶ πρὸς τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον εἰπόντα “ἐλαβεν δέ, ὅτι τὸ φθαρτικὸν τινος καὶ αὐτὸ φθαρτόν, ἕως ὡς γινομένης τῆς φθορᾶς ἢ ὑπ' ἐναντίου ἢ ὑπὸ ὁμοίου, καὶ ὅτι τὸ φθεῖρον, εἰ μὲν αἰδίου μένοι, πάλιν κινήθησεται, εἰ δὲ φθείροιτο διὰ κινήσεως, φθαρῆσεται.

maggiore. All'uso sinonimico della formula *κατὰ μάρανσιν καὶ σβέσιν* che, secondo Simplicio, indicherebbe in Alessandro una sola causa di estinzione, sembra opporsi l'autorità di Aristotele⁷⁷ che distingue le due cause come quella che si produce da sé (*κατὰ μάρανσιν*) e quella che si produce per via di contrari (*κατὰ σβέσιν*). È probabile allora che anche Alessandro avesse voluto indicarle entrambe. Lo scolio riprende l'idea in modo che non possano esservi dubbi che si tratti di Filopono, che in due luoghi del suo commento al *De Anima* impiega lo stesso esempio con gli stessi termini e allo stesso scopo, con nessun riscontro nel resto della tradizione esegetica.⁷⁸ Nello scolio, in cui il riferimento esemplificativo è più rapido, manca il rilievo che contesta che lo spegnimento avviene in regime di *ὁμοιότης*, come negli altri passi di Filopono e nello stesso Simplicio che stabiliscono relazione di contrarietà anche tra minore e maggiore, tra molto e poco. È possibile che questa correzione provenisse ad entrambi dalle lezioni di Ammonio. Che poi l'obiezione manchi nello scolio può dipendere dalla funzione accessoria dell'esempio, se non si vuole prendere in considerazione l'ipotesi di una sua progressiva riduzione. A conferma dell'origine filoponea dello scolio, si può per altro indicare ancora una volta anche la locuzione avverbiale *ἀνάγκη πᾶσα* di ricorrenza straordinariamente frequente tra i commentatori solo in Filopono.

VIII 2, 252 b 27: *κἂν τῷ ἀπίερω*

f. 90r

ὅτι δὲ ἀδύνατον κινεῖσθαι τὸ ἄπειρον τοπικὴν κίνησιν ἐν τοῖς φθάσασιν ἔδειξε· τοῦ γὰρ οἰσθήσεται τὸν πάντα τόπον καταλαβόν· εἰ γὰρ κινήσεται μεθιστάμενον, ἔσται τι τοῦ ἀπίερου μεῖζον· τοῦ γὰρ ἐν ᾧ ἦν πρὸ τοῦ κινήθῃναι μεῖζον ἔσται προστιθέμενον καὶ τοῦ εἰς ὃ μετέστη τὸ ἐξ ἄμφοῶν. ἄπειρον δὲ ἔστι τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἀπίερων ὁμοιομερῶν μίγμα ἔλεγεν ὁ Ἀναξαγόρας ὅπερ ὅλον ἅμα κινεῖσθαι ἀδύνατον. συγχωρούμενου δ' ὅμως τοῦ δύνασθαι κινεῖσθαι, τί κωλύει ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ζῴου ἐκ παντελοῦς ἡρεμίας καὶ αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι μὴ προυπαρχούσης ἐτέρας κινήσεως ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων προυπάρχει ἢ τοῦ κινουῦντος αὐτὰ κινήσεις;⁷⁹

Che è impossibile che l'infinito si muova di movimento locale, l'ha dimostrato prima. Dove potrebbe spostarsi, infatti, visto che occupa l'intero spazio? Se, infatti, potesse muoversi trasferendosi di luogo, vi sarà qualcosa di più grande dell'infinito. L'infinito che risulta da entrambi, infatti, aggiunto, sarebbe più grande (del luogo) nel quale si trovava prima di spostarsi e (del luogo) verso il quale si sposta. Ma, dice Anassagora, infinita è la mescolanza di infiniti omeomeri, di modo che risulta impossibile che si muova tutta simultaneamente. E tuttavia, anche a voler riconoscere che possa muoversi, che cosa vieta, come per il vivente, che anche l'infinito si muova a partire da una quiete assoluta e senza che sia preesistito altro movimento, quello che (invece) accade alle realtà inanimate, dove il movimento di ciò che le muove preesiste?

⁷⁷ *De Resp.* 14, 474 b 13-22; *De Iuv. et sen.* 5, 469 b 21-23: ἀλλὰ μὴν πυρὸς γε δύο ὁρῶμεν φθοράς, μάρανσιν τε καὶ σβέσιν. καλοῦμεν δὲ τὴν μὲν ὑφ' αὐτοῦ μάρανσιν, τὴν δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων σβέσιν.

⁷⁸ Philop., *In De An.*, p. 179.31-180.1 Hayduck (*CAG XV*, Berlin 1897): εἰ γὰρ καὶ πάσχει ὁ λύχνος ὑπὸ μεγάλης λαμπάδος ἀποσβεννύμενος, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ ὅμοιον πάσχει, ἀλλ' ἢ ἀνόμοιον· ὡς ἀσθενέστερον γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου; p. 298.20-21: εἰ γὰρ καὶ πάσχει τὸ λυχνιαῖον φῶς ὑπὸ τῆς λαμπάδος (σβέννυται γὰρ ὑπ' αὐτῆς), ἀλλ' ὡς ὑπὸ ἀνομοίου πάσχειν. Vi si può aggiungere, non senza utilità, anche Philop., *In De Gen. et corr.*, p. 140.23-27 Vitelli: κἂν γὰρ τι δοκῇ τὸ ὅμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου πάσχειν, οἷον τὸ πολὺ πῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀλίγου (ἐὰν γὰρ εἰς πυρκαϊᾶν προσενέγκῃς λύχνον, σβέννυται), οὐχ ἢ ὅμοιον ἀλλ' ἢ ἐναντίον πάσχει (ἐναντίον γὰρ τὸ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ), ἐκδαπανωμένης τῆς ὕλης τοῦ ἐλάττονος πυρὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ μείζονος.

⁷⁹ *Vat. gr.* 2208, f. 130r.

È questo un caso tanto particolare quanto prezioso. La tradizione scolastica ci restituisce, infatti, con assoluta certezza, un estratto del commento di Filopono in cui l'esegeta utilizzava il precedente alessandrino più di quanto non abbia fatto Simplicio. Il frammento che ora, dopo l'evidenza del *testimonium* filoponeo, può ricondursi anche con maggiore attendibilità ad Alessandro,⁸⁰ è questo, come trascritto dal suo editore: τοῦτο λέγει διὰ τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν λέγοντα τὸ μίγμα τὸ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοιομερειῶν ἀπειρῶν οὐσῶν ἀπειρον εἶναι, ἐνδειξάμενος δ' ὅτι οὐ δυνατὸν ἅμα πᾶν τὸ ἀπειρον κινήθῃναι τὴν τοπικὴν κίνησιν ἣν κινεῖται τὰ αὐτοκίνητα διὰ τοῦ εἰπεῖν εἶπερ ἐνδέχεται καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς· εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ἔσται, τί τοῦ ἀπειροῦ μεῖζον ἐν ᾧ κινήθῃσεται μεθιστάμενον ὅλον; οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τι ἔξω τοῦ ἀπειροῦ, ὥστε οὐδὲ ἔσται τις τοιαύτη κίνησις ἐν τῷ ἀπειρῷ οἷον ἔλεγεν. I paralleli con il commento di Simplicio⁸¹ sono facilmente individuabili:⁸² εἰ δὲ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ φησὶ τοῦτο δυνατὸν, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀπειρῷ δυνατὸν, ἤτοι τῷ Ἀναξαγόρου (ὡς ἤκουσεν ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος, διότι τὸ μίγμα τὸ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοιομερειῶν ἀπειρῶν οὐσῶν ἀπειρον ἀνάγκη εἶναι)... προσέθηκε καὶ τὸ εἶπερ ἐνδέχεται κινεῖσθαι τὸ ἀπειρον καὶ ἡρεμεῖν ὅλον, ὅτι δέδεικται τὸ ἀπειρον κατὰ μέγεθος μὴ δυνατὸν ὄν κινήθῃναι τὴν τοπικὴν κίνησιν, ἣν κινεῖται τὰ αὐτοκίνητα. Simplicio cita esplicitamente Alessandro a proposito del μίγμα anassagoreo e stante la prossimità su questo punto dei tre documenti (Alessandro, Simplicio e lo scolio), nulla impedirebbe di pensare che Simplicio sia alla base dello scolio. Il fatto è però che la relazione tra lo scolio e il frammento *alessandrino* non si limita al riferimento ad Anassagora, ma coinvolge, fino alla piena corrispondenza nei termini, un tratto assente in Simplicio, che preferisco restituire come di seguito: εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο, ἔσται τι τοῦ ἀπειροῦ μεῖζον ἐν ᾧ κινήθῃσεται μεθιστάμενον ὅλον. È il passo in cui Alessandro osserva che se l'infinito si muovesse di movimento locale, allora si dovrebbe dare uno spazio maggiore dove l'infinito possa dislocarsi nel suo insieme. Identica considerazione nello scolio, con l'uso determinante, per stabilirne la relazione con il frammento, del participio μεθιστάμενον, senz'altro non casuale: ποῦ γὰρ οἰσθήσεται τὸν πάντα τόπον καταλαβόν; εἰ γὰρ κινήσεται μεθιστάμενον, ἔσται τι τοῦ ἀπειροῦ μεῖζον. Si noterà come lo scolio consenta il sospetto che l'interpretazione di Rashed del frammento alessandrino di riferimento sia difettosa a causa di erronea interpunzione, innanzitutto, e dello scambio tra pronomi indefinito e pronomi interrogativo. È senz'altro più ovvio intendere il tratto anticipando, come sopra, la virgola prima di ἔσται, di cui costituirà soggetto il τι τοῦ ἀπειροῦ μεῖζον⁸³ e non solo perché questo restituirebbe la stessa sequenza dello scolio, ma perché sarebbe questo anche il senso conclusivo richiesto dal ragionamento: εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο, ἔσται τι τοῦ ἀπειροῦ μεῖζον ἐν ᾧ κινήθῃσεται μεθιστάμενον ὅλον, “se infatti questo fosse possibile (che l'infinito nel suo insieme si muovesse di movimento locale), esisterebbe qualcosa di più grande dell'infinito verso il quale (l'infinito) si trasferirebbe dislocandosi nel suo insieme”. La traduzione del tratto, come ricostruito da Rashed,⁸⁴ è invece questa: “si en effet cela devait être le cas, quelle sera la chose plus grande que l'infini dans laquelle il se mouvra par un déplacement de toute sa masse?” Ma a parte di questo rilievo, resta indubbia la relazione tra i due documenti, come indubbia, di necessità, la dipendenza dell'uno dall'altro. Che poi Filopono fosse l'unico in grado di utilizzare Alessandro autonomamente da Simplicio,⁸⁵ questo può solo confermarne la paternità.

⁸⁰ Fr. 561 Rashed.

⁸¹ Simpl., *In Phys.*, p. 1188.5-12 Diels.

⁸² Cf. anche Rashed, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise. Commentaire* (cit. n. 1), p. 505-6.

⁸³ In Alessandro, per limitarci al probabile autore del testo dello scolio, non si dà mai nella sequenza εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἔσται (ovvero εἰ τοῦτο ἔσται, in assenza di quella di più puntuale riscontro) la separazione proposta da Rashed.

⁸⁴ Rashed, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise. Commentaire* (cit. n. 1), p. 505.

⁸⁵ Non importa se con la mediazione di Ammonio. È la questione, cioè, che riguarda la provenienza dell'esegesi alessandrino nel commento alla *Fisica* di Filopono, se essa si debba ad Ammonio, alla cui attività risalirebbero, secondo Golitsis,

VIII 2, 253 a 17: τούτων δ' ἐνίας

f. 90v

τὸ ζῶον οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοκίνητον τὰς φυσικὰς κινήσεις, ἀλλὰ μόνον τὴν κατὰ τόπον, τῶν δὲ φυσικῶν κινήσεων αἴτιον τὸ περιέχον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀλλοιοῦν ἡμᾶς τοιῶσδε ἢ τοιῶσδε καὶ κινεῖν τῇ εισπνοῇ καὶ ἐκπνοῇ τὸ ἔμφυτον θερμὸν ἀλλοιώσεως θρέψεως πόσεως ἀξήσεως αἴτιον γίνεται. τῆς οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὕπνον ἡρεμίας γινομένης ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀτμῶν ἀναδόσεως εἰς τὸν ἐγκέφαλον· πληρουμένων γὰρ τῶν πόρων τῶν νεύρων δι' ὧν χορηγεῖται ἐκ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πνεῦμα εἰς τὰ αἰσθητήρια καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἡρεμουσῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων τοῦ πνεύματος οὐκέτι χορηγούμενου· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐστὶν ὁ ὕπνος ἢ ἡρεμία αἰσθήσεως· ὅταν κινήθῃ τὸ ἔμφυτον θερμὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος λεπτοποιήσῃ τοὺς ἀτμούς καὶ διαφορήσῃ δίδωσι πάλιν πόρον τῷ αἰσθητικῷ πνεύματι ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια καὶ οὕτως ἐγρήγορις γίνεται. ὥστε εἰ τὴν μὲν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν ὑπὸ ὄρμῆς καὶ φαντασίας κινεῖται τὸ ζῶον ἢ τις δι' αἰσθήσεως γίνεται, αὐτὰ δὲ κινεῖνται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐμφύτου θερμοῦ, τοῦτο δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πάσχοντος, ἔξωθεν ἄρα τῶν ζῴων τὸ κινήτικόν αἴτιον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ περιέχον κινεῖ τὸ ἔμφυτον θερμὸν, τοῦτο δὲ τὴν ὄρεξιν, αὕτη δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἀλόγων τὸ ὅλον ζῶον κινεῖ, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν λογικῶν τὴν διάνοιαν· ἢ δὲ διάνοια τὸ ζῶον ἀλλὰ καὶ φαινόμενόν τι ἔξωθεν τῶν ἡδέων κινεῖ τὴν ὄρεξιν, ἢ δὲ τὸ ζῶον ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἢ καὶ τῶν φευκτῶν τι φανὲν κινεῖ εἰς φυγὴν αὐτοῦ.⁸⁶

Il vivente non risulta muoversi da sé rispetto ai movimenti naturali, ma solo rispetto al movimento locale. Causa dei movimenti naturali è invece ciò che è esterno. È questo infatti che ci trasforma in un modo o nell'altro e muovendo il calore congenito attraverso l'inspirazione e l'espiazione diviene causa di alterazione, nutrimento, idratazione, accrescimento. Dunque, sopraggiunta durante il sonno la quiete a causa della distribuzione dei vapori verso il cervello (quando infatti si riempiono i pori dei nervi attraverso i quali lo spirito sensibile si trasferisce dal cervello verso gli organi di percezione e da questi, mentre le sensazioni sono in stato di quiete, lo spirito non si traferisce più – nient'altro infatti è il sonno se non quiete di sensazione –), quando il calore congenito, mosso dall'esterno, rende sottili e disperde i vapori, offre di nuovo allo spirito sensibile il passaggio verso gli organi di percezione e così avviene il risveglio. Di modo che, se il vivente si muove di movimento locale, che si verifica a causa del senso, in forza di impulso e immaginazione, e se questi ultimi sono mossi dal calore congenito, e questo dal principio passivo, dunque il principio del movimento sarà esterno ai viventi. Infatti ciò che è esterno muove il calore congenito, e questo (muove) il desiderio, e il desiderio muove il vivente nel suo complesso nel caso dei viventi irrazionali, mentre muove il giudizio nel caso dei viventi razionali; allora il giudizio muove il vivente, ma anche la presenza esterna di alcunché di piacevole stimola il desiderio e questo (spinge il vivente) verso di esso, oppure anche la presenza di qualcosa che debba essere evitato muove (il vivente) a fuggirlo.

Sulla paternità del passo, che per il suo contenuto può essere messo in relazione anche con quanto si legge in *Simplicio*,⁸⁷ potrebbe già risultare decisivo il brevissimo *excerptum* vitelliano,⁸⁸ evidente compendio dell'estremo e non limpido testo dello scolio (l. 12-13): τὴν μὲν διάνοιαν ἐπὶ τῶν λογικῶν, τὴν δὲ ὄρεξιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλόγων. Possono, tuttavia, risultare altrettanto determinanti un

Les Commentaires (cit. n. 1), p. 59-61, anche le altre occasioni in cui Filopono fa riferimento al commento di Alessandro, oppure se può ipotizzarsene una consultazione diretta. Che Filopono fosse in grado di accedere al commento di Alessandro al *De Caelo* e a un tempo di notare l'opposizione interpretativa Alessandro/Ammonio è cosa già dimostrata e sembra che questo possa essere anche il caso del commento alla *Fisica*.

⁸⁶ *Vat. gr.* 2208, f. 130v.

⁸⁷ *Simpl., In Phys.*, p. 1190.24-1191.25 Diels.

⁸⁸ *Philop., In Phys.*, p. 824.32 Vitelli.

paio di indicazioni legate sostanzialmente all'*usus*. La prima si richiama all'impiego dell'espressione (l. 4) ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀτμῶν ἀναδόσεως che identica si ritrova ancora, nella tradizione interpretativa, solo in Filopono;⁸⁹ la seconda all'uso del tecnico λεπτοποιεῖν (l. 8), che tra i commentatori è anch'esso esclusivo di Filopono.⁹⁰ A questo va aggiunto un lungo scolio filoponeo⁹¹ che costituisce una variazione sul tema o quasi una riscrittura rispetto al nostro, con ripresa puntuale di concetti e termini⁹² sino alla definizione, propria al solo Filopono,⁹³ del sonno come inattività delle sensazioni (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐστὶν ὁ ὕπνος ἢ ἡρεμία αἰσθήσεων).

VIII 5, 258 b 2: ἐὰν δὲ διααιρεθῆ

f. 97v

ἐὰν ἡ χεὶρ ἀφαιρεθῆ τοῦ ζώου οὐκέτι σφίζεται ἡ φύσις τῆς ὀλότητος, ἀλλὰ κολοβὸν τὸ ὄλον γίνεταί.

Se infatti si sottrae al vivente la mano, la natura del complesso non sopravvive piú, ma il complesso risulta mutilo.

È probabile che l'esempio e l'uso dello specifico κολοβόν derivassero a Filopono dalle lezioni di Ammonio, come documentano da una parte ancora Filopono,⁹⁴ dall'altra il commento alla *Metafisica* di Asclepio dove diffusamente ricorrono e l'uno e l'altro.⁹⁵

⁸⁹ Philop., *In Meteor.*, p. 125.31 Hayduck (*CAG XIV.1*, Berlin 1901): ἡ τῶν ἀτμῶν ἀνάδοσις.

⁹⁰ Philop., *In Meteor.*, p. 99.33 Hayduck. Meno decisive, ma altrettanto tecniche, altre locuzioni frequentissime solo in Filopono (τὸ ἔμφυτον θερμόν, τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πνεῦμα, χορηγεῖσθαι) confermano gli interessi e le competenze medico-filosofiche in Filopono, già per altro documentate: cf. R.B. Todd, "Philosophy and Medicine in John Philoponus' Commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*", in J. Scarborough (ed.), *Symposium on Byzantine Medicine*, Dumbarton Oaks Pub. Service, Washington DC 1984 (Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 38), p. 103-10; Ph.J. van der Eijk, *Philoponus. On Aristotle on the Soul 1.3-5*, Cornell U.P., Ithaca N.Y. 2006 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), p. 1-4; P. Lautner, "Methods in examining Sense-perception: John Philoponus and Ps.-Simplicius", in M. Achard - F. Renaud (ed.), *Le commentaire philosophique dans l'Antiquité et ses prolongements: méthodes exégétiques* (II), *Laval théologique et philosophique* 64 (2008), p. 651-61; J. Wilberding, "The Revolutionary Embryology of the Neoplatonists", *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 49 (2015), p. 321-61, in part. p. 331-2, n. 28.

⁹¹ A commento di Arist., *Phys.* VIII 6, 259 b 6 (Philop., *In Phys.*, p. 890.9-25 Vitelli): βούλεται δεῦξα ὅπερ ἐναγχοῦς εἴπομεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπὶ πάσης κινήσεως ἑαυτοῦς ἐστὶν αἷτια τὰ αὐτοκίνητα, ἀλλὰ μόνη τῆς κατὰ τόπον, καὶ ταύτης οὐ κυρίως οὐδὲ μόνα· δέονται γὰρ τῶν ἔξωθεν. ὑπό τε γὰρ τῶν ὀρεκτῶν κινεῖται ἔξωθεν ὄντων, καὶ τῆς τροφῆς πεττομένης μὲν καθυδούσι, τῷ πληροῦν τοὺς πόρους δι' ὧν αἱ αἰσθητικαὶ δυνάμεις φέρονται ἐκ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου ἐπὶ τὸ λοιπὸν σῶμα (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐστὶν ὁ ὕπνος ἢ ἡρεμία αἰσθήσεων, αὕτη δὲ γίνεταί τῶν ἐκ τῆς πέψεως ἀτμῶν πληρούντων τοὺς πόρους, δι' ὧν τὸ αἰσθητικὸν δικνεῖται πνεῦμα, καὶ κωλύοντων φέρεσθαι ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα), ὅταν δὲ ἡδη διακρίνηται ἡ τροφή καὶ διαφορῆται μετὰ τὴν πέψιν τὰ περιττώματα, τότε γίνεταί καὶ ἡ ἐγρήγορις τῶν πόρων τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ πνεύματος διαφορῆντων. τῆς δὲ πέψεως αἷτια μὲν καὶ αἱ φυσικαὶ δυνάμεις, αἷτιον δὲ καὶ τὸ περιέχον τοιῶσδε διατιθὲν τὸ σῶμα· διὸ οὐδὲ συνεχῶς ταύτην ἑαυτὰ κινεῖ τὴν κίνησιν, ἄτε δεόμενα καὶ τῆς ἔξωθεν ῥοπῆς. κατὰ αὐξήσιν μέντοι καὶ ἀλλοίωσιν προφανῶς οὐχ ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν κίνησιν, τούτεστι τὴν κατὰ τόπον, καὶ αὐξεται καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται.

⁹² Cf. Philop., *In Phys.*, p. 890.12-18 Vitelli, dove le due sequenze τῷ πληροῦν τοὺς πόρους δι' ὧν αἱ αἰσθητικαὶ δυνάμεις φέρονται ἐκ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου... τῶν ἐκ τῆς πέψεως ἀτμῶν πληρούντων τοὺς πόρους, δι' ὧν τὸ αἰσθητικὸν δικνεῖται πνεῦμα non lasciano dubbi.

⁹³ Oltre che nei due scoli, ugualmente anche in Philop., *De Aet. mundi contra Proclum*, 258.5-6 Rabe: ὁ τε ὕπνος οὐδὲν ἔτερον ἐστὶν ἢ ἡρεμία αἰσθήσεων.

⁹⁴ Questa volta senza dubbio dall'insegnamento diretto del maestro, cf. *In Cat.*, p. 32.11 Busse: ἐνός γοῦν τῶν μερῶν ἀφαιρεθέντος κολοβὸν τὸ ὄλον γίνεταί. Ma cf. anche Philop., *De Aet. mundi contra Proclum*, p. 419.13-15 Rabe: ἀμέλει λείποντος δακτύλου ἐνός τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου σῶμα κολοβὸν καὶ οὐχ ὄλον ἐστίν.

⁹⁵ Cf. per esempio Asclep., *In Metaph.*, p. 346.1-3 Hayduck: πάλιν δὲ λέγεται μέρος οὗ ἀφαιρουμένου κολοβὸν γίνεταί τὸ ὄλον, οὐ μέντοι γε καταμετρεῖ τὸ ὄλον, ὥσπερ τὰ δύο τῶν τριῶν ἢ ἡ κεφαλή τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.

VIII, 8. 263b27: καὶ ὅτε γίγνεται

f. 104r

δεύτερον ἀξίωμα ὅτι τὸ γινόμενον ὅτε γίνεται οὐπω ἐστίν. ὑποκείσθω χρόνος τις συγκείμενος ἐκ τῶν $\alpha\beta\gamma$ ἀτόμων. ἔστω οὖν ἐν μὲν τῷ $\alpha\beta$ γίνεται λευκόν, ἐν δὲ τῷ $\beta\gamma$ γεγονός τε καὶ ὄν λευκόν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐν τῷ $\alpha\beta$ ἐγίνετο λευκόν, δῆλον ὅτι οὐπω ἦν λευκόν. εἰ οὖν ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ $\alpha\beta$ οὐκ ἦν, ἐν δὲ τῷ $\beta\gamma$ λευκόν ἐστί, δεῖ δὲ πρὸ τοῦ εἶναι λευκόν γίνεσθαι λευκόν, ἀνάγκη μεταξὺ ἕτερον εἶναι χρόνον τοῦ τε $\alpha\beta$ καὶ $\beta\gamma$ ἐν ᾧ ἐγίνετο λευκόν. ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐὰν ὑποτεθῆ ἄλλο τι μεταξὺ ἐν ᾧ ἐγίνετο, ἐπειδὴ πάλιν τὸ γινόμενον οὐπω ἔστί, δεῖ πάλιν ἄλλον τινὰ εἶναι μετ' αὐτὸν ἐν ᾧ ἐγίνετο καὶ τοῦτο ἐπ' ἄπειρον. ἀδύνατον ἄρα ἐξ ἀτόμων εἶναι τὸν χρόνον.⁹⁶

Il secondo principio è che ciò che si genera, nel momento in cui si genera, non esiste ancora. Si supponga un tempo composto dalle parti indivisibili ABC e che dunque nel (tempo) AB diventi bianco, nel (tempo) BC lo sia divenuto e sia bianco. Dal momento che nel (tempo) AB diveniva bianco, è chiaro che non era ancora bianco. Se dunque durante tutto (il tempo) AB non lo era, ma in BC è bianco, e se è necessario che prima di essere bianco diventi bianco, allora dovrà esservi un altro tempo intermedio tra AB e BC durante il quale diveniva bianco. Ma di nuovo se si suppone un altro (tempo) intermedio durante il quale diveniva, visto che tutto ciò che diviene non esiste ancora, di nuovo vi dovrà essere dopo di questo un altro (tempo) nel quale diveniva, e così all'infinito. Dunque è impossibile che il tempo si componga di parti indivisibili.

All'interno della scansione argomentativa che rigetta la segmentazione del tempo in unità atomiche si situa anche la prova indiretta in forza della quale Aristotele inferisce, a partire dalla necessità di postulare porzioni di tempo intermedie tra supposte unità temporali indivisibili, che il tempo in cui una realtà è soggetta a trasformazione non può essere suddiviso in frazioni indivisibili.⁹⁷ Secondo Lettinck⁹⁸ che, inutile dirlo, ignorava l'esistenza dello scolio di *PcsI*, il commento arabo⁹⁹ avrebbe avuto il suo presupposto in un frammento di Vitelli.¹⁰⁰ Ora, mentre il contenuto esegetico dei due frammenti

⁹⁶ *Vat. gr.* 2208, f. 147r.

⁹⁷ VIII 8, 263 b 26 - 264 a 1. Cf. R. Sorabji, "Aristotle on the Instant of Change", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes* 50 (1976), p. 69-89, in part. p. 82-3. Una descrizione introduttiva del luogo è in D.W. Graham, *Aristotle Physics. Book VIII*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1999, p. 143-8; ma l'analisi più puntuale dell'ἀξίωμα con utili riferimenti alla tradizione esegetica tardo antica e alla letteratura moderna si può leggere in J. Bowin, "Aristotle on the Unity of Change: Five *Reductio* Arguments in *Physics* viii 8", *Ancient Philosophy* 30 (2010), p. 319-45, in part. p. 331-40, cui ora tuttavia fanno seguito i rilievi di D. Blyth, *Aristotle's Ever-turning World in Physics 8. Analysis and Commentary*, Brill, Leiden 2016 (*Philosophia Antiqua*, 141), p. 259-61, che si riferisce in modo esplicito ma altrettanto rapido al frammento di Filopono chiamato in causa da Lettinck. Una traduzione del commento di Simplicio e degli spunti esegetici di Alessandro si trova in R. McKirahan, *Simplicius. On Aristotle Physics 8.6-10*, Duckworth, London 2001 (*Ancient Commentators on Aristotle*), p. 76-9, 167-8; per l'estrema condensazione dell'argomento nella parafrasi di Temistio, cf. R.B. Todd, *Themistius On Aristotle Physics 5-8*, Duckworth, London 2008 (*Ancient Commentators on Aristotle*), p. 149, n. 792.

⁹⁸ Lettinck, *Philoponus. On Aristotle Physics 5-8* (cit. n. 16), p. 150, n. 305.

⁹⁹ Cf. p. 907.6-19 (135-136 Lettinck).

¹⁰⁰ Cf. p. 845.34-846.19 Vitelli: τὸ μεταβάλλον τὸ δ' λαμβάνει, χρόνον δὲ ἐκ δύο ἀτόμων τῶν $\alpha\beta$ συγκείμενον, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ α γίνεσθαι τὸ δ' λευκόν, ἐν δὲ τῷ β γεγονέναι καὶ εἶναι. εἰ τοίνυν ἐν μὲν τῷ β γέγονε καὶ ἔστιν, ἐν δὲ τῷ α γίνεται, τὸ δὲ γινόμενον οὐπω ἐστίν, τοῦτο δὲ διὰ γενέσεως ἄγεται εἰς τὸ εἶναι, δεῖ εἶναι μεταξὺ τοῦ α καὶ β χρόνον ἐν ᾧ γενήσεται ("assume D come ciò che si trasforma, il tempo come composto da due indivisibili, A e B, e che D diviene bianco in A, che è divenuto ed è bianco in B. Se dunque in B è divenuto ed è bianco, in A diviene, ma ciò che diviene non è ancora, ma giunge all'essere attraverso la generazione, vi deve essere un tempo intermedio tra A e B in cui diventerà"). Bowin, "Aristotle on the Unity of Change" (cit. n. 97), p. 331, n. 14, nota il rimaneggiamento in Filopono dei termini della *reductio* aristotelica: "Philoponus, *ad loc.*, recasts the problem, substituting indivisibles A and B for A, and indivisible C for B, so that

non può per evidenti ragioni risultare troppo distante,¹⁰¹ non vi è però alcuna corrispondenza che possa far credere che l'uno e l'altro siano testimoni di un'unica sezione del commento di Filopono. A documentarla invece, questa corrispondenza, è senz'altro l'accostamento della fonte araba con lo scolio di *Pcsl* che indica strettissima prossimità tra i due *excerpta*. Il testo arabo di riferimento è il seguente: "the second premiss is that what is being generated has not yet reached the state of having been generated, i.e. the form is not yet acquired while it is being generated. Then he says: if we suppose that a certain time consists of (parts) A, B, C and D, each of them indivisible, and something is turning white during the time AB and has become white at the time C, then it follows that between B and C there must be another time, because the form of the white has been acquired at the time C, whereas before that, i. e. during the time AB, it was not (yet) acquired, because that was the time of its generation, and a form is not yet acquired during the time of its generation. Thus, in the time B it did not exist; it can exist in the time CD only if it has been generated (in a time) between AB and CD. We may give the same argument for that time as we did for this time, and this continues ad infinitum".¹⁰² La quasi coincidenza con lo scolio risulta immediata fin dall'esordio¹⁰³, e l'unica incongruenza riguarda la funzione di D, che nell'argomento aristotelico ricopre la funzione della realtà soggetta al processo di trasformazione, ma che il commento arabo assume anch'essa come parte indivisibile di tempo. Lo scolio tralascia di introdurre o anche solo di qualificare D come ciò che è soggetto a trasformazione, e non è dato sapere se questa omissione si debba ad una progressiva riduzione del commento di Filopono nel suo passaggio alla forma di scolio o se già in Filopono la realtà soggetta al processo di trasformazione si trovasse non specificata.

III.

Offro di seguito una lista delle corrispondenze più significative tra la raccolta di Vitelli e gli scoli desumibili da *Pcsl*, laddove molto spesso il progresso consiste nel fatto che lo scolio integra, anticipandone l'*incipit* o ritardandone l'*explicit*, la testimonianza vitelliana; più raramente mostra come due sezioni scolastiche di Vitelli in realtà costituiscano parti della stessa traccia esegetica; infine consente di correggere quelle che sul testo di riferimento risultano lezioni incerte. Per pura economia solo per i casi più significativi offro il testo dello scolio per esteso; sarà il lettore interessato a provvedere a farlo per le altre occasioni. Al riferimento all'edizione di Vitelli segue l'indicazione del foglio di *Pcsl* (e, dove indicativo, quello di *Vat. gr.* 2208) e del luogo della *Fisica* oggetto dell'esegesi:

what Aristotle calls A is composed of A and B". E in realtà è anche questa sorta di semplificazione o sostituzione denunciata da Bowin che distanzia il frammento Vitelli dal commento arabo, senza dubbio più vicino, come si vedrà, al nostro scolio. Ovviamente, come degli altri frammenti del commento ai libri 5-8 raccolti da Vitelli, non esiste traduzione dell'estratto, e non si può essere sicuri che il riferimento di Bowin a Filopono, in assenza di più esplicito rinvio, debba riguardare il frammento greco e non il commento arabo. Solo nel commento arabo (e, va da sé, nel nostro scolio, ignoto a Bowin) fa la sua apparizione l'unità temporale C nella successione dei segmenti temporali indivisibili ABC e dunque solo da quel contesto Bowin può averla desunta in Filopono e discutibilmente giustificata.

¹⁰¹ Almeno per i frammenti rispettivamente compresi a p. 907.6-14 del testo arabo ed editi a p. 845.34-38 Vitelli di quello greco. Il resto è assolutamente congetturale.

¹⁰² In realtà il punto dubbio ed evidentemente contraddittorio nel resoconto arabo è facilmente visibile, l'iniziale classificazione di D alla stregua di una delle unità temporali indivisibili, ma il suo essere inteso in questa funzione solo alla fine del frammento, insieme con C, che aveva per il resto rappresentato l'unità temporale indivisibile di avvenuta acquisizione della forma. Si tratta, in altri termini, di quella rielaborazione dell'assioma denunciata da Bowin (cf. *supra*) sostanzialmente evitata nel frammento di *Pcsl*.

¹⁰³ Certo è che se anche *In Phys.*, p. 845.34-846.19 Vitelli, dove si legge lo schema con AB unità temporali indivisibili e D realtà soggetta a trasformazione, deve farsi risalire a Filopono, risulta più facile immaginare un fraintendimento della costruzione argomentativa nel suo trasferimento dal greco all'arabo.

Philop., *In Phys.*, p. 802.32-803.12 Vitelli: 68v (VI 2, 233 a 28-29: ὥστε ἐν τῷ ἀπειρώ).

p. 865.22-31 Vitelli: 71r (VI 4, 235 a 13-14: ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον).

p. 866.21-31 Vitelli; 807.30-808.10: 71v (*Vat. gr.* 2208, f. 108v-109r) (VI 5, 235 b 19: ἔτι δὲ καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην): ἐπειδὴ τὸ μεταβεβληκὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ $\bar{\alpha}$ ἀπολέλοιπε τὸ $\bar{\alpha}$, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐν τινι, ἢ ἐν τῷ $\bar{\beta}$ εἶσται ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ τινί· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀδύνατον, ἐν τῷ $\bar{\beta}$ ἄρα εἶσται. εἰ γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶη, ἔστω ἐν τῷ γ · συμβήσεται ἅμα τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μεταβάλλειν καὶ μεταβεβληκῆναι ἐν τῷ $\bar{\beta}$, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐκ εἶσται ἐχόμενον τοῦ γ τὸ $\bar{\beta}$, ἀλλ' εἶσται διαιρετὸν τὸ μεταξὺ εἰς αἰεὶ διαιρετά, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. πᾶσα δὲ μεταβολὴ συνεχῆς, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα τὸ μεταβάλλον εἰς τὸ $\bar{\beta}$ ἐν τῷ γ ὄν εἶτα μεταβάλλειν εἰς τὸ $\bar{\beta}$ · ἀλλὰ μὴν ὑπόκειται ἔτι μεταβεβληκὸς εἰς τὸ $\bar{\beta}$ · τὸ αὐτὸ ἄρα καὶ μεταβάλλει εἰς τὸ $\bar{\beta}$ καὶ μεταβεβληκῆναι, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἐχόμενον τὸ γ τῷ $\bar{\beta}$, τουτέστι ἀπτόμενόν τε καὶ μηδὲν ἔχον μεταξὺ, δυνατὸν ἦν ἐν τῷ γ εἶναι καὶ μεταβεβληκῆναι ἐν τῷ $\bar{\beta}$ (οὐ γὰρ εἶχεν ἔτι εἰς ὃ μετέβαλεν). νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν συνεχῆς ἐξ ἡμερῶν, ὡς δέδεικται, ἀλλ' ὃ τι ἂν ληφθῆι μόνον τοῦ συνεχοῦς, τοῦτο διαιρετὸν εἰς αἰεὶ διαιρετά, οὐ δυνατὸν εἶναι τὸ γ τῷ $\bar{\beta}$ ἐχόμενον, ἀλλ' εἶσται τι αὐτῶν μεταξὺ· ὥστε τὸ μεταβάλλον εἰς τὸ $\bar{\beta}$, δεῖ καὶ ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ μεταβαλεῖν εἴπερ συνεχῆς ἢ μεταβολή.

p. 808.12-14 Vitelli: 72r; p. 868.20-24; p. 809.15-22: 72v (*Vat. gr.* 2208, f. 110r-v) (VI 5, 236 b 1-2 αὐτὸ δὲ ὃ μεταβάλλει ἢ καθ' ὃ μεταβάλλει, οὐκέθ' ὁμοίως ἕξει): δεῖξας ὅτι οὔτε ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ μεταβάλλον τί ἐστί τὸ πρῶτον κατὰ τὴν μεταβολήν, βούλεται νῦν δεῖξαι ὅτι οὔτε ἐν τῷ εἶδει, καθ' ὃ ἢ μεταβολή, ἐστί τὸ πρῶτον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν λειπόμενον. εἰπὼν δὲ αὐτὸ ὃ μεταβάλλει, ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸ τὸ μεταβάλλον τὸ πρῶτῳ ἐστί, διὰ τοῦτο προσέθηκεν ἢ καθ' ὃ μεταβάλλει, ἵνα σημάνη τὸ εἶδος, τὸ δὲ οὐκέτι ὁμοίως ἀντὶ τοῦ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἀπλῶς ἐλέγομεν ὅτι καθ' αὐτὰ οὐκ ἔχουσι τὸ πρῶτον κατὰ τὴν μεταβολήν, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἶδους δυνάμεθα ἀποφήσασθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτῳ καὶ ὁ χρόνος καθ' αὐτὸ ὄντα διαιρετά, διότι καὶ συνεχῆ, καθ' αὐτὰ οὐκ εἶχον τὸ πρῶτον (ἐπ' ἄπειρον γὰρ ἐτέμνοντο καθ' αὐτά), τὸ μέντοι εἶδος, καθ' ὃ γίνετα ἢ μεταβολή, οὐδ' ἄπαν ἐστί καθ' αὐτὸ διαιρετὸν· τὸ γοῦν ποιὸν ἀδιαιρετον μὲν ἐστί καθ' αὐτό, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ γίνετα διαιρετὸν. τὸ μέντοι ποσόν (τόν τε τόπον φημί καὶ τὴν αὐξήσιν καὶ τὴν μείωσιν) καθ' αὐτὸ διαιρετὸν ὄν καθ' αὐτό καὶ τὸ πρῶτον οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἐπ' ἄπειρον διαιρεῖσθαι. ὅτι γὰρ οὐδὲ ἐν τούτοις ἐστί τὸ πρῶτον κατὰ τὴν μεταβολήν (τῷ τε τόπον φημί καὶ τῇ αὐξήσει καὶ τῇ μείώσει), δείκνυσιν οὕτως.

p. 809.25-29 Vitelli: 73r (VI 5, 236 b 5-6: περὶ δὲ τοῦ λευκοῦ ἄλλος λόγος).

p. 816.15-17 Vitelli: 76v (VI 8, 239 a 33: εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως).

p. 820, 21-28 Vitelli: 79r (VI 10, 241 b 4: τῷ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τμηθῆναι), 79r (241 b 7: ἐνδέχουτ' ἂν μεταβάλλειν).

p. 874.5-6 Vitelli, p. 822.3-4: 79v (VII 1, 241 b 24-25: εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἑαυτῷ).

p. 874.17-20 Vitelli: 80v (VII 1, 242 b 7: ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ).

p. 875.20-23 Vitelli: 82r (244 a 20: ἢ δ' ἕλιξ ἀπ' ἄλλου).

p. 875.29-32 Vitelli: 82r (244 a 25: τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς).

p. 876.13-18 Vitelli: 82v (VII 2, 245 a 12-13: αὐξάνει γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον αὔξον).

p. 876.20-23 Vitelli: 82v (VII 2, 245 b 1: πρώτου καὶ ἐσχάτου).

p. 876.25-29 Vitelli: 83v (*Vat. gr.* 2208, f. 121v) (246 a 30: αἱ γὰρ ἕξεις ἀρεταὶ καὶ κακίαι): αἱ ἀρεταὶ καὶ κακίαι ἕξεις οὖσαι τῶν πρὸς τί εἰσι, αἶ τε τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ αἱ μὲν τοῦ σώματος αἶ τε ἀρεταὶ καὶ κακίαι πρόδηλον ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τί εἰσιν· ἡ γὰρ ὑγεία συμμετρία ἐστὶ τῶν στοιχείων, ἡ δὲ συμμετρία συμμετρῶν ἐστὶ συμμετρία. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν συμμετρῷ ὡσι ποιούσιν ὑγείαν, ὅταν δὲ τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ πάλιν συμμετρῶς ἔχωσι πρὸς ἄλληλα γίνεται ἡ ἰσχύς, ὅταν δὲ τὰ ὀργανικὰ, κάλλος· ὁμοίως καὶ ἡ κακία τῶν πρὸς τι· ἡ γὰρ ἀμετρία τῶν ἀσυμμέτρων ἐστὶν ἀμετρία· πάλιν γὰρ ἡ μὲν τῶν στοιχείων ἀσυμμετρία ποιεῖ νόσον, ἡ δὲ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν τὴν ἀσθένειαν, ἡ δὲ τῶν ὀργανικῶν τὸ αἴσχος.

p. 877.8-17 Vitelli: 84r (247 b 21: ἡ ἐνέργεια γένεσις).

p. 877.19-28 Vitelli: 84r (*Vat. gr.* 2208, f. 123r) (247 b 22: ἡ δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς λῆψις): δεῖξας ἐπὶ τῶν ἕξεων καὶ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν λοιπὸν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δυνάμεων βούλεται δεῖξαι ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τῆς κτήσεως τούτων ἀλλοιώσις ἐστὶ οὐδὲ γένεσις. λῆψιν δὲ ἐπιστήμης, φησίν. αὐτὴν τὴν κίνησιν τῆς δυνάμεως, ἣν ἔχοντες λοιπὸν ἐπιτήδειοί ἐσμεν εἰς τὸ καὶ τὴν ἕξιν κτήσασθαι, οἷοι εἰσιν οἱ παῖδες οἱ τῆς νηπίας παυσάμενοι ἡλικίας καὶ ἡδὴ μαθόντες παραδέξασθαι δυνάμενοι. τὸ γὰρ ἔμβρυον ἢ τὸ βρέφος δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμων. οὐ γὰρ δύναται τότε ἐπιστήμην δέξασθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο δυνάμει ἐπιστητόν. δυνάμει γὰρ ἔχει τὸ δυνάμει ἐπιστήμων. δείκνυσιν οὖν ὅτι ἐπὶ τῆς δυνάμεως οὔτε ἀλλοιώσις θεωρεῖται οὔτε γένεσις. γίνεται γὰρ, φησίν, ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ οὐκ αὐτῆς παθούσης τι οὐδὲ μεταβαλοῦσης, ἀλλὰ τῆς φυσικῆς ταραχῆς καταστάσεως· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς παιδίοις πολλή ἐστὶν ἡ φυσικὴ ταραχή· τῆς γὰρ φύσεως εἰς τέλειον ἀγαγεῖν βουλομένης τὸ ζῶον σφοδρότεροι τότε αἱ φυσικαὶ δυνάμεις κινεῦνται θρεπτικῇ ἀλλοιωτικῇ αὐξητικῇ. διὸ καὶ θάττον ἐπὶ πλέον τότε προκόπτουσι τὰ ἔργα τῆς φύσεως. μᾶλλον γὰρ αὐξοῦσι τὰ παιδία μᾶλλον πέπτουσι. πολλῆς οὖν κινουμένης φυσικῆς ταραχῆς ἐπικρύπτεται ἡ διάνοια. ὅταν δὲ λοιπὸν ἄρξωνται καθίξασθαι καὶ μετριάζεσθαι αἱ φυσικαὶ κινήσεις τότε λοιπὸν ἀναλάμπει ἡ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν δεκτικὴ δύναμις.

p. 878.8-15 Vitelli: 85v (*Vat. gr.* 2208, f. 126r) (VII 4, 249a3: ἀλλ' ἐν ἐνός τὸ πρῶτον): τοῦτο κατασκευή ἐστὶ τοῦ μὴ δύνασθαι τὴν μίαν φύσιν ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὰ συνώνυμα ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ δεκτικῷ εἶναι· πᾶσα γὰρ μία φύσις ἐν ἐνί τινι ὑποκειμένῳ ὑφέστηκε, καὶ πᾶν ἐν ὑποκείμενον μιᾶς φύσεως δεκτικόν ἐστὶν, οἷον χρωμάτων μὲν ἡ ἐπιφάνεια δεκτικὴ, χυμῶν δὲ οὐκέτι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑγρὸν χυμῶν δεκτικόν, ψόφοις δὲ τὸ διηχῆς τοῦ ἀέρος ὑπόκειται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐκ ἂν οὖν τὴν διαφορὰν τοῦ λευκοῦ φύσει μίαν εἴποιμεν τὴν τε ἐν χρώματι καὶ ψόφῳ θεωρουμένην. ἐτέρου γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ φύσις ἐτέρα.

p. 880.17-25 Vitelli: 86v (VII 4, 249 b 24-25: τὸ πλεῖον πάθος): ἐπὶ τῶν ἰσοσταχῶν ἀλλοιώσεων τὸ κοινὸν ἀνόμοιον, ἰδικὸν δὲ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀνισοσταχῶν φορῶν κοινὸν μὲν τὸ ἀνισοσταχῆς ἢ τὸ ἄνισον, ἰδικὸν δὲ τὸ μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον. οὐχ οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνισοσταχῶν γενέσεων ἔχομεν ὀνόματα ἢ κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν ἢ ἰδικὸν ἑκατέρας, ἀλλὰ διὰ λόγον καὶ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ τὰ ἰδικὰ δηλοῦμεν. λέγομεν δὲ ὅτι ἀνισοσταχῆς ἐστὶ γένεσις, θάττων μὲν ἢ τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶδους ἐν ἐλάττονι χρόνῳ, βραδυτέρα δὲ ἢ ἐν μεῖζονι.

p. 881.4-16 Vitelli: 87r (VII 5, 250 a 22-23: οὐδὲ δὴ τοσοῦτον μόριον): τὸ μὲν μόριον τῆς κέγχρου ἢ ὁ εἷς νεωλκὸς ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ὑπάρχοντα συνεισφέρει τι εἰς τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ ἀέρος ἢ τῆς νεώς, οἷον εἰ ρ' εἶεν οἱ ἔλκοντες, τὸ ἑκατοστὸν μέρος τῆς δυνάμεως ὁ εἷς συνεισάγει τῇ ὅλῃ δυνάμει. ταύτην οὖν, φησί, τὴν δύναμιν ἦν συνεισῆγγεν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ὁ εἷς νεωλκὸς ἢ τὸ ὅλον μόριον τῆς κέγχρου, καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὄντα ταῦτα οὐ κινήσει. εἶτα καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπάγει. αὐτό, φησί, τὸ μόριον καθ' ἑαυτὸ οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ὄν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὡς καθ' ἑαυτὸ ὄν καὶ ἰδιοπεριορίστως κινουῖν, οὕτω κινεῖ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ, τουτέστιν ὕλης λόγον ἐπέχει. ὥσπερ οὖν τὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος μόρια, ὡς ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἐρμηνείας εἴρηται, καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἄσημά ἐστιν, ἐν μέντοι τῷ ὅλῳ ὡς ὕλη ὄντα συμβάλλεται ἕκαστον πρὸς τὴν ὅλην τοῦ ὀνόματος σημασίαν, οὕτως καὶ ὁ νεωλκὸς καθ' αὐτὸν μὲν οὐδὲν κινήσει, ἐν μέντοι τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ ὡς ὕλη ὑπάρχων συνεισάγει τι εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου κίνησιν.

p. 882.18 Vitelli: 88r (VIII 1, 251 a 26-27: ἢ γὰρ ἡρέμησις στέρησις κινήσεως).

p. 824, 22-25 Vitelli: 90r (VIII 2, 252 b 29: πρῶτον λεχθέν).

p. 884.25 Vitelli: 92v (*Vat. gr.* 2208, f. 133r-v) (VIII 4, 254 b 8: τὰ μὲν): κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μὲν κινεῖ ὁ φαλακρὸς ἢ ὁ λευκός· οὐ γὰρ ἢ φαλακρὸς ἢ λευκὸς οἰκοδομεῖ ἢ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ. κινεῖσθαι δὲ πάλιν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς, ὡς ὅταν λέγωμεν τὸν λευκὸν ἢ τὸν φαλακρὸν ἢ τὸν φιλόσοφον βαδίζειν. ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς συντάττει καὶ τὰ κατὰ μέρος ὅταν μορίου τινὸς αὐτῶν κινουόντος ἢ κινουμένου τὰ ὅλα κινεῖν ἢ κινεῖσθαι λέγεται. καίτοι πρότερον ἐν τῇ τῶν κινουόντων καὶ τῶν κινουμένων διαιρέσει τὰ κατὰ μόρια ταῦτα κινουόντα καὶ κινούμενα ἀντιδιεῖλε τοῖς καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς. ἀντίκειται γὰρ τοῖς μὲν κατὰ μόρια κινουῖσιν ἢ κινουμένοις τουτέστι τοῖς κατ' ἄλλο· λέγομεν γὰρ κινεῖσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦ δακτύλου καὶ τῆς ἀρτηρίας κινουμένης· τὰ πρῶτως, τοῖς δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὰ καθ' αὐτό. νῦν μέντοι πᾶν ὃ μὴ κυρίως καὶ πρῶτως καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖται κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὀνομάζει.

p. 829.13-18 Vitelli: 92v (VIII 4, 254 b 19: διαφέρει γὰρ ὁποῖαν).

p. 830.2-4 Vitelli: 93r (VIII 4, 255 a 12: ἔτι πῶς ἐνδέχεται).

p. 830.9-12 Vitelli: 93v (VIII 4, 255 a 25-26: τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν τοιαύτην).

p. 831.12-15 Vitelli: 94r (VIII 4, 255 b 15: αἴτιον δ' ὅτι πέφυκέν ποι).

p. 831.35-832.1 Vitelli: 94v (VIII 5, 256 a 5: καὶ τοῦτο).

p. 832.4-6 Vitelli: 94v (VIII 5, 256 a 16: εἰ δὲ τοιοῦτο).

p. 885.27-886.6 Vitelli: 95v (*Vat. gr.* 2208, f. 136r) (VIII 5, 257 a 6: ἐτέραν τινὰ): ἐπεὶ τὰ τῆς κινήσεως εἶδη ὠρισμένα εἰσὶ καὶ οὐκ ἄπειρα, τὸ δ' κινουῖν τὴν γ' ἢ οὐ κινήσεται, καὶ ἔχω τὸ ζητούμενον ὅτι τὸ πρῶτως κινουῖν ἀκίνητόν ἐστιν, ἢ εἰ κινήσεται καὶ αἰεὶ ὑπὸ κινουμένου κινεῖται, τὸ κινούμενον αἰεὶ ἀνακάμπτει, καὶ τὸ δ' κινήσεται τὴν κατὰ τόπον πάλιν κίνησιν ἦνπερ καὶ τὸ α'. ὥστε τὸ δ' κινούμενον τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν κινήσει τὸ α' τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν διὰ μέσων τῶν β'γ'. ὥστε πάλιν ἤξομεν εἰς τὴν προτέραν ὑπόθεσιν, καὶ κινήσει τὸ κινουῖν ἦνπερ κινεῖται κίνησιν· ὥστε τὸ διδάσκον καθὸ διδάσκει διδαχθήσεται. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, ἀδύνατον ἄρα πᾶν τὸ κινουῖν κινούμενον αὐτὸ κινεῖν οὔτε καθ' αὐτὸ οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς.

p. 886.13-19 Vitelli: 96v (*Vat. gr.* 2208, f. 136v) (VIII 5, 257 b 9: θερμαίνει τὸ θερμόν): θερμαίνει τὸ θερμόν, τουτέστιν εἰς συνώνυμον αὐτῷ ἄγειν τὸ κινούμενον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, οἷον τὸ θερμαίνον θερμόν ὃν θερμόν ποιεῖν τὸ θερμαινόμενον. τοῦτο δὲ λέγει ἐπεὶ μὴ πάντα τὰ ποιῶντα ὅμοια ἑαυτοῖς ποιοῦσι· ἢ γὰρ μάστιξ τοὺς μώλωπας ποιεῖ οὐκ ἔχουσα αὐτῇ μώλωπας, καὶ ἡ παρατριψίς θερμαίνει καὶ οὐκ ἔστι θερμότης, κινεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ οὐκ ἔστι κίνησις, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐνεργεῖα εἰς ὅπερ κινεῖ εἶδος, τοῦτο καὶ ἔχει· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὅλως κινεῖται φυσικῆν τινα κίνησιν. ὅλως δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τόπον κινούντων οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος καθ' ἣν κίνησιν λέγεται τὸ αὐτοκίνητον εἶναι αὐτοκίνητον οὔτε γὰρ αἱ ἡμίονοι κινουῦσαι τὴν ἄμαξαν ἐνεργεῖα εἰσὶν ἐν τῷ τόπῳ ἐνθα δεῖ κινήθῃναι, οὔθ' ὅπερ εἶπον ἡ ψυχὴ κινουῦσα καὶ αὐτὴ κινεῖται. ὥστε οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ κινεῖν ἐνεργεῖα ἔχειν ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος εἰς ὃ κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἔστι μὲν τινα ἃ καὶ αὐτὰ δυνάμει ἔχει ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἡμίονων κινουσῶν τὴν ἄμαξαν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν παρατριβομένων. θερμαίνοντα γὰρ τὸν ἀέρα δυνάμει ὄντα θερμόν καὶ αὐτὰ δυνάμει ἐστὶ θερμά. ἀντὶ τοῦ θερμαίνεται γοῦν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἡ ψυχὴ κινουῦσα τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν οὐδόλως κινεῖσθαι πέφυκεν.

p. 886.24-887.1 Vitelli: 96v (*Vat. gr.* 2208, f. 137r) (VIII 5, 257 b 26-27: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦ πρώτως): δείξας ὅτι ἀδύνατον οὕτω λέγεσθαι εἶναι τὸ αὐτοκίνητον, διότι τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ ἀντικινεῖ ἄλληλα (συνέβαινε γὰρ ἕκαστον ἢ κινεῖ κίνησιν ταύτῃ κινεῖν, καὶ οὕτω συναληθεύει ἢ ἀντίφασις), νῦν δείκνυσιν ὅτι μὴ ἐνδέχεται τοῦ πρώτως αὐτοκινήτου μήτε ἐν μήτε πλείονα μέρη ἕκαστον καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι αὐτοκίνητον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ ὅλον καθὸ ὅλον κινεῖν τε ἑαυτὸ καὶ κινεῖσθαι. πρόεισιν δὲ αὐτῷ ἢ δεῖξίς τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον. τὸ ὅλον, φησίν, εἰ κινεῖτο ὑφ' αὐτοῦ, ἐπεὶπερ ἐστὶν αὐτοκίνητον, ἦτοι ὑπὸ τινος τῶν αὐτοῦ μερῶν κινήθησεται κινουῦντος τὸ ὅλον ἢ ὅλον ὑφ' ὅλου ὡς εἶναι ὅλον κινεῖν καὶ ὅλον κινούμενον. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὑπὸ τινος τῶν αὐτοῦ μερῶν κινούμενον κινεῖτο, ἐκεῖνο ἂν εἶη τὸ πρώτως αὐτοκίνητον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ ὅλον. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μόνον ἐκεῖνο τοῦ ὅλου χωρισθὲν φησίν, ἐκεῖνο μὲν αὐτὸ ὑφ' αὐτοῦ κινήθησεται τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν οὐκέτι κεχωρισμένου τοῦ κινουῦντος αὐτό. εἰ δὲ τὸ ὅλον κατὰ πάντα τὰ μέρη ὑφ' αὐτοῦ κινεῖται, τὰ μέρη ἂν αὐτοῦ εἶη κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτοκίνητα. ὡς γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου κινουμένου καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ συνεχῆ τούτου μέρη κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κινεῖται καὶ οὐ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐπειδὴ ἐν τόπῳ ἐστὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ὅλου αὐτοκινήτου ὄντος τὰ τούτου μέρη κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εἶη ἂν αὐτοκίνητα ἐὰν ὑποτεθῆ μὴ κινεῖν ἑαυτά. τοιοῦτον γὰρ τὸ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. οὐκέτι ἔσται τὸ ὅλον οὕτως αὐτὸ κινήτῳ ὡς τῶν μερῶν ἢ τινῶν ἢ ἐνός τῷ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὰ τὸ ὅλον κινούντων, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὅλον κινεῖν καὶ ὅλον κινεῖσθαι δύναται. δεδεικται γὰρ ὅτι πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον ὑπὸ τινος ἐτέρου κινουῦντος κινεῖται. τούτων δὲ δεδειγμένων συνάγει λοιπὸν τὸ ἐπόμενον λέγων οὕτως. τῆς ὅλης ἄρα τὸ μὲν κινήσει ἀκίνητον ὄν, τὸ δὲ κινήθησεται. εἰ γὰρ μήτε ὅλον καθ' ὅλον τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ κινεῖν καὶ κινεῖσθαι δύναται, μήτε τῶν μερῶν ἢ ἐν ἢ πλείω τῷ κινεῖσθαι δύναται κινεῖν τὸ ὅλον, λείπεται ἄρα μέρος μὲν τι ἀκίνητον εἶναι τοῦ αὐτοκινήτου τὸ κινεῖν, μέρος δὲ κινούμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀκινήτου.

p. 836.13-24 Vitelli: 97v (VIII 5, 258 a 20: ἄμφω ἀλλήλων).

p. 891.33-892.24 Vitelli: 99v (VIII 6, 259 b 28: οὐκ ἔστιν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ).

p. 895.35-896.9 Vitelli: 896.10-14; 839.32-840.1; 896.15-19; 840.1-4: 100r (VIII 7, 260 b 1: ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε ἀλλοιοῦται).

p. 842.14-18 Vitelli: 102r (*Vat. gr.* 2208, ff. 143v-144r) (VIII 7, 262 a 3: ἄνθρωπος ἢ θεός). ἄξιον ἀπορίας πῶς ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ κύκλον κινήσεως εἶναι λέγει ἐναντίας κινήσεις. οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰσι ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ τόπου ἐναντιότητες ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς εὐθείας ἐκ τοῦ ἰστᾶν ἀλλήλας τὰς κινήσεις ἐναντίας

εἶναι. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κύκλου αἱ ἀντιπρόσωποι κινήσεις ἐναντίαι, τίς ἡ ἐναντιότης ζητητέον. λέγομεν γὰρ μὴ εἶναι τῇ κύκλω κινήσει ἐναντίαν. διὸ οὐκ ἐναντίαι τῇ κινήσει τῆς ἀπλανοῦς αἱ τῶν πλανωμένων. φασὶ οὖν ὅτι τῇ μὲν κύκλω κινήσει μὴ εἶναι ἐναντίαν. κύκλω δὲ ἐστὶ κινήσεις ἢ ὅλου κύκλου οἷόν εἰσι αἱ τῶν οὐρανίων κινήσεις. οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν δύο κύκλους ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς γραμμῆς κινεῖσθαι, ἵνα καὶ ἐναντιωθεῖεν ἀλλήλαις, ταῖς δὲ ἐπὶ κύκλου κινήσεσιν οὐκ ἄτοπον ἐναντίωσιν εἶναι· ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κύκλου δύο τινὰ δύνανται ἀντιπροσώπως κινεῖσθαι. οὐ γὰρ ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν εὐθειῶν ἐναντία ἐστὶ τὰ πέρατα, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κύκλου ὅτι μὴδ' ἐστὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ πέρατα. ἴσταται μέντοι καὶ ἐπὶ τούτου τὰ ἀντικείμενα κἂν συνεχεῖς ὧσι αἱ κινήσεις καὶ μὴ ἢ ἀνάκαμψις ἐπὶ τῆς εὐθείας.

p. 842.30 Vitelli: 102r (*Vat. gr.* 2208, f. 144r-v) (VIII 8, 262 a 18: τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων): ὁ λέγει συντόμως τοῦτο ἐστὶ. τοῦ μέσου ποτὲ μὲν δυνάμει λαμβανομένου ποτὲ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ ὅταν μὲν ἐνεργείᾳ λαμβάνηται καὶ διαιρῆ τὴν γραμμὴν τότε τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ἐν ὄν. δύο λόγους ἀναδέχεται. ἐστὶ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦ μὲν προτέρου ἡμίσεως πέρασ τοῦ δὲ ἐτέρου ἀρχή. ὅταν οὖν ἐπὶ τοιαύτης γραμμῆς κινήται τι, λέγω δὴ κατ' ἐνεργείαν, διηρημένης γινομένης ἐν τῷ κατ' ἐνεργείαν τούτῳ σημείῳ τῷ διαιροῦντι αὐτὴν ἀνάγκη στῆναι δι' οὐς ἤδη προειλήφαμεν λόγους. δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν διαιρουμένην τὴν γραμμὴν καὶ τὸ σημεῖον κατ' ἐνεργείαν γινόμενον οὐ τῇ τομῇ, ἀλλὰ τῷ κινούμενον μέχρις ἐκείνου ἀφιγμένον ὡς ἐπὶ τι πέρασ οὕτως ἀνακάμπτειν· κἂν μὴ ἀνακάμπτη δέ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡμισυ φέρηται, τὸ ἐπὶ τὸ ἡμισυ ὡς ἐπὶ ἄλλην τινὰ γραμμὴν ἀφικνεῖσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ ἕτερον ἡμισυ πάλιν ὡς ἐπὶ ἄλλην γραμμὴν. ταύτῃ τὸ μέσον σημεῖον ἐνεργείᾳ λαμβάνεται. ἐν μὲν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ὑπάρχει, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ δύο. οὐ τοῦτο οὖν λέγει ὅτι ἐνεργείᾳ διαιρεῖ τὸ σημεῖον τὴν γραμμὴν. δύο γὰρ οὕτω σημεῖα γίνονται κατ' ἐνεργείαν. μάλιστα γὰρ εἰ μὴ διασταῖεν ἐνεργείᾳ αἱ γραμμαὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκη δύο εἶναι τὰ σημεῖα. εἰ γὰρ ἄπτοινο ἀλλήλων αἱ γραμμαὶ ἀνάγκη ἐφαρμοζόντων ἀλλήλοισ τῶν περάτων ἐν εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον. οὐ γὰρ δήπου σημεῖον σημείου ἄπτεται.

p. 844.2-3 Vitelli; 844.5-7: 103r (*Vat. gr.* 2208, f. 145r) (VIII 8, 262 b 21: ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἀδύνατον): ἐπὶ τῆς συνεχοῦς, φησί, γραμμῆς ἀδύνατον λέγειν ὅτι ἐν τῷ μέσῳ σημείῳ ἐν χρόνῳ τινὶ ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ γίνεταί καὶ ἀπογίνεταί ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐστίν. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀνακάμπτοντος ἀληθές τοῦτο. κέχρηται γὰρ τῷ σημείῳ ἐξ οὗ ἀνακάμπτει κατ' ἐνεργείαν πέρατι. δεῖ δὲ ἐν τῷ κατ' ἐνεργείαν σημείῳ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπογίνεσθαι μὴ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ νῦν. λαμβάνει δὲ πάλιν ἐπὶ τούτου ἕτερα στοιχεῖα, λαμβάνει γὰρ τῆς ὅλης γραμμῆς τὰ πέρατα η καὶ δ , καὶ τὸ μὲν δ ἄνω, κάτω δὲ τὸ ϵ καὶ φερόμενον ποτὲ μὲν ἄνωθεν κάτω, ποτὲ δὲ κάτωθεν ἄνω. τῷ γοῦν ἐνὶ πέρατι, τῷ δ , ὡς δυσὶ κέχρηται, αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ πέρατα λαμβάνει ἀντὶ τῶν κινουμένων.

p. 848.6-11 Vitelli: 105v (*Vat. gr.* 2208, f. 149r) (VIII 8, 264 b 33: οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει): οὐδὲν, φησί, διαφέρει ἐν τούτοις μὲν πλείω εἶναι ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ ἔλαττον τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ἄκρων. κἂν γὰρ ἐν ἧ τὸ μέσον δι' οὗ γίνεταί ἡ μεταβολή, τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνει. τοῦτο δὲ εἶπεν ἴσως διὰ τὸ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθοράν. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις μεταβολαῖς πολλὰ ἐστὶ μεταξὺ, ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ οὐ δοκεῖ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνακάμπτειν· γίνεταί μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων σπέρμα τυχόν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ σπέρματος σάρεξ εἶτα ἄλλο τι εἶτα ἔμβρυον, εἶτα ἐφεξῆς μέχρι τοῦ τελείου ἀνδρός· ἐν δὲ τῇ φθορᾷ οὐ δοκεῖ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνακάμπτειν. ἢ λέγομεν ὅτι εἰ καὶ μὴ διὰ πάντων ἀνακάμπτει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τινων προδρόμων καὶ ἀτελῶν εἰδῶν ἀνακάμπτει εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἀλλ' οὖν ἐστὶ τι πάντως ἢ τινὰ δι' ὧν δεῖ πάλιν τὴν ἀνάκαμψιν ποιεῖσθαι. εἰσὶ γὰρ προδρομὰ τινὰ καὶ ἀτελεῖ εἶδη τοῦ τελείου εἶδους δι' ὧν πάλιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης δεῖ ἀνακάμψαι τὸ ἀναλύον εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα. εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ ὡς ζῶον διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνακάμπτει, ἀλλ' οὖν ὡς σῶμα.

p. 848.31-849.6 Vitelli: 106r (*Vat. gr.* 2208, f. 149v) (VIII 9, 265 a 32: τῆς δὲ περιφεροῦς): τῆς κύκλω οὔτε ἀρχὴν οὔτε μέσον οὔτε τέλος ἔστι λαβεῖν· οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον ἀρχὴ ὁ Κριός ἢ μέσον τῶν παρ' ἐκάτερα αὐτοῦ Ἰχθύων λέγω δὴ Ταύρου, ἢ τέλος ὡς ἀπὸ Ταύρου τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιουμένων; ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστου. οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἀρχὴ ἢ ἐκεῖνο, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἀρχὴ ἢ μέσον ἢ τέλος. ἐπεὶ οὖν μὴ ἔστιν ἀρχὴ καὶ μέσον καὶ τέλος κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐν τῷ κύκλω, διὰ τοῦτο δυνατὸν συνεχῆ εἶναι μόνην καὶ μίαν τὴν τοιαύτην κίνησιν· αἰεὶ γὰρ τὰ κύκλω κινούμενα ἐν ἀρχῇ τέ εἰσι καὶ μεσότῃ καὶ ἐν τελειώσει πρὸς ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην δηλονότι σχέσιν, καὶ οὐδέποτε ἐν οὐδενὶ τούτων εἰσίν, ἀρχῇ λέγω καὶ μέσῳ καὶ πέρατι εἰ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ταῦτα λαμβάνονται καὶ φύσει, καὶ οὐ θέσει· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἐν ἀνατολῇ ὁ ἥλιος, αἰεὶ ἐν δύσει, αἰεὶ ἐν μεσουρανήματι, ὡς πρὸς ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην οἴκησιν ἕκαστον τῶν οὐρανίων.

p. 849.8-16 Vitelli: 106r (VIII 9, 265 b 2: αἴτιον δ' ὅτι πάντα συμβέβηκε ταῦτα τῷ κέντρῳ).

Un cours sur la syllogistique d'Aristote à l'époque tardo-antique: le commentaire syriaque de Proba (VI^e siècle) sur les Premiers Analytiques

Édition et traduction du texte, avec introduction et commentaire

Henri Hugonnard-Roche

Abstract

The aim of this article is to provide a new edition, with translation and commentary, of the treatise on the *Prior Analytics* by Proba, an archiatros (chief physician) and archdeacon of Antioch, composed probably in the second half of the 6th century. The commentary examines in detail Proba's Syriac text by comparison with the main Greek sources on the subject, namely the commentaries by Ammonius and Philoponus, but also with the text of an author most probably contemporary of Proba, that is the commentary by Elias. Proba's treatise is clearly a school text, the first part of which is modelled on the exegetical Greek commentaries, whereas most of the second part is a presentation of the concludent moods of the Aristotelian assertoric syllogistic. Among other topics, it is interesting to underline the use by Proba and Philoponus of the Porphyrean theory of the predicables for the description of the syllogistic moods.

Introduction

C'est au début du VI^e siècle de notre ère qu'apparaissent en syriaque les premières œuvres qui prennent des textes du corpus aristotélicien comme objet d'étude. Il s'agit, en particulier, des premières traductions en syriaque – conservées anonymement – de textes de logique, que sont les *Catégories* ainsi que l'*Isagoge* de Porphyre, qui fait partie du corpus aristotélicien par sa place en tête de l'*Organon* dans le cursus des études.¹ Deux commentaires sur les *Catégories* furent aussi composés vers la même époque par Sergius de Reš'aina (mort en 536) qui étudia à Alexandrie, probablement auprès du chef de l'école néoplatonicienne, Ammonius, et qui contribua largement à la diffusion du savoir grec en syriaque, entre autres choses par ses traductions de traités médicaux de Galien, et par celles des œuvres théologiques du pseudo-Denys l'Aréopagite.²

¹ Sur la composition des corpus anciens de logique contenus dans les manuscrits syriaques, nous nous permettons de renvoyer à notre étude sur "Les traductions syriaques de l'*Isagoge* de Porphyre et la constitution du corpus syriaque de logique", *Revue d'histoire des textes* 24 (1994), p. 293-312, repr. dans H. Hugonnard-Roche, *La logique d'Aristote du grec au syriaque. Études sur la transmission des textes de l'Organon et leur interprétation philosophique*, Vrin, Paris 2004 (Textes et traditions, 9), p. 79-97. On peut lire une présentation synthétique de la tradition syriaque de l'*Organon* dans S. Brock, "The Syriac Commentary Tradition", dans Ch. Burnett (ed.), *Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts. The Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin Traditions*, Warburg Institute, London 1993 (Warburg Institute Surveys and Texts, 23), p. 3-18.

² Sur Sergius, voir notamment H. Hugonnard-Roche, "Sergius de Reš'aina, traducteur du grec en syriaque et commentateur d'Aristote", dans Hugonnard-Roche, *La logique d'Aristote* (cité à la note 1), p. 123-42; voir aussi une synthèse récente dans Sergius of Reshaina, *Introduction to Aristotle and his Categories, Addressed to Philotheos*. Syriac Text, with Introduction, Translation, and Commentary by S. Aydin, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2016 (Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus, 24), p. 3-66.

Un peu plus tard dans le siècle, des commentaires sur l'*Isagoge* de Porphyre, sur le *Peri Hermeneias*, et sur les *Premiers Analytiques* d'Aristote furent composés par un certain Proba. De cet auteur, également connu sous le nom latin de Probus dans la littérature érudite, nous ne savons presque rien, sinon ce que nous apprennent les manuscrits: dans deux d'entre eux, il est présenté comme prêtre, archidiaque et archiâtre (médecin chef) d'Antioche.³ C'est sans doute de cette activité professionnelle que témoigne d'ailleurs l'emploi d'exemples relevant de l'art médical, comme celui du scalpel, dans le commentaire sur les *Premiers Analytiques*, édité et traduit dans cet article, au lieu que les commentateurs grecs sur le même ouvrage d'Aristote donnent d'autres exemples, empruntés à d'autres arts, comme l'exemple traditionnel de l'enclume utilisée par le forgeron.⁴

Longtemps, sur la base de l'association du nom de Proba avec ceux de Hiba et Kumi dans le catalogue d'auteurs syriaques composé par 'Abdisho' (métropolitain de Nisibe, mort en 1318), on a pensé que Proba avait appartenu à l'École d'Édesse au V^e siècle.⁵ F. Zimmermann, le premier, a mis en relation les "questions" à examiner avant l'étude d'un ouvrage, telles qu'elles se présentent chez Proba, avec celles qui se rencontrent chez Ammonius, ce qui conduisait à placer l'activité de Proba au VI^e siècle.⁶ À partir de critères internes, ses œuvres peuvent de fait être datées approximativement de la seconde moitié du VI^e siècle: on a pu remarquer, en effet, qu'elles ont pour sources des commentaires néoplatoniciens appartenant à la tradition alexandrine, issue d'Ammonius. Nous ne reviendrons pas ici sur cette question, déjà traitée en d'autres lieux.⁷ Nous ajouterons seulement que l'on trouverait aisément des éléments pour conforter cette hypothèse dans les deux commentaires de Proba, portant l'un sur le *Peri Hermeneias* d'Aristote,⁸ l'autre sur l'*Isagoge* de Porphyre.⁹ Et l'étude, ci-dessous, du commentaire sur les *Premiers Analytiques* apportera encore d'autres éléments à l'appui de cette thèse.

³ Berlin, *Sachau* 226, fol. 12v-13r (souscription d'une partie du commentaire sur l'*Isagoge* de Porphyre, cf. l'édition Baumstark citée ci-dessous, n. 9, p. 12 [syriaque], 156 [allemand]); et *Mingana Syr.* 606, fol. 141r (suscRIPTION de la traduction du *Peri Hermeneias* attribuée à Proba). Une mise au point sur les questions de datation et d'identité qui se rapportent à Proba a été proposée par S. Brock, "The Commentator Probus: Problems of Date and Identity", dans J. Lössl – J.W. Watt (eds.), *Interpreting the Bible and Aristotle in Late Antiquity. The Alexandrian Commentary Tradition between Rome and Baghdad*, Ashgate, Farnham 2011, p. 195-206, qui renvoie (p. 199 n. 17) à plusieurs de nos études dans lesquelles nous aboutissons aux mêmes conclusions que l'auteur. Voir aussi la notice bio-bibliographique de H. Hugonnard-Roche, "Probus", dans R. Goulet (éd.), *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques* [désormais *DPhA*] Vb = P 283, CNRS-Éditions, Paris 2012, p. 1539-42.

⁴ Voir ci-dessous la traduction, p. 129, et les notes 11 et 13.

⁵ Voir un bref rappel des opinions émises par les savants J.F.G. Hoffmann, A. Baumstark et A. Vööbus, sur ce point, dans Brock, "The Commentator Probus" (cité à la note 3), p. 202.

⁶ Cf. *Al-Farabi's Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle's De Interpretatione*, Translated with an Introduction and Notes by F.W. Zimmermann, Oxford U.P., London 1981, p. xci, n. 2.

⁷ Voir Brock, "The Commentator Probus" (cité à la note 3), et nos propres études mentionnées *ibid.*, p. 199 n. 17, et dans Hugonnard-Roche, "Probus" (cité à la note 3).

⁸ Une édition partielle, avec traduction latine, notes et un très utile glossaire des termes syriaques, a été procurée par J.F.G. Hoffmann, *De Hermeneuticis apud Syros Aristoteles*, I.C. Hinrichs Bibliopola, Leipzig 1869. Nous préparons une nouvelle édition complète du texte, avec traduction et commentaire. Sur un point particulier, on peut lire H. Hugonnard-Roche, "La théorie de la proposition selon Proba, un témoin syriaque de la tradition grecque (VI^e siècle)", dans Id., *La logique d'Aristote* (cité à la note 1), p. 275-91, originellement paru dans Ph. Büttgen - S. Diebler - M. Rashed (éd.), *Théories de la phrase et de la proposition de Platon à Averroès*, Éditions Rue d'Ulm, Paris 1999 (Études de littérature ancienne, 10), p. 191-208.

⁹ Le texte est encore inédit dans son ensemble, et seul un extrait a été publié par A. Baumstark, *Aristoteles bei den Syrern vom 5. bis 8. Jahrhundert*, Teubner, Leipzig 1900, repr. Scientia Verlag, Aalen 1975, p. 4-12 (syriaque), p. 148-56 (traduction allemande). On peut lire une première introduction à ce texte dans H. Hugonnard-Roche, "Le commentaire syriaque de Probus sur l'*Isagoge* de Porphyre. Une étude préliminaire", *Studia graeco-arabica* 2 (2012), p. 227-43.

Les traductions syriaques des Premiers Analytiques

Deux traductions syriaques des *Premiers Analytiques* sont aujourd'hui conservées. L'une est anonyme dans les manuscrits, l'autre est l'œuvre de Georges des Arabes († 724). Cette dernière, qui couvre le texte entier du traité, est contenue dans un manuscrit unique, London, British Library, *Add.* 14659, qui daterait du VIII^e ou du IX^e siècle, et elle a été éditée dans deux publications successives par G. Furlani, "Il primo libro dei *Primi Analitici* di Aristotele nella versione siriana di Giorgio delle Nazioni", et "Il secondo libro dei *Primi Analitici* di Aristotele nella versione siriana di Giorgio delle Nazioni", *Atti della Reale Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Memorie Cl. Sc. Mor.* VI, v, 3 (1935), p. 143-230, et VI, vi, 3 (1937), p. 229-87.

La traduction anonyme, qui ne couvre que les sept premiers chapitres du traité d'Aristote, est aujourd'hui conservée dans au moins six manuscrits, dont le plus ancien est le Vat. *sir.* 158, datant du VIII^e ou du IX^e siècle. Cette traduction a été éditée partiellement (jusqu'à 25 b 23) par I. Friedmann, *Aristoteles' Analytica bei den Syrern*, Diss. Erlangen, Berlin 1898; et entièrement par A. Nagy, "Una versione siriana inedita degli *Analitici* d'Aristotele", *Atti della Reale Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Rendiconti Cl. Sc. Mor.*, V, 7 (1898), p. 321-47.

D'autres traductions ont existé, aujourd'hui perdues, dont la trace est attestée dans les *marginalia* du manuscrit Paris, BnF, *ar.* 2346, qui contient une "édition" ancienne de l'*Organon* logique d'Aristote: quelques notes mentionnent les noms de traducteurs plus tardifs, Athanase de Balad († 686), Théophile d'Édesse († 785), puis Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq († 873) et Ishāq ibn Ḥunayn († 910).¹⁰

A. Baumstark a proposé d'attribuer la version anonyme, comme celle du *Peri Hermeneias* qu'elle suit dans les manuscrits, à Proba.¹¹ Dans son étude sur la tradition textuelle des *Premiers Analytiques*, L. Minio-Paluello dresse un apparat critique du texte aristotélicien, dans lequel il intègre en particulier les leçons des deux traductions syriaques, et il conserve à cette occasion l'attribution à Proba, à titre d'hypothèse.¹² Il fait de même dans sa publication de l'édition Ross, parue par la suite.¹³ L'attribution à Proba est reprise par Peters.¹⁴

La comparaison de la traduction anonyme avec les passages du commentaire de Proba qui apparaissent comme des citations d'Aristote permettent toutefois d'exclure que cette traduction anonyme soit l'œuvre de Proba. Ainsi, dans la liste des questions à examiner citée au début du traité, la traduction anonyme distingue la question τί (dans τί ἐστι πρότασις καὶ τί ὅρος καὶ τί συλλογισμός) de la question ποῖος (dans ποῖος τέλειος καὶ ποῖος ἀτελής)¹⁵, en traduisant le premier mot par le pronom interrogatif *mun* ("quoi"), qui correspond au grec, et en traduisant le

¹⁰ Sur cette "édition" de l'*Organon*, voir H. Hugonnard-Roche, "Une ancienne 'édition' arabe de l'*Organon* d'Aristote: problèmes de traduction et de transmission", dans J. Hamesse (éd.), *Les problèmes posés par l'édition critique des textes anciens et médiévaux*, Univ. catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve 1992 (Publications de l'Institut d'études médiévales, Textes, études, congrès, 13), p. 139-57.

¹¹ A. Baumstark, *Geschichte der syrischen Literatur*, A. Marcus und E. Webers Verlag, Bonn 1922 (réimpr. W. de Gruyter, Berlin 1968), p. 102.

¹² L. Minio-Paluello, "Il testo dei *Primi Analitici* d'Aristotele: Le tradizioni antiche siriana e latina", *Rivista degli Studi Orientali* 32 (1957), p. 567-84, repr. dans Id., *Opuscula. The Latin Aristotle*, Hakkert, Amsterdam 1972, p. 310-27.

¹³ *Aristotelis Analytica Priora et Posteriora*, recensuit W.D. Ross, Praefatione et appendice auxit L. Minio-Paluello, Oxford U.P., Oxford 1964, p. 2 (Sigla).

¹⁴ P. Peters, *Aristoteles Arabus. The Oriental Translations and Commentaries on the Aristotelian Corpus*, Brill, Leiden 1968 (Monographs on Mediterranean Antiquity, 2), p. 14.

¹⁵ Cf. Arist., *An. Pr.* I 1, 24 a 11-13.

second mot par l'interrogatif *ayno* ("quel"), qui correspond encore au grec. Dans le commentaire de Proba, au contraire, les deux mots grecs sont rendus par le même mot syriaque *mun* ("quoi").¹⁶

La suite du texte grec offre un exemple plus caractéristique encore de divergence entre la traduction anonyme et la citation de Proba, car elle se rapporte à des expressions techniques. Soit l'expression grecque: τί τὸ ἐν ὅλῳ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι τόδε τῷδε.¹⁷ Dans la traduction anonyme, on lit: *mun itawhi b-kuleh aw lo itawhi hono b-hono* ("qu'est-ce que: ceci est ou n'est pas dans cela tout entier"), qui est une traduction quasi littérale du grec.¹⁸ Dans le commentaire de Proba, on lit: *mun kulonoyo aw mun lo kulonoyo* ("qu'est-ce que 'universel' et qu'est-ce que 'non universel'"), ce qui n'est pas une traduction littérale, mais une traduction interprétative du grec.¹⁹ De même, la traduction anonyme et le commentaire diffèrent un peu sur la manière de rendre καὶ τί λέγομεν τὸ κατὰ παντός ἢ μηδενὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι: la traduction anonyme écrit: *w-mun 'omrnan d-'al kul aw 'al lo medem metqatreg* ("ce que nous voulons dire <par> être prédiqué de tout ou n'être prédiqué d'aucun"); tandis que Proba écrit: *w-mun 'al kul w-mun w-lo 'al had* ("qu'est-ce que <être dit> de tout et <être dit> d'aucun").²⁰ Dans le commentaire de Proba, le mot grec κατηγορεῖσθαι n'est pas rendu, mais surtout la manière de rendre κατὰ μηδενός est très différente de celle de l'anonyme: Proba utilise, comme il le fera tout au long de son ouvrage, l'expression *w-lo 'al had*. Au lieu de *medem*, dans l'expression *lo medem* ("non quelque chose"), Proba calque en quelque manière l'expression grecque μηδενός à l'aide de la formule *lo had*, dans laquelle *had* ("un") reprend la signification de la partie εἷς / ἓν du mot grec μηδεὶς / μηδέν.

Sur la base de ces différences, portant en particulier sur des expressions techniques, il paraît légitime de soutenir que la traduction anonyme n'est pas l'œuvre de Proba. Resterait évidemment à faire une comparaison plus systématique que celle que nous venons d'esquisser.

Les sources du commentaire

Le commentaire de Proba sur les *Premiers Analytiques* a trouvé sa source dans la tradition des commentaires grecs alexandrins, comme l'attestent les nombreux parallèles entre le texte de Proba, et ceux qui proviennent de l'enseignement d'Ammonius sur le traité d'Aristote, qu'il s'agisse du commentaire anonyme ou du commentaire rédigé par Philopon.²¹ On en trouvera les exemples signalés dans nos notes tout au long du commentaire, que nous avons donc régulièrement confronté avec ceux d'Ammonius et de Philopon, en y ajoutant à l'occasion Alexandre, spécialement lorsque sur un point particulier la comparaison s'avérait fructueuse, parce que la source de Proba pouvait s'être inspirée plus particulièrement d'Alexandre, ou avoir fourni à Proba une thèse reprise par ce dernier. Remarquons d'ailleurs qu'Ammonius et Philopon n'ont pas manqué de s'inspirer largement d'Alexandre, comme l'a signalé J. Barnes.²² Nous n'avons pas convoqué toute la littérature antique

¹⁶ Cf. Arist., *An. Pr.* I, 1, 24 a 13-14; pour la traduction syriaque anonyme, voir Nagy, "Una versione siriaca" (cité à la p. 107), p. 322. Pour la traduction de Proba, voir ci-dessous, p. 132.

¹⁷ Arist., *An. Pr.* I 1, 24a13-14.

¹⁸ Cf. Nagy, "Una versione siriaca" (cité à la p. 107), p. 322.

¹⁹ Voir ci-dessous, p. 132.

²⁰ Cf. Arist., *An. Pr.* I 1, 24a14-15; pour la version anonyme, voir Nagy, "Una versione siriaca" (cité à la p. 107), p. 322; pour la version de Proba, voir ci-dessous, p. 132.

²¹ Soit respectivement: Ammonii *In Aristotelis Analyticorum priorum librum I commentarium*, ed. M. Wallies, Reimer, Berlin 1899 (*CAG* IV.6), et Ioannis Philoponi *In Aristotelis Analytica priora commentaria*, ed. M. Wallies, Reimer, Berlin 1905 (*CAG* XIII.2).

²² Cf. *Alexander of Aphrodisias. On Aristotle Prior Analytics* 1.1-7, transl. by J. Barnes et al., Duckworth, London 1991, p. 7.

sur les sujets abordés par Proba, mais seulement les commentaires qui semblaient les plus propres à éclairer le texte, et à le placer dans la tradition des complexes de questions et réponses développés dans l'école d'Ammonius.

Toutefois, comme nous l'avons déjà noté à propos des œuvres de Sévère Sebokht (VII^e siècle), les textes aujourd'hui conservés sous les noms d'Ammonius et de Philopon ne représentent pas nécessairement toute la tradition issue de l'école d'Alexandrie,²³ et Proba, comme plus tard Sévère, a pu avoir accès à un autre état de cette tradition, ou à plusieurs états de ladite tradition. On en trouvera deux exemples remarquables, plus bas dans notre traduction, à propos de la définition du "terme" et de celle du "syllogisme" par Aristote: dans le premier cas, Proba fait appel à l'emploi du mot "terme" par Euclide, dans le second, il mentionne un exemple de syllogisme rhétorique mettant en scène Eschine. Pourtant ni Euclide, ni Eschine, ne sont mentionnés par Ammonius ni Philopon, dans les contextes des définitions en question.

L'écriture du commentaire

La tradition codicologique a divisé le commentaire en deux portions, qui sont signalées dans les manuscrits par des notes de copistes telles que: "Fin de la copie du commentaire de la première section", ou bien "Je transcris maintenant le commentaire de la deuxième section du livre des *Analytiques*". De fait, les deux portions ont chacune leur autonomie dans les manuscrits et sont séparées l'une de l'autre, la seconde étant souvent placée avant la première, l'une des raisons possibles de ce fait étant que les deux portions ainsi distinguées sont assez différentes dans leur écriture même, comme on le verra. Et cette division reflète partiellement la division interne du commentaire, celle établie par l'auteur lui-même.

Du point de vue de son contenu, le texte se divise en trois sections. Il commence par une introduction, portant sur les points à examiner avant toute étude d'un texte, qui débute ainsi:

Il y a sept points principaux qu'avant <l'explication de> tout ouvrage il convient de poser, comme nous l'avons appris dans le traité qui précède celui-ci: le but, l'utilité, le rang <dans l'ordre de lecture>, par qui il est composé, la raison du titre, la division en chapitres, à quoi il se rapporte.

Cette introduction reprend les fameux points à examiner avant l'étude d'un texte, selon le schéma néoplatonicien, qui s'est progressivement installé dans la tradition scolaire. Nous ne nous y attarderons pas, sinon pour marquer que, dès le début, le commentaire de Proba s'inscrit dans cette tradition.²⁴

Vient ensuite la première partie qui a tous les caractères d'un commentaire *ad litteram*, comportant des lemmes extraits du texte d'Aristote, en traduction syriaque. Elle commence par ces mots:

"Explication du livre des *Analytiques*". Venons-en donc au corps du livre. Il nous faut savoir que dès l'abord <Aristote> cherche à nous enseigner le but du livre, et l'énumération de neuf points qui se rapportent au but, et ce qu'est la proposition. Il dit donc que son but est de traiter du syllogisme apodictique.²⁵

²³ Cf. H. Hugonnard-Roche, "Questions de logique au VII^e siècle. Les épîtres syriaques de Sévère Sebokht et leurs sources grecques", *Studia graeco-arabica* 5 (2015), p. 53-104, à la p. 55.

²⁴ Ainsi qu'on le lira ci-dessous, dans le commentaire *ad loc.*, la quasi-totalité de cette introduction manque dans les manuscrits.

²⁵ Cf. ci-dessous notre traduction, p. 133.

Ces lignes reprennent exactement le début du texte d'Aristote:

Πρῶτον εἰπεῖν περὶ τί καὶ τίνος ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις, ὅτι περὶ ἀπόδειξιν καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἀποδεικτικῆς.²⁶

Puis, un peu après, le texte se poursuit ainsi:

L'énumération de neuf points qui a été dite est celle-ci: qu'est ce que la proposition? qu'est-ce que le terme? qu'est-ce que le syllogisme? [...] Les six autres points sont ceux-ci: qu'est-ce que le syllogisme parfait? qu'est-ce que le syllogisme imparfait? qu'est-ce que "universel" et qu'est-ce que "non universel"? qu'est-ce que <être dit> de tout et <n'être dit> d'aucun?²⁷

La première partie du traité de Proba se rapporte donc aux lignes introductives des *Premiers Analytiques* I 1, 24 a 11-15, dans lesquelles Aristote énonce les points à étudier dans sa recherche sur le syllogisme, ses parties et ses espèces. Cette partie se présente alors comme un commentaire exégétique du premier chapitre des *Premiers Analytiques* dans lequel Aristote répond aux questions posées.

La deuxième partie du traité de Proba commence par ces lignes:

<Les propositions> qui se convertissent sont au nombre de trois: la négative universelle, l'affirmative universelle, l'affirmative particulière. La négative particulière, en effet, ne se convertit pas.²⁸

Proba reprend ici le point traité par Aristote dans le deuxième chapitre des *Premiers Analytiques*, à savoir la conversion des prémisses. Puis, après l'exposé sur la conversion, il expose tous les modes concluants des trois figures syllogistiques, qui sont décrits par Aristote dans les chapitres 4 à 7 des *Premiers Analytiques*. Il faut noter que Proba ne commente pas le contenu du chapitre 3 d'Aristote, qui porte sur la conversion des propositions modales, puisqu'il n'exposera pas la syllogistique modale, dont Aristote traite dans les chapitres 8 à 22 des *Premiers Analytiques*. La deuxième partie, d'un style d'écriture différent de celui de la première partie, se présente donc comme une explication de la forme syllogistique (propositions, termes, figures), suivi d'un sommaire des modes concluants des trois figures syllogistiques.

Nous avons dit que le commentaire était, dans la première partie, de type exégétique. Pour préciser ce point, examinons-le de plus près, sur quelques exemples. Proba reprend la définition de la proposition par Aristote, comme ceci:

La définition de la proposition est: "phrase affirmative et négative <disant> quelque chose de quelque chose, qu'elle soit universelle ou particulière ou indéfinie".²⁹

La définition de Proba suit de près le texte grec d'Aristote, *An. Pr.* I 1, 24 a 16-17:

Πρότασις μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ λόγος καταφατικός ἢ ἀποφατικός τίνος κατὰ τίνος· οὗτος δὲ ἢ καθόλου ἢ ἐν μέρει ἢ ἀδιόριστος.

Aussitôt après Proba soulève l'aporie suivante, avec les réponses correspondantes:

Certains blâment cette définition comme défectueuse selon la qualité et la quantité. La qualité est défectueuse car, lorsqu'il a dit "quelque chose de [*al* = sur = *κατά*] quelque chose", il n'a

²⁶ Arist., *An. Pr.* I 1, 24 a 10-11.

²⁷ Cf. ci-dessous notre traduction, p. 133.

²⁸ Cf. ci-dessous notre traduction, p. 141.

²⁹ Cf. ci-dessous notre traduction, p. 133.

pas ajouté “quelque chose [*men* = (séparée) de = ἀπό] de quelque chose”, ce qui est le propre de la négation.

Nous répondons que premièrement il a mentionné la négation, en disant “négative”; que deuxièmement ce qu’il a dit “quelque chose de quelque chose” est <à entendre> en commun de l’affirmation et de la négation.

La quantité, d’autre part, est défectueuse parce que, lorsqu’il a dit “universelle ou particulière ou indéfinie”, il aurait fallu qu’il dise “et singulière”.

Nous répondons que peut-être, en disant “particulière”, il y a inclus la singulière; ou bien, ce qu’il est vrai de dire, il n’a pas mentionné la singulière, parce que les philosophes s’occupent de choses générales, et les choses qui sont mentionnées à l’aide d’une particulière sont générales en quelque manière: “quelque”, en effet, et “non tout” se disent en commun de “homme”, de “taureau” et de “cheval”.³⁰

Plus loin, Proba écrit:

Après avoir fait porter son enseignement sur la proposition, <Aristote> cherche à nous enseigner ce qu’est le terme, et il dit: “j’appelle terme ce en quoi se résout la proposition, ainsi ce qui est prédiqué et ce dont cela est prédiqué, que ‘est’ ou ‘n’est pas’ réalise soit l’adjonction <d’un terme à l’autre> soit leur séparation”.³¹ Le fait qu’il a dit “j’appelle” montre que, même s’il n’a pas lui-même institué le nom “terme”, il l’a le premier utilisé pour <désigner> la partie de la proposition.

Ces exemples, et une multitude d’autres de même nature que l’on pourrait ajouter, suggèrent deux remarques. Il est manifeste, tout d’abord, que le commentaire de Proba ne peut s’entendre, et qu’on ne peut en suivre le développement, que si l’on a le texte d’Aristote sous les yeux. Il en résulte que le commentaire de Proba a, selon toute vraisemblance, fait l’objet d’un enseignement, plus précisément d’un enseignement oral, sur la base d’une lecture suivie du texte d’Aristote. On peut observer d’autre part que les traductions des parties du texte d’Aristote sont extrêmement littérales. Nous avons écrit plus haut qu’une traduction anonyme des *Premiers Analytiques* composée au VI^e siècle est conservée, mais que la traduction des lemmes dans le texte de Proba ne correspond pas à cette traduction anonyme. Il est alors vraisemblable que Proba ait effectué lui-même sa propre traduction des *Analytiques* pour ses auditeurs, dont les lemmes inclus dans le commentaire nous conserve le texte. On ne peut pas non plus exclure que l’explication du texte d’Aristote ait été faite, au moins partiellement, à partir du texte grec en même temps que d’une traduction, dans un milieu encore largement hellénophone comme celui d’Antioche au VI^e siècle.

Notre seconde remarque se rapporte à la mise en forme que Proba impose parfois au commentaire. Celui-ci, de type exégétique, nous l’avons dit, se présente fréquemment sous une forme aporétique, comme chez les commentateurs grecs, dans sa première partie du moins. Mais le passage que l’on vient de lire plus haut, à propos de la définition de la proposition, de sa qualité et de sa quantité, qui énonce des apories empruntées à la tradition d’Ammonius et Philopon, montre que Proba superpose, en quelque sorte, à la forme aporétique de l’exposé, une forme que l’on peut dire dialogique, par questions et réponses. À de nombreuses reprises au long du commentaire, il adopte cette mise en forme soulignée par des formules du type: “certains sont dans le doute ... nous

³⁰ Cf. ci-dessous notre traduction, p. 133-5.

³¹ Traduction littérale d’Aristote, *An. Pr.* I 1, 24 b 16-18: ὅρον δὲ καλῶ εἰς ὃν διαλύεται ἡ πρότασις, οἷον τό τε κατηγορούμενον καὶ τό καθ’ οὗ κατηγορεῖται, προστιθεμένου ἢ διαιρουμένου τοῦ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι.

répondons que”; “certains blâment cette définition ... nous répondons que”; “certains recherchent pourquoi ... nous répondons que”, etc. Lisons encore ce petit dialogue implicite:

Tout syllogisme a donc deux propositions, l'une majeure et l'autre mineure. Laquelle est la majeure? Celle qui a le terme majeur. Le terme majeur est celui qui est prédiqué dans la conclusion. Laquelle est la mineure? Celle qui a le terme mineur. Le terme mineur est celui qui est sujet dans la conclusion.³²

Et dans le sommaire des modes concluants, on trouve aussi, au cours de la démonstration de leur validité, des formules de type dialogique, qui ne se trouvent pas comme telles dans le texte d'Aristote, ni dans les commentaires d'Alexandre ou de Philopon, par exemple :

[...] si quelqu'un dit qu'il n'y a pas conclusion, convertis la négative qui dit aucune pierre n'est animal, et dis: aucun animal n'est pierre; et dis ensuite: aucun animal n'est pierre, tout homme est animal, et conclus: aucun homme n'est pierre.

Il paraît assez clair que cette forme dialogique était liée à l'enseignement, auquel le commentaire a servi de support. Eu égard à sa forme, en effet, le commentaire dans son ensemble, nous l'avons dit, ne peut guère se lire sans le texte des *Analytiques*, en traduction syriaque, voire en version grecque accompagnée d'une traduction syriaque. Les formules que nous venons de relever, dans la description des modes syllogistiques, viennent confirmer, nous semble-t-il, que le texte de Proba est à lire comme un résumé du cours portant sur les *Analytiques*, qui porte la marque d'une relation de maître à élève. On ne sait rien d'un enseignement supposé que Proba aurait pu dispenser à Antioche, ni de la sorte d'auditoire qu'il aurait pu y avoir. Toutefois l'auditeur-lecteur devait avoir reçu un minimum de connaissance en logique, et avoir acquis un minimum de vocabulaire technique, et avoir lu, ou avoir suivi un enseignement sur les *Catégories* et le *Peri Hermeneias* très probablement. Rappelons qu'au début de son traité Proba écrit que “Il y a sept points principaux qu'avant <l'explication de> tout ouvrage il convient de poser, comme nous l'avons appris dans le traité qui précède celui-ci”, faisant certainement allusion au commentaire qu'il a lui-même composé sur le *Peri Hermeneias*, et dans lequel on retrouve l'énumération des sept points à examiner, dont il parle.

Le texte de ce cours, tel que nous le possédons, semble parfois incomplet, ou allusif, voire carrément obscur, surtout en quelques passages de la dernière partie, et il ressemble alors plutôt à des notes qu'à un cours rédigé. Cet aspect se remarque par exemple dans les dernières lignes du commentaire à propos des figures ne produisant pas de syllogismes, qui ne sont introduites par aucune explication et sont simplement ajoutées à la fin du sommaire de la syllogistique.³³

Les deux parties du commentaire de Proba semblent ne pas avoir exactement la même visée. La seconde partie est une sorte de grammaire de la syllogistique, en ce sens qu'elle fournit les éléments unitaires dont se composent les syllogismes, les termes, qui sont le sujet et le prédicat, lesquels se composent en propositions affirmatives ou négatives, universelles ou particulières, deux propositions formant ensuite un syllogisme. La grammaire indique les règles de composition des propositions et de formation des syllogismes, en figures et modes; les règles de la grammaire syllogistique permettent de former ensuite des déductions syllogistiques concluantes, dans chacun des modes des trois figures. C'est cette grammaire des énoncés syllogistiques bien formés dont les préceptes sont décrits dans la seconde partie. Il suffit donc de suivre les règles pour être capable de construire les syllogismes dont

³² Cf. ci-dessous notre traduction, p. 143.

³³ Voir ci-dessous notre traduction, p. 151-3.

Aristote a fourni en quelque sorte le catalogue dans les *Premiers Analytiques*, aux chapitres 4 à 6. Et cet exposé ne se prête pas, du moins dans la présentation de Proba, à l'examen d'apories relatives aux questions abordées. Il est vrai que, dans le commentaire de Philopon, par exemple, certaines apories sont soulevées, à propos par exemple de la conversion des propositions assertoriques, mais Proba ne les mentionne pas et se contente d'énoncer très brièvement les règles qui gouvernent les conversions.

La première partie a une visée différente. Il s'agit d'une étude sémantique des définitions des éléments de la syllogistique, données par Aristote dans le premier chapitre des *Premiers Analytiques*: qu'est-ce qu'une proposition? Qu'est-ce qu'un terme? Qu'est-ce qu'un syllogisme? Quelles sont les significations de ces mots et que désignent-ils? Pour cette étude, Proba se fonde sur la tradition reçue du commentarisme alexandrin, auquel il emprunte notamment les apories soulevées à propos de ces désignations. Mais il ne conserve qu'une faible part des développements auxquels ont donné lieu les solutions de ces apories chez un Philopon, par exemple. En outre, ces apories sont lues et résolues en dehors de tout arrière-plan historique. Nous voulons dire que telle aporie pouvait avoir été soulevée par tel auteur, que d'ailleurs Ammonius ou Philopon ne mentionne pas, mais dont ils connaissaient sans doute eux-mêmes le plus souvent l'origine. Et la réfutation de telle ou telle position critique avait sa place dans la défense de la doctrine aristotélicienne. Chez Proba, en revanche, les apories, détachées d'un tel contexte, font plutôt fonction de support à une mise en forme dialogique de l'enseignement.

Nous ne possédons pas d'autre commentaire syriaque sur les *Premiers Analytiques*, de même sorte que celui de Proba, pour la même époque. Pourtant il y a lieu de penser qu'il représente un exemple ordinaire, pourrait-on dire, de l'enseignement sur les *Analytiques*, tel qu'il devait être pratiqué dans les milieux syriaques hellénisés de la Syrie (occidentale) au VI^e siècle.

Ceci amène à la fameuse question, soulevée par les exégètes, de l'arrêt supposé des études syriaques à la fin de la logique assertorique dans les *Premiers Analytiques*, au terme du chapitre sept du premier livre. Nous n'entendons pas revenir longuement sur ce point ici. On a déjà fait remarquer qu'il n'y avait pas lieu de faire crédit à l'histoire recomposée, attribuée à al-Fārābī, qui mettait en avant la défiance des autorités chrétiennes à l'égard de la logique modale.³⁴ Plutôt que de s'interroger sur ce qui manquerait à un commentaire tel que celui de Proba, il nous semble plus judicieux de s'intéresser à sa composition et à la visée que cette composition indique. Le commentaire de Proba, dans ses deux parties, n'a pas pour objet, en réalité, d'explicitier le texte des *Premiers Analytiques*, mais bien plutôt d'exposer la constitution d'une logique prédicative assertorique, dont la finalité est l'apodictique. La seconde partie énumère les modes concluants des trois figures aristotéliciennes, et la démonstration de la validité de ces modes. C'est par leur moyen qu'est censée s'établir toute démonstration scientifique. Quant à la première partie, elle vise manifestement à lever toutes les objections touchant les définitions et l'usage des éléments de la construction syllogistique, et ceci dans la suite des commentaires d'Ammonius et de Philopon. Nous pensons donc que le commentaire de Proba est adapté à son propos et que celui-ci n'est certainement pas propre à la tradition syriaque. Le commentaire a été composé dans un milieu fortement hellénisé, dans lequel on lisait Aristote et les commentaires alexandrins dans le texte grec: les emprunts de Proba sont faits directement aux versions grecques, et non pas à des versions syriaques que rien n'atteste à cette époque. Et il n'y a pas de raison de penser que l'enseignement de Proba fût différent de celui que l'on pouvait dispenser dans une école grecque. En somme, nous pensons que le texte de Proba, qui est manifestement la mise par écrit d'un cours introductif à la syllogistique, reflète

³⁴ Sur cette histoire, on peut lire l'étude critique de J.W. Watt, "Al-Fārābī and the History of the Syriac *Organon*", dans G.A. Kiraz (ed.), *Maphono w-Rabo d-Malphone. Studies in Honor of Sebastian P. Brock*, Gorgias Press, Piscataway 2008, p. 751-78, où l'on trouvera la bibliographie des études sur le sujet.

un type d'enseignement que l'on pouvait suivre dans une école syriaque, mais aussi dans une école grecque: dans l'un et l'autre cas, le cours était centré sur la logique assertorique. Le texte de Proba en est un témoin exceptionnellement conservé, pour des raisons liées sans doute à la constitution de la tradition syriaque, alors que des témoins grecs auront disparu.

À la suite de la vue d'ensemble que nous venons de présenter, nous ajouterons quelques remarques ponctuelles qui se rapportent encore à l'écriture du commentaire.

Description des modes syllogistiques

Pour exprimer la relation de prédication entre deux termes, Aristote emploie généralement le verbe *κατηγορεῖσθαι*, dans une formule du type τὸ Α κατὰ παντός τοῦ Β κατηγορεῖσθαι, mais il peut aussi utiliser les formules équivalentes construites avec les verbes *λέγεσθαι* ou *ὑπάρχειν*. D'autre part, Aristote décrit comme équivalentes les deux formulations τὸ ἐν ὅλῳ εἶναι ἕτερον ἐτέρῳ et τὸ κατὰ παντός κατηγορεῖσθαι θάτερον θάτερον.³⁵ À propos de ces deux formulations, Alexandre écrit qu'Aristote les emploie toutes deux, mais que τὸ κατὰ παντός est premier par nature, tandis que τὸ ἐν ὅλῳ est premier pour nous:

χρηται δὲ τῷ κατὰ παντός και τῷ κατὰ μηδενός ἐν τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ, ὅτι διὰ τούτων γνώριμος ἡ συναγωγή τῶν λόγων, και ὅτι οὕτως λεγομένων γνωριμώτερος ὁ τε κατηγορούμενος και ὁ ὑποκείμενος, και ὅτι πρώτον τῇ φύσει τὸ κατὰ παντός τοῦ ἐν ὅλῳ αὐτῷ, ὡς προείρηται.³⁶

Mais il ajoute aussitôt après:

ἡ μέντοι χρῆσις ἡ συλλογιστικὴ ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ ἀνάπαλιν ἔχει· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ λέγεται κατὰ πάσης δικαιοσύνης, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν πᾶσα δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ. διὸ και δεῖ κατ' ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ἐκφορὰς γυμνάζειν ἑαυτούς, ἵνα τῇ τε χρῆσει παρακολουθεῖν δυνώμεθα και τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ.³⁷

Pourtant l'usage syllogistique se fait habituellement en sens inverse: la vertu n'est pas dite de toute justice, mais à l'inverse 'toute justice est vertu'. C'est pourquoi il faut nous exercer aux deux formulations, afin de pouvoir suivre l'usage habituel et l'enseignement <d'Aristote>.

Il semble bien que la recommandation d'Alexandre ait trouvé un écho dans les milieux de l'enseignement, car Proba décrit systématiquement chacun des modes syllogistiques, ceux de la première figure au moins, tout d'abord selon l'usage habituel, soit le τὸ ἐν ὅλῳ, suivi d'un exemple, puis selon la manière du τὸ κατὰ παντός, suivi du même exemple reformulé selon cette seconde manière.³⁸

Représentations graphiques des figures syllogistiques

Les manuscrits grecs conservent parfois des représentations graphiques des formules syllogistiques sous forme de diagrammes, qui servaient à l'exégèse des *Premiers Analytiques* dans la tradition scolaire. D'après ces sources, les formulations d'Aristote induisaient en général une

³⁵ Sur le commentaire de Proba à propos de ces formules, voir ci-dessous nos remarques, dans le paragraphe intitulé *De omni et nullo*, p. 122-3.

³⁶ Alex. Aphr., *In An. Pr.*, p. 54.21-25 Wallies.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 54.25-29 Wallies.

³⁸ Voir la traduction, ci-dessous, p. 145. Philop., *In An. Pr.*, p. 73.24-27 Wallies, donne le même exemple (substance, animal, homme) selon les deux formulations pour le premier mode de la première figure, sans toutefois signaler que la formulation dans laquelle on part du terme mineur est désignée par le syntagme τὸ ἐν ὅλῳ dans le texte d'Aristote.

représentation graphique horizontale, au moyen de figures en formes de lunules: on peut en trouver des exemples dans les textes du Pseudo-Ammonius, qui encadrent le commentaire d'Ammonius, dans le *Parisinus gr.* 2054.³⁹ Plusieurs exégètes modernes des textes d'Aristote ont d'ailleurs noté que le philosophe lui-même faisait usage de termes tels que *διάγραμμα*, *σχῆμα*, ou *διάστημα*, qui appartenaient à la terminologie géométrique, et renvoyaient à l'analyse géométrique d'un problème. Et certains ont tenté de reconstruire les figures géométriques qui ont pu servir à l'analyse par Aristote des figures syllogistiques.⁴⁰

Mais d'autres dessins ou d'autres formulations correspondent, non pas à des représentations horizontales, mais plutôt à des représentations verticales, comme c'est le cas d'une remarque que l'on peut lire dans le commentaire de Philopon sur les *Premiers Analytiques*. En effet, le commentateur expose comment les trois figures se distinguent selon la position que le moyen terme occupe, à la fois comme prédicat et sujet des deux autres termes, respectivement, dans la première figure, comme prédicat des deux autres termes dans la deuxième figure, et comme sujet des deux autres termes dans la troisième figure, et il ajoute une brève description en terme de représentation graphique. Voici ce texte:

(...) διὰ τοῦτο πρῶτον μὲν λέγεται σχῆμα, ὅταν ὁ μέσος ὅρος τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φυλάττων τάξιν τῷ μὲν ὑπόκειται, τοῦ δὲ κατηγορεῖται· δεύτερον δὲ σχῆμα ἐν ᾧ ἀμφοτέρων κατηγορεῖται, ἐν ᾧ καὶ δευτέραν μὲν ἀμείνονα δὲ τῆς λοιπῆς ἀπέλιψε τάξιν· τρίτον δὲ σχῆμα ἐν ᾧ ὁ μέσος ὅρος ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς ἄκροις ὑπόκειται, ἔνθα καὶ τὴν ἐσχάτην τάξιν ἀπέλιψε. διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὸ πρῶτον σχῆμα ἐπ' εὐθείας γράφεται τοῖς ἄκροις ὁ μέσος ὅρος, κατὰ δὲ τὸ δεύτερον ὑπεράνω, κατὰ δὲ τὸ τρίτον ὑποκάτω.⁴¹

Citant ce passage dans une étude sur des diagrammes syllogistiques trouvés dans des scholies byzantines à la *Rhétorique* datant vraisemblablement du XII^e siècle, C. Rambourg juge que cette allusion à une représentation graphique "apporte un élément nouveau par rapport au texte d'Aristote, utilisant la dimension verticale pour répartir les termes", mais elle estime cette indication trop mince

³⁹ Voir l'édition de ces textes dans Ammon., *In An. Pr.*, p. x, et p. 39-42 Wallies.

⁴⁰ Voir, en particulier, M. Wesoly, "ΑΝΑΛΥΣΙΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑ ΣΧΗΜΑΤΑ. Restoring Aristotle's Lost Diagrams of the Syllogistic Figures", *Peitho / Examina Antiqua* 1.3 (2012), p. 83-114, qui reprend et corrige un article précédent, "Aristotle's Lost Diagrams of Analytical Figures", *Eos* 74 (1996), p. 53-64. On peut trouver aussi quelques représentations figurées sommaires, constituées de segments de droites, dans Aristoteles, *Erste Analytik. Zweite Analytik*, herausgegeben, übersetzt, mit Einleitungen und Anmerkungen von H.G. Zekl, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 1998, p. 550 n. 196-198. Sur l'emploi par Aristote de termes techniques empruntés au domaine des mathématiques, lire B. Einarson, "On Certain Mathematical Terms in Aristotle's Logic", *The American Journal of Philology* 57 (1936), p. 33-54, 151-72; selon l'auteur, ce sont des lignes horizontales qui auraient servi à Aristote à représenter les figures syllogistiques, mais sa reconstruction est très sommaire.

⁴¹ Philop., *In An. Pr.*, p. 65.16-22 Wallies "(...) c'est pourquoi une figure est dite première, lorsque le moyen terme conservant sa même position est sujet d'un <extrême>, prédicat de l'autre; la deuxième figure est celle dans laquelle le moyen est prédiqué des deux <extrêmes>, c'est-à-dire dans laquelle il occupe la deuxième position, mais supérieure à celle des deux autres <termes>; la troisième figure est celle dans laquelle le moyen terme est sujet des deux extrêmes, c'est-à-dire où il occupe la position inférieure. C'est pourquoi dans le cas de la première figure le moyen terme est inscrit sur la même ligne droite que les extrêmes, dans la deuxième il est au-dessus <des deux extrêmes>, et dans la troisième au-dessous d'eux)". On trouverait dans le commentaire de Philopon d'autres brèves allusions à des représentations figurées des explications d'Aristote touchant les figures syllogistiques; cf. par exemple *In An. Pr.*, p. 73.11-13 Wallies: βούλεται ἡμᾶς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ καταγραφῇ σώζειν τὴν τοῦ μέσου τάξιν, ἵν' ἐπ' εὐθείας τάξαντες τοὺς τρεῖς ὅρους τῷ μέσῳ τὴν μέσῃ ἀποδοῦμεν χώραν (cf. Arist., *An. Pr.* I 1, 25 b 35-36: καλῶ δὲ μέσον μὲν (...) ὁ καὶ τῆ θέσει γίνεται μέσον).

pour confirmer l'emploi d'une telle schématisation pour représenter les figures syllogistiques.⁴² La "dimension verticale" à laquelle fait allusion Philopon se trouve pourtant confirmée par les formulations employées par Proba – lequel, on l'a dit, s'inspire clairement des commentaires de la tradition alexandrine –, qui invitent à penser que les représentations en usage dans son enseignement étaient verticales. Ainsi, la formulation de l'équivalence entre les deux expressions "être dans une chose tout entière" et "être prédiqué d'une chose tout entière" donne lieu à un commentaire de Proba, qui suppose manifestement que le sujet se trouve en bas par rapport au prédicat, qui est au-dessus de lui. Voici ce texte:

C'est une même chose, dit-il [Aristote], qu'une chose soit dans une autre tout entière et qu'une chose soit prédiquée d'une autre tout entière, parce que les <deux formules> se disent de la même proposition. Lorsque, en effet, on commence par le bas, il faut que le sujet participe de la totalité du prédicat, et non pas d'une partie seulement, par exemple: "tout homme est animal, tout animal est substance", tout homme participe de l'animal tout entier, c'est-à-dire de la respiration et de la sensation et de l'être. Lorsqu'à l'inverse on commence par le haut, il faut que le prédicat soit prédiqué de tout le sujet.⁴³

On trouve une autre claire allusion à une représentation graphique du syllogisme, dans la justification donnée du second rang attribué à la figure dans laquelle le moyen est prédicat dans les deux prémisses, dans la phrase suivante:

Puisque, d'autre part, le moyen, qu'il soit prédiqué des deux <autres termes> ou qu'il soit sujet relativement aux deux <autres termes>, tombe alors hors de sa position de moyen au sens propre, c'est à juste titre que la deuxième figure est celle dont le moyen est prédiqué des deux <autres termes>, c'est-à-dire celle dans laquelle il se trouve en position supérieure.⁴⁴

La "position supérieure" du moyen est manifestement celle qu'il occupe dans le schéma servant à illustrer la seconde figure syllogistique. Les allusions de Proba à une semblable représentation verticale confirment l'allusion de Philopon, et attestent, sans ambiguïté, l'usage de cette représentation dans l'enseignement scolaire – enseignement qui est le but du commentaire de Proba, comme nous l'avons exposé plus haut.

C'est le lieu de rappeler que, dans une étude antérieure sur une épître syriaque du philosophe et savant Sévère Sebokht (VII^e siècle), portant sur quelques points de logique, nous avons rencontré une description explicite de représentations graphiques "verticales" des syllogismes, accompagnée de dessins dans les manuscrits. En voici le texte:

[...] il faut savoir qu'il [Aristote] a tiré ce nom [i.e. de figure] de la géométrie, car lui aussi inscrit les liaisons des propositions sur certaines figures géométriques, tout comme les géomètres font pour leurs

⁴² C. Rambourg, "Les diagrammes syllogistiques des scholies à la *Rhétorique* d'Aristote (CAG XXI.2)", *Classica et Mediaevalia* 63 (2012), p. 279-315, à la p. 285. Ces scholies, mises sous le nom d'un certain Stephanos dans le manuscrit *Vaticanus gr.* 1340, ont été éditées sous le titre *ἑτέρα σχόλια τοῦ κυροῦ στεφάνου*, par H. Rabe: *Anonymi et Stephani in Artem rhetoricam commentaria*, ed. H. Rabe, Reimer, Berlin 1896 (CAG XXI.2), p. 263-322: voir des schémas en formes de "lunules", p. 264-5, et p. 300, qui illustrent des syllogismes rhétoriques; de même, dans le *Fragmentum commentarii in Aristotelis Rhetorica*, édité dans le même ouvrage, on trouve des schémas de même type p. 324-326 Rabe.

⁴³ Cf. ci-dessous notre traduction, p. 141.

⁴⁴ Cf. encore ci-dessous notre traduction, p. 143.

démonstrations: <comme eux> à partir de lignes il fait soit une figure rectiligne, soit comme une sorte de triangle, et sur les sommets des droites ou des angles il inscrit les termes, comme tu peux le voir en bref à l'aide des dessins ci-dessous.⁴⁵

Questions de logique

Nous nous proposons ici de reprendre de manière synthétique deux sujets abordés plus ponctuellement dans les notes de notre commentaire.

Divisions du syllogisme

Voulant décrire le but, ou la visée (*nīšo*, qui rend le grec *σκοπός*), du traité d'Aristote, dans la première des questions préliminaires au commentaire proprement dit, Proba divise le syllogisme en trois sortes: apodictique, dialectique, sophistique. Ce faisant, il reprend une division traditionnelle présente chez Alexandre, Ammonius et Philopon.⁴⁶ Toutefois, le texte de Proba tel qu'il est conservé présente une lacune, aussitôt après la tripartition énoncée, et on ne peut connaître le parti que l'auteur a pu tirer, ou ne pas tirer, de tout le commentaire d'Ammonius qui, dans la suite, distingue les traités syllogistiques des traités de logique non syllogistiques, que sont la *Rhétorique* et la *Poétique*.⁴⁷ Pourtant les diverses divisions annexées par Proba à la fin de son introduction éclairent sur ce sujet. Toutes ces quatre divisions visent, en effet, à justifier la triple division susdite à l'aide de différents critères qui se rencontrent, pour trois d'entre eux, au début du commentaire de Philopon, dans la partie précisément qui traite du *skopos* du traité. Partant de l'affirmation que la démonstration est un certain syllogisme (*ἡ ἀπόδειξις συλλογισμὸς τὶς ἐστι*)⁴⁸, Philopon met en place une argumentation, qui vise à expliquer pourquoi il ne peut y avoir que trois sortes de syllogismes. Le fil de l'argumentation est celui-ci: le syllogisme est une sorte de connaissance, qui est en position moyenne entre celui qui connaît et la chose connue. L'analyse de chacun de ces éléments conduit au résultat recherché: la division des facultés cognitives de celui qui connaît, comme la division des choses connaissables et celle de la connaissance elle-même, mettent toutes trois en évidence qu'il n'y a que trois sortes de syllogismes.⁴⁹ Cette grille d'analyse s'est transmise dans une tradition d'école, comme en fait foi par exemple sa reprise dans le manuel de logique byzantin intitulé *Συνοπτικὸν σύνταγμα φιλοσοφίας* (connu sous le nom d'Anonymus Heiberg, d'après le nom de son éditeur).⁵⁰ Elle est aussi à l'œuvre

⁴⁵ Cf. Hugonnard-Roche, "Questions de logique au VII^e siècle" (cité à la note 23), p. 66-7, 91-2, où nous avons déjà rapproché ce texte de Sévère Sebokht du passage de Philopon cité plus haut.

⁴⁶ Cf. ci-dessous notre traduction, p. 129 et n. 5.

⁴⁷ Sur ce point, lire D. Black, *Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy*, Leiden, Brill 1990 (Islamic Philosophy and Theology, 7), p. 31-4. Dans la mesure où Proba ne s'occupe nullement de la question de l'intégration de la *Rhétorique* et de la *Poétique* dans la logique, nous ne prendrons en considération dans l'ouvrage de D. Black que ce qui touche à la tripartition qui nous intéresse ici.

⁴⁸ Philop., *In An. Pr.*, p. 1.12 Wallies.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1.15-4.14 Wallies. On peut lire une analyse de l'argumentation de Philopon dans S. Ebbesen, *Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi. A Study of Post-Aristotelian Ancient and Medieval writings on Fallacies*, vol. 1, *The Greek Tradition*, Brill, Leiden 1981 (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum, De Wulf-Mansion Centre, VII, 1), p. 91-4.

⁵⁰ Cf. *Anonymi logica et quadriivium cum scholiis antiquis*, ed. J.L. Heiberg, Andr. Fred. Høst & Søn, København 1929 (The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, Historical-Philological Class, vol. 15, pt. 1). Voir la présentation de l'argumentation telle qu'elle se trouve, un peu modifiée, dans ce manuel, dans Ebbesen, *Commentators* (cité à la note 49), p. 102-5.

dans le commentaire d'Élias et, en sous-main peut-on dire, dans les tableaux de divisions annexés par Proba à son introduction.

Ces divisions de Proba, cependant, ne reprennent pas exactement la grille d'analyse mise en œuvre par Philopon, et l'on trouvera dans les notes attachées aux divisions en question, plus loin dans notre traduction, des remarques sur les différences de détail, entre la présentation de Proba et les commentaires de Philopon, ou encore d'Ammonius et d'Élias. Nous nous attacherons ici plutôt à une vue d'ensemble des démarches respectives de Proba et des commentateurs grecs.

La première différence concerne le fait que Proba propose, en préalable à l'énoncé de la grille d'analyse du syllogisme "du point de vue de celui qui connaît, de la connaissance, et de ce qui est connu" (grille empruntée à la tradition d'Ammonius et de Philopon), une première division du syllogisme selon les valeurs de vérité: l'apodictique toujours dit vrai, le dialectique dans la plupart <des cas> dit vrai, le sophistique dans la plupart <des cas> dit faux. Il est remarquable que Proba en fasse, en quelque sorte, une division préalable à tout autre examen, qui s'appuie sur une division préliminaire du vrai et du faux qui s'attribue à un énoncé (ici le syllogisme) selon une modalité exprimée dans les termes de "toujours" ou "dans la plupart des cas".

Cette division est proche, pour une part, de celle qu'Élias place au début de son analyse de la division des syllogismes, en s'appuyant comme Proba sur une division du vrai et du faux, si du moins l'on omet le "entièrement faux" qui se dit du poétique, et le "également vrai et faux" qui se dit du rhétorique, dans la division d'Élias en cinq parties.⁵¹

Cette division elle-même apparaît comme intermédiaire entre la division de Philopon d'une part, selon laquelle "toujours vrai" se dit de l'apodictique, "non toujours vrai" et "parfois faux" se disent du dialectique,⁵² et "toujours faux" se dit du sophistique, et la division d'Élias d'autre part, selon laquelle "toujours vrai" se dit de l'apodictique, "plus vrai que faux" se dit du dialectique, et "plus faux que vrai" se dit du sophistique. Le même complexe de questions et de réponses produit ainsi des divisions différentes, selon la présence et le poids donné par le commentateur à telle ou telle variable figurant dans le complexe: "toujours", "parfois", "plus ... que", "dans la plupart des cas".

Pour ce qui concerne, dans le texte de Proba, la place de la division du syllogisme selon son degré de véracité, on trouve encore, dans la tradition postérieure à Philopon, un point de comparaison possible. Chez Philopon, on l'a dit, c'est la distinction entre les facultés psychiques de celui qui connaît qui est la première source de division des syllogismes. En revanche, dans des versions postérieures de l'argumentation philoponienne, c'est le degré de véracité des prémisses qui est le fondement premier de la division.⁵³ Ainsi Élias établit la classification des cinq sortes de syllogismes sur la base des degrés de vérité des prémisses, dans son commentaire sur les *Catégories*, comme ceci: πέντε γὰρ εἰσιν εἶδη τῶν συλλογισμῶν, ἀποδεικτικὸς διαλεκτικὸς ῥητορικὸς σοφιστικὸς ποιητικὸς. καὶ εἰκότως, ἐπειδὴ καὶ αἱ προτάσεις ὅθεν λαμβάνονται πέντε εἰσίν· ἡ γὰρ πάντη ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν αἱ προτάσεις καὶ ποιοῦσι τὸν ἀποδεικτικόν, ἡ πάντη ψευδεῖς καὶ ποιοῦσι τὸν ποιητικόν τὸν μυθώδη, ἡ πῆ μὲν ἀληθεῖς πῆ δὲ ψευδεῖς, καὶ τοῦτο τριχῶς· ἡ γὰρ μᾶλλον ἀληθεύει ἤττον δὲ ψεύδεται καὶ ποιεῖ τὸν διαλεκτικόν συλλογισμόν, ἡ πλεον ἔχει τὸ ψεῦδος τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ ποιεῖ τὸν σοφιστικόν, ἡ ἐπίσης ἔχει τὸ ἀληθὲς τῷ ψεύδει καὶ ποιεῖ τὸν ῥητορικόν.⁵⁴

⁵¹ On peut lire le texte d'Élias, cité plus bas, dans la note 18 de la traduction à la p. 155.

⁵² Philop., *In An. Pr.*, p. 2.31 Wallies: ὅς (i.e. συλλογισμός) οὐ πάντως ἀεὶ ἀληθεύσει, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ καὶ ψεύσεται.

⁵³ Ce point a été noté par Black, *Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric* (cité à la note 47), p. 39, d'où nous reprenons les références à Élias.

⁵⁴ Cf. Élias, *In Cat.*, p. 116.35-117.8 Busse. On peut lire une division semblable dans le commentaire d'Élias sur les

Commentant la division d'Élias, D. Black fait observer que la rhétorique et la poétique n'y sont nullement des subdivisions de la dialectique, mais qu'un glissement s'est produit dans le spectre des valeurs de vérité, dans leur relation aux arts logiques, et elle le décrit ainsi:

The result of this shift is that poetics in Elias's scheme has taken over the characterization that Philoponus had assigned to sophistic, whereas sophistic itself assumes a place among the syllogisms that possess a mixture of truth and falsity.

Au lieu donc que le “toujours faux” caractérisait le syllogisme sophistique chez Philopon, il caractérise chez Élias le syllogisme poétique, tandis que le syllogisme sophistique chez Élias est caractérisé par le “plus faux que vrai”. On peut observer alors qu'un glissement semblable est aussi à l'origine de la division de Proba, dans la mesure où le syllogisme dialectique de Proba qui dit vrai dans la plupart des cas est assimilable au syllogisme dialectique d'Élias qui dit plus vrai que faux, et où le syllogisme sophistique de Proba qui dit faux dans la plupart des cas est assimilable au syllogisme sophistique d'Élias qui dit plus faux que vrai. La différence entre Élias et Proba est que ce dernier ne dit rien des syllogismes rhétorique et poétique.

Dans les divisions suivantes touchant les diverses sortes de syllogismes, qui reprennent les critères de la grille d'analyse de Philopon, on observe à nouveau des glissements dans les relations établies entre les syllogismes et les critères de classement, par rapport aux relations établies par Philopon. Ainsi, s'agissant des facultés de celui qui connaît, “l'imaginative et le sens font le syllogisme sophistique” selon Proba, tandis que ni l'une ni l'autre ne fait de syllogisme selon Philopon, qui précise toutefois que la *διάνοια* produit les syllogismes sophistiques à partir de prémisses reçues de la *φαντασία*. Pour Proba, en revanche, “la pensée discursive fait le syllogisme apodictique”. Mais la différence essentielle entre Proba et Philopon, est que le premier ne cherche en aucune façon à concilier la division tripartite en syllogismes apodictiques, dialectiques, sophistiques, avec une division qui inclurait également les arguments rhétoriques et poétiques, comme le font Philopon et Élias. Le point central autour duquel s'articule alors la différence est le rôle accordé à la *διάνοια*. Pour Proba, “la pensée discursive fait le syllogisme apodictique”, alors que pour Philopon, la *διάνοια* est la faculté productrice de toute argumentation logique, dont les espèces sont déterminées par la qualité épistémique des prémisses, selon qu'elles sont reçues du *νοῦς*, de la *δόξα* ou de la *φαντασία*.

La division suivante du syllogisme par Proba, selon le second critère de la grille d'analyse de Philopon, la nature de la connaissance, se distingue encore de celle de Philopon. Selon ce dernier, comme chez Ammonius, ce sont les notions sémantiques de toujours vrai, toujours faux, tantôt vrai tantôt faux, qui caractérisent chacune des trois sortes de syllogismes, à savoir respectivement apodictique, sophistique, et dialectique. Mais, dans sa toute première division – celle qu'il a placée en préalable comme nous l'avons dit plus haut –, Proba a déjà utilisé ce type de critère sémantique, sous une forme un peu différente il est vrai de celle de Philopon. Par suite de ce premier glissement, il fait appel alors à un nouveau critère que l'on pourrait dire plutôt pragmatique, à savoir la “solidité” de la connaissance et la facilité ou non de la défaire. Cette division semble suggérée par l'adjectif *ἀπταιστος*, par lequel Philopon qualifie la connaissance toujours vraie.⁵⁵ On ne trouve pas cette

Premiers Analytiques: voir le texte cité ci-dessous, dans la note 18 de notre traduction du texte de Proba, p. 155. À la différence d'Élias, Proba s'en tient à la division des syllogismes en trois sortes: apodictique, dialectique, sophistique.

⁵⁵ Philop., *In An. Pr.*, p. 4.9 Wallies. Une expression comparable peut se lire dans les scholies aux *Premiers Analytiques*, cf. *Scholía in Aristotelem*, ed. A. Brandis, Reimer, Berlin 1836, repr. De Gruyter, Berlin 1961 (*Aristotelis Opera ex recensione I. Bekkeri*), p. 142.44.

division de Proba dans les commentaires grecs conservés, mais on doit envisager la possibilité qu'elle ait eu quelque antécédent dans le commentarisme de tradition alexandrine.

Quant à la dernière division selon la nature des choses connues, celle de Proba ne diffère de celle de Philopon que par son expression en termes de modalités logiques, et non en termes de modalités temporelles.

Prises donc dans leur ensemble, les divisions de Proba, non seulement excluent la rhétorique et la poétique des arts de la logique, mais tendent à donner au syllogisme apodictique sa définition la plus stricte: il dit toujours vrai, à partir d'une connaissance solidement établie, à propos de choses nécessaires, et il est le produit de la pensée discursive et de nulle autre faculté.

Dictum de omni et nullo

À la fin du premier chapitre des *Premiers Analytiques*, Aristote explique les expressions grecques qui signifient l'attribution universelle de la manière suivante:

τὸ δὲ ἐν ὅλῳ εἶναι ἕτερον ἐτέρῳ καὶ τὸ κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι θατέρου θάτερον ταυτὸν ἐστίν. λέγομεν δὲ τὸ κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι ὅταν μηδὲν ἢ λαβεῖν [τοῦ ὑποκειμένου] καθ' οὗ θάτερον οὐ λεχθήσεται· καὶ τὸ κατὰ μηδενὸς ὡσαύτως.⁵⁶

Qu'une chose soit dans une autre tout entière et qu'une chose soit prédiquée d'une autre tout entière, c'est la même chose. Nous disons qu'<une chose> est prédiquée <d'une autre> tout entière lorsqu'on n'en [du sujet] peut rien prendre dont l'autre ne se dise pas; et il en est de même pour <la prédication> d'aucun.⁵⁷

Afin d'éclairer le commentaire de Proba sur ce passage, dont il reproduit littéralement la première phrase, il est bon de se reporter à l'exégèse d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise, qui cite la seconde formulation de l'attribution, en même temps qu'il l'explique, comme suit:

τὸ οὖν κατὰ παντός, φησίν, ἐστίν, ὅταν μηδὲν ἢ λαβεῖν καθ' οὗ θάτερον οὐ λεχθήσεται, τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὅταν μηδὲν ἢ λαβεῖν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, καθ' οὗ τὸ κατηγορούμενον οὐ ῥηθήσεται· ἐπεὶ γὰρ πᾶσα πρότασις κατηγορικὴ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου ὅρου ἐστὶ καὶ κατηγορούμενου, τότε λέγεται ὁ κατηγορούμενος κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἀληθῶς, ὅταν μηδὲν ἢ λαβεῖν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, καθ' οὗ οὐ ῥηθήσεται τὸ κατηγορούμενον, οἷον τὸ ζῶον κατὰ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου· οὐδένα γὰρ λαβεῖν ἐστίν ἀνθρώπου, καθ' οὗ τὸ ζῶον οὐ ῥηθήσεται.⁵⁸

il dit donc <qu'une chose est prédiquée d'une autre> tout entière, lorsqu'on n'en peut rien prendre dont l'autre ne se dise pas, c'est-à-dire lorsqu'on ne peut rien prendre du sujet dont le prédicat ne se dise pas; puisque en effet toute proposition prédicative est composée d'un terme sujet et d'un terme

⁵⁶ Arist., *An. Pr.* I 1, 24 b 26-30.

⁵⁷ Dans l'introduction à la traduction d'*Alexander of Aphrodisias. On Aristotle Prior Analytics* (cité à la note 22), les auteurs mettent en garde contre une interprétation, qui serait fautive, de l'expression ἐν ὅλῳ εἶναι, et ils écrivent: "Now you might expect 'A is in *holōi tōi B*' to mean 'A is in the whole of B', i.e. A is found everywhere in B, or A holds of every B. But in fact the Greek means exactly the opposite: A is in *holōi tōi B* if B is true of every A. B is, as it were, a whole for A. To make this reasonably clear, we have followed the customary – and *awkward* – translation, writing 'A is in B as in a whole'". Nous avons, pour notre part, adopté une traduction simplifiée, en écrivant "A est dans B tout entier", mais en précisant ici qu'il faut aussi la comprendre comme signifiant que A est dans B comme dans un tout, conformément d'ailleurs à l'explication qu'en donne Alexandre, dans le texte que nous citons immédiatement après.

⁵⁸ Alex. Aphr., *In An. Pr.*, p. 24.27-25.2 Wallies.

prédicat, alors le prédicat est dit en vérité du sujet tout entier, lorsque on ne peut rien prendre du sujet dont le prédicat ne se dise pas, par exemple l'animal est dit de l'homme tout entier; on ne peut en effet prendre aucun homme dont animal ne se dise pas.

Puis Alexandre explicite la première formulation d'Aristote comme suit:

οὕτως δὲ ἐχόντων ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν ὅλῳ γίνεται τῷ ζῳῳ, τοῦτ' ἔστι περιεχόμενον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὡς ὅλου· μέρος γὰρ πως τοῦ καθόλου τὸ ἐν ὅλῳ· τὸ γὰρ ἐν ὅλῳ σημαντικόν ἐστι τοῦ μὴ ἔξω πίπτειν τι τοῦ λεγομένου ἐν ὅλῳ εἶναι ἐκείνου, ἐν ᾧ λέγεται εἶναι ὡς ἐν ὅλῳ.⁵⁹

Les choses étant ainsi, homme est dans animal tout entier, c'est-à-dire est inclus par lui comme par un tout; en effet, ce qui est dans un tout est d'une certaine façon partie de l'universel; être dans un tout, en effet, signifie que rien de ce qui est dit être dans le tout ne tombe en dehors de cela dans quoi il est dit être comme dans un tout.

Une interprétation traditionnelle de la syllogistique d'Aristote considère que l'énoncé prédicatif universel, pour prendre cet exemple qui correspond à ce dont il est question dans les textes qu'on vient de citer, identifie ce qui est désigné par les termes sujets à des ensembles d'individus, auxquels serait attribuée la propriété désignée par le prédicat: en d'autres mots, l'énoncé "tout homme est animal" signifierait qu'à tous les hommes, ou à chacun des individus hommes, est attribué le prédicat "animal". Ou encore, si l'on commence par ce qui est prédiqué de manière à intervertir l'ordre des termes, pour reprendre la manière d'écrire de Proba, le prédicat "animal" s'attribue à chacun des individus de l'ensemble des hommes. Ainsi donc que l'écrit G. Granger, selon l'interprétation usuelle, "La proposition prédicative universelle: B appartient à tout A, serait représentée dans un champ comprenant des 'individus' subsumés sous le sujet A, et un prédicat B attribué à chacun de ces individus".⁶⁰ Pourtant il n'est pas évident que la prédication universelle d'Aristote puisse toujours aisément s'interpréter en terme de quantification sur des individus, les lettres utilisées par le philosophe comme symboles de termes ne représentant nullement des variables au niveau du calcul syllogistique, comme on l'a désormais reconnu.⁶¹ Et, ainsi que le remarque encore Granger, Aristote, dans sa syllogistique, traite manifestement sujet et prédicat "comme des concepts de même type, et dont les fonctions sont permutable, comme il arrive nécessairement dans le jeu des trois termes".⁶² Selon l'interprétation de

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 25.2-5.

⁶⁰ G.-G. Granger, *La théorie aristotélicienne de la science*, Aubier Montaigne, Paris 1976 (Analyses et Raisons), p. 118.

⁶¹ Les lettres utilisées par Aristote dans ses formules syllogistiques sont aujourd'hui plutôt considérées comme des lettres porteuses d'une signification non encore spécifiée, et appelées "dummy letters" par les auteurs de langue anglaise: sur ce point, voir notamment C. Kirwan, *Logic and Argument*, Duckworth, London 1978, p. 1-8, et K.L. Flannery, *Ways into the Logic of Alexander of Aphrodisias*, Brill, Leiden-New York-Köln 1995 (Philosophia Antiqua, 62), p. 114-116 (où l'on trouvera la bibliographie antérieure). Pour sa part Granger, *La théorie aristotélicienne* (cité à la note 60), p. 116, expliquait déjà que "les symboles de termes introduits par Aristote au moyen de lettres ne sont pas *stricto sensu* des variables au niveau du calcul syllogistique. Ce sont des lettres syntaxiques, des symboles d'indéterminées, dont il n'est pas nécessaire de préciser l'identification. La notion de variable est alors reportée au niveau métalinguistique des modèles. Un énoncé prédicatif universel est tel que toute représentation qui le satisfait a même structure que l'emboîtement de deux classes, la représentation du sujet étant incluse dans celle du prédicat. Mais ces classes figuratives des termes doivent être prises en bloc, et nullement identifiées à des classes d'individus: seules les propriétés apparaissent comme des indéterminées du calcul, et le champ des objets d'une représentation est un champ de propriétés".

⁶² Granger, *La théorie aristotélicienne* (cité à la note 60), p. 118.

Granger, les termes d'une proposition prédicative désignent tous deux des propriétés, et "leur rapport est une relation entre propriétés qui constitue le lien spécifique de prédication et n'est envisagé, *dans le syllogisme catégorique*, ni comme exprimant le rapport fonctionnellement dissymétrique d'un individu à une propriété, ni comme sous-tendant le rapport de deux classes d'individus".⁶³

Dans la perspective de ces questions, il est intéressant de relever l'explication proposée par Proba du *dictum de omni et nullo*. Commentant le texte d'Aristote, il écrit:

C'est une même chose, dit-il, qu'une chose soit dans une autre tout entière et qu'une chose soit prédiquée d'une autre tout entière, parce que les <deux formules> se disent de la même proposition. Lorsque, en effet, on commence par le bas, il faut que le sujet participe de la totalité du prédicat, et non pas d'une partie seulement, par exemple: "tout homme est animal, tout animal est substance", tout homme participe de l'animal tout entier, c'est-à-dire de la respiration et de la sensation et de l'être.⁶⁴

Si fugitive soit-elle, cette remarque suggère que Proba s'inscrit ici dans une tradition où ce qui est pris en considération dans l'interprétation d'Aristote, ce ne sont pas des classes d'individus, mais des classes de prédicats ou de propriétés. Le sujet "homme", selon l'explication de Proba, est inclus dans le prédicat homme tout entier, en ce sens que "homme" participe de toutes les propriétés du genre supérieur "animal", dans lequel l'espèce homme est incluse. Proba mentionne la respiration et la sensation, de manière sans doute quelque peu hasardeuse: si cela est vrai pour la sensation, que possède tout animal, cela n'est pas le cas pour la respiration, si l'on s'en rapporte aux travaux sur les animaux d'Aristote, qui faisaient autorité à l'époque de Proba. Du moins, l'idée générale semble être celle-ci: toute chose dont une autre est prédiquée, ou mieux toute chose dont la désignation est en position de sujet pour un prédicat, participe des propriétés de la chose dont la désignation est prédiquée. Et cette interprétation, ainsi que le mot que nous avons traduit par "participer", renvoient selon toute probabilité à l'*Isagoge* de Porphyre, dont la théorie des prédicables sous-tend le commentaire de Proba. Reste encore à comprendre ce que veut dire la déclaration de Proba que "homme" participe de "l'être" de "animal": on pourrait peut-être comprendre l'expression *hoy d-itawhi* comme un équivalent de οὐσία, "substance", c'est-à-dire le genre supérieur à "animal", bien que la mention de "substance" après la respiration et la sensation paraisse un peu déplacée. Peut-être l'expression en question signifie-t-elle simplement "ce qu'il est", signifiant par là toutes les autres propriétés du genre "animal".

Il n'y a dans le commentaire de Proba qu'une brève remarque qui semble signaler un héritage porphyrien, et l'on en pourrait alors douter. Mais le témoignage d'une lecture des modes syllogistiques à travers la hiérarchie porphyrienne des genres et des espèces se manifeste clairement dans le commentaire de Philopon, comparé à celui d'Alexandre. Alors que ce dernier décrit le premier mode concluant de la première figure dans un pur langage aristotélicien, en faisant appel aux lettres et aux termes désignés comme "majeur extrême, mineur extrême, et moyen", Philopon reprend simplement l'énoncé aristotélicien du mode, puis ajoute l'exemple traditionnel (absent en ce lieu chez Aristote et Alexandre), qui rend l'exposé plus clair:

ἐπὶ τῶν ὑλῶν δὲ σαφέστερος ὁ λόγος· οἷον οὐσία κατὰ παντός ζῴου, ζῶον κατὰ παντός ἀνθρώπου, καὶ συνάγεται οὐσία κατὰ παντός ἀνθρώπου· καὶ ἀνάπαλιν πᾶς ἀνθρώπος ζῶον, πᾶν ζῶον οὐσία, πᾶς ἀνθρώπος ἄρα οὐσία (*In An. Pr.*, p. 73.24-27 Busse).

⁶³ Granger, *ibid.*

⁶⁴ Cf. ci-dessous notre traduction, p. 141.

Ensuite il ajoute encore cette remarque touchant la “fabrication” de ce mode syllogistique:

δῆλον δὲ ἐπὶ τούτου τοῦ σχήματος ὡς δεῖ ἐπὶ τοῦ πρώτου τρόπου λαμβάνειν ὄρους, πρῶτον μὲν γενικώτατον, δεύτερον ὑπάλληλον γένος καὶ τρίτον εἰδικώτερον τοῦ μέσου εἶδος (*In An. Pr.*, p. 73.27-30 Busse).

S’agissant de la première figure, il est apparaît clairement comment, dans le premier mode, il faut prendre les termes: pour le premier le genre le plus général, pour le second le genre qui lui est inférieur, et pour le troisième l’espèce la plus inférieure du moyen.

Les mêmes types d’explication qui mettent en œuvre les prédicables porphyriens propres à guider la composition des syllogismes se trouvent aussi dans le commentaire de Philopon à propos des autres modes et des autres figures, moyennant les modifications appropriées pour chacun d’eux. Ce recours à la théorie porphyrienne des prédicables pour décrire les modes syllogistiques manifeste la prégnance de l’*Isagoge* dans la lecture faite de certains aspects de la logique aristotélicienne par certains philosophes dans l’antiquité tardive. Philopon en porte le témoignage exemplaire dans les textes auxquels nous avons fait allusion. Pour sa part, Proba en conserve une trace légère dans sa remarque citée plus haut à propos de l’interprétation du *dictum de omni*.

Les manuscrits

Quatre témoins du texte sont identifiables:

– Bedjan (Bdj) Édition procurée par A. van Hoonacker, à partir d’un manuscrit en sa possession, dont la trace est aujourd’hui perdue malheureusement.⁶⁵ Dans ces conditions il est d’autant plus regrettable que l’éditeur, s’il donne une description du contenu du manuscrit, ne se prononce pas sur la datation de la copie. Il reproduit toutefois une brève notice portée à la fin du manuscrit, qui indique que celui-ci provenait des couvents de Saint-Georges et Sainte-Barbe de la ville de Karamlish. Ce manuscrit, écrit en caractères “nestoriens” sur papier, selon van Hoonacker, contenait une suite de traités consacrés à la logique:

- une traduction des *Catégories* d’Aristote, sans nom d’auteur, mais identique, selon van Hoonacker, à celle que contient le manuscrit de Berlin, *Sachau* 226, fol. 11-32. Nous savons donc aujourd’hui qu’il s’agit de la version de Jacques d’Édesse.⁶⁶

- deux scholies sur les *Catégories*, dont la seconde est attribuée à Eusèbe d’Alexandrie. Ajoutons aujourd’hui que cette scholie est, selon toute vraisemblance, identique à celle qui a été éditée, avec la même attribution, par G. Furlani.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Toutes nos informations proviennent, sauf ajout de notre part, de la préface de A. van Hoonacker, “Le traité du philosophe syrien Probus sur les *Premiers Analytiques* d’Aristote”, *Journal Asiatique* 16 (1900), p. 70-166, aux p. 70-4, où l’on trouvera une description plus détaillée. Sur le possesseur du manuscrit, voir la notice de H.L. Murre-van den Berg, “Bedjan, Paul (1838-1920)”, dans *Gorgias Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Syriac Heritage*, Gorgias Press, Piscataway NJ 2011, p. 65-6.

⁶⁶ On peut trouver une liste des manuscrits contenant la traduction des *Catégories* par Jacques d’Édesse, avec une étude des relations entre ces manuscrits, dans D. King, *The Earliest Syriac Translation of Aristotle’s Categories*. Text, Translation and Commentary, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2010 (Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus, 21), p. 282-96.

⁶⁷ G. Furlani, “Uno scolio d’Eusebio d’Alessandria alle *Categorie* d’Aristotele in versione siriana”, *Rivista Trimestrale di Studi Filosofici e Religiosi* 3 (1922), p. 1-14. Cette même scholie se trouve dans le manuscrit de Berlin, *Petermann* 9 (n° 88 dans le catalogue de E. Sachau, *Verzeichnis der syrischen Handschriften der Königlichen Bibliothek zu Berlin*, A. Asher & Co.,

- le commentaire de Paul le Perse sur le *Peri Hermeneias*, traduit du persan en syriaque par Sévère Sebokht, évêque de Qennesrin.⁶⁸ Selon la description de van Hoonacker, ce commentaire était suivi d'un appendice comprenant deux textes:

1. "des éclaircissements composés par Abraham à l'usage des étudiants".

2. "un court supplément d'explication par Jesubokht".⁶⁹

- la lettre de Sévère Sebokht à Aitilaha, évêque de Ninive, où l'auteur traite "des propositions dans le livre *Peri Hermeneias*". Cette lettre a été éditée, traduite et commentée par nous-même.⁷⁰

- L'"explication du traité sur les *Analytiques* composée par Proba", dont nous proposons, dans la présente étude, une édition révisée, avec une nouvelle traduction et un commentaire.

- Le "traité sur les syllogismes d'après les *Premiers Analytiques*" par Sévère Sebokht.⁷¹

Le village de Karamlish, situé à une quinzaine de kilomètres au sud-est de Mossoul, fut un centre nestorien important à l'époque du patriarche syro-oriental Denha II († 1381/2), habité également par des populations syro-orthodoxes et arméniennes.⁷² Entre le XVII^e et le XIX^e siècle, un grand nombre de manuscrits y furent copiés, notamment pour les églises de Saint-Georges et de Sainte-Barbe, et une importante collection fut ainsi constituée en ces lieux.⁷³ Il y a donc des raisons de penser que le manuscrit qui fut en possession de Bedjan datait de la période des XVIII^e/XIX^e siècles.

Le cœur du manuscrit contient des textes sur les *Catégories*, sur le *Peri Hermeneias*, et sur les *Premiers Analytiques*. Il représente clairement un cursus scolaire, touchant l'essentiel de l'étude de la logique aristotélicienne. À noter à ce sujet un petit texte en vers "signalant au maître les défauts auxquels il pourra reconnaître le disciple incapable ou indigne".⁷⁴

On notera que, d'après les indications de pagination de van Hoonacker, les deux parties du commentaire se suivaient selon l'ordre normal, dans le manuscrit Bedjan.

- Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, *Sachau* 226 (B), (no 89 dans le catalogue Sachau⁷⁵), fol. 79r-87v pour la première partie du commentaire de Probus sur les *Premiers Analytiques*, et fol. 55v-63v pour

Berlin 1899, vol. 1, p. 321-35, aux p. 326-7); voir aussi H. Hugonnard-Roche, "Eusèbe d'Alexandrie?", dans Goulet (éd.), *DPhA*, III (2000), p. 356-58.

⁶⁸ Sur ce traité, on peut lire H. Hugonnard-Roche, "Sur la lecture tardo-antique du *Peri Hermeneias* d'Aristote: Paul le Perse et la tradition d'Ammonius. Édition du texte syriaque, traduction française et commentaire de l'*Élucidation* du *Peri Hermeneias* de Paul le Perse", *Studia graeco-arabica* 3 (2013), p. 37-104.

⁶⁹ À Isho'bokht de Rev Ardashir, évêque métropolitain de Fars, sont attribuées des scholies sur les *Catégories*: voir A. Baumstark, *Geschichte* (cité à la note 11), p. 215-6, et n. 2 p. 218 pour l'indication des manuscrits contenant ce texte. Sur l'auteur, voir L. Van Rompay, "Isho'bokht of Rev Ardashir", dans *Gorgias Encyclopedic Dictionary* (cité à la note 65), p. 216.

⁷⁰ H. Hugonnard-Roche, "L'épître de Sévère Sebokht à Aitilaha sur le *Peri Hermeneias*. À propos des propositions métathétiques et privatives, et de l'existence du possible", in A. Straface - C. De Angelo A. Manzo (éd.), *Labor limae*. Atti in onore di Carmela Baffioni, Prefazione di W. Madelung, *Studi magrebini* N.S. XII-XIII, Napoli 2014-2015, p. 337-60.

⁷¹ Van Hoonacker, *Le traité* (cité à la note 65), signale (p. 74 n. 2) que le même traité se trouve dans le manuscrit de Berlin, *Sachau* 226; d'autres manuscrits sont signalés par Baumstark, *Geschichte* (cité à la note 11), p. 246 n. 11, auxquels il faut ajouter le manuscrit de Birmingham, *Mingana syr* 44.

⁷² Cf. J.M. Fiey, O.P., *Assyrie chrétienne. Contribution à l'étude de l'histoire et de la géographie ecclésiastiques et monastiques du nord de l'Iraq*, vol. 2, Imprimerie catholique, Beyrouth 1965 (Recherches publiées sous la direction de l'Institut de lettres orientales de Beyrouth, 23), p. 400-15; A. Harrak, "Karamlish", *Gorgias Encyclopedic Dictionary* (cité à la note 65), p. 242.

⁷³ Cf. D. Wilmshurst, *The Ecclesiastical Organisation of the Church of the East, 1318-1913*, Peeters, Louvain 2000 (Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, 582, Subsidia 104), p. 8-15, 218-21.

⁷⁴ Cf. van Hoonacker, *Le traité* (cité à la note 65), p. 71-72.

⁷⁵ Sachau, *Verzeichniss* (cité à la note 67), vol. 1, p. 335-38.

la seconde partie. Le manuscrit contient aussi le commentaire de Proba, désigné comme prêtre, archiâtre et archidiacre d'Antioche, sur l'*Isagoge* de Porphyre; deux vies d'Aristote, dont le texte est édité par Sachau dans son catalogue, p. 335-336; la traduction syriaque des *Catégories* d'Aristote par Jacques d'Édesse; la traduction syriaque de la grammaire de Denys le Thrace par Joseph Huzoyo; le traité sur les syllogismes de Sévère Sebokht; l'épître du même Sévère Sebokht à Aitilaha. La souscription du dernier texte, l'épître à Aitilaha, indique que le manuscrit a été copié par un certain Elias Hôhô d'Alqoš. La copie daterait vraisemblablement de l'année 1882 selon Sachau, qui s'appuyait sans doute sur la comparaison de ce manuscrit avec d'autres manuscrits provenant d'Alqoš à pareille époque.

Le contenu du manuscrit montre, à nouveau, qu'il représente une tradition scolaire, qui couvre la partie de l'*Organon* "aristotélien" traditionnel, allant de l'*Isagoge* aux *Analytiques*.

– Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, *Vaticanus sir.* 593 (V), fol. 181r-186r pour la seconde partie du commentaire de Proba, fol. 186r-192v pour la première partie du même commentaire. Ce manuscrit de 234 folios numérotés est formé de trois parties, dont la troisième (fol. 155r-234v) contient le texte de deux vies d'Aristote, la traduction des *Catégories* par Jacques d'Édesse, la version syriaque de la grammaire de Denys le Thrace par Joseph Huzoyo, le traité de Proba sur les *Analytiques*, et le *Livre du commerce des commerces* de Bar Hebraeus. La première partie porte un *colophon* au fol. 62r, indiquant que la transcription du texte qui précède (une explication des offices due à Mar 'Abdisho' bar Brikha) fut faite à Mossoul et achevée en 1917.⁷⁶ La troisième partie qui contient le traité de Proba n'est pas de la même main, mais elle est copiée sur le même papier quadrillé, de type "écolier", et elle a très vraisemblablement été copiée à une date proche.

– Alqosh, Notre-Dame des Semences, 55 (A), dans le catalogue de Jac.-M. Vosté, "Catalogue de la bibliothèque syro-chaldéenne du couvent de Notre-Dame des Semences près d'Alqoš (Iraq)", *Angelicum* 5, fasc. 1 (1928), p. 3-36, à la p. 24. D'après la description de Vosté, ce manuscrit contiendrait l'"explication du deuxième livre des analytiques" attribuée à Probus; le traité sur les syllogismes attribué à Sévère Sebokht; "l'explication des analytiques par Probus", c'est-à-dire certainement la première partie de l'"explication" susdite; la lettre de Sévère Sebokht "à un évêque de Ninive sur la *prûtāsīs* dont il est question dans le *peri-hermeneias*", c'est-à-dire une copie de la lettre à Yonan⁷⁷; le *Livre du commerce des commerces* de Bar Hebraeus. D'après la description de Vosté, ce manuscrit fait partie d'un groupe de cinq manuscrits de logique, datant tous de la même époque que le premier d'entre eux (numéroté LI dans le catalogue), qui a été écrit en 1822.⁷⁸ Les manuscrits de Notre-Dame des Semences ont été un temps emportés et déposés au monastère de Saint-Georges à Mossoul, puis au monastère chaldéen de Bagdad,⁷⁹ d'où ils ont été retirés, mais leur trace est aujourd'hui perdue. Nous n'avons donc pas eu accès au manuscrit A.

⁷⁶ Voir la description détaillée du manuscrit par Arn. Van Lantschoot, *Inventaire des manuscrits syriaques des fonds Vatican (460 [corr. ex 490] – 631), Barberini oriental et Neofiti*, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Città del Vaticano 1965 (Studi e Testi, 243), p. 121-23. Sur 'Abdisho', voir la notice de J.W. Childers, "'Abdisho' bar Brikha", *Gorgias Encyclopedic Dictionary* (cité à la note 65), p. 3-4.

⁷⁷ Édition et traduction, avec commentaire, par Hugonnard-Roche, "Questions de logique au VII^e siècle" (cité à la note 23), p. 53-104.

⁷⁸ Vosté, *Catalogue*, p. 22-23.

⁷⁹ Cf. King, *The Earliest Syriac Translation* (cité à la note 66), p. 283 n. 3.

Comparaison des manuscrits

On remarquera d'abord la semblable disposition, dans Bdj, B et A, des deux parties du commentaire de Proba sur les *Analytiques*, qui enserrant le traité de Sévère Sebokht sur les *Analytiques*, la seconde partie de l'ouvrage de Proba étant placée en tête de cet ensemble. Les manuscrits B et A provenant d'Alqosh, et ayant été écrits vers la même époque, on est porté à attribuer à Bdj une semblable provenance, à moins que ce dernier ne soit l'une des sources des écrits logiques copiés à Alqosh au tournant des XIX^e et XX^e siècles. Dans V, le commentaire de Proba n'est pas accompagné du traité de Sévère, mais il est remarquable que les deux parties du commentaire soient écrites à nouveau dans l'ordre inverse de leur ordre normal de lecture.

D'autre part, les trois manuscrits Bdj, B et V, présentent la même importante lacune dans la description des points à établir avant l'examen de tout ouvrage, – lacune qui commence au cours de l'exposé du but et qui ne prend fin que dans celui de la division en chapitres. Ce sont presque entièrement six des sept points qui manquent dans le texte, soit l'équivalent probablement du contenu d'un folio du manuscrit source, peut-on supposer. Ces trois manuscrits ont donc un ancêtre commun, et il y a tout lieu de penser qu'il en allait de même du manuscrit A, qui appartenait au même milieu d'origine que B et V (et sans doute Bdj), comme on vient de le voir.

Une autre lacune commune atteste de même la parenté des manuscrits Bdj, B et V (note 28 de l'édition, et note 83 de la traduction). De même, une itération commune atteste la parenté de Bdj et B (note 11 de l'édition), mais les omissions de quelques mots, propres à Bdj ou à B, montrent qu'aucun des deux n'est une copie de l'autre. Des omissions plus ponctuelles, comme on peut les lire dans l'apparat, montrent en outre qu'aucun des trois manuscrits Bdj, B et V, n'est la copie directe d'un autre d'entre eux.

L'édition du texte

L'édition de A. van Hoonacker a été faite sur la base du manuscrit Bdj, avec quelques variantes en notes, tirées du manuscrit B. Notre propre édition est faite sur la base de celle de Bedjan, car il nous a paru inutile de chercher à donner la priorité à l'un ou l'autre des deux autres manuscrits (B ou V), dans la mesure où ceux-ci sont très tardifs et ne peuvent guère être considérés, en tout état de cause, comme antérieurs à celui utilisé par Bedjan, ou représentant une tradition antérieure à ce manuscrit, même si nous ignorons la date de ce dernier. En outre, les variantes entre les manuscrits B et V, et le texte de Bedjan, sont minimales et ne remettent pas en cause le sens du texte. Il était donc plus sage de partir du texte déjà édité, auquel nous apporterons peu de modifications. Nous n'avons pas jugé indispensable de normaliser l'orthographe, et nous reprenons celle de Bdj, sans relever dans l'apparat les variantes purement orthographiques, comme l'absence d'écriture du *yūdh* dans le mot *eskimo*, par exemple, ou celle du *yūdh* encore dans l'écriture de la lettre *bēth* (*byt*). Nous n'avons pas relevé non plus certaines ponctuations diacritiques manifestement fautives, marquant à tort un pluriel, par exemple.

Note sur la traduction

La traduction de van Hoonacker est dans l'ensemble de bonne qualité. Nous avons librement repris parfois certaines formules heureuses de sa traduction, sans chercher à nous en démarquer pour le simple souci de la renouveler. En revanche nous nous sommes attachés à corriger les erreurs et nous avons adopté un certain nombre d'expressions techniques, plus précises ou plus conformes à la théorie syllogistique aristotélicienne. D'autre part la traduction de van Hoonacker ne comporte que

peu de notes, si ce n'est dans un nombre de cas limité, en particulier là où le texte est de prime abord peu compréhensible. Notre effort a donc porté tout particulièrement sur le commentaire du texte, et nous avons entrepris de le confronter systématiquement avec les textes des commentateurs grecs de la tradition néoplatonicienne alexandrine, représentée par Ammonius et ses successeurs. Les résultats de ces comparaisons figurent dans le commentaire qui fait suite à la traduction.

Nous ferons ici deux remarques sur des points particuliers de traduction. Nous utilisons en parallèle les mots “analyse” et “synthèse” d'une part, “résolution et composition” d'autre part, selon le contexte, en privilégiant notamment le mot “résolution” pour préserver la parenté linguistique du mot syriaque ainsi traduit avec d'autres mots syriaques de même racine, traduits aussi par des mots apparentés en français comme “résoudre”. Sur ce sujet nous pouvons nous prévaloir, pensons-nous, des équivalences énoncées dans les *Réponses aux secondes objections* qui accompagnent les *Méditations métaphysiques* de Descartes, où l'on peut lire: “La manière de démontrer est double: l'une se fait par l'analyse ou résolution, et l'autre par la synthèse ou composition”.⁸⁰

Nous traduisons le mot *prūtāsīs*, pure transcription du grec *πρότασις*, en général par “proposition”, mais lorsqu'il désigne la proposition spécifiée dans le rôle de prémisses d'un argument, nous le traduisons par “prémisse”. Nous suivons en cela l'usage qui a été celui des traducteurs des premiers chapitres du commentaire d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise sur les *Premiers Analytiques*.⁸¹ Comme le remarquent les traducteurs, il n'est pas toujours aisé de savoir si le mot *πρότασις* signifie “prémisse” plutôt que “proposition” dans le texte d'Alexandre, mais le lecteur sait que la traduction représente le grec *πρότασις*. Il en va de même pour *prūtāsīs* dans le texte de Proba, et l'on peut faire une remarque analogue à propos de notre traduction.

⁸⁰ Descartes, *Ceuvres*, IX.1, *Méditations*, trad. française, éd. Ch. Adam et P. Tannery, nouvelle éd. mise à jour par B. Rochot, Vrin - CNRS-Éditions, Paris 1964, p. 121.

⁸¹ Cf. *Alexander of Aphrodisias. On Aristotle Prior Analytics* (cité à la note 22), trad. Barnes, p. 22.

<Explication du livre des Analytiques>

Avec l'aide de notre Seigneur, je transcris l'explication du livre des *Analytiques*, composée par le savant Proba.

Il y a sept points principaux qu'avant <l'explication de> tout ouvrage il convient de poser,¹ comme nous l'avons appris dans le traité qui précède celui-ci:² le but, l'utilité, le rang <dans l'ordre de lecture>, par qui il est composé, la raison du titre, la division en chapitres, à quoi il se rapporte.³

Le but. Le but donc de ce livre est de nous enseigner le syllogisme en général.⁴ En effet, il y a trois sortes de syllogismes: apodictique, dialectique, sophistique.⁵ [lac]

Telle étant donc la division en chapitres, il nous faut savoir que le titre de ce livre est *Analytika*, c'est-à-dire "résolution". Et l'on demande, étant donné que <l'auteur> divise <son ouvrage> en trois chapitres, pourquoi il a laissé de côté le premier et celui du milieu, et a nommé <l'ouvrage> d'après le dernier.⁶ Nous disons que c'est soit parce que <ce chapitre est celui> dont il a le plus fréquemment fait usage, soit en raison de sa difficulté.⁷ Lorsque, en effet, il y a composition et résolution, parfois la composition est plus difficile que la résolution, et parfois la résolution est plus difficile que la composition. Mais lorsque les deux sont difficiles, la résolution est plus difficile que la composition. Par exemple, la composition de la maison est plus difficile que sa résolution, et la résolution de l'eau et du vin est plus difficile que la composition. Alors, en effet, que la construction de la maison est difficile, et que la résolution de l'eau et du vin est difficile, la résolution de l'eau et du vin est beaucoup plus difficile que la construction de la maison.⁸

A quoi <le livre> se rapporte. On demande à quoi se rapporte ce livre. Nous disons qu'il se rapporte à la logique. Mais on demande ce qu'est la logique: or donc une partie de la philosophie ou bien un instrument de celle-ci? En effet, les stoïciens disent qu'elle est une partie de la philosophie, Aristote qu'elle est un instrument, Platon qu'elle est un instrument et une partie.⁹

Les stoïciens cherchent à montrer qu'elle est une partie de la philosophie au moyen de deux arguments. Le premier argument est que toute chose dont une discipline fait usage, et qui n'est en aucune façon partie d'une autre discipline ni partie d'une partie de la discipline qui en fait usage, est nécessairement une partie de la discipline qui en fait usage. Ainsi l'astronomie fait usage de la logique, en tant que celle-ci est une partie de la philosophie. Que la logique ne soit pas une partie d'une autre discipline, ils l'ont laissé comme évident. Mais qu'elle ne soit pas partie de partie, ils cherchent à le montrer comme ceci: la philosophie se divise en théorie et pratique, et chacune d'elle a un sujet et une fin. Par exemple, de même que l'art de la médecine a pour sujet les corps des hommes et pour fin la santé – tout son soin en effet est de produire ou de conserver la santé dans les corps humains –, de même la théorie a pour sujet toutes les choses qui sont et pour fin la connaissance vraie de ces choses. Quant à la pratique, elle a pour sujet les âmes des hommes et pour fin leur ornement. Or la théorie et la pratique font pareillement usage de la logique, qui n'est partie d'aucune d'elles. Donc la logique n'est pas partie de partie de la philosophie.¹⁰

Nous leur disons: votre division est incomplète. Il vous fallait dire en effet que toute chose dont une discipline fait usage et qui n'est pas partie d'une autre discipline, ni partie de partie de celle-ci, ni instrument <de la discipline en question>, est une partie de celle-ci. Soit en effet l'art de la médecine: elle fait usage du scalpel, qui n'est pas partie d'une autre discipline, ni partie de partie de celle-ci, ni partie de l'art de la médecine. Votre division donc ne tient pas.¹¹

Le second argument, les stoïciens le disposent de la manière suivante: toute chose qu'une discipline produit est une partie de celle-ci. Nous disons que cette division non plus ne tient pas.¹² Soit en effet l'art de la médecine: comme on l'a dit, elle produit le scalpel, qui n'est pas partie d'elle.¹³

Aristote, d'autre part, cherche à montrer que la logique est instrument de la philosophie de la manière suivante: toute chose dont une discipline fait usage et qui est en vue de cette discipline est nécessairement inférieure à la discipline qui en fait usage; par exemple, l'art de l'équitation fait usage de la fabrication des rênes. Si donc la grammaire et la rhétorique et ces autres <disciplines> font usage de la logique, qui est aussi en vue d'elles, il se trouverait une partie de la philosophie qui serait inférieure à la grammaire et à la rhétorique, ce qui est absurde.¹⁴

Platon, d'autre part, dit que <la logique> est instrument et partie, instrument lorsque nous considérons les règles en tant que règles, par exemple <la règle> que de deux affirmatives universelles on conclut une affirmative universelle;¹⁵ partie, lorsque nous étudions l'universel et le particulier au point de vue de ce qui les rapproche et que nous étudions aussi l'universel et le particulier au point de vue de ce qui les éloigne l'un de l'autre¹⁶ – ce que la philosophie est seule à connaître. Non seulement, en effet, les choses sont connues, mais aussi la ressemblance et la distance qu'elles ont entre elles. Et il n'est pas absurde non plus que la mère de toutes les disciplines fasse un instrument à son propre usage et à celui des autres disciplines, en vue de leur institution et de leur conservation. Ce qu'il fallait dire avant <l'étude de> ce livre, nous l'avons dit.

Fin des prolégomènes au commentaire qui explique la raison du livre des *Analytiques*.

Espèces du syllogisme¹⁷

- apodictique: celui-ci toujours dit vrai
- dialectique: dans la plupart <des cas > dit vrai
- sophistique: dans la plupart <des cas> dit faux¹⁸

Autre exposé sur le syllogisme du point de vue de celui qui connaît, de la connaissance, et de ce qui est connu.¹⁹

Les <facultés> cognitives sont <les suivantes>:

- l'intellect n'a pas besoin du syllogisme pour connaître
- la pensée discursive fait le syllogisme apodictique
- la puissance de conjecture fait le syllogisme dialectique
- l'imaginative et le sens font le syllogisme sophistique.²⁰

Toute connaissance quelle qu'elle soit:

- est ou bien solidement établie et elle fait le syllogisme apodictique
- ou bien difficile à défaire et elle fait le syllogisme dialectique
- ou bien facile à défaire et elle fait le syllogisme sophistique.²¹

Tout ce qui est

- ou bien est nécessairement et fait le syllogisme apodictique
- ou bien est possible et fait le syllogisme dialectique
- ou bien est impossible et fait le syllogisme sophistique.²²

5 אֲנִי מְשַׁלֵּחַ לְךָ מִן הַבְּיָרִית מִן הַבְּיָרִית מִן הַבְּיָרִית . וְהִנֵּה הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה הִיא הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה .
 10 וְהִנֵּה הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה הִיא הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה . וְהִנֵּה הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה הִיא הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה .
 15 וְהִנֵּה הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה הִיא הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה . וְהִנֵּה הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה הִיא הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה .
 20 וְהִנֵּה הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה הִיא הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה . וְהִנֵּה הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה הִיא הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה .
 25 וְהִנֵּה הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה הִיא הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה . וְהִנֵּה הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה הִיא הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה .
 30 וְהִנֵּה הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה הִיא הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה . וְהִנֵּה הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה הִיא הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה .
 35 וְהִנֵּה הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה הִיא הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה . וְהִנֵּה הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה הִיא הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה .
 40 וְהִנֵּה הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה הִיא הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה . וְהִנֵּה הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה הִיא הַבְּיָרִית הַזֶּה .

24 אבד Bdj] אבד BV || 37 אבד BdjV] אבד B.

Explication du livre des *Analytiques*.

Venons-en donc au corps du livre. Il nous faut savoir que dès l'abord <Aristote> cherche à nous enseigner le but du livre, et l'énumération de neuf points qui se rapportent au but, et ce qu'est la proposition.

Il dit donc que son but est de traiter du syllogisme apodictique. On demande comment, alors que lui-même a dit que son but est de traiter du syllogisme apodictique, nous pouvons dire que son but est de traiter du syllogisme en général.²³ Nous disons que, de même que le scalpel a pour but premier de faire la saignée, et pour but second de procurer la guérison, de même Aristote a pour but premier de traiter du syllogisme en général, et pour but second de traiter du syllogisme apodictique.²⁴

L'énumération de neuf points qui a été dite est celle-ci: qu'est ce que la proposition? qu'est-ce que le terme? qu'est-ce que le syllogisme? C'est à bon droit qu'il a examiné ces points: la proposition est étudiée en tant qu'elle est partie du syllogisme, le terme en tant qu'il est partie de la proposition, et le syllogisme est étudié en tant qu'il est le but visé <par le livre>.²⁵

Les six autres points sont ceux-ci: qu'est-ce que le syllogisme parfait? qu'est-ce que le syllogisme imparfait? qu'est-ce que "universel" et qu'est-ce que "non universel"? qu'est-ce que <être dit> de tout et <être dit> d'aucun?²⁶

Certains sont dans le doute, se demandant pourquoi il a placé la proposition en première position, puis le terme, puis le syllogisme. Pourquoi, en effet, n'a-t-il pas commencé par les choses simples, pour en venir ensuite aux composées, ou bien pourquoi, ayant commencé par les composées, n'a-t-il pas d'abord terminé son exposé sur les composées, pour en venir ensuite aux simples?²⁷

À ce doute, nous répondons par trois solutions. D'abord qu'il s'est servi de manière inusitée du mot "terme" pour <désigner> la partie de partie du syllogisme, non point en effet que ce mot "terme" soit inusité, mais lui le premier s'en est servi ainsi de manière inusitée, et c'est pourquoi il ne l'a pas placé en première position.²⁸

Deuxièmement nous disons que *thūmo* ["terme"] est homonyme et se dit de choses multiples. On appelle *thūmo*, en effet, le discours définitionnel qui porte sur la nature <de la chose>, et aussi la délimitation des terres, et les extrémités et limites des figures. Et il ne convenait pas qu'il commençât par un mot homonyme.²⁹

Troisièmement nous disons que, lorsqu'il fait porter son enseignement sur le terme, il a besoin de la proposition, de même que nous nous avons besoin de "animal" lorsque nous exposons la définition de "homme". C'est pourquoi il a d'abord mentionné la proposition avant le terme.³⁰

Certains encore sont dans le doute, <pensant> qu'Aristote, aimant la concision, n'aurait point dû parler des mêmes choses à plusieurs reprises, alors qu'ayant traité des voix simples dans les *Catégories* et dans le *Peri Hermeneias*, il en traite encore ici.³¹

Nous répondons que dans les *Catégories* il ne les a pas prises comme parties, mais seulement comme vocables simples,³² et dans le *Peri Hermeneias* comme parties de l'affirmative et de la négative, et c'est pourquoi il y nomme *phasis* le nom et le verbe.³³ Mais ici il comprend le nom et le verbe comme partie de partie du syllogisme.³⁴

La définition de la proposition est: "phrase affirmative et négative <disant> quelque chose de quelque chose, qu'elle soit universelle ou particulière ou indéfinie".³⁵

Certains blâment cette définition comme défectueuse selon la qualité et la quantité. La qualité est défectueuse car, lorsqu'il a dit "quelque chose de [= sur] quelque chose", il n'a pas ajouté "quelque chose [séparée] de quelque chose", ce qui est le propre de la négation.³⁶

Nous répondons que premièrement il a mentionné la négation, en disant "négative"; que deuxièmement ce qu'il a dit "quelque chose de quelque chose" est <à entendre> en commun de l'affirmation et de la négation. Celui en effet qui dit "Socrate marche" et celui qui dit "Socrate ne marche pas" prédisent <l'un et l'autre quelque chose> de Socrate, <l'un> qu'il marche, <l'autre> qu'il ne marche pas.³⁷

La quantité, d'autre part, est défectueuse parce que, lorsqu'il a dit "universelle ou particulière ou indéfinie", il aurait fallu qu'il dise "et singulière".³⁸

Nous répondons que peut-être, en disant "particulière", il y a inclus la singulière; ou bien, ce qu'il est vrai de dire, il n'a pas mentionné la singulière, parce que les philosophes s'occupent de choses générales, et les choses qui sont mentionnées à l'aide d'une particulière sont générales en quelque manière: "quelque", en effet, et "non tout" se disent en commun de "homme", de "taureau" et de "cheval".³⁹

Il nous enseigne d'autre part en quoi le syllogisme apodictique se différencie du syllogisme dialectique, et il dit qu'il s'en différencie par l'usage et par la fin.⁴⁰ Par l'usage, car l'apodictique assume des notions communes ou ce qui est connu à partir de notions communes,⁴¹ et fait ainsi le syllogisme, tandis que le dialectique, en questionnant, assume une partie d'une contradiction, et fait ainsi le syllogisme. Par la fin, <le syllogisme apodictique diffère du syllogisme dialectique>, car l'apodictique dit toujours vrai, tandis que le dialectique ne dit pas toujours vrai.⁴²

Certains recherchent pourquoi il n'a pas différencié le syllogisme sophistique du syllogisme apodictique, comme il a différencié le dialectique de l'apodictique.⁴³

Nous répondons que le syllogisme sophistique est très éloigné de l'apodictique, et que la différence en est évidente pour tous. Il appartient, en effet, à l'art <sophistique> de montrer l'unité des choses très éloignées les unes des autres, tout de même que la différence de celles qui sont très rapprochées.⁴⁴

Après avoir fait porter son enseignement sur la proposition, <Aristote> cherche à nous enseigner ce qu'est le terme, et il dit: "j'appelle terme ce en quoi se résout la proposition, ainsi ce qui est prédiqué et ce dont cela est prédiqué, que "est" ou "n'est pas" réalise soit l'adjonction <d'un terme à l'autre> soit leur séparation".⁴⁵ Le fait qu'il a dit "j'appelle" montre que, même s'il n'a pas lui-même institué le nom "terme", il l'a le premier utilisé pour <désigner> la partie de la proposition.⁴⁶

Il a fait cela, d'autre part, à l'imitation des géomètres; puisqu'en effet il a nommé les syllogismes figures, il était juste qu'il appellât "termes" leurs extrémités et leurs limites. Les géomètres, en effet, nomment "termes" les limites des figures.⁴⁷ Ainsi Euclide dit: "j'appelle figure ce qui est circonscrit par un ou par plusieurs 'termes'".⁴⁸ Ce nom d'ailleurs est emprunté aux "termes" des terres: de même, en effet, que les "termes" sont les limites des terres, de même ici aussi ces "termes" sont des limites, et il n'y a rien à assumer hors d'elles.⁴⁹ En effet, le syllogisme composé se résout en syllogisme simple,⁵⁰ le syllogisme simple en propositions, et la proposition en termes; on ne peut résoudre le terme en autre chose, même si les grammairiens divisent la *lexis*⁵¹ en vue de l'examen des écrits. Les philosophes, en effet, font porter leur attention sur les significations des choses, et non sur les écrits.⁵²

Quant à ce qu'il a dit: "que 'est' ou 'n'est pas' réalise soit l'adjonction <d'un terme à l'autre> soit leur séparation", Alexandre dit que par là il signifie l'affirmation et la négation.⁵³ Certains disent que ce n'est pas vrai, car s'il avait voulu signifier cela, il aurait suffi qu'il dise: "lorsque 'est' ou 'n'est pas' est ajouté". Lorsqu'en effet "est" est ajouté, cela produit une affirmation, et "n'est pas" produit une négation, comme <lorsqu'on dit>: "Socrate est philosophe", "Socrate n'est pas philosophe".⁵⁴

Certains disent qu'Alexandre a bien dit. Lorsque "est" ou "n'est pas" est ajouté, une affirmation ou une négation est produite, qui a pour troisième <élément> ce qui est co-prédiqué.⁵⁵ Lorsque <"est" ou "n'est pas"> est séparé, une affirmation ou une négation métathétique est produite, comme <lorsqu'on dit> par exemple "Socrate est non-juste" et "Socrate n'est pas non-juste". Par cela, effet, que l'on a dit: "Socrate est non-juste", le fait d'être juste est séparé de lui, et si c'est l'autre cas, c'est l'inverse.⁵⁶

D'autres expliquent autrement la phrase <d'Aristote> et disent qu'il a écrit cela par amour de la concision.⁵⁷ Puisque, en effet, il y a deux couples d'opposés, l'addition et la soustraction <d'un côté>, la composition et la séparation <de l'autre>, il lui a suffi que de chaque couple il prît un <membre> opposé, puisqu'au moyen de l'un il amène l'autre; en effet, en disant addition, il amenait aussi la soustraction, et en disant séparation, il amenait la composition, c'est-à-dire l'union. Grâce à ce que nous avons dit, toutes les propositions sont incluses.⁵⁸ En effet, lorsque "est" ou "n'est pas" est ajouté, sont produites les propositions qui ont comme troisième <élément> ce qui est co-prédiqué; lorsque "est" ou "n'est pas" est soustrait, sont produites les propositions <constituées> du sujet et du prédicat seulement.⁵⁹ En outre, lorsque "est" ou "n'est pas" est composé, sont produites les propositions métathétiques et celles que nous avons appelées modales:⁶⁰ "Socrate est utilement non-injuste", "Socrate n'est pas utilement non-injuste",⁶¹ et les non modales métathétiques.⁶² Lorsque "est" ou "n'est pas" est séparé, sont produites les propositions simples modales.⁶³

Certains définissent autrement le "terme"⁶⁴, et disent: "le terme est ce sans quoi il n'y a pas de proposition". Ils ont raison de dire que sans lui il n'y a pas de proposition, mais cela ne nous suffit pas pour définir le terme, de même qu'il ne suffit pas qu'on dise que la définition de "homme" est "animal", sans lequel il n'est pas possible que soit produite la définition de "homme". En effet, "animal" ne suffit pas pour poser <la définition de> "homme"; de même, les termes, de quelque manière qu'il soient pris, ne suffisent pas pour poser la proposition: il est nécessaire, en effet, que l'un ait la position de sujet, l'autre celle de prédicat.⁶⁵

Ainsi donc il faut dire que, par les mots "est" ou "n'est pas" est ajouté", <Aristote> signifie toute proposition qui a un troisième <élément> co-prédiqué; et par les mots "est séparé", il signifie toute proposition qui n'a pas "est" ou "n'est pas".⁶⁶

Après avoir parlé de la proposition et du terme, <Aristote> veut nous enseigner le syllogisme et il dit: "le syllogisme est un discours dans lequel, certaines choses ayant été posées, quelque autre chose que les choses posées survient nécessairement, du fait qu'elles sont".⁶⁷ Il dit "posées" pour "assertées", et par là il a distingué le syllogisme de la proposition. En effet, même si la proposition est un discours, et même si y sont posées plusieurs choses, à savoir les termes, pourtant ces choses ne sont pas des assertions, du fait qu'elles ne signifient pas le vrai ou le faux.⁶⁸

<Certains> disent: pourquoi dit-il "assertées" et n'a-t-il pas dit "assertée"? Nous répondons: pour distinguer son syllogisme de celui des rhéteurs,⁶⁹ et du syllogisme hypothétique. Les rhéteurs, en effet, posent une chose seulement et aussitôt forment leur syllogisme. Par exemple, Eschine,⁷⁰ disent-ils, a reçu des biens de Philippe, donc il est un traître; un tel est très soigneux de sa personne, donc il est adultère.⁷¹ Ils font cela, ou bien parce qu'ils prétendent que pour l'accusation comme pour la défense il n'y a guère de place pour s'étendre beaucoup en longueur et que par conséquent ils seraient contraints d'abrégier leurs discours;⁷² ou bien parce qu'ils ne chercheraient pas à montrer qu'ils forment des syllogismes, afin de n'être pas supposés vaincre par l'art des paroles ou par l'artifice, et non parce qu'ils détiennent la vérité;⁷³ ou bien parce qu'ils honorent les juges, en sorte qu'il ne convient pas qu'ils leur disent ce qui est généralement connu;⁷⁴ ou bien, ce qui est plus vrai, parce qu'il ne convient pas <qu'ils énoncent> des généralités, car leur point faible est dans la prémisse majeure, la réfutation de ce qui est général étant trop aisée. Ils ne peuvent dire, en effet, que quiconque a reçu des biens de Philippe est un traître, ou que quiconque est soigneux de sa personne est adultère.⁷⁵

D'autre part, <Aristote> distingue son propre syllogisme des syllogismes hypothétiques, en ceci que les hypothétiques, même s'ils contiennent plusieurs énoncés, n'assument qu'une seule assertion, par exemple: "si le soleil est au-dessus de la terre, il fait jour". Ainsi, en prenant une seule assertion, on a formé un syllogisme; on dit, en effet: "si le soleil est au-dessus de la terre, il fait jour".⁷⁶

"Quelque autre chose survient du fait que ces choses sont".⁷⁷ "Quelque autre chose", dit-il, <premièrement> afin de distinguer son syllogisme du syllogisme qui mentionne les mêmes propos, par exemple "si le soleil est au-dessus de la terre, il fait jour", et "s'il fait jour, le soleil est au-dessus de la terre".⁷⁸ Deuxièmement, parce que les prémisses sont comme la matière, la conclusion comme la forme.⁷⁹ Troisièmement, parce que les prémisses sont en vue d'autre chose, tandis que la conclusion est ce que l'on cherche; c'est en vue de la conclusion, en effet, que sont prises les prémisses.⁸⁰ Quatrièmement, parce que les prémisses sont des assertions, la conclusion ce que l'on cherche.⁸¹

"Quelque autre chose nécessairement survient". Il faut savoir que tout ce qui se démontre, ou bien est démontré par consécution, c'est-à-dire par une règle, ou par la nature des choses, ou bien par les deux à la fois.⁸² Par exemple, "tout homme est pierre; toute pierre est substance; tout homme est substance"; ceci est montré au moyen d'une règle, qui dit que de deux affirmatives universelles, suit une affirmative universelle. Selon la nature des choses, d'autre part, <la conclusion> ne suit pas, en raison de la fausseté qui se trouve dans cet <argument>.⁸³ De la nature des choses, d'autre part, il suit par exemple que: "Socrate est doué de raison; une chose douée de raison est mortelle; Socrate donc est mortel". Nous disons que ceci est démontré à partir de la nature des choses et non par une règle, parce que sont vraies d'une part <...>,⁸⁴ d'autre part, à partir de particulières seulement il ne se produit pas de conclusion de façon nécessaire, comme nous l'enseignerons.

<Une chose peut être démontrée>, d'autre part, des deux <manières> à la fois, par exemple: "tout homme est animal, tout animal est substance, tout homme donc est substance"; ici la prescription de la règle est observée, et de même la nature des choses se trouve vérifiée.

<Il faut savoir> en second lieu que toute démonstration,⁸⁵ quelle qu'elle soit, procède ou bien d'universels qui sont égaux, ou bien de ceux qui sont plus universels, mais ne procède pas de ceux qui sont inférieurs. De ceux qui sont égaux, elle procède par exemple <ainsi>: "tout homme est capable de rire, tout <être> capable de rire est capable de pensée⁸⁶ et de connaissance,⁸⁷ tout homme donc est capable de pensée et de connaissance".⁸⁸ À partir de <termes> qui sont plus universels, elle procède <ainsi>: "tout homme est animal, tout animal est substance, tout homme donc est substance".⁸⁹

Si quelqu'un veut montrer une <chose> particulière à partir d'une chose particulière, par exemple que "un tel qui a marché pendant la nuit a été reconnu voleur", et donc toi aussi qui as marché pendant la nuit tu es un voleur, ceci n'est pas une démonstration, mais on l'appelle un exemple.⁹⁰

En outre, si quelqu'un démontre l'universel à partir de particuliers, par exemple que, "puisque Pythagore le philosophe, et Socrate le philosophe, et tel et tel philosophe, ont été tués, tous les philosophes sont tués", ou bien "puisque le taureau et l'âne et le chameau, lorsqu'ils mangent, font mouvoir leur mâchoire inférieure, tout animal donc, lorsqu'il mange, fait mouvoir sa mâchoire inférieure", ce type <d'argument> est appelé induction, et non pas démonstration.⁹¹

"Par cela qu'elles sont", dit-il, car il ne faut pas que la conclusion requière un terme en dehors de ceux qui sont posés; ainsi: "tout homme est rationnel, tout <être> rationnel est un vivant, donc tout homme est un vivant". Mais si tu dis: "tout homme est rationnel, tout <être> rationnel est un vivant, tout homme donc est substance", cette conclusion ne suit pas de ce qui a été posé, mais elle requiert un autre terme qui soit assumé dans une prémisses, et de cette manière est produite la conclusion.⁹²

Or il faut que nous sachions que les Pyrrhoniens s'élèvent contre cela et disent: si c'est au moyen du syllogisme qu'est produite toute démonstration et saisie de ce qui est cherché, nous vous demandons: tel syllogisme, il est montré qu'il produit cette <démonstration> ou bien cela n'est pas montré, et si cela n'est pas montré, vous ne parvenez pas à saisir qu'il produit <cette démonstration>, mais si c'est montré, c'est montré au moyen d'un autre syllogisme, et encore cela est montré ou n'est pas montré, et les mêmes choses adviennent et ainsi à l'infini.⁹³

Quant à nous, en retournant d'abord leur doute contre eux, nous disons: vous avez démontré ce que vous avez dit ou non, et si vous ne l'avez pas démontré, vous vous rendez vous-mêmes non crédibles, et si vous l'avez démontré, vous l'avez démontré au moyen d'une autre démonstration, et cette démonstration à son tour à l'aide d'une autre démonstration, et ainsi à l'infini.⁹⁴

Ensuite nous disons que, lorsqu'on établit en termes généraux la doctrine du syllogisme, le syllogisme se comprend aussi lui-même dans cette opération. De même, en effet, que la parole qui dit que toute parole est audible, s'applique aussi à elle-même en même temps qu'aux autres, de même la chose se voit-elle dans le cas présent.⁹⁵

On recherche ensuite ce qu'est le syllogisme parfait, et <Aristote> dit: "j'appelle donc syllogisme parfait celui qui n'a besoin de rien d'autre, en dehors de ce qui a été assumé, pour faire apparaître la nécessité".⁹⁶ Il a dit très justement "qui n'a besoin de rien d'autre, en dehors de ce qui a été assumé, pour faire apparaître la nécessité". Dans tout syllogisme, en effet, se trouve <ce caractère> de nécessité, mais il n'est pas évident dans tout syllogisme, à moins que n'y soit ajouté quelque chose, c'est-à-dire une conversion, ou bien plusieurs choses, c'est-à-dire des conversions et la réduction à l'impossible. Par "quelque chose", en effet, il veut dire une conversion, et par "plusieurs choses" il veut dire des conversions et la réduction à l'impossible. Le syllogisme parfait n'a pas besoin de l'une de ces choses pour faire apparaître la nécessité qui est en lui. Le syllogisme imparfait en a besoin pour faire apparaître ce qui est en lui.⁹⁷

"Qu'une chose soit dans une autre tout entière et qu'une chose soit prédiquée d'une autre tout entière, c'est la même chose".⁹⁸ C'est une même chose, dit-il, qu'une chose soit dans une autre tout entière et qu'une chose soit prédiquée d'une autre tout entière, parce que les <deux formules> se disent de la même proposition. Lorsque, en effet, on commence par le bas, il faut que le sujet participe de la totalité du prédicat, et non pas d'une partie seulement, par exemple: "tout homme est animal, tout animal est substance", tout homme participe de l'animal tout entier, c'est-à-dire de la respiration et de la sensation et de l'être. Lorsqu'à l'inverse on commence par le haut, il faut que le prédicat soit prédiqué de tout le sujet.⁹⁹ Il faut toujours, en effet, que le prédicat soit égal au sujet ou qu'il soit plus grand que lui; dans le cas où il serait plus petit que lui, tout <le prédicat> ne <se dirait> pas <de> tout <le sujet>.¹⁰⁰

Fin de la copie du commentaire de la première section.

Je transcris maintenant le commentaire de la deuxième section du livre des *Analytiques*.

<Les propositions> qui se convertissent¹⁰¹ sont au nombre de trois: la négative universelle, l'affirmative universelle, l'affirmative particulière. La négative particulière, en effet, ne se convertit pas. La négative universelle se convertit en elle-même;¹⁰² par exemple, "aucun homme n'est pierre" se convertit ainsi: "aucune pierre n'est homme". La négative particulière ne se convertit pas en elle-même; par exemple, "non tout vivant est homme"; et si quelqu'un la convertit et dit "non tout homme est vivant", il dit faux. Elle ne se convertit donc ni en une autre <proposition>¹⁰³ ni en elle-même, parce qu'elle ne se convertit jamais.

L'affirmative universelle se convertit en une particulière, par exemple, "tout homme est vivant" se convertit ainsi: "quelque vivant est homme", et elle est vraie. Mais si l'on disait "tout vivant est homme", on dirait faux.

L'affirmative particulière se convertit en elle-même, par exemple "quelque homme est vivant", se convertit ainsi: "quelque vivant est homme", et elle est vraie.¹⁰⁴

Toute proposition, quelle qu'elle soit, a deux <éléments>, le sujet et le prédicat. Le sujet et le prédicat sont appelés "termes", et le prédicat est le majeur, le sujet le mineur.¹⁰⁵

Tout syllogisme est <formé> de deux propositions,¹⁰⁶ et il a trois termes. On demande: si toute proposition a deux termes, pourquoi le syllogisme n'a-t-il pas quatre termes? Nous disons que l'un de ces trois termes, celui qui est le moyen, se trouve dans les deux propositions, parce qu'il est le moyen et occupe la position moyenne. Par exemple, "tout homme est animal", "tout animal est substance": ici "animal" est repris dans les deux propositions et il est moyen <terme>.¹⁰⁷

Il y a trois figures du syllogisme.¹⁰⁸ On a la première figure lorsque le moyen est prédiqué d'un <terme> et sujet pour l'autre,¹⁰⁹ comme lorsque nous disons "homme est animal, animal est substance": ici, "animal" est prédiqué de "homme", et sujet pour "substance".

On a la deuxième figure lorsque le moyen est prédiqué des deux <autres termes>¹¹⁰. Il est prédiqué comme ceci: "tout homme est animal" et "aucune pièce de bois n'est animal"; ici "animal" est prédiqué de "homme" et de ce qui est inanimé.

On a la troisième figure lorsque les deux <autres termes> sont prédiqués du <moyen>. Il sont prédiqués comme ceci: "tout homme est animal" et aussi "tout homme est substance".

On demande pourquoi les figures sont dans cet ordre.¹¹¹ Nous disons qu'à juste titre le premier rang revient à la figure dans laquelle le terme moyen est prédicat et sujet. En effet, il garde alors proprement la position moyenne, lorsqu'il n'a pas seulement la position de majeur du fait qu'il est prédicat, mais aussi la position de mineur du fait qu'il est sujet; de cette manière, en effet, il participe des deux extrêmes, en ce qu'il possède leurs deux propriétés. C'est pourquoi il est <dit> proprement moyen, et c'est pourquoi la première figure est celle dans laquelle le moyen se trouve être tel <que nous l'avons dit>.

Puisque, d'autre part, le moyen, qu'il soit prédiqué des deux <autres termes> ou qu'il soit sujet relativement aux deux <autres termes>, tombe alors hors de sa position de moyen au sens propre, c'est à juste titre que la deuxième figure est celle dont le moyen est prédiqué des deux <autres termes>, c'est-à-dire celle dans laquelle il se trouve en position supérieure.¹¹² Au dernier rang est placée la figure dont le moyen est sujet relativement aux deux <autres termes>.

Tout syllogisme a donc deux propositions, l'une majeure et l'autre mineure.¹¹³ Laquelle est la majeure? Celle qui a le terme majeur. Le terme majeur est celui qui est prédiqué dans la conclusion. Laquelle est la mineure? Celle qui a le terme mineur. Le terme mineur est celui qui est sujet dans la conclusion.¹¹⁴ Par exemple, "tout homme est animal, tout animal est substance"; la conclusion est "tout homme est une substance"¹¹⁵; ici "homme" est sujet, et "substance" est prédiquée; donc "substance" est le terme qui est majeur, "homme" le terme mineur; c'est pourquoi la proposition qui dit "tout animal est substance" est la majeure, celle qui dit "tout homme est animal" est la proposition mineure.¹¹⁶

Les caractères communs des figures sont que ce qui se trouve d'inférieur dans les prémisses se trouve dans la conclusion.¹¹⁷ Or la négative est inférieure à l'affirmative, et la particulière inférieure à l'universelle. Si donc il y a une prémisses particulière, la conclusion se trouve être particulière, et si une prémisses est négative, la conclusion est négative. Si alors l'une des prémisses est une négative universelle, et l'autre une affirmative particulière, la conclusion se trouve être une négative particulière. Un autre caractère commun des figures est qu'aucune conclusion n'est produite, ni à partir de deux particulières, ni à partir de deux négatives.¹¹⁸

C'est le propre de la première figure que la prémisses mineure soit affirmative, et que la prémisses majeure soit universelle.¹¹⁹ Ces propriétés de la première figure, fais-en le partage entre la deuxième et la troisième figure.¹²⁰ La deuxième figure reçoit <la propriété> que sa prémisses majeure soit universelle, et la troisième figure reçoit <la propriété> que sa prémisses mineure soit une affirmative. D'autre part, une propriété de la deuxième figure est que ses deux <prémisses> ne soient pas semblables l'une à l'autre par la forme, c'est-à-dire qu'elles ne soient point toutes deux ou affirmatives ou négatives, mais que si l'une est affirmative, l'autre soit nécessairement négative.¹²¹

Toute proposition à propos de laquelle on te demande: "convertis-la et vois si elle est vraie et si tu l'admetts", si on te le demande de telle manière que tu l'admettes, reçois <la> sans crainte¹²²

Dans la première figure il y a quatre modes.¹²³

A Premier mode: d'une mineure universelle affirmative, et d'une majeure universelle affirmative, on conclut une affirmative universelle. Par exemple: si A est dans B tout entier, et B dans G tout entier, A est dans G tout entier; et encore autrement: tout homme est animal, tout animal est substance, tout homme est substance. Mais si l'on commence par ce qui est prédiqué de manière à intervertir <l'ordre des termes>, on dit ainsi: substance <est prédiquée> de tout animal, animal de tout homme, substance de tout homme.

B Deuxième mode: d'une mineure universelle affirmative et d'une majeure universelle négative, on conclut une négative universelle. Par exemple: si A n'est dans aucune instance de B, et B dans G tout entier, A n'est dans aucune instance de G; et encore autrement: tout homme est animal, aucun animal n'est pierre, et l'on conclut: aucun homme n'est pierre. Si l'on commence par ce qui est prédiqué, en sorte d'intervertir <l'ordre des termes>, on dit ainsi: pierre ne <se prédique> d'aucun animal, animal de tout homme, pierre d'aucun homme.

G Troisième mode: d'une mineure particulière affirmative et d'une majeure universelle affirmative, on conclut une affirmative particulière. Si A est dans B tout entier, et B dans quelque instance de G, A est dans quelque instance de G; et encore autrement: quelque rationnel est homme, tout homme est mortel, et l'on conclut: quelque rationnel est mortel. Si l'on commence par ce qui est prédiqué, en sorte d'intervertir <l'ordre les termes>, on dit ainsi: mortel <se prédique> de tout homme, homme de quelque rationnel, mortel de quelque rationnel.

D Quatrième mode: d'une mineure particulière affirmative et d'une majeure universelle négative, on conclut une négative particulière. Si A n'est dans aucune instance de B, B dans quelque instance de G, A n'est pas dans G tout entier; et encore autrement: quelque homme est philosophe, aucun philosophe n'est inculte,¹²⁴ et l'on conclut: non tout homme est inculte. Si l'on commence par ce qui est prédiqué, en sorte d'intervertir <l'ordre des termes>, on dit ainsi: inculte ne se <prédique> d'aucun philosophe, philosophe de quelque homme, et l'on conclut: inculte ne <se prédique> pas de tout homme.

Dans la deuxième figure il y a quatre modes.

A Premier mode: d'une majeure universelle négative et d'une mineure universelle affirmative, on conclut une négative universelle. Soit le <terme> majeur N, à savoir pierre, le <terme> moyen M, à savoir animal, et le <terme> mineur S,¹²⁵ à savoir homme. On le montre à l'aide d'une conversion: par exemple, si M n'est dans aucune instance de N, et M dans S tout entier, N n'est dans aucune instance de S. La conversion se fait comme ceci: si M n'est dans aucune instance de N, il est manifeste que N non plus n'est dans aucune instance de M. Et si N n'est dans aucune instance de M, et M dans S tout entier, ce qui se trouve être le deuxième mode de la première figure: N n'est dans aucune instance de S. Et encore autrement: tout homme est animal,

et aucune pierre n'est animal; ici animal est prédiqué des deux <autres termes>, et l'on conclut: aucun homme n'est pierre. Si l'on dit que ce n'est pas concluant, convertis la négative qui dit: aucune pierre n'est animal, et dis: aucun animal n'est pierre; et dis ensuite: aucun animal n'est pierre, tout homme est animal, et conclus: aucun homme n'est pierre. Ce qui se trouve être le deuxième mode de la première figure.

B Deuxième mode: d'une majeure universelle affirmative et d'une mineure universelle négative, on conclut une négative universelle. On le montre à l'aide de deux conversions. Si M est dans N tout entier, et M dans aucune instance de S, S n'est dans aucune instance de N. On le montre comme ceci: si M n'est dans aucune instance de S, S n'est dans aucune instance de M; et si S n'est dans aucune instance de M, et M dans N tout entier,¹²⁶ on retrouve le deuxième mode de la première figure: il est manifeste que S non plus n'est dans aucune instance de N. Mais la conclusion ne requiert pas que S ne soit dans aucune instance de N, car c'est là encore une prémisse mineure,¹²⁷ mais que N ne soit dans aucune instance de S, parce que la conclusion provient de celle qui est la prémisse majeure, et cela encore est manifeste à l'aide de la deuxième conversion, que si S n'est dans aucune instance de N, N non plus n'est dans aucune instance de S. Et encore autrement: tout homme est animal, et aucune pierre n'est animal; et l'on conclut: aucune pierre n'est homme. Si l'on dit que ce n'est pas concluant, convertis la négative qui dit: aucune pierre n'est animal, et dis: aucun animal n'est pierre. Ensuite résous <le syllogisme> comme ceci: tout homme est animal, aucun animal n'est pierre, et conclus: aucun homme n'est pierre; puis convertis encore la conclusion qui dit: aucun homme n'est pierre,¹²⁸ et dis: si aucun homme n'est pierre, alors aucune pierre n'est homme. C'est là en effet ce qui était cherché, et non la <proposition> qui dit: aucun homme n'est pierre. Ce qui se trouve être le deuxième mode de la première figure.

G Troisième mode: d'une majeure universelle négative et d'une mineure particulière affirmative, on conclut une négative particulière. On le montre à l'aide d'une conversion. Si M n'est dans aucune instance de N, et M dans quelque S, N n'est pas dans S tout entier. On le montre alors comme ceci: si M n'est dans aucune instance de N, alors N n'est dans aucune instance de M; et si N n'est dans aucune instance de M, et que M est dans quelque instance de S, on trouve le quatrième mode de la première figure: N n'est pas dans S tout entier. Et encore autrement: aucun homme n'est cheval, quelque mortel est cheval, et l'on conclut: non tout mortel est homme. Et si l'on dit que ce n'est pas concluant, convertis la négative qui dit: aucun homme n'est cheval, et dis: aucun cheval n'est homme; et ensuite résous <le syllogisme>: aucun cheval n'est homme, quelque mortel est cheval, et conclus: non tout mortel est homme, ce qui se trouve être le quatrième mode de la première figure.

D Quatrième mode: d'une majeure universelle affirmative et d'une mineure particulière négative, on conclut une négative particulière. On le montre à l'aide de l'impossible seulement, et non point à l'aide d'une conversion, parce qu'il ne résulte pas de conclusion de deux particulières.¹²⁹ Si M est dans N tout entier, et si M n'est pas dans S tout entier, N n'est pas dans S tout entier. À supposer que non, qu'il soit dans S tout entier: puisque M est dans N tout entier, et N dans S tout entier, M se trouve dans S tout entier. Mais <il a été posé que> M n'était pas dans S tout entier; or que M soit dans S tout entier et qu'à la fois il ne soit pas dans S tout entier, cela est impossible. Et encore autrement: tout homme est rationnel, non tout animal est rationnel, et l'on conclut: non tout animal est homme. Si quelqu'un dit que ce n'est pas concluant, réponds lui: à raison de la contradiction, il est nécessairement vrai que ou bien non tout animal est homme ou bien tout animal est homme; donc en suivant ce que tu dis, <on aurait>: tout animal est homme, tout homme est rationnel, et l'on conclut: tout animal est rationnel, ce qui se trouve être le premier mode de la première figure, <à savoir> que de deux affirmatives universelles on conclut une affirmative universelle. Mais il a été assumé que non tout animal est rationnel, et il est impossible que soient vrais ensemble <les deux membres de> la contradiction: tout animal est rationnel, non tout animal est rationnel.

Dans la troisième figure il y a six modes.

A Premier mode: d'une majeure universelle affirmative et d'une mineure universelle affirmative, on conclut une affirmative particulière. Soit le <terme> majeur P, le <terme> mineur R, le <terme> moyen S. Si P et R sont dans S tout entier, P est dans quelque instance de R. On le montre à l'aide d'une conversion, comme ceci: si R est dans S tout entier, S est dans quelque instance de R, et l'on trouve le troisième mode de la première figure: P est dans S tout entier, et S est dans quelque instance de R, <donc> P est dans quelque instance de R. Et encore autrement: tout homme est mortel, tout homme est rationnel, et l'on conclut: quelque rationnel est mortel. Si quelqu'un dit que ce n'est pas concluant, convertis l'affirmative qui dit: tout homme est rationnel, et dis: alors quelque rationnel est homme; et ensuite résous <le syllogisme>: quelque rationnel est homme, tout homme est mortel, et conclus: quelque rationnel est mortel, ce qui se trouve être le troisième mode de la première figure.

B Deuxième mode: d'une mineure universelle affirmative et d'une majeure universelle négative, on conclut une négative particulière. Si R est dans S tout entier, P dans aucune instance de S, P n'est pas dans R tout entier. On le montre à l'aide d'une conversion, car si R est dans S tout entier, S est dans quelque instance de R; et l'on trouve le quatrième mode de la première figure: P n'est dans aucune instance de S, S est dans quelque instance de R, <donc> P n'est pas dans R tout entier. Et encore autrement: tout homme est mortel, et aucun homme n'est cheval, et l'on conclut: non tout mortel est cheval. Si quelqu'un dit que ce n'est pas concluant, convertis l'affirmative qui dit: tout homme est mortel, et dis: quelque mortel est homme, et ensuite résous <le syllogisme>: quelque mortel est homme, et aucun homme n'est cheval, et conclus: non tout mortel est cheval. Ce qui se trouve être le quatrième mode de la première figure.

G Troisième mode: d'une mineure universelle affirmative et d'une majeure particulière affirmative, on conclut une affirmative particulière. Ainsi, si R est dans S tout entier, et P dans quelque instance de S, P est dans quelque instance de R. On le montre à l'aide de deux conversions, comme ceci: si P est dans quelque instance de S, S est dans quelque instance de P, et l'on trouve le troisième mode de la première figure: si R est dans S tout entier, et S dans quelque instance de P, R est dans quelque instance de P. Mais il n'a pas été posé que d'une prémisses mineure soit conclue une proposition majeure, mais la majeure l'emporte sur la mineure, et celle-ci est la première <dans la formule dite>, que si R est dans quelque instance de P, P est dans quelque instance de R. Et encore autrement: tout homme est mortel, quelque homme est rationnel, et l'on conclut: quelque mortel est rationnel. Si quelqu'un dit que ce n'est pas concluant, convertis l'affirmative qui dit: quelque homme est rationnel, et dis: quelque rationnel est homme, et ensuite résous <le syllogisme>: quelque rationnel est homme, tout homme est mortel, et conclus: quelque rationnel est mortel. Et maintenant convertis la conclusion qui dit: quelque rationnel est mortel, et dis: quelque mortel est rationnel; et l'on trouve le troisième mode de la première figure. Si quelqu'un demande pourquoi l'affirmative universelle n'a pas été convertie, réponds lui: parce que l'universelle se convertit en particulière, et que de deux particulières ne résulte pas de conclusion.

D Quatrième mode: d'une mineure particulière affirmative et d'une majeure universelle affirmative, on conclut une affirmative particulière. Par exemple, si R est dans quelque instance de S, et P dans S tout entier, P est dans quelque instance de R. On le montre à l'aide d'une conversion: si R est dans quelque instance de S, S est dans quelque instance de R, et l'on trouve le troisième mode de la première figure: P est dans S tout entier, S est dans quelque instance de R, <donc> P est dans quelque instance de R. Et encore autrement: quelque homme est rationnel, tout homme est mortel, et l'on conclut: quelque rationnel est mortel. Si quelqu'un dit que ce n'est pas concluant, convertis l'affirmative qui dit: quelque homme est rationnel, et dis: quelque rationnel est homme, et résous <le syllogisme>: quelque rationnel est homme, tout homme est mortel, et conclus: quelque rationnel est mortel, ce qui se trouve être le troisième mode de la première figure.

H Cinquième mode: d'une mineure universelle affirmative, et d'une majeure particulière négative, on conclut une négative particulière. On le montre à l'aide de l'impossible. Si R est dans S tout entier, et que P n'est pas dans S tout entier, P n'est pas dans R tout entier. Sinon, que P soit dans R tout entier; et puisque R est dans S tout entier, il se trouve que P est dans S tout entier. Mais il a été assumé qu'il n'est pas dans S tout entier. Et que P soit et ne soit pas, à la fois, dans S tout entier, c'est impossible. Et encore autrement: tout homme est mortel, non tout homme est philosophe, et l'on conclut: non tout mortel est philosophe. Si quelqu'un dit que ce n'est pas concluant, <on répond que>, à raison de la contradiction, <le prédicat philosophe> est nécessairement vrai ou bien de tout ou bien de non tout <mortel>; puisque <à supposer la conclusion fautive par hypothèse> il n'est pas vrai de non tout, il est vrai de tout. Donc tout homme est mortel, tout mortel est philosophe, et l'on conclut: tout homme est philosophe. Mais il a été assumé que non tout homme est philosophe, et voici que l'on conclut: tout homme est philosophe; survient donc une contradiction qui dit: tout homme est philosophe, non tout homme est philosophe, ce qui est impossible.

W¹³⁰ Sixième mode: d'une mineure particulière affirmative, et d'une majeure universelle négative, on conclut une négative particulière. Si R est dans quelque instance de S, P dans aucune instance de S, P n'est pas dans R tout entier. On le montre à l'aide d'une conversion. Si R est dans quelque instance de S, S est dans quelque instance de R, et l'on trouve le quatrième mode de la première figure: P n'est dans aucune instance de S, S dans quelque instance de R, donc P n'est pas dans R tout entier. Et encore autrement: quelque homme est mortel, et aucun homme n'est cheval, et l'on conclut: non tout mortel est cheval. Si quelqu'un dit que ce n'est pas concluant, convertis la prémisse qui dit: quelque homme est mortel, et dis: si quelque homme est mortel, quelque mortel est homme, et ensuite résous <le syllogisme>: quelque mortel est homme, et aucun homme n'est cheval; et l'on conclut: non tout mortel est cheval; ce qui se trouve être le quatrième mode de la première figure.

<Formules ne produisant pas de syllogismes>¹³¹

Première figure.

A De deux affirmatives particulières qui ne tiennent pas¹³²: quelque homme est mortel, quelque mortel est cheval, et l'on conclut: quelque homme est cheval.¹³³

B De deux négatives universelles qui ne tiennent pas: aucun homme n'est pierre, aucune pierre n'est animal, et l'on conclut: aucun homme n'est animal.¹³⁴

G De deux négatives particulières qui ne tiennent pas: non tout mortel est rationnel, non tout rationnel a une vie bornée; et l'on conclut: non tout mortel a une vie bornée.¹³⁵

Deuxième figure.

A De deux affirmatives particulières qui ne tiennent pas: quelque cheval est animal, quelque homme est animal, et l'on conclut: quelque cheval est homme.

B De deux négatives universelles qui ne tiennent pas: aucun homme n'est pierre, aucun animal n'est pierre, et l'on conclut: aucun homme n'est animal.

G De deux négatives particulières qui ne tiennent pas: non tout homme est philosophe, non tout <être> capable de rire est philosophe, et l'on conclut: non tout homme est capable de rire.

Troisième figure.

A De deux affirmatives particulières qui ne tiennent pas: quelque mortel est cheval, quelque mortel est homme, et l'on conclut: quelque cheval est homme.

B De deux négatives universelles qui ne tiennent pas: aucune pierre n'est homme, aucune pierre n'est capable de rire, et l'on conclut: aucun homme n'est capable de rire.

G De deux négatives particulières qui ne tiennent pas: non tout animal est homme, non tout animal est capable de rire, et l'on conclut: non tout homme est capable de rire.

Fin du commentaire du livre des *Analytiques* composé par le savant Proba.

Notes à la traduction

¹ Dans la recension anonyme du commentaire d'Ammonius sur les *Premiers Analytiques*, l'énumération des points principaux à examiner, en commençant la lecture de tout ouvrage, vient après que l'auteur a défini le but visé par le philosophe comme étant l'examen des réalités (ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐξέτασις), qu'il atteint par l'étude des voix (φωναί) signifiantes. Le classement de ces voix, selon l'ordre croissant de complexité syntaxique, permet d'ordonner les ouvrages du corpus logique en *Catégories* (traitant des mots isolés), *Peri Hermeneias* (traitant des mots composés en phrase simple), *Premiers Analytiques* (traitant des phrases composées en syllogismes), puis selon la nature des syllogismes, en *Seconds Analytiques*, *Topiques* et *Réfutations sophistiques*. C'est au terme de cette analyse que le commentateur s'estime en mesure d'énumérer les points en question, en même temps que de donner les réponses les concernant. Cf. Ammon., *In An. Pr.*, p. 1.3-5.9 Wallies (*CAG* IV.6, Berlin 1899). Dans la recension du commentaire d'Ammonius rédigée par Philopon, au contraire, les points principaux sont énumérés dès les premières lignes du commentaire, comme dans le traité de Proba: cf. Philop., *In An. Pr.*, p. 1.5-10 Wallies (*CAG* XIII.2, Berlin 1905).

² Il s'agit, selon toute vraisemblance, du commentaire composé par Proba sur le *Peri Hermeneias*, qui contient, en effet, l'énumération des sept points que l'on retrouve dans le présent commentaire: cf. Hoffmann, *De Hermeneuticis apud Syros Aristoteleis* (cité plus haut, p. 106 n. 8), p. 83.23-30 (syr.), p. 90 (trad.) et la note p. 113.

³ Ammon., *In An. Pr.*, p. 4.36-5.5 Wallies, énumère les six points suivants: le but, l'ordre de lecture, l'utilité, l'authenticité, la partie (de la philosophie) à laquelle l'ouvrage se rapporte, le titre. Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 1.4-10 Wallies, déclare pour sa part qu'il a déjà énuméré, dans les traités antérieurs, les six points qu'il faut traiter avant la lecture de chacun des ouvrages d'Aristote, et il les rappelle, à savoir: le but, l'utilité, l'ordre de lecture, la raison du titre, l'authenticité, la division en chapitres. Puis, il précise aussitôt (p. 1.9-10), qu'il va ajouter un septième point: à quelle partie de la philosophie le traité se rattache, et s'il se place, ou non, sous l'une des parties de celle-ci. Par cette dernière précision, il annonce évidemment la fameuse discussion sur la question de savoir si la logique est partie ou instrument de la philosophie. Proba énumère les mêmes points que Philopon, et dans le même ordre, à la seule exception de l'interversion des points touchant l'authenticité et la raison du titre.

⁴ L'objet visé par les *Premiers Analytiques* est présenté par Ammonius (nous désignerons ainsi désormais la recension anonyme) au moyen de l'expression περί συλλογισμοῦ ἀπλῶς (p. 4.36), et par Philopon au moyen de l'expression περί τοῦ ἀπλῶς καὶ καθόλου συλλογισμοῦ (p. 4.20). Le mot syriaque *kullonoyo*, par lequel Proba qualifie le syllogisme qui est l'objet visé par les *Premiers Analytiques*, correspond bien, pour le sens, au mot grec καθόλου, employé par Philopon.

⁵ Cette division devenue traditionnelle des sortes de syllogismes se rencontre, par exemple, chez Alexandre, *In An. Pr.*, p. 7.7-9 Wallies (*CAG* II.1, Berlin 1883): συλλογισμοῦ δὲ ὄντος οὐ πάντως ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις διὰ τὸ συλλογισμὸν εἶναι καὶ διαλεκτικὸν τινα καὶ σοφιστικόν; cf. *Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.1-7*, transl. Barnes (cité plus haut, p. 108 n. 22) [désormais: trad. Barnes], p. 49 (et la note 49, où d'autres références sont signalées): "but if there is a syllogism, there need not be a demonstration, because there are also dialectical and sophistical syllogisms". La division est reprise par Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 2.10-16 Wallies, et par Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 2.22- 4.14. Sur la division des syllogismes, voir un exposé d'ensemble dans notre introduction, p. 117-20.

⁶ Les trois chapitres, qui étaient décrits dans la partie perdue du texte de Proba, devaient correspondre aux trois chapitres dont les titres, d'après les explications d'Ammonius portant (à propos du titre du traité) sur les notions d'analyse et de synthèse dans les syllogismes, devaient être (*In An. Pr.*, p. 6.31 Wallies): Συνθετικά, Εὐρετικά, Ἀναλυτικά. Philopon omet le second titre, mais il note que, si le syllogisme est synthèse et rassemblement de plusieurs énoncés, le traité devrait

plutôt être intitulé *Συνθετικά* (*In An. Pr.*, p. 5.21-24). La même tripartition du traité est décrite en des termes un peu différents aussi bien par Ammonius (*In An. Pr.*, p. 6.14-17 Wallies) que par Philopon (*In An. Pr.*, p. 5.25-28), que nous citons: *διαριεῖται τοῦτο τὸ βιβλίον εἰς κεφάλαια τρία, καὶ διδάσκει ἡμᾶς τὸ μὲν πρῶτον μέρος τὴν γένεσιν τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ, τὸ δὲ δεῦτερον τὴν εὐπορίαν τῶν προτάσεων, τὸ δὲ τρίτον τὴν εἰς τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς ἀνάλυσιν* (“Ce traité se divise en trois chapitres: sa première partie nous enseigne la production du syllogisme, la deuxième la bonne fourniture des prémisses, et la troisième l’analyse des syllogismes”). La même division se trouve dans le commentaire de David conservé en arménien: cf. David the Invincible, *Commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics*. Old Armenian Text with an English Translation, Introduction and Notes by A. Topchyan, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2010 (Philosophia Antiqua, 122; Commentaria in Aristotelem Armeniaca, 2), p. 45. Que les trois chapitres mentionnés par Proba aient été nommés d’après les titres cités plus haut, ou d’après la division en termes de *γένεσις*, *εὐπορία* et *ἀνάλυσις*, c’est bien à la tradition de cette tripartition que font allusion ses propos.

⁷ Le titre des *Analytiques* est emprunté au chapitre le plus scientifique et le plus précieux (*ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐπιστημονικωτέρου καὶ τοῦ τιμιωτέρου*) selon Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 6.32 Wallies, qui note aussi que celui qui sait analyser scientifiquement, sait aussi faire la synthèse correspondante. Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 5.29 Wallies, note également que la troisième partie du traité est la plus importante et la plus achevée (*κυριωτέρας καὶ τελειωτέρας*), et il ajoute, p. 5.30-6.1, la précision que, l’analyse une fois effectuée, la synthèse n’est pas difficile, alors qu’il n’en va pas de même dans le cas inverse.

⁸ Ces lignes sur la difficulté comparée de la composition et de la résolution, qui visent à montrer que la résolution est en définitive d’un ordre de difficulté plus élevé que la composition, sont sans parallèle dans les commentaires d’Ammonius et de Philopon, *ad. loc.* Voir toutefois la note précédente à propos de la brève remarque faite par Philopon, sur la facilité avec laquelle la synthèse s’effectue après la réalisation de l’analyse.

⁹ La question “à quoi se rapporte” (en grec: *ὑπὸ ποῖον τῆς φιλοσοφίας μέρος ἀνάγεται*) le traité des *Premiers Analytiques* est traditionnellement le lieu de la discussion sur ce qu’est la logique, partie ou instrument de la philosophie: voir, en particulier, Ammon., *In An. Pr.*, p. 8.15-11.21 Wallies; Philop., *In An. Pr.*, p. 6.19-9.20 Wallies. Le débat est exposé par Alexandre d’Aphrodise au tout début de son commentaire: cf. *In An. Pr.*, p. 1.7-2.33 Wallies; voir aussi la traduction, et ses notes, dans *Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle Prior Analytics*, p. 41-43. La discussion de cette question avait été introduite par le philosophe syriaque Sergius de Reš’aina († 536), dans son commentaire sur les *Catégories*: voir la traduction (et son commentaire) dans H. Hugonnard-Roche, *La logique d’Aristote du grec au syriaque*. (cité plus haut, p. 106 n. 1), p. 197-202 et 221-31. Les trois positions, représentées par les Stoïciens, Aristote et Platon, sont celles que décrivent les commentateurs grecs à propos du débat, dont Proba va donner un exposé très abrégé.

¹⁰ Proba donne un exposé fidèle, mais très sommaire, de la structure de l’argument stoïcien, tel qu’il est décrit chez Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 9.5-35 Wallies, et Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 6.25-7.7 Wallies. Toutefois, l’exemple de l’astronomie est propre à Proba, et si la médecine est mentionnée par Ammonius, c’est pour expliquer que, étant donné qu’aucune autre technique que la médecine n’utilise la chirurgie comme partie ou partie de partie d’elle-même, la chirurgie est partie de la médecine. L’exemple est donc employé à des fins différentes de celles de Proba. Quant au sujet et à la fin de la partie théorique de la philosophie, ils sont définis par Proba en termes proches, mais non point identiques à ceux que l’on rencontre chez Ammonius et Philopon; s’agissant du sujet et de la fin de la partie pratique, ils en diffèrent en ce que seul Proba mentionne les âmes humaines. Pour une comparaison de Proba avec Ammonius et Philopon, ainsi qu’avec Sergius de Reš’aina, sur ces sujets, voir Hugonnard-Roche, *La logique d’Aristote*, p. 224-26.

¹¹ Une semblable démarche réfutative d’ensemble se trouve dans Ammon., *In An. Pr.*, p. 9.36-10.7 Wallies, qui emprunte son contre-exemple, non pas à la médecine comme Proba, mais à l’art du forgeron, dont l’enclume n’est pas une partie, mais un instrument; il présente en outre l’argument stoïcien comme un paralogisme, à savoir celui d’une énumération incomplète des membres de la disjonction dans la prémisse majeure. Même démarche réfutative d’ensemble encore dans Philop., *In An. Pr.*, p. 7.10-22 Wallies, qui ne donne pas de contre-exemple.

¹² Il faut comprendre que le nouvel élément ajouté à la division arrangée par les stoïciens ne permet pas de soutenir leur argument.

¹³ Cet argument est le premier dans la présentation d’Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 9.1-2 Wallies, qui le réfute aussi à l’aide d’un contre-exemple, non point tiré toutefois de l’art de la médecine, mais de celui du forgeron, dont l’enclume n’est pas une partie, mais un instrument (p. 9.36-10.1).

¹⁴ On peut lire un passage parallèle et un argument semblable dans Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 10.9-20 Wallies, où l’on trouve également l’exemple de la comparaison entre l’art de la fabrication du mors et celui de l’équitation. Voir de même Philop., *In An. Pr.*, p. 7.17-8.16 Wallies, où se trouvent aussi, parmi divers autres exemples soutenant le même argument, ceux de la fabrication du mors comparée à l’équitation, et de la rhétorique comparée à la philosophie. La grammaire et la rhétorique ensemble (jointes à la médecine) se trouvent prises comme exemples également dans le même contexte par

Olympiodore, *Proleg.*, p. 16. 3-4 Busse (*CAG XII*, Berlin 1902). On peut lire également une argumentation et des exemples semblables chez Sergius de Reš'aina, cf. Hugonnard-Roche, *La logique d'Aristote*, p. 199-200, et p. 226-27, où l'on trouvera d'autres références sur les sources de ce type d'argumentation.

¹⁵ Une même formulation de cette règle est donnée en exemple, également à propos de la position platonicienne dans la discussion en cours, par Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 9.9-10 Wallies.

¹⁶ Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 10.38-11.20 Wallies, et Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 9.5-17 Wallies, expriment autrement l'objet de la logique, en tant qu'elle est partie de la philosophie: à l'opposé de la logique prise comme instrument qui considère les règles dépouillées des réalités, la logique prise comme partie considère les règles en même temps que les choses. L'exemple en est clairement exposé par Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 11.6-11 Wallies, qui donne d'abord un syllogisme du premier mode de la première figure (Barbara), formulé à l'aide des lettres A, B, G, puis le même syllogisme, dans lequel les lettres de schéma ont été remplacées par les termes "âme", "automotrice", "toujours mue", "éternelle". Philopon, dans le lieu cité ci-dessus, expose la même distinction, en précisant que c'est l'addition ou la soustraction de la matière qui distingue les deux rôles de la logique (p. 9.15-17): εἰ μὲν μεθ' ὕλης λαμβάνοιτο, ἔσται μέρος τοῦ μετρούμενου, εἰ δὲ ἄνευ ὕλης, τουτέστιν αὐτὸ τὸ μέτρον, ἔσται ὄργανον. οὕτω καὶ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ παρὰ τῷ Πλάτῳ. On ne trouve chez aucun des deux auteurs la caractérisation formulée par Proba, ni d'ailleurs chez Olympiodore, Élias ou David.

¹⁷ La reprise de la division triple du syllogisme, à la fin du *prooemium*, se retrouve également chez Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 11.22-38 Wallies, mais sous une forme différente: le commentateur grec se borne à mettre en relation les trois espèces du syllogisme, apodictique, dialectique et sophistique, avec les traités qu'Aristote est censé avoir consacrés à chacune de ces espèces, *Seconds Analytiques*, *Topiques* et *Réfutations sophistiques*, et il caractérise en outre la *Rhétorique* et la *Poétique* comme traitant des espèces non syllogistiques de la logique. Philopon omet cette division à la fin du *prooemium*. Sur cette division du syllogisme et sur les trois autres divisions qui ci-après mettent en jeu les syllogismes apodictique, dialectique et sophistique, voir l'introduction p. 117-20.

¹⁸ La présentation des deux dernières espèces est différente chez Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 2.14-16 Wallies, qui déclare que les syllogismes dialectiques sont tantôt vrais, tantôt faux, et que les syllogismes sophistiques sont faux. C'est une thèse proche qu'expose aussi Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 2.24-35 Wallies. En revanche, la tripartition de Proba fait partiellement écho à la division qui se trouve dans le fragment conservé du commentaire d'Élias sur les *Premiers Analytiques*, édité par L.G. Westerink, "Elias on the *Prior Analytics*", *Mnemosyne* 24 (1961), p. 126-39, à la p. 139, dont voici le texte: πενταχῶς δὲ λεγόμενου τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ· ἡ γὰρ πάντη ἀληθεῖς εἰσὶν αἱ προτάσεις, καὶ γίνεται ὁ ἀποδεικτικὸς· ἡ πάντη ψευδεῖς καὶ μυθώδεις, καὶ γίνεται ὁ ποιητικὸς· ἡ πῆ μὲν ἀληθεῖς πῆ δὲ ψευδεῖς, καὶ τοῦτο τριχῶς· ἡ γὰρ μᾶλλον ἀληθεῖς, καὶ γίνεται ὁ διαλεκτικὸς καὶ ἔνδοξος· ἡ μᾶλλον ψευδεῖς, καὶ γίνεται ὁ σοφιστικὸς· ἡ ἐξ ἴσου ἀληθεῖς καὶ ψευδεῖς, καὶ γίνεται ὁ ῥητορικὸς. La même division se trouve dans Élias, *In Cat.*, p. 116.35-117.8 Busse (*CAG XVIII*, Berlin 1900); cf. le texte cité ci-dessus dans notre introduction, p. 118. Si l'on met de côté les syllogismes poétiques et rhétoriques, on voit que les qualifications des syllogismes, non seulement apodictiques, mais aussi dialectiques et sophistiques, sont exprimées en des termes voisins chez Proba et chez Élias, encore que chez ce dernier les critères de vérité et de fausseté s'appliquent aux propositions, et non au syllogisme construit à l'aide de celles-ci. Une division des cinq sortes de syllogismes, identique à celle d'Élias, se trouve également dans le commentaire arménien de David: cf. la traduction anglaise du passage dans David the Invincible, *Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics*, p. 35 Topchyan.

¹⁹ Une triple division, parallèle à celle de Proba, est décrite par Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 2.29-31 Wallies, selon qui la prise en considération des trois éléments de cette division que sont τὸ γινώσκον, τὸ γινωσκόμενον, τὴν μεταξὺ τούτων γνῶσιν, permet de mieux montrer la différence entre les diverses sortes de syllogismes. Voir de même Philop., *In An. Pr.*, p. 1.14-18 Wallies.

²⁰ Dans son commentaire sur la *Peri Hermeneias*, Ammonius énumère les cinq facultés de l'âme mentionnées par Proba: cf. Ammon., *In De Int.*, p. 5.4 Busse (*CAG IV.5*, Berlin 1897): νοῦν διάνοιαν δόξαν φαντασίαν αἴσθησιν. Mais dans son commentaire *In An. Pr.*, p. 2.33 Wallies, il ne mentionne que trois facultés, la dianoétique, la doxastique, l'imaginative (τὸ διανοητικόν, τὸ δοξαστικόν, τὸ φανταστικόν), et il précise un peu plus loin (p. 3.17-19) que la faculté noétique a été laissée de côté, parce qu'elle ne connaît pas par syllogisme, mais par appréhension directe (ἀπλάτεις ἐπιβολαῖς); il omet d'autre part de parler du sens. Pour sa part, Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 1.19-20 Wallies, énonce une division de "ce qui connaît" (τὸ γινώσκον) semblable à celle que donne Proba, soit: νοῦς, διάνοια, δόξα, φαντασία, αἴσθησις. Il précise aussi (p. 1.20-2.2) que ni l'intellect ni le sens ne procèdent par syllogisme, le premier parce qu'il est plus fort que le raisonnement syllogistique, le second parce qu'il est plus faible. Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 2.2-11 Wallies, ajoute encore que l'imaginative non plus ne forme pas de syllogismes, parce qu'elle est lieu d'arrêt et de garde des apparences reçues de la sensation, tandis que le syllogisme est mouvement d'un donné vers ce qui ne l'a pas été; quant à la δόξα, elle ne forme pas non plus de syllogisme, car elle n'est rien d'autre qu'une conclusion obtenue par la διάνοια. Selon Philopon, donc, tous les syllogismes sont produits par la διάνοια, mais ils sont apodictiques, dialectiques ou sophistiques, selon que la διάνοια reçoit les prémisses de

ces syllogismes dialectiques respectivement du νοῦς, de la δόξα ou de la φαντασία. Une division proche de celle de Philopon, mais non point identique à elle, – et différente de celle de Proba –, se trouve dans David the Invincible, *Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics*, p. 37 Topchyan.

²¹ La division de la connaissance par Proba est formulée en des termes différents de ceux d'Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 3.26-29 Wallies, qui exprime la relation entre les trois sortes de syllogismes et les trois sortes de connaissances à l'aide des notions sémantiques du toujours vrai (syllogisme apodictique), toujours faux (syllogisme sophistique), tantôt vrai tantôt faux (syllogisme dialectique): πᾶσα γνώσις ἢ ἀεὶ ἀληθῆς ἐστὶν ἢ ἀεὶ ψευδῆς ἢ ποτὲ μὲν ἀληθῆς ποτὲ δὲ ψευδῆς· ὁ ἀποδεικτικὸς συλλογισμὸς ἀεὶ ἀληθῆς ἐστὶν, ὁ σοφιστικὸς ἀεὶ ψευδῆς, ὁ διαλεκτικὸς ποτὲ ἀληθῆς ποτὲ ψευδῆς. Voir de même Philop., *In An. Pr.*, p. 4.9-12 Wallies: on notera toutefois qu'il ajoute à la caractérisation de la connaissance toujours vraie celle d'ἀπταιστος, qui paraît relever du même type de classement que celui que l'on trouve dans Proba. La division des syllogismes selon la connaissance ne se trouve pas dans le texte d'Élias, ni dans celui de David.

²² La division correspondante d'Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 3.19-25 Wallies, n'est pas exprimée en termes de modalités logiques, mais en termes de modalités temporelles: ce qui existe toujours est l'objet du syllogisme apodictique, ce qui n'existe jamais est l'objet du syllogisme sophistique, ce qui tantôt existe et tantôt n'existe pas (comme les êtres soumis à la génération et à la corruption) est l'objet du syllogisme dialectique: ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ γινωσκομένου εἰλήφθω· ἢ ὄντα ἐστὶν καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα, ὡς τὰ νοητά, τὰ οὐράνια, ἢ μὴ ὄντα ἐστὶν, ὡς ὁ τραγέλαφος καὶ ὁ σκινδαψὸς καὶ τὸ βλίτυρι καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἢ πῆ μὲν ὄντα πῆ δὲ οὐκ ὄντα, ὡς τὰ ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀποδεικτικὸς συλλογισμὸς περὶ τὰ ὄντα καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντά ἐστιν· ὁ δὲ σοφιστικὸς περὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα, ὡς καὶ ὁ θεῖος Πλάτων λέγει ἐν τῷ Σοφιστῆ ὅτι περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔχει· ὁ δὲ διαλεκτικὸς ἔχει περὶ τὰ ποτὲ μὲν ὄντα ποτὲ δὲ μὴ ὄντα. Division semblable chez Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 4.4-9 Wallies. Cette division ne se trouve pas dans les commentaires d'Élias, ni de David, sur les *Premiers Analytiques*.

²³ Ce but a été mentionné, rappelons-le, au début du commentaire, cf. ci-dessus, p. 129 et n. 4. Quant à la divergence apparente entre le but annoncé par Aristote, qui serait de traiter du syllogisme apodictique, en grec περὶ ἀπόδειξιν (*An. Pr.* I, 1, 24 a 10-11), et le but effectivement visé par l'ouvrage, qui serait de traiter du syllogisme en général, cette divergence est notée par les commentateurs grecs, Ammon., *In An. Pr.*, p. 12.10-14 Wallies, et Philop., *In An. Pr.*, p. 10.4-7 Wallies. Voir aussi Élias, *In An. Pr.*, p. 138.18-19 Westerink.

²⁴ Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 12.14-27 Wallies, distingue, pour l'ensemble des *Analytiques*, une fin plus proche, le syllogisme pour les *Premiers Analytiques*, et une fin plus éloignée, la démonstration (ἀπόδειξις) pour les *Seconds Analytiques*, mais il prend pour point de comparaison un exemple différent de celui de Proba, à savoir celui de l'homme vertueux dont la fin proche est la vertu (ἀρετή), et la fin éloignée le bonheur (εὐδαιμονία). Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 10.9-25 Wallies, développe, en des termes un peu différents, une argumentation semblable quant au fond, et il donne comme illustration du double but visé par la recherche sur le syllogisme l'exemple de l'agriculteur qui donnerait comme but à l'agriculture la confection du pain, ou le charpentier qui dirait viser la construction des navires. Voir, dans le même sens, Élias, *In An. Pr.*, p. 138.18-26 Westerink, qui donne entre autres exemples celui de la saignée qui a pour fin la santé. Voir, de même encore, David the Invincible, *Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics*, p. 31-33 Topchyan, où se retrouve également l'exemple de la saignée, effectuée en vue de la santé.

²⁵ On peut lire une justification comparable qu'il faille examiner ces trois points, par exemple chez Ammon., *In An. Pr.*, p. 13.15-17 Wallies.

²⁶ Les neuf points énumérés par Proba reprennent le contenu des questions dont l'examen est annoncé par Aristote dès le début des *Premiers Analytiques* I, 1, 24 a 11-15: εἶτα διορίσαι τί ἐστὶ πρότασις καὶ τί ὅρος καὶ τί συλλογισμὸς, καὶ ποῖος τέλειος καὶ ποῖος ἀτελής, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί τὸ ἐν ὄλῳ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι τὸδε τῷδε, καὶ τί λέγομεν τὸ κατὰ παντὸς ἢ μηδενὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι. La présentation par Proba d'un double dénombrement en trois et six points n'apparaît pas explicitement dans les commentaires d'Ammonius, Philopon ou Élias. On notera que, dans l'énumération donnée par Proba, les deux points se rapportant à l'universel et au non universel reprennent ceux qui dans le texte d'Aristote sont exprimés par l'expression τὸ ἐν ὄλῳ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι τὸδε τῷδε (24 a 12-13). Par comparaison, observons que cette expression est traduite de manière littérale dans la version syriaque anonyme ancienne: voir notre introduction, ci-dessus p. 108.

²⁷ La même question, comportant une semblable alternative, est posée par Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, 14.5-11 Wallies, et par Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 10.31-11.2 Wallies.

²⁸ Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 14.13-18 Wallies, explique que, si d'autres auteurs avant Aristote – dont Platon –, avaient déjà employé le mot "proposition" (πρότασις), Aristote est le premier qui utilisa le mot "terme" (ὅρος) pour désigner ce qu'il entendait par ce mot.

²⁹ Cette explication se rapporte à la signification du mot syriaque *thūmo* qui signifie, dans cette langue, "terme", mais aussi "définition", "extrémité", "limite". Cette deuxième solution de l'aporie, relative à l'homonymie du mot "terme", en syriaque *thūmo*, n'a pas d'équivalent dans les commentaires d'Ammonius et de Philopon. Le mot grec ὅρος cependant

pouvait donner lieu à une semblable remarque, et il n'est pas impossible que Proba l'ait rencontrée dans une autre version du commentaire issu de l'enseignement d'Ammonius.

³⁰ Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 14.18-27 Wallies, et Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 11.7-9 Wallies, exposent, de manière plus explicite que Proba, qu'Aristote définit le terme comme "ce en quoi se résout la prémisse" (Ammon., *In An. Pr.*, p. 14.21-22: λέγει γὰρ "ὄρον δὲ καλῶ εἰς ὃν διαλύεται ἡ πρότασις"; cf. Aristote, *An. Pr. I*, 1, 24 b 16). Ammonius et Philopon présentent l'un et l'autre cette explication comme la plus vraie, et Ammonius dit aussi la plus persuasive. La comparaison proposée par Proba ne se trouve pas chez les deux commentateurs grecs.

³¹ Cette aporie ne figure pas dans les commentaires d'Ammonius et de Philopon, du moins *ad locum*. On pourrait penser qu'elle a été forgée par un ou des commentateurs pour introduire aux remarques de vocabulaire qui suivent dans le texte de Proba, et que l'on retrouve, plus longuement développées chez Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 11.19-36 Wallies, sans y être introduites par une aporie.

³² En réalité, il n'est pas question dans les *Catégories* de la φωνή (équivalent grec du mot syriaque *qolo*) au sens où l'entend Proba, et le mot n'y apparaît qu'une fois avec le sens d'émission vocale (*Cat.*, 6, 4 b 34). Mais c'est par construction de l'architecture de l'*Organon* que les commentateurs en sont venus à considérer que les *Catégories* traitaient des voix simples (ἀπλᾶ φωναί), et le *Peri Hermeneias* des mots composés en énoncés; cf., par exemple, Ammon., *In De Int.*, p. 9.28-29 Busse, remarquant qu'Aristote a traité des voix simples tout au long des *Catégories*.

³³ Arist., *Peri Hermeneias* 5, 17 a 17-18. Voir Ammon., *In De Int.*, p. 10.12-15 Busse, et Ammon., *In An. Pr.*, p. 16.9-13 Wallies; Philop., *In An. Pr.*, p. 11.19-24 Wallies.

³⁴ Alors que l'aporie dont ces lignes sont censées apporter la solution ne figure pas chez Ammonius ni Philopon, le contenu de la réponse est bien dans Philopon, où il apparaît sous forme de remarques faisant suite aux considérations sur la définition de "terme", et la place où il convient d'en traiter (cf. ci-dessus n. 30). Selon Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 11.19-25 Wallies, ὄρος, φάσις, ἀπλῆ φωνή, ὄνομα, ἔξιμα, sont même chose par le substrat (τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ), mais différent par la forme (τῇ σχήσει): ὄρος est utilisé pour désigner la partie du syllogisme, φάσις pour désigner la partie de la proposition, ὄνομα pour le sujet de la proposition, ἔξιμα pour le prédicat. Notons toutefois que Philopon ne se réfère pas explicitement à propos de cette leçon de vocabulaire aux *Catégories*, ni au *Peri Hermeneias*. On peut lire une semblable leçon dans Ammon., *In An. Pr.*, p. 16.9-22 Wallies.

³⁵ Cf. Arist., *An. Pr. I*, 1, 24 a 16-17. La définition de Proba suit de près le texte grec, sauf par l'emploi de la conjonction de coordination "et" (w-) avant "négative", au lieu de la particule disjonctive aw ("ou"). La traduction anonyme est identique au texte de Proba, si ce n'est qu'elle contient aw. Observons que la particule ἢ a fait difficulté pour Philopon. En effet, considérant à juste titre que l'extension du *definiendum* πρότασις devait être égale à celle du *definiens*, il suggérait d'interpréter ἢ dans le sens de καί: τὸν γὰρ 'ἢ' σύνδεσμον οὐ διαζευκτικὸν ἀλλὰ παραδιαζευκτικὸν ληψόμεθα ἀντὶ τοῦ 'καί', ἕνα ἄμφω κατὰ τοῦ γένους κατηγορεῖται τῆς ἀποφάνσεως ἢ προτάσεως (*In An. Pr.*, p. 17.24-26 Wallies). Ainsi, le *definiens* devrait être composé tout à la fois de l'affirmative et de la négative τὸ γὰρ καταφατικὸς ἢ (= καί) ἀποφατικὸς (*ibid.*, p. 17.22 Wallies). Sur ce sujet, lire l'analyse critique de la position de Philopon dans Tae-Soo Lee, *Die griechische Tradition der aristotelischen Syllogistik in der Spätantike. Eine Untersuchung über die Kommentare zu den analytica priora von Alexander Aphrodisiensis, Ammonius und Philoponus*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1984 (Hypomnemata, 79), p. 60-61. On peut se demander si la traduction du texte d'Aristote donnée par Proba ne reflète pas la discussion par Philopon sur ce point. Par ailleurs, nous avons adopté la traduction "indéfinie", afin de conserver la parenté entre le mot syriaque ici utilisé et celui de même racine par lequel est désignée la définition.

³⁶ Nous avons ajouté les mots entre crochets pour tenter de rendre le texte syriaque, sans nous obliger à de longues périphrases: le mot "sur" traduit le mot syriaque *al*, qui rend κατὰ dans la traduction de τινος κατὰ τινος, tandis que le mot "séparé" sert à traduire le mot syriaque *men*, qui rendrait ἀπό dans la traduction de τινος ἀπό τινος. L'aporie mentionnée par Proba se rattache évidemment à la remarque faite par Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 16.29.31 Wallies, que la définition de la prémisse enveloppe la question de sa qualité et de sa quantité: ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἐρμηνείας μεμαθήκαμεν, τὸ μὲν τί ἐστὶν ποσὸν τῶν προτάσεων, τὸ δὲ ποιόν· ἀφ' ἑκατέρου οὖν ὀρίζεται τὴν πρότασιν, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ποσοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ποιού. Et Ammonius poursuit en donnant, relativement à la qualité, la définition suivante, qui mentionne tout à la fois l'affirmative et la négative: ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ποιού εἰπὼν λόγος καταφατικὸς ἢ ἀποφατικὸς τινος κατὰ τινος ἢ τινος ἀπὸ τινος. Plus loin, Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 17.10-16 Wallies, observe que les éditions plus récentes comportent le texte entier cité, tandis que les éditions et les copies anciennes omettent la fin du texte, à savoir ἢ τινος ἀπὸ τινος. Proba n'avait manifestement connaissance que du texte des éditions "anciennes".

³⁷ Comparer sur ce point l'interprétation d'Alexandre, *In An. Pr.*, p. 11.22-26 Wallies: τὸ δὲ κατὰ τινος καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀποφάσεως εἶπεν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀποφάσει ὑποκείμενός τις ὄρος ἐστὶ καὶ κατηγορούμενος· τὸ γὰρ κατὰ τινος νῦν οὐ τοῦ καταφατικοῦ δηλωτικὸν ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου, ὃ κατηγορεῖται ἢ καταφατικῶς ἢ ἀποφατικῶς (cf. trad. Barnes, p. 57). Selon Alexandre, dans le texte d'Aristote en question, l'expression κατὰ τινος ne signifie donc pas l'affir-

mation, mais la prédication, et elle s'applique aussi bien à la proposition affirmative qu'à la négative. Les exemples "Socrate marche" et "Socrate ne marche pas" se trouvent chez Philopon, lorsqu'il s'agit de montrer qu'on ne saurait concéder que l'affirmative serait plus simple tandis que la négative serait plus complexe: en effet, la négative ne contient pas le signifié de l'affirmative, c'est l'expression vocale qui est plus complexe, non le signifié; dans la phrase "Socrate ne marche pas", il n'y a pas la phrase "Socrate marche", mais de même que la phrase "Socrate marche" dit que la marche appartient à Socrate, la phrase "Socrate ne marche pas" dit que la marche ne lui appartient pas (cf. *In An. Pr.*, p. 16.9-16 Wallies). Par là Philopon rejoint le point de vue d'Alexandre, et c'est ce que dit aussi Proba.

³⁸ Le mot *kulhad* utilisé par Proba est une traduction imparfaite de l'expression grecque καθ' ἑκαστον, ου καθ' ἑκαστα, employée par Aristote et les commentateurs pour désigner les réalités singulières, et par suite les propositions singulières; cf. Arist., *De Int.* 7, 17 a 38-39: τὰ δὲ καθ' ἑκαστον. Ammon., *In De Int.*, p. 88.29-89.2 Busse, divise les prémisses en universelles et en singulières à partir de la nature signifiée par le sujet (ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου), selon qu'elle est dite d'une pluralité (κατὰ πλείονων οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἢ ζῷον) ou d'un seul individu (καθ' ἑνὸς οἷον Σωκράτης ἢ Πλάτων).

³⁹ Proba souligne que le sujet d'une prémisses attributive particulière est un universel. L'expression syriaque *lo kul* est la transposition littérale du grec μὴ παντί (dans une formule telle que: τὸ Α μὴ παντί τῷ Β), que nous avons choisi de rendre littéralement dans notre traduction. Cette négation "forte" exprimée à l'aide de la formule μὴ παντί signifie que le prédicat n'est pas attribué à tout le sujet, à la différence de la négation "faible" exprimée à l'aide de la formule μὴ τινί qui signifie que le prédicat n'est pas attribué au moins à quelque partie du sujet (cf. Arist., *An. Pr.* I 1, 24 a 18); voir, par exemple, sur ce sujet les explications claires de Granger, *La théorie aristotélicienne de la science* (cité plus haut, p. 121 n. 60), p. 122-5.

⁴⁰ Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 21.25-22.3 Wallies, ne traite pas de la distinction entre deux types de syllogismes, mais de la distinction entre la proposition apodictique et la proposition dialectique, comme Aristote, *An. Pr.* I 1, 24 a 22-25. Quant aux critères de la distinction qu'il mentionne, ce sont, d'une part l'usage (χρησις) que l'on fait de ces propositions en vue soit de la réfutation d'un adversaire dans la discussion dialectique, soit de l'assomption d'une proposition vraie dans la démarche démonstrative, d'autre part la nature des choses (ἡ φύσις τῶν πραγμάτων): le dialecticien pose ce qui paraît recevable à ses adversaires, que ce soit vrai ou faux, tandis que celui qui démontre n'assume que ce qui est vrai. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 19.13-20.9 Wallies, quant à lui, distingue la proposition apodictique de la dialectique selon les deux critères de la matière et de l'usage (ἀπὸ τε τῆς ὕλης καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς χρήσεως): selon la matière, la proposition apodictique porte sur des choses nécessaires (toujours semblables), tandis que la dialectique porte sur les choses apparentes (φαινόμενα) et les choses acceptées (ἐνδοξα); selon l'usage, la proposition dialectique est l'assomption d'une partie d'une contradiction, et la dialectique est d'abord une question, mais au moment de former un syllogisme elle est l'assomption d'une partie d'une contradiction. De même déjà Alexandre, *In An. Pr.* I 1, p. 12.6-19 Wallies, distinguait entre propositions démonstratives et propositions dialectiques à l'aide des critères de l'usage et de la matière, en remarquant que les différences entre propositions correspondaient aux différences entre syllogismes (trad. Barnes p. 58-9). Tout en substituant le critère de la fin à celui de la matière, Proba retrouve les caractéristiques essentielles des distinctions aristotéliciennes: le critère de l'utilité se rapporte à l'élément pragmatique de la description aristotélicienne, tandis que le critère de la fin retient l'élément sémantique de cette description, tel du moins qu'il a été interprété dans une partie de la tradition, à savoir dans les termes d'une quantification temporelle sur la notion de vérité. Sur ce point, cf. Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, translated, with introduction, notes, and commentary, by R. Smith, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis-Cambridge 1989, p. 107-8 (à propos de *An. Pr.* I 1, 24 a 22 - b 15).

⁴¹ Les mots *huššobe gawnoye* ("notions communes") sont l'équivalent syriaque des mots grecs κοινὰς ἐννοίας par lesquels Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 24.8 Wallies glose le mot ὑποθέσεις utilisé par Aristote pour désigner les principes initiaux à partir desquels procède la déduction apodictique (*Anal. Pr.* I 1, 24 a 30 - b 10: διὰ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑποθέσεων). Même explication du passage d'Aristote chez Ammon., *In An. Pr.*, p. 21.5-6 Wallies: τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀντι τοῦ 'τῶν ἀνωθεν ποθεν ἀπὸ κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν λαμβανομένων', et encore *ibid.* p. 21.9-10: ἐξ ὑποθέσεων τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἀντι τοῦ 'ἀπὸ τῶν οικείων ἀρχῶν καὶ οἷον ἀπὸ κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν'. Dès le *proemium*, Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 2.24-27 Wallies, notait que la διάνοια formait le syllogisme apodictique, toujours vrai, à partir de principes, qu'il disait s'appeler κοινὰς ἐννοιαί, elles-mêmes toujours vraies et certaines par elles-mêmes: ἢ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ τὰς ἀρχὰς δεξαμένη ἢ διάνοια συλλογίζεται, ἃς καὶ καλοῦμεν κοινὰς ἐννοίας, καὶ ποεῖ τὸν ἀποδεικτικὸν συλλογισμόν αἰεὶ ἀληθῆ ὄντα καὶ μηδέποτε ψευδόμενον, ἐπεὶ καὶ αἰ κοινὰς ἐννοιαὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμὸς αἰεὶ ἀληθεῖς καὶ αὐτόπιστοι.

⁴² Voir ci-dessus, p. 131, le tableau de la division des syllogismes et les notes afférentes, ainsi que notre introduction, p. 117-20.

⁴³ Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 20.19-22 Wallies, se contente de signaler qu'Aristote n'a pas mentionné la proposition sophistique, parce que le syllogisme sophistique est à fuir, comme étant nuisible, et que s'il faut le connaître, c'est pour l'éviter. Plus brièvement encore, Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 21.24-25 Wallies, dit qu'Aristote a omis la proposition sophistique comme totalement inutile.

⁴⁴ À propos de ces lignes, van Hoonacker, p. 133 note 3, renvoie au texte d'Aristote, *Top.* III 1, mais il s'agit là du lieu du préférable, qui n'a rien à faire avec la question ici envisagée.

⁴⁵ La citation d'Aristote, *An. Pr.* I 1, 24 b 16-18, est une traduction littérale du grec et elle est quasi identique à la traduction anonyme, (sauf le *haw* avant *d-alawbi*; cf. Nagy, "Una versione siriana", p. 323-4). On notera que le texte traduit comportait la variante ἡ διαρουμεένου, absente des manuscrits selon les éditeurs Ross et Minio-Paluello (*Aristotelis Analytica Priora et Posteriora* (cité plus haut, p. 107 n. 13), p. 3, apparat critique), mais il est possible que Proba ait eu accès à un texte contenant cette variante, soit par une traduction existante, soit par un commentaire comportant cette variante, comme le font ceux d'Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 22.33-34 Wallies et de Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 25.29 Wallies, et déjà avant eux celui d'Alexandre, *In An. Pr.*, p. 15.4-5 Wallies (trad. Barnes, p. 61).

⁴⁶ Le mot *someb* doit être compris au sens technique de l'institution des noms. Alexandre, *In An. Pr.*, p. 14.25-27 Wallies, fait observer qu'en disant "j'appelle terme", Aristote semble indiquer que le mot n'était pas, en son temps, d'usage commun, au moins dans l'acception qu'il lui donne. Cf. aussi Ammon., *In An. Pr.*, p. 14.13-18 Wallies, qui oppose le mot "terme" (ὄρος) qu'Aristote est le premier à poser dans le sens qu'il lui confère, au mot πρότασις déjà utilisé par Platon et d'autres; cf. de même Ammon., *In An. Pr.*, p. 22.14-18 Wallies, où Aristote est qualifié, pour l'emploi de ce nom de ὀνοματοθέτης. Dans le même sens, voir la remarque de Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 25.4-8 Wallies, qui tire de l'expression d'Aristote l'idée qu'il semble avoir lui-même posé le nom de "terme".

⁴⁷ On ne rencontre ni chez Alexandre, ni chez Ammonius ou Philopon, ni non plus chez David, une telle justification de l'emploi du mot "terme" au moyen d'une comparaison avec le vocabulaire des géomètres. Et Euclide n'est pas cité par ces commentateurs grecs dans ce contexte. En revanche, Philopon expose que les figures (τὰ σχήματα) syllogistiques ont été ainsi désignées par analogie avec la désignation des figures géométriques, par Aristote qualifié à l'occasion de φιλοσοφώμετρος; cf. *In An. Pr.*, p. 66.27-32 Wallies. Dans son épître au périodeute Yonan, Sévère Sebokht explique à son tour de la même manière l'emploi par Aristote du mot σχήμα pour désigner les figures syllogistiques: cf. notre traduction dans Hugonnard-Roche, "Questions de logique", p. 67: "Si tu demandes d'autre part pourquoi il [Aristote] appelle simplement 'figure' une combinaison de la sorte que nous avons dite, il faut savoir qu'il a tiré ce nom de la géométrie, car lui aussi inscrit les liaisons des propositions sur certaines lignes géométriques, tout comme les géomètres font pour leurs démonstrations"; voir aussi notre commentaire *ibid.*, p. 90-91.

⁴⁸ Euclide, *Éléments* I, déf. 14: σχῆμά ἐστι τὸ ὑπὸ τινος ἢ τινῶν ὄρων περιεχόμενον; cf. aussi, par comparaison, la définition I, 13, du "terme": ὄρος ἐστίν, ὃ τινός ἐστι πέραις. Le fragment conservé d'une traduction syriaque du livre premier des *Éléments* d'Euclide ne comporte pas les définitions, et d'ailleurs la date de cette traduction, de fait inconnue, n'est pas antérieure à la fin du VIII^e siècle: voir, sur ce sujet, H. Hugonnard-Roche, "Mathématiques syriaques", dans É. Villey (éd.), *Les sciences en syriaque*, Geuthner, Paris 2014 (Études syriaques, 11), p. 67-106, en part. p. 80-83, 91-101. Proba a pu avoir connaissance du texte d'Euclide directement en grec, ou par une citation dans une version du commentaire d'Ammonius différente de celle qui nous a été conservée.

⁴⁹ Cette interprétation étymologique est également absente chez les commentateurs grecs, dont les œuvres sont conservées.

⁵⁰ L'expression est au singulier dans les manuscrits, mais il faudrait plutôt comprendre que le syllogisme composé se résout en plusieurs syllogismes simples.

⁵¹ Faute sans doute de trouver dans la langue syriaque un mot propre à exprimer le concept de "mot" entendu au sens qui est celui de λέξις pour le grammairien, Proba a transcrit simplement le mot grec, que nous transcrivons à notre tour.

⁵² Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 25.8-12 Wallies note de même que le terme "circonscrit" l'analyse du syllogisme, du moins pour les philosophes qui, à l'opposé des grammairiens, font porter leur examen seulement sur les expressions significatives. Pour les grammairiens, voir en particulier le manuel scolaire de Denys le Thrace: cf. *La grammaire de Denys le Thrace*, traduite et annotée par J. Lallot, CNRS-Éditions, Paris 1989 (Sciences du langage), p. 48: λέξις ἐστὶ μέρος ἐλάχιστον τοῦ κατὰ σύνταξιν λόγου ("Le mot [léxis] est la plus petite partie de la phrase [lógos] construite", trad. Lallot, p. 49). Lallot précise, dans son commentaire, p. 120, que λόγος désigne, pour les grammairiens, la phrase comme ensemble de mots sémantiquement complet, et qu'il faut entendre λέξις comme la plus petite partie de la phrase signifiant un contenu de pensée; c'est cette partie qui se divise en syllabes ou en éléments ou lettres. Comme on l'a vu plus haut, le terme, en quoi se résout ici la proposition, peut aussi être appelé φάσις lorsqu'il est considéré comme partie de l'affirmative ou de la négative; il peut être dit λέξις, lorsqu'il est considéré comme unité linguistique significative minimale, et la considération des parties de la λέξις relève alors de la grammaire et non plus de la philosophie. Notons que le traité de Denys le Thrace a été traduit ou plutôt adapté, en syriaque par Joseph Huzoyo, à une époque voisine de celle de Proba: édition par A. Merx, *Historia artis grammaticae apud Syros*, F.A. Brockhaus, Leipzig 1889 (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 9, 2), p. 50*-72* (texte), 9-28 (trad.). Pour une vue d'ensemble sur les problèmes d'authenticité et de datation que pose le texte de la *Technè*, voir F. Ildefonse, "Denys dit le Thrace", dans *DPhA*, Vol. II, Paris 1994, p. 742-7. Sur la version

syriaque, lire R. Contini, “Considerazioni interlinguistiche sull’adattamento siriano della TEXNH GRAMMATIKH di Dionisio Trace”, dans R.B. Finazzi - A. Valvo (éd.), *La diffusione dell’eredità classica nell’età tardoantica e medievale: il “Romanzo di Alessandro” e altri scritti*. Atti del seminario internazionale di studio, Roma-Napoli, 25-27 settembre 1997, Edizioni dell’Orso, Alessandria 1998 (L’eredità classica nel mondo orientale, 2), p. 95-111. On peut lire une traduction anglaise annotée du texte édité par Merx, faite par D. King, *Merx, History of the Syriac Grammatical Tradition*, à l’adresse suivante https://www.academia.edu/18999813/Merx_History_of_the_Syriac_Grammatical_Tradition, p. 67-83.

⁵³ Alexandre, *In An. Pr.*, p. 15.4-11 Wallies, expose que, lorsque “est” ou “n’est pas” est ajouté, il ne s’agit pas d’un troisième terme, mais “est” signifie alors la composition du prédicat et du sujet, et indique une affirmation, et d’autre part “est” dit négativement (entendons, sous la forme: “n’est pas”), sépare les termes l’un de l’autre et indique une négation: τὸ δὲ προστιθεμένου ἢ διαιρουμένου τοῦ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι προσέθηκεν, ἵνα μὴ τινες ἀγνοήσαντες, ὅταν τὸ ‘ἔστι’ τρίτον προσκατηγορῆται ἐν προτάσει, διαιροῦντες τὴν πρότασιν τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι τρίτον ὅρον ἡγῶνται εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ὅρος ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις προτάσεσι τὸ ‘ἔστιν’, ἀλλὰ προστιθέμενον μὲν σύνθεσιν σημαίνει τοῦ κατηγορουμένου καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ ἔστι καταφάσεως δηλωτικόν· ἀποφατικῶς δὲ λεγόμενον διαρεῖ καὶ χωρίζει τοὺς ὅρους ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἔστιν ἀποφάσεως δηλωτικόν; trad. Barnes, p. 61: “He adds ‘when you add or remove ‘is’ or ‘is not’ lest out of ignorance people should divide up propositions in which ‘is’ is co-predicated as a third item, and should think that ‘is’ or ‘is not’ is a third term. For in propositions of this kind ‘is’ is not a term. Rather, when it is added, it signifies a compounding of the predicate and the subject and betokens an affirmation; and when it is said in the negative form, it removes and separates the terms from one another and betokens a negation”.

⁵⁴ Selon la critique ici exposée, l’explication de texte donnée par Alexandre n’est pas exacte, car si Aristote avait voulu dire ce qu’Alexandre veut lui faire dire, il aurait suffi qu’il écrive προστιθεμένου τοῦ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι, comme cela est illustré par l’exemple suivant concernant Socrate. Alexandre, *In Anal. Pr.*, p. 15.23-28 Wallies, envisage la critique “inverse” selon laquelle l’addition de “n’est pas” est inutile, car il semble suffisant d’ajouter ou de retrancher “est”, puisque l’addition de “est” fait une affirmation et le retranchement de “est” fait une négation. Alexandre répond à la critique en expliquant qu’Aristote ajoute “n’est pas” pour montrer comment se forme la négation.

⁵⁵ L’expression employée par Proba, *tlitoyo haw d-akhdō metqatreg*, correspond précisément à la formule grecque τρίτον προσκατηγορηθῆναι utilisée par Aristote, *De Int.* 9, 19 b 19.

⁵⁶ Proba présente ici une défense de l’interprétation d’Alexandre au moyen d’un type d’argumentation qui ne correspond en rien à ce que dit le commentateur péripatéticien, mais il emprunte à la tradition des commentateurs néoplatoniciens, tels Ammonius et Philopon, les moyens de cette défense. D’après ces derniers, c’est Jamblique qui a interprété le difficile passage d’Aristote, comme faisant allusion à différentes espèces de propositions, cf. la discussion de l’interprétation d’Alexandre et son rejet par Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 22.34-24.24 Wallies; discussion et rejet, de même, par Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 25.30-30.21 Wallies. La dénomination de métathétique, appliquée aux propositions ayant un prédicat nié (étudiée par Aristote, *De Int.*, 10), est attribuée à Théophraste par Ammonius, *In De Int.*, p. 161.9-11 Busse.

⁵⁷ D’après Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 26.5 Wallies, c’est aussi la raison avancée par Jamblique pour expliquer qu’Aristote n’ait donné qu’une version abrégée de la double opposition qu’il va développer, et que Proba va reprendre à sa manière. Selon l’interprétation de Jamblique, rapportée par Ammonius (sous le nom de ὁ μέγας φιλόσοφος) et par Philopon (qui l’attribue explicitement à ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος), l’explication qui va suivre n’est pas distincte de la précédente, mais l’une et l’autre font un même ensemble, dans lequel la phrase d’Aristote sert à introduire une classification des propositions simples, modales, et métathétiques, à partir d’une double opposition qui met en jeu l’addition et la soustraction d’un côté, la composition et la division de l’autre, de la copule affirmative (“est”) ou négative (“n’est pas”) relativement aux autres parties de l’énoncé propositionnel. Cf. Ammon., *In An. Pr.*, p. 23.8-25, et Philop., *In An. Pr.*, p. 26.4-7: les termes formant couples sont πρόσθεσις et ἀφαίρεσις, σύνθεσις et διαίρεσις.

⁵⁸ D’après Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 26.2-10 Wallies, c’est précisément par le moyen de la double opposition susdite que, selon les meilleurs des interprètes, comme Jamblique, l’on retrouve toutes les sortes de propositions qu’Aristote fait connaître dans la *Peri Hermeneias*; après avoir rappelé en quoi consiste la double opposition en question: ἡ δὲ πρόσθεσις καὶ διαίρεσις οὐκ ἀντικείμεναι· τῇ μὲν γὰρ προσθέσει ἀντικείμεναι ἡ ἀφαίρεσις, τῇ δὲ διαίρεσει ἡ σύνθεσις, Philopon écrit ceci: οἱ δὲ γε ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν ἐξηγητῶν φασιν, ὡς ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος, διὰ βραχυλογίαν ἐξ ἐκατέρας ἀντιθέσεως ἐν εἰπῶν καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἐκατέρας ἐδήλωσε· τοῦτο δὲ σύνθεσε αὐτῷ ποιεῖν. ὥστε ἔσονται ἀντιθέσεις δύο, πρόσθεσις, ἀφαίρεσις, σύνθεσις, διαίρεσις. διὰ τούτων δὲ ἐδήλωσεν ἡμῖν πάσας τὰς προτάσεις τὰς παραδεδομένας ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἐρμηνείας· πᾶσα γὰρ πρότασις ἢ προστιθέμενον ἔχει τὸ ἔστιν ἢ ἀφαιρούμενον ἢ συντιθέμενον ἢ διαιρούμενον. Philopon développe la description de toutes les propositions qui naissent de ces oppositions dans les lignes suivantes (*ibid.*, p. 26.10-34). D’autre part, une explication du mot que nous avons traduit par “amène” est fournie par le commentateur de David, dont nous citons la traduction anglaise faite sur le texte arménien: “By saying then ‘with the addition’ to some [term] ‘or separation’ [from it] of [‘is’ or ‘is not’], [Aristotle] covered all premisses, as he explained in *On Interpretation*.”

For though there are two pairs of antitheses: addition and removal, separation and synthesis, by mentioning one [member of each pair] of the antitheses, he suggests the other too, meaning, by addition, [also] removal, and by separation, [also] synthesis” (David, *Commentary*, p. 83, le traducteur indiquant en note que le mot traduit par “suggests” a pour signification littérale “nods at”, *ibid.* note 144).

⁵⁹ C’est-à-dire, respectivement, les propositions de *tertio adiacente* et les propositions de *secundo adiacente*, selon la terminologie traditionnelle du moyen âge latin.

⁶⁰ Cf. Ammon., *In An. Pr.*, p. 24.10-11 Wallies: ἡ σύνθεσις οὖν τοῦ ‘ἔστιν’ σημαίνει τὰς μετὰ τρόπου προτάσεις; et de manière plus complète, Philop., *In An. Pr.*, p. 26.28-31 Wallies: πάλιν αἱ μετὰ τρόπου καταφατικαὶ ἀπλαῦ, ὡς ἡ ‘Σωκράτη δυνατὸν ἐστὶ περιπατεῖν’ λέγουσα, σύνθεσιν λέγεται ὑπομεῖναι τοῦ εἶναι· ἡ δὲ ἐκ μεταθέσεως σύνθεσιν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι, ὡς ἡ ‘Σωκράτη δυνατὸν ἐστὶ μὴ περιπατεῖν ἢ μὴ περιπατοῦντα εἶναι’. D’après l’exemple de Philopon, la σύνθεσις de εἶναι produit une proposition modale, et la σύνθεσις de μὴ εἶναι produit une proposition modale métathétique. Mais il n’apparaît pas que la σύνθεσις de εἶναι et de μὴ εἶναι puisse produire les propositions simplement méthathétiques, non modales, comme le texte de Proba semble le laisser entendre. La description de ce dernier est donc inexacte, ou au moins maladroite (à supposer que le texte syriaque soit transmis sans erreur), car l’exemple donné ensuite pas Proba est bien en accord avec celui de Philopon, puisqu’il porte sur des propositions à la fois modales et métathétiques. D’autre part, par l’expression “celles que nous avons appelées modales”, Proba fait probablement allusion à son propre commentaire sur le *Peri Hermeneias*, cf. Hoffmann, *De Hermeneuticis apud Syros Aristoteles*, p. 68.4-6 et la traduction, p. 94: *Capite autem quarto [s. libri de interpretationibus] docet nos [Aristoteles] de protasi cum modo e.g. Socrates pulchriter disputat.*

⁶¹ Les propositions modales données comme exemples par Ammonius et Philopon sont des propositions dans lesquelles la modalité est introduite par des expressions de la nécessité (ἐξ ἀνάγκης) ou du possible (δυνατόν). On notera que Proba utilise, pour sa part, un adverbe (*hoshoit*); en cela, il se conforme d’ailleurs à la tradition logico-philosophique grecque; cf. Ammon., *In De Int.*, p. 214.25-29 Busse, qui explique qu’un mode est un mot (φωνή) qui signifie comment le prédicat appartient au sujet et donne pour exemple des adverbes: τρόπος μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φωνὴ σημαίνουσα ὅπως ὑπάρχει τὸ κατηγορούμενον τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, οἷον τὸ ταχέως, ὅταν λέγωμεν ‘ἡ σελήνη ταχέως ἀποκαθίσταται’, ἢ τὸ καλῶς ἐν τῷ ‘Σωκράτης καλῶς διαλέγεται’, ἢ τὸ πάνυ ἐν τῷ ‘Πλάτων Δίωνα πάνυ φιλεῖ’, ἢ τὸ αἰεὶ ἐν τῷ ‘ὁ ἥλιος αἰεὶ κινεῖται’. Sur ce sujet, voir J. Barnes, “Ammonius and Adverbs”, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary volume* (1991), p. 145-63.

⁶² Comme nous l’avons noté ci-dessus, n. 60, il n’apparaît pas que la σύνθεσις de εἶναι et de μὴ εἶναι produise les propositions non modales métathétiques. Au regard de ce qu’écrit Philopon, la description de Proba est donc inexacte.

⁶³ Cette description ne correspond pas non plus à celle de Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 26.31-34 Wallies, selon laquelle la διαίρεσις produit toujours des propositions modales, soit négatives simples, soit négatives métathétiques.

⁶⁴ Nous avons corrigé, avec van Hoonacker, l’expression *l-lahmūto* (“agrément”) manifestement fautive qui figure dans les trois manuscrits consultés, par l’expression *l-thūmo* (“terme”).

⁶⁵ Cette définition du “terme” et sa critique ne se trouvent pas dans Ammonius ni dans Philopon, *ad loc.* ni non plus chez David. Elle pourrait provenir d’un autre commentaire néoplatonicien inconnu de nous, ou d’une autre rédaction que celle dont nous disposons du commentaire d’Ammonius ou de celui de Philopon.

⁶⁶ Proba ne conserve donc pas l’explication de Jamblique reprise par Ammonius et Philopon, mais il retient une interprétation plus simple de la partie de phrase aristotélicienne ici discutée: il fait de διαρουμένου l’opposé de προστιθεμένου, ce dernier terme signifiant l’addition de la copule dans les phrases de *tertio adiacente* (affirmatives ou négatives), tandis que le terme opposé, compris comme signifiant la séparation au sens de suppression (ainsi que l’explique Ammonius, *In De Int.*, p. 26.34-27.3 Busse: καὶ ὁ ἀναιρῶν μέντοι τὸ βαδίζειν ἀπὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους (ἢν ἀναιρεσιν αὐτὸς [= Ἀριστοτέλης] διαίρεσιν ἐκάλεσεν ὡς χωρίζουσιν τὸ κατηγορούμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου διὰ τοῦ ἀρνητικοῦ μορίου διααιρετικοῦ τινος ὀργάνου χρεῖαν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ποιούντος) [...]), signifie la suppression de la copule dans les phrases de *secundo adiacente* (affirmatives ou négatives).

⁶⁷ La traduction du texte d’Aristote, *An. Pr.* I 1, 24 b 18-20, est littérale, et ne diffère de la traduction anonyme que par des variantes mineures, cf. Nagy, “Una versione siriana”, p. 324.

⁶⁸ Ni Ammonius ni Philopon n’interprètent l’expression “sont posées” (τεθέντων) comme le moyen de distinguer le syllogisme de la proposition. Pour sa part, Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 26.30-27.14 Wallies, déclare que, par l’expression ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων, Aristote veut distinguer les syllogismes des discours non syllogistiques (tel le vocatif ou l’optatif), qui ne font pas l’objet d’une concession (ὁμολογηθέντων), mais il considère que par cette expression ne sont point exclus les syllogismes hypothétiques, dans lesquels des choses sont bien posées, sinon au sens propre, du moins d’une certaine manière (καὶ ἐκεῖ τιθέμεθα πως, p. 27.11). À la différence d’Ammonius, Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 33.2-10 Wallies, déclare que, par l’expression τεθέντων, Aristote distingue le syllogisme, soit des autres discours, tel le vocatif et les autres dans lesquels rien n’est posé, c’est-à-dire concédé, soit des syllogismes hypothétiques, dans lesquels les prémisses sont

supposées (p. 33.7: ὑποτίθεσθαι μὲν λέγομεν τὰς προτάσεις), mais nullement posées (τίθεσθαι δὲ οὐδαμῶς). On notera qu'Ammonius et Philopon explicitent tous deux ce terme τεθέντων au moyen du verbe ὁμολογοῦμαι, qui signifie l'accord concédé qui touche les prémisses du syllogisme. Proba semble adopter une interprétation un peu différente, ou du moins marquer différemment l'accent, en interprétant le fait de poser les prémisses comme une assertion. Selon David, *Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics*, p. 93, Aristote emploie l'expression "sont posées" en sorte d'embrasser à la fois les syllogismes catégoriques, pour lesquels il aurait suffi de dire "sont prédiquées", et les syllogismes hypothétiques, pour lesquels il aurait suffi de dire "sont supposées".

⁶⁹ Selon Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 27.14-33 Wallies, le mot grec τινῶν, dans la définition aristotélicienne, sert à distinguer le syllogisme à proprement parler des syllogismes à une seule prémisses, syllogismes incomplets (οὐ τέλειοι) dont font usage les rhéteurs; de même Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 33.10-23 Wallies. Sur l'histoire du syllogisme rhétorique vu comme syllogisme incomplet, ou abrégé, voir l'important article de M.F. Burnyeat, "Enthymeme: Aristotle on the Logic of Persuasion", in *Aristotle's Rhetoric. Philosophical Essays*, ed. by D.J. Furley and A. Nehamas, Princeton U.P., Princeton 1994 (Proceedings of the twelfth Symposium Aristotelicum), p. 3-55.

⁷⁰ Le mot syriaque se lit, en transcription, *dsknīs*, et nous sommes portés à accepter la judicieuse correction de van Hoonacker (p. 141 n. 1), qui suggère que Proba (ajoutons: ou sa source) a lu dans le grec Δισχινης au lieu de Δισχινης. Il n'y a aucun doute, en effet, que l'exemple se rapporte, comme le signale van Hoonacker, à l'accusation de dorodochie élevée par Démosthène contre Éschine; cf. Démosthène, Περὶ τῆς παραπροσβείας (*Sur l'ambassade infidèle*), 110-20. L'exemple relatif à Eschine ne se trouve ni chez Ammonius ni chez Philopon, mais Proba a pu le lire dans une autre version, ou copie, de tel ou tel commentaire issu de la tradition d'Ammonius. Un exemple faisant intervenir Eschine, à propos aussi du syllogisme rhétorique, se trouve chez David, mais il est tout différent, cf. David, *Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics*, p. 95: "Now Aeschines used such syllogisms against Demosthenes, saying: 'Since he is a son-hater and a wicked father, then, a fortiori, he will never appear good and useful in public affairs'".

⁷¹ Le même exemple est donné par Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 27.22 Wallies, et par Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 33.13 Wallies, ainsi que par David, *Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics*, p. 95. Il se trouve déjà, sous une forme proche, chez Aristote, *Soph. El.* 5, 167 b 8-11, et *Rhet.* II 24, 1401 b 23-24, comme exemple d'enthymème apparent relativement à la consécution.

⁷² La même raison est avancée par Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 33.10-12, 14-17 Wallies, pour expliquer l'omission de la prémisses majeure par les rhéteurs.

⁷³ Cette explication ne se trouve pas dans les commentaires d'Ammonius et de Philopon.

⁷⁴ Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 33.17-21 Wallies, explique plus clairement que les rhéteurs peuvent utiliser des syllogismes incomplets pour paraître honorer les juges en leur attribuant la connaissance des méthodes dialectiques et en les jugeant capables d'ajouter la prémisses majeure manquante. Voir aussi Ammon., *In An. Pr.*, p. 27.17-22 Wallies.

⁷⁵ Cette interprétation, relative à l'omission de la prémisses majeure, ne se trouve pas dans le commentaire de Philopon, ni dans celui d'Ammonius. Philopon, toutefois, précise, au début de ses remarques sur le sujet, que la démarche des rhéteurs consiste à conserver la prémisses mineure et à laisser de côté la majeure pour mener à la conclusion (*In An. Pr.*, p. 33.11-12 Wallies: οὔτινες τὴν ἐλάττωνα τῶν προτάσεων λαβόντες τὴν δὲ μείζονα καταλιπόντες ἐπάγουσι τὸ συμπέρασμα).

⁷⁶ Selon Alexandre, *In An. Pr.*, p. 17.32-33 Wallies, dans le cas de "si c'est le jour, il fait clair", le conséquent suit nécessairement de l'antécédent, mais non pas syllogistiquement: ἐν γὰρ τῷ 'εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστίν', ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔπεται τῷ ἡμέρα εἶναι τὸ φῶς εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐ συλλογιστικῶς; c'est, en effet, une caractéristique du syllogisme qu'il prouve à partir d'une pluralité d'items (*ibid.*, p. 18.1-2): ἴδιον γὰρ συλλογισμοῦ τὸ διὰ πλείονων τὸ ἀναγκαῖον δεικνύναι (cf. trad. Barnes, p. 65: "It is the proper characteristic of a syllogism that it proves from a plurality of items"). Ni Ammonius ni Philopon, semble-t-il, ne prennent en considération la différence entre syllogisme catégorique et syllogisme hypothétique ici soulignée par Proba, à savoir que le syllogisme hypothétique ne comporte qu'une seule assertion constituée de sa prémisses conditionnelle. Proba semble réduire les prémisses du syllogisme hypothétique à une seule proposition, la conditionnelle, et il rejoint là le propos d'Alexandre qui, après avoir dit que la caractéristique du syllogisme est de prouver à partir d'une pluralité d'items, ajoute la précision suivante (*ibid.*, p. 18.2-4): διὸ οὐδ' ἂν αἱ μὲν λέξεις ὅσι πλείους τῶν τιθεμένων, ταῦτόν δὲ ταῦτα σημαίνῃ τῷ πρώτῳ, οὐδ' οὕτω συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων ἔσται (trad. Barnes, p. 65-66: "That is when even if there is a plurality of expressions for what is posited, still, if the rest [reading *talla* for *tauta*] signify the same as the first, there will be no syllogism from them in such a case"). Proba applique cette remarque au cas de la proposition conditionnelle: si l'on ajoute à une proposition conditionnelle, un énoncé qui reproduit une partie de la conditionnelle, on n'obtient pas un syllogisme.

⁷⁷ Proba poursuit ici le commentaire de la définition aristotélicienne du syllogisme.

⁷⁸ Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 27.35-28.13 Wallies, expose que l'expression ἑτερόν τι τῶν κειμένων vise à distinguer le syllogisme aristotélicien des raisonnements appelés chez les stoïciens οἱ διαφορούμενοι συλλογισμοί et ἀδιαφόρως

περαίνοντες: les premiers disent deux fois la même chose (“s’il fait jour, il fait jour; or il fait jour; donc il fait jour”), et s’ils ont l’apparence de syllogismes, ils n’en sont pas; quant aux seconds, il s’agit aussi de pseudo-syllogismes qui procèdent de manière non différenciée (ἀδιαφόρως), dont l’exemple, chez Ammonius, est: “s’il fait jour, il ne fait pas nuit; or il fait jour; donc il fait jour”. Dans le cas de ces deux sortes d’arguments, la conclusion, déclare Ammonius, n’est pas différente de ce qui a été posé. Selon Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 33.23-26 Wallies, le terme grec ἕτερον sert à distinguer le syllogisme aristotélicien des syllogismes dont la conclusion est semblable aux prémisses (διὰ τούς διαφορουμένους συλλογισμούς, οὔτινες τὸ αὐτὸ ἔχουσι συμπέρασμα τὰς προτάσεων), tels que “s’il fait jour, il fait jour; or il fait jour; donc il fait jour”, car la conclusion doit être autre que les prémisses. Alexandre déjà, *In An. Pr.*, p. 18.12-18 Wallies, expliquait que la conclusion devait être différente de ce qui avait été posé, en donnant pour exemple les arguments ἀδιαφόρως περαίνοντες, parmi lesquels sont inclus les διαφορούμενοι λόγοι. L’argument de Proba vise une autre sorte de syllogisme, ou déduction, à savoir celle qui lierait deux propositions s’impliquant mutuellement (non point formellement, mais matériellement selon le langage tardo-antique, c’est-à-dire en vertu des états de choses auxquels se rapportent les deux parties de la proposition conditionnelle implicative dans l’exemple donné); cf. Ammon., *In An. Pr.*, p. 28.3-5.

⁷⁹ Philopon dit, au début de son commentaire, *In An. Pr.*, p. 6.10-14 Wallies, que les prémisses sont la matière du syllogisme, dont la conclusion est la forme. Lorsqu’il aborde la question de la définition même du syllogisme, il rappelle cette distinction et il ajoute, p. 32.31-33.2, que les expressions d’Aristote, τεθέντων et τινῶν, se rapportent à la matière des syllogismes, c’est-à-dire aux prémisses, alors que l’expression ἕτερόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει se rapporte à la forme, c’est-à-dire à la conclusion. Sur les diverses interprétations de la matière et de la forme dans la tradition logique grecque, voir J. Barnes, “Logical Matter and Logical Form”, dans A. Alberti (ed.), *Logica, mente e persona. Studi sulla filosofia antica*, Leo S. Olschki, Firenze 1990 (Accademia Toscana di scienze e lettere ‘La Colombaria’, Studi 60), p. 7-119.

⁸⁰ Même raison clairement exposée par Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 33.27-33 Wallies, qui donne l’exemple de la relation réciproque du gouvernail et du navire: ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἕνεκά του καὶ τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα· οἷον πηδάλιον ἕνεκά του ἐστὶν· ἕνεκα γὰρ τοῦ πλοίου· τὸ δὲ πλοῖον οὐ ἕνεκα [...] τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν προτάσεων· εἰσὶ γὰρ αἱ μὲν προτάσεις ἕνεκά του· τοῦ συμπέρασματος γὰρ ἕνεκα· τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα οὐ ἕνεκα· ἕνεκα γὰρ αὐτοῦ αἱ προτάσεις· ὥστε αὐτῆ ἕτερον ἂν εἴη τὸ συμπέρασμα παρὰ τὰς προτάσεις.

⁸¹ Alexandre, *In An. Pr.*, p. 44.13-23 Wallies (trad. Barnes, p. 104-105) expose que ce qui est à prouver est appelé un problème (πρόβλημα), et il décrit les différentes espèces de propositions qui entrent sous le genre πρότασις: une fois prouvé, le problème (πρόβλημα) devient conclusion (συμπέρασμα); quant à la proposition prise en vue de prouver autre chose, c’est une assumption (λήμμα) ou un agrément (ὁμολόγημα). La raison invoquée par Proba paraît prendre son sens si l’on traduit le mot syriaque *mettawdyonyoto* par assertions (ou assumptions) plutôt qu’énoncés: Proba opposerait le statut épistémique des prémisses, d’une part, qui sont des propositions qui ont fait l’objet d’une assumption (λήμματα dans le langage d’Aristote) ou auxquelles l’assentiment a été donné (ὁμολογήματα dans le langage de Platon, cf. Ammon., *In An. Pr.*, p. 26.33-36 Wallies; Plat., *Théétète* 155 B 5), soit parce qu’elles sont premières ou parce qu’elles ont été démontrées, et le statut de la proposition, d’autre part, qui est à prouver, à savoir celle qui est un πρόβλημα, avant de devenir, au terme de la déduction, une conclusion, dont le statut épistémique est alors le même que celui des prémisses.

⁸² Alexandre, *In An. Pr.*, p. 20.30-21.1 Wallies (trad. Barnes, p. 71) souligne que la nécessité dont il s’agit, dans le texte d’Aristote, n’est pas celle de la conclusion (comme certains l’ont pensé, dit-il), mais la nécessité de la consécution, ou nécessité syllogistique de la relation entre conclusion et prémisses. Il ne mentionne aucunement une démonstration qui se ferait en vertu de la nature des choses. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 28.23-29.19 Wallies, note que la mention de la nécessité vise à distinguer la conviction (πίστις) qui résulte du syllogisme, de deux autres types de convictions: l’une dite ἀπὸ τῶν ἴσων, utilisée par les rhéteurs, est celle qui va d’un singulier à un autre singulier, ou d’un particulier à un autre particulier; l’autre, dite ἐπαγωγική, est la conviction obtenue par induction du particulier à l’universel; seule la conviction produite par le syllogisme est nécessaire. À propos du mot συμβαίνει, Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 29.20-34 Wallies, introduit une remarque sur une double acception du nécessaire dans les syllogismes: l’un se dit κατὰ τὴν ὑπαρξιν τῶν πραγμάτων (selon l’existence des choses), l’autre κατὰ τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τῆς λέξεως (selon la consécution du discours). Ce dernier appartient à tout syllogisme, mais non pas le premier. C’est là, en fait, une manière de distinction entre forme et matière qui est proche de celle de Proba. Un syllogisme peut être nécessaire selon la consécution, non selon l’existence; tout syllogisme (valide) est nécessaire selon la consécution, mais tous ne le sont pas selon l’existence. Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 34.10-35.2 Wallies, expose que ἐξ ἀνάγκης ne veut pas dire qu’une conclusion est nécessaire du fait que la matière est nécessaire, mais que cette expression vise à distinguer les syllogismes nécessaires des syllogismes dits paradigmatiques (p. 34.16-17: ἡ μὲν οὖν παραδειγματικὴ πίστις τὸ ἴσον ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου πιστοῦται) et épagogiques (inductifs), qui ne possèdent pas cette nécessité. Philopon reprend à ce propos les trois types de convictions énumérés par Ammonius: c’est dans la démonstration apodictique, qui fait connaître le particulier à partir de l’universel, que se produit la déduction nécessaire: ἡ δὲ γε ἀποδεικτικὴ δεῖξις αὐτῆ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐκ τοῦ καθόλου τὸ μέρος πιστουμένη ἔπεται πάντως τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης (p. 34.29-30). L’emploi de

συμβάλει est là pour montrer que ce n'est pas seulement dans le cas où la matière est nécessaire que suit la conclusion, mais même lorsqu'elle est impossible ou possible (contingente). Ni Ammonius ni Philopon ne parlent de règles, ni ne distinguent, à la manière de Proba par référence à des règles, de la démonstration conduite selon une règle (*gonuno*), c'est-à-dire, en somme, une démonstration formellement valide, une démonstration qui serait validée par la nature des choses (ou encore matériellement valide). Sur l'interprétation de la nécessité syllogistique et les moyens de l'exprimer, chez les commentateurs grecs, voir Lee, *Die griechische Tradition* (cité ci-dessus à la n. 35), p. 103-6.

⁸³ On notera, en effet, que l'exemple a été choisi de manière à souligner la validité formelle de la déduction, puisque la première prémisse est fautive. Et par conséquent il n'est pas matériellement valide.

⁸⁴ Les manuscrits comportent ici une lacune, vraisemblablement occasionnée, comme le suggère van Hoonacker, p. 143, n. 2, par un saut du même au même, dans lequel une première particule *man* ("d'une part", dans les manuscrits Bdj et V) (ou *men*, "de", dans le manuscrit B) a été confondue avec une seconde particule *men*, placée un peu plus loin dans le texte. La restitution du sens proposée par van Hoonacker (qui traduit "parce que d'un côté c'est la vérité <qui est énoncée dans les propositions en question; mais d'autre part>") nous paraît vraisemblable: il faudrait comprendre, en somme, que la conclusion suit des deux prémisses parce qu'elles sont vraies, bien que, en règle générale, on ne puisse former une déduction syllogistiquement nécessaire à partir de deux prémisses particulières, comme le dit le reste de la phrase. La règle énoncée ici sera reprise plus loin, p. 143 (cf. n. 118).

⁸⁵ On notera que Proba utilise ici le terme grec ἀπόδειξις translittéré, ce qui est d'importance, comme le montrera la suite du texte (voir les notes à suivre).

⁸⁶ Le terme syriaque *hawno*, ici employé, est celui qui a été utilisé plus haut (cf. édition p. 130, trad. n. 20) pour signifier l'intellect dans la division des facultés cognitives.

⁸⁷ Le terme syriaque *ida'to*, employé ici, signifie la connaissance au sens large.

⁸⁸ Les termes du syllogisme pris pour exemple sont des termes universels d'égale extension, parce qu'ils signifient d'une part une substance, et d'autre part des propres de cette substance, qui sont entre eux réciprocaux. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 28.23-31 Wallies, distingue (cf. ci-dessus n. 82) trois types de conviction: celle qui provient de choses égales, celle qui provient de l'induction, celle qui provient du syllogisme; celle qui provient de choses égales ne produit pas une démonstration selon Ammonius, mais c'est celle qui est utilisée par les rhéteurs. L'explication est semblable chez Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 34.16-20 Wallies: la conviction qui provient de choses égales est dite par lui paradigmatique, c'est-à-dire qu'elle provient d'arguments appuyés sur des exemples, à savoir ceux dont se servent les rhéteurs. Manifestement Proba n'emploie pas le mot "égal" dans le même sens que les deux commentateurs grecs.

⁸⁹ Selon Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 29.7-17 Wallies, et Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 34.14-30 Wallies, par opposition à la conviction (πίστις) qui caractérise la conclusion fondée sur la relation de l'égal à l'égal, ou du plus petit au plus grand, seule la conviction qui caractérise la conclusion fondée sur la relation du plus grand au plus petit est celle de la démonstration (ἀπόδειξις). Pour Proba, au contraire, la relation de l'égal à l'égal, et celle du plus universel au moins universel, se rapportent toutes deux à la démonstration proprement dite: comme le montrent les exemples, la première est celle où les deux termes sont dans une relation d'une substance à un propre ou d'un propre à un autre propre (d'une même substance); la seconde est celle où les termes sont dans des relations de genre à espèce, ou d'espèce supérieure à espèce inférieure. Proba interprète ainsi les relations d'égal ou de plus universel, dans le cadre des rapports entre prédicables décrits par l'interprétation porphyrienne des catégories.

⁹⁰ Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 34.18-19 Wallies, emploie un exemple comparable, mais non identique ("un tel faisant route de nuit a rencontré des voleurs, toi aussi si tu faisais route de nuit tu rencontrerais des voleurs") pour montrer ce qu'est un "exemple" (παράδειγμα). Mais l'explication qu'il en donne est différente de celle de Proba. Dans la présentation qu'en donne Philopon, en effet, il s'agit d'un argument qui justifie l'égal à partir de l'égal (τὸ ἴσον ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου), alors que Proba, comme on l'a vu dans ce qui précède, a mis sous cette caractéristique un argument proprement démonstratif.

⁹¹ L'exemple d'induction se rapportant à la mâchoire inférieure mobile des animaux se trouve chez Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 28.32-29.2 Wallies, et chez Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 34.21-22 Wallies, sans qu'aucun animal précis soit nommé, et déjà chez Alexandre, *In An. Pr.*, p. 43.28-29 Wallies, qui mentionne les hommes, les chevaux, les chiens, les bœufs et les brebis. Selon Ammonius, la conviction acquise par une telle induction n'est pas nécessaire, car on pourra trouver des animaux dont la mâchoire supérieure est mobile; Philopon précise que l'examen de milliers de cas particuliers ne suffit pas à établir une conclusion universelle, mais qu'en revanche il suffit d'un contre-exemple pour réfuter une telle conclusion: le contre-exemple usuel (non cité par Philopon) est celui du crocodile qui ne meurt que la mâchoire supérieure, cf. Arist., *Hist. An.* I 11, 492 b 23-24: κινεῖ δὲ πάντα τὰ ζῷα τὴν κάτωθεν γένυν, πλὴν τοῦ ποταμίου κροκοδείλου· οὗτος δὲ τὴν ἄνω μόνον; *De Part. an.* IV 11, 691 b 4-6.

⁹² Explication semblable, mais plus développée, chez Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 35.2-15 Wallies, qui se réfère à l'explication donnée par Aristote lui-même: λέγω δὲ τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι τὸ διὰ ταῦτα συμβάλειν, τὸ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα συμβάλειν τὸ

μηδενός ἐξῶθεν ὄρου προσδεῖν πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον (*An. Pr.* I 1, 24 b 20-22). Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 29.35-30.25 Wallies, propose un double commentaire de ce passage, en le mettant d'abord en relation avec l'opposition entre manifeste (σαφές) et non manifeste (ἀσαφές): la démonstration vise à rendre raison du non manifeste à partir du manifeste; puis il expose la raison que l'on trouve dans Philopon et dans Proba, en rapportant, comme Philopon, cette explication à la suite du texte d'Aristote. Remarquons que l'opposition entre manifeste et non manifeste est utilisée par Philopon dans son commentaire portant sur le mot ἔτερον dans la définition du syllogisme par Aristote (*In An. Pr.*, p. 33.34-35.7 Wallies). Notons encore que Proba emploie un exemple différent de celui que donnent Ammonius et Philopon, qui porte sur l'âme sous la forme: ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοκίνητος, τὸ αὐτοκίνητον ἀκίνητον, ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα ἀθάνατος.

⁹³ L'objection sceptique de la remontée à l'infini de la preuve ne se trouve pas dans les commentaires d'Alexandre et d'Ammonius. Elle se trouve, mise au compte des philosophes sceptiques (οἱ ἐφεκτικοί), au tout début du développement portant sur le syllogisme (et non pas là où la place Proba), dans le commentaire de Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 30.29-31.2, sous une forme semblable à celle que lui donne Proba. Pour Philopon, il s'agit d'abord de répondre à la question εἰ ἔστιν ὁλως συλλογισμός, avant de traiter du τί ἐστι. Voir aussi, dans le même sens, David, *Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics*, p. 89.5-16. Il est intéressant de remarquer que David rapporte que les sceptiques rejettent le syllogisme comme instrument de "saisie": "reject syllogism as an instrument of apprehension", selon la traduction de Topchyan, qui rapproche (p. 89 note 7) le mot arménien traduit par "apprehension" du grec κατάληψις; ce mot grec est probablement celui que Proba rend à l'aide du mot *madrkonutyō* (accolé à *methawyonuto*, "démonstration"), dans le syntagme que nous traduisons par "démonstration et saisie".

⁹⁴ Une réfutation semblable se lit chez Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 31.2-7 Wallies. Voir aussi David, *Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics*, p. 91.1-5.

⁹⁵ La seconde réponse à l'argument sceptique est seulement esquissée par Proba et, de ce fait, difficile à saisir. L'idée est que le syllogisme qui établit la doctrine du syllogisme, s'inclut lui-même dans cette opération, de la même façon que toute parole énonçant qu'une parole est audible est elle-même audible. Le point de départ de ce type d'argument se trouve vraisemblablement dans un développement comparable à celui que Philopon ajoute à sa première réfutation de l'argument sceptique: il y distingue le syllogisme (συλλογισμός) de ce qui est l'objet du syllogisme (συλλογιστόν); le premier est ce par quoi nous effectuons les démonstrations, le second est qui est en est l'objet (περᾶγμα). Devant l'objection que l'aporie se reproduit à propos du συλλογιστόν, Philopon expose que toute démonstration n'a pas pour point de départ une démonstration issue elle-même d'un syllogisme, mais que les principes ultimes des démonstrations ne sont pas syllogistiques, mais sont des κοινὰ ἔννοιαι: ainsi se trouve exclue la remontée à l'infini de la preuve. Voir aussi le développement de David, *Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics*, p. 91.6-19, dont nous citons le début (trad. Topchyan): "Furthermore, we are not involved in an infinite regress, for the syllogism which showed that syllogism exists also showed itself, though not as syllogism but as syllogizable. Likewise, definition defines itself, though not as definition but as definable". Le texte de Proba apparaît comme une trace de ce type d'argumentation, reçue d'une tradition grecque.

⁹⁶ Cf. Arist., *An. Pr.* I 1, 24 b 22-24: la traduction syriaque est littérale.

⁹⁷ S'agissant de la distinction entre syllogismes parfaits et syllogismes imparfaits, le point examiné par Alexandre, *In An. Pr.*, p. 23.17-24.18 Wallies, est de savoir si les syllogismes imparfaits requièrent des assumptions extérieures aux suppositions initiales, ce qui exclurait qu'ils puissent être encore dits des syllogismes, en conformité avec les termes τῶ ταῦτα εἶναι de la définition du syllogisme par Aristote (termes qui excluent précisément que le syllogisme ait besoin d'un élément extérieur pour que soit affirmée sa nécessité); la réponse d'Alexandre est que, dans le cas des syllogismes imparfaits, ce qui est requis pour la manifestation de la nécessité est déjà potentiellement présent dans les choses posées, mais a besoin d'être révélé, par le moyen de conversions ou de réductions à l'impossible. Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 36.19-37.2 Wallies, reprend la discussion en soulignant l'emploi par Aristote de l'expression πρὸς τὸ φανῆναι, qu'il oppose à πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι: les syllogismes parfaits sont nécessaires d'une nécessité manifeste, tandis que les syllogismes imparfaits sont nécessaires d'une nécessité qu'il appartient à celui qui sait de la manifester. Il faut donc comprendre que l'introduction éventuelle d'éléments extérieurs (conversions) pour la manifestation du nécessaire ne va pas à l'encontre de la définition du syllogisme, puisque ces éléments ne se rapportent pas à la genèse même des syllogismes. Voir, dans le même sens, le commentaire d'Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 32.28-33.2 Wallies. À propos du cas particulier de la réduction à l'impossible, Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 37.6-38.29 Wallies, fait état d'une aporie selon laquelle Aristote, contrairement à sa définition, recevrait comme syllogismes des arguments assumant des éléments extérieurs aux choses posées, et il résout cette aporie (comme Alexandre auparavant, cf. Barnes, p. 77 note 48) en exposant que les éléments extérieurs assumés dans la conduite à l'impossible ne relèvent pas de la partie déductive du syllogisme, mais de sa partie réfutative de l'hypothèse impossible. Dans son extrême brièveté, le commentaire de Proba apparaît comme un résumé minimal de ce qui doit être dit sur la question, à savoir que le syllogisme parfait est celui qui rend manifeste par soi la nécessité qui est en lui, sans l'aide de conversions ou de réductions à l'impossible, indispensables aux syllogismes imparfaits.

⁹⁸ Le texte syriaque est une traduction mot pour mot du grec d'Aristote, *An. Pr.* I 1, 24 b 26-28, à l'exception de la précision apportée en grec par la reprise, en ordre inverse, des deux premiers ἔτερον ἑτέρω exprimée au moyen des formes θατέρου θάτερον.

⁹⁹ Alexandre, *In An. Pr.*, p. 24.27-25.5 Wallies, explique, en paraphrasant Aristote, "<dit> de tout" par cela que rien du sujet ne peut être pris dont le prédicat ne soit pas dit, et "dans le tout" par cela que rien de ce qui est dit être dans quelque chose comme dans un tout ne tombe en dehors de cela dans quoi il est dit être comme dans un tout (cf. l'introduction, p. 120-1). Ammonius, *In An. Pr.*, p. 33.22-34.17 Wallies, explique que la proposition catégorique universelle affirmative (et il transpose aussi l'explication aux universelles négatives) peut être considérée de deux façons, à partir du terme sujet ou à partir du terme prédicat: "dans le tout" se dit lorsque la proposition est considérée du point de vue de l'inclusion du sujet dans le prédicat tout entier, qui le circonscrit; inversement, "prédié de tout" se dit lorsque la proposition est considérée à partir du prédicat (cf. déjà Alex., *In An. Pr.*, p. 25.9-11 Wallies). Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 38.32-39 Wallies, dit, plus brièvement, que les deux expressions d'Aristote sont les mêmes (ταὐτά εἰσι) quant au substrat (τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ), et ne diffèrent que par la forme (τῆ σχέσει), et il indique, en utilisant la même image que Proba, et le même exemple, que si l'on monte du sujet au prédicat, on dit que l'homme est "dans l'animal tout entier" (ce qui montre l'inclusion du premier dans le second tout entier), tandis que si l'on descend du prédicat au sujet, on dit "prédié de tout". Il paraît vraisemblable que cette image de "montée" et de "descente" devait se rattacher à une pratique scolaire de figuration graphique des rôles et places respectives des sujets et prédicats dans les propositions catégoriques de la logique aristotélicienne (sur ce point, voir l'introduction, p. 114-17). On notera, d'autre part, que Proba ne traite pas explicitement le cas des propositions négatives, comme le fait Philopon. En revanche, le terme que nous avons traduit par "participe" (*msbawtaf*) n'a pas d'équivalent dans les commentaires grecs.

¹⁰⁰ Le texte syriaque, ici particulièrement elliptique (littéralement "non tout dans tout") paraît incomplet, et nous l'avons interprété *ad sensum*, en le comprenant comme van Hoonacker, qui traduit les deux derniers membres de phrase comme ceci: "(le prédicat) qui serait d'extension plus restreinte ne s'appliquerait pas tout entier au sujet tout entier (?)". On remarque que Proba admet que, dans la prédication "dit de tout", le prédicat est égal au sujet ou plus grand que lui, comme le font Alexandre, *In An. Pr.*, p. 25.7-9 Wallies, et Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 39.15-24 Wallies, mais que Philopon seul distingue le cas de "est dans tout", en considérant qu'alors le sujet est d'extension plus petite que celle du prédicat, et non pas égale à celle-ci, contrairement à ce que devrait impliquer l'équivalence annoncée des deux formules aristotéliciennes.

¹⁰¹ Proba ne traitera dans la suite de son commentaire que des propositions d'attribution pure (catégoriques non modales). D'autre part, Proba ne donne qu'une brève description des modes de conversion des propositions quantifiées, en relation avec la construction de la syllogistique qui suivra, mais sans traiter de la conversion en elle-même comme objet propre de recherche ainsi que l'ont fait les commentateurs grecs: sur ce dernier sujet, voir Lee, *Die griechische Tradition*, p. 79-94.

¹⁰² C'est-à-dire en une proposition de même forme, une négative universelle.

¹⁰³ C'est-à-dire une proposition de forme différente, par la qualité ou la quantité.

¹⁰⁴ À propos du bref exposé de Proba sur la conversion, on peut faire la remarque suivante. Les commentateurs grecs ont traité de la conversion, plus ou moins longuement, et Philopon en particulier (à la suite d'Ammonius, dont le texte s'arrête en ce point du commentaire) a cherché à donner un exposé systématique des diverses sortes de conversions qu'il distingue, conversions des termes, des syllogismes, et des propositions: cf. *In An. Pr.*, p. 39.27-45.20 Wallies, et les analyses de Lee, *Die griechische Tradition*, p. 79-94. Proba ne retient rien des tentatives de définition et des divisions instituées par Philopon (ou la tradition qu'il représente), mais il ne considère, implicitement, les conversions qu'il énumère que comme des instruments nécessaires à la construction de la syllogistique, qu'il exposera dans la suite. Il ne se soucie pas d'explicitement la conversion, ni en termes de relation entre les deux propositions, par exemple, ni comme règle. Il importe seulement que la proposition obtenue par l'opération de conversion à partir d'une proposition vraie soit également vraie. Les conversions décrites sont celles d'Aristote, *An. Pr.* I 2, 25 a 5-13.

¹⁰⁵ Proba a déjà commenté plus haut la définition du terme par Aristote (en 24 b 16-18), comme ce en quoi se résout la proposition; il s'arrêterait, en particulier, à la question posée par l'addition de "est" ou "n'est pas" au couple formé par le sujet et le prédicat. Ici, il a en vue le rôle des termes sujet et prédicat dans la constitution de la forme syntaxique de la proposition, mais il superpose un peu rapidement les deux caractérisations de sujet et prédicat d'une part, de majeur et de mineur de l'autre: il n'est pas exact que le prédicat soit toujours le majeur, et le sujet le mineur, dans toutes les figures. Aristote lui-même définissait le majeur et le mineur séparément pour chaque figure. Mais c'est par une convention que, dans la tradition tardo-antique, par analogie avec ce qui est le cas dans le premier mode de la première figure (Barbara), le majeur sera caractérisé, de manière commune à toutes les figures, comme le prédicat dans la conclusion, et le mineur comme le sujet dans la conclusion; cf. Philop., *In An. Pr.*, p. 67.27-29 Wallies: *χρηστότεον οὖν κοινῶ κανόνι ἐπὶ τῶν τριῶν σχημάτων τούτῳ, ὅτι μείζων ἐστὶν ὄρος ὁ ἐν τῷ συμπεράσματι κατηγορούμενος, ἐλάττων δὲ ὁ ἐν τῷ συμπεράσματι ὑποκείμενος*. Proba

se conforme à cette tradition, mais il omet d'expliquer cet usage, qui ne correspond pas à ce que l'on peut lire dans Aristote (cf. W. Kneale - M. Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, Oxford U.P., Oxford 1962, 1975², p. 69-71).

¹⁰⁶ On notera que le syllogisme est formé, selon Proba, de deux prémisses seulement (à l'exclusion de la conclusion). Alexandre (*In An. Pr.*, p. 41.2-8 Wallies) et Philopon (*In An. Pr.*, p. 72.2-10 Wallies, par exemple) déjà notaient que les syllogismes résultaient de deux prémisses, mais ils n'affirmaient pas aussi nettement qu'ils étaient formés de deux prémisses. La même caractérisation du syllogisme s'est retrouvée chez des auteurs postérieurs, par exemple al-Fārābī, cf. J. Lameer, *Al-Fārābī and Aristotelian Syllogistics. Greek Theory and Islamic Practice*, Brill, Leiden-New York-Köln 1994 (Islamic Philosophy and Science, 20), p. 83.

¹⁰⁷ Deux caractérisations du moyen terme semblent conjuguées dans l'explication sommaire de Proba, comme dans la description donnée par Aristote, *An. Pr.* I 4, 25 b 35-36. Le moyen est d'abord moyen selon un critère sémantique, en ce que son extension est moyenne entre celle du majeur et celle du mineur; le moyen est aussi, selon un critère syntaxique, en position moyenne dans les deux prémisses, qui sont liées par lui en vue de produire une conclusion; cf. la note *ad loc* de Smith, *Prior Analytics*, p. 113. Ces deux critères sont précisément réunis dans l'exemple canonique du premier mode de la première figure (Barbara) donné par Proba. Sur les difficultés de la description d'Aristote, voir des explications plus détaillées dans J. Lukasiewicz, *La syllogistique d'Aristote dans la perspective de la logique formelle moderne*, présentation et traduction française de F. Caujolle-Zaslowsky, Armand Colin, Paris 1972; réimpr. Vrin, Paris 2010, p. 46-8; G. Patzig, *Die aristotelische Syllogistik. Logisch-philologische Untersuchungen über das Buch A der "Ersten Analytiken"*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1969, p.104-6; trad. anglaise G. Patzig, *Aristotle's Theory of the Syllogism. A logico-philological Study of book A of the Prior Analytics*, translated from the German by J. Barnes, D. Reidel, Dordrecht 1968 (Synthese Library), p. 97-9; W. Kneale - M. Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, p. 68-71.

¹⁰⁸ On notera que la question de la quatrième figure n'est pas posée par Proba. La question de l'absence d'une quatrième figure dans la syllogistique d'Aristote est longuement examinée par Patzig, *Aristotle's Theory of the Syllogism*, p. 109-27, où est expliquée la raison de cette absence; voir aussi Granger, *La théorie aristotélicienne*, p. 126-7.

¹⁰⁹ Description comparable chez Alex. Aphr., *In An. Pr.*, p. 46.30-32: ἐν ἣ γὰρ συζυγία ὁ μέσος καὶ δις λαμβανόμενος τοῦ μὲν κατηγορεῖται τῶν ἐν τῷ προβλήματι ὅρων τῷ δὲ ὑπόκειται, τοῦτο τὸ σχῆμα πρῶτον καλεῖται; de même Philop., *In An. Pr.*, p. 65.1-2 Wallies: ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ὁ μέσος ὅρος τῷ μὲν ὑπόκειται τῶν ἄκρων, τοῦ δὲ κατηγορεῖται, γίνεται τὸ πρῶτον σχῆμα.

¹¹⁰ Comme l'avait fait Aristote, Proba caractérise différemment le moyen pour chacune des deuxième et troisième figures, en abandonnant la comparaison des extensions comparées des termes, pour ne s'en tenir qu'aux positions respectives du moyen; cf. Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, p. 69-71. Mêmes définitions des deuxième et troisième figures encore par Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 65.2-4 Wallies.

¹¹¹ Cette question est traitée par Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 65.4-66.26 Wallies, dans un long développement où il offre diverses raisons, dont on ne trouve chez Proba qu'un bref sommaire de la première et la plus simple d'entre elles (*ibid.*, p. 65.5-9); l'explication de Proba est proche, dans sa simplicité, de celle d'Alexandre, *In An. Pr.*, p. 47.20-22 Wallies: εἰκότως γὰρ πρῶτον τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ ὁ μέσος οὐ τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἄκρους σχέσει μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ τάξει μέσος ἐστὶ καὶ τῇ θέσει (trad. Barnes, p. 108: "It is reasonable for that figure to be first in which the middle term is middle non only in its relation to the extremes but also in order and in position").

¹¹² Allusion à la représentation graphique des figures, cf. ci-dessus notre introduction, p. 114-17.

¹¹³ Sur l'idée que le syllogisme, selon Proba, serait composé de deux propositions, voir ci-dessus n. 106.

¹¹⁴ Sur les termes majeur et mineur comme prédicat et sujet, respectivement, dans la conclusion, cf. la référence à Philopon, ci-dessus note 105.

¹¹⁵ Dans la formulation de la conclusion, Proba ajoute le mot *hdo* ("une") devant *usia*, ce qu'il ne fait pas d'ordinaire: peut-être est-ce une manière de marquer que "homme" est inclus dans "substance", en soulignant que les deux termes n'ont pas la même extension.

¹¹⁶ Exemple et explication identiques chez Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 67.30-35 Wallies, si ce n'est que les propositions ne sont pas quantifiées dans l'exemple de Philopon. En outre, Philopon ajoute ensuite des exemples avec les explications correspondantes pour les deuxième et troisième figures.

¹¹⁷ Cette règle, dite dans la scolastique latine *peïorem semper conclusio sequitur partem*, avait été formulée pour les modales par Théophraste, cf. I.M. Bochenski, *La logique de Théophraste*, Librairie de l'Université, Fribourg en Suisse 1947 (Collectanea Friburgensia, fasc. 32), p. 79, qui remarque que cette règle était appliquée par Aristote aux modes assertoriques. On en trouve une brève formulation appliquée aux propositions assertoriques d'Aristote, chez Alex. Aphr., *In An. Pr.*, p. 51.7-8: ἔτι οὕτως γίνεται τὸ τῷ χειρόνι τῶν λαμβανομένων ὁμοιον γίνεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα (trad. Barnes, p. 113: "Further, in this way it turns out that the conclusion is similar to the inferior assumption"). Une formulation plus développée, voisine de celle de Proba, se trouve chez Philop., *In An. Pr.*, p. 71.12-17 Wallies: δεῦ δὲ πάλιν καθόλου ἐπὶ τῶν τριῶν

σχημάτων εἰδέναι καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν σχημάτων τῇ χειρόνι τῶν προτάσεων ἔπεται τὸ συμπέρασμα· οἶον ἔαν αἱ δύο ὡσι καθόλου ἢ δὲ ἑτέρα ἀποφατική, ἀποφατικὸν συνάγεται τὸ συμπέρασμα· πάλιν ἔαν μερική εἴη ἢ ἑτέρα τῶν προτάσεων, μερικὸν· ἔαν δὲ ἡ μὲν εἴη μερική ἢ δὲ ἑτέρα ἀποφατική, μερικὸν ἀποφατικὸν, ἐπειδὴ κἀνταῦθα τὰ χείρονα νικᾷ.

¹¹⁸ Ce caractère ressort de la liste des modes concluants passés en revue par Aristote, *An. Pr.* I 4-6; cf. aussi la remarque d'Aristote, *An. Pr.* I 24, 41 b 6-7: ἔτι τε ἐν ἅπαντι δεῖ κατηγορικὸν τινα τῶν ὄρων εἶναι καὶ τὸ καθόλου ὑπάρχειν (" dans tout syllogisme, il faut que l'un des termes soit affirmatif, et qu'il y ait une attribution universelle"), c'est-à-dire que l'une des prémisses soit affirmative et que l'une d'elles soit universelle. Cf. Philop., *In An. Pr.*, p. 70.1-3 Wallies: κοινῶς μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν τριῶν σχημάτων δεῖ παραφυλάττεσθαι τὸ μήτε τὰς δύο προτάσεις εἶναι ἀποφατικὰς μήτε τὰς δύο μερικὰς.

¹¹⁹ Cf. Philop., *In An. Pr.*, p. 70.3-8: εἰ γὰρ μέλλοι ἢ συζυγία τῶν συμπλεκομένων ἀλλήλαις προτάσεων γίνεσθαι συλλογιστική, δεῖ τὴν ἑτέραν τῶν προτάσεων κεκοσμηθῆσθαι κατὰ τε τὸ ποσὸν καὶ τὸ ποιόν [...] ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος τὸ τὴν μὲν μείζονα εἶναι καθόλου τὴν δὲ ἐλάττωνα καταφατικήν; Philopon ajoute la remarque, omise par Proba, que la qualité (affirmative ou négative) de la majeure est indifférente, tout comme la quantité (universelle ou particulière) de la mineure (*ibid.*, p. 70.8-10): ἀδιαφορεῖ γὰρ ἢ μὲν μείζων κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, ἢ δὲ ἐλάττων κατὰ τὸ ποσόν· αἱ δὲ μὴ οὕτως ἔχουσαι συζυγία ἀσυλλόγιστοί εἰσιν.

¹²⁰ Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 70.10-11 Wallies, fait suivre le texte cité dans la note précédente de la remarque suivante, où l'on trouve une formule comparable (mais non identique) à celle de Proba: ταῦτα δὲ τὰ ἴδια τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος ἔμεριστο τὰ ἄλλα δύο.

¹²¹ S'agissant de la deuxième figure, Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 70.11-17 Wallies, énumère les caractéristiques suivantes, que l'on retrouve avec des formulations voisines dans Proba: ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ δευτέρῳ δεῖ φυλάττειν τὴν μὲν μείζονα καθόλου ὡσπερ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ, τὴν δὲ ἐλάττωνα ἀνομοιοσχέμονα τῇ μείζονι κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, τουτέστιν ἴνα, εἰ ἢ μείζων εἴη καταφατική, ἢ ἐλάττων ἐστὶν ἀποφατική, καὶ ἔμπαλιν, εἰ ἢ μείζων ἀποφατική, ἢ ἐλάττων καταφατική, δῆλον ὡς τῆς μείζονος ἀδιαφόρως ἐχούσης περὶ τὴν ποιότητα τῆς δὲ ἐλάττωνος περὶ τὴν ποσότητα· αἱ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἔχουσαι συζυγία καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι ἅπασαι ἀσυλλόγιστοί εἰσιν. Quant à la troisième figure, Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 70.17-21 Wallies, indique que, outre les caractéristiques communes à toutes les figures, une seule est à observer, à savoir que la mineure soit affirmative: ἐν δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ σχήματι τί δεῖ παρατηρεῖν; πρὸς τῷ φυλάττειν τὰ κοινῶς ἐπὶ τῶν τριῶν σχημάτων παρατετηρημένα, λέγω δὴ τὸ μήτε τὰς δύο εἶναι μερικὰς μήτε τὰς δύο ἀποφατικὰς, ἔτι παρατηρεῖν ἴδιον ἐν μόνον, τὸ τὴν ἐλάττωνα εἶναι καταφατικήν. Sur ces règles chez Philopon, cf. Lee, *Die griechische Tradition*, p. 119-20.

¹²² Notre traduction ne se démarque guère de celle de van Hoonacker, p. 153, car, comme ce dernier l'observe, il ne semble pas possible de traduire autrement le texte syriaque. Lui-même traduit ainsi: "Toute proposition au sujet de laquelle on te demande: 'Convertis-la, et vois si elle est vraie et si tu l'admets?' – si on te pose la question en présentant la proposition sous une forme où tu l'admets, accepte l'offre sans crainte". Selon l'interprétation de van Hoonacker, la conversion d'une proposition universelle affirmative fautive peut produire une proposition vraie ou une proposition fautive, mais si la proposition à convertir est vraie, on peut effectuer la conversion car celle-ci, effectuée selon les règles, produit une proposition vraie. Il est à noter que Proba présente curieusement cette remarque concernant la conversion d'une proposition, en l'insérant dans une démarche dialectique entre un questionneur et son répondant, auquel il est demandé d'effectuer une conversion et de vérifier sa validité, pour recevoir ensuite comme vraie la proposition issue de la conversion. La démarche dialectique n'est pas celle qui est appropriée aux *Premiers Analytiques*, et si Proba adopte souvent une forme dialogique dans sa présentation des critiques adressées aux thèses aristotéliennes, c'est là un trait purement rhétorique, qui est clairement distinct de la démarche dialectique suggérée dans le présent passage (sur ce sujet, voir notre introduction, p. 111-13).

¹²³ On observera que Proba se borne à la description des modes valides, et qu'il ne mentionne pas, à la différence d'Aristote, les schémas qui ne permettent pas une déduction valide. En conséquence de ce choix, rien n'est dit de la méthode qui use de contre-exemples (triplets de termes concrets), destinés à montrer qu'aucune déduction ne peut être construite à partir de tel ou tel mode "syllogistique". On observera, d'autre part, que Proba ne fait pas mention, dans son commentaire, des cinq modes "indirects" ajoutés par Théophraste aux quatre modes valides de la première figure aristotélienne, – modes de Théophraste auxquels Alexandre fait allusion en précisant qu'Aristote lui-même les mentionne dans son ouvrage (*In An. Pr.*, p. 69.27-70. Wallies): Θεόφραστος δὲ προστίθησιν ἄλλους πέντε τοῖς τέσσαρσι τούτοις οὐκέτι τελείους οὐδ' ἀναποδείκτους ὄντας, ὧν μνημονεύσει καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, τῶν μὲν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ βιβλίῳ προελθόντων, τῶν δὲ ἐν τῷ μετὰ τοῦτο τῷ δευτέρῳ κατ' ἀρχάς (...); trad. Barnes, p. 135: "To these four Theophrastus adds five more, which are no longer perfect or indemonstrable. Aristotle, too, will mention these, some at a later point in this book and some at the beginning of the next, i.e. the second, book". Ces modes sont brièvement mentionnés par Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 79.10-20 Wallies, sans que le nom de Théophraste

soit cité. Sur ces modes, voir notamment Bochenski, *La logique de Théophraste*, p. 56-61; Patzig, *Aristotle's Theory*, p. 109-14.

¹²⁴ Le terme syriaque *bedyūto*, ici employé, est la transposition du mot grec *ιδιώτης*.

¹²⁵ Les lettres de schéma utilisées par Proba pour représenter les termes répondent, dans l'alphabet syriaque, aux lettres grecques utilisées par Aristote, à l'exception du *semkath* (s), qui remplace le *khi* grec (X), dans les modes de la deuxième figure. Le même *semkath* répond au *sigma* grec (Σ) dans les modes de la troisième figure.

¹²⁶ Comme l'a noté van Hoonacker dans sa traduction p. 156 n. 1, le sens impose d'omettre la particule *lo* qui précède "dans tout" dans le texte syriaque de tous les manuscrits.

¹²⁷ Ainsi que le remarque van Hoonacker, p. 157 n. 1, c'est le terme "extrême" dans la prémisse majeure universelle, c'est-à-dire N, qui doit être prédicat dans la conclusion, laquelle doit donc être de la forme "N n'est dans aucune instance de S"; la proposition à laquelle on a abouti jusqu'à présent, "S n'est dans aucune instance de N", est donc considérée par Proba comme une mineure, dont la conversion produit la conclusion cherchée: "N n'est dans aucune instance de S".

¹²⁸ La phrase "puis convertis encore la conclusion qui dit: aucun homme n'est pierre" est omise dans la traduction de van Hoonacker, p. 157.

¹²⁹ La mineure, étant une négative particulière, n'est pas convertible (cf. la règle énoncée plus haut par Proba, p. 141), et la majeure, étant une universelle affirmative, se convertit en une particulière. À supposer qu'on la convertisse, on aurait deux particulières, qui ne peuvent produire aucune conclusion (cf. encore la règle énoncée plus haut par Proba, p. 143).

¹³⁰ Les lettres qui servent à désigner les modes dans les différentes figures sont celles de l'alphabet syriaque (*ōlaph*, *bēth*, *gōmal*, *dōlath*, *bē*, *waw*), et non point des lettres transposées à partir des lettres de l'alphabet grec, comme le rend manifeste ici la lettre *waw*.

¹³¹ Il ne s'agit pas, dans ce qui suit, des "syllogismes non concluants", ou plus précisément des paires de propositions qui ne peuvent servir de prémisses à des syllogismes valides, celles dont la première occurrence est mentionnée par Aristote, *An. Pr.* I 4, 26 a 2-4: le philosophe y considère une paire dans laquelle "le premier terme suit le moyen entier et le moyen n'appartient à rien du dernier terme", car on ne peut alors inférer aucune conclusion, c'est-à-dire il ne peut y avoir syllogisme des extrêmes: *εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον παντὶ τῷ μέσῳ ἀκολουθεῖ, τὸ δὲ μέσον μηδενὶ τῷ ἐσχάτῳ ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἔσται συλλογισμὸς τῶν ἄκρων*. Il peut en effet se faire alors que le premier terme appartienne au dernier entier ou à rien de lui, comme le montrent les exemples: "animal se dit de tout homme, homme d'aucun cheval, animal se dit de tout cheval", "animal se dit de tout homme, homme d'aucune pierre, animal ne se dit d'aucune pierre". Les prémisses de formes AaB et BeC sont ainsi compatibles soit avec une conclusion de forme AaC, soit avec une conclusion de forme AeC, mais elles n'impliquent nécessairement aucune des deux. Ces paires de prémisses sont celles qu'Alexandre, *In An. Pr.*, p. 55.11-13 Wallies, nomme *συζυγία ἀσυλλογιστοῖ*, expression reprise par Philopon, *In An. Pr.*, p. 74.32 Wallies. Sur les problèmes posés par l'interprétation des explications données de ces "combinaisons non concluantes" chez les commentateurs anciens, Alexandre et Philopon en particulier, mais aussi modernes, voir Patzig, *Die aristotelische Syllogistik*, p. 180-97, trad. Barnes, p. 168-92. Comme on va le voir, les cas présentés par Proba ne relèvent pas de ces "combinaisons non concluantes" d'Aristote, reprises par Alexandre et Philopon.

¹³² Tous les pseudo-syllogismes énoncés par Proba présentent une même difficulté qui se rapporte à l'emploi du mot *qoymon*, participe formé sur la forme verbale *qom* (radical: *qwm*), dont la signification la plus générale est "se dresser, se tenir droit". La phrase est traduite par van Hoonacker comme ceci: "de deux affirmatives particulières, la conclusion ne tient pas: Quelque homme est mortel, quelque mortel est cheval; conclusion: quelque homme est cheval". Il s'agit là d'une traduction interprétative, qui a le mérite de donner un sens acceptable, mais qui a le défaut de ne pas rendre exactement le texte syriaque, dont nous avons donné une version volontairement littérale. La forme *qoymon* est un pluriel, qui semble s'accorder avec les mots qui désignent les deux affirmatives, et elle ne se rapporte à aucun mot qui désignerait la conclusion que van Hoonacker lui donne pour sujet. La répétition de la même formule dans tous les pseudo-syllogismes fait douter qu'il s'agisse d'une simple corruption du texte, même si le style extrêmement elliptique des dernières lignes du commentaire suggère de ne les recevoir qu'avec précaution. Il reste que le sens n'est pas immédiatement clair. On peut observer que, dans chacune des figures, les trois pseudo-syllogismes énoncés sont composés, respectivement, de deux affirmatives particulières, de deux négatives universelles, et de deux négatives particulières, c'est-à-dire les trois formules qui sont à rejeter en vertu de la remarque rapportée plus haut, à la suite d'Aristote, que "un autre caractère commun des figures est qu'aucune conclusion n'est produite, ni à partir de deux particulières, ni à partir de deux négatives" (ci-dessus p. 143 et n. 118) L'expression "qui ne tiennent pas" pourrait alors signifier le fait que les couples de prémisses ainsi qualifiées ne produisent pas de conclusion. Les pseudo-conclusions sont alors formées, à ce qu'on peut lire, par la pure et simple reprise, dans lesdites conclusions, de la qualité et de la quantité des prémisses.

¹³³ Outre le renvoi au texte de Proba cité dans la note précédente, cf. aussi Arist., *An. Pr.* I 4, 26 b 21-22: *οὐδὲ ἐὰν ἀμφο τὰ διαστήματα κατὰ μέρος ἢ κατηγορικῶς ἢ στερητικῶς, ἢ τὸ μὲν κατηγορικῶς τὸ δὲ στερητικῶς λέγεται (...) οὐκ*

ἔσται συλλογισμὸς οὐδαμῶς (“il n’y aura pas non plus, d’aucune façon, de syllogisme lorsque les deux intervalles sont énoncés de façon particulière, que ce soit avec des affirmations ou des négations, ou avec une affirmations et une négation (...); cf. Aristote, *Premiers Analytiques*, trad., introd., notes, commentaire et bibliographie par M. Crubellier, GF Flammarion, Paris 2014, p. 61, trad. modifiée).

¹³⁴ Voir encore le texte de Proba, ci-dessus p. 143 et n. 118; cf. aussi Arist., *An. Pr.* I 4, 26 a 9-11: οὐδ’ ὅταν μήτε τὸ πρῶτον τῷ μέσῳ μήτε τὸ μέσον τῷ ἐσχάτῳ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχη, οὐδ’ οὕτως ἔσται συλλογισμὸς (“Pas davantage, lorsque le premier n’appartient à aucun moyen, ni le moyen à aucun dernier, il n’y aura de cette façon syllogisme”).

¹³⁵ Cf. les références données ci-dessus n. 133.

The Curriculum of Aristotelian Philosophy among the Syrians

John W. Watt

Abstract

Since many Syriac texts on secular subjects have not come down to us, an assessment of the philosophical culture of the Syrians, both in the pre-Abbasid and early Abbasid eras, should take into account not only the preserved philosophical writings, but also those known to have once existed from references in other Syriac or Arabic texts. Equally important to bear in mind is the fact that particularly in the pre-Abbasid era, many learned Syrians were able to read Greek and were not confined in their reading to those works which had been translated. Considered in this light, it becomes clear that Syriac interest in Aristotelian philosophy, at least on the part of an elite which in the seventh century appears to have been particularly drawn to the School established at the monastery of Qenneshre on the Euphrates, did not fundamentally differ, despite its Christian colouring, from the Neoplatonic School of Ammonius at Alexandria, and in particular envisaged Aristotelian philosophy as proceeding from logic through physics and mathematics to metaphysics. The *Organon* was studied at least up to the *Sophistical Refutations*, and there is evidence of some interest in mathematics, particularly astronomy. In the pre-Abbasid period, however, there is no sign of any engagement with the physical treatises of Aristotle, despite some interest in natural philosophy evident in the *Hexaemeron* of Jacob of Edessa. The most likely explanation for the divergent estimations of Aristotle as logician and natural philosopher is the rejection of his theory of the eternity of the world, already manifested in the reserve of some Christians at Alexandria to his *Physics*, and the rejection of the theory together with the support provided to the creation story of *Genesis* in the writings of John Philoponus, fragments of whose *Contra Aristotelem* and *De Opificio mundi* are extant in Syriac. In Abbasid Baghdad, Syrians and Christians writing in Arabic who wished to engage with Muslim philosophers could no longer confine their writing on natural philosophy within the framework of the biblical *Hexaemeron*, and Aristotle's physical treatises again assumed great significance, without, however, Christians abandoning their rejection of the eternity of the world. The *Metaphysics* was regarded from the earliest days of Syriac Aristotelianism as the culmination and goal (*telos*) of Aristotelian philosophy, but while in the School of Alexandria the curriculum was completed by a pagan exposition of Plato, such as is evident in the *Platonic Theology* of Proclus, the pioneer of Syriac Aristotelianism, Sergius of Res'ainā, fashioned a Christian version of the curriculum by replacing it with the biblical interpretation presented in the corpus of Pseudo-Dionysius.

Interest in Aristotle on the part of Syriac scholars from the sixth century onwards is widely recognised as having contributed to the diffusion of Greek philosophical thought in the Near East. Syrians were among the students of the Neoplatonists in Alexandria, and Aristotle and his commentators were still being studied in Syriac in ninth and tenth century Baghdad, but the depth and range of that Syriac engagement are still subject to diverse opinions, and these diverging opinions impact on the significance one may attribute to Syriac Aristotelianism for early Graeco-Arabic philosophy. One reason for the divergences is that some important extant texts are still unedited or untranslated, another is the paucity of extant Syriac manuscripts from that early period.

¹ An earlier version of this article was presented at a symposium in Geneva in May 2017 on 'Aristotle in Armenia', for the invitation to which I should here like to thank Prof. Valentina Calzolari.

Most surviving Syriac manuscripts that date back to the tenth century or earlier come from two monastic libraries in Egypt, only one of which, Deir al-Surian, contains a significant number on philosophy, and even these, unsurprisingly in a monastery, are greatly outweighed by the number on biblical and patristic matters.¹ An assessment of the importance of texts which are currently lost to us, based necessarily only on references to them present in other writings, both Syriac and Arabic, affects the picture we will draw of the philosophical culture of the Syrians both in the pre-Abbasid and early Abbasid periods.

The most notable of the lost pre-Abbasid philosophical texts are the seventh century translations by Athanasius of Balad of the complete *Prior Analytics*, the *Posterior Analytics*, the *Topics*, and the *Sophistical Refutations*.² If it is thought surprising that such important texts have not survived in Syriac, no less so is the fact that the ninth century Syriac translations of Ḥunayn and Iṣḥāq of the *Categories* to the *Topics* and other treatises of Aristotle mentioned by the *Fihrist* are also lost.³ The Syriac versions of Galen have suffered a similar fate: very little of the twenty-six or so translations of Sergius of Reš'ainā mentioned by Ḥunayn in his famous *risāla*, and the round ninety-six of his own in the same text, has survived.⁴ The dominance of Arabic and corresponding decline of Syriac as the preferred literary medium for works of philosophy and medicine from the tenth century will be one

¹ The other source of several early manuscripts is St. Catherine's monastery in Sinai, some of which are of interest for 'popular philosophy' (ethics). The Deir al-Surian manuscripts are mostly now located in the British Library or the Vatican, while a few still remain on site. For fuller discussion of these issues, cf. S.P. Brock, "Without Mushē of Nisibis, Where Would We Be?" in R. Ebied - H. Teule (eds.), *Symposium Syriacum VIII*, Peeters, Leuven 2004, pp. 15-24. In the magisterial catalogue of W. Wright, *Catalogue of Syriac Manuscripts in the British Museum Acquired since the Year 1838*, 3 vols., British Museum, London 1870-1872, only 36 (1154-89) of the approximately 1200 pages of manuscript description are devoted to those dealing with 'scientific literature' (logic, grammar, ethics, medicine, and agriculture). It is no doubt a safe assumption that philosophy was a minority interest among Syrians, but the fact that monastic libraries are the sole source of Syriac manuscripts from the Near East may exaggerate the disparity between their interest in theological and non-theological subjects. Unfortunately the library of the most famous monastery to support philosophical studies, Qenneshe (see below), has not survived.

² The evidence for these lost translations comes from *Letter 48* of Patriarch Timothy I (d. 823) and the Paris manuscript of the Arabic *Organon*. On the Syriac translations of the six-volume *Organon*, both the extant and the lost, cf. H. Hugonnard-Roche - A. Elamrani-Jamal, "L'*Organon*. Tradition syriaque et arabe", in R. Goulet (ed.), *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques (DPhA)*, CNRS-Éditions, Paris 1989, I, pp. 502-28; S.P. Brock, "The Syriac Commentary Tradition", in C. Burnett (ed.), *Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts*, Warburg Institute, London 1993, pp. 3-18; and J.W. Watt, "Al-Fārābī and the History of the Syriac *Organon*", in G.A. Kiraz (ed.), *Malphono w-Rabo d-Malphone. Studies in Honor of Sebastian P. Brock*, Gorgias Press, Piscataway 2008, pp. 751-78, esp. pp. 755-8, 763-4.

³ Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, pp. 248.20-249.15 Flügel (Ibn al-Nadīm, *Kitāb al-Fihrist*, ed. G. Flügel, Voegel, Leipzig 1871-1872) for the *Categories* to *Topics*, pp. 249.26- 252.4 for the others. Cf. A. Baumstark, *Geschichte der syrischen Literatur*, Marcus und Webers, Bonn 1922, pp. 227-31. The *Fihrist's* statement that Ḥunayn made an Arabic translation of the *Categories* is clearly wrong. Ḥunayn made a Syriac version, Iṣḥāq an Arabic (though not, as commonly assumed, from his father's Syriac); cf. F.E. Peters, *Aristoteles Arabus*, Brill, Leiden 1968, pp. 7-8; D. King, *The Earliest Syriac Translation of Aristotle's Categories*, Brill, Leiden 2010, pp. 21-9. Some of these lost translations were probably used by Bar Hebraeus, but their recovery from his works is difficult on account of his heavy reliance upon Avicenna. Cf. for the *Rhetoric*, for example, J.W. Watt, *Aristotelian Rhetoric in Syriac*, Brill, Leiden 2005, pp. 6-8, 20-29, 41-5. A Syriac version of *Poetics* 1449 b 24-1450 a 9 was cited by Bar Shakko (d. 1241) in his *Book of Dialogues*; cf. D. Margoliouth, *Analecta Orientalia ad Poeticam Aristoteleam*, Oxford U.P., London 1887, pp. 77-9 Arabic pagination (Syriac) and 54-6 (Latin translation).

⁴ Cf. G. Kessel, *Appendix 4*, in J.C. Lamoreaux, *Hunayn ibn Iṣḥāq on his Galen Translations*, Brigham Young U.P., Provo 2016, pp. 168-80; S.P. Brock, "The Syriac Background to Ḥunayn's Translation Techniques", *Aram* 3 (1991), pp. 139-62, esp. pp. 153-6. See also J.W. Watt, "Why Did Ḥunayn, the Master Translator into Arabic, Make Translations into Syriac? On the Purpose of the Syriac Translations of Ḥunayn and his Circle", in J. Scheiner - D. Janos (ed.), *The Place to Go: Contexts of Learning in Baghdād, 750-1000 C.E.*, Darwin Press, Princeton 2014, pp. 363-88, esp. pp. 363-70.

reason for their loss. Only in the thirteenth century did a ‘Syriac Renaissance’ occur in these fields of study, but after that time Syriac scribes and their readers who interested themselves in philosophical matters mostly preferred to copy or read the expositions of Bar Hebraeus (d. 1286) of Aristotelian philosophy, rather than Aristotle himself or his late antique commentators,⁵ and Bar Hebraeus depended for his interpretation of Aristotle largely on Avicenna. By contrast, clarity on the earlier curriculum of Aristotelian study among the Syrians before and during the early Abbasid period can serve to bring into sharper focus both the elements of continuity in the history of philosophy in the Near East between the late antique and early medieval periods, and the way in which that philosophical tradition was subsequently developed and enriched by Arabic writers.

The earliest Syriac Aristotelian known to us is Sergius of Reš‘ainā, who studied in Alexandria in the time of Ammonius and died in 536.⁶ In order, however, to gain an overall perspective on the Syriac Aristotelian tradition, it will be useful to begin with a text from an author two centuries later, George, bishop of the Arab tribes (d. 724). In his commentary on the *Categories*, preserved in a single 8/9th century manuscript (BL *Add.* 14,659), George proceeded through the ten traditional questions of the *prolegomenon* to that treatise and thus raised the question, number four in the sequence, of the ‘end’ of Aristotelian philosophy:⁷

What is the end of the Aristotelian philosophy? We say (it is) that we may know the one principle, cause, and creator of all. For the Philosopher demonstrates in the treatise called *Metaphysics* (Syr. *bātar kyānyātā* = Gr. *meta ta physika*) that the principle and cause is one, bodiless, from which everything has come into being.

There is no doubt that George was familiar with Philoponus’ corresponding *prolegomenon*,⁸ but the fact that George is hardly very original here is exactly the point I wish to make. Since Sergius was a student at Alexandria, one would expect his commentary on the *Categories* to exhibit a close similarity to those of the Alexandrians. But George’s acquaintance with Aristotelian philosophy was entirely gained in the Syriac-speaking area. Two hundred years after Sergius, the Neoplatonic Aristotelianism of the school of Ammonius was alive and well in Syriac-speaking Mesopotamia. George and the Syriac tradition in which he stood did not study Aristotle primarily to win debates with rival churchmen, as is sometimes suggested,⁹ but for the same reason as the Neoplatonists of late

⁵ Cf. J.W. Watt, “The Syriac Translations of Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq and their Precursors”, in M. Tamcke - S. Grebenstein (eds.), *Geschichte, Theologie und Kultur des syrischen Christentums*. Beiträge zum 7. Deutschen Syrologie-Symposium in Göttingen, Dezember 2011, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 2014, pp. 423-45, esp. pp. 429-33.

⁶ On Sergius, see H. Hugonnard-Roche, “Sergius de Reš‘ainā”, in Goulet (ed.), *DPhA*, VI (2016), pp. 214-27, and J. Watt, “Sergios (Sargīs) von Reš‘aynā”, in C. Riedweg - C. Horn - D. Wyrwa (eds.), *Die Philosophie der Kaiserzeit und der Spätantike, Teilband 3*, Schwabe, Basel 2017, §194 (Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie).

⁷ The commentary is still unedited, but the *prolegomenon* is published with an English translation and discussion in J.W. Watt, “The *Prolegomena* to Aristotelian Philosophy of George, Bishop of the Arabs”, in S. Grebenstein - S. Griffith (eds.), *Christsein in der islamischen Welt. Festschrift für Martin Tamcke zum 60. Geburtstag*, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 2015, pp. 141-63, esp. pp. 144-52. The manuscript is described by Wright, *Catalogue*, vol. III (above, n. 1), pp. 1163-4.

⁸ The text of George published as indicated above (the manuscript is deficient at the beginning) is clearly dependent on Philoponus, *In Cat.*, pp. 5.15-8.27 Busse (Berlin 1898, *CAG* XIII 1).

⁹ D. Gutas, “Origins in Baghdad”, in R. Pasnau (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge 2009, pp. 11-25, esp. pp. 14-15; Id., “Die Wiedergeburt der Philosophie und die Übersetzungen ins Arabische”, in U. Rudolph (ed.), *Philosophie in der islamischen Welt 1. 8.-10. Jahrhundert (PIW)*, Schwabe, Basel 2012 (Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie), pp. 69-70. Against the hypothesis that logic played much part in theological disputations in

antiquity: to acquire knowledge of the single principle of everything.¹⁰ This principle is envisaged without the special characteristics of the Neoplatonic One, and as an efficient, not merely a final, cause.¹¹ George, and presumably Philoponus, no doubt identified it with the Christian God.¹²

Two other important points can be taken from this text. One is connected to the observation made above concerning the limited extant Syriac evidence from this period. Since we have no manuscript evidence of a Syriac version of Philoponus' commentary, either George read it in Greek, or a Syriac version that once existed has been lost. In one sense it hardly matters which is the case, once we realise that George, and many other learned Syrians of the pre-Abbasid years, could read Greek. Syriac translations were made of some important texts, and George himself made translations of the *Categories*, *De Interpretatione*, and *Prior Analytics*.¹³ But those who could read Greek were not confined in their reading to those works which had been translated. Thus although we have no manuscript evidence for Syriac versions of any of the Greek commentators, Syriac Aristotelians with a knowledge of Greek could and did read at least some of them, in addition to Aristotle himself. Works of around a dozen Greek commentators are said by Ibn al-Nadīm to have been available in tenth century Baghdad.¹⁴ Some of them at least are likely to have been known to pre-Abbasid Syrians. Towards the end of the eighth century the East Syrian patriarch Timothy I asked a correspondent named Sergius to look out for commentaries by Alexander, Olympiodorus, and Stephanus, as well as by the Syriac Sergius of Reš'ainā, in the Syrian Orthodox monastery of Mar Zina.¹⁵

The other important point to emerge from George's *prolegomenon* is that his conception of Aristotelian philosophy was not confined to logic. Point five asks the question:

What are the things which lead us to the end? We say that (it is) the doctrine of the things which are in (or subject to) time and change. For from these, by the intermediation of mathematics, we may ascend to those which always exist in like manner, and thus after bodiless substances (ascend) to the first cause of all.

the pre-Abbasid period, cf. D. King, "Why were the Syrians interested in Greek Philosophy?" in P. Wood (ed.), *History and Identity in the Late Antique Near East*, Oxford U.P., Oxford 2013, pp. 61-81, and J.W. Watt, "Pensée grecque, controverses syriaques", in F. Ruani (ed.), *Les controverses religieuses en syriaque*, Geuthner, Paris 2016, pp. 349-80, esp. pp. 354-63.

¹⁰ Cf. in general D. King, "Logic in the Service of Ancient Eastern Christianity: an Exploration of Motives", *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 97 (2015), pp. 1-33.

¹¹ Cf. R. Sorabji, *Matter, Space, and Motion. Theories in Antiquity and their Sequel*, Duckworth, London 1988, pp. 273-81; K. Verrycken, "The *Metaphysics* of Ammonius Son of Hermeias", in R. Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle Transformed*, Duckworth - Bloomsbury Academic, London - Ithaca N.Y 1990 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), pp. 199-231, esp. pp. 220-26.

¹² Cf. *Simplicius. Commentaire sur les Catégories*, Traduction commentée sous la direction de I. Hadot, Fasc. I: *Introduction, première partie (p. 1-9,3 Kalbfleisch)*. Commentaire et notes par I. Hadot, Brill, Leiden 1990 (*Philosophia Antiqua*, 50), p. 103.

¹³ These are all preserved, uniquely, along with his commentaries, in the manuscript *Add.* 14,659; cf. above, n. 7.

¹⁴ Theophrastus, Alexander, Porphyry, Themistius, Iamblichus, Syrianus, Ammonius, Philoponus, Simplicius, Olympiodorus, Stephanus, Theon, and Allinus. Cf. Watt, "Why did Hunayn" (above, n. 4), pp. 379-82.

¹⁵ Timothy, *Ep.* 19, *Timothei Patriarchae I epistulae*, ed./tr. O. Braun, E Typographeo Reipublicae, Paris 1914/1915, pp. 129/86 (*Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium [CSCO] 74/75*). Cf. V. Berti, "Libri e biblioteche cristiane nell' Iraq dell' VIII secolo: una testimonianza dell'epistolario del patriarca siriano-orientale Timoteo I (727-823)", in C. D'Ancona (ed.), *The Libraries of the Neoplatonists*. Proceedings of the Meeting of the European Science Foundation Network "Late Antiquity and Arabic Thought. Patterns in the Constitution of European Culture" held in Strasbourg (March 12 - 14, 2004), Brill, Leiden 2007 (*Philosophia Antiqua*, 107), pp. 307-17, esp. pp. 310-12; Id., *Vita e studi di Timoteo I, patriarca cristiano di Baghdad*, Association pour l'avancement des études iranniennes, Paris 2009, pp. 325-6.

For George, therefore, as for the Alexandrian commentators, the curriculum of Aristotelian philosophy proceeded from physics and mathematics to metaphysics. In point three George had already confirmed that they must be preceded by the logical treatises. It is therefore the entire Alexandrian curriculum of Aristotelian theoretical philosophy, from logic to metaphysics, which in theory at least was the subject of George's interest.

George was the last of the Aristotelian scholars known to us who were connected at some stage of their lives to the Syrian Orthodox monastery of Qenneshre, on the banks of the Euphrates. This monastic institution was celebrated in the Syriac-speaking region as a centre of Greek studies, and had originally been located near Antioch. It migrated there, at the time of the Chalcedonian persecution of miaphysites around 530, under the leadership of John bar Aphthonia, whose father had taught rhetoric in Edessa. John himself appears to have written exclusively in Greek, and it is quite possible that its membership included some who were interested in philosophy from the earliest days of its relocation or before it. However the earliest Aristotelian scholar known to us from Qenneshre is Severus Sebokht (d. 666/7); he was followed by Athanasius of Balad (d. 686/7), Jacob of Edessa (d. 708), and George, all of whom were familiar with Greek while writing in Syriac.¹⁶

Severus' works include a treatise on the syllogisms of *Prior Analytics*¹⁷ and a letter to a periodetes named Jonan on some logical issues. The first of these begins:

Our aim in this treatise is briefly to demonstrate, that is to set down in writing, regarding the types of categorical syllogisms which are (treated) in the book of *Prior Analytics* of the philosopher Aristotle. I shall speak about their construction and resolution, together with how many of them and what they are, and also how many and what are their figures, according to the logical and syllogistical art. For this is useful for us, and greatly helps with the ultimate science of logical and demonstrative knowledge (*theoria*) which (is based on) these (syllogisms) which are treated in the *Book of Apodeictics* (= *Posterior Analytics*), the (*Book*) in which truth is genuinely demonstrated and distinguished from falsehood by means of the logical art. Thus if it is beneficial to know the truth and to love it over falsehood, then it is possible to know this by means of syllogisms.

It ends:

The student should first know that this book of the *Analytics* is not for itself. On the contrary, as the book of *Categories*, which teaches (us) about simple namings (or predications), (leads us up) to the *Peri hermeneias*, which (teaches us) about the first combination of simple namings, (which in turn) leads us up to this book of the *Analytics*, so also this book of the *Analytics*, which teaches us about the construction together with the resolution of categorical syllogisms, leads us up to the use of the logical treatise of the book of the *Apodeictics*, which is the aim and fulfilment of the whole logical art, which (in turn) is the instrument (*organon*) of the whole of philosophy, which (in turn), according to a fine Platonic word or definition, is assimilation to God according to what is possible for man.¹⁸

¹⁶ On Qenneshre and these four Aristotelian scholars, cf. H. Hugonnard-Roche, "Die Schule von Keneschre", in Riedweg-Horn-Wyrwa (eds.), *Die Philosophie der Kaiserzeit und der Spätantike, Teilband 3* (above, n. 6), §197; J. Watt, "Jakob von Edessa", *ibid.*, §198; and H. Daiber, "Die syrische Tradition in frühislamischer Zeit", in Rudolph (ed.), *PIW* (above, n. 9), pp. 43-7. A striking contemporary testimony to the dedication of Athanasius and Jacob to the study of Greek is found in the prologue of Phocas' translation of Pseudo-Dionysius; cf. below, n. 35.

¹⁷ Unedited. Cf. Baumstark, *Geschichte* (above, n. 3), p. 246, n. 11 (with the correction of Cambridge, *Add.* 3287 to 3284, cf. below, n. 21) and Hugonnard-Roche, "Sévère Sebokht", in Goulet (ed.), *DPhA VI* (2016), pp. 230-35, esp. p. 233.

¹⁸ MSS BL, *Add.* 14,660, foll. 47v-54r and *Add.* 17,156, foll. 3r-5v; cf. Wright, *Catalogue*, vol. III (above, n. 1), pp. 1160-3.

Thus although Severus dealt only with the early chapters of the *Prior Analytics*, his interest in it was to help the student understand the *Posterior Analytics*, and beyond that the whole of philosophy. The ‘end’ of philosophy is the well-known saying of Plato (*Theaetetus* 176 B 1), which is regularly cited as one of the definitions of the subject, and in the Greek context this would imply that the student on completing the study of Aristotle should proceed to that of Plato. In the Syriac context, however, the implication could be different. The same Platonic text was cited by Sergius, but neither Sergius nor Severus showed any interest in Plato, and since the *Metaphysics* is the only treatise with a theological dimension in the Aristotelian school corpus, it can hardly be doubted that, like Sergius¹⁹ and George, Severus considered the *Metaphysics* to be the culmination of Aristotelian philosophy. It seems unlikely, however, that the *Metaphysics* by itself would ever have been considered sufficient to achieve the ‘assimilation to God according to what is possible for man’. Severus thus appears to adhere to the Neoplatonic curriculum, in which Aristotle’s logic, physics, and metaphysics served as preliminary to the theological truth found in Plato, but without engaging any writings of Plato himself. This prompts the question whether something other than the Platonic dialogues represented for him the fulfilment of philosophy, a point to be considered below (in the section on metaphysics).

The letter to Jonan indicates that the students for whom Severus wrote were indeed actively interested in logical questions. Jonan had asked Severus to clarify a number of issues around Aristotle’s logic, such as his understanding of the contradictory opposites and negations of *De Interpretatione* 10 and the meaning of ‘figure’, but also whether in Aristotle’s *Analytics* there was a *Prior* and a *Posterior*. Severus clarified that there were four books between the *De Interpretatione* and the *Topics*, the latter two of which could be designated *Apodeictics* or *Posterior Analytics*. He presented the ‘standard’ view that the (*Prior*) *Analytics* were written on account of the *Apodeictics*, but also mentioned the view that *Prior Analytics* I was composed for the *Apodeictics*, and *Prior Analytics* II for the *Topics*.²⁰ The treatise on the syllogisms of the *Prior Analytics* is said to have been written in 638,²¹ the translation of the *Eisagoge* by Athanasius of Balad in 645,²² but we do not know the date of his translations of *Prior Analytics* to *Sophistical Refutations*. However if the afore mentioned dates are correct, and Athanasius translated the later books of the *Organon* at about the same time as the *Eisagoge*, the students Severus was addressing would presumably have had to read the later books in Greek. Severus seems to have known commentaries by Alexander, Ammonius, and Philoponus, in addition possibly to others unknown to us,²³ and no doubt it was mainly in Greek that these commentaries were available at Qenneshre, even though over the course of time some Syriac translations cannot be ruled out.

¹⁹ For the citation of the *Theaetetus*, see chapter one of Sergius’ commentary on the *Categories*, translated in H. Hugonnard-Roche, *La logique d’Aristote du grec au syriaque. Études sur la transmission des textes de l’“Organon” et leur interprétation philosophique*, Vrin, Paris 2004 (Textes et traditions, 9), pp. 187-231, esp. p. 191, with commentary pp. 204-5; on the planned exposition culminating with the *Metaphysics*, see the citation from Sergius below. The commentary is not yet edited.

²⁰ H. Hugonnard-Roche, “Questions de logique au VII^e siècle. Les épîtres syriaques de Sévère Sebokht et leurs sources grecques”, *Studia graeco-arabica* 5 (2015), pp. 53-104, esp. pp. 62-9, with commentary pp. 72-93.

²¹ According to a note in MS. Cambridge, *Add.* 3284 (18th century), fol. 41r. Cf. W. Wright, *A Catalogue of the Syriac Manuscripts Preserved in the Library of the University of Cambridge*, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge 1901, p. 886.

²² According to a note in MS. *Vat. syr.* 158 (9/10th century), fol. 16r. Cf. S.E. Assemani - J.S. Assemani, *Bibliothecae Apostolicae Vaticanae codicum manuscriptorum catalogus*, vol. 3, Ex Typographia linguarum orientalium Angeli Rotilii in aedibus maximorum, Romae 1759, p. 306.

²³ Hugonnard-Roche, “Questions de logique” (above, n. 20), pp. 53-7.

A century at least before Severus, Sergius also wrote in Syriac while making use of Greek commentators. His commentary on the *Categories* does not formally raise the ten traditional questions of the *prolegomena*, but his introductory chapters do cover some of the same ground. In the course of them he makes clear his conception of the curriculum and his intention to comment on the whole of it:

The book written by him [Aristotle] about simple namings is called *Categories*, that which he wrote about their first combination *On Interpretation*, that about the linkage of discourse is named *Prior Analytics*, and that about the art of demonstrations itself is named *Apodeictics*. Together with this there is that called *Topics*, and that about the refutation of sophists which he named *Sophistical Refutations*. With these, therefore, this philosopher completed the whole art of logic, which is, as we have said, an instrument of philosophy and not a part of it. Some people say that the *Art of Rhetoric* which was composed by him is also part of the same (art) of logic. However, let us turn now to the subject itself and start to speak as (well as) we can about the aim of each one of these treatises, beginning the sequence with that on *Categories*, which is about simple namings, and similarly treating each of them one by one in the same way. Then we will go on to his other treatises, those on the parts of praxis, and on all natures, mathematics, and the other ones called theological.²⁴

Whether or not Sergius did write commentaries on any treatise other than the *Categories*, that is the only one which has come down to us. It is likely that it was written before the old, anonymous Syriac translation of the *Categories* itself, but even if that is not the case, it is clear that Sergius did not make use of this translation, and, since we know of no sixth century Syriac translations of any texts of Aristotle beyond *Prior Analytics* I.7, we can also assume that his projected commentaries on the remainder of the corpus, whether or not any were ever written, were similarly envisaged without recourse to a Syriac version of the corresponding Aristotelian treatise. If therefore Sergius expected his readers also to read the treatises of Aristotle himself, he must have assumed that they would do so in Greek.

The logic curriculum envisaged both by Sergius and the Qenneshre Aristotelians was not therefore that of the ‘truncated *Organon*’ ending at *Prior Analytics* I.7, even though the extant sixth century translations do not extend beyond that point.²⁵ There is little doubt that some Syrians, as well as some Greeks, Latins, and Armenians, were satisfied with this reduced curriculum. It has been appropriately described as a ‘corpus minimal’ corresponding to a ‘bagage philosophique minimal’ of learned study in late antiquity.²⁶ The Syriac Aristotelians from Qenneshre, however, clearly

²⁴ Cf. J.W. Watt, “Sergius of Resʿainā on the *Prolegomena* to Aristotle’s Logic: The Commentary on the *Categories*, Chapter Two”, in E. Coda - C. Martini Bonadeo (eds.), *De l’Antiquité tardive au Moyen Age. Études de logique aristotélicienne et de philosophie grecque, syriaque, arabe et latine offertes à Henri Hugonnard-Roche*, Vrin, Paris 2014 (Études Musulmanes, 44), pp. 31-57, esp. p. 35 with commentary pp. 48-9. The Syriac text is still unedited. Cf. above, n. 19.

²⁵ Cf. above, n. 2.

²⁶ H. Hugonnard-Roche, “La tradition gréco-syriaque des commentaires d’Aristote”, in V. Calzolari - J. Barnes (eds.), *L’œuvre de David l’Invincible et la transmission de la pensée grecque dans la tradition arménienne et syriaque*, Brill, Leiden 2009 (Philosophia antiqua 116), pp. 153-73, esp. p. 173. Hugonnard-Roche, “Syriac Studies”, *Studia graeco-arabica* 3 (2013), p. 243, further suggests that works based on the ‘truncated’ and full versions of the *Organon* belong to different literary genres, the former being manuals of logic designed to teach the categorical syllogism, the latter exegetical commentaries. As he also observes, the preponderance of manuscripts devoted to the former does not imply a lack of interest among the learned in the latter.

did not limit themselves to it.²⁷ We would surely have a much fuller understanding of their more extensive engagement with Aristotle's logic if any commentaries (or translations) from their hands on the *Posterior Analytics* to the *Sophistical Refutations* had come down to us. However the lost translations by Athanasius of Balad of the *Organon* from the beginning of the *Prior Analytics* to the end of the *Sophistical Refutations*, the extant commentary and translation on the entire *Prior Analytics* by George, and Severus' desire to guide students towards the *Posterior Analytics* – all of these together leave no room for doubt that they studied the whole *Organon* (from the *Eisagoge* to at least the *Sophistical Refutations*), and along with its Greek and Syriac texts also had available those of some of the Greek commentators. Athanasius' translations were not therefore isolated oddities or idiosyncratic personal preferences. They were, on the contrary, made for the study of, and instruction in, these treatises, and the texts of Severus cited above show us the outline of the curriculum in which it was intended that they should be used.²⁸

Qenneshre seems to have been the favoured location to which those members of the West Syrian confession who were interested in philosophy were drawn. Whether in its curriculum it was unique among the West Syrians, and whether in the seventh century a curriculum of comparable extent was taught at any school of the East Syrians, cannot be established on the basis of our current evidence. In the following century, however, that curriculum was known in the Tigris region among both West and East Syrians, and in particular to the East Syrian patriarch Timothy I, whose interest in logic and the complete *Organon* is evident in a number of his extant epistles.²⁹ He knew the translations of Athanasius of Balad, sought commentaries or scholia on the *Topics*, *Sophistical Refutations*, *Rhetoric*, and *Poetics*, and pursued the search for commentaries, whether in Syriac or Greek, by Alexander, Olympiodorus, Stephanus, and Sergius.³⁰ The fact that he sought these commentaries in the West Syriac monasteries of Mar Mattai and Mar Zina points to the spread of the Qenneshre curriculum also to the West Syriac monasteries in the Tigris region. Commentaries or analyses of the later books of the *Organon* from authors of a Syriac background writing in Syriac or Arabic in ninth and tenth century Baghdad are known to have been composed by al-Marwazī, who wrote in Syriac,³¹ and in Arabic by the Syro-Arabs Abū Bišr Mattā³² and Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī.³³ Al-Fārābī studied the *Organon* at least to the *Posterior Analytics* with the Syro-Arab Yūḥannā ibn Ḥaylān (and Abū Bišr Mattā?).³⁴

²⁷ It scarcely needs saying that there is no evidence that these Syriac scholars felt themselves liberated from an episcopal prohibition (in Alexandria!) against the study of the full *Organon* by the coming of Islam to their lands, as al-Fārābī fantasised; cf. recently U. Rudolph, "Der spätantike Hintergrund", in Rudolph (ed.), *PIW* (above, n. 9), pp. 22-4.

²⁸ Against the restriction of the (entire) Syriac tradition in pre-Abbasid times to the 'truncated *Organon*', cf. further Watt, "The Syriac Translations of Ḥunayn" (above, n. 5), pp. 435-44; Id., "The Syriac Aristotelian Tradition and the Syro-Arabic Baghdad Philosophers", in D. Janos (ed.), *Ideas in Motion in Baghdad and Beyond. Philosophical and Theological Exchanges between Christians and Muslims in the Third/Ninth and Fourth/Tenth Centuries*, Brill, Leiden 2015, pp. 7-43, esp. pp. 12-14.

²⁹ Cf. Berti, *Vita e studi di Timoteo I* (above, n. 15), pp. 316-32.

³⁰ *Epp.* 48, 43, and 19. See for *epp.* 48 and 43, *Die Briefe 42-58 des ostsyrischen Patriarchen Timotheos I*, ed./tr. M. Heimgartner, Peeters, Leuven 2012, pp. 89-90, 66/74-5, 49-50 (CSCO, 644/645); and for *Ep.* 19, above, n. 15.

³¹ Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, p. 249.13-14 Flügel (on the *Posterior Analytics*) and p. 263.15-17. Cf. Peters, *Aristoteles Arabus* (above, n. 3), pp. 17-18.

³² Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, p. 249.14 Flügel (on the *Posterior Analytics*) and p. 264.2-4 (on 'the four books of logic').

³³ Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, p. 249.17-21 and p. 264.12 Flügel (on the *Topics*), and G. Endress, *The Works of Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī. An Analytical Inventory*, Reichert, Wiesbaden 1977, pp. 33-4 (on the *Posterior Analytics*, *Topics*, and *Sophistical Refutations*).

³⁴ Cf. U. Rudolph, "Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī", in Rudolph (ed.), *PIW* (above, n. 9), pp. 370-72.

The sixth century Aristotle translations, as also the translations we possess from Sergius (namely of Pseudo-Dionysius and a very small portion of his medical work), are all in idiomatic Syriac and aim to give a comprehensible rendering of the original. Seventh century translations, both of Aristotle and other texts, are excessively literal, and exhibit the same approach to the translation of Greek texts as that of the Armenian Hellenizing School. For both the Qenneshre translators and the Armenian Hellenizers, an ideal translation mirrored the original as closely as possible, irrespective of the likely incomprehensibility of such a translation, without an expositor, to those not schooled in the requisite terminology. Both groups had a profound respect, bordering on reverence, for the Greek wording, and possessed a good knowledge of the language.³⁵ The difference between the freer, reader-oriented style of the Syriac translations of the sixth century and the literal, text-oriented style of the seventh is not absolute, and some signs of movement from the former to the latter are already discernible within those of the sixth century.³⁶ The reasons for the change need not therefore be attributed solely to external influences, but it is not impossible that the Armenian Hellenizing tradition had some influence on the Syriac, especially if the said Armenian tradition began as early as the middle of the fifth century or the beginning of the sixth.

It was doubtless on account of this exaggerated fidelity to the Greek wording and resultant deformation of natural Syriac that in the tenth century Ibn Suwār, who did not know Greek, found Athanasius' translation of the *Sophistical Refutations* incomprehensible or unsatisfactory.³⁷ All the indications are that the ninth century Syriac translations of Ḥunayn (and Ishāq) reverted to a more natural Syriac idiom and were directed to the sense of the Greek, rather than its wording.³⁸ According to the *Fihrist* a fresh set of Syriac translations of the six-volume *Organon* (less, possibly, the *Sophistical Refutations*) was made by Ḥunayn and Ishāq.³⁹ From the Abbasid period we also have the first evidence of Syriac versions of the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*, that of the former from the notes of Ibn al-Samḥ to his edition of the Arabic *Rhetoric*, of the latter from the Syriac-to-Arabic translation of the *Poetics* by Abū Biṣr Mattā.⁴⁰ From the same period comes the only explicit evidence

³⁵ On the Armenian, cf. V. Calzolari, "L'école hellénisante I", in M. Nicanian, *Âges et usages de la langue arménienne*, Entente, Paris 1989, pp. 110-30, esp. pp. 122-7 ('particularités linguistiques'). For the Syriac, cf., e.g., S.P. Brock, "Towards a History of Syriac Translation Technique", in R. Lavenant (ed.), *Symposium Syriacum 1980*, Pontificium Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, Roma 1983, pp. 1-14. The contrast between the manner of the sixth century translations and those of the Qenneshre scholars was sharply drawn by Phocas, who maintained that at the time of Sergius the art of translation from Greek had not yet been adequately mastered by many, but the passage of time and generations had brought forth other 'lovers of toil' such as the saintly and renowned Athanasius, patriarch of Antioch, and Jacob, bishop of Edessa, who by their ability cleared the way as much as is possible and in some manner conjoined (*hwau mzaugānē d-*) the two languages; cf. G. Wiessner (ed.), "Zur Handschriftenüberlieferung der syrischen Fassung des Corpus Dionysiacum", *Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Phil.-hist. Klasse 3* (1972), pp. 165-216, esp. p. 198. Cf. above, n. 16.

³⁶ Cf. D. King, *The Syriac Versions of the Writings of Cyril of Alexandria. A Study in Translation Technique*, Peeters, Leuven 2008, esp. pp. 353-88 (CSCO, 626); Id., *The Earliest Syriac Translation of Aristotle's Categories* (above, n. 3), pp. 69-79.

³⁷ Cf. Watt, "The Syriac Translations of Ḥunayn" (above, n. 5), pp. 442-4. It was probably for the same reason that Ḥunayn considered one of Ayyūb's Galen translations incomprehensible; cf. S.P. Brock, "Changing Fashions in Syriac Translation Technique: The Background to Syriac Translations under the Abbasids", *Journal of the Canadian Society for Syriac Studies 4* (2004), pp. 3-14, esp. pp. 8-9.

³⁸ Cf. Brock, "The Syriac Background to Ḥunayn's Translation Techniques" (above, n. 4); Id., "Changing Fashions in Syriac Translation Technique" (above, n. 37), pp. 3-14.

³⁹ Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, pp. 248-9 Flügel. Cf. above, n. 3. The version of the *Sophistical Refutations* by Ishāq sought by Yaḥyā, as also those of the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics* (*Fihrist*, p. 253.3-4 Flügel), could have been in Syriac or Arabic.

⁴⁰ Cf. M.C. Lyons, *Aristotle's Ars Rhetorica. The Arabic Version*, Pembroke Arabic Texts, Cambridge 1982, pp. 1-1v;

of Syriac versions of some of the Greek commentators.⁴¹ Earlier than Ḥunayn we also know of Syriac translations of the *Prior Analytics* and *Sophistical Refutations* by Theophilus of Edessa (d. 785),⁴² and in the late years of the eighth century patriarch Timothy I, as indicated above, showed a keen interest in texts and commentaries on the *Organon*. Despite Ibn Suwār's criticism of Athanasius' translation of the *Sophistical Refutations*, the Baghdad Aristotelians knew and made use of his translations as well as those of Theophilus of Edessa and Ḥunayn and Iṣḥāq.

Like the Syriac versions of Galen made for Syrian doctors, these philosophical translations were produced for Syriac readers (though for the philosophical we do not know the identity of the patrons). While not made merely to facilitate the production of Arabic versions, both the medical and philosophical sometimes secondarily served that purpose.⁴³ The old (pre-Ḥunayn) Arabic version of the *Topics* commissioned from Timothy by al-Mahdī was made from Syriac,⁴⁴ as were the translations by Abū Biṣr Mattā which completed the Arabic *Organon*, that of the *Posterior Analytics* from Ḥunayn's and Iṣḥāq's Syriac, that of the *Poetics* from an anonymous. Ḥubayṣ and 'Isā ibn Yaḥyā made their Arabic versions of Galen from Ḥunayn's Syriac, and Syriac interest in both Galen and Aristotle, a tradition going back to Sergius, remained vibrant in the early Abbasid period. The famous physician Yūḥannā ibn Māsawayh, who commissioned eighteen Syriac translations of Galen from Ḥunayn and three from Ḥubayṣ, declared that when Galen and Aristotle agree on something, 'that's (the way it is)', but when they differ, it is very difficult for reason to find the right answer on it.⁴⁵ Reference has already been made to al-Marwazī, mentioned as a teacher of Mattā, who "wrote about logic and other things only in Syriac, and was a well-known physician in Baghdad".⁴⁶

The Alexandrian curriculum of Aristotelian philosophy, the basis of Syriac Aristotelianism, determined also the structure of Arabic Aristotelianism, but with the significant additions of the biological works and, in contrast to the pre-Abbasid Syriac Aristotelian cursus, the physical. This

L. Tarán - D. Gutas, *Aristotle. Poetics. Editio maior of the Greek text with historical introductions and philological commentaries*, Brill, Leiden 2012 (Mnemosyne, Bibliotheca Classica Batava, Supplementum, 338), pp. 91-2; and cf. above, n. 3. Whether or not Timothy had a Syriac version of the *Poetics* (and the *Rhetoric*) is uncertain; cf. Watt, "The Syriac Aristotelian Tradition" (above, n. 28), pp. 17-18.

⁴¹ On the basis of the evidence in the *Fibrist*, it would appear that possibly eleven or more Syriac versions of the commentators were known in Baghdad: four by Alexander, three by Themistius, two by Olympiodorus, and one each by Philoponus and Simplicius. Nine of these were on the physical treatises, one on the metaphysical (Alexander on *Lambda*), and possibly one on the logical (Themistius on the *Posterior Analytics*? Cf. Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fibrist*, p. 263.25-6 Flügel). Four of them were said to be extant in Syriac (without naming a translator), and seven to have been translated (into Arabic) by Mattā or Yaḥyā. Throughout the present article it is assumed that Mattā and Yaḥyā translated exclusively from Syriac. Cf. Watt, "Why did Ḥunayn" (above, n. 4), p. 380.

⁴² Cf. above, n. 2.

⁴³ Cf. Watt, "Why did Ḥunayn" (above, n. 4), pp. 363-77.

⁴⁴ Timothy, *Ep.* 43, ed./tr. Heimgartner (above, n. 30), pp. 65-6/47-9.

⁴⁵ Yūḥannā ibn Māsawayh, *Le livre des axiomes médicaux*, edition and tr. by D. Jacquart - G. Troupeau, Droz, Geneva 1980, p. 116, no. 8. Cf. G. Strohmaier, "Griechische Philosophen bei arabischen Autoren des Mittelalters", in P. Bruns (ed.), *Von Athen nach Bagdad zur Rezeption griechischer Philosophie von der Spätantike bis zum Islam*, Borengässer, Bonn 2003 (Hereditas, 22), pp. 161-79, esp. p. 167. For some evidence, 'buried' in hagiography, of a concern for medicine in East Syrian Christianity earlier than our evidence for the medical centre at Jundishapur, cf. P. Bruns, "Von Bischofen, Ärzten und Asketen—Schnittpunkte von Christentum und Medizin im spätantiken Sasanidenreich", in *Malphono w-Rabo d-Malphone* (above, n. 2), pp. 29-42. See also G.J. Reinink, "Theology and Medicine in Jundishapur", in A.A. MacDonald et al. (eds.), *Learned Antiquity: Scholarship and Society in the Near East, the Greco-Roman World, and the Early Medieval West*, Peeters, Leuven 2003, pp. 163-74.

⁴⁶ Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fibrist*, p. 263.15-17 Flügel.

curriculum is broadly manifested in *The Number of Aristotle's Books* by al-Kindī,⁴⁷ *The Philosophy of Aristotle* by al-Fārābī,⁴⁸ and the account of Aristotle's writings in the *Fihrist* (pp. 248-52 Flügel). Perhaps the most striking example, however, of a similar perception of the nature and purpose of Aristotelian philosophy across Greek, Syriac, and Arabic cultures is the short treatise of al-Fārābī (the authorship of which has not gone unquestioned) *On What Must Proceed the Study of the Philosophy (of Aristotle)*,⁴⁹ points four and five of which may be cited here to set beside those of George quoted near the beginning of this article:

Four. The end pursued in the study of philosophy is the knowledge of the Creator Sublime, who is one, unmoved, the efficient cause of all things, and disposer to this world of his generosity, wisdom, and justice. In the works in which the Philosopher accomplishes this, there is assimilation to the Creator to the extent of the human faculty.

Five. The way which one devoted to philosophy must follow is to strive for right action and attain the end. Striving for right action takes place through science, for action is the fulfilment of knowledge. The attainment of the end in science occurs only through the understanding of nature, for this lies closest to our reason, then follows mathematics. The end in action is first attained when man first establishes himself, but then teaches others who live in his house or his city.⁵⁰

Mathematics and Physics

While for the most part the commentators evidently assumed that the disciplines lying between logic and metaphysics were to be studied in treatises of Aristotle, the wording of their *prolegomena* does not always require it,⁵¹ and in practice mathematics in late antiquity was studied not from Aristotle but from mathematicians.⁵² Extant works of Severus Sebokht testify to an interest in mathematics at Qenneshre, albeit directed almost exclusively to astronomy,⁵³ and the discovery of further texts since the pioneering work of Nau⁵⁴ has enabled the identification of eleven astronomical

⁴⁷ Cf. G. Endress - P. Adamson, "Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī", in Rudolph (ed.), *PIW* (above, n. 9), p. 103.

⁴⁸ Cf. Rudolph, "Al-Fārābī", in Id., *PIW* (above, n. 9), pp. 401-2. The 'broadly manifested curriculum' referred to here is not meant to obscure the well-known differences between al-Kindī and al-Fārābī. The logical treatises and the Alexandrian-Syriac *Organon* did not have the significance for al-Kindī that they had for the Baghdad Aristotelians and al-Fārābī.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 381.

⁵⁰ *Alfārābī's Philosophische Abhandlungen*, ed./tr. F. Dieterici, Brill, Leiden 1890, p. 53.13-22/ pp. 88-9.

⁵¹ Philoponus speaks only about "instruction" (*In Cat.*, p. 6.3 Busse [*CAG* XIII 1] *didaskalia*), Olympiodorus (*In Cat.*, p. 9.31 Busse [*CAG* XII 1] *bathmos*) and David (*In Cat.*, p. 121.6 Busse [*CAG* XVIII 1] *bathmoi*) about the "levels" of philosophy. Ammonius speaks about the "treatise" (*In Cat.*, p. 6.18 Busse [*CAG* IV 4] *pragmateia*) on each, but does not specify the author. Only Simplicius speaks of "all the writings" (*In Cat.*, p. 6.16 Kalbfleisch [*CAG* VIII 1] *sungrammata*) of the Philosopher".

⁵² Cf. C. Scholten, *Antike Naturphilosophie und christliche Kosmologie in der Schrift De Opificio mundi des Johannes Philoponos*, W. de Gruyter, Berlin 1996, pp. 396-400; Id., *Johannes Philoponos. De Opificio mundi*, 3 vols., Herder, Freiburg 1997, vol. 1, pp. 11-17; Rudolph, "Der spätantike Hintergrund", in Rudolph (ed.), *PIW* (above, n. 9), pp. 20-21.

⁵³ Cf. É. Villey, "Qenneshre et l'astronomie aux VI^e et VII^e siècles", in É. Villey (ed.), *Les sciences en syriaque*, Geuthner, Paris 2014 (Études syriaques, 11), pp. 149-90; H. Hugonnard-Roche, "Mathématiques en syriaque", *ibid.*, pp. 67-106.

⁵⁴ See the annotated collection of his articles in É. Villey - H. Hugonnard-Roche (eds.), *Astronomie et cosmographie syriaques: recueil d'articles de François Nau*, Gorgias Press, Piscataway 2014 (Œuvre des grands savants syriacisants; Scholars of Syriac. Collected works, 1).

works known there, as well as a few others not directly connected to it.⁵⁵ Of particular note is the treatise of Severus *On the Astrolabe*, the recent discovery of a manuscript of which at Mardin has enabled the construction of a better critical text than was available to Nau.⁵⁶ The prologue to this treatise shows not only that Severus was familiar with the tradition of edition and commentary on scientific texts in late antiquity, but also, with the references to Aristotelian logic and pedagogy, that he considered astronomy to fall within the curriculum of Aristotelian philosophy. Notable also is the fact that all the sources of the work were Greek. The parallelism with the situation in the area of logic is exact: authors writing in Syriac knew and made use of Greek texts, especially those employed in or originating in the environment of the school of Alexandria, for which no Syriac translations were either made or have survived to our day.⁵⁷ Ptolemy and Theon of Alexandria were the principal Greek astronomical writers who according to our evidence from Severus' works were known at Qenneshe, to which it now seems probable that we should add Ammonius' *On the Astrolabe*.

The most important difference between the Alexandrian and pre-Abbasid Syriac Aristotelian corpora is the complete absence of the physical treatises from the latter. It seems very likely that this reflects a lack of significant engagement with these works on the part of Syrians, rather than merely an accident in the transmission of texts, and if so it is certainly not inexplicable. In his *Appearance of Philosophy*, al-Fārābī imagined a clash between Christian thought in the pre-Islamic era and Aristotelian philosophy with his fantasy of an episcopal prohibition on the teaching of logic beyond the 'truncated *Organon*',⁵⁸ but he was aiming at the wrong target. The real problem for some Christian students in Alexandria – some but not all – lay not in the logical treatises, but the physical. In the *Ammonius* of Zacharias of Mytilene, the philosophy master is said to have challenged Christian students in the course of a lecture on Aristotle's *Physics* on their refusal to consider the universe to be co-eternal with the Good.⁵⁹ Aristotle's logic was not considered a threat to their faith by philosophically inclined Christians, but the difference between the concept of an eternal and self-existent universe with a heaven inhabited by planetary and stellar gods, and the doctrine of a temporally limited world created and governed by a single deity, constituted a severe stumbling block for many of them. While the problem affected the *Physics* and *De Caelo* in particular, since the *physika* were treated as a single coherent group, Aristotle's status as a philosopher of nature was compromised in the eyes of many Christians.

Not all of them considered the idea of the eternity of the world incompatible with their faith, and Sergius, the Syriac Aristotelian pioneer, did not directly confront it in his treatise *On the Causes of the Universe according to the View of Aristotle the Philosopher, that it is a Sphere*.⁶⁰ This is not an independent work, but a carefully adapted Syriac version of a treatise by Alexander of Aphrodisias,

⁵⁵ Villey, "Qenneshe et l'astronomie" (above, n. 53), pp. 160-81.

⁵⁶ É. Villey, "Ammonius d'Alexandrie et le *Traité sur l'astrolabe* de Sévère Sebokht", *Studia graeco-arabica* 5 (2015), pp. 105-28.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 110-16.

⁵⁸ Cf. above, n. 27. For different suggestions as to the causes of al-Fārābī's fantasy, cf. Watt, "Al-Fārābī and the History of the Syriac *Organon*" (above, n. 2), pp. 771-8; G. Endress, "Die Bagdader Aristoteliker", in Rudolph (ed.), *PIW* (above, n. 9), pp. 292-3.

⁵⁹ Zacaria Scolastico, *Ammonio*, edizione traduzione a c. di M.M. Colonna, La Buona Stampa, Naples 1973, p. 98/150-51.

⁶⁰ Cf. E. Fiori (ed. and tr.), "L'épitomé syriaque du *Traité sur les causes du tout* d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise attribué à Serge de Rēš'aynā", *Le Muséon* 123 (2010), pp. 127-58. Sergius thus accepted the spherical universe of secular astronomy and philosophy, not the 'biblicist' notions of Theodore of Mopsuestia and Cosmas Indicopleustes, against which Philoponus argued in his *De Opificio mundi* (see below).

which is not extant in Greek but has survived in an Arabic version.⁶¹ Sergius modified Alexander's original text by eliminating attributes such as 'divine' or 'ungenerated' in relation to the celestial bodies and replacing them with terms such as 'revolving', 'pure' or 'superior', agreeing with the view that the First Mover must be eternally creating and causing movement, but refraining from affirming that the creation itself is eternal.⁶² In his translation of Pseudo-Dionysius he correctly reproduced the view of the Areopagite that the creation was not co-eternal with the creator.⁶³ Had Sergius commented on the physical treatises of Aristotle, one imagines he would have refrained from personally endorsing the theory of the eternity of the world, but while we know that he intended to write such commentaries, we have no evidence that his intention was ever realised.⁶⁴

Already in the sixth century in ecclesiastical circles outside those of the philosophers we have evidence of a general Christian hardening against any flirtation with the antique conception of the divinity or rationality of the heavenly bodies.⁶⁵ The extent to which conciliar condemnations in the Byzantine realm may have influenced the Qenneshre Aristotelians is of course uncertain, but it is nevertheless the case that the one significant treatise on nature we have from them is a commentary not on Aristotle's physical treatises, but on the creation story of *Genesis*. Jacob of Edessa's *Hexaemeron* owed much to that of Basil, but differed in incorporating a significant amount of natural philosophy, even though many of its sources, while certainly *Greek* (as he himself often stated), are still unidentified.⁶⁶ Jacob strongly maintained that the perceptible creation consists of only four elements, not Aristotle's five, and that it was created in time:

As long as he knew it was the right thing (to do), he held back and restrained the sea of his goodness ... and arrested his will from creating. But when it was pleasing to his will, and his all-knowing wisdom

⁶¹ See C.F. Genequand (ed. and tr.), *Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Cosmos. Arabic text with English Translation, Introduction and Commentary*, Brill, Leiden 2001 (Islamic philosophy and theology, 44); Id., *Alexandre d'Aphrodise. Les principes du tout selon la doctrine d'Aristote*. Introduction, texte arabe, traduction et commentaire, Vrin, Paris 2017.

⁶² Cf. D. King, "Alexander of Aphrodisias's *On the Principles of the Universe* in a Syriac Adaptation", *Le Muséon* 123 (2010), pp. 159-91, esp. pp. 167-70.

⁶³ *De Divinis nominibus* X.2-3 (937 B - 940 A, ed. B.R. Suchla, *Corpus Dionysiacum*, Vol. 1, *De Divinis nominibus*, De Gruyter, Berlin 1990, pp. 215-7). Cf. the Syriac version of Sergius in *Dionigi Areopagita. Nomi divini, teologia mistica, epistole: la versione siriana di Sergio di Rēs aynā (VI secolo)*, ed. E. Fiori, Peeters, Leuven 2014, pp. 91-3 (CSCO, 656).

⁶⁴ On Sergius' intention to comment on the physical treatises, cf. the citation of Sergius above, n. 24. He did translate the Pseudo-Aristotelian *De Mundo*; cf. P. de Lagarde (ed.), *Analecta Syriaca*, Teubner, Leipzig 1858, pp. 134-58. Like Alexander's treatise, it did not belong in the main philosophy corpus (cf. below, n. 82), and with its doctrine of the dependence of the cosmos upon God, it did not present Sergius with as acute a problem as he faced with the former. His translation is accordingly much more faithful to the original than is the case with Alexander. Here too his version can be read as implying that God is eternally active in moving and preserving (391 b 16-19, 397 b 5-8, Syriac p. 136.10-12, p. 149.16-18 Lagarde), without the implication of the actual eternity of the creation.

⁶⁵ Cf. J.T. Walker, *The Legend of Mar Qardagh. Narrative and Christian Heroism in Late Antique Iraq*, Univ. California Press, Berkeley 2006, p. 193.

⁶⁶ In geographical matters Ptolemy was certainly used by Jacob (whether in Greek or Syriac); cf. O. Defaux, "Les textes géographiques en langue syriaque", in *Les sciences en syriaque* (above, n. 53), pp. 107-47, esp. pp. 126-32. Other possible non-Christian sources include Theophrastus, *De Lapidibus*, and Pseudo-Aristotle, *De Mundo*. Jacob's account of the winds could have been taken from *De Mundo* 4 (but not from Sergius' translation), though it could also have been derived from another Greek source which transmitted Timosthenes' system of the twelve-rose compass. Cf. M. Greatrex, "Jacob of Edessa's Use of Theophrastus, *De lapidibus*", in M.F. Wiles - E.J. Yarnold (eds.), *Papers presented at the Thirteenth International Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford, 1999: Studia Patristica vol. 35*, Peeters, Leuven 2001, pp. 391-4; Daiber, "Die syrische Tradition", in Rudolph (ed.), *PIW* (above, n. 9), p. 45; H. Takahashi, "Syriac and Arabic Transmission of *On the Cosmos*", in J.C. Thom (ed.), *Cosmic Order and Divine Power*, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2014, pp. 153-67, esp. p. 158 and n. 28.

agreed that the right thing from that moment was to create, he uncovered the sea of his goodness and showed the immensity of his power.⁶⁷

In a section directed principally against astrology, but also attacking late antique ideas concerning the divinity of the heavenly bodies, he wrote:

They are not gods, nor (are they) living, rational, autonomous or free-willed, nor do they possess animate reason or govern this (sublunar) universe, as some erring Greeks and Chaldeans thought about them and called them gods, rulers of this world and what is in it.⁶⁸

Jacob the Aristotelian philosopher doubtless did not wish to point the finger directly at Aristotle as one of these ‘erring Greeks’, but he was probably well aware that Aristotle was prepared to accept ‘the tradition handed down from early times’ that the heavenly bodies are gods.⁶⁹

The Qenneshre scholars were not the first Aristotelians in the Alexandrian Neoplatonic tradition to reject the doctrine of the eternity of the world and the divinity of the heavens. In the previous century John Philoponus had done so, in his *Contra Proclum* and *Contra Aristotelem*, and while also commenting on Aristotle’s *Physics*, he had written an *Exegesis of the Mosaic Cosmogony* - the treatise conventionally known as *De Opificio mundi* - in which he claimed that Aristotle had invented a new idea, being the first natural philosopher to have proposed that the world had no beginning and was ungenerated, while in fact the beginning and temporal creation of the world had already been clearly described by ‘Moses’.⁷⁰ Whether or not Jacob’s *Hexaemeron* was directly influenced by that of Philoponus,⁷¹ it is likely that Philoponus’ attack on Aristotle and his decision to write a commentary on *Genesis* incorporating Greek natural philosophy provided the intellectual foundation within the Aristotelian tradition for a comparable work in Syriac.⁷² Against that it is often supposed that Philoponus’ influence in the Syriac sphere was confined (despite George’s use of his commentary on the *Categories*) to his forays into Christian theology, but a strict demarcation between theological and philosophical influence is not tenable. Among his works preserved in Syriac (and only fragmentarily in Greek) are his *Treatise Concerning the Whole and the Parts* and his *Diatētēs*. A reader of the former would find there a treatise on a recognised philosophical theme (‘mereology’), indebted particularly to Aristotle’s *Physics* and *De Generatione et corruptione*. Only if he went on to the *Diatētēs* would he perceive a theological motive in, or application of, the former treatise, in which the philosophical doctrines of the whole and the parts, actuality and potentiality, are applied to the Christological controversy.⁷³

⁶⁷ Iacobi Edesseni *Hexaemeron, seu in opus creationis libri septem*, ed. J.-B. Chabot, tr. A.A. Vaschalde, E Typographeo Reipublicae, Paris 1928-1932, p. 45a.7-19/36 (CSCO, 92/97). On the four elements, cf. *ibid.*, ed. Chabot, pp. 64b32-68a25/tr. Vaschalde, pp. 52-4. The ether, according to Jacob, is not a fifth element, but ‘the mixture of air and fire ... is called by the Greeks ether, which translated means flaming air. This is the third element’: Chabot, p. 67a.29-b.5/tr. Vaschalde, p. 53.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p.163a36-b8 Chabot; tr. Vaschalde, p. 138.

⁶⁹ Arist., *Metaph.* Λ 8, 1074 a 38 - b 14.

⁷⁰ *De Opificio mundi* II 13, ed. G. Reichardt, Joannis Philoponi *De Opificio mundi* libri VII, Teubner, Leipzig 1897, p. 82.3-12; ed./tr. Scholten, Johannes Philoponos, *De Opificio mundi* (above, n. 52), vol. 1, p. 224.12-20/225.

⁷¹ Unambiguous evidence of such influence is hard to find, but a case has been made by M. Wilks, ‘Jacob of Edessa’s Use of Greek Philosophy in his *Hexaemeron*’, in B. ter Haar Romeny (ed.), *Jacob of Edessa and the Syriac Culture of his Day*, Brill, Leiden 2008, pp. 223-38, esp. pp. 226-8.

⁷² Cf. Walker, *The Legend of Mar Qardagh* (above, n. 65), pp. 190-94.

⁷³ Cf. D. King (introd. and tr.), ‘A Treatise Concerning the Whole and the Parts’, in R. Sorabji (ed.), *Philoponus: On Aristotle Categories 1-5 and A Treatise Concerning the Whole and the Parts*, Bloomsbury, London 2015, pp. 167-221, esp.

In an analogous way one can consider Philoponus' *Contra Aristotelem* and his *De Opificio mundi* as related works, the former a philosophical treatise refuting the doctrine of eternity, the latter applying it to the theological issue of divine creation. The former is preserved only in fragments (mainly by his adversary Simplicius),⁷⁴ the latter complete in a single Greek manuscript of the tenth or eleventh century.⁷⁵ A seventh century Syriac manuscript, British Library *Add.* 17,214, which consists of short extracts from patristic theologians, contains brief contiguous citations from these two works:⁷⁶

From John the Grammarian, an indication of (the proposition of) the second chapter of the eighth book *Against Aristotle*: Our account proposes about that which is dissolved into not-being that it is not evil in and by itself, and about the world itself that it will not be dissolved into not-being. (Further) from the second chapter: However the world will not be dissolved into not-being, because neither are the divine oracles dissolved into this, while we have clearly spoken of new heavens and a new earth. From the same, from the sixteenth chapter of the first book of the treatise *On Six Days*: The apostle made known the corruption of all bodies when saying, 'The creation itself will be liberated', he says, "from bondage to corruption into the freedom of the glory of the children of God" (*Ep. Rom.* 8.21).⁷⁷

The accuracy of the latter is confirmed from the Greek. Of the former only six books are mentioned by Simplicius and the Arabic tradition, but as Christian Wildberg has argued, that is no reason to dispute the accuracy of the Syriac fragment. The later books may have been of a more theological and eschatological character than the earlier, and correspondingly of less interest to Simplicius and the Arabic tradition.⁷⁸ Among the Christian Syrians, however, the refutation of the eternity of the world *a parte ante* and *a parte post* would both have been of interest. It is clearly impossible to say from these fragments how much, if any, of these works was translated directly into Syriac.⁷⁹ The final composition of the manuscript occurred in Syriac, for Ephraim and Philoxenus of Mabbug are among the authors cited, but it is not impossible that an earlier redaction containing the extracts from Philoponus once existed in Greek. Despite these imponderables, the fragments provide

pp. 169-78. See on the *Diatētēs* H. Chadwick, "Philoponus the Christian Theologian", in R. Sorabji (ed.), *Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science*, Institute of Classical Studies, London 2010, pp. 83-96, esp. pp. 87-9. A treatise on the whole and the parts, differing from Philoponus, was composed by Yahyā ibn 'Adī; cf. Endress, *The Works of Yahyā ibn 'Adī* (above, n. 33), pp. 53-5.

⁷⁴ Philoponus, *Against Aristotle, on the Eternity of the World*, introd. and tr. C. Wildberg, Duckworth, London 1987.

⁷⁵ *Vindobonensis theologicus graecus* 29. It is externally attested in Greek only by Photius (9th century). Cf. Scholten, *Antike Naturphilosophie* (above, n. 52), p. 15; Id., *De Opificio mundi* (above, n. 52), vol. 1, p. 67.

⁷⁶ On the manuscript, cf. Wright, *Catalogue* (above, n. 1), vol. II, pp. 915-7. Cf. also Baumstark, *Geschichte* (above, n. 3), pp. 162-3.

⁷⁷ Fol. 72vb36(ult.)-73ra19 = *Contra Aristotelem*, fragment 134, tr. Wildberg, *Against Aristotle* (above, n. 74), p. 148; fol. 73ra19-29 = *De Opificio mundi* I 16, ed. Reichardt, p. 40.8-12; ed./tr. Scholten, vol. 1, p. 146.20-23/147).

⁷⁸ Wildberg, *Against Aristotle* (above, n. 74), p. 26; Id., "Prolegomena to the Study of Philoponus' *Contra Aristotelem*", in Sorabji, *Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science* (above, n. 73), pp. 239-50, esp. pp. 239-42.

⁷⁹ The third and last fragment from Philoponus in this manuscript (foll. 73ra29-b17) is entitled from the eleventh chapter of the fourth book *Against Andrew the Ariomanite* (Greek *areiomantēs*). It is connected to the other two fragments through the theme of the finite term of the world and its "deliverance from bondage to corruption" (*Ep. Rom.* 8,21). In other Syriac manuscripts there are fragments from writings of Philoponus *Against Andrew* and *Against the Arians*. It is likely (though not certain) that they are all taken from the same work, directed against an Arian named Andrew. Cf. A. Van Roey, "Fragments anti-ariens de Jean Philopon", *Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica* 10 (1979), pp. 237-50, the fragment from *Add.* 17,214 at p. 241 (Syriac) and 242 (Latin). It is quite possible that, like the *Diatētēs*, this Christological writing was translated complete into Syriac.

us with a clear indication that these two works could both have been known in Graeco-Syriac circles in the seventh century (the era of the Qenneshre Aristotelian scholars). In the ninth century much of the *Contra Aristotelem* was known to al-Kindi,⁸⁰ but it is naturally not surprising that we have no evidence from Muslim writers that they knew the *De Opificio mundi*.

The physical treatises of the Aristotelian school corpus were not necessarily unknown to Syriac Aristotelians who were able to read Greek,⁸¹ but since they were seen as compromised, they were neither translated nor cited by Syriac authors subsequent to Sergius.⁸² Some of the commentators on the physical treatises might also have been known, even though not translated. In a remarkable passage in the East Syrian *Legend of Mar Qardagh* (late sixth or seventh century), the hagiographer not only correctly represents the difference between the pagan and Christian conceptions of the heavens, but also compares the movement of the heavenly bodies – moved by God – to ‘the manner of a stone or an arrow or a cart’ – moved by us. Not only does he thus appear to be aware that Philoponus’ impetus theory extended to both earthly and celestial motion, but his reference to the objects of earthly movement represents a striking echo of the ‘stone and arrow’ in Philoponus’ theory of projectile motion presented in his commentary on the *Physics*.⁸³

As a result of the emergence in the Abbasid period of Muslim interest in the Aristotelian school corpus, the attitude of Syriac philosophers to the physical treatises underwent a significant change. With Muslim thinkers not beholden to the ‘six days’ of *Genesis*,⁸⁴ it is not surprising that among Christians who engaged philosophically with them it ceased to present the same ‘embargo’ on Aristotle as a philosopher of nature as had been the case hitherto.⁸⁵ It seems, however, that the change occurred rather gradually. Timothy referred to a passage in the *De Generatione et corruptione*, but it is possible that he only knew it through a commentary on the *Eisagoge*, and he sought a work designated

⁸⁰ Cf. H.A. Davidson, “John Philoponus as a Source of Medieval Islamic and Jewish Proofs of Creation”, *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 89 (1969), pp. 357-91.

⁸¹ The *Physics* was certainly known to Sergius. Cf. S. Aydin, *Sergius of Reš‘ainā. Introduction to Aristotle and his Categories, Addressed to Philotheos*, Brill, Leiden 2016, pp. 138-45, 229-36.

⁸² The pseudo-Aristotelian *De Mundo* was translated by Sergius; cf. above, n. 64. However, according to all the commentators except David, it did not belong among the universal works, and therefore did not form part of the genuine philosophy corpus; cf. Hadot, *Simplicius. Commentaire sur les Catégories* (above, n. 12), pp. 65-8. Later Syriac Aristotelians may have used it for information on terrestrial phenomena without accepting all its cosmological doctrine, e.g. the fifth element. Cf. above, n. 66.

⁸³ Cf. Walker, *The Legend of Mar Qardagh* (above, n. 65), pp. 28-32, 194-7.

⁸⁴ Cf. T. Nagel, “Juden, Christen und Muslime: Religionsgeschichtliche Betrachtungen”, in *Christsein in der islamischen Welt* (above, n. 7), pp. 39-64, esp. p. 39.

⁸⁵ Around the middle of the ninth century, Ibn Qutayba wrote disapprovingly of those dazzled by beguiling novelty talking of “*Generation and Corruption, Physics (sam‘ al-kiyān)*, single words, quality, quantity, time, demonstration, and combined expressions”, indicating therefore some acquaintance with the said physical treatises as well as the *Categories* or the *Organon*; cf. Ibn Kutaiba’s *adab-al-kātib*, ed. M. Günert, Brill, Leiden 1900, pp. 3.11-4.2, tr. G. Lecomte, “L’introduction du *kitāb adab al-kātib* d’Ibn Qutayba”, in *Mélanges Louis Massignon*, vol. 3, Institut Français de Damas, Damascus 1957, pp. 45-64, esp. p. 53. His ‘novelty’ was in contrast to traditional Islamic religious sciences, but in relation to the earlier Syriac philosophical tradition, it can be said that serious attention to the physical treatises was indeed new, but that to the logical was a continuation of what had gone before. Ibn Qutayba continued (ed. pp. 4-5 Günert, tr. p. 55 Lecomte) with a discussion in connection with *ḥadd al-mantiq* of the meaning of the saying “the beginning of action is the end of thought” and the construction of a house, well known as a parable of the construction of the *Organon* both to Alexandrians (cf. *Prolégomènes à la philosophie de Platon*, éd. L.G. Westerink, tr. J. Trouillard avec la collaboration de A.-Ph. Segonds, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 2003 [CUF], p. XLVII) and Syrians (cf. Watt, “Sergius of Reš‘ainā on the *Prolegomena* to Aristotle’s Logic” [above, n. 24], pp. 34-5).

The Natural Principles of Bodies which he ascribed to “someone of the Platonic dogma”, not the Aristotelian. Aristotelian natural philosophy was probably only known to Job of Edessa through secondary compilations.⁸⁶ The designation of the *Physics* in some Arabic texts as *sam‘ al-kiyān* points to a Syriac *šem‘ā kyānāyā* (Greek *physikē akroasis*) and thus to some Syriac interest in the text prior to Ishāq’s Arabic translation, and the translations – Greek to Syriac and Syriac to Arabic, of Ḥunayn, Ishāq, Mattā, and Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī – of Aristotle’s *physika* and the Greek commentaries on them,⁸⁷ as also the glosses from Syriac in the Arabic *Physics* (MS. Leiden Or. 583), show that by then distrust of these treatises had diminished in the Syriac philosophical community. The form in which the text of the *Physics* became available (in whole or part) to Syriac readers is uncertain, but the Christian Baghdad Aristotelians writing in Arabic commented extensively on it.⁸⁸

The acceptance of the *physika* into the curriculum did not, however, always lead to acceptance of the teaching on the eternity of the world. While al-Kindī knew some of these treatises, he also knew Philoponus’ arguments against the doctrine, and, unlike al-Fārābī and the Muslim *falsafa*, held to the temporal creation of the universe.⁸⁹ On the Christian side, the doctrine continued to be rejected. Despite Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī’s involvement in commenting and translating the physical treatises and their Greek commentators,⁹⁰ when challenged by the Muslim al-Miṣrī that if he followed Aristotle in everything, he must also accept his theory of the eternity of the world, he declared that Aristotle was not his guide in matters to do with Christianity,⁹¹ and claimed that authentic proofs indicate that there had been a time when the world had not been created before the creator made it.⁹²

Metaphysics

George named no treatises on physics or mathematics, but did name the *Metaphysics* as the culminating treatise of Aristotelian philosophy, even though his source, Philoponus, did not do so. This suggests that he knew it and that it was important to him, but might he have merely taken the reference from another *prolegomenon*? In Ammonius (possibly) and Simplicius he could have read the

⁸⁶ Cf. Y. Arzhanov - R. Arnzen, “Die Glossen in MS. Leyden Or. 583 und die syrische Rezeption der aristotelischen *Physik*”, in Coda-Martini Bonadeo (eds.), *De l’Antiquité Tardive au Moyen Age* (above, n. 24), pp. 415-63, esp. pp. 419-21. On the other hand, the fact that the *De Generatione et corruptione* was particularly mentioned by Ibn Qutayba (see previous note) might be thought to heighten the possibility that it was already known in its entirety to Timothy. *The Natural Principles of Bodies* might be the (doxographical) work from which an extract is cited in the MS. Deir al-Surian 27, foll. 98-9; cf. S.P. Brock - L. van Rompay, *Catalogue of the Syriac Manuscripts and Fragments in the Library of Deir Al-Surian, Wadi Al-Natrun (Egypt)*, Peeters, Leuven 2014, pp. 168-9.

⁸⁷ Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, p. 250.10-11, 22-3 (*Physics*), 29-30 (*De Caelo*); p. 251.3-7 (*De Gen. et corr.*), 8-10 (*Meteorologica*), 11-15 (*De Anima*), and 21-2 (*Liber Animalium*).

⁸⁸ Cf. Arzhanov-Arnzen, “Die Glossen” (above, n. 86), pp. 425-9, 434-63; and on the commentaries from the school of Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī, cf. P. Lettinck, *Aristotle’s Physics and its Reception in the Arabic World*, Brill, Leiden 1994 (summary in the introduction, esp. pp. 4-6, 32-3).

⁸⁹ Cf. G. Endress, “Building the Library of Arabic Philosophy. Platonism and Aristotelianism in the Sources of al-Kindī”, in D’Ancona (ed.), *The Libraries of the Neoplatonists* (above, n. 15), pp. 319-50, esp. pp. 345-8; Endress - Adamson, “Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī”, in Rudolph (ed.), *PIW* (above, n. 9), p. 129; and Davidson, “John Philoponus” (above, n. 80).

⁹⁰ Cf. Endress, *The Works of Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī* (above, n. 33), pp. 27-30, 35-8.

⁹¹ *La grande polémique antinestorienne de Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī*, vol. I, ed./tr. E. Platti, Peeters, Louvain 1981, p. 106.12-15/91 (CSCO, 427-428).

⁹² Id., vol. II, 1982, p. 203.18-19/178-9 (CSCO, 437-438). See in general Endress, “Die Bagdader Aristoteliker”, in Rudolph (ed.), *PIW* (above, n. 9), pp. 321-2; and Watt, “Pensée grecque, controverses syriaques” (above, n. 9), pp. 373-5.

passage from the *Iliad* ('Let the ruler be one') with which Aristotle concludes *Metaphysics Lambda*,⁹³ but he would have needed to know the *Metaphysics* to know that it came from there. He could, however, have known this from Olympiodorus,⁹⁴ or found explicit references to the *Metaphysics* in a longer passage from David.⁹⁵ There is no other evidence that he knew either Olympiodorus or David, but even if he did, why would he not have read the *Metaphysics*, given that he believed it to be the goal of Aristotelian philosophy? The Greek text was translated by Uṣṭāt for al-Kindī, so there is no reason it could not have been known to George, in Greek if not in Syriac.⁹⁶

As it would have been strange for Severus Sebokht not to have read the *Posterior Analytics* given his view of the logic curriculum, similarly it seems natural in the light of George's account of the whole Aristotelian philosophy that he would have read the *Metaphysics*. The difference lies in the fact that while we know Athanasius of Balad translated the former, we know of no translator of the latter. We do, however, know of some citations or echoes of the *Metaphysics* by Jacob of Edessa in his *Encheiridion*.⁹⁷ By themselves they do not prove that Jacob had a complete text at his disposal, either in Greek or Syriac. They might have been taken from an epitome, handbook, or other secondary source, but such an assumption is not necessary. The citations are perfectly consistent with the thesis that the *Metaphysics* was studied by the Aristotelians of Qenneshreh.

Ammonius' harmonisation of Plato and Aristotle's *Metaphysics* had to some extent already prepared the way for Christians' acceptance of the treatise, with its interpretation of Plato's Ideas as principles in the divine Intellect which were causally responsible for the creation of the world.⁹⁸ However this was still understood as without beginning or end, and the eternity of the world does make a brief appearance in the *Metaphysics*.⁹⁹ Both the very brevity of these statements, and the fact that the doctrine belonged to the domain of physics rather than metaphysics, can credibly account for the acceptance by the pre-Abbasid Syriac Aristotelians of the *Metaphysics* alongside their rejection of the physical treatises. Formally, the classification of the one as *theologika* and the other as *physika* could permit them to disregard an assertion about the eternity of the world within the theological context, just as, for example, a biblical statement about the "eternity of the world (earth)" (*Ecclesiastes 1,4 eis ton aiōna*) could be set aside by Philoponus as a source of knowledge about nature on the grounds that the book in question was "more ethical than physical".¹⁰⁰ While accepting

⁹³ Ammonius, *In Cat.*, p. 6.16 app. crit. Busse (*CAG IV 4*); Simplicius, *In Cat.*, p. 6.10-11 Kalbfleisch (*CAG VIII*).

⁹⁴ Olympiodorus, *In Cat.*, p. 9.22-4 Busse (*CAG XII 1*).

⁹⁵ David, *In Cat.*, pp. 120.1-121.4 Busse (*CAG XVIII 1*) for the passage unique to David; see the references to the *Metaphysics* at p. 120.1 and 26, and the citation of the *Iliad* at p. 119.33.

⁹⁶ Around the same time as Uṣṭāt translated the *Metaphysics* into Arabic, Ḥunayn translated *Lambda* into Syriac; cf. Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, p. 251.27-9 Flügel.

⁹⁷ G. Furlani (ed./tr.), "L'*Encheiridion* di Giacomo d'Edessa nel testo siriano", *Rendiconti della Reale Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei. Classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche* 6.4 (1928), pp. 222-49, esp. p. 227/241. Cf. Id., "Di alcuni passi della *Metafisica* di Aristotele presso Giacomo d'Edessa", *Rendiconti della Reale Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei. Classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche* 5.30 (1921), pp. 268-73. The passages are *Metaph.* Δ, 1014 b 16-17; 17-18; 18-20; 26-8; 36; 1015 a 13-15. On the overall thrust of the *Encheiridion*, in particular Jacob's interest in ontology, cf. H. Hugonnard-Roche, "Le vocabulaire philosophique de l'être en syriaque, d'après des textes de Sergius de Rēš'ainā et Jacques d'Édesse", in J.E. Montgomery (ed.), *Arabic Theology, Arabic Philosophy. From the Many to the One: Essays in Celebration of Richard M. Frank*, Peeters, Leuven 2006, pp. 101-25, esp. pp. 111-21. Cf. also the similarity in intention noted between Jacob and Philoponus, *ibid.*, pp. 121-3.

⁹⁸ Cf. above, n. 11.

⁹⁹ *Metaph.* Λ 6, 1071 b 3-10; 8 1073 a 24-b 1; 1074 a 36-8.

¹⁰⁰ *De Opificio mundi* III 10, ed. Reichardt, p. 135.1-24; ed. Scholten, vol. 2, pp. 322.8-324.5, with the comment

Philoponus' criticism of the eternalist doctrine, if they followed his *Contra Aristotelem*, they could attribute the motion of the heavens to nature or soul,¹⁰¹ if the *De Opificio mundi*, to God's impressed force.¹⁰² For modern criticism which sees profound changes over time in Philoponus' thought, it is improbable that when he wrote these works he still held his earlier positive views on the value of the *Metaphysics* derived from the Ammonian synthesis,¹⁰³ including those embodied in his commentary on the *Categories*, but such a critical approach to his writings is unlikely to have played any part in the thinking of the Qenneshre Aristotelians, who would have treated his writings as a unified whole.

Sergius' citation of *Theaetetus* 176 B 1 in the *prolegomena* to his commentary on the *Categories* and his understanding that 'the theological treatises' (the *Metaphysics*) constituted the culmination of the Aristotelian corpus have been mentioned above. Equally important are the remarks with which he concludes the commentary:

These things are called in Greek 'categories', about which Aristotle wrote (this) short treatise, which is the portal and commencement of the discipline which (is designated) by (the word) 'logic' ... I urge you therefore to meditate on them, so that you may grasp and remember these things which will be profitable for you in connection with the entire teaching (of the Philosopher) on natures and other doctrines which are useful for the truly discerning. But if time allows us, we will work (our way through) all the (logical) treatises one by one, so that you may understand the discipline of logic. For without them it is not possible to comprehend the treatises of medicine, nor understand the doctrine of the philosophers. Nor, furthermore, (is it possible without them) to uncover the true meaning of the divine scriptures, in which is the hope of our salvation, unless through his exalted way of life someone should receive divine power so that he has no need of human instruction. For there is no possible way or path to all things knowable by human power except through the discipline of logic.¹⁰⁴

One would surely be correct in assuming that only an elite minority of Christians would have ascribed to the view that the study of logic was necessary in order "to uncover the true meaning of the

pp. 324-5, n. 65. The separation of the *Metaphysics* from the five physical treatises can still be seen in the bipartite structure of the 10th century MS. *Paris. gr.*1853 according to the analysis of F. Ronconi, "Le corpus aristotélicien du *Paris. gr.* 1853 et les cercles érudits à Byzance. Un cas controversé", *Studia graeco-arabica* 2 (2012), pp. 201-25.

¹⁰¹ *Contra Aristotelem*, fragment 49, tr. Wildberg, *Against Aristotle* (above, n. 74), pp. 65-7.

¹⁰² *De Opificio mundi* I 12, ed. Reichardt, pp. 28.20-29.9; ed./tr. Scholten, vol. 1, pp. 124-7. This latter solution obviously represents a fundamental departure from Aristotle; cf. Sorabji, *Matter, Space, and Motion* (above, n. 11), pp. 244-6, and Scholten, *Antike Naturphilosophie* (above, n. 52), pp. 373-9. Attribution of celestial motion to soul would be ruled out for any who agreed with Jacob on that point (cf. above, n. 68), but Jacob attributes it not to Philoponus' impressed force, but to their inner nature established by God, a view similar to Philoponus' earlier conception, prior to the composition of the *De Opificio mundi* (cf. Sorabji, *Matter, Space, and Motion*, pp. 211-13, 233-4). Cf. Chabot (ed.), *Iacobi Edesseni Hexaemeron*, pp. 164a.28-164b.5 tr. Vaschalde, p. 139 (above, n. 67): "These (matters) of the motion (of the heavenly bodies) are not voluntary, free, or independent, but (derive) from the nature (*mkānūtā*) which God the Creator 'ennatured' (*akin*) and placed in them, so that they should be moved in accordance with the movement of the sun. The sun is their illuminator and mover, just as the Creator and Sustainer 'ennatured' it, and neither is it moved nor does it move (the others) by its own will or freedom". On this new status afforded to the sun and its repositioning at the outer edge of the cosmos, cf. Wilks, "Jacob of Edessa's Use of Greek Philosophy in his *Hexaemeron*" (above, n. 71), pp. 228-36.

¹⁰³ Cf. Scholten, *Antike Naturphilosophie* (above, n. 52), pp. 373-9; Verrycken, "The *Metaphysics* of Ammonius" (above, n. 11), pp. 223-6.

¹⁰⁴ MS. British Library, *Add.* 14,658, foll. 60va-61ra. Those "of an exalted way of life who have no need of human instruction" are presumably ascetics opposed to philosophy and Greek culture. It is hard to tell whether Sergius is being ironical here, or genuinely acknowledging their different way.

divine scriptures'. A very special understanding of the Bible is clearly implied here, mediated perhaps through an author who could only be properly studied by those who had previously mastered logic. Sergius' statement in fact looks like a parallel to, or an adaptation of, the contemporary Neoplatonic belief that the philosophy curriculum culminating in the 'theological' interpretation of Plato's *Parmenides* had to begin with logic. Sergius, however, showed no special interest in Plato, although at Alexandria as a pupil in the school of Ammonius he could hardly have been unaware of Plato and the *Platonic Theology* of Ammonius' teacher Proclus. Nevertheless, as Sergius stated in the prologue of the commentary, it was Aristotle whom he considered to be "the origin, beginning, and principle of all knowledge, not only for Galen and the other physicians like him, but also for all the writers called philosophers who came after him".¹⁰⁵

Despite Ammonius' synthesis, pagan Neoplatonists in general were not unaware of problems in asserting the harmony of Plato and Aristotle. There is no evidence of Syriac interest in the Platonic corpus, but since, as noted above, the Platonic "assimilation to God according to what is possible for man" was considered by both Sergius and Severus Sebokht to be the goal of the curriculum, the *Metaphysics* seems unlikely to have been the endpoint for them of "the whole of philosophy". For the Alexandrians in the school of Ammonius, the endpoint was the study of Plato in the interpretation of Proclus, for Sergius, it appears, the study of the Bible in the interpretation of Pseudo-Dionysius, whose works he translated into Syriac. In his prologue to this translation, which probably is based on an earlier independent treatise, he envisaged a multi-stage ladder of knowledge (*theoria*), some of whose steps consisted of Christian spiritual progress according to the teaching of Evagrius of Pontus, and others of a philosophical cursus comprising logic, physics, mathematics, and metaphysics. Beyond all of these, however, he envisaged a further stage which, "by means of all these already mentioned, touches, as far as is permitted, on the exalted radiance of the hidden divinity". This final stage is subsequently described as "the hidden and veiled vision of the intellect which reaches out, as much as is possible, through some distant similarity between them, towards the unfathomable radiance of Being", and "not a knowledge but an excess of ignorance and superior to knowledge". In its present context, it clearly refers to the theology of Pseudo-Dionysius.¹⁰⁶

Pseudo-Dionysius was the only Christian writer translated by Sergius; his other translations were entirely from the non-Christian Greek tradition and limited to philosophy (pseudo-Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias) and medicine (especially Galen). Since he apparently had no interest in

¹⁰⁵ The prologue is translated in Hugonnard-Roche, *La logique* (above, n. 19), pp. 165-86, the citation at p. 168.

¹⁰⁶ Sergius' prologue is edited with a French translation by P. Sherwood, "Mimro de Serge de Rešayna sur la vie spirituelle", *L'Orient syrien* 5 (1960), pp. 433-57; 6 (1961), pp. 95-115, 122-56. There is a better translation by E. Fiori, *Sergio di Resh'ayna. Trattato sulla vita spirituale*, Monastero di Bose, Bose 2008. The citations above are from Sherwood "Mimro de Serge", 6 (1961), pp. 122-5, Fiori, pp. 40-41. In this treatise Sergius designated (Aristotelian) physics and metaphysics respectively as knowledge "which extends over visible natures" and that which "ascends to hidden substances above vision". Cf. the terminology of Simplicius, *In Cat.*, p. 6.16-18 Kalbfleisch (*CAG VIII*): the (theoretical) writings of Aristotle "lead up to knowledge, via that of natural things to that of those above nature." The surprising inversion in the sequence of mathematics and metaphysics in Sergius' scheme is probably on account of the fact that mathematics was not studied from Aristotle, and when thinking about his writings (as in the passage of Simplicius just cited), physics was perceived as leading on to metaphysics; cf. similarly David, *In Cat.*, p. 120.23-6 Busse (*CAG XVIII.1*): the *Metaphysics* immediately follows the physical treatises. Sergius keeps physics and metaphysics next to one another and places mathematics after them. His scheme is also discussed by E. Fiori, "Un intellectuel alexandrin en Mésopotamie", in Coda-Martini Bonadeo (ed.), *De l'Antiquité Tardive au Moyen Age* (above, n. 24), pp. 59-90, esp. pp. 77-86. Even if Sergius wrote this treatise (or an earlier form of it) before he knew the corpus of Dionysius, by placing it at the front of his translation of the corpus he evidently determined that it should subsequently be read in connection with it.

translating any other Christian theologian, he seems to have seen ‘the Areopagite’ as connected in a special way to the Greek philosophical tradition, and more specifically as a Christian counterpart to (the Athenian) Proclus, whose Neoplatonic reading of the Bible completed and perfected the Aristotelian curriculum for Christians in the way that Proclus’ interpretation of the *Parmenides* did for pagans.¹⁰⁷ There is no doubt that the Qenneshre scholars, and others, were attentive readers and followers of Dionysius, and it appears quite possible that Sergius’ view of his place at the summit of the philosophical curriculum remained influential in Syriac Aristotelian circles.¹⁰⁸ ‘Dionysius’ did not accept the doctrine of the eternity of the world.¹⁰⁹

In the ninth century al-Kindī wrote *On First Philosophy* not only without adhering to that doctrine, but even placing at the outset a lengthy exposition against it. In his armoury he possessed, alongside Philoponus’ writings against the doctrine, the pseudonymous *Theology of Aristotle*.¹¹⁰ Also for the author of the *Harmony of Plato and Aristotle* – possibly al-Fārābī – this last work was of great significance,¹¹¹ as he considered it to be the direct continuation of the *Metaphysics*. Thus noting in the *Theology* the allusions of ‘Aristotle’ to the words of ‘Plato’ affirming that the One creates everything in an atemporal act, he could resolve what he saw as only an apparent contradiction between the temporal and eternalist views of creation in the works of Plato and Aristotle respectively.¹¹² Syriac Aristotelians did not believe that Aristotle wrote the Dionysian corpus, but it does not seem unrealistic to consider both the late antique juxtaposition of Aristotle and Plato and the Muslim juxtaposition of the *Metaphysics* and *Theology of Aristotle* as analogous to a Syriac juxtaposition of Aristotle and Pseudo-Dionysius.¹¹³ Christian interest in the *Metaphysics* is evident in the Abbasid period. In the *Fihrist* we hear of Syriac and Arabic translations of certain of its Books and some

¹⁰⁷ The term *Plato christianus* was coined by P. Bettolo, “Scuole e ambienti intellettuali nelle chiese di Siria”, in C. D’Ancona (ed.), *Storia della filosofia nell’Islam medievale*, Einaudi, Torino 2005, pp. 48-100, at p. 98. Perhaps we may nuance Bettolo’s insight by suggesting that the Bible itself was Sergius’ *Plato christianus*, while Pseudo-Dionysius could be termed *Proclus christianus*. That Pseudo-Dionysius’ Christianized Neoplatonism owed much to Proclus has long been established. Cf. also J.W. Watt, “The Syriac Aristotle between Alexandria and Baghdad”, *Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture* 7 (2013), pp. 26-50, esp. pp. 33-6.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 41-5; Id., “From Sergius to Mattā. Aristotle and Pseudo-Dionysius in Syriac Tradition”, in J. Lössl - J.W. Watt (eds.), *Interpreting the Bible and Aristotle in Late Antiquity*, Ashgate, Farnham 2011, pp. 239-57; and A. Treiger, “Palestinian Origenism and the Early History of the Maronites: in Search of the Origins of the Arabic *Theology of Aristotle*”, in Janos (ed.), *Ideas in Motion* (above, n. 28), pp. 44-80. On George’s knowledge of and dependence upon Pseudo-Dionysius, cf. V. Ryssel, *Georgs des Araberbischofs Gedichte und Briefe*, Hirzel, Leipzig 1891, pp. 36-43, 75-7 (translation), 152-5, 163-6, 191-2 (commentary). George’s treatises *On Souls, Spirits, and Intellects* and *Whither Souls Migrate* in *Add.* 14,538, foll. 17r-v, translated in Ryssel, *ibid.*, pp. 142-4 with commentary p. 232, in which Daiber, “Die syrische Tradition”, in Rudolph (ed.), *PIW* (above, n. 9), p. 47, detects a Neoplatonic tinge, may have been influenced, as was Sergius’ prologue to his translation of Pseudo-Dionysius, not only by Aristotle and Pseudo-Dionysius (as noted by Ryssel), but also by the doctrine of Evagrius of Pontus; cf. on Evagrius’ differentiation of ‘souls’ and ‘intellects’, A. Guillaumont, *Les ‘Kephalaiā Gnostica’ d’Évagre le Pontique et l’histoire de l’origénisme chez les Grecs et chez les Syriens*, Éditions du Seuil, Paris 1962, pp. 103-6.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. above, n. 63.

¹¹⁰ Cf. Endress, “Building the Library of Arabic Philosophy” (above, n. 89), pp. 333-6, 349-50; Endress-Adamson, “Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī”, in Rudolph (ed.), *PIW* (above, n. 9), pp. 105-6, 129-30. The controversy over the eternity of the world continued in the period after al-Kindī to engage both Muslim and Christian thinkers. Cf. above n. 92.

¹¹¹ Cf. Rudolph, “Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī”, in Rudolph (ed.), *PIW* (above, n. 9), pp. 402-3.

¹¹² Cf. C. Martini Bonadeo, *al-Fārābī. L’armonia delle opinioni dei due sapienti, il divino Platone e Aristotele*, PLUS, Pisa 2008 (Le vie del sapere. Testi), pp. 63-7, 203-6.

¹¹³ Cf. H. Hugonnard-Roche, “Le mouvement des traductions syriaques. Arrière-plan historique et sociologique”, in R. Goulet - U. Rudolph (eds.), *Entre Orient et Occident: La philosophie et la science gréco-romaines dans le monde arabe*, Fondation Hardt, Geneva 2011, pp. 45-86, esp. p. 71.

Greek commentators from the hands of Ḥunayn, Ishāq, Mattā, and Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī,¹¹⁴ and elsewhere of commentaries on individual books by Mattā¹¹⁵ and Yaḥyā.¹¹⁶ Yaḥyā’s theology may have been influenced not only by Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* and Philoponus’ arguments against the eternity of the world, but also by Pseudo-Dionysius,¹¹⁷ and his pupil Ibn Zur‘a also seems to have assumed some connection between the *Metaphysics* and Pseudo-Dionysius.¹¹⁸ Syriac Aristotelians and their Syro-Arabic successors thus probably accepted the *Metaphysics* into their philosophical curriculum not as its final end, but as the precursor to the corpus of Pseudo-Dionysius.

¹¹⁴ Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, pp. 251.25-252.1 Flügel; Endress, *The Works of Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī* (above, n. 33), pp. 27-8. Note also Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, p. 252.2-4 Flügel for Porphyry and Themistius on *Ethics*, translated by Ishāq and written in his hand in Syriac.

¹¹⁵ Cf. Endress, “Die Bagdader Aristoteliker”, in Rudolph (ed.), *PIW* (above, n. 9), p. 299.

¹¹⁶ Cf. Id., *The Works of Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī*, pp. 38-9.

¹¹⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 71-3; Id., “Die Bagdader Aristoteliker”, in Rudolph (ed.), *PIW* (above, n. 9), pp. 318-22.

¹¹⁸ Cf. Watt, “From Sergius to Mattā’ (above, n. 108), p. 256; Endress, “Die Bagdader Aristoteliker”, in Rudolph (ed.), *PIW* (above, n. 9), p. 329.

Reconstructing Ishāq ibn Hunayn's Arabic Translation of Aristotle's *De Anima*

Alexander Treiger

Abstract

The present contribution reconstructs several passages from Ishāq ibn Hunayn's lost Arabic translation of Aristotle's *De Anima*, based on the Hebrew and the Latin versions produced from Ishāq's Arabic, as well as on Ishāq's extant Arabic translation of Themistius' commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima*. The relationship between these texts is carefully examined. One passage from Ibn Zur'a's supplement to Ishāq's translation of Aristotle's *De Anima* is similarly reconstructed. The reconstruction sheds light on Avicenna's commentatorial technique in his *Marginal Notes on the De Anima* and on Averroes' commentatorial technique in his *Long Commentary* on the same book.

Ishāq ibn Hunayn's Arabic Translation of Aristotle's De Anima: Testimonia and Textual Evidence

The *Fibrist* – an indispensable tenth-century analytical inventory of Arabic literature, whose author, the bibliographer Ibn al-Nadīm (d. 995), was exceptionally well informed about the Aristotelian tradition – contains the following intriguing report on the Arabic (and Syriac) versions of, and commentaries upon, Aristotle's *De Anima*.¹

الكلام على كتاب النفس وهو ثلاث مقالات نقله حنين إلى السرياني تامة، ونقله إسحق إلا شيئاً يسيراً، ثم نقله إسحق نقلاً ثانياً تامةً جود فيه. وشرح ثامسطيوس هذا الكتاب بأسره: أما المقالة الأولى ففي مقالتين، والثانية في مقالتين، والثالثة في الثلاث مقالات. [...] قال إسحق: نقلت هذا الكتاب إلى العربي من نسخة رديئة، فلما كان بعد ثلاثين سنة وجدت نسخة في نهاية الجودة فقابلت بها النقل الأول، وهو شرح ثامسطيوس.

T1: Report on [Aristotle's] treatise *On the Soul* in three books (*maqālāt*): (a) Hunayn translated it into Syriac in its entirety. (b) Ishāq translated it [into Arabic]² with the exception of a small part. (c) Then Ishāq produced a second, complete and revised translation. (d) Themistius commented on the entire treatise: on the first book in two books, on the second in two books, and on the third in three books. [...] (e) Ishāq said: I translated this treatise into Arabic from a poor manuscript; then after thirty years I found an excellent manuscript, so I corrected (*qābaltu*) the first translation against it, and this is the commentary of Themistius.³

¹ I express my deep gratitude to my esteemed Doktorvater, Professor Dimitri Gutas, whose seminar on Avicenna's *Marginal Notes* on Aristotle's *De Anima* at Yale I had the privilege of attending in 2001 and who offered valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article (originally submitted as a term paper for his seminar). I am also deeply grateful to Professor Cristina D'Ancona for accepting the article for publication in *Studia graeco-arabica* and for her encouragement and support all the way through, and to the anonymous reviewer for his or her critical comments.

² The text does not explicitly say that the target language of Ishāq's version of the *De Anima* was Arabic, but it is highly unlikely that both he and his father Hunayn would have produced independent Syriac versions. See also **T1e** and discussion below.

³ Ibn al-Nadīm, *Kitab al-Fibrist*, ed. G. Flügel, F.C.W. Vogel, I-II, Leipzig 1871-72, vol. 1, p. 251. For a careful analysis

Ibn al-Nadīm's report ties the history of the Syriac and Arabic translations of the *De Anima* to two famous ninth-century translators: Ḥunayn ibn Iṣḥāq (d. 873) and his son Iṣḥāq ibn Ḥunayn (d. ca. 910-911). Ḥunayn is credited with an integral Syriac translation of the *De Anima*, while Iṣḥāq is apparently credited with two Arabic translations of the same work (one incomplete, the other complete and revised) and with an Arabic translation of Themistius' (d. ca. 387-388) Commentary on the *De Anima*.⁴ While there is an extant Arabic translation of the *De Anima*, and this translation is indeed attributed to Iṣḥāq ibn Ḥunayn, it is most certainly not by him (its language indicates that it is older). This version will therefore be referenced below as "Pseudo-Iṣḥāq".⁵ Iṣḥāq's authentic Arabic translation(s) of the *De Anima* appear to be lost (as is, regrettably, Ḥunayn's Syriac version).⁶

We do have, however, a Hebrew version of the *De Anima* by Zeraḥya ben Yiṣḥāq ben Shealtiel Ḥen (d. after 1291)⁷ and a Latin version of the *De Anima* by Michael Scot (fl. ca. 1217-1240), which is preserved in the lemmata of Averroes' *Long Commentary* on the *De Anima*.⁸ As Alfred Ivry has shown, the Hebrew and the Latin versions (both translated from Arabic) represent more or less the same Arabic text, which is different from *Pseudo-Iṣḥāq's* old translation.⁹ Averroes' *Middle Commentary* on the *De Anima*¹⁰ and (the first part of) Avicenna's *Marginal Notes* on the

of this passage as well as parallels in Ibn al-Qiṭī (d. 1248) and Ḥāḡḡī Ḥalifa (d. 1658) see H. Gätje, *Studien zur Überlieferung der aristotelischen Psychologie im Islam*, Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, Heidelberg 1971, pp. 20ff.; F.E. Peters, *Aristoteles Arabus: The Oriental Translations and Commentaries on the Aristotelian Corpus*, Brill, Leiden 1968, pp. 40-3.

⁴ The Greek original: Themistii in libros Aristotelis *De Anima paraphrasis*, ed. R. Heinze, G. Reimer, Berlin 1889 (*CAG*, V.3); English translation of the Greek text: R.B. Todd (trans.), *Themistius, On Aristotle's "On the Soul"*, Cornell U.P., Ithaca NY 1996.

⁵ 'A. Badawī (ed.), *Aristūṭālīs fī l-naḡṡ*, "al-Ārā' al-ṭabī'iyya" al-mansūb ilā Flūṭarḡḡus, "al-Ḥāss wa-l-maḡsūs" li-Ibn Ruṡd, "al-Nabā' al-mansūb ilā Aristūṭālīs, Maktabat al-nahḡa al-miṣriyya, al-Qāhira 1954 (abbreviated: *Pseudo-Iṣḥāq*), pp. 1-188. Cf. R.M. Frank, "Some Fragments of Iṣḥāq's Translation of the *De Anima*", *Cahiers de Byrsa* 8 (1958-59), pp. 231-51, here pp. 231-2; Gätje, *Studien* (above n. 3), pp. 28-44.

⁶ On Iṣḥāq's translation technique, see now: K. Eksell, "Pragmatic Markers from Greek into Arabic: A Case Study on Translations by Iṣḥāq ibn Ḥunayn", *Studia graeco-arabica* 5 (2015), pp. 321-44.

⁷ *Aristotle's "De Anima" Translated into Hebrew by Zeraḡyah ben Isaac ben Shealtiel Ḥen. A Critical Edition with an Introduction and Index* by G. Bos, Brill, Leiden 1994 (Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus, 6).

⁸ This commentary is preserved only in Latin (and in a Hebrew version produced from Latin): F.S. Crawford (ed.), *Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima libros*, The Mediaeval Academy of America, Cambridge MA 1953; English translation: R.C. Taylor - Th.-A. Druart, *Averroes (Ibn Ruṡd) of Cordoba, Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle*, Yale U.P., New Haven CT 2009; French translation of the third part: A. de Libera, *Averroès: L'intelligence et la pensée, Grand Commentaire du De Anima, Livre III (429 a 10 - 435 b 25)*, Flammarion, Paris 1998. For some Arabic fragments of the *Long Commentary* see A. ben Chehida, "Ikṭiṣāf al-naṣṡ al-'arabī li-ahamm aḡzā' al-Sarḡ al-kabīr li-Kitāb al-naḡṡ, ta'līf Abī l-Walīd Ibn Ruṡd", *al-Ḥayāb al-ṭaqāfiyya* 35 (1985), pp. 14-48 (not seen); C. Sirat - M. Geoffroy, *L'original arabe du Grand Commentaire d'Averroès au De Anima d'Aristote, Prémices de l'édition*, J. Vrin, Paris 2005. See also D. Wirmer, "Le Grand Commentaire d'Averroès au *De Anima* et ses lecteurs juifs", *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 17 (2007), pp. 135-58; C. Sirat, "Les Citations du Grand Commentaire d'Averroès au *De Anima* d'Aristote dans les *Croyances des philosophes* de Shem-Tov Ibn Falaquera", in J.-B. Brenet (ed.), *Averroès et les averroïsmes juif et latin. Actes du Colloque international (Paris, 16-18 juin 2005)*, Brepols, Turnhout 2007, pp. 249-55.

⁹ A.L. Ivry, "The Arabic Text of Aristotle's *De Anima* and Its Translator", *Oriens* 36 (2001), pp. 59-77.

¹⁰ Abū l-Walīd Ibn Ruṡd, *Talḡīṡ Kitāb al-naḡṡ*, A.L. Ivry, al-Maḡlis al-a'lā li-l-ṭaqāfa, al-Qāhira 1994 (cf. the more recent edition with an English translation: *Averroes' Middle Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima*, ed. and trans. A.L. Ivry, Brigham Young U.P., Provo UT 2002).

*De Anima*¹¹ seem to be based on this text as well.¹² At a certain point (corresponding to 431 a 14, i.e., near the middle of *De Anima* III 7, very close to the end of the treatise) the following note occurs in the unique manuscript of Avicenna's *Marginal Notes*:

نسخة الفصّ كان (!) إلى هاهنا نقل إسحق بن حنين، ومن هاهنا نقل آخر بإصلاحات كثيرة للمفسّر.

T2: Up to this point, the version of the commented text (*nushbat al-faṣṣ*)¹³ was that of Ishāq ibn Ḥunayn's translation; from here onwards, it is another translation, with multiple corrections by the commentator [i.e., Avicenna].¹⁴

From this point on, Avicenna indeed no longer follows the Arabic text on which both the Hebrew and the Latin versions of the *De Anima* are based, but rather *Pseudo-Ishāq*'s old Arabic translation.¹⁵

A somewhat similar note is preserved, at exactly the same point of Aristotle's text,¹⁶ in the manuscripts of the Hebrew version of the *De Anima*:

השלמת מה שהעתיק יצחק בן חנין מזה המאמר מהעתקת אבי עיסי בן יצחק מן האשורי אל לשון הערבי.

T3: Supplement to what Ishāq ibn Ḥunayn translated from this treatise, [taken] from Abū 'Īsā ibn Ishāq's translation from Syriac into Arabic.¹⁷

Finally, the Arabic translation of Themistius' *Commentary* on the *De Anima* is preserved, almost in its entirety, in one manuscript and has been published by M.C. Lyons. This translation comprises seven sections divided as indicated in the *Fihrist*. The third section bears the following title:

¹¹ On this text see D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works*, Brill, Leiden 1988, p. 321a, *Index of Names and Places*, s.v. "Avicenna: Marginal Notes on *De Anima*"; Id., *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works*, Second, Revised and Enlarged Edition, Including an Inventory of Avicenna's Authentic Works, Brill, Leiden 2014, p. 591a, *Index of Authors Cited, Names, and Places*, s.v. "Avicenna: Marginal Glosses on *De Anima*"; Id., "Avicenna's Marginal Glosses on *De Anima* and the Greek Commentatorial Tradition", in P. Adamson - H. Baltussen - M.W.F. Stone (eds.), *Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries*, 2 vols., Institute of Classical Studies, London 2004, vol. 2, pp. 75-85; see esp. p. 80, n. 32 where Gutas points out that Avicenna follows the text of Themistius rather than that of Aristotle. This is quite significant given the relation between the Arabic translation of Themistius and the Arabic translation of the *De Anima* (both produced by Ishāq ibn Ḥunayn).

¹² Ivry, "The Arabic Text" (above, n. 9), p. 65: "[I]t is Ishāq's language and style which reappear in the majority of the citations from *De Anima* itself in both of Averroes' commentaries. This translation proves to be the same essentially as that found in most of the quotations and paraphrases of *De Anima* which appear in Avicenna's glosses to that work".

¹³ On the term *faṣṣ* (pl. *fuṣūṣ*), "commented text", cf. A. Bertolacci, "From al-Kindī to al-Fārābī: Avicenna's Progressive Knowledge of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* According to His *Autobiography*", *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 11 (2001), pp. 257-95.

¹⁴ Avicenna, *Marginal Notes on the "De Anima" (al-Ta'liqāt 'alā ḥawāṣī Kitāb al-naṣf)*, ed. 'A. Badawī, in Id., *Aristū 'ind al-'arab*, Maktabat al-naḥḍa al-miṣriyya, al-Qāhira 1947, pp. 75-116 (abbreviated: Avicenna), here p. 109, n. 1.

¹⁵ *Pseudo-Ishāq*'s translation is also quoted by Avicenna at one point before 431 a 14 (see n. 32 below); it is also quoted on several occasions in Averroes' *Long Commentary* as "alia translatio" – see references in Ivry, "The Arabic Text" (above, n. 9), p. 60, n. 4.

¹⁶ This has been noted by Gätje, *Studien* (above n. 3), p. 22.

¹⁷ P. 127.325-326 Bos (cf. Bos' English translation of this note on p. 9). This note can be tentatively retranslated into Arabic as follows: تَمَّتْ ما نقله إسحق بن حنين من هذه المقالة من نقل أبي عيسى بن إسحق من السرياني إلى اللغة العربية. See also M. Steinschneider, *Die hebräischen Übersetzungen des Mittelalters und die Juden als Dolmetscher*, Kommissionsverlag des bibliographischen Bureaus, Berlin 1893, p. 146.

المقالة الأولى من كتاب ثامسطيوس في تفسير المقالة الثانية من كتاب أرسطوطاليس في النفس،
ترجمة إسحق بن حنين الثانية.

T4: First book of Themistius' commentary on the second book of Aristotle's *De Anima* [in] the second translation of Ishāq ibn Ḥunayn.¹⁸

All these *testimonia* present a coherent though not altogether clear picture. The manuscript note in Avicenna's *Marginal Notes* (**T2**) and the note in the Hebrew version (**T3**), both occurring at the same place near the end of the treatise and ascribing the preceding part of the Arabic text to Ishāq,¹⁹ correspond clearly to the indication of the *Fibrist* (**T1b**) that Ishāq translated the *De Anima* "with the exception of a small part". If so, Avicenna seems to have had access to Ishāq's first and incomplete version of the *De Anima*, whereas Ishāq's second and complete translation (if it ever existed) was apparently unknown to him.

Some difficulties, however, remain. Thus, we have a very ambiguous phrase "and this is the commentary of Themistius" (**T1e**): it is unclear whether this phrase refers only to the second ("excellent") manuscript (the "poor" one having been that of the *De Anima*) or to both the excellent and the poor manuscripts, in which case Ishāq's entire statement in **T1e** would refer to Themistius' commentary rather than to the *De Anima* as such.

The first possibility would imply that Ishāq corrected his earlier translation of the *De Anima* on the basis of Themistius' commentary, but this is unlikely, for, as argued by Richard Frank, "Themistius did only a paraphrase, which, although considerably longer than the *de Anima* itself, does in no wise contain the integral text of the original".²⁰

It is more plausible to assume that the entire passage (regarding both the "poor" and the "excellent" manuscripts) refers to Themistius' *Commentary* on the *De Anima* rather than to the *De*

¹⁸ M.C. Lyons (ed.), *An Arabic Translation of Themistius['] Commentary on Aristoteles [sic] De Anima*, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia 1973, p. 42. Similar titles are given to sections 4-7 – see pp. 88, 136, 169, and 214 Lyons (the first section has no title; the beginning of the second section is lacking).

¹⁹ It should be noted, however, that the title of the first section of the Hebrew version seems to ascribe it to Ḥunayn rather than to Ishāq – see p. 45.2 Bos.

²⁰ Frank, "Some Fragments" (above, n. 5), p. 233. Frank himself, however, understood the text of the *Fibrist* in a hardly more plausible way, namely: "after 30 years I found another recension which was truly excellent in all respects; I compared this with the first translation and found it to be the 'commentary' of Themistius" (*ibid.*, my emphasis). As Frank's discussion makes clear, the pronoun "it" in the phrase "[I] found it to be the 'commentary' of Themistius" refers to the second manuscript (or, as he has it, "recension"). Frank then goes on to argue that "the translator [i.e., Ishāq], according to th[is] quotation, mentions how he came to notice that it [i.e., the excellent recension] was the work of Themistius rather than that of Aristotle, almost as if the manuscript which he had gave no indication of the author" (Frank, "Some Fragments" (above, n. 5), p. 234). Frank's interpretation is both implausible and incorrect. It is implausible because Ishāq would need no "comparison" to recognize that the second manuscript contained something else than Aristotle's text – it would be sufficient for him to have a glance at the first sentence of the text to realize that what he had in front of him was a Peripatetic commentary on Aristotle rather than an original composition by Aristotle himself (Themistius' commentary begins as follows: "In this treatise we must try to follow Aristotle on everything that can be systematically understood about the soul"). It is incorrect because Frank does not take into account the technical meaning of the verb *qābala*: in this context it clearly means "to correct" one manuscript (in this case: a translation) on the basis of another. Cf. similar use of this term in Ḥunayn's *Risāla*, §3 – G. Bergsträsser (ed. and trans.), *Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq über die syrischen und arabischen Galen-Übersetzungen*, F.A. Brockhaus, Leipzig 1925, p. 5.5-6 (German translation, p. 4); J.C. Lamoreaux (ed. and trans.), *Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq on His Galen Translations*. With an Appendix by G. Kessel, Brigham Young U.P., Provo, UT 2016, p. 11; F. Rosenthal, *The Classical Heritage in Islam*, trans. from German by E. Marmorstein and J. Marmorstein, University of California Press, Berkeley 1975, p. 20.

Anima itself; the phrase “and this is the commentary of Themistius” is simply an explanation added (by Ibn al-Nadīm?) to clarify this. It is very likely that these words of Ishāq have their origin in a colophon of his (second) Arabic version of Themistius' commentary, a manuscript of which Ibn al-Nadīm may well have examined.²¹ The disadvantage of this interpretation is that it fails to explain how, according to **T1c**, Ishāq managed to produce his “second, complete and revised” translation of the *De Anima*.

There is also a third possibility, suggested by Helmut Gätje, that the “excellent” manuscript contained both Themistius' commentary and the text of the *De Anima*. In this case, Ishāq could have translated the former into Arabic and subsequently used the latter to correct and complete his earlier translation of the *De Anima*.²²

The Hebrew note (**T3**) is somewhat ambiguous as well. Two questions arise. First, does the text mean that the ending of the Hebrew version (after 431 a 14) (as well as the parallel section of the Latin translation)²³ reflect the Syro-Arabic version of Abū 'Īsā ibn Ishāq²⁴ or does it mean that they are based on Ishāq's translation made from Abū 'Īsā ibn Ishāq's Syriac version?²⁵ Second, do we have a proof (independent of **T3**) that the second part of the text (after 431 a 14) is not supplied from Ishāq's second and complete (presumably Graeco-Arabic) translation?²⁶

The answer to the first question largely depends on Abū 'Īsā ibn Ishāq's identity. If Moritz Steinschneider is correct in his suggestion, adopted by the majority of scholars, that Abū 'Īsā ibn Ishāq is Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī's pupil Abū 'Alī 'Īsā ibn Ishāq Ibn Zur'a (d. 1008),²⁷ then the second interpretation of the Hebrew note is ruled out on chronological grounds. The first interpretation, on the other hand, seems very plausible indeed: it stands to reason that Ibn Zur'a had at his disposal Ishāq's first and incomplete translation of the *De Anima* and completed it working from an unknown (possibly Hunayn's) Syriac version.

²¹ The only extant manuscript of the Arabic version of Themistius' *Commentary* on the *De Anima* (Ishāq's second version, according to **T4**) breaks off near the end of the book, and so this colophon, if it existed, is irreparably lost.

²² Gätje, *Studien* (above n. 3), p. 24.

²³ A textual comparison of the Hebrew version with the Latin reveals that after 431 a 14 both versions reflect more or less the same Arabic text – see synoptic edition of Passage 8 in *Appendix III* below.

²⁴ This is the interpretation shared by Frank (“Some Fragments” [above, n. 5], p. 235, n. 1), Peters (*Aristoteles Arabus* [above, n. 3], pp. 41-2), and Ivry (“The Arabic Text” [above n. 9], p. 62, n. 16).

²⁵ Steinschneider (*Die hebräischen Übersetzungen* [above, n. 17], p. 146) understands this passage as meaning that the second part (after 431 a 14) contains Abū 'Īsā ibn Ishāq's Arabic rendering of Ishāq's (Syriac) supplement (השלמה) to the (according to Steinschneider, incomplete) Syriac version by Hunayn (rendered by the same Abū 'Īsā ibn Ishāq into Arabic for the first part of the text). This interpretation seems to me to be very far-fetched. It is nevertheless upheld by Bos (Bos, *Aristotle's "De anima"* [above, n. 7], p. 12). This interpretation agrees neither with the evidence of **T2**, which clearly ascribes the version of the text preceding 431 a 14 to Ishāq, nor with the evidence of the *Fihrist* (**T1a**), which states explicitly that Hunayn's Syriac version was a complete one.

²⁶ This is the opinion of Gätje (*Studien* [above, n. 3], p. 41): “Angesichts dieses Sachverhaltes und der oben dargestellten Parallelen aus Avicenna und A I [=the translation preserved in Averroes' lemmata before 431 a 14] halte ich es nach wie vor für wahrscheinlich, daß A I in einer Beziehung zur ersten, unvollständigen Übersetzung Ishāqs steht und daß A I + A II [=the translation preserved in Averroes' lemmata after 431 a 14] wohl doch eine spätere Redaktion Ishāqs darstellen”. Cf. criticism of Gätje's position by Bos, *Aristotle's "De anima"* (above, n. 7), pp. 11-12.

²⁷ Steinschneider, *Die hebräischen Übersetzungen* (above, n. 17), p. 146. On Ibn Zur'a, see: C. Haddād, *'Īsā ibn Zur'a, philosophe arabe et apologiste chrétien du X^e siècle*, Dār al-Kalima, Beirut 1971 (second ed. CERPOC, Beirut 2013); J.P. Monferrer-Sala, “Ibn Zur'a”, in D.Th. Mallett - A. Mallett (eds.), *Christian-Muslim Relations: A Bibliographical History*, vol. 2, Brill, Leiden 2010 (The History of Christian-Muslim Relations), pp. 570-74; G. Endress, “Ibn Zur'a”, in U. Rudolph (ed.), *Philosophie in der islamischen Welt: I: 8.-10. Jahrhundert*, Schwabe Verlag, Basel 2012, pp. 325-33.

As far as the second question is concerned, to the best of my knowledge, no answer to it has been provided so far. The editor of the Hebrew text Gerrit Bos merely observes that the “Hebrew translation does not show a sudden change in style or vocabulary from 431a14 on”.²⁸ Ivry’s article does not address this issue at all. Even casual examination, however, is sufficient to establish that the second part of the Hebrew text cannot reflect the same translation as the first part (or even a revised version of the former). This becomes clear when one considers the ways in which both parts render key Greek terms, such as, e.g., the Aristotelian term $\tilde{\eta}$ (=Latin: *qua*). Before 431 a 14 this term is rendered rather consistently by من طريق ما/أُن (=Hebrew: מדרך מה ש- , Latin: *secundum quod*).²⁹ From this point on, this term is rendered, also rather consistently, by بما (=Hebrew: במה ש- or באשר , Latin: *secundum quod*, but sometimes more literally: *in eo quod*).³⁰ One may conclude, therefore, that the second part of the text is certainly not by Ishāq. Most likely, we have here a Syro-Arabic version by a later translator who supplemented Ishāq’s incomplete version.³¹ At present, there seems to be no reason to question Steinschneider’s suggestion that this translator was Ibn Zur’a. I shall therefore refer to this version as “Ibn Zur’a’s supplement”.

This being the case, one should note that we have absolutely no evidence of the existence of Ishāq’s second and complete translation of the *De Anima* mentioned in the *Fihrist* (T1c). Averroes, in both his *Middle* and *Long Commentary* on the *De Anima*, used, after 431 a 14, Ibn Zur’a’s Syro-Arabic version; and it is this version that is preserved in the Hebrew translation as well. Avicenna in his *Marginal Notes* used, from this point on, the old, *Pseudo-Ishāq*’s translation, though one cannot exclude the possibility that he was also familiar with Ibn Zur’a’s supplement.³² The fact that Ishāq’s

²⁸ Bos, *Aristotle’s “De anima”* (above, n. 7), p. 12, n. 18. From this he concludes that the underlying Arabic version was produced by a single translator: in his view (following Steinschneider), Abū ‘Īsā ibn Ishāq [=Ibn Zur’a] – see n. 25 above.

²⁹ See, e.g., 403 a 13 = Bos p. 47.59 (מדרך מה ש-), p. 18.5 Crawford (*secundum quod*); 405 a 23-24 (twice) = p. 53.177-178 Bos, p. 41.6-8 Crawford; 418 a 23 = p. 89.332 Bos, Crawford 227.4; 431a11 = p. 126.323 Bos, p. 467.2-3 Crawford; cf. n. 69 below. (I do not, of course, mention the cases in which Ishāq mistook $\tilde{\eta}$ for one of its homographs). Cf. similar renderings in Ishāq’s translation of Themistius’ commentary: p. 45.6 Lyons (three times = Heinze 40.1-2, Todd 57), 90.4-5 (three times = Heinze 59.16, Todd 79), 91.3-5 (four times = Heinze 59.33-34, Todd 79), 91.14-15 (twice = Heinze 60.7, Todd 80), 96.10-11 (twice = Heinze 62.5-6, Todd 82), 98.1-2 (twice = Heinze 62.27, Todd 82), 116.5-6 (twice = Heinze 70.34, Todd 91), 118.3 (=Heinze 71.34, Todd 92), 130.10 (=Heinze 77.17, Todd 98), 182.6 (twice = Heinze 100.21-22, Todd 125), 209.5-6 (=Heinze 114.24, Todd 140). Sometimes, however, $\tilde{\eta}$ is rendered by من جهة ما (e.g. Lyons 141.6, Heinze 82.9, Todd 104 – this expression is typically used by Ishāq to render the Greek $\tau\tilde{\omega}$ + inf., e.g., in 430 a 14-15, cf. Passage 6 in Appendix II below) or by أُن على (e.g. Lyons 130.15-16 [twice], Heinze 77.22, Todd 99). Elsewhere, من طريق ما/أُن is used to render $\kappa\alpha\theta\acute{\omicron}$ / $\kappa\alpha\theta’ \acute{\omicron}$. e.g. Lyons 91.5 (=Heinze 59.34, Todd 79), 129.1 (twice = Heinze 76.33, Todd 98).

³⁰ See, e.g., 431 b 13 = p. 128.352 Bos (באשר), p. 478.2 Crawford (*in eo quod*); 431 b 14 = p. 128.352 Bos (במה ש-), p. 478.3 Crawford (*in eo ... quod*); 433 b 11 = p. 134.456 Bos (באשר), p. 522.1 Crawford (*secundum quod*); 433 b 18 = p. 134.463 Bos (במה ש-), p. 523.12 Crawford (*secundum quod*); 433 b 27 = p. 134.473 Bos (to be emended to באשר [כאשר]), p. 527.1-2 Crawford (*secundum quod*).

³¹ The possibility of Ishāq himself working from a Syriac version cannot be ruled out at this stage of research, but it is highly unlikely. The assumption that Ishāq worked from a Syriac version does not explain, e.g., the relative infrequency, after 431 a 14, of the ف ... أُن construction, used by Ishāq rather consistently to render the Greek particle $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ (cf. n. 52 and n. 163 below): if it were he who translated the second part of the text as well, one might expect that he would render the Syriac *dēn* (the usual equivalent of the Greek $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$) in the same way.

³² It is even possible that despite the fact that Avicenna’s commentary after 431 a 14 seems to be based on *Pseudo-Ishāq*’s translation, it is Ibn Zur’a’s version that was recorded in the manuscript of the *De Anima* at his disposal; the evidence of T2 that Avicenna’s manuscript of the *De Anima* after 431 a 14 contained “multiple emendations by the commentator” may explain why Avicenna may have refrained from using this translation, even if it was indeed recorded in his manuscript. Avicenna seems to have had *Pseudo-Ishāq*’s translation in a separate (and complete) manuscript, as is indicated by the fact that he refers to this translation on one occasion before 431 a 14 (at 429 a 11, cf. Avicenna, *al-Ta’liqāt ‘alā*

second and complete translation of the *De Anima* was not available to Avicenna and Averroes, and presumably to Ibn Zur'a as well (otherwise he would not have needed to supplement it), lends support to the assumption that it never existed.

In light of this, two possible explanations of the evidence of the *Fihrist* (T1c) present themselves. First, it is possible that the "Ishāq" in T1c has to be emended to "Abū ['Alī] 'Īsā ibn Ishāq" [=Ibn Zur'a]. T1c could then be taken to allude, however imprecisely, to Ibn Zur'a's supplement to Ishāq ibn Hunayn's translation. Second, it is possible that T1c refers not to Ishāq's (non-existent) second translation of the *De Anima*, but to Ishāq's second translation of Themistius' *Commentary* on the *De Anima*. This would dovetail well with the indication of T4, which specifically mentions that this is a manuscript of Ishāq's second translation of Themistius' *Commentary* on the *De Anima*.

A New Method for Reconstructing Select Passages of Ishāq's Translation of the De Anima and Ibn Zur'a's Supplement

Certain passages from Ishāq's translation (up to 431 a 14) and Ibn Zur'a's supplement (both lost in Arabic) can be reconstructed on the basis of two Arabic sources: Ishāq's translation of Themistius' *Commentary* on the *De Anima* (up to 431 a 14 only) and Averroes' *Middle Commentary* on the *De Anima*.³³ Both sources have verbatim or near verbatim quotations from Aristotle,³⁴ and in these cases the Arabic text of the quotations is sufficiently close to the lost Arabic text of Ishāq's and Ibn Zur'a's *De Anima* to allow reconstruction. In order to reconstruct these passages one has to modify the text of the Arabic quotations according to the Hebrew and the Latin versions which both reflect Ishāq's and Ibn Zur'a's Arabic *De Anima*.³⁵ In most cases the modifications required are very slight.

In Appendixes II and III below I have presented a synoptic edition of eight Arabic passages (Appendix II: seven fragments from Ishāq's translation of Themistius' *Commentary* for the section before 431 a 14; Appendix III: one fragment from Averroes' *Middle Commentary* for the section after 431 a 14) with their Hebrew and Latin parallels. A comparison between Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin allows a fairly precise reconstruction of the Arabic text of Ishāq's and Ibn Zur'a's *De Anima* for these passages – namely, the Arabic text underlying both the Hebrew and the Latin version.³⁶

ḥawāṣṣī Kitāb al-naḥṣ, p. 98.21 Badawī, corresponding to *Pseudo-Ishāq*, p. 72.10-11 Badawī [in Badawī's text the words أو غير مفارق are omitted due to homoioteleuton]) and seems to consult it elsewhere as well. At 429 a 1 Avicenna even remarks that this version is more accurate [*aṣaḥḥ*] than Ishāq's (Avicenna, *al-Ta'liqāt 'alā ḥawāṣṣī Kitāb al-naḥṣ*, p. 98.22 Badawī).

³³ Because Avicenna often paraphrases the quotations from Aristotle, his *Marginal Notes* should be used with great caution and only when backed by other sources. Richard Frank's attempt to reconstruct fragments of Ishāq's version on the basis of Avicenna's text only has not yielded reliable results [Frank, "Some Fragments" (above, n. 5)].

³⁴ *Verbatim* quotations from Aristotle are conveniently marked by expanded spacing in Heinze's edition of Themistius' *Commentary*. In his edition of the Arabic translation of Themistius, Lyons does not identify them. Additional quotations are identified in Todd's English translation of Themistius' *Commentary*. Verbatim or near verbatim quotations from Aristotle in Averroes' *Middle Commentary* can only be identified on the basis of their agreement with the Hebrew and Latin versions.

³⁵ The Hebrew version is particularly important, for in most cases it is a word for word rendering of the underlying Arabic text.

³⁶ On two occasions, Alfred Ivry deals with passages from Ishāq's translation of Themistius' commentary that render Aristotle verbatim (Ivry, "Arabic Text" [above, n. 9], pp. 70-1 and 73); yet he seems to be unaware of the fact. See, e.g., his explanation of the similarity between Ishāq's translation of Themistius and the Hebrew and the Latin versions: "It is significant that the Latin of the *Long Commentary* (and essentially the Hebrew of Zerahyah) is a verbatim translation of [the Arabic version of] Themistius' text, which reads: [...] It is thus possible that Averroes adopted the Ishāqian translation

Why is Ishāq's translation of Themistius' quotations from Aristotle's *De Anima* so close to Ishāq's translation of the *De Anima* itself? There are several possible answers to this question: (1) (a) Ishāq translated both Themistius and the *De Anima* directly from Greek, and (b) he was so consistent in his terminology and translation techniques as to render the same Greek text in the same way; (2) (a) Ishāq consulted his own translation of the *De Anima* when translating Themistius' *Commentary*, or (b) *vice versa*. Statement (1a) seems to be correct. As far as (1b) is concerned, it seems that even though Ishāq's translations are indeed remarkably consistent, this in itself would not be sufficient to explain such a close alignment between the two texts as exhibited by the passages edited in Appendix II below. There seems to be a closer relation between the two translations, which goes beyond their having been produced by the same individual. In one case at least, textual evidence seems to point to the possibility (2a).³⁷ Presumably, when translating Themistius' *Commentary*, Ishāq took care that future Arabic readers of Themistius would be able to recognize and locate the relevant passages in the *De Anima*, and hence used the "standard" Arabic *De Anima* translation (his own!) for Themistius' quotations from the *De Anima*.³⁸ By contrast, it seems that the possibility (2b) is not borne out by textual evidence. It seems clear that Ishāq did not correct his translation of the *De Anima* according to Themistius' *Commentary*, as one interpretation of the evidence of the *Fibrist* (T1d) would have it. There are quite a few cases of textual disagreements between the two Arabic texts (in some cases even going back to a different Greek *Vorlage*).³⁹

represented in Themistius' text when quoting Aristotle in the *Long Commentary*, and, like Avicenna, used Ishāq's other translation of the *De Anima* here for the lemma of his *Middle Commentary*" (Ivry, *ibid.*, pp. 70-1).

³⁷ In 429 a 31 - b 3 Aristotle's text reads: Ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθησις οὐ δύναται αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα αἰσθητοῦ, ὅσον ψόφου ἐκ τῶν μεγάλων ψόφων, οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν χρωμάτων καὶ ὁσμῶν οὔτε ὀρνῶν οὔτε ὁσμᾶσθαι. There are two possibilities to understand the genitive case of the underlined noun ψόφου:

as dependent on the verb αἰσθάνεσθαι: "for example, [it cannot perceive] a voice after [lit.: from] intense voices";

as dependent on the noun αἰσθησις: "for example, [perception of] voice [=sense of hearing] [cannot perceive] after [lit.: from] intense voices".

Modern translations of the *De Anima* usually follow the first possibility – e.g., the French translation by E. Barbotin reads here: "par exemple, on ne perçoit pas le son à la suite de sons intenses". Ishāq, on the other hand, chose the second option, as testified by the Hebrew version of this passage: the Hebrew השב לאחור renders the Arabic الحس المنصرف, which itself is a corruption of الحس للصوت (see nn. 114 and 115 below). Now, Ishāq's *Vorlage* for Themistius' quotation, to judge from his Arabic translation, must have read slightly differently: οἷον τοῦ ψόφου τοῦ μικροῦ ἐκ τῶν μεγάλων ψόφων (see n. 113 below). Clearly, the addition of the adjective (τοῦ) μικροῦ makes the second possibility much less plausible, for there is no separate kind of perception for weak voices as opposed to strong and intense ones. Yet, Ishāq follows the second possibility in his translation of Themistius as he does in that of the *De Anima* – he supplies the adjective without changing the basic structure of the sentence: كأنك قلت الحس للصوت الصغير عن الأصوات العظيمة. The accuracy and precision with which Ishāq renders Greek texts into Arabic is well known, and, in my view, he would have hardly chosen the second possibility of translating the sentence had he been producing his translation independently, i.e., without using his own translation of the *De Anima*. It seems to me that this idiosyncratic rendering of Themistius' text can best be explained on the assumption that Ishāq followed his own Arabic translation of the *De Anima* and diverged from it in cases in which Themistius' text did not agree with it.

³⁸ Just as in modern translations into English, it is a standard practice not to translate, say, Biblical quotations literally but to supply the text from one of the standard English translations.

³⁹ See nn. 54 (?), 58, 65, 78, 82, 90, 91, 94, 98, 101, 102, 103, 115 (?), 116, 119 (?), 120, 124, 126, 134, 135, 137, 142, 143, 144, 146, 147 below.

Appendix I: An Interpretation that Has Its Origin in Textual Transmission

The first part of Passage 6 (*De Anima*, III 5, 430 a 14-15) – perhaps the most crucial sentence in the entire *De Anima* – presents, in its Latin version, a tripartite division of the intellect:

Oportet igitur ut in ea sit [1] intellectus qui est intellectus secundum quod efficitur omne, et [2] intellectus qui est intellectus secundum quod facit ipsum intelligere omne, et [3] intellectus secundum quod intelligit omne, quasi habitus, qui est quasi lux. ...

On the other hand, both Aristotle's original text and the Hebrew translation of the *De Anima* (as well as Averroes' *Middle Commentary*) present a bipartite division of the intellect:

Καὶ ἔστιν [1] ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῶ πάντα γίνεσθαι, [2] ὁ δὲ τῶ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἔξινος τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς.
ויהיה בהם [1] שכל הוא מצד שהוא נהיה כל דבר, ובהם [2] שכל הוא מצד שהוא ישימוני ישכיל כל דבר,
כקנין מה, הוא כמו האורה.

This idiosyncrasy of the Latin version certainly goes back to its Arabic *Vorlage*, for Averroes' *Long Commentary* (as opposed to his *Middle Commentary*) presupposes tripartition. Alain de Libera, in the introduction to his French translation of the third part of the *Long Commentary*, argues that the lemma of the *Long Commentary* is “strongly contaminated by the *De Intellectu* of Alexander of Aphrodisias (whose first sentence is no other than Νοῦς ἔστι κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλη τριττός: “Intellect is threefold, according to Aristotle”).⁴⁰ In his notes to the translation, de Libera argues further that it is the second intellect of the lemma (*intellectus qui est intellectus secundum quod facit ipsum intelligere omne*) that is interpolated.⁴¹ In what follows I shall attempt to show that this suggestion, tempting as it is, is incorrect, and the tripartition in the lemma of the *Long Commentary* is better accounted for by an accident of textual transmission than by alleged contamination of the text by Alexander of Aphrodisias' ideas.⁴²

First of all, let us take note of the fact that the two intellects of the Hebrew translation correspond not to the first and third intellects of the Latin version, as de Libera's interpolation hypothesis requires, but rather to the first and the second. Clearly, the Hebrew שכל מצד שהוא ישימוני ישכיל כל דבר and the Latin *intellectus secundum quod facit ipsum intelligere omne* represent the same Arabic text that can be reconstructed as follows: عقل من جهة أنه يجعله يعقل كل شيء.⁴³ On the other hand, the third intellect of the Latin version finds exact parallel in the Arabic version of Themistius: عقل من جهة أنه يفعل كل شيء.⁴⁴ Now, both Arabic fragments are plausible translations of the same Greek text – ὁ δὲ τῶ πάντα ποιεῖν – the first being more interpretative and the second more literal. It seems likely that one of these translations, most probably the second one (originating from Themistius' *Commentary*), was initially written in the margin of an Arabic manuscript of the *De Anima* and later on, but certainly before Averroes' time, was incorporated in the text in one or more manuscripts of this treatise.⁴⁵ These manuscripts thus came to refer twice to the same entity of Aristotle's original text. This reading was then adopted by Averroes in his *Long Commentary* but rejected in the *Middle Commentary* (for which he seems to have used a different, and perhaps superior, Arabic manuscript of the *De Anima*).⁴⁶

⁴⁰ De Libera, *Averroès* (above, n. 8), p. 32.

⁴¹ De Libera, *Averroès* (above, n. 8), p. 270, n. 411.

⁴² This is not to say, of course, that Averroes could not have been influenced by Alexander in his interpretation of the tripartition.

⁴³ The verb לשים (literally: “to put”) is often used in Zerahya's translation to render the Arabic جعل (for which the Latin translator commonly uses *facere*), cf. 430 a 16 (Passage 6: (ישים המראים אשר הם בכח מראים בפועל: 431 a 5 (Passage 7: (המורגש ישים המרגיש בפועל אחר היותו בכח: 431 a 5 (Passage 7: שים. *Index*, p. 188 Bos, *s.v.* שים.

⁴⁴ On the *יעقل* < *يفعل* corruption in both Themistius' text and the lemma (but after Averroes) see n. 128 below.

⁴⁵ But not in others, as the Hebrew version and Averroes' *Middle Commentary* testify.

⁴⁶ See n. 68 below.

*Appendix II: Reconstruction of Select Passages
from Ishāq's Arabic Translation of the De Anima*

- A = Ishāq's Arabic version of Themistius' verbatim quotations from Aristotle, ed. Lyons
 H = Zerahya's Hebrew translation of Ishāq's Arabic translation of the *De Anima*, ed. Bos
 *H = (presumed reading of) the Arabic *Vorlage* of H
 L = the Latin *lemmata* of Averroes' *Long Commentary* on the *De Anima*, ed. Crawford
 *L = (presumed reading of) the Arabic *Vorlage* of L
 LC = the textus of Averroes' *Long Commentary* on the *De Anima*, ed. Crawford
 MC = Averroes' *Middle Commentary* on the *De Anima*, ed. Ivry (1994)
 MN = Avicenna's *Marginal Notes* on the *De Anima*, ed. Badawī
 PI = *Pseudo-Ishāq's* old Arabic translation of the *De Anima*, ed. Badawī

Sigla printed in low-case letters (a, h, etc.) refer to variant readings in the *apparatuses* of the respective editions. The synoptic edition below offers several corrections to Bos' and Crawford's editions.⁴⁷ It also provides some observations concerning Zerahya's and Michael Scot's terminology and methods of translation.⁴⁸ It should also be noted that Zerahya seems to have followed, on certain occasions, Averroes' *Middle Commentary* rather than Ishāq's translation.⁴⁹

Passage 1: De Anima, I 4, 408 b 18-30 (Ishāq's version)

Bos, p. 62.380 - 63.389	Lyons, 21.12 - 22.6 ⁵¹	Crawford, p. 87.1-10, 88.1 - 89.9 ⁵⁶
<p>אבל השכל ראוי שיהיה עצם אחד בדבר⁵⁰ ולא יפסד. כי אלו היה נפסד היה ראוי בזה בלבד בזמן העייפות אשר תהיה בזקנה.</p>	<p>فإنما⁵² العقل فيشبهه أن يكون جوهرًا ما يكون في الشيء⁵³ ولا يفسد فإنه لو كان يفسد لكان حرًا بذلك خاصة⁵⁴ عن الكلال الذي يكون في⁵⁵ الشيخوخة.</p>	<p>Intellectus autem videtur esse substantia aliqua que fit in re et non corrumpitur. Si enim corrumpetur, magis dignum esset ut corrumpetur in fatigatione que est apud senectutem.</p>

⁴⁷ For Bos' edition (above, n. 7) see nn. 50, 57, 75, 105, 106, 122, 140 (misprint), and 151 below; cf. also n. 30 above. For Crawford's edition (which is altogether much more accurate – quoted above, n. 8) see nn. 73, 74, 96, and 150 below.

⁴⁸ See, e.g., n. 52 below, and cf. n. 43 above.

⁴⁹ See nn. 59 and 60 below. It seems less likely that someone prior to Zerahya had corrected the manuscript according to Averroes' *Middle Commentary*, or that someone after Zerahya corrected his translation of the *De Anima* according to (the Arabic original or a Hebrew translation of) Averroes' *Middle Commentary*.

⁵⁰ בדבר (في الشيء) scripsi] בלבד. H. Ivry, "Arabic Text" (above, n. 9), p. 70, n. 62 regards the version בלבד ("solely") as "idiosyncratic" and "equivalent to *shai' / res*", but does not suggest this emendation. For an explanation of the Arabic في الشيء see n. 53 below.

⁵¹ (=p. 29.24-35 Heinze, Todd, *Themistius, On Aristotle's On the Soul* [above, n. 4], p. 46). Fragments of this passage are quoted in Lyons p. 22.14-17 (=p. Heinze 30.5-8, p. 46 Todd), p. 23.2-3 and ff. (=p. 30.12-13 Heinze and ff., p. 46-7 Todd), p. 184.4-8, 14-15, 17-18 (=p. 101.19-23, 31-32, 34-36 Heinze, p. 126 Todd), p. 186.1-3 (=p. 102.20-22 Heinze, p. 127 Todd), p. 191.14-16 (= p. 105.18-21 Heinze, p. 130 Todd). Cf. Lyons, *An Arabic Translation* (above, n. 18) p. X, n. 12, and MC 33.

⁵² The *فإنما* construction is used by Ishāq quite consistently to render the Greek particle *δέ*; this construction is usually rendered by אבל in Hebrew and by *autem* in Latin (cf. n. 163 below).

⁵³ *يشبهه* (يشبهه) ~ *ἐπιγίγνεται*. The Greek verb is rendered etymologically (يكون في), and the neutral noun الشيء is supplied after the preposition rendering the Greek prefix.

⁵⁴ عند (عند?) *L, and cf. MC 33.10: عند الضعف. عند (عند?) *H (cf. p. 73.20 Bos in Passage 2 below for another occasion of عند) *H, and cf. MC 33.10: عند الضعف.

⁵⁵ عند (عند?) *L, and cf. MC 33:11: عند الكبير; LC 87.25, 88.35: *apud senectutem*.

⁵⁶ Fragments of this passage are cited by Averroes in the third part of his LC, cf. Crawford p. 408.630-633, 409.637-639 (=de Libera, *Averroës* [above, n. 8], p. 77), 446.71-74, 76-81, 82-84 (=de Libera, *ibid.*, pp. 114-15), partially quoted in nn. 72 and 74 below.

Bos, p. 62.380 - 63.389	Lyons, 21.12 - 22.6	Crawford, p. 87.1-10, 88.1 - 89.9
<p>אבל אנו מוצאים מה שיקרה בחושים מזה, כי הזקן אלו היה לו עין ענין הבחור, לא היה רואה כמו שהיה רואה הבחור. ותהיה הזקנה אינו ענין שהתפעלה הנפש בו שום דבר אבל ענין הוא בה כמו שהיה בענין השכרות ובענין החוליה והצירור בשכל והעיון יותר ראויים שיהיו⁵⁷ נפסדים בפנים</p>	<p>لكنّا نجد ما يعرض فيه هو ما يعرض في الحواس⁵⁸ فإنّ الشيخ لو قبل عيننا مثل عين الشاب⁵⁹ لأبصر⁶⁰ كما يبصر الشاب، فتكون الشيخوخة ليست حالاً انفعلت فيها النفس شيئاً مّا لكن⁶¹ حالاً هي فيها كما يكون في حال السكر وفي حال العلة⁶². والتصور بالعقل⁶³ والنظر فخليقان⁶⁴ بأن يفسدا فيما</p>	<p>Sed videmus quod illud quod accidit in sensibus ex hoc accidit in corpore. Senex enim si reciperet oculum iuvenis, videret ut iuvenis. Et sic senectus non est dispositio in qua anima patitur aliquid, sed dispositio in qua anima est sicut est apud ebrietatem et egritudinem. Et intelligere et considerare diversantur quando aliquid</p>

⁵⁷ [scripsi] שיהיו H (<ישתנו> כשיהיו) (it seems that Bos marks his addition inaccurately, and it should be read <ישתנו כש> יהיו). Bos' addition of the verb ישתנו is based on the Latin *diversantur*, for which see n. 64 below.

H and probably *L, the additions *illud quod* and *accidit in corpore* being, in all likelihood, due to the Latin translator. The first addition is absent in the manuscripts in the quotation of Aristotle's text in the commentary (lc 88.33, but Crawford follows here the Venetian edition that added these words to harmonize the text of the commentary with that of the lemma). The second addition is not quoted at all, and the only two manuscripts (D and G) that quote the text up to the words *ex hoc*, omit the word etc. that would indicate that the quotation is truncated. Neither has Averroes' commentary any indication that this addition (which hardly makes any sense) was known to him. For a text corresponding to A cf. LC 87.25-26: *accideret ei apud senectutem illud quod accidit sensibus*; Avicenna's *Marginal Notes*, p. 85.21-22: *من كلال فعل الشيخ إما - أي أحياناً - ما يعرض - أي أحياناً - من كلال فعل الشيخ إما* *ولكنّا نجد ما يعرض - أي أحياناً - من كلال فعل الشيخ إما* *يعرض كما يعرض في الحواس*.

(but possibly identical with A and shortened by the Latin translator, cf. shortening below: *videret ut iuvenis* ~ *كعين الشاب*), *H, and cf. the identical text in MC 33.12-13: *لو كانت له عين كعين الشاب*: *لو كانت له عين كعين الشاب*. In certain cases (cf. n. 60 below), Zerahya's translation seems to follow the MC rather than the Arabic translation of the *De Anima*.

h (Bos suggests deleting the word *لا* to bring the text in accordance with the Greek original and the Latin translation, but this is incorrect – cf. the same variant reading in mc 33.13, corrected by Ivry on the basis of a marginal reading to *لا يبصر*; evidently here, as in n. 59 above, Zerahya's translation follows the MC).

⁶¹ Lyons here (and on p. 23.3) mistakenly vocalizes *lākinna* instead of *lākin*.

⁶² Both nouns are in the plural in the Greek original: *ἐν μέθαις καὶ νόσοις*.

⁶³ *τὸ νοεῖν* ~ *التصور بالعقل*.

⁶⁴ *L*. Avicenna seems to have known the reading *يختلفان*, cf. MN 87:2-3: *إذا عرض للتصور العقلي*. Both the Arabic *فخليقان* (which underlies the Hebrew translation as well) and the Latin *diversantur* (<يختلفان>) are probably corruptions of the original *يخلفان* ("are worn out" ~ *μαραίνεσθαι*). A. de Libera's suggestion (de Libera, *Averroès*, p. 225, n. 227 with reference to the quotation of this passage in Crawford, p. 408.631-633, cf. n. 72 below) that "[I]e latin *diversari* correspond ici au grec *μαραίνεσθαι*, se consumer, s'épuiser (et non pas *διαφέρειν*). ... Averroès semble alléguer une version fautive qui expose *diversantur* (de *μαραίνεσθαι*) par *diversa sunt* (de *διαφέρειν*)" hardly seems tenable for the following two reasons: (1) such a meaning of the verb *diversari* is not attested in dictionaries of medieval Latin; (2) this suggestion seems to presuppose that Averroes wrote his commentary in Latin rather than in Arabic.

<p>שום דבר אחר, אבל הוא בעצמו אין עלה בו. אבל ההבדל או החיבה או השנאה אינו עלה לזה אבל לזה אשר לו זה מדרך מה שלו זה. ועל כן כשיפסד זה לא יזכור ולא יאהב, כי זה לא יהיה בעבור זה אבל למשותף אשר יתחברו.⁷⁰ אבל השכל ראוי יותר שיהיה דבר אלוהי ודבר בלתי מתפעל.</p>	<p>أحسب بشيء ما آخر،⁶⁵ فأما ما هو في نفسه فلا علة به.⁶⁶ وأما التمييز⁶⁷ أو المحبة أو البغضاء فليست عللا⁶⁸ لذلك لكن لهذا الذي له ذلك من طريق ما⁶⁹ له ذلك. ولذلك أيضا⁷⁰ إذا فسد هذا لم يذكر ولم يحب⁷¹ فإنه لم يكن لذلك⁷⁴ لكن للمشترك⁷⁵ الذي تلف.⁷⁶ فأما⁷⁷ العقل فخليق أن يكون أحق بأن يكون⁷⁸ شيئا إلهيا وشيئا غير منفعل.⁷⁹</p>	<p>aliud corrumpitur intus; ipsum autem in se nihil patitur.⁷² Distinctio autem et amor et odium non sunt cause⁷³ illius, sed istius quod⁷⁴ habet, secundum quod habet. Et ideo etiam, quando hoc corrumpetur, non rememorabimur, neque diligemus alios.⁸⁰ Non igitur est illius, sed eius quod est commune, quod amittebatur. Intellectus autem dignus est ut sit aliquod divinum et aliquod impassibile.</p>
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*L. The reading بأن يفسد داخلا شيء ما آخر, *H. (?) بأن يفسد داخلا شيء ما آخر [A] بأن يفسدا فيما أحسب بشيء ما آخر⁶⁵ in lieu of the original يفسدا (in lieu of the original يفسد) is dependent on the corruption يخلقان < فخليقان (see n. 64 above), for it is the latter form that requires a dual after it. For the word داخلا (~εἶσω) in *H and *L cf. Lyons, p. 23.5; the idiosyncratic فيما أحسب in A seems to have its origin in the corruption εἶσω > εἶσωω (“deem, suppose”, =Epic form of ἴσχω) in Ishāq’s *Vorlage*.

⁶⁶ ~ ἀπαθές. For another rendering of the term ἀπαθές see n. 79 below.

⁶⁷ διανοεῖσθαι ... τὸ ... التمييز. This term was rendered in *Pseudo-Ishāq*’s translation (PI 20) by التفكر, and was subsequently emended by Averroes in the MC to التذكر (see quotation in n. 68 below). This emendation was obviously made on the basis of the following phrase لم يذكر ولم يحب, which Averroes regarded as parallel to the passage أو المحبة أو البغضاء (cf. n. 71 below), and cf. Lyons, p. 183.12-13 (=p. 101.8-9 Heinze, p. 125 Todd): المحبة والبغضاء والذكر.

⁶⁸ ~ ἀπαθῆ) A, *L] علة *H. Averroes’ *Middle Commentary* is based on another reading: فعلا, cf. MC 33.17-18: وأما التذكر والمحبة والبغضاء <ف> ليست فعلا للعقل الذي لا يفسد لكن للشيء الذي له هذه الأفعال، من طريق ما له هذه الأفعال (for the term تذكر see n. 67 above). This reading فعلا is integrated in the text and therefore must have predated Averroes; it follows that Averroes used different manuscripts of Ishāq’s version of the *De Anima* for his *Middle* and *Long Commentary*. (Interestingly, however, one of the manuscripts of the *Long Commentary* has *actiones* in place of cause). Avicenna (MN, p. 89.14) has the correct reading عللا and interpreted it correctly.

⁶⁹ ~ ἦ, cf. n. 29 above.

⁷⁰ ~ αἰ) A, *L] om. *H. Cf. similar case in n. 130 below. This word seems to be omitted in Averroes’ MC (p. 33.18) and Avicenna’s MN (p. 89.16).

⁷¹ ~ ἦ, cf. n. 29 above. *L] لم نذكر ولم يحب [A, *H] ~ οὐτε μνημονεύει οὐτε φιλεῖ) A, *H] (لم يذكر ولا أحسن ولا أبغض). The addition of the words ولا أبغضنا and أما التمييز أو indicates that, in Averroes’ view, this passage is parallel to the beginning of the previous sentence: المحبة أو البغضاء, cf. n. 67 above.

⁷² The Latin translation here seems to be somewhat less literal than elsewhere, and cf. quotations of this passage in Crawford, p. 408.631-633 and 446.76-78 for a more literal translation: *Et formare per intellectum et considerare sunt diversa ita quod intus corrumpatur* (p. 446: *corrumpetur*) *aliquid* (p. 446: *aliquod*) *aliud*; *ipsum autem in se nullam habet corruptionem* (p. 446: *occasionem*).

⁷³ cause] *esse* L. The Latin translator has misunderstood the Arabic علة, which in this case means “defects” rather than “causes” and stands for the Greek πάθη, cf. in the preceding sentence له علة ~ ἀπαθές (n. 66 above; correctly rendered in Latin by *nihil patitur*).

⁷⁴ *quod scripsi] scilicet quod* L (Crawford’s emendation); cf. quotation of this passage in LC 446.79-80 for a more literal translation: *Distinctio autem et amor* (the words *et odium* are omitted) *non sunt cause* (cause] *esse* LC) *illius, sed istius cuius est hoc, secundum quod est eius*.

⁷⁵ H [Bos’ emendation יתחרב h] יתחבר (cf. n. 76 below).

⁷⁶ *H. يلف [A, *L] ~ ἀπόλωλεν) تلف.

⁷⁷ This sentence is quoted almost verbatim in Averroes’ MC, p. 34.6-7: فأما العقل فخليق بأن يكون أحق الأشياء مما فينا بأن: يكون شيئا إلهيا وشيئا غير منفعل (cf. discussion of this passage in Ivry, “Arabic Text” (above, n. 9), pp. 72-3).

⁷⁸ *H, *L, and cf. Lyons, p. 184.7-8, where these words are omitted as well.

⁷⁹ ~ ἀπαθές. For another rendering of the term ἀπαθές see n. 66 above.

⁸⁰ The last word is probably added by the Latin translator. It is absent in a quotation of this passage in p. 446.81 Crawford.

Passage 2: *De Anima*, II 1, 412 a 23-24 (Ishāq's version)

Bos p. 73.20-21	Lyons, p. 48.2-3 ⁸¹	Crawford, p. 143.5-6
כי בזמן מציאות הנפש ימצא היקיצה והשינה	إِنَّه بالطبع ⁸² عند وجود النفس وجود ⁸³ النوم واليقظة	quoniam apud ipsum est esse anime ⁸⁴

Ishāq's version of the *De Anima* (reconstructed) seems to have been:

إِنَّه عند وجود النفس يوجد النوم واليقظة.

Passage 3: *De Anima*, II 2, 413 b 24-27 (Ishāq's version)

Bos, p. 76.91-93	Lyons, p. 59.12-15 ⁸⁶	Crawford, p. 159.1-160.5
אבל השכל והכח העיוני עדיין לא התבאר בו שום דבר מעניינו. אבל ידמה שיהיה סוג אחר מן הנפש, ויהיה זה לבדו יתכן שיהיה נפרד, כמו שיתכן ⁸⁵ שיהיה נפרד הנצחי הנפסד	فَأَمَّا العقل والقوة النظرية فلم يتبين بعد ⁸⁷ شيء من أمره لكن يشبه أن يكون ⁸⁸ جنسا آخر من النفس ويكون هذا وحده قد يمكن أن يفارق كما يفارق الأبدى الفاسد .	Intellectus autem et virtus speculative, nichil adhuc declaratum est de eis. Sed tamen videtur quod hoc sit aliud genus anime, et iste solus potest abstrahi, sicut sempiternum abstrahitur a corruptibili.

Passage 4: *De Anima*, II 5, 417 b 6-7, 12-15 (Ishāq's version)

Bos, p. 87.291-292	Lyons, p. 19.16-20.1 ⁸⁹	Crawford, p. 216.7-9
וזה או שלא תהיה שינוי, כי התוספת בו יהיה אל ההשלמה, או שיהיה סוג אחר מן השינוי ...	وليس ⁹⁰ ذلك باستحالة إذ كانت الزيادة إنما تكون فيه ⁹¹ إلى الاستكمال إلا أن ... يكون جنسا آخر من الاستحالة .	Et hoc aut non est alteratio, quoniam additio in ipso erit ad perfectionem, aut est aliud genus alterationis. ...

⁸¹ (=p. 41.14-15 Heinze, p. 58 Todd).

⁸² بالطبع A (~φύσει in place of φησί, cf. apparatus of Heinze's edition) om. *H, *L (not in the *De Anima*).

⁸³ وجود A] probably يوجد *H (but may have been changed by the Hebrew translator).

⁸⁴ The Latin version seems to be based on a corrupt text, which may be tentatively reconstructed as follows:
فإنَّ عنده وجود النفس. The last part of the passage is missing altogether.

⁸⁵ This word has probably been added by the Hebrew translator.

⁸⁶ (=p. 46.3-5 Heinze, p. 64 Todd). Cf. Lyons, p. 185.11-13 (=p. 102.11-13 Heinze, p. 127 Todd), p. 187.4-6
(=p. 103.7-9 Heinze, p. 128 Todd).

⁸⁷ *H probably adds فيه.

⁸⁸ *L adds هذا, and cf. Lyons, p. 185.12 and 187.5, where this word is added.

⁸⁹ (=p. 28.29-31 Heinze, p. 45 Todd).

⁹⁰ *H, *L وذلك إما ألا يكون استحالة ... وإما [A (~Heinze, manuscript C: ὅτι ... ἢ)] ليس ذلك باستحالة ... إلا
(~*De Anima*: ὅτι ἢ ... ἢ).

⁹¹ *H, *L. The word فيه seems to render the Greek εἰς αὐτό (or, perhaps, a non-attested variant reading ἐν αὐτῷ).

<p>Bos, p. 87.296-298</p> <p>أبَلْ مَا هَاهُنَا لَمْ يَكُنْ أَحَدٌ مِمَّنْ هَاهُنَا، وَبِحَقِّهِ الْحِكْمَةُ مَأْشُورٌ هُوَ بِهَسَلْمَا مَلْمَمٌ، كَيْ هُوَ رَأَى أَوْ سَلَا يَأْمُرُ بُو كَلَلْ هُوَ يَتَفَعَّلُ، أَوْ سِيَأْمُرُ هَاهُنَا سِنِي مَمِينِسْ.</p>	<p>Lyons, p. 20.1-3⁹²</p> <p>فَأَمَّا الَّذِي يَتَعَلَّمُ بَعْدَ أَنْ كَانَ بِالْقُوَّةِ⁹³ وَيَقْتَبِسُ الْمَعْرِفَةَ عَنِ الْعَالَمِ بِالْفِعْلِ⁹⁴ فَقَدْ يَنْبَغِي إِمَّا أَلَّا يُقَالَ فِيهِ إِنَّهُ يَنْفَعِلُ أَصْلًا⁹⁵ وَإِمَّا أَنْ يُقَالَ إِنَّ الْاِسْتِحَالَةَ ضَرْبَانِ.</p>	<p>Crawford, p. 217.7-11</p> <p>Qui autem addiscit postquam fuit in potentia, et accipit⁹⁶ scientiam ab eo qui est in perfectione doctor, oportet aut ut non dicatur omnino pati, aut ut dicatur quod alteratio est duplex.</p>
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Passage 5: De Anima, III 4, 429 a 15-16, 24-26, 29-b5 (Ishāq's version)

<p>Bos, p. 120.219-220</p> <p>أَمَّ كَنْ رَأَى سِيَهِيَا بَلْتِي مَتَفَعَّلْ، أَبَلْ هُوَ مَقْبَلْ لَصُورَا... ..</p>	<p>Lyons, p. 191.4-5⁹⁷</p> <p>فَقَدْ يَجِبُ إِذَا أَنْ يَكُونَ الَّذِي يَتَصَوَّرُ بِالْعَقْلِ⁹⁸ غَيْرَ مَنْفَعِلٍ إِلَّا أَنَّهُ قَابِلٌ لِلصُّورَةِ... ..</p>	<p>Crawford, p. 381.1-2⁹⁹</p> <p>Oportet igitur ut sit non passivum, sed recipit formam. ...</p>
<p>Bos, p. 121.231-237</p> <p>وَعَلَّ كَنْ يَهِيَا مَن رَأَى أَيْنُو مَعُورَبْ لِنُورِ، كَيْ أَلُو هِيَا مَعُورَبْ لِنُورِ هِيَا بَعْنِيْنِ مَوَّ، أَوْ حَسَّ أَوْ كَرَّ، هِيَا لُو كَلِي أَحَا، كَمُو لِحُوسْ... ..</p>	<p>Lyons, p. 191.3-4¹⁰⁰</p> <p>وَلِذَلِكَ بِالْوَجِبِ لَيْسَ هُوَ مَخَالِطًا لِلْبَدَنِ¹⁰¹ وَلَا¹⁰² لَهُ آلَةٌ كَمَا لِلْحَاسِّ آلَةٌ مَا¹⁰³.</p>	<p>Crawford, p. 413.1-5¹⁰⁴</p> <p>Et ideo necesse est ut non sit mixtum cum corpore. Quoniam, si esset mixtum cum corpore, tunc esset in aliqua dispositione, aut calidus aut frigidus, aut haberet aliquod instrumentum sicut habet sentiens. ...</p>

⁹² (=p. 28.31-34 Heinze, p. 45 Todd).

⁹³ بِالقُوَّةِ ~ ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος.

⁹⁴ A العالم بالفعل (~ τοῦ ἐνεργεία ἐπισταμένου, cf. p. 28.32-33 Heinze: τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ἐπισταμένου)]
 H, *L (~De Anima: τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος καὶ διδασκαλικού).

⁹⁵ A [يقال فيه إنه ينفعل] H. It is unclear which reading underlies the Latin translation.

⁹⁶ accipit l] accept L.

⁹⁷ (=p. 105.7-8 Heinze, p. 130 Todd). Cf. Lyons, p. 163.10-11 (this passage belongs to the section 428 b 2 - 429 b 31 [Lyons, p. 160.5-166.16] that does not seem to have correspondence in Heinze's text, cf. Lyons, pp. XIII-XIV for a discussion of this phenomenon).

⁹⁸ A [الذي يتصوّر بالعقل (~ τὸ νοητικόν)] om. *H and *L (not in the De Anima).

⁹⁹ (=de Libera, Averroës [above, n. 8], p. 51).

¹⁰⁰ (=p. 105.5-7 Heinze, p. 130 Todd).

¹⁰¹ *H and *L add a passage that may be reconstructed as follows: فَإِنَّهُ لَوْ كَانَ مَخَالِطًا لِلْبَدَنِ لَكَانَ بِحَالٍ مَا، إِمَّا حَارًّا وَإِمَّا
 بردًا.

¹⁰² H, *L (~De Anima: καὶ ... εἶη, or, in some manuscripts, ἢ καὶ ... εἶη).

¹⁰³ A [آلة كما للحاسّ] H, *L.

¹⁰⁴ (=de Libera, Averroës [above, n. 8], p. 81).

Bos, p. 121.231-237	Lyons, p. 190:13-191.1 ¹⁰⁷	Crawford, p. 417.1-10 ¹¹⁷
<p>אמנם אם נעדר הנפעל במרגיש ובמצייר בשכל אינו הוא מתדמה, ונראה¹⁰⁵ בחושים והחוש. כשהחוש לא יוכל לחוש אחר מורגש חזק, כאלו אתה אומר המרגיש השב לאחור בעבור הקולות החזקות ולא¹⁰⁶ אותם שחוזרים לאחור¹⁰⁸ בעבור המראים החזקים ובעבור ריחנים חזקים, לא יראו ולא יריחו. אבל השכל כשיצייר דבר חזק מן המושכלים לא יהיה ציורו למה שתחתיו יותר חסר, אבל יותר נוסף. כי המרגיש לא ימלט מן הגשם, וזה נבדל.</p>	<p>فَمَا¹⁰⁸ أَنْ عَدَمَ الانفعال¹⁰⁹ فِي الْحَاسِّ وَفِي الْمُتَصَوِّرِ بِالْعَقْلِ¹¹⁰ لَيْسَ هُوَ مُتَشَابِهًا فِظَاهِرًا فِي الْحَوَاسِّ وَالْحَسِّ،¹¹¹ وَذَلِكَ أَنَّ الْحَسَّ لَا يَقْدِرُ أَنْ يَحْسَّ عَنْ¹¹² مُحْسُوسٍ قَوِيٍّ كَأَنَّكَ¹¹³ قُلْتَ الْحَسَّ¹¹⁴ لِلصَّوْتِ¹¹⁵ الصَّغِيرِ¹¹⁶ عَنِ الْأَصْوَاتِ الْعَظِيمَةِ وَلَا عَنِ الْأَلْوَانِ الْقَوِيَّةِ وَعَنِ الرَّوَاحِ الْقَوِيَّةِ الرَّوَاحِ وَالْأَلْوَانِ الَّتِي هِيَ أضعف،¹¹⁹ فَمَا الْعَقْلُ فَإِنَّهُ إِذَا تَصَوَّرَ شَيْئًا مِنَ الْمُعْقُولَاتِ الْقَوِيَّةِ¹²⁰ لَمْ يَكُنْ تَصَوُّرَهُ لَمَّا دُونَهُ أَنْقَصَ بَلْ أَزِيدَ. وَذَلِكَ أَنَّ الْحَاسَّ لَيْسَ يَخْلُو مِنْ¹²¹ الْجِسْمِ، وَهَذَا مُفَارِقٌ.</p>	<p>Quoniam autem privatio passionis in sentiente et in formatione per intellectum non est consimilis manifestum est in sensu. Sensus enim non potest sentire post forte sensatum, v.g. post sonos magnos aut post colores fortes aut post odores fortes; intellectus autem, cum intellexerit aliquod forte intelligibile, tunc non minus intelliget illud quod est sub primo, immo magis. Sentiens enim non est extra corpus; iste autem est abstractus.</p>

¹⁰⁵ ונראה [h] [נראה] H (Bos' emendation). The Hebrew translator has misinterpreted the *ف* as a mere conjunction, rather than a part of the *ف... أما* construction (possibly because he had *إِنَّمَا* in place of *أَمَا* in his *Vorlage*, cf. n. 108 below).

¹⁰⁶ ולא [h] [ולא] H (Bos' emendation).

¹⁰⁷ (=p. 104.31-105.4 Heinze, p. 130 Todd).

¹⁰⁸ فَأَمَا A, *L] [فَمَا] *H.

¹⁰⁹ *H. *إِنَّ عَدَمَ الانفعال* A, *L] [أَنَّ عَدَمَ الانفعال] *H. The Hebrew translator has misunderstood the word *عدم* as a verb rather than as a noun.

¹¹⁰ *L] [التصوّر بالعقل] A, *H] [التصوّر بالعقل] A, *H].

¹¹¹ *L] [الحسّ والحسّ] A, *H] [الحسّ والحسّ] A, *H].

¹¹² Although both the Hebrew and the Latin have here a word meaning “after” (אחר, *post*), the underlying reading seems to be *عن* rather than *بعد*, cf. Avicenna's testimony in MN, p. 101.23. In the text of the LC it is rendered by the preposition *a* (e.g. *a magno sono*). Cf. also n. 143 below.

¹¹³ Themistius' quotation deviates here from Aristotle's text as found in modern editions – cf. p.104.34-105.1 Heinze: *οἷον τοῦ ψόφου τοῦ μεγάλου τῶν μικρῶν ψόφων οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν χρωμάτων καὶ ὁσμῶν τῶν ἀμυδροτέρων ὁσμῶν καὶ χρωμάτων; De Anima: οἷον ψόφου (τοῦ ψόφου – Mss.) ἐκ τῶν μεγάλων ψόφων, οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν χρωμάτων καὶ ὁσμῶν οὐτε ὄραῖν οὐτε ὁσμᾶσθαι. Ishāq's *Vorlage* for Themistius seems to have differed from Heinze's text at the beginning of this passage, being a mixed version, in which Themistius' text had probably been corrected in accordance with Aristotle's: *οἷον τοῦ ψόφου τοῦ μικροῦ ἐκ τῶν μεγάλων ψόφων* in lieu of *οἷον ἐκ τοῦ ψόφου τοῦ μεγάλου τῶν μικρῶν ψόφων* in Heinze. Ishāq seems to have misinterpreted the genitive case of the expression *τοῦ ψόφου τοῦ μικροῦ* as dependent on the preceding noun *αἰσθησις* rather than on the verb *αἰσθάνεσθαι*; for an analysis of this misinterpretation see n. 37 above.*

¹¹⁴ *H] [الحسّ] A, *H] om. *L. The Hebrew participle *מרגיש* (literally: = *حاسّ*) can render in Zerahya's translation both the participle *حاسّ* and the noun *حسّ*, cf. Bos, Index, p. 168, s.v. *מרגיש*.

¹¹⁵ *H, om. *L. Yet, the variant *المنصرف* must have been known to Averroes, as is clear from both his MC and LC – cf. MC, p. 125.17-126.1,2-3: *عن: 125.17-126.1,2-3: الحواس إذا أحست محسوسا قويا لم تقدر على أن تحس ما هو دونه عند انصرافها عن: 125.17-126.1,2-3: الحواس القوي ... وأما العقل فإنه بخلاف ذلك، أعني إذا انصرف عن النظر إلى معقول قوي كان نظره إلى ما دون ذلك المعقول أسهل وأفضل*; LC, p. 418.25-26: *sensus non potest sentire sua sensibilia convenientia sibi quando senserit aliquod forte et recesserit ab eo subito ad aliud sensibile, v.g. quando sensus auditus recesserit a magno sono, aut visus a forti colore, aut olfactus a forti odore.*

¹¹⁶ A (cf. reconstruction of the Greek *Vorlage* in n. 113 above)] om. *H, *L (not in the *De Anima*).

¹¹⁷ (=de Libera, *Averroës* [above, n. 8], p. 85).

¹¹⁸ The words *אותם שחוזרים לאחור* were probably added by the Hebrew translator.

¹¹⁹ (or *لا ترى ولا تشم*) [A (p.105.1 Heinze: *τῶν ἀμυδροτέρων ὁσμῶν καὶ χρωμάτων*)] *H (p.105.1 Heinze: *τῶν ἀμυδροτέρων ὁσμῶν καὶ χρωμάτων*), om. *L. perhaps *لا يرى ولا يشم*]

¹²⁰ *H, *L. Both A and *H+*L are possible translations of the Greek *القوية* [A *شيئا قويا من المعقولات*]

¹²¹ ... *τι ... σφόδρα νοητόν.*

¹²² *οὐκ ἔνευ.* ليس يخلو من.

Passage 6: De Anima, III 5, 430 a 14-19, 21-25 (Ishāq's version)

<p>Bos, p. 123.272-124.277</p> <p>ויהיה בהם שכל הוא שכל מצד שהוא נהיה¹²² כל דבר, ובהם שכל הוא שכל מצד שהוא ישימונו ישכיל כל דבר, כקנין מה, הוא כמו האורה. כי האורה בצד מן הצדדים ישים המראים אשר הם בכח מראים בפועל. וזה השכל גם כן נבדל, בלתי מעורב, ואינו מתפעל, והוא בעצמותו פעולה. כי הפועל לעולם יותר מעולה מן הנפעל, וההתחלה יותר מעולה מן ההיולי. ...</p>	<p>Lyons, p. 192.11-16¹²³</p> <p>فَيَكُونُ¹²⁴ عَقْلٌ هُوَ عَقْلٌ مِنْ جِهَةِ أَنَّهُ يَصِيرُ كُلَّ شَيْءٍ، وَيَعْقِلُ¹²⁵ هُوَ عَقْلٌ¹²⁷ مِنْ جِهَةِ أَنَّهُ يَفْعَلُ كُلَّ شَيْءٍ،¹²⁸ كَمَلِكَةٍ مَّا،¹²⁹ بِمَنْزِلَةِ الضَّوِّ فَإِنَّ الضَّوِّ أَيْضًا¹³⁰ عَلَى جِهَةِ مِنَ الْجِهَاتِ يَجْعَلُ¹³¹ الْأَلْوَانَ الَّتِي هِيَ بِالْقُوَّةِ أَلْوَانًا بِالْفِعْلِ. وَهَذَا الْعَقْلُ أَيْضًا مُفَارِقٌ غَيْرُ مُخَالِطٍ وَلَا مُنْفَعَلٌ وَهُوَ فِي جَوْهَرِهِ فِعْلٌ، فَإِنَّ الْفَاعِلَ أَيْدًا أَشْرَفَ مِنَ الْمُنْفَعَلِ وَالْمَبْدَأُ أَشْرَفَ مِنَ الْهَيُولَى. ...</p>	<p>Crawford, p. 437.1-7, p. 440.1-4¹³²</p> <p>Oportet igitur ut in ea sit intellectus qui est intellectus secundum quod efficitur omne, et intellectus qui est intellectus secundum quod facit ipsum intelligere omne, et intellectus secundum quod intelligit omne, quasi habitus, qui est quasi lux. Lux enim quoquo modo etiam facit colores qui sunt in potentia colores in actu. Et iste intellectus etiam est abstractus, non mixtus neque passibilis, et est in sua substantia actio. Agens enim semper est nobilius patiente, et principium nobilius materia. ...</p>
<p>Bos, p. 124.278-281</p> <p>אבל בכלל אינו ולא בזמן ולא הוא פעם ישכיל ופעם לא ישכיל, וכשיהיה נבדל הוא מה הוא, וזה לבד בלתי מת נצחי, אבל לא יזכור, שזה בלתי מתפעל, והשכל המתפעל נפסד, וחולתי זה לא ישכיל שום דבר.</p>	<p>Lyons, p. 184.8-11¹³³</p> <p>وَأَمَّا بِالْمَجْمَلَةِ فَلَيْسَ¹³⁴ فِي زَمَانٍ وَلَا هُوَ مَرَّةً يَعْقِلُ وَمَرَّةً لَا.¹³⁵ وَإِذَا فَارِقَ فَهِيَ مَا هُوَ فَقَطْ¹³⁶ وَهَذَا فَقَطْ غَيْرُ مَائِتٍ أَبَدِيٍّ. وَإِنَّمَا صَرْنَا¹³⁷ لَا نَذَكُرُ¹³⁸ لِأَنَّ هَذَا غَيْرُ مُنْفَعَلٍ وَالْعَقْلُ الْمُنْفَعَلُ فَاسِدٌ وَدُونَ هَذَا لَيْسَ يَعْقِلُ شَيْئًا.</p>	<p>Crawford, p. 443.2-8¹³⁹</p> <p>... universaliter autem non est neque in tempore. Neque quandoque intelligit et quandoque non intelligit. Et cum fuerit abstractus, est illud quod est tantum, et iste tantum est immortalis semper. Et non rememoramus, quia iste est non passibilis, et intellectus passibilis est corruptibilis, et sine hoc nichil intelligitur.</p>

¹²² scripsi (or can it be ינהיה – Zerahya's attempt to form an imperfect from ינהיה?) H. Bos' suggestion (*apparatus ad loc.* and cf. p. 32) that the Hebrew ינהיה and the Latin *efficitur* originate from the Arabic variants *يقود* and *يكون* respectively is incorrect.

¹²³ (=p. 106.1-6 Heinze, p. 131 Todd). Cf. Lyons, p. 187.1-2 (=103.3-4 Heinze, p. 128 Todd), p. 197.9-10 (=p. 108.21-22 Heinze, p. 134 Todd).

¹²⁴*H and *L add *فيها* (not in the Greek), which H interprets as inanimate plural.

¹²⁵*H adds *فيها* (not in the Greek), which H interprets as inanimate plural. Cf. MC, p. 129.8-9, where the word *فيها* is repeated twice: *فيكون فينا عقل هو عقل من جهة أنه يقبل كل معقول وفينا عقل من جهة أنه يفعل كل معقول*.

¹²⁶*H and *L add *هو عقل من جهة أنه يجعله يعقل كل شيء*.

¹²⁷ *L. *وعقل*, *H. [A] *هو عقل* om.

¹²⁸ *L. *من جهة أنه يعقل كل شيء*, *H. [A] (*يعقل* being Lyons' emendation of *يفعل*) om. *H. Averroes, however, must have read *يفعل*, as is clear from his commentary (and cf. the passage from MC quoted in n. 125 above), cf. discussion in de Libera, *Averroës* [above, n. 8], p. 271, n. 411 (who, however, does not wish to exclude the possibility that Averroes read *يعقل* but corrected this reading in the commentary).

¹²⁹ *ως ἡ κελκή μα*.

¹³⁰ *L] *أيضا* A, *H. Cf. a similar case in n. 70 above.

¹³¹ *ποιεῖ*.

¹³² (=de Libera, *Averroës* [above, n. 8], pp. 105-6, 109).

¹³³ (=p. 101.23-27 Heinze, p. 126 Todd). Fragments of this passage are quoted in Lyons, p. 184.11-12,13-14,15-17 (=p. 101.28, 30-31, 32-34 Heinze, p. 126 Todd), p. 185.6 (=p. 102.5-6 Heinze, p. 126 Todd), 186.3-4 (=p. 102.22-24 Heinze, p. 127 Todd), p. 187.7,12 (=p. 103.9-10,15 Heinze, p. 128 Todd).

¹³⁴*H and *L add *ولا*.

¹³⁵*H and *L add *يعقل* (*~νοεῖ*).

¹³⁶ *فقط* (*~μόνον*) A, *L] om. *H (but added by Bos from the Latin), and cf. Lyons 184:14 (=p. 101.30 Heinze), where the word *فقط* is omitted. Heinze, in the *apparatus* (both here and in p. 101.30), notes that this word is omitted in one of the manuscripts.

¹³⁷ *صرنا*] om. *H and *L, and cf. Lyons, p. 184.15, where this word is omitted.

¹³⁸ *H. *يذكر* (*~μνημονεύσμεν*) A, *L] *يذكر*.

¹³⁹ (=de Libera, *Averroës* [above, n. 8], p. 112).

Passage 7: *De Anima*, III 7, 431 a 4-7 (Ishāq's version)

Bos, p. 126.317-320	Lyons, p. 20.3-7 ¹⁴¹	Crawford, p. 465.1-6 ¹⁴⁹
<p>והנה נמצא המורגש ישים המרגיש בפועל אחר היותו בכח, והוא לא יתפעל ולא ישתנה. ועל כן זה מין אחר מן התנועה. כי התנועה אמנם היא פעולה מבלתי תמה. אבל הפעולה הגמורה היא תנועה אחרת והיא פעולת¹⁴⁰ התמות.</p>	<p>وقد نجد المحسوس يخرج الحاسَّ إلى الفعل¹⁴² عن ما¹⁴³ بالقوَّة فإنَّه ليس ينفعل ولا يستحيل. ولذلك فإنَّ هذا نوع آخر من الحركة إذ كانت الحركة إنما هي فعل الناقص،¹⁴⁴ وأما الفعل المطلق¹⁴⁵ فهو حركة أخرى وهي الحركة التي تكون¹⁴⁶ من¹⁴⁷ الكمال.¹⁴⁸</p>	<p>Et videmus sensatum facere sentiens in actu postquam erat in potentia, neque patiendi alterationem. Et ideo iste est alius modus motus. Motus enim est actio non perfecta;¹⁵⁰ actio autem simpliciter est alius motus, et est actio perfecti.</p>

¹⁴⁰ Bos has פאולת, which seems to be a misprint (in his apparatus the word is spelled correctly).

¹⁴¹ (=p. 28.34-29.1 Heinze, p. 45 Todd).

¹⁴² يجعل الحاسَّ بالفعل [يخرج الحاسَّ إلى الفعل] *H, *L (the latter translation corresponds more closely to the Greek τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ ποιοῦν).

¹⁴³ A [عن ما] (or possibly كونه) *H, *L. Both A and *H+*L are possible translations of the Greek ἐκ (δυνάμει) ὄντος.

¹⁴⁴ ناقص (or perhaps غير كامل) A [~τοῦ ἀτελοῦς] *H, *L.

¹⁴⁵ *L [على الإطلاق] A, *H] perhaps المطلق (~ἀπλῶς).

¹⁴⁶ A [الحركة التي تكون] om. *H, *L.

¹⁴⁷ *H, *L. Both A and *H+*L are possible translations of the Greek ἡ (scil. ἐνεργείᾳ) τοῦ τετελεσμένου.

¹⁴⁸ *L. Both forms are possible translations of the Greek τοῦ τετελεσμένου. A, *H] الكمال.

¹⁴⁹ (=de Libera, *Averroës* [above, n. 8], p. 134).

Appendix III: Reconstruction of a Passage from Ibn Zur'a's Supplement

Passage 8: De Anima, III 8, 431 b 20-22 (Ibn Zur'a's version)

ed. Bos, p. 129.359-361	Averroes, MC, p. 136.5-6	ed. Crawford, p. 503.1-4 ¹⁵⁹
ונקבץ עתה על צד המשא הענינים אשר נאמרו בנפש, ונאמר שהנפש היא על צד <אחד> ¹⁵¹ שאר הנמצאים. כי הנמצאים או שיהיו מושב- לים או מורגשים.	فلنجمع ¹⁵² الآن ¹⁵³ على جهة الجمل ¹⁵⁴ الأشياء التي قيلت ¹⁵⁵ في النفس. فنقول ¹⁵⁶ إن النفس هي على نحو ما جمع ¹⁵⁷ الموجودات. وذلك أن الموجودات إما أن تكون معقولة أو محسوسة. ¹⁵⁸	Congregemus igitur secundum summam ea que dicta sunt in anima. Dicamus igitur quod anima est quoquo modo alia entia. Entia enim aut sunt intellecta aut sensata.

The following comparison proves that Ibn Zur'a's translation is not identical with *Pseudo-Ishāq's* translation and shows that it differs substantially from Ishāq's style of translation and terminology. The table below compares the reconstructed fragment of Ibn Zur'a's translation with the corresponding passages from *Pseudo-Ishāq's* translation and Ishāq's translation of Themistius' verbatim quotation of this passage in Aristotle.¹⁵⁹ The Greek text of this passage of the *De Anima* reads as follows: Νῦν δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς τὰ λεχθέντα συγκεφαλαιώσαντες, εἰπωμεν πάλιν ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πῶς ἐστὶ πάντα · ἡ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ τὰ ὄντα ἢ νοητὰ. The *Vorlagen* of the translators may have been slightly different from this text and from each other.¹⁶⁰

Ibn Zur'a (Passage 8)	<i>Pseudo-Ishāq</i> (p. 78.20-21)	Ishāq (ed. Lyons, p. 210.11-14)
فلنجمع الآن على جهة الجملة ¹⁶² الأشياء التي قيلت في النفس. فنقول إن النفس هي على نحو ما سائر ¹⁶³ الموجودات. وذلك أن الموجودات إما أن تكون معقولة أو محسوسة.	أما في وقتنا هذا <ف>لنوصل ما قلنا في النفس ولنردّد القول فيها: إن النفس هي جميع الأشياء. والأشياء إما محسوسة وإما معقولة.	وأما في هذا الموضوع ¹⁶⁴ فقد ينبغي أن نجمل ما قلناه في أمر النفس. فنعود ¹⁶⁵ فنقول إن النفس على جهة من الجهات هي الأشياء كأهلها فإن الموجودات إما أن تكون محسوسة وإما أن تكون معقولة.

¹⁵⁰ Bos. <מן הצדדים> scripsi] <אחד>¹⁵⁰

¹⁵¹ *H, *L. فنجمع [MC] possibly

¹⁵² MC, *H] om. *L. الآن (~νῦν)

¹⁵³ *H, probably الجملة *L (which seems to be the original reading). فلنجمع ... على جهة الجملة

corresponds to the Greek participle συγκεφαλαιώσαντες.

¹⁵⁴ τὰ λεχθέντα ~ الأشياء التي قيلت¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁵ The Greek πάλιν seems to be omitted.

¹⁵⁶ *H, *L. سائر [MC] جمع

¹⁵⁷ In Greek the order is different: ἡ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ τὰ ὄντα ἢ νοητὰ.

¹⁵⁸ (=de Libera, *Averroës* [above, n. 8], p. 169).

¹⁵⁹ Of course, this passage has no correspondence in Ishāq's incomplete translation of the *De Anima*.

¹⁶⁰ For observations on Ibn Zur'a's *Vorlage* see nn. 156 and 158 above.

¹⁶¹ Averroës' *Middle Commentary* has الجمل – see n. 154 above.

¹⁶² Averroës' *Middle Commentary* has جمع (as in *Pseudo-Ishāq's* translation) – see n. 157 above.

¹⁶³ For this rendering of the Greek νῦν δὲ in Ishāq's translation cf., e.g., *De Anima*, II 7, 419 a 7 (=p. 92.371 Bos, p. 240.1 Crawford) and II 8, 419 b 4 (=p. 93.398 Bos, p. 247.1 Crawford) rendered by אביל בזה המקום / *in hoc loco autem* (or: *in hoc autem loco*).

¹⁶⁴ πάλιν ~ فنعود¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁵ Lyons adds أيضا – see n. 70 above.

Appendix IV: Avicenna's Commentatorial Technique in His Marginal Notes on the *De Anima*

One may now compare the reconstructed text of fragments of Ishāq's Arabic translation of the *De Anima* with passages from Avicenna's *Marginal Notes* on the *De Anima*.

<p>Ishāq (Passage 1, section)</p> <p>وأما التمييز أو المحبة أو البغضاء فليست عللا لذلك لكن لهذا الذي له ذلك من طريق ما له ذلك. ولذلك¹⁶⁶ إذا فسد هذا لم يذكر ولم يحب فإنه لم يكن لذلك لكن للمشترك الذي تلف. فأما العقل فخليق أن يكون¹⁶⁷ شيئا إلهيا وشيئا غير منفعل.</p>	<p>Avicenna (p. 89.13-21)¹⁶⁸</p> <p>وأما التمييز (وقد عرفنا ما يريد به) والمحبة والبغضاء فليست عللا (أي آثارا وانفعالات) لذلك (أي للنفس الأصل) لكن (إنما) هي علل وآثار لهذا (البدن) الذي له ذلك (النفس الأصل) من [حيث] له ذلك (...). ولذلك إذا فسد هذا (أي البدن) لم يبق لذلك الذي هو النفس أن يتذكر [أو أن] يحب [فإن هذا] لم يكن لذلك [بل للحالة المشتركة التي بينهما]¹⁶⁹ (...). فأما (قوة) العقل فخليق أن [تكون] شيئا إلهيا وشيئا [لا يتأذى بالانفعالات الجسمانية].</p>
<p>Ishāq (Passage 5, section)</p> <p>وذلك أن الحس لا يقدر أن يحس عن محسوس قوي... فأما العقل فإنه إذا تصوّر شيئا قويا من المعقولات¹⁷⁰ لم يكن تصوّره لما دونه أنقص بل أزيد. وذلك أن الحاس ليس يخلو من الجسم، وهذا مفارق.</p>	<p>Avicenna (pp. 101.23, 102.1 - 2,13-14)</p> <p>(قال:) "وذلك لأن الحس لا يقدر أن يحس عن محسوس قوي" (...), (فقال:) "لكن العقل إذا تصوّر [القوي] [كان] تصوّره [للضعيف] أزيد" (...). (فهو يقول:) "وذلك أن الحاس ليس يخلو من جسم، وهذا مفارق".</p>

These comparisons shed light on Avicenna's commentatorial technique. In the first fragment we see that Avicenna inserts his commentary in between the words of Aristotle's text (in Ishāq's translation).¹⁷⁰ One can see that he follows Ishāq very closely, and only occasionally paraphrases. The second passage from Avicenna's *Marginal Notes* is a collation of three quotations from Aristotle's text between which lengthy interpretations are inserted. One may note that even when Avicenna uses such formulas as *قال* / *فقال* / *فهو يقول*, this does not mean that he quotes Aristotle verbatim. In some cases he may paraphrase or shorten the original quotation.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁶ Lyons adds *أحقّ بأن يكون* – see n. 78 above.

¹⁶⁷ Parentheses mark interpretational additions by Avicenna; square brackets enclose the cases in which Avicenna most likely paraphrases rather than quotes verbatim. Major differences between Avicenna and Ishāq are underlined (I have not underlined the cases in which Avicenna uses *ذلك* instead of Ishāq's *ذلك*).

¹⁶⁸ This text does not seem to agree with either the original *تلف* or with the variant *يلفّ* preserved in the Hebrew version (cf. n. 76 above). One has to check if this is indeed what is written in the manuscript of Avicenna's *Marginal Notes*.

¹⁶⁹ Lyons has *شيئا من المعقولات القوية* – see n. 120 above.

¹⁷⁰ This technique is used in some Qur'an commentaries, e.g., in the commentaries by al-Nasa'fi and by "al-Ġalālayn" (the two Ġalāls: Ġalāl al-Dīn al-Maḥallī and Ġalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī).

¹⁷¹ Cf. Ivry, "Arabic Text", p. 72, n. 76, citing D. Gutas, "Aspects of Literary Form and Genre in Arabic Logical Works", in Ch. Burnett (ed.), *Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts: The Syriac, Arabic, and Medieval Latin Traditions*, Warburg Institute, London 1993, pp. 29-76, here p. 56. A similar analysis of interpretational techniques in Averroes' *Middle Commentary* can be undertaken (in this case, to avoid a vicious circle, one should use passages reconstructed on the basis of Ishāq's translation of Themistius' Commentary).

Ibn al-Ṭayyib's Arabic Version and Commentary of Aristotle's De Caelo

Gerhard Endress*

Abstract

Aristotle's cosmological treatise *De Caelo*, appropriately named "Book on the Heaven and the World" in the Arabic tradition, was one of the most influential, and – apart from the *Organon* of logic – the best represented among Aristotle's authentic works in Mediaeval Arabic translations and commentaries. The identity and ascription of the extant versions poses a number of problems which only recently, in the light of manuscript findings and the discovery of some early testimonies, can be solved with certainty. The present contribution, after giving a survey of the translators' work – beginning with Ibn al-Biṭrīq, working in the age of al-Ma'mūn and in the circle of al-Kindī – concentrates on the translation, annotation and commentary of the Baghdad physician and philosopher Abū l-Farağ 'Abdallāh ibn al-Ṭayyib (d. 1043). The transmission, language and interpretation of his *Kitāb al-Samā'*, parts of which have been identified in an acephalous manuscript, and a fragment of his 'Great Commentary', are presented and analysed in detail.

1. The Arabic Versions of Aristotle's De Caelo

1.1. Introduction

Aristotle's *De Caelo* (Περὶ οὐρανοῦ, Arabic, *Kitāb al-Samā' wa-l-ālam*), was translated into Arabic in the early period of the Graeco-Arabic translation movement, in the newly founded capital, Baghdad, due to the eager interest of scientists and administrators of the rising 'Abbāsīd empire in astronomy, astrology, and other disciplines apt to unravel the dependence of the sublunar world from the eternal sphere, and to resolve the antinomy between the eternity of the divine First Cause and the contingency of the created being.

The wide readership and far-ranging influence of the work, from the beginnings of Aristotle's reading in 'Abbāsīd Baghdad to the late revival of the Arabic Aristotle in Ṣafavid Iran, is attested in extant translations, in a number of early *testimonia* and quotations supplementing the direct tradition, in *compendia* and literal commentaries, and in new interpretations of the Aristotelian cosmology and physics in the framework of the encyclopaedic *summae* of post-Avicennian philosophy. Compared with the Arabic tradition of other parts of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, the textual tradition of *De Caelo* is exceptionally rich. Whereas the reading of many Aristotelian texts was superseded through the overwhelming success of Avicenna's *Summae* and later *compendia*, the *De Caelo* continued to be read, or was rediscovered due to the theological interest of its subject matter and the interpretation given to certain concepts by the early translator.

* My sincere thanks are due to Cleophea Ferrari for her careful proofreading and helpful suggestions, and to Cristina D'Ancona and Elisa Coda for their painstaking efforts in editing my manuscript, assisted by Issam Marjani for the Arabic passages – needless to say that all imperfections and blunders that remain are my own!

Our present study is concerned with the extant Arabic versions of *De Caelo*, their origin, dating and transmission, as well as with their identification with regard to the early bibliographical data and the testimonies of the readers and commentators of the text. After an overview of the Arabic tradition, special attention will be given to the translation and commentary of Ibn al-Ṭayyib (d. 435 A.H./1043 A.D.), only recently identified in manuscript, and prepared for critical edition.

Three versions have survived in manuscript:

B The early, ninth century translation of Yahyā (Yūḥannā) ibn al-Biṭrīq from Syriac;

B^C A partial revision of this early version, extending to book I, chapters 1-6, possibly made for the lemmata of Alexander's commentary (v. § 3.1, pp. 223-5);

T A further translation, made independently from Ibn al-Biṭrīq's translation **B** and its partial revision **B^C**, but on the basis of the same Syriac version, has partially survived in a defective codex, Paris BnF 2281, and by internal and external evidence can now be safely attributed to Abū l-Faraǧ 'Abdallāh ibn al-Ṭayyib, as also the running commentary in the form of marginal scholia accompanying the Aristotelian text (v. § 4).

Since the first from these Arabic versions to become available in print¹ was made on the basis of a single manuscript not of Ibn al-Biṭrīq's original version, but of the partially revised version **B^C** of his translation, and since the translation of Ibn al-Ṭayyib survived only anonymously in an acephalous fragment, initial attempts at identification and dating of the translators were hampered by lack of the relevant materials.² On the basis of numerous manuscripts of version **B** and its revision, transmitted in an Eastern (Iranian) and a Western (Andalusian) tradition, and of a linguistic and structural analysis of the translations, a fairly clear picture has emerged. Taken together with enlightening *testimonia* of some early readers of the work and further fragments of the Arabic versions emerging in recent years, most – if not all – of the questions of the chronology and attribution of the extant versions can now be clarified.

2.1.1. Ibn al-Nadīm and the Bibliographical Tradition

The oldest detailed report on the Arabic translations of Aristotle's *De Caelo* is found in the *Kitāb al-Fihrist* of Ibn al-Nadīm (extant recension dated 377/987):³

Book on the Heaven and the World, in four books. This was translated by Ibn al-Biṭrīq, Ḥunayn revised it. Abū Bišr Mattā has translated part of the first book. Alexander of Aphrodisias commented on a part of the first treatise of this book.⁴ There is a commentary by Themistius on the whole work,

¹ Aristūṭālīs, *al-Samā' wa-l-Āṭār al-'ulwiyya*, ḥaqqaqahumā wa-qaddama lahumā 'A. Badawī, al-Qāhira 1960 (Dirāsāt islāmiyya, 28).

² See my 1965 thesis, G. Endress, *Die arabischen Übersetzungen von Aristoteles' Schrift De Caelo* (henceforth: *ArÜbCael*), Frankfurt a.M. 1965, printed 1966), where I assumed the version of the Paris ms. to be the oldest one, and called it version A, being misled by the 'modern' terminology of B – in fact, the revised version B^C.

³ M. Steinschneider, *Die arabischen Übersetzungen aus dem Griechischen* [*Unveränderter Abdruck der Abhandlungen in: Beihefte zum Centralblatt für Bibliothekswesen* 5 (1889); 12 (1893); *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 50 (1896); *Archiv für Pathologische Anatomie und Physiologie und für Klinische Medizin* 124 (1891)], Akad. Verlag (repr. Graz 1960), § 29 (53), pp. 55-57; F.E. Peters, *Aristoteles Arabus. The Oriental Translations and Commentaries on the Aristotelian Corpus*, Brill, Leiden 1968 (Monographs on Mediterranean Antiquity), p. 35.

⁴ A. Müller, *Die griechischen Philosophen in der arabischen Überlieferung*, Verlag der Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, Halle 1873, p. 51 n. 32, followed by Steinschneider, *Die arabischen Übersetzungen aus dem Griechischen* (above, n. 3), § 29 (53), p. 55, states that Abū Bišr, corrected by Yahyā ibn 'Adī, translated the commentary of Themistius, contaminating Ibn al-Nadīm's note

translated and [and: *v.l.* or, al-Qifṭī] revised by Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī. By Ḥunayn, there is something on this (text),⁵ viz. *the Sixteen Questions*. By Abū Zayd al-Balḥī, there is a commentary on the beginning of this book, "which he wrote" [*add.* al-Qifṭī] for Abū Ġāfar al-Ḥāzin.

Ibn al-Nadīm, *Kitāb al-Fihrist*, vol. 1, pp. 250.28-251.2 ed. G. Flügel; vol. 2, p. 168.1-7 ed. A.F. Sayyid; German trans. by Müller, *Die griechischen Philosophen in der arabischen Überlieferung* (above, n. 4), pp. 18-19; H. Suter, "Das Mathematikerverzeichnis im *Fihrist* des Ibn Abī Ja'qūb an-Nadīm", *Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Mathematischen Wissenschaften* 6 (1892), pp. 8-9; English trans. by B. Dodge, *The Fihrist of al-Nadīm. A Tenth-Century Survey of Muslim Culture*, Columbia U.P., New York - London, 1970, vol 2, p. 603; cf. Peters, *Aristoteles Arabus* (above, n. 3), pp. 35-6.

This article of the *Fihrist* was adopted verbatim by al-Qifṭī (m. 646/1248) in his *Kitāb Iḥbār al-'ulamā' bi-ahbār al-ḥukamā'* (abridgment by al-Zawzanī, *Tārīḥ al-ḥukamā'*, ed. A Müller - J. Lippert, Dietrich, Leipzig 1903, pp. 39.22-40.5, omitting, however, the words *wa-aṣlahāhū Ḥunayn* ("and Ḥunayn revised it", *sc.* Ibn al-Biṭrīq's version), and concerning the commentary of Themistius, changing *naqalahū wa-aṣlahāhū* (*sc.* Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī) into *naqalahū aw aṣlahāhū*, probably correctly (see below, p. 228). Al-Qifṭī further adds (*ibid.*, p. 40.6-8): "There is a treatise on this book, and a refutation, called *al-Taṣaffuḥ* (*The Scrutiny*), by Abū Ḥaṣīm al-Ġubbā'ī, in which he invalidates the principles of Aristotle".

This is supplemented by Ibn al-Nadīm's notes on the translations of Abū Biṣr Mattā (*Fihrist*, p. 264.1-2 Flügel; p. 201.9-10 Sayyid = al-Qifṭī, p. 323.16 Müller-Lippert):

Mattā ibn Yūnus. [...] Among his commentaries [are the following: [...]. Translation of the commentary of Alexander on the *Book on the Heaven* (*naql kitāb tafṣīr al-Iskandar li-kitāb al-Samā'*); Abū Zakariyyā' Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī revised this.⁶

Against the *Fihrist*, p. 250.29-30 Flügel, in this instance the translation of Abū Biṣr Mattā is not said to have comprised part of book I only, but the restriction is confirmed by Ibn al-Sarī who had the text before him (see the following section and *infra*, § 3.1.2.2).

2.1.2. Ibn al-Sarī

A valuable supplement to the bibliographer's *Catalogue* – completed, in the extant version, in 377/987H (Ibn al-Nadīm died in 380/990)⁷ – is the testimony of an expert reader of Aristotle's text, the mathematician Abū l-Futūḥ Aḥmad ibn al-Sarī (also known as Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, d. 548/1153). In his treatise *Explanation of an error occurring in a Proposition mentioned in the Third Treatise of the 'Book on the Heaven and the World'*, he discusses a passage in Aristotle's *De Caelo* III 8, 306 b 3-8, and in order to exclude the possibility that the erroneous statement was "due to a mistake of the translator of this book, viz. Yaḥyā ibn al-Biṭrīq", he proceeds to check on the other translations. He lists – and for the relevant passage, quotes – the following Arabic versions:

on the commentary of Themistius (*Fihrist*, p. 250.30 Flügel) with his information on Alexander's *Tafṣīr* (*ibid.*, p. 264.1-2 Flügel).

⁵ *wa-li-Ḥunayn fihī ṣay'*, see below, § 3.1.2.1, p. 224.

⁶ Cf. above n. 4.

⁷ R. Sellheim, "Das Todesdatum des Ibn an-Nadīm", *Israel Oriental Studies* 2 (1972), pp. 428-32.

the translation of this book made by Abū 'Alī 'Īsā ibn Zur'a,
 the translation of this book by Abū l-Farağ ibn al-Ṭayyib made from Syriac into Arabic,
 the translation of Abū l-Farağ 'Abdallāh ibn al-Ṭayyib from Syriac into Arabic

and then, turning to the commentaries of the Greeks, says:

there is no ancient commentary on this book except the commentary (*ṣarḥ*) of Themistius, found complete,
 and of the commentary of Alexander, a part of his commentary (*tafsīr*) on the first treatise.

Ibn al-Sarī: *Qawl li-l-ṣayḥ Abī l-Futūḥ Aḥmad Ibn al-Sarī fī bayān al-ḥaṭa' al-'arīd fī mā'nā maḍkūr fī l-maqāla al-ṭālīḡa min kitāb al-Samā' wa-l-'ālam*, ms. Istanbul: Aya Sofya 4830, ff. 129a-139b; ed. M. Türker, "İbnü 's-Şalāḥ' in *De Coelo* ve onun şerhleri hakkındaki tenkitleri", *Araştırma* 2 (1964), pp. 1-79, quotations from p. 54.18-25, cf. p. 57.1 (*naql Ibn al-Biṭrīq min al-suryānī ilā l-'arabī*), p. 57.10-11, 57.16-17.

For the 10th/11th century translations not mentioned by Ibn al-Nadīm, his report will be given in full *infra*, § 3.2.1, p. 226f.).

2.1.3 Further Quotations and References

While further revisions and even new versions were made, Ibn al-Biṭrīq's translation remained nonetheless the standard Arabic text of Aristotle's *De Caelo*. The lemmata in Ibn Rušd's *Great Commentary* (*Tafsīr kitāb al-Samā' wa-l-'ālam*) are given in his rendering (v. *infra*, 222 with n. 24, on the Tunis ms. of this work). It is labelled as one of the "translations of al-Kindī" by Ibn Rušd who deplors (*Comm. mag. Cael.* III c. 35) not having one of the superior productions of Iṣḥāq ibn Hunayn (the translator of Aristotle's *Physics* a.o.) at his disposal.

2.1.4. Summary

Aristotle's *De Caelo* is known in the Arabic tradition, both direct and indirect, under the title *Kitāb al-Samā' wa-l-'ālam* (*Book on the Heaven and the World*). The composite title is justified by the contents of the work.⁸ It appears in the same form in the Arabic list of Aristotle's writings of Ptolemy.⁹ But the simple title *Kitāb al-Samā'* is also found in al-Kindī's treatise *On the Number of Aristotle Books* (*R. fī Kammiyyat kutub Aristāṭālīs*, ed. M. Guidi - R. Walzer, p. 111.26 § X.17), and the same form of the title was used by Abū l-Farağ ibn al-Ṭayyib, according to the *explicit* of his commentary on Book II in the surviving fragment (v. *infra*, p. 265).

The Arabic title of Aristotle's Περὶ οὐρανοῦ, *Kitāb al-Samā' wa-l-'ālam* describes very appropriately the subject-matter of the work: the Heavens, meaning the celestial sphere, moving eternally in circular motion (Book I and Book II), and the realm of the earth and the four sublunar elements (Book III and Book IV). It was described in just these terms by the Greek commentators: cf. Philop., *In Meteor.*,

⁸ Some early scholars wondered about a possible confusion or contamination with ps.-Aristotle's *De Mundo ad Alexandrum* (as A. Müller, *Die griechischen Philosophen in der arabischen Überlieferung* [above, n. 4], p. 51, n. 31), but it is clear now that the latter was translated on its own (under the title *K. Aristūṭālīs fī l-'Ālam*). On the Arabic translations of *De Mundo*, v. S.M. Stern, "The Arabic Translations of the Pseudo-Aristotelian Treatise *De Mundo*", *Le Muséon* 77 (1964), pp. 187-204; 78 (1965), pp. 381-93.


⁹ Abū l-'Abbās Aḥmad ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, *Kitāb 'Uyūn al-anbā' fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā'*, ed. A. Müller, al-Qāhira / Königsberg, 1882-84, vol. 1, p. 68; al-Qifṭī, *Ta'riḥ al-ḥukamā'* [above, p. 215], p. 44; see also P. Moraux, *Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote*, Éditions universitaires de Louvain, Louvain 1951, p. 296.

p. 3.30-32 Hayduck (*CAG* XIV.1): οὐρανὸν δὲ τοῖς παλαιοῖς καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον ὀνομάζειν ἕθους, ὡς καὶ Πλάτων “ὄν δὴ οὐρανὸν καὶ κόσμον ἐπωνομάκαμεν” ἐν Τιμαίῳ φησί (*sc. Tim.* 28 B, cf. however Hayduck *ad locum*: “sed magis congruunt quae leguntur *Polit.* 269 D”, cf. also Philop., *In De Gen. et corr.*, p. 1.16-23 Vitelli [*CAG* XIV.2]).

Ibn al-Nadīm knew three Arabic versions of *De Caelo*. We have to regard his testimony against the information provided by Ibn al-Sarī on both the earlier and two more tenth-century translations, based on autopsy. We will examine the identity of the texts mentioned there in comparison with those extant in manuscript.

- A complete translation by Ibn al-Biṭrīq, a *mawlā* of the Caliph al-Ma'mūn, who worked in the circle of the philosopher-scientist al-Kindī, the *ḥaylasūf al-'Arab* (see below, § 2.2). He is the translator of the vulgate version of the book, ascribed to him explicitly in some of the extant manuscripts as well as in the testimony of Ibn al-Sarī.
- A revision (*iṣlāḥ* ‘emendation’) of this translation by Ḥunayn ibn Iṣḥāq. The notice of Ibn al-Nadīm is omitted in al-Qifṭī’s article – who for the rest, copies the whole section faithfully – and is probably to be disregarded, due to a contamination with the mention of Ḥunayn’s *Sixteen Questions* (see below, p. 224, on this text).
- A translation said to comprise only part of the first book, by Abū Biṣr Mattā, and by the same, a translation of the commentary of Alexander on the *Book on the Heaven* (*naql kitāb tafsīr al-Iskandar li-kitāb al-Samā*); “Abū Zakariyyā Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī revised this”. But “Alexander of Aphrodisias commented on part of the first treatise of this book” only; this is confirmed by Ibn al-Sarī. As we know, Alexander’s commentary was a literal commentary, quoting the lemmata of Aristotle’s text. So Abū Biṣr’s “translation of part of the first book” of Aristotle’s *De Caelo* relates to the lemmata from Alexander’s commentary. We have reasons to believe that this is the partial revision of Ibn al-Biṭrīq’s translation of *De Caelo* Book I, c. 1-6, found in one group of manuscripts (v. § 3.1).
- A translation made from the Syriac by ‘Īsā ibn Zur‘a is mentioned by Ibn al-Sarī. His quotation of *De Caelo* III 8, 306 b 3-8 is the only specimen we have. While made on the basis of the same Syriac text, it is definitely different from Ibn al-Ṭayyib’s, from which the same passage is quoted in Ibn al-Sarī’s comparative examination.
- Abū l-Farağ ibn al-Ṭayyib’s translation is first mentioned, and quoted, by Ibn al-Sarī. Later, Ibn Rušd makes use of his version in order to emend the vulgate translation of Ibn al-Biṭrīq, providing the lemmata of his *Great Commentary*. The identification of an acephalous fragment of 62 leaves in ms. Paris, BnF, arabe 2281, with Ibn al-Ṭayyib’s annotated translation was suggested by a number of structural and linguistic details, and supported definitely by the discovery of a piece of his *Great Commentary*, to be presented in the main part of the present study (§ 4).

2.2. The Translation of Ibn al-Biṭrīq



2.2.1. Yaḥyā (Yūḥannā) ibn al-Biṭrīq

Yaḥyā ibn al-Biṭrīq was a prominent figure in the great translation movement, culminating during the reign of the ‘Abbāsīd Caliph al-Ma’mūn. He belonged to the entourage of the vizier al-Ḥasan ibn Sahl who after the assassination of his eminent brother, al-Faḍl ibn Sahl, was appointed vizier of al-Ma’mūn in 202/818 (he died in 236/851)¹⁰ – both the brothers al-Faḍl and al-Ḥasan were among the sponsors of translators and scientists whose support brought riches and advancement to high stations at the court. Our earliest source, Ibn Ḡulḡul’s *Ṭabaqāt* (written in 377/987), calls him a *mawlā* (‘freedman’) of al-Ma’mūn; this would imply his conversion to Islam.

Apart from Ibn al-Nadīm’s testimony of his activity as one of the earlier translators (*Fihrist*, pp. 243.12-244.3 Flügel), notices are devoted to him, and several translations of his are recorded, by Sulaymān ibn Ḥassān Ibn Ḡulḡul (*Ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā’ wa-l-ḥukamā’*, edited by F. Sayyid: *Les Générations des médecins et des sages*, Publications de l’Institut français d’Archéologie orientale du Caire, Le Caire 1955 [Textes et traductions d’auteurs orientaux, 10], p. 67), al-Qiftī (*Tārīḥ al-ḥukamā’* [as quoted *supra*, p. 215], p. 379 Müller-Lippert – largely dependent on the *Fihrist*); Ibn Abī Uṣaybī’a (*‘Uyūn al-anbā’ fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā’*, vol. 1, p. 205 Müller); Ibn al-‘Ibrī (Barhebraeus) (*Tārīḥ muḥtaṣar al-duwal*, p. 138 Šāliḥānī). See D.M. Dunlop, “The Translations of al-Biṭrīq and Yaḥyā (Yūḥannā) b. al-Biṭrīq”, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 3/4 (1959), pp. 140-50.

His complete name is Abū Zakariyyā’ Yaḥyā ibn al-Biṭrīq; Ibn Ḡulḡul and al-Qiftī give his *ism* in the form Yūḥannā, corresponding to the Aramaic form of Greek *Ioannes*. The father, al-Biṭrīq,

¹⁰ See D. Sourdél, *Le vizirat ‘abbāsīde*, Inst. Français de Damas, Damas 1959-60, vol. 1, pp. 215-18.

according to Ibn al-Nadīm was active “in the time of al-Manṣūr, who charged him with translating a number of the ancient books” (*Fihrist*, p. 244.3 Flügel). The name al-Biṭrīq is the Greek title of *patrikios*. Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a reproduces this information of the *Fihrist*, and adds: “There are many excellent translations made by him, second only to the work of Ḥunayn ibn Iṣḥāq, and I have seen in his translation many medical writings of Hippocrates and Galen” (Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a, *‘Uyūn*, vol. 1, p. 205.9-11 Lippert).

The name of the son Yaḥyā is mentioned among those who were sent by the Caliph in quest of Greek manuscript sources into Byzantine territory, along with al-Ḥaḡḡāḡ ibn Maṭar (the translator of Euclid's *Elementa*) and Salm (or Salmā, in the Aramaic form), director of the caliphal library, the *Bayt al-Ḥikma*, and is also listed among the *Asma' al-naqala min al-luḡāt ilā l-lisān al-‘arabī* (“Names of the translators from the [foreign] languages into Arabic”, cf. *Fihrist*, p. 244.1 Flügel), after his father, al-Biṭrīq, and followed by al-Ḥaḡḡāḡ ibn Maṭar and Ibn Nā‘ima al-Ḥimṣī, a member of his circle (see § 2.2.3).

“Yūḥannā was not a physician, but his strength was rather in philosophy” (Ibn Ḡulḡul, *Ṭabaqāt*, p. 67.12 Sayyid; al-Qifṭī, *Tārīḥ al-ḥukamā’*, p. 379.19-20 Müller-Lippert); al-Qifṭī adds: “Above all, he was devoted to translating the works of Aristotle, also – like Ḥunayn and others – the books of Hippocrates” (*ibid.*, p. 379.20-21 Müller-Lippert). Indeed, the list of translations transmitted under Ibn al-Biṭrīq's name or attributed to him in the bio-bibliographical *testimonia*¹¹ contains, beside some medical titles, Plato's *Timaeus* and an important list of *Aristotelica*. Even considering the many uncertainties of attribution and authenticity (see § 2.2.3), we can say that Ibn al-Biṭrīq was the first to translate the works of Greek philosophy on a larger scale, moving – at variance with the astronomers and physicians dominating the scientific community of the early ‘Abbāsīd administration – in a circle of philosopher-scientists: the circle of al-Kindī.

2.2.2. The Syriac Source

Ibn al-Biṭrīq had no Greek. As we learn from Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a, “He knew neither Greek nor Arabic properly; he was just a *lātīnī* who knew the language of present-day Byzantium and their script, i.e., the connected letters, not the unconnected of the ancient Greek” – *lātīnī* instead of *rūmī* is unusual, but in respect to language, what is meant must be the Byzantine *koinē*, and the ‘unconnected’ is the uncial majuscule script of the Byzantine codices.¹² Additional evidence of Syriac being the source language of his translation of *De Caelo* and other works is provided by the testimony of Ibn al-Sarī, and by the linguistic evidence of terminology, grammar and style. The restriction to Syriac sources, unsupported as yet by the commentaries of the school tradition, is one of the reasons why some of his translations (as e.g. of Aristotle's *Analytica Posteriora*) were superseded and replaced by those of the translators who in the next generation could rely on the original Greek texts – Ḥunayn ibn Iṣḥāq, Iṣḥāq ibn Ḥunayn, Ṭābit ibn Qurra, Abū ‘Uṭmān al-Dimašqī – and then by those of the 10th century, Abū Biṣr Mattā and his school, who, again relying on Syriac sources, revived the teaching curriculum of the Alexandrian school through translations of the Peripatetic and Neoplatonic commentators preserved in the monasteries of Mesopotamia and the Fertile Crescent.

¹¹ A full list, to be complemented and emended in the light of recent research, was compiled by Dunlop, “The Translations of al-Biṭrīq and Yaḥyā (Yūḥannā) b. al-Biṭrīq” (quoted above, p. 218).

¹² Cf. P. Maas, *Griechische Paläographie* (1927), repr. in D. Harlfinger (ed.), *Griechische Kodikologie und Textüberlieferung*, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1980, pp. 37-59, p. 53f.

No Syriac translation of *De Caelo* has been preserved, nor is any literal translation explicitly quoted by authors writing in Syriac.¹³ It is clear from *testimonia* and internal evidence that both the oldest, early ninth-century Arabic translation of Ibn al-Biṭrīq and the last one by Abū l-Farağ ibn al-Ṭayyib were made from Syriac, and from a comparison of these translations it appears that both were made from the same Syriac *Vorlage* (v. *infra*, § 4.5). But there is no trace of this Syriac version surviving in references or quotations of Jacobite or Nestorian readers, neither in pre-Islamic Syriac literature nor in the learned philosopher-theologians of the church of a later period.

A contemporary of Yaḥyā ibn al-Biṭrīq was Job of Edessa (Ayyūb al-Ruhāwī, called al-Abraš ‘the pock-marked’), a philosopher and physician, another translator of Greek works into Arabic, but mostly into Syriac. Hunayn ibn Ishāq, in his *Epistle* on the Syriac and Arabic translations of Galen, names him as translator of 36 works of Galen, among them the *Book on the Theriak*, translated into Arabic by Ibn al-Biṭrīq *from the Syriac of Ayyūb*.¹⁴ Like Ibn al-Biṭrīq, he was active under al-Ma’mūn and died after 832. His *Summa* of natural science and natural philosophy, the *Book of Treasures* (*Ktābā d-Simātā*)¹⁵ reveals an intimate knowledge of *De Caelo* (see ed. Mingana, p. 85 / translation, pp. 16, 86/18, 89/23, 207-8/220-22 – in this place, p. 207/220, an explicit reference – p. 217/239-40, etc. *saepius*). While these references show the author’s familiarity with the Greek work, there is no evidence that he was quoting a Syriac translation available to him, let alone done by himself.

2.2.3. *The Circle of al-Kindī: a Common Agenda, and a Common Language*

Only in the Q family of manuscripts (v. § 2.2.4), “Yaḥyā ibn al-Biṭrīq fatā l-Ma’mūn” is explicitly mentioned as translator of *De Caelo* in the inscription. This is confirmed by the well-informed reader, Ibn al-Sarī, whose quotation from Book III, Ch. 8, corresponds to the text transmitted in manuscript. Taking together the terminology and style of the translation, found as well (a) in other translations of Greek philosophical works under the name of Ibn al-Biṭrīq, and (b) in the works of a group of early translators contemporary with Ibn al-Biṭrīq, and finally, (c) the connection of this group with the ‘Philosopher of the Arabs’, Abū Yūsuf Ya’qūb ibn Ishāq al-Kindī as commissioner, reader and revisor of their translations, we have ample evidence for placing version B of *De Caelo* in the ‘Circle of al-Kindī’.

The coherence of this ensemble of Greek-Arabic translations from the ‘Circle of al-Kindī’¹⁶ can be demonstrated from internal evidence. We have a number of further philosophical works which on the one hand were quoted by al-Kindī or can be shown to have influenced his choice of topics and his doctrine, and which on the other hand – and here textual philology meets the history of ideas – are connected by common features of terminology and style.

¹³ Apart from logic, little has been preserved from the works of Aristotle in Syriac; a meticulous survey of the evidence that can be gleaned from quotations, glosses and indirect transmission has been given by R. Arnzen - Y. Arzhanov, “Die Glossen in Ms. Leyden Or. 583 und die syrische Rezeption der aristotelischen *Physik*”, in E. Coda - C. Martini Bonadeo (eds.), *De l’Antiquité tardive au Moyen Âge: Études de logique aristotélicienne et de philosophie grecque, syriaque, arabe et latine offertes à Henri Hugonnard-Roche*, Vrin, Paris 2014 (Études Musulmanes, 44), pp. 415-63.

¹⁴ Hunayn ibn Ishāq, *Risāla fī dīkr mā turğima min kutub Ġālīnūs bi-ilmībi wa-bā’ d mā lam yutarğam*, ed. with German trans. by G. Bergsträsser, *Hunayn ibn Ishāq über die syrischen und arabischen Galen-Übersetzungen*, Brockhaus in Komm, Leipzig 1925 (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, 17.2), pp. 38.19-39.2 no. 83.

¹⁵ Ed. A. Mingana, *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical and Natural Sciences as Taught in Baghdad About A. D. 817, or Book of Treasures, by Job of Edessa*, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge 1935 (Woodbrooke Scientific Publications, 1).

¹⁶ See G. Endress, “The Circle of al-Kindī: Early Arabic Translations from the Greek and the Rise of Islamic Philosophy”, in G. Endress - R. Kruk (eds.), *The Ancient Tradition in Christian and Islamic Hellenism. Studies on the Transmission of Greek Philosophy and Sciences, dedicated to H.J. Drossaart Lulofs on His Ninetieth Birthday*, Research School CNWS, Leiden 1997 (CNWS Publications, 50), pp. 43-76.

The most prolific translator of philosophical works in this group, although not explicitly mentioned in connection with al-Kindī, but quoted by him and linked to other versions by many properties of his language, was indeed Yaḥyā ibn al-Biṭrīq (§ 2.2.1, *supra*, p. 218), who had been a *mawlā* of al-Ma'mūn, and whose *nasab*, the Byzantine title of *patrikios*, is a pointer to the Hellenized Christian milieu of the Fertile Crescent.¹⁷ The common characteristics encountered in this group of translations are not shared uniformly by all of them, and not yielding univocal evidence in favour of or against this or that individual translator; what we have is an ensemble of “index fossils”, which may permit us to link a number of texts with each other or with al-Kindī's philosophical and scientific milieu.¹⁸ Best known among the colleagues of Ibn al-Biṭrīq working in this circle are 'Abd al-Masīḥ ibn 'Abdallāh Ibn Nā'ima al-Ḥimṣī who translated an annotated version of several treatise from *Enneads* IV-VI of Plotinus under the name of Aristotle, the famous *Theology* (*Uṭūlūḡiyā wa-huwa l-qawl fi l-rubūbiyya*) “revised by al-Kindī”, and Uṣṭāṭ (Eustathios) who translated Aristotle's *Metaphysics* “for al-Kindī” (*Fihrist*, p. 251.27-28 Flügel).

Closest to *De Caelo* in terminology and style, on the other hand, are the Arabic versions of Proclus's *Elementatio theologica*, likewise transmitted as part of the *Theology of Aristotle*, “excerpted by Alexander Aphrodisiensis”, and like the *Uṭūlūḡiyā*, with many *interpretamenta*, and accompanied by more treatises of Alexander (mostly authentic).¹⁹ From the same milieu, we have an Arabic compendium of Aristotle's *De Anima*, largely dependent on the commentary of John Philoponus.²⁰ Together with the texts mentioned before, these form a group of texts which what has been called the ‘Metaphysics Corpus’ of al-Kindī,²¹ who made good use of the sources provided by his circle.

Notwithstanding the personal and philosophical coherence of the group, we observe differences between the fields of interest and the language of the translations, technique and terminology. Even with regard to the works of Aristotle said to have been translated by Ibn al-Biṭrīq himself, in the manuscripts or in *testimonia*, there remain questions of attribution and identification. Beside *De Caelo*, the translation of Aristotle's *Meteorologica* is under Ibn al-Biṭrīq's name; there are parallels in the terminology, but differences in style – this is not surprising when we regard the character of this version, over long stretches a rough paraphrase or summary rather than a faithful translation (in all probability, due to its Syriac *Vorlage*). Also under the name of Ibn al-Biṭrīq, we find the Arabic version of Aristotle's books *De Animalibus*, but here the language, despite some correspondences, is much closer to the vocabulary and usage of Uṣṭāṭ's translation of the *Metaphysica*. Another close relative of both the Arabic *Metaphysica* and *De Animalibus*, and hence attributable to Uṣṭāṭ, is the translation of Aristotle's *Ethica Nicomachea*, books V to X (as opposed to books I-IV, translated by Ishāq ibn Ḥunayn).²²

¹⁷ Cf. my *ArÜbCael* (above, n. 2), pp. 89ff. I will not go here into the history of the spurious *Kitāb Sirr al-asrār* (*Secretum secretorum*), also attributed to Ibn al-Biṭrīq.

¹⁸ For the principal characteristics and a series of examples see Endress, “The Circle of al-Kindī” [above, n. 16], p. 14], and *infra*, § 4.6, a comparison with the distinctive features of Ibn al-Ṭayyib's translation of the same Syriac version of *De Caelo*.

¹⁹ See G. Endress, *Proclus Arabus: Zwanzig Abschnitte aus der Institutio Theologica in arabischer Übersetzung*, Beirut - Wiesbaden 1963 (Beiruter Texte und Studien, 10) [henceforth: *ProclArab*].

²⁰ R. Arnzen, *Aristoteles' De Anima: eine verlorene spätantike Paraphrase in arabischer und persischer Überlieferung*, Brill, Leiden 1998 (Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus, 9).

²¹ F.W. Zimmermann, “The Origins of the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*”, in J. Krayer et al. (eds.), *Pseudo-Aristotle in the Middle Ages. The Theology and Other Texts*, The Warburg Institute, London 1986 (Warburg Institute Surveys and Texts, 11), pp. 108-240; Id., “Proclus Arabus rides again”, *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 4 (1994), pp. 9-51.

²² As shown on the basis of painstaking analytical studies of lexicon, grammar and style by M. Ullmann, *Die Nikomachische Ethik des Aristoteles in arabischer Übersetzung, Teil 1: Wortschatz, Teil 2: Überlieferung, Textkritik, Grammatik*, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 2011-2012.

It is probably through al-Kindī's school, where the Neoplatonism of Plotinus and Proclus was received under Aristotle's name, and the authentic writings of Aristotle on cosmology and psychology were given the stamp of gnostic Neoplatonism²³ – thus preparing the integration of the strands of Ancient philosophy through Miskawayh and Ibn Sīnā – that the key texts continued to be read even while new translations became available. Other works of the translator Ibn al-Biṭrīq, as Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*, were superseded and lost without trace. It is true that in many other cases the Arabic Aristotle was simply displaced by the *summae* of Avicenna and survived only when accompanied by commentaries read in their own right (*Physica*, *Metaphysica*). But the *De Caelo* in Ibn al-Biṭrīq's version continued to be read as the vulgate version, even though two complete 10th/11th translations had become available — so Ibn Ruṣd complained that for most of the lemmata of his *Great Commentary* (*Tafsīr al-Samā' wa-l-'ālam*), he had only “the translations of al-Kindī – but more faithful are those of Iṣḥāq”.

2.2.4. The Vulgate Translation of Yaḥyā (Yūḥannā) Ibn al-Biṭrīq: the Witnesses of the Text

The Arabic version **B** made by Yaḥyā ibn al-Biṭrīq has been transmitted in three main groups of witnesses:

a) Western tradition

Ġ The Maghribi tradition of version **B** is represented by one manuscript, preserving the text of Aristotle's *De Caelo* in the lemmata of an incomplete copy (Book I, Ch. 7 – Book II, Ch. 7) of Ibn Ruṣd's *Commentarium Magnum*.²⁴

The Western Arabic tradition is further represented by two medieval Latin translations from Arabic, those of Gerard of Cremona (1114-1187)²⁵, and – in connection with Averroes's *Commentarium Magnum* – by Michael Scot (d. c. 1235).²⁶

b) Eastern tradition

Q A family of several manuscripts, all coming from Iran of the Ṣafavid and post-Ṣafavid periods (11th–13th/17-19th cent.) and going back to an exemplar (now lost) copied in Damascus in 580/1184.

c) A third family of manuscript presents – for book I, ch. 1-6 – a revised version **B^C** of Ibn al-Biṭrīq's original translation:

Mhr All copies, like those of the **Q** family, are from the schools of Ṣafavid Iran and its Indian offsprings, and go back to a common archetype connected with the 6th/12th century Christian physician Mihrān ibn Manṣūr. For Book I, Chapters 1-6, this group represents a revised version of Ibn al-Biṭrīq's translation (see the following section).

^{k23} See G. Endress, “Platonizing Aristotle: the Concept of ‘Spiritual’ (*rūḥānī*) as a Keyword of the Neoplatonic Strand in Early Arabic Aristotelianism”, *Studia graeco-arabica* 2 (2012), pp. 265-79.

²⁴ Ms. Tunis, al-Maktaba al-Waṭāniyya, 11821 (c. 8th/14th century. Facs.-ed.: *Sharḥ (Tafsīr) kitāb al-Samā' wa-l-'ālam. Commentary on Aristotle's Book On the Heaven and the Universe*, Facsimile ed., reproduced from ms. 11821, National Library, Tunis, with an introd. by G. Endress, Publications of the Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science, Frankfurt a.Main 1994 (Series C. Facsimile editions, 57).

²⁵ Ed. I. Opelt in *Alberti Magni Opera omnia*, t. V, *Pars 1: De Caelo et mundo*, Aschendorff Verlag, Münster 1971, printed, with a short critical apparatus, in the lower margins of Albert's *De Caelo et mundo*.

²⁶ Ed. in *Averrois Cordubensis commentum magnum super libro De celo et mundo Aristotelis*, ex recognitione Francis James Carmody † in lucem edidit Rüdiger Arnzen, editioni praefatus est Gerhard Endress, Peeters, Leuven 2003 (Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales. Bibliotheca, 4).

3. The Revised Version of Ibn al-Biṭrīq's Translation and the tenth-century Translators of *De Caelo* and its Commentators

3.1 The Partial Revision of Ibn al-Biṭrīq's Translation

3.1.1. Transmission

While Ibn al-Biṭrīq's translation became the vulgate version of *De Caelo*, and the basis of all later treatments, a number of manuscripts of Iranian origin offer a revised version of Book I, Chapters 1-6. All the extant copies were transcribed from a common exemplar, going back to the holograph of Mihrān ibn Maṣṣūr al-Masīhī written for the Artuqid Nağm-al-Dīn Alpī in 553/1158. Terminology, style and the quality of this version in regard of accuracy and fidelity point to a revisor who either had access to the Greek text, or revised the translation in the light of commentaries and glosses available in Greek or Syriac.

The Christian physician Mihrān ibn Maṣṣūr ibn Mihrān was working in the service of the Artuqid Nağm-al-Dīn Alpī (r. 548/1154-572/1176) of Diyārbakr.²⁷ For the same ruler, he revised the Arabic version of Dioscurides' *Materia medica*, as appears from the manuscript Mašhad, Āstān-i Quds-i Raḍawī 149, where he is said to have prepared a new version of this work from the Syriac for the Artuqid ruler.²⁸

The revisor of Ibn al-Biṭrīq's version made deep interventions into his predecessor's work only in the first chapters of Book I of *De Caelo*, but even here, he is clearly dependent upon him. He corrects and clarifies the older version – we do not know which additional materials, versions or commentaries were at his disposal (but cf. below on Alexander's commentary) – but from Chapter 5 his changes are becoming less and less. For the rest, he 'modernizes' the terminology, conforming with the technical language introduced by Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq and his group, in particular the philosophical texts translated by Ishāq ibn Ḥunayn, such as Aristotle's *Physica*.

3.1.2. Testimonies and the Question of Whodunit

3.1.2.1. Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq

Ibn al-Nadīm, as quoted before, after mentioning Ibn al-Biṭrīq's translation adds that "Ḥunayn revised it" (*wa-aṣlahāhū Ḥunayn*, cf. *Fihrist*, p. 250.30 Flügel). This remark is missing from al-Qiftī's report on *De Caelo*, copied, as all other notices on Aristotle and his works in his *Tārīḥ al-ḥukamā'* from Ibn al-Nadīm's book, with additions and corrections on the basis of his own library and his intimate knowledge of the books available in early 12th century Syria. This omission, and the fact that no other trace is found of a translation of *De Caelo* attributable to Ḥunayn, raises doubts as to the actual contribution of Ḥunayn.

²⁷ Alp-Īnağ Qutlug Bek ibn Timurtaş (Nağm-al-Dīn Alpī), ruler of Diyārbakr 548-572/1154-76. On the Artuqids of Mārdīn and the Amīr Nağm-al-Dīn Alpī v. Cl. Cahen, "Le Diyār Bakr au temps des premiers Urtuqidēs", *Journal Asiatique* 227 (1935), pp. 219-76; C. Hillenbrand, "The Establishment of Artuqid power in Diyār Bakr in the twelfth century", *Studia Islamica* 154 (1981), pp. 129-53 (with genealogical table after p. 154); S. Lane Poole, *Coins of the Urtuqi Turkumāns*, Trübner, London 1875, pp. 24-25 (nos. 29-33).

²⁸ See A. Dietrich, "Eine wenig beachtete arabische Übersetzung der *Materia medica* des Dioskurides", in H.-H. Eulner *et alii* (ed.), *Medizingeschichte in unserer Zeit, Festgabe für E. Heischkel-Artelt und W. Artelt*, F. Enke, Stuttgart 1971; M. Ullmann, *Untersuchungen zur arabischen Überlieferung der Materia medica des Dioskurides*, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 2009, pp. 341-55.

Whereas many a translation was wrongly attributed to the famous translator of Greek works, it is doubtful that a version actually revised by Ḥunayn or in his school should not have replaced the older version and put it under his name. It is true that Ḥunayn revised many an older translation, mainly of medical but also of some philosophical sources, into both Syriac and Arabic, and in his *Epistle on the Available Translations of Galen* he lists not a few older versions, Syriac and Arabic, which he revised (*aṣṣlaḥa*) on the basis of one or more exemplars of the original Greek.²⁹ But it can be excluded that version **B^C** of *De Caelo*, neither extensive nor intensive in detail, should go back to Ḥunayn.

While the mention of Ḥunayn's *Iṣlāḥ* may have been an added gloss in the *Fibrīst*, the mention of a second work by the famous translator, both in the *Fibrīst* and in other sources, may well be authentic, and what is more, can be identified with an extant treatise on *De Caelo*. After giving his information of the translations, Ibn al-Nadīm adds that "by Ḥunayn, there is something on this [*sc. De Caelo*], viz. the 'Sixteen Questions'". Then, Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a (d. 668/1270), in his lexicon of the *Generations of the Physicians* (cf. '*Uyūn al-anbā' fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā'*', vol. 1, p. 200.1 ed. Müller) lists among the works of Ḥunayn (a) "Summaria of the Book on the Heaven and the world" (*Ġawāmi' kitāb al-Samā' wa-l-ālam*), and then, (b) "Compendium of the comments of the ancient Greeks on Aristotle's book *On the Heaven and the World*" (*Ġawāmi' tafṣīr al-qudamā' al-Yūnāniyyīn li-kitāb Aristūṭālīs fī l-Samā' wa-l-ālam*). These very "Sixteen Questions" on *De Caelo*, indeed constituting a compendium of the cosmological parts of *De Caelo*, Books I and II, are preserved in a Middle Latin version *Liber Celi et mundi*, transmitted under the name of Avicenna, *incipit*: "Collectiones expositionum ab antiquis grecis in libro Aristotelis de mundo qui dicitur celi et mundi".

The Latin *Liber Celi et mundi*, directly dependent on an Arabic original, is attributed to two 12th century translators, Domenicus Gundissalinus of Toledo (d. c. 1190) and Johannes Hispalensis of Sevilla. The late 13th century Hebrew version made by Šlomo ben Moše is clearly derived from the Latin, but reworked, with considerable changes and additions.

The Latin has been edited, and translated into English, by O. Gutman, *Pseudo-Avicenna: Liber celi et mundi, a Critical Edition with Introduction*, Brill, Leiden 2003 (Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus, 14). On the Hebrew version see R. Glasner, "The Hebrew version of *De celo et mundo* attributed to Ibn Sīnā", *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 6 (1996), pp. 89-112.

In the sixteen chapters of this book, the author gives a paraphrase of *De Caelo* I.1, I.2, I.3, I.5, I.8, II.1-2, II.4, II.6, II.7, II.8. Chapters 10, 12, 14 and 16 of the ps.-Avicenna are not paraphrases of *De Caelo* texts, but elaborate on related questions of the celestial influence on the sublunar world (so does ch. 16, a simplified account of the nature and qualities of the four elements, but this is quite independent from Aristotle's *De Caelo*).

²⁹ Cf. G. Bergsträsser, *Ḥunayn ibn Iṣḥāq und seine Schule. Sprach- und literaturgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu den arabischen Hippokrates- und Galen-Übersetzungen*, Brill, Leiden 1913, p. 45; Ḥunayn ibn Iṣḥāq, *Risāla fī ḍikr mā turġima min kutub Ġālīnūs*, ed. and trans. by G. Bergsträsser: *Ḥunayn ibn Iṣḥāq über die syrischen und arabischen Galen-Übersetzungen* (above, n. 14), p. 39.1, on Galenic texts translated by Ibn al-Biṭrīq. His translation of Plato's *Timaeus* "in three *maqālāt*", probably a paraphrase or epitome, is mentioned in the *Fibrīst* (p. 246.15-16 Flügel = vol. 2, p. 156.9-10 Sayyid) and said to have been revised by Ḥunayn; see R. Arnzen, "Plato's *Timaeus* in the Arabic tradition", in F. Celia - A. Ulacco (eds.), *Il Timeo. Eseggesi greche, arabe, latine*, PLUS, Pisa 2012 (Le vie del sapere. Studi, 2), pp. 181-269. Of Aristotle's *Meteorologica*, first translated by Ibn al-Biṭrīq, Ḥunayn made an independent *Epitome*, v. H. Daiber, *Ein Kompendium der aristotelischen Meteorologie in der Fassung des Ḥunayn ibn Iṣḥāq*, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, Oxford 1975 (Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus. Prolegomena et Parerga, 1).

Miguel Alonso,³⁰ relating the subsequent words of the *Fibrist* on the Arabic translations, *wa-li-Ḥunayn fihi šay'* to the preceding mention of Themistius's commentary, instead of to Aristotle's *De Caelo* itself, tried to find evidence in the Latin ps.-Avicenna of extensive use of Themistius's *Paraphrase*. On closer inspection, Gutman confirmed rather close parallels with the ps.-Avicenna in three passages, but these "prove nothing more than that the author of the *Liber celi et mundi* knew of Themistius's work"; for the rest, most of the "quotations" claimed by Alonso simply refer to the content of the *De Caelo* itself. — The identification of the Latin *Liber Celi et mundi* with the "Sixteen Questions" and the *Ḡawāmi'* attributed to Ḥunayn in the Arabic *testimonia* does not rest on the supposed dependance on Themistius, but doubts may be raised.³¹ Whatever the results of further study, it is clear that Ḥunayn is not the revisor of *De Caelo* **B^C**.

3.1.2.2. *Abū Bišr Mattā and the commentary of Alexander*

After Ibn al-Biṭrīq's translation and Ḥunayn's revision, the *Fibrist* names Abū Bišr Mattā as a translator of *De Caelo*: "He translated part of the first book", continuing: "Alexander of Aphrodisias commented on a part of the first treatise of this book", and in the notice devoted to the works of Abū Bišr, mentions that he was the translator of Alexander's commentary as well (v. *supra*, § 2.1.1, *Fibrist*, p. 250.29 and p. 264.1-2 Flügel; the added note, p. 264.2, that Yahyā ibn 'Adī revised his version is due to a textual confusion with the information on Themistius's commentary).

This is confirmed by Ibn al-Sarī, *Bayān al-ḥaṭā'* [quoted in full, *infra*, § 3.2.1, pp. 226f.] who still was able to consult "part of the first treatise" (*ba'd al-maqāla al-ūlā*) with Alexander's commentary, but found this irrelevant for his problem concerning the passage in Book III. There is no further trace of Alexander's commentary in the Arabic tradition, except for the quotations found in the commentary-paraphrase of Themistius.

Like most translators of his generation, Abū Bišr Mattā ibn Yūnus al-Qunna'ī (d. 328/940) had no Greek but translated from Syriac into Arabic; still, the wide range of school commentaries at his disposal, translated by himself and his followers, enabled him to arrive at an adequate understanding of the Aristotelian logic, physics, and metaphysics.³² Hence it seems very probable that the revision of Ibn al-Biṭrīq's Arabic version of *De Caelo* is none other than the version found in the lemmata of Aristotle's text translated and transmitted along with Alexander's literal commentary. **B^C** is indeed extending over part of Book I only, and is adapting the technical language of the translation to the standard terminology of logic and physics introduced by the Aristotelian school of Ishāq and by the school of Baghdad founded by himself. In lack of an independent Syriac version of Aristotle, and ignorant of Greek, he made good use of Alexander's commentary for some of the most relevant revisions of Ibn al-Biṭrīq's version.

How did **B^C** find its way into our manuscript tradition, scanty and known from a single strand only? Ibn al-Sarī was active at the Artuqid court in the service of Temür-Taš ibn Īl-Ġāzī (r. 1122-54); Mihrān ibn Manšūr joined his successor Nağm-al-Dīn Alpī (from 548/1154). It is possible that Mihrān incorporated the revised version of Mattā, found in the lemmata of what was available of Alexander's commentary, and – as we see – still extant in Diyārbakr in his time, into his copy of Ibn al-Biṭrīq's translation, and so constituted the exemplar of the **Mhr** family of manuscripts surviving in 16th century Iran: the sole witness of this branch of the *De Caelo* tradition in Arabic.

³⁰ M. Alonso, "Ḥunayn traducido al latín por Ibn Dāwūd y Domingo Gundisalvo", *Al-Andalus* 16 (1951), pp. 37-47.

³¹ See Glasner, "The Hebrew Version" (above, p. 224), p. 93 and n. 20.

³² See G. Endress, "Mattā ibn Yūnus", in *EI*², s.n., vol. 6, p. 844-6.

3.2. The Tenth-Century Translations of Aristotle and the Reception of the Greek Commentators

3.2.1. The Testimony of Ibn al-Sarī

In a full screening of all the Arabic versions of *De Caelo* available to him, the mathematician Abū l-Futūḥ Aḥmad ibn al-Sarī gives the best and most detailed survey of the Arabic tradition up to the 11th century. In his treatise *Explanation of an error occurring in a proposition mentioned in the third treatise of the Book on the Heaven and the World*, he refutes Aristotle's assumption, put forth in *De Caelo* III 8, 306 b 3-8, that there are two regular solids which can fill up a three-dimensional space, the pyramid and the cube (whereas in a plane, three regular plane figures can fill the space: the triangle, the square, and the hexagon).³³

Ibn al-Sarī, *Qawl li-l-ṣayḥ Abī l-Futūḥ Aḥmad ibn al-Sarī fī bayān al-ḥata' al-'ārid fī ma'nā madkūr fī l-maqāla al-tālīta min kitāb al-Samā' wa-l-'ālam*, ms. Istanbul, Aya Sofya 4830, ff. 129a-139b; ed. M. Türker, "İbnü 's-Şalāḥ'ın *De Coelo* ve onun şerhleri hakkındaki tenkitleri", (quoted above, p. 215-16). — On Aḥmad ibn al-Sarī, a mathematician and physician in the service of the Artuqid amīr Temür-Taş ibn Il-Ġāzī ibn Artuq (ruler of Mārdīn and Mayyāfāriqīn, 516-548/1122-54) who died in Damascus in 548/1158, v. Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, *Uyūn*, vol. 2, p. 164 Müller; al-Qifṭī, *Tārīḥ al-ḥukamā'*, p. 279 Müller-Lippert; Suter, *Die Mathematiker und Astronomen der Araber und ihre Werke* (quoted above, p. 215), p. 120; M. Krause, "Stambuler Handschriften islamischer Mathematiker", *Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Mathematik, Astronomie und Physik*, Abt. B., Studien 3 (1936), pp. 437-532.

Ibn al-Sarī starts from Aristotle's critique of Plato's *Timaeus*, where he says (*De Caelo* III 8, 306 b 3-9) that "in general, the attempt to give a shape to each of the simple bodies is unsound", and continues that "it is agreed that there are only three plane figures which can fill a space, the triangle, the square, and the hexagon", and only two solids, the pyramid and the cube". After an exposition of the argument, Ibn al-Sarī declares his perplexity at the Philosopher's statement – in fact, cubes only can fill a space. In order to confirm his suspicion, improbable as it might seem, that the Philosopher should have committed a severe blunder "even if entangled in sleep" (*fī l-manām mutayyam*), he first excludes the possibility that it was "due to a mistake of the translator of this book, viz. Yaḥyā ibn al-Biṭrīq", (quoted p. 57.1 as *naql Yaḥyā ibn al-Biṭrīq min al-suryānī ilā l-'arabī*) and proceeds to check on the other translations:

So I looked at the version of this book made by Abū 'Alī 'Isā ibn Zur'a, from Syriac into Arabic, and found the passage to be likewise,

as also the version of Abū l-Faraġ 'Abdallāh ibn al-Ṭayyib, made from Syriac into Arabic.

Hence I turned to the commentaries, especially to those of the Greeks since they are more knowledgeable with respect to the author's intention in this book. As is well known, there is no ancient commentary on this book available except the commentary of Themistius, found complete, and the commentary of Alexander, extant for part of the first book.³⁴ When we looked into the commentary of Themistius, we found that he made a full commentary of the passage, explaining that the fiery substances (*al-nāriyyāt*)

³³ For the problem, cf. Th.L. Heath, *Mathematics in Aristotle*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1949, pp. 177-8. The first European scholar to notice Aristotle's slip was Josephus Blancanus (Giuseppe Biancani, 1566-1624) in his *Aristotelis loca mathematica* (Bologna 1615).

³⁴ Alexander's commentary is, of course, irrelevant for Ibn al-Sarī's problem because the passage in question occurs in Book III. He confirms Ibn al-Nadīm's statement that only part of Book I of *De Caelo* was translated by Abū Biṣr Mattā (v. *supra*, pp. 214f.).

fill the empty space (*al-fadā'*) in two ways (*'alā waḡhayn*), but these two ways are not valid but are void in face of the principles of geometry.

So I followed up this passage in the Compendium (*ihṭiṣār*) that Nikolaos made of this book, but found that he did not go into the point at all.³⁵ Then we turned to the commentaries of the moderns and their glosses. We found *Quaestiones* presented by Abū 'Alī ibn Zur'a to Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī on this topic, viz. "Why do only two bodily shapes fill the space", and other matters, dependent on the discourse of Themistius in his commentary on this passage, and Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī replied to these questions with answers missing the truth altogether [this is quoted in an Appendix at the end of the treatise, pp. 71-79 Türker].

Likewise, we found that Abū Sahl al-Masīḥī in his *Epitome* of this book missed the point altogether in that he passed over the bodily shapes and replaced them with the corresponding plane shapes.³⁶

Now we looked into this matter in the commentary (*ṣarḥ*) of Abū l-Faraḡ ibn al-Ṭayyib and saw that he quibbled around the comments of Themistius, confounding these with other things of his own, and compounding the error, already mentioned, found in Themistius's commentary and in the [Aristotelian] text. There is another commentary by this Abū l-Faraḡ without the text [i.e. the lemmata] of Aristotle's discourse, in this he reports the error just as in his greater commentary.

Having heard of annotations [i.e. a literal commentary of scholia] by al-Fārābī on this book, dictated to Ibrāhīm ibn 'Adī, I searched for this in the City of Peace [Baghdad] but could not find it, so I obtained a copy from Damascus and consulted the relevant passage, but found that he did not broach the issue and did not add any comment on the matter (Ibn al-Sarī, *Bayān al-ḥaṭā'*, pp. 54.18-55.17 Türker).

Coming to the conclusion that the text was transmitted as it stands in the translations, and might have been added in the Greek, its faulty implications being overlooked out of ignorance by the commentators, Ibn al-Sarī is convinced that the truth of the matter must prevail, true to Aristotle's own precept – *amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas* (giving a full quotation of *Eth. Nic.* I 4, 1096 a 11-17!). He proceeds with quoting the Arabic translations of 306 b 3-9:

- in the translation of Yaḥyā Ibn al-Biṭrīq from Syriac into Arabic (p. 57.1-9),
- in the translation of Abū 'Alī 'Isā ibn Zur'a from Syriac into Arabic (p. 57.9-15),
- in the translation of Abū l-Faraḡ 'Abdallāh ibn al-Ṭayyib from Syriac into Arabic (p. 57.16-23).

The translation of Aristotle's *De Caelo* by 'Isā ibn Zur'a, a close disciple of Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī and like him a theologian of the monophysite Christian church, is not attested elsewhere; accordingly, Ibn al-Sarī's quotation is the only specimen we have of his version. His version of the commentary of Themistius, on the other hand, is known, but is preserved in Hebrew and Latin only (see next section).

Ibn al-Sarī's information on the translation and comments of Abū l-Faraḡ ibn al-Ṭayyib, and his quotation of an excerpt from his version not preserved otherwise, form a valuable addition to our information on the work of this 10th/11th century physician, philosopher and Nestorian churchman (v. *infra*, § 4.2).

³⁵ The *Epitome* (*muḥtaṣar*) of Nicolaus of Damascus: presumably the one found in his *Philosophy of Aristotle*. See H.J. Drossaert Lulofs, *Nicolaus Damascenus On the Philosophy of Aristotle: Fragments of the First Five Books*, Brill, Leiden 1965 (*Philosophia Antiqua*, 13), pp. 152-65 (ascribed to Nicolaus of Laodicea in recent scholarship).

³⁶ Abū Sahl 'Isā ibn Yaḥyā al-Masīḥī (m. 1010), a Christian physician from Khorasan and one of Ibn Sīnā's teachers in medicine. His *Talḥiṣ kitāb al-Samā' wa-l-'ālam li-Aristū* is extant in the ms. Leiden, Biblioteek der Rijksuniversiteit, *Acad.* 44, no. 4.

3.2.2. *The Commentary of Themistius: Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī and ‘Isā ibn Zur‘a*

Finally, Ibn al-Sarī quotes Themistius’s commentary-paraphrase on *De Caelo* III 8 in full, and by criticizing his exposition – supporting Aristotle’s statement – point by point, the mathematician proves that cubes only can fill the space.

In order to expose the truth of the matter, even though it should imply contradicting those who first guided us, we shall first establish the text of Aristotle’s words on this matter according to the different translations, and also the text of Themistius in his commentary on this matter (p. 56.12-14 Türker).

The commentary of Themistius is mentioned already by Ibn al-Nadīm:

There is a commentary by Themistius on the complete book that Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī has translated, or the translation of which he revised (*al-Fibrīst*, p. 250.30 Flügel).

This is clarified by Ibn al-Sarī in his treatise. He states that his commentary was partially translated into Arabic by Abū Bišr Mattā from the Syriac version of Ḥunayn ibn Iṣḥāq and revised by Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī (p. 56.12-23 Türker), and he adds (p. 68.7-9 Türker): “There is a marginal note (*ḥāšīya*) on this passage, either by the translator, Abū Bišr Mattā, or rather – as it seems to me – by the revisor (*li-l-muṣallih*), Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī”. We may conclude from these remarks that Yaḥyā ibn Adī did not make a translation of his own, but only revised his teacher’s work.³⁷

The commentary-paraphrase of Themistius (4th century A.D.), the only Hellenistic commentary on *De Caelo* which was available to Arabic authors completely, is known in a Hebrew translation from the Arabic of Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī (d. 974), made in A.D. 1284 by Zeraḥyā b. Yiṣḥāq b. She’alti’el Hen (Gracian, v. Steinschneider, *Die hebräischen Übersetzungen des Mittelalters und die Juden als Dolmetscher*, Kommissionsverlag des bibliographischen Bureaus, Berlin 1893, p. 125), and translated from Hebrew into Latin by Moses Alatino (16th century).

Ed. S. Landauer, *Themistii In libros Aristotelis De caelo paraphrasis, hebraice et latine. Sefer ha-shamayim we-ha-‘olām le-Aristō ‘im pērūsh Tāmistiūs*, Reimer, Berlin 1902 (*CAG* V.4). — Hebrew translation by Zeraḥyā b. Yiṣḥāq b. She’alti’el, made in 1284, from the lost Arabic version of Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī, and the Latin translation from the Hebrew by Moses Alatino. New manuscript materials for the Hebrew version described by the late lamented M. Zonta, “*Hebraica veritas*: Temistio, Parafraisi del *De coelo*: tradizione e critica del testo”, *Athenaeum: studi di letteratura e storia dell’antichità* 82, no. 2 (1994), pp. 403-28, notably, the ms. Firenze, BNC, II.II.528, is being used for the new critical edition prepared by Elisa Coda; v. Ead., “Un fragment du commentaire perdu au *De Caelo* d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise sur les différents sens des termes ‘engendré’ et ‘inengendré’ (Thémistius, *In De Caelo*, p. 43.3-44.17 Landauer), *Studia graeco-arabica* 5 (2015), pp. 13-26. A list of quotations from, and references to Alexander has been provided by E. Coda in an appendix to her article “Alexander of Aphrodisias in Themistius’ Paraphrase of the *De Caelo*”, *ibid.* 2 (2012), p. 355-71; see also Ead., “Reconstructing the text of Themistius’ Paraphrase of the *De Caelo*”: the Hebrew and Latin versions on the three meanings of the term ‘heaven’”, *ibid.* 4 (2014), pp. 1-15. — My special thanks are due to Elisa Coda for supplying references and comments based on her forthcoming edition.

In Themistius, Ibn al-Sarī found an exhaustive interpretation of the passage, quoted in full and discussed in the present treatise, but found unsatisfactory in the mathematician’s judgment. Finding the Arabic of the translation maimed by *takalluf kaṭīr wa-ḥurūḡ ‘an madḥab al-‘Arab fi l-kalām*, clumsy and incorrect, he goes on to quote and analyze Themistius’s commentary sentence

³⁷ The passage quoted by Ibn al-Sarī (pp. 58.3-70.1 Türker, interrupted by comments of the author) corresponds to pp. 133.26-134.36 Landauer of the extant Hebrew version (pp. 197.34-199.34 of the Latin version).

by sentence. As a final resource, the mathematician looked into the commentaries and glosses of the “moderns” (*šurūḥ al-ḥadaṯ wa-ta’āliqihim*): in the first instance, the *Su’ālāt* submitted by Ibn Zur’a to Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī on the question; this is reproduced in full in an appendix to his treatise. In the final analysis, finding all of the commentators missing the mark, Ibn al-Sarī goes on to prove beyond doubt that among the regular solids, only the cube can fill an empty space.³⁸

4. Translation and Commentary of Abū l-Faraġ ‘Abdallāh ibn al-Ṭayyib

4.1. Abū l-Faraġ ibn al-Ṭayyib

After the *translatio vetus* of Ibn al-Biṭrīq (and independently of its partial revision **B^C** by a later student of this text), a second version was made by the 10th/11th century physician and philosopher, Abū l-Faraġ ‘Abdallāh ibn al-Ṭayyib. One of the last students of the Baghdad school of Christian Aristotelians in the tradition of Mattā ibn Yūnus and Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī, he had studied with Ibn al-Samḥ (d. 1027) and al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār ibn al-Ḥammār (d. 1020), and was appointed chief physician of the Bīmāristān of Baghdad, founded by the Būyid ‘Aḍud-al-Dawla. He was also secretary of the Nestorian *katholikos* of Iraq, Elias 1st (*kātib al-Ġātāliq*), and a renowned theologian and historian of the Nestorian church. He died in 435/1043.

G. Graf, *Geschichte der christlichen arabischen Literatur*, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Città del Vaticano 1944-1953 (Studi e testi), vol. 2, p. 167; see the biography containing a list of his medical and philosophical writings in Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a, *‘Uyūn*, vol. 1, pp. 239-41 Müller; a shorter notice: al-Bayhaqī, *Tatimmat Šiwān al-ḥikma*, p. 27 ed. M. Shafī (Lahore 1935) – containing some original material, and treating his relations with his contemporary Ibn Sinā. For a comprehensive biography and a complete inventory of his translations, commentaries and other writings, see C. Ferrari, *Der Kategorienkommentar von Abū l-Faraġ ‘Abdallāh Ibn al-Ṭayyib, Text und Untersuchungen*, Brill, Leiden 2006 (Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus, 19), pp. 17-42. See also Ead., “Die Bagdader Aristoteliker, 6: Abū l-Faraġ Ibn al-Ṭayyib”, in *Philosophie in der islamischen Welt, Band 1: 8.-10. Jh.*, hrsg. von U. Rudolph, Schwabe, Basel 2012, pp. 346-52; J. Schacht - M. Meyerhof, *The Medico-philosophical Controversy between Ibn Butlan and Ibn Ridwan*, Egyptian University, Cairo 1937, Index s.n.

In the field of philosophy, he was most active as a commentator of Aristotle, especially of Aristotelian logic; his literal commentaries of Aristotle’s *Categoriae* and of Porphyry’s *Isagoge* have survived. Only a few of his translations from the Syriac – like his teachers, he had no Greek – are extant, among them ps.-Aristotle, *De Virtutibus et vitiis*,³⁹ but we have a number of his epitomes (called *Ṭimār* ‘collection of fruits’ by the author) of both philosophical and medical Greek texts.

While the list of his writings given in Ibn Abū Uṣaybi‘a’s *‘Uyūn al-anbā’ fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā’* (vol. 1, pp. 240-1 Müller) does not name a commentary or translation of *De Caelo*, a number of *testimonia* witness to the existence and readership of both his version and commentary. What is more, a large fragment of *De Caelo* in an independent Arabic version, preserved in manuscript, can be shown to be his work (a) from the identity of quotations from this version given under his name, (b) from its structural framework and the references given in an accompanying commentary, referring to the author’s “great

³⁸ Cf. G. Endress, *The Works of Yahyā ibn ‘Adī: an Analytical Inventory*, Reichert, Wiesbaden 1977, pp. 63-4 § 4.52. According to Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, p. 264.24 Flügel, Ibn Zur’a wrote a treatise *Ma’ānī qit’ a min al-maqāla al-ṭālīṭa min k. al-Samā’*; this may have comprised his questions and the comments of his master.

³⁹ *Fī l-Faḍīla*, attributed to Aristotle, and according to ms. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Petermann 9 (*Syr.* 88, v. Sachau, *Kat.*, p. 328f. no. 88, no. 25), translated by Ibn al-Ṭayyib from Syriac into Arabic: ed. M. Kellermann-Rost, *Ein pseudo-aristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend. Edition und Übersetzung der arabischen Fassungen des Abū Qurra und des Ibn al-Ṭayyib*, Diss., Erlangen 1965.

commentary' (*tafsīrunā al-kabīr*), and – linking this evidence with Ibn al-Ṭayyib – a fragment of this very 'Great Commentary', closing with the end of Book II where both the title and author are named.

Like other translations and commentaries made by Ibn al-Ṭayyib, the annotated translation of Aristotle's *De Caelo* was divided into lecture units (*ta'ālīm*, the *πρόξεις* of the Alexandrian commentators) and was accompanied (a) by a running commentary, here given in the form of short marginal notes, called *λέξεις* in the Alexandrian cursus, and (b) a *Great Commentary*, i.e. a literal commentary consisting of successive lemmata and *commentaria* (v. *infra*, § 4.7). We may regard this as a hallmark of his method, found in further extant commentaries of this author modelled on the Alexandrian lecture course on the works of Aristotle and other ancient authors, but fallen into desuetude with the transmitters of Graeco-Arabic learning other than himself. An exception is the system of *Prolegomena* and *προτεχνολογούμενα* of the Alexandrian introductions to Aristotle and his individual works, still found in some of the later commentaries and *summae* of Aristotelian philosophy (notably those of Averroes).

It is this structure that provided the first hint for identifying the fragmentary, acephalous text of the unique codex with Ibn al-Ṭayyib's translation, mentioned and quoted in a number of *testimonia*. Certain peculiarities of the translation on the one hand, and the discovery of an authored fragment of Ibn al-Ṭayyib's *Great Commentary*, helped to confirm the identity of the extant text with the work of the 10th/11th century Aristotelian scholar, and to make a new assessment of his influence.

4.2. Testimonies and Quotations

4.2.1. Memorandum of a Disciple of Ibn Sīnā

During the sack of Isfahan by the troupes of Ma'sūd of Ghazna in 1034, Ibn Sīnā lost the manuscript of his yet unfinished *Insāf*, as well as most of his library. One of his pupils offered to buy for him the books of the Baghdad Aristotelians in order to furnish the basis for recovering the sources necessary for reconstructing his work. A detailed *Memorandum* is preserved in ms. Oxford, Bodl. Hunt. 534, ff. 13bult.-15b2 (preceding Ibn Sīnā's *Mubāḥaṭāt*), giving a list of the works obtained:

These books [by Ibn al-Ṭayyib] that became available to us are those which he composed on the *Eisagoge* [of Porphyry], *Categories*, *De Interpretatione*, *Sophistici Elenchi*, *De Caelo*, *De Sensu et sensato*, and *Metaphysics*.

Translation and commentary by D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition. Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works. Second, Revised and Enlarged Edition, Including an Inventory of Avicenna's Authentic Works*, Brill, Leiden 2014, 2015², p. 69.

4.2.2. Ibn al-Sarī

Detailed informations on Ibn al-Ṭayyib's work on the *De Caelo*, and excerpts from his translation, are given by the mathematician Ibn al-Sarī, as quoted in full *supra*, § 3.2.1. Apart from the Arabic translation of the Aristotelian text, he knew both a long and a short commentary on *De Caelo* by Ibn al-Ṭayyib.

4.2.3. Ibn Rušd, Averroes, *Comm. mag. in Aristotelis De Caelo*

In his *Great Commentary* (*Tafsīr*, also *Šarḥ*) on *De Caelo*, finished near the end of his life, Ibn Rušd deplores that for this important work he had only one of the old translations from the school of al-Kindī at his disposal (Averrois Cordubensis *Commentarium Magnum super libro De celo et mundo Aristotelis* (above, n. 26), liber III, c. 35.6, p. 567 Carmody-Arnzen). Still, in some cases, where Ibn al-Biṭrīq's translation baffled him, he took recourse to an alternative version.

a) *De Caelo* III 6, 304 b 21-30 (according to Ibn al-Biṭrīq's Arabic version, pp. 338.15-339.9 Badawī):

“We want to inquire first whether the elements are of infinite duration and eternal, or generated and falling under destruction. (...) We say: It is impossible that the elements should be eternal. For we see that fire and water and each of the simple bodies dissolve and decompose, but either this dissolution and decomposition is infinite, or it must stop. Now we say, if the dissolution should be infinite, the time of dissolution will be infinite as well, and also the time of composition [read. *al-tarkīb*] will be infinite, because every part of the parts of the element will dissolve at one time and will be composed at another time” (*etc.*, leading to the absurdity of two concurring processes of infinite duration).

In Ibn Rušd's text, the second part of the disjunction *li-anna kulla ġuz'in min aġzā'i l-uṣtuqussi yanḥallu fi zamānin āḥara wa-yatarakkabu fi zamānin āḥara* was omitted through homoeoteleuton, in the textus as well as in the lemma quoted in the commentary. The integral text was found “in the translation of Abū l-Faraġ”.

- Averroes, *Comm. magnum in De Caelo*, III comm. 52, p. 599.83-88 Carmody-Arnzen: Deinde dixit Quia omnis pars elementi dissolvitur in alio tempore, idest illud quod corrumpitur corrumpitur in alio tempore ab eo in quo generatur, scilicet quod illud de quo dicitur quod iam corruptum est postquam fuit: **in translatione Albufarage** est scriptum “quod omnis pars elementi corrumpitur in tempore, et generatur in alio”; et hoc non indiget expositione.

b) *De Caelo* III 7, 305 a 33 - b 5. In his discussion of the theories about the way in which one element may come forth from another (ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἐξ ἀλλήλων γενέσεως), Aristotle first refutes Empedocles and Democritus. If generation is the ‘coming out’ of a simple body from another (ἐνυπάρχον ἐκκρίνεσθαι), it is an illusion.

305 b 3-5 (οἱ περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα καὶ Δημόκριτον) ποιοῦντες (...) φαινομένην γένεσιν· ἐνυπάρχον γὰρ ἕκαστον ἐκκρίνεσθαι φασιν, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀγγείου τῆς γενέσεως οὔσης, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκ τινος ὕλης, οὐδὲ γίγνεσθαι μεταβάλλοντος. (“If generation is an excretion of one body from another, as they say, generation is an illusion. They make it a process of excretion from a body of what was in it all the time-as though generation required a vessel (ἀγγεῖον) rather than a material-so that it involves no change of anything”, trans. Stocks).

Arabic (Ibn al-Biṭrīq's version, as read by Ibn Rušd):

Lākinnaḥum aṭbatū bi-ḍālīka kawnan mumawwahan, wa-ḍālīka annaḥum qālū inna l-uṣtuquṣṣāti kāminatun ba' ḍuhā fi (*v.l.* min) ba' ḍin, wa-innamā kāna ba' ḍuhā min ba' ḍin ka-zuhūri (*v.l.* li-zuhūr) ba' ḍihā min ba' ḍin, ka-anna l-kawna inā'un (*v.l.* innamā) taḥruġu minhu l-ašyā'u wa-taḥzharu, lā anna l-ašyā'a takūnu min 'unṣurin-mā bi-stiḥālatin wa-taġayyurin.

Averroes, *Comm. magnum in De Caelo*, textus III.56, p. 610.7-11 Carmody-Arnzen, in Ibn Rušd's lemma (trans. Michael Scotus):

Sed ipsi confirmant per hoc generationem sophisticam: dixerunt enim quod elementa sunt clausa exinvicem et egredientia exinvicem, sicut facere filios, et quod generatio non est nisi (*innamā*) exitus rerum, {sicut ignis a lapide apud impulsionem}, neque quia res generantur exinvicem secundum transmutationem et alterationem.

Latin, trans. Gerardus Cremonensis (p. 233.75-78 Opelt):

Verum ipsi affirmaverunt per illud generationem fallacem; quod est, quoniam ipsi dixerunt, quod elementorum alia sunt occultata in aliis et sunt egredientia alia ex aliis, sicut ortus et partus, et ex generatione quidem non egrediuntur res et apparent, {sicut ignis ex lapide apud percussionem}, quoniam res generantur ex materia sua per alterationem et mutationem.

The example “sicut ignis a lapide apud impulsione” (“like fire from a stone when it is struck”), is missing in the Arabic codices of Ibn al-Biṭrīq’s version, and probably goes back to a gloss in the Western tradition; as Averroes rightly remarks, it does not fit the context (generation by excretion). For a better example, he turns to Abū l-Farağ ibn al-Ṭayyib’s translation:

- Averroes, *Comm. magnum in De Caelo* III, comm. 56, p. 612.68-80 Carmody-Arnzen: Et dixit Secundum alterationem et transmutationem, quia sic est generatio apud dicentes generationem esse in capitulo translationis non in capitulo transmutationis, et exitus ignis a lapide est ex capitulo alterationis et transmutationis; et tamen induxit exemplum de eo quoniam apparet, et non est ex capitulo translationis. Et **in translatione Albefarag** est aliud exemplum nobilius, et est illud: dicunt enim quod elementa sunt clausa adinvicem, et non generantur exinvicem nisi secundum apparentiam eorum abinvicem, ita quod generatio non est nisi exitus rerum, sicut exitus eius quod exit a vase, non quod generentur exinvicem secundum alterationem. Et hoc est intellectum per se, sed videtur quod iste vir non transtulit nisi secundum intentionem, non secundum verba.

The “preferable example” (probably, *miṭāl afdal*) of excretion of one body from another turns out to be a faithful rendering of the Greek ἀγγεῖον, Arabic *ināʿ* (Latin, *vas*); this figures in Ibn al-Biṭrīq’s translation as well, but was misread (إنما) by the transmitters of most branches of the manuscript tradition. — Being unaware of the textual corruption, Averroes praises Ibn al-Ṭayyib’s translation for being faithful to the intention, not sticking to the words.⁴⁰

c) *De Caelo* III 7, 305 b 10-20. While according to Aristotle generation is the change (μεταβολή) of some matter into what is generated, he rejects the view of Empedocles that a simple body is coming out of another body as if the latter were a vessel (305 b 4-5 ἐνυπάρχον ἕκαστον ἐκκρίνεσθαι φασιν, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀγγείου τῆς γενέσεως οὔσης).

305 b 10-20 Ἐτι δὲ τῶν μειγμένων σωμάτων οὐκ ἀνάγκη χωρισθὲν θάτερον αἰεὶ πλείω τόπον ἐπέχειν· ὅταν δ’ ἐξ ὕδατος αἴρ γενήται, πλείω καταλαμβάνει τόπον· τὸ γὰρ λεπτομερέστερον ἐν πλείονι τόπῳ γίγνεται. Φανερόν δὲ τοῦτό γε καὶ ἐν τῇ μεταβάσει· διατμιζομένου γὰρ καὶ πνευματομένου τοῦ ὑγροῦ ῥήγνυται τὰ περιέχοντα τοὺς ὄγκους ἀγγεῖα διὰ τὴν στενοχωρίαν. Ὡστ’ εἰ μὲν ὅλως μὴ ἔστι κενὸν μηδ’ ἐπεκτείνεται τὰ σώματα, καθάπερ φασὶν οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες, φανερόν τὸ ἀδύνατον· εἰ δ’ ἔστι κενὸν καὶ ἐπέκτασις, ἄλογον τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἰεὶ πλείω τόπον ἐπιλαμβάνειν τὸ χωριζόμενον (Trans., based on Stock and Kouremenos: “Again, when one of the bodies that are mixed is separated, there is no reason why it should always take up more space, but when air is generated from water, it occupies more space, since the finer body takes up more space. This is obvious also in any case of transformation. As the liquid is converted into vapour or air the vessels which contain it will burst due to lack of space. Now, if there is no vacuum at all, and if, as those who take this view say, there is no expansion of bodies, the impossibility of this is manifest; and if *vacuum* does exist and expansion does occur, there is no accounting for the fact that the body which separates out occupies of necessity a greater space”).

Ibn al-Biṭrīq’s translation, used by Ibn Ruṣd for the lemmata of the *Commentarium magnum*:

“We say further that the bodies mixed with one another, when one is separated from the other, it will not take more space than its other space (*sc.* in the state of mixture) necessarily. But the air, when it is generated from water, takes more space than it took in the first instance, and that is because the finer body is in (*min* : *leg. fi*) a greater space. Now this is evident and clear in [a process of] transformation and change (*fi l-istihāla*

⁴⁰ Ferrari, *Der Kategorienkommentar von Abū l-Farağ ‘Abdallāh Ibn al-Ṭayyib* (quoted above, p. 229), pp. 26-7.

wa-l-nuqla): when moisture evaporates and becomes hot, the containing vessel bursts and comes apart due to its becoming too narrow for it. If this is the case, and if there is no void and no vacuum at all into which it would expand and spread out – as the advocates of latency (*kumūn* ‘inherence’ of a body in another) say –, it is clear and manifest that it is impossible that the body takes up more space than its [own] space *when it appears and comes out. But when void and vacuum do exist, and expansion and spreading out, it is absurd that the body separating out from another body, should occupy more space than its former space*”.

305 b 19 ἀεὶ : om. Ar^B

Averroes, *Comm. magn. in De Cael.*, text. III.58, p. 610.1-11 Carmody-Arnzen (trans. Michael Scotus):

Et dicamus etiam quod corporum miscibilium cum separatur unum ab altero, non occupat maiorem locum altero necessario. Aer autem, cum fuerit ex aqua, occupat maiorem locum suo priori, corpus enim subtilius est in maiori loco. Et hoc manifestum est in alteratione et translatione, quoniam cum humiditas fuerit vapor et inflatur, extendit vas continens ipsum, et frangitur cum non possit ei sufficere vas. Et cum ita sit, et nihil est vacuum in quo expandantur corpora, sicut dicunt facientes latitationem, manifestum est quod impossibile est ut corpus recipiat maiorem locum suo primo loco.

Omitting the last part of the Arabic lemma (in italics in our quotation), corresponding to 305 b 18-20 εἰ δ' ἔστι ... χωρίζομενον, due to homoeoteleuton.

- Averroes, *Comm. magnum in De Caelo*, c. III, p. 58.39-56 Carmody-Arnzen: Deinde dixit Et cum ita sit, et nihil est vacuum, potest intelligi: Et si generatio non est nisi exitus ab aere, et universaliter corporis subtilis a subtili, et impossibile est vacuum esse in quo corpora expandantur et transferantur ex magnitudine in parvitatem, cuius expansionis causa apud facientes latitationem sit vacuum, manifestum est quod impossibile est ut idem corpus cum transfertur occupet ampliorem locum quam ante; et si concesserimus eis vacuum esse, non est possibile eis dicere etiam quod cum corpus latet, est minus, et cum apparet est maius; sed Aristoteles pertransiit hanc partem divisionis et verificat hanc expositionem, quia hoc videmus propalatum **in translatione Albefarag**. Dixit enim:

Et cum ita sit, et nihil est vacuum omnino in quo corpora expandantur, manifestum est quod est impossibile ut occupent maiorem locum primo cum exierint et apparuerint; et si fuerit vacuum cum quo adaptatur expansio, impossibile est ut corpus occupet maiorem locum suo primo loco cum separatum fuerit ab alio corpore (min mawḍi'ihī idā mā zahara wa-haraġa), idest quod impossibile contingit huic positioni sive concessum fuerit vacuum esse et quod est causa transmutationis corporis ex magnitudine in parvitatem, sive non.

Ibn Rušd found the full text of Aristotle's two-sided argument against the advocates of generation by excretion in Ibn al-Ṭayyib's version only.

4.2.4. Quotations from Ibn al-Ṭayyib's Translation in the Manuscript Family Q of version B

a) The Eastern group of manuscripts presenting Ibn al-Biṭrīq's version replaces the text corresponding to *De Caelo* I 7, 275 a 28 – b 2 ὑποκείσθω ... διήρηται, probably due to omission through homoeoteleuton in the standard version B, by a different translation. Here, both the Ḥaydarābād and Iṣfahān mss. add in the margin (ms. 'U 441, f. 23a; ms. Ṣ, f. 18b):

hādihī l-ḥuṭūt wa-l-ḥurūf 'alā mā ṭabata fi naql 'Abdallāh ibn al-Ṭayyib kātib al-Ġāṭaliq.

These lines and the letters [representing them, *sc.* in the mathematical proofs] correspond to those established in the translation of 'Abdallāh ibn al-Ṭayyib, secretary of the Katholikos.

The terminology conforms with Ibn al-Ṭayyib's usage: *ġism* for σῶμα against Ibn al-Biṭrīq's *ġirm*, *mutanābī* for πεπερασμένον against *dū nihāya* in the context of version B, *ḥasbu* for μόνον against *faqat*.

b) Also in the **Q** family of manuscripts of Ibn al-Biṭrīq's translation, the transliterated term *abūfāsīs* for Greek ἀπόφασις is replaced by the Arabic term *naqīd* in I. 12, 282 a 4, 7, 10. In other instances, I 12, 281 b 33 and 282 a 6, *abūfāsīs* has been left unchanged. Then at 282 a 14, where the Arabic *abūfāsīs* is taken from the context but has no verbal equivalent in the Greek, a marginal note in ms. Ḥaydarābād 441 (f. 41b) explains that this is replaced by *naqīd* in Ibn al-Ṭayyib's version – this is indeed the case, as can be seen from the extant part in ms. **P**:

naql al-šayḥ Abī [sic] l-Farağ k̄atib al-Ġātaliq [‘U: al-samā yaliq] ‘awwada fī l-muntasah ‘naqīd’ wa-huwa l-šahīḥ li-annahū innamā arāda l-salb.

The translation of the *šayḥ* Abū l-Farağ, secretary of the Katholikos, has replaced this in [the reading of] the exemplar (*muntasah*), by *naqīd* (opposite), and this is correct, since indeed he means the negation.

Ms. Iṣfahān 301 (f. 36b) has a similar gloss at this place, but the copyist misunderstood the reference to Ibn al-Ṭayyib's change in terminology:

naql al-šayḥ Abū [sic] l-Farağ k̄atib al-Ġātaliq ‘awwada ‘didd’: ‘naqīd’, wa-huwa l-šahīḥ li-annahū innamā arāda l-salb.

The translation of the *šayḥ* Abū l-Farağ [...] has replaced ‘*didd*’ by ‘*naqīd*’, and this is correct [etc.].

c) In the manuscript family of version **B^C** (v. §3.1.1), a group of Iranian manuscripts going back to a common subarchetype **Mhr** and best represented by ms. Mašhad, Āstān 149, a lengthy passage translating *De Caelo* I 2, 269 a 2-18, missing from the copyist's exemplar, has been supplied from a different version, but not explicitly attributed to one of the translators. The terminology would not exclude Ibn al-Ṭayyib.

4.3. The Manuscript

4.3.1. General Description and Contents of the Manuscript

P Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, fonds arabe 2281.

Ancien fonds 597; v. W. MacGuckin de Slane, *Catalogue des manuscrits arabes*, Impr. nationale, Paris 1883-95, pp. 399-400 — URL of digital reproduction: <http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b525084694/>.

148 folia, 18/19×5/9 cm. 19th century red leather binding, with embossed stamp of the Bibliothèque royale. A multi-text manuscript bound up of four parts written by different hands, with an added title and colophon. The fictitious title f. 1a, *Silsilat al-tawārīḥ* and *incipit*, and the apocryphal *colophon* f. 148, written by the same coarse hand, were fabricated in order to convey the appearance of a single, complete work, giving (f. 148) 488/1095 as the alleged date of completion. The second piece contains a reading note (*qirā'a*) dated 596/1199-1200.

- fol. 1a. *Silsilat al-tawārīḥ* [fictitious title on an added leaf before the acephalous treatise beginning on f. 2a, and corresponding to a *colophon* added at the end of the volume, f. 148]. *Inc.* f. 1b1-6: “hādā kitāb fihi silsilat al-tawārīḥ wa-l-bilād wa-l-buḥūr wa-anwā‘ al-asmāk wa-fihi ‘ilm al-falak wa-‘ağā’ib al-dunyā wa-qiyās al-buldān wa-l-ma‘mūr minhā wa-l-waḥš wa-‘ağā’ib wa-ğayr dālīka wa-huwa kitāb nafīs”.
- ff. 2-56. [*Aḥbār al-Šīn wa-l-Hind*] The first part written by Sulaymān ‘the Merchant’ or summarized from his accounts (as indicated by a reference fol. 6a10); the second part a supplement by Abū Zayd al-Ḥasan al-Sīrāfi. Ed. as *Silsilat al-tawārīḥ* by Eusèbe Renaudot: *Anciennes Relations des Indes et de la Chine, de deux voyageurs Mahometans, qui y allèrent*

dans le neuvième siècle, Coignard, Paris 1718; re-ed. under the title *Ahbār al-Šīn wa-l-Hind*, with new translation by Joseph Toussaint Reinaud, *Relation des voyages faits par les Arabes et les Persans dans l'Inde et à la Chine dans le IX^e siècle de l'ère chrétienne*, texte arabe imprimé en 1811 par les soins de feu [Louis-Mathieu] Langlès, publié avec des corrections et additions et accompagné d'une traduction française et d'éclaircissements par M. Reinaud, 2 vols., Imprimerie royale, Paris 1845; further ed., trans. by Jean Sauvaget, *Ahbār al-Šīn wa-l-Hind: Relation de la Chine et de l'Inde*, rédigée en 851, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1948.

f. 6a10. Quoting Sulaymān al-Tāġir.

f. 23b. *Expl.*: “tamma l-kitāb al-awwal”. [Followed by reading note:] “naẓara fī ḥādā l-kitāb al-faḳīr Muḥammad fī sanat 1011 [A.D. 1602]”.

f. 24a. *al-Kitāb al-tānī fī ahbār al-Šīn wa-l-Hind. Inc.*: “Qāla Abū Zayd al-Ḥasan al-Sīrāfī: innanī naẓartu fī ḥādā l-kitāb ya'nī l-kitāb al-awwal alladī umirtu bi-ta'ammulihī wa-iṭbāt mā waqaftu 'alayhi [...] fa-waġadtu ta'riḥ al-kitāb fī sanat sab' wa-ṭalāṭin wa-mi' atayn (237/851)”.

f. 56a. Collation note dated Šafar 596/1199-1200.

- 2, fol. 57. Table, in *dīwānī* numerals, of the dimensions of several fortresses of Syria. In fact, this is part of the following piece:
- 3, fol. 58-62. “Misāḥat al-bilād al-ġāriya fī mulk [...] Nūr al-Dīn ibn Zankī fī sanat arba' wa-sittīn wa-ḥamsimī'a”. *Memorandum* written in 544 H. (1169 A.C.), shortly after the death of the sultan Nūr al-Dīn ibn Zangī, on the dimensions of several fortresses guarding the dominions of the dynasty, noting the distances between one fortress and the next.
- 4, foll. 63-124. Acephalous fragment of an Arabic version of Aristotle's *De Caelo*, with marginal commentary.
- 5, foll. 125-147. An acephalous treatise, beginning with the second leaf of the introduction, on the anatomy and usefulness of the parts of the human body, in form of questions and answers. The extant part treats the hand and the arm. A very concise catechism, only remotely dependent on Galens's *De Usu partium*. The paper and the scholarly handwriting (with sparing use of diacritical marks) point to an early, 11th-12th century dating of the ms.
- 6. The *explicit*, fabricated by the scribe of the fictitious title and *incipit*, is dated 488/1095.

4.3.2. Description of the De Caelo part of the manuscript

- foll. 63-124. Seven quires from a paper codex of considerable age. Collation notes (*muqābala*) occur at several instances (fol. 112b at the beginning of the 13th *ta'lim*, item 106b beside the intermediate title of the 16th *ta'lim*: “*balaġat al-qir[ā'a] wa-muqābalat al-dustū[r]*”), but are not dated.

See G. Vajda, “Manuscrits arabes de la Bibliothèque Nationale. I. Fragments d'une traduction arabe du *De Caelo* d'Aristote”, *Revue des études islamiques* 16 (1948), pp. 89-92.

Paper, cut and writing of the relevant part of our ms. differ from the remaining pieces bound up into the volume. Being larger than other pieces bound up with it, the block was cut down by the bookbinder in order to make it fit the size, leading to some textual losses due to close trimming where the marginal comments were continued into the upper and lower margins. In the course of a recent restoration of the ms. in 1980, when a number of damaged areas were covered with transparent tape, and the volume was rebound, some passages still readable in a microfilm prepared in the late 1950s were effaced, and some of the comments written on the inner margins close to the fold were concealed.

لان المبدأ الذي منه ياخذ في الحركة
 عمنه منقطع
 ولذا للحصارت في بدايتها لا
 تكون له سكون
 قال المتن
 هذا ما سمع السان على ان العالم واحد وهو انه
 ليس خارجة جسم ولا مكان ولا حلا ولا زمان وعند ذلك
 لمقطع يعلمنا ع
المعلم الرابع عشر
 قال ان سبطوطا ليس
 معدان هنا ولخصا مده الامتياز
 يريدان يخصص عن العالم ويملك هو
 مكنون من س
 ام عن مكنون من س
 وملك عند امر لا عند اصلا
 سيدارة باطرافه ونعود
 اليها اذ لا يجر كسبه من مع
 سعة لا يرسوا اعانه عقدها
 وسئل ان سبطوطا
 واحد وان لم يكن خارجة لا جسم
 ولا مكان ولا حلا ولا زمان
 ام مكنون من مكنون صورة
 مالم يطر من خود ايم صار مكنون
 ما ان سبطوطا من العدد الى الصور
 اقول سبطوطا للصور غير معارفه
 لما ان الشذوذ الصور
 اقول كما ان سبطوطا الصور
 الى العدم او تمت على كمال
 هو ان سبطوطا

Ms. Paris, BnF, arabe 2281, fol. 112b. Beginning of *ta'lim* 14, with collation note in the margin. © Bibliothèque nationale de France, 2017.

The *De Caelo* part is written in a meticulous scholarly *nashī*. The main text of Aristotle's work is written in fairly large, bold letters, and accompanied by marginal comments in smaller script in a column to the left of the main text. It is divided into larger units (*ta'lim*, see below) and smaller pericopes of text followed by summary comments, set off by centered titles *Qāla Aristūṭālis* and *Qāla l-mufasssīr*. Each phrase bearing an annotation closes with a dotted triangle ❖, establishing the correspondence with the marginal comments (*ta'ālīq*).

The text is mostly unvocalized (but *tanwīn* for *ḡarr* and *naṣb*, as also *šadda*, are occasionally provided), with punctuation being used sparingly, but given wherever ambiguity may occur, and with frequent *mubmal* signs added to letters *ḥ*, *r*, *s* and *ṭ*. Less familiar words and formations are fully vocalized in some rare cases (as fol. 111a: *yuharrimahū*). According to Middle Arabic usage, *hamza* is not noted in final position (*šay*, *samā*) and in the middle of words (*dāyim*).

4.3.3. Inventory of De Caelo texts

The single texts from Aristotle's *De Caelo* are continuous in relation to the other pieces contained in the manuscript, but intermittent, and not in sequence. Put into the order of the Greek Aristotle, we have the following fragments:

	fol.	<i>De Caelo</i> ed. Bekker	contiguous pieces
1.	110–119	I 9, 279 a 3–10, 280 a 34	I 9, 279 a 3 – I 12, 283 a 30
2.	99–108	I 11, 280 b 1–12, 282 a 4	
3.	89–98	I 12, 282 a 4 – 283 a 22	
4.	120	I 12, 283 a 22–30	
5.	121	I 12, 283 b 7–14	I 12, 283 b 7–21
6.	124	I 12, 283 b 14–21	
7.	73–78	II 1, 283 b 30 – 2, 285 a 1	II 1, 283b30–2, 285 a 1
8.	109	II 2, 85 a 16–31	II 2, 285a16–31
9.	122–123	II 3, 286 a 17 – b 7	II 3, 286 a 17 – b 7
10.	63–72	II 4, 287 a 23 – II 6, 288 b 26	II 4, 287 a 23 – II 9, 290 b 12
11.	79–88	II 6, 288 b 26 – II 9, 290 b 12	

Altogether, from the original volume five full quires (quinions) of 10 *folia* each have been preserved (110–119, 99–108, 89–98, 63–72, 79–88), seven *folia* from a sixth quire (120, 121, 124, 73–76), and five *folia* from yet another quire (77, 78, 109, 122, 123).⁴¹ In this estimate, based on the proportional length of the lost text, we assume a loss of one leaf between foll. 120 and 121, and between foll. 78 and 109, respectively, and of two leaves each between foll. 124/73, 109/122, and 123/63. Not counting these gaps, the codex comprises the last third of Book I and the first half of book II, thus covering a quarter of the whole work.

4.4. Structure of the Text and Annotation.

The text of the translation of Aristotle, divided into pericopes introduced by the words *Qāla Aristūṭālis* (*sic*, with short *i*), takes two thirds of each manuscript page, while the left third, in smaller script, contains a literal commentary. The latter is given in the form of short scholia (*ta'ālīq*), paraphrasing the progress of the argument or explaining single concepts, introduced by *yurīdu* “he means” or (referring to single words or expressions) *ifham* “to be understood as”, “that

⁴¹ In Vajda's inventory, the gap between 283 a 30 and 283 b 7 is not noted, but there is no gap, as indicated by him, between 283 b 11 and b 14.

is to say”. A three-point triangle at the end of a line of the text serves as a referent to the relevant marginal comment. At the end of each pericope of 2-3 pages, the Commentator, introduced by *Qāla l-mufasssīr*, gives a summary of the preceding section. Then the text resumes with the next lemma, *Qāla Aristūṭālis*.

Text and commentary are divided, as in all other commentary works of Abū l-Farağ ibn al-Ṭayyib (on the authorship, v. §§ 4.1-4.2, on Ibn al-Ṭayyib as a commentator, § 4.7, p. 255ff.), into lecture units, Arabic *ta'lim* (Greek $\pi\rho\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha\iota\varsigma$). Book I of *De Caelo* contained 18 such chapters, *ta'ālīm* (references to the *Great Commentary*, *al-Taḥsīn al-kabīr* show that this was divided into identical units of *ta'ālīm*):

- Book I, *ta'lim* 13 = *De Caelo* I 9, 277 b 27 [?] (fragment starting at 279 a 3) to 279 b 3 (fol. 110a – 112b): There cannot be more than one world.
- Book I, *ta'lim* 14 = *De Caelo* I 10, 279 b 4 – 280 a 34 (fol. 112b–119b): Opinions on the duration of the world, if it is eternal, ungenerated or generated, imperishable or perishable.
- Book I, *ta'lim* 15 = *De Caelo* I 11, 280 b 1 – 281 b 18 (fol. 99a–106b): Analysis of the terms ‘ungenerated’ and ‘generated,’ ‘perishable’ and ‘imperishable,’ ‘possible’ and ‘impossible.’ A thing cannot have a capacity for opposites at the same time.
- Book I, *ta'lim* 16 = *De Caelo* I 12, 281 b 18 – 282 b 2 (fol. 106b–108b, 89a–91a): That which is for ever cannot be for a certain time only, thus it is not generated; the ungenerated and the imperishable are one, and co-extensive with the existent (*yatawassat al-mawğūd*, closing *taḥsīn*, f. 91a).
- Book I, *ta'lim* 17 = *De Caelo* I 12, 282 b 2 – 283 b 7 [? ms. fragment ending with 283 a 30, before a lacuna] (fol. 91a-98b, 120a-b): The ungenerated and the imperishable imply (‘follow’) each other, suppose potency of not-being and potency of being to coexist for an indefinite time to, is absurd.
- Book I, *ta'lim* 18 [possibly one more *ta'lim* for Book I, division lost in lacuna] = *De Caelo* I 12, 283b 6 [?]-22 [extant text 283 b 7–21 only] (fol. 121, 124): It is impossible that the ungenerated be perishable, or that the imperishable be generated, because if there was in it a potency to perish, this potency cannot be both realized and not realized with respect to a past state.

— The extant part of Book II starts with the second pericope of *ta'lim* 1:

- Book II, *ta'lim* 1 = *De Caelo* II 1 [283 b 26-30 missing due to loss of 2 folia], 283 b 30 – 284 b 5: The heaven is ungenerated and unperishable; it is the realm of divinity (*mawḍi' li-Llāh*). – *De Caelo* II 2: 284 b 6 – 285 a 1 (fol. 73–78) [285 a 2–a16 lost in lacuna of 2 folia], 285 a 16-a 31 (fol. 109) [285 a 31 – 286 a 2 lost in lacuna of 2 folia]: There is a right side and a left side in the heaven, also an above and a below, a front and a back.
- Book II, *ta'lim* 2 = *De Caelo* II 3 [286 a 3-, lost in lacuna], 286 a 17 – b 7 (fol. 122-123) [286 b 7 - b 9 lost]: Motion and rest in the universe: The heavenly eternal movement must be circular; there must be a centre at rest, this is earth, and its contrary, fire, and corresponding movements, and there are several revolutions of the celestial bodies. – II 4 [286 b 10 - 287 a 22 lost in lacuna of 2 folia], 287 a 23 – 287 b 21 (fol. 63-65): The shape of the heavenly body is spherical.
- Book II, *ta'lim* 3 = *De Caelo* II 5, 287 b 22 – II 6, 289 a 10 (f. 65b ult.-80.11): The rotation of the sphere of the fixed stars is from right to left. It is perfectly regular.

- Book II, *ta'lim* 4 = *De Caelo* II 7, 289 a 11–35 (fol. 80 b 11 – 82 b 6): The nature of the stars is that of the heavenly body in which they exist; albeit emitting heat and light, they do not consist of fire. — II 8, 289 b 1 – 290 a 29 (fol. 82 b 7–87 b apu.): The motion of the stars: The sphere moves, while the stars are at rest, having no movement of their own.
- Book II, *ta'lim* 5 = *De Caelo* II 8, 290 a 29 – b 11 (fol. 87 b apu.–88 b 11); II 9, 290 b 12 [breaking off after φανερόν δ' ἐκ τούτων = *wa-zāhirun mim mā qulnā*] (f. 88 b ult.): the stars having no organ for movement, they have no self-movement.

For a detailed survey of some of Ibn al-Ṭayyib's scholia and his short commentaria, intercalated between the pericopes of the text, v. *infra*, § 4.7.2.1, pp. 255ff. At several instances, the author refers to his *Great Commentary* (v. *infra*, § 4.7.3, pp. 265ff).

4.5. Ibn al-Ṭayyib's Arabic Translation of De Caelo

Both the testimonies of Ibn al-Sarī and Ibn Rušd affirm that Ibn al-Ṭayyib made a translation of his own on the basis of a Syriac *Vorlage* (Σ). The evidence of the text further shows that he made a translation of his own instead of using an extant translation as the basis of his annotations and commentary. While for Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristotle's *Categories* he had Ishāq ibn Ḥunayn's translation at his disposal, he must have been aware of the deficiencies of Ibn al-Biṭrīq's, used by everybody else in lack of an alternative version. We do not know if the partial revision B^C was at his disposal; in any case, it was not complete, and we cannot exclude the possibility that it was made at a later date (v. *supra*, § 3.1.2.2, p. 225).

While it can be shown from the indications mentioned above that Ibn al-Ṭayyib (a) made a translation of his own, and (b) translated from the Syriac, his translation is so close to Ibn al-Biṭrīq's that we cannot forego the conclusion that he used the same Syriac text. At the same time, he may have drawn on additional material, such as another Syriac version,⁴² or – for his translation as well as for his commentary – one of the Greek commentators available to him in Syriac.

4.5.1. Translation and Interpretation

¶ Common *interpretamenta* and *additamenta* Ar^B and Ar^T:

- I 12, 283 a 23: The proof of the mutual implication of 'ungenerated' and 'unperishable', demonstrated by way of a series of contrary / contradictory statements using letter symbols (cf. 283 a 1-3), is reversed and applied to proving the co-extension of 'generated' *vs.* 'perishable' / 'ungenerated' *vs.* 'imperishable'. This may have been a gloss added in Σ or its Greek exemplar, adding yet another variant to the repetitious drill of 282 b 15 – 283 a 3.
- II 5, 288 a 12: Added conclusion, containing an alternative interpretation, of 288 a 10-12: (βέλτιστον γὰρ κινεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς τε κίνησιν καὶ ἄπαστον), καὶ ταύτην ἐπὶ τὸ τιμιώτερον.
 - ▶ Ar^B = Ar^T "and (we say) that its (*sc.* the sky's) movement proceeds from the most excellent place, and the most excellent place is the direction to its right. So it has now become clear and evident why the sky moves from the East to the West, and not from the West to the East".

Whereas the Greek commentators explain *τιμιώτερον* as being the forward movement, in the Arabic it is explicated as being the movement from right to left, i.e. from East to West.

⁴² An instructive example for such repeated translations and revisions on the basis of additional Syriac sources is found in the Arabic versions of Aristotle's *Sophistici Elenchi*; v. H. Hugonnard-Roche, "Contributions syriaques aux études arabes de logique à l'époque abbasside", *ARAM* 3.1/2 (1991), pp. 193-210.

4.5.2. *A Specimen Passage, I 9, 279 a 16 – b3: Comparative Analysis*

For a comparison of the two Arabic translations of Ibn al-Bitṛīq and Abū l-Faraḡ ibn al-Ṭayyib, here is a specimen passage in parallel layout, followed by a literal commentary. This is to demonstrate the dependence of both on a common Syriac *Vorlage*, as well as their differences regarding the textual basis, the techniques of translation, terminology, and style.

- *De Caelo* I 9, 279 a 16 – b 3 on the transcendent Beyond (τᾶκεῖ), persisting for eternity (αἰών), immortal and divine (ἀθάνατος καὶ θεῖος):

[279 a 16] Ἐξω δὲ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ δέδεικται ὅτι οὔτ' ἔστιν οὔτ' ἐνδέχε-
 [17] ται γενέσθαι σῶμα. Φανερόν ἄρα ὅτι οὔτε τόπος οὔτε κενὸν οὔ-
 [18] τε χρόνος ἔστιν ἔξω. Διόπερ οὔτ' ἐν τόπῳ τᾶκεῖ πέφυκεν, οὔτε
 [19] χρόνος αὐτὰ ποιεῖ γηράσκειν, οὐδ' ἔστιν οὐδενὸς οὐδεμία μετα-
 [20] βολὴ τῶν ὑπὲρ τὴν ἐξωτάτω τεταγμένων φορᾶν, ἀλλ' ἀναλ-
 [21] λοιώτα καὶ ἀπαθῆ τὴν ἀρίστην ἔχοντα ζωὴν καὶ τὴν αὐταρ-
 [22] κεστάτην διατελεῖ τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα. (Καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τοῦνομα
 [23] θεῖως ἔφθεγκται παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων. Τὸ γὰρ τέλος τὸ περι-
 [24] ἔχον τὸν τῆς ἐκάστου ζωῆς χρόνον, οὗ μὴθὲν ἔξω κατὰ φύσιν,
 [25] αἰὼν ἐκάστου κέκληται. Κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον καὶ τὸ τοῦ
 [26] παντὸς οὐρανοῦ τέλος καὶ τὸ τὸν πάντα χρόνον καὶ τὴν ἀπει-
 [27] ρίαν περιέχον τέλος αἰὼν ἔστιν, ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰεὶ εἶναι τὴν ἐπωνυ-
 [28] μίαν εἰληφώς, ἀθάνατος καὶ θεῖος). Ὅθεν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
 [29] ἐξήρηται, τοῖς μὲν ἀκριβέστερον τοῖς δ' ἀμαυρῶς, τὸ εἶναι
 [30] τε καὶ ζῆν.

Καὶ γὰρ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις φιλοσοφῆ-

[31] μασι περὶ τὰ θεῖα, πολλάκις προφαίνεται τοῖς λόγοις ὅτι
 [32] τὸ θεῖον ἀμετάβλητον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πᾶν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ
 [33] ἀκρότατον· ὁ οὕτως ἔχον μαρτυρεῖ τοῖς εἰρημένους. Οὔτε γὰρ ἄλ-
 [34] λο κρεῖττον ἔστιν ὅ τι κινήσει (ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ἂν εἶη θεϊότερον) οὔτ'
 [35] ἔχει φαῦλον οὐδέν, οὔτ' ἐνδεὲς τῶν αὐτοῦ καλῶν οὐδενός ἔστιν.
 [279 b 1] Καὶ ἄπαυστον δὴ κίνησιν κινεῖται εὐλόγως· πάντα γὰρ
 [2] παύεται κινούμενα ὅταν ἔλθῃ εἰς τὸν οἰκεῖον τόπον, τοῦ δὲ κύ-
 [3] κλω σώματος ὁ αὐτὸς τόπος ὅθεν ἤρξατο καὶ εἰς ὃν τελευτᾷ.

“In its discussions concerning the divine, popular philosophy (ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις φιλοσοφίμασι) often propounds the view that whatever is divine, whatever is primary and supreme, is necessarily unchangeable (τὸ θεῖον ἀμετάβλητον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πᾶν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ἀκρότατον). This fact confirms what we have said. For there is nothing else stronger than it to move it – since that would mean more divine – and it has no defect and lacks none of its proper excellence” (*De Caelo* 279 a 30-35 trans. J.L. Stocks).

Ibn al-Bīṭrīq		Ibn al-Ṭayyib
وقد بيّنا أنّنا وقلنا إنّهُ ليس خارجاً من السماء جرمٌ ولا يمكن أن يكون فيه جرم من الأجرام البتّة .	279 a 16	وقد بيّنا فيها تقدّم أنّهُ ليس خارجاً من السماء جسمٌ ولا يمكن أن يكون فيه جسمٌ من الأجسام البتّة .
فقد استبان إذاً وصحّ أنه ليس خارجاً من السماء موضع ولا فراغ ولا زمان ، فإن كان هذا على هذا فلذلك صار ما هناك ليس في موضع ولا يستطيع الزمان أن يهرمه ، وليس شيء بخارج من آخر السلوك يستحيل ولا يتغيّر البتّة، لكنّه ثابت لا يتغيّر ولا يقبل الآثار . فالحيّة هناك ثابتة أفضل الحياة دائمة إلى الأبد .	279 a 17 279 a 18 279 a 20	وإذا كان هذا على هذا، فبيّن ظاهرٌ أنه ليس خارجاً من السماء مكانٌ ولا خلاء ولا زمان ، ولهذا يكون ما هناك ليس هو في مكان ، ولا يمكن الزمان أن يهرمه ، ولا يمكن في الجسم المحيط أن يستحيل ولا يتغيّر البتّة، لكنّه ثابت لا يتغيّر ولا يقبل الانفعال ، بل حياته ثابتة دائمة على الدهر جارية على أفضل الوجوه .
فقد أصاب الأولون في تلخيص اسم الأبد وقالوا فيه قولاً شافياً ، وذلك أنهم قالوا إن الغاية والأفق المحيط بزمان حياة كل واحد من الأشياء الحيّة، الذي ليس من ورائه ولا من خلفه زمان آخر طبيعي، هو دهر ذلك الشيء وخلوده فعلى هذه الصفة نقول إن غاية أفق السماء كلّها والغاية المحيطة بالزمان كلّها الدائم هو دهر السما .	279 a 21	ولهذا ما يكون الأولون قد أصابوا في تلخيص اسم الدهر وقالوا فيه قولاً استقصوه ، وذلك أنهم قالوا إنّ الزمان المحيط بحياة كل واحد من الموجودات التي لها حياة، وليس بعده زمان آخر طبيعي، فهو الدهر الأبدي ولهذا نقول إنّ الفلك هو المحيط بالزمان كلّ الذي هو الدهر
وإنما اشتقّ هذا الاسم من تلقاء فعله لأنه دائم أبداً ، وهو في بعض الأشياء بين بياناً واضحاً وفي بعض الأشياء بين بياناً يسيراً .	279 a 27	وإنما اشتقّ له هذا الاسم من قبيل فعله إذ كان دائماً أبداً لأبداً إلى هي غير مائت . وهو إلى بعض الأشياء أقرب وإلى بعضها أبعد .

Ibn al-Bīṭrīq		Ibn al-Ṭayyib
<p>وقد ذكرنا في كتبنا في الفلسفة ، الخارجة أعني التي وضعنا للعامّة ، فقلنا إنه قد ينبغي للشيء الروحاني ألا يتغيّر ولا يفسد اضطراراً ، لأنه علّة كل علّة من عللها ، وليست من ورائها علّة أخرى . وهو على هذه الصفة التي وصفت لا يتغيّر ولا يستحيل ، تامّ كامل دائم إلى الأبد ،</p> <p>وذلك أنه ليس فوقه علّة أخرى معلولة حتى تحركه . فإن الفيت علّة أخرى كانت هي أيضاً ثابتة قائمة دائماً ليس من خلفها أفضل منها . ونقول أيضاً إنه لا يقبل شيئاً من الآفات ، أعني ذلك الشيء الروحاني ، وحركته دائماً لا انقطاع لها</p>	279 a 30	<p>وقد ذكرنا في كتبنا في الفلسفة ، الخارجة أعني التي وضعنا للعامّة ، وقلنا إنه ينبغي للشيء الروحاني ألا يتغيّر ولا يفسد من الاضطرار ، لأنه علّة جميع ما بعده من عالمه ، وليس من بعده علّة أخرى . وهو على الصفة التي ذكرت لا يتغيّر ولا يستحيل ، تامّ كامل دائم على الأبد ، إلهي لا يقربه الشرّ ، وغير محتاج إلي شيء من الخيرات التي هو سببها ، وليس فوقه علّة أخرى هو معلولها حتّى تحركه . فإن وجدت علّة أخرى فهي أيضاً ثابتة قائمة دائماً وليس من خلفها أفضل منها . وأيضاً فإنه لا يقبل شيئاً من الانفعالات أعني ذلك الجسم الروحاني ، وحركته دائماً لا انقطاع لها</p>
<p>ووقد يستحقّ أن تكون له هذه الحركة لأنّ الأشياء كلها تسكن حركاتها وذا انتهت إلى مواضعها ؛ وأما هذا الجرم الفائق الشريف فلا تسكن حركته البتّة ، لأن موضع هذا الجرم المستدير ، واحد أعني أن موضع ابتداء حركته هو موضع آخر حركته . فلذلك صار دائماً الحركة لا يسكن البتّة .</p>	279 b 1	<p>فبالوجوب ما كانت له هذه الحركة ، لأنّ الأشياء كلّها تسكن حركتها اذا انتهت الى مواضعها فأما هذا الجسم الفائق الشريف فلا تسكن حركته البتّة ، لأنّ المبدأ الذي منه يأخذ في الحركة عنده يقطع . ولذلك صارت حركته دائماً لا سكون لها .</p>

Commentary

- 279 a 16 δέδεικται ὅτι ...
- ▶ Ar^B *wa-qad bayyannā ānifan wa-qulnā innahū ...*
- ▶ Ar^T *wa-qad bayyannā fī-mā taqaddama annahū ...*

In both versions, most probably on the basis of the Syriac, the Greek particles underlining the coherence and evidence of the argument are elaborated in the style of the late Greek commentary-lecture (v. *infra*, § 4.6.2, for further examples). Against version B, heavily loaded with hendiadys, amplification and paraphrasis, version T generally has less elaborate phrasing.

- 279 a 18 φανερόν ἄρα ...
- ▶ *fa-qadi stabāna idan wa-ṣahḥa annahū ... fa-in kāna hādā' alā hādā', fa-li-dālika ṣāra ...*
- ▶ *wa-idā kāna hādā' alā hādā', fa-bayyinun zāhirun annahū ... wa-li-hādā yakūnu ...*

Ar^B's phrase is one of most frequently used in this version for rendering Greek particles as δῆ, ἄρα, underlining evidence. While Ar^T has similar phrasing, it divides the argument between a recap and a conclusion.

- 279 a 20 τῶν ὑπὲρ τὴν ἐξωτάτω τεταγμένων φορῶν
- ▶ Ar^B *ṣay'un min ḥāri ḡi āhari l-sulūki*
- ▶ Ar^T *al-ḡismāni l-muḥītu*

Ar^B's terminology is not yet consolidated, and inconsistent in the rendering of terms not recognized as such. While Ar^T does not translate the Greek expression, but replaces it by a technical term in the sense of τὸ περιέχον σῶμα, referring to the outermost sphere, Ar^B gives a somewhat awkward rendering *verbum de verbo* (passing over τεταγμένη as an auxiliary), missing the superlative ἐξωτάτω (not available in Syriac).

Cf. Themistius, *In De Caelo* <lat.>, p. 55.24-25 Landauer: Haec autem omnia illi corpori necessarie contingunt, quod in circulum fertur [necessarie: necessario Landauer, item *editio princeps* Venetiis 1574, f. 15v47-48, to be emended from the Hebrew: *yehayyeb*] (E. Coda)]; *ibid.* pp. 55.39-56.2 ait deinde [sc. Alexander] Si enim primam causam intellexerit, verbis τὴν ἐξωτάτω φορῶν motum sphaerae superioris intendet [re-translation by Landauer of Simplicius, *In De Caelo*, pp. 287.30-288.1 Heiberg: ὑπὲρ δὲ τὴν ἐξωτάτω φορῶν εἰ μὲν λέγοι, φησί (ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος), περὶ τοῦ πρώτου αἰτίου; ed. Venet., f. 16r4-5: Ait deinde: si enim primum mobile intellexerit, omnino extremum corpus superius intelliget, quod in circulum fertur; <hebr.>, ed./trans. Coda: "Then he (Alex.) says that (Aristotle) intends the First Cause, hence he understands this when he speaks of an ultimate motion moved by its driving cause in a circle".

- 279 a 21 (τὴν ἀρίστην ἔχοντα ζῶην) καὶ τὴν αὐταρκεστάτην
- ▶ Ar^B *tābit lā yataḡayyar*
- ▶ Ar^T *lā yataḡayyar wa-lā yaqbal al-infi'āl*

αὐτάρκης, a specifically Greek notion, found the translators (the Arabic being based on the Syriac) at a loss, content with taking up *tābit* from the previous clause (*tābit lā yataḡayyar / lā yataḡayyar wa-lā yaqbal al-infi'āl* "unalterable and impassive").

- 279 a 22-27 αἰών
- ▶ Ar^B a22 *al-abad*; a25, a27 *al-dahr*; a22 τοῦτο τοῦνομα *ism al-abad*
- ▶ Ar^T *dahr*, a25 *al-dahr al-abadī*; a22 τοῦτο τοῦνομα *ism al-dahr*

In both versions αἰών is recognized as a term, as shown in the explication of 279 a 22 τοῦτο τοῦνομα: Ar^B *ism al-abad*, Ar^T *ism al-dahr*. Only Ibn al-Ṭayyib is consistent in rendering αἰών as

dahr, and only Ar^T lets transpire, in a25 αἰὼν ἐκάστου : *al-dahr al-abadi* the speculative connotation and the notion of transcendence. Ibn al-Biṭrīq at first (a22-23) introduces *abad* in place of *dahr*, but in a25/27 has *dahr*; 279 a 27 *li-annahū dā'im abad* might be a plausible, if somewhat tautological explication of *abad* αἰὼν unless Ar^B had replaced the term *abad*, introduced in the first instance, by *dahr wa-hulūd*. So the announcement of an “exposition of the name of *abad*” (*talhīs ism al-abad*) opens out, by inconsistent usage, onto a different concept: *dahr*, the old Arabic concept of Time as blind fate, and then (a25) – completing the confusion – this is evolved into a hendiadys: *dahr wa-hulūd*. In a close rendering of Σ, Ar^B at first defines αἰὼν as an individual property: *huwa dahr dālika l-šay' wa-hulūduhū* (αἰὼν ἐκάστου a25), and then, in a loose rendition using a false analogy, a27: *dahr al-samā'*. The philosophical significance is not conveyed, but the concepts are blurred.

Against Ar^B, Ar^T is strictly literal, giving the correspondences θεῖος : *ilāhī* and ἀθάνατος : *gayr mā'it*, but fails equally in the crucial point. Neither of the two versions succeeds in conveying the connection between word and concept, and to render the Aristotelian ‘etymology’ of αἰὼν. Strictly speaking, this would be possible only by referring to the linguistic elements of the Greek (similarly, the translation of I 3, 270 b 22-24 αἰθήρ was bound to fall short of the Greek explanation αἰθέρα προσωνόμασαν τὸν ἀνωτάτω τόπον, ἀπὸ τοῦ θεῖν ἀεὶ τὸν ἄδιον χρόνον θέμενοι τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν αὐτῷ. Not the coinage of an adequate word for the concept is being praised, but the interpretation and application of the concept. Aristotle’s ‘etymology’ (*istiqaq*) loses its analytical character (αἰὼν < ἀεὶ εἶναι), becoming a circumstantial explanation making no real sense: *id kāna dā'imān abadan* “since it is perpetual and eternal”.

- 279 a 28 ἀθάνατος καὶ θεῖος : om. Ar^B (B*?)
- 279 a 28-30 Ὁθεν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐξήρτηται, τοῖς μὲν ἀκριβέστερον τοῖς δ' ἀμαυρῶς, τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ ζῆν.

The sentence baffled the translators; τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ ζῆν is missing altogether in Ar^B. While Ar^T seems to have made a better sense of what transpired from the Greek wording: “This (the αἰὼν) is closer to some things, and farther from some things”, Ar^B changes the ontological connection between the αἰὼν and the existent beings (cf. *Simpl., In De Caelo*, p. 288.17-20 Heiberg) into a logical or cognitive one, *bayān wādīh* – *bayān yasīr*. Both versions will have relied on glosses, translated instead of the obscure phrase they were meant to explain.

Cf. Them., *In De Caelo* <lat.>, p. 56.31 Landauer: *atque ab illius esse ceterarum etiam rerum esse pendet, harum quidem evidentius, harum vero obscurius, secundum quod illi propinquiore vel remotiores existunt [ab-pendet: emend. Landauer];* Alatino’s translation as in the *editio princeps*, f.16r28-30: *Ex quo etiam ceteris rebus, quae in generatione consistunt, communicata sunt (in aliis evidentius, in aliis obscurius) status et vita; secundum quod illi propinquiore vel remotiores existunt; Zerahya’s Hebrew version, transl. from E. Coda’s critical ed. [cf. p. 37.26-27 Landauer]: “And dependent from this are the other things, in respect to some less, in respect to others more (visibly) [cf. Ar^B], according to whether they are closer to or farther from us [cf. Ar^T].”*

- 279 a 30-31 καὶ γὰρ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις φιλοσοφήμασι περὶ τὰ θεῖα, πολλάκις προφαίνεται τοῖς λόγοις.
- 279 a 31 περὶ τὰ θεῖα: om. Ar^Σ {Ar^B Ar^T}
- ▶ Ar^Σ *wa-qad dakarnā fī kutubinā fī l-falsafa al-hāriḡa a'nī llatī waḡa'nā li-l-amma* (“We have explained in our books on the exoteric philosophy, i.e. those we wrote for the general public”).

The following passage, according to modern scholarship, is a reference to popular philosophy, but was understood by the Greek commentators and also by the Arabic translator to refer to Aristotle's exoteric writings. Even today, this latter interpretation has followers.⁴³

Cf. Simpl., *In De Cael.*, pp. 288.31-289.1 Heiberg: ἐγκύκλια δὲ καλεῖ φιλοσοφήματα τὰ κατὰ τάξιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοῖς πολλοῖς προτιθέμενα, ἅπερ καὶ ἐξωτερικὰ καλεῖν εἰώθαμεν.

- 279 a 31-33 πολλάκις προφαίνεται τοῖς λόγοις ὅτι τὸ θεῖον ἀμετάβλητον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πᾶν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ἀκρότατον.

While the concept of αἰών, notwithstanding a fairly intelligible rendering of 279 a 18-30, remained foreign to the translators, the introduction of τὸ θεῖον ('the divine'), in Arabic *al-rūhānī* ('the spiritual entity'), prompts an enlarged paraphrase of the final section of Chapter 9, on the attributes of the transcendent Beyond:

Σ {Ar ^{BT} } We have explained in our books on the exoteric (Ar. 'external') philosophy, i. e. those which we [!] wrote for the general public (<i>al-amma</i>), and have said,	30 καὶ γὰρ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις φιλοσοφήμασι περὶ τὰ θεῖα, πολλάκις προφαίνεται τοῖς λόγοις
Σ {Ar ^{BT} } that by necessity this spiritual thing (<i>hādā l-ṣay' al-rūhānī</i>) must be unchanging and indestructible,	32 ὅτι τὸ θεῖον ἀμετάβλητον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι [πᾶν]
Ar ^B because it is the cause of every cause of †their† causes (<i>ilalibā</i>), Ar ^T because it is the cause of all that comes after it in its world (<i>min 'ālamihī</i>),	32-33 (τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ἀκρότατον)
Σ {Ar ^{BT} } there being no other cause beyond it.	
Σ {Ar ^{BT} } It is of this description that has been stated, unchanging and unalterable, perfect, complete and perpetual in eternity,	33 (ὁ οὕτως ἔχων μαρτυρεῖ τοῖς εἰρημένοις)
Ar ^T and divine, no evil (<i>ṣarr</i>) shall approach it, and it is not in need of a perfection that should be its cause;	35 οὐδ' ἔχει φαῦλον οὐδέν, οὐτ' ἐνδεὲς τῶν αὐτοῦ καλῶν οὐδενός ἐστιν.
Ar ^B because above it there is no other causa causata ⁴³ which should move it; Ar ^T and above it there is no other cause the causatum of which it (sc. this transcendent being) should be;	33-34 οὔτε γὰρ ἄλλο κρεῖττόν ἐστιν ὃ τι κινήσει
Σ {Ar ^{BT} } and if there were another cause, this in its turn would be steadfast, enduring and eternal, and nothing more excellent would be beyond it.	(ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ἂν εἶη θειότερον)
Σ {Ar ^{BT} } And further, this – i.e., this spiritual thing (this spiritual body Ar ^T) – will not be affected Ar ^B by any of the evils (<i>āfāt</i> 'damages', φαῦλον), Ar ^T (<i>infi'ālāt</i> 'affections', πάθη)	35 οὐτ' ἔχει φαῦλον (v.l. πάθος Ar ^T) οὐδέν.
Σ {Ar ^{BT} } and its movement is eternal and unceasing, Ar ^B and by rights this movement belongs to it ... Ar ^T and necessarily this movement belongs to it, ...	279 b 1 Καὶ ἄπαυστον δὴ κίνησιν κινεῖται εὐλόγως ...

⁴³ Cf. A. Jori, *Aristoteles: Über den Himmel, übersetzt und erläutert*, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 2009 (Aristoteles. Werke in deutscher Übersetzung, 12.3), p. 410.

⁴⁴ 'illatun ubrā ma'lūlatun : leg. 'illatun ubrā <huwa> ma'lūlahā, cf. Ar^T?

- 32 τὸ θεῖον *al-šay' al-rūḥānī* “this spiritual thing”

rūḥānī ‘spiritual’ is used only here in Ibn al-Ṭayyib’s translation, but more frequently in Ibn al-Biṭrīq’s version, as a term translating the Greek θεῖος. This usage reflects a Neoplatonic influence (*rūḥ*: πνεῦμα) and is found most prominently in the Arabic Plotinus source, *Kitāb Aristūṭālīs al-musammā Utūlūḡiyā ay al-rubūbiyya (Theologia Aristotelis)*. This was translated by Ibn al-Biṭrīq’s contemporary Ibn Nā’ima al-Ḥimṣī, working like him in the circle of al-Kindī, and is closely related in terminology and style to his translations. Cf. G. Endress, “Platonizing Aristotle: the Concept of ‘spiritual’ (*rūḥānī*) as a Keyword of the Neoplatonic Strand in Early Arabic Aristotelianism” (quoted above, p. 222, n. 23), pp. 265-79.

- τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ἀκρότατον
 - ▶ Ar^B because it is the cause of every cause of †their† causes (*‘ilalihā*),
 - ▶ Ar^T because it is the cause of all that comes after it in its world (*min ‘ālamihī*)

The text in Ar^B is corrupted. While the translation “the cause of all causes” may be a simple emendation *ad sensum* at first look, it is not justified by the syntax of the Arabic phrase. But then, if Ar^T is a correct rendering of the common Syriac *Vorlage*, Ar^B could be easily explained as a misreading of the latter: *عللها > علله*.

In both Arabic translations, based on the Syriac, the transcendent Beyond becomes the First Cause. While the passage does not contain explicit evidence of an Unmoved Mover, some early commentators understood it so, and the question has continued to be discussed in modern scholarship. It is true that Aristotle ascribes life to the ‘things out there’, as elsewhere to the pure actuality of the First Mover. But the cosmology of the *De Caelo* in general does not presuppose the theory of the Prime Mover, and would contradict it in some respects. It seems more probable that the plural τὰκεῖ denotes separately existing, *supra*-mundane principles which like Plato’s realm of subsistent ideas are outside the heavens, while the heavens constitute space, movement and time, and – again as in Plato’s cosmology – are ensouled.⁴⁵

- 279 a 35 – b 1 (οὐτ’ ἔχει φαῦλον οὐδέν) οὐτ’ ἐνδεές τῶν αὐτοῦ καλῶν οὐδενός ἐστιν

Missing in both versions at the appropriate place. Version Ar^T inserts, however, further above, a rendering of οὐτ’ ἔχει φαῦλον ... ἐστιν – probably taken from a gloss found in the Syriac exemplar. In this way, the first member of the disjunction, οὐτ’ ἔχει φαῦλον οὐδέν, is translated twice. In the second (proper) place, the translation is based on a variant reading: φαῦλον : πάθος.

4.6. *The Language of the Translations: Terminology and Style in Comparison*

Both the oldest Arabic translation of *De Caelo*, made by Ibn al-Biṭrīq in the age of al-Ma’mūn, and Ibn al-Ṭayyib’s new translation go back to the same Syriac version. The comparative analysis of a specimen passage, given above (pp. 240-6), provides ample evidence. Ibn al-Ṭayyib had no Greek, so he was unable to emend the text independently; Syriac elements – most striking is his use of a Syriac loanword (ܟܟܪܐ *kakkerā*) for τάλαντον – show that he used the Syriac directly without an intermediary. In view of many differences against Ibn al-Biṭrīq’s and other known translations, we may exclude that Ibn al-Ṭayyib revised an earlier version, although this was a frequent practice

⁴⁵ P. Moraux [ed.], Aristote, *Du ciel*, Les Belles Lettres, Paris (CUF), p. XLIV, with references (note 5); but according to Alexander (as quoted by Simpl., *In De Caelo*, p. 287.19-21 Heiberg), the whole passage would refer to the sphere of the fixed stars exclusively.

(cf. the many cases noted by Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq and Ibn al-Nadīm). While the partial revision **B^c** did not go beyond *De Caelo* I 6 (except for routine changes of obsolete terminology), Ibn al-Sarī's quotation of *De Caelo* III 8 from the Syro-Arabic version of 'Īsā ibn Zur'a (v. *supra*, pp. 226-7) shows that Ibn al-Ṭayyib used neither this – evidently different from his own – nor any other Arabic predecessor, or at the most occasionally as an auxiliary reference. For differences in interpretation, possibly dependent on one of the commentators known in Syriac or Arabic translation, v. *supra*, pp. 240ff.

References are generally taken only from those parts of the Arabic translations of *De Caelo* which exist in both versions, Ibn al-Biṭrīq's (Ar^B) and Ibn al-Ṭayyib's (Ar^T). Full comparative glossaries and surveys of the usage of the early translation and the later versions of *De Caelo*, both illustrated by parallels and contrastive pairs from the circle of al-Kindī and the later, post-Ḥunayan translations, are found in the relevant sections of my previous studies, *ArÜbCael* (above, n. 2) and *ProclArab* (above, n. 19).

4.6.1. Terminology: Borrowing, Adaptation, and Transposition

In terminology, we observe several methods used for the transposition and for the creation of terms. In translation as well as in the subsequent process of integration, the language of Arabic philosophy was built between the translators of the Kindī circle and their readers, and accomplished by the founders of Islamic philosophy in its proper sense from al-Kindī to al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā.

4.6.1.1. Functional

The primitive, but (even in the first period of Arabic translations) by no means predominant procedure of functional transposition – a foreign or an indigenous lexeme or syntagm is allotted to represent the function of the technical term, by convention – is that of the adoption of loanwords. These are words adopted or borrowed, with little modification, from the source language. Loan-translations, on the other side, are expressions adopted from the source through translating its semantic elements more or less literally ('calque'). Both serve as functional shells for the concepts defined by the respective disciplines and systems.

a) Loanwords: Transliterated Greek and Syriac Words and Other Loanwords

Terms adopted from Greek Loanwords current in Syriac

Several Greek loanwords were adopted by the translators from Syriac, but not necessarily from the immediate Syriac sources used. We should note that the use of such words, naturalized in Arabic even before being used in translation, does not necessarily point to a Syriac *Vorlage*. Only a minority however were naturalized to become part of the Arabic vocabulary in the long run (such as *hayūlā* and *uṣṭuquṣ*). Generally, many of the transliterated Greek and Syro-Greek loanwords were replaced at a later stage with regular Arabic terms, introduced by the second generation of Arab translators and adopted by the Arab readers of their work (e.g., the translations of Aristotle's *Organon* and *Physics* made by Ishāq ibn Ḥunayn and his circle in the late 9th/early 10th century, and by Abū Biṣr Mattā and Yahyā ibn 'Adī in the 10th century).

Some Greek loan-words had been current in Syriac, whence they were adopted in Arabic:

- γένος : *ǧīns* < Syr. *gensā* [not occurring in our *De Caelo* texts].
- στοιχεῖον 280 a 16 etc. : *uṣṭuquṣṣ*⁴⁶ (< Syr. *estūksā*) Ar^B / Ar^T
- τάζεις : *ṭaqs* < Syr. *ṭaksā*, used in conjunction with Arabic equivalents, v. *infra*, p. 250.

ὕλη 286 a 25 : *hayūlā* Ar^B / Ar^T. This is the traditional vocalization of the Arabic transliteration of Syriac ܠܘܠܐ, where *yw* represents Greek *y*. In both versions.

Both *hayūlā* and *uṣṭuquṣṣ* are concurring with Arabic *unṣur*:

- 279 a 8 ἐξ ἀπάσης ἄρ' ἐστὶ τῆς οὐκείας ὕλης ὁ πᾶς κόσμος· ὕλη γὰρ ἦν αὐτῷ τὸ φυσικὸν σῶμα καὶ αἰσθητόν
 - ▶ Ar^B *wa-dālika anna l-ālama kullahū murakkabun min 'unṣurihī kullihī l-mulā'imi lahū l-lā'iqi bihī, wa-qad qulnā ānifan inna 'unṣura l-ālamī huwa l-ǧirmu l-ṭabī'iyu l-maḥsūs.*
 - ▶ Ar^T *li-anna l-'unṣura bi-asrihī mawǧūdun fi l-ālamī wa-huwa murakkabun minhu, wa-qad qulnā ānifan anna 'unṣura l-ālamī huwa l-ǧismu l-ṭabī'iyu l-maḥsūs.*

- 286 a 25 ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ ὕλη τῶν ἐναντίων
 - ▶ Ar^B *li-anna hayūlā l-addādi wāḥidatun*
 - ▶ Ar^T *min qibali anna l-hayūlā li-l-aḍḍādi wāḥidatun bi-'aynihā.*

The use of *'unṣur* for ὕλη, beside the loanword *hayūlā*, is only found in the early period of the Graeco-Arabic translations, notably in the circle of al-Kindī (v. references for Uṣṭāṭ in *Die arabischen Übersetzungen von Aristoteles' Schrift De Caelo* [above, n. 2], p. 123). In later translations, *'unṣur* occurs as an equivalent of στοιχεῖον (instead of the loanword *uṣṭuquṣṣ*), when the term denotes one of the four elements.

Syriac:

- τάλαντον: *kakra*. Most striking as evidence for Ibn al-Ṭayyib's independent use of the Syriac *Vorlage* is a Syriac loanword, *kakra*, from the Syriac *kakkerā*, for Greek τάλαντον, *De Caelo* I 11, 281 a 9, a *hapax legomenon* not attested in any other Arabic text.

Persian

While some Persian loanwords, quite common in the early translations, survived into later usage, Ibn al-Biṭrīq's translation has one rare term deserving special attention:

κύβος 305 b 30 etc.: *narda* Ar^B. Also found in the Arabic version of Arist., *Metaph.* Δ 17, 1002 a 22 made by another member of the 'Kindī circle', Uṣṭāṭ (p. 278.5 Bouyges). Otherwise, the Persian term occurs in Arabic only for the dice used in the game of *nard* ('backgammon'). For the collective (*la'b*) *al-nard*, *narda* is the *nomen unitatis* ('single dice').

baḥt ('luck, fortune') is used in conjunction with Arabic terms, but mostly replaced in the later version: ὡς ἔτυχε 301 a 11 *bi-l-baḥt* Ar^B, 289 b 26 *bi-manzilāt al-baḥt wa-l-muṣādafa* Ar^B; 289 b 26 *bi-l-baḥt wa-l-ittifāq* Ar^T, 290 a 31 *abaṭan bi-l-ittifāq* Ar^T.

Some foreign words were already part of the Arabic vocabulary before being used by the translators as technical terms: *ǧawhar*, commonly used for the Greek οὐσία ('substance') – not occurring in our *De Caelo* texts.

⁴⁶ On the form, see H. Gätje, Review of E. Bannerth, *Das Buch der Vierzig Stufen von 'Abd al-Karīm al-Ġīlī*, in *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 56 (1960), pp. 322-5, in part. p. 324, n. 2.

Greek Words Transliterated by the Translator, used singly and in combination with Arabic terms:

In not a few cases, the use of transliterated Greek terms shows uncertainty of the early translators regarding the precise meaning and the adequate rendering of technical terms of logic and physical/metaphysical principles:

- ἀπόφασις: Ar^B *abūfāsīs*, rendered by Ibn al-Ṭayyib as *salb* and *naqīd*, *tanāqud*, respectively.

	Ar ^B	Ar ^T
ἀπόφασις 281 b 33	<i>abūfāsīs</i>	<i>tanāqud</i> (<i>ḥadday al-tanāqud</i>)
ἀπόφασις 282 a 4. 6. 7	<i>abūfāsīs</i>	<i>naqīd</i>
ἀπόφασις 282 a 10	<i>abūfāsīs</i>	<i>salb</i>

- *De Cael.*, I 12, 282 a 4-10: Ἐπεὶ δ' ἀπόφασις τοῦ μὲν αἰεὶ δυναμένου εἶναι τὸ μὴ αἰεὶ δυνάμενον εἶναι, τὸ δ' αἰεὶ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι ἐναντίον, οὗ ἀπόφασις τὸ μὴ αἰεὶ δυνάμενον μὴ εἶναι, ἀνάγκη τὰς ἀποφάσεις ἀμφοῖν τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ εἶναι μέσον τοῦ αἰεὶ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ αἰεὶ μὴ ὄντος τὸ δυνάμενον εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι· ἡ γὰρ ἐκατέρου ἀπόφασις ποτε ὑπάρξει, εἰ μὴ αἰεὶ.

Ar^B wa-naqūlu ayḍan inna abūfāsīs al-šay'i allaḍī laḥū quwwatun an yakūna dā'iman aysa huwa allaḍī laysat laḥū quwwatun an yakūna dā'iman aysa, fa-ammā ḍidduhū fa-huwa llaḍī laḥū quwwatun an yakūna dā'iman laysa; fa-ammā abūfāsīs ḥāḍā l-ḍiddi fa-huwa llaḍī laysat laḥū quwwatun an yakūna dā'iman laysa. fa-naqūlu innahū qad yakūnu bayna ḥāḍayni l-abūfāsīs šay'un yatawassaṭuhumā wa-huwa llaḍī laḥū quwwatun an yakūna aysa wa-an yakūna laysa fi zamānin wa-zamānin, wa-ḍalika anna abūfāsīs kulli wāḥidin minhumā yakūnu laysa fi zamānin mā li-anna kilayhimā laysā dā'imayni.

Ar^T fa-inna naqīḍa qawlinā inna al-šay'a laḥū quwwatun 'alā an yūḡada dā'iman huwa qawlunā inna laysa fi l-šay'i quwwatun 'alā an yūḡada dā'iman, wa-ḍidduhū huwa an yakūna fi l-šay'i quwwatun 'alā allā yūḡada dā'iman; wa-naqīḍu ḥāḍā huwa qawlunā laysa fi l-šay'i quwwatun 'alā an lā yūḡada dā'iman. wa-ḥidā'a ḥāḍā l-taqābuli yakūnu baynahumā mutawassīṭun, wa-huwa l-šay'u llaḍī fiḥi quwwatun 'alā an yūḡada wa-an lā yūḡada fi zamānin wa-zamānin, wa-salbu kulli wāḥidin minhumā yakūnu fi zamānin mā min qibali annahumā ḡayru dā'imayni.

In Arabic logical writings, both in the translations of the *Organon* (as in *Cat.* 13 b 2-3) and in original works, *ḍidd* and the verbal noun *taḍādd* are used for the contrary opposite (ἐναντίον) (v. *Cat.* ed. Georr, *Lex. s.v.*; A.M. Goichon, *Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sīnā (Avicenne). Vocabulaires comparés d'Aristote et d'Ibn Sīnā*, Desclée de Brouwer, Paris 1938, no. 381; as also in the translations of *De Caelo*, wherever the strict sense of ἐναντίον is concerned). The contradictory opposite of statements (ἀπόφασις, *De Int.* 17 a 25-35) is normally rendered by Arabic *salb* 'negation' (v. *De Int.* ed. Pollak, *Glossary s.v.*; Goichon, *Lexique*, nos. 715-16). Ibn al-Bīṭrīq, not yet disposing of an established terminology, preferred to transliterate ἀπόφασις as *did*, most probably, his Syriac source. It is striking that Ibn al-Ṭayyib, who wrote full literal commentaries on *Cat.* and *De Int.*, did not use the clear-cut terminology established in all the current translations, using *salb* in one case, but elsewhere *naqīd* and *tanāqud*, both corresponding rather to Greek ἀντίφασις (*De Int.* 17 a 33, cf. *De Int.* ed. Pollak, *Glossary s.v.*).

In the Q family of manuscripts of Ar^B, *abūfāsīs* was replaced by *naqīd* in some instances. The inconsistent terminology was noticed by a reader of Ar^B, commenting in a marginal note on 282 a 14 (mss. Ḥaydarābād 441 and Iṣfahān 301) that "the translation of the *šayḥ* Abū l-Faraḡ, secretary of the Katholikos, has replaced this (*abūfāsīs*) in [the reading of] the exemplar (*muntasab*), by *naqīd* (opposite), and this is correct, since indeed he means the negation" (see full quotation above, p. 234, § 4.2.4 b).

Ibn al-Biṭrīq, in default of an adequate Arabic terminology, transliterated the Greek word as well in the case of *κατάφασις*:

- *κατάφασις* ‘affirmation’

	Ar ^B	Ar ^T
<i>κατάφασις</i> 286 a 26	<i>qaṭāfasīs</i>	<i>malaka</i>

ἢ γὰρ αὐτὴ ὕλη τῶν ἐναντίων, καὶ τῆς στερήσεως πρότερον ἢ *κατάφασις* *De Caelo* II 3, 286 a 26

Ar^B *li-anna hayūlā l-adḍādi wāhidatun, wa-inna l-qaṭāfasīs qabla l-‘adami*, p. 236.14 Badawī

Ar^T *min qibali anna l-hayūlā li-l-a‘ḍādi wāhidatun bi-‘aynihā, wa-inna l-malakata tataqaddamu l-‘adama*, *De Caelo* 122 b 5

▪ The use of *malaka* for *κατάφασις* in Ar^T (normally translated by *iḡāb* ‘affirmation’ vs. *salb* ‘negation, privation’) is justified by the context, where *κατάφασις* vs. *στέρησις* may be regarded as synonymous with *ἔξις*.

Some of these transliterated terms were coupled with an Arabic equivalent for the sake of clarity, while the Arabic word in itself was not deemed sufficiently specific as a technical term:

κλεψύδρα *De Caelo* II 13, 294 b 21 = *al-āniya allatī tud‘ā qlbsdry / qlsydry wa-hiya l-naššāfa* ‘the vessel called *qalafsudrī*, i.e. the siphon’ Ar^B. (The passage is not extant in Ibn al-Ṭayyib’s translation).

τάξις 280 a 17: *šarḥ*, 286 b 34, 293 a 14, 301 a 2. 5, elsewhere *šarḥ wa-martaba*, *šarḥ wa-ṭaqs* Ar^B; against *šay‘ manzūm* (‘an ordered thing’ Ar^T 280 a 17).

ἄτακτος 280 a 7: *ḡayr dī šarḥ*; 280 a 8 *laysa labū šarḥ* Ar^B, against 280 a 7: *ḡayr manzūm*, 280 a 8 *‘adam al-nizām* Ar^T.

▪ The loanword *ṭaqs* (Greek *τάξις*, ‘order’) appears in syntagmas with Arabic *šarḥ* (‘dissection, orderly disposition’), and occasionally *martaba* (‘order’) in the same meaning is a characteristic feature of Ibn al-Biṭrīq’s terminology as well as of other translators of his group. It was generally replaced by Arabic *nizām*, as also in Ibn al-Ṭayyib’s version.

But many of the *ad hoc* transliterations of the early translations fell from use as soon as Arabic equivalents gained acceptance, except for terms figuring as titles of some parts of the Aristotelian encyclopaedia, or those naturalized completely in analogy to the paradigms of Arabic morphology: *safsata* for the *Sophistica*, and *falsafa*, Greek *philosophía*, in distinction from the more general Arabic *hikma*, originally ‘wise saying’, ‘wisdom.’

b) Loan-translations

Like loan-words, loan-translations function as shells for the concepts they are appointed to represent: from the root *naṭaqa* ‘speak’, translating the basic meaning of Greek *λέγειν*, are formed *nāṭiq*, for Greek *λογικός* ‘rational’, and *manṭiq* ‘logic’.

mabsūt, a calque on the Syriac part. pass. *pešūt*, for *ἀπλοῦς*, is a characteristic term of the translations of Ibn al-Biṭrīq and the Kindī circle in general, replaced by the standard *basīt* in Ibn al-Ṭayyib’s version:

ἀπλοῦς 279 a 4, 288 a 11, 288 a 34, 288 b3, 288 b 19: *mabsūt* Ar^B, *basīt* Ar^T.

‘illa signifying ‘cause’ is a loan from Syriac *‘elletā*, against the ancient Arabic signification ‘defect, illness’. The word, through the reception of the early translations in philosophy and scientific writings, continued in use, but was mostly replaced by *sabab* in later translations and in general usage.

aysa, a neologism used in the opposition *laysa* vs. *aysa*: οὐκ (μὴ) εἶναι vs. εἶναι only, may be regarded as a calque on Syriac *layt* vs. *īt*. In Ibn al-Ṭayyib, as generally in all of the later translations, it is replaced by *yū ḡad* vs. *lā yū ḡad* (examples below, p. 252).

c) Positing Functional Equivalence

Apart from verbal or structural loans, new terminological conventions – especially in the early period of reception – were modelled not on the accurate transfer of Greek lexical models, understood by virtue of their metaphorical content, but by the pregnant approximation *ad sensum* of Greek key concepts of the logical and scientific discourse:

κατάφασις ~ *iḡāb*,

ἀπόφασις ~ *salb* (examples above, p. 249f.).

Under the same agenda, negative composites are replaced by a positive *contrarium*:

ἀδυναμία ~ *duʿf*,

ἄδηλος ~ *yahfā*,

mostly in exaggerative conjunction with the negative expression:

ἀδύνατον ~ *muhāl ḡayr mumkin*,

ἀσώματος ~ *rūhānī lā ḡirmī* (v. *ArÜbCael*, p. 78; *ProclArab*, p. 159); similarly

παρὰ φύσιν ~ *qasran*, *qasrī* (βίβλ., v. *ArÜbCael*, pp. 49, 61), *bi-l-ʿarad*, *ʿaradī* (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) beside *ḡayr ṭabīʿī*, *hāriḡ ʿan al-ṭabīʿa*, *bi-hilāf al-maḡrā l-ṭabīʿī*.

4.6.1.2. Paradigmatical

From the earliest reception of scientific professional language, indigenous Arabic words were applied to technical concepts by analogy, extension or specification of the inherent metaphors, concrete images representing abstract universals.

ḡawhar (from the Persian, ‘jewel’) never had a serious competitor as a term for ‘substance’ (Greek οὐσία), even though the Iranian Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ used a different Arabic word in his early rendering of the *Organon*: *ʿayn* (‘eye’, ‘the thing itself’). An old Arabic word, *sabab* (‘rope’), was to become the standard term for ‘cause’ instead of *illa* (not in Ibn al-Ṭayyib’s version, who like Ar^B used *illa* under the influence of his Syriac *Vorlage*).

Beginning with the early group of translators around al-Kindī, we observe the triumph of abstraction by semantic derivation. In deriving abstract terms from such metaphors of the common language, abstraction is mainly achieved by two procedures:

(a) The formation of the verbal noun, *maṣdar*, is used to convey the universal as a process;

(b) Derived from the *concreta* by the formation of abstract nouns based on the relative adjective (*-ī* > *-iyya*), the abstract is in its turn hypostatized (‘verdinglicht’).

On the one side, we find *qiyās* ‘taking measure’ > ‘analogy’, *taḡrīd* ‘stripping, peeling’ > ‘abstraction’, *iḏāfa* ‘putting next to one another’ > ‘relation’, *taṣawwur* ‘picturing, imagining’ > ‘conception’, *taṣdīq* ‘declaring as true’ > ‘judgment’.

On the other hand, a long repertory of neologisms appears in which abstract nouns are derived from pronouns and particles with the Arabic *nisba* suffix, as *mābiyya* ‘quiddity’ from *mā* ‘what?’, *kayfiyya* ‘quality’ from *kayfā* ‘how?’, imported into medieval Latin by the twelfth-century translators.

The concepts of being qua being, of ontological universals, and of the categories offered immense difficulties for which no uniform solutions were found. Our translators developed a whole system of terms to provide for the different usages of Greek εἶναι, Arabic having no copula to indicate the predicate of existence: *anniyya* for Greek τὸ εἶναι, τὸ τί ᾗν εἶναι ‘to be, being, essence’, *huwiyya* for τὸ ὄν (‘being’, *part. praes.*), *aysa* vs. *laysa* for ‘being’ vs. ‘non-being’, and *ḏāt* for ‘essence’. In the case of *huwiyya*, an Arabic word was derived from a Syriac root *hwy* (‘to be, become’). Since this was a system of concurring words, none of which was well-defined, it was superseded by a system of derivatives of a single Arabic root: *wuḡūd* (‘to be found’). Here, as in other cases, the competition between terms mirrored the competition between translators.

The copula of the Indo-European languages having no equivalent in Arabic (where the simple sentence ‘A is B’ is expressed as a nominal sentence), the translators used different words in order to express absolute ‘being’ and to differentiate ‘being’ from ‘not being’ on the one hand and from ‘coming into being’, ‘becoming’ on the other.

► Ar^B *aysa*, formed as a positive counterpart of *laysa* – another Syriac calque (Ar. *laysa*: Syr. *layt* = *aysa*: *īt*, albeit not in strict etymological correspondence), signifies ‘being’ only in opposition with ‘non-being’ (*laysa*).

Whenever the opposition ‘being’ vs. ‘becoming’ requires concise expression, **B** employs the 2nd form of the verb *kāna*: *kuwwina* ‘to be brought into being’, ‘to become’ = γίγνεσθαι, γενέσθαι, *part. pass. mukawwan* = γιγνόμενος, γενόμενος, γενητός, *nomen verbi takwīn* = γένεσις (in some instances, the derivations *mutakawwin*, *takawwun* of the intransitive 5th form, easily confounded with the 2nd form derivations, may be the original readings). This remains in use, as also in Ibn al-Ṭayyib’s version, for γενητός, ἀγένητος (*mukawwan* / *ḡayr mukawwan*).

► Ar^T *wuḡida*, *part. pass. mawḡūd*, *nomen verbi wuḡūd*) signifies ‘being’:

- in the sense of the εἶναι ‘exist’;
- in opposition to ‘becoming’ (*kāna*);
- in opposition to ‘non-being.’ The latter could be translated in verbal and adjectival syntagms with *lā yūḡad*, *ḡayr mawḡūd*, but for the substantive, τὸ μὴ εἶναι, a different concept would be used, *‘adam* = στέρησις (similarly, ἀεὶ μὴ ὄν 292 b 10 = *dā’im al-‘adam*).

4.6.1.3. Syntagmatical: Linguistic Adaption and Transposition

Simple, descriptive approximations of the processual or syntagmatical elements of the concepts conveyed by a given term sometimes yielded expressions not recognized as pregnant renderings of the underlying terminology and were discarded in the usage of demonstrative discourse, to be replaced by more adequate terms. But while the Arabic mathematicians had, from a fairly early stage of scientific writing, fully worked out sets of terms, e.g., for describing and deducing the axioms and deductions of geometry, the philosophers had not.

It is striking, for example, that the early translator of Aristotle’s *De Caelo* is unable to render the concept of ἀναλογία, using Arabic *iqtirān* (‘conjunction’) and the verb *ašbaha* (‘be similar’) instead, and that in some of the Neoplatonic texts the crucial concept of μέθεξις is rendered occasionally by a simple *fī* (‘in’), ‘A is in B’ meaning that ‘A participates in B’, in other instances by expressions with *nayl* (‘taking’), *istifāda* (‘making use of’). The degree of abstraction involved here was mastered by the translators only after the philosophers had paved the way.

For the sake of univocity, even the *concreta* of natural designations were given up in favour of a ‘scientific’, syntagmatic paraphrase, where the meaning of the term is specified through its position in an array of oppositional pairs or triads.

Thus, the early *na't* ('description') for Greek κατηγορία goes together with *hāmil* ('bearer') for the substrate, Greek υποκείμενον. The 'scientific' *maqūla* ('predicate'), derived from the root *q-w-l* ('to say') as is the Greek κατηγορία from κατηγορέω, required a different set of terms where the υποκείμενον was in Arabic *mawḍū'* ('posited [as a substrate]').

	Ar ^B	Ar ^T
κατηγορία 281 a 32	<i>na't</i>	<i>maqūla</i>
καταλέγειν κατηγορίαν 268 a 18	<i>waḍa'a ism ... wa-bihī na'ata(hū)</i>	
ἐφ' ὧν λέγεται 268 a 22	<i>al-na't</i>	

Word Formation and Derivation. — Here, most of the compositional and derivational elements of the Greek could not be rendered without admitting, in the process of transposition, divergences in quantity (dilution, amplification) and quality (notably, the substitution of grammatical categories). Nominal composites are reproduced analytically.

Thus *alpha privativum* is rendered by *ḡayr* c. gen.: ἀκίνητος ~ *ḡayr mutaharrīk*, ἄπειρος ~ *ḡayr mutanāhī*, *ḡayr dī nihāya*. Here the older translators, like Ibn al-Biṭrīq, prefer (like in the Syriac pattern) the negative particle *lā* c. acc. (general negation, *nafy al-ḡins*) and treat the syntagm as a determinate noun: ἄλογος ~ *lā nuṭqa laḥū*, ἄπειρος ~ *lā nihāyata laḥū*, ἀπειρία ~ *lā nihāya*, ἡ πρώτη ἀπειρία ~ *lā nihāya al-mursala al-ūlā*, τὸ ἀσώματον ~ *lā ḡirm*, οὐδέν ~ *lā šay'* (v. *ArÜbCael* [above, n. 2], pp. 59, 78).

The Greek adverb in -ως and other adverbial expressions are substituted by Ibn al-Biṭrīq and other translators of the Kindī circle by a prepositional expression *bi-naw'* c. gen.: ἀπλῶς ~ *bi-naw' mabsūt*, χρόνῳ ~ *bi-naw' zamān*, similarly ὄλως ~ *bi-qawl ḡāmi* (cf. *ArÜbCael* [above, n. 2], pp. 67, 81, 114, 121). Later translators, including Ibn al-Ṭayyib, will use the adverbial accusative of an adjective.

Verbal adjectives formed with -τός a.o., especially those with *alpha* privative, are rendered by Ibn al-Biṭrīq and other early translators by function verbs (and their participles) construed with verbal nouns: μεριστός ~ *yaqbal al-taḡzi'a*, διαιρετός ~ *qābil li-l-tafṣīl*, ἀπαθής ~ *lā yaqbal al-ātār*, likewise ἄτομος ~ *lā yaqbal al-taḡzi'a*, γενητός ~ *wāqi' taḥt al-kawn*, φθαρτός ~ *wāqi' taḥt al-fasād*, ἀναλλοίωτος ~ *lā yadhluḥu l-taḡayyur* (cf. *ArÜbCael*, pp. 165-69).

Beside, and in place of such analytical transpositions, Ibn al-Ṭayyib, in conformity with Ishāq ibn Ḥunayn and the 10th century school of Baghdad, has synthetic transposition through analogue and homologue derivation. Instead of the paraphrastic expressions given above, the part. pass. serves for rendering the verbal adjectives in -τός: γενητός ~ *mukawwan*, αἰσθητός ~ *maḥsūs* (v. *ArÜbCael*, p. 78). Here, the later translators including Ibn al-Ṭayyib are neglecting the distinction (not observed in later Greek usage already) between the part. praes. act. and other verbal adjectives, using uniformly the part. act. with intransitive verbs: γενητός ~ *kā'in*, φθαρτός ~ *fāsīd* (v. *ArÜbCael*, p. 49).

4.6.2. Expository Rhetoric: Didactic Phraseology And Demonstrative Discourse

In the field of stylistics and phraseology, we are encountering, in the translators' usage, the exegetical amplification and rhetorical ornament that are familiar not only from the manuals of ancient rhetoric, but equally from the Peripatetic and Neoplatonic commentary tradition that conveyed, along with the texts, the school tradition of teaching and interpretation. A rich repertory of phrases used for introduction, transition, summing up, underlining the evidence of the result and the stringency of the argument is deployed – just as in the oral instruction of the lecture course – where the basic text has only modal, connective and inferential particles. This remarkably elaborate phraseology

of reasoning and of presenting evidence is characteristic of a whole group of early translations, like those commissioned by or made in the environment of the scientist and philosopher al-Kindī, such as Ibn al-Biṭrīq's version of Aristotle's *De Caelo* and Ibn Nā'ima's translation of the Neoplatonic sources current under the title of the *Theology of Aristotle*.⁴⁷

But while this phraseology is common to the group of translators to which Ibn al-Biṭrīq belonged, it is not used uniformly in all of the translations attributed to him. It is true, on the other hand, that in the case of *De Caelo* such a stylistic repertory, structuring and organizing the outline and sequence of arguments, an inventory of introductory, summarizing, transitional and connecting phrases, is found not only in the early translation of Ibn al-Biṭrīq and the Kindī circle, but in the later translation of Abū l-Faraġ ibn al-Ṭayyib as well. Since both versions of *De Caelo* are based upon the same Syriac text, it is not surprising to find a corresponding usage of such phrases, pointing generally to the common *Vorlage*, i.e. the Syriac version used by both translators. One can observe, however, that the phraseology of Ibn al-Ṭayyib is less elaborate, less fraught with emphatic hendiadys and cumbersome paraphrase.

The following are the main elements:

a) *Opening of a theme, introducing a topic or further argument and leading over to the next topic (transitus):*

ἔτι (δὲ) ..., ἀλλὰ (μὴν) ..., ... οὖν ... ~ *wa- / fa-naqūlu ayḍan* (Syriac *tūb, tūb dēn*) 'further we say ...';
fa-naqūlu ayḍan inna ..., fa-nurīdu an naṣḥaṣa 'an ...

• ἔτι δὲ 279 b 21

▶ Ar^B *wa-naqūlu ayḍan inna ...*

▶ Ar^T *wa-ayḍan fa-inna ...*

• λόγος δὲ καθόλου ὅδε 282 a 14

▶ Ar^B *fa-nurīdu l-āna an naqūla fī hādīhi l-ašyā'i bi-qawlin kulliyyin ...*

▶ Ar^T *fal-naqul fī dālīka qawlan kulliyyan ...*

See examples in *ArÜbCael* (above, n. 2), pp. 66-8, *ProclArab* (above, n. 19), pp. 171-3.

b) *Announcing the proof of a supposition, underlining the evidence of the present statement, and stressing the stringency of an argument:*

ἐκ τῶνδε φανερόν ~ *wa-burhānu dālīka, wa-bayānu dālīka wa-taṣḥihuhū bi-mā anā dākīrūhu l-āna; φανερόν ~ wa-hādā bayyinun zāhirun lā yuḥtāġu ilā munāzaratin fīhi.*

See examples in *ArÜbCael*, pp. 63-5; *ProclArab*, pp. 174-6; 180-3.

c) *Reverting to a topic treated previously after a digression (ἄφοδος):*

ἀλλὰ (μὴν), νῦν, τοίνυν ... ~ *fa-narġi' u wa-naqūlu, fa- (fal-) narġi' u ilā mā kunnā fīhi (bi-sabilihī), fa-naqūlu inna ...*

See examples in *ArÜbCael*, pp. 68-9, *ProclArab*, pp. 178-80.

d) *Elaborating a fictitious or anticipated objection:*

εἰ δὲ ... λέγω δὲ ... ~ *fa-in qāla qā'ilun ... qulnā muġībīna ...* (276 b 32 – 277 a 4, cf. Simpl., *In De Cael.*, p. 257.1-9 Heiberg *ad locum*: εἰ τις οὖν τοῦτο λέγοι, ὅτι ... εἰ τις οὖν ταῦτα λέγοι, φησί, ῥητέον αὐτῷ ...).

See examples in *ArÜbCael*, pp. 70-1, 179, *ProclArab*, pp. 183-4.

⁴⁷ See the inventories and comparative tables given in my *ArÜbCael*, pp. 63-72; *ProclArab*, pp. 171-85.

e) Validating a conclusion from established premises and returning to the thesis so proven:

ἄρα, οὖν, ὥστε ~ *fa-in kāna hādā 'alā hādā raǧā'nā fa-qulnā inna ...*; ἄρα ~ *fa-in kāna hādā 'alā dā fa-lā mahālata anna ...*, *fa-in kāna dālīka ka-dālīka fa-kāna ...*

See examples in *ArÜbCael*, pp. 69-70, *ProclArab*, pp. 174-8.

f) Back reference:

δή, δέδεικται ~ *ka-mā qulnā ānīfan*.

δέδεικται 288 a 24

- Ar^B *wa-qad bayyannā wa-awḍahñā*
 - Ar^T *fa-innā qad qulnā fi-mā salafa wa-awḍahñā anna ...*
- See examples in *ArÜbCael*, pp. 71-2, 179; *ProclArab*, p. 181.

g) Summing up, and stating the final result:

φανερὸν ἄρα ~ *fa-qadi stabāna l-āna wa-ṣahḥa anna ...*, *fa-qadi stabāna l-āna wa-ṣahḥa anna ...*, and concluding with a final 'quod erat demonstrandum': *wa-dālīka mā aradnā an nubayyin*.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν ... ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἤμῃν εἰρήσθω 289 a 10

- Ar^B *fa-qadi stabāna l-āna wa-ṣahḥa bi-mā qaddamnā bi-muqaddamāt wa-l-maqāyīs anna ...*
 - Ar^T *fa-qad ittadaḥa l-āna wa-bāna bi-mā dakarnā min al-muqaddamāti wa-l-maqāyīsī anna ...*
- See examples in *ArÜbCael*, pp. 64-5, *ProclArab*, pp. 180-3.

4.7. Ibn al-Ṭayyib's Commentaries on Aristotle's De Caelo

4.7.1. Ibn al-Ṭayyib as a Commentator: Analytical Structure. Lexis and Theōria

The commentary work of Abū l-Faraǧ ibn al-Ṭayyib presents the most faithful continuation of the Alexandrian commentary tradition both in philosophy and in medicine.⁴⁸ The 'running commentary' (literal commentary, *commentaire continu*), the common form of philosophical instruction in late Antiquity, reflected the method of the Alexandrian lecture-course. Its characteristic features, beside the overall division into numbered lecture units (*ta'ālīm*, sg. *ta'lim*, πρᾶξις), are found in all of Ibn al-Ṭayyib's commentaries:

- The introductory *capita* (κεφάλαια) preceding each of the Alexandrian commentaries of Aristotle's works, in the school of Ammonius, fully elaborated by Olympiodorus and his disciples, as also other, such as medical, works of the school canon (for Ibn al-Ṭayyib's commentary on Aristotle's *De Caelo*, surviving only in fragments, these are not extant).

⁴⁸ See the detailed surveys and analyses by K. Praechter, "Die griechischen Aristoteleskommentare [review of *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*]", *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 18 (1909), pp. 516-38, English translation in R. Sorabji, *Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence*, Cornell U.P., Ithaca N.Y. 1990, Chap. 2, pp. 31-54; L.G. Westerink, *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy*. Introduction, text, translation and indices, North-Holland Pub. Co., Amsterdam 1962, esp. 'Introduction,' pp. x-xxv; II. *The Alexandrian School Since Hermias*; Id., "The Alexandrian Commentators and the Introductions to their Commentaries", *ibid.*, Chap. 14, pp. 325-48; I. Hadot, "Le commentaire philosophique continu dans l'Antiquité", *Antiquité tardive. Revue internationale d'histoire et d'archéologie V^e-VIII^e s.* 5 (1997), pp. 169-76; W. Wolska-Conus, "Les commentaires de Stéphanos d'Athènes au *Prognostikon* et aux *Aphorismes* d'Hippocrates: de Galien à la pratique scolaire alexandrine", *Revue des études byzantines* 50 (1992), pp. 5-86.

- The familiar structure of the continuous commentary:

For each section, the θεωρία provides a general doctrinal analysis and discussion, while the λέξις offers an exegesis focusing on individual sentences and words.

In contrast to Ibn al-Ṭayyib's commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristotle's *Categories*, the elements of his *De Caelo* comments are not presented in a single multipart exposition, but in two separate literary units:

- On the one hand, we have the Aristotelian text with marginal comments and summaries of each pericope (this is what we find in the long fragment of the Paris manuscript).

- Then, by good luck, a fragment from Ibn al-Ṭayyib's *Great Commentary*, referred to as *al-Taḥṣīn al-kabīr* in Ibn al-Ṭayyib's marginal comments and summary *taḥṣīn* of the Paris ms., has survived in three folia from the Cairo Geniza. This contains the end of his exposition of book II, and by giving the author's name, links the work with the references to *al-Taḥṣīn al-kabīr* in the summaries of the *mufassṣir* intercalated in the Paris manuscript between the sections of Aristotle's text. As against the explanatory scholia, *ta'ālīq*, of the Paris ms., the *Taḥṣīn al-kabīr* provides a systematic analysis of Aristotle's positions and arguments, and concluding summaries '*alā sabīl al-ṭamara wa-l-iḥṭiṣār*' "in the way of presenting the gist in concise exposition".

The manuscript evidence is confirmed by Ibn al-Sarī, who in his testimony quoted above, p. 227, explicitly attributes to Ibn al-Ṭayyib two commentaries: "There is another commentary by this Abū l-Faraḡ without the text [i.e., the lemmata] of Aristotle's discourse, in this he reports the error [*sc.* the error found in *De Caelo* III 8 discussed by Ibn al-Sarī in his treatise] just as in his greater commentary" – calling the 'greater commentary' the one found in the Paris ms. containing text and annotation.

It is clear, however, from the references of the *mufassṣir* in ms. Paris, recapitulating the preceding sections, where Ibn al-Ṭayyib himself refers to "our great commentary" at several instances (*taḥṣīrunā l-kabīr*, fol. 104a, 105b, 115b, 120b, etc.), that this one is the *theōria* preserved in the Geniza fragments. He also mentions (fol. 109a and 111b) his own *taḥṣīn li-Qāṭiḡūriyās*, a literal commentary on the *Categoriae*; here, Abū l-Faraḡ ibn al-Ṭayyib's commentary is indeed extant (as also his *Taḥṣīn k. Īsāḡūḡī*, on Porphyry's *Isagoge*), and the relevant references can be identified in their proper places.⁴⁹

4.7.2 Text and Taḥṣīn

4.7.2.1 Divisions of the annotated text

The Aristotelian text (*lemmata* introduced by *qāla Aristūṭālis*) is divided, as in every other commentary work of Abū l-Faraḡ ibn al-Ṭayyib, into lecture units, Arabic *ta'lim* (Greek *περὶ λέξις*). Book I of *De Caelo* contains 16 such chapters, *ta'ālīm*, the extant parts of Book II are from *ta'ālīm* 1 to 5. References to *al-Taḥṣīn al-kabīr* show that this was divided into identical units of *ta'ālīm*. The *ta'ālīm*, again, are divided into shorter pericopes, explained sentence by sentence, sometimes word by word, in the marginal scholia. Each pericope is followed by a short summary comment, introduced by the words *qāla l-mufassṣir*, of the preceding lemma. In this, the commentator gives the result of the argument (*ḥuḡḡā*) and characterizes the demonstrative procedure – *bayān* 'explanation', *bayān ḡadalī* ('dialectic demonstration'), *burhān* ('demonstrative proof'), solution of an *aporia* (*ṣakk*). Here is a survey of the pericopes and the comments given:

⁴⁹ Ed. Ferrari, as quoted above, p. 229, see references given below, p. 261.

- Book I, *ta'lim* 13 = *De Caelo* I 9, 277 b 27 (? – fragment starting at 279 a 3) to 279 b 3 (fol. 110a-112b): There cannot be more than one world.

Pericope extending from ca. 279 a 2 (fragment beginning at 279 a 3) to 279 a 5.

Closing *Tafsīr*: “This is the argument (*ḥuḡḡa*) showing that the entire matter is in this world”.

Pericope I 9, 279 a 6-10 (om. 10-11 ἀλλ’ εἷς καὶ μόνος καὶ τέλειος οὗτος οὐρανός ἐστιν).

Closing *Tafsīr*: “This is the result of the discourse” (*sc.* proving that there are not, nor were nor will be, many worlds).

Pericope I 9, 279 a 11 – 279 b 3: There is no place outside of the heaven, nor void nor time.

Closing *Tafsīr* points out the result of “what follows the preceding exposition (*bayān*) that the world is one, *sc.* that outside the world there is no body, no place, no void, and no time”.

- Book I, *ta'lim* 14 = *De Caelo* I 10, 279 b 4 – 280 a 34 (fol. 112 b - 119 b): Opinions on the duration of the world, if it is eternal, ungenerated or generated, imperishable or perishable.

Pericope I.10: 279b4 - b17: The problem under discussion and previous views.

Closing *Tafsīr*: “He [Aristotle] imposes upon himself to investigate the issue of the world, if it is generable (*kā'in*) or ungenerable, perishing (or: perishable, *fāsīd*), or imperishable, and before this, he enumerates the opinions of the Ancients”.

Pericope I 10, 279 b 17-21: To say that the world is generable, yet is imperishable and unending, is impossible.

Closing *Tafsīr*: A refutation of this opinion “based on induction (*istiqrā'*) from how things are” (b 19 ὅσα ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἢ πάντων).

Pericope I 10, 279 b 21-31: What has no beginning, cannot change; to have a beginning implies change, then the world will not be imperishable.

Closing *Tafsīr*: “This exposition, showing that the world, being generable, must perish, is made by analogy (*bi-ṭariq al-qiyās*)”, closing with reference to a commentary given “at the beginning of the lecture in the *Great Commentary*” *fi ṣadr al-ta'lim min al-tafsīr al-kabīr* (f. 115b).

Pericope I 10, 279 b 32 – 280 a 2: Against justifying the [Platonic] account of generation in terms of a geometrical model (ὁμοίως ... τοῦς τὰ διαγράμματα γράφουσι, Ar^T: *kamā anna l-muhandisīna yaf'alūna fi l-aškāli l-murakkabati min ḥutūtīn kaṭīratin ... aṣḥābu l-handasati*), not a physical process.

Closing *Tafsīr*: This is the argument used by the adherents of Plato in defense of his tenet that the world is generated (*sc.* in time, *muhdat*).

Pericope I 10, 280 a 2-11: Refutation of the geometrical model of generation where the elements of a construction, order and disorder exist simultaneously, this being incompatible with an everlasting world.

Closing *Tafsīr*: “This is part of the argument (*ḥuḡḡa*) they put forward on behalf of Plato and his tenet that the world is generable, opining that he was conceiving this as ‘becoming’ in the mind, not in existence”.

Pericope I 10, 280 a 11-23: Against the theory of alternating constitution and dissolution of the world.

Closing *Tafsīr*: “He refutes the word of those who say that it (the world) comes into being at one time and perishes at another time, and that this succession will not end”.

Pericope I 10, 280 a 23-28: Against the atomist theory of one of several worlds coming to be and perishing once only, “and we shall explicate later if this is possible or not”.

Closing *Tafsīr*: Explicating the foregoing announcement: “He means the doctrine that the world comes into being all at once and then perishes, and will not return a second time”.

Pericope I 10, 280 a 28-34: Announcing to examine the doctrine of the *Timaeus* (Plato is not named neither in Greek nor in the Arabic version), *viz.* that the world comes into being, but will continue eternally for the rest of time, unending and imperishable. “They maintained this tenet at random” (φουσικῶς : *ka-mā ttafaqa* Ar^T [a loose rendering of Syriac *kyānā it?*] – Ar^B has: *bi-qawlin ṭabī‘yyin*).

Closing *Tafsīr*: Restating the basic dilemma – some pretend that a thing may be generated but will not perish, and others say that there is something ungenerated that may perish, “and we will revert to investigating the truth of the matter, in good order (*‘alā ṭarīq al-qānūn*), tomorrow. And here ends the lecture”.

- Book I, *ta‘līm* 15 = *De Caelo* I 11, 280 b 1 – 281 b 18 (fol. 99a – 106b): Analysis of the terms ‘ungenerated’ and ‘generated’, ‘perishable’ and ‘imperishable’, ‘possible’ and ‘impossible’. A thing cannot have a capacity for opposites at the same time.

Pericope I 11, 280 b 1-6: Ungenerable *vs.* generable, perishable *vs.* imperishable.

Closing *Tafsīr*: Aristoteles imposes upon himself to study the implications (*muzāwaḡa* ‘pairing’) of generable/coming-to-be (*kā’in*) & perishable (*fāsīd*), ungenerable (*ḡayr kā’in*) & imperishable (*ḡayr fāsīd*), and to begin with, to enumerate the significations of these words.

Pericope I 11, 280 b 6 – b 20: Ungenerable *vs.* generable.

Closing *Tafsīr*: This is an enumeration of the several uses of these words.

Pericope I 11, 280 b 20 – 281 a 1: Perishable *vs.* imperishable.

Closing *Tafsīr*: He enumerates the various significations in order to specify the meanings intended in the present context.

Pericope I 11, 281 a 1-19: The meaning of ‘possible’ (*li-l-šay’ quwwa* ‘having power’) *vs.* ‘impossible’ (*laysa labū quwwa* ‘not having power’).

Closing *Tafsīr*: He defines ‘strong’ *vs.* ‘weak’ power in respect to the limit (*ḡāya*) or falling short of a limit.

Pericope I 11, 281 a 19-27: A difficulty arising from the definition of capacity with respect to a maximum limit.

Closing *Tafsīr*: For the solution of this aporia (*ḡall al-šakk*), reference is made to the first part of the lecture in the *Great Commentary* (*šadr al-ta‘līm min al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*).

Pericope I 12, 281 a 28 – b 2: The capacity that a thing obtains to be or not be for a limited time of either state.

Closing *Tafsīr*: He excludes that for one thing, there may be the capacity for two contraries during an unlimited time. Reference is made to the first part of the lecture in the *Great Commentary* (*šadr al-ta‘līm min al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*).

Pericope I 11, 281 b 2-18: The distinction between false (*kaḏīb*) and impossible (*muḡāl*, ‘absurd’).

Closing *Tafsīr*: He differentiates between the false and the absurd (*muḡāl*), the possible and the impossible. End of *Ta‘līm*.

- Book I, *ta'lim* 16 = *De Caelo* I 12, 281 b 18 – 282 b 2 (fol. 106b-108b, 89a-91a): That which is for ever cannot be for a certain time only, thus it is not generated; the ungenerated and the imperishable are one, and co-extensive with the existent (*yatawassaṭ al-mawǧūd*, closing *tafsīr*, f. 91a).

Pericope I 12, 281 b 18-34: One and the same thing cannot be capable of opposites, viz. both of being always and of not-being always.

Closing *Tafsīr* gives a fairly lengthy summary of the argument demonstrating that “it is impossible that a thing has potency for two opposites in infinite time”.

Pericope I 12, 281 b 34 – 282 b 2:

Tafsīr at the end of *ta'lim*: “It has been made clear that the ungenerated and the imperishable are one, co-extensive in regard of (‘in the midst of’) the eternally existent (*tabayyana anna ǧayru l-kāʾini wa-ǧayru l-fāsidi humā wāḥidun yatawassaṭu l-mawǧūda dāʾiman*) ...”, closing with a reference that “we have commented upon this at the beginning of the lecture in our *Great Commentary*” (*ṣadr al-taʾlim min al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*) (f. 91a6).

- Book I, *ta'lim* 17 = *De Caelo* I 12, 282 b 2 – 283 b 7 [? ms. fragment ending with 283 a 30, before lacuna] (fol. 91a-98b, 120a-b): The ungenerated and the imperishable imply (‘follow’) each other: supposing the potency of not-being and that of being to coexist for an indefinite time is absurd.

Pericope I 12, 282 b 2-23: Imperishable implies ungenerated.

Closing *Tafsīr* indicates “*bayānu hādā huwa l-bayānu ʿalā anna l-kāʾina yatbaʿu l-fāsida li-annahumā naqīdāni li-ǧayri l-kāʾini wa-ǧayri l-fāsidi, wa-hādāni yatalāzamāni, fa-ḍālika bi-hādīhi l-ṣifati, wa-bayānuhū li-mā nubayyinuhū min ḍālika yatawassaṭu l-mawǧūda fi baʿḍi l-awqāti l-maʿdūma fi baʿḍi l-awqāt*”.

Pericope I 12, 282 b 23 – 283 a 3 + *additamentum*:

Both versions add to 282 a 3 a longer gloss: After the relations Z & Θ, E & Z, H & Θ, E & H have been considered, the relations are arranged in a somewhat more systematic order E & Z, H & Θ, Z & Θ, E & H, followed by the explanation of which matters are designated respectively by the abstract symbols.

Closing *Tafsīr* indicates *bayān* “*ʿalā anna l-kāʾina yatbaʿu hū l-fāsidi wa-l-fāsidi yatbaʿu hū l-kāʾin*” [etc.].

Pericope I.12, 283 a 4-17: Generated implies destructible, indestructible implies ungenerated. First and second argument.

Closing *Tafsīr*, stating the preceding “summary explanation” (*al-bayān al-muǧmal*).

Pericope I 12, 283 a 17-20: Third argument.

Closing *Tafsīr* points out the principle (*aṣl*) repeated here.

Pericope I 12, 283 a 20-24: Fourth argument.

Closing *Tafsīr* points out the logical implication (*ilzām*).

Pericope I 12, 283 a 24-29: The destructible must at some time perish.

Closing *Tafsīr* summarizes the preceding *huǧǧa*, and refers to a detailed commentary given at the beginning of the respective *ta'lim* in his *Tafsīr al-kabīr*.

Pericope I 12, 283 a 29 – b 6 [lacuna in ms. after fol. 120, 283 a 30 ἄγένητον – b 7 ὅτι νῦν ἔστιν].

- [Book I, *ta'lim* 18, division lost in lacuna] = *De Caelo* I 12, 283 b 6 [?]–22 [extant text 283 b 7–21 only] (fol. 121, 124): It is impossible that the ungenerated be perishable, or that the imperishable be generated, because if there was in it a potency to perish, this potency cannot be both realized and not realized with respect to a past state.

Pericope I 12, 283 b 6

Closing *Tafsir* summarizes “hāḍihi l-ḥuḡḡatu l-āḥiratu llatī yubayyinu bihā annahū ḡayra mumkinin an yakūna l-šay'u ḡayra kā'inin fāsīdan wa-lā ḡayra fāsīdin kā'inan”.

Pericope I 12, 283 b 11: ἔστω δὴ ... ἐνεργεία

Closing *Tafsir* defines the doubt (*šakk*) raised on the potency for and actuality of opposite states.

Pericope I 12, 283 b 12–17

Closing *Tafsir* on the solution of the aporia raised in the last paragraph (*hādā huwa ḥall al-šakk ...*), concerning the impossibility of a potency for opposites to be realized simultaneously.

Pericope I 12, 283 b 17–22 [lacuna, 283 b 21–22 καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων φθείρεται]: It is physically impossible for what is eternal *a parte ante* to perish later, and v.v. (καὶ φυσικῶς δὲ καὶ μὴ καθόλου σκοποῦσιν: Ar^T “exposing [this error] by induction from the physical things, not by demonstration, as we did before” (*bi-l-istiqrā'i mina l-umūri l-ṭabī'iyati lā bi-l-qiyāsi kamā fa'alnā fī-mā salafa*, cf. above, *Tafsir* on 272 b 19).

[*Tafsir* lost in lacuna].

¶ The extant part of Book II starts with the second pericope of *ta'lim* 1:

- Book II, *ta'lim* 1 = *De Caelo* II 1 [283 b 26–30 missing due to the loss of 2 folia, 283 b 30 – 284 b 5, II 2, 284 b 6 – 285 a 1 (fol. 73–78) [285 a 2–16 lost in lacuna of 2 folia], 285 a 16–31 (fol. 109) [285 a 31 – 286 a 2 lost in lacuna of 2 folia].

Pericope: *De Caelo* II 1 [283 b 26]–284 a 2: resumé of the proofs, closing Book I (Ch. 8–12), that the heaven has neither come to be nor will perish.

Tafsir summarizing Aristotle's *bayān* that the heaven is ungenerable and imperishable.

Pericope II 1, 284 a 2–11: The belief of the Ancients in the eternity of the noble, encompassing heaven.

Tafsir summarizes *bayān* of the heaven being ungenerated in regard of the views of the Ancients.

- Book II, *ta'lim* 2 = *De Caelo* II 3 [286 a 3–17, lost in lacuna], 286 a 17 – b 7 (fol. 122–123) [286 b 7–9 lost]: Motion and rest in the universe. The heavenly eternal movement must be circular; there must be a centre at rest, namely earth, and its contrary, fire, and the corresponding movements, and there are several revolutions of the celestial bodies.— II 4: [286 b 10 – 287 a 22 lost in lacuna of 2 folia], 287 a 23 – b 21 (fol. 63–65): The shape of the heavenly body is spherical.

Pericope ending at 287 a 30.

Tafsir on II 4, 287 a 30: *al-ḥuḡḡa al-ṭālitā fī anna šakl al-samā' kuri* “the third argument proving that the shape of the heaven is spherical” (f. 63b).

- Book II, *ta'lim* 3 = *De Caelo* II 5, 287 b 22 – II 6, 289 a 10 (f. 65b ult.–80.11): The rotation of the sphere of the fixed stars is from right to left. It is perfectly regular.

Pericope II 5, 287 b 22 – 288 a 12.

Tafsīr summarizing the result of the argument: “He gives the cause for which the sphere of the fixed stars moves from the Eastern point forwards, and not from the Eastern point backwards, and so rises above us from the direction of the West”.

Pericope II 6, 288 a 13-27: The movement of the heaven is perfectly regular.

Ta'liq on II 6, 288 a 19 (regularity of the circular movement). Cross-reference to the initial part of the lecture in the *Great Commentary* (*'alā mā šaraḥnā fi šadr al-tā'lim min al-tafsīr al-kabīr*, f. 69 b 7).

Pericope II 6, 288 a 27 – b 6: Irregularity in the circular movement is neither caused by the heaven itself nor by the mover.

Tafsīr following II 6, 288 a 27: “First explanation” (*hādā l-bayān al-awwal alladī yubayyin bihī anna ḥarakat falak al-kawākib al-tābita mustawiya*). Closing reference to the “initial part of the lecture in the *Great Commentary* (*šadr al-tā'lim min al-tafsīr al-kabīr*)” (f. 69b)”.
Tafsīr following II 6, 288 b 6: “hādā l-bayān al-tānī fi anna ḥarakat falak al-kawākib al-tābita wāḥida mustawiya”, closing with a reference to the *Great Commentary*: *wa-qad šaraḥnābu fi šadr al-tā'lim min al-tafsīr al-kabīr* “and we have commented upon this at the beginning of the *tā'lim* of the *Great Commentary*” (f. 70b).

Tafsīr following II 6, 288 b 30: *hādā l-bayān al-rābi'*, with a reference to the exposition at the beginning of the *Great Commentary* (f. 79a).

Tafsīr following II 6, 288 b 30: *hādā l-bayān al-rābi'*, with a reference to the exposition at the beginning of the *Great Commentary* (f. 79a).

- Book II, *tā'lim* 5 = *De Caelo* II 8, 290 a 29 – b 11 (fol. 87b pu.-88b11); II 9, 290 b12 [breaking off after φανερόν δ' ἐκ τούτων = *wa-zāhirun mimma qulnā*] (f. 88b ult.): The stars having no organ for movement, they have no self-movement.
- Book II, *tā'lim* 4 = *De Caelo* II 7, 289 a 11-35 (fol. 80b11-82b2): The nature of the stars is that of the heavenly body in which they exist; albeit emitting heat and light, they do not consist of fire. — II 8, 289 b 1 – 290 a 29 (fol. 80b11–87b apu.): The motion of the stars: The sphere moves, while the stars are at rest, having no movement of their own.

Pericope 290 a 13-24. The movement of the stars.

Tafsīr following II 8, 290 a 13-24: Solution of the aporia (*ḥall al-šakk*): The stars are not self-moving independently of their spheres.

- Book II, *tā'lim* 5 = *De Caelo* II 8, 290 a 29–b 11 (fol. 87b pu.-88b11); II 9, 290 b12 [breaking off after φανερόν δ' ἐκ τούτων = *wa-zāhirun mimma qulnā*] (f. 88b ult.): The stars having no organ for movement, they have no self-movement.

Pericope II 8, 290 a 29 – b 11: The stars have no organ for movement.

Tafsīr following II 8, 290 b 11: This is the second, dialectical explanation concerning the motion of the stars (*hādā l-bayān al-tānī al-ḡadalī*).

Pericope II 9, 290 b 12 [breaks off after 290 b 12 φανερόν δ' ἐκ τούτων = *wa-zāhirun mimma qulnā*]

In his annotation to *De Caelo* I 9, 279 a 30 ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις φιλοσοφίμασι, the author refers to his *Tafsīr li-Qāṭiḡūriyās*, where the exoteric writings of Aristotle are defined in the context of the general *Prolegomena* to Aristotle's work, v. Ferrari (ed.), *Der Kategorienkommentar von Abū l-Faraḡ 'Abdallāh ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib* (above, p. 229), Arabic text, p. 13.18-25: “lammā kānat kutub Aristūṭālis tanqasim ilā qismayn, ilā l-zāhira wa-l-ḥafiyya, waḡaba an takūn šurat kalāmihī 'alā ḍarbayn, zāhir wa-ḥafiyy, ammā l-zāhir fa-bi-manzilat rasā'ilihī wa-kutubihī l-ḡadaliyya, fa-inna hādihī l-kutub ista'mala fihā zuhūr al-mā'ānī wa-wuḍūḥ al-alfāz”. — In his *commentum* on *De Caelo* II 2, 284 a 22 πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ πρότερον, Ibn al-Ṭayyib points to the section on πρότερον/ὑστερον, *Cat.* 12, 14 a 26 - b 23, but without referring to his own commentary (cf. *Tafsīr kitāb al-Qāṭiḡūriyās*, ed. Ferrari, p. 389ff. [*theoria*], 395ff. [*praxis*]).

4.6.2.2 *Ibn al-Ṭayyib's Marginal Annotation (ta'liq)*

As a specimen of Ibn al-Ṭayyib's annotation accompanying his own translation of *De Caelo*, here is the passage from *De Caelo* I 9 on the transcendent beyond (τάκεῖ), the realm of αἰών "ἀθάνατος καὶ θεῖος", already presented above, § 4.5.2, pp. 240-6, for our comparison between the versions of Ibn al-Bīṭrīq and Ibn al-Ṭayyib:

[279 a 16] Φανερόν ἄρα ὅτι οὐ-[279 a 18]τε τόπος οὔτε κενόν οὔτε χρόνος ἐστὶν ἔξω. Διόπερ οὐτ' ἐν τόπῳ τάκεῖ πέφυκεν, οὔτε χρόνος αὐτὰ ποιεῖ γηράσκειν, οὐδ' ἐστὶν οὐδενός οὐδεμία μετα-[279 a 20]βολῆ τῶν ὑπὲρ τὴν ἐξωτάτω τεταγμένων φορᾶν, ἀλλ' ἀναλλοίωτα καὶ ἀπαθῆ τὴν ἀρίστην ἔχοντα ζωὴν καὶ τὴν αὐταρκεστάτην διατελεῖ τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα. (Καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τοῦνομα θεῖως ἐφθεγκται παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων. Τὸ γὰρ τέλος τὸ περιέχον τὸν τῆς ἐκάστου ζωῆς χρόνον, οὐ μὴθὲν ἔξω κατὰ φύσιν, αἰὼν ἐκάστου κέκληται. Κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον καὶ τὸ τοῦ παντός οὐρανοῦ τέλος καὶ τὸ τὸν πάντα χρόνον καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν περιέχον τέλος αἰῶν ἐστὶν, ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰεὶ εἶναι τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν εἰληφώς, ἀθάνατος καὶ θεῖος). Ὅθεν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐξήρτηται, τοῖς μὲν ἀκριβέστερον τοῖς δ' ἀμαυρῶς, τὸ εἶναί [279a30] τε καὶ ζῆν.

Καὶ γὰρ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίσι φιλοσοφήμασι περὶ τὰ θεῖα, πολλάκις προφαίνεται τοῖς λόγοις ὅτι τὸ θεῖον ἀμετάβλητον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πᾶν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ἀκρότατον· ὃ οὕτως ἔχον μαρτυρεῖ τοῖς εἰρημένοις. Οὔτε γὰρ ἄλλο κρεῖττόν ἐστὶν ὃ τι κινήσει (ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ἂν εἴη θεϊότερον) οὔτ' ἔχει φαῦλον οὐδέν, οὔτ' ἐνδεές τῶν αὐτοῦ καλῶν οὐδενός ἐστὶν.

[279 b 1] Καὶ ἄπαστον δὴ κίνησιν κινεῖται εὐλόγως· πάντα γὰρ παύεται κινούμενα ὅταν ἔλθῃ εἰς τὸν οἰκεῖον τόπον, τοῦ δὲ κύκλω σώματος ὃ αὐτὸς τόπος ὅθεν ἤρξατο καὶ εἰς ὃν τελευτᾷ.

Arabic translation, ms. Paris, BnF, arabe 2281, f. 111 a 1 – b 10, with Ibn al-Ṭayyib's marginal annotations (*ta'ālīq*)

[279a16] We have explained in what precedes that outside the heaven there is no body, and it is impossible that there should be any body at all. And if this the case, it is clear and evident that there is no place nor void nor time outside of the heaven.	No annotation (<i>ta'liq</i>) on this passage.
[a18] Therefore, what is there is not in a place,	Meaning: the encompassing sphere.
[a19]and it is impossible that time should cause it to age,	Meaning: to count its number and to add to it.
and it is impossible for the encompassing body to change or to alter at all,	Meaning: because to its form there is no opposite, as explained, and it is not moved from one state to another.
[a21] but is stable and unchanging, and does not receive any affection.	That is to say: because to its form there is no opposite.
[a21-2] Indeed, its life is stable, enduring for eternity (<i>dahr, αἰών</i>), living in the best of ways.	That is to say: because its form will never be separated from its matter.

[a22-3] Therefore, the Ancients were right in coining the name of <i>dabr</i> , driving home the point fully	No annotation (<i>ta'liq</i>) on this passage.
[a23-4] by saying that the time encompassing the life of each one of the beings having life,	Meaning: (the time) that counts the time of every one and divides it (ms. <i>yufadḍiluhū</i> : leg. <i>yufaṣṣiluhū</i>).
[a24] there being no other natural time after it,	Meaning: There is no time close to it nor surpassing it.
is the perpetual eternity (<i>al-dabr al-abadī</i>).	That is to say: The eternity (ὁ αἰών) takes up the time in its (whole) extension without there being in it anything preceding or succeeding.
[a26-7] Therefore we say that the sphere is encompassing all of time, which is the eternity.	That is to say: Because the eternity is the measure (<i>iḥṣā'</i> , counting) of its movement.
[a27-8] Actually, this name is derived from its activity, since this (<i>al-dabr</i>), is lasting for ever unto eternity, divine and immortal.	Meaning: It was given this name, stating that it is encompassing all of eternity because its activity is perpetual.
[279 a 29] It is closer in relation to some things,	Meaning: To the planetary spheres since it is adjacent to them.
and to other things, more remote.	That is to say: Like the elements and the bodies of the animals and plants.
[279 a 30] We have mentioned in our books on the exoteric philosophy, i.e those we have written for the public (<i>al-amma</i>)	Mention of this has been made in our commentary on the <i>Categoriae</i> , where we have said which these books are, and that these are the books [using] dialectical [arguments] (<i>al-kutub al-ḡadaliyya</i>). ⁴⁹
[a32] and have stated that this spiritual entity must not change nor perish by necessity,	Meaning: because its substrate does not involve privation (<i>'adam</i> , non-being) since it is absolute form.
because it is the cause of all that comes after it in respect of its world (<i>min 'alamihī</i> , leg. <i>min 'ilalihī</i> 'its causes'? cf. <i>versio B</i>),	Meaning: since it is the agent cause for what comes after it.
and there is not after it another cause.	Meaning: because its form is unseparable from its matter, being in the best of modes.
[a33] It is of the quality that we have stated, it does not undergo alteration nor change, it is complete and perfect, lasting until eternity, divine, and evil will not approach it,	Meaning: because it is independent (<i>mustaqill</i> , αὐτάρκτης), not in need of what is beyond it.

⁴⁹ See Abū l-Faraḡ ibn al-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr kitāb al-Qāṭiḡūriyās*, pp. 399ff., 395ff. Ferrari.

[a33–4] nor is it in need of any good of which it is the cause,	Meaning: since it is governing everything, and there is no other thing governing itself.
and there is not above it another cause by which it would be caused in that this would be moving it.	That is, exercising natural government, since above the sphere of the fixed stars there is no other sphere preceding it but the First Cause, in fact this movement is a natural movement.
[279a34] And if there should be another cause, this as well would be stable, steady and eternal, and there would not be beyond it something more excellent (<i>κρεῖττον</i>).	Meaning: if it should turn out that a cause is preceding it, the same description would apply to it, and no other (cause) would precede it.
[a35] Further, this – i.e., this spiritual body – does not receive any affection (<i>πάθος</i> , for <i>φασῖλον</i>),	Meaning: because it has no opposite, and change occurs in opposites.
[279b1] and its movement is eternal and unending.	Meaning: because its form is eternal and stable.
It is by necessity that this movement belongs to it,	Meaning the perpetual (movement) that has no ending.
[b1–2] because in all things, their movement comes to rest once they arrive at their (proper) places;	Meaning: when they are outside of their (proper) place, and they return until they reach their [...]. ⁵⁰
[b2–3] but as for this superior, noble body, its movement does not come to rest at all,	Meaning: because its form is one and does not weaken.
[b3] because at the starting point (<i>mabda'</i> , <i>ἀρχή</i>) from which the movement starts, it will also cease,	Meaning: it takes off from one point and returns to it since its movement is circular.
and therefore its movement will be perpetual.	Meaning: because there is no limit to it at which it should halt.
<i>The Commentator says:</i>	
This it what follows the explanation that the world is one; viz. that outside of the world there is neither body nor place nor void. And here ends our lecture.	

⁵⁰ Lacuna, last word cut off in the binding.

4.7.3. Ibn al-Ṭayyib's Tafsīr kitāb al-Samā'

4.7.3.1 Character and Identity

Like in Ibn al-Ṭayyib's extant commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories* and Porphyry's *Isagoge*, a literal commentary – the λέξις of the Greek commentary-lecture – provides, for each section, an exegesis focusing on individual sentences and words. In the case of *De Caelo*, however, Ibn al-Ṭayyib's own translation was combined with the literal exposition in the first instance, given in the form of marginal notes. Then, the *Great Commentary*, *al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, gave the exegesis of Aristotle's doctrine and argument, i.e. the θεωρία part of the commentary was given separately, possibly as a separate codicological unit.

4.7.3.2 The Manuscript

The surviving fragment of the *Tafsīr* provides a specimen of three connected leaves, including the end of Book II, with an *explicit* giving the title and author's name. Apart from the author's self-references in the *ta'ālīq* of the Paris fragments (acephalous, hence *a priori* anonymous), we have no other testimony apart from the meticulous and significant report of Ibn al-Sarī, and a summary mention found in the report on Ibn Sīnā's shopping list of books recovered from Baghdad (v. *supra*, § 4.2.1, p. 230).

Ms. Cambridge University Library, T.-S. Ar. 40.18. Three papyrus folia. Coarse *nashī* writing, unvocalized and almost completely undotted. This fragment of the *Great Commentary* was identified by Y. Tzvi Langermann in the Taylor-Schaechter collection of manuscript pieces from the Cairo Geniza, "Transcriptions of Arabic Treatises into the Hebrew Alphabet: an underappreciated mode of transmission", in *Tradition, Transmission and Transformation. Proceedings of Two Conferences on Pre-modern Science held at the University of Oklahoma*, ed. by F.J. Ragep and S.P. Ragep with S. Lindsay, Brill, Leiden [etc.] 1996 (Collection des travaux de l'Académie internationale d'Histoire des sciences, 37), pp. 247-62, v. pp. 252f.⁵²

Expl. f. 3b:

ينقضي التعليم والمقالة الثانية من كتاب السماء
تفسير الشيخ الفيلسوف الفاضل أبي الفرج عبد الله بن الطيّب رضي الله عنه
على طريق الثمرة والاختصاره

End of the lecture, and of the second treatise of the *Book on the Heaven* with commentary of the excellent master, the philosopher Abū l-Farağ 'Abdallāh ibn al-Ṭayyib, may God be pleased with him, using the method of *tamara* and abridgement.

The term *tamara* ('fruit', i.e. 'core, gist of the matter'), and the verbal noun *istīmār* ('harvesting, reaping the crop, exploitation'), are familiar from Ibn al-Ṭayyib's summaries (*tīmār*, *tamara*) of the works of Galen and other Greek authors.⁵³

⁵² I want to express my gratitude to Professor Langermann who first informed me of this important finding, and put at my disposal his own transcription of the Arabic text.

⁵³ See the list of his writings in Ferrari, *Der Kategorienkommentar* (above, p. 229), pp. 34-42.

4.7.3.3 Contents and structure

The fragment covers *De Caelo* Book II, Chapter 14, treating two topics: (a) The place of the earth —The earth is at rest in the center of the cosmos (296 a 25 – 297 a 6); (b) The earth is spherical in shape 297 a 6 – 298 a 20), including some points of the doxography of chapter 13. A characteristic of Ibn al-Ṭayyib's commentaries, known from his extant *Tafsīr* of Aristotle's *Categoriae* and Porphyry's *Isagoge*, is the systematic analytical structure, dividing, defining and sorting Aristotle's arguments, the steps taken for investigating a topic (*maṭlab*, ἐπιχειρήματα), classifying the proofs (*huǧǧā*), and the objections and problems to be solved (*šakk*, 'doubt', ἀπορίαι), evaluating the strength of his expositions in terms of explanation (*bayān*), demonstration (*burhān*) and dialectical proof (*burhān ǧadālī*).

Distinctive of his method is the reduction of each topic to the elements of logical procedure. This goes back to his predecessors of the Baghdad school of translators and transmitters of Aristotle's logic. On the one hand, we have the recasting of the propositions and arguments in terms of the figures of the syllogism; on the other hand, the reasoning and the evaluation of the underlying principles follow the fundamentals of Aristotle's *Analytica Posteriora* (in Arabic, *Kitāb al-Burhān*). The belief that each science, universal or particular, is resting on its own principles and following its specific basis in demonstrating fact and reason (*An. Post.* II 27-28) is transparent in the very outline of our chapter where Ibn al-Ṭayyib divides the arguments between those of 'the metaphysician' (*al-ilāhī*) on the one side and the 'physical scientist' (*al-ṭabī'ī*) on the other.

It may have been the pedantry of his numbered catalogues of topical divisions, not all of them easily applicable to the Aristotelian text, which Ibn Sīnā found so exasperating. Nevertheless, Ibn Sīnā's hierarchical divisions of his *summae* of philosophy and medicine may well have been inspired in a way by this faithful continuator of the Greek commentary tradition. Even more clearly Ibn Rušd was influenced by his predecessor, although he rarely admits to having consulted him (see § 4.2.3, pp. 230-33). The analytical structure of the *Middle Commentary* on *De Caelo* (*Talḥiṣ al-Samā' wa-l-'ālam*) with its fine division into numbered units of *ǧumla* and *maṭlab*, *faṣl* and *qism*, topics of *bayān*, *šakk*, and *burhān* breathes the same obsession with the science of demonstration.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Ed. Ğ. al-'Alawī (Fās 1984); for the *Middle Commentary* of the *Physica*, see Ğ. al-'Alawī, "Min Talḥiṣ al-Samā' al-ṭabī'ī: taqṣīm al-Samā' al-ṭabī'ī li-Ibn Rušd", *Maǧallat Kulliyyat al-Ādāb wa-l-'ulūm al-insāniyya bi-Fās, Ğāmi'at Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abdallāh* 7 (Fās, 1983/84), pp. 205-55 – here only the table of contents, presenting a very similar structure, is preserved in Arabic.

كذا في كتابها ما لعله لم يدركه في كتابه الاول
 وما هو هذه الصفة اعني في كتابه هو مساه
 ولاها ارضه و الارض لغير المنادي والعاتاب
 وهكذا الوارثه ورجلها سكله . والطبعي
 قول الارضونه الابعاد نحو به على الماده
 ورا الحس و قيل انك لو سرت بسر الزايف اللوات
 الحونه بالمرحوم وراه ولا في الارض محمد الكبر
 مع الذكره و بعض العلم والمفاهيم التامه
 في كتابها عن السبع السبع الفيلسوف العاقل
 ان السبع محمد الله الطبع في الله على طبع
 المبره والاحصاء
 ولواها العقل كما ملاها
 وصلى الله على سيد رسلك محمد وآله الطاهر
 وهو بيان هو الولد

[Fifteen arguments for the earth being at rest in the centre of the cosmos]

[... Concerning the earth being at rest in the center, this will be made clear by fifteen arguments:]

Fifth argument: The earth descends by its nature. If it were a star (residing) in the ether, it would be in a place outside [i.e. contrary to] its nature.

Cf. II 14, 296 a 25-30 οἱ μὲν αὐτὴν ἐν τῶν ἀστρῶν εἶναι ποιοῦσιν ... Ὅτι δ' ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον, δῆλον λαβοῦσιν ἀρχὴν ὡς εἴπερ φέρεται εἴτ' ἐκτὸς οὐσα τοῦ μέσου εἴτ' ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου, ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὴν βία κινεῖσθαι ταύτην τὴν κίνησιν· οὐ γὰρ αὐτῆς γε τῆς γῆς ἐστίν.

Aristotle's first argument, 296 a 25-34. The motion attributed to the earth by certain philosophers (*viz.* the Pythagoreans, *supra* II 13, 293 b 15-32) will not be a natural movement, but an enforced (βία) movement, since the parts of the earth do not have such a movement, but actually move towards the centre (ἐπ' εὐθείας πάντα φέρεται πρὸς τὸ μέσον).

Sixth argument: Waters are (enclosed) in the hollows of the earth and in the oceans; it follows necessarily that the oceans and rivers [rather] belong to the †ethereal† body.

Cf. II 4, 287 b 5-7 ὑπόθεσιν λαμβάνουσιν ὅτι πέφυκεν αἰεὶ συρρεῖν τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸ κοιλότερον· κοιλότερον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ τοῦ κέντρου ἐγγύτερον.

Seventh argument: Whereas they [*sc.* the Pythagoreans] would extoll the nobility of fire, they debased it, and made the earth higher than it in the structure of the world.

Cf. II 13, 293 a 30 – b 1 Τῷ γὰρ τιμιωτάτῳ οἶονται προσήκειν τὴν τιμιωτάτην ὑπάρχειν χώραν, εἶναι δὲ πῦρ μὲν γῆς τιμιώτερον, τὸ δὲ πέρασ τοῦ μεταξὺ, τὸ δ' ἔσχατον καὶ τὸ μέσον πέρασ· ὥστ' ἐκ τούτων ἀναλογιζόμενοι οὐκ οἶονται ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου τῆς σφαίρας κεῖσθαι αὐτὴν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον (293 b 1) τὸ πῦρ.

Eighth argument: If the earth were not in the centre, what should encompass it, since nothing but the heavy would fit it?

Ninth argument: From the earth and the other elements, the living beings are constituted, so it is necessary that the animalia belong to the ethereal body, and the ethereal body will be affected through its mixture with the bodies of the world of generation.

Tenth argument: If the earth were in motion, there would not be left anything stable in the world for the periphery to move around it.

Eleventh argument: The fact that [otherwise] the nature of the world would be reversed, so that the heavy would be above by nature, and the light would be below by nature.

Cf. II 14, 296 b 6-9 ἔτι δ' ἡ φορὰ τῶν μορίων καὶ ὅλης αὐτῆς ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τοῦ παντός ἐστίν· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τυγχάνει κειμένη νῦν ἐπὶ τοῦ κέντρου.

[فأما أن الأرض ساكن في المركز، فيتبين بخمس عشرة حجج ...]

f. 1a

٣ والخامسة أن الأرض ترسب بطباعها،
فلو كانت كوكباً في الأثير لقد كانت تكون في مكان
خارج عن الطبع ❖

٦ والسادسة أن المياه في تقعيرات
الأرض والبحار، فوجب أن تكون البحار والأنهار
في الجسم الأثيري هـ

٩ والسابعة أنه من حيث زلّفوا شرف
النار، وضعوا عنها وجعلوا الأرض أعلى منها في
وضع العالم.

١٢ والثامنة إذا لم تكن الأرض في
المركز، فما ذا تحتوي عليه، ولا يوافقه إلاّ الثقيل.

١٥ والتاسعة أن من الأرض وباقي
الأسطقسات تتكوّن الحيوانات، فيجب أن تكون الحيوان
من الجسم الأثيري، وينفعل الجسم الأثيري بامتزاجه مع أجسام
عالم الكون.

f. 1b

١٨ والعاشر إذا كانت الأرض تتحرّك، فلا يبقى
بعد ثابت في العالم يتحرّك عليه المحيط.

٢١ والحادية عشر أن ينعكس طباع العالم فيكون
الثقيل فوق بالطبع والخفيف أسفل بالطبع.

Twelfth argument: 'Centre' is an homonymous word: Applied to the centre of a substance, it is the noblest part, like the heart relative to the animals and the ether relative to the world; the middle in a magnitude is the point of the centre, like the navel in the human body. But to say that the fire must be in the centre of the magnitude, while extolling its nobility, is pointless.

Thirteenth argument: Not the fire is the noblest body of the world [*pace* the Pythagoreans], but the ether.

Fourteenth argument: By saying that the noblest body in the world must be in the noblest place, they imply this to be the outermost place, but the centre and the middle in a substance are not in such a place.

Cf. again, II 13, 293 a 30 - b 1: Τῷ γὰρ τιμιωτάτῳ οἴονται προσήκειν τὴν τιμιωτάτην ὑπάρχειν χώραν, εἶναι δὲ πῦρ μὲν γῆς τιμιώτερον (...) ἄλλα μᾶλλον τὸ πῦρ.

Fifteenth argument: If the place of fire were the noblest of the places, then the ether would be in this place because it is the noblest of the bodies.

Cf. II 5, 288 a 4-12: ἡ πρὸς τὸν ἄνω τόπον (*sc.* φορά) τιμιωτέρα (θειότερος γὰρ τόπος ὁ ἄνω τοῦ κάτω) ... [I. 9] Εἰ γὰρ ἔχει ὡς ἐνδέχεται βέλτιστα (*sc.* ὁ οὐρανός), αὕτη ἂν εἴη αἰτία καὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου· βέλτιστον γὰρ κινεῖσθαι ἀπλῆν τε κίνησιν καὶ ἄπαυστον, καὶ ταύτην ἐπὶ τὸ τιμιώτερον.

As for a summary of the remaining arguments he [Aristotle] uses in refuting the (faulty) opinions concerning the earth being at rest, whether the reasoning is based [a] on the resemblance of the circumference to the surface of the sky and the horizon, or [b] its being above the water or above the air, we may dispense with it, because this has been given before at the beginning of the lecture in a summary of the core issues, a repetition being useless.

[a] Cf. II 13, 295 b 10-16: Οἱ μὲν οὖν πλεῖστοι περὶ τὰς αἰτίας ταύτας διατρίβουσιν· εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ διὰ τὴν ὁμοιοτήτᾳ φασιν αὐτὴν μένειν, ὥσπερ τῶν ἀρχαίων Ἀναξίμανδρος· μᾶλλον μὲν γὰρ οὐθὲν ἄνω ἢ κάτω ἢ εἰς τὰ πλάγια φέρεσθαι προσήκει τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἰδρυμένον καὶ ὁμοίως πρὸς τὰ ἔσχατα ἔχον· ἅμα δ' ἀδύνατον εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν κίνησιν· ὥστ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης μένειν.

[b] Cf. II 13, 294 a 28 - b 2: Οἱ δ' ἐφ' ὕδατος κεῖσθαι. Τοῦτον γὰρ ἀρχαιότατον παρειλήφραμεν τὸν λόγον, ὃν φασιν εἰπεῖν Θαλῆν τὸν Μιλήσιον, ὡς διὰ τὸ πλωτὴν εἶναι μένουσαν ὥσπερ ξύλον ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἔτερον (καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἐπ' ἀέρος μὲν οὐθὲν πέφυκε μένειν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὕδατος), ὥσπερ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ὄντα περὶ τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος τοῦ ὀχοῦντος τὴν γῆν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ὕδωρ πέφυκε μένειν μετέωρον, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τινός (294 b 1) ἔστιν. Ἔτι δ' ὥσπερ ἀῆρ ὕδατος κουφότερον, καὶ γῆς ὕδωρ· ὥστε πῶς οἶόν τε τὸ κουφότερον κατωτέρω κεῖσθαι τοῦ βαρυτέρου τὴν φύσιν;

Now the rule of sense perception is in the midst (*fī awṣāt*) of the explanations of the metaphysician in proofs demonstrating "why is the agent among the eternal things?": because He is the final end, since the things effected are beneath him, and through him their perfection is achieved, he being their end.

And the physicist (is concerned with) the final end (*ḡāya, causa finalis*) of things specific to them, either forms and actions, or the concomitants, and then the forms are their cause.

- والثانية عشر الوسط اسم مشترك يقع على
 ٢٤ وسط الجواهر، وهذا هو الأشرف فيه، كالقلب
 من الحيوان والأثير من العالم؛ والأوسط في العظم
 وهو نقطة الوسط كالسرّة في بدن الإنسان،
 ٢٧ فالقول بأنّ النار تجب أن تكون في وسط العظم
 مع تشريفهم لها لا وجه له.
 والثالثة عشر ليس النار أشرف أجسام
 ٣٠ العالم، لكنّ الأثير.
 والرابعة عشر ما قالوا إنّ أشرف
 f. 2a أجسام العالم يجب أن يكون بالمكان الأشرف، فهذا
 ٣٣ آخر الأماكن، والمركز والوسط في الجواهر لا يكون
 في مثل هذا المكان.
 والخامسة عشر لو كان مكان النار أشرف
 ٣٦ الأماكن، لكان الأثير فيه لأنّه أشرف الأجسام.
 فأما باقي استثمار الحجج التي ردّ بها
 الآراء في سكونها، إن كان كان علته تشابه المحيط أو وجه
 ٣٩ الخضراء أو العرض أو كونها على ماء أو على الهواء،
 فنحن نتسغني عنه لأنّها مضت في صدر التعليم
 المستثمرة، فإعادته لا تفيد.
 ٤٢ والقانون الحسيّ في أوساط بيانات الإلهي ببراين لِمَ الفاعل في الأزليّات، لأنّه
 الغاية، إذ كانت المفعولات دونه وبه كمالها فهو الغاية،
 f. 2b والطبيعيّ غايات الامور والخاصّة بها
 ٤٥ إمّا الصّور والأفعال وإمّا اللوازم، فالصور اذن
 كانت بسببها هـ

٣٠ الأثير [الأثيرى، خ، وحرف الياء النهائي مشطوب

٣٢ الأشرف] الوسط، خ

٣٤ هذا [غايات Langermann

The main issues (*maṭālib*) of this lecture (*ta'lim*) are four:

The FIRST is the place of the earth.

The metaphysician says: (It is in) the centre, because this evolves necessarily from the Fifth Nature due to its being at rest; and movement precedes rest, and what comes to be from it comes to be at first, and from rest, at last; and because it (the earth) is close (*yuḡāwir*) to what is not corrupted.

The physicist says: Because it is heavy and cold.

The SECOND is its movement.

The metaphysician says: It is immobile because it is a totality following its totality in the final end, that is to say, the spherical body.

Cf. II 14, 296 b 6-15: Ἔτι δ' ἡ φορὰ τῶν μορίων καὶ ὅλης αὐτῆς ἢ κατὰ φύσιν ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τοῦ παντός ἐστίν· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τυγχάνει κειμένη νῦν ἐπὶ τοῦ κέντρου· [...] ἀνάγκη δὲ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ παντός· καὶ γὰρ τὰ κοῦφα καὶ τὸ πῦρ εἰς τὸναντίον φερόμενα τοῖς βάρεσι πρὸς τὸ ἔσχατον φέρεται τοῦ περιέχοντος τόπου τὸ μέσον.

The physicist says: Because it is in the place natural to it. If it moved in a straight line, it would either go on infinitely, and go beyond the world – or come to rest while being above it in some place, and still belonging to it. If, by analogy to this, we were to instance a stone, it would not need to be thrown, neither rotating nor rolling nor in a spiral motion, because the sphere needs to be at rest, according to what the metaphysician says.

The physicist: Because this necessitates that inside it there is something around which it should rotate, so it would come part (*yatabaddad*) and be disrupted; and (as a further consequence), the stone (thrown upwards) would not meet the place (on the ground) corresponding to its azimuthal position (when descending).

Cf. II 14, 296 b 21-25: Φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι ἀνάγκη ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου εἶναι τὴν γῆν καὶ ἀκίνητον, διὰ τε τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας, καὶ διότι τὰ βία ῥιπτούμενα ἄνω βάρη κατὰ στάθμην πάλιν φέρεται εἰς ταυτό, ἂν εἰς ἄπειρον ἢ δύναμις ἐκριπτῆ.

II 8, 290 a 9-10: τοῦ δὲ σφαιροειδοῦς δύο κινήσεις εἰσὶ καθ' αὐτό, κύλισις καὶ δίνησις, εἴπερ οὖν κινεῖται τὰ ἄστρα δι' αὐτῶν.¹

[The THIRD IS] its being at rest.

The Metaphysician says: By nature, because it is following a principle in its final end, and because it is a totality.

The Physicist says: Because it is in the last of places, and where it is adjacent to the indestructable.

Opinions were divided about this. Some people said: (the earth is at rest) because of its resemblance to the circumference. Some said: because it is (floating) on the water; and some people said: because it is upon the air.

¹ “Among the arguments which Ibn al-Ṭayyib gives against the theory of the rotation of the earth is the assertion that such a motion would produce centrifugal forces that would cause the earth to break up (*yatafakkaka*). It is interesting to note that Copernicus attributes this same argument to Ptolemy, but no such statement is found in the *Almagest*. With the exception of one remark by Koyré, I have not found any discussion of this point” (Langermann, *loc. cit.* [supra, p. 265], p. 253). Langermann refers to Ptolemaeus, *De Revolutionibus* I 7, and A. Koyré, *The Astronomical Revolution*, trans. R.E.W. Maddison, Hermann - Methuen - Cornell U.P., Paris - London - Ithaca N.Y. 1973, p. 112 (n. 9 to p. 57); cf. also J.L.E. Dreyer, *A History of Astronomy from Thales to Kepler*, Dover, New York 1953², pp. 271-2.

ومطالب هذا العلم أربعة :

الأول في مكان الأرض .

٤٨ والإلهي يقول : الوسط لأنّها واجبة عن الطباع الخامس لأجل سكونه، والحركة تتقدّم السكون

فما يكون عنها يكون أولاً وعن السكون أخيراً ولأنّها تجاور ما لا يفسد هـ

٥١ والطبيعي

يقول : لأنّها ثقيلة وباردة هـ

والثاني في حركتها .

٥٤ والإلهي يقول : غير متحركة لأنّها كليّة وتابعة لكليته

في الغاية وهي الجرم الفلكي .

والطبيعي :

٥٧ لأنّها في المكان الطبيعي لها، وإن تحرّكت على

الاستقامة، فإمّا أن تمضي بلا نهاية فتفوت العالم

أو تقف [فـ]هو فوقها في أحد الأماكن وهي منه . وعلى

٦٠ هذا لو طرحنا حجراً لما وجب أن يلقي ولا على الاستدارة

لا رحاوية ولا دولاوية لأنه يلزم أن يكون الفلك

ساكناً على ما يقول الإلهي .

٦٣ والطبيعي : لأن هذا يوجب

أن يكون داخلها شيء متحرك عليه وأبداً ويتفكك

ولا يلقي الحجر الموضع الذي يسامت به .

٦٦ و«الثالث في» سكونها ❖ والإلهي يقول : بالطبع لأنّها

تابعة لمبدأ في غابته ولأنّها كلية .

والطبيعي : لأنّها في آخر الأماكن وبِحَيْث يجاور ما لا يفسد هـ

٦٩ واختلف الناس فيه فقوم قالوا : لتشابهها

من المحيط ❖ وقوم قالوا

لأنّها على الماء ❖ وقوم قالوا لأنّها على الهواء ❖

٧٢ وقد أفسدنا هذه الآراء كلها .

f. 3a

٦٤ وأبداً [تأبّد leg.

٧٢ وقد افسدنا هذه الآراء كلها [add. in margine

We have refuted all these opinions.

Cf. II 13, 295 b 10-16 εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητά φασι αὐτὴν μένειν, ὥσπερ τῶν ἀρχαίων Ἀναξίμανδρος, etc. [v. *supra*].

Cf. II 13, 294 a 28 - b 6 Οἱ δ' ἐφ' ὕδατος κεῖσθαι, etc. [v. *supra*].

The FOURTH is its being finite, and that its shape is spherical.

<The Metaphysician says:> Because it is following a principle in its final end and in its essence, and so its concomitants, and whatever is of this description, i.e. in its end, is finite. And (further) because it is eternal: the eternal is deprived of principles and ends, and so are its concomitants, among them its shape.²

The Physicist says: Because the form of the dimensions is encompassing the matter. And from the sense-perception (it is clear), since when going a some distance, you will see part of the southern stars you did not see before.

Cf. II 14, 297 b 30-34: Ἔτι δὲ διὰ τῆς τῶν ἀστρῶν φαντασίας οὐ μόνον φανερόν ἐστι περιφερῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ μέγεθος οὐκ οὔσα μεγάλη· μικρᾶς γὰρ γιγνομένης μεταστάσεως ἡμῖν πρὸς μεσημβρίαν καὶ ἄρκτον ἐπιδήλως ἕτερος γίγνεται ὁ ὀρίζων κύκλος.

And further, because the earth is convex, and convexity goes with the spherical (form).

Cf. II 14, 297 b 23-30: Ἔτι δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν φαινομένων κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν αἰ τῆς σελήνης ἐκλείψεις τοιαύτας ἂν εἶχον τὰς ἀποτομάς· [...] περὶ δὲ τὰς ἐκλείψεις αἰεὶ κυρτὴν ἔχει τὴν ὀρίζουσαν γραμμὴν, ὥστ' ἐπεὶ περὶ ἐκλείπει διὰ τὴν τῆς γῆς ἐπιπρόσθησιν, ἡ τῆς γῆς ἂν εἴη περιφέρεια τοῦ σχήματος αἰτία σφαιροειδῆς οὔσα.

End of the lecture, and of the second treatise, as commented upon by the master, the excellent philosopher, Abū l-Faraġ 'Abdallāh ibn al-Ṭayyib, may God be pleased with him, in the method of presenting the gist in concise exposition.

To the giver of reason be praise without end
God bless the lord of the prophets, Muḥammad, and his chaste family
He is sufficient for us and the best trustee.

² leg. *ṣaklūhā*, sc. *ṣakl al-ard*?

f. 3b

- والرابع في أنّها متناهية وشكلها كري .
 <والإلهي يقول: > لأنها تابعة لمبدأ في غايته في ذاته ولوازمه ،
 ٧٥ وما هو بهذه الصفة، أعني في غايته، هو متناهٍ ،
 ولأنها أزليّة تعدم المبادئ والغايات ،
 وهكذا لوازمه ومن جملتها شكله ❖
 ٧٨ والطبيعي يقول : لأنّ صورة الأبعاد محتوية على المادّة ،
 ومن الحسّ من قبل أنّك لو سرت يسيراً لرأيت من الكواكب
 الجنوبيّة ما لم يكن تراه . ولأنّ الأرض محدّبة والتحديد
 ٨١ مع الكريّة .
 وينقضي التعليم والمقالة الثانية
 من كتاب السماء تفسير الشيخ الفيلسوف الفاضل
 ٨٤ أبي الفرج عبد الله بن الطيّب رضي الله عنه على طريق
 الثمرة والاختصار هـ
 ولواهب العقل حمداً بلا نهاية
 ٨٧ وصلّى الله على سيّد رسله محمد وآله الطاهرين
 وهو حسبنا ونعم الوكيل

Šahṣ: Its Origin and Development as a Logical Term

Amir Hossein Pournamdar*

Abstract

Abundantly used as a technical term in the Arabic classical texts of logic and philosophy, the word *šahṣ* will be studied in detail as a preamble to a thorough analysis of a turning point which occurred in its meaning, during the Graeco-Arabic translation movement (starting from the 8th century). Through discovering the genuine meaning of *šahṣ* in the context of the Arabic language at the time of the emergence of Islam and its following two or three centuries, it will be ascertained that this term, in its common usage in the intellectual tradition of Islam, i.e. ‘a thing or a person belonging to a species’, has imposed itself upon the non-specialized, ordinary language of the Arabs as the result of the dominance of the logico-philosophical literature. *Šahṣ* was never used to serve such a meaning before the transmission of the philosophical works to the Arab world, and it was the attempts of the translators that made this word signifying ‘a specific entity or individual’, in contrast to its real meaning, viz. ‘body’, ‘material appearance’. In the second part, by taking into account one of the oldest extant logical works in the Islamic tradition, i.e. *al-Mantiq* attributed to Ibn al-Muqaffa¹, it is suggested that this change of meaning could be regarded as a case of Arabic borrowings from Persian.

1. The Meaning of Šahṣ

As a crucial step, the Arabic classical dictionaries¹ will be examined in order to find those meanings of the root *šḥṣ* which might be the closest to the meaning which is under scrutiny, viz. ‘an individual or a person’, or according to the contemporary Arabic-English dictionary *al-Mawrid* in the entry *šahṣ*, ‘person, individual’.² Since there is hardly any resemblance between the definition set forth in classical lexicons and what is understood by *šahṣ* in the sense of ‘individual’, we will have to find among all the derivatives of *šḥṣ* those that have some kind of reference to or similarity with ‘person, individual, or man’ so that we can succeed in establishing a link.

One of the most commonplace derivatives of the mentioned root is the verb *šahaṣa*, ‘to stare, raising the eyes while gazing’, which also means ‘to go up, to lift’ and ‘to depart from a place’; this derivative can hardly have any correspondence to what we are searching for. However, there is another word derived from the root in question which itself enjoys numerous other derivatives and is the subject of this study: the word *šahṣ*, from which we have *šahṣiṣ*, *šāḥiṣ*, *mušahḥaṣ*, *tašahḥuṣ*, *šahṣiyya*, and so on. This is expectedly the nearest to the meaning which is being sought among all the derivatives of the above-mentioned root; we will have to find any references to ‘a thing, person or individual’. Even the smallest of the similarities will be of great importance because, as will be seen,

¹ I would like to thank the anonymous referee of the initial version of this article who helped, by some judicious and thoughtful notes, to make my discussion on Ibn al-Muqaffa¹ less controversial and more coherent. Also, the comments by Prof. Babak Alikhani on the idiosyncrasies of the Iranian languages saved me from a couple of errors.

² Throughout this article, ‘Arabic’ is used to refer to classical Arabic, unless otherwise mentioned.

³ R. Baalbaki, *Al-Mawrid: A Modern Arabic-English Dictionary*, Dar el-Ilm Lilmalayin, Beirut 1415/1995, p. 664.

there is barely any relation between the signification of the word *šahṣ* as presented in Arabic classical dictionaries and its logico-philosophical sense as ‘a person or an individual’.

In the *Kitāb al-ʿAyn* of al-Farāhīdī (d. 786 or 791), the word *šahṣ* is defined as follows:

Al-šahṣ: the bodily appearance³ of man when you see it from afar, and everything that you see as its body, you see its *šahṣ*. Its plural: *al-šuhūṣ* and *al-ašhāṣ*.⁴

Interestingly enough, among its meanings there is no mention of anything like ‘essence, self, person, and entity’ and, in general, no reference to a determined thing, *nafs* or *dāt*. In other dictionaries, we find exactly the same meaning, with some occasional adjustments. In the *Kitāb al-Ġīm*, Abū ʿAmr al-Šaybānī (d. 828) provides no definition for *šahṣ*,⁵ but in defining *sadaḥ*, which means ‘darkness’ and also ‘the body of man’ and his ‘apparition from distance’, he mentions *šahṣ* as its equivalent.⁶ In the 10th century we have the dictionary called *al-Ġamhara fī l-Luġa* by Ibn Durayd (d. 933), where *šahṣ* is defined in a different way, although the meaning is the same.

Šahṣ of everything is that which is encountered by the eye and it is nothing other than the body (*ġuṭṭa*), and you saw the *šahṣ* of the thing. And a *šahīṣ* man has a huge *šahṣ* and everything with huge *šahṣ*, including every living creature (*dābba*) and the like, is *šahīṣ*...⁷

Al-Azharī (d. 981), again in the 10th century, following the conventional definition, attributes the same meaning to *šahṣ*.

Šahṣ: al-Layṭ said: *al-šahṣ* is the bodily appearance of man when you see it from afar, and whatever part of its body you saw, you have seen its *šahṣ*. And its plural: *al-šuhūṣ* and *al-ašhāṣ*.⁸

Then, he goes on to explain the other derivatives of this root in the form of verbs and adjectives. Again, there is no mention of the meaning in question, and we can only find references to body or corporeity. In other lexicons more or less contemporary to al-Azharī’s *al-Tabḏīb fī l-Luġa*, Šāhib ibn ʿAbbād (d. 995) in *al-Muḥīṭ fī l-Luġa*⁹ and al-Ġawharī (d. 1002) in *Tāġ al-Luġa* repeat their predecessors.

Al-Šahṣ: the bodily appearance of man and the like which you see from afar. It is said ‘three *ašhuṣ*’, and ‘many *šuhūṣ* and *ašhāṣ*’. The man *šahuṣa*, so he is *šahīṣ*, that is, he is corpulent, and the woman is *šahīṣa*.

³ ‘Bodily appearance’ is a translation of *sawād*, which primarily means ‘blackness’ or ‘darkness’. In the entry on *šahṣ*, dictionaries normally mention the ‘*sawād* of the man’ as its equivalent; in this sense, *sawād* has a mixed meaning including unidentifiable appearance, vague and distant image, and blackness due to a distance. Overall, in relation to *šahṣ*, it should be taken to mean ‘bodily appearance’, and not ‘individual’ as Fred Leemhuis does inaccurately. Moreover, if *sawād* means ‘individual’, as Leemhuis suggests, how can it be said in such a way as to say ‘*sawād al-insān*’? In this case, it would be rendered as ‘a man’s individual’. See F. Leemhuis, “Can You Marry a Djinni?”, in H.G. Kippenberg et al. (eds.), *Concepts of Person in Religion and Thought*, W. de Gruyter, Berlin 1990 (Religion and Reason, 37), pp. 217-28, here p. 224.

⁴ Al-Ḥalil ibn Aḥmad al-Farāhīdī, *Kitāb al-ʿAyn*, ed. M. Maḥzūmī et al., Dār al-Ḥiġra, Qum 1409/1988, vol. 4, p. 165.

⁵ Abū ʿAmr al-Šaybānī, *Kitāb al-Ġīm*, ed. I. al-Ibyārī, vol. 2, al-Hayʿa al-ʿĀmma, Cairo 1974, p. 126.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 107. This could be another piece of evidence against Leemhuis’ claim that *sawād*, which is frequently mentioned in dictionaries as an equivalent of *šahṣ*, means ‘individual’. This is not the meaning of *sawād*, whose common use is to denote ‘darkness’ or ‘blackness’. Obviously, there is an affinity between *šahṣ* and ‘darkness’ – at least, that kind of darkness which is the only visible thing when there is distance between the observer and the object of vision.

⁷ Ibn Durayd, *al-Ġamhara fī l-Luġa*, Dār Šādir, Beirut 1345/1926, vol. 2, p. 223.

⁸ al-Azharī, *Tabḏīb al-Luġa*, Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāṭ al-ʿArabī, Beirut 2001, vol. 7, p. 36.

⁹ Šāhib Ibn ʿAbbād, *al-Muḥīṭ fī l-Luġa*, ed. M.H. ʿĀl Yāsīn, ʿĀlam al-Kutub, Beirut 1994, vol. 4, p. 218.

Šahāṣa šuhūṣan, which means ‘to raise’. He šahāṣa his eye, and it was šāḥiṣ, it is the time when he opened his eye and did not blink...¹⁰

A few other meanings are provided at the end of this entry in the *Tāğ al-Luğa*, in a similar vein as the dictionaries previously discussed. No one bears any relationship to the meaning we are seeking.

Three centuries later, when the influence of the philosophical literature was predictably more perceptible in the common language, Ibn Manzūr (d. 1312) in his masterpiece *Lisān al-‘Arab*, despite the fact that his entry is much more comprehensive and detailed, hardly refers to the established meaning of this word in philosophy and logic; as a lexicographer living between the 13th and 14th century, he might well have included ‘person, specific thing, a particular, or an individual’ among the senses of this word; but, to our surprise, his definitions indicate no such meaning.¹¹ Al-Firūzābādī (d. 1414) in his *al-Qāmūs al-Muḥīt*¹² and al-Zabīdī (d. 1790) in his *Tāğ al-‘Arūs*¹³ give no explicit reference to the meaning which in contemporary Arabic features as the primary meaning of this word.

The intended sense for which we have searched the seminal lexicons and which is today the primary sense of this word is simply a connotation of ‘personhood’. In Wortabet’s *Arabic-English Dictionary*, in the entry on *šahṣ*, we read “corporeal form; object; person, bodily figure in the distance”.¹⁴ From our study so far, the third meaning mentioned by Wortabet, namely ‘person’, could be recognized as a meaning which has been associated with this word only from the 8th century;¹⁵ however, as far as the lexicons are concerned, it can be found solely in the contemporary ones.¹⁶

After examination of the definitions of *šahṣ* in various lexicons, it is now clear that this word, in its original usage, had no meaning close to ‘individual or person’ which, almost on the contrary, is frequently implied by this word in philosophical texts. Although in contemporary Arabic taking *šahṣ* to mean ‘individual’ is very common, in the past it was never used to designate ‘a person or individual’: as we have seen, the prevalent meaning was ‘body and corporal appearance’. As our next step, we will be investigating some early texts in order to find if in such works the word *šahṣ* bears the meaning we could not find in classical dictionaries.

¹⁰ Ğawharī, *Al-Šihāb: Tāğ al-Luğa wa-Šihāḥ al-‘Arabīyya*, Dār el-Ilm Lilmalayin, Beirut 1990, vol. 3, p. 1042.

¹¹ Ibn Manzūr, *Lisān al-‘Arab*, Dār Šādir, Beirut 1994, vol. 7, pp. 45-6.

¹² Al-Firūzābādī, *al-Qāmūs al-Muḥīt*, Al-Resalah Publishers, Beirut, 2005, p. 621.

¹³ Al-Zabīdī, *Tāğ al-‘Arūs min Ğawāhir al-Qāmūs*, Dār al-Fikr, Beirut 1994, vol. 9, pp. 295-6.

¹⁴ W.T. Wortabet, *Arabic-English Dictionary*, Librairie du Liban, Beirut 1984, p. 301.

¹⁵ The definition of *šahāṣa* offered by the contemporary Arabic dictionary *al-Mu’ğam al-Wasīt* (I. Mustafa et al., *al-Mu’ğam al-Wasīt*, Dār al-Shurūq al-dawliyya, Egypt 1424/2004) is preceded by the explanation in parentheses: “according to philosophers”. The entry is just a definition based on modern conceptions. “Every object that has height and appearance; this became dominant for the man. (According to philosophers) The conscious entity for its independence in volition” (*ibid.*, p. 475). The authors try to define ‘an individual or person’ which is normally signified by *šahṣ*; however, under the influence of Western notions, they are referring only to human individuals. They simply say that it became dominant in exclusive reference to man, but they provide no further explanation about the basis on which this came to happen.

¹⁶ The main reason for the reluctance of these lexicographers to include *šahṣ* as connoting ‘person’ or ‘individual’ in their entries on *šḥṣ* could be attributed to their loyalty to the definitions offered by their forerunners and predecessors; they hardly alter these handed down definitions, as is clear from the reports of the books quoted above. However, the case of Ibn Manzūr is admittedly rather different, and reasonably enough, we expect him to have included the discussed meaning of *šahṣ* in his great book. There is one possible justification which will be solidified in what follows in this article: it is difficult to believe that he did not know of any such signification of this word as to mention ‘person’ or ‘individual’ in his work; on the contrary, not only was he completely aware of this usage of *šahṣ*, he also knew that it was not a genuinely Arabic usage, rather a technical, non-Arabic usage of *šahṣ*. For this reason he did not include it in his *Lisān al-‘Arab*, ‘the tongue of the Arabs’.

2. *Šahṣ* in Context

In the Quran, the root *šḥṣ* is used only twice and both of them simply mean ‘to stare’.¹⁷ In numerous books by the Muḥaddiṭīn, people who narrated the words of the Prophet Muḥammad, his companions – and, for the Shi’ites, in addition to these, his grandchildren (known as Imāms) – we can hardly find a usage of this word which might indicate ‘a person or an individual’.¹⁸ Among all the handful of occasions when this word is used in each of the *ḥadīṭ* books, normally in two or three of these cases we find *šahṣ* so close to the ‘individual’ that the reader unfamiliar with the original meaning of the word would be liable to take it wrongly to mean ‘person or individual’.

In *Šahīḥ al-Buḥārī*, there is a *ḥadīṭ* attributed to the Prophet,¹⁹ whose authenticity is much debated by later thinkers.

Chapter on his saying: “No *šahṣ* is more jealous (*ḡayūr*) than God”.²⁰

Using the word *šahṣ* to refer to God is so strange and suspicious that those who believe it to be a case of distortion in narrating the Prophet have had recourse to other versions of this saying. This *ḥadīṭ* also has variant forms; in that same book, we read, “no person (*aḥad*) is more jealous than God”,²¹ or “no thing (*šay*) is more jealous than God”.²² However, it must be noted that these two other versions are more frequent than the one reported earlier which can be found only once in both al-Buḥārī’s and al-Muslim’s *Šihāḥ*.²³

Whether or not this *ḥadīṭ*, in its real and pristine form, contains the word *šahṣ* would be of secondary importance to our present study, for it is sure that this word so rarely, if ever, has been used in this sense in Arabic that when the Arabs encountered it in this usage, they tried to justify and adapt it to the context in order to avoid it meaning ‘an individual or person’. One example of this attempt is Ibn Taymīyya’s (d. 1328) criticism of Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209) in his *Bayān Talbīs al-Ġahmīyya* which is a refutation of al-Rāzī’s *Asās al-Taqdīs*. In *Asās al-Taqdīs*, al-Rāzī cites a *ḥadīṭ* similar to the one quoted above, expounding on some parts of it. When he comes to *šahṣ*, as a thinker completely familiar with philosophical and logical literature, he writes:

First, al-*šahṣ*: and its intention is the determined essence and specified reality.²⁴

This meaning is exactly the one that we are looking for and has been the dominant meaning of the word in Arabic philosophical texts. However, of utmost importance to us is the criticism of Ibn

¹⁷ *Quran*, 14:42, and 21:21.

¹⁸ The books of *ḥadīṭ* and tradition investigated include: the *Šahīḥ* by al-Buḥārī (used only once, as will be discussed below); Sulaym ibn Qays’ (d. 695) controversial book; Ṣadūq’s (d. 991) *ʿIlal al-Šarāʿī*; *al-Tawḥīd*; *al-Ḥiṣāl*, and *Man lā yahduruhu al-Faqīḥ*; Muḥammad ibn Ḥassan al-Tūsī’s (d. 1067) *al-Amālī*; *al-Istibṣār*; al-Qummī’s (d. 919) *Tafsīr al-Qummī*; Šarīf al-Rāḍī’s (d. 1015) *Nahḡ al-Balāḡa*; Muslim ibn al-Ḥaǧǧāǧ’s (d. 875) *Šahīḥ Muslim* (in this book, the cases of using *šahṣ* are the same as those of al-Buḥārī’s); Muhammad Ibn Yaʿqūb al-Kulaynī’s (d. 940) *Uṣūl al-Kāfi*.

¹⁹ al-Buḥārī’s book is the only one in which we encounter the word *šahṣ* in a sense close to ‘individual’.

²⁰ Buḥārī, *Tawḥīd*, 20. ‘Jealous’ probably is not an accurate equivalent in this statement: I borrowed this translation from M. Swartz, *A Medieval Critique of Anthropomorphism, Ibn Al-Ġawzī’s Kitāb Aḥbār Aṣ-Šifāt*, A Critical Edition of the Arabic Text with Translation, Introduction and Notes, Brill, Leiden 2002 (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science, Texts and Studies), pp. 189-90; H. Ritter, *The Ocean of the Soul: Men, the World and God in The Stories of Farīd al-Dīn ʿAṭṭār*, Translated by J. O’Kane with Editorial Assistance of B. Radtke, Brill, Leiden 2003 (Handbook of Oriental Studies. The Near and Middle East, 69), p. 349.

²¹ *Ibid.*, *Kusūf*, p. 2.

²² *Ibid.*, *Nikāḥ*, p. 107.

²³ Muslim, *Šahīḥ*, p. 17.

²⁴ Ibn Taymīyya, *Bayān Talbīs al-Ġahmīyya fī Tāsīs Bidāʾihim al-Kalāmīyya*, ed. R.H. Muḥammad ʿAli, Maǧmaʿ al-Malik Fahad, Saudi Arabia 1426/ 2005, vol. 7, p. 391.

Taymīyya with regard to al-Rāzī's definition. After citing another *ḥadīṭ* where *šahṣ* is again attributed to God, he says that if the definition given by al-Rāzī were the real meaning of *šahṣ*, then one would have no way to the true understanding of the Prophet's words. Taking the word *šahṣ* to mean "a specified reality (*al-ḥaqīqa al-maḥṣūsa*) and a determined entity (*al-dāt al-mu'ayyana*)" is what the logicians say about this word: for instance, they say that the species of something is restricted to its *šahṣ*, i.e. this species or class has only one member, or that the species is divided into its *ašḥāṣ*, and use expressions of the same kind in which *šahṣ* means 'an individual object'. But, says Ibn Taymīyya, since at first this meaning was only for humans and people, it came to be known as *šahṣ* but, later on, its usage expanded to include every other individual so that they all came to be called *šahṣ*. This specialized usage is far from the genuine tongue of the Qurayš, which is the Prophet's tribe and through which the Quran is revealed. Now, it is upon us to learn the tongue the Prophet used to speak, as the means to understand his words and their meaning; between the tongue of Qurayš and others there are differences that unless one does not come to master them, one will misconstrue it. And if so, [i.e. if al-Rāzī's claim is true,] in the Prophet's tongue and other Arab languages there is no such a thing as to call a specified essence a *šahṣ*, as is customary among a group of people [i.e.] logicians and philosophers].²⁵

Ibn Taymīyya is aware of the fact that *šahṣ* has some non-Arabic aspect which is imposed on it through the intellectual tradition of Islam and more precisely by the logical tradition; however, his account of its origin and of how it entered Arabic is not tenable and seems to be based on mere conjecture. From the evidence gathered above, *šahṣ* was never used in Arabic to refer to 'human individual or person', and even this usage is derived from that specialized language which is denounced by Ibn Taymīyya himself as a hindrance to understanding the true meaning of the Prophet's tongue, namely the usage according to which everything belonging to a class is called a *šahṣ*. As the result of the prevalence of the philosophical terminology, this usage was transmitted partially to the common language, and thus only people came to be referred to as *šahṣ*.

In his book devoted to the study of the *ḥadīṭs* which are in one way or another controversial, Ibn Aṭīr (d. 1239) assigns an entry to *šahṣ*. Taken in itself, even regardless of the content, this is an evidence of the fact that for Arab lexicographers the mere presence of this word in a *ḥadīṭ* would render it strange. Moreover, in his definition and account of this word, Ibn Aṭīr says that he believes that *šahṣ* in the cited *ḥadīṭ* means only 'whatever that has height and appearance', but with respect to God, when we say 'no *šahṣ* other than God', this is meant to ascribe to him an essence (*dāt*), and *šahṣ* is thus being used as a metaphor: it is not its real usage.²⁶

Ibn al-Ġawzī (d. 1201), in his *Kitāb Aḥbār al-Šifāt*, quite explicitly rules out the *ḥadīṭs* containing *šahṣ* as a distortion introduced by their transmitters, who thought that, by doing this, these *ḥadīṭs* would become more understandable. Ibn al-Ġawzī believes that *šahṣ* refers to a "compound body".

Although some transmitters use the term *šahṣ* in reporting this tradition, others follow the reading: "no being (*šay'*) is more jealous than God". In the case of traditions [containing the expression *lā šahṣa*], the transmitters simply added the term *šahṣ* [in place of *šay'*] because they supposed that to be the meaning of the text, but it should be noted that the use of this expression represents a change introduced by the

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 400. In this very book, Ibn Taymīyya, before the above-quoted discussion, explores the other thinkers who are for or against counting such *ḥadīṭs* as authentic and accordingly, whether we could attribute *šahṣ* to God. However, in the end he does not give his own view. See *ibid.*, p. 392-9.

²⁶ Ibn al-Aṭīr, *Al-Nihāya fi Ġarīb al-Ḥadīṭ wa-l-Aṭhar*, ed. M. Tanahi - T.A. Zawi, M. Esma'ilian, Qum 1367/ 1988, vol. 2, p. 450.

transmitters. The term *šahṣ* implies the existence of a body composed of parts, for one terms something a *šahṣ* because it possesses corporeality (*šuhūṣ*) and height. The truth of the matter is that the term *šahṣ* is to be taken as referring to creatures; it is not appropriate that the term be applied to the Creator. Hence, the tradition should be taken to mean: there is no jealous “person” [or *šahṣ*] among you but that God is more jealous than he.²⁷

Ibn al-Ġawzī writes unequivocally that *ḥadīṯ*s of this kind are not authentic. He nonetheless makes an attempt to justify them. Considering the fact that Ibn al-Ġawzī is undoubtedly familiar with the philosophical terminology, his effort to give grounds for this *ḥadīṯ* by saying that *šahṣ* is referring to people and not God is understandable: the crucial point of his argument is its first part, where he rejects the *ḥadīṯ*s containing the term *šahṣ* as distortions brought in by the transmitters; the second part is only an effort to account for their unorthodox version of the Prophet’s tradition.

Based on the evidence provided so far, one could in all likelihood argue that this word with connotation of ‘personhood’ has never been a genuine Arabic term.²⁸ This novel meaning must have been borrowed from other traditions of the early Islamic centuries.

There might be an objection to the claim that this sense must have been formed under the influence of some external source: one may object that there are instances, although very rare, of this usage in early texts like al-Buḥārī’s, where we can find a similarity between what the logicians understand by this word and its original Arabic sense. But first the authenticity of such *ḥadīṯ*s is suspect, as discussed by Ibn Ġawzī and Ibn Taymīyya;²⁹ second, we can simply consider the striking absence of this word from the non-logico-philosophical Arabic language and its abundant usage in the books translated in early Islamic centuries. It is telling that in other genres, i.e. outside the scope of philosophy and logic, for example in *kalām*, *ḥadīṯ* and so on this sense of *šahṣ* cannot be found.³⁰

The fact that some translators of logico-philosophical texts to Arabic choose *šahṣ* as an equivalent to the Greek *ἄτομον*³¹ and, less frequently, *καθ’ ἑκαστον*³² was so welcomed by later translators that

²⁷ Swartz, *A Medieval Critique of Anthropomorphism. Ibn Al-Ġawzī’s Kitāb Aḥbār aṣ-Ṣifāt* (above, n. 20), pp. 189-90.

²⁸ Swartz has the same stance about the real meaning of *šahṣ* in Arabic and believes that ‘person’ is never a satisfactory rendering of this word, for the lexicons point out repeatedly that it refers to “bodily or corporeal form or figure or substance of a man”, or something possessing height and visibility. “The term *šahṣ* is entirely devoid of anything comparable to the Western notion of personhood” (*ibid.*, p. 189). He is thus forced to retain the Arabic word in his translation and only use its transliteration. I have two remarks: 1) Swartz reads *sawād* as *suwād* which is unclear, and then translates it as ‘substance’, which also adds to the ambiguity; *sawād* is both the ‘body’ and ‘darkness’ which are in direct correspondence to *šahṣ*, and by this reading, he could easily avoid such complexity. 2) In referring to the usual meaning of *šahṣ*, he invokes “the Western notion of personhood” which is also far from the context; he could simply refer to “the philosophical notion of individuality” even in the earliest intellectual communities of the Islamic world.

²⁹ Both suspect that these traditions could have been formed or altered under the influence of the logico-philosophical language.

³⁰ See for example: ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Ḥayyāt, *al-Intiṣār wa al-radd ‘alā Ibn al-Rāwandī al-mulḥid*; Abū l-Ḥassan al-Aṣṣārī, *Maqālāt al-Islāmīyyin wa Iḥtilāf al-Muṣallin*; al-Ġāḥiz, *Kitāb al-Ḥayawān*; *Rasā’il al-Ġāḥiz*; *Kitāb al-Bayān wa al-Tibyān*; a collection of pre-Islamic poems known as *Mu’allaqāt al-Sab’*; Muḥammad Ibn Ġarīr Ṭabarī, *Tārīḥ al-Ṭabarī*.

³¹ For instance, Abū ‘Uṭmān al-Dimaṣqī in his rendering of *ἄτομον* throughout the *Isagoge* uses *šahṣ*. See *Isāgūḡī* in ‘A. Badawī, *Mantiq Aristū*, Wakalat Al-Maṭbū‘āt Dār al-Qalam, vol. 3, pp. 1021-68. Also Ibn al-Muqaffā’, as one of the very early translators, uses this word several times in his *al-Mantiq* (Ibn al-Muqaffā’, *al-Mantiq li-Ibn al-Muqaffā’*, ed. M.T. Danishpazhuh, Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Tehran 1381/2002, p. 4, 5, 6, 9, 20, 21).

³² An example of this can be found in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* (Ar. *Mā bā’ d al-Ṭabī’a*): see Ibn Ruṣd, *Tafsīr Mā bā’ d al-Ṭabī’a*, Hekmat, Tehran 1377, vol. 1, p. 173.

in their works, for example that of Porphyry's *Isagoge* (*Īsāgū'gī*), this word is frequently used in its novel meaning, namely referring to 'a person, individual, and a thing belonging to a species'. As Ibn Taymīyya pointed out above, it was exclusively used in logical and philosophical contexts, while in the then contemporary non-philosophical literature (better, in the works of those who were not so familiar with philosophical terminology) one can hardly, if one ever could, find *šahṣ* signifying 'an individual'. There is a puzzling discrepancy in the usage of a term in two apparently separate contexts in the very same Arab community – though time proved that they were convergent: the common language was to undergo a change and as a result, the philosophical literature was to dictate the primary meaning of this term to other fields of the Arabic language.

It can be inferred that *šahṣ* in the sense of 'an individual', despite its common meaning as 'body and bodily appearance', was not a familiar word to the Arabs, and it was due to the translators of the logico-philosophical works if it took this secondary meaning. This conclusion is based on the following reasons: 1) The Quranic and *ḥadīth* literature, as the main sources of the Arabic language in the early centuries, make no use of this word in the sense of 'individual or person'. Rare counterexamples are of suspect authenticity. 2) Works which were far away from the influence of philosophical literature, such as those of *kalām*, history and the like are tellingly silent about the meaning of 'individual' attributed to this term. 3) No lexicon indicates such a meaning for it. 4) Despite its absence from the Arabic non-philosophical language, it is frequently and abundantly used in logical and philosophical works. 5) Islamic scholars like Ibn Taymīyya and Ibn Aṭīr explicitly state that *šahṣ* in the sense of 'individual' is not originally Arabic and is a strange use of this word.

In conclusion, the great importance of Ibn al-Muqaffā' (d. 756 or 759), as one of the very first translators from Greek into Arabic, most probably through Pahlavi,³³ must be taken into account. As mentioned before, *šahṣ* and the plural *ašḥās* are used noticeably in the treatise called *al-Mantiq*, which is historically attributed to al-Muqaffā' or, by some modern scholars, to his son (d. ca. 760),³⁴ whereas in other works by al-Muqaffā' we cannot find him making any use of *šahṣ* as 'individual or person'.³⁵ This is a crucial point, through a deeper study of which we might succeed in shedding some light on the origins of the dual meaning of *šahṣ*.

3. *Šahṣ* for the Persians

Inspecting Persian in order to find the meanings of the word *šahṣ* in that neighbouring language of the Arabs will help us illuminate on the likely source of the change of meaning of this Arabic term. Essential to our treatment of this discrepancy is the remark that *šahṣ* – signifying either 'body' or 'person' – is used frequently in Persian poetry and prose, while the non-philosophical Arabic texts of the early *hijrī* centuries do not use *šahṣ* as 'person'. On the contrary, the works written in Persian in the same period seem to be more acquainted with this usage.³⁶

Among all the translations into Arabic carried out in the early centuries from different languages, those attributed to Ibn al-Muqaffā' are known as the very first ones, which are often (albeit

³³ Based on Ibn al-Nadīm's account, one could hold Ibn al-Muqaffā' to be the first scholar to compose a logical work in the Islamic period. See Ibn Nadīm, *al-Fihrist*, Beirut 1417/1996, p. 337.

³⁴ See for example J. van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra: Eine Geschichte des religiösen Denkens im frühen Islam*, De Gruyter, Berlin, 1991-7, vol. 2, p. 27.

³⁵ The works by Ibn al-Muqaffā' include *al-Adab al-Kabīr*; *al-Adab al-Šaḡīr*; *al-Durra al-Yatīma*; *Kalīla wa-Dimna*.

³⁶ Compare two classic history books, viz. the *Tārīḫ al-Ṭabarī* (Ṭabarī, *Tārīḫ al-Rusul wa-l-Mulūk*, ed. M. A. Ibrahim, Dār al-Turāṭ, Beirut 1387/1967) and its Persian translation *Tārīḫ Bal'amī*; in the former, which was composed some 50 years before the Persian translation, there is no mention of this word as connoting 'personhood', while the *Bal'amī* uses this term in reference to people (for example, see *Tārīḫnāmah-i Ṭabarī*, ed. M. Roushan, Soroush, Tehran 1378/1999, vol. 1, pp. 10, 82, 84, 170).

controversially) held to be made from Pahlavi; among them there is *Kalīla wa-Dimna*, a masterpiece of Arabic literary prose. However, the focus will be here on the translation into Arabic of a work of Aristotelian logic, most probably from Pahlavi or perhaps, as argued by Paul Kraus, from another language.³⁷ This translation is attributed either to Ibn al-Muqaffa' or to his son Muḥammad,³⁸ and contains a sort of free translation of the *Isagoge*, plus Aristotle's *On Interpretation* and *Prior Analytics*; its influence on later translators can hardly be exaggerated.

Analyzing the cases in which the author uses *šahṣ* and, in addition to that, taking into account his mother tongue, namely Persian, would give us a good deal of evidence for coming up with a reasonable theory on the origin of the semantic change mentioned above; we must try to relate *šahṣ* in the sense of 'body or corporeal appearance' to *šahṣ* in the sense of 'person or individual'. In his logical treatise, the Persian scholar shows the signs of a turning point, where this word came to be used in two separate senses: *šahṣ* as 'individual' is emerging and consequently, it co-occurs with *šahṣ* as 'body'.³⁹

3.1. Co-occurrence of Body and Person

After defining the genus as every name which includes the names with different forms, e.g. animal which groups the elephant and the ant while they possess different forms, Ibn al-Muqaffa' (or Ibn al-Muqaffa' junior) clarifies the meaning of 'form'⁴⁰ in this manner:

And the form is every name which occurs to names with differing *ašḥās*, a single form would embrace them. Such as the utterer saying: the man, thus he embraces with that this and that [man] whose *ašḥās* are different, while the form of man embraces them all.⁴¹

He clearly speaks of the *šahṣ* of a man which is different from the *šahṣ* of another man, though both fall under the same species. Despite the fact that the two senses can be derived in some way from the usage of *šahṣ* in this text, it shows more resemblance to 'body or matter' rather than 'person or individual'; how can we talk about the 'person or individual' of a man? Yet we obviously speak of his body or flesh. Additionally, considering the dominant explanation of the way two individuals are different in Peripatetic philosophy, two individuals of the same species could be different only with respect to their bodies and material appearances.⁴² However, on another occasion the Persian author

³⁷ P. Kraus, "Zu Ibn al-Muqaffa'", *Rivista degli Studi Orientali* 14 (1934), pp. 1-20, especially p. 13.

³⁸ Although Daneshpazhuh believes that there is still no consensus on the source language of Ibn al-Muqaffa', it is not of much concern to us here, since for our present study the sole fact that this book is by Ibn al-Muqaffa' or his son – as maintained by Daneshpazhuh against N. Rescher, *Studies in the History of Arabic Logic*, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 1963, p. 29, n. 3 – proves that this Arabic logical work is composed by someone familiar with Persian or Pahlavi. For the ways in which Daneshpazhuh argues his point see his "Introduction," in Ibn al-Muqaffa', *al-Mantiq*, pp. 64-9.

³⁹ One must not forget that the evolution in the usage of *šahṣ* started as a local convention in the philosophical circles in the Islamic world. Obviously, it was never a large-scale awareness in the common language of the Arabs, but only a local change among the specialists of the transmitted Greek intellectual tradition. It is thus reasonable to attribute such an alteration and, one might say, ingenuity to a specific person or group.

⁴⁰ Both 'form' and 'species' are renderings of the same Greek term εἶδος. Thus, Ibn al-Muqaffa', instead of *al-naw'*, which came to be the common term for 'species' in the Islamic world, uses *al-šūra*, which was to be the Arabic equivalent for 'form'. Therefore, in this context, when he uses *al-šūra* (the form), he means *al-naw'* (the species).

⁴¹ Ibn al-Muqaffa', *al-Mantiq*, p. 4.

⁴² Having the same specific form (*al-šūra al-naw'īyya*) and, therefore, being different by virtue of matter has been the prevalent view regarding the Aristotelian account of individuation, due to Aristotle's rather explicit reference to this issue (*Metaph.*, VII, 1034 a 5-8; V, 1016 b 31-35; XII, 1074 a 33) and, in general, the possibilities set forth by his system to explain the individual differences – at least, as understood by his early commentators.

makes use of *šahṣ* meaning ‘an individual or a member of a class’, which was, as far as we have found, without precedent in the Arabic language until then.

And the related (*al-mudāf*) separates from existence and nonexistence, in that the relative is found in differing *ašhāṣ* like the father and the son, and the owner and the owned. And sometimes the existence and nonexistence gather in a single *šahṣ* as the vision and its absence gather in a single eye...⁴³

It is clear that *šahṣ* is being used in the sense, new at that time, of ‘a person or individual’. Obviously, Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ uses *šahṣ* as an equivalent of the Greek ἄτομον, although in all likelihood he was not really familiar with Greek.⁴⁴

And therewith, that above which there is no genus is called *summum genus*, and that below which there is no species⁴⁵ of differing *ašhāṣ*, which are subsumed under a single species, is called *infima species*. And that which is indivisible and uncut is called *al-šahṣ*.⁴⁶

He is calling *šahṣ* the indivisible, i.e. the equivalent of the Greek ἄτομον. In the *Īsāgūḡī* translated by al-Dimašqī (d. after 914), whenever Porphyry uses ἄτομον, in the Arabic translation we find *šahṣ*. Therefore, considering the fact that *šahṣ* was never used in Arabic in that sense, it could be inferred that the terminology of the *Īsāgūḡī* is undoubtedly under the influence of this early translation of that precis or paraphrase of *Isagoge* rendered into Arabic either by Ibn al-Muqaffa‘, a Persian scholar who had mastery of both Pahlavi and Arabic, or maybe by his son. Although ἄτομον, which literally means ‘indivisible’, was also used to refer to ‘individual’, designating a thing or person belonging to a class – more or less as in contemporary usage – the important point is the reason why this term refers to two somewhat different concepts.⁴⁷

The understanding of individuality as some kind of indivisibility has been perhaps the most widespread view of individuality in the history of philosophy (...). Those who uphold this view find support for it in the very etymology of the term ‘individuality’, which suggests that the intention of individuality has to do with indivisibility. (...) For the medievals, who took a long time to clarify this issue, the indivisibility which characterizes individuals is that feature which prevents them from being divided into individuals belonging to the same species or kind as the individual in question.⁴⁸

Hence, there is a close relation between these two seemingly different concepts. However, the translators into Arabic were familiar with the two meanings of this term, and as a result, in the Arabic

⁴³ Ibn al-Muqaffa‘, *al-Manṭiq*, p. 20. There seems to be a mistake in Daneshpazhuh’s edition. He has included ‘existence and nonexistence’ in the rest of the sentence along with ‘the owner and the owned’; however, ‘existence and non-existence’ is clearly the subject of the next sentence.

⁴⁴ “Notwithstanding the attribution to Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ of the translation of some Greek works, along with the Persian ones, there is no mention of his knowing Greek in ancient sources, and moreover, we do not know that the translator in question knew any languages other than Arabic and Persian” (Abbas Iqbal, *Šarḥ-i Hāl-i ‘Abdullāh Ibn al-Muqaffā’*, Asātīr, Tehran 1382/2003, p. 57).

⁴⁵ As mentioned above, n. 41, in the Arabic text, instead of ‘species’ there is the other translation of εἶδος as ‘form’. Here, I use ‘species’ for *al-šūra*.

⁴⁶ Ibn al-Muqaffa‘, *al-Manṭiq*, p. 5.

⁴⁷ In Aristotle, ἄτομον refers to both ‘atom’, that which does not divide, and ‘individual’, a member of a species (*Metaph.*, III, 995 b 29-30; 998 b 14-15; 998 b 28-29).

⁴⁸ J. Gracia, *Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages*, Philosophia Verlag, München 1984, pp. 22-3.

translated texts one finds, depending on the context, either ‘indivisible’ or ‘individual’.⁴⁹ It is clear why in showing that this Greek term means ‘indivisible’ it is translated as ‘that which does not divide’ (*allatī lā-tataġazza*), yet the reason why it was translated as *šahṣ* in order to refer to ‘individual or entity’ is still obscure.

The Arabic word *šahṣ*, as seen above, was never taken to convey such a concept, and it is unclear why these early translators choose a word which designates ‘body, matter, or corporeity’, namely *šahṣ*, to carry the sense of ‘individual and person’. Let me stress again that *šahṣ* and its derivatives bear no relation to either ‘individual’ or ‘indivisible’, a point which leaves us with even not the smallest clue in order to relate this word to its novel semantic function in Arabic.

In concluding this section, I would like to outline a plausible explanation. In the Greek texts translated into Arabic, there is a word which sometimes signifies ‘that which does not divide’, and on other occasions ‘that which belongs, as a member, to a kind or class’, and these two concepts are very likely to be held interrelated.⁵⁰ According to the extant early Arabic translations, two expressions were adopted to convey these notions: 1) expressions like *lā-munqasim* or *lā-mutaġazzi*, which refer to its ‘indivisibility’; 2) *šahṣ*, which refers to its ‘individuality’. The former is well understandable; however, the basis for the latter is far from clear. The question why a word which means ‘body, corporeity, and corporal appearance’ should be chosen to refer to ‘individual or person’ remains unanswered. Here, the role of a Persian mediator becomes prominent, and whether this mediator is al-Muqaffa’ or his son is hardly of primary importance to our question.

3.2. A Similar Term in Iranian Languages?

Pahlavi or Persian could probably shed some light on the obscurity resulting from the weird change undergone by the Arabic word *šahṣ*,⁵¹ the change as the result of which it came to signify both ‘body’ and ‘individual’. In Middle Persian,⁵² the word *tan* always had the semantic function which is in close accordance with the Arabic *šahṣ*. The Pahlavi *tan* is derived from a much older term used both in Avestan and Old Persian: *tanū*. Not only does it refer to ‘body, corporeity’ but it also signifies ‘self’ or, more precisely, ‘physical self’ as opposed to ‘immaterial self’, namely *urvan* (soul), which later became *ruwān* in Pahlavi. The Avestan *tanū* does not necessarily mean ‘body’, because it is also widely used in the pronominal sense “self-, oneself”.⁵³

R. Kent, in his lexicon in *Old Persian*, contributes an entry for *tanū* and mentions “body, self” as the equivalents of this word.⁵⁴

⁴⁹ For some of the instances in Aristotle of this term being translated as indivisible (like the Arabic *lā-munqasim* or *lā-mutaġazzi*), see S.M. Afnan, *A Philosophical Lexicon*, Hekmat, Tehran 1385/2006, p. 50. There are also other examples such as the translations of Arist., *Metaph.*, II 2, 994 b 21; X 8, 1058 a 20; X 9, 1058 b 10; *Phys.* VII 5, 257 b 4.

⁵⁰ As discussed by Gracia, quoted above n. 49.

⁵¹ The present study does not intend to raise the controversial question of the translation of Greek literature into Pahlavi, since it is not directly involved in the present question. In comparison to Arabic, Pahlavi is about to be held as an earlier target language of Greek literature, as some scholars are trying to establish.

⁵² The same as contemporary Persian.

⁵³ W. Skalmowski, “Avestan *tanu.pərəθa-*”, in L. Isebaert (ed.), *Studia Etymologica Indoeuropaea memoriae A.J. Van Windekens (1915-1989) dicata*, Peeters, Louvain 1991, pp. 273-80, here p. 273.

⁵⁴ R. Kent, *Old Persian. Grammar, Texts, Lexicon*, American Oriental Society, New Haven(CT) 1950, p. 186.

In Pahlavi, *tan* is used to serve the same purpose. In his entry for *tan*, Mackenzie cites both ‘body’ and ‘person’.⁵⁵ *Tan*, primarily, refers to ‘body and physical appearance’; moreover, it is used to talk about ‘a person or individual’.⁵⁶ Besides its common and well-known application in Pahlavi as ‘body’, *tan*, together with *hwēš*,⁵⁷ constitutes a very frequent compound as *hwēštān* meaning ‘self’.⁵⁸ Now that we have shown that in pre-Islamic Iranian languages (also in New Persian, as it started to emerge from the very early Islamic centuries) there was a word which had the same semantic role as the Arabic *šahṣ*, a few centuries before the translation movement during which this Arabic term accepted a novel signification, we must seek to establish a channel through which the Iranian word could be linked to the Arabic one.

So far, we have seen that there is a turning point in *al-Mantiq* through which *šahṣ* denoting ‘individual’ becomes introduced into logico-philosophical literature; on the other hand, in Iranian languages there is a term (*tan*) which had been used to signify both ‘corporeity or body’ (the original meaning of *šahṣ*) and ‘individual’. In what follows, it should be shown that Ibn al-Muqaffa’ or his son without falling into the complexities caused by the modern scholarship in discussing the authorship of Ibn al-Muqaffa’ could be held as the innovator of this tweak.

4. The Earliest Source

In our quest to trace *šahṣ* in Arabic language, the oldest source we have managed to find where *šahṣ* is used to mean ‘individual’ is the well-known logical text attributed to Ibn al-Muqaffa’.⁵⁹ Considering the meaning of this word for the native Persians, among whom we have ‘Abd Allah ibn al-Muqaffa’ (and maybe also Ibn al-Muqaffa’ junior, namely Muḥammad ibn al-Muqaffa’) who is a prominent scholar well versed not only in Arabic but also in Persian,⁶⁰ it could be justifiable to attribute to the author of *al-Mantiq* the ingenuity in virtue of which the Arabic *šahṣ* underwent the change discussed here. Ibn al-Muqaffa’, or his son Muḥammad, with a Persian-structured mind, had the Persian and Pahlavi word *tan* at his disposal, a word which would help him to convey two meanings: ‘body’ and ‘individual’. As noted above, the question as to whether the original text out of which the Arabic *al-Mantiq* was created was in Pahlavi, Syriac or Greek is secondary to the present purpose. The mere fact that Ibn al-Muqaffa’, or his son, knew Persian or Pahlavi supports this reconstruction of the origins of *šahṣ* as ‘individual or person’.⁶¹

⁵⁵ D.N. Mackenzie, *A Concise Pahlavi Dictionary*, Oxford U.P., Oxford 1971, p. 81.

⁵⁶ In his *Persian-Pahlavi Dictionary*, Farahvashi mentions *tan* in both entries of ‘*šahṣ*’ (‘individual’) and *badan* (‘body’). See the entries of ‘*badan*’, and ‘*šahṣ*’ in B. Farahvashi, *Farhang-i Fārsi bi Pahlavi*, Tehran, Danišgāh-i Tehrān, 1381, p. 68, 327.

⁵⁷ *Hwēš*: ‘(one’s) own’ (Mackenzie, *Dictionary*, quoted above n. 56, p. 96).

⁵⁸ Being a descendant of Old Persian *tanū*, the Pahlavi *tan* cannot be held to be influenced by Syriac or Greek texts translated into Pahlavi before the rise of Islam.

⁵⁹ Without providing any evidence, M. Cooperson speculates on the basis of Kraus’ controversial article (above, n. 37) that this translation could not have been done by any of the Persian Ibn al-Muqaffa’*s*. According to Cooperson, the translator was a Christian convert named Moḥammad ibn al-Muqaffa’. This claim is hardly defensible. See M. Cooperson, “Ibn al-Muqaffa’,” in O. Leaman (ed.), *The Biographical Encyclopedia of Islamic Philosophy*, Routledge, London 2006, pp. 280-6; see also M. Cooperson, “Ibn al-Muqaffa’,” in J.W. Meri, *Medieval Islamic Civilization*, vol. 1, Routledge, London 2006, p. 346.

⁶⁰ On the fact that Ibn al-Muqaffa’ junior did most probably know not only Persian but also Pahlavi, a fact that is hard to contradict, see the most recent study on Ibn al-Muqaffa’ and *al-Mantiq* which is about to be published: E. Hermans, “A Persian Origin of the Arabic Aristotle? The Debate on the Circumstantial Evidence of the *Mantiq* revisited”, *Journal of Persianate Studies*, forthcoming.

⁶¹ Furthermore, if one is sceptical enough to doubt the authorship of any of these two Ibn al-Muqaffa’*s* and only hold them as the editors, again we could envisage that any of them could have imposed this dual signification upon *šahṣ* in editorial stages.

Having the task of conveying the concept of ‘personhood and individuality’ into Arabic, the Persian author of *al-Mantiq*, inspired by the Persian and Pahlavi *tan*, could be supposed to have appealed to the Arabic *šahṣ*, which is the term with the closest meaning to the Persian and Pahlavi *tan* to translate the Greek, logico-philosophical concept frequently mentioned for example in the *Isagoge*.

5. Pahlavi as the Source Language?

On this ground, and in the light of recent research on the author of *al-Mantiq*,⁶² it is likely to assume that the source language of this translation was an Iranian language, more precisely Pahlavi. Accordingly, one of the Ibn al-Muqaffa’s, either the father or son, could have had as the equivalent of the Greek ἄτομον in his Pahlavi version of the text either *tan*, or some other similar word, each of which would not cast doubt on our argument: on the one hand, if the term in the Pahlavi *Isagoge* had been *tan* (which would be a proper assumption and is also more probable), he then just needed to turn to the Arabic *šahṣ*, which corresponded to *tan* in one important respect, i.e. in referring to a kind of ‘body’ which involves movement and roughly can be held as living, rather than to ‘matter’ (*mādda*) which is a very general term including non-organic entities.⁶³ On the other hand, if in the Pahlavi translation of the *Isagoge* ἄτομον had been rendered by a term other than *tan*, but synonymous with it, then Ibn al-Muqaffa’ could have been inspired by the notions denoted by *tan*, viz. ‘body’ and ‘person’, thus inventing a new usage for *šahṣ* which was potentially a good candidate to serve this purpose. According to each scenario, it would seem reasonable enough to think that the Persian translator could have modified his Arabic choice,⁶⁴ namely *šahṣ*, according to the Pahlavi *tan*.⁶⁵

⁶² Although D. Gutas agrees that considering Ibn al-Muqaffa’ as the translator of this logical compendium is not far-fetched (see D. Gutas, “Origins in Baghdad,” in R. Pasnau, *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge 2014, pp. 11-25), with regard to the source language he leaves the matter undecided (D. Gutas, “Die Wiedergeburt der Philosophie und die Übersetzung ins Arabische”, in U. Rudolph [ed.], *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Philosophie in der Islamischen Welt. 8.-10. Jahrhundert*, Schwabe, Basel, 2012, pp. 55-91, here pp. 72-3). G. Troupeau, “La logique d’Ibn al-Muqaffa’ et les origines de la grammaire arabe”, *Arabica* 28 (1981), pp. 242-50, on the basis of some linguistic evidence, I. Kristó-Nagy, *La pensée d’Ibn al-Muqaffa’*, Éditions de Paris, Paris 2013, pp. 175-9, on the basis of the fact that Ibn al-Muqaffa’ applies logical rules in his other works and remarking that he did not know Greek or Syriac, and E. Hermans, “A Persian Origin” (quoted above, n. 60), with a comprehensive inspection of the studies on Ibn al-Muqaffa’ and *al-Mantiq*, as well as of “the circumstantial evidence” that all the arguments against the existence of a Pahlavi medium are insufficient, maintain that Ibn al-Muqaffa’’s work was in all likelihood translated from a Pahlavi original.

⁶³ One may wonder why did Ibn al-Muqaffa’ not use the term *ḡism* to translate the Pahlavi *tan* in relationship to matter and body. In fact, *ḡism* has always been more frequent and widely used than *šahṣ* in Arabic. However, there is a subtle difference between these two words: *ḡism* is used to talk about any kind of matter, including the nonorganic, and is very general and inclusive besides its being to some extent stationary; instead, *šahṣ* was mostly used to refer to the body of man and animal, i.e. things which are alive and moving. This nuance shows that it is in complete concord with *tan*, which mainly refers to the body of living creatures, especially people.

⁶⁴ Whether *šahṣ* was his only choice, or he could have had other options but was looking for a fresh term to convey this new concept is the subject of an independent study.

⁶⁵ There were other words like *aḥad*, *raḡul*, *insān*, *šay*, etc. which could have appeared as candidates to carry the concept of ‘individuality’, but they are assuredly insufficient. One might mention *fard* as a more acceptable alternative, but this word, in spite of its recent, common meaning, which is in complete agreement with the concept of “individuality”, was never used to refer to an ‘individual’ for many centuries. Its two meanings found in early texts are adjectival. In one sense (viz. ‘unique, one’), it was an attribute of God, and in the other (viz. ‘odd’), it served to indicate a set of numbers, as opposed to even numbers. The word *fard* in its usage as referring to ‘individual and person’ is a rather recent one and quite strange to early Arabs. There might be instances of the plural *afrād* in some texts of early Arab literature, but when inspected in detail, it appears

By taking into account this innovation by the author of *al-Manṭiq* into account, it becomes clear why in his logical texts *šahṣ* is used at times so equivocally that the reader would be likely to have difficulty in discerning what his real intention is; is he speaking of ‘body’, or ‘person’? This could also explain why Persian authors of the early centuries of the Islamic tradition who were also the first writers of the early New Persian,⁶⁶ were more accustomed to using *šahṣ* in both senses rather than the native Arabs themselves.⁶⁷

To sum up, it is evident that *šahṣ* in its meaning as ‘individual and person’ was not genuine Arabic, and it generally designated ‘body and bodily appearance’. Tracking the change that occurred to *šahṣ* in terms of its meaning it became clear that *šahṣ* in its then new usage had entered Arabic through the path of the translation movement, because this word was very common in logico-philosophical literature, while, exactly at the same time, it was intriguingly absent from other fields of the Arabic language. Among the translations of that period that are extant, the logical work attributed to Ibn al-Muqaffā’ is of great importance for us due to two reasons: 1) This text being one of the very early, if not the first, work translated into Arabic; 2) Ibn al-Muqaffā’ himself being a distinguished scholar of Arabic who has proven to be an influential figure with regard to his non-native language, viz. Arabic.⁶⁸

The Pahlavi *tan* signifies both ‘body’ and ‘individual, self, or person’, when no single clue was found in order to justify why *šahṣ*, and not some other word, or even a neologism, was chosen to carry the concept of ‘individual or person’ to Arabic.

This suggests to relate the two Persian and Arabic words, and advance that *tan* might have been most likely the cause of this change undergone by *šahṣ*. More precisely, *tan* could have inspired the author (or perhaps the editor) of *al-Manṭiq* to use an Arabic term which, before then, only meant ‘body and corporeality’ in order to designate also the ‘individual and person’.

As a supplementary evidence, the case of early Iranian writers of Persian prose and poetry shows that these authors, being familiar with both languages, were more accustomed to the secondary meaning of *šahṣ*. There are occasions when they use one of these terms instead of the other or even they make use of them simultaneously – an evidence that attests to the deep affinity of these two seemingly different terms.

6. Conclusion

I have tried to show that the word *šahṣ*, despite its meaning as ‘body, bodily figure, and corporeality’ in classical Arabic, in the sense of ‘person, individual, and member of a class’ was never recognized as true Arabic, rather as a technical term in the logico-philosophical circles which date back to the Graeco-Arabic translation movement. Finding no plausible relation between other meanings derived from this root, namely *šḥṣ*, and its then new meaning as ‘individual’ or ‘person’, I have had recourse to the terminology used in the Arabic precis or paraphrase of the *Isagoge* known as *al-Manṭiq*: the

that it is in all probability a plural of *farid*, not *fard*. I am planning to devote and independent research to the word *fard*.

⁶⁶ New Persian is the language that came to be used in Iran about two centuries after the conquest by the Arabs.

⁶⁷ Interestingly, Nāšir Ḥusraw (d. 1088) and Bal‘amī (d. 992 or 997) use both *tan* and *šahṣ*, together or alone, in the same context, a fact which indicates the similarity of the two terms. It is telling that these Persian writers are aware of the similitude of these two words and use them interchangeably. For example, see Nāšir Ḥusraw, *Zād al-Musāfir*, ed. E. Haeri, *Mīrāt-i Maktūb*, Tehran 1384 /2005, pp. 187, 193.

⁶⁸ Even if the work was done by his son, what matters is the fact that all the ancient sources attribute it to ‘Abd Allāh ibn al-Muqaffā’, not to his son, and authority was granted to it as the work of the renowned ‘Abd Allāh ibn al-Muqaffā’.

earliest extant logical text in Arabic using the term *šabṣ*, where this word is used with the meaning in question on several occasions. As the next step, in my attempt to explain why Ibn al-Muqaffa' or, as some scholars like P. Kraus believe, his son should have given this sense to this word, I have suggested the Pahlavi word *tan* and its dual meaning, viz. 'body' and 'person', as a possible source of inspiration for the author of *al-Mantiq*. On the one hand, he had the Arabic word *šabṣ* in its original meaning of 'body and bodily appearance', and on the other, he had at his disposal the Pahlavi *tan*, which was used to refer to both 'body' and 'person'. On this ground, I have suggested that the change undergone by *šabṣ* – a change that rendered it non-Arabic in meaning, as Ibn Taymīyya and Ibn al-Ġawzī claim – can be explained through the influence that the Middle Persian, or the early New Persian, could have had on Arabic. In supporting this explanation, I have mentioned the case of early Persian writers of the Islamic tradition like Nāṣir Ḥusraw and Bal'amī: on the one hand, they prove to be completely familiar with the secondary meaning of *šabṣ* as 'person' or 'individual', while in the works of their Arab peers, e.g. historical and literary works, this term does not have such meaning; on the other hand, they show their complete awareness of the deep similarity of *šabṣ* and *tan* by using them in similar contexts interchangeably.

The Šābi'ans of Šā'id al-Andalusī

Godefroid de Callataÿ*

Abstract

The *Ṭabaqāt al-umam* opens with an account of the seven primeval nations taken from Mas'ūdī's *Tanbīh*. At the end of Šā'id's version, however, we are told that “these seven nations, which together constituted the whole of mankind, were all Šābi'ans” – an indication not found in the Oriental model. Several references to Šābi'ans also appear in the core of the *Ṭabaqāt*, a definitely more original section of the work in which the author reports the achievements of the eight nations (Indians, Persians, Chaldeans, Greeks, Romans, Egyptians, Arabs, and Jews) which in his view contributed to the improvement of science. The present paper examines all these passages. We try to determine where the author of the *Ṭabaqāt* situates these groups of Šābi'ans in the overall history of the nations, and we ask ourselves to what extent these groups may be regarded as continuators or remnants of the primordial Šābi'ans.

In 460/1068, not long before Toledo passed under Christian control, the Muslim scholar Šā'id al-Andalusī, who had been a *qāḍī* in this city for some time, put an end to the redaction of a book in which he purported to review the scientific achievements of the different nations of the world. This is his *Ṭabaqāt al-umam* (*Categories of Nations*), a work whose pioneering position in the historiography of science from a world perspective needs no further elaboration.¹ The structure of the treatise, the only one of Šā'id's works to have come down to us, is extraordinarily simple. Having left out of his review the nations and races of the earth that in his view did not contribute to the improvement of science – most remarkably, the Chinese and the Turks –, Šā'id retains eight nations, reserving one chapter for each in the rest of his *opus*. The order in which these eight nations are dealt with is the following: (1) the Indians (*fi l-hind*); (2) the Persians (*fi l-furs*); (3) the Chaldaeans (*inda l-kaldān*); (4) the Greeks (*fi l-yūnān*); (5) the Romans (*fi l-rūm*);

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¹ See for instance: M. Plessner, “Der Astronom und Historiker Ibn Šā'id al-Andalusī und seine Geschichte der Wissenschaften”, *Rivista degli Studi Orientali* 31 (1956), pp. 235-57, here p. 235: “Er [Šā'id] hat als erster eine Weltgeschichte der Wissenschaften versucht und damit ein Werk geschenkt, das als einziges unter allen älteren wissenschaftshistorischen Büchern in arabischer Sprache, soweit sie uns erhalten sind, einen trotz – oder wegen – seiner Kürze grösstenteils lesbaren Text bietet und nicht hauptsächlich aus Biographien und Aufzählungen von Büchertiteln besteht”; M.S. Khan, “*Ṭabaqāt al-umam* of Qāḍī Šā'id al-Andalusī”, *Indian Journal of History of Science* 30/2-4 (1995), pp. 133-49, here p. 133: “The *Ṭabaqāt al-Umam* by Qāḍī Šā'id al-Andalusī is a work of importance, being ‘the first world history of science’”; J. Samsó, *Las Ciencias de los Antiguos en al-Andalus*, Fundación Ibn Tufayl de Estudios Árabes, Almería 2011, p. 19: “una auténtica historia universal de la ciencia”.

(6) the Egyptians (*fi abl maṣr*); (7) the Arabs (*inda l-'arab*); (8) the Jews (*fi banī isrā'īl*). This sequence seems to correspond to a progression from East to West, combined with the desire to conclude the survey by focusing on the achievements of scholars still active on the soil of al-Andalus.² In the prologue to the work, the same eight nations appear in the same order, except that the Hebrews are there inserted between the Chaldaeans (whom they are said to derive from) and the Greeks.³

The seven primeval Nations

The same prologue opens with the mention of a theory – already found in Mas'ūdī's *Tanbīh*⁴ – according to which the ecumene (the inhabited quarter of the earth) originally consisted of seven primeval nations (*umam*). Šā'id introduces this doctrine in these words:

Those who have studied the history of the nations and thoroughly examined the epochs and the succession of eras sustain that in ancient times (*fi sālif al-duhūr*), before the subdivision into tribes and the separation of languages, there were seven nations.⁵

These seven primeval nations are then briefly described by the author, in the following succession: (1) 'Persians'; (2) 'Chaldaeans' (including Syrians, Babylonians, Armenians, Nabateans, and others); (3) 'Greeks, Romans, Franks, Galicians, Burjān, Slavs, Russians, and others'; (4) 'Copts' (including Egyptians, Abyssinians, Nubians, Berbers, and others); (5) a collection of 'Turkish tribes'; (6) 'peoples from Hind and Sind'; (7) 'peoples from Šīn'. For each of these seven nations (or rather groups of nations, as we can see), the author repeatedly insists that 'they spoke a unique language and formed a unique empire (*kānat luġatu hum wāḥida wa-mamlakatu hum wāḥida*)'.

The following Table (see Fig. 1) will help us to summarize the principal indications of the text regarding the geographic location and, when specified, the 'unique language' attributed to each of these groups.

² G. Martinez-Gros, "Classification des nations et classifications des sciences: trois exemples andalous du V^e/XI^e siècle", *Mélanges de la Casa Velázquez* 20 (1984), pp. 84-114, here pp. 87-8: "L'influence de la géographie des climats est encore sensible dans l'ordre de succession des Nations qui se sont intéressées aux sciences: Indiens, Perses, Chaldéens, Grecs, *Rūm*, Egyptiens, Arabes (d'Orient et d'Espagne), Juifs enfin. En gros, on le voit, la science va d'Est en Ouest, dans la zone centrale de la Terre, même si les irrégularités de cette progression attirent déjà l'attention. L'Arabie est à l'est de l'Egypte, de la Grèce, du *Rūm*, qui la précèdent pourtant sur notre liste. Mais les Arabes sont répartis en 'Orientaux' et 'Andalous' et ici, visiblement le point de vue andalou l'emporte. Plus gênante la place des Juifs, en dernière position, quand leur terre d'origine est la Syrie". See also: M.G. Balty-Guesdon, "Al-Andalus et l'héritage grec d'après les *Ṭabaqāt al-umam* de Šā'id al-Andalusī", in A. Hasnawī – A. Elamrani-Jamal – M. Aouad (eds.), *Perspectives arabes et médiévales sur la tradition et scientifique et philosophique grecque*. Actes du colloque de la SIHSPAI, Paris 31 mars - 3 avril 1993, Peeters, Paris - Leuven 1993, pp. 331-42, here p. 336: "Le second présupposé à l'œuvre dans les *Ṭabaqāt al-umam* est l'universalité des sciences, dans le passé et dans leur réalisation présente. Toutes les nations ont cultivé des parties d'un même ensemble, à des degrés divers. Aucun savoir n'est attribué à l'un ou à l'autre. Tous ces savoirs ont convergé vers l'Andalus".

³ Abū l-Qāsim ibn Šā'id al-Andalusī, *Ṭabaqāt*, ed. L. Cheikho, Beirut 1912 (reprinted in: *Kitāb Ṭabaqāt al-Umam par Abū l-Qāsim Ibn Šā'id al-Andalusī* (m. 462/1069-70), Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science at the Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe University, Frankfurt a.M. 1999 [hereafter: Cheikho-Blachère]), p. 7.

⁴ Mas'ūdī, *Tanbīh*, ed. J.M. De Goeje, Brill, Leiden 1894 (*BGA*, VIII), pp. 77-85.

⁵ *Ṭabaqāt*, p. 5 Cheikho-Blachère.

<i>Nations</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Language</i>
Persians	'at the centre of the ecumene': Zagros, Ṭabaristān, Khurasān, Kirmān, Sijistān, Fārs...	'Originally Persian (then Pahlavi, Zend, and other idioms')
Chaldaeans	'at the centre of the ecumene': Sawād, Jazīra, Syria, Arabia, Hijāz, Tihāma, Najd, Ḥaḍramawt, Yaman...	'Originally Syriac (then also Hebrew and Arabic)'
Greeks, Romans, Franks, Galicians, Burjān, Slavs, Russians	Black Sea, Sea of Azov, 'in the upper-North quarter of the ecumene'	'A unique language' (<i>unspecified, but presumably Greek</i>)
Copts	Egypt, 'Peoples of the South', 'Peoples of the West, as far as the Atlantic Ocean'	'A unique language' (<i>unspecified, but presumably Copt</i>)
Turks	<i>Unspecified</i>	'A unique language' (<i>unspecified, but presumably Turk</i>)
Hind and Sind	India, Sind, and surroundings	'A unique language' (<i>unspecified, but presumably Sanskrit</i>)
Šīn	China, 'Āmūr, and surroundings	'A unique language' (<i>unspecified, but presumably Chinese</i>)

Fig. 1. The seven primeval nations in the *Ṭabaqāt al-umam*

In a previous article I have argued that this distribution of the seven primeval nations which we find in both Maṣ'ūdī and Šā'id (with only minor discrepancies between the two) has its roots in the theory of *kēšvar-s* (Arabic: *kišwār-s*) ultimately deriving from Sasanid Persia. This theory postulates that the world was originally made up of seven circular territories, six of which circumscribing the seventh – the region of the Īrānshār – at the centre of the representation. The manuscript tradition of Bīrūnī's *Ṭahdīd nihāyāt al-amākin*⁶ preserves a typical example of this scheme, which takes the following aspect (see Fig. 2).




Fig. 2. Bīrūnī's system of *kišwār-s*

⁶ See Al-Biruni, *The Determination of the Coordinates of Positions for the Correction of Distances between Cities*, ed. J. Ali, American Univ. of Beirut, Beirut 1967 (Centennial Publications), p. 101.

Early in Islamic geography, the Iranian *kišwār* theory was amalgamated with the Greek theory of climes, with its classical subdivision of the ecumene into seven horizontal bands aligned side-by-side in latitude in the Northern hemisphere. At some early stage, the *kišwār* theory was also given an astrological turn, with each of the circles being connected to a specific planet, as one infers for instance from a list of associations provided by Abū Mašar in his short treatise on ‘The Cities and their Climes, Signs, and Planets’.⁷ This system can be visualised as follows (see Fig. 3):




Fig. 3. Abū Mašar’s list of associations between planets and *kišwār*-s

Readers interested in the details of these associations and their astrological implications for Islamic geography and cosmology in the Middle Ages may refer to that other contribution.⁸ What will retain us here is the remark on which Ša‘id concludes his review of the seven primeval nations, one of the few statements not found as such in Maš‘ūdī’s *Tanbīh*. The text reads:

These seven nations together constituted the whole of mankind (*fa-hādīhi al-umam al-sab’a kānat muḥīta bi-ḡami’ al-bašar*). All of them were Šābi’ans, who worshipped idols representing the essences of the upper world and the individual spheres of the planets and the like (*wa-kānū ḡami’an šābi’a ya’budūn al-ašnām tamṭīlan bi al-ḡawābir al-’ulwiyya wa-l-ašḡāš al-falakiyya min al-kawākib al-sab’a wa-ḡayri hā*). These seven nations later split up, their languages divided, and their religions diverged

⁷ See K. Yamamoto - Ch. Burnett (eds.), *Abū Mašar on Historical Astrology. The Book of Religions and Dynasties (On the Great Conjunctions)*, Brill, Leiden - Boston - Köln 2000 (Islamic Philosophy Theology and Science. Texts and Studies, vol. 33-34), Vol. I, pp. 514-19.

⁸ G. de Callatay, “*Kiṣwār*-s, planètes et rois du monde: le substrat iranien de la géographie arabe, à travers l’exemple des *Ikhwān al-Šafā’*”, in B. Broeckeaert - S. Van den Branden - J.J. Pérennès (eds.), *Perspectives on Islamic Culture, Essays in Honour of Emilio G. Platti*, Peeters, Leuven 2013 (Les Cahiers du MIDEO, 6), pp. 53-71.

from one another (*tumma iftaraqat hādīhi al-umam al-sab'a wa-taša'abat luġātu hā wa-tabāyanat adyānu hum*).⁹

This is the first time that 'the Šābi'ans' are mentioned in the treatise. What Šā'id reports here suggests that these people of a bygone age were primarily characterized by their obsessiveness with idolatry and astrology. It also leaves us with the impression that this belief in the essences of the upper world was understood as being their own particular form of religion. What is definitely noteworthy in the above lines is the affirmation that in those remote and original times the Šābi'ans 'constituted the whole of mankind'.

The eight scientific Nations and the Šābi'ans

In the rest of his work, while dealing with the eight nations that have since then demonstrated their scientific skills, we find that Šā'id has a lot more to say about 'the Šābi'ans'. Indeed, he mentions Šābi'ans in connection with nearly every one of the nations he has retained for his classification. In some cases, as we shall see, he refers to them as to savants of the past, but in other instances he unambiguously mentions them as his own contemporaries. The present paper will focus on all these passages. We shall try to determine where the author of the *Ṭabaqāt* situates these groups of Šābi'ans in the overall history of the nations, and we shall ask ourselves to what extent these groups may be regarded as continuators or remnants of the primordial Šābi'ans.

Before we turn to these passages, we need first to highlight the structural similarities and dissimilarities between the two sequences of nations described by Šā'id, namely the seven primordial races on the one hand, and on the other the eight scientific nations (see Fig. 4).

Primeval Races	Scientific Nations
Persians	Indians
Chaldaeans	Persians
Greeks, Romans, etc.	Chaldaeans
Copts	Greeks
Turks	Romans
Indians	Egyptians
Chinese	Arabs
	Jews

Fig. 4. The seven primeval Races and the eight scientific Nations

The two lists agree with one another in defining as individual groups the Persians, the Indians, and the Egyptians (although these latter are named Copts in the second list). They also converge in the inclusion of the Greeks and the Romans, but whereas the sevenfold list gathers them together, with other nations, as a group of its own, the two are treated separately in the eightfold structure. Likewise, the Arabs and the Jews, who are part and parcel of the Chaldaeian group in the first sequence, now receive each their own chapter in the second. As for the Chinese and the Turks, two of the seven primeval races, they do not appear in the other list for not being regarded as scientific nations, as we have seen.

⁹ *Ṭabaqāt*, p. 7 Cheikho-Blachère.

Indians

The first category of Ṣābi'ans we come across in line with a 'scientific nation' are the "Indian Ṣābi'ans", which Ṣā'id mentions in Chapter 1 as one of the two groups constituting the country's population:

As for the divine science, they [the Indians] all agree that God – How powerful and exalted is He! – is unique and that there cannot be anything associated with Him, yet they disagree about the other issues regarding Him. Some of them are Brahmanists, and others are Ṣābi'ans. The Brahmanists form a group not large in number but claiming a noble extraction. Some of them sustain that the world was generated and some that it is eternal, yet they all agree that prophecies are vain, that it is forbidden to slaughter animals and to make them suffer. As for the Ṣābi'ans, who are a multitude and form the majority of the Indians, they affirm that the world is eternal, and that the cause of its existence is no other than the Creator – How powerful and exalted is He ! They attach great significance to the stars. They represent them with images in their likeness and seek to make them propitious through various operations in line with what they know of the nature of each one of these stars. [This they do] in order to attract the faculties of these stars and to direct these faculties on this world, in agreement with the dispositions of these stars and with their own choices (*Tabaqāt*, p. 12 Cheikho-Blachère).

As can be seen, Ṣā'id seems to consider the Ṣābi'ans of India as genuine followers of the primeval Ṣābi'ans, highlighting here again the penchant for astrology and astral magic yet reporting in addition their belief in the eternity of the world. What makes Ṣā'id's testimony particularly revealing is, of course, the assumption that these Indian Ṣābi'ans form the majority of the country's population in his own time. In the rest of the chapter, Ṣā'id confesses his relative unfamiliarity with Indian science, but still stresses the Indians' expertise and know-how in various disciplines, such as mathematics, music, or chess-playing. The science of the heavens again receives prime of place in this enumeration, with a detailed account of Sindhind, Arjabhar and Arkand, the three principal systems of classical Indian cosmology as they were known to Abū Ma'shar and many others in medieval Islam. These systems are three variants of a theory positing that the history of the universe consists in the indefinite succession of gigantic cycles determined by the return into conjunction of the seven planets with the starry sphere in the first degree of Aries. These systems vary from one another as to the length of this universal Great Year – namely, 4,320,000,000 years for the Sindhind, 4,320,000 years for the Arjabhar, and 360,000 years for the Arkand –, but they all agree in establishing the year -3,101 of the Common Era as the moment when the last great conjunction took place, coinciding with the great Flood and announcing the current cycle.¹⁰ In a similar vein, Ṣā'id also mentions by his name one Indian astronomer, i.e. Kanka. Although this is not said as such, we have the best reasons to assume that the *qādī* of Toledo attributed all these achievements of Indian astronomy to the 'Ṣābi'ans', rather than to the Brahmans.

All these are interesting data to be recalled here, especially when one considers the leading role that Ṣā'id is known to have played as part of the team of astronomers who were responsible for the construction of the illustrious 'Toledan Tables', lost in the Arabic original but still extant in a rich

¹⁰ See for instance D. Pingree, *The Thousands of Abū Ma'shar*, The Warburg Institute, London 1968, pp. 28-29. On the doctrine of the Great Year, see G. de Callatāy, *Annus Platonicus. A Study of World Years in Greek, Latin and Arabic Sources*, Peeters, Louvain - Paris 1996; G. de Callatāy, "Eternity and World Cycles", in Y. Melamed (ed.), *Eternity*, Oxford U.P., Oxford 2016, pp. 64-69.

and widely-ramified Latin tradition.¹¹ As has been established for long in modern scholarship, the 'Sindhind' Indo-Iranian tradition left a considerable imprint on these tables, which were to remain unsurpassed in al-Andalus until the time of King Alfonso X El Sabio and the 'Alphonsine Tables' in the thirteenth century.¹²

Persians

Chapter 2, on the Persians, also includes a passage on 'Šābi'ans', who in this case are manifestly referred to as a group of a bygone epoch. The text reads:

Some historians have reported that all Persians were originally monotheists who followed the religion of Noah (*fī awwal amri-hā kānat muwahhida 'alā dīn nūh*) – Peace be upon him! – until Budhāsaf the Oriental brought to Ṭahmūrath, the third king of Persia, the doctrine of the Ḥanīf-s, that is, of the Šābi'ans (*madhab al-hunafā' wa hum al-šābi'yyūn*). Having converted to that doctrine, Ṭahmūrath imposed it at once on the Persians, and they believed in it for about 1,800 years, until they all converted to Mazdaism (*fa-taqadū hu nahwa alfsana wa-tamānīmī'a sana tamaḡḡasū ḡami'an*).¹³

Together with that on the Arabs, the chapter on the Persians is, in spite of its brevity, the only one where the chronology of the nation under consideration is presented fully and seamlessly, as was once noted by Gabriel Martínez-Gros in a study of the 'implicit conception of history' at stake in the *Ṭabaqāt*.¹⁴ From the passage above, we infer that in this history Persian Šābi'anism was introduced from the Orient at the time of King Ṭahmūrath. We find the same story, or a close variant of it, in a great variety of Arabic sources dealing with the 'Sumaniyya', in other words the Buddhists.¹⁵ These sources would seem to suggest that, as a result of a series of amalgamations and deformations, the 'Buddhism' as practiced by these 'Sumaniyya' had for some historians of the Islamic Middle Ages

¹¹ G.J. Toomer, "A Survey of the *Toledan Tables*", *Osiris* 15 (1968), pp. 5-174; F.S. Pedersen, *The Toledan Tables. A Review of the Manuscripts and the Textual Versions with an Edition*, Commission Agent Reitzels Forlag, Copenhagen 2002, in four volumes.

¹² On all this, see M.S. Khan, "Qāḍī Šā'id's Account of Medieval Arab Astronomy", *Islamic Culture*, s.n. (July 1980), pp. 153-62; L. Richter-Bernburg, "Šā'id, the Toledan Sciences and Andalusī Science", in D. King - G. Saliba (eds.), *From Deferent to Equant: A Volume of Studies in the History of Science in the Ancient and Medieval Near East in Honor of E.S. Kennedy*, Academy of Sciences, New York 1987, pp. 373-402; E. Llaveró Ruiz, "El cadi Šā'id de Toledo, primer historiador de la filosofía y de las ciencias en el mundo árabe", *Anales Toledanos*, 24 (1987), pp. 7-29, here pp. 12-15; L. Richter-Bernburg, "Šā'id al-Andalusī: Abū al-Qāsim Šā'id ibn Abī al-Walīd Aḥmad ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad ibn Šā'id al-Taḡhlībī al-Qurṭubī", in Th. Hockey et al. (ed.), *The Biographical Encyclopedia of Astronomers*, Springer, New York 2007, pp. 1005-6; Samsó, *Las Ciencias de los Antiguos* (above, n. 1), pp. 144-52 (pp. 481-4).

¹³ *Ṭabaqāt*, p. 17 Cheikho-Blachère.

¹⁴ G. Martínez-Gros, "La clôture du temps chez le cadi Šā'id: une conception implicite de l'histoire", *Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée* 40 (1985), pp. 147-53, here p. 149: "Des six peuples – Arabes mis à part – dont l'auteur nous parle (Indiens, Perses, Chaldéens, Grecs, Rūm, Égyptiens), les Perses sont les seuls dont l'Histoire, ininterrompue, s'étende du Déluge à l'Islam: 3164 ans vécus sous cinq dynasties, celles de Kayūmārt, Mīnūshihir, Kaykubad, des Diadoques (531 ans) et des Sassanides (433 ans). C'est le pouvoir royal qui donne ici la mesure du temps".

¹⁵ D. Gimaret, "Bouddha et les bouddhistes dans la tradition musulmane", *Journal Asiatique* 257 (1969), pp. 273-316, here p. 279: "Cependant, pour la plupart des historiens, Būdhāsf serait un faux prophète, apparu en Inde au début du règne de Ṭahmūrāth, petit-fils de Gayōmart et troisième roi des Perses, et qui aurait prêché la religion des Sabéens. Telle est la tradition que rapportent al-Ṭabarī, puis al-Mas'ūdī, al-Maqdisī, Ḥamza al-Iṣfahānī, al-Bīrūnī. Selon al-Mas'ūdī, Būdhāsf se serait rendu de l'Inde dans le Sind, et aurait parcouru le Kirmān. Il serait même allé jusque dans le Fārs, où les Perses auraient pratiqué sa religion jusqu'à l'apparition de Zoroastre".

become nothing more than a reference to the paganism of ancient Persia, as was observed by the late Patricia Crone.¹⁶

A few lines further on in the same chapter, Šā'id specifies that after this 1,800-year long period the Persians 'rejected Šābi'anism' (*rafaḍū dīn al-šābi'a*), and that "they believed in Zoroaster as a prophet sent from God" (*i'taqadū zarādušt nabīyyan mursalan min 'indi allāh*) for about 1,300 years before Persia was ultimately crushed by Islam at the time of caliphs 'Umar and 'Uṣmān. In addition to praising the Persians for their particular skills in both medicine and astrology, Šā'id also mentions in this chapter the 360,000-year conjunctive Great Year – a period which the Persians derived from India, but which had been traditionally referred to in medieval Islam since Abū Ma'shar as 'the Cycle of the Persians'.¹⁷ The mention of this period in this context deserves some consideration. According to 'Alī b. 'Abdallāh al-Qasrī, the author of a *Kitāb al-Qirānāt* (*Book of Conjunctions*) preserved in part in al-Maqdisī's *Kitāb al-Bad' wa-l-Tārīḥ* (*Book of Creation and History*), the science of the 360,000-year cycle remained the prerogative of 'Būdhāsaf the philosopher, from the ancient nation of Babylon (*Būdāsaf al-faylasūf min ahl bābāl al-'atīqa*).¹⁸ This said, it remains unclear which role in particular Šā'id attributes to the 'Persian Šābi'ans' in this scientific evolution.

Chaldaeans

Chapter 3, on the Chaldaeans, is the shortest of the *Ṭabaqāt*. It does not include any explicit mention of the Šābi'ans, but it stresses the Chaldaeans' familiarity with both astrology and talismans in a way that surpasses everything of that sort for any of the other nations:

The Chaldaeans developed the scientific observation of the stars and were experts in the science of the secrets of the sphere. They were famous for their familiarity with the natures and decrees of the stars, and with the properties and powers of the generated beings. To the peoples of the other side of the ecumene they transmitted the way to design temples in order to attract the powers of the stars, to reveal their natures and to cast their rays upon these temples by way of various offerings and special operations. Wonderful deeds and astonishing results were obtained by them in the establishment of talismans and other types of magic.¹⁹

The influence of 'Babylonian-Chaldaeans' magic upon Andalusī scholars prior to Šā'id's time has long been acknowledged. Suffice it to mention the *Gāyat al-ḥakīm* (*Picatrix*), the most famous treatise of astral magic ever written in Arabic, which was compiled by Maslama b. Qāsim al-Qurṭubī around the middle of the tenth century.²⁰ But let us turn back to the *Ṭabaqāt*. As the most savant of the Chaldaeans Šā'id

¹⁶ P. Crone, *The Iranian Reception of Islam: the Non-Traditional Strands* (*Collected Studies* in Three Volumes, edited by Hanna Siurua), vol. 2, Leiden - Boston: Brill, 2016, pp. 209-32 ('Buddhism as ancient Iranian paganism'). Crone's study is primarily focused on Ḥamza al-Iṣfahānī and Ḥwārizmī.

¹⁷ de Callataÿ, *Annus Platonicus* (above, n. 10), p. 134: "As for the expression 'Cycle of the Persians', there cannot be any doubt that it refers, not to this allegedly flourishing period in the development of Sasanian astronomy, but to the kings and heroes, like Hūshank or Ṭahmūrath, whose mythical lives had been related to the story of the famous flood: in his introduction to *The Thousands* of Abū Ma'shar, Pingree cites texts from Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Hāshimī and al-Bīrūnī that are clear confirmation of this".

¹⁸ Maqdisī, *Kitāb al-Bad' wa-l-Tārīḥ*, ed. C. Huart as *Le Livre de la création et de l'histoire d'Abou-Zēid Aḥmed ben Sabl el-Balkhī* publié et traduit par C. Huart d'après le manuscrit de Constantinople, 6 vols, Ernest Leroux, Paris 1899-1919, here Vol. 2, p. 97.

¹⁹ *Ṭabaqāt*, p. 18 Cheikho-Blachère.

²⁰ See for instance: D. Pingree, "Some of the Sources of the *Ghāyat al-Ḥakīm*", *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld*

cites Hermes the Babylonian, whom he makes a contemporary of Socrates, but he relies on Abū Mašar to say that long before this Hermes and others in recent times, “there was the Hermes who lived before the Flood, whom the Jews identify with the prophet Henoch, and who is the same as Idrīs – Peace be upon him! (*al-Hirmis alladī kāna qabla al-tūfān alladī yaz'amu al-ibrāniyyūn anna-hu ḥanūḥ al-nabiyy wa-huwa Idrīs 'alay-hi al-salām*)”.²¹ Amongst the savants who came after to Hermes the Babylonian, and therefore after the Flood, Šā'id mentions an astrologer by the name of Wālīs, whom we may identify with confidence with Vettius Valens, in spite of the fact that the text shows signs of corruption here. Curiously enough, Šā'id appears to be hesitant as to what nation Vettius should belong to. As shall be seen, the same savant is also mentioned amongst the Egyptian scholars in the corresponding chapter. From a statement to be found there it clearly follows that Šā'id regarded him as a Šābi'an as well. In fact, it is most likely that Šā'id considered all post-deluvian Babylonian savants as Šābi'ans.

Greeks

Turning to the Greeks in Chapter 4 (not surprisingly one of the longest chapters of the *Ṭabaqāt*), we come across various mentions of the Šābi'ans, the first of which almost from the outset of Šā'id's account. Thus, just after having recalled Greece's location on the surface of the earth and praised the nation for being that of Alexander the Great, the author declares straight off:

The Greeks were a community of Šābi'ans, who attached great significance to the stars and worshipped idols (*wa-kānat 'umma al-yunāniyyīn sābi'a mu'azzima li-l-kawākib dā'ina bi-'ibādat al-aṣnām*). Their savants were called *fālāsifa* – in the singular, *faylasūf* – a name that means ‘lover of wisdom’ in the Greek language.²²

If need be, this passage would confirm that Šā'id uses ‘Šābi'ans’ in a very broad sense. There cannot be any doubt, for instance, that he would have called Šābi'ans the five savants he retains as the major figures in Greek philosophy, namely (and in this order) Empedocles, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.

One also comes across Pythagoras, or rather the Pythagorean school, in the second passage of Chapter 4 in which Šābi'ans are mentioned:

The first [Greek] philosophers busied themselves with prime natural philosophy (*al-falsafa al-ṭabi'iyya al-ūlā*), a field into which the school of Pythagoras (*šī'a fit-āgūrus*), Thales of Miletus and the Greek

Institutes 43 (1980), pp. 1-15, here p. 3: “The *Ghāya* itself proclaims that the Nabataean Chaldaeans, the Egyptian Copts, the Nabataean Syrians, the Abyssinians, the Kurds, the Indians and the Persians each have knowledge of different kinds of magic, and in fact it has drawn, whether wittingly or not, upon materials derived from most of these cultures. In another passage the *Ghāya* less correctly names as the three main sources of its magic the Šābi'ans (by which are here intended the Nabataeans), the Greeks and the Indians, and ascribes to them respectively the methods of making talismans, of praying to the planets and of using magical characters and words”. See also D. Pingree, “Al-Ṭabarī on the Prayers to the Planets”, *Bulletin d'Études Orientales* 44 (1992), pp. 105-17. On Maslama b. Qāsim al-Qurṭubī as author of the *Ghāya*, see M. Fierro, “Bāṭinism in al-Andalus. Maslama b. Qāsim al-Qurṭubī (d. 353/964), author of the *Rubāt al-Ḥakīm* and the *Ghāyat al-Ḥakīm (Picatrix)*”, *Studia Islamica* 84 (1996), pp. 87-112; G. de Callatāy, “Magia en al-Andalus: *Rasā'il Ijwān al-Šafā*”, *Rubāt al-Ḥakīm y Gāyat al-Ḥakīm (Picatrix)*”, *Al-Qantara* 34.2 (2013), pp. 297-343.

²¹ *Ṭabaqāt*, p. 18 Cheikho-Blachère. Pingree, *The Thousands of Abū Ma'shar* (above, n. 10), pp. 13-18; C. Burnett, “The Legend of the Three Hermes and Abū Ma'shar's *Kitāb al-ulūf* in the Latin Middle Ages”, *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 39 (1976), pp. 231-4; K. van Bladel, *The Arabic Hermes. From Pagan Sage to Prophet of Sciences*, Oxford U.P., Oxford 2009, pp. 121-63.

²² *Ṭabaqāt*, p. 20 Cheikho-Blachère.

and Egyptian communities of Šābi'ans (*'awāmm al-šābi'a min al-yunāniyyīn wa-l-maṣriyyīn*) have specialized.²³

We may infer from the previous quotation that Šā'id in fact regarded as Šābi'ans all the savants he lists in the rest of this chapter without exception. Whether philosophers in the broad sense of the word, such as the 'big five' mentioned above, or representatives of more specific disciplines, such as Ptolemy, Euclides, Galen or Archimedes, these scholars all posited a link of dependency and causality between the supra-lunar world and the world of coming-to-be and passing-away.

The third explicit mention of the Šābi'ans in this chapter concerns in reality one of the "modern followers" (*min al-tā'hirīn*) of Pythagoras and ancient natural philosophy. He is Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Zakariyā' al-Rāzī (the Rhazes of the Latin Middle Ages), the Persian physician and philosopher who died in 925 CE. Šā'id portrays Rāzī as a man who detested Aristotle and criticized him for having corrupted philosophy. As examples of this anti-Aristotelian position, which he himself condemns, Šā'id mentions Rāzī's works on metaphysics, on spiritual medicine, as well as his:

other works showing his preference for the doctrine of the Dualists about associationism (*al-išrāk*), for the views of the Brahmans regarding the vanity of prophecy (*ibtāl al-nubuwwa*), and for the belief of all the Šābi'ans in the transmigration [of souls] (*al-tanāsuh*).²⁴

This is the first time in the *Tābaqāt* that we come across the notion of *tanāsuh al-arwāh* ('transmigration of souls') in line with the Šābi'ans. Having referred in the same passage to the Brahmans for their rejection of prophecy, Šā'id is, in all likelihood, still having India in mind when he refers to the Šābi'ans. In the already mentioned 'Book of Creation and History', al-Muṭahhar b. Ṭāhir al-Maqdisī provides a detailed and remarkable account of the doctrine of the transmission of souls as professed by the 'Sumaniyya'.²⁵ As has been said above, there is little doubt that it is to these Buddhists that Šā'id is referring when he mentions the 'Šābi'ans' in his chapter about India. What this last passage on the transmigration of souls confirms in any case is the universalist approach which Šā'id takes whenever it comes to the Šābi'an issue. It is becoming patent that bridges must be built between all these passages on 'Šābi'ans', irrespective of the chapters in which they are found.

Romans

Chapter 5 will provide us with another clear piece of evidence of this. Having dealt with the Greeks in the previous chapter, Šā'id now turns to the Romans, which necessarily implies some words to account for the period of history shared by these two civilisations. The first three passages mentioning the Šābi'ans in this chapter all reflect this problem. The first one reads:

²³ *Tābaqāt*, ed. Cheikho-Blachère, pp. 32-33. This statement is reminiscent of others in Arabic literature. In one of the two versions of *Epistle 32* ('On the Intellectual Principles According to the View of Pythagoras') that has come down to us from the corpus of *Rasā'il Iḥwān al-Šafā'*, we find for instance the assumption that "Pythagoras was a monotheist sage, from the people of Ḥarrān in Syria (*Fītāgūrus kāna ra'ḡulan ḥakīman muwahḥīdan min abl ḥarrān min al-šām*)"; see *Rasā'il Iḥwān al-Šafā'*, 32b, ed. P.E. Walker, in P.E. Walker - I.K. Poonawala - D. Simonovitz - G. de Callatay (eds.), *The Epistles of the Brethren of Purity, Sciences of the Soul and Intellect Part I. An Arabic Critical Edition and English Translation of Epistles 32-36*, Oxford U.P. in association with the Institute of Ismaili Studies, Oxford 2015, p. 17 of the Arabic edition.

²⁴ *Tābaqāt*, p. 33 Cheikho-Blachère.

²⁵ Maqdisī, *Kitāb al-Bad' wa-l-Ta'riḥ*, Vol. 1, pp. 197-199 Huart (Arabic edition).

The city of Rome (*madīna rūmiyya*) became the capital of these two kingdoms [= the Roman and the Greek worlds] and remained so for 335 years, until Constantine, the son of Helena, adopted the religion of the Messiah, rejected the religion of the Šābi'ans (*rafāḍa dīn al-sābi'a*) and built on the gulf [= the Bosphorus] a city linked with his name called Constantinople, in the centre of the Greek world (*fi wasat bilād al-yunāniyyīn*).²⁶

Similarly, we read a few lines further that:

In ancient times, the Romans were Šābi'ans (*wa-kāna al-rūm qadīman šābi'a*), until Constantine, the son of Helena and the founder of Constantinople, adopted the religion of the Christians and prompted the Romans to convert to it.²⁷

The third passage is more informative as it deals with Šābi'ans that were still active in Muslim times:

During the dominion of the 'Abbāsids, under Muslim sovereignty (*fi dawla al-'abbāsiyya min mulūk al-islām*), a number of Christians and Šābi'ans were savants in the various sciences (*ḡamā'a min al-našārā wa-l-šābi'a 'ulamā' bi-funūn al-'ilm*). I do not know whether they were Greeks or Romans, or from another neighbouring nation.²⁸

It is evidently not the purpose of this paper to re-enter into the many problems raised by medieval sources regarding the identification of these survivors of Šābi'anism within Islam, let alone to discuss the notoriously tricky issue of the role they may have played in the transmission of sciences.²⁹ As can

²⁶ *Tabaqāt*, p. 34 Cheikho-Blachère.

²⁷ *Tabaqāt*, p. 35 Cheikho-Blachère.

²⁸ *Tabaqāt*, p. 36 Cheikho-Blachère.

²⁹ Since Chwolsohn's pioneering and emblematic essay in the 19th century (D. Chwolsohn, *Die Ssabier und der Ssabismus*, 2 vols, Saint Petersburg, 1856; reprinted Oriental Press, Amsterdam 1965), the subject has generated an immense literature. Let us only mention here: J. Hjärpe, *Analyse critique des traditions arabes sur les Sabéens harraniens*, Ph.D Thesis, Uppsala, 1972; J.D. McAuliffe, "Exegetical Identification of the Šābi'ūn", *The Muslim World* 72 (1982), pp. 95-106; C. Buck, "The Identity of the Šābi'ūn: An Historical Quest", *The Muslim World* 74 (1984), pp. 172-86; M. Tardieu, "Šābiens coraniques et 'Šābiens' de Ḥarrān", *Journal Asiatique* 274 (1986), pp. 1-44; Id., "Les calendriers en usage à Ḥarrān d'après les sources arabes et le commentaire de Simplicius à la *Physique* d'Aristote", in I. Hadot (éd.), *Simplicius. Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie*, W. de Gruyter, Berlin - New York 1987, pp. 40-57; T. Green, *The City of the Moon-God: Religious Traditions of Harran*, Brill, Leiden 1992; F.E. Peters, "Hermes and Harran: The Roots of Arabic-Islamic Occultism", in M. Mazzaoui - V.B. Moreen (eds.), *Intellectual Studies on Islam: Essays Written in Honor of Martin B. Dickson*, University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City 1990, pp. 185-215; J. Lameer, "From Alexandria to Baghdad: Reflections on the Genesis of a Problematical Tradition", in G. Endress - R. Kruk (eds.), *The Ancient Tradition in Christian and Islamic Hellenism. Studies On the Transmission of Greek Philosophy and Sciences dedicated to H.J. Drossaert Lulofs On His Ninetieth Birthday*, Research School CNWS, Leiden 1997 (CNWS Publications, 50), pp. 181-91; C. Genequand, "Idolâtrie, astrolâtrie et sabéisme", *Studia Islamica* 89 (1999), pp. 109-28; D. Pingree, "The Šābi'ans of Ḥarrān and the Classical Tradition", *International Journal of the Classical Tradition* 9 (2002), pp. 8-35; J. Hämeen-Anttila, "Continuity of Pagan Religious Traditions in Tenth-Century Iraq", in A. Panaino - G. Pettinato (eds.), *Ideologies as Intercultural Phenomena. Melammu Symposia III*, Mimesis, Bologna 2002 (International Association for Intercultural Studies of the MELAMMU Project), pp. 89-107; Van Bladel, *The Arabic Hermes* (above, n. 21), pp. 64-114; D. De Smet, "Le Platon arabe et les Sabéens de Ḥarrān. La 'voie diffuse' de la transmission du platonisme en terre d'Islam", *Res Antiquae* 7 (2010), pp. 73-86; A. Caiozzo, "Éléments de rituels imagés dans les manuscrits de l'Orient médiéval", in J.-P. Boudet - A. Caiozzo - N. Weill-Parot (eds.), *Picatrix: Image et Magie. Actes du colloque international de Paris des 11 et 12 mai 2007*, Honoré Champion, Paris, 2011, pp. 57-75. See also A. Fratini - C. Prato, "I Sebōmenoi (tòn Theòn): una risposta all'antico enigma dei Sabei" [<http://www.ricerche filosofiche.it/> (accessed 18 August, 2017)].

be seen, Šā'id admits that he possesses only some vague notions in these respects. In the same chapter, he does however mention by name one of these later Šābi'an scholars:

Amongst the Šābi'ans there was Abū-l-Ḥasan Tābit b. Qurra al-Ḥarrānī, a philosopher who mastered the sciences, who was well-versed in the various branches of wisdom, and who was able to understand the books on philosophy. He is the author of good works on logic, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, among other disciplines. He was a contemporary of Ya'qūb b. Ishāq al-Kindī and Quṣṭā b. Lūqā.³⁰

From the above statements about Roman Šābi'ans we may conclude that, in Šā'id's view, a fraction of the primeval Šābi'ans, of those who lived at the time of Romulus and Augustus, managed to survive the emergence of both Christianity and Islam in the subsequent periods of history. In contrast with what he says of the Šābi'ans of India, the author of the *Ṭabaqāt* does not refer to these survivors of Šābi'anism as his own contemporaries. They were active in 'Abbāsīd times, but seem to have disappeared not long after the caliphate of al-Ma'mūn, and in any case in the first half of the tenth century.

Egyptians

Chapter 6, on the Egyptians, includes one mention of the Šābi'ans:

In ancient times the people of Egypt were Šābi'ans. They worshipped idols and managed temples. Later on, they converted to Christianity when it emerged, and this lasted until the triumph of the Muslims over that religion. Some of them converted to Islam, but the rest remained faithful, as *ḍimmī*-s, to their religion, until the present day.³¹

In agreement with the theory of the seven primeval nations, we are told that Šābi'anism was the original religion of Egypt, here again before the appearance of Christianity and then Islam. In this case, however, it does not seem that Šābi'ans survived these new religions. Regarding Egypt, Šā'id has more to tell us about the very early and mythical times. We thus find once again the mention of the Flood and of the first Hermes whom the Jews identify with Henoch and the Muslims with Idrīs. The story is this time given in greater detail. The pre-deluvian Hermes is here said to be the first to have been informed of the spiritual beings of the heavenly spheres, the first to have erected temples, and the inventor of medicine. He is also reported as the first to have predicted the Flood and as the sage who, in order to prevent human arts and sciences from disappearing in the cataclysm, built the pyramids as sanctuaries for these sciences. It appears that Šā'id's report of the three Hermes is fundamentally the same as that of Abū Ma'shar, yet with some rearrangement of the structure in order to better correspond to the design of the *Ṭabaqāt*.³²

Immediately after these lines is found the statement that, after the Flood, there were in Egypt savants versed in various branches of philosophy, especially those concerned with talismans, incantations, alchemy and the like. Amongst the post-deluvian savants we find again the second

³⁰ *Ṭabaqāt*, p. 37 Cheikho-Blachère.

³¹ *Ṭabaqāt*, p. 38 Cheikho-Blachère.

³² Van Bladel, *The Arabic Hermes* (above, n. 21), p. 130: "It can be seen from the other relations of the legend that Šā'id al-Andalusī has presented a heavily edited version of the passages on the Hermes from the *Thousands* of Abū Ma'shar, arranged to fit his program of giving the history of science in order by nation. Therefore the first Hermes appears in the section on Egypt, the second, Babylonian, Hermes is in the section on the Chaldaean nation, and the third (whom he calls the second) is again in the section on Egypt".

Hermes, but also scholars such as Proclus, Theon of Alexandria and Vettius Valens – a sure indication that Šā'id is here again referring to the people he views as Šābi'ans.

Arabs

Chapter 7, the longest of the *Ṭabaqāt*, is the one devoted to the Arabs. As is well known, Šā'id's report proves relatively unexceptional in the section concerned with the Eastern Arabs but offers much valuable first-hand information in the part focused on al-Andalus. This said, the beginning of the chapter provides us with another kind of dichotomy. What we are told indeed is that there are in fact two groups of Arabs to be considered, one extinct and the other still in existence (*fāmin hum firqatān firqa bā'ida wa firqa bāqiyya*). To the first pertain ancient peoples such as the 'Ād, the Ṭamūd, and the like, about whose glory nothing can be ascertained since time has for long annihilated them and their achievements. As to the surviving Arabs, they are said themselves to be divided into two branches, the Qaḥṭān and the 'Adnān, which both left their imprint on history first during the Ġāhiliyya and then under Islam. Of the various tribes which were famous at the time of the Ġāhiliyya (the Ḥimyar and their Tubba' descendants, the Kinda, and the like), Šā'id mentions their passion for astrology, to which those monarchs had recourse for most aspects of their lives and which sharply contrasts with their total disregard for observational astronomy and for the rest of the rational sciences. In terms of beliefs, Šā'id also mentions the multiple cults that these ancient tribes rendered to such or such planet, to such or such star, to such or such idol, as well as the presence of Christian, Jewish or Manichaean elements in this pre-Islamic context. It is at this stage of the report that we come across a new mention of the Šābi'ans:

All the Arabs that worshipped idols professed the uniqueness of God Most-High. Their worship for idols was nothing but a form of the religion of the Šābi'ans (*wa-innamā kānat 'ibādātu hum la hā ḍarban min al-tadayyun bi-dīn al-šābi'a*), who attached great significance to the stars and to the ways to represent them in temples. This has nothing to do with what is assumed by those who ignore the religions of the nations and the views of the sects. Regarding the worshipping of idols these people consider these idols to be divinities that have created the world – an assumption that no one endowed with thought and reasoning could ever sustain or admit in any way. The proof of this is this verse of God Most-High: 'We only worship them that they may bring us nearer to Allāh in position' (Qu. 39:3).³³

It is certainly striking to find under Šā'id's pen that there were Arab Šābi'ans at the time of the Ġāhiliyya, and that these people should in no way be assimilated to polytheists. On the contrary, the present text rather seems to suggest that belief in the uniqueness of God is one of the necessary conditions to be a Šābi'an, something not found in the passages from the *Ṭabaqāt* mentioned thus far.

Before he turns his attention to the savants of Islam, Šā'id adds important data of comparative chronology regarding the pre-Islamic period. He situates the destruction of the dam of Ma'rib, in Yemen, 2,060 solar years after the Flood, and says that this time coincided with the reigns of the Ḥimyarite Šammir Yar'aš, of the Jewish David, and of the Persian Kayḥusraw III. The destruction of the Ma'rib dam is generally dated to a few centuries before the rise of Islam. It is not clear, however, whether Šā'id assumed that Šābi'ans were still active in Arabia after this date, although it is more likely that he did.

³³ *Ṭabaqāt*, p. 44 Cheikho-Blachère.

There is another mention of Šābi'ans in this chapter, but it occurs much later and does not in fact concern the Arabs. It takes place in a discussion over the epoch that preceded the Arab-Muslim conquests of al-Andalus. The text reads:

As for the religion of the people in al-Andalus, it was originally the religion of the Šābi'an Romans, then it was Christianity until the triumph of the Muslims in the period mentioned above.³⁴

Jews

It is to the Jews that Šā'id devotes the last chapter of his *Ṭabaqāt*, one of the only sections of the book with no mention of the Šābi'ans. As stated above, the overall impression is that Šā'id wrote this ultimate chapter as a kind of appendix to his previous section on the Arabs of al-Andalus, a method which allowed him to conclude his work by focusing on what he knew best, that is, the scientific achievements of the mankind in his own country. This short and quite peculiar chapter³⁵ opens with the assertion that the Jews did not care about philosophy but only busied themselves with the Law and with prophetic biographies. It includes the statement that Israel was the cradle of prophecy and that most of the prophets were actually Jews. Šā'id also tells us that the Jewish people, originally located in Syria (*bilād al-Šām*), were forced to migrate to such an extent that they are now found in all parts of the world, with the notable exception of Arabia which they were forced to leave under the caliphate of 'Umar. Resulting from their contacts here and there with other nations, some Jews in the Near East, in Ifrīqiyā but more especially in al-Andalus managed to become experts in the rational sciences, particularly medicine, philosophy and astrology. The text mentions a few of these authorities, such as his contemporary Abū l-Faḍl Ḥašdāy b. Yūsuf b. Ḥašdāy, a scholar for whom Šā'id obviously shows great respect and who was already mentioned in the previous chapter, on the Arabs.³⁶ Still, Šā'id also makes it clear at the end of this chapter that these rationalists were always in the minority in comparison with the Jewish scholars who delved into religious matters. At the convergence of religious and scientific preoccupations, there is, however, one invention from the Banū Isrā'īl that Šā'id mentions with particular admiration. This is the calendar, a sophisticated system which enabled the Jews to date with accuracy every event since the birth of Adam, the father of all humans. Faithful to his habit of putting in relation with one another the different chronologies at his disposal, Šā'id notes that the 4,867th year of the Jewish calendar coincided with the year 458 of the Hegira (or 1006 CE).

A Tentative Reconstruction of Šā'id's Chronology of Nations

Now that all statements about the Šābi'ans in the *Ṭabaqāt* have been cited, and given the abundance of such chronological parallels within the work, we may tentatively propose a reconstruction of Šā'id's chronology of nations in the form of a synthetic table (see fig. 5). For each of the eight scientific nations, the elements deemed relevant to the discussion are distributed over the following four columns: 1) 'pre-deluvian times'; 2) 'Šābi'anism'; 3) intermediary period; 4) current age.

³⁴ *Ṭabaqāt*, p. 62 Cheikho-Blachère.

³⁵ A brief study of this chapter can be found in J. Finkel, "An Eleventh Century Source for the History of Jewish Scientists in Mohammedan Lands", *Jewish Quarterly Review*, New Series, 18 (1927-1928), pp. 45-54.

³⁶ On the particular relevance of this scholar to the *Ṭabaqāt*, see Balty-Guesdon, "Al-Andalus et l'héritage grec" (above, n. 2), pp. 336-7.

Nations	Pre-deluvian times	Šābi'anism	Intermediary period	Current age
Indians	Sindhind = 4,320,000,000 years Arjabhar = 4,320,000 years Sindhind = 360,000 years	Brahmanism Šābi'ans (= Buddhists) Kanka	Brahmanism → Current Šābi'ans	
Persians	'Cycle of the Persians' = 360,000 years	Noah's religion Kāyūmarth (1st king) Tahmūrath (3rd king) Budhāsaf the Oriental Šābi'anism lasting for 1,800 years	Zoroaster Zoroastrianism	Islam
Chaldaeans	Pre-deluvian Hermes (= Henoch = Idrīs)	Nimrūd, builder of Babel Tower Hermes the Babylonian (cont. Socrates) 'Another Hermes', disciple of Pythagoras Vettius Valens (?) and others	Persians defeat Chaldaeans Zoroastrianism	Islam
Greeks		Alexander the Great The Ptolemies 'All Greeks were Šābi'ans' (Empedocles, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle) and others	Romans defeat Greeks Merging of both nations Constantine Christianity	
Romans		Romulus August 'The Romans were Šābi'ans'		Residual Christians and Šābi'ans under Islam Tābit b. Qurra al-Ḥarrānī Merging of Copts with Greeks, Romans, and others
Egyptians	Pre-deluvian Hermes (= Henoch = Idrīs), builder of Pyramids	'The Egyptians were Šābi'ans' Proclus, Theon of Alexandria, Vettius Valens and others		
Arabs	Various tribes, lost for long	<u>In the East:</u> Ġāhiliyya (Qaḥṭān and Adnān) 'All Arab Idolaters were in fact Šābi'ans'		Muḥammad Islam replaces Idolaters in Arabia (as well as Persians in Iran, Byzantines in Syria, Copts in Egypt)
Jews		<u>In al-Andalus:</u> Roman Šābi'ans	Christianity	Islam Residual Jews under Islam

Fig. 5. Reconstruction of Šā'id's chronology of Nations

Not much is known of the people and events reported in the 'pre-deluvian' column. The figure of the first Hermes, his identification with the Jewish Henoch and with the Muslim Idris, his role in the invention of the sciences and in the construction of the Egyptian pyramids, all this material is described as legendary or mythical rather than as genuinely historical. In terms of time-measuring, this period is also one that does not resemble any of those which have followed: whereas none of these latter exceeds one or two thousand years in all, the pre-deluvian age is believed to have lasted for 360,000 years according to the Persians, and up to 4,320,000,000 years according to some Indians.

The second column is that of 'Šābi'anism'. As we remember from Šā'id's introduction, it corresponds to the epoch when the seven primeval nations 'together constituted the whole of mankind' and when 'they were all Šābi'ans'. Since we are here concerned only with Šā'id's scientific nations, there obviously cannot be traces of 'the Šābi'an Chinese' and 'the Šābi'an Turks'. Yet what our table confirms with great clarity is that an explicit statement about 'Šābi'ans' has been provided for almost all the peoples considered, generally accompanied with generalisations of the type: 'All the Greeks were Šābi'ans', 'The Romans were Šābi'ans', 'The Egyptians were Šābi'ans', 'All the Arab idolaters were in fact Šābi'ans'. As mentioned above, we even find at times that chronological bridges have purposefully been introduced between the representatives of one given Šābi'an people and those from another. Thus, while dealing with the Chaldaeans, Šā'id informs us that 'Hermes the Babylonian' was a contemporary of Socrates and that the sage Pythagoras counted 'another Hermes' amongst his pupils.

The third and four columns should help us to better visualise how things have changed from this remote period of ‘pan-Šābī’anism’ to Šā‘id’s own time. In fact, there are cases where these columns are not necessary, given that the situation has not evolved. India is a unique example of a country that has remained the home of a minority of Brahmins and of a majority of Šābī’ans up to the present. In contrast with this continuity and linearity, the history of the Persians was marked by various important turns: the 1,800 years of Šābī’anism were followed by about another 1,300 years of Zoroastrianism, and Zoroastrianism was in turn replaced with Islam. In some cases, one has also to account for the absorption of one nation by another (as with the Persians defeating the Chaldeans or the Romans defeating the Greeks), with the resultant merging of cells in the table. What the table also helps to illustrate is how Abrahamic religions contributed to eradicate the Šābī’an creed. Christianity is meant to have played this role in relation to ‘the Greeks’, to ‘the Romans’ and to ‘the Egyptians’, while Zoroastrianism is assumed to have done it in Persia and Islam in the Arab peninsula, in the age of the prophet Muḥammad himself. Although Islam is evidently presented as the dominant religion of the current age, we note with interest the presence of residual minorities such as the Christians and the Šābī’ans in the Middle East (the relevant passage actually refers to ‘Abbāsīd times, as we have seen) or the Jews in the Extreme West of the Dār al-Islam.

Conclusions

The above textual survey shows that Šā‘id al-Andalusī attaches great importance to the Šābī’an issue. It also leads us to the conclusion that the numerous statements provided about the Šābī’ans in the different chapters of the *Ṭabaqāt* devoted to the scientific nations find themselves in the continuity of – and in good agreement with – the theory of the primeval nations that Šā‘id mentions in his prologue. From the collection of his statements we are to infer that there was a time, in a distant past yet still after the great Flood, where philosophy and the rest of the rational sciences were cultivated in various regions of the ecumene by men who shared a common view about the world. These people used to revere idols and had in common a strong penchant for the science of the stars, magic and, in general, for any kind of knowledge susceptible to lead one to understanding the destinies of human souls and to unveil the secrets of the universe. By way of their intellects, these people had arrived at the conclusion that there could only be one god. The list of their representatives include Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle and, to put it in a few words, whichever one of the ancient Greek authorities in the entire spectrum of the rational sciences. The theory also implies that these Greek masters were part of an extended network of intellectuals active in other parts of the inhabited world, such as Egypt, Persia, or India. It also supposes an intellectual filiation between these ancient masters and more recent Šābī’ans that were still in existence under Islam such as the Ḥarrānīan Ṭābit b. Qurra in ‘Abbāsīd times. In the final lines of the introduction, Šā‘id acclaims the savants of the past, irrespective of their origins, in the following words:

The men of sciences were the lights in the darkness, the indicators of the right direction, the masters of human kind, the best amongst the nations; they grasped what the Creator Most-High had allotted them and realized the objective assigned to them. May God’s prayer be upon them! How empty is this world when they are missing! (*Ṭabaqāt*, p. 11 Cheikho-Blachère)

In view of what has been recalled throughout this contribution, we may assume that the author of the *Ṭabaqāt* had also the ‘Šābī’an category’ well present in his mind when he wrote this beautiful evocation.

The Soul as “Harmony” in Late Antiquity and in the Latin Middle Ages

A Note on Thomas Aquinas as a Reader of Themistius’ In Libros De Anima Paraphrasis

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Abstract

The importance of Themistius’ paraphrasis of the *De Anima* is often acknowledged in scholarship mostly with respect to Thomas Aquinas’ own understanding of the Aristotelian doctrine of intellection, and occasionally also with respect to Avicenna and Averroes. This focus on Themistius’ interpretation of *De Anima* III should not prevent those interested in the history of the reception of Aristotle from taking into account other ideas typical of this paraphrasis. The present article argues that Themistius’ emphasis on soul as *ousia*, prompted by Plotinus’ polemics against the doctrine of soul as ‘harmony’ that Themistius quotes almost literally, was crucial for Thomas Aquinas’ own exegesis in his *Sententia Libri De Anima*.

With the notable exception of Gerard of Cremona’s translation from Arabic of *In Analytica Posteriora*,¹ no commentary by Themistius was translated into Latin before 1267.² Indeed, even the name of this renowned philosopher and rhetor of 4th century Byzantium remained almost unknown in the Western world until November 22, 1267, when the translation of *In Libros De Anima Paraphrasis* was completed. The date features in the colophon of the manuscript Toledo, Biblioteca del Cabildo 47-12, f. 37 v, to which attention was called by the editor of the Latin translation Gerard Verbeke. The colophon reads:

expleta fuit translatio huius operis anno Domini MCCLXVII decimo kalendas decembris Viterbii.
Fuit autem Themistius tempore Juliani apostatae apud eum plurimum honoratus.³

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¹ J.R. O’Donnell, “Themistius’ Paraphrasis of the *Posterior Analytics* in Gerard of Cremona’s Translation”, *Mediaeval Studies* 20 (1958), pp. 239-315.

² This assessment does not take into account the question of the Latin circulation from Late Antiquity onwards of a work on Aristotle’s *Categories* that can be traced back to Themistius and is known under the title *Categoriae Decem*: cf. L Minio-Paluello, “Note sull’Aristotele latino medievale. XV. Dalle *Categoriae Decem* pseudo-agostiniane (temistiane) al testo vulgato aristotelico boeziano”, *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* 54 (1962), pp. 137-47 (repr. in Id., *Opuscula. The Latin Aristotle*, Hakkert, Amsterdam 1972, pp. 448-58).

³ *Themistius. Commentaire sur le traité de l’âme d’Aristote, traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke*. Édition critique et étude sur l’utilisation du commentaire dans l’œuvre de saint Thomas par G. Verbeke, Brill, Leiden 1973, p. LXIII (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum, 1). In 1481, the paraphrase was translated again by Ermolao Barbaro Jr., in 1554 by Ludovico Nogarola, and finally, between 1582 and 1588, by Federico Bonaventura: cf. R.B. Todd, “Themistius”, in V. Brown (Editor in Chief) - J. Hankins - R.A. Kaster (Associate Editors), *Catalogus translationum et commentariorum. Mediaeval and Renaissance Latin Translations and Commentaries. Annotated Lists and Guides*, vol. VIII, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C. 2003, pp. 59-102, esp. pp. 79-84.

The name of the translator is not given, but the authorship of the Flemish Dominican William of Moerbeke, then at the papal court in Viterbo,⁴ lies beyond doubt.⁵ As pointed out in a series of important studies,⁶ Moerbeke was then working relentlessly to implement his “insatiable desire to pass on to Latin-reading students the yet undiscovered or rediscovered treasure of Greek civilization”, as Lorenzo Minio-Paluello has it.⁷ Although recent scholarship does not follow the 20th century scholars who, on the basis of some Medieval sources, depict Moerbeke as working on Thomas’ demand,⁸ there are cases where the latter was indeed

⁴ A. Paravicini Bagliani, “Guillaume de Moerbeke et la cour pontificale”, in J. Brams - W. Vanhamel (eds.), *Guillaume de Moerbeke. Recueil d'études à l'occasion de 700^e anniversaire de sa mort (1286)*, Leuven U.P., Leuven 1989 (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. De Wulf-Mansion Centre, Series I, 8), pp. 23-52.

⁵ Todd, “Themistius” (above, n. 2), p. 78, claims that Moerbeke’s authorship is established “mainly on stylistic grounds”, echoing Paravicini Bagliani, “Guillaume de Moerbeke et la cour pontificale” (above, n. 4), p. 24 n. 2: “l’attribution de cette traduction à Guillaume de Moerbeke se fonde aussi sur des argumentations d’ordre linguistique”. Paravicini Bagliani refers to Verbeke, *Thémistius. Commentaire sur le traité de l’âme d’Aristote* (above, n. 3), pp. LXIII-LXVIII, who, following the lead of L. Minio-Paluello, “Guglielmo di Moerbeke traduttore della *Poetica* di Aristotele, 1278”, *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* 39 (1947), pp. 1-17 (repr. in Id., *Opuscula* [above, n. 2, pp. 40-56]), compares the Latin renderings of various Greek particles, reaching the conclusion that “l’identité du traducteur ne fait pas de doute, à cause de la convergence des données de la critique externe (lieu et date de traduction) avec celles de la critique interne, bien que ces dernières soient incomplètes. La méthode de traduction est certainement celle de Guillaume de Moerbeke et les informations sur le lieu et la date de la version correspondent avec ce que nous savons par ailleurs sur l’activité du célèbre dominicain flamand”.

⁶ After the seminal work by M. Grabmann, *Guglielmo di Moerbeke O.P., il traduttore delle opere di Aristotele*, Roma 1946 (*Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae*, XI, 20), a number of studies has been devoted to Moerbeke’s biography, his translations, and his relationship with several scientists and philosophers of his time. Cf. especially A. Paravicini Bagliani, “Witelo et la science optique à la cour pontificale de Viterbe (1277)”, *Mélanges de l’École Française de Rome* 87 (1975), pp. 425-53. For a detailed commented bibliography cf. W. Vanhamel, “Biobibliographie de Guillaume de Moerbeke”, in Brams - Vanhamel (eds.), *Guillaume de Moerbeke* (above n. 4), pp. 301-83; after 1989, cf. J. Brams, “Guillaume de Moerbeke et Aristote”, in J. Hamesse - M. Fattori (eds.), *Rencontres de cultures dans la philosophie médiévale. Traductions et traducteurs de l’Antiquité tardive au XIV^e siècle*. Actes du Colloque international de Cassino, 15-17 juin 1989 publiés par la SIEPM et l’Université degli studi di Cassino, KU Leuven - Università di Cassino, Leuven-Cassino 1990, pp. 317-36; Id., “Les traductions de Guillaume de Moerbeke”, in J. Hamesse (ed.), *Les traducteurs au travail. Leus manuscrits et leurs méthodes*. Actes du Colloque international organisé par le Ettore Majorana Centre for Scientific Culture, Erice 30 septembre - 6 octobre 1999, Brepols, Turnhout 2001, pp. 231-56.

⁷ L. Minio-Paluello, “Moerbeke, William of”, in Ch.H. Gillispie (ed.), *Dictionary of Scientific Biography*, Vol. 4, 1974, pp. 434-40, esp. p. 434.

⁸ J.-P. Torrell, *Initiation à saint Thomas d’Aquin. Sa personne et son œuvre. Nouvelle édition profondément remaniée et enrichie d’une bibliographie mise à jour*, Cerf, Paris 2015, p. 229 n. 51, quotes a 1312 list of Thomas Aquinas’ works claiming that: “Fr. Wilhelmus Brabantinus, Corinthiensis, transtulit omnes libros naturalis et moralis philosophiae de graeco in latinum ad instantiam Fratris Thomae”. Torrell also quotes the biographer of Thomas Guglielmo da Tocco, claiming that Thomas “procuravit quod fieret nova translatio que sententia Aristotilis continet clarius veritatem”. According to Torrell, *ibid.*, the former piece of information is in all likelihood the source of the latter. Another ground for the claim that some of Moerbeke’s translations were done upon the request of Thomas Aquinas is a note on the MS Oxford, Bodleian Library, *Ashmolean* 424, which has been studied mostly in relationship to Witelo’s *Perspectiva*, a work dedicated to William of Moerbeke. The relevant part of the note claims that Moerbeke “transtulit physicam Aristotelis de graeco in latinum ad preces sancti Thomae de Aquino”: cf. Paravicini Bagliani, “Moerbeke et la cour pontificale” (above, n. 4), p. 43, referring to his previous work “Un matematico nella corte papale del secolo XIII: Campano da Novara († 1296)”, *Rivista di storia della Chiesa in Italia* 27 (1973), pp. 98-129, esp. p. 116. The idea that Moerbeke’s translations were done “ad instantiam fratris Thomae” has been challenged mostly by R. A. Gauthier in his *Preface* to the Leonine edition of Thomas’ commentary on the *De Anima: Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia* iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita. Tomus XLV, 1. *Sententia Libri De Anima* cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum. Commissio Leonina - Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Roma-Paris 1984. Gauthier, *Praefatio* p. 176*, comments upon the pieces of information just quoted as follows: “Ces textes ont pu faire illu-

the first to benefit from a brand new translation or a revision of earlier translations made by Moerbeke.

One of the cases where Thomas' quotations are very close to the completion by Moerbeke of one of his translations is surely that of Themistius' *In Libros De Anima Paraphrasis*.⁹ Thomas makes extensive use of the paraphrase, both in his own *Sentencia Libri De Anima*, dated 1267-1268,¹⁰ and in the *De Unitate intellectus*, dated 1270.¹¹ It is well known that in this treatise Thomas has recourse (also) to Themistius in order to disprove the interpretation of the Aristotelian intellectual faculty as a substance existing apart from the individual souls that are forms of the individual bodies – a substance that turns out to be one and the same for all mankind.¹² It is in particular on the

sion, tant que l'histoire des traductions latines médiévales d'Aristote n'était pas connue; ils ne le peuvent plus aujourd'hui: nous avons désormais sur cette histoire trop d'informations précises avec lesquelles ils sont en contradiction". Although sharing the essentials of Gauthier's argument, C. Steel, "Guillaume de Moerbeke et saint Thomas", in Brams - Vanhamel (eds.), *Guillaume de Moerbeke* (above, n. 4), pp. 57-82, draws from his analysis of Moerbeke's translations and their use by Thomas the following conclusion: "L'étude de l'histoire des traductions et les remarques critiques du P. Gauthier nous ont obligés à limiter nettement la portée de ce témoignage. Cette étude a restitué ainsi à Moerbeke son autonomie et son originalité intellectuelle. Mais elle a confirmé également qu'il y a eu communication scientifique entre les deux dominicains (ce qui est le noyau solide de la tradition). Thomas a très vite compris l'importance du travail de son confrère. Il en a profité le premier, et c'est probablement grâce à son autorité que des traductions de Moerbeke ont commencé à circuler à Paris, et à partir de là dans la culture latine" (pp. 81-82).

⁹ Cf. Gauthier, *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Sentencia Libri De Anima. Praefatio*, p. 129*: "Nombreux avaient été au XIII^e siècle, avant saint Thomas, les commentateurs du *De anima* d'Aristote, mais tous avaient commenté la *Translatio vetus* de Jacques de Venise, qui datait du milieu du XII^e siècle. Saint Thomas fut le premier à commenter, dès qu'elle eut paru, la *Translatio noua* de Guillaume de Moerbeke: là est l'originalité, et peut-être la raison d'être, de son commentaire". On James of Venice's translation (*Translatio vetus*) and Moerbeke's revision of it cf. L. Minio-Paluello, "Le texte du *De Anima* d'Aristote. La tradition latine avant 1500", in *Autour d'Aristote. Recueil d'études de philosophie ancienne et médiévale offert à Monseigneur A. Mansion*, Louvain 1955, pp. 217-43 (repr. in *Opuscula. The Latin Aristotle* [above, n. 2], pp. 250-76); Gauthier, *Praefatio*, p. 160*; R. Wielockx, "Guillaume de Moerbeke réviseur de sa révision du *De Anima*", *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 54 (1987), pp. 113-85. On the grounds of a detailed analysis, Gauthier establishes that "Il n'est pas impossible que saint Thomas ait reçu en même temps, à la fin de 1267, l'ensemble de l'œuvre de Moerbeke, révision du texte d'Aristote et traduction de la paraphrase de Thémistius" (p. 283*). Cf. also Steel, "Guillaume de Moerbeke et saint Thomas", referring to the attitude to counter Averroes' interpretation of the *De Anima* by means of Themistius' that is typical of the *De Unitate intellectus*: "Dans ce traité polémique, Thomas est heureux de pouvoir citer le Thémistius authentique contre le Thémistius manipulé d'Averroès: *patet etiam quod Averroes perverse refert sententiam Themistii et Theophrasti...* (...). Remarquons enfin que Thomas fut également le premier à profiter de la traduction de l'*Elementatio theologica* de Proclus, ce qui lui a permis de reconnaître que le *Liber de causis* est une adaptation de ce texte de Proclus. (...) C'est probablement par l'intermédiaire de Thomas que certaines traductions de Moerbeke (celle de Thémistius, de Proclus, de Simplicius) ont commencé à circuler dans le milieu universitaire à Paris" (pp. 70-71).

¹⁰ *Sentencia Libri De Anima*, quoted in the preceding note; that this work was written between 1267 and 1268 is established also on the basis of the presence in it of quotations from Themistius' paraphrasis: see below, pp. 311-12 with notes 19-25.

¹¹ *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita. Tomus XLIII. De principiis naturae, De Aeternitate mundi, De Motu cordis, De Mixtione elementorum, De Operationibus occultis naturae, De Iudiciis astrorum, De Sortibus, De Unitate intellectus, De Ente et essentia; De Fallaciis, De Propositionibus modalibus*, cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum. Editori di San Tommaso, Santa Sabina, Roma 1976. Cf. also A. de Libera, *Thomas d'Aquin, Contre Averroès. L'unité de l'intellect contre les averroïstes suivi des textes contre Averroès antérieurs à 1270*. Traduction, introduction, bibliographie, chronologie, notes et index, Flammarion, Paris 1994; Id., *L'Unité de l'intellect. Commentaire du De Unitate intellectus de Thomas d'Aquin*, Vrin, Paris 2004 (Études et commentaires).

¹² This doctrine cannot be ascribed to Averroes without qualification, because he changed his mind on the nature of intellect in the various works he devoted to the *De Anima* (the *Epitome*, the Middle and Long commentaries, not to mention other minor writings), and there is no scholarly consensus on their relative chronology. Valuable summaries of the positions held in scholar-

issue of intellect that Thomas repeatedly quotes Themistius;¹³ other *magistri* followed in Thomas' footsteps.¹⁴ What he claims he has found in Themistius' account of *De Anima*, III, 4-5, is the correct interpretation of intellect as a faculty – indeed, the highest faculty – of the human soul: the form of the individual body, the entelechy of the living being. The theory that makes the intellect instead something distinct from the individual soul, a separate entity shared in common by all mankind, is notoriously rejected by Thomas as a misinterpretation of Aristotle, and one that was propounded only by Averroes plus his followers at the Paris university. All this has been shown in a series of studies to which there is nothing that I can add. I will rather focus on the *Sententia Libri De Anima*. Against the background of a general reassessment of Themistius' sources that includes an inventory of his Plotinian readings,¹⁵ I will try to argue here that, via Moerbeke's translation of *In Libros De Anima Paraphrasis* and Thomas' use of it, Themistius passed on to the Latin readership the Plotinian account of the reasons why the soul cannot be the "harmony" of the body.

That some of Themistius' arguments are germane to Plotinus' did not go unnoticed by Thomas Aquinas, who was to some extent acquainted with the Plotinian doctrine thanks to Macrobius. Thomas remarks that both Plotinus and Themistius part company from Plato's extreme dualism, here presented, in "Gregorius Nissenus'" wording, as the doctrine that makes man *solum intellectus*.¹⁶

ship on the evolution (or lack thereof) of Averroes' position are provided by M. Geoffroy, "À la recherche de la Béatitude", an introductory essay to Averroès. *La Béatitude de l'âme*. Éditions, traductions annotées, études doctrinales et historiques d'un traité d' "Averroès", par M. Geoffroy et C. Steel, Vrin, Paris 2001 (Sic et Non), esp. pp. 42-81, and by R.C. Taylor in the Introduction to his English translation of the Long Commentary (lost in Arabic apart from some fragments, on which more later): cf. *Averroes of Cordoba's Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle, Translation and Introduction* by R.C. Taylor with Th.-A. Druart Subeditor, Yale U.P., New Haven 2009, where a "middle position", a "transitional position", and a "final position" are singled out. Leaving aside the complex question whether or not the position held in the *Long Commentary* counts as Averroes' last word on the human intellect, one can confidently say that this was indeed the doctrine known to Thomas and the other scholastic authors of the 13th century. The *Long Commentary* was translated into Latin by Michael Scot (edition: Averrois Cordubensis *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De Anima libros* recensuit F.S. Crawford, Cambridge [MA] 1953 [Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem ... Versionium Latinarum VI 1]). The origins of the Latin "Averroism" are in themselves a subject of scholarly research: see esp. R.-A. Gauthier, "Notes sur les débuts (1225-1240) du 'premier averroïsme'", *Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 66 (1982), pp. 321-73. Finally, on the fragments of the Arabic *Long Commentary* I have alluded to before, attesting to a different draft with respect to the Latin version, see C. Sirat - M. Geoffroy, *L'original arabe du Grand Commentaire d'Averroès au De Anima d'Aristote. Prémisses de l'édition*, Vrin, Paris 2005 (Sic et Non). — Themistius was critical also for Averroes, as shown by R.C. Taylor, "Themistius and the Development of Averroes' Noetics", in R.L. Friedman - J.-M. Counet (eds.), *Medieval Perspectives on Aristotle's De Anima*, Peeters, Leuven 2013 (Philosophes Médiévaux, 58), pp. 1-38.

¹³ G. Verbeke, "Thémistius et le *De Unitate intellectus* de saint Thomas", in Verbeke, *Thémistius. Commentaire sur le traité de l'âme d'Aristote* (above n. 3), pp. xxxix-lxii, previously published in the *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 53 (1955), pp. 141-64. According to Verbeke, the *verbatim* quotations are ten, all of them "empruntés au commentaire du philosophe grec sur le chapitre V du troisième livre du *Traité de l'âme*, chapitre qui traite de l'intellect actif" (p. xxxix). In reality, the *verbatim* quotations are taken also from other parts of Themistius' *In Libros De Anima*. Verbeke's article deals with only one passage, and the references in it are based on the 1936 edition of Thomas' *De Unitate intellectus* by L.W. Keeler; in consideration of all this, I deem it useful to provide the list of all the quotations with reference to the *editio Leonina* (as quoted above): see below, Appendix I. The passage dealt with in Verbeke's article quoted above is n° 11 in my list.

¹⁴ E.P. Mahoney, "Themistius and the Agent Intellect in James of Viterbo and Other Thirteenth-century Philosophers", *Augustiniana* 23 (1973), pp. 428-31.

¹⁵ I take the liberty of directing the reader interested in this survey to my book *Insegnare la filosofia. Temistio fra Costantinopoli e il medioevo arabo-latino* (forthcoming, Pisa U.P. 2018). It strains credulity that the discussions about Themistius' philosophical allegiance (Aristotelian or Neoplatonic) do not start from an accurate inventory of his quotations from the *Enneads*.

¹⁶ *De Unitate intellectus*, III 256-264: "Si autem dicatur quod hoc indiuiduum quod est Sortes neque est aliquid compositum ex intellectu et corpore animato, neque est corpus animatum tantum, sed est solum intellectus; hec iam erit opinio Platonis, qui, ut Gregorius Nissenus refert, 'propter hanc difficultatem non uult hominem ex anima et corpore esse, sed

While Plato, in Thomas' eyes, was unable to account for continuity between sense-perception and intellection because of his conviction that man is his intellect, Plotinus – whom he depicts as a commentator of Aristotle – was aware of the fact that man is his soul. This means: the individual form of this individual body, endowed with a series of faculties that span from sense-perception to intellection.¹⁷ The fact that he connects to one another the post-Aristotelian Platonism of Plotinus and the account of the Aristotelian soul given by Themistius proves once again, if proof is needed, that Thomas was remarkably percipient of the real nature of the philosophical positions that he came across.¹⁸ However, when Thomas had recourse to Themistius in his commentary on *De Anima* I 4 he was surely not aware that what he was using as a means for understanding Aristotle was in reality Plotinus.

1. *Themistius in Thomas Aquinas' Sententia Libri De Anima, Book I, Chapter IX (commentary on De Anima I 4)*

In 1932, the Belgian scholar Marcel De Corte called attention to the use made by Thomas in his *Sententia Libri De Anima* of the newly translated commentary by Themistius.¹⁹ Even though the main conclusion drawn by De Corte apropos the date of Thomas' commentary has been challenged in subsequent scholarship, one thing has been established on firm grounds in this study: Thomas quotes extensively Themistius in his commentary on Book I. From this fact, coupled with the quotations in the 1270 *De Unitate intellectus*, De Corte argued that Thomas had commented upon books II and III at a time when Themistius had not yet been translated. In De Corte's account, Thomas' commentary on Book I was written later on, at a time when he had become acquainted with Moerbeke's translation.²⁰ Both the date of Thomas' commentary on Book I and its basis, namely the alleged absence of quotations from Themistius in the commentaries on Books II and III, have

animam corpore utentem et uelut indutam corpus". The rest of this passage, containing Thomas' assessment of the Plotinian doctrine and the comparison he establishes with Themistius', is quoted below, Appendix II. What Thomas believes to be Gregory of Nyssa's account is in reality Nemesius' *De Natura hominis*, whose Sections 2 and 3, on the soul, exist also as a separate treatise *On the Soul* attributed to Gregory of Nyssa: cf. M. Chase, "Némésius d'Émèse", in R. Goulet (ed.), *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques*, IV, CNRS Éditions, Paris 2005, pp. 625-50, esp. p. 627. A complete inventory of Thomas' quotations from "Gregorius Nissenus" coming in reality from Nemesius has been provided by E. Dobler, *Falsche Väterzitate bei Thomas von Aquin. Gregorius, Bischof von Nyssa oder Nemesios, Bischof of Emesa? Untersuchungen über die Autentizität der Zitate Gregors von Nyssa in den gesamten Werken des Thomas von Aquin*, Universitätsverlag Freiburg/Schweiz 2001 (Dokimion, 27), esp. pp. 109-12 on the *De Unitate intellectus*.

¹⁷ Thomas' assessment owes much to the fact that Macrobius' summary of the Plotinian doctrine is based on I 1[53]. This treatise, placed by Porphyry as the first of the first *Ennead*, deals with the typically post-Aristotelian topic of the subject of affections. Hence, the solution advanced by Plotinus (and summarised by Macrobius faithfully) implies getting rid of dualism as the idea that the soul is one thing that enters the body, in itself another thing. Plotinus elaborates on the fact that the soul and body interact: he holds fast to the Platonic doctrine that man is his soul, but wants to account also for body-soul interactions. For more information on the treatise, its problems and solutions cf. C. Marzolo, *Plotino. Che cos'è l'essere vivente e che cos'è l'uomo? I 1[53]*. Introduzione, testo greco, traduzione e commento, Pisa University Press, Pisa 2006 (Greco, arabo, latino. Le vie del sapere, 1).

¹⁸ An example is the continuity Thomas establishes between the Platonic tenet that man is his soul and the Aristotelian account of the intellect as the peak of man's life in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, admittedly one of the points in the corpus where the distance between Aristotle and Plato is reduced: the relevant passage is quoted below, Appendix I.

¹⁹ M. De Corte, "Thémistius et saint Thomas d'Aquin. Contribution à l'étude des sources et de la chronologie du commentaire de saint Thomas sur le *De Anima*", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 7 (1932), pp. 47-83.

²⁰ Hence De Corte, "Thémistius et saint Thomas d'Aquin", p. 72 concluded that the commentary on Book I was to be dated to the "second séjour que saint Thomas fit à Paris de 1269 à 1272, et, si l'on considère avant tout son caractère inachevé, pendant l'année scolaire 1271-1272".

been disproved first by Gerard Verbeke,²¹ and then, with much more detailed argumentation as for the time and circumstances of the composition of the *Sentencia Libri De Anima*, by R. A. Gauthier. First Gauthier shows that echoes of Themistius' paraphrase feature also in Thomas' commentaries on Books II and III.²² Then he raises the question why the quotations in Book I are explicit, while in commenting on Books II and III Thomas takes from Themistius only silent inspiration on minor points.²³ Gauthier's response revolves around the different attitude of Thomas in commenting on Book I, where the doxography on the soul in pre-Aristotelian philosophy plays an important role, if compared to that of his commentaries on Books II-III, where the doctrinal issues prevail.²⁴

On the basis of this element and others, that include (i) a comparison with further works quoting the so-called *Revisio Moerbekana* of the Latin text of the *Metaphysics*; (ii) a comparison with the *De Unitate intellectus*, and (iii) the existence of an Italian family of manuscripts of the *Sentencia Libri De Anima*, Gauthier reaches the conclusion that this work was composed between December 1267 and September 1268. Thus, he draws the conclusion that the *Sentencia Libri De Anima* was written down by Thomas during his stay at the Dominican studium of Santa Sabina in Rome, hence at a moment of his life when he was also working at the I^a Pars of the *Summa theologiae*, the *Quaestiones De Anima*, and the *Quaestiones De Spiritualibus creaturis*.²⁵

²¹ G. Verbeke, "Les sources et la chronologie du commentaire de S. Thomas au *De Anima* d'Aristote", *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 45 (1947), pp. 314-38, reprinted with corrections as "Thémistius et le commentaire de S. Thomas au *De Anima* d'Aristote" in Verbeke, *Thémistius. Commentaire sur le traité de l'âme d'Aristote* (above n. 3), pp. IX-XXXVIII.

²² Gauthier, Sancti Thomae de Aquino *Sentencia Libri De Anima. Praefatio*, pp. 274*-275*, lists some 30 passages where Thomas takes inspiration from or quotes implicitly Themistius, keeping apart those passages where the affinity between Thomas' and Themistius' exegesis of the *De Anima* might depend upon Averroes, who notoriously makes extensive use of Themistius in his *Long Commentary* (see above, p. 310 n. 12 *sub fn.*). As Gauthier has it, "Averroès connaissait bien Thémistius, souvent il le cite ou s'en inspire, et par lui l'exégèse de Thémistius est souvent passée chez les commentateurs de la *Vetus*; en bien de cas, on ne peut dire si les rencontres de saint Thomas avec Thémistius supposent la lecture de la traduction de Moerbeke ou ne relèvent pas plutôt de cette influence indirecte" (p. 274*).

²³ Gauthier, Sancti Thomae de Aquino *Sentencia Libri De Anima. Praefatio*, p. 274*: "Mis en évidence par M. De Corte, un fait reste acquis, même s'il faut aujourd'hui en nuancer l'énoncé: aux chapitres 1-11 du livre I du commentaire de saint Thomas, l'utilisation de Thémistius est massive et littérale; aux livres II et III du commentaire, si elle ne disparaît pas complètement, comme le croyait M. De Corte, elle se fait à tout le moins très discrète".

²⁴ Gauthier, Sancti Thomae de Aquino *Sentencia Libri De Anima. Praefatio*, pp. 275* and 282*: "Saint Thomas utilise donc la paraphrase de Thémistius de deux manières bien différentes d'une part au livre I et d'autre part aux livres II et III de son commentaire sur le *De Anima*: là citations abondantes et précises, ici réminiscences rares et vagues. Cette constatation, dès qu'elle a été faite, a posé un problème. Une solution s'est immédiatement offerte: si les deux parties du commentaire sont disparates, c'est qu'elles ne relèvent pas du même genre littéraire. (...) En somme, l'abondance et l'exactitude des citations sont en raison inverse de l'intérêt du texte. Si le commentaire du livre I du *De Anima* relève d'un autre genre littéraire que le commentaire des livres II et III, cela tient à la nature du texte commenté: autre le commentaire laborieux et livresque d'un texte qu'on n'a pas relu depuis les jours lointains de l'école, autre le commentaire libre et spontané d'un autre texte connu, relu, aimé". Gauthier's developments about Book I of the *De Anima* in the teaching of the *magistri* of the 13th-14th centuries provide the background for understanding Thomas' attitude: see pp. 276*-279*.

²⁵ Gauthier, Sancti Thomae de Aquino *Sentencia Libri De Anima. Praefatio*, p. 288*: "L'apparition de la *Nova* [i.e., Moerbeke's revision of the Graeco-Latin version of the *De Anima* by James of Venice, namely the so-called *Vetus*] et de la traduction de la paraphrase de Thémistius invitait saint Thomas à procéder à une mise au point de ses connaissances aristotéliennes, mais la nature même du travail dans lequel il était alors engagé lui imposait de diviser le travail: la *Somma de théologie*, qu'il destine aux débutants, ne peut donner que l'essentiel de la doctrine; il faut réserver à des œuvres séparées la discussion plus détaillée des *Questions*, et la présentation de la moelle, *sentencia*, du traité de l'âme d'Aristote. Trop savante pour les débutants, la *Sentencia* sera utile aux maîtres qui voudront approfondir cet instrument privilégié de la réflexion théologique sur l'âme".

Among the Themistian quotations in Thomas' commentary on Book I, admittedly more numerous and explicit than elsewhere in the *Sententia Libri De Anima*,²⁶ I will focus on the one which features in Chapter IX, where Thomas takes into account *De Anima* I 4. Aristotle discusses here the doctrines on the soul that antedate his own, and criticises them, as Plato did before him in the *Phaedo*. At 407 b 27 - 408 a 18, with arguments that differ from those in Plato's *Phaedo*,²⁷ he deals with that which makes the soul the harmony of the body:

[407 b 27] Καὶ ἄλλη δὲ τις δόξα παραδέδοται περὶ ψυχῆς, πιθανὴ μὲν πολλοῖς οὐδεμιᾶς ἦττον τῶν λεγομένων, λόγον δ' ὥσπερ εὐθύνοισι δεδωκυῖα καὶ τοῖς ἐν κοινῷ γινόμενοις λόγοις. [b 30] ἄρμονίαν γὰρ τινὰ αὐτὴν λέγουσι· καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἄρμονίαν κρᾶσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐναντίων εἶναι, καὶ τὸ σῶμα συγκεῖσθαι ἐκ ἐναντίων. καίτοι γε ἡ μὲν ἄρμονία λόγος τίς ἐστι τῶν μιχθέντων ἢ σύνθεσις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν οὐδέτερον οἶόν τ' εἶναι τούτων. ἔτι δὲ τὸ κινεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρμονίας, ψυχῆ δὲ πάντες ἀπονέμουσι τοῦτο μάλισθ' ὡς εἰπεῖν. ἀρμόζει δὲ μᾶλλον καθ' ὑγείας λέγειν ἄρμονίαν, καὶ ὅλως τῶν σωματικῶν ἀρετῶν, ἢ κατὰ ψυχῆς. φανερώτατον δ' εἶ τις ἀποδιδόνα πειραθεῖη τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ἔργα τῆς ψυχῆς ἄρμονία τινί· χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἐφαρμόζειν. ἔτι δ' εἰ λέγομεν τὴν [a 5] ἄρμονίαν εἰς δύο ἀποβλέποντες, κυριώτατα μὲν, τῶν μεγεθῶν ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσι κίνησιν καὶ θέσιν, τὴν σύνθεσιν αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω συναρμόζωσιν ὥστε μηδὲν συγγενὲς παραδέχεσθαι, ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ τὸν τῶν μεμιγμένων λόγον, οὐδέτερος μὲν οὖν [a 10] εὐλογον, ἢ δὲ σύνθεσις τῶν τοῦ σώματος μερῶν λίαν εὐξεστάτος. πολλὰ τε γὰρ αἱ συνθέσεις τῶν μερῶν καὶ πολλαχῶς· τίνος οὖν ἢ πῶς ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν νοῦν χρὴ σύνθεσιν εἶναι, ἢ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἢ ὀρεκτικόν; ὁμοίως δὲ ἄτοπον καὶ τὸ τὸν λόγον τῆς μίξεως εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν· οὐ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει [a 15] λόγον ἢ μίξις τῶν στοιχείων καθ' ἣν σὰρξ καὶ καθ' ἣν ὄστον. συμβῆσεται οὖν πολλὰς τε ψυχὰς ἔχειν καὶ κατὰ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα, εἴπερ πάντα μὲν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων μεμιγμένων, ὁ δὲ τῆς μίξεως λόγος ἄρμονία καὶ ψυχὴ.²⁸

[407 b 27] There is yet another opinion concerning soul which has come down to us, commending itself to many minds as readily as any that is put forward, although it has been severely criticised even

²⁶ Gauthier, *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Sententia Libri De Anima. Praefatio*, p. 273*: "G. Verbeke a d'abord confirmé ce que M. De Corte avait déjà bien mis en lumière: l'utilisation massive de Thémistius au livre I du commentaire de saint Thomas. Notre édition renforce encore cette conclusion: en plusieurs endroits où, à en croire les éditions anciennes, saint Thomas s'écartait quelque peu du texte de Thémistius qu'il cite, l'étude des manuscrits nous a amenés à rétablir la conformité de la citation avec le texte cité".

²⁷ Cf. H.B. Gottschalk, "Soul as Harmony", *Phronesis* 16 (1971), pp. 179-98.

²⁸ The Latin text in Moerbeke's revision of the *Vetus* runs: "Alia autem quedam opinio tradita est de anima, credibilis quidam multis et neque una minor hiis que dicte sunt, rationes autem tanquam directas prebens et in communi factis rationibus. Armoniam enim quandam dicunt. Et enim armoniam temperamentum et compositionem contrariorum esse et corpus componi e contrariis. Et quidem armonia quedam ratio compositorum est aut compositio, anima autem neutrum possibile est esse horum. Amplius autem mouere non est armonie, anime autem attribuunt hoc omnes. Congruit autem magis de sanitate dicere armoniam, et omnino de corporeis uirtutibus, quam de anima. Manifestum autem si aliquis temptauerit reddere passiones et opera anime armonia quadam: difficile enim adaptare. Amplius autem dicimus armoniam in duo respicientes, maxime quidem propria magnitudinem in habentibus motum et positionem, compositionem ipsorum, cum sic congruant ut nullum congenium pretermittatur. Hinc autem et eorum que miscentur rationem. Neutro quidem igitur modo rationabile. Compositio autem partium corporis multum inuestigabilis est: multe enim compositiones partium et multipliciter sunt; cuius igitur et quomodo congruit accipere intellectum compositionem esse aut et sensitium et appetitium? Similiter autem et inconueniens et rationem mixtionis esse animam. Non enim eandem habet rationem commixtio elementorum secundum quam caro et secundum quam os; accidet igitur multas animas habere. Et secundum omne corpus, si quidem omnia ex elementis commixta sunt, commixtionis autem ratio armonia et anima" (edited together with Thomas' *Sententia Libri De Anima*, p. 43).

in the popular discussions of the present day. [b 30] The soul is asserted to be a kind of harmony, for harmony is on this view a blending or combining of opposites, and the components of the body are opposites. And yet this harmony must mean either a certain proportion in the components or else the combining of them; and the soul cannot possibly be either of these. Furthermore, to cause motion is no attribute of a harmony: yet this function more than any other is all but universally assigned to soul. Again, it is more in harmony [408 a 1] with the facts to apply the term harmony to health or bodily excellence generally than to soul, as is very clearly seen when we try to assign to a harmony of whatever kind the affections or functions of the soul: it is difficult to harmonise them. Further, if we use the word [a 5] harmony with a twofold application; first, and in its most natural sense, of those magnitudes which have motion and position, to denote the combining of them into a whole, when they are so closely fitted together that they do not admit between them anything of the same kind; and then in a secondary sense to denote the proportion subsisting between the components of a mixture: in neither sense [a 10] is it reasonable to call soul a harmony. The view which regards it as a combining of the parts of the body is singularly open to criticism. For there are many combinings of the parts, and they combine in many ways. What part, then, is that whose combining with the rest we must assume to be the intellect, and in what ways does it combine? Or again, what of the sensitive and appetitive faculties? But it is equally absurd to regard the soul as the proportion determining the mixture. For the elements are not mixed in the same [a 15] proportion in flesh as in bone. Thus it will follow that there are many souls, and that, too, all over the body, if we assume that all members consist of the elements variously commingled and that the proportion determining the mixture is a harmony, that is, soul (trans. Hicks).²⁹

As usual, Thomas begins the *divisio textus* of this specific chapter by replacing it against the background of the main part it belongs to: Book I, that aims at reaching the definition of the soul and includes criticism of the doctrines that failed in this search.³⁰ According to Thomas, after having criticised Plato's account of the soul in the *Timaeus*, Aristotle moves on to a position that is at least in part (*quantum ad aliquid*) germane to Plato's: that which makes the soul an instance of attunement. For Thomas, the sole difference Aristotle sees between Plato's position and that of the soul as "harmony" lies in that Plato made the soul arise from numbers attuned, while this position squarely identifies attunement and soul.³¹

Thomas' *divisio textus* of *De Anima* I 4 is as follows: Aristotle first presents the doctrine (407 b 27-32), then argues against it (407 b 32 - 408 a 21); finally, Aristotle accounts for the philosophical reasons that might have suggested it (408 a 21-34).³² My discussion will focus on the passage quoted

²⁹ Aristotle, *De Anima*, with Translation, Introduction and Notes by R.D. Hicks, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge 1907, pp. 29-31.

³⁰ *Sententia Libri De Anima*, I, pp. 6.192-7.209 Gauthier: "(...) et ideo uidetur esse questio utrum diffinitio anime sit sicut generis aut sicut speciei specialissime. Nam aliqui querentes de anima uidentur intendere solum de anima humana; et quia apud antiquos philosophos erat duplex opinio de anima (Platonici enim qui ponebant uniuersalia separata scilicet quod essent forme et ydee et erant causa rebus particularibus cognitionis et esse, uolebant quod esset quedam anima separata per se, que esset causa et ydea animabus particularibus, et quicquid inuenitur in eis deriuatur ab illa; naturales autem philosophi uolebant quod non essent substancie naturales nisi particulares tantum et quod uniuersalia nichil sint in rerum natura), et propter hoc est questio utrum sit querenda una communis ratio anime sicut dicebant Platonici, uel huius uel illius anime sicut dicebant Naturales, scilicet ut anime equi uel hominis aut dei".

³¹ *Sententia Libri De Anima*, I 9.1-11 (p. 43.1-11) Gauthier: "Postquam Philosophus reprobaui opinionem Platonis, hic consequenter reprobatur quandam aliam opinionem conformem opinioni Platonis quantum ad aliquid. Fuerunt enim quidam qui dixerunt quod anima erat armonia; et isti concordauerunt cum Platone in hoc quod Plato dixit quod anima erat composita ex numeris armonicis, hii uero quod erat armonia; sed differebant in hoc quod Plato dixit quod anima erat armonia numerorum, hii uero quod armonia tam compositorum quam contrariorum erat anima".

³² *Sententia Libri De Anima*, I 9 (p. 43.12-17) Gauthier: "Circa hoc autem tria facit: primo enim ponit opinionem

above, namely 407 b 27 - 408 a 18, leaving aside the section on Empedocles' doctrine (408 a 18-34), whose affinity with that of the soul as attunement is alluded to by Aristotle at 408 a 18-19: ἀπαιτήσεε δ' ἄν τις τοῦτό γε καὶ παρ' Ἐμπεδοκλέους, "one might address also to Empedocles the same objection". Thomas elaborates more on this allusion, transforming the soul as attunement into a subset of the doctrine that makes things arise from principles that combine with each other.

The first point singled out by Thomas, i.e. the account of earlier opinions, is in its turn subdivided into two. The doctrine of the soul as attunement is first presented by Aristotle, says Thomas, as an instance of the search for material causes that is typical of early Greek philosophy;³³ second, this doctrine is described as grounded on the idea that both the soul and attunement are "forms".³⁴ In presenting Aristotle's account, Thomas has recourse to various sources, as is shown by the fact that he mentions a certain Dinarchus – a misspelling for Dichaiarchus³⁵ – as one of the supporters of this doctrine: a piece of information contained in Nemesius' *De Natura hominis*, which is in all likelihood Thomas' source, be it directly or indirectly.³⁶ Then, Aristotle moves on to criticise this doctrine, and he does so, according to Thomas, in four steps. In what follows, I will describe the four points singled out by Thomas, all of them depending at least in part upon Themistius' paraphrase.

Point (i): those who define the soul as attunement are compelled to deny that it is a substance. If compared with Aristotle's statement, Thomas' account clearly appears to be amplified, and his main source is Themistius. While Aristotle limited himself to saying that the soul cannot be attunement, neither in the sense of λόγος ... τῶν μιχθέντων nor in the sense of their σύνθεσις, Thomas adds that the reason why it is so lies in that neither the *compositio* nor the *proportio compositionis* are substances, while the soul is indeed a substance: a point that Aristotle does not mention here.

istorum et rationem opinionis; secundo uero disputat contra opinionem, ibi: Et quidem armonia etc.; tercio uero ostendit quomodo hec opinio est multum probabilis, ibi: Si uero alterum anima etc."

³³ *Sentencia Libri De Anima*, I 9 (p. 44.19-39) Gauthier: "Primo enim ponit dictam opinionem de anima dicens quod quedam opinio tradita est ab antiquis de anima, que uidebatur habere rectas rationes, et non solum in speciali de anima, set etiam quantum ad id quod commune est, quia antiqui philosophi nichil tractauerunt de causa formali, set tantum de materiali; et inter omnes illi qui magis uisi sunt appropinquare ad causam formalem fuerunt Democritus et Empedocles, qui, scilicet Empedocles, posuit quod omnia constabant ex sex principiis quorum quatuor posuit materialia, scilicet quatuor elementa, et duo, scilicet amicicium et litem, partim materialia et partim actiua; et dicebant quod hec principia materialia habebant inter se quandam proportionem que resultabat ex eis ita quod conueniebant in aliquo uno, quia sine hoc non possent esse simul, et hanc dicebant formam rerum et armoniam quandam esse. Unde et sicut de aliis formis, sic dicebant de anima quod erat armonia quedam".

³⁴ The two statements seem hardly consistent with each other, but this question cannot be addressed here.

³⁵ The philosopher alluded to under the anonymous reference "Dicitur autem" (see the following note for the full reference by Thomas) is indeed Dichaiarchus (= fr. 12a Wehrli = fr. 21b Mirhady — My sincere thanks go to Prof. T. Dorandi for directing me to this new edition), as shown by the comparison with Aëtius IV 2, 7 and Stobaeus I 49, 1: cf. Nemesius, *On the Nature of Man* translated with an introduction and notes by R.W. Sharples and P.J. Van Der Eijk, Liverpool U.P., Liverpool 2008 (Translated Texts for Historians, 49), p. 53 with n. 262. As shown by Gauthier in the *apparatus fontium ad loc.*, Thomas refers to "Dinarchus" also in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, II 64. I owe to Prof. Dorandi the remark that Thomas relied surely on Nemesius, where the name is spelled "Dinarchus".

³⁶ *Sentencia Libri De Anima*, IX, p. 44.40-48 Gauthier: "Secundo cum dicit: Et enim armoniam etc., ponit rationem huius opinionis, dicens quod armonia est complexio et proportio et temperamentum contrariorum in compositis et mixtis; et hec proportio que est inter ista contraria dicitur armonia et forma illius compositi; unde, cum anima sit quedam forma, dicebant ipsam esse armoniam. Dicitur autem hec opinio fuisse cuiusdam Dinarchi et Simmias et Empedoclis". As for Simmias, the spokesman of the doctrine of the soul as harmony in the *Phaedo*, Gauthier in the *apparatus fontium ad loc.* refers to the Latin translation of this dialogue by Henricus Aristippus, but is more inclined to think of some doxographical source: "uerba tamen Simmiae apud Platonem Thomam legisse non liquet". Here too, the source of Thomas is surely Nemesius, as remarked by Prof. Dorandi, because Nemesius quotes Simmias in association with "Dinarchus".

Aristotle, <i>De Anima</i> I4, 407 a 30-34 (see above, p. 313)	Thomas, <i>Sententia Libri De Anima</i> I 9.55-69 (p. 44) Gauthier
<p>ἁρμονίαν γὰρ τινα ἑαυτὴν λέγουσι· καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἁρμονίαν κρᾶσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐναντίων εἶναι, καὶ τὸ σῶμα συγκεῖσθαι ἐκ ἐναντίων· καίτοι γε ἡ μὲν ἁρμονία λόγος τίς ἐστι τῶν μιχθέντων ἢ σύνθεσις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν οὐδέτερον οἶόν τ' εἶναι τούτων.</p> <p>Armoniam enim quandam dicunt. Et enim armoniam temperamentum et compositionem contrariorum esse et corpus componi e contrariis. Et quidem armonia quedam ratio compositorum est aut compositio, anima autem neutrum possibile est esse horum.</p>	<p>Ad positionem autem obicit quatuor rationibus, quarum prima talis est. Constat quod armonia proprie dicta est consonancia in sonis; set isti transumpserunt istud nomen ad omnem debitam proportionem tam in rebus compositis ex diuersis partibus quam in commixtis ex contrariis; secundum hoc ergo armonia potest duo dicere, quia uel ipsam compositionem aut commixtionem uel proportionem ipsius compositionis seu commixtionis. Set constat quod neutrum istorum est anima. Ergo anima non est armonia. Quod autem anima non sit compositio siue proportio compositionis, patet: isti enim accipiunt animam ut substantiam quandam; set illa duo sunt accidentia; non sunt ergo idem.</p>
<p>The soul is asserted to be a kind of harmony, for harmony is on this view a blending or combining of opposities, and the components of the body are opposities. And yet this harmony must mean either a certain proportion in the components or else the combining of them; and the soul cannot possibly be either of these (trans. Hicks, see above p. 314).</p>	<p>Aristotle puts forward four objections to this opinion, and the first is as follows. Properly speaking, attunement is obviously the harmony of sounds; those philosophers however transferred this term to every kind of exact proportion both in things resulting from different parts and in things resulting from the mixture of contraries. Taken in this sense, "harmony" can mean two things: (i) either the composition or mixture themselves, or (ii) the ratio of the composition or mixture. However, the soul is obviously neither of these. Therefore, soul is not harmony. Now, that the soul cannot be either composition or the ratio of the composition is evident, for those philosophers do assume that the soul is a substance of some sort, whereas these two are accidents: therefore, they are not the same.</p>

As pointed out by Gauthier, both Themistius and Nemesius inspire this remark. Themistius says:

ταῦτα μὲν ἅπαντα εἴρηται ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐν ἄλλοις· ἃ δὲ νῦν Ἀριστοτέλης φησί, τοιαῦτά ἐστιν· ἡ ἁρμονία λόγος ἐστὶ τῶν ἡρμωσμένων καὶ σύνθεσις τῶν μεμιγμένων, ἡ ψυχὴ δ' οὔτε σύνθεσις οὔτε λόγος· καὶ ἡ μὲν οὐσία ἡ δὲ οὐ (p. 24.29-32 Heinze).

Haec quidem omnia dicta sunt a philosophis in aliis; quae autem nunc Aristoteles ait, talia sunt. Armonia ratio est armonizatorum et compositio mixtorum, anima autem neque compositio est neque ratio; et hec quidem substantia, hec autem non (p. 61.27-31 Verbeke).

As for Nemesius, he claims that

δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι λέγουσιν, Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ καὶ Δείναρχος ἀνούσιον.³⁷

Manifestum autem est quoniam et horum alii quidem animam substantiam esse dicunt, Aristoteles autem et Dinarchus insubstantialem.³⁸

³⁷ Nemesii Emeseni *De Natura hominis* edidit M. Morani, Teubner, Leipzig 1987 (Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana), p. 17.9-10. Morani sticks with "Dinarchus" against "Dichaiarchus" in Nemesius' text (see above, n. 35).

³⁸ Némésius d'Émèse, *De Natura hominis. Traduction de Burgundio de Pise*, éd. G. Verbeke et J.-R. Moncho, Leiden, Brill 1975 (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum, Suppl. 1), p. 24.34-36.

Thomas' remark deserves special attention: if he were acquainted with Nemesius' passage, as the mention of "Dinarchus" earlier in the same commentary suggests,³⁹ why on earth did he fail to notice that in that passage Aristotle sides with "Dinarchus" in denying the substantiality of the soul? The answer lies in Themistius' account. His testimony, as we have just seen, goes the other way round: Aristotle criticises the doctrine of soul as attunement precisely because the latter is not a substance, what Thomas obviously maintains soul to be according to Aristotle. These are, as Themistius says, Aristotle's *ipsissima verba*: in Moerbeke's translation Thomas reads "quae autem nunc Aristoteles ait, talia sunt". Thus, it is a fair guess that Thomas drew from Nemesius the information that there was a philosopher, named "Dinarchus", who defined the soul as attunement drawing the conclusion that it is not a substance, while he found in Themistius the bold assessment that for Aristotle the soul is indeed a substance: a doctrine unconditionally subscribed to by Thomas, and whose confirmation he found in Themistius. Thus, the part of Nemesius' account concerning Aristotle was discarded by Thomas, who retained only "Dinarchus" name as an example of a philosopher who made the soul *insubstantialis*. I will defer the analysis of this point until Section 2 in this article, where the source that accounts both for Nemesius' and Themistius' remarks, different as they may be, will be taken into account.

Point (ii): soul is admittedly the principle of movement, *set armonia non mouet*. This point also deserves attention, because what Thomas says goes beyond Aristotle's text, and his source is once again Themistius.

<p>Aristotle, <i>De Anima</i> I 4, 407 b 34-408 a 1 (see above, p. 313)</p> <p>ἔτι δὲ τὸ κινεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἁρμονίας, ψυχῇ δὲ πάντες ἀπονέμουσι τοῦτο μάλιστα' ὡς εἶπεῖν.</p> <p>Amplius autem mouere non est armonie, anime autem attribuunt hoc omnes.</p>	<p>Thomas, <i>Sentencia Libri De Anima</i> I 9.70-80 (p. 44) Gauthier</p> <p>Secundam rationem ponit cum dicit: <i>Amplius autem mouere</i> etc., quod talis est. Constat quod omnes philosophi dicunt quod anima mouet; set armonia non mouet, immo relinquitur ex mouente et sequitur, sicut ex motu cordarum qui est per musicum relinquitur armonia quedam in sono et ex applicatione et contemperatione partium a componente relinquitur proportio quedam in composito; ergo, si anima est armonia et hec relinquitur ex armonizatore, oportebit ponere aliam animam que armonizet.</p>
<p>Furthermore, to cause motion is no attribute of a harmony: yet this function more than any other is all but universally assigned to soul (trans. Hicks, see above, p. 314).</p>	<p>He advances a second reason by saying: <i>Furthermore, to cause motion</i>, etc., which is as follows: it is well known that all philosophers say that the soul moves; but attunement does not move, rather it results from a moving principle and comes after it, as a given attunement in sounds is the effect of the movement of the strings produced by the player, and as from the union and melting of parts made by someone who mixes them in a given proportion results in the mixture; consequently, should the soul be attunement, since attunement results from someone who attunes, there should be another soul that would attune.</p>

³⁹ See above n. 36.

As Gauthier remarks in the *apparatus fontium*, Thomas' account is taken verbatim from Themistius:

καὶ ἡ μὲν κινεῖ τὸ σῶμα, ἀρμονία δὲ οὐ κινεῖ τὰ ἡρμωσμένα, ἀλλ' ἐπιγίγνεται μὲν ἡρμωσμένοις, ἀρμόζει δὲ ἄλλος, ὥσπερ τὰς χορδὰς ὁ μουσικός· ἄλλης οὖν δεήσει τῆ ψυχῆ τῆς ποιούσης αὐτῆ τὴν ἀρμονίαν (p. 24.32-35 Heinze).

Et haec quidem movet corpus, harmonia autem non movet harmonizata, sed adest harmonizatis, harmonizat autem alius, sicut cordas musicus. Alia igitur anima indigebit anima, scilicet faciente harmoniam sibi (pp. 61.32-62.35 Verbeke).

Point (iii) consists in that the doctrine of the soul as attunement cannot account for the diverse and even conflicting feelings and deeds of the soul:

<p>Aristotle, <i>De Anima</i> I 4, 408 a 1-5 (see above, p. 313)</p> <p>ἀρμόζει δὲ μᾶλλον καθ' ὑγείας λέγειν ἀρμονίαν, καὶ ὅλως τῶν σωματικῶν ἀρετῶν, ἢ κατὰ ψυχῆς. φανερώτατον δ' εἴ τις ἀποδιδόναι πειραθεῖται τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ἔργα τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρμονία τινί· χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἐφαρμόζειν.</p> <p>Congruit autem magis de sanitate dicere armoniam, et omnino de corporeis uirtutibus, quam de anima. Manifestum autem si aliquis temptauerit reddere passiones et opera anime armonia quadam: difficile enim adaptare.</p>	<p>Thomas, <i>Sentencia Libri De Anima</i> I 9.81-102 (pp. 44-45) Gauthier</p> <p>Terciam rationem ponit cum dicit: <i>Congruit autem</i> etc., que talis est. Philosophus enim dicit in IV Phisicorum: quicumque assignat diffinitionem seu naturam rei, oportet quod illa assignatio, si sufficiens est, conueniat operationibus et passionibus illius rei; tunc enim diffinitur optime quid est res quando non solum cognoscimus substanciam et naturam ipsius rei, set etiam passiones et accidencia eius. Si ergo anima est armonia quedam, oportet quod per cognitionem armonie deveniamus in cognitionem operationum et accidencium anime; set hoc est ualde difficile, ut puta si uelimus operationes anime in armoniam referre: "cuius enim armonie erit sentire et cuius amare aut odire" et intelligere? Set per cognitionem armonie magis <i>congruit</i> uenire in cognitionem accidencium corporum, ut si uelimus cognoscere sanitatem dicemus quod est complexio adequata et temperata humorum et qualitatum in corpore, et sic <i>de aliis corporeis uirtutibus</i>. Et sic armonia magis esset attribuenda corpori quam anime.</p>
<p>Again, it is more in harmony with the facts to apply the term harmony to health or bodily excellence generally than to soul, as is very clearly seen when we try to assign to a harmony of whatever kind the affections or functions of the soul: it is difficult to harmonise them (trans. Hicks, see above, p. 314).</p>	<p>He puts forward the third reason by saying: <i>Again, it is more in harmony</i>, etc., and it is the following. Aristotle himself says in the <i>Physics</i>, Book IV, that if one provides the definition or nature of a thing, for the definition to be exact it is necessary that it fits both the actions and the affections of the thing it refers to. Indeed, a good definition is given when not only the substance and nature of the thing is known, but also its affections and accidents. Therefore, should soul be a sort of attunement, it would be necessary that once the attunement is known, we also know the actions and the accidents of the soul, something that proves to be really difficult, as if, for instance, we were to refer to the attunement the actions of the soul: "to what kind of attunement will belong to perceive, and to what kind to love, or to hate", or to understand? In reality, it would be <i>more in harmony</i> to come to know the physical accidents, like for instance if we were to know 'health' and we say that it consists in an adequate and harmonic mixture of humours and qualities in the body, and so on for <i>other bodily powers</i>. Thus, attunement fits better body than soul.</p>

Here too, as indicated by Gauthier, Thomas takes inspiration from Themistius:

φανερῶς δ' <ἄν> ἄτοπος ὁ λόγος φανείη πειρωμένοις τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὰ ἔργα ἕκαστον εἰς ἄρμονίαν τινὰ ἀναφέρειν. ποίας γὰρ ἄρμονίας τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ ποίας τὸ φιλεῖν ἢ μισεῖν; (pp. 24.35-25.1 Heinze).

Manifeste autem inconueniens sermo apparebit temptantibus passiones animae et opera unumquodque in harmoniam quandam referre. Cuius enim harmoniae est sentire et cuius amare aut odire? (p. 62.35-38 Verbeke).

Point (iv) consists in that attunement is a physical property that Aristotle is ready to grant only to things having local movement (κίνησιν καὶ θέσιν, *motum et positionem*). In Thomas' presentation of this point⁴⁰ Gauthier detected two verbatim quotations from Themistius.⁴¹

It appears from this survey that Thomas' account of the reasons why for Aristotle the soul cannot be the attunement of body bears heavily on Themistius.

Apart from point (iv), where Themistius' source is Aristotle's own wording, the objections against soul as attunement are taken from Plotinus, as I will try to show below.

⁴⁰ *Sentencia Libri De Anima*, I 9.103-151 (p. 45) Gauthier: "Quartam rationem ponit cum dicit: *Amplius autem dicimus* etc. ,quae talis est. Harmonia invenitur aliquando in compositis et *habentibus compositionem et motum*, quia quando haec sic inuicem simul ponuntur et ordinantur *ut nichil congenium <praetermittatur>*, id est ut nullus defectus eiusdem generis ibi sit, «tunc» ille partes «dicuntur bene harmonizatae et compositio ipsarum nominatur harmonia, sicut ligna et lapides et» alia corpora naturalia; sic etiam et corde, quando bene ordinatae sunt (seu fistule), ut exinde consonancia sonorum resultet, dicuntur bene armonizatae et huiusmodi consonancia dicitur armonia; et hoc modo proprie dicitur armonia. Aliquando autem invenitur in corporibus mixtis ex contrariis; quando enim aliqua contraria sunt complexa et commixta in aliquo ita ut nulla repugnancia seu excessus alicuius contrarii sit ibi, ut puta calidi aut frigidi aut humidi aut sicci, tunc illa dicuntur bene armonizata et horum ratio, id est proportio, dicitur armonia. Si ergo anima est armonia, secundum aliquem istorum modorum diceretur; set constat quod neutro istorum modorum rationabile est animam dici armoniam; ergo male dicunt animam armoniam esse. Et quod neutro istorum modorum anima dicatur armonia, patet. Non enim anima potest dici armonia secundum quod invenitur in rebus compositis et habentibus compositionem: nam ordo partium compositarum in corpore est ualde manifestus, facile enim est scire ordinem ossium ad ossa et neruorum ad neruos et brachii ad manum et carnis ad ossa; set ratio ordinis partium anime est nobis inmanifesta, non enim per hoc possumus scire ordinem qui est inter intellectum et sensum et appetitum et huiusmodi. Nec etiam potest dici armonia secundum proportionem corporum commixtorum ex contrariis, et hoc duplici ratione. Una ratio est, quia diuersa proportio inuenitur in diuersis partibus corporis: nam *commixtio elementorum* non habet eandem *rationem*, idest proportionem, *secundum quam* est *caro* et *secundum quam* est *os*; ergo in diuersis partibus erunt diuerse anime. Alia ratio est, quia omnia corpora sunt *commixta ex elementis* et contrariis; si ergo proportio *commixtionis* in quolibet corpore est armonia et armonia est anima, ergo in quolibet corpore erit anima quod est inconueniens. Et sic patet quod inconuenienter dicunt animam esse armoniam".

⁴¹ The verbatim quotations are as follows: (1) *Sentencia Libri De Anima* I 9.104-112 (p. 45) Gauthier: "Armonia inuenitur aliquando in compositis et habentibus positionem et motum, quia quando hec sibi inuicem simul ponuntur et ordinantur ut nichil congenium <praetermittatur>, id est ut nullus defectus eiusdem generis ibi sit, 'tunc' ille partes 'dicuntur bene armonizate et compositio ipsarum nominatur armonia, sicut ligna et lapides et' alia corpora naturalia" = p. 62.39-44 Verbeke: "Venit autem haec opinio maxime quidem ex magnitudinibus, quaecumque habent positionem et motum, quoniam haec autem sic inuicem secus ponuntur ut nihil congenium suscipiatur, tunc dicuntur esse bene harmonizatae, et compositio ipsarum nominatur harmonia, sicut ligna et lapides et quaecumque naturalia corpora harmonizant artes". (2) *Sentencia Libri De Anima* I 9.129-134 (p. 45) Gauthier: "Non enim anima potest dici armonia secundum quod inuenitur in rebus compositis et habentibus positionem: nam ordo partium compositarum in corpore est ualde manifestum, facile enim scire ordinem ossium ad ossa et neruorum ad neruos et brachii ad manum et carnis ad ossa" = pp. 62.50-63.52 Verbeke: "Secundum quem igitur modorum horum est harmoniam vocare animam? Neque enim ut compositio aut secus positio, velut ossium ad ossa, aut ossium ad neruos".

2. The Harmony of the Body? Plotinus' Greek and Latin Legacy

My starting point here is the brand new Italian translation of the treatise *On the Immortality of the Soul*, IV 7[2], where Plotinus devotes a section to arguing against the doctrine of the soul as the “harmony” of the body.⁴² Elaborating more on a previous article she authored together with the late lamented Matthias Baltes,⁴³ Cristina D’Ancona shows that in commenting upon *De Anima* I 4, 407 b 27 - 408 a 18 Themistius quotes *verbatim* Plotinus’ *On the Immortality of the Soul*.

Plotinus, IV 7[2], 8 ⁴ .1-28	Themistius, p. 24.21-25.1 Heinze
<p>ἄρ' οὖν ἕτερον μὲν σώματος, σώματος δέ τι, οἷον ἄρμονία; τοῦτο γὰρ ἄρμονίαν τῶν ἀμφὶ Πυθαγόραν λεγόντων ἕτερον τρόπον ᾧ ἤθησαν αὐτὸ τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι οἷον καὶ ἡ περὶ χορδᾶς ἄρμονία.</p> <p>ὡς γὰρ ἐνταῦθα ἐντεταμένον τῶν χορδῶν ἐπιγίνεται τι οἷον πάθημα ἐπ' αὐταῖς, ὃ λέγεται ἄρμονία, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τοῦ ἡμετέρου σώματος ἐν κράσει ἀνομοίων γινομένου τὴν ποιὰν κρασὶν ζωὴν τε ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ψυχὴν οὔσαν τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ κράσει πάθημα. ὅτι δὲ ἀδύνατον, πολλὰ ἤδη πρὸς ταύτην τὴν δόξαν εἴρηται· καὶ γὰρ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρότερον ἡ ψυχὴ, ἡ δ' ἄρμονία ὕστερον, καὶ ὡς τὸ μὲν ἄρχει τε καὶ ἐπιστατεῖ τῷ σώματι καὶ μάχεται πολλαχῆ, ἄρμονία δὲ οὐκ ἂν οὔσα ταῦτα ποιοῖ, καὶ ὡς τὸ μὲν οὐσία, ἡ δ' ἄρμονία οὐκ οὐσία, καὶ ὅτι ἡ κρασὶς τῶν σωμάτων, ἐξ ὧν συνέσταμεν, ἐν λόγῳ οὔσα ὑγεία ἂν εἴη, καὶ ὅτι καθ' ἕκαστον μέρος ἄλλως κραθὲν εἴη ἂν ψυχὴ ἑτέρα, ὥστε πολλὰς εἶναι, καὶ τὸ δὴ μέγιστον, ὡς ἀνάγκη πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ταύτης ἄλλην ψυχὴν εἶναι τὴν ποιουσαν τὴν ἄρμονίαν ταύτην, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν ὀργάνων τὸν μουσικὸν τὸν ἐντιθέντα ταῖς χορδαῖς τὴν ἄρμονίαν λόγον ἔχοντα παρ' αὐτῷ, καθ' ὃν ἀρμόσει. οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖ αἱ χορδαὶ παρ' αὐτῶν οὔτ' ἐνταῦθα τὰ σώματα ἑαυτὰ εἰς ἄρμονίαν ἄγειν δυνήσεται. ὅλως δὲ καὶ οὗτοι ἐξ ἀψύχου ἔμψυχα ποιοῦσι καὶ [τά] ἐξ ἀτάκτων κατὰ συντυχίαν τεταγμένα, καὶ τὴν τάξιν οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' αὐτὴν ἐκ τῆς αὐτομάτου τάξεως τὴν ὑπόστασιν εἰληφέναι. τοῦτο δὲ οὔτε ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος οὔτε ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις δυνατὸν γενέσθαι. οὐκ ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρμονία.</p>	<p>πιθανότητα μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος ἔχει, διελήλεγκται δὲ πολλαχῆ καὶ ὑπ' Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος.</p> <p>καὶ γὰρ ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τοῦ σώματος, τουτέστιν ἡ ψυχὴ, ἄρμονία δὲ ὕστερον, καὶ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἄρχει καὶ ἐπιστατεῖ τῷ σώματι καὶ μάχεται πολλαχίς, ἄρμονία δὲ οὐ μάχεται τοῖς ἡρμοσμένοις, καὶ ὅτι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἤττον ἄρμονία μὲν δέχεται, ψυχὴ δὲ οὐ, καὶ ὡς ἄρμονία μὲν σωζομένη οὐ προσίεται ἀναρμοστίαν, ψυχὴ δὲ κακίαν προσίεται, καὶ ὅτι εἴπερ τοῦ σώματος ἡ ἀναρμοστία νόσος ἐστὶν ἢ αἰσχος ἢ ἀσθένεια, ἡ ἄρμονία τοῦ σώματος κάλλος ἂν εἴη καὶ ὑγεία καὶ δύναμις ἀλλ' οὐ ψυχὴ, ταῦτα μὲν ἅπαντα εἴρηται ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐν ἄλλοις· ἃ δὲ νῦν Ἀριστοτέλης φησί, τοιαῦτά ἐστιν. ἡ ἄρμονία λόγος ἐστὶ τῶν ἡρμοσμένων καὶ σύνθεσις τῶν μεμιγμένων, ἡ ψυχὴ δ' οὔτε σύνθεσις οὔτε λόγος· καὶ ἡ μὲν οὐσία ἡ δὲ οὐ· καὶ ἡ μὲν κινεῖ τὸ σῶμα, ἄρμονία δὲ οὐ κινεῖ τὰ ἡρμοσμένα, ἀλλ' ἐπιγίνεται μὲν ἡρμοσμένους, ἀρμόζει δὲ ἄλλος, ὥσπερ τὰς χορδὰς ὁ μουσικός· ἄλλης οὖν δεήσει τῇ ψυχῇ τῆς ποιούσης αὐτῇ τὴν ἄρμονίαν. φανερῶς δ' <ἀν> ἄτοπος ὁ λόγος φανείη πειρωμένους τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὰ ἔργα ἕκαστον εἰς ἄρμονίαν τινα ἀναφέρειν. ποίας γὰρ ἄρμονίας τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ ποίας τὸ φιλεῖν ἢ μισεῖν;</p>

⁴² Plotino. *L'immortalità dell'anima* (IV 7[2]). *Plotiniana arabica* (pseudo-Teologia di Aristotele, capitoli I, III, IX). Introduzione, testo greco, traduzione e commento; testo arabo, traduzione e commento di C. D'Ancona, Pisa U.P., Pisa 2017 (Greco, Arabo, Latino. Le vie del sapere, 5), pp. 440-2 (trans.) and 317-36 (commentary).

⁴³ M. Baltes† - C. D'Ancona, “Plotino, *L'immortalità dell'anima*. IV 7[2], 8⁴”, in R. Chiaradonna (ed.), *Studi sull'anima in Plotino*, Bibliopolis, Napoli 2005 (Elenchos. Collana di testi e studi sul pensiero antico, 42), pp. 19-58.

Is it, then, something different from body, but belonging to body, like its tuning? For, though the Pythagoreans meant this term, tuning, in another sense, people thought it was something like the tuning of strings. For just as here, when the strings are stretched, they come to be affected in a kind of way, and this being affected is called being in tune, in the same way, since our body also consists of a mixture of dissimilar parts, the mixture of a particular kind produces life and soul, which is the way of being affected which comes upon the mixture. But many arguments have already been brought against this view to show that it is impossible: they are that soul is the prior and the tuning subsequent to it; and that this prior reality rules and directs the body and fights it in many ways, but the soul would not do this if it was a being in tune; and that the prior reality is a substance, but being in tune is not a substance, and that the mixture of bodies of which we consist, when it was in proportion, would be health [not soul]; and that in each part, which is mixed in a different way, there would be a different soul, so that there would be many; and what is certainly the greatest difficulty of all, that it is necessary that there should be another soul before this soul producing this being in tune, as with musical instruments there is the player who brings the strings into tune and has a proportion in himself according to which he will tune them. For neither can the strings nor the bodies here bring themselves into tune by themselves. And in general these people also make ensouled things out of soulless, and things casually arranged out of things in disorder, and do not make order arise from the soul, but say that the soul has received its existence from a chance arrangement. But this cannot happen either in parts or wholes. The soul, then, is not being in tune (trans. Armstrong).

Now although this theory is plausible, it is thoroughly disproved in numerous [arguments] by both Aristotle and Plato. [Plato argued]: (a) that while the one (i.e. the soul) is prior to the body, the attunement is posterior; (b) that the [soul] rules and commands the body and is often in conflict with it, whereas an attunement does not conflict with what has been attuned; (c) that an attunement admits differing degrees, whereas the soul does not; (d) that where an attunement is maintained it does not admit a non-attunement, whereas the soul admits vice; (e) that if non-attunement of the body is sickness, ugliness or weakness, then the attunement of the body would be health, beauty, and power rather than the soul. All the preceding points have been stated by philosophers elsewhere; the following points are what Aristotle states here. Attunement is a ratio between things that have been attuned, and a combination of things that have been mixed, yet the soul is neither a combination nor a ratio. In fact the [soul] is a substance, but the [combination] is not.

The soul causes the body to move, whereas the attunement does not cause movement in what has been attuned, but supervenes on what has been attuned, while someone else imposes the attunement, as where the musician tunes the strings. This means that the soul will need another soul to provide its attunement. The theory would obviously appear absurd if we tried to refer the affections and function of each thing's soul back to a specific attunement. For what sort of attunement does sense-perception belong, and what sort is there for loving or hating? (trans. R.B. Todd 1996, pp. 40-41).

The first uncontroversial point that arises from this comparison is that Themistius had Plotinus' *On the Immortality of the Soul* ready to hand when commenting upon *De Anima*, I 4. What he takes from Plotinus' arguments – that are in part derived from Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias, but are also, at one and the same time, directed against Aristotle and Alexander⁴⁴ – is first and foremost the idea that the soul cannot be the attunement of the body because of its ontological priority with respect to it. Prior to and independent from body, soul rules over it and can resist it in various ways. The remote origin of this argument is obviously Plato's *Phaedo*, but Themistius' wording shows clearly that his immediate source is Plotinus, whom he quotes verbatim.⁴⁵

The reason that Plotinus qualifies as the main one, namely the fact that were the soul an attunement, there should be another soul prior to it “producing this being in tune”, is also endorsed by Themistius. But what proves to be decisive for the medieval reception is the fact that Themistius

⁴⁴ As argued for by D'Ancona, *Plotino. L'Immortalità dell'anima*, pp. 323-35.

⁴⁵ The argument is ultimately rooted in the *Phaedo*, but the forms it takes in Themistius, Nemesius and Philoponus shows that all three depend upon Plotinus' *On the Immortality of the Soul*: cf. Baltes† - D'Ancona, “Plotino, *L'immortalità dell'anima*”, p. 35, and D'Ancona, *Plotino. L'Immortalità dell'anima*, p. 329.

credits Aristotle himself with the claim that the soul cannot be a kind of attunement because it is a substance, while attunement is not.

As pointed out by D'Ancona, Plotinus' remark that "the prior reality is a substance, but being in tune is not a substance" involves a sharp criticism of Aristotle's and Alexander's accounts of the soul.⁴⁶ This may or may not have been noticed by Themistius, but one thing is sure: if one reads *De Anima*, I 4 under Themistius' guidance, one is driven quite naturally to conclude that while others have advanced various reasons why the soul is not an instance of attunement, Aristotle's own main reason consists in that soul is a substance, while attunement is not. Plotinus' words τὸ μὲν οὐσία, ἡ δ' ἄρμονία οὐκ οὐσία are quoted literally, but after a sentence that presents them as a statement by Aristotle, or better, Aristotle's idiosyncratic reason: the soul is οὐσία. Mixing up skilfully Aristotle's genuine argument of *De An.*, I 4, 407 b 30-32 ("And yet this harmony must mean either a certain proportion in the components or else the combining of them; and the soul cannot possibly be either of these") and Plotinus' IV 7[2], 8⁴.13-14 ("the prior reality is a substance, but being in tune is not a substance"), Themistius succeeds in presenting the substantiality of the soul as the specific Aristotelian argument against the soul as attunement:

All the preceding points have been stated by philosophers elsewhere; the following points are what Aristotle states here. Attunement is a ratio between things that have been attuned.

Although Aristotle did not advance this argument,⁴⁷ Thomas had no reason not to follow Themistius' lead. This might account also for the fact that he completely discards Nemesius' account that, at variance with Themistius', echoes the real intention of Plotinus in this passage. Plotinus aims to challenge Aristotle's definition of the soul as οὐσία, insinuating that the Aristotelian arguments against the soul as harmony should have suggested to him to abandon his idea that it is σώματος ... τι. If the soul is a substance, it has to be independent of and prior to the body. This was, if D'Ancona is right, the intention of Plotinus in adding Aristotle's and Alexander's arguments to the traditional

⁴⁶ According to D'Ancona, *Plotino. L'Immortalità dell'anima*, p. 322, Plotinus takes the doctrine of the soul as attunement as one of the instances of epiphenomenism, whose main representatives are for him the Stoics. After having discussed the Stoic version of the soul as an "emergent property" (in modern language), Plotinus moves on to criticise another version of the same doctrine, that of the soul as attunement: "I Pitagorici la fanno emergere in altro modo, non nel senso evoluzionista dello stoicismo ma in un senso propriamente epifenomenista, altrettanto errato per Plotino. Nel fare ciò, essi hanno ritenuto che l'anima stesse al corpo appunto come l'armonia sta alle corde, tesi che Plotino respinge sia con gli argomenti del *Fedone* che con quelli di Aristotele e Alessandro. In questa prospettiva, assume un particolare significato il fatto (...) che la posizione epifenomenista venga individuata dall'espressione ἕτερον μὲν σώματος, σώματος δὲ τι, descrizione dell'anima che Aristotele approva. Ancora una volta, Plotino sottintende una critica: Aristotele, il quale sa bene quanti inconvenienti sorgano dal definire l'anima come un prodotto dell'accordo armonico del corpo, non si è reso conto che anche la sua posizione rischia di incorrere nello stesso errore: quello di trattare l'anima come una proprietà del corpo".

⁴⁷ "È Plotino a impiegare l'idea che l'anima è οὐσία come una prova del fatto che essa non possa essere 'armonia': dopo di lui, i platonici non esiteranno a leggere nelle critiche rivolte da Aristotele alla tesi dell'anima-armonia esattamente questa concezione, anche se nel passo del *De Anima* in cui questa tesi è criticata l'idea che l'anima sia un'οὐσία non svolge alcun ruolo, e anche se la definizione di anima come οὐσία ... ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον compare solo più avanti nel trattato aristotelico. (...) È fuor di dubbio che quando Plotino dice che l'anima non può essere armonia perché è οὐσία, egli dà a questo termine un significato ben diverso da Aristotele: i platonici posteriori, invece, sembrano decisi a ritrovare nella critica aristotelica dell'anima-armonia proprio la nozione plotiniana di οὐσία come 'vero essere' in senso platonico. Temistio è ancora una volta un esempio molto interessante: esponendo la dottrina di *De An.*, I 4, 407 b 32-34 (...) egli cita fedelmente le parole di Aristotele, introdotte dalla formula "ecco che cosa dice Aristotele", ma aggiunge una conclusione che è ripresa letteralmente dalla linea 14 di Plotino: 'e l'anima è οὐσία, mentre l'armonia non lo è' (Them., *In De An.*, 24.30-32 Heinze)" (Baltes† - D'Ancona, "Plotino, L'immortalità dell'anima", pp. 37-8).

Platonic ones against the doctrine of the soul as “harmony”. And this is what Nemesius of Emesa has correctly read in Plotinus, whom he takes as his source of inspiration when he accounts for Aristotle’s doctrine of the soul repeatedly saying that it is not a substance – at least if one takes “substance” in its most rigorous sense of an ontologically independent reality.⁴⁸

Themistius exhibits a completely different approach. He is convinced that Aristotle’s definition of the soul as a substance is beyond criticism; moreover, he is convinced that such a definition perfectly meets Plato’s requirements for the soul to be an instance of the “real being”, the immaterial and intelligible one. The fact that Plotinus makes use of the notion of the soul as οὐσία as an argument against the soul as attunement reinforces Themistius’ conviction. This is precisely the conviction that surfaces, in another language and in a different scholarly context, when Thomas looks for the *interpretatio authentica* of Aristotle’s *De Anima* in Moerbeke’s Latin version of Themistius’ paraphrase.

⁴⁸ Nemesius, *De Natura hominis* 2, pp. 22.17-23, 23.19-20, 26.10-11, 27.9-11 and 28.9-11 Morani, says: “So it is clear from what has been said that the soul is not a body: it follows next to say that it is not insubstantial. Since Deinarchus defined the soul as an attunement, and also Simmias, in reply to Socrates, said that the soul was an attunement (...) we must set out the refutations of this to be found in Plato’s *Phaedo*. (...) Further, the soul by admitting opposites in turn is a substance and a substrate, while an attunement is a quality and in a substrate; but substance is other than quality; so the soul is also other than attunement. (...) Aristotle, who says that the soul is an actuality, none the less agrees with those who say that it is a quality. (...) So soul never exists without body, nor body apart from soul. For soul is not body but belongs to body (σῶμα μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι, σώματος δέ τι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν σώματι ὑπάρχει καὶ σώματι τοιῶδε, καθ’ ἑαυτὴν δὲ οὐχ ὑπάρχει), and therefore it exists in a body and a body of a certain sort, but it does not exist on its own. Therefore the soul cannot be the actuality of the body in any way, but is an incorporeal being complete in itself (οὐ δύναται τοίνυν ἡ ψυχὴ κατ’ οὐδένα τρόπον ἐντελέχεια τοῦ σώματος εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οὐσία αὐτοτελῆς ἀσώματος)”: trans. Sharples - Van Der Eijk quoted above n. 35, pp. 59-66.

Appendix I

Themistius, In Libros De Anima Paraphrasis and Thomas Aquinas, De Unitate intellectus

Literal quotations

1.

De Unitate intellectus, I 654-662

Si quis autem contra hoc obiciat quod Aristotiles dicit in I De anima, quod “intelligere et amare et odire non sunt illius passiones, id est anime, sed huius habentis illud secundum quod illud habet; quare et hoc corrupto neque memoratur neque amat, non enim illius erant sed communis, quod quidem destructum est”: patet responsio per dictum Themistii hoc exponentis, qui dicit “Nunc dubitanti magis quam docenti assimilatur” Aristotiles.

Them., *In Libros De Anima*, II, *ad De An.*, I 4, 408 b 18-29, tr. Moerbeke, ed. Verbeke, pp. 74.87-75.91
Sed quae quidem dubitabit utique aliquis, haec et talia sunt; quae autem utique de ipsis audebit aliquis existimare, oportet reponi in aliud tempus, in quo et philosophus manifestum aliquid de ipsis determinat; nunc autem dubitanti magis quam docenti assimilatur ipse.

Them., *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis (...)* edidit R. Heinze, Berlin 1889 (*CAGV* 3), p. 30.34-38
ἀλλ’ ἂ μὲν ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν· ἂ δ’ ἄν τις περὶ αὐτῶν θαρρήσειεν ὑπονοῆσαι, εἰς ἕτερον χρόνῳ καιρὸν ταμιεύεσθαι, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὁ φιλόσοφος φανερόν τι περὶ αὐτῶν διορίζεται. νῦν γὰρ ἀποροῦντι καὶ αὐτὸς μᾶλλον ἢ διδάσκοντι προσέεικεν.

2.

De Unitate intellectus, II 1-5

Nunc autem considerare oportet quid alii Peripatetici de hoc ipso senserunt. Et accipiamus primo verba Themistii in Commento de anima, ubi sic dicit “Intellectus iste quem dicimus in potentia magis est anime connaturalis”, scilicet quam agens; “dico autem non omni anime, sed solum humane. Et sicut lumen potentia uisui et potentia coloribus adueniens actu quidem uisum fecit et actu colores, ita et intellectus iste qui actu non solum ipsum actu intellectum fecit, sed et potentia intelligibilia actu intelligibilia ipse instituit.

Them., *In Libros De Anima*, VI, *ad De An.*, III 4, 430 a 14 - III 5, 430 a 23, tr. Moerbeke, pp. 224.1-225.8 Verbeke
Et est iste intellectus separatus et impassibilis et immixtus: quem autem dicimus potentia intellectum, et si maxime sibi eadem intitulaverimus, tamen magis est animae connaturalis, dico autem non omni animae sed soli humanae. Et sicut lumen potentia visui et potentia coloribus adueniens actu quidem visum fecit et actu colores, ita et intellectus iste qui actu producens potentia intellectum non solum ipsum actu intellectum fecit, sed et potentia intelligibilia actu intelligibilia ipsi instituit.

Them., *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, VI, pp. 98.32-99.3 Heinze

καὶ ἔστιν οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστός τε καὶ ἀπαθής καὶ ἀμιγής. ὃν δὲ λέγομεν δυνάμει νοῦν, εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα αὐτῷ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιφημίζομεν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον γε ἔστι τῆ ψυχῆ συμφοῆς, λέγω δὲ οὐ πάση ψυχῆ ἀλλὰ μόνον τῆ ἀνθρωπίνῃ. καὶ ὡσπερ τὸ φῶς τῆ δυνάμει ὄψει καὶ τοῖς δυνάμει χρώμασιν ἐπιγινόμενον τὴν μὲν ἐνεργεῖα ὄψιν ἐποίησεν, τὰ δὲ ἐνεργεῖα χρώματα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ νοῦς οὗτος ὁ ἐνεργεῖα προαγαγὼν τὸν δυνάμει νοῦν οὐ μόνον αὐτὸν ἐνεργεῖα νοῦν ἐποίησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ δυνάμει νοητὰ ἐνεργεῖα νοητὰ αὐτῷ κατεσκεύασεν.

3.

De Unitate intellectus, II 12-22

Et post pauca concludit “Quam igitur rationem habet ars ad materiam, hanc et intellectus factivus ad eum qui in potentia. Propter quod et in nobis est intelligere quando uolumus. Non enim est ars materie exterioris, sed inuestitur toti potentia intellectui qui factivus; ac si utique edificator lignis et erarius eri non ab extrinseco existeret, per totum autem ipsum penetrare potens erit. Sic enim et qui secundum actum intellectus intellectui potentia superueniens unum fit cum ipso”.

Them., *In Libros De Anima*, VI, *ad De An.*, III 5, 430 a 15-23, tr. Moerbeke, pp. 225.16-226.24 Verbeke
Quam igitur rationem habet ars ad materiam, hanc et intellectus factivus ad eum qui potentia, et sic hic quidem omnia fit, hic autem omnia facit; propter quod et in nobis est intelligere quando volumus. Non enim est ars materiae exterioris, sicut aeraria [non] est aeris et aedificativa lignorum, sed investitur toti potentia intellectui qui factivus, ac si utique aedificator lignis et aerarius aeri non ab extrinseco assisteret, per totum autem ipsum penetrare potens erat. Sic enim et qui secundum actum intellectus intellectui potentia superveniens unus fit cum ipso.

Them., *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, VI, p. 99.11-18 Heinze

ὄνπερ οὖν ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὕλην λόγον ἔχει, τοῦτον καὶ ὁ νοῦς ὁ ποιητικὸς πρὸς τὸν δυνάμει, καὶ οὕτως ὁ μὲν πάντα γίνεται, ὁ δὲ πάντα ποιεῖ. διὸ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν νοεῖν ὅταν βουλώμεθα· οὐ γὰρ ἔξωθεν τῆς ὕλης ἡ τέχνη, ὡσπερ χαλκευτικὴ τοῦ χαλκοῦ καὶ τεκτονικὴ τοῦ ξύλου, ἀλλ' ἐνδύεται ὅλῳ τῷ δυνάμει νῷ ὁ ποιητικὸς, ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ ὁ τέκτων τοῖς ξύλοις καὶ ὁ χαλκοτύπος τῷ χαλκῷ μὴ ἔξωθεν ἐπεστάτει, δι' ὅλου δὲ αὐτοῦ φοιτᾶν οἷός τε ἦν. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν νοῦς τῷ δυνάμει νῷ προσγενόμενος εἷς τε γίνεται μετ' αὐτοῦ.

4.

De Unitate intellectus, II 23-33

Et post pauca concludit “Nos igitur sumus aut qui potentia intellectus, aut qui actu. Siquidem igitur in compositis omnibus ex eo quod potentia et ex eo quod actu, aliud est hoc et aliud est esse huic, aliud utique erit ego et michi esse. Et ego quidem est compositus intellectus et potentia et actu, michi autem esse ex eo quod actu est. Quare et que meditor et que scribo, scribit quidem intellectus compositus ex potentia et actu, scribit autem non qua potentia sed qua actu; operari enim inde sibi deriuatur”.

Them., *In Libros De Anima*, VI, *ad De An.*, III 5, 430 a 15-23, tr. Moerbeke, p. 228.68-75 Verbeke
Nos igitur sumus aut qui potentia intellectus aut qui actu. Siquidem igitur in compositis omnibus ex eo quod potentia et ex eo quod actu, aliud est esse hoc et aliud est esse huic, aliud utique erit ego et mihi esse, et ego quidem est compositus intellectus ex potentia et actu, mihi autem esse ex eo quod actu est. Quare et quae meditor, et quae scribo, scribit quidem intellectus compositus ex potentia et actu, scribit autem non qua potentia, sed qua actu. Operari enim inde sibi derivatur.

Them., *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, VI, p. 100.16-22 Heinze

Ἡμεῖς οὖν ἡ ὁ δυνάμει νοῦς ἢ ὁ ἐνέργεια. εἴπερ οὖν ἄλλο ἐπὶ τῶν συγκειμένων ἀπάντων ἔκ τε τοῦ δυνάμει καὶ τοῦ ἐνέργεια τὸ τόδε καὶ τὸ τῷδε <εἶναι>, ἄλλο ἂν εἶη καὶ τὸ ἐγὼ καὶ τὸ ἐμοὶ εἶναι, καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ὁ συγκείμενος νοῦς ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει καὶ τοῦ ἐνέργεια, τὸ δὲ ἐμοὶ εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνέργεια ἐστίν, ὥστε καὶ ἂ διανοοῦμαι ταῦτα, καὶ ἂ συγγράφω, γράφει μὲν ὁ σύνθετος νοῦς ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει καὶ τοῦ ἐνέργεια, γράφει δὲ οὐχ ἢ δυνάμει, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐνέργεια· τὸ γὰρ ἐνεργεῖν ἐκεῖθεν αὐτῷ ἐποχτεύεται.

5.

De Unitate intellectus, II 33-42

Et post pauca adhuc manifestius “Sicut igitur aliud est animal et aliud animali esse, animali autem esse est ab anima animalis, sic et aliud quidem ego, aliud autem michi esse. Esse igitur michi ab anima et hac non omni; non enim a sensitiva, materia enim erat fantasie; neque rursum a fantastica, materia enim erat potentia intellectus; neque eius qui potentia intellectus, materia enim est factiui. A solo igitur factiuo est michi esse”.

Them., *In Libros De Anima*, VI, *ad De An.*, III 5, 430 a 15-23, tr. Moerbeke, pp. 228.79-229.85 Verbeke
Sicut igitur aliud est animal et aliud animali esse, animali autem esse est ab anima animalis, sic et aliud quidem ego, aliud autem mihi esse. Esse enim mihi ab anima et hac non omni; non enim a sensitiva, materia enim erat phantasiae; neque rursum a phantastica, materia enim erat potentia intellectus; neque eius qui potentia intellectus, materia enim erat factivi. A solo igitur factivo est mihi esse.

Them., *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, VI, p. 100.2-32 Heinze

ὥσπερ οὖν ἄλλο τὸ ζῶον καὶ ἄλλο τὸ ζῶον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ζῶον εἶναι παρὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶ τοῦ ζώου, οὕτω καὶ ἄλλο μὲν τὸ ἐγώ, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἐμοὶ εἶναι. τὸ οὖν ἐμοὶ εἶναι παρὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ταύτης γε οὐ πάσης· οὐ γὰρ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς, ὕλη γὰρ ἦν τῆς φαντασίας· οὐδὲ αὖ τῆς φανταστικῆς, ὕλη γὰρ ἦν τοῦ δυνάμει νοῦ· οὐδὲ τοῦ δυνάμει νοῦ, ὕλη γὰρ ἦν τοῦ ποιητικοῦ. παρὰ μόνου τοίνυν τοῦ ποιητικοῦ τὸ ἐμοὶ εἶναι.

6.

De Unitate intellectus, II 43-46

Et post pauca subdit “Et usque ad hunc progressa natura cessauit, tamquam nichil habens alterum honoratius cui faceret ipsum subiectum. Nos itaque sumus actiuus intellectus”.

Them., *In Libros De Anima*, VI, *ad De An.*, III 5, 430 a 15-23, tr. Moerbeke, p. 229.88-91 Verbeke
Extrema autem et summa specierum actiuus iste intellectus et usque ad hunc progressa natura cessavit tanquam nihil alterum habens honoratius, cui utique ipsum faceret subiectum. Nos igitur sumus actiuus intellectus.

Them. *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, VI, pp. 100.35-101.1 Heinze

ἔσχατον δὲ καὶ ἀκρότατον τῶν εἰδῶν ὁ ποιητικὸς οὗτος νοῦς, καὶ ἄκρι τούτου προελθοῦσα ἡ φύσις ἀπεπαύσατο ὡς μηδὲν ἔχουσα ἕτερον τιμιώτερον, ὅτι ἂν αὐτὸν ἐποίησεν ὑποκείμενον. ἡμεῖς οὖν ὁ ποιητικὸς νοῦς.

7.

De Unitate intellectus, II 47-55

Et postea reprobans quorundam opinionem dicit “Cum predixisset, scilicet Aristotiles, in omni natura hoc quidem materiam esse, hoc autem quod materiam mouet aut perficit, necesse ait et in anima existere has differentias, et esse aliquem hunc talem intellectum in omnia fieri, hunc talem in omnia facere. In anima enim ait esse talem intellectum et anime humane uelut quandam partem honoratissimam”.

Them., *In Libros De Anima*, VI, *ad De An.*, III 5, 430 a 25, tr. Moerbeke, p. 233.73-79 Verbeke
Cum praedixisset enim in omni natura hoc quidem materiam esse, hoc autem quod materiam movet et perficit, necesse ait et in anima existere has differentias, et esse aliquem hunc quidem talem intellectum in omnia fieri, hunc autem talem in omnia facere. In anima enim ait esse talem intellectum et animae humanae uelut quandam partem honoratissimam.

Them., *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, VI, p. 103.1-6 Heinze

προειπών γάρ ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ φύσει τὸ μὲν ὕλην εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ὁ τὴν ὕλην κινεῖ καὶ τελειοῖ, ἀνάγκη φησὶ καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς, καὶ εἶναι τινα τὸν μὲν τοιοῦτον νοῦν τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν. ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γὰρ εἶναι φησι τὸν τοιοῦτον νοῦν καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης οἷόν τινα μοῖραν τὴν τιμιωτάτην.

8.

De Unitate intellectus, II 55-58

Et post pauca dicit "Ex eadem etiam littera hoc contingit confirmare, quod putat, scilicet Aristotiles, aut nostri aliquid esse actuum intellectum, aut nos".

Them., *In Libros De Anima*, VI, *ad De An.*, III 5, 430 a 25, tr. Moerbeke, p. 234.88-90 Verbeke

Ex eadem etiam littera hac et hoc contingit confirmare, quod putat aut nostri aliquid esse activum intellectum aut nos.

Them., *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, VI, p. 103.15-17 Heinze

ἐκ δὴ τῆς αὐτῆς ταύτης ῥήσεως καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι βεβαιώσασθαι, ὅτι ἡ ἡμῶν τι εἶναι οἴεται τὸν ποιητικὸν νοῦν ἡ ἡμῶν (...).

9.

De Unitate intellectus, II 66-80

Et Theophrasti quidem libros non uidi, sed eius verba introducit Themistius in Commento que sunt talia, sic dicens "Melius est autem et dicta Theophrasti proponere de intellectu potentia et de eo qui actu. De eo igitur qui potentia hec ait: Intellectus autem qualiter a foris existens et tamquam superpositus, tamen connaturalis? Et que natura ipsius? Hoc quidem enim nichil esse secundum actum, potentia autem omnia bene, sicut et sensus. Non enim sic accipiendum est ut neque sit ipse, litigiosum est enim, sed ut subiectam quandam potentiam sicut et in materialibus. Sed hoc a foris igitur, non ut adiectum, sed ut in prima generatione comprehendens ponendum".

Them., *In Libros De Anima*, VI, *ad De An.*, III 5, 430 a 25, tr. Moerbeke, p. 242.54-63 Verbeke

Melius est autem et dicta Theophrasti proponere de intellectu potentia et de eo qui actu; de eo igitur qui potentia haec ait: "Intellectus autem qualiter a foris existens et tamquam superpositus, tamen connaturalis? Et quae natura ipsius? Hoc quidem enim nihil esse secundum actum, potentia autem omnia, bene, sicut et sensus. Non enim sic accipiendum est ut neque sit ipse (litigiosum est enim), sed ut subiectam quandam potentiam sicut et in materialibus. Sed hoc a foris ergo non ut adiectum, sed ut in prima generatione comprehendens ponendum".

Them., *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, VI, pp. 107.30-108.1 Heinze

Ἄμεινον δὲ καὶ τὰ Θεοφράστου παραθέσθαι περὶ τε τοῦ δυνάμει νοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δυνάμει τάδε φησίν. "ὁ δὲ νοῦς πῶς ποτε ἔξωθεν ὦν καὶ ὡσπερ ἐπίθετος ὅμως συμφυῆς; καὶ τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν εἶναι κατ' ἐνέργειαν, δυνάμει δὲ πάντα, καλῶς, ὡσπερ καὶ ἡ αἰσθησις. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ληπτέον ὡς οὐδὲ αὐτός (ἐριστικὸν γάρ). ἀλλ' ὡς ὑποκειμένην τινὰ δύναμιν καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὕλικῶν. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔξωθεν ἄρα οὐχ ὡς ἐπίθετον, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ γενέσει συμπεριλαμβανόμενον θετέον".

10.

De Unitate intellectus, III 230-235

Quod exponens Themistius dicit “Nam et si ab aliis aliquando scientia et sanitas est, puta a docente et medico, tamen in patiente et disposito facientium inexistere actus ostendimus prius, in hiis que De natura”.

Them., *In Libros De Anima*, III, *ad De An.*, III 1, 414 a 12, tr. Moerbeke, p. 109.68-72 Verbeke

Nam et si ab aliis aliquando scientia et sanitas, puta a docente et medico, tamen in patiente et disposito facientium inexistere actus ostendimus prius in his que *De natura*, quare et anima in corpore ut species in materia.

Them., *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, III, p. 46.23-26 Heinze

καὶ γὰρ εἰ παρ’ ἄλλων ἐνίοτε ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ υἰγεία, οἷον παρὰ τοῦ διδάσκοντος καὶ τοῦ ἰατροῦ, ἀλλ’ ἐν γε τῷ πάσχοντι καὶ διατιθεμένῳ τὰς τῶν ποιούντων ἐνυπάρχειν ἐνεργείας ἔφθημεν ἐν τοῖς Περὶ φύσεως ἀποδείξαντες, ὥστε καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ σώματι ὡς εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ.

11.

De Unitate intellectus, V 354-370

Et ut Grecos non omitteremus, ponenda sunt circa hoc verba Themistii in Commento. Cum enim quesisset de intellectu agente utrum sit unus aut plures, subiungit soluens “Aut primus quidem illustrans est unus, illustrati autem et illustrantes sunt plures. Sol quidem enim est unus, lumen autem, dices modo aliquo partiri ad visus. Propter hoc enim non solem in comparatione proposuit, scilicet Aristoteles, sed lumen; Plato autem solem”.

Them., *In Libros De Anima*, VI, *ad De An.*, III 5, 430 a 25, tr. Moerbeke, p. 235.7-11 Verbeke

Aut primus quidem illustrans est unus, illustrati autem et illustrantes plures, sicut lumen; sol quidem enim est unus, lumen autem dices utique modo aliquo partiri ad visus; propter hoc enim non solem in comparatione proposuit sed lumen, Plato autem solem.

Them., *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, VI, p. 103.32-35 Heinze

ἡ ὁ μὲν πρῶτως ἐλλάμπων εἷς, οἱ δὲ ἐλλαμπόμενοι καὶ ἐλλάμποντες πλείους ὥσπερ τὸ φῶς. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἥλιος εἷς, τὸ δὲ φῶς εἴποις ἄν τρόπον τινὰ μερίζεσθαι εἰς τὰς ὀψεις. διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τὸν ἥλιον παραβέβληκεν ἀλλὰ τὸ φῶς, Πλάτων δὲ τὸν ἥλιον.

12.

De Unitate intellectus, V 370-379

Unitatem autem huius separati principii probat Themistius per hoc quod docens et addiscens idem intelligit, quod non esset nisi esset idem principium illustrans.

Them., *In Libros De Anima*, VI, *ad De An.*, III 5, 430 a 25, tr. Moerbeke, pp. 235.22-236.26 Verbeke

Sic autem et in scientiis docens addiscenti eadem intelligit: neque enim utique esset docere et addiscere, nisi idem esset conceptus docentis et addiscentis; si autem idem, sicut est necesse, palam quia et idem fit intellectus qui docentis cum eo qui addiscentis.

Them., *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, VI, p. 104.6-10 Heinze

οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστήμασι ὁ διδάσκων τῷ μανθάνοντι τὰ αὐτὰ νοεῖ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἦν τὸ διδάσκειν καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν, εἰ μὴ ταῦτό ἦν τὸ νόημα τοῦ διδάσκοντος καὶ τοῦ μανθάνοντος. εἰ δὲ ταῦτόν ὥσπερ ἀνάγκη, δηλονότι καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς γίνεται νοῦς ὁ τοῦ διδάσκοντος τῷ τοῦ μανθάνοντος.

13.

De Unitate intellectus, V 379-385

(...) unde in fine concludit "Sed quod quidem dixi pronuntiare quidem de eo quod uidetur philosophis, singularis est studii et sollicitudinis. Quod autem maxime aliquis utique ex uerbis que collegimus accipiat de hiis sententiam Aristotilis et Theophrasti, magis autem et ipsius Platonis, hoc promptum est propalare".

Them., *In Libros De Anima*, VII, *ad De An.*, III 5, 430 a 25, tr. Moerbeke, p. 244.2-6 Verbeke

Sed quod quidem dixi pronuntiare quidem de eo quod uidetur philosophis, singularis est studii et sollicitudinis. Quod autem maxime aliquis utique ex uerbis quae collegimus accipiat de his sententiam Aristotilis et Theophrasti, magis autem forte et ipsius Platonis; hoc enim promptum forte propalare.

Them., *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, VII, pp. 108.35-109.3 Heinze

ἀλλ' ὅπερ εἶπον, τὸ μὲν ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ τοῦ δοκοῦντος τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἰδίας καὶ σχολῆς ἐστὶ καὶ φροντίδος, ὅτι δὲ μάλιστα ἂν τις ἐξ ὧν συνηγάγομεν ῥήσεων λάβοι τὴν περὶ τούτων γυνῶσιν Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου, μᾶλλον δὲ ἴσως καὶ αὐτοῦ Πλάτωνος, τοῦτο γοῦν πρόχειρον ἴσως δισχυρίζεσθαι.

Summaries and comments

1.

De Unitate intellectus, II 93-97

Quod autem Alexander intellectum possibilem posuerit esse formam corporis, etiam ipse Auerrois confitetur; quamuis, ut arbitror, peruerse uerba Alexandri acceperit, sicut et uerba Themistii preter eius intellectum assumit.

2.

De Unitate intellectus, II 55-58

Patet igitur ex premissis uerbis Themistii, quod non solum intellectum possibilem, sed etiam agentem partem anime humane esse dicit, et Aristotilem ait hoc sensisse; et iterum quod homo est id quod est, non ex anima sensitiua ut quidam mentiuntur, sed ex parte intellectiua et principaliori.

Cf. Literal quotations, **8**.

3.

De Unitate intellectus, III 286-289

Et per hunc modum arbitror et Themistium in uerbis supra positis, et Plotinum in uerbis nunc inductis, dixisse quod homo est anima uel intellectus.

4.

De Unitate intellectus, IV 15-18

Plato autem ponens intellectum unum separatum, comparauit ipsum soli, ut Themistius dicit: est enim unus sol, sed plura lumina diffusa a sole ad uidendum.

Cf. Literal quotations, **11**.

Appendix II

Macrobius as a Source of Thomas Aquinas' Account of Plotinus in the De Unitate intellectus

De Unitate intellectus, III 264-289

Sed et Plotinus, ut Macrobius refert, ipsam animam hominem esse testatur, sic dicens 'Ergo qui uidetur non ipse uerus homo est, sed ille a quo regitur qui uidetur. Sic, cum morte animalis discedit animatio cadit corpus a regente uiduatum, et hoc est quod uidetur in homine mortali. Anima uero, quia uerus homo est, ab omni mortalitatis condicione aliena est'. Qui quidem Plotinus unus de magnis ponitur inter commentatores Aristotilis, ut Simplicius refert in Commento Predicamentorum. Hec autem sententia nec a uerbis Aristotilis multum aliena uidetur (...). Et per hunc modum arbitror et Themistium in uerbis supra positis, et Plotinus in uerbis nunc inductis, dixisse quod homo est anima uel intellectus.

Macrobius, *In Somn. Scip.*, II 12, 7-10

Et quia Tullio mos est profundam rerum scientiam sub breuitate tegere uerborum, nunc quoque miro compendio tantum includit arcanum quod Plotinus, magis quam quisquam uerborum parcus, libro integro disseruit, cuius inscriptio est 'quid animal quid homo'. in hoc ergo libro Plotinus quaerit cuius sint in nobis voluptates, maerores, metusque ac desideria et animositas uel dolores, postremo cogitationes et intellectus, utrum merae animae an uero animae utentis corpore; et post multa quae sub copiosa rerum densitate disseruit, quae nunc nobis ob hoc solum praetereunda sunt, ne usque ad fastidii necessitatem uolumen extendant, hoc potremo pronuntiat, animal esse corpus animatum. sed ne hoc neglectum uel non quesitum relinquit, quo animae beneficio, quae uia societatis animetur. has ergo omnes quas praediximus passiones adsignat animali, uerum autem hominem ipsam animam esse testatur. ergo qui uidetur, non ipse uerus homo est; sed uerus ille est a quo regitur quod uidetur. sic cum morte animalis discesserit animatio, cadit corpus regente uiduatum, et hoc est quod uidetur in homine mortali, anima autem, qui uerus homo est, ab omni condicione mortalitatis aliena est, adeo ut in imitationem dei mundum regentis regat et ipsa corpus, dum a se animatur.

Ambrosii Theodosii Macrobi *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis* edidit Iacobus Willis, editio secunda, Teubner, Leipzig 1970 (Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana), pp. 131.25-132.15. Macrobius' source is Plotinus, *Enn.* I 1[53], Περὶ τοῦ τί τὸ ζῷον καὶ τίς ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

Thomas' further information on Plotinus is taken, as he says, from Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, known to him thanks to Moerbeke's Latin translation. As pointed out in the *apparatus fontium* of the *De Unitate intellectus*, ad III, 274, the relevant passage by Simplicius in Moerbeke's version reads: "Plotinus autem magnus super haec operosissimas disquisitiones in tribus totis libris *De generibus entis* inscriptis ad librum *Predicamentorum* protulit". Cf. Simplicius, *Commentaire sur les Catégories d'Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke*, éd. critique par A. Pattin, Louvain-Paris 1971 (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum V.1), p. 2.25-27, corresponding to p. 2.3-5 Kalbfleisch: Πλωτῖνος δὲ ὁ μέγας ἐπὶ τούτοις τὰς πραγματειωδέστατας ἐξετάσεις ἐν τρισὶν ὅλοις βιβλίοις τοῖς Περὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος ἐπιγεγραμμένοις τῷ τῶν Κατηγοριῶν βιβλίῳ προσήγαγε.

Book Announcements & Reviews

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A. Longo, D.P. Taormina (eds.), *Plotinus and Epicurus. Matter, Perception, Pleasure*, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge - New York 2016, XVIII + 236 pp.

The ten papers collected in this volume are developed in the framework of the project *Le filosofie post-ellenistiche da Antioco a Plotino* directed by A. Longo and D. P. Taormina. As stated in the Introduction (pp. 1-25), the aim of the research is to clarify Plotinus' relationship to Epicureanism. Epicurean texts were not included in the curriculum of the Platonists in Late Antiquity (although they circulated in the Mediterranean basin at least until the early 3rd century AD, particularly in Athens, Alexandria and Rome), and naturally Plotinus' circle in Rome was no exception. However, in the *Enneads* there are various references to Epicureanism: Epicurean terms (e.g. ἐπιβολή and ἐπιλογισμός), Epicurus' name in II 9 [33], and several anti-Epicurean arguments. So, the relationship between Plotinus and Epicureanism is worth being examined in depth, also in the light of the Herculaneum papyri, the inscriptions at Oenoanda, and Gnostic writings: "The primary aim of the volume is to test its starting hypothesis – and that is: whether certain points in Plotinus' philosophy may be elucidated by specifically referring to his use of Epicurean material, as this emerges from an initial survey" (p. 8). This aim can be considered as achieved.

The first part, "Historical overview", is formed by only one paper: T. Dorandi, "The School and Texts of Epicurus in the Early Centuries of the Roman Empire" (pp. 29-48). Plotinus may well have known Epicureanism through Epicurus' own texts, rather than through doxographical traditions, and this because the Epicurean school in Athens was still active as an institution in the 2nd century AD. In addition, in the same period Epicurus' texts circulated throughout the Mediterranean. Plotinus may have read them in Alexandria, as suggested by the diffusion of the Epicurean works in Egypt documented by Dorandi in his learned study.

The second part, entitled "Common anti-Epicurean arguments in Plotinus", begins with A. Longo, "The Mention of Epicurus in Plotinus' tr. 33 (*Enn.* II 9) in the context of the polemics between Pagans and Christians in the second to third centuries AD. Parallels between Celsus, Plotinus, Origen" (pp. 51-68). The only passage in the *Enneads* where Epicurus is explicitly mentioned is II 9[33], 15, where Plotinus criticises the Gnostics for denying providence exactly as Epicurus did, in order to justify immoral pleasures. This idea is not attested in Epicurus' extant texts, but features among the arguments used by Celsus against Christians, then turned around by Origen against Celsus: Origen depicts Celsus as an Epicurean. "Plotinus' writings reflect a phase of transition in third-century Platonism: whereas his anti-Christian – and in particular anti-Gnostic – polemics stand in continuity with the polemics of the Middle Platonists Celsus (second century AD) against Christians, many features of his philosophy are to be found in the writings of Origen (third century AD), who attacked Celsus and undertook a monumental work of systematisation with regard to Christian doctrine" (p. 68). Also M. Mazzetti, "Epicurean and Gnostics in tr. 47 (*Enn.* III 2) 7.29-41" (pp. 69-81) deals with Plotinus' use of anti-Epicurean arguments in his anti-Gnostic polemics. In III 2[47], 7.29-41, Plotinus refutes two theses: (i) providence does not reach the lower world, (ii) it does not have full control of the latter. These are traditional Epicurean statements, and it is as such that they are criticised; but here Plotinus deals with them as with Gnostic tenets, as shown by a comparison with passages of II 9[33].

M. Pagotto Marsola, " 'Heavy birds' in tr. 5 (*Enn.* V 9) 1. 8. References to Epicureanism and the Problem of Pleasure in Plotinus" (pp. 82-95) discusses the well-known metaphor of birds in V 9[5], 1. Here Plotinus lists three attitudes towards intelligible reality, comparing each of them to birds of unequal weight. According to Pagotto Marsola, this comparison does not allude – as most scholars think – to the Epicureans (the heaviest birds), the Stoics (those capable of flight) and the

Aristotelians plus Platonists (the only ones that can really fly towards the intelligible). A tripartition similar to this is used by Plotinus to attack Epicureans and Gnostics, who, for their part, famously subdivide mankind into the three orders of spiritual, psychic and merely material. In V 9[5], 1 he does not enumerate the philosophical schools, rather alludes to a tripartition of Platonic origin to which he has recourse in II 9[33] in order to refute the materialism common to Gnostics and Epicureans.

The next two studies are devoted to the epistemic questions raised by V 5[32], 1. In “Plotinus, Epicurus and the Problem of Intellectual Evidence. Tr. 32 (*Enn.* V 5) 1” (pp. 96-112), P.-M. Morel focuses on Plotinus’ argumentation that sense perception cannot be either the origin of intellectual knowledge, or a kind of knowledge comparable to it. Real intellectual knowledge is provided not by demonstration, but by the presence of the Forms in the intellect. In his polemics against the doctrines that connect sense-perception and intellection, Plotinus refers to a series of arguments that are reminiscent of Epicurean theories, even though it cannot be excluded that his adversaries include the Aristotelians. D.P. Taormina, “‘What is known through sense perception is an image’. Plotinus’ tr. 32 (*Enn.* V 5) 1.12-19. An anti-Epicurean argument?” (pp. 113-30), claims that self-perception is presented by Plotinus as self-contradictory, and wonders whether or not the arguments here employed are directed against the Epicureans. The comparison between V 5[32], 1.12-19 and IV 6[41], 1.28-32 on the one hand, and some testimonies on Epicurus, Alexander of Aphrodisias and Plutarch on the other, proves that this passage contains typical anti-Epicurean arguments, thus confirming the analysis by P.-M. Morel.

The third part, “Plotinus’ Criticism of Epicurean Doctrines” consists of two studies. M. Ninci, “Corporeal Matter, Indefiniteness and Multiplicity. Plotinus’ Critique of Epicurean Atomism in tr. 12 (*Enn.* II 4) 7.20-8” (pp. 133-59), deals with Plotinus’ anti-atomist argument in II 4[12]. The arguments against atomic matter, their dependence on Aristotle, their affinity with Epicurus, and the Plotinian conception of matter emerge from the analysis of a passage in this treatise. The paper also suggests that the whole of Plotinus’ thought can be reconstructed from a short passage, because “when Plotinus thinks in the negative, he always lets the positive side of his philosophy emerge, and with the utmost clarity” (p. 158). In his “Plotinus’ Reception of Epicurean Atomism in *On Fate*, tr. 3 (*Enn.* III 1) 1-3” (pp. 160-74), E. Eliasson focuses on the connection between atomism and determinism. At variance with É. Bréhier and others, Eliasson claims that Chapters 1 and 3 of III 1[3] are closely connected: in Chapter 3 Plotinus resumes the anti-Epicurean arguments of Chapter 1. The arguments here employed are not original, but seem to be taken from unidentified works.

The last part, “Epicurean Elements in Plotinus. Some Instances”, consists of two papers. A. Cornea, “*Athroa epibolē*. On an Epicurean Formula in Plotinus’ Work” (pp. 177-88), studies the occurrence of the formula ἀθρόα ἐπιβολή in the *Enneads*. It is quoted directly from Epicurean sources: anyone but Epicurus and Plotinus uses it. In the *Enneads*, it occurs in three treatises (IV 4[28], III 8[30], and III 7[45]) belonging to the middle of Plotinus’ career, just like II 9[33], where is located the sole explicit mention of Epicurus (and, more generally, of a post-Aristotelian philosopher): thus, according to Cornea, the use of this expression is evidence of Plotinus’ interest in Epicurus, rooted in his polemic against the Gnostics.

A point of contact between Plotinus and Epicurus is the idea, discussed by A. Linguiti in his “Plotinus and Epicurus on Pleasure and Happiness” (pp. 189-99), that happiness does not increase in time. Although they have different concepts of happiness (bodily pleasure according to Epicurus, contemplation of the Forms for Plotinus), both “embraced – albeit in different ways – the same theoretical stance: a stance that is also attested among the Stoics and that presumably is of Academic-Aristotelian origin” (p.195). At any rate, Epicurus’ influence on Plotinus is excluded according to Linguiti. The book ends with a bibliography (pp. 199-214), and the Indexes (pp. 215-36).

This collection of papers has the merit of drawing attention to the Epicurean elements used more or less explicitly by Plotinus, against the background of the circulation of Epicurean texts in 2nd-3rd century Alexandria. It also highlights the connection established in the *Enneads* between Epicureanism and Gnosticism. A limit that I see is that nothing is said of the link between Epicureanism and ancient Atomism, that is also well attested in the *Enneads*. In his refutation of the atomistic theories, Plotinus does not refer necessarily to Epicureanism: his target is atomism in general, of which Epicurean physics is for him only one of the possible versions. His use of Aristotle's arguments shows that he puts Epicurus and Democritus on equal footing. Some attention is paid to this (Ninci, pp. 134-40), but the focus of the volume is primarily on ethics. This collection of essays proves nevertheless useful for those interested in Plotinus' sources.

GG

Ideas in Motion in Baghdad and Beyond. Philosophical and Theological Exchanges between Christians and Muslims in the Third/Ninth and Fourth/Tenth Centuries, ed. by D. Janos, Brill, Leiden [etc.], Boston 2015 (Islamic History and Civilization. Studies and Texts, 124), IX + 479 pp.

This multi-authored volume edited by Damien Janos contains a short introduction, eleven essays in chronological order, and a bibliography. Its focus is on the philosophical inter-cultural exchanges between Christians and Muslims in the 9th-10th century Baghdad, with an eye on further developments. In the words of its editor, the volume aims "to highlight the role that the Arabic Christian philosophers played in the elaboration of the vibrant and cosmopolitan intellectual culture that flourished in medieval Baghdad" (p. 1). This role has often been studied in isolation from the development of mainstream Islamic philosophy, and this volume proposes a more dynamic approach.

Opening the volume, J.W. Watt in his "The Syriac Aristotelian Tradition and the Syro-Arabic Baghdad Philosophers" (pp. 7-43) analyses the Syriac Aristotelian tradition and the activity of the Syro-Arabic philosophers in Baghdad. This is done not from the perspective of their alleged instrumental role in transmitting the Greek texts to the subsequent Arab readership, but from that of their original philosophical agenda. Watt begins with the early, pre-Abbasid phase of Syriac philosophy and in particular from Sergius of Reš'aina, the Syriac scholar who was most influential on the later tradition. A treatment of the monastic school of Qenneshre on the Euphrates follows, then a presentation of the East Syrian patriarch Timothy I (d. 823). Watt ends his contribution examining the shared interest in Aristotelian philosophy of Christian and Muslim scholars in the 9th century through the analysis of the East Syrian Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq, and then through the work of the Baghdad Aristotelians from the 10th century onwards.

The perspective of a Christian philosophical agenda is the backdrop of the following three contributions. A. Treiger, "Palestinian Origenism and the Early History of the Maronites: In Search of the Origins of the Arabic *Theology of Aristotle*" (pp. 44-80) presents two rival working hypotheses on the theological background – either Melkite or Maronite – of 'Abd al-Masiḥ al-Ḥimṣī, the Christian translator of a selection of Plotinus' *Enneads* that forms the backbone of the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*. In her "Some Observations about the Transmission of Popular Philosophy in Egyptian Monasteries after the Islamic Conquest" (pp. 81-108) U. Pietruschka presents a vivid picture of the transmission of 'popular philosophy' (in S. Brock's terminology) in Egyptian monasteries, where Coptic literature, immediately before and afterwards the Islamic Conquest, was preserved. The Copto-Arabic and Ethiopic literature blossomed benefitting from Syriac manuscripts and thus preserving old translations: several examples are taken from the collections of gnomologies.

O. Varsányi's "The Concept of 'aql in Early Arabic Christian Theology: A Case for the Early Interaction between Philosophy and *kalām*" (pp. 109-34) sheds light on the use of the concept of 'intellect' in 9th century Arabic Christian authors such as 'Ammār al-Baṣrī (d. ca. 840), a Nestorian theologian, Theodore Abū Qurra (d. in 820 or 825), a Melkite, and the Jacobite Ḥabīb ibn Ḥidma Abū Rā'īṭa al-Takrītī (d. probably soon after 830).

The editor of the volume D. Janos contributes an article on "Active Nature and other Striking features of Abū Bishr Mattā ibn Yūnus's Cosmology as Reconstructed from his Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*" (pp. 135-77). Some features of the cosmology of the Nestorian Abū Bishr Mattā ibn Yūnus can be derived from the notes (*ta'ālīq*) on Aristotle's *Physics* which survive in the Leiden manuscript *Or.* 583, and which cover books II, 3; III, 2, plus parts of books V and VII. Abū Bishr Mattā appears to be less a mere transmitter of ancient philosophical learning than an active protagonist of the 10th century philosophical debate in Arabic. Nature is a teleological "principle of motion and rest that is internal to physical things and responsible for bringing about their actualization" (p. 149). Nature induces motion, and applies form on the material substrate to reach a given end. Departing from Aristotle, Abū Bishr Mattā seems to ascribe a certain degree of rationality to nature and calls it an agent: "active nature" (*al-ṭabī'a al-fā'āla*). The most interesting example of "active nature" which he uses five times is that of the animal semen (p. 151). According to Janos, Mattā's original theory of nature has probably been shaped by a combination of Aristotle's zoological treatises, Alexander of Aphrodisias's works, especially the Arabic Alexander's *On the Principles of the Cosmos*, and Philoponus's *Commentary on the Physics*, parts of which are transmitted by the same manuscript.

The magisterial contribution by G. Endress, "Theology as a Rational Science: Aristotelian Philosophy, the Christian Trinity and Islamic Monotheism in the Thought of Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī" (pp. 221-52) is the first of four papers devoted to another protagonist of the 10th century philosophical debate: the Nestorian Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī (d. 974). Endress presents Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī's philosophical project which, following the teaching of Abū Bishr Mattā, considers the Aristotelian science of demonstration, with its criticism of non-demonstrative procedures, as the universal criterion of rational discourse. On this basis Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī founded his epistemology, designing "a universal theology, monotheist and creationist, a theology claiming the rank of rational science, supported by apodictic proofs and refuting the claims of his critics – the theologians of the *kalām* – with the weapons of logic" (p. 227). In order to discuss Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī's account of the first principle of his rational theology, Endress analyses the treatise *On the Affirmation of the [divine] Unity*, which forms also the object of O. Lizzini's contribution (see below). In this treatise, Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī presents an implicit critique of the Muslim creed, declaring the absolute unity (*al-tawḥīd*) of God. The aim of the treatise is both theological (to account for God's nature) and apologetic (to defend the Christian account of God from the charge of polytheism). To exemplify Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī's logical refutation of the Muslim theologians, Endress presents Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī's discussion of the favoured topoi of his Aṣ'arite contemporaries. Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī wants to establish the *contingentia futura* against those who, invoking the prescience and omnipotence of God, deny future contingency; he refutes the human 'acquisition' (*iktisāb*) of deeds whose origin is in reality only God, a doctrine that according to Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī leads to contradictions. Finally, Endress discusses Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī's critique of atomism based on Aristotle's *Physics*, which is preserved in three treatises edited by the same scholar in 1984, and in a fourth one, extant in the ms. Tehran, Madrasa-yi Marwī 19.

This treatise is edited and translated by D. Bennett and R. Wisnovsky: "A Newly Discovered Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī Treatise against Atomism" (pp. 298-311). Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī depends on Aristotle's *Physics*, but the question of atomism has also theological implications: atomism was famously one of the solutions proposed by the Muslim theologians to explain God's omnipotence and omniscience. Yaḥyā

ibn 'Adī's arguments insist on the fact that spatial extension presupposes elementary magnitudes, with ends or extremities that can meet, get into contact, or unite. Indivisibles have no parts and no extremities that could join, thus it is impossible that they give rise to continuous magnitudes as evidently the bodies are.

As mentioned above, another study is devoted to this author, by O. Lizzini: "What Does *Tawḥīd* Mean? Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī's *Treatise on the Affirmation of the Unity of God between Philosophy and Theology*" (pp. 253-80). The distinction of the two meanings of the label "unity", namely "oneness" and "uniqueness" lies at the core of this short treatise. Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī enumerates the various meanings of the term 'one', and analyses the theological implications of this notion in order to obtain "a Trinitarian formulation of divine unity, which, in contrast to the absolute doctrine of Islam, reveals a relative or 'modulated' understanding of monotheism" (p. 257).

C. Baffioni's chapter "Movement as 'Discrete': Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī as a Source for the Iḥwān al-Ṣafā'?" (pp. 281-97) sheds light on the unusual representation of movement in the well-known Encyclopedia. Two passages from Epistle 7 and 11 of the *Rasā'il Iḥwān al-Ṣafā'* are analysed, where line, surface, solid space and time are considered the species of continuum, and number and motion are given as examples of discrete quantities. In Aristotle's *Physics*, motion is considered as a continuum, and continuous motion is stated to exist before all other movements; it is local, circular, perpetual and without interruption, while rectilinear motion cannot be continuous, being produced by a single motionless agent in a single moving thing, which is a dimensional magnitude. Baffioni maintains that the Iḥwān al-Ṣafā' departed from Aristotle probably under the influence of Ibrāhīm al-Nazzām (d. 835 or 845) a Mu'tazilite theologian and poet, and she wonders whether the Iḥwān al-Ṣafā' did also influenced the much later Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī, with his idea of 'instant' in motion.

There are only two papers that do not concern the Arabic Christian tradition, and one is Ph. Vallat's "Between Hellenism, Islam, and Christianity: Abū Bakr al-Rāzī and his Controversies with Contemporary Mu'tazilite Theologians as Reported by the Ash'arite Theologian and Philosopher Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī" (pp. 178-220). Some years ago, M. Rashed collected from the *Advanced Investigations into Theology*, a nine-volume encyclopaedic theological work by Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209), some fragments in which Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d. 925) is quoted by name. These fragments are taken from Abū Bakr al-Rāzī's *Divine Science* and from one of the epistles that the latter wrote in his long controversy with Abū l-Qāsim al-Balḥī, a Mu'tazilite theologian who died in 933. Vallat collects new textual evidence (a set of 19 fragments of which he offers the translation and commentary) where Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī seems to quote Abū Bakr al-Rāzī without naming him. According to Vallat, they contain Abū Bakr's refutation of the very idea of Quranic prophecy, and maintain that reason is self sufficient for all that ought to be known for human beings to reach salvation, a tenet that makes prophecy superfluous.

The last contribution, D. Twetten's long article "Aristotelian Cosmology and Causality in Classical Arabic Philosophy and its Greek Background" (pp. 312-412), is devoted to the problem of how God exerts causation in creating the world in Arabic-Islamic philosophy of the classical age. Twetten traces the continuity between late ancient Greek and Arabic cosmologies: both transformed Aristotle's unmoved mover to fit with Plato's *Timaeus* and *Parmenides*, the crowning part of the Neoplatonic curriculum. Ammonius and Simplicius were the first to transform the prime mover into a demiurgical efficient cause of the existence of the heavens, labelled here an "onto-poietik" cause: "a cause that efficiently produces what is below it from eternity, without presupposing even matter" (p. 408). They considered the prime mover the first of the separate intellects, which is between the One and the Soul and moves the ensouled spheres. In the Christian Neoplatonism of Philoponus and of the pseudo-Dionysius the One and the prime mover were identified with God, who creates the

cosmos timelessly and without change with nothing presupposed, yet at a first moment in time. Thus the Arabic philosophers inherited two different paradigms of God's creation. According to the first, God is the creator of a cosmos possessing a first moment in time. According to the second, God is an "onto-poietik" eternalist first cause. Twetten's outline of the history of Arabic classical cosmology draws "a shift from the creationist 'Aristotle' of al-Kindī to the derivationist 'Aristotle' of the mature al-Fārābī and the effort at getting at the true Aristotle and the true Aristotelian philosophy results, for example, not only in Maimonides's denial of creationism to Aristotle, but also in Averroes's denial of *ontopoiesis*" (p. 408).

This provoking volume draws a picture of great interest, that certainly will lead to a rethinking of the role of Christian intellectuals from the 6th to the 10th centuries in the development of Arabic-Islamic thought.

CMB

Trajectoires européennes du Secretum secretorum du Pseudo-Aristote (XIII^e-XV^e siècle), sous la direction de C. Gaullier-Bougassas, M. Bridges et J.-Y. Tilliette, Brepols, Turnhout 2015 (Alexander Redivivus, 6), 513 pp.

W.F. Ryan and C.B. Schmitt edited in 1982 a collection of essays entitled *Pseudo-Aristotle. The Secret of Secrets. Sources and Influences* (The Warburg Institute, London), and this volume resumes the task of exploring the dissemination of one of the most famous among the pseudo-Aristotelian works in early modern Europe. The three editors C. Gaullier-Bougassas, M. Bridges, and J.-Y. Tilliette open this multi-authored volume by a general introduction entitled "Cheminements culturels et métamorphoses d'un texte aussi célèbre qu'énigmatique" (pp. 5-25), where the basic information on the text is given, and the rationale behind this collection of studies is presented. The *Secretum secretorum* is the Latin version of the Arabic *Sirr al-asrār*, "une œuvre originale de la culture arabe, écrite à partir d'influences tant grecques qu'arabes, perses et indiennes" (p. 9), but allegedly recording the teaching imparted by Aristotle to his pupil Alexander in epistolary form. Both the *Sirr al-asrār* and its Latin version feature "un mélange, étrange à nos yeux modernes, de réflexions philosophiques, de développements scientifiques, tantôt très obscurs tantôt très concrets, et de conseils pratiques, pour une vision finalement très pragmatique du pouvoir, dont la finalité essentielle est la recherche de la toute-puissance et de la gloire" (p. 8). Since its translation into Latin first by John of Seville (first half of the 12th century) and then by Philip of Tripoli (first half of the 13th century), this text has been widespread, as attested by more than 150 Latin manuscripts (p. 15). The focus of the present collection of essays is on the later transmission: "Notre choix a été de consacrer le présent volume aux traductions et aux adaptations en langues vernaculaires du *Sirr al-asrār*, et les analyses réunies élargissent le champ linguistique aux domaines allemand, anglais, écossais, tchèque, italien et espagnol (...). Pour le monde slave, elles renouvellent la réflexion sur l'influence littéraire et politique de l'adaptation russe du *Secret des secrets*" (pp. 21-22).

S. Williams, "Two Independent Textual Traditions? The Pseudo-Aristotelian *Secret of Secrets* and the Alexander Legend" (pp. 27-54) challenges G. Cary's claim in his 1956 book on *The Medieval Alexander* that the *Secretum secretorum* was relatively unimportant on the creation of the medieval legend of Alexander. Williams collects several data from a number of manuscripts and from authors of the 14th and 15th centuries, coming to the conclusion that Cary's statement is true only in part: "The *Secret of Secrets* was effectively unavailable during the crucial first stage of the Alexander's Legend's development in Western Europe – the twelfth and

early thirteenth centuries. While a partial version of the Latin *Secret of Secrets* was circulating by c. 1120 (...) [t]he full *Secret of Secrets* was translated from Arabic a good hundred years later, and by that time the Alexander Legend as it appeared in the romances had taken definite, albeit not definitive, shape” (p. 52).

The section devoted to the French translations (13th-15th centuries) contains four essays. C. Gaullier-Bougassas, “Révélation hermétique et savoir occulte de l’Orient dans le *Secretum secretorum* et les *Secrets des secrets* français” (pp. 57-106) discusses the adaptations that are apparent in the French versions by Pierre d’Abernun (ca. 1267), Jofroy de Waterford and Servais Copale. “À la fin du XIII^e siècle, le dominicain Jofroi de Waterford, secondé par Servais Copale, se livre à son tour à une adaptation du *Secretum secretorum*, qu’il modifie profondément avec un travail de compilation, plus complexe et plus divers, et aussi une pratique délibérée de la censure, qui touche directement aux sciences occultes de l’Orient. Si Pierre d’Abernun prévoyait de compléter l’œuvre par un discours chrétien, Jofroi de Waterford christianise de l’intérieur le contenu de l’enseignement du *Secretum secretorum*, en amplifiant la traduction par des ajouts très substantiels qui donnent une profondeur éthique et religieuse nouvelle” (p. 79). The same translations into French are studied from the point of view of the medical section by Y. Schauwecker, “La diététique dans les *Secrets des secrets* français et ses enjeux épistémologiques” (pp. 107-35). In their translations Jofroi de Waterford and Servais Copale did not hesitate to include elements of a different origin, taken for instance from Avicenna’s *Canon* of medicine, or the treatise *De conservanda sanitate* by Peter of Spain: “les traducteurs ont dû prendre toute une série de décisions oscillant souvent entre deux pôles: celui du respect du modèle, d’une part, et celui de l’aspiration à se conformer au savoir de leur époque, d’autre part” (p. 109). D. Lorée, “Lire le *Secret des secrets* à l’aube de la Renaissance: l’adaptation française du XV^e siècle” (pp. 137-55) explores the manuscript circulation of the translations mentioned above. “L’étude des *incipit* et des *explicit* de nos différents témoins ainsi que les connaissances que nous avons sur les possesseurs des manuscrits permettent d’affiner la réflexion sur la réception de l’œuvre. Le titre arabe complet du traité mettait l’accent sur ses deux dimensions, politique et hermétique: *Livre de la politique sur la manière de gouverner* connu sous le nom de *Secret des secrets*. Dans son prologue latin, Philippe de Tripoli avait ajouté un dessein moral, qui perdure dans une très grande majorité de nos témoins. Ils proposent en effet à peu près le titre suivant: *Livre du gouvernement du/des roy(s) (et des princes) appelé le Secret des secrets*. L’aspect politique qui domine dans ce titre est presque systématiquement explicité dans les premières lignes du chapitre initial avec l’introduction d’un deuxième titre, *Livre des bonnes meurs*, qui met en avant, dans la lignée de la traduction latine, la question éthique” (pp. 142-3). C. Silvi, “Un texte encyclopédique sous le signe de la mouvance: la diffusion des *Secrets des secrets* français dans les premiers imprimés (XV^e-XVI^e siècle)” (pp. 157-83) shows how important have been the decisions of the Humanist editors of the early modern age in reshaping the text. “[E]n privilégiant ou plutôt en imposant deux versions manuscrites au détriment de toutes les autres, les éditeurs contribuèrent, à leur manière, à donner à ce texte, qui n’en avait alors aucune, une certaine stabilité. (...) mais, quelle que soit sa forme, le texte conserve, en général, son titre originel: il est encore et toujours le ‘Secret des secrets d’Aristote’. La question n’est plus alors seulement de rendre identifiable le texte publié, il s’agit de la promesse de grandes révélations faites par un philosophe d’exception, destinées initialement à une élite privilégiée et mises enfin, grâce à l’imprimerie, à la disposition de tous” pp. 177-8).

Then a section follows on the spread of the *Secretum secretorum* in Spain and Italy, beginning with the chapter by H.O. Bizzarri, “Le *Secretum secretorum* en Espagne: de traité médical à miroir de prince” (pp. 187-213). Bizzarri describes the dissemination of the text in Castille, first through

two translations entitled respectively *Poridad de los poridades* and *Secreto de los secretos*, and then in various Spanish mirrors for princes. “Au XV^e siècle, le *Secretum secretorum* fit partie de la liste des sources des traités politiques qui servirent de base idéologique pour la chevalerie castillane. Il fut cité avec l’œuvre de saint Thomas, les épîtres de Sénèque, ou encore les écrits d’Aristote telles les *Éthiques* ou la *Politique*” (p. 204). J. Pensado Figueiras, “La traduction castillane de l’*Epistola Aristotelis ad Alexandrum de dieta servanda* de Jean de Séville” (pp. 215-41) offers the critical edition of the late medieval Castilian version of the medical part of John of Seville’s Latin translation of the *Sirr al-asrār*. “L’insertion de l’*Epistola* au côté d’herbiers et de pharmacopées indique que la tradition médiévale la considérait comme une œuvre autonome de diététique, plutôt qu’un simple chapitre d’un traité plus vaste consacré à l’éducation des princes, le *Secretum secretorum*, traduit de l’arabe par Philippe de Tripoli” (p. 216).

Two essays are devoted to the Italian adaptations. M. Campopiano, “La circulation du *Secretum secretorum* en Italie: la version vernaculaire du manuscrit de Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale centrale, Magliabecchi XII.4” (pp. 243-56) devotes his essay to the earliest manuscript to attest one of the many Italian *volgarizzamenti* of the *Secretum secretorum*, meaning with this term compilations that reorganise, often substantially, the text translated. The political leadership of the Italian city republics represented the ideal readership of such adaptations: “Entre le XIII^e et le XIV^e siècle, de nombreux ouvrages que l’on pourrait définir comme didactiques s’adressaient à ces groupes, notamment les écrits de Brunetto Latini comme le *Livre du Trésor* et le *Tesoretto* (...). La culture de ces groupes sera largement nourrie par des *volgarizzamenti*. (...) C’est le destin de notre *Secretum*: le lecteur toscan (et italien) le lira comme un texte de son propre milieu, stimulé par la vibrante vie économique, culturelle et politique de la péninsule à cette époque” (p. 256). M. Milani, “Un compendio italiano del *Secretum secretorum*: riflessioni e testo critico” (pp. 257-314) offers the critical edition of one of these adaptations, transmitted “dal codice quattrocentesco *Plut.* 44.39 della Biblioteca Mediceo-Laurenziana di Firenze (...), al quale si affiancano (...) tre mss. frammentari, egualmente quattrocenteschi” (p. 257). Milani offers the critical edition of this compilation, in which he detects close affinity with the Castilian version. However, “differenze comunque non trascurabili (...) portano a escludere rapporti diretti tra le due versioni romanze [namely the Italian and Castilian], come pure rendono assai improbabile la derivazione dallo stesso ms. latino” (p. 259).

Britain, as M. Bridges says in her “John Lydgate’s Last Poem” (pp. 317-36), “proved to be fertile ground for the early reception of the *Secretum secretorum*” (p. 317). However, the vernacular versions appeared later if compared with southern Europe. One of these is a poem by John Lydgate (d. ca. 1449 or 1451). “One of the most celebrated public voices of his time, Lydgate had a propensity for self-representation in a generic role, as a cleric and poet of town and court, poet laureate in the service of, and counsellor to, those who ‘ought’ to listen. It is hardly surprising that he should have chosen to write a version of this work, in the rhyme-royal stanza form that shaped much of his poetic production; in particular, the relationship between Aristotle and Alexander, as articulated in the *Secretum*, afforded an ideal opportunity for reaffirming the mutual empowerment of the writer and his prince” (pp. 318-9).

The section on the reception in English literature continues with the essay, co-authored by A. Caughey and E. Wingfield, on “Sir Gilbert Hay, Older Scots Literature, and the *Secretum secretorum*” (pp. 337-55). *The Buik of the Gouvernaunce of Princis*, together with the *Buik of King Alexander the Conquerour*, are two Older Scot texts by Sir Gilbert Hay (d. ca. 1465) that incorporate substantial parts of the *Secretum secretorum*. This study contains an analysis of “the various ways in which Hay adopts and adapts the *Secretum*” (p. 337). While the precise source

of the first text remains unknown (p. 338), the second text is based on “the second recension of the Latin *Historia de Preliis*”, supplemented by “not only the Old French Roman d’Alexandre, and interpolations to it such as the *Vœux du Paon* and *Voyage au paradis*, but also upon the pseudo-Aristotelian *Secretum secretorum* and several pieces of otherwise-independent Older Scots conduct literature” (p. 345).

Also in German and Czech literature the *Secretum secretorum* was widespread, and a section of the volume is devoted to this. First comes the essay by R. Forster, “The German *Secret of Secrets*: Between Dietary Handbook and Mirror for Princes” (pp. 359-85), opened by the following words, that substantiate the claim above: “The number of German *Secretum secretorum* versions is quite extraordinary: at least nineteen translations were completed before 1500. Of these, seven are translations (from the mid thirteenth to the early sixteenth century) of the text of John of Seville. More often, it was the Philip of Tripoli text that was translated into German (twelve times between the late thirteenth and the late fifteenth century)” (p. 359). After a survey of each of these versions, Forster reaches the conclusion that “In the German speaking countries, the *Secretum* was considered primarily as a medical treatise” (p. 383). Notwithstanding the high number of versions, however, “no German version ever reached the status of a ‘Vulgate’ text, accepted by most readers and therefore transmitted in a larger number of manuscripts. (...) Hence, German versions remained at the very margins of the literary scene” (p. 385).

A different scenario appears in Czech literature. In his essay “La fabrique d’une fiction sur Alexandre le Grand: citations du *Secretum secretorum* dans l’Annexe de l’Alexander d’Ulrich von Etzenbach (*Alexander-Anhang*, fin XIII^e – début XIV^e siècle)” (pp. 387-426) C. Thierry explores the fortune of the legend of Alexander at the court of the “rois de Bohême Okar II Přemysl et de son fils Wenceslas II, connaissant son apogée dans les dernières décennies du XIII^e siècle” (p. 387), and this thanks to the Alexander by the German poet Ulrich von Etzenbach. In his *Alexander* Ulrich draws abundantly from sources different from the *Secretum secretorum*, namely the *Historia de preliis* and the French *Alexandreis* by Gauthier de Châtillon, but includes also quotations from the *Secretum*. Ulrich’s eclecticism is guided by the *intentio* to present an adapted version of the legend: “Dans cette version (...) Alexandre ne sait finalement pas résister aux envoûtements de l’Inde, et son errance a toutes les apparences d’une dérive (...) le récit fait passer Alexandre du statut du conquérant modèle à celui du collectionneur compulsif, pour enfin lui prêter, discrètement mais sûrement, les traits de l’Antéchrist” (p. 387).

É. Adde-Vomáčka, “La réception du *Secret des secrets* dans les pays tchèques du XIII^e au XVI^e siècle” (pp. 427-47) begins before, and ends after the period studied in the previous essay. The first attestation dates back to the middle of the 13th century and features in the works of Albert Behaim (d. 1260). A highly-placed servant of the Church, Albert Behaim “avait eu l’occasion de rencontrer Philippe de Tripoli en personne alors qu’il se trouvait à Rome de 1215 à 1237”, and there is evidence that Albert recopied for himself Philip’s translation (pp. 428-9). Then É. Adde-Vomáčka surveys the *Alexander* of Ulrich von Etzenbach mentioned above, an anonymous *Lapidarius et Liber de physionomia Aristotelis* of the second half of the 13th century, and the 15th century “Recommendations” to the king of Paulirinus of Prague. “Si l’arrivée sur le sol tchèque du premier manuscrit latin du *Secret des secrets* se fit vraisemblablement dans les hautes sphères de la société et dans l’entourage du roi, le texte connut un vif succès et une rapide diffusion, comme en témoignent les sept manuscrits latins conservés, dont quatre datent du XIV^e siècle, et aussi les trois traductions en langue tchèque aujourd’hui avérées” (p. 432).

The last section is devoted to the transmission of the Hebrew version of the *Secretum secretorum* in Russia. Sh.A. Boyarin, “The Context of the Hebrew *Secret of Secrets*” (pp. 451-72) explores

the legend of Alexander at Jerusalem, based ultimately on Flavius Josephus' *Jewish Antiquities*. This narrative is embedded also in the Hebrew versions of the *Sirr al-asrār*, and "serves as one of the matrices for understanding the relationship between 'Jewish' and 'Greek' forms of learning: Alexander and Aristotle become the point at which two cultures meet, both physically and textually, when texts about them or attributed to them are translated into Hebrew. (...) The colophon in the manuscript that records the *Alexander Romance* (...) attributes its translation from Arabic to Hebrew to Rabbi Samuel ibn Tibbon, the famous early-thirteenth century translator of Maimonides and Aristotle. Although this attribution must be viewed as false, it creates the impression that a scholar interested in Aristotelian materials would and should be reading the *Alexander Romance*" (p. 471).

The last essay in the volume is E. Koroleva, "Le discours politique dans le *Secret des secrets* russe et son influence sur les écrits russes du XVI^e siècle" (pp. 473-95). "Le *Secret des secrets* rentre parfaitement dans ce schéma de *translatio*, car le traité est placé sous l'autorité grecque d'Aristote, connu à partir du XI^e siècle en Russie, du moins de nom, en tant que philosophe, homme sage et précepteur, aussi bien à travers des textes historiographiques, comme la biographie d'Alexandre le Grand du Pseudo-Callisthène, qu'à travers des ouvrages à coloration didactique et théologique, comme l'*Hexaméron* de Jean l'Exarque de Bulgarie. (...) Quelle était alors la réception de l'ouvrage à la cour moscovite? Commençons par une courte citation qui se trouve dans la correspondance d'Ivan le Terrible avec André Kourbski, plus précisément dans la première lettre du tsar, une réponse à l'invective de Kourbski lui reprochant les répressions contre les boyards, ses serviteurs fidèles, et l'accusant du péché d'orgueil. En rédigeant sa lettre, probablement avec l'aide des employés de sa chancellerie, Ivan IV recourt à de nombreux exemples pour prouver son bon droit. Il les tire avant tout des livres bibliques et des œuvres pieuses comme celle de Jean Chrisostome, mais il est remarquable que le tsar cite aussi des textes profanes comme l'*Histoire de Troie* adaptée du texte latin de Guido de Columna à la limite des XV^e et XVI^e siècles et l'*Alexandrie* dite de Serbie, la version russe de la vie d'Alexandre remontant à la recension du Pseudo-Callisthène. Dans ce contexte, il n'est point étonnant que l'on puisse aussi y trouver une citation de la version russe du *Secret des secrets*. Ivan cherche à établir le lien entre l'apparence physique de Kourbski et son caractère de traître: 'Tu dis que je ne reverrai pas ton visage avant le Jugement dernier. Mais qui donc voudrait le voir, ton visage d'Éthiopien? A-t-on jamais vu un homme honnête ayant des yeux pers? Même ton aspect extérieur trahit ta perfidie'" (pp. 479-81). This exchange, that dates from the years between 1564 and 1579, shows the long-lasting life of the pseudo-Aristotelian physiognomy as part and parcel of a mirror for princes.

A cumulative index ('Index des noms d'œuvres et d'auteurs') concludes the volume. I have occasionally detected some disputable tenets, like that of p. 14 where the *Secretum secretorum* is described as "le tout premier ouvrage du Philosophe (ou attribué à lui) relevant de la physique accessible en Occident", and this under the clause that the first translation into Latin dates from ca. 1120, while the Latin paraphrastic version of the pseudo-Aristotelian *De Mundo* by Apuleius antedates even that datation by some ten centuries, or like that of p. 74, where the *Cyranides* is described as a "texte arabe écrit au II^e siècle après J.-C. puis traduit en latin", while the alleged Arabic origin ascribed in the Middle Ages to the Latin version of the Hermetic *Κυρανίδες* is obviously false. Such minor points however by no means prevent the reader from gratefully acknowledging that this collection of learned articles is a rich and useful study of an extremely complicated tradition.

EC

V. Kaya, *İbn Sînâ'nın Kelâma Etkisi* [*Avicenna's Influence on Islamic Theology*], Otto Yayınları, Ankara 2015, pp. 183 (in Turkish).

In recent scholarship, it has already been established that major issues of *Kalâm* (Islamic theology) such as the distinction between essence and existence, the dichotomy of necessary and contingent beings, and the proofs for the existence of God had significantly contributed to Avicenna's philosophical system. Nevertheless, to what extent Avicenna's contributions and criticisms played their role in the development of the later *Kalâm* is still worth studying, for this entails a comparative approach. V. Kaya's *Avicenna's Influence on Islamic Theology* is important in that it proposes to offer us a comparative approach to evaluate how *Kalâm* interacted with Avicenna's philosophy and developed after his time. What makes Kaya's interpretation valuable is that he prefers an approach which posits a mutual influence between *Kalâm* and *Falsafa* (Islamic philosophy), rather than settling Avicenna in the centre: a common, if inadequate, method which has mostly been applied in the studies on Avicenna.

First the author deals with the issue of the subject-matter of theology in the eyes of Avicenna. He goes on to examine such problems as the conceptual history of the terms 'necessary being' (*wāğib*) and contingent being (*mumkin*) before and after Avicenna, the description of God as a 'necessary being', the proof from contingency (*dalil al-imbkân*), the essence-existence distinction, God's attributes in terms of their being under the category of necessity and contingency. All these topics are addressed in order to evaluate to what extent Avicenna was influential in the relevant problems.

In the history of *Kalâm*, the *Mutakallimûn*'s (Muslim theologians) perception of Avicenna was either positive or negative; in each case, it was almost impossible for them to disregard Avicenna's writings. A milestone of this approach of the *Mutakallimûn* is al-Ġazālî's stance, who was the first *mutakallim* to officially encounter the philosophical project of Avicenna. As stated by Kaya, al-Ġazālî was aware that the philosophy of Aristotle and his loyal followers in the Islamic world, such as al-Fārābî and Avicenna, had not been critically dealt with by his predecessors. However, the fact that Avicenna was seen as a turning point should not give the impression that all philosophical production after him could be reduced to certain influences and implications of Avicenna's philosophical system, for this contradicts the rules of continuity in the history of ideas. Any attempt to relate metaphysical ideas after Avicenna directly to his system is simply "taking the easy way out". However, the *Mutakallimûn* did not refrain from confronting Avicenna's philosophy, for they were aware that, if they had ignored the rapid expansion of the writings of Avicenna, the *Kalâm* might have not endured its strong position in Islamic thought.

There have been different assessments as to the two-sided relationship between philosophers and theologians, who were both under the influence of Greek philosophy. In this respect, it is essential to look into the relationship of the Muslim philosophers to classical Islamic theology, in order to reach a correct assessment of the nature of the relationship between Islamic philosophy and theology. In fact, if their works are studied closely, major figures of Islamic philosophy such as al-Kindî, al-Fārābî and Avicenna were in contact with *Kalâm*, specifically the Mu'tazilite *Kalâm*. Kaya gives some examples to show the philosophers' interaction with Kalam literature. In his treatises, al-Kindî discussed such Kalam issues as the creation of the world (*hudût*), the impossibility of infinite regress (*tasalsul*), prophecy, and human beings' capability to act (*istiṭā'a*). Al-Fārābî considered the Kalam and jurisprudential (*fiqh*) premises in his discussion of the logical premises and syllogisms. It is also known that he included *Kalâm* and *Fiqh* in the classification of the sciences. Finally, with Avicenna's writings, the relationship between *Kalâm* and *Falsafa* reached its peak.

In his treatise *R. Fî Aqsâm al-'Ulûm*, Avicenna posited an overlap between the subject-matter of metaphysics (*al-'ilm al-ilâhî*) and the science of unity (*tawhîd*, which is *Kalâm*). According to the

author, this gave way to the later *Mutakallimūn*'s understanding of philosophy and theology as two disciplines which seek for the same truth. Besides, the fact that for al-Ġazālī and Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī philosophy was almost equalized with the philosophical system of Avicenna, and that the latter sought to establish a new and "correct" system of *Kalām* contributed to the increase of Avicenna's influence on later periods. In accordance with these facts, the author set his objective to see how much the later theologians were influenced by the works of Avicenna and how one can evaluate this influence accurately. However, since it is impossible to examine the influence of Avicenna in all areas, he focuses on ontology, i.e. the study of the existent qua existent, and especially on Avicenna's basic terms "necessarily existent" (*wāġib al-wuġūd*) and "possibly existent" (*mumkin al-wuġūd*). In such a project, it is also necessary to limit the scope of investigation in terms of Kalamic literature. The author deems it necessary to look into Aš'arite Kalamic literature, since it might prove difficult to deal only with Mu'tazilite and Māturidite literature, due to the fact that the Aš'arite works provide sufficient material. However, it is still interesting to examine the works which belong to these two important literatures, in terms of the interaction between *Kalām* and *falsafa* after Avicenna, such as Abū l-Mu'īn al-Nasafī's *Tabsira al-Adilla*, and Ibn al-Malāḥimī's *al-Mu'tamad* and *al-Fā'iq*.

Avicenna generally avoids mentioning the names of the Kalamic scholars and schools, in spite of the fact that his writings allude to many contemporary Kalamic concepts and discussions. As an example of the rare occasions in which Avicenna mentions the *Mutakallimūn*, one can see the section in his *al-Naġāt* on origination (*ḥudūt*), where he displays contempt for the weakness of the *Mutakallimūn*'s misconception of creation, and his *Risāla* to one of the *Mutakallimūn* in which he mentions the Mutazilite al-Qādī 'Abd al-Ġabbār by name. In order to prove Avicenna's hidden, but deep engagement with *Kalām*, Kaya specifies certain contexts, all of which, he argues, bear witness to Avicenna's interaction with contemporary Mu'tazilite theology. According to the author, there is still no clear evidence to prove that Avicenna uses any other work which belongs to other Kalamic schools, such as the Aš'ariyya and Māturīdiyya. Avicenna's *al-Risāla al-Ar'šīyya* exhibits a close interaction with the Mu'tazilite *Kalām* in that it shows Avicenna's familiarity with the Kalamic discussions on the essence of God and the relationship between essence and attributes. In this treatise, Avicenna sets his aim to establish "the realities of the science of *tawḥīd*", a typical Kalamic agenda, confirming the Mu'tazilite formula that God's attributes are not different from His essence. Nonetheless, Avicenna also criticises the classical Kalamic viewpoint that different actions come from the single essence of God, thus he avoids following any Kalamic ideas if there is any harm to the basic principals of his philosophical system.

In the classification of the sciences, Avicenna gives particular importance to the science of *Kalām*, or rather the "science of unity" as it is called by him, a fact that ties him to the attitude of his predecessors, such as al-Fārābī and al-'Āmirī. For these Muslim philosophers, *Kalām* corresponds to dialectics in the Aristotelian sense, whose duty is to defend or rebut certain argumentations. In this respect, Kaya points to the places where Avicenna's observation on the method of *Kalām* are similar to those of al-Fārābī. In Kaya's words, no matter if the situation seems so, there is the simple fact Avicenna included the main issues of Islamic theology, such as the existence of God, the unity of God and the attributes of God in the science of metaphysics. According to Kaya, Avicenna, in fact, attempted to establish "an apodictic (*burhānī*) *Kalām*", just as the *Mutakallimūn* strived to do (p. 44). To prove his case, Kaya quotes Avicenna's statement in his *Ta'aqqub al-Mawāzi' al-Ġadaliyya*, that it is possible to raise the Kalamic argumentations to the state of certainty (*burhān*), even though the *Mutakallimūn* of his age fell short of achieving that purpose. Besides, Avicenna's inclusion of the Kalamic principles in the science of metaphysics paved the way to al-Ġazālī's making of *Kalām* as a universal science in philosophical terms.

Another context which proves the strong relationship between Avicenna and *Kalām* is the discussions on the origination of the world (*ḥudūt*). Avicenna criticized the *Mutakallimūn* who argued

that the world has a beginning in time, having stated that their argument from its origination lacks certainty in its premises. Furthermore, Avicenna supported the idea that it is contingency (*imkān*), not origination itself, that sets the criteria as to why something receives its existence from its agent. In fact, Avicenna devotes a famous section in his *al-Nağāt* to this particular issue. Offering a new context to understand this section, Kaya argues that it should be examined with the contemporary Mu'tazilite literature about the issue of the permanence of substances (*baqā al-ğawābir*). Kaya points that Avicenna refutes the Mu'tazilite view that substances are free from the effect of their agents in the state of their being existent. The author also quotes some passages from al-Qādī 'Abd al-Ğabbār which seem to set the background for Avicenna's discussion of origination. Another Kalamīc topic which concerned Avicenna was atomism. Avicenna levels his criticisms towards the theory of atomism, not only in relation to ancient Greek philosophical literature, but also with respect to the contemporary theories in Mu'tazilite *Kalām*. Basically, Avicenna's recurring definition of the body, as "a contiguous (*muttaṣil*) substance which is not composed of indivisible parts" exhibits his open criticism of Kalamīc atomism, which is based on indivisible parts. For that reason, a parallelism has been drawn with Avicenna and the Mu'tazilite Nazzām, who was also against the theory of atomism.

As is shown by recent scholarship, Avicenna's stance on the essence-existence relationship has direct reference to the Kalamīc discussions on whether non-existent (*ma'dūm*) entities are things or not. Accordingly, Kaya provides more Kalamīc grounds for thinking so. As he points out, pre-Avicennan Mu'tazilites examined in detail the ontological status of the non-existent, significantly contributing to the usage and development of concepts such as existence, non-existence, thing etc., a situation which sets the backdrop for the later essence-existence distinction. For the Mu'tazilites, while the concepts of *wuğūd*, *huṣūl* and *iṭbāt* denote the existence of things, the concepts of *ṣay'iyya*, *dāt*, and *'ayn* denote their essence. Avicenna criticizes the Mu'tazilite concept of non-existence and their proof from origination (*hudūt*), arguing that the Mu'tazilite's biggest mistake is to take non-existence as an existent entity and to build the origination theory on this false premise. Avicenna uses the particular existence (*al-wuğūd al-ḥās*) to denote essence, and the positive existence (*al-wuğūd al-iṭbātī*) to denote real (*versus* mental) existence. By the expression "particular existence" for the essence of things, Avicenna's choice entails direct criticism of the Mu'tazilite notion that entities are absolutely non-existent before their creation.

Avicenna's engagement with Kalamīc literature extends to his familiarity with discussions in Mu'tazilite works. In one particular example, it is very interesting to see that Avicenna supports the Basran Mu'tazilites on their view of *aṣlah* (what is proper and best for God to do), against their opponents, the Baghdad Mu'tazilites. Avicenna holds that God cannot be required to consider what is best for His creatures, as the Baghdad Mu'tazilites claim. If this were accepted, it would have been useless for human beings to be grateful to God, since God would have done what is required for Him. This line of argumentation, which is used by Avicenna in *al-Risāla al-Arṣīyya* is clearly taken from Mu'tazilite authorities such as al-Qādī 'Abd al-Ğabbār. Overall, as Kaya says, Avicenna's relation to classical *Kalām* goes beyond simple allusions which occur in several places in his writings, and indicates a much more elaborate interaction with contemporary Kalamīc literature. This can only be seen with a comparative outlook between his writings and classical *Kalām*.

In the second chapter Kaya addresses the development of a key concept in theology and philosophy, that of necessary being (*wāğib al-wuğūd*). The trio of necessity, contingency and impossibility were known to the *Mutakallimūn* before Avicenna at the epistemological level, and the *Mutakallimūn* also utilized 'necessity' to describe God as "the necessary being" at the ontological level. Especially the Kalamīc literature of the fourth/tenth century witnesses the fact that in the discussions on the attribute of 'eternity' (*qidam*), God's existence was posited as necessary while other beings are only possible. Kaya quotes some passages from the works of pre-Avicennan *Mutakallimūn* such as

al-Bāqillānī, al-Qādī ‘Abd al-Ġabbār, al-Butḥānī (a Zaydite/Mu‘tazilite author of the fourth century), all emphasizing the dichotomy of necessary being (God) and contingent beings. The concept of contingent (*mumkin/ġā’iz*) also played an important role in the *Mutakallimūn*’s theory of the origination of the world. The classical distinction of the eternal-originated was equalized with the distinction between necessary and contingent. The early *Mutakallimūn*’s usage of modal logic witnesses to the fact that they were acquainted with these Aristotelian concepts, even though these were adapted to different contexts. The author points to some related texts which belong to the early Mu‘tazilite (al-Ka‘bī) and Maturidite *Kalām*, all of which indicate that modal logic was in wide circulation in classical *Kalām*. Therefore, it is not acceptable to say that Avicenna was a starting point for *Kalām* to engage in modal logic and ontology. The description of God as a necessary existent can even be found in the writings of Abū l-Ḥasan al-Aš‘arī, as is traceable in quotations from the works of his followers. All this shows the early *Mutakallimūn*’s eagerness to utilize Aristotelian logic, even if they tried to settle *Kalām* as a distinct discourse from the philosophical tradition. As a result, Avicenna cannot be the only one who transmitted the above-mentioned concepts to theologians.

The two-sided nature of the relationship between philosophy and theology suggests to re-evaluate the topics in later *Kalām* which have been supposed to be totally under the influence of Avicenna. The author argues that the main concern of Avicenna in his criticisms towards the *Mutakallimūn* was the issue of the origination of the world. He wanted to propose a mediation between the notion of origination and the Aristotelian concept of eternity. The world is eternal in time, but it is still “originated” (*ḥādīt*) since it owes its contingent existence to its sole creator. For Avicenna, to apply the concept of contingency (*imkān*) is the best way to prove God’s creating power, since it entails that, in this way, the world depends on God’s action at every moment, not only at the time of creation, as suggested by contemporary *Mutakallimūn*. It is meaningful to see that Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, a prominent theologian after Avicenna, saw the notion of contingency as an alternative method to the classical notion of origination. In the last resort, the *Mutakallimūn* did not totally depend on Avicenna’s writings to use the proof from contingency – they rather took Avicenna’s criticisms into consideration when they applied their classical method for proving the contingency of the world.

As for proofs for the existence of God, Kaya disagrees with the idea that before Avicenna the *Mutakallimūn* used the proof from origination, while after him they switched towards the proof from contingency. The texts of *Kalām* scholars such as Abū Rašīd al-Nisābūrī, Ibn Bābawayh, al-Bāqillānī reveal that the proof from contingency was in circulation before Avicenna. Besides, it is important to notice that the idea of contingency supported by the *Mutakallimūn* and Avicenna differ significantly. While Avicenna is of the opinion that the state of contingency must be found in the eternal substance, the *Mutakallimūn* maintain that contingency does not need the notion of ‘eternity’. Besides, the proof from contingency in *Kalām* does not depend exclusively on the concept of existence, as is the case with Avicenna’s. Post-Avicennian scholars such as al-Ġuwaynī do not exhibit the influence of Avicenna, as alleged in recent studies; rather, they follow the classical Kalamīc argumentation which is mostly based on the idea of *taḥsis*. Kaya points out that Avicenna’s influence can be detected in an argumentation by al-Ġazālī in his *Faḍā’ih al-Baṭiniyya*, where in order to prove the existence of God he bases himself on mere existence and states “there is no doubt that something exists”, just as Avicenna does in his *al-Mabda’ wa-l-Ma’ād*. Avicenna criticized the *Mutakallimūn* because they used an argumentation to prove the existence of God which is based on the sensible world. Avicenna’s main impact, as Kaya suggests, was that he proposed a more stringent and clear proof based on logical terms, not that he introduced new concepts into the vocabulary of the *Mutakallimūn*.

The chapter on the essence-existence distinction argues that early Kalamīc texts show that, in the mind of the Muslim theologians, there was certainly a distinction between the essence of things and

their existence, but expressed in terms different from those of the *falāsifa*. According to Kaya, there were two main contexts in classical Kalam to look for the distinction: 1. The discussions on whether the non-existent is a thing or not (*al-mā'dum šay'*), 2. The discussions on whether human beings are capable of knowing the essence of God or His existence. In the first context, some *Mutakallimūn* held that God's creating power is active only in bringing things into existence, not in giving them their essences and identities. The non-existents can be regarded as entities, even though these were not yet brought into existence by God. As for the second context, the early theologian ʿAmr (d. 815) held that human beings can only know that God exists, not what He really is. He clearly distinguished between the *māhiyya* ('essence') and the *anniyya* ('existence') of things. According to Kaya, the fact that later *Mutakallimūn* dealt with the classical Kalam problem of the non-existent under the heading of the essence-existence distinction can be seen as a continuation of the early Kalam idea that the issue is directly related to the problem of creation. Avicenna is of the opinion that the attributes of God can be predicated of God either in the way of attribution (*idāfa*) or negation (*salb*), and this is in order for him to prove the ultimate unity of God, beyond any multiplicity. This can be seen as a purely Neoplatonic tenet; however, in some of his texts, Avicenna seems to take into consideration the Mu'tazilite tradition on the attributes of God. His clear statement in *al-Risāla al-Arṣiyya* that God's attributes are not superadded to his essence is an approval of the Mu'tazilite thesis, or at least a denial of the views that God has attributes besides His essence, an opinion that was held by the *Ṣifātiyya*. This position of Avicenna shows that he acted not only as a representative of Neoplatonic philosophy, but also an intellectual actor in the Muslim community of his times.

The discussions on whether the attributes of God are necessary ('*wāğib*') or possible ('*mumkin*') in later *Kalām* cannot be merely related to Avicenna's distinction of necessary and possible, since we can trace back the discussion well before Avicenna in Mu'tazilite literature. The Mu'tazilites saw the concepts of necessity and possibility as general categories to be applied to all existent and mental entities. Moreover, they particularly pointed to the problem whether God's attributes can be accepted as necessary, since necessity means being free from any cause. In this context, the discussions on the necessity of the attributes of God took place between the Mu'tazilites and the Kullābites (and later, the Aš'arites). The Aš'arites struggled to find a way to put the essential attributes under the category of 'necessity' and to argue that both God and His attributes are necessary, that is, free from any cause. The early interaction of the Aš'arite *Kalām* with Mu'tazilite theology on this particular subject led the later Aš'arites to take into consideration Avicenna's dichotomy between necessary and contingent beings in their system. Moreover, Kaya discusses the claim by scholars such as R. Wisnovsky that the *Mutakallimūn* owe their distinction of "necessary by itself" (*wāğib bi-dātihī*) and "necessary by other" (*wāğib bi-ğayrihī*) to the vocabulary of Avicenna: the distinction, again, was in wide circulation in the Kalam of this age. For Kaya, the real influence of Avicenna in the issue of God's attributes has to be detected in his understanding of the attributes as attributions (*idāfat*) or negations (*sulūb*). Avicenna sought to explain the traditional Islamic theory of attributes in terms of these two categories, and the theologians after him followed his path to come with alternative theories.

Kaya's overall thesis in the book can be summarized as follows: to evaluate Avicenna's influence on Islamic theology, one must not fall into the error of reducing all post-Avicennan philosophical theories in later *Kalām* to the philosophy of Avicenna. Indeed, the interactions of *Kalām* with the philosophical notions goes well back early from the time of Avicenna, and this is particularly relevant in the application of the terms necessity, possibility, and impossibility at the epistemological and ontological levels. It is essential to look into the history of the relationship between *Kalām* and *Falsafa* as a "history of mutual interaction" and to see Avicenna as a "decisive point", rather than a "starting point".

ZH

Jari Kaukua, *Self-Awareness in Islamic Philosophy. Avicenna and Beyond*, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge 2015, VII-X + 257 pp.

This interesting volume collects Jari Kaukua's research conducted during his doctoral and postdoctoral studies and explores "a particular way of describing and conceiving of the self and self-awareness that emerges explicitly for the first time in Islamic philosophy in the psychological writings of Avicenna (d. 1037)" (p. 3). Kaukua does not intend to apply any of the modern Western notions of "self" and "self-awareness" to the examined period, but makes a distinction between a "phenomenological" level of discourse, regardless of the existence and the nature of its object, and a "metaphysical" level that takes these implications into account. This, in turn, allows him to distinguish between the description of self expounded by Avicenna and shared by later Arabic thinkers and their re-thinking of its significance in order to establish the nature of the self. On this basis, Kaukua proceeds to analyse the development of the concept of the self and self-awareness in the thought of Avicenna's twelfth-century critics, Abū l-Barakāt al-Baġdādī, Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and Suhrawardī, down to Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophical revision in the seventeenth century. He states clearly that his account does not mean to provide an "archaeology" of the Latin medieval and modern understanding of the self, but focuses on post-classical Islamic period as an autonomous field of philosophical research.

The first chapter presents the most important pre-Avicennian philosophical concepts of the self and self-cognition. Kaukua's point of departure are Aristotle's doctrine of "perception of perception" in *De Anima* III 2 – according to which one and the same subject perceives something and perceives itself to perceive that something –, and the Aristotelian doctrine of intellection as identity of the intellect in act and its intelligible object in *De Anima* III 4, *Metaphysics* XII 7 and XII 9. This doctrine was available to Arabic readers not only through the Arabic translation of Aristotle's corpus, but also in the pseudo-Aristotle's *Book on the Pure Good* (see proposition 12), the Latin *Liber de Causis*. In all these passages on intellection "we are dealing with an eternally actual intellect that is capable of bringing the world about through its overabundant act of self-intellection, that is, the Neoplatonic intellectual *hypostasis* which, when combined with the thought thinking itself that functions as the goal for all existing things in *Metaphysics* XII, acts as both the source and the point of return of the entire cosmos, including individual human intellects. Consequently, the sort of self cognition these texts describe cannot be identified with any ordinary type of human self-awareness" (p. 17). In the pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle* (from Plotinus's *Enneads* IV-V-VI) the human self seems to be described in a broader sense, but even though the inclination towards the self is in contrast with a mundane orientation and there are many references to entering oneself (*daḥala fī dātī*), and to returning to oneself (*raġa'a fī dātī*), it remains what results from the acquired knowledge of the true self: something that human beings try to reach, but that initially they do not have. This approach is very clear in al-Fārābī's *On Intellect*, where "intellection becomes self-intellection only when the intellect is fully developed and can therefore dispense with any reference to external material objects" (p. 19). According to Kaukua, all these pre-Avicennian Arabic concepts of the self do not suffice to explain the novelty of Avicenna's concept of self-awareness which is introduced by a general framework of Avicenna's psychology, and in particular of its key doctrines: the Avicennian substance dualism (the individual human essence is an immaterial substance which performs the functions of a form animating the body for its own ends; the body is the necessary condition for the coming to be of the soul as an individual); the doctrine of the five internal senses, and that of abstraction.

Chapter two briefly recalls Avicenna's definition of the soul as the first perfection (*kamāl*) of the genus "living body"; then it discusses Avicenna's famous thought experiment of the flying man, which

has been strongly debated by scholars. According to Kaukua, it suggests the phenomenological basis of self-awareness, conceived by Avicenna as something we can recognize in our everyday experience. Self-awareness, in turn, provides a pointer towards the truth of psychological substance dualism. Kaukua insists on the character of the reminder of the thought experiment of the flying man, not of the demonstration. “It is used to argue for the initial plausibility of the substance dualistic view that there might be something to human being apart from embodied existence. In other words, it is intended to convince the reader who fails to see that the thing which is a soul for the human body can be something in itself, independent of its relation to the body, and it does this by showing that there is a feature in our experience that gives a clue of what the incorporeal existence could possibly consist in” (p. 34). In other words, the flying man points to affirm the existence of one’s essence as separated from the body: in Kaukua’s reading self-awareness must be identified precisely with the awareness of this essence, conceived as unchanging in the flux of the various accidents appended to it.

Chapter three explores Avicenna’s possible reasons for introducing his new concept of self-awareness. He states that not only intellection, but more generally the soul entails incorporeality and hence indivisibility, despite the multiplicity of activities and organs involved in its function as the form of a body. In fact, departing from Aristotle’s hylomorphic psychology, Avicenna solves the problem of the individuation of human beings by stating that the soul’s individuality requires a relationship to a body proper to it and it alone (a “configuration”, i.e. a tendency to be concerned with a particular body). This, however, raises the issue of how the soul can still exist and be an individual after the death and the corruption of the body. In this regard, “Avicenna suggests that the relation to the body has to be understood as a property of the soul, as a temporally qualifiable ‘being-related-to-the-body’ that can be the soul’s property whether or not any body actually exists” (p. 45). Avicenna mentions five different individuating properties of the soul (*Šifā’, Fī l-nafs* V 3): (i) a set of ‘rational actions and passions’, which constitute immaterial character traits corresponding to the humoral temperament of the soul’s erstwhile body; (ii) an intellect developed to an extent peculiar to each human soul; (iii) the awareness each person has of her- or himself; (iv) particular character traits acquired through habituation; (v) the possibility of other individuating properties that we may not be aware of (the list is compared with similar properties mentioned in *Šifā’, Madḥal* I 12). The problem seems thus not to be solved by Avicenna in a satisfying manner: the soul’s individuating properties are somewhat “accidental”, due to their provenance from the union of the soul to the body. The third property, however, unlike the others, may be independent from the body.

The role of self-awareness in the individuation of a human being is developed in the *Tā’līqāt* (160-161), a later compilation, in a context dealing with God’s intellectuality: self-awareness is innate, and does not involve the use of cognitive instruments; it is essential, necessary and concomitant to human being, it constitutes human existence. Self-awareness “is the mode in which individual immaterial human substances exist just as materiality is the mode in which individual human bodies exist” (p. 54). In Kaukua’s interpretation, then, Avicenna may have perceived self-awareness as the solution to the question of how a human being can be both an immaterial substance and an individual instantiation of the human species, and represents the highest form of unity that man can achieve, coming closer than human intellection to the self-intellection proper to God.

Chapter four presents Kaukua’s reconstruction of Avicenna’s concept of self-awareness. This concept is singled out by two conditions: continuity and the fact that it is experientially given (as in the case described by the “flying man”). The first condition marks the difference of Avicennian self-awareness from reflective awareness (explicit consideration of an ongoing act by the very subject of the act), less fundamental than the former. Avicenna employs the argument that infers the unity of the soul’s substance from the unity of the experience. In *Šifā’, Fī l-nafs* V 7, he states that

the unifying principle is not the body but “the thing that each of us sees as himself”, although the inference of a metaphysical subject from an experiential phenomenon may be fallacious. Moreover, two Avicennian arguments are explored in order to establish the concept of self-awareness more clearly: the first one attempts to demonstrate that self-awareness does not arise from the subject’s reflection upon himself, but is prior to it; the second is an argument from personal identity which proves the existence of the self by proving the endurance of a numerically one substance through the change of its attributes. Elsewhere (*Mubāḥaṭāt* III, 68) he provides another argument for continuity, relying on the distinction between self-awareness and memory: “The idea is that the self is constantly present to itself, regardless of whether anything else is present to it, or whether it ever turns to reflect on this presence” (p. 88). Kaukua then examines Avicenna’s concept of self-reflection and of how the intellect can grasp an individual under a universal description only with reference to an individual meaning. On the whole, Avicenna’s self-awareness is more fundamental, since it emerges in this study as “an inherent feature of all human experience from the highest echelons of intellection down to the lowest strata of sense-perception” (p. 102).

Chapter five moves to Avicenna’s heritage in the thought of his twelfth-century successors. Kaukua first presents an overview of Avicennian material in al-Suhrawardī’s writings, such as the “Peripatetic” *Talwīḥāt* and the “illuminationist” *Ḥikmat al-iṣrāq*, where the reader can find all the main arguments on self-awareness presented in Avicenna, but with a new emphasis on the thesis that “the different mode of givenness of ourselves allows us to conclude that our selves are not bodies” (p. 112). Then Kaukua goes on to show how the concept of self-awareness as a substance is questioned by two critics of Avicenna, Abū l-Barakāt al-Baḡdādī (*Kitāb al-mu’tabar, al-‘ilm al-ṭabī‘ī* VI 1) and Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (*Mabāḥiṭ* II 2.2.1.3): awareness of the self does not allow one to conclude that the nature of the self is that of a substance, i.e. of the soul. This criticism was picked up by Suhrawardī, who refuses the conclusion that self-awareness can be referred to any entity as its property or a mode of existence.

Chapter six presents Suhrawardī’s separation of Avicenna’s phenomenology of the self from his metaphysics. Starting from the problem of how the divine knowledge both of universals and particulars is to be conceived, Suhrawardī expounds an epistemological model which is able to account for the subject’s knowledge of itself and of other objects, be they universal or particular. “Avicenna’s theory of knowledge, because it is based on the inherence of cognitive forms in the knowing subject and makes the apprehension of particular objects conditional to a relation to matter, fails on both accounts as an explanation of God’s knowledge” (p. 127). In fact, Suhrawardī points out that, since self-awareness is prior to reflection, it is a type of knowledge that the Avicennian inherence theory cannot explain. He subsequently rethinks this model by introducing the notion of knowledge as “presence” (*ḥudūr*) of what is known to the knower (*Talwīḥāt* III.3.1). The use of the notion of presence in a similar context can also be found in the writings of Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, although the identification of knowledge and presence is typical of Suhrawardī. The metaphysical counterpart for this substitution is that Suhrawardī replaces the Peripatetic notion of substance and of definition, both unsuitable in his eyes, with those of “appearance” (*zuhūr*, a sort of stream of existence) and of “light” (*nūr*, that is, the very fact of appearing): these two are the fundamental elements of his illuminationist theory, since they do not need definition. Kaukua explains that, according to this theory, the appearance to another presupposes appearance to itself and that “the pure lights or appearances behind the lights or appearances for another are Platonic forms, which account for the identity and stability of concrete appearances by being their immediate causes in a downward emanative process of illumination” (p. 152). The “self” is reconsidered in these new terms as pure existence and a separate light, capable of a dynamic progression in the degree of its self-awareness.

Chapters seven and eight consider Mullā Ṣadrā's concept of self-awareness. Mullā Ṣadrā (1571/2-1635/6) has developed his own metaphysical thought on the basis of Avicenna, Suhrawardī and Ibn 'Arabī. As shown in chapter seven, in his *al-Ḥikma al-muta'aliya fī al-asfār al-arba'a* Mullā Ṣadrā employs the argument of the flying man, recast in the form of the experiment of the "flying animal": it differs from Avicenna because of its systematic role (it is now considered a proper "proof") and its broader scope to prove the existence not only of the intellectual, but also the sub-intellectual mode of mental existence. Mullā Ṣadrā's basic concept of self-awareness is nonetheless consistent with the Avicennian model, as shown by the reprise of its various arguments on the topic.

Mullā Ṣadrā's most famous theory is that of the change in the category of substance, which entails the possibility of an evolution in human self-awareness and of including in the subject's self-awareness the individualizing properties inherited from the conjunction with the body. By arguing so, Ṣadrā provides an answer to Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's criticism against Avicenna on the problem of the separability of self-awareness from other constituents of the human experience. He identifies self-awareness neither with substantiality nor with pure existence, but with a particular mode of existence, thus developing a middle stance between the two options.

Chapter eight proceeds to show that Mullā Ṣadrā's concept of mental existence is "thoroughly detached from matter. Even though its objects may have a spatial structure and location and in this sense be analogous to material things, their spatiality is not material but experiential, a matter of either imagination or perception" (pp. 195-6). The soul implied in Mullā Ṣadrā's idea of mental existence is also inseparable from its acts, thus departing from Avicenna's theory and denying the validity of the "flying man", because it isolates the soul from its acts. Moreover, the soul performs its acts both necessarily (i.e. naturally) and voluntarily (because of the lack of an external agent that forces it to do so).

Mullā Ṣadrā also discusses again the arguments on the unity of the soul, since the identity of the human self may be dissolved due to his theory of substantial change. In order to do this, he has recourse to Ibn 'Arabī's concept of "fixed essence" (*'ayn ṭābit*) as the foundation in God's mind of the identity of the existents. He also draws his solution from the pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle*: "The thrust of the material is that the identity in change is due to an atemporal, unchanging and unified principle governing the change" (p. 211). The change in substance is conceived as unified by considering pre-reflective self-awareness as the process of temporal continuity of its existence, a continuity that is necessarily lost in the act of self-reflection, since the latter can only focus on a single moment of the process: "the later self [...] is aware of itself as the present state of a developmental process, and thereby grasps the earlier phases as so many steps that have led it to the present" (p. 222). This new concept of selfhood, departing from the conception of its static identity, implies furthermore that the possibility of attaining "transparent" self-awareness is reduced.

Kaukua's conclusion summarizes the overview through the authors examined, pointing out that, notwithstanding the remarkable shift from Avicenna's conception of the soul as substance to Mullā Ṣadrā's dynamic selfhood, no solution similar to the one of Western modernity occurred, since the idea of self as a construction remains absent. However, he wishes that the concepts expounded throughout his book provide an interesting set of questions for reflection also within contemporary debate in the philosophy of the mind.

An Appendix on the Arabic terminology related to self-awareness (pp. 233-7), the Bibliography and an Index of names close this challenging volume which has the merit of drawing attention of the philosophical debate to the pre-modern, non-Western conception of self-awareness in post-classical Islamic philosophy.

GM

Formen und Nebenformen des Platonismus in der Spätantike, hersg. von H. Seng, L.G. Soares Santoprete, C.O. Tommasi, Universitätsverlag Winter, Heidelberg 2016 (Bibliotheca Chaldaica, 6), 424 pp.

I quindici saggi raccolti in questo volume sono il risultato di un progetto di ricerca triennale, diretto dagli editori e intitolato “Il lato oscuro della Tarda Antichità. Marginalità e integrazione delle correnti esoteriche nella spiritualità filosofica dei secoli II-VI”. Il libro, seguendo una traiettoria cronologica, esplora soprattutto il modo in cui i grandi esponenti della tradizione platonica di età imperiale (Plotino, Porfirio, Giamblico, Proclo, Ammonio, Damascio) si sono rapportati alle pratiche e dottrine religiose, sia della tradizione ellenica, sia, soprattutto, ad esperienze e testi più recenti: ermetismo, gnosticismo, *Oracoli caldaici*. Alcuni contributi mettono a tema anche il confronto col cristianesimo che, pur non avendo, se non in alcune correnti, i caratteri di una sapienza esoterica, è stato anch'esso, soprattutto all'inizio, un movimento culturalmente marginale, rispetto al quale i filosofi di scuola reagirono con una decisa difesa della propria tradizione.

I primi tre saggi del volume affrontano aspetti particolari di quelle che, usando le parole del titolo, si possono definire *Nebenformen* del platonismo di età imperiale. Il contributo di Chiara Ombretta Tommasi (“Some Reflections on Antique and Late Antique Esotericism: between Mainstream and Counterculture”, pp. 9-36) introduce in due modi alla prospettiva generale che ha guidato il progetto di ricerca e la composizione del volume: da una parte, ripercorre la storia degli studi dedicati alle correnti esoteriche nel mondo occidentale e dei condizionamenti culturali che li hanno orientati, fino al nascere di una disciplina accademica a sé (“Western Esotericism”); dall'altra, discutendo varie possibili definizioni della nozione di ‘esoterico’,¹ mostra come una corretta impostazione dello studio delle tradizioni esoteriche occidentali (oggi prevalentemente concentrato sulle forme che esse hanno assunto a partire dall'età moderna) non può prescindere dal considerare le loro radici nella tarda antichità, quando proliferarono esperienze religiose più o meno apertamente alternative a quelle tradizionali e rivolte a piccoli gruppi di iniziati.

È precisamente alle complesse interazioni che si sono svolte tra i rappresentanti della cultura filosofico/religiosa ufficiale e gruppi e scritti più marginali rispetto a essa che è dedicata la maggior parte dei saggi del volume, col proposito di giungere a una loro comprensione più ricca e di superare opposizioni semplificanti come quella tra ortodossia/eresia o razionale/irrazionale.

Anna Van den Kerchove (“La mystique dans les écrits hermétiques”, pp. 37-63) prende le mosse dalle pagine dedicate da A.-J. Festugière allo studio della mistica nel *Corpus Hermeticum*² e affronta nel proprio contributo due questioni: qual è l'uso che negli scritti ermetici si fa della nozione di ‘mistico’ e che cosa si può ricavare dai passi del *corpus* nei quali sono descritte esperienze di incontro col divino che oggi si descriverebbero come mistiche. Se il termine *μυστικός* compare una sola volta — in CH XIV 1 — per indicare un modo di esprimere la verità velato e accessibile soltanto a chi sia in possesso di una certa maturità spirituale, l'autrice indica quattro passi nel *Corpus* e nel *Discorso sull'ogdoade e l'enneade* della biblioteca copta di Nag Hammadi, che descrivono esperienze di visione — CH I (*Poim.*) 1-4; X 4-6; XIII 3; NH VI 6 — mediante le quali l'anima di un discepolo, dopo un

¹ Sono tre le prospettive principali prese in considerazione; quella di W.J. Hanegraaff: esoterismo come definizione per forme di conoscenza rifiutate e considerate illegittime dalla cultura ufficiale; quella di K. von Stuckrad: esoterismo come categoria generale sotto la quale raccogliere le forme di alterità culturale o contro-cultura. Alle spalle degli studi recenti l'autrice indica i lavori di J. Matter, che per primo utilizzò il termine “esoterismo” nel senso di una sapienza iniziatica e segreta, staccata e superiore rispetto alla conoscenza profana accessibile a tutti e nelle forme comuni.

² A.-J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, IV, *Le Dieu inconnu et la gnose*, Librairie Lecoffre J. Gabalda et C. Éditeurs, Paris 1954 (Études Bibliques), pp. 141-258.

percorso di purificazione, perviene a un'esperienza puntuale di conoscenza della realtà divina, che produce in essa una trasformazione permanente.

J.-D. Dubois ("Controverses sur la sotériologie des gnostiques valentiniens", pp. 65-80), attraverso un esame dei resoconti eresiologici di Ireneo ed Epifanio, dei testi valentiniani conservati nella biblioteca di Nag Hammadi e delle testimonianze su Eracleone conservate da Origene, mette in discussione la fondatezza della tradizionale distinzione, in seno alla gnosi valentiniana, tra una scuola occidentale (che avrebbe assegnato al Cristo un corpo psichico) e una orientale (che gli avrebbe invece assegnato un corpo pneumatico, assumendo di fatto una posizione doceta). Questa distinzione non ha, secondo l'autore, fondamento nelle fonti valentiniane, ma è una costruzione eresiologica, mirante a rendere evidente il fatto che la cristologia valentiniana era contraddittoria e irricevibile.

Questa revisione della cristologia dei valentiniani pone il problema di come intendere la loro dottrina della salvezza e di come essi si rappresentassero il rapporto tra esseri psichici ed esseri spirituali. L'autore ritiene che, come pensavano il Salvatore dotato di un corpo spirituale realmente incarnato in un corpo materiale visibile (psichico), così i valentiniani pensassero sia gli esseri psichici, sia quelli spirituali come destinatari della salvezza e osserva che i termini φύσις e οὐσία nel lessico dei valentiniani non devono essere intesi con il significato ontologico che vi leggevano gli eresiografi della grande chiesa (p.e. Origene). Dubois, tuttavia, non articola ulteriormente questa posizione e rinvia alla necessità di un approfondimento dello studio della soteriologia gnostica a partire dalle fonti dirette e non dai resoconti eresiologici.

Due saggi si occupano della polemica antignostica di Plotino. Angela Longo ("La maschera di Epicuro sul volto dell'avversario in tema di provvidenza e piacere nello scritto di Plotino, *Contro gli Gnostici*: alcuni paralleli con Celso, Attico, Alessandro di Afrodisia e 'Ippolito' di Roma", pp. 81-108) concentra la propria attenzione su *Enn.* II 9[33], 15.4-17, dove Plotino afferma che le tesi gnostiche sul fine dell'uomo e sulla provvidenza sono ancora più riprovevoli di quelle di Epicuro. Scopo dello studio è mostrare che i procedimenti e i temi polemici usati da Plotino in questo passo (equiparazione delle tesi degli avversari a quelle di Epicuro, istituzione di un nesso tra la negazione della provvidenza e un'etica edonistica, rifiuto dell'idea che la provvidenza divina sia riservata soltanto a una certa categoria di esseri a danno di altri) sono stati usati anche da altri autori, più o meno coevi, nella polemica contro i rispettivi avversari,³ evidenziando, quindi, sia il loro carattere stereotipato, sia l'intenzione da parte di Plotino di stabilire, usandoli, un confine netto tra ciò che ha dignità filosofica e tesi che rappresentano, invece, un sovvertimento dei valori fondamentali della tradizione ellenica.

L'ampio saggio di Luciana Gabriela Soares Santoprete ("New Perspectives on the Structure of Plotinus' *Treatise* 32 (V 5) and his Anti-Gnostic Polemic", pp. 109-62) ha lo scopo di dimostrare che il trattato plotiniano *Sul fatto che gli intelligibili non sono esterni all'Intelletto e sul Bene* è parte integrante di una tetralogia antignostica⁴ e che la dottrina in esso esposta è orientata a confutare

³ Segnalo due sviste nella traduzione dal greco: a p. 87 Eus., *PE* XV 5, 6 (= Att. fr. 3 43-46 des Places) ... ἔτι μηχανήν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν πορίζειν οἴεται è tradotto: "pensa, inoltre, di procurare un espediente all'agire ingiusto" dimenticando la negazione (trad. "pensa, inoltre, di procurare un espediente per evitare l'agire ingiusto"); a p. 91 Alex. Aphr., *De Fato* 31, p. 203.7-12 Bruns ... ὁ Πύθιος ... πάντα πράττει πρὸς τὸ μὴδὲν τῶν ἀνοσιωτάτων τε καὶ ἀσεβεστάτων παρελθεῖν τὸν οἶκον αὐτοῦ è tradotto in modo piuttosto oscuro: "... il <dio> Pitico ... fa di tutto perché niente di più sacrilego e di più empio ne risparmi la casa" (sarebbe forse più chiaro: "... il <dio> Pitico ... fa di tutto perché niente di ciò che è più sacrilego ed empio ne risparmi la casa").

⁴ L'autrice intende in questo modo avvalorare la tesi presentata per la prima volta da R. Harder, "Eine neue Schrift Plotins", *Hermes* 71 (1936), pp. 1-10, secondo il quale gli attuali trattati III 8[30], V 8[31], V 5[32], II 9[33] delle *Enneadi* plotiniane costituivano in origine un unico trattato, corrispondente a un ciclo di lezioni, poi spezzato in quattro trattati distinti da Porfirio. Per un bilancio della discussione cf. C. D'Ancona, "Plotin", in R. Goulet (ed.), *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, Va,

tesi gnostiche circa la struttura ontologica del mondo intelligibile. Il limite di questo contributo mi sembra, però, consistere in una certa circolarità dell'argomentazione: l'autrice dimostra come – una volta ammesso che il trattato 32 sia parte di un più vasto scritto antignostico – se ne possano leggere coerentemente i singoli dettagli dottrinali in questa prospettiva, ma non dimostra che effettivamente Plotino abbia pensato il trattato con questa funzione.

È certamente vero che il modo in cui Plotino intendeva la struttura del mondo intelligibile e il suo rapporto con quello sensibile lo portava a criticare come del tutto inadeguato il modo in cui alcuni membri gnostici della sua cerchia di discepoli interpretavano Platone; ma non mi pare che si possa ricavare dal testo di V 5 che questa critica fosse lo scopo principale di tale scritto. La discussione intorno a questi temi era profondamente radicata nella tradizione platonica di età imperiale e Plotino espone qui in modo positivo le ragioni della propria particolare interpretazione di Platone, che tanto più richiedeva di essere argomentata, in quanto si discostava vistosamente da un'interpretazione letterale del *Timeo*.

Come anche l'autrice osserva, il trattato si apre con una rassegna di tesi riconducibili alle tradizioni peripatetica, epicurea, stoica, scettica, medioplatonica. Si può certamente pensare che Plotino intendesse confutare, insieme a queste, anche posizioni gnostiche riconducibili a queste tesi; ma solo se si assume preliminarmente che il trattato sia parte di un progetto antignostico, si può giungere alla conclusione formulata dall'autrice, che “Plotinus intends here to question more precisely the epistemology of the Gnostics, rather than the theories of these schools of thought” (p. 113).

I dieci saggi che seguono formano un gruppo compatto di interventi che affrontano, con ampiezza e prospettive diverse, il tema della religione dei filosofi: la questione, cioè, di come i platonici da Porfirio a Damascio abbiano tentato di coordinare in un sistema unitario coerente, ma con esiti notevolmente diversi l'uno dall'altro, dottrina platonica e pratiche culturali, tradizionali o recenti. Il titolo del saggio di Giulia Sfameni Gasparro (“Tra costruzione teosofica e polemica anticristiana nel *De Philosophia ex oraculis haurienda*: sulle tracce del progetto porfiriano”, pp. 163-98) – descrive in modo preciso lo scopo di questo contributo che, muovendo da un esame del prologo, conservato da Eusebio,⁵ propone una riflessione sullo scopo perseguito dal filosofo componendo la *Philosophia ex oraculis* e lo individua nella duplice intenzione di costruire una teosofia ellenica e di svolgere una polemica anticristiana.

Si tratta, più esattamente, dei due aspetti di un medesimo progetto filosofico: la polemica anticristiana – della quale l'autrice ricorda opportunamente che non ci è possibile precisare “quanto fosse explicit[a] e programmatic[a] nella composizione originale” (p. 165) – scaturiva necessariamente dal tentativo fatto da Porfirio di elaborare un “discorso sugli dèi” vero, capace, cioè, di mostrare l'accordo fra le tradizioni religiose ancestrali di greci e barbari e la dottrina platonica.⁶ Porfirio, nel prologo dell'opera, ritorna, infatti, due volte sul tema della verità, che è rivelata dagli dèi ed è faticosamente e dolorosamente partorita da coloro che impegnano seriamente tutta la propria

CNRS-Éditions, Paris 2012, pp. 885-1068 (qui: pp. 905-6; 984-9); R. Dufour, *Annexe 1. Les traités 30 à 33: un grand traité?*, in Plotin, *Traité 30-37*, sous la dir. de L. Brisson et J.-F. Pradeau, Flammarion, Paris 2006, pp. 399-406 (GF 1228).

⁵ Eus., *P.E.* IV 6, 2-8, 2 (= Porph. 303-305 F Smith).

⁶ Eusebio in *P.E.* IV 6, 3 (= Porph. 303 F Smith) descrive in questi termini il progetto porfiriano: οὗτος τοιγαροῦν ἐν οἷς ἐπέγραψεν Περὶ τῆς ἐκ λογίων φιλοσοφίας συναγωγῆν ἐποιήσατο χρησμῶν [...] εἷς τε ἀπόδειξιν τῆς τῶν θεολογουμένων ἀρετῆς εἰς τε προτροπὴν ἧς αὐτῷ φίλον ὀνομάζειν θεοσοφίας (cf. anche Aug., *De Civ.*, XIX 23, 17 = Porph. 343 F Smith: “Nam in libris quos ἐκ λογίων φιλοσοφίας appellat, in quibus exequatur atque conscribit rerum ad philosophiam pertinentium velut divina responsa [...]).” Come osserva l'autrice (pp. 169-70), si trattava, dunque, per il filosofo di mostrare la verità delle tradizioni riguardanti gli dèi e di incoraggiare i lettori a ricercare una sapienza riguardante gli dèi (o donata dagli dèi) degna di filosofi.

vita per realizzare la salvezza della propria anima.⁷ Il *Περὶ τῆς ἐκ λογίων φιλοσοφίας* era, perciò, un libro destinato a filosofi e mirante a proporre un'interpretazione filosofica degli oracoli provenienti dagli dèi, mostrando l'ordine gerarchico che organizza il mondo divino. La prospettiva che guidava Porfirio in quest'opera era sostanzialmente la medesima che emerge anche nella *Lettera ad Anebo*: egli si sforzava di inserire il patrimonio religioso tradizionale in un orizzonte filosofico-razionale coerente, legittimando sí le forme comuni del culto, affermando, però, allo stesso tempo il primato etico e conoscitivo della vita filosofica come via di unione col mondo divino.

Alla riflessione di Porfirio sul rapporto tra filosofia e religione tradizionale è dedicato anche l'intervento di Mariangela Monaca ("Conversando con Porfirio: note alla *Θεραπευτικὴ* di Teodoreto di Cirro", pp. 335-56) che, studiando l'uso di testi porfiriani nell'apologia di Teodoreto, illustra un problema caratteristico della tradizione testuale dei polemisti anticristiani antichi: anche quando sono citati alla lettera e con riferimenti precisi alle opere di provenienza, gli scritti degli avversari del cristianesimo sono stati piegati dagli apologeti cristiani a esprimere prospettive a volte molto lontane da quelle dei loro autori e funzionali agli scopi della polemica antipagana.

Così Teodoreto si avvale della testimonianza di Porfirio per dimostrare la verità e la superiorità del cristianesimo rispetto ai culti tradizionali dei greci (cf. *Therap.*, XII 96-98) e, in particolare, per dimostrare che anche gli avversari del cristianesimo riconoscevano la maggiore antichità di Mosè e dei sapienti barbari rispetto ai greci; la natura perversa dei demoni e del culto sacrificale loro destinato; la relazione di ogni pratica divinatoria con i demoni malvagi.

Quattro saggi esaminano aspetti diversi del pensiero di Giamblico. Andrei Timotin ("À la recherche d'une religion platonicienne. La polémique entre Porphyre et Jamblique sur la prière", pp. 199-217) espone le differenze nel progetto filosofico-religioso di Porfirio e Giamblico a partire dalla loro concezione della preghiera e dell'azione rituale. Entrambi i filosofi hanno avuto di mira la conciliazione tra dottrina platonica e pratiche religiose del culto civico, ma l'hanno realizzata in modi profondamente diversi.

Porfirio, nella *Lettera ad Anebo*, poneva il problema del senso della preghiera, osservando che le varie forme di invocazione e di culto rituale possono essere efficaci soltanto se rivolte a esseri passibili, mentre sono del tutto vane nei confronti di esseri impassibili, come sono gli dèi,⁸ che non sono influenzati dalla voce degli oranti o dalle pratiche del culto sensibile. Si tratta di un'obiezione che si trova in termini in parte simili anche in Massimo di Tiro e Origene⁹ e che Porfirio teneva presente anche nel *De Abstemtina* (II 34, 1-2), riservando al Dio supremo un culto silenzioso, fatto non di richieste particolari, bensì di "pensieri puri" e del quale, secondo lui, soltanto l'anima purificata del filosofo era capace.

⁷ Cf. Eus., *P.E.* IV 7, 2 (= Porph. 303 F Smith): ἔξει δὲ ἡ παροῦσα συναγωγὴ πολλῶν μὲν τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν δογμάτων ἀναγραφῆν, ὡς οἱ θεοὶ τάληθὲς ἔχειν ἐθέσπισαν. [...] ἦν δ' ἔχει ὠφέλειαν ἢ συναγωγὴ, μάλιστα εἴσονται ὅσοιπερ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὠδίναντες ἠῤῥξαντό ποτε τῆς ἐκ θεῶν ἐπιφανείας τυχόντες ἀνάπαυσιν λαβεῖν τῆς ἀπορίας διὰ τὴν τῶν λεγόντων ἀξιόπιστον διδασκαλίαν. Cf. inoltre IV 8, 1 (= Porph. 304 F Smith): [...] δοτέον δὴ τοῖς τὸν βίον ἐνστησαμένοις πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς σωτηρίαν.

⁸ Cf. Eus., *P.E.* V 10, 10 (= Porph., *Ad Aneb.* fr. 13 Saffrey-Segonds): Εἰ δὲ οἱ μὲν ἀπαθεῖς, οἱ δὲ ἐμπαθεῖς, [...] μάταιοι αἱ θεῶν κλήσεις εἴσονται [...] ἀκλήητον γὰρ καὶ ἀβίαστον καὶ ἀκατανάγκαστον τὸ ἀπαθές. Nella versione francese (a p. 200) è caduta la traduzione di οἱ δὲ ἐμπαθεῖς e il senso del passo ne risulta alterato: "Si les uns parmi les dieux sont non-sujets au pàtir, en l'honneur desquels sont érigés par ces prêtres, dit-on, des phallus ...".

⁹ Max. Tyr., *Orat.* V 3: "Il divino è cupido, avido di doni e non differisce in nulla dalla massa degli altri uomini [...] o, al contrario, il divino è costante, fermo e inesorabile"; Orig., *De Orat.* V 6: "primo, se Dio ha una preconnoscenza delle cose future e bisogna che esse si avverino, vana è la preghiera; secondo, se tutto accade conformemente al volere di Dio e immutabili sono i suoi disegni e nessuna delle cose che egli vuole può essere mutata, è vana la preghiera rivolta a lui".

A queste obiezioni Giamblico rispondeva nel *De Mysteriis* con una difesa del valore positivo della preghiera rituale, dichiarando l'origine divina delle formule eucologiche e che il culto, compiuto nel modo dovuto, realizza nell'anima del celebrante l'unione con gli dèi. Sicché la preghiera vocale non è eterogenea rispetto alle realtà divine, bensì è comunicazione del divino con se stesso. In questa prospettiva si giustifica anche la preghiera di supplica, che non è espressione di un vano tentativo di condizionare gli dèi, ma il naturale volgersi (τρέπεσθαι) dell'inferiore verso ciò che è superiore; è, cioè, manifestazione del principio cosmico dell'ἐπιστροφή di ciò che è principiato verso il proprio principio (I 15).

Come Porfirio, anche Giamblico pensava la realtà divina nei termini di una gerarchia discendente, ma, anziché insistere sulle differenze tra i diversi piani, metteva l'accento sul vincolo di simpatia che legava ciascun livello di questa gerarchia a tutti gli altri: egli attribuiva, perciò, alle azioni materiali compiute nella celebrazione del culto e non alla mera attività noetica del filosofo la capacità di suscitare il movimento ordinato di ritorno dell'intera realtà al proprio principio. Porfirio e Giamblico hanno, dunque, risposto in modo diverso a un'esigenza comune: quella di elaborare una teoria filosofica della religione e del culto tradizionali, capace sia di rispondere a obiezioni di tipo razionale, sia di opporsi a movimenti, come il cristianesimo, che facevano appello a una rivelazione divina estranea, dal loro punto di vista, a ogni razionalità filosofica.

Mi sembra che questo e gli altri contributi del volume mettano bene in evidenza come, al di là delle profonde differenze tra gli autori nell'elaborazione di una giustificazione razionale del culto, tutti i filosofi concordassero nell'esigenza di produrre una tale giustificazione razionale. Le posizioni divergevano tra Plotino e Porfirio, da una parte, e Giamblico e i suoi successori, dall'altra, quanto alla convinzione che la filosofia fosse in grado di produrre da sola il *reditus* dell'anima al proprio principio; tutti i platonici, però, consideravano caratteristico del discorso filosofico il fatto di muoversi sul piano argomentativo e secondo criteri di rigorosa coerenza razionale anche quando prendeva a oggetto dottrine che si ritenevano rivelate dagli dèi.

Il saggio di Matteo Agnosini ("Giamblico e la divinazione κατὰ τὸ φανταστικόν. Verso l'integrazione di un genere divinatorio: il caso dell'idromanzia", pp. 219-41) mostra in modo particolarmente efficace questo aspetto a proposito di un tema che sembra quanto mai remoto da ogni possibile rigorizzazione razionale: la giustificazione della pratica divinatoria per mezzo dell'acqua. Anche in questo caso, Giamblico reagisce a un'obiezione di Porfirio (*De Myst.* III 1): l'idromanzia, come altre tecniche divinatorie, si basa sulla produzione di immagini mentali mediante l'ausilio di un supporto materiale, in questo caso l'acqua; come si può ricondurre questa esperienza alla manifestazione di realtà intelligibili e sottrarla al rischio che si tratti solo di illusioni autoprodotte dalla parte irrazionale dell'anima del percipiente?

La risposta di Giamblico (*De Myst.* III 14) insiste sul carattere oggettivo di questa esperienza e, giustificando filosoficamente pratiche divinatorie tradizionali, crea le premesse per dare una fondazione filosofica anche alle pratiche teurgiche. La φαντασία dell'operatore è, infatti, secondo lui, illuminata da rappresentazioni che si producono per volontà degli dèi nel veicolo etereo dell'anima, grazie a un processo che il filosofo chiama "conduzione della luce" (φωτὸς ἀγωγή). La divinazione, quindi non è il frutto di un'alterazione più o meno patologica delle facoltà dell'anima, ma la percezione – inusuale, eppure spiegabile in termini naturali e oggettivi – del manifestarsi degli dèi attraverso la mediazione di una realtà sensibile. Il rito compiuto dall'operatore crea le condizioni favorevoli alla percezione di questo manifestarsi.

La dottrina dell'anima è dunque sviluppata da Giamblico sia ricorrendo a fonti extrafilosofiche, sia a servizio di una giustificazione razionale di pratiche rituali tradizionali o recenti. La lunga influenza esercitata dalla psicologia giamblichea nel platonismo posteriore è illustrata dall'intervento di José Molina Ayala ("La doctrina del alma, de Jámblico, como trasfondo en Damascio, *De Principiis* III 66,

1-68, 9 W.-C.”, pp. 243-58). L'autore esamina un passo del trattato di Damascio mostrando come, pur senza citarlo esplicitamente, egli utilizzi la dottrina dell'anima di Giamblico a sostegno della tesi che le anime umane non sono parti o attività di un'anima universale, bensì sono sostanze separate. Il forte impegno di Giamblico nell'integrare in un unico sistema filosofia platonica e rivelazioni religiose emerge anche dal saggio di Daniela Patrizia Taormina (“I Greci a scuola degli Egizi e dei Caldei. Giamblico e la materia primordiale”, pp. 259-91). Il dibattuto problema della genesi della materia è svolto, infatti, da Giamblico, non solo nel contesto della tradizionale discussione filosofica sulla cosmologia descritta da Platone nel *Timeo*, ma ne integra e amplia l'interpretazione ricorrendo a elementi attinti alla teologia del *Corpus Hermeticum* e all'ontologia caldaica.

Se, da una parte, Giamblico condivideva con Porfirio la critica nei confronti di autori come Plutarco e Attico, che interpretavano alla lettera *Tim.* 30 A – attribuendo al Demiurgo un'azione ordinatrice su una materia primordiale ingenerata e in moto disordinato¹⁰ –, egli si differenzia da Porfirio quando fa derivare “dagli egiziani” la dottrina da lui attribuita a Platone circa il carattere generato della materia e dichiara che “anche Hermes vuole che la materialità sia derivata dalla sostanzialità”.¹¹ L'autrice (pp. 264-5) fa osservare che anche i termini che Giamblico usa in questo contesto (ὀλότης, οὐσιότης) sono tipici della letteratura ermetica (cf. CH XII 22) e indicano una “pura energia”, anteriore a qualunque determinazione corporea.

Alla dottrina di una materia generata, ma eterna, Giamblico trovava conferma anche negli *Oracoli caldaici*, secondo una testimonianza trasmessa da uno scolio attribuito a Giovanni Lido (*De Mens.* IV 159 Wunsch). Stando a questo passo, Giamblico interpretava gli *Oracoli* ricavandone la dottrina di una materia “intemporale, ma non priva di principio, bensì generata e causata”¹² e caratterizzata dal fatto di essere eterna, non soggetta a mutamento, perfetta e ordinata.

Con una meticolosa discussione di alcune testimonianze, l'autrice mostra come Giamblico, applicando all'interpretazione dei testi oracolari ed ermetici le proprie categorie ontologiche, pervenisse a una loro lettura coerente con i propri assunti filosofici. In tal modo egli completava e arricchiva la cosmologia esposta nel *Timeo*: la materia, descritta nella cosmologia platonica come una realtà disordinata, grazie alle fonti egiziane e caldaiche era ricondotta, su un piano ontologico precedente la produzione del cosmo sensibile, a ordine e perfezione, rendendo quindi possibile giustificare sul piano razionale gli atti rituali propri del culto teurgico, che proprio attraverso la manipolazione di oggetti materiali tendevano a realizzare l'unione dell'anima con gli dèi.

Anche Helmut Seng (“Ἰουγγες, συνοχεῖς, τελετάρχαι in den *Chaldaeischen Orakeln*”, pp. 293-316) mostra il complesso lavoro esegetico compiuto – questa volta da Proclo e Damascio – sugli *Oracoli caldaici* per coordinarne o, in questo caso, piuttosto per costruirne la dottrina in accordo con quella ch'essi ricavavano da Platone. Grazie a questo lavoro esegetico nozioni che nei frammenti e nelle testimonianze a noi pervenuti degli *Oracoli* sono appena accennate o appartengono solo a un contesto rituale sono state sistematizzate nel quadro di una ontologia complessa, che descrive il processo derivativo della realtà intelligibili dai principi e il movimento di ascesa dell'anima verso di essi.

Un problema di metodo nello studio del modo in cui i filosofi tardo-antichi hanno integrato filosofia e religione è affrontato nel saggio di Ilinca Tanaseanu-Döbler (“Damaskios gegen Proklos

¹⁰ Cf. Procl., *In Tim.*, I, pp. 382.12-383.1 Diehl (= Iambl., *In Tim.* fr. 37 Dillon).

¹¹ Procl., *In Tim.*, I, p. 386.8-13 Diehl (= Iambl., *In Tim.* fr. 38 Dillon); cf. anche *De Myst.* VIII 3.

¹² Ioan. Lyd., *De Mens.* (?) IV 159: ἄχρονον δὲ αὐτὴν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀναρχον, γεννητὴν δὲ ὅμως καὶ αἰτιατὴν; nella traduzione che si legge a p. 271 c'è un refuso: “Senza tempo è la materia, ma non senza principio, *benché* generata e causata”; al posto di “*benché*” si dovrebbe leggere “*bensì*”.

zum ersten Prinzip: Lehrkontroversen und die Grenzen philosophischer ‘Orthodoxie’ und ‘Häresie’ im späten Neuplatonismus”, pp. 357-402). In esso l’autrice esamina la pertinenza di una coppia di concetti – quelli di ‘ortodossia’ ed ‘eresia’ – che sono stati elaborati nel loro significato attuale in seno alla tradizione teologica cristiana e che recentemente sono stati utilizzati da Polymnia Athanassiadi per descrivere l’evoluzione complessiva del platonismo tra II e VI secolo. Il processo di costruzione di una ortodossia platonica sarebbe legato, secondo la Athanassiadi, alla definizione di un corpus di scritture normative, alle discussioni concernenti i criteri per la loro interpretazione corretta e alla dura polemica dei platonici tardi nei confronti dei sostenitori di tesi da loro considerate devianti.¹³

Tanaseanu-Döbler esamina la consistenza di questa impostazione considerando in particolare il progetto filosofico di Damascio e la sua polemica contro Proclo a proposito della dottrina del primo principio. L’autrice critica l’uso della nozione di “ortodossia-eresia” in questo contesto, perché essa include, nell’uso che ne fa la tradizione teologica cristiana, non solo il dibattito intorno all’interpretazione corretta e perciò veritiera di testi autorevoli, ma anche l’attribuzione di un rilievo soteriologico decisivo al discernimento tra tesi vere e false, tale che l’adesione a una prospettiva dottrinale giudicata falsa comporta anche l’esclusione dalla comunità dei salvati. Applicare questo modo di intendere i conflitti identitari alle discussioni di scuola che oppongono i filosofi platonici appare una forzatura problematica.

Mettendo a confronto la forma letteraria, il linguaggio e le tesi principali sostenute da Damascio nel *De Principiis* e da Proclo sia nella *Elementatio theologica* che nella *Theologia Platonica*, Tanaseanu-Döbler mostra come il primo si distanzi dal secondo, tra l’altro, per la forma zetetica con la quale espone la propria dottrina e per la preferenza accordata all’interpretazione del *Parmenide* data da Giamblico, che invece Proclo criticava. Lo studio evidenzia quale grande disparità dottrinale anche su questioni centrali potesse esserci tra filosofi inseriti nella medesima tradizione e accomunati dai medesimi presupposti metafisici. La polemica dottrinale non comportava, tuttavia, nel platonismo di età imperiale alcuna procedura di esclusione, alcun anatematismo inflitto ai portatori di tesi reputate incompatibili con una verità salvifica. Sicché le categorie teologiche di ‘ortodossia’ ed ‘eresia’ si rivelano fuorvianti e inadeguate a dare conto del dibattito scolastico tra platonici.

Gli ultimi due contributi da presentare considerano da punti di vista complementari il problema del rapporto tra filosofi platonici e ambiente cristiano fra V e VI secolo. Oliver Schelske (“Neuplatonische Identität in literarischer Form: Die Orpheus-Figur zwischen christlichem und paganem Anspruch”, pp. 317-33) muove dal presupposto che di un’identità collettiva si può parlare soltanto là dove esistano punti di riferimento e d’identificazione comuni e percepiti come normativi. Nel caso di una comune identità ellenica, un elemento costruttivo essenziale è rappresentato dal patrimonio mitologico. Non è casuale, infatti, che proprio sul tema del modo in cui questo patrimonio dovesse essere valutato e interpretato si sia svolto per alcuni secoli un dibattito acceso tra intellettuali cristiani e pagani.

Un esempio dell’importanza del patrimonio mitico per l’identità ellenica e delle diverse modalità di appropriazione che ne sono state realizzate in epoca tardo-antica è offerto dalla figura di Orfeo: figura centrale e immagine di una vita autenticamente filosofica per i platonici pagani, Orfeo ha invece avuto un significato ambivalente presso gli autori cristiani, che ne enfatizzarono o l’opposizione nei confronti del Cristo o il significato positivo di suo precorritore e immagine.¹⁴ Schelske mostra

¹³ Cf. P. Athanassiadi, *La lutte pour l’orthodoxie dans le platonisme tardif. De Numénius à Damascius*, Vrin, Paris 2006 (L’âne d’or, 25); per una critica di questa lettura del platonismo di età imperiale cf. anche R. Chiaradonna, “Tolleranza religiosa e neoplatonismo politico tra III e IV secolo”, in *Tolleranza religiosa in età tardoantica. IV-V secolo*, a cura di A. Marcone, U. Roberto, I. Tantillo, Edizioni Università di Cassino, Cassino 2014, pp. 37-79.

¹⁴ Cf. per le due posizioni Clem. Alex., *Protr.* I 1, 1; 7, 3; e Lact., *Div. inst.* I 5, 4.

come proprio la preoccupazione di sottrarre Orfeo all'una o all'altra forma di manipolazione da parte dei cristiani, proponendone invece un'interpretazione in chiave neoplatonica, abbia guidato la composizione degli *Orphei Argonautica*, un poema in esametri risalente al V secolo.

Il contributo di Rainer Thiel ("Die Transformation der Theurgie im christlichen Alexandria des 6. Jahrhunderts nach Christus", pp. 403-18) conclude il volume, proponendo un esame complessivo del modo diverso in cui i platonici di Alessandria e di Atene presero posizione nei confronti del cristianesimo, ormai dominante. Contro la tesi di una anche solo formale adesione di Ammonio al cristianesimo, al tempo in cui fu patriarca di Alessandria Pietro Mongo (477-490)¹⁵, l'autore sottolinea che la testimonianza del dialogo polemico di Zaccaria Scolastico (~ 465-553), intitolato appunto *Ammonio*, si può intendere correttamente solo ammettendo che Ammonio fosse rimasto legato alla religione tradizionale. Resta, però, significativa la presenza tra gli uditori di Ammonio ad Alessandria anche di cristiani, frutto, secondo l'autore, di una scelta di compromesso da parte di Ammonio, che ha garantito all'insegnamento dei platonici alessandrini una sopravvivenza di circa un secolo più lunga rispetto ai loro colleghi ateniesi.

Thiel ritiene che fossero tre gli ambiti dottrinali nei quali l'insegnamento tradizionale dei filosofi platonici conteneva tesi che potevano suscitare reazioni polemiche da parte di un uditorio composto in parte da cristiani: la questione della creazione o dell'eternità del mondo; la giustificazione filosofica della prassi culturale tradizionale; la pratica della teurgia. È proprio in relazione al terzo punto che lo studioso coglie in Ammonio un atteggiamento cauto, finalizzato a smorzare il conflitto con i cristiani.

Una delle definizioni della filosofia offerte da Ammonio all'inizio del proprio commento all'*Isagoge* di Porfirio (p. 3.8-9 Busse) è basata su *Theaet.* 176 A-B: la filosofia è *ὁμολωσις θεῶν*. Il commento che segue questa definizione (p. 3.9-24 Busse) spiega, da una parte, che il filosofo, come un dio, esercita una duplice attività, perché conosce ogni cosa e si prende cura delle realtà che gli sono sottoposte; dall'altra precisa che il modo in cui questa duplice attività può essere realizzata da un uomo è diverso dal modo in cui l'esercitano gli dèi. Marino, invece, nella *Vita Procli* (28), descrivendo il modo in cui Proclo esercitava le virtù teurgiche, scriveva che il filosofo "praticava la provvidenza nei confronti delle realtà inferiori in una maniera più divina rispetto al modo delle virtù civili".

Thiel precisa che si tratta solo di indizi; essi, tuttavia, sembrano indicare in modo persuasivo una strategia da parte di Ammonio, che avrebbe consapevolmente attenuato la pretesa di realizzare mediante la pratica delle virtù teurgiche la divinizzazione del filosofo, evitando in questo modo di entrare apertamente in conflitto con l'antropologia dei cristiani.

Pur nella varietà degli autori e dei temi che vi sono trattati, dalla lettura di questa raccolta emerge un quadro nitido del modo in cui tra III e VI secolo i platonici hanno praticato la filosofia: da una parte, essi hanno incluso nel platonismo un *corpus* di scritti e dottrine provenienti da ambienti religiosi e pratiche culturali che solo con difficoltà si lasciano integrare in un sistema coerente (infatti, da Plotino a Damascio il confronto con queste fonti ha dato luogo a una notevole varietà di soluzioni filosofiche diverse); dall'altra, tale integrazione è stata compiuta dai platonici mediante uno sforzo di rigorizzazione e razionalizzazione dei materiali provenienti da fonti di tipo religioso-culturale. Questo tratto caratterizza propriamente il discorso filosofico tardo-antico, anche quando si rivolge a contenuti e a preoccupazioni affini a quelli che si riscontrano in altri tipi di letteratura (i trattati gnostici di Nag Hammadi, la letteratura oracolare ...) che, pur accogliendo a loro volta numerosi temi dalla tradizione platonica, non possono essere considerati filosofici in senso proprio.

Marco Zambon

¹⁵ Essa si fonda su un passo della *Vita Isidori* di Damascio (fr. 316 Zintzen = fr. 118 B Athanassiadi), in cui si rimprovera ad Ammonio di aver concluso per amore di vantaggi personali degli accordi col patriarca cristiano.

Heidi Marx-Wolf, *Spiritual Taxonomies and Ritual Authority. Platonists, Priests, and Gnostics in the Third Century C.E.*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2016 (Divinations. Rereading Late Ancient Religion), XI + 200 pp.

1. Tesi e struttura del volume

Heidi Marx-Wolf inizia questo libro scrivendo che esso riguarda “a conversation that took place about spirits, both good and malign” (p. 1); essa coinvolse, tra la fine del II e il corso del III secolo, intellettuali a vario titolo legati alla tradizione platonica: gli autori di alcuni dei testi di Nag Hammadi, gli autori dei papiri magici greci rinvenuti in Egitto, ma soprattutto Origene, Porfirio, Giamblico e, in misura minore, Plotino.

Ciò che accomuna questi personaggi – che le consuetudini accademiche assegnano a livelli di cultura diversi (“platonismo dei professori” e *underworld* platonico),¹ a campi religiosi diversi (cristianesimo, paganesimo) e, perciò, anche a discipline diverse (storia delle religioni, del cristianesimo, della filosofia) – è l’impegno nel produrre “systematic discourses that ordered the realm of spirits in increasingly more hierarchical ways” (p. 1), tentando di imporre un ordine ontologico ed etico stabile al mobile e ambivalente mondo delle realtà divine intermedie familiari ai loro contemporanei; l’autrice parla a questo proposito di “tassonomie spirituali”.

L’autrice intende dimostrare che questo sforzo da parte dei filosofi platonici non è stato un esercizio accademico, ma l’espressione di una strategia tesa a opporre alle critiche da parte cristiana un universo religioso ordinato e razionalizzato e ad affermare, in concorrenza con altri soggetti, la propria autorità nel campo sacrale. Caratteristica dei filosofi del III secolo è, infatti, la tendenza a presentarsi come specialisti in campo teologico e rituale e ad attribuirsi, perciò, una funzione eminente come mediatori di salvezza per gli altri uomini.

Nel perseguire l’obiettivo di costruire tassonomie spirituali, di attribuirsi un ruolo sacerdotale e una funzione salvifica, i filosofi si trovarono in competizione principalmente con altri due gruppi di intellettuali: gli esperti del sacro legati a culti locali e tradizionali (soprattutto egiziani), per esempio quelli che produssero i cosiddetti “papiri magici greci”, e gli gnostici. Diversamente da quanto spesso si pensa, però, le relazioni e le somiglianze tra i membri di questi gruppi erano strette e nascevano dalla partecipazione a una tradizione culturale comune.

La diversa affiliazione religiosa non costituiva per loro un ostacolo nello scambio e nella condivisione di dottrine: solo nel corso del IV secolo, infatti, i confini tra identità religiose differenti si irrigidirono; ma “third-century intellectuals, including Platonists, ‘Gnostics’, Manichaeans, Hermetists and Chaldaeans, wrote and thought using a common cultural coin in answer to a common set of questions and concerns about divinity” (p. 5).

L’autrice mette così al centro della propria ricerca l’attenzione a due aspetti importanti del contesto culturale e religioso del III secolo: la competizione tra gruppi di intellettuali per conquistare una posizione dominante nell’interpretare e orientare l’esperienza dei loro contemporanei e, allo stesso tempo, l’esistenza di un terreno comune sul quale questi gruppi si muovevano. Questo terreno comune

¹ Di un “professoraler Mitteleplatonismus” parla H. Dörrie in *Die Frage nach dem Transzendenten im Mittelplatonismus*, in *Les sources de Plotin. Dix exposés et discussions*. Vandoeuves-Genève 21-29 août 1957, Genève, Fondation Hardt, 1960 (Entretiens sur l’antiquité classique, 5), pp. 191-223; *Discussion* pp. 224-41, qui p. 229; anche in Id., *Platonica minora*, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, München 1976 (Studia et testimonia antiqua, 8), pp. 211-28. Di un “Platonic underworld” parla J. Dillon a proposito della letteratura gnostica, ermetica, oracolare in J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists. A Study of Platonism 80 b.c. to A.D. 220*, Duckworth, London 1977 [nuova ed. 1996].

non era dato soltanto da una cultura filosofico-letteraria condivisa nelle sue linee fondamentali da tutte le élites sociali dell'Impero, ma anche dal fatto che, nel costruire uno schema esplicativo della struttura del mondo degli esseri divini, gli intellettuali si dovevano confrontare con un tessuto preesistente di tradizioni mitiche e rituali di tipo più popolare che non potevano essere ignorate.

Il volume è diviso in quattro capitoli: il primo, esaminando la dottrina demonologica di Origene, Porfirio e Giamblico, mostra le strette analogie esistenti tra autori che, pure, appartenevano a campi contrapposti per affiliazione religiosa o per interpretazione del platonismo. Il secondo capitolo è dedicato a una presentazione delle "tassonomie" spirituali elaborate da Origene, Porfirio e Giamblico e mostra come i tre autori abbiano tentato di includere nella struttura teorica delle rispettive demonologie le tradizioni religiose e rituali popolari, realizzando, anche a costo di una minore consistenza logica del proprio edificio dottrinale, intersezioni con ambienti sociali distinti dal loro.

Il terzo e quarto capitolo indagano le ragioni per le quali gli autori considerati si impegnarono nella costruzione di queste complesse tassonomie del mondo divino. Il terzo esamina le relazioni tra alcuni scritti della biblioteca gnostica di Nag Hammadi (in particolare *Apocrifo di Giovanni e Zostriano*) e d'altro lato Origene, Plotino e Porfirio, mostrando che non solo essi hanno in comune problemi e riferimenti dottrinali, ma che è anche possibile riconoscere un influsso esercitato dagli scritti gnostici sui filosofi menzionati, i quali avrebbero sviluppato le proprie cosmologie e tassonomie spirituali in risposta a quelle proposte dagli autori degli scritti di Nag Hammadi.

Il quarto capitolo affronta la commistione che autori come Origene, Porfirio e Giamblico hanno attuato tra filosofia e funzione sacerdotale. L'adozione da parte loro di uno status sacerdotale è stata funzionale alla competizione che essi instaurarono – soprattutto nel contesto delle scuole filosofiche delle grandi città dell'Impero – con figure sacerdotali tradizionali e con gli gnostici, anch'essi in vari gradi familiari con la cultura filosofica contemporanea.

Vorrei qui di seguito approfondire la discussione su alcuni dei temi principali del saggio.

2. La questione di Origene e Porfirio

Un primo punto che mi sembra meritevole di discussione riguarda il metodo e i destinatari del volume e investe, credo, non tanto le scelte individuali dell'autrice, quanto il problema di come si debba scrivere oggi un saggio destinato a un pubblico accademico. In questo libro, infatti, la brevità, la rinuncia a un pesante apparato di note, la chiarezza nella presentazione delle tesi – che sono indubbiamente dei pregi – mi sembrano in vari casi realizzate a spese di una discussione adeguata delle fonti e dei problemi che esse pongono e mediante una selezione unilaterale nella letteratura scientifica.² Inoltre, alcune conclusioni che si potrebbero argomentare anche diversamente sono fondate ricorrendo a ipotesi che, nel migliore dei casi, possono essere considerate solo probabili. È il caso, per esempio, del rapporto di Porfirio con Origene.

Da ormai più di tre secoli e mezzo esiste tra gli studiosi un dibattito circa le relazioni che univano tra loro i principali rappresentanti della cultura filosofica del III secolo; il perno è costituito dal problema se l'Origene menzionato da Porfirio e Longino nella *Vita Plotini* (*VP*), autore di due soli scritti, che fu condiscipolo di Plotino presso Ammonio Sacca e maestro di Longino (ed è nominato anche nel *Commento al Timeo* di Proclo), sia identico al prolifico scrittore cristiano contro il quale Porfirio polemizzava nel *Contra Christianos* e del quale Eusebio scrisse una biografia apologetica nel

² Nella bibliografia alla fine del volume i contributi scritti in una lingua diversa dall'inglese sono meno del 10% e mi colpisce l'assenza di nomi come quelli di A.J. Festugière o di P. Hadot, che, pure, sui temi trattati nel volume hanno dato contributi importanti. Cf. anche sotto, nota 39.

VI libro della *Storia ecclesiastica*. A questo problema si aggiungono la questione dell'identità e della dottrina di Ammonio Sacca, la questione se Porfirio sia stato discepolo dell'Origene cristiano e se Giamblico sia stato allievo di Porfirio.³

L'autrice assume per vera l'ipotesi dell'identità.⁴ Così, per esempio, nel I capitolo, dopo aver mostrato le analogie che si possono constatare tra la demonologia di Porfirio e quella di Origene e di altri autori cristiani,⁵ la spiega ipotizzando che lo scritto di Origene *Sui demoni* sia stato la fonte della dottrina porfiriana.

A questa conclusione giunge attraverso due passaggi: nel primo segue H. Lewy.⁶ Egli osservava che l'interpretazione allegorica delle diverse classi dei cittadini di Atene (*Tim.* 24 A - B), attribuita a Porfirio nel *Commento al Timeo* di Proclo (p. 152.10-28 Diehl), coincide con la classificazione dei demoni esposta da Porfirio in *De Abstinencia* II 37-38 e da lui attribuita a "certi platonici" (II 36, 6). Siccome la descrizione dell'antico ordinamento di Atene rientra nella narrazione della lotta tra Atene e Atlantide, a proposito della quale Proclo scrive che Porfirio ne attingeva l'interpretazione allegorica da Origene e Numenio (p. 77.6-24 Diehl), Lewy concludeva che Origene – più precisamente il suo trattato *Sui demoni* – fosse la fonte anche della demonologia esposta nel *De Abstinencia*.

Il secondo passo è l'identificazione dell'Origene citato da Proclo con l'Origene cristiano (del quale Porfirio sarebbe stato anche discepolo per un certo tempo), al quale, dunque, è attribuita la composizione del trattato *Sui demoni e la classificazione dei demoni* esposta da Porfirio in *De Abstinencia* II 37-38.⁷

Questa ricostruzione dell'identità di Origene e dei suoi rapporti con la scuola di Ammonio e con Porfirio è ipotetica e controversa, come l'autrice sa,⁸ poiché non possiamo considerare fatti accertati né che Porfirio nel *De Abstinencia* dipendesse precisamente dal perduto trattato di Origene *Sui*

³ Cf. Porph., *VP*, 3, 24-32; 20.9-47 (Origene e Plotino furono allievi di Ammonio Sacca; Origene autore del trattato *Sui demoni* e maestro di Longino); Procl., *In Tim.* I, pp. 76.30-77.3 Diehl (la lotta tra Atene e Atlantide, descritta da Platone in *Tim.* 24 C-25 D, è interpretata da Origene come immagine della lotta tra demoni buoni e malvagi); Eus., *HE VI* 9, 5 = Porph. *C. Christ.* fr. 39 Harnack = 6F Becker (Porfirio da ragazzo conobbe Origene: [ἀνήρ] ὃ κατὰ κομῆν νέος ὢν ἐντετύχησα). A p. 121 e 142, nota 57, l'autrice completa la discendenza filosofica di Ammonio aggiungendo che Giamblico fu allievo di Porfirio per qualche tempo. Quanto ad Ammonio, l'autrice (pp. 73, 142 n. 57) assume le conclusioni di E. DePalma Digeser, *A Threat to Public Piety. Christians, Platonists, and the Great Persecution*, Cornell U.P., Ithaca N.Y. - London 2012, pp. 23-48: Ammonio era un cristiano, interessato al "potenziale ieratico della filosofia" e all'armonizzazione di Platone e Aristotele. Per una ricostruzione complessiva del dibattito su questi punti: M. Zambon, "Porfirio e Origene: uno *status quaestionis*", in S. Morlet (éd.), *Le traité de Porphyre contre les chrétiens. Un siècle de recherches, nouvelles questions*. Actes du Colloque international organisé les 8-9 septembre 2009 à l'Université Paris IV-Sorbonne, Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, Paris 2011 (Collection des Études Augustiniennes, 190), pp. 107-64; C. D'Ancona, "Plotin", in R. Goulet (éd.), *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, V.1, de Paccius à Plotin, CNRS-Editions, Paris 2012, pp. 885-1068, qui 975-82.

⁴ L'autrice accoglie le conclusioni di P.F. Beatrice, "Porphyry's Judgment on Origen", in R. Daly (ed.), *Origeniana Quinta. Historica, Text and Method, Biblica, Philosophica, Theologica, Origenism and Later Developments*. Papers of the 5th International Origen Congress (Boston College, 14-18 August 1989), Leuven U.P.-Peeters, Leuven 1992, pp. 351-67 (Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologarum Lovaniensium, 105); Th. Böhm, "Origenes Theologe und (Neu-)Platoniker? Oder: wem soll man misstrauen, Eusebius oder Porphyrius?", *Adamantius* 8 (2002), pp. 7-23; E. DePalma Digeser, *A Threat to Public Piety. Christians, Platonists, and the Great Persecution*, Cornell U.P., Ithaca-London 2012.

⁵ Orig., *CC VII* 64; *Exhort. mart.* 45; *Min. Fel., Oct.*, 27, 2; *Ps.-Clem., Hom.* IX 10; e Porph., *Phil. orac.* 326 F Smith = Eus., *PE*, IV 22, 15-23, 6; *De Abst.* II 40, 1-5.

⁶ H. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy. Mysticism Magic and Platonism in the Later Roman Empire*, nouvelle éd. par M. Tardieu, Études Augustiniennes, Paris 1978, pp. 497-508 [nuova ed. 2011], indica il trattato *Sui demoni* di Origene (considerato un filosofo neoplatonico distinto dal cristiano) la fonte della dottrina demonologica svolta da Porfirio in *De Abst.* II 37-43.

⁷ Cf. anche, Beatrice, "Porphyry's Judgment" (cit. n. 4), p. 367, che concorda con Lewy, ma identifica l'autore del trattato con l'Origene cristiano.

⁸ Cf. p. 142, nota 58.

demoni, né che l'Origene in questione fosse il teologo cristiano, né che Porfirio ne sia stato discepolo. Ciò non significa che questa ricostruzione non possa essere vera, ma andrebbe almeno menzionata qui anche l'altra possibilità, che a me pare più semplice, cioè che siano stati i teologi cristiani – incluso Origene – a elaborare la propria dottrina demonologica attingendo a un patrimonio di idee diffuso nelle scuole di filosofia platonica e nelle convinzioni popolari dei loro contemporanei.

Il modo in cui Porfirio descrive la natura e l'azione dei demoni malvagi – dotati di un corpo fatto di pneuma e perciò passibili, i demoni, quando si identificano con il proprio corpo e con le sue passioni, diventano malvagi, ingannano e corrompono gli uomini, dai quali sollecitano offerte cruenti di cui si nutrono – è del tutto simile, per esempio, al modo in cui, nell'ultimo quarto del II secolo, ne parlava anche il filosofo platonico Celso:

Bisogna, forse credere agli uomini sapienti, i quali affermano che la maggior parte dei demoni terrestri, completamente assorbiti nel divenire, inchiodati al sangue e al fumo [dei sacrifici], legati da incantesimi e da altre cose simili non potrebbero nulla di più che curare il corpo [...].⁹

Non mi sembra dimostrato, insomma, che Porfirio avesse bisogno di leggere Origene o altri autori cristiani per formulare le proprie tesi circa i demoni malvagi, la natura decaduta del culto sacrificale civico e la sua destinazione a nutrire demoni materiali. Per altro, non mi sembra che l'ipotesi di un unico Origene, ricordato come esegeta delle Bibbia dalle fonti cristiane e come esegeta del *Timeo* dai filosofi, sia necessaria a sostenere le tesi svolte dall'autrice in questo saggio.

Anche nel secondo capitolo, la ricostruzione della demonologia dell'Origene cristiano inizia con un paragrafo dedicato al trattato *Sui demoni* (pp. 40-2), ma lo schema di classificazione descritto da Porfirio nel *De Abstinentia* (che si presume derivi da quello scritto) non ha rapporto con la dottrina che Origene espone nel *De Principiis*, né l'autrice lo utilizza ricostruendola o tenta di coordinare le due prospettive, se non scrivendo che la diversa impostazione di queste demonologie si può spiegare ammettendo che, nel corso della propria attività scolare, l'alessandrino commentasse i dialoghi di Platone assumendone almeno in parte la prospettiva e il linguaggio, mentre in altri contesti adottava linguaggi diversi.

3. La questione di un orizzonte di pensiero comune

L'enfasi posta in questo saggio sul comune orizzonte culturale nel quale si è svolta l'attività "tassonomica" degli intellettuali del III secolo – considerata la presenza nel nostro mondo accademico di, comunque necessarie, distinzioni disciplinari e specializzazioni tematiche – è utile, perché sottolinea l'importanza di uno sguardo non settoriale sulle relazioni reciproche, sulla produzione letteraria di questi autori e sui presupposti sociali e culturali della loro attività. Su questo aspetto il libro offre considerazioni estremamente interessanti soprattutto nell'ultimo capitolo, nel quale emergono i legami che collegano i filosofi di scuola agli ambienti – a loro culturalmente affini – nei quali sono stati prodotti la letteratura cosiddetta "magica", ma anche quella ermetica, caldaica, gnostica.

Questa considerazione mi sembra valere in particolare per lo studio di quei testi, complessivamente raccolti sotto la denominazione di "letteratura gnostica" che, per ragioni linguistiche (gran parte di ciò che ne rimane è scritto in copto) e più ancora per il condizionamento esercitato dalla tradizione eresologica cristiana, sono stati a lungo marginalizzati nello studio della filosofia di età imperiale e del pensiero teologico cristiano, mentre ora si riconosce che hanno importanti punti in comune con la produzione letteraria di autori come Origene, Plotino, Porfirio e Giamblico.

⁹ Orig., CC, VIII 60; cf. Porph., *De Antro nymph.*, 11 e le note di commento a questo testo in Porfirio, *L'antro delle ninfe*, ed. L. Simonini, Adelphi, Milano 1986, pp. 129-39.

Precisare in che modo si è svolto ed è stato percepito dai protagonisti il gioco tra competizione reciproca e inclusione in un comune orizzonte di pensiero è, però, difficile e non sempre riesco a cogliere esattamente la posizione dell'autrice su questo tema.

L'esistenza di una competizione, nella quale i protagonisti si pongono “squarely in the center of things, and worked very hard to jostle their competitors out of the center and into the periphery” (p. 11) suppone, infatti, che vi siano – oltre a un linguaggio comune e a questioni e prospettive condivise – anche identità definite e contrapposte. Perciò mi lascia perplesso l'affermazione che:

the evidence indicates that religious identity, both Christian and non-Christian, was under construction in the third century. Hence, it is impossible to fit thinkers as complex as the ones under consideration here into clearly defined religious groups. This is because there is little evidence that such groups existed in the ways in which we tend to think of religious or ideological affiliation today (p. 4).

Che le affiliazioni religiose o ideologiche non fossero pensate nel III secolo al modo in cui le pensiamo oggi è chiaro ed è anche verissimo che nel III secolo gli elementi che definivano l'identità di un cristiano rispetto a un non cristiano (o quella di un membro della cosiddetta “grande chiesa” rispetto a un cristiano di diverso orientamento) non erano gli stessi che si determinarono in epoca post-nicena e oltre.

Ciò, non vuol dire, però, che, soprattutto tra gli intellettuali, non vi fosse la percezione di identità religiose diverse. Plotino sconcertava i propri allievi con affermazioni apparentemente irruguardose verso gli dèi;¹⁰ Porfirio e Giamblico erano in conflitto sul modo appropriato di coordinare la dottrina di Platone e la tradizione culturale greca,¹¹ ma il loro orizzonte religioso era omogeneo ed era un altro rispetto a quello nel quale si riconosceva Origene. E di questa diversità e opposizione gli uni e l'altro erano perfettamente e polemicamente consapevoli.¹² Resta vero che su questioni che non impegnavano direttamente la propria identità religiosa, questi personaggi potevano condividere tesi anche importanti, indipendentemente dal modo in cui si interpretano le influenze reciproche tra loro.

Trovo, però, problematica la conclusione che l'autrice trae al termine del primo capitolo:

This chapter has reviewed the position of a number of third-century Platonists on the ontological status of evil daemons [...]. It has demonstrated that it would be difficult to predict the precise positions of thinkers such as Origen, Porphyry, and Iamblichus based solely on what we might assume are their religious or ideological affiliations (p. 37).

Nell'introduzione si esprime in termini più espliciti:

the close similarities between Porphyry and Origen on evil spirits is [sic] only surprising if one assumes that religion and not social or educational milieu was the primary category that these Platonists used to identify themselves (p. 8).¹³

¹⁰ Porph., *VP*, 10.33-36.

¹¹ Al confronto tra le tesi di Porfirio e quelle di Giamblico a proposito del valore delle pratiche sacrificali tradizionali e della possibilità anche per le persone comuni di accedere a una reale purificazione dell'anima mediante queste pratiche sono dedicate le pp. 29-37.

¹² Non mi spiegherei, altrimenti, la letteratura polemica contro i cristiani prodotta tra la fine del II e i primi anni del IV secolo da filosofi platonici (come Celso, Plotino, Porfirio, Alessandro di Licopoli, Sossiano, Ierocle) e le confutazioni prodotte da intellettuali cristiani, in primo luogo il *Contra Celsum* di Origene; per non parlare della repressione violenta del cristianesimo o del manicheismo, intrapresa da vari imperatori fra III e IV secolo.

¹³ Cf. la medesima idea a p. 28: Porfirio e Origene condividono una stessa cultura e perciò è verosimile che Porfirio abbia adottato tesi cristiane circa il sacrificio di sangue. Molti studiosi moderni, invece, secondo l'autrice sono fuorviati

Mi sembra che da un fatto vero l'autrice, se non la fraintendo, abbia tratto conseguenze opinabili: le similitudini tra la demonologia di Origene e quella di Porfirio e Giamblico ci sono e dimostrano che l'uno e l'altro provenivano da un ambiente sociale e da una formazione culturale e filosofica simili, pur appartenendo a campi religiosi diversi. Non mi sembra, però, che questo faccia di loro, essendo l'uno un cristiano e gli altri difensori della tradizione greca, dei "soci improbabili" o "strani" ("unlikely / strange bedfellows"; pp. 14 e 37) o indichi che l'appartenenza religiosa avesse per loro un significato secondario rispetto alle comuni origini socio-culturali.

Significa soltanto che, nella prima metà del III secolo, una dottrina demonologica pienamente articolata non entrava nella definizione della specifica identità religiosa di un cristiano (come, per altro, non vi entra oggi) e, dunque, non costituiva un tema in cui la contrapposizione tra cristiani e gentili emergesse in modo vistoso.

La *regula fidei* cristiana insegnava, sí, l'esistenza di spiriti malvagi e buoni, ma lasciava alla ricerca di chi ne avesse la volontà e i mezzi il compito di sviluppare una dottrina a loro riguardo.¹⁴ Non c'è, pertanto, nulla di strano nel fatto che Origene abbia largamente attinto dalla tradizione platonica, in cui si era formato,¹⁵ gli elementi per articolare la propria dottrina demonologica e la propria angelologia. Proprio così, d'altra parte, si è attirato la violenta critica di Porfirio: questi riconosceva certamente in lui un greco per cultura ed educazione, ma lo accusava di aver svenduto la propria formazione ellenica, per metterla a servizio di miti stranieri, aderendo al cristianesimo.¹⁶ Non mi sembra, perciò, che il radicamento in una tradizione culturale comune abbia attenuato la consapevolezza di una distanza e la contrapposizione dell'uno all'altro sul terreno religioso.

Anche l'autrice, del resto, dichiara che mettere in luce lo scambio dialogico tra gli intellettuali e concentrarsi sui parallelismi concettuali esistenti tra loro in alcuni punti chiave non significa negare l'esistenza di importanti divergenze tra cristiani e non cristiani. Ciò che il suo lavoro ha di mira è mettere in discussione quello che chiama un "modello conflittuale" nella rappresentazione del rapporto tra cristiani e non cristiani, un modello che suppone identità chiaramente articolate, statiche e impermeabili agli scambi reciproci (p. 28). Questo modello è certamente inadeguato, ma non credo che considerare la religione una "categoria primaria che questi platonici usavano per identificare se stessi" implichi che lo si adotti e si pensino le relazioni tra cristiani, giudei, elleni, gnostici ecc. nei termini di "clear, impermeable, and inflexible boundaries between such groups" (p. 4).

dall'idea che le posizioni tendenzialmente assunte dai filosofi in questioni di teologia e di rito fossero determinate prima di tutto e soprattutto dalla loro identità religiosa.

¹⁴ Cf. Orig., *PA I, praef.* 6. 10: "De diabolo quoque et angelis eius contrariisque virtutibus ecclesiastica praedicatio docuit quoniam sint quidem haec, quae autem sint vel quomodo sint, non satis clare exposuit [...]. Est etiam illud in ecclesiastica praedicatione, esse angelos dei quosdam et virtutes bonas, qui ei ministrant ad salutem hominum consummandam; sed quando isti creati sint, vel quales aut quomodo sint, non satis in manifesto distinguitur". L'autrice cita e commenta questi passi a p. 43.

¹⁵ Cf. Eus., *HE*, VI 19, 8 (Porph., *C. Christ.* fr. 39 Harnack = 6F Becker): "Aveva familiare Platone; teneva sempre in mano gli scritti di Numenio, di Cronio, di Apollifane, di Longino, di Moderato, di Nicomaco e dei più distinti tra i pitagorici; si giovava dei libri dello stoico Cheremone e di Cornuto, dai quali apprese il metodo allegorico dei misteri greci, che poi applicò alle scritture dei giudei" (trad. Rinaldi).

¹⁶ Cf. Eus., *HE*, VI 19, 7 (Porph., *C. Christ.* fr. 39 Harnack = 6F Becker): "[...] Origene, al contrario, sebbene greco e cresciuto con cultura greca, devì verso una cocciutaggine barbarica. Pertanto guastò sé medesimo e la sua attitudine agli studi. La sua vita era quella di un cristiano e contraddiceva alle leggi; nella sua concezione del mondo e di Dio la pensava da greco e fece delle idee greche un sostrato a miti stranieri [...]" (trad. Rinaldi).

4. *Gnosticismo e filosofia*

Un fenomeno che pone in modo particolarmente interessante la questione circa la definizione di identità religiose e di pensiero distinte e conflittuali, eppure in stretta relazione reciproca e radicate in un terreno comune di fonti, problemi e metodi, è costituito, come si è detto, dallo gnosticismo (una categoria che l'autrice considera anacronistica e fuorviante), al quale è dedicato il terzo capitolo del libro. L'autrice persegue due obiettivi: mostrare che le scuole raccolte sotto la categoria eresiologicala di "gnosticismo" non sono deviazioni e corruzioni di un presunto cristianesimo originario; mostrare che la speculazione sviluppata in questi ambienti ha avuto un impatto profondo sul pensiero dei teologi cristiani della grande Chiesa (Origene anzitutto) e sui filosofi platonici (Plotino e Porfirio).

È chiaro che non si può assumere che all'interno delle chiese cristiane nel III secolo vi fossero "confini confessionali" definiti e chiaramente percepiti ed è perciò metodologicamente corretto il rifiuto di studiare il fenomeno gnostico come se esso costituisse una deviazione rispetto a un'ortodossia cristiana originaria (si tratta di un modello interpretativo che dipende dalla letteratura eresiologicala, ma non ha fondamento storico).

La letteratura prodotta dagli autori della biblioteca di Nag Hammadi non rappresenta, perciò, un *corpus* di testi che veicolano dottrine ereticali o marginali, ma è testimonianza di un lavoro teologico e filosofico del quale anche la speculazione di Origene e quella dei platonici non cristiani sono espressione e nel quale le influenze si sono esercitate in varie direzioni, visto che anche nel caso di prese di posizione polemiche contro tesi che si reputano errate ci si pone in qualche modo sotto l'influenza della propria controparte.

L'autrice ricorda giustamente l'ampio spazio che nell'opera di Origene ha la polemica antieretica e, dunque, la necessità di elaborare soluzioni alternative a quelle da lui reputate contrarie alla *regula fidei*, rispondendo, però, ai problemi posti dai suoi interlocutori e assumendone, almeno in parte, le categorie di pensiero e il linguaggio (pp. 76-8; 85-7). Altrettanto opportuna è la menzione della presenza alla scuola di Plotino di cristiani di orientamento gnostico, ai quali Plotino stesso, Amelio e Porfirio opposero confutazioni delle dottrine che reputavano in contrasto con un platonismo corretto. Nel farlo, essi dovettero approfondire questioni e assumere punti di vista omogenei a quelli dei loro interlocutori e questo certamente implica un'influenza esercitata dalle tesi gnostiche sullo sviluppo del platonismo plotiniano e porfiriano (pp. 79-85)¹⁷.

Più delicata mi pare, però, l'affermazione che testi come quelli della biblioteca di Nag Hammadi "are in fact central to our understanding of early Christian apologetic, Neoplatonic philosophy, and the production of spiritual taxonomies in late antiquity" (p. 73). Questo può valere per l'apologetica cristiana, ma mi chiedo se sia vero che, per avere una corretta comprensione del neoplatonismo, la conoscenza dei testi di Nag Hammadi sia d'importanza centrale.

L'autrice ritiene, infatti, che tutti i discepoli, diretti e indiretti, di Ammonio siano stati animati non solo da preoccupazioni polemiche contro gli gnostici, ma anche profondamente influenzati da loro¹⁸. Accoglie la tesi di J.M. Narbonne, secondo il quale il confronto con gli gnostici si estese lungo tutta la carriera e l'opera filosofica di Plotino¹⁹ e dà ampiamente conto delle tesi di J. Turner

¹⁷ Cf. Porph., *VP*. 16.

¹⁸ Cf. anche p. 40: "both Plotinus and Porphyry seemed to have adopted a number of insights from those Christian secretaries Porphyry calls 'Gnostics' who attended Plotinus's school at Rome".

¹⁹ J.-M. Narbonne, *Plotinus in Dialogue with the Gnostics*, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2011 (Studies in Platonism, Neoplatonism, and the Platonic Tradition, 11).

e M Zeke, che fanno dipendere temi centrali del pensiero plotiniano dalla dottrina e dalle pratiche rituali attestate in alcuni degli scritti di Nag Hammadi (il presupposto per una simile conclusione è che i trattati di Nag Hammadi come *Allogene* e *Zostriano*, nella redazione a noi nota, siano anteriori e non posteriori a Plotino).²⁰

Anche nel caso di Porfirio (pp. 93-8) l'autrice ritiene che l'insistenza con la quale egli meditò il problema del destino *post mortem* dell'anima umana dipenda dalla centralità di questo tema nel *Zostriano* e anche la sua polemica con Giamblico a proposito del ruolo dei riti nella purificazione dell'anima potrebbe ricondursi alla funzione loro assegnata da quello scritto. Di questo trattato Plotino aveva affidato a Porfirio la confutazione, per noi perduta; ma apparterrebbero a un insieme di scritti diretti ad affermare la posizione platonica contro le tesi gnostiche sul destino ultraterreno dell'anima umana anche il trattato *Su ciò che dipende da noi* (che, secondo J. Wilberding, coinciderebbe con il perduto commento di Porfirio alla *Repubblica* di Platone, di fatto limitato soltanto all'esegesi del mito di Er)²¹ e il trattato *De Styge*, entrambi giunti a noi in stato frammentario.

La materia è complessa e non può certo essere argomentata in modo esaustivo in poche pagine; mi sembra, tuttavia, che dall'evidenza di una serie di temi e riferimenti comuni e di rapporti di scuola documentati l'autrice passi troppo facilmente ad affermazioni di carattere generale circa l'influenza profonda e pervasiva che gli scritti di Nag Hammadi avrebbero avuto su Plotino e Porfirio, limitandosi a indicare gli studiosi sui quali si fonda e ad assumerne le conclusioni, che pure sono oggetto di discussioni e contestazioni (cf. p. 161, n. 35).

5. La questione della "tassonomia" e dei suoi scivolamenti

Il secondo capitolo descrive il modo in cui Origene, Porfirio e Giamblico hanno pensato gli esseri divini intermedi nel quadro complessivo della loro cosmologia e soteriologia. L'esame si concentra di proposito sugli esseri intermedi, perché negli studi essi sono stati oggetto di un'attenzione molto minore rispetto alle tesi filosofiche concernenti i primi principi.

L'autrice considera particolarmente significativi i luoghi in cui lo sforzo sistematico di questi autori in qualche modo fallisce e le distinzioni di ordine ontologico o etico da loro istituite tra le diverse categorie di esseri spirituali si confondono. Questo accade, anzitutto, perché i filosofi tentano di comprendere in uno schema esplicativo ordinato uno "spiritual landscape" (p. 39) preesistente, fatto di credenze e di riti "popolari". L'autrice offre alcuni esempi di questo sforzo di integrazione e razionalizzazione da parte dei filosofi.

Un caso è l'esegesi origeniana dell'episodio in cui una negromante, su richiesta del re Saul, evoca l'anima del profeta Samuele (1 Sam 28; cf. pp. 49-52). Il testo pone a Origene un doppio problema: è possibile che un demone abbia potere sull'anima di un profeta e la possa costringere a dare responsi? Inoltre, come può essere che l'anima di un profeta si trovi nell'Ade, un luogo destinato alla punizione dei peccatori? Origene spiega questo testo mostrando che Samuele svolgeva nell'Ade la stessa

²⁰ J.D. Turner, "Gnosticism and Platonism: The Platonizing Sethian Texts from Nag Hammadi in Their Relation to Later Platonic Literature", in R.T. Wallis - J. Bregman (ed.), *Neoplatonism and Gnosticism*, State University of New York Press, Albany NY 1992, pp. 425-59 (Studies in Neoplatonism: Ancient and Modern); Z. Mazur, "Unio Magica, Part I: On Magical Origins of Plotinus' Mysticism", *Dionysius* 21 (2003), pp. 23-52; Id., "Unio Magica, Part II: Plotinus, Theurgy and the Question of Ritual", *Dionysius* 22 (2004), pp. 29-56.

²¹ Cf. J. Wilberding, *Porphyry: To Gaurus on How Embryos Are Ensouled and on What Is in Our Power*, Bristol Classical Press, London 2011.

missione profetica che aveva svolto sulla terra, annunciando anche là il futuro avvento del liberatore, il Cristo²².

Un secondo esempio è dato dalla non chiara distinzione tra la sfera degli dèi dell'Olimpo e quella dei demoni, che emerge da alcuni testi di Porfirio (pp. 52-53): se in *De Abst.* II 37, 1-5 gli dèi del pantheon olimpico sono posti nel rango degli dèi visibili, in altri frammenti della *Philosophia ex oraculis* e del *Περὶ ἀγαλμάτων* sono loro attribuite funzioni che nel *De Abstinencia* sono proprie dei demoni buoni. Sicché non appare chiara la frontiera che segna il passaggio dalla sfera degli dèi a quella dei demoni.

Il caso di Giamblico è particolarmente eloquente (pp. 62-64): egli inserisce nella serie angeli-demoni-eroi anche gli arconti, ora tra gli angeli e i demoni, ora tra i demoni e gli eroi.²³ In realtà, gli arconti non hanno un ruolo preciso nella gerarchia degli esseri divini tracciata da Giamblico e non sembrano distinguersi in modo significativo dai demoni. La ragione della loro inclusione sembra essere il fatto che essi erano parte del cosmo spirituale dell'ambiente nel quale Giamblico viveva.

I filosofi, dunque, non hanno sviluppato i propri discorsi tassonomici in modo isolato e indipendente dal contesto sociale nel quale sono vissuti, bensì si sono sforzati di dare un senso alle credenze dei loro contemporanei. Essi perseguivano in questo modo l'obiettivo di affermarsi come autorità religiose anche presso quegli strati di popolazione che non avevano una cultura filosofica (p. 64).

Una seconda ragione – che l'autrice considera più importante – per spiegare “lo scivolamento, l'elisione e l'ambiguità” (p. 64) che si producono nelle tassonomie dei filosofi, facendo almeno in parte fallire il loro sforzo ordinatore, è costituito dalla dimensione materiale degli spiriti in questione: “the materiality of spirits, as conceived of in this period, accounts, in part, for some of the resistance encountered by Origen, Porphyry, and Iamblichus in their attempts to construct a totalizing perspective on the spiritual realm” (p. 39).

La materia, infatti, nella descrizione che ne offrono i platonici, non è una realtà inerte, ma è dotata di una vitalità propria, una capacità di attirare, sedurre e condizionare le realtà spirituali che a essa si associano. È questa, secondo l'autrice, la ragione che spiega come mai gli sforzi di Origene, Porfirio e Giamblico per “at imposing systematic and totalizing taxonomic structures» sulle cangianti realtà divine intermedie ‘go astray” (p. 68).

Anche in questo caso, mi chiedo se ai fatti che descrive l'autrice non applichi una spiegazione che oppone troppo rigidamente la tendenza al sistema e gli elementi che le resistono: mi chiedo, cioè, se l'indubbio sforzo sistematico messo in atto dai filosofi per dare conto delle realtà divine intermedie avesse davvero l'obiettivo di produrre classificazioni rigide e totalizzanti e se le incongruenze rilevate debbano perciò essere intese come il segno del fallimento di questo sforzo.

L'inadeguatezza di questa descrizione mi pare particolarmente evidente nel caso di Origene e, in misura minore, Porfirio. L'autrice ricorda che un movente importante per elaborare una dottrina articolata concernente gli esseri spirituali è stato per Origene il fatto ch'essa non esisteva in termini espliciti nel *depositum fidei* e che la varietà di opinioni riguardo a questa come ad altre questioni sollevava conflitti tra i cristiani.²⁴ È stato, dunque, per opporsi a concezioni errate (ch'egli attribuiva a Marcione, Valentino, Basilide) – secondo le quali esisterebbero nature diverse tra gli esseri razionali,

²² Cf. Origene. Eustazio. Gregorio di Nissa, *La maga di Endor*, a cura di M. Simonetti, Firenze, Nardini - Centro internazionale del libro, 1989 (Biblioteca patristica, 15), pp. 44-75.

²³ In realtà in *De Myst.* II (il libro nel quale Giamblico parla degli arconti) l'oscillazione è tra una serie demoni-eroi-arconti e una serie demoni-arconti-eroi.

²⁴ Orig., *PA*, I *praef.*; cf. sopra nota 14.

che dipendono da creatori differenti e determinano per gli individui destini diversi – che Origene ha costruito il proprio schema cosmologico e soteriologico (cf. *PA* II 8-10).

Intelletti creati tutti uguali, liberi e beati, usando più o meno malamente la propria libertà, si sono allontanati da Dio e hanno perciò bisogno di attraversare un percorso di cura e purificazione, adatto alla situazione di ciascuno, che li riporti alla condizione originaria. Da qui le differenze tra le creature razionali – angeli, uomini e demoni – che non sono ontologiche, ma qualitative, e non dipendono direttamente dal Creatore, ma dalle creature stesse.

Dopo aver descritto il processo di trasformazione al quale, secondo Origene, vanno incontro le creature razionali nel cosmo, l'autrice conclude:

[...] the differences between angelic, daemonic, and human souls are difficult to enforce in such instances. In other words, although Origen was involved in constructing a taxonomic edifice and a cosmological/teleological discourse into which he could emplot the souls of angels, humans, and evil daemons, in the end, the story he tells undermines any essential distinctions between these spi-ritual creatures at the ontological level (pp. 50-51).

È una conclusione vera, ma questo è esattamente ciò che Origene intendeva fare: non vi è da parte sua alcuna “difficoltà nel fissare differenze ontologiche” (p. 51), perché il suo obiettivo era appunto quello di smantellare schemi ontologici – ch'egli attribuiva ai propri avversari – che fissavano in nature determinate e in destini necessari le creature razionali. La fluidità che caratterizza il sistema origeniano non è un elemento che “mina” il suo sforzo sistematico, bensì è il modo preciso con il quale egli fonda la possibilità di un progresso per tutte le creature spirituali.

Trovo, inoltre, discutibile – se la comprendo correttamente – l'osservazione che:

although Origen endeavors to account for spiritual difference at the level of genus and species, the terms of his discourse allow for a rather alarming degree of mobility between various taxa, based, in large part, on the mutability of bodies at the level of material composition [...] (p. 66).²⁵

La mutabilità delle creature spirituali, che permette a Origene di ipotizzare anche per Satana il ritorno alla condizione di angelo luminoso, si riflette certamente nella loro costituzione corporea, ma non mi sembra si possa attribuire a Origene l'idea che essa dipenda appunto dalla natura fluida della materia. È il corpo a trasformarsi a mano a mano che avviene un progresso o un regresso nell'anima, non l'anima a essere determinata dalle caratteristiche della materia di cui è fatto il corpo.

Anche a proposito di Porfirio l'autrice osserva che egli ha una tendenza a organizzare secondo una prospettiva gerarchica gli esseri divini, ma “does not seem to have developed a single, consistent vision of the spiritual cosmos [...]. His thinking tends to be situational, flexible, and somewhat *ad hoc*” (p. 53). Se è così, le ambiguità e gli scivolamenti che si constatano nei suoi discorsi e nel passaggio dall'una all'altra opera (e dobbiamo ricordarci che molto di ciò che abbiamo consiste in frammenti), non avvengono malgrado le intenzioni del filosofo di costruire una tassonomia del tutto coerente, ma fanno parte del suo programma e del modo in cui egli si accosta alla riflessione intorno alle spirituali realtà intermedie.

²⁵ Cf. anche p. 69: “once primordial minds become embodied, their bodies, transformable as they may be, are essential to their existence, remediation, and salvation. But because matter itself is mutable, changeable, in constant flux, these bodies, and the nature of the souls that inhabit them, are not fixed and static”.

Per questo mi chiedo se, almeno nel caso di Origene e Porfirio, sia appropriato attribuire loro il progetto di costruire un “edificio tassonomico”, se questo è inteso nel senso di una struttura sistematica totalizzante e dai confini nettamente definiti.

6. *Filosofia e sacerdozio*

Un tratto che accomuna Origene, Porfirio e Giamblico – e che risale in parte ad autori come Plutarco e Numenio nel II secolo – è l’attribuzione al filosofo, insieme alla funzione tradizionale di guida o consigliere in campo politico, anche del ruolo di sacerdote. Ciascuno di questi autori, infatti, tende a declassare le forme tradizionali di sacerdozio a funzioni inferiori e complementari, mentre riserva al filosofo la capacità e il compito di rendere culto al dio supremo. Il quarto capitolo del saggio è dedicato a questo tema e pone la questione di come la funzione cultuale e sacerdotale del filosofo debba essere correttamente intesa.

In termini schematici, la questione si può porre in questi termini: il linguaggio cultuale e l’attribuzione al filosofo di una funzione sacerdotale corrispondeva effettivamente per i filosofi platonici del III secolo a un’attività rituale, che essi consideravano parte integrante della propria vita filosofica, o aveva un significato metaforico? L’autrice ritiene che la rivendicazione di un ruolo sacerdotale da parte di Origene, Porfirio e Giamblico non fosse merely symbolic or metaphoric. Each of them claimed to know about proper and improper ritual, about sacrifices, and about salvific actions” (p. 122). Questa affermazione mi sembra vera per tutti e tre i filosofi solo a patto di precisarne il contenuto e di differenziarlo secondo le prospettive di ciascuno. Presento qualche considerazione sul caso di Origene e di Porfirio, che mi paiono sollevare problemi d’interpretazione maggiori.

Vi è nel modo in cui Origene parla del culto e del sacerdozio una notevole ambivalenza: assai più del culto e del sacerdozio visibile, egli considerava decisivi per il cristiano la mediazione sacerdotale del Cristo (CC VIII 13. 36-37; *Orat.* XV 4), della quale ogni battezzato è partecipe (*HLv* IX 1), e la pratica del culto “in spirito e verità” (Gv 4, 23-24), fatto non di riti particolari, ma di una vita interamente dedicata a Dio (CC VIII 23). In questa prospettiva – come giustamente nota l’autrice (pp. 105-7) – reinterpretava in senso etico e spirituale tutte le prescrizioni rituali del *Levitico* e dei *Numeri* (p.e. *HLv* II 2).

Allo stesso tempo, egli era un presbitero e svolgeva la propria predicazione nel quadro di assemblee liturgiche, raccomandava che i cristiani vi partecipassero con frequenza e attenzione (HGn X 1-3; XI 3; *HEx* XII 2; *HLv* IX 5); riteneva che il culto visibile fosse necessario soprattutto ai cristiani semplici, ma sosteneva che tutti sulla terra, anche i perfetti, vivono nella dimensione del parziale e dell’incompiuto e, dunque, hanno bisogno di compiere anche gli atti del culto esterno (HNm XXIII 11; *CIob* XIII 111-112; *CRm* X 10). Conservava, però, nei confronti della materialità del culto rituale e dei ministri a esso preposti, una riserva, per non dire un disagio: esso appare nella severità delle richieste etiche rivolte ai ministri (*HLv* VI 6); nella distinzione tra la festa perpetua, in cui vive il cristiano perfetto, e la celebrazione di giorni stabiliti, che sono come “esempi sensibili” per i cristiani incipienti (CC VIII 22-23); infine, nell’insistenza con la quale dichiarava che il sacerdozio autentico si attua nella consacrazione alla parola divina (*HLv* IV 6; *HJos* VII 2; *CIob* I 10-11).

Analoga è la concezione del sacerdozio del filosofo espressa da Porfirio: la funzione sacerdotale del filosofo si attua non mediante il compimento di riti determinati o la recitazione di formule, bensì in un silenzio libero dalla contaminazione delle passioni e offrendo in sacrificio al dio supremo l’elevazione dell’anima e la conformazione a lui (*De Abst.* II 34, 2-3; 43.3; *Ad Aneb.* I 3, p. 5.4-7 Sodano). Esiterei, pertanto, a definire Porfirio un “esperto di riti” nel senso in cui lo era Giamblico (p. 109; cf. *De Myst.* V 20-21).

L'autrice, infatti, attribuisce anche a Porfirio, come a Giamblico, l'idea che parte dell'attività del filosofo sia la realizzazione di immagini cultuali degli dèi e, in particolare, del dio supremo.²⁶ Riferendosi a *De Abst.* II 49, 3 scrive:

Porphyry himself made explicit reference to the practice of making cult statues when he discussed the philosopher as priest in *On Abstinence*. He notes that the “priest of the god who rules all” was an expert in the making of this god’s cult image (p. 111).

L'autrice accoglie qui il punto di vista di T. Krulak circa l'interpretazione data da Porfirio alle immagini degli dèi: secondo questo autore, Porfirio, nel *Περὶ ἀγαλμάτων*, ne proponeva una lettura allegorica, considerandole come segni fisici di significati intelligibili – al modo in cui le parole scritte sono la traccia fisica di concetti, comprensibili solo a chi sappia leggere –, non per ovviare all'imbarazzo causato dall'uso di rappresentare antropomorficamente le divinità, bensì perché nutriva fiducia nella capacità delle statue rituali di rivelare la verità sugli dèi. Sarebbe stato appunto il filosofo, in quanto conoscitore del mondo intelligibile, colui al quale, secondo Porfirio, spettava la realizzazione di statue degli dèi capaci di comunicarne in modo veritiero le qualità.²⁷

Due punti qui mi riescono problematici: uno è che questa valutazione della capacità delle immagini di comunicare la verità sugli dèi mi sembra contraddire altre affermazioni di Porfirio circa la necessità di abbandonare la *φαντασία*, quindi la produzione di immagini mentali, se si vuole accedere alla conoscenza delle realtà intelligibili. L'altro punto è che il passo del *De Abstinencia* citato dall'autrice a proposito della produzione di immagini del dio supremo non mi sembra riferirsi a immagini fisiche, ma alla conformazione dell'intelletto del filosofo al dio.

Quanto al primo punto, Porfirio, nelle *Sentenze*, invita a non attribuire agli incorporei – ricorrendo all'immaginazione o all'opinione – proprietà che sono soltanto dei corpi e precisa che, fino a che ci si trova sotto il dominio della facoltà immaginativa, è assai difficile pervenire alla conoscenza, anche solo parziale, degli intelligibili.²⁸ In un altro passo egli chiarisce quest'idea, affermando che, se si attribuiscono luogo e relazione a una realtà intelligibile, ciò che ne risulta non è tanto una diminuzione nello statuto dell'oggetto intelligibile, quanto un allontanamento da esso, perché rappresentarsi un intelligibile in termini di spazio e relazione vuol dire coprirne come con un velo la realtà e impedisce di averne conoscenza vera.²⁹ Ciò accade perché la facoltà di farsi immagini è proiettata verso l'esterno, mentre l'attività dell'intelletto si esercita con un atto di concentrazione su di sé e di contemplazione di se stesso.³⁰

Se la *φαντασία* comporta un movimento opposto a quello richiesto per un atto d'intellezione, posso pensare che per Porfirio la produzione di immagini fisiche degli dèi intelligibili avesse un valore positivo e un'utilità soltanto come propedeutica a una loro apprensione più adeguata e che lo sforzo di intrecciare tra loro la dottrina platonica circa le realtà formali e le tradizionali narrazioni mitiche sugli dèi, da lui compiuto, secondo Eusebio, nel *Περὶ ἀγαλμάτων*³¹ avesse uno scopo pedagogico e

²⁶ Scrive, infatti, a p. 112: “vediamo quanto Porfirio e Giamblico fossero in realtà vicini nella loro comprensione dei filosofi come sacerdoti e teurghi”.

²⁷ Cf. pp. 111; 169 n. 59, dove cita T. Krulak, “Invisible Things on Visible Forms”. Pedagogy and Anagogy in Porphyry's *Περὶ ἀγαλμάτων*, *Journal of Late Antiquity* 4 (2011), pp. 343-64.

²⁸ Porph., *Sent.* 33, p. 37.6-13 Lamberz = p. 346.31-38 Brisson *et al.*

²⁹ Porph., *Sent.* 40, pp. 47.9-48.7 Lamberz = p. 360.13-362.14 Brisson *et al.*

³⁰ Porph., *Sent.* 43, p. 55.6-13 Lamberz = p. 372.33-47 Brisson *et al.*

³¹ Eus., *PE* III 6, 7-7, 1 = Porph. 351 F Smith.

apologetico, ma non nascesse dalla convinzione che il filosofo avesse necessità o utilità a produrre immagini.³²

In questa prospettiva mi pare vada letto anche il passo di *De Abstinencia* II 49, 3:

καὶ ὡσπερ ὁ τινος τῶν κατὰ μέρος <θεῶν> ἱερεὺς ἔμπειρος τῆς ἰδρύσεως τῶν ἀγαλμάτων αὐτοῦ τῶν τε ὀργιασμῶν καὶ τελετῶν καθάρσεων τε καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων, οὕτως ὁ τοῦ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν θεοῦ ἱερεὺς ἔμπειρος τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀγαλαματοποιίας καθάρσεων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δι' ὧν συνάπτεται τῷ θεῷ.

e come il sacerdote di uno degli dèi particolari è esperto nel costruirne le statue, nei misteri, nelle iniziazioni, nelle purificazioni e in altri riti simili, così il sacerdote del dio al di sopra di ogni cosa è esperto nel produrne l'immagine, nelle purificazioni e negli altri riti mediante i quali si viene a contatto con il dio.

L'autrice, come abbiamo visto sopra, ne intende l'ultima parte nel senso che "the 'priest of the god who rules all' was an expert in the making of this god's cult image" (p. 111). Questa interpretazione si fonda sul fatto che, con la tradizione manoscritta e con l'editore precedente dell'opera, A. Nauck, legge: ἔμπειρος τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀγαλαματοποιίας. J. Bouffartigue e M. Patillon, invece, nella propria edizione del *De Abstinencia* ritengono che il pronome sia un riflessivo: ἔμπειρος τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀγαλαματοποιίας e in tal caso si dovrebbe intendere che "il sacerdote del dio supremo è esperto nel fare di se stesso un'immagine [del dio]".

La correzione non mi pare necessaria, ma – sia che si legga αὐτοῦ, sia che si legga αὐτοῦ – credo che il significato del passo sia quello indicato dai due studiosi francesi e che si ricava da un passo plotiniano al quale questa immagine è collegata:³³ il filosofo eleva al dio supremo un'immagine non sensibile, perché, conformando a lui il proprio intelletto, gli si assimila. Il filosofo fa della propria mente il tempio di Dio, "ornandolo con una statua vivente, il proprio intelletto, nel quale il dio ha impresso la propria immagine" e in questo tempio rende al dio un culto conveniente, perché lo conosce;³⁴ infatti, "il sapiente è il solo sacerdote, il solo che ama Dio, il solo che sa pregarlo".³⁵

Certamente, Porfirio si preoccupava di coordinare alla propria dottrina filosofica anche le pratiche religiose tradizionali e riteneva che anche il filosofo – oltre a praticare per condiscendenza il culto civico – rendesse, egli solo, culto nel modo piú appropriato al dio supremo, giacché la pietà si deve esercitare anche mediante le opere.³⁶ Nel suo caso, però, si tratta di quella che potremmo chiamare una trasposizione completa della religione nell'etica. La mediazione del culto esterno è inutile al filosofo, dal momento che l'unione con Dio è data da "un pensiero pieno di Dio e ben fondato in Lui".³⁷ Per questo faccio fatica ad attribuire a Porfirio l'idea che il sacerdozio del filosofo consista in una mediazione di tipo rituale e a immaginarlo impegnato nella fabbricazione di statue culturali degli

³² In termini simili Porfirio si esprime nella *Lettera a Marcella*, quando ricorda alla moglie: "dalla mia ombra e dal mio fantasma apparente non hai ricavato vantaggio mentre erano presenti, né, essendo essi assenti, la loro assenza ti causa alcuna afflizione, se t'impegno a fuggire dal corpo. Mi troverai con la massima purezza presente e unito a te [...], se t'impegnerei a risalire verso te stessa" (*Ad Marc.* 10, p. 111.5-11 des Places).

³³ Cf. Plot., *Enn.* I 6[1], 9.7-13: "innalzati verso te stesso e guarda; e, se ancora non ti vedi bello, come l'artefice di una statua che deve diventare bella toglie una cosa, raddrizza l'altra, una cosa la liscia, l'altra la pulisce, finché non fa apparire un bel viso sulla statua, così tu [...] non smettere di lavorare la tua statua (Plat., *Phaedr.* 252 D)"; citato in *Porphyre, De l'abstinence. Tome II. Livres II-III*, éd. J. Bouffartigue - M. Patillon, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1979, p. 49 (CUF).

³⁴ Porph., *Ad Marc.* 11, pp. 111.23-112.5 des Places.

³⁵ Porph., *Ad Marc.* 16, pp. 115.20-116.1 des Places.

³⁶ Porph., *De Abst.* I 29; *Ad Marc.* 15; 17, p. 116.1-4 des Places.

³⁷ Porph., *Ad Marc.* 19, p. 117.10-11 des Places.

dèi. Mi sembra che sulla questione del culto rituale la sua posizione sia molto piú prossima a quella di Plotino (ed eventualmente di Origene) che a quella di Giamblico.

È con quest'ultimo che l'azione rituale è a pieno titolo inserita nella vita del filosofo e che l'equiparazione della vita filosofica a un sacerdozio corrisponde alla pratica effettiva di riti, per i quali il filosofo rivendica una competenza specifica e superiore a quella di altri soggetti tradizionali:

[...] (le divine cerimonie e) non l'atto del pensiero uniscono agli dèi i teurgi; poiché che cosa in questo caso impedirebbe a coloro i quali praticano la filosofia teoretica di ottenere l'unione teurgica con gli dèi? Ma la verità non è questa: piuttosto l'adempimento delle azioni ineffabili, e compiute in maniera degna degli dèi e al di sopra di ogni intellesione, e la potenza dei simboli senza voce, comprensibili agli dèi soltanto, operano l'unione teurgica.³⁸

Che fosse o no legata al compimento di determinati rituali, l'assunzione da parte dei filosofi citati del ruolo di sacerdoti del dio supremo è interpretata dall'autrice come una presa di posizione polemica nei confronti di altri soggetti, che si presentavano come esperti nella realizzazione di immagini cultuali e nel compimento di cerimonie sacre, l'attività dei quali è documentata dal *corpus* di papiri, provenienti prevalentemente dall'Egitto, catalogati sotto la denominazione complessiva di *Papyri Graecae Magicae*.

Questa denominazione riflette il pregiudizio degli studiosi, sia egittologi che classicisti, che per lungo tempo hanno considerato quei testi espressione di una religiosità decaduta e marginale. Si tratta, invece, del risultato di un lavoro di reinvenzione del patrimonio religioso e sapienziale egiziano da parte di sacerdoti ellenizzati, che hanno adattato il proprio ruolo tradizionale alle aspettative e alle esigenze di un pubblico piú ampio. Si tratta del medesimo ambiente religioso e culturale – aperto all'influsso del pensiero platonico, gnostico, giudaico – nel quale è stato prodotto anche il *Corpus Hermeticum* (pp. 112-18).

Quest'opera di traduzione e reinvenzione del patrimonio religioso tradizionale a beneficio di un pubblico di formazione ellenica da parte di membri di collegi sacerdotali egiziani familiari con la lingua e la cultura religiosa e filosofica dominanti nell'Impero aveva lo scopo di mantenere la continuità di una tradizione sapienziale e di garantire agli esponenti della classe sacerdotale egiziana

³⁸ Iambl., *De Myst.* II 11 [= *Jamblique. Réponse à Porphyre*. Texte établi, traduit et annoté par H.-D. Saffrey et A.-Ph. Segonds avec la collaboration de A. Lecerf, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 2013 (CUF), p. 73.1-8; trad. A. Sodano in Giamblico, *I misteri egiziani*, Rusconi, Milano 1984, p. 113]. Ho già espresso, parlando di Porfirio e Origene, perplessità per una certa facilità dell'autrice nell'adottare conclusioni fondate su ipotesi. Il problema si pone anche nella ricostruzione della biografia di Giamblico. L'autrice afferma che Giamblico sarebbe nato intorno al 240, avrebbe studiato ad Alessandria con il futuro vescovo di Laodicea Anatolio e, in seguito, a Roma, presso Porfirio. Si tratta di una ricostruzione del tutto ipotetica: la *Suda* pone il *floruit* di Giamblico sotto il regno di Costantino (306-337), quindi egli potrebbe benissimo essere nato negli anni '60 del III secolo o anche dopo (la datazione alta permette di identificare il filosofo con un Giamblico nominato in Porph., *V. Plot.* 9.3-5, ma non è affatto sicura). Un Anatolio è menzionato da Eunapio come maestro di Giamblico, ma non è detto che si tratti del maestro alessandrino cristiano, né che Giamblico abbia soggiornato ad Alessandria (J.M. Dillon, "Iamblichos de Chalcis", in Goulet (ed.), *DPhA*, III, CNRS-Éditions, Paris 2000, p. 827, corregge su questo punto le tesi che aveva sostenuto in lavori precedenti, qui citati dall'autrice senza menzionare il mutamento di opinione da parte di Dillon); nemmeno si può assumere come un fatto che, dopo di lui, Giamblico sia stato discepolo di Porfirio. Su quest'ultimo punto, per esempio, H.D. Saffrey, "Pourquoi Porphyre a-t-il édité Plotin? Réponse provisoire", in Porphyre. *La Vie de Plotin*, II, Études d'introduction, texte grec et traduction française, commentaire, notes complémentaires, bibliographie, Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, Paris 1992 (Histoire des doctrines de l'antiquité classique, 16), pp. 31-64, qui, pp. 40-2, nega che il legame tra Giamblico e Porfirio possa essere definito un rapporto di discepolato. Cfr. inoltre, L.I. Martone, *Giamblico, De Anima. I frammenti, la dottrina*, Pisa U.P., Pisa 2014 (Greco, Arabo, Latino. Le vie del sapere. Studi, 3), pp. 21-28.

prestigio economico e sociale. In questo modo essi entrarono in competizione con rivendicazioni analoghe da parte dei filosofi, anch'essi preoccupati di affermare il proprio primato come eredi di una tradizione di sapienza di origine divina.

7. Conclusione

Pur con alcune semplificazioni e interpretazioni discutibili, il saggio propone una riconsiderazione interessante dell'autorappresentazione e del ruolo sociale perseguito, nel corso del III secolo, da gruppi diversi di "imprenditori culturali" (p. 126) che, pur seguendo progetti e traiettorie in parte differenti e tra loro concorrenziali, hanno mantenuto strette relazioni reciproche e si sono vicendevolmente influenzati. È soprattutto sull'aspetto dell'omogeneità culturale e dello scambio di influenze tra filosofi cristiani e non cristiani, sacerdoti, gnostici, cultori dell'ermetismo che l'autrice insiste, a costo di lasciare in ombra in alcuni casi elementi, non meno importanti, che differenziano tra loro i vari gruppi e i singoli autori.

Il risultato al quale perviene questo lavoro è duplice: anzitutto mette in evidenza che alcuni gruppi di intellettuali, pur relativamente marginali nella società del III secolo, avevano l'aspirazione a svolgere una funzione di orientamento sociale e politico e che questa aspirazione si esprimeva anche attraverso la rivendicazione di una competenza superiore sia nella conoscenza del modo corretto di relazionarsi con il dio supremo, sia nella conoscenza e nel controllo delle realtà divine intermedie.

L'altro risultato che emerge nelle pagine conclusive del libro (pp. 126-31) è evidenziare l'importanza che questo modo di pensare il ruolo degli intellettuali ha avuto nel IV e V secolo per la costruzione del ruolo politico e religioso dei vescovi cristiani (l'autrice cita gli esempi di Ambrogio e Giovanni Crisostomo): anche questi ultimi, infatti, si sono presentati come guide autorevoli delle proprie chiese in virtù di una specifica conoscenza e dominio degli atti cultuali che assicuravano un giusto rapporto con la sfera del divino a tutti i livelli; e su questa funzione, oltre che sulla loro appartenenza all'élite sociale e culturale dell'Impero, hanno fondato anche la rivendicazione e l'esercizio di un ruolo politico attivo.

Marco Zambon

H. Seng - G. Sfameni Gasparro (Hg.), *Theologische Orakel in der Spätantike*, Universitätsverlag Winter, Heidelberg 2016 (Bibliotheca Chaldaica / Band 5), 386 pp.

Late Antiquity is famously fond of ‘inspired’ texts: theological poetry, like the Orphic hymns, or poems by ‘Homer’ and other authors, then considered of divine origin. To this literature belongs also the *Oracles* (χρησμοί). At variance with the classical age, late ancient oracles are classified as theological because they do not provide solutions to individual problems or critical situations in cities, but give answers on the divine nature. The relevance of the oracles in late ancient spirituality is attested by the flourishing of a new literary genre: the collections of theological oracles, sometimes arranged in accordance with the scheme elaborated by the philosophical schools, where the allegorical exegesis takes an increasingly important place.

The most important collections are the *Chaldean Oracles*, Porphyry’s *Philosophia ex oraculis haurienda*, the *Oracula Sibyllina* and the *Theosophy* of Tübingen. The latter was composed in 502/503 A.D., but depends on earlier collections, especially Porphyry’s. A conference held in Frankfurt am Main in July 2012 under the direction of Helmut Seng and Giulia Sfameni Gasparro was devoted to these texts, and the thirteen papers are now collected in the volume under examination.

After a brief preface of the editors, the volume begins with L.G. Soares Santoprete’s paper “Tracing the Connections between ‘Mainstream’ Platonism (Middle- and Neo-Platonism) and ‘Marginal’ Platonism (Gnosticism, Hermeticism and the *Chaldean Oracles*) with Digital Tools: the Database, the Bibliographical Directory, and the Research Blog The Platonism of Late Antiquity” (pp. 9-45). An overview of the current status of research on Platonism in Late Antiquity is followed by a survey of the relationship between Middle- and Neo-Platonism on one side, and Gnosticism, Hermeticism and the *Chaldean Oracles* on the other. Then some editorial projects are listed, with a focus on *Les Platonismes de l’Antiquité tardive*, directed by the author herself and A. Van den Kerchove. The currents mentioned above are admittedly a ‘marginal’ kind of philosophy, but their theological ideas influence and are influenced by the ‘mainstream authors’ of Platonism. According to the author, the difference lies essentially in the ways of expression, namely rational analysis versus myths and personifications (p. 12). To my mind, this is quite a questionable assumption to make. A full discussion of this point goes beyond the limits of a review, but it should at least be said that Platonism and Gnosticism disagree over the nature of the cosmos, seen as fundamentally bad by Gnostics, as intrinsically good and divine by Platonists: this is stated in as many letters by Plotinus in his treatise II 9[33]. Plotinus’ attitude against the Gnostics obviously does not escape the scholars engaged in the project *Les Platonismes de l’Antiquité tardive*, to which the rest of this paper is devoted.¹ Plotinus, the Gnostics and the *Chaldean Oracles*; Numenius and Plotinus; the *Chaldean Oracles* in themselves; Porphyry, Gnosticism, and Judeo-Christian thought; Hermeticism, Gnosticism and Christianity, and finally the role of the anonymous commentary on Plato’s *Parmenides* are the topics dealt with in this project. A note of caution, however, should be put at least on this last item: the well-known

¹ This project “aims to demonstrate that the various conflicts that animated Platonic circles in Late Antiquity afford fertile ground for study of the complexity of the dynamic between integration and marginality in the history of Platonism. (...) This triple project will allow us to clarify how other doctrines from the philosophical tradition have been appropriated in debates within ‘mainstream’ Platonism in order to refute ‘marginal’ views, as well as how some ‘marginal’ ideas have been incorporated within Platonism in order to refute their ‘marginal’ positions. (...) Finally, it will highlight how these two different forms of assimilation and ideas have given rise to considerable innovation within Late Antiquity thought, and in turn thereby marked all subsequent Western thought” (p. 37).

fragments of this commentary, studied first by Pierre Hadot and ascribed by him to Porphyry,² have been the subject of prolonged scholarly controversy, and one can well side, as the author does, with those who see in it a point of contact between Platonism and the *Chaldean Oracles*. However, also the overwhelming presence in this commentary of philosophical topics and even expressions typically Plotinian³ should be taken into consideration in order to reach a balanced account.

In their paper “Sources et principes: universalité et particularité dans les *Oracles Chaldaïques*” (pp. 47-88), A. Lecerf et L. Saudelli claim that Iamblichus’ interpretation of the *Chaldean Oracles* has influenced the metaphysical procession elaborated by Damascius in his *De Principiis*. The idea that a god can generate itself at different levels will in turn influence Proclus; Iamblichus and other Neoplatonists after him try to connect the traditional gods of paganism to metaphysical items like the procession, the Demiurge, the intelligible model, and so on.⁴ This is in itself a well-established point: one has just to recall E.R. Dodds’ claim “That Homer’s Olympians, the most vividly conceived anthropomorphic beings in all literature, should have ended their career on the dusty shelves of this museum of metaphysical abstractions is one of the time’s strangest ironies”.⁵ Iamblichus and later Neoplatonists have to set the hierarchical relations among gods and the divine ‘chains’ (σειραί) issued from each of them. In doing so, they take inspiration from the *Iliad* and Plato’s *Phaedrus*.⁶ In Book III of the *De Principiis*, Damascius has recourse to the idea of a ‘wrapping’ of the inferior gods in the superior ones, with the superior gods seen as universal sources, and the inferior ones as particular sources. Now, this theological system is reminiscent of the *Chaldean Oracles*. Following its terminology, Iamblichus distinguishes between source (πηγή) and principle (ἀρχή): a ‘source’ includes various ‘principles’, thus producing a hierarchical procession: “C’est bien dans les *Oracles* que les néoplatoniciens trouvent une extraordinaire population divine arrangée sur des plans horizontaux et verticaux [...] De ce point de vue, les *Oracles* témoignaient d’un très fort dynamisme, déjà noté par H. Lewy, et qui n’avait pas grand-chose de commun avec la leçon plotinienne” (pp. 80-1).

The *Chaldean Oracles* inspires not only some Neoplatonists, but probably also the Gnostics, as J.D. Turner claims in his “The *Chaldean Oracles*: A Pretext for the Sethian Apocalypse *Allogenes*?” (pp. 89-114), examining the Gnostic procession from and reintegration back into the origin. According to Turner, this scheme features in the *Chaldean Oracles*, in the commentary on the *Parmenides* mentioned above, and in the Sethian *Allogenes*, with some ties also with the so-called *Megale Apophasis*. First Turner compares the ontology of the *Chaldean Oracles* to that of the *Allogenes*, one of the treatises of the the Nag Hammadi collection that was studied also by Platonists, as witnessed by Porphyry’s *Life of Plotinus*, 16. The *Chaldean Oracles* poses three principles: two Intellects and Hecate, a principle that mediates between them. The first Intellect is the Supreme

² P. Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus*, I-II, Études Augustiniennes, Paris 1968.

³ M. Zambon, “Review of G. Bechtle, *The Anonymous Commentary on Platos’ Parmenides*, Verlag Paul Haupt, Wien 1999”, *Elenchos* 20 (1999), pp. 194-202.

⁴ This requirement is quite unusual to Plotinus, who links the metaphysical reality to the traditional gods of paganism only in V 1[10], 7.30-37 where, as Lecerf and Saudelli note, the Hesiodic triad Uranus, Kronos and Zeus is considered as a poetic representation of the three hypostases. It can be added that the same is done at V 5[32], 6.27-28, apropos Apollo; it is clear, however, that such analogies are anything but systematic: in the *Enneads* there is no endeavour to combine traditional religion and metaphysics.

⁵ E.R. Dodds, *Commentary*, in *Proclus. The Elements of Theology. A Revised Text with Translation, Introduction and Commentary* by E.R. Dodds, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1963², p. 260.

⁶ The authors refer to *Iliad* 8, 17-27 and *Phaedrus* 246 E.

Deity, a transcendent Monad⁷ not directly involved with creation. This principle produces the second Intellect,⁸ endowed with a demiurgical function.⁹ Between them stands Hecate, endowed with three functions: to be the emanative power of the Father,¹⁰ to separate and join the two Intellects,¹¹ and to give rise to the soul and multiplicity.¹² A metaphysical hierarchy similar to that of the *Chaldean Oracles* features in the *Allogenes*, with a supreme unknowable One,¹³ the Triple Powered One, and the Barbelo Aeon, a divine Intellect containing the archetypes of all things.¹⁴ The Chaldaean Hecate resembles the Sethian Triple Powered One; in turn, Hecate is similar to the Aeon Barbelo: both cause intelligible multiplicity. Then, Turner moves to a comparison with the commentary on the *Parmenides*. According to the *Allogenes*, the final ascent to the supreme One is an ascending series of contemplative acts, whose final step is the union with it, a sort of unknowable knowledge.¹⁵ Also the first fragment of the anonymous *Parmenides* commentary outlines the final contemplative act as a non-comprehending comprehension and ineffable pre-thinking.¹⁶ Turner claims that this theory originates in the *Chaldean Oracles*, because here too the knowledge of the supreme deity is described as not-knowledge and is linked to the initiate's passivity and quietude, labelled the 'flower of intellect'. Furthermore, the *Chaldean Oracles*, the *Allogenes*, and the commentary on the *Parmenides* present, all of them, some mediating principles: respectively, Hecate, the supreme Father-Power, Intellect, and the demiurgical Intellect, arranged in a triadic structure. A comparison with the *Megale Apophasis* follows: this writing was composed during the 2nd century by someone who claimed allegiance to Simon Magus.¹⁷ That the Middle Platonic and Neopythagorean doctrines form the background of all these Platonizing religious currents is a well established tenet; but if the aim of the paper was to highlight the cross-pollination between philosophy and the religious currents of that time, it seems to me that it ends by showing rather the influence of philosophy on such currents.

More attention to the cross-pollination is paid by P.F. Beatrice who, in his study "So spoke the gods. Oracles and philosophy in the so-called Anonymous commentary on the *Parmenides*" (pp. 115-44), advances a new hypothesis about this text, that involves Porphyry's exegesis of the *Chaldean Oracles*. A new edition of the fragments of Porphyry's *De Philosophia ex oraculis haurienda* is necessary, according to Beatrice. The first remark concerns Augustine's reference to the *De Regressu animae*. In

⁷ Turner refers to *OC* 11 and 18 (*OC = Oracles Chaldaïques avec un choix de commentaires anciens*. Texte établi et traduit par É. des Places, Paris 1971).

⁸ Turner refers to *OC* 3 and 12.

⁹ Turner refers to *OC* 8 and 37.

¹⁰ Turner refers to *OC* 35, and notes that this aspect of Hecate resembles Plotinus' intelligible matter of VI 7[38], 17.

¹¹ Turner refers to *OC* 6 and 50.

¹² Turner refers to *OC* 29, 42, 44, 35 and 4.

¹³ Turner refers to *Allogenes*, XI 61 Funk.

¹⁴ Turner refers to *Allogenes*, XI 45 Funk.

¹⁵ Turner refers to *Allogene*, XI 63-64 Funk.

¹⁶ Turner quotes *Anon. in Parmenidem*, II 12-27 Hadot.

¹⁷ Like the *Chaldean Oracles*, this text describes the supreme principle and its emanation as fire, probably inspired by the Stoic metaphor; like the *Allogenes* and the anonymous *Parmenides* commentary (and even Plotinus), it articulates its ontology in three phases. According to Turner, p. 110, "It is quite possible that the authors of *Allogenes* and its sister treatises reconceptualized the triadic metaphysical structure and contemplative technique of the *Oracles* along the lines of an earlier Simonian model of reflexive ontogenesis, but further articulated it in a Platonic direction by means of the Existence - Vitality - Mentality triad and techniques of apophatic predication and aphaeretic contemplation derived from contemporary Middle Platonic and Neopythagorean speculation on Platonic dialogues such as the *Sophist*, *Parmenides* and *Symposium* in a way similar to that found in the anonymous *Commentary*".

Beatrice's opinion, this reference points to a section of the *De Philosophia ex oraculis haurienda*, and this because several fragments referred by Augustine to the *De Regressu animae* are about Chaldean teachings and theurgy: all topics discussed in *De Philosophia ex oraculis haurienda*. Then, Beatrice claims that two theological oracles about Christ attributed to Hecate by Eusebius in the *Praeparatio Evangelica*¹⁸ show that Porphyry uses oracles in his attack on Christianity, and that Eusebius quotes Porphyry on the basis of a work entitled *De Philosophia ex oraculis haurienda*.¹⁹ He then quotes testimonies of Proclus,²⁰ Damascius,²¹ Augustine²² and the *Theosophy*²³ that, independently of each other, attribute to Porphyry some doctrines that are contained also in the commentary on the *Parmenides*. Given that these doctrines are inspired by two *Chaldean Oracles*,²⁴ and that the ancient sources that mention Porphyry in relationship to the *Parmenides* refer only to discussions about the hypotheses of this dialogue,²⁵ without any explicit mention of a commentary, Beatrice claims that "it would appear inevitable to conclude that Porphyry commented on these passages of the *Parmenides* not in a specific Commentary, but rather in some part or section of the *Philosophy according to the Oracles*" (p. 125). He also refers to the passages of the commentary where the superiority of negative theology is stated,²⁶ or the theological oracles are praised as divine revelations. All in all, the *De Philosophia ex oraculis haurienda*, according to Beatrice, originally included not only a collection of oracles but also, from the fourth book onward, a long philosophical section: it is to this section that the fragments of the *De Regressu animae*, Περὶ ἀγαλμάτων, *Ad Gaurum*, *Symmikta Zetemata*, should be ascribed. In addition, also the alleged paraphrase of the *Enneads* transmitted by the Arabic *Theology of Aristotle* did originally belong to this collection – a claim that is not supported by research on the Arabist side.²⁷ The philosophical part of the *De Philosophia ex oraculis haurienda* was devoted, according to Beatrice, to a process starting from the purification of the body and the 'spiritual' soul through oracles and theurgy, and ending with the philosophical purification of the intellectual soul.²⁸ What this hypothesis wants to account for is the presence of

¹⁸ Beatrice quotes Eusebius, *Dem. evang.*, III 7, 1-2 Heikel.

¹⁹ Beatrice quotes Eusebius, *Dem. evang.*, III 6, 39 Heikel.

²⁰ Cf. Proclus, *In Parm.* VI 1070, 13-16 and 20-24; 1071, 2-3 Steel (quoted by Beatrice from the edition Cousin, col. 1070, 15-19 and 24-30; 1071, 1-3) and *In Alc.* 84, 14-17 Segonds (quoted by Beatrice from the edition Cousin, col. 84, 12-14).

²¹ Beatrice quotes Damascius, *De Princ.* II 1, 11-13 Westerink - Combès.

²² Beatrice quotes Augustine, *De Civ.*, X 23, 1-19 p. 436. 27-437. 5 Dombart - Kalb = Porph. fr. 284 F 9-19 Smith.

²³ Beatrice quotes *Theosophia* II 13 Beatrice = § 65 Erbse.

²⁴ Beatrice quotes *OC* 5 and 7 des Places.

²⁵ Beatrice refers to Proclus, *Theol. Plat.* I 11 p. 51, 4-5 and II 4 p. 31, 22-28 Saffrey - Westerink; *In Parm.* VI 1053, 28-1054, 30 Steel (quoted by Beatrice from the edition Cousin, col. 1053, 36 - 1054, 37) = Porph., fr. 170F Smith; Simplicius, *In Phys.*, p. 230.34 - 231.24 Diels = Porph., fr. 236F Smith; Porph., fr. 171F Smith = Damascius, *In Parm.* II p. 112.18-20 Westerink-Combès; *Theosophia* I 24-26 Beatrice = § 27 Erbse.

²⁶ Beatrice refers to I 3-4 and II 19-21 Hadot.

²⁷ For an overview of the scholarship on this text cf. C. D'Ancona, "The *Theology* Attributed to Aristotle: Sources, Structure, Influence", in Kh. El-Rouayheb - S. Schmidtke (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy*, Oxford U.P., Oxford 2017, pp. 8-29; recent scholarship concurs in maintaining that the Arabic *Theology of Aristotle* is based on the *Enneads* themselves rather than on an intermediate text, allegedly concocted by Porphyry.

²⁸ Beatrice, p. 134, claims that "All these elements indicate together that the materials listed so far all come from the Philosophy according to the *Oracles*, and that only the complex and tormented vicissitudes of this great anti-Christian work have produced the more or less extensive fragments we presently know by their artificial titles, surreptitiously introduced in the course of the Byzantine manuscript tradition. Needless to recall, in this context, the similar case of the *Life of Pythagoras*, which is not a separate work, but a long fragment of Book I of the *History of Philosophy*".

similar topics in various writings by Porphyry, but it seems to me that to gather several of his works (and even works not by him) within the 'new' and enlarged *De Philosophia ex oraculis haurienda* is supernumerary: nothing prevents these texts from presenting, all of them, the same idea of the ascent to the intelligible realm through purification.

The relationship among the *Chaldean Oracles*, *De Philosophia ex oraculis haurienda* and the *Theosophy* is discussed by H. Seng in his paper "Theologische Orakel zwischen Metaphysik und Ritual" (pp. 145-70). Seng compares the formal features of the *Chaldean Oracles* and *De Philosophia ex oraculis haurienda*: contrary to what Hans Lewy argued,²⁹ it is not clear who speaks and gives oracles in these texts, because "Kein einziges Chaldaeischen Orakel lässt sich Apollon oder Hekate zuweisen, umgekehrt besteht kein Grund, diejenigen Orakel bei Porphyrios, die von diesem auf Apollon oder auf Hekate zurückgeführt werden, zu den OC zu rechnen" (p. 151). In the *Chaldean Oracles* gods are not forced by theurgy, and oracles that represent a god 'imprisoned' by a theurgist³⁰ are open to doubt. A hymn transmitted by the *Theosophy*³¹ that Lewy considered as a quotation from Porphyry's *De Philosophia ex oraculis haurienda* derives in reality from the *Chaldean Oracles*.³² However, Seng admits that both works contain a similar divine hierarchy, the same transcendent view of the first god, and a similar cosmology.

The study of I. Tanaseanu - Döbler, "Denn auf der Erde können sie sich nicht aufhalten, sondern nur auf heiliger Erde': Bemerkungen zum Verhältnis der Götter zur Materialität in Porphyrios' *Philosophia ex oraculis haurienda*" (pp. 171-204) analyses the material aspects of communication between gods and humans, which feature in this text: according to the author, Porphyry elaborates precise guidelines for worship referring to theurgy, mediums, signs and symbols, animate figurines, sacrifices and oracles.

The paper by J. Walter, "Interpretatio pagana des Christentum: Liebeslyrik, Adonis-Kult und christliche Heiligenverehrung in den theologischen Orakeln bei Porphyrios (*De Phil. ex or.*, p. 183f. 180 - 182.185f. Wolff = fr. 343F; 345F; 346F Smith)" (pp. 205-26), analyses three theological oracles contained in *De Philosophia ex oraculis haurienda*, pointing to some polemical topics adopted against Christians during the Diocletian persecution: deployment of expressions and themes of tragedy, love poetry and the cult of Adon (*De Phil. ex or.*, p. 183f. Wolff = fr. 343F Smith), rejection of the divine nature of Christ (*De Phil. ex or.*, p. 180 - 182 Wolff = fr. 345F Smith), and the cognitive and ethical deficiency of this cult (*De Phil. ex or.*, p. 185f. Wolff = fr. 346F Smith). In this manner, it emerges how Pagans saw Christianity.

In her paper "Introduzioni e commenti agli oracoli della *Teosofia di Tubinga*" (pp. 227-56) L.M. Tissi discusses the Christian tradition of theological oracles attested by the *Theosophy*.

²⁹ Seng refers to H. Lewy, *Chaldean Oracles and Theurgy. Mysticism Magic and Platonism in the Later Roman Empire*, Troisième édition par M. Tardieu, avec un supplément *Les Oracles chaldaïques 1891-2011*, Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, Paris 2011.

³⁰ Seng quotes OC 220, 221, 223, f. and 225, all of them considered *dubia* by des Places' edition of the *Chaldean Oracles*.

³¹ Seng quotes the hymns in *Theosophy*, § 27, 228-246 Erbse = I 24, 197-215 Beatrice.

³² On the contrary, in his edition of *Theosophy* Beatrice claims that Porphyry's collection of oracles is the main source of the first book of *Theosophy*, and that the author of this text (Severus of Antioch?) writes in order to respond to Porphyry's attack against Christianity by adopting his same kind of writing (i.e., a collection of oracles) and by naming his work 'theosophy', that is using a word introduced by Porphyry in the philosophical vocabulary: cfr. *Anonymi Monophysitae Theosophia. An Attempt at Reconstruction* by P.F. Beatrice, Brill, Leiden - Boston - Köln 2001 (VChr Suppl. 56), pp. XXVI-XXIX.

Through the analysis of some introductions and comments of book I, the author shows how the editor has used neoplatonic doctrines and Homeric scholia in order to prove that the oracles contain *in nuce* Christian truths. Such use of these texts belongs to the cultural environment of “*κοινωνία*” between Christians and Pagans, where collections of oracles became a literary genre well established, although each of them is a working copy, that can be changed according to the context and the purpose of the editor.

In her paper “Les Sept Sages prophètes du christianisme. Tradition gnomique et littérature théosophique” (pp. 257-79), A. Busine considers three oracles of the *Theosophorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, attributed to the Seven Sages, seen as representatives of ancient wisdom, who, before philosophers but after Moses, talk about Christ. Adapting themes of the Hellenistic period (especially the topic of the Sages’ banquet), the oracles analysed by the author deal with the life and death of Christ,³³ the nature of God,³⁴ and the conversion of Athena’s temple into a Christian church.³⁵ Such forgeries prove that Christians have included the Seven Sages among those who had foreseen their religion.

Another collection of oracles incorporated in the *Theosophy* are the *Oracula Sybillina*, used by Jews and, then, by Christians. They are expressions of a monotheistic view, as proves M. Monaca in her study “Gli *Oracula Sybillina*: la profezia sibillina e l’unicità di Dio” (pp. 281-303). In the oldest of the surviving oracles, composed in Alexandria during the 2nd century BC, the Sybil describes the Jewish god in accordance with negative theology, Orphism and Platonism; then, part of them are reported also in the *Theosophy*,³⁶ where the Sybil and Apollo (who inspires her oracles) become the messengers of Christianity. Through these transformations, the *Oracula Sybillina* connects philosophical and pagan concepts to religious currents.

The Christian use of pagan oracles is examined also by C. Moreschini in his paper “Le citazioni oracolari nel *De Trinitate* dello Pseudo Didimo di Alessandria” (pp. 305-27). In his *De Trinitate*, the Pseudo-Dydimus confirms, against the Arians, the trinitarian theology of the Cappadocians referring to the concepts of unknowability, excellence, unity and simplicity of God attested in oracular poetry, and quoting some oracles in order to single out the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. In this manner, he proves that Pagans and the Cappadocians have the same idea of God.

The central role of theological oracles in the debate between Pagans and Christians is the topic of “Gli ‘oracoli teologici’ fra pagani e cristiani – temi e problemi a confronto” (pp. 329-50) by G. Sfameni Gasparro. The theological oracles begin with Celsus, who builds up with them a sapiential tradition against Christianity. Plutarch also linked oracular revelation (and Apollo, as its source) to philosophical research; but it was Celsus who first referred to the wisdom of the past in order to attack Christians. This approach will be continued by Porphyry and, with a totally different stance, also by Eusebius and the *Theosophy*’s author. However, Porphyry’s anti-Christian project depends on Plotinus’ teaching: the latter uses theological oracles (seen as expression of divine will in II 9 [33], 9), to show how all reality is linked to the supreme principle, an assumption repeatedly stated in the *Enneads*. Also the anti-Christian purpose of the *Vita Plotini* seems to confirm the Plotinian roots of Porphyry’s polemic.

³³ Busine quotes $\omega 11$ contained in *Theosophorum Graecorum Fragmenta*. Iterum recensuit H. Erbse. Stuttgart-Leipzig 1995.

³⁴ Busine quotes χ_5 pronounced by Solon contained in *Theosophorum Graecorum Fragmenta*; the same oracle is attested also in another collection of oracles, where it is pronounced by Chilon: cf. χ_7 contained in *Theosophorum Graecorum Fragmenta*.

³⁵ Busine quotes π_1 contained in *Theosophorum Graecorum Fragmenta*.

³⁶ Monaca refers to *Theos.* III A 1 and A II Beatrice.

The volume ends with the study by C.O. Tommasi, “La preghiera delle Salamandre: Porfirio, Gabalis, Lévi, Landolfi. Per la fortuna di *Theos*. § 27 Erbse = I 24 Beatrice” (pp. 351-78), that reconstructs the transmission of a theological oracle from the *De Philosophia ex oraculis haurienda*³⁷ until the 20th century. This oracle, which concerns three kinds of beings born from the Father, is known thanks to the *Theosophy*,³⁸ and was reported in the Comte de Gabalis of Nicolas -Pierre-Henry de Montfaucon de Villars,³⁹ who joins the magic formula “begging of the four elements”, an evocation of the essential spirits theorised by Paracelsus. The aim of the transmitters of this oracle is to prove that the ancient Greeks knew monotheism *in nuce*. Then, through the grimoires (like the *Petit Albert* and the *Grimorium Verum*) the oracle is transmitted to the *Dogme et Rituel de la Haute Magie* by Eliphas Lévi,⁴⁰ where it is known as “Oraison des salamandres” and, from there, in the gothic novel *Racconto d’Autunno* by Tommaso Landolfi.⁴¹ C.O. Tommasi highlights one of the possible routes of the theological oracles that come to the present also in the form of magic formulas.

An index of authors’ names closes the volume. This collection of papers provides an exhaustive overview on how Pagans and Christians made use of the theological oracles to legitimise their beliefs.

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³⁷ Tommasi quotes and analyses Porphyry, *De Phil. ex or.*, p. 143-147 Wolff = fr. 325F Smith.

³⁸ Tommasi quotes *Theos*. § 27 Erbse = I 24 Beatrice.

³⁹ Tommasi quotes N.-P.-H., Montfaucon de Villars, *Le Comte de Gabalis, ou Entretiens sur les sciences secrètes, avec l’adaptation du Liber de Nymphis de Paracelse par Blaise de Vigenère (1583)*. Édition présentée et annotée par D. Kahn, Honoré Champion, Paris 2010 (Sources classiques, 105), pp. 199-201.

⁴⁰ Tommasi quotes E. Lévi, *Dogme et Rituel de la Haute Magie*, Paris 1886, pp. 75-87.

⁴¹ Tommasi quotes T. Landolfi, *Racconto d’Autunno*, Adelphi, Milano 1995³, pp. 88-92.

W. Kroll, *Discours sur les oracles chaldaïques*. Traduction par Henri Dominique Saffrey, Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, Paris 2016 (Textes et traditions, 28), XII + 126 pp.

This volume contains the French translation by Henri Dominique Saffrey of the Latin dissertation submitted by Wilhelm Kroll in 1894 to the University of Breslau on the *De Oraculis Chaldaicis*, destined to be the starting point for modern studies on this subject (pp. 1-103). It contains also the “Avertissement” of Father Saffrey (pp. VII-XII) and, as an “Annexe”, Kroll’s paper “Les Oracles Chaldaïques”, published in *Rheinisches Museum* 50 (1895, pp. 105-8).

As Saffrey points out in the “Avertissement”, the dissertation is the “première étude sérieuse de ce texte perdu” and, for this reason, “toujours utile à consulter” (p. X): given the increasing interest in the *Chaldean Oracles*,¹ he embarks on making more accessible this pioneer work. Kroll collected the “Chaldean” quotations from the writings of the Neoplatonists, distinguishing between their original meanings and their interpretations; his conclusion was that the *Chaldean Oracles* featured a religious poem with a basic theology, embedding philosophical (especially Platonic) elements and a ‘cult of Fire’, probably influenced by Oriental religious currents. Saffrey makes some improvements on the original text by Kroll: he uses italics to distinguish more clearly between the comments, the Neoplatonists’ excerpts, and the Chaldean verses. Also, the sections of the dissertation are subdivided into paragraphs with subtitles. The Greek texts are quoted according to the modern editions that were not available to Kroll; the references to secondary manuscripts are eliminated. Finally, Saffrey adds an *Index Locorum*, a bibliography of the editions used and, in the “Avertissement”, eight fragments of the *Chaldean Oracles* unknown to Kroll.²

In his preface, Kroll provided an overview of the previous researches on the *Chaldean Oracles*. The first editor was Francesco Patrizi in 1591, who attributed the collection to Zoroaster; during the 19th century, new editions of the *Chaldean Oracles* were made by Thomas Taylor³ and, then, by Johann Carl Thilo.⁴ Kroll found these works defective, lacking as they do of any effort to distinguish the genuine meaning of the fragments beyond the Neoplatonic interpretations. The sources used are listed in the first chapter, “Les sources des Oracles chaldaïques” (pp. 3-12). The most important are the Neoplatonic ones. Philosophers of “Platonic” allegiance, especially after Plotinus, refer to a great number of ‘oracles’ in order to prove their affinity with the theories of Orpheus, Homer, Pythagoras and Plato: Porphyry (quoted by Augustine in the *De Civitate Dei*), Iamblichus, Syrianus, Psellus and, above all, Damascius and Proclus. Some references to the *Chaldean Oracles* are attested also in the anonymous epistle XVII contained in the *Anecdota Graeca* III edited by Cramer and in Hermippus’ *De Astrologia*.

Chapter II, “Les fragments” (pp. 13-96), contains all the Chaldean verses collected by Kroll. Each of them is discussed and compared to others of the same subject, often highlighting the difference between the original meaning and that which is attributed to it in the context where it is quoted. The

¹ Such interest is attested, according to Saffrey, by works like H. Seng, *Un livre sacré de l’Antiquité tardive: les Oracles chaldaïques*, Paris 2016, and by the fact that an entire collection is devoted to the *Chaldean Oracles*: the *Bibliotheca Chaldaica*, published by the Universitätsverlag Winter.

² Saffrey refers to OC 6, 134, 135, 159, 227 (OC = *Oracles Chaldaïques* avec un choix de commentaires anciens. Texte établi et traduit par É. des Places, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 2010⁵ [Collection des Universités de France]); Olymp., *In Alc.*, p. 125.23-24 Westerink; Proclus, *In Parm.* VII 512.16-17, and 20-22 Steel; Proclus, *Theol. plat.* IV 21, p. 64.11-12 Saffrey-Westerink.

³ Kroll quoted T. Taylor, *Classical Journal* 16 (1817), pp. 333-4, and 17 (1818), pp. 128-33.

⁴ Kroll quoted Johann Karl Thilo, *Commentarius in Synesii hymnum secundum*, vv. 1-24, Halle 1842; Id., *Commentatio ad Synesii hymnum secundum*, vv. 22-24, *De triplici silentio philosophico, mystico, divino*, Halle 1843.

chapter is divided into six sections, devoted to the supreme gods, to cosmology, to the minor gods, to human soul's creation, and finally to fire's worship and eschatology. The first section includes fragments concerning the supreme God, his activities and his relationship to the two Intellects, Hecate and the hypercosmic gods. The section devoted to cosmology describes the structure of the Chaldean cosmos, that is divided into three zones: the Empyrean (or noetic world), the ethereal (the heaven of fixed stars) and the material world. The third section exposes the hierarchy of the inferior gods: the ἀρχικοί, ἕργες, συνοχεῖς, τελετάρχαι, angels, demons, heroes, ζῶναι and ἄζωνοι. The section devoted to the human soul shows its links with the Intellects and Hecate, seen as the cosmic soul. The section concerning Fire's worship highlights the existence and the use of the ὀχετοί, suprasensible channels that connect the world to the divine realm. The final section exposes some eschatological rules: the initiate who follows them can ascend to the highest God with his soul (and, if he is a theurgist, also with his body).

The third chapter, "Origine et âge des *Oracles chaldaïques*" (pp. 97-103), lists the philosophical and religious influences of the *Chaldean Oracles* and discusses its period of composition. The Chaldean doctrine combines Platonic theories (the creation of the cosmos, the soul's *anamnesis* and the distinction between two kinds of *eros*) with the 'Pythagorean' ideas on the monad, dyad, human soul and matter, as well as with the Stoic concept of God as divine Fire. The philosophical elements are intermingled with influences from Oriental religions, as the great relevance of Hecate and the 'worship of Fire' suggest. There are also some similarities with Gnosticism and Hermetism: a fact that suggests to date the composition of the *Chaldean Oracles* between the end of the 2nd and the beginning of the 3rd century A.D. The first Neoplatonist to use the *Chaldean Oracles* is Porphyry, and this confirms the date of composition proposed. Porphyry's evidence is important also because he ascribes the composition of the work to Julian, probably the son of the Julian who 'reveals' the *Oracles*; however, nothing more can be said due to the lack of information.

Kroll's paper "Les *Oracles chaldaïques*" (pp. 105-8), published in *Rheinisches Museum* 50 (1895), ends the volume. Saffrey includes this study because it counts as a summary of the dissertation: Kroll exposed synthetically the doctrine of the *Oracles*, giving further information on the date and the context of its composition.

It was Saffrey's aim to make accessible this ground-breaking work, an aim that has been fully achieved for the benefit of an increasing number of scholars and students interested in the spirituality and thought of Late Antiquity. For this Father Saffrey deserves our deep gratitude.

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Sergius of Reshaina, *Introduction to Aristotle and His Categories, Addressed to Philotheos*. Syriac Text, with Introduction, Translation, and Commentary by S. Aydin, Brill, Leiden - Boston 2016 (Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus, 24), 328 p.

Depuis quelques décennies, la figure de Sergius de Reshaina n'a cessé de grandir dans les histoires de la philosophie en milieu syriaque. À la suite des travaux d'édition et de traduction qui ont été consacrés à son œuvre, dans le sillage notamment de ceux de G. Furlani, à qui il faut rendre hommage – travaux qui ont contribué à mieux faire connaître son œuvre ainsi que le contexte historique dans lequel elle a été produite –, Sergius est apparu comme celui qui a introduit, pour ainsi dire, la philosophie de tradition néoplatonicienne, dans la culture syriaque. Les études récentes ont rappelé, en effet, que Sergius avait étudié à Alexandrie, à l'époque où Ammonius était le chef de l'école néoplatonicienne en cette ville, et qu'il avait selon toute vraisemblance étudié la philosophie auprès d'Ammonius lui-même.¹

L'ouvrage qui ici est le point de départ de nos remarques atteste précisément l'influence manifeste des sources philosophiques alexandrines sur le traité de Sergius, édité, traduit et commenté par S. Aydin. Le traité de Sergius ne porte, à vrai dire, aucun titre dans l'unique manuscrit où il est conservé. La seule information fournie est l'adresse à un certain Philotheos, personnage inconnu par ailleurs, mais il est explicitement fait référence à Aristote dans l'ouvrage, dont la composition se rapporte, en de nombreuses sections, aux parties successives du traité aristotélicien, telles que la substance, la quantité, les relatifs, la qualité, et les divers post-prédicaments. En outre, Aydin a montré, de façon très convaincante, que ce traité sans titre, qu'il a nommé par commodité *Introduction to Aristotle and his Categories*, était une sorte d'abrégé du traité plus développé de Sergius, couramment désigné comme un *Commentaire aux Catégories*, dont des parties ont fait l'objet de traductions par G. Furlani, nous-même et J. Watt.²

Ce *Commentaire* était présenté par Sergius, dans son prologue, comme la première étape d'une introduction à la philosophie d'Aristote, qui devait couvrir toutes ses parties. Par sa composition, il apparaissait comme largement modelé sur les commentaires alexandrins de la tradition d'Ammonius, auxquels il empruntait les matériaux de ses exposés sur les *Catégories* d'Aristote. Dans un tableau très suggestif (p. 72-5), Aydin met en vis-à-vis les parties successives du *Commentaire* et celles de l'*Introduction*, d'où l'on voit clairement quelles sections sont omises dans l'*Introduction*.

Dès l'abord, ces deux introductions à la philosophie d'Aristote, et plus particulièrement aux *Catégories*, posent la question de leur visée et de leur genre littéraire. Le *Commentaire* a été décrit comme semblable aux commentaires de l'école alexandrine, et même comme composé en vue de son utilisation en parallèle avec la lecture du traité des *Catégories*, selon J. Watt, idée reprise par Aydin. Nous ne nous attarderons pas sur ce point, car cet ouvrage n'est pas l'objet principal de nos remarques, mais nous ne pensons nullement que ce soit le cas, en raison de la composition même du

¹ Les travaux sur les textes philosophiques, théologiques et médicaux, de Sergius sont mentionnés notamment au cours de la revue de ces textes faite par Aydin dans l'introduction de son ouvrage (p. 10-25).

² G. Furlani, "Sul trattato di Sergio di Rêsh'aynâ circa le *Categorie*", *Rivista trimestrale di studi filosofici e religiosi* 3 (1922), p. 135-72; H. Hugonnard-Roche, *La logique d'Aristote du grec au syriaque. Études sur la transmission des textes de l'Organon et leur interprétation philosophique*, Vrin, Paris 2004 (Textes et traditions, 9), p. 164-231 (traduction et commentaire du prologue et du livre premier du traité); J. Watt, "Sergius of Reshaina on the *Prolegomena* to Aristotle's Logic: The *Commentary on the Categories, Chapter Two*", dans E. Coda - C. Martini Bonadeo (éd.), *De l'Antiquité tardive au Moyen Âge. Études de logique aristotélicienne et de philosophie grecque, syriaque, arabe et latine offertes à Henri Hugonnard-Roche*, Vrin, Paris 2014 (Études musulmanes, 44), p. 31-57.

Commentaire, qui ne suit pas strictement l'ordre des matières dans les *Catégories*. Et la visée du traité est présentée dans le prologue non point comme une exégèse systématique du traité aristotélicien, mais comme le premier d'une suite d'exposés synthétiques sur le but et le contenu scientifique de chacun des traités, pris en particulier, du Philosophe. C'est en quelque sorte le premier chapitre d'une somme de philosophie aristotélicienne en projet.

Dans son introduction, Aydin passe en revue tous les ouvrages composés par Sergius, tant dans le domaine de la philosophie que de la théologie et de la médecine, qu'il s'agisse d'œuvres originales ou de traductions et d'adaptations, telles que, s'agissant d'adaptations, celles du *De Mundo* et du traité *Sur les principes de l'univers* d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise. Argumentant à propos de l'authenticité ou non de divers opuscules (conservés ou perdus), Aydin note en particulier, à propos d'un opuscule (de moins d'un folio) intitulé *Une démonstration naturelle de Sergius archiâtre* (London, B.L. Add. 12144, fol. 178ra21-rb43), que cet opuscule contient une citation de l'*Isagoge* de Porphyre, semblable à ce que l'on trouve dans l'*Introduction*: observant une parenté de langage et de contenu entre l'opuscule en question et la traduction conservée anonymement de l'*Isagoge*, Aydin suggère que Sergius a pu être l'auteur de cette traduction. Si l'opuscule n'est pas l'œuvre de Sergius, ajoute en outre Aydin, il a pu être composé par un élève. Plus loin, dans son introduction, l'auteur revient sur la question de la traduction anonyme de l'*Isagoge*. Observant que l'on a pu, à juste titre, rejeter l'attribution à Sergius de la traduction anonyme des *Catégories*, il met en doute que l'on puisse aussi aisément rejeter l'attribution au même Sergius de la traduction anonyme de l'*Isagoge*. Il rappelle que S. Brock, dans son introduction à son édition de cette version anonyme de l'*Isagoge*, a noté que le vocabulaire de cette version est proche du vocabulaire de Sergius dans son *Commentaire*, et il ajoute que la traduction de la définition porphyrienne de l'accident dans la traduction anonyme de l'*Isagoge* est identique à celle que l'on trouve dans l'opuscule *Une démonstration naturelle*, attribué à Sergius. Sans doute la dite définition est-elle un peu différente de celle que l'on trouve dans l'*Introduction*, mais cela s'expliquerait par le fait que, dans ce dernier ouvrage, Sergius ne traduit pas, mais paraphrase la définition en question. En somme, si Sergius n'a pas traduit l'*Isagoge*, conclut Aydin, cette traduction devait exister à son époque et il a pu en avoir connaissance.

En divers passages de son commentaire, Aydin mentionne à nouveau la possibilité que Sergius ait pu être l'auteur de cette traduction, et si nous-même nous nous y attardons, c'est que ce point soulève une question de méthode. L'auteur nous semble avoir tendance à valoriser les ressemblances entre le lexique de Sergius et celui de la traduction de l'*Isagoge*, et à minorer leurs différences. Nous n'en prendrons qu'un exemple, tiré des paragraphes qui concernent la catégorie de l'opposition. À propos de l'opposition, Aristote lui-même distingue entre les opposés (*τὰ ἀντικείμενα*) et les contraires (*τὰ ἐναντία*), qui en sont une espèce (*Cat.* 11 b 17-19). Les commentateurs grecs eux-mêmes, Ammonius et Philopon, distinguent et explicitent la différence entre *ἀντίθεσις* et *ἐναντιότης*. Sergius, pour sa part, marque cette différence par l'emploi de deux termes différents, *dalqubloyuto* pour *ἀντίθεσις*, et *sagubloyuto* pour *ἐναντιότης*. Le traducteur anonyme des *Catégories* utilise le seul terme *dalqubloyuto* pour les deux notions, effaçant ainsi leur différence, et rendant le texte d'Aristote incohérent en certains passages.³ Dans la traduction syriaque anonyme de l'*Isagoge*, les deux mots syriaques sont employés, mais de manière incohérente. Aydin reconnaît que cet usage peut être tenu pour une preuve contre l'attribution de la traduction à Sergius, mais il ajoute la restriction suivante: "but the instances are few and the confusion there may depend on the textual transmission of this translation, if not reflecting an initial tendency in Sergius" (p. 247).

³ Cf. Hugonnard-Roche, *La logique d'Aristote* (cité n. 2), p. 32.

L'appel à l'argument de la transmission textuelle nous semble fort ressembler à un argument *ad hoc*, irréfutable de ce fait même, mais peu convaincant. Quant à l'idée que Sergius ait pu utiliser un terme pour l'autre, elle semble également peu convaincante: que signifie "initial", si l'on se souvient que Sergius a étudié à Alexandrie auprès d'Ammonius? Faut-il imaginer qu'il ait traduit l'*Isagoge* avant son séjour alexandrin? D'autre part, Sergius écrit explicitement dans son *Commentaire*, lorsqu'il traite de l'opposition: "À beaucoup (de gens) il semble que l'opposition (*dalqubloyuto*) est la même chose que la contrariété (*saqubloyuto*) car elles n'ont aucune différence l'une par rapport à l'autre. Mais cela n'est pas vrai, car l'opposition est plus large que la contrariété. En effet, tout ce qui est contraire est dit être opposé, mais tout ce qui est opposé n'apparaît pas être le contraire de quelque chose. La contrariété est donc une des espèces de l'opposition".⁴ Sergius était donc parfaitement conscient de la différence, non seulement entre les deux termes, mais aussi entre les deux notions signifiées. Suggérer qu'il ait pu ignorer cette différence, dans une première époque de son travail philosophique, nous semble à nouveau un argument purement *ad hoc*, destiné à défendre une hypothétique attribution qui lui serait faite de la rédaction de la traduction syriaque de l'*Isagoge*. Il est indéniable qu'il existe des parentés lexicales entre cette version de l'*Isagoge* et les textes de Sergius, mais elle s'explique dans une large mesure par les habitudes de traduction en usage à la première époque des traductions gréco-syriaques de ce type de textes philosophiques, et aussi peut-être, pour certains cas, par la connaissance que Sergius aurait pu avoir de ce texte, dont il n'aurait d'ailleurs pas retenu tous les éléments lexicaux. Cela dit, il ne nous semble pas de bon usage de se fonder sur des ressemblances pour tenter de fonder une attribution, au moins potentielle, en ne prenant pas suffisamment en compte les différences. Et l'on sait qu'une attribution présentée à de nombreuses reprises comme possible tend à devenir une attribution quasi-certaine, par l'effet même de sa répétition, auprès d'un public insuffisamment critique.

Ceci nous amène à un lieu commun trop largement répandu dans l'histoire de l'*Organon* aristotélicien. Présentant, dans une section de son introduction, le *curriculum* des études à Alexandrie, qui devait former l'arrière-plan scolaire de Sergius lui-même, Aydin note que les livres de logique qui étaient lus au cours des études introductives, étaient l'*Isagoge* de Porphyre, puis quatre traités d'Aristote, les *Catégories*, le *De Interpretatione*, les *Premiers Analytiques* et les *Seconds Analytiques* (aussi appelés *Apodictiques*). Il ajoute: "This list corresponds to the study of the so called short or truncated *Organon* attributed to the Alexandrian and the Syriac traditions and being said to stop at *Prior Analytics* 1.7" (p. 44). Cette affirmation est manifestement fautive, puisque la liste en question comprend la fin des *Premiers Analytiques* et les *Seconds Analytiques* en entier. Pour sauver tout à la fois la liste du *curriculum* alexandrin, et le témoignage des sources qui prétendent que l'étude s'arrêtait avant la fin de la liste complète des ouvrages de la logique aristotélicienne, Aydin suggère que la limite des études devrait être reportée à la fin des *Seconds Analytiques*, et non point à la fin des *Premiers Analytiques* 1.7. Il nous semble que le débat sur ce sujet repose sur des confusions, qui posent un problème de méthode. On a déjà montré que, si par cette dernière limite l'on entendait que les lettrés syriaques n'avaient pas connaissance du reste de l'œuvre logique d'Aristote, cela est manifestement faux, puisque tous les traités de l'*Organon* avaient été traduits du grec en syriaque, par des lettrés issus du monastère de Qenneshre, dans la seconde moitié du VII^e siècle. Il est dès lors fort peu probable que la même limite corresponde à un *curriculum*, même si l'on n'a pas une connaissance très poussée du *curriculum* suivi dans les écoles syriaques sur ce sujet. En revanche cette limite correspond bien au contenu de certains traités, dont l'objet est centré sur la syllogistique assertorique.

⁴ Nous reprenons notre traduction, *ibid.*, p. 32.

On peut citer par exemple le *Traité de logique* de Paul le Perse, celui sur les *Premiers Analytiques* de Proba, celui de Sévère Sebokht sur les syllogismes, et l'on peut mentionner aussi le *Liber Peri Hermeneias* d'Apulée (ou du Pseudo-Apulée). Chacun des traités syriaques possède d'ailleurs ses caractéristiques propres, notamment par la place qui y est faite à des extraits d'autres traités comme les *Catégories* ou le *Peri Hermeneias*. Il n'y a donc pas lieu, pensons-nous, de confondre *curriculum* et réalisation effective de traités particuliers.

Ceci nous amène à l'*Introduction* de Sergius elle-même. Aydin fait très justement observer, dans son introduction, que cet ouvrage de Sergius, même s'il est en quelque manière un abrégé du *Commentaire*, n'est pas pour autant un commentaire des *Catégories*, selon le sens ordinaire du mot. Sa composition semblerait indiquer qu'il n'était pas destiné à l'usage dans une classe d'école, mais qu'il était plutôt conçu comme une introduction à la philosophie d'Aristote, destinée à un cercle plus éduqué. D'autres auteurs ont écrit deux ouvrages plus ou moins étendus sur le même sujet, note encore Aydin, qui mentionne les deux commentaires de Porphyre sur les *Catégories*, et ceux de Boèce et d'al-Fārābī sur les mêmes *Catégories*. À vrai dire, ces comparaisons ne nous semblent guère utiles pour justifier que Sergius ait écrit deux ouvrages d'introduction à la philosophie d'Aristote. Nous savons déjà que ces deux ouvrages répondent à deux demandes qui ont été faites à Sergius. Et il est plus intéressant de s'arrêter à la composition même de ces traités. Nous ne nous intéresserons ici qu'à celle de l'*Introduction*.

Précisons d'abord que l'édition du texte syriaque par Aydin est excellente et que la traduction est dans l'ensemble parfaitement fiable. Le texte syriaque et la traduction (imprimés en vis-à-vis) sont découpés en sections numérotées, auxquelles renvoient les paragraphes du commentaire, placés à leur suite. Le commentaire de Aydin est attentif aux questions de lexique, et l'auteur explicite souvent le choix et l'emploi des termes techniques par Sergius. La majeure partie du commentaire, toutefois, est consacrée à une confrontation du texte de Sergius avec les commentaires grecs sur les *Catégories*, ceux d'Ammonius et de Philopon principalement, comme il est naturel eu égard à la date du texte de Sergius (antérieur à 536, date de la mort de l'auteur). À l'occasion sont cités d'autres commentaires, tels ceux de Simplicius, d'Olympiodore ou d'Élias, par exemple, qui permettent de contextualiser les débats ou arguments auxquels a donné lieu tel ou tel passage d'Aristote. Les textes syriaques permettent parfois d'avoir une vue plus complète de la tradition du commentarisme grec, et Aydin souligne à juste titre que l'accord, sur tel point particulier, entre l'*Introduction* de Sergius et le commentaire d'Élias, permet de remonter à un enseignement d'Ammonius que la version conservée ἀπὸ φωνῆς du commentaire de ce dernier sur les *Catégories* n'a pas reproduit en son intégralité (p. 237-8).

Mais il est remarquable qu'à propos de certaines parties de l'*Introduction*, soient cités des commentaires sur l'*Isagoge* de Porphyre, et non sur les *Catégories*. En effet, après une brève introduction (livre I^{er} selon le découpage de Aydin), qui concerne la division de la philosophie en ses parties, le livre II qui traite de sujets d'ordre sémantique et le livre III consacré à la substance et aux accidents, contiennent l'un et l'autre des sujets qui se rapportent à des thèmes communs à Porphyre et à Aristote. Le livre II examine notamment si les catégories se rapportent aux choses simples, aux concepts ou aux noms; puis il examine les quatre espèces du discours, la question de l'être des universaux, la liste des catégories, les genres et espèces et l'arbre de Porphyre, la question des homonymes, polyonymes, synonymes et hétéronymes. On retrouve, parmi ces sujets, des questions traitées par Aristote dans le *Peri Hermeneias*, d'autres traitées dans les introductions des commentaires néoplatoniciens aux *Catégories*, ou dans les commentaires grecs à l'*Isagoge*, notamment. D'ailleurs l'ordre dans lequel ces sujets sont abordés n'est pas exactement le même dans l'*Introduction* de Sergius et dans son *Commentaire*. On trouve certes, dans le commentaire de Aydin, l'exposé des sources et des commentaires grecs parallèles à ceux des Sergius. Il eût été intéressant,

toutefois, d'ajouter quelques remarques sur l'introduction, de la part de Sergius, de ces sujets dans son ouvrage, dont l'essentiel est un exposé touchant les *Catégories*, et sur l'ordre même selon lequel ces sujets sont traités. C'est, en effet, la visée même de l'ensemble de l'ouvrage qui est en jeu, en quelque manière. Conscient que l'ouvrage de Sergius n'est pas un pur et simple commentaire des *Catégories*, Aydin lui a donné pour titre: *Introduction to Aristotle and his Categories*, mais il aurait fallu, pour le lecteur, développer les raisons pour lesquelles il s'agit d'une introduction à Aristote, et non pas seulement aux *Catégories*. Une part de ces raisons se trouve dans les diverses additions faites par Sergius aux sujets propres des *Catégories*, dont nous avons mentionné certaines trop rapidement ci-dessus, et dans l'organisation même de ces additions. Si le philosophe qui guide toute la démarche de Sergius, celui qu'il considère comme le savant majeur à étudier, est bien Aristote, un autre auteur joue un rôle fondamental à certains égards dans la tradition philosophique dont il relève, à savoir Porphyre, et spécialement l'*Isagoge*. Lui aussi fait partie de ce qui permet de dire que le traité de Sergius est une introduction à Aristote et aux *Catégories*, en raison de son importance pour la lecture de la sémantique et de l'ontologie des *Catégories*, et plus largement de la logique aristotélicienne.

L'analyse philologique et l'analyse philosophique, d'autre part, ne sont pas toujours simples à faire coïncider, pas du moins autant qu'on pourrait le penser. Aussitôt après la préface et un paragraphe concernant la division de la philosophie, Sergius traite très brièvement de la question de l'objet du traité des *Catégories*, en écrivant (dans la traduction de Aydin): "After the division of philosophy, we say that all things that are simple in the world are either words or concepts that signify the objects that are in the world, or objects that are perceived" (p. 97). Il décrit ensuite les différents éléments ainsi distingués, sans énoncer toutefois l'objet du traité, comme le font les philosophes néoplatoniciens de son temps (à la suite de Porphyre et de Jamblique), à savoir que le propos d'Aristote est de traiter des mots qui signifient les choses par l'intermédiaire des concepts.⁵ La forme verbale traduite par "perceived", formée sur le verbe *ida'* ('savoir', 'connaître'), peut vouloir dire, en effet, "(réalités) perçues", mais elle peut aussi vouloir dire "signifiées". L'on pourrait alors traduire: "toutes les (entités)⁶ simples qui sont dans le monde sont ou bien les sons vocaux (*bnot qole* = φωναί), ou bien les concepts qui signifient les réalités (*sebuoto* = πράγματα), ou bien les réalités signifiées". Le contexte est, en effet, celui de la relation sémantique qui lie les trois éléments dont il est question: mots (ou entités linguistiques), concepts signifiants et choses signifiées. Il ne s'agit pas de savoir si les choses sont perçues, ni de la relation entre des concepts et des choses perçues, mais de la relation entre des concepts et les choses signifiées par ceux-ci. L'important n'est pas que les choses soient perçues, mais qu'elles n'existent pas qu'en pure imagination comme le fameux bouc-cerf, car le propos du philosophe concerne ce qui est et existe réellement. Sur cet exemple, on voit que l'on peut adopter une traduction qui satisfait la philologie, et le sens qu'elle enveloppe, ou bien une traduction, qui ferait crédit à Sergius d'une analyse philosophique sous-jacente, mais conforme à ce qu'il a pu apprendre auprès de ses maîtres alexandrins. En toute rigueur, le choix est indécidable.⁷

⁵ Voir, par exemple, Ammonius, *In De Int.*, p. 9.17-18 Busse (*CAG IV*, Berlin 1895): ἔστιν οὖν σκοπὸς ἐνταῦθα τῶ φιλοσόφῳ διαλαβεῖν περὶ φωνῶν σημαίνουσῶν πράγματα διὰ μέσων νοημάτων.

⁶ Le texte syriaque ne contient pas ici de mot pour signifier "choses", mais seulement un pronom au pluriel.

⁷ À propos du même passage, Aydin suggère que le mot grec φωνή a pu prendre le sens technique de "word", sous l'influence du syriaque, dans lequel ce sens de "word" serait très tôt attesté pour l'expression *bat qolo*, dont nous avons vu plus haut qu'elle est utilisée là où le grec utiliserait φωνή. C'est par l'intermédiaire de Porphyre et de Jamblique, eux-mêmes issus d'un milieu pourvu d'un arrière-plan araméen, que le mot grec φωνή aurait acquis la signification technique de "word". Cette remarque repose sur deux décisions de traduction: celle de traduire *bat qolo* par "word", et celle de traduire φωνή par "word", et sur l'assomption supplémentaire que "word" a un sens technique, que l'auteur ne précise en aucune manière.

Un autre exemple de conflit potentiel entre analyse philologique et analyse philosophique est offert par les remarques de Aydin à propos de la description par Sergius des homonymes, polyonymes, synonymes et hétéronymes. Précisons d'abord que cette description est extrêmement brève et partiellement incomplète, en ceci par exemple que Sergius commence sa description, en écrivant à propos des homonymes: "some of the objects share only a name and are called homonyms, as 'dog of land', 'dog of water', [...]" (p. 107-9), sans indiquer que les réalités en question ne partagent pas la même définition. Mais le point n'est pas là, mais dans la suite, que voici: "Some of them share only the definition and are named *of the same species* [i.e. polyonymes], as for exemple 'stone', 'rock', and 'flint'. Some of the them share both the name and the definition and are *of one species* [i.e. synonyms], as 'Alexander the Macedonian' and 'Alexander Paris'".⁸ Il est exact que les divers objets (ou les diverses réalités), désignés par les termes 'stone', 'rock', and 'flint', ont en commun la même définition, et qu'ils sont de même espèce, et ce sont des objets répondant aux mêmes critères que les commentateurs grecs nomment polyonymes (les exemples d'Ammonius étant: l'épée, le glaive, le sabre). Il est vrai aussi que les réalités désignées par les noms 'Alexandre de Macédoine' et 'Alexandre Paris' ont en commun le nom 'Alexandre' et qu'elles appartiennent à une même espèce, l'espèce homme. Toutefois ces dernières réalités ne sont pas synonymes, au sens où Aristote, et les commentateurs alexandrins, Ammonius et Philopon entre autres, emploient ce terme, qui désigne chez eux des réalités "à la façon dont les genres sont attribués à leurs propres espèces",⁹ c'est-à-dire à la façon dont 'animal' se dit à la fois de l'homme et du bœuf (*Cat.* 1 a 6-8). Il est donc trompeur d'indiquer dans la traduction, comme le fait Aydin, que "of one species" équivaut à *synonyms*, d'autant qu'il remarque dans son propre commentaire que les deux Alexandre sont donnés comme des exemples d'homonymes par Philopon, Élias et Simplicius, ainsi que par Porphyre auparavant. Il est inexact, en outre, que la plupart des commentateurs grecs utilisent l'exemple des deux Ajax, qui seraient alors dit homonymes et synonymes en même temps: soit ils n'emploient pas le terme synonyme, soit ils mettent en garde contre l'apparence de synonymie. C'est, par exemple, parfaitement clair dans le passage où Ammonius explique qu'il faut prendre en considération, comme l'a précisé Aristote, la définition de l'essence signifiée par le nom (*κατὰ τοῦνομα*), c'est-à-dire non pas quelque définition au hasard, mais celle qui correspond au nom que les réalités ont en commun. Les deux Ajax ont en commun "animal rationnel mortel", mais ce n'est pas la définition qui correspond au nom: celle-ci est pour l'un "fils de Télamon", et pour l'autre "fils d'Oïlée", et les deux Ajax sont donc homonymes et non pas synonymes.¹⁰

Au terme de son commentaire sur ce sujet, Aydin écrit: "With his various expressions Sergius tries to render the underlying meaning of these classes instead of producing some kind of calque. As a student of the Alexandrian school, Sergius was in the midst of the discussion concerning this terminology and what these words were thought to designate, but at the same time he operates in

Nous ne pouvons reprendre ici toute la tradition de l'emploi de *φωνή* dans la littérature aristotélicienne, mais, en l'état, l'argument ne nous semble guère convaincant.

⁸ Nous reproduisons exactement la traduction de Aydin, p. 109.

⁹ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.*, p. 15.24 Busse (*CAG IV*, Berlin 1895): ὡςπερ κατηγορεῖται τὰ γένη τῶν οικείων εἰδῶν.

¹⁰ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.*, p. 19.17-20.1 Busse. À propos de cette question des homonymes et synonymes, Aydin mentionne le commentaire de Simplicius, mais il ne semble pas connaître le commentaire fondamental de C. Luna sur cette partie de l'ouvrage du commentateur, dans: *Simplicius. Commentaire sur les Catégories*. Traduction commentée sous la direction de I. Hadot, fasc. III, *Préambule aux Catégories, Commentaire au premier chapitre des Catégories* (p. 21-40.13 *Kalbfleisch*). Traduction de Ph. Hoffmann (avec la collaboration d'I. Hadot, P. Hadot et C. Luna). Commentaire et notes à la traduction par C. Luna, Brill, Leiden -New York - København - Köln 1990 (*Philosophia Antiqua*, 51).

another sphere and does not put on himself the burden of tradition and that of transferring the whole vocabulary. Therefore, he can express the essence of the Greek terms, without feeling obliged to coin exact counterpart in Syriac” (p. 199-200). On peut certes accorder à Aydin que Sergius n’a pas cherché à former des calques de tous les termes grecs, et qu’il a sans doute opéré dans une autre sphère. Mais on ne peut considérer qu’il a réussi à rendre la signification sous-jacente des classes de réalités désignées par les termes grecs, du moins pas pour ce qui concerne les synonymes. Et il n’est certainement pas exact de dire qu’il a exprimé l’essence des termes grecs, spécialement de celui qui s’applique aux réalités synonymes.

Ainsi que Aydin le remarque à plusieurs reprises, Sergius construit habituellement des équivalences sémantiques plutôt que des équivalences étymologiques pour traduire des termes grecs techniques, et nous venons d’en voir des exemples. Mais en général, bien évidemment, cela n’a pas des conséquences de portée philosophique telles que celles que nous venons de rencontrer. Nous ferons une dernière remarque touchant le vocabulaire de Sergius, et sa traduction. Le début du paragraphe concernant les relatifs commence ainsi: “Again, those who have been trained in physics divide the category (*gensā*) of relatives in the art of logic and say as follow [...]” (p. 145). Sans doute, si l’on s’en rapporte à Aristote, il est légitime de traduire le mot *gensā* (transposition syriaque du grec γένος) par “category”. Mais, si l’on prend garde que les catégories sont désignées par Porphyre comme les dix genres suprêmes, et que cette désignation porphyrienne était devenue d’usage courant, notamment sous l’influence de la description de la division dite “arbre de Porphyre”, il paraît tout aussi légitime de traduire le mot syriaque en question par ‘genre’. C’est d’ailleurs ce que fait Aydin, précisément dans le paragraphe où Sergius décrit cette fameuse division.

C’est le grand mérite de l’ouvrage de Aydin de donner à lire, non seulement aux érudits syriacisants, mais aussi aux spécialistes de la philosophie grecque tardo-antique, un commentaire de Sergius de Reshaina, qui peut être considéré comme un représentant de la tradition alexandrine, issue d’Ammonius. L’ouvrage comporte aussi d’utiles glossaires syriaque-grec et grec-syriaque, et des index syriaque-anglais et anglais-syriaque.

Henri Hugonnard-Roche

The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology. Edited by S. Schmidtke, Oxford U.P., Oxford 2016, 815 pp.

Voici que, sur l'initiative et sous la direction de Sabine Schmidtke, Professor of Islamic Intellectual History at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton (NJ.), quarante et une études ayant trait à la théologie musulmane nous sont proposées en un ensemble des mieux articulés qui en couvre toute l'histoire depuis les origines au VII^{ème} siècle jusqu'à nos jours, XX^{ème} siècle. Certes, le lecteur ou le chercheur a toujours eu la possibilité de consulter les riches articles de l'*Encyclopédie de l'Islam* (1^{ère} édition¹ et 2^{ème} édition²). Une 3^{ème} édition³ de celle-ci est à peine commencée, car celle qui la précédait a vu ses onze volumes édités de 1960 à 2005, ce qui en appelait "la mise à jour" en fonction des derniers acquis de la recherche scientifique. Certes, il était toujours possible de consulter le livre de Louis Gardet et de Georges Anawati au titre significatif, *Introduction à la théologie musulmane: Essai de théologie comparée*⁴ en sa teneur augmentée (passant de 343 pages à 541 pages en son édition de 1970) auquel était venu s'ajouter, en forme de manuel, l'ouvrage, en deux tomes de Robert Caspar, *Traité de théologie musulmane*.⁵ Il n'en reste pas moins vrai que les études n'ont pas manqué, ces dernières années, dans le cadre islamologique, et surtout celui du *kalām*. Et c'est pourquoi le premier avantage de cette "somme théologique" est de fournir à la fin de chacun de ses chapitres une bibliographie des plus détaillées qui tiennent compte des dernières publications en la matière. À ce titre, déjà, il convient d'en remercier la promotrice et la coordinatrice, la Professeuse Sabine Schmidtke elle-même.

Le présent volume offre en effet une très riche et très vaste vue d'ensemble de la pensée théologique en Islam depuis ses manifestations les plus anciennes jusqu'à ses expressions les plus récentes. Qui plus est, il tient aussi compte de l'importance significative des échanges intercommunautaires au cours des siècles entre penseurs musulmans, d'une part, et théologiens juifs ou chrétiens, d'autre part. La pensée de ces derniers non seulement a parfois reflété celle des Musulmans, tandis que les méthodologies chrétiennes en matière de raisonnement spéculatif sur les données de la foi et les notions alors élaborées en matière doctrinale ont également exercé une certaine influence sur sa formation elle-même. L'organisation de l'ensemble du livre en ses chapitres est diachronique. L'inégalité des trois 'parties' reflète, d'une part, la très riche production académique des études concernant l'histoire intellectuelle qui va des origines de l'Islam jusqu'à sa période classique, en contraste, d'autre part, avec la déplorable rareté de celles-ci quand il s'agit de la période postclassique. C'est ainsi qu'après une "comprehensive Introduction" par Sabine Schmidtke (pp. 1-17), ses références (*Bibliographical References*, pp. 17-23), se présentent comme l'heureuse annonce qu'il en sera de même à la fin de chaque chapitre: effectivement chacun se voit doté d'une bibliographie strictement mise à jour et qui épuise son sujet, effort dont il faut savoir également remercier Sabine Schmidtke. Voici donc comment se présente le *Summary of the Volume*. La 1^{ère} Partie (ch. 1 à 20) de loin la plus détaillée, comprend des études qui discutent des "Forms of Islamic Theology(ies) during the Formative and the Early Middle Period". La 2^{ème} Partie (ch. 21-24) comprend quatre études de cas qui explorent, tour à tour, les "Intellectual Interactions of Islamic Theology(ies)". La 3^{ème} Partie (ch. 25 à 35) se concentre sur "The Later Middle and Early

¹ *Encyclopédie de l'Islam. Dictionnaire géographique, ethnologique et biographique des peuples musulmans*, éd. M.T. Houtsma - R. Basset - T.W. Arnold - R. Hartmann, Brill - Maisonneuve, Leiden - Paris 1913-1938.

² *Encyclopédie de l'Islam*. Nouvelle édition établie avec le concours de principaux orientalistes par C.E. Bosworth *et al.*, assistés de P.J. Bearman, sous le patronage de l'Union Académique Internationale, Brill, Leiden 1960-2005.

³ *The Encyclopaedia of Islam Three*, edited by K. Fleet - G. Krämer - D. Matringe - J. Nawas - E. Rowson, Brill, Leiden 2011—

⁴ L. Gardet - G.C. Anawati, *Introduction à la théologie musulmane. Essai de théologie comparée*, Vrin Paris 1948, 1970².

⁵ R. Caspar, *Traité de théologie musulmane. I. Histoire de la pensée religieuse musulmane. II. Le Credo*, Pontificio Istituto di Studi Arabi e d'Islamistica, Roma 1987, 1999.

Modern Period”. La 4^{ème} Partie (ch. 36-39) comprend également quatre études de cas qui analysent surtout “The Impact of Political and Social History on Islamic Theology”. Enfin la 5^{ème} Partie (ch. 40-41) aborde cette importante question: “The Islamic Theological Thought from the End of the Early Modern Period to the Modern Period”. Et voici donc brièvement décrit l’ensemble des quarante et une études qu’offre cette ‘somme de théologie musulmane’ qui nous vient de l’Université d’Oxford.

Le Ch. 1 (pp. 27-43), intitulé “Origins of Kalām”, est l’œuvre d’Alexander Treiger, Associate Professor of Religious Studies at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia. L’A. y explique les premières querelles à propos de la tout-puissance divine et du libre arbitre de l’homme, d’où des pages sur “The Origins of Kalām-Style Argumentation and of the term kalām” avant de traiter des “Origins of the Qadar Debate”, non sans d’étranges débats entre théologiens chrétiens à la même époque. D’où l’étude approfondie des “Three ‘Early’ Texts on Qadar, Attributed to Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafīyya (*Questions against the Qadarites*), Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz (*Epistle*), and Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (*Qadarite Epistle*)”. La conclusion de l’A. s’avère être des plus affirmatives: “Si les trois textes sont des faux tardifs, comme cela semble très probable, il faut donc dire que nous n’avons pas de documents relatifs au *kalām* dans le premier siècle de l’hégire: les origines du *kalām* en tant que tel demeurent donc des plus obscures”.

Au Ch. 2 (pp. 44-54), “The Early Qadariyya” is analysed by Steven C. Judd, Professor of Middle East History at Southern Connecticut State University in New Haven. L’association du mouvement qadarite avec la calife omeyyade Yazīd et la 3^{ème} *fitna* qui s’ensuivit n’a guère laissé de trace. Ce phénomène ne dura que quelques décennies après la prédication de Ma‘bad (690) jusqu’à la chute du calife Yazīd b al-Walīd (740). On a beaucoup fait pour les éloigner du grand développement théologal en prétendant que leur doctrine se référerait à des pensées philo-chrétiennes.

Avec le Ch. 3 (pp. 56-80), “Jahm b. Ṣafwān (d. 128/745-6) and the ‘Jahmiyya’ and Ḍirār b. ‘Amr (d. 200/815)”, Cornelia Schöck, Professor of Islamic Studies at the Department of Philology of the Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany, brosse un tableau de l’œuvre philosophique de Jahm dont on ne connaît que le *K. al-Taḥrīsh*. Une 1^{ère} partie présente “Jahm b. Ṣafwān and the ‘Jahmiyya’”. En bref, “la connaissance et l’ignorance ne se réfèrent qu’aux choses seulement corporelles et existant réellement. ‘Chose’ est le genre de toutes les entités auxquelles appartient d’être ‘semblable ou dissemblable’. Toute chose qui existe est corporelle. Dieu est non-chose, incomposé, indivisible en parties et donc intellectuellement imperceptible, indescriptible, inintelligible. Il ne peut être décrit par des attributs et il est donc impossible de décrire qui il est, tandis qu’on le peut connaître par intuition. Tous les attributs et tous les verbes sont identiques quant au sens et à la référence dès qu’ils sont appliqués à Dieu. Dieu est la seule cause de toutes choses”. Ḍirār s’en tient à Aristote: le corps est un composé et un substrat d’accidents, il distingue entre accidents inséparables *per se* et les autres: il est impossible que des accidents sensibles proviennent de pensées non sensibles et donc la matière de l’immatériel, il est impossible de séparer l’existence des accidents, il n’y a ni matière primordiale ni forme immanente ou essence. Et Dieu et l’homme sont des agents en réalité. En conclusion, l’A. signale qu’il y aurait lieu de méditer sur le mystère de l’être lui-même et celui du Dieu un et trine des Chrétiens.

Au Ch. 4 (pp. 81-90), Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi, Professor of Classical Islamic Theology à l’École Pratique des Hautes Études, Sorbonne, Paris s’explique sur le vocabulaire de la “Early Shī‘ī Theology” et la dialectique de l’apparent et de l’occulte entre sunnisme et šī‘isme, exotérique (*ẓāhir*)/ésotérique (*bā‘īn*), noms et attributs de Dieu/essence de Dieu, prophète-messager (*nabī rasūl*)/imām-ami de Dieu (*imām/walī*), prophétie (*nubuwwa*)/imāmat et amitié avec Dieu (*imāma-walāya*), lettre de la révélation (*tanzīl*)/herméneutique spirituelle (*ta‘wīl*), soumission à la religion révélée (*islām*)/initiation à la religion ésotérique (*imān*). Et lui de faire de même pour la dialectique du bon et du mauvais: intelligence cosmique/ignorance cosmique [...], amour envers l’imām (*walāya, tawallī, muwālā*)/dissociation loin des adversaires (*barā’a, tabarrī, mu’ādāt*).

Le Ch. 5 (pp. 91-102) fait place à l'“Excursus I: Christian Theological Thought during the First ‘Abbāsid Century”, dûment présenté par Sidney H. Griffith, Professor of Arabic Christianity at the Catholic University of America, Washington, DC. Expert en la matière, il refait en quelques pages de forme synthétique toute l'histoire de la polémique islamo-chrétienne en cette période, depuis Jean de Damas (m. c. 750) jusqu'au X^{ème} siècle avec Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī (m. 974) en passant par le patriarche Timothée I (m. 823), Abū Qurra (m.c. 830), ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī (m.c. 850) et Abū Rā’iṭa (m.c. 851), que cette polémique ait été pensée et écrite en grec ou en arabe, du côté chrétien, ou uniquement en arabe du côté musulman où brille, entre autres, al-Hāšimī.

Quant au Ch. 6 (pp. 103-29), qui a pour titre *Excursus II: Ungodly Cosmologies* et pour auteur la regrettée Patricia Crone, jadis Professor of Islamic History at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton (NJ), il fournit un large tableau des cosmologies alors régnautes au Moyen-Orient, lesquelles ne faisaient aucune place à Dieu dans leur “vision du monde”: le fait est que *Mutakallimūn* musulmans et théologiens chrétiens furent obligés d'en réfuter les assertions tout en empruntant certains éléments acceptables: dialogue et interaction des philosophies et des sagesses! Quels y étaient alors les derniers représentants des grandes cosmogonies qui avaient régné dans le monde gréco-romain et que l'A. appelle “les acteurs”? Au point de vue épistémologique, celle-ci, après avoir distingué entre “scepticisme et dogmatisme”, passe en revue les Zindīqs, les Dahrīs: *Aṣḥāb al-ṭabā’ī* et les *Aṣḥāb al-hayūlā*. Car le problème est là: “Tous les peuples ‘athées’ nient la création *ex nihilo*, certains croient que Dieu a créé le monde à partir d'une matière pré-existante, d'autres soutiennent qu'il a sa propre origine en lui-même, et d'autres enfin soutiennent qu'il a toujours existé”. L'A. insiste à bon droit sur cette permanence des diverses formes de l'athéisme philosophique qui n'était pas sans influencer la problématique théologique des uns et des autres.

Le Ch. 7 (pp. 130-41) se devait donc d'introduire “The Mu‘tazilite Movement (I): The Origins of the Mu‘tazila”. L'A. en est Racha El-Omari, Associate Professor of Religious Studies at the University of California Santa Barbara. Son information est des plus riches, ce qui lui permet d'abord de préciser ce que signifie “le terme Mu‘tazila”, puis d'en décrire “le mouvement” en ses écoles provinciales ainsi que “les doctrines” développées par les unes et les autres. On peut le suivre en sa conclusion: “L'usage que fait al-Malaṭī (m. 987) du mot *tazalū* indique quelles furent les caractéristiques du mouvement, “fidélité à l'étude et au culte, ascétisme quiétiste, relative neutralité politique”, d'où “l'apparente contradiction de l'orientation politique entre Wāṣil et ‘Amr, d'un côté, et des partisans d'al-Nafs al-Zakiyya, de l'autre”.

Le Ch. 8 (pp. 142-58) en assure les premiers développements avec “The Mu‘tazilite Movement (II): The Early Mu‘tazilites”. L'A., David Bennett, Postdoctoral Fellow in the Representation and Reality Research Programme at the University of Gothenburg, y propose la doctrine reconnue comme représentative de la Mu‘tazila, après en avoir présenté les sources et les personnages les plus connus. La *Miḥna* est brièvement évoquée et les cinq principes sont rappelées: unicité de Dieu (*tawḥīd*), justice de Dieu (*‘adl*), récompense et châtement (*al-wa‘d wa-l-wa‘id*), la position (du pécheur) entre les deux positions du croyant et du mécréant (*al-manzila bayna l-manzilatayn*), commanderie du bien et interdiction du mal (*al-amr bi-l-ma‘rūf wa-l-nahy ‘an al-munkar*). Mais s'y ajoute un recours à l'atomisme: “indivisibilité du plus petit des corps, et certaines influences venues du dualisme, des Grecs, et des sagesses indiennes et iraniennes”. Qui plus est, en Dieu, les attributs font partie de l'essence même de Dieu et l'homme est responsable de ses actes car il en est le créateur (*ḥallāq*).

Au Ch. 9 (pp. 159-80), Sabine Schmidtke refait une lecture compréhensive du “Mu‘tazilite Movement (III): The Scholastic Phase” lorsque celui-ci s'est définitivement institutionnalisé. Article de synthèse, il renvoie à la première génération des Mu‘tazilites, puis aux enseignements de la Bahšamiyya avec Abū Hāšim qui y introduisit la notion d'“états” (*aḥwāl*) dans la spiritualité mu‘tazilite, et enfin comment se fit la transmission des doctrines et de leurs subtilités à la dernière génération des Bahšamiyya.

C'est pour l'A. l'occasion de s'étendre sur "Abū l-Husayn al-Baṣrī et son école". Intéressantes sont encore les allusions de l'A. aux relations de la Mu'tazila avec l'Aš'arisme de leur temps et aussi avec les théologiens juifs Karaïtes de la même époque. Il est certain que le Mu'tazilisme représente le meilleur effort des philosophes et théologiens de l'âge d'or à Bagdad pour intégrer le patrimoine légué par les Grecs à travers les traductions que les moines syriaques en firent alors en vue d'amener la pensée de leur temps, très pluraliste en tous domaines, à tenter une première harmonie entre foi et raison.

Le Ch. 10 (pp. 181-95) envisage, grâce à Hassan Ansari, Member of the School of the Historical studies at the Institute of Advanced Study, Princeton (NJ) "The Shī'ī Reception of Mu'tazilism (I): Zaydīs" et le Ch. 11 (pp. 196-214), grâce au même Hassan Ansari, aidé par Sabine Schmidtke, "The Shī'ī Reception of Mu'tazilism (II): Twelver Shī'īs". Ces deux études révèlent "la mu'tazilization du Zaydisme iranien" en s'étendant sur "les différentes traditions littéraires du Zaydisme en Iran" et celle de l'Imāmisme duodécimain à travers ses diverses manifestations: "la théologie šī'ite du vivant même des imāms, puis durant l'occultation mineure, enfin durant l'occultation majeure". S'y ajoute aussi une vue d'ensemble de cette même théologie "à partir du VI^{ème}/XII^{ème} siècle".

Le Ch. 12 (pp. 215-24) et le Ch. 13 (pp. 225-31) s'interrogent sur l'émergence de l'Aš'arisme à cette époque, le premier évoquant le rôle des "Predecessors of Ash'arism: Ibn Kullāb (m. 855), al-Muḥāsibī (m. 857) and al-Qalānīsī" décrit par Harith Bin Ramli, Research Fellow at the Cambridge Muslim College, et le second en situant son premier épanouissement *Between Cordoba and Nīsābūr*: "The Emergence and Consolidation of Ash'arism (Fourth-Fifth/Tenth-Eleventh Century)" étudié par Jan Thiele, Marie Curie Fellow at the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC), Madrid. Les trois premiers, surnommés "kullābites", élaborèrent alors une "structure ontologique apte à défendre l'idée de l'éternité des attributs divins". Cordoue et Nīsābūr virent se développer des écoles de théologie qui tendaient à établir un équilibre doctrinal entre les partisans philo-mu'tazilites de la raison et les non moins acharnés défenseurs de la seule révélation, ce qui était l'idéal al-Aš'arī (m. 936). C'est ainsi qu'une doctrine commune fut alors proposée comme expression orthodoxe du sunnisme, encouragée par le prince seljoukide Nizām al-Mulk (m. 1092), comme idéologie officielle et propagée partout grâce aux ouvrages d'al-Ġuwaynī (m. 1085), d'al-Bāqillānī (m. 1013) et d'al-Ġazālī (m. 1111).

Deux autres études signalent l'originalité de tendances théologiques qui témoignent à leur manière du pluralisme intellectuel qui régnait alors dans le monde musulman. Le Ch. 14 (pp. 242-51) s'intéresse à la "Early Ibādī Theology" dont parle avec compétence Wilferd Madelung, Laudian Professor Emeritus of Arabic at the University of Oxford et le Ch. 15 (pp. 252-62) donne une idée de la théologie des "Karrāmiyya" grâce à Aron Zysow, independent scholar based in Boston (MA). Les Ibādīyya du Mزاب algérien et du Sultanat d'Oman restent fidèles à la transcendance abstraite et immatérielle de Dieu (nulle vision de celle-ci dans l'au-delà, refus de la nature incréée du Coran). Quant aux premiers disciples d'Ibn Karrām (m. 869), leur cosmogonie empruntait beaucoup au stoïcisme et leur théologie s'attardait plus particulièrement sur la création, ce qui les distingue singulièrement des Mu'tazilites, des Aš'arites et des Mātūrīdites.

Les six chapitres qui suivent se situent au plan des défis mêmes que se devaient d'affronter les diverses théologies de l'époque, défis qui semblent paradoxalement être toujours les mêmes aujourd'hui. Le Ch. 16 (pp. 263-79), en effet, affronte le contraste de base: "Scripturalist and Traditionalist Theology", qu'il analyse en ses divers aspects Binyamin Abrahamov, Professor Emeritus of Islamic Theology and Mysticism, and Qur'anic Studies at Bar Ilan University, Israel. Celui-ci répartit comme suit les quatre catégories de sa typologie; les scripturalistes ou littéralistes qui s'en tiennent à la seule lecture des "signifiés" du Coran, les traditionnistes qui ne retiennent que les dits et les faits des anciens tout en se posant des questions sur leur authenticité, les autres traditionnistes qui s'en tiennent au Coran, à la Sunna et au consensus (*iġmā*), les rationalistes qui rejoignent les vérités religieuses par la raison. Ces quatre types de

penseurs musulmans varient en pourcentage, mais on les trouve en chaque période de l'évolution de la théologie islamique. Comment foi et raison peuvent-elles dialoguer quand il s'agit de Dieu?

Le Ch. 17 (pp. 280-96) a pour titre "Ḥanafi Theological Tradition and Māturīdism" et c'est Ulrich Rudolph, Professor of Islamic Studies at the University of Zurich, qui en assure la présentation d'ensemble. Suite à l'œuvre d'Abū Ḥanīfa (m. 767), fondateur éponyme de l'école juridique qui porte son nom, une "tradition théologique ḥanafite" s'est en effet formée au cours des âges, tout en tenant compte des circonstances et en s'adaptant à celles-ci en droit (*fiqh*), ce qui ne fut pas sans influencer sa théologie. On harmonise là où les choses semblaient irréconciliables. C'est ici que l'œuvre d'al-Māturīdī (m. 944) consiste en l'élaboration d'une théologie ḥanafite qui s'exprime par son livre *Kitāb al-tawḥīd* (*Traité de l'unicité divine*). L'école ḥanafite s'était particulièrement développée en Turkestan, Afghanistan, Iran puis Moyen-Orient et Empire Ottoman.

Le Ch. 18 (pp. 297-312), avec ce titre "Philosophical Theology", permet à Peter Adamson, Professor of Late Ancient and Arabic Philosophy at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, d'analyser la collaboration de l'une et de l'autre au cours des siècles. Si al-Ġazālī, en son temps, se félicite de "l'incohérence des philosophes" (*Tabāfut al-falāsifa*), Averroès, quant à lui, dénonce "l'incohérence de l'incohérence" (*Tabāfut al-tabāfut*). Qu'en fut-il donc de l'accueil de la philosophie grecque et du recours à celle-ci dans le domaine du *kalām*? De ce terreau classique voici qu'émergent al-Kindī pour qui Dieu n'est pas un intellect et l'univers n'est pas éternel, al-Fārābī qui n'hésite pas à emprunter à Platon, Aristote et Plotin, et Avicenne (m. 1037) dont *La métaphysique* (*al-Šifā*) s'impose par l'affirmation d'une Cause première nécessairement existante dont les attributs peuvent correspondre à ceux du Dieu de la révélation. Averroès, avec son *Traité décisif* (*Faṣl al-maqāl*), entend bien démontrer que raison et révélation concordent entre elles pour atteindre la vérité, même si l'une et l'autre y parviennent par des voies différentes.

Au Ch. 19 (pp. 313-24), Daniel de Smet explique ce qu'est la "Ismā'īlī Theology". Il est Directeur de recherche au CNRS et il dirige le projet "Livres sacrés. Canons et hétérodoxies" du Laboratoire d'Études sur les Monothéismes. C'est à ce titre qu'il offre cette autre approche théologique en islam, celle des Ismaéliens, Šī'ites qui estiment qu'à la mort (785) de l'imām Ġāfar al-Šādiq, le 6^{ème} de la ligne duodécimaine, devait succéder son fils Ismā'īl prédécédé, qui avait été désigné comme son successeur. Or c'est un fils plus jeune, Mūsā al-Kāzim, qui lui succéda. Les Ismaéliens, partisans de cet Ismā'īl, ont régné au Caire avec la dynastie des Fātimides, après avoir été les Qarmates, contestataires du pouvoir 'abbāside de Bagdad, et les Frères de la Pureté dont les *Épîtres* sont célèbres avant que certains n'en viennent à pratiquer l'action politique violente. Aujourd'hui, comme fidèles de l'Aga Khan, ils représentent une interprétation humaniste, voire rationalisante, de la théologie musulmane. Ils rejettent le *kalām* et disent que la théologie est une science impossible. Une trilogie est au centre de leur vision du monde: la Parole divine (*kalīma*), la Volonté (*irāda*) et le Commandement (*amr*). Le mystère demeure: quel est le plus sublime beau nom de Dieu quand on est convaincu, comme eux, que l'intellect est la source de la révélation?

Le Ch. 20 (325-343) rappelle au lecteur qu'il existe aussi une "Sufi Theological Thought" et c'est Martin Nguyen, Associate Professor of Islamic Religious Traditions in the Religious Studies Department at Fairfield University, Connecticut, qui en propose les principes essentiels, les manifestations diversifiées et les vocabulaires spécifiques. L'engagement soufi n'est pas sans relation avec la théologie scolastique de l'islam, mais il y faut bien comprendre que "sa voie" comporte des états (*aḥwāl*) et des stations (*maqāmāt*) pour parvenir à une connaissance expérimentale de Dieu et de l'union divine. Dans ce dernier cas, y a-t-il unicité de l'être (*waḥdat al-wuġūd*) ou unicité de témoignage (*waḥdat al-šuhūd*)? Et quelles y sont les ascensions et les visions? D'autant plus que "l'amour" divin peut être dit *maḥabba* ou *īšq*, avec des degrés dans l'amitié avec Dieu (*walāya*) et le don

des miracles (*karāmāt*). Toutes choses qui supposent ou entraînent une recomposition théologique non sans risquer des déviances hétérodoxes ou un recours à des techniques répréhensibles.

Le Ch. 21 (pp. 347-63) est une approche monographique de l'“Occasionalism” dans l'ensemble du *kalām* par Ulrich Rudolph, déjà cité. On sait que cette théorie “insiste sur le pouvoir absolu de Dieu en niant toute espèce de causalité naturelle et en attribuant tout effet causal dans le monde immédiatement à Lui”, et se retrouve aussi chez quelques auteurs européens au seuil des temps modernes. Les fondations de l'occasionalisme en islam renvoient aux III-IV/IX-X^{èmes} siècles, à Abū l-Hudayl (m. 842) à ses successeurs et à ses développements, ainsi qu'à l'enseignement d'al-Aṣ'arī (m. 935): cette théorie qui promeut la transcendance créatrice de Dieu a connu bien des expressions philo-théologiques par la suite, lesquelles n'ont pas manqué de subtiles analyses à ce sujet essentiel du dogme musulman (cf. al-Ġazālī).

Le Ch. 22 (pp. 364-83) apporte des précisions quant à l'œuvre d'“Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā'ī's (d. 321/933) Theory of 'States' (*aḥwāl*) and its adaptation by Ash'arite Theologians”, recherche assurée par Jan Thiele, déjà cité. À partir du “problème des attributs divins”, al-Ġubbā'ī a développé le concept d'“états” (*aḥwāl*) en lui donnant un signifié spécifique, d'où “les typologies des attributs dans la théologie Bahṣamī” et “l'adaptation du concept de *ḥāl*” en *kalām* par les théologiens aṣ'arites. Il s'agissait de donner aux attributs divins (“qualités éternelles”), attributs existants et non existants tout à la fois, une juste place en théologie en les considérant comme des “états”, ce qui évitait de leur donner une réalité ontologique.

Le Ch. 23 (pp. 384-407) traite de théologie morale avec ses “Theories of Ethical Value in Kalām: A New Interpretation”. Leur étude est ici assurée par Ayman Shihadeh, Senior Lecturer in Islamic Studies at SOAS, University of London. Quelles furent, en effet, les structures philo-théologiques qui réglèrent les problèmes de morale et donc les relations entre “Metaethics, Applied Theological Ethics, Normative Ethics”, c'est-à-dire sagesse et liberté en Dieu quant à la valeur des actes humains? Le réalisme mu'tazilite en éthique fondamentale (les actes sont ontologiquement bons ou mauvais en eux-mêmes) est expliqué en fonction des “Baghdādī (et) Baṣran views”. Tout cela en opposition avec le “volontarisme théologique de l'aṣ'arisme classique” lequel fait dépendre la qualité éthique des actes humains du fait qu'ils sont commandés ou interdits par Dieu, d'où l'importance de la Loi (*Ṣarī'a*) qui seule qualifie la valeur des actes. Un “neo-ash'arism” s'est fait jour en éthique en qualifiant alors les actes entre “utiles et nuisibles”.

Le Ch. 24 (pp. 408-31) envisage de plus près les rapports entre “Theology and Logic” et c'est Khaled El-Rouayheb, Professor of Islamic Intellectual History at Harvard University, qui en décrit les manifestations historiques, rappelant tour à tour “l'antique opposition à la logique grecque chez les premiers théologiens (IX-X^{èmes} siècles)”, puis son “assimilation par ceux qui suivirent aux XI-XV^{èmes} siècles”, bien qu'il y ait toujours eu “quelques protestations contre cette ‘naturalisation’ de la logique grecque”. L'A. résume ensuite ce qui est advenu après le XIV^{ème} siècle dans ce domaine toujours controversé. Il est certain qu'il y a toujours eu conflit entre les experts en exégèse coranique, plus ou moins tentés d'être littéralistes, et les partisans du recours à la logique en vue d'étendre le champ d'intervention de l'*iḡtibād*.

Le Ch. 25 (pp. 435-53) revient sur la question des rapports entre philosophie et théologie avec ce titre “Theology engages with Avicennan Philosophy: al-Ghazālī's *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* and Ibn al-Malāḥimī's *Tuhfat al-mutakallimīn fī l-radd 'alā l-falāsifa*”. Frank Griffel, Professor of Islamic Studies at Yale University in New Haven, en analyse les livres les plus représentatifs quant à l'opposition entre Avicenne, d'une part, et ceux d'al-Ġazālī et d'Ibn al-Malāḥimī, d'autre part. La stratégie globale du premier dans le *Tahāfut* s'exprime en “trois discussions à propos de l'éternité du monde, de la résurrection des corps et de la connaissance que Dieu a des ‘particuliers’”: ces trois erreurs sont discutées et condamnées par lui en bonne et due forme. Quant au second, dont l'unique manuscrit a été récemment retrouvé, il élargit la liste des opinions erronées données par al-Ġazālī, y intégrant celles relatives à la prophétie et à l'eschatologie.

Le Ch. 26 (pp. 456-72) s'interroge sur ce qui est advenu de la théologie des šī'ites duodécimains "Twelver shī'i Theology". Œuvre commune de Reza Pourjavady, Hafis Visiting Lecturer for Religion and Culture in Iran at the Goethe Universität, Frankfurt, et de Sabine Schmidtke, ce chapitre en étudie les expressions variées aux "Ilkhanid and Post-Ilkhanid Eras". Mais c'est lorsque l'Iran adopta le šī'isme duodécimain comme religion officielle de l'État lors de la "Safavid Era" que se multiplièrent les études et les interprétations du patrimoine religieux fidèlement transmis par les douze imāms et leurs successeurs, les grands *muğtabid*-s du duodécimanisme.

Au Ch. 27 (pp. 473-93), c'est la "Zaydī Theology in Yemen" qui est commentée par Hassan Ansari, Member of the School of Historical Studies at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton (NJ), par Sabine Schmidtke et par Jan Thiele. Le premier tiers consiste en l'histoire de la "théologie zaydite avant et après l'unification du Yémen: les imāmats de la Caspienne", le deuxième démontre la continuité de "la théologie Bahšhamite" au cours des siècles qui suivirent le VII-XIII^{ème} et le troisième entend établir son pluralisme interne et les "contre-réactions" qui en témoignent.

Les Ch. 28 (pp. 494-514) et Ch. 29 (pp. 515-33) s'occupent de l'aš'arisme tardif. Le Ch. 28, intitulé "Handbooks in the Tradition of Later Eastern Ash'arism", que l'on doit à Heidrun Eichner, Professor of Islamic Studies at the Eberhard Karls University, Tübingen, Germany, passe en revue les manuels qui y sont les témoins d'une "interaction avec les enseignements māturīdites": il s'agit des ouvrages d'al-Šahrastānī et de Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, surtout la "somme théologique" de ce dernier, *al-Mulabḥaṣṣ fi l-Ḥikma*, avec leurs développements sur la cosmogonie, le divin, la prophétie, l'eschatologie et l'imāmat. Le Ch. 29, qui a pour titre "Later Ash'arism in the Islamic West" et est de la plume de Delfina Serrano Ruano, Tenured Researcher at the Institute for Languages and Cultures of the Mediterranean and the Near East of the Spanish National Council for the Scientific Research in Madrid, s'occupe de la diffusion de l'aš'arisme en Afrique du Nord et en Andalousie avec "un statut quasi-officiel", puis de ses relations avec le réformisme *sui generis* d'Ibn Tūmart et de ce que l'A. appelle "Almohad *aš'arism*", avant que n'y soit évoqué ce qui advint de la théologie aš'arite de par la suite.

Le Ch. 30 (534-546) s'efforce de faire un bilan de l'"Egypt and the Later Ash'arite School". C'est Aaron Spevack, Assistant Professor of Islamic Studies at Colgate University, qui en est l'auteur. Il y reprend l'histoire de l'aš'arisme en Égypte, des origines jusqu'à l'époque d'al-Gazālī et de Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī, puis de l'influence persane (X-XVI^{ème} siècles) sur celle-ci. Son apogée et son effervescence s'y manifestent tant au Maghreb qu'au Moyen-Orient au XVII^{ème} siècle, comme en témoignent les manuels bien connus d'al-Sanūsī (d. 1490) et d'al-Bāğūrī (d. 1860). On peut alors parler d'une "synthèse tout autant persane que maghrébine et égyptienne". Dans la foulée de ce livre vient alors le Ch. 31 (547-566), des plus intéressants quant au comparatisme théologique. Intitulé "Excursus III: The Coptic and Syriac Receptions of Neo-Ash'arite Theology" et proposé par Gregor Schwarb, Independent Scholar based in London, lequel s'emploie à analyser l'influence de l'aš'arisme sur les théologiens coptes et les syriaques de ce temps-là: le dialogue des théologies, même polémique, invite ainsi les doctrines à se confronter dans leurs spécificités mêmes.

Le Ch. 32 (pp. 567-86) dresse un bilan de la théologie officielle musulmane dans l'Empire ottoman avec pour titre "Theology in the Ottoman Lands" et pour auteur A. M. Sait Özervarlı, professor of Ottoman Intellectual History à la Yıldız Technical University, Istanbul. C'est au XV^{ème} siècle que les Ottomans s'engagèrent dans l'enseignement de la théologie, en fidèles héritiers des *madrassa*-s des "Anatolian Saljūqs" et non sans rapports avec les théologiens byzantins de leur époque. Ce fut ensuite l'épanouissement de la pensée théologique ottomane dans la fidélité à al-Taftazānī (d.1875) et al-Ğurğānī en ses liens avec la philosophie, avant que ne vienne la somme théologique de Yanyali Esad sur l'existence de Dieu. Les temps modernes ont été aussi témoins d'un renouveau de la théologie islamique avec Harputi (1842-1914) et Šayḥ Musa Kazim (1858-1920), Ismail Hakki (1868-1946)

et Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924). Il n'empêche que la théologie ottomane fut toujours contrainte à faire face à une théologie philosophique des plus exigeantes.

Les Ch. 33 (pp. 587-605) et 34 (pp. 607-24) s'intéressent tous deux à l'islam du continent asiatique. Le premier est intitulé "Theology in Central Asia" par Nathan Spannaus, Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Oxford. Dans l'aire où brillèrent Bukhara, Samarkand et Hérat, les formes du māturīdisme et du soufisme ne manquèrent jamais d'y connaître des représentants attirés. Nombreux sont en effet les théologiens de renom qui y vécurent au Moyen-Âge: la théologie y exerça toujours un rôle de première importance sous la "Shirazi Influence" et y donna large place au développement du soufisme. Les problèmes de l'ontologie y furent toujours privilégiés. Quant au Ch. 34 (pp. 607-24), intitulé "Theology in the Indian Subcontinent", Asad Q. Ahmed, Associate Professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, et Reza Pourjavady, en présentent les formes pluralistes au cours des âges: influence des théologiens iraniens, émergence et déclin d'une théologie scolastique au XVII^{ème} siècle, rôle croissant des théologiens śī'ites, puis "Two Reformist Theologians: Shāh Walī Allāh and Shibli Nu'mānī". Ce pluralisme explique les disputes théologiques de l'époque et l'émergence de sectes institutionnalisées.

Le Ch. 35 (625-646), dont l'auteur est Jon Hoover, Associate Professor of Islamic Studies at the University of Nottingham, donne à la "Ḥanbalī Theology", une importance toute particulière tout en ne disant rien du moderne wahhābisme. Le ḥanbalisme est né avec Ibn Ḥanbal (m. 855), s'est développé en *fiqh* et en *kalām* et s'est exprimé très tôt en une théologie typiquement fondamentaliste, d'où son opposition aux mu'tazilites et autres défenseurs du rôle de la raison dans les choses de la foi (cf. les deux *miḥna*-s). Ibn 'Aqīl (m. 1119), Ibn al-Zāgūnī (m. 1132) et Ibn al-Ġawzī (m. 1201) en furent les représentants attirés préparant la route au maître de la théologie et du droit ḥanbalite, Ibn Taymiyya (m. 1328) le chantre du *tawḥīd* absolu. Sa théologie lui est très personnelle: il s'y distingue de tous et ne craint pas d'affirmer de Dieu qu'ontologiquement "Son amour pour les croyants dépend de Son amour pour Lui-même. L'Amour de Dieu pour Lui-même est à la base de tout autre amour. Dieu n'a pas besoin de l'amour humain et pareillement n'a pas besoin de la création". Après avoir très longuement apprécié en lui sa théologie ḥanbalite, l'auteur signale ce qu'il en fut après lui jusqu'au XVIII^{ème} siècle.

Les Ch. 36, 37, 38 et 39 semblent constituer une parenthèse avec des études sectorielles qui représentent autant de 'cas' particuliers dans l'histoire de la théologie musulmane. C'est ainsi que le 'cas' du Ch. 36 (pp. 649-59), "Al-Ma'mūn (r. 198/813-218/833) and the *Miḥna*", est analysé par Nimrod Hurvitz, Senior Lecturer at the Department of Islamic Studies at the Ben Gurion University of the Negev: situation politico-religieuse, autorité de la spéculation théologique, conflit entre les *muhaddithūn* et les *Mutakallimūn*, contexte de la *Miḥna*, effet de celle-ci sur l'histoire subséquente. Le fait est que le calife prétendait soutenir la doctrine mu'tazilite du caractère créé du Coran, d'où la persécution infligée à ses adversaires, les ḥanbalites. Le prince a-t-il le droit de s'immiscer dans les débats théologiques? Le Ch. 37 (660-678), quant à lui, traite des 'cas' de "The *Miḥna* of Ibn 'Aqīl (d. 513/1119) and the *Fitnat Ibn al-Qushayrī* (d. 514/1120)". Ils sont présentés et expliqués par Livnat Holtzman, Senior Lecturer and Chair of the Department of Arabic at Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan. Ibn 'Aqīl fut persécuté pour avoir soutenu des thèses mu'tazilites contre la doctrine des traditionnalistes (*mutahaddithūn*). En fin de compte, ses adversaires agréèrent sa "lettre de rétractation". La *fitna* d'al-Qūshayrī est due à des querelles intestines du parti ḥanbalite.

Le 'cas' du Ch. 38 (pp. 679-92) est une étude sur "The Religious Policy of the Almohads". Maribel Fierro, Research Professor at the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Madrid, y analyse d'abord la "profession de foi" du Mahdī almohade Ibn Tūmart, fondateur du mouvement réformiste "unitarien" au Maroc et d'un Empire qui unifiait tout le Maghreb, de la Tunisie à l'Andalousie. Il y dit aussi "pourquoi sa doctrine consistait en un anti-anthropomorphisme" qui

l'amena à contraindre ses adversaires à se convertir à l'almoihadisme, nonobstant leurs résistances au nom de la Loi, de la théologie, de la philosophie ou du soufisme. Quant au Ch. 39 (pp. 693-703), son 'cas' embrasse les "Interpretations of Ash'arism and Māturīdism in Mamluk and Ottoman Times" et c'est la participation de Lutz Berger, Professor of Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Kiel, Germany, à cette encyclopédie de la "théologie islamique": quelle était la situation de la théologie en Égypte à cette époque? S'agissait-il d'un véritable compromis entre aš'arisme et māturīdisme? Les conflits religieux avaient-ils des origines sociales? Au fond, le *kalām* a-t-il une fonction sociale?

Le très long Ch. 40 (pp. 707-764) "Main Trends of Islamic Theological Thought from the Late Nineteenth Century to Present Times" résume à lui seul ce qu'il en est de cette théologie islamique au cours des deux derniers siècles qui ont vu l'entrée des peuples musulmans dans "la modernité". On doit à la compétence de Rotraud Wielandt, Professor Emerita of Islamic Studies and Arabic Literature at the University of Bamberg, Germany, de nous fournir une vue d'ensemble de ces "divers courants" qui, parfois grâce à un nouveau langage, s'efforcent de mettre à jour les acquis des diverses écoles théologiques classiques. Elle analyse d'abord les manifestations de l'"Innovation: its Origins and Limits": la question des racines locales du modernisme islamique, la prédominance durable des approches traditionnelles en théologie académique, le cas exceptionnel de la théologie universitaire turque contemporaine. Viennent ensuite "The Pioneers of Modernism": Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), Muḥammad 'Abduh (1849-1905), La place d'al-Afġānī (1838-1897) dans la biographie intellectuelle de 'Abduh, le problème de la base textuelle pour étudier la théologie de 'Abduh, la pense théologique de 'Abduh. Cette introduction ouvre la voie au "Modernist Theological Thought of the Early Twentieth Century": thèmes prévalents, Syrie [al-Qāsimī (1866-1914)], Centre de l'Empire Ottoman (Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi [1865-1914] et Izmirli Ismail Hakki [1869-1946]), le *Tatar* moderniste de Kazan Bigiyef (1875-1949), un exemple de théologie moderniste šī'ite en Iran: Shari'at Sangalaji (1890-1944). C'est alors que l'A. présente "Iqbal (1877-1938)'s Theology for Modern Man", suivi aussitôt par les "New Hermeneutical and Epistemological Approaches to the Qur'ānic Revelation": les pionniers en seraient al-Khūlī (m. 1967), Mohammed Arkoun (1928-2010) et Ḥāmid Abū Zayd (1943-2010), de nombreux *scholars* turcs disciples de Fazlur Rahman et des auteurs iraniens hésitant entre l'herméneutique moderne et l'épistémologie. Le chapitre s'achève avec les perspectives de "Beginnings and Development of the Interest in a New Kalām": premiers concepts, le *kalām* appelé coranique de Wahiduddin Khan, le "nouveau kalām" fondé en philosophie, typologie des nouvelles approches.

Le Ch. 41 (pp. 765-92) dont le titre laisse entendre qu'il s'agit d'une reprise partielle et d'une "conclusion" du Ch. 40, "Striving for a New Exegesis of the Qur'ān", est l'œuvre de Johanna Pink, Eisenberg Professor of Islamic Studies and Islamic History at the University of Freiburg, Germany. Elle y passe en revue le "revival" islamique qui est à la racine même du réformisme, les premières formes modernes de l'exégèse coranique, les diverses expressions de la doctrine de l'*i'ğāz* coranique, l'influence qui s'y exerce dans le cadre de l'État colonial, de l'État national et de l'État islamique et l'apport d'un nouveau langage et de thèmes inédits qu'y créent de nouvelles herméneutiques. La question demeure de la réforme du *tafsīr* grâce à une exégèse "contextualisée".

Grâce à cette rapide présentation détaillée des quarante et un chapitre de l'*Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology*, celui-ci est donc appelé à être consulté, puis analysé et enfin dépassé. On y tiendra compte de ce qu'en dit Sabine Schmidtke: "Étant donné le grand nombre des *desiderata* exprimés pour l'étude de la théologie islamique, le tableau d'ensemble qui en est offert dans le présent volume s'avère nécessairement incomplet. De diverses manières, cette encyclopédie entend donc être un encouragement et un guide pour les chercheurs et les professeurs qui désirent s'engager dans le champ de cette étude".

Maurice Borrmans M. Afr.

Hunayn ibn Ishāq on His Galen Translations. A parallel English-Arabic text edited and translated by John C. Lamoreaux, with an appendix by Grigory Kessel, Brigham Young U.P., Provo (Utah) 2016, XXXIII + 207 pp.

Das *Sendschreiben* (*Risāla*) des Bagdader Arztes Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq (808-873/77 n. Chr.) an den Hofbeamten ‘Alī ibn Yahyā al-Munaḡḡim dürfte sicherlich jeder Graeco-Arabist früher oder später einmal in den Händen halten, zumindest wenn er sich mit der Bewegung der Übersetzer beschäftigt. In ihm legt der Verfasser nicht nur ausführlich dar, welche Galentraktate seines Wissens vom Griechischen ins Syrische und/oder Arabische übertragen wurden, sondern er macht zusätzlich noch Angaben zum Umfang, zum Inhalt, zur Intention der Schriften sowie zu ihren Übersetzern und, wenn bekannt, auch zu ihren Auftraggebern. Als Textgrundlage für die *Risāla* diente bisher die im Jahre 1925 erschienene Edition von G. Bergsträsser – so lautet die korrekte Schreibweise seines Namens; die Form “Bergsträsser” wurde nur für Publikationen benutzt.¹ Sieben Jahre später veröffentlichte Bergsträsser, mittlerweile Ordinarius für semitische Philologie und Islamwissenschaften an der Universität München, eine textkritisch-sprachliche Studie über die *Risāla*, in der er v.a. das Verhältnis der unterschiedlichen Fassungen und ihre sprachlichen Besonderheiten behandelt.² Seitdem ist nichts Substantielles mehr zu diesem Werk publiziert worden. Dies dürfte wohl nicht zuletzt daran liegen, dass die *Risāla* zwar vergleichsweise oft benutzt, in der Regel aber nur zum Nachschlagen einzelner Passagen verwendet wird. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist es als überaus erfreulich zu betrachten, dass John C. Lamoreaux (L.) mit dem hier zu besprechenden Buch eine Arbeit vorgelegt hat, die diese Lücke etwas zu schließen hilft.

Das Werk beginnt mit einigen knappen Bemerkungen zu den Ursprüngen der griechisch-syrisch-arabischen Übersetzungsbewegung (S. IX-XII). Dann wendet sich L. zunächst dem Leben und den Werken Ḥunayns zu, bevor er eine Art inhaltliche Auswertung der *Risāla* vornimmt, in dem er auf ihrer Basis einige Worte darüber verliert, wie diese Galen-Übersetzungen konkret zustande gekommen sind (S. XII-XVIII). Die nächsten beiden Abschnitte behandeln die Fragen, in welcher Form uns die drei bisher bekannten Fassungen A-C der *Risāla* vorliegen bzw. veröffentlicht wurden (S. XVIII-XXI) und wie diese sich in die einzelnen Stadien der Genese des *Sendschreibens* einordnen (S. XXI-XXVI). Die Einleitung beschließen einige Bemerkungen zu den Editionsprinzipien und zur englischen Übersetzung, eine kurze Übersicht über den Inhalt der *Risāla* sowie ein Abkürzungsverzeichnis (S. XXVI-XXXIII). Darauf folgt der arabische Text inklusive englischer Übersetzung (S. 1-131), dem sich insgesamt vier Appendizes anschließen. Dazu gehört eine Diskussion der Bedeutung von *talhīs*, *taḥalluṣ* und *talabḥuṣ* in Ḥunayns *Risāla* (S. 133-37), eine Prosopographie der im Text genannten Übersetzer und Auftraggeber der Übersetzungen (S. 138-52) sowie eine Auflistung der von Ḥunayn erwähnten Galenschriften unter Angabe der wichtigsten Literatur, die ihre Überlieferung in der griechischen, lateinischen, syrischen und arabischen Literatur dokumentiert (S. 153-67). Der vierte Anhang stammt nicht von L., sondern von Grigory Kessel. Er enthält eine Auflistung der Galenwerke, die sich ganz oder wenigstens in Form von einzelnen Zitaten in der syrischen Tradition erhalten haben (S. 168-92). Am Ende des Werkes finden sich schließlich noch eine Bibliographie (S. 193-204) sowie ein Index (S. 205-7).

¹ Siehe *Hunayn ibn Ishāq, Über die syrischen und arabischen Galen-Übersetzungen*, hrsg. u. übers. v. G. Bergsträsser, Leipzig 1925 (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 17.2). Zur Schreibung seines Namens siehe: histvv.uni-leipzig.de/dozenten/bergstraesser_g.html; eingesehen am 21.5.2017.

² G. Bergsträsser, *Neue Materialien zu Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq's Galenbibliographie*, F.A. Brockhaus, Leipzig 1932 (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 19.2).

Im Zentrum des vorliegenden Buches steht eindeutig die Edition und Übersetzung des arabischen Textes der *Risāla*. Eine Ausgabe dieser Schrift anzufertigen, ist keine einfache Arbeit, da sie laufend überarbeitet und ergänzt wurde: Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq hat eine erste Fassung in syrischer Sprache abgefasst, bevor er sie dann 855/56 n. Chr. ins Arabische übersetzt hat. Im Jahre 864 n. Chr. hat er diese erste arabische Version überarbeitet und erneut veröffentlicht. Uns erhalten haben sich nun zwei Versionen A und B, die wohlgemerkt beide auf die gerade genannte Überarbeitung zurückgehen, jedoch nicht mit dieser identisch sind, da sie weitere Ergänzungen sowohl von Ḥunayn selbst als auch von anderen Bearbeitern enthalten, die zum Teil erst nach dem Tod des eigentlichen Verfassers in den Text eingefügt worden sind. In der danach folgenden handschriftlichen Überlieferung wurde zumindest die Fassung A überdies von Kopisten mit anderen (uns nicht erhaltenen) Fassungen der *Risāla* kontaminiert.

Man hat es hier also mit einer äußerst komplexen Überlieferung zu tun. L. ist sich dessen glücklicherweise bewusst (S. XXI-XXVI), was seiner Edition auch erkennbar zugutekommt. Er hat sich dafür entschieden, die ältere *Risāla*-Fassung (= Version B) herauszugeben. Eine Begründung dafür erfolgt nicht, doch lässt sich vermuten, dass dies sicherlich dem Umstand geschuldet ist, dass G. Bergsträsser in seiner eingangs genannten Ausgabe die jüngere Version A bereits publiziert hat.

Die Edition dieser Fassung B basiert in erster Linie auf dem Kodex *Aya Sofya* 3590, der somit als *codex unicus* anzusehen ist. Bisweilen korrigiert L. diese Handschrift durch die Lesarten des Kodex *Aya Sofya* 3631, die der Rezension A der *Risāla* zugrundeliegt. Des Weiteren zieht er zur Textverbesserung an einigen wenigen Stellen neben einer Kurzfassung der *Risāla* (= Version C) die Nebenüberlieferung in Ibn abi Uṣaybī'as ' *Uyūn al-anbā'* heran, nicht jedoch die in Ibn al-Nadīms *Fihrist* (S. XXVI-XXVII). Für den Benutzer wäre es sehr hilfreich gewesen, wenn L. ggf. unter Angabe von einigen Beispielen etwas mehr zu seiner Methodik gesagt hätte: Welche Voraussetzungen müssen erfüllt sein, damit die später entstandene Rezension A für eine Verbesserung herangezogen werden kann? So ist z.B. nach Ansicht des Rezensenten Bergsträsser darin zuzustimmen, dass im *Risāla*-Eintrag zu Galens *De Usu partium* der nur in Version A enthaltene Satz "Ḥubayš hat es für Muḥammad ins Arabische übersetzt" auch in den Text von Version B gehört – und nicht nur in die Anmerkungen, wie L. es getan hat (S. 62, § 51 Anm. 4) –, da ansonsten der darauf folgende Satz über die Korrekturarbeiten Ḥunayns keinen Sinn ergibt.³

Dasselbe gilt für L.s Bewertung der Nebenüberlieferung. Auch in diesem Punkt wäre es wünschenswert gewesen, wenn er seine oben genannte Einschätzung der beiden Werke von Ibn Abī Uṣaybī'a und Ibn al-Nadīm näher begründet hätte, zumal Bergsträsser genügend Ansatzpunkte für eine Diskussion bietet, da dieser sein eigenes editorisches Vorgehen nicht nur ausführlich darlegt, sondern insbesondere den Wert der Nebenüberlieferung viel höher veranschlagt.⁴

Für insgesamt drei Stellen aus der *Risāla* kann L. noch weitere Zeugnisse aus der Nebenüberlieferung nennen, die aber für die Textkonstitution nichts hergeben. Dabei kommt er S. 100, § 101 Anm. auf den Kodex *Escor. ar.* 805 zu sprechen, in dem sich der Abschnitt über die Epidemien-Kommentare Galens befindet. Hierzu ist anzumerken, dass dieser Kodex nur einen Ausschnitt aus dem entsprechenden *Risāla*-Eintrag zum *Epidemien*-Kommentar Galens enthält, dafür jedoch zusätzlich noch den Anfang des folgenden Eintrags über Galens *De Humoribus*-Kommentar.⁵

Dem Rezensenten liegt die der Edition zugrundeliegende Handschrift *AS* 3590 nicht vor. Ein Vergleich der Textprobe, die Bergsträsser in seinen *Neuen Materialien* von der Version B bietet, mit

³ Siehe Bergsträsser (Anm. 2), S. 37.

⁴ Siehe Bergsträsser (Anm. 2), S. 10f.; 38f.; 49.

⁵ Siehe Hippocratis *De Humoribus*, hrsg., übers. u. erl. von O. Overwien, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 2014 (CMG I 3,1), S. 51 Anm. 1.

den entsprechenden Abschnitten in der Edition von L., hat immerhin ergeben, dass beide nahezu denselben Text bieten.⁶ Dies lässt darauf schließen, dass L. bei der Transkription generell gründlich vorgegangen ist.

Dem Rezensenten sind in diesem Zusammenhang nur zwei Kleinigkeiten aufgefallen: S. 29.11 ist *حصر* statt *حضر* zu lesen. Außerdem schreibt L. auf S. 124, § 133 Anm. 1, dass Handschrift A “in Harrān” ergänzt. Nach Bergsträsser geht dagegen erst aus Kodex B hervor, dass die im Text erwähnte Galenschrift in Harrān gefunden wurde, da die entsprechende Ortsangabe in A nicht identifizierbar ist.⁷

L. hat sich bewusst dafür entscheiden, den arabischen Text wörtlich wiederzugeben (S. XXIX), was den Vorteil hat, dass man die sehr nüchtern-technische Diktion Hunayns gut nachvollziehen kann (“This book consists of”; “I have translated it into” ...). Stichproben in verschiedenen Passagen des *Sendschreibens* haben ergeben, dass L. den Text weitestgehend korrekt wiedergegeben zu haben scheint.

Unklar bleibt allerdings, wie L. zu der Auffassung kommt, dass *lahḥaṣa* auf S. 68, § 57.3 die Bedeutung “summarize” (s. auch S. 133 Anm. 1) hat. Naheliegender wäre es, das Verb mit “erläutern” oder “erklären” wiederzugeben.⁸ Des Weiteren ist L.s Übersetzung “after the manner of” für die öfter vorkommende Wendung *نحا نحو* unpassend. Galen schreibt nämlich nicht “nach der Art des Hippokrates ... Erasistratos ... Asklepiades” (S. 110, §115). Vielmehr muss es an dieser Stelle heißen: “Was die übrigen Schriften betrifft, von denen er in seiner Liste sagt, dass er sich in ihrer Niederschrift *dem Hippokrates ... dem Erasistratos ... dem Asklepiades zuwendet*”. Schließlich geht es in den fraglichen Schriften Galens nicht darum, dass der Verfasser den Stil des Hippokrates, Erasistratos oder Asklepiades nachahmt, sondern sich mit ihren medizinischen Haltungen kritisch auseinandersetzt bzw. diese kommentiert. In gleicher Weise schreibt Galen auch nicht “nach der Art der dritten Gruppe” (S. 114, § 121), sondern er *wendet sich der dritten Gruppe zu*. In diesem Fall bezieht sich Hunayn wohl (u.a.) auf die Schrift *De methodica secta*, da es die Methodiker sind, die von Galen immer als dritte Medizingruppierung bezeichnet werden.⁹ Entsprechend ist S. 114, § 121 in Anm. 1 auch “Methodists” statt “Empiricists” zu schreiben.

In den Fußnoten zur Übersetzung bietet L. Informationen ganz unterschiedlicher Art. Dazu gehören v.a. inhaltlich signifikante Abweichungen der Version A, die in englischer Übersetzung dargeboten werden.

Dieses Verfahren sorgt mitunter allerdings für Irritationen. Für Galens Schrift *Ad artes addiscendas* scheint die Fassung A nicht den zu erwartenden Titelbestandteil *تعلم*, sondern *تعليم* zu bieten, darauf lässt jedenfalls L.s Angabe “A reads: *Exhortation to the Teaching of Medicine*” schließen (S. 112, § 119 Anm.). Weder Bergsträssers Editionstext noch dessen Korrekturen bestätigen jedoch diese Lesart.¹⁰ Da sich L. andererseits vorgenommen hat, darauf hinzuweisen, wenn er vom Editionstext Bergsträssers abweicht (S. XXVI), fragt man sich als Leser, was nun in A steht.

⁶ Die Textprobe von Bergsträsser (Anm. 2, S. 77-82, entspricht den S. 23.8-31.7; 131.2-7 in der Edition von L. Sie macht vom Umfang her etwas weniger als 9 % des *Sendschreibens* aus.

⁷ Siehe Bergsträsser (Anm. 2, S. 11, sowie Bergsträsser (Anm. 2), S. 56.4 [arab.], Anm. d. mit Angabe der (nicht auflösbaren) Manuskriptlesart.

⁸ Siehe Bergsträsser (Anm. 2, S. 24 („präzisieren“) und M. Ullmann, *Wörterbuch der klassischen arabischen Sprache*, Bd. II.1, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 1983, S. 427b.

⁹ So schreibt Galen in *De Libris propriis* I.4: τὴν τρίτην δὲ μεθοδικήν; zitiert nach *Galien*, t. 1, par V. Boudon-Millot, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 2007, S. 137.13. Galen erwähnt *De Methodica secta* auch in *De Libris propriis*; siehe Boudon-Millot, S. 163.19. Siehe hierzu auch F. Käs, “Eine neue Handschrift von Hunayn ibn Isḥāq Galenbibliographie”, *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der arabisch-islamischen Wissenschaften* 19 (2010-11), S. 179.

¹⁰ Siehe Bergsträsser (Anm. 2), S. 46.8 (arab.) und Bergsträsser (Anm. 2), S. 22; vgl. auch S. 30; 48.

Des Weiteren erklärt L. in den Fußnoten einzelne Begriffe wie z.B. die Titel der Galenschriften (S. 72, § 63 Anm.), gibt Sachinformationen (S. 22, § 13 Anm. 6), verweist auf Parallelen innerhalb der *Risāla*, die dem Verständnis der jeweiligen Stelle dienen (S. 124, § 134, Anm. 2) und nennt mitunter die griechischen Quellbegriffe, die bestimmten Ausdrücken Ḥunayns zugrunde liegen (S. 24, § 15 Anm. 7; 9).

S. 3, § 1 Anm. 6: Diese Anmerkung kann man streichen, da die Lesart *وإلى غيرها* in A sicherlich nur eine Verlesung innerhalb der Handschriftentradition für das inhaltlich zutreffende *العربية* aus B ist.¹¹ S. 8, § 3 Anm. 6: Bergsträfers Studie *Neue Materialien* wird sowohl in den Anmerkungen (s. auch S. 40, § 23 Anm. 3; S. 56, § 43, Anm. 3; S. 89; § 85 Anm. 8) als auch im Literaturverzeichnis (S. 194) durchgehend als *Neue Materialien* zitiert. S. 24, § 15 Anm. 9: Statt *heltikē* ist *helktikē* zu schreiben. S. 26, § 16 Anm. 8: Statt *tadabbara* ist *tadarraba* zu schreiben. S. 60, § 48 Anm. 1 und 74, § 65 Anm. 2: Statt “De Lacy” ist “Strohmaier” zu schreiben.¹² S. 88, § 85 Anm. 6: L. datiert Philagrius im Anschluss an I. Barsoum, *The Scattered Pearls* in das 7. Jh. n. Chr. Da Philagrius’ Werke aber bereits von Oribasius zitiert werden, sollte man davon ausgehen, dass er spätestens im 4. Jh. n. Chr. gelebt hat.¹³ Diese Datierung findet sich im Übrigen auch in allen übrigen in dieser Fußnote genannten Abhandlungen. S. 89, § 85 Anm. 9: Die Angabe “Libri ad Eunapium 1.1.5” ist ohne Nennung der zugrundeliegenden Edition missverständlich. In der maßgeblichen *CMG*-Ausgabe von Raeder findet man die Stelle unter “Libri ad Eunapium, prooem. 5”.¹⁴

Ḥunayn weist selbst immer wieder darauf hin, dass er seine Informationen den Galenschriften selbst entnommen hat. Naheliegenderweise stammen die meisten dieser Zitate aus *De Libris propriis*, vereinzelt lassen sie sich aber auch auf andere Texte zurückführen. L. hat sich die Mühe gemacht, einen Großteil dieser Quellen ausfindig zu machen. In diesem Zusammenhang zeigt sich interessanterweise, dass Ḥunayn seine galenische Vorlage mitunter vereinfacht, uminterpretiert oder auch missversteht. L. weist selbst S. 52, § 38 Anm. 1 auf einen dieser Fälle hin. Ein weiteres Beispiel findet sich in Ḥunayns Diskussion der spätantik-alexandrinischen Unterrichtspraxis, in der dieser schreibt, dass man sich laut Galen nach *De Sectis* den Büchern über Anatomie zuwenden soll (S. 40, § 23.3). Der Arzt aus Pergamon hat die Lektüreabfolge dieser Werke jedoch etwas differenzierter dargestellt. So heißt es in *De ordine librorum propriorum*, dass nur der Student, der sich nicht mit dem logischen Beweis beschäftigen will, nach den drei Einführungsschriften, zu denen neben *De Sectis* noch *De Pulsibus ad tirones* und *De Ossibus ad tirones* gehören, *De Anatomicis administrationibus* und andere Werke zur Anatomie lesen soll, während die übrigen Lerner mit *De Demonstratione* beginnen können.¹⁵ In dieselbe Richtung weist der *Risāla*-Eintrag zu *De Sectis*, der, wie L. im Übrigen richtig anmerkt, auf der entsprechenden Kurzbeschreibung dieser Schrift in Galens *De Libris propriis* beruht (S. 10, § 5 Anm. 3-4). Denn auch in diesem Fall weicht Ḥunayn von seiner mutmaßlichen Vorlage ab, wenn er die Formulierung “weil es außerdem gewisse Unterschiede in ihnen (sc. den Medizinrichtungen) gibt” (*ἐπειδὴ καὶ διαφοραὶ τινες ἐν αὐταῖς εἰσι*) in seinem

¹¹ Siehe auch Bergsträsser (Anm. 2), S. 11; 13.

¹² Siehe das Inhaltsverzeichnis (“contents”) in Galeni *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*, vol. 1, ed. and transl. by Ph. de Lacy, 2. Auflage, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 2005 (*CMG* V 4,1,2) und in Galeni *De Semine*, ed. and transl. by Ph. de Lacy, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1992 (*CMG* V 3.1).

¹³ Siehe auch R. Masullo, “Philagrius”, in K.-H. Leven (Hrsg.), *Antike Medizin*, C.H. Beck, München 2005, S. 693-4.

¹⁴ Siehe Oribasii *Synopsis ad Eustathium, Libri ad Eunapium*, ed. J. Raeder, Teubner, Leipzig u. Berlin 1926 (*CMG* VI 3), S. 317f.

¹⁵ Siehe Boudon-Millot (Anm. 9), S. 90.23-93.4. L. hat sich hier entsprechend von Ḥunayn in die Irre führen lassen, wenn er diese Stelle folgendermaßen kommentiert: “that the serious student of medicine should read *Anatomical Procedures after Sects*” (S. 40; § 23 Anm. 6).

Sendschreiben dergestalt interpretiert, dass es innerhalb der drei Schulen der Dogmatiker, Empiriker und Methodiker weitere Vertreter gibt: „weil es in einer jeden von diesen drei Schulen außerdem andere Schulen gibt, die sich der Art nach unterscheiden“.¹⁶ Es dürfte sich mit Sicherheit lohnen, dieser Frage noch etwas systematischer nachzugehen.

Die Einleitung des vorliegenden Buches bietet grundlegende Informationen, viel Neues erfährt man allerdings nicht. Dabei hätte sich insbesondere die inhaltliche Auswertung der *Risāla* (S. XIV-XVIII) für eine Präsentation neuer Erkenntnisse angeboten. Gerade durch die Bereitstellung dieser älteren Fassung der *Risāla* stellt sich dem Leser nämlich zwangsläufig die Frage nach ihrem Verhältnis zu Version A: Worin genau liegen ihre Unterschiede? Welche Inhalte wurden in A nachgetragen? Hier stellen insbesondere diejenigen Passagen ein gewisses Problem dar, die postum in den Text aufgenommen wurden. Denn wenn die Fassung A bereits vor dem Tod Ḥunayns entstanden ist, bliebe zu klären, aus welchem Grund sich diese Nachträge nicht nur in A, sondern auch in der älteren Fassung B finden (z.B. S. 72, § 64.3). Wurde die B-Überlieferung durch die A-Tradition kontaminiert, was bedeuten würde, dass diese Passagen (in B) zu tilgen sind? Oder wurden beide Versionen zumindest zeitweise zusammen überliefert? Eng mit diesem Problem hängt die Frage zusammen, ob alle diese Nachträge aus B formal auch in A enthalten sind oder ob die ältere Fassung sogar solche enthält, die sich nicht in der jüngeren finden. Eine Lösung dieser Frage dürfte ebenfalls nicht nur unsere Kenntnis der Textgenese erweitern, sondern unter Umständen auch Auswirkungen auf die Edition haben. L. äußert sich leider nicht explizit dazu, er schreibt lediglich: „later additions seem to be more frequent in A than in B“ (S. XXIII).

Natürlich wäre es zu viel verlangt gewesen, von L. zusätzlich zur Editionsarbeit noch eine ausführliche textkritisch-überlieferungsgeschichtliche Studie zu erwarten. Andererseits hat sich Bergsträsser auch zu diesen Punkten in seinen *Neuen Materialien* bereits geäußert, und da der Rezensent davon ausgeht, dass sich L. detailliert mit dessen Abhandlung auseinandergesetzt haben muss, hatte er gehofft, wenigstens einige allgemeine Aussagen zu diesem Bereich vorgelegt zu bekommen. In gleicher Weise überrascht es, dass L. zwar einige Auffälligkeiten der arabischen Sprache beschreibt, die uns in beiden Fassungen des *Sendschreibens* entgegentreten, und die durchaus interessante Frage aufwirft, inwiefern uns hier der Verfasser Hunayn selbst entgegentritt (S. XXVII), aber mit keinem Wort auf die ausführlichen Ausführungen von Bergsträsser zu diesem Thema eingeht.¹⁷ So bleibt man als Leser in diesem Teil der Arbeit etwas enttäuscht und mitunter auch ratlos zurück.

Immerhin kann L. noch ein weiteres Puzzleteil zur Entstehung der *Risāla* beitragen. Der Rezensent findet L.s Argumentation durchaus nachvollziehbar, dass die beiden erhaltenen Fassungen kurz vor Ḥunayns Tod innerhalb von zwei Monaten entstanden sind (S. XXIV-XXVI).

Die Appendizes sind für die Benutzung der Edition sehr nützlich. Unverständlich ist es jedoch, dass L. für die Diskussion von *talḥiṣ* und *talabḥuṣ* (S. 133-7) nicht auch M. Ullmanns *Wörterbuch der klassischen arabischen Sprache* herangezogen hat, zumal dort die *Risāla* nicht nur grundsätzlich als Belegtext dient, sondern für *lahḥaṣa* mit Bezug auf S. 47.14 auch eine Bedeutung angegeben wird: „ein Buch verfassen, niederschreiben“.¹⁸ L.s These, dass *talḥiṣ*, *tabḥalus* und *talabḥuṣ* auf das griechische Wort *διόρθωσις* zurückgehen, womit die Korrektur oder auch Herstellung einer Edition bezeichnet wird, ist grundsätzlich sicherlich erwägenswert. Die Belege, die er aus der der Galenschrift *De Febrium differentiis* anführt (S. 137 Anm. 21), um zu zeigen, dass besagte Begriffe von Ḥunayn

¹⁶ Die Übersetzungen beruhen auf S. 11.1 (ed. L.), sowie Boudon-Millot (Anm. 9), S. 137.8-9.

¹⁷ Siehe Bergsträsser (Anm. 2), S. 53-76, bes. S. 75f.

¹⁸ Siehe Ullmann (Anm. 8), S. 428a.

für die Wiedergabe von διόρθωσις oder seiner Ansicht nach damit verwandter Begriffe wie z.B. διορίζειν benutzt wurden, haben allerdings keine Aussagekraft. Die entsprechenden Formen von *lahḥaṣa* geben teilweise zwar in der Tat διορίζειν wieder, dieses Wort hat an den betreffenden Passagen jedoch die Bedeutung „erklären“ und demnach nichts mit einem Editionsprozess zu tun.¹⁹

Im Hinblick auf die Liste der von Hunayn erwähnten Galenwerke (S. 153-67) ist zu sagen, dass sie in dieser Form schon von F. Käs angestellt wurde.²⁰ Der Rezensent findet es durchaus nachvollziehbar, dass L. sie erneut präsentiert, da auf diese Weise alle Informationen gebündelt in einem Buch vorliegen. Allerdings hat L. einen nicht ganz unwichtigen Teil aus der Studie von Käs ausgelassen: die Stellen aus der Nebenüberlieferung bei Ibn al-Nadīm, Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a und al-Qifṭī. Es überrascht in der Tat, dass L. sie weder in einer Appendix noch in einem Testimonienapparat aufführt, v.a. da sie teilweise zur Textgestaltung der *Risāla* beitragen. Die Galenbibliographie des mittlerweile verstorbenen G. Fichtner sollte außerdem nicht nach der Ausgabe 2004 zitiert werden (S. 153), da sie inzwischen im Internet frei zugänglich ist und, vergleichbar mit dem *Sendschreiben* Hunayns, laufend erweitert wird. Die letzte Fassung zum Zeitpunkt der Erstellung dieser Rezension datiert von Mai 2017.²¹

Der inhaltlich ergiebigste Appendix ist der vierte von G. Kessel, der eine aktuelle Bestandsaufnahme der syrischen Galenüberlieferung bietet. Der Rezensent weist darauf hin, dass er den Verfasser dieses Beitrages persönlich kennt. Dennoch kann er nicht umhin festzustellen, dass dieser Überblick gut präsentiert und gegliedert ist und zumindest nach Kenntnis des Rezensenten nichts fehlt.

Abschließend sei noch darauf hingewiesen, dass der Titel der Edition, *Hunayn ibn Ishāq on His Galen Translations*, etwas unglücklich gewählt ist, da der Bagdader Übersetzer, wie auch eingangs gesagt, keineswegs nur seine eigenen syrischen und arabischen Wiedergaben von Galenschriften aufführt, sondern alle, die ihm bekannt sind.

Es sei angemerkt, dass die angesprochenen Monita, insgesamt betrachtet, eher Nebenschauplätze der *Risāla* betreffen bzw. mit dem Wunsch zu tun haben, dass L. an einigen Punkten etwas ausführlicher hätte sein können, zum Teil auch müssen. Der eigentliche Kern der Arbeit, d.h. die Edition des arabischen Textes sowie die englische Übersetzung, scheint jedoch ein weitestgehend getreues Abbild der Fassung B zu vermitteln. Somit liegen uns nun neben der Kurzfassung (Version C) die beiden vollständigen Versionen des *Sendschreibens* in zuverlässigen Editionen vor. Im Hinblick auf die Benutzbarkeit sei zu guter Letzt noch positiv vermerkt, dass L. die Kapitelzählung sowie die Paginierung inklusive Zeilenzählung aus Bergsträfers Edition am Rand seines arabischen Textes bzw. seiner englischen Übersetzung notiert hat. So fällt eine Orientierung in beiden Fassungen deutlich leichter.

Es bleibt zu hoffen, dass sich nun jemand der gewiss nicht leichten Aufgabe annimmt, diese drei Fassungen der *Risāla* systematisch miteinander zu vergleichen und dabei v.a. – ausgehend von Bergsträfers *Neuen Materialien* – die inhaltlichen und sprachlichen Unterschiede in den Blick zu nehmen, damit wir einen besseren Einblick in den kleinen Kreis der Übersetzer um Hunayn ibn Ishāq erhalten.

Oliver Overwien

¹⁹ Siehe Galen. *Über die Arten der Fieber in der arabischen Version des Hunayn ibn Ishāq*, Edition u. Übersetzung v. M. Wernhard, Diss. München 2004, S. 98.1; 210.13 (und nicht 210.14, wie L. schreibt). Diese Passagen entsprechen in Kühns Edition des griechischen Textes Bd. VII, S. 315.16; 368.1. In einer weiteren Passage, die L. aus diesem Galentext als vermeintlichen Beleg anführt (S. 206.2), gibt verneintes *lahḥaṣa* das Adverb ἀδιαρθρότως („konfus“; von ἀ-διαρθρέω) wieder; siehe VII, S. 365.6 Kühn. Wie dieses Wort in L’s Argumentation passen soll, bleibt unklar.

²⁰ Siehe Käs (Anm. 9), S. 135-93.

²¹ Siehe cmg.bbaw.de/online-publikationen/Hippokrates-Bibliographie_2017-5.pdf; eingesehen am 21.8.2017.

Epistles of the Brethren of Purity. Sciences of the Soul and Intellect. Part I. An Arabic Critical Edition and English Translation of Epistles 32-36, edited and translated by P.E. Walker; I.K. Poonawala and D. Simonowitz; G. de Callatay. *Foreword* by N. El-Bizri, Oxford U.P. in Association with The Institute of Ismaili Studies, Oxford 2015, XXIII + 270, Arabic pagination ٥-٢٠٢ pp.

Despite the fact that they are often labelled ‘enigmatic’, the writings that compose this tenth-century Arabic encyclopaedia are better and better known thanks to generations of scholars¹ whose efforts are now resumed by the specialists at work on the ongoing project *Epistles of the Brethren of Purity*.² The elusive character of the *Epistles* lies first and foremost in their deliberate anonymity, that reflects the nature of “secretive coterie”³ of the writers⁴ who either authored them or were their recipients; however, that of the exact identification of the origins of the encyclopedia is not the only question to remain unsettled. In many cases, that of the sources it depends upon is an open question as well. The *Epistles* are famously rich in references to ancient wisdom, especially even though not exclusively Greek; however, only seldom are the quotations explicit, and even when a school, a philosopher, or a scientist are mentioned, this is often in the form of rephrasing and interpretation.⁵ Thus, the series *Epistles of the Brethren of Purity* represents a well welcomed contribution to the knowledge of the most influential example of dissemination of scientific and philosophical learning in Medieval Islam. If I am speaking of dissemination it is because, as the general introduction remarks, the encyclopedia is issued from and directed to a non-specialist audience.⁶

¹ An overview of the history of scholarship is provided at p. XIX of the *Foreword* (common to all the volumes of the series).

² A list of the *Epistles* already published features on a non-numbered page at the beginning of the volume.

³ N. El-Bizri, *Foreword*, p. xv.

⁴ At least four people are mentioned as the authors of the *Epistles* in the ancient sources (chiefly Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī) and the prevailing view in contemporary scholarship is indeed that of several scholars at work during a certain span of time, but the hypothesis of a single author has also been tentatively advanced: see S. Diwald, *Arabische Philosophie und Wissenschaft in der Enzyklopädie Kitāb Iḥwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ* (III). *Die Lehre von Seele und Intellekt*, O. Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 1975 (Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur Mainz), pp. 12-15. After having remarked that “Die einheitliche Stil scheint ein Indiz für einen einzelnen Autor zu sein, unabhängig von der Frage, ob es sich um eine Originalabfassung oder Redaktion oder Überarbeitung handelt” (p. 14), S. Diwald mentions the cross-references and comes to the conclusion that “auch die Vorverweise lassen keine zwingenden Rückschlüsse auf mehrere Autoren zu, sie sprechen aber auch nicht dagegen” (p. 15).

⁵ Relying on C. Baffioni’s multifaceted research (see in part. *Frammenti e testimonianze di autori antichi nelle Rasāʾil degli Iḥwān al-Ṣafāʾ*, Istituto Nazionale per la Storia antica, Roma 1994), G. de Callatay, *Iḥwān al-Safāʾ. A Brotherhood of Idealists on the Fringe of Orthodox Islam*, Oneworld, Oxford 2005 (Makers of the Muslim World), p. 74, sums up the issue of the sources as follows: the Brethren “were generally more familiar with the doctrines of ancient philosophers and scientists than with their actual writings (...) This suggests that for the most part they learnt about the philosophers’ views from doxographies (...) rather than from their actual works”.

⁶ N. El-Bizri, *Foreword*, pp. xvii-xviii: “In spite of their erudition and resourcefulness, it is doubtful whether the Brethren of Purity can be impartially ranked amongst the authorities of their age in the realms of science and philosophy. Their inquiries into mathematics, logic, and the natural sciences were recorded in the *Epistles* in a synoptic and diluted fashion, sporadically infused with gnostic, symbolic, and occult directives. (...) In terms of the epistemic significance of the *Epistles* and the intellectual calibre of their authors, it must be stated that despite being supplemented by oral teachings in seminars (*majālis al-ʿilm*), the heuristics embodied in the *Rasāʾil* were not representative of the most decisive achievements of their epoch in the domains of mathematics, natural sciences, or philosophical reasoning”.

Each volume of the series contributes to shedding light on the history of the brotherhood and its endeavour to collect and rework in the light of an ‘ecumenical’ spirituality the learned legacy that, in the view of the Brethren, antedates the rise of Islam. The translation of *Epistles* 32-36 offered in the volume under examination allows the reader to raise, and in part to solve, some of the riddles about the philosophical sources of the encyclopaedia. This is apparent in all the three main topics dealt with in the six *Epistles* of this volume,⁷ namely the hierarchy of the suprasensible principles (*Epistles* 32a and 32b, 33), the cosmos as a Macroanthropos (*Epistle* 34), the Intellect and Intelligible (*Epistle* 35), and the celestial cycles and revolutions (*Epistle* 36), all of them making up the “third section” of the encyclopaedia, labelled “On the Sciences of Soul and Intellect”. In this multi-authored volume, the translation of and introduction to the *Epistles* 32a, 32b, 33 and 35 are by P.E. Walker; *Epistle* 34 is translated by D. Simonowitz and the introduction is by I.K. Poonawala; finally, *Epistle* 36 is translated by G. de Callatay, who is also the author of the relevant introduction.

The first three *Epistles* are “Pythagorean” in the sense clarified by P. Walker in his Introduction to this subset: *Epistle* 32 expresses “the opinion of Pythagoras about intellectual principles”, while *Epistle* 33, as proclaimed in its title, elaborates on the “Pythagorean” ideas from the viewpoint of the brotherhood, thus promising “to be especially important for determining the exact doctrines espoused by the Brethren, as opposed to those they report from others”.⁸ The textual transmission is troubled, so that *Epistle* 32 is printed in two versions labelled 32a and 32b,⁹ but it is clear that already in *Epistle* 32 the doctrine expounded is by no means Pythagoras’, rather it comes from some other source. As a matter of fact, after the initial claim that Pythagoras taught the doctrine of divine creation according to numbers – a tenet that, albeit modified, can be traced back to the Pythagorean tradition – the topic that comes to the fore is that of the hierarchical order of creation, issued from a tradition of thought admittedly different from Pythagoras’.

A true Pythagorean devotes attention to each and every number, giving every one its due. Lists of things that come in pairs, triplets, and fours are provided in both versions but with considerable amplitude in 32b, which then continues at some length with things in sixes, sevens, and, most especially, fives. A second theme, markedly notable in 32a, is the rank order of creation, particularly in regard to intellectual beings, that is, the immaterial higher realm commencing with intellect, the soul, matter and form, nature, and the heavenly spheres. God is the source, the Originator of all, the One; all else begins when He emanates through His goodness an emanation of various excellences to intellect, and from intellect downward to soul and the rest below. Each lower stage in the scheme suffers a diminution in status, declining step-by-step from perfection towards imperfection.¹⁰

The descending hierarchy of beings after the One is presented as the doctrine of the Pythagorean school,¹¹ but it is immediately evident to the reader that its real source is to be found in one or more

⁷ As we shall see immediately below, *Epistle* 32 is split into 32a and 32b.

⁸ Walker, Introduction, p. 2.

⁹ Walker, Introduction, p. 5: “(...) there is considerable confusion in the manuscripts; although all contain parts and passages of the same material, it is in a different order. In the end there is nothing to indicate the superiority of one version over the other, or even to suggest what an original text might have been like. Thus it is necessary to conclude that two or more versions of *Epistle* 32 existed from the earliest period and that some scribes had access to one, which they copied, and yet others to another version, which is the one they copied without realizing that there was any difference”.

¹⁰ Walker, Introduction, p. 9.

¹¹ At p. ٥٠١٠ (= p. 17 of the English trans.) Pythagoras “the Sage” is mentioned, and at p. ٨٠١١ (= p. 18, English) the reference is to the school (*al-Fitāğūriyyūn*). Among the studies that contribute to shedding light on the sources of the

of the Neoplatonic texts translated and adapted in the 9th century Baghdad under the supervision of al-Kindī.¹² This comes as no surprise: there is scholarly consensus on the fact that the Arabic Neoplatonica, and chiefly the pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle*, are among the sources of the *Epistles*. My point in presenting here some textual parallels is less that of adding pieces of evidence to this well-established tenet than that of discussing the implications of such borrowings in the *Epistles* edited in this volume.

Epistle 32a combines the ‘Pythagorean’ doctrine of the one and the numerical series with the Neoplatonic account of the universal causality of the One in the typical adaptation of the “circle of al-Kindī”, consisting in that such a causality is put on equal footing with creation, and the procession of the first numbers from the one is put on equal footing with the emanation of the Intellect, Soul, nature, and matter from the Creator.

Thus one is the origin of numbers, just as the Creator is the cause of existing things (*‘illat al-mawǧūdāt*), the One who brings them into existence, orders and perfects them, finishes and completes them. Just as one has no parts to it, nor [does it have] a like, similarly the Creator is unique without likeness, or similar, or partner. Just as one exists in all numbers enveloping them, similarly God is present in every existent enveloping it. Just as one gives its name to every number and amount, similarly the Creator gives existence to every existent. Just as one maintains the permanence of number, similarly by the permanence of the Creator the endurance and permanence of existing beings is sustained. Just as one determines the value of every number and thing enumerated and measured, so too, similarly, the knowledge of the Creator encompasses all things, both the visible and invisible. They maintain that, just as the repetition of one generates numbers and increases them, so similarly from the Creator’s emanation and His munificence comes the generation of creatures, their perfection, and completion. Just as two is the first number generated by the repetition of one, similarly the intellect is the first existent emanated by the goodness of the Creator. Just as three follows after two, so similarly the soul follows after the intellect, just as four follows in order after three, similarly nature follows in order after soul, and just as five follows after four, similarly prime matter follows after nature.¹³

The cosmic hierarchy of this passage is clearly derivative and the Arabic Neoplatonica have been already taken into account by scholars who commented upon it,¹⁴ without however indicating specific sources. In view of this, it is useful to go deeper into detail in order to ascertain how literal the quotations are.¹⁵

The first passage in *Epistle 32a* that bears traces of direct reading of the pseudo-*Theology* is the following:

knowledge that the Brethren might have had of the ‘Pythagorean’ doctrines – obviously meaning almost everywhere Neopythagorean – see Diwald, *Arabische Philosophie und Wissenschaft* (above, n. 4), pp. 32-5 and C. Baffioni, “‘Detti aurei’ di Pitagora in trasmissione araba”, in V. Placella - S. Martelli (eds.), *I moderni ausili all’ecdotica*, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Napoli 1994, pp. 107-31.

¹² G. Endress, “The Circle of al-Kindī. Early Arabic Translations from the Greek and the Rise of Islamic Philosophy”, in G. Endress - R. Kruk (eds.), *The Ancient Tradition in Christian and Islamic Hellenism. Studies on the Transmission of Greek Philosophy and Sciences dedicated to H.J. Drossaart Lulofs on His Ninetieth Birthday*, CNWS School, Leiden 1997, pp. 43-76.

¹³ Pp. ٨. ١١-٩. ١٦, English trans. Walker, pp. 18-19.

¹⁴ Cf. Diwald, *Arabische Philosophie und Wissenschaft*, pp. 43-45.

¹⁵ In the tables below pp. 409-10 ‘Badawī’ stands for ‘A. Badawī (ed.), *Aflūṭīn ‘indal-‘arab. Plotinus apud Arabes. Theologia Aristotelis et fragmenta quae supersunt*, Dār al-Nahḍa al-Miṣriyya, Cairo 1955, and ‘Lewis’ stands for *Plotini Opera*, ed. P. Henry et H.-R. Schwyzter. Tomus II. *Enneades IV-V*, accedunt *Plotiniana Arabica* quae anglice vertit G. Lewis, Desclée de Brouwer, Paris 1959.

ps.- <i>Theology of Aristotle</i> , III, p. 50.9-12 Badawī	<i>Epistle</i> 32a, pp. ١٢. ١٨-١٣. ٣ Walker
وأما نحن فنقول إنّ الله عز وجلّ علة للعقل والعقل علة للنفس والنفس علة للطبيعة والطبيعة علة للأكوان الجزئية، غير أنه وإن كانت الأشياء بعضها علة لبعض فإن الله تعالى علة لجميعها كلها، غير أنه علة لبعضها بتوسط وعلة لبعضها بغير توسط وهو الذي جعل العلة كما قلنا فيما سلفا	وذلك أنّ هذا الهيولى أول معلول النفس والنفس أول معلول العقل والعقل أول معلول البارئ جل اسمه وأنّ البارئ تعالى ذكره علة كل موجود ومُتَقِنُّهُ ومُتَمِّمُهُ ومكمله على النظام والترتيب الأشرف فالأشرف
Now we say that God is the cause of mind and mind is the cause of soul and soul is the cause of nature and nature is the cause of all particular existences, yet if one thing is the cause of another, God is the cause of them all, although He is the cause of some of them indirectly and of some directly, it being He that made the cause, as we said above (trans. Lewis, p. 205).	That is because this matter [i.e. prime matter] is the first effect of soul, and soul is the first effect of intellect, and intellect is the first effect of the Creator, and the Creator is the cause of all existing beings, their sustainer, completer, and perfecter, in accord with the arrangement and order in which the most noble is the most noble (trans. Walker, p. 21).

A passage that could not have been written without direct acquaintance with the text of the pseudo-*Theology* is the following:

ps.- <i>Theology of Aristotle</i> III, p. 51.8-14 Badawī (modified)	<i>Epistle</i> 32a, pp. ١٣. ٥-٩ and ١٤. ٨-١٣ Walker
غير أنه وإن كانت النفس تفعل في الهيولى والعقل يفعل في النفس، فإنما تفعل النفس في الهيولى الصورة، ويفعل العقل في النفس الصورة أيضاً. فإن الله تبارك وتعالى هو الذي يحدث أنبيات الأشياء وصورها، غير أنه يحدث بعض الصور بلا توسط وبعضها بتوسط. وإنما تحدث أنبيات الأشياء وصورها لأنه هو الشيء الكائن بالفعل حقاً، بل هو الفعل المحض، فإذا فعل فإنما ينظر إلى ذاته فيفعل فعله دفعة واحدة.	فالعقل هو أول موجود أوجوده البارئ جلّ اسمه وأبدعه من غير واسطة ثم أوجد النفس بواسطة العقل ثم الهيولى وذلك أنّ العقل هو جوهر روحاني فاض من البارئ وهو باق تامّ كمال والنفس جوهرة روحانية فاضت من العقل وهي باقية تامة غير كاملة واعلم أنّ العقل إنما قبل فيض البارئ عزّ اسمه وفضائله التي هي البقاء والتمام والكمال دفعة واحدة بلا زمان ولا حركة نصب لقيه من البارئ عزّ اسمه وشدة روحانيته فأما النفس فإنها لما كان وجودها من البارئ تعالى ذكره بترسط العقل صارت رتبته دون العقل وصارت ناقصة في قبول الفضائل
But if soul acts on matter and mind acts on soul, soul makes form in matter, and mind makes form in soul. It is God who originates the essences and forms of the things, but he originates some of the forms directly and some of them indirectly . The reason why he originates the essences and forms of things is that he is the thing truly existing in actuality: indeed he is absolute activity, and when he acts he does but look at himself and perform his activity simultaneously (trans. Lewis, p. 207).	Thus the intellect is the first existent that the Creator brings into existence and the most noble of them, and He originates it without intermediary . Next He brings into being soul with the intermediary of the intellect , and then next prime matter. And that is because intellect is an immaterial substance emanating from the Creator, who is permanent, complete, and perfect, and the soul is an immaterial substance that emanates from the intellect and it is permanent and complete but not perfect (trans. Walker, p. 22). Know that the intellect receives the emanation of the Creator and His excellences, which are permanence, completeness, and perfection, in one fell swoop , outside of time, without motion or exertion, only because of its close proximity to the Creator and the intensity of its spirituality. As for the soul, because of its having its existence from the Creator through the intellect, its rank is lower than intellect, and it is deficient in the reception of excellences, and also because soul at one time directs itself toward intellect in order to have goodness and excellences extended from there, and yet at another, it turns toward matter in order to pass on the emanation with those godnesses and excellences that are extended to it (trans. Walker, pp. 22-23).

Finally, the following passage from *Epistle 35* echoes the same section of the pseudo-*Theology* as the two passages from *Epistle 32a* quoted above:

ps.- <i>Theology of Aristotle</i> III, pp. 51.14-52.5 Badawi	<i>Epistle 35</i> , p. ١٠٩.٢-١٠ Walker
<p>وأما العقل، فإنه وإن كان هو ما هو بالفعل فإنه لما كان من فوقه شيء آخر نالته قوة ذلك الشيء، ومن أجل ذلك يحرص على أن يتشبهه بالفاعل الأول الذي هو فعل محض. فإذا أراد فعلا فإيما ينظر إلى ما فوقه فيفعل فعله غاية في النقاوة. وكذلك النفس وإن كانت هي ما هي بالفعل، فإنها لما صار العقل فوقها نالها شيء من قوته، فإذا فعلت فإنما تنظر إلى العقل فتفعل ما تفعل. فأما الفاعل الأول وهو فعل محض فإنه إنما يفعل فعله وهو ينظر إلى ذاته لا إلى خارج منه لأنه ليس خارجا منه شيء آخر هو أعلى منه ولا أدنى. فقد بان إذن وصح أن العقل قبل النفس وأن النفس قبل الطبيعة وأن الطبيعة قبل الأشياء الواقعة تحت الكون والفساد، وأن الفاعل الأول قبل الأشياء كلها، وأنه مبدع ومتمم معا، ليس بين إبداعه الشيء وإتمامه فرق ولا فصل البتة.</p>	<p>واعلم أن الموجودات كلها صور وأعيان غيريات أفاضها الباريء جل جلاله على العقل ومن العقل على النفس ومن النفس على الهيولى والعقل هو أول موجود جادها به الباريء جل جلاله وأوجده وهو جوهر بسيط روحامي فيه جميع صور الموجودات غير متراكمة ولا متزاحمة كما يكون في نفس العالم صور المعلومات ونفس الصانع صور المصنوعات قبل إخراجها ووضعها في الهيولى وأن العقل أفاض تلك الصور على النفس الكلية دفعة واحدة بلا زمان كفيض الشمس نورها على القمر</p>
<p>As for the mind, even though it is its real self in actuality, since there is something else above it the power of that thing attains it and consequently it desires to become like the first agent who is absolute activity. When it wishes to act it does but look at what is above it and perform its activity in the utmost purity. Similarly, even though the soul is her real self in actuality, since the mind is above her something of its power attains her, and when she acts she does but look at the mind and do what she does. Now the first agent, who is absolute activity, performs his activity looking at himself, not at anything outside himself, for there is nothing else outside him, be it higher than he or inferior to him. So now it is demonstrated and verified that mind is prior to soul and that soul is prior to nature and that nature is prior to the things that fall under genesis and corruption, and that the first agent is prior to all things, and that he originates and completes simultaneously, with no distinction or division at all between his originating a thing and his completing it (trans. Lewis, slightly modified, p. 207).</p>	<p>Know that all beings that exist are forms and changeable essences that the Creator emanates to the intellect, and from the intellect to the soul, and from the soul to prime matter. The intellect is the first existing being on which the Creator bestows existence, and thus causes it to exist. It is a simple, immaterial substance in which all the forms of existents are not jumbled together or overcrowded, as is the case with the forms of things known in the soul of the world and with the form of manufactured things in the soul of an artisan prior to their production and being put into matter. The intellect emanates these forms to the universal soul in one fell swoop, outside of time, as with the Sun's emanating its light on the Moon (trans. Walker, pp. 119-20).</p>

Thus one can confidently say that, at least as far as *Epistles 32a* and *35* are concerned, the pseudo-*Theology* is much more than a vague source of inspiration for their author, or authors: it counts as a literary source properly speaking.

As I.K. Poonawala points out in his introduction, *Epistle 34*, entitled “The Universe is a Macroanthropos”, mirrors *Epistle 26*, whose title runs “On the Meaning of the Saying of the Sages that the Human Being is a Microcosm”.¹⁶ The “Sages (*ḥukamā*)” alluded to in this title and at the beginning of *Epistle 34*¹⁷ are described as belonging to the Platonic tradition broadly speaking,¹⁸ and

¹⁶ Poonawala, Introduction, p. 54.

¹⁷ Cf. p. ٥٣. ١ (= p. 83 in the English trans. by D. Simonowitz).

¹⁸ Poonawala, Introduction, p. 54 recapitulates as follows the main implications of the topic: “The Platonic idea of a world soul animating the universe had, as its corollary, the concept of the human body as a representation of a miniature universe that was animated by its own soul. The supposed analogy between the whole and its parts served not only to develop a cosmology in which the reality of the individual person received due attention but was also fundamental to astrology and other fields in which belief in a metaphysical relationship between man and the rest of nature is postulated”.

here too attempts have been made to indicate the intermediate sources that might have transmitted such formulae and doctrines, thus prompting their adoption in the *Epistles*.¹⁹ Prof. Poonawala rightly claims that the doctrine of cosmos as a macroanthropos is best accounted for against the background of the main doctrines of the Brethren about “man as the central link between the two worlds: terrestrial and celestial” (pp. 54-5), and refers to the Neoplatonic origins of this idea, mentioning also the pseudo-*Theology* (p. 58). Thus, it is puzzling to find at p. 66 the statement of a 13th century author who attributes the *Epistles* of the Brethren of Purity to Ġafar al-Šādiq quoted without any caveat, or, to be more precise, presented in the context of what seems to be substantial agreement. Since Prof. Poonawala will elaborate more on this point in further publications,²⁰ I deem it useful to discuss the issue here, and to submit to him in this review the reactions of an outside reader.

The claim that Ġafar al-Šādiq authored the *Epistles* of the Brethren of Purity comes from “the eighth Yemeni *dā'i* Husayn b. ‘Alī b. Muḥammad al-Walid al-Qurashī (d. 667/1268)” (p. 66). This author states in his *Unique Treatise Concerning the Confirmation of the Basic Principles of the Creed* that the *Epistles* were “issued or put into circulation” (p. 66, fn. 37) by Ġafar al-Šādiq, the “hidden Imām” of the Ismaili tradition, who died in 765/147 H. This assessment, as explained by Prof. Poonawala shortly before, is in itself derived from an earlier source, lost to us: the biography by the Ismaili author Ġafar ibn Manšūr al-Yaman (d. ca. 957/346 H) of his father Ibn Ḥawšab, who can thus count as the original source of the information.²¹ Thus, we have a 10th century Ismaili source claiming that the *Epistles* were authored, or transmitted, by the “hidden Imām” of the 8th century. To this piece of evidence Prof. Poonawala adds the following commentary:

In my opinion, it is high time to put aside the thesis put forth by S.M. Stern and supported by W. Madelung that the authors of the *Rasā'il* were the Qarāmiṭa and that the *Epistles* was composed around the middle of the fourth/tenth century. Both Y. Marquet and Abbas Hamadani have vigorously refuted their arguments piece by piece. Most recently, the Fāṭimid historian of repute Michael Brett has strongly argued against the thesis of Stern and Madelung on quite convincing grounds (p. 66).

This creates a drift towards the idea that, *since* the date proposed by Stern and Madelung for the creation of the encyclopedia is wrong, *then* the testimony of the Ismaili authors quoted above might be right. However, the literal quotations from the pseudo-*Theology* that result from the tables at pp. 409-10 above show that the *terminus post quem* of the compilation of at least

¹⁹ Diwald, *Arabische Philosophie und Wissenschaft*, pp. 130-2, lists the texts, both religious and philosophical, that are likely to have contributed to the topic of man as microcosmos and cosmos as macroanthropos. She rightly points to the ‘Saying’ 10 of the *Tabula smaragdina*, p. 114 Ruska (cf. J. Ruska, *Tabula smaragdina. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der hermetischen Literatur*, Heidelberger Akten der von-Portheim-Stiftung, Bd. 16, Heidelberg 1926, Arabic text p. 113: علي تكوين العالم الأكبر تكوين العالم الأصغر, German translation p. 114: “Gemäß dem Bau der großen Welt ist der Bau der kleinen Welt”) as to one of the sources of *Epistles* 26 and 34. In addition to the sources and studies indicated by S. Diwald in her 1975 study quoted above, cf. R. Finckh, *Minor mundus homo. Studien zur Mikrokosmos-Idee in der mittelalterlichen Literatur*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1999 (Palaestra. Untersuchungen aus der deutschen und skandinavischen Philologie, 306), with a special focus on the Latin tradition.

²⁰ Poonawala, *Introduction*, p. 66: “I will pursue the theme of this story in the introduction to my edition and translation of the forty-first epistle with more details and fresh thoughts”.

²¹ Attention has been called to this text, as Poonawala highlights at p. 66 n. 35, by A. Hamdani, “An Early Fāṭimid Source on the Time and Authorship of the *Rasā'il Iḥwān al-Šafā'*”, *Arabica* 26 (1997), pp. 62-75.

Epistles 32a and 35 is 842/227 H, that is the date of the death of the caliph al-Mu‘taṣim, who is mentioned at the beginning of the pseudo-*Theology*. Here we are told in as many words that the translation was done under al-Mu‘taṣim’s reign,²² and since what features in *Epistles* 32a and 35 is not a generic echo of Plotinian doctrines, but the literal wording of the Arabic adaptation of Plotinus’ writings, the conclusion imposes itself that the author, or authors, of these two *Epistles* had either the pseudo-*Theology* or at least the Arabic adapted version of Plotinus at his or their disposal.²³ This rules out the authorship of Ġaf‘ar al-Šādiq alleged by the Ismaili sources of the 10th and 13th centuries.

Epistle 36, as G. de Callatay has in his Introduction, “is authentically the astrological epistle of the entire corpus” (p. 137). It is subdivided into two parts, the first of which is devoted to the celestial revolutions, while the second “goes straight into the realm of astrological speculation” (p. 138). A section of the Introduction is devoted to the “science of the stars (*‘ilm al-nuġūm*)” according to the Brethren, with its three main branches – cosmology, computations, and astrology – as stated in *Epistle* 3, *On Astronomy*, recently translated in the same series.²⁴

The authors clearly desired (...) to proceed some steps further towards the unknown. Beyond the multiplicity of the elements that constitute the body of the world, they were eager to climb, in some way as Plato has done in the *Timaeus*, back to the universal soul which, thanks to the intellect instilled in it by God, makes this great body a moving and living being. (...) the Ikhwān narrate how the universal soul originally gave rise to a multitude of individual souls, how these latter souls descended from the all-encompassing sphere (*al-falak al-muḥīt*) in order to spread out, up to the centre of the Earth, through all individual bodies of the sublunary world, and finally how the same souls may hope to climb back one day to the external sphere, their ultimate objective, announcing the resurrection of all the individual human souls” (p. 144).

This main cosmological frame accounts for the conviction of the brotherhood that there are paths downwards and upwards that connect the earth and heaven. Men dwelling in the sublunary world can know the celestial movements, and here Ptolemy provides them with his guidance;²⁵ not only, but they can also know how the celestial powers influence their life:

The transmission of this influx from the stars does not stop at the Moon, but goes as far as the centre of the Earth (and of the universe). Because the souls of absolutely all beings that come-to-be under

²² Pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle*, p. 3.1-9 Badawī (see above n. 15).

²³ A detailed discussion of this issue goes beyond the limits of this review, and I will limit myself to saying that the passages in bold in the table of p. 409 belong not to the original text of Plotinus, in Greek, but to its Arabic adaptation, that dates from the thirties or the forties of the 9th century (see the preceding note).

²⁴ *Epistles of the Brethren of Purity. On Astronomy. An Arabic Critical Edition and English Translation of Epistle 3*, edited and translated by F.J. Ragep and T. Mimura. Foreword by N. El-Bizri, Oxford U.P. in association with The Institute of Ismaili Studies, Oxford 2015, reviewed in the 2016 issue of *Studia graeco-arabica*, pp. 265-6.

²⁵ As G. de Callatay has it, “In astronomical terms, the universal soul moves the external sphere, that is, the whole celestial vault, according to the diurnal revolution from East to West. In turn, this ultimate sphere, the *primum mobile*, carries the revolutions of the eight other spheres, that is, in increasing order of distance from the all-encompassing sphere, the sphere of the fixed stars and then the seven planetary spheres: Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Venus, Mercury, and the Moon. For a terrestrial observer standing at the centre of the world, the speeds of revolution of these eight spheres with respect to the external sphere decrease in proportion to the distance from the *primum mobile*, as if a certain loss of energy was noticed in each transmission from one sphere to the next below. Ptolemy’s *Almagest*, the principal basis of the Ikhwān’s astronomy, reveals that the movements of these spheres are in reality of great complexity” (p. 145).

the sphere of the Moon originate in the superior realities of the heavens, it naturally follows that their existence is caused by one revolution or another in the heavenly spheres. (...) An astrological treatise par excellence, the epistle on cycles and revolutions is also, by nature, that which most clearly reveals the inner convictions of the Brethren in terms of the powerfulness of astral influences. From the coming-to-be of worms, insects, and lice to the emergence of new religions and empires, and from the replacing of men on the royal throne to the interchange of land masses and seas over the entire surface of the Earth, it would seem that nothing in this world of coming-to-be and passing away escapes the influence of this extreme determinism (p. 146).

Another section of the Introduction (pp. 146-56) is devoted to the sources of the “science of the stars” cultivated by the brotherhood, and provides the reader with all the essential pieces of information on the Greek and Iranian sources of these ideas. The same is done in the numerous and rich footnotes on the translation, thus offering a well-welcomed help to the understanding of a highly technical and demanding part of the encyclopaedia.

Cristina D’Ancona

C. Cerami, *Génération et substance. Aristote et Averroès entre physique et métaphysique*, De Gruyter, Boston – Berlin 2015 (*Scientia Graeco-Arabica*, 18), XIII + 734 pp.

This volume is composed of two parts devoted respectively to Aristotle's (Chapters I-V) and Averroes' (Chapters VI-IX) doctrines of substantial generation, a topic that in the view of the author Cristina Cerami is vital for both philosophers.

Substantial generation differs from nonsubstantial change, as stated by Aristotle mainly in *Physics* I 7 and in *De Generatione et corruptione* I 3-4,¹ in so far as nonsubstantial change entails the continuity of the subject, whereas substantial generation consists in coming-to-be *simpliciter*.² C. Cerami sets for herself first the task of "clarifier le statut de la génération substantielle dans la philosophie naturelle du Stagirite et d'expliquer le dédoublement de l'étude de la génération dans son enquête métaphysique" (pp. 1-2). Thus, the first five chapters elaborate more on the double status that the author detects, as in the opening sentence just quoted, in Aristotle's analysis of coming-to-be *simpliciter*. With this problem deal Chapter I, "La génération substantielle dans le corpus philosophique d'Aristote: les critères d'une étude systématique" (pp. 23-62), and Chapter II, "Les premières causes de la nature et du mouvement naturel dans son ensemble" (pp. 63-95).

That Aristotle approaches substantial generation in two different ways emerges, according to C. Cerami, from a comparison between *Physics* I, where one and the same subject, matter, ceases to be this and becomes that – following a pattern that is labelled "modèle prédicatif"³ – and *De Generatione et corruptione*, where Aristotle's focus is on the rise of a new entity taken as a whole, ὅλον. In the first case matter counts as subject, and the coming-to-be of a given being depends upon form; in the second case, matter enters as a constituent of the 'thatness' of the thing, because substantial generation only refers to individual substances, that are composed out of matter and form: "Si les substances achevées sont les seules véritables substances, c'est parce qu'elles sont les seules à être τὸδε τι et en un sens absolu, tandis que ni les éléments ni les corps homéomères ne le sont. Pour être quelque chose d'absolument déterminé, elles doivent être quelque chose d'absolument un. La matière ne peut être un substrat autonome par rapport à la forme" (p. 127), at variance with what happens in *Physics* I 7, where matter stands as a principle that either receives a form, thus becoming something, or ceases to possess that form.

Cerami parts company with the contemporary interpretations of Aristotle's primary substance that see two models at work, and that she recapitulates as follows: (i) that of *Metaphysics Zeta*, Chapters 7-9 plus *Physics* I, where the individual (τὸδε τι) cannot be the primary substance precisely in so far as it results from the union of matter and form, thus failing to meet the basic criterion of priority, namely

¹ According to C. Cerami, *Physics* I 7 and *De Gen. corr.* I 3-4 offer "deux modèles explicatifs différents" (p. 25). The difference is dealt with chiefly at pp. 96-128 but also later on, and consists essentially in that in the *De Gen. corr.* "Aristote ne parle plus simplement de deux contraires qui sont tour à tour prédiqués d'un substrat permanent, mais d'un changement radical de sujet à la suite du processus de génération. On aura une génération absolue quand se produit un changement total de telle chose en telle autre, du feu, par exemple, en terre. Quand le changement affecte le sujet propre des prédications accidentelles, défini comme étant composé d'un aspect formel et d'un aspect matériel, on aura là une génération absolue" (p. 109). Cf. also below pp. 415-16.

² *Phys.* I 7, 190 a 31-33: πολλαχῶς δὲ λεγομένου τοῦ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τῶν μὲν οὐ γίγνεσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸδε τι γίγνεσθαι, ἀπλῶς δὲ γίγνεσθαι τῶν οὐσιῶν μόνον, κατὰ μὲν τᾶλλα φανερόν ὅτι ἀνάγκη ὑποκεῖσθαι τι τὸ γιγνόμενον. *De Gen. corr.* I 2, 317 a 20-22: ἔστι γὰρ γένεσις ἀπλῆ καὶ φθορὰ οὐ συγκρίσει καὶ διακρίσει, ἀλλ' ὅταν μεταβάλλῃ ἐκ τοῦδε εἰς τὸδε ὅλον.

³ See below, pp. 415-16.

not to be derived from something else, and (ii) that of *Metaphysics Theta*, where the individual is a whole, with matter conceived of as a mere property of the individual substance.⁴ Only this second model allows the τὸδε τι to be primary substance. This interpretation sounds unconvincing to C. Cerami, and this on two counts: first, because it implies that *Metaphysics Zeta* 7-9 and *Physics* I share one and the same account of substantial generation, an idea that is the duty of the first part of this book to dismantle; second, because it entails the reliance of a physical theory upon a metaphysical principle, that of the priority of actuality over potentiality. “Le fait d’affirmer que la doctrine de *Phys. I/ Met. Z* 7-9 est corrigée à la lumière de la théorie de la puissance et de l’acte (...) conduit inévitablement à admettre une dépendance de la physique à l’égard de la métaphysique”.⁵ Since her interpretation of the relationship between the two sciences in Aristotle goes against this, Cerami maintains that “les conclusions qu’Aristote tire en *Met. Z* 7-9 présentent le modèle propre à la génération substantielle, celui qui tient compte d’une suprématie du τὸδε τι et qui considère la génération absolue comme l’advenir d’un nouveau sujet unitaire composé d’un aspect matériel et d’un aspect formel” (p. 57).

The focus on the τὸδε τι and its rise occupies Chapter III, “Du général au spécifique: l’étude de la génération substantielle dans ses caractéristiques propres” (pp. 96-128) and Chapter IV, “La mise en œuvre de l’étude de la génération substantielle: la génération animale” (pp. 129-64), both dealing with the *De Generatione et corruptione*.

An individual substance comes to be out of another individual substance, a whole produced by another whole: this entails a change with respect to *Physics* I. Aristotle “modifie le modèle prédicatif de *Phys. I* et présente la génération absolue comme le remplacement de deux étants, dont le premier serait

⁴ Cerami refers chiefly to the studies by M.L. Gill, *Aristotle on Substance. The Paradox of Unity*, Princeton U.P., Princeton 1989, and by M.J. Loux, *Primary Ousia. An Essay on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z and H*, Cornell U.P., Ithaca-London 1991. I think that her account of the position of M.L. Gill is based on statements like that of pp. 167-8 of *Aristotle on Substance*: “a substantial form can now count as a proper subject, since the generic matter of which the form is predicated is in fact a property of the form rather than the form’s being a property of it. Substantial form properly satisfies the subject criterion of the *Categories* and *Metaphysics Z* 3 because, being separate and τὸδε τι, the form is that of which things are predicated but not itself predicated (in the normal way) of anything else” and that of pp. 240-1: “I opened this book with a paradox that seems to undermine the claim of living organisms and other composites to be primary substances. The unity of composites is problematic because every generated object, with the exception of elements, contains matter from which it was generated and that survives in it as a constituent. (...) A generated composite cannot be a vertical unity if the preexisting matter from which it was generated remains within it as a definite subject to which the form of the composite belongs”. As for Loux’s interpretation, Cerami refers to pp. 109-46 of *Primary Ousia*, but a good summary of his position lies also, so it seems to me, in the chapter entitled “Form as Ousia”, pp. 183 and 187: “the theory of *Metaphysics Z* and *H* commits Aristotle to two theses: first, that the essence of a substantial form involves nothing, whether intrinsic or extrinsic to the form, that functions as matter; second, that although the matter for a given form can be defined only by reference to the matter and form whose predicative relation enables us to explain why it is the kind of thing it is, what functions as proximate matter or subject for a substantial form can always be defined independently of that form. But how, in turn, are a form and its matter related to the composite particular into whose analysis they enter? Well, they are its *ousiai*. (...) The substantial form associated with the species is what constitutes the *ousia* of the relevant particulars. The form is not, however, predicated of those particulars. It is predicated of the parcels of matter making up the particulars, and the predication at work here is accidental rather than essential”.

⁵ One may think that the allusion is to the claim of *Metaph. H* 1, 1042 a 27-28 that matter is only potentially an individual substance (ὕλην δὲ λέγω ἢ μὴ τὸδε τι οὐσα ἐνεργεία δυνάμει ἐστὶ τὸδε τι), a claim that is sometimes referred to in the scholarship with which Cerami disagrees. In reality, Cerami’s point is more general than this, and is explained at p. 195, n. 93, as follows: “Dans sa monographie sur *Met. Z*, M.L. Gill (...) estime que le but du passage final de *Z* 7 est de montrer la nature non unitaire de la substance composée. L’interprète précise néanmoins que la position présentée dans ces lignes, et plus globalement dans le livre *Z*, ne correspond pas à la doctrine définitive d’Aristote. Le livre *Z* n’est en réalité qu’un passage dialectique dans la recherche sur ce qu’est substance. C’est en effet dans les livres successifs et avec l’introduction des notions d’acte et puissance, qu’il expliquera que la matière et la forme constituent un tout unitaire, du fait que la matière n’est que substance en puissance”.

moins déterminé que l'autre et, par conséquent, matière de celui-ci. Le vrai sujet de la génération n'est pas une matière demeurant identique au cours de la transformation, mais le nouvel étant produit de la génération: le nouveau tout qui vient à être. La génération absolue n'est donc pas un simple processus de remplacement de deux contraires, mais la constitution d'un nouveau ὄλον à partir d'un autre, moins déterminé, qui sert de matière. Comme Aristote l'avait énoncé, la génération absolue est le changement de l'objet dans sa totalité, voire un changement dans sa matière et dans sa forme" (p. 116).⁶

According to Cerami, the change of pattern in the *De Gen. corr.* with respect to *Physics* I paves the way to the notion of substance as it features in *Metaphysics Zeta*, and Chapter V "Le quelque chose qui vient à l'être: substance et génération dans le livre Z de la *Métaphysique*" (pp. 165-229) is devoted to outline her own interpretation of this admittedly controversial book of the *Metaphysics*. In her outline of the contents of *Zeta*, and in particular with her interpretation of chapters 7-9 as a pathway to *Theta* with its assessment of the priority of actuality over potentiality as the true criterion for primary substance,⁷ Cerami expounds her understanding of the relationship between physics and metaphysics in Aristotle. "Cela confirme, dans un cadre plus général, que la recherche naturelle fournit à la recherche métaphysique des résultats dont celle-ci ne peut se passer. L'examen de la génération et les conclusions auxquelles Aristote parvient au fur et à mesure que sa recherche naturelle se spécifie fournissent un contenu à sa théorie métaphysique. (...) De ce point de vue, la philosophie de la nature et de la génération ne peut être considérée comme subordonnée à la science de la substance: c'est en revanche la première qui doit être considérée comme antérieure à la métaphysique" (p. 229).

Both this interpretation of Aristotle's theory of substantial generation and the general frame in which Cerami inscribes it are explicitly grounded in Averroes' own reading. This is stated at the beginning of the volume⁸ and represents the overarching topic of Part II, "Averroès entre physique et métaphysique", comprised of Chapters VI–IX.

Substantial generation is accounted for, as Cerami has anticipated in Part I, in a way that is inspired by Averroes: "On pourrait dire, en portant à bout l'intuition qu'on attribuera à Averroès, que la matière est une propriété par soi d'un type particulier. *La matière en ce sens aurait certaines caractéristiques des affections accidentelles, ainsi que certaines propriétés de l'essence. C'est en suivant cette idée qu'un certain aristotélisme dont Averroès est l'héritier fera de la doctrine des accidents essentiels un point crucial de son ontologie*" (p. 57 and *fn. 67*).

It is not only the case that Averroes understands substantial generation in a way that meets the interpretation favoured by Cerami. The main point is rather that Averroes does so because he understands the relationship between the *Physics* and the *De Gen. corr.* in exactly the way that has guided the interpretation advanced in the first part of Cerami's book. This is detailed in Chapter VI, "L'étude de la génération substantielle et l'ordre du corpus physique d'après Averroès" (pp. 237-83), where the thesis of the volume is stated as follows: "On a montré que l'explication du phénomène de la génération substantielle qu'Aristote fournit ne peut se comprendre hors du projet philosophique

⁶ It is not entirely clear to me whether this shift is understood as a refinement on the part of Aristotle of the criteria set in *Physics* I, with these criteria remaining valid as a general frame, or the shift is intended as a change of mind: pp. 62, 69, 99, 101, and 460 seem to go in the first direction, while at p. 165 the claim that "Afin de distinguer une génération véritablement absolue d'une génération relative, il faut modifier le modèle indifférencié de *Phys.* I et suivre les indications du *DGC* qui imposent une *restructuration du réel* selon le critère appelé du τὸδε τι" (my emphasis) seems to go the other way round.

⁷ "Les résultats de *Met. Z* 7-9 non seulement contribuent au but du livre dans son entier, mais ne contredisent pas les résultats auxquels les livres suivants et notamment le livre Θ parviendront: démontrer que la substance première, en tant que forme, est l'actualité d'un substrat qui n'est qu'en puissance ce qu'elle est en acte" (p. 228).

⁸ "S'il faut lire Aristote pour comprendre Averroès, il faut aussi lire Averroès pour comprendre Aristote" (p. 20).

global dans lequel il l'inscrit. Car le paradigme explicatif qu'il en donne diffère en fonction du but visé dans les différentes parties de son corpus physique et métaphysique. Selon le traité, la génération substantielle est considérée, de façon plus ou moins abstraite, comme un processus partageant la même nature que les autres devenirs ou comme un phénomène absolument unique possédant ses caractéristiques propres. C'est le but visé qui impose à l'analyse son niveau de généralité. (...) L'analyse des traités qu'Averroès a écrits dans la seconde phase de sa réflexion, notamment les Commentaires Moyens (CM) et les Grands Commentaires (GC) des œuvres d'Aristote, montre que le même principe exégétique vaut aussi dans le cas de sa reconstruction de la théorie aristotélicienne de la génération (...). Averroès envisage en effet au sein de la physique une distinction entre des recherches générales et des recherches spécifiques. Les recherches générales précèdent les autres parce qu'elles envisagent les étants naturels en tant que tels, c'est-à-dire en tant que doués d'un principe de mouvement interne, et que, ce faisant, nous conduisent aux causes absolument premières et aux accidents essentiels que tous les étants naturels partagent. Les recherches physiques se spécifient en revanche suivant les divisions du genre du corps naturel où l'on distingue les cinq corps simples, puis les corps composés de plus en plus complexes. Dans les recherches 'spécifiques', on procède alors de l'étude du simple vers celle du composé, c'est-à-dire de l'étude des corps simples vers l'étude des êtres composés de plus en plus complexes, lesquels s'achèvent dans l'homme" (pp. 237-8).

Cerami is aware of the fact that in this assessment of the hierarchical relationship of Aristotle's works Averroes is nothing other than the last representative of the Aristotelian curriculum as it was postulated in the philosophical schools of late Antiquity. She devotes an interesting section of Chapter VI to provide evidence of this heritage in Averroes' approach, mostly *via* al-Fārābī.⁹ Here we see that Averroes endorses the Farabian (and for that matter also Avicennian) focus on the scope of one or another work (*ḡarad*, that translates *σκοπός* and is in its turn translated as *intentio*). The place of a given work in the systematic order of the corpus is assigned by its *intentio*. Averroes' account of the *ordo* of Aristotle's *Physics* and its *intentio* is quoted by Cerami¹⁰ and commented upon as follows: "Il y a donc dans la physique, comme dans toute science théorique, deux parties: une première partie qui traite des choses partagées par tous les étants qui sont objet de la science, et un ensemble d'autres parties qui traitent des choses que chaque espèce de ces étants possède en propre. Dans le cas de la science naturelle, Aristote a consacré à la partie générale le traité de la *Physique*, qui a donc pour but de faire connaître les choses communes à tous les étants naturels, tandis qu'il a consacré aux différentes parties spécifiques les autres traités de son corpus. (...) C'est pourquoi il faut que la partie générale de la philosophie naturelle précède celle qui porte sur les diverses espèces des étants naturels" (pp. 244-5 and 249).

This allows Averroes to solve most of the problems of mutual consistency between statements that, like the ones discussed in the first part of the book, *prima facie* account for the same thing in different ways. As we have just seen, if the account of substantial generation provided in the *Physics*

⁹ This is done chiefly on the grounds of a passage extracted from the *Prologue* of the *Long Commentary* on the *Physics*, where Averroes endorses the late Antique curriculum. Cerami says: "Selon une pratique devenue courante depuis les commentateurs de l'antiquité tardive, introduite dans le monde arabe par al-Fārābī, Averroès y présente les huit questions préalables (*capitula*) relatives au livre commenté: (1) quelle est l'*intentio* de l'œuvre (2) son utilité, (3) quel est son ordre (*ordo*) par rapport aux autres traités scientifiques, (4) en combien de parties elle est divisée (*divisio*), (5) quelle est la relation (*proportio*) de la science physique aux autres sciences théorétiques, (6) quelle est la méthode suivie (*via doctrinae*), (7) quel est le nom du livre, (8) quel est le nom de l'auteur" (pp. 241-2).

¹⁰ The passage is quoted at pp. 244-5 from the Junctine edition (repr. Frankfurt a.M. 1962), vol. IV, 3 c 1- g 8 (as for the *ordo* of the *Physics*) and 1 g 6-16 (as for the *intentio*).

agrees with that provided in the *De Gen. corr.*, it is precisely because in the *Physics* Aristotle wants to explain change in general, while he devotes the *De Gen. corr.* to explaining elemental combinations with an eye to the rise of the living being. “C’est en considérant ces critères d’organisation comme les principes au cœur de la physique aristotélicienne qu’Averroès conclut que les traités physiques d’Aristote constituent l’exposition des résultats de la recherche scientifique. C’est pour cette même raison, assure-t-il, que ces traités doivent suivre l’ordre contraire à l’ordre de la découverte des principes, selon lequel on procède, par induction, du particulier à l’universel. L’ordre du corpus, qu’Averroès appelle ‘ordre de l’enseignement’ (*ordo doctrinae, tartīb al-ta’līm*), va en effet des causes universelles aux causes particulières (...). C’est au moyen de cette distinction entre un ordre de la découverte et un ordre de l’enseignement qu’Averroès peut rendre compte des déclarations apparemment contradictoires d’Aristote” (p. 240). This substantiates Cerami’s claim that Averroes represents a vantage point for the reader of Aristotle.¹¹

As I have said before, this interpretation is the overarching concern of the two parts of the book. This drives me to the first of my two main perplexities. In her exposition of Averroes’ solution, Cerami continues: “Lorsque Aristote assure qu’il faut procéder des faits vers leurs causes et du particulier vers l’universel, l’ordre prescrit est celui de la découverte; lorsqu’en revanche il prescrit de procéder des causes universelles vers les causes particulières, et de l’universel vers le particulier, il n’est plus question de la recherche, mais de l’exposition de ses résultats. Dans ce cas alors, l’ordre à suivre est celui qu’Aristote a adopté lui-même dans son corpus physique, en plaçant au tout début le traité qui expose la démonstration des causes universelles, à savoir la *Physique*, puis les traités qui étudient les causes de plus en plus particulières” (p. 241). This solution is by no means Averroes’ own idea: on the contrary, it is rooted in the scholastic tradition he inherits, as Cerami has already explained and as she recalls also here.¹² But by the same token one is led to contextualize the proposed solution: in other words, if it is perfectly understandable that Averroes has recourse to it, the contemporary scholar struggling with the statements of one or another work of the corpus cannot help but resist using it as a tool to unravel Aristotle’s intentions. Averroes ignored that the structure of the corpus was dictated not by Aristotle, but by an uninterrupted chain of scholars bent on his acroamatic works, a chain that is rooted, even before the late ancient commentators whose echo reached him, and even before Alexander of Aphrodisias who acted as one of their main interlocutors, in Andronicus of Rhodes’ systematic edition – or in that of Andronicus’ source.¹³

The structure of Aristotle’s physical *corpus* described in Part I of the book¹⁴ explicitly mirrors the structure it has in Averroes’ eyes.¹⁵ This is not to say that the century-long systematizations

¹¹ See above n. 8.

¹² “L’idée selon laquelle il faut suivre dans l’exposition de la doctrine l’ordre contraire à celui de la découverte découle directement de la façon dont Averroès évalue le corpus scientifique d’Aristote, mais aussi de la conception qu’il formulait du savoir de son propre temps” (p. 241).

¹³ For some caveats on the originality of Andronicus’ edition as well as for the general frame of the point raised here cf. J. Barnes, “Roman Aristotle”, in J. Barnes - M. Griffin (eds.), *Philosophia togata II. Plato and Aristotle at Rome*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1997, pp. 1-69 (reprinted in G. Nagy [ed.], *Greek Literature in the Roman Period and in Late Antiquity*, Routledge, Abingdon 2001).

¹⁴ “Selon le plan esquissé dans le prologue du traité des *Météorologiques* (...) la recherche naturelle d’Aristote se présente comme un système cohérent dans lequel chaque étude joue un rôle précis. La *Physique* traite des premières causes de la nature et du mouvement naturel dans son ensemble; les deux premiers livres du *De Caelo* traitent des astres dans l’organisation de leurs déplacements supérieurs, tandis que les deux derniers livres du *De Generatione et corruptione* décrivent la nature des composants ultimes (les quatre éléments) et expliquent leurs transmutations cycliques” (p. 96).

¹⁵ “De ce point de vue, Averroès semble repérer dans la reconstruction du corpus physique deux démarches parallèles,

of Aristotle's works are wrong and lead astray. Such is not the case: it goes without saying that the systematic planning that is reflected in Andronicus' edition and that serves as the basis for the formation of the scholastic *corpus* is based on some uncontroversial statements by Aristotle. How could it have been otherwise? But one thing is to refer to the topic of the subalternation of the sciences, as Aristotle surely does,¹⁶ and another different thing is to organise the treatment of the physics as a systematic whole where each departmental science has its precise place.¹⁷ More importantly, this should not cloud the zetetic nature of the Aristotelian works that have come down to us. If I can advance the impression of an outside reader, in the case of substantial generation it is not certain that the different status of matter that emerges if one compares *Physics* I 7 with *Metaphysics Zeta* can be traced back to a difference in the level of the analysis, let alone that the *manuductio* from *Physics* I 7 to *Metaphysics Zeta* is prompted by the focus of the *De Gen. corr.* on the rise of the individual substance. This is surely a way to make Aristotle's statements consistent, and an interesting one: my perplexity is less on the solution itself, that from the viewpoint of an exegete preoccupied with the whole consistency of the system is appealing, than on the fact that it was foreseen as such by Aristotle himself.

Chapter VII, "Les racines universelles de la nature: l'étude générale de la génération" (pp. 294-439) elaborates on the idea that in Averroes' eyes the distinction between physics and metaphysics pivots on the fact that "le physicien doit établir l'existence des causes premières matérielle et motrice, mais qu'il n'étudie ni la cause formelle première ni la cause finale dernière. (...) une seule explication semble se dégager: le fait que la physique n'arrive ni à la forme première ni à la fin dernière découle de la manière dont le physicien considère ces deux causes, et, en dernière instance, du genre-sujet qui limite l'horizon de sa recherche. (...) C'est en donnant cette explication qu'Averroès peut conclure que la physique est une science absolument autonome capable d'arriver par ses seuls moyens aux principes premiers de son genre-sujet" (pp. 307-8). In Chapter VIII, "La voie vers le plus parfait. L'étude propre

du général vers le particulier et du simple vers le complexe. (...) On commence en ce sens du corps simple incorruptible, le corps céleste, qui est cause éloignée des corps sublunaires, mais qui est étudié en *DC* I-II en tant que tel; puis on en vient à l'étude des corps sublunaires, en procédant de l'étude des corps simples vers l'étude des corps dont les formes sont de plus en plus complexes. C'est en fonction de ce critère causal que l'étude des quatre corps simples engendrables et corruptibles de *DC* III-V précède celle de *DGC* II, parce que ces corps sont étudiés, dans le premier traité, en tant que tels, alors qu'ils sont étudiés en tant que causes des corps composés dans le second traité, qui vise à établir les causes et les accidents essentiels des corps composés" (pp. 238-9).

¹⁶ In her presentation of Aristotle's statement about the physical sciences, Cerami (p. 96, see above n. 14) refers to *Meteor.*, I 1, 338 a 20 – 339 a 9. This well-known passage has attracted much scholarship and is commented upon by J. Brunschwig, "On Generation and Corruption I.1: A False Start?", in F. De Haas - J. Mansfeld (eds.), *Aristotle: On Generation and Corruption, Book I. Symposium Aristotelicum*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2004, pp. 24-63. Brunschwig says: "The authenticity of this passage, sometimes suspected a long time ago, was successfully and definitely established (...). But it is equally generally agreed that Aristotle is not describing here the actual chronology of his physical treatises; he is rather giving a largely retrospective overview of the ordered mapping of the topics he has dealt with; he is probably indicating also the order in which he would like his treatises to be read. This overview certainly influenced the order in which the physical treatises were put in the so-called Andronicos' 'edition' (if we can still use this familiar description of what Andronicos did, after the doubts raised by Barnes [1997]), as well as in Ptolemy's catalogue of Aristotle's works (...), and still of course in the medieval manuscripts and all our modern editions" (p. 28 n. 12).

¹⁷ A telling example of systematization of this part of the corpus has been provided by Ph. Hoffmann in his brand-new study "I trattati di storia naturale e la zoologia nella classificazione neoplatonica degli scritti di Aristotele tra il V e il VI secolo d.C.", in M.M. Sassi with E. Coda and G. Feola (eds.), *La zoologia di Aristotele e la sua ricezione dall'età ellenistica e romana alle culture medievali*. Atti della X "settimana di formazione" del Centro GrAL (Pisa 18-20 novembre 2015), Pisa U.P., Pisa 2017 (Greco. Arabo, Latino. Le vie del sapere. Studi, 6), pp. 145-69.

de la génération substantielle” (pp. 440-534), Cerami presents Averroes’ understanding of substantial generation as an attempt to steer a middle course between Alexander of Aphrodisias’ hylemorphism and Galen’s account of the living being.¹⁸ Chapter IX, “La noblesse de l’être: physique, ontologie et théologie dans le *Grand Commentaire de la Métaphysique*” (pp. 535-671) completes the picture of Averroes as the continuator of the “néo-aristotélisme engagé par Alexandre d’Aphrodise” (p. 534).

This rich and useful volume substantially contributes to the ongoing research on Arabic philosophy, especially because it is cast in the explicit theoretical perspective that I have tried to outline above: the usefulness of reading Aristotle with Averroes’ lens. It is not surprising that in doing so C. Cerami is naturally inclined to downgrade the importance of the Neoplatonic sources in shaping the Arabic Aristotle. This is apparent in several minor points, like for instance her treatment of Averroes’ allegiance to the principle of the priority of the first cause over the secondary causes.¹⁹ This is also apparent in her main picture of Averroes’ cosmos, and this drives me to my second perplexity.

One of the inspirations of this book is the idea to disentangle Averroes from the tradition of the Graeco-Arabic ‘Peripatetism’, with its undeniable mix of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic tenets. This is especially evident in the treatment of the *Dator formarum*, that counts in Averroes’ eyes as a misunderstanding on the part of some Muslim philosophers of the basic rules of Aristotle’s causality. “Mais qui sont ces ‘autres philosophes musulmans’ qui défendent, avec Avicenne, la séparation des deux ordres de causalités²⁰ et l’existence d’un Donneur des formes? Dans le *CM* du *GA*²¹, on l’a vu, Averroès affirme qu’Ibn Bāğğa défendait la même thèse qu’Avicenne, en assurant que ‘ce qui transforme la matière n’est pas ce qui donne la forme’. En associant les deux penseurs, Averroès a expliqué que leur doctrine affirmait que seul l’Intellect Agent donne la forme animée’, tandis que ‘celui qui transforme la matière donne la forme de la complexion’. Il suggérait, par la suite, d’identifier cet Intellect Agent au principe efficient que ‘nombreux péripatéticiens’ appellent ‘Donneur des formes’ et dont, d’après eux, les puissances formatrices tiennent leur origine. (...) Il faut donc supposer que ce soit Ibn Bāğğa, dans le *GC* de la *Met.*, la cible innommée de la critique d’Averroès” (p. 637). Cerami mentions also al-Fārābī as one of the targets of Averroes. She is right, because the former explicitly states in his *Epistle on the Meanings of ‘Intellect’* that the Agent Intellect introduces the Forms both on matter and on the human potentiality to intelligize.²² (I am less sure about the identification of the Farabian work Averroes is alluding to²³). One may readily

¹⁸ Cf. pp. 443-4.

¹⁹ For instance, Averroes’ distinction between the *causae simplices, primae et universales* on the one hand, and the *causae compositae, secundae et particulares* quoted at p. 535 gives a distinct Neoplatonic ring for any reader of Prop. 1 of *Liber de Causis*: “Omnis causa primaria plus est influens super causatum suum quam causa universalis secunda”. Another echo of the *Liber de Causis*, this time of Prop. 30-31, occurs in Averroes’ distinction between the separate substances that are “more eternal” in so far as they are immobile, and those substances that are divine, but in perennial movement (p. 546).

²⁰ Cerami has explained this expression just before, p. 636. According to the theory criticised by Averroes, “les phénomènes sensibles sont le produit de deux ordres de causalité parallèles: celui du corps, comprenant les corps sublunaires et les corps célestes (...); celui de l’intelligible qui met en jeu un intellect séparé dont procèdent toutes les formes substantielles des étants naturels”.

²¹ I.e. the *Middle Commentary* on the *De Generatione animalium*.

²² Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, *Risalat fi ‘l-‘aql*. Texte arabe intégral en partie inédit établi par M. Bouyges S.J., Beyrouth 1938 (Bibliotheca arabica scholasticorum. Série arabe. Tome VIII, fasc. 1), pp. 30.3-31.4.

²³ Cerami, p. 650, quotes a passage by Averroes where the latter alludes to the work by al-Fārābī “On the Two Philosophies”. She sides with D. Wirmer in thinking that the work alluded to is the Farabian *Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle*,

acknowledge that Averroes wanted to disentangle Aristotle from all this; the question is to what extent did he succeed in his endeavour, and to what extent his cosmos, even without the *Dator formarum* as the author of the sublunar forms, was really different from al-Fārābī's and Avicenna's. True, according to Averroes "Il n'est pas besoin de postuler l'existence de formes séparées et d'un Donneur de formes pour expliquer la génération, car ce sont les puissances formatrices qui le font" (p. 656). However, when Averroes explains why Aristotle did postulate an Agent Intellect as the source of our intellections,²⁴ his picture of the cosmic hierarchy has much more in common with al-Fārābī's and Avicenna's than with Aristotle's and Alexander's. While τὸ ποιητικόν (Aristotle) and the νοῦς ποιητικός (Alexander) coincide with the Unmoved Mover, the Agent Intellect of al-Fārābī, Avicenna, and Averroes is a separate substance that, far from coinciding with the Unmoved Mover, is the last of the separate intelligences.²⁵

To sum up, Averroes' reading of Aristotle is oriented by the exegetical tradition in two crucial respects: first and foremost, by the reconstruction of Aristotle's works as parts of a systematic whole envisaged as such by Aristotle himself, a reconstruction that, initiated by Alexander of Aphrodisias, was continued by the Neoplatonic commentators at Alexandria. Second, Averroes' interpretation of the Aristotelian cosmos is oriented by the Neoplatonic distinction between the First Principle and the separate Intellect, or intellects, causing the soul to intelligize.

Notwithstanding these perplexities, Cristina Cerami's volume is rich and instructive; also, it is not its minor merit to allow this sort of questions to rise.

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but the work alluded to is rather the *K. al-ğam'*, where the question of the interpretation of Aristotle's theology is raised in exactly the same terms. Compare Averroes' statement quoted by Cerami: "Et si ces gens en sont arrivés à cela, c'est qu'ils n'avaient pas compris la démonstration d'Aristote à cet endroit et qu'ils n'ont pas reconnu sa vérité. Et on ne s'étonne pas seulement d'Avicenne, mais aussi d'Abū Naṣr. Il apparaît, en effet, à son propos dans son livre *Sur les deux Philosophies*, qu'il soulève des doutes sur cette question" with Fārābī's claim in the *Harmonization of the Two Opinions of the Two Sages: Plato and the Divine Aristotle* that "Some presume that Aristotle is of the opinion that the world is eternal and Plato of a different opinion, that is, that he is of the opinion that the world is generated and has a maker" (trans. Butterworth, p. 153); then al-Fārābī starts quoting the pseudo-*Theology* and crediting Aristotle with an emanationist account that lies in the background of Averroes' remark. The Farabian authorship of the *Harmonization* has been challenged, but this is another question, with no relevance for the identification of the doctrine criticised by Averroes here.

²⁴ The passage quoted by Cerami at p. 665 runs: "S'il existe quelque chose d'incorporel, il ne pourra transformer la matière qu'au moyen d'un autre corps soustrait au changement, comme les corps célestes. Et c'est pour cela que les intellects séparés ne peuvent fournir une forme mélangée à la matière. Si <Aristote> a été amené à introduire un intellect agent séparé de la matière dans l'advenue des puissances intellectives uniquement, c'est parce que les puissances intellectives sont pour lui non mélangées à la matière" (my emphasis).

²⁵ The identification of the Agent Intellect with the tenth intelligence results from Averroes' *Epitome of the Metaphysics*, p. 136 van den Bergh ("Der aktive Intellekt emaniert aus dem untersten dieser Bewegter, und wir wollen annehmen, dass dieser der Bewegter der Sphäre des Mondes sei"), and even if one readily agrees that Averroes changed his mind as for the cosmological role of the Agent Intellect, it seems uncontroversial that he continued to grant it the function of activating the human potential intellect. H.A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, On Intellect. Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect*, Oxford U.P., New York - Oxford 1992, p. 315, recapitulates the point as follows: "Although he repeatedly revised his position on the active intellect's role as a cause of sublunar existence, Averroes remained firm throughout his career regarding the active's intellect nature. Like his predecessors among the Arabic Aristotelians, he consistently construed it as an incorporeal substance transcending the human soul; and he took for granted that it is the last link (...) in the hierarchy of incorporeal intelligences".

M. Zonta, *Il Commento medio di Averroè alla Metafisica di Aristotele nella tradizione ebraica. Edizione delle versioni ebraiche medievali di Zerahyah Hen e di Qalonymos ben Qalonymos con introduzione storica e filologica*, I-II, T. 3, Pavia U.P. Pavia 2011 (Editoria scientifica), vol. I, 1-149 + IX pp., vol. II t. 1, 1-174 + IV pp., vol. II t. 2, 175-351 + IV pp.

It is with deep sorrow that we record the demise of Mauro Zonta, one of the leading figures of the History of Medieval Hebrew Thought in our generation. Born in Pavia in 1968, he obtained his M.A. in Classical Literature in 1991 at the University of his native city. Since the beginning of his scholarly activity Zonta showed his prodigious capacities in reading and analysing Medieval Hebrew philosophical works. This he did first by translating into Italian the Hebrew dictionary of philosophical terms that features at the beginning of Falaquera's *Opinions of the Philosophers*,¹ as well as in a seminal article on the Hebrew translation of Themistius' paraphrase of the *De Caelo*.²

In 1995 Zonta got his Ph.D. in Hebrew Studies at the University of Turin, under the guidance of Bruno Chiesa and Giuliano Tamani. He soon began to display his skills in Classics and Oriental Studies in his PhD thesis, published in the book reviewed here: a complete study of Averroes' *Middle Commentary* on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* as transmitted in the two Hebrew versions of Zerahya Hen, towards the end of the 13th century, and of Qalonymos ben Qalonymos, in the first decades of the 14th century. Together with two subsequent books,³ the study of the Hebrew versions of Averroes' *Middle Commentary* on the *Metaphysics* marked the start of his teaching career. He also carried on a survey of the manuscripts of the Hebrew translations, commentaries, and *compendia* of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* held in Italian libraries. In 1998 Zonta was appointed Associate Professor of History of Medieval Hebrew Philosophy at the University of Rome "La Sapienza". Above all, we owe Mauro Zonta the first complete Italian translation of the Judaeo-Arabic version of Maimonides' *Guide of the Perplexed*.⁴ In recent times the study of Medieval Hebrew Philosophy in Italy has experienced a powerful flowering on account to a large extent of Zonta's own books, translations, and countless contributions.

The book reviewed here is, in his own words (vol. 1, p. IX) an up-to-date and revised version of his PhD thesis mentioned above, in two volumes. Volume one is a historico-philological introduction to the editions of the Arabic-into-Hebrew versions of Averroes' *Middle Commentary* on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* by Zerahya Hen and Qalonymos ben Qalonymos, with three appendices, among which an Italian translation with commentary of the first two books of Averroes' commentary (pp. 80-121). Volume two, in two tomes, includes the critical edition of Zerahya's version, faced with a provisional edition of Qalonymos'. Even taking into account that only one of the two translations is edited properly speaking, namely that of Zerahya, it is beyond doubt that this work is ground-breaking.

¹ Silvio Zamorani Editore, Torino 1992.

² "Hebraica Veritas: Temistio, Parafrasi del *De Coelo*. Tradizione e critica del testo", *Atheneum* 82 (1994), pp. 403-28.

³ *La filosofia antica nel Medioevo ebraico* (Paideia, Brescia 1996) [selected reviews: G. Tamani, *Annali di Ca' Foscari* 35.3 s.or. 27 (1996), pp. 507-11; J. Habbi, *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 62 (1996), pp. 473-4; R. Brague, *Archives de Philosophie* 61 (1998), *Bullettin de philosophie médiévale* II, pp. 25-7; V. Mauro, *Studi Medievali*, s. III, a. 39 (1998), pp. 509-10; C. Baffioni, *Annali dell'Istituto Universitario Orientale* 57 (1997), pp. 587-8; P. Morpurgo, *Rassegna mensile di Israel* 64 (1998), pp. 171-4; A.L. Ivry, *The Jewish Quarterly Review* 90 (1999), pp. 207-8]; and *Aristoteles Hebraicus*, Supernova, Venezia 1997, co-edited with G. Tamani [selected reviews: L. Lanza, *Studi medievali*, s. III, 40 (1999), pp. 490-1; J.-P. Rothschild, *Revue des Études Juives* 158 (1999), 513-15; O. Leaman, *Journal of Semitic Studies* 45 (2000), pp. 198-9].

⁴ Utet, Torino 2003 [selected reviews: S.J. Sierra, *Annali di storia dell'esegesi* 20 (2003), pp. 571-3; R. Gatti, *Eidos* 2.1 (2003), pp. 115-16; M. Campanini, *Rivista di storia della filosofia* 59 (2004), pp. 829-32; S. Di Donato, *Revue des Études Juives* 164 (2005), pp. 553-8; M. Perani, *Materia giudaica* 12.1-2 (2007), pp. 315-17].

Zonta has granted access to Averroes' lost *Middle Commentary* on the *Metaphysics* in both the Hebrew versions, that were the work of translators active in different times and places. It is especially sad that Zonta's critical edition with the English translation of Qalonymos' version, planned for the series 'Averroes Hebraicus', was still in preparation. Among the many studies he initiated, this will remain the most regrettably unpublished.

The translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* into Arabic was momentous for the intellectual elite of the Arabic-speaking world, from the time of its earliest translation done on the demand of al-Kindī in early 'Abbāsīd times to later periods. In the Muslim West, Averroes (d. 1198 A. D.) wrote on the *Metaphysics* all the three kinds of 'commentary'⁵ that he had decided to devote to the five key texts of Aristotle's system: the *Posterior Analytics*, *Physics*, *De Caelo*, *De Anima*, and indeed the *Metaphysics*.⁶ As is well known, we owe our knowledge of the Arabic *Metaphysics*, in itself lost to us, to Averroes' *Tafsīr Mā ba'd al-ṭabī'a*. Thanks to this commentary where the lemmata are quoted *in extenso*, one can read the Arabic version of the *Metaphysics* almost in its entirety: only books *Kappa*, *Mu*, and *Nu* are missing from Averroes' commentary. One of his latest works, the commentary has come down to us in the MS Leiden, Universiteitsbibliotheek, Or. 2074 (cod. arab. 1692), and has been edited between 1938 and 1952 by the Jesuite Father Maurice Bouyges.⁷ The sort of Averroes' *Middle Commentary* was different. This paraphrase⁸ was written by Averroes in 1174, but later

⁵ On the three kinds of 'commentary' to Aristotle's works see *Averroës. Middle Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima. A Critical Edition of the Arabic text with English Translation, Notes, and Introduction* by A.L. Ivry, Brigham Young U.P., Provo, Utah 2002, pp. XIII-XIV: "These formats are commonly distinguished in English as the 'long', 'middle', and 'short' commentaries. Beyond indicating their sizes relatively to one another, these designations do little to explain the distinctive nature of each kind of commentary for all three types of compositions. The short commentaries, also called epitomes, are particularly unsuited for what is traditionally considered as 'commentary', since these are often more like summaries of the field as well as synopses of the text in question. In these epitomes, Averroës draws on post-Aristotelian ideas as heavily as on Aristotle's own views, thematizing the subject without necessarily following the order of Aristotle's own presentation and freely offering his own views of the issues discussed. This awareness of the post-Aristotelian tradition is also evident in Averroës' long commentaries. These appropriately named works reproduce every word of Aristotle's own text and comment at considerable length on nearly every sentence in them. (...) Averroës' approach in his middle commentaries differs from that of both the short and long commentaries (...) Aristotle's text is again featured, but not in its entirety. (...) Moreover, Averroës goes to great length to disentangle Aristotle from his commentators. He refrains for the most part from discussing the views of the commentators, which are given in the corresponding long commentary, and refrains as well from explicitly presenting his own responses to these views. Instead, he concentrates on presenting Aristotle's text, shorn to a large extent of the embellishments, entailments, and problems with which the long commentary abounds and to which the short commentary often refers".

⁶ As G. Endress has it, "Le projet d'Averroës conduisit au renouveau du genre du commentaire, élaboré selon le procédé des anciens et développé en plusieurs étapes. Il fut abordé dans la ligne modeste des épitomés d'al-Farābī et d'al-Ġazālī, reçus et lus dans l'Andalousie par ceux qui maintenaient l'herméneutique rationnelle dans le discours religieux. Il fut révisé à l'occasion du tournant radical provoqué par la critique de Ġazālī (...); Ibn Rušd jugea corrompu l'aristotélisme d'Ibn Sīnā, qui avait succombé aux attaques d'al-Gazālī. Enfin, dernière étape du projet et résultat d'un cheminement personnel et d'une longue lutte spirituelle, la série des cinq Grands Commentaires firent du texte d'Aristote et de son explication littérale le fondement du savoir": see G. Endress, "Le projet d'Averroës", in *Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition. Sources, Constitution and Reception of the Philosophy of Ibn Rušd (1126-1198)*. Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Averroicum (Cologne 1996) ed. by G. Endress and J.A. Aertsen with the assistance of K. Braun, Brill, Leiden [etc.] 1999 (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science. Texts and Studies, 31), pp. 4-31, here p. 8.

⁷ In the series *Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasticorum* (Série arabe, V.I, V.II, VI, VII) – available online at <http://learnin-groads.cfs.unipi.it/bibliotheca-arabica-scholasticorum-online> (consulted July 2017).

⁸ Also to the *Middle Commentary* on the *Metaphysics* applies what Ivry says (see above n. 5) apropos the *Middle Commentary* on the *De Anima*: "Averroës highlights certain sentences from an Aristotelian passage, quoting some of them but paraphrasing more, summarizing the text" (p. XIV).

on he revised his work; the Arabic original is lost to us, but two medieval Arabic-into-Hebrew versions survive: one by Zeraḥya Ḥen, made in Rome in 1284, and another by Qalonymos ben Qalonymos, probably made in Arles in 1317. Despite the great importance of this text for the history of medieval philosophy, both of these Hebrew versions remained unpublished until Zonta's edition. Above all he deserves the perennial gratitude of those working in the field for having edited such an interesting piece of the Graeco-Arabic legacy first in Muslim Spain, and then in the learned Jewish communities of Rome and Provence.

Chapters 1 to 3 of Volume I (pp. 1-45) contain a detailed study of the history of the tradition of the two extant Hebrew versions of Averroes' *Middle Commentary* on the *Metaphysics*. An in-depth Introduction sums up and reworks several of Zonta's own previous contributions devoted to the topic.⁹ Chapter 4 (pp. 45-64) counts as the philological introduction and includes the description of the manuscripts. As for Zeraḥya's translation (pp. 45-54), two of the five preserved manuscripts are of the highest value for Zonta: the MS Torino, Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria, A.II.13 (*olim* Peyron 33),¹⁰ dated 1284, and the MS Cambridge, Cambridge University Library, *Add.* 173, dated 1289. The first is the most ancient dated manuscript of this translation, copied in all likelihood during the lifetime of Zeraḥya himself (pp. 45-7), and counts for Zonta as the starting point of the entire manuscript tradition (p. 48). Since it was seriously damaged during the fire of the Turin library in 1904, the basic source of the edition of Zeraḥya's translation is the Cambridge manuscript, which Zonta considers to be a direct copy of the former (pp. 49-50). As I have said before, the critical edition of Zeraḥya's translation and the provisional edition of Qalonymos' one are facing in this volume (pp. 53-64). The former translation survives in twenty manuscripts; the text published here is established on the basis of two of them: Ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana D 85 sup. (*olim* Bernheimer 73) undated (XV cent.), and Parma, Biblioteca Palatina parmense 2613 (*olim* De Rossi 1308) dated 1346, the most ancient dated manuscript of this work.¹¹ Chapter 5 is devoted to Zeraḥya's terminology and translation technique (pp. 64-73). Zonta offers here the first systematic study of Zeraḥya's philosophical vocabulary, and explores the technicalities of his Arabic-into-Hebrew translation. A comparison could perhaps be done of Zonta's impressive analysis with the annotations that Samuel Landauer, in the first years of the 20th century, listed in the critical apparatus of his edition of Zeraḥya's version of the *Paraphrase* of the *De Caelo* by Themistius.¹² Chapter 6 concludes the philological introduction and provides the criteria of the edition.¹³ Volume two includes the about seven hundred page editions of the two mentioned

⁹ *La filosofia antica nel medioevo ebraico* see above n. 3, in part. pp. 238ff.; ii) "Il commento medio di Averroè alla *Metafisica* nella tradizione ebraica: alcuni problemi testuali" (in C. Baffioni, *Averroes and the Aristotelian Heritage*, Guida, Napoli 2004, pp. 189-99); iii) "A case of Author's Variant Readings and the Textual History of Averroes' *Middle Commentary* on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*", in O. Weijers - J. Hamesse, *Écriture et réécriture des textes philosophiques médiévaux*, Brepols, Turnhout 2006, pp. 465-83; iv) "The Revision of Qalonymos ben Qalonymos's Medieval Hebrew Version of Averroes' *Middle Commentary* on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*", *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 21 (2010), pp. 457-73.

¹⁰ Zonta's different statements concerning the identity of the scribe of this ms testify his modesty, being ready, if need be, to revise his own opinions.

¹¹ For Book VI only, these mss. are compared with the ms. Harvard, Houghton Library, Hebrew 41.

¹² Themistii in *libros Aristotelis De Caelo paraphrasis hebraice et latine*, ed. S. Landauer, Reimer, Berlin 1902 (*CAGV.4*).

¹³ In the critical apparatus of the edition of Zeraḥya's translation are registered two lines of variant reading, including those of Zeraḥya's translation, and those of Qalonymos ben Qalonymos's one as found in the two manuscripts take into consideration by the A. in his edition of the text. On this point see the review by Y. Halper, *Philosophy East and West* 63.1 (2013), pp. 96-9, who remarks also other points (such as passages written in Hebrew in

Hebrew translations. Textual discrepancies between the two translations are noted in the apparatus of Zerahya's translation.

Zonta's edition of Averroes' *Middle Commentary* on the *Metaphysics* was published in 2011 and since then this monumental work has gained firm footing in the scholarship of the field. There is nothing that I can add to its high value: this painstaking research has put at our disposal a crucial text whose role in Averroes' thought was accessible before only to the admittedly few who were capable of reading the Hebrew manuscripts that preserved it for centuries. Let me emphasize once again that Averroes' *Middle Commentary* on the *Metaphysics* is not only lost in its Arabic original, but has not been translated into Latin either.¹⁴ My description of Zonta's work is meant to sadly celebrate his tireless work and lasting contribution for generations to come.

Elisa Coda

reverse order, or holdovers for earlier publications – *ibid.*, pp. 98-9). Nevertheless, these do not detract the usefulness of Zonta's book.

¹⁴ Cf. G. Endress, "Averrois Opera. A Bibliography of Editions and Contributions to the Text", in *Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition* (above, n. 6), pp. 339-81, here p. 364.

Mauro Zonta (1968-2017).
In memoriam

Mauro Zonta nacque a Pavia il 3 settembre 1968. La sua tesi di dottorato (Torino, 1995) fu un'edizione integrale delle diverse versioni superstiti dell'intero 'Commento medio' di Averroè alla *Metafisica* di Aristotele.

Dal 1998 fu professore di Storia della filosofia ebraica e dal 1999 anche di Storia della filosofia araba presso l'Università di Roma 'La Sapienza'. Fu autore di 13 libri, 126 articoli, 116 comunicazioni a congresso.

L'ambito delle sue ricerche riguardò la storia e la letteratura della filosofia ebraica, araba e siriana. I suoi studi, svolti secondo criteri filologici e condotti su testi manoscritti in massima parte inediti, portarono alla luce aspetti sempre nuovi delle affinità tra la cultura ebraica e quella araba e latina medievali, nonché le loro radici nella filosofia greca antica. Riuscì sovente a individuare traduzioni ignote di testi filosofici e scientifici greci perduti, oltre a molti testi filosofici ebraici prima sconosciuti.

Leggeva correntemente, oltre alle principali lingue moderne e classiche, ebraico, arabo, siriano, persiano, armeno e sanscrito. Il suo ambito di studi non smise mai di ampliarsi. Per il suo *Saggio di lessicografia araba medievale* del 2014 giunse a indagare le radici della terminologia filosofica araba con paralleli etimologicamente significativi anche in altre lingue semitiche classiche, quali etiope, siriano e mandeo, e in altre lingue non semitiche: le varianti più antiche delle lingue georgiana, coptica, nubiana, persiana e medio-persiana, partica, corasmia, sogdiana, tocharia, turca, ugarica, ciagataica, turca kipciak, tibetana, mongola, e il cinese altomedievale. Da qui le sue conclusioni, significativamente intitolate "La terminologia filosofica araba medievale: un ponte tra Oriente e Occidente" (*ivi*, pp. 289-97).

La sua umiltà e la sua perseveranza furono ingredienti preziosi della nostra collaborazione, incoraggiata fin dal 1993 da Alain-Philippe Segonds. Ci dedicavamo alla ricostruzione delle opere di Alessandro di Afrodisia perdute in greco e conservate in arabo. Dopo la sua prima traduzione cominciava la parte più dura del lavoro. Le singole scelte lessicali traduzioni si verificavano analiticamente per retroversione, fino a che ogni parola non risaliva a un suo possibile antecedente greco, che fosse attestato negli indici dei testi greci di Aristotele e di Alessandro di Afrodisia. Il processo poteva durare molti anni. Sul percorso, si ricavava così anche il criterio per mettere a parallelo diverse versioni, anche in diverse lingue, di uno stesso testo perduto. Così nel 2015 poté codificare il concetto di 'traduzione critica', specificamente disegnato per rendere in una lingua moderna i resti di un'opera perduta in greco: con Mauro Zonta non ci si accontentava infatti di tradurre in italiano o in inglese una singola traduzione, ma si aspirava a rendere al lettore un testo il più vicino possibile a quella che sarebbe stata la traduzione in lingua moderna del testo greco originale. Pur fornendo a parte le traduzioni di tutte le traduzioni attestate, si poteva puntare così a una traduzione appunto critica, specie in vista dell'edizione del trattato di Alessandro di Afrodisia *Sui principi dell'universo*, di cui era stato possibile disegnare nel 2015 uno *stemma translationum* siriano-arabo. Lasciò questo mondo prima che l'opera fosse compiuta.

Sapiente e semplice insieme, gentilmente determinato e instancabile, infondeva un senso naturale di calma e di fiducia, alla moglie, ai figli, e a chiunque intorno a lui, anche le molte volte in cui lo aggredì la malattia. Mai si lamentò una volta, mai si diede per indisposto. Operato quattro volte, sempre minimizzava: "è solo un intervento, a fine mese ci sono di nuovo", mi mandava a dire, "e si ricordi che dobbiamo lavorare". Il 27 agosto si è addormentato per sempre, cullato dalla presenza ininterrotta della moglie Francesca.

Silvia Fazzo*

* Ringrazio Francesca Ziino Zonta dell'indispensabile collaborazione.

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