


# Symposium Platonicum XII


## *Le Parménide* de Platon

### Plato's *Parmenides*



Résumés – Book of Abstracts

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*τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν: Xenocrates and the notion of ἐξαιφνης in Plato's Parmenides*

In the second part of *Parmenides*, several arguments are dedicated to the problem of time. In the first argument (A I), the one is proved to be completely 'atemporal' (141d: οὐδὲ χρόνου αὐτῷ μέτεστιν, οὐδ' ἔστιν ἐν τινι χρόνῳ). In the second argument (A II), the one participates in time insofar it participates in being (152a: Μετέχει ἄρα χρόνου, εἴπερ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι), and in variety of ways: it can be both younger and older than itself (152d4-e3); younger and older than others (153b8-d5; 152e10-153b7); the same age as itself and as others (152e3-10; 153d5-e7). In this paper, we shall mainly be concerned with the third argument (A III) on time in its relation to the previous two. Some regard it as an 'appendix' to **A II** (Scolnicov 2003, p. 135) or simply as the third stage of it (Brisson 1999, p. 274). Others see it as the 'third deduction' (Allen 1983, p. 306) — a conscious deviation from the initial scheme playfully reproducing a similar move in the historical Parmenides with his 'third way'.

On any reading, the scope of **A III** is unclear: **A II** has just demonstrated that 'the one that is' necessarily has opposite properties (155c4-7: τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ἔστι τε καὶ γίγνεται, κτλ), whereas **A III** clearly states that 'at one time it participates, and at another it does not participate; for only thus (μόνως) could it both participate and not participate in the same thing' (155e10-11). According to Scolnicov, this (apparent) contradiction is explained by the fact that **A II** deals with the Forms, which can be 'contrarily predicated in different respects', whereas this 'appendix' (**A III**) is concerned with sensible things, which (unlike Forms) can have different predicates at different times.

Against this view, we argue that **A III** is self-standing: if in **A II** Plato had wished to limit his observations to Forms only, he would have hardly chosen to speak of qualities which imply temporality (younger — older — same age), for these are not applicable to Forms. Neither does it make sense to speak of 'becoming' in connection with Forms, which Plato does in **A II** at 152c6-d2 (cf. Strang and Mills 1974, p. 63).

Therefore, we suggest to regard **A III** as Plato's reaction to Academic discussions on time, and not as a reply to the historical Parmenides, even if it is Parmenides who is speaking. Indeed, in his later dialogues (*Philebus* e.g.), Plato occasionally alludes to the discussions among the members of the Academy, and it might as well be the case in the *Parmenides*.

In fact, **A III** is the only place in the *Corpus Platonikum* where the notion of ἐξαιφνης appears (156d1-157b4), but it is clear that this notion was broadly discussed in the Academy. Aristotle gives his well-known definition of ἐξαιφνης in *Phys.* IV 13, 222b14-15 (τὸ ἐν ἀναισθήτῳ χρόνῳ διὰ μικρότητα ἐκστάν), and the paradox of the 'ceasing instant' puzzles him in other books of the *Physics* as well (see Sorabji 1983). In his description of an instant, Aristotle suggests that it is not a very short period, but a boundary of a period (cf. *Phys.* IV 10, VI, 3 etc.).

Similar notion of timeless instant is found in Xenocrates (*Frg.* 87.32-33 ed. Parente: ἐν χρόνῳ τινὶ ἀνεπαισθήτῳ), who also describes it as a boundary between past and future (ἐν ὄρῳ χρόνου τοῦ παρεληλυθότος καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος). Most importantly, Xenocrates raises the question of

transitions ‘in no time’ in connection with physical change (sounds, movements etc.), just as it is the case in **A III**. This question, we suggest, might have been provoked by Xenocrates’ own discovery which concerns the discrete nature of sound (on which see Guthrie 1986 vol. V, p. 490). Each blow, according to Xenocrates (frg. 87 = fr. 9 Heinze) ‘occupies no time, but exists on the boundary between past and future’ (ἐν οὐδενὶ χρόνῳ ἔστιν ἀλλ’ ἐν ὄρω χρόνου τοῦ παρεληλυθότος καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος). Apparently, Xenocrates did not limit his observations to sounds: also visual data was analysed by him into ‘atomic units’ (see Dillon 2003, 118). So, things appear to us continuous only because our senses are not acute enough.

In sum, we maintain that in **A III** Plato recaps certain theses concerning time discussed in the Academy. Namely, he shows that the idea of ‘timeless boundary’ inevitably brings us to a paradox: at any given ‘instant’ the one is neither one nor many, neither like nor unlike, neither small nor large etc. (157b). Thereby he probably reacts to the Xenocratean ‘atomism’ which made mathematical units basic elements of physical reality (cf. Aristot. *Met.* I 6, 987b27-28: ὁ μὲν [sc. Πλάτων] τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά, οἱ δ’ [sc. Πυθαγόρειοι] ἀριθμοὺς εἶναι φασιν αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα).

### *τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν: Xenocrates et la notion de l’ἐξαιφνης dans le Parménide de Platon*

Dans la deuxième partie de *Parménide*, au moins trois arguments sont consacrés au problème du temps. Dans le premier argument (A I), l’un n’a aucun rapport avec le temps, et n’est dans aucun temps (141d: οὐδὲ χρόνου αὐτῷ μέτεστιν, οὐδ’ ἔστιν ἐν τινι χρόνῳ). Dans le deuxième argument (A II), l’un participe du temps dans la mesure où il participe de l’être (152a: Μετέχει ἄρα χρόνου, εἴπερ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι), et cela de différentes manières : il peut être à la fois plus jeune et plus âgé que lui-même (152d4-e3); plus jeune et plus âgé que les autres (153b8-d5 ; 152e10-153b7); le même âge que lui-même et que les autres (152e3-10; 153d5-e7).

Ici, nous nous intéresserons principalement au troisième argument (A III) sur le temps et à son rapport aux deux précédents. Certains savants le considèrent comme une “annexe” à A II (Scolnicov 2003, p. 135) ou simplement comme la troisième étape (« un corollaire ») de A II (Brisson 1999, p. 273-274). Selon les autres, c’est la “troisième déduction” (Allen 1983, p. 306) qui présente une déviation consciente du schéma initial reproduisant un mouvement similaire chez Parménide historique avec sa “troisième voie”.

En tout cas, la portée de A III n’est pas claire: A II vient de démontrer que ‘l’un qui est’ est doté nécessairement des propriétés opposées (155c4-7: τὸ ἐν αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ἔστι τε καὶ γίγνεται, κτλ), alors que A III indique explicitement que “c’est à un moment qu’il a part à l’être et à un autre moment qu’il n’y a point part ; c’est là en effet pour lui l’unique moyen (μόνως) de participer et de ne point participer à la même chose» (155e10-11). Selon Scolnicov, cette (apparente) contradiction s’explique par le fait que A II concerne des Formes, qui peuvent être “contrarily predicated in different respects”, alors que cette “annexe” (A III) concerne des choses sensibles, qui (contrairement aux Formes) peuvent avoir des prédicats différents à différents moments.

Contre ce point de vue, nous faisons valoir que A III est un argument autonome : si dans A II Platon avait voulu limiter ses observations aux Formes, il aurait à peine choisi de parler de qualités qui impliquent temporalité (plus jeune -- plus âgé — même âge), car celle-ci ne sont pas applicables aux Formes. Il n'est pas non plus logique de parler de "devenir" par rapport aux Formes, ce que Platon fait dans A II à 152c6-d2 (cf. Strang et Mills 1974, p. 63). Par conséquent, nous suggérons de considérer A III comme la réaction de Platon aux discussions académiques portant sur le temps, et non comme une réponse à Parménide historique, même si c'est Parménide qui parle. En effet, dans ses dialogues tardifs (le *Philébus* par exemple), Platon fait parfois allusion aux discussions entre les membres de l'Académie, et ce pourrait aussi bien être le cas dans le *Parménide*.

En fait, A III est le seul passage dans le Corpus Platonicum où la notion de *ἐξαιφνης* apparaît (156d1-157b4), mais il est clair que cette notion a été largement discutée dans l'Académie. Aristote donne sa définition bien connue de *ἐξαιφνης* dans Phys. IV, 13, 222b14-15 (τὸ ἐν ἀναισθήτῳ χρόνῳ διὰ μικρότητα ἐκστάν), et dans d'autres livres de la Physique il est intéressé par des différents paradoxes portant sur l'instant indivisible (voir Sorabji 1983). Dans sa description d'un instant, Aristote suggère que ce n'est pas une période très courte, mais la limite d'une période (cf. Phys. IV, 10, VI,3 etc.).

On retrouve la même notion d'instant atemporel dans Xénocrate (Frg. 87.32-33 ed. Parente: ἐν χρόνῳ τινὶ ἀνεπαισθήτῳ), qui le décrit aussi comme une limite entre le passé et le futur (ἐν ὄρῳ χρόνου τοῦ παρεληλυθότος καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος). Plus important encore, Xenocrates soulève la question des transitions instantanées en relation avec le changement physique (sons, mouvements, etc.), comme c'est aussi le cas dans A III. Cette question, croyons-nous, aurait pu être provoquée par la "découverte" de Xénocrate: la nature discrète du son (Voir Guthrie, 1986, vol. V, p. 490). Chaque coup, selon Xénocrate (frg. 87 = fr. 9 Heinze), n'est pas dans un temps, mais il existe sur la frontière entre le passé et le futur " (en οὐδενὶ χρόνῳ ἐστὶν mais dans ὄρῳ temps de παρεληλυθότος et le futur). Apparemment, Xénocrate ne limite pas ses observations aux sons: il divise aussi des données visuelles en "unités atomiques" (voir Dillon 2003, 118). Ainsi, les choses nous apparaissent continues seulement parce que nos sens ne sont pas assez aigus.

En somme, nous maintenons que dans A III Platon récapitule certaines thèses concernant la nature du temps discutées dans l'Académie. A savoir, il montre que la notion d'une frontière atemporelle nous amène inévitablement à un paradoxe, car « lors qu'il va de l'un vers le plusieurs et du plusieurs vers l'un, il n'est ni un ni plusieurs, il ne se dissocie ni ne s'associe ; de même, lors qu'il va du semblable vers le dissemblable, du dissemblable au semblable, il n'est ni semblable ni dissemblable, etc. » (157a4-8). Ainsi, il réagit probablement à l' « atomisme » de Xénocrate, qui a regardé des unités mathématiques comme des éléments de base de la réalité physique (cf. Aristot. *Met.* I 6, 987b27-28: ὁ μὲν [sc. Πλάτων] τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά, οἱ δ' [sc. Πυθαγόρειοι] ἀριθμοὺς εἶναι φασιν αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα).

### *Three Reasons that the Five Uses of διάνοια in Parmenides are Significant*

Although the word διάνοια appears only five times in *Parmenides*, an analysis of those uses sheds light on three significant issues in the study of Plato: (1) the value of Aristotle’s testimony on the status of mathematical objects as “Intermediates” (τὰ μεταξύ), (2) the value of Aristotle’s testimony about the role of the One and the Indefinite Dyad in Plato’s ἀρχαί-metaphysics, and finally (3) the unity of Plato’s *Parmenides* itself, and more specifically, how the hypothesis-based investigation of the One in the second part of the dialogue actually contributes toward its stated purpose (135c8-d1): to provide the young Socrates with the exercise he needs before defining what is καλόν, δίκαιον, ἀγαθόν “and each one of the forms [καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν].” To state the paper’s thesis in a preliminary way, if the true One, thanks to its dependence on διάνοια, must be numbered among what Aristotle called τὰ μεταξύ, it cannot be regarded as an un-hypothetical ἀρχή, and if the “one over many” εἶδη—a *fortiori* dependent on διάνοια if the One is—are susceptible to “the Third Man,” that does not annihilate “the Theory of Ideas” entirely but rather restricts “the Scope of the Forms” (130b1-e4) to the second of its four possible components: δίκαιον τι εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ καὶ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πάντων αὐτῶν τοιούτων (130b7-9).

Of the five uses of διάνοια, the second is the most important. In the Second (and longest) Hypothesis, “the existent One [τὸ ἐν ὄν]” has become what the arithmetic lesson of *Republic* 7 has shown that the One cannot be: Many (cf. *R.* 525d8-e3), indeed “the unbounded multitude [ἄπειρον τὸ πλήθος]” (143a1-2). Parmenides proposes that “we should take in thought [τῆ διανοία λάβωμεν]” the One “alone in itself [μόνον καθ’ αὐτό]” without that of which we have said it partakes, i.e., οὐσία (143a6-8). While the passage that follows on the generation of number has received considerable attention since antiquity thanks to the problem of primes, little attention has been given to the antecedents of this διάνοια-based “thought experiment.” The creation, through abstraction, of a One that is no sense Many not only refers back to the First Hypothesis of *Parmenides* but also (note “both Adeimantus and Glaucon” at 126a2) to the Divided Line of *Republic* 6. There, “the Odd and the Even” are identified as the paradigmatic hypotheses of arithmetic (*R.* 510c3-4), but as Sir David Ross pointed out, it is the indivisible One of *Republic* 7 and *Philebus* 56d9-e3 that provides the best evidence for Platonic “Intermediates” (*Plato’s Theory of Ideas*, 62). The use of διάνοια at 143a7 links this monad-based evidence to the Second or dianoetic section of the Divided Line, thus making the indivisible but *non-existent* One (ἄνευ οὐσίας derived from 143a8 via 143a6-7) the ἀρχή of what Aristotle called “mathematical number,” i.e., of the Intermediates.

According to the Aristotle-dependent *Prinzipienlehre*, however, “eidetic number” (*Metaphysics* 1086b4; also 1088b34, and 1090b35) originates from the twinned ἀρχαί of the One and the Indefinite Dyad. Although the latter term is not found in *Parmenides* or anywhere else in Plato (but see ἀχώριστα δύο at *R.* 524c1) the third, fourth, and fifth uses of διάνοια, two of them linked once again to the verb λαμβάνειν (165a8 and 165b5-6), the other to the verb ἀφελεῖν (158c2), employ a complimentary form of abstracting thought-experiment to imagine what is other than the One (in the Third Hypothesis) or what is without the One (in the Seventh): ἄπειρον πλήθει (158c6-7 and 165c2). If this term is Plato’s version of Aristotle’s Indefinite Dyad—and reputable scholars

have thought that it is (see Mitchell Miller’s 1995 “Unwritten Teachings in *Parmenides*,” 621)—then *Parmenides* makes both of the so-called ἀρχαί dependent on a man-made act of abstraction, connected, thanks to διάνοια, with the Second (R. 511d8-e1), not the First Part of the Divided Line. With the Idea of the Good at the pinnacle of the First (cf. R. 511b5 and 532a5-b2), the One is merely the ἀρχή of the Second. In other words, attention to the use of διάνοια in *Parmenides*—especially in the phrase λαμβάνειν διανοία—strengthens Aristotle’s claim that Plato regarded mathematical objects as Intermediates but weakens his claim that Plato embraced the One as one of two metaphysical or cosmological ἀρχαί or regarded it as the Good.

The first use of διάνοια is in the dialogue’s First Part, where Parmenides offers a single justification for the so-called “Theory of Forms” to balance the multiple objections to it he has just offered. If there are no “forms of existent things [εἶδη τῶν ὄντων],” there will be no way to define the εἶδος of each thing and thus there will be nothing toward which διάνοια will turn (135b8); this result will completely destroy “the power of discussion [τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν]” (135c1-2) and thus undermine philosophy itself (135c5-7). By applying the anti-logical τέχνη described in *Phaedrus* (261d10-e2; cf. *Phdr.* 261d6-8 and *Prm.* 129d8-e1) to the One in the dialogue’s Second Part, Parmenides salvages διάνοια as the ἀρχή of all One-over-Many εἶδη (R. 596a5-7)—which are susceptible to the Third Man—in a manner that nevertheless makes room for the real objects of Socrates’ concern: the Beautiful, the Just, and above all the Good (135c9 and 130b7-9; cf. R. 534b8-d1). Thanks to the role of διάνοια beginning in the Second Hypothesis, it becomes possible to identify the dialogue’s unifying principle: the purpose of *Parmenides* is to restrict “the Scope of the Forms” to those objects that deserve the Platonic significance of the word ἰδέα in Parmenides’ ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου τὴν αὐτὴν αἰεὶ εἶναι (135c1). In this light, the error of the young Socrates is not a failure to discriminate—as Parmenides deceptively suggests (130e1-3)—between, e.g., man (130c2) and hair (130c6) but between the εἶδος of “just, beautiful, and good” (on the one hand) and (on the other) dianoetic objects like “similarity itself”—identified as productive of ἀπάτη in *Phaedrus* (261e6-262b9)—and One and Many (*Prm.* 130b3-5), upon which Socrates will therefore be exercised in accordance with ἡ ἀντιλογικὴ τέχνη (*Phdr.* 261d10-e2) in *Parmenides*.

In concluding, I will address the reason that Plato allows his Parmenides to claim falsely that “the One itself” is “my hypothesis” (137b2-4)—in fact it is Plato’s own—and why Socrates singles out διάνοια to illustrate Plato’s alleged indifference to a technical vocabulary in *Republic* 7 (533d6-9), a playful and preliminary indication of that term’s significance in *Parmenides*.

### *Tres razones de la importancia de los cinco usos de διάνοια en el Parménides*

Aunque la palabra διάνοια solo aparece cinco veces en el *Parménides*, un análisis de esos usos arroja luz sobre tres aspectos importantes en el estudio de Platón: (1) el valor del testimonio de Aristóteles respecto del estatus de los objetos matemáticos en cuanto “Intermediarios” (τὰ μεταξύ); (2) el valor del testimonio de Aristóteles respecto del papel que juegan el Uno y la Díada Indefinida en la metafísica de los ἀρχαί de Platón; y, por último, (3) la unidad del propio *Parménides* de Platón y, más específicamente, cómo la investigación del Uno a partir de hipótesis, investigación que se adelanta en la segunda parte del diálogo, contribuye de un modo efectivo al logro de su propósito

explícito (135c8-d1), a saber, el de someter al joven Sócrates a la práctica que necesita antes de definir qué es καλόν, δίκαιον, ἀγαθόν “y cada una de las formas [καὶ ἐν ἑκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν]”. Para enunciar la tesis de esta contribución de un modo preliminar, si el verdadero Uno, gracias a su dependencia de la διάνοια, debe enumerarse entre aquello que Aristóteles llamó τὰ μεταξύ, no puede considerarse como un ἀρχή anhipotético, y si las εἶδη “una sobre muchos” –dependientes *a fortiori* de la διάνοια, si el Uno es– son susceptibles del argumento de “el Tercer Hombre”, ello no aniquila por completo “la Teoría de las Ideas”, sino que más bien restringe “el Ámbito de las Formas” (130b1-e4) al segundo de sus cuatro posibles componentes: δικαίου τι εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ καὶ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πάντων αὐτῶν τοιούτων (130b7-9).

De los cinco usos de διάνοια, el segundo es el más importante. En la Hipótesis Segunda (la más larga), el Uno existente [τὸ ἐν ὄν] ha devenido lo que la lección de aritmética de *República* 7 ha mostrado que el Uno no puede ser: Muchos (cf. *República* 525d8-e3), de hecho, “la multiplicidad ilimitada [ἄπειρον τὸ πλήθος]” (143a1-2). Parménides propone que “aprehendamos con el pensamiento [τῆ διανοίᾳ λάβωμεν]” al Uno “solo por sí mismo [μόνον καθ’ αὐτό]”, sin aquello de lo cual hemos dicho que participa, es decir, la οὐσία (143a6-8). Si bien el pasaje que sigue acerca de la generación del número ha recibido una atención considerable desde la Antigüedad, gracias al problema de los números primos, poca atención se le ha prestado a los antecedentes de este “experimento mental” basado en la διάνοια. La creación, por medio de la abstracción, de un Uno que en ningún sentido es Muchos no sólo se retrotrae a la Primera Hipótesis del *Parménides*, sino también (nótese la expresión “ambos, Adimanto y Glaucón”, en 126a2) a la Línea Dividida de *República* 6. Allí, “lo Impar y lo Par” se identifican como las hipótesis paradigmáticas de la aritmética (*República* 510c3-4), pero, como lo ha señalado Sir David Ross, el Uno indivisible de *República* 7 y de *Filebo* 56d9-e3 ofrece la mejor evidencia para los “Intermediarios” platónicos (*Plato’s Theory of Ideas*, 62 = *La teoría de las Ideas de Platón*, 68). El uso de διάνοια en 143a7 vincula esta evidencia basada en la mónada con la Segunda Sección de la Línea Dividida, la sección dianoética, haciendo así que el Uno indivisible, si bien *no existente* (ἄνευ οὐσίας, que se deriva de 143a8 por medio de 143a6-7), sea el ἀρχή de lo que Aristóteles llamó “el número matemático”, es decir, de los Intermediarios.

Sin embargo, según la *Prinzipienlehre* que depende de Aristóteles, “el número eidético” (*Metafísica* 1086b4; también 1088b34 y 1090b35) se origina de los ἀρχαί gemelos del Uno y la Díada Indefinida. Aunque el último término no se encuentra en el *Parménides* ni en ningún otro lugar en Platón (ver, sin embargo, el ἀχώριστα δύο de *República* 524c1), los usos tercero, cuarto y quinto de διάνοια –dos de ellos asociados de nuevo al verbo λαμβάνειν (165a8 y 165b5-6) y el otro al verbo ἀφελεῖν (158c2)– emplean una forma reconocida de experimento mental de abstracción para imaginar qué es lo diferente del Uno (en la Tercera Hipótesis) o qué es sin el Uno (en la Séptima Hipótesis): ἄπειρον πλήθει (158c6-7 y 165c2). Si este término es la versión de Platón de la Díada Indefinida de Aristóteles –y reconocidos estudiosos han pensado que lo es (ver Mitchell Miller, 1995, “Unwritten Teachings’ in the *Parmenides*”, 621)–, entonces el *Parménides* hace que los dos llamados ἀρχαί sean dependientes de un acto de abstracción humano, vinculado, gracias a la διάνοια, con la Segunda, no con la Primera Parte de la Línea Dividida. Con la Idea del Bien en la cima de la Primera Parte (cf. *República* 511b5 y 532a5-b2), el Uno es meramente el ἀρχή de la Segunda. En otras palabras, prestar atención al uso de διάνοια en el *Parménides* –especialmente en la frase

λαμβάνειν διάνοια– debilitarse la tesis de Aristóteles de que Platón asumió el Uno como uno de los dos ἀρχαί metafísicos o cosmológicos o que lo consideró como el Bien.

El primer uso de διάνοια se da en la Primera Parte del diálogo, donde Parménides ofrece una única justificación de la así llamada “Teoría de las Formas” para contrarrestar las múltiples objeciones que acaba de levantar contra ella. Si no hay “formas de las cosas que son [εἶδη τῶν ὄντων]”, no habrá modo de definir el εἶδος de cada cosa, por lo que no habrá nada hacia lo cual se dirija la διάνοια (135b8); este resultado destruirá por completo “la facultad de la discusión [τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν]” (135c1-2) y minará así a la propia filosofía (135c5-7). Al aplicar al Uno, en la Segunda Parte del diálogo, la antilógica τέχνη descrita en el *Fedro* (261d10-e2; cf. *Fedro* 261d6-8 y *Parménides* 129d8-e1), Parménides rescata la διάνοια como ἀρχή de todas las εἶδη de Uno-sobre-Muchos (*República* 596a5-7) –que son susceptibles del argumento del Tercer Hombre– y ello de modo tal que deja espacio, sin embargo, para los verdaderos objetos que le interesan a Sócrates: lo Bello, lo Justo y, sobre todo, el Bien (135c9 y 130b7-9; cf. *República* 534b8-d1). Gracias a la función de la διάνοια al comienzo de la Segunda Hipótesis, es posible identificar el principio unificador del diálogo: el propósito del *Parménides* es restringir “el Ámbito de las Formas” a aquellos objetos que merecen recibir el sentido de la palabra ἰδέα en la expresión de Parménides ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου τὴν αὐτὴν αἰεὶ εἶναι (135c1). Visto a esta luz, el error del joven Sócrates no consiste en una equivocación en discriminar –como engañosamente sugiere Parménides (130e1-3)–, por ejemplo, entre hombre (130c2) y pelo (130c6), sino entre el εἶδος de “lo justo, lo bello y lo bueno” (por un lado) y (por el otro) objetos dianoéticos como “la semejanza en sí” –que se identifica como una ἀπάτη productiva en el *Fedro* (261e6-262b9)– y el Uno y los Muchos (*Parménides* 130b3-5), sobre lo cual Sócrates, en el *Parménides*, será sometido a una práctica en conformidad con ἡ ἀντιλογικὴ τέχνη (*Fedro* 261d10-e2).

Para concluir, abordaré la razón por la que Platón le permite a su Parménides sostener falsamente que “el Uno mismo” es “mi hipótesis” (137b2-4) –de hecho, es la hipótesis de Platón– y por qué Sócrates elige la διάνοια para ilustrar la presunta indiferencia de Platón frente al vocabulario técnico en *República* 7 (533d6-9), una indicación en broma y preliminar de la importancia de dicho término en el *Parménides*.

### *Drei Gründe für die Signifikanz des Gebrauchs von διάνοια im Parmenides*

Obwohl der Begriff διάνοια lediglich fünfmal im *Parmenides* verwendet wird, wirft eine Analyse der einzelnen Verwendungen Licht auf drei signifikante Probleme in der Auseinandersetzung mit Platon: (1.) den Wert von Aristoteles’ Zeugnis bezogen auf den Stellenwert mathematischer Objekte als ‚Mittleres‘ (τὰ μετὰξύ), (2.) den Stellenwert von Aristoteles’ Zeugnis bezogen auf die Bedeutung des Einen und die unbestimmte Zweierheit in Platons ἀρχαί-Metaphysik, und schließlich (3.) die Einheit von Platons *Parmenides* selbst, und zwar im konkreten Fall bezogen auf die Frage, in welcher Weise die hypothesenbasierte Auffindung des Einen im zweiten Teil des Dialogs zum verfolgten Ziel beitragen kann (135c8-d1), dem jungen Sokrates zunächst die Übung zu gewähren, die er zur Definition des καλόν, δίκαιον, ἀγαθόν „und



jeder einzelnen Form [καὶ ἐν ἑκαστῶν τῶν εἰδῶν]“ benötigt. Die These meines Vortrags lautet in vorläufiger Formulierung: Wenn das wahre Eine aufgrund seiner Abhängigkeit von διάνοια zu dem gezählt werden muss, was Aristoteles τὰ μεταξὺ nannte, kann es nicht für eine un-hypothetische ἀρχή gehalten werden; und wenn das „Eine über Vielen“ εἶδη – *a fortiori* abhängig von διάνοια, sofern das Eine existiert – empfänglich für das Argument des „Dritten Menschen“ ist, kann „die Theorie der Ideen“ nicht vollständig aufgehoben werden, sondern wird eher „den Umfang der Formen“ (130b1-e4) auf die zweite seiner vier möglichen Komponenten beschränken: δικαίου τι εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ καὶ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πάντων αὖ τῶν τοιούτων (130b7-9).

Von den fünf Verwendungen von διάνοια ist die zweite die wichtigste. In der zweiten (und längsten) Hypothese ist „das eine Seiende [τὸ ἐν ὄν]“ zu dem geworden, was das Eine laut der arithmetischen Unterweisung in *Politeia* 7 niemals werden kann: Vieles (vgl. rep. 525d8-e3), ja sogar „die unbegrenzte Menge [ἄπειρον τὸ πλῆθος]“ (143a1-2). Parmenides schlägt vor, dass „wir in Gedanken das Eine allein für sich selbst nehmen sollten [τῆ διανοίᾳ μόνον καθ’ αὐτό λάβωμεν]“, „ohne dasjenige, woran es, wie wir sagen, Anteil hat“, nämlich an der οὐσία (143a6-8).

Während die Passage, die auf die Erschaffung der Zahlen folgt, seit dem Altertum aufgrund des Problems der Primzahlen beträchtliche Beachtung gefunden hat, wurde den Vorläufern dieses διάνοια-basierten „Gedankenexperiments“ wenig Beachtung geschenkt. Die Schaffung eines absolut einheitlichen Einen durch Abstraktion bezieht sich nicht nur auf die erste Hypothese des *Parmenides*, sondern auch auf das *Liniengleichnis* von *Politeia* 6 (vgl. „sowohl Adeimantos als auch Glaukon“ in 126a2). Dort werden „das Ungerade und das Gerade“ als paradigmatische Hypothesen der Arithmetik identifiziert (rep. 510c3-4), doch wie Sir David Ross hervorhob, ist es das unteilbare Eine in *Politeia* 7 und *Philebos* 56d9-e3, das den besten Beleg für die platonischen „Intermediates“ liefert (*Plato’s Theory of Ideas*, 62). Die Verwendung von διάνοια in 143a7 verbindet diesen monaden-basierten Beweis mit dem zweiten oder dianoetischen Abschnitt des *Liniengleichnisses*, wodurch das unteilbare, aber nicht existierende Eine (ἄνευ οὐσίας von 143a8 mit 143a6-7) zur ἀρχή von dem, was Aristoteles „mathematische Zahl“ nannte, gemacht wird, nämlich den ‚Intermediates‘.

Nach der von Aristoteles abhängigen *Prinzipienlehre* allerdings stammt die „eidetische Zahl“ (*Metaphysik* 1086b4; auch 1088b34 und 1090b35) aus den Zwillings-ἀρχαί des Einen und der unbestimmten Zweiheit. Obwohl letzterer Begriff nicht im *Parmenides* oder anderswo bei Platon zu finden ist (aber vgl. ἀχώριστα δύο in rep. 524c1), nutzen die dritte, vierte und fünfte Verwendung von διάνοια – zwei von ihnen sind wiederum mit dem Verb λαμβάνειν (165a8 und 165b5-6) verbunden, die dritte mit dem Verb ἀφελεῖν (158c2) –, eine komplementäre Form des abstrahierenden Gedankenexperiments, um eine Vorstellung davon zu bekommen, was anders ist als das Eine (in der dritten Hypothese) oder was ohne das Eine existiert (in der siebten Hypothese): ἄπειρον πλῆθει (158c6-7 und 165c2). Wenn dieser Begriff Platons Version von Aristoteles unbestimmter Zweiheit ist – und angesehene Gelehrte haben geglaubt, dass es so ist (vgl. Mitchell Miller „Unwritten Teachings in Parmenides“, 1995, 621) – dann macht Parmenides die beiden so genannten ἀρχαί abhängig von einem künstlichen Akt der Abstraktion, verbunden – dank διάνοια – mit dem zweiten, nicht dem ersten Teil des *Liniengleichnisses* (rep. 511d8-e1). Mit der Idee des Guten am Ende des ersten Teils (vgl. Rep. 511b5 und 532a5-b2) ist das Eine nur die ἀρχή des zweiten Teils. Mit anderen Worten, die Aufmerksamkeit auf die Verwendung von διάνοια im *Parmenides* – vor allem in der Phrase λαμβάνειν διάνοια – verstärkt Aristoteles’ Behauptung, dass Platon mathematische Objekte als ‚Intermediates‘ betrachtete, aber schwächt seine Behauptung,

dass Platon das Eine als eines von zwei metaphysischen oder kosmologischen ἀρχαί annahm oder als das Gute betrachtete.

Die erste Verwendung von διάνοια ist im ersten Teil des Dialogs zu finden, worin Parmenides eine einzige Rechtfertigung für die sogenannte „Theorie der Formen“ anbietet, um die vielfältigen Einwände, die er gerade dargeboten hat, auszugleichen. Wenn es keine „Formen von existierenden Dingen [εἶδη τῶν ὄντων]“ gibt, wird es keine Möglichkeit geben, das εἶδος jeder Sache zu definieren, und somit wird es nichts geben, worauf sich διάνοια (135b8) beziehen wird. Dieses Ergebnis wird „die Macht der Diskussion [τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν]“ (135c1-2) vollständig zerstören und somit die Philosophie selbst unterminieren (135c5-7). Durch die Anwendung der antilogischen τέχνη, wie sie im *Phaidros* (261d10-e2; vgl. Phdr. 261d6-8 und Prm. 129d8-e1) beschrieben wird, auf das Eine im zweiten Teil des Dialogs, rettet Parmenides διάνοια als die ἀρχή aller Eins-über-Vielen εἶδη (Rep. 596a5-7) – diese sind für den „Dritten Menschen“ empfänglich – in einer Weise, die dennoch Raum gibt für die realen Objekte von Sokrates' Anliegen: das Schöne, das Gerechte und vor allem das Gute (135c9 und 130b7- 9, vgl. Rep. 534b8-d1). Dank der Rolle von διάνοια, die in der zweiten Hypothese ihren Anfang nimmt, wird es möglich, das verbindende Prinzip des Dialogs zu identifizieren: Das Ziel des *Parmenides* besteht darin, „den Umfang der Formen“ auf jene Objekte zu beschränken, die die platonische Bedeutung des Wortes ἰδέα in Parmenides' ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου τὴν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ εἶναι (135c1; vgl. Rep. 511c1) verdienen. In diesem Licht ist der Fehler des jungen Sokrates nicht ein Unterscheidungsfehler – wie Parmenides in täuschender Weise andeutet (130e1-3) – beispielsweise zwischen Mann (130c2) und Haar (130c6), sondern zwischen dem εἶδος von „gerecht, schön, und gut“ (einerseits) und (andererseits) dianoetischen Objekte wie „der Ähnlichkeit als solcher“ – identifiziert als Produkte der ἀπάτη im *Phaidros* (261e6-262b9) – und ‚Eins‘ und ‚Vieles‘ (Prm. 130b3-5), worauf Sokrates daher gemäß der ἀντιλογικὴ τέχνη (Phdr. 261d10-e2) im *Parmenides* geprüft wird.

Abschließend werde ich den Grund anführen, warum Platon seinem Parmenides erlaubt, fälschlicherweise zu behaupten, dass „das Eine selbst meine Hypothese“ (137b2-4) ist – tatsächlich ist es Platons eigene Hypothese – und warum Sokrates den Begriff διάνοια herausgreift, um Platons angebliche Gleichgültigkeit gegenüber einem technischen Vokabular in *Politeia* 7 (533d6-9) hervorzuheben – ein spielerischer und einführender Hinweis auf die Signifikanz dieses Begriffs im *Parmenides*.

### *Ousia and dunamis in the greatest aporia (Parm., 133b4-135b4)*

The “greatest aporia” to Socrates’s theory of Forms is an argument presented by Parmenides in Plato’s *Parmenides* (133b4-135b4). In what follows I offer a reconstruction of it that emphasizes to some points usually neglected by scholarship.

The first part of the argument consists of the confrontation between Socrates’s and Parmenides’s theories of ousia (133c4 is the first occurrence of the term in the dialogue). Parmenides urges Socrates to agree that his theory of Forms amounts to the postulation of an ousia to particulars among us according to three theses:

1. An ousia is an individual by itself postulated as the being of each particular among us (133c4).
2. An ousia is not among us because what is among us cannot be by itself (133c6).
3. We postulate an ousia to things that cannot be by itself (from 2).

Thereafter Parmenides introduces a second theory of ousia, one that postulates ousia to a specific kind of Form, the reciprocal relatives (Duncombe, 2013: 53). The reciprocity of the relata is the reason for postulating an ousia to them (133c9). Parmenides thinks this is compatible to Socrates’s theory because the rule for postulation of an ousia (3) is the same. His argument is:

4. Each one of two reciprocal forms cannot be by itself (implicit premise from 3).
5. We postulate an ousia to reciprocal forms (133c9).

Parmenides never says that reciprocity suffices to postulate ousia to particulars among us (see 133c9-d4). He first claims that the ousia of Forms is not relative to us (133c9-d2), and the reason for that may well be that an ousia must be itself by itself. Next he asserts that whenever reciprocity happens in things among us, this is a relation between particulars, which not being able to be by themselves, cannot be a Form (133d2-4). If these reasons are correct, then the argument is:

6. Ousia of reciprocal Forms is not relative to us (133c9-d2) because what is among us is not by itself (from 2).
7. Reciprocity in things among us is not to Forms (133d2-4) because each relata cannot be by itself (from 4).

In the second part of the argument, Parmenides focuses on reciprocal relations, using the classic example of Mastery and Slavery. In doing so he shifts his vocabulary from the ousia of to their dunamis (133e5). He states that reciprocally correlative individuals, either particulars or Forms, have in themselves the property of being a relative (*δύναμις πρὸς τι*, see 133e5). Thereupon, he infers that dunamis is the property of reciprocal relation. His argument runs as follows:

8. Each particular or Form that is a reciprocal correlative has *dunamis* (133e5).
9. *Dunamis* is a reciprocal relation between correlatives (from 8).
10. Reciprocity of correlatives must be among individuals of the same kind (from 6 and 7).
11. Each particular that has a *dunamis* has only one reciprocal correlative of the same kind.

The inference from 8 to 9 seems to be a faulty induction, as well as deducing 10 out of 6 and 7, given their reasons. One must thence reject the interpretation that Parmenides is working with a general theory of relatives (as for example Ducombe, 2013: 51) and to suppose that 8 to 10 are new premises; a theory of *dunamis*, instead of a theory of *ousia*. Consequently Parmenides's conclusion does not rely on Socrates's theory of Forms unless other hidden premises are provided.

I claim that Parmenides postulates the *ousia* of knowledge and its objects in supposing that knowledge is a *dunamis* we have (see 134a3-4). My argument to this point is that Parmenides's theory of *ousia* of reciprocal relatives should apply to both *relata*. Were knowledge a reciprocal relative, every Form would also be reciprocal relative. This goes against 3, for he would postulate *ousia* for what is by itself, and also supposes that every form is a reciprocal relative, in opposition to Parmenides's statement that only some of them were (133c8). If instead we have Parmenides arguing according to his theory of *dunamis*, it would run as follows:

12. Knowledge is a *dunamis* we have (implicit premise, from 8).
13. Knowledge itself is a reciprocal relation to Forms (134a3-4, b6-7, from 9).
14. Knowledge in us is a reciprocal relation to things among us (134a9-10, from 11).
15. Knowledge in us is not a reciprocal relation to Forms (134b11-12, from 10).

This version of the argument has the merit of (i) not relying on self-predication (as for example Vlastos, 1954: 346 and Cornford 1957: 98), for it supposes that  $\acute{\upsilon}\pi\prime\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omicron\upsilon$  in 134b6 simply means reciprocity; and of (ii) not assuming separation between forms and particulars (as in Lewis 1979: 105, Patterson 1983: 6 and Muller 1983: 4) for the argument is based on the *dunamis* of different kinds. But its major value is explaining the third part of the argument, which contrasts our knowledge and the knowledge of the god. Knowledge of Forms (134b3-4) is the knowledge the god has (134c11), and therefore is a *dunamis* one individual has (see 134d5-6). This is an important claim against interpretations that suppose the argument distinguishes immanent characters and forms (see McPherran 1983: 151 f. and the problems he has to explain *dunamis* in McPherran, 1999: 64), for Forms are immanent characters of the god. Awareness to the fact that Parmenides advances based on *dunamis*, and not on *ousia*, is key to understanding how the two latter parts of the argument hold together, and how the greatest *aporia* emerges as their conclusion as follows:

16. God has knowledge itself (134c10-11, from 8).
17. Forms have their *dunamis* only relative to god (134d4-7, from 10).
18. God does not have knowledge of what is among us (134d1-2, 134d11-e1, e6-7, from 10).
19. Forms do not have their *dunamis* relative to us (134d5-6, from 10).
20. We do not know god (134e3).
21. God has Mastery itself (134d9-10, from 8).
22. Slavery has its *dunamis* only relative to god (from 10, parallel to 17).

23. We are not slaves relative to god (134d10-11, from 10, parallel to 18).
24. We are not masters relative to god (134e2, from 10, parallel to 20).
25. God is not our master (134e5 from 10, parallel to 19).

It is evident that Parmenides is relying on his theory of *dunamis* for his argument both because all his conclusions are based on the inference from 8 to 10, and because now he also supposes Mastery to be a *dunamis*. The difficulty is not that Mastery is not in us, a proposition that follows from Socrates's theory of Forms (according to 2). The difficulty is that individual who has Mastery does not have a correspondent individual who has Slavery.

An argument based on a theory of *dunamis* is not an insurmountable objection to Socrates's theory of forms, as Parmenides makes clear (133b6-8, 134e9-135b2). Other delicate issues that I would like to address at the end are: (a) if Socrates has any reason to accept Parmenides's theory of *dunamis* and (b) if the move from 8 to 9 and 10 can be proved not to be a faulty induction.

### *Ousia et dunamis dans la plus grande aporie (Parm., 133b4-135b4)*

La «plus grande aporie» de la théorie des formes de Socrate est un argument présenté par Parménide dans les *Parménide* de Platon (133b4-135b4). Dans ce qui suit, j'en propose une reconstitution qui met en relief certains points généralement négligés par les interprètes.

La première partie de l'argument consiste en la confrontation entre les théories de Socrate et de Parménide sur l'*ousia* (133c4 est la première apparition du terme dans le dialogue). Parménide exhorte Socrate à reconnaître que sa théorie des formes équivaut à postuler une *ousia* à des particuliers parmi nous, selon trois thèses :

1. Une *ousia* est un individu en soi postulé comme l'être de chaque particulier parmi nous (133c4).
2. Une *ousia* n'est pas parmi nous parce que ce qui est parmi nous ne peut être par soi-même (133c6).
3. Nous postulons une *ousia* à des choses qui ne peuvent pas être par elles-mêmes (de 2).

Parménide introduit ensuite une seconde théorie, qui postule l'*ousia* à un type spécifique de forme, les relatives réciproques (Duncombe, 2013 : 53). La réciprocité des *relata* est la raison pour laquelle on leur postule une *ousia* (133c9). Parménide croit que cette thèse est compatible avec la théorie de Socrate parce que la règle de postulation d'une *ousia* (3) est la même. Son argument est :

4. Chacune des deux formes réciproques ne peut pas être par elle-même (prémisse implicite de 3).
5. Nous postulons une *ousia* à des formes réciproques (133c9).

Parménide ne dit jamais que la réciprocité suffit à postuler qu'une *ousia* aux particuliers parmi nous (voir 133c9-d4). Il prétend d'abord que l'*ousia* des formes ne nous concerne pas

(133c9-d2), et la raison me semble être qu'une ousia doit être en soi-même. Ensuite, il affirme que chaque fois que la réciprocité se produit dans les choses parmi nous, il s'agit d'une relation entre des particuliers qui, ne pouvant être en soi-même, ne peuvent pas être une forme (133d2-4). Si ces raisons sont correctes, l'argument est le suivant :

6. L'ousia des formes réciproques n'est pas relatif à nous (133c9-d2) parce que ce qui est parmi nous n'est pas par soi-même (de 2).

7. La réciprocité des choses parmi nous n'est pas à la forme (133d2-4) parce que les relata ne peuvent pas être par soi-même (de 4).

La deuxième partie de l'argument se concentre sur les relations réciproques, en utilisant l'exemple classique de la maîtrise et de l'esclavage. Ce faisant, Parménide change son vocabulaire de l'ousia des choses à son dunamis (133e5). Il affirme que les individus réciproquement corrélatifs, qu'ils soient particuliers ou formes, ont en eux-mêmes la propriété d'être un relatif (*δύναμις πρὸς τι*, voir 133e5). Il en déduit que la dunamis est la propriété de la relation réciproque. Son argumentation est la suivante :

8. Chaque particulier ou forme qui est un corrélatif réciproque a une dunamis (133e5).

9. Dunamis est une relation réciproque entre corrélatifs (de 8).

10. La réciprocité des corrélatifs doit être entre individus du même type (à partir de 6 et 7).

11. Chaque particulier qui a un dunamis n'a qu'un seul corrélatif réciproque du même type.

L'inférence de 8 à 9 semble être une induction erronée, et aussi la déduction de 10 après 6 et 7 (compte tenu ses raisons). On doit donc rejeter l'interprétation selon laquelle Parménide travaille avec une théorie générale de la relativité (comme Ducombe, 2013 : 51) et de supposer que 8 à 10 sont nouvelles prémisses ; une théorie de la dunamis plutôt que une théorie de l'ousia. Par conséquent, la conclusion de Parménide ne s'appuie pas sur la théorie des formes de Socrate, à moins que d'autres prémisses cachées ne soient fournies.

Je défends que Parménides postule l'ousia de la connaissance et de ses objets en supposant que la connaissance est une dunamis (voir 134a3-4). Mon argument est que l'ousia des relatifs réciproques devrait s'appliquer aux deux relata. Si la connaissance était un relatif réciproque, chaque forme serait également un relatif réciproque. Cela va à l'encontre de 3, car il postulerait une ousia pour ce qui est par soi-même. Cela suppose également que chaque forme est un relatif réciproque, contrairement à l'affirmation de Parménides selon laquelle seulement quelques formes sont relatives (133c8). Donc l'argument de Parménide se déroule comme suit :

12. La connaissance est un dunamis que nous avons (prémisse implicite, de 8)

13. La connaissance elle-même est une relation réciproque avec les formes (134a3-4, b6-7, sur 9)

14. La connaissance en nous est une relation réciproque avec les choses parmi nous (134a9-10, sur 11)

15. La connaissance en nous n'est pas une relation réciproque avec les formes (134b11-12, sur 10)

Cette version de l'argument a le mérite de ne pas compter sur l'auto-predication (comme Vlastos, 1954 : 346 et Cornford 1957 : 98) et de ne pas supposer la séparation entre formes et particularités (comme chez Lewis 1979 : 105, Patterson 1983 : 6 et Muller 1983 : 4). Mais sa valeur majeure est d'expliquer la troisième partie de l'argumentation, qui contraste notre connaissance et la connaissance du dieu. La connaissance des formes (134b3-4) est la connaissance que possède le dieu (134c11) et pourtant c'est une dunamis qu'un individu possède (voir 134d5-6). Cela est une affirmation importante contre les interprétations qui supposent que l'argument distingue les caractères et les formes immanentes (voir McPherran 1983 : 151 et les problèmes qu'il a à expliquer dunamis dans McPherran, 1999 : 64). Conscience du fait que Parménide avance basée sur la dunamis permet de comprendre comment les deux dernières parties de l'argument tiennent ensemble et comment la plus grande aporie résulte comme conclusion :

16. Le dieu a la connaissance même (134c10-11, de 8)
17. Les formes n'ont leur dunamis que par rapport au dieu (134d4-7, sur 10)
18. Le dieu n'a pas connaissance de ce qui est parmi nous (134d1-2, 134d11-e1, e6-7, sur 10)
19. Les formes n'ont pas leur dunamis par rapport à nous (134d5-6, sur 10)
20. Nous ne connaissons pas le dieu (134e3)
21. Le dieu a la maîtrise elle-même (134d9-10, de 8)
22. L'esclavage a sa dunamis seulement par rapport au dieu (de 10, parallèle à 17)
23. Nous ne sommes pas esclaves par rapport au dieu (134d10-11, de 10, parallèle à 18)
24. Nous ne sommes pas des maîtres par rapport au dieu (134e2, du 10, parallèle au 20)
25. Le dieu n'est pas notre maître (134e5 du 10, parallèle au 19)

Toutes les conclusions reposent sur l'inférence de 8 à 10. De plus, Parménide suppose que la maîtrise est une dunamis. La difficulté n'est pas que la maîtrise ne soit pas en nous, une proposition qui découle de la théorie des formes de Socrate (selon 2). La difficulté est que l'individu qui a la maîtrise n'a pas un seul individu correspondant qui a l'esclavage.

Un argument fondé sur la théorie des dunamis ne constitue pas une objection insurmontable à la théorie des formes de Socrate, comme le dit clairement Parménide (133b6-8, 134e9-135b2). D'autres questions délicates que je voudrais aborder à la fin sont : (a) si Socrate a des raisons d'accepter la théorie de Parménides sur la dunamis et (b) si le passage de 8 à 9 et 10 peut être prouvé comme quelque chose d'autre que une induction erronée.

### *La duplice accezione dell'espressione me esti nella quinta e nella sesta ipotesi del Parmenide*

La trattazione delle ipotesi in cui si articola la *pragmateia* del *Parmenide* può essere oggetto di interpretazione da diversi punti di vista, primi fra tutti quello logico-ontologico e quello epistemologico. La prospettiva che si vuole qui adottare è, invece, quella semantica e, più precisamente, quella relativa all'impiego dell'espressione *me esti* e alla portata semantica che le viene attribuita.

Non v'è dubbio che Platone mostri in diversi luoghi una chiara consapevolezza della complessità inerente all'impiego congiunto della negazione e del verbo essere. Interessanti elementi di riflessione al riguardo emergono dal confronto fra la quinta e la sesta ipotesi del *Parmenide*, la cui natura e implicazioni raramente sono state prese in esame in modo del tutto adeguato dalla prospettiva qui proposta: la rilevanza dell'aspetto semantico è testimoniata dal fatto che le conseguenze di queste due ipotesi discendono fondamentalmente dalla diversa maniera in cui è inteso il significato dell'espressione "non è" (dalla diversa maniera in cui è inteso quello che tale espressione *semainei*, per usare il verbo sintomaticamente impiegato nei passi in questione).

A sostegno di questa affermazione, la prima parte dell'intervento sarà dedicata a una rapida lettura dell'inizio della sesta ipotesi (163c), per sottolineare come: a) lo Straniero avvii l'analisi dell'ipotesi "*hei ei me esti*" proprio dalla semantica dell'espressione "non è"; b) la serie di conseguenze negative tratte in questa sesta ipotesi discenda dal fatto che l'espressione *me esti* è intesa come volta a indicare il puro e semplice non essere di ciò a cui è applicata e il suo non partecipare in alcun modo all'essere.

Nella seconda parte dell'intervento sarà brevemente esaminato l'esordio della quinta ipotesi, per ribadire che a') anche in questo caso lo Straniero pone una questione linguistica (160c6: *ismen ho legei*; 160c1: *legoi*); b') anche in questo caso la serie di conseguenze positive dell'ipotesi discende dal significato che viene attribuito all'espressione *me esti* nell'ambito del *logos* in cui compare: poiché lo Straniero mette qui l'accento sul fatto che dire "non è" di qualcosa suppone che i parlanti stiano parlando, per l'appunto, di qualcosa e suppongano dunque che ciò di cui parlano abbia una qualche propria fisionomia, ne deriva per "l'uno che non è" la partecipazione a una serie di determinazioni. In effetti, la differenza rispetto alla sesta ipotesi è che nella quinta l'attenzione si sposta sul soggetto del *logos*: esso, in quanto non è preceduto da negazione (cfr. 160b5-c1), è anticipatamente posto nel linguaggio come referente di un discorso e dunque come qualcosa di reale.

La duplice accezione dell'espressione *me esti* in un *logos* apre dunque, nelle due ipotesi, due diversi scenari. La terza parte dell'intervento sarà volta a mettere in evidenza che la polarità fra questi due scenari di significato è riproposta nelle argomentazioni che Platone mette in bocca allo Straniero nel *Sofista* quando, per la prima volta all'interno del dialogo, viene esplicitamente tematizzato il nodo concettuale del non essere. Mi riferisco alle pagine 237B-239A, dove sono presentate in successione tre argomentazioni concernenti il non essere: si mostrerà come l'impostazione della sesta ipotesi e le conseguenze che ne derivano siano in relazione con la prima



delle tre argomentazioni del *Sofista*, incentrata sulla nozione di *medamos on* (che richiama verbalmente l'esordio della sesta ipotesi) e sulla inconsistenza ontologica a cui rinvia il dire *me esti*. Analogamente, l'impostazione della quinta ipotesi e le conseguenze che ne derivano sono in relazione con la seconda argomentazione del *Sofista*, ove il non essere è espresso attraverso la formula *me on auto kath'hauto* ed è dunque pensato come dotato di un suo profilo ontologico, che, per quanto paradossale, risulta passibile di qualificazioni, ancorché solo negative.

L'intento della comparazione fra i passi del *Parmenide* e quelli del *Sofista* è mostrare che la quinta e la sesta ipotesi sono emblematiche della riflessione che Platone ha svolto non solo sulla semantica dell'espressione *me esti*, ma anche, a partire da essa, sulla natura stessa del non essere. Le due ipotesi del *Parmenide* prese in esame risultano, infatti, opposte e inconciliabili proprio perché attraverso la considerazione della semantica dell'espressione *me esti* mettono in luce due facce estreme di un unico problema: il problema consistente nel considerare il non essere come assoluto. Infatti, se nella sesta ipotesi l'assolutezza del non essere è presentata come l'effetto nullificante della negazione, la quinta ci pone di fronte a un non essere austero, assolutamente altro dall'essere ma non per questo privo di una sua paradossale dignità ontologica e provvisto, pertanto, di determinazioni. Questa polarità estrema a cui il pensiero e il linguaggio sono ridotti nel riferirsi a ciò che non è viene ripresa, come si diceva, nelle prime due argomentazioni del *Sofista*, ove tuttavia si profila una possibile sua composizione nella terza argomentazione: quest'ultima prospetta, infatti, seppur in maniera ancora implicita, la soluzione teorica proposta da Platone più avanti nello stesso *Sofista*, consistente nel negare tanto all'essere quanto al non essere il crisma dell'assolutezza e dell'austerità.

Il *Parmenide* con le due ipotesi qui prese in considerazione dà voce alla problematica del rapporto fra essere e non essere, lasciandola ancora allo stato di dilemma irresolubile, ma anticipando la chiave attraverso cui nel *Sofista* se ne preparerà la soluzione: si tratta della chiave linguistica che impone di sviscerare fino in fondo le difficoltà in cui il linguaggio si avvolge quando si affronta il tema del non essere.

In conclusione, allargando rapidamente lo sguardo all'architettura del *Parmenide*, si considererà che, anche dalla prospettiva d'analisi qui adottata, parziale e limitata a due sole ipotesi, può trovare conferma l'idea che la *pragmateia* abbia la funzione di mettere in scena nodi problematici dell'elaborazione concettuale di Platone e germi delle soluzioni teoriche che il filosofo si accingeva a predisporre in dialoghi successivi.

### *The double meaning of the expression me esti in the fifth and sixth hypotheses of the Parmenides*

The elaboration of the hypotheses in *Parmenides*' second half can be interpreted from different points of view, first of all the logical-ontological and the epistemological one. Instead, the perspective adopted here is semantic, in that it concerns the use of the expression *me esti* and the semantic value attributed to it.

There is no doubt that Plato shows in different passages a clear awareness of the complexity implied by the joint use of the verb "to be" and of negation. In this regard, interesting points for reflection emerge from the comparison between the fifth and sixth hypotheses, whose nature and

implications has been not fully examined from the perspective proposed here: the relevance of the semantic aspect is evidenced by the fact that the consequences of these two hypotheses basically derive from the different ways in which the Stranger explains what the expression "is not" means (or *semainei*, to use the verb Plato symptomatically uses in these passages).

In support of this statement, the first part of the paper will be devoted to a quick glance at the beginning of the sixth hypothesis (163c), to point out that: a) the Stranger explicitly sets the issue in terms of the semantic value of the expression "*me esti*"; b) the series of negative consequences drawn in the sixth hypothesis derives from the fact that in this context the expression means the absolute non-being of what *me esti* and its lack of participation in being

In the second part of the paper the beginning of the fifth hypothesis will be examined quickly, to confirm that a') also in this case the Stranger poses a linguistic question (160c6: *ismen ho legei*; 160c1: *legoi*); b') also in this case the series of positive consequences of the hypothesis derives from the way in which the expression is supposed to give meaning to the *logos* in which it appears: the Stranger puts emphasis on the fact that the whoever says "is not" of something is supposed to be talking about something that possesses own lineaments. This is the reason why the Stranger attributes to "the one that is not" the participation in a series of determinations. In fact, the fifth hypothesis differs from the sixth one because it focuses on the subject of the *logos*: inasmuch as the subject is not preceded by negation (see 160b5-c1), it is placed in advance in language as the referent of the speech, and therefore as something real.

The double meaning attributed to the expression *me esti* in a *logos* seems to open two different scenarios, as shown in the considered passages. The third part of the paper will be aimed at highlighting that the polarity between these two scenarios is displayed in the arguments that Plato puts in the Stranger's mouth in the *Sophist* when the problematic issue of non-being is explicitly thematised for the first time in the dialogue. I am referring to pages 237B-239A, where three arguments concerning non-being are developed in succession. I will argue that the formulation of the sixth hypothesis and the derived consequences are related to the first argument of the *Sophist*, which takes into account the notion of *medamos on* (verbally recalling the beginning of the sixth hypothesis) and the ontological inconsistency involved in saying "*me esti*". Similarly, the formulation of the fifth hypothesis and the derived consequences are related to the second argument of the *Sophist*, where non-being is expressed through the formula *me on auto kath' hauto* and is therefore thought of as having its own (paradoxical) ontological profile, which can be described through attributes, even if only negatively.

The intent of the comparison between the passages of the *Parmenides* and those of the *Sophist* will be to show that the fifth and sixth hypotheses are emblematic of the reflection that Plato carried out not only on the semantics of the expression *me esti*, but also, starting from this, on the very nature of non-being. The two hypotheses of the *Parmenides* taken into consideration are, in fact, opposed and irreconcilable precisely because they highlight two extreme faces of the same problem: the problem consisting in considering non-being as absolute. On the one hand, in the sixth hypothesis the absoluteness of non-being is depicted as the nullifying effect of the negation; on the other hand, the fifth hypothesis places us in front of an austere non-being, absolutely different from being and nevertheless possessing a (paradoxical) ontological dignity and, consequently, determinations. This extreme polarity, which thought and language are reduced to in referring to non-being, is resumed, as previously said, in the first two arguments of the *Sophist*, where, however, a possible composition of them arises in the third argument. For this argument

anticipates, even if in an implicit way, the theoretical solution proposed by Plato later in the *Sophist*, when both the being and the non-being will be denied the absoluteness and the austerity.

Through the two hypotheses considered here the *Parmenides* gives voice to the problem of the relationship between being and non-being, leaving it to the state of an unsolvable dilemma, but at the same time anticipating the conceptual strategy through which the *Sophist* will prepare its solution: I am referring to the linguistic perspective that requires a thorough examination of the difficulties in which language is involved when the issue of non-being is addressed.

In conclusion, the whole structure of the *Parmenides* will be rapidly considered. Although the point of view adopted here is partial and limited to only two hypotheses, it sheds some light on the function of the *pragmateia*: the function of displaying problematic issues of the conceptual elaboration of Plato and germs of the theoretical solutions that the philosopher was about to prepare in subsequent dialogues.

## Augustin Michael J.

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### “If the One is not” (*Prm.* 160b-164b)

My focus in this paper is the third antinomy in the second part of the *Parmenides* (160b-164b).<sup>1</sup> I ask, How does this collection of arguments help the young Socrates grasp the truth with authority (136b6-c5; cf. 135d3-6), and thereby save the theory of Forms (135b5-c4)? It is my view that the principal lesson of the *Parmenides* is that the Forms must be “predicationally many”<sup>2</sup> — both in the sense that they *are* many things and in the sense that they *are not* many things. The groundwork for the latter, I claim, is laid in the third antinomy of the *Parmenides*, and brought to completion in the *Sophist* (256c-259b).

I assume the following with respect to the second part of the *Parmenides*: (1) Parmenides sincerely recommends the method of training to the young Socrates; (2) Parmenides’s demonstration of the method of training contains genuine antinomies<sup>3</sup>; it is not possible to accept all of the conclusions established in the dialogue’s second part<sup>4</sup>; and (3) all of the antinomies concern the same subject, namely, the One (*to hen*).<sup>5</sup>

The argument for my claim about the third antinomy proceeds in two stages. The first stage examines the relationship between the third antinomy’s two deductions, what I will call its “positive deduction” and its “negative deduction.” The positive deduction establishes a number of conclusions about the One-that-is-not (hereafter, OTIN), some of which are certainly true. For instance, that OTIN is *knowable* (160c5-d2; 160d3-e2), is *different from the others* (160c5-d2; 160d3-e2), and *partakes (meteinaí) of not-being* (162b5-6). But almost all of the positive deduction’s conclusions about OTIN are overturned in the negative deduction.<sup>6</sup> Why? My examination shows that the negative deduction overturns the conclusions of the positive deduction because of the meaning or signification (*sêmeion*) of the phrase *mê estin*, “is not”; in the negative deduction, *mê estin* signifies “nothing other than the complete absence of being from that which is said not to be” (163c2-4; cf. 163c4-d1). Since this is the case, nothing that is can belong to OTIN; for if something that is did belong to OTIN, then, “by partaking (*metechon*) of that, [OTIN] would partake (*metechoi*) of Being” (163e7-164a1).<sup>7</sup> Recognition of this point permits an interim conclusion: the positive deduction was able to establish a number of its conclusions about OTIN because there *mê estin* had a different signification.

The second stage of the argument determines what the different signification is. Here I restrict my focus to a difficult passage in the positive deduction that establishes that OTIN

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1 All references are to the *Parmenides*, unless I indicate otherwise.

2 I borrow this phrase from Curd (1989).

3 This interpretation is advocated by, among others, Russell (1937), Ryle (1939), Friedländer (1969), Owen (1970), Schofield (1977), Allen (1997), and Gill (1996), (2012) 45-72, and (2014).

4 Meinwald (1991) and (2014) argues that there is a way to accept all of the conclusion established in the dialogue’s second part. See also Peterson (1996), (2000), and (2003). For criticisms of this interpretation see, among others, Rickless (2007) 102-6, Gill (2012) 52 with n. 17, and Gill (2014) 504-5.

5 I disagree, therefore, with the Neoplatonist’s interpretation of the dialogue’s second part. This interpretation is defended by Miller (1986) and Sayre (1978), (1983), and (1996), among others.

6 The sole exception is the conclusion that the One that is not neither ceases to be nor comes to be (163a7-b6; 163d7-8).

7 I follow the translation of Gill and Ryan (1996), unless I indicate otherwise.

must partake somehow (*metechlein pē*) of Being (161e3-162b8). This passage is naturally divisible into two parts. The first part (161e3-162a4) contains two short arguments that, collectively, establish *why* OTIN must partake of Being: to speak truly is to speak of *onta*, “things that are.” Since Parmenides and Aristoteles claim to speak truly about OTIN, therefore OTIN *is* (*estin ara* [...] *to hen ouk on*; 161e4-162a2); in addition, if OTIN *were not* a not-being — that is, if it were to give up (*anēsei*) its being with respect to being a not-being — it would straightaway *be* a *being* (162a2-4).

The second part (162a4-162b8) establishes *how* OTIN partakes of Being. This is accomplished through a discussion of Being and Not-being themselves, which is then applied to OTIN: Being, if it is to be completely, must partake of Being with respect to being a being, and must partake of Not-being with respect to not-being a not-being (162a6-b1).<sup>1</sup> It is my view that this means that Being must have the attribute of being, since it is, and not have the attribute of not-being, since it is what being *is*, the nature of being. Similarly, Not-being, if it is to not be completely, must partake of Not-being with respect to not-being a not-being, and of Being with respect to being a not-being (162b1-3). I interpret this as asserting that Not-being has the attribute of not-being, since it is not identical with Being, but it also has the attribute of being, because it *is* not-being. Finally, since OTIN is a not-being, “it must have being a not-being as a bond to its not-being” (162a4-5). It is my view that this means that OTIN has the attribute of not-being, in the same way as Not-being itself, since neither is identical with Being itself (or with any other form). However, OTIN still has the attribute of being, because it *is* a not-being. Therefore, OTIN, since it is not, has a share of being with respect to its not-being (162b4-7). This passage, I conclude, distinguishes two ways of being: (1) being the nature of Being, what being *is*; (2) having the attribute of being.

If this is the case, What is the signification of *mē estin* and the phrase *to mē on*, “what-is-not” or “not-being,” in this passage? I maintain that what “is not” or what is said “not to be” is said only to be *not identical with* the what-it-is-to-be, with Being itself. Just as Not-being must partake of Not-being, so that it is not identical with Being itself (as well as all of the other not-beings), it must also partake of Being, so that it *is* not-being. Similarly, OTIN must partake of Not-being, so that it is not identical with Being itself, but also partake of Being, since it too *is* not-being. I suggest that this is the beginning of the account of “is not” and “not-being” developed in the *Sophist*.

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<sup>1</sup> I accept Shorey’s emendations at 162a8 and 162b2. See Gill (1996) 94-9 and Gill (2002) for a case against Shorey’s emendations. Gill translates the lines as what-is, “if it is to completely be, partak[es] of being in regard to being a being and of not-being in regard to being a not-being.”

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### *el Uno no es*" (Prm. 160b-164b)

Esta comunicación se concentra en la tercera antinomia de la segunda parte del *Parménides* (160b-164b).<sup>1</sup> Mi pregunta es cómo es que esta colección de argumentos ayuda al joven Sócrates a asir la verdad con autoridad (136b6-c5; cf. 135d3-6) y, de esta manera, a salvar la teoría de las Formas (135b5-c4). Considero que la principal Enseñanza que nos deja el *Parménides* es que las Formas deben ser "muchas predicacionalmente hablando"<sup>2</sup> — tanto en el sentido de que *hay* muchas cosas, como en el de que *no hay* muchas cosas. El trabajo preparatorio para lo segundo,

1 Todas las referencias son al Parménides, salvo indicación contraria.

2 Tomo prestada esta frase de Curd (1989).

sostengo, se encuentra en la tercera antinomia del *Parménides*, pero es completada en el *Sofista* (256c-259b).

Con respecto a la segunda parte del *Parménides* estoy trabajando bajo la siguiente hipótesis: (1) Parménides recomienda sinceramente el método de entrenamiento al joven Sócrates; (2) la demostración del método de entrenamiento que hace Parménides contiene antinomias genuinas<sup>1</sup>; no es posible aceptar todas las conclusiones establecidas en la segunda parte del diálogo<sup>2</sup>; y (3) todas las antinomias conciernen al mismo tema, a saber, lo Uno (*to hen*).<sup>3</sup>

El argumento para defender mi posición sobre la tercera antinomia procede en dos tiempos. En el primero examino la relación entre las dos deducciones que componen la tercera antinomia, a las que llamaré su “deducción positiva” y su “deducción negativa”. La deducción positiva establece un cierto número de conclusiones acerca del “Uno que no es” (desde ahora, UNE), algunas de las cuales son en efecto verdaderas. Por ejemplo, que el UNE es *cognoscible* (160c5-d2; 160d3-e2), que es *deferente de los otros* (160c5-d2; 160d3-e2), y que *participa (meteinaí) del no-ser* (162b5-6). Pero casi todas las conclusiones de la deducción positiva acerca de UNE son invertidas en la deducción negativa.<sup>4</sup> ¿Por qué? Mi examen muestra que la deducción negativa invierte las conclusiones de la deducción positiva por el sentido o significación (*sêmeion*) de la frase *mê estin*, “no es”; en la deducción negativa *mê estin* significa “nada distinto a la completa ausencia de ser en eso que se dice que no es” (163c2-4; cf. 163c4-d1). Dado que este es el caso, nada que es puede pertenecer a UNE, pues si algo que es perteneciera a UNE, entonces “por participación (*metechon*) de ello, [UNE] participaría (*metechoi*) del Ser” (163e7-164a1).<sup>5</sup> El reconocimiento de este punto permite llegar a una conclusión intermedia: la deducción positiva pudo establecer un cierto número de sus conclusiones sobre UNE porque allí *mê estin* tenía una significación diferente.

La segunda parte del argumento determina cuál es esa significación diferente. Aquí voy a restringir mi atención a un pasaje difícil en la deducción positiva que establece que UNE debe participar de alguna manera (*metechein pē*) del Ser (161e3-162b8). Este pasaje, por su propia naturaleza, es divisible en dos partes. La primera (161e3-162a4) contiene dos argumentos cortos que, en su conjunto, establecen *por qué* UNE debe participar del Ser: hablar verdaderamente es decir de los *onta*, “las cosas que son.” Dado que Parménides y Aristóteles declaran estar hablando verdaderamente sobre UNE, entonces OTIN es (*estin ara [...] to hen ouk on*; 161e4-162a2). Adicionalmente, si UNE *no fuera* un no-ser –esto es, si renunciara (*anêsei*) a ser un no-ser — sería directamente un *ser* (162a2-4).

La segunda parte (162a4-162b8) establece *cómo* UNE participa del Ser. Esto es logrado por medio de una discusión sobre el Ser y el No-ser, que es luego aplicada a UNE: el Ser, para que sea completo, debe participar del Ser en lo relativo a ser un ser, y debe participar del No-Ser en lo relativo a no-ser un no-ser (162a6-b1).<sup>6</sup> Considero que esto significa que el Ser debe tener el atributo de ser, puesto que *es*, y no debe tener el atributo no-ser, puesto que esto es lo que ser es, la naturaleza de ser. De manera similar, No-ser, para que no sea completamente, debe participar del

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1 Esta interpretación es defendida, entre otros, por Russell (1937), Ryle (1939), Friedländer (1969), Owen (1970), Schofield (1977), Allen (1997), y Gill (1996), (2012) 45-72, y (2014).

2 Meinwald (1991) y (2014) sostiene que hay una forma de aceptar todas las conclusiones alcanzadas en la segunda parte del diálogo. Véase también Peterson (1996), (2000), y (2003). Para críticas a esta interpretación véase, entre otros, Rickless (2007) 102-6, Gill (2012) 52 y n. 17, y Gill (2014) 504-5.

3 Estoy en desacuerdo, por consiguiente con la interpretación neoplatónica de la segunda parte del diálogo. Esta interpretación es defendida por Miller (1986) y Sayre (1978), (1983), y (1996), entre otros.

4 La única excepción es la conclusión de que lo Uno que no es ni cesa de ser ni llega a ser (163a7-b6; 163d7-8).

5 Sigo la traducción de Gill y Ryan (1996), a menos que indique lo contrario.

No-ser en lo relativo a no-ser un no-ser, y del Ser en lo relativo a ser un no-ser (162b1-3). Aquí interpreto esto como que el No-ser tiene el atributo de no-ser, puesto que no es idéntico con el Ser, pero también tiene el atributo de ser, porque *es* no-ser. Finalmente, dado que UNE es un no-ser, “debe tener el ser un no-ser como un vínculo a su no-ser” (162a4-5). Considero que esto significa que UNE tiene el atributo de no-ser, de la misma manera en que lo tiene el No-ser porque ninguno de los dos son idénticos con el Ser mismo. Sin embargo, UNE aún guarda el atributo de ser, porque *es* un no-ser. Por consiguiente, dado que UNE no es, tiene en parte el ser en lo relativo a su no-ser (162b4-7). Este pasaje, concluyo, distingue dos formas de ser: (1) ser la naturaleza del Ser, lo que ser *es*; (2) tener el atributo de ser.

Si este es el caso, ¿cuál es la significación de *mê estin* y de la frase *to mê on*, “lo que-no-es” o “no-ser” en este pasaje? Sostengo que lo que “no es” o lo que es dicho que “no es” es dicho solo que *no es idéntico con* lo que-es-ser, junto con el Ser mismo. Así como el No-ser debe participar del No-ser, para que no sea idéntico con el Ser mismo (así como todos los demás no-seres), también debe participar del SER, de manera que *es* no-ser. De manera semejante, UNE debe participar del No-ser, para que no sea idéntico con el Ser mismo, pero también debe participar del Ser, puesto que también *es* no-ser. Propongo que este es el comienzo de la explicación sobre “no es” y “no-ser” desarrollada en el *Sofista*.

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6 Acepto las enmiendas de Shorey en 162a8 y en 162b2. Véase Gill (1996) 94-9 y Gill (2002) para una posición en contra a las enmiendas de Shorey. Gill traduce las líneas como lo que es, “si debe ser completamente, participa del ser en lo relativo a ser un ser y del no ser en lo relativo a ser un no-ser.”



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### *How the Separation Argument Frames the Method of Hypotheses*

Parmenides' third argument problematizing the young Socrates' theory of forms—the so-called separation argument—is presented in the text as the most devastating of his three arguments against young Socrates and his position. Many attempts have been made to overcome the double problem presented by the argument: that we humans have no knowledge of the forms and that the gods have no knowledge of us and of our affairs. In this paper I will argue that not only are such attempts doomed to failure, they are unnecessary and even unhelpful. Consequently, I will suggest a different tack. I will suggest that our *inability* to overcome the force of the separation argument is itself a key of sorts for unlocking Parmenides' method of hypotheses presented in the second half of the dialogue. That is, our attitude towards the hypotheses should not be to see them as a way of overcoming the problem of separation and so of holding on to a theory of forms of the sort that the young Socrates advocates, nor should it be to see the method as a sort of training for a future understanding of the forms. Rather, the separation argument is in some way decisive and we do not get knowledge of the forms in any straightforward sense. However, we do get something. It is exactly what Parmenides himself says we need from a theory of forms: somewhere to turn our thought. The method of the hypotheses, I will argue, is actually an example of how to *fail to grasp the forms well*. In this respect, although the forms are the entities to which we turn our thought, the method is actually a way of grasping not forms but sensible *imitations*. In short, an imitation fails to fully be a form; in failing to fully know the form *in the same way* as that in which the imitation fails to be the form, our knowledge comes to embody, and thereby comprehend, the imitation.

My argument for this way of interpreting the text will be threefold. The first and most significant fold will rest on the surprising agreement of Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides about the contradictory nature of sensible things; the second will focus on our understanding, albeit negative, of the separate forms; and the third will consider the significance of the unity of knowing and being asserted by the historical Parmenides.

It is a mistake, I suggest, that so little attention is paid to the fact that the three chief interlocutors of the *Parmenides* all agree that sensible things are contradictory—it is perhaps the foremost point of agreement among them. Indeed, the claim that sensible things are contradictory, a claim that comes up frequently in the dialogues, is generally interpreted away. I will suggest that an understanding of this claim is central to an understanding of the hypotheses. The claim is, in one sense, straightforward: sensible things are imitations; as such, they are not what they are; they are *not the same as themselves* and are therefore contradictory. This idea of sameness—and lack of sameness—will prove crucial to our understanding of the hypotheses if understood in this way, or so I will attempt to demonstrate. At any rate, if we do take seriously the point that sensible imitations are contradictory, along with the attendant claim that forms are not ever contradictory, we are indeed forced to re-imagine the function of the hypotheses. The argument can be stated simply: sensible things are contradictory and forms are not. The hypotheses end in and are full of explicit and acknowledged contradictions, both within each one and between each other. Therefore, the hypotheses are concerned with sensible things and not with forms.

The second fold of my argument for this interpretation concerns our understanding of the separate forms, or lack thereof. It is seldom acknowledged just how devastating a claim about our knowledge the claim that forms are separate actually is. The claim, if taken seriously, seems to me to necessitate that the very categories and methods of our thinking are not applicable to understanding form. This, I suggest, is what Parmenides—and Plato—have in mind in the separation argument. It entails even that our claim that forms are separate, a claim that applies a category appropriate to sensible things to the forms themselves, is problematic at best. What follows is that, although sensible things and human knowledge is separate from form, we still cannot hold, based on our human reasoning, that form is separate from us. The strangely one-sided separation that we get from this way of understanding Parmenides is itself a major factor to be considered in our interpreting the hypotheses.

The third fold of the argument is primarily textual and concerns the close connection between knowing and being assumed in my method of interpreting the hypotheses. This connection is justified not only by appealing to Platonic passages that emphasize the connection, such as the “famous likely” story passage of the *Timaeus* and the even more famous divided line passage of the *Republic*, it is also suggested by the figure of Parmenides himself. I have in mind of course the Parmenidean fragment that emphasizes the sameness of knowledge and being. It is this sameness that suggests an interpretation of the hypotheses whereby our knowledge comes to know sensible imitations by failing to know that which they are imitating in the same way in which they fail to embody it.

I will attempt to justify this method of interpreting the hypotheses by demonstrating how it handles certain specific contradictions from and between the first two hypotheses. I will be especially interested in the contradictions concerning sameness and difference.

### *Wie das Separationsargument die Voraussetzung für die Hypothesenmethode schafft*

Parmenides’ drittes Argument, welches des jungen Sokrates’ Ideenlehre problematisiert – das sogenannte Separationsargument – wird im Text als das verheerendste der drei Argumente gegen den jungen Sokrates und seine Position dargestellt. Zahlreiche Versuche sind unternommen worden, folgendes Doppelpuzzle zu überwinden: dass wir Menschen kein Wissen über die Ideen und, dass die Götter kein Wissen über uns und unsere Angelegenheiten haben.

In dieses Paper argumentiere ich, dass solche Versuche nicht nur zum Scheitern verurteilt, sondern unnötig und sogar irreführend sind. Ich werde einen alternativen Weg vorzeichnen. Mein Vorschlag lautet, dass unser Unvermögen, das Separationsargument in seiner Wucht zu überwinden, eine Art Schlüssel für Parmenides’ Hypothesenmethode im zweiten Teil des Dialoges darstellt. Unsere Disposition zu den Hypothesen sollte demnach nicht durch den Drang geprägt sein, mit ihr das Separationsproblem zu überwinden, und damit die Ideenlehre des jungen Sokrates zu erhalten, noch sollte die Methode als eine Art Training für ein zukünftiges Verstehen der Ideen angesehen werden. Das Separationsargument ist zentral und wir gewinnen kein unumwundenes Verständnis über die Ideen. Wir gewinnen aber doch etwas. Es ist genau, was Parmenides selbst als

das benennt, was wir von einer Ideenlehre brauchen: Einen Ort, auf den wir unsere Gedanken richten sollen.

Die Hypothesenmethode, so meine Leseart, zeigt exemplarisch unser Unvermögen, die Ideen vollständig zu begreifen. In dieser Hinsicht verhält es sich so, dass – obwohl die Ideen das sind, worauf wir unsere Gedanken richten sollen – die Methode nicht auf das Verständnis von Ideen zielt, sondern auf spürbare *Imitation*. In Kürze: Eine Imitation verfehlt es, eine Idee zu sein. Indem wir darin scheitern, direktes Wissen über die Ideen zu haben, und zwar *in der gleichen Weise* wie die Imitation daran scheitert, eine Idee zu sein, kann unser Wissen beginnen, die Imitation zu verkörpern – und damit zu verstehen.

Mein Argument wird dreiteilig sein. Erstens wird es um das überraschende Übereinkommen von Sokrates, Zenon und Parmenides bezüglich der widersprüchlichen Natur von sinnlichen Dingen gehen. Dann werde ich das negative Verstehen der separaten Ideen beleuchten. Zuletzt werde ich die Signifikanz der Einheit von Wissen und Sein des historischen Parmenides besprechen.

Es scheint mir ein Fehler, ausser Acht zu lassen, dass die drei Hauptfiguren des *Parmenides* sich alle darin einig sind, Sinnesdinge seien widersprüchlich – es scheint gerade der Hauptpunkt ihrer Einigkeit. Nichts desto trotz wird gerade dieser Punkt, nämlich, dass Sinnesdinge widersprüchlich sind, häufig weginterpretiert. Ich möchte anregen, dass ein Verstehen dieser Behauptung notwendig ist für das Verstehen der Hypothese. Die Behauptung ist gewissermassen einfach: Sinnesdinge sind Imitationen; als solche sind sie nicht *was sie sie sind*. Sie sind nicht mit sich selbst identisch, und also widersprüchlich. Diese Vorstellung von Gleichheit – und deren Abwesenheit – wird sich als zentral für unser Verständnis der Hypothese herausstellen. Wenn wir die Aussage, Sinnesdinge seien widersprüchlich, ernst nehmen, zusammen mit der Annahme, dass Ideen unmöglich widersprüchlich sein können, zwingen wir uns, die Funktion der Hypothese neu zu denken. Das Argument ist leicht formuliert; Sinnesdinge sind widersprüchlich und Ideen sind es nicht. Die Hypothesen münden in und sind voll mit expliziten und anerkannten Widersprüchen, und zwar in Bezug auf- und zwischen einander. Daraus ergibt sich, dass es in den Hypothesen um Sinnesdinge geht und nicht um Ideen.

Die zweite Falte meines Arguments für diese Interpretation kümmert sich um das Verständnis der separaten Idee oder deren Absenz. Selten wird anerkannt, wie verheerend eine solche Aussage über unser Wissen sei, dass Ideen in der Tat vollkommen abgetrennt sind.

Der Aussage, wird sie ernst genommen, scheint die Notwendigkeit innezuwohnen, dass die Kategorien und Methoden unseres Denken nicht auf das Verstehen von Ideen anwendbar sind. Dieser Punkt ist es, den Parmenides – und Plato – mit dem Separationsargument im Sinn haben. Dieser Punkt schliesst auch mit ein, dass die Behauptung, Ideen seien abgetrennt – eine Behauptung, die eine passende Kategorie für Sinnesdinge auf die Ideen selbst anwendet – bestenfalls problematisch ist. Daraus folgt, dass wir, obwohl Sinnesdinge und menschliches Wissen abgetrennt von den Ideen sind, basiert auf unseres menschliches Denkvermögen, nicht aufrechterhalten können, dass Ideen von uns abgetrennt sind. Die ungewöhnlich einseitige Trennung, die wir mit dieser von mir vorgeschlagenen Parmenides-Leseart erhalten, ist selbst ein Kernfaktor der Hypotheseninterpretation.

Die dritte Falte meines Arguments ist primär textueller Natur und dreht sich um die enge Verbindung von Wissen und Sein, welche in meine Interpretationsmethode eingeschrieben ist. Diese Verbindung ist nicht nur durch die platonischen Passagen, welche die Verbindung nahelegen, gerechtfertigt (wie zum Beispiel die berühmt-berüchtigte Passage im *Timaeus* und das

sogar noch bekanntere Liniengleichnis in der *Politeia*), sondern die Figur des Parmenides selbst suggeriert den Zusammenhang. Hier denke ich natürlich an die Stelle, in welcher die Gleichheit von Wissen und Sein nahegelegt wird. Es ist diese Gleichheit, die eine Hypotheseninterpretation suggeriert, worin unser Wissen sich Sinnesimitation vergegenwärtigt, indem es darin versagt, das zu erkennen, was sie imitieren – und zwar in der gleichen Weise, in der sie es auch nicht schaffen, es zu verkörpern.

Ich werde versuchen, diese vorgeschlagene Interpretationsmethode stark zu machen indem ich sie auf spezifische Kontradiktionen zwischen den ersten zwei Hypothesen anwende und ihre Bewährung aufzeige. Speziell interessieren wird mich dabei die Kontradiktionen bezüglich Gleichheit und Unterschied.

# Blyth Dougal

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## *Questionable Inferences in Parmenides Deductions 1 & 2 (to 144e)*

There is ongoing general disagreement about interpretation of the deductions in the second half of the *Parmenides*: some consider them dialectical exercises, others parody or refutation of individual earlier and contemporary views, and/or evocations of Platonic doctrines. I provide an analytical reading of the argument of the passage *Prm.* 137c-143c, with attention to the speaker Parmenides' assumptions, point by point, and his inferential choices in alternative treatments of the same topics. This includes the first, negative, deduction of implications for the one (*to hen*) of the first hypothesis (that there is one, or the one is one), and the first stages of the second, positive, deduction (as far as that the one itself is many). In both cases I am primarily interested in the assumptions and inferences concerning the relation between the one and being, in two specific respects.

Firstly I identify cases where the inferences Parmenides proposes are clearly dubious, and consider the implications of rejecting the assumptions required for them and of making alternative inferences. Secondly I evaluate the ontological status of the key philosophical terms in their dialectical contexts on the basis of their logical behaviour in Parmenides' inferences, and the status these terms would have under alternative possible inferences that reject Parmenides' often initially unspoken assumptions.

The latter concern relates specifically to whether in individual arguments the terms being, the one, sameness and difference, and motion and rest ought to be understood as referring to forms, particulars, the cosmic whole, or merely linguistic items, or must remain intentionally indeterminate. Thus I argue that by identifying non-stated alternative possible inferences as likely to be deliberately suggested to the reader (by the contradictions and absurdities that Parmenides' own inferences lead to), we can construct more or less consistent sensible alternative proposals for the status and relations of the key terms involved, which will help us make sense of Plato's purposes both in this dialogue and in the *Sophist's* treatment of the same terms. There are clear connections with the *Sophist* esp. 244c-246a, where again discussion is led by an Eleatic, there explicitly rejecting Parmenides' own account of being (*to on*), with some similar arguments, but also differences from *Prm.*, and no firm account of being; even the doctrine of the greatest kinds (*megista gene*) and their interweaving (254b-260b) remains unclear in many respects.

It seems that in *Prm.* 137c-143c many of the significant references to the one itself, being (*to on, ousia*) and the other key terms are in fact to nothing more than the meanings of these words, hypostasized temporarily as intelligible objects, to which the words are taken to refer. Plato seems in several places to indicate that the terms must be understood like this by the way Parmenides makes inferences either implicitly or explicitly from their linguistic characteristics (e.g. 139c4-6, d2-e2, 141e3-8, 142b8-c2, 143b3-6) and their location in human thought (143a7). This approach does not at all match the way forms are described in other Platonic dialogues.

One key passage occurs in the first stage of the second deduction. Here there seems to be one particularly distinctive inference that ought to be rejected. At this point the one that is has been split into two parts (its unity and its being), and each of these parts is again thought independently to involve two separate parts, producing by repeated application an infinity within the original one that is, by internal division. After the first division Parmenides claims that the part that was the unity (of the original one that is) now has its own being (142e4), and that these parts of a part can similarly then be divided. But an inappropriate model of spatial or material division has illegitimately insinuated itself into the account. The basis of the original division was just that the linguistic terms ‘one’ (*hen*) and ‘is’ (*esti*) have different meanings (142b7-c1), with the claimed implication that the one participates in something other, being (*ousia*, c5-7), and so (given this ongoing interpretation of participation in the dialogue) it has its own share of being. There are no grounds here for assuming that the intelligible objects (i.e., meanings of linguistic terms) putatively referred to as ‘the one’ and ‘its being’ are spatially extended. In fact the natural inference from Parmenides’ claim, that unity (‘the one’), which is a (logical) part of the one that is, requires its own being, is that this part only exists in relation to the already identified being from which the initial division logically separates it. In that case, the other (logical) part in the first division is its only proper being, not any other being now found within it, by a second division (like a rabbit pulled out of a magician’s hat!), after it had been separated from its own share of being.

The implication of this would be that, if there is a unique one that is (as the historical Parmenides claimed), it contains in an ontologically indissoluble unity its own being and unity. That then raises the question of the status of the distinct linguistic terms used to describe it as it appears in the second deduction, which include all the key terms, being, one, different, same, and even rest and motion, as well as others. Alternative answers might be (i) that these terms only have definite meaning in sentences, so that we cannot infer to the independent meaningfulness or existence of their separate objects apart from the use of the terms in connected discourse (perhaps a non-Platonic answer), or (ii) that they refer to significant eidetic elements of thought and language, but in their universality these *megista gene* are ontologically subordinate to the more content-rich moral and other such forms (thus e.g. Ambuel 2007 on the *Sophist*, ‘shadows of forms’), or else (iii) that these terms do in principle refer to primary forms, but that the one that is transcends these forms, taken individually and collectively as the intrinsic significances of its own names. In the latter case it could be inferred that language use and discursive cognition must in a particular sense think in ways that go beyond quasi-mathematical deductions from linguistic terms in order to recognise the truth about this ultimate subject matter. Otherwise it would seem (iv) that we would have to reject, on no reliable grounds in the text, the hypothesis that there is a primary one that is.

While it is not possible here to decide among these answers, the results of detailed analysis of the inferences in the first deduction and in the next argument in the second (for an external infinity of the one derived from numbers) will help to make the issues clearer.

### *Inferenze discutibili in Parmenide Deduzioni 1 e 2 (a 144e)*

C’è un disaccordo generale in corso sull’interpretazione delle deduzioni nella seconda metà *Parmenide*: alcuni considerano esercizi dialettici, altri parodistici o confutazioni di singole teorie

precedenti e contemporanee e / o evocazioni di dottrine platoniche. Fornisco una lettura analitica dell'argomento del passaggio *Prm.* 137c-143c, con attenzione alle supposizioni dell'interlocutore Parmenide, punto per punto, e le sue scelte inferenziali in trattamenti alternativi degli stessi argomenti. Ciò include la prima deduzione negativa delle implicazioni per l'uno (*to hen*) della prima ipotesi (che c'è uno, o l'uno è uno), e le prime fasi della seconda, positiva, deduzione (fino a che l'uno stesso è molti). In entrambi i casi sono principalmente interessato alle supposizioni e alle inferenze riguardanti la relazione tra l'uno e l'essere, in due specifici aspetti.

In primo luogo, identifico i casi in cui le inferenze che Parmenide propone sono chiaramente discutibili, e considero le implicazioni del rifiuto delle assunzioni richieste per loro e delle inferenze alternative. In secondo luogo, valuto lo stato ontologico dei termini filosofici chiave nei loro contesti dialettici sulla base del loro comportamento logico nelle inferenze di Parmenide, e lo stato che questi termini avrebbero in inferenze possibili alternative che respingono le assunzioni spesso non dette di Parmenide.

Quest'ultima preoccupazione riguarda specificamente se in singoli argomenti i termini l'essere, l'uno, l'identità e la differenza, e il movimento e il riposo dovrebbero essere intesi come riferiti a forme, particolari, l'intero cosmico, o semplicemente elementi linguistici, o devono rimanere intenzionalmente indeterminati. Quindi sostengo che identificando le possibili inferenze alternative non dichiarate che possono essere suggerite deliberatamente al lettore (dalle contraddizioni e dalle assurdità che le stesse inferenze di Parmenide conducono), possiamo costruire proposte alternative sensate più o meno coerenti per lo status e relazioni dei termini chiave coinvolti, che ci aiuteranno a dare un senso agli scopi di Platone sia in questo dialogo sia nel trattamento da parte di *Sofista* degli stessi termini. Ci sono chiari collegamenti con il *Sofista*, esp. 244c-246a, dove ancora una volta la discussione è guidata da un eleatico, che respinge esplicitamente la descrizione di Parmenide dell'essere (*to on*), con alcune argomentazioni simili, ma anche differenze da *Prm.*, e nessun conto fermo dell'essere; anche la dottrina dei più grandi generi (*megista gene*) e il loro intreccio (254b-260b) rimane poco chiara sotto molti aspetti.

Sembra che in *Prm.* 137c-143c molti dei riferimenti significativi all'uno stesso, l'essere (*to on, ousia*) e gli altri termini chiave sono in realtà nient'altro che i significati di queste parole, ipostatizzati temporaneamente come oggetti intelligibili, a cui le parole sono prese fare riferimento. Platone sembra in diversi punti indicare che i termini devono essere intesi in questo modo dal modo in cui Parmenide fa inferenze sia implicitamente che esplicitamente dalle loro caratteristiche linguistiche (ad esempio 139c4-6, d2-e2, 141e3-8, 142b8-c2, 143b3-6) e la loro posizione nel pensiero umano (143a7). Questo approccio non corrisponde affatto al modo in cui le forme sono descritte in altri dialoghi platonici.

Un passaggio chiave si trova nella prima fase della seconda deduzione. Qui sembra esserci una deduzione particolarmente distintiva che dovrebbe essere respinta. A questo punto, è stato diviso l'uno che è, in due parti (la sua unità e il suo essere), e si pensa che ambedue le queste parti di nuovo coinvolgano in modo indipendente due parti separate, producendo per applicazione ripetuta un infinito all'interno dell'originale uno che è, per divisione interna. Dopo la prima divisione Parmenide afferma che la parte che era l'unità (di quello originale uno che è) ora ha il suo essere (142e4), e che queste parti di una parte possono essere analogamente divise. Ma un modello inappropriato di divisione spaziale o materiale si è illegittimamente insinuato nel conto. La base della divisione originale era che i termini linguistici "uno" (*hen*) e "è" (*esti*) hanno significati diversi (142b7-c1), con la pretesa implicazione che l'uno partecipa a qualcosa di altro, l'essere (*ousia*, c5-7), e così (data questa interpretazione continua della partecipazione al dialogo) ha la sua parte



dell'essere. Non ci sono motivi per supporre che gli oggetti intelleggibili (cioè i significati dei termini linguistici) chiamati "l'uno" e "il suo essere" siano spazialmente estesi. Di fatto, l'inferenza naturale dalla pretesa di Parmenide, che l'unità ("l'uno"), che è una parte (logica) dell'uno che, richiede il proprio essere, è che questa parte esiste solo in relazione all'essere già identificato da cui la separa logicamente la divisione iniziale. In tal caso, l'altra parte (logica) della prima divisione è il suo unico essere proprio, non essendo nessun altro essere ora trovato al suo interno, da una seconda divisione (come un coniglio tirato fuori dal cappello di un mago!), dopo che era stato separato dalla sua stessa quota di essere.

L'implicazione di ciò sarebbe che, se c'è un tale uno unico (come sosteneva la storica Parmenide), esso contiene in un'unità ontologicamente indissolubile il proprio essere e l'unità. Ciò solleva quindi la questione dello stato dei termini linguistici distinti usati per descriverlo come appare nella seconda deduzione, che include tutti i termini chiave, l'essere, uno, diverso, stesso, e persino riposo e movimento, così come altri. Le risposte alternative potrebbero essere (1) che questi termini hanno solo un significato definito nelle frasi, in modo che non possiamo dedurre la significatività indipendente o l'esistenza dei loro oggetti separati a parte l'uso dei termini nel discorso connesso (forse una risposta non-platonica), o (2) che si riferiscono a significativi elementi eidetici del pensiero e del linguaggio, ma nella loro universalità questi *megista gene* sono ontologicamente subordinati alle forme morali di contenuto più ricco e ad altre forme simili (secondo Ambuel 2007 sul *Sofista*, "ombre di forme"), oppure (3) che questi termini si riferiscono in linea di principio a forme primarie, ma che l'uno che è trascende queste forme, prese individualmente e collettivamente come i significati intrinseci dei propri nomi. In quest'ultimo caso si potrebbe dedurre che l'uso del linguaggio e la cognizione discorsiva debbano in un certo senso pensare in modi che vanno oltre le deduzioni quasi-matematiche dai termini linguistici per riconoscere la verità su questo argomento ultimo. Altrimenti sembrerebbe (4) che dovremmo respingere, senza motivi attendibili nel testo, l'ipotesi che esista un tale uno che è primario.

Mentre non è possibile qui decidere tra queste risposte, i risultati dell'analisi dettagliata delle inferenze nella prima deduzione e nell'argomento successivo nella seconda (per un infinito esterno dell'uno, derivato dai numeri) aiuteranno a risolvere i problemi più chiari.

## Bossi Beatriz

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### *How can the objection about independent existence against knowability be solved through mental gymnastics? (Parmenides, 133b-135b)*

According to the objector, the main reason for someone to reject that the Forms are αὐτὰ καθ'αὐτὰ is that, if they were so, they could not be known (133b4-6). However, Parmenides does not regard the difficulty as insurmountable, but as one that requires an expert 'willing to follow a long remote proof' (133 b 4-c1; 135a7-b2). Then, it would be an error to believe that due to their being αὐτὰ καθ'αὐτὰ, the Forms must be unknowable<sup>1</sup>.

In this paper I shall attempt to defend the view that the expression αὐτὰ καθ'αὐτὰ in the sense of 'ontologically self-subsistent' should not be understood as 'radically separated' from 'the things among us' or from our intellects (*pace* Hermann<sup>2</sup>) though this view might sound strange, as we are used to take it so in Aristotle's writings<sup>3</sup>. Naturally, one suspects that Aristotle could be hidden behind the mask of the objector, in spite of being only seventeen at the time the dialogue is dated. (However, one cannot tackle the irresolvable question of the chronological possibility of Aristotle's having moved Plato to write about this here). \_

Parmenides claims that 'anyone who posits that there is, for each thing, some being itself by itself, (*auten kath' auten*) would agree in the first place that none of them is in us' (133c3-5). Thus, it seems that the Forms, being independent, cannot be 'located' in us. Socrates agrees and Parmenides argues:

"Then those Forms that are what they are in relation to one another<sup>4</sup>, have their being in relation to themselves, and not in relation to the things that are among us (οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅσαι τῶν ἰδεῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν αἱ εἰσιν, αὐταὶ πρὸς αὐτὰς τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν) - whether one posits them as likenesses or in some other way- (εἴτε ὁμοιώματα εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ τις αὐτὰ τίθεται) participating of which<sup>5</sup>, we attribute to each entity a name (ὧν ἡμεῖς μετέχοντες<sup>6</sup> εἶναι ἕκαστα ἐπονομαζόμεθα). But the ones among us, even though having the same names as those ones, are what they are in relation to one another (τὰ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ταῦτα ὁμώνυμα ὄντα ἐκείνοις αὐτὰ αὖ πρὸς αὐτὰ

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1 See Dorter (1994) 39-40; Mitchell (1986).

2 Hermann (2010) 19.

3 Fine (2003, 254) observes that 'Aristotle argues that Plato moves from the claim 'that forms are substances to the conclusion that they are separate'. But Plato, she argues, 'does not link substantiality and separation in the way required by Aristotle's argument'.

4 In light of the *Sophist* all the Forms are relative to others, though not all of them have reciprocal relations or admit contrary Forms.

5 Most interpreters assume that ὧν refers to the Forms (antecedent: αὐταὶ). Thus, that we 'participate' in the forms means that we 'know' them, and due to this 'participation', we name things after them (Brisson, 1999, 104; Fronterotta, 1998, 76). Others take the relative ὧν as referring to the likenesses (Peterson, 1981).

6 Cornford (1969) 96 claims that *metechein* with genitive means 'to have as our share' and 'to possess', so he translates: 'which we possess and so come to be called by their several names'. Allen (1983) translates: 'of which we participate and are in each case named after them'. On the other hand, Casertano (1996) and Ferrari (2016) translate ἐπονομαζόμεθα with an active meaning.

ἔστιν), but not in relation to the Forms (ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ εἶδη); and it is in relation to one another and not to those ones, that they are named that way (καὶ ἑαυτῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων ὅσα αὖ ὀνομάζεται οὕτως) (133 c 8-d 5).

I will attempt to defend the view that there is no need to choose between the 'separation' or 'divorce' interpretation of this passage (Cherniss, 1962, 283-4; Fujisawa, 1974, 30-34; Wiengartner, 1973, 185-6) and the non-separation view (Peterson, 1981, 14; Lindsay, 2011, 196-7) because there is evidence for both perspectives. The premises for ontological separation imply the hypothesis of the Forms, which, though formally 'unknowable', must be 'knowable somehow' in order that Parmenides could defend homonymy between two *different* levels.

Parmenides introduces the Socratic hypothesis about 'participation' to reject it on the ground of ontological defining inter-relations on absolute separate levels, *on equal footing*. Admitting likenesses, however, allowed him to claim homonymy. As homonymy is not enough proof for eponymy, he can consistently defend separation and unknowability, which is explained as follows: 'If one of us is master or slave of anyone, he is not the slave of Mastery itself, of what a master is (...) On the contrary, being a man, he is a master or a slave of a man. Mastery itself is Mastery of Slavery itself (...) neither the ones in us have power in relation to them nor they in relation to us (οὐ τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα τὴν δύναμιν ἔχει οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἡμᾶς) (133d7-134a1).

However, the argument is fallacious because if the Forms were *completely* unknowable, *strictu sensu* 'likenesses' would not be justified, and then not even homonymy could be claimed. On the contrary, the soul should have some δύναμις in relation to the Forms in order to posit homonymy.

Which takes us to think that Parmenides' teaching looks 'mildly ambiguous' inasmuch as the Forms are *still* posited, while they turn out to be 'mysteriously known' to be 'unknowable'. Parmenides seems to use his rhetoric skills to show Socrates the 'weaknesses' of his hypothesis<sup>1</sup> but Socrates does not realize about the fallacy of the argument or the need of claiming that Forms and things are *not* ontologically alike. The argument does not prove either that the Forms '*only* relate among themselves' or how 'the things among us' can be known without relating to the Forms: knowing 'Mastery itself', i.e. 'what a master is' is essential to call someone 'a master'. Without them, we could not even get to know the reciprocal relationships of the things among us.

Though the question of whether the second part of the dialogue really provides clues to 'solve' the *aporiai* is controversial, I will attempt to show how the mental gymnastics is essential to distinguish 'in relation to itself' from 'in relation to others' and so, to admit that though the forms are ἀντὰ καθ'ἀντὰ, they can be 'in us' 'somehow', namely, not 'in themselves', but 'in relation to us'. If this is so, there is no symmetry.<sup>2</sup> Ontological independence does not entail epistemological impossibility. On the contrary, Plato will have to justify why his epistemology entails the ontological independence of the Forms.

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1 See Miller (1986, 59-65) in this respect.

2 In this sense I hope to develop Meinwald's thesis (1991, 159-163) on the relation between the 'greatest difficulty' and the second part of the dialogue, further.

## ¿Cómo podría la objeción acerca de la incognoscibilidad de las Formas resolverse con la ayuda de la ‘gimnasia’ mental? (Parménides, 133b-135b)

De acuerdo con el objector, la razón principal para rechazar que las Formas sean *αὐτὰ καθ'αὐτὰ* es que, si así lo fueran, no podrían ser conocidas (133b4-6). Sin embargo, Parménides no considera que esta dificultad sea insalvable, sino que requiere un experto dispuesto a seguir un largo y remoto proceso de prueba (133 b 4-c1; 135a7-b2). Por tanto, sería un error creer que, debido a que las Formas son *αὐτὰ καθ'αὐτὰ*, deben ser necesariamente incognoscibles<sup>1</sup>.

En este trabajo intentaré defender la tesis de que la expresión *αὐτὰ καθ'αὐτὰ* en el sentido de ‘ontológicamente auto-subsistente’ no debería entenderse como ‘radicalmente separada’ de ‘las cosas entre nosotros’ o de nuestros intelectos (*pace* Hermann<sup>2</sup>), aunque esta perspectiva pueda sonar extraña debido al hecho de que estamos acostumbrados a entenderlas como sinónimas en los escritos de Aristóteles<sup>3</sup>. Naturalmente, uno sospecha que Aristóteles podría estar escondido tras la máscara del objector, a pesar de que contaba solamente con 17 años en el momento en que el diálogo se dio a conocer. Sin embargo, no podemos asegurar que Aristóteles haya sido el móvil que impulsara a Platón a escribir el diálogo.

Parménides sostiene que ‘cualquiera que suponga que para cada cosa hay algún ente por sí mismo (*auten kath' auten*) estará de acuerdo, en primer lugar, en que ninguno de ellos está en nosotros’ (133c3-5). De modo que, al parecer, las Formas, siendo independientes, no pueden estar ‘localizadas’ en nosotros. Sócrates asiente y Parménides argumenta:

“Luego aquellas Formas que son lo que son en relaciones recíprocas<sup>4</sup>, tienen su ser/esencia en relación consigo mismas, y no en relación con las cosas que son entre nosotros (*οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅσαι τῶν ἰδεῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν αἱ εἰσιν, αὐταὶ πρὸς αὐτὰς τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν*) – sea que uno las suponga como semejanzas o de algún otro modo- (*εἴτε ὁμοιώματα εἴτε ὅπη δὴ τις αὐτὰ τίθεται*) participando de de las cuales<sup>5</sup>, atribuimos a cada cosa un nombre (*ὧν ἡμεῖς μετέχοντες*<sup>6</sup>

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1 Dorter (1994) 39-40; Mitchell (1986).

2 Hermann (2010) 19.

3 Fine (2003, 254) observa: ‘Aristotle argues that Plato moves from the claim ‘that forms are substances to the conclusion that they are separate’. Pero Platón, ella argumenta: ‘does not link substantiality and separation in the way required by Aristotle’s argument’.

4 A la luz del *Sofista* todas las Formas son relativas a otras, aunque no todas son recíprocas ni admiten Formas contrarias.

5 La mayor parte de los intérpretes suponen que *ὧν* se refiere a las Formas (antecedente: *αὐταὶ*). Así, que nosotros ‘participamos’ en las Formas significa que ‘las conocemos’ y nombramos las cosas siguiendo sus nombres (Brisson, 1999, 104; Fronterotta, 1998, 76). Otros autores toman el relativo *ὧν* como refiriéndose a las ‘semejanzas’ (Peterson, 1981).

6 Cornford (1969) 96 afirma que *metechein* con genitivo significa ‘to have as our share’ y ‘to possess’, por lo que traduce: ‘which we possess and so come to be called by their several names’. Allen (1983) traduce: ‘of which we participate and are in each case named after them’. Casertano (1996) y Ferrari (2016) traducen *ἐπνομαζόμεθα* con un significado activo.

εἶναι ἕκαστα ἐπονομαζόμεθα). Pero las cosas entre nosotros, aunque tengan los mismos nombres que aquellas, son lo que son are en relación unas con otras (τὰ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ταῦτα ὁμώνυμα ὄντα ἐκείνοις αὐτὰ αὖ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐστίν), pero no en relación con las Formas (ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ εἶδη); y es en relación con ellas mismas y no con aquellas que son así llamadas (καὶ ἑαυτῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων ὅσα αὖ ὀνομάζεται οὕτως) (133 c 8-d 5).

Con relación a este pasaje, existen dos interpretaciones opuestas: la 'separatista' (Cherniss, 1962, 283-4; Fujisawa, 1974, 30-34; Wiengartner, 1973, 185-6) y la 'no separatista' (Peterson, 1981,14; Lindsay, 2011, 196-7). Intentaré defender la tesis de que no es necesario elegir entre una de las dos, ya que el pasaje ofrece evidencia en favor de ambas perspectivas. En efecto, las premisas a favor de una separación ontológica absoluta implican la hipótesis de las Formas, las cuales, aunque sean formalmente 'incognoscibles', deben ser 'conocidas de algún modo' para que Parménides pueda defender la homonimia entre *dos* niveles diferentes.

Parménides introduce la hipótesis socrática de la participación para refutarla sobre la base de que, en cada uno de los niveles, son las relaciones internas a cada nivel las que definen ontológicamente los miembros de su nivel, *en igualdad de condiciones*. Sin embargo, al admitir 'semejanzas', Parménides puede establecer una relación de homonimia. Pero como la homonimia no es prueba de eponimia, él puede, aparentemente, sostener a la vez la separación y la incognoscibilidad. Lo cual es explicado del siguiente modo: si uno de nosotros es amo de otro, no lo es de la Esclavitud misma, ni, si es esclavo, no lo es del Señorío mismo, de aquello en lo que consiste ser amo, sino que, siendo hombre, es amo o esclavo de un hombre. Y análogamente, el Señorío mismo lo es de la Esclavitud misma y vice versa. Ni las cosas entre nosotros tienen poder sobre las Formas, ni aquellas sobre nosotros (οὐ τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα τὴν δύναμιν ἔχει οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἡμᾶς) (133d7-134a1).

Y sin embargo, el alma debe tener alguna δύναμις con relación a las Formas para suponer la homonimia. El argumento es falaz porque si las Formas fuesen completamente incognoscibles, *strictu sensu* las 'semejanzas' no estarían justificadas, ni tampoco podría afirmarse la hominimia.

El método de enseñanza de Parménides resulta deliberadamente ambiguo, ya que las Formas son supuestas de todos modos, aunque sean misteriosamente conocidas como incognoscibles. Parménides usa sus habilidades retóricas para mostrar a Sócrates la debilidad de su hipótesis<sup>1</sup>. Pero Sócrates no se da cuenta de que debería rechazar la idea de que Formas y cosas no son semejantes en su status ontológico. El argumento no prueba que las Formas '*solamente* se relacionan entre ellas' ni cómo 'las cosas entre nosotros' pueden ser conocidas sin relación con las Formas: saber lo que es la Esclavitud misma, i.e. 'aquello en lo que consiste ser esclavo' es esencial para poder estar en condiciones de llamar a alguien 'esclavo'. Sin Formas no podríamos ni siquiera llegar a conocer las relaciones recíprocas de las cosas entre nosotros.

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1 Véase Miller (1986, 59-65).

Aunque la cuestión de si la segunda parte del diálogo realmente provee claves para resolver las *aporiai* es controvertida, intentaré mostrar cómo la ‘gimnasia’ propuesta por Parménides, en cuanto ejercicio en la diferencia entre *pros heauto* y *pros ta alla*, será clave en la resolución de la cuestión, a fin de poder admitir y comprender cómo, aunque las Formas sean *αὐτὰ καθ’αὐτὰ*, están en nosotros, no ‘en sí mismas’<sup>2</sup>, sino en su relación ‘con otros’, sea como ‘semejanzas’, copias o de algún otro modo. Si esto es así, no hay necesidad de simetría. La independencia ontológica no implica imposibilidad epistemológica. Platón tendrá que justificar por qué su epistemología implica la necesidad de la independencia ontológica de las Formas.

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<sup>2</sup> En este sentido espero llevar la tesis de Meinwald (1991, 159-163) acerca de la relación entre ‘la más grande dificultad’ y los desarrollos de la segunda parte del diálogo, hacia un desarrollo ulterior.

### *“Antisthenes, Aristotle, and the “participation” in the “Ideas as thoughts” hypothesis (Parm. 132b-c): an historical approach”*

Using a historical approach, I aim to understand Socrates’ “Ideas as thoughts” hypothesis and the second objection raised against it by Parmenides. In particular, I aim to understand how the hypothesis and the objection deploy “participation”. Here we have both texts (*Parmenides* 132b3-c11):

[Hypothesis] “But, Parmenides, said Socrates, perhaps it may be that each of these forms is a thought, and it would not be proper for it to come to be anywhere else but in souls.”

[...]

[2<sup>nd</sup> Objection] “And what, then? said Parmenides. Is it not necessary, from the way you say the other things participate in the forms, that it seems to you that either each is made of thoughts and everything thinks, or, although thoughts, they are without thought?”

I will try address three issues: i) what does the hypothesis mean? ii) could this hypothesis be an allusion to some historic doctrine? and iii) how could Aristotle improve our understanding of the role of *participation* in the second objection?

Firstly, it is necessary to pay attention to the reason Socrates gives for his hypothesis. He presents it hesitantly, as an abrupt and desperate shot of someone who does not want his theory of Ideas to be refuted (Brisson, 1994). Socrates tell us that he suggested it because, being a thought, perhaps the Form “would be one indeed and would no longer be affected by what we were just referring to” (132b6). What was “just referred to” are Parmenides’ criticisms of Ideas, known as “Dilemma of Participation”, “Third Man”, etc. (Allen, 1997; Brisson). They posed the problems of the *inner unity* or *simplicity* and the *unicity* of the Form (El Mur, 2005).

Despite some notable ambiguity in the use of the term “*noéma*” in the text – it can mean both the act of thinking and the product of this act (Proclus, *Comment.*) -, Socrates tries to defend his postulation of Ideas from these criticisms. That is, Socrates seems to understand that if the relation of the Form to the sensible instances were like the relation of the thought to the objects of thought, the Form could relate to multiple things without losing its own *unity* and *unicity*. About this ambiguity, Brisson thinks that Parmenides’ following argument, which distinguishes the act of thinking from its content, shows that the meaning by which Socrates’ hypothesis was understood in the dialogue was that of the Forms being products of thinking.

Therefore, notwithstanding the ambiguity in the use of key terms such as *noéma*, *hén e éinai*, (Brochard, 1926; Cornford, 1939; Ryle, 1939), the dialogue itself allow us to give a “conceptualist” sense to Socrates’ hypothesis (Cherniss, 1932; Taylor, 1968; Ferrari, 2004; *pace* Bossi, 2005). Nonetheless the *Parmenides* does not provide a clear and complete account of this hypothesis. This gap gave room for Dümmler (1889) and Zeller (1892) to point out that the “Forms as thoughts” doctrine belonged to Antisthenes, and this view is lively defended by Brancacci (1990). Antisthenes even wrote a dialogue (“*Sátbon*”, an insulting corruption of the name “*Pláton*”) defending, against Platonic primacy of the *Idea or quality itself* (*he poiótes*), the primacy of the individual concrete thing, i.e., that *which is characterized by the quality* (*tò poión*). This is testified by Simplicius, who also informs us that:

“Antisthenes agrees that he sees the *horse* (*híppon*) even if he does not admit to seeing *horseness* (*hippóteta*); the former is seen by our eyes, the latter is comprehended by our reason (*tôi logismói*); the latter is prior by its rank as a cause, the former is posterior in that it is a *result* (*hos apotélesma*).”

(in Arist. Cat. 8B25; David, in Porph. Isagog.).

Then the “horseness” and the other Ideas would “only” exist as “mere notions of thoughts” (*psilàs monàs ennoías*), as “empty words without any corresponding reality” (*diakénos legoménas kat’oudemiàs hypostáseos*) (Simplicius, *ibidem*; Tzetzes, *Chiliades*, VII). Ammonius (*in Porph. Isagog.*) adds that for Antisthenes the ideas (*eíde*) have no objective reality, but, just like notions such as “hypocentaur”, they exist only as mere mental products, results of thinking activity (*tà dè en psiláís epinoiáís hypárchei*). Thus many points allow us to affirm that this is the doctrine to which the *Parmenides* alludes, when Socrates suggests that the Form “comes to be” (*eggígnesthai*) in souls (*en psycháís*) as thought (*noéma*) (Brancacci; *contra*, Graeser, 2003). I will try to assess this reading, and ask whether it is possible to harmonize the aim of Socrates’ hypothesis with Antisthenes’ doctrine.

However, Parmenides’ second objection to “the Forms as thoughts” hypothesis can hardly be explained within this doctrine, because it does not consider “participation” to be real. Scolnicov (2003) states that understanding that objection requires a “distinction, within the Form, of properties that are participated in from those that are not”, but adds that “such a distinction we do not have”. On this matter, I should say that, though we may not have the distinction in a sufficiently clear way in the *corpus platonicum*, we do have it elsewhere. In *Topics* 137b3-13, Aristotle establishes a clear distinction between two kinds of properties: properties that the Form has by the *general fact* of being an intelligible Form (say, “*properties qua Form*”), and properties that the Form has by the *specific fact* of being the individual Form that it is (say, “*specific properties*”).

One important feature is that it restricts the scope of participation: the only properties of the Form that would be shared by its sensible instances are the “*specific properties*” (Cherniss, 1944; Owen, 1968; Keyt, 1969; Vlastos, 1972; and maybe *Sophist* 255e3-7). Thus by sharing in the Idea of Beautiful a statue is *beautiful* but not *imperishable* (*Phaedo* 100b5-c8; *Parmenides* 130e4-131a3). And by sharing in the Idea of Shuttle that device is a *shuttle* but not *immaterial* (*Cratylus*, 389b1-



c2). Because if some of the “properties *qua* Form” were shared in, e.g. imperishability and immateriality, our world would be composed of instances which would be sensible and, at the same time, imperishable and immaterial – a total absurdity (Keyt, 1971; Shields, 2011). However it seems that exactly this kind of absurdity is what Parmenides is stating. Since Socrates postulated a predicate that would be common to all Forms (“to be thought”), it would be a “property *qua* Form”. And according to the rule above, it could in no way be shared by the sensible instances. But Parmenides, in his objection, affirms exactly the *contrary*.

So I will defend the view, in the context of the Platonic metaphysics, on one hand, that second objection can not be seen as “valid” (Cherniss, 1944; Vlastos, 1972; *pace* Helmig, 2007). But on other hand, I will try to show that for Plato the unacceptability of this objection *does not* demonstrate the legitimacy of “Ideas as thoughts” hypothesis, but that it simply points to other dialogical or extra-dialogical purposes.

« *Antisthène, Aristote, et la “participation” dans l’hypothèse des “Idées comme pensées” (Parm. 132b-c) : une approche historique* »

Mon objectif est de comprendre, à travers une approche historique, l’hypothèse des “Idées comme pensées” développée par Socrate et la seconde objection émise par Parménide contre celle-ci, principalement le rôle de la « participation » dans le passage. Voici le texte (*Parménide* 132b3-c11):

[Hypothèse] “A moins, Parménide, aurait objecté Socrate, que chacune de ces formes soit une pensée, et qu’elle ne doive se produire nulle part ailleurs que dans les âmes.”

[...]

[Seconde objection] “ Et donc, ensuite? dit Parménide. Il n’est pas nécessaire, selon les modalités dont vous dites que les autres sujets participent dans les formes, qu’il vous semble que chacune d’elle est faite de pensées et que tout pense, ou bien que pensées, elles soient sans pensée?”

J’essaierai d’atteindre cet objectif en répondant à trois questions : 1) que signifie cette hypothèse ? 2) est ce que cette hypothèse était une allusion à une doctrine historique ? 3) comment Aristote a-t-il pu améliorer notre compréhension du rôle de la *participation* dans la seconde objection ?

Tout d’abord, il est nécessaire de porter attention à la raison que Socrate donne à son hypothèse. Il la présente avec hésitation, dans une tirade désespérée et assez abrupte, de la part d’une personne qui ne souhaite pas voir réfuter son postulat des Idées (Brisson, 1994). Et il a dit l’avoir suggéré parce que, étant une pensée, il était possible que la Forme «serait une en fait, et ne serait plus affectée par ce à quoi nous venions juste de nous référer » (132b6). A propos de ce à quoi nous venons juste « de nous référer », dans les pages précédentes Parménide avait levé apories importantes contre le postulat des Idées, comme le « Dilemme de la Participation », le « Troisième Homme », etc. (Allen, 1997; Brisson). Elles posaient les problèmes de *l’unité intrinsèque* ou *simplicité* et de *l’unicité* de la Forme (El Mur, 2005).

Bien qu'il existe des ambiguïtés notables dans l'utilisation du terme "*noéma*" dans le texte – il peut signifier aussi bien l'acte de pensée que le produit de cet acte (Proclus, *Comment.*)-, Socrate essaie de « défendre » son postulat des Idées face à ces apories. Cela signifie que Socrate semble comprendre que si la relation de la Forme avec les instances sensibles était comme une des relations entre la pensée avec les choses pensées, la Forme pouvait être reliée à de multiples sujets sans la perte de sa propre *unité* ou *unicité*. A propos de l'ambiguïté, Brisson pense que l'argumentation suivante de Parménide, qui différencie l'acte de penser de son contenu, montre que la signification par laquelle l'hypothèse de Socrate a été comprise dans le dialogue, était que les Formes sont des produits de la pensée.

Ainsi, nonobstant l'ambiguïté dans l'utilisation de mots-clés comme *noéma*, *bén* et *eínai*, (Brochard, 1926; Cornford, 1939; Ryle, 1939), le dialogue en lui-même nous permet de donner un sens « conceptualiste » à l'hypothèse de Socrate (Cherniss, 1932; Taylor, 1968; Ferrari, 2004; *pace* Bossi, 2005). Toutefois, le *Parménide* ne propose pas une définition claire et plus complète de cette hypothèse. Ce manque a permis à Dümmler (1889) et Zeller (1892) de suggérer que la doctrine des "Formes-pensées" est celle d'Antisthène, et cette vue est vivement défendue par Brancacci (1990). Antisthène a même écrit un dialogue ("*Sátbon*", une corruption insultante de "*Pláton*") qui défend, contre la primauté platonicienne de *l'Idée ou qualité en elle-même (he poiótes)* la primauté du sujet concret individuel, c'est-à-dire *ce qui est caractérisé* par la qualité (*tò poión*). Cela est témoigné par Simplicius, qui informe aussi que :

“Antisthène est d'accord qu'il voit le *cheval (híppon)* même s'il n'admet pas voir la *chevalité (hippóteta)*, le premier est vu par nos yeux, le second est compris par notre raison (*tôi logismôi*), le second est prioritaire par son rang comme une cause, le second lui est postérieur par ce en quoi il est un *résultat (bos apotélesma)*.”

(*in Arist. Cat.* 8B25; David, *in Porph. Isagog.*).

Alors, la « chevalité » et les autres Idées existeraient « seulement » comme de « simples notions de pensées » (*psilàs monàs ennoías*), comme des « mots vides auxquelles ne correspondent aucune réalité » (*diakénos legoménas kat'oudemiàs hypostáseos*) (Simplicius, *ibidem*; Tzetzes, *Chiliades*, VII). Ammonium (*in Porph. Isagog.*) ajoute que pour Antisthène les Idées (*eíde*) n'ont pas de réalité objective, mais, de la même façon que la notion d'« hypocentaur », elles existent seulement comme de simples produits mentaux, des résultats de l'activité de pensée (*tà dè en psilaís epinoíais hypárchei*). De nombreux points permettent d'affirmer que ceci est la doctrine à laquelle le dialogue de Parménide fait allusion, quand Socrate suggère la Forme « venir à être » (*eggígnesthai*) dans les âmes (*en psychaís*) comme pensée (*noéma*) (Brancacci; *contra*, Graeser, 2003). J'essaierai d'évaluer ceci, et si cela est possible d'harmoniser le but de l'hypothèse de Socrate avec la doctrine d'Antisthène.

Néanmoins, la seconde objection de Parménide peut difficilement être expliquée à l'intérieur de cette doctrine, parce qu'elle ne considère pas la « participation » comme réelle. Scolnicov (2003) établit que la compréhension de cette objection requiert une "distinction, au sein de la Forme, des propriétés qui sont partagées de celles qui ne sont pas", mais ajoute que « nous n'avons pas une telle distinction ». À ce propos j'ajouterai que, bien que nous ne trouvons

possiblement pas une telle distinction suffisamment claire dans le *corpus platonicum*, nous pouvons la trouver ailleurs. Dans les *Topics* 137b3-13, Aristote établit une distinction claire entre deux sortes de propriétés: les propriétés que la Forme a par le *fait général* d'être une Forme intelligible (dites, « propriétés qua Formes ») et les propriétés que la Forme a par le *fait spécifique* d'être la Forme individuelle qu'elle est (dites, « propriétés spécifiques »).

Une importance notable dans cette distinction est l'utilité de penser à une règle de « fonctionnement » de la participation : obligatoirement les seules propriétés de la Forme qui pourraient être partagées par les instances sensibles sont les « propriétés spécifiques » (Cherniss, 1944; Owen, 1968; Keyt, 1969; Vlastos, 1972 ; et peut-être *Sophiste* 255e3-7). Ainsi, en raison du partage de l'Idée du Beau, une statue est *belle* mais non *impérissable* (*Phédon* 100b5-c8; *Parménide* 130e4-131a3). De la même façon, en partageant de l'Idée de Navette, cet appareil est une *navette* mais n'est pas *immatériel*. Car si certaines des « propriétés qua Forme » étaient partagées, par exemple l'impérissabilité et l'immatérialité, notre monde serait composé d'instances qui seraient sensibles, et à la fois impérissables et immatérielles – une absurdité totale (Keyt, 1971; Fronterotta, 2001; Shields, 2011). Cependant, il semble que c'est exactement ce type d'absurdité que Parménide établit. Depuis que Socrate a postulé un prédicat qui serait commun à toutes les Formes (« être pensées »), cela serait une « propriété qua Forme ». Et selon la règle ci-avant, cela ne pourrait en aucune façon être partagée avec les instances sensibles. Mais Parménide, dans son objection, affirme justement le *contraire*.

Alors je défendrai la interprétation, dans le contexte de la métaphysique platonicienne, que d'un côté la seconde objection ne peut pas être vue comme « valide » (Cherniss, 1944; Vlastos, 1972; *pace* Helmig, 2007). De l'autre côté, j'essaierai de montrer que pour Platon l'inacceptabilité de cette objection *ne représente toutefois pas* la légitimation de l'hypothèse des « Idées comme pensées », mais ne peut que pointer vers des objectifs dialogiques ou extradialogiques d'un autre type.

## Bremond Mathilde

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### *Gorgias's dialectic in Plato's Parmenides*

The process that Plato develops in the second part of the *Parmenides* has been an object of wonder and interrogations: its aporetic structure and its shortcomings in terms of distinctions and definitions do not resemble the standard Platonic dialectic. Some critics have tried to understand this strangeness by referring to some source of inspiration: in particular, Luc Brisson explains the archaic aspects of the argumentation through the fact that Plato would take over the Eleatics. This could be expected since Parmenides is the main protagonist of the dialog and Plato claims to be inspired by Zeno's method for the "gymnastic" he develops in the second part. My aim is, however, to reveal an important but unmentioned source of Plato, i.e. Gorgias in his treatise *On Not-Being*. In my talk, I will first exploit some textual parallels, already noticed by critics like Jaap Mansfeld and John Palmer, in order to show that Plato has indeed Gorgias's treatise in mind when writing the *Parmenides*. I will secondly go further by showing that Plato's method and approach in the second part of the *Parmenides* is much more similar to Gorgias's than to Zeno's. Finally, I will make more general considerations on the "gymnastic" of the *Parmenides* and present some problematic issues that arise from its comparison with other treatises, in particular the *Sophist* and the *Republic*.

I will first focus on two remarkable parallels between Plato's *Parmenides*, in particular the first hypothesis, and Gorgias's *On Not-Being*. I will stress that the three theses supported by Gorgias in his treatise, i.e. that there is nothing, that there is no knowledge and that there is no communication possible, regularly appear in the *Parmenides*, most notably in conclusion of the first hypothesis (141e-142a). Moreover, Plato takes over the argument of Gorgias proving that being is nowhere in 138a-b (to be compared with Sextus Empiricus's summary of *On Not-Being* in *Adversus Mathematicos* VII.69–70). These parallels allow me to claim that Plato is using Gorgias in the *Parmenides*, not as an adversary, but as a source of inspiration for his demonstration in the second part.

Secondly, I will show that Plato's exercise in the second part of the *Parmenides* is inspired by Gorgias. Plato claims in 135d-136a that he will follow Zeno's method, i.e. make deductions from a hypothesis. This reasoning, as in the case of Zeno, leads to contradictions, and therefore creates paradoxes. Gorgias's method is very similar to Zeno's (it is most likely inspired by it): while Zeno shows that if there are many things, they are both alike and unlike, which is impossible (*Parmenides* 127e), Gorgias argues that if being is, it is neither one nor many and neither eternal nor generated, which is also impossible. However, Plato changes Zeno's method inasmuch as he applies it not to only one hypothesis but to every possible hypothesis on a topic. In this regard, he is closer to Gorgias, who also examines and refutes opposite hypotheses: that there is not-being and that there is being, that being is one and many... This difference is not anecdotal, but it changes completely the aim of the paradoxes: while Zeno's used them as a *reductio ad absurdum* to demonstrate the opposite thesis, i.e. that being is one (at least according to Plato's *Parmenides* 128a-b), both Gorgias and Plato show that every hypothesis leads to contradictions, and none of them is proved satisfactory. Gorgias draws an explicit conclusion from this demonstration, i.e. that nothing exists; I think that rather than defending nihilism, Gorgias tries to

show that the Eleatic ontology (and ontology in general) necessarily leads to contradictions and should therefore be abandoned. Even though Plato does not present a conclusion to his long reasoning in the second part of the *Parmenides*, I make the hypothesis that it would be similar to the one of Gorgias: not that ontology as such is impossible, but that the Eleatic kind of ontology is doomed to fail, and should be replaced by another kind of ontology, i.e. the one that Plato develops in the *Sophist*.

I will end this presentation by considering some issues on the exercise proposed in the *Parmenides*, especially when compared with the claims in other works of Plato. For Plato says that this exercise is useful for a young person (as Socrates is) and necessary for studying the ideas (135c-d). This method, which leads to show that the one is one thing and its contrary at the same time, is, however, as previously shown, similar to the one of Gorgias, and is indeed described as sophistic in the *Sophist* (259d). Plato rejects it strongly in this work and even claims in the *Republic* (539b-c) that such an approach is harmful for the youth, which tends to make a game of contradicting and turn sceptical. There seems therefore to be a conflict between the method of the *Parmenides* and the prescriptions of the *Sophist* and the *Republic*. My aim will not be to solve this difficulty but only to develop it. I will examine the hypothesis that a sophistic phase of refutation and doubt could be necessary for the dialectical process of building an ontology, by using some passages of the *Republic*. Finally, I will confront two possible conceptions of the sophistic apories developed by Gorgias: either, according to Plato, they are superficial and misleading, as many passages of the *Sophist* and the *Republic* seem to indicate; or they can be used to reject a first naïve conception, like the Eleatic one, before building a new ontology, as it is the case, according to me, in the *Parmenides*. The difference between Gorgias's apories and Plato's lies then not in their method or content, but in the aim from which they are used: according to Plato, the sophists make contradictions for the childish pleasure of refuting, while he uses them to put theses to a test, which is the job of the dialectician.

### *La dialectique de Gorgias dans le Parménide de Platon*

Le procédé développé par Platon dans la deuxième partie du *Parménide* a suscité étonnement et questions : sa structure aporétique et ses manquements en matière de distinctions et de définitions ne ressemblent pas à la dialectique platonicienne habituelle. Certains critiques ont essayé de comprendre cette étrangeté en renvoyant à une source d'inspiration : en particulier, Luc Brisson explique les aspects archaïques de l'argumentation par le fait que Platon reprenne les Éléates. Ce pourrait être attendu étant donné que Parménide est le principal protagoniste du dialogue et que Platon affirme s'inspirer de la méthode de Zénon pour la « gymnastique » qu'il développe dans la deuxième partie. Mon but est toutefois de révéler une source importante mais que Platon ne mentionne pas, à savoir Gorgias dans son traité *Sur le Non-être*. Dans ma présentation, je tirerai d'abord parti de parallèles textuels, déjà remarqués par des critiques comme Jaap Mansfeld et John Palmer, afin de montrer que Platon avait bien le traité de Gorgias à l'esprit lors de sa rédaction du *Parménide*. Je poursuivrai en montrant que la méthode et la démarche de Platon dans la seconde partie du *Parménide* est bien plus similaire à celle de Gorgias qu'à celle de Zénon. Enfin, je présenterai des remarques plus générales sur la « gymnastique » du *Parménide* et

exposerai quelques points problématiques qui émergent de sa comparaison avec d'autres traités, en particulier le *Sophiste* et la *République*.

Je me concentrerai tout d'abord sur deux parallèles remarquables entre le *Parménide* de Platon, en particulier la première hypothèse, et *Sur le Non-être* de Gorgias. Je soulignerai que les trois thèses soutenues par Gorgias dans son traité, à savoir qu'il n'y a rien, qu'il n'y a pas de connaissance et qu'il n'y a pas de communication possibles, apparaissent à plusieurs reprises dans le *Parménide*, notamment en conclusion de la première hypothèse (141e-142a). De plus, Platon reprend l'argument de Gorgias qui prouve que l'être n'est nulle part en 138a-b (à comparer avec le résumé de *Sur le Non-être* par Sextus Empiricus en *Adversus Mathematicos* VII.69-70). Ces parallèles me permettent d'affirmer que Platon utilise Gorgias dans le *Parménide*, non comme adversaire, mais comme source d'inspiration pour sa démonstration dans la deuxième partie.

Deuxièmement, je montrerai que l'exercice platonicien de la deuxième partie du *Parménide* est inspiré par Gorgias. Platon affirme en 135d-136a qu'il suivra la méthode de Zénon, c'est-à-dire qu'il fera des déductions à partir d'une hypothèse. Ce raisonnement, comme dans le cas de Zénon, aboutit à des contradictions, et crée donc des paradoxes. La méthode de Gorgias est très semblable à celle de Zénon (il s'en est probablement inspiré) : tandis que Zénon montre que s'il y a plusieurs êtres, ils sont à la fois semblables et dissemblables, ce qui est impossible, Gorgias soutient que si l'être est, il n'est ni un ni multiple et ni éternel ni engendré, ce qui est aussi impossible. Cependant, Platon modifie la méthode de Zénon en ce qu'il l'applique non plus à une seule hypothèse, mais à toutes les hypothèses possibles sur un sujet. De ce point de vue, il se rapproche de Gorgias, qui lui aussi examine et réfute des hypothèses opposées : que le non-être est et que l'être est, que l'être est un et multiple... Cette différence n'est pas anecdotique mais change complètement le but des paradoxes : alors que Zénon les utilisait comme *reductio ad absurdum* pour démontrer la thèse opposée, à savoir que l'être est un (du moins selon Platon *Parménide* 128a-b), à la fois Gorgias et Platon montrent que chaque hypothèse aboutit à des contradictions, et qu'aucune d'entre elles ne se montre satisfaisante. Gorgias tire une conclusion explicite de cette démonstration, à savoir que rien n'existe ; je pense que plutôt que de soutenir un nihilisme, Gorgias essaye de montrer que l'ontologie éléate (et l'ontologie en général) mène nécessairement à des contradictions et doit par conséquent être abandonnée. Bien que Platon ne présente pas de conclusion de son long raisonnement de la deuxième partie du *Parménide*, je fais l'hypothèse qu'elle serait semblable à celle de Gorgias : non que l'ontologie en tant que telle est impossible, mais que l'ontologie à la manière éléate est destinée à échouer, et devrait être remplacée par un autre type d'ontologie, celle que Platon développe dans le *Sophiste*.

J'achèverai cet exposé en prenant en considération quelques problèmes concernant l'exercice proposé dans le *Parménide*, en particulier si on le compare avec les propos d'autres œuvres de Platon. En effet, ce dernier affirme que cet exercice est utile pour un jeune homme comme Socrate et nécessaire pour étudier les idées (135c-d). Cette méthode, qui aboutit à montrer que l'un est une chose et son contraire en même temps, est cependant, comme montré précédemment, semblable à celle de Gorgias et est de fait décrite comme sophistique dans le *Sophiste* (259d). Platon la rejette clairement dans cet ouvrage et affirme même dans la *République* (539b-c) qu'une telle démarche est nuisible à la jeunesse, qui est encline à contredire pour s'amuser et à devenir sceptique. Il semble donc qu'il y ait un conflit entre la méthode du *Parménide* et les prescriptions du *Sophiste* et de la *République*. Mon but ne sera pas de résoudre cette difficulté mais seulement de la développer. J'examinerai l'hypothèse que la phase sophistique de réfutation et de doute soit nécessaire au processus dialectique de construction d'une ontologie, en m'appuyant sur

des passages de la *République*. Enfin, je mettrai en opposition deux conceptions possibles des apories sophistiques développées par Gorgias : soit, pour Platon, elles sont superflues et trompeuses, comme de nombreux passages du *Sophiste* et de la *République* le laissent entendre ; ou elles peuvent être utilisées pour rejeter une première conception naïve, comme celles des Éléates, avant de construire une nouvelle ontologie, comme c'est le cas, selon moi, dans le *Parménide*. La différence entre les apories de Gorgias et de Platon ne tient alors pas à leur méthode ou à leur contenu, mais au but dans lequel elles sont utilisées : selon Platon, les sophistes développent des contradictions par plaisir puéril de la réfutation, tandis qu'il les utilise pour tester des thèses, ce qui est la tâche du dialecticien.

## *Dialectic in the Parmenides*

The *Parmenides* is Plato's most enigmatic dialogue and, as a consequence, no general agreement has been reached in relation to its philosophical contents and the methodological character of the deductions which constitute the main theme of its second part. In my view this enigmatic character, which has to do, first of all, with Plato's theory of ideas and the unresolved objections presented in this dialogue against this doctrine as stated in the middle dialogues, is closely related to the no less enigmatic nature of Plato's concept of dialectic. My proposal will focus on dialectic, but it is impossible to avoid the analysis of the ontological implications of the eight hypotheses (with the appendix), besides those epistemological hints given in the discussion that cannot be neglected in order to evaluate the soundness and even the seriousness of the logic exhibited in Parmenides' performance.

I am completely convinced that the dialogue is a real puzzle in the sense that what occasionally seems a defensible philosophical thesis is often contaminated by fallacies (even recognized by Cornford, 1939) or by a dubious logic and ambiguities. This inevitably convinces me that the necessity of interpreting the dialogue not only considering what Parmenides says about the method of hypotheses and its practice in the second part, which is my main purpose, but also taking into account the context in which it is inserted. Many clues in this sense can be given by two different sorts of elements. First of all, we have to consider Parmenides's practice in the light of those dialogues closely related to this work and examine its continuity with the concept of dialectic sustained in works as the *Phaedo*, the *Republic* and the *Theaetetus*. But we also have to consider, from an ontological point of view, the doctrines that are to be found in the *Sophist* and the *Philebus*, because we can detect in these works very important philosophical elements which are also present in those hypotheses of the *Parmenides* (cfr. C.Kahn, 2013, p.18-46) whose conclusions seem to me quite acceptable. In the second place, Plato speaks of dialectic in the *Parmenides*, as well as in the *Theaetetus*, as a *pragmateia* (136c6; cfr. *Tht.* 161e4-6) and it is very probable that the *Topics* (cfr.101a26), despite the differences between Plato and Aristotle's concept of dialectic (F.Solmsen, J.Moreau, 1968), can provide us many useful indications of a practice that in this last work has been codified and can exhibit clear and defined rules. It is not necessary to sustain, as G.Ryle (1968, p.77), that "the second part of the *Parmenides* was composed for the pedagogic benefit of Aristotle's pupils" to admit the similarities and parallels that can be found between the *Topics* and the *Parmenides* (as E.Berti has showed in several papers which deal specifically with "Aristotle and Plato's dialectical method in the *Parmenides*", 1980; cfr. 1992, 2002). The differences between these two philosophers in relation to dialectic cannot be denied (*pace* Berti), but in my view have been exaggerated. I would like to recall that if Aristotle speaks in the *Topics* of three different uses of dialectic, Plato also makes reference in the *Republic* to different "species" (εἶδη, or "divisions" in Shorey's translation) and "ways" (ὁδοί, 532e1) of dialectic that Socrates does not want to explain in this work. The continuity of the *Republic* with the *Parmenides* is evident, as Plato himself indicates when he mentions Glaucon, Adeimantus and Cephalus at the very beginning of this dialogue. The similarities of vocabulary between the *Republic* (διὰ πάντων



ἐλέγχων διεξιῶν, 534c1-2), the *Parmenides* (ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν σχεῖν, 136e1-3) and the *Topics* (πρὸς ἀμφοτέρα διαπορήσαι... τὰληθές τε καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος, 101a35-36) are very clear in relation to the mutual implications of dialectic, conceived as a gymnastic intellectual exercise, the paths for finding out the truth in philosophical discussions and the refutation of the hypotheses proposed.

In my interpretation of the methodological part of the *Parmenides*, I would pay special attention to two different aspects of this question, for in my opinion the enigmatic character of the *Parmenides* depends on the special intertwining of gymnastics and truth. In this methodological part, the three key terms are training, contradictory hypotheses and truth (or intelligence). On the relation between training and truth, these two aspects, that I would like to emphasize for a fruitful interpretation of the hypotheses, are manifested by what Plato considers an unavoidable element of *planē* (“ranging” in Cornford and Allen translations, 136e2) in these preparatory exercises. This means that what has been called the gymnastic interpretation of the dialogue (R. Robinson, 1953, p.223 f.) must allow a certain amount of wandering and error. In this sense, it seems incredible to sustain that contradictions are “merely apparent” and that “we can accept all the arguments and their conclusions” (C.Meinewald, 1991, e.g., p.23). But the other aspect of this question is truth and it would seem also incredible to offer such an exhibition of arguments and deductions without any sound philosophical doctrine or any good methodological indications on how a theoretical discussion has to be implemented. Nevertheless, this was the thesis sustained by R.Robinson, who affirmed that “the *Parmenides* contains no statement of doctrine, either directly or indirectly” and “no statement of method” (1953, p. 223 f.).

The contradictory character of the eight hypotheses cannot be an accidental circumstance in the design of the dialogue, where all the possibilities are to be present and dialectically examined, for the truth of one of these implies the falsehood of the other. *Parmenides* recommends Socrates to examine the consequences “not only if each thing is hypothesized to be, but also if that same thing is hypothesized not to be” (Allen trans., 135e9-136a2). This double formulation of the hypotheses, prescribed for an exhaustive training, is necessary if the method must permit us “to meet with truth and gain intelligence” (136e2-3) and, as a consequence, from the eight hypotheses considered four must be acceptable (2 with appendix, 3, 5, 7) and true and the other four (1, 4, 6, 8) unacceptable and false. It would be pretentious to sustain that this is an easy and clear summary of the dialogue, given the amount of scholarship that has offered so many different solutions. Nevertheless, after analysing each hypothesis, a task that naturally cannot be even intended in a mere proposal of my paper, the doctrine should be a positive one able to square the relation of the deductions with the First Part of the *Parmenides* and with what we know of Plato’s ontology in dialogues such as the *Sophist* and the *Philebus*. In this sense, I agree with M.L.Gill (e.g., 2014, p.517) and many others who sustain that the deductions show that forms must partake of other forms and that the one is both one and many. But I would also like to highlight the epistemological language referred to the conclusions reached within each hypothesis as an internal testimony of their validity or unacceptability. Terms like *epistēmē* and *doxa* (and others as *onoma*, *logos* and *aisthēsis*) are explicitly used (cfr. 142a3, 155d6, 160d5-8, 164b1, 165a2, 166a4-7, 166b1-3...) to confirm that the conclusions reached in the different hypotheses are to be accepted or denied.

## *La dialéctica en el Parménides*

El *Parménides* es el diálogo más enigmático de Platón por lo que no es extraño que no se haya alcanzado ningún acuerdo general en relación con sus contenidos filosóficos ni con la metodología de las deducciones que constituyen el tema principal de la segunda parte. En mi opinión, este carácter enigmático, que tiene que ver, en primer lugar, con la teoría platónica de las formas y las objeciones no resueltas que se presentan en la obra contra esta doctrina tal y como se formula en los diálogos del periodo medio, está estrechamente relacionado con la naturaleza no menos enigmática del concepto platónico de dialéctica. Mi propuesta se centrará en la dialéctica, pero es imposible evitar el análisis de las implicaciones ontológicas de las ocho hipótesis (con el apéndice), además de las indicaciones epistemológicas ofrecidas en la discusión, que no pueden ser minusvaloradas para evaluar la validez e incluso la seriedad de la lógica exhibida en la actuación de Parménides.

Estoy completamente convencido de que el diálogo es un auténtico rompecabezas en el sentido de que lo que ocasionalmente parece una tesis filosófica defendible está a menudo contaminada por falacias (incluso reconocidas por Cornford, 1939) o por ambigüedades y una lógica dudosa. Esto me convence inevitablemente también de la necesidad de interpretar el diálogo considerando no solo lo que Parménides dice sobre el método de las hipótesis y su práctica en la segunda parte, que constituye mi propósito fundamental, sino teniendo en cuenta igualmente el contexto en el que se inserta. Muchas indicaciones pueden venir en este sentido de dos tipos diferentes de factores. En primer lugar, debemos considerar la práctica de Parménides a la luz de aquellos diálogos estrechamente relacionados con esta obra y examinar la continuidad con el concepto de dialéctica defendido en obras como el *Fedón*, la *República* y el *Teeteto*. Pero también debemos considerar desde un punto de vista ontológico las doctrinas que encontraremos en el *Sofista* y el *Filebo*, ya que podemos detectar en estas obras elementos filosóficos muy importantes que también están presentes en las hipótesis del *Parménides* (cfr. C.Kahn, 2013, p.18-46) cuyas conclusiones me parecen bastante aceptables. En segundo lugar, Platón habla de la dialéctica tanto en el *Parménides* como en el *Teeteto* como una *pragmateía* (136c6; cfr. *Teet.* 161e4-6) y es muy probable que los *Tópicos* (cfr.101a26), a pesar de las diferencias existentes entre el concepto de dialéctica de Platón y el de Aristóteles (F.Solmsen, J.Moreau, 1968), puedan proporcionarnos claves muy útiles de una práctica que ha sido codificada en esta obra y que en ella puede registrar reglas claras y definidas. No es necesario sostener, como G.Ryle (1968, p.77) que “la segunda parte del *Parménides* fue compuesta para el beneficio pedagógico de los discípulos de Aristóteles”, para admitir las similitudes y paralelos que pueden hallarse entre los *Tópicos* y el *Parménides* (como E.Berti ha mostrado en diversos trabajos que abordan específicamente la cuestión de “Aristóteles y el método dialéctico en el *Parménides*”, 1980; cfr. 1992, 2002). Las diferencias entre estos dos filósofos en este punto no pueden ser negadas (*pace* Berti), pero han sido exageradas por la crítica. Me gustaría recordar que, si Aristóteles habla en los *Tópicos* de tres diferentes usos de la dialéctica, Platón también hace referencia en la *República* a diferentes “especies” (εἶδη) y “camino” (ὁδοί, 532e1) de la dialéctica que Sócrates no desea explicar en esta obra. La continuidad de la *República* con el *Parménides* es evidente, como el mismo Platón nos indica con su mención de Céfalo, Glaucón y Adimanto en los comienzos mismos del diálogo. Las similitudes de vocabulario entre la *República* (διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων διεξιῶν, 534c1-2), el *Parménides* (ἀνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν σχεῖν, 136e1-3) y los *Tópicos* (πρὸς ἀμφοτέρω διαπορήσαι...τὰληθές τε καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος, 101a35-36) son muy claras en relación con las

implicaciones mutuas de la dialéctica, considerada como una gimnástica intelectual, los caminos para hallar la verdad en las discusiones filosóficas y la refutación de las hipótesis propuestas.

En mi interpretación de la parte metodológica del *Parménides*, prestaría especial atención a dos aspectos diferentes de la cuestión, pues en mi opinión el carácter enigmático del *Parménides* depende del entrelazamiento particular que se da entre la gimnasia y la verdad. En esta parte metodológica, los tres términos clave son el entrenamiento, las hipótesis contradictorias y la verdad (o la inteligencia). Respecto a la relación entre el entrenamiento y la verdad, estos dos aspectos, que me gustaría subrayar para una interpretación fructífera de las hipótesis, se manifiestan en lo que Platón considera un elemento inevitable de *planē* (“ranging” en las traducciones de Cornford y Allen, 136e2), presente en estos ejercicios preparatorios. Esto significa que lo que se ha llamado una interpretación gimnástica del diálogo (R. Robinson, 1953, p.223 ss.) debe permitir una cierta dosis de extravío y error. En este sentido, parece increíble sostener que las contradicciones puedan ser “meramente aparentes” y que “podamos aceptar todos los argumentos y sus conclusiones” (C. Meinwald, 1991, p. 21). Pero el otro aspecto de la cuestión es la verdad y parecería igualmente increíble ofrecer tal exhibición de argumentos y deducciones sin una doctrina filosófica válida ni indicaciones metodológicas sobre cómo debe llevarse a cabo una discusión teórica. Sin embargo, esta fue la tesis sostenida por R. Robinson, que afirmó que “el *Parménides* no contiene ninguna declaración doctrinal, directa ni indirectamente” y tampoco ninguna “declaración acerca del método” (1953, p.223 s.).

El carácter contradictorio de las ocho hipótesis no puede ser una circunstancia accidental en el diseño del diálogo, en el que todas las posibilidades tienen que estar presentes y ser dialécticamente analizadas, pues la verdad de una de estas implica la falsedad de la otra. Parménides recomienda a Sócrates examinar las consecuencias de suponer tanto que una cosa es como que no es (cfr. 135e9-136a2). Esta doble formulación de la hipótesis es necesaria si el método debe permitirnos “hallar la verdad y adquirir inteligencia” (136e2-3), por lo que, en consecuencia, de las ocho hipótesis consideradas cuatro deben ser aceptables (2 con apéndice, 3, 5, 7) y verdaderas, y las otras cuatro inaceptables y falsas. Sería pretencioso sostener que este pueda ser un fácil y claro resumen del diálogo, dada la cantidad ingente de explicaciones divergentes ofrecida por los especialistas. Sin embargo, después de analizar cada hipótesis, una tarea que naturalmente no puede ser ni siquiera intentada en esta mera propuesta, la doctrina resultante debería ser positiva y capaz de cuadrar la relación de las deducciones con la Primera Parte del *Parménides* y con lo que sabemos de la ontología platónica en diálogos como el *Sofista* y el *Filebo*. En este sentido, estaría de acuerdo con M.L. Gill (p.e., 2014, p.517) y otros muchos, que sostienen que las deducciones muestran que las formas deben participar de otras formas y que el uno debe ser a la vez uno y múltiple. Pero también me gustaría subrayar el lenguaje epistemológico referido a las conclusiones alcanzadas dentro de cada hipótesis como un testimonio interno de su validez o inaceptabilidad. Términos como *epistēmē* y *dóxa* (y otros como *ónoma*, *lógos*, *aísthēsis*) son explícitamente utilizados (cfr. 142a3, 155d6, 160d5-8, 164b1, 165a2, 166a4-7, 166b1-3...) para confirmar que las conclusiones alcanzadas en las diferentes hipótesis deben ser aceptadas o negadas.

### *The Eleatic gymnasia*

In this paper, I discuss the classical problem about the valence of the exercise recommended by Parmenides to Socrates. In *Parm.* 135b5-137c3 we find the bridge between the first and the second part of the dialogue, which establishes the educational valence of the method displayed in the second part as an answer to Socrates' *aporia* in the first part. In these lines, Parmenides said that Socrates should be trained in the method that would make him able to "define the beautiful, the just, the good, and all other ideas", which is dialectic as the method of the hypotheses.

But why does dialectics is also depicted as a mere exercise (*γυμνασία*) of babbling (*ἄδολεσχία*)? Why should it be beneficial for the young? Is its function just propedeutic, or does it possess an epistemic valence? These questions are not just contextual to the *Parmenides*. These questions are problematic if we read them taking the *Republic* as the main framework for acquiring Plato's view about the best educative method. Notably, in the *Republic* (books 6 and 7) dialectics is identified as the higher method for getting to know the first principles. Should we maybe think that Plato has just changed his mind? Or that the dialectic depicted in the *Republic* is the "real" method, and the one displayed in the *Parmenides* is just an inconclusive exercise?

In order to reply to this issue, I will first discuss the classical answer, assessing Proclus' account on it (J. Dillon, *Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Parmenides*, translated by G. R. Morrow and J. Dillon, Introduction and Notes by J. Dillon, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1987). For the Neoplatonic philosopher, there are no contradictions with the *Republic* because this *γυμνασία* is not a mere exercise, but it is the method for triggering the desire for knowledge, exploring the different paths that can lead to it. For Proclus this is only one of the aspects of the platonic educative system and thus it should be understood within this wider context, without contradictions. Then, Proclus argued that the employment of the word *adoleschia* depends by Socrates' ironic way for labelling his method. This is not unusual and we find this depiction in the *Phaedo* 70b, the *Theaet.* 195b and the *Sophist* 219b-225d too. But, most importantly, this is not how Parmenides would define the method, but how it is called by the many. Lastly, Proclus argued that this exercise is not depicted as beneficial to the youth in general (and thus against *Resp VII*, 537e-539d), but it is prescribed to a very special young only, i.e. Socrates. Thus, the Parmenides' prescription to Socrates, says Proclus, is not in contradiction with the pedagogical instructions of the *Republic*.

I agree with Proclus about the fact that this *γυμνασία* is not a mere exercise, since the intellectual *γυμνασία* is preparatory for the recognition of truth, and thus it has a fundamental epistemic valence, the one of triggering the motivation for philosophical inquiry. As Proclus has rightly underlined, also in the *Republic* dialectic is described as *γυμνασία* (526b6) and thus *γυμνασία* does not mean "mere exercise". Then, we may conjecture that employing the word *ἄδολεσχία* Plato is referring to the criticism toward Socrates as a babbling sophist (*Pol.* 299b3-c6), criticism that Plato here wants to avoid providing the Eleatic method of hypotheses as the best training for Socrates.

However, I disagree with Proclus in thinking that there is no contrast with the *Republic*. I argue that this incompatibility lies in the real difference between the methods. What in the *Parmenides* is called dialectic is not what it is in the *Republic*. Therefore, my main argument says that what is depicted in the *Parmenides* is a very novel method that is grounded in the Eleatic philosophy and for showing this I will provide a conceptual analysis of the method depicted in the second part of the *Parmenides*, also discussing the most established interpretations about it (J. L. Ackrill, "ΣΥΜΠΛΑΟΚΗ ΕΙΔΩΝ" (1955), in *Akrill, Essays on Plato and Aristotle*, Clarendon Press, 1997, 72-79; M. L. Gill, *Philosophos: Plato's Missing Dialogue*, Oxford University Press, 2012; M. M. McCabe, "Unity in the *Parmenides*: The Unity of the *Parmenides*," in *Form and Argument in Late Plato*, ed. C. Gill and M. M. McCabe, Clarendon Press, 1996; S. Rickless, *Plato's Forms in Transition: A Reading of the *Parmenides**, Cambridge University Press, 2007; E. Sanday, *A Study of Dialectic in Plato's *Parmenides**, Northwestern University Press, 2015).

My main claim is that the methods are different not only regarding their epistemic goals - being unveiling the truth for the dialectic of the *Republic*, and the assessment of truth for the *Parmenides* (as Zeno said in *Parm.* 136e1-4) - but also regarding how the method of hypotheses is employed. In the *Republic* dialectic runs back from a hypothesis to the unhypothetical first principle, whether in the *Parmenides* it analyses the consequences that derive from a couple of opposite hypotheses. Dialectics in the *Parmenides* is dilemmatic (S. Scolnicov, "The condition of Knowledge in Plato's *Parmenides*", in Ales Havlicek, Filip Karfik (eds.), *Plato's Parmenides. Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Platonicum Pragense*, OYKOYMENH, Praga 2005, pp. 165-180) and thus in consonance with the Parmenedean ontology which is grounded in the principle of opposition between being and not-being. Finally, the dialectics exemplified in the second part of the *Parmenides* appears to be Eleatic, not "Platonic" - if for "Platonic" we maintain the definition of dialectic as provided in the *Republic*.

### *La gymnasia eleatica*

In questo saggio discuto il problema classico della valenza dell'esercizio raccomandato da Parmenide a Socrate. In *Parm.* 135b5-137c3 viene stabilito il ponte tra la prima e la seconda parte del dialogo, collegamento che sancisce la valenza educativa del metodo esemplificato nella seconda parte come risposta all'aporia di Socrate nella prima parte. In queste righe, Parmenide raccomanda a Socrate l'addestramento in quel metodo che lo renderebbe capace di "definire l'idea del bello, del giusto, del buono e di tutte le altre", ovvero la dialettica come metodo ipotetico.

Ma perché la dialettica è qui definita anche come un mero esercizio (γυμνασία) e una chiacchiera inutile senza senso (ἀδολεσχία)? Perché dovrebbe essere di beneficio ai giovani? La sua funzione è solo propedeutica a uno studio serio o possiede anche una valenza epistemica? Queste domande non sono solo contestuali al *Parmenide*, ma esprimono un problema specialmente se considerate in riferimento alla *Repubblica* dove la dialettica è riconosciuta come il miglior metodo educativo. In particolare nei libri 6 e 7 della *Repubblica*, la dialettica è intesa come il metodo più elevato per raggiungere la conoscenza dei primi principi. Dovremmo forse pensare che Platone abbia semplicemente cambiato idea? O che la dialettica come presentata nella *Repubblica* è il metodo "vero", e quella invece esercitata nel *Parmenide* è solo un esercizio inconcludente?

Per rispondere a questo problema, esaminerò innanzitutto la risposta classica, analizzando la prospettiva di Proclo (J. Dillon, *Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Parmenides*,

translated by G. R. Morrow and J. Dillon, Introduction and Notes by J. Dillon, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1987). Per il filosofo neoplatonico, la prospettiva espressa nel *Parmenide* non è in contraddizione con quella della *Repubblica* perché la γυμνασία non è un semplice esercizio, ma è il metodo utilizzato per innescare il desiderio della conoscenza attraverso l'esplorazione dei diversi percorsi che possono portare a essa. Per Proclo, però, questo esercizio è solo uno degli aspetti del sistema educativo platonico e quindi deve essere compreso all'interno di questo contesto più ampio, senza contraddizioni. Inoltre Proclo sosteneva che l'impiego della parola ἀδολεσχία avesse una valenza ironica. Questo utilizzo non è insolito, basti vedere il suo impiego in *Phaed.* 70b, *Theaet.* 195b e *Soph.* 219b-225d. Ma, soprattutto, Proclo sottolinea che questo non è il modo in cui Parmenide definisce il metodo, ma come viene chiamato dai molti. Infine, il filosofo neoplatonico sosteneva che questo esercizio non è descritto come benefico per i giovani in generale (e quindi contro *Resp.* VII, 537e-539d), ma è prescritto solo a un giovane molto speciale, cioè Socrate. Quindi, la prescrizione di Parmenide a Socrate, afferma Proclo, non è in contraddizione con le istruzioni pedagogiche della *Repubblica*.

Sono d'accordo con Proclo sul fatto che questa γυμνασία non sia un mero esercizio, dal momento che la γυμνασία intellettuale è preparatoria per il riconoscimento della verità, e quindi ha una valenza epistemica fondamentale, quella di innescare la motivazione per l'indagine filosofica. Come ha giustamente sottolineato Proclo, anche nella *Repubblica* la dialettica è descritta come γυμνασία (526b6) e quindi γυμνασία non significa "mero esercizio". Possiamo inoltre ipotizzare che attraverso l'uso della parola ἀδολεσχία Platone si riferisca ironicamente alla critica nei confronti di Socrate considerato un sofista che parla a vuoto (*Pol.* 299b3-c6), critica alla quale Platone qui risponde attraverso il metodo ipotetico prescritto a Socrate.

Non sono invece d'accordo con Proclo nel ritenere che non ci sia contrasto con la *Repubblica*. Ciò che nel *Parmenide* è chiamato dialettica non è quanto viene proposto nella *Repubblica* come miglior metodo filosofico. Sostengo pertanto che la dialettica esemplificata nella seconda parte del *Parmenide* è un metodo nuovo che si basa sulla filosofia eleatica. Per argomentare in favore di questa tesi fornisco un'analisi concettuale del metodo illustrato nella seconda parte del *Parmenide*, discutendo alcune delle principali interpretazioni al riguardo (J. L. Ackrill, "ΣΥΜΠΛΗΘΗ ΕΙΔΩΝ" (1955), in *Akrill, Essays on Plato and Aristotle*, Clarendon Press, 1997, 72-79; M. L. Gill, *Philosophos: Plato's Missing Dialogue*, Oxford University Press, 2012; M. M. McCabe, "Unity in the Parmenides: The Unity of the Parmenides," in *Form and Argument in Late Plato*, ed. C. Gill and M. M. McCabe, Clarendon Press, 1996; S. Rickless, *Plato's Forms in Transition: A Reading of the Parmenides*, Cambridge University Press, 2007; E. Sanday, *A Study of Dialectic in Plato's Parmenides*, Northwestern University Press, 2015).

Sostengo che i metodi sono diversi non solo per quanto riguarda i loro obiettivi epistemici - lo svelamento della verità nella *Repubblica* e la valutazione del valore di verità delle ipotesi assunte nel *Parmenide* (come sostenuto da Zenone in *Parm.* 136e1-4) - ma anche riguardo al funzionamento del metodo ipotetico. Nella dialettica della *Repubblica* si percorre una via a ritroso che conduce dall'ipotesi al primo principio non ipotetico, mentre nel *Parmenide* vengono analizzate le conseguenze che derivano dall'assunzione di ipotesi, intese come coppie di opposti. La dialettica del *Parmenide* è dilemmatica (S. Scolnicov, "The condition of Knowledge in Plato's *Parmenides*", in Ales Havlicek, Filip Karfik (eds.), *Plato's Parmenides. Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Platonicum Pragense*, OYKOYMENH, Praga 2005, pp. 165-180) e quindi in consonanza con l'ontologia parmenidea che si fonda sul principio di opposizione tra essere e non

essere. Concludo perciò sostenendo che la dialettica esemplificata nella seconda parte del *Parmenide* è una dialettica eleatica, non "platonica" - se per "platonico" manteniamo la definizione di dialettica fornita dalla *Repubblica*.

## Carpenter Amber

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### *Separation Anxieties. Parmenides 133a-135c*

There are manifold problems with postulating εἶδη ὄντα αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά, says Parmenides; but the greatest [μέγιστον] among them is that such beings will be unknowable (by us, as it turns out).

Why is *this* the problem that really worries Parmenides? What is he anxious about?

What is it about *auta kath'auta* that generates the difficulty? And what would it take to dispel it?

At first it seems that Parmenides' worry outstrips the difficulty of the puzzle. The elaboration of this greatest difficulty comprises the assertion of basic principles; a 'test case' ('master' and 'slave'); and an application to the case of real interest ('knowledge' and 'knowables'). But the crucial flaw is already conspicuous in the initial principles set out, and the application to the test case does nothing to ameliorate it. If we can identify this misstep, we should be able to dispel the larger problem about knowledge.

Forms, Socrates agrees are not 'in us' (ἐν ἡμῖν, 133c5), for being in us would violate their being *auta kath'auta*. From this, Parmenides concludes that "all of τῶν ἰδεῶν are what they are in relation to one another, and have their being in relation to themselves, not in relation to us" (133c9-10). So far, so familiar: Forms do not depend upon sensible particulars for their being. However, Parmenides then goes on to apply the same stricture to sensible particulars: "These things that belong in us... are in their turn what they are in relation to themselves but not in relation to the forms" (133d3-4). But whatever 'have being with respect to' or 'being in relation to' mean – and we will need to examine this more closely – the very notion that forms and particulars are on a par in this respect *has* to be mistaken. Particular sensible things were meant to be *unlike* forms in exactly this respect: they are not self-sufficient, they are not *auta kath'auta*, while forms are. In fact, the only reason we might have been motivated to posit some such *auta kath'auta* is because we recognised that more familiar bits of reality did *not* enjoy this status. And it is specifically the characteristic of *eidē* as *auta kath'auta* that is highlighted in this argument. A line of reasoning that ends up making sensible particulars *also* 'themselves by themselves' has gone badly wrong.

So this seems to be the crucial misstep. But what exactly has gone wrong, and how to set it right is not clear. And if we avoided this misstep, would this actually solve the crucial difficulty about knowledge – not, as Socrates' reaction implies, that god doesn't know, but rather that we cannot fruitfully discuss justice itself?

In what follows, I will argue that Plato is putting his finger on delicate matters of dependence and independence. In brief, metaphysical independence seems to imply separability. What is independent is what it is quite apart from whatever it is independent of. But separateness – like the 'likeness' relation that Parmenides tantalisingly introduces (133d2) only to whisk it away – is a symmetrical relation (if A is separate from B, then B is separate from A), while independence is not (if A is independent of B, this implies nothing at all about B's independence or otherwise of A). So the one cannot imply the other. This issue is acute in an epistemological context, since explanation – the core of Plato's conception of knowledge-as-opposed-to-mere-belief – is



essentially *asymmetrical*, while Forms, in order to do the very explanatory work for which they were posited, must apparently be quite separate from the changing vicissitudes of sensible particulars, so as to remain supremely unaffected by these changes.

Forms must be independent of sensible particulars – they must “have their being” or be what they are quite regardless of anything at all about particulars, including their existence or otherwise. But this seems to imply separability. If forms are separable from sensible particulars, then sensible particulars are separable from forms – since separateness is symmetrical. But we know that sensibles are not thus separable. On the contrary, they depend *for their being* on Forms – sensibles are what they are *because* Forms are what they are. (This is the false move Parmenides makes.) If sensible particulars did not depend on intelligibles *for their being*, they would either be self-sufficient and not liable to the paradoxes Zeno brings against them; or else the sensible world would be hopelessly unintelligible, constituting of things with no fully determinate identity at all. But if sensibles depend on forms, then forms are *depended upon*. They stand in inescapable relation to something else. Is this something that determines their being, so that they are no longer *auto kath'auto*? If not, why not? The argument shows us the need to think through how independence and connectedness can be simultaneously maintained.

In this most abstruse of conceptual exercises, there is a beating moral heart. For what is at stake is whether any progress can be hoped for by addressing moral disagreement in argument, rather than in arms. The truly terrible implication of the separation argument is not the conclusion Socrates baulks at. That god fails to know what is in any case not such as to permit of complete and completely precise knowledge is hardly shocking. The real anxiety in separation is that we should be so cut off from reality that nothing we could do could constitute even a rational approach to it. This is where it matters that our true object of interest is not masters and slaves, but knowledge and its objects. For any given form, its inaccessibility makes it unapproachable. But if the Form of Knowledge itself is a reality thoroughly inaccessible to us, then we cannot even approach a grasp of what truly better and truly inferior cognition is – for Knowledge Itself will be what knowing, that perfect cognitive state, *is*. What we thereby lack is the very possibility of discovering any criteria by which to evaluate whether some way of arranging our beliefs has any better claim to correctness than any other. For if there is a form of knowledge, this is what it does – not know forms, but *be knowledge*; and knowing what knowledge is, or would be if we had it, is the only guide to belief formation and revision that is not just a variant on power.

“Even if there were such a thing as real justice,” speaks the cynic of today, “it would be nothing to us, since we have no way of knowing it or adjudicating conflicting opinions about it”; “all knowledge claims are just assertions of power”, says the post-modernist, singing from the same hymn-sheet. The greatest difficulty, Parmenides recognises, is to preserve the independence of our cognitive standards, while ensuring they can still be *standards*, accessible and applicable to our actual cognitive activities. Without this, we do not just lose “the power of dialectic” (135c2) as some strange specialist activity; we lose rather the very basis for the possibility of settling disagreements in public life through discussion, rather than force.

*Trennungssängste. Parmenides 133a-135c*

Es gibt mehrere Probleme, sagt Parmenides, wenn man εἶδη ὄντα αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ postuliert. Das größte aber ist, dass solche Seiende (durch uns) unerkennbar wären.

Warum soll *dieses* das Problem sein, das Parmenides am meisten besorgt? Wovor hat er Angst?

Was an den *auta kath'auta* verursacht die Schwierigkeit? Und wie ist sie zu lösen?

Anfangs scheint Parmenides' Sorge größer zu sein als die Schwierigkeit. Die Entfaltung dieser größten Schwierigkeit umfasst eine Erklärung von Prinzipien; einen Musterfall (‚Herr‘ und ‚Sklave‘); und die Anwendung auf den Fall von eigentlichem Interesse (‚Wissen‘ und ‚die Erkennbare‘). Aber der entscheidende Fehler ist schon in den vorausgesetzten Prinzipien zu sehen, und der Musterfall hilft nicht dabei. Wenn wir diesen Fehler bestimmen können, sollten wir auch das größere Problem mit dem Wissen ausräumen können.

Sokrates stimmt zu: die Formen sind nicht ‚in uns‘ (ἐν ἡμῖν, 133c5); das spräche gegen ihren Status als *auta kath'auta*. Daraus schließt Parmenides, „alle τῶν ἰδεῶν sind was sie sind im Bezug auf einander, und haben ihr Sein im Bezug auf einander, und nicht auf uns“ (133c9-10). So weit, so bekannt: Formen sind für ihr Wesen nicht von wahrnehmbaren Einzeldinge abhängig. Doch Parmenides schließt weiter das Gleiche von *sensibilia*: „Diejenige die in uns gehören...sind ihrerseits was sie sind hinsichtlich einander, aber nicht im Bezug auf die Formen“ (133d3-4). Aber egal was ‚im Bezug auf‘ oder ‚hinsichtlich‘ heißt – und das müssen wir genauer untersuchen – die bloße Vorstellung, dass Formen und wahrnehmbare Einzeldinge sich in dieser Hinsicht ähneln, *muß* falsch sein. Einzeldinge sollten *ungleich* Formen sein in genau dieser Hinsicht: sie sind nicht unabhängig, nicht *auta kath'auta*. Tatsächlich war der einzige Grund solche *auta kath'auta* Seiende zu postulieren, dass die bekannteren Realitäten *nicht* diese Selbständigkeit besitzen. Und es ist besonders dieses Merkmal von *eidē* als *auta kath'auta*, das der Absatz hier betont. Eine Deutung wonach wahrnehmbare Einzeldinge auch selber ‚selbst nach ihrem selbst‘ seien, ist schiefgelaufen – und zwar auffällig.

Das also scheint der entscheidende Fehler zu sein. Aber was genau schief gelaufen ist und wie es berichtigt werden könnte, ist unklar. Und wenn wir den Fehler vermieden, würde das tatsächlich das vermeiden, was die entscheidende Schwierigkeit ist, nämlich nicht, wie Socrates' Reaktion impliziert, daß dem Gott das Wissen fehlt, sondern daß wir keine sinnvolle Diskussion über Gerechtigkeit haben können?

Im Weiteren werde ich argumentieren, daß Platon feingliedrige Probleme von Selbständigkeit und Unselbständigkeit herausstellt. Kurz gesagt: Metaphysische Unabhängigkeit scheint Getrenntheit zu implizieren. Was unabhängig ist, ist das, was es ist, und zwar unabhängig von dem, wovon es unabhängig ist. Aber Getrenntheit ist - genau wie die Ähnlichkeitsbeziehung, die Parmenides uns so provokativ vor die Nase hält (133d2) - eine symmetrische Relation (wenn A getrennt ist von B, dann ist B getrennt von A), und Unabhängigkeit nicht (wenn A unabhängig ist von B, sagt das nichts über die Abhängigkeit oder Unabhängigkeit von B aus). Eines kann also das andere nicht implizieren. Dieses Problem wird akut in einem erkenntnistheoretischen Kontext, weil Erklärung - der Kern von Platons Konzeption von Wissen als Gegenteil von bloßem Glauben - wesentlich asymmetrisch ist, während Formen, um ebendiese erklärende Funktion zu erfüllen, die Platon ihnen zuschreibt, offensichtlich getrennt sein müssen von den Wechselfällen sinnlicher Einzeldinge, damit sie von deren Veränderungen nicht berührt werden.

Formen müssen unabhängig von sinnlichen Einzeldingen sein. Sie müssen „ihr Wesen haben“, oder das sein, was sie sind, egal wie die Einzeldinge beschaffen sind oder ob sie überhaupt

existieren. Das aber scheint Getrenntheit zu implizieren. Wenn Formen trennbar von sinnlichen Einzeldingen sind, dann sind sinnliche Einzeldinge trennbar von Formen, weil Trennbarkeit symmetrisch ist. Wir wissen aber, daß sinnliche Einzeldinge nicht auf diese Art abgetrennt werden können. Im Gegenteil: *Ihr Sein* hängt von den Formen ab: Sinnliche Einzeldinge sind, was sie sind, *weil* Formen das sind, was sie sind (und hier liegt der Fehler, den Parmenides macht). Wenn sinnliche Einzeldinge nicht *für ihr Sein* von Intelligiblem abhängig wären, wären sie entweder selbständig oder unterlägen nicht den Paradoxa, die Zenon ihnen gegenüber in Stellung bringt. Oder aber die sinnliche Welt wäre hoffnungslos unintelligibel, da sie aus Dingen bestünde, die keine bestimmte Identität haben. Aber wenn sinnliche Einzeldinge von Formen abhängen, dann wird von Formen abgehängt: Sie stehen in einer bestimmten Beziehung zu etwas. Ist dies etwas, das ihr Sein bestimmt, sodaß sie nicht mehr *auto kath'auto* sind? Und wenn nicht, warum nicht? Das Argument zeigt uns, daß es nötig ist, bis zum Ende durchzudenken, wie Unabhängigkeit und Verbundenheit gleichzeitig der Fall sein können.

In dieser abstrusen Begriffsakrobatik schlägt allerdings ein moralisches Herz. Denn was hier auf dem Spiel steht, ist, ob irgendein Fortschritt davon zu erwarten ist, daß man moralische Uneinigkeit mit Argumenten angeht statt mit Gewalt. Die wirklich schreckenerregende Implikation des Getrenntheits-Arguments ist nicht die Schlußfolgerung, die Sokrates zurückschrecken läßt. Daß der Gott nicht wissen kann, was ohnehin nicht vollständig und vollständig präzise gewußt werden kann, ist alles andere als schockierend. Wirklich beängstigend an der Getrenntheit ist, daß wir so sehr von der Realität abgeschnitten sein könnten, daß nichts von dem, was wir tun, als rationaler Zugriff auf diese gelten könnte. An dieser Stelle wird es wichtig, daß es uns nicht so sehr um Herren und Sklaven geht, sondern um Wissen und dessen Gegenstände. Für jede einzelne Form gilt, daß ihre Unerreichbarkeit sie unzugänglich macht. Aber wenn die Form des Wissens selbst eine uns vollständig unerreichbare Wirklichkeit ist, dann können wir nicht einmal eine Ahnung davon haben, was bessere oder schlechtere Urteile von der Welt sind - denn die Form des Wissen wird sein, was es ist zu wissen (der perfekte kognitive Zustand). Was uns also fehlt, ist die Möglichkeit überhaupt Kriterien zu entdecken, nach denen wir bestimmen können, ob irgendeine Art und Weise unsere Meinungen zu konstellieren einen höheren Anspruch auf Richtigkeit haben kann als irgendeine andere. Denn wenn es Wissen in irgendeiner Form überhaupt gibt, dann so: Nicht Wissen von Formen, sondern Wissen zu *sein*; und zu wissen, was Wissen ist, oder was es wäre, wenn wir es hätten, ist der einzige Orientierungshilfe, die wir haben, die nicht auf Macht basiert, um uns Meinungen zu bilden und sie zu verändern.

“Selbst wenn es so etwas gäbe, wie echte Gerechtigkeit”, würde ein heutiger Zyniker sagen, “für uns wäre es nichts, da wir keine Möglichkeit haben, von ihr zu wissen oder konfligierende Meinungen von ihr zu entscheiden”. “Alle Wissensansprüche sind nur Machtansprüche”, sagt der Postmoderne, und singt dabei das gleiche Lied. Die größte Schwierigkeit ist es, das erkennt Parmenides, unsere Standards dafür, was Wissen ist, aufrecht zu erhalten und dabei dafür zu sorgen, daß sie im Bezug auf unsere tatsächlichen denkerischen Aktivitäten als Standard fungieren können. Ohne das verlieren wir nicht einfach nur die “Kraft der Dialektik” (135c2) wie eine seltsame Spezialistentätigkeit; wir verlieren viel mehr die Basis überhaupt für die Möglichkeit öffentliche Meinungsverschiedenheiten durch einen Diskurs zu lösen statt mit Gewalt.

### *Onkoi e Arithmoi. Come i sogni di Democrito e le meraviglie dei Pitagorici possono aiutarci a capire i significati di arithmos nel Parmenide di Platone*

**1. Il passo-chiave.** L'intervento tenta di chiarire (almeno in parte) i significati di *arithmos* nel *Parmenide* a partire dall'ultimo passo del dialogo in cui compaiono *arithmos*, pari e dispari (164 c 8-165 e 1, spec. 165 d 8-e 1). Si tratta di un numero, di un pari e di un dispari, di cui «si opina» (165 e 1) o «appare» senza corrispondere a verità (164 e 3), «come sognando in un sogno» (164 d 3), l'appartenenza ad *onkoi*, ossia «agglomerati» (164 d 1; trad. F. Ferrari [2004]), che sono «reciprocamente altri, se sono altri, senza che l'uno sia» (164 d 5-6); a ciascun *onkos* spetta, fra le altre proprietà, un «simulacro di uguaglianza» (165 a 5: *phantasma isotetos*): l'uno, che sembra costituirlo, ma «non è», appare istantaneamente uno e infinitamente molteplice, piccolissimo e immenso (cfr. p. es. 164 d 2-4); esso stesso può sembrare qualcosa di unitario, ma allorché venga «colto con il pensiero» (cfr. 165 a 8, b 6: *dianoia lambanein*) di fatto si frantuma in una pluralità illimitata, come quando si osserva da vicino qualcosa che si vedeva da lontano (cfr. 165 a 5-c 5); di per sé e in relazione agli altri, esso appare simile e dissimile, identico e diverso, in contatto e separato, immobile e in movimento, come le figure dipinte in prospettiva (cfr. 165 c 6-e 1).

**2. Lo sfondo matematico.** Il passo ha uno sfondo non solo «fisico-fenomenista», ma anche matematico. È già stato rilevato dagli interpreti (p. es. Migliori, Sayre, Graeser, Coxon) il suo nesso con argomenti che possono risalire a Zenone, a Democrito, a Protagora (in linea con *Tim.* 54 d e *Theaet.* 152 d); si può tuttavia riscontrare più di un legame con alcuni tratti (in parte attribuiti da Platone stesso ai *thaumasioi* Pitagorici) della *aritmetike* e della *logistike*, condivisi anche dalla geometria, descritti in *Resp.* VI-VII (la loro natura dianoetica; la confusione di partenza fra uno e infinitamente molteplice, grande e piccolo; il progressivo frazionamento dell'uno; i paralleli con la visione da lontano/da vicino e in prospettiva; lo stesso richiamo al sogno), tanto da riconoscerci il modo di procedere «iniziale», caratterizzato dalla confusione fra contrari e ancorato alla «visione», proprio di chi concepisce *arithmoi*, *logoi* e anche *metra*, «come sognando intorno a ciò che è» (cfr. *Resp.* VII, 533 b 6).

**3. Numeri «sognati» contro numeri «veri».** L'aspetto «fenomenico» delle matematiche si può riscontrare anche in punti precedenti del dialogo (p. es. 144 a 6-7; 158 b 8-c 5), nei quali si prospetta un numero svincolato sia dall'essere, sia dall'uno. Questi numeri «sognati» funzionano come una sorta di contro-modello rispetto a *tutte* le multiformi apparizioni di *arithmos*, pari e dispari, o di singoli *arithmoi*, nel corso del dialogo, dove i numeri, intesi sia come numeri-oggetto (insiemi di unità; membri di una serie), sia come proprietà numeriche (cfr. 143 d 1 ss.), di cose sensibili e di forme (cfr. 130 a 2, 135 e 3-4), presentano sempre un rapporto, complicato ma essenziale, con l'essere e con l'uno.

## *Onkoi and Arithmoi. How Democritus' Dream and Pythagorean Wonder help us to understand the many Senses of Arithmos in Plato's Parmenides*

**1. The Crucial Passage.** The paper tries to clarify (at least partially) the different meanings of *arithmos* in Plato's *Parmenides* starting from the last occurrence of *arithmos* in the dialogue (164 c 8-165 e 1, with particular regard to 165 d 8-e 1). The passage refers to an even or odd number that or «apparently» (164 e 3) or «like in a dream» (164 d 3) belongs to *onkoi* - «agglomerated masses» (164 d 1), which are «reciprocally different, if they are different, while the one is not» (164 d 5-6). Many properties are attributed to each *onkos*, particularly «an image of equality» (165 a 5: *phantasma isotetos*): the one, that apparently lets it be, but «is not», appears at the same time one and infinitely many, extremely small and huge (164 d 2-4). The *onkos* itself may look like something one, but - if «grasped by thought» (165 a 8, b 6: *dianoia lambanein*) - it breaks itself in an unlimited plurality, like an object initially seen from afar and finally observed from nearby (165 a 5-c 5): in itself and in relation to other *onkoi*, it appears - like figures painted in perspective (165 c 6-e 1) - similar and dissimilar, identical and different, in contact and separated, unmoved and moved.

**2. The Mathematical Background.** The passage has not only a "physical-phenomenalist" background, but also a mathematical one. Many scholars (i.e. Brisson, Migliori, Sayre, Graeser, Coxon) have already shown its connection with arguments that can remount to Zeno, Democritus, Protagoras (in coherence with *Tim.* 54 d and *Theaet.* 152 d). On the other hand it reveals more than one echo of the features that *Resp.* VI-VII attribute to *arithmetike*, *logistike*, and geometry as well, in the way they are discussed by *thaumasioi* Pythagoreans: their dianoetic nature; the confusion between one and infinitely many, great and small, as their starting-point; the parallels with the vision from afar/nearby and in perspective; the reference to dream. The mathematics of the *onkoi* can be consequently interpreted like the "initial" form of mathematical reasoning, characterized by a confusion of contraries and anchored in the "vision", which is typical of those who conceive *arithmoi*, *logoi* and *metra* «as if they were dreaming about what really is» (*Resp.* VII, 533 b 6).

**3. Numbers "in a dream" vs. "true" numbers.** The "phenomenalist" aspect of mathematics can be found in previous passages of the dialogue as well (i.e. 144 a 6-7; 158 b 8-c 5), where a number is presented that has no real links with being and one. Such numbers "in a dream" can play the role of a counterexample compared to *all* multiform passages in the dialogue in which *arithmoi*, even and odd, particular numbers - conceived both like object (sets of units; members of a series) and numerical properties (143 d 1 ff.) of sensible things and Forms (130 a 2, 135 e 3-4) - show always a complicated but essential relationship with being and one.

# Charalabopoulos Nikolaos

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## *La strada per l'Accademia : Il protrettico implicito del Parmenide di Platone*

Alcuni tratti del *Parmenide* non hanno termini di paragone nel corpus platonico. Anzitutto, un Socrate diciannovenne prova a sconfiggere Zenone sul terreno di quest'ultimo, prima di essere ridotto al silenzio da Parmenide. Come Alcibiade o Teeteto, Socrate è qui rappresentato come un giovane promettente ma inesperto, che sembra essere confutato da una benevola e riconosciuta autorità nel campo della filosofia. All'interno del corpus platonico, quindi, il *Parmenide* riunisce in sé la data drammatica più antica (agosto del 450) e più recente (probabilmente gli anni '80 del IV secolo), corrispondenti, rispettivamente, alla scena principale del dialogo e alla cornice introduttiva. Il grosso del testo, circa due terzi del dialogo, consiste sorprendentemente in un esercizio dialettico che pare un rompicapo, battezzato dal suo progenitore come un 'gioco estenuante' (πραγματειώδη παιδιὰν 137b2). Tale esercizio può essere inteso come un esame serio di tecniche argomentative differenti oppure come una decostruzione dei ragionamenti eleatici attraverso un esteso *coup de théâtre...de l'absurde*.

La mia tesi è che da un certo punto di vista queste stranezze sono parte integrante del carattere protrettico del dialogo. Il *Parmenide* platonico pratica una forma di ragionamento filosofico che deve essere distinto da quello che vede impegnato il Socrate platonico, ossia la ricerca della verità coltivata nell'Accademia. Platone promuove la sua visione del mondo attraverso una dimostrazione in negativo di quel che la filosofia socratica *non* è, una dimostrazione che emerge dai seguenti aspetti del dialogo.

### **1. Topografia**

L'azione principale del *Parmenide* consiste nel resoconto di una conversazione fra Parmenide, Zenone e Socrate avvenuta ad Atene durante le Panatenee del 450 a.C. e riferita da un distinto signore ateniese a beneficio di un gruppo di visitatori stranieri provenienti dall'Asia Minore. Costoro sono esplicitamente identificati come filosofi che hanno lasciato il loro paese natio per Atene allo scopo di ascoltare il racconto di quella famosa conversazione da una fonte affidabile, ossia da Antifonte, che ha mandato a memoria la testimonianza oculare di Pitodoro, uno degli accoliti di Zenone. La costruzione del *Parmenide*, quindi, presenta due platee interne di (aspiranti) filosofi, divise dal tempo ma rese contigue dalla vicinanza spaziale. La progenie filosofica di Anassagora 'replica' la visita ateniese di Parmenide come un pellegrinaggio. Si tratta al tempo stesso di un'appropriazione potente del motivo parmenideo del viaggio alla scoperta della verità, nonché di un elogio di Atene come luogo di incontro dei migliori protagonisti di quelle che più tardi saranno identificate come le correnti 'ionica' e 'italica' della filosofia greca.

Lo zelo dei visitatori prende corpo nelle tappe del loro lungo viaggio, sia esplicite che implicite (queste ultime sono contraddistinte da un asterisco): da Clazomene (126a1), i visitatori raggiungono il \*Pireo e raggiungono quindi l'agorà ateniese (a2) prima di stabilirsi in una casa privata nel distretto di Melite (a9-10). Da notare il fatto interessante che una residenza privata è pure la destinazione del viaggio degli Eleati registrato nel racconto di Antifonte: Parmenide,

accompagnato da Zenone, arriva al \*Pireo da \*Elea ed è ospitato da Pitodoro nella sua casa situata nel distretto del Ceramico oltre le mura della città (127c1). Tuttavia, la discrepanza fra le tue visite segnala la trasformazione di Atene come centro culturale. A differenza dell'occasione festiva e del carattere pubblico della visita avvenuta nel quinto secolo, il viaggio dei Clazomenii è un evento estemporaneo e occasionale, privo di qualunque contesto civico o religioso.

L'ambientazione del dialogo di cornice è una casa, fuori dalla città, nell'area del Ceramico, in cui vengono recitati e commentati libri di filosofia. Si può anche notare che (a) il demo di Melite confinava con quello di Collito e (b) che la prosecuzione all'interno delle mura della strada dell'Accademia, la via principale del Ceramico, è la via panatenaica. Alla luce di questi nessi topografici, si è portati a intendere la casa di Antifonte come una proiezione della residenza di Platone all'Accademia, e la visita dei Clazomenii come un pellegrinaggio abortito, che non ha mai raggiunto la sua destinazione finale.

## 2. (Inter)testualità

La rete intertestuale del *Parmenide* punta in direzioni diverse. L'opera di Parmenide appare come un ovvio sotto-testo, tanto per il motivo del viaggio quanto per la struttura tripartita condivisa dal poema epico (proemio, verità, opinione) e dal dialogo in prosa (ricerca di Antifonte, 126a-127a; a casa di Pitodoro, 127a-137c; l'uno e i molti, 137c-166c). Riferimenti ad altri dialoghi platonici come il *Simposio* (stratificazione narrativa) o al *Carmide* (*Parm.* 126a2-3 ≈ *Charm.* 153b3-4) sono a loro volta di particolare importanza.

Il principale sotto-testo platonico sembra essere la *Repubblica*, come suggeriscono la topografia e il cast di personaggi. Il Pireo, dove è ambientata la *Repubblica*, è infatti il comune punto di partenza su suolo attico per entrambi i gruppi di visitatori. Al tempo stesso, gli interlocutori di Socrate nella *Repubblica* sono o esplicitamente presenti (Glaucone e Adimanto, i fratelli maggiori di Platone) oppure evocati, come accade per Antifonte, il fratellastro di Platone, e per Cefalo, tramite l'omonimia fra Cefalo di Clazomene e Cefalo di Siracusa, il proprietario della casa in cui si svolge la *Repubblica*. E' un tocco speciale di ironia platonica il fatto che un dialogo in cui sono mosse (presunte) critiche feroci alla necessità filosofica delle Idee debba essere letto sullo sfondo della più elaborata argomentazione in loro favore.

Contemporaneamente, la nozione stessa di testualità si impone come un problema fin dalle prime battute del dialogo. L'obiettivo apparente della visita degli Eleati è la presentazione al pubblico ateniese di un nuovo libro di Zenone – una lettura che viene commentata da Socrate. Antifonte, a sua volta, viene presentato come uno che ha studiato meticolosamente (διεμελέτησεν 126c7) e mandato a memoria la conversazione fra Parmenide, Zenone e Socrate dopo aver letto il libro di Pitodoro (πολλάκις ἀκούσας τοῦ Πυθοδώρου ἀπομνημονεύει c2-3). Testimonianza indiretta di questo libro può essere la scomparsa delle formule narrative nello scambio fra Parmenide e Aristotele – un tratto che richiama il Teeteto, nel quale la conversazione fra Socrate e Teeteto è stata registrata da Euclide in un libro che ha la forma di un dialogo diretto.

Intendo sostenere la tesi che dal punto di vista testuale la *πραγματειώδης παιδιά* di Parmenide è l' 'esecuzione' di un dialogo diretto in prosa, fondato su argomentazioni di stile zenoniano, che funge da sfondo di contrasto per il dialogo socratico come definito e promosso da Platone.

## 3. Dialettica (parmenidea)

Costruito com'è sullo iato fra, da un lato, le continue oscillazioni di Parmenide fra l'uno e i molti e, dall'altro, tutto quanto precede l'esercizio dialettico, il testo del *Parmenide* ricorda la traiettoria di un pendolo. Uno scambio di idee reciproco fra pensatori che si riconoscono a vicenda in un contesto spazialmente e cronologicamente definito è rimpiazzato da un'argomentazione intangibile, portata a un elevato grado di astrazione in un contesto smaterializzato. Il sommovimento della discussione iniziale cede il passo all'illusione di un pensiero in movimento, che finisce poi per cadere nella spirale discendente di un'argomentazione circolare. Nella migliore tradizione dell'assurdo comico, le parole retrospettive di Parmenide in chiusura (166c2-5) mandano all'aria qualunque pretesa di progresso intellettuale e suggellano la natura auto-distruttiva della ginnastica mentale degli Eleati (almeno nella rappresentazione di Platone).

### *Road to Academy : The implicit protreptics of Plato's Parmenides*

The *Parmenides* displays a couple of features nowhere else to be found in the Platonic corpus. To begin with, a 19-year old Socrates attempts at beating Zeno at his own game before himself getting silenced by Parmenides. Much like Alcibiades or Theaetetus he is depicted as the promising but inexperienced youngster who seems to be refuted by an acknowledged, benevolent philosophical authority. Accordingly, the *Parmenides* features the earliest (August 450) and the latest (probably 380s) dramatic dates in the Platonic corpus, those of the main action and the introductory scene respectively. The bulk of the text, nearly two thirds of the dialogue, puzzlingly consists in a head-spinning exercise in dialectics, identified by its progenitor as a 'troublesome game' (πραγματειώδη παιδιὰν 137b2). This may be construed as a serious examination of alternative argumentative techniques or a deconstruction of the Eleatic reasoning by means of an extended *coup de théâtre...de l'absurde*.

My argument is that one way to account for these oddities is that they form an integral part of the protreptic character of the dialogue. The Platonic *Parmenides* practices a particular type of philosophical reasoning that needs to be distinguished from what the Platonic Socrates engages in, namely the search for truth cultivated in the Academy. Plato's exhortation for his own worldview takes the form of his showing what Socratic philosophy is not and may be detected in the following aspects of the dialogue.

#### **1) Topography**

The main narrative of the *Parmenides* records a conversation between Parmenides, Zeno and Socrates held in Athens at the Panathenaia of 450 BC, related by an Athenian gentleman to a group of foreign visitors from Asia Minor. These men are explicitly identified as philosophers who left their homeland for Athens so that they may hear about that momentous meeting from a reliable source, namely Antiphon who had memorised the eye-witness account of Pythodoros, one of Zeno's associates. The plot of the *Parmenides* then features two internal audiences of (prospective) philosophers, divided by time, brought together by spatial proximity. Anaxagoras' philosophical descendants 'replay' Parmenides' visit to Athens as a pilgrimage: at the same time a powerful appropriation of the Parmenidean motif of journey for the discovery of truth and a praise of Athens as the meeting point of the best in what later came to be identified as the 'Ionian' and the 'Italian' branches of Greek philosophy.



The visitors' zeal is objectified in the signposts of their long journey, whether stated or implied (the latter indicated with an asterisk): from Klazomenae (126a1) they reach \*Piraeus and then move on to the Athenian Agora (a2) before settling down in a private house at the district of Melite (a9-10). Interestingly, a private residence is the destination of the Eleatics' journey recorded in Antiphon's narrative: Parmenides, accompanied by Zeno, arrives at \*Piraeus from \*Elea and is hosted by Pythodoros in his house at the district of Kerameikos beyond the city walls (127c1). Yet the discrepancy between the two visits points to the transformation of Athens as an intellectual centre. Unlike the festive occasion and the great publicity of the fifth-century visit, the Klazomenians' trip is an unprepared *ad hoc* event lacking any civic or religious context.

The setting of the frame dialogue is a house in the area of Kerameikos outside the city where philosophical books are performed and commented on. It may also be noticed that (a) the deme of Melite shared borders with that of Kollytos and (b) the intramural continuation of the Academy Road, the main street of Kerameikos, is the Panathenaic Way. In view of these topographical correlations one is inclined to construe Antiphon's house as an avatar of Plato's own residence in the Academy and the Klazomenians' visit as a 'perverted' pilgrimage, one that never reached its final destination.

## 2) (Inter)Textuality

The web of intertextuality in the *Parmenides* is spread in a number of different directions. Parmenides' own composition seems an obvious subtext whether one points to the motif of journey or the tripartite structure shared by both the epic poem (Prooemium, Truth, Opinion) and the prose dialogue (Looking for Antiphon 126a-127a; At Pythodoros' house 127a-137c; The one and the many 137c-166c). References to other Platonic dialogues, such as the *Symposium* (multiple layers of narratives) or the *Charmides* (*Prm.* 126a2-3 ≈ *Chrm.* 153b3-4), are also of particular significance.

The main Platonic subtext seems to be the *Republic* as suggested by both topography and cast. For Piraeus, the setting of the *Republic*, is the common starting point in Attic soil for both groups of visitors. At the same time, Socrates' interlocutors in the *Republic* are either themselves present (Glaukon, Adeimantos, Plato's older brothers) or invoked as is the case with Antiphon, Plato's half-brother, or Kephalos of Kalzomenai, the namesake of Kephalos of Syracuse, the owner of the house where the story of the *Republic* takes place. It is a special touch of Platonic irony that a dialogue that (supposedly) raises severe objections to the philosophical necessity of the Forms is to be read in the context of the most elaborate argumentation for them.

At the same time, textuality itself becomes an issue from early on in the dialogue. The apparent objective of the Eleatics' visit is Zeno's presenting his new book to the Athenian public – a performance commented upon by Socrates. Antiphon, in turn, is said to have studied meticulously (διεμελέτησεν 126c7) and learnt by heart the conversation between Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates since he had read the relevant book by Pythodoros (πολλάκις ἀκούσας τοῦ Πυθόδωρου ἀπομνημονεύει c2-3). An indirect evidence for such a book may be the loss of the markers of narrative in Parmenides' exchange with Aristotle – a feature reminiscent of the *Theaetetus*, in which the conversation between Socrates and Theaetetus has been recorded by Euclides in his book in the form of a dramatic dialogue.

I wish to argue that in textual terms Parmenides' πραγματειώδης παιδιὰ is a performance of a prose dramatic dialogue featuring argumentation of Zenonian style that works as a foil to the Socratic dialogue – as defined and promoted by Plato.

### **3) (Parmenidean) Dialectics**


Built on the rupture between Parmenides' consecutive oscillations between the one and the many and everything that comes before it, the text of the Parmenides recalls the trajectory of a pendulum. A reciprocal exchange of ideas between thinkers acknowledging each other's presence in a contextualised time and space is suddenly replaced by disembodied argumentation of a high level of abstraction in a de-materialised milieu. The commotion of the initial discussion gives way to the illusion of a thought in motion falling into a downward spiral of circular argumentation. In the best tradition of comic absurd Parmenides' all-encompassing final words (166c2-5) blow up any pretensions for intellectual progress and seal the self-defeating character of the (Platonic version of) Eleatic gymnastics of mind.

## Se l'Uno non è: oltre l'arimetizzazione dell'Essere

Il *Parmenide* è un dialogo con un carattere precipuamente introduttivo. La sua collocazione all'interno del *corpus* platonico spinge a pensare che esso sia funzionale ai dialoghi che lo seguono, che nel loro esplicito richiamarsi costituiscono davvero un *unicum*. Si deve allora pensare che questi dialoghi non fanno che sviluppare quanto nel *Parmenide* è messo in campo. L'ipotesi che vorrei proporre in quel che segue è che c'è una linea teorica precisa dal *Parmenide* al *Politico*, ed essa riguarda la crisi introdotta nel pensiero antico dalla scoperta delle grandezze incommensurabili. Considero perciò tutti i dialoghi seguenti al *Parmenide* (soprattutto il *Teeteto* e il *Sofista*) come dei sismografi del terremoto concettuale prodotto da questa scoperta: essi si muovono in una situazione di dissesto, che ha reso oscuro concetti prima chiari, e che rende di nuovo necessario interrogarsi su che cos'è scienza, che cos'è l'essere, che cos'è il *logos*. Svilupperò questa ipotesi in tre parti, per poi avanzare una conclusione teorica.

### 1. La divisibilità mereologica nel Parmenide

La struttura del *Parmenide*, al di là della sua complessità analitica, è schematizzabile in due ipotesi principali: se l'Uno è, se l'Uno non è. Si tratta dunque del rapporto tra l'Uno e l'essere, da una parte, e l'Uno e il non essere, dall'altra. Questo significa che non vi si tratta semplicemente del problema dell'essere, ma del problema della sua arimetizzazione, e cioè della sua concepibilità in termini numerici (come *arithmos*), ovvero come uno o molti. Questa "arimetizzazione dell'essere" porta a dei paradossi, che vengono sistematicamente sviscerati nel corso del dialogo, e riassunti nella conclusione: «tanto se l'Uno è quanto se l'Uno non è, sia l'Uno sia gli Altri (*talla* - il termine *allo* allude alla mera molteplicità quantitativa, non differenziata qualitativamente), da tutti i punti di vista, sono e non sono, appaiono e non appaiono, e in rapporto a sé medesimi e nel rapporto reciproco tra loro» (166c). Infatti dire che "l'Uno (non) è" significa porre una equivalenza tra Essere e Uno, il che genera una diairesi infinita, e cioè: prendendo singolarmente l'Uno e l'essere, si può dire che "l'Uno è" e che "l'Essere è uno", ma a sua volta ognuna di queste affermazioni si scinde (per un processo ricorsivo) in queste stesse affermazioni: l'"Uno è" e l'"l'Essere è uno", da una parte, e l'"Essere è uno" e "l'Uno è" dall'altra, e così via.



“Di nuovo dunque ciascuna delle parti implica sia l'Uno sia l'Essere, e la parte viene ad essere costituita almeno da due parti, e così, per lo stesso ragionamento che si può ripetere sempre, ciò che diviene parte implica ogni volta queste due parti: l'Uno sempre implica l'Essere e l'Essere l'Uno. Perciò necessariamente non c'è mai l'Uno perché si sdoppia di continuo” (142e). Questa

scissione frammenta l'uno e l'essere: è anzi dovuta, come scrive Platone, all'Essere stesso che viene detto dell'Uno (144e), dal momento che, come si dice nella prima tesi, l'Uno in quanto tale, senza che si dica che è, è del tutto inconoscibile (142a).

L'impostazione del problema dell'Uno e dei Molti sulla base dell'equiparazione tra l'Uno e l'essere (o, in maniera equivalente, il non-essere) conduce a una frammentazione, e cioè a una numerabilità indefinita, perché "se c'è il numero (*arithmos*), c'è molteplicità e infinita pluralità degli enti" (144a): l'Uno viene infatti reiterato a ogni passaggio. Ma questa situazione non è altro che la conseguenza di quella identificazione, cioè dell'aritmizzazione dell'essere, della sua concepibilità in termini di numeri naturali.

### 2. L'introduzione di un non-numero (che è anche un relativo non-essere)

Il percorso teorico che i dialoghi seguenti delineano è quello di una *disarticolazione dell'equivalenza pitagorico-eleatica tra l'Uno e l'Essere*. A questo conduce la scoperta delle grandezze incommensurabili, che portano all'affermazione della divisibilità all'infinito, ma non più come sua *discretizzazione mereologica*, cioè divisione in *parti* (come accadeva nei paradossi di Zenone). La mereologia è infatti interna all'aritmizzazione dell'Essere, perché corrisponde all'esprimibilità degli enti in termini frazionari. La divisibilità all'infinito mostrata dalle grandezze incommensurabili, invece, non produce nessuna mereologia: tra la diagonale e il lato del quadrato non c'è alcuna parte comune. La divisibilità, quindi, assume un altro significato: quello della fundamentalità del rapporto (divisione) come tale sulle entità che sarebbero messe in rapporto, esprimibile anche come passaggio dalla concettualità del *metechein* (partecipazione, essere parte di) a quella del *synechein* (tenere assieme, essere in rapporto). Ovvero da una concezione digitale a una analogica dell'Essere. Nel *Teeteto* questo emerge nella funzione dell'anima (che è, come le grandezze incommensurabili, detta *dynamis* – cfr. 147e e 185c), la quale mette in rapporto, compara (*analogizomene*, 186a) gli enti, rintracciando tra essi identità e differenze. In sostanza, quel che il *Teeteto* fa faticosamente emergere è che l'Essere non può essere identificato con l'Uno e perciò indica piuttosto una dimensione diversa da quella dell'Uno: una dimensione ulteriore, quella della *dynamis*, di ciò che, non essendo attuale (non essendo un numero naturale, quel che i Pitagorici intendevano con il termine *arithmos*), può diventarlo. L'incommensurabile non è *allo* rispetto all'Uno, non introduce una *moltiplicazione* o *divisione* dell'Uno in infiniti altri Uno, ma è *heteron*, di un altro genere, o un'altra dimensione rispetto all'Uno, come la *dynamis* rispetto all'attualità. Un non-numero che è anche un relativo non-essere.

### 3. I paradossi dell'aritmizzazione dell'essere

Questa nuova concezione dell'essere è sancita nel *Sofista* nella celebre definizione secondo cui l'Essere è *dynamis* (247e), e come tale è anteriore, o altro, rispetto all'Uno. Questa definizione giunge dopo una disamina delle ontologie moniste e pluraliste precedenti a Platone, le quali conducevano alle stesse aporie messe in luce nel *Parmenide*.

In 237d si dice innanzitutto che chi dice *qualcosa* dice anche sempre *una* cosa. Questa affermazione pone una stretta correlazione tra il qualcosa (*ti*) e il numero (*arithmos*), cosicché il numero è contato tra le cose che sono (*ton onton*, 238a): anzi, tutto ciò che è è numero, e viceversa. Le difficoltà che emergono da questa tesi riguardano una certa confusione, dovuta a un modo un po' infantile di parlare (242c). Tutti quelli che hanno cercato di riflettere sull'essere, dice Platone, hanno cercato di risolvere la questione in maniera mitica, raccontandoci delle storie, "come se fossimo dei bambini": essi hanno ridotto il problema del *to on* a un problema di numerabilità

elementare, facendo cioè riferimento a uno, due, tre o molte entità. Questa maniera infantile di pensare accomuna le ontologie moniste e pluraliste. In entrambe, si tratta di contare come si fa con le dita: uno, due, tre, ecc.

Lo Straniero osserva tuttavia che, se noi identifichiamo l'essere solo con uno dei due principi, l'altro sarà un non-essere, cosicché di fatto c'è solo un principio; se, al contrario, poniamo due o più principi, tutti intesi come essere, il risultato è paradossalmente lo stesso: poiché sono tutti "essere", si riducono tutti all'uno. Ne segue che "i due sono uno" (244a).

Sembra che, se partiamo da una considerazione numerica del problema dell'essere, non ci sia alternative al monismo parmenideo e ai suoi paradossi. Sia che il principio è uno, sia che poniamo una molteplicità di principi, il risultato è sempre lo stesso: "due è uno" oppure "l'uno è due", ovvero "uno è anche molti" (244a; 245b).

Questa conclusione è del tutto analoga a quella con cui si prova l'esistenza delle grandezze incommensurabili. La negazione della loro esistenza, e cioè la tesi che tutto è commensurabile, comporta infatti che l'uno sia due, o, più in generale, che i numeri pari siano uguali ai numeri dispari. Così dice Aristotele negli *Analitici primi*: se la diagonale del quadrato fosse commensurabile al lato, allora i numeri dispari sarebbero uguali ai numeri pari (*An. Pr. I, 23, 41a 23-31*), e l'uno sarebbe uguale al due. Un'assurdità che, come dice Socrate nel *Teeteto*, non si può credere neanche in sogno (190b). L'affermazione dell'esistenza delle grandezze incommensurabili salva quindi da questo collasso ontologico e costituisce il definitivo superamento dell'Eleatismo.

#### 4. Conclusione

Sviluppando le aporie del *Parmenide*, conseguenti alla identificazione aritmetizzante dell'essere con l'Uno, il *Teeteto* e il *Sofista* giungono dunque a una nuova ontologia: un'ontologia che abbandona l'identificazione dell'Essere con l'Uno e lo pensa piuttosto come l'incommensurabile stesso (Joly, *Le renversement platonicien*, 1994; Toth, *Platon et l'irrationnel mathématique*, 2011). Come tale, l'essere si colloca però in una dimensione *diversa* rispetto a quella degli enti numerabili: quella della *dynamis*. Questo risultato comporta alcune conseguenze teoriche che vanno al di là del *Parmenide* e che non sono pienamente colte né da Platone né dal pensiero greco in generale, a causa della persistenza del principio henologico, che è un principio di attualità e di positività. A mio avviso, possono essere riassunte sotto i seguenti titoli:

1) *Modalità*. L'essere non è più concepibile in termini quantitativi, ma in termini modali: esso è altro rispetto all'attuale, è un principio di trasformazione della realtà, non della sua computabilità. Ciò risolve anche l'aporia della divisibilità all'infinito: l'essere come *dynamis* è una potenzialità, come dirà Aristotele, e non una attualità. La divisibilità all'infinito non significa la compresenza di infiniti enti, ma la possibilità del processo di divisione, che è un processo relazionale e generativo.

2) *Relazionalità*. Ancor più, come osserverà Hegel nella *Scienza della logica*, le grandezze incommensurabili non significano delle *entità*, non sono dei quanta risultato di una divisione in parti dell'essere: significano anzi che l'essere è rapporto, e che nulla esiste fuori dal rapporto. Il significato della divisione all'infinito non è dunque la frammentazione in parti infinitesimali, in tanti Uno che replicano all'infinito questa stessa situazione; "divisione all'infinito" significa che la divisione, cioè il rapporto, è il vero *prius* ontologico.

3) *Posizionalità*. L'idea che l'Uno sia il principio è superata dalla concezione posizionale dei numeri, la quale comporta l'introduzione dello zero, sconosciuto ai Greci. Da un punto di vista posizionale, non cardinale, lo zero non significa il nulla: significa il principio, l'*arché*. Nel pensiero indiano, dove sembra sia stato introdotto, lo zero è inteso inoltre come una *potenza*, qualcosa che non è ancora del tutto positivo (attuale) ma che può dare origine a qualsiasi cosa positiva e attuale.


È probabilmente in queste direzioni che bisogna assumere la seconda ipotesi del *Parmenide* come quella che, pur non essendo stata percorsa dalla filosofia seguente, fondamentalemente henologica, e che ha privilegiato piuttosto la prima ipotesi, è invece più interessante da un punto di vista matematico: "l'Uno non è" conduce all'ipotesi del continuo e alla concezione posizionale e non cardinale del numero.

*If the One is not: Beyond the Arithmetization of Being*

The *Parmenides* is a dialogue chiefly introductory. Its collocation within the Platonic *corpus* leads us to think it prepares the following dialogues, which refer each other in a really unique manner. We must therefore think that these dialogues do anything but develop what is deployed in the *Parmenides*. The hypothesis I would like to propose is that there is a clear theoretical line from the *Parmenides* to the *Statesman*, and it concerns the crisis introduced in the ancient thought by the discovery of the incommensurable magnitudes. I thus consider all the dialogues, which follow the *Parmenides* (above all the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*), as seismographs of the conceptual earthquake produced by this discovery: they move in a disrupted situation, which obscured what once was clear and makes again necessary to inquiry what is science, what is Being, what is the *logos*. I will work up this hypothesis in three parts, and then propose a theoretical conclusion.

1. *The Mereological Divisibility in the Parmenides*

The structure of the *Parmenides*, beyond its analytical complexity, can be schematized in two principal hypothesis: if the One is, if the One is not. It is a question then of the relation between the One and the Being, on one side, and the One and the Not-Being, on the other, that is of the relation between the One and the two ways the goddess points the finger at in the Preface to Parmenides' Poem: those of Being and of Not-Being. This means that it does not concern simply the problem of Being, but the problem of its arithmetization, that is of its conceivability in numerical terms (through *arithmoi*), as One or Many. This "arithmetization of Being" leads to paradoxes, which are systematically analysed in the course of the dialogue, and summed up in the conclusion: "whether one is or is not, it and the others (*talla* - the word *allo* alludes to a mere quantitative, not qualitatively differentiated, multiplicity) both are and are not, and both appear and not appear all things in all ways, both in relation to themselves and in relation to each other." (166c) In fact, to say that "the One is (not)" means to put an equivalence between Being and One, which generates an infinite *diairesis*. By taking on their own the One and the Being, we can say namely that "the One is" and "the Being is one"; but in its turn each of these claims cleaves (through a recursive process) in these same claims, "the One is" and "the Being in one", on one side, and "the Being is one" and "the One is", on the other side, and so forth.



“So again, each of the two parts possesses oneness and being; and the part, in its turn, is composed of at least two parts; and in this way always, for the same reason, whatever part turns up always possesses these two parts, since oneness always possesses being and being always possesses oneness. So, since it always proves to be two, it must never be one.” (142e) This cleavage fragments the One and the Being: it is even due, as Plato writes, to the Being itself, which is said of the One (144e), since, as the first thesis states, the One as such, without saying that it is, is completely unknowable. (142a)

The setting of the problem of the One and the Many through the equivalence between One and Being (or Not-being) leads to a fragmentation, that is to an infinite countability, since “if there is number, there would be many, and an unlimited multitude of beings” (144a): the One is in fact reiterated at any step. However, this situation is nothing but the consequence of that initial identification, that is of the arithmetization of Being, of its conceivability in terms of natural numbers.

### 2. *The Introduction of a Not-number (which is also a Relative Not-Being)*

The theoretical path the following dialogues outline concludes in the *disarticulation of the Pythagorean-Eleatic equivalence between One and Being*. This is the issue of the discovery of the incommensurable magnitudes, which affirm the divisibility in infinitum, but no more as *mereologic discretization*, namely, as division into *parts* (as it happened in Zeno’s paradoxes). The mereology is actually internal to the arithmetization of Being, since it expresses the division into fractions. The divisibility in infinitum expressed by the incommensurable magnitudes, on the contrary, does not produce any mereology: between the diagonal and the side of the square there is no common fraction. The divisibility, then, assumes another meaning: that of the fundamentality of the relation (of the division) as such over the entities that are in this relation. It can be expressed also as a passage from the conceptuality of the *metechein* (participation, to be a part of) to that of *synechein* (to tie together, to be in relation). Namely: from a digital to an analogue conception of Being. In *Theaetetus* this emerges in the function of the soul (which is called, just as the incommensurable magnitudes, *dynamis* - see 147e and 185c), which “puts in relation”, compares (*analogizomene*, 186a) the beings, finding identities and differences among them. In a nutshell, what the *Theaetetus* lets laboriously emerge is that Being cannot be identified with the One and therefore discloses a different dimension than that of the One: a further dimension, that of the *dynamis*, of what is not actual (since it does not express a natural number, an *arithmos*), but *can* almost become actual (for instance, if raised to the square). The incommensurable is not *allo* with respect to the One, it does not introduce a *multiplication* or a *division* of the One into infinite other Ones, but is *beteron*, of a *different* genus, just like the *dynamis* with respect to the actuality. A not-number that is also a relative Not-being.

### 3. *The Paradoxies of the Arithmetization of Being*

This new conception of Being is enshrined in the *Sophist*, in the famous definition according to which Being is *dynamis* (247e), and as such anterior, or different, with respect to the One. This definition comes after an examination of the monist and pluralist ontologies preceding Plato, which led to the same aporias highlighted in the *Parmenides*.

In 237d it is firstly stated that who says *something* says always also *one* thing. This claim puts a strict correlation between the something (*tì*) and the number (*arithmós*), so that the number itself is counted among the things that are (*tôn ónton*, 238a): everything that is, is number, and vice versa.



The difficulties arising from this claim concern a certain confusion, due to a rather easygoing way of talking (242c). All those who tried to reflect about being, Plato says, tried to solve the question in a mythic manner, by talking us stories, “as we were children”: they reduced the problem of the *tò ón* to a problem of *elementary* numbering, that is, by making reference to one, two, three or many entities. This childish way of thinking unites the monists’ and the pluralists’ ontologies. In both, it is a question of counting as we make with fingers: one, two, three, etc.

The Stranger observes, however, that, if we identify the Being with only one of two principles, the other one will be a Not-being, so that there will be by fact only one principle; if, on the contrary, we pose two or even more principles, and all are understood as Being, the result is paradoxically the same: since all are “being”, they turn once again into the one. It follows “that the two are one.” (244a)

It seems then that, if we start from a numeric consideration of the problem of being, there is no alternative to the Parmenidean monism and its paradoxes. Either if the being is one or if we introduce a multiplicity of principles, the result is always the same: “two is one” or “one is two”, that is, “one is also many.” (244a; 245b)

This conclusion is entirely analogous to that one, by which the existence of the incommensurable magnitudes is proved. The negation of their existence – that is: the claim that all is commensurable – involves actually that the one is two, or, more in general, that the odd numbers are identical with the even numbers. So Aristotle says in the *Prior Analytics*: if the diagonal of the square were commensurable to the side, then the odd numbers were equal to the even numbers (*An. Pr. I, 23, 41a 23-31*), and then the one would be equal to the two. An absurdity that, how Socrates says in the *Theaetetus*, one could not believe even by sleeping (190b). The acceptance of their existence saves then from this ontological collapse and represents the definitive overcoming of Eleatism.

#### 4. Conclusion

By developing the aporias of the *Parmenides*, resulting from the arithmetizing identification of Being and One, the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* come to a new ontology: an ontology that abandons this identification and thinks of Being as the incommensurable itself (Joly, *Le renversement platonicien*, 1994; Toth, *Platon et l'irrationnel mathématique*, 2011). As such, Being is located, however, in a *different* dimension with respect to that of countable entities: the dimension of the *dynamis*. This result involves some theoretical consequences that goes beyond the *Parmenides* and are not fully grasped neither by Plato nor by the Greek thought in general, because of the persistence of the henologic principle, which is also a principle of actuality and positivity. To my opinion, they can be summed up under the following titles:

1) *Modality*. Being is no more conceivable in quantitative terms, but in modal terms: it is different from the actual, it is a principle of the transformation of reality, not of its computability. This resolves also the aporia of the divisibility in infinitum: Being as *dynamis* is a potentiality, as Aristotle will say, and not an actuality. The divisibility in infinitum does not mean the copresence of infinite beings, but the possibility of the process of division, which is a relational and generative process.

2) *Relationality*. Moreover, as Hegel will state in the *Science of Logic*, the incommensurable magnitudes does not represent *entities*, they are not *quanta* (finite magnitudes) which result from a division of the Being into parts: they rather signify in a clear manner that Being is a relation and

nothing exists out of a relation. The meaning of the division in infinitum is not therefore the fragmentation in infinitesimal parts, in many Ones, which replicate in infinitum this same situation; “division in infinitum” means that the division, that is the relation, the ratio, is the very ontological *prius*.

3) *Positionality*. The idea that the One is the principle is overcome by the positional conception of numbers, which involves the introduction of the zero, unknown by the Greeks. From a positional, and not cardinal, point of view, the zero does not mean the nothing: it means the principle, the *arché* as starting point of something. In the Indian thought, where it seems to have been introduced, the zero is understood as a power, something that is not yet positive or actual, but can arise everything positive and actual.

It is probably in this direction that the second hypothesis of the *Parmenides* has to be assumed. Although not pursued by the following philosophy, basically henologic, which privileged rather the first hypothesis, it is instead more interesting from a mathematical point of view: “the One is not” leads to the hypothesis of the continuous and to the positional and not cardinal conception of number.

### *Il Parmenide di Platone fra il Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος di Gorgia e il Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος di Protagora : l'ombra dei sofisti nella γυμνασία*

Come è ben noto Platone sviluppa nel *Parmenide* la propria riflessione sulla filosofia eleatica nel codice di un dialogo che in un'Atene della metà del V secolo un Socrate ancora giovane intreccia con il vecchio Parmenide e il suo fedele discepolo Zenone. Tra il momento in cui Platone immagina l'incontro nella casa di Pitodoro e quello della composizione del dialogo la filosofia degli Eleati ha certo conosciuto interpretazioni, rivisitazioni, critiche di natura diversa di cui certo Platone, al di là della finzione letteraria, non può non aver tenuto conto. Del resto, lo stesso racconto sul destino del λόγος di Zenone evoca attacchi sviluppati da altri pensatori contro Parmenide quale motivazione della βοήθεια del più giovane discepolo (128c-e). E la stessa prima parte del *Parmenide* mette in scena la confutazione da parte di Socrate del λόγος di Zenone e la successiva reazione di Parmenide (128e-135c): nella cornice del dialogo Platone ci offre forse un esempio idealizzato dell'ampio dibattito sviluppatosi tra V e IV secolo intorno al pensiero di Parmenide. Da tempo molti interpreti hanno messo in luce l'importanza della ricezione del pensiero eleatico nella sofistica, non poche delle dottrine ontologiche, linguistiche e retoriche dei sofisti possono essere lette nel quadro di una rivisitazione di assunti parmenidei (cf. ad. es. Bonazzi 2010 pp. 26-57 e Casertano 2015 pp. 45-77). E la critica, mi riferisco soprattutto all'importante contributo di Palmer 1999, ha ipotizzato che l'interpretazione sofistica del pensiero eleatico svolga un ruolo non marginale nei dialoghi di Platone, in particolar modo nel *Parmenide*.

Il presente contributo intende analizzare l'eventuale presenza nel *Parmenide* di dottrine riconducibili ai due più importanti esponenti della sofistica, Gorgia e Protagora, con particolare riferimento alla seconda parte del dialogo, la cosiddetta γυμνασία.

Numerosi interpreti hanno colto echi del Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος di Gorgia, opera in cui il sofista rovesciava le tesi sull'essere di Parmenide per dimostrare i tre κεφάλαια in base a cui niente è, e se anche ci fosse qualcosa questo non potrebbe essere conosciuto, e se fosse possibile conoscerlo non si potrebbe comunicarlo ad altri (MXG 979a12-13 = 32D26LM). Più in particolare, come già riconoscevano fra gli altri da Diès 1923 p. 19, Wahl 1951<sup>4</sup> pp. 56-57 e Calogero 1977<sup>2</sup> pp. 269-311 e come ha confermato in prospettiva analitica Palmer 1999 pp. 112-117, la strategia argomentativa utilizzata da Parmenide nella I ipotesi presenta caratteri simili a quella impiegata dal sofista nel proprio λόγος. Più nello specifico, l'argomento di 138a-b relativo all'impossibilità per l'uno di trovarsi in un luogo è sostanzialmente lo stesso proposto per l'essere in MXG 979b23-27. La distinzione fra tipi di κινήσεις sviluppata da Parmenide in 138b-139a per mostrare che l'uno non può muoversi presenta somiglianze con MXG 980a1-3. La stessa conclusione della prima ipotesi, relativa alla inesistenza dell'uno e all'impossibilità di un suo λόγος e di una sua δόξα (141e-142a) potrebbe alludere ai tre κεφάλαια gorgiani (cf. Brémond 2018), del resto evocati probabilmente da Parmenide già nella discussione con Socrate (135a-b, cf. Hays 1990 pp. 335-337). Ma al di là della prima ipotesi tracce di un'influenza gorgiana sono ravvisabili anche in altri passi della γυμνασία. Ad

esempio la V ipotesi (161e-162b) si richiama forse all'ἴδιος ἀπόδειξις di Gorgia per l'essere dello ἐν οὐκ ὄν (cf. Dixsaut 2002 pp. 194-205).

Se la presenza di echi gorgiani è generalmente rilevata dagli interpreti moderni, più difficili da cogliere sono eventuali richiami a Protagora. Secondo Palmer 1999 p. 116 n. 36 se, come nel caso del λόγος di Gorgia, avessimo una conoscenza più ampia del Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος di Protagora sarebbe possibile riconoscere nel *Parmenide* una presenza altrettanto estesa di quest'opera. L'esistenza dell'opera è nota solo grazie ad un estratto della Φιλολόγος ἀκρόασις di Porfirio (*apud* Eus. *PE* X 3, 24-25 = 410F Smith = 80B2DK = 31R2LM), secondo il quale Platone avrebbe attinto dal Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος di Protagora argomenti contro chi concepiva l'essere come uno, πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τὸ ὄν εισάγοντας. Il riferimento è molto probabilmente al *Parmenide*. Purtroppo l'estratto si interrompe prima che siano spiegate le ragioni dell'affermazione (cf. Männlein-Robert 2001, pp. 284-285). Il tema della ripresa da parte di Platone di opere di Protagora non è isolato dal momento che anche Aristosseno sosteneva che Platone avesse ripreso le *Antilogie* del sofista per la *Repubblica* (67 Wehrli = 80B5DK = 31R2LM, cf. Corradi 2013). Non deve inoltre stupire la presenza di argomenti antieleatici in Protagora: non pochi interpreti hanno considerato l'Ἀλήθεια di Protagora come una risposta alla posizione di Parmenide (cf. ad es. Heitsch 1969, ma si consideri già la testimonianza di Simplicio, *In Phys.* 1108.14-29 = 80A29DK = 20D12bLM, relativa al dibattito fra Zenone e Protagora sul problema del molteplice).

Ma in quali passi del *Parmenide* è verisimile cogliere un'eventuale ripresa di riflessioni protagoree sulla quale avrebbe potuto fondarsi la notizia conservata da Porfirio? Certo l'insieme della γυμνασία potrebbe essere considerata una applicazione del principio antilogico protagoreo in base al quale su ogni tesi, in questo caso quella dell'essere dell'uno, è possibile sviluppare due discorsi contrapposti (80B6a DK = 31D26LM). Ma è plausibile richiamare elementi più specifici. Nella V ipotesi emerge il problema dell'impossibilità del falso (161e-162a) che può essere messo in relazione con la problematica dell'οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν che l'*Eutidemo* (286c = 80A19DK = 31R10LM) riconduce a Protagora e con la verità di tutte le opinioni che emerge in relazione all'uomo-misura ad esempio nell'apologia del *Teeteto* (167d, cf. Tabak 2015 pp. 108-118). Nella VII ipotesi l'analisi delle conseguenze per gli altri dal fatto che l'uno non sia fa emergere un mondo limitato alla sfera dalla pura apparenza in cui ai particolari sensibili non può essere attribuito stabilmente alcun carattere determinato, un mondo che, come è stato notato, appare vicino a quello presupposto dal principio protagoreo dell'uomo-misura almeno nell'interpretazione che di esso Platone offre nel *Teeteto* (152d ss., cf. Ferrari 2004 p. 361). Altri possibili elementi protagorei potrebbero celarsi nella I ipotesi dietro al richiamo alla tematica della misura (140b-d), certo centrale per il pensiero di Protagora (80B1DK = 31D9LM), e nell'analisi delle tre declinazioni temporali dell'essere attraverso le corrispondenti forme verbali (140d-141e) da mettere forse in relazione con l'attribuzione a Protagora di una riflessione sui μέρη χρόνου (80A1DK = 31D20LM, cf. Dunn 2001).

Una volta evidenziati i numerosi echi possibili delle opere dei due sofisti nel *Parmenide*, resta aperto il problema di stabilire il motivo della loro presenza nel dialogo. Forse potrebbero essere richiamati per sostenere il carattere ironico della γυμνασία, come ad esempio fa Calogero 1977<sup>2</sup> nella prospettiva di una dissoluzione platonica dell'eleatismo. Altri interpreti hanno pensato che il reale oggetto della confutazione platonica fossero proprio le dottrine sostenute dai sofisti (Palmer 1999 o Tabak 2015) o la ripresa di tali dottrine in pensatori più tardi (Wahl 1951<sup>4</sup> pp. 59-60). È però forse plausibile proporre una lettura più positiva. Se, come abbiamo avuto modo di sottolineare, non era possibile che Platone eludesse per lo studio dell'eleatismo la riflessione di Protagora e Gorgia, ad un

tempo non poteva trascurare il contributo che Protagora e Gorgia avevano dato, pur con scopi in parte criticabili nella prospettiva platonica, allo sviluppo di quel metodo del *διαλέγεσθαι* che da Zenone giunge, perfezionandosi, alla *γυμνασία* del *Parménide* (cf. Berti 1987 pp. 13-101), quale esercizio imprescindibile per chi voglia consacrarsi alla ricerca sulla verità (cf. Ferrari 2009), dando vita a quella *πραγματειώδης παιδιά*, frutto maturo del sofisticato *παίγνιον* elaborato da Gorgia per difendere Elena (80B11DK = 32D24LM).

### *Le Parménide de Platon entre le Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος de Gorgias et le Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος de Protagoras : l'ombre des sophistes dans la γυμνασία*

Comme on le sait, Platon développe dans le *Parménide* sa réflexion sur la philosophie éléatique dans le cadre d'un dialogue qu'un Socrate encore jeune entame avec le vieux Parménide et son fidèle disciple Zénon dans l'Athènes de la moitié du V<sup>e</sup> siècle. Entre le moment où se situe la rencontre qui a lieu dans la maison de Pythodore telle que la rapporte Platon et celui de la composition du dialogue, la philosophie éléatique a assurément connu des interprétations, des réélaborations, des critiques de diverses natures dont Platon, au-delà de la fiction littéraire, ne pouvait pas ne pas tenir compte. D'ailleurs le récit lui-même sur le *λόγος* de Zénon évoque des attaques développées par d'autres penseurs contre Parménide, attaques qui ont provoqué la *βοήθεια* de Zénon (128c-e). Et la première partie du dialogue elle-même met en scène la réfutation par Socrate du *λόγος* de Zénon, elle-même suivie de la réaction de Parménide (128e-135c). Platon offre donc, dans ce dialogue, un exemple idéalisé du débat autour de la pensée de Parménide qui avait fait florès entre V<sup>e</sup> et IV<sup>e</sup> siècle.

Depuis plusieurs années de nombreux commentateurs ont souligné l'importance de la réception de la pensée éléatique dans la sophistique : maintes doctrines ontologiques, linguistiques et rhétoriques des sophistes peuvent être interprétées dans le cadre d'une réélaboration de thèses parménidéennes (cf. p. ex. Bonazzi 2010 p. 26-57 et Casertano 2015 p. 45-77). Nombre de commentateurs – il suffit de penser à l'étude fondamentale de Palmer 1999 – ont avancé l'hypothèse que l'interprétation sophistique de l'éléatisme joue un rôle important dans les dialogues platoniciens, notamment dans le *Parménide*.

La présente contribution se propose d'analyser la présence éventuelle dans le *Parménide*, plus particulièrement dans la seconde partie du dialogue – la soi-disant *γυμνασία* –, de doctrines remontant aux deux représentants les plus importants de la sophistique, Gorgias et Protagoras. Nombreux sont en effet les interprètes qui ont décelé des allusions au *Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος* de Gorgias, œuvre dans laquelle le sophiste renversait les thèses parménidéennes sur l'être pour démontrer les trois *κεφάλαια* selon lesquels : rien n'est ; à supposer même qu'il y ait quelque chose l'on ne pourrait pas le connaître ; et quand bien même il y aurait quelque chose et qu'il serait possible de le connaître, on ne pourrait pas le communiquer à autrui (MXG 979a12-13 = 32D26LM). Comme l'ont déjà remarqué Diès 1923 p. 19, Wahl 1951<sup>4</sup> p. 56-57 et Calogero 1977<sup>2</sup> p. 269-311, et comme l'a confirmé dans une perspective analytique Palmer 1999 p. 112-117, la stratégie argumentative que Parménide utilise dans la première hypothèse présente des caractères similaires à ceux du *λόγος* du sophiste. Ainsi en est-il de l'argument avancé en 138a-b concernant l'impossibilité pour l'un de se trouver quelque part qui est quasiment le même que celui que Gorgias avance à propos de l'être

dans le MXG 979b23-27. De même, la distinction entre les types de κινήσεις que Parménide développe en 138b-139a pour montrer que l'un ne peut pas se mouvoir présente des similitudes certaines avec le MXG 980a1-3. La conclusion elle-même de la première hypothèse, qui parvient à démontrer l'inexistence de l'un et l'impossibilité de son λόγος et de sa δόξα (141e-142a) pourrait faire allusion aux trois κεφάλαια gorgiens (cf. Brémond 2018), lesquels sont d'ailleurs déjà probablement évoqués dans le dialogue par Parménide dans la discussion qu'il a avec Socrate (135a-b, cf. Hays 1990 p. 335-337). Mais, même au-delà de la première hypothèse, il est également possible de découvrir des traces d'une influence gorgienne dans d'autres passages de la γυμνασία. La cinquième hypothèse (161e-162b), par exemple, renvoie peut-être, pour ce qui est de l'être du ἐν οὐκ ὄν, à l'ἴδιος ἀποδείξις de Gorgias, ou, à tout le moins, pourrait l'évoquer (cf. Dixsaut 2002 p. 194-205).

Si la présence d'échos gorgiens a été remarquée par de nombreux interprètes modernes, la présence d'allusions à Protagoras est en revanche plus difficile à déceler. Selon Palmer 1999 p. 116 n. 36, si nous disposions, comme c'est le cas du λόγος de Gorgias, d'une connaissance plus large du Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος de Protagoras, il serait probablement aisé de découvrir dans le *Parménide* nombre d'allusions à cet ouvrage. Malheureusement, les seuls renseignements concernant cet ouvrage se trouvent dans un extrait de la Φιλολογος ἀκρόασις de Porphyre (*apud* Eus. PE X 3, 24-25 = 410F Smith = 80B2DK = 31R2LM), selon lequel Platon aurait tiré du Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος de Protagoras des arguments contre les penseurs monistes, πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τὸ ὄν εἰσάγοντας. Le texte se réfère probablement au *Parménide* mais, malheureusement, l'extrait s'interrompt avant que ne soient données les raisons de cette affirmation. (cf. Männlein-Robert 2001, p. 284-285). Cette idée selon laquelle Platon reprendrait dans ses dialogues des thèmes développés dans des ouvrages protagoréens n'est pas isolée ; Aristoxène soutenait, par exemple, que Platon s'était servi pour la rédaction de sa *République* des *Antilogies* de Protagoras, et que quasiment la totalité de la *République* provenait d'elles (67 Wehrli = 80B5DK = 31R2LM, cf. Corradi 2013). Il n'y a d'ailleurs pas lieu de s'étonner de la présence chez Protagoras d'arguments anti-éléatiques, et plusieurs interprètes considèrent que l'Ἀλήθεια de Protagoras est une réponse du sophiste aux positions de Parménide (cf. ad es. Heitsch 1969, mais voir aussi le témoignage de Simplicius, *In Phys.* 1108.14-29 = 80A29DK = 20D12bLM, concernant le débat entre Zénon et Protagoras sur la question de la multiplicité).

Reste à identifier les passages du *Parménide* dans lesquels il est possible de repérer avec quelque vraisemblance des allusions éventuelles à des réflexions protagoréennes sur lesquels Porphyre aurait pu s'appuyer. Certes, l'ensemble de la γυμνασία pourrait être considérée comme une application du principe antilogique protagoréen selon lequel, à propos de toute thèse – dans le cas qui nous occupe celle concernant l'être de l'un – il est possible de développer deux discours opposés (80B6a DK = 31D26LM). On peut toutefois repérer des éléments plus spécifiques. La cinquième hypothèse s'occupe du problème de l'impossibilité du faux (161e-162a). Cette question peut aisément être mise en rapport avec celle de l'οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν que l'*Euthydème* (286c = 80A19DK = 31R10LM) fait remonter à Protagoras, et également avec la thèse selon laquelle toutes les opinions sont vraies, thèse qui découlerait de celle de l'homme-mesure, selon l'Apologie du *Théétète* (167d, cf. Tabak 2015 p. 108-118). L'analyse des conséquences pour les autres du fait que l'un n'est pas fait émerger, dans la septième hypothèse, un monde circonscrit au domaine de l'apparaître dans lequel on ne peut attribuer de manière stable aux particuliers sensibles aucun caractère déterminé, un monde qui, comme cela a été remarqué, est très proche de celui que présuppose le principe protagoréen de l'homme-mesure, du moins dans l'interprétation que Platon

en donne dans le *Théétète* (152d ss., cf. Ferrari 2004 p. 361). La première hypothèse pourrait elle aussi receler d'autres éléments protagoréens, ainsi du renvoi au thème de la mesure (140b-d), lequel est assurément central dans la réflexion de Protagoras (80B1DK = 31D9LM), et de l'analyse des trois déclinaisons temporelles de l'être à travers les formes verbales correspondantes (140d-141e) que l'on pourrait mettre en rapport avec l'attribution à Protagoras d'une réflexion concernant les *μέρη χρόνου* (80A1DK = 31D20LM, cf. Dunn 2001).

Une fois soulignés les nombreux échos possibles des ouvrages de deux sophistes dans le *Parménide*, reste à établir les raisons de leur présence. Il est certes possible de s'appuyer sur eux pour soutenir le caractère ironique de la *γυμνασία*, comme le fait Calogero 1977<sup>2</sup>, qui les considère dans la perspective d'une dissolution platonicienne de l'éléatisme. Ou, comme d'autres interprètes l'ont pensé, on pourrait envisager que ce sont les doctrines sophistiques auxquelles Platon fait allusion (Palmer 1999 ou Tabak 2015) ou la reprise de ces doctrines par des penseurs postérieurs (Wahl 1951<sup>4</sup> p. 59-60) qui sont la véritable cible polémique de Platon. Il est toutefois peut-être plausible de proposer une interprétation plus positive. Si Platon, comme nous l'avons déjà souligné, ne pouvait pas faire abstraction, pour l'étude de l'éléatisme, de la réflexion de Protagoras et de Gorgias, il ne pouvait pas non plus – quand bien même leur contribution se fût proposé des buts qui, dans la perspective platonicienne, étaient en partie critiquables – négliger l'apport de ces deux sophistes au développement de cette méthode du *διαλέγεσθαι* qui, de Zénon, parvient, en se perfectionnant, à la *γυμνασία* du *Parménide* (cf. Berti 1987 p. 13-101), en tant qu'exercice incontournable pour qui voudrait se consacrer à la recherche de la vérité (cf. Ferrari 2009). Il est donc possible de percevoir dans la *πραγματιώδης παιδιά* du dialogue une sorte de fruit mature du *παίγνιον* sophistique que Gorgias avait élaboré pour la défense d'Hélène (80B11DK = 32D24LM).

### *La fuerza dialéctica y la fuerza de postular hipótesis*

Hay un único punto en el que coinciden los intérpretes antiguos y actuales del *Parménides*: con la puesta en escena del encuentro entre Zenón, Parménides y un joven Sócrates, Platón ha querido poner en relación 1) la filosofía del eleatismo, 2) la respuesta al monismo eléata que ofrece la concepción platónica de las formas, y 3) las dificultades que las forman plantean a su vez. También hay coincidencia (básicamente porque el texto lo dice de modo explícito) en que la gimnasia dialéctica, que parte de la tesis parmenídea y de su negación, y que atraviesa ocho series de deducciones, debería contribuir de algún modo a encaminarse hacia la solución de las aporías relativas a las formas platónicas. Aquí terminan los acuerdos y comienzan las divergencias interpretativas. No es claro de qué modo se deben interpretar las hipótesis, ni cuál es el sentido de lo que se deduce de ellas, ni qué beneficio podría traer aparejado a las formas platónicas semejante “mecanismo infernal”<sup>1</sup>, que concluye sin brindar ninguna aclaración retrospectiva. En el marco de este mínimo acuerdo estructural, encontramos no obstante una noción alrededor de la cual se organizan tanto el planteo inicial del eleatismo como la entera gimnasia dialéctica destinada a fortalecer los argumentos que deberán superar el monismo. Es la de *hypóthesis/hypotithemi*.

Las interpretaciones contemporáneas no suelen detenerse en el valor del formular hipótesis para el propósito del *Parménides*: pareciera aceptarse tácitamente que nuestro diálogo no va más allá del método hipotético planteado en los diálogos maduros<sup>2</sup>. Intentaré mostrar, sin embargo, que la originalidad de las nociones de *hypóthesis/hypotithemi* no sólo es relevante para la comprensión global del *Parménides* sino también para el despliegue, en otros diálogos de vejez, de una dimensión heurística capaz de superar, en contextos diversos, las aporías relativas a la incognoscibilidad. Para eso, mi argumentación se va a dirigir primero a tratar de mostrar que un primer aspecto novedoso de la formulación de hipótesis en el *Parménides* consiste en su aplicación lógico-semántica (que amplía una primera aproximación matemática al procedimiento en la *República*)<sup>3</sup>. En segundo lugar, insistiré en la vinculación de la gimnasia dialéctica del *Parménides* con una objeción de tipo gorgiano. En efecto, las dos hipótesis y las ocho series de deducciones a partir de ellas surgen al proyectar y reconducir hacia la propia concepción del ser el desafío que Gorgias había lanzado al eleatismo. El imaginario objetor dirá que las formas platónicas –concebidas como algo en sí– no existen (οὔτε ἔστι ταῦτα) y que si existen son incognoscibles para la naturaleza humana (αὐτὰ εἶναι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἄγνωστα). Platón no agrega a continuación, exactamente como Gorgias, que si las formas fueran cognoscibles sería imposible comunicarlas a otro, pero sí afirma algo muy parecido: sólo un ser extraordinariamente admirable sería capaz de instruir a otro (ἄλλον ... διδάξει), luego de

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1 Ferrari, 2004: 119.

2 Robinson, 1941: 186-187 concluye que en el *Parménides* hay un uso análogo de las hipótesis al que aparece en *República* VI, con énfasis en el carácter exhaustivo de la deducción de consecuencias, siendo el único aspecto novedoso el examen de una tesis y su negación.

3 En cierta medida, el cambio de perspectiva está implícito en el modo en que Brisson (1994: 16) define qué se entiende en el *Parménides* por *hypóthesis*: “una proposición puesta de forma provisoria de la que se extraen consecuencias lógicas para obtener un medio indirecto de (i) probar esas consecuencias, (ii) *descubrir las condiciones de posibilidad de un problema*, o (iii) descubrir la inconsistencia de la hipótesis y establecer así su rechazo” (el subrayado es nuestro). Buscaremos explicitar el sentido de ese cambio de perspectiva.



llegar a entender que hay un género de cada una y una esencia en sí y por sí (ὡς ἔστι γένος τι ἐκάστου καὶ οὐσία αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτήν)<sup>1</sup>. Recordemos que la defensa de las formas en el *Parménides* obedece a que sin ellas no habría “dónde dirigir el pensamiento” y “se destruiría la fuerza dialéctica” (135b-c).

Por otra parte, la referencia a hipótesis, la que permite que no se escape “la verdad” (135d), siempre se describe en el *Parménides* como un suponer/formular hipótesis (cf. *hypotithemi* en 135e, 136a, 136b, 136c, 137b, etc.). Trataré de mostrar, en relación con esto, cómo el suponer/formular hipótesis, entendido como un mecanismo que permite avanzar en el conocimiento, se emplea en diálogos posteriores, como *Timeo*, *Critias* y *Leyes*, para aventurarse en ámbitos del saber diversos – conocimiento histórico, fisiología, cosmología– en los que no hay un acceso directo a la verdad. Por ejemplo, Platón considera que los dos géneros, ser y devenir, postulados al comienzo del relato cosmológico de *Timeo* son dos “supuestos” (cf. ὑποτεθέν en *Tim.* 48e). Igualmente, el considerar que determinadas formas geométricas son los principios del fuego y de los demás elementos es un supuesto, un postulado de acuerdo con “el relato verosímil según necesidad” (cf. *Tim.* 53d: ταύτην δὴ πρὸς ἀρχὴν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σωμάτων ὑποτιθέμεθα κατὰ τὸν μετ' ἀνάγκης εἰκότα λόγον πορευόμενοι; cf. también *Tim.* 55e). Así también, cuando intenta describir cómo se dan las impresiones en los seres humanos reconoce que esa explicación no es independiente de la que se brinde acerca de la formación de la carne en el cuerpo. De ahí que se deba “suponer” uno de los dos tipos de estudio, psicofisiología o histología, “y luego volver sobre el que se haya dado por supuesto” (cf. *Tim.* 61d: ὑποθετέον δὴ πρότερον θάτερα, τὰ δ' ὑποτεθέντα ἐπάνιμεν αὖθις).

El suponer/formular hipótesis permite aproximarse a lo verdadero. Los supuestos, cuya no-verdad es admitida, no carecen de valor práctico ni de utilidad para el conocimiento. Junto con la reivindicación de la fuerza dialéctica, la lógica implacable del *Parménides* también permite revelar la fuerza multiplicadora del postular hipótesis, de un modo lexicalmente original y filosóficamente fecundo.

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### *La forza dialettica e la forza del formulare ipotesi*

Antichi e moderni lettori del *Parmenide* sono d'accordo fino a un certo punto: con la messa in scena del incontro tra Zenone, Parmenide e un giovane Socrate, Platone ha voluto vincolare: 1) la filosofia eleatica, 2) la risposta al monismo eleatico offerta dalla concezione platonica delle forme, e 3) le difficoltà che a sua volta propongono le forme. Coincidono anche nel avvertire (perché poi il testo lo afferma in maniera esplicita) che la ginnasia dialettica –la cui parte dalla tesi parmenidea e dalla sua negazione e attraversa otto deduzioni– dovrebbe contribuire in certo modo ad avviarsi verso la soluzione delle aporie concernenti le forme platoniche. L'accordo finisce a questo punto, e appaiono numerose divergenze. Non si vede con chiarezza come si dovrebbero capire le ipotesi, ne

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<sup>1</sup> La relación de *Parm.* 135a-b, con el *Tratado del No Ser* es sugerida por Migliori (1990: 163), como réplica a una asociación de este pasaje con la doctrina protagórica del *homo mensura* (Grote, 1885: 280-281). Pero no desarrolla a partir de ahí otras consecuencias.

quale sia il suo significato, meno ancora quale potrebbe essere il vantaggio per le forme platoniche di tutto questo “meccanismo veramente infernale”<sup>1</sup>, il cui finisce senza chiarire il rapporto in modo retrospettivo. Nella cornice di questo schematico accordo, vorrei dirigere la attenzione su una nozione intorno a cui si organizzano il planteo del eleatismo, l'intera gimnasia dialettica che dovrebbe rinforzare gli argomenti che superino il monismo. Questa nozione è quella di *hypóthesis/hypotíthemi*.

Il senso e valore del ipotizzare non viene spesso analizzato negli studi contemporanei sul Parmenide: sembra condivisa l'idea de che questo dialogo si attenga senza, approfondirne, al metodo ipotetico della *Repubblica*<sup>2</sup>. Vorrei argomentare, invece, che l'originalità nell'impiego di *hypóthesis/hypotíthemi* nel *Parmenide* è rilevante per la comprensione globale di questo dialogo e anzi consente di spiegare la sua proiezione, in altri dialoghi tardi, come dimensione euristica capace di superare, in contesti diversi, le aporie della incognoscibilità. Nel corso della nostra argomentazione, tenteremo di mostrare prima che la formulazione di ipotesi nel Parmenide introduce una applicazione logico-semantica (più ampia di quella prima comprensione matematica del procedere attraverso ipotesi nella *Repubblica*)<sup>3</sup>. In secondo luogo, si proverà a vincolare la ginnastica dialettica del *Parmenide* con una obiezione di tipo gorgiano. In effetti, le due ipotesi considerate e le otto deduzioni che da esse si fanno, appaiono quando Platone sottomette la propria concezione del' essere alla sfida che Gorgia aveva posto agli Eleati. Nel Parmenide, un immaginario obietore afferma che le forme platoniche –concepite in sé– non esistono (οὔτε ἔστι ταῦτα), e se esistono sono incognoscibili dalla natura umana (αὐτὰ εἶναι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἀγνωστα). Platone modifica la terza tesi di Gorgia: non dice que se le forme fossero cognoscibili, sarebbe comunque impossibile comunicare questo ad un altro, ma afferma qualcosa molto simile: solo un uomo molto dotato sarà in grado di comprendere che esiste un genere e una sostanza in se stessa di ciascuna cosa (ὡς ἔστι γένος τι ἐκάστου καὶ οὐσία αὐτῆ καθ' αὐτήν)<sup>4</sup>, e uno ancora più straordinario sarà in grado di insegnarlo a un altro (ἄλλον ... διδάξαι). Bisogna avere in mente che la difesa delle forme platoniche nel *Parmenide* nasce della convinzione de che senza di esse “non avrà dove rivolgere il pensiero” e si “destruggerà completamente la potenza della dialettica” (135b-c).

Il riferimento a ipotesi è, ancor più, ciò che consente di trattenere la verità (cf. 135d: εἰ δὲ μή, σὲ διαφεύξεται ἢ ἀλήθεια), e questo riferimento si descrive nel *Parmenide* come un suporre/formulare ipotesi (cf, *hypotíthemi* in 135e, 136a, 136b, 136c, 137b, ecc.). Vorrei mostrare come il suporre /formulare ipotesi, concepito come meccanismo che ci consente di fare progressi nella conoscenza, si impiega in dialoghi tardi come *Timeo*, *Critia*, *Leggi*, per azzardarsi in scopi diversi –fisiologia, cosmologia, storia– nei cui la verità tende a sfuggire e non sembra accessibile. Platone considera, per esempio, che i due génos, essere e divenir, postulati al inizo del relato cosmologico di *Timeo* sono “supposizioni” (cf. ὑποτεθέν, *Tim.* 48e). Considera anzi Platone che

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1 Ferrari, 2004: 119.

2 Secondo Robinson, 1941: 186-187, la differenza tra il *Parmenide* e *Rep.* VI è che nel primo si intenta esaurire la deduzione di conseguenze; l'unica novità sarebbe l'esame di ogni tesi insieme alla sua negazione.

3 In un certo senso, il cambio di prospettiva è implícito nel modo in cui Brisson (1994: 16) descrive cosa significa *hypóthesis* nel *Parmenide*: “est une proposition posée à titre provisoire don con tire les conséquences logiques, que- ce soit pour obtenir un moyen indirect (i) de prouver ces conséquences, (ii) de découvrir les conditions de possibilité d'un problème, ou (iii) de découvrir l'inconsistance de l'hypothèse et de conclur à son reject ” (corsivo mio). Tentaremo di chiarire il senso di questo cambio di prospettiva.

4 Il vincolo di *Parm.* 135a-b col *Tratato sul Non Essere* di Gorgia é messo in rilievo da Migliori (1990: 163), come risposta alla identificazione di questo passo con la dottrina protagorica del *homo mensura* (Grote, 1885: 280-281). Ma Migliori non considera altre conseguenze di questo vincolo.

certi triangoli sono i principi del fuoco de gli altri elementi come supposizioni, postulati que vanno d'accordo col "relato verisimile secondo necessità" (cf. *Tim.* 53d: ταύτην δὴ πυρὸς ἀρχὴν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σωμάτων ὑποτιθέμεθα κατὰ τὸν μετ' ἀνάγκης εἰκότα λόγον πορευόμενοι; cf. anche *Tim.* 55e). Quando tenta di descrivere, sempre nel Timeo, come si formano le impressioni, Platone ammette che questa spiegazione non può essere indipendente della spiegazione che riguarda la formazione della carne nei corpi. Per ciò si dovrà "suporre" uno dei due studi, psicofisiologia oppure istologia, "e tornare più tarde su cui sia stato suposto" (cf. *Tim.* 61d: ὑποθετέον δὴ πρότερον θάτερα, τὰ δ' ὑποτεθέντα ἐπάνιμεν αὖθις).

Suporre /formulare ipotesi consente di avvicinare la verità. I suposti, le ipotesi, la cui non-verità è implicitamente ammesa, non mancano comunque di valore pratico ne di utilità per la conoscenza. Insieme alla rivendicazione della forza dialettica, la logica implacabile del *Parmenide* consente di rivelare anche la forza moltiplicatrice del formulare ipotesi, in un modo lessicalmente originale e filosoficamente fecondo.

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### *What the instant looks like. Plato's Parmenides and the science of transition.*

This contribution focuses on Plato's view of the instant (*τὸ ἐξαιφνης*) as presented in the *Parmenides* (156d – 157b). It investigates the relevant tenet according to which the Being and the Becoming of the One can be determined through the transition from a state to another or from affections (*παθήματα*) or properties to others by means of the durationless instant.

First, I argue that Plato's view of instantaneity cannot be assimilated to any perdurantism. Indeed, when talking about the being of the one in the instant (156 c- 156e), Plato refers to the condition for an inner transition from a state to another to occur. Therefore, the instant is set out of the flow of time. In other words, the “now” (*νῦν*) cannot be assimilated with the instant. The now or different “nows” can be aggregated and can be part of a time series. The instant on the contrary is unique. We cannot have, in Plato's view, a series of instants (156e), nor we need it if we want to describe physical phenomena, since we have the now as a mode of time, different from ‘before’ and ‘after’ to do that. The way in which the one relates to the instant cannot be understood in spatio-temporal terms.

However, in order to ensure in the one a transition from Being to Becoming and viceversa, the instant must allow an indirect reference to the spatio-temporal world where any transition occurs, as well as a link to the eternal world of forms, given that it is in the *μεταξύ*. Thus, I clarify in which sense the instant situates in the *μεταξύ* between Being and Becoming as a necessary tool in order to determine the properties of the one with respect to the Being. In my view, Plato's arguments point to the fact that there must be a science of transition (155e – 156c), namely a coherent theory through which we can account for any sudden transition or non-local switching from a state to another. The pressing issue to clarify is which science he is talking about. Is it a theory leading to science (*ἐπιστήμη*)? Or is it a theory with a hybrid status? And why does Plato need it? In 155d Plato mentions that we can have knowledge, opinion and sensation of the one. Whereas the one needs to be in time in order to be known or felt through its affections, yet the condition for it to change is posited outside the flow of time, in the instant. Thus, the understanding of the ground of this transition cannot pertain to sensation and opinion, but only to science. How? This is because any condition of a transition of the one, e.g. from one to many, occurs out of time, in the instant, but in turn the instant is the signature of a process of generation or signifies a transition in the physical world that occurs in time.

The science of transition is meant to give a definition of the generation (*τὸ γίνεσθαι*). It is a theory about coming into being or the genesis of new states (157a). Thus, in my view, in 155e – 157a Plato approaches the problem of justifying any generation through a science of transition which has a hybrid status: it only explains the possibility and actuality of generation, but it does not deal with specific products of this generation. Plato's theory of transition refers to the fundamental ground of any transition, the instant, but it cannot define the instant through time, whereas the instant signifies the non-place (*τὸ ἄτοπον*) where any generation takes place (in this sense it brings with it a sense of absurdity).

Among the most interesting properties of the instant we find non-locality. Indeed, the instant as sudden shift or switch allows us to think of the interruption of a process and the condition for the rising of a new different one at any place or nowhere. Furthermore, given the atemporal character of the instant understood in terms of durationless thing, a state can pertain to an entity at once or more states as actual possibilities can pertain to one and the same entity at once. Only thanks to the temporal dimension or “being in time” of the one we can apply the principle of identity and the excluded middle, but in the instant, they do not hold.

There are different types of transition, according to my reading. One is clearly physical occurring in both space and time (change of a state or position) or of places in time (motion), as well as purely in time when a change in our feelings (e.g. from pleasure to pain) occurs. When it is regarded as the result of a continuous process, a transition is referring to physical or mental states of the phenomenal world.

However, there can be another type of transition that is non-local and defines the way in which change can occur in the One, i.e. how its properties can be configured when it partakes in the Being. The instant is what allows us to think of the transition from a state to another or of a sudden change of regime (switch, change of direction of a transition) both in the external physical world and in our bodies. However, at the most abstract level of Plato’s science of transition, the instant also allows to characterize the inner determinations of the One and how it partakes in the Being and the Becoming.

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### *A cosa somiglia l’istante. Il Parmenide di Platone e la scienza della transizione.*

Questo contributo si concentra sulla nozione platonica di istante (*τὸ ἐξαιφνης*) come viene presentata nel *Parmenide* (156d – 157b) e sull’importante principio secondo cui l’essere e il divenire dell’uno possono essere determinati attraverso una transizione da uno stato ad un altro o da certe affezioni (*παθήματα*) o proprietà ad altre grazie all’istante atemporale.

In primo luogo sostengo che la visione platonica di istantaneità non può essere assimilata ad alcun perdurantismo. Infatti, quando Platone parla dell’essere dell’uno nell’istante (156 c- 156 e), si riferisce alla condizione perchè si dia una transizione interna da uno stato ad un altro. Perciò l’istante è posto fuori dal passaggio del tempo. In altre parole, l’“ora” (*νῦν*) non può essere assimilato all’istante. L’ora o differenti “ora” possono essere aggregati e possono essere parte di una serie temporale. Al contrario l’istante è unico. Non possiamo avere, secondo Platone, una serie di istanti (156e), e neppure ne abbiamo bisogno se vogliamo descrivere fenomeni fisici, in quanto già abbiamo l’ora come modalità del tempo che si differenzia dal prima e dal dopo per farlo. Il modo in cui l’uno si pone in relazione con l’istante non può essere compreso in termini spazio-temporali.

Tuttavia per assicurare una transizione nell’uno dall’essere al divenire e viceversa, l’istante deve permettere un riferimento indiretto al mondo spazio-temporale dove avvengono transizioni, e

allo stesso tempo anche un riferimento al mondo eterno delle forme, in quanto esso si trova nel *μεταξύ*. Dunque va chiarito in che senso situandosi nel *μεταξύ*, tra essere e divenire, l'istante sia uno strumento necessario per determinare le proprietà dell'uno rispetto all'essere. Secondo la mia lettura, gli argomenti di Platone sono volti a mostrare come debba esserci una scienza del passaggio o della transizione (155e-156c), ovvero una teoria coerente mediante la quale possiamo dar conto di ogni transizione improvvisa o di un cambio non-locale da uno stato a un altro. La questione che ci preme chiarire è di che tipo di scienza stiamo parlando. È una teoria che produce scienza (*ἐπιστήμη*)? O è una teoria con uno status ibrido? E soprattutto perchè Platone ne ha bisogno? In 155d Platone menziona che possiamo avere scienza, opinione e sensazione dell'uno. Mentre l'uno deve stare nel tempo per essere conosciuto o sentito attraverso le sue affezioni, la condizione del suo mutamento è posta fuori del tempo, nell'istante. Dunque, la comprensione del fondamento di questa transizione non può appartenere alla sensazione e all'opinione, ma solo alla scienza. Come? Questo accade perchè ogni condizione per una transizione dell'uno (per esempio dall'uno a molti) è posta fuori del tempo, nell'istante, ma del resto l'istante è a sua volta segno di un processo di generazione o significa una transizione nel mondo fisico che accade nel tempo.

La scienza della transizione è volta a definire la generazione (*τὸ γίνεσθαι*). È una teoria del venire all'essere, della genesi di nuovi stati (157a). Perciò, a mio avviso, in 155e-157a Platone si avvicina al problema di giustificare qualsiasi generazione attraverso una scienza della transizione che ha uno status ibrido: essa spiega solamente la possibilità e la realtà della generazione, ma non ci dice nulla dei prodotti specifici che vengono generati. La teoria platonica della transizione si riferisce al fondamento di qualsiasi transizione, l'istante, ma non può definire l'istante stesso mediante qualcos'altro come il tempo, mentre l'istante a sua volta significa un non-luogo (*τὸ ἄτοπον*) dove ogni generazione ha luogo (in questo senso porta con sé un carattere di absurdità).

Tra le caratteristiche più interessanti dell'istante troviamo la non-località. Infatti l'istante inteso come salto o cambio improvviso ci permette di pensare l'interruzione di un processo e la condizione del sorgere di nuovi in ogni luogo o da nessuna parte. Inoltre, dato il carattere atemporale dell'istante inteso come un qualcosa senza durata, uno stato può appartenere ad un ente allo stesso tempo o più stati come possibilità reali possono appartenere a uno e lo stesso ente al medesimo tempo. Solamente grazie alla dimensione temporale o all'essere nel tempo dell'uno è possibile applicare il principio di identità e il terzo escluso, ma nella dimensione dell'istante ciò non è possibile.

Secondo la mia lettura, dunque, Platone riesce a dar conto di diversi tipi di transizione. Una chiaramente fisica che ha luogo nello spazio e nel tempo (cambio di uno stato o posizione) o che prevede un passaggio di luoghi nel tempo (movimento), come anche una puramente nel tempo quando avviene un cambiamento nei nostri sentimenti (dal piacere al dolore). Quando è considerato come il risultato di un processo continuo, una transizione si riferisce agli stati fisici o mentali del mondo fenomenico.

Ma può esserci una transizione non locale e che definisce il modo in cui un cambiamento può avvenire nell'uno, ovvero come le sue proprietà possono essere configurate quando partecipa dell'essere. L'istante è ciò che ci permette di pensare e conoscere la transizione da uno stato all'altro o a un cambiamento di regime (interruzione, cambio di direzione) sia nel mondo fisico che nei nostri corpi. Tuttavia, ad un livello più astratto della scienza della transizione di Platone, l'istante è ciò che ci permette di caratterizzare le determinazioni interne dell'uno e come esse partecipino dell'essere e del divenire.

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### *Parmenides, 146b2-5: Unbreakable Laws Broken?*

It seems that there are three laws of identity and non-identity that are undeniable. Firstly, there is nothing that could be both identical and non-identical to something i.e.  $\Box\neg\exists x\exists y(x=y\wedge x\neq y)$ . Call this Restrictiveness. Secondly, there is nothing that could be neither identical nor non-identical to something, since these are necessary conditions for something counting as a thing at all i.e.  $\Box\neg\exists x\exists y(\neg x=y\wedge\neg x\neq y)$ . Call this Exhaustivity. Thirdly, ‘non-identical’ must entail ‘not identical’ and vice versa and ‘not non-identical’ must entail ‘identical’ and vice versa i.e.  $\Box\forall x\forall y((x\neq y\leftrightarrow\neg x=y)\wedge(\neg x\neq y\leftrightarrow x=y))$ . Call this Exclusivity. Yet, in the second deduction of the *Parmenides*, at 146b2-5, Parmenides seems to break Exhaustivity and Exclusivity by claiming that there is at least one thing that is neither identical nor non-identical to something. In this paper, I argue that this is not as troubling as it initially appears because Parmenides does not say that there *is* something that breaks Exhaustivity and Exclusivity but that there *might* be. Further, if we look to the first part of the dialogue, we find that we can explain why we find this suggestion at 146b2-5: there are some things that are genuinely difficult to reconcile with Exhaustivity and Exclusivity. This has repercussions for the participation relation and what counts as an object.

I begin by justifying my reading of ταυτότος and ἕτερος as ‘identical’ and ‘non-identical’ before proceeding to outlining the brief argument that begins with 146b2-5. 146b2-5 constitutes the first premise of this argument: Πάν που πρὸς ἅπαν ὧδε ἔχει, ἢ ταυτόν ἐστίν ἢ ἕτερον· ἢ ἐὰν μὴ ταυτόν ἢ μὴδ’ ἕτερον, μέρος ἂν εἴη τούτου πρὸς ὃ οὕτως ἔχει, ἢ ὡς πρὸς μέρος ὅλον ἂν εἴη, which we might translate ‘Everything with respect to everything is like this: either identical or non-identical or if neither identical nor non-identical, then as a part to that of which it so holds or as a whole to the one of its parts’. I explain that given the context of the argument, it seems that here, Parmenides rejects Exhaustivity and Exclusivity because there are at least two things that are exempt from identity and non-identity: a part with respect to the whole it is part of or a whole with respect to one of its parts. This seems outrageous. Yet, the wider context of the second deduction indicates that Plato presents this as plausible.

I then explore a potential escape route in Harte, the only scholar who pays much attention to 146b2-5. On her reading, Parmenides is not denying Exhaustivity and Exclusivity at all and what he does say is plausible: for any (putative) pair, a and b, a stands to be in exactly one of the following ways: as identical, as non-identical, as a part with respect to the whole it is part of or a whole with respect to one of its parts. However, I argue that her interpretation is not compatible with the careful construction of 146b2-5. I provide an alternative interpretation, on which what Parmenides says amounts to the claim that everything with respect to everything is either identical or non-identical (and Exhaustivity and Exclusivity are true) or there is at least one part with respect to the whole it is part of or a whole with respect to one of its parts that is neither identical nor non-identical (and Exhaustivity and Exclusivity are false).



One obvious objection to this reading is that it forces us to acknowledge that Plato suggests that Exhaustivity and Exclusivity might be false. Yet, the mere suggestion that Exhaustivity and Exclusivity might be false seems utterly unacceptable. I explore two strategies to deal with this. The first is to look to the very first arguments of the second deduction. There, Parmenides suggests that whatever is one must be and therefore have a being-part and whatever is must be one and have a one-part. This generates an infinite number of parts such that the one is always coming to be two. In light of this, we might think that the one of the second deduction cannot be either identical or non-identical to one of its parts and vice versa because it is always dividing. Thus, the parts of the one are simply not stable enough to be either identical nor non-identical to it or vice versa. It is in light of this that Plato suggests that Exhaustivity and Exclusivity may be false. However, I argue that this strategy fails.

I then turn to a second strategy, which involves looking to the first part of the dialogue. I argue that there, the discussion of the sail and day analogy yields an answer: there are some candidates that are genuinely difficult to reconcile with Exhaustivity and Exclusivity: a Form with respect to one of its instantiations or an instantiation with respect to its Form or a property itself with respect to one of its instances or vice versa. Moreover, I suggest that this has interesting lessons for understanding the participation relation and exactly what counts as a proper object. Thus, 146b2-5 is not only explicable but also has interesting metaphysical consequences.

### *Parménides, 146b2-5: ¿Rompiendo leyes inquebrantables?*

Parece que hay tres leyes de identidad y no-identidad que son innegables. En primer lugar, no hay nada que pueda ser idéntico y no-idéntico a algo, i.e.  $\Box \neg \exists x \exists y (x=y \wedge x \neq y)$ . Llamo a esto Restrictividad. En segundo lugar, no hay nada que pueda ser ni idéntico ni no-idéntico a algo, ya que estas son condiciones necesarias para que algo cuente como una cosa, es decir,  $\exists x \exists y (\neg x = y \wedge \neg x \neq y)$ . Llamo a esto Exhaustividad. En tercer lugar, "no-idéntico" debe implicar "no idéntico" y viceversa, y "no no-idéntico" debe implicar "idéntico" y viceversa, es decir,  $\Box \forall x \forall y ((x \neq y \leftrightarrow x = y) \wedge \neg x \neq y \leftrightarrow x = y)$ . Llamo a esto Exclusividad. Sin embargo, en la segunda deducción de *Parménides*, en 146b2-5, Parménides parece romper la ley de Exhaustividad y de Exclusividad al afirmar que hay al menos una cosa que no es ni idéntica ni no-idéntica a algo. En este artículo, sostengo que esto no es tan problemático como parece inicialmente, porque Parménides no dice que *hay* algo que rompe la ley de Exhaustividad y la de Exclusividad, sino que *pueda* haberla. Además, si consideramos la primera parte del diálogo, encontramos que podemos explicar por qué encontramos esta sugerencia en 146b2-5: hay algunas cosas que son genuinamente difíciles de conciliar con la ley de la Exhaustividad y de la Exclusividad. Esto tiene repercusiones para nuestra concepción de la relación de participación y sobre qué cuenta como un objeto.

Comienzo por justificar mi lectura de ταὐτός y ἕτερος como "idéntico" y "no-idéntico" antes de proceder a delinear el breve argumento que comienza en 146b2-5. La oración en 146b2-5 constituye la primera premisa de este argumento: Πᾶν που πρὸς ἅπαν ὧδε ἔχει, ἢ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἢ ἕτερον· ἢ ἐὰν μὴ ταὐτόν ᾗ μὴδ' ἕτερον, μέρος ἂν εἴη τούτου πρὸς ὃ οὕτως ἔχει, ἢ ὡς πρὸς μέρος ὅλον ἂν εἴη, que podríamos traducir "Todo con respecto a todo es así: ya sea idéntico o no-idéntico o si no es ni idéntico ni no-idéntico, entonces será como una parte de aquello que la contiene o será como un

todo con respecto a una de sus partes.” Explico que dado el contexto del argumento, parece que aquí, Parménides rechaza la ley de la Exhaustividad y de la Exclusividad porque hay al menos dos cosas que están exentas de identidad y no-identidad: una parte con respecto al todo del que forma parte o un todo con respecto a una de sus partes. Esto parece escandaloso. Sin embargo, el contexto más amplio de la segunda deducción muestra que Platón presenta esto como plausible.

Después de esto exploro una posible ruta de escape propuesta por Harte, la única que ha prestado suficiente atención a 146b2-5. En su interpretación, Parménides no niega la ley de la Exhaustividad y la Exclusividad en lo absoluto y lo que dice es plausible: para cualquier par (putativo),  $a$  y  $b$ ,  $a$  se encuentra en relación a  $b$  en solo una de las siguientes maneras: como idéntico, como no-idéntico, o como una parte con respecto al todo del que forma parte o como un todo con respecto a una de sus partes. Sin embargo, yo argumento que esta interpretación no es compatible con la cuidadosa construcción de 146b2-5. Ofrezco una interpretación alternativa, en la que lo que dice Parménides equivale a la afirmación de que todo con respecto a todo es idéntico o no-idéntico (y la ley de la Exhaustividad y de la Exclusividad son verdaderas) o que hay al menos una parte con respecto al todo del que forma parte o un todo con respecto a una de sus partes que no es ni idéntico ni no-idéntico (y la ley de la Exhaustividad y la Exclusividad son falsas).

Una obvia objeción a esta lectura es que nos obliga a reconocer que Platón sugiere que la ley de la Exhaustividad y la de Exclusividad podrían ser falsas. Sin embargo, la mera sugerencia de que podrían ser falsas parece totalmente inaceptable. Exploro dos estrategias para lidiar con esto. La primera es revisar los primeros argumentos de la segunda deducción. Allí, Parménides sugiere que cualquier cosa que es *una* debe *ser*, y, por lo tanto, debe tener una “parte-ser” y cualquier cosa que *es* debe ser *una* y debe tener una “parte-uno.” Esto genera un número infinito de partes de tal manera que el uno siempre está llegando a ser dos. A la luz de esto, podríamos pensar que el uno de la segunda deducción no puede ser idéntico o no-idéntico a una de sus partes y viceversa porque siempre se está dividiendo. Por lo tanto, las partes del uno no son lo suficientemente estables para ser idénticas o no-idénticas a él o viceversa. Es a la luz de esto que Platón sugiere que la ley de la Exhaustividad y de la Exclusividad podrían ser falsas. Sin embargo, sostengo que esta estrategia falla.

Paso después a una segunda estrategia, que implica mirar a la primera parte del diálogo. Defiendo que allí, la discusión de la analogía de la vela y el día ofrece una respuesta: hay algunos candidatos que son genuinamente difíciles de conciliar con la ley de la Exhaustividad y de la Exclusividad: una Forma con respecto a una de sus instancias o una instancia con respecto a su Forma o una propiedad en sí misma con respecto a una de sus instancias o viceversa. Por otra parte, sugiero que esto nos puede ayudar a comprender la relación de participación y exactamente qué cuenta como un objeto en sentido propio. Por lo tanto, 146b2-5 no solo es explicable sino que también tiene interesantes consecuencias metafísicas.

*Beyond the Socratic Dialectic: Parmenidean Methodology in Plato's Parmenides*

For the 2019 IPS, I propose to closely examine the second section of Plato's *Parmenides*. In particular, I will focus on how it serves as an example of a Parmenidean-style method of inquiry, which follows a "path through all things." In comparative and contrastive conjunction with Parmenides' own poem—especially those passages which explicitly refer to the need to follow various "routes of inquiry," in order to examine "all things"—this project may very well shed light on how certain passages of Parmenides' own poem might best be understood. Of course, there is risk of anachronism with such speculation. Yet, at the very least, this project may provide further insight into how Plato understood and/or used Parmenides' work for his own ends—both as a springboard source for this eponymous dialogue, as well as the intention of the dialogue's second section.

Narrative:

The first section of Plato's *Parmenides* concludes in an aporetic dilemma. Reasoning has led to the conclusion that the Forms either: 1a) do not exist, or 1b) are unknowable to human beings, while 2) both the denial of their existence, or ability to know of them, would destroy all possibility for philosophical reasoning. To resolve this paradox and discover the truth, Parmenides encourages young Socrates to further develop his philosophical acumen beyond his traditional dialectic method. That is, Socrates should not only consider the implications of a proposed definition or hypothesis (as he normally does), but also the implications of denying that very same proposed definition/hypothesis. After entreaties by Socrates and Zeno to explicate his meaning further, Parmenides agrees to provide an example of this very methodology in discussion with Aristoteles. This methodical exposition, which comprises the bulk of the dialogue's second section, considers the implications of Being a) as a single unity, b) as an existent thing, and c) as a non-existent thing.

That Plato intends a close connection between the ensuing excursus, and that which is found in Parmenides' own poem, is especially suggested by Zeno's phrasing at 136a:

ἀγνοοῦσιν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν σχεῖν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Παρμενίδη, Σωκράτει συνδέομαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐτὸς διακούσω διὰ χρόνου.

For the multitude are unaware that without this *wandering path through all things*, it is not possible for the mind to grasp the truth, having come upon it. So Parmenides, I join Socrates in his entreaty, so that I might hear [the method] as well, after a long time.

That Parmenides' character in the Platonic dialogue will use a method of inquiry described as τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης calls to mind numerous passages throughout Parmenides' own poem, wherein the didactic goddess speaks of the need to follow certain “routes of inquiry” in order to discover the Truth.

That Parmenides conceives of philosophical inquiry as a journey along certain pathways is evident even in the mythological *proem* that opens his work.

The first passage from Parmenides that Zeno's phrasing calls to mind is interpretatively difficult due to corruption in its transmission. In the philosopher youth's exposition of his divine chariot ride to meet the poem's didactic goddess, he claims to follow a “well-known path” (ὁδὸν πολύφημον), which is further described in 1.3 as:

δαίμονος, ἣ κατὰ [παντ' ἀτη] φέρει εἰδότα φῶτα.

[the path] of the god/goddess, which bears the knowing man through [all cities].

Many emendations have been suggested for this corruption, as few scholars are satisfied with the manuscript reading reported above. If a case could be made that Plato's description of a methodological path by which “all things” (διὰ πάντων) must be examined—in this case, all relevant possibilities and implications—were picking up on the description in line 1.3, then that would further support emendations favoring παντ' τη. This has implications not only for the kind of activity the philosopher-youth is engaged in, but the characterization of the path as well—e.g. the proper translation of δαίμονος in this same line, and whether that path is to be associated with the poem's didactic goddess or Helios.

The route/road metaphor continues throughout the rest of the philosopher-youth's journey to meet the didactic goddess, who then outlines several routes of inquiry that must be engaged in to learn the truth (1.28b-1.32). And once again, Zeno's claim that “all things” must be considered seems relevant:

χρεῶν δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι, (28b)

ἡμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐκύκλιος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ,

ἡδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐνί πίστις ἀληθῆς

ἀλλ' ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεται ὡς τὰ δοκεῦντα

χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περ ὄντα [περῶντα]

While any attempt to translate the final lines is quite contentious, and thus will not be attempted in this abstract, it should be clear from the bolded portion that part of what will be learnt—and perhaps the learning process itself—also involves a sense of considering “all things.” And this learning outcome or process is the goal of the philosopher-youth's journey, the one which he began following the “path of the δαίμονος” for. Scholars have been divided over whether there are two “routes of inquiry” outlined by the goddess at this point, or 3. Once again, the tripartite method outlined in the second section of Plato's *Parmenides* may prove instructive on this interpretative point.

The question over the number of routes of inquiry hinted at in Parmenides' own poem, which must each be traveled to learn about "all things," arises in numerous passages throughout the poem (B.2, B.6, and B.8). Comparing and contrasting the lines of argumentation, and the overarching methodologies, in each text will comprise the bulk of this paper.

### *Au-delà de la dialectique socratique : la méthode parménidienne dans le Parménide de Platon*

Pour l'IPS 2019, je propose d'examiner de près la deuxième partie de Parmenides de Platon. En particulier, je vais me concentrer sur la manière dont il sert d'exemple de méthode d'enquête de type parménidien, qui suit une «voie à travers toutes les choses». la nécessité de suivre différentes «pistes d'enquête» pour examiner «toutes choses» - ce projet pourrait très bien éclairer la manière dont certains passages du propre poème de Parménide pourraient être mieux compris. Bien sûr, il existe un risque d'anachronisme avec une telle spéculation. Cependant, à tout le moins, ce projet pourrait fournir un aperçu supplémentaire de la manière dont Platon a compris et / ou utilisé le travail de Parmenides à ses propres fins - à la fois source de ce dialogue éponyme et intention de la deuxième section du dialogue.

Récit:

La première section de Parmenides de Platon se termine par un dilemme aporétique. Le raisonnement a mené à la conclusion que les Formes: 1a) n'existent pas, ou 1b) ne peuvent être connues des êtres humains, 2) le déni de leur existence ou leur capacité à les connaître détruirait toute possibilité de raisonnement philosophique . Pour résoudre ce paradoxe et découvrir la vérité, Parmenides encourage le jeune Socrate à développer davantage son sens philosophique au-delà de sa méthode dialectique traditionnelle. C'est-à-dire que Socrate ne devrait pas seulement considérer les implications d'une définition ou d'une hypothèse proposée (comme il le fait normalement), mais également les implications de nier cette même définition / hypothèse proposée. Après avoir été supplié par Socrate et Zeno d'expliquer davantage sa signification, Parmenides accepte de fournir un exemple de cette méthodologie en discussion avec Aristoteles. Cette présentation méthodique, qui comprend l'essentiel de la deuxième partie du dialogue, considère les implications de l'être a) comme une unité unique, b) comme une chose existante et c) comme une chose inexistante.

Cette Platon veut établir un lien étroit entre l'exkursus qui s'ensuit, et ce qui se trouve dans le propre poème de Parmenides, est particulièrement suggéré par le phrasé de Zénon à 136a:

ἀγνοοῦσιν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν σχεῖν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Παρμενίδη, Σωκράτει συνδέομαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐτὸς διακούσω διὰ χρόνου.

Car la multitude ne sait pas que sans ce cheminement errant à travers toutes choses, il n'est pas possible pour l'esprit de saisir la vérité, étant venu sur elle. Alors

Parménide, je rejoins Socrate dans sa supplication, pour que j'entende aussi [la méthode] après un long moment.

Ce caractère de Parménide dans le dialogue platonicien utilisera une méthode de recherche décrite comme suit: τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης évoque de nombreux passages du propre poème de Parménides, dans lesquels la déesse didactique parle de la nécessité de suivre certaines «voies de recherche» afin de découvrir la vérité.

Que Parménide conçoive l'enquête philosophique comme un voyage sur certaines voies est évidente, même dans le propos mythologique qui ouvre son travail.

Le premier passage de Parménides que la phrase de Zeno évoque est difficile à interpréter en raison de la corruption dans sa transmission. Dans l'exposition du jeune philosophe à la traversée de son chariot divin à la rencontre de la déesse didactique du poème, il prétend suivre une «voie bien connue» (ὁδὸν πολύφημον), décrite plus loin en 1.3:

δαίμονος, κατὰ [παντ' ἄτη] φέρει εἰδότα φῶτα.

[le chemin] du dieu/déesse, qui porte l'homme connaissant à travers [toutes les villes].

De nombreuses corrections ont été suggérées pour cette corruption, car peu de chercheurs sont satisfaits de la lecture du manuscrit mentionnée ci-dessus. Si l'on pouvait argumenter que la description par Platon d'un chemin méthodologique selon lequel "tout" (διὰ πάντων) doit être examiné - en l'occurrence, toutes les possibilités et implications pertinentes - a été reprise dans la description de la ligne 1.3, alors soutenir davantage les amendements favorisant παντ' ἄτη. Cela a des implications non seulement sur le type d'activité du jeune philosophe, mais aussi sur la caractérisation de la voie, par exemple. la traduction appropriée de δαίμονος dans cette même ligne, et si ce chemin doit être associé à la déesse didactique du poème ou à Helios.

La métaphore route / route se poursuit tout au long du voyage du philosophe et de la jeunesse à la rencontre de la déesse didactique, qui décrit ensuite plusieurs voies d'enquête qui doivent être engagées pour apprendre la vérité (1.28b-1.32). Et une fois encore, l'affirmation de Zeno selon laquelle «toutes choses» doivent être considérées semble pertinente:

χρεῶ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι, (28b)

ἡμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐκύκλιος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ,

ἡδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐν πίστις ἀληθῆς

ἀλλ' ἔμπηγς καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεται ὡς τὰ δοκεῦντα

χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περ ὄντα [περώντα]

Bien que toute tentative de traduire les dernières lignes soit assez controversée, et ne sera donc pas tentée dans ce résumé, il devrait être clair que la partie en gras de ce qui sera appris - et peut-être le processus d'apprentissage lui-même - compte tenu de «toutes choses». Et ce résultat d'apprentissage ou processus est le but du parcours du philosophe-jeune, celui pour lequel il a

commencé à suivre le «chemin des δαίμονος». Les érudits ont été divisés sur la question de savoir s'il existe deux «voies d'investigation» décrites par la déesse à l'heure actuelle.

La question du nombre de voies d'investigation évoquées dans le propre poème de Parménide, qui doit être parcouru pour en apprendre davantage sur «toutes choses», apparaît dans de nombreux passages du poème (B.2, B.6 et B.8). ). La comparaison et le contraste des lignes d'argumentation et des méthodologies globales dans chaque texte constitueront l'essentiel de cet article.

## Di Girolamo Sergio

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### *La ὑπόθεσις di Parmenide e la γυμνασία del Parmenide*

Quella che in *Parm.* 128d5-6 è indicata come la ὑπόθεσις di Parmenide è presentata in 128a8-b1 mediante l'enunciato [a] 'ἐν ... εἶναι τὸ πᾶν', cui si accenna successivamente varie volte nella sezione iniziale 127d6-130a2,<sup>1</sup> anche al plurale 'ἐν ἅπαντα' in 129b5. Ancora come riferimenti alla stessa ὑπόθεσις vanno considerati alcuni enunciati affini, ricorrenti in altri dialoghi:

<i>Teeteteo</i>	[b] 180e1 (≈ DK28B8,38): †οἷον ἀκίνητον τελέθει τῷ παντὶ ὄνομ' εἶναι† [c] 180e3-4: ἐν τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἔστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ [d] 181a7-8: οἱ τοῦ ὅλου στασιῶται [e] 183d1: τὸ πᾶν ἐστάναι [f] 183e3-4: οἱ ἐν ἐστὸς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν
<i>Sofista</i>	[g] 242d6: ἐνὸς ὄντος τῶν πάντων καλουμένων [h] 244b6: τῶν ἐν τὸ πᾶν λεγόντων [i] 245e1-2: τῷ τὸ ὄν ... ἐν μόνον εἶναι λέγοντι [l] 249c11-d1: τῶν ἐν ... λεγόντων τὸ πᾶν ἐστηκός [m] 252a6-7: τὸ πᾶν ... τῶν ὡς ἐν ἰστάντων

Un'indagine su tali enunciati può fornire importanti chiarimenti per interpretare la struttura complessiva della γυμνασία del *Parmenide* (137c4-166c5) e il suo rapporto con la sezione iniziale del dialogo. Un'interpretazione del genere, infatti, deve rispondere ad alcune questioni.

(Q1) Qual è l'esatto significato filosofico di [a] e degli enunciati affini?

(Q2) Come si spiega, data la costanza di [a] in 127d6-130a2, la problematica soluzione di continuità per cui la γυμνασία – come è esplicitamente detto<sup>2</sup> – verte sulla stessa ὑπόθεσις, ma di questa è considerato solo il predicato 'ἐν' e non il soggetto 'τὸ πᾶν'/'ἅπαντα'?

(Q4) Socrate obietta agli argomenti zenoniani e alla stessa ὑπόθεσις parmenidea di essersi mossi ἐν τοῖς ὀρωμένοις<sup>3</sup> e Parmenide, accogliendo l'obiezione, afferma che nella πραγματεία bisognerà considerare gli εἶδη.<sup>4</sup> In che modo [a] può prestarsi a questa dichiarata trasposizione sul piano eidetico, al quale pure essa era originariamente estranea?

Il contributo intende rispondere a tali quesiti, e interpretare così la struttura complessiva della γυμνασία, attraverso un nuovo approccio. Innanzitutto, si argomenterà come l'indagine debba partire da una nuova interpretazione e traduzione di [g]. Tuttavia, le numerose e importanti implicazioni della nuova lettura saranno illustrate, qui e nel contributo, solo brevemente in funzione della successiva dimostrazione di come esse possano applicarsi alle suddette questioni del *Parmenide*.

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1 CASERTANO, G., *Il nome della cosa*, Napoli, Loffredo, 1996, pp. 13-14.

2 *Parm.* 137b1-4.


3 *Parm.* 129e6-130a2.

4 *Parm.* 135e1-4.



Nella bibliografia sul *Sofista* si trovano due tipi di traduzione di [g]. La traduzione più frequente è: «what is called [‘]all things[’] is one». <sup>1</sup> Una seconda tipologia di traduzione è: «ce qu'on appelle [‘]toutes choses[’] n'est qu'un seul être». <sup>2</sup>

Tuttavia, se si esamina attentamente tutto il contesto in cui occorre [g], si comprende che questo enunciato ha un significato molto diverso. Il contesto è la sezione 242c8-245e8 del *Sofista*, che si occupa dei pluralisti (242c9-d4 e 243d8-244b5) e dei monisti dell'ἕθνος eleatico, tra i quali c'è innanzitutto Parmenide (242d4-7 e 244b6-245d11). Questa sezione nasconde una struttura incrociata, così schematizzabile:



La struttura incrociata è data dal fatto che ciascuna delle due posizioni, dei pluralisti e dei monisti, è problematizzata in modo da essere condotta alla posizione opposta.

Innanzitutto, si osservi come le dottrine dei pluralisti siano presentate attraverso varie tesi, che però in *Soph.* 244b3 sono tutte riassunte dalla formula più generale: πλείον ἑνός ... τὸ πᾶν εἶναι. Si osservi poi la corrispondenza letterale e semantica tra tale formula e l'esito pluralistico della problematizzazione della dottrina dei monisti.

Si passi poi a osservare la problematizzazione delle dottrine dei pluralisti, più esattamente dualisti. Qui sono considerati tre casi. Il II e il III caso, usando la costruzione 'ὄνομα καλεῖν τινα', mostrano la difficoltà dei dualisti a riferire il nome 'ὄν' ai due principî e, transitivamente, a τὰ παντα che dai due principî derivano. In entrambi i casi c'è un esito monistico, che nel II deriva dal chiamare (243e5: καλοῦντες) 'ὄν' distributivamente uno dei due principî (243e5: θάτερον), mentre nel III dal chiamare (243e8: καλεῖν) 'ὄν' collettivamente ambedue i principî (243e8: τὰ ἄμφω).

Se ora si considera la struttura incrociata e l'occorrenza di καλέω in [g], si desume che il senso di questo enunciato deve corrispondere filosoficamente a uno dei due casi monistici della

1 PALMER, J. A., *Plato's Reception of Parmenides*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1999, p. 187.

2 CORDERO, N.-L., *Platon, Le Sophiste*, traduction inédite, introduction et notes par N.-L. CORDERO, Paris, GF-Flammarion, 1993, p. 139.

problematizzazione della posizione pluralistica e che anche in questo enunciato deve essere impiegata la stessa costruzione ‘ὄνομα καλεῖν τινα’, ma al mediopassivo, con ‘ὄν’ e ‘ἐν’ come nomi e τὰ παντα come loro referenti. Che sia così è fortemente confermato dal fatto che in 244b12 occorre la stessa costruzione e che in 244b9-d13 la problematizzazione della dottrina dei monisti verte proprio sull’uso che costoro fanno di ‘ὄν’ e ‘ἐν’ come nomi.

Ma a quale dei due casi monistici, II o III, corrisponde [g]? Deve trattarsi del III caso. Questo, infatti, ha implicazioni mereologiche: riferire il nome ‘ὄν’ collettivamente ai due principî, e transitivamente a τὰ παντα che dai due principî derivano, significa considerare i due principî, e transitivamente τὰ παντα, come parti di un composto unitario.<sup>1</sup> Ora si osservi come in 244d14-245d11, contestualmente alla citazione di DK28B8,43-45, la problematizzazione della posizione monistica avvenga proprio rispetto a una questione mereologica.

Considerando tutto ciò, la traduzione corretta di [g] deve essere: «tutte le cose insieme (collettivamente) sono chiamate ‘ὄν’ e ‘ἐν’». Ciò che emerge è una forma di monismo che non nega la pluralità, ma che, da un lato, pensa collettivamente τὰ παντα come un *quid* unitario e unico, chiamato ‘ὄν’ e ‘ἐν’, e che, dall’altro, riconosce un primato e una pienezza ontologica a questo *quid* rispetto a τὰ παντα, analogamente a quanto fanno i dualisti verso i due principî rispetto alle cose da essi composte.

Applicata al *Parmenide*, questa complessiva interpretazione consente di rispondere alle suddette questioni e spiegare diversi aspetti della *γυμνασία*. Ecco solo alcuni esempi.

**(Q1)** [a] e gli enunciati affini del *Parmenide* hanno un significato analogo a quello di [g]. In essi il termine ‘ἐν’ deve significare non solo «unicità», come si ritiene tradizionalmente, ma anche «unitarietà»: pensare τὸ πᾶν come ἐν significa pensare ἅπαντα come un intero unico, in quanto onnicomprensivo, e unitario. Questo spiega perché in *Parm.* 129c4-d6 Socrate si riferisca al problema sollevato dalla ὑπόθεσις con un indubbio senso mereologico e secondo una dialettica tra una prospettiva distributiva e una *collettiva*: considerando distributivamente le sue parti, Socrate è πολλά, ma, considerandole *collettivamente*, egli è ἐν.

**(Q2)** Non c’è discontinuità tra la ὑπόθεσις parmenidea e l’ipotesi della *γυμνασία*, che, riprendendo la stessa ὑπόθεσις, ha come oggetto dichiarato τὸ ἐν ο τὸ ὄν ἐν e non τὸ πᾶν. Se in base a [g] gli Eleati chiamano ‘ὄν’ e ‘ἐν’ τὰ πάντα, allora τὸ ἐν e τὸ ὄν ἐν devono essere τὰ πάντα, pensati unitariamente nel modo indicato da [g]. È così che si spiega perché il problema intero-parti sia così centrale nella *γυμνασία* e in tutto il *Parmenide*. Inoltre si spiegherebbe come Parmenide intenda e usi le espressioni ‘πρὸς ἑαυτό’ (o ‘πρὸς αὐτό’) e ‘πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα’ (o ‘πρὸς ἀλλήλα’):<sup>2</sup> considerare τὸ ἐν ο τὸ ὄν ἐν “πρὸς ἑαυτό” significa considerare τὰ πάντα collettivamente come ἐν, mentre considerare τὸ ἐν ο τὸ ὄν ἐν “πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα” significa considerare τὰ πάντα distributivamente come πολλά.

**(Q3)** Accettando la summenzionata interpretazione di [g], si osserva come debbano esserci delle connessioni terministiche e filosofiche tra la ὑπόθεσις parmenidea e le Forme platoniche in quanto ἐν ἐν<sup>3</sup> / ἐπι<sup>4</sup> πᾶσιν. Il contributo intende sostenere che queste connessioni potrebbero spiegare come la *γυμνασία* possa occuparsi delle Forme, pur partendo da un’ipotesi sulle cose sensibili.

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1 CORNFORD, F. M. D., *Plato’s Theory of Knowledge. The Theaetetus and the Sophist of Plato*, translated with a running Commentary by F. M. D. CORNFORD, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1935, p. 220.

2 *Parm.* 136a4-c5.

3 *Parm.* 131b5-6.

4 *Parm.* 132a11-b1; c3; c6-7.

## *Parmenides' ὑπόθεσις and the Parmenides' γυμνασία*

What in *Parm.* 128d5-6 is presented as Parmenides' ὑπόθεσις is introduced in 128a8-b1 by means of the sentence [a] 'ἐν ... εἶναι τὸ πᾶν', which appears again several times in the opening section 127d6-130a2,<sup>1</sup> also in the plural 'ἐν ἅπαντα' in 129b5. Some similar sentences in other dialogues must be considered as references to the same ὑπόθεσις:

<i>Teeteteo</i>	[b] 180e1 (≈ DK28B8,38): ἴοιον ἀκίνητον τελέθει τῷ παντὶ ὄνομ' εἶναι† [c] 180e3-4: ἐν τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἔστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ [d] 181a7-8: οἱ τοῦ ὄλου στασιῶται [e] 183d1: τὸ πᾶν ἐστάναι [f] 183e3-4: οἱ ἐν ἐστὸς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν
<i>Sofista</i>	[g] 242d6: ἐνὸς ὄντος τῶν πάντων καλουμένων [h] 244b6: τῶν ἐν τὸ πᾶν λεγόντων [i] 245e1-2: τῷ τὸ ὄν ... ἐν μόνον εἶναι λέγοντι [l] 249c11-d1: τῶν ἐν ... λεγόντων τὸ πᾶν ἐστηκός [m] 252a6-7: τὸ πᾶν ... τῶν ὡς ἐν ἰστάντων

An extended examination of these sentences can provide many important insights to interpret the overall structure of the *Parmenides' γυμνασία* (137c4-166c5) and its relationship to the opening section of the dialogue. In order to interpret such points, in fact, one needs to answer some questions.

**(Q1)** Which is the exact philosophical meaning of [a] and the similar sentences?

**(Q2)** The *γυμνασία* examines the consequences that follows from a hypothesis which is said to be Parmenides' ὑπόθεσις,<sup>2</sup> but the dialectical exercise seems to focus on the predicate 'ἐν' rather than the subject 'τὸ πᾶν'/'ἅπαντα'. How can one explain the consistency of these two points?

**(Q3)** Socrates objects that Zeno's arguments, and Parmenides' ὑπόθεσις itself, wander ἐν τοῖς ὀρωμένοις.<sup>3</sup> Parmenides agrees with Socrates and says that the *γυμνασία* should rather be directed toward things that one would regard as εἶδη.<sup>4</sup> How might the exercise deal with Forms, even though it starts from a hypothesis about sensible things?

The paper aims to answer these questions, and explain the overall structure of the *γυμνασία*, by means of a new methodological approach. Firstly it will be argued that the inquiry needs to start from a new interpretation and translation of [g]. However, the numerous and important implications of the new reading will be illustrated, here and in the paper, just to explain how they can solve the aforementioned issues of the *Parmenides*.

There are two kinds of translations of [g] in the bibliography on the *Sophist*. The most common translation is: «what is called [']all things['] is one». <sup>5</sup> A second type of translation is: «ce qu'on appelle [']toutes choses['] n'est qu'un seul être». <sup>6</sup>

1 CASERTANO, G., *Il nome della cosa*, Napoli, Loffredo, 1996, pp. 13-14.

2 *Parm.* 137b1-4.


3 *Parm.* 129e6-130a2.

4 *Parm.* 135e1-4.

5 PALMER, J. A., *Plato's Reception of Parmenides*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1999, p. 187.

6 CORDERO, N.-L., *Platon, Le Sophiste*, traduction inédite, introduction et notes par N.-L. CORDERO, Paris, GF-Flammarion, 1993, p. 139.

However, if one carefully examine the entire context of occurrence of [g], one understands that this sentence has a very different meaning. The context is the section 242c8-245e8 of the *Sophist*, that deals with the pluralists (242c9-d4 and 243d8-244b5) and the Eleatic monists, among whom there is firstly Parmenides (242d4-7 and 244b6-245d11). This section hides a crossed structure, which can be outlined as follows:



The crossed structure derives from the fact that each of the two positions is criticized in such a way to be forced to the opposite position.

First of all let us observe that the pluralist doctrines are presented through various theses, but in *Soph.* 244b3 all of them are summarized by means of the most general formula: πλείον ἑνός ... τὸ πᾶν εἶναι. Then let us observe the literal and semantic correspondence between this formula and the pluralist outcome of the criticism against the monists.

Secondly let us move on to observe the criticism against the pluralists, more exactly the dualists. Here there are three cases. Both the 2<sup>nd</sup> and the 3<sup>rd</sup> cases use the construction 'ὄνομα καλεῖν τινα' and show that the dualists are in trouble referring the name 'ὄν' to their two principles and, transitively, to τὰ παντα that derive from these principles. In both cases there is a monist outcome, which in the 2<sup>nd</sup> one derives from calling (243e5: καλοῦντες) 'ὄν' distributively one of the two principles (243e5: θάτερον), while in the 3<sup>rd</sup> one from calling (243e8: καλεῖν) 'ὄν' collectively both principles (243e8: τὰ ἄμφω).

Now, if one takes in account the crossed structure and the occurrence of καλέω in [g], one has to conclude that there must be a philosophical correspondence between the meaning of this sentence and one of the two monist cases of the criticism against the pluralists and that in this sentence the same construction 'ὄνομα καλεῖν τινα' must be used, even though at the mediopassive, with 'ὄν' and 'ἕν' as names and τὰ παντα as their referents. Such an interpretation is strongly confirmed by the fact that in 244b12 the same construction is used and that in 244b9-d13 the criticism against the monists concerns the way they use 'ὄν' and 'ἕν' as names.

Other contextual elements lead to conclude that [g] must have a philosophical meaning similar to the 3<sup>rd</sup> case. This case has mereological implications: referring the name ‘δν’ collectively to the two principles, and, transitively, to τὰ παντα that derive from the two principles, means considering the two principles, and transitively τὰ παντα, as parts of a whole which is ἐν.<sup>1</sup> Now let us observe that in 244d14-245d11, together with a quotation of DK28B8,43-45, the criticism against the monists takes place precisely with respect to a mereological question.

In the light of this interpretation, the correct translation of [g] must be: «the things all together (collectively) are called ‘δν’ and ‘ἐν’». What emerges is a type of monism that does not deny plurality, but, on the one hand, regards collectively τὰ παντα as an unitary and unique *quid*, called ‘δν’ and ‘ἐν’, and, on the other hand, recognizes an ontological primacy to this *quid* rather than to τὰ παντα (such as the dualists recognize an ontological primacy to their two principles rather than to the things derived from these ones).

Referred to the *Parmenides*, this overall interpretation allows one to answer the aforementioned questions and explain several aspects of the *γυμνασία*. Here are some examples.

**(Q1)** [a] and the similar sentences of the *Parmenides* must have a meaning similar to that of [g]. The word ‘ἐν’ must mean not only «uniqueness», but also «unitarity»: considering τὸ πᾶν as ἐν means considering ἅπαντα as a whole which is both unique, because it encompasses everything, and unitary. This explains why in *Parm.* 129c4-d6 Socrates refers to the problem posed by Parmenides’ ὑπόθεσις with an undeniable mereological sense and adopting a dialectic transition from a distributive perspective to a collective one, and vice versa: if one regards distributively his parts, Socrates is πολλά, but, if one considers collectively them, he is ἐν.

**(Q2)** There is no inconsistency between Parmenides’ ὑπόθεσις and the hypothesis of the *γυμνασία*, whose subject is τὸ ἐν or τὸ δν ἐν and not τὸ πᾶν. According to [g] the Eleatics call τὰ πάντα ‘δν’ and ‘ἐν’, so τὸ ἐν e τὸ δν ἐν must be τὰ πάντα, regarded collectively as one. Therefore it would be explained why the compositional problem is so pivotal in the *γυμνασία*. Furthermore it would be explained how Parmenides understands and uses the expressions ‘πρὸς ἑαυτό’ (or ‘πρὸς αὐτό’) and ‘πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα’ (or ‘πρὸς ἄλληλα’):<sup>2</sup> considering τὸ ἐν or τὸ δν ἐν ‘πρὸς ἑαυτό’ means considering τὰ πάντα collectively as ἐν, whereas considering τὸ ἐν or τὸ δν ἐν ‘πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα’ means considering τὰ πάντα distributively as πολλά.

**(Q3)** Accepting the aforementioned interpretation of [g], there must be some lexical and philosophical connections between Parmenides’ ὑπόθεσις and Plato’s Forms inasmuch as ἐν ἐν<sup>3</sup> / ἐπὶ<sup>4</sup> πᾶσιν. The paper aims to claim that these connections might explain how the *γυμνασία* deals with Forms, even though it starts from a hypothesis about sensible things.

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1 CORNFORD, F. M. D., *Plato’s Theory of Knowledge. The Theaetetus and the Sophist of Plato*, translated with a running Commentary by F. M. D. CORNFORD, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1935, p. 220.

2 *Parm.* 136a4-c5.

3 *Parm.* 131b5-6.

4 *Parm.* 132a11-b1; c3; c6-7.

### *The number as a prototype of “unified plurality” (Parm.147a3-6)*

As well known, the second series of deductions related to the first hypothesis “the one is” (*Parm.*142b1-157b5) aims at examining the consequences for the “one” in relation to the others, i.e. for the “one” that participates in being. Within such a theoretical scenario, the being assigned to the “one” is clearly participative, for which whatever the “one” may be, that is whatever predicate is assigned to it, its being is linked to participating in that specific character. The determination of the being of the “one” in terms of participation allows also to assign this entity a series of qualifications, such as “being identical” and “being different”, which had not been assigned to the “one that is one”, i.e. only for itself, like in the first series of the exercise.

In this second deduction, the “one” participates in properties which are considered as parts belonging to it. The whole sequence can be divided into two parts: in the first, a notion of whole as the mere sum of its constituting parts is employed. If the whole represents all the parts, then the “one” (which is the whole), if identical to the parts intended as a collection of elements, loses its individuality; and in the second part of the exercise, we can find another notion of whole according to which the whole is more than the sum of its parts. With these assumptions, the aim of this study is to draw attention to the fact that within the framework representing this second series of deductions related to the first hypothesis “the one is”, and based on the assumption of a *holistic* and *structural* supposition, Plato formulates a conception of the number as a “unified plurality” (see *Parm.*147a3-6):

«However, neither do the not-ones participate in the one; for then they would not be not-one, but would, in some way, be one. —True. —So, neither would the not-ones be numbered for if they had number, at any rate, they would not be entirely not-one. —Indeed not»<sup>1</sup>.

In this quotation, Plato seems to want to establish a bi-univocal correspondence between the fact that an entity results determined due to the limiting action exercised by the “one”, and the possibility that we may “have number” of it (*Parm.* 147a6, ἀριθμὸν γε ἔχοντα). According to Scolnicov, «being numbered is to be a unified plurality. But the others are here considered as ‘entirely not one’. And insofar as the not-ones do not participate in the one, they cannot be such as to be an ἀριθμός, a ‘thing numbered’— that is, they cannot be a denumerable plurality»<sup>2</sup>. As anticipated earlier, this study aims at drawing attention to the conception of the number as expressed in this *locus platonis*. In particular, the unity represents the *condicio sine qua non* for the number to have determinacy, and this depends on the assumption of a structural and holistic presupposition. In this way, the primary aspect of the numbers is neither to be συνθέσεις μονάδων, nor to be πλήθη μονάδων, as the Pythagoreans thought, but this aspect consist of the fact that numbers have to be considered as unities within which multiplicity has to be structured, a sort of self-contained unit that exercises a delimiting function towards multiplicity.

This conception of the number intended as unified plurality (*Parm.*147a3-6), alludes to the so-called ideal number which, as we know, Aristotle credits to Plato. The existence of the ideal

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1 Cf. *Plato's Parmenides*, Translated with an Introduction and Commentary by S. Scolnicov.

2 Cf. *Plato's Parmenides*, Translated with an Introduction and Commentary by S. Scolnicov, pag.115.

number disjointed from the mathematical number, has always been a source of interpretation difficulties. Notwithstanding this, it is possible to state with certainty that Plato would have considered arithmetical numbers as “combinable”, and the ideal numbers as “non-combinable”: the former would thus be thought as aggregates of undifferentiated units, while the latter, not consisting of units, could not be used in mathematical operations (*Metaph.* XIII 6. 1080a17-23, 1081b35-1082 a20 etc.) because of their *formal* and *qualitative* ontological identity. As regards this distinction between ideal and arithmetical numbers, it is necessary to clarify that the former are non-combinable because each is τῷ εἶδει different from another, so they only differ according to πρότερον and ὕστερον; the latter, instead, are consecutive; their units are not formally distinct one from another – which is what makes them combinable and allows the numbers to generate other numbers through reiterated sums. In this way, the link between the ideal numbers is the μετά, while the one between the mathematical numbers is the πρὸς, i.e. the sum.

### *Il numero come prototipo di "pluralità unificata" (Parm. 147a3-6)*

Come noto, la seconda serie di deduzioni relative alla prima ipotesi “l'uno è” (*Parm.* 142b1-157b5) si propone di esaminare le conseguenze per l’“uno” considerato in relazione agli altri, e cioè per l’“uno” che partecipa dell’essere. All’interno di un simile scenario teorico, l’essere assegnato all’“uno” è chiaramente partecipativo, per cui qualsiasi cosa l’“uno” sia, vale a dire qualsiasi predicato venga a esso assegnato, il suo essere è vincolato alla partecipazione di quel determinato carattere. La determinazione dell’essere dell’uno in termini di partecipazione consente anche di assegnare a questa entità una serie di qualificazioni – come ad esempio l’“essere identico” e l’“essere diverso” – che erano state invece sottratte all’ “uno che è uno”, considerato cioè solo in virtù di sé stesso, e oggetto della prima serie di deduzioni dell’esercizio. In questa seconda deduzione l’uno viene dunque considerato come possessore “generoso” di parti, cioè come “partecipante” a proprietà appunto concepite come sue parti.

L’intera sequenza può essere suddivisa in una prima parte, in cui viene impiegata una nozione di intero inteso come mera somma delle sue parti costitutive: se l’intero si identifica con tutte le parti, allora l’uno (che è l’intero) se è identico a tutte le parti collettivamente, non lo è individualmente. E una seconda parte, in cui sembra essere presupposta un’altra nozione di intero; vale a dire, non più quella per cui esso risulta identico alle parti (ontologia della composizione), bensì quella in base alla quale l’intero è qualcosa di unitario e differente dalle sue parti costitutive (ontologia olistica). Fatte queste premesse, con il presente studio mi propongo di richiamare l’attenzione sul fatto che all’interno della cornice rappresentata da questa seconda serie di deduzioni relative alla prima ipotesi “l'uno è”, e in seguito all’assunzione di un presupposto *olistico* e *strutturale*, Platone giunge alla formulazione di una concezione del numero inteso come “pluralità unificata”. In proposito, è opportuno prestare attenzione a quanto affermato in *Parm.* 147a3-6:

«Ma ciò che non è uno non partecipa certo dell’uno, altrimenti non sarebbe “non uno”, ma in qualche modo “uno”. [...] Ciò che non è uno non sarà neppure numero, perché se avesse numero non sarebbe assolutamente “non-uno”»<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Platone, *Parmenide*, Introduzione, traduzione e note a cura di F. Ferrari.

Nel passo in questione, Platone sembra voler stabilire una corrispondenza biunivoca tra il fatto che un ente risulti determinato, sulla base dell'azione limitante esercitata dall' "uno", e la possibilità che di esso si possa "avere numero" (*Parm.* 147a6, ἀριθμὸν γε ἔχοντα). A commento del passo, Scolnicov afferma che «being numbered is to be a unified plurality. But the others are here considered as 'entirely not one'. And insofar as the not-ones do not participate in the one, they cannot be such as to be an ἀριθμός, a 'thing numbered'— that is, they cannot be a denumerable plurality»<sup>1</sup>.

Come anticipato poc'anzi, è propriamente sulla concezione del *numero* ricavabile in questo *luogo* platonico che il presente studio si propone di richiamare l'attenzione. In particolare, il fatto che l'unità rappresenti la *condicio sine qua non* rispetto alla determinazione stessa del numero non può che essere fondata sull'assunzione di un presupposto strutturale e olistico, per cui l'*intero* risulta essere qualcosa di unitario e differente rispetto alle sue parti costitutive. In questo modo, i numeri non sono in primo luogo συνθέσεις μονάδων, "aggregati di unità", oppure πλήθη μονάδων, "pluralità di unità", come volevano i Pitagorici, ma essi si configurano innanzitutto come "pluralità unificata". Con ciò si vuole significare che i numeri devono essere considerati primariamente come unità entro le quali il molteplice viene a essere strutturato; una sorta di *figura-forma* che svolge una funzione delimitante rispetto alla molteplicità. Sulla base di un simile presupposto teorico, a emergere è l'aspetto *qualitativo* del numero, e cioè la sua natura *formale* o *strutturale*, distinta dalla mera somma delle sue parti. Una simile concezione del numero, così inteso come pluralità unificata (*Parm.* 147a3-6), sembra rinviare al cosiddetto numero ideale che, come noto, la testimonianza di Aristotele attribuisce a Platone. L'esistenza di questa seconda specie di numero, distinto da quello matematico, è da sempre fonte di gravi difficoltà interpretative. Nonostante ciò è possibile affermare con certezza che Platone avrebbe considerato i numeri aritmetici come "combinabili", e quelli ideali come "non combinabili": i primi sarebbero dunque pensati come aggregati di unità indifferenziate, mentre i secondi non sarebbero soggetti a operazioni matematiche (*Metaph.* XIII 6. 1080a17-23, 1081b35-1082 a20 ecc.) per via della loro identità ontologica di carattere *formale* e *qualitativo*. In merito a questa distinzione tra i numeri ideali dai numeri aritmetici, è opportuno precisare che i primi sono incombinabili in quanto ogni numero è diverso τῷ εἶδει dall'altro, per cui essi si distinguono solo secondo πρότερον e ὕστερον; i secondi sono, invece, consecutivi; le loro unità non sono distinte formalmente – ciò che le rende combinabili e permette ai numeri di generarsi per somme reiterate. Il legame fra i numeri ideali è dunque il μετά, mentre quello fra i matematici il πρὸς, cioè l'aggiunta.

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1 Cf. *Plato's Parmenides*, Translated with an Introduction and Commentary by S. Scolnicov, pag.115.



### *Sulla ομοιότης nel linguaggio e nell'essere a partire da Proclo, interprete del Parmenide di Platone*

Il *paper* si concentrerà su un'idea ben precisa del *Parmenide*, quella attraverso la quale l'Eleate, fin dalla prima parte (130e4-131a1) e poi nella sua *gymnasia* (147d1-e3), stipula un legame, un nesso ermeneutico tra essere e linguaggio. La domanda iniziale è questa: perché proprio il linguaggio? Perché Platone, per bocca di Parmenide, per comprendere la relazione tra l'uno e i molti, deve utilizzare proprio il confronto con i nomi? A mio parere Proclo ci aiuta nel trovare una possibile risposta a tale questione.

Negli *Elementi di teologia* (65, 1-2), il filosofo licio dichiara che le cose possono esistere in tre modi: nella loro stessa essenza (*καθ'ὑπαρξιν*), oppure in quanto contenute nella loro causa sotto forma di principio (*κατ' αἰτίαν*), oppure ancora in quanto partecipate dalla loro causa sotto forma di immagine (*κατὰ μέθεξιν εἰκονικῶς*). L'essere iconico di una cosa descrive proprio quest'ultima maniera di esistere: questa designa una cosa che è in relazione di rappresentazione con un'altra che è ad essa superiore ma che in essa stessa tuttavia si conserva; questa relazione di partecipazione, che ha una natura evidentemente ontologica, considera il produttore contenuto nel prodotto (*τὸ παραγόμενον*) che, a sua volta, manifesta in se stesso (*ἐν ἑαυτῷ δείκνυσι*) in maniera secondaria (*δευτέρως*) ciò che il produttore (*ὁ τὸ παράγον*) è a titolo primario (*ὑπάρχει πρώτως*). Ebbene, la modalità di esistenza del nome è proprio *κατὰ μέθεξιν εἰκονικῶς* e ciò che a mio parere si rivela interessante è che proprio a questa modalità iconica di esistere si riferiscono sia Platone che Proclo quando vogliono mettere in connessione l'essere dei molti e l'essere del linguaggio. Tale modalità di esistenza è alla base sia dell'essere sia della sua espressione. Due cose, infatti, rappresentano meglio di ogni altra tale maniera iconica di essere: il nome e i molti.

Per Proclo il nome e l'immagine s'identificano con la relazione, essi sono la relazione. La natura iconica del nome lo rende lo strumento più adatto a rappresentare anche la relazione ontologica: è proprio questa, infatti, che ne garantisce l'origine naturale, il suo essere ontologicamente legato all'essenza della cosa nominata (*In Crat.* 48, 16, 13-19). È nel *Commento al Parmenide*, però, che Proclo spiega chiaramente che l'immagine ha una sua natura ontologica ben precisa e autonoma. Caratteristica essenziale dell'immagine è che essa sia al tempo stesso simile e dissimile rispetto al suo modello, affinché ciò che è immagine di una cosa si distingua dal suo modello. È così che, interpretando *Parm.* 130b1-6, a proposito della somiglianza come principio cosmogonico, l'esegeta spiega che perché una cosa sia l'immagine di un'altra, sono necessari al tempo stesso il dissimile e il simile (*τὸ ἀνόμοιον καὶ τὸ ὁμοιον*). La somiglianza forma una coppia con la dissomiglianza in maniera naturale, perché le cose create secondo la somiglianza con il loro modello sono anche distinte dal loro modello. Né le cose solamente simili sono immagini, perché il simile senza il dissimile è modello e non immagine; né lo sono le cose solo dissimili, perché il nome stesso di immagine designa qualcosa che somiglia ad un'altra cosa (Procl. *In Parm.* 3, 805, 22-26). Ciò che risulta di massimo interesse è che la sola relazione che il simile e il dissimile indicano è una relazione di tipo ontologico, quella che esiste tra gli esseri di ordine inferiore e gli esseri di ordine superiore, quella cioè in grado di spiegare la relazione tra l'uno e i molti, tra le immagini e i loro

modelli (*In Parm.* 3, 806, 11-21). Allo stesso modo, un nome se contiene allo stesso tempo elementi simili ed elementi dissimili, non si allontana dall'essenza della cosa di cui è nome, ma manifesta piuttosto la sua propria natura relazionale, iconica appunto.

Che il linguaggio e l'essere condividano natura ed espressione, lo dimostra, infine, uno sviluppo figurativo che tale teoria assume nell'interpretazione procliana sia del *Parménide* che del *Cratilo*. Mi riferisco al nome come ἄγαλμα delle cose nominate. Proclo, quando deve spiegare l'omonimia tra idee e partecipanti (Platone ne parla in *Parm.* 130e4-131a1 e 147d1-e3), ricorre all'immagine del nome come "statua delle cose": è *agalma*, ad esempio, il nome ἄνθρωπος, da riferirsi sia all'idea noetica del referente, sia al referente sensibile stesso: «I nomi, se sono statue discorsive delle cose (ἀγάλματα τῶν πραγμάτων λογικά), lo sono primariamente delle cose immateriali, secondariamente di quelle sensibili (*In Parm.* 4, 851, 8-10 ed. Cousin). [...] E infatti qui 'uomo', il nome 'uomo' dico, potresti dirlo in un modo (ἄλλως μὲν) statua della specie divina (ἄγαλμα τοῦ θείου εἶδους), in un altro (ἄλλως δέ) di quella sensibile (τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ) (4, 851, 18-21)». Questo passo s'inserisce evidentemente all'interno della questione fondamentale sulla relazione dello stesso nome con l'idea, unica, e con le cose sensibili, molteplici. La medesima riflessione è espressa da Proclo in *In Crat.* 51, 19, 12-19. La costruzione delle statue a immagine degli dei è analoga alla costruzione del nome ad immagine delle cose, che è a sua volta analoga alla costruzione del cosmo a immagine dell'universo intelligibile.

L'analisi di tale analogia conduce allora ad una nuova possibile interpretazione della complessa relazione di partecipazione dei molti con l'uno, delle cose sensibili con le idee: è la natura iconica, capace di dare ragione del simile e del dissimile presente nelle cose e nell'uno, a garantire l'interezza dell'essere, così come è la stessa natura iconica che lega insieme nomi, cose e idee a garantire l'interezza del pensiero.

### *Sur la ὁμοιότης dans le langage et dans l'être chez Proclus interprète du Parménide de Platon*

Ma contribution veut s'occuper d'une idée précise du *Parménide*, celle à travers laquelle le philosophe d'Élée, dès la première partie du dialogue (130e4-131a1) et, puis, dans son *gymnasia* (147d1-e3), stipule un lien très étroit, un rapport herméneutique entre être et langage. La question initiale est la suivante: pourquoi le langage? Pourquoi Platon, à travers Parménide, utilise justement le parallèle avec les noms, pour comprendre la relation entre l'un et l'autre? À mon avis, Proclus nous aide à trouver une réponse possible à cette question.

Dans les *Éléments de théologie* (65, 1-2), le philosophe lycien explique qu'il y a pour toute chose trois façons d'exister: dans sa propre subsistance (καθ' ὑπαρξιν), ou bien en tant que contenue dans sa cause sous forme de principe (κατ' αἰτίαν), ou bien encore en tant que participée par sa cause sous le mode d'image (κατὰ μέθεξιν εἰκονικῶς). L'être iconique d'une chose décrit cette dernière façon d'exister; elle désigne une chose qui est en relation de représentation avec une autre chose qui lui est supérieure mais qui se conserve toutefois en elle-même; ce rapport de participation, qui a une nature évidemment ontologique, considère le producteur contenu dans le produit (τὸ παραγόμενον) qui, à son tour, manifeste en lui-même (ἐν ἑαυτῷ δείκνυσι) sur le mode dérivé (δευτέρως) ce qu'est le producteur (δὲ τὸ παράγον) à titre premier (ὑπάρχει πρώτως). Eh bien, la façon

d'exister du nom c'est *κατὰ μέθεξιν εἰκονικῶς* et ce qui, à mon avis, se révèle intéressant, c'est le fait que c'est à cette façon d'exister que les deux, aussi bien Platon que Proclus, se réfèrent lorsqu'ils veulent connecter l'être de la multiplicité et l'être du langage. Cette façon d'exister est à la base tant de l'être que de son expression.

Pour Proclus, le nom et l'image s'identifient à la relation, ils sont la relation. La nature iconique du nom en fait l'instrument le plus approprié pour représenter la relation ontologique: c'est précisément cette nature qui en garantit l'origine naturelle, son lien ontologique avec l'essence de la chose nommée (*In Crat.* 48, 16, 13-19). Toutefois, c'est dans le *Commentaire sur le Parménide* que Proclus explique clairement que l'image a une nature ontologique très précise et autonome. Une caractéristique essentielle de l'image est représentée par le fait qu'elle est à la fois semblable et dissemblable par rapport à son modèle, de sorte que ce qui est l'image d'une chose se distingue de son modèle. Voilà comment, interprétant *Parm.* 130b1-6, à propos de la similitude en tant que principe cosmogonique, l'exégète explique que, pour qu'une chose devienne l'image d'une autre, il faut à la fois le dissemblable et le semblable (*τὸ ἀνόμοιον καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον*). La similitude forme un couple avec la dissimilitude de manière connaturelle, parce que les êtres créés selon la ressemblance avec leurs modèles sont aussi distincts de ces modèles. En fait, les choses qui sont seulement semblables ne sont pas des images, puisque la similitude, sans la dissimilitude, est modèle et non pas image; néanmoins, les choses qui sont seulement dissemblables ne sont pas des images, puisque le nom même d'image désigne une forme qui ressemble à quelque chose d'autre (Procl. *In Parm.* 3, 805, 22-26). Ce qui est le plus grand intérêt c'est que le seul rapport qui existe entre semblable et dissemblable est une relation de type ontologique, celle qui existe entre les êtres d'ordre inférieur et les êtres d'ordre supérieur, le seul rapport qui est capable d'expliquer la relation entre l'un et les plusieurs, entre les images et leurs modèles (*In Parm.* 3, 806, 11-21). De même, si un nom contient à la fois des éléments semblables et des éléments dissemblables, il ne s'éloigne pas de l'essence de la chose représentée, mais manifeste plutôt sa propre nature relationnelle, iconique, son lien à l'essence de la chose.

Le fait que le langage et l'être partagent nature et expression est démontré, enfin, par une évolution figurative que cette théorie acquiert dans l'interprétation proclienne du *Parménide* et du *Cratyle*. Je me réfère à l'image du nom en tant que *ἄγαλμα* des choses nommées.

Proclus, quand il doit expliquer l'homonymie entre les idées et les participants (Platon en parle in *Parm.* 130e4-131a1 et 147d1-e3), utilise l'image du nom comme «statue des choses»: par exemple, le nom *ἄνθρωπος* est *agalma* en tant qu'il doit être attribué aussi bien à l'idée noétique du référent qu'au référent sensible même: «les noms s'ils sont des statues verbales des réalités (*ἄγαλματα τῶν πραγμάτων λογικά*), ils le sont à titre premier des formes immatérielles et à titre secondaire des sensibles (*In Parm.* 4, 851, 8-10). [...] De fait, 'homme' ici-bas – je veux dire le nom d'homme – on peut le dire, dans un sens (*ἄλλως μὲν*), statue de la forme divine (*ἄγαλμα τοῦ θεοῦ εἶδους*), dans un autre (*ἄλλως δέ*), [statue] du sensible (*τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ*) (4, 851, 18-21)». Cet extrait s'insère évidemment à l'intérieur de la question fondamentale de la relation du même nom avec l'idée, unique, et avec les choses sensibles, multiples. La même réflexion est exprimée par Proclus in *In Crat.* 51, 19, 12-19. La construction de statues à l'image des dieux est analogue à la construction des noms à l'image des choses, qui est à son tour analogue à la construction du cosmos à l'image de l'univers intelligible.

L'analyse de cette analogie peut alors conduire à une nouvelle interprétation de la complexe relation de participation entre les choses sensibles et les idées: c'est la nature iconique, capable de "donner raison" du semblable et du dissemblable présents dans les choses et dans l'un,

qui assure l'intégrité de l'être; de la même façon, c'est toujours la même nature iconique qui lie ensemble les noms, les choses et les idées et qui peut assurer l'intégrité de la pensée.

L'extrême difficulté d'interprétation de la seconde partie du *Parménide* est devenue un lieu commun des introductions générales au dialogue<sup>1</sup>. L'étonnement des lecteurs, qui a généré une multitude d'hypothèses exégétiques différentes déjà au cours de l'Antiquité, se reflète – et trouve en partie son origine – dans la structure formelle de la section, où l'*εὐτονία* caractéristique du dialogue socratique<sup>2</sup> est abandonnée à la faveur d'un entretien sèchement conduit par la voix de Parménide, avec la longue série des hypothèses et des déductions ; le rôle du répondant, le jeune Aristote futur membre des Trente, est presque réduit à l'assertion systématique, ce qui éloigne l'entretien de la vivacité typique de la forme dialoguée.

Il n'est donc pas étonnant de voir comment l'exceptionnalité de cette partie du dialogue, autant pour la forme que pour le contenu, est soulignée à plusieurs reprises par Platon lui-même, en utilisant les personnages du dialogue ; cette présence implicite de l'auteur est repérable dès le proème, avec l'observation d'Antiphon : rapporter le dialogue des grandes Panathénées constitue une « tâche énorme » (*πολὸν ἔργον*, 127a6 ; les mêmes mots sont utilisés par Socrate plus tard dans le dialogue, face aux indications de Parménide concernant la 'gymnastique' : 136d1). Parménide lui-même, avant d'introduire la première hypothèse, annonce la traversée d'un énorme océan de discours (*πέλαγος λόγον*, 137a6). Platon, comme chaque bon écrivain, est bien conscient de risquer d'épater le lecteur avec une tournure imprévue, à savoir la tumultueuse succession des arguments et des déductions : plusieurs fois, il met en garde son public sur l'effort qui lui sera demandé.

Mais le *Parménide* ne constitue qu'une tesselle dans la mosaïque littéraire de la maturité de Platon, un épisode qui appartient à une plus vaste stratégie de bouleversement des canons du *λόγος Σωκρατικός* : dans la *γυμνασία* du *Parménide*, peut-être pour la première fois<sup>3</sup>, Socrate s'éloigne de la scène pour laisser la place à l'entretien entre Parménide et Aristote. Le modèle formel – le *τρόπος* – de cet exercice, si l'on en croit ce que dit Platon, est le traité de Zénon (135d6-7). Le *Parménide* constitue donc probablement le premier épisode d'une évolution littéraire du genre dialogue, qui comporte la marginalisation du personnage de Socrate et une recherche strictement cohérente avec une orientation méthodologique définie : ce parcours portera aux autres dialogues 'éléatiques', notamment le *Sophiste* et le *Politique* où, encore une fois, Socrate ne joue pas le rôle de protagoniste. S'il est évident, d'une part, que les expériences du *Sophiste* et le *Politique* aboutissent à un résultat divers sur le plan littéraire, d'autre part, l'importance du *Parménide* dans le cadre de la naissance d'un dialogue « systématique » est bien manifestée par les mentions du dialogue que Platon lui-même offre, au moyen de Socrate, dans le *Sophiste* (217c5-7, *πάγκαλοι λόγοι*) comme dans le *Théétète* (183e5-184a2), deux cas significatifs d'intertextualité à l'intérieur du *corpus*.

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1 Voir par exemple BRUMBAUGH 1961, 1 ; MILLER 1986, 3 ; MEINWALD 1991, 3 ; FRONTEROTTA 1998, 3-4 ; SCOLNICOV

2003, 1 ; FERRARI 2004, 9 ; BRISSON 2018<sup>2</sup>, 9.

2 Sur l'*εὐτονία* comme caractéristique des dialogues socratiques voir D.L. II 60, l. 11-12 ; le contraste apparent entre la partie 'socratique' du *Parménide* et la section 'gymnastique' est bien soulignée par MCCABE 1996, 5-8.

3 La chronologie – absolue ou relative – des dialogues de Platon est en grande partie incertaine ; cependant, une prééminence du *Parménide* dans la série des dialogues 'éléatiques' semble une donnée acquise par les savants : voir par exemple THESLEFF 1982, 157-161 [=2009, 304-308], et BRANDWOOD 1990, 251.

Mon intervention, en laissant de côté l'interprétation détaillée du contenu, vise à analyser le choix stylistique adopté par Platon dans la seconde partie du *Parménide*, en particulier s'appuyant sur les traces de poésie implicite que l'auteur lui-même offre au cours du dialogue ; cela pourra permettre un positionnement de l'entreprise littéraire du *Parménide* dans le contexte général de la poésie platonicienne, en particulier dans le cadre du renouvellement des formes du dialogue socratique. La nouvelle forme de dialogue songée par Platon se rapproche plus proprement des exigences liées à la transmission d'un savoir positif<sup>1</sup> : son élaboration constitue la tentative de tendre le genre dialogue vers les caractéristiques fonctionnelles du traité. La présentation continue du traité (*σύγγραμμα*), avec ses possibles réductions et simplifications<sup>2</sup>, constituera notamment la forme littéraire privilégiée par l'Académie post-platonicienne, au moins jusqu'au retour du modèle 'socratique' au début de l'époque hellénistique<sup>3</sup>. Dans ce cadre historique, comprendre en profondeur le choix de Platon dans la seconde partie du *Parménide* pourra également nous aider à mieux saisir la fonction et la valeur de l'« exercice » proposé au jeune Aristote.

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1 BRISSON 2001, 221-226, parle correctement d'une tendance vers un « dialogue apaisé », avec la recherche d'une exposition dialectique formellement impeccable, suivant les règles que Platon lui-même avait établi dans les autres dialogues. En ce sens, la seconde part du *Parménide* est vraiment « le meilleur exemple d'un dialogue bien mené avec un questionneur » (p. 221-222) ; c'est un type d'entretien où Socrate trouve sa place avec difficulté. Sur la marginalisation de Socrate dans les dialogues élatiques voir en particulier BLONDELL 2002, 314-396 ; voir aussi MCCABE 1996, 21 : « in the second part, the persons have effectively disappeared, leaving behind just the arguments ».

2 La présence de ces formes simplifiées et schématisées est présumable sur la base des écrits « systématiques » qui nous ont été préservés, par exemple les *Définitions* attribués à Platon et les *Divisions* attribués à Aristote (ou à Platon).

3 C'est à cette phase, sous le scholarcat de Polémon et Arcésilas, qu'on serait tentés d'assigner la plupart des dialogues inauthentiques attribués à Platon dans nos manuscrits ; il n'est pas clair, toutefois, si l'entièreté de ce *corpus* soit à assigner à l'Académie : pour cette question voir ARONADIO 2008, 23-32, et BRISSON 2014, 12-17.

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### *Platone sul Parmenide*

L'estrema difficoltà interpretativa che riguarda la seconda parte del *Parmenide* è talmente nota da essere divenuta un *topos* fisso, incipitario, in pressoché ogni presentazione generale del dialogo<sup>1</sup>. Lo sconcerto della critica già antica, che ha moltiplicato nei secoli gli orientamenti di lettura e le loro sfumature, si specchia – e in parte si fonda – nell'effettiva natura impervia del testo, in cui si abbandona improvvisamente l'*εὐτονία* caratteristica del dialogo socratico<sup>2</sup> e, consegnato il ruolo di guida a Parmenide, ci si avventura nella serrata scansione delle ipotesi, cui il conforto delle reazioni (perlopiù assertive) del giovane Aristotele non sottrae l'impressione di una concatenazione ineluttabile, lontana dalla vivacità dialogica dello scambio di domanda e risposta.

Non sorprende quindi che l'eccezionalità formale e contenutistica della sezione sia a più riprese sottolineata da Platone nel dialogo stesso, fin dalle pagine del proemio, con l'osservazione di Antifonte: riproporre i λόγοι delle Grandi Panatenee, nel ricordo di Pitodoro, costituisce un πολὺ ἔργον (127a6), parole riprese da Socrate di fronte alle indicazioni 'programmatiche' di Parmenide (136d1); nella voce del canuto eleate, trascinato come il cavallo di Ibico, si annuncia la traversata di un esteso πέλαγος λόγων (137a6). Platone è al corrente del rischio di sconvolgere il lettore con la vorticosa successione degli argomenti e delle deduzioni, e annuncia la difficoltà, anticipa l'ampiezza dello sforzo richiesto.

Ma il *Parmenide* costituisce solo un tassello all'interno di un'operazione più vasta, una vera forma di sperimentalismo letterario che il Platone maturo intraprende, stravolgendo i canoni del λόγος Σωκρατικός : nella γυμνασία del *Parmenide*, forse per la prima volta<sup>3</sup>, Socrate si allontana dal centro della scena, per ascoltare le argomentazioni di Parmenide. Per il *Parmenide* il modello formale, a detta di Platone, il τρόπος, è nel dettato di Zenone, nella scansione esemplare dei γράμματα dell'eleate (135d6-7). Il *Parmenide* costituisce probabilmente il primo, ardito episodio di una evoluzione letteraria del genere-dialogo, evoluzione che porta al ridimensionamento della figura di Socrate nel *Sofista* e nel *Politico*, che ancora ad Elea guardano – per forma e contenuti – con il

1 Cf. e.g. BRUMBAUGH 1961, 1 ; MILLER 1986, 3 ; MEINWALD 1991, 3 ; FRONTEROTTA 1998, 3-4 ; SCOLNICOV 2003, 1 ; FERRARI 2004, 9 ; BRISSON 2018<sup>2</sup>, 9

2 Sull'*εὐτονία* quale caratteristica tipica dei dialoghi socratici cfr. D.L. II 60, rr. 11-12; sul contrasto tra la parte 'socratica' e la γυμνασία, nel quadro della struttura generale del dialogo, si vedano le osservazioni di MCCABE 1996, 5-8.

3 La cronologia dei dialoghi di Platone è notoriamente problematica e oggetto di un dibattito probabilmente inestinguibile: la precedenza del *Parmenide* rispetto agli altri dialoghi 'eleatici' sembra tuttavia imporsi in gran parte della critica; cfr. e.g. THESLEFF 1982, 157-161 [=2009, 304-308] ; BRANDWOOD 1990, 251.

personaggio dello ξένος : certo, il risultato, il respiro di *Sofista* e *Politico* è diverso, ma il riconoscimento dell'importanza del *Parmenide* nell'evoluzione verso un dialogo 'sistematico' è ancora manifesto nelle menzioni che, tramite il ricordo di Socrate, l'autore offre per il dialogo, proprio nel *Sofista* (217c5-7, πάγκαλοι λόγοι), come già nel *Teeteto* (183e5-184a2), due casi notevolmente limpidi e significativi di intertestualità all'interno del *corpus*.

Il mio intervento, lasciate da parte le problematiche contenutistiche, vuole indagare e valorizzare la forma scelta da Platone nella seconda parte del *Parmenide*, esaminando in primo luogo le tracce di poetica implicita che l'autore stesso ci offre nel dialogo e al di fuori di esso, e insieme collocando l'impresa letteraria di Platone in un quadro più vasto, con l'esplorazione di una forma di dialogo alternativa rispetto ai canoni del λόγος Σωκρατικός, un dialogo più adatto alle istanze dell'esposizione continua di un sapere positivo<sup>1</sup>, che fa proprie almeno in parte – le dinamiche di una trasmissione del sapere più canonica, più vicina al σύγγραμμα: proprio alla forma estesa del trattato, con le sue possibili riduzioni e schematizzazioni<sup>2</sup>, si affiderà perlopiù la prima Accademia post-platonica, perlomeno fino al ritorno in forze di un modello 'socratico', al principio dell'età ellenistica<sup>3</sup>. Comprendere meglio le ragioni della scelta letteraria di Platone nel *Parmenide*, inoltre, potrà forse aiutare a capire più a fondo il significato e la funzione della γυμνασία.

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1 Correttamente BRISSON 2001, 221-226, parla della tendenza ad un « dialogue apaisé », e del tentativo di conquista di un'esposizione dialettica formalmente impeccabile, nel rispetto delle regole che Platone stesso – già nei dialoghi socratici – stabilisce per il διαλέγεσθαι. La seconda parte del *Parmenide*, in questo senso, è davvero « le meilleur exemple d'un dialogue bien mené avec un questionneur » (pp. 221-222), un tipo di dialogo in cui Socrate trova con difficoltà il suo spazio; per il ruolo di Socrate nei dialoghi eleatici si veda in particolare BLONDELL 2002, 314-396. Cf. anche MCCABE 1996, 21: « in the second part, the persons have effectively disappeared, leaving behind just the arguments ».

2 La presenza di forme ridotte ed 'epitomate' all'interno della scuola è presumibile sulla base di scritti giunti fino a noi

sia pure in forma rielaborata – quali le *Definizioni* attribuite a Platone e le *Divisioni* attribuite ad Aristotele.

3 A questa fase della storia della scuola, tra lo scolarcato di Polemone e la 'svolta' scettica di Arcesilao, sono da assegnare probabilmente molti dei dialoghi spuri del *corpus*, se si accetta una loro origine nell'Accademia: la questione è dibattuta; si vedano rispettivamente ARONADIO 2008, 23-32, e BRISSON 2014, 12-17.



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### “Οὐκ ἔστιν” (141e8): The Performative Contradiction of the First Hypothesis

Toward the end of the first hypothesis, Parmenides gets Aristotle to agree that being [οὐσία] must be in time; that is, that that being must partake in at least one of the temporal modes: either to have been in the past, to be in the present, or will be in the future (140e-142a). If this is true, then “the one [τὸ ἓν] does not partake in being”<sup>1</sup> (141e7-8), meaning *temporal* being—to which Aristotle agrees, saying “Apparently not [οὐκ ἔοικεν]” (141e9). In the next logical step, Parmenides gets Aristotle to agree that “Therefore, ‘the one’ in no way is [Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ἓν] (141e9-10).” This, however, contradicts the very first premise that begins Parmenides’ entire gymnastic exercise, “if one is [εἰ ἓν ἔστιν]” (137c4). The problem with the previous conclusion—that to be is to be in time—is that in professing his assent to it, Aristotle, in fact, gainsays it. He performatively contradicts the very thing he wants to assert. Aristotle wants to answer Parmenides question, “Therefore could something partake of being in anyway other than in one of those ways? [ἔστιν οὖν οὐσίας ὅπως ἂν τι μετέσχοι ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τούτων τι;]” (141e7-8)—that is, in another way other than in one of three temporal modes. At 141e8, Aristotle responds with a two word answer in Greek: “οὐκ ἔστιν [It’s not possible].” We can, therefore, ask of the very claim Aristotle is making—that it is impossible for something to be and not be in time—when in time does it hold true? At what time “is not possible [οὐκ ἔστιν]” for something to *not* partake of temporal being? Is it not possible only in the present moment? Or was it not possible only in the past? Or will it be not possible only in the future? If Aristotle’s assertion is to have any force it needs to hold at all times. That is, it must have *atemporal* being. We might say that Aristotle’s assertion has, following Kant, necessary apodictic force (A74-5/B100). It has the same tenselessness as mathematical propositions. When in time is  $1+1=2$ ? Does it hold only in the past, or in the present, or in the future that  $1+1=2$ ? No, it doesn’t hold, or exist, in a single temporal mode, instead it holds atemporally at all times. Like mathematical entities, the Forms must necessarily have this kind of atemporal existence. Accordingly, in atemporally maintaining that anything that *is* must be *in time*, Aristotle undermines his own assertion. He performatively contradicts the very thing that he wants to affirm.

My interpretation of the first hypothesis and of the *Parmenides* is indebted to Mitch Miller’s (1986) and to his observation that what is actually missing from the first hypothesis is an atemporal sense of being—the idea that being does *not* necessarily imply being *in time*. But even Miller misses the importance of this performative contradiction of the οὐκ ἔστιν at 141e8 (1986, 89-91). I want to draw three lessons from Aristotle’s performative contradiction. First, it gives us an indication as to the best method of interpreting not only the first hypothesis but the other hypotheses in the second half of the dialogue as well. In noticing the performative contradiction, the listener or reader learns that one does *not* have to defend the truth and consistency of *all* the premises of the first hypothesis, as many interpreters want to do (Cornford 1939 129-30; R.E. Allen 1997, 246; Rickless 2007, 132-5; Sayre 1996, 156-157; cf. Tabak 2015, 69). Instead, Plato

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1 All English translations are from Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell translation in Cooper (1997), sometimes slightly altered.

inserts Aristotle's performative contradiction as a provocation to the careful listener or reader of the dialogue, to try to unravel its inconsistency. Plato is merely presenting the problem and gesturing toward a possible solution; that is, that there is another kind of being, an atemporal or tenseless being. Furthermore, this shows us that sometimes mistakes, failures, and, in this case, a contradiction, can be instructive and more pedagogically effective than just giving the reader a step-by-step proof, all the steps of which must be faithfully followed without questioning. The second lesson is that the kind of atemporal being suggested by the performative contradiction connects the first hypothesis to what is referred to as the appendix or digression that follows the first two hypotheses that concerns "the Instant [τὸ ἐξαιφνης]" (155e-157b). "The Instant" is a strange or out of place (ἄτοπος) thing that is not in space or time (156c2-3; c6; c9-d1; e1; e6). Its atemporal or tenseless existence is supposed to suggest the way in which Forms do *not* exist in a particular time and place. Lastly, Aristotle's performative contradiction signals a turn in Parmenides' questioning in the first hypothesis. It should make us reconsider the radical claims that follow Aristotle's inconsistent Οὐκ ἔστιν at 141e8, all of which aim to refute the initial premise of the first hypothesis, "if one is." For example, these are the paradoxical claims that:

- (i) deny 'the one' being (141e9-10)
- (ii) deny 'the one' oneness (141e12);
- (iii) deny 'the one' a name, or that there is an account, knowledge, perception, or belief of it (142a3-4); and lastly
- (iv) deny that 'the one' be named or spoken of, or be the object of belief or knowledge, or that any existing thing perceive it (142a4-6).

These are further performative and logical contradictions that follow from accepting the premise of the performative contradiction that to be is to be only *in time*. Parmenides gets Aristotle to agree that 'the one' can have no name, while at the very same time referring to it as 'the one.' Parmenides gets Aristotle to agree that 'the one' cannot be the object of belief or knowledge, while at the same time making 'the one' the grammatical and intentional object of his very question! All of these final steps of the first hypothesis depend on the proposition that being necessarily means being in time. If this crucial enthymeme can be rejected, then one can dismiss these final argumentative moves and save the majority of the earlier premises of the first hypothesis. This means seeing that there are at least two kinds of being: existence in time and a tenseless existence. The first kind of spatio-temporal existence is appropriate to the sensible things among us, and the second kind of atemporal existence is appropriate to mathematical objects, but more importantly to Socrates' Forms.

### *"Οὐκ ἔστιν (141e8): La contraddizione performativa della prima ipotesi"*

Nella parte conclusiva della prima ipotesi, Parmenide persuade Aristotele che l'essere [οὐσία] deve esistere nel tempo; cioè che l'essere deve prendere parte ad almeno una delle modalità temporali: o essere stato nel passato, essere nel presente, o essere nel futuro (140e-142a). Se questo è vero, "Dunque l'uno [τὸ ἓν] non partecipa in nessun modo dell'essere" (141e7-8)<sup>1</sup>, che significa essere in modo temporale - su cui Aristotele è d'accordo, dicendo "Sembra di no [οὐκ ἔοικεν]" (141e9). Nel passaggio logico successivo Parmenide fa accettare ad Aristotele che "Perciò l'uno non

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<sup>1</sup> Tutte le traduzioni italiani sono da *Parmenide* a cura di Franco Ferrari (2004).

è in alcun modo [Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ἓν] (141e9-10)." Questo, tuttavia, contraddice la premessa di Parmenide "intero esercizio ginnico, "se è uno [εἰ ἓν ἔστιν]" (137c4). Il problema con la precedente conclusione - che essere è esistere nel tempo - è che, professando il suo assenso, Aristotele, di fatto, la contraddice. Egli confuta in modo performativo ciò che vuole affermare. Aristotele vuole rispondere alla domanda di Parmenide: "Ma è possibile che qualcosa partecipi dell'essere in un modo diverso da qualcuno di quelli elencati? [ἔστιν οὖν οὐσίας ὅπως ἂν τι μετάσχοι ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τούτων τι;] "(141e7-8) - cioè, in modo diverso da uno dei tre modi temporali. A 141e8, Aristotele replica con una risposta di due parole in greco: "οὐκ ἔστιν [Non è possibile]." Possiamo, quindi, nello stesso modo interrogarci sull'affermazione di Aristotele - che è impossibile che qualcosa sia e non sia nel tempo - domandando 'quando, nel tempo, ciò è vero'? A che ora "non è possibile [οὐκ ἔστιν]" per qualcosa partecipare all'essere? È impossibile solo nel momento presente? O era impossibile solo nel passato? O sarà impossibile solo nel futuro? Perché l'affermazione di Aristotele sia valida, essa deve valere in ogni momento, deve comprendere un essere atemporale. Potremmo dire che l'affermazione di Aristotele ha, con Kant, la necessità apodittica (A74-5 / B100). Essa ha la stessa assenza di tensione delle proposizioni matematiche. Quando nel tempo è  $1 + 1 = 2$ ? Era solo nel passato, o è solo nel presente, o sarà solo nel futuro che  $1 + 1 = 2$ ? No, non regge, o esiste, in una singola modalità temporale ma, al contrario, si mantiene atemporalmente in ogni momento. Come le entità matematiche, le Forme devono necessariamente avere questo tipo di esistenza atemporale. Di conseguenza, sostenendo in modo atemporale che tutto ciò che è deve essere nel tempo, Aristotele mina la sua stessa affermazione. Egli confuta se stesso, in modo performativo, e ciò che vuole affermare.

La mia interpretazione della prima ipotesi e del *Parmenide* in generale si ispira a Mitch Miller (1986) e alla sua osservazione che ciò che manca nella prima ipotesi è un senso dell'essere atemporale: l'idea che l'essere non implica necessariamente l'essere nel tempo. Ma anche a Miller sfugge l'importanza di questa contraddizione performativa del οὐκ ἔστιν a 141e8 (1986, 89-91). Vorrei dedurre tre conclusioni dalla contraddizione performativa di Aristotele. La prima offre un'indicazione sul modo migliore di interpretare non solo la prima ipotesi, ma anche le altre ipotesi nella seconda metà del dialogo. Nel notare la contraddizione performativa, l'ascoltatore o il lettore impara che non si deve difendere la verità e la coerenza di tutte le premesse della prima ipotesi, come molti interpreti vogliono far credere (Cornford 1939, 129-30, R.E. Allen 1997, 246; Rickless 2007, 132-5, Sayre 1996, 156-157, cfr Tabak 2015, 69). Al contrario, Platone inserisce la contraddizione performativa di Aristotele come una provocazione per l'attento ascoltatore o lettore del dialogo, per cercare di svelare la sua incoerenza. Platone sta semplicemente presentando il problema e indicando una possibile soluzione; cioè, che esiste un altro tipo di essere, un essere atemporale. Inoltre, questo ci mostra che a volte gli errori, i fallimenti e, in questo caso, una contraddizione possono essere istruttivi e più efficaci dal punto di vista pedagogico rispetto a dare al lettore una prova passo dopo passo, in cui tutti i passaggi devono essere seguiti pedissequamente senza essere messi in discussione. La seconda lezione è che il tipo di essere atemporale suggerito dalla contraddizione performativa collega la prima ipotesi a quella che viene chiamata l'appendice o la digressione che segue le prime due ipotesi che riguardano "l'istante [τὸ ἐξαιφνης]" (155e-157b). "L'istante" è una cosa strana o fuori posto (ἄτοπος) che non è nello spazio o nel tempo (156c2-3; c6; c9-d1; e1; e6). Si suppone che la sua esistenza atemporale suggerisca il modo in cui le Forme non esistono in un particolare momento e luogo. Infine, la contraddizione performativa di Aristotele segnala una svolta nell'indagine di Parmenide nella prima ipotesi. Essa dovrebbe farci riconsiderare le affermazioni radicali che seguono l'inconsistente "Οὐκ ἔστιν" di Aristotele a 141e8, che mira a confutare la

premessa iniziale della prima ipotesi, "se è uno." Per esempio, queste sono le affermazioni paradossali che:

- (i) nega l'essere all'uno (141e9-10)
- (ii) nega l'unicità all'uno (141e12);
- (iii) nega che l'uno a un nome, o che esiste un ragione, conoscenza, percezione o opinione di esso (142a3-4); e infine
- (iv) nega che l'uno sia chiamato o parlato di, o sia l'oggetto della credenza o conoscenza, o che qualsiasi cosa esistente lo percepisce (142a4-6).

Queste sono ulteriori contraddizioni performative e logiche che seguono l'accettazione dell'ipotesi della contraddizione performativa che l'essere deve essere solo nel tempo. Parmenide fa sì che Aristotele accetti che l'uno non può avere un nome, mentre allo stesso tempo riferendosi a esso come l'uno. Parmenide fa accettare ad Aristotele che l'uno non può essere l'oggetto dell'opinione o della conoscenza, mentre allo stesso tempo fa di esso l'oggetto grammaticale e intenzionale della sua stessa domanda! Tutti questi passaggi finali della prima ipotesi dipendono dalla proposizione che l'essere necessariamente è l'essere nel tempo. Se questo entimema cruciale può essere rifiutato, allora si possono respingere queste ultime manovre argomentative e salvare la maggior parte delle premesse precedenti della prima ipotesi. Ciò significa vedere che ci sono almeno due tipi di essere: esistenza nel tempo ed esistenza atemporale. Il primo tipo di esistenza spaziotemporale è appropriato alle cose sensibili, e il secondo tipo di esistenza atemporale è appropriato agli oggetti matematici, ma ancor di più alle Forme socratiche.

### *Not being anywhere, it would not be at all (145E): the physical-empirical dimension in the second part of the Parmenides*

Studies on the second part of the *Parmenides* usually seem to assume that the dialectical exercise concerns exclusively the intelligible realities, the Ideas and the Principles. It may be useful to focus on those passages that imply empirical and material references, which are often overlooked. The aim is to recognize that Plato never loses sight of the entire sphere of reality, therefore including the physical dimension, even within a metaphysical or – according to other scholars – logical-linguistic reflection. This fact cannot be evaded: it must, instead, be promoted in order to have a more complete and adequate understanding of this decisive part of the dialogue.

To this purpose, we will identify in the various arguments those marks which are *not only or exclusively* referable to the ideal realities but which *also* involve the material and physical reality.

For example, in the first thesis (137D-138A), and in the second thesis (145A-B), we find a reflection on geometric form which hardly appears applicable to ideal realities only. Indeed, the reality to which we refer implies beginning, middle and end, therefore parts: without these parts we cannot talk about *the straight* or *the round*. Of course we can – and we must – think of the ideal geometric shapes, but here also the material dimension cannot be excluded.

This is confirmed by the theme of contact, which has a close bond with that of geometric form; in the first thesis (138A-B), it is connected to the theme of being in itself or in other: what is in other must be *surrounded* by this other in which it is included, so it must have a round shape i.e. participate in the round and have multiple points of contact. The same theme is taken up again in the second thesis (148D-149D) together with a series of elements which here refer primarily to the physical dimension:

Is it not necessary that everything that is to touch an object be immediately close to what it is to touch, occupying that place which is after the place of the object that it is to touch? ... the One too, if it is to touch itself, must stay immediately next after itself, occupying the space close to that in which it is (148E4-10).

Here the theme of contact is emphasized by the expressions “to touch”, “occupying place”, “to be close”, which leave no doubts about the reference to the physical-material character of the topic. Moreover, contact presupposes number as the necessary premise of every material reality: by means of number, there are *two* objects and *a* contact, *three* objects and *two* contacts and so on (149A-C). In this way, number has a material-quantitative dimension too (in the *Sophist* the Eleatic Stranger clearly affirms this twofold nature of number: 1) number, as a totality of natural numbers, is among the things that are; 2) number is necessary for the things that exist and also for those that do not exist): it describes a reality of relationships and contacts among different beings; so it applies to physical realities as much as to intelligible realities.

The presence of the empirical-material dimension also somehow emerges from the connection of the argument on geometrical form with that on motion (138C-E). Among the various motions, translation is the most difficult to attribute to Ideas, while on the contrary it is easily attributable to empirical beings. Plato emphasizes that what moves is *partly inside partly outside* with respect to the place from which and to which the motion occurs. Here the material

dimension seems largely prevalent, especially as a consequence of the reference to the place; indeed, we can apply this figure to Ideas only using a metaphorical language. In the same way, rotation motion, which is also described in the first thesis, must have a center around which to rotate; this is very difficult to apply to the ideal world's realities, apart from the idea of rotation itself, that, however, certainly does not rotate.

The importance attributed to the topic of place ever since the first thesis is also decisive (137E-138B): the One in itself, not having a geometric form, thus not having parts, is neither in itself nor in any other, so it is nowhere; again, at 139A-B, the argument of the rest leads to say that what is neither in itself nor in any other cannot be contained in anything. All this hardly excludes a material value of the argument. The theme of the place is so relevant that it is re-proposed in the second thesis: at 145E, to prove that the One as whole is in something, it is affirmed that if it were nowhere, it would not be at all; at 151A-B: there is nothing besides the others and the one, which necessarily must be in something, so they are included *in each other*, otherwise they would not be at all.

These affirmations about the place-existence bond are of clear Zenonian origin, which brings us back to a series of arguments related to the physical dimension already discussed in the first part of the dialogue (references to other Zenonian topics are also found in the third thesis, at 158C where there is a reference to the minimal particles of every reality).

In the second thesis the reference to Being that is in the big and in the small parts (144C) can only indicate a relationship of a material nature. Then the precise references to the magnitude and its measurement, within both the first (140B-D) and the second thesis (151B-E), are certainly physical.

The dissertation about time must be added to what we have now said. In the second thesis it is clear that time is the precondition not only of becoming but of all that exists: what is in time and flows with time (152A5-7). This has emerged negatively since the first thesis (to which the second thesis makes explicit reference at 152A1-2): the One-One is external to time, it is neither older nor younger nor coeval neither to itself nor to others, so in the end it is not, it does not exist (140E-141E).

It is clear here that change and becoming cannot be attributed to intelligible, immobile and eternal realities, so we are talking about empirical-phenomenal reality and of time itself (in fact time belongs to the generated dimension, dependent on the motion of the stars as shown by the *Timaeus*).

All this is confirmed *a fortiori* by the enigmatic section concerning the instant (155E4-157B4), which is placed as a reality out of time to justify the change in time that only concerns empirical things: the transition from one state to another is explained through the instant.

In short, on the basis of a thorough analysis of the texts, this report would like to show how a series of data confirm that Plato, in the second part of the *Parmenides*, puts into play and weaves the different levels, the intelligible-ideal and the physical-empirical, in the attempt to explain the complexity of the investigated reality.

Se non è in alcun luogo non è affatto (145E): la dimensione fisico-empirica nella seconda parte del Parmenide

Solitamente le analisi sulla seconda parte del *Parmenide* sembrano presupporre che l'esercizio dialettico riguardi esclusivamente le realtà intelleggibili, le Idee e i Principi. Può quindi

essere utile prestare attenzione a quei passi che accennano a realtà o riferimenti empirici, se non materiali, che spesso sono trascurati dal precedente tipo di analisi. Si tratta di riconoscere che, pur all'interno di una riflessione metafisica, o – secondo altri – logico-linguistica, Platone non perde mai di vista l'intero piano del reale e quindi anche la dimensione fisica. Tale dato non solo non può essere eluso, ma deve essere valorizzato, pena una non completa e inadeguata comprensione di questa decisiva parte del dialogo.

A tale scopo vanno individuate nei vari argomenti quelle tracce, che in qualche modo sono riferibili *non solo o esclusivamente* alle realtà ideali, ma che coinvolgono *anche* la realtà materiale e fisica.

Ad esempio, nella prima tesi (137D-138A), e anche nella seconda (145A-B), troviamo una riflessione sulla forma geometrica, che difficilmente appare esclusivamente applicabile alle realtà ideali. Infatti la realtà a cui si fa riferimento implica inizio, mezzo e termine, cioè parti, senza le quali non si può parlare di *dritto* e di *rotondo*. Certo possiamo, e anzi dobbiamo, pensare alle forme geometriche piane e solide ideali, ma qui anche la dimensione materiale non può essere esclusa.

Questo risulta confermato dal tema del contatto, che ha uno stretto rapporto con quello della forma geometrica e che nella prima tesi (138A-B) viene presentato connesso all'essere in sé o in altro: ciò che è in altro deve essere *circondato* da questo altro in cui è incluso, quindi deve avere una forma rotonda, cioè partecipare del rotondo, e avere più punti di contatto. Lo stesso tema viene ripreso nella seconda tesi (148D-149D) insieme ad una serie di elementi che qui rinviano primariamente alla dimensione fisica:

Tutto ciò che deve essere a contatto con un oggetto non è necessario che si trovi immediatamente vicino a quello che deve toccare, occupando il posto dopo quello dell'oggetto che tocca? ... Anche l'Uno allora, se deve avere un contatto con sé stesso, deve trovarsi subito dopo se stesso, deve occupare lo spazio vicino a quello in cui esso è (148E4-10).

Qui il tema del contatto è enfatizzato da verbi e espressioni, quali “toccare”, “occupare uno spazio”, “trovarsi vicino”, che non lasciano dubbi sul riferimento al carattere fisico-materiale dell'argomento. Inoltre il contatto presuppone il numero come premessa necessaria di ogni realtà materiale: esso infatti rende possibile avere *due* oggetti e *un* contatto, *tre* oggetti e *due* contatti e così via (149A-C). Di conseguenza il numero ha anche una dimensione materiale-quantitativa (a riprova, nel *Sofista*, 238A-C lo Straniero Eleate afferma chiaramente questa duplice natura del numero: 1) il numero, come complesso dei numeri naturali, è tra le cose che sono; 2) il numero è necessario per le cose che esistono e anche per quelle che non esistono), in quanto descrive e si identifica con una realtà di relazioni e contatti tra enti differenti; perciò non può che applicarsi tanto alle realtà fisiche tanto alle realtà intelleggibili.

La presenza del dato empirico-materiale affiora in qualche modo anche dalla connessione dell'argomento sulla forma geometrica con quello sul movimento (138C-E). In particolare, tra i vari movimenti, la traslazione è quello più difficilmente attribuibile alle Idee ma facilmente attribuibile agli enti empirici. Platone sottolinea che ciò che si muove risulta *in parte dentro, in parte fuori*, rispetto al luogo da cui e verso cui il movimento avviene. Qui la dimensione materiale sembra largamente prevalente, soprattutto in conseguenza del riferimento al luogo, tanto che se si vuole applicare in qualche modo questa figura alle Idee bisogna pensare a un linguaggio metaforico. Quanto al movimento di rotazione, descritto sempre nella prima tesi, esso deve avere un centro intorno a cui ruotare, altro dato che si applica molto difficilmente alle realtà del mondo ideale, a parte la stessa idea di rotazione, la quale però certamente non ruota.



Dirimente è inoltre l'importanza attribuita al luogo fin dalla prima tesi (137E-138B), in cui si afferma che l'Uno in sé, non avendo forma geometrica, quindi parti, non è né in sé né in altro, quindi non è in nessun luogo; ancora a 139A-B, l'argomento della quiete porta a dire che ciò che non è né in sé né in altro non può essere contenuto in niente. Tutto ciò difficilmente esclude una valenza materiale dell'argomento. Inoltre la tematica del luogo è talmente rilevante che viene riproposta nella seconda tesi a 145E: per dimostrare che l'Uno come intero è in qualcosa, si afferma che, se non fosse in nessun luogo, non sarebbe affatto e a 151A-B: non c'è nulla oltre agli altri e all'uno, i quali necessariamente devono essere in qualcosa, quindi interni l'un l'altro, reciprocamente, altrimenti non sarebbero affatto.

Tali affermazioni sul rapporto luogo-esistenza sono di chiara origine zenoniana, il che ci riporta ad una serie di argomentazioni connesse alla dimensione fisica già tematizzata e criticata nella prima parte del dialogo (riferimenti ad altri argomenti zenoniani possono trovarsi anche nella terza tesi, a 158C, quando si fa riferimento a particelle minime di ogni realtà).

Nella seconda tesi il riferimento all'Essere che si trova nelle parti grandi e in quelle piccole (144C) non può che indicare una relazione di tipo materiale. Fisici sono poi certamente i precisi riferimenti alla grandezza e alla sua misurazione presenti sia nella prima (140B-D) sia nella seconda tesi (151B-E).

A questi dati va infine aggiunta la trattazione sul tempo. Nella seconda tesi si chiarisce che il tempo è la precondizione non solo del divenire ma di tutto ciò che esiste: ciò che è nel tempo e scorre con il tempo (152A5-7). Questo era emerso in negativo sin dalla prima tesi (a cui, a 152A1-2, la seconda tesi fa esplicito riferimento): l'Uno-Uno che è esterno al tempo, non è più vecchio né più giovane né coevo né a sé né agli altri, quindi alla fine, si conclude, non è, non esiste (140E-141E).

È qui chiaro che il mutamento e il divenire non possono essere attribuiti alle realtà intelleggibili, immobili ed eterne, quindi si sta parlando della realtà empirico-fenomenica e del tempo stesso come tale (esso infatti appartiene alla dimensione generata, dipendente dal movimento degli astri come mostra il *Timeo*).

Tutto ciò viene confermato *a fortiori* dalla enigmatica sezione riguardante l'istante (155E4-157B4), che, posto come realtà *fuori dal tempo*, serve a giustificare il mutamento *nel* tempo che riguarda *esclusivamente* le cose empiriche: attraverso l'istante viene spiegato il passaggio da uno stato all'altro.

In sintesi, con questa relazione si vuol mostrare, sulla base di un'analisi approfondita dei testi, come una serie di dati confermino che Platone nella seconda parte del *Parmenide* mette in gioco e intreccia i diversi piani, quello intellegibile-ideale e quello fisico-empirico, nel tentativo di rendere ragione della complessità della realtà indagata.

### *La maschera di Parmenide: riduzionismo ed equiparazionismo nella prima parte del Parmenide*

Una tradizione interpretativa prestigiosa e ancora oggi abbastanza influente considera il *Parmenide* un punto di svolta della filosofia di Platone, e ritiene che in esso vengano gettate le basi per una sostanziale revisione della teoria delle idee, se non addirittura per un abbandono di essa. Secondo questa tendenza interpretativa, le obiezioni che il personaggio di Parmenide muove alla concezione delle idee avanzata da Socrate (e molto simile a quella esposta nel *Fedone*, nel *Simposio* e nei libri centrali della *Repubblica*) sono filosoficamente consistenti e determinano l'esigenza di riformulare in modo radicale questa concezione o addirittura di abbandonarla.

Si tratta di un punto di vista che reputo profondamente sbagliato, sia perché non esamina le obiezioni di Parmenide alla luce dei principali assunti della dottrina platonica, sia perché non valorizza il contesto dialogico in cui tali obiezioni vengono formulate. Alle spalle di questa tendenza ermeneutica si colloca poi l'errata convinzione che Parmenide rappresenti uno dei "padri" della filosofia platonica. In realtà, se si esaminano con attenzione i riferimenti a Parmenide contenuti nei dialoghi, si constata come, al di là delle apparenti dichiarazioni di ammirazione per il suo pensiero, Platone prenda *sempre* le distanze dai contenuti teorici attribuiti al pensatore di Elea.

Le sei obiezioni che Parmenide indirizza alla concezione delle idee sono il risultato dell'assunzione di un punto di vista estraneo al pensiero dialettico: si tratta in realtà di una prospettiva fisicista, equiparazionista e riduzionista, che tende ad assimilare la natura delle idee a quella dei particolari sensibili. Platone attribuisce un simile atteggiamento al personaggio di Parmenide perché si propone di evidenziare gli errori e i fraintendimenti ai quali si espone questo tipo di attitudine teorica, suggerendo in questo modo di abbandonarla. In altre parole, la prima parte del *Parmenide* contiene una "simulazione teorica" dei rischi ai quali si espone una falsa interpretazione della teoria delle idee. Le testimonianze relative ai dibattiti intorno alla teoria delle idee provano che questo tipo di interpretazione aveva dei sostenitori sia all'interno dell'Accademia (Eudosso e Aristotele), sia al di fuori di essa (Antistene). Dunque il *Parmenide* non è il manifesto dell'autocritica di Platone e ancora meno il programma di una revisione della teoria delle idee.

Dal punto di vista teorico l'intera serie delle obiezioni con le quali il personaggio di Parmenide ritiene di poter confutare la teoria delle idee si fonda sull'assunzione di una nozione *simmetrica di separazione*. In effetti, proprio all'inizio del suo intervento, Parmenide, modificando il punto di vista di Socrate (129d6-e4), concepisce la separazione delle idee e dei particolari come se si trattasse di una relazione simmetrica e reciproca, vale a dire come se i due ordini ontologici fossero reciprocamente separati (130b1-5): se A è separato da B, anche B è simmetricamente separato da A.

A partire da un simile schema simmetrico, discendono tutte le aporie collegate alla nozione di partecipazione. Quest'ultima costituisce per Platone una *metafora*, per mezzo della quale egli si propone di descrivere un fenomeno difficile e oscuro (*Ti.* 51a7-b2): la relazione che intercorre tra entità che si trovano fuori dallo spazio e fuori del tempo ed entità spazio-temporali. Il personaggio di Parmenide interpreta in maniera letterale la metafora della partecipazione e dunque si chiede se le cose sensibili partecipano dell'idea nella sua totalità oppure a parti di essa (*kata mere*), rilevando come entrambe le soluzioni risultano inconsistenti (131a4-6). Alle spalle del suo

argomento agisce un assunto equiparazionista, che concepisce le idee come se avessero le stesse caratteristiche logiche e ontologiche dei fenomeni spaziali. L'estraneità di un simile punto di vista alla dialettica trova conferma nello scambio di 131b3-9: a Socrate che propone di uscire dal dilemma paragonando la presenza dell'idea nei sensibili a quella del giorno, Parmenide risponde assimilando erroneamente questa presenza a quella di un velo. In questo modo egli fraintende completamente il ragionamento di Socrate, il quale intende sottolineare l'incommensurabilità tra due ordini ontologici, la cui relazione non può venire concepita in termini spaziali. Per Platone, a differenza di Parmenide, una proprietà può venire *condivisa*, senza per questo essere spazialmente divisa.

Anche l'obiezione successiva (132a1-b2), che risulta simile al celebre argomento del "terzo uomo", presuppone l'assunzione di una prospettiva equiparazionista, che assimila l'essere delle idee a quello dei fenomeni sensibili. Parmenide non considera che l'idea di grandezza non è grande per partecipazione (*pros allo*), ma in se stessa (*pros heauto*), cioè in quanto corrisponde perfettamente alla nozione di "grande". Egli commette l'errore di trattare allo stesso modo (*hosautos*: 132a6) l'"essere-F" di F-in sé e l'"essere-F" di una cosa che partecipa di F.

L'errore logico che Platone attribuisce al personaggio di Parmenide si perpetua in tutti gli argomenti con i quali il filosofo di Elea crede di confutare l'ipotesi delle idee. Anche l'ultimo, definito enfaticamente *to megiston*, riflette il vizio teorico riduzionista. Parmenide presuppone che la separazione tra idee e fenomeni sensibili sia simmetrica, e che, poiché le idee sono separate dalle cose sensibili, anche queste ultime siano separate dalle idee (133c3-134a2). In questo modo egli non riconosce la funzione causale che le idee esercitano nei confronti dei fenomeni spazio-temporali, negando in questo modo uno dei presupposti fondamentali della concezione delle idee (*Phd.* 100b1-e3, 101a1-b2 ecc.). Per Platone la *separazione* equivale all'indipendenza ontologica (*kath'heauto einai*) e per questa ragione essa appartiene solo alle idee. Le cose sensibili non sono separate dalle idee, dal momento che dipendono ontologicamente da esse. La natura *asimmetrica* della separazione secondo Platone emerge chiaramente da uno degli assiomi collocati all'inizio del discorso di Timeo: tutto ciò che diviene, cioè il mondo fenomenico, diviene in virtù di una causa, poiché è impossibile che qualcosa si generi *choris aitiou*, cioè separatamente da una causa (*Ti.* 28a4-6). Dunque l'essere (*to on*) è separato, perché indipendente, mentre il divenire non è separato, perché richiede una causa.

Inoltre, nel momento in cui Parmenide considera le idee inconoscibili (*agnosta*), tralascia l'esistenza dell'anima, la quale, in quanto *syngenes tou ontos*, consente all'uomo di entrare in contatto con il mondo delle idee (*Men.* 81c9-d4, *Phd.* 79d3, *Rp.* 490a8-b7, 611e2, *Phdr.* 248b7-c1, *Ti.* 90a2-7 ecc.).

Le obiezioni di Parmenide sono dunque inconsistenti dal punto di vista della filosofia di Platone, e possono venire respinte all'interno della versione classica della teoria delle idee, senza ricorrere a una nuova versione. Il personaggio di Parmenide non è l'"apostolo della dialettica" e tantomeno il rifondatore della concezione delle idee. Egli rappresenta il portavoce di un'attitudine teorica erronea, che non riconosce la *differenza ontologica* tra le idee e le cose, e che concepisce i due modi di essere (*duo eide ton onton*) come se fossero realtà dotate delle medesime caratteristiche logiche e ontologiche. Anche nella seconda parte del dialogo, all'interno della sua celebre *gymnasia*, il personaggio di Parmenide non abbandona la sua impostazione riduzionistica e continua a trattare le idee come se fossero estese nello spazio (e per ciò divisibili) e nel tempo (e dunque destinate a diventare più vecchie e più giovani).

La ragione per la quale Platone attribuisce a Parmenide una simile attitudine teorica risiede probabilmente nel fatto che ai suoi occhi l'universo del poema di Parmenide è un universo *fisico* e che dunque la maschera di Parmenide si adatta perfettamente a incarnare i vizi teorici della *physiologia* presocratica, ancora presenti nel dibattito sulla teoria delle idee.

### *Le masque de Parménide: réductionnisme et physicalisme dans la première partie du Parménide*

Une tradition interprétative prestigieuse et encore très influente considère le *Parménide* comme un tournant dans la philosophie de Platon, et croit que ce dialogue jette les bases d'une révision substantielle de la théorie des idées, sinon même de son abandon. Selon cette tendance interprétative, les objections que le personnage de Parménide soulève contre la conception des idées avancée par Socrate (et substantiellement identique à celle exposée dans le *Phédon*, dans le *Banquet* et dans les livres centraux de la *République*) sont philosophiquement cohérentes et déterminent la nécessité de reformuler radicalement cette conception ou même de l'abandonner.

C'est un point de vue que je considère comme profondément erroné, à la fois parce qu'il n'examine pas les objections de Parménide à la lumière des principales prémisses de la doctrine platonicienne, et parce qu'il ne tient pas compte du contexte dialogique dans lequel ces objections sont formulées. Derrière cette tendance herméneutique se cache la conviction erronée que Parménide représente l'un des "pères" de la philosophie platonicienne. En réalité, si l'on examine attentivement les références à Parménide contenues dans les dialogues, on constate qu'au-delà des déclarations apparentes d'admiration pour sa pensée, Platon s'éloigne *toujours* des contenus théoriques attribués au penseur d'Élée.

Les six objections de Parménide à la conception des idées sont le résultat de l'acceptation d'un point de vue étranger à la pensée dialectique: en réalité, il s'agit d'une perspective physicaliste et réductionniste, qui tend à assimiler la nature des idées à celle des phénomènes sensibles. Platon attribue une attitude similaire au personnage de Parménide, parce qu'il vise à mettre en évidence les erreurs et les malentendus auxquels ce type d'attitude théorique est exposé, suggérant ainsi de l'abandonner. En d'autres termes, la première partie du *Parménide* contient une *simulation théorique* des risques auxquels est exposée une fausse interprétation de la théorie des idées. Des témoignages de débats sur la théorie des idées prouvent que ce type d'interprétation avait des partisans tant à l'intérieur de l'Académie (Eudoxe et Aristote) qu'à l'extérieur (Antisthène). Par conséquent, le *Parménide* n'est pas le manifeste d'autocritique de Platon et encore moins le programme d'une révision de la théorie des idées.

D'un point de vue théorique, toute la série d'objections avec lesquelles le personnage de Parménide croit pouvoir réfuter la théorie des idées est basée sur l'acceptation (implicite) d'une notion symétrique de séparation. En effet, dès le début de son discours, Parménide, en modifiant le point de vue de Socrate (129d6-e4), conçoit la séparation des idées et des phénomènes comme s'il s'agissait d'une relation symétrique et réciproque, c'est-à-dire comme si les deux ordres ontologiques étaient mutuellement séparés (130b1-5): si A est séparé de B, B est aussi symétriquement séparé de A.

A partir d'un tel schéma symétrique, toutes les apories liées à la notion de participation redescendent. Pour Platon, ce dernier constitue une métaphore par laquelle il propose de décrire un

phénomène difficile et obscur (*Ti.* 51a7-b2): la relation qui existe entre les entités qui sont hors de l'espace et hors du temps et les entités spatio-temporelles. Le personnage de Parménide interprète littéralement la métaphore de la participation et se demande donc si les choses sensibles participent à l'idée dans son intégralité ou en partie (*kata mere*), notant que les deux solutions sont incohérentes (131a4-6). Derrière son argumentation se cache une position réductionniste, qui conçoit les idées comme si elles avaient les mêmes caractéristiques logiques et ontologiques que les phénomènes spatiaux. L'extranéité d'un tel point de vue à la dialectique est confirmée par l'échange de 131b3-9: à Socrate, qui propose de sortir du dilemme de la participation en comparant la présence de l'idée dans le sensible à celle du jour, Parménide répond en assimilant par erreur cette présence à celle d'un voile. Il interprète ainsi de manière totalement erronée le raisonnement de Socrate, qui vise à souligner l'incommensurable entre deux ordres ontologiques, dont la relation ne peut être conçue en termes spatiaux. Pour Platon, contrairement à Parménide, une propriété peut être *partagée*, sans être divisée spatialement.

Même l'objection subséquente (132a1-b2), qui est semblable au fameux argument du "troisième homme", présuppose l'acceptation d'une perspective égalitaire, qui assimile l'être des idées à celui des phénomènes sensibles. Parménide ne considère pas que l'idée de grandeur n'est pas grande pour la participation (*pros allo*), mais en soi (*pros heauto*), c'est-à-dire qu'elle correspond parfaitement à la notion de "grande". Il commet l'erreur de traiter de la même manière (*hosautos*: 132a6) l'"être F" de F-en soi et l'"être F" d'une chose qui participe à F.

L'erreur logique que Platon attribue au personnage de Parménide est perpétuée dans tous les arguments avec lesquels le philosophe d'Éléa croit réfuter l'hypothèse des idées. Ce dernier, défini avec emphase comme un mégiston, reflète aussi le vice théorique réductionniste. Parménide présuppose que la séparation entre les idées et les phénomènes sensibles est symétrique, et que, puisque les idées sont séparées des choses sensibles, ces dernières sont également séparées des idées (133c3-134a2). De cette façon, il ne reconnaît pas la *fonction causale* des idées par rapport aux phénomènes spatio-temporels, niant ainsi l'une des hypothèses fondamentales de la conception des idées (*Phd.* 100b1-e3, 101a1-b2, etc.). Pour Platon, la séparation est équivalente à l'indépendance ontologique (*kath'heauto einai*) et pour cette raison, elle n'appartient qu'aux idées. Les choses sensibles ne sont pas séparées des idées, puisqu'elles en dépendent ontologiquement. La nature asymétrique de la séparation de Platon ressort clairement de l'un des axiomes placés au début du discours de *Timée*: tout ce qui devient, c'est-à-dire le monde phénoménal, devient en vertu d'une cause, puisqu'il est impossible qu'une chose soit générée *choris aitiou*, c'est-à-dire, séparément d'une cause (*Ti.* 28a4-6). Par conséquent, l'être (*to on*) est séparé parce qu'il est indépendant, alors que le devenir n'est pas séparé parce qu'il nécessite une cause.

De plus, lorsque Parménide considère que les idées sont inconnaissables (*agnosta*), il néglige l'existence de l'âme, ce qui, en tant que *syngenes tou ontos*, permet à l'homme d'entrer en contact avec le monde des idées (*Men.* 81c9-d4, *Phd.* 79d3, *Rp.* 490a8-b7, 611e2, *Phdr.* 248b7-c1, *Ti.* 90a2-7 etc.).

Les objections de Parménide sont donc incohérentes du point de vue de la philosophie de Platon, et peuvent être rejetées dans la version classique de la théorie des idées, sans recourir à une nouvelle version. Le personnage de Parménide n'est pas "l'apôtre de la dialectique" et encore moins le nouveau fondateur de la conception des idées. Il représente le porte-parole d'une attitude théorique erronée qui ne reconnaît pas la *différence ontologique* entre les idées et les choses, et qui conçoit les deux façons d'être (*duo eide ton onton*) comme s'il s'agissait de réalités ayant les mêmes caractéristiques logiques et ontologiques. Même dans la deuxième partie du dialogue, au sein de la

célèbre *gymnasia*, le personnage de Parménide n'abandonne pas son approche réductionniste et continue à traiter les idées comme si elles étaient étendues dans l'espace (et donc divisibles) et dans le temps (et donc destinées à devenir plus âgées et plus jeunes).

La raison pour laquelle Platon attribue une telle attitude théorique à Parménide réside probablement dans le fait qu'à ses yeux, l'univers du poème de Parménide est un univers physique et que son masque est donc parfaitement adapté pour incarner les vices théoriques de la physiologie présocratique, encore présents dans le débat sur la théorie des idées.

### *The Second Part of the Parmenides as Plato's "Way of Seeming": What the Equestrian Theme Can Tell Us.*

Horses and horsemanship are prominent in the pages of the *Parmenides* that precede its second part. I propose that the system of allusions their mention generates has some bearing on the status Plato intended us to attribute to the arguments that follow the prologue.

Antiphon, the immediate source of transmission for the discussion with Parmenides, is described as a dedicated horseman (126c), and first shown to us at his home in the company of a blacksmith, who is there to get instructions about a bridle that Antiphon would like fixed up (127a). In his original poem, the real Parmenides portrays himself as a charioteer who drives his horses to meet with a goddess, whose words he then transmits to the audience for his poem. We have here a parallel, then: two horsemen, both serving as messenger for a figure of superior wisdom. But there is also a contrast. Parmenides in Plato's dialogue, aged though he is, is still capable of great argumentative exertion; he even compares himself to the old racing horse in Ibycus' poem, trembling with anticipation before the race begins, knowing all too well the challenges it holds in store (136e-137a). Antiphon, however, has retired from the philosophic exertions of his youth (126b-c). His memory retains the discussion clearly and in full; but this achievement has done nothing to make a philosopher of him, or even to preserve his philosophic enthusiasm. All ambition to understand the Forms as a whole has been relinquished; what Antiphon understands these days is the use of bridles. (Given the widely acknowledged cross-reference to the *Republic* in this opening scene, a further allusion may be intended to the contrast between bridle-user and bridle-maker in *Rp.* 601c-602b; if so, it would have implications for the notable absence of Forms of artefacts within the scale of types at *Prm.* 130b-e.)

Parmenides' poem falls into two phases: the so-called "Way of Truth" and the "Way of Seeming." The arguments in Plato's *Parmenides* also fall into two distinct phases: Parmenides' critique of Socrates' views about the Forms and his deductions concerning "the one." The first phase is a case of peirastic dialectic: Parmenides puts to the test the views that Socrates already holds or to which he is willing to assent on the basis of his existing views, and shows those views to be wanting. The second phase, by contrast, is a case of didactic dialectic: Parmenides develops the entailments of various hypotheses about the one, and although he has an interlocutor along for the ride, that partner (Young Aristotle) was chosen especially for his youth and docility (137b), and the argument could almost as well have been presented in the form of continuous deductions.

I propose that the two phases of Plato's *Parmenides* correspond to the two phases of Parmenides' poem. That is to say, the peirastic arguments of the first part are Plato's "Way of Truth," the didactic arguments of the second part his "Way of Seeming." That the two works correspond in a general way is suggested not only by the motif of the messenger-horseman but also by the more widely noted motif of the welcoming hand-clasp (*Prm.* 126a corresponding to Parmenides B1. 22-3). But the motif of horsemanship has a more particular and telling

consequence than that of the hand-clasp. When it returns in the shape of Parmenides' comparing himself to a race horse about to compete on the track, at the point when he about to begin the didactic dialectic, it strikingly corresponds to a recurrence of the same motif in Parmenides' poem, just as the Goddess begins the Way of Seeming. She explains to Parmenides, the charioteer, that the reason she is equipping him with a cosmology of the world as it appears — in addition to the rigorous deduction of how the world actually is that occupies the Way of Truth — is in order that "no thought of mortal men may ever overtake you" (B8. 61). But the term she uses for "overtake" properly means "ride past" (*παρελάσσει*). It is a metaphor from horse-racing. The comparison in Plato's *Parmenides*, however, casts the character Parmenides as horse rather than as rider; the implied rider would be Plato himself, preparing to whip his character into action on the deductions, even as he manipulates that character's source-poem.

I say "manipulates" because, if this correspondence is accepted, Plato has evidently reversed the poles of Parmenides' poem. The rigorous deduction from hypothesis that is the Way of Truth now characterizes the didactic dialectic that in Plato's dialogue stands in the position of the Way of Seeming, while the argument that acknowledges its own inadequacy, which in Parmenides' poem is the Way of Seeming, in Plato's dialogue appears as the peirastic dialectic that leaves Socrates at a loss and nevertheless occupies the position of the Way of Truth. What would Plato's point be in making this reversal? Would it not be that the path he chooses for himself as a philosopher is the exploratory, peirastic path rather than the closed circle of deductive certainty? This is what we would in any case expect from the patterns of inquiry pursued in other dialogues and the fact that the *Parmenides* is an outlier in the corpus.

As for the particular implication of the fact that the character Parmenides compares himself to a racehorse: I take it that, just as the actual Parmenides shows in the Way of Seeming that he can "do cosmology" just as capably as the next pre-Socratic, or even more capably, so that none can ride past him, so Plato in the second part of the *Parmenides* shows that he (Plato) can perform rigorous metaphysical deductions as well as the next philosopher; and most especially, that he can overtake Parmenides himself by performing deductions resembling that in the Way of Being not just once, as Parmenides did, but no fewer than eight times. Alas, what those deductions prove is in excess of what one would wish, for their conclusions are mutually contradictory. But that is the way with metaphysical arguments at this level of abstraction — or so I take Plato to believe. The second part of the *Parmenides* is no parody (any more than the Way of Seeming is a cosmological parody); it is serious metaphysics. But for that very reason it is inadequate, as Plato strove to indicate by rendering its conclusions confounding and ineffective. Let it be the case that an adequate understanding of, say, the relation between Form and participant, or the one and the many, would resolve the contradictions; still, that understanding is not recoverable from the deductions themselves without special pleading, nor is such deduction the path that Plato chose in order to examine these issues in the other dialogues generally assigned to his later period. Moreover, the subsequent career of Antiphon shows how little impact such arguments are likely to have even on one keen enough to commit them to memory. For these reasons, Plato made the second part of the *Parmenides* correspond to Parmenides' Way of Seeming.



*La deuxième partie du Parménide est-elle le "Chemin de l'Opinion" pour Platon? (Enquête sur le motif équestre.)*

On parle assez souvent de chevaux et de la maîtrise du cheval dans les pages du *Parménide* qui précèdent la deuxième partie du dialogue. Je suggère que le système d'allusions auquel ce motif donne lieu aurait une portée non négligeable sur les raisonnements qui suivent le prologue.

Antiphon, le personnage du dialogue qui est la source la plus directe à diffuser la discussion tenue par Parménide, non seulement nous est décrit comme quelqu'un qui se consacre à la maîtrise du cheval (126c) mais aussi se présente d'abord en guise de client d'un forgeron venu chez lui pour s'informer sur les détails d'une bride dont Antiphon se voudrait équiper (127a). Pour sa part, le Parménide historique se présente dans son poème comme conducteur de char qui guide ses chevaux à faire la rencontre d'une déesse, dont il diffuse ensuite les paroles aux auditeurs de son poème. On a donc ici une correspondance: des cavaliers qui servent tous les deux d'intermédiaires pour les paroles d'une figure de sagesse nettement supérieure. Mais la correspondance comporte aussi un décalage. Le Parménide de Platon, en dépit de sa vieillesse, s'avère capable de dépenser beaucoup d'énergie à mener la discussion. Il parvient à un certain point à s'assimiler au vieux cheval de course dont fait mention le poète Ibycus, cheval qui tremble d'anticipation avant que la course ne commence, sachant très bien qu'elle se présentera comme une véritable gageure. Antiphon, par contraste, s'est retiré des efforts philosophiques auxquels il s'était consacré dans sa jeunesse (126b-c). Bien qu'il garde très bien en mémoire les moindres détails de la discussion tenue par Parménide, il n'est pas parvenu par la suite à devenir philosophe, ni même à retenir l'enthousiasme d'autrefois qu'il nourrissait pour la philosophie. L'ambition de pénétrer le système des Idées est absente; dorénavant il veut se faire expert en l'usage des brides. (Étant donné qu'on croit trouver dans la série de personnages présentée dans le prologue du *Parménide* une allusion claire aux personnages de la *République*, il ne serait pas trop hasardeux d'y trouver aussi une allusion au contraste entre celui qui fait la bride et celui qui l'utilise, *Rép.* 601c-602b. Une telle allusion serait particulièrement intéressante à propos des Idées d'outils et des objets fabriqués, absentes de l'échelle des Idées établie par Parménide, *Prm.* 130b-e — et c'est une absence frappante.)

Le poème de Parménide se divise en deux parties, que l'on appelle respectivement "Le Chemin de la Vérité" et "Le Chemin de l'Opinion" (ou bien "du Semblant"). Or, les raisonnements du *Parménide* de Platon eux-aussi se présentent en deux parties nettement distinguées: d'une part, la critique que fait Parménide envers ce que Socrate croit savoir à propos des Idées; d'autre part, le raisonnement déductif que fait Parménide à propos de l'Un. La dialectique de la première partie est "peirastique": Parménide met à l'épreuve les opinions que Socrate possède déjà ou sur lesquelles il est prêt à se mettre d'accord, compte tenu de ses opinions actuelles; et pour finir il les juge insuffisantes. La dialectique de la seconde partie, par contraste, est "didactique": Parménide se met à suivre les implications de plusieurs hypothèses au sujet de l'Un, et bien qu'il entraîne dans sa course un partenaire, cet interlocuteur est choisi sur la base de sa jeunesse et sa docilité (137b); Parménide aurait pu également (ou presque) mener l'argument tout seul.

Or, il me semble que les deux parties du *Parménide* de Platon sont analogues aux deux parties du poème de Parménide. C'est-à-dire que la dialectique peirastique de la première partie serait, en effet, le "Chemin de la Vérité" pour Platon, tandis que la dialectique didactique de la deuxième partie serait son "Chemin de l'Opinion." Que ces deux oeuvres sont analogues, au moins de manière générale, nous est indiqué non seulement par le motif du messenger-cavalier mais aussi par le motif que l'on note plus souvent, celui de la poignée de main (*Prm.* 126a vis-à-vis Parménide B1. 22-3). Cependant, le motif équestre implique une conséquence bien plus particulière que celui de la poignée de main. Quand ce motif réapparaît, à travers l'assimilation de Parménide avec le cheval de course qui est sur le point de concourir sur la piste — comparaison que fait Parménide quand il est sur le point de lancer la dialectique didactique — il y a une correspondance frappante qui lie cette réapparition avec la réapparition du motif équestre dans le poème de Parménide, justement lorsque la déesse vient de se lancer sur le Chemin de l'Opinion. À Parménide, le conducteur de char, elle révèle pourquoi elle se propose de lui expliquer la cosmologie du monde sensible, et de ne pas se borner à déduire de manière rigoureuse la vérité à propos de l'Être — œuvre accomplie par la première partie du poème, le Chemin de la Vérité. Elle lui offrira cette cosmologie, dit-elle, afin que "aucun mortel ne surpasse ton jugement" (B8. 61). Or, cette phrase se sert d'une métaphore de la course de chevaux: à proprement parler, "surpasser" veut dire "dépasser en allant à cheval" (*παρελάσσει*). Dans le passage correspondant du *Parménide* de Platon, en revanche, Parménide s'identifie non pas à celui qui guide le cheval mais plutôt au cheval; ce qui implique que dans le rôle de jockey ou de conducteur de char on trouverait Platon lui-même, qui se prépare à lancer son personnage sur la longue piste des raisonnements déductifs, tandis qu'il manœuvre le poème qui lui sert de source.

En quel sens Platon "manœuvre"-t-il le poème de Parménide? Si l'on admet que les deux textes sont analogues de la manière indiquée, il est évident que Platon a choisi d'inverser la polarité du poème de Parménide. Le raisonnement déductif et rigoureux qui part d'une hypothèse — le raisonnement du Chemin de la Vérité — se manifeste par contre dans la partie du dialogue Platonicien qui correspond dans l'ordre de présentation au Chemin de l'Opinion, c'est à dire, dans sa deuxième partie, où l'on trouve la dialectique didactique. D'autre part, le genre de raisonnement qui avoue sa propre insuffisance — raisonnement qui dans le poème de Parménide figure en guise du Chemin de l'Opinion — figure dans le dialogue de Platon en guise de la dialectique peirastique qui plonge Socrate dans l'embarras; mais c'est une dialectique qui occupe dans le dialogue la position du Chemin de la Vérité.

En réalisant cette inversion, qu'est-ce que Platon aurait voulu nous dire? N'est-ce pas qu'il ait choisi pour sa pratique de philosophie plutôt le chemin peirastique, le chemin d'exploration, aux questions ouvertes, que le cercle fermé de la certitude déductive? Une telle conclusion s'harmoniserait d'ailleurs avec les modes d'enquête poursuivis dans les autres dialogues, le *Parménide* faisant ici figure d'exception.

Quant au fait que Parménide dans le dialogue de Platon s'assimile à un cheval de course, il me semble qu'on peut en déduire, de la même manière que le poète Parménide démontre dans son Chemin de l'Opinion qu'il est capable de fournir une cosmologie tout aussi persuasive, ou même plus persuasive, que celles fournies par d'autres, de même aussi Platon, dans la deuxième partie de son *Parménide*, se montre capable de produire des raisonnements déductifs dans le domaine de la

métaphysique qui soient tout aussi rigoureux que chez d'autres, et même plus; car, en menant à leur terme à huit reprises des raisonnements déductifs, dont chacun serait l'égal du seul Chemin de la Vérité, il dépasse Parménide lui-même. Mais hélas, en le dépassant, ces raisonnements en viennent à se contredire. C'est ce à quoi il faut s'attendre, quand il s'agit de raisonnements métaphysiques poussés à un tel degré d'abstraction — voilà la position que je voudrais attribuer à Platon. Soyons clair; je ne soutiens pas que la deuxième partie du *Parménide* soit une espèce de parodie, ni un jeu d'esprit — et je dirais qu'il en est de même pour Le Chemin de l'Opinion dans le poème de Parménide. Ce que nous trouvons dans la deuxième partie du *Parménide*, c'est de la métaphysique sérieuse. Mais c'est précisément pour cette raison qu'elle s'avère insuffisante. Platon s'est efforcé de nous indiquer cette conséquence, en rendant déroutantes et inefficaces les conclusions auxquelles aboutissent ces raisonnements. Admettons la possibilité que, si on était parvenu à comprendre de façon satisfaisante les rapports entre l'Idée et ce qui participe à l'Idée, ou bien les rapports entre l'Un et le Multiple, on serait capable aussi de résoudre l'aspect contradictoire de ces conclusions. On n'arrivera cependant pas à cette condition à partir des raisonnements mêmes; au contraire, on aurait plutôt tendance à y imposer ce que l'on croit savoir déjà à propos de ces rapports, ayant peut-être recours à des artifices intellectuels. Platon, pour sa part, n'a pas cessé d'examiner ces rapports dans les autres dialogues qu'on attribue à sa dernière période, mais n'utilise jamais plus la méthode de la deuxième partie du *Parménide*. D'ailleurs, la carrière ultérieure d'Antiphon indiquerait que même sur celui qui s'acharne à les mémoriser, ce genre de raisonnements ont très peu d'effet pour la vie. Voilà pourquoi Platon aurait rendu la deuxième partie de son *Parménide* analogue au "Chemin de l'Opinion."

### *The eleatic doctrine of the one-all in zeno's first logos*

As is widely known, the *Parmenides* opens with Socrates and Zeno discussing the relative demonstration of the impossibility of multiplicity, by analysing the first of Zeno's forty *logoi* in support of this thesis. However, most critics have regarded this as a fallacious demonstration that betrays either philosophical ingenuity or treacherous intentions. This has led scholars to overlook the theoretical means by which Socrates sets out to refute the argument, and to lose sight of the importance of this discussion within the overall economy of the dialogue. The aim of my work is to reinterpret the demonstration attributed to Zeno, in order to highlight its inner coherence, that is to say its congruency with the metaphysics of the one-all which Plato attributes to the Eleatic thinkers. In the light of this analysis, it will then be possible to propose a new approach to Socrates' objections, and more generally to understand the reason why Plato believes that a criticism of the doctrine identifying being with the one is essential.

Within the dramatic framework of the dialogue, Zeno has just finished reading out his *logoi* against the multiple. To clarify matters further, Socrates asks Zeno to read the argument presented in the first *logos* again. Once his request has been met, Socrates addresses Zeno to assess what he has just learned: if the many exist, then the same things are both *omoia* and *anomoia*, but this is impossible, since *omoia* are not *anomoia*, and vice-versa; therefore, the many cannot be, because this would entail impossible consequences, *adunata* (127d6-e8). Socrates then goes on to observe that all forty *logoi* of Zeno's text are designed to show that multiplicity does not exist; and while this might seem like a different argument at first, it actually amounts to a championing of the thesis that all is one – a thesis expounded by Zeno's master Parmenides in his poem (127e8-128b6). Zeno, on his part, confirms Socrates' verdict, but defends himself against the charge of obscurity, stating that his aim to support the thesis of the one-all, by showing how the opposite thesis, the pluralist one, leads to even worse and more ridiculous contradictions than those assigned to Parmenides (128b7-e4). Leaving aside the issue of the historical reliability of Plato's reconstruction, which falls beyond the scope of the present enquiry, the section is a promising one, as it sheds light on the way in which Plato interpreted Eleatic doctrines in order to counter them through his own philosophy.

According to the Eleatic thinkers – whom Plato regards as forming a single, coherent movement<sup>1</sup> – all things, *panta*, are actually one thing, *hen*, that is immobile, eternal and ever self-identical, according to an absolute monism that rules out any form of non-being (128a8-b1).<sup>2</sup> In the light of this theory, what is the meaning and philosophical significance of Zeno's argument, as expounded in the *Parmenides*?

Many scholars have deemed the Zenonian argument discussed by Socrates as a fallacious one that is incapable of truly explaining the logical impossibility of the existence of the many. In their view, if we posit the existence of the many, the same things are no doubt simultaneously similar and dissimilar, yet in different respects: they are similar because they all exist in the same

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<sup>1</sup> With regard to the partiality of Plato's reconstruction, see CORDERO 1991, 91-124; FRONTEROTTA 2000, 31-53.

<sup>2</sup> For references to this doctrine in Plato's writing, see FRONTEROTTA 2000, 31-53.

way, but dissimilar because each thing is different from all others.<sup>1</sup> Again, according to a different possible meaning of *omoios*, each thing is self-identical yet different from all others.<sup>2</sup> Hence, the contradiction is only apparent, because it is not explicitly shown with respect to what, or in what sense, objects are both similar and dissimilar.<sup>3</sup> In my view, however, these readings do not take account of the assumptions from which Plato has Zeno set out; they ultimately refute the argument on the basis of premises that Zeno explicitly rejects. From the perspective of absolute monism, only one thing is and can exist, namely being, a single, unitary and self-identical logical form and self-substance. Therefore, with respect to anything that exists it is necessary to predicate being in the sense of an absolute identity with being itself and a rejection of any form of differentiation or multiplicity, which would entail an unacceptable violation of the principle of non-contradiction. Hence, the very notion of similarity must be reduced to absolute identity and homogeneity: significantly, *omoios* occurs with this meaning both in Parmenides and in Melissus, as the fundamental predicate of being along with the one (DK28 B8, ll.6, 22, 47; DK30 B7, ll.1-2, 4), and sometimes the term carries this meaning even in Plato (*Euthyphr.* 5d3; *Phaed.* 69a3; *Phaedr.* 271a6).

Zeno's argument, then, is based on a sincere and coherent adherence to the Eleatic thesis of the one-all: from this perspective, granting the multiplicity of things would mean making this single reality both self-identical and different from itself, insofar as the other that stands in contrast to it, if it is to be anything at all, must also fully coincide with being, which would lead to contradiction. Precisely for this reason, Zeno can set out to offer an indirect demonstration, by justifying the singularity of being on the basis of the logical absurdity engendered by the notion of multiplicity.

The Eleatic doctrine of the one-all only admits predication in terms of identity, thereby explicitly setting itself in contrast with Platonic thought, the aim of which is instead to combine the eternity, immutability and self-identity of each Idea with the multiplicity of the Ideas, while establishing a relation between these two levels of reality. Precisely for this reason, Socrates' objection, far from being simply a commonsensical observation, can only counter Zeno's argument on the basis of theoretical assumptions that Eleatism explicitly rejects. If we grant the possibility of a predicative attribution, and of different levels of reality, then it is possible for two things to simultaneously participate of the same notion of *omoiotes* without identifying with it, in such a way as to avoid all contradiction. At the same time – and in the same way – two things can participate of *anomoiotes*. Similarity and dissimilarity, then, both characterise the things in question in different ways, while remaining distinct from one another (128e5-129b1). Likewise, the same thing will be both one and many, without this entailing any logical absurdity: for it will participate of unity without coinciding with it, and the reason why it is one will be quite distinct from the reason why it is multiple, as the latter has to do with the various parts it comprises (129c4-d1).

If my analysis is correct, it is possible to appreciate the meaning and importance of Plato's engagement with Eleatic doctrine right from the opening lines of the dialogue. In the *Parmenides* Plato broaches – yet does not solve – the problem of participation, which is no doubt one of the key issues in his philosophical project, whose theoretical core is constituted by the acceptance of multiplicity and of predication not in terms of identity. As is widely known, this is an aporetic dialogue: the problem is only solved to some degree in later dialogues. Nevertheless, what can be

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1 See BARNES 1982<sup>2</sup>, 237-238.

2 See MCKIRAHAN 2010<sup>2</sup>, 177-178.

3 See RAPP 2006, 175.

found in the *Parmenides* is actually a preliminary and necessary critique of the philosophical tradition that most radically rejected certain assumptions of crucial importance for the Platonic model: before he can fully expound his doctrine of the Ideas, Plato must show the inner contradictions to which a coherent Eleatic model leads.

### *La dottrina eleatica dell'uno-tutto nel primo logos di zenone*

Come noto, il *Parmenide* si apre con Socrate e Zenone che discutono la dimostrazione relativa all'impossibilità del molteplice, analizzando il primo dei quaranta *logoi* dell'Eleate a sostegno di questa tesi. La critica, tuttavia, ha per lo più ritenuto questa dimostrazione fallace, frutto di ingenuità filosofica o di intenti proditori, e ciò ha condotto a trascurare gli strumenti teorici con cui Socrate procede a confutarla, e a perdere di vista l'importanza di questa discussione nell'economia del dialogo. Il mio lavoro intende invece rileggere la dimostrazione attribuita a Zenone, allo scopo di mostrarne la coerenza interna, ovvero la sua congruenza con la metafisica dell'Uno-Tutto che Platone attribuisce ai pensatori eleatici. Alla luce di questa analisi sarà poi possibile proporre un nuovo approccio alle obiezioni di Socrate, e più in generale comprendere il motivo per cui Platone ritenga essenziale una critica di quella dottrina che identifica l'essere con l'uno.

Nella presentazione drammatica, Zenone ha appena ultimato la lettura dei suoi *logoi* contro il molteplice, ma Socrate, in vista di ulteriori chiarimenti, chiede che venga riletta l'argomentazione contenuta nel primo di questi. Esaudita la sua richiesta, dunque, si rivolge a Zenone per verificare quanto appreso: se i molti sono, allora le stesse cose sono *omoia* e *anomoia*, ma questo è impossibile, dal momento che gli *omoia* non sono *anomoia* e viceversa; di conseguenza i molti non possono essere, poiché ciò comporterebbe conseguenze impossibili, *adunata* (127d6-e8). Sempre Socrate, poi, continua affermando che tutti i quaranta *logoi* dello scritto hanno come obiettivo quello di dimostrare che la molteplicità non esiste, e questo, nonostante a prima vista sembri qualcosa di diverso, altro non significa che sostenere la tesi per cui tutto è uno, espressa dal maestro Parmenide nel suo poema (127e8-128b6). Zenone, dal canto suo, conferma il giudizio di Socrate, ma si difende dall'accusa di oscurità, dichiarando che suo intento è quello di soccorrere la tesi dell'Uno-Tutto, mostrando come la tesi contraria, quella pluralista, conduca a contraddizioni ben più gravi e ridicole di quelle attribuite a Parmenide (128b7-e4). Al di là dell'attendibilità storica della ricostruzione platonica, che va ben oltre gli intenti di questa indagine, la sezione è promettente perché consente un accesso alla comprensione di come Platone lesse le dottrine eleatiche per contrapporvi la propria filosofia.

Dunque, secondo i pensatori eleatici, che Platone considera un movimento unitario e coerente<sup>1</sup>, tutte le cose, *panta*, in realtà sono una sola, *hen*, immobile, eterna e sempre identica a sé stessa, nell'ottica di un monismo assoluto che esclude qualunque forma di non essere (128a8-b1)<sup>2</sup>. Ora, in virtù di questa teoria, qual è il significato e il valore filosofico dell'argomento di Zenone che leggiamo nel *Parmenide*?

Molti interpreti hanno ritenuto l'argomentazione zenoniana discussa da Socrate fallace, e pertanto incapace di dimostrare davvero l'impossibilità logica dell'esistenza dei molti. A loro avviso, infatti, assumendo l'esistenza dei molti, le stesse cose sono certo simili e dissimili

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1 In merito alla parzialità della ricostruzione platonica cfr. CORDERO 1991, 91-124; FRONTEROTTA 2000, 31-53.

2 Per i riferimenti a questa dottrina in tutta l'opera platonica cfr. FRONTEROTTA 2000, 31-53.

contemporaneamente, ma secondo rispetti diversi: simili perché tutte ugualmente esistenti, e dissimili perché ognuna diversa dall'altra<sup>1</sup>. E ancora, secondo una diversa possibilità semantica di *omoios*, ogni cosa è identica a sé stessa ma diversa dall'altra<sup>2</sup>. Dunque, la contraddizione sarebbe soltanto apparente, poiché non esplicita rispetto a cosa, o in che senso, oggetti sono simili e dissimili nello stesso tempo<sup>3</sup>. A mio parere, tuttavia, tali letture non tengono conto dei presupposti da cui Platone fa muovere Zenone, e finiscono per invalidare l'argomento muovendo da premesse che Zenone rifiuta esplicitamente. Nell'ottica di un monismo assoluto, infatti, ciò che è e che può esistere è una singola cosa, l'essere, unica, unitaria e identica a sé stessa, forma logica e sostanza di sé. Di qualunque cosa che sia, dunque, bisogna predicare l'essere nel senso di un'identità assoluta con l'essere stesso e del rifiuto di qualunque forma di differenziazione o molteplicità, che comporterebbe un'inaccettabile infrazione al principio di non contraddizione. Pertanto, anche la nozione di somiglianza dev'essere ricondotta a quella di identità e omogeneità assoluta, e non a caso *omoios* ricorre con questo significato tanto in Parmenide, quanto in Melisso, come predicato fondamentale dell'essere insieme all'uno (DK28 B8, ll.6, 22, 47; DK30 B7, ll.1-2, 4), e anche in Platone può assumere questa valenza (*Euthyphr.* 5d3; *Phaed.* 69a3; *Phaedr.* 271a6).

Il discorso di Zenone, pertanto, si fonda su una sincera e coerente adesione alla tesi eleatica dell'Uno-Tutto: in quest'ottica, ammettendo una molteplicità di enti, quest'unica realtà verrebbe ad essere contemporaneamente identica a sé stessa e diversa da sé stessa, dal momento che l'altro che le si contrappone, per essere qualcosa, non può che identificarsi completamente a sua volta con l'essere, originando la contraddizione. Proprio per questo Zenone può procedere a una dimostrazione indiretta, giustificando la singolarità dell'essere in base all'assurdo logico generato dalla nozione di molteplicità.

Pertanto, la dottrina eleatica dell'Uno-Tutto ammette solo la predicazione di tipo identitario, e si pone così in esplicito contrasto con la speculazione platonica, il cui obiettivo, al contrario, è quello di coniugare l'eternità, l'immutabilità e l'autoidentità delle singole idee con la loro molteplicità, e di mettere in relazione due diversi livelli di realtà. Proprio per questo l'obiezione di Socrate, lungi dall'essere una semplice constatazione di buon senso, può sottrarsi all'argomentazione di Zenone solo assumendo presupposti teorici che l'Eleatismo esplicitamente rifiuta. Ammettendo la possibilità di un'attribuzione di tipo predicativo, e diversi livelli di realtà, infatti, due entità possono partecipare contemporaneamente dell'identica nozione di *omoioites* senza con essa identificarsi, ed evitando così qualunque contraddizione. Allo stesso tempo, e secondo le stesse modalità, due entità possono partecipare della *anomoioites*. Somiglianza e dissomiglianza, pertanto, caratterizzeranno entrambe in modo diverso le entità in questione, ma resteranno ben distinte l'una dall'altra (128e5-129b1). Allo stesso modo, una stessa entità è al contempo una e molteplice, senza che ciò comporti alcun assurdo logico: essa infatti partecipa dell'unità senza con essa identificarsi, e il motivo per cui è una è ben distinto da quello per cui è molteplice, che si riferisce alle diverse parti che la compongono (129c4-d1).

Se la mia analisi è corretta, diventano chiari il senso e l'importanza del confronto con la dottrina eleatica fin dalle battute iniziali. Nel *Parmenide*, infatti, Platone affronta, senza risolverlo, il problema della partecipazione, sicuramente uno dei nodi centrali dell'intero progetto speculativo, il cui nucleo teorico è costituito dall'ammissione della molteplicità e della predicazione di tipo non identitario. Il dialogo, come noto, è aporetico, e il problema riceverà una qualche forma di

1 Cfr. BARNES 1982<sup>2</sup>, 237-238.

2 Cfr. MCKIRAHAN 2010<sup>2</sup>, 177-178.

3 Cfr. RAPP 2006, 175.

soluzione solo in dialoghi successivi. E tuttavia, ciò che si rintraccia nel *Parmenide* è in realtà una critica preliminare e necessaria a quella tradizione filosofica che più radicalmente rifiuta alcune assunzioni cruciali per il modello platonico: prima di fornire una rappresentazione compiuta della dottrina delle idee, Platone deve mostrare le contraddizioni interne a cui conduce un coerente modello eleatico.

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Il *Parmenide* si apre evocando due volte (126a1, b1) la città di Clazomene, senza che la seconda occorrenza del termine sia una glossa autoschediastica. Dobbiamo ritenere questo riferimento casuale, oppure è una traccia che Platone ci invita a seguire? L'opportunità di leggere il riferimento geografico come filosoficamente connotato è giustificato dalla qualifica degli anonimi accompagnatori di Cefalo (sconosciuto cittadino di Clazomene) come μάλα φιλοσόφοι (b8). Non sono dunque cittadini comuni, ma uomini educati alla filosofia. Un lettore di Platone difficilmente poteva non pensare ad Anassagora. La tesi che intendo sostenere nel mio *paper* è che proprio Anassagora sia uno dei principali riferimenti del *Parmenide*, nella misura in cui la sua filosofia è una fonte della "teoria delle idee" (i.e. l'argomento principale dell'opera, secondo gli antichi interpreti), e che la prima parte del dialogo risulti pienamente intelligibile solo partendo da questo dato. Il *Parmenide* presenta Atene come un crocevia filosofico: vi giunsero da Elea, in passato, Parmenide e Zenone, vi abita Socrate e ora si presentano in città i "veri filosofi" di Clazomene. Il riferimento al valore filosofico di Clazomene, ovvero ad Anassagora, è però generalmente sottostimato (eccezioni sono, ad es., Miller 1986, 25 e Schudoma 2001, 15). Sayre (1996, 58) ha addirittura negato la pregnanza del riferimento geografico perché "Anaxagoras appears to have left Clazomene at an age too young to have left behind an enduring philosophic tradition based on his views", ma questa osservazione non tiene conto di *Apol.* 26d8, in cui Socrate accusa Meleto di considerare ignoranti gli Ateniesi, perché presuppone che non sappiano che le teorie discusse sono contenute negli *Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου*. Un libro che Platone dichiara celeberrimo ad Atene, venduto a una dracma (un prezzo molto basso).

La Teoria delle Idee recepisce un importante aspetto della proposta di Anassagora, quello per cui i composti non sono originari, ma il risultato della "partecipazione" di enti che sono propriamente ciò che sono (i.e. il seme del legno è propriamente legno, mentre un composto legnoso no, ospitando anche i semi di tutte le altre cose). Platone, tuttavia, attribuisce esistenza separata a questi enti, laddove Anassagora sottraeva alla sfera materiale solo il νοῦς.

Si potrebbe obiettare che la spiegazione qui attribuita ad Anassagora sia in realtà condivisa da tutti i filosofi "pluraristi", tuttavia solo in Anassagora troviamo la spiegazione del reale in termini di *partecipazione, separazione e inseità* degli enti originari (mosterò le analogie lessicali durante la presentazione). Nel fr. 12 DK si legge che le altre cose hanno parte (μοῖραν μετέχει) di tutto, mentre il νοῦς è ἀπειρον καὶ αὐτοκρατές καὶ μέμικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι, ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτὸς ἑωυτου; se infatti non fosse in se stesso, ma mescolato, parteciperebbe dei semi di tutte le altre cose. Ciò che ha carattere divino, come il νοῦς, non ha una relazione immanentistica con ciò che ha carattere materiale. L'analogia con la Teoria delle Idee è piuttosto chiara, con una differenza fondamentale: ciò che è in sé *F*, per Platone, non può essere materiale. Se la mereologia di Anassagora implica che ciò che appare fuoco abbia letteralmente *parte* di ciò che è realmente fuoco (cfr. il fr. B 11 DK: ἐν παντὶ παντὸς μοῖρα ἐνεστι πλὴν νου), la Teoria delle Idee lo esclude. Il rifiuto della mereologia Anassagorea è dunque decisivo per la fondazione della Teoria delle Idee. Essa resta però una potente spiegazione del rapporto partecipativo. A differenza del latino *participio*, infatti, il greco μετέχειν (μετά + ἔχω)

non implica etimologicamente la condivisione di una parte, come propone invece la mereologia anassagorea. Nel *Parmenide*, Parmenide interpreta la proposta di Socrate di introdurre le idee esattamente in questi termini, intendendo la μέθεξις come “aver una parte di”. In questo quadro, non vi è alcuna differenza ontologica tra le idee e i partecipanti (si veda Ferrari 2010). Vorrei dimostrare le seguenti tre cose:

- i) *Parm.* 131a3-7 introduce l’interpretazione della Teoria delle Idee come mereologia, riecheggiando il fr. B 6 DK di Anassagora, in cui μετέχει significa μοίραν μετέχει, ma al contempo fornisce la chiave platonica per interpretare il passo (i.e. l’analogia del giorno di 131b3-6). In questo contesto rigetterò l’ipotesi (v. Denyer 1983, 323; Gill-Ryan 1996, 28) di interpretare la partecipazione *all’intero* della forma in termini di *mass terms*, applicando l’analisi di Quine dei cosiddetti *scattered objects*;
- ii) la Teoria delle Idee permette di offrire una nuova modalità di eponimia, negando la tesi anassagorea per cui il costituente presente in quantità maggiore nel composto dà nome al composto stesso. È infatti possibile attribuire questa tesi ad Anassagora, o comunque a un contesto filosofico anassagoreo, sulla base della colonna XIX del Papiro di Derveni (ἐκ [τοῦ δ]ὲ τὰ ἐόντα ἐν [ἐκ]αστον κέκ[λη]ται ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐπικρατοῦντος), che è fortemente indebitato con il pensiero di Anassagora (v. Betegh 2004, 278-305);
- iii) l’argomento del regresso, o “Argomento del terzo uomo”, dipende interamente dall’interpretazione mereologica del rapporto di partecipazione, dunque non riguarda in alcun modo la Teoria delle Idee, che si fonda esattamente sulla negazione di questa modalità di relazione tra le cose e le idee. Se le forme sono ontologicamente equipollenti alle cose, è possibile contarle insieme a esse, come il regresso richiede; altrimenti, si tratta di un errore piuttosto grossolano.

In conclusione, proporrò una ragione storica per giustificare la discussione nel *Parmenide* di una interpretazione immanentistica del rapporto Forme-cose all’altezza cronologica del dialogo (che è tardo): la presenza di Eudosso nell’Academia.

### *From Clazomenae to Athens: Anaxagoras in the Parmenides*

The *Parmenides* opens by evoking twice (126a1, b1) the city of Clazomenae. The second occurrence of the term is surely not an autoschediastical gloss. Should we consider this reference accidental, or is it a trace that Plato invites us to follow? The opportunity to read the geographical reference as philosophical connoted is justified by the qualification of the anonymous companions of Cephalus as μάλα φιλόσοφοι (b8). They are not ordinary citizens, but they practice philosophy. What kind of philosophy? A contemporary of Plato could only think of Anaxagoras’ thought. The thesis I intend to support in my paper is that Anaxagoras is one of *Parmenides*’ main references, insofar as his philosophy is a source of the “Theory of Forms” (i.e. the main subject of the dialogue, according to ancient interpreters), and that the first part of the dialogue is fully intelligible only starting from this fact. The *Parmenides* presents Athens as a philosophical crossroads. Parmenides and Zeno came there in the past, in the city where Socrates lives now, and lastly the “true philosophers” from Clazomenae arrive in the city to hear the story of that ancient meeting. The reference to the philosophical value of the city of Clazomenae, viz. the city of Anaxagoras, is however generally underestimated (exceptions are, for instance, Miller 1986, 25 and Schudoma

2001, 15. Sayre (1996, 58) has even denied the significance of the geographical reference because “Anaxagoras appears to have left Clazomene at an age too young to have left behind an enduring philosophic tradition based on his views”. This observation does not take into account *Apol.* 26d8, where Socrates accuses Meletus of considering ignorant the Athenians, because he presumes that they do not know that the theories under discussion are in Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου. A book that Plato declares to be very famous in Athens, sold at a drachma (a very low price).

Plato’s Theory of Forms acknowledges an important aspect of Anaxagoras’ proposal, that is that the compounds are not original entities, but the result of the mutual “participation” of entities that are exactly what they are (i.e. the seed of wood is properly wood, while a woody compound is not, hosting the seeds of all other things). Plato, however, attributes a separate (i.e. non material) existence to these entities, whereas Anaxagoras subtracted only the νοῦς from the material dimension.

It could be objected that the explanation attributed to Anaxagoras is in fact shared by all the “pluralistic” philosophers, however only Anaxagoras explains (at least according to our sources) the world in terms of *participation*, *separation* and original entities that are *in themselves* (I’ll show several of these linguistic analogies during my presentation). In Anaxagoras’ fr. 12 DK we read that all other things μετέχει in a part of every thing, whereas the νοῦς is ἀπειρον καὶ αὐτοκρατέες καὶ μέμικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι, ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτὸς ἕωυτου. If indeed it were not in itself, but mixed to other things, it would participate in the seeds of all other things. In other terms, what has a divine nature cannot have an immanentist relationship with what has a material nature. The analogy with the Theory of Forms is quite clear, but with a fundamental difference: according to Plato, what is in itself *F* cannot be material. Anaxagoras’ mereology implies that what appears to be fire has literally parts of what is really fire (see fr. 11 DK: ἐν παντὶ παντὸς μοῖρα ἐνεστι πλὴν νοῦ). The Theory of Forms consciously rejects this point. The rejection of the Anaxagorean mereology is therefore decisive for the foundation of Plato’s metaphysics. However, it remains a powerful explanation of the relationship between original entities and compounds, based on the notion of “part”. In fact, unlike the Latin *participio*, the Greek μετέχειν (μετά + ἔχω) does not etymologically imply the sharing of a part, as proposed by the Anaxagorean mereology. In the *Parmenides*, Parmenides interprets Socrates’ proposal to introduce the Forms exactly in these terms, meaning the μέθεξις as “having a part of”. In this framework, there is no ontological difference between the Forms and the participants (see Ferrari 2010). I would like to demonstrate the following three things:

- i) *Parm.* 131a3-7 introduces the interpretation of the Theory of Forms, echoing Anaxagoras’ fr. 6 DK, in which μετέχει means μοῖραν μετέχει, but at the same time it provides Plato’s key to interpret the dilemma of participation (i.e. the analogy of the day, 131b3-6, which is an anti-Anaxagorean explanation). I will reject the hypothesis (see Denyer 1983, 323; Gill-Ryan 1996, 28) of interpreting participation into the whole of the Form in terms of “mass terms”, applying a Quinean analysis of the so-called “scattered objects”;
- ii) The Theory of Forms offers a new explanation of the eponymy, denying the Anaxagorean thesis that the seed that is present in greater quantity in the compound gives it the name it has. It is in fact possible to attribute this thesis to Anaxagoras on the basis of the XIX column of the Derveni Papyrus ((ἐκ [τοῦ δ]ὲ τὰ ἐό ντα ἐν [ἐκ]αστον κέκ[λη]ται ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐπικρατοῦντος), which is strongly indebted to the thought of Anaxagoras (see Betegh 2004, 278-305);
- iii) The Regress Argument or Third Man Argument depends entirely on the mereological

interpretation of the participation, so it does not in any way concern the Theory of Forms, which is based precisely on the negation of this kind of relationship between Forms and things.

In conclusion, I will propose a historical reason to justify Plato's need to discuss again in the *Parmenides* (i.e. a late dialogue) an immanentistic interpretation of the μέθεξις: the presence of Eudoxus in the Academy.

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### *La argumentación zenoniana del Parménides de Platón*

El *Parménides* platónico parece tener una intención claramente polémica, probablemente motivada por el interés del autor en revisar muchas de las tesis expuestas en diálogos anteriores, presentando nuevas perspectivas y matizando algunos aspectos que se habían desarrollado de manera más sencilla.

El análisis de las hipótesis de la segunda parte muestra un modo de proceder que sin duda recuerda a las aporías de Zenón y no está muy lejos del estilo del propio sofista Gorgias en su tratado *Sobre el no ser o sobre la naturaleza*. Se plantean esas hipótesis a modo de disyuntiva y se concluye que ninguna de esas soluciones excluyentes resulta satisfactoria, de manera que se ha de postular un nuevo punto de partida.

También puede destacarse la semejanza con respecto al procedimiento desarrollado en el *Teeteto*, diálogo redactado, a buen seguro, en una fecha muy cercana al *Parménides*. Ambas obras abren lo que habitualmente se entiende como la fase crítica de la filosofía platónica. De acuerdo con la clásica propuesta de Cornford (en *La teoría platónica del conocimiento*), el *Teeteto* puede entenderse como una extensísima reducción al absurdo, intentando definir la *episteme* sin hacer ninguna alusión a la teoría de las Formas, de manera que la conclusión aporética del diálogo ha de entenderse como una defensa de la necesidad de esas entidades inmateriales e inmutables, sin las cuales, como se señala al inicio del *Parménides*, “no habrá adónde dirigir el pensamiento” (135b).

Lo que deseamos destacar en esta exposición no es, por lo tanto, la tantas veces estudiada influencia parmenídea en el pensamiento de Platón, que parece alcanzar su cénit en el famoso “parricidio” del *Sofista*, sino la herencia dialéctica que se muestra de manera muy clara en el *Parménides* y que hunde sus raíces en el peculiar y sugerente estilo de Zenón de Elea.

El papel que desempeña Zenón en el diálogo no es, por lo tanto, meramente testimonial, sino que su argumento acerca de la pluralidad, lo semejante y lo desemejante, da lugar a la compleja discusión que se desarrolla durante el resto del diálogo y, especialmente, en el análisis de la Teoría de las Formas de la primera parte de la obra. Pero la influencia del discípulo de Parménides no se limita a estimular la discusión, sino que su modo de razonar es uno de los aspectos centrales de toda la conversación.

Precisamente, el principal problema socrático, como se indica en 135c, es su falta de experiencia y su incapacidad para emplear el método de razonamiento zenoniano con habilidad suficiente como para demostrar las tesis que pretende defender. Esto supone una muestra más de la importancia que tiene en el *Parménides*, no sólo el contenido de las tesis ontológicas que se ponen en cuestión, sino el método racional por medio del cual puede alcanzarse certeza a propósito de ellas.

Ya en un interesante pasaje de *Fedro* (261d), diálogo cuya redacción se estima en una fecha muy cercana a la del *Parménides*, Platón se refiere al arte del Palamedes de Elea, expresión que muy probablemente alude al propio Zenón. En él se destaca la habilidad dialéctica del discípulo de Parménides, capaz de hacer creer al auditorio que las mismas cosas son semejantes y desemejantes (*ὁμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια*), únicas y múltiples (*ἓν καὶ πολλά*), inmóviles y móviles (*μένοντα καὶ φερόμενα*).

Todos estos términos recuerdan sin duda tanto al poema de Parménides como a la discusión del diálogo que lleva su nombre.

Cornford (en *Platón y Parménides*), sin embargo, cree que Platón menosprecia el estilo de Zenón asociándolo a la retórica de los sofistas, que pueden persuadir sobre cosas falsas y que no se preocupan por el conocimiento de la verdad. Obviamente, el nombre del héroe griego nos recuerda también a otro de los discursos de Gorgias, la *Defensa de Palamedes*, que también emplea dicotomía y disyunciones para alcanzar la conclusión que se pretende demostrar.

Sin embargo, ese pasaje del *Fedro* discute los recursos persuasivos del discurso, que desempeñan una función fundamental en la verdadera retórica, aquella que se sirve de los recursos lingüísticos y dialécticos como segundo paso tras el requisito fundamental, que no es otro que el conocimiento de la verdad sobre el tema acerca del cual versa el discurso.

Siendo así, Zenón se convierte en una pieza fundamental para la comprensión, tanto del *Parménides*, como de varios aspectos centrales del pensamiento platónico. El estilo del filósofo de Elea no solamente es un arte de la discusión y la controversia (ἡ ἀντιλογική), sino una manera de razonar y de descartar hipótesis cuyas conclusiones resulten contradictorias o insatisfactorias, un ejercicio (γυμνασία) que nos prepara para la adquisición de la verdad que, por lo tanto, debe considerarse como una herramienta plenamente filosófica. Tanto es así que, antes de comenzar la tercera parte del *Parménides* (135d) que examina las hipótesis acerca de lo Uno, el maestro de Elea recomienda a Sócrates lo siguiente: “Esfuézate y ejercítate más, a través de esa práctica aparentemente inútil y a la que la gente llama vana charlatanería, mientras aún eres joven. De lo contrario, la verdad se te escapará”.

### *Zenonian Form of Reasoning in Plato's Parmenides*

The Platonic *Parmenides* may be described as a refutative or controversial text. This was likely motivated by the author's interest in revising some of the theses that had been explained in previous dialogues, as well as by his interest in presenting new perspectives and offering nuances to certain aspects developed in a simpler manner in previous works.

The analysis of the hypotheses in the second part of the dialogue shows a new procedure that reminds us of Zeno's aporias and that is not far from the sophist Gorgias style in his treatise *On not Being or On nature*. The aforementioned hypotheses are presented as disjunctive propositions and the conclusion suggests that none of the solutions appear to be satisfactory, so that a new starting point is required.

There are also obvious similarities with the method applied in *Theaetetus*. This dialogue was certainly written around the same time as *Parmenides*. Both are usually seen as the opening of the critical phase of Platonic philosophy. According to Cornford's classic proposal (in *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*), the whole dialogue should be understood as a very large *reductio ad absurdum*, since the characters try to define *episteme* without mentioning the Theory of Forms. As such, the aporetic conclusion of the dialogue must be interpreted as a defense of the requirement of those immaterial and immutable entities, without which we “will utterly destroy the power of carrying on discussion” (135b).

Therefore, what we wish to emphasize in this paper is not the well-known Parmenidean influence on the Platonic thought, which seems to reach its peak in the famous “parricide” in the

*Sophist*, but the dialectical heritage that can be found in *Parmenides* due to the peculiar and suggestive style of Zeno.

As a result, Zeno's role in the dialogue is not merely testimonial. On the contrary, his argument on plurality, the likeness and the unlikeness, results in a complex discussion that takes place during the rest of the dialogue as well as in the analysis of the Theory of Forms in the first part of the text. But the influence of Parmenides' disciple is not only seen in the fact that he triggers this discussion but, more importantly, in the actual form of reasoning, which is one of the key aspects of the whole conversation.

Precisely, the main Socratic problem, as indicated in 135c, is his lack of experience and his inability to use the Zenonian method with sufficient skill to prove the theses he intends to defend. This is another example of how the focus in the *Parmenides* is not only placed on the content of the ontological theses, but on the rational method employed to reach certainty about them.

In an interesting passage of *Phaedrus* (261d), which was likely written at a very similar time to that of the *Parmenides*, Plato mentions the art of Palamedes of Elea, an expression that seems to allude to Zeno himself. The author stresses the dialectical ability of Parmenides' disciple, able to make the audience believe that the same things are like and unlike (ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια), one and multiple (ἓν καὶ πολλά), immobile and mobile (μένοντα καὶ φερόμενα). All these terms undoubtedly remind us of Parmenides' poem and the discussion of the dialogue named after him.

Nevertheless, Cornford (in *Plato and Parmenides*) believes that Plato is underestimating Zeno's style by associating it with sophistic rhetoric, which allows for false premises to be taken for truths. Obviously, the name of the Greek hero also reminds us of another of Gorgias' texts, the *Defense of Palamedes*, in which he also employs dichotomies and disjunctions to reach the conclusion intended.

However, the abovementioned passage of *Phaedrus* discusses the resources of speech for persuasion and how they can play a key role in true rhetoric by using linguistic and dialectical resources only as the second step after the main prerequisite of the speech: the knowledge of the truth about the subject of said speech.

Thus, Zeno becomes an essential piece for the understanding of the *Parmenides*, as well as of several crucial aspects of the Platonic thought. The style of the philosopher of Elea does not only represent a high form of artistic discussion and controversy (ἡ ἀντιλογική), but also provides a form of reasoning that allows to discard hypotheses which could result in contradictory or unsatisfactory conclusions. It is an exercise (γυμνασία) that prepares us for the grasping of the truth and, as a result, ought to be considered nothing but a philosophical tool. In fact, just before the beginning of the third part of *Parmenides* (135d), in which the hypotheses about the One are examined, the master of Elea recommends the following to Socrates: "exercise and train yourself while you are still young in an art which seems to be useless and is called by most people mere loquacity; otherwise the truth will escape you".

## *Una mereologia nel Parmenide di Platone?*

### 1. Introduzione

Platone, esplorando se l'uno è o non è, offre nel *Parmenide* una teoria mereologica coerente: il tutto è più che la somma delle sue parti perché, come *holon*, il tutto dà luogo alle parti, e non viceversa, cioè, non sono le parti a generare il tutto. Questa teoria, però, non viene utilizzata in modo consistente durante il dialogo.

### 2. Argomento

2.1. Il testo. Nella seconda parte del dialogo, la discussione passa dal considerare se l'uno è uno alla considerazione se l'uno semplicemente è<sup>1</sup>. Ora, l'uno ch'è (ἐν ὄν) risulta essere un tutto (ὄλον); da questo viene che sia l'uno, sia l'essere (τό τε ἐν καὶ τὸ εἶναι), sono parti (μορία)<sup>2</sup>. In questa ricerca si conclude che l'uno avrà sempre l'essere, e l'essere, a sua volta, l'uno. Pertanto, paradossalmente, l'uno essendo una molteplicità non sarà mai<sup>3</sup>.

2.2. Conseguenze mereologiche. Il vocabolario utilizzato da Platone permette di distinguere la seguente struttura mereologica: c'è un tutto (ὄλον) composto per parti-di tale tutto, ovvero, μορία<sup>4</sup>. Ciò significa che la parte (τὸ μόριον) è parte, non dell'insieme di cose (πάντων), ma di quel certo uno che noi chiamiamo tutto (ένός τινος ὁ καλοῦμεν ὄλον)<sup>5</sup>. Questa teoria mereologica stabilisce che il tutto non è composto per parti *simpliciter* (μέρη): le semplici parti non originano il tutto (questa sarebbe una posizione vicina alla dottrina mereologica che considera che a identità di parti corrisponde l'identità del tutto, o più brevemente, che il tutto è uguale alla somma delle sue parti), piuttosto è il tutto che possiede le parti-di (μορία) tale tutto e, pertanto, il tutto dà senso e ha priorità sulle sue parti (dottrina mereologica dove l'identità di parti non è sufficiente per stabilire l'identità del tutto, o brevemente, il tutto è più che la somma delle sue parti)<sup>6</sup>. Così, il tutto che è un certo

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1 PLATONE, *Parmenide* 142 c2-3.

2 PLATONE, *Parmenide* 142 d4-5.

3 PLATONE, *Parmenide* 142 e6- 143 a1.

4 Il tutto come ὄλον viene distinto dall'insieme (πάν). Il primo contiene parti-di (μορία) mentre il secondo ha semplicemente le parti (μέρη): le stesse parti di legno potrebbero trovarsi nell'insieme di una barca oppure di un calesse. Ma, le parti proprie della barca, ad esempio, il timone sarà parte della barca e non del calesse. La differenza fra ὄλον e πάν è stata difesa da Cetrone (CETRONE, B., «L'*eidos* come *holon* in Platone», F. FRONTEROTTA – LESZL, ed., *Eidos – Idea. Platone, Aristotele e la tradizione platonica*, Academia Verlag –Sankt Augustin, Germany 2005, 103-114). Una breve esposizione dell'uso dei termini μορία e μέρη si trova in ANGELES GARNICA, D. *El caballo negro del Phaedrus. Demostrar, mostrar y armonizar el conflicto del alma*. Tesi dottorale I, 3.3.1. Roma 2018.

5 PLATONE, *Parmenides* 157 d7-e2.

6 Sull'attuale dibattito mereologico si può consultare C. VARZI, *Ontologia*, 109-110.



uno non è (a) né la somma delle sue parti (vale a dire, un insieme di *items* contabili: quest'uno non è considerato come un numero cardinale)<sup>1</sup>, né l'uno è una parte contabile (cioè, non è una forma messa all'interno di una sequenza: quest'uno non si identifica con il numero ordinale)<sup>2</sup>. Il tutto, se di contare si vuol parlare, è ciò che permette di contare senza poter essere contato a sua volta<sup>3</sup>. Questa è una teoria mereologica coerente, la quale però non è mantenuta consistentemente nel *Parmenide*.

### 3. Difficoltà

Durante le discussioni sull'uno, il *Parmenide* non mantiene la relazione ὅλον–μέρια. Il termine ὅλον, infatti, appare diverse volte in relazione con il termine μέρη<sup>4</sup>. Era forse Platone conscio della teoria mereologica che viene esposta nei passaggi segnalati del *Parmenide*? Oppure l'uso inconsistente dei termini fu deliberatamente voluto?

### 4. A mo' di conclusione

Nel *Parmenide* viene offerta una teoria mereologica coerente. Il dialogo però fallisce, fra altre cose, a causa del fatto che Platone non mantiene questa teoria lungo il dialogo. Se Platone non era consapevole della teoria mereologica appena esposta, l'inconsistenza può esser spiegata per mancanza di conoscenza. Ma se Platone era effettivamente consapevole di questo, occorre trovare altre spiegazioni. Una possibile spiegazione potrebbe essere che, quando Platone rispetta le relazioni stabilite dalla teoria mereologica, egli sta parlando più seriamente rispetto a quando non la rispetta.

Il consiglio che Parmenide dà al giovane Socrate<sup>5</sup> è ancora oggi un invito a praticare con impegno la ἀδολεσχία, quella sottile distinzione del vocabolario, nonostante questa pratica ormai sia considerata molte volte attività inutile.

### Referenze

ANGELES GARNICA, D. *El caballo negro del Phaedrus. Demostrar, mostrar y armonizar el conflicto del alma*. Roma 2018

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1 Questa posizione è coerente con la concezione che l'uno non è un *arithmos*, infatti, l'uno non è una molteplicità di *items* contabili (Cfr., P. PRITCHARD, *Plato's Philosophy of Mathematics*, 71).

2 L'uno come la prima posizione nella sequenza di forme è suggerito per BLYTH, D. «Platonic Number in the Parmenides and Metaphysics XIII», 30. Ma nella teoria che abbiamo segnalato, l'uno non è una posizione in una data sequenza, neppure la prima. L'uno sarebbe piuttosto quello che permette di dare senso a tutta la sequenza.

3 Rimane la difficoltà che nel *Parmenide* 153 a5-b1 pare affermarsi l'uno come il più piccolo degli *arithmos*. La difficoltà si potrebbe sciogliere dicendo che l'uno non è un qualsiasi *arithmos*; infatti, l'uno non si può contare (non è una molteplicità di *items*) e neppure è una posizione tra le posizioni, dal momento che dà senso a tutta la sequenza. Un altro modo di prendere la difficoltà è interpretare il passaggio come parte delle ipotesi nella ricerca delle risposte giuste.

4 All'inizio del dialogo (131 a-c) si mette in relazione *holon* e *mere*. In altri passi mischia i termini, ad esempio, nel 153 c1-2 Parmenide dice che l'uno ne ha parti (μέρη) ma, subito dopo nel 153 c5-7, le stesse parti si mettono in relazione con il tutto, ma questa volta le chiama *μερία*.

5 PLATONE, *Parmenide* 135 d2-6

BLYTH, D. «Platonic Number in the Parmenides and Metaphysics XIII», *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 8 (2000) 23-45.

CETRONE, B. «L'*eidōs* come *holon* in Platone», F. FRONTEROTTA – W. LESZL, ed., *Eidos – Idea. Platone, Aristotele e la tradizione platonica*, Academia Verlag –Sankt Augustin, Germany 2005, 103-114

PLATÓN, *Parmenides* J. BURNET ed., *Platonis opera*, vol. 2, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1967.

PRITCHARD, P. *Plato's Philosophy of Mathematics*. Academia Verlag – Sankt Augustin, International Plato Studies, vol. 5, Germany 1995.

VARZI, ACHILLE C. *Ontologia*, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2005, 2008<sup>2</sup>.

## ¿Una mereología en el Parménides?

### 1. Introducción

En el *Parménides*, explorando si el uno es o no es, Platón ofrece una teoría mereológica coherente: el todo es más que la suma de sus partes pues el todo, como *holon*, da lugar a las partes y no, inversamente, las partes al todo. Esta teoría no se utiliza consistentemente durante el diálogo.

### 2. Argumento

2.1 El texto. En la segunda parte del diálogo, hay un punto donde se examina, no ya si el uno es uno, sino si el uno simplemente es<sup>1</sup>. El uno que es (ἐν ὄν) resulta ser un todo (ὅλον) del que tanto lo uno como el ser (τό τε ἐν καὶ τὸ εἶναι) son partes (μέρια)<sup>2</sup>. Esta investigación concluye que lo uno siempre tendrá ser, y el ser tendrá siempre lo uno, por lo que, paradójicamente, serán una multiplicidad, y, por tanto, el uno jamás será<sup>3</sup>.

2.1 Consecuencias mereológicas. El vocabulario utilizado por Platón distingue la siguiente estructura mereológica: hay un todo (ὅλον) compuesto por partes- de ese todo (μέρια)<sup>4</sup>. Esto es, la parte (τὸ μέρος) es parte, no de muchas cosas juntas (πάντων), sino de un cierto uno que llamamos *todo* (ἐνός τινος ὃ καλοῦμεν ὅλον)<sup>5</sup>.

Esta teoría mereológica establece que el todo no está compuesto por partes *simpliciter* (μέρη) que lo originan (esta posición rechaza la doctrina mereológica que establece que, a identidad de partes, identidad del todo, o brevemente, que el todo es igual que la suma de sus partes), sino que el todo posee partes-de (μορία) ese todo, por lo que es el

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1 PLATÓN, *Parmenides* 142 c2-3.

2 PLATÓN, *Parmenides* 142 d4-5.

3 PLATÓN, *Parmenides* 142 e6- 143 a1.

4 El todo como ὅλον es distinto al conjunto (πᾶν), pues el primero contiene partes-de (μορία) y el segundo simplemente partes (μέρη): las mismas partes de leño pueden dar lugar a una barca o a una carreta. Pero las partes de la barca, por ejemplo, el timón es parte de la barca y no de la carreta. La diferencia entre ὅλον y πᾶν ha sido expuesta por Cetrone (CETRONE, B. «L'*eidōs* come *holon* in Platone», F. FRONTEROTTA – W. LESZL, ed., *Eidos – Idea. Platone, Aristotele e la tradizione platonica*, Academia Verlag –Sankt Augustin, Germany 2005, 103- 114). Una breve exposición del uso de μορία y μέρη se encuentra en ANGELES GARNICA, D. *El caballo negro del Phaedrus. Demostrar, mostrar y armonizar el conflicto del alma*. Tesis doctoral I, 3.3.1. Roma 2018

5 PLATÓN, *Parmenides* 157 d7-e2

todo el que da sentido y tiene prioridad sobre sus partes (esta doctrina mereológica establece que la identidad de partes no es suficiente para la identidad del todo, o brevemente, el todo es más que la suma de sus partes)<sup>1</sup>. Por tanto, el todo que es un cierto uno, no es (a) ni la suma de sus partes (es decir un conjunto de items contables: este uno no se considera como numero cardinal)<sup>2</sup>, ni tampoco el uno es una parte que se pueda contar (es decir, una forma ubicada en una secuencia: este uno no se identifica con un número ordinal)<sup>3</sup>. Este todo, si de contar se quiere hablar, es lo que permite contar sin poder a su vez ser él contado<sup>4</sup>. Esta es una teoría mereológica coherente que, sin embargo, no se mantiene de modo consistente en el *Parménides*.

### 3. Dificultad

Durante las discusiones sobre el uno, el *Parménides* no respeta la relación *ὅλον-μέρια*, pues el término *ὅλον* aparece en diversas ocasiones relacionado con *μέρη*<sup>5</sup>. ¿Platón fue consciente de la teoría mereológica que el *Parménides* expone en los pasajes señalados? ¿Usó inconsistentemente los términos de manera deliberada?

### 4. Conclusión

El *Parménides* ofrece una teoría mereológica de fuerte coherencia interna. Sin embargo, el diálogo fracasa, en parte, porque Platón no respeta esta teoría a lo largo del diálogo. Si Platón no fue consciente de la teoría mereológica que hemos mostrado, la inconsistencia se explica por la misma incoscienza. Si fue consciente, otras explicaciones deben buscarse, entre las cuales sugerimos que, cuando Platón respeta las relaciones que establece la teoría, habla con mayor seriedad que cuando no la respeta. En última instancia, el consejo de Parménides al joven Sócrates<sup>6</sup> a practicar arduamente la *ἀδολεσχία*, es decir, la sutil distinción del vocabulario, no obstante esto sea considerado muchas veces inútil, sigue siendo válido para el estudio del *Parmenides*.

### Referencias

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1 Sobre estas posiciones en el actual debate mereológico se puede consultar C. VARZI, *Ontologia*, 109-110.

2 Esta posición es coherente con la concepción que el uno no es un *arithmos* cualquiera, es decir, el uno no es una pluralidad de items contables (Cfr., P. PRITCHARD, *Plato's Philosophy of Mathematics*, 71).

3 Que el uno sea tomado como el primero de una secuencia de formas lo sugiere BLYTH, D. «Platonic Number in the Parmenides and Metaphysics XIII», 30. Sin embargo, en la doctrina mereológica que hemos expuesto, el uno no es una posición más de una secuencia, así sea la primera. Sino que el uno es aquello que permite dar sentido a la secuencia toda.

4 Queda la dificultad que en *Parménides* 153 a5-b1 parece afirmarse que el uno es uno el más pequeño de los *arithmos*. La dificultad podemos resolverla diciendo que el uno no es un *arithmos* cualquiera, en el sentido que no se puede contar (no tiene subunidades) ni es una posición más (puesto que da sentido a la secuencia toda). O bien, se puede interpretar el pasaje como parte de las afirmaciones, no certeras, sino hipotéticas, en la búsqueda de una respuesta.

5 Así, al inicio del diálogo (131 a-c) se pone en relación *holon* y *mere*. Representativo es 153 c1-2 donde Parménides dice que el uno tiene partes (*μέρη*). Inmediatamente después, en 153 c5-7, las mismas partes se relacionan con el todo y el uno, pero designándolas con el término *μορία*.

6 PLATÓN, *Parmenides* 135 d2-6

- ANGELES GARNICA, D. *El caballo negro del Phaedrus. Demostrar, mostrar y armonizar el conflicto del alma*. Roma 2018
- BLYTH, D. «Platonic Number in the Parmenides and Metaphysics XIII», *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 8 (2000) 23-45.
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- PLATÓN, *Parmenides* J. BURNET ed., *Platonis opera*, vol. 2, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1967.
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- VARZI, ACHILLE C. *Ontologia*, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2005, 2008<sup>2</sup>.

*Platonis Parmenides, 132a 1 - 132b 1. Contra Vlastos et socios eius*

De la batterie de difficultés que Parménide soulève en relevant le défi lancé à Zénon de faire remonter au niveau des intelligibles les paradoxes que le jeune par Socrate venait de déjouer en le circonscrivant au domaine des réalités sensibles, celle qu'on lit en 132a 1 - 132b 2<sup>1</sup> est – sinon la mieux étudiée – du moins la plus discutée<sup>2</sup>. De la pléthore d'études que cette section du dialogue a suscitées, la série de quelque six essais que Gregory Vlastos lui a consacrés est de loin la plus influente ou, à tout le moins, celle qui a donné lieu aux débats quantitativement – sinon qualitativement – les plus significatifs<sup>3</sup>. De fait, à très peu d'exceptions près, la presque totalité de la littérature secondaire sur l'argument évolue dans le cadre arrêté par Vlastos : la plupart des interprètes partagent ses présupposés en fonction desquels ils définissent et les questions qu'ils posent et les réponses qu'ils leur apportent.

La finalité de la communication est double.

1. A l'opposé d'une approche très répandue qui considère que les difficultés du passage tiennent moins à ce que Platon a dit qu'à ce qu'il n'aurait pas dit, il s'agira dans un premier temps d'aborder cette section pour elle-même, en se gardant notamment de suppléer des prémisses d'appoint et des axiomes subsidiaires. On soulignera – au fil d'une lecture rigoureusement cursive – que la structure de l'argument n'est pas déductive et que le regard synoptique de l'âme y joue un rôle capital. C'est, en effet, le fait de considérer de la même manière l'Idée issue du constat que les

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1 *Platonis Parmenides*, C. Moreschini (éd.), Roma, Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1966, 132a 1 - 132b 1 : « <Παρμενίδης> οἶμαι σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε ἐν ἑκαστον εἶδος οἶσθαι εἶναι. ὅταν πόλλ' ἄττα μεγάλα δόξῃ σοι εἶναι, μία τις ἴσως δοκεῖ ἰδέα ἢ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι, ὅθεν ἐν τῷ μέγα ἡγή εἶναι. <Σωκράτης> ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι. <Παρμενίδης> τί δ' αὐτὸ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὰλλα τὰ μεγάλα ἐὰν ὡσαύτως τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδῃς, οὐχὶ ἐν τι αὐτὸ μέγα φανείται, ὃ ταῦτα πάντα ἀνάγκη μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι; <Σωκράτης> ἔοικεν. <Παρμενίδης> ἄλλο ἄρα εἶδος μεγέθους ἀναφανήσεται, παρ' αὐτὸ τε τὸ μέγεθος γεγονὸς καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ. καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις αὐτῶν πᾶσιν [132b 1] ἕτερον, ὃ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα ἔσται. καὶ οὐκέτι δὴ ἐν ἑκαστόν σοι τῶν εἰδῶν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ ἅπειρα τὸ πλῆθος [<Parménide :> “je pense que tu penses que chaque Forme est une à partir de cela : chaque fois qu'il te semble que plusieurs choses sont grandes, il te semble également – à toi qui les embrasses toutes du regard – qu'un certain aspect unique est le même. A partir de là tu estimes que le Grand est un”. <Socrate :> “tu dis vrai” répondit-il. <Parménide :> “or, qu'en est-il du Grand lui-même et des autres choses grandes si de la même manière tu les regardes tous par ton âme ? n'est-ce pas qu'à nouveau quelque chose d'unique apparaîtra grand, en vertu duquel il est nécessaire que toutes ces choses apparaissent grandes ?” <Socrate :> “semble-t-il”. <Parménide :> “une autre Forme de grandeur fera donc son apparition, surgissant à part de la grandeur en soi et des choses qui participent de la grandeur en soi, ainsi qu'une autre <Forme>, à nouveau, en plus de toutes celles-là, par laquelle toutes ces choses seront grandes. Aussi chacune de tes Formes ne sera pas unique mais plusieurs à l'infini”] ».

2. Un premier recensement systématique de la littérature secondaire a dépassé les 700 titres (pour l'essentiels des monographies, des chapitres d'ouvrages et des articles de revues, à l'exclusion donc des traitements plus ponctuels, mais tout aussi pertinents, comme les introductions et, surtout, les notes dans les traductions modernes et contemporaines du dialogue).

3 Ces études sont : G. Vlastos, « The Third Man Argument in the *Parmenides* », *The Philosophical Review*, 63, 1954, p. 319-349; « Postscript to the Third Man. A Reply to Mr. Geach », *The Philosophical Review*, 65, 1956, p. 83-94; « Plato's "Third Man" Argument (*Parmenides* 132a 1 - 132b 2). Text and Logic », *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 19, 1969, p. 289-301; « "Self-Predication" in Plato's Later Period », *The Philosophical Review*, 78, 1969, p. 74-78; « A note on "Pauline Predications" in Plato », *Phronesis*, 19, 1974, p. 95-101; « On a Proposed Redefinition of "Self-Participation" in Plato », *Phronesis*, 26, 1981, p. 76-79.

particuliers présentent une seule et même détermination et ces particuliers eux-mêmes qui déclenche le regressus compromettant son unité.

2. Dans un deuxième temps il sera question de faire ressortir les inconvénients de l'interprétation proposée par Vlastos, inconvénients dont souffre – à différents degrés – sa nombreuse postérité. Deux en particulier feront l'objet d'une considération approfondie :

2.1 En premier lieu, Vlastos considère que le *πῶλλ' ἅττα* en 132a 2 désigne non seulement des particuliers mais également des Formes, ce qui est une aberration en soi et un défaut d'autant plus flagrant de la lecture de Vlastos que celui-ci attribue au premier *εἶναι* en 132a 2 une valeur existentielle plutôt que copulative (en traduisant « there exists one Form in each case » plutôt que « each Form is one »).

2.2 En deuxième lieu, Vlastos a relégué la clause « *ἐὰν ὡσαύτως τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδης* <scilicet *αὐτὸ τὸ μέγα καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ μεγάλα*> » (132a 5-6) à l'arrière-plan de l'argument, au point que le *ὡσαύτως* disparaît à terme de sa traduction de ces quelques lignes, en dépit du fait qu'il produit la confusion entre les Idées et les particuliers sensibles sur laquelle repose l'argument tout entier.

En montrant que ces deux erreurs sont solidaires, on essaiera de les éradiquer du paysage exégétique de l'après-Vlastos en démontrant – et c'est là peut-être l'originalité de la communication – qu'on les retrouve telles quelles non seulement chez ses épigones, mais aussi bien au-delà comme dans le cas de Gail Fine qui en a fait la cheville ouvrière de sa reconstruction de l'argument du « Troisième homme » dans le traité perdu d'Aristote sur les Idées<sup>1</sup>.

Nota bene : en raison de la prépondérance des documents en langue Anglaise au sein du corpus étudié, la communication sera en Anglais scientifique ou analytique (comme on voudra).

### *Platonis Parmenides, 132a 1 - 132b 1. Contra Vlastos et socios eius (it)*

Delle numerose difficoltà che il personaggio eponimo solleva accettando la sfida di riprodurre sul piano dell'intelligibile i paradossi che il giovane Socrate pensa aver neutralizzato relegandoli nella sfera delle realtà sensibili, quella che si legge in 132a 1 - 132b 2<sup>2</sup> è, senza dubbio, la più discussa<sup>3</sup>. Della pleora di studi che hanno trattato di questa sezione del dialogo, la serie di sei saggi che Gregory Vlastos le ha dedicato<sup>4</sup> è di gran lunga la più influente, non foss'altro per il dibattito che ha suscitato e nutrito da oltre mezzo secolo. È un dato di fatto che, nella stragrande maggioranza dei casi, la letteratura secondaria sull'argomento si muove all'interno del quadro stabilito dall'interpretazione di Vlastos, di cui condivide i presupposti e in funzione del quale modula domande e risposte.

La finalità della comunicazione è duplice.

1. Rompendo con la prassi abituale che consiste a concentrarsi su quello che Platone non avrebbe detto piuttosto che su quello che ha effettivamente scritto, si tratterà, in un primo tempo, di considerare la sezione 132a 1 - 132b 2 per se stessa astenendosi dall'introdurre premesse ed assiomi sussidiari. Una lettura rigorosamente corsiva del testo metterà in evidenza, in primo luogo,

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1. Cf. notamment, mais non exclusivement, G. Fine, « The One Over Many », *Philosophical Review*, 89, 1980, p. 197-240 ; « Aristotle and the More Accurate Arguments », dans M. Schofield et M. Craven Nussbaum (éd.), *Language and Logos*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 155-177 ; « Owen, Aristotle, and the Third Man », *Phronesis*, 27, 1982, p. 13-33 ; *On Ideas. Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993.

che la struttura dell'argomento non è deduttiva, in secondo luogo, che lo sguardo sinottico dell'anima svolge un ruolo fondamentale nella misura in cui è proprio il fatto di guardare allo stesso modo le realtà sensibili e l'Idea sorta dall'osservazione che tali realtà presentano determinazioni unitarie (come il fatto di essere tutte grandi) è precisamente ciò che fa scattare il regresso all'infinito volto a compromettere l'unità dell'Idea stessa.

2. In un secondo tempo, si tratterà di identificare gli inconvenienti dell'interpretazione di Vlastos, inconvenienti di cui soffre in misura variabile anche la sua posterità. Due in particolare saranno studiati in dettaglio :

2.1 Da un lato, il fatto che Vlastos mantiene che il *πόλλ' ἄττα* in 132a 2 designa non solamente gli individui particolari ma altresì le Idee stesse. Il che costituisce un'aberrazione tanto più evidente in quanto Vlastos attribuisce dal canto suo un valore esistenziale invece che copulativo al primo *εἶναι* in 132a 2 (traduce infatti : « there exists one Form in each case » piuttosto che « each Form is one »).

2.2 Dall'altro lato, Vlastos ha relegato in secondo piano la clausola « *ἐὰν ὡσαύτως τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδης* <scilicet *αὐτὸ τὸ μέγα καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ μεγάλα*> » (132a 5-6), al punto da omettere dalla traduzione l'*ὡσαύτως* a dispetto del fatto ch'esso produce la confusione fra le Idee e le cose sulla quale riposa l'argomento tutt'intero.

A partire dalla solidarietà dei due errori, si cercherà di eliminarli dal contesto esegetico del dopo Vlastos mostrando come li si ritrova tali e quali non solo fra gli epigoni ma anche ben al di là come dimostrato dal caso di Gail Fine che ne ha fatto il cardine della sua ricostruzione dell'argomento del « Terzo uomo » nel trattato perduto di Aristotele sulle Idee <sup>1</sup>.

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2 *Platonis Parmenides*, C. Moreschini (éd.), Roma, Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1966, 132a 1 - 132b 1 : « <Παρμενίδης> οἶμαι σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε ἐν ἑκαστον εἶδος οἶσθαι εἶναι· ὅταν πόλλ' ἄττα μεγάλα δόξῃ σοι εἶναι, μία τις ἴσως δοκεῖ ἰδέα ἢ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι, ὅθεν ἐν τὸ μέγα ἡγή εἶναι. <Σωκράτης> ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι. <Παρμενίδης> τί δ' αὐτὸ τὸ μέγα καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ μεγάλα ἐὰν ὡσαύτως τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδης, οὐχὶ ἐν τι αὐτὸ μέγα φανείται, ἢ ταῦτα πάντα ἀνάγκη μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι; <Σωκράτης> ἔοικεν. <Παρμενίδης> ἄλλο ἄρα εἶδος μεγέθους ἀναφανήσεται, παρ' αὐτὸ τε τὸ μέγεθος γεγονὸς καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ· καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις αὐτὸ πᾶσιν [132b 1] ἕτερον, ἢ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα ἔσται· καὶ οὐκέτι δὴ ἐν ἑκαστὸν σοι τῶν εἰδῶν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος [A. Riccardo, *Platone. Parmenide. Traduzione, introduzione e note di Luc Brisson*, Napoli, Loffredo, 1998, p. 92 : <Parmenide :> ecco, come immagino, a partire da quale considerazione tu giungi a porre che ciascuna Forma è una. Ogni volta che più cose ti sembrano essere grandi, è una sola Forma, suppongo, che ti appare essere la stessa, quando le afferrì tutte con lo sguardo ; ecco perché ritieni che il Grande è unico. <Socrate :> dici il vero rispose. <Parmenide :> ebbene, il Grande in sé e tutte queste altre cose che sono le cose grandi, supponi allo stesso modo di afferrarle tutte con un colpo d'occhio, con gli occhi dell'anima. Non ti apparirà di nuovo qualcosa di unico, che è grande, e in virtù di cui queste stesse cose nel loro insieme ti appariranno necessariamente grandi ? <Socrate :> sembra. <Parmenide :> è dunque un'altra Forma di Grandezza che si appresta a fare la sua comparsa, estendendosi sulla Grandezza in sé e sulle cose che partecipano di questa Forma ; il che equivale a dire che, oltre la Grandezza in sé e le cose che ne partecipano, ci sarà ancora una Forma, diversa, in virtù della quale la Grandezza in sé e le cose che ne partecipano saranno grandi. Di conseguenza, ciascuna delle tue Forme non sarà ormai più una, ma si moltiplicherà senza limite] ».

3. Un censimento più o meno esaustivo ha evidenziato l'esistenza di oltre 700 titoli (essenzialmente volumi monografici, capitoli d'antologia e articoli di rivista, senza contare dunque contributi altrettanto sostanziali ma più puntuali come le introduzioni e le note alle traduzioni moderne e contemporanee del dialogo).

4. Ossia, G. Vlastos, « The Third Man Argument in the *Parmenides* », *The Philosophical Review*, 63, 1954, p. 319-349 ; « Postscript to the Third Man. A Reply to Mr. Geach », *The Philosophical Review*, 65, 1956, p. 83-94 ; « Plato's "Third Man" Argument (*Parmenides* 132a 1 - 132b 2). Text and Logic », *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 19, 1969, p. 289-301 ; « "Self-Predication" in Plato's Later Period », *The Philosophical Review*, 78, 1969, p. 74-78 ; « A note on "Pauline Predications" in Plato », *Phronesis*, 19, 1974, p. 95-101 ; « On a Proposed Redefinition of "Self-Participation" in Plato », *Phronesis*, 26, 1981, p. 76-79.

Nota Bene: In considerazione della preponderanza degli studi di lingua Inglese in seno alla letteratura presa in considerazione, la comunicazione sarà anch'essa in Inglese scientifico o, se si preferisce, in Inglese analitico.

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1. Cf. in particolare ma non esclusivamente : G. Fine, « The One Over Many », *Philosophical Review*, 89, 1980, p. 197-240 ; « Aristotle and the More Accurate Arguments », dans M. Schofield et M. Craven Nussbaum (éd.), *Language and Logos*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 155-177 ; « Owen, Aristotle, and the Third Man », *Phronesis*, 27, 1982, p. 13-33 ; *On Ideas. Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993



*Time and the Instant: Reassessing the Implications of a Platonic Passage*

Any serious student of the *Parmenides* will be acquainted with Cornford's justly famous work on it, and hence with his dismissive assessment of what some interpreters have made of Plato's coda on time and the instant (*to exaiφhnēs*) (Cornford (1939, 203):

“I have not been able to understand how Plato's businesslike account of the instant...at which the various species of change occur, can be connected with the sudden vision of the Beautiful...and the doctrine of *Anamnēsis*...The only link appears to be the use of the word *exaiφhnēs* in its normal sense of “suddenly” at *Smp.*, 210e and *Ep.* Vii, 341d.”

In this paper, I will suggest that in his zeal to defend a sober, business-like Plato, Cornford has missed something crucial about the broader implications of this remarkable passage and the light it sheds – not only on the *Parmenides*, and on Plato's time doctrine – but on broader questions about philosophical thought and its proper mode of expression.

More concretely, I will argue that the *exaiφhnēs* passage (*Prm.* 155e4-157b5) shows how both forms and the activity of *noēsis* – far from being theoretical flights of fancy which have lost all contact with empirical experience – are indispensably constitutive of our most ordinary empirical experience, in this case, of temporal change. Indeed, reflection on the details of the passage will show that ordinary temporal experience is literally incomprehensible on its own terms without recourse to Form and *noēsis*. However, when we try articulate this conceptually, we are forced into the use of imagistic language for reasons which will reveal the link which Cornford missed between this passage and Plato's descriptions of the philosopher's progress in understanding, in the *Symposium*, *Meno* and elsewhere.

The structural significance of Parmenides' attempt to explain the nature of time in the *exaiφhnēs* passage cannot be fully grasped without noticing the pre-philosophical view of time which it will transform. The *Parmenides* is a gymnastic (135d4-136a2) meant to train Socrates for attaining a “lordly view of the True (136c5); i.e., a comprehensive view, freed from all more limited views and their unreflective doxastic assumptions. The assumption in question here is expressed (at 141e3-142a1) by Young Aristotle, for whom the only possible kind of being is being which is subject to temporal determination. For Young Aristotle, this assumption about our ordinary experience is so obvious that it requires no discussion. It is the attempt to posit beings that somehow transcend the temporal flow which must justify itself.

But the situation is, in fact, exactly the opposite: the central implication of the *exaiφhnēs* passage is that ordinary temporal experience is completely impossible without supra-temporal Forms and without a non-temporal interruption in the continuum of time which explains how Form can be present in the temporally determined particular. In this sense, I think it is Miller (1991) who gives the correct interpretation: the *exaiφhnēs* passage completes the central project of the *Parmenides* – articulating a philosophically adequate grasp of the nature and function of Form. The core of Miller's analysis can be stated for our purposes as follows:

Our most basic experience of temporality is the experience of *determinate* change (from being to non-being, like to unlike, greater to less, moving to resting, etc.). But this means that our basic temporal experience is a discernment of unity and distinctness within time, and this presupposes that the principle of non-contradiction is operative in things and in our grasp of them. Only if we follow Miller in understanding the One which is the subject of Hypothesis 1 as the eternal Form, and the One of Hypothesis II as the temporally determined particular, can we begin to understand how there can be such determinate, non-contradictory unity to temporal things: The form is that which is situated “in the instant” and lets the particular be one, self-same thing throughout its temporal history of changes. It is not eternity which needs to justify itself before the tribunal of common sense, then, but rather temporality. Otherwise stated, there is *no* common-sense experience of temporality at all without the presence within the temporal flow of transcendent, eternal form as a precondition for unity and distinctness in things which can undergo change and motion in time.

A close investigation of the *exaiφnēs* passage shows, however, that even Parmenides (to say nothing of scholars interpreting the passage) finds it impossible to articulate this relation without imagistic language. He too must have recourse to describing the *exaiφnēs* as something out of place and out of time, and yet as a quasi-temporal space “into which” and “out of which” (*eis tautēn...kai ek tautēs*) instantaneous change occurs (156d1-2, and e1). Why?

I think what Plato is trying to convey here is a situation identical to what we find in the ascent passage of the *Symposium*, or in the *Seventh Epistle*, or the recollection myth of the *Meno*. In all these passages, the presence of intelligible form within experience is the pre-condition for the soul’s ability to understand and speak about its erotic activity (to generate beautiful *logoi*, as Diotima says at *Smp.* 210a7-8), to learn, or to discursively think things through. These are all *temporal* processes which the soul must undergo (cf. *Theaetetus* 189e6-190a7). But just as at the core of time there is a non-temporal element as a precondition, so too in the psychic process of discursive understanding there is the sheer presence of intelligibility, which while making possible all discursive thought and expression is *not* itself directly expressible. Where conceptual *logos* runs up against its own preconditions, the only possible solution is to point to, or portray, the presence of intelligibility as appearing in a sudden realization or recollection of a formal structure that is always there. This is true not only in the *Symposium* or *Epist. VII*, but also in other passages where Form and our access to it are described in terms of a sudden break or leap, a vision or illumination (e.g., *Rep.* IV, 435a2 on the flashing forth (*eklampasai*) of justice).

The link between the coda on time and the vision or recollection of Form in other dialogues is not merely lexical then, as Cornford would have it, but substantial. Or rather, as often in Plato, lexical and thematic similarities can point to the substantive problem: the bond between *ten autēn aei idea* and the power of *dialegethai*. This bond seems impervious to direct, discursive articulation. Nevertheless, without it we cannot hope to understand anything of our experience, exactly as Parmenides warns us (135c1-2).

### *El tiempo y lo instantáneo: una reevaluación de las implicaciones de un texto platónico*

Los que han estudiado seriamente el *Parménides* conocerán la obra justamente famosa que Cornford dedicó al diálogo, y consecuentemente con su valoración despreciativa de algunas

interpretaciones de la coda de Platón sobre el tiempo y lo instantáneo (*to exaiφhnēs*) (Cornford (1939, 203):

“I have not been able to understand how Plato’s businesslike account of the instant...at which the various species of change occur, can be connected with the sudden vision of the Beautiful...and the doctrine of *Anamnēsis*...The only link appears to be the use of the word *exaiφhnēs* in its normal sense of “suddenly” at *Smp.*, 210e and *Ep.* Vii, 341d.”

En ese artículo, sugiero que con su exceso de celo de defender un Platón sobrio y serio Cornford no se dio cuenta de las implicaciones más generales de ese texto notable, no sólo para el entendimiento del *Parménides* y de la doctrina platónica del tiempo, sino también para echa luz sobre cuestiones más generales sobre la forma del pensamiento filosófico y su expresión.

Más concretamente, arguyo que el texto sobre lo instantáneo (*Parm.* 155e4-157b5) muestra que tanto las ideas como la actividad de la *noēsis* no son fantasías teoréticas que hayan perdido todo contacto con la experiencia empírica, sino esencialmente constitutivas de nuestra experiencia cotidiana, es decir, del cambio temporal. Al reflexionar sobre los detalles del texto, resulta que la experiencia cotidiana de la temporalidad es incomprendible sin recurso a las ideas y a la *noēsis*. No obstante, cuando intentamos articular eso conceptualmente, nos vemos forzados a usar lenguaje metafórico por razones que demuestran el vínculo (no notado por Cornford) entre este texto y otros (el *Banquete*, *Menón*, etc.) que describen el progreso del entendimiento filosófico.

El significado estructural del intentado de Parménides a explicar la naturaleza del tiempo en el texto sobre lo instantáneo sólo se puede captar si se toma en cuenta la concepción pre-filosófica del tiempo que aquél mismo transformará. El *Parménides* es una gimnasia (135d4-136a2) cuyo propósito es prepararle a Sócrates que alcance “una visión soberana de la verdad” (136c5), es decir, una visión comprensiva y liberada de todas las visiones más restringidas de la verdad y sus suposiciones doxásticas. El joven Aristóteles expresa a suposición que aquí está en cuestión (141e3-142a1), ya que él supone que la única forma del ser es el ente que es sujeto a determinaciones temporales. Para el joven Aristóteles esta suposición es tan evidente que no requiere discusión. Es el intentado a postular seres que de algún modo trasciendan el flujo temporal lo que necesita justificación.

Pero resulta que la situación es exactamente lo contrario. La implicación central del texto sobre lo instantáneo es que la experiencia temporal ordinario es completamente imposible sin ideas supra-temporales y la interrupción no-temporal en el continuo del tiempo, lo que explica como la idea puede estar presente en lo particular temporalmente determinado. En este sentido, es Miller (1991) quien interpreta correctamente el texto: el texto sobre lo instantáneo lleva a cabo el proyecto central del *Parménides* de articular una comprensión filosóficamente adecuada de la naturaleza y función de las ideas. El núcleo del análisis de Miller es más o menos lo siguiente:

Nuestra experiencia más básica de la temporalidad es la experiencia del cambio *determinado* (desde el ser al no ser, desde lo similar al no similar, desde el mayor al menor, desde el movimiento al reposo, etc.). Lo que quiere decir que nuestra experiencia básica de lo temporal es una identificación de la unidad y distintividad del tiempo, las cuales presuponen la operatividad del principio de la no-contradicción dentro de las cosas y dentro de nuestra comprensión de ellas. Sólo si seguimos la interpretación de Miller, según la cual el Uno de la hipótesis I es la Idea eterna y el Uno de la hipótesis II es lo particular temporalmente determinado, podemos entender la unidad determinada y no-contradictoria de las cosas temporales. La idea es lo que se sitúa “en el instante” y

posibilita que lo particular sea una unidad a través de su historia de transformación. No es la eternidad sino la temporalidad misma la que ha de vindicarse ante el tribunal del sentido común. Dicho de otro modo, la experiencia cotidiana de la temporalidad no se puede dar sin la presencia de la idea trascendente y eterna dentro del flujo del tiempo, la que sirve como precondition de la unidad y distintividad de las cosas que sufren cambio y movimiento en el tiempo.

No obstante, una lectura detenida del texto en cuestión muestra que incluso Parménides (por no hablar de sus intérpretes) lo encuentra imposible articular esta relación sin recurso al lenguaje metafórico. Él también ha de decir que lo instantáneo queda fuera de lugar y fuera de tiempo y no obstante que es un espacio casi-temporal “a que” y “desde que” (*eis tautēn...kai ek tautēs*) ocurre el cambio instantáneo (156d1-2, e1). ¿Porqué?

Lo que Platón está intentando a comunicar aquí es una situación idéntica a lo que encontramos en el ascenso del *Banquete*, en la *Carta VII*, y en el mito de la reminiscencia en el *Menón*. En cada uno de estos textos, la presencia dentro de la experiencia de la idea inteligible es la precondition que posibilita que el alma entienda y exprese su actividad erótica (de generar discursos bellos, como dice Diotima, *Banquete* 210<sup>a</sup>7-8), y que aprenda y sopesa discursivamente las cosas. Todas estas actividades son procesos *temporales* que el alma ha de padecer (*Theaetetus* 189e6-190<sup>a</sup>7). Pero así como el cambio temporal depende de un elemento no-temporal como precondition, también en el proceso psíquico del entendimiento discursivo hay el puro darse de la inteligibilidad, la cual posibilita todo pensamiento discursivo pero no se deja expresar discursivamente. Cuando el *logos* conceptual confronta sus propios precondiciones la única solución posible es indicar o representar la presencia de la inteligibilidad como la apariencia de una comprensión o reminiscencia repentina de una estructura formal que ya siempre está allí. Y eso no sólo en el *Banquete* o la *Carta VII*, sino también en otros textos donde la aprensión de la idea se describe en términos de una ruptura o salto repentinos, una visión o iluminación (p. ej. *Rep. IV*. 435a2 sobre el brillar (*eklampsai*) de la justicia).

El vinculo entre la coda sobre el tiempo y la visión o reminiscencia de la idea en otros diálogos no es, entonces, meramente léxico, como lo quiere Cornfold, sino sustancial. O más bien, como siempre en Platón, similaridades léxicas y temáticas indican problemas sustanciales: el vínculo entre *ten autēn aei idea* y la facultad del *dialegesthai*. Ese vínculo resiste toda articulación directa y discursiva. No obstante, sin él no podemos aspirar a entender nada de nuestra experiencia, exactamente como Parménides nos advierte. (135c1-2).

### *“Plotinus and Parmenides”*

In 1939, F.M. Cornford published his *Plato and Parmenides*. In the course of this influential commentary on the dialogue, Cornford takes a few pages to heap scorn on what he calls “the Neoplatonic interpretation” of the hypotheses of the second part of the dialogue. In part owing to this dismissal, and no doubt in part owing to many others who have followed Cornford in their work on *Parmenides*, interpretations of the “exercise,” especially in the English-speaking world, have not been fruitful. Even among those who see in the second part of the dialogue a positive contribution to the solution to the problems raised in the first part of the dialogue, it is supposed that the superposition of a One above Being is irrelevant to that contribution. In this paper, I hope to show that (1) there is an entire “family” of interpretations of *Parmenides* that can be labeled “Neoplatonic,” but that Plotinus’ interpretation stands out for its insights; (2) this interpretation of the dialogue has its roots in the Old Academy, especially in the works of Aristotle and Speusippus; (3) on philosophical grounds, Plotinus has the best understanding of the “moral” of the second part of the dialogue.

Regarding (1), I focus on the differences between the interpretation of Plotinus and that of Proclus, the latter of which comes, as Proclus tells us, from his esteemed teacher Syrianus. The key difference between the two is that Plotinus sees how to incorporate Aristotle’s concept of *ἐνέργεια* into the account of the first principle of all. This enables Plotinus to answer the crucial question of how the “transcendent” One can have any causal relevance to the cosmos. This is something that Proclus does not quite see. Further, Plotinus applies the Aristotelian concept of *ἐνέργεια* to the One, understood to be equivalent to the Good, and articulates its causal activity in terms of his doctrine of the two *ἐνέργειαι*. The attributes denied of the One in the first hypothesis are not an impediment to identifying that One with the Good in *Republic* about which quite a lot can be said, including its causal relevance to the cosmos. The concept of *ἐνέργεια* is crucial to the comprehensive systematization of the Platonic insights. Without it, the relevance of the One of the first hypothesis is obscured or lost.

Regarding (2), I want to summarize and extend the work of Dodds, Miller, and Halfwassen in order to show that there is no innovation in Plotinus’ interpretation. There is nothing “neo” in his Platonism. Both Aristotle and Speusippus (according to Proclus’ recording of his view) assume that the One of the first hypothesis of *Parmenides* is identical with the superordinate Good of *Republic* and elsewhere. They also assume that the One of the second hypothesis is *not* identical with the One of the first, but is a One-Many, identical with One-Being as referenced in *Sophist*. The Indefinite Dyad or Great-and-Small is found here. Finally, we see that the One of the third hypothesis is a “One and Many,” anything governed by Soul and therefore in time and capable of change. Following Aristotle, I argue that the second part of *Parmenides* is a “logical” exercise regarding the meaning of “one,” exactly in the sense in which Aristotle himself speaks “logically” about being in the fourth chapter of the seventh book of *Metaphysics*.

Regarding (3), I will show the cogency of the identification of the Idea of the Good and the One of the first hypothesis of *Parmenides*. This will require showing (a) how Plato views the achievement of goodness as the integrative unity of that which strives for the Good and (b) that the necessary absolute simplicity of the first principle of all entails the complexity of Being, such that the meaning of “one” in the first hypothesis must be different from the meaning of “one” in the second hypothesis and the meaning of “one” in the third. The “others” refer to whatever does or does not participate in “one” according to each of the three senses. The “logical” exercise regarding these “ones” then enables the reader or student to solve the problems for Forms that Parmenides raises in the first part of the dialogue. It does this by showing that the “one-over-many” that the Form is, is not absolutely one as is the One of the first hypothesis. Nor is the “one” that is one instance of or participant in any Form. The relation between Forms and sensibles or between that which is purely intelligible and that which is qualifiedly intelligible or unintelligible must be seen as contextualized within the larger framework of the three hypostases, One, Intellect, and Soul.

### *Plotin et le Parménide*

FM Cornford publie en 1939 son livre *Platon et Parménide*. Au sein de cet important commentaire sur le dialogue, Cornford prend quelques pages pour exprimer son dédain sur ce qu’il appelle «l’interprétation néoplatonicienne» des hypothèses de la deuxième partie du dialogue. En partie à cause de ce rejet, et sans doute aussi suite à beaucoup d’autres qui ont suivi Cornford dans leur lecture du Parménide, les interprétations de «l’exercice», en particulier dans le monde anglo-saxon, n’ont pas été fructueuses. Même parmi ceux qui voient dans la seconde partie du dialogue une contribution positive à la solution des problèmes soulevés dans la première partie du dialogue, on suppose généralement que la superposition d’un «Un au-dessus de l’Être» est sans rapport avec cette contribution. Dans cet article, j’espère montrer que (1) il y a toute une «famille» d’interprétations de Parménide qui peuvent être qualifiées de «néoplatoniciennes», mais que l’interprétation de Plotin s’en distingue; (2) cette interprétation du dialogue a ses racines dans l’ancienne Académie, en particulier dans les œuvres d’Aristote et de Speusippe; (3) Sur le plan philosophique, Plotin est celui qui comprend le mieux la «morale» de la seconde partie du dialogue .

En ce qui concerne (1), je me concentre sur les différences entre l’interprétation de Plotin et celle de Proclus, dont cette dernière vient, comme nous le dit Proclus, de son estimé professeur Syrianus. La principale différence entre les deux est que Plotin comprend comment incorporer le concept aristotélicien d’*ἐνέργεια* dans le premier principe du tout. Cela permet à Plotin de répondre à la question cruciale de savoir comment le «transcendant» peut avoir une quelconque relation de cause à effet avec le cosmos. Cet enjeu, Proclus ne le comprend pas vraiment. En outre, Plotin applique le concept aristotélicien d’*ἐνέργεια* à l’Un, compris comme équivalent au Bien, et articule son activité causale à travers sa doctrine des deux *ἐνέργειαι*. Les attributs qu’on nie à l’Un dans la première hypothèse ne sont pas un obstacle à l’identification de l’Un avec le Bien dans la République à propos duquel on peut en dire beaucoup, y compris sur sa pertinence causale pour le

cosmos. Le concept d'ἐνέργεια est crucial pour la systématisation complète des idées platoniciennes. Sans elle, la pertinence de la première hypothèse s'obscurcit ou se perd.

En ce qui concerne (2), je souhaite résumer et étendre le travail de Dodds, Miller et Halfwassen afin de montrer qu'il n'y a pas d'innovation dans l'interprétation de Plotin. Il n'y a rien de «néo» dans son platonisme. Aristote et Speusippe (d'après l'enregistrement de Proclus) supposent que la première hypothèse de Parménide est identique à celle du Bien suprême de la République et d'autres dialogues. Ils supposent également que l'Un de la seconde hypothèse n'est pas identique à la première, mais est un l'Un-plusieurs, identique à l'Un-Être tel qu'il apparaît dans le Sophiste. On trouve ici la dyade indéfinie, ou le grand et le petit. Enfin, nous voyons que l'une des trois hypothèses est un «un et plusieurs», tout ce qui est régi par l'âme et donc dans le temps et capable de changer. Après Aristote, je soutiens que la deuxième partie de Parménide est un exercice «logique» concernant la signification de «un», exactement dans le sens où Aristote lui-même parle «logiquement» de l'être au chapitre quatre du septième livre de Métaphysique.

En ce qui concerne (3), je montrerai le bien-fondé de l'identification de l'idée du bien et de celle de la première hypothèse de Parménide. Il sera nécessaire de montrer (a) comment Platon considère l'accomplissement du bien comme l'unité intégrative de ce qui vise le Bien et (b) que la simplicité absolument nécessaire du premier principe implique la complexité du désir, de sorte que le sens de «un» dans la première hypothèse doit être différent du sens de «un» dans la deuxième hypothèse et du sens de «un» dans la troisième. Les «autres» se rapportent à tout ce qui participe ou non à «un» selon les trois sens. L'exercice «logique» concernant ces «uns» permet ensuite au lecteur ou à l'étudiant de résoudre les problèmes des formules que Parménide soulève dans la première partie du dialogue. Cela se fait en montrant que le «un-au-dessus-du multiple» que la forme est, n'est pas absolument un, tout comme l'un des première hypothèse. Le «un» n'est pas non plus une instance ou un participant de quelque forme que ce soit. La relation entre les formes et les sensibles ou entre ce qui est purement intelligible et ce qui est intelligible ou inintelligible doit être considérée comme contextualisée dans le cadre plus large des trois hypostases, l'Un, l'Intellect et l'Âme.

*La “mayor dificultad” y el conocimiento divino en Parménides 133b-134e*

Parménides describe su última objeción a la teoría platónica de las Formas (133b-134e) como la “mayor dificultad” (133b4: μέγιστον) (MD) de todas las señaladas, la que conlleva las peores consecuencias y una que solo podría ser resuelta por un sujeto especialmente dotado y dispuesto a seguir una “larga y laboriosa demostración” (133b7-c1). Este juicio contrasta, sin embargo, con la extendida interpretación de la objeción como una serie de sofismas. Si este fuera el caso, las palabras de Parménides tendrían un sentido superficial, presentando como *difícil* un *falso* problema. En este trabajo quisiera considerar nuevamente la MD tomando tanto en serio las palabras de Parménides como las críticas al argumento. Para esto (I) presentaré los aparentes sofismas del pasaje, (II) intentaré responder a estos considerando la interpretación de quienes defienden la validez del argumento apuntando a la “separación definicional” de los términos relativos, para, finalmente, (III) argumentar que en el “segundo argumento” de la MD (134b-e) se introduce una premisa teológica (el *poder* de los dioses de conocer las Formas) que vuelve necesario complementar el tratamiento dialéctico de las Formas con uno epistemológico y teológico. De esta manera, quisiera sugerir que una solución a la MD debe buscarse en desarrollos teóricos de otros diálogos (para esto propongo tomar en consideración especialmente algunos pasajes de *Leyes X*).

(I) La MD puede dividirse en dos argumentos conducentes a dos conclusiones epistemológicas y a una “política”: MD1 (133c-134a) concluye que (C1) nosotros no conocemos las Formas y MD2 (134b-e) que (C2) los dioses no conocen los asuntos humanos ni (C3) los gobiernan (Ducombe 2013: 8-9). Ambos argumentos se desarrollan a partir de las siguientes premisas comunes (cfr. Rickless 2007: 86-87):

(P1) Las Formas existen en sí y por sí, de modo que no pueden existir entre nosotros (133c3-5).

(P2) Si X es una Forma y la naturaleza de X se define por su relación con Y, Y es una Forma (133c8-d2).

(P3) Si X existe entre nosotros y la naturaleza de X se define por su relación con Y, Y existe entre nosotros (133d2-d5).

(1) Algunos han considerado que estas premisas implican una “separación radical” de las Formas y los particulares, estando así las conclusiones del argumento ya asumidas en las premisas (Allen 1997: 193). (2) Una segunda crítica acusa que en la aplicación de P2 y P3 a los términos relacionales señor-siervo (133d7-134a1) y conocimiento-verdad (134a3-b1) Parménides extrapolaría *por analogía* al segundo par el carácter relacional propio del primero (Lewis 1979: 117-118; Forrester 1974: 234). (3) Probablemente la crítica más seria a la MD es la que acusa el recurso de la “autopredicación” de las Formas (cfr. el “Tercer Hombre”: 132a-b; 132d-133a). Hay tres usos en el pasaje que suscitan esta crítica: (a) del hecho de que uno *sea señor del* hombre que es siervo, parece seguir Parménides que el señorío en sí *es señor de* (o *tiene poder sobre*) la servidumbre en sí (133e3-5); (b) supuesto que el conocimiento en sí es de la verdad en sí, se sigue que las Formas *son conocidas por* el conocimiento en sí (134b6-7); y (c) que los dioses *poseen* el conocimiento más exacto se



identifica con su *participación* del conocimiento en sí, de modo que estos participarían de una Forma de conocimiento que a su vez *conocería* las demás Formas (134c10-11) (Cornford 1939: 99).

(II) Respecto a (1) es necesario objetar que las premisas P2 y P3 no se refieren a todas las Formas, sino tan solo a aquellas que *se definen por su relación* con otras Formas (Rickless 2007: 87). El punto de partida no es por tanto la “separación radical”, sino que las *Formas relacionales* no pueden definirse por su relación con los particulares (separación definicional) – lo que no implica que entre Formas y particulares no pueda existir una relación de participación (contra Cherniss 1944: 284, n. 191) –. Respecto de (2) cabe recordar que de la MD no sólo resultan conclusiones epistemológicas, sino también una política (teológica). Si esto es así, el argumento no procede por analogía, sino más bien aplicando a ambos términos relacionales las premisas P1-P3 (Ducombe 2013: 6-10). Los problemas acusados por (3a-b) pueden evitarse si se considera que en griego expresiones del tipo *x conoce y* significan lo mismo que *x es conocimiento de y* – una explicación similar puede esgrimirse respecto a las expresiones *ser señor de y tener poder sobre* – (Peterson 1981: 14-15; Lindsay 2011: 199). La última objeción (3c) es abordada por Rickless (2007: 91-93) quien sostiene que el argumento introduce una premisa nueva (que el conocimiento de los dioses, *por ser de dioses*, es conocimiento de Formas) que permite avanzar desde P2 a la conclusión de que (C2) los dioses no conocen los asuntos humanos.

(III) La solución de Rickless a la objeción 3c presupone que un *poder* puede ser una Forma. Conocimiento como poder es, sin embargo, un *pathema*, es decir, un estado de un alma (o de la inteligencia) y, por lo tanto, *distinto de* las Formas a las que se dirige intencionalmente tal estado epistémico (cfr. *República* 511d7; 533e7-534a8). La alteridad entre pensamiento y objeto ha quedado establecida en 132b-d y es *el alma que conoce* finalmente el término correlativo de las formas (conocidas). En este sentido, no es la participación en el conocimiento en sí el que garantiza la participación en las Formas, sino más bien es la posesión intencional de estas lo que permite que se participe en *el conocimiento de* estas (esto es, en el conocimiento en sí), pues, si bien el conocimiento (X) y su objeto (Y) son correlativos, es solo por la posesión de Y que participamos también de X y no al revés.

A partir de esta propuesta quisiera sugerir algunas líneas de interpretación de la MD: (i) en MD2 no sólo se señala a los dioses como *conocedores* de las Formas, sino que son estas mismas descritas como “divinas” (134e3). La conclusión de MD1 (C1) puede así interpretarse de otra manera: siendo las formas *divinas*, su cognoscibilidad deberá buscarse en la tarea de *asemejarse* al intelecto *divino* (*Teeteto* 176a-b; cfr. también *República* X, 613a7-b1). (ii) MD plantea un verdadero problema a los defensores de las Formas, en cuanto que exige a la dialéctica considerar también la epistemología de las Formas y la naturaleza divina (teología). Si bien las formas ni son pensamientos ni dependen de estos para su existencia, estas son por naturaleza *cognoscibles*. La consideración de la naturaleza de la divinidad no viene a explicar tanto la condición de posibilidad de las Formas como las condiciones ideales de su inteligibilidad. (iii) La justificación del conocimiento y gobierno de los dioses de los asuntos humanos requiere de otros presupuestos teológicos cuyo desarrollo puede encontrarse en otros diálogos. Particularmente en *Leyes X* se sugiere no sólo que el(los) dios(s) puede(n) identificarse con el intelecto (*nous*), sino también que el intelecto gobierna sobre el cosmos cuando este reside en un alma (897b1-4; cfr. también *Timeo* 34a8-b7 y *Filebo* 30c9-d4), de modo que los dioses pueden ser tanto dueños de los seres vivos (902c2-3) como cuidadores del universo (903b4-7).

## *The “greatest difficulty” and the divine knowledge in Parmenides 133b–134e*

Parmenides describes his final objection to the Platonic Theory of Forms (133b-134e) as having the “greatest difficulty” (133b4: μέγιστον) (GD) of all those indicated; it carries the worst consequences and could only be resolved by someone sufficiently gifted and willing to follow a “long and laborious demonstration” (133b7-c1). This judgment, however, contrasts with the widespread interpretation of the objection as a series of sophisms. If this were the case, Parmenides’ words would have a superficial meaning, presenting a *false* problem as a *difficult* one. In this paper, I analyze the GD again, taking into account both Parmenides’ words and the critiques to the argument. In order to do this, I (i) present the alleged sophisms of the passage, (ii) try to answer these, appealing to the commentators that defend the validity of the argument, pointing to the “definitional isolation” of the relative terms, and, finally (iii) argue that, in the “second argument” of the GD (134b-e), a theological premise is introduced (gods’ power to know the Forms), which makes it necessary to complement the Forms’ dialectical treatment with epistemological and theological ones. In this way, I suggest that a solution of the GD has to consider other dialogues’ theoretical developments (for that I propose to take into account especially some passages of *Laws X*).

(I) The GD can be divided into two arguments, leading to two epistemological conclusions as well as a “political” one: GD1 (133c-134a) concludes that (C1) the Forms are unknowable by us and GD2 (134b-e) that (C2) the gods do not know human affairs nor (C3) can they master us (Ducombe 2013: 8-9). Both arguments develop from the following common premises (Rickless 2007: 86-87):

(P1) The Forms are what they are by themselves and none of these beings are in us (133c3-5).

(P2) If X is a Form and X is what it is in relation to Y, then Y is a Form (133c8-d2).

(P3) If X is in us and X is what it is in relation to Y, then Y is in us (133d2-d5).

(1) Some have considered that these premises give rise to a “radical isolation” of the Forms from the participants, so the conclusions of the argument would already be assumed in the premises (Allen 1997: 193). (2) A second criticism claims that in the application of P2 and P3 to the relational terms *master-slave* (133d7–134a1) and *knowledge-truth* (134a3-b1), Parmenides would extrapolate by analogy to the second pair the relational character of the first (Lewis 1979: 117-118; Forrester 1974: 234). (3) Probably the most serious criticism of the GD lies in the accusation of “self-predication” of the Forms (see the “Third Man”: 132a-b; 132d-133a). There are three uses in the passage that justify this criticism: (a) from the fact that one is master of the man who is a slave, Parmenides seems to conclude that the Form Master *is master of* (or *has power over*) the Form Slavery (133e3-5); (b) from the assumption that the Form Knowledge is of the Form Truth, it follows that the “Forms *are known by* the Form of knowledge itself” (134b6-7); and (c) that the gods possess the most exact knowledge is identified with his participation of the Form Knowledge,

so that the gods would participate in a Form of knowledge which in turn *would know* the rest of the Forms (134c10-11) (Cornford 1939: 99).

(II) Regarding (1), it is necessary to point out that the premises P2 and P3 do not refer to all the Forms, but only those defined by their relationship with other Forms (Rickless 2007: 87). The starting point is not therefore “radical isolation,” but that the *relational forms* cannot be defined by their relationship with individuals (definitional isolation)—which does not imply that between forms and participants cannot exist a (participation-)relationship (against Cherniss 1944: 284, n. 191). Regarding (2), it should be remembered that the GD does not result only in epistemological conclusions, but also in a (theological) political one. If this is so, the argument does not proceed by analogy, but rather by applying to both relational terms the premises P1-P3 (Ducombe 2013: 6-10). Problems that arise via (3a-b) can be avoided if one considers that in Greek, expressions like “x knows y” have the same meaning as “x is knowledge of y”—a similar explanation can be defended regarding the expressions “x is a master of y” and “x has power over y” (Peterson 1981: 14-15; Lindsay 2011: 199). The last objection (3c) is addressed by Rickless (2007: 91-93), who argues that the argument introduces a new premise (that the knowledge of the gods, *because* they are gods, is knowledge of Forms) that allows us to advance from P2 to the conclusion that (C2) the gods do not know human affairs.

(III) Rickless’ solution to objection 3c presupposes that a “power” can be a Form. Knowledge as power is, however, a *pathema*, that is, a “state” of the soul (or of an intellect) and, therefore, *distinct* from the Forms to which such an epistemic state is intentionally directed (cf. *Republic* 511d7; 533e7-534a8). The *otherness* between thought and its object has been established in 132b–d. It is finally the soul, the one which knows its correlative term of (known) Forms. In this way, it is not the participation in the knowledge itself that enables us to participate in the Forms, but rather the intentional possession of these Forms that enables our participation in its knowledge (that is, the knowledge itself), because, although the knowledge (X) and its object (Y) are correlative terms, it is only by the possession of Y that we also participate in X, and not vice versa.

From this proposal, I would like to propose some lines of interpretation of the GD: (i) in GD2, the gods not only are designated as the knowers of the Forms, but the Forms themselves are also designated as “divine” (134e3). Thus, the conclusion of the GD1 (C1) can be interpreted in another way: insofar as the Forms are divine, their knowability should be assured in the task of resembling the divine intellect (*Theaetetus* 176a5-b2; cf. also *Republic* X, 613a7-b1). (ii) The GD involves a real problem for the Forms, insofar as it requires that the dialectician also take into account the epistemology of the Forms and the nature of the divine (theology). Although the Forms are neither thoughts nor dependent on them for their existence, they are by nature *knowable*. Certainly, the consideration of the nature of the gods does not provide a justification of the existence of the Forms, but it can be useful to explain the ideal conditions of their intelligibility. (iii) The justification of the gods’ knowledge and command of human affairs requires other theological presuppositions whose development can be found in other dialogues. Particularly in *Laws* X, it is suggested not only that the god(s) can be identified with reason (*nous*), but also that reason rules over the cosmos when it (reason) inhabits in a soul (897b1-4; cf. also *Timaeus* 34a8-b7 and *Philebus* 30c9-d4), so the gods can be both owner of the living beings (902c2-3) and carer of the universe (903b4-7).

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### *Struttura e senso della settima deduzione in Parm. 164b5-165e1*

Il presente intervento si propone di analizzare la settima serie di deduzioni (D7) nel complesso esercizio dialettico articolato nella seconda parte del *Parmenide*. Questa porzione di testo non ha ancora ricevuto particolare attenzione.<sup>1</sup> L'analisi si concentra sia sull'aspetto strutturale, vale a dire l'architettura della scansione argomentativa, sia su quali possano esserne gli obiettivi teorici. D7 parte dall'ipotesi che l'Uno non sia e considera le conseguenze rispetto ai molti. È oggetto di controversia se le conseguenze per i molti siano pensate rispetto a se stessi o rispetto all'Uno. Una prima discussione consiste quindi nel valutare pro e contro di entrambe le opzioni, anche rispetto alla eventuale simmetria con le altre deduzioni.

D7 si apre con due assunti: primo, gli altri (*alla*) sono (o gli altri sono altri), perché se così non fosse non si potrebbe parlare di essi; secondo, si deve applicare alla stessa realtà i termini "altro" e "diverso" (*heteron*). In assenza di uno, si dice che gli altri sono altri, cioè differiscono, in relazione a loro stessi. Il primo cruciale problema esegetico rispetto a questo passaggio risiede nel comprendere la natura di questa differenziazione interna e in che modo essa produca degli ammassi (*onkoi*). Tali ammassi non rappresentano delle autentiche nature unitarie poiché essi sono indefinitamente divisibili e ogni loro parte a sua volta costituisce un nuovo ammasso con una proliferazione indefinita di caratteri e proprietà.

Viene dunque introdotta la nozione di apparenza su cui ruota l'intera D7. Essa è introdotta per giustificare il fatto che gli ammassi appaiono essere delle unità, ma che non possono essere tali data l'assenza di uno. Da ciò consegue che detti ammassi possono ospitare caratteri sempre diversi e le loro condizioni di identità non possono essere stabilite con sicurezza. È interessante notare come Parmenide faccia riferimento all'attività di cogliere con il pensiero e come essa, in assenza di uno, non riesca a raggiungere un punto fermo circa i suoi oggetti, i quali sono sempre riconducibili a ulteriori determinazioni (definite in questo caso *archai* e *teleutai*, evidenziando l'estensione temporale). In questo senso, tutto ciò che si coglie con il pensiero risulta immancabilmente frantumato.

D7 si conclude con l'attribuzione agli altri/molti di tutte le proprietà e del loro opposto. Ciò è però originalmente connesso alla nozione di apparenza. Le molte cose non hanno immediatamente ed evidentemente tutte le determinazioni incompatibili. Attraverso un paragone classicamente platonico, la dinamica fenomenica è comparata alla percezione di un dipinto: da lontano molte cose possono apparire simili, ma avvicinandosi si nota che esse appaiono diverse. Questa similitudine sembra accordarsi felicemente con quanto detto sull'instabilità dell'apprensione mentale rispetto a oggetti che non godono di unità: ciò che si apprende/vede in una prospettiva si rivela differente proseguendo l'indagine/avvicinandosi.

La tensione strutturale di D7 sembra quindi collegare almeno tre nuclei tematici: i) considerare la molteplicità/differenziazione come interna ai molti che la "esercitano" reciprocamente, con la conseguente risultanza di ammassi indefiniti; ii) comprendere la nozione di

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<sup>1</sup> Non si dà a mia conoscenza uno studio espressamente dedicato a essa, sebbene sia stata considerata senza particolare enfasi nei maggiori commentari al *Parmenide*.

apparenza come *effetto* dell'instabilità delle condizioni di identità dei molti derivante dalla loro reciproca differenziazione; iii) l'impossibilità di discernere a livello cognitivo condizioni di identità stabili, dal momento che a ogni punto di arrivo l'oggetto di indagine potrà essere ulteriormente analizzato rivelandosi differente.

Il concetto di apparenza rappresenta il *trait d'union* dell'intera deduzione. Di grande interesse è l'*inferenza* condotta da Parmenide il quale asserisce che (1) i molti/altri sono, (2) il loro modo di essere è quello della differenziazione reciproca tale da non concedere condizioni di identità fisse e che (3) *pertanto* i loro ammassi appaiono (e non sono come appaiono). Il fatto stesso che qualcosa appaia viene a coincidere con il fatto che se in un tempo x1 una cosa si manifesta come Y, in un tempo x2 essa si manifesta come Z, senza poter decidere quale delle due modalità di apparenza sia preferibile o fondata. In questo senso, il concetto stesso di apparenza è spiegato dalla differenziazione interna agli altri dovuto all'assenza di Uno. L'assenza di Uno ha come effetto principale la differenziazione interna ai molti/altri sul piano ontologico e la frantumazione sul piano cognitivo, rimarcando in questo modo la forte correlazione tra i due piani.

Quanto detto finora chiama in causa implicitamente il tema centrale dell'Uno su molti (One-over-many principle) perché considera le conseguenze inaccettabili per lo statuto ontologico dei molti in assenza di Uno. La tesi principale del presente intervento è allora mostrare che il senso di D7 sia evidenziare la necessità onto-epistemologica dell'Uno su molti. Da questa prospettiva è legittimo considerare l'Uno in questione come un *eidōs* qualunque e i molti come le cose che di esso partecipano. Gli effetti dell'assenza dell'uno lasciano intendere quale compito onto-epistemologico esso svolge: senza Uno non solo non si può avere conoscenza sulla natura di F preso in sé ma non si può neanche dire che una cosa che appare F è F, cioè partecipa di F.<sup>1</sup>

Un ultimo spunto problematico deve essere incluso nella presente relazione. L'argomentazione iniziale secondo cui, dato che l'Uno non è, gli altri non possono che differenziarsi rispetto a loro stessi sembra suggerire che se l'Uno fosse allora essi si differenzierebbero rispetto all'Uno. Più chiaramente, il contributo onto-epistemologico fondamentale dell'Uno (cioè ogni *eidōs*) non è solo espresso dal fatto che esso fornisce identità e determinazione alle altre cose che partecipano di esso. La struttura stessa di D7 sembra asserire che l'Uno è *anche* ciò rispetto a cui gli altri sono altri, cioè ciò rispetto a cui gli altri/molti si differenziano. Il risultato interessante di questo modo di leggere D7 è duplice: in primo luogo, l'Uno non può coincidere con nessuno dei molti/altri che partecipano di esso (si pensi al regresso della Grandezza); in secondo luogo, i molti/altri saranno altri rispetto all'Uno e non tra di loro, ammettendo dunque la possibilità che essi siano simili tra di loro attraverso la condivisione di un carattere comune.<sup>2</sup> Di conseguenza, l'Uno si configura come condizione di identità che *strutturalmente* riunisce una molteplicità di altre cose distinte, le quali possono essere simili l'una con l'altra attraverso il comune riferimento all'Uno da cui differiscono. In conclusione, la struttura di D7 e il suo significato filosofico risultano intelligibili sullo sfondo del ruolo onto-epistemologico dell'*eidōs* investigato *in absentia*. Un risultato notevole di questo approccio negativo è una nuova luce sulla nozione platonica di apparenza.

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1 L'interpretazione qui proposta non intende la molteplicità e instabilità derivante dall'ipotesi di Parmenide come esclusivamente relativa a proprietà numeriche o immediatamente quantificabili (caldo, freddo, etc.).

2 Questo risulta coerente con quanto detto in *Parm.* 165c7-d7 dove questa possibilità è esclusa dal momento che le stesse cose appaiono sia diverse che in possesso di una medesima proprietà.

## *Structure and sense of the seventh deduction in Parm. 164b5-165e1*

The present paper purports to analyse the seventh series of deductions (D7) of the complex dialectical exercise exposed in the second part of the *Parmenides*. This section of the text has not drawn particular attention.<sup>1</sup> The analysis is focused on both the structural aspects, i.e. the argumentative architecture, and the theoretical objectives of the deduction. D7 moves from the hypothesis that the One is not and considers its consequences for the many. It is controversial whether the consequences affecting the many must be drawn for the many in relation to themselves or in relation to the One. The paper very briefly discusses pros and cons of the two options also considering their possible symmetry to the other deductions.

D7 starts with two assumptions: firstly, the others (*alla*) are (or the others are other) because if they were not one could not speak about them; secondly, one must apply the terms “other” and “different” (*heteron*) to the same reality. Since the One is not, it is said that the others are other, that is, they differ, in relation to themselves. The first crucial exegetical problem concerning this passage lies in understanding the nature of this internal differentiation and the way it comes down to masses or bulks (*onkoi*). These masses are no unitary natures because they can be infinitely divided and any of their parts in turn is a new mass resulting in an infinite proliferation of characters and properties.

The notion of appearance is now introduced and the entire D7 hinges on it. It is needed to account for the fact that each mass seems to be one when no such thing is possible, given that the One is not. From this, it follows that these masses are hospitable to changing characters in such a way that their identity conditions cannot be determined with certainty. It is worth noting that Parmenides refers to the act of grasping by means of thought and that if the One is not this act is not able to give durable results: for any apprehension one can have of things they constantly defer to further properties and determinations (here called *archai* and *teleutai*, thereby highlighting temporal extension). In this way, anything that can be grasped in thought is inevitably chopped up.

D7 concludes with the attribution of all the properties, incompatible properties included, to the others/many. This is ingeniously connected to the notion of appearance. The many things do not immediately and clearly possess all the incompatible characters. By resorting to a classically Platonic comparison, appearance is paralleled to the perception of a painting: from afar, things appear to be similar to each other, whereas to a closer look they appear to be different. This comparison squares very well with what has been said about the instability of the objects of mental apprehension if the One is not: that which is apprehended/observed from a certain point of view turns out to be different if one continues the investigation/looks it closer.

The very structure of D7 connects at least three arguments: i) multitude/differentiation is internal to the many, which “perform” it towards each other, thereby producing indefinite masses; ii) the notion of appearance is the *effect* of the instability affecting the identity conditions of the many, which in turn derives from their reciprocal differentiation; iii) the impossibility to cognitively discern stable identity conditions insofar as, for any conclusion one can arrive to, the object of enquiry can be further analysed and reveals to be different.

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<sup>1</sup> Although the deduction has been taken into account, without particular emphasis, in the major commentaries, I do not know of any study overtly meant to analyse it.

The concept of appearance is the *trait d'union* of the entire deduction. Of great interest is the *inference* drawn by Parmenides when he asserts that (1) the many/others are, (2) their being consists in reciprocal differentiation in such a way that they cannot be granted fixed identity conditions and (3) *therefore* the masses of the many appear (and are not as they appear). The fact that something appears comes to be the same as the fact that at time x1 something manifests itself as Y, at a later time x2 it manifests itself as Z, without ever being able to establish which manifestation is true. As a consequence, the reciprocal differentiation due to the absence of the One and internal to the others accounts for the very concept of appearance. The main result of the absence of the One is twofold: on the ontological level, the many/others are internally differentiated; on the cognitive level, the object of cognition shatters, underlining the strong correlation between the two levels.

What has been said so far implicitly refers to the One-over many principle because it singles out the unacceptable consequences for the ontological status of the many, if the One is not. The main thesis of this paper is then showing that the sense of D7 lies in pointing out the onto-epistemic necessity of the One-over-many principle. Thus, in this context the One is being interpreted as any *eidōs* whatsoever, and the many as the sensible things partaking of it. The effects coming from the absence of the One reveal its onto-epistemic role: without the One, say the Form F, one can neither know of F by itself, nor truly assert that one thing appearing to be F is actually F, that is partakes of F.<sup>1</sup>

One last argument needs to be included in this paper. The first argument in D7 that the others have to differentiate themselves (since the One is not) suggests that if the One were, then the others would differ from the One and not from each other. To put it more clearly, the fundamental onto-epistemic contribution of the One, i.e. any *eidōs*, is not just that it provides the others partaking of it with identity and determination. The very structure of D7 seems to be suggesting that the One is *also* that with regard to which the others are other, which means that from which the others/many differ. The interesting outcome of this reading of D7 is twofold: firstly, the One never coincides with any of the many/others that partake of it (consider the Largeness regress); secondly, the many/others are other than the One and not other than each other, thereby allowing the possibility to be similar to each other through sharing a common feature.<sup>2</sup> Hence, the One figures as an identity condition which *structurally* reunites a multitude of distinct things that in turn can be similar to each other by referring to the One they differ from. To conclude, the structure of D7 and its philosophical significance become intelligible having in the background the onto-epistemic role of the (absent) *eidōs*. One notable outcome of this negative approach is that it casts a new light on Plato's notion of appearance.

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1 The present interpretation does not consider the instability deriving from Parmenides' hypothesis as exclusively related to numerical or immediately quantifiable properties (hot, cold, etc.).

2 This squares with what is said in *Parm* 165c-d7 where this possibility is ruled out because the same things appear both dissimilar and similar.



### *'Let us say the third': The Meaning of τὸ τρίτον in the Deductions of Plato's Parmenides*

Among the many sections of argument concerning the One in the second half of Plato's *Parmenides*, only one is explicitly numbered: the third (*to triton*, 155e4). This suggests, on the face of it, that it is to be counted both after and among the first two deductions (or 'hypotheses'), as one of them. Yet one rare area of consensus today, met with only a few dissenting voices, is that it is not to be counted as a third deduction at all and can even be ignored in interpreting the genuine deductions: the only argument explicitly counted is the one that does not count. If this interpretation appears to contradict the explicit words of the text, there are still good reasons for denying that 'the third' is a third deduction. But then must we disregard altogether its explicit designation as 'third'?

For C. Meinwald in her well known study, our choice is limited to the following three interpretations: 1) 'The third' is a section coordinate with the other eight, making the total number of deductions nine. 2) It is a continuation of the second deduction. 3) it is an appendix to both preceding deductions. The vast majority of scholars indeed subscribe to one of these. The first, however, ignores the obvious asymmetry introduced by 'the third' into both the language and the structure of the deductions. The second ignores the clear indications that the One at issue in 'the third' is not only that of the second, but also that of the first deduction (explained further below) and can explain the language of a 'third' only by locating the 'first' and 'second' within the second deduction itself, with no convincing criterion for doing so. As for the third interpretation, it can make no sense at all of this language: why would a mere appendix to the first and second deductions be labelled 'the third'?

In the second half of the paper I outline and defend a fourth interpretative possibility. It depends on recognizing Plato's use of the phrase *to triton* elsewhere to refer to *what is neither one of two opposed things because it encompasses both*. Thus in the *Sophist* being is 'the third' in relation to motion and rest because, being neither one nor the other, it encompasses both (250b8-9). In the *Philebus*, among many uses of the phrase *to triton* to refer to what is neither one thing nor another (indeed the main argument of the dialogue is that the good life is a *triton* that cannot be identified with either reason or pleasure but includes both: 14b4, 67a10-11), *to triton* refers to the mixture of limit and the unlimited (25b5, 26b7, 26d7-8; at 27b8-9 *triton meiktên kai gegenêmenên ousian*). In the *Timaeus*, 'the third' is an *eidos* of being in between the indivisible and changeless, on the one hand, and the divisible and changing, on the other, mixed from the two (*triton ex amphoin en mesôi sunekerasato ousias eidos*, 35a1-4).

Given, then, the opposed conclusions reached concerning the 'One that is' in the first two deductions, the kind of 'third' that is needed is one that can encompass both. *And that is exactly what we get*. Discussed under 'the third' is a One that *is both one and many* (that of the second deduction) *and neither one nor many* (that of the first deduction). The argument then proceeds to identify the 'middle' that makes it possible to affirm both characterizations. If the One is one at one time and many at another, and if it transitions from one state to another through the process of becoming one or becoming many, processes also existing in time, there must still be a

point at which it 'switches' from being many (as it still is in the process of becoming one) to being one or from being one (as it still is in the process of becoming many) to being many. This 'switch' is neither a state nor a process (the general sense given here to the opposition between 'rest' and 'motion') and cannot take place in time. Parmenides characterizes it as a *metabolé* that takes place 'suddenly', using the word *exaiphnês* for what he calls this 'strange' or 'out-of-place' (*atopos*) nature because not in time. This 'sudden switch' is explicitly described as 'between motion and rest' (*metaxu tês kinêseôs kai staseôs*, 156d7), *just like being itself* in the *Sophist*. In this 'sudden switch' between being one and many, the One is *neither one nor many nor* in time, like the One of the first deduction. But it is through this 'sudden switch' that the One can be *both* one and many and in time, as it is in the second deduction. This argument is then applied to all of the other properties ascribed to or denied of the One (being like and unlike, equal and unequal, etc., 157a6-b5). Expressed schematically, through the 'middle' that is the 'sudden switch', the One can be neither/nor as well as both/and for all the properties considered. *To triton*, then, refers neither to a third deduction nor in general to a 'third' in a series of things counted, but to the way in which the account of the 'sudden switch' encompasses both of the preceding deductions, mixes them together, as it were, and thereby enables us to affirm them both. Though usually translated, and justifiably, as "Let us speak for a third time," *to triton legômen* grammatically allows the translation: "Let us speak of the third."

But if this is so, and if all of the pairs of deductions that follow are characterized by the same 'neither . . . nor'/'both . . . and' opposition, then should we not also conclude that 'the third' is 'third' in relation *to all of these pairs*? Is not 'the third' what enables us in each case to begin, as Parmenides always says, 'again from the beginning' (*palin ex archês*), so that we get eight deductions rather than four? This is the suggestion defended here. The constant doubling demands a third.

The significance of 'the third' is often dismissed for violating the principles of non-contradiction and excluded-middle. But *the deductions as a whole* violate both principles. What 'the third' does is show how they can do so and still be accepted in their entirety as what is 'most true' (166c5) by showing the extent to which the One, 'switching suddenly', is not subject to either principle. 'The third' gives us a middle that *need not be excluded*. It therefore renders unnecessary what a number of scholars have considered necessary, even with no real support in the text (as I will attempt to show): to reject one side of the opposed deductions.

Though without this interpretation of the phrase *to triton*, the general reading presented here has had some rare defenders: most notably, George Grote in the past and Spyridon Rangos in the present. But the most thorough defense has been provided by Martin Heidegger in an unpublished seminar from 1930/31 about which something will therefore be said in conclusion.

### *'Let us say the third': The Meaning of τὸ τρίτον in the Deductions of Plato's Parmenides*

Parmi les déductions (ou 'hypothèses') qui concernent l'Un dans la seconde moitié du *Parménide* de Platon, seulement une est énumérée : 'la troisième' (*to triton*, 155e4). Il semble donc que cette déduction doit être comptée après et donc parmi les deux premières comme étant

un d'eux. Mais une rare instance de consensus aujourd'hui trouvant bien peu d'opposition est l'opinion que 'la troisième' ne compte pas du tout et peut même être ignorée par une interprétation de l'ensemble des déductions : la seule déduction qui ne compte pas est celle qui est comptée. Si cette interprétation semble contredire les mots explicites du texte, il y a quand même de bonnes raisons pour conclure que 'la troisième' n'est pas une troisième déduction. Mais faut-il dans ce cas ignorer sa désignation explicite comme 'troisième' ?

Pour C. Meinwald dans son étude bien connue, notre choix est limité aux trois options : 1) 'la troisième' est une déduction qui peut être additionnée aux huit autres déductions pour en faire neuf. 2) Elle est une continuation de la seconde. 3) Elle est une annexe aux deux premières déductions. Mais la première option ignore l'asymétrie que 'la troisième' introduit dans le langage autant que dans la structure de l'ensemble de déductions. La seconde option ignore les claires indications (mentionnées en bas) que l'Un en discussion dans 'la troisième' n'est pas seulement l'Un de la seconde déduction, mais aussi celui de la première déduction. En plus, elle peut expliquer la désignation 'troisième' seulement en localisant 'un' et 'deux' dans la seconde déduction même et sans critère convaincant. En ce qui concerne la troisième option, elle n'a aucune explication pour cette désignation : pourquoi énumérer comme 'troisième' ce qui n'est rien d'autre qu'une simple annexe aux deux premières déductions ?

Dans la dernière partie de cette présentation, je présente schématiquement et je défends une quatrième option d'interprétation. Cette option commence avec l'observation que Platon ailleurs utilise la phrase *to triton* pour désigner ce que n'est ni l'une ni l'autre de deux choses opposées parce qu'il comprend les deux. Dans le *Sophiste* l'être est *to triton* par rapport au mouvement et au repos, ne pouvant être identifié avec ni l'un ni l'autre parce qu'il comprend les deux (250b8-9). Dans le *Philèbe* parmi plusieurs occurrences du terme *to triton* pour désigner ce qui n'est ni l'un ni l'autre (en effet, l'argument principal du dialogue est que la vie heureuse est un *triton* qui ne peut être identifié ni avec la raison ni avec le plaisir, mais comprend les deux, 14b4, 67a10-11), *to triton* désigne le mélange de la limite et d'illimité (25b5, 26b7, 26d7-8; at 27b8-9 *triton meiktên kai gegenêmenên ousian*). Dans le *Timée*, *to triton* est un *eidos* de l'être situé entre l'indivisible et immuable, d'un côté, et le divisible et mutable, de l'autre côté, étant un mélange des deux (*triton ex amphoin en mesôi sunekerasato ousias eidos*, 35a1-4).

Parce que les deux premières déductions arrivent à des conclusions opposées, la sorte de 'troisième' dont nous avons besoin est celle qui peut comprendre et contenir cette opposition. Et c'est précisément ce que nous recevons avec *to triton*. L'Un en discussion sous *to triton* est aussi bien un que multiple (l'Un de la seconde déduction) et ni un ni multiple (l'Un de la première déduction). L'argument procède à introduire le 'moyen terme' qui rend possible l'affirmation des deux descriptions. Si l'Un est un à un moment et à un autre moment multiple, et si la transition entre les deux se fait à travers le devenir-un ou le devenir-multiple, processus qui eux aussi existent dans le temps, quand est-ce qu'il 'passe' d'être plusieurs (comme il l'est encore dans le processus de devenir un) à être un ou d'être un (comme il l'est encore dans le processus de devenir multiple) à être plusieurs ? Ce 'passage' n'est ni un état ni un processus (qui est le sens donné ici à l'opposition entre 'repos' et 'mouvement') et ne peut pas avoir lieu dans le temps. Parménide le caractérise comme étant une *metabolê* qui se produit 'subitement', faisant usage du mot *exaiaphnês* pour désigner cette 'étrange' nature qui est 'hors-lieu' (*atopos*) parce qu'il n'est pas dans le temps. Ce 'change soudain' est décrit comme existant 'entre le mouvement et le repos' (*metaxu tês kinêseôs kai staseôs*, 156d7), comme l'être lui-même dans le *Sophiste*. Dans ce 'change soudain' qui se passe entre l'être-un et l'être-plusieurs, l'Un n'est ni un ni plusieurs ni dans le temps, comme l'Un de la

première déduction. Mais c'est seulement par ce 'change soudain' que l'Un peut être aussi bien un que multiple et peut être dans le temps, comme l'Un de la seconde déduction. Cet argument est alors appliqué à toutes les autres propriétés, dont l'Un est pourvu et dépourvu dans les déductions (être semblable et dissemblable, égal et inégal, etc. 157a6-b5). Schématiquement, par le 'moyen terme' qui est le 'change soudain', l'Un peut être 'aussi bien . . . que . . .' et 'ni . . . ni . . .' pour toutes les propriétés en question. Dans ce cas, *to triton* ne désigne ni une troisième déduction ni en général quelque chose qui est le numéro 'trois' dans une série, mais se réfère à la façon dont le 'change soudain' comprend les deux déductions précédentes, les mélange, pour ainsi dire, et nous laisse accepter les deux. Même si la phrase est normalement, et avec pleine justification, traduite comme 'parlerons une troisième fois, *to triton legômen* grammaticalement laisse se traduire aussi comme 'parlerons du troisième.'

Mais si toutes les déductions qui suivent se divisent selon cette opposition entre 'aussi bien . . . que . . .' et 'ni . . . ni . . .', ne devons-nous pas conclure que *to triton* est le 'troisième' en relation à tous les paires de déductions ? N'est pas *to triton* qui nous permet dans chaque cas, comme Parménide l'exprime chaque fois, de commencer 'encore du commencement' (*palin ex archês*), avec le résultat que nous avons huit déductions au lieu de quatre ? C'est la thèse avancée ici. Le dédoublement répété demande un 'troisième'.

L'importance du 'troisième' est souvent rejetée parce qu'il transgresse les principes de non-contradiction et du tiers exclu. Mais *toutes les déductions dans leur ensemble transgressent les deux principes*. Ce que le 'troisième' nous montre, en nous montrant que l'Un dans son 'change soudain' n'est pas soumis aux deux principes, est qu'en dépit de cette transgression les déductions peuvent être acceptées dans leur ensemble comme 'le plus vrai' (166c5). Le 'troisième' nous offre 'un tiers' qui *ne doit pas être exclu*. Il nous montre qu'il ne faut pas faire ce qui est souvent considéré comme nécessaire (sans vrai appui textuel, comme je vais essayer de montrer): rejeter une moitié des déductions opposées.

Même si c'est sans l'interprétation présentée ici de la phrase *to triton*, une lecture semblable de la seconde moitié du *Parménide* a trouvé déjà quelques rares défenseurs : les plus notables sont George Grote dans le passé et Spyridon Rangos dans le présent. Mais l'argumentation la plus soutenue et détaillée pour une telle lecture se trouve dans un séminaire par Martin Heidegger qui date des années 1930/1931 et pour lequel il existe des notes détaillées qui n'ont pas encore été publiées. Donc ma conclusion en dira quelques mots.

*Reference, Participation and the Being of Not-Being. Parm. 160b5-163b6 and the Sophist*

It has been frequently remarked in the Platonic scholarship that the so-called fifth deduction (D5)<sup>1</sup> of the second part of the *Parmenides* (160b5-163b6) paves the way for the account of not-being developed in the core section of the *Sophist*<sup>2</sup>. While I believe that there are good reasons to agree with this claim in general, I consider unsatisfactory the attempts made so far to clarify *how* exactly this ‘preparation’ or ‘anticipation’ of the arguments and the theses of the *Sophist* is supposed to work. The aim of this paper is to offer a fresh examination of (the main moves of) D5, in order to shed light on its connections with the *Sophist*.

I shall argue that far from providing us with a clear statement of the arguments or the theses spelled out in the *Sophist*, and in particular of the new qualified meaning of not-being in terms of difference, D5 is meant to stimulate us to reflect upon (1) the metaphysical requirements for meaningful speech and thought; (2) the decisive function of the kind ‘being’ in the mechanics of the relation of participation; (3) the relationship between being, not-being and truth. It should never be forgotten that we are in the context of a *γυμνασία*, an exercise aimed at training the reader (in order to solve the difficulties raised in the first part of the dialogue), so that, rather than providing ready-made answers, Plato intends to challenge us with arguments that prompt us to work out solutions for ourselves.

My paper will be divided into three parts – and, as it happens, I will have my analysis unfolding in parallel with the development of the sequence of thoughts in Plato’s text.

(1) I will first examine Parmenides’ introductory claim that if someone says that ‘the one is not, [it is] clear that what he says is not is different from the others (160c5-6)’<sup>3</sup>. Some interpreters have maintained that the key to Parmenides’s argument would be the implicit introduction of a new meaning of *μὴ ἔστι* that, far from denoting the inexistence of the ‘one’, refers to its *difference* from something else. Thus, it is *in virtue of* such ‘not being’ that the one is ‘different from the others’<sup>4</sup>. This reading, I submit, is misguided. For Parmenides makes it unequivocal that when someone says that ‘the one is not’, (s)he speaks of something knowable (*γνωστόν τι*) and different from others (*ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων*), ‘*whether he attaches being or not-being to it*’ (*εἴτε τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ προσθεῖς εἴτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι*)<sup>5</sup>. Thus, the difference of the one from other things does not depend upon the predication of not-being of it. What Parmenides rather emphasizes is that a meaningful and intelligible *λόγος* has

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1\* Please note that the work count does not include the *Selected bibliography* at the end of this document.

The number of the so-called deductions of the second part of the *Parmenides* is a notorious *vexata quaestio*. The reasons why I talk of a ‘fifth’ deduction rely on Brisson-Décarie 1987.

2 Cf. e.g. Grote 1865: 312; Natorp 1903: 271-2; Friedländer 1928-30: 195; Cornford 1939: 231; Miller 1986: 149; Fronterotta 1998: 97-8; Scolnicov 2003: 147; Ferrari 2004: 141. Allen 1983: 328-9 denies that the problems raised at D5 are close those found in the *Sophist*, but his arguments are far-fetched.

3 Translations of the *Parmenides* are after Gill-Ryan 1996.

4 Cf. in particular Scolnicov 2003: 147; but also Fronterotta 1998: 97-8.

5 *Parm.* 160c8-d1. My italics.

always a *τινός* requirement, must *refer* to something, viz. have a subject that is not a pure nothing, but is rather something endowed with a distinctive identity which sets it apart from other things. That is why we are able to distinguish the sentence ‘if the one is not’ from ‘the not-one is not’<sup>1</sup>. Such claim about the metaphysical requirements of language and thought and the nature of reference, as is well known, will be extensively thematised throughout the *Sophist*<sup>2</sup>.

(2) *Parm.* 160c5-6 is the pivotal first step into a series of inferences, which in turn lead to the provisional conclusion that ‘the one can’t *be*, if in fact it is not, but nothing prevents it from *partaking* of many things (μετέχειν δὲ πολλῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει)<sup>3</sup>. The second section of my paper will be devoted to analyze this conclusion and its argumentative connection with the startling claim at 161e2-3 that, among the things that the one-that-is-not partakes in, there must be also, *somehow*, being (καὶ οὐσίας γε δεῖ αὐτὸ μετέχειν πῆ). The argument seems to me to run as follows. Although the one is said not to be, in fact it partakes in many things (unlikeness, likeness, equality etc.), by just being a subject of meaningful λόγος. This means that many things are predicated of it. But since the one is said not to be, then it partakes of not-being as well, and the sentence ‘the one is not’ can be rephrased as ‘the one *is* a not-being’. If this is the case, then the one partakes not only of not-being, but also of being.

The argument, as I understand it, is meant to stimulate us to think that if participation into a kind *F* has its linguistic counterpart in a predication involving the use of the copula (*x is F*), then the subject of predication does not only partake of *F*, but also of the kind ‘being’. This point will be further explained in the *Sophist*, through the famous letters analogy, and notably with the claim that being is a so-called vowel-kind responsible of the combination of other kinds – even when the participated kind is ‘not-being’<sup>4</sup>.

(3) This last remark will open the way to the final section of my paper. In thematizing some sort of interweaving of being and not-being, Plato, I submit, wants us to reconsider the (Parmenidean) meaning of the two terms denoting them and the underlying metaphysical views they are based on. Notice, in particular, that here Parmenides supports his point that the sentence ‘the one is not’ is *truly* rephrased as ‘the one *is* a not-being’, by proposing a definition of truth (‘to speak of things that are (ὄντα λέγειν)’) that can be easily disputed. For, if the truth value of ‘the one is not’ is the same as ‘the one *is* a not-being’, then truth does not only qualify a λόγος that says (of) ὄντα (that they are), but also (of) μὴ ὄντα (that they are not). In fact, the Eleatic Stranger will actually reject that definition in the *Sophist*, by replacing it with a more complex one, including reference to not-being<sup>5</sup>.

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1 This reading is close with those of Natorp 1903: 271-2 and Cornford 1939: 231, although, as I will explain in the full version of the paper, some points of their analysis seem to me unpersuasive.

2 Cf. Thomas 2008: 632 and *passim* for the expression ‘τινός requirement’ and a treatment of the reference issue in the *Sophist*.

3 *Parm.* 160e7-8. My italics.

4 Cf. Crivelli 2012: 116 who perceptively claims that ‘Plato seems committed to distinguishing two levels of combination: immediate and mediated combination, which occurs thanks to the immediate combination of a further factor (the vowel-kind being)’.

5 Cf. Brisson 2018<sup>4</sup>: 263-4 n.2.

## *Riferimento, partecipazione e l'essere del non essere. Parm. 160b5-163b6 e il Sofista*

È stato frequentemente osservato negli studi platonici che la cosiddetta quinta deduzione (D5)<sup>1</sup> della seconda parte del *Parmenide* (160b5-163b6) prepara la concezione del non-essere sviluppata nella sezione centrale del *Sofista*<sup>2</sup>. Ritengo che vi siano buone ragioni per concordare con questa posizione in generale, ma considero insoddisfacenti i tentativi compiuti finora per chiarire *come* esattamente si svolga questa ‘preparazione’ delle argomentazioni e delle tesi del *Sofista*. Lo scopo di questo articolo è, pertanto, di offrire un nuovo esame (delle principali manovre argomentative) di D5, al fine di gettar luce sulle connessioni fra essa e il *Sofista*.

Argomenterò che, lungi dal fornirci chiare formulazioni di argomenti o tesi sviluppati nel *Sofista*, e in particolare del nuovo significato del non essere in termini di differenza, D5 intende stimolarci a riflettere su (1) i requisiti metafisici del pensiero e del linguaggio dotati di senso; (2) la funzione decisiva del genere ‘essere’ nel meccanismo della relazione di partecipazione; e (3) la relazione fra essere, non essere e verità. Non si deve mai dimenticare, infatti, che ci troviamo nel contesto di una *γυμνασία*, un esercizio che mira ad addestrare il lettore (al fine di risolvere le difficoltà sollevate nella prima parte del dialogo), per cui, piuttosto che fornire risposte pronte, Platone intende metterci alla prova con argomenti che ci inducano ad elaborare autonomamente le soluzioni.

Il mio intervento si articolerà in tre parti – e, di fatto, la mia analisi procederà in parallelo con lo sviluppo della sequenza argomentativa del testo platonico.

(1) Esaminerò innanzitutto l’affermazione iniziale di Parmenide secondo cui, se qualcuno afferma che ‘nell’ipotizzare che l’uno non è, [risulta evidente che] ciò che non è costituisce qualcosa di diverso dalle altre cose’ (160c5-6)<sup>3</sup>. Alcuni interpreti hanno sostenuto che la chiave dell’argomento di Parmenide sarebbe l’implicita introduzione di un nuovo significato di *μὴ ἔστι* che, lungi dal denotare l’inesistenza dell’uno, si riferisce alla sua *differenza* dalle altre cose. Così, è *in virtù* di tale ‘non essere’ che l’uno sarebbe ‘diverso dalle altre cose’<sup>4</sup>. Questa lettura, ritengo, non coglie nel segno. Infatti Parmenide rende inequivoco che quando qualcuno afferma che ‘uno non è’, egli/ella parla di qualcosa di conoscibile (*γνωστόν τι*) e diverso dalle altre cose (*ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων*), ‘sia che si aggiunga ad esso l’essere, sia il non essere (*εἴτε τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ προσθεις εἴτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι*)<sup>5</sup>. Perciò, la differenza dell’uno dalle altre cose non dipende dalla predicazione del non essere di esso. Ciò che Parmenide intende invece evidenziare è che un *λόγος* intellegibile e dotato di senso deve sempre rispettare il requisito di un *τινός*, deve *riferirsi* a qualcosa, ovvero avere un soggetto che non è un puro nulla, ma è piuttosto qualcosa dotato di un’identità distintiva che lo distingue dal resto. Ecco perché noi siamo in grado di discernere la frase ‘se l’uno non è’ da ‘se il non-uno non è’<sup>6</sup>. Una

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1 Il numero delle cosiddette deduzioni della seconda parte del *Parmenide* è una notoria *vexata quaestio*. Le ragioni per cui parlo di una ‘quinta’ deduzione si basano su Brisson-Décarie 1987.

2 Cf. e.g. Grote 1865: 312; Natorp 1903: 271-2; Friedländer 1930: 195; Cornford 1939: 231; Miller 1986: 149; Fronterotta 1998: 97-8; Scolnicov 2003: 147; Ferrari 2004: 141. Allen 1983: 328-9 nega che i problemi sollevati in D5 siano simili a quelli del *Sofista*, ma i suoi argomenti sono inconsistenti.

3 Le traduzioni del *Parmenide* seguono Ferrari 2004 con alcune lievi modifiche.

4 Cf. in particolare Scolnicov 2003: 147; ma anche Fronterotta 1998: 97-8.

5 *Parm.* 160c8-d1. Corsivi miei.

tale posizione sui requisiti del pensiero e del linguaggio dotati di senso e sulla natura del riferimento, com'è ben noto, verrà estesamente tematizzata nel *Sofista*<sup>1</sup>.

(2) *Parm.* 160c5-6 è il fondamentale primo passo verso una serie di inferenze, che a loro volta condurranno alla conclusione provvisoria che 'all'uno, visto che non è, non sarà possibile essere; tuttavia, nulla impedisce che partecipi di molte cose (μετέχειν δὲ πολλῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει)<sup>2</sup>. La seconda sezione del mio articolo sarà dedicata ad analizzare questa conclusione e la sua connessione argomentativa con la sorprendente affermazione in 161e2-3 che, fra le cose di cui l'uno-che-non-è partecipa vi è, *in qualche modo*, anche l'essere (καὶ οὐσίας γε δεῖ αὐτὸ μετέχειν πῆ). L'argomento mi sembra procedere nel modo seguente. Sebbene l'uno sia detto non essere, in realtà esso partecipa di molte cose (dissomiglianza, somiglianza, uguaglianza ecc.), semplicemente essendo il soggetto di un λόγος dotato di senso. Questo significa che molte cose sono predicate di esso. Ma siccome l'uno è detto non essere, esso parteciperà evidentemente del non essere, e l'enunciato 'l'uno non è' potrà legittimamente essere riformulato come 'l'uno è un non-ente'. Se è così, allora esso parteciperà non solo del non-ente, ma anche dell'ente.

L'argomento, a mio modo di vedere, è finalizzato a stimolarci a pensare che se la partecipazione in un genere F ha come sua controparte linguistica quella di una predicazione che coinvolge l'uso della copula ( $x \text{ è } F$ ), allora il soggetto della predicazione non solo partecipa di F, ma anche del genere 'essere'. Questo punto verrà ulteriormente illustrato nel *Sofista*, attraverso la celebre analogia delle lettere, e in particolare tramite l'idea che l'essere è un genere-vocale responsabile della combinazione di altri generi – anche quando il genere partecipato è il 'non essere'<sup>3</sup>.

(3) Quest'ultima osservazione aprirà la strada alla sezione finale del mio intervento. Nel tematizzare una forma di interconnessione fra essere e non essere, ritengo che Platone miri a farci riconsiderare il significato (parmenideo) dei termini che li denotano e le posizioni metafisiche su cui essi si basano. Si noti, in particolare, che qui Parmenide supporta la sua tesi che l'enunciato 'l'uno non è' potrà legittimamente essere riformulato come 'l'uno è un non-ente', proponendo una definizione della verità ('dire le cose che sono' (ὄντα λέγειν)) che può essere agevolmente messa in questione. Infatti, se il valore di verità di 'l'uno non è' è lo stesso di quello di 'l'uno è un non-ente', allora la verità non solo qualifica un λόγος che dice (de)gli ὄντα (che essi sono), ma anche (de)i μὴ ὄντα (che essi non sono). In effetti, lo Straniero di Elea respingerà quella definizione nel *Sofista*, sostituendola con una più complessa, che includa un riferimento al non essere<sup>4</sup>.

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6 La mia lettura è vicina a quella di Natorp 1903: 271-2 e Cornford 1939: 231, sebbene, come spiegherò nella versione completa dell'articolo, alcuni punti della loro analisi non mi risultano persuasivi.

1 Cf. Thomas 2008: 632 e *passim* per l'espressione 'τινός requirement' e una trattazione del problema del riferimento nel *Sofista*.

2 *Parm.* 160e7-8. Corsivi miei.

3 Cf. Crivelli 2012: 116 che acutamente afferma 'Plato seems committed to distinguishing two levels of combination: immediate and mediated combination, which occurs thanks to the immediate combination of a further factor (the vowel-kind being)'.

4 Cf. Brisson 2018<sup>4</sup>: 263-4 n.2.



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### *Apparence et ressemblance dans le Parménide : les limites de l'image. (Dialectique de l'apparence et aporie de la ressemblance)*

Le *Parménide* présente, dans ses deux dernières hypothèses (plus précisément, dans ses deux dernières « séries de déductions » : 164b5-165e1, 165e2-166c2) un usage systématique des termes d'apparaître (*phainesthai*) ou d'apparence (*phantasma*). On étudiera ici le sens et le statut propre à cet usage, qui semble, chez Platon, tout à fait singulier (la singularité s'expliquant en grande partie par la dimension dialectique du raisonnement).

I/ La signification de cet apparaître semble à première vue irréductible à d'autres emplois platoniciens du registre du *phainesthai*. On étudiera donc la spécificité de la relation entre être et apparaître dans le cas précis du *jeu dialectique des hypothèses*.

Cependant, la question se pose aussi de savoir dans quelle mesure les développements sur ce qu'est l'apparence à la fin du *Parménide* peuvent être éclairés par d'autres dialogues, où Platon évoque, sur la même question de l'apparence, des pensées étrangères à la sienne propre, dans une perspective non plus dialectique mais plutôt métaphysique et doxographique.

II/ Le deuxième aspect de cette réflexion sera d'examiner ce développement sur l'apparaître, à la toute fin du dialogue, en relation à l'ensemble du *Parménide*, c'est-à-dire plus précisément en prenant cette fois en considération *la première partie du dialogue*, et en particulier la critique bien connue qu'adresse le vieux Parménide à la thèse de la participation par ressemblance (132c12-133a7 ; voir 132d1-4). Nous examinerons alors comment les deux dernières séries de déductions présentent une difficulté fondamentale pour l'idée de semblance et de représentation, qui fait écho à la difficulté (« *aporia* », 133b1), dans la première partie du dialogue, de la thèse des Formes et en particulier à la difficulté qui était attachée à la participation par ressemblance. Nous étudierons donc comment la fin du dialogue permet d'apporter à l'*aporia* propre à la ressemblance, développée dans la première partie, des éléments plus complets de compréhension.

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Dans les deux dernières séries de déductions, il s'agit de savoir, « s'il n'y a pas d'un », ce qu'il advient aux « autres » (*ta alla*). Or, répondre à cette question suscite immédiatement, pour Parménide, la nécessité de substituer le registre de l'apparaître à celui de l'être.

Dans l'avant-dernière série en effet, on tire de l'hypothèse « si l'un n'est pas » des conclusions qui ne peuvent pas être formulées en termes d'existence ou de réalité. La négation de l'un aboutit ici à l'impossibilité de penser, pour les « autres », une consistance déterminée et définie. Aussi les caractères susceptibles de leur être attachés ne peuvent-ils pas être considérés comme dotés d'une réalité minimale. Ils seront seulement le mode sur lequel les choses autres que l'Un se présentent ou sont perçues : les « autres », répète Parménide, « apparaissent » tels ou tels. Toutes les qualités relèvent donc d'une pure semblance ou d'une forme de représentation imaginaire, comme en un « rêve nocturne » (164d2).

En quoi consiste exactement ce « sembler » : s'agit-il de ce qui semble à l'esprit, ou d'un phénomène que l'on peut apparenter au phénomène sensible ? Ou bien d'autre chose encore ? (voir l'emploi de *noeô* en 165c1-2 : *egguthen de kai oxu nooûnti* : « à celui qui regarde de près et qui a un regard perçant »<sup>1</sup>).

Quoi qu'il en soit, la négation de l'Un a pour corrélat dialectique une forme de réalité paradoxale, à la fois amoindrie et d'un autre ordre que l'être, que Platon pense en usant du registre lexical du « *phainesthai* ».

Quant à la toute dernière série de déduction, elle tire, de l'absence d'un, des conséquences qui interdisent même de faire subsister, ne serait-ce qu'à titre de résultat dialectique, cette forme de réalité, pourtant aussi réduite que possible, que serait l'apparaître. En l'absence d'un, il faut aller encore en deçà de cette réalité minimale de l'apparence : il faut affirmer qu'il n'y a rien. Rien ne peut être dit de quelque objet que ce soit. Cette dernière série de déductions souligne que l'apparaître semble ici pensé comme une limite entre l'être et le pur néant.

Le contexte théorique où le registre de l'apparence est mobilisé est tout à fait singulier : il ne s'agit en effet ni d'esthétique, ni du registre usuel de l'illusion sensible, ni de la *doxa*, ni enfin de la description d'un donné empirique par opposition à une *ousia* intelligible. On recherchera quel statut cet « apparaître » peut revêtir dans l'économie platonicienne de la pensée de l'être et de l'un. On examinera pour ce faire la possibilité de trouver, dans d'autres dialogues, en particulier dans le *Cratyle* et le *Théétète*, l'évocation d'une forme de réalité en quelque sorte phénoménale, qui serait du même ordre.

Mais la question de l'apparaître devra donc aussi être examinée selon notre deuxième perspective : son rapport de complémentarité ou d'opposition à la critique fameuse que Parménide adressait, dans la première partie du dialogue, à l'idée d'une participation par ressemblance.

La critique portait sur la possibilité d'une relation entre une chose et un *eidōs*, considéré comme son *paradeigma* (132c12-133a7). Il nous semble possible de soutenir clairement que la critique de Parménide ne doit pas être lue comme une réfutation, mais comme l'exposé d'une difficulté, qui est susceptible d'être résolue. La question est alors : pouvons-nous trouver dans le *Parménide*, ou dans d'autres Dialogues, avant ou après le *Parménide*, des éléments de réponse aux difficultés soulevées par le vieux Parménide ?

Il s'agira donc de faire apparaître ici comment la question de la semblance donne lieu dans le *Parménide* à deux perspectives et à deux types de difficultés :

a/ Platon dégage les conditions de possibilités et les difficultés propres à l'affirmation d'une relation de ressemblance, cela dans la problématique et la perspective de l'*eidōs* et de la participation à l'*eidōs*, d'une part ;

et b/ il met aussi en évidence les conditions de possibilités et les difficultés propres à l'affirmation d'une semblance, sans relation de ressemblance à un modèle, cela dans la problématique et la perspective de l'un et de la conséquence de sa négation, d'autre part.

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1 Trad. L. Brisson (*Platon. Parménide*, Paris, Flammarion, 1999<sup>2</sup>, 1994<sup>1</sup>).

Platon donne donc, à la toute fin du *Parménide*, une forme de représentation dialectique d'un objet paradoxal, puisqu'il constitue une sorte de réalité sans être, un apparaître sans référent, sans substrat et sans modèle. Or cette représentation dialectique vient compléter le questionnement critique que la première partie du dialogue avait déjà élaboré au sujet de l'image. Il importe alors d'étudier de quelle façon ce développement portant sur l'apparence dans la seconde partie du *Parménide* permet de réexaminer et de clarifier les difficultés (et la nécessité) que la première partie du dialogue attachait à la participation par ressemblance.

### *Appearance and Likeness in the Parmenides: borderline conceptions of image. (Dialectic of Appearance and aporia of Likeness)*

In the *Parmenides*, the two final 'hypotheses' (or the two final 'series of deductions': 164b5-165e1, 165e2-166c2) present an important use of the notion of appearing (*phainesthai*) and appearance (*phantasma*). The usage seems most unusual and can be explained by the dialectical nature of the reasoning. My purpose will be to analyse what the concept of appearing means within the economy of the dialogue.

I/ The way in which the idea of appearance is brought out by Parmenides seems at first sight completely irreducible to other usages of *phainesthai* adopted by Plato. Therefore, the specificity of the relationship between being and appearing will be analysed in the precise case of dialectical play of hypotheses.

Nonetheless, the question will also need to be asked as to how far the developments of what appearing signifies at the end of the *Parmenides*, can be elucidated by developments on appearance in other dialogues, where Plato evokes thinking foreign to his own philosophy, in a perspective that is no longer dialectical but metaphysical and doxographical.

II/ The second aspect of our analysis will examine this passage concerning appearing, at the end of the dialogue, in relation to the *Parmenides* as a whole: i.e. more precisely by taking into consideration, this time, the *first part of the dialogue*, and in particular Parmenides' well known criticism of the *metexis* conceived as likeness (132c12-133a7; see 132d1-4). We will then examine how the last two series of deductions present a fundamental difficulty for the idea of semblance and representation, which echoes to the difficulty ("*aporia*", 133b1) attached to likeness. We will therefore study how the end of the *Parmenides* makes it possible to bring more complete elements of understanding to this *aporia* of likeness, developed in the first part of the dialogue.

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The last two series of deductions deal with knowing what happens to "the others" (*ta alla*), if there is no One. And in order to answer this question, Parmenides replaces the register of being by the register of appearing.

In the penultimate series of deductions, the conclusions (about "the others"), that Parmenides draws from the hypothesis "if one is not", cannot be formulated in terms of existence or reality. Here, the negation of the one first precludes thinking what a set and defined consistency for the "others" might be. Further, characters likely to be attached to these "others" cannot be considered as being endowed with a minimal reality; they are only the way "things other than the

One" are presented or perceived; the "others", Parmenides repeats, "appear" like this or that. All the qualities are, then, posited as being purely a semblance or a form of imaginary representation, as in a "nocturnal dream" (164d2).

An analysis of "semblance" is needed: does it refer to what seems to the mind or to a sensible phenomenon? Or something else again? (see the use of *noeô* at 165c1-2: *egguthen de kai oxu nooûnti*: "to closer and keener inspection").

Anyway, for its dialectical corollary, the negation of the One requires a paradoxical form of reality, both diminished and of another order than being, that Plato can only name by using the notion and lexical range of "*phainesthai*".

The final series of deductions, right at the end of the dialogue, deduces the consequences of the absence of one which, if only as a dialectical result, prevent even the existence of that form of reality (as tenuous as possible) that appearing would be. In the absence of one, it is necessary to go even beyond this minimal reality of appearance, and assert that there is nothing. Nothing can at all be said about any object. The last series of deductions underlines the fact that the appearing has to be thought of as an intermediary form, or a borderline between being and pure nothingness.

The theoretical context in which the register of appearing arises here is most unusual: it concerns neither aesthetics, nor the usual register of sensible illusion, nor opinion (*doxa*), nor even the description of empirical data as opposed to intelligible *ousia*. I will, then, investigate the meaning and status that can be attributed to this occurrence of "appearing" within the Platonic thinking on being and one. In order to do this, other Platonic dialogues (especially the *Cratylus* and the *Theaetetus*) will be examined with a view to finding, if possible, references to a form of reality, somehow phenomenal in nature, of the same order.

But the question of appearing will therefore also be examined from our second point of view: its relationship (of complementarity or opposition) to Parmenides' famous criticism, in the first part of the dialogue. The criticism was about the possibility of a relationship between a thing and an *eidōs*, considered as its *paradeigma* (132c12-133a7). Our point is, first, that Parmenides' criticism of the likeness-relationship between a thing and a Form should not be read as a *refutation*, but as *difficulties* that *might be resolved*. And the question therefore is: can we find in the *Parmenides*, or in others Dialogues, before or after the *Parmenides*, platonic answers to the difficulties raised by the elder Parmenides ?

I will therefore examine the way in which the question of semblance gives rise in the *Parmenides* to two theoretical perspectives and two types of difficulty:

a/ on the one hand, Plato analyses the conditions for possibilities and difficulties involved in asserting a relationship of likeness, within the problem and the perspective of the *eidōs* and partaking of the *eidōs*;

b/ and on the other hand, Plato highlights the conditions for possibilities and difficulties involved in asserting a semblance, with no relationship of likeness to a model, within the problem and perspective of the one and the consequence of its negation.

Plato, therefore, in the passage right at the end of the *Parmenides*, dialectically represents an extremely paradoxical object which might constitute a sort of reality without being, an appearing without referent, substrate or model. That dialectic approach completes the critical analysis that related to the possibility of the likeness in the first part of the dialogue.

Then it will be useful to examine, furthermore, in what way the development about appearance, in the second part of the *Parmenides*, helps to focus and re-emphasises the difficulties and the necessity of the likeness-participation raised by the first part of the dialogue.

*The Ground of Being in the Parmenides' First and Second Hypotheses:  
Damascius' Inheritance of Proclus' Reading of the First Hypothesis*

Like nearly all Neoplatonists, Proclus and Damascius were well-known for holding an ontological reading of the *Parmenides'* hypotheses in the second half of the dialogue, according to which the first three hypotheses respectively describe the three main principles of all things: the One, which is prior to Being; Being-itself, or the intelligible world; and Soul and all particular souls. In the background for both philosophers, as with most Neoplatonists, is a longstanding problem of explaining how the second hypothesis' affirmations come to be from the negations of the first hypothesis. This in turn corresponds with the problem of how the principle of Being comes to be from the first principle which is beyond being, so that Being is an effect that comes from a cause that shares none of its characteristics. This background becomes important when we consider Proclus' and Damascius' positions, where Damascius represents a radical departure from Proclus and the majority of Neoplatonists when he holds that a higher principle, the Ineffable, is the true first principle rather than the One. As will be elaborated below, Damascius' position is informed by his reading of the *Parmenides* which is, in turn, influenced by his predecessor Proclus' view of the relation between the first and second hypotheses.

Whereas previous Neoplatonists like Porphyry and Iamblichus attempt to explain Being's derivation from the One either through the One unfolding and defining itself as Being (for the anonymous *Parm.* commentator, perhaps Porphyry: see e.g. *In Parm.* Fr.'s XI, 33–XII, 35 [Hadot])—or through the One hiddenly pre-containing the attributes of Being, while transcending Being-itself (for Iamblichus: see e.g. Proclus' *In Parm.* 1114,1–14 [Steel])—Proclus follows his master, Syrianus, and holds that the One produces intermediate principles—the henads—which possess the One's character as particular unities which are also beyond Being, *and* yet also anticipate the positive attributes of Being. Proclus' framework influences (and is in turn influenced by) his reading of the relation between the *Parmenides'* first and second hypotheses: the negations of the first hypothesis are correlated in number and kind with the assertions of the second hypothesis, so that the first hypothesis' negations are 'causative' of the second's positive attributes (*In Parm.* 1075,13 ff. [Steel]).

This background is what leads Proclus to posit a two-sided interpretation for the One: seen by itself as the first cause of all things, the negations of the first hypothesis apply to it properly, while seen in relation to its effects as their cause, the One is seen through the henads which proceed from it, where the henads—inheriting the various negative properties of the One, including as beyond Being—belong to the second hypothesis as directly productive of Being's positive attributes (*In Parm.* 1068,1–1070,12 [Steel]). One can also see this kind of two-sided interpretation directly in Proclus' reconciliation of the assertion of 'beginning', 'middle', and 'end' to the first principle, from *Laws* IV (715e7–716a2), and the negation of 'beginning', 'middle', and 'end' to the first hypothesis' 'One' in *Parm.* 137d4–7: the positive ascription of the terms apply to the One when seen in relation to its effects (i.e. the One is 'beginning' and 'end' from the perspective of Being), while when seen in itself, the negations of those terms apply to the One properly (*In Parm.* 1114,1

ff. [Steel]). For Proclus the first hypothesis is then a pre-condition, and therefore ground, for the positive features of Being in the second hypothesis to come about. This general two-sided framework is ultimately how Proclus can show the One relation to Being as a cause—while being separate from Being as a transcendent principle.

With this background in mind, Damascius marks a radical departure with his reconfiguration of Proclus' framework when makes the Ineffable the first principle rather than the One. For Damascius a major influence is his reading of the *Parmenides'* first hypothesis, where ineffability is one of the final attributes spoken of the One—represented particularly in the first hypothesis' removal of the previous negations spoken of the One (*Parm.* 142a). The ineffability that results at the end of the first hypothesis' 'One' is *presupposed* from the very beginning of the hypothesis: the One's ineffability is only possible if one *begins* with, rather than ending with, ineffability (see *De Princ.* I, 9,1 ff.). Damascius' reading is connected with his notion of the One in itself as representing the 'summit' of Being, or 'all things' (τὰ πάντα) in Damascius' terminology, rather than a purely transcendent principle fully detached from Being as for Proclus: the One for Damascius cannot then be truly the first principle, since it still functions as a cause, even if it is transcendent. Thus even though the negations of the first hypothesis are themselves negated at the end (*Parm.* 142a), they are still expressed, which implies that they are negations *of* something which comes about in Being. For Damascius the 'One' of the first hypothesis implies a necessary attachment to the 'One' of the second hypothesis, so that one cannot have the One in itself without the One being necessarily attached to Being as its cause—even if it transcends Being. As a result, the Ineffable for Damascius represents the ground by which the One of the first hypothesis comes about, while paradoxically it cannot be represented by the *Parmenides'* first hypothesis but is instead pre-supposed from the beginning of the hypothesis.

One may wonder how Damascius comes up with this interpretation: why would we suppose or think that ineffability is a necessary pre-condition from the *start* of the first hypothesis, and not just at the end? And how could Damascius have come up with his interpretation in light of Proclus' own take—why even consider this distinct interpretation in the first place? In this paper I wish to show that Damascius carries forward Proclus' intuition of a two-sided interpretation for the One of the first hypothesis: when seen truly in itself, and *not* as a cause in any sense, the One is a 'symbol', in Damascius' words, of the Ineffable (*De Princ.* II, 11,18–25), while when seen in relation to Being, the One with its negations is then represented as a transcendent cause relative to Being. In this respect I propose to develop a thesis Westerink-Combès pose in their commentary to Damascius' *Parm. Comm.* (vol. I, p. xxx) with the two directions through which the One is perceived, either in relation to the Ineffable as a symbol of it, or in relation to all things as their cause. This paper will thus compare Proclus' two-sided interpretation of the One and then analyze Damascius' understanding of the One's relation both to the Ineffable, before it, and Being, after it, and ultimately show how Damascius inherits, as well as transforms, Proclus' interpretive framework for the first hypothesis and the Ineffable as a pre-condition and ground for the first *and* second hypothesis.



## *El Fundamento del Ser en la Primera y Segunda Hipótesis del Parménides: La Herencia de Damascio de la lectura de Proclo sobre la Primera Hipótesis*

Como la mayoría de los Neoplatónicos, Proclo y Damascio eran bien conocidos por mantener una lectura ontológica de las hipótesis del *Parménides* en la segunda mitad del diálogo, según la cual las primeras tres hipótesis describen respectivamente los primeros tres principios de todas las cosas: el Uno, que es anterior al Ser; el Ser en sí mismo, o el mundo inteligible; y el Alma y todas las almas particulares. En el fondo, para ambos filósofos, como para casi todos los Neoplatónicos, existe un problema antiguo de explicar como las afirmaciones de la segunda hipótesis surgen de las negaciones de la primera hipótesis. Esto, a su vez, corresponde al problema de como el principio del Ser surge del primer principio que es mas allá del ser, de tal manera que el Ser es un efecto que viene de una causa que comparte ninguna de sus características. Este fondo se vuelve importante cuando consideramos que las posiciones de Proclo y Damascio, donde Damascio representa un alejamiento radical de Proclo y de la mayoría de Neoplatónicos donde mantiene que un principio más elevado, lo Inefable, es el verdadero primer principio en vez que el Uno. Como será desarrollado más adelante, la posición de Damascio esta informada por su lectura del *Parménides* la cual es, a su vez, influenciada por la interpretación de su predecesor, Proclo, sobre la relación entre la primera y la segunda hipótesis.

Donde Neoplatonicos anteriores como Porfirio y Jámblico intentaron explicar la derivación del Ser desde el Uno ya sea a través de el Uno desplegándose y definiéndose como Ser (para el comentarista anónimo del *Parm.*, tal vez Porfirio: véase p.e. *In Parm.* Fr.'s XI, 33-XII,35 [Hadot]) —o a través del Uno conteniendo con anterioridad de manera oculta los atributos del Ser, al mismo tiempo trascendiendo el Ser mismo (para Jámblico: véase p.e. Proclo *In Parm.* 1114,1 [Steel])— Proclo sigue a su maestro, Siriano, and mantiene que el Uno produce principios intermedios—las enadas—que poseen las características del Uno como unidades particulares que están también más allá del Ser, y sin embargo, también anticipan los atributos positivos del Ser. El marco de referencia de Proclo influye (y a su vez es influido) por su lectura de la relación entre la primera y la segunda hipótesis del *Parménides*: las negaciones de la primera hipótesis son correlacionadas en numero y tipo con las afirmaciones de la segunda hipótesis, de tal manera que las negaciones de la primera hipótesis son ‘causante’ de los atributos positivos de la segunda hipótesis. (*In Parm.* 1075,13 ss. [Steel]).

Este fondo es lo que conlleva a Proclo a postular una interpretación doble para el Uno: visto por sí mismo como la primera causa de todas las cosas, las negaciones de la primera hipótesis se aplican a él propiamente, mientras que, visto en relación a sus efectos como su causa, el Uno es visto a través de las enadas que proceden desde él—heredando las diversas propiedades negativas del Uno, incluyendo como más allá del Ser—pertenecen a la segunda hipótesis como directamente productora de los atributos positivos del Ser (*In Parm.* 1068,1-1070,12 [Steel]). Uno puede también ver esta clase doble interpretación directamente en la reconciliación de Proclo de la afirmación del ‘comienzo’, ‘medio’, y ‘fin’ al primer principio, *Leyes IV* (715e7-716a2), y la negación de ‘comienzo’, ‘medio’, y ‘fin’ al primer principio ‘Uno’ en *Parm.* 137d4-7: la atribución de los términos se aplica al Uno propiamente (*In Parm.* 1114,1 ss. [Steel]). Para Proclo la primera hipótesis es pues una precondition, and por lo tanto la base, para los rasgos positivos del Ser en la segunda hipótesis. Este doble marco general es últimamente como Proclo puede mostrar que la

relación del Uno con el Ser como causa—siendo a su vez separado del Ser como principio transcendental.

Con este fondo en mente, Damascio marca un alejamiento radical con su reconfiguración del marco de Proclo cuando de el Inefable el primer principio en vez del Uno. Una gran influencia para Damascio es su lectura de la primera hipótesis del *Parmenides*, donde inefabilidad es uno de los atributos finales hablados sobre el Uno—representado particularmente en la eliminación de las anteriores negaciones habladas del Uno de la primera hipótesis (*Parm.* 142a). La inefabilidad que resulta al final de la primera hipótesis ‘Uno’ es presupuesta desde el mismísimo comienzo de la hipótesis: la inefabilidad del ‘Uno’ es solamente posible si uno comienza con, en vez de terminar con, inefabilidad (véase *De Princ.* I, 9, 1 ss.). La lectura de Damascio esta conectada con su noción del Uno en si mismo como representando la ‘cumbre’ del Ser, de ‘todas las cosas’ (τὰ πάντα) en la terminología de Damascio, en vez que un principio puramente transcendental completamente desapegado del Ser como para Proclo: el Uno para Damascio no puede entonces ser verdaderamente el principio primero, ya que aun funciona como cause, incluso si es transcendental. Por lo tanto, aunque las negaciones de la primera hipótesis son negadas al final (*Parm.* 142a), aun son expresadas, lo que implica que son negaciones de algo que viene a ser en el Ser. Para Damascio, el ‘Uno’ de la primera hipótesis implica necesariamente un apego al ‘Uno’ de la segunda hipótesis, de tal manera que uno no puede tener el Uno en sí mismo sin el Uno estar necesariamente apegado al Uno como su causa—aun si este trasciende Ser. Como resultado, lo Inefable para Damascio representa el fundamento por el cual el Uno de la primera hipótesis viene a ser, mientras que paradójicamente no puede ser representado por la primera hipótesis del *Parmenides* pero es en vez presupuesto desde el comienzo de la hipótesis.

Uno se pregunta como Damascio llega a tener esta interpretación: ¿por qué supondríamos o pensaríamos que inefabilidad es una precondition necesaria desde el comienzo de la primera hipótesis, and no solo al final? Y como pudo Damascio llegar con su interpretación teniendo en cuenta la interpretación de Proclo—¿Por qué si quiera considerar esta interpretación distinta en el primer lugar? En este ensayo deseo mostrar que Damascio lleva adelante la intuición de Proclo de una interpretación doble para el Uno de la primera hipótesis: cuando visto verdaderamente en si mismo, y no como una causa de ninguna manera, el Uno es un ‘símbolo’, en las palabras de Damascio, de lo Inefable (*De Princ.* II, 11,18-25), mientras que cuando visto en relación al Ser, el Uno con sus negaciones es entonces representado como una causa transcendente relativa al Ser. En este respecto propongo desarrollar una tesis que Westerink-Combès propone en su comentario al *Parm.* *Comm. de Damascio* (vol. I, p.xxx) con las dos direcciones con las que el Uno es percibido, ya sea en relación a lo Inefable como un símbolo de él, o en relación a todas las cosas como su causa. Este ensayo entonces comparará la doble interpretación del Uno de Proclo and luego analizará el entendimiento de Damascio sobre la relación del Uno tanto a lo Inefable como al Ser, y finalmente mostrará como Damascio hereda, tanto como transforma, el marco interpretativo de Proclo para la primera hipótesis y el Inefable como precondition y fundamento para la primera y segunda hipótesis.

*La méthode dialectique et le Parménide de Platon*

Le *Parménide* de Platon se trouve, de nos jours, dans une situation singulière : considéré comme un dialogue central du corpus Platonicien, son importance théorique reste néanmoins partiellement occultée.

Les « difficultés » que rencontre toute personne qui veut analyser cette œuvre sont dues à sa structure complexe. Le dialogue « vrai et propre » s'enclasse à l'intérieur de trois cadres et est divisé en deux sections liées l'une à l'autre par une « section intermédiaire » ayant une haute valeur philosophique.

Comme tout le monde le sait, la première section – prenant la forme d'un dialogue indirect – contient une discussion entre Parménide et Socrate sur la doctrine des Idées, au cours de laquelle trois objections apparemment insolubles sont formulées. La « section intermédiaire », elle, contient la description, par Parménide, d'une méthode pour étudier la vérité. Enfin, la deuxième section, s'étendant sur trente pages de l'édition Stephanus, développe la partie la plus longue et la plus complexe du dialogue, contenant un sujet encore partiellement obscur. Le style évolue en un dialogue direct entre Parménide et le jeune Aristote, dans lequel le philosophe met en œuvre la méthode d'investigation qu'il vient d'exposer (135c8-137c3) autour d'une discussion complexe sur l'Un. Plus précisément, il présente et analyse deux hypothèses opposées, à savoir: « si l'Un est » (εἰ ἐν ἔστι) et « si l'Un n'est pas » (εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἕν).

Cette discussion se déroule selon le traitement dialectique des hypothèses que Platon expose brièvement dans la *République* – c'est-à-dire au moyen du développement de huit hypothèses, dont quatre sont réfutées et quatre sont démontrées par la réfutation des hypothèses opposées. Ce passage contient une doctrine très importante exposant l'implication réciproque de l'Un et du Multiple.

Parmi les interprétations courantes que l'on retient de ce passage aujourd'hui – l'«interprétation néoplatonicienne», selon laquelle la première hypothèse constitue une sorte de théologie négative et les autres correspondent aux hypostases successives de l'Un ; l'«interprétation anglo-saxonne», qui a vu dans le *Parménide* de Platon un «exercice purement dialectique» dépourvu de tout contenu doctrinal ; et l'«interprétation aporétique», selon laquelle le dialogue arrive à des conclusions contradictoires – celle qui a reçu le plus grand succès reste l'«interprétation sérieuse», selon laquelle le dialogue est la démonstration de la communication entre les genres – à savoir, entre les Idées –, qui aurait été développée dans le *Sophiste*, voire même constitue une introduction aux «soit-disant doctrines non écrites», effectuée au moyen de la méthode apagogique.

Dans l'esprit de ces dernières interprétations, il y a celle proposée par Enrico Berti, *Conseguenze inaccettabili conseguenze accettabili delle ipotesi del Parmenide*, que je voudrais examiner et développer.

En fait, dans ce que l'on a appelé «section de connexion/intermédiaire», Parménide montre à Socrate quelle est la meilleure façon de défendre la doctrine des Idées des difficultés qu'il a exposé, en décrivant ce qu'il appelle un «exercice» ou un «entraînement» (γυμνάσια), sans lequel la

vérité peut nous échapper (135 c-d). Dans des termes similaires, Aristote affirmera, dans les *Topiques*, que la dialectique est utile «pour l'entraînement» (πρὸς γυμνασίαν) et «pour les sciences philosophiques», puisque «ceux qui savent développer une aporie dans les deux directions opposées verront plus facilement, en chacune, le vrai et le faux» (Aristot. *Top.* I 2, 101 a 28-36).

En particulier, pour Platon, cet exercice est représenté par la dialectique que Zénon met en œuvre au début du dialogue, avec laquelle la thèse de Parménide était soutenue par la réfutation – au moyen d'une réduction à contradiction – de l'hypothèse opposée, selon laquelle les choses sont nombreuses (127e – 128e). Mais cet exercice dialectique semble avoir besoin de deux raffinements:

1) Le premier – et plus évident – exige que la dialectique ne soit pas appliquée à des choses sensibles, mais à des Idées;

2) Le second – et plus technique – montre qu'il ne faut pas déduire seulement les conséquences d'une seule hypothèse, mais qu'il faut faire la même chose avec l'hypothèse opposée:

«Il ne suffit pas de supposer qu'un objet existe et d'examiner les conséquences de cette supposition; il faut encore supposer que ce même objet n'existe pas, si tu veux pousser à fond ta gymnastique» (Plat. *Parm.* 135e – 136a).

Le sens de cette prescription réside dans le fait que les deux hypothèses sont, probablement, contradictoires et donc, en vertu du principe du tiers exclus, une fois qu'on a identifié le faux par réfutation, la vérité de la première sera démontrée.

Probablement, Aristote fait allusion à cette «découverte» de Platon, quand il affirme, en *Métaphysique M*, que:

«A cette époque [de Socrate] il n'y avait pas encore une force dialectique telle [comme c'était celle de Platon] pour être en mesure d'enquêter sur les opposés aussi indépendamment de l'essence et de pouvoir déterminer si la science des contraires est la même» (Aristot. *Metaph.* M 4, 1078 b 25-27).

Ces opposés pourraient en fait être les deux propositions contradictoires parmi elles, pour lesquelles la démonstration du fausseté de l'une coïncide avec la démonstration de la vérité de l'autre, d'où l'on peut dire que la science des contraires est la même.

Si cela est vrai, la contribution de Platon à l'histoire de la dialectique est minime dans la *République*, où il est dit que le passage à travers tous les réfutations conduit à la définition du bien, alors qu'elle est beaucoup plus grande dans le *Parménide*, où il est affirmé la nécessité de déduire les conséquences des hypothèses opposées et il est montré qu'elles sont les conséquences de ce travail dans le cas de l'Un et du multiple.

Dans mon intervention, je voudrais analyser quelques passages du *Parménide*, pour montrer le sens de la dialectique théorisé dans ce dialogue comme «passage à travers tous les lieux», ou comme une procédure qui ne fonctionne que si, pour comprendre comment les choses sont vraiment, on considère tous les cas possibles. Si c'est le cas, les conséquences des hypothèses sur l'Un ne peuvent pas être considérées comme équivalentes entre-elles, mais elles doivent être arrangées avec des paires d'hypothèses opposées, c'est-à-dire selon des alternatives d'éventualités contradictoires.

## *Il metodo dialettico ed il Parmenide di Platone*

Il *Parmenide* di Platone si trova oggi in una condizione particolare; infatti, benché fra le opere platoniche sia considerato come un dialogo di particolare importanza, la sua rilevanza teoretica resta parzialmente celata.

Le “difficoltà” in cui incorre chiunque voglia analizzare tale opera sono dovute alla sua complicata struttura, per cui il dialogo vero e proprio si trova all’interno di tre cornici, ed è diviso in due sezioni connesse da una ulteriore sezione di raccordo, di un notevole valore filosofico.

Come è noto, la prima sezione – avente la forma di un dialogo indiretto – riporta una discussione che avrebbe avuto luogo fra Parmenide e Socrate a proposito della dottrina delle Idee, sollevando tre pesanti obiezioni apparentemente irrisolvibili, mentre la “sezione di raccordo” contiene la descrizione da parte di Parmenide di un metodo per indagare la verità. Infine, la seconda sezione, della lunghezza di trenta pagine dell’edizione della Stephanus, sviluppa la parte più lunga e complessa del dialogo, sviluppando un argomento ancora parzialmente oscuro.

Quivi lo stile si evolve in dialogo diretto tra Parmenide e il giovanissimo Aristotele, in cui il filosofo mostra un esempio del metodo di indagine appena delineato (135c8-137c3), sviluppando una complessa discussione intorno all’Uno, in cui si analizzano le due ipotesi opposte tra loro: “se l’uno è” (εἰ ἓν ἔστι) e “se l’uno non è” (εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἓν).

Tale discussione è condotta secondo il trattamento dialettico delle ipotesi a cui Platone allude nella *Repubblica* – cioè attraverso lo sviluppo di otto ipotesi, di cui quattro vengono confutate e quattro vengono dimostrate attraverso la confutazione di quelle opposte – e presenta un importante contenuto dottrinale, rappresentato dalla trattazione dell’implicazione reciproca dell’Uno e dei Molti.

Ad oggi, fra le varie interpretazioni che sono state fornite in rapporto a tale tema – fra le quali vale citare l’“interpretazione neoplatonica”, secondo la quale la prima ipotesi costituisce una sorta di teologia negativa e le altre corrispondono alle successive ipostasi dell’Uno, l’“interpretazione anglosassone”, che ha visto nel *Parmenide* un puro esercizio dialettico privo di ogni contenuto dottrinale, e quella “aporetica”, secondo cui il dialogo approda a conclusioni contraddittorie –, quella che ha riscosso maggior successo è stata quella “seria”, che ha interpretato il dialogo come la dimostrazione della comunicazione fra i generi – ovvero fra le Idee –, che sarebbe poi stata sviluppata nel Sofista, o addirittura come una introduzione alle “cosiddette dottrine non scritte”, condotta attraverso il metodo apagogico.

Nel novero di tali interpretazioni vi è quella proposta da Enrico Berti, *Conseguenze inaccettabili conseguenze accettabili delle ipotesi del Parmenide*, che vorrei approfondire e sviluppare.

In effetti, nel cosiddetto “intermezzo” fra le due parti del dialogo, Parmenide indica a Socrate quale sia il modo per difendere la dottrina delle Idee dalle difficoltà a cui essa va incontro, che è definito come un “esercizio” o un “allenamento” (γυμνάσια), senza il quale la verità rischia di sfuggire (135 c-d). In termini analoghi, nei *Topici*, Aristotele affermerà che la dialettica è utile “per allenamento” (πρὸς γυμνασίαν) e “per le scienze filosofiche”, dato che “coloro che sanno sviluppare un’aporia nelle due direzioni opposte scorgeranno più facilmente in ciascuna sia il vero che il falso” (Aristot. *Top.* I 2, 101 a 28-36).

In particolare, per Platone, tale esercizio è rappresentato dalla dialettica praticata da Zenone all’inizio del dialogo, con cui veniva appoggiata la tesi di Parmenide mediante la confutazione – per

mezzo della riduzione a contraddizione – dell’ipotesi ad essa opposta, secondo cui le cose sono molte (127e -128e). Solo che la dialettica di Zenone pare necessitare di due perfezionamenti:

Il primo – e più ovvio – richiede che essa non sia applicata alle cose sensibili, ma alle idee;

Il secondo – più tecnico – è che non ci si limiti a dedurre le conseguenze di una sola ipotesi, ma che si faccia lo stesso con l’ipotesi opposta:

«Non solo, dopo aver posto che una singola cosa è, bisogna esaminare le conseguenze derivanti dall’ipotesi, ma porre anche come ipotesi che questa che questa stessa cosa non sia, se vuoi esercitarti meglio» (Plat. *Parm.* 135e - 136a).

Il senso di questa prescrizione risiede nel fatto che le due ipotesi sono, probabilmente, contraddittorie e perciò, per il principio del terzo escluso, una volta individuata la falsa per confutazione, sarà dimostrata la veridicità della prima.

Probabilmente, Aristotele allude a tale “scoperta” di Platone, quando afferma nella *Metafisica* che:

«a quel tempo [di Socrate] non c’era ancora una forza dialettica tale [come fu quella di Platone] da poter indagare gli opposti anche indipendentemente dall’essenza e da poter stabilire se la scienza degli opposti è la stessa» (Aristot. *Metaph.* M 4, 1078 b 25-27).

Tali opposti potrebbero infatti essere le due proposizioni contraddittorie fra loro, per le quali la dimostrazione della falsità dell’una coincide con la dimostrazione della verità dell’altra, da cui si può dire che la scienza degli opposti è la stessa.

Se ciò è vero, il contributo di Platone alla storia della dialettica è solo accennato nella *Repubblica*, ove si afferma che il passare attraverso tutte le confutazioni conduce alla definizione nel bene, mentre è ampiamente teorizzato ed illustrato proprio nel *Parmenide*, dove si afferma la necessità di dedurre le conseguenze di ipotesi opposte e si mostra a che cosa questo porti a proposito dell’Uno e dei Molti, a cui Parmenide, nel dialogo, applicherà il metodo ora teorizzato.

Nella mia ricerca vorrei analizzare alcuni passi del *Parmenide*, per mostrare il senso della dialettica teorizzata nel dialogo come “passaggio attraverso tutti i luoghi”, ovvero come procedimento che funziona solo se, per comprender come stanno veramente le cose, si considera la totalità dei casi possibili. Se così fosse, le conseguenze delle ipotesi sull’Uno non possono essere considerate come equivalenti fra loro, ma devono disporsi a coppie di ipotesi opposte, cioè secondo alternative di eventualità reciprocamente contraddittorie.

### *La exégesis plotiniana de Parménides 131 a-b: el problema de la participación.*

Platón plantea en *Parménides* 131 a-b el problema de la participación de las cosas sensibles en las Ideas desde un punto de vista aporético. El argumento se desarrolla de la siguiente manera: si hay ciertas formas de las que participan las cosas sensibles, cabe preguntarse si cada cosa participa de la forma entera o de una parte. Si la forma entera está en cada una de las múltiples cosas manteniendo su unidad, entonces la forma estará simultáneamente en cosas múltiples y separadas. Luego estará separada de sí misma. Sócrates propone la imagen del día para evitar el problema y Parménides la sustituye por la imagen del velo, introduciendo un modo literal de entender el concepto “estar en”. Si una parte del velo está sobre una parte y otra sobre otra, entonces las formas son divisibles en partes con el consiguiente problema de afirmar que algo uno se ha vuelto divisible en partes manteniéndose uno.

Plotino presenta en *En.* VI 4.2.14-50 una exégesis de este pasaje que quiebra el marco en el que se presenta tradicionalmente la participación. No se trata de entender lo sensible como una entidad autónoma y de poner lo inteligible en relación con ella. En esta cartografía, donde la participación emerge como aporía, lo inteligible aparece siempre como supeditado ontológicamente a lo sensible; no siendo comprendido según principios propios.

La aporía que presenta la participación se debe, en gran medida, a la proyección sobre lo inteligible de parámetros que son propios de lo sensible. En *En.* VI 5.8.1-10 se afirma: “es razonable y aun necesario, creo yo, desechar la idea de que, estando las formas y la materia situadas por separado, haya llegado hasta la materia una irradiación emitida desde algún punto lejano de arriba. Mucho me temo que estas sean palabras vacías. Porque ¿qué puede querer decir <lejos> y <aparte> en este contexto”. Este texto hace alusión a las palabras de Aristóteles en su crítica a la teoría de las ideas en *Met.* 991 a 20 donde acusa de “palabras vacías y metáforas poéticas” las expresiones como “provenir de” con las que intenta darse cuenta de la participación.

Plotino hace suya la crítica aristotélica en este punto y comparte el carácter vacío y aporético de la participación entendida en este marco. De ahí que, como señala Tornau, proponga un cambio de perspectiva poniendo en cuestión la significación misma de las nociones que utilizamos para referirnos a lo inteligible. Es este cambio de perspectiva el que resolvería la aporía de la participación, haciéndola aparecer como una noción con sentido.

El pasaje que proponemos analizar, *En.* VI 4.2.14-50, presenta un ejemplo privilegiado de este modo de operar. Plotino toma como base el pasaje de *Parménides* 131 a-b para desplegar una exégesis donde se pone de manifiesto la inviabilidad de la aplicación de conceptos como “estar en”, “lejos” o “cerca” cuando se trata de lo inteligible. Estos conceptos pertenecen a la conformación propia de lo sensible y no pueden ser proyectados sobre lo inteligible de un modo literal; en este ámbito carecen de sentido.

Lo inteligible no está en lo sensible como en un lugar, no depende de lo sensible. La perspectiva que se abre es la inversa; lo sensible establece su dependencia respecto de lo inteligible en su ser mismo. Plotino pone en cuestión el sentido de la sustancialidad de lo sensible y su individualidad, su ser un “esto” al margen de lo inteligible. La participación de lo sensible en lo inteligible no se establece entre dos términos equiparables sino que viene a retrotraerse al corazón mismo de lo sensible en su conformación como imagen de lo inteligible.

Esta exégesis se sumerge en la complejidad del marco ontológico plotiniano alcanzando de lleno al sentido del dualismo entre el mundo sensible y el inteligible. Este dualismo, lejos de acentuarse, viene a llenarse de matices que acercan el mundo inteligible a lo sensible de un modo no local. El hecho de que el mundo inteligible no esté en un lugar modifica internamente el sentido de la participación y de la relación que lo sensible establece con lo inteligible. Si lo inteligible no está en un lugar esta relación no puede ser local: “Pero si ni <lejos> ni <cerca> existen realmente, forzoso es que esté presente todo entero, si es que está presente; y lo está enteramente a cada uno de aquellos de los que no está ni lejos ni cerca; pero si son capaces de recibirlo está presente”.

En nuestra comunicación atenderemos a la lectura que Plotino hace de este pasaje del *Parménides* y al modo en que replantea el sentido de la participación. Veremos cómo la noción de “estar en” viene a ser repensada en las coordenadas de la metafísica plotiniana, desembocando en un planteamiento con fuerte implicaciones epistemológicas.

### *Plotinus' exegesis of Parmenides 131 a-b: the problem of participation.*

In his *Parmenides* 131 a-b Plato poses the problem of the participation of sensible things in Ideas from an aporetic viewpoint. The argument is developed in the following way: if there are certain forms in which the sensible things participate, the question is whether each thing participates in the form as a whole or only in part of it. If the whole form is in each of the multiple things while still remaining one, then the form will be simultaneously in multiple and in separate things. Thus, it will be separate from itself. Socrates proposes the image of the day to avoid this problem and Parmenides counters this with the metaphor of the sail, introducing a literal way to understand the concept of “being in”. If one part of a sail covers one individual and the other part covers others, then the forms are divisible into parts, with the resulting problem of how to claim that one thing has become divisible into parts while still remaining one.

In his *En. VI* 4.2.14-50 Plotinus presents an exegesis of this passage which breaks down the framework of how this participation is traditionally presented. This is not a question of understanding the sensible as an independent entity and relating the intelligible to it. In this scheme, where participation emerges as aporia, the intelligible always appears as ontologically subject to the sensible, not as understood according to its own principles.

The aporia presented by participation is due to a great extent to attributing to the intelligible parameters which pertain to the sensible. *En. VI* 5.8.1-10 states: “I think that if also examine the participation of Matter in Forms, one might more easily come to accept our thesis and no longer reject it as impossible or raise difficulties about it. For I think it is both reasonable and necessary, inasmuch as the Form and Matter are not separate and apart from one another, that the illumination of Matter by the Forms does not descend upon matter from somewhere far above –if indeed this manner of speaking is not wholly devoid of sense” (trad. Emilsson and Strange).



This text alludes to the words of Aristotle in his critique of the theory of ideas in *Met.* 991a 20 where he accuses expressions such as “comes from” of being “devoid phrases and poetical metaphors” with which we attempt to explain participation.

Plotinus assumes the Aristotelian critique on this point and shares the empty, aporetic nature of participation understood within this framework. Thus, as Tornau remarks, he proposes a change of viewpoint, questioning the very meaning itself of the notions we use to refer to the intelligible. It is this change of viewpoint which could resolve the aporia of participation, making it appear as a meaningful notion.

The passage we propose to analyse here, *En.* VI 4.2.14-50, provides an exceptional example of this *modus operandi*. Plotinus takes the passage in *Parmenides* 131 a-b as the basis for developing an exegesis which claims that it is impracticable to apply concepts such as “being in”, “far” or “near” to the intelligible. These concepts pertain to the sensible and cannot be projected onto the intelligible in a literal way; in this context they would be meaningless.

The intelligible is not in the sensible as if in a place; it does not depend on the sensible. The vista which opens up is the opposite; the sensible establishes its dependence with regard to the intelligible in its own being. Plotinus questions the meaning of the substantiality of the sensible and its individuality, its being a “this” apart from the intelligible. The participation of the sensible in the intelligible is not established between two comparable terms but rather goes back to the very heart of the sensible in its formation as image of the intelligible.

This exegesis is integrated into Plotinus’ complex ontological framework, fully achieving the meaning of the dualism between the sensible and the intelligible world. This dualism, far from being emphatic, is full of nuances which bring the intelligible world closer to the sensible but not in any place-based way. That the intelligible world is not in any specific place modifies intrinsically the meaning of participation and of the relationship which the sensible establishes with the intelligible. If the intelligible is not in any place this relationship cannot be local: “But since it is neither far from near to it, that necessarily in present as a whole, if it is present at all, and it is present to each of those things that are neither far from nor near to it, those that are able to receive it” (trad. Emilsson and Strange).

In this paper we discuss Plotinus’ reading of this passage of the *Parmenides* and how he reconsiders the meaning of participation. We will see how the notion of “being in” is reconsidered within Plotinus’ metaphysical coordinates, leading to an approach with strong epistemological implications.

## Ho Hua-kuei

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### *The Absence of Perception. An Examination on Likeness in Plato's Parmenides*

The absence of perception in Plato's *Parmenides* seems evident. This is foreshadowed by the weighty roles of two Eleatic philosophers—Parmenides and Zeno—and their method of deduction in the dialogue. Zeno's book is read as the philosophical setting for this fictional dialogue. (127c-d) According to Socrates' summary, Zeno uses a contradiction that things are “both like and unlike (ὅμοιά τε ... καὶ ἀνόμοια)” to reject the assumption “things are many.” (127e2) The form of argument is what we called Reductio ad Absurdum (RAA). The validity of an RAA argument does not have to appeal to premises in which perception is involved. A feature shown by Zeno's argument as the typical Eleatic style is to apply RAA without appealing to any perceptible fact of the physical world. This feature is particularly observable in the deductions practiced by a Socrates' contemporary fellow named Aristotle, under Parmenides' leading, in Part II of the dialogue. (137c-166c) In Part I (127a-137c), although the conversation is not as abstract as Part II, before the text enters to the well-known criticisms on the theory of the forms, Socrates asks Zeno and Parmenides to show the contradictions in the forms by pure reasoning this time, not in the perceptible things (the things seen, τοῖς ὁρωμένοις). (129e-130a) The role of perception is deliberately reduced, if not entirely eliminated.

What is the effect of the absence of perception? When the characters in the *Parmenides* are to examine the relations between things and their corresponding forms, particularly when the form in issue is a form of Likeness (εἶδος τι ὁμοιότητος, 129a1), what is the effect if the discussion does not involve perception?

In Plato's writings, Likeness in *mimesis* may involve perception most. In this paper, my proposal is to compare the relation of *mimesis* with the Likeness discussed in the *Parmenides*, to see the results of Plato's experiment on the absence of perception.

The form of Likeness—if it is a form—would be the most problematic but also the most crucial form in the discussion. This is not only because Zeno's argument cited above applied the contradiction concerning Likeness, but because the things which partake of a form would be “like” that form. Socrates claims that a form works as a model, the things of the form are its “likenesses” (ὁμοιώματα, such as portraits) and their partaking of the form is to “be represented as images” (εἰκασθῆναι). (132d1-4) Then Parmenides challenges his claim on the relation between the form and “the thing being represented as an image” (τῷ εἰκασθέντι). (132d5-7) His challenge builds up the “Likeness Regress.” (132c-133a)

The wording reminds us of the Line in the *Republic*. In the analogy of the Line, the relation between belief and knowledge is the same as “the relation between the likeness and what it is a likeness of (τὸ ὁμοιωθὲν πρὸς τὸ ᾧ ὁμοιώθη).” (510a9-10) The demonstration in the Line starts from the lowest section of the images (τὰς εἰκόνας), named “image-making” (εἰκασίαν). (509e-510a; 511e) The images are, in other words, “the things represented (τοῖς ... μιμηθεῖσιν).” (510b4)

We may associate the relation of Likeness to the relation of *mimesis* (μίμησις, imitation or representation), for example, the relation between the depicted Simmias in a picture and Simmias himself. (*Phaedo* 73e) A more helpful reference may be the story of three kinds of couch in *Republic* 10. (596a-597e) Couches in pictures are like couches in the perceptible world; couches in the perceptible world in turn are like the form of couch. The Likeness between couches and the form of couch, can be understood as a relation between the representations and what they are representations of, in the case of *mimesis*.

However, Plato does not make the reference to *mimesis* in the *Parmenides*. The power of *mimesis* works on our perception, say, eyesight. (*Rep.* 602c) Since the role of perception in the *Parmenides* is deliberately reduced, does this result in the exclusion of *mimesis* as well?

Concerning Likeness, there are a few oddities in the *Parmenides*, which have been explored in different views. (E.g. Meinwald 1992, Gill & Ryan 1996, Rickless 2006 and 2016 among others.) I am wondering: if we are aware that the Likeness between things and their corresponding form is the relation of *mimesis*, will they still occur?

I will focus on four oddities below:

1. Likeness is regarded as a property. When Socrates starts to elucidate his own theory, he supposes that “Likeness” is a form, itself by itself (αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ), while “Unlikeness” is another form, its opposite. (128e6-129a2) Socrates in the dialogue regards “Likeness” (as well as “Unlikeness”) as a property rather than a relation.
2. Likeness is treated as a symmetrical relation. In the Likeness Regress (132c-133a), the Likeness of the things to their form is symmetrically equivalent to the Likeness of the form to the things. The symmetry will not stand in the relation between the representations and what they are representations of, in the case of *mimesis*.
3. All of eight deductions in Part II apply the contradictions concerning Likeness: to be both like and unlike, or to be not like nor unlike. (139e-140b, 147c-148d, 158e-159a, 159e-160a, 161a-c, 164a, 165c-d and 166b) The contradictions are inferred from the connections of Likeness to being the same and being itself/themselves, and the disconnections from being different and being another/others, except in Deductions 7 and 8. This seriously ignores the vagueness of the predicate “to be like.”
4. Deductions 7 and 8 do not ignore the vagueness of Likeness. Plato introduces the appearing-terms (φαίνεται, φαινόμενον, φάντασμα and so on) into the reasoning. Then Parmenides adopts an example of perception, someone seeing (ὁρῶντι, 165c1) from far away, in the final second page of the dialogue. This contradicts the earlier request to keep off from the perceptible things (129e-130a, 135d-e).

Plato’s applications of *mimesis* can be found not only in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*, but also in the dialogues which are usually dated later than the *Parmenides*, such as *Sophist*, *Timaeus*, *Philebus* and *Laws*. At the same time, perception is not absent in these dialogues. The exclusion of *mimesis* from the examination of the Likeness in the *Parmenides* is worth further consideration.

## *Der Ausschluss der Wahrnehmung. Eine Untersuchung zur Ähnlichkeit in Platons Parmenides*

Auf den ersten Blick erscheint Wahrnehmung aus den Untersuchungen in Platons *Parmenides* ausgeschlossen zu sein. Dieser Ausschluss kündigt sich bereits in den Dialogfiguren an, den beiden großen eleatischen Philosophen Parmenides und Zenon, die für ihre dialektische Methode bekannt sind. Zenons Schrift dient der Untersuchung als Ausgangspunkt (127 c-d). Laut Sokrates zielt Zenons Argument darauf ab, die Annahme, „dass das Seiende vieles sei“ durch den Gegenbeweis, dass es dann sowohl „ähnlich als auch unähnlich“ sein müsste (ὅμοιά τε ... καὶ ἀνόμοια)“ (127e2) *ad absurdum* zu führen. Zenons Argument kann Gültigkeit für sich beanspruchen, ohne dass seine Prämissen sich auf Gegenstände der Wahrnehmung beziehen – ganz im Einklang mit dem für die eleatische Schule typischen Argumentationsstil, nach der eine *reductio ad absurdum* nicht mit Bezug auf einen Gegenstand der physikalischen Welt durchzuführen sei. Dieses stilistische Merkmal der eleatischen Dialektik lässt sich auch in den Untersuchungen erkennen, die Aristoteles, ein Zeitgenosse des Sokrates, unter Anleitung von Parmenides im zweiten Dialogteil vornimmt. Im ersten Dialogteil (127a-137e) ist die Argumentation zwar nicht ganz so abstrakt, doch bevor die Rede auf die bekannte Kritik der Ideenlehre kommt, verlangt Sokrates von Zenon und Parmenides, diese Widersprüche nicht an „den Sinnendingen“ (τοῖς ὀρωμένοις) und in bezug auf diese, sondern bei den Ideen und zwar allein anhand der Vernunft aufzusuchen. Wahrnehmung wird so willentlich ausgeschaltet, wenn nicht gar eliminiert.

Was soll durch den Ausschluss der Wahrnehmung bewirkt werden? Angesichts dessen, dass die Dialogpartner im *Parmenides* die Beziehung zwischen den Dingen und den Ideen und insbesondere die Idee der Ähnlichkeit untersuchen (εἰδός τι ὁμοιότητος, 129a1), lässt sich fragen, welche Wirkung mit dem Ausschluss der Wahrnehmung beabsichtigt ist.

In anderen Schriften Platons wird das Problem der Ähnlichkeit mit bezug auf *Mimesis* und meist auch mit bezug auf die Wahrnehmung behandelt. Mein Beitrag möchte die Beziehung zwischen *Mimesis* und der Ähnlichkeitsbeziehung, wie sie im *Parmenides* diskutiert wird, behandeln, und aus dieser Sicht das im *Parmenides* durchgeführte Experiment, die Wahrnehmung in der Untersuchung der Ähnlichkeit auszuschließen, beurteilen.

Die Idee der Ähnlichkeit – vorausgesetzt es handelt sich hierbei um eine Idee – wird dabei am schwierigsten zu untersuchen sein. Dies liegt daran, dass nicht nur in dem oben zitierten Argument von Zenon bereits die Widersprüchlichkeit der Ähnlichkeit festgestellt wird, sondern weil die Dinge an der Idee in Art der Ähnlichkeit teilhaben. Sokrates behauptet, dass die Idee wie ein Musterbild wirke. Die Dinge sind „Ähnlichkeiten“ (ὁμοιώματα, wie „Bilder“) der Idee, und ihre Teilhabe an der Idee besteht darin, dass sie als Bilder der Idee nachgebildet sind (εἰκασθῆναι). (132d1-4) Parmenides jedoch widerspricht dieser Behauptung und zieht in Zweifel, dass eine solche Beziehung zwischen Idee und Dingen, die als Bilder der Idee nachgebildet sind, bestehe. (132d5-7) Sein Widerspruch führt zu dem bekannten infiniten Regress der Ähnlichkeit. (132c-133a)

Dieser Ausdruck erinnert an das Liniengleichnis in der *Politeia*. Demnach verhält sich die Beziehung zwischen Meinung und Erkenntnis analog zu der Beziehung zwischen dem Ähnlichen und dem, dem sie ähnlich sind (τὸ ὁμοιωθὲν πρὸς τὸ ὃ ὁμοιώθη). (510a9-10) Die Ausführung im Liniengleichnis beginnt mit dem untersten Bereich der Bilder (τὰς εἰκόνας), den Schatten und

Spiegelungen, also den „Abbildungen“ (εἰκασίαν). (509e-510a; 511e) Bilder sind mit anderen Worten „nachgeahmte Dinge“ (τοῖς ... μιμηθεῖσιν). (510b)

Theoretisch bietet es sich daher an, die Ähnlichkeitsbeziehung auch in bezug auf die *Mimesis*-Beziehung zu behandeln. So stellt sich z.B. die Frage, worin die Beziehung zwischen Abbild und Urbild besteht. Dieses Beispiel wird im *Phaidon* besprochen, in dem die Beziehung zwischen Simmias' Bild und Simmias selbst behandelt wird. (73e) Auch die Ausführungen zu den drei Arten einer Liege in der *Mimesis*-Passage im 10. Buch der *Politeia* lassen sich in diesem Zusammenhang anführen. (596a-597e) Eine Liege in der Wahrnehmungswelt ist der Idee der Liege ähnlich. Die Ähnlichkeit zwischen Liegen und der Idee der Liege kann als eine Ähnlichkeitsbeziehung, also dem Ähnlichen und dem, dem es ähnlich ist, verstanden und in Hinsicht auf die *Mimesis* betrachtet werden.

Im *Parmenides*-Dialog bezieht sich Platon jedoch offenbar nicht auf die *Mimesis*. Liegt dies nun daran, dass *Mimesis* auf Wahrnehmung, z.B. Sichtwahrnehmung, einwirkt (*Politeia* 602c), aber eben gerade diese im *Parmenides* bewusst ausgelassen wird?

Was Ähnlichkeit an sich betrifft, gibt es einige Widersprüchlichkeiten im *Parmenides*, die unterschiedlich behandelt wurden (u.a. von Meinwald 1992, Gill & Ryan 1996, Rickless 2006 und 2016). Geht man nun auf die *Mimesis*-Problematik zurück, stellt sich die Frage: Wie stellen sich diese Widersprüchlichkeiten dar, wenn wir uns die Ähnlichkeitsbeziehung zwischen Dingen und ihrer entsprechenden Ideen in der Form der *Mimesis*-Beziehung vorstellen? Der vorliegende Beitrag widmet sich dabei vorwiegend folgenden Punkten:

1. Ähnlichkeit wird als eine Eigenschaft behandelt. Wenn Sokrates beginnt, seine eigene Theorie auszuführen, geht er davon aus, dass „Ähnlichkeit“ eine Idee ist, die „selbst für sich selbst“ besteht (αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ), während „Unähnlichkeit“, ihr Gegenteil, eine andere Idee ist. (128e6-129a2) Sokrates betrachtet in diesem Dialog „Ähnlichkeit“ und „Unähnlichkeit“ eher als Eigenschaften und weniger als eine Beziehung.
2. Ähnlichkeit wird aber auch als eine symmetrische Beziehung behandelt. So entspricht in dem Argument des infiniten Regresses der Ähnlichkeit (132c-133a) die Ähnlichkeit von Dingen zu ihrer Idee der Ähnlichkeit von der Idee zu den Dingen. Eine solche symmetrische Beziehung lässt sich jedoch im Fall der *Mimesis* nicht auf die Beziehung zwischen Nachahmungen und Nachgeahmtem übertragen.
3. Der zweite Dialogteil besteht aus acht Untersuchungen, die alle die Widersprüchlichkeit der Ähnlichkeit ansprechen: gleichzeitig ähnlich und unähnlich sein, oder weder ähnlich noch unähnlich zu sein. (139e-140b, 147c-148d, 158e-159a, 159e-160a, 161a-c, 164a, 165c-d und 166b) Die Widersprüche ergeben sich daraus, dass, mit Ausnahme in der siebten und achten Untersuchung, Ähnlichkeit mit Gleichsein und Selbstsein, aber nicht mit Anderssein oder Etwas-anderes-Sein verbunden wird. Die Undeutlichkeit des Prädikats „ähnlich sein“ wird dabei missachtet.
4. Die der Ähnlichkeit eigenen „Undeutlichkeit“ ist dagegen Gegenstand in der siebten und achten Untersuchung, in denen dann Ausdrücke des Erscheinens eingeführt werden (φαίνεται, φαινόμενον, φάντασμα etc.). So ist nicht zu vermeiden, dass Platon zur Unterstützung der Untersuchungen auch ein Beispiel aus der Wahrnehmungswelt einführt: jemand sieht etwas aus der Ferne (ὄρωντι, 165c1). Dies widerspricht gewissermaßen dem Verdikt am Eingang des Dialogs, dass Wahrnehmung auszuschließen sei.

Wahrnehmung und *Mimesis* werden nicht nur in den sogenannten mittleren Dialogen *Phaidon* und *Politeia*, sondern auch in den Dialogen *Sophistes*, *Timaios* und *Philebos* sowie in den

*Nomoi* behandelt, die allgemein einem späteren Stadium als *Parmenides* zugerechnet werden. Dass in den Untersuchungen zur Ähnlichkeit im *Parmenides* Wahrnehmung und *Mimesis* weitgehend ausgeschlossen werden, ist es wert, eingehender betrachtet zu werden.

### *Nonbeing and the Final Four Hypotheses in Plato's Parmenides*

How much is the Platonic Parmenides based on the historical thinker himself? While the question is obviously riddled with difficulties, one must nevertheless attempt an answer since Plato presents his philosophy as the true heir to Parmenides' thought. It is of some interest to inquire into how Plato portrays Parmenides so that the nature of his disagreements with the latter can be more precisely located. This paper is a partial attempt to tackle this issue with respect to the question of nonbeing.

Parmenides' poem prohibits one from thinking nonbeing by the following reasoning. Since thinking is always thinking something, and something is something that is, then nonbeing cannot be thought (DK 28B3, B6, B7). By contrast, the Platonic Parmenides outlines a program of mental gymnastics or dialectical exercise (*Parm.* 135c8-9), which proceeds by first positing the being of a chosen Form, drawing out inferences from this, and in turn, also positing its *nonbeing* and asking what follows from this (135e8-136c5). It seems as if while the historical Parmenides forbids one from thinking about nonbeing, Plato's Parmenides allows or even urges one to think about it. Is Plato exercising poetic license in putting these words into Parmenides' mouth? Or did he interpret Parmenides' prohibition differently than is usually understood? In this paper I shall argue that, contrary to appearances, at least the final four hypotheses (160b5-166c5), all of which investigate the consequences of "if (the) One is not," constitute an elaborate version of the same prohibition made by Parmenides in the relevant fragments.

I shall first critique a prevalent approach to the gymnastics section of the *Parmenides*. It is commonly noted that the eight hypotheses (the section on τὸ ἐξάϊφνης can be counted as an appendix to the first two) are arranged into four pairs, where each pair presents contradictory results of the same subject under consideration. According to this common approach, the reader's task is to work out how these results are only apparent by discovering the qualifications that would make them compatible. While vastly different readings can be generated by such an approach, such readings suffer when this approach is applied to the third pair. That pair investigates the consequences for the One if the One is not. But the contradictory attributes of the One are not all neatly divided by each member of the pair. One expects, for example, that since one leg of the pair argues that the One neither comes to be nor perishes (163d1-8), the other leg would argue that it both comes to be and perishes. Instead it argues that not only does the One both come to be and perish, but also, it neither comes to be nor perishes as well (163a7-b5). In other words, the apparent contradiction does not occur between members of a pair, but even *within* a member. Such an approach thus appears unable to account for this passage.

This motivates a new reading of the final four hypotheses. In the next section, I shall begin by arguing that despite the phrase ἐξ ἀρχῆς or πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν, "from the beginning" or "back to the beginning," each hypothesis does not proceed completely anew. Instead, each goes "back to the beginning" *with previous results kept in mind*. Otherwise put, the sequence of the final four hypotheses is not accidental. Strictly speaking, the talk of "four" hypotheses is misleading: the four "repetitions" constitute a single examination of what follows "if the One is not."

My interpretation of the drift of Parmenides' arguments is guided by this assumption. So, the meaning of "if the One is not" is first analyzed into two components in the fifth and sixth hypothesis. The fifth examines the subject, *the One itself* that is posited to not-be, while the sixth examines the predicate, the *nonbeing* of the One thus posited. What Parmenides does is first to argue that the One must itself partake in knowledge and difference-in-kind. This point of departure allows him to infer that the One must have many characteristics—but most significantly, it must have *being* in order to not be. This is argued for by asserting a close connection between discoursing (λέγω), discoursing truly (λέγω ἀληθῆ), and discoursing about things that are (λέγω τὰ ὄντα) (161e4-162a3). This is, I shall suggest, a Platonic elaboration of the Parmenidean principle "to think is to think something that is." The point of departure for the final four hypotheses, then, is still the One as initially something that is, and does not violate the prohibition against nonbeing.

Nonbeing only enters the scene when Parmenides moves from the fifth hypothesis to the sixth. The One by itself has all the characteristics established in the former; in the latter, the question is what characteristics will be left for it once it is qualified as something that is not. Special attention will be devoted to 163c3-7, which explicitly articulates nonbeing as simple, straightforward *absence* of being (οὐσίας ἀπουσία)—an absence that eventually results in the utter unintelligibility of the One that is not. The concluding lines of this hypothesis, as before, formulate Parmenides' prohibition in typically Platonic fashion (164a7-b3).

The one now cannot be the object of knowledge, perception, or discursive treatment, and the final two hypotheses develop this result further. By contrasting my reading with the approach of "resolving apparent contradictions," critiqued above, I shall suggest that these two hypotheses tacitly revisit Zeno's speech, whose hypothesis is "if many are." Back then, Socrates pointed out how the contradictions drawn by Zeno from this are solved by positing Forms (127d6-130a2); Parmenides here shows how those contradictions stand when the One is not posited. The seventh hypothesis contains a positive and a negative element. Positively, it establishes the *independence* of phenomenality from the One (and indirectly from Forms in general), because it argues that, even when one posits the nonbeing of the One, sensible things do not therefore stop *appearing* to be one and many, odd and even, limited and unlimited, and so on. But in conjunction with the concluding hypothesis, it negatively shows that such independence breaks down because without the *being* of the One (indirectly, without stable Forms), one cannot distinguish between reliable and spurious appearance. The nonbeing of the One understood as its absence or withdrawal therefore leads to the unintelligibility of the many. The final pair, as I shall argue, thus marks a genuine contradiction: the many both appear as *x* and cannot even appear as *x*. In this way, the final four hypotheses together constitute a *reductio* honoring Zeno's comradely support of the One.

In the conclusion, I shall briefly summarize how this reading shows Plato's Parmenides as committed to the prohibition against nonbeing, and suggest how this may help us understand better the relation of the *Sophist* to the *Parmenides*: the deliberately limited horizon of the *Parmenides* is only forced open by the question of the sophist, who cannot be distinguished from the philosopher without the discovery of discursive nonbeing as Difference.

### *Nichtsein und die letzten vier Hypothesen in Platons Parmenides*

Wie sehr basiert der platonische Parmenides auf dem historischen Denker selbst? Während keine einfache Antwort auf diese Frage gefunden werden kann, so muss man dennoch versuchen



eine Antwort zu geben, da Platon seine Philosophie als das wahre Erbe des Parmenideschen Denkens darstellt. Es ist von Interesse, zu untersuchen, wie Platon Parmenides darstellt, damit die Art seiner Meinungsverschiedenheiten mit letzterem genauer bestimmt werden können. Dieser Aufsatz ist ein Versuch, dieses Problem der Meinungsverschiedenheiten in Bezug auf die Frage des Nicht-Seins anzugehen und aufzugreifen.

Die folgenden Überbelegungen aus Parmenides' Gedicht verbieten es einem das Nicht-Sein zu denken. Da das Denken immer etwas denkt und das Etwas ein Seiendes ist, kann das Nicht-Sein nicht gedacht werden (*DK* 28B3, B6, B7). Demgegenüber skizziert der platonische Parmenides ein Programm von »Gymnastik« oder dialektischer Übung (*Parm.* 135c8-9), das zunächst das Sein einer Idee postuliert, daraus Schlüsse zieht, und im Gegenzug das *Nicht-Sein* derselben postuliert und untersucht, welche Schlüsse daraus folgen (135e8-136c5). Es scheint, dass, während der historische Parmenides es verbietet, über das Nicht-Sein nachzudenken, Platons Parmenides es erlaubt, gar darauf drängt. Benutzte Platon die poetische Freiheit, Parmenides diese Worte in den Mund zu legen? Oder interpretierte er das Verbot von Parmenides anders als allgemein angenommen? In diesem Vortrag werde ich, entgegen allem Anschein, argumentieren, dass uns zumindest die letzten vier Hypothesen (160b5–166c5), die alle die Konsequenzen von »wenn Eines (oder das Eine) nicht ist« untersuchen, eine ausführliche und sorgfältig ausgearbeitete Version des von Parmenides ursprünglich formulierten Verbotes präsentieren.

Ich werde zunächst eine vorherrschende Herangehensweise an den Gymnastikabschnitt des *Parmenides* kritisieren. Es ist allgemein bekannt, dass die acht Hypothesen (der Abschnitt über τὸ ἐξ αἰφνης kann als Anhang zu den ersten beiden gezählt werden) in vier Paare unterteilt sind, und jedes Paar widersprüchliche Ergebnisse desselben Subjekts generiert. Gemäß der verbreiteten Herangehensweise besteht die Aufgabe des Lesers darin, herauszufinden, wie die Ergebnisse nur dann zum Vorschein kommen können, wenn die Voraussetzungen entdeckt werden, die sie kompatibel machen. Während durch diese Herangehensweise sehr unterschiedliche Ausdeutungen und Interpretationen erzeugt werden können, reicht sie für das dritte Paar nicht aus. Dieses Paar untersucht, was mit dem Einen passiert, wenn es nicht ist. Aber die widersprüchlichen Attribute des Einen werden nicht von jedem Teil des Paares sauber getrennt. Man erwartet zum Beispiel, dass, da eine Teil des Paares beweist, dass das Eine weder entsteht noch vergeht (163d1–8), das andere Teil beweisen würde, dass das Eine sowohl entsteht als auch vergeht. Stattdessen beweist es nicht nur, dass das Eine entsteht und vergeht, aber auch dass das Eine weder entsteht, noch vergeht (163a7–b5). Mit anderen Worten, der scheinbare Widerspruch tritt nicht zwischen Teilen eines Paares auf, sondern sogar *innerhalb* eines Teils. Ein solcher Ansatz scheint daher nicht in der Lage zu sein, diese Passage zu erklären.

Dies motiviert eine neue interpretative Herangehensweise mit Bezug auf die letzten vier Hypothesen. Im nächsten Abschnitt werde ich zunächst argumentieren, dass trotz der Formel ἐξ ἀρχῆς oder πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν, »von Anfang an« oder »zurück zum Anfang«, jede Hypothese nicht völlig neu verläuft. Stattdessen geht jede Hypothese "zurück zum Anfang," während es frühere Ergebnisse im Hinterkopf behält. Anders gesagt, die Reihenfolge der letzten vier Hypothesen ist nicht zufällig. Streng genommen ist die Rede von »vier« Hypothesen irreführend: Die vier »Wiederholungen« bilden eine einzige Untersuchung dessen, was folgt, »wenn das Eine nicht ist«.

Meine Interpretation der Derivationen in Parmenides' Argumenten folgt dieser Annahme. Die Bedeutung von »wenn das Eine nicht ist« wird zunächst in der fünften und sechsten Hypothese in zwei Komponenten analysiert. Die fünfte Hypothese untersucht das

Subjekt, das Eine *selbst*, das als Nicht-Sein postuliert wird, während das sechste das Prädikat, das *Nicht-Sein* des so gesetzten Einen, untersucht. Was Parmenides zunächst tut, ist den Beweis anzustellen, dass das Eine selbst an Wissenschaft und Gattungsunterschieden teilhaben muss. Dieser Ausgangspunkt erlaubt ihm zu folgern, dass das Eine viele Eigenschaften haben muss – aber vor allem muss es die Eigenschaft »zu sein« haben, um nicht zu sein. Dies wird bewiesen, indem behauptet wird es gäbe eine enge Verbindung zwischen dem Reden ( $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega$ ), dem wahren Reden ( $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega \acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\theta\eta$ ) und dem Reden über Seiende ( $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega \tau\grave{\alpha} \delta\upsilon\tau\alpha$ ) (161e4–162a3). Dies ist, wie ich vorschlagen werde, eine platonische Ausarbeitung des parmenidischen Prinzips »zu denken ist etwas zu denken, was ist«. Der Ausgangspunkt für die letzten vier Hypothesen ist dann immer noch das Eine als zunächst etwas, was ist und nicht gegen das Verbot des Nicht-Seins verstößt.

Das Nicht-Sein tritt erst dann in Erscheinung, wenn Parmenides von der fünften zur sechsten Hypothese übergeht. Das Eine hat alle Eigenschaften, die in ersterer, der fünften Hypothese, begründet sind; in letzterer stellt sich die Frage, welche Merkmale für es übrigbleiben werden, wenn es erst einmal als Nicht-sein relativiert wurde. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit wird der Textstelle *Parm.* 163c3–7 gewidmet, die das Nicht-sein explizit als einfache, direkte Abwesenheit des Seins ( $\sigma\upsilon\sigma\iota\alpha\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\alpha$ ) artikuliert – eine Abwesenheit, die schließlich zur völligen Unverständlichkeit des Einen führt, das nicht ist. Die abschließenden Zeilen dieser Hypothese formulieren das Verbot von Parmenides nach wie vor in typisch platonischer Weise (164a7-b3).

Das Eine kann jetzt nicht Gegenstand von Wissen, Wahrnehmung oder Reden sein, und die letzten beiden Hypothesen entwickeln diese Tatsache weiter. Indem ich meine Interpretation mit dem Ansatz der »Auflösung scheinbarer Widersprüche« kontrastiere, werde ich vorschlagen, dass diese beiden Hypothesen stillschweigend Zenons Rede wiederholen. Sokrates wies darauf hin, wie die von Zenon gezogenen Widersprüche, die aus der Hypothese »wenn Viele sind« folgen, durch Setzen von Ideen gelöst werden kann (127d6-130a2); Parmenides zeigt hier, wie sich diese Widersprüche halten, wenn das Eine nicht postuliert ist. Die siebte Hypothese enthält ein positives und ein negatives Element. Positiv ist, dass es die Unabhängigkeit der Phänomenalität vom Einen (und indirekt von den Ideen im Allgemeinen) begründet, weil es zeigt, dass, selbst wenn man das Nicht-sein des Einen postuliert, die wahrnehmbaren Dinge nicht aufhören als eins und viele, ungerade und gerade, begrenzt und unbegrenzt und so weiter zu erscheinen. Aber in Verbindung mit der abschließenden Hypothese zeigt sich negativ, dass diese Unabhängigkeit in sich zusammenbricht, denn ohne das Sein des Einen (und indirekt, ohne stabile Ideen) kann man nicht zwischen zuverlässiger und falscher Erscheinung unterscheiden. Das Nichtsein des Einen, verstanden als Abwesenheit oder Absonderung des Einen, führt daher zur Unverständlichkeit oder Unfassbarkeit des Vielen. Das letzte Paar stellt also, wie ich darlegen werde, einen echten Widerspruch dar: das Viele erscheint sowohl als  $x$  und kann doch nicht als  $x$  erscheinen. Auf diese Weise bilden die letzten vier Hypothesen zusammen eine *Reductio ad absurdum*, die Zenons freundliche Unterstützung des Einen (128a4-b6) würdigt.

Abschließend möchte ich kurz zusammenfassen, wie diese Auslegung zeigt, dass der platonische Parmenides dem Verbot des Nicht-seins gehorcht. Dann werde ich vorschlagen, wie dies uns helfen kann, das Verhältnis des *Sophistes* zu dem *Parmenides* besser zu verstehen: nämlich, dass der bewusst begrenzte Horizont des *Parmenides* wird nur durch die Frage nach dem Wesen des Sophisten durchbrochen und geöffnet, der sich ohne die Entdeckung des diskursiven Nichtseins als der Idee »Differenz« vom Philosophen nicht unterscheiden läßt.

### *L'être et le temps dans le Parménide de Platon*

L'exercice de la deuxième partie du *Parménide* de Platon contient plusieurs arguments concernant les déterminations temporelles et le temps. L'un, selon les huit hypothèses à examiner (pour le programme de l'examen cf. 136 a et 137 b), est-il « plus vieux » ou « plus jeune » ou « du même âge » (140 e-141 a ; 151 e) ? Est-il « dans le temps » (141 a) ? « Participe-t-il du temps » (151 e) ? Ces arguments sont liés à ceux concernant l'être. L'un « participe-t-il de l'être », « est-il » du tout (141 e ; 151 e) ? C'est sur ce sujet que se terminent les développements de la première déduction (140 e-149 a) et c'est à ces questions qu'est consacrée la section finale deux fois prolongée de la deuxième déduction (151 e-157 b). Si la troisième, la quatrième, la septième et la huitième déduction ne reviennent pas d'une manière explicite sur ces questions, la cinquième et la sixième reprennent le thème de la participation à l'être (161 e ; 163 c), inauguré dès la première déduction, ainsi que celui du passage atemporel du non-être à l'être et de l'être au non-être (162 b-163 b ; 163 b-164 b), auquel aboutirent, dans la deuxième déduction, les arguments portant sur les aspects temporels de l'un (155 e-157 b). Qu'apprend-on de tous ces arguments sur l'être et le temps ? Et quelle lumière jettent-ils sur l'ensemble de l'« exercice » (135 c) que le vieux Parménide propose, en guise d'un « jeu laborieux » (137 b), au jeune Socrate ?

Chose surprenante pour le lecteur du *Timée* (37 c-38 b), le *Parménide* assume que l'être comporte des caractères temporels du passé, du présent et du futur de sorte que ne peut participer de l'être que ce qui participe de l'un de ses trois aspects temporels (141 e). C'est pourquoi les arguments concernant les attributs temporels tels que « plus jeune », « plus vieux » et « du même âge » sont intimement liés à ceux qui portent sur l'être. En effet, le rapport entre l'être et le temps que présuppose le *Parménide* platonicien rappelle plutôt la théorie du *Sein und Zeit* de Heidegger que celle du *Timée* de Platon : c'est à partir du temps avec ses trois « ek-stases » que l'on explique ce que cela veut dire « être ». N'« est » que ce qui est temporel. L'un de la première déduction qui ne comporte pas de caractéristiques temporelles n'est pas dans le temps (141 a-d) et ne participe donc pas de l'être (141 d-e). En revanche, l'un de la deuxième déduction, du fait qu'il participe de l'être, participe aussi du temps (151 e-152 a). Il peut donc être dit plus jeune, plus vieux ou du même âge soit par rapport à lui-même soit par rapport à autre chose, mais on peut également nier de lui les trois caractéristiques sous les deux points de vue (152 a-153 e). Si cet argument est élaboré d'abord pour « être et devenir » plus jeune, plus vieux ou du même âge (*ibid.*), il se montre dans un second temps que le « devenir » temporel est à distinguer de l'« être » temporel (154 a-155e). En plus, étant donné que l'un de la seconde déduction admet tour à tour des attributs contradictoires, on conclut dans un troisième temps (155 e) que le changement d'une telle détermination à l'autre a lieu dans un instant qui ne se situe dans aucun temps et que, partant, l'un qui change ainsi ne se situe dans aucun temps non plus (155 e-157 b). Parménide présente donc une analyse de la temporalité de « l'un qui est » à trois niveaux, en procédant de son être temporel à son devenir temporel et aux conditions de son mutabilité. L'argumentation qui commence par poser l'un comme participant du temps (151 e) aboutit à le situer en dehors du temps (156 e) en y ajoutant ainsi encore une caractéristique contradictoire.

La comparaison avec le passage du *Timée* qui définit le temps par opposition à l'éternité (37 d) en s'appuyant sur la distinction entre l'être toujours identique qui ne comporte pas de caractéristiques temporelles et le devenir qui constitue des mouvements aux paramètres temporels (38 a-b) fait ressortir la différence entre les présupposés du Locrien et ceux de l'Éléate. Ce dernier ne fait pas de distinction entre l'être et le devenir, telle que l'astronome du *Timée* la conçoit depuis le début de son exposé (27 d), mais il travaille avec un concept de l'être aux aspects temporels en distinguant entre les processus temporels et leurs résultats et en excluant ce qui ne comporte pas de tels aspects du domaine de l'être. En revanche, la théorie des Formes que le jeune Socrate oppose aux arguments de Zénon au début du *Parménide* (128 e-130 a) implique la même conception de l'être que celle avec laquelle travaille Timée. Si le Parménide platonicien lui-même souligne la nécessité de la théorie des Formes pour la dialectique, c'est révélateur de la nature de l'exercice qu'il recommande à Socrate de pratiquer avant que celui-ci ne se prenne à définir les Formes (135 b-c).

### *Sein und Zeit in Platons Parmenides*

Die Übung des zweiten Teils von Platons *Parmenides* beinhaltet mehrere auf die zeitlichen Bestimmungen und die Zeit bezogene Argumente. Ist das Eine, entsprechend den acht durchzuführenden Deduktionen (zum Programm der Übung siehe 136a und 137b), „älter“ oder „jünger“ oder „gleichen Alters“ (140e-141a; 151e)? Ist es „in der Zeit“ (141a)? „Nimmt es an der Zeit teil“ (151e)? Diese Argumente hängen mit denen zusammen, die das Sein betreffen. „Nimmt das Eine am Sein teil“, „ist es“ überhaupt (141e; 151e)? Diesen Fragen sind die abschließenden Ausführungen der ersten Deduktion gewidmet (140e-149a), und dieselben Themen werden in dem letzten, zweimal verlängerten Abschnitt der zweiten Deduktion behandelt (151e-157b). Nehmen die dritte, vierte, siebte und achte Deduktion diese Fragen nicht ausdrücklich wieder auf, gehen die fünfte und die sechste Deduktion auf das in der ersten Deduktion eingeführte Thema der Teilhabe am Sein (161e; 163c) sowie an das Thema des zeitlosen Umschlags vom Sein zum Nicht-Sein und umgekehrt (162b-163b; 163b-164b) wieder ein, in das die Überlegungen zu den zeitlichen Charakteristika des Einen innerhalb der zweiten Deduktion einmündeten (155e-157b). Was lernt man aus all diesen Argumenten? Und welches Licht werfen sie auf die ganze „Übung“ (135c), die der alte Parmenides dem jungen Sokrates als ein „mühsames Spiel“ (137b) empfiehlt?

Zur Überraschung für den Leser von Platons *Timaios* (37c-38b) geht Platons Parmenides davon aus, dass das Sein durch zeitliche Merkmale der Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft gekennzeichnet ist, sodass nur das am Sein teilhaben kann, was an einer der drei zeitlichen Bestimmungen teilhat (141e). Dies ist der Grund, warum die Argumente, die zeitlichen Attribute „jünger“, „älter“ und „gleichen Alters“ behandeln, aufs Engste mit denen zusammenhängen, die das Sein betreffen. In der Tat erinnert das Verhältnis von Sein und Zeit, das Platons Parmenides voraussetzt, vielmehr an die Auffassung Heideggers im *Sein und Zeit* als an die Theorie des Timaios: Das *explanans* des Seins ist die Zeit mit ihren drei „Ek-stasen“. „Ist“ nur, was zeitlich ist. Das Eine der ersten Deduktion, das keine zeitlichen Bestimmungen zulässt, ist nicht in der Zeit (141a-d) und nimmt nicht am Sein teil (141d-e). Das Eine der zweiten Deduktion hingegen hat an der Zeit teil, weil es am Sein teilhat (151e-152a). Es kann von ihm daher gesagt werden, dass es jünger, älter oder des gleichen Alters ist in Bezug auf sich selbst oder in Bezug auf Anderes; es können von ihm aber auch alle drei Bestimmungen in beiden Hinsichten verneint werden (152a-153e). Ist dieses Argument zunächst für „Sein und Werden“ herausgearbeitet (ebd.), so zeigt sich in einem zweiten Anlauf, dass das zeitliche Sein vom zeitlichen Werden zu unterscheiden ist (154a-

155e). Da es sich ergibt, dass das Eine der zweiten Deduktion abwechselnd kontradiktorische Bestimmungen zulässt, wird in einem dritten Anlauf (155e) darüber hinaus gefolgert, dass das Umschlagen zwischen solchen Bestimmungen nicht in der Zeit stattfindet, und dass folglich auch das Eine, welches derart umschlägt, nicht in der Zeit ist (155e-157b). Parmenides bietet also in der zweiten Deduktion eine dreistufige Analyse der Zeitlichkeit des „seienden Einen“, indem er von seinem zeitlichen Sein zuerst zu seinem zeitlichen Werden und dann zu den Bedingungen seiner Wandelbarkeit übergeht. Die Beweisführung, die damit beginnt, dass das Eine als an der Zeit teilhabend gesetzt wird (151e), endet damit, dass es aus der Zeit herausgenommen wird (165e). Dadurch wird dem Einen der zweiten Deduktion eine weitere kontradiktorische Bestimmung zugeschrieben.

Der Vergleich mit dem Timaios ist lehrreich. Dort wird die Zeit in Gegenüberstellung zur Ewigkeit definiert (37d), wobei zwischen dem immer identischen Sein, dem keine zeitlichen Attribute zukommen, und dem Werden, das in zeitbehafteten Bewegungen besteht, unterschieden wird (38a-b). Solche Unterscheidung zwischen Sein und Werden, wie sie Timaios gleich zu Anfang seiner Darlegung vornimmt (27d), macht Platons Parmenides nicht. Stattdessen arbeitet er mit einem Seinsbegriff, zu dem zeitliche Bestimmungen gehören. Der Unterschied zwischen Werden und Sein ist für ihn ein Unterschied zwischen zeitlichem Prozess und seinem zeitlichen Resultat, während das, was keine zeitlichen Merkmale aufweist, aus dem Bereich des Seins ausgeschlossen wird. Aber impliziert die Theorie der Ideen, mit der der junge Sokrates am Anfang des Dialogs den Argumenten des Zenon standhält (128e-130a), nicht dieselbe Auffassung von Sein, mit der Timaios arbeitet? Wenn Platons Parmenides bekräftigt, dass Sokrates' Theorie der Ideen für die Möglichkeit der Dialektik unabdingbar ist, weist er dadurch die Übung, die er Sokrates als Propädeutik zur Philosophie empfiehlt, nicht aus dem eigentlichen Bereich der letzteren aus?

### *The second part of Plato's Parmenides and Dianoia*

The second part of Plato's *Parmenides* is still controversial in the interpretation. Halfwassen points out, however, that the interpretation of the second part of *Parmenides*, despite the variety of interpretation, falls within the category of metaphysical and logical interpretations, as Proclus summarized. The metaphysical interpretation is distinguished according to what the "one" of the first hypothesis and of the second hypothesis means, and the logical interpretation is also distinguished according to whether it is a simple logical exercise unrelated to metaphysics or a pedagogical practice for better metaphysics. But if we interpret the second part of *Parmenides* in the dichotomy of logic or metaphysics, we would fall into the difficulty of interpretation, for Plato shows both of logic and metaphysics in the second part of *Parmenides*. Therefore, in the second part of *Parmenides*, we need not ask if it is logic or metaphysics, but examine how logic and metaphysics are unified or reconciled in it.

Plato examines <the one itself> in the first hypothesis and <the being one> in the second hypothesis. And this distinction of investigation leads to different interpretations of many scholars. Meinwald interprets this distinction as <the self-relation> and <the relation with others>, and Conford interprets it as <the being of Parmenides> and <the being of Plato>. These interpretations, therefore, examine the one of the first hypothesis and the one of the second hypothesis in a contextual separation. But this separation causes the difficulty of interpreting the second part as a whole.

On the other hand, Proclus identifies the one of the first hypothesis as the idea of the good of *Politeia*, and identifies the one of the second hypothesis as many ideas. And he suggests that many ideas are derived from the absolute One, the idea of the good. He therefore grasps the first hypothesis and the second hypothesis in a connection, not in a separation. But the clue of his connection is outside the text. Plato does not specify the idea of the good of *Politeia* anywhere in *Parmenides*. Not only that, but also Plato does not say in the second hypothesis that the many can come out of 'the one itself', but that it can come out of 'the being one'.

So are the two hypotheses separated in the content as the above interpretations? Plato shows that even though "the being one" in the second hypothesis can not be separated into "being" and "one" (142b5-7; 143a4-5; 142d9-143a3), it can be separated only through our thinking ( $\tau\eta$   $\delta\iota\alpha\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$ ) into "being" and "one" (143a4-9; 143b1-144c2), and each separated (the being, the one) goes again to the inseparability, i.e. "a being something", since even every one that has been separated through our thinking is a being (144c8-144e7). And this dialectical transformation is presented as the core reason for the being one to accept many determinations. In the end, the text of the second hypothesis clearly indicates that <one itself>, <being itself> and <dianoia> are the bases for the one to transform to the many.

Thus we can see a relation between <the being one> and <the one itself> in the second hypothesis. Of course, the investigation of the first hypothesis reveals the self-relation of the one and the investigation of the second hypothesis shows the relation with others of the one, as Meinwald claims. The main argument of the second Hypothesis, however, is that the relatedness with others of the one must depend on the one itself. In other words, the roots that the one of the

second hypothesis can take all determinations in itself is the one of the first hypothesis, i.e. <one itself> with <being itself> and <dianoia>. <The one itself> of the first hypothesis is therefore a necessary condition for the being one of the second hypothesis to accept all determinations.

What does the opposite result of the first hypothesis and of the second hypothesis mean? The being one of the second hypothesis can transform to <the many> due to separation and combination by Dianoia. On the other hand, the one itself of the first hypothesis denies the others or the relatedness with the others, denying the possibility of thinking about <one itself>, the words for that, and even the very existence of oneself. But can we deny that the one itself is explored in the first hypothesis, that is, that it is thought and mentioned? This irrationality is possible, even if the object under investigation is not <One>. Anything “itself” is beyond the limit of our thinking and can not be defined by our thinking. However, in spite of this absurdity, Plato suggests in the second Hypothesis that <One itself> and <Being itself> are the necessary conditions for the being one to evolve into the many. In other words, he gives <Something itself> as justification that the being one can have many determinations, though it can not be defined by our thinking and can not exist. How does Plato explain this contradiction that the non-existence or the non-determination is suggested as a reason of the many?

He explains the contradiction in two ways in *Parmenides*. First, he distinguishes between <the idea itself> and <the idea set by dianoia> explicitly or consciously in the second part of *Parmenides*. Contrary to the interpretation of Owen or Rickless, this distinction can explain how Plato can represent combination of Forms (symplokē eidōn) in the later dialogues without abandoning the idea as a metaphysical or epistemological basis.

The second attempt to explain the contradiction is a discussion of the moment (τὸ ἐξαιφνης) in 155e4-157b5. The moment is neither a movement nor a rest, and it does not exist because it is not in time. But it is presented as the basis for everything that changes in time. Thus Beierwaltes interprets the moment as the immanent basis of all beings which experience change. However, the text describes the moment as a transcendent of time and change. And this is similar to the one of the first hypothesis, for the One itself does not exist in time like <moment> and serves as the basis for <one> to change into <many>. Thus, the contradictory conclusion of the first hypothesis is the irrationality that arises from the fact that the One itself is the cause of all changes in time, even though it exists as something transcendent of time (in fact, it can not be spoken as “exist”). And we can see in the second part of *Parmenides* that this contradiction is caused by the limitations of our dianoia for something itself or a transcendent of time.

As explained above, the enlightenment of the second part of *Parmenides* is that a truth of all beings or a something “itself” as a metaphysical ground can not be grasped in and of itself and that it can have its content only if it passes into „a being set by our dianoia”. Therefore, it should be said that the aporias of the first part of *Parmenides* is not solved by the second part, but is justified. That is, the arguments of the second part of *Parmenides* prove that the aporias of the idea revealed in the first part arise inevitably when our thinking tries to grasp the metaphysical ground in and of itself.

### *Der zweite Teil des Parmenides Platons und Dianoia*

Die Interpretation des zweiten Teils des *Parmenides* ist noch umstritten in der Untersuchung der Philosophie Platons. Halfwassen weist jedoch darauf hin, dass die Interpretation des zweiten Teils des *Parmenides* trotz der Vielfalt der Interpretation innerhalb der Kategorie

metaphysischer und logischer Interpretationen liegt, wie Proklos zusammengefasst hat. Die metaphysische Interpretation wird unterschieden nach dem, was das „Eine“ von Hypothese 1 und 2 bedeutet, und die logische Interpretation wird auch danach unterschieden, ob es sich um eine einfache logische Übung ohne Bezug zur Metaphysik oder um eine pädagogische Praxis für bessere Metaphysik handelt. Aber wenn wir den zweiten Teil des *Parmenides* in der Dichotomie von Logik oder Metaphysik interpretieren, würden wir schließlich in die Schwierigkeit der Interpretation geraten, denn Platon zeigt die beiden Logik und Metaphysik in dem zweiten Teil des *Parmenides* vor. Daher müssen wir bei dem zweiten Teil des *Parmenides* nicht fragen, ob es Logik oder Metaphysik ist, sondern untersuchen, wie Logik und Metaphysik darin vereint oder versöhnt werden.

Platon untersucht <das Eine selbst> in der ersten Hypothese und <das seiende Eine> in der zweiten Hypothese. Und diese Unterscheidung der Untersuchung führt zu verschiedenen Interpretationen vieler Forscher. Meinwald interpretiert diese Unterscheidung als <Selbst-Beziehung> und als <Beziehung mit Anderem>, und Conford interpretiert sie als Eins des Parmenides und als Eins des Platon. Diese Interpretationen untersuchen deshalb das Eine selbst der ersten Hypothese und das seiende Eine der zweiten Hypothese in einer kontextuellen Trennung. Diese Trennung verursacht aber die Schwierigkeit, den zweiten Teil als Ganzes zu interpretieren.

Andererseits identifiziert Proklos das Eine selbst der ersten Hypothese als Idee des Guten der *Politeia* und identifiziert das seiende Eine der zweiten Hypothese als viele Ideen. Und er deutet, dass die vielen Ideen von einem absoluten Einen, d.h. der Idee des Guten, abgeleitet sind. Er ergreift deshalb die erste Hypothese und die zweite Hypothese in einer Verbindung, nicht in einer kontextuellen Trennung. Aber der Anhalt seiner Verbindung ist außerhalb des Textes. Platon gibt nirgendwo im *Parmenides* die Idee des Guten der *Politeia* explizit an. Nicht nur das, auch in der zweiten Hypothese sagt Platon nicht, dass Vieles aus ‚Eins selbst‘ herauskommen kann, sondern dass es aus ‚dem seienden Einen‘ herauskommen kann.

Sind die beiden Hypothesen also inhaltlich getrennt wie die oben genannten Interpretationen? Platon zeigt, dass obwohl das seiende Eine in der zweiten Hypothese nicht in „Sein“ und „Eins“ abgetrennt werden kann (142b5-7; 143a4-5; 142d9-143a3), es nur durch unser Denken (τῆ διανοίᾳ) als „Sein“ und „Eins“ getrennt werden kann (143a4-9; 143b1-144c2), und jedes abgetrennte (das Sein, das Eins) wieder die Untrennbarkeit, d.h. „ein seiende Etwas“ gewinnt, da sogar jedes, das durch unser Denken abgetrennt wurde, ein Seiendes ist (144c8-144e7). Und diese dialektische Umsetzung wird als Kerngrund dafür dargestellt, dass das seiende Eine viele Bestimmungen akzeptieren kann. Am Ende deutet der Text der zweiten Hypothese eindeutig darauf hin, dass <Eins selbst>, <Sein selbst> und <Dianoia> die Grundlage dafür sind, dass Eins zu Vieles wird.

So können wir eine Beziehung zwischen dem seienden Einen und dem Einen selbst in der zweiten Hypothese sehen. Natürlich offenbart die Untersuchung der ersten Hypothese die Selbstbeziehung vom Einen und die Untersuchung der zweiten Hypothese zeigt die Beziehung mit Anderem vom Einen, wie Meinwald behauptet. Das Hauptargument der zweiten Hypothese ist jedoch, dass die Beziehung mit Anderem vom Einen von dem Sich-Selbst des Einen abhängig sein muss. Mit anderen Worten, die Grundursache, dass das seiende Eine der zweiten Hypothese alle Bestimmungen in sich annehmen kann, ist das Eine der ersten Hypothese, d.h. <Eins selbst> mit <Sein selbst> und <Dianoia>. <Eins selbst> der ersten Hypothese ist daher eine notwendige Bedingung dafür, dass das seiende Eine der zweiten Hypothese alle Bestimmungen akzeptiert.



Was bedeutet das entgegengesetzte Ergebnis von Hypothese 1 und 2? Das seiende Eins der zweiten Hypothese kann sich aufgrund von Trennung und Kombination durch Dianoia zu <Vieles> entwickelt. Das Eine selbst der ersten Hypothese verneint aber die Anderen oder die Beziehung mit den Anderen, so dass die Möglichkeit des Denkens über <Eins selbst >, Worte für das und sogar die Existenz von sich selbst verneint wird. Aber können wir leugnen, dass das Eins selbst in der ersten Hypothese erforscht wird, das heißt, dass es gedacht und erwähnt wird? Diese Irrationalität ist möglich, auch wenn das Untersuchungsobjekt nicht <Eins> ist. Jedes Etwas „selbst“ ist nämlich jenseits der Grenze unseres Denkens und kann nicht durch unser Denken definiert werden. Trotz dieser Absurdität schlägt Platon jedoch <Eins selbst> und <Sein selbst> als eine notwendige Bedingung dafür vor, dass sich das seiende Eine in der zweiten Hypothese in Vieles entwickelt. Mit anderen Worten, er gibt <Eins selbst> oder <Etwas selbst> als Begründung vor, dass das seiende Eine viele Bestimmungen haben kann, obwohl es nicht durch unser Denken definiert werden kann und nicht existieren kann. Wie erklärt Plato diesen Widerspruch, dass Nicht-Existenz als Grund vorgeschlagen wird?

Er erklärt den Widerspruch auf zwei Arten im *Parmenides*. Erstens unterscheidet er explizit oder bewusst zwischen <Idee selbst> und <die durch Dianoia gesetzte Idee> in dem zweiten Teil des *Parmenides*. Entgegen der Interpretation von Owen oder Rickless, kann diese Unterscheidung erklären, wie Platon Verflechtung der Formen (*symplokē eidōn*) in den späteren Dialogen darstellen kann, ohne die Idee als metaphysische oder erkenntnistheoretische Grund aufzugeben.

Der zweite Versuch, den Widerspruch zu erklären, ist eine Diskussion über den Augenblick (*τὸ ἐξαιφνης*) in 155e4-157b5. Der Augenblick ist weder eine Bewegung noch eine Ruhe, und es existiert nicht, weil es nicht in der Zeit ist. Aber es wird als Grund für alles vorgelegt, was sich in der Zeit verändert. So interpretiert Beierwaltes den Augenblick als immanente Basis aller Seienden, die Veränderung erfahren. Im Text wird jedoch der Augenblick als ein Transzendentes von Zeit und Veränderung beschrieben. Und dies ähnelt dem Einen selbst der ersten Hypothese, denn das Eine selbst existiert auch nicht in der Zeit wie <Augenblick> und dient als Grundlage dafür, dass <Eins> sich in <Vieles> verändert. Somit ist die widersprüchliche Schlussfolgerung der ersten Hypothese die Irrationalität, die daraus entsteht, dass das Eine selbst der Grund für alle Veränderungen ist, obwohl es, wie <Augenblick>, als Etwas Transzendentes von Zeit und Veränderung existiert (genau genommen kann man es nicht als ‚existieren‘ sprechen). Und wir können im zweiten Teil des *Parmenides* erkennen, dass dieser logische Widerspruch durch die Begrenzungen unserer Dianoia für ein Etwas selbst oder ein Transzendentes von Zeit verursacht wird.

Wie oben erklärt, ist die Erleuchtung, die wir durch den zweiten Teil des *Parmenides* erreichen können, dass eine Wahrheit aller Seienden oder ein Etwas „selbst“ als metaphysische Grund an und für sich (*per se*), d.h. in der Beziehungslosigkeit mit Anderen, nicht erfasst werden kann und dass es seinen Inhalt haben kann, nur wenn es in „ein durch Dianoia gesetztes Seiendes“ übergeht. Daher sollte es gesagt werden, dass Aporien des ersten Teils des *Parmenides* nicht durch den zweiten Teil gelöst wird, sondern begründet ist. Das heißt, die Argumenten des zweiten Teils des *Parmenides* beweist, dass die Aporien der Idee, die im ersten Teil offenbart wird, unweigerlich entsteht, wenn das menschliche Denken (Dianoia) den metaphysischen Grund an und für sich (*per se*) zu erfassen versucht.

### *Socrate en devenir. L'évolution spirituelle de Socrate comme clé herméneutique du Parménide*

Le *Parménide* est le texte qui, plus que tout autre, force le lecteur à interpréter activement et à se demander ce qui constitue une bonne interprétation d'un dialogue platonicien. Il a donné lieu à plusieurs styles de lecture: métaphysique, logique, et plus récemment cosmologique. Un critère plus fondamental consiste à distinguer les interprétations soucieuses de complétude et d'exactitude (respectant la cohérence interne du texte) des interprétations que l'on pourrait qualifier de 'créatrices' (lectures d'inspiration néo-platonicienne ou analytique exploitant les ressources philosophiques du texte de façon plus libre). Aussi stimulantes soient-elles, ces interprétations sont 'atrophiantes' en ce qu'elles tendent à privilégier une partie du texte au dépend du tout. Ma communication repose sur la conviction qu'une interprétation claire et cohérente du *Parménide* – dans son entier – est accessible et doit être privilégiée.

Deux éléments sont essentiels pour comprendre le dialogue comme tout unifié. Du point de vue narratif, il faut saisir la nature de la relation qui s'établit entre Parménide et Socrate. Il faut aussi pouvoir expliquer pourquoi leur échange semble si important que deux personnes au moins ont cru bon de le mémoriser, à la manière de livres vivants.<sup>1</sup> Du point de vue argumentatif, il faut surtout montrer comment la seconde partie du *Parménide* est liée à la première. Ces critères requièrent un déplacement de l'attention au niveau textuel. Alors que la plupart des commentateurs sont absorbés par les deux parties argumentatives du dialogue (la critique des Formes, la série de déductions liées aux huit hypothèses), la clé herméneutique ouvrant l'accès à ces parties réputées obscures se trouve ailleurs: dans le prologue et, surtout, dans la 'section de transition' reliant ces deux parties.<sup>2</sup> Ce changement d'orientation révèle que le thème unifiant du *Parménide* n'est pas métaphysique, logique ou cosmologique mais bien plutôt *psychologique*. Platon y dépeint le jeune Socrate à un moment critique de son développement spirituel, guidé par un vieux Parménide jouant ici le rôle d'expert pédagogue.<sup>3</sup>

#### **1- Parménide pédagogue : observation, réfutation, conseil, exercice, exemple**

Je commencerai par passer en revue les diverses phases et méthodes de la pédagogie philosophique pratiquée par Parménide. **(a) Observation.** Fait rarement noté, Parménide a soumis le jeune Socrate à une évaluation avant d'entrer en dialogue avec lui.<sup>4</sup> Il a observé non seulement son discours, mais ses motivations; les dispositions psychologiques de son interlocuteur ne lui sont pas inconnues. **(b) Réfutation.** L'examen critique auquel Parménide soumet les Formes les vise moins *elles*, que la solidité du savoir qu'en détient Socrate. Cette orientation personnelle de l'examen, qui en révèle la visée pédagogique, devient manifeste dans la section de transition lorsque Parménide encourage Socrate à persister dans son souci des Formes malgré l'embarras dans lequel sa critique l'a plongé.<sup>5</sup> **(c) Conseil.** Cette 'purification' causée par la réfutation ouvre la voie à l'étape du conseil.

1 Sans compter le long voyage entrepris par Céphale à seule fin d'en entendre le récit!

2 J'inclus dans le prologue tout ce qui précède l'examen des Formes (126a-130a) et ce que j'appelle la 'section de transition' va de 134e à 137c.

3 Je m'intéresse à Socrate comme personnage dramatique des dialogues de Platon, non au Socrate historique.

4 135d. Cf. *Alc.* 103a-106a.

5 Cf. *Sophiste*, 230b-e.

Parménide invite Socrate, moins suffisant qu'il ne l'était durant ses attaques envers Zénon, à prendre soin de lui-même en se soumettant à un entraînement.<sup>1</sup> **(d) Exercice.** Parménide décrit cet entraînement comme une routine intellectuelle comportant huit figures. Pour toute entité que l'on pose comme existante, il faut examiner ce en qui résulte pour l'entité 1) prise isolément, 2) considérée en rapport avec ses autres, puis considérer 3) ces autres dans leur rapport avec l'entité, 4) ces autres dans leur rapport à eux-mêmes. On reprend ensuite chacune de ces quatre figures en niant l'existence de l'entité.<sup>2</sup> **(e) Exemple.** La méthode d'enseignement choisie est mimétique. Parménide offre une démonstration à la manière d'un maître de gymnastique qui exécuterait lui-même une routine en face d'un apprenti gymnaste. C'est ce qu'on trouve dans la seconde partie du dialogue. L'entité choisie par Parménide comme objet d'exercice est sa thèse concernant l'unité du tout (137b, cf. 128a), mais il s'agit d'un exemple. Socrate devra ensuite accomplir le même type d'exercice avec son propre objet privilégié : les Formes.<sup>3</sup> Dans cette perspective pédagogique, le lien entre les deux parties argumentatives du dialogue est clair.

## 2- Objectif pédagogique de l'entraînement

La métaphore gymnique n'est toutefois pas parfaitement limpide lorsque transposée au domaine cognitif. Divers types d'exercices corporels favorisent diverses capacités : force, endurance, vitesse, agilité, etc. S'il en va de même de l'âme, il faut voir quelle capacité cognitive (ou morale) cet entraînement vise à développer.<sup>4</sup> En outre, alors que certains types d'exercices ne diffèrent pas du résultat visé (l'haltérophile soulève des haltères pour mieux soulever des haltères), pour d'autres, il s'en distingue (le nageur peut soulever des poids afin de mieux nager). À quelle catégorie appartient l'entraînement de Parménide? La déclaration à l'effet que Socrate doit pratiquer ce type d'exercice *tandis qu'il est encore jeune* afin de pouvoir espérer, *un jour, atteindre la vérité* (135d) suggère qu'il s'agit de la seconde. Cela indique la nature préparatoire de l'entraînement dépeint dans la seconde partie du *Parménide*; il ne s'agit pas d'une fin, mais d'un moyen d'apprentissage.

## 3- Apport de Parménide au développement spirituel de Socrate

Les efforts pédagogiques de Parménide sont-ils restés vains ou ont-ils porté fruit? On trouve réponse à cette question dans le récit autobiographique du *Phédon*, où Socrate apparaît plus jeune encore que dans le *Parménide*. Il s'y remémore d'abord ses premiers tâtonnements dans l'étude de la nature, ses intuitions téléologiques frustrées par la lecture d'Anaxagore, et la conversion vers les *logoi* qui a suivi.<sup>5</sup> Ce point de départ de son évolution spirituelle ne peut qu'avoir précédé l'entretien rapporté dans le *Parménide* puisque Platon l'y dépeint comme déjà dévoué aux Formes. Mais dans la suite de son récit du *Phédon*, Socrate présente aussi l'approche qu'il a décidé d'adopter *post-conversion*.<sup>6</sup> Or, il s'agit d'une méthode par hypothèse qui rappelle étrangement celle de Parménide comme je le montrerai en conclusion. Il semble donc que le *Parménide* trace le portrait d'un moment crucial dans l'éducation philosophique de Socrate. D'où l'importance éminente de ce récit d'apprentissage.

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1 135c-d. Cf. *Alcibiade* (127e, 132a). Socrate emploiera lui-même ces méthodes plus tard comme pédagogue.

2 Voir Karfik (2005).

3 Imaginons l'exercice: Si l'on pose que les Formes existent, que résulte-t-il pour les Formes elles-mêmes par rapport à elles-mêmes isolément? Que résulte-t-il pour les Formes par rapport aux leurs autres? Et ainsi de suite.

4 L'acquisition d'au moins une vertu *morale* particulière, la douceur face aux attaques et objections d'opposants, en dépend. Cf. *Parménide*, 130a, *Phédon*, 89a.

5 95a-99e.

6 100a-b.

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### *Becoming Socrates. Socrates Philosophical Evolution as Hermeneutic Key to Plato’s Parmenides*

No dialogue more than the *Parmenides* forces the reader to engage in interpretation *actively* and to reflect on what constitutes a good reading of a Platonic text. It has generated a wide variety of readings depending on what commentators take its main object to be: metaphysics, logic, and more recently, cosmology. A more basic distinction, still, would be to divide interpretations between those concerned with completeness and accuracy (readings that seek to respect the inner coherence of the text) and creative ones that exploit the text’s philosophical resources with more freedom (e.g. readings drawing inspiration from Neo-Platonism or analytic philosophy). As stimulating as these readings can be, they generally atrophy the dialogue in that they tend to privilege one part of the text at the expense of the whole. My paper holds that a clear and coherent interpretation of the entire *Parmenides* is within reach and should be privileged.

Two elements are essential to understanding the dialogue as a unified whole. From a narrative point of view, we need to grasp the nature of the relationship that develops between old Parmenides and young Socrates. We also must be able to explain why their exchange is so meaningful that at least two individuals decided to memorize the whole conversation.<sup>1</sup> From an argumentative point of view, it is crucial to show how the second part of the *Parmenides* links closely to the first. These requirements lead to a change of focus. Whereas most commentators are absorbed by the two argumentative parts of the dialogue (the critique of the Forms, the deductions from the series of eight hypotheses), the hermeneutic key to these infamously obscure parts can be found elsewhere: in the prologue, and most importantly in the transition section between them.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not to mention the trip undertaken by Cephalus to hear an account of this discussion.

<sup>2</sup> I include what precedes the examination of the Forms in the prologue (126a-130a). The transition section extends from 134e to 137c.

This change in orientation reveals that the unifying theme of *Parmenides* is not metaphysical, logical, or cosmological, but rather, *psychological*. Plato paints a portrait of the young Socrates at a turning point in his spiritual development, under the guidance of Parmenides who here appears as a pedagogical expert.<sup>1</sup> My paper aims at shedding light on the methods, objective and results of this educational attempt.

### **I- Parmenides' Pedagogy: Observation, Refutation, Counselling, Training, Example**

I will start with a summary of the phases and methods of Parmenides' pedagogy. **(a) Observation.** Although seldom noted, Parmenides has submitted Socrates to an assessment before engaging with him.<sup>2</sup> He has not only paid attention to his discourse, but also to his motivations –he is familiar with the psychological dispositions the youth. **(b) Refutation.** The critical examination of the Forms by Parmenides is less directed at *them* than it aims at assessing the solidity of the knowledge *Socrates* has of them. This personal orientation of the examination reveals its therapeutic function. In the transition section, Parmenides encourages Socrates to persist in his concern for the Forms despite the difficulties in which the critique plunged him.<sup>3</sup> **(c) Counselling.** The 'purification' generated by this refutation opens the road for counselling. Socrates is now less smug than he was in his attacks against Zeno, and Parmenides can invite him to care for himself through a form of training.<sup>4</sup> **(d) Training.** Parmenides describes this training as an intellectual routine of sorts including eight series of movements. For each entity that one poses as existing, one must consider what results for the entity 1) taken in isolation, 2) taken in relation with its others, then assess 3) these others as they relate to the entity, 4) these others as they relate to themselves. One then goes through the same fourfold pattern by *denying* that the entity exists.<sup>5</sup> **(e) Example.** The teaching method used to exemplify this is mimetic. Parmenides offers a demonstration not unlike a gym coach who would perform a routine before a trainee. This 'live' demo is what the second part of the dialogue is about. The entity chosen by Parmenides is his own thesis concerning the unity of the whole (137b, cf. 128a), but it is just an example. Socrates is encouraged to perform the same type of exercise with his own object of predilection: the Forms.<sup>6</sup> In light of this pedagogical perspective, the link between the two argumentative parts of the dialogue is strong.

#### **2-The Pedagogical objective of the training**

However, the gymnastic metaphor is not unproblematic when transposed in the cognitive sphere. Different types of exercises favor the development of diverse physical abilities: strength, endurance, speed, agility, etc. If the same applies to the soul, we ought to ask which cognitive (or moral)<sup>7</sup> capacity Parmenides' training aims at developing. Moreover, while certain types of exercises are no different from the goal they aim to achieve (the professional weightlifter lifts weights in order to lift heavier weights), others are distinct (a swimmer could lift weights or stretch in order to swim

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1 I am interested in Socrates as a character in Plato's dialogues and make no claim about the historical Socrates.

2 135d. Cf. *Alc.* 103a-106a.

3 Cf. *Sophist*, 230b-e.

4 135c-d. Cf. *Alcibiades* (127e, 132a), Socrates will later use a similar approach.

5 I benefited from the clarifications provided by Karfik (2005).

6 One could imagine Socrates' first round of exercise: Let us assume that Forms exist, what follows for them in relation to themselves only? What follows for Forms in relation with their others? Etc.

7The acquisition of at least one specific *moral* virtue depends on it: gentleness in face of attacks and objections. Cf. *Parmenides*, 130a, *Phaedo*, 89a.

better). In what category does Parmenides' training fall? His declarations to the effect that Socrates ought to train *while he is still young* to be able *to reach the truth eventually* (135d) suggests that it belongs to the second. This aspect of the gymnastic analogy reveals the propaedeutic function of the training exemplified in the second part of *Parmenides*. This exercise is not an end in itself; it serves another purpose as I will show.

### **3- Parmenides' contribution to Socrates spiritual evolution**

Although the dialogue remains silent on this, one has to ask: did Parmenides' efforts bear fruits? We find an answer to this question in Socrates' autobiographical account in the *Phaedo*. No matter how young Socrates is in the *Parmenides*, he appears at a younger age still in the *Phaedo*. There, on the last day of his life, Socrates recalls his tribulations in the study of nature, his teleological intuitions, the frustration felt after reading Anaxagoras' treatise, and the conversion towards *logoi* that ensued.<sup>1</sup> This starting point of his spiritual evolution precedes the discussion portrayed in *Parmenides* since in that dialogue, Plato paints him as already enamoured with Forms. In the subsequent part of his *Phaedo* narrative, however, Socrates mentions the method he decided to adopt *post-conversion*.<sup>2</sup> Now, this method based on the use of hypothesis is strangely reminiscent of the one prescribed in the *Parmenides*. If this is correct, Plato's *Parmenides* enables us to take a peek at a crucial moment in Socrates evolution.

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1 95a-99e.

2 100a-b.

### *Zenonian eristic and Socratic inquiry*

Since the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century the *Parmenides* has commonly been read as marking a transition from a supposed middle period of Plato's literary production toward his hypothetically later dialogues, a transition initiated, it is commonly believed, by an ontological reorientation in Plato's thought supposedly documented in the *Parmenides*. While critics have disagreed on the question how that reorientation is to be understood, the criticism of the young Socrates' assumption of forms found in the first part of the dialogue has generally been read as a kind of self-criticism on the part of Plato, in particular of the conception of forms we find expressed in dialogues such as the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*.<sup>1</sup> A corollary view has been that Plato through this criticism wished to signal a reorientation in his conception of philosophical inquiry that led to a partial break with his earlier, Socratic conception thereof and a partial appropriation of features characteristic of especially the Eleatic and Pythagorean traditions (see e.g. Stenzel 1917; 5; Ryle 1939, 130; Ross 1951, 6-9, 83).

A reason for doubting such developmental approaches to the *Parmenides*, however, is the fact that Plato depicts Socrates as a very young man in the dialogue (see Gadamer 1978 [1991], 133n3; Miller 1985, 65-67; Dorter 1994, 19-20), a dramatic feature that is hard to explain on the hypothesis that Plato wished to indicate a significant change, ontological or methodological, in his own thought. By portraying Socrates as young, Plato rather seems to suggest that whatever teachings the *Parmenides* may contain, these teachings will have affected the mature Socrates we find in Plato's other dialogues.

This presentation pursues such a line of reasoning while concentrating on a particular aspect of Parmenides' criticism of the young Socrates, namely his claim that Socrates needs to practice a kind of hypothetical reasoning similar to the one he has just witnessed Zeno perform if he is ever to reach the truth (135c8-136c5). In the presentation I ask what bearing this aspect of the dialogue should have for our understanding of Socrates as depicted in other Platonic dialogues. I argue that the way the *Parmenides* connects the young Socrates with the style of argumentation characteristic of Zeno has wide ramifications for the way we should understand Socratic inquiry. In particular I argue that the *Parmenides*, by linking the Socratic search for truth and definition with Zeno, suggests that there is a closer connection between eristic and dialectic inquiry than many critics have assumed (but see Kerferd 1981, 59-67, and Nehamas 1990).

I set out from the observation that Plato has Parmenides' criticism of the young Socrates culminate in a series of claims that serve to highlight the importance of the kind of reasoning exemplified by Zeno (or at least a variation of it, see Cornford 1939, 105) for acquiring truth. Parmenides states that Socrates needs to practice this kind of reasoning while young "lest the truth should escape" him (*ei de mê, se diaphouxetai hê alêtheia*; 135d6) and proceeds to spell out in detail how Socrates must inquire into a number of general features such as unity, difference, motion, and rest through a complex use of suppositions and counter-suppositions if he is ever to "discern the

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<sup>1</sup> This view is common both to interpreters who hold that Plato did not reject transcendent forms, but rather came to investigate their interrelation, as e.g. F. M. Cornford, see Cornford 1935, 11-13 and 1939, 105 and to critics who hold that Plato rejected such forms, e.g. G. Ryle and G. E. L. Owen, see Ryle (1939) and Owen (1953).

truth” (*diopsesthai to alêthes*; 136c5), two claims that in turn are picked up by Zeno’s claim that people are unaware that, unless you search through everything in this way, “you cannot get hold of insight when chancing upon truth” (*adynaton entychonta tôi alêthei noun schein*; 136e2-3)

In the presentation I pursue three interrelated questions:

1. How is ‘truth’ to be understood in these passages?
2. Why is Zeno’s style of argumentation a prerequisite for grasping or acquiring truth?
3. What connection, if any, does Zeno’s use of *hypothesis* have with Socratic inquiry?

I first argue that truth should be understood ontologically, in the sense “what is real” or “what is there for thought”, not as truth understood as a feature or function of sentences. This claim, I argue, is made plausible by the fact that an ontological conception of truth is central to the poem of the historical Parmenides, a conception of truth Plato would expect his readers to have in mind, and by the fact that Parmenides in the dialogue explicitly connects truth with the act of defining features such as justice, goodness, and beauty (see 135c8-d1), features central to Plato’s own ontology.

I next argue that Zeno’s style of argumentation is a prerequisite for grasping ontological truth because it, by being disputatious in nature, helps the philosopher overcome common human opinions or prejudices that may impede ontological inquiry. Part of Parmenides’ criticism of the young Socrates is directed against his reliance on such opinions (see 130e1-4) and it is in part in order that Socrates may overcome such a reliance, I suggest, that Parmenides encourages him to take exercise in Zeno’s style of argumentation.

I finally argue that the picture of Zeno we find in Plato’s *Phaedrus* (see 261b6-8 with 261d6-8) suggests that Plato saw Zeno both as the originator of an eristic style of argumentation commonly depicted by Plato as being diametrically opposed to dialectical inquiry and as the originator of the Socratic type of inquiry that, through refutations, seeks to define or circumscribe essences. This picture, I suggest, harmonizes with the picture of Zeno emerging from the *Parmenides*, and by presenting us with it, Plato illustrates how Zeno served as an inspiration for his own, Socratic understanding of philosophical inquiry.

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### *Zenonische Eristik und sokratisches Suchen*

Seit Anfang des 19ten Jahrhunderts ist Platons *Parmenides* im allgemein als Zäsur zwischen Platons sogenannten mittleren und den sogenannten späteren Dialoge gelesen worden, wobei der Wandel in Platons Philosophie, der sich gemäß dieser Hypothese im *Parmenides* vollzieht, meistens als durch eine ontologische Neueorientierung initiiert verstanden wird. Die Forschung ist nicht einig in der Beantwortung der Frage, wie dieser Wandel näher zu verstehen sei, ist aber im Allgemeinen der Auffassung, dass die Kritik der Ideenannahme des jungen Sokrates als eine Art Selbstkritik Platons zu lesen sei, insbesondere als eine Kritik der Ideenannahme wie sie im *Phaidon* und *Staat* zum Ausdruck kommt. In der Folge hat die Forschung auch angenommen, dass diese Kritik einen Wandel in Platons Verständnis davon ankündigt, wie eine philosophische Untersuchung durchzuführen sei, ein Wandel demzufolge Platons früheres, sokratisches Ideal hinter einem eleatischen und pythagoreischen Ideal partiell zurücktritt (siehe e.g. Stenzel 1917; 5; Ryle 1939, 130; Ross 1951, 6-9, 83).

Ein Grund solchen Entwicklungsinterpretationen zum *Parmenides* gegenüber eher skeptisch zu sein ist, dass Platons Sokrates im *Parmenides* als sehr jung in porträtiert wird (siehe Gadamer 1978 [1991], 133n3; Miller 1985, 65-67; Dorter 1994, 19-20), ein dramatischer Aspekt des Dialoges, der nur schwer erklärlich ist, wenn man annimmt, dass Platon in dem Dialog einen signifikanten Wandel – ontologisch oder methodologisch verstanden –, ankündigen wollte. Der Umstand, dass Platon Sokrates in dieser Weise porträtiert, suggeriert eher, dass die Lehre, die im *Parmenides* enthalten ist, was auch immer sie sein mag, den Sokrates, wie wir ihn in anderen Dialogen finden, beeinflusst haben muss.

Dieser Vortrag verfolgt einen solchen Gedankengang und rückt einen besonderen Aspekt der Kritik des *Parmenides* in den Mittelpunkt, nämlich seine Behauptung, dass Sokrates, um die Wahrheit zu erreichen, eine besondere Argumentationsweise, nämlich eine mit Hypothesen arbeitende, praktizieren muss, die Zenon kurz vorher exemplifiziert (135c8-136c5). Ich verfolge die Frage, welche Konsequenzen dieser Aspekt des Dialoges für unser Verständnis von Sokrates, wie er in anderen Dialogen dargestellt wird, haben muss. Ich vertrete die These, dass die Verknüpfung des jungen Sokrates mit die Argumentationsweise von Zenon im *Parmenides* weitreichende Folgen für die Weise hat, in der wir Platons Sokrates im Allgemein verstehen sollten; insbesondere werde ich dafür argumentieren, dass Platon, indem er diese Verknüpfung skizziert, suggeriert, dass eine viel engere Verbindung zwischen der sokratischen Suche nach Wahrheit und dem eristischen Streitgespräch besteht als die Forschung normalerweise annimmt (aber siehe Kerferd 1981, 59-67, and Nehamas 1990).

Ich setze an bei der Tatsache, dass Platon die Kritik des jungen Sokrates in einer Reihe von Behauptungen kulminieren lässt, die die Bedeutung der zenonischen Argumentationsweise (oder jedenfalls eine damit verwandte Argumentationsweise, siehe Cornford 1939, 105) für die Erreichung der Wahrheit unterstreicht. *Parmenides* behauptet, dass Sokrates sich in dieser Weise des Denkens üben muss, da ihm sonst die Wahrheit entfliehen werde (*ei de mê, se*

*diapheuxetai hē alētheia*; 136d6); er fährt fort und verdeutlicht wie Sokrates eine Reihe von sehr allgemeinen Termini wie Einheit, Verschiedenheit, Bewegung, und Ruhe durch einen komplexen Gebrauch von Hypothesen und Gegenhypothesen untersuchen muss, um die Wahrheit zu erkennen (*diopsesthai to alēthes*; 136c5); und schließlich behauptet Zenon, dass es nicht bemerkt wurde, dass, falls man nichts alles in dieser Weise untersucht, „Du niemals Einsicht erwerben wirst, selbst wenn Du die Wahrheit antriffst“ (*adynaton entychonta tōi alēthei noun schein*; 136e2-3).

In dem Vortrag werde ich drei mit einander verbundenen Fragen nachgehen:

1. Wie ist 'Wahrheit' in diesen Passagen zu verstehen?
2. Warum ist Zenons Weise zu argumentieren eine Möglichkeitsbedingung für den Erwerb der Wahrheit?
3. Welche Verbindung besteht zwischen Zenons Gebrauch von *hypothesis* und der sokratischen Suche nach Wahrheit?

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### *Parmenides' Angels in VI<sup>th</sup> c. Syria*

At the beginning of the sixth century CE, in the province of Syria-Palestine of the Eastern Roman Empire, one can trace in the Greek sources an ongoing debate on the nature, number and function of Angels. The chief representatives of such considerations are John of Gaza, author of a 732 verses poem entitled *The Description of the Cosmic Picture* (ἐκφρασις τοῦ κοσμικοῦ πίνακος), and the pseudo Dionysius the Areopagite. Among some fifty allegorical figures representing the cosmos, the first describes the depiction of seven Angels whose role is to contain Nature's overwhelming power. Although such a number corresponds to the Biblical tradition, the status of John's Angels appears to have more to do with the Neoplatonic tradition. As for Dionysius, the interaction with Proclus' system is at the heart of the making of his angelic hierarchy.

The fact that both authors refer in a direct way to the Platonic theory of Intermediary Beings is significant. We stand here beyond the mere metaphorical level either of the chain or of the ladder (the later subsequently developed into such texts as *The Divine Ladder* by John Climacus in the VII<sup>th</sup> c.). The interaction from Divine to Human and reciprocally refers to the fundamental definition of Plato in the *Symposium*: "For everything between Divine and Human is full of demonic" (*Symp.* 202d13-e1 καὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον μεταξύ ἐστὶ θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ). More precisely, John and Denys know and use – even though in a different perspective – Proclus' thought on the topic, *i.e.* considering the order of the intellectual level of the cosmos as an organization based on a progression of three triads of Medieties.

Proclus states that the structure of reality is described ontologically in the second half of Plato's *Parmenides* (*Platonic Theology* 1.10). This paper will argue that both John and Dionysius employ Proclus' interpretation of the second hypothesis to elaborate their views on Angels. Their identification of the second hypothesis with the intellectual level and specifically the association of Angels with various forms of Intellect (Νοῦς) reveal a close reading and adaptation of Proclus' system. Since it is known that at least one of Proclus' disciples (Ulpian) and Isidore, as Proclus' successor as diadochus himself (Damasc., *V. Isid.* in Phot., *Bibl.*, cod. 242), originated from Gaza at the time when John lived there and around the first use of Dionysius' writings, one may deduce that Plato's *Parmenides*, hypothesis 2, was studied in the region of Syria-Palestine in the early VI<sup>th</sup> c. as a description of that specific level of reality. Therefore, this paper proposes to explore that example of an early reception of Proclus' reading of the *Parmenides*, at a time which is a turning point in the elaboration of fundamental theological notions (chiefly having to do with the Christological issue).

One of the main questions addressed will be that of participation. In John's *Description* as well as in Denys' *Celestial Hierarchy*, Angels are referred to as noetic Beings. In John, the adjectives νοερός (9 occurrences) and νοήμων (2 occurrences) are used, as the very noun νοῦς (7 occurrences) and the verb νοέω (6 occurrences). However, the last verse of the poem describes the One as "Who the Intellect cannot conceive" (*Tab.* 732 ἄσπορος εἰς τελέθων τις ὃν οὐ νόος εὔρει). Contrary to the superior level which is not, one can know Angels through intellectual operation. Although John's whole poem is located at the level of the Nous, the aspiration towards the One is made perceptible by the use of a specific iconography in the very picture, as the personifications, even the ones of the

‘inferior’ levels of the cosmos like Ocean, Earth and Sea, are gazing upon the Sun, presented as symbol of the One.

The following sections of the *Parmenides*’ second hypothesis will be considered with particular interest, in relation to the spanning question of how to represent (or not) Angels:

“(If One is, what are the consequences for the One? Positive consequences [142b-155e])

— The One partakes of being (142b)

— The One has a shape (145b)

— The One has a location (145b-e)”.

As they are located at the noetic level, Angels can be seen as having part to some sort of existence. Moreover, they may have a certain type of body, which is not a human one, but can somehow be thought of in anthropomorphic terms, for the sake of a necessary, didactic understanding of the notion. Thus, Proclus’ proposal concerning the fact that noetic Beings have a location, even though they are incorporeal as such, is innovative in relation to his predecessors, especially Porphyry. This paper intends to study the consequences of the discrepancy between the various Neoplatonic views on the subject of the Angels, in particular in the way they impact VI<sup>th</sup> c. authors. In one hand, the issue concerning the representation of the Angels’ body is central to the cosmic picture of Gaza, as those figures are shown as engaged in various actions in relation to the other characters. On the other hand, the negative definition of an Angel’s nature in Denys – without a body (ἀσώματος) and not material (ἄυλος) would seem to prevent any attempt of representing that purely intellectual concept in human terms. However, a solution might be found in the coexistence of a double perspective: each level is νοητός and νοερός, at the same time intelligible manifestation of the divine to the following level and intellectual activity tensed toward the upper levels’ contemplation. As intermediaries and although essentially spiritual, Angels are rightly located – and therefore pictured – as half-way between Divine and Human levels.

### *Les Anges du Parménide dans la Syrie du VI<sup>e</sup> siècle*

Au début du VI<sup>e</sup> siècle, dans la province de Syrie-Palestine de l’Empire romain d’Orient, un débat sur la nature, le nombre et la fonction des Anges émerge dans les sources grecques. Deux des principaux représentants de ce courant de pensée sont Jean de Gaza, auteur d’un poème de 732 vers intitulé *La description du Tableau cosmique* (ἐκφρασις τοῦ κοσμικοῦ πίνακος), et le pseudo Denys l’Aréopagite. Parmi quelque cinquante figures allégoriques représentant le cosmos, le premier décrit la représentation de sept Anges dont le rôle est de contenir l’excédent de puissance de la nature. Bien que ce nombre corresponde à la tradition biblique, il apparaît que le statut des Anges de Jean a davantage à voir avec la tradition néoplatonicienne. De même en ce qui concerne Denys, l’interaction avec le système proclusien est au cœur de la conception de sa hiérarchie angélique.

Le fait que ces deux auteurs se réfèrent de manière directe à la théorie platonicienne des Êtres Intermédiaires est significatif. Nous nous trouvons là au-delà du seul niveau métaphorique de la chaîne ou de l’échelle (cette dernière image se trouvant développée par la suite dans des textes comme *L’Échelle divine* de Jean Climaque au VII<sup>e</sup> siècle). L’interaction entre le divin et l’humain et réciproquement se réfère à la définition fondamentale de Platon dans le *Banquet* : « Car tout est démonique entre le divin et l’humain » (*Symp.* 202d13-e1 καὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον μεταξύ ἐστὶ θεοῦ

τε και θνητοῦ). Plus précisément, Jean et Denys connaissent et utilisent – bien que dans une perspective différente – la pensée de Proclus sur le sujet, soit la conception de l'ordre du niveau intellectuel du cosmos comme une organisation basée sur la progression de trois triades de Médiétés.

Proclus postule que la structure de la réalité est ontologiquement décrite dans la seconde moitié du *Parménide* (*Théologie Platonicienne* 1, 10). Cet essai vise à démontrer comment Jean et Denys se servent tous deux de l'interprétation proclusienne de la seconde hypothèse pour élaborer leurs considérations sur les Anges. L'identification qu'ils font de la seconde hypothèse avec le niveau intellectif et en particulier l'association des Anges avec des formes variées de l'Intellect (Νοῦς) révèle une lecture attentive et une adaptation du système proclusien. Comme il est connu qu'au moins l'un des disciples de Proclus (Ulpien) et Isidore, le successeur de Proclus comme diadoque lui-même (Damasc., *V. Isid.* dans Phot., *Bibl.*, cod. 242), étaient originaires de Gaza à l'époque de Jean et aux alentours du premier usage des écrits de Denys, on peut en déduire que la seconde hypothèse du *Parménide* de Platon était étudiée dans la région de Syrie-Palestine au début du VI<sup>e</sup> siècle en tant que description d'un niveau spécifique de réalité. Notre essai se propose en conséquence d'explorer cet exemple de réception immédiate de la lecture que Proclus faisait du *Parménide*, à un moment-clé pour l'élaboration de notions théologiques fondamentales (principalement en ce qui concerne la problématique christologique).

L'une des principales questions envisagées sera celle de la participation. Dans la *Description* de Jean comme dans la *Hiérarchie céleste* de Denys, les Anges sont désignés comme des Êtres noétiques. Dans Jean, les adjectifs νοερός (9 occurrences) et νοήμων (2 occurrences) sont utilisés, comme le nom νοῦς lui-même (7 occurrences) et le verbe νοέω (6 occurrences). Cependant, le dernier vers du poème décrit l'Un comme « Celui que l'Intellect ne peut concevoir » (*Tab.* 732 ἄσπορος Εἷς τελέθων τις ὃν οὐ νόος εὔρει). Contrairement au niveau supérieur, il est possible de connaître les Anges par une opération intellectuelle. Bien que le poème de Jean se situe tout entier au niveau du Nous, l'aspiration vers le Un est rendue perceptible par l'emploi d'une iconographie spécifique dans le tableau lui-même, en ce que les personnifications, même celles des niveaux « inférieurs » du cosmos tels qu'Océan, Terre et Mer, regardent en direction du Soleil, présenté comme le symbole de l'Un.

Les sections suivantes de la seconde hypothèse du Parménide seront examinées avec un intérêt particulier, en relation avec l'épineuse question de la (non)-représentation des Anges :

(« Si l'Un est, quelles sont les conséquences pour l'Un ? Conséquences positives [142b-155e])

- L'Un participe de l'Être (142b)
- L'Un a une forme (145b)
- L'Un a une place (145b-e). »

En tant qu'ils se situent au niveau noétique, les Anges peuvent être vus comme ayant part à une certaine forme d'existence. De plus, il est possible qu'ils aient une sorte particulière de corps, qui ne soit pas humain, mais qui d'une certaine façon puisse être pensé en termes anthropomorphiques, à des fins didactiques nécessaires à la compréhension de la notion. Ainsi, la proposition proclusienne concernant le fait que les Êtres noétiques ont une place, même s'ils sont incorporels en tant que tels, est innovante par rapport à ses prédécesseurs, notamment Porphyre. Cet essai souhaite étudier les conséquences de la divergence entre les diverses perspectives néoplatoniciennes sur le sujet des Anges, en particulier dans la manière dont elles influencent les

auteurs du VI<sup>e</sup> siècle. D'une part, la question qui concerne la représentation des Anges est centrale pour le tableau cosmique de Gaza, puisque ces figures sont montrées comme engagées dans des actions variées en relation avec les autres personnages. D'autre part, la définition négative de la nature de l'Ange chez Denys – privé de corps (ἀσώματος) et immatériel (ἄυλος) – semblerait s'opposer à toute tentative de représenter un tel concept, purement intellectuel, dans des termes humains. Une solution peut cependant être trouvée dans la coexistence d'une double perspective : chaque niveau est νοητός et νοερός, à la fois manifestation intelligible du divin vers le niveau qui le suit et activité intellectuelle en tension vers la contemplation des niveaux supérieurs. En leur qualité d'intermédiaires et bien qu'essentiellement spirituels, les Anges sont justement situés – et représentés – à mi-chemin entre le niveau divin et celui humain.

### *Plato's Parmenides in seventh century Constantinople. The Hexaemeron of George of Pisidia*

The poem by George of Pisidia dedicated to Sergius patriarch of Constantinople (610-638) on the nature of reality, entitled Hexaemeron, is important evidence for direct reading of Plato's Parmenides, especially the second half of the dialogue. The poem describes the relation between God and creation and the tone is both Christian and philosophical. The context is important since the controversy in George of Pisidia's time concerned the idea that Christ had two energies and two wills, that means that an individual contained both infinite and finite principles within his person. This debate, in which patriarch Sergius was at the forefront, was central in the reading of Neoplatonism in Byzantium. It is known that at this time Maximus the Confessor (580-662) employed arguments present Proclus in order to argued his point of view within orthodox theology. Using Proclus' ideas and texts was rather acceptable since Dionysius the Areopagite had strong connections with the proclean system. At the time of the Hexameron, the question of the wills and energies was not settled and therefore it is an important witness of the reading of Plato's Parmenides and its hypothesis. It is a source for the status quo of the reception of a neoplatonic reading of the Parmenides in the years 610-638.

At Hexameron lines 1648-1677 specifically, the poet develops the contrast between One and Many. The paper will argue that the discussion derives from his reading of the Plato's Parmenides and specifically the second half. His interest is mainly ontological and specifically focused on the relation between the divine and creation. It is a striking poem, since one often sees late antique authors quoting the neoplatonic interpretations of the second half of the Parmenides, but not in the terms employed directly by Plato. They assume that the neoplatonic interpretation is more or less correct and employ their solutions, without looking at the original dialogue. Neoplatonists normally considered the hypotheses of the second half as representing ontological levels of reality (e.g. Plotinus Ennead 5.1, Proclus in Parmenidem and Proclus Theologia Platonica 1.10). Moreover, such an understanding of the hierarchy of reality was also accepted by Dionysius the Areopagite (he coined the expression *hierarchia*).

The poem surprisingly uses terminology derived directly from part two of Plato's dialogue. The discussion on the topic of One and Many is connected with the interpretation of dialogue found in Proclus and his school. Therefore, when reading this section of the poem one must take into account both the original text of the dialogue and the interpretation of Proclus. Part of the reason is the question of readership. The editor, Gonnelli, has identified a number of variants in the text, precisely at this point. The question is not philological, but philosophical. The textual variants are due to the meaning of the text and its relation with contemporary controversies.

George of Pisidia in his Hexameron, presented an interpretation of the second half of the Parmenides which was controversial in the seventh century. Thus, the Hexameron interprets both Plato's dialogue and the neoplatonic readings within the context of the monoergist and monothelite controversies. The subsequent readers modified the text precisely on the question of the relation between the One and the Many. The question concerns not the first hypothesis, but mainly the remaining positive hypotheses, since they were considered to describe the status of

intellectual reality. In the sixth and seventh centuries this topic became important since there was an ongoing dispute about energies/forces as well as the nature of *physis* and the principles governing it. Thus these lines deal with the problem of Philoponus and Simplicius. It is worth remembering that the dedicatee of the poem, patriarch Sergius of Constantinople, was condemned at the third ecumenical synod of Constantinople (680-681). This was the same synod which promoted the orthodoxy of Maximus the Confessor. The topic of discussion at this synod was precisely the question of energies, which means the relation between God and creation, i.e. the questions of nature which neoplatonists saw resolved in the second half of the Parmenides. George of Pisidia, understood that the philosophical root of the question of the relation between God and creation could be found in the correct interpretation of the second half of the Parmenides. His readers agreed with this analysis and modified the text to ensure that it conformed with their opinions. The poem was central in byzantine culture, as one may see from the numerous manuscripts transmitting it and by the fact it was translated into classical Armenian and into Church Slavonic and was considered a classic within Byzantine literature. The paper will indicate how the reading of the second half of Parmenides was different in the fifth century (Proclus), sixth century (Damascius and Dionysius the Areopagite) and the new context of the seventh century Constantinople.

### *Il Parmenide di Platone nella Costantinopoli del settimo secolo. L' Esaemerone di Giorgio di Pisidia*

La poesia di Giorgio di Pisidia dedicata a Sergio, patriarca di Costantinopoli (610-638) sulla natura della realtà, intitolata Esaemerone, offre dati importanti sulla lettura diretta del Parmenide di Platone specialmente la seconda metà del dialogo. La poesia descrive la relazione tra Dio e la creazione ed il tono è sia cristiano che filosofico. Il contesto è importante vista la controversia al tempo di Giorgio di Pisidia che riguardava l'idea che Cristo avesse due energie e due volontà, il che significa che un individuo contiene sia principi infiniti che finiti all'interno della propria persona.

Questo dibattito, nel quale il patriarca Sergio era protagonista, fu centrale nella lettura del neoplatonismo a Bisanzio. Si sa che Massimo il Confessore (580-662) utilizzò argomenti presenti in Proclo per argomentare il suo punto di vista nella teologia ortodossa. Utilizzare le idee di Proclo ed i suoi testi era accettabile visto che Dionigi l'Areopagita aveva forti legami con il sistema di Proclo. Al tempo dell'Esaemerone, la questione delle due volontà ed energie non era ancora risolta e dunque era un testimone importante della lettura del Parmenide di Platone e delle sue ipotesi. È una fonte per lo status quo della ricezione di una lettura neoplatonica del Parmenide negli anni 610-638.

Alle linee 1648-1677 in particolare dell'Esaemerone, il poeta sviluppa il contrasto tra l'Uno ed i Molti. La presentazione proporrà la tesi che la distinzione ed il contrasto furono tratti direttamente dalla seconda metà del dialogo platonico. Il suo interesse è principalmente ontologico e focalizzato specificatamente sulla relazione tra il divino e la creazione. È un poema notevole, poichè si vedono spesso autori tardo-antichi che citano interpretazioni neoplatoniche nella seconda del Parmenide di Platone, ma non nei termini utilizzati direttamente da Platone. Presuppongono che l'interpretazione neoplatonica è più o meno corretta ed utilizzano le loro interpretazioni, senza



riferirsi al dialogo originale. I neoplatonici erano soliti considerare le ipotesi della seconda metà del dialogo come rappresentazioni ontologiche della realtà. (per esempio Plotino *Enneade* 5.1, Proclo in *Parmenidem* e Proclo *Teologia Platonica* 1.10). Inoltre, una tale lettura della gerarchia della realtà fu accolta da Dionigi l'Areopagita (che coniò il termine gerarchia).

La poesia utilizza una terminologia derivante direttamente dalla seconda parte del dialogo di Platone. La discussione a proposito dell'Uno e dei Molti è collegata con l'interpretazione del dialogo fatta da Proclo e dalla sua scuola. Dunque, quando si legge questa sezione del poema si deve tener conto sia il testo originale del dialogo che l'interpretazione di Proclo. Uno dei motivi è la questione del lettore. L'editore Gonnelli ha identificato un numero importante di varianti nel testo proprio a questo punto. La questione non è filologica ma filosofica. Le varianti testuali sono dovute al significato del testo e la relazione con le controversie contemporanee.

Giorgio di Pisidia presentò un'interpretazione della seconda metà del *Parmenide* che risultava controversa nel settimo secolo. L'Esamerone interpreta sia il dialogo Platonico e le letture neoplatoniche all'interno del contesto della controversia monoergista e monotelita. I lettori successivi hanno modificato il testo precisamente sulla questione della relazione tra l'Uno e i Molti. La questione non riguarda la prima ipotesi quanto quelle successive, poichè si considerava che esse descrivessero lo status della realtà intellettuale. Nel sesto e nel settimo secolo l'argomento divenne importante visto che c'era una disputa sulle energie/forze e sulla natura della *physis* e dei principi che la governavano. Dunque questi versi si occupano del problema di Filopono e Simplicio. Vale la pena ricordare che il destinatario del poema, Sergio Patriarca di Costantinopoli, fu condannato al terzo concilio ecumenico di Costantinopoli (680-681). Questo fu il sinodo che promosse l'ortodossia di Massimo il Confessore. L'argomento di discussione di questo concilio era proprio la questione delle energie, che significa la relazione tra Dio e creato, cioè la natura che i neoplatonici consideravano risolta nella seconda metà del *Parmenide*. Giorgio di Pisidia comprese che la radice filosofica della questione della relazione tra Dio e creato poteva essere trovata nell'interpretazione corretta della seconda metà del *Parmenide*. I suoi lettori concordarono con questa analisi e modificarono il testo per assicurarsi che si conformasse con le loro opinioni. La poesia era centrale nella cultura bizantina, come si può vedere dai numerosi manoscritti che la tramandano e dal fatto che fu tradotto in armeno classico e nel paleoslavo e fu considerato un classico nella letteratura bizantina. La presentazione indicherà come la lettura della seconda metà del *Parmenide* fu differente nel quinto secolo (Proclo), sesto secolo (Damascio, Dionigi l'Areopagita) e nel nuovo contesto della Costantinopoli del settimo secolo.

## Le Merrer Nicolas

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### *Le mauvais rêve de Parménide. A propos de la dernière hypothèse du Parménide de Platon (163b7-166c1)*

Voici comment le vieux Parménide récapitule, à la toute fin du *Parménide* de Platon, les conséquences tirées des différentes versions des deux hypothèses sur l'un et les autres, positive et négative, qui occupent toute la seconde partie du dialogue : « [...] l'un, s'il est (un) ou s'il n'est pas (un) (ἐν εἶτ' ἔστιν εἶτε μὴ ἔστιν), lui et les autres, tant dans leurs rapports à eux-mêmes que dans leurs rapports mutuels, sont tout, de toutes les façons, et ne le sont pas, le paraissent et ne le paraissent pas » (166c2-4). A lire cette conclusion, on voit mal comment ce même Parménide aurait bien pu en venir à soutenir la thèse qui est par ailleurs la sienne, ainsi énoncée par Socrate au début du dialogue : ἐν φῆς εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, « tu dis que "le tout est un" » (128a8-b1). Dans la mesure où il semble bien y avoir un hiatus entre les conclusions logiques tirées par Parménide de la seconde partie du dialogue et l'affirmation de sa propre thèse, impliquant l'être de l'un, il me paraît nécessaire de chercher à en proposer une interprétation. Ce faisant, je n'entrerai pas dans la difficile question de savoir comment interpréter la reformulation platonicienne de la pensée du Parménide historique (cf. notamment le débat entre Brisson et O'Brien, dans A. Havlicek and F. Karfik (eds), *Plato's Parmenides, Proceedings of the fourth Symposium Platonicum Pragense*, Prague, Oikoumène, 2005) : mon propos ne concernera Parménide que comme personnage du dialogue éponyme de Platon.

Qu'est-ce qui a bien pu pousser Parménide, dans son *Poème* (tel que lu par Platon), à soutenir à propos du tout une thèse impliquant l'être de l'un, alors même que la conclusion du long effort dialectique de la seconde partie du dialogue, par la liste manifestement exhaustive de contradictions qu'elle propose, semble devoir rendre une telle décision impossible ? Cette question se pose d'autant plus, me semble-t-il, que ce « jeu laborieux » (137b1) qui amène Parménide à conclure le dialogue comme il le fait se présente comme la démonstration, adressée au jeune Socrate, du type d'exercice qu'il est nécessaire de pratiquer au préalable pour pouvoir ensuite soutenir, contre toute objection possible, un discours de vérité (135d6, 136c5). L'hypothèse de lecture que j'aimerais présenter ne se donne pas pour objectif de réduire ce hiatus entre deux aspects du Parménide platonicien, mais vise bien plutôt à tenter de l'interpréter comme étant délibéré de la part de Platon, et philosophiquement signifiant.

Il me semble que l'on peut trouver une explication de ce choix de Parménide en faveur d'une thèse philosophique impliquant que l'un soit, *malgré* les conclusions logiques de la seconde partie du dialogue, dans l'examen des conséquences de l'ultime version, la plus radicale, de la dernière hypothèse (163b7-166c1) : ἐν εἶ μὴ ἔστι, « l'un, s'il n'est pas » (163c1). L'examen des conséquences de cette hypothèse pour l'un-non-étant amène Parménide à établir une liste (non exhaustive) de ce qui, parmi ce qui est, ne pourra pas être le concernant dans la mesure où il n'est pas : il ne sera ni « de celui-là », ni « à celui-là » (τὸ ἐκείνου ἢ τὸ ἐκείνω), ni « quelque chose », ni « ceci » (ἢ τὸ τί ἢ τὸ τοῦτο), ni « de ceci », ni « d'un autre », ni « à un autre » (ἢ τὸ τούτου ἢ ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλω), il ne sera ni « jadis », ni « ensuite », ni « maintenant » (ἢ ποτὲ ἢ ἔπειτα ἢ νῦν), il n'y aura à son égard « ni science, ni opinion, ni sensation, ni discours, ni nom » (ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δόξα ἢ αἴσθησις

ἢ λόγος ἢ ὄνομα, 164a7-b2). Or, ce qui apparaît à l'examen de ce qui en découle pour les autres-que-l'un (non-étant) c'est que, livrés à eux-mêmes pour être autres, ils ne seront rien dans la mesure où l'un est toujours impliqué dans toute détermination. En conséquence : « l'un, s'il n'est pas, rien ("pas même un", οὐδέν) n'est » (166c1).

Mais plus encore que ce verdict radical, c'est la démarche suivie par Parménide pour y aboutir qui me paraît susceptible de fournir un élément de réponse à la question que je pose. L'examen des conséquences du non-être de l'un pour les autres, à partir de 164b5, me paraît marquer une rupture dans le déroulement général de l'exercice en quoi consiste toute la seconde partie du dialogue. On y assiste, me semble-t-il, à une prise de distance de Parménide à l'égard des actes *dianoétiques* sur lesquels repose l'exercice, ce que confirme un examen des 4 occurrences de *διανοία* dans cette seconde partie. Chacune des deux occurrences qui précèdent notre passage (164b5 sq.) est associée à un verbe conjugué à la première personne du pluriel : Parménide y assume alors un acte de pensée auquel il associe ses auditeurs (143a7 : τῇ διανοίᾳ ...λάβωμεν ; 158c2 : Εἰ ἐθέλοισιν τῇ διανοίᾳ ... ἀφελεῖν). Mais, une fois l'un posé comme absolument non-étant, les autres sont privés de toute détermination et ne se laissent plus appréhender autrement qu'à titre de « masse » (ῥγκος) – terme lui-même illusoire puisque de tels semblants d'unité n'apparaissent qu'à un regard lointain et « émoussé » (ἀμβλύ) pour se révéler pluralités illimitées à un regard plus proche et « perçant » (ὀξύ). Dans ce contexte, Parménide ne s'approprie plus l'acte de saisir par la pensée, mais il le décrit comme de l'extérieur : « chaque fois que *quelqu'un* saisit par la pensée quelque chose (τίς τι λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ) comme appartenant à [ces masses] » (165a7-8) ; « il est nécessaire, je crois, que soit brisé et émietté tout ce qui est, et qu' *on saisit par la pensée* (ὁ ἄν τις λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ) » (165b4-6).

Désormais spectateur de ces opérations dianoétiques qu'il imagine sans plus les effectuer, Parménide ne peut que déduire et constater l'abolition de tout ce qui constitue leur objet (ce qui est inévitable depuis 164a7-b2) – mais aussi finalement de tout *sujet* susceptible d'effectuer de tels actes de pensée : si, en l'absence de tout un, il n'y a même pas possibilité de voir apparaître chez les autres quelque chose (τι) que ce soit, il risque bien de ne plus y avoir personne (τις) non plus, même pour s'y laisser tromper. Ce monde où, « soudainement (ἐξαίφνης), comme dans un rêve endormi » (164d2), la valeur accordée jusque-là à toute tentative de saisir un objet par la pensée s'inverse en son contraire et devient synonyme d'illusion et de regard émoussé, Parménide ne s'y voit manifestement pas. On peut alors se demander si, en amont (et en dépit) de la conclusion qu'il semble (ὡς ἔοικεν, 166c3) vouloir tirer au terme de la succession des hypothèses, le vertige provoqué par ce « rêve » que suscite la tentative d'imaginer un monde où l'un ne serait rien n'a pas contribué à son affirmation d'une thèse qui exige l'être de l'un.

### *Parmenides' bad dream. About the last hypothesis of Plato's Parmenides (163b7-166c1)*

Here is how the old Parmenides summarizes, at the very end of Plato's *Parmenides*, the consequences drawn from the different versions of the two hypotheses on one, positive and negative, which occupy the whole second part of the dialogue: "[...] the one, if it is (one) or if it is not (one) (ἐν εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν), it and the others, both in their relationships to themselves and

to each other, are everything, in any way, and are not, appear and do not appear" (166c2-4). Reading this conclusion, it is difficult to see how the same Parmenides could have come to support his own thesis, as stated by Socrates at the beginning of the dialogue: ἐν φησ εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, "you say that everything is one" (128a8-b1). Insofar as there seems to be a gap between the logical conclusions drawn by Parmenides from the second part of the dialogue and the affirmation of his own thesis, involving the being of one, it seems necessary to me to try to propose an interpretation of such a gap. In doing so, I will not enter into the difficult question of how to interpret the Platonic reformulation of the thought of the historical Parmenides (cf. in particular the debate between Brisson and O'Brien, in A. Havlicek and F. Karfik (eds), *Plato's Parmenides, Proceedings of the fourth Symposium Platonicum Pragense*, Prague, Oikoumènè, 2005): my subject will only concern Parmenides as a character in Plato's eponymous dialogue.

What could have pushed Parmenides, in his *Poem* (as read by Plato), to defend a thesis involving the being of one, even though the conclusion of the long dialectical effort of the second part of the dialogue, by the obviously exhaustive list of contradictions it proposes, seems to make such a decision impossible? This question arises all the more, it seems to me, because this "laborious game" (137b1) which leads Parmenides to conclude the dialogue as he does presents itself as a demonstration, addressed to the young Socrates, of the type of exercise that it is necessary to practice beforehand in order to then be able to support, against any possible objection, a speech of truth (135d6, 136c5). The reading I would like to present does not aim to reduce this gap between two aspects of the Platonic Parmenides, but rather aims to attempt to interpret it as deliberate on the part of Plato, and philosophically significant.

It seems to me that one can find in the dialogue an explanation for Parmenides' choice in favour of a philosophical thesis implying one as being, despite the logical conclusions of the second part. Such an explanation could be found, I think, in the examination of the consequences of the final, most radical version of the last hypothesis (163b7-166c1): ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, "one, if it is not" (163c1). Examining the consequences of this hypothesis for the one-not-being leads Parmenides to draw up a (non-exhaustive) list of what, among beings, cannot be concerning it insofar as it is not: "from that one", "to that one" (τὸ ἐκείνου ἢ τὸ ἐκείνω), "something", "this" (ἢ τὸ τί ἢ τὸ τοῦτο), "from this", "from another", "to another" (ἢ τὸ τούτου ἢ ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλω), "formerly", "then", "now" (ἢ ποτὲ ἢ ἔπειτα ἢ νῦν), "science, opinion, sensation, speech or name" (ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δόξα ἢ αἴσθησις ἢ λόγος ἢ ὄνομα, 164a7-b2). And what appears when examining what follows for the others-than-one (not-being) is that, left to themselves to be others, they will be nothing to the extent that one is always involved in any determination. As a result: "one, if it is not, nothing ("not even one", οὐδέν) is" (166c1).

But even more than this radical verdict, it is the approach followed by Parmenides to achieve it that seems to me likely to provide an element of an answer to the issue I raised. The examination of the consequences of the non-being of one for the others, starting in 164b5, seems to me to mark a break in the general course of the exercise, i.e. the whole second part of the dialogue. It seems to me that Parmenides is distancing himself from the dianoetic acts on which the exercise is based, which is confirmed by an examination of the 4 occurrences of *διανοία* in this second part. Each of the two occurrences preceding our passage (164b5 ff.) is associated with a verb conjugated in the first person plural: Parmenides then assumes an act of thought in which he associates his listeners (143a7: τῇ διανοίᾳ ...λάβωμεν; 158c2: εἰ ἐθέλομεν τῇ διανοίᾳ ... ἀφελείν). But, once one is posed as absolutely non-being, the others are deprived of any determination and no longer allow themselves to be apprehended other than as a "mass" (ὄγκος) - a term that is itself illusory since such

semblances of unity appear only to a distant and "blunt" look (ἀμβλύ) to reveal themselves as unlimited pluralities to a closer and "sharp" look (ὀξύ). In this context, Parmenides no longer appropriates the act of grasping by thought, but describes it as external: "whenever *someone* grasps something by thought (τίς τι λάβη τῆ διανοία) as belonging to[these masses]..." (165a7-8); "it is necessary, I believe, to break and crumble all that is, and which *someone* grasps by thought (ὅ ἄν τις λάβη τῆ διανοία)" (165b4-6).

Now a mere spectator of these dianoetic operations, Parmenides can only deduce and note the abolition of everything that constitutes their object (which has been inevitable since 164a7-b2) - but also finally the abolition of any *subject* likely to carry out such acts of thought. If, in the absence of one, there is not even the possibility of seeing something (τι) appear in others, there is a risk that there will no longer be anyone (τις) either, even to be deceived. This world where, "suddenly (ἐξαίφνης), as in a sleeping dream" (164d2), the value given until then to any attempt to grasp an object by thought is reversed in its opposite and becomes synonymous with illusion and a blunt look: in such a world, Parmenides obviously could not be. One may then wonder whether the vertigo he felt in this "dream" caused by his attempt to imagine a world where the one would be nothing could not have contributed to his affirmation of a thesis that requires the being of the one.

### *Simplicius on the origin of the onto-epistemological parallelism between Parmenides and Plato's Parmenides*

The passage I will investigate is **SIMPL.**, in *Cael.* 556,3-560,10, in which the neoplatonist Commentator interprets **ARIST.**, *Cael.* III 1, 298b14-24. Before talking about the four elements of the sublunary sphere, he discusses the question if these elements of the sublunary world are subject to generation or not and firstly he criticizes the theories of the philosophers who preceded him, in particular Parmenides and Melissus, who deny coming-to-be and consider it only an apparent phenomenon (*ἀλλὰ μόνον δοκεῖν ἡμῖν*, **ARIST.**, *Cael.* III 1, 298b16). On the one hand Aristotle asserts that Parmenides and Melisso realized that the condition for a science of being can be that this latter refers to not generated and immobile objects and so ontologically stable (*τοιούτας δέ τινας νοῆσαι πρῶτοι φύσεις, εἴπερ ἔσται τις γνώσις ἢ φρόνησις*, *Cael.* III 1, 298b22-23); on the other hand, both at the same time do not admit any other essence aside from the sensible beings (*διὰ τὸ μὴθὲν μὲν ἄλλο παρὰ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσίαν ὑπολαμβάνειν εἶναι*, *Cael.* III 1, 298b21-22). Aristotle, from these two preconditions, concludes by saying that the Eleatics came to believe that the generation is only apparent (*Cael.* III 1, 298b21 ss.). Aristotle, in his reconstruction, comes to the conclusion that Parmenides and Melisso proceeded on the assumption of the isomorphism between the stability of the object and the incontrovertibility of the science itself. The Stagyrte considers this assumption correct according to which the science concerns to objects endowing ontological stability. Aristotle has pointed out that the Eleatics made the mistake without realizing, to have mixed physics and metaphysics: inasmuch they do not admit no other substance apart from sensible beings, their philosophy indeed is about nature, but they reject the idea of generation since the science of being deals with not generated immobile objects, they apply metaphysical reasoning to the sensible beings. (cf. **ARIST.**, *Cael.* III 1, 298b23-24, *οὕτω μετήνεγκαν ἐπὶ ταῦτα τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν λόγους*). All in all, Aristotle states that they do not argue in a proper way to the science of the nature (cf. **ARIST.**, *Cael.* III 1, 298b23, *οὐ φυσικῶς γε δεῖ νομίσαι λέγειν*).

Simplicius demonstrates that Aristotle's criticism is not properly aimed to refute Parmenides, but to avoid that superficial listeners are misled from the outward aspects of his doctrines. The Commentator is of the opinion that Parmenides' investigation is metaphysical and regards the intelligible world. In confirming this interpretation he quotes (and this is what is particularly interesting for us), with some differences from the text of Burnet, **PL.**, *Prm.* 135b8-c1 (*οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέψει τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξει, μὴ ἔων ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου τὴν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ εἶναι*, while in Simplicius' text, in *Cael.* 557,6-7, we read *οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέψει τις τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξει μὴ τῶν ἀιδίων εἰδῶν ὑποτιθεμένων εἶναι*), that is the famous passage in which the dramatic Parmenides, turning towards Socrates, says that who denies the theory of ideas will be quite at a loss, that is the theory that admits eternal entities which exist separately, since of the things that always flow, that is of the sensible, science can not be given (*τῶν γὰρ ἀεὶ ρεόντων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη*, in *Cael.* 557,5-6). Here we are immediately after the end of the discussion on the last group of problems concerning the presumed unknowability and uselessness of the ideas (*Prm.* 134b4-135b2) and soon thereafter (from *Prm.* 135c8) begins the so-called dialectical exercise. It is also interesting to give importance to the fact that in the dialogue

is the dramatic Parmenides to speak. In the first section of the dialogue, in fact, it is a young Socrate to defend dialectically the eidetic hypothesis against the objections made by the duo Zenone-Parmenides, for which reason Platone, before Simplicius, identifies a theoretical continuity between Eleaticism and his philosophy, pointing out in Parmenides a supporter of the onto-epistemological parallelism. Simplicius, as a good platonian, seems to grasp the suggestion that comes from Plato, and it is the only time in which Simplicius in *in de Caelo*, refers to *Parmenides*.

In Simplicius' opinion the historical Parmenides and the platonian Parmenides are, however, coinciding, so the platonian passage shows that Eleatics were the first philosophers that sensed the principle of the onto-epistemological parallelism. Aristotle's criticism to Parmenides in *Cael.* III 1 is then converted, through *Prm.* 135b8-c1, in a "historiographical" theory directed towards to integrate historical Parmenides in the platonian tradition and to be somehow the precursor.

The motif of the seeming feature of Aristotle's criticism to the predecessor philosopher is an authentic *leitmotiv* in Simplicius' commentaries to Aristotle, and it can be considered a powerful exegetical method that operates whenever the Commentator comes across in the aristotelian texts in which are contained criticisms or confutations of Platone or Presocratics. In Simplicius this method is useful to support a *symphonic historiography*, that is fairly different from Aristotle's concept of the history of philosophy (that is conventionally considered as a *dialectical historiography*), and it finds an overall agreement in the ancient thought, agreement that is dominated by platonism and it is useful to oppose to the spreading of Christian faith, that shortly afterwards will defeat and assimilate Greek philosophy, transforming it.

### *Simplicio sulla genesi del parallelismo onto-epistemologico tra Parmenide e il Parmenide di Platone*

Il passo che intendo prendere in esame è **SIMPL.**, in *Cael.* 556,3-560,10, in cui il Commentatore neoplatonico interpreta **ARIST.**, *Cael.* III 1, 298b14-24. Qui lo Stagirita, prima di parlare dei quattro elementi del mondo sublunare, affronta il problema se gli elementi del mondo sublunare siano soggetti a generazione oppure no, e innanzitutto critica le teorie di quei filosofi che lo hanno preceduto, nello specifico Parmenide e Melisso, che sopprimono il divenire e lo riducono a un fenomeno solo apparente (*ἀλλὰ μόνον δοκεῖν ἡμῖν*, **ARIST.**, *Cael.* III 1, 298b16). Aristotele, in particolare, dice da un lato che Parmenide e Melisso intuirono che la condizione affinché possa darsi una scienza dell'essere è che quest'ultima si rivolga a oggetti ingenerati e immobili, e dunque ontologicamente stabili (*τοιαύτας δὲ τινὰς νοῆσαι πρῶτοι φύσεις, εἴπερ ἔσται τις γνῶσις ἢ φρόνησις*, *Cael.* III 1, 298b22-23), e dall'altro lato che essi, allo stesso tempo, non ammettevano nessun'altra sostanza oltre a quella degli enti sensibili (*διὰ τὸ μηθὲν μὲν ἄλλο παρὰ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσίαν ὑπολαμβάνειν εἶναι*, *Cael.* III 1, 298b21-22). Da queste due premesse gli Eleati, conclude Aristotele, giunsero a ritenere che la generazione è soltanto apparente (*Cael.* III 1, 298b21 ss.). Nella ricostruzione di Aristotele, dunque, Parmenide e Melisso muovono dal presupposto dell'isomorfismo tra la stabilità dell'oggetto e l'incontrovertibilità della scienza che lo studia. Lo Stagirita giudica corretto questo presupposto secondo cui la scienza verte su oggetti dotati di stabilità ontologica e tuttavia, sempre secondo Aristotele, gli Eleati avrebbero commesso l'errore di mescolare senza accorgersene fisica e metafisica: in quanto essi non ammettevano, come sottolinea lo stesso Aristotele, nessun'altra sostanza oltre a quella degli enti sensibili, infatti, la loro filosofia verte

sulla natura, in quanto però negano la generazione perché la scienza dell'essere non può vertere se non su enti ingenerati e immobili essi applicano agli enti sensibili ragionamenti di ordine metafisico (cf. **ARIST.** *Cael.* III 1, 298b23-24, οὕτω μετήνεγκαν ἐπὶ ταῦτα τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν λόγους). In definitiva, dunque, bisogna ritenere, dice Aristotele, che essi non argomentarono in modo adeguato alla scienza della natura (cf. **ARIST.** *Cael.* III 1, 298b23, οὐ φυσικῶς γε δεῖ νομίσαι λέγειν).

Simplicio discute questa critica di Aristotele per mostrare che essa in realtà non è finalizzata a confutare Parmenide, ma solo a evitare che uditori superficiali, cioè apprendisti della filosofia, fossero fuorviati dagli aspetti più esteriori delle dottrine parmenidee, che al contrario vanno comprese nella loro verità più profonda. Il Commentatore ritiene che l'indagine di Parmenide sia di natura squisitamente metafisica e che riguardi l'intelligibile (περὶ τὰ ὑπὲρ τὴν φύσιν φιλοσοφοῦντας, in *Cael.* 556,19). A conferma di questa sua interpretazione però, ed è questo che è particolarmente interessante per noi, Simplicio cita, con qualche differenza rispetto al testo Burnet, **PL.**, *Prm.* 135b8-c1 (οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέψει τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξει, μὴ ἑῶν ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου τὴν αὐτὴν αἰε εἶναι, mentre nel testo di Simplicio, in *Cael.* 557,6-7, si legge οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέψει τις τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξει μὴ τῶν αἰδίων εἰδῶν ὑποτιθεμένων εἶναι), cioè il noto passo in cui il Parmenide drammatico, rivolgendosi a Socrate, dice che non si avrà dove rivolgere il pensiero qualora non si accolga la teoria delle idee, cioè quell'ipotesi che pone come esistenti in modo separato entità eterne, perché delle cose che sempre scorrono, cioè del sensibile, non si può dare scienza (τῶν γὰρ αἰε ρεόντων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, in *Cael.* 557,5-6). Ci troviamo immediatamente dopo la fine della discussione relativa all'ultimo gruppo di problemi concernenti la presunta inconoscibilità e inutilità delle idee (*Prm.* 134b4-135b2), e di lì a poco (a partire da *Prm.* 135c8) avrà inizio il cosiddetto esercizio dialettico. È interessante, altresì, assegnare una debita importanza al fatto che nel passo del dialogo è il Parmenide drammatico a parlare. Nella prima sezione del dialogo, infatti, è un giovane Socrate a difendere dialetticamente l'ipotesi eidetica a fronte delle obiezioni mosse dalla coppia eleatica Zenone-Parmenide, ragion per cui è Platone stesso, già ben prima di Simplicio, a individuare implicitamente una continuità teoretica fra l'Eleatismo e la propria filosofia, individuando in Parmenide un sostenitore del parallelismo onto-epistemologico. Simplicio, da buon platonico, sembra cogliere il suggerimento che gli proviene dallo stesso Platone e si tratta, va precisato, dell'unica volta che Simplicio, nell'*in de Caelo*, fa riferimento al *Parmenide*.

Il Parmenide storico e il Parmenide platonico sono per Simplicio coincidenti, per cui il passo platonico indicherebbe che gli Eleati furono i primi filosofi ad intuire il principio del parallelismo onto-epistemologico. La critica di Aristotele a Parmenide in *Cael.* III 1 viene allora convertita, tramite *Prm.* 135b8-c1, in una tesi "storiografica" volta a integrare il Parmenide storico nella tradizione platonica e a costituirne, in una certa misura, l'antesignano.

Il motivo del carattere solo apparente della critica di Aristotele ai filosofi che lo hanno preceduto, d'altra parte, è un autentico *leitmotiv* nei commentari di Simplicio ad Aristotele, e costituisce un metodo esegetico potente che opera tutte le volte in cui il Commentatore si imbatte in quei testi aristotelici nei quali sono contenute delle critiche o confutazioni nei confronti di Platone o dei Presocratici. Si tratta di un metodo che in Simplicio è direttamente funzionale a sorreggere quella che può essere considerata come una *storiografia sinfonica*, ben differente rispetto alla concezione della storia della filosofia secondo Aristotele (che convenzionalmente viene considerata una *storiografia dialettica*), e atta a trovare un accordo globale nel pensiero antico, accordo dominato dal platonismo e utile a combattere il dilagare di un cristianesimo che di lì a poco avrebbe in parte sconfitto la filosofia greca, e in parte l'avrebbe assimilata, trasformandola.



### *Prädikationen pros beauto im Parmenides als Aussagen über die Struktur von Ideen*

Constance Meinwald hat mit ihrer Monographie „Plato’s *Parmenides*“ (1991) eine neuartige Interpretation des gesamten Dialogs vorlegt, die sich hauptsächlich auf dessen zweiten Teil bezieht. Sie vertritt darin die Auffassung, dass die Konklusionen aller acht Ableitungen im zweiten Dialogteil einander nicht widersprechen, sondern dass mit allen acht Konklusionen von ein und demselben Gegenstand, dem Einen (bzw. der Idee Einheit, *to hen*), Kompatibles ausgesagt wird. Ihre Argumentation beruht auf der Unterscheidung zwischen zwei Prädikationsarten, Prädikationen in Bezug auf anderes (*pros ta alla*) und Prädikationen in Bezug auf das Subjekt der Prädikation selbst (*pros beauto*). Die Unterscheidung sei dazu geeignet, aufzuzeigen, dass die Konklusionen aller acht Ableitungen im zweiten Teil wahre und konsistente Aussagen über denselben Gegenstand enthalten, und sie sollen eine Möglichkeit eröffnen, die Argumente des Dritten Menschen im ersten Teil des *Parmenides* zu parieren.

Der Vortrag geht von Meinwalds Unterscheidung zweier Prädikationsarten im *Parmenides* aus, wobei das Hauptinteresse den Prädikationen *pros beauto* gilt. Zunächst soll untersucht werden, ob und inwieweit sich im *Parmenides* diese Art von Prädikationen eindeutig identifizieren lässt. Im Zentrum steht die Frage, inwiefern sich Prädikationen *pros beauto* als Prädikationen über die Natur einer Sache bzw. einer Idee explizieren lassen. Ziel des Vortrags ist es aufzuzeigen, dass Prädikationen *pros beauto* innerhalb von Platons dihairetischem Definitionsmodell, wie es sich insbesondere im *Sophistes* und im *Politikos* findet, eine zentrale Bedeutung zukommt. Nebenbei soll diskutiert werden, ob und inwieweit die Unterscheidung zweier Prädikationsarten dazu geeignet ist, die Schwierigkeiten im ersten und zweiten Dialogteil aufzulösen.

(1) *Meinwalds Interpretationsansatz*: Der zweite Teil des *Parmenides* wird im Gespräch zwischen dem jungen Sokrates und Parmenides als eine Übung (*gymnasia*) angekündigt, die den Zweck hat, jemanden zu befähigen, besser mit den aufgeworfenen Schwierigkeiten umzugehen (*Prm.* 135d7). Die folgende Übung gliedert sich in acht Abschnitte, die sich jeweils als Ableitungen verstehen lassen. Den ersten vier Ableitungen liegt die Hypothese zugrunde, dass es das Eine gibt, den anderen vier Ableitungen liegt die Negation dieser Hypothese zugrunde. In den Ableitungen wird ausgehend von der jeweiligen Hypothese danach gefragt, zum einen was dem Einen in Beziehung auf es selbst zukommt und was ihm in Beziehung auf anderes zukommt und zum anderen was dem anderen in Beziehung auf das Eine zukommt und was dem anderen in Beziehung auf es selbst zukommt.

Meinwald richtet sich mit ihrem Interpretationsansatz einerseits gegen den „Rejektionismus“ (Ryle, Moravcsik, von Kutschera), nach dem die Konklusionen der acht Ableitungen widersprüchlich sind, und andererseits gegen den „Multisubjektivismus“ (neuplatonische Deutungen), nach dem die Ergebnisse der Ableitungen nur scheinbar widersprüchlich sind und der Anschein auf der irrtümlichen Annahme beruht, dass mit allen Konklusionen Aussagen über denselben Gegenstand gemacht werden, während sie tatsächlich von

verschiedenen Gegenständen handeln. Meinwald geht dagegen davon aus, dass (i) alle Konklusionen korrekt gefolgert werden, diese sich (ii) nur scheinbar widersprechen und (iii) in allen Ableitungen über denselben Gegenstand gesprochen wird. Ihre Argumentation fußt auf der Annahme, dass Platon im ersten Dialogteil eine systematische Unterscheidung zwischen zwei Prädikationsarten entwickelt, die er im zweiten Teil zur Auflösung der scheinbaren Widersprüche anwendet.

(2) *Unterscheidung zweier Prädikationsarten*: Laut Meinwald ist ein Satz der Form „A ist F *pros* C“ mehrdeutig, weil aus dem Satzschema nicht eindeutig hervorgeht, in welchem Sinn die Präposition „*pros*“ in Verbindung mit dem für „C“ einzusetzenden Ideennamen verwendet wird. Die Präposition kann einerseits zur Bezeichnung der Teilhaberrelation verwendet werden, so dass der Satz als gewöhnliche Prädikation zu verstehen ist. Mit dem Satz „Sokrates ist weise *pros* Weisheit“ wird demnach ausgesagt, dass Sokrates wegen seiner Teilhabebeziehung zur Idee Weisheit weise ist. Solche Prädikationen nennt Meinwald Prädikationen *pros ta alla* (PTA-Prädikation), weil hier über das Subjekt der Aussage in Beziehung auf etwas anderes etwas ausgesagt wird.

Andererseits könne die Präposition „*pros*“ auch für eine grundsätzlich andere Prädikationsart verwendet werden, die Meinwald Prädikation *pros beauto* (PH-Prädikation) nennt. Wird ein Satz der Form „A ist F *pros* C“ als PH-Prädikation verwendet, so wird damit etwas über die innere Struktur der Natur einer Idee und die internen Relationen der Ideen untereinander gesagt (Meinwald 1991, 71; Meinwald 1992, 379). Unter der Natur einer Idee F-heit sei das zu verstehen, was es heißt, F zu sein. Dass mit einem PH-Satz etwas über die innere Natur einer Idee ausgesagt wird, hieße also, dass damit erläutert wird, was es heißt, (ein) F zu sein, d.h. was zum Wesen eines F-Dinges gehört. Dabei sei die innere Natur einer Idee F-heit insofern strukturiert, als es zum (ein) F-Sein gehört, auch bestimmte andere Dinge zu sein. So ist beispielsweise die Idee Mensch strukturiert, weil es auch zum Mensch-Sein zählt, ein Lebewesen und vernunftbegabt zu sein.

Diese innere Strukturierung von Ideen lässt sich mit Baumdiagrammen veranschaulichen, die an Linnés Klassifikationssystem angelehnt sind. Ein Baumdiagramm bildet die Struktur einer Gattung und dieser entsprechend die Struktur der Natur einer Idee ab. So lassen sich von jeder Art (z.B. Mensch) die übergeordnete Gattung (Lebewesen), die Art selbst (Mensch) und die verschiedenen Spezifika (z.B. Vernunftbesitz), die diese Art von anderen Arten derselben Gattung unterscheiden, korrekt aussagen. Dabei wird mit solchen Aussagen eine Aussage über sämtliche Exemplare einer Art und es wird etwas über die Zusammenhänge der Ideen untereinander ausgedrückt, da die Teilhabeverhältnisse der Sinnendinge notwendigerweise auf jenen Zusammenhängen beruhen.

Eine alternative Erklärung des Aussagegehalts von PH-Sätzen besteht darin, zu sagen, dass eine wahre PH-Prädikation über eine Idee F-heit das enthält, was der F-heit gemäß der Definition zukommt (Peterson 1996; Frances 1996). Das heißt, dass sich alles, was im Definiens der F-heit enthalten ist, korrekt mit PH-Prädikationen von der F-heit aussagen lässt.

(3) *PH-Prädikationen als Aussagen über die Struktur von Ideen*: Der Vortrag argumentiert dafür, dass es sich bei der Struktur der Natur der Ideen und den internen Zusammenhängen der Ideen untereinander, die durch korrekte PH-Sätze abgebildet werden, um *metaphysische* Notwendigkeiten (im Sinne Kripkes) und nicht um *erkenntnistheoretische* handelt. Um dies zu sehen, ist eine Analyse selbstprädikativer PH-Sätze wie „Die Gerechtigkeit ist gerecht“

aufschlussreich. Meinwald deutet selbstprädikative PH-Sätze als Identitätsaussagen, in denen die Natur einer Idee mit ihr selbst identifiziert wird. Demzufolge wird mit selbstprädikativen PH-Prädikationen die erkenntnistheoretische Notwendigkeit ausgedrückt, dass die Idee F-heit mit sich selbst identisch ist.

Im Vortrag soll gezeigt werden, warum dies nicht zutrifft. Derartige Identitätsaussagen müssten durch PTA-Prädikationen ausgedrückt werden („Die Gerechtigkeit ist mit dem Gerechten identisch *pros* Idee Identität“): die Idee Gerechtigkeit ist mit sich selbst identisch, weil sie an der Idee Identität teilhat, d.h. sie ist mit sich selbst identisch in Beziehung auf (*pros*) die Idee Identität. Ich möchte einen alternativen Vorschlag formulieren, wie wahre selbstprädikative PH-Sätze zu verstehen sind, wenn damit eine Aussage über die internen Relationen der Ideen untereinander gemacht wird. Hierfür werde ich das Modell der dihairetischen Definitionen im *Sophistes* und *Politikos* zur Erklärung heranziehen.

Im Ergebnis möchte ich den Interpretationsansatz Meinwalds weiterentwickeln. Eine Modifikation ihrer Analyse ist erforderlich, um den Aussagegehalt von PH-Prädikationen (insbesondere von selbstprädikativen PH-Sätzen) präziser zu erfassen und um mögliche Gegenbeispiele gegen ihren Lösungsversuch, die Argumente des Dritten Menschen zu parieren, abzuwehren (Durrant 1997; Frances 1996; Pelletier/Zalta 2000).

### *Predications pros heauto in the Parmenides as statements on the structure of Forms*

In her monograph "Plato's *Parmenides*" (1991), Constance Meinwald presents a new interpretation of the dialogue, which mainly refers to its second part. She argues that the conclusions of all eight hypotheses in the second part do not contradict each other but rather refer consistently to one and the same object, the One (to *hen*). Her argumentation is based on the distinction between two types of predication: predication in relation to others (*pros ta alla*) and predication in relation to the thing itself, i.e. to the subject of predication (*pros heauto*). In her eyes, the distinction is intended (i) to show that the conclusions of all hypotheses in the second part contain true and consistent statements on the same subject and (ii) to rebut the arguments of the Third Man in the first part.

The talk proceeds from Meinwald's distinction between two types of predication in the *Parmenides*, focusing mainly on predications *pros heauto*. First, I will examine whether and to what extent this type of predication can be identified in the *Parmenides*. The main question is in what sense predications *pros heauto* can be explicated as predications about the nature of a thing, i.e. a Form. The aim of the talk is to show that predications *pros heauto* play a crucial role in Plato's dihairetic model of definition, as found in the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*. In addition, I will discuss the extent to which the distinction between these types of predication can resolve the difficulties in the first and second parts of the dialogue.

(1) *Meinwald's approach*: The second part of the *Parmenides* is introduced in the conversation between the young Socrates and Parmenides as an exercise (*gymnasia*) for the purposes of enabling someone to deal better with the difficulties raised (*Prm.* 135d7). The exercise is divided into eight sections, each of which can be understood as a deduction with a partial result. The first four deductions are based on the hypothesis that the One is; the other four deductions are

based on the negation of this hypothesis. In every deduction, it is asked (i) what the One has in relation to itself and what it has in relation to the other and (ii) what the other has in relation to the One and what the other has in relation to itself.

Meinwald's interpretation is directed on the one hand against a position called "rejectionism" (Ryle, Moravcsik, von Kutschera), according to which the conclusions of the eight deductions are contradictory; on the other hand, it is directed against a position called "multisubjectivism" (Neoplatonic interpretations), according to which the results of the deductions only appear contradictory, where the appearance arises from the misleading assumption that all conclusions make statements about the same object, although they actually deal with different objects. Meinwald, by contrast, assumes that all of the conclusions (i) result from deductions, (ii) only seem to contradict each other, and (iii) refer to the same subject. Her argumentation is based on the presumption that in the first part Plato develops a systematic distinction between two types of predication, which he uses in the second part to resolve the apparent contradictions.

(2) *Two types of predication*: According to Meinwald, a sentence of the form "A is F *pros* C" is ambiguous because the sentence schema does not clearly indicate the sense in which the preposition "*pros*" is used in connection with "C" to designate a Form. On the one hand, the preposition can be used to denote the relation of participation, so that the sentence is to be understood as an ordinary predication. The sentence "Socrates is wise *pros* wisdom" thus states that Socrates is wise because of his participation in the Form Wisdom. Meinwald calls such statements predications *pros ta alla* (PTA-predication) because here something is said about the subject of the predication in relation to some other thing.

On the other hand, "*pros*" could also be used for a fundamentally different type of predication, which Meinwald calls predication *pros heauto* (PH-predication). If a sentence of the form "A is F *pros* C" is used as PH-predication, something is said about the internal structure of the nature of a Form and the internal relations between the Forms. "The nature of a Form F-ness" designates what it means to be (an) F. The fact that a PH-predication expresses something about the inner nature of a Form therefore means that it explains what it means to be (an) F, i.e. the essence of being (an) F. The inner nature of a Form is structured to the extent that being F includes being certain other things as well. For example, the Form Human is structured because being human also means being a living being and being rational.

This internal structure of Forms can be illustrated with tree diagrams inspired by Linné's classification system. A tree diagram represents the structure of a genus and its species and, accordingly, the structure of the nature of a Form. Thus, one can correctly predicate of each species (e.g. human beings) the respective superior genus (living beings), the species itself (human beings), and the various specific features (e.g. rationality) which distinguish this species from other species of the same genus. Such statements both predicate something about all exemplars of a species and are statements about the internal relationships among the Forms, since the participation relations of sensible things are necessarily based on them.

An alternative explanation of the content of PH-predications is to say that a true PH-predication about a Form F-ness contains what is true of F-ness *according to its definition* (Peterson 1996, 171; Frances 1996, 50). In other words: everything contained in the definition of F-ness can be correctly stated in PH-predications about F-ness.

(3) *PH-Predications as statements on the structure of Forms*: The aim of my talk is to argue that the structure of the nature of Forms and the internal relations between Forms, which are expressed by correct PH-predications, are *metaphysical* necessities (in Kripke's sense), not epistemological ones. To see this, an analysis of PH-self-predications such as "Justice is just" is revealing. Meinwald interprets PH-self-predications as identity statements in which the nature of a Form is identified with itself. This assumes that an epistemological necessity such as "The Form F-ness is identical to itself" is expressed by a PH-self-predication.

I will show, however, why this is not the case. Such identity statements would have to be expressed through PTA-predications ("Justice is identical with the Just *pros* the Form Identity"); the Form Justice is identical with itself because it participates in the Form Identity (is identical with itself in relation to (*pros*) the Form Identity). The talk ends with a suggestion as to how true PH-self-predications are to be understood when a statement is made about the internal relations between Forms by using the model of dihairetic definitions in the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*.

My aim is to further develop Meinwald's approach. A modification of her analysis is necessary in order to grasp the meaning of PH-predications more precisely (in particular of PH-self-predications) and to resist possible counter-examples against her rebuttal of the arguments of the Third Man.

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### *Plato's Parmenides and the Problem of Separation*

The Platonic Form is often characterized through its separation from the sensible world. The separation is hence one of the most well-known features of Plato's ontology. In *Phaedo*, Socrates asserts that the soul as an ontological entity is not the same as the body (*Phaedo* 80a-b), and the philosopher should practice the death, which means the liberation and the separation of the soul from the body (λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος) (*Phaedo* 67e-d, 80e). This kind of ontological difference between the sensible and the intellectual world will be repeatedly stressed in *Republic* and some other middle dialogues. Nevertheless, separation seems to be a difficulty for Plato's theory of Form in his later dialogues. In the first part of *Parmenides*, six arguments are introduced to criticize Plato's theory of Form. It is remarkable that this passage (*Parmenides* 130a-134e) begins and ends with the problem of separation. At the beginning, Parmenides repeats Plato's viewpoint that the Form is separated (χωρῖς) from those who participate in it (*Parmenides* 130b)<sup>1</sup>. Then he asks for a clarification about how the Form could relate to the sensible objects. However, Socrates' interpretations prove to be problematic by Parmenides, and the ontological dependence of the sensible objects on the Form seems to be impossible. In the end, Parmenides shows that the total separation leads to the unknowability of the Form (*Parmenides* 133a-134e).

Although these difficulties in the first part constitute serious challenges for the theory of Form, it seems that Plato gives no certain answer to them besides the eight deductions in the second part of this dialogue. Therefore, some scholars endorse the interpretation that *Parmenides* represents the crisis of the theory of Form and Plato's "intellectual honesty" (Vlastos); but this is controversial, because it contradicts the fact that Plato hasn't given up his theory of Form in *Timaeus* and *Sophist*. For this reason, the interconnection among different Forms in *Sophist* is sometimes regarded as Plato's reaction to the problem of separation in *Parmenides*. But it's still not clear if Plato has tried to solve this problem in the second part of *Parmenides*. The eight deductions are mainly discussed from the logical point of view since long time, and the problem of separation that is put up in the first part is more or less neglected. Nevertheless, if we take into consideration that Parmenides says that the exercise in the second part is helpful for Socrates (*Parmenides* 135c-136c), it seems that Plato should have discussed the problem of separation in the second part more or less.

To clarify these difficulties is the aim of this paper. I will concentrate on two aspects. On the one hand, I will show what role does the problem of separation play in the first part of *Parmenides*, not only for Plato but also for the Eleatics, on the other side, I will discuss how Plato deals with the problem of separation in the second part of this dialogue. My theses are follows.

1. The problem of separation has two aspects, namely the difference and the connection. After Plato has introduced the separately existing Form in his philosophy, he needs to explain how the sensible objects relate to the Form. Correspondingly, six arguments in the first part of *Parmenides* could be divided into two groups. The first five arguments are the Eleatics' criticism on the connection between the Form and the sensible objects, while the

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<sup>1</sup> *Parmenides* 130b: καὶ μοι εἰπέ, αὐτὸς σὺ οὕτω διήρησαι ὡς λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἶδη αὐτὰ ἅπτα, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὐτὸ μετέχοντα;

last one is concerned about the difference between them.

2. One important reason for the “biggest” difference is that Socrates fails to give a convincing interpretation of how the Form relates to the sensible objects. This leads to the conclusion that both of them are so different that any connection between them is impossible. The total separation is hence inevitable. In order to avoid this aporia, Plato has to take both sides into account and to combine the difference and the connection in his theory together. It is hence important to discuss, **if** and **how** the Form is separated from the sensible objects in one sense and not separated in another.
3. In *Parmenides*, Plato gives a positive answer to the if-question. In the first four deductions, deduction 1 and 4 are about the difference, while 2 and 4 about the connection. Therefore, the One and the Many are separated and not separated at the same time. However, Plato hasn't answered the how-question through the eight deductions. His theory still lacks a crucial interpretation of participation, namely how the sensible world could come to be from the mixture of ontological principles.

Where is Plato's clarification of γένεσις of sensible Beings? There seems to be three possibilities. It could be Platonic “unwritten doctrines”, as the supporters of the “Tübingen School” claim<sup>1</sup>, or the theory of interconnection among different Forms in *Sophist*, or the myth of the coming-to-be of the sensible world in *Timaeus*. (In the appendix of the second deduction, Plato mentions the possibility of the fusing of Beings and non-Beings in “sudden” (ἐξαίφνης) (*Parmenides* 155e-157b). This may suggest that the mixture of different principles and the coming-to-be of the sensible world can only be discussed outside the structure of time, just as Plato shows in *Timaeus*.) No matter which possibility people prefer, one thing is certain that in *Parmenides* Plato actually only makes sure that both sides of the problem of separation (the difference and the connection) are possible, but almost says nothing about the exact relationship between the One and the Many. The aim of the second part of *Parmenides*, is perhaps only, as Plato says elsewhere, to help his readers be “capable of discerning a single thing that is also by nature capable of encompassing many” (*Phaedrus* 266b)<sup>2</sup>.

### *Der Platonische Parmenides und das Problem der Getrenntheit*

Platonische Idee wird häufig durch ihre Getrenntheit von der sinnlichen Welt charakterisiert. Deswegen gehört die Getrenntheit zu den bekanntesten Merkmalen der Ontologie Platons. In *Phaidon* behauptet Sokrates, die Seele als eine ontologische Entität sei anders als der Körper (*Phaidon* 80a-b), und der Philosoph solle den Tod einüben, den die Befreiung und die Getrenntheit der Seele vom Körper (λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος) bedeutet (*Phaidon* 67e-d, 80e). Dieser ontologische Unterschied zwischen der sinnlichen und der intellektuellen Welt wird auch in *Politeia* (*Rep.* 514a ff.) und anderen Dialogen der mittleren Zeit betont. Allerdings scheint die Getrenntheit in späten Dialogen eine Schwierigkeit für Platons Ideenlehre zu sein. Im ersten Teil des *Parmenides* sind sechs Argumente einzuführen, um die platonische Ideenlehre zu kritisieren. Bemerkenswert ist es, dass sich der Anfang und das Ende dieser Passage (*Parmenides* 130a-134e) auf das Problem der Getrenntheit beziehen: Zuerst wiederholt Parmenides die

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1 They intend to regard the first two deductions as the description of two ultimate principles (the One and the Indefinite Dyad).

2 *Phaedrus* 266b: δυνατόν εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ πεφυκόθ' ὄραν.

platonische Auffassung, dass Ideen von den, was an ihnen teilhaben, getrennt (*χωρίς*) existieren (*Parmenides* 130b)<sup>1</sup>. Danach verlangt Parmenides eine klare Erklärung über die Beziehung zwischen den Ideen und den Sinnlichen. Jedoch erweisen sich die Auffassungen des Sokrates, dass die sinnlichen Gegenstände in verschiedener Weise an Ideen teilhaben können, vom Gesichtspunkt des Parmenides als problematisch. Zu Ende zeigt Parmenides im letzten Argument, dass die völlige Getrenntheit zur Unfassbarkeit der Ideen führt (*Parmenides* 133a-134e).

Obwohl diese Schwierigkeiten im ersten Teil als Herausforderungen für die getrennt existierenden Ideen bezeichnet werden, scheint es so, dass Platon im zweiten Teil des *Parmenides* außer den achten Hypothesen keine ausdrückliche Lösung gibt. Deswegen bevorzugen viele Forscher die Interpretation, dass *Parmenides* die Krise der Ideenlehre und Platons „intellektuelle Ehrlichkeit“ (intellectual honesty) (Vlastos) präsentiert. Dies ist aber umstritten, weil es mit der folgenden Tatsache schwer zu vereinbaren ist, dass Platon in *Timaios* und *Sophistes* die Ideenlehre nicht aufgibt. Aus diesem Grund sieht man manchmal die Verflechtung der Ideen in *Sophistes* als den Lösungsvorschlag Platons, um die Schwierigkeit der Getrenntheit in *Parmenides* zu vermeiden. Doch bleibt die Frage offen, ob und wie Platon im zweiten Teil des *Parmenides* diese Schwierigkeit behandelt. Deshalb ist es nötig, das Ziel der achten Deduktionen im zweiten Teil zu erläutern. Seit langer Zeit werden diese Deduktionen hauptsächlich vom logischen Standpunkt betrachtet und diskutiert. Das im ersten Teil aufgestellte Problem der Getrenntheit steht bis heute nicht immer im Zentrum der Forschung und wird mehr oder wenig vernachlässigt. Aber man darf gewiss nicht das ignorieren, dass Parmenides nach seinen sechs Argumenten gegen Ideenlehre noch annimmt, dass die Übungen im zweiten Teil hilfreich für Sokrates seien (*Parmenides* 135c-136c). Impliziert es nicht, dass Platon im zweiten Teil in einer gewissen Weise auf das Problem der Getrenntheit im ersten Teil reagiert?

Um Platons Reaktion auf das Problem der Getrenntheit in *Parmenides* zu erläutern, ist die Aufgabe dieser Arbeit. Ich möchte mich auf zwei Aspekte konzentrieren. Einerseits will ich zeigen, welche Rolle das Problem der Getrenntheit für Platon selbst und auch für die Eleaten in den Argumenten des ersten Teils des *Parmenides* spielt, andererseits will ich antworten, ob und in welchem Sinne Platon im zweiten Teil des Dialogs auf das Problem der Getrenntheit reagiert. Mein Hauptziel hier ist, um die folgenden Thesen zu verteidigen.

(1) Das Problem der Getrenntheit besteht tatsächlich aus zwei Seiten, nämlich Unterschied und Zusammenhang. Nachdem Platon die getrennt existierenden Ideen eingeführt hat, muss er noch klar machen, wie sich die Sinnliche auf sie beziehen können. Dementsprechend können die sechs Argumente im ersten Teil in zwei Gruppen geteilt werden. Die ersten fünf Argumente sind die eleatische Kritik am Zusammenhang zwischen den Ideen und den Sinnlichen, und das letzte die am Unterschied zwischen den beiden.

(2) Eine wichtige Ursache der „größten“ Schwierigkeit, und zwar der Unfassbarkeit der Ideen, liegt darin, dass Sokrates scheitert, eine überzeugende Interpretation des Zusammenhangs zwischen den Ideen und den Sinnlichen zu geben. Daher ist die völlige Getrenntheit unvermeidbar. Um diese Aporie zu vermeiden, muss Platon dessen beide Seiten berücksichtigen, nicht nur den Unterschied, sondern auch den Zusammenhang. Deshalb ergibt sich zwei Fragen, **ob** und **wie** die Ideen getrennt in einem Sinne, und ungetrennt in anderem existieren können.

(3) Platon gibt in *Parmenides* eine positive Antwort auf die Ob-Frage. In den ersten vier Hypothesen z. B., richten Hypothese 1 und 4 auf den Unterschied, 2 und 3 auf den

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<sup>1</sup> *Parmenides* 130b: *καί μοι εἰπέ, αὐτὸς σὺ οὕτω διήρησαι ὡς λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἶδη αὐτὰ ἅπτα, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὐτὸ μετέχοντα;*



Zusammenhang. Es wird verteidigt, das Eine und das Viele seien getrennt miteinander in einer Sichtweise, und ungetrennt in anderer. Die Wie-Frage behandelt Platon in *Parmenides* aber nicht. Es fehlt noch eine Interpretation, wie die sinnliche Welt aus der Mischungen der ontologischen Prinzipien erzeugt wird.

Wo ist aber Platons Erklärung für γένεσις der sinnlichen Objekte? Drei Möglichkeiten sind vorhanden. Sie könnte Platons „ungeschriebene Lehre“ sein, wie die Vertreter der „Tübinger Schule“<sup>1</sup> behaupten, oder die Theorie der Verflechtung der Ideen in *Sophistes*, oder der Mythos der Weltentstehung in *Timaios*. (Im Appendix nach der zweiten Hypothese erwähnt Platon die Möglichkeit der Verschmelzung des Seienden und des Nicht-Seienden in „Augenblick“ (ἐξαιφνης) (*Parmenides* 155e-157b). Das heißt vielleicht, dass die Mischung der ontologischen Prinzipien und das Werden der sinnlichen Welt nur außer der Struktur der Zeit dargestellt werden können, genau wie Platon in *Timaios* zeigt.) Auf jeden Fall kann man eine Tatsache feststellen, dass Platon in *Parmenides* nur die Möglichkeit des Unterschieds und die des Zusammenhangs sichert, die genaue Beziehung zwischen dem Eine und dem Viele aber nicht völlig erläutert. Das Ziel des zweiten Teils des *Parmenides* ist vielleicht nur, wie Platon anderswo spricht, „auf eines zu blicken, auch wenn es an vieles gewachsen ist“ (*Phaidros* 266b).<sup>2</sup>

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1 Sie bevorzugen, die ersten zwei Hypothesen als Platons Beschreibung der höchsten Prinzipien – das absolute Eine und die unbestimmte Zweiheit – zu betrachten.

2 *Phaidros* 266b: δυνατόν εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ πεφυκόθ' ὄραν.

## *How do the eight hypotheses in Parmenides come into light? – Chiasmus as a method of division*

### **0. Introduction**

In analyzing the transitional part between the first and second part of *Parmenides* (135b-137c), this paper focuses on the way how the hypotheses are brought into light. First, except for the dihairesis (διαίρεσις), another method of division is introduced, namely cross-division terminologically called chiasmus (χιασμή). The hypotheses come into light based on the chiasmus – this fact is also justified by Proclus. In commenting *Parmenides*, Proclus uses the same chiastic method. Moreover, Plato makes a use of chiasmus not only in *Parmenides* but also in *Politicus*. Finally, the relationship between chiasmus and diairesis is taken into consideration by introducing Aristotle’s application of chiasmus. For Plato, Aristotle and Proclus apply the chiasmus in many cases, the application of chiasmus should not be regarded as an exceptional case. Rather, the chiasmus is a philosophical method which is universally applicable.

### **1. Plato’s *Parmenides* (135b-137c)**

At the end of the first part of the dialogue, Parmenides points out that, to understand the idea in a proper and better way, one needs a gymnastic training which is composed of some hypotheses. Based on the scheme Parmenides provides in the text, the hypotheses can be reconstructed in the following way: what follows, when the one exists – that is in the one with respect to the one and with respect to the others as well as in the others with respect to the one and with respect to the others; what follows, when the one does not exist – that is in the one with respect to the one and with respect to the others as well as in the others with respect to the one and with respect to the others.

There are two contradictory premises: when the one exist and when the one does not exist. In the hypotheses which infer from the affirmative premise, there are two contrary pairs: “in the one – in the others” and “with respect to the one – with respect to the others”. When those two pairs cross with each other, a cross-division, terminologically called chiasmus, occurs. There are two chiasmen which have the same structure. Their difference lies merely in the premise: the premise of the first chiasmus is an affirmative statement and that of the second chiasmus is a negative statement.

Diagram 1 (εἰ τὸ ἓν ἔστιν)

	πρὸς τὸ ἓν	πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα
τῷ ἓνι	I ὑπόθεσις	II ὑπόθεσις

τοῖς ἄλλοις	III ὑπόθεσις	IV ὑπόθεσις
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Diagram 2 (εἰ τὸ ἐν μὴ ἔστιν)

	πρὸς τὸ ἐν	πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα	As
τῷ ἐνὶ	V ὑπόθεσις	VI ὑπόθεσις	
τοῖς ἄλλοις	VII ὑπόθεσις	VIII ὑπόθεσις	

illuminated, a chiasmus consists of a fourfold division and two chiasmen as two fourfold divisions lead to an eightfold division. Because of emerging from two chiasmen, the hypotheses cannot be counted as nine but should be regarded as eight. Nothing but the chiasmic method determines as well as guarantees the number of hypotheses.

## 2. Proclus In Platonis Parmenidem Commentaria, 622: 18-623: 19 (Carlos Steel ed.)

Proclus as a significant commentator of Plato's works is fully aware of the chiasmic method. In commenting the text in which Plato speaks of the gymnastic training, Proclus applies the chiasmic method of division. First, Proclus agrees with Plato that in terms of the hypotheses, there are two contradictory premises (622: 24-26). Then, Proclus takes a heritage of the Platonic chiasmus, making a little modification. According to Proclus, both in the affirmative and in the negative premise, there is not only one chiasmus (as Plato asserts that), but there should be three chiasmen respectively. When the one exists, we should consider (622: 26-623: 4): (1) what follows, (2) what does not follow and (3) what both follows and does not follow. Those are three aspects in which Proclus looks at the hypotheses. Since there is a fourfold division in each aspect, in three aspects, three fourfold divisions are reconstructed. So, when the one exists, we should investigate (623: 4-12): (1) what follows, if the one exists in itself and in the others, both with respect to itself and with respect to the others; (2) what does not follow, if the one exists in itself and in the others, both with respect to itself and with respect to the others; (3) what follows and does not follow, if the one exists in itself and in the others, both with respect to itself and with respect to the others. It is likewise with the negative premise (when the one does not exist).

By adding the triple aspects, Proclus respectively trebles the two Platonic chiasmen. In terms of the affirmative premise, therefore, Proclus speaks of three chiasmen and counts the hypotheses as twelve. In terms of the negative premise, correspondingly, there should be also three chiasmen and twelve hypotheses. Crucial is that Proclus, although he counts more hypotheses than

Plato, completely agrees with Plato that the hypotheses must be classified by means of the chiasmus.

It is well-known that Proclus is the first and the most famous figure who insists on the nine hypotheses (1039: 5-1040: 17). In that case, Proclus should not be regarded as a commentator but as a philosopher. As a philosopher, Proclus aims to articulate his own philosophical thesis by commenting on the Platonic dialogues. When he primarily plays the role of a commentator, however, he takes what Plato says seriously and applies the Platonic method to classify the hypotheses as well as determinate the number of them.

### 3. Plato's *Politicus* (291c-292b; 297b-303b)

To classify different kinds of constitution, Plato also applies the chiasmus in *Politicus*. While all the above-mentioned chiasmen are conducted in the structure of 2X2, the chiasmus in *Politicus* has a structure of 3X2. On the one hand, Plato divides the constitution into three kinds in which one ruler, few or many rulers govern respectively (302c4-6; 291c7-d11). On the other hand, Plato makes a twofold division of the constitution by adding another criterion "legal-illegal". A constitution is legal or illegal, depending on that rulers govern according to the law or against the law (302e5-8). So, there are two pairs of criterions: "one-few-many" and "legal-illegal". When the two pairs cross with each other, a cross-division occurs. Since the chiasmus has a structure of 3X2, a sixfold division comes out.

	μοναρχία	ὀλίγων ἀρχή	πολλῶν ἀρχή
ἐννομ ον	βασιλική	ἀριστοκρατία	δημοκρατία
παράνο μον	τυραννική	ὀλιγαρχία	δημοκρατία

By means of the chiasmus, constitutions are classified into six kinds: (1) the constitution in which one ruler governs according to the law is called kingdom; (2) the constitution in which one ruler governs against the law is called tyranny; (3) the constitution in which few rulers govern according to the law is named aristocracy; (4) the constitution in which few rulers govern against the law is named oligarchy; (5) and (6) the constitution in which many rulers govern, whether according to or against the law, is named democracy (291e1-8; 302d1-e2).

### 4. Aristotle: Relationship between chiasmus and diairesis

Chiasmus as a method of division is not just connected with diairesis, but it is rather rooted in it. Under certain conditions, chiasmus can be attributed to diairesis. For example, the above-mentioned chiasmus Plato introduces in *Politicus* is conducted in a diairetic way. Furthermore, we should take Aristotle's application of chiasmus into consideration because Aristotle not only applies the chiasmus but he also clarifies the relationship of chiasmus to diairesis.

# Wie kommen die acht Hypothesen in Parmenides zustande – Chiasmus als Einteilungsmethode

## 0. Einleitung

In der vorliegenden Arbeit thematisiere ich den Übergang vom ersten Teil zum zweiten Teil des *Parmenides* (135b-137c) und lege den Akzent darauf, wie die Hypothesen zustande gebracht werden. Zuerst lässt sich darlegen, dass es außer der Dihairesis (διαίρεσις) eine andere Einteilungsmethode gibt, nämlich Chiasmus (χιαστική). Die Tatsache, dass die Hypothesen anhand des Chiasmus zum Vorschein kommen, lässt sich auch von Proklos bestätigen, indem er sich in seinem Kommentar zu *Parmenides* den Chiasmus vor Augen führt. Dann lässt sich aufzeigen, dass Plato den Chiasmus nicht nur in *Parmenides*, sondern auch in *Politicus* verwendet. Zuletzt ist vom Verhältnis zwischen Chiasmus und Dihairesis die Rede, wobei Aristoteles' Anwendung des Chiasmus einbezogen ist. Aus der Tatsache, dass Platon, Aristoteles und Proklos in vielen Fällen den Chiasmus anwenden, lässt sich schlußfolgern, dass die Anwendung des Chiasmus nicht für Ausnahme gehalten werden darf, der Chiasmus vielmehr als allgemein gültige philosophische Methode gilt.

## 1. Platons *Parmenides* (135b-137c)

Am Ende des ersten Teils des Dialogs behauptet Parmenides, dass um die Idee richtig und besser zu verstehen, man eine geistige Gymnastik brauche, die aus einigen Hypothesen besteht. Nach dem Schema, das Parmenides im Text anzubieten hat, sind die Hypothesen folgendermaßen zu rekonstruieren: Was folgt, wenn das Eine ist, und zwar sowohl im Einen in Bezug auf das Eine und in Bezug auf die anderen als auch in den anderen in Bezug auf das Eine und in Bezug auf die anderen; Was folgt, wenn das Eine nicht ist, und zwar sowohl im Einen in Bezug auf das Eine und in Bezug auf die anderen als auch in den anderen in Bezug auf das Eine und in Bezug auf die anderen.

Vor allem liegen zwei gegensätzlichen Prämissen vor, wovon die eine affirmativ (wenn das Eines ist) und die andere negativ (wenn das Eines nicht ist) formuliert ist. In den Hypothesen, die unter der affirmativen Prämisse stehen, sind zwei Paare von Gegensätzen vorhanden, nämlich „im Einen – in den anderen“ und „in Bezug auf das Eine – in Bezug auf die anderen“. Dadurch dass sich die zwei Paare miteinander kreuzen, kommt eine vierfache Einteilung zustande, die terminologisch Chiasmus genannt wird. Ein zweiter Chiasmus ergibt sich, indem dieselbe Struktur von den Hypothesen, die unter der affirmativen Prämisse stehen, zu den Hypothesen, die unter der negativen Prämisse stehen, transformiert ist.

Diagramm 1 (εἰ τὸ ἓν ἔστιν)

	πρὸς τὸ ἓν	πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα
τῷ ἓνι	I ὑπόθεσις	II ὑπόθεσις
245 τοῖς ἄλλοις	III ὑπόθεσις	IV ὑπόθεσις

Diagramm 2 (εἰ τὸ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν)

	πρὸς τὸ ἓν	πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα	Ein
τῷ ἓνι	V ὑπόθεσις	VI ὑπόθεσις	
τοῖς ἄλλοις	VII ὑπόθεσις	VIII ὑπόθεσις	

Chiasmus besteht aus einer vierfachen Einteilung und aus zwei vierfachen Einteilungen ergibt sich die achtfache Einteilung. Da die Hypothesen anhand zwei Chiasmen zustande kommen, müssen sie nicht zu neun, sondern zu acht gezählt werden. Nichts anderes als die chiasmatische Einteilungsmethode bestimmt sowie garantiert die Anzahl der Hypothesen.

## 2. Proklos In Platonis Parmenidem Commentaria, 622: 18-623: 19 (Carlos Steel Hrsg.)

Proklos als großartiger Kommentator des Platons hat klares Bewußtsein über die chiasmatische Einteilungsmethode. In seinem Kommentar zu der *Parmenides*-Stelle, wo Platon über die geistige Gymnastik spricht, hat Proklos die chiasmatische Einteilung vor Augen. Zunächst ist Proklos mit Platon übereinstimmend, dass sich die Hypothesen unter der gegensätzlichen Prämissen stehen (622: 24-26). Dann übernimmt Proklos die platonische Vierteilung, und zwar mit Modifikation. Proklos' Meinung nach ist jeweils unter der affirmativen und der negativen Prämisse nicht nur ein Chiasmus zu bilden, sondern sollten drei Chiasmen aufzustellen sein. Wenn das Eine ist, muss man untersuchen (622: 26-623: 4): (1) was folgt, (2) was nicht folgt und (3) was sowohl folgt als auch nicht folgt. Dies sind nichts anderes als drei Untersuchungsaspekte. Da sich in jedem Aspekt eine Vierteilung ergibt, verhält es sich bei Proklos um drei Vierteilungen, die auf Chiasmus zurückgehen. Wenn das Eine ist, muss man untersuchen (623: 4-12): (1) Was folgt, falls das Eine in sich selbst und in den anderen ist, jeweils in Bezug auf sich selbst und in Bezug auf die anderen; (2) Was nicht folgt, falls das Eine in sich selbst und in den anderen ist, jeweils in Bezug auf sich selbst und in Bezug auf die anderen; (3) Was folgt und nicht folgt, falls das Eine in sich selbst und in den anderen ist, jeweils in Bezug auf sich selbst und in Bezug auf die anderen. Es ist gleichfalls bei der negativen Prämisse (wenn das Eine nicht ist).

Indem die dreierlei Aspekte einzufügen sind, lassen sich die beiden platonischen Chiasmen jeweils verdreifachen. Bezüglich der affirmativen Prämisse erwähnt Proklos darum drei Chiasmen und zählt die Hypothesen zu zwölf. Bezüglich der negativen Prämisse gibt es dementsprechend drei Chiasmen und zwölf Hypothesen. Wichtig ist, dass Proklos zwar mehr Hypothesen zählt als Platon, steht aber mit Platon in Übereinkunft, die Hypothesen anhand des Chiasmus zu klassifizieren.

Es ist allerdings bekannt, dass Proklos als Erster bzw. Berühmtester die Hypothesen in *Parmenides* zu neun zählt (1039: 5-1040: 17). In diesem Fall verhält Proklos sich nicht als

Kommentator, sondern als Philosoph. Im Satus eines Philosophen zielt er darauf ab, seine eigenen philosophischen Einstellungen auszudrücken, und zwar auf die Art und Weise, Platons Dialog zu kommentieren. Wenn aber er zunächst die Rolle des echten Kommentatoren spielt, übernimmt und verwendet Proklos den Platonic Chiasmus, die Hypothesen einzuteilen und ihre Anzahl zu bestimmen.

### 3. Platons *Politicus* (291c-292b; 297b-303b)

Platon wendet den Chiasmus auch in *Politicus* an, um die Staatsverfassungen zu klassifizieren. Während alle oben erwähnten Chiasmen in Form von 2X2 strukturiert ist, hat der Chiasmus in *Politicus* eine Struktur von 3X2. Einerseits teilt Platon die Staatsverfassungen dreifach in die Alleinherrschaft, die Herrschaft der Wenigen und die Herrschaft der Vielen ein, und zwar je nach der Anzahl der Herrscher (302c4-6; 291c7-d11). Andererseits sind die Staatsverfassungen zweifach einzuteilen, je nachdem ob ein Staat gesetzmäßig oder gesetzwidrig regiert wird (302e5-8). Dabei geht es um zwei Paare von Einteilungskriterien, nämlich „Eines-Weniges-Vieles“ und „gesetzmäßig-gesetzwidrig“. Dadurch dass sich die zwei Paare miteinander kreuzen, ergibt sich eine sechsfache Einteilung, die einen Chiasmus von 3X2 bildet.

		μοναρχία	ὀλίγων ἀρχή	πολλῶν ἀρχή
ον	ἐννομ	βασιλική	ἀριστοκρατία	δημοκρατία
μον	παράνο	τυραννική	ὀλιγαρχία	δημοκρατία

Anhand des Chiasmus sind die Staatsverfassungen in sechs gruppen einzuteilen: (1) Wird ein Staat von einem Herrscher gesetzmäßig regiert, lässt sich die Staatsverfassung als Königtum bezeichnen. (2) Wird ein Staat von einem Herrscher gesetzwidrig regiert, lässt sie sich als Tyrannei bezeichnen. (3) Wird ein Staat von einigen Herrschern gesetzmäßig regiert wird, lässt sie sich als Aristokratie bezeichnen. (4) Wird ein Staat von einigen Herrschern gesetzwidrig regiert, lässt sie sich als Oligarchie bezeichnen. (5) und (6) Wird ein Staat von vielen Herrschern regiert, lässt sich die Staatsverfassung, sei sie gesetzmäßig oder gesetzwidrig, gemeinsam Demokratie nennen (291e1-8; 302d1-e2).

### 4. Aristoteles: Verhältnis des Chiasmus zur Dihairesis

Der Chiasmus als Einteilungsmethode hängt nicht nur mit der Dihairesis zusammen, sondern ist in die Dihairesis verwurzelt. Unter den bestimmten Bedingungen ist der Chiasmus in die Dihairesis zurückzuführen. Der oben erwähnte Chiasmus, den Platon in *Politicus* einführt, z. B. lässt sich auf die dihairetische Weise durchführen. Einen Schritt weitergehend sollen wir auf Aristoteles' Anwendung des Chiasmus Rücksicht nehmen, denn Aristoteles nicht nur verwendet die chiasmatische Einteilungsmethode, sondern er bringt das Verhältnis des Chiasmus zur Dihairesis zum Ausdruck.

*La Noesi nascosta. Sulla presenza della teoria platonica dell'Anima nella gymnasia del Parmenide (142a-144e, 155e-157b, 157b-159b)*

L'obiettivo del mio contributo è di mostrare che la concezione platonica dell'Anima e della sua attività noetica, oltre ai numerosi riferimenti della prima parte del dialogo (132a, 132b-c, 134a-e, 135b-c), è fortemente presente anche nella sezione dedicata allo svolgimento delle ipotesi sull'Uno.

Presupponendo che il fulcro dell'esercizio dialettico sia l'analisi delle relazioni intelligibili (128e-130a, 135d-e), mi limiterò per brevità a considerare i tre passaggi in cui la presenza di un soggetto pensante viene dichiarata espressamente o almeno è più facilmente riconoscibile.

1) Nel passare dalla prima deduzione (137c sgg.) alla seconda (142a sgg.), ovvero da un'unità priva di articolazione e non realmente essente (141e-142a) ad una unità in se stessa molteplice ed essente sotto tutti i rispetti, non è rilevante solo la diversa considerazione dei rapporti fra l'Uno e l'Essere. Nella seconda deduzione (*Parm.* 142b-144a) viene reso possibile il passaggio dall'Uno-Tutto di partenza (*hen-bolon*), ciascuna parte del quale è anch'essa un Uno che è, al livello della distinzione in ognuna delle singole parti dell'Uno dall'Essere grazie al riconoscimento della loro Diversità (*heterotēs*). Più chiaramente: ciò che permette di considerare l'Uno e l'Essere come entità distinte (*hetera allēlōn*), e di derivare così la serie dei numeri, è il Pensiero (*dianoia*, da intendere qui nell'accezione generale di "Pensiero", come in *Phaedr.* 247d1, più che in quella specifica usata in *Resp.* VI 510d4 sgg.).

Senza questa attività intellettuale di fondo non sarebbe in alcun modo possibile né passare dal livello ontologico o metafisico dell'Uno assoluto (comunque lo si voglia intendere) al livello dell'Uno che è realmente, ovvero da un'unità irriflessa ad una unità riflessa e pensata dialetticamente, né in generale sarebbe possibile coinvolgere tutti quei Generi che caratterizzano e permettono lo sviluppo della seconda deduzione e delle successive.

2) Un approfondimento di questa funzione centrale dell'attività pensante di una Psiche lo abbiamo nel cosiddetto Corollario (155e-157b), dove la transizione fra Uno e Molti all'interno dell'Uno che è, inteso come un Tutto, viene ulteriormente dinamizzata e chiarita nei suoi fondamenti ontologici.

Nel discutere il Corollario intendo mostrare:

a) che la possibilità di un *metaballein* eidetico fra tutte le forme di *heterotēs* e di *enantiotēs* menzionate nel testo non contrasta con la nota concezione delle Idee (e del Divino) come entità eternamente invariabili e prive di quella specifica forma di *metabolē* chiamata *alloiōsis*, tipica degli enti visibili e corporei, delineata sia nel *Fedone* (78d sgg.) che in *Repubblica* II (377d-383c; cfr. *Leg.* X 893c sgg.). Non viene perciò esclusa la possibilità di un *cambiamento autoprodotta*, che non indurrà mai l'Idea a trapassare in una natura allotria, e si limiterà a svolgersi come scambio fra Quiete e Moto;



b) che Platone, affermando (cfr. *Parm.* 162b-c) che la *metabolē* è una *kinēsis*, sembra dirci che anche il mutamento considerato nel Corollario va inteso come un movimento. La conseguenza principale di questa assunzione è che una tale specie di movimento, per poter risultare *ontologicamente superiore* sia al Moto che alla Quietè, dovendoli comprendere in sé per permettere il *metaballein* dell'uno nell'altro, deve necessariamente rappresentarne la *sintesi*: la *metabolē* fra *kinēsis* e *stasis* non potrà che essere una *kinēsis akinētos*.

Ma il palese accento, fra i due *gbenē* coinvolti nell'unificazione, sul Movimento, che rimane a fondamento di questa fusione concettuale, è congruente sia alla definizione dell'Anima come *archē kinēseōs kai metabolēs*, che conosciamo dal *Fedro* e dalle *Leggi* (245c sgg. e 894b-896a), sia dalla descrizione della costituzione dialettica dell'Anima cosmica nel *Timeo*, in cui la coesistenza simultanea e atemporale di Movimento e Quietè si esprime nel suo essere Principio di vita e del tempo (cfr. 30b-c, 34a, 36d-e, 37e), e nella descrizione di quella *dynamis* dell'Anima cosmica il cui fine è il compiersi di *noūs* ed *epistēmē*: *il circolo dell'Identico* (*Tim.* 37a-c; cfr. *Leg.* X 897d e *Resp.* VII 524e).

Il Corollario sembrerebbe dunque confermare l'ipotesi che alla base della *metabolē* realizzantesi nella dimensione extratemporale dell'*exaiphnēs*, giaccia la concezione di una *oūsia* dinamizzata da un Principio di movimento di natura intellettuale/psichica: le Idee possono "passare", perché esiste l'Anima.

3) Gli ultimi passaggi che discuterò provengono dalla quarta deduzione (157b-159b). L'analisi del relazionarsi dell'Uno che è agli Altri che ne partecipano (intendo i singoli Uni che co-appartenengono questa Uni-Totalità), induce sia l'Uno che l'Essere a mostrare il loro volto "archetipico": il metodo aferetico, introdotto in 158c2, procede ad isolare le componenti dell'Uno che è togliendo l'Uno dallo *holon*. Ciò che rimane è, da un lato, il *pantelōs hen* (cfr. *Parm.* 157c4, 159c5; *Soph.*, 245a8-9), l'Uno assoluto forse descritto nella prima deduzione, e dall'altro, "la natura altra dall'Idea"/o "altra dall'Uno" (*hetera physis tou̐ eidoūs/henōs*, 158c5-6). Questi sono *i due volti* in cui la Totalità compiuta, il *teleion holon* (157d7-e5) si mostra, quando si 'eliminino' da esso gli elementi che lo determinano come Uni-Totalità che è. Lo *hen* assoluto isolato col *Pensiero* dall'*oūsia*, è evidentemente *Non Molti*, mentre la natura *Altra dall'Idea/dall'Uno*, ridotta allo stato di latenza di Essere, risulta *Non Uno*, e considerata di per sé si mostra "infinita o indeterminata quantitativamente" (158c6-7). Entrambe queste manifestazioni rappresentano dunque, in maniera perfettamente speculare, *negazioni dialettiche* dell'Uno che è.

In questa analisi, che nel dialogo ci viene proposta come un "esperimento concettuale" (158c) il *Pensiero* funge quindi da elemento sceverativo di quelle componenti di Uno o Limite, e Illimitato, che, se oltre ad avere una rilevanza ontologica, avessero anche un significato metafisico, potrebbero dirci molto sia sulla struttura ontologica di fondo dell'Uni-Totalità eidetica, sia sul modo in cui i concetti generalissimi di Uno e Quantità indeterminata (forse un'allusione allo *hen* ed alla *aōristos dyas* della tradizione indiretta?) dovrebbero interagire in modo da "generare" il mondo eidetico (forse proprio il *teleion holon* di *Parm.* 157d7-e5).

L'attività pensante si rivelerebbe qui come uno strumento metodologico imprescindibile di analisi ontologica e forse anche metafisica della realtà ideale.

Concluderei dicendo che alla luce dei passi discussi risultano piuttosto evidenti sia la presenza che la funzione teoretica centrale di un movimento di natura intellettuale/psichica sullo sfondo dello sviluppo delle deduzioni concernenti l'Uno.

C'è da chiedersi se questo Principio psichico di movimento, valga “solamente” come un Principio estrinseco, come espressione dell'attività pensante del filosofo-dialettico che indaga i modi possibili dell'Uno di relazionarsi all'Essere, o se invece debba considerarsi simultaneamente come un Principio dinamico *intrinseco* all'intelligibile che agisce anche dal suo interno.

Se così fosse potremmo rileggere il passaggio dalla prima alla seconda deduzione (dall'Uno-Uno all'Uno che è) come il passaggio da un'unità disarticolata e non pensante ad una unità complessa *pensante se stessa dialetticamente*.

Analogamente, potremmo rileggere il Corollario come descrizione dell'attività di un Principio di movimento e di divenire (non temporale!) che anima l'intelligibile dal suo interno.

Infine, potremmo vedere nei passaggi della quarta deduzione l'influsso del ruolo di mediazione (distinzione ed unificazione) ontologica e metafisica del Pensiero grazie alla quale la dualità ancora indefinita di Pensiero ed Essere, che in quanto non è ancora né Uno né Pluralità e ancora un non-pensiero ed un non-pensato, *può diventare un Pensiero ed un Pensato*. Soggetto potenzialmente conoscente e Oggetto potenzialmente conoscibile riconoscono, nella mescolanza fra Uno e Quantità indeterminata prodotta nell'atto conoscitivo, la loro *comune struttura dialettica di Unitotalità*, generando le condizioni per concepire l'intelligibile uni-molteplice come realmente esistente.

Vedere nel *Parmenide* l'agire di un Principio di movimento di natura noetica/psichica, contribuirebbe così ad una comprensione più profonda del significato che Platone attribuisce all'*oūsia* nel *Sofista* (248e-249b), nel chiamare il *pantelōs on empsychon*, in quanto deve includere in sé *Vita, Intelligenza e Movimento* (*zōē, noūs e kinēsis*), il che sarebbe impossibile senz'Anima, e della concezione del paradigma intelligibile nel *Timeo* come *panteles zoōn* (30c-31b).

### *The Hidden Noesis. On the Presence of Plato's Theory of Soul in the gymnasium of the Parmenides (142a-144e, 155e-157b, 157b-159b)*

In my paper I intend to show that Plato's conception of the Soul with its noetic activity, besides the many references in the first part of the dialogue (132a, 132b-c, 134a-e, 135b-c), is still going strong in the section devoted to the development of the hypothesis on the One.

Assuming the analysis of intelligible relations to be the core of the dialectical exercise (128e-130a, 135d-e), I will confine myself, to be concise, to discuss three passages in which the presence of a thinking subject is explicitly admitted or is at least easily recognizable.

1) In the transition from the first deduction (137c sgg.) to the second (142a sgg.), that is from a unity bare of structure and not even existing (141e-142a) to a manifold unity that truly is, the attitude in considering the relation between the One and Being is not the only thing that makes the difference. In the second deduction (142b-144a) the passage from the One-Whole (*hen-holon*) of the very beginning, each part of which itself is a “One that is”, to the level of the distinction within each of these parts of the One from Being, is made possible thanks to the acknowledgement of their Difference (*heterotēs*). To say it better: that what allows to consider the One and Being as two distinct entities (*hetera allēlōn*), and to derive the sequence of numbers is *Thought* (*dianoia*, to be broadly understood as in *Phaedr.* 247d1, and not in its narrower sense as in *Resp.* VI 510d4 sgg.).

Without this basic intellectual activity it would neither be possible to move from the ontological or metaphysical level of the absolute One (however one wants to interpret it) to the level of the One that truly is, i.e. from an unreflected unity to a unity thought of as dialectically structured, nor it would be possible to involve all those Kinds functioning as driving power of the logical development of the second and of the following deductions.

2) A deepening of the crucial role of the Soul's thinking activity is provided in the Corollary (155e-157b), where the change occurring within the One and Whole from the One to the Many further increases its dynamism and becomes clearer about its ontological foundations.

By discussing the Corollary I intend to show:

a) that the possibility of an ideal *metaballein* among all forms of *heterotēs* and *enantiotēs* mentioned here does not counter the well-known view of Ideas (and of the Divine) as eternally unchangeable entities bare of that specific form of *metabolē* called *alloiōsis*, typical of visible and bodily entities, and outlined both in the *Phaedo* (78d sgg.) and in *Republic* II (377d-383c; cfr. *Leg.* X 893c sgg.). Therefore, a *self-produced change*, that will never force Ideas to transform into extrinsic natures, and will be limited to a passage between Movement and Rest is allowed;

b) that Plato, claiming that *metabolē* is *kinēsis* (*Parm.* 162b-c), refers to the notion of change in the Corollary as well. The main consequence of this assumption is that such a kind of movement, to be *ontologically prior to both Movement and to Rest*, for it should include both to enable their mutual *metaballein*, must be necessarily their *synthesis*: the *metabolē* between *kinēsis* and *stasis* can only be a *kinēsis akinētos*.

The clear emphasis on Movement, is coherent with the definition of the Soul as *archē kinēseōs kai metabolēs* known both from the *Phaedrus* and the *Laws* (245c sgg. and 894b-896a), and from the account of the dialectical constitution of the World-Soul in the *Timaeus*. Here, a temporal coexistence of Movement and Rest discloses in the description of the Soul as Principle of life and time (30b-c, 34a, 36d-e, 37e), and of its *dynamis* to generate *noūs* and *epistēmē*: *the circle of Identity* (*Tim.* 37a-c; cfr. *Leg.* X 897d e *Resp.* VII 524e).

So, the Corollary seems to legitimate the conception of Being as vivified by a Principle of intellectual/psychic movement laying behind the *metabolē* taking place in the extratemporal dimension of *exaiphnēs*: Ideas can “pass by” because the Soul exists.

3) The last passages I will discuss are taken from the fourth deduction (157b-159b). The analysis of the relation between the One and the Others partaking in it (the individual unities belonging to this Uni-Totality), leads both the One and Being to show off their “archetypal” features: the aphaeretic method, introduced in 158c2, isolates the elements of the “One that is” by removing the One from the *holon*. What is left is, on the one hand, a *pantelōs hen* (*Parm.* 157c4, 159c5; *Soph.*, 245a8-9), maybe the absolute One of the first deduction, and on the other hand, “the nature other than the Idea”/or “other than the One” (*hetera physis toū eidoūs/henōs*, 158c5-6). These are *the two faces* of the fulfilled Totality, *teleion holon* (157d7-e5) disclosed once we separate its basic constituents from each other. The absolute *hen isolated by Thought* from the *oūsia*, is evidently *Not-Many*, while the nature *Other than the Idea/than the One*, reduced to a mere latency of Being, is a *Not-One*, “infinite or indeterminate as regards to quantity” (158c6-7). Both natures represent, in a mirror-like way, *dialectical negations* of the “One that is”.

In this inquiry, suggested in the dialogue as a “conceptual experiment” (158c) Thought serves as instrument to distinguish the One or Limit from the Limitless. If these notions would

have, besides their ontological meaning, a metaphysical pregnancy as well, they would provide us with important informations concerning both the fundamental ontological architecture of the ideal Uni-Totality and the way in which the most general concepts of One and indeterminate Quantity (an allusion to *hen* and *aōristos dyas* of the indirect tradition?) should interact in order to “generate” the ideal reality (plausibly the *teleion holon* in 157d7-e5).

In this case the thinking activity would become an irreplaceable methodological instrument of ontological and of metaphysical analysis of ideal Being.

To conclude, the chosen texts clearly show off presence and theoretical importance of a psychic/intellectual movement on the background of the second part of the *Parmenides*.

The challenging question is whether the value of this psychic Principle of movement is “only” extrinsic, i.e. whether it expresses “just” the thinking activity of the philosopher-dialectician inquiring the possible interconnections of One and Being, or whether it would be more correct to consider it as a dynamic Principle *immanent* to the intelligible and acting in it from within.

If this would be the case, we could re-read the passage from the first to the second deduction (from the “One-One” to the “One that is”) as a transition from a disjointed and “unaware” to a dialectical *self-thinking* unity.

Similarly, we could see the Corollary as the description of a Principle of movement and (non-temporal!) becoming, able to breathe life into Being.

Finally, we could discover in the fourth deduction the ontological and metaphysical mediating influence of Thought, due to which the still undefined duality of Thought and Being, can develop into a *structured unity*. The potential Subject and Object of knowledge recognize in the mixture of One and undetermined Quantity occurring in the act of knowing their common dialectical nature, producing the conditions to conceive the intelligible Uni-Totality as truly existing.

Seeing in the *Parmenides* the agency of a Principle of noetic/psychic movement, would increase our comprehension of both Plato’s characterisation of *oūsia* in the *Sophist* (248e-249b) as *pantelōs on/empsychon*, for it has to include *Life, Intelligence* and *Movement* (*zōē, noūs* and *kinēsis*), which would be impossible without Soul, and of the conception of the intelligible paradigm in *Timaeus* as *panteles zoōn* (30c-31b).

### *Parmenides in Plato's Parmenides*

In this paper I propose a new interpretation of Plato's *Parmenides*, as Plato's thorough engagement with Eleaticism, whose aim is to set up his briefer refutation of this position in *Sophist*.

Most interpretations of *Parmenides* have in common the assumption that Plato subjects his own position to some kind of criticism in this dialogue. Instead, I think Plato is making the best case he can for Eleaticism, in a way analogous to Aristotle's presentations of his predecessors.

Plato gives what he takes to be the 'core' of Parmenides' thought, in order to show its shortcomings, namely that Parmenides is forced to consider the sensory world as illusory and reduce the intelligible world to the bare One. The dialogue is a genuine attempt to explain why anyone would posit such a counterintuitive position.

These consequences are shown to be shortcomings in *Sophist*, where Plato refutes Parmenides' fundamental premise. I think that he diagnoses the common fault of his predecessors as their assumption that Forms don't mix (242c-243a, 251d-252c). This is presenting this in his own language, as Aristotle presents his diagnosis of his predecessors' faults as their exclusive use of his own material cause. The Eleatics assume that Forms don't mix, or in Aristotle's language, that things are "one in formula" (*Metaphysics* I.5.986b19).

Dramatically, there is evidence for reading *Parmenides* as part of Plato's 'trilogy', because the conversation in the *Parmenides* is bookended by its first two dialogues. That conversation is referred to in *Theaetetus* (183e-184b) after the discussion of Heraclitus, and again right at the beginning of *Sophist* (217c). This can't be a coincidence. I take *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides*, consequently, as a pair of detailed treatments of Plato's predecessors — Ionians (+ Empedocles) and Eleatics — which prepare for their summary treatment in *Sophist*.

The philosophical evidence for reading *Parmenides* this way comes partly from the fact that this makes the presentation of Parmenides in his namesake dialogue line up with what the Eleatic stranger says of him in *Sophist*. The more important philosophical evidence is that it lets me present *Parmenides* as a single, internally coherent argument.

The animating idea of the dialogue is indicated by Zeno. Whereas Parmenides' critics said many laughable things followed from his thesis of the One, Zeno's book showed that what follows from the many is more laughable (128c-d). The dialogue is a stepwise elimination of the many, so that its readers have no choice but to accept the sole One. The underlying assumption that leads to the thesis of the One is what Plato diagnoses in *Sophist*, the idea that that things are qualitatively unmixed, or 'one in formula'. I call this idea that single things can have only one character 'homoeomerism', because of its similarity to Anaxagoras' idea that the elements of things are qualitatively homogenous parts. The dialogue argues in three distinct steps that, if things are many, single things have more than one character, which is impossible. It concludes that there must only be the One.

The first step is Parmenides' examination of parts and wholes in response to Socrates' suggestion of Forms. He begins with Forms that govern the relations between other Forms — One, Many, Like, Unlike — and moves on to Forms that are participated by things as wholes — Just, Beautiful, Good. Socrates assumed things were many through material parts like front and back

(129c). But this makes it impossible to explain how a whole can genuinely be many. How can Socrates be Just and Good as a whole if these must be predicated of different parts?

Parmenides then moves on to Forms that name wholes themselves — Man — and their elements — Fire and Water. *Theaetetus* lies in the background here. Either Man is a sum of parts with no character of its own, or Man has a character whose simplicity makes its parts disappear. The problem is exacerbated by intermediate parts like hair, mud, and dirt.

Both this and the next section are versions of the same problem, the attempt to call one thing many things. A whole has to be itself as well as its parts. A Form has to be itself as well as the character given to participants. But there is no way to say this coherently, according to Parmenides.

It is customary to call the next section a series of criticisms of the Theory of Forms, but technically it is a criticism of participation. No one seems to have suggested that the dialogue's response to the criticisms is to eliminate participants, rather than Forms. Without participants, the problems of participation disappear. Parmenides doesn't say we should do this, but he does say we can't get rid of Forms (135a-c). And this would make him advocate something close to his actual position of an illusory sensible world.

Participation posits a single thing, a Form, that has to be different from the character present in participants, while also somehow being the same as that character. The first four problems try all of the possible ways in which the Form and its donated character can be related, and all fail. The first two begin with an identity of the Form and the character in the participant and move to difference; the second two go from difference to identity. Both pairs begin with the Form dominant, and then make the participant dominant.

So Forms cannot be (1) numerically or (2) qualitatively identical with the character they give to participants, where numerical identity makes the Form dominant by saying it itself is present, and qualitative identity makes the participant dominant by saying that the Form is just another iteration of its own character. And (3) Forms cannot make participants intelligible like them, (4) and Forms cannot have derived characters like participants. Finally, the fifth problem simply denies participation.

Having eliminated sensible multiplicity, the dialogue goes on to eliminate intelligible multiplicity. In four hypotheses the One has no relation to the Others and has no characteristics. These hypotheses make use of the homoeomeric assumption quite directly, holding that 'One' has only a single meaning, and that 'Many' is its direct contradiction, using 'Many' for a series of *modus tollens* arguments. The other four hypotheses are more complicated, arguing that a One related to a Many has a totality of contradictory characters. These hypotheses also assume homoeomerism, by pretending that Forms have a univocal character. But it then draws contradictions from unspoken shifts in how each Form is understood.

Between the absence of characteristics and a totality of contradictory characters, I think we are intended to think the second is clearly more laughable, to use Zeno's phrase. But if there are Others, the One is related to them. So there must not be Others. An intelligible world populated by the One is less laughable than the One and the Others.

Finally, the hypotheses are not completely negative, from Plato's point of view. We can go back to the second part of *Parmenides* with the art of dialectic from *Sophist*, and read the positive hypotheses as delineating how Forms could mix with each other, not all at once, but at various times and in various ways. It isn't the completion of dialectic, but a sort of preparation for it.

## *Parménide dans le Parménide de Platon*

Dans ce texte, j'aimerais proposer une nouvelle interprétation du *Parménide* de Platon. J'aimerais suggérer que ce dialogue révèle toute l'étendue du rapport de Platon à l'éléatisme, et que son objectif consiste à préparer le terrain pour la réfutation plus brève de cette position dans le *Sophiste*.

La plupart des interprétations du *Parménide* partagent une même supposition, selon laquelle Platon, dans le dialogue, remettrait en cause sa propre position. Je crois plutôt que Platon se propose de rendre compte de l'éléatisme avec justesse, mais de manière à en révéler les failles, d'une manière analogue à celle d'Aristote lorsque celui-ci présente ses prédécesseurs. Platon identifie ce qu'il considère comme étant le « cœur » de la pensée de Parménide, afin d'en démontrer les lacunes, à savoir le fait qu'elle oblige Parménide à concevoir le monde sensible comme illusoire et à réduire le monde intelligible à l'Un. Le dialogue est donc une tentative sincère d'expliquer pourquoi l'on pourrait être porté à défendre une position aussi contre-intuitive.

Ces conséquences nous sont présentées comme des lacunes dans le *Sophiste*, alors que Platon réfute la prémisse fondamentale de Parménide. Je crois qu'il diagnostique une faute commune chez ses prédécesseurs, à savoir le fait de présumer que les Formes ne peuvent s'entremêler (242c-243a, 251d-252c). Tout comme Aristote présente l'erreur de ses propres prédécesseurs comme résultant de leur usage exclusif de sa propre cause matérielle, Platon présente son diagnostic dans son propre langage. Les Éléates présupposent que les Formes ne s'entremêlent pas, ou en langage aristotélicien, que les choses sont d'« une unité formelle » (*Métaphysique* I. 5.986b19, 'tou kata ton logon henos').

Sur le plan dramaturgique, il est permis d'envisager le *Parménide* comme s'inscrivant dans la « trilogie » de Platon, puisque la conversation dans le *Parménide* fait écho à ses deux premiers dialogues. Cette conversation est évoquée dans le *Théétète* (183e-184b), après la discussion portant sur Héraclite, puis une fois encore au tout début du *Sophiste* (217c). Il ne s'agit certainement pas d'une coïncidence. Par conséquent, je propose de lire le *Théétète* et le *Parménide*, dans la mesure où ils traitent tous deux de manière détaillée de prédécesseurs de Platon – les Ioniens (+ Empédocle) et les Éléates –, comme préparant le terrain pour le traitement plus sommaire qu'il leur réserve dans le *Sophiste*.

Les preuves philosophiques à l'appui d'une telle lecture du *Parménide* proviennent en partie du fait qu'elle nous permet d'accorder la présentation de Parménide dans le dialogue du même nom avec ce qu'en dit l'étranger éléatique dans le *Sophiste*. Mieux encore, une telle lecture me permet de présenter le *Parménide* comme contenant un argument unique et cohérent.

L'idée directrice de ce dialogue nous est indiquée par Zénon. Alors que les critiques de Parménide ont pu tirer toutes sortes d'affirmations risibles à partir de la thèse de l'Un, le livre de Zénon démontre que ce qu'on peut affirmer à partir de la thèse du Multiple est plus risible encore (128c-d). Le dialogue est une élimination, pas à pas, du Multiple, de manière à ce que les lecteurs n'aient plus aucun choix que d'accepter, uniquement, l'Un. Le présupposé implicite qui conduit à la thèse de l'Un est diagnostiqué par Platon dans le *Sophiste*, à savoir que les choses ne s'entremêlent pas qualitativement, ou qu'elles sont d'« une unité formelle ». Je comprends cette idée, selon laquelle les choses particulières ne peuvent avoir qu'un caractère, comme une forme d'« homoeomérisme », en raison de sa ressemblance avec l'idée chez Anaxagore selon laquelle les éléments des choses seraient des parties qualitativement homogènes. Le dialogue suggère, en trois

étapes distinctes, que si les choses sont multiples, les choses particulières comportent plus d'un caractère, ce qui est impossible. Il se conclut donc sur l'idée qu'il ne peut y avoir que l'Un.

La première étape correspond à l'examen par Parménide de parties et de tous, qui répond à la suggestion faite par Socrate quant aux Formes. Il commence par les Formes qui gouvernent les relations entre d'autres Formes – l'Unité, le Multiple, la Similitude, le Dissemblable – pour ensuite passer aux Formes auxquelles participent des choses comme tous – le Juste, le Beau, le Bien. Socrate présupposait que les choses étaient multiples en tant que parties matérielles comme la face avant et la face arrière (129c). Mais cela rend impossible toute tentative visant à expliquer comment un tout pourrait véritablement être multiple. Comment Socrate peut-il être Juste et Bon comme un tout si ceux-ci doivent être posés dans une multiplicité de parties? Parménide passe ensuite aux Formes qui désignent des tous en eux-mêmes — L'Homme — et leurs éléments — l'Eau et le Feu. Le *Théétète* constitue ici la toile de fond. Soit l'Homme est une somme de parties sans caractère propre, soit l'Homme comporte un caractère dont la simplicité fait disparaître les parties. Le problème est ici exacerbé par l'existence de parties intermédiaires telles que les cheveux, la boue et la saleté.

Cette section et la prochaine présentent des versions d'un même problème, qui tient à la tentative de nommer une chose comme plusieurs choses. Un tout doit être lui-même tout en étant ses parties. Une Forme doit être elle-même tout en étant le caractère donné à ce qui y participe. Mais il n'existe pas de manière cohérente d'affirmer cela, selon Parménide.

Si la prochaine section est communément comprise comme présentant une série de critiques de la Théorie des Formes, ces critiques visent, plus exactement, l'idée de participation. Personne ne semble avoir suggéré que la réponse proposée par le dialogue passe par une élimination des participants, plutôt qu'une élimination des Formes. Sans participants, les problèmes liés à la participation disparaissent. Parménide ne suggère pas qu'il faille procéder ainsi, mais il affirme tout de même que nous ne pouvons pas nous débarrasser des Formes (135a- c). Cela impliquerait qu'il défende une position semblable à celle qu'il défend véritablement, selon laquelle le monde sensible serait illusoire.

La participation propose une seule chose, une Forme, qui doit être distincte du caractère présent dans les participants, tout en étant identique à ce même caractère. Les quatre premiers problèmes envisagent toutes les manières possibles de mettre en relation la Forme et son caractère donné, mais elles échouent. Les deux premières commencent par une identité de la Forme et du caractère dans le participant, puis passent à la différence; les deux autres passent de la différence à l'identité. Les deux paires commencent avec la Forme comme dominante, pour ensuite faire du participant la dominante. Ainsi les Formes ne peuvent pas être (1) numériquement ou (2) qualitativement identiques avec le caractère qu'elles donnent à ses participants, lorsque l'identité numérique fait de la Forme la dominante en affirmant qu'elle y est elle-même présente, ou lorsque l'identité qualitative fait du participant la dominante en affirmant que la Forme n'est qu'une autre itération de son propre caractère. Aussi, (3) les Formes ne peuvent pas rendre les participants aussi intelligibles qu'elles-mêmes, et (4) les Formes ne peuvent pas avoir de caractères dérivés comme ceux de ses participants. Enfin, le cinquième problème nie tout simplement la participation.

Ayant éliminé la multiplicité sensible, le dialogue poursuit en éliminant la multiplicité intelligible. Dans quatre hypothèses, l'Un n'a pas de relation aux Autres et n'a pas de caractéristiques. Ces hypothèses nous amènent à faire usage du présupposé homéomérique de manière plutôt directe, en envisageant l'Un comme ayant une seule signification, et en comprenant le « Multiple » comme sa contradiction, ce dernier informant une série d'arguments *modus tollens*. Les quatre autres hypothèses sont plus complexes, puisqu'elles proposent qu'un Un qui serait en



relation avec le Multiple contiendrait une totalité de caractères contradictoires. Ces hypothèses présupposent aussi l'homoeomérisme, en faisant comme si les Formes avaient un caractère univoque. Mais cela mène également à dégager des contradictions à partir des glissements implicites dans la compréhension de chacune de ces Formes.

Entre l'absence de caractéristiques et une totalité de caractères contradictoires, je crois que nous sommes amenés à croire que la seconde est clairement plus risible, pour emprunter à Zénon sa formule. Mais s'il existe des Autres, l'Un leur est lié. Il ne faut donc pas qu'il existe des Autres. Un monde intelligible peuplé par l'Un est moins risible que l'Un et les Autres.

Enfin, les hypothèses ne sont pas entièrement négatives, du point de vue de Platon. Nous pouvons revenir à la seconde partie du *Parménide* avec l'art de la dialectique du *Sophiste*, et lire les hypothèses positives comme esquissant la possibilité d'en entremêlement des Formes, non pas toutes à la fois, mais à divers moments et de diverses manières. Ce n'est pas l'achèvement de la dialectique, mais une espèce de préparation à celle-ci.

# Maennlein-Robert Irmgard

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## *Der ferne Gott – Ideen auf Distanz? Die siebte Aporie im Kontext (Plat. Parm. 133b4-135b4)*

Im Eingang des Platonischen *Parmenides* berichtet Kephalos von einem Gespräch, das der Parmenides, Zenon, der junge Sokrates und ein junger Mann namens Aristoteles vor langer Zeit miteinander in Athen geführt hätten. In dessen Verlauf entspinnt sich ein Dialog des Parmenides mit Sokrates über die Ideen. Parmenides formuliert dabei sieben als Aporien formulierte Kritikpunkte gegen die These von der absoluten Existenz der Ideen, wie Sokrates sie hier vertritt. Im Fokus dieses Beitrages soll die siebte Aporie des Parmenides stehen, die eng mit der sechsten resp. deren Einleitung verbunden ist: Dort formulierte Parmenides das, wie er sagt, größte Problem: Die Erkennbarkeit der Ideen (*Parm.* 133b3ff.). Die Widerlegung dieses Kritikpunktes könne nur von einem erfahrenen und fähigen Mann nachvollzogen werden. In der siebten Aporia nun fokussiert Parmenides (erneut) die separate Existenz der Ideen und deren Nicht-Erkennbarkeit. Daraus leitet er die Unerkennbarkeit des Schönen und des Guten und all dessen ab, was wir für Ideen halten. Wenn Wissen als Gattung (*γένος*) existiert, muss dieses genauer als das unsere sein, ebenso sei es mit Schönheit etc. Allein Gott sei Wissen an sich resp. das genaueste Wissen zuschreiben (134c10f.). Allerdings könne Gott, im Besitz des Wissens an sich, unsere Realität nicht erkennen. Sie hätten bereits darin übereingestimmt, dass Ideen keine Wirkung auf unsere Realität hätten und umgekehrt. Er zieht den Schluss, dass also der Gott, im Besitz der umfassendsten Herrschaft und des genauesten Wissens, niemals Macht über uns habe und etwas von dem bei uns erkenne und umgekehrt wir nicht über jene Macht hätten noch etwas vom Göttlichen mit unserem Wissen erkennen könnten (134d9-e6). Somit konstatiert er die absolute Trennung, Bezugslosigkeit und Ferne zwischen den Ideen resp. Gott und der Menschenwelt. Am Ende spricht Sokrates von einem *θαυμαστός λόγος*, wenn man dem Gott Wissen abspräche (134e7f.).

Im Vortrag sollen folgenden drei Themen akzentuiert werden:

### **1) Der ferne Gott**

In der letzten Aporie bringt Parmenides unvermittelt ‚Gott‘ ins Spiel, dem die vollständigste Form von Wissen und Macht bescheinigt wird. Aus dem unmittelbaren Kontext wird deutlich, dass hier erstmals im Dialog der göttliche (zwischen Gott, Göttlichem und Göttern sowie Singular und Plural changierende) Charakter der Ideen greifbar wird (Ferrari 2004, 224). Dieser Gott wird gleichsam als Personifikation einer der separat existierenden Ideen verstanden, die keine Wirkung auf uns und die Realität bei uns, den Menschen, hat – und umgekehrt. Das Hauptproblem ist hier die auf der separaten Existenz der Ideen (und des Gottes) basierende Distanz zwischen der göttlichen Ideenwelt und der Menschwelt. Mehrfach zuvor war ihr ontologischer Status als absolut von der sinnlichen Welt bezeichnet worden (*χωρίς* etc., Ferrari 2004, 206 A. 34). Die Ideen und somit auch der Gott existieren, so schlussfolgert Parmenides, absolut und getrennt voneinander (vgl. Peterson 1981). Damit hätten aber die Ideen ihre Relevanz für uns verloren. Die absurde (epistemologische) Konsequenz des separaten (ontologischen) Status der von Sokrates ins

Feld geführten Ideen wird besonders greifbar in der Figur des – in der Literatur kaum beachteten (aber: Eggers Lan 1986/87) – unvermittelt genannten Gottes (resp. des Göttlichen / der Götter). Daher soll überprüft werden, inwiefern wir hier von einer impliziten Theologie im Kontext der Ideenlehre sprechen dürfen und inwiefern diese im aktuellen aporetischen Kontext (noch?) nicht akzentuiert wird. Es wird zu fragen sein, ob der hier eingeführte Gott epistemologisch wie ontologisch nicht nur als exemplarische, sondern als hierarchisch höherstehende Idee zu verstehen ist (vgl. Superlativ: ἀκριβεστάτην, 134c11). Es wird kritisch zu diskutieren sein, ob die Einbettung in eine paradoxe Aporie grundsätzlich die Höherstellung des Gottes innerhalb der Ideenwelt in Frage stellt oder nicht (vgl. Wyller 1960/2007, 75).

## 2) Der Zweifler und die Distanz

Im unmittelbaren Kontext der siebten und letzten Aporie wird durch Parmenides die anonyme Figur eines *fictus interlocutor* ins Spiel gebracht: Es ist der von Natur aus geeignete und erfahrene Zweifler, der die (aufwendige) Widerlegung seines Zweifels an dieser Ideenlehre mitvollziehen könnte. Er wird kurz davor (133b4-c2) und wenig später (135a7-b2) erneut (Ferrari 2004, 222f.; 232) genannt. Der Passus dieser Aporie erhält somit nicht nur durch ihre Schlussposition, sondern auch durch diese Rahmung eine besondere Stellung. Damit verweist m.E. der Autor Platon auf die besondere Absurdität dieser Aporie, die aber grundsätzlich auflösbar wäre. Der Zweifler fungiert überdies als Identifikationsfigur für Kritiker an der Ideenlehre. Zum einen ist damit auf entsprechende (innerakademische) Kritiker außerhalb des hier vorhandenen Personentableaus verwiesen, weshalb theologische Konzeptionen innerhalb der Alten Akademie, z.B. die Ideenlehre des Eudoxos (vgl. Cornford 1936, 86f.) und Ideenlehre sowie Gottesbild des Aristoteles (Allen 1983, 173-176; Migliori 1990, 154) berücksichtigt werden müssen (Brisson 1994, 30f.; 42; Graeser 2003, 5; 25-31). Zum anderen wird rhetorisch-spielerisch ein neues Gesprächsniveau in Aussicht gestellt, auf dem die bislang kritisierte Ideenlehre besser definiert werden kann (vgl. Reale <sup>2</sup>2000, 303f.). Mit Platons literarischen Kunstgriff des Zweiflers und seiner – aufwendigen, gleichwohl möglichen – Belehrung zeichnet sich m.E. eine Distanzierung vom bisherigen aporetischen Gespräch über die Ideen ab, die auch in Sokrates' ironischer Anmerkung (θαυμαστός λόγος, vgl. McPherran 1999) zum Ausdruck kommt.

## 3) Literarische Strategien der Distanzierung

Auch im komplexen narrativen Rahmen des gesamten *Parmenides*-Gesprächs finden sich Distanzmarker: Kephalos erzählt, wie er durch die Vermittlung von Glaukon und Adeimantos in Athen von Antiphon ein Gespräch erfahren habe, das dieser wiederum in seiner Jugend von Pythodoros gehört habe, in dessen Haus seinerzeit das Gespräch zwischen dem alten Parmenides, Zenon, dem jungen Sokrates sowie dem jungen Aristoteles stattgefunden habe. Die historische Distanz zwischen der aktuellen Erzählsituation und der des damaligen Gesprächs über die Ideen ist also beträchtlich. Dazu kommt, dass sämtliche Berichterstatter (v.a. Antiphon und Pythodoros) keinesfalls philosophisch ausgewiesen, also philosophische Laien sind. Überdies ist das methodische Unvermögen des jungen Sokrates im Eingang des Dialogs so auffällig, dass seine dialektischen Schwächen als distanzschaffende Signale zum Nach- und Mitdenken für die Rezipienten verstanden werden dürfen.

Relevant ist auch das räumliche und festive Setting des (berichteten) Gesprächs mit Parmenides und Zenon, das im Haus des Pythodoros im Kerameikos, vor den Toren Athens, stattfindet. Die beiden Eleaten sind anlässlich des Panathenäenfestes zu Ehren der Stadtgöttin Athena nach Athen gekommen waren, welches das Zusammentreffen mit Sokrates erst motiviert. Das genannte Gespräch erweist sich als philosophische Parallelhandlung zum religiösen Panathenäenfest. Da die Panathenäenprozession traditionell vom Kerameikos hinauf auf die Akropolis verlief und eben vom Kerameikos in die entgegengesetzte Richtung die Strasse zum Gelände des Heros Akademos hinausführte, wird deutlich, dass der Raum des Gespräches, das Haus im Kerameikos, an einer Schnittstelle zwischen Religion und (Platonischer) Philosophie platziert ist. Räumlich (der Kerameikos liegt vor der Stadt) wie thematisch distanzieren sich die Philosophen freilich vom Spektakel der Polisreligion und führen ein philosophisches Gespräch, das gleichwohl theologische Implikationen hat. Parallelen mit dem personalen, festiven wie räumlichen Setting aus Platons *Politeia* sind evident. Mit Blick auf die siebte Aporie des *Parmenides*, die religiösen Kult wie theologische Spekulation überflüssig machen würde, sollen daher die genannten narrativen, personalen und räumlichen Distanzmarker in die Interpretation einbezogen werden.

### *The Distant God – Ideas at a Distance? The Seventh Aporia in Context (Plat. Parm. 133b4-135b4)*

At the beginning of Plato's *Parmenides*, Kephalos recalls a conversation that Parmenides, Zenon, the young Socrates and a young man named Aristotle had had a long time ago in Athens. There progresses a dialogue between Parmenides and Socrates about ideas. Parmenides formulates seven points of criticism (Aporiai) against the thesis of the absolute existence of the ideas, as Socrates represents it here. The focus of this contribution is to be the seventh aporia of Parmenides, which is closely connected with the sixth respectively its introduction: there Parmenides expressed, as he says, the biggest problem: the recognizability of the ideas (*Parm.* 133b3ff.). The refutation of this crucial point would only be possible by an experienced and capable man. In the seventh Aporia, Parmenides (again) focuses on the separate existence of ideas and their unrecognizability. From this he derives the unrecognizability of the beautiful and the good and all that we consider ideas. If knowledge exists as a genre (γένος), it must be more precise than ours, just as it must be with beauty etc. Only God is to attribute knowledge itself or the most exact knowledge (134c10f.). However, God, in possession of knowledge per se, could not recognize our reality. They had already agreed that ideas had no effect on our reality and vice versa. He draws the conclusion that God, having the most comprehensive supremacy and the most exact knowledge, never has power over us and recognizes anything of that with us and vice versa we do not have power over that nor can we recognize anything of the divine with our knowledge (134d9-e6). Thus he states the absolute separation, lack of reference and distance between the ideas resp. God and the human world. In the end Socrates calls it a θαυμαστός λόγος if one denies the God knowledge (134e7f.).

The following three topics are to be emphasized in this paper:

#### **1) The Distant God**

In the last aporia, Parmenides suddenly brings 'God' into play, to whom the most complete form of knowledge and power is attested. From the immediate context it becomes clear that here for the first time in dialogue the divine (between God, divine and gods as well as singular and plural changing) character of the ideas becomes seizable (Ferrari 2004, 224). This God is understood, as it were, as the personification of one of the separately existing ideas, which has no effect on us and the reality with us, the humans - and vice versa. The main problem here is the distance based on the separate existence of ideas (and God) between the divine world of ideas and the human world. Several times before their ontological status had been described as absolute from the sensual world (*χωρίς* etc., Ferrari 2004, 206 A. 34). Parmenides concludes that the ideas and thus also the God exist absolutely and separately from each other (cf. Peterson 1981). With that, however, the ideas would have lost their relevance for us. The absurd (epistemological) consequence of the separate (ontological) status of the ideas brought into the field by Socrates becomes particularly evident in the figure of the God (or of the divine / the gods) suddenly named – scarcely noticed in literature (but: Eggers Lan 1986/87). Therefore it will be examined to what extent we may speak here of an implicit theology in the context of the doctrine of ideas and to what extent it is not (yet?) accentuated in the current aporetic context. It will have to be asked whether the God introduced here epistemologically and ontologically is to be understood not only as an exemplary idea, but also as a hierarchically higher idea (cf. Superlative: *ἀκριβεστάτην*, 134c11). It will have to be critically discussed whether the embedding in a paradoxical aporia fundamentally questions the higher position of God within the world of ideas or not (cf. Wyller 1960/2007, 75).

## 2) The Sceptic and the Distance

In the immediate context of the seventh and final aporia, Parmenides brings into play the anonymous figure of a *fictus interlocutor*: it is the by nature suitable and experienced skeptic who could help to (elaborately) refute his doubt about this doctrine of ideas. He is mentioned again shortly before (133b4-c2) and a little later (135a7-b2) (Ferrari 2004, 222f.; 232). The passage of this aporia thus gets a special position not only by its final position, but also by this framing. With this, in my opinion, the author Plato refers to the particular absurdity of this aporia, which, however, would be dissolvable in general. Moreover, the skeptic functions as a figure of identification for critics of the doctrine of ideas. On the one hand this refers to relevant (inner-academic) critics besides the tableau of persons available here, which is why theological conceptions within the Old Academy, e.g. the doctrine of ideas of Eudoxus (cf. Cornford 1936, 86f.) and the doctrine of ideas as well as the conception of God of Aristotle (Allen 1983, 173-176; Migliori 1990, 154) must be considered (Brisson 1994, 30f.; 42; Graeser 2003, 5; 25-31). On the other hand, in a rhetorical and playful way, a new level of conversation is proposed at which the theory of ideas criticized so far can be better defined (cf. Reale <sup>2</sup>2000, 303f.). With Plato's literary device of the skeptic and his – elaborate, nevertheless possible – instruction, a distance from the previous aporetic discussion about the ideas becomes emerging, which is also expressed in Socrates' ironic remark (*θαυμαστός λόγος*, cf. McPherran 1999).

## 3) Literary Strategies of Distance

Distance markers can also be found in the complex narrative framework of the entire *Parmenides* conversation: Kephalos recounts how, through the help of Glaukon and Adeimantos in Athens, he learned of Antiphon about a conversation that in his youth Antiphon in turn had

heard from Pythodoros, in whose house the conversation between the old Parmenides, Zeno, the young Socrates and the young Aristotle had taken place. The historical distance between the present narrative situation and that of the discussion of ideas at the time is therefore considerable. In addition, all the reporters (above all Antiphon and Pythodoros) are by no means philosophically proven, i.e. they are philosophical amateurs. Moreover, the methodological inability of the young Socrates at the beginning of the dialogue is so conspicuous that his dialectical weaknesses may be understood as distance-creating signals for the recipients to reflect and think along.

Also relevant is the spatial and festive setting of the (reported) conversation with Parmenides and Zenon, which takes place in the house of Pythodoros in Kerameikos, just outside Athens. The two Eleates came to Athens on the occasion of the Panathenian Festival, celebrated in honour of the city goddess Athena, which is what motivates their encounter with Socrates. The aforementioned conversation proves to be a philosophical parallel action to the religious Panathene festival. Since the Panathenic procession traditionally ran from Kerameikos up to the Acropolis and led just from Kerameikos in the opposite direction out the street to the area of Heros Akademos, it becomes clear that the very place of the conversation, the house in Kerameikos, is placed at an interface between religion and (Platonic) philosophy. Spatially (the Kerameikos lies in front-of-city) and thematically, of course, the philosophers distance themselves from the spectacle of polis religion and conduct a philosophical conversation that nevertheless has theological implications. Parallels with the personal, festive and spatial setting of Plato's *Politeia* are evident. With regard to the seventh aporia of the *Parmenides*, which would make religious cult and theological speculation superfluous, the above-mentioned narrative, personal and spatial distance markers should therefore be included in the interpretation.

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### *1676: Leibniz, lecteur de la seconde partie du Parménide*

Durant le printemps 1676, Leibniz lit et résume le *Phédon*, le *Théétète* et le *Parménide*. De ces résumés, seuls les deux premiers nous sont parvenus (A VI.3 283-311 = FC 44-145). Du dernier, l'on ne connaît guère que la forme : annotant la lettre 73 de Spinoza, Leibniz dit avoir condensé le *Parménide* sous la forme d'une *démonstration* (A VI.3 370.26-27).

Si l'influence du *Phédon* sur la pensée leibnizienne est évidente et bien documentée, notamment parce que Leibniz le cite dans le *Discours de métaphysique* (A VI.4 1562.3-1563.13), celle du *Théétète* l'est un peu moins (à cet égard, beaucoup reste à faire, en particulier concernant la lecture leibnizienne de la dernière partie du dialogue qui a pu nourrir ses réflexions en logique, voir : A VI.3 575.7-8, 27 qui réfère à 201e-202a). Quant à l'estime de l'influence du *Parménide*, elle demeure une *terra incognita* des études leibniziennes, sans doute parce qu'elle se fait beaucoup plus discrète. Leibniz ne fait en effet explicitement référence au *Parménide* qu'à deux reprises, en octobre et en novembre 1676, dans des opuscules au sein desquels il associe l'unicité spinoziste de la substance et la 'démonstration' de la seconde partie du *Parménide* (A VI.3 370.26-27, 573.14-18). En outre, si le *Phédon* et le *Théétète* sont encore mentionnés par Leibniz après 1676 (respectivement : A VI.4 435.16, 1386.18, 1387.3, 1403.6, 1562.3-1563.13, 1571.5, 1948.7, 2039.3, 2475.13, VI.6 165.21-23 etc. et A VI.4 1945.12-14), ce ne sera plus jamais le cas du *Parménide*. Comme on le verra, ce fait s'explique aisément : d'une part, la brève attirance pour le spinozisme ne survécut pas longtemps à sa rencontre avec le maître (novembre 1676) ; d'autre part le tournant dynamique de la physique leibnizienne – et son corollaire, la phénoménalisation du continu – rendit caduc les problèmes cinématiques du *Parménide*. L'intérêt du dialogue platonicien s'évanouit donc presque aussitôt pour la réflexion leibnizienne.

Malgré le peu de références explicites au *Parménide*, il apparaît toutefois que le *Pacidius Philalethi*, rédigé en octobre-novembre 1676, garde trace de la récente lecture attentive des trois dialogues platoniciens (au-delà de la forme dialogique déjà très caractéristique, Pacidius se réclame expressément de la maïeutique du *Théétète* : A VI.3 534.2-4), et en particulier des passages cinématiques de la première (138b-139b = A VI.3 535-538) et de la seconde hypothèse (156c-157b = A VI.3 545) du *Parménide*. Cela n'a rien d'étonnant. En tant que somme et critique des réflexions sur le mouvement menées entre 1669 et 1676, le *Pacidius Philalethi* marque le dernier texte proprement cinématique de Leibniz avant le tournant que représente le *De Concursu corporum* (1678), lequel constitue les premiers linéaments de la nouvelle science dynamique. Il est donc peu surprenant que, dans le *Pacidius*, Leibniz fasse allusion aux réflexions platoniciennes sur le changement : celles-ci s'inscrivent temporairement dans le champ problématique de la pensée leibnizienne.

En dépit de leur rareté, les quelques références et allusions à la seconde partie du *Parménide* sont suffisamment claires pour que l'on puisse reconstruire la lecture leibnizienne de ce dialogue.

Un fait textuel apparaît d'emblée : jamais Leibniz ne cite ou ne fait allusion à la première partie du *Parménide*, en cela ce qui l'intéresse dans ce dialogue diffère des préoccupations de ses

contemporains (par exemple, Simon Foucher – lui-même lecteur assidu de Platon – se concentre exclusivement sur la première partie du *Parménide*, partie dans laquelle il dit voir, en 1689, « le fond de toute la dispute que j’ay eue avec le Pere Malbranche sur les idées » A II.2 292.5-6, voir aussi A II.2 475.7-9). Il apparaît immédiatement que la lecture leibnizienne du dialogue ne s’inscrit dans aucun ‘ tiroir ’ ni de la classification rapportée par Proclus (*Theol. Plat.*, I 7-12 et *In Parm.* I 630.37-643.5, VI 1051.34-1064.12) ni de la classification des interprétations récentes (Ryle, Cornford, Marguerite, Allen, Pemberton, Meinwald, Gill, Rickless, Priest, etc.), et qu’elle ne s’appuie pas non plus sur la lecture parallèle du commentaire de Marsile Ficin (dont il connaît les traductions et dont il juge le ‘pseudo’-platonisme avec sévérité : A II.2 86.28-87.6, VI.4 479.6-25). Sa manière de lire le *Parménide* consiste tout autant dans l’isolement de certains arguments, et – pour le cas des passages cinématiques – dans leur liaison, que dans l’appréhension de la seconde partie du *Parménide* comme étant une démonstration unitaire et cohérente.

1. Leibniz ne pouvait en effet qu’être sensible à la dialectique combinatoire de la seconde partie du *Parménide*, par conséquent il n’est pas étonnant que, loin d’un jeu ou d’un exercice dialectique stérile, il y décèle une authentique *démonstration*, examinant successivement et en ordre toutes les alternatives afin d’en déduire l’unicité substantielle absolue. Ne restait plus dès lors qu’à souligner la parenté entre les anciens Eléates et le ‘nouveau Parménide’ Spinoza (A VI.4 2461.6-8 et GP VII 536, identification parfois corrigée au profit d’une lecture ‘idéaliste’ de l’éléatisme : GP IV 523). Interpréter la seconde partie du *Parménide* comme une démonstration unique est loin d’aller de soi. La position de Leibniz se rapproche ici de ceux qui, à l’instar de Gill, voient dans la seconde partie du *Parménide* une *reductio ad absurdum* démontrant que, d’une certaine manière, l’un peut être à la fois un et multiple. La différence cruciale étant que Leibniz inscrit sa lecture du *Parménide* dans un schème imprégné de spinozisme, i.e. celui où l’unicité substantielle côtoie la multiplicité des modes.

2. Le lien que Leibniz effectue entre les deux passages cinématiques du *Parménide*, qui plus est, témoigne de son acuité caractéristique. A chaque fois, il refuse la conclusion platonicienne et accentue la portée aporétique de l’argument. Il les déclare en outre « absurdes » pour des raisons similaires. Je voudrai montrer que cette similarité confine à l’identité, et correspond à une distance prise par Leibniz à l’égard des éléments scotistes et pseudo-cavaliériens de la *Theoria Motus Abstracti* (1671). Je suggèrai par ailleurs que la lecture leibnizienne s’avère être l’interprétation ‘correcte’ des passages cinématiques du *Parménide*, dans la mesure où ils constituent bien une réflexion poussée sur la notion de *limite*, laquelle – comme l’avait vu Natorp – joue un rôle crucial dans l’argumentaire du *Parménide* dans la mesure où celui-ci affronte le labyrinthe de la *compositione continui*. A cet égard, il est remarquable que Leibniz lise ces deux arguments platoniciens comme conduisant à l’acceptation de *dialetheias*, en cela il anticipe certains aspects de la lecture contemporaine du *Parménide* telle qu’elle est menée par Graham Priest.

En somme, d’une certaine manière, la lecture de la seconde partie du *Parménide* a été pour Leibniz un moyen de déceler l’impasse que représentait la physique continuiste du *conatus* au profit à la fois d’une cinématique (provisoire) du contigu et d’une approche des infinitésimaux comme ‘fictions utiles’ (les références au *Parménide* sont circonscrites à la première partie du *Pacidus Philalethi*, c’est-à-dire celle dévolue à l’examen de la continuité du mouvement, tandis que la seconde opère sous le paradigme de sa contiguité). La tolérance envers les *dialetheias* qui affleurait en certains endroits de la *TMA* est en effet définitivement résolue en 1676, tout comme la tentation, voire la bienveillance, à l’égard du monisme spinozien.



L'intérêt de la lecture leibnizienne du *Parménide*, au-delà des études leibniziennes, est double : d'une part, si on la compare à celle de Foucher, elle nous renseigne sur la fonction du *Parménide* dans les débats métaphysiques du XVII<sup>ème</sup> siècle ; d'autre part, parce qu'elle anticipe certains aspects des lectures récentes les plus stimulantes, elle témoigne de l'actualité du dialogue platonicien pour le travail de la pensée.

### *1676: Leibniz, lecteur de la seconde partie du Parménide (en)*

During the spring of 1676, Leibniz reads and summarizes the *Phaedon*, the *Theaetetus* and the *Parmenides*. Only the first two summaries have reached us (A VI.3 283-311 = FC 44-145). Of the last, we know only the form: annotating the letter 73 of Spinoza, Leibniz said to have condensed the *Parmenides* in the form of a *demonstration* (A VI.3 370.26-27).

If the influence of the *Phaedon* over Leibniz's thought is obvious and well documented, especially because Leibniz quotes it in the *Discours de métaphysique* (A VI.4 1562.3-1563.13), that of the *Theaetetus* is less well known (in this respect, much remains to be done, in particular concerning the Leibnizian reading of the last part of the dialogue which could feed his reflections in logic, see: A VI.3 575.7-8, 27 which refers to 201e-202a). As for the estimation of the influence of the *Parmenides*, it remains a *terra incognita* of Leibniz Studies, probably because its influence is much more discreet. Leibniz makes explicit reference to the *Parmenides* only twice, in October and November 1676, in papers in which he connects the Spinozist uniqueness of the substance with the 'demonstration' of the second part of the *Parmenides* (A VI.3 370.26-27, 573.14-18). Moreover, if the *Phaedon* and the *Theaetetus* are still mentioned by Leibniz after 1676 (respectively: A VI.4 435.16, 1386.18, 1387.3, 1403.6, 1562.3-1563.13, 1571.5, 1948.7, 2039.3, 2475.13, VI.6 165.21-23 etc. and A VI.4 1945.12-14), this will never be the case with the *Parmenides*. As we shall see, this fact can easily be explained: on the one hand, the brief attraction for Spinozism did not survive long after his meeting with the master (November 1676); on the other hand, the dynamic turn of Leibniz's physics – and its corollary, the phenomenalization of the continuum – obsoleted the kinematic problems of the *Parmenides*. The interest of the Platonic dialogue vanishes almost immediately for Leibniz's reflection.

Despite the few explicit references to the *Parmenides*, it appears that the *Pacidius Philaethi*, written in October-November 1676, keeps track of the recent careful reading of the three Platonic dialogues (beyond the very characteristic dialogical form, Pacidius expressly refers to the maieutics of the *Theaetetus*: A VI.3 534.2-4), and in particular, of the kinematic passages of the first (138b-139b = A VI.3 535-538) and second (156c-157b = A VI.3 545) hypotheses of the *Parmenides*. This is not surprising. As a sum and a critical review of the analyses on motion carried out between 1669 and 1676, the *Pacidius Philaethi* marks Leibniz's last truly kinematic text before the turning point represented by the *De Concursu corporum* (1678), which constitutes the first lineaments of the new science of dynamics. It is therefore hardly surprising that, in the *Pacidius*, Leibniz alludes to Platonic reflections on change: these temporarily fit in with the problematic field of Leibniz's thought.

In spite of their rarity, the few references and allusions to the second part of the *Parmenides* are clear enough to reconstruct the Leibnizian reading of this dialogue.

A textual fact appears straight away: Leibniz never quotes or refers to the first part of the *Parmenides*. Thereby, what interests him in this dialogue differs from the preoccupations of his contemporaries (for instance, a diligent reader of Plato as Simon Foucher focuses exclusively on the

first part of *Parmenides*, a part in which, in 1689, he says that he found “le fond de toute la dispute que j’ay eue avec le Pere Malbranche sur les idées” A II.2 292.5- 6, see also A II.2 475.7-9). It immediately appears that the Leibnizian reading of the dialogue does not fit into the mould of the classification reported by Proclus (*Theol. Plat.*, I 7-12 and *In Parm.* I 630.37-643.5, VI 1051.34-1064.12), nor of the classification of recent interpretations (Ryle, Cornford, Marguerite, Allen, Pemberton, Meinwald, Gill, Rickless, Priest, etc.), and that it does not rely either on Marsilio Ficino’s commentary (whose he knows the translations and of whose he severely considers the ‘pseudo’-Platonism: A II.2 86.28-87.6, VI.4 479.6-25). His way of reading the *Parmenides* consists as much in the isolation of some arguments (and, in the case of the kinematic passages, in their connection) as in the understanding of the second part of the *Parmenides* as a unitary and coherent demonstration.

1. Leibniz could only be sensitive to the combinatorial dialectic of the second part of the *Parmenides*, so it is not surprising that, far from a sterile dialectical game or exercise, he discovers in it a genuine *demonstration*, examining successively all the alternatives in order to deduce the absolute substantial uniqueness. It remained only to highlight the kinship between the old Eleatics and the ‘new *Parmenides*’ Spinoza (A VI.4 2461.6-8 and GP VII 536, identification sometimes corrected in favour of an ‘idealistic’ reading of the Eleatism: GP IV 523). Interpreting the second part of the *Parmenides* as a single demonstration is far from self-evident. Here, Leibniz’s position approaches those who, as Gill, find in the second part of the *Parmenides* a *reductio ad absurdum* showing that, in a certain way, one can be both one and multiple. The crucial difference is that Leibniz enters his reading of the *Parmenides* into a Spinozist framework, viz. in which substantial uniqueness coexists with the plurality of modes.

2. Moreover, the connection that Leibniz makes between the two kinematic passages of the *Parmenides* testifies to his usual perspicacity. Each time, he rejects the Platonic conclusion and emphasizes the aporetic scope of the argument. He also declares them “absurd” for similar reasons. I would like to show that this similarity borders on identity, and corresponds to a distance taken by Leibniz with regard to the Scotist and pseudo-Cavalierian elements of the *Theoria Motus Abstracti* (1671). I shall further suggest that the Leibnizian reading turns out to be the ‘right’ interpretation of the kinematic passages of the *Parmenides*, inasmuch as they constitute a thorough reflection on the notion of *limit*, which – as Natorp had seen – plays a crucial role in the argument of the *Parmenides* in that it faces the labyrinth of the *compositione continui*. In this respect, it is remarkable that Leibniz reads these two Platonic arguments as leading to the acceptance of *dialetheias*. Thereby, he anticipates certain aspects of the contemporary reading of the *Parmenides* as conducted by Graham Priest.

In sum, for Leibniz, the reading of the second part of the *Parmenides* was a means of detecting the impasse represented by the continuist physics of the *conatus* in favour of both a (provisional) kinematics of the contiguous and of an approach of the infinitesimals *qua* ‘useful fictions’ (the references to the *Parmenides* are circumscribed to the first part of the *Pacidus Philalethi*, i.e. the part devoted to the examination of motion *qua* continuous, while the second operates under the paradigm of its contiguity). Indeed, in 1676, the tolerance for *dialetheias* that appear in some parts of the *TMA* is definitely over, as is the temptation, even indulgence, with regard to Spinozian monism.

The interest of Leibniz’s reading of the *Parmenides*, beyond Leibniz Studies, is twofold: on the one hand, if we compare it to the reading of Foucher, it informs us on the function of the *Parmenides* in the metaphysical quarrels of the 17<sup>th</sup> century; on the other hand, because it

anticipates certain aspects of the most stimulating recent reading, it bears witness to the actuality of the Platonic dialogue for the work of thought.

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### *Intra-Socratic Polemics. The Parmenides as part of an anti-megaric programme*

During the last years, there was a strengthening of the Platonic studies in dialogue with the Socratic philosophies. The exam of the extant materials can shed light on the controversies with contemporaries that motivated numerous passages of the *corpus*. The expansion of the analysis on lines such as the Megarics, Cyrenaics, Antisthenes, Aeschines, among others, allows transposing the mere suggestion of allusions and conduct a study of the tension between the Platonic philosophy and that of its fellow disciples. The *Parmenides* offers a compelling case for this line of research, especially taking into account the nineteenth-century historiography that considered it as part of a "megaric period" of Plato coinciding with his prolonged stay in Megara, and even led to reject works such as the *Sophist*, the *Parmenides* and the *Statesman* as texts directly written by authors of the Megaric line (especially Socher, 1820). Then, in the process of consolidation of the historical-critical approach, multiple possibilities of intertextuality with megaric positions were explored in this and other dialogues. After the historiographical turn at the beginning of the twentieth century that forgot almost entirely during several decades the Socratic philosophies, and the development of reliable philological materials that allow resuming these studies on other bases, it is possible to re-evaluate the relationship between Plato and these schools without the exaggerations of other times, but returning the controversial context that surrounded the composition of the Platonic works.

Our study will offer elements to show that the *Parmenides* can be understood as an exercise of anti-megaric polemic in three main points. On the one hand, Parmenides constitutes a significant figure for the line initiated with Euclid, and the way in which his influence is comprehended explains some features that he adopts in the *Parmenides*. In order to show this point, we will dwell on the question of the role of Parmenides in the discussions of the Socratic circle, its influence on the Megaric line and its value in the tension with Platonism. Against the influential doubts of von Fritz (1931), the works of Döring (1972), Mársico (2011, 2013) and Brancacci (2018) have reinforced the combination of Eleatism and Socratism in the Megaric line, in a way that can be deepened with profit pointing out the *Parmenides* as an example of the collision between that combination and the one operated by Plato in other ways and with different results giving rise to contrasting dialectical models.

On the other hand, the set of arguments between 130a and 135c presents numerous allusions to megaric devices in tension with the Theory of Ideas. The thesis of the unit associated with the good that transforms ontology in "agathology", as well as the rejection of all forms of *methexis*, leaves men in a restricted plane of knowledge that enables forms of refutative eristic regarding currents that, like Platonism, have more comprehensive pretensions. The first part of the *Parmenides* alludes to the megaric arguments that argue with the Theory of Forms interpreting them from the Platonic perspective, in a way that makes it easier to advance in their solution. The extreme simplification of some elements, as well as the crude vision concerning the Ideas, result in operations that show the young Socrates incapable of answering but point out at the same time the way of response.

To make this relationship explicit, we will analyse the elements of tension with the megaric philosophy in the argument of the extension of forms (130b-e), the dilemma of participation (130e-131e) and the two versions of the argument of the third man (131e-133a), comparing with the version of Polixenus. We will also refer to the anti-platonic program of Stilpo as an element to indicate the plausibility of this controversial substrate in the *Parmenides*.

Finally, the exercise of argumentation developed in the last part of the dialogue can be understood as an examination of the thesis of the unity that collides with the megaric treatment in two main points. On the one hand, the methodological one, given that in agreeing to the examination of hypotheses the proposal adheres to a program rejected by Euclid, which we know from the testimony of Diogenes Laertius, II.107 (SSR, II.A.34) that conceived the demonstrations in a way that contradicts the link between premises and conclusion. On the other hand, the metaphysical aspect, given that the passage presents the disadvantages of the thesis of the unity that supported the megaric approach. To analyze this point, we will show the presence of the megaric thesis on the unity of good in the analysis of the hypotheses about the good that supports the idea that the *Parmenides* constitutes a challenge to the theoretical foundations of this group.

In this way, taking into account the design of the profile that Parmenides adopts in this text, the aspects of the critique of the theory of Ideas in the first part, and the megaric elements in the treatment of the hypotheses about the unity, it will be possible to evaluate the plausibility of understanding dialogue as an attempt to challenge the founding points of this group, and thereby to encourage a dynamic understanding of the eidetic plane, in the manner it is found in the *Sophist*. The figure of Parmenides will be revealed in this way as an authority for both lines that revives to pose the megaric criticism about the Theory of Ideas as a challenge that encourage the young Socrates to continue his exploration and not as a real obstacle, minimising the refutative value of the megaric invectives. At the same time, the second part, presented as a purely philosophical exercise, contradicts the fundamental parameters of the philosophy that begins with Euclid, leaving in the hands of Parmenides the objection of the main points of the megaric line and reinforcing the relative position of Platonism.

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## *Polémicas intra-socráticas. El Parménides como elemento de un programa anti-megárico*

Los últimos años han visto un fortalecimiento de los estudios platónicos en diálogo con las filosofías socráticas, cuyo estudio a partir de los materiales supérstites puede echar luz sobre las polémicas con los contemporáneos que motivan numerosos pasajes del *corpus*. La ampliación de los estudios sobre líneas como la megárica, cirenaica, antistélica, esquínea, entre otras, permiten trasponer la mera sugerencia de alusiones para abordar un estudio de la tensión entre la filosofía platónica y la de sus discípulos. El *Parménides* ofrece un caso interesante para esta línea de investigación, especialmente teniendo en cuenta la historiografía decimonónica que llegó a considerarlo como parte de un “período megárico” de Platón coincidente con la prolongada estancia en Mégara y llegando a rechazar obras como el *Sofista*, el *Parménides* y el *Político* como textos directamente escritos por autores de la línea megárica (Socher, 1820). Luego, en el proceso de consolidación del enfoque histórico-crítico, se exploraron múltiples posibilidades de intertextualidad con posiciones megáricas en este y otros diálogos. Tras el viraje historiográfico de inicios del s. XX que dejó en el olvido durante varias décadas las filosofías socráticas y el desarrollo de materiales filológicos confiables que permiten retomar estos estudios sobre otras bases, es posible volver a evaluar la relación entre Platón y estas escuelas sin las exageraciones de otras épocas, pero devolviendo el contexto polémico que en efecto rodeó la composición de las obras platónicas.

Nuestro estudio ofrecerá elementos para mostrar que el *Parménides* puede ser comprendido como un ejercicio de polémica anti-megárica en tres puntos principales. Por un lado, Parménides constituye una figura de peso para la corriente iniciada con Euclides y el modo en que se comprende su influjo explica algunos rasgos que adopta en el *Parménides*. Para ello nos detendremos en la cuestión del papel de Parménides en las discusiones del círculo socrático, su influjo en la línea megárica y su papel en la tensión con el platonismo. Contra las influyentes dudas de von Fritz (1931), los trabajos de Döring (1972), Mársico (2011, 2013) y Brancacci (2018) han reforzado la combinación de eleatismo y socratismo en la línea megárica, de un modo que puede ser profundizado con provecho señalando el *Parménides* como un ejemplo de la colisión entre esa combinación y la operada por Platón por otras vías y con otros resultados dando lugar a modelos dialécticos contrastantes.

Por otro lado, el conjunto de argumentos entre 130a y 135c presenta numerosas alusiones a argumentos megáricos en tensión con la Teoría de las Ideas. La tesis de la unidad asociada con el bien que transforma la ontología en “agathología”, a la vez que el rechazo de toda forma de *méthexis*, deja a los hombres en un plano de conocimiento restringido que habilita formas de erística refutativa respecto de corrientes que, como la platónica, tienen pretensiones más abarcativas. La primera parte del *Parménides* retoma los argumentos megáricos que riñen con la Teoría de las Formas interpretándolos desde la perspectiva platónica, de un modo que hace más fácil avanzar en su solución. La simplificación extrema de algunos elementos, así como la visión

burda respecto de las Ideas resultan operaciones que hacen descansar en la juventud de Sócrates la falta de respuesta, pero señalan a la vez la vía de respuesta.

Para explicitar esta relación, nos detendremos en el análisis de los elementos de tensión con la filosofía megárica en el argumento de la extensión de las formas (130b-e), el dilema de la participación (130e-131e) y las dos versiones del argumento del tercer hombre (131e-133a), teniendo en este caso en cuenta la versión de Políxeno. Nos referiremos asimismo al programa anti-platónico de Estilpón como elemento para señalar la plausibilidad de este sustrato polémico en el *Parménides*.

Finalmente, el ejercicio de argumentación sobre la unidad que se desarrolla en la última parte del diálogo puede ser comprendido con provecho como un examen de las tesis de la unidad que colisiona con el tratamiento megárico en dos puntos principales. Por un lado, el metodológico, dado que al avenirse al examen de hipótesis el planteo responde a un programa rechazado por Euclides, que según sabemos por testimonio de Diógenes Laercio, II.107 (SSR, II.A.34) comprendía las demostraciones de un modo que contraría el vínculo entre premisas y conclusión. Por otro, el metafísico, dado que el recorrido presenta los inconvenientes de la tesis de la unidad que sostenía el planteo megárico del bien-uno. Para analizar este punto mostraremos la presencia de la tesis megárica sobre el bien-uno en el análisis de las hipótesis sobre el bien abonando la idea de que el *Parménides* constituye una impugnación de las bases teóricas de este grupo.

De este modo, atendiendo al diseño del perfil que Parménides adopta en este texto, a los aspectos de la crítica a la teoría de las Ideas que estructuran la primera parte, y a los elementos megáricos del tratamiento de las hipótesis sobre lo uno, será posible evaluar la plausibilidad de comprender el diálogo como un intento de impugnación de los puntos de partida de este grupo, y alentar con ello una comprensión dinámica del plano eidético, tal como se despliega en el *Sofista*. La figura de Parménides se revelará de este modo como una alusión de autoridad para ambas líneas que revive para definir las críticas megáricas a la Teoría de las Ideas como desafíos que incentivan al joven Sócrates a proseguir su exploración y no como verdaderos obstáculos, minimizando, por tanto, el valor refutativo de las invectivas megáricas. Al mismo tiempo, la segunda parte, en lo que se presenta como un verdadero ejercicio filosófico, se contravienen los parámetros fundamentales de análisis de lo uno que rigen en la filosofía que se inicia con Euclides, dejando en manos de Parménides la impugnación de los puntos básicos de la línea megárica y reforzando con ello la posición relativa del platonismo.

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### *La première antinomie de Parménide, ἀὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοιά et le étonnement de Socrate*

Dans la première partie du *Parménide*, Socrate utilise un très riche vocabulaire pour expliquer comment l'interaction entre les formes et les objets sensibles peut résoudre le paradoxe de Zénon. Parmi les expressions les plus habituelles, telles que ἀὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶδος, ἀὐτὰ τὰ γένη, ὁμοιότης et ὃ ἔστιν ἀνόμοιον, le lecteur du *Parménide* trouve, dans ce qu'on appelle le "long discours de Socrate" (128e5-130a2) l'expression plutôt inhabituelle ἀὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοιά. La construction n'est pas courante. Dans le contexte de discussions sur les idées, des locutions comme celles-ci, composées d'un adjectif pluriel + ἀὐτὰ τὰ, se produisent seulement deux fois dans l'ensemble du *corpus* platonicien, (*Phd* 74C1: ἀὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα / *Prm*.129b1: ἀὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοιά). Par ailleurs, depuis l'antiquité, les commentateurs et interprètes ont été intrigués par l'usage d'une expression au pluriel pour désigner, apparemment, une idée. Les idées sont des entités unitaires, uniques. Même si nous avons beaucoup de belles choses, il n'y a qu'une seule Beauté. Mais, si c'est en effet le cas, pourquoi le pluriel?

Le plus ancien commentateur qui a fait face à ce problème que nous connaissons est Olympiodorus. Il répond à la question en désignant un troisième type d'entité (c'est-à-dire, en plus des idées et des objets sensibles) comme référence de l'expression. Olympiodorus suggère que ce type de construction ne désigne pas l'idée, mais les diverses pensées mentales ou représentations de l'idée dans l'esprit de différentes personnes (τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ εἶδη).

Au cours du dernier siècle, la controverse est réapparue et, au cours de cette controverse, on a beaucoup parlé de l'ontologie de Platon et des types d'entités dont Socrate a besoin pour expliquer comment les objets sensibles peuvent avoir des propriétés, surtout des propriétés opposées. Mais, malgré le grand nombre d'interprétations avancées sur le sujet, il est devenu progressivement la vision la plus acceptée, celle qui considère ἀὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοιά une manière inhabituelle de faire référence à l'idée de la Ressemblance. Ainsi, Bluck et Geach soutiennent que si Platon comprend les idées comme standards, alors, par conséquent, une idée relationnelle telle que la Ressemblance doit être entendue comme constituée de deux entités parfaitement ressemblantes. Vlastos et Owen, à leur tour, soutiennent que les locutions plurielles désignent les idées, non parce que celles-ci sont standards, mais parce que la grammaire grecque permet d'utiliser l'adjectif pluriel neutre pour désigner l'entité abstraite correspondante.

Dans ma présentation, je vais soutenir qu'il est crucial pour l'interprétation du *Parménide* que l'expression ἀὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοιά ne désigne ni l'idée de la Ressemblance, ni les objets sensibles ressemblants, mais les propriétés immanentes (ou caractères immanents ou idées-copies) que les sensibles portent par leur participation à l'idée de la Ressemblance. La nature exacte de ce troisième type d'entité n'est pas claire dans la discussion, et sa signification précise sera souvent modifiée pendant la confrontation dialectique entre Socrate et Parménide. Cependant, quel que soit leur nature, ce que je veux soutenir est que la reconnaissance de la présence de ces entités dans les arguments du *Parménide* est essentielle pour la compréhension de la relation entre la première et la deuxième partie du dialogue.

Le principal passage pour comprendre pourquoi *αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια* doit désigner les propriétés immanentes se trouve dans la déclaration de Parménide que l'hypothèse elle-même "si l'on est" indique que l'un a des parties (142d-143a). Selon Parménide, si le sujet supposé est un, alors il doit s'agir d'un ensemble composé d'au moins deux parties: l'un et l'être. L'unité et l'être sont des propriétés du sujet de la seconde hypothèse, quel que soit ce sujet, et ce fait lui-même fait de "un" et de "être" parties de ce sujet.

Selon mon interprétation, ce passage présente un principe méréologique qui régit la majeure partie de la discussion précédente, y compris la solution de Socrate au paradoxe de Zénon et la critique de Parménide. Ce principe stipule que chaque attribut d'un sujet doit être considéré comme une partie de ce sujet. Par conséquent, tout sujet ayant plus d'une propriété doit être considéré comme un tout composé de parties, chaque partie représentant l'une de ses propriétés.

En faisant abstraction de ce principe, Zénon avait considéré toute chose individuelle comme une entité contradictoire, parce que celles-ci sont caractérisées par des propriétés opposées telles que la ressemblance et la dissemblance. Socrate a résolu ce problème en proposant que chacune de ces deux propriétés opposées représente une partie différente de la même chose sensible. De façon que, affirme Socrate, les deux propriétés opposées ne sont plus des attributs de la même chose et par conséquent, l'apparente contradiction disparaît. Il y a une partie de Socrate qui est le sujet de la ressemblance et une autre partie de lui qui est le sujet de la dissemblance. Et il n'y a pas de contradiction si différents sujets ont des propriétés opposées. Pour que le paradoxe de Zénon émerge, il faut que l'exacte même chose soit semblable et dissemblable.

L'ontologie proposée par Socrate est donc composée de trois types d'entités. Chaque chose sensible est un ensemble composé de nombreuses parties, chaque partie, vaguement entendue comme une propriété immanente, représentant un de ses attributs. Les propriétés immanentes sont des parties des choses sensibles causées par leur participation aux idées. Chaque propriété immanente est une unité, en ce sens qu'elle n'a pas de parties, cependant elles sont nombreuses: ma propriété immanente de la ressemblance est différente de la vôtre. Enfin, les idées sont des unités absolues. Il n'y a qu'une idée de Ressemblance et cette idée est la cause des nombreuses ressemblances immanentes qu'ont les objets sensibles.

À partir du schéma conceptuel décrit ci-dessus, je vais interpréter deux des passages les plus controversés du dialogue: le long discours de Socrate (128e5-130a2) et la première antinomie de Parménide. Mon objectif est de démontrer: 1) que le discours de Socrate n'a de sens que si nous comprenons *αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια* comme un troisième type d'entité, c'est-à-dire la propriété immanente donnée aux objets sensibles par la participation à l'idée de la Ressemblance; 2) que, dans les deux premières hypothèses de la deuxième partie du dialogue, Parménide répond à Socrate en démontrant qu'il n'est possible ni pour les idées ni pour les propriétés immanentes d'être les entités unitaires que Socrate veut qu'elles soient. Enfin, 3) je vais utiliser ces résultats pour suggérer une nouvelle réponse à la question concernant la relation entre la première et la deuxième partie du *Parménide*. Selon mon interprétation, l'exercice de la deuxième partie du dialogue n'apporte pas la solution à la critique de Parménide de la théorie des idées, malgré ce que pense la majorité des interprètes d'aujourd'hui. Au contraire, les déductions radicalisent cette critique en soulignant une incompréhension fondamentale dans la conception socratique de l'unité.

*Parmenides' first and second hypotheses, αὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοιά, and Socrates' astonishment.*

In the first part of the *Parmenides*, Socrates uses a rich vocabulary to explain how the interaction between forms and sensible particulars can provide a solution to Zeno's paradox. Along with more usual expressions such as αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶδος, αὐτὰ τὰ γένη, ὁμοιότης, and ὃ ἔστιν ἀνόμοιον, the reader of the *Parmenides* finds, in the so-called "Socrates' long speech" (128e5–130a2), the rather unusual expression αὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοιά. The construction is rare; locutions such as this one, composed of αὐτὰ τὰ + plural adjective only happen two times on the entire platonic *corpus*, in discussions about forms (*Phd* 74c1: αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα / *Prm*.129b1: αὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοιά). Besides, the fact that we could have a plural expression being used to designate a form has been intriguing commentators and interpreters since antiquity. Forms are supposed to be singular, unitarian entities. While we have many beautiful things, there is only one Beauty. But, then, why the plural?

The oldest commentator to deal with this problem that we know of is Olympiodorus. And he solves the question by pointing to a third kind of entity (i.e. in addition to forms and sensibles) as the reference of the expression. Olympiodorus suggests that this kind of construction designate not the form but the several thoughts or mental representations of the form in various persons' minds (τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ εἶδη).

Over the course of the last century, however, a renewed controversy about the meaning of this odd expression took place. During the course of this controversy, much has been said about Plato's ontology, and the types of entities Socrates needs in order to explain how sensible particulars can have opposite properties. But, despite the great amount of interpretations advanced on the topic, it gradually became the more or less established view that αὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοιά is just an unusual way of referring to the form of Likeness. Thus, Bluck and Geach argue that if Plato understands forms as standards, then a relational form such as Likeness must consist of two perfectly like entities. Vlastos, and Owen, on the other hand, hold that the locution have a form-designating role not because forms are standards, but because Greek grammar allows the use of the plural neuter adjective to designate the corresponding abstract entity.

In my presentation, I will argue that it is crucial for the interpretation of the *Parmenides* that the expression αὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοιά do not designate the form of Likeness, nor the sensible like things, but the immanent properties (or immanent characters or form-copies) that the sensibles bear by their participation on the form of Likeness. The exact nature of this third type of entity is not clear in the discussion, and its precise meaning will swift during the dialectical confrontation between Socrates and Parmenides. But my claim is that the recognition of its presence on the arguments is essential for the comprehension of the relation between the first and the second part of the dialogue.

The key passage to understand why αὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοιά must designate immanent properties is to be found in Parmenides' statement that the very hypothesis "if the one is" (or if it is one) indicates that the one has parts (142d-143a). According to Parmenides, since the thing hypothesized is one being, then it must be a whole composed of at least two parts: one and being. Oneness and being are properties of the subject of the second hypothesis, whatever this subject may be, and that fact alone makes both 'one' and 'being' parts of this subject.

According to my interpretation, this passage spells out a mereological principle that governs most part of the preceding discussion, including Socrates' solution to Zeno's paradox, and

Parmenides' criticism. This principle states that every property a given subject has must be considered a part of this subject. Therefore, any subject with more than one property is to be considered a whole composed of parts, each part of it representing one of its properties.

Disregarding this principle, Zeno had thought any individual thing a self-contradictory entity, on the basis that these things are characterized by the opposite properties likeness and unlikeness. Socrates solves this problem by proposing that each one of these two opposite properties represents a different part of the same sensible thing. This way, Socrates claims, the apparent contradiction vanishes, since the two opposite properties are not attributes of the same thing anymore. There is a part of Socrates that is the subject of likeness, and another part of him that is the subject of unlikeness. And there is no contradiction in different subjects having opposite properties; Zeno's paradox only works if the exact same thing is both like and unlike.

Socrates' proposed ontology is therefore composed of three different kinds of entities. Each sensible thing is a whole composed of many parts, each part representing one of its immanent properties. Immanent properties are parts of sensible things caused by their participation in the forms. Each immanent property is an unity, in the sense that it does not have different parts, but there are many of them; my likeness is different from yours. Finally, forms are absolute unities. There is just one form of Likeness and that form is the cause of the many immanent likenesses sensible objects have.

In my presentation, I will use the conceptual scheme delineated above to interpret two of the most debated passages of the dialogue: Socrates' long speech (128e5–130a2) and Parmenides' first antinomy. My aim is to demonstrate: 1) that Socrates' speech can only make sense if we understand *ἀτὰ τὰ ὁμοιά* as a third kind of entity, the immanent property sensibles have by participating in the form of Likeness; 2) that in the first two hypothesis of the second part of the dialogue, Parmenides is answering Socrates' challenge. Parmenides' arguments aim to show that, according to Socrates' own premisses, it is not possible for forms or immanent properties to be the kind of unity Socrates wants them to be. Finally, 3) I will use these results to suggest an innovative answer to the vexed question about the relation between the first and second parts of the *Parmenides*. According to my interpretation, the exercise of the second part of the dialogue does not provide the solution to Parmenides' criticism of the theory of forms, despite what the majority think today. Rather, it radicalizes this criticism by pointing to a fundamental miscomprehension on Socrates' conception of what it is to be a unity.

### *Gunk in the Third Deduction of the Parmenides*

In the third deduction of the *Parmenides* (157b5-59b1), Plato has Parmenides investigate 'what the Others undergo if the One is' (156d5-6). In the course of that investigation, we are offered an account of how the Others are one or unified: They are unified because they 'partake' of the One (157c2). Even though Parmenides goes on in the fourth deduction to undermine the account from the third deduction (because, roughly, the One would no longer be One if the Others partook of it), the third deduction has been called the 'most constructive' of the deductions in the *Parmenides*,<sup>1</sup> and some have taken it to express part of Plato's own account of mereology.<sup>2</sup> There is, then, some scholarly presumption to think of the third deduction as providing a promising account of the relation between the Others and the One which, moreover, Plato himself may have been inclined to accept.

However, I am going to argue that there is a hitch in the third deduction which threatens to undermine Parmenides' proposal. Roughly, even if the Others partake of the One, the account of the third deduction leads to an ontology of gunk, that is, an ontology on which there are no mereological atoms. Hence, it is unclear whether the participation relation between the Others and the One is sufficient to impose the sort of structure on the Others which, in the context of this deduction, Parmenides (or Plato) seems to hope for.

'The Others' ('τὰ ἄλλα') with which Parmenides is concerned in the third deduction are characterized as 'other than the One' (157c1) and presumably include all the things distinct from the One. Unlike the One, the Others are not completely one because they have parts (157c3-4). Since they have parts, the Others are wholes (157c5-9), not bare 'pluralities', as Parmenides argues at length (157c9-e2). Each whole is 'one *complete* thing (ἐν τέλειον) having come to be from all [its parts]' (157e1), and the same is true of the parts so that 'it is necessary for the whole and the part to partake of the One' (158a6-7).

In the account sketched, Parmenides distinguishes between wholes and parts, but that distinction seems superficial. For all the Others are unified in virtue of partaking of the one, including both wholes and parts. Indeed, Parmenides claims that 'about each part, it is the same account' (157e5-6), which suggests that the parts are unified in the same way in which the wholes are, namely, in virtue of the unification of its parts into 'one complete thing'. In other words, whether something counts as a part or as a whole is a relative matter: The parts of a whole are themselves wholes with parts, and so forth, all unified by partaking of the One.

Hence, Parmenides' account leads to an ontology of *gunk*: There are no (mereological) atoms, but rather, each part of any whole has further parts, and so on *ad infinitum*. It is here that the problems begin. For in the remainder of the third deduction, Parmenides seems to assume that the participation relation between the Others and the One rules out an ontology of gunk.

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1 As Mary Louise Gill puts it (*Plato: Parmenides*, translated by Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan, Introduction by Mary Louise Gill, Indianapolis: Hackett (1996), p. 86).

2 See in particular Verity Harte's discussion of the passage (Harte, V., *Plato on Parts and Wholes*, Oxford: OUP (2002), ch. 3: 123-29).

In those later parts of the deduction, Parmenides has much to say about the 'limit' (πέρας) and what is 'unlimited' (ἄπειρον). In particular, he argues that the Others are 'unlimited in plurality' (ἄπειρον πλῆθει) (158b6) insofar as they do not partake of the One, and 'whenever we examine the other nature [i.e. the nature of the Others] itself by itself, however much we ever see of its shape will be unlimited in plurality' (158c5-7). For it is only insofar as the Others partake of the One that they are limited and distinguished from each other (158d2-8).

What exactly is the sense in which the Others, or their nature, are 'unlimited' by themselves, but 'limited', or, as Parmenides put it earlier, 'complete', insofar as they partake of the One? One sense appears to be that the Others are individuated in virtue of partaking of the One: That is, the parts are distinguished from each other and from the whole only because they participate in the One (158c7-d2).

However, the participation relation between the Others and the One seems to also have the function of preventing an ontology of gunk. One natural way in which we can understand the claim that the Others, insofar as they do not partake of the One, are 'unlimited in plurality', is that the Others are divisible into an infinite plurality. That reading is supported by the language used in the claim that 'whenever (ἀεί) we examine the other nature itself by itself, however much (ὅσον) we ever (ἀεί) see of its shape will be (ἔσται) unlimited in plurality' (158c5-7). Parmenides' claim suggests that if we were to take any quantity of the Others, insofar as they do not partake of the One, we could divide it into an unlimited or infinite plurality without encountering any mereological atoms.

Yet, if it is one function of having the Others partake of the One to rule out an ontology of gunk, the account of the third deduction fails. For we saw that, even insofar as the Others partake of the One, there will be gunk (because any part of any whole is itself a whole with parts). Hence, the participation relation between the Others and the One is not sufficient to ensure that the Others turn out to be 'unlimited in plurality' in one of the relevant sense. The account of the third deduction, then, misses one of its own goals.

If the line of reasoning I sketched is correct, it is doubtful whether the third deduction offers a viable account of the relation between the Others and the One, as is often implied, and perhaps also whether Plato himself was inclined to accept that account.

### *“Gunk” in der dritten Untersuchung des Parmenides*

In der dritten Untersuchung des *Parmenides* (157b5-59b1) lässt Platon Parmenides die Frage besprechen, "was den Anderen zukommt, wenn das Eine ist" (156d5-6). Parmenides schlägt uns im Zuge der Untersuchung eine Theorie vor, der gemäß die Anderen Einheit erlangen, indem sie am Einen teilhaben (157c2). Obwohl die vierte Untersuchung die Theorie der dritten in Zweifel ziehen wird (in etwa weil das Eine nicht mehr eines sei, wenn die Anderen an ihm teilhätten), wurde die dritte Untersuchung schon die "konstruktivste" aller im *Parmenides* befindlichen Untersuchungen genannt<sup>1</sup>, mithin als wichtiger Teil von Platons eigener mereologischen Theorie aufgefasst.<sup>2</sup> Es gibt also in der Forschung die Tendenz, die Theorie der dritten Untersuchung für

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1 Wie es Mary Louise Gill ausdrückt (Gill, M.L., and Ryan, P., *Plato: Parmenides*, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996: 86).

2 Vgl. insbesondere Verity Hartes Interpretation unserer Stelle (Harte, V., *Plato on Parts and Wholes*, Oxford: OUP (2002), ch. 3: 123-29).

eine vielversprechende Darstellung der Relation zwischen den Anderen und dem Einen zu halten, der Platon womöglich selbst zuneigte.

Die dritte Untersuchung scheint mir nun aber einen nicht geringfügigen Makel aufzuweisen, der die darin vorgeschlagene Theorie zu unterhöhlen droht. Denn, wie ich im folgenden ausführen möchte, auch wenn die Anderen am Einen teilhaben, führt Parmenides' Theorie zu einer Ontologie des "Gunks", der gemäß es keine mereologischen Atome gibt, obwohl er diese Konsequenz scheinbar vermeiden möchte. Deshalb ist es zweifelhaft, ob die Theorie tatsächlich so aussichtsreich ist, wie häufig impliziert wird, und vielleicht auch ob Platon sie für erfolgversprechend gehalten habe.

"Die Anderen", mit denen sich Parmenides beschäftigt, werden als "andere als das Eine" (157c1) bezeichnet und umfassen wohl alle Gegenstände, die nicht mit dem Einen identisch sind. Im Gegensatz zum Einen sind die Anderen nicht "vollständig eines", weil sie Teile haben (157c3-4). Da aber nur ein Ganzes Teile hat, sind die Anderen Ganze (157c5-9), keine reinen "Viele", wie Parmenides in einem längeren Argument darlegt (157c9-e2). Jedes Ganze ist "aus allen [seinen Teilen] ein Vollständiges (ἐν τέλειον) geworden" (157e1) und für die Teile gilt dasselbe, sodass "es für das Ganze und den Teil notwendig ist, am Einen teilzuhaben" (158a6-7).

Parmenides unterscheidet in seinen Ausführungen zwischen Ganzen und Teilen, aber diese Unterscheidung scheint nicht tief zu greifen. Denn alle Anderen erlangen Einheit, indem sie am Einen teilhaben, was vermutlich sowohl die Ganzen als auch die Teile miteinschließt: Parmenides' ausdrückliche Behauptung, dass "dieselbe Überlegung (λόγος) auch vom Teil gilt" (157e5-6), legt nahe, dass die Teile auf dieselbe Weise Einheit erlangen wie die Ganzen, nämlich aufgrund der Vereinigung der Teile zu "einem Vollständigen." Sprich, ob etwas als Teil oder Ganzes gilt ist relativ: Die Teile eines Ganzen sind wiederum Ganze mit Teilen, die aufgrund ihrer Teilhabe am Einen vereinigt worden sind.

Die Theorie der dritten Untersuchung führt also zu einer Ontologie des Gunks: Es gibt keine mereologischen Atome, vielmehr hat jeder Teil eines jeden Ganzen wiederum Teile und so weiter *ad infinitum*. Da Parmenides in der Fortsetzung der dritten Untersuchung anzunehmen scheint, dass die Teilhabe der Anderen am Ganzen eine Ontologie des Gunks verunmöglicht, wird sich, wie wir in Kürze sehen werden, die eben genannte Konsequenz seiner Theorie als problematisch erweisen.

In der Fortsetzung seiner Untersuchung spricht Parmenides von der "Grenze" ("πέρας") und dem "Unbegrenzten" ("ἄπειρον") und argumentiert, dass die Anderen, insofern sie nicht am Einen teilhätten, "der Menge nach unbegrenzt (ἄπειρον πλῆθει)" seien (158b6). Insbesondere behauptet er, dass "wann auch immer wir die andere Natur [d.h. die Natur der anderen] an und für sich betrachten, so wird sie, wieviel auch immer wir von ihrer Gestalt sehen, der Menge nach unbegrenzt sein" (158c5-7). Denn die Anderen sind nur insofern begrenzt und voneinander unterschieden, als sie am Einen teilhaben (158d2-8).

Worin genau besteht die "Unbegrenztheit" der Anderen oder ihrer Natur an und für sich sowie ihre "Begrenztheit" oder "Vollständigkeit", wie Parmenides es zuvor ausdrückte, insofern als sie am Einen teilhaben? Zum einen besteht die Begrenztheit oder Unbegrenztheit der Anderen

wohl eben darin, dass sie nur dank der Teilhabe am Einen individuiert werden und sich voneinander unterscheiden (158c7-d2).

Zudem scheint die Teilhabe der Anderen am Einen aber auch die Funktion zu haben, eine Ontologie des Gunks auszuschließen. Wir können die Aussage, dass die Anderen, insofern als sie nicht am Einen teilhaben, "der Menge nach unbegrenzt" seien, natürlicherweise so verstehen, dass die Anderen, insofern als sie nicht am Einen teilhaben, unendlich teilbar seien. Diese Lesart wird von der von Parmenides verwendeten Sprache gestützt, wenn er sagt, dass "wann auch immer ( $\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\iota$ ) wir die andere Natur [d.h. die Natur der anderen] an und für sich betrachten, so wird sie ( $\xi\sigma\tau\alpha\iota$ ), wieviel auch ( $\delta\sigma\sigma\omicron\nu$ ) immer ( $\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\iota$ ) wir von ihrer Gestalt sehen, der Menge nach unbegrenzt sein" (158c5-7). Denn diese Aussage legt nahe, dass wir jedwede Quantität der Anderen, insofern als sie nicht am Einen teilhaben, in eine unbegrenzte oder unendliche Menge teilen könnten, ohne je auf mereologische Atome zu stoßen.

Wenn es nun aber die Funktion der Teilhabe der Anderen am Einen sein soll, genau eine solche Ontologie des Gunks auszuschließen, scheitert die Theorie der dritten Untersuchung. Denn wir haben festgestellt, dass die Theorie auch dann in eine Ontologie des Gunks mündet, wenn die Anderen am Ganzen teilhaben (da jeder Teil wiederum ein Ganzes mit Teilen ist). Die Teilhabe der Anderen am Einen ist also nicht hinreichend, um die Konsequenz zu verhindern, dass die Anderen, selbst insofern als sie am Einen teilhaben, in einer wesentlichen Hinsicht "der Menge nach unbegrenzt" sind. Die Theorie der dritten Untersuchung verfehlt also ihr eigenes Ziel zumindest teilweise.

Falls mein schematisch dargestellter Gedankengang schlüssig ist, müssen wir bezweifeln, ob die Ausführungen der dritten Untersuchung wirklich eine attraktive Theorie der Relation der Anderen zum Einen darstellen, und zuletzt auch, ob wir davon ausgehen sollten, dass Platon selbst sie für überzeugend gehalten habe.



### *La polivalenza strutturale del concetto di Uno nella seconda parte del Parmenide.*

Non ci sono dubbi sull'importanza del concetto di Uno nella trattazione dialettica della seconda parte del *Parmenide*. Ma Platone stesso ci invita nei dialoghi a non rimanere vittima dell'errore che le parole ci inducono a fare. Queste danno l'impressione di definire qualcosa di unitario, mentre spesso "nascondono" differenze profonde. Questo è ciò che accade nel *Parmenide*: con il termine "Uno" Platone mette in gioco realtà diverse, che occorre cogliere.

Platone evidenzia subito queste differenze. Infatti l'Uno della Prima tesi non è quello della Seconda tesi. La Prima tesi riguarda un Uno che ha le caratteristiche che Platone stesso successivamente sintetizzerà nella formula uno-uno (ἐν ἑν, 142C3). Data tale natura questo principio assolutamente semplice esclude nella sua stessa valenza semantica ogni articolazione interna e qualsiasi rapporto con qualcosa. Il risultato finale non può che essere negativo: una serie di negazioni che portano alla conclusione che tale Uno non è e, pertanto, non è nemmeno uno, né è conoscibile.

La cosa più importante è la struttura logica delle argomentazioni, cioè il ragionamento centrale che ricorre nelle diverse tesi: comunque sia, l'Uno diverrebbe due. Tutto si basa quindi proprio sulla natura monistica di questo principio.

Emerge così la differenza con l'Uno-che-è della Seconda tesi: questo, dato il suo rapporto strutturale e reciproco con l'Essere, si trova coinvolto in moltissime relazioni per cui si rivela essere una infinita molteplicità.

Platone aggiunge subito un terzo "Uno", un concetto qui appena abbozzato, ma che, come vedremo, trova successivamente un'ampia trattazione. Con una operazione puramente mentale, distinguendo l'Uno dal suo stesso essere, è possibile pensare un Uno che appare solo uno, cioè cogliere la sua natura a prescindere dalla partecipazione che ha con l'essere (143A). Non è quindi il primo Uno che non partecipa di nulla e nemmeno il secondo che è l'Uno-che-è nella sua necessaria relazione con l'Essere.

Dunque il concetto di Uno si presenta immediatamente carico di valenze diverse, un dato che Platone rafforza, anche con allusioni talmente esplicite da essere sostanzialmente evidenti.

Primo, il testo mette in gioco quasi subito un quarto senso completamente diverso di uno, l'uno numero, che sommandosi al due dà luogo al tre (143D). Certo è un numero in un'accezione particolare, visto che il primo pari è il due e il primo dispari è il tre. Tuttavia tutto lo svolgimento numerico in qualche modo dipende dall'uno, in quanto il due è due volte uno e il tre tre volte uno.

Questo inserimento permette di evidenziare con forza la polivalenza del termine "Uno". Infatti l'uno che si somma è il numero uno, mentre quello della affermazione finale «se allora l'Uno è, necessariamente anche il numero è» (144A4) è l'Uno-che-è, qualunque sia la valenza che gli si attribuisca. A conferma, nella trattazione del divenire il numero uno è posto come primo in quanto semplice e antecedente rispetto a tutti gli altri, che da esso derivano per composizione (153A-B).

Quanto alle allusioni risultano particolarmente importanti le esplicite tematizzazioni dei diversi sensi dell'Uno. Ad esempio nella seconda tesi, prima si afferma che l'Uno, dovendo essere

presente in tutti gli enti, non può farlo come intero e quindi è diviso in parti, cioè è “infinita pluralità” (πολλά τε καὶ ἄπειρα, 144E4). Nello stesso tempo le parti sono nell’Uno come intero, che quindi costituisce un limite, che dà luogo ad un ente finito. Di qui Platone trae una conseguenza nella forma più provocatoria possibile: «Dunque, l’Uno-che-è è sia uno sia molti, sia intero sia parti, sia limitato sia quantità infinita» (τὸ ἐν ἄρα ὄν ἐν τέ ἐστὶ που καὶ πολλά, καὶ ὅλον καὶ μέρη, καὶ πεπερασμένον καὶ ἄπειρον πλήθει (145A2-3). Così Platone chiarisce subito che tutte le (apparenti) contraddizioni delle argomentazioni dipendono dalla diversità del soggetto cui si riferiscono. Infatti tutti i primi predicati sono propri dell’Uno-intero, i secondi dell’Uno-parte. Tale coppia è così importante che Platone la tematizza: «Ma partecipare dell’Uno è necessario sia all’intero sia alla parte. Quello sarà un Uno-intero, di cui le parti sono parti; l’altra, a sua volta, in quanto parte dell’intero, sarà una parte singolare dell’intero» (158A6-B1). Non possiamo qui illustrare come e quanto questa coppia sia decisiva nello svolgimento di molte diverse tesi.

Inoltre, non possono essere ignorati i tanti riferimenti – troppi per essere anche solo citati in questo breve paper - in cui Platone sotto la veste dell’Uno da una parte parla di realtà appartenenti al mondo ideale, dall’altra si riferisce ad enti che, essendo inseriti nel tempo e nello spazio e avendo una forma geometrica e dimensioni, non possono che appartenere al mondo empirico. Analogamente, bisogna assumere la distinzione, esplicitamente formulata, tra l’Uno in sé, che solo è veramente Uno, e le cose che sono uno unicamente perché partecipano dell’Uno (157E-158A).

Comunque in un processo binario come quello che quasi sempre Platone svolge non può essere sottovalutata la molteplicità delle figure che si oppongono all’Uno. Inizialmente si parla di altro dall’Uno, che poi si trasforma, senza alcuna segnalazione, in altri (146D5-6); ciò poi viene esplicitato con la constatazione che gli altri, proprio in quanto tali, sono più di uno (153A). Tale passaggio dal singolare al plurale non può essere sottovalutato dal punto di vista concettuale, anche perché è certamente voluto da Platone.

Ancora meno può essere sottovalutata la opposizione tra l’Uno preso in senso assoluto e il Non uno: «Se dunque prendiamo i due termini in senso integrale, l’Uno e il Non Uno...» (εἰ ἄρα πάντη τὸ μὲν ἐν ἐστὶ, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἐν, 147A8-B1). Questa coppia porta a conseguenze molto rilevanti che qui non possiamo approfondire. Risulta però chiaro che si tratta di una coppia molto particolare, visto che la Diversità è del tutto esclusa (146E) <sup>senza che questo</sup> comporti l’identità tra i due termini, poiché in questo caso il Non uno parteciperebbe dell’Uno (144A). In questa chiave si possono intendere frasi espresse in un linguaggio tutt’altro che preciso, come spesso accade in Platone: «Poiché dunque non c’è nulla oltre agli altri e all’Uno...» (151A7); «quando si è detto l’Uno e gli altri si è significato tutto» (159C1).

Sarebbe infine importante verificare come anche nelle ultime quattro tesi, in cui l’Uno non è, Platone compie analoghe analisi, ad esempio cercando (invano) nella Quinta tesi di mantenere un Uno che è e non è, mentre se il non essere dell’Uno-che-non-è è assunto in senso pieno, come avviene nelle altre tesi la conclusione finale deve essere totalmente negativa: «Niente è».

In sintesi, con un’analisi approfondita dei testi è possibile mostrare che nella seconda parte del Parmenide Platone offre un’ampia gamma di trattazioni che rispettano la complessità del reale anche laddove utilizza il solo termine “Uno”. Questo infatti è polivoco, sia intrinsecamente sia per l’uso che se ne può fare e per gli intrecci in cui viene collocato. Non poteva essere diversamente visto che «quanto attiene a tutti gli altri enti vale anche per l’Uno» (155E1-2).

*The structural polyvalence of the concept of the One in the second part of the Parmenides.*

There is no doubt about the importance of the concept of the One in the dialectical treatment of the second part of *Parmenides*. But Plato himself invites us in his dialogues not to be a victim of the error that words lead us to. Words give the impression of defining something unified, while often “hiding” differences – sometimes large ones. This is exactly what happens in the *Parmenides*: with the term “One” Plato brings into play different realities, which must be adequately understood.

Plato immediately highlights these differences. In fact, the One of the First Thesis is not that of the Second Thesis. The First Thesis concerns a One that has the characteristics that Plato himself will later synthesize in the formula one-one (ἐν ἑν, 142C3). Given this nature, this absolutely simple principle excludes in its own semantic value every internal articulation and any relationship with something. The final result can only be negative: a series of negations that lead to the conclusion that this One is not and, therefore, it's neither one nor knowable.

The most important thing is the logical structure of the arguments, the central reasoning that occurs in the different theses: the One would, in any case, become two. Everything is therefore based precisely on the monistic nature of this principle.

Thus emerges the great difference with the One-which-is of the Second Thesis: this, given its structural, reciprocal connection with Being, finds itself involved in numerous relationships because of which it turns out to be an infinite multiplicity.

Plato immediately adds a third “One”, a concept here just sketched, but which, as we will see, is later treated extensively. By distinguishing the One from its very being, with a purely mental operation, it is possible to think of a One that appears as only one, thus grasping its nature regardless of its participation with being (143A). This is not, therefore, the first One that does not participate in anything, nor the second that is the One-that-is in its necessary relationship with Being.

So the concept of One presents itself immediately loaded with different values, a fact that Plato strengthens, even with allusions so explicit they are substantially evident.

First, the text brings into play almost immediately a fourth, completely different sense of one: the one-number, which added to the two gives rise to the three (143D). Certainly it is a number in a particular sense, since the first even number is the two and the first odd number is the three. However, the whole number sequence in some way depends on the one, since the two is twice one and the three, three times one.

This insertion allows to strongly highlight the polyvalence of the term “One”. In fact the one that's added is the number one, while the one of the final affirmation («if then the One is, necessarily also the number is», 144A4) is the One-that-is, whatever the valence we attribute here. As a confirm, in the treatment of becoming number one is placed first as simple and antecedent with respect to all others, which derive from it by composition (153A-B).

As for the allusions, the explicit thematizations of the different senses of the One are particularly important. For example, in the second thesis, at first we state that the One, because it has to be present in all the entities and cannot do it as a whole, is therefore divided into parts, i.e. is “infinite plurality” (πολλά τε καὶ ἄπειρα, 144E4). At the same time the parts are in the One as a whole, which therefore constitutes a limit, that gives rise to a finite entity. Hence Plato draws a consequence in

the most provocative form possible: «So the One-that-is is both one and many, both whole and parts, both limited and infinite quantity» (τὸ ἓν ἄρα ὄν ἓν τέ ἐστί που καὶ πολλά , καὶ ὅλον καὶ μέρη, καὶ πεπερασμένον καὶ ἄπειρον πλῆθει (145A2-3) Thus Plato immediately clarifies that all the (apparent) contradictions of the arguments depend on the diversity of the subject to which they refer. In fact all the first predicates are attributable to the One-whole, the second ones to the One-part.

Such a couple is so important that Plato discusses it: «But to participate in the One is necessary both to the whole and to the part. That should be a One-whole, in which the parts are parts; the other, in turn, as part of the whole, will be a singular part of the whole» (158A6-B1) We can not illustrate here how decisive this couple is in the exposition of many different theses.

Moreover, we cannot ignore the various occurrences - too many to be even mentioned in this short paper - in which Plato under the disguise of the One, speaks of reality belonging to the ideal world, and simultaneously refers to bodies that, because they are inserted in time and space and have a geometric shape and size, can only belong to the empirical world. Similarly, we must assume the explicitly formulated distinction between the One in itself, which alone is the true One, and the things which are one only because they partake of the One (157E-158A).

However, in a binary process like the one that almost always Plato adopts, the multiplicity of the figures that oppose the One can not be underestimated. Initially we talk about (something) other than One, which then turns, without any signal, into others (146D5-6). This is then explained with the observation that the others, precisely as such, are more than one (153A). This passage from the singular to the plural cannot be underestimated from a conceptual point of view, also considering it is certainly desired by Plato.

Even less can we underestimate the opposition between the One taken in an absolute sense and the Non-one: «If then we take the two terms in an integral sense, the One and the Non-One ...» (εἰ ἄρα πάντη τὸ μὲν ἓν ἐστί, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἓν, 147A8-B1). This couple leads to very significant consequences that we cannot investigate here. However, it is clear that this is a very particular couple, since Diversity is excluded (146E) without implying the identity between the two terms, because in this case the Non one would participate in the One (144A). We then have a key to understand some sentences expressed in an “imprecise” language, as often happens in Plato: «Since therefore there is nothing besides the others and the One ...» (151A7); «When we have said the One and the others, everything has been meant» (159C1).

It would also be important to verify how even in the last four theses, in which the One is not, Plato performs analogous analysis, for example looking (in vain) in the Fifth Thesis to maintain a One that is and is not, while if the non-being of the One-that-is-not is taken in the full sense, as happens in other final theses, the conclusion has to be totally negative: “Nothing is”.

In summary, with a thorough analysis of the texts it is possible to show that in the second part of the *Parmenides*, Plato offers a wide range of treatments that respect the complexity of the real even when only using the term “One”. This One has multiple values, both intrinsically and for the ways it can be used and the relationships in which we can place it. It could not be otherwise, since «all that pertains to the other things, also pertains to the One» (155E1-2).

### *La peculiare solennità dell'isagoge procliana al Parmenide di Platone*

Prima di ogni inizio i Neoplatonici sono soliti discutere, attraverso notazioni di metodo, la natura dei dialoghi platonici: ciò accade in scritti propriamente isagogici, ma ciò accade talvolta anche prima dell'inizio del commento di un dialogo (Procl. *in Parm.* I 618,21 Luna-Segonds=I 618,15 Steel), come mostra la struttura di quei commenti procliani pervenutici assieme alla loro sezione isagogica. Questo metodo, ereditato dalla tradizione medioplatonica, sembra infatti essere stato perfezionato all'interno della scuola di Atene proprio da Proclo, il quale discute preliminarmente l'utilità e l'imprescindibilità delle indicazioni esegetiche. Tali indicazioni nella premessa del *Commento al Parmenide* sono racchiuse in una eccezionale e solenne cornice. Ciò è oltremodo significativo, perché è come se, nella premessa e prima ancora di essere esplicitato, il contenuto del dialogo fosse presentato da Proclo in una immagine che è la massima espressione della poesia dei teologi e la cui funzione filosofica è quella di mettere il lettore nella condizione di valutare il legame tra il contenuto del dialogo e il metodo usato per l'esegesi. Tale metodo risulta dall'accordo dell'insegnamento dialettico con le realtà ed è il risultato dello sforzo della ragione che lavora per conferire una peculiare forma di evidenza alle divine realtà metafisiche. Il dialogo si divide in due parti, la cui conciliazione non è priva di difficoltà, e due sono anche le parti della premessa – il cui esame è al centro di questa proposta di intervento – che Proclo prepone al *Parmenide* (I 617,1-658,30 L.-S.=I 617,1-658,22 S.). La premessa, che contiene una invocazione agli dèi e discute questioni pregiudiziali, accorda poesia mistagogica e indicazioni metodologiche facendo convergere il tutto in una precisa unitaria finalità collegabile all'unico σκοπός del dialogo. L'individuazione e la comprensione di tale finalità – come si mostrerà – sono in grado di incidere sulla ridefinizione dell'importanza del *Parmenide* nell'intero quadro non solo dottrinale ma anche metodologico neoplatonico.

Sin da Omero, cioè sin dagli inizi della letteratura greca, l'*incipit*, costituito dall'inno alle Muse, rappresenta il luogo in cui il divino e l'umano comunicano. Nell'*Iliade* come nell'*Odissea* l'invocazione alle Muse dichiara la provenienza divina della poesia: tuttavia, mentre nell'*Iliade* il poeta, invocando la Musa, diventa lo strumento attraverso il quale la Dea canta agli uomini le gesta degli eroi, nell'*Odissea* il poeta invoca la Musa con una presa di coscienza maggiore. La divinità e l'uomo hanno in questo proemio omerico quasi pari rilievo, come mostra il fatto che il poeta si inserisca nell'invocazione con il pronome personale *μοι* (Hom. *Od.* 1,1), lasciando così emergere i contorni della propria figura e un suo proprio ruolo. L'inizio dell'*Odissea* è più vicino agli intenti di Proclo, ammiratore di Omero e di quella poesia ispirata destinata – come lo sono il *Poema* di Parmenide e anche, benché in prosa, il *Parmenide* – a iniziati, cioè a studenti predisposti e preparati ad accogliere la luce della verità. Proclo invoca con un inno gli dèi, facendo riferimento alle classi divine che corrispondono ai livelli dell'essere discussi nell'esercizio dialettico nella seconda parte del dialogo, affinché la *sua* anima (*in Prm.* I 617,1-13 L.-S. = I 617,1-9 S.) possa essere *accompagnata* dalla guida ispirata di Platone. In questa prima delle due parti che andranno a costituire la presente comunicazione si osserverà come Proclo rielabori l'esperienza poetico-teologica omerica per legarla ai metodi dell'esegesi allegorica. L'obiettivo è evidenziare cosa comporti questa invocazione agli dèi

nell'economia del commento – invocazione che, per posizione, forma e contenuti, è un *unicum* nei commenti procliani – e attraverso la quale Proclo ottiene di introdurre i suoi iniziati *nel modo più appropriato*, e quindi col metodo più appropriato, alla mistica visione che Platone rivela nel *Parmenide*.

Tuttavia la premessa procliana non è soltanto una preghiera che identifica in Platone quell'autorità poetico-religiosa in grado di rendere la sua filosofia una mistagogia. Invero la premessa non disegna solo la figura del poeta-teologo, ma anche – come si argomenterà – quella del maestro di dialettica. Il *Parmenide* è uno scritto teologico in cui proprio l'esposizione dialettica è ciò che conferisce un'articolazione unitaria, sistematica ed esauriente delle realtà in sommo grado, cioè delle classi degli dèi. E questo è principalmente ciò che nella seconda parte della comunicazione si farà emergere, mettendo in luce le straordinarie capacità esegetiche degli antichi commentatori assieme al significato metafisico che la stessa attività esegetica custodisce. Il ben noto ossimorico progetto ateniese di una 'scienza teologica' influenza la nascita della scienza esegetica. Tale scienza è subordinata a quella teologica, perché presuppone la ormai avvenuta costituzione di una dottrina che ora necessita di essere trasmessa in forma adeguata e coerente con i suoi contenuti attraverso l'uso di specifici elementi esegetici. Dimostrare ciò implicherà ridefinire, ampliandoli, i termini che consentono di affermare la centralità del *Parmenide* nella tradizione platonica: sarà infatti necessario osservare non solo come il dialogo incida nel conferire forma scientifica alla teologia ma anche come la teologia in esso esposta influenzi la definizione di un metodo esegetico che ha fondamento metafisico e forma scientifica.

Al fine di raggiungere questo obiettivo si procederà alla maniera neoplatonica, seguendo le indicazioni di Proclo, la cui esemplare premessa al testo del *Parmenide* è costruita con un lessico che oscilla tra due campi semantici, quello poetico-misterico e quello scientifico, per intrecciare prospettive contenutistiche non contraddittorie ma convergenti. Si osserverà come le indicazioni di metodo contenute nella premessa riflettano i contenuti del *Parmenide* così da evidenziare perché, se si può parlare di una scienza teologica, si può parlare anche di una esegesi che *uniforma* i suoi termini, la sua struttura e i suoi contenuti a quella dottrina che ha il fulcro nel dialogo collocato all'apice del *curriculum* neoplatonico. A questo punto, attraverso indicazioni storico-esegetiche e logico-metafisiche, sarà possibile dimostrare che la struttura narrativa dell'intero dialogo riflette il suo contenuto, riflette cioè la teoria delle Idee, e che è in base a questa relazione tra forma e contenuto che la prima e la seconda parte del dialogo possono essere tenute assieme. Infatti, applicando le indicazioni esegetiche di Proclo, l'intera struttura del dialogo va letta come l'immagine letteraria del processo emanativo delle Idee che dall'Intelletto raggiungono i diversi livelli dell'Anima, e la successione dei λόγοι, nelle quattro versioni – quella originale, quella di Pitodoro, quella di Antifonte e quella di Cefalo –, rappresenta a livello microcosmico l'universo metafisico neoplatonico. Questo e altri esempi rinvenibili all'interno di quell'immagine letteraria e *dispiegata* dell'universo metafisico che è il microcosmo dialogico metteranno in luce i legami tra le diverse parti dell'opera platonica e come ogni aspetto del testo contribuisca a definire l'intero *Parmenide* un 'inno scientifico' che celebra la genesi degli dèi e la dipendenza di tutti gli esseri dall'Uno.

A conclusione di questa disamina risulterà chiaro che εἶδος e ὕλη del *Parmenide* convergono armonicamente verso l'unico e unitario σκοπός, che σκοπός letterario e σκοπός metafisico coincidono e, quindi, che lo σκοπός, ossia lo strumento isagogico principe dell'esegesi, assieme alle altre questioni preliminari, non concerne solo l'insegnamento sulle realtà divine ma riproduce esso stesso a livello microcosmico gli aspetti delle realtà di cui tratta.

## *The Peculiar Solemnity of Proclus' Isagoge to Plato's Parmenides*

Before embarking on his reading of a Platonic dialogue, a Neoplatonist commentator will typically discuss the nature of the dialogues in general, by offering some methodological observations. This is the case with the strictly isagogical writings, but at times remarks on the subject are introduced even before the beginning of the commentary on a dialogue, as is shown by the structure of those Proclean commentaries that have reached us along with their isagogical section. This method, inherited from the Middle Platonist tradition, would appear to have been perfected within the Athenian school by Proclus himself, who as a preliminary step discussed the usefulness and indispensability of exegetical guidelines. In the prologue to the Commentary on the *Parmenides*, these guidelines are set within a remarkable and solemn framework. This is particularly significant because it is as though in the introduction itself the content of the dialogue, even before being made explicit, were presented by Proclus through an image that encapsulates the poetry of the theologians and which serves the philosophical function of allowing the reader to evaluate the connection between the content of the dialogue and the exegetical method used. The latter stems from the agreement of dialectical teaching with reality. It is the outcome of an effort made by reason to lend a particular form of evidence to divine metaphysical realities. The dialogue is divided into two parts which are not easy to reconcile, as so is Proclus' introduction to the *Parmenides* (I 617,1-658,30 L.-S.=I 617,1-658,22 S.) – the focus of this paper. The introduction, which features an invocation to the gods and discusses certain preliminary questions, combines mystagogical poetry and methodological guidelines in the pursuit of a single goal associated with the one and only σκοπός of the dialogue. As I will show, by identifying this goal, it is possible to redefine the importance of the *Parmenides* within the methodological as well as doctrinal framework of Neoplatonism.

From Homer onwards, which is to say from the dawn of Greek literature, the *incipit*, in the form of a hymn to the Muses, was a means to establish communication between the gods and men. In the *Iliad* as much as in the *Odyssey* the invocation to the Muses affirms the divine origin of poetry. However, whereas in the *Iliad* the poet, by invoking the Muses, becomes the instrument through which the goddess sings to men about the feats of heroes, in the *Odyssey* the poet invokes the *Muse* with greater awareness. The deity and man are almost on an equal footing in this Homeric proem, as is shown by the fact that the poet himself enters the invocation through the personal pronoun *μοι*, thereby emerging as a figure and highlighting his role. The opening of the *Odyssey* is closer to the aims of Proclus, who admired Homer and the inspired poetry that were intended for initiates, which is to say students predisposed and ready to receive the light of truth. Proclus invokes the gods through a hymn, referring to the various divine classes that correspond to the various levels of being, as discussed in the second part of the dialogue. In doing so, Proclus hopes that his own soul will be led by Plato's inspired guidance. In the first of the two parts that make up my paper I will examine how Proclus reworks the Homeric poetic-theological experience in such a way as to connect it with the methods of allegorical exegesis. The aim is to highlight the significance of this invocation of the gods for the commentary as a whole – an invocation that, in terms of its position, form and content, finds no parallel in Proclus' commentaries. Through this

prologue Proclus is able to introduce his initiates to the mystical vision that Plato reveals in the *Parmenides* in the most appropriate way, which is to say with the most appropriate method.

However, Proclus' prologue is not just a prayer that identifies Plato as the poetic-religious authority capable of making his philosophy a mystagogy. The prologue outlines not just the figure of the poet-theologian but also that of the master of dialectic. The *Parmenides* is a theological work in which the dialectic exposition is precisely what provides a unitary, systematic and exhaustive breakdown of the entities of the highest degree, the various classes of gods. This will be the chief focus of part two of the paper, which will highlight the remarkable exegetical abilities of the ancient commentators, along with the metaphysical significance of exegesis. The well-known oxymoronic Athenian plan to develop a 'theological science' influenced the birth of the science of exegesis. This science is subordinate to theology, because it presupposes a doctrine that must be transmitted in an adequate form and consistently with its content, through the use of specific exegetical elements. To illustrate this it will be necessary to redefine and broaden the reasons that make it possible to affirm the centrality of the *Parmenides* within the Platonic tradition: it will be necessary to examine not just how the dialogue helped give theology a scientific veneer, but also how the theology it expounds influenced the definition of an exegetical method that had a metaphysical foundation and took a scientific form.

In order to achieve this goal, I will proceed in Neoplatonic fashion. Proclus' exemplary introduction to the *Parmenides* is based on the use of a language fluctuating between two semantic fields, the poetic-mystagogical field and the scientific one, in such a way as to combine perspectives that are convergent rather than contradictory. I will show how the methodological guidelines provided in the prologue reflect the contents of the *Parmenides*, in order to highlight why it is possible to speak not just of a theological science but also of a form of exegesis that makes its terms, structure and contents conform to that doctrine which finds its highest expression in the dialogue at the apex of the Neoplatonic *curriculum*. At this stage, in the light of certain historical-exegetical and logical-metaphysical guidelines, it will be possible to show that the narrative structure of the whole dialogue reflects its content, namely the theory of Ideas, and that this relation between form and content is what holds the two parts of the dialogue together. By applying Proclus' exegetical guidelines, the whole structure of the dialogue may be interpreted as a literary image of the process of emanation of the Ideas, which reach the various levels of the Soul from the Intellect. The succession of λόγοι in the four versions – the original one and those of Pythodorus, Antiphon, and Cephalus – represents the Neoplatonist metaphysical universe at the microcosmic level. This and other examples of the dialogical microcosm as a literary and unfolding image of the metaphysical universe will highlight the connections between the various parts of Plato's work and show how every aspect of the text contributes to defining the *Parmenides* as a 'scientific hymn' celebrating the genesis of the gods and the dependence of all beings upon the One.

By the end of this enquiry, it should be clear that εἶδος and ὕλη in the *Parmenides* harmoniously converge towards the one and only σκοπός; that the literary σκοπός and the metaphysical σκοπός coincide; and, therefore, that the σκοπός, which is to say the chief isagogical tool in exegesis, like the other preliminary questions, does not merely concern the teaching about divine entities, but actually reproduces the defining aspects of the reality it focuses on at the microcosmic level.



### *A Diagnosis of Dialectic in Parm. 142b1-144e7*

The *Parmenides* is the Platonic dialogue that has exercised the most ancient as well as modern exegetes. The analysis of, and the relation between the two parts as well as Plato's assessment of the Eleatic philosophy of Parmenides and Zeno have been the bones of contention. In particular, the second part of the dialogue is a complex oracle that conceals rather than reveals anything. This paper focuses on the initial two arguments in the second deduction. Though the focus is narrow, the paper draws from the *Sophist* in order to shed light on both similarities and differences of the notion of dialectic that is executed and in order to evaluate the two arguments. Whenever researchers have referred to the *Sophist* so far so as to compare wholes and parts of the form of difference with wholes and parts in the two arguments, for instance, they have not highlighted differences at all.

**I.** First I will introduce Plato's lack of mannerism as an artist and a philosopher and argue that Plato's *Parmenides* is one of Plato's philosophers *par excellence*. For Plato is interested in frameworks of thinking and types of manifold philosophical views, like monism or hedonism, which go beyond particular philosophers. On the first level, this figure both accommodates the historical Parmenides and goes beyond him in a unique way. We do not have a representative of Eleatic philosophy, like the Guest in the *Sophist*, who commits the intellectual "murder" of what the "real" Parmenides stands for, but the intellectual father himself, who as such becomes representative of Plato's philosophy. Though there is not any reflection on intellectual "suicide" in the dialogue, to allow a kind of negation (as otherness) in the world of forms is something that goes far beyond appropriating the Presocratic philosopher and goes also quite definitely against his decision to radically abolish negation from logical space *tout court*.<sup>1</sup> On the fictional-normative level, Plato shows that a philosopher should never rest on his laurels, but must always develop and even go beyond his past theses, and be open to critical challenges. If this reading is reasonable, what Plato invites us to do is not to decipher a monolithic or dogmatic doctrine of his or the Old Academy's philosophy (in agreement with Graeser 2000 on this, p. 51).

**II.** Before analysing the two arguments, I will argue that what is conducted in the second part is dialectic. That Parmenides is Plato's philosopher and that Plato's philosopher is characterised as the dialectician, for the latter of which various evidence will be provided, does not yet explain how to understand the second part of the dialogue. For the philosopher fulfills different tasks and different kinds of dialectic in different contexts, but what kind of dialectic is executed in the second part of the dialogue exactly? The paper will use both Socratic statements in 128e-130a (in particular 129d-e) and Parmenides programmatic remarks for the following exercise in 135b-137b (especially 135b-c on *dialektike dunamis*)<sup>2</sup>. The argument is twofold: first the current

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1 See similarly how Plato's Socrates goes beyond the historical Socrates in the *Phaedo*, who was first a follower of the Presocratic materialistic accounts before he turned to his second voyage and Plato's theory of forms.

2 I will not understand the phrase as the power to conduct dialogue but as the power of dialectic as of the forms to interrelate. Again this has to be proven in the particular context and corroborated by further evidence in the corpus.

dialectic focuses on the relationship between Plato's forms; second, there is a crucial difference from the *Sophist's* dialectic, though, in which two models are rejected, the one of complete separation of all forms from one another and the one of complete mixture of all forms with one another, before the third model of partial mixture is opted for and applied to the relationships between the greatest kinds (251d-252e). In the *Parmenides*, in contrast, the dialectician turns from the model of complete separation to the one of complete mixture. Interestingly, Socrates gets "served" exactly what he would make him wonder: complete mixture (sunkrasis) and separation (diakrasis), but not partial mixture (129e)<sup>1</sup>. This line follows Owen's verdict about the second part of the dialogue, according to whom "we encounter problems of a characteristic philosophical stamp. It is the first systematic exercise in the logic of aporetic and not demonstrative argument" (p. 303).<sup>2</sup>

**III.** The (much more) positive and demonstrative results in the *Sophist* will help me to interpret the two arguments at the beginning of the second deduction in the following respect: they will assist me in diagnosing that they are unsound although they are valid. This means that I will disagree with both Schofield who argues that the arguments are not valid, but saves Plato as they are *ad Parmenidem*, and even more strongly with Mendell who pushes Schofield's line further and presupposes that this is the case for the entire Platonic corpus since Plato rarely formulates the presupposed premises in the arguments. Moreover, I will argue, though I am much more favorable to her line of thought, that Curd also went too far in her critique of Schofield when arguing that the arguments are also sound and the regress in the first argument not vicious.

The two arguments in *Parm.* 142b1-144e7 have been considered to be anti-Eleatic by Cornford and Schofield, but I will follow Owen also in this interpretation of his when he says that Plato introduces the special, as he calls them, syncategorematic terms that will emerge in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*.<sup>3</sup> Though this I find true, I think there is something wrong with both arguments that show that the One that is is an unlimited plurality. My hypothesis is that what goes wrong is twofold: (i) The one and the being are not treated as special vowel-connectives and bonds, in accordance to the *Sophist's* picture, but like anything whatsoever. They are considered to be component properties (property parts) of one another as any other properties would be in the first argument. Though the "Anaxagorean holistic model", as Scolnicov called it, might remind us of the complete permeation of being, otherness and sameness in the *Sophist*, it is problematic in the above respect. (ii) Although the kind of beings alluded to go beyond numbers (see *kai pantachos onta*, 144b5f.) in the second argument that focuses on instance parts and not property parts instead, we have no question asked and no theory of a general ontology formulated as in the *Sophist*. Without such a theory, we are wrong to speak of "pan" or "holon" and "panta" in the case of being and the one, given our definition of "holon" with which we have operated since the first deduction as what does not lack any part.

#### Some relevant secondary literature (400 words):

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1 I am indebted to Gabriële Wersinger Taylor's work. It has helped me see this dimension in the dialogue.

2 I do not find Harte's linguistic analysis of aporia in the dialogue to be refuting Owen's verdict.

3 To choose one interpretation in this part of the dialogue and think that it is the one and only winner is an illusion. My interpretation is therefore not exclusive.

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### *Diagnose der Dialektik in Parm. 142b1-144e7*

Der *Parmenides* ist der platonische Dialog, der die Exegeten sowohl der Antike als auch der Moderne am meisten verwirrt hat. Zu den beruehmten Zankaepfeln gehoeren die Analyse der zwei Teile und ihr Verhaeltnis sowie Platons Schaetzung der eleatischen Philosophie. Der zweite Teil des

Dialogs sieht wie ein besonders komplexes Orakel aus, das eher verbirgt als entbirgt. Mein Vortrag fokussiert auf die ersten zwei Argumente der zweiten Deduktion, und zieht vom Dialog *Sophistes* um sowohl Aehnlichkeiten als auch Differenzen des einschlaegigen Konzepts der Dialektik zu erhellen und um die zwei Argumente einzuschuetzen, wobei die Forscher keine Differenzen hervorgehoben haben, wenn sie sich auf den *Sophistes* bezogen haben, zum Beispiel auf die Idee der Andersheit und ihre Teile (257c-258c).

I. Zunaechst werde ich Platons Mangel an Manierismus in Bezug auf seine Art und Kunst des Schreibens und seine Philosophie einfuehren und auf dieser Basis argumentieren, dass Platons Parmenides ein von Platons Philosophen *par excellence* ist. Denn Platon sich eher an Typen von mannigfaltigen Ansichten interessiert, wie Hedonismus und Monismus, die ueber die historischen Personenlichkeiten ihrer Vertreter hinausgehen. Auf einer ersten Ebene, unterbringt dieser Charakter den historischen Parmenides aber gleichzeitig ueberwindet er ihn auf eine einzigartige Weise. Hier findet kein metaphorischer "Vatermord" des historischen Parmenides statt, der durch den Gast aus Elea geuebt wird, wie im *Sophistes*. Stattdessen tritt der Parmenides selber hervor, der die platonische Philosophie repraesentiert. Obwohl es keine Rede von (intellektuellem) "Selbstmord" ist, geht es eindeutig ueber die parmenideische Lehre hinaus, eine Art der Negation (wie Andersheit) in der Welt des Denkbaren zu erlauben. Auf der fiktiven-normativen Ebene, zeigt Platon, dass sich die Philosophen nie auf ihren Lorbeeren ausruhen lassen, sondern immer ihre vergangenen Thesen weiterentwickeln und sogar ueberwinden, indem sie kritische Herausforderungen aufnehmen sollten. Wenn diese Interpretation richtig ist, laedt uns Plato nicht ein, eine monolithische Lehre seiner oder der akademischen Philosophie im zweiten Teil des Dialogs zu entziffern (in Uebereinstimmung mit Graeser 2000, p. 51).

II. Bevor ich die zwei Argumente analysiere, werde ich dafuer argumentieren, dass platonische Dialektik im zweiten Teil ausgefuehrt wird. Dass Parmenides Platons Philosoph ist, und dass Platons Philosophen als Dialektiker charakterisiert werden, erklart noch nicht wie man Dialektik in diesem Zusammenhang verstehen sollte. Denn der Philosoph fuehrt verschiedene Aufgaben und unterschiedliche Arten der Dialektik in verschiedenen Zusammenhaengen aus. Also was fuer eine Art der Dialektik wird im zweiten Teil des *Parmenides* ausgefuehrt? Dafuer werde ich mich auf die Bemerkungen des Sokrates sowie des Parmenides konzentrieren: 128e-130a (besonders 129d-e) und Parmenides' programmatische Einfuehrung in die kommende Uebung in 135b-137b (besonders 135b-c ueber *dialektike dunamis*)<sup>1</sup>. Das Argument ist zwiefach: (1) die jetzige Dialektik bezieht sich auf die Beziehungen zwischen platonischen Ideen. (2) Diese Dialektik unterscheidet sich auf entscheidende Weise von derjenigen im *Sophistes*, in der zwei Modelle zurueckgewiesen sind, dasjenige der voelligen Separation der Ideen voneinander und dasjenige der kompletten Mischung aller Ideen mit einander, bevor die einzige moegliche dritte Option ausgewaehlt wird: partielle Mischung wird auf die Beziehungen der groessten Gattungen angewendet (251d-252e). Im Gegensatz dazu oszilliert der Dialektiker im *Parmenides* zwischen dem Modell der totalen Separation und der voelligen Mischung. Interessanterweise bekommt Sokrates genau was er darum gebeten hat: eine Ausfuehrung der *sunkrasis* und *diakrasis*, aber nicht der bedingten Mischung, die von ihm unvorstellbar ist (129e)<sup>2</sup>. Diese Linie ist vereinbar mit Owens Urteil ueber den zweiten

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1 In diesem Kontext verstehe ich den Ausdruck „*dialektike dunamis*“ nicht als die Kraft der Dialogfuehrung, sondern als die Kraft der Dialektik, d.h. der Formen, sich miteinander zu verknuepfen, was im konkreten Kontext belegt und durch weitere Evidenz im platonischen Corpus bekraeftigt werden muss und kann.

Teil des Dialogs: “we encounter problems of a characteristic philosophical stamp. It is the first systematic exercise in the logic of aporetic and not demonstrative argument” (S. 303).<sup>1</sup>

**III.** Die (viel mehr) positiven Demonstration und Ergebnisse des *Sophistes* werden mir dabei helfen, die zwei Argumente am Beginn der zweiten Deduktion als gueltig aber nicht stichhaltig zu diagnostizieren. Darueber werde ich anderer Meinung sein als Schofield, der fuer das Ungueltige des ersten Argumentes plaediert, und noch mehr als Mendell, der Schofields Linie auf radikale Weise zum Ende denkt und fuer das ganze platonische Corpus validiert, dass naemich Platons Argumente nicht gueltig sind or sein koennen wenn die Praemissen nicht artikuliert werden. Darueberhinaus werde ich argumentieren, dass etwas schief mit den zwei Argumenten laeuft, im Gegensatz zu Curd –trotz meiner allgemeinen Sympathie fuer ihre Kritik an Schofield-, und auf diese Weise wird meine Auslegung mit Gills verbuendet sein.

Die zwei Argumente in *Parm.* 142b1-144e7 sind als anti-eleatisch charakterisiert worden (Cornford and Schofield). Meinerseits werde ich Owen auch in diesem Punkt folgen, wenn er naemlich sagt, dass Plato einige spezielle Konzepte einfuehrt, die „syncategorematisch“ nennt, und die dann im *Theaitetos* und im *Sophistes* eintauchen.<sup>2</sup> Obwohl ich dem zustimme, wird meine Analyse der zwei Argumente zeigen, dass die Lage auf zwiefache Weise problematisch ist: (i) Das Eine und das Sein werden nicht als ausgezeichnete verbindende Ideen hervorgehoben, sondern wie alles was auch immer sein und eines sein kann. Im ersten Argument sind die als Eigenschaften-Komponente Teile von einander, wie irgendwelche Eigenschaften so waeren. Es ist daher problematisch, obwohl das “Anaxagoreische/holistische Modell”, wie Scolnicov es nannte, uns an die totale Durchdringung von Ideen wie Sein, Andersheit und Identitaet erinnern mag. (ii) Das zweite Argument fokussiert auf Teile als Instanzen des Einen und des Seienden. Obwohl die Arten des Seienden ueber die Zahlen hinausgehen (siehe *kai pantachos onta*, 144b5f.), wird keine Frage gestellt und keine Theorie einer allgemeinen Ontologie formuliert wie im *Sophistes*. Ohne eine solche Theorie duerfen wir nicht von “pan” oder “holon” und “panta” in den Faellen von Sein und Einheit sprechen. Denn unsere Definition des Ganzen, mit dem wir seit der ersten Deduktion operiert haben, ist die folgende: dasjenige, dem kein Teil fehlt.

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2 Ich bin Gabrièle Wersinger Taylor zum Dank verpflichtet, weil sie mir sehr geholfen hat, diese Dimension im Dialog zu entdecken.

1 Hartes linguistische Anayse von *aporia* im Parmenides widerlegt nicht Owens Urteil.

2 Eine Interpretation in diesem Teil des Dialogs auszuwaehlen und die als die einzige moegliche Option zu denken ist eine Illusion. Meine Interpretation ist deswegen nicht exklusiv.

## Mouzala Melina G.

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### *Forms as paradigms in Plato's Parmenides 132c-d. Proclus' response to Aristotle's and Alexander of Aphrodisias' attacks on the Forms considered as patterns*

My aim in this paper is threefold. Firstly, to analyze and discuss Proclus' interpretation of Socrates' suggestion that "Forms stand fixed as patterns, as it were, in the nature of things; the other things are made in their image and are likenesses" (*Parmenides* 132d). This analysis will especially focus on Proclus' explanation of the quality of being a pattern (*paradeigmatikon idiōma*) and the way in which he construes the role of Forms as paradigmatic causes. Through this analysis I will examine the problems that emerge from the Platonic doctrine that Forms are paradigms and further paradigmatic causes.

Secondly, I set out to clarify the main point of Aristotle's criticism of the Forms as paradigms, in his *Metaphysics* (where he seems to discuss the problems of *methexis* with the same order in which they are posed in *Parmenides*), by investigating Alexander of Aphrodisias' exegesis of the Aristotelian objections. We will see how Alexander of Aphrodisias explains on the one hand the Platonic Forms as paradigms or patterns and on the other hand the Aristotelian *eidos* considered as paradigm, in his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* as well as in his lost commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, according to the testimony of Simplicius.

Thirdly, I intend to examine in general the Neoplatonic response to Aristotle's and Alexander of Aphrodisias' attacks on the Forms considered as patterns by comparing Proclus', Syrianus' and Asclepius of Tralles' interpretation of Forms as paradigms (since the latter's commentary is highly dependent on the lectures of Ammonius, we can assume that we can also trace in it Ammonius' view of the notion of *paradeigma*). Throughout this post-Platonic debate we can find interesting lines of reasoning which are offered by the Platonists as a solution to the problem of *methexis* with which the dialogue is concerned in his first part. This problem is interwoven- within the frame of the same discussion- with the problem of causality and the theory of principles, since it relates to the question of how the principles operate as paradigmatic causes.

The major part of this paper will be devoted to Proclus' interpretation of *Parmenides* 132d. According to Proclus, this is a crucial point of the dialogue, where Socrates, since he had undertaken to solve the problems about participation previously discussed in the dialogue, designed to free us from the difficulty about whole and part, by introducing the notion of assimilation and of participation in the mode of assimilation. This solution also reveals the primal and universal causality of the paradigm. Proclus exposes an interesting theory, according to which Socrates' statement is correct, but in so far as he assigns only the quality of being a pattern (*paradeigma*) to the Forms and not also the qualities of bringing to fruition and perfection and preserving and unifying things, in this he would seem still to have an incomplete grasp of the correct doctrine about them. Proclus maintains that each Form is not only a pattern to sensible objects, but is also the active cause and principle of their being. Furthermore, he makes an important distinction between "patterns simpliciter said", which means "patterns of the realm of sensible things", and "patterns, as it were", and puts forward a series of arguments in favor of the thesis that we must not separate apart the pattern (*to paradeigma*) and the creative principle (*to poioun*), but rather

combine them in one and contemplate both together. My aim is to show that the background or the justification of Proclus' argumentation can be traced in some of the most important Platonic texts, especially in the *Phaedo*, the *Cratylus* and the *Timaeus* (but also with regard to some central ontological distinctions and relations referred to by Proclus we can find a thread which binds these opinions with the *Sophist* and the *Philebus*).

Proclus' view of the close relationship between the paradigm and the efficient and final cause stimulates us to think Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic Forms as paradigms and efficient causes. From what we read in the Aristotelian text and its explanation by Alexander we can infer that a considerable part of Aristotle's criticism refers to difficulties discussed in Plato's *Parmenides*. Alexander of Aphrodisias explains this criticism by making the distinction between the notion of the model which is borrowed from painters and the Platonic Ideas considered as models; he then justifies Aristotle's objection that when the Platonists maintain that the Ideas are models are using empty words and poetical metaphors, stressing that in the latter case the creative principle is missing. He also expounds a very useful analysis of what the term *paradigm* means when it is used by Aristotle for his enmattered form. I will compare Alexander's exposition with that of Simplicius so as to highlight the main characteristics of the Aristotelian conception of *paradeigma* in his philosophy of Nature. This analysis will help us to understand not only the Aristotelian objection against the Platonic Forms considered as paradigms, but also Proclus' response to this objection, as it is illustrated in his commentary on *Parmenides*. The main point of this response is that assimilation is not a sufficient explanation of the role of Forms as paradigms and paradigmatic causes and what is more of *methexis*. The function of Forms as paradigms must be understood as also having some other characteristics which can ensure and justify their causal role and lead to the solution of the Third Man problem.

Syrianus' and Asclepius' discussion of the same Aristotelian objection also shed light on Proclus' interpretation of the Forms as paradigms and generally on the question how the participants in the Forms participate in them. Syrianus, by invoking probably Aristotle's theory in the *Metaphysics* Lambda, argues that according to Aristotle's own postulates there are paradigmatic causes of things of this realm (*paradeigmata tōn tēde*) and shows that a purely by chance likeness, even in the realm of perishable things, is a very rare occurrence. Asclepius, on the other hand, by invoking the theory of creation known from the *Timaeus*, explains why Plato calls the forms *paradeigmata* and accuses Aristotle himself of using *metaphorais*, i.e. empty words, in such an important part of his theory as it is Logic.

The aim of this comparable study of the texts is to reconstruct in a reliable and cohesive way the Neoplatonic response to Aristotle, so as to bring to the fore some important and hidden aspects of the Platonic theory itself through its reception.

### *Les Formes comme paradigmes dans le Parménide de Platon, 132c-d. La réponse de Proclus aux attaques d'Aristote et d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise sur les Formes considérées comme modèles*

Mon objectif dans cet article est triple. Tout d'abord, je propose d'analyser et discuter l'interprétation proclienne de la suggestion de Socrate que les « Formes sont solidement établies dans la nature comme des modèles, tandis que les autres choses leur ressemblent et en sont des

ressemblances, et cette participation des autres choses aux formes consiste en cela qu'elles en sont des images » (*Parménide* 132d). Cette analyse se concentrera essentiellement sur l'explication proclienne du caractère exemplaire (*paradeigmatikon idiôma*) et sur la manière dont il construit le rôle des Formes en tant que causes paradigmatiques. À travers cette analyse, j'examinerai les problèmes qui émergent de la doctrine platonicienne selon laquelle les Formes sont des paradigmes et puis des causes paradigmatiques.

Deuxièmement, je propose de clarifier le point principal de la critique aristotélicienne des Formes comme des paradigmes, dans la *Métaphysique* (où il semble discuter les problèmes de la participation [*methexis*] dans le même ordre qu'ils sont posés dans le *Parménide*), à l'aide de l'exégèse d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise sur les objections aristotéliciennes. Nous verrons comment Alexandre d'Aphrodise explique d'une part les Formes platoniciennes comme paradigmes ou modèles, et d'autre part l'*eidōs* aristotélicien considéré comme paradigme dans son commentaire sur la *Métaphysique* d'Aristote, ainsi que dans son commentaire perdu sur la *Physique* d'Aristote, selon le témoignage de Simplicius.

Troisièmement, je propose d'examiner en général la réponse néoplatonicienne aux attaques d'Aristote et d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise sur les Formes considérées comme des modèles, en comparant l'interprétation des Formes en tant que paradigmes de Proclus avec celle de Syrianus et de Asclépius de Tralles (puisque le commentaire du dernier est fort dépendant des lectures d'Ammonius, nous pouvons assumer que nous pouvons également y tracer le point de vue d'Ammonius sur la notion de *paradeigma*). Tout au long de ce débat post-platonicien nous pouvons trouver quelques modes de raisonnement intéressantes qui sont offertes comme une solution au problème de la *methexis* auquel le dialogue se rapporte dans sa première partie. Ce problème est associé – dans le cadre de la même discussion – avec le problème de la causalité et la théorie des principes, car il concerne la question de comment les principes opèrent comme des causes paradigmatiques.

La plus grande partie de cet article sera consacrée à l'interprétation du *Parménide* 132d par Proclus. Selon Proclus, c'est un point crucial du dialogue car Socrate a pensé résoudre aussi les premières apories relatives à la participation, en invoquant l'assimilation et la participation par similitude, solution qui nous libère de l'aporie sur le tout et la partie. Cette solution indique aussi la causalité primordiale et totale du modèle. Proclus expose une théorie intéressante selon laquelle tout cela a été dit correctement par Socrate ; cependant qu'il n'ait attribué aux Formes que le caractère exemplaire et non pas aussi le caractère générateur, perfectif, gardien et unifiant, sous ce rapport-là, Socrate semblerait saisir encore imparfaitement la théorie des Formes. Proclus soutient également que chaque Forme n'est pas seulement un modèle des choses sensibles, mais aussi la cause active et le principe de leur être. Qui plus est, Proclus fait une importante distinction entre les « modèles absolument dits », laquelle signifie « modèles du domaine des choses sensibles », et les Formes qui sont « comme des modèles », et propose une série d'arguments à faveur de la thèse selon laquelle il ne faut pas séparer le modèle (*to paradeigma*) et le principe créatif (*to poioun*), mais plutôt les combiner en un et les contempler ensemble. Mon objectif est alors de montrer que l'arrière-plan et la justification de l'argumentation de Proclus se retrouvent dans certains des textes platoniciens les plus importants, spécialement dans le *Phédon*, le *Cratyle* et le *Timée* (mais dans certains distinctions et relations ontologiques centrales auxquelles Proclus fait référence nous pouvons aussi trouver un fil liant ces opinions avec le *Sophiste* et le *Philèbe*).

Le point de vue de Proclus sur la relation étroite entre le paradigme et la cause efficiente et finale nous incite à penser la critique des Formes platoniciennes comme des paradigmes et des



causes efficientes par Aristote. À partir de ce que nous lisons dans le texte aristotélicien et son explication par Alexandre, nous pouvons inférer qu'une part considérable de la critique d'Aristote se réfère aux difficultés discutées dans le *Parménide* de Platon. Alexandre d'Aphrodise explique cette critique en faisant la distinction entre le modèle emprunté aux peintres et les Idées platoniciennes considérées comme des modèles ; il justifie alors l'objection d'Aristote selon laquelle quand les Platoniciens soutiennent que les Idées sont des modèles ils utilisent des mots vides ou vains et des métaphores poétiques, soulignant que dans ce dernier cas le principe créatif est absent. Il expose également une analyse très utile sur ce que signifie le terme *paradigme* lorsqu'il est utilisé par Aristote pour sa forme matérielle. Je comparerai l'exposition d'Alexandre avec celle de Simplicius afin de mettre en évidence les principales caractéristiques de la conception aristotélicienne du *paradeigma* dans sa philosophie de la Nature. Cette analyse aidera à comprendre non seulement l'objection aristotélicienne aux Formes platoniciennes considérées comme des paradigmes, mais aussi la réponse de Proclus à cette objection, telle qu'elle est illustrée dans son commentaire sur le *Parménide*. Le point principal de cette réponse est que l'assimilation n'est pas une explication suffisante du rôle des Formes en tant que paradigmes ou causes paradigmatiques, et en outre de la *methexis*. La fonction des Formes comme paradigmes doit être comprise comme ayant également d'autres caractéristiques qui peuvent assurer et justifier leur rôle causal et conduire ainsi à la solution du problème du troisième homme.

La discussion par Syrianus et Asclépius de la même objection aristotélicienne a également permis de mieux comprendre l'interprétation des Formes comme des paradigmes, et généralement la manière dont les participants participent aux Formes. Syrianus, en invoquant probablement la théorie aristotélicienne du livre Lambda de la *Métaphysique*, défend que selon les propres postulats d'Aristote, il y a de causes paradigmatiques des choses du monde sensible (*paradeigmata tôn tēde*) et montre qu'une ressemblance purement fortuite, même si dans le domaine des choses périssables, c'est un événement très rare. Asclépius, d'autre part, en invoquant la théorie de la création connue du *Timée*, explique pourquoi Platon appelle les Formes *paradeigmata* et accuse Aristote lui-même d'utiliser des métaphores poétiques, c'est-à-dire des vains mots, dans une partie importante de sa théorie que la logique.

L'objectif de cette étude comparative des textes consiste alors en reconstruire de manière fiable et cohérente la réponse néoplatonicienne à Aristote, afin de mettre en relief certains aspects importants et cachés de la théorie platonicienne elle-même à travers sa réception.

## *Homonymy and Likeness in Plato's Parmenides*

It is generally agreed that in the *Parmenides* Plato tackled several theoretical difficulties entailed in the theory of transcendent Forms, proposed in the *Phaedo*, *Symposium*, and the *Republic*. *Parmenides* examines a series of difficulties concerning “participation” (*methexis*) in the first part, which have been extensively discussed by modern scholars, in particular with the Third Man Argument (TMA) in focus. But I suggest that the issue of “likeness” (*homoion*) is no less important. In this paper, I examine how Plato discussed “likeness” in this dialogue and sorted out the problem, so that the Form of Likeness (proposed by Socrates in this dialogue) no longer appeared in the later dialogues, e.g. the *Sophist*. I will discuss the issue in four stages.

In the first stage, we shall look at the backgrounds of the problem. In the theory of transcendent Forms, the relation between Forms and sensible things is often characterized as “homonymous” (*omōnymon*, having the same names) in *Phaedo* 78e, and again in *Parmenides* 133d. Later Aristotle focused on this concept in the criticism of Plato's Forms, starting from the clear definitions of “homonymy” and “synonymy” in the first chapter of the *Categories*. Interestingly, we observe that “homonymy” is first mentioned for Plato's half-brother Antiphon and his grandfather (126c). Also, homonymy might well be applied to “Aristotle”, who answers *Parmenides* in the second part, between one of the Thirty and the intelligent student of the Academy. The initial reference must be Plato's deliberate allusion to the important issue. It is natural to expect that the homonymous relation between Forms and sensibles should be examined in terms of likeness, and that the concept of likeness should also be clarified.

Here I'd like to note two points. First, in Greek, the word “*homoion*” means both “like” and “the same” (cf. LSJ, I.1 and 2). Therefore, *Parmenides* in his poem used these words almost indiscriminately (*t' auton*, B3, 6.8-9, 8.29, 34; *homoion*, B8.22), and Melissus did the same (B7(1), cf. *MXG* 974a12, *Simpl. Phys.* 103.30-33). Second, while likeness in Zeno's argument is between sensible things, the theory of Forms deals with Forms and sensibles. Likeness and homonymy should be distinguished into two types.

In the second stage, we should remember that the concept of likeness was first introduced by Zeno in his first hypothesis. He states that, if things are many, they must then be both like and unlike, but that is impossible (127e): he concludes, by *reductio ad absurdum*, that there cannot be many things. The argument looks vague, but should be discussing different relations between predicates: e.g. A is large and B is large, so they are like, but A is heavy and B is light, so they are unlike. If so, “like” is not an ordinary predicate, but a second-order predicate. Against this argument, Socrates suggests that the Form of Likeness will easily explain how A and B are both like and unlike (128e-129b); e.g. they participate in likeness in respect of largeness, but in unlikeness in respect of weight. Thus, Socrates counts Likeness as among the Forms (128e-129b, 130b), in order to solve the difficulty raised by Zeno. But in the following analysis, I will prove that introducing the Form of Likeness was not a good solution.

In the third stage, the fourth criticism by *Parmenides* (132c-133a) resorts to the concept of likeness. I follow the interpretation proposed by Malcolm Schofield (“Likeness and Likenesses in

the *Parmenides*”, in C. Gill and M. M. McCabe eds. *Form and Argument in Late Plato*, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 49-77), and suggest that the second regress argument (the so-called “second Third Man Argument”) concerns not Forms in general, but the specific Form of Likeness. In this interpretation, the concept of Likeness plays a crucial role in representing the relation between Forms and sensibles, namely, between models and copies. A model is *like* its copies, so they participate in the Form of Likeness; then, this Form as model is like participants as copies, so they once again participate in Likeness, so infinite regress is generated. Thus, this argument focuses on Likeness as a source of difficulty.

In the fourth stage, I examine some passages of the second part of the *Parmenides*, where likeness is discussed as one feature to examine in relation to the One. There, the concept of likeness is analysed: “whatever has a properly *the same* is surely *like*” (139e, trans. M. L. Gill & P. Ryan; cf. 147c-148d, 158e-159a). This seems a crucial step from the vague use of the concept towards a new understanding of it in terms of the other Form, namely “Sameness”. In fact, Sameness is counted among the five Greatest Kinds in the *Sophist*, but the dialogue never mentions the Form Likeness. This suggests how Plato sorted out the difficulties concerning “likeness”.

When Aristotle criticized Plato’s theory of Forms, he explained the relation between Forms and sensibles in terms of homonymy (having the same name but different definitions). In *Metaphysics* A 6, he gives a formula of the theory as “Plato thought that the many *synonymous* things [sc. sensible things that share *the same* names] are *homonymous* with the Forms by means of participation” (987b9-10: the text is much discussed, but I reconstruct it by keeping the reading of  $\alpha$ - family manuscripts). In this formula, he seems to have distinguished between “synonym” and “homonym” in examining the relations between Forms and sensibles.

I believe that the problems concerning the theory of Forms are not so simple as based on a single or a few basic assumptions only, but that they are so profound that Plato had to sort out each philosophical issue carefully and delicately in order to continue thinking of Forms in the later dialogues. Likeness and homonymy are one of such issues.

### *Homonymie und Ähnlichkeit in Platons Parmenides*

Es ist allgemein anerkannt, daß Platon im *Parmenides* mehrere theoretische Schwierigkeiten diskutierte, die mit der Lehre von transzendenten Ideen zusammenhängen, die im *Phaidon*, *Symposium* und *Staat* vorgeschlagen wurden. *Parmenides* untersucht im ersten Teil eine Reihe von Schwierigkeiten in Bezug auf “Partizipation” (*methexis*), die von modernen Gelehrten ausführlich diskutiert wurden, insbesondere das Third Man Argument (TMA). Aber ich schlage vor, daß das Thema “Ähnlichkeit” (*homoion*) so wichtig wie “Partizipation” ist. Ich untersuche, wie Platon in diesem Dialog “Ähnlichkeit” besprechen und das Problem aussortiert hat, so daß die Idee der Ähnlichkeit (von Sokrates in diesem Dialog vorgeschlagen) wird in den späteren Dialogen, z.B. der *Sophist*, nicht mehr erwähnt. Ich untersuche das Thema in vier Phasen.

In der ersten Phase werden wir uns mit den Hintergründen des Problems befassen. In der Ideenlehre wird die Beziehung zwischen Ideen und sinnlichen Dingen oft als “homonym” (*omōnymon*, mit den gleichen Namen) in *Phaedo* 78e und wieder in *Parmenides* 133d charakterisiert. Später konzentrierte sich Aristoteles auf diesen Begriff in der Kritik an Platons Ideen, ausgehend von den klaren Definitionen von “Homonymie” und “Synonymie” im ersten Kapitel der *Kategorien*. Interessanterweise beobachten wir, daß “Homonymie” erstmals in Bezug

auf Platons Halbbruder Antiphon und seinen Großvater (126c) erwähnt wird. Homonymie kann auch gut auf "Aristoteles" angewendet werden, der Parmenides im zweiten Teil antwortet: zwischen einem der Dreißig und dem intelligenten Studenten der Akademie. Der erste Hinweis muß Platons bewußte Anspielung auf das wichtige Thema sein. Natürlich erwarten wir, daß das homonyme Verhältnis zwischen Ideen und Sinnlichen in Bezug auf Ähnlichkeit untersucht werden sollte und auch daß der Begriff des Ähnlichkeit geklärt werden sollte.

Hier möchte ich zwei Punkte notieren. In der griechischen Sprache bedeutet das Wort "*homoion*" sowohl "dieselbe" als auch "gleich" (vgl. LSJ, I.1 und 2). Daher benutzte Parmenides in seinem Gedicht diese Wörter fast wahllos (*t' auton*, B3, 6.8-9, 8.29, 34; *homoion*, B8.22), und auch Melissus (B7(1), vgl. MXG 974a12, Simpl. Phys. 103.30-33). Zweitens, während die Ähnlichkeit in Zenons Argumentation zwischen sinnliche Dingen besteht, beschäftigt sich die Ideenlehre mit Ideen und sinnliche Dinge. Ähnlichkeit und Homonymie werden in den beiden Fällen gesehen.

In der zweiten Phase sollten wir uns daran erinnern, daß der Begriff des Ähnlichkeit zuerst von Zenon in seiner ersten Hypothese eingeführt wurde. Zenon stellt fest, daß, wenn die Dinge viele sind, sie sowohl ähnlich als auch unähnlich sein müssen, aber das ist unmöglich (127e): Er schließt mit einer *reductio ad absurdum*, daß es nicht viele Dinge geben kann. Dieses Argument erscheint vage, aber es müssen die verschiedenen Beziehungen zwischen Prädikaten diskutiert werden: z.B. A ist groß und B ist groß, also sind sie ähnlich, aber A ist schwer und B ist leicht, also sind sie unähnlich. Wenn dies der Fall ist, ist Ähnlichkeit kein gewöhnliches Prädikat, sondern ein Prädikat zweiter Ordnung. Gegen dieses Argument schlägt Sokrates vor, daß die Idee der Ähnlichkeit leicht das Problem lösen wird, wie A und B ähnlich und unähnlich sind (128e-129b); z.B. sie nehmen in Bezug auf die Größe an Ähnlichkeit teil, in Bezug auf Schwere aber an Unähnlichkeit. So zählt Sokrates die Ähnlichkeit als eine der Ideen (128e-129b, 130b), um die von Zenon aufgeworfene Schwierigkeit zu lösen. Aber ich werde beweisen, daß die Einführung der Idee der Ähnlichkeit keine gute Lösung war.

In der dritten Phase greift die vierte Kritik (132c-133a) auf das Konzept der Ähnlichkeit zurück. Ich folge der Interpretation, die von Malcolm Schofield vorgeschlagen wurde ("Likeness and Likenesses in the Parmenides", in C. Gill und MM McCabe, Hrsg. *Form and Argument in Late Plato*, Oxford University Press, 1996, S. 49-77): das zweite Regress-argument (das sogenannte "zweite Third-Man-Argument") betrifft nicht die Ideen im Allgemeinen, sondern die Idee der Ähnlichkeit. In dieser Interpretation spielt der Begriff der Ähnlichkeit eine entscheidende Rolle für die Darstellung der Beziehung zwischen Ideen und Sinnlichen, nämlich zwischen Modellen und Kopien. Ein Modell ist wie seine Kopien, also nehmen sie an der Idee der Ähnlichkeit teil; dann ist diese Idee als Modell wie die Teilnehmer als Kopien, so daß sie wieder an der Ähnlichkeit teilnehmen, so daß ein unendlicher Regress entsteht. Daher konzentriert sich das Argument auf Ähnlichkeit als eine Quelle von Schwierigkeiten.

In der vierten Phase diskutiere ich den zweiten Teil des Parmenides, in dem Ähnlichkeit als eines der Merkmale zur Untersuchung des Einen diskutiert wird. Dort wird der Begriff der Ähnlichkeit analysiert: "Was auch immer eine Fähigkeit "dieselbe" hat, ist sicherlich ähnlich" (139e, cf. 147c-148f, 158e-159a). Dies scheint ein entscheidender Schritt von der vagen Verwendung des Konzepts hin zu einem neuen Verständnis in Bezug auf die andere Idee, nämlich "Dieselbe". Tatsächlich wird Dieselbe zu den fünf größten Gattungen in dem Sophist gezählt, aber dieser Dialog erwähnt nie die Idee der Ähnlichkeit. Dies scheint zu bedeuten, daß Platon die Schwierigkeiten bezüglich "Ähnlichkeit" gelöst hat.

Als Aristoteles Platons Ideenlehre kritisierte, erklärte er die Beziehung zwischen Ideen und Sinnlichen im Sinne der Homonymie (mit demselben Namen, aber verschiedenen Definitionen). In Metaphysik A 6 gibt er eine Formel der Ideenlehre als "Platon dachte, daß die vielen *synonymen* Dinge [d.h. sinnliche Dinge, die die gleichen Namen haben] *homonym* sind mit den Ideen durch Teilnahme." (987b9-10, Der Text ist viel diskutiert, aber ich rekonstruiere es, indem ich die Handschriften der  $\alpha$ -Familie lese) In dieser Formel, unterschied er klar zwischen "Synonym" und "Homonym", indem er die Beziehungen zwischen Ideen und Sinnlichen prüfte.

Ich glaube, daß die Probleme in Bezug auf Platons Ideenlehre nicht so einfach sind, da sie nur auf einer oder wenigen Grundannahmen beruhen, aber daß sie so tiefgründig sind, daß Platon jedes philosophische Problem sorgsam und vorsichtig lösen mußte, um weiter an Ideen zu denken in den späteren Dialogen. Homonymie und Ähnlichkeit sind eines dieser Probleme.

### *Forms and Images in Plato's Parmenides, Sophist and Politeia*

In the *Parmenides*, the great philosopher from Elea, Parmenides, thoroughly examines the Theory of Forms that Plato has already presented in different ways in other dialogues. In this paper, I peer into the paradigm-based Theory of Forms in order to illuminate the problematics concerning forms and images in Plato's philosophy. In this theory, the young Socrates proposes to understand the forms as follows: 'the forms (εἶδη) stand fixed like models (παραδείγματα) in nature, and the others resemble them (τούτοις εἰκέναι) and are their likenesses (ὁμοιώματα)' (132c-d). I call this argument the 'model-image-argument' (MIA). According to the MIA, the relationship between the forms and the other things corresponds to that of a model and its 'images' (εἰκασθῆναι) (132d). Parmenides, however, turns down this argument on the grounds that, if one follows the MIA, the following difficulty emerges: 'beside the form, another form will always turn up, and [...] a new form will never cease coming to be' (132e).

This criticism by Parmenides is often interpreted either as Plato's self-criticism or as a sarcastic description of Parmenides, who intentionally misunderstands the argument. As Scolnicov comments (*Plato's Parmenides*, 2003, p.67), Socrates, expanding the MIA, presumes that the copies  $a_1$  and  $a_2$  are similar because they are formed after the original  $A$ . Parmenides, however, reinterprets the MIA and assumes that the copy  $a$  and the original  $A$  are alike because both of them are formed after the alleged original  $A$ . This understanding of the MIA results in an infinite retroaction and never leads to the original. Tabak, who sees the entire discussion of the first part of the *Parmenides* as 'a satirical display of various objections to the Theory of Forms', understands that the fallacy of Parmenides is a part of demonstrating his sophistry (*Plato's Parmenides Reconsidered*, 2015, S.29; 41). Nevertheless, although it is not obvious for the young, unexperienced Socrates, the fallacy of Parmenides is evident. Did Plato just want to show us that the great philosopher Parmenides misleads his young pupils by committing a logical error? If this is not Plato's single intention, the following question should be addressed: what is the actual aim of Parmenides' criticism, which looks like a naïve but malicious error at first glance?

This paper assumes that the criticism by Parmenides attempts to problematise not only the MIA proposed by Socrates but also the relationship between model and image. In this way, it questions the status of copies in general. To observe this point precisely, we need to keep in mind that the fallacy of Parmenides is located in the 'order of being'. As Proclus has already remarked, 'the model is not present to the image, nor is it coordinate with it' (*Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Parmenides*, trans. Morrow et al., 1987, p.265). This indicates that Parmenides' fallacy is a categorical error. However, the point is that one is able to discern this error only when the model is recognised as the model of *this* image. For instance, we can say that the reflection of Socrates in a mirror (the copy  $a$ ) resembles the person Socrates (the original  $A$ ), but not the opposite, because we know that the person is the original. The MIA presumes a fixed relationship between model and copy. This fixed relationship is questioned in the criticism by Parmenides.

This examination is an attempt to shed light on the problematics of the MIA. These problematics will appear distinctly through consideration of the MIA in connection with other

dialogues: the *Sophist*, in which Plato clearly refers to the *Parmenides*, and the *Politeia*, which he probably composed before the *Parmenides* and in which he touches on the MIA. As the first step of the examination, I focus on two arts of images: copies and simulacra. Because Plato makes their differentiation in his late dialogue *Sophist*, I first analyse this dialogue with the help of the interpretation of Deleuze, who sees the problematics concerning *le simulacre* in Plato's philosophy in a unique way.

After the Eleatic Stranger and his interlocutor Theaetetus came to the answer to the question of 'what is a sophist?', that 'he is an imitator of realities' (235a), the Stranger divides the images created by mimetic art into two categories: copy (εἰκῶν) and simulacrum (φάντασμα) (235d-6b). Although both come from the same art, there is a huge difference. While the image in narrow sense (εἰκῶν) is a simple copy of the model or the original, the simulacrum never rests upon the model, because 'it appears, but is not like' the original (236b). The simulacrum that is produced through mimetic art always assumes that 'not-being exists' (237a). The feature of the simulacrum is that it is 'built upon a disparity or upon a difference' (Deleuze, *Platon et simulacre*, 1969, p.297). Despite this difference, the differentiation of the simulacrum from the copy is difficult. This observation shows that the resemblance among model, copy, and simulacrum makes the identification of the original almost impossible.

If we turn our eyes to the *Parmenides* with the consideration above, two problems come to light. First, even if one compares two things that resemble each other, the comparison will not always lead to the original. The reason is that a simulacrum can sneak into 'the selection of the lineage', which leads to the model (Deleuze, *op. cit.*, S.293). In this sense, the MIA overlooks the difference between copy and simulacrum. The second point concerns the resemblance of images to the original. The differentiation of simulacrum from copy requires distinguishing the copying resemblance from the illusionary one. The former, which Socrates describes with 'likenesses (ὁμοιώματα)', exists between copy and model. The latter, on the other hand, never exists between copy and model, but makes the simulacrum appear to be a copy. Parmenides' criticism is directed toward these two different kinds of resemblance.

The question I address at the end of this examination is how such a confusion of images should influence society. The problem sketched above seems to be not only metaphysical but also social and political. To analyse this point, I take up the discussion considering the banishment of poets in the last book of the *Politeia*. Here, Socrates criticises the poets by comparing them with a painter who produces a simulacrum (φάντασμα) (599a). This comparison hints at the reason why the simulacra are reproduced continuously and hence enable the confusion between models and images. Precisely formulated, the simulacrum as medium tries to let the difference between model and copy disappear and, finally, to pretend that it is something that it is not (cf. Kablitz, *Mimesis versus Repräsentation*, 2009, p.219). According to Socrates, the emotions of the recipients of mimetic art play a decisive role in this confusion. By putting a polis as the place where the different images encounter each other, Socrates shows why the simulacrum sneaks into 'the selection of the lineage' and is eternally reproduced, although it never resembles the original in its ontological sense.

### *Formen und Bilder in Platons Parmenides, Sophist, und Politeia*

Im Parmenides überprüft der große eleatische Philosoph Parmenides im Gespräch mit dem jungen Sokrates gründlich die Ideenlehre, die Platon bereits auf verschiedene Weise in anderen Dialogen vorgelegt hat. In dieser Präsentation untersuche ich insbesondere die auf dem „Paradigma“ basierende Ideenlehre. Da schlägt Sokrates vor, die Formen (Ideen) folgenderweise zu verstehen: „die Formen (εἶδη) stehen wie Vorbilder (παραδείγματα) in der Natur und die übrigen Dinge gleichen ihnen (τούτοις εἰκέναι) und sind Ähnlichkeitsbildungen (ὁμοιώματα)“ (132c-d). In dieser Untersuchung nenne ich dieses Argument das „Vorbild-Abbild-Argument“ (im Folgenden: das VAA). Dem VAA nach entspricht das Verhältnis zwischen der Form und den Dingen demjenigen von einem Vorbild und seinen „Abbildern“ (εἰκασθῆναι) (132d). Dieser Satz wird jedoch von Parmenides kritisiert. Der Angelpunkt seiner Kritik besteht darin, dass dem VAA nach „neben der Form je immer eine andere Form erscheinen wird“ (132e).

Die Kritik des Parmenides wird oft entweder als Selbstkritik Platons, oder als sarkastische Darstellung des sich irrenden Parmenides interpretiert. Wie Scolnicov erklärt (*Plato's Parmenides*, 2003, S.67), nimmt Sokrates im VAA an, dass die Abbilder  $a_1$  und  $a_2$  sich gleichen, weil sie nach dem Original  $A$  gestaltet sind. Parmenides aber interpretiert das VAA so, dass ein Abbild  $a$  dem Original  $A$  ähnlich ist, weil sie beide,  $a$  und  $A$ , einem angeblichen Original  $A'$  ähnlich gestaltet sind. Aus dieser Auslegung resultiert eine endlose Abstufung. Tabak behauptet, die ganze Diskussion im ersten Teil des Dialogs könne als „eine satirische Darstellung der verschiedenen Einwände gegen die platonische Ideenlehre“, und der Irrtum des Parmenides als eine Demonstration der Sophistik verstanden werden (*Plato's Parmenides Reconsidered*, 2015, S.29; 41). Dennoch, obwohl es für den jungen, unerfahrenen Sokrates nicht offensichtlich ist, liegt der Irrtum des Parmenides auf der Hand. Wollte Platon bloß zeigen, dass der große Philosoph Parmenides seine jungen Schüler mit einem offensichtlichen Irrtum zu einem Trugschluß führen wollte? Wenn dies jedoch nicht Platons einzige Absicht gewesen ist, stellt sich die Frage, worauf diese Kritik, die auf den ersten Blick wie ein einfacher, böswilliger Irrtum aussieht, noch eigentlich gezielt hat.

In dieser Untersuchung gehe ich davon aus, dass die Kritik von Parmenides nicht nur versucht, das VAA von Sokrates, sondern auch das Verhältnis zwischen Vorbild und Abbild zu problematisieren, und somit den Status der Abbilder in Frage zu stellen. Für die genauere Betrachtung dieses Punktes, müssen wir uns zuerst bewusst werden, dass sich der Irrtum des Parmenides in der „Seinsanordnung“ befindet. Wie schon Proklos bemerkte, „steht [das Vorbild] im Hinblick auf [seine Abbildung] nicht in der gleichen Seinsreihe“ (*Kommentar zum platonischen Parmenides*, übers. Zekl, 2010, S.341). Das heißt, der Irrtum des Parmenides ist ein kategorischer Fehler. Aber man kann diesen Fehler erkennen, wenn das Vorbild als das Vorbild *dieses Abbilds* erfasst wird. Es lässt sich daher der Satz formulieren, dass das Spiegelbild von Sokrates (das Abbild  $a$ ) dem Menschen Sokrates (dem Original  $A$ ) ähnelt, das Gegenteil jedoch nicht gilt, weil wir wissen, dass der Mensch das Original ist. Das VAA setzt ein festes Verhältnis zwischen Vorbild und Abbild voraus. Die Kritik des Parmenides richtet auf dieses Verhältnis in sich.

Diese Untersuchung versucht, die Problematik des VAA ans Licht zu bringen. Sie zeigt sich jeweils, wenn es im Zusammenhang mit anderen Dialogen betrachtet wird. Diese Dialoge sind der Sophist, in dem Parmenides deutlich erwähnt wird, und die Politeia, die Platon wahrscheinlich vor dem Parmenides verfasst hat, und in der er das VAA streift. Im ersten Schritt der Untersuchung konzentriere ich mich auf zwei Arten von Bildern: Abbilder und Trugbilder. Weil deren Differenzierung in Platons Spätdialog Sophist vorgenommen wird, analysiere ich diesen Dialog anhand der Darlegung Deleuzes, der die Problematik der Trugbilder – in seinen Worten „simulacre“ – bei Platon auf originelle Weise erläutert.



Nachdem der eleatische Fremde und Theaitetos auf die Frage „was ist ein Sophist?“, zum Zwischenergebnis „ein Nachahmer des Wirklichen“ gekommen sind (235a), teilt der Fremde die Bilder, die durch die Nachahmungskunst geschaffen werden, in zwei Kategorien ein: Abbild (εἰκῶν) und Trugbild (φάντασμα) (235d-6c). Obwohl beide von derselben Kunst stammen, gibt es eine große Differenz. Während das Abbild eine Kopie des Vorbilds bzw. Urbilds ist, beruht das Trugbild keineswegs auf dem Vorbild, weil „es zu gleichen scheint und doch nicht gleicht“ (236b). Das von der Kunst erzeugte Trugbild setzt immer voraus, „das Nichtseiende zu sein“ (237a). Dieses Bild ist insofern ein „Trug“-bild, als dass es tatsächlich „auf einer Differenz beruht und eine Unähnlichkeit verinnerlicht“, wodurch der Betrachter getäuscht wird (Deleuze, Platon et simulacre, 1969, S.297). Trotz dieses Unterschieds ist die Differenzierung des Trugbilds, das im ontologischen Sinne keinesfalls dem Vorbild ähnlich ist, vom Abbild, das vom Vorbild abgeleitet ist, schwierig. So lässt sich erkennen, dass die Ähnlichkeiten, die zwischen Vorbild, Abbild und Trugbild bestehen, die Identifizierung des Vorbilds erschweren.

Wenn wir uns mit dieser Erkenntnis den Dialog Parmenides ansehen, können wir zwei Problematiken ausmachen. Erstens, wenn man die Stammlinie der sich gleichenden Dinge zurückverfolgt, führt sie einem nicht unbedingt zum Original. Grund dafür ist, dass sich ein Trugbild in „die Selektion der Stammlinie“ (Deleuze, *op. cit.*, S.293), die zur Form führen sollte, geschlichen hat. Von dieser Perspektive aus übersieht das VAA des jungen Sokrates anscheinend den Unterschied der Bildarten, wodurch seine Erklärung der Ideen mangelhaft ist. Der zweite Punkt betrifft die Ähnlichkeit der Bilder mit den Originalen. Die Differenzierung von Trugbild und Abbild führt zum Bedürfnis der Unterscheidung zwischen der ebenbildlichen Ähnlichkeit und der illusionären Ähnlichkeit. Die Erste existiert zwischen Abbild und Vorbild, und wird von Sokrates mit „Ähnlichkeitsbildungen (ὁμοιώματα)“ bezeichnet. Die illusionäre Ähnlichkeit, die nie zwischen Abbild und Vorbild existiert, lässt aber das Trugbild als ein Abbild erscheinen. Indem Parmenides kritisiert, dass das VAA zur endlosen Abstufung der Abbilder führt, deutet er den Unterschied zwischen diesen zwei Arten der Ähnlichkeit an. Vor dem Hintergrund dieser zwei Problematiken kann man also die Kritik des Parmenides, selbst wenn sie eine „satirische Darstellung der Sophistik“ sein sollte, als eine Warnung vor der Suche nach den Formen, die im VAA verankert ist, ansehen.

Die Frage, die ich zu Ende meiner Untersuchung angehe, ist, wie eine solche Verwechslung der Bilder die Gesellschaft beeinflussen kann. Das Problem, das bisher skizziert wurde, scheint nicht ausschließlich ein metaphysisches Problem, sondern auch ein politisches Problem zu sein. Zur Analyse dieses Punktes nehme ich die Dichterkritik im letzten Buch der Politeia auf. Denn in ihr steht der Zusammenhang von Vorbild, Abbild und Trugbild ebenfalls im Zentrum. Hier kritisiert Sokrates die Dichtung als eine Form der Nachahmung aufgrund des VAA, wobei er den größten Dichter sowie Erzieher aller Griechen, Homer, mit einem Maler, der ein Trugbild (φάντασμα) produziert, vergleicht (599a). Dieser Vergleich führt zur Überlegung, warum das Trugbild ständig reproduziert, und so die Verwechslung der Bilder ermöglicht wird. Vor diesem Hintergrund kann die Dichterkritik als Kritik an der Wirkung des Trugbilds verstanden werden. Das heißt konkret, das Trugbild als Vermittler versucht, den Unterschied zwischen Vorbild und Abbild verschwinden zu lassen und so letztendlich vorzugeben, dass es etwas ist, was es eben nicht ist (cf. Kablitz, *Mimesis versus Repräsentation*, 2009, S.219). Der Beobachtung des Sokrates nach spielt die Emotionen der Rezipienten bei der Verwechslung eine entscheidende Rolle. Indem Sokrates eine Gemeinschaft, nämlich eine Polis, als den Ort, in dem sich die verschiedenen Bildarten begegnen, festsetzt, zeigt uns die Dichterkritik der Politeia den Grund, warum sich das Trugbild in ‚die

Selektion der Stammlinie‘ schleicht und ewig reproduziert wird, obwohl es in seiner Ontologie dem Original gar nicht ähnelt.

### *Il prologo come figura del dialogo intero*

Nella premessa del commento di Proclo al *Parmenide* di Platone (I 658.23–659.17 Steel), il filosofo spiega il significato dei proemi dei dialoghi, le scene di apertura nelle quali Platone presenta i personaggi e la conversazione si avvia nella direzione del significato del dialogo in questione. Secondo Proclo la scena iniziale è fondamentale perché presenta un'immagine nella quale il dialogo intero è rappresentato o riflesso (il verbo è *enikonizetai*, I 659.10 Steel). Io credo che non sia un caso che tale considerazione generale di Proclo sui dialoghi platonici sia collocata proprio nella premessa del commento al *Parmenide*, infatti il prologo del *Parmenide* è in questo senso esemplare e nel mio contributo al *Symposium Platonicum* di Parigi amerei poterlo argomentare. Quel che vorrei mostrare è che nel prologo del *Parmenide* siano in *nuce* raffigurate la prima e la seconda parte del dialogo.

Dopo aver ascoltato i *logoi* di Zenone, Socrate dice a Parmenide che Zenone desidera essere legato al suo amico, a Parmenide stesso, non solo mediante la *philia*, ma anche mediante il *sungramma*, il testo scritto (128a). Nel *Fedro* (278d) il *sungramma* si configura come un'immagine di qualcosa di più importante e in questo caso il qualcosa di più importante sarebbe la *philia* che lega Zenone a Parmenide.

Infatti, nel *sungramma*, di cui è stata appena ascoltata la lettura, Zenone - dice Socrate - ha mostrato che *ou polla esti* (127e, 128b), che il *molteplice non è*. Ma Parmenide aveva già dimostrato che *hen to pan*, che uno è il tutto (128a-b).

Parmenide e Zenone, dunque - osserva Socrate - dicono cose simili che sembrano diverse (128b). Dicono *hen* ma sembrano dire *polla*. L'essenza del loro dire è una e simile, l'apparenza è molteplice e diversa. Questa situazione, configurata nel commento socratico del *sungramma* zenoniano, dimostra alcune caratteristiche della scrittura platonica. Esse possono essere schematizzate come segue:

- 1) l'argomento eleatico dell'uno e dei molti e della somiglianza e della dissomiglianza non è soltanto enunciato da Parmenide e Zenone, personaggi del dialogo platonico, ma è per così dire *incarnato* da essi, i quali, nel contesto drammatico del prologo, appaiono essere essi stessi la messa in scena, visibile e tangibile, del loro argomento: essi sono la testimonianza evidente di una molteplicità che è solo apparente, perché in realtà Parmenide ha scritto la stessa cosa di Zenone (*tauton gegraphe tropon*, 128a), e quindi i loro discorsi (che sono due) sono in realtà uno, perché dicono *schedon tautà* (pressappoco le stesse cose), ma non sembrano farlo (128b).

Essi e i loro discorsi sono simili e dissimili. Sono apparentemente dissimili e in realtà simili. La dissomiglianza è solo nello scritto ma la somiglianza abita l'essenza della *philia* che li lega e che è testimoniata dall'intento di Zenone di portare una *boetheia* a Parmenide (128c).

- 2) Parmenide e Zenone incarnano il loro argomento, ma, incarnandolo e mettendolo in scena, essi dimostrano la verità *non* dell'argomento che incarnano (tutto è uno, i molti non sono), né della dimostrazione che dell'argomento offre Zenone (se i

molti fossero, patirebbero conseguenze impossibili: sarebbero simili e dissimili, 127e), bensì della interpretazione socratica di esso: non c'è nulla di straordinario (*thaumaston*, 129b1) se i molti (Parmenide e Zenone) sono anche uno, sono simili e dissimili (dicono la stessa cosa e non dicono la stessa cosa). Quel che sarebbe straordinario non è il somigliare dello scritto di Parmenide a quello di Zenone e contemporaneamente l'essere dissimili dei due scritti: straordinario sarebbe l'esser qualcosa dissimile da sé stesso. Quel che sarebbe *thaumaston* sarebbe la contraddizione non nell'apparire (che è una molteplicità irriducibile all'unità e dunque costitutivamente attraversata dalla contraddizione), ma nell'essere. Non negli scritti considerati l'uno in relazione all'altro, o l'interpretazione dell'uno in relazione a quella dell'altro. *Thaumaston* sarebbe la contraddizione *non* tra linguaggio e pensiero, *non* tra sensibile e intellegibile (dunque non tra i molti, né tra i molti e l'uno), bensì nel pensiero in sé stesso (nell'uno stesso).

- 3) Parmenide e Zenone, criticando la separazione delle forme dalle cose (130b), appiattiscono l'essere sull'apparire (un atteggiamento che li accomuna ai sofisti) e così facendo contraddicono proprio ciò che hanno messo in scena: che ciò che sembra (che dicano cose dissimili) sia diverso da ciò che è (che dicono pressappoco la stessa cosa, che dicono cose simili).
- 4) Nella seconda parte del dialogo viene argomentata l'impossibilità della tesi eleatica (l'appiattimento dell'essere sull'apparire, concezione fisicista della realtà) perché è essa che conduce a conseguenze contraddittorie. Nella seconda parte del *Parmenide*, dunque, Platone - applicando il metodo dialettico la cui invenzione risale a Zenone (e dunque ritorcendo contro gli eleati la loro stessa argomentazione)- mostra *non* una revisione della teoria delle idee, come tanto spesso si dice, bensì le conseguenze contraddittorie cui porterebbe l'interpretazione eleatica di tale teoria, interpretazione incapace di concepire la natura metafisica delle idee e dunque la differenza tra l'apparire e l'essere. E' neglignendo questa differenza, e non ammettendola, che si giunge a quelle conseguenze contraddittorie di cui parla Zenone in 130a-135c.

### *The Prologue as an Image of the Dialogue as a Whole*

In the prologue to Proclus' commentary on Plato's *Parmenides* (I 658.23–659.17 Steel), the philosopher explains the meaning of the prologues to the dialogues, the opening scenes in which Plato presents the various characters and the conversation approaches the topics at issue. According to Proclus, the opening scene is crucial because it offers an image that represents or reflects the dialogue as a whole (the verb used is *eneikonizetai*, I 659.10 Steel). I believe that it is hardly a coincidence that this general statement by Proclus about the Platonic dialogues occurs precisely in the prologue to the commentary on the *Parmenides*. Indeed, in this respect the prologue to the *Parmenides* is an exemplary one, and this is something I would like to discuss in my contribution to the *Symposium Platonicum* in Paris. What I would like to show is that the prologue to the *Parmenides* represents the first and second parts of the dialogue in embryonic form.

After having listened to Zeno's *logoi*, Socrates tells Parmenides that Zeno wishes to be bound to his friend, Parmenides, not just by *philia* but by the *sungramma*, the written text (128a). In the *Phaedrus* (278d) the *sungramma* embodies something more important, namely the *philia* binding Zeno and Parmenides.

Indeed, according to Socrates, in the *sungramma*, which has just been read aloud, Zeno has shown that *ou polla esti* (127e, 128b), i.e. that the many are not. But Parmenides had already demonstrated that *hen to pan*, that the all is one (128a-b).

Parmenides and Zeno, therefore – Socrates observes – say similar things that seem different (128b). They say *hen* but seem to be saying *polla*. The essence of their speeches is one and the same, its appearance is manifold and different. This situation, outlined in the Socratic commentary on Zeno's *sungramma*, reflects certain features of Platonic writing. These can be summed up as follows:

- 1) the Eleatic argument about the one and the many and about similarity and dissimilarity is not merely enunciated by Parmenides and Zeno, as characters in Plato's dialogue, but is so to speak embodied by them. In the dramatic context of the prologue they seem to be providing a visible and tangible *mise-en-scène* of their argument: they stand as evidence of a multiplicity that is only apparent, because in reality Parmenides has written the same thing as Zeno (*tauton gegraphe tropon*, 128a); hence, their speeches (which are two) are actually one, as they are saying *schedon tautà* (roughly the same things), even though they do not appear to be doing so (128b).

The two characters and their speeches are both similar and dissimilar. They are apparently dissimilar but in reality similar. The dissimilarity only exists as far as the writing is concerned, whereas the similarity concerns the essence of the *philia* that binds them and which is witnessed by Zeno's intention to offer Parmenides *boetheia* (128c).

- 2) Parmenides and Zeno embody their argument but, by embodying and staging it, they show the truth not of the argument they embody (all is one, the many are not), or of the demonstration that the argument offers Zeno (if the many existed, impossible consequences for them would ensue: they would be both similar and dissimilar, 127e); rather, they show the truth of the Socratic interpretation of this argument: there is nothing amazing (*thaumaston*, 129b1) in the fact that while the many (Parmenides and Zeno) are one, they are both similar and dissimilar (they are both saying and not saying the same thing). What is amazing is not the fact that Parmenides' text resembles Zeno's one, although at the same time the two pieces of writing are dissimilar; rather, what would be amazing would be to have something that is dissimilar to itself. What is *thaumaston* is contradiction not in terms of appearance (which is a multiplicity irreducible to unity and hence intrinsically marked by contradiction), but in terms of being. The amazing does not lie in the texts considered in relation to one another, or in the interpretation of the one in relation to the other. What is *thaumaston* is the contradiction not between language and thought, or between the sensible and the intelligible (hence, not between the many, or between the many and the one), but rather contradiction within thought itself (i.e. in the one itself).
- 3) By criticising the separation of forms from things (130b), Parmenides and Zeno reduce being to appearance (an attitude they share with the sophists). In doing so, they contradict what they have staged, namely: the fact that what seems to be (i.e. that they are saying different things) is different from what is (i.e. that they are saying roughly the

same thing, that they are saying similar things).

- 4) In the second part of the dialogue the debate shifts to the impossibility of the Eleatic thesis (the reduction of being to appearance, and the physicalist conception of reality), because it leads to contradictory outcomes. In the second part of the *Parmenides*, therefore, Plato – by applying the dialectical method first developed by Zeno (and hence turning the Eleatics' own argument against them) – outlines not a revision of the theory of Ideas, as scholars often maintain, but rather the contradictory outcomes of the Eleatic interpretation of this theory: an interpretation incapable of conceiving the metaphysical nature of the Ideas and hence the difference between appearance and being. It is by overlooking this difference, and not by granting it, that we reach those contradictory outcomes mentioned by Zeno in 130a-135c.

### *The One and Time: Parmenides 151e-153a*

In what is traditionally called the Second Hypothesis, Parmenides presents a series of deductions meant to contradict the opposite deductions in the First Hypothesis. In this paper, we will focus on the deduction in the Second Hypothesis which draws out the consequences of the one's partaking of being, where partaking of being implies partaking of time. While, in the First Hypothesis, Parmenides denies that the one partakes of time, now he supposes that it does. In an elaborate, but careful argument, he draws two conclusions, which contradict one another. First, he concludes that:

(III.12) The one always both is and is coming to be older and younger than itself.<sup>1</sup>

Second, he concludes that:

(IV.4) Since the one is or comes to be for an equal time, i.e., a time equal to itself, it neither is nor comes to be younger or older than itself.

In this paper, we will pay close attention to the logic of the whole deduction in order to see how it arrives at this contradiction. Our strategy depends on a claim about the way that Parmenides' argument uses Zeno's paradox called the Flying Arrow. According to the paradox, (a) anything occupying a place just its own size is at rest; in the present, what is moving occupies a place just its own size. Thus, the arrow is at rest. (b) Since what is moving always moves in the present, the flying arrow is always at rest. However, we shall see that Parmenides' argument uses the paradox in an odd way, dividing its premises between the two parts of the deduction. Then we shall see that this odd usage has a purpose. It is Parmenides' way of showing that the conception of movement through time, which results in (III.12), is itself impossible.

We shall see that Parmenides uses (b) to establish the conclusion to the first argument, (III.12); then he uses (a) to establish the conclusion to the second argument, (IV.4).

We can start with (b). In Zeno's paradox, (b) is actually an argument in its own right. Its first part is a premise that claims (b') what is moving always moves in the present. In Parmenides' argument, where the one is moving through time, (b') appears as:

(III.11) The now is always present to the one throughout its being, for the one always is now whenever it is.

As we shall see, this premise is needed in order to conclude that (III.12) the one always both is and is coming to be older and younger than itself, since both parts of this claim depend on the one's always being at the now. However, the conclusion that the one always is and is coming to be older and younger than itself would be contradictory if it meant that the one, at the same moment, is and is coming to be older and younger than itself. So, if we assume that it is not a contradiction, it means that, in moving through time, the one serially exhibits two characteristics; always it is stopping at the now and then moving to the later. As we shall argue, this part of the deduction embodies the idea that the one's movement through time is both discontinuous and continuous.

In the second part of this deduction, Parmenides uses (a), from Zeno's paradox, to establish (IV.4). This latter conclusion depends on an odd sounding premise:

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<sup>1</sup> The numbering of propositions reflects the numbering in the larger paper of which this is the abstract. Translations, by Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan (Cooper (1997) pp.359-397) have been modified.

(IV.2) If the one is or comes to be for an equal time, i.e., a time equal to itself, it is the same age.

While the expression ‘for an equal time, i.e., a time equal to itself’ is odd, we shall argue that (IV.2) is analogous to the statement in (a): anything occupying a place just its own size is at rest. In particular, in (IV.2), Parmenides is making a claim about movement through time that is analogous to what Zeno says, in the Flying Arrow, about movement through space. Once we understand the analogy, we can see how Parmenides uses the Flying Arrow to establish (IV.4).

At this point, we will argue that Parmenides divides Zeno’s paradox into these parts with a precise purpose. If, instead of keeping the Flying Arrow intact, Parmenides divides it so he can detour through an argument that arrives at (III.12) in order to contradict it, the reason must be that (III.12) implies something significant about movement through time, viz., movement through time is both continuous and discontinuous; movement through time must have both characteristics. On the one hand, if the one moves at all, its movement must be continuous. On the other, if the one moves through the present, there must be a time when the one and the present coincide. At that point, its movement is discontinuous. While both of these characteristics are necessary for movement through time, Parmenides uses the Flying Arrow to show that these characteristics are incompatible because they lead to a contradiction.

Finally, we shall see what consequence this result implies for interpreting the second part of this dialogue. While most commentators take the second part to be about the form of the one, Brisson has argued that it is about the one of Parmenides’ original poem. It is a defense of his central claim that the all (the universe) is one. Our interpretation of 151e-153a supports Brisson’s position. The impossibility of movement through time is not a dilemma of participation (See Allen). Nor can it be eliminated by qualification (See Meinwald). The impossibility of movement through time is best understood as applying to the all conceived of as one.

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## *L’Un et le temps : Parménide 151e-153a*

Dans la Deuxième Hypothèse de ce dialogue, Parménide présente une série de déductions qui contredisent les déductions opposées, présentées dans la Première Hypothèse. Plus particulièrement, dans la Première Hypothèse, Parménide nie que l’un participe au temps ; alors que dans la Deuxième Hypothèse, il pose que l’un y participe. Dans cette communication, nous nous focaliserons sur la déduction de la Deuxième Hypothèse, qui montre les conséquences pour l’un s’il participe à l’être et, par conséquent, au temps. Par un argument complexe mais



soigneusement construit, il tire deux conclusions, qui se contredisent. Tout d'abord, il conclut que :

(III.12) C'est donc sans cesse que l'un est et devient plus vieux et plus jeune que lui-même.<sup>1</sup>

Puis, il conclut que :

(IV.4) Donc l'un qui devient et est aussi longtemps que lui-même, n'est ni devient ni plus jeune ni plus vieux que lui-même.

Nous nous proposons d'examiner la déduction dans son ensemble. Notre stratégie repose sur l'affirmation que l'argument de Parménide utilise le paradoxe de Zénon qui s'appelle La Flèche. Selon le paradoxe, (a) tout ce qui occupe un espace égal à lui-même est au repos; dans le présent, ce qui se déplace occupe un espace égal à lui-même. Par conséquent, la flèche, qui se déplace, est au repos. (b) Puisque ce qui se déplace se déplace toujours dans le présent, la flèche est toujours au repos. Cependant, nous verrons que l'argument de Parménide utilise le paradoxe d'une manière étrange, divisant ses prémisses entre les deux parties de la déduction. Nous verrons ensuite que cet usage étrange a un but, celui de prouver que le concept de mouvement dans le temps, qui mène à (III.12), est impossible en lui-même. Nous verrons que Parménide se fonde sur (b) pour la conclusion du premier argument, (III.12); et il utilise (a) à établir la conclusion du second argument, (IV.4).

Nous commencerons par (b). Dans le paradoxe de Zénon, (b) est, à proprement parler, un argument en lui-même. La première partie est une prémisses qui dit (b') ce qui se déplace se déplace toujours dans le présent. Dans la déduction de Parménide (b') apparaît comme :

(III.11) Le maintenant est sans cesse présent à l'un à travers tous les moments de son être; car l'un est maintenant, chaque fois qu'il est.

Comme nous verrons, cette prémisses est nécessaire afin de conclure que (III.12) l'un est et devient sans cesse plus vieux et plus jeune que lui-même puisque les deux parties de cette conclusion dépendent de l'idée que l'un est toujours au présent. Cependant, la conclusion que l'un est et devient sans cesse plus vieux et plus jeune que lui-même serait contradictoire si elle voulait dire que l'un, au même moment, est et devient plus vieux et plus jeune que lui-même. Par conséquent, si nous supposons qu'elle n'est pas une contradiction, elle veut dire que, en se déplaçant dans le temps, l'un présente, en série, deux caractéristiques : toujours, il s'arrête au présent et, ensuite, il se déplace au futur. Comme nous montrerons, cette partie de la déduction incarne l'idée que le mouvement de l'un dans le temps est discontinu et continu.

Dans la seconde partie de cette déduction, Parménide utilise la partie (a) du paradoxe de Zénon, pour établir (IV.4). Cette conclusion-ci dépend d'une prémisses d'un air apparemment bizarre :

(IV.2) Si l'un est et devient aussi longtemps que lui-même, il a le même âge.

Bien que l'expression 'aussi longtemps que lui-même' soit bizarre, nous montrerons que (IV.2) est une déclaration de registre de temps qui est analogue à la déclaration de registre d'espace que nous venons de citer dans (a) : tout ce qui occupe un espace égal à lui-même est au repos. Dès lors, ce que (IV.2) dit sur le mouvement dans le temps est analogue à ce que Zénon dit sur le mouvement dans l'espace. Une fois cette analogie comprise, la manière dont Parménide utilise La Flèche pour établir (IV.4) devient claire.

A ce point, nous montrerons que Parménide divise le paradoxe de Zénon dans un but précis. Au lieu de garder le paradoxe intact, il le divise pour faire un détour par un argument qui

<sup>1</sup> Le numérotage des propositions est de la communication d'où cet abstrait provient. La traduction, modifiée, est celle de Diès (1920) pp. 94-95.

aboutit à (III.12) afin de le contredire ; évidemment, (III.12) a une importante implication pour le mouvement dans le temps, à savoir qu'il est continu et discontinu. D'un côté, si l'un se déplace, il faut que son mouvement soit continu. D'un autre côté, si l'un se déplace dans le présent, il y a nécessairement un moment où l'un et le présent coïncide. A ce moment-là, son mouvement est discontinu. Bien que les deux caractéristiques soient nécessaires pour le concept de mouvement dans le temps, Parménide utilise La Flèche afin de montrer que ces deux caractéristiques sont incompatibles puis qu'elles impliquent une contradiction.

Finalement, nous verrons les conséquences que ce résultat implique pour l'interprétation de la seconde partie de ce dialogue. Bien que maints commentateurs pensent que le sujet de la seconde partie est la forme de l'un, Brisson conclut que le sujet est l'un qui se trouve dans le poème de Parménide. La seconde partie donc défend la déclaration centrale que le tout (l'univers) est un. Notre interprétation de 151e-153a soutient la position de Brisson. L'impossibilité du mouvement dans le temps n'est pas un dilemme de la participation (Allen) ; et on ne peut pas l'éliminer par des limitations (Meinwald). On peut mieux comprendre l'impossibilité du mouvement dans le temps comme une caractéristique de l'un qui est le tout de Parménide.

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### *A Valuable Nugget in Deduction 5*

In Deduction 5 (If the one is not, what follows for the one?), Parmenides constructs a curious argument to show that if the one is not, then it has being--in fact, that it has to have being in order to not be. Conversely, that which is, must partake of not-being in order to be. The argument itself, and the response I will propose, point to a series of conclusions about a) the nature of a thought or spoken logos, b) an (overrated) strategy for responding to the paradoxes of Parmenides Part II, and c) the limits of paradox resolution in addressing philosophical issues raised by Parmenides' arguments.

First, the argument (162a2-b3):

If the one <or anything else that is not> is not not-real, but somehow ceases from being with respect to not-being, then it will immediately be (a2-3)--i.e., whatever is not <including the one that is not>, since it is not, must possess being not-being as a bond (*desmos*) to not-being, if it will not be (a4-5); it partakes of the not-being of being, and of the being of not-being (162b1-3). Similarly, that which is has the not-being of not-being, so that it will fully be (a5-6); it partakes of the being of being and of the not-being of not-being (162a7-b1)

This looks at first sight like a bit of slight of hand designed simply to produce a strikingly paradoxical result. But beyond that, it is obvious that if what is will thereby partake of the not-being of not-being, then it will by the same token have to partake of the being of the not-being of not-being (it will really be the case that it is really not not-real), and of the being of being of being, etc. And there will be a similar regress regarding that which is not. This is obvious without Parmenides spelling it out, and for present purposes he does not need to do that, since he already has his desired paradox without introducing the infinite regresses lurking here. Notice, however, that we have the makings of a Zenonian argument to the effect that no one can ever formulate a logos. For that would require supplying a never-ending series of bonds in order to secure a chain of bonds that could bind subject and predicate. This is impossible for even the fastest of "fast talkers".

The correct response, I suggest, is simply to say that no bond (*desmos*) is needed to bind together the constituents of a declarative logos. This is true even if the verbal expression of the logos contains an explicit copula (or negated copula) along with subject and predicate. In that case 'is' and 'is not' merely signify that the subject is qualified in a certain way, or possesses some attribute--not that there is some third thing, some link or bond, that joins subject and predicate. This response receives support from a Platonic metaphor in the *Sophist*, where *onoma* and *rhema* are "interwoven" to form a logos. This suggests a direct connection, or even a kind of co-mingling, between *onoma* and *rhema*, so that the result represents some subject as being characterized in a certain way. It does not suggest that the logos needs a third constituent element to bond *onoma* and *rhema*. Indeed, if the suggested response is correct, adding such bonds will be unnecessary and futile.

Regarding the general "dialectical" lessons of the passage (items b and c above), the response proposed here implies that removing the surface contradiction by adding qualifications (e.g., qua..., insofar as...) is problematic at best. (The Conference talk would examine some

attempts along those lines, and cite other arguments from Part II that plainly cannot be freed of paradox in that way.) More important is c), the fact that removing surface contradictions usually does not even touch any underlying philosophical issue—here, the notion of a basic *logos* and its minimal constituents. Insofar as we are interested in that, removing a contradiction in the current set of conclusions would in itself tell us nothing positive about *logoi*. Generalizing one step further, an analogous point holds for typical suggested refutations of Parmenides' objections to Young Socrates' theory of separate Forms in Part I, for those objections consistently raise difficult issues that remain even if we accept one or another response to them on Plato's behalf (e.g. spot an ambiguity in some term essential to the argument, or reject a premise that would not have been accepted by Plato—even if Young Socrates fails to challenge it).

Finally, notice that the “solution” advocated here—following the *Sophist*—still does not really explain how the unity of a *logos* comes about, either. That has remained a problem and is today a lively topic—alike concerning the best way formally to represent a simple sentence, the cognitive or psychological mechanism of “uniting” subject and predicate, and the metaphysical question of the relation of subject and attribute. The last is of particular interest here in light of Parmenides' heavy emphasis in Part I on the “separateness” of Forms and the host of problems that poses for “participation” of sensibles in Forms. Our current passage at least can suggest the possibility that nothing is to be gained by adding some relational bond to the picture. A coherent theory of participation in separate Forms is possible, however, although developing that point would take us far beyond anything found in our passage from Deduction 5.

### *Ein Wertvolles Nugget in Deduktion 5*

In Deduktion 5 (Wenn das Eins nicht ist, was folgt in Bezug auf das Eins?) beweist Parmenides, dass, wenn das Eins nicht ist, es deshalb sein muss, —und wenn etwas ist, es deshalb nicht sein muss. Parmenides' Argument deutet drei Probleme an: a) die Natur des *logos* (oder *protos logos*, wie im *Sophistes*), b) das Aushalten der Widersprüche in Parmenides' Teil II, und c) die Beschränkungen dieses Aushaltens der Widersprüche vis à vis der Untersuchung philosophischer Fragen, die hinter Parmenides' Argumente stehen.

Zuerst das Argument (162a-b5):

Wenn das Eins nicht ist, aber irgendwie das Sein aufhört in Bezug auf das Nicht-Sein, dann will es zugleich sein—i.e., was nicht ist, weil es nicht *ist*, muss einen Anteil am Sein haben in Bezug auf das Nicht-Sein, wenn es wirklich nicht sein wird: es nimmt Teil am Seienden des Nicht-seienden, und auch am Nicht-Seienden des Seienden. Ebenso, wenn etwas ist, hat es das Nicht-Seiende des Nicht-Seienden, damit es ganz sein wird (a5-6), und hat Teil am Seienden des Seienden und am Nicht-seienden des Nicht-seienden (a7-b1).

Es wird deutlich, wengleich implizit, dass es wird zwei unendliche Regresse geben wird, und auch ein Zenonisches Argument gegen die Möglichkeit des *logos*, weil *logos* eine unendliche Reihe von Verknüpfungen zwischen Subjekt und Prädikat brauchen wird.

Die richtige Antwort ist, dass es keiner solchen Verknüpfung zwischen Subjekt und Prädikat bedarf, selbst wenn ein Satz eine explizite copula hat. Denn der Satz sagt nur, dass das Subjekt ein spezifisches Attribut hat—nicht, dass es ein drittes Ding, eine Verknüpfung zwischen Subjekt und Prädikat gibt. Ähnlich spricht Platons *Sophistes*: *onoma* und *rhema* sind verwoben.

Der Text sagt nichts von einer zusätzlichen Verbindung. Gemäß der Metapher, dass Subjekt und Attribut selbst mit einander verwoben sind.

Jetzt zu den zwei "dialektischen" Punkten (b und c): Die hier ausgedrückte Antwort impliziert, dass in diesem Text (167a7-b1) die Ausschaltung der Widersprüche durch die Einfügung von Qualifikationen zweifelhaft ist. Aber wichtiger ist c): die Ausschaltung der Widersprüche in Teil II gibt keine Antwort auf die vielen philosophischen Probleme, die hinter den Paradoxen liegen. In Bezug auf unseren Text meint das die Frage nach der Natur des Satzes und seiner Bestandteile. (Das gilt auch in Bezug auf die meisten Antworten zu Parmenides' Einwänden gegen die Theorie von getrennten Ideen in Teil I.)

Endlich, die hier befürwortete Antwort, gemäß der Metapher des *Sophistes*, erklärt nicht wirklich, *wie* die Einheit eines *logos* zustande kommen könnte. Das ist doch noch ein Problem heute, in Bezug auf die formale Darstellung eines Satzes, den kognitiven Mechanismus der Vereinigung von Subjekt und Attribut, und die metaphysische Beziehung zwischen Subjekt und Attribut. Die letztere ist hier von besonderem Interesse angesichts von Parmenides' Schwerpunktsetzung auf die "Getrenntheit" der Ideen und die resultierenden Probleme hinsichtlich "*methexis*". Unser Beitrag kann jedoch darauf verweisen, dass man ein drittes Ding nicht braucht und nicht einfügen soll, um (weltliches) Subjekt und Idee zusammen zu halten. Eine kohärente Lösung ist auch hier möglich, aber das auszuführen liegt jenseits des Rahmen unseres Beitrags.

*The risk of the ἐξαιφνης (On Parm. 156e3)*

This paper aims at challenging the supposed validity of the ἐξαιφνης-argument by proposing an alternative reading of “κινδυνεύει” (156e3), the one-word answer given by Aristotle at the end of the so-called appendix following the second deduction (155e4-157b5).

After having overturned the results of the first deduction in the second deduction, Parmenides encourages Aristotle to say the “third thing”. What many scholars consider to be an appendix to the second (and perhaps the first) deduction begins with the highly-debated τὸ τρίτον (155e4) and concludes by the time Parmenides returns to the original positive hypothesis, this time investigating the consequences for the others (157b6-7). To overcome the difficulty the interlocutors have reached, i.e. that contradictory predicates turn out to belong to the “one that is”, Parmenides constructs a complex argument. In order to indicate its structure, I will rely on the lines Cornford famously dispensed with, namely the interlocutor’s answers. I will use them as textual indicators of the argument’s logical steps.

On the basis of Aristotle’s answers, the argument of the appendix can be reconstructed as follows. The difficulty initially presented by Parmenides (155e4-8) is recognized as such by Aristotle: If the one is as it was previously presented, it sometimes partakes of being and sometimes does not. All absurd consequences that are said to follow from this assumption are accepted without resistance (155e8-156b8). However, as soon as Parmenides makes the point that a switch from motion to rest or from rest to motion cannot take place in one determinate time (156c1-3) Aristotle asks for clarification (156c3). Then, Aristotle assents to Parmenides’ explanation as well as to the consequences drawn from the initial claim at 156c1-3. By “inferring” the existence of a thing “out of place” (ἄτοπον), Parmenides then restates that the switch does not occur in time. Asking for clarification (156d2) Aristotle gives Parmenides the chance to describe the nature of the ἐξαιφνης (“sudden”), the description of which (156d2-156e7) is formally interrupted only once at 156e3. After Aristotle’s agreement at 156e7, Parmenides generalizes the results of the treatment of the ἐξαιφνης: what has been claimed concerning the out-of-time switch from rest to motion is said to hold for other switches as well (156e7-157b4). The successive list of switches (switch from being into ceasing-to-be, from non-being to coming-to-be, from one to many, and vice versa, from like to unlike, and vice versa, from small to large, and to equal, and vice versa) is endorsed without exception by Aristotle.

According to my reconstruction, Aristotle reacts in two ways: most of the time he agrees (e.g. ὁρθῶς at 156a1 and πάνυ γε at 156b4), whereas only on a few occasions does he ask for clarification (e.g. πῶς δῆ; at 156c3). While in the latter case Parmenides has to reformulate his previous point, in the former he feels entitled by the interlocutor’s full acceptance of his previous claim to make a further step in the argument. That is exactly what happens in the middle of the ἐξαιφνης exposition. Aristotle replies “κινδυνεύει” (156e3) to Parmenides’ presentation of the μεταξὺ nature of the extraordinary “sudden”. Parmenides takes that as an endorsement and moves straight to the conclusion of the whole argument unfolded in the appendix: “And the one, if in fact it both

rests and moves, could switch to each state – for only in this way could it be both. But in switching, it switches suddenly, and when it switches, it would be in no time at all, and just then it would be neither in motion nor at rest” (156e3-7, Gill-Ryan’s translation modified).

Considering the way Parmenides reacts, it is legitimate to take the “κινδυνεύει” as “yes, that must be so” (Fowler). Indeed, “κινδυνεύει” can be used to convey an “affirmative answer” (*LSJ* 4b). That also seems to hold true for translations like “It looks that way (Gill-Ryan), “Very likely” (Allan and Scolnicov), “Quite likely” (Chrysakopolou-Hermann), “así parece” (Santa Cruz). Considering that we are reading the dialogue and cannot detect tone of voice and that unlike πάνυ γε, “κινδυνεύει” can also mean “it might be, possibly” (*LSJ* 4b), the above translations can be read to convey reluctant acceptance. Since this word can be read with varying intonation, the question remains as to how strong Aristotle’s endorsement is supposed to be.

A close analysis of the argument preceding this response shows that Aristotle’s answer can only be read as accepting the conclusion with reluctance. This is because, unlike the scholarly majority that has tried to rescue at any cost the validity of Parmenides’ argument, I will show that it is invalid. Given the fact that ἐξαιφνης, as I will argue, is employed merely as a *deus ex machina* and therefore cannot serve as a real explanation, we should not understand Aristotle as immediately accepting the argument. That he feels forced to grant a conclusion he would rather not accept is suggested by renderings such as “Potrebbe essere vero” (Migliori) and “Il y a des chances” (Brisson). Even more reluctance is suggested by Schleiermacher’s “so mag es wohl sein”. Some interpreters go even further by relying more directly on the primary meaning of κινδυνεύω, i.e. “running a risk”. They thus translate with “c’è il rischio” (Ferrari) and “Cela risque d’être le cas”, which is the way in which Brisson renders “κινδυνεύει” at 141d3, a passage which, interestingly, also deals with the concepts of partaking in time and being in a determinate time.

If I am right that Parmenides’ argument is not valid, then we can draw several interesting conclusions. First, it suggests all occurrences of “κινδυνεύει” in the dialogue (134c3, 141d3, 142a1, 147b8, 156e3, 159a4, 161d4, 162c6) are connected with argumentative conclusions the interlocutor would rather avoid: “κινδυνεύει” seems to signalize the “danger” he runs into if the conclusion reached in the discussion turns out to be the case. Second, “κινδυνεύει” can be seen as a clue for the reader that the preceding arguments are flawed in some way. Therefore, we see that Plato intended the second part of the dialogue not as an expression of his own view, but as an exercise in dialectic.

### *Das riskante ἐξαιφνης (Parm. 156e3)*

In diesem Betrag soll die gemeinhin angenommene Gültigkeit des ἐξαιφνης-Argumentes auf Basis einer alternativen Interpretation von “κινδυνεύει” (156e3) – einem Einwortsatz des Aristoteles am Ende des sogenannten Anhangs zu der zweiten Deduktion (155e4-157b5) – infrage gestellt werden.

Nachdem die Ergebnisse der ersten Deduktion am Ende der zweiten Deduktion umgekehrt wurden, fordert Parmenides Aristoteles auf, das „dritte Ding“ zu sagen. Das, was die meisten Interpreten als einen Anhang zur zweiten (und vielleicht auch zur ersten) Deduktion betrachten, fängt mit dem immer noch kontroversen τὸ τρίτον (155e4) an und endet mit Parmenides’ Rückkehr zur ursprünglichen, positiven Hypothese, welche nun aber die Folgen für

die Anderen untersucht (157b6-7). Um die eben entstandene Schwierigkeit zu überwinden, d.h. dass kontradiktorische Prädikate dem Einen, das ist, zugehören scheinen, liefert Parmenides eine ausgefeilte Argumentation. Um deren Struktur zu zeigen, werden die Zeilen, auf die Cornford bekanntlich verzichtete, in Betracht gezogen. Eben die Antworten des Gesprächspartners sollen als Kennzeichen der logischen Argumentationsschritte dienen.

In Anbetracht der von Aristoteles gegebenen Antworten kann die Argumentation des Anhangs wie folgt interpretiert werden: Die von Parmenides dargelegte Schwierigkeit (155e4-8) wird als solche von Aristoteles angenommen: Wenn das Eine, das ist, so ist, wie es zuvor beschrieben wurde, dann hat es manchmal Anteil und manchmal keinen Anteil am Sein. Während alle absurden Folgen, die sich aus dieser Annahme ergeben, ohne Widerstand akzeptiert werden (155e8-156b8), fragt Aristoteles nach (156c3), als Parmenides erklärt, dass der Wechsel von Bewegung zur Ruhe und von Ruhe zur Bewegung zu keinem bestimmten Zeitpunkt stattfinden kann (156c1-3). Danach stimmt Aristoteles sowohl Parmenides' sukzessiver Erklärung als auch den aus der ursprünglichen Behauptung in 156c1-3 resultierenden Folgen zu. Nachdem Parmenides die Existenz eines „an keinem Platz befindlichen“ (ἄτοπον) Dinges abgeleitet hat (156d1), legt er erneut dar, dass der Wechsel zu keinem Zeitpunkt stattfinden kann. Die Nachfrage des Aristoteles (156d2) gibt Parmenides Gelegenheit, sich in der Beschreibung der außerordentlichen Beschaffenheit des ἐξαίφνης („plötzlich“) zu ergehen, welche nur einmal, nämlich in 156e3, unterbrochen wird. Nach Aristoteles' Zustimmung in 156e7 verallgemeinert Parmenides die Ergebnisse der Behandlung über das ἐξαίφνης: Das, was für den außerzeitlichen Wechsel von Ruhe zu Bewegung festgelegt wurde, gelte es auch für die restlichen Wechsel (156e7-157b4). Die daraus folgende Liste von Wechseln (Wechsel vom Sein zum Nicht-Sein, vom Nicht-Sein zum Werden, vom Eins zum Vielen und umgekehrt, vom Ähnlichen zum Unähnlichen und umgekehrt, vom Kleinen zum Großen sowie zum Gleichen und umgekehrt) wird von Aristoteles ausnahmslos bestätigt.

Wie man sieht, reagiert Aristoteles auf zweierlei Art und Weise: Meistens stimmt er zu, wie zum Beispiel in 156a1 (ὀρθῶς) und in 156b4 (πάννυ γε), und nur selten fragt er nach, wie zum Beispiel in 156c3 (πῶς δῆ;). Während Parmenides im letzteren Fall seinen Gedankengang neu finden muss, entnimmt er im vorangegangenen Fall aus der vollen Zustimmung seines Gesprächspartners zu der zuvor aufgestellten Behauptung die Berechtigung, einen zusätzlichen argumentativen Schritt zu machen. Genau dies geschieht während der Darlegung des ἐξαίφνης: Auf Parmenides' Darstellung der μεταξὺ-Beschaffenheit des außerordentlichen „Plötzlichen“ antwortet Aristoteles „κινδυνεύει“ (156e3). Parmenides nimmt es als Zustimmung und geht direkt zur Schlussfolgerung der ganzen, im Anhang enthaltenen Argumentation über: „Auch das Eine also, wenn es ruht und auch sich bewegt, muss von einem zum andern wechseln; denn nur so kann es beides tun. Wechselt es, so wechselt es im Plötzlichen, sodass, indem es wechselt, es in gar keiner Zeit ist und alsdann weder sich bewegt noch ruht.“ (156e3-7, Schleiermachers modifizierte Übersetzung).

Parmenides' Reaktion wegen ist es legitim, „κινδυνεύει“ mit „yes, that must be so“ (Fowler) wiederzugeben, da „κινδυνεύει“ gebraucht werden kann, um eine „affirmative answer“ (LSJ 4b) zu vermitteln. Das gilt auch für Übersetzungen wie „It looks that way“ (Gill-Ryan), „Very likely“ (Allan and Scolnicov), „Quite likely“ (Chrysakopolou-Hermann), „así parece“ (Santa Cruz). Unter der Berücksichtigung, dass man den Dialog liest, d.h. dass man die Artikulierung nicht aufdecken kann, und dass „κινδυνεύει“ – anders als πάννυ γε – auch „it might be, possibly“ (LSJ 4b) bedeutet, bleibt bezüglich der erwähnten Übersetzungen die Frage offen, wie stark Aristoteles' Zustimmung sei.



Durch eine sorgfältige Untersuchung des Argumentes, welches Aristoteles' Antwort vorangeht, soll gezeigt werden, dass er seine Zustimmung nur widerwillig gibt. Es soll dafür argumentiert werden, dass, anders als die Mehrheit der Interpreten behauptet, die Gültigkeit von Parmenides' Argument fragwürdig erscheint. Da das *ἐξάιφνης* lediglich ein *deus ex machina* und keine eigentliche Erklärung darstellt, plädiert dieser Beitrag dafür, dass Aristoteles keine uneingeschränkte Zustimmung erteilt. Dass er sich gezwungen fühlt, einen Schluss zu billigen, den er lieber nicht akzeptieren würde, wird von Widergaben wie „Potrebbe essere vero“ (Migliori), „so mag es wohl sein“ (Schleiermacher) und „Il y a des chances“ (Brisson) suggeriert. Einige Interpreten gehen noch weiter, indem sie sich auf die ursprüngliche Bedeutung von *κινδυνεύω*, d.h. „das Risiko eingehen“, beziehen und mit „c'è il rischio“ (Ferrari) und „Cela risque d'être le cas“ übersetzen. Den letztgenannten Ausdruck wählt Brisson für das „κινδυνεύει“ in 141d3, also an einer Stelle, die interessanterweise ebenfalls die Teilhabe an der Zeit und das Sein zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt thematisiert.

Wenn Parmenides' Argumentation nicht gültig ist, dann ergeben sich interessante Konsequenzen. Zunächst weist eine solche Ungültigkeit der Argumentation darauf hin, dass alle Fälle, in denen „κινδυνεύει“ im Dialog vorkommt (134c3, 141d3, 142a1, 147b8, 156e3, 159a4, 161d4, 162c6), mit argumentativen Schlussfolgerungen verbunden sind, die der Gesprächspartner lieber vermeiden würde. Mit anderen Worten scheint „κινδυνεύει“ das „Risiko“ zu verdeutlichen, welches er eingehen würde, wenn der Schluss der Fall sein sollte. Auch für den Leser kann „κινδυνεύει“ als Hinweis betrachtet werden, dass die vorhergehenden Argumentationen in gewisser Weise unzulässig seien. Somit werden wir Leser aufgefordert, den zweiten Teil des Dialoges nicht als Platons eigene Stellungnahme, sondern als dialektische Übung zu deuten.

*The Argument of Zeno at Parmenides 127e1-8 to which Socrates Responds*

**Introduction**

My goal in this essay is to understand Zeno's argument summarized by Socrates at *Parmenides* 127e against the thesis that beings are many (*ei polla esti ta onta* (127e1-2)).

We do not have in the *Parmenides* Zeno's direct statement of his argument: We have only Socrates' summary of it, to which Zeno agrees.

If beings are many, then they must be both like and unlike, but that is impossible: for unlikes can't be likes, nor likes unlikes? . . . If they were many, they would suffer impossibilities (*paschoi an ta adunata*)? (127e1-8).

Three features of this argument make it particularly challenging for an interpreter: (i) Socrates' summary does not provide details to fill the gap to explain the inference from: "beings are many" to "they are both like and unlike." (ii) Zeno gave his argument in order to defend the thesis of Parmenides that everything is one by attacking its opposite. But Parmenides' thesis was unclear, so Zeno's defense is unclear. (iii) Zeno says his argument belongs to a genre of youthful competition, so we are uncertain how much validity we can expect of that argument.

I emphasize that my goal is to understand the argument that the character Socrates of Plato's *Parmenides* reports and to which he reacts. That is different from the goal of identifying precisely any argument that the historical Zeno might have given.

My essay is a step toward a further goal of illuminating Socrates' spontaneous reaction to Zeno's argument. By "the spontaneous reaction" I mean the reaction that Socrates has before Parmenides begins to question Socrates. Socrates' spontaneous reaction has three stages: first, he twice summarizes Zeno's argument (127e1-4; 127e6-8) and gets Zeno's agreement to the summary; second, he makes two objections (128e8-129b1); third, he challenges Zeno (129b1-c3 and 129d6-130a1) to give the same sort of argument about forms, thus implying that Zeno will not be able to do that.

I strongly distinguish Socrates' spontaneous reaction to Zeno's argument from the many additional proposals to which Socrates gives his assent as he answers Parmenides' questions from 130b1-135a. Plato signals the importance of Socrates' spontaneous reaction: Zeno and Parmenides admire Socrates' reaction (130a-b); Parmenides later commends Socrates for a special insight (135c: *μοι δοκεῖς καὶ μᾶλλον ἠσθῆσθαι*). His commendation must refer to Socrates' spontaneous contribution.

Clearly, to understand Socrates' spontaneous reaction – his summary of Zeno, his objections, and his challenge -- it is important to understand the argument of Zeno to which Socrates reacts.

Toward my immediate goal I consider several interpretations or reconstructions of Zeno's argument.

### **Part I. Interpretations that Take Zeno’s Target to be the Numerical Supposition**

I consider briefly three different reconstructions that belong to a very large family. The reconstructions in that family propose that the supposition that Zeno targets for attack – *ei polla esti ta onta*—is the supposition that the count of beings is one. I call this the “numerical target.”

From this family I consider (i) the interpretation of J. Barnes, (ii) the second of two interpretations proposed by D. El Murr, and (iii) the interpretation of R.E. Allen.

In order to clarify each reconstruction I present it as a list of sentences that are steps of the argument. Providing such explicit small steps of each argument facilitates understanding of and comparison among the reconstructions.

Each reconstruction speculatively supplies some unstated premises in order to make clearer the inferential steps that arrive at Zeno’s result that beings, if many, are both like and unlike.

### **Part II: Interpretations that Take Zeno’s Target as the Multi-Attribute Supposition**

I consider two interpretations/reconstructions of the argument that propose that the supposition that Zeno targets for attack is the thesis that beings are many in the sense that --as we would put it-- beings have many attributes. (E.g. Socrates is many in that Socrates is young and Socrates is a man.) I call this supposition the “multi-attribute target.” D. Lee and A. Nehamas give these interpretations. To clarify the reconstructions of Lee and Nehamas I set out each reconstructed argument as a list of sentences that are steps in the argument. I observe some features that these reconstructions share with Allen’s interpretation discussed in Part I.

### **Part III. An Improved Reconstruction**

I offer an improved interpretation. It belongs in the family of reconstructions that have a numerical target.

### **Part IV. Defense of the Improved Reconstruction**

- B. I note some possibly relevant evidence from outside the *Parmenides*: (i) Proclus’ report of ancient arguments against Parmenides; (ii) the fragments of one of Zeno’s arguments against plurality; (iii) Plato’s presentation in the *Sophist* of an argument against the Eleatic ‘one being’.
- C. I offer a new understanding of the role of Socrates’ question (127e 3-4): “For are neither the unlikes such as to be likes nor the likes unlikes?  
(οὔτε γὰρ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια οὔτε τὰ ὅμοια ἀνόμοια οἷόν τε εἶναι;)
- D. I show how my improved reconstruction takes account of details that the reconstructions discussed in Part I and Part II took special care to accommodate. For example:
  - a. Zeno would not have made a simple mistake. (Allen, Nehamas).
  - b. Socrates mentions forms in his spontaneous objection to Zeno’s argument. (Allen: Socrates’ response is “metaphysical”, so Zeno’s argument must be “metaphysical”)
  - c. Zeno implies that if beings are many, Socrates is many. (Nehamas, Lee)
  - d. In his spontaneous objection Socrates says that it results from Zeno’s supposition that beings are many that beings would be (128a8-129a1) “unlike to themselves” (Nehamas)

I conclude that my improved interpretation/reconstruction of the argument of Zeno's to which Socrates gives his spontaneous reaction is more successful than the other reconstructions discussed here.

## *L'argument de Zénon à Parménide 127e1-8 auquel répond Socrate*

### **Introduction**

Mon but dans cet essai est de comprendre l'argument de Zénon résumé par Socrate à *Parménide* 127e contre la thèse selon laquelle les êtres sont plusieurs (*ei polla esti ta onta*).

Nous n'avons pas dans le *Parménide* la déclaration directe de Zénon de son argumentation: nous n'en avons que le résumé de Socrate, auquel Zénon est d'accord.

Si les êtres sont multiples, alors ils doivent être à la fois semblables et dissemblables, mais cela est impossible, car les dissemblables ne peuvent pas être semblables ni les semblables dissemblables? . . . S'ils étaient multiples, ils subiraient des impossibilités (*paschoi an ta adunata*)? (127e1-8).

Trois caractéristiques de cet argument le rendent particulièrement difficile pour un interprète: (i) le résumé de Socrate ne fournit pas de détails pour remplir le vide afin d'expliquer l'inférence de: «les êtres sont multiples» à «ils sont à la fois semblables et dissemblables.» (ii) Zénon a donné son argument pour défendre la thèse de Parménide que tout est un en attaquant son opposé. Mais la thèse de Parménide n'était pas claire, donc la défense de Zénon n'est pas claire. (iii) Zénon dit que son argument appartient à un genre de compétition de jeunesse, nous ne savons donc pas combien de validité nous pouvons attendre de cet argument.

J'insiste sur le fait que mon objectif est de comprendre l'argument que rapporte le personnage de Socrate du *Parménide* et auquel il réagit. Cela est différent du but d'identifier précisément un argument que le Zénon historique aurait pu donner.

Mon essai est un pas de plus vers l'objectif d'éclairer la réaction spontanée de Socrate à l'argument de Zénon. Par «la réaction spontanée», j'indique la réaction de Socrate avant que Parménide commence à interroger Socrate. La réaction spontanée de Socrate se déroule en trois étapes: premièrement, il résume à deux reprises l'argument de Zénon (127e1-4; 127e6-8) et obtient l'accord de Zénon sur le résumé; deuxièmement, il fait deux objections (128e8-129b1); troisièmement, il défie Zénon (129b1-c3 et 129d6-130a1) de donner le même type d'argument sur les formes, impliquant ainsi que Zénon ne sera pas capable de le faire.

Je distingue fortement la réaction spontanée de Socrate à l'argument de Zénon des nombreuses propositions additionnelles auxquelles Socrate donne son consentement quand il répond aux questions de Parménide du 130b1-135a. Platon signale l'importance de la réaction spontanée de Socrate: Zénon et Parménide admirent la réaction de Socrate (130a-b); plus tard Parménide félicite Socrate pour une perspicacité spéciale (135c: *μοι δοκεῖς καὶ μᾶλλον ἡσθησθαι*). Son éloge doit faire référence à la contribution spontanée de Socrate.

Clairement, pour comprendre la réaction spontanée de Socrate - son résumé de Zénon, ses objections et son défi - il est important de comprendre l'argument de Zénon auquel Socrate réagit.

Pour atteindre mon objectif immédiat, j'examine plusieurs interprétations ou reconstitutions de l'argument de Zénon.

## **Partie I. Les interprétations qui considèrent que la cible de Zénon est la supposition numérique**

Je considère brièvement trois reconstructions différentes appartenant à une très grande famille. Les reconstructions dans cette famille proposent que le cible de l'attaque de Zénon - *ei polla esti ta onta* - est la supposition que le compte des êtres est un. J'appelle cela «la cible numérique.»

De cette famille, je considère (i) l'interprétation de J. Barnes, (ii) la deuxième des deux interprétations proposées par D. El Murr et (iii) l'interprétation de R.E. Allen.

A fin de clarifier chaque reconstruction je la présente comme une liste de phrases qui sont les étapes de l'argument. Fournir de tels petits pas explicites de chaque argument facilite la compréhension et la comparaison entre les reconstructions.

Chaque reconstruction fournit de manière spéculative des prémisses non déclarés afin de rendre plus claires les pas inférentielles qui aboutissent au résultat de Zénon, à savoir que les êtres, s'ils sont multiples, sont à la fois semblables et dissemblables.

## **Partie II: Interprétations prenant la cible de Zénon comme supposition multi-attributs**

Je considère deux interprétations / reconstructions de l'argument qui proposent que le cible de Zénon est la thèse que les êtres sont multiples dans le sens où - comme nous le dirions - les êtres ont de nombreux attributs. (Par exemple, Socrate est multiple dans la mesure où Socrate est jeune et Socrate est un homme). J'appelle cette supposition la «cible multi-attributs». D. Lee et A. Nehamas donnent ces interprétations. Afin de clarifier les reconstructions de Lee et de Nehamas je présente chaque argument reconstruit comme une liste de phrases qui constituent des pas dans l'argument. J'observe certaines caractéristiques que ces reconstructions partagent avec l'interprétation d'Allen discutée dans la partie I.

## **Partie III. Une reconstruction améliorée**

Je propose une interprétation améliorée. Il appartient à la famille des reconstructions qui ont une cible numérique.

## **Partie IV. Défense de la reconstruction améliorée**

A. Je note des éléments provenant de l'extérieur du *Parménide* peut-être pertinents à notre recherche: (i) la rapport de Proclus des arguments antiques contre Parménide; (ii) les fragments d'un des arguments de Zénon contre la pluralité; (iii) la présentation de Platon dans le *Sophiste* d'un argument contre «l'être unique» élatique.

B. J'offre une nouvelle interprétation du rôle de la question de Socrate (127e 3-4):

«Car ni les dissemblables ne peuvent être semblables ni les semblables dissemblables?» (οὐτε γὰρ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια οὐτε τὰ ὅμοια ἀνόμοια οἷόν τε εἶναι;)

C. Je montre comment ma reconstruction améliorée explique les détails que les reconstructions discutés dans les parties I et II ont pris soin de prendre en compte. Par exemple:

a. Zénon n'aurait pas fait une simple erreur. (Allen, Nehamas).

b. Socrate mentionne des formes dans son objection spontanée à l'argument de Zénon. (Allen: la réponse de Socrate est «métaphysique», donc l'argument de Zénon doit être «métaphysique».)

c. Zénon implique que si les êtres sont multiple, donc Socrate est multiple. (Nehamas, Lee)

d. Dans son objection spontanée, Socrate dit qu'il résulte de la supposition de Zénon que les êtres sont multiples, que les êtres seraient (128a8-129a1) «dissemblables d'eux-mêmes» (Nehamas).

Je conclus que mon interprétation / reconstruction améliorée de l'argument de Zénon auquel Socrate donne sa réaction spontanée a plus de succès que les autres reconstructions discutés ici.

### *The Parmenides' 'Greatest Difficulty' and the Origins of Stoic Metaphysics*

In the last few decades scholars have progressively shown that Plato's dialogues strongly contributed to the formulation of fundamental tenets of Stoic philosophy (e.g. F. Ademollo, 'The Platonic Origins of Stoic Theology', *OSAPh* 43 (2012), 217-43; A.G. Long, ed., *Plato and the Stoics*, Cambridge 2013). In this stream of studies, the influence from certain passages of Plato's *Parmenides* has been detected (e.g. P. Scade, 'Plato and the Stoics on Limits, Parts, and Wholes', in Long 2013, 80-105). In this paper I will show that a specific passage of the dialogue, the so-called 'greatest difficulty' (133b4-134e8), is likely to have strongly contributed not only to the Stoics' rejection of forms, but also – and above all – to their doctrine of genera, which represents the core of their metaphysics. This has a specific pay-off, for in this case the Stoics would have appealed to Plato's text in order to undermine the Academics' argument against the knowability of perceptible objects.

The first part of the paper will be devoted to the analysis of the 'greatest difficulty' (see esp. S. Peterson, 'The Greatest Difficulty for Plato's Theory of Forms: the Unknowability Argument of *Parmenides* 133c-134c', *Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie* 63 (1981), 1-16; M.L. McPherran, 'Plato's Reply to the 'Worst Difficulty Argument of the *Parmenides*: *Sophist* 248a-249d', in A. Preus, J.P. Anton, eds, *Plato. Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy III*, Albany, New York 1989, 227-46). Of course the main point made by Parmenides is that separation makes knowledge impossible, for we are only acquainted with the objects 'around us' and hence have no access to the forms. However, according to my analysis of the argument, both Parmenides and Socrates commit themselves to a series of tenets which at the same time undermine separation and potentially represent the boundaries of a different metaphysical model. More specifically, I shall show that the passage posits the following ideas:

1. Each thing 'around us' is material, or at least pertains to the material world – as opposed to the forms.
2. Each material thing is what it is, and is knowable as it is, inasmuch as it is an individual (133d2-5).
3. Each material thing must have some transitory dispositions, whose cause is nonetheless ascribed to certain forms by Socrates' doctrine. Indeed, while Parmenides complains that we cannot have access to the beautiful itself (134b14-c2), he also implies that we can get acquainted with beautiful things, etc., although separation will prevent us from really grasping the origin of these dispositions.
4. Each thing has specific transitory relationships with other individual things (133d7-134a2).

Just to be clear, in my view a more experienced 'Platonic' spokesman would have objected to 2 that there *must* be a superior, immaterial cause in order for any individual object to be what it is and to have certain qualities. However – and this is the point Parmenides makes, and which Socrates is unable to refute – separation apparently undermines the efficacy of this superior cause

and would have dangerous consequences from both an ontological and an epistemological point of view. First, separation would theoretically deprive each individual object and its (both absolute and relative) dispositions of autonomous existence, but then separated forms would not be able to be the causes of the objects and their dispositions. In other words, forms would be required to have an efficacy they cannot have. Second, by positing separate and inaccessible causes for beings being what they are, separation makes it impossible to have any proper knowledge of both the separate universals and material individuals. All in all, then, the ‘greatest difficulty’ establishes the exigency to produce a metaphysical model rejecting separation, complying with assumptions 1-4, and ensuring both ontological consistency and epistemological efficacy.

In the second part of the paper I shall argue that Stoic metaphysics accepts and exploits Parmenides’ challenge. More specifically, I shall show that the four assumptions indicated above each pave the way to one of the Stoic genera (see *Long & Sedley* 28-29):

1. Parmenides clearly radicalises the opposition between the ‘two worlds’, and one of the key features distinguishing forms from what is around us is the material constitution of the latter, representing the common substance of all things (in Stoic terms).
2. The Stoics’ second genre complies with Parmenides and Socrates’ assumption that each individual object is shaped according to qualities which specifically pertain to it and do not depend on any universal. It maintains that everything contains some kind of *common quality* (e.g. being ‘man’; 133d7-e3), but is what it is because of its specific and *proper quality*, which determines its existence and are the proper reasons allowing it to be object of any cognitive act (134a6-b2). This means that the rejection of separation must not only deprive universals of any (either immanent or transcendent) existence, but more specifically ascribe proper existence only to individuals as uniquely qualified items.
3. The Stoics understood that the (often transitory) dispositions of a thing must also be accounted for in its metaphysical constitution, but that nevertheless they are not part of its distinctive qualities. Therefore, these dispositions too are led back to each individual as the third genre.
4. Consistently with Parmenides’ emphasis on the fact that the relationship between a slave and his master is a relative one, the Stoics reserve for relative dispositions a specific genre, namely the fourth.

Briefly, the theoretical core of Parmenides’ ‘greatest difficulty’ seems to dictate the agenda of Stoic metaphysics. Moreover, the passage hints at further puzzles which subsist if one keeps separation (according to Parmenides’ version, of course) and which are solved by Stoic metaphysics. First, Parmenides objects that separation deprives the names of things around us of their efficacy (133c8-d5). Not only do the Stoics posit a strict correspondence between nature and names (e.g. *SVF* II 146), but they also think that both common and proper names designate related ‘concepts’, meaning that objects can be involved in any reasoning (e.g. *SVF* II 183 and III D22 – on Diogenes of Babylon). Second, the Stoics are able to comply with the exigency of providing God with perfect knowledge of the world (134c10-e8), and in order to make this possible it is necessary not only to reject the separation of God himself, but also to regard each individual as being directly related to him. Finally – and most importantly – Stoic metaphysics solve the difficulty in question by rejecting the impossibility of knowledge: by excluding universals from the range of existing things and focussing on individuals, Stoic metaphysics allows human knowledge.

This last point leads to the historiographical pay-off of this narrative. It is widely acknowledged that Stoic metaphysics is structured in such a way as to dismiss the Academic idea



that it is impossible to have cognition of the particulars around us, and more specifically the Academic ‘growing argument’. If my reading is correct, the Stoics based their response to Plato’s heirs on Plato’s own (apparent) self-criticism of separation.

Therefore, in construing their metaphysics, the Stoics took Plato’s *Parmenides*’ as a crucial reference point, just as they founded their materialist theory of principles on the idea, expressed in the *Sophist*, that being is that which can act and be acted upon (*SVFI* 90 and II 363).

### *La ‘difficoltà più grande’ del Parmenide e le origini della metafisica stoica*

Nelle ultime decadi alcune ricerche hanno progressivamente mostrato che i dialoghi di Platone contribuirono in modo significativo alla formulazione di elementi teorici centrali della filosofia stoica (ad es. F. Ademollo, ‘The Platonic Origins of Stoic Theology’, *OSAPh* 43 (2012), 217-43; A.G. Long, ed., *Plato and the Stoics*, Cambridge 2013), e in tale cornice un qualche ruolo è stato attribuito anche ad alcuni passi del *Parmenide* (e.g. P. Scade, ‘Plato and the Stoics on Limits, Parts, and Wholes’, in Long 2013, 80-105). In questo *paper* voglio sostenere che un passo specifico del dialogo, ovvero la ‘difficoltà più grande’ (133b4-134e8), non solo contiene le basi per il rifiuto delle forme da parte degli Stoici, ma propone assunti centrali alla base della metafisica degli Stoici e della loro dottrina dei generi. Il guadagno di una simile conclusione è evidente se si considera che gli Stoici avrebbero così utilizzato il testo Platonico per costruire la loro risposta all’obiezione accademica circa la possibilità di conoscere i sensibili.

La prima parte del *paper* sarà dedicata all’analisi della ‘Difficoltà’ (su cui cfr. ad es. S. Peterson, ‘The Greatest Difficulty for Plato’s Theory of Forms: the Unknowability Argument of *Parmenides* 133c-134c’, *Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie* 63 (1981), 1-16; M.L. McPherran, ‘Plato’s Reply to the ‘Worst Difficulty Argument of the *Parmenides*: *Sophist* 248a-249d’, in A. Preus, J.P. Anton, eds, *Plato. Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy III*, Albany, New York 1989, 227-46). Come noto, il cuore dell’obiezione di Parmenide consiste nel mostrare che la separazione delle idee rende impossibile la conoscenza, poiché è possibile avere accesso solo agli oggetti della realtà ‘attorno a noi’ e non invece alle forme separate. Tuttavia, la mia analisi mira a mostrare che, nel corso dell’argomento, Parmenide e Socrate convergono su una serie di posizioni che non solo minano la dottrina delle idee, ma possono anche rappresentare le basi teoriche per un nuovo e differente modello metafisico. Più in particolare, dimostrerò che l’argomento stabilisce i seguenti punti:

1. ogni oggetto ‘intorno a noi’ è materiale, o almeno appartiene al mondo materiale – come opposto a quello delle idee;
2. ogni oggetto materiale è ciò che è, ed è conoscibile per come è, in quanto è un oggetto particolare, dotato di specifiche qualità (133d2-5).
3. ogni oggetto materiale deve avere delle disposizioni transitorie, la cui causa, nella dottrina di Socrate, è identificata nelle idee. In effetti, nel momento in cui Parmenide segnala che non si può avere accesso conoscitivo al ‘bello in sé’ (134b14-c2), egli implica che è possibile avere accesso alle ‘cose belle’ ma non all’idea che le rende tali, poiché la separazione lo impedisce.

4. ogni oggetto particolare possiede specifiche relazioni transitorie con altri oggetti particolari (133d7-134a2).

A mio avviso un più maturo difensore della dottrina platonica avrebbe probabilmente obiettato a '2' che – e spiegato perché – la presenza di cause separate e immateriali è in ogni caso necessaria. E tuttavia – secondo l'obiezione di Parmenide, che Socrate non è qui in grado di superare – in questo contesto dialettico la separazione mina le fondamenta dell'efficacia di tali cause, il che produce conseguenze pericolose di ordine ontologico ed epistemologico. Da un lato, la separazione priva gli oggetti particolari e le loro disposizioni qualitative (proprie e relative) di autosufficienza ontologica, ma al contempo le forme separate – secondo l'argomento di Parmenide – non sarebbero in grado di essere cause dei particolari e delle loro qualità: in altri termini, alle idee è attribuita una funzione che poi esse non sono in grado di svolgere a causa della loro separazione. Dall'altro, è proprio la separazione delle idee, associata alla loro funzione, a rendere paradossalmente impossibile non solo la conoscenza delle idee, ma anche quella degli oggetti particolari. Da tutto ciò segue che la 'Difficoltà' stabilisce l'esigenza di produrre un modello teorico in grado di rifiutare la separazione, soddisfare le condizioni 1-4, e assicurare sia coerenza ontologica che efficacia epistemologica.

Su queste basi, nella seconda parte del *paper* dimostrerò che la metafisica stoica accetta e sviluppa positivamente la sfida di Parmenide. In particolare, indicherò che le posizioni 1-4 preparano la formulazione dei quattro generi stoici (*Long & Sedley* 28-29):

1. Parmenide radicalizza l'opposizione tra i due 'mondi', e uno degli aspetti centrali che distinguono le forme dai particolari è la costituzione materiale dei secondi: in termini stoici, la materialità è la sostanza comune di tutte le cose.
2. Il secondo genere stoico soddisfa e sviluppa la condizione, posta da Parmenide e Socrate, per cui ogni particolare è caratterizzato da qualità che gli appartengono. Esso considera che ogni cosa ha una qualità comune (ad es., essere uomo: 133d7-e3), ma implica anche che ogni cosa è ciò che è solo grazie alla sua qualità propria, che determina la sua esistenza e gli consente di essere l'oggetto di un atto conoscitivo specifico (134a6-b2). Ciò significa che il rifiuto della separazione non solo priva gli universali di qualsiasi esistenza autonoma (immanente o trascendente), ma attribuisce anche un'esistenza reale solo ai particolari in quanto oggetti individualmente qualificati.
3. Gli Stoici inoltre colsero che le disposizioni (spesso transitorie) di un oggetto devono essere spiegate all'interno della costituzione metafisica dell'oggetto stesso, ma devono al contempo essere distinte dalle sue qualità individuali: sono queste le disposizioni che vengono ricondotte al terzo genere.
4. Coerentemente con l'insistenza di Parmenide sul fatto che la relazione schiavo-padrone è relativa, gli Stoici collocano le disposizioni relative in un genere specifico, il quarto.

Dunque, il nucleo teorico della 'Difficoltà' sembra dettare l'agenda dell'elaborazione della metafisica stoica. Inoltre, il passo in questione fa riferimento a ulteriori difficoltà che sussistono (secondo Parmenide) se si ammette la separazione e che sono invece risolte dal modello stoico. In primo luogo, Parmenide obietta che la separazione rende impossibile un'efficace relazione tra nomi e cose (133c8-d5), una relazione che invece gli Stoici ponevano in modo stretto (e.g. *SVF* II 146), stabilendo inoltre che nomi comuni e propri designano relativi 'concetti', che consentono a loro volta di produrre ragionamenti sulle cose (e.g. *SVF* II 183 e III D22 – su Diogene di Babilonia). In secondo luogo, gli Stoici riescono a soddisfare l'esigenza di attribuire al Dio una perfetta conoscenza del cosmo (enunciata a 134c10-e8): per farlo, è necessario non solo rifiutare la separazione del Dio

stesso, ma anche considerare i particolari come direttamente legati ad esso. Infine, la metafisica stoica risolve la difficoltà relativa alla possibilità della conoscenza: privando gli universali di esistenza e causalità e insistendo sul ruolo dei particolari, la metafisica stoica garantisce all'uomo la possibilità della conoscenza.

Quest'ultimo punto conduce a considerare il guadagno storiografico della mia ricostruzione. Come noto, la metafisica stoica è concepita in modo tale da rifiutare l'idea Accademica per cui è impossibile avere conoscenza del mondo di particolari che ci circonda, idea basata sul cosiddetto 'growing argument'. Se la mia lettura è corretta, gli Stoici fondarono la loro risposta agli eredi di Platone su un passo di (apparente) autocritica dello stesso Platone.

Per concludere, nel costruire la loro metafisica gli Stoici considerarono il *Parmenide* come un riferimento cruciale, proprio come basarono la loro teoria dei principi materiali sull'idea, espressa nel *Sofista*, per cui essere è ciò che è capace di agire e patire (*SVFI* 90 and II 363).

### *Parmenides on Trial: Infinite difficulties and one challenge*

In Plato's *Parmenides* the reader faces a fictional Parmenides who, in the second half of his exercise, treads the very path which, according to the poem of the historical philosopher, is utterly inscrutable (*παναπευθέα*, Parm. 2, 6).

This puzzling, yet fundamental observation is the starting point for the following claim: The *Parmenides* represents an invitation to examine critically Eleatic philosophy, which is of central importance to Plato, by revealing some of its difficulties. In light of this assumption, Plato's masterstroke is to choose the initiator of Parmenidean thought to first question it himself, and to undertake this by the means of his own student Zeno, the 'Eleatic Palamedes' (Phdr. 261d6). For the exercise is explicitly (Prm. 135d8) based on Zeno's method and can be considered a consistent further development of the same.

This interpretation presents at least two advantages: firstly, it offers a possible explanation why in light of the theory of forms the hypotheses contain many problems which have been revealed by earlier studies (e.g. a tendency to reification; Ferrari 2004): The Platonic Parmenides is certainly inspired and positively influenced by young Socrates' ideas, but he naturally starts from his own assumptions (on which Plato recognisably draws, if only selectively and quite freely), not from a fully worked out theory of forms. Secondly, the ambivalent references to the historical Parmenides in Plato's other works can successfully be connected to this understanding. A Parmenides who challenges his own claims does indeed possess "an absolutely noble depth of mind" (*βάθος τι ... παντάπασι γενναῖον*, Tht. 184a1), but at the same time, as the exercise shows, his thought presents "infinite difficulties" (*ἀπεράντους ἀπορίας*, Tht. 245d12).

The paper is divided into two main sections. In the first, introductory section I shed light on the particular way in which the subsequent exercise is characterised in the first part of the dialogue; in the second section, I concentrate on a more in-depth analysis of the second half of the exercise (from Prm. 160b5).

The first part of the *Parmenides* contains some clear signs which warn the reader against considering the second half as something like an original philosophical approach. In the first place, the transmission of the narrative occurs explicitly through Zeno's students whom philosophy does not take hold of in the same way as Parmenides correctly foresees for Socrates (130e2–3). This is especially evident in the character of Antiphon – the last heir of this transmission line – who as an adult turns away from philosophy. Equally conspicuous are, in the second place, the many allusions to the context of competition, for example: (i) the reason for the Eleatics' visit in Athens, the Panathenaic Games (127a8); (ii) Zeno's contentiousness (*φιλονικία*, 128d7,e2; cf. Phd. 91a3) in contradicting (*ἀντιλέγειν*, d2); (iii) the notion of *γυμνασία* itself which refers to an athletic or rhetorical 'combat exercise' (vgl. Tht. 169c1, Lg. 830d7), similarly (iv) the term *ἀδολεσχία* which in the *Sophist*, together with sophistic art itself, is called a species of eristic (Sph. 225d10). A further manifest contrast to the philosophical ascent in the historical Parmenides' poem – and also to the chariot of the soul in the *Phaedrus* – is achieved by the double mention of horses: Parmenides

identifies himself with a horse which is afraid of the race in a poem by Ibycus (136a9–137a4, vgl. Ibyc. 2 Bergk) and Antiphon professionally works with horses (the bridle, χαλινός, in 127a2 being often associated with battle in Greek literature, cf. Pi. O. 13, 66; S. OC 1068; A. Th. 124). These clues are altogether too strong to be simply ignored: what we can expect in the second part of the dialogue is not a philosophical ascent, but an exercise in *agón*.

Does therefore the scope of the second part solely consist in giving an exercise in disputation to Socrates who has proven unable to defend his claims against Parmenides? But if so, for what reason is he not chosen as interlocutor? It is my contention that it is not Socrates, but Parmenides himself who is on trial in this exercise which follows the pattern of Zeno's method and which therefore, from the start, does not aim at a positive result (128d4–6). Against this background the second half of the hypotheses (εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἓν, 160b5) in which the philosopher treads a path forbidden to him proves to be especially interesting. The section opens with a striking self-referential question (Τίς οὖν ἂν εἴη αὕτη ἢ ὑπόθεσις;, 160b6–7) which invites a closer consideration. I will focus on two aspects in this part of the paper: as is known (cf. recently Wellmann 2016) the first deduction of the second hypothesis contains a surprising turning point in which some form of being is assigned to the One if it is not, because it requires being as a bond (δεσμός, 162a4) for its not-being. This turning point is reached by introducing the notion of truth. But is this a necessary and convincing step in the argument? And can this passage be interpreted as a first attempt to open Parmenidean thought to correction or even as a preparation for the *Sophist*? In any case this passage, for Parmenides, is a striking concession. The last two deductions of the second hypothesis which consider the consequences for the Others if the One is not (from 164b5) have received considerably less attention. The first of these depicts in an impressive way the nightmare (ὡσπερ ὄναρ ἐν ὕπνῳ, 164d2) of a world of mere shadow paintings (ἔσκιαγραφημένα, 165c7) in which no identification is possible and in which appearances suddenly (ἐξαίφνης, 164d3) change. This deduction distinguishes itself, among other things, for the considerably lower degree of abstraction in comparison to the others; it rather describes a way of experiencing the world. The last deduction, more radical than the previous, leads to the conclusion that the Others are completely bereft of their being. Parmenides resumes: “If One is not, nothing is” (ἔν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲν ἔστιν, 166c1). It seems to me that these last two deductions, in contrast to the earlier ones, do arrive at a common result: some form of unity *must* be assumed, since otherwise – independently from the adopted point of view – nothing else can be individualised. Thus, these last two deductions dismiss the reader, in the face of the revealed inner contradictions and the missing clearness of the Parmenidean conception of the One, and with the task to take it over.

The *Parmenides* is therefore neither a mere parody (Tabak 2015) – even though the text does contain parodist elements, such as Zeno's story of the theft – nor can the reciprocal and inner contradictions of the hypotheses be individually explained in terms of either the neoplatonic or modern approaches, with or without reference to the theory of forms (e.g. Miller 1986, Meinwald 1991, Schudoma 2001, Rickless 2007), nor can the meaning of the second half be reduced solely to an exercise (Ferrari 2004). Rather, the dialogue is the beginning of a proper confrontation with Eleatic philosophy which is initiated by the fictional Parmenides himself.

## *Parmenides auf dem Prüfstand: Unendliche Schwierigkeiten und eine Aufgabe*

Platons *Parmenides* konfrontiert den Leser mit einem fiktiven Parmenides, der in der zweiten Hälfte seiner Übung genau den Pfad beschreitet, der laut dem Lehrgedicht des historischen Philosophen vollständig unerkundbar ist (*παναπευθέα*, Parm. 2, 6).

Diese rätselhafte, aber grundlegende Beobachtung ist der Ausgangspunkt für folgende These: Der *Parmenides* stellt eine Einladung zur kritischen Beschäftigung mit der für Platons Ideendenken zentralen eleatischen Philosophie dar, indem er Schwierigkeiten derselben aufweist. Platons Coup besteht dabei darin, dass die Öffnung des parmenideischen Denkens für diese kritische Betrachtung durch ihren Initiator selbst und mit den Mitteln seines Schülers Zenon, des ‚eleatischen Palamedes‘ (Phdr. 261d6), erfolgt. Denn Parmenides’ Übung basiert explizit (135d8) auf Zenons Methode und ist eine konsequente Weiterentwicklung derselben.

Der Vorteil dieser Deutung liegt erstens darin, dass verständlich wird, warum der Text der Hypothesen aus Sicht der Ideenlehre viele bereits benannte Probleme präsentiert (etwa die Tendenz zur Vergegenständlichung, Ferrari 2004): Der platonische Parmenides lässt sich zwar von den Ideen des jungen Sokrates begeistern und beeinflussen, doch er geht selbstverständlich von seinen eigenen Grundlagen aus (auf die Platon in recht selektiver und freier, aber doch erkennbarer Weise zurückgreift), nicht von einer voll ausgearbeiteten Ideenlehre. Zweitens lassen sich die ambivalenten Bezugnahmen auf Parmenides im übrigen platonischen Werk gut mit dieser Deutung in Verbindung bringen. Ein Parmenides, der sich selbst herausfordert, besitzt in der Tat „eine ganz edle Tiefe des Geistes“ (*βάθος τι ... παντάπασι γενναῖον*, Tht. 184a1), doch zugleich präsentiert, wie gerade die Übung aufzeigt, sein Denken „unendliche Schwierigkeiten“ (*ἀπεράντους ἀπορίας*, Tht. 245d12).

Der Vortrag gliedert sich in zwei Abschnitte. Nachdem einleitend ein Blick auf die im ersten Teil des Dialogs gegebene Charakterisierung der Übung geworfen wird, widmet sich der folgende Teil eingehender der zweiten Hälfte der Hypothesen (ab Parm. 160b5).

Der erste Teil des *Parmenides* enthält einige deutliche Warnungen davor, im zweiten Teil so etwas wie einen eigenständigen philosophischen Ansatz zu sehen. Erstens erfolgt die Vermittlung der Erzählung ausdrücklich über Zenons Schüler, d.h. über Figuren, die nicht auf dieselbe Weise von der Philosophie ergriffen werden, wie es Parmenides für Sokrates richtig voraussagt (130e2–3). Besonders deutlich wird dies in der Gestalt des Antiphon – der letzte Erbe dieser Vermittlungslinie –, der sich als Erwachsener von der Philosophie abwendet. Ebenso auffallend sind die vielen Anspielungen auf den Kontext des Wettkampfs, zum Beispiel: (i) der Anlass des Besuches der Eleaten in Athen, die Panathenäen (127a8); (ii) Zenons Streitlust (*φιλονικία*, 128d7,e2; vgl. Phd. 91a3) beim Widersprechen (*ἀντιλέγειν*, d2); (iii) der Begriff *γυμνασία* selbst, der eine athletische oder rhetorische ‚Kampfübung‘ bezeichnet (vgl. Tht. 169c1, Lg. 830d7) sowie auch (iv) der Terminus der *ἀδολεσχία*, die im *Sophistes*, als Unterbegriff der Streitkunst, den Rang eines Schwesterbegriffs zur Sophistik belegt (Sph. 225d10). Ein augenscheinlicher Kontrast zum philosophischen Aufstieg im Lehrgedicht des historischen Parmenides – wie auch zum Seelenwagen des *Phaidros* – wird schließlich durch die zweifache Erwähnung von Pferden erzielt: Parmenides selbst identifiziert sich mit dem den Wettkampf scheuenden Pferd des Dichters Ibykus (136a9–137a4, vgl. Ibyc. 2 Bergk) und Antiphon beschäftigt sich professionell mit Pferden (wobei

das in 127a2 erwähnte Zaumzeug, χαλινός, in der Dichtung des Öfteren im Kontext des Kampfes auftritt, vgl. Pi. O. 13, 66; S. OC 1068; A. Th. 124). Diese Hinweise sind in ihrer Gesamtheit zu stark, um beiseitegelassen zu werden: Was wir im zweiten Teil des *Parmenides* zu erwarten haben, ist kein philosophischer Aufstieg, sondern eine Übung im Agon.

Verfolgt also der zweite Teil des Dialogs schlicht die Absicht, den jungen Sokrates, der seine Thesen gegenüber Parmenides nicht hinreichend verteidigen kann, im Streitgespräch zu üben? Weshalb wird er dann nicht selbst zum Gesprächspartner auserwählt? Meiner Auffassung nach steht in dieser Übung nach zenonischem Muster, die von vorne herein kein positives Ergebnis anstrebt (128d4–6), nicht Sokrates auf dem Prüfstand, sondern Parmenides selbst. Vor diesem Hintergrund erweist sich die zweite Hälfte der Hypothesen (εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἓν, 160b5), in welcher der Philosoph ihm verbotene Wege beschreitet, als besonders interessant. Der Abschnitt, der mit einer auffallenden autoreferentiellen Frage beginnt (Τίς οὖν ἂν εἴη αὐτῆ ἢ ὑπόθεσις;, 160b6–7), verdient daher eine genauere Betrachtung. Zwei Aspekte sollen gesondert untersucht werden: Bekanntermaßen (vgl. zuletzt Wellmann 2016) enthält die erste Deduktion der zweiten Hypothese einen überraschenden Wendepunkt, an welchem dem nicht-seienden Einen doch ein Sein zugesprochen werden muss, das es als „Band“ (δεσμός, 162a4) für sein Nicht-Sein benötigt. Dieser Wendepunkt erfolgt über die Einführung des Begriffs der Wahrheit. Doch handelt es sich hier um eine notwendige und überzeugende Folgerung? Und kann diese Stelle bereits als ein erster Versuch der Öffnung des parmenideischen Denkens für Korrekturen oder gar als Vorbereitung auf den *Sophistes* gedeutet werden? In jedem Fall ist diese Passage, aus dem Mund des Parmenides, ein bemerkenswertes Zugeständnis. Weniger Aufmerksamkeit haben die letzten beiden Deduktionen der zweiten Hypothese erhalten (ab 164b5), welche die Folgen für die Anderen betreffen, wenn das Eine nicht ist. Die erste der beiden beschreibt auf eindrucksvolle Weise das Bild eines Albtraums (ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἐν ὑπνῳ, 164d2): einer Welt des bloßen Scheins und der Schattenzeichnungen (ἐσκιαγραφημένα, 165c7), in der keinerlei Identifikation mehr möglich ist und in der Erscheinungen einander plötzlich (ἐξαίφνης, 164d3) ablösen. Diese Deduktion zeichnet sich unter anderem dadurch aus, dass sie einen wesentlich geringeren Grad an Abstraktheit erreicht als die übrigen; sie beschreibt vielmehr eine Weise des Welterlebens. Die letzte Deduktion, noch radikaler als die vorige, ergibt, dass auch die Anderen ihres Seins vollständig beraubt werden. Parmenides schlussfolgert: „Wenn Eines nicht ist, ist nichts“ (ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲν ἔστιν, 166c1). Mir scheint, dass diese beiden Deduktionen entgegen den früheren durchaus zu einem gemeinsamen Resultat gelangen: So etwas wie Einheit *muss* angenommen werden, weil andernfalls – unabhängig von der jeweiligen Betrachtungsweise – nichts Anderes individualisierbar ist. Es sind diese beiden letzten Deduktionen, die den Leser angesichts der aufgezeigten inneren Widersprüchlichkeit und Unklarheit der parmenideischen Konzeption des Einen mit der Aufgabe entlassen, sich ihr anzunehmen.

Der *Parmenides* ist damit weder eine reine Parodie (Tabak 2015) – obgleich sich etwa in Zenons Geschichte des Diebstahls durchaus parodistische Elemente finden – noch lassen sich die gegenseitigen und inneren Widersprüche der Hypothesen im Sinne der neuplatonischen oder auch moderner Deutungsansätze im Einzelnen ausdeuten, ob mit oder ohne Bezug auf die Ideenlehre (z.B. Miller 1986, Meinwald 1991, Schudoma 2001, Rickless 2007), noch kann die zweite Hälfte schließlich allein auf die Bedeutung einer Übung reduziert werden (Ferrari 2004): Vielmehr stellt er den Beginn einer dezidierten Auseinandersetzung mit der eleatischen Philosophie dar, die der fiktive Parmenides selbst initiiert.

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### *La deuxième partie du Parménide : identité et altérité de l'intelligible*

Quel rapport entretient la deuxième partie du *Parménide* avec la première partie ? Parménide précise que l'exercice proposé doit porter sur les « choses qui sont par excellence objets de la raison et dont on pourrait estimer que ce sont des Formes » (« περι ἐκεῖνα ἃ μάλιστα τις ἂν λόγῳ λάβοι καὶ εἶδη ἂν ἠγήσαιτο εἶναι » : 135e2-4). Nous essaierons de montrer dans cette présentation que Parménide suggère dans la deuxième partie du dialogue un changement de point de vue : si les apories de la première partie étaient causées par l'analyse de la notion de participation du sensible à l'intelligible, la deuxième partie, à travers les huit séries de déductions, développe une réflexion concernant la nécessité pour l'intelligible de posséder une identité propre sans toutefois que cette identité implique qu'il faille considérer les Formes intelligibles comme autarciques et complètement isolées. En réalité, chaque Forme, dans sa dimension d'altérité, doit s'ouvrir sur ce qui lui est différent (aussi bien les autres Formes que les objets sensibles).

Nous défendrons ainsi l'idée que dans l'énonciation même de l'hypothèse, « l'un » est mis en rapport avec d'autres entités, à savoir les plusieurs, « τὰ πολλά ». Ainsi l'essence même de l'hypothèse sera d'envisager son sujet par rapport à d'autres éléments. Il faut donc recourir à cet aspect relationnel pour essayer d'élucider l'objectif des séries de déductions. Nous obtenons ainsi :

- 1) Si l'un est, quelles sont les conséquences de cette hypothèse pour :
  - a) l'un lui-même
    - i) par rapport à lui-même (1)
    - ii) par rapport aux autres choses (les plusieurs) (2)
  - b) les autres choses (les plusieurs)
    - i) par rapport à elles-mêmes (3)
    - ii) par rapport à l'un ? (4)
- 2) Si l'un n'est pas, quelles sont les conséquences de cette hypothèse pour :
  - a) l'un lui-même
    - i) par rapport à lui-même (5)
    - ii) par rapport aux autres choses (6)
  - b) les autres choses (les plusieurs)
    - i) par rapport à elles-mêmes (7)
    - ii) par rapport à l'un ? (8)

Nous suggérerons que l'hypothèse de la deuxième partie du *Parménide* repose sur les éléments suivants : supposons un objet X et examinons quelles sont les conséquences pour l'objet en question et pour *les objets (a, b, c etc.) qui se trouvent distingués de cet objet* et cela à chaque fois en considérant les objets (soit X, soit a b c etc.) par rapport à eux-mêmes ou par rapport aux *autres* objets qui sont réciproquement mis en rapport avec eux. Dans un second temps, il faudra mener les mêmes recherches en posant comme hypothèse que X n'est pas. Il s'avère essentiel de constater que la priorité dans cet exercice ne semble pas être donnée au référent de l'hypothèse, mais plutôt aux différentes *relations* qui existent entre les objets impliqués dans l'hypothèse en question. C'est à ce

titre que Platon porte une attention toute particulière à la distinction entre par rapport à soi (*pros beauto*) et par rapport aux autres choses (*pros ta alla*).

La différence entre les deux parties du dialogue pourrait être analysée ainsi : dans la première partie du *Parménide*, il était question de comment les particuliers, en tant qu'entités distinctes, participent aux Formes, alors que dans la deuxième partie, c'est exactement la question inverse qui se pose : comment les Formes entrent-elles en relation avec les particuliers qui, quant à eux, ne sont pas des entités distinctes et indépendantes, mais des images des Formes ? Si les Formes sont des réalités autarciques et fermées sur elles-mêmes, il peut sembler légitime de se poser la question suivante : qu'est ce qui leur permet d'être en relation avec quoi que ce soit d'autre qu'elles-mêmes ? Or, cette question ne concerne pas exclusivement la relation Formes-particuliers, mais aussi la relation Formes-Formes. La deuxième partie du *Parménide*, par le renversement de point de vue qu'elle propose, pose la question du statut de l'intelligible en s'intéressant aux notions de relation et d'absence de relation qu'il entretient avec lui-même et avec ce qui lui est différent.

Nous montrerons plus particulièrement que si la discussion proposée par Parménide peut s'interpréter comme traitant du rapport entre l'intelligible (l'un) et les objets sensibles (les plusieurs), alors les séries impliquent deux cas distincts : 1) l'absence de participation entre les deux réalités (la séparation radicale de la première partie (133c2-7)), due au fait que l'un, considéré *pros beauto*, n'admet aucune distinction et aucune ouverture sur autre chose (déductions : 1, 4, 6, 8) ; et 2) la participation entre les deux catégories (le sensible et l'intelligible) (déductions : 2, 3, 5, 7). Or, dans ce cas, nous semblons retomber dans certaines des apories de la première partie. La multiplication à l'infini de l'un dans la deuxième série n'est pas sans rappeler l'argument du Troisième Homme (132a- b). Nous avons ainsi deux cas distincts de communication des propriétés : si ce sont les plusieurs qui participent à l'un, alors l'un sera affecté des propriétés du cadre spatio-temporel, alors que si c'est l'un qui participe aux plusieurs, ces derniers seront affectés par les propriétés de l'un. Par rapport à l'hypothèse des Formes, cela implique que, soit les Formes sont réifiées en objets sensibles (comme dans la première partie du *Parménide*), soit - et c'est là la nouveauté de cette deuxième partie du *Parménide* - l'intelligible agit comme principe *limitant* sur le sensible.

Nous concluons notre présentation par la suggestion suivante : la deuxième partie du *Parménide* semble établir que, si nous nous plaçons du point de vue de l'intelligible, il y a nécessité 1) de fonder les relations que chaque Forme, *identique* à elle-même, entretient avec ce qui lui est *différent* - aussi bien les autres Formes que les objets sensibles et 2) de postuler un *milieu* dans lequel les Formes, ou plutôt leurs images, pourraient apparaître en limitant ce dernier afin de garantir un statut au sensible.

### *The second part of the Parmenides: identity and alterity of the intelligible*

What relationship does the second part of the *Parmenides* have with the first part? Parmenides states that the proposed exercise must be about "those things that one might above all grasp by means of reason and might think to be forms" ("περί ἐκείνα ἃ μάλιστα τις ἂν λόγῳ λάβῃ καὶ εἶδη ἂν ἠγγῆσαιτο εἶναι": 135e2 -4). We will try to show in this presentation that Parmenides suggests in the second part of the dialogue a change of point of view: if the *aporias* of the first part were caused by the analysis of the notion of participation of the sensible to the intelligible, the second

part of the dialogue, through the eight series of deductions, develops a reflection concerning the necessity for the intelligible to have an *identity* of its own, without this identity implying that it is necessary to consider the intelligible Forms as autarchic and isolated entities. In reality, each Form, in its dimension of *alterity*, must open itself on what is different from it (other Forms as well as sensitive objects).

We will thus defend the idea that the enunciation of the hypothesis, "the one" is related to other entities, namely the many, "τὰ πολλά". Thus, the very essence of the hypothesis will be to consider its subject in relation to other elements. We must therefore consider this relational aspect to elucidate the aim of the series of deductions. We obtain this as follows:

- 1) If the one is, what are the consequences of this hypothesis for:
  - a) the one itself
    - i) in relation to itself (1)
    - ii) in relation to the other things (the many) (2)
  - b) the other things (the many)
    - i) in relation to themselves (3)
    - ii) in relation to the one? (4)
- 2) If the one is not, what are the consequences of this hypothesis for:
  - a) the one itself
    - i) in relation to itself (5)
    - ii) in relation to the other things (6)
  - b) the other things (the many)
    - i) in relation to themselves (7)
    - ii) in relation to the one? (8)

We will suggest that the hypothesis of the second part of the *Parmenides* is based on the following elements: take an object X and consider what are the consequences for the object in question and for the objects (*a, b, c etc.*) that are distinguished from this object in each case by considering the objects (either X or *a, b, c etc.*) in relation to themselves or in relation to the *other* objects that are reciprocally related to them. Then, it will be necessary to carry out the same pattern of research by hypothesizing that X is not. It is essential to note that the priority of this exercise does not seem to be given to the referent of the hypothesis, but rather to the different relations that exist between the objects involved in the hypothesis in question. It is for this reason that Plato pays particular attention to the distinction between the notions of being in relation to itself (*pros heauto*) and in relation to the other things (*pros ta alla*).

The difference between the two parts of the dialogue can thus be analyzed as follows: in the first part of the *Parmenides*, it was a question of how the particulars, as distinct entities, participate in the Forms, while in the second part, it is exactly the opposite question that arises: how do Forms relate to particulars which, in turn, are not independent entities, but images of Forms? If the Forms are self-sufficient and isolated entities, it may seem legitimate to ask the following question: what allows them to be in relation with anything other than themselves? However, this question does not concern exclusively the Form-particular relation, but also the Form-Form relation. The second part of the *Parmenides*, by the change of viewpoint that it proposes, raises the question of the status of the intelligible by focusing on the notions of relations and lack of relations that it has with itself and with what it is different from.

More specifically, we will show that if the discussion proposed by Parmenides can be interpreted as dealing with the relation between the intelligible (the one) and the sensible objects (the many), then the series imply two distinct cases: 1) the absence of participation between the two realities (the radical separation of the first part (133c2-7)), due to the fact that the one, considered *pros heauto*, admits no distinction and no ontological opening to anything else (deductions : 1, 4, 6, 8); and 2) the participation between the two categories (the sensible and the intelligible) (deductions : 2, 3, 5, 7). Now, in this case, we seem to fall back into some of the *aporias* of the first part. The infinite multiplication of the one in the second series reminds us of the Third Man argument (132a-b). Thus, we have two distinct cases of communication of the properties: if the many participate in the one, then the one will be contaminated by spatio-temporal properties; whereas if it is the one that participates in the many, these latter will be affected by the properties of the former. In relation to the hypothesis of the Forms, this implies that either the Forms are reified as sensible objects (as in the first part of the *Parmenides*), or - and this is the novelty of this second part of the *Parmenides* - the intelligible acts as a limiting principle on the sensible.

We will conclude our presentation with the following suggestion: the second part of the *Parmenides* seems to establish that, from the point of view of the intelligible, it is necessary to 1) found the relations that each Form, *identical* to itself, has with what is *different* from it – both the other Forms and the sensible objects and 2) postulate a *milieu* in which the Forms, or rather their images, could appear. In doing so, the Forms will limit this *milieu* in order to guarantee ontological status to the sensible.

*The Dialogue between Parmenides and Timaeus: the Concept of Eternity in Plato*

The concept of eternity plays a crucial role in Plato's philosophy. "Eternal forms," "the eternal world of forms" are phrases so usual in the literature that "the eternal" could be considered almost as a synonym for the "forms." Nevertheless, up to the *Timaeus*, Plato does not offer a more or less complete analysis of the concept. And even in the *Timaeus* the description of eternity (as well as of the eternal) is ambiguous and causes controversy in the historical and philosophical literature.

There are two main strategies for interpreting the notion of eternity in a broader context. First, by eternity one can understand the infinity of time:  $x$  is eternal, iff there is no such past when  $x$  did not exist, and there is no future when  $x$  will not exist. This strategy can be called *temporalism*. Second, by eternity one can understand the transcendence of time and duration:  $x$  is eternal iff no element of  $x$  is a part of the temporal series. This is a strategy of *traditional eternalism*. Both of these strategies are applied to interpret Plato's eternity, but both of them seem unsatisfactory.

The explicit temporal connotations of the keywords for the description of eternity (*ἀεί, αἰδιος, αἰών*) are spoken in favor of temporalism. Nevertheless, the difference between the eternal and the temporal in Plato is not quantitative, but qualitative, as eloquently attested by the exclusion of *the present* from the list of the forms of time in the *Timaeus* (37e4). The position of traditional eternalism also raises questions. First, if eternity is transcendental to time, it contradicts Plato's description of temporal things in "eternal" terms (e.g., *αἰώνιος* in 37d7 for the description of the copy; *αἰδιος* in 37c6 and 40b5 for celestial bodies). Secondly, if eternity is transcendent to time, then the forms can in no way participate in the organization of the cosmos.

I believe that the exit from the interpretative deadlock could be found in the *Parmenides*. Here, Plato discusses the notion of the present time (*ὁ νῦν χρόνος* or merely *τὸ νῦν* – *Parm.* 151e–152e), which has a unique position in the flow of time. According to Plato, *the present* plays the role of the link or the principle of unity and existence in the flow of time: "[I]f nothing that comes to be can sidestep the now, whenever a thing *is* at this point, it always stops its coming-to-be and then is whatever it may have come to be [*εἰ δέ γε ἀνάγκη μὴ παρελθεῖν τὸ νῦν πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἐπειδὴν κατὰ τοῦτο ἦ, ἐπίσχει αἰεὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἔστι τότε τοῦτο ὅτι ἂν τύχη γιγνόμενον*]" (152c–d, hereinafter transl. by *M. L. Gill* and *P. Ryan*). Reaching in its becoming the present, an object ceases to become and turns out to be what it was becoming. The present, therefore, is *the place of the being*, deprived of becoming. Moreover, since the objects are in constant change, the passage through the present is not only the participation of the object in the being but also its self-identity condition: the object still retains its own identity in the present while becoming different to its past states.

Nevertheless, in the *Parmenides*, the present as a place of the being is considered not independently but as an element of time. Here all the paradoxicality of time is revealed: everything that exists in time is in constant change and becoming; all that exists in time passes through the present deprived of change and becoming. This paradox indicates that in the very heart of all becoming there is *the being*. While the present in the flow of time is the principle of unity and

existence, it is still only *a trace of the being*: “For if it were going forward, it could never be grasped by the now [ληφθείη ὑπὸ τοῦ νῦν]. A thing going forward is able to lay hold of both the now and the later – releasing the now and reaching for the later, while coming to be between the two, the later and the now” (152c). The present as a part of the time, thus, always *slips* from the future into the past; it is not able to hold the being. On the one hand, the presence of the present ensures the existence of temporal objects; on the other hand, it is only a relative being, i.e., *becoming*.

The present in the flow of time performs several functions at once. First, the present guarantees self-identity and existence of any object in time. It is possible to argue that objects in time do not exist: once born they perish, and in the transition from non-being-before to non-being-after temporal things are in constant change. Nevertheless, participation in the present guarantees at least a relative existence of these objects, since the passage through the present links the temporal things to the being. Secondly, the present guarantees the self-identity and the existence of time itself. Every present moment was the future and will become the past. There is no past was not present, and there is no future will not be present. Without the present, carrying the being in itself, time would be impossible, it literally could not *be*. Therefore, the present is the fundamental for time.

Scholars repeatedly noted the connections between the discussion of temporal problematics in the *Timaeus* and the *Parmenides*. I believe, the *Parmenides* offers a specification of the *Timaeus*' eternity. While in the *Parmenides* the present is considered as a constitutive, but still an element of the flow of time, in the *Timaeus* Plato conceptualizes the present as a metaphysical principle, writing about its independent of time existence. The present, not as an element of a time series, but as the fundamental for time is the sought eternity of the *Timaeus*. It is not extra-temporal, because it is a durational basis of time, but atemporal, because the present *per se* is irreducible to the succession. Thus, eternity is *atemporal duration*, a specific mode of existence of the forms in the entirety and soleness of the present.

### *Der Dialog zwischen Parmenides und Timaios: Der Begriff der Ewigkeit bei Platon*

Der Begriff der Ewigkeit spielt eine entscheidende Rolle in der Platonischen Philosophie. Ausdrücke wie „ewige Ideen“ oder „das ewige Ideenreich“ begegnen einem so oft innerhalb der Forschungsliteratur, dass „ewig“ fast schon als ein Synonym für „ideal“ betrachtet werden kann. Auch wenn die Bedeutung des Ewigen bei Platon als selbstevident vorausgesetzt wird, bietet er keine vollständige Bestimmung des Begriffs bis hin zu seinem Spätdialog *Timaios*. Jedoch ist die Bestimmung der Ewigkeit (genauso wie des Ewigen) in *Timaios* mehrdeutig und verursacht kontroverse Debatten sowohl in der historisch-philosophischen als auch in der philosophischen Literatur.

Es gibt zwei grundlegende Strategien, um den Begriff der „Ewigkeit“ zu interpretieren. Erstens kann man unter der Ewigkeit eine zeitliche Unendlichkeit bzw. eine Allzeitlichkeit verstehen:  $x$  ist ewig genau dann, wenn es keine solche Vergangenheit gibt, in der  $x$  nicht existierte, und es keine solche Zukunft gibt, in der  $x$  nicht existieren wird. Diese Strategie kann als temporalistisch bezeichnet werden. Zweitens kann man unter der Ewigkeit die Transzendenz der Zeit und Dauer verstehen:  $x$  ist ewig genau dann, wenn kein Element von  $x$  einen Teil der

temporalen Reihe bildet. Es ist die Strategie des traditionellen Eternalismus. Beide Strategien werden angewendet, um die Ewigkeit bei Platon zu interpretieren, jedoch scheinen beide unbefriedigend zu sein.

So zeugen zugunsten des Temporalismus die explizit temporalen Schlüsselbegriffe (*ἀεί, αἰδιος, αἰών*), die Platon benutzt, um die Ewigkeit und das Ewige zu bezeichnen. Der Unterschied zwischen dem Ewigen und dem Temporalen bei Platon ist jedoch nicht von einer quantitativen, sondern einer qualitativen Natur. Dies belegt äußerst eindrucksvoll die Ausnahme des Zeitmodus „Jetzt“ aus der Liste der Zeittypen (Tim. 37e4). Nichtsdestotrotz ist auch die eternalistische Interpretation der Ewigkeit bei Platon hoch umstritten. Erstens, wenn Ewigkeit die Zeit transzendiert, so muss man erklären, welchen Sinn es hat, dass Platon Zeit und des Zeitlichen mit den Termini des Ewigen bestimmt (z.B. *αἰώνιος* in 37d beschreibt das Abbild; *ίδιος* in 37c6 und 40b5 beschreibt die Himmelskörper). Zweitens, wenn Ewigkeit die Zeit transzendiert, können Ideen in keiner Weise an der Ordnung des Kosmos teilnehmen.

Der *Parmenides* zeigt einen Ausweg aus dem obigen Interpretationsdilemma. Es wird ein Konzept des Jetztes eingeführt (*ὁ νῦν χρόνος*, oder nur *τὸ νῦν* – Parm. 151e–152e), das eine besondere Position in dem Zeitverlauf einnimmt. Laut Platon, also, stellt das Jetzt im Zeitverlauf ein verbindendes Element dar und gilt somit als Prinzip der Einheit und des Seins: „Wenn es also notwendig ist, daß alles werdende das Jetzt nicht vorbeigehe (*εἰ δέ γε ἀνάγκη μὴ παρελθεῖν τὸ νῦν πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον*): so hält es auch notwendig, wenn es an diesem ist, mit dem Werden inne (*ἐπίσχει ἀεὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι*), und ist (*ἔστι*) als dann das in dessen Werden es eben begriffen ist,“ (152c–d). Wenn es, also, in seinem Werden das Jetzt erreicht, hört das Objekt auf zu werden und ist das, was es geworden ist. Das Jetzt ist demnach der „Ort“ des Seins, der jedes Werden ausschließt. Darüber hinaus sind die Objekte in der Sinnenwelt in ständiger Veränderung, deswegen bedeutet es für das Objekt, immer wenn es in das Jetzt eintritt, nicht nur die Konstitution seiner selbst im Sein, sondern auch die Bedingung seiner Selbstidentität. Wenn das Objekt in Bezug auf seinen früheren Zustand anders wird, behält es trotzdem seine eigene Identität.

Allerdings wird das Jetzt im *Parmenides* nicht als ein des Seins Ort an sich, sondern als ein Element der Zeit als solche betrachtet. Hier findet sich die ganze Paradoxie der Zeit: Einerseits ist alles, was in der Zeit existiert, in ständiger Veränderung und im Werden; Andererseits läuft alles, was in der Zeit existiert, das Jetzt durch, das jede Veränderung und Werden ausschließt. Dieses Paradox weist darauf hin, dass im Werden das Sein wesentlich veranlagt ist. Das Jetzt in der Zeit, als Prinzip des Seins und der Einheit, ist eine Spur des wahren Seins: „Denn fortschreitend würde es niemals von dem Jetzt ergriffen werden (*ληφθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ νῦν*). Nämlich das fortschreitende verhält sich so, daß es beide berührt, das Jetzt und das Hernach, das Jetzt nämlich verlassend, und das Hernach ergreifend, zwischen beidem werdend, dem Jetzt und dem Hernach,“ (152c). Das Jetzt als ein Teil der Zeit rutscht immer, auf diese Weise, aus dem „Hernach“ in die Vergangenheit ab und ist nicht in der Lage, sein eigenes Sein zu halten. Einerseits gewährleistet die Präsenz des Jetzt die Existenz der temporalen Objekte. Andererseits ist es nur ein relatives Sein, d.h. das Werden.

Auf diese Weise führt das Jetzt in der Zeit gleichzeitig mehrere Funktionen aus. Erstens garantiert das Jetzt für jedes Objekt Selbstidentität und Sein in der Zeit. Man kann sagen, dass das Seiende in der Zeit nicht *seiend* ist: Das einmal Geborene stirbt und, beim Übergang vom Vor-Nichtsein zum Nach-Nichtsein, ist es in ständiger Veränderung. Trotzdem garantiert die Teilnahme an dem Jetzt dessen zumindest relatives Sein, weil durch den Durchlauf des Jetzt ein Objekt trotzdem am Sein teilnimmt. Zweitens gewährleistet das Jetzt Selbstidentität und Sein der Zeit. Jedes Jetzt war mal Zukunft und wird zu Vergangenheit. Ohne das Jetzt, das das Sein in sich

trägt, wäre Zeit unmöglich, sie hätte einfach nicht *sein* können. Anders gesagt, das Jetzt ist die Grundlage der Zeit.

Auf das Verhältnis der temporalen Problematik in den Dialogen *Timaios* und *Parmenides* wurde von Forschern wiederholt hingewiesen. Meiner Meinung nach, bietet *Parmenides* eine Klärung des Begriffs der Ewigkeit, das im *Timaios* eingeleitet wurde. Obgleich in *Parmenides* das Jetzt als ein konstitutives Element der Zeit betrachtet wird, so definiert Platon in *Timaios* das Jetzt als ein zeitunabhängiges metaphysisches Prinzip. Dieses Jetzt entspricht im *Timaios* der Ewigkeit, die nicht als Element der Zeitreihe, sondern als die Grundlage für die Zeit zu verstehen ist. Demnach transzendiert Ewigkeit die Zeit nicht, weil sie eine dauernde Grundlage der Zeit ist. Sie ist nicht zeitlich, weil das Jetzt in der Zeitreihe nicht eindeutig trennbar ist. Die Ewigkeit ist eine atemporale Dauer, eine besondere Art des Seins des Idealen in der Fülle und Exklusivität des Jetztes.



*‘Why is the recovery of thought and philosophy conducted through an investigation into the one?’*

The outcome of the arguments in the first part of the *Parmenides* is an *aporia* and Socrates’ profession (135c7) that he does not at all know where to turn in response to it. The *aporia* is as radical as can be imagined, because it concerns the prospect of philosophy, and indeed thought in general, being undermined. This prospect, Parmenides has concluded (135b-c), is a consequence of giving up on the existence of Forms, and on our desire to mark off and define them, in response to the series of objections that have been levelled against Forms.

The remainder of the dialogue is cast as at least the beginning of a recovery from this predicament, conducted in terms of an extended investigation into the one. But why is the recovery conducted in terms of this concept?

I argue that few other concepts could have served this task. A response to the radical *aporia* cannot, without begging the question, assume that there are Forms. Rather, it must rely on a concept that is both a basic element in all thought and a basis for arguing that there are Forms. For Plato, few concepts can accomplish this, and the concept of the one is pre-eminent among them. This is apparent already from *Republic* VII.523a-525a, if we understand this as an argument for the claims that, first, without the concept of the one, we cannot make judgements about any thing, including any sense-perceptible thing; and, secondly, what the one is cannot be understood by pointing to a sense-perceptible example-and-exemplar of a thing that is one (I defend more fully this reading of the *Republic* passage in a paper forthcoming in *Etudes Platoniciennes*).

I argue that Plato’s aim in the second part of the *Parmenides* is to take substantially further this project, of demonstrating that the concept of the one is a basic element in all object-directed thought; and to do this by distinguishing the many and various ways in which this concept is involved in such thought. This will amount to a defence of Forms, if we suppose that, first, the Form of a quality, F (e.g. of beauty, justice, goodness, cf. 135c8-d1), is what this quality is, if what it is cannot be specified by pointing to a sense-perceptible example-and-exemplar of a thing that is F (cf. 130d3-4); and, secondly, Forms are unitary and the cause of the unity of the things that partake in them.

This reading finds initial support in the transition to the second part of the dialogue, when Parmenides (at 136a-b) implies that only certain concepts, which typically come in opposites and are jointly true of all things, can serve the task ahead. They include: the one and the many; likeness and unlikeness; change and rest; generation and corruption; and being and not being. It is notable that these concepts call to mind both the *koina* of the *Theaetetus* and the *megista genē* of the *Sophist*; dialogues in which, we may suppose, Plato takes this project yet further.

Demonstrating that Plato’s investigation into the one is an investigation into a basic element in all object-directed thought will involve taking up a number of questions. Why is the investigation conducted not with reference to sense-perceptible things but with reference to intelligible things and potentially Forms? (135d7-e4) How does the investigation arrive at the idea of sense-perceptible things? (which it does by 155d-e) What is the import of the references to

grasping the one, or the many, in thought (143a7, 158c2, 165a8, b5-6)? Why (after the first hypothesis) is the idea of participation central to the investigation? Is it because participation is a crucial condition for thought? For predication? Why must the investigation consider also the hypothesis that there is not a one, hence that nothing is one? Is it for the sake of showing that, in that case, nothing can be thought of? Does the second part of the dialogue take up the statement, made early in the dialogue (132b8-c4), that any thought is of something, and of some one thing? Is the view that Plato's investigation is into the basic elements of object-directed thought consonant with the fact that the investigation is not into thoughts, but, if anything, into the objects of thought?

These (and related) questions are prompted by the conviction that the second part of the *Parmenides* is motivated not only by the objections to Forms raised in the first part, but also by Parmenides' claim, following directly upon these objections (135b-c), that, any objections against Forms notwithstanding, Forms are needed for philosophy and indeed for thought in general. It is hard to see how the investigation into the one can be relevant in response to this *aporia* – on the one hand, there are serious objections against Forms, on the other hand, Forms are needed for philosophy and thought in general – unless it is an investigation into the basic elements of object-directed thought, and elements that can provide a basis for the commitment to Forms, in particular by its emerging that these elements are Forms and indeed primary among the Forms (cf. 130b3-5, where it is suggested that likeness and the one are primary among the Forms).

*Perchè il recupero del pensiero e della filosofia è condotto attraverso una ricerca sull'uno?*

L'esito dei ragionamenti nella prima parte del Parmenide è un' *aporia* e la dichiarazione di Socrate (135c7) di non avere nessuna idea di dove rivolgersi per dare una risposta. L'*aporia* è radicale come si può ben immaginare, perché concerne la prospettiva della filosofia, e in realtà il pensiero in generale, ad esserne minato. Questa prospettiva, ha concluso Parmenide (135bc), è una conseguenza della rinuncia alla realtà sia delle Idee sia del nostro desiderio di determinarle e definirle, in risposta alla serie di obiezioni che sono state mosse contro le Idee.

Il resto del dialogo è lanciato come l'inizio di un recupero di questa categoria, condotto come una estesa ricerca sull'argomento dell'uno. Ma perchè questo recupero viene condotto nei termini di questo concetto dell'uno?

Vorrei sostenere che pochi altri concetti avrebbero potuto servire questo compito. Una risposta all'*aporia* radicale non può, senza dare la domanda per scontata, assumere la realtà delle Idee. Piuttosto, ci si deve basare su un concetto che è sia un elemento fondamentale in tutto il pensiero sia una base per sostenere che ci sono Idee. Per Platone, pochi concetti possono raggiungere quest'obiettivo, e il concetto dell'uno è preminente fra di essi. Questo è evidente già dalla Repubblica (VII.523a-525a), se interpretiamo questo passaggio come un ragionamento per le affermazioni che, in primo luogo, senza il concetto dell'uno non si può esprimere giudizi su nessuna cosa, compresa qualsiasi cosa percepibile dai sensi, e, in secondo luogo, l'uno non può essere inteso indicando un esempio esemplificativo di una cosa che sia percepibile dai sensi.

Vorrei sostenere che l'obiettivo di Platone nella seconda parte del Parmenide è quello di andare sostanzialmente avanti con questo progetto, vale a dire di dimostrare che il concetto dell'uno

è un elemento fondamentale in tutto il pensiero orientato a qualsiasi oggetto, e fare ciò distinguendo i molti e vari modi in cui questo concetto fa parte di tale pensiero. Ciò sarà pari a una difesa delle Idee, se presupponiamo che, in primo luogo, l'Idea di una qualità, F (ad esempio, di bellezza, di giustizia, di bontà, 135c8-d1) è ciò che questa qualità è, se ciò non può essere specificato indicando un esempio percepibile esemplificativo di una che è F (130d3-4), e, in secondo luogo, che le Idee sono sia unitarie sia la causa dell'unità delle cose che partecipano in esse.

Questa lettura trova sostegno iniziale nel passaggio alla seconda parte del dialogo, quando Parmenide (136a-b) indica che solo certi precisi concetti, che di solito sono opposti fra di loro, possono sostenere il compito da svolgere. Questi includono l'uno e i molti, somiglianza e dissomiglianza, cambiamento e stasi, generazione e distruzione, essere e non essere. Questi concetti richiamano alla mente sia i *koīna* del Teeteto sia i *megista genē* del Sophista, dialoghi in cui, possiamo supporre, Platone avanza ulteriormente con questo progetto.

Dimostrare che la ricerca di Platone nell'uno è una ricerca su un elemento fondamentale in tutto il pensiero orientato agli oggetti implicherà il prendere in considerazione una serie di domande. Perché la ricerca non è condotta con riferimento a cose percepibili dai sensi ma con riferimento a cose intelligibili e potenzialmente a Idee? (135d7-e4) In che modo la ricerca arriva all'idea di cose percepibili dai sensi? (il che accade entro il 155d-e) Quale è l'importanza dei riferimenti per cogliere l'uno, o i molti, nel pensiero vero e proprio (143a7, 158c2, 165a8, b5-6)? Perché, dopo la prima ipotesi, l'idea della partecipazione è centrale per la ricerca? È per la ragione che la partecipazione è una condizione cruciale per il pensiero? Per la predicazione? Perché la ricerca deve considerare inoltre l'ipotesi che non c'è un uno, quindi che nulla è uno? È per dimostrare che, in questo caso, nulla può essere pensato? Il dialogo nella sua seconda parte si occupa dell'affermazione, fatta in precedenza nel dialogo (132b8-c4), che qualsiasi pensiero è di qualcosa e di una cosa singolare? La visione secondo cui la ricerca di Platone tratta degli elementi fondamentali del pensiero orientato agli oggetti è in sintonia col fatto che la ricerca non tratta di pensieri ma, semmai, degli oggetti del pensiero?

Queste e relative domande si originano dalla convinzione che la seconda parte del *Parmenide* sia motivata non solo dalle obiezioni contro le Idee sollevate nella prima parte ma anche con l'affermazione di Parmenide, che segue direttamente queste obiezioni (135b-c), che, nonostante qualsiasi obiezione contro le Idee, le Idee sono necessarie per la filosofia e in realtà per il pensiero in generale. Non vedrei bene come mai la ricerca nell'uno possa essere rilevante in risposta a quest'*aporia* (da un lato, ci sono serie obiezioni contro le Idee, dall'altro le Idee sono necessarie per la filosofia e in effetti per il pensiero in generale), a meno che non sia una ricerca sugli elementi fondamentali del pensiero orientato agli oggetti e su elementi che possono fornire una base per l'impegno verso le Idee, in particolare se diventa evidente che questi elementi sono Idee e in effetti primarie tra le Idee (v. 130b3-5, dove si suggerisce che la somiglianza e l'uno sono primarie tra le Idee).

## Protopopova Irina

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### «Parménide» et «Hippias Majeur» : Deux types d'*eidos* et deux types de participation

1. Dans la première partie de «Parménide», Parménide demande au jeune Socrate comment les choses reçoivent leur part de l'*eidos* : de tout l'*eidos* entier ou d'une partie («Et tout ce qui participe d'une idée, participe-t-il de l'idée entière, ou seulement d'une partie de l'idée?» — 131a, *tr. Victor Cousin*). Deux versions possibles de la participation sont présentées dans le dialogue.

- 1) L'*eidos* est entièrement dans chacune des choses multiples et séparés, en restant toutefois le même («l'idée une et identique serait à la fois tout entière en plusieurs choses séparées les unes des autres» *Prm.* 131b). Socrate offre l'exemple d'une 'jour' qui, étant le même, se trouve en même temps dans des endroits divers, mais ne se sépare pas de lui-même («comme le jour, tout en étant un seul et même jour, est en même temps dans beaucoup de lieux sans être pour cela séparé de lui-même, de même chacune des idées sera en plusieurs choses à la fois sans cesser d'être une seule et même idée», *l.c.*). Dans ce cas, l'*eidos* est indivisible et les «choses» participent à l'*eidos* comme à l'unité.
- 2) L'*eidos*, comme un tissu, couvre plusieurs hommes («comme si tu disais qu'une toile dont on couvrirait à la fois plusieurs hommes»). Il y a donc des parties différentes au-dessus des personnes différentes — dans ce cas, l'*eidos* est divisible (les idées sont elles-mêmes divisibles) et des «choses» participent aux ses parties.

Ceci est présenté comme une aporie. Nous croyons d'abord que ces deux types de participation sont en corrélation avec les deux types d'*eidos* explicitement mis en évidence dans le dialogue «Hippias Majeur».

Deuxièmement, nous considérons que dans le dialogue «Parménide», ces deux types d'idées sont présentés comme les deux principes de l'existence de l'Un, qui sont également présents dans le dialogues «Sophiste» (l'interaction de cinq grands genres) et «Timée» (la description de l'âme cosmique).

2. Le premier type d'idées peut être appelé *qualitatif* ou *indivisible*. Socrate dit : «Si je suis fort et toi aussi, disais-tu, nous le sommes tous les deux ; si je suis juste et toi aussi, nous le sommes tous les deux ; et si nous le sommes tous les deux, chacun de nous l'est. De même, si je suis beau et toi aussi, nous le sommes tous les deux ; et si nous le sommes tous deux, chacun de nous l'est» (303b). Ici, chaque chose a la même qualité que la totalité de choses similaires.

Hippias croit que c'est toujours le cas. En répondant, Socrate dit : «si nous sommes deux conjointement, c'est une nécessité que chacun de nous soit aussi deux ; et que si chacun de nous est un, il est également nécessaire que tous les deux nous ne soyons qu'un (301de). Hippias est désespéré : «Il n'est donc pas nécessaire <...> que chacun de nous soit ce que nous sommes tous les deux, et que nous soyons tous les deux ce qu'est chacun de nous» (302b).

Ceci est un exemple du deuxième type d'*eidos*. David Ross (*Plato's Theory of Ideas*, Clarendon Press, 1951, p. 4), l'appelle 'numérique' — mais cela appauvrit considérablement le sens.

L'exemple du plaisir de l'ouïe et de la vision (éventuellement, on peut l'appeler *esthétique*) est discuté en détail dans le dialogue «Hippias Majeur» : séparément, le plaisir de la vision et celui

de l'ouïe sont qualitativement différents, mais ensemble ils créent une unité d'une nouvelle qualité. Ainsi, ce type d'*eidōs* existe comme l'unité, dont les parties ne possèdent pas individuellement les caractéristiques de l'unité.

Nous pouvons trouver un exemple caractéristique de ce type d'idées dans le dialogue «Théétète»: les premières lettres du nom Socrate, sigma et oméga, séparément, n'ont rien de commun, mais ensemble elles créent une syllabe qui, selon Socrate, n'est pas l'ensemble de lettres, mais elles «constituent un *eidōs* uni, qui en résulte et qui possède sa propre idée unie, différente de celle des lettres (χρῆν γὰρ ἴσως τὴν συλλαβὴν τίθεσθαι μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐκείνων ἓν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχον, ἕτερον δὲ τῶν στοιχείων, 203e).

Nous appelons ces idées 'les idées *composites*', ou *quasi-divisibles*. 'Quasi' parce qu'il ne s'agit pas de la division sensible, mais de la diérèse dans la sphère intelligible.

3. Dans le dialogue «Parménide», l'*eidōs* composite ou quasi-divisible est converti au principe nécessaire de l'existence de l'Un au début de la seconde hypothèse (142d), quand il s'avère que c'est impossible de penser l'Un comme l'un, mais il est nécessaire de supposer que l'Un existe : «Si *il est* se dit de l'un qui est, et un de l'être un, et si l'être et l'un ne sont pas la même chose, mais appartiennent également à cette chose que nous avons supposée, je veux dire l'un qui est, ne faut-il pas reconnaître dans cet un qui est, un tout, dont l'un et l'être sont les parties?» (142d)

Ce principe de l'existence de l'Un en tant qu'unité, constitué de parties, conduit l'argumentation nécessairement à la dialectique de l'*identique* et de l'*autre* : «Ainsi l'Un, en tant qu'il est un tout, est en quelque chose d'autre que lui-même ; mais en tant qu'il est toutes les parties dont le tout est formé, il est en lui-même ; en sorte que l'un est nécessairement et en lui-même et en quelque chose d'autre que lui-même» (145e).

La dialectique de l'*identique* et de l'*autre* est basée sur un autre type de l'implication lié à l'indivisibilité de l'*eidōs*. C'est possible de le montrer par l'exemple de la façon dont l'Un est identique à l'Autre (différent) en raison de sa différence de lui : «Ainsi, en tant que l'un est autre que tout le reste, et tout le reste autre que l'un, l'un, participant au même autre que tout le reste, ne participe pas à une chose différente, mais à la même chose que tout le reste. Or, ce qui participe en quelque manière de la même chose, est semblable. N'est-il pas vrai?» (147e–148a)

Ici, comme on le voit, l'Un diffère de l'Autre, mais l'Autre aussi diffère de l'Un, par conséquent, ils sont tous deux liés à la «différence» — et si c'est le cas, c'est à cause de la distinction qu'ils sont similaires. Nous voyons ici un autre type de la participation — non pas des parties de l'Un, mais des *eidōs* différents de l'*eidōs* qualitative *indivisible*.

À mon avis, le problème de «l'Un et l'Autre», qui est le plus important pour Platon, est résolu par un modèle dynamique et compréhensif d'interaction entre les deux principaux types de *eidōs* et de participation liées à la divisibilité et à l'indivisibilité.

## *The Parmenides and the Hippias Major: Two Types of eidōs and Two Types of Participation*

1. In the first part of the *Parmenides*, Parmenides asks a young Socrates about how things communicate with *eide* — whether they partake in the entire *eidōs* or in a part of it (“So does each

thing that gets a share get as its share the form as a whole or a part of it?” — 129a, *transl. Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan*). They identify two types of participation:

- 1) An *eidōs* is located fully within each of the diverse and distinct things, while remaining the same (“being one and the same, it will be at the same time, as a whole, in things that are many and separate”, 131b). Socrates gives the example of a day, which, remaining one and the same, is simultaneously in multiple places, but never separate from itself (“if it’s like one and the same day. That is in many places at the same time and is none the less not separate from itself. If it’s like that, each of the forms might be, at the same time, one and the same in all”, *l.c.*). In this case, the *eidōs* is shown to be indivisible, and the ‘things’ that are part of it belong to it as a whole.
- 2) An *eidōs*, like a blanket, covers a variety of people (“it’s as if you were to cover many people with a sail”, *l.c.*), so that different people are located under different parts of it — in this case, the *eidōs* is divisible (“so the forms themselves are divisible”, 131c), and the ‘things’ partake in its parts. This is presented as an *aporia*. I presume, first, that these two types of communion relate to the two types of *eide* explicitly singled out in the dialogue *Hippias Major*; second, that in the *Parmenides* these two types of *eidōs* are presented as the two founding principles of the existence of ‘the One’, which, in turn, feature in the *Sophist* in the interaction of the five great genera, and in the *Timaeus*, in the description of the cosmic soul.

2. We may call the first type of *eidōs* *qualitative* or *indivisible*. In the *Hippias Major*, Socrates says: if I am beautiful, and you, Hippias, are beautiful, then both of us together are beautiful. And *vice versa*, if we are both beautiful, then each of ourselves is beautiful (righteous, good, healthy, etc) (303bc). In this case, each separate thing has the same quality as the sum of similar things.

Hippias believes that this will always hold. Socrates replies: if you and I together, Hippias, are *two*, then each of us by ourselves must be *two*, and if each of us is *one*, then both must be *one* as well (301de). Hippias is dumbstruck: as it turns out, “it’s not entirely necessary <...> that whatever is true of both is also true of each, and that whatever is true of each is also true of both” (302b, *trans. Paul Woodruff*).

This is an example of the second type of *eidōs*. David Ross in his book on *Plato’s Theory of Ideas* (Clarendon Press, 1951, p. 4) calls it ‘numerical’ — but that takes away much of its meaning. In the *Hippias Major*, there is a detailed analysis of the pleasure of sound and sight (it could conveniently be called *aesthetic*): separately, the pleasures of sight and sound are qualitatively distinct from each other but united they acquire a completely new quality. As such, this type of *eidōs* exists as a whole, whose parts, taken separately, do not possess the qualities of that whole.

A good example of such an *eidōs* can be found in the *Theaethetus*: the first letters of the name Socrates, sigma and omega, separately do not have anything in common but together they create a syllable which, as Socrates puts it, is not a sum of letters, but a “combination which forms a unified *eidōs*, that has its own unified idea, separate from that of the letters” (χρῆν γὰρ ἴσως τὴν συλλαβὴν τίθεσθαι μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἐκείνων ἓν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχον, ἕτερον δὲ τῶν στοιχείων, 203e).

Greater, as it were, examples of this type of *eidōs* are the city-state and the soul: parts of the one and the other separately (the yearning, raging and rational aspects of the soul, or the corresponding classes of the city, craftsmen, guards and philosophers) do not possess the properties of the whole, but the whole that is created from them is not a mechanical sum of all parts.

Let us call these *eide composite*, or *quasi-divisible*. ‘Quasi’ because the division here does not concern the sphere of the sensual, but is a diaeresis in the noetic sphere.

3. In the *Parmenides*, the composite or quasi-divisible type of *eidos* becomes a necessary precondition for the existence of ‘the One’ at the beginning of the second hypothesis, when it is established that ‘the One as one’ is unthinkable, but that it is necessary to assume that ‘the One exists’ (“if we state the ‘is’ of the one that is, and the ‘one’ of that which is one, and if being and oneness are not the same, but both belong to that same thing that we hypothesized, namely, the one that is, must it not itself, since it is one being, be a whole, and the parts of this whole be oneness and being?” — 142d).

That principle of the existence of the One as a whole composed of parts necessarily leads our reasoning to the dialectic of *identity* and *difference*: “So the one, insofar as it is a whole, is in another; but insofar as it is all the parts, it is in itself. And thus the one must be both in itself and in a different thing” (145e).

The dialectic of identity and difference is based on a different type of participation, tied to the indivisibility of *eidos*. It is easy to show this using the example of how the One is *identical* to the *other* because of being different to it: “So insofar as the one is different from the others, and the others from the one, on the basis of having the property difference itself, the one would have a property not other, but the same as the others. And that which has a property the same is surely like, isn’t it?” (147e–148a)

Here we can see that the One is different from the other but that the other also is different from the one. Thus, their common quality is ‘difference’ — and because of this, they are identical. Here we are seeing another type of participation — not of parts in the whole but of different *eide* in a qualitative *indivisible eidos*.

To my mind, the most important, for Plato, problem of the ‘One and Many’ is solved with the help of a comprehensive dynamic model of interactions between the two founding types of *eidos* and *participation* connected to divisibility and indivisibility.

## Ramelli Ilaria

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### *The reception of Plato's Parmenides in Origen of Alexandria*

I shall explore the problem of the reception of Plato's *Parmenides*—a dialogue that was to become central in Neoplatonism—in one of the main exponents of patristic philosophy, Origen of Alexandria († 255/6ca), who very probably was the disciple of the so-called Socrates of Neoplatonism, Ammonius Saccas, along with Plotinus, the founder of Neoplatonism and Origen's younger contemporary. Plotinus even attributes his own characterisation of the Nous-‘Demiurge’-‘secondary One’ as One-Many, as opposed to the ‘primary One’ as ‘absolutely One’, to Plato's *Parmenides*, which likely played an important role in Origen's protology too. As I shall argue, Origen's God-Father as ‘absolutely One’ and the Son-Wisdom-Demiurge as ‘One-Many’ is very similar to Plotinus' conception, based on the *Parmenides*. Origen knew both Plato's *Parmenides* and, possibly, Plotinus' protology, as well as, surely, Clement's notion of the Son-Logos as One-Many (‘One as All’) and God the Father as absolutely One.

A substantial part of my presentation will be devoted to the relationship between Origen and the mysterious *Commentary on the Parmenides*. Harold Tarrant surmised that this anonymous Commentary—written by a Middle Platonist according to Kevin Corrigan—was by Origen, although he expects the following objection: why is it not mentioned by Porphyry and other sources together with Origen's two ‘Ammonian’ treatises (*On Daemons* and *The King Is the Only Creator*)? One could hypothesise, in this connection, that the *Commentary on the Parmenides* did not expound Ammonius' secret doctrines, or not only. Also, I would not be too surprised if Origen the Christian Platonist, who commented on Plato, had written *C.Parm.* The latter is a running commentary, similar to Neoplatonist running commentaries (as noted by Dennis Clark) as well as to Origen's commentaries. *C.Parm.* associates the first hypothesis' One in the *Parmenides* with One as God/first principle, beyond Being, in apophatic terms (2.4-27), and Nous-Mind with the second hypothesis' One-Being, insisting that God-One and Nous are at the same time identical and not identical. All this fits Origen well, who deemed God both One (Monad-Henad) and Nous-Being, on the basis of both Plato's *Parmenides* and Scripture, and deemed God-One and the Son-Logos-Nous both identical qua God and not identical qua different hypostases.

Tarrant perspicuously asks: ‘How is it that [pagan] Origenes...seems to have become a regular part of the exegetical tradition of the *Parmenides* when he normally did not write, and when the titles of the two known exceptions [the ‘Ammonian’ treatises] do not suggest any relation to that dialogue?’. One could suspect this might depend on the fact that this Origen is the same as the Christian Platonist, who used the *Parmenides* and even imported its hypotheses into his own definition of God in *First Principles* and elsewhere (and interpreted the *Parmenides* elsewhere too).

Another source that may be of interest in the exploration of the knowledge of Plato's *Parmenides* by Origen is the Neoplatonist Proclus. Proclus mentions an ‘Origen’, who is usually identified with ‘Origen the Pagan’ (although he might also be the Christian Platonist) not only in *C.Tim.*, but also in *TP 2.4* and *C.Parm.* 635-638: Proclus' criticism of Origen's protology, primarily that Origen did not ascend beyond Nous and Being towards the One as transcending them (so in Plotinus' theory), corresponds to Origen the Christian's protology (although Origen was more ambivalent than the way Proclus portrays, somewhat polemically, his metaphysics and protology). My



presentation will endeavour to demonstrate this. Plotinus based himself precisely on the *Parmenides* to argue that the One transcends Nous and Being (*Enn.* 5.1.8; 5.5.6; 5.6.6, according to an interpretation of *Parm.* 141E9-10: ‘the One is in no way’, οὐδαμῶς ἔστι). In *C.Parm.* 1.636-638, Proclus reports that ‘some’ thought that *Parmenides* was about Being and argued that Being is One. This corresponds to Origen’s view according to *TP* 2.4 and the Platonic Christian Origen’s view. In Proclus’ report, the style of Plato’s *Parmenides* is ‘unadorned [ἀκαλλώπιστον] beauty’ according to ‘an expert in divine matters’ (*C.Parm.* 1.645) —likely Origen, who used ἀκαλλώπιστος πιθανότης of Plato’s style (*C.Tim.* 1.86.25ff.). Proclus ascribes to ‘leading theologians’ the theory that in the *Parmenides* the God of the yirst hypothesis is the ‘intelligible Father’, ‘the cause of all beings’, and a ‘participated henad’ (*C.Parm.* 6.1070). This also yits the metaphysics of Origen the Christian Platonist. Proclus objects that the God of the yirst hypothesis of the *Parmenides* is not even a Father.

Proclus attacks Origen for failing to posit a principle superior to Nous and Being. For Proclus, Origen’s alleged failure to go beyond Nous depended on Aristotelian innovations. Indeed, the Middle Platonist Maximus of Tyre, who—in fact unlike Origen—identified God with Nous and nothing superior, motivated this with Aristotle’s principle that ‘the most perfect [ἐντελέστατος] intellect eternally thinks all at the same time’ (*Diss.* 11.8). Proclus, stating that Origen’s protology depended on Aristotelian innovation, may also have thought of *Fr.Io.* 13—if this is indeed by Origen—which regards God as Nous thinking itself, like Aristotle’s divinity: the Divinity is *oikeion* to itself and thinks itself, being the subject, object, and activity of thinking; the Son is the object of the Father’s thinking and in turn thinks the Father. Proclus declared that Origen studied at the school of Ammonius, whom Proclus viewed as someway Aristotelianising qua ‘harmoniser’ of Aristotle with Plato. Origen was acquainted with Peripatetic teachings, but stuck to Ex 3:14, where God self-identifies as Being, and on which he commented philosophically in *C.Io.* 13.21.123.

### *The reception of Plato’s Parmenides in Origen of Alexandria (it)*

Investigherò la questione della ricezione del *Parmenide* di Platone—un dialogo che sarebbe di lì a poco divenuto centrale nel Neoplatonismo—in uno dei principali esponenti della filosofia patristica, Origene di Alessandria, che probabilmente era discepolo del cosiddetto ‘Socrate del Neoplatonismo’, Ammonio Sacca, insieme con Plotino, il fondatore del Neoplatonismo e un più giovane contemporaneo di Origene. Proprio al *Parmenide* Plotino attribuì la sua caratterizzazione del Nous-Demiurgo-Uno secondario come Uno-Molti, in opposizione all’Uno primario come assolutamente e semplicemente Uno. E il *Parmenide* sembra aver rivestito un ruolo importante anche nella protologia di Origene. Come mostrerò, Dio Padre in Origene quale assolutamente Uno e il Figlio-Sapienza-Demiurgo-Mente divina quale Uno-Molti è una concezione simile a quella di Plotino basata sul *Parmenide*. Origene sembra aver conosciuto sia il *Parmenide* di Platone sia, probabilmente, la protologia plotiniana, e di certo la teoria di Clemente Alessandrino del Figlio-Logos come Uno-Molti e di Dio Padre come assolutamente Uno, che illustrerò.

Una parte importante della mia presentazione sarà rivolta alla relazione tra Origene e il problematico *Commento al Parmenide*. Harold Tarrant ha ipotizzato che questo *Commento* anonimo (composto da un Medioplatonico secondo Kevin Corrigan) fosse di Origene, pur aspettandosi la seguente obiezione: perché questo commento non è menzionato da Porfirio insieme con i due trattati di Origene che esponevano le dottrine di Ammonio Sacca (*Sui Demoni* e *Il Re è*

*l'unico Creatore*)? Forse in quanto il *Commento al Parmenide* non esponeva le dottrine segrete di Ammonio, o non solo. Potrebbe mai darsi che Origene, il Platonico cristiano che commentava Platone, avesse scritto o ispirato questo *Commento*? Si tratta di un *running commentary*, simile a quelli neoplatonici (come osservato da Dennis Clark) e anche ai commenti di Origene. Esso associa l'Uno della prima ipotesi del *Parmenide* con l'Uno come Dio-Primo Principio, al di là dell'Essere, in termini apofatici, e il Nous-Mente divina con l'Uno-Essere della seconda ipotesi, e insiste che Dio-Uno e il Nous sono al contempo identici e non identici. Ciò si adatta perfettamente alla protologia di Origene (cristiano), che riteneva Dio sia Uno (Monade ed Enade) sia Nous-Essere, in base sia al *Parmenide* sia alla Scrittura, e riteneva Dio-Uno e il Figlio- Logos-Nous sia identici in quanto divinità, con la stessa *ousia*, sia non identici in quanto ipostasi diverse.

Tarrant giustamente si domanda: 'How is it that ['pagan'] Origenes...seems to have become a regular part of the exegetical tradition of the *Parmenides* when he normally did not write, and when the titles of the two known exceptions [the 'Ammonian' treatises] do not suggest any relation to that dialogue?'. Si potrebbe sospettare (anche in base a molti altri indizi) che ciò sia dovuto all'identità tra l'Origene platonico 'pagano' e l'Origene platonico cristiano, che conosceva e utilizzava il *Parmenide* e sembra avere perfino importato le sue ipotesi nella sua definizione di Dio nel *De Principiis* e altrove, e sembra aver interpretato il *Parmenide* anche in altri passi.

Un'altra fonte che potrebbe rivelarsi di interesse riguardo alla conoscenza che Origene aveva del *Parmenide* è il neoplatonico Proclo. Questi menziona un Origene, generalmente identificato con il 'pagano', anche se potrebbe essere il platonico cristiano, in vari passi, nel *Commento al Timeo*, nella *Teologia Platonica*, e precisamente nel *Commento al Parmenide*. La critica che Proclo rivolge a Origene, essenzialmente di non ascendere al di là dell'Essere e del Nous verso l'Uno che li trascende (nello schema plotiniano) corrisponde alla protologia dell'Origene cristiano, anche se Origene era più ambivalente di quanto Porco non ne ritragga, polemicamente, la metafisica e la protologia. La mia presentazione cercherà di dimostrarlo. Plotino si basava proprio sul *Parmenide* per sostenere che l'Uno trascende il Nous e l'Essere (*Enn.* 5.1.8; 5.5.6; 5.6.6, secondo l'esegesi di *Parm.* 141E9-10: l'Uno οὐδαμῶς ἔστι).

In *C.Parm.* 1.636-638, Proclo riporta che alcuni ritenevano che il *Parmenide* trattasse dell'Essere, sostenendo che l'Essere si identifichi l'Uno. Ora, ciò corrisponde al pensiero di Origene esposto in *TP* 2.4 e alla teoria dell'Origene platonico cristiano. Proclo riporta la definizione dello stile del *Parmenide* come di una 'bellezza disadorna [ἀκαλλώπιστον]' secondo 'un esperto in cose divine' (*C.Parm.* 1.645): questi potrebbe essere Origene, che descriveva lo stile di Platone ἀκαλλώπιστος πιθανότης (come riferito in *C.Tim.* 1.86.25ff.). Proclo attribuisce a 'teologi importanti' la teoria che il Dio della prima ipotesi del *Parmenide* è 'Padre intelligibile', 'la causa di tutti gli esseri' e una 'enade partecipata' (*C.Parm.* 6.1070). Ciò potrebbe essere applicato alla metafisica di Origene Platonico cristiano. Proclo obietta che il Dio della prima ipotesi del *Parmenide* non è nemmeno Padre.

Proclo biasima dunque Origene per non aver posto un principio superiore al Nous e all'Essere (quale l'Uno di Plotino). Secondo Proclo, questa mancanza da parte di Origene dipendeva da 'innovazioni aristoteliche'. In effetti, il medioplatonico Massimo di Tiro, che identificava Dio con il Nous e null'altro di superiore, motivava la sua scelta precisamente con un principio aristotelico: 'l'intelletto più perfetto [ἐντελέστατος] pensa eternamente tutto al contempo' (*Diss.* 11.8). Proclo, asserendo che la protologia di Origene dipendesse da innovazioni aristoteliche, potrebbe anche aver avuto in mente un passo (ora il frammento 13, se effettivamente di Origene) dal *Commento a Giovanni* (opera filosofica, come il *Περὶ ἀρχῶν*) concernente Dio quale Nous che pensa se stesso,

come la divinità aristotelica: il divino è *oikeion* a se stesso e pensa se stesso, essendo il soggetto, l'oggetto e l'attività di pensiero; il Figlio è l'oggetto del pensiero del Padre e a sua volta pensa il Padre. Per Proclo, in effetti, Origene aveva studiato alla scuola di Ammonio, come Plotino, e Ammonio era un Aristotelizzante in quanto 'armonizzatore' di Aristotele con Platone. Origene conosceva bene le dottrine peripatetiche, ma si atteneva ad Esodo 3:14, dove Dio si identifica con l'Essere. Origene commentava filosoficamente questo versetto biblico nella stessa opera filosofica summenzionata (*C.Io.* 13.21.123).

## Regali Mario

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### *Parmenide e il cavallo di Ibico: l'immagine dell'eros senile per la dialettica (Parm. 136e-137c)*

Sulla caratterizzazione di Parmenide si concentra da sempre l'attenzione degli esegeti: chi postula un'evoluzione nel pensiero di Platone scorge in Parmenide il portavoce dell'autore che sottopone a drastica revisione la dottrina delle idee; chi invece crede nella presenza di un sistema filosofico coerente attraverso il *corpus* dei dialoghi ritiene al contrario che Platone intenda prendere le distanze da Parmenide, suggerendo al destinatario uno iato profondo tra la propria voce e la voce del suo personaggio. L'interpretazione del *Parmenide* trova quindi il suo perno nella caratterizzazione di Parmenide, nella quale la critica tenta di scorgere indizi in questa o quella direzione. Altro nodo da sciogliere è poi il rapporto tra le due parti del dialogo: l'esame dell'ipotesi delle idee condotto con Socrate (128e5-136e4), e l'esempio di *gymnasia* condotto con Aristotele il giovane, l'esercizio dialettico di cui, a detta dello stesso Parmenide, Socrate ha bisogno a causa della sua giovane età (137b6-166c5). E nel momento di cesura fra le due sezioni Platone incastona una parafrasi da Ibico, tramite la quale Parmenide descrive il proprio stato d'animo prima di affrontare la nuova indagine, l'*ἀμύχανος πραγματεία* alla quale è invitato. Decisivo è quindi il ruolo che le immagini di Ibico rivestono per l'interpretazione del dialogo: la parafrasi è al centro di una scena dove convergono sia la caratterizzazione di Parmenide sia l'articolazione tra le due sezioni del dialogo.

Parmenide paragona se stesso al "cavallo di Ibico" che, ormai anziano, è chiamato alla gara con i carri e cade in preda al timore perché conosce la fatica e il pericolo ai quali andrà incontro. Il Nel frammento infatti (287 *PMGF*), il poeta, anch'egli anziano, è chiamato alla contesa amorosa e trema di paura a causa della sua età che renderà certo gravosa la sfida ormai prossima, come un vecchio cavallo dal passato vittorioso che si appresta dubbioso alla contesa con i carri. Di fronte alle preghiere degli altri personaggi presenti, Parmenide accetta comunque di intraprendere la vasta indagine, ἡ διὰ πάντων διέξοδος τε καὶ πλάνη, paragonando la propria condizione al *pathos* del cavallo di Ibico (136e1-137a7). Parmenide coglie l'*ἀπεικασία* che Ibico stabilisce tra se stesso, ormai anziano e costretto, ἄκων, ad amare, e il vecchio cavallo che sta per entrare in agone con il carro; allo stesso modo Parmenide, che ben ricorda la difficoltà, teme l'impegno che deve fronteggiare: attraversare un tale "mare di λόγοι" con il peso dell'età avanzata che ora lo opprime. Come vedremo, il tema dell'età è al centro della scena del *Parmenide* sin dalla cornice, costruita con la funzione di aprire al lettore una profonda prospettiva temporale su eventi collocati in un passato remoto: Cefalo di Clazomene, il narratore ormai maturo, aveva incontrato molti anni prima Antifonte, ancora fanciullo, παῖς, in occasione del suo primo viaggio ad Atene, e ora lo cerca di nuovo perché alcuni suoi concittadini, che si occupano di filosofia, sono venuti a sapere che in gioventù Antifonte aveva appreso da Pitodoro, allievo di Zenone, i λόγοι che intrecciarono fra loro Socrate, Zenone e Parmenide (126b1-4). Tale movimento verso il passato è costruito da Platone tramite una serie di coppie di maestri anziani ed allievi giovani (Pitodoro e Antifonte, Zenone e Pitodoro, Parmenide e Zenone, Parmenide e Socrate, Parmenide e Aristotele il giovane), tra le quali l'ultima, che animerà il resto del dialogo, è quella con il più ampio divario d'età. Tramite la parafrasi del frammento di Ibico, Platone costruisce quindi per Parmenide la maschera del maestro anziano che si appresta di

nuovo alla schermaglia erotica con l'allievo giovanissimo: non sfugge la metafora, frequente in Platone, della *paideia* filosofica come rapporto erotico, un motivo che informa di sé il *Simposio*, l'*Alcibiade maggiore e minore*, come la ricca produzione di scuola socratica che nasce attorno al giovane Alcibiade. Ma con l'immagine del faticoso eros senile Platone sembra segnare una distanza profonda dal paradigma dell'eros filosofico di Socrate: non a caso al giovanissimo interlocutore è richiesto di alleviare le difficoltà della ricerca, evitando digressioni e offrendo con le sue risposte occasioni di riposo al maestro anziano (137b6-8). L'eros senile di Parmenide, la cui fatica traspare con chiarezza dalle immagini di Ibico, non è certo l'eros che nel racconto di Diotima dona lo slancio verso la procreazione dei *καλοὶ λόγοι*, ultimo passo prima di affrontare il "mare del bello" (*Symp.* 210c), né la corrente di Eros che trascina alla *φιλοσοφία* al termine della palinodia del *Fedro* (256a-257b). Tramite il cavallo di Ibico, Platone offre un ritratto di Parmenide che si oppone in modo polare al Socrate erotico che emerge dal *Carmide* o dal *Simposio*. Non a caso, nel *Teeteto*, quando Socrate, ormai maturo, ricorda l'incontro avvenuto nel *Parmenide* attribuisce al "venerando e insieme terribile" Parmenide una nobile profondità di pensiero ma ne rifiuta il metodo: tornare sulle tracce di Parmenide desterebbe un problema impossibile da affrontare per vastità (*πλήθει ἀμήχανον*) mentre ora è necessaria la *μαιευτικὴ τέχνη* per far partorire al giovane Teeteto le sue opinioni *περὶ ἐπιστήμης* (183e8-184b1). Nella dialettica di Parmenide Aristotele non ha alcun ruolo e deve anzi porre il minore intralcio possibile al raggiungimento della meta prestabilita; al contrario nella maieutica di Socrate al centro sono Teeteto e le *δόξαι* che egli deve partorire.

L'analisi della parafrasi di Ibico permette quindi di aggiungere un indizio in favore della tesi che scorge nella *gymnasia* una natura introduttiva e preparatoria, che non implica di necessità una svolta filosofica definitiva e programmatica tramite l'abbandono della teoria delle idee. Il *Parmenide* racconta un passato lontano nel quale Socrate incontra l'anziano maestro Parmenide che lo spinge all'esercizio della filosofia; Socrate conserverà l'*horme* che lo stesso Parmenide notava in lui (135d2-3) ma la dirigerà in direzione diversa. Al contrario, sulle tracce di Parmenide, nel *Sofista* e nel *Politico*, proseguirà lo Straniero di Elea, nel quale è possibile scorgere il ritratto del dialettico che conduce ricerche specifiche all'interno della scuola.

Per comprendere la funzione che ha la parafrasi di Ibico nel contesto dialogico del *Parmenide*, è necessario quindi collocare il passo nel più ampio orizzonte del repertorio d'immagini e motivi della tradizione poetica che Platone traduce nella sua scrittura filosofica. Come ha sostenuto di recente Z. Petraki (2011, pp. 71-72) in merito alla *Repubblica*, "Plato is doing much more than merely embedding this type of imagery in the text: the philosopher breaks the link with any traditional literary past [...]. In fact, traditional story-patterns are now encapsulated in mere words [...] which, while evoking traditional thought-patterns and ideas, are intended to play a new (philosophical) role in an innovative environment". Non diversamente, il frammento di Ibico è impiegato nella scena di cesura fra le due sezioni del *Parmenide* per rielaborare, tramite la caratterizzazione di Parmenide, il motivo tradizionale dell'eros pederastico nel mondo nuovo della ricerca speculativa sviluppata con gli strumenti della dialettica. Un'operazione condotta all'interno della scuola, lontano dalle strade di Atene dove al contrario è ancora necessaria la maschera di Socrate e il suo *eros* sempre giovanile.

*Parmenides and Ibycus' horse: the dialectician as an old lover (Parm. 136e-137c)*

Ancient and modern scholars have always focused on Parmenides' characterization in the *Parmenides*: those who postulate an evolution in Plato's thought tend to see in Parmenides the mouthpiece of the author who wants to submit his doctrine of the Forms to a drastic revision; on the contrary, unitarians believe that Plato somehow distances himself from Parmenides: any interpretation of the dialogue requires a full understanding of its protagonist' characterization. Another puzzle that has to be solved is the relation between the two parts in which the dialogue is clearly divided: the critique of the theory of Forms with Socrates (128e5-136e4), and the *gymnasia* with Aristotle the young, the dialectical exercise Socrates needs because of his young age (137b6-166c5). Between the two sections Plato places a paraphrase from Ibycus, through which Parmenides describes his state of mind before starting the new investigation, the ἀμήχανος πραγματεία to which he is called. The role that Ibycus play in the *Parmenides* is therefore extremely relevant: around the paraphrase of his poetry Plato builds a scene which is pivotal both for the characterization of Parmenides and for the articulation between the dialogue's two sections. Parmenides compares himself to Ibycus' horse who, now grown old, is called to the chariot race and comes to fear because he knows out of experience the dangers he will have to face. In fact, in the fragment (287 *PMGF*) the poet is called as an old man to the challenge of love and trembles with fear because of his age, like an old horse who used to win but now is scared in front of the next challenge. Parmenides nevertheless accepts to undertake the vast investigation, ἡ διὰ πάντων διέξοδος τε καὶ πλάνη, comparing his condition to the pathos of Ibycus' horse (136e1-137a7). Parmenides understands well the ἀπεικασία that Ibycus establishes between himself, now old and forced, ἄκων, to love, and the trembling aged horse who is about to enter the agon; in the same way Parmenides fears the commitment he has to face: to cross such a "sea of λόγοι" with the burden of age which now oppresses him. As we shall see, the theme of age is pivotal in *Parmenides'* frame, where Plato introduces the reader to events occurred in a far gone past: the conversation Socrates, Zeno and Parmenides had 50-60 years ago at least (126b1-4). This movement towards the past is built by Plato through several couples of old masters and young students (Pythodorus and Antiphon, Zeno and Pythodorus, Parmenides and Zeno, Parmenides and Socrates, Parmenides and Aristotle the young). The last couple, Parmenides and Aristotle the young who will dominate the rest of the dialogue, is the one with the widest age gap. Through the paraphrase of Ibycus' poetry, Plato then builds for Parmenides the mask of the old master who is trembling for the erotic challenge with the young pupil; once again Plato's reader meets the metaphor of philosophical *paideia* as erotic relationship, a motif which informs the *Symposium* itself, the two *Alcibiades*, and many other works of first generation Socratics about the young Alcibiades. But with the image of the "old lover" Plato seems to distinguish clearly Parmenides' attitude from Socrates' philosophical eros: it is not by chance that Aristotle the young is asked to facilitate Parmenides' task, avoiding digressions and offering him moments to rest (137b6-8). Parmenides' eros, the eros of an old lover, is certainly not the eros that in the *logos* of Diotima gives the impetus towards procreation of the καλοὶ λόγοι, the last step before facing the "great sea of beauty" (*Symp.* 210c), nor the stream of Eros which in the *Phaedrus* drags to φιλοσοφία at the end of the *palinodia* (256a-257b). Through Ibycus' image Plato offers a portrait of Parmenides which is radically different from the erotic Socrates we know from the *Charmides* or the *Symposium*. Not by chance, in the *Theaetetus*, when Socrates, now

mature, remembers the meeting happened in the *Parmenides*, he praises the "venerable and at the same time terrible" Parmenides but rejects his method: returning to Parmenides would raise a problem impossible to deal with (πλήθει ἀμήχανον) while now it is necessary the μαιευτική τέχνη for the young Teetetus and his opinions περί ἐπιστήμης (183e8-184b1). In the dialectic of Parmenides Aristotle the young has almost no part; on the contrary, Socrates' maieutics gives the greatest importance to Theaetetus and to the δόξαι he must give birth to.

The analysis of the paraphrase from Ibycus thus allows us to add a clue in favor of the thesis that sees in the *gymnasia* with Aristotle the young only an introductory and preparatory activity, which does not imply a programmatic turning point by abandoning the theory of Forms. The *Parmenides* tells a distant past in which Socrates meets the old master Parmenides who pushes him to the exercise of philosophy; Socrates will maintain the *horme* that Parmenides himself noted in him (135d2-3) but will lead it in a different direction. On the contrary, the Stranger from Elea will follow the trail of Parmenides' character, probably the portrait of the dialectician who conducts specific research inside Plato's Academy.

To understand the role of Ibycus' poetry in the dialogic context of the *Parmenides*, it is therefore necessary to place it in the broader horizon of the literary motifs that Plato translates into his philosophical writing. As recently claimed by Z. Petraki (2011, pp. 71-72) about the *Republic*, "Plato is doing much more than just embedding this type of imagery in the text [...] In fact, traditional story-patterns are now encapsulated in mere words [...] which, while evoking traditional thought-patterns and ideas, are intended to play a new (philosophical) role in an innovative environment ". Not differently, Ibycus' fragment is used in the pivotal scene between the two sections of the dialogue in order to translate, through the characterization of Parmenides, the traditional themes of pederastic *eros* in the new world of dialectics: the world of Plato's school, away from the streets of Athens where on the contrary the mask of Socrates and its ageless *eros* are still necessary.

### *Poésie et poésie dialogique dans le prologue du Parménide*

D'un point de vue formel, le *Parménide* est unique dans le corpus platonicien. Outre ses particularités stylistiques (Ledger 1989, 164-167), le dialogue comporte un cadre narratif, présenté dans le prologue (126a-130a), d'une exceptionnelle complexité. Le dialogue narré comme forme littéraire relève de la culture orale, alors encore vivace, et des biographies de héros, dont celle de Socrate. Dans le *Phédon*, Échérate écoute le récit que lui fait Phédon, qui a assisté au dernier entretien de Socrate en prison ; dans le *Banquet* le récit d'Apollodore repose sur celui d'Aristodème, qui était présent au banquet d'Agathon. Dans le cas du *Parménide*, la transmission orale est plus complexe encore. Céphale de Clazomènes raconte ce qu'il tient d'Antiphon, lequel à son tour dépend du récit de Pythodore, compagnon de Zénon et non de Socrate, concernant les discussions ayant eu lieu, il y a fort longtemps, entre le jeune Socrate, Zénon et Parménide. Malgré la complexité de la transmission orale, la fidélité de celle-ci est soulignée : Antiphon a entendu à plusieurs reprises le récit de la bouche de Pythodore et il s'est exercé à les apprendre à fond (126c2-3, c7). Céphale a grand désir d'entendre ce récit, à l'image du jeune Socrate venu entendre Zénon faire la lecture de son écrit (γράμματα, 127c3). La seconde partie du prologue (127e-130a) consiste en la discussion, tenue immédiatement après lecture, entre Socrate et Zénon sur le sens de son écrit. L'éloignement temporel et le vif intérêt manifesté par les narrateurs pour les discussions entre Socrate, Zénon et Parménide, ont pour effet d'en souligner l'importance.

Les commentateurs modernes n'ont pas manqué de s'intéresser à l'*historicité* des témoignages contenus dans le prologue : Parménide et Zénon seraient venus à Athènes lors des Grandes Panathénées (127a8), alors âgés de 65 et d'environ 40 ans respectivement (b1-4), indications que les commentateurs ont tendance à considérer comme suffisamment fiables pour l'étude des Éléates. La lecture publique que fait Zénon de son écrit, dont il dit qu'il a été « volé » (ce qui l'a dérobé du choix de le « publier » ou non) constituerait une source précieuse sur la circulation à l'époque des textes écrits (128c-d ; Nails 2002, 308-309 ; Warren 2009, 16-18). Toutefois cette historicité doit à certains égards être mise en doute. Par exemple, le témoignage sur l'âge de Zénon, et donc indirectement celui de Parménide, est incompatible avec celui de Diogène Laërce (IX, 29 ; cf. Mansfeld 1986, 44) ; la possibilité d'une rencontre entre le vieux Parménide et le jeune Socrate (dont rien de précis n'est dit de l'âge, sauf qu'il est très jeune, σφόδρα νέον) est encore plus à caution. En revanche, la manière dont est présentée ces discussions éventuellement fictives attire l'attention du lecteur sur la grande importance de leur contenu (cf. Scolnicov 2003, 44).

Je propose, d'un point de vue méthodologique, que la question de l'*historicité* ne soit pas séparée de celle de l'*intention* de l'auteur Platon, aussi difficile soit-elle à déterminer dans le cas du *Parménide*, et même qu'elle en dépende. La mention des Grandes Panathénées est à cet égard révélatrice. Y ont lieu alors les récitations de poésie, dont celle d'Homère, par divers rhapsodes (cf. *Ion* 530a-b). Outre le fait que la coïncidence entre cet important événement et la visite de philosophes étrangers à Athènes soit tout à fait plausible, Platon entend associer le prestige religieux et culturel des Grandes Panathénées à son agenda philosophique (comme il le fait aussi dans le *Timée*). La lecture publique du texte écrit de Zénon, que Socrate est venu entendre, et le récit des discussions que Pythodore a raconté à plusieurs reprises (πολλάκις) à Antiphon, lequel s'est souvent



exercé afin de s'en souvenir mot pour mot (*ἀπομνημονεύει*, 126c3) et le réciter, suggèrent une analogie entre rhapsodie et philosophie. Quelle est la signification et la portée de cette analogie ? On a assurément raison d'expliquer le choix du dialogue comme genre littéraire par l'intention qu'entretient Platon, d'une part, d'imiter le plus fidèlement possible la discussion vivante et, d'autre part, de rivaliser avec la poésie traditionnelle (p. ex. Montanari 2010, 154). Il convient toutefois de ne pas sous-estimer la *continuité* entre poésie et philosophie platonicienne.

Le *Parménide* (comme le *Phédon*, le *Théétète* et le *Banquet*) comporte une importante dimension commémorative à l'endroit de la figure de Socrate, le maître du dialogue vivant. Certains commentateurs de nos jours estiment pourtant, de manière générale, que le sens du dialogue platonicien résiderait exclusivement dans la représentation de la philosophie en acte (Capuccino 2014, 203 ; cf. Frede 1992, 202) ; l'intention de ces dialogues ne serait pas commémorative puisque, par ailleurs, leur historicité n'est qu'artifice (Clay 2009, p. 118). En réalité, il n'y a pas semble-t-il, pour Platon, un choix à faire entre *le travail de mémoire* et *l'acte de penser* ; les deux apparaissent indissociables (cf. Alrivié 1976, 22 ; Tarrant 1996, 137-138). La biographie ancienne, y compris chez Platon, est d'ailleurs inséparable de la fiction, celle notamment d'un « Socrate potentiel » (Momigliano 1993, p. 146). L'un des avantages du dialogue narré, par comparaison au dialogue joué, réside dans la possibilité de présenter divers modes de réception de la philosophie par le lecteur. La *mimésis* platonicienne est en ce sens une (ré)actualisation dramatique, comme la poésie récitée est poésie en acte (cf. Nagy 2002, 95-96 ; Desclos 2006, 193).

Platon a recours à des stratégies littéraires, il exprime en outre des *réflexions* sur celles-ci. Il rappelle au lecteur de diverses manières qu'un dialogue présenté comme oral est un toujours texte, qui peut être mis en rapport par l'auteur avec d'autres textes (cf. Erler 2007, 78-80). La discussion sur l'écrit de Zénon illustre bien la problématique de l'écrit dans *Phèdre* (274b-278e). Signalons notamment les aspects suivants : sont requises la présence de l'auteur pour son interprétation et surtout une discussion orale adéquate sur celle-ci (128a-c ; cf. *Apol.* 22a-b ; *Théét.* 164e-165a) ; l'auteur porte ainsi secours (*βοήθεια*) à son écrit, en l'occurrence aussi celle d'un autre écrit d'où il est issu (128c6) ; l'auteur n'estime pas son propre texte en tant que texte comme quelque chose de grande valeur (128c2-3) ; la référence au vol de l'écrit de Zénon (128c-e) correspond à l'idée selon laquelle l'écrit n'est plus la propriété de l'auteur et que sa destinée lui échappe. L'illustration, dans le *Parménide*, de cette poétique dialogique constitue en cela la bonne *mimésis* (cf. *Rép.* 398b1-3).

### *Poetry and dialogical poetics in the Prologue of the Parmenides*

From a formal point of view, the *Parmenides* is unique in the Platonic corpus. In addition to its stylistic peculiarities (Ledger 1989, 164-67), its narrative frame, introduced in the prologue (126a-130a), is extremely complex. The literary form of the reported dialogue stems both from oral culture, still very much alive at the time, and from the biographies of heroes, including that of Socrates. In the *Phaedo*, Echecrates listens to the story told by Phaedo, who was a direct witness to Socrates' last discussion in prison; in the *Symposium* Apollodorus' account rests on that of Aristodemus, who was present at Agathon's party. In the case of the *Parmenides*, the oral transmission is more intricate. Cephalus of Clazomenae tells (the reader) what he heard from Antiphon, who in turn depends on the account of Pythodorus, a companion of Zeno rather than Socrates, of the discussions the young Socrates, Zeno and Parmenides had a very long time before. Despite the complexity of the oral transmission, the accuracy of the account is underscored: Antiphon repeatedly heard the story from Pythodorus' mouth and took great care to learn it by

heart (126c2-3, c7). Cephalus keenly wishes to hear the story, similarly to the young Socrates who came to hear Zenon recite his written work (γράμματα, 127c3). The second part of the prologue (127e-130a) consists in the discussion, held immediately after that reading, between Socrates and Zenon on the meaning of his work. Temporal distance and the intense interest expressed by the narrators in the discussions between Socrates, Zenon and Parmenides appear to be designed to underline their importance.

Many modern commentators focus on the *historicity* of the testimonies in the prologue: Parmenides and Zeno are said to have come to Athens at the greater Panathenaea (127a8), then 65 and nearly 40 years old respectively (b1-4), indications commentators tend to regard as sufficiently reliable for the study of the Eleatic school. Zeno's public recitation of his work, written in his youth and "stolen" from him (robbing him of the possibility of choosing whether or not to "publish"), would constitute a valuable source of information on the circulation of written texts at the time (128c-d; cf. Nails 2002, 308-309; Warren 2009, 16-18). This historicity should, however, be questioned in some respects. For instance, the information about Zeno's age, and indirectly about that of Parmenides, is incompatible with Diogenes Laertius' account on the subject (IX.29; cf. Mansfeld 1986, 44); the very possibility of an encounter between the old Parmenides and the young Socrates (the age of whom is not given – he is "very young", σφόδρα νέον) is even more subject to doubt. Be that as it may, the way these apparently fictitious discussions are presented draws attention to the great importance of their content (cf. Scolnicov 2003, 44).

From the methodological viewpoint, I claim that the question of historicity should not be divorced from that of Plato's *intention*, however difficult it is to determine in the case of the *Parmenides*, and that indeed the question of intention should be given priority. The reference to the greater Panathenaea is revealing. These were an important forum for the recitation of poetry, including that of Homer, by various rhapsodists (cf. *Ion* 530a-b). In addition to the likely coincidence between that important event and the visit of philosophers from abroad to Athens, Plato intends to associate the religious and cultural prestige of the greater Panathenaea with his philosophical agenda (as he does also in the *Timaeus*). Zeno's public reading of his written work, which Socrates came to hear, and the story Pythodorus told many times (πολλάκις) to Antiphon, who worked hard to learn it by heart (ἀπομνημονεύει, 126c3) in order to be able to recite it, suggests an analogy between rhapsody and philosophy. What is the significance and scope of that analogy? It is surely possible to explain Plato's choice of the dialogue by his desire to imitate living discussion as faithfully as possible on the one hand, and to compete with traditional poetry on the other (e. g. Montanari 2010, 154). We should not, however, underestimate the *continuity* between poetry and Platonic philosophy.

The *Parmenides* (just as the *Phaedo*, the *Theaetetus* and the *Symposium*) has a significant commemorative dimension regarding the figure of Socrates, the master of living dialogue. Yet some modern commentators believe the significance of the Platonic dialogue to lie exclusively in the presentation of philosophy, or thinking, in action (Capuccino 2014, 203; cf. Frede 1992, 202); besides the intention of the dialogues could not be commemorative since their historicity is but an artifice (Clay 2009, p. 118). In reality, there does not appear to be for Plato a choice between *memory work* and the *act of thinking*, which are indissociably linked (cf. Alrivié 1976, 22; Tarrant 1996, 137-138). Ancient biography, including in Plato, is inseparable from fiction, notably the construction of a "potential Socrates" (Momigliano 1993, p. 146). One of the advantages of the reported dialogue, in comparison to the direct dialogue, lies in the possibility of presenting various modes of reception of philosophy by the reader. Platonic mimesis is in that sense a dramatic

(re)actualization, just as recited poetry is poetry as performance (cf. Nagy 2002, 95-96; Desclos 2006, 193).

Plato not only uses literary strategies but also *reflects* on them. He reminds the reader in various ways that a dialogue presented as direct is still a text, which can be referred to by its author in relation to other texts, both his or her own or others' (cf. Erler 2007, 78-80). The discussion on Zeno's written work is a good illustration of the challenges of writing in the *Phaedrus* (274b-278e). Let us draw attention to the following: a meaningful interpretation of a piece of writing requires the presence of the author (or his/her substitute) and above all an adequate oral discussion of that work (128a-c; cf. *Apol.* 22a-b; *Theaet.* 164e-165a); the author thus comes to the defence (*βοήθεια*) of his work, in this case to that of another book it stems from (128c6); the author regards his or her own text as of no great value (128c2-3). The reference to the theft of Zeno's work (128c-e) corresponds to the idea that a work once put into writing is no longer its author's property, that its destiny escapes the latter's control. The illustration of this dialogical poetics in the *Parmenides*, constitutes good mimesis (cf. *Rep.* 398b1-3).

### *L'argomento del "terzo uomo" nel Parmenide.*

Tra i tanti argomenti di primo piano offerto dal *Parmenide* c'è senz'altro il cosiddetto *trìtos ánthropos*, di cui altri due versioni si trovano in *Rep.* 597c1-d3 con il cosiddetto *argomento del letto* e in *Tim.* 31a2-b3 con *l'argomento dell'idea del cosmo*. In genere il *trìtos ánthropos* è un argomento che ha assunto e ancora continua ad assumere una rilevanza filosofica di eccezionale valore, non fosse altro che per il fatto di essere stato addotto da Aristotele (da qui la denominazione per il suo esempio dell'uomo) in *Metaph.* 990b17-1079a13, 1039a2 e in *Soph. Ref.* 178b36 ss. contro la teoria delle idee dello stesso Platone. Per quanto riguarda più strettamente la posizione nel *Parmenide* innanzitutto sembrano imporsi due coordinate che lo incorniciano: la prima interna al duplice testo del dialogo in una economia peculiare non trascurabile della sua struttura; la seconda esterna di *background* storiografico, per così dire, rinvenibile solo in un'unica fonte peripatetica non priva di sospetti. Per quanto riguarda questa seconda coordinata, dalla quale forse sarebbe conveniente partire, Alessandro di Afrodisia in *Metaph.* 83,12-85,17 registra due distinti *lògoi* contro la tesi dell'esistenza delle idee: il primo non contiene affatto l'argomento del terzo uomo, ma solo l'unico della partecipazione per somiglianza tra la realtà chiamata "idea" e i loro mutui somiglianti; 2) il secondo concerne proprio quattro tipi di terzo uomo, tre dei quali sono privi del concetto di partecipazione e sono basati sulla predicazione delle sostanze concepite come predicati universali realmente esistenti e identificati con l'idee platoniche. Solo l'argomento del sofista Polisseno combina il concetto di predicazione con quello di partecipazione, argomentando proprio che nell'impossibilità di poter far partecipare l'idea ai rispettivi sensibili introduce una terza entità intermedia tra i due poli perché fosse giustificabile la procedura della partecipazione e quindi della conseguente predicazione.

Questo quadro che si mostra abbastanza pluralistico e complesso dovrebbe provocare un approccio a tale argomento diverso da quello che si potrebbe valutare come una semplificazione scolastica, cioè quello di giudicarlo unico e monolitico sulla scia della trattazione aristotelica. Con l'intervento di Aristotele si focalizza una certa concentrazione forse più rappresentativa e più specificamente modellata su motivi prevalentemente polemico-elenctici di segno anti-accademico, oltre a fornire la denominazione comune ai disparati fenomeni raccordabile a una procedura dialettica della *reductio ad absurdum*, che ha come nerbo probativo la nozione zenoniana del *progressum in infinitum*. Platone impiega, adatta o forse più propriamente concepisce in modo alquanto originale e inedito un argomento diffuso o almeno abbastanza usato nelle diatribe filosofiche, sicuramente molto prestante a configurazioni ulteriori e in qualche modo indipendenti. Tale argomento, che secondo le sue due versioni occupa la terza (*Parm.* 132a1-b2) e la quinta aporia (*Parm.* 132c-133a3) delle 6 nel proemio, indubbiamente fornisce un principio logico-dialettico ritenuto stringente in un contesto aporetico in cui (e per tutto il dialogo del *Parmenide*) il venerabile maestro ormai di età molto avanzata dà prova di maneggiare la tecnica del giovane discente in modo molto più appropriato e mirabile del discente stesso. Di conseguenza i due argomenti platonici anche se presentano una modulazione sostanzialmente identica, sembrano prospettare due (scelte?) trattazioni peculiari che si fondano sulla categoria della partecipazione e su quella della rassomiglianza, quindi non propriamente sulla giustificabilità di un intermediario ma

sul rapporto diretto ed esclusivo tra l'unità eidetica e la molteplicità sensibile diveniente, il tema principale che Parmenide sceglie tra i vari possibili menzionati per l'esercizio dialettico da affrontare nel dialogo. Ciò che sorprende immediatamente dal punto di vista linguistico è che mancano del tutto i termini *trìton*, anche se non è possibile dedurre che Platone non ne conoscesse l'argomento, almeno nella forma in cui si conosce di Polisseno, ma è molto probabile che anche in quella aristotelica, e *kategorèin*, il che non vuol dire affatto che Platone ignorasse una tale funzione analitico-proposizionale (anzi si è parlato di autopredicazione dell'idea stessa), come emerge anche nel *Soph.* 262e3ss circa il tema del *discorso*, e soprattutto i suoi risvolti teoretico-filosofici. Si dovrebbe trattare invece di una latente esclusione di aspetti o formulazioni dell'argomento, che Platone dovrebbe considerare inconsistenti e autocontraddittori, ma che gli accademici avrebbero in seguito riproposto per ragioni di controversie incentrate su di esse. Capire anche questi rilievi, oltre alla ragione e alla portata delle elaborazioni platoniche di tali testi all'interno del *Parmenide* e per la teoria delle idee in genere, vorrebbe essere lo scopo di questo studio.

*The argument of the "third man" (TMA) in the Parmenides.*

Among so many prominent arguments offered by the *Parmenides* there is certainly the so-called *trìtos ánthropos*, of which two other versions are in *Rep.* 597c1-d3 with the so-called *bed argument* and in *Tim.* 31a2-b3 with the *argument of cosmos' idea*. Generally the *trìtos ánthropos* is an argument that has assumed and still continues to assume a philosophical relevance of exceptional value, if only for the fact of having been adduced by Aristotle (hence the denomination for his example of man) in *Metaph.* 990b17-1079a13, 1039a2 and in *Soph.* Ref. 178b36 ff. against Plato's theory of ideas. As regards the position in the *Parmenides* more closely, first of all two coordinates, which frame it, appear to be necessary: the first one inside the double text of the dialogue in a peculiar non-negligible economy of its structure; the second external of historiographical background, as it were, traceable only in a single peripatetic source that is not without suspicion. As for this second coordinate, perhaps it would be convenient to start from, Alexander of Aphrodisias in *Metaph.* 83.12-85.17 records two distinct *lògoi* against the thesis of the existence of ideas: the first does not contain the third man's argument at all, but only the one of participation by the likeness between the reality called "idea" and its resembling ones; 2) the second concerns just four types of third man, three of which are devoid of the concept of participation and are based on the predication of substances conceived as universal predicates actually existing and identified with Platonic ideas. Only the argument of the sophist Polixenus combines the concept of predication with that of participation, arguing precisely that in the impossibility of the idea to participate in respective sensitive ones a third intermediate entity between the two poles is to be introduced to justify the procedure of participation and therefore of the consequent predication.

This framework, which appears to be quite pluralistic and complex, should provoke an approach to this subject different from the common one considerable as a scholastic simplification, that is as unique and monolithic topic in the wake of the Aristotelian treatment. Aristotle's intervention focuses a certain concentration perhaps more representative and more specifically modeled on mainly polemic-elenctic grounds of anti-academic sign, as well as providing the common denomination to the disparate phenomena connected to a dialectical procedure of the *reductio ad absurdum*, which has Zeno's notion of *progressum in infinitum* as a probative force. Plato employs, adapts or perhaps more properly conceives in a rather original and unprecedented way a widespread argument or at least quite used in philosophical diatribes, certainly very

disposable to further and in some way independent configurations. This argument, which according to its two versions occupies the third (*Parm.* 132a1-b2) and the fifth aporia (*Parm.* 132c-133a3) of the 6 in the poem, undoubtedly provides a logical-dialectical principle considered cogent in an aporetic context in which (and for all the dialogue of Parmenides) the venerable master of very advanced age proves now to handle the young learner's technique in a much more appropriate and admirable way than the learner himself. Consequently, the two Plato's arguments, even if they present a substantially identical modulation, seem to suggest two (chosen?) peculiar treatises of its, based on the category of participation and resemblance, therefore not properly on the justification of an intermediary but on the direct and exclusive relationship between the eidetic unity and the sensitive becoming multiplicity, the main theme that Parmenides chooses among the various possible mentioned ones for the dialectical exercise to be addressed in the dialogue. What is surprising immediately from the linguistic point of view is that the terms *trìton* is completely missing, even if it is not possible to deduce that Plato did not know the subject, at least in the form in which it is known of Polixenus, but it is very probable in the Aristotelian one too, just as well as the term *kategorèin*, which does not at all mean that Plato ignored such an analytical-propositional function (on the contrary, there has been talk of self-predication of the idea itself), as also shown in the *Soph.* 262e3 ff about the theme of the speech, and above all its theoretical-philosophical implications. Instead, it should be a latent exclusion of aspects or formulations of the argument, Plato should consider inconsistent and self-contradictory, but the Academics would later re-propose for reasons of controversy centered on them. Understanding these aspects, besides the reason and the scope of the Platonic elaborations of such texts within the *Parmenides* and for the theory of ideas in general, would be the aim of this study.

### *A Long Lost Relative in the Parmenides? Plato's Family of Hypothetical Methods*

Plato's *Parmenides* has not received the attention it deserves from a methodological perspective, especially as concerns its systematic use of the language of hypothesis. In this paper I argue that the *Parmenides* contains a unique but overlooked method for testing first principles, a method I call 'exploring both sides'. Plato has Parmenides recommend exploring the consequences of both a hypothesis and its contradictory then has him employ the method throughout the second half of the dialogue. It is a genuine dialectical method, but distinct from the so-called 'method of hypothesis' of the *Meno*, *Phaedo*, and *Republic* in both structure and aim. In this way I challenge Richard Robinson's influential dismissal of the *Parmenides* as being of little methodological importance.

Interpreters interested in Plato's use of 'hypothesis' (ὑπόθεσις) have focused on the *Meno*, *Phaedo*, and *Republic* and for good reason: each dialogue not only uses the term, but does so in central passages that show a keen methodological and epistemological interest in hypotheses. But there is less of a good reason to focus on these three dialogues to the neglect of the *Parmenides*. This neglect goes at least as far back as Robinson's classic study *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, first published in 1941, the second half of which is dedicated to Plato's use of 'hypothesis'. Robinson includes a chapter on the *Parmenides* only to argue that it shouldn't be combined with any of the other evidence he considered.<sup>1</sup> He admits that the dialogue "comes nearest of all Plato's works to being wholly methodological" (267) but adds "the methodological aspect of the *Parmenides*... seems to be, like its other aspects, bewildering, sceptical, and depressing" (280). This demotion of the *Parmenides* from the ranks of methodologically interesting dialogues has been as influential as it was premature.

Just looking to the language of hypothesis gives a *prima facie* case for taking the dialogue seriously from a methodological perspective. Out of 100 total occurrences in Plato (41 of the noun-form 'ὑπόθεσις' and 59 of the verb-form 'ὑποτίθημι'), nearly a quarter appear in Plato's *Parmenides*. This is by far the most out of any Platonic dialogue: there are 23 occurrences in the *Parmenides*, with *Republic* coming in at a distant second with 15 occurrences, and *Phaedo* and *Laws* tied for third at 10. The difference is even more striking in terms of frequency. Plato uses 'hypothesis' and its cognates an average of over 15 times per 10,000 words in the *Parmenides*, over twice as often as the *Meno* and *Republic* VI–VII at about 7 times per 10,000 words each. Not a single other dialogue has a frequency of 5 or greater, just a third of the frequency in the *Parmenides*.

A further piece of *prima facie* evidence for hypothesis being central to the *Parmenides* is its distribution throughout the dialogue. The language of hypothesis does not simply appear in one isolated section, but is used consistently from the very first pages to the very last. It is most concentrated around the central methodological passage (135c5–137c3), which explicitly

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<sup>1</sup> In fact, this chapter was absent from the first edition, and only appeared with the second edition published in 1953.

recommends exploring both sides. I argue that the method is thematized from the very beginning of the dialogue with Zeno's display and is repeatedly employed throughout.

I suggest that, while exploring both sides shares its hypothetical nature with the canonical method of the *Meno*, *Phaedo*, and *Republic*, it is distinct in both structure and aim. Each respective method can be characterized by the following conditions:

#### **Exploring both sides**

Structure: (1a) deriving consequences from a hypothesis

(1b) deriving consequences from the contradictory of that hypothesis Aim:

(1c) assessing the truth of the hypotheses based on their consequences

#### **The canonical 'method of hypothesis'**

Structure: (2a) Identifying a 'higher' hypothesis from which some thesis can be derived (2b)

Deriving consequences from that hypothesis

Aim: (2c) Assessing the truth of the thesis based on that of the 'higher' hypothesis

Both methods are hypothetical in structure since they involve deriving consequences from some hypothesis (1a & 2b). Yet exploring both sides is set apart by the 'lateral' step of looking to the contradictory hypothesis (1b) as opposed to the 'vertical' step of identifying a higher hypothesis in the canonical method (2a). This difference goes hand in hand with a difference in aim, more specifically what I call their 'internal' as opposed to 'external' aim (1c & 2c). The 'lateral' step of exploring both sides is precisely what is needed when testing candidate first principles; in the case of a genuine first principle, there is nowhere higher 'up' to go. And this is precisely how it is employed in the second half of the *Parmenides*.

Furthermore, the method can be used to encourage further inquiry when an interlocutor might otherwise give up. This is what Plato has Parmenides do when he points out that, despite the serious problems they have encountered with Socrates' theory of forms, someone who *denies* their existence will "destroy the ability for dialectic" (135c1-2). It is immediately after this that Parmenides recommends the method of exploring both sides.

The same method of exploring both sides appears in other dialogues in the discussion of first principles as well, including the *Cratylus*, the central discussion of being and not-being in the *Sophist*, and even the *Lysis*. The *Lysis* is traditionally taken to be from an earlier period of Plato's development, and in the *Sophist* exploring both sides appears simultaneously with the distinct method of collection and division. My argument suggests that, instead of changing his mind from one period to the next, Plato develops a family of distinct dialectical methods, each with its own peculiar aim. While they are put to work for different purposes, we must not neglect this unique and important method that Plato introduces most explicitly in the *Parmenides* and that serves as a central theme throughout the dialogue.

### *¿Un pariente perdido en el Parménides? La familia platónica de métodos hipotéticos*

El *Parménides* de Platón no ha recibido la atención que merece desde una perspectiva metodológica, especialmente en lo que concierne al uso sistemático del lenguaje de la hipótesis. En



este trabajo, sostengo que el *Parménides* contiene, aunque haya sido pasado por alto, un método único para poner a prueba primeros principios, un método que denomino ‘explorar ambos lados’. Platón le recomienda a Parménides que explore las consecuencias de una hipótesis, así como de la hipótesis contradictoria; luego, le pide que emplee el método a lo largo de la segunda mitad del diálogo. Es un método dialéctico genuino, pero distinto del así llamado ‘método de la hipótesis’ del *Menón*, *Fedón* y *República*, tanto en su estructura como en su objetivo. De esta manera, pongo en duda el influyente rechazo del *Parménides* expresado por Richard Robinson por la poca importancia metodológica que supuestamente tendría este diálogo platónico.

Los intérpretes interesados en el uso de la “hipótesis” (ὑπόθεσις) por parte de Platón se han concentrado en *Menón*, *Fedón* y *República*, y lo han hecho por un buen motivo: cada uno de estos diálogos no sólo recurre a este término, sino que lo hace en pasajes centrales que muestran un vivo interés metodológico y epistemológico en las hipótesis. Pero no hay en verdad buenas razones para enfocarse en estos tres diálogos y descuidar el *Parménides*. Este descuido se remonta, cuanto menos, al estudio clásico de Robinson *Plato's Earlier Dialectic* [*La dialéctica platónica temprana*], publicado por primera vez en 1941, cuya segunda mitad está dedicada al uso de la “hipótesis” por parte de Platón. Robinson incluye un capítulo sobre el *Parménides* sólo para afirmar que éste no debería relacionarse con ninguna de las otras evidencias que consideró.<sup>1</sup> Admite que el diálogo en cuestión “de todas las obras de Platón es el más próximo a ser totalmente metodológico” (267) pero agrega que “el aspecto metodológico del *Parménides* [...] parece ser, así como sus otros aspectos, desconcertante, escéptico y deprimente” (280). Esta degradación del *Parménides* del rango de los diálogos metodológicamente interesantes ha sido tan influyente como prematura.

El solo hecho de observar el lenguaje de la hipótesis da *prima facie* una oportunidad para tomar en serio el diálogo desde una perspectiva metodológica. De las 100 apariciones totales en la obra de Platón (41 de la forma sustantiva ‘ὑπόθεσις’ y 59 de la forma verbal ‘ὑποτιθημι’), casi una cuarta parte tiene lugar en el *Parménides*. Este es, por lejos, el máximo en cualquier diálogo platónico: hay 23 apariciones en el *Parménides*, mientras que en un distante segundo lugar se ubica *República* con 15 de ellas, y *Fedón* y *Leyes* empatan por el tercer lugar con 10. La diferencia es aún más notable en términos de frecuencia. Platón usa en el *Parménides* el término ‘hipótesis’ y sus cognados un promedio de más de 15 veces por cada 10.000 palabras, más del doble de la asiduidad con la que se lo puede encontrar en *Menón* y *República* VI-VII, en los que se ubica en cerca de 7 veces por cada 10.000 palabras en cada uno. Ningún otro diálogo tiene una frecuencia de 5 o más veces, lo que representa solo un tercio de la frecuencia en *Parménides*.

Otra prueba *prima facie* de evidencia de que la hipótesis es central para el *Parménides* es su distribución a lo largo del diálogo. El lenguaje de la hipótesis no aparece simplemente en una sección aislada, sino que se usa constantemente desde las primeras hasta las últimas páginas. Se encuentra más concentrado en torno al pasaje metodológico central (135c5–137c3), que explícitamente recomienda explorar ambos lados. Sostengo que el método está tematizado desde el comienzo mismo del diálogo con la exposición de Zenón y se emplea repetidamente en todas partes.

Sugiero que, mientras el explorar ambos lados comparte su naturaleza hipotética con el método canónico del *Menón*, *Fedón* y *República*, a su vez, es distinto tanto en su estructura como en su objetivo. Cada método respectivo puede ser caracterizado por las siguientes condiciones:

### **Explorar ambos lados**

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1 De hecho, este capítulo estuvo ausente en la primera edición, y sólo apareció con la segunda edición publicada en 1953.

Estructura: (1a) derivar consecuencias de una hipótesis

(1b) derivar consecuencias de la hipótesis contradictoria Objetivo:

(1c) evaluar la verdad de las hipótesis en base a sus consecuencias

### **El 'método de hipótesis' canónico**

Estructura: (2a) identificar una hipótesis 'superior' de la cual se puedan derivar ciertas tesis

(2b) derivar consecuencias de esa hipótesis

Objetivo: (2c) evaluar la verdad de la tesis basada en aquella correspondiente a la hipótesis 'superior'

Ambos métodos tienen una estructura hipotética, ya que involucran la derivación de consecuencias de ciertas hipótesis (1a y 2b). Sin embargo, el explorar ambos lados se distingue por el paso 'lateral' de dar atención a la hipótesis contradictoria (1b) en oposición al paso 'vertical' de identificar una hipótesis superior, tal como en el método canónico (2a). Esta diferencia va de la mano con una divergencia en el objetivo, más específicamente lo que llamo su objetivo 'interno' en oposición al 'externo' (1c y 2c). El paso 'lateral' de explorar ambos lados es precisamente lo que resulta necesario al poner a prueba a los primeros principios propuestos; en el caso de un primer principio genuino, no hay ningún lugar superior al que recurrir 'más arriba'. Y así es precisamente la forma en que se emplea en la segunda mitad del *Parménides*.

Además, el método puede utilizarse para alentar una mayor investigación cuando un interlocutor se diera por vencido. Esto es lo que hace Platón cuando Parménides señala que, a pesar de los serios problemas que han encontrado con la teoría de las formas de Sócrates, alguien que niegue su existencia "destruirá la capacidad de la dialéctica" (135c1-2). Inmediatamente después de esto, Parménides recomienda el método de explorar ambos lados.

El mismo método de explorar ambos lados aparece en otros diálogos en la discusión de los primeros principios, incluyendo al *Crátilo*, tanto como a la discusión central de ser y no ser en el *Sofista*, e incluso *Lisis*. Tradicionalmente se considera a *Lisis* como proveniente de un período temprano del desarrollo de Platón, y en el *Sofista* el explorar ambos lados aparece simultáneamente con el método diferente de colección y división. Mi argumento sugiere que, en lugar de cambiar de opinión de un período al siguiente, Platón desarrolla, en cambio, una familia de métodos dialécticos distintos, cada uno con su propio objetivo peculiar. Si bien son puestos en obra para diferentes propósitos, no debemos descuidar este método único e importante que Platón introduce más explícitamente en el *Parménides* y que sirve como un tema central a lo largo del diálogo.

### *La presenza del Parmenide di Platone nel dibattito antico sulla dialettica*

Nello sviluppo delle molteplici tesi o ipotesi (*hypotheseis*) sull'uno che Platone presenta nella seconda parte del *Parmenide* (*Parm.* 137 C sgg.), viene coinvolta una serie di nozioni che sono esattamente lo strumento mediante il quale è possibile giungere alla conclusione di ciascuna, positiva o negativa che essa sia. Esse sono principalmente le nozioni di totalità, mutamento, identità, somiglianza, uguaglianza, ed altre relative al luogo e al tempo.

La particolarità di tale uso sta nel fatto che queste nozioni, indicate esplicitamente come ciò di cui l'uno "è affetto" (*paschonton, peponthon*) (*Parm.* 135 E; 140 A; *passim*), vale a dire come determinazioni che all'uno sono attribuibili, non sono assunte in generale, ma nel loro rapporto col termine a ciascuna opposto. Anzi, è proprio questa forma delle nozioni, cioè il loro essere strutturate in coppie di opposti, ciò che consente il procedere argomentativo in ciascun caso. Tali coppie sono infatti costituite dai concetti di tutto e parte (*holon-meros*), in quiete e in moto (*hestanai-kineisthai*), identico e diverso (*tauton-heteron*), simile e dissimile (*homoion-anomoion*), uguale e disuguale (*ison-anison*), più vecchio e più giovane (*presbyteron-neoteron*), e così via.

Particolarmente significative in sé, e in ordine ad ulteriori riflessioni offerte dallo stesso Platone in diversi luoghi, ma anche dalla tradizione filosofica a lui contemporanea e successiva, sono le coppie costituite da identico e diverso, simile e dissimile ed uguale e disuguale. È esattamente sul modo in cui Platone tratta di queste coppie di opposti nel *Parmenide*, soprattutto nell'ambito delle prime tesi, che qui si vuole concentrare l'attenzione (*Parm.* 139 B sgg.), tenendo conto del fatto che esse hanno molta fortuna nell'ambito del dibattito filosofico antico anche e proprio per l'intima connessione che presentano, fin dall'inizio, con la dialettica.

Se è vero infatti che proprio nel *Parmenide* esse sono utilizzate in quello che esplicitamente viene indicato come "esercizio" (*gymnasia*) della dialettica (*Parm.* 135 B sgg.), è anche vero che tale esercizio, senza di esse, non avrebbe nemmeno luogo. Da questo punto di vista, sembra dunque di poter riconoscere che il legame esplicito e articolato tra queste nozioni, intese nella loro forma di coppie di opposti, e la dialettica abbia nel *Parmenide* una delle sue massime espressioni nell'ambito del pensiero platonico. Né si può ritenere che tale legame sia da considerarsi limitato al caso della dialettica vista come puro "esercizio", vale a dire come procedimento argomentativo fine a se stesso. Nel *Sofista*, infatti, l'identico (*tauton*) e il diverso (*heteron*), insieme ad essere, moto e quiete, sono dimostrati essere due dei cinque sommi generi (*megista gene*) (cfr. spec. *Soph.* 254 B - 255 E), e in questo caso nessuno dubita che ciò sia ottenuto da Platone mediante una discussione dialettica che è essa stessa filosofia, ed anzi filosofia in uno dei suoi momenti più alti.

Il legame stretto fra la dialettica e le nozioni di identico e diverso, simile e dissimile, uguale e disuguale rimane anche in Aristotele. Basti ricordare la loro presenza nei *Topici*, trattato da lui espressamente dedicato alla dialettica – intesa come vera e propria *techne* indipendente –, dove si riscontra come intorno ad esse ruoti una molteplicità di "luoghi notevoli" (*topoi*), e soprattutto intorno all'identico (*tauton*), che viene a costituirsi come uno dei temi principali (cfr. *Top.* VII). In tal senso già Aristotele, ma anche altri esponenti dell'Accademia antica, come Speusippo – autore dell'opera intitolata *Homoia*, cioè appunto *Simili* – e Senocrate, pur in modi diversi, si può dire che

siano protagonisti di un vero e proprio dibattito non solo sulla dialettica in generale, ma anche e proprio, e comunque in relazione ad essa, sulle nozioni citate.

Ora, ciò che si vuole proporre in questa sede, sulla base di un'attenta riconsiderazione dell'uso di tali nozioni nel *Parménide*, è di collegare la dottrina platonica al pensiero di Aristotele, preferendolo ad altre possibili prese di posizione al riguardo. Questo, tuttavia, non perché si intenda operare un confronto fra le due trattazioni o le rispettive argomentazioni dialettiche sulle nozioni di identico e diverso, simile e dissimile, uguale e disuguale, ma perché è Aristotele stesso che in due passi della *Metafisica* attribuisce a "i dialettici" (*hoi dialektikoi*) una trattazione di queste nozioni e a tale trattazione oppone esplicitamente la propria (cfr. Aristot. *Metaph.* III 1, 995 b 21-27; IV 2, 1003 b 33 - 1004 b 10). In passato si era proposto di identificare tali "dialettici" con "Platone e i platonici", ma sulla base del confronto soprattutto con il *Sofista*. Si tratterebbe dunque ora di vedere, in base all'uso che di tali nozioni Platone opera nel *Parménide*, se e in quale misura Aristotele possa essersi riferito anche e forse soprattutto a questo luogo platonico. Se tale breve indagine avesse un qualche esito positivo, si tratterebbe di poter riconoscere una presenza effettiva e circostanziata della presenza del *Parménide* di Platone nel dibattito antico sulla dialettica fin dai suoi inizi.

### *La présence du Parménide de Platon dans l'ancien débat sur la dialectique*

Dans le développement des nombreuses thèses ou hypothèses (*hypotheseis*) sur l'un qui sont présentées par Platon dans la deuxième partie de *Parménide* (*Parm.* 137 C ss.), apparaissent certaines notions qui sont exactement l'« outil » par lequel il est possible d'atteindre la conclusion de chacune d'entre eux, positif ou négatif que ce soit. Ce sont principalement les notions de « totalité », de « changement », d'« identité », de « ressemblance », d'« égalité » et autres, relatives au lieu et au temps.

La particularité de cet usage consiste dans le fait que ces notions, désignées explicitement comme « ce dont on souffre » (*paschonton, peponthon*) (*Parm.* 135 E; 140 A; *passim*), c'est-à-dire comme déterminations qui sont attribuables à un, ne sont pas considérées en général, mais chacune est considérée en rapport à son terme opposé. En effet, c'est précisément cette structure formelle qui permet la procédure argumentative dans tous les cas. Ces couples sont en fait constitués par les concepts de « tout » et de « partie » (*holon-meros*), « immobiles » et « en mouvement » (*hestanai-kineisthai*), « identique » et « différent » (*tauton-heteron*), « semblable » et « dissemblable » (*homoion-anomoion*), « égal » et « inégal » (*ison-anison*), « plus vieux » et « plus jeune » (*presbyteron-neoteron*), et ainsi de suite.

Très important en soi (mais aussi pour le développement de quelques réflexions supplémentaires, offertes par Platon lui-même dans de nombreux textes, mais aussi par la tradition philosophique contemporaine et postérieure), sont les paires composées de « identique » et « différent », de « semblable » et « dissemblable » et d'« égal » et « inégal ». C'est précisément sur la manière dont Platon traite ces paires d'opposés dans le *Parménide*, et en particulier dans le contexte des premières thèses, que je voudrais attirer mon attention (*Parm.* 139 B ss.), compte tenu

du fait que, depuis les temps anciens, ils ont suscité beaucoup d'intérêt pour la connexion intime qu'elles présentent, dès le début, avec la dialectique.

En fait, s'il est vrai que dans le *Parménide* ces notions sont utilisées dans ce que l'on appelle explicitement « exercice » (*gymnasia*) de la dialectique (*Parm.* 135 B ss.), il est également vrai que cet exercice n'aurait même pas lieu sans elles. De ce point de vue, je pense que le lien explicite et articulée entre ces concepts, conçues sous la forme de paires d'opposés, et la dialectique, a dans le *Parménide* une de ses expressions les plus élevées dans le contexte de la pensée platonicienne.

De plus, on ne peut pas considérer que ce lien soit limité au cas de la dialectique considérée comme un « exercice » pur, c'est-à-dire comme un processus argumentatif privé d'un autre but. Dans le *Sophiste*, en fait, Platon démontre qu'« identique » (*tauton*) et « différent » (*heteron*), avec « être », « mouvement » et « immobilité », font partie des cinq genres suprêmes (*megista gene*) (voir *Soph.* 254 B - 255 E), et, dans ce cas, personne doute que ceci soit réalisé par le philosophe à travers une discussion dialectique, qui est elle-même « philosophie » – et en particulier la philosophie dans un de ses plus « haut » moments –.

Le lien existent entre la dialectique et les notions d' « identique » et « différent », « semblable » et « dissemblable », « égal » et « inégal » demeure également dans Aristote. Il suffit de se souvenir de leur présence dans les *Topiques*, œuvre qu'il a expressément consacré à la dialectique – entendue comme une véritable *techne* indépendante – où il constate que ces notions sont connectées à une multiplicité de « lieux d'importance particulière » (*topoi*) et surtout à l'identique (*tauton*), qui est l'un des thèmes principaux (voir *Top* VII).

De ce point de vue, Aristote, mais aussi d'autres représentants de l'ancienne Académie, tels que Speusippe – auteur de l'œuvre intitulée *Homoia*, c'est-à-dire *Similaires* – et Senocrates, peuvent être considérés comme les protagonistes d'un véritable débat dialectique sur les concepts mentionnés.

Maintenant, sur la base d'un réexamen minutieux de l'utilisation de ces notions dans le *Parménide*, je voudrais essayer de relier la doctrine platonicienne à la pensée d'Aristote, en la préférant à d'autres points de vue sur ce thème. Ce n'est pas parce que j'ai l'intention de faire une comparaison entre les deux arguments dialectiques concernant les notions d' « identique » et « différent », « semblable » et « dissemblable », « égal » et « inégal », mais parce que c'est Aristote lui-même qui, dans la *Métaphysique*, attribue aux « dialectiques » (*hoi dialektikoi*) une discussion sur ces notions et qu'oppose ce traitement au sien (voir Aristot. *Metaph.* III 1, 995 b 21-27 ; IV 2, 1003 b 33 - 1004 b 10).

Dans le passé, il avait été proposé d'identifier ces « dialectiques » avec « Platon et les platoniciens », sur la base de la comparaison avec le *Sophiste*. Il s'agit maintenant de voir, sur la base de l'utilisation de telles notions, que Platon travaille dans le *Parménide*, si et dans quelle mesure Aristote a pu se référer à ce texte platonicien. Si cette enquête aboutissait à un résultat positif, on pourrait reconnaître la présence réelle du *Parménide* de Platon dans le débat antique sur la dialectique depuis ses débuts.

## Sabrier Pauline

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### *Is the Sophist a sequel to the Parmenides? The question of the unity of the world in the two dialogues*

In his 2002 seminal paper, Brisson proposes a new interpretation of Plato's *Parmenides*, whereby he defends the view that the dialogue is best understood as being addressed, from beginning to end, to the question of the historical Parmenides, namely 'Is the world one?'. One strength of Brisson's interpretation is that it allows us to understand better the notoriously vexed question of the relation between the two parts of the dialogue: according to his interpretation, the first part stages how the theory of Forms is initially a response to the Eleatics, whereas the second part offers an example of how the Eleatics themselves address the problem. Brisson's thesis is illuminating in many respects. Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether and how the issues raised in the *Parmenides* are addressed by Plato.

The central claim I shall defend in this paper is that in the *Sophist*, Plato takes over the Parmenidean question about the unity of the world, but this time, as opposed to what is happening in the second part of the *Parmenides*, he addresses it using properly Platonic tools.

— First, I shall argue that the problem of the unity of the world is raised in a particularly acute way at the end of the Gigantomachia passage at 249d, when the Eleatic Stranger declares that being (*to on*), that is the totality (*to pan*), encompasses both together all that which is changing and all that which is changeless. For if the conclusion about being reached by Theaetetus and the Eleatic Stranger is correct, then it raises two questions about the unity of the world: (i) how being can consist of things that are not only distinct from one another, in the sense of being different and non-overlapping, but most opposed (*enantiôtata*) to one another, and nevertheless remain one; (ii) how being can relate to changing and changeless things in such a way that each and both kinds of things are.

— Second, I shall argue that Plato addresses these two questions in the passages where he examines and defends the communion among Being, Change and Rest. More to the point, I shall argue that he makes two important claims for the problem of the unity of the world: (i) first, that the world is not the mere sum of its parts but has a structure; (ii) second, that Being is inseparable from Change and Rest. Starting with the first point (i), I shall show that the argument for it is to be found in the claim that Being has communion with Change and Rest but that Change and Rest do not combine with one another, that is defended at length at 251e-252e. In particular, I shall pay attention to how Plato defends this claim against the view that everything combine with every thing, which, or so I shall argue, amounts to the opposite view about the world, namely that the world has no structure but is the mere sum of its parts. I shall rely here on some of the analyses put forward by Harte on her book on parts and wholes. Turning to the second point (ii), I shall defend it on the basis of a close analysis of the description of the relation among Being, Change and Rest at 250b7-10. Critics usually take this passage as making the point that Being is different from Change and Rest and that we thus have to posit three Forms (Being, Change and Rest) and not two or even one. Whereas I believe that this view is partially correct, it is insufficient in that it ignores the strikingly spacial vocabulary that the Eleatic Stranger is using here to describe the relation among the three kinds. By contrast, I shall take seriously Plato's claim that Being encompasses (*periechein*)

and comprises (*sullabein*) Change and Rest, as meaning that although Being is different from Change and Rest, both taken separately and taken together as a group, Being is not separate or distinct from them. In other words, it means that we cannot have the one without having the others, that is, searching for Being, we cannot find it without at the same time finding either Change or Rest or both; for Being always goes together with Change and Rest.

— Finally, I shall argue that we are given a hint of the solution to the problem of the connection between the sensible realm and the intelligible realm in the passage at 249a-c where the Eleatic Stranger argues that the soul is what makes the connection between changeless and changing things. In this passage, the Eleatic Stranger declares that the soul is both a changing thing and what *nous* comes to be in. This passage prefigures what happens in the *Timaeus* where the question of the relation between the sensible and the intelligible realm receives fuller treatment.

If the argument of the present paper is on the right lines, then it contributes to the study of the *Parmenides* in two ways: first, it helps clarifying the relation between the *Parmenides*, the *Sophist* and the *Timaeus*; second, it confirms the view that the criticisms raised against the theory of Forms in the *Parmenides* should not be understood as refutations but rather as challenges or *aporiai* that Plato needs to address.

BRISSEON, L. (2002), “Is the world one?”, A New Interpretation of Plato’s *Parmenides*, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy (22), 1–20.

HARTE, V. (2002), *Plato on Parts and Wholes. The Metaphysics of Structure*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

### *Le Sophiste est-il la suite du Parménide ? La question de l’unité du monde dans les deux dialogues*

Dans un article de 2002, Brisson défend une nouvelle interprétation du *Parménide* de Platon selon laquelle le dialogue doit être compris comme étant dédié d’un bout à l’autre à la question du Parménide historique, c’est-à-dire la question de savoir si le monde est un. Une des forces de l’interprétation de Brisson est qu’elle apporte une réponse au difficile et disputé problème de la relation entre les deux parties du dialogue : d’après son interprétation, la première partie servirait donc à montrer que la théorie des Formes, dans sa conception initiale, doit être comprise comme une réponse à Parménide, tandis que la seconde partie offrirait un exemple de la manière dont Parménide et Zénon eux-mêmes traitent le problème. À bien des égards, la thèse de Brisson éclaire le *Parménide* d’un jour nouveau. Néanmoins, il reste à comprendre si, et le cas échéant comment, Platon résout les difficultés soulevées dans le *Parménide*.

La thèse centrale que je voudrais défendre dans cet article est que Platon reprend dans le *Sophiste* la question parménidéenne de l’unité du monde, mais pour cette fois la traiter à l’aide d’outils proprement platoniciens, contrairement à ce qu’il fait dans la seconde partie du *Parménide*.

— Dans une première partie, je chercherai donc à montrer comment le problème de l’unité du monde émerge de manière particulièrement aiguë à la fin du passage de la Gigantomachie, en 249d, lorsque l’Étranger d’Élée déclare à propos de l’être (*to on*), et donc du tout (*to pan*), qu’il comprend ensemble à la fois les choses qui sont en mouvement et les choses qui sont en repos. En effet, si la conclusion à laquelle parviennent Théétète et l’Étranger est juste, alors elle soulève deux

questions: (i) d'une part, comment il est possible que l'être soit composé de deux catégories d'êtres non seulement distinctes l'une de l'autre, au sens où elles sont différentes l'une de l'autre et n'ont aucune partie en commun, mais encore absolument contraires l'une à l'autre (*enantiôtata*), et reste pourtant un; (ii) quelle est la relation entre l'être et les choses en mouvement et en repos de sorte qu'il soit possible de dire à propos de chacune de ces catégories d'être, prise séparément et ensemble, qu'elles sont.

— Dans une seconde partie, je défendrai la thèse selon laquelle Platon traite ces deux questions dans le passage où il examine et défend la communion des Formes entre l'Être, le Changement et le Repos. En particulier, j'argumenterai que Platon établit dans ce passage deux thèses très importantes pour le problème de l'unité du monde, à savoir : (i) d'abord, la thèse selon laquelle le monde n'est pas la simple somme de ses parties, mais qu'il a une structure ; (ii) ensuite, la thèse selon laquelle l'Être est inséparable du Changement et du Repos. Commencant par le premier point (i), il s'agira de montrer que cette thèse est défendue par Platon lorsqu'il affirme que l'Être est en communion avec le Changement et le Repos, mais qu'il n'y a en revanche pas communion entre le Changement et le Repos, thèse qu'il défend en détails en 251e-252e. Je m'intéresserai en particulier à la manière dont Platon défend cette thèse contre la thèse selon laquelle tout se mélange, cette dernière thèse qui, comme j'essaierai de le montrer, mène à la conclusion inverse en ce qui concerne le monde, à savoir qu'il n'a pas de structure mais qu'il est la simple somme de ses parties. Mon argumentation s'appuiera ici sur les analyses développées par Harte dans son livre sur le tout et la partie. Concernant le second point (ii), je tenterai de le défendre à partir d'un examen détaillé de la description de la relation entre l'Être, le Changement et le Repos telle qu'elle est produite en 250b7-10. Sur ce point, les commentateurs ont souvent interprété ce passage comme visant à établir la différence entre l'Être, le Changement et le Repos de sorte que cela mène à la conclusion qu'il y a bien là trois Formes (l'Être, le Changement et le Repos) et non deux voire même une seule. Bien que cette analyse de ce passage soit en partie correcte, elle ne permet pas de rendre compte du vocabulaire très étonnant qu'emploie l'Étranger à ce moment du dialogue, et qui est emprunt de métaphores spatiales. À l'inverse, l'interprétation que je défends prend au pied de la lettre l'idée que l'Être entoure (*periechein*) et réunit (*sullabein*) le Changement et le Repos, comme signifiant que bien que l'Être soit différent du Changement et Repos, pris ensemble ou séparément, l'Être n'est pas séparé ou distinct d'eux. Pour le dire différemment, cela signifie qu'il n'est pas possible d'avoir l'un sans avoir les autres, c'est-à-dire que celui qui cherche l'Être ne peut le trouver sans trouver en même temps soit le Changement, soit le Repos, soit les deux, pour la raison que l'Être va toujours de paire avec le Changement et le Repos.

— Pour terminer, je montrerai que Platon, dans le *Sophiste*, pointe du doigt la solution au problème de la relation entre le sensible et l'intelligible dans le passage en 249a-c dans lequel l'Étranger déclare que l'âme est ce qui fait le lien entre les choses en mouvement et en repos. C'est dans ce passage en effet que l'Étranger affirme que l'âme est à la fois une chose en mouvement et ce en quoi le *nous* advient. Ce passage préfigure le *Timée* où la question de la relation entre le sensible et l'intelligible est développée plus en détails.

Si la thèse défendue dans cet article se révèle être sur la bonne voie, alors elle contribue à l'étude du *Parménide* de deux manières : d'abord, en cherchant à clarifier la relation entre le *Parménide*, le *Sophiste* et le *Timée* ; ensuite, en apportant un soutien supplémentaire à l'interprétation du *Parménide* selon laquelle les objections adressées à la théorie des Formes ne doivent pas être comprises comme des réfutations mais comme des obstacles ou des apories que Platon doit relever.



- BRISSON, L. (2002), “Is the world one?”, A New Interpretation of Plato’s Parmenides’, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* (22), 1–20.
- HARTE, V. (2002), *Plato on Parts and Wholes. The Metaphysics of Structure*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

## Sanday Eric

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### *Design and Purpose of the Hypotheses*

The two largest questions facing interpreters of the *Parmenides* are: (1) what are the subjects of the hypotheses and why? And (2) why there are eight hypotheses? There are many fine studies that aim to add to work in the field but that are of uncertain value as long as these questions are not well answered.

First and most fundamentally, I do not accept the received reading that the subject of the hypotheses is the form or principle of unity. The subject of the hypotheses as given is an underdetermined monad, and the task of reading the hypotheses is to sort out distinct senses that "one" must have given the context and structure created by the hypotheses.

The most obvious reason not to take the subject to be the form of unity is that the subject of the hypotheses is not identified that way. When "to hen" is used, the definite article is used demonstratively to refer to "that" one, i.e. the one just identified, etc. In all decisive instances the subject is identified simply as "hen", "[a] one".

Some potential counter-evidence can be found in H2, such as the reference to "auto to hen" at 144e6, which would be the standard way to refer to the form of unity. Additionally, the second argument in H2 refers to "auto to hen" 143a, and "to hen auto" & "auto to hen" at 144e. The reference to "the one itself [auto to hen]" makes sense in context as a reference to the immanent character of unity, i.e. the "the one being [τὸ ἐν ὄν]" taken up in its character as a being one. At 144e, Τὸ ἐν ... αὐτὸ, refers again to the immanent character of oneness within "[a] one". The one of H2 must, in one respect, have spatial magnitude because at 145aff. Parmenides refers to the one of H2 as "limited" (πεπερασμένον), i.e. as a magnitude, the middle of which is "equidistant" from its extremes, and which is indefinitely divisible into further "component parts". Any magnitude or any one of the component parts of a magnitude has an immanent character of unity, and this is what "the one itself" refers to, i.e. "that very one" that we pick out in thought, i.e. an "instance part" of the form of unity, which we "grasp ... in thought, alone by itself", without the being of which it partakes. The instance parts of unity cannot be larger and smaller, less and more, but are *just one*. The language in H2 that seems to point to the form of unity is referring to the immanent character of being one that is separated out in thought.

Related to this point, the introduction of the hypotheses at 137b should be read to say "if [a] one is" and not "if a one *is one*". In other words, the "hen" should not be read *predicatively* (rejecting Gill's Meinwaldian suggestion). Scholars have had a small debate about whether the Greek must be emended if we are *not* going to read the premise predicatively. I think there is no need for emendation. The emendation would be to: εἴτε ἐν ἐστὶν εἴτε μὴ [ἐστὶν] or μὴ [ἔστι] ἐν. I agree with Allen that ἐστὶν has an existential sense that allows for either reading, predicative or existential. I read it existentially. I would translate 137b4: "concerning the one itself, whether [a] one is or if [a] one is not". The larger point, however, is that if we read the last clause *predicatively*, we will encounter fatal conflicts with the text.

First, the predicative reading of 137b4 conflicts with the examples Parmenides gives of the method of hypothesis from 135e-136b. None of the examples are predicative statements. Each of them hypothesizes "if X is". He summarizes: "concerning whatever one would ever hypothesize *as*

*being* and *as not being* and as suffering whatever else” (περὶ οὗτου ἂν ἀεὶ ὑποθῆ ὡς ὄντος καὶ ὡς οὐκ ὄντος καὶ ὅτι οὖν ἄλλο πάθος πάσχοντος). To fit the instructions, we should not read 137b4 predicatively.

More comprehensively, the predicative reading conflicts with the premises of the hypotheses. For instance, H2 reads: “Ὅρα δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς. ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, ἄρα οἷόν τε αὐτὸ εἶναι μὲν, οὐσίας δὲ μὴ μετέχειν; “Now then, take a look from the beginning: if [a] one is, is it possible for it to be but not to partake in being?” There is no reason *not* to take this as hypothesizing “if [a] one is”. In fact, it becomes more difficult to make sense of this passage if we assume that the hypothesis should be read “if one is one”. H4 says that the “one” and the “others” are exhaustive of all things, which does not turn on the one’s (i.e. the one in question’s) being one. H5 asks what results if “[a] one is not”, and its reference to the intelligibility of the one as something hypothesized does not turn on whether the one is or is not one but on its not-being *and yet* being something determinately intelligible. Grammatically and substantively, H1 and H3 do not require that we avoid taking “hen” predicatively, since the one in those hypotheses is indeed taken to be one, but for the sake of consistency we cannot take “hen” predicatively in our reading of any premise (even if we may take the predicative sense of “hen” to be operative *within* any hypothesis, given reason to think so).

Second, why eight hypotheses?

The basic division proposed by Parmenides in his instructions are: hypothesize a subject, (a) if it is and if it is not, what follows (b) for it and its others, (c) both in relation to themselves and each other. Proceeding from the top down, (a) the basic division is into two groups of hypotheses, the first hypothesizing the object “if it is”, and the second hypothesizing the same object “if it is not”, corresponding to H1-4 and H5-8, respectively. Those two groups, in turn, are divided in half, the first part exploring consequences for the subject hypothesized (e.g. H1-2), the second part exploring consequences for its others (e.g. H3-4). I think that’s as far as the instructions go. We expect four hypotheses. But, of course, we have eight. Why?

Many have followed Sayre and Meinwald’s proposal that we see differentiated hypotheses on the basis of the instruction to examine consequences *pros heauto* and *pros alla*. However, as Mitchell Miller has argued persuasively, in each hypothesis we see Parmenides take up and exhibit consequences both *pros heauto* and *pros alla*. Thus, this part of the initial set of instructions for the method of hypothesis cannot differentiate one hypothesis from another but, rather, characterizes each internally.

I think we have eight for essentially Heraclitean reasons. We have four paired hypotheses that present apparently contradictory pairs, H1/H2, H3/H4, H5/H6, and H7/H8. These pairs (and some other pairings) serve as “thought-summoners”, in the words of Socrates in the *Republic*. Only by facing and then disentangling these “back-turning harmonies” do we see the challenge Plato’s challenge through and specify the relationship of participation. Doing so is essential to the educational value of the exercises. We must contribute our own efforts.

## *Design und Zweck der Hypothesen*

Die beiden größten Fragen Interpreten des Parmenides zugewandt sind: (1), was die Themen der Hypothesen sein sollten und warum? Und (2) warum gibt es acht Hypothesen? Es gibt viele gute Studien, die darauf abzielen, die Arbeit auf dem Feld zu erweitern, aber von unsicherem Wert sind, solange diese Fragen nicht gut beantwortet werden.

Zuerst und am Grunde nehme ich nicht die empfangene Lesung, dass das Thema der Hypothesen die Form oder Prinzip der Einheit sein sollte. Das Subjekt der Hypothesen ist eine unterbestimmte Monade. Die Aufgabe, die Hypothesen zu lesen, besteht darin, verschiedene Sinne auszusortieren, dass „einer“ den von den Hypothesen geschaffenen Kontext und die Struktur gegeben haben muss.

Der offensichtlichste Grund nicht das Thema zu nehmen die Form der Einheit zu sein, ist, dass das Thema der Hypothesen ist auf diese Weise nicht identifiziert. Wenn „to hen“ verwendet wird, wird der bestimmte Artikel demonstrativ verwendet, um auf „das“, d.h. das gerade identifizierte usw. zu verweisen. In allen entscheidenden Fällen wird das Subjekt einfach als „hen“, „[eine] solche“ identifiziert.

Einige potentielle Gegenbeweise können in H2 gefunden werden, wie zum Beispiel der Verweis auf „auto to hen“ bei 144e6, der der Standardweg wäre, sich auf die Form der Einheit zu beziehen. Außerdem bezieht sich das zweite Argument in H2 auf „auto to hen“ 143a und „to hen auto“ und „auto to hen“ auf 144e. Die Bezugnahme auf „das Eine selbst“ macht Sinn im Zusammenhang als eine Bezugnahme auf den immanenten Charakter des Einsamsein, das „das Eine [τὸ ἐν ὄν]“, das in seinem Charakter als Einheit aufgenommen wird. Bei 144e bezieht sich Τὸ ἐν ... αὐτὸ wiederum auf den immanenten Charakter der Einheit in „[eine] Solche“. Die (eine) von H2, sie müssen in einer Hinsicht räumliche Größe haben, weil bei 145aff. Parmenides bezieht sich auf die eine von H2 als „limite“ (πεπερασμένον), das heißt als eine Größenordnung, dessen Mitte „äquidistanten“ von ihren Extremen ist, und die unbegrenzt in weitere „Komponententeile“ teilbar ist. Jede Größe oder irgendeines der Komponententeile einer Größe hat einen immanenten Charakter der Einheit, und das ist es, worauf sich „der Eine selbst“ bezieht, d. h. „Das genauer Eine“, das wir in Gedanken herausgreifen. Jeder Bestandteil des räumlichen Ein von H2 hat den immanenten Charakter der Einheit als einen „Instanzteil“ der Form der Einheit, den wir „im Denken, für sich allein“ begreifen, ohne das Wesen, an dem er teilhat. Die Instanzteil der Einheit kann nicht größer und kleiner sein, weniger und mehr, ist aber nur ein. Die Sprache, in H2, die der Form der Einheit zu zeigen scheint, bezieht sich auf die immanente Charakter einer zu sein, die in Gedanken wird abgetrennt.

Im Zusammenhang mit diesem Punkt sollte die Einführung der Hypothesen bei 137b gelesen werden zu sagen, „wenn [a] Eins ist“ und nicht „wenn eine ist Eins“. Mit anderen Worten sollte die „hen“ nicht prädikativ gelesen werden (Gill Meinwaldian Vorschlag zurückgewiesen). Wissenschaftler haben eine kleine Debatte darüber haben, ob die griechischen muss emendiert werden, wenn wir nicht prädikativ die Prämisse lesen werden. Ich denke, dass es keine Notwendigkeit für ein Emendation gibt. Das Emendation würde lauten: εἴτε ἐν ἐστὶν εἴτε μὴ [ἐστὶν] or μὴ [ἐστὶ] ἐν. Ich stimme mit Allen zu, dass ἐστὶν einen existentiellen Sinn hat, das entweder zum Lesen erlaubt, prädikativen oder existentiell. Ich habe es existenziell gelesen. Ich würde 137b4 übersetzen: „Über den einen selbst, ob [einer] ist oder wenn [einer] nicht ist“. Der größere Punkt ist jedoch, dass wir, wenn wir den letzten Satz prädikativ lesen, auf fatale Konflikte mit dem Text stoßen werden.

Das prädikative Lesen von 137b4 steht zuerst im Widerspruch zu den Beispielen, die Parmenides von der Methode der Hypothese aus 135e-136b gibt. Keines der Beispiele sind prädikative Aussagen. Jeder von ihnen vermutet „wenn X ist“. Er fasst zusammen: „was auch immer man jemals hypothetisieren würde als sein und nicht sein und was auch immer sonst leiden“ (περὶ οὗτου ἂν αἰεὶ ὑποθῆ ὡς ὄντος καὶ ὡς οὐκ ὄντος καὶ ὅτι οὐν ἄλλο πάθος πάσχοντος). Um den Anweisungen zu befolgen, sollten wir 137b4 nicht prädikativ lesen. Umfassender das prädikative

Lesen steht im Widerspruch zu den Prämissen der Hypothesen. Zum Beispiel liest H2: Ὅρα δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς. ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, ἄρα οἷόν τε αὐτὸ εἶναι μὲν, οὐσίας δὲ μὴ μετέχειν; „Nun, schau von Anfang an: Wenn es einer ist, ist es möglich, dass es ist, aber nicht am Sein teilzuhaben?“ Es gibt keinen Grund, dies nicht als Hypothese anzunehmen, „wenn [ein] Solche ist“. In der Tat, wird es schwieriger diese Passage zu verstehen, wenn wir annehmen, dass die Hypothese „wenn ein Eins ist“ gelesen werden sollte. H4 sagt, dass die „Eins“ und die „anderen“ aller Dinge erschöpfend sind, die lässt sich nicht auf die eigenen, (das heißt der in Frage) eine zu sein. H5 fragt, was sich ergibt, wenn „[ein] Eins nicht ist“, und sein Verweis auf die Verständlichkeit des einen als etwas Hypothetisches schaltet sich nicht ein, ob das eine ist oder nicht. Grammatisch und substantiell, H1 und H3 nicht verlangen, dass wir „hen“ prädikativ vermeiden nehmen. Da der eine in diesen Hypothesen tatsächlich als Eins angenommen wird, können wir aus Gründen der Konsistenz „hen“ nicht prädikativ für das Lesen irgendeiner Prämisse nehmen. Selbst wenn wir den prädikativen Sinn von „hen“ annehmen könnten, um innerhalb jeder Hypothese operativ zu sein, die einen Grund hat, so zu denken.

Zweitens, warum acht Hypothesen?

Die grundlegende Teilung von Parmenides in seinen Anweisungen vorgeschlagen: hypothesize ein Subjekt, (a) wenn es ist, und wenn es nicht ist, was folgt (b) für sie und ihre anderen, (c) sowohl in Bezug auf sich selbst und miteinander. Ausgehend von oben nach unten (a) erfolgt die Grundteilung in zwei Gruppen von Hypothesen, wobei die erste Hypothese das Objekt „wenn es ist“ und die zweite Hypothese das gleiche Objekt „wenn es nicht ist“ entsprechend H1-4 und H5-8, jeweils. Diese beiden Gruppen sind wiederum in zwei Hälften geteilt. Der erste Teil untersucht die Konsequenzen für das Thema hypothetisch (z.B. H1-2), der zweite Teil untersucht die Konsequenzen für seine anderen (z.B. H3-4). Ich denke, das ist so weit wie die Anweisungen gehen. Wir erwarten vier Hypothesen. Aber natürlich haben wir acht. Warum?

Viele haben Sayre und Meinwald Vorschlag gefolgt, die wir Hypothesen sehen unterscheiden auf der Grundlage des Befehlsfolgen pros heauto und pros alla zu untersuchen. Wie Mitchell Miller jedoch überzeugend argumentierte, sehen wir in jeder Hypothese, dass Parmenides sowohl pros heauto als auch pros alla aufgreift und zeigt. Daher kann dieser Teil der ersten Menge von Anweisungen für die Methode der Hypothese nicht voneinander unterscheiden, sondern charakterisiert jede intern.

Ich denke, wir haben acht im Wesentlichen heraklitische Gründe. Wir haben vier gepaarte Hypothesen, die scheinbar widersprüchliche Paare präsentieren, H1/H2, H3/H4, H5/H6 und H7/H8. Diese Paare (und einige andere) dienen als „Gedankenbeschwörer“, in den Worten des Sokrates in der Republik. Nur durch gegenüber und dann diese „zurückgehenden Harmonien“ entwirren tun wir die Herausforderung Platons Herausforderung durch und geben Sie das Verhältnis der Beteiligung zu sehen. Dies ist wesentlich für den erzieherischen Wert der Übungen. Wir müssen unsere eigenen Bemühungen einbringen.

### *Zenonian workout. The aim and uses of dialectic in Plato's Parmenides, 135d-136e and Aristotle's Topics, I.1-2*

One of the most controversial issues of Plato's *Parmenides* is the relationship between its first and its second half. Despite the amount of scholarly attention received by the logical structure of the series of deductions,<sup>1</sup> the more general methodological framework of Parmenides' exercise has been considerably less well explored. In this paper, I shall address myself to this problem by focusing on the explicit aim and uses of Parmenides' exercise and by comparing it with Aristotle's description of the aim and uses of dialectic in the *Topics*. In short, I shall suggest that, in the *Parmenides*, Plato displays not merely a dialectical exercise, but more specifically a method of philosophical inquiry. I shall divide my paper into three parts.

I shall start by providing a thorough reading of lines 135d-136e of Plato's dialogue, which introduce Parmenides' exercise (γυμνασία). This section will bring to the fore three important points: (a) the dialectical exercise that Parmenides introduces is explicitly aimed at discovering truth; (b) it will consist in a dilemmatic examination of any given hypothesis taken into consideration; (c) it should be applied not only to theses propounded by one's interlocutor but also to one's own. By stressing in particular point (a), my reading will emphasise the importance of Plato's philosophical characterisation of Parmenides' exercise, which might seem useless (ἀχρήστου, 135d4) or even idle talk (ἀδολεσχίας, 135d5), but is the necessary condition for recognising truth. This is particularly clear from 135d6, where Parmenides states that, for whatever thesis (cf. ὅτι ἂν προέλη, 136c1-2), an exhaustive discussion of its implications secures one's capability to discern what is true (διόψεσθαι τὸ ἀληθές).

The second step of my paper will clarify that the method outlined in Parmenides' dialogue with Socrates should be identified with the method used by the character Zeno of Elea in the first part of the work. Parmenides explicitly presents his own exercise as based on a twofold modification of Zeno's. First, while Zeno restricted his method to the domain of visible things, Parmenides extends it to include objects of thought. Second, while Zeno took into consideration only one hypothesis, Parmenides will develop arguments *pro* as well as arguments *contra* the thesis at stake. I shall claim that these two modifications are not methodological changes but a broader application of one and the same method. Specifically, Plato's description of Zeno's dialectic in the *Parmenides* shows that (i) it is a formal strategy, in the sense that it does not depend on a specific domain, but, on the contrary, it can be applied to any object; (ii) it always proceeds *via negativa*, i.e. by way of arguments *against* a given thesis, whether for destructive or for constructive purposes. On this basis, I shall conclude this part by defining the Zenonian method as 'negative (or apophatic) dialectic'.

The third and last part of my paper will compare this methodological section of Plato's *Parmenides* with Aristotle's definition of the aim and uses of dialectic. I shall emphasise three respects in which the first two chapters of Aristotle's *Topics* (book I) present striking similarities

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<sup>1</sup> See in particular R. E. Allen, *Plato's Parmenides*, Yale University Press, New Haven: 1997; G. E. L. Owen, 'Notes on Ryle's Plato', in G. Fine, *Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology*, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1999, 298-319.

with *Parmenides* 135d-136e. First, in *Topics* I.1, Aristotle introduces dialectic as a method to defend and question one's own thesis as well as one's interlocutor's (as in (c) above). Second, when, in *Topics* I.2, he reflects on the uses of dialectic, on the one hand he mentions training (γυμνασία), on the other he draws particular attention to its philosophical use. Finally, it is precisely in this passage (101a34-36) that Aristotle (as in (a) and (b) above) states that, if we are able to argue *pro* and *contra* a given thesis, we will more easily discern what is true and what is false (ῥᾶον... κατοψόμεθα τᾶληθές τε καὶ το ψεῦδος)—thus echoing *Parmenides*, 136b6-c5. This comparison will enable me to reflect on the similarities (as well as on the divergencies) between the dialectic outlined in the *Parmenides* and Aristotle's description of the dialectical method in his *Topics*.

Overall, my paper will offer a new account of Parmenides' exercise in the second half of Plato's eponymous dialogue by shedding light on the explicit aim and uses of its hypothetical method. I shall show the following three points: (1) the dialectical method worked out at 135d-136e is presented as specifically aimed at discovering truth; (2) Plato ascribes it to Zeno of Elea and depicts it as an exercise of 'negative dialectic'; (3) the hallmarks of Aristotle's dialectic draw heavily upon Plato's description of Zenonian dialectic in the *Parmenides*. These conclusions will enable me to rethink the philosophical contribution of the second half of the *Parmenides* to the economy of the dialogue.

### *Entraînement zénonien. But et usages de la dialectique dans le Parménide de Platon (135d-136e) et les Topiques d'Aristote (I.1-2)*

L'une des questions les plus controversées du *Parménide* de Platon est la relation entre la première et la deuxième moitié du dialogue. Malgré la grande attention accordée par la littérature secondaire à la structure logique de la série de déductions<sup>1</sup>, le cadre méthodologique plus général de l'exercice de Parménide a été nettement moins étudié. Dans mon intervention, je prendrai en considération ce problème en me concentrant sur le but et les usages explicites de l'exercice de Parménide et en comparant celui-ci avec la description aristotélicienne du but et des usages de la dialectique dans les *Topiques*. En somme, mon objectif sera de montrer que, dans le *Parménide*, Platon ne présente pas seulement un exercice dialectique, mais plus précisément une méthode d'enquête philosophique. Mon intervention comprendra trois parties.

Je commencerai par une lecture détaillée des lignes 135d-136e du dialogue platonicien, qui introduisent l'exercice (γυμνασία) de Parménide. Cette partie mettra en avant les trois points suivants : (a) l'exercice dialectique introduit par Parménide vise explicitement à découvrir la vérité ; (b) il consiste en un examen dilemmatique de n'importe quelle hypothèse de départ ; (c) il devrait être appliqué non seulement aux thèses proposées par l'interlocuteur mais aussi à nos propres thèses. En se concentrant en particulier sur le point (a), mon analyse mettra l'accent sur l'importance du caractère philosophique que donne Platon à l'exercice de Parménide, exercice qui pourrait sembler inutile (ἀχρήστου, 135d4), voire creux (ἀδολεσχίας, 135d5), mais qui est la condition nécessaire à la reconnaissance de la vérité. Ce point apparaît très clairement à la ligne 135d6, où Parménide affirme que, quelle que soit la thèse (cf. ὅτι ἂν προέλη, 136c1-2), la discussion exhaustive de ses implications permet de discerner le vrai (διόψεσθαι τὸ ἀληθές).

<sup>1</sup> Voir en particulier R. E. Allen, *Plato's Parmenides*, Yale University Press, New Haven : 1997 ; G. E. L. Owen, 'Notes on Ryle's Plato', in G. Fine, *Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology*, Oxford University Press, Oxford : 1999, 298-319.

La deuxième partie montrera que la méthode décrite dans le dialogue de Parménide et Socrate devrait être identifiée avec la méthode utilisée par le personnage de Zénon d'Élée dans la première moitié de l'œuvre. Parménide présente explicitement son exercice comme étant basé sur une double modification de celui de Zénon. D'une part, alors que Zénon circonscrivait sa méthode au seul domaine du visible, Parménide y inclut aussi les objets de la pensée. D'autre part, alors que Zénon ne prenait en considération qu'une seule hypothèse, Parménide développe aussi bien des arguments *pro* que des arguments *contra* la thèse en jeu. Je soutiendrai que ces deux modifications ne sont pas des changements méthodologiques mais plutôt un élargissement de l'application d'une même méthode. Plus précisément, la description platonicienne de la dialectique de Zénon dans le *Parménide* montre (i) qu'il s'agit d'une stratégie formelle au sens où elle ne dépend pas d'un domaine particulier, mais qu'elle peut être appliquée à n'importe quel objet ; (ii) qu'elle procède toujours *via negativa*, c'est-à-dire à travers des arguments *contre* une thèse donnée, qu'il s'agisse de la défendre ou de la réfuter. À partir de ces réflexions, je conclurai cette partie en définissant la méthode zénonienne comme « dialectique négative (ou apophatique) ».

La troisième et dernière partie de mon intervention établira une comparaison entre cette section méthodologique du *Parménide* de Platon et la définition aristotélicienne du but et des usages de la dialectique. Je montrerai que les deux premiers chapitres du premier livre des *Topiques* d'Aristote présentent de fortes similarités avec les lignes 135d-136e du *Parménide* à trois niveaux. En premier lieu, dans *Topiques* I.1, Aristote introduit la dialectique comme une méthode pour défendre et remettre en cause aussi bien notre propre thèse que celle de l'interlocuteur (comme au point (c) ci-dessus). En deuxième lieu, lorsque, dans *Topiques* I.2, il réfléchit aux usages de la dialectique, d'un côté il mentionne l'entraînement (*γυμνασία*), de l'autre il accorde une attention particulière à son usage philosophique. Enfin, c'est précisément dans ce passage (101a34-36) qu'Aristote affirme (comme aux points (a) et (b) ci-dessus) que, si nous sommes capables d'argumenter *pro* et *contra* une thèse donnée, nous discernerons plus facilement le vrai du faux (*ῥᾶρον... κατοψόμεθα τᾶληθές τε καὶ το ψεῦδος*) – faisant ainsi écho aux lignes 136b6-c5 du *Parménide*. Cette comparaison me permettra de réfléchir aux similarités (aussi bien qu'aux différences) entre la dialectique telle qu'elle apparaît dans le *Parménide* et la méthode dialectique décrite par Aristote dans ses *Topiques*.

Ainsi, mon intervention proposera-t-elle un nouveau regard sur l'exercice de Parménide dans la seconde moitié du dialogue éponyme de Platon, en mettant en lumière le but et les usages explicites de sa méthode hypothétique. Je démontrerai les trois points suivants : (1) la méthode dialectique élaborée aux lignes 135d-136e est présentée comme visant explicitement à découvrir la vérité ; (2) Platon l'attribue à Zénon d'Élée et la conçoit comme un exercice de « dialectique négative » ; (3) les caractéristiques fondamentales de la dialectique d'Aristote sont étroitement liées à la description platonicienne de la dialectique de Zénon dans le *Parménide*. Ces conclusions me permettront de repenser la contribution philosophique de la deuxième moitié du *Parménide* à l'économie du dialogue.



*La μεγίστη ἀπορία de Parménide : enjeux théoriques et issues*

On sait que la plus grande difficulté (μεγίστη ἀπορία) concernant les formes, que Parménide évoque dans le dialogue qui porte son nom, est relative à la possibilité de les connaître. Si l'on admet que les formes sont complètement séparées des choses, choses qui participent des formes, alors elles ne peuvent pas être connues par les hommes, mais uniquement par les dieux. Aux hommes est réservée la seule connaissance de ce qui est dans le monde (Pl. *Prm.* 134b). Cette critique est la dernière d'une série de difficultés relatives à la théorie des formes avancées par Parménide, qui peuvent être lues comme l'ensemble des difficultés théoriques à surmonter si l'on veut considérer comme valable la théorie des formes. Dans le *Parménide*, l'aporie reste apparemment sans issue.

La difficulté épistémologique soulevée par Parménide est une constante de la pensée platonicienne, plusieurs fois évoquée dans les dialogues. Pour montrer la portée théorique de cette objection et la manière dont elle se traduit concrètement dans des domaines spécifiques de la connaissance, dans la première partie de notre exposé nous prendrons un exemple tiré du domaine politique : comment les hommes peuvent-ils connaître les principes de l'agir politique ? Dans la deuxième partie, à travers une analyse de *Prm.* 135a-b, notre but sera de démontrer que dans le *Parménide* c'est Parménide même qui, après avoir soulevé l'aporie, donne des indices nous permettant d'entrevoir la méthode pour la surmonter. Enfin, on conclura par une courte réflexion sur la manière dont ces questionnements peuvent contribuer à jeter une lumière sur la démarche du dialogue.

Dans un premier moment, nous analyserons donc la « grande impasse » évoquée par Parménide en l'éclairant à travers le *specimen* politique. Dans le *Parménide*, Socrate affirme que les formes sont des « modèles inscrits dans la nature, et les autres choses ressemblent à elles et sont similaires » (τὰ μὲν εἶδη ταῦτα ὡσπερ παραδείγματα ἐστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις εἰκέναι καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα, *Prm.* 132d). Les choses participent donc des formes car elles en sont les images (εἰκασθῆναι, *Prm.* 133d). Parmi les critiques avancées par Parménide à cette théorie, la suivante est la plus importante : si ces modèles n'ont pas de rapport avec ce qui se trouve dans notre monde, alors la connaissance en soi ne se trouve jamais auprès de nous (*Prm.* 134a). Seul le dieu pourra donc posséder ce que Parménide appelle « la connaissance en soi » (αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη, *Prm.* 134a) ou « la connaissance la plus parfaite » (αὐτὴ ἢ ἀκριβεστάτη ἐπιστήμη, *Prm.* 134d). L'objection avancée par Parménide est une difficulté que Platon se pose concrètement. Un exemple de cette aporie est offert par l'une des problématiques politiques soulevées plusieurs fois dans les dialogues. Dans le *Politique*, on définit la constitution correcte par nature, donc l'idée de constitution, celle dont le pouvoir serait détenu par des hommes doués d'une science véritable (ἀληθῶς ἐπιστήμονες, *Pol.* 293c). Toutes les autres constitutions ne peuvent être que des imitations de celle-ci (le verbe utilisé est μιμῆσθαι, *Pol.* 293e et 300c). Mais cet individu doué d'un savoir total, celui capable de réaliser la vraie constitution, n'existe pas dans notre monde, et s'il existait il serait « comme un dieu parmi les hommes » (*Pol.* 303b), dont le paradigme est Cronos dans l'époque révolue du monde. Dans les deux dialogues alors, le *Parménide* et le *Politique*, l'existence de l'ἐπιστήμη parfaite est certes

contemplée, mais elle est elle-même un modèle idéal, qui ne concerne que les dieux. Mais comment l'homme peut-il s'approcher de la connaissance parfaite d'un modèle inscrit dans la nature ?

Dans la deuxième partie, nous analyserons la manière dont cette question est traitée dans le *Parménide*. Dans ce dialogue, le philosophe éponyme conclut sa critique sur l'impossibilité de connaître les formes par les mots suivants :

Comme nous venons de le rappeler, changer la conviction de celui qui tient ces propos est chose extraordinairement difficile. Et ce serait un homme particulièrement doué, celui à qui on pourrait **enseigner** (*μαθεῖν*) qu'il y a de chaque chose un Genre, un être en soi et par soi. Ce serait un homme plus merveilleux encore **celui qui aurait fait cette découverte** (*τοῦ εὕρησοντος*) et qui pourrait **la transmettre par l'enseignement** (*διδάξει*) à quelqu'un d'autre **après en avoir auparavant éprouvé tous les détails par une critique adéquate** (*πάντα ἱκανῶς διευκρινησάμενον*) (Pl. *Prm.* 135a-b, trad Brisson modifiée).

Le but de la deuxième partie de notre exposé est de démontrer que dans ce passage Parménide suggère subrepticement le chemin qui mène à l'issue de « la grande impasse » formulée auparavant. On commencera par observer que, dans ce passage, un modèle bien précis de connaissance est sous-tendu, que Platon sème un peu partout dans ses dialogues. Il s'agit de l'opposition entre une *εὕρεσις*, qui est une découverte effectuée par soi-même, et une *μάθησις*, c'est-à-dire un enseignement dispensé par un autre, opposition souvent utilisée pour exemplifier la méthode dialectique de la connaissance (voir par exemple Pl. *Alc. 1*, 106d-109b-e ; Pl. *Tht.* 105d, Pl. *Resp.* 455b ; Pl. *Leg.* 968d). Dans ce passage, il est dit que seul un homme « particulièrement doué » peut recevoir l'enseignement (*μάθησις*) du fait que chaque chose possède une forme. Et que cet enseignement ne peut qu'être dispensé par un être plus exceptionnel encore. Celui-ci après avoir découvert (*εὕρεσις*) que chaque chose possède une forme et après avoir soumis cette hypothèse à une critique suffisante (*πάντα ἱκανῶς διευκρινησάμενον*), peut à son tour l'enseigner (*διδάξει*). Ici Parménide est lui-même en train d'évoquer la méthode dialectique de la connaissance conduite par un maître – être humain particulièrement doué qui a déjà atteint un niveau supérieur de connaissance grâce à une découverte – comme moyen pour sortir de l'impasse. Pour revenir à notre *comparatum*, le *Politique*, on rappellera que dans ce dialogue, si la connaissance parfaite est réservée au dieu, les hommes peuvent toutefois parcourir une route : dans l'impossibilité de posséder la connaissance parfaite du dieu, l'homme doit se vouer à une recherche dialectique constante, finalisée à la recherche commune et à la découverte des modèles adéquats qui soient le plus proches possible des modèles idéaux.

Enfin, on conclura par une réflexion sur la fonction du passage analysé du *Parménide* : en donnant au personnage de Parménide d'abord la fonction de critiquer la théorie des formes et ensuite celle de donner des indices sur la méthode pour dépasser les critiques, Platon ne serait-il pas en train de nous indiquer que c'est dans l'acte même de dialoguer, dont le *Parménide* est l'exemplification, que l'on trouve la solution à toutes les apories de Parménide ? Le *Parménide* même, ne serait-il pas l'exemple déployé de l'action de *διευκρινεῖν* (évoquée en *Prm.* 135a-b) effectuée par celui qui a découvert l'existence des formes, action nécessaire et préalable pour que la théorie des formes, une fois passée au crible de la dialectique à l'aide d'un maître, puisse être à son tour enseignée dialectiquement ?

## *La μείστω ἀπορία di Parmenide: implicazioni teoriche e vie d'uscita*

Il personaggio di Parmenide, nel dialogo che da lui prende il nome, menziona quella che definisce «la più grande difficoltà» (μείστω ἀπορία) relativa alle forme: la possibilità di conoscerle. Se infatti si ammette che le forme sono completamente separate dalle cose, le quali invece partecipano delle forme, allora queste ultime non possono essere conosciute dagli uomini, ma unicamente dagli dei. Agli uomini è riservata soltanto la conoscenza di ciò che è nel mondo (Pl. *Prm.* 134b). Tale osservazione è l'ultima di una serie di difficoltà epistemologiche che concernono la teoria delle forme, che Parmenide solleva nel dialogo. Queste critiche possono essere lette come l'insieme delle difficoltà teoriche che devono essere superate se si vuole fondare in maniera solida la teoria delle forme. Ma nel *Parmenide* restano apparentemente senza via d'uscita.

La difficoltà epistemologica segnalata da Parmenide costituisce una costante del pensiero platonico ed è evocata a più riprese nei dialoghi. Per mostrare la portata teorica di tale obiezione e la maniera in cui essa si traduce concretamente nei differenti campi del sapere, nella prima parte del nostro intervento prenderemo un esempio tratto dal campo della politica: è possibile per gli uomini conoscere i principi dell'agire politico? Nella seconda parte, attraverso un'analisi di *Prm.* 135a-b, il nostro obiettivo sarà di dimostrare che nel dialogo è Parmenide stesso che, dopo aver sollevato l'aporia, fornisce alcuni indizi che ci permettono di intravedere il metodo per superarla. Infine, concluderemo con una breve riflessione sulla maniera in cui tali questioni possono aiutarci a comprendere il *Parmenide*.

In un primo momento analizzeremo la «grande aporia» evocata da Parmenide, esplicitandola tramite lo *specimen* politico. Nel *Parmenide* Socrate afferma che le forme sono «dei modelli nella natura, mentre le altre cose assomigliano ad esse e sono simili» (τὰ μὲν εἶδη ταῦτα ὡσπερ παραδείγματα ἐστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις εἰκέναι καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα, *Prm.* 132d). Le cose partecipano quindi alle forme perché ne sono l'immagine (εἰκασθῆναι, *Prm.* 133d). Tra le critiche avanzate da Parmenide a tale teoria, la più importante è la seguente: se tali modelli non hanno rapporto con ciò che si trova nel nostro mondo, allora la conoscenza in sé non si trova mai presso di noi (*Prm.* 134a). Soltanto il dio potrà allora possedere ciò che Parmenide chiama «la conoscenza in sé» (αὐτῇ ἐπιστήμη, *Prm.* 134a) o «la conoscenza più esatta» (αὐτῇ ἢ ἀκριβεστάτῃ ἐπιστήμη, *Prm.* 134d). Un esempio di tale aporia è offerto da uno dei problemi della riflessione politica di Platone più volte sottolineato nei dialoghi. Nel *Politico* viene definita la costituzione corretta per natura, e quindi l'idea di costituzione, quella in cui il potere è nelle mani degli uomini dotati di una scienza perfetta (ἀληθῶς ἐπιστήμονες, *Pol.* 293c). Tutte le altre costituzioni non possono essere altro che delle imitazioni di tale costituzione (il verbo utilizzato è μιμεῖσθαι, *Pol.* 293e e 300c). Ma tale individuo, dotato di un sapere perfetto e capace di realizzare la vera costituzione, non esiste nel nostro mondo e se esistesse sarebbe «come un dio tra gli uomini» (*Pol.* 303b), il paradigma del quale è Cronos nell'epoca precedente del mondo. Nei due dialoghi allora, il *Parmenide* e il *Politico*, l'esistenza dell'ἐπιστήμη perfetta è sì contemplata, ma è essa stessa un modello ideale che concerne soltanto gli dei. Come può l'uomo allora avvicinarsi alla conoscenza perfetta di un modello iscritto nella natura?

Per rispondere a questa domanda, nella seconda parte analizzeremo il modo in cui questa questione è trattata nel *Parmenide*. In questo dialogo, il filosofo eponimo conclude la sua critica sull'impossibilità di conoscere le forme con le seguenti parole:

Chi avanza queste obiezioni sembra dire qualcosa di sensato e, come si è detto poco fa, sarà straordinariamente difficile da persuadere. Solo a un uomo naturalmente molto dotato **si potrà insegnare** (μαθεῖν) che esiste un genere e una sostanza in se stessa di ciascuna cosa; e uno ancora più straordinario **lo scoprirà** (τοῦ εὐρήσοντος) e sarà in grado di **insegnarlo** (διδάξαι) a un altro, dopo **aver esaminato in modo adeguato tutte queste difficoltà** (πάντα ἰκανῶς διεκρινησάμενον) (Pl. *Prm.* 135a-b, trad. Ferrari modificata).

L'obiettivo della seconda parte dell'intervento è di dimostrare che in questo passaggio Parmenide suggerisce surrettiziamente il cammino che porta all'uscita della «grande aporia» formulata prima. In un primo momento osserveremo che nel passaggio è sotteso un modello della conoscenza ben preciso, che Platone dissemina spesso nei suoi dialoghi. Si tratta dell'opposizione tra un'εὐρεσις, e cioè una scoperta effettuata da soli, e una μάθησις, e cioè un insegnamento dispensato da un altro. Tale opposizione è utilizzata per esemplificare il metodo dialettico della conoscenza (vedi per esempio Pl. *Alc. 1*, 106d-109b-e; Pl. *Thet.* 105d, Pl. *Resp.* 455b; Pl. *Leg.* 968d). In questo passo viene detto che soltanto un uomo «naturalmente molto dotato» può ricevere l'insegnamento (μάθησις) secondo il quale ogni cosa possiede una forma e che tale insegnamento non può che essere dispensato da un essere «ancora più straordinario». Costui, dopo aver scoperto (εὐρεσις) che ogni cosa possiede una forma, e dopo aver **sottoposto tale ipotesi a una critica adeguata** (πάντα ἰκανῶς διεκρινησάμενον), può infine insegnarla (διδάξαι). Nel passaggio, è Parmenide a evocare il metodo dialettico della conoscenza condotta da un maestro – un uomo particolarmente dotato che ha già raggiunto un livello superiore della conoscenza grazie a una scoperta – come metodo per uscire dall'aporia che lui stesso aveva messo in luce. Per tornare al nostro *comparatum*, se nel *Politico* la conoscenza perfetta è riservata al dio, gli uomini possono tuttavia percorrere un'altra strada: impossibilitato com'è a possedere la conoscenza perfetta del dio, l'uomo deve dedicare la sua vita a una ricerca dialettica costante, finalizzata a trovare dei modelli adeguati che siano i più aderenti possibili a dei modelli ideali.

Infine, concluderemo con una riflessione sulla funzione del brano del *Parmenide* qui analizzato: se Platone dapprima fa pronunciare al personaggio di Parmenide alcune critiche alla teoria delle forme per poi mettergli in bocca alcuni indizi sul metodo per superarle, non sarà perché Platone ci sta indicando che è nell'atto stesso del dialogare, di cui il *Parmenide* è l'esemplificazione, che è possibile trovare la soluzione a tutte le aporie del *Parmenide*? Il *Parmenide* allora non sarà esso stesso un esempio dispiegato dell'azione di διεκρινεῖν (evocata in *Prm.* 135a-b) compiuta da colui che ha scoperto l'esistenza delle forme, azione necessaria e preliminare perché la teoria delle forme una volta vagliata criticamente insieme a un maestro possa essere a sua volta insegnata dialetticamente?

### *Sind die Ideen wirklich unteilbar? Zur zweifachen Natur ideeller Formen im Ausgang von Prm. 131a–e.*

In meinem Vortrag möchte ich ausgehend von *Prm.* 131a5–e7 und unter Einbeziehung weiterer Stellen dieses Werkes sowie Passagen aus anderen Dialogen einen Beitrag zur Beantwortung der Frage liefern, ob und inwiefern es aus der platonischen Perspektive sinnvoll ist, eine „Teilbarkeit“ der Ideen zu behaupten.

Die genannte Passage, in der sich die „Segeltuch-Analogie“ befindet, ist im Kontext von Parmenides' Kritik an der Ideenlehre im ersten Teil des Dialogs angesiedelt. In diesem Teil formuliert Parmenides verschiedene Einwände, die im Ausgang von einigen Kerngedanken der Ideenlehre (Teilhabe-Lehre, Ideen als Vorbilder, Trennung von Ideen und Einzeldingen) im aporetischen Aufweis der Inkonsistenz der von Sokrates vertretenen Theorie kulminieren.

Die Einwände gegen die Teilhabe-Lehre basieren auf der Annahme, dass die Ideen in den Dingen, die an ihnen teilhaben, anwesend sein müssen, und zwar entweder in Gänze oder als Teile. Man kann das Argument so zusammenfassen, dass Parmenides aus dem ersten Fall die Konsequenz zieht, dass die Ideen von sich selbst getrennt, aus dem zweiten, dass sie zerstückelt, also teilbar, sind (vgl. u. a. Graeser 2003, 13). Beide Fälle seien für einen Vertreter der Ideenlehre unannehmbar, woraus die innere Inkonsistenz dieser Lehre folge. Der junge Sokrates weiß dem nichts entgegenzuhalten und findet keinen Weg aus der Aporie. Die Lösung dieser Schwierigkeit und die damit verbundene Rettung der Teilhabe-Lehre werden also an dieser Stelle dem Leser überlassen. Eine naheliegende Strategie besteht darin, die Konzeption der Teilhabe als „Sein der Idee in den Dingen“ zurückzuweisen (vgl. Allen 1983, 114; Panagiotou 1987, 21; Migliori 1990, 138), damit die Unteilbarkeit der Ideen aufrechterhalten werden kann. Ich möchte mich von dieser Interpretationstendenz distanzieren, indem ich zeige, dass die Thesen vom „In-den-Dingen-Sein“ und der Teilbarkeit der Ideen nicht nur in früheren Dialogen, sondern auch in den Spätdialogen einschließlich des *Parmenides* positiv behauptet werden, sodass sie einen unverzichtbaren Bestandteil auch jener Version der Ideenlehre, die vom späten Platon vertreten wird, bilden.

In Bezug auf das Sein der Ideen in den Dingen ist zunächst auf *Phd.* 107d und den entsprechenden Kontext zu verweisen. Der Gedanke der *παρουσία* der Ideen in den sinnlichen Dingen ist eine zentrale Voraussetzung für den letzten Beweis der Unsterblichkeit der Seele, in dem der Dialog seinen argumentativen Höhepunkt findet. Ein Verzicht auf diese These würde also den wichtigsten Argumentationsgang dieses Werkes fatal unterminieren. Dem naheliegenden Einwand, dass Platon im *Parmenides* eine naive Auffassung aus seinem früheren Denken überwinden will, ist entgegenzuhalten, dass einerseits die These vom „In-den-Dingen-Sein“ der Ideen, wenn auch in problematisierender Formulierung, in *Phlb.* 15b vorkommt und andererseits der damit verbundene Gedanke der Teilbarkeit der Ideen auch an mehreren Orten in den Spätdialogen vertreten wird. Eine Form von Immanenz der Ideen in den Dingen, verbunden mit einer nicht räumlich-materiell zu verstehenden Teilbarkeit der Ideen, ist gemäß der These meines Beitrags ein wichtiger Bestandteil von Platons Ideentheorie.

Die Semantik der Teilbarkeit wird von Platon an verschiedenen Stellen und mit verschiedenen Bedeutungen auf die Ideen bezogen. So wird etwa die Dialektik als Kunst der Teilung der Ideen verstanden (*Phdr.* 265e1–266b1, vgl. *Phlb.* 16d1–e2) und die „Unterideen“, die zu einer „Oberidee“ gehören, als deren Teile bezeichnet (vgl. den Sprachgebrauch in den *Dihairesen* in *Sph.* und *Plt.*). Im *Timaios* wird außerdem bei der Beschreibung der Erschaffung der Seele durch den Demiurgen auf Sein, Andersheit und Selbigkeit einmal zwar als unteilbare (*ἀμέριστον*), im gleichen Passus jedoch zugleich als „im Bereich der Körper teilbare“ (*κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστόν*) Substanzen Bezug genommen (*Ti.* 35a1–6).

Im *Parmenides* wird im Laufe der zweiten Deduktion das Thema der Teilbarkeit auf das seiende Eine bezogen. Weil dem Einen in dieser Argumentation Sein zugesprochen wird, kommt ihm auch Teilbarkeit zu, denn das Sein ist „zerstückelt in das [...] wie auch immer beschaffene Seiende und am meisten von allem geteilt“ (*Prm.* 144b4–6; vgl. dazu auch die Rede von „Zerstückelung“ in Bezug auf die Idee des Anderen in *Sph.* 257c7–258e1). Obwohl die Interpretation dieser Passage, und allgemeiner der gesamten „Übung“ des *Parmenides*, höchst umstritten ist, liegen viele Hinweise es nahe, dass die zweite Deduktion vom Einen als Idee handelt (Vgl. Allen 1983, 260) und dass die diesem zugesprochenen Eigenschaften auf die Ideen im Allgemeinen übertragen werden können.

Man kann also von drei Zusammenhängen sprechen, in denen Platon innerhalb seines *Œuvres* den Ideen eine Form von Teilbarkeit zuspricht. Der erste, „dialektische“ Sinn bezieht sich auf die dihairetische Teilung der Ideen in Unterideen, der zweite, „ontologische“ Sinn betrifft die Teilhabe aller Seienden qua Seienden an allgemeinen Ideen wie Sein oder Andersheit, und die dritte Bedeutung (die man „ontisch“ oder „phänomenisch“ nennen könnte) bezieht sich schließlich auf die Anwesenheit der Ideen in den Einzeldingen. Während bei der ersten Bedeutung sich die Frage stellt, ob die Teilung der Idee nur im Medium der dialektischen Erkenntnis geschieht und somit nicht das Wesen der Idee selbst betrifft, scheint es sich in der zweiten und dritten Bedeutung um konstitutive Eigenschaften der Ideen zu handeln, was diese Fälle im gegenwärtigen Kontext besonders relevant macht.

Freilich können die Interpreten, die auf die intrinsische Unteilbarkeit der Ideen bestehen, auf verschiedene Stellen verweisen, die diese These unterstützen. So werden die Ideen in *Phd.* 78b5, 80b2 und *Smp.* 211b1, 211e4 als *μονοειδής* bezeichnet, und in *Smp.* 211e4 sowie *Phdr.* 247e1 wird von ihnen gesagt, dass sie nicht „in einem anderen“ sind, was gegen die oben erwähnte Interpretation der Teilhabe als „In-den-Dingen-Sein“ sprechen würde.

Wie sind also diese anscheinend widersprüchliche Äußerungen Platons in Bezug auf die Teilbarkeit der Ideen miteinander vereinbar? Offenbar liegt in Bezug auf dieses Problem eine innere Spannung in Platons Denken, die weder zu leugnen noch zu beseitigen ist. Am plausibelsten scheint der Vorschlag, diese Spannung mithilfe des zweiten Teils des *Parmenides* in der ontologischen Struktur der Ideen zu integrieren. Das für diesen Zweck fruchtbare Instrument, das *Parmenides*' Übung liefert, ist die Unterscheidung zwischen Aussagen in Bezug auf die eigene Natur (*πρὸς ἑαυτόν*) und in Bezug auf die Relationen zu anderem (*πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα*; s. dazu Meinwald 1991, 165–170; Wellmann 2016, 252–53). Bezüglich unserer Frage kann die Unterscheidung folgendermaßen fruchtbar gemacht werden: In der ersten Hinsicht, d. h. auf die eigene φύσις bezogen, sind die Ideen unteilbar, während sie in Bezug sowohl auf die anderen Ideen als auch auf die sinnlichen Dinge in mehrfachem (freilich nicht räumlichen) Sinne teilbar sind.

Dies impliziert, dass die Beschreibungen der Ideen in den mittleren Dialogen, mit ihrer Betonung des Fürsichseins und der Trennung der Ideen von allem Sinnlichen, vorwiegend den

ersten Aspekt beleuchten und den zweiten im Schatten lassen. In den späteren Dialogen wird dagegen mit der Betonung der Teilhabefähigkeit der Ideen sowohl untereinander als auch in Bezug auf Sinnliches der *πρὸς-τὰ-ἄλλα*-Aspekt in den Fokus gerückt. Die Frage, ob dies eine Revision von Platons Ideenlehre bedeutet, kann nicht endgültig beantwortet werden. Dass jedoch seit dem *Parmenides* eine Vertiefung des Problems der Bezogenheit der Ideen auf die sinnliche Welt erfolgt, kann als unbezweifelbar gelten. Eine der Hauptbotschaften dieses Dialogs ist demnach, dass die Instanziierungen im sinnlichen Bereich dem Wesen der Ideen nicht bloß äußerlich sind, sondern die Ideen selbst von ihren Instanziierungen in gewissem Maße mitkonstituiert werden.

*Le idee sono davvero indivisibili? Sulla duplice natura delle forme ideali partendo da Prm. 131a-e.*

Nel mio intervento intendo, partendo da *Prm.* 131a5-e7 e prendendo in considerazione ulteriori luoghi di tale opera, nonché passaggi tratti da altri dialoghi, fornire un contributo sulla questione se e in quale misura sia sensato, nella prospettiva platonica, affermare una forma di “divisibilità” delle idee.

Il passo menzionato, in cui si trova l’“analogia del velo”, si colloca nel contesto della critica parmenidea alla teoria delle idee nella prima parte del dialogo. In essa Parmenide formula diverse obiezioni che, partendo da alcune tesi fondamentali proprie della teoria delle idee (dottrina della partecipazione, idee come paradigmi, separazione di idee e mondo fenomenico), culmina nella dimostrazione aporetica dell’inconsistenza della teoria sostenuta da Socrate.

Le obiezioni alla dottrina della partecipazione sono basate sull’assunzione che le idee debbano essere presenti negli enti che partecipano di esse, e che tale presenza debba essere o una presenza dell’idea nella sua totalità, oppure di una parte di essa. Riassumendo l’argomento, si può affermare che Parmenide dal primo caso trae la conseguenza che le idee sono separate da se stesse, dal secondo che sono “spezzettate”, quindi divisibili (cfr. tra gli altri Graeser 2003, 13). Entrambi i casi sarebbero inammissibili per un sostenitore della teoria delle idee, e da ciò conseguirebbe l’intrinseca inconsistenza di tale teoria. Il giovane Socrate non ha nulla da opporre a questa argomentazione, e non trova alcuna via d’uscita dall’aporia. La soluzione a tale problema e il conseguente salvataggio della dottrina della partecipazione vengono dunque, in questo passaggio, lasciati al lettore. Una possibilità a prima vista plausibile consiste nel rifiutare la concezione della partecipazione come “essere delle idee nelle cose”, in modo che l’indivisibilità delle idee possa essere mantenuta (cfr. Allen 1983, 114; Panagiotou 1987, 21; Migliori 1990, 138). Nel mio contributo intendo distanziarmi da tale tendenza interpretativa, mostrando come le tesi della presenza delle idee nelle cose e della divisibilità delle idee vengano affermate positivamente non solo in dialoghi precedenti, ma anche nei dialoghi tardi, compreso il *Parmenide* stesso, in modo da costituire una parte irrinunciabile anche della versione della teoria delle idee sostenuta dal tardo Platone.

Riguardo alla dottrina della presenza delle idee nelle cose, è opportuno rinviare a *Phd.* 107d e al rispettivo contesto. La tesi della *παρουσία* delle idee nelle cose sensibili è una premessa centrale per l’ultima prova dell’immortalità dell’anima, in cui culmina il dialogo. La rinuncia a tale tesi risulterebbe dunque fatale ai fini dell’argomentazione principale del *Fedone*. Alla possibile obiezione che nel *Parmenide* Platone intenda appunto superare una concezione immatura propria di una fase

anteriore del suo pensiero, si può ribattere che da un lato la tesi della presenza delle idee nelle cose è presente, seppure in una formulazione ambigua, anche in *Phlb.* 15b, e che, dall'altro lato, anche la tesi, ad essa connessa, della divisibilità delle idee viene sostenuta in diversi luoghi nei dialoghi tardi. In altre parole, in base alla tesi del mio contributo, una forma di immanenza delle cose nelle idee, a cui si connette una divisibilità delle idee da non intendere in senso spaziale-materiale, costituisce una componente essenziale della teoria platonica delle idee.

Il campo semantico della divisibilità viene riferito alle idee in diversi passaggi e con significati diversi. In primo luogo, la dialettica viene concepita come l'arte della divisione delle idee (*Phdr.* 265e1–266b1, cfr. *Phlb.* 16d1–e2) e le idee subordinate vengono definite come “parti” delle idee ad esse sovraordinate (cfr. l'uso linguistico nelle „divisioni“ in *Sph.* e *Plt.*). Nel *Timeo*, inoltre, nel contesto della descrizione della formazione dell'anima ad opera del Demiurgo (*Ti.* 35a1–6), Platone si riferisce a Essere, Identità e Alterità da un lato come entità indivisibili (ἀμέριστον), ma nello stesso passaggio al tempo stesso come sostanze divisibili “nell'ambito dei corpi” (κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστόν).

Nel *Parmenide*, il tema della divisibilità viene discusso nel corso della seconda deduzione in riferimento all'“Uno-che-è”. In tale argomentazione, all'Uno viene attribuito il predicato dell'essere, da cui consegue la divisibilità dell'uno, poiché l'essere è “spezzettato negli enti [...] di ogni sorta, ed è diviso più di ogni altra realtà” (*Prm.* 144b4–6; cfr. anche lo „spezzettamento“ dell'idea dell'Altro in *Sph.* 257c7–258e1). Benché l'interpretazione di questo passaggio, così come in generale dell'intero “esercizio” parmenideo, sia decisamente controversa, è plausibile che la seconda deduzione tratti dell'uno come idea (cfr. Allen 1983, 260) e che le proprietà che vengono attribuite a quest'ultimo possano essere estese alle idee in generale.

È dunque possibile individuare tre contesti in cui Platone, all'interno della sua opera, attribuisce alle idee una forma di divisibilità. Nel primo uso, che possiamo definire “dialettico”, la divisibilità si riferisce alla partizione diairetica delle idee in generi subordinati, il secondo contesto d'uso può essere definito “ontologico” e riguarda la partecipazione di ogni ente in quanto ente a idee generali come Essere o Alterità, e la terza accezione, che possiamo chiamare “ontica” o “fenomenica”, si riferisce infine alla presenza delle idee nelle cose sensibili (*Phd.*, *Ti.*). Mentre per quanto riguarda il primo senso si pone la domanda se la divisione dell'idea non avvenga meramente nell'elemento della conoscenza dialettica, senza coinvolgere di conseguenza l'essenza stessa dell'idea, nel secondo e nel terzo caso si tratta verosimilmente di caratteri costitutivi delle idee, il che rende tali casi di particolare rilievo ai fini della presente trattazione.

Non v'è dubbio che gli interpreti che insistono sull'intrinseca indivisibilità delle idee abbiano diversi passi a cui poter rimandare per supportare la propria tesi. In *Phd.* 78b5, 80b2 e *Smp.* 211b1, 211e4, le idee sono definite μονοειδής, e in *Smp.* 211a7–b1; *Phdr.* 247e1 si afferma che esse non sono “in altro”, il che sembra contraddire la già menzionata interpretazione della partecipazione come presenza dell'idea nelle cose.

Im che modo è possibile, dunque, conciliare tali affermazioni sulla divisibilità delle idee apparentemente contraddittorie? È evidente che riguardo a tale questione vi sia una tensione interna al pensiero platonico che non è possibile negare né tantomeno rimuovere. La proposta più plausibile consiste nell'integrare, con l'aiuto della seconda parte del *Parmenide*, tale tensione all'interno della struttura ontologica delle idee stesse. Lo strumento utile a tale scopo che l'esercizio parmenideo mette a disposizione è la distinzione, che può essere applicata ad ogni oggetto d'indagine, tra affermazioni riferite alla natura propria (πρὸς ἑαυτόν) e affermazioni rivolte alle relazioni con altro (πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα; cfr. a riguardo Meinwald 1991, 165–170; Wellmann 2016, 252–



53). In riferimento al nostro problema, tale distinzione può essere messa in opera nel modo seguente: nella prima prospettiva, cioè in relazione alla propria φύσις, le idee sono indivisibili, mentre in riferimento tanto alle altre idee quanto agli enti sensibili esse sono (chiaramente non in senso materiale-spaziale) divisibili.

Ciò implica che la descrizione delle idee tipica dei dialoghi centrali, con la caratteristica accentuazione dell'essere-in-sé e della separazione delle idee dall'ambito sensibile, mettono in luce principalmente il primo aspetto lasciando in ombra il secondo. Nei dialoghi tardi invece, con la sottolineatura della capacità delle idee di entrare in relazioni di partecipazione sia reciprocamente che in riferimento agli enti sensibili, è l'aspetto "πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα" a passare in primo piano. Se ciò comporti una revisione della teoria platonica delle idee, è una domanda a cui non è possibile dare una risposta definitiva. Non v'è, invece, dubbio che a partire dal *Parmenide* si assista ad un approfondimento del problema della relazione delle idee con il mondo sensibile. Uno dei messaggi più importanti di questo dialogo consiste nell'affermazione che le realizzazioni delle idee nell'ambito sensibile non sono semplicemente estrinseche alle idee stesse, ma sono per esse, in una certa misura, costitutive.

#### **Erwähnte Literatur/Letteratura menzionata:**

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# Stone Sophia

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## *Indirect Proof in Plato's Parmenides*

In Plato's *Parmenides* we learn that the purpose of Zeno's book was to defend the criticisms against his teacher Parmenides. Those criticisms, presumably, were that if *to pan* is a unity, that is, if the all or the world (whatever you wish for *to pan*) is one, then many absurdities follow. Zeno's paradoxes were meant to show the contrary, that if the world is a plurality, even many more absurdities follow. Cornford and his student Raven thought that it was the Pythagorean pluralists whom Zeno was targeting (Cornford, 1939; Raven, 1966). One consequence of Zeno's attack, argued Cornford, was the separation of arithmetic from geometry (Cornford 1939:60). After Zeno, we have two different approaches to the problem of incommensurables.

According to the Greek historian and mathematician Wilbur Richard Knorr, the problem of incommensurables didn't arise until circa 430 BCE, after Parmenides and Zeno (Knorr 1975:48-49). He argued that the early Pythagorean teachings [of number and pebble arithmetic] initiated Theodorus' studies of incommensurables (Knorr 1975: 48). It is interesting that the early Pythagoreans didn't recognize that the side of the square did not share a common measure with its diagonal. As Walter Burkert points out, the Pythagoreans had a reverence for certain numbers, their properties and interrelations. He says that cosmic forces were at work, so to speak, in dichotomies such as the Even and Odd. To them, the universe was necessarily a harmony of pluralities, governed by a table of opposites that explained everything in the world. It necessarily followed that the boundaries or limits of these pluralities, i.e., the definitions, the patterns, the shapes...guided understanding and knowledge of the world. A proof showing that two lines did not share a common measure would reduce their preconceptions to banality (Burkert 1972: 433).

Plato's school lies at the crosshairs of this great shift in thinking about mathematical relation and the metaphysical structure of the world. The main characters of the *Parmenides* were part of this great symposium (Raven 1966:175). Plato cleverly places his theory of Forms into that great metaphysical debate, whether the world, or the all, or reality, is one, or whether it is many. Plato's answer to this question as we have seen from the *Phaedo* is that the real beings, *ta onta*, are singular in form, themselves never affected by any change and always remained the same (78d) and that the world has a relation to those real beings, that each sensible thing of the world (78e) acquires their characteristics by having a share in those real beings. The sensibles in this world are always susceptible to change, and, unlike those real beings, are not everlasting. Sensibles are necessarily complex, whereas forms are unities.

Thus it is methodologically significant that Plato places in the mouth of Parmenides objections to his theory of Forms (135a-135c1). One of the problems introduced is the Third Man argument, leading to an infinite regress of forms. The regress is generated because the account of what a form is and how one comes to have knowledge of a form (either through sensible

observation or through intelligible thought) does not have a definite limit that separates what is and is not a form. The problem only arises if one can ascribe the same properties to forms as we do sensible particulars. But we saw in Plato's *Phaedo* (78d-e) that forms and sensibles do not share any properties in common, and yet forms are still in some way responsible for the characteristics that sensibles have.

The set up of the problem in Part I in Plato's *Parmenides*, where Socrates is asked to answer Parmenides's objections, and Part II, the solution, takes the shape of an indirect proof, the kind that we find in Parmenides's poem, the kind that we find in Zeno's paradoxes, and the kind that we find in proving that the side of the square is incommensurable with its diagonal. I suggest that the age of Socrates here has no bearing on how we should interpret Plato's treatment of Parmenides's objections, as commonly argued. Rather, we should interpret Plato's treatment of the objections within the context of developments in Greek mathematical thinking right from the time of Zeno, the first dialectician (Szabó 1978: 248), to the Greek mathematicians Theodorus and Theaetetus, whose work on incommensurables are outlined to us in Plato's *Theaetetus*. Plato was familiar with the problem of incommensurability as demonstrated in the *Meno* passage at 84Aff, and the fact that he portrays two different approaches to the problem in the *Theaetetus* shows that it was a problem coming to fruition among the Greek mathematicians in Plato's day.

In the *Meno*, Socrates challenges the boy to find twice the area of a given square from its side. He tells the boy that if he cannot count it out, *kai mē boulei arithmeîn*, that he point to the line (84a). In the translations of this passage, interpreters tend to imply that the boy is unable to count out the number for himself. But the problem is impossible, because in order to count the boy would need a common measure by which to count. The sides and the diagonal could never have shared a common measure for the boy to count out. The demonstration with Socrates and the boy isn't simply about recollection; the subject of the demonstration is about the incommensurability of a square's sides with its diagonal, a demonstration by indirect proof. We learn from Socrates that in order to make the measures commensurable, an impossible problem from the standpoint of Greek arithmetic, requires a geometric solution. The length of the line and the length of the diagonal of the square do not share a common measure, but their areas do.

Plato is doing something similar in the *Parmenides* with respect to the claim that, in order to have knowledge, we need to posit a form for each thing (135a-135c1). The hypothesis under consideration is the hypothesis that not only are there forms for the just, the beautiful and the good, there are forms for human being, fire, water, hair, mud, dirt, and everything else. In the second part of the dialogue, Plato assumes the truth of this hypothesis. What follows is an indirect proof, showing that unlimited forms, forms without limits and no forms at all lead to impossible results. What are the results if there is a form for everything, every characteristic, every natural thing, and what are the results if there are no forms? The conclusion is an untenable result. At the end of the exercise, Parmenides says: «as it seems, whether one is or is not, it and the others both are and are not, and both appear and do not appear all things in all ways, both in relation to themselves and in relation to each other», (166c3-6, tr. Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan). Just like the realization that it is impossible to count out the diagonal for lack of countable integers, at the end of the deductions, it is impossible to know the objects of the world without definite limits.

Therefore, there must be forms, and forms must provide limits, but there must be a limit to forms, in order for knowledge to be possible.

### *Preuve indirecte dans le Parménide de Platon*

Dans le *Parménide* de Platon, nous apprenons que le but du livre de Zénon était de défendre les critiques lancées contre son professeur Parménide. Ces critiques étaient vraisemblablement que si *to pan* est une unité, c'est-à-dire si tout ou le monde (peu importe ce que vous voulez faire pour *to pan*) est un, alors de nombreuses absurdités s'ensuivent. Les paradoxes de Zénon étaient censés montrer le contraire, à savoir que si le monde est une pluralité, même de nombreuses absurdités s'ensuivent. Cornford et son étudiant Raven pensaient que c'était les pluralistes pythagoriciens que Zénon ciblait (Cornford, 1939; Raven, 1966). Une des conséquences de l'attaque de Zénon, selon Cornford, fut la séparation de l'arithmétique et de la géométrie (Cornford 1939: 60). Après Zénon, nous avons deux approches différentes du problème des incommensurables.

Selon l'historien et mathématicien grec Wilbur Richard Knorr, le problème des incommensurables n'apparut qu'en 430 av J.-C., après Parménide et Zénon (Knorr 1975: 48-49). Il a soutenu que les premiers enseignements pythagoriciens avaient initié les études de Théodore sur les incommensurables (Knorr 1975: 48). Il est intéressant de noter que les premiers Pythagoriciens n'ont pas reconnu que le côté d'un carré ne partageait pas de mesure commune avec sa diagonale. Comme le souligne Walter Burkert, les pythagoriciens respectent certains nombres, leurs propriétés et leurs interrelations. Il avance que les forces cosmiques étaient en quelque sorte à l'œuvre dans des dichotomies telles que *artios* et *perittos*. Pour eux, l'univers était nécessairement une harmonie de pluralités, régie par une table des contraires qui expliquait tout dans le monde. Il en découle que les délimitations ou les limites de ces pluralités, c'est-à-dire les définitions, les modèles, les formes... guidaient la compréhension et la connaissance du monde. Une preuve démontrant que deux lignes ne partageaient pas une mesure commune réduirait leurs préconceptions à des banalités (Burkert 1972: 433).

L'Académie de Platon se situe à la croisée de ce grand changement dans la réflexion sur la relation mathématique et la structure métaphysique du monde. Les personnages principaux du *Parménide* faisaient partie de ce grand symposium (Raven 1966: 175). Platon place habilement sa théorie des formes dans ce grand débat métaphysique, que le monde, le tout ou la réalité soit un, ou qu'il soit plusieurs. La réponse de Platon à cette question, telle que nous l'avons vue dans le *Phèdon* est que les êtres réels, *ta onta*, ont une forme singulière, qu'ils ne sont jamais affectés par aucun changement et restent toujours restés les mêmes (78d), et que le monde est en relation avec ces êtres réels, que chaque chose sensible du monde (78e) acquiert ses caractéristiques en ayant sa part dans ces êtres réels. Les êtres sensibles dans ce monde sont toujours susceptibles de changer et, contrairement à ces êtres réels, ne sont pas éternelles. Les êtres sensibles sont nécessairement complexes, alors que les formes sont des unités.

Il est donc méthodologiquement significatif que Platon fait emmètre à Parménide des objections à sa théorie des formes (135a-135c1). L'un des problèmes présentés est l'argument du troisième homme, qui conduit à une régression infinie des formes. La régression est générée parce que le récit de ce qu'est une forme et comment on en vient à connaître une forme (soit par observation sensible ou par la pensée intelligible) n'a pas de limite définie qui sépare ce qui est et n'est pas une forme. Le problème ne se pose que si l'on peut attribuer les mêmes propriétés aux formes que les détails sensibles. Mais comme nous l'avons vu dans le *Phèdon* de Platon (78d-e) les formes et les êtres sensibles n'ont aucune propriété en commun, et pourtant les formes sont en quelque sorte encore responsables des caractéristiques des sensibles.

La mise en place du problème dans la première partie du *Parménide* de Platon, où Socrate est invité à répondre aux objections de Parménide, et la deuxième partie, la solution, prend la forme d'une preuve indirecte, du genre que nous trouvons dans le poème de Parménide, ainsi que dans les paradoxes de Zénon, et aussi du genre que nous trouvons dans la preuve que le côté d'un carré est incommensurable avec sa diagonale. Nous devrions plutôt interpréter le traitement des objections par Platon dans le contexte des développements de la pensée mathématique grecque depuis Zénon, le premier dialecticien (Szabó 1978: 248), jusqu'aux mathématiciens grecs Théodore et Théétète, dont les travaux sur les incommensurables nous sont présentés dans le *Théétète* de Platon. Platon était familier avec le problème de l'incommensurabilité, comme le montre le passage de *Ménon* 84a<sup>ff</sup>, et le fait qu'il dépeint deux approches différentes du problème dans le *Théétète* montre que c'était un problème qui se réalisait chez les mathématiciens grecs à l'époque de Platon.

Dans le *Ménon*, Socrate défie le garçon de trouver deux fois la surface d'un carré donnée de son côté. Il dit au garçon que s'il ne peut pas le compter, *kai mē boulei arithmein*, qu'il montre du doigt la ligne (84a). Mais le problème est impossible à résoudre, car pour compter, le garçon aurait besoin d'une mesure commune pour compter. Les côtés et la diagonale n'auraient jamais pu partager une mesure commune pour le garçon. La démonstration entre Socrate et le garçon ne concerne pas simplement la mémoire; Le sujet de la démonstration concerne l'incommensurabilité des côtés d'un carré avec sa diagonale, une démonstration par preuve indirecte. Socrate nous apprend que, pour rendre les mesures commensurables, un problème impossible du point de vue de l'arithmétique grecque exige une solution géométrique. La longueur de la ligne et la longueur de la diagonale du carré ne partagent pas une mesure commune, mais leurs surfaces oui.

Platon fait quelque chose de similaire dans le *Parménide* en ce qui concerne l'affirmation selon laquelle, pour avoir la connaissance, nous devons poser une forme pour chaque chose (135a-135c1). L'hypothèse considérée est que non seulement il y a des formes pour le juste, le beau et le bon, mais qu'il y a aussi des formes pour l'être humain, le feu, l'eau, les cheveux, la boue, la saleté et tout le reste. Dans la seconde partie du dialogue, Platon assume la vérité de cette hypothèse. Ce qui suit est une preuve indirecte, montrant que des formes illimitées, des formes sans limites et qu'aucune forme ne conduisent à des résultats impossibles. Quels sont les résultats s'il y a une forme pour tout, pour chaque caractéristique, pour chaque chose naturelle et quels sont les résultats s'il n'y a pas de formes? La conclusion est un résultat intenable. À la fin de l'exercice, Parménide dit: «comme il semble, qu'on soit ou non, il et les autres sont et ne sont pas, et tous deux apparaissent et n'apparaissent pas de toutes les manières, les deux par rapport à eux-mêmes et par rapport à l'autre » (166c3-6, tr. Mary Louise Gill et Paul Ryan). Tout comme la prise de conscience

qu'il est impossible de compter la diagonale par manque d'entiers dénombrables, à la fin des déductions, il est impossible de connaître les objets du monde sans limites définies. Par conséquent, il doit y avoir des formes, et les formes doivent fournir des limites, mais les formes doivent être limités pour que la connaissance soit possible.

## Sun Yujung

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### *Unité et différenciation de l'Être : 139b4-148d8 du Parménide de Platon*

Parmi toutes les démonstrations faites par Parménide dans la deuxième partie du dialogue, les déductions concernant deux paires de prédicats – à savoir le rapport de l'un avec le tout et les parties, ainsi qu'avec l'identité (ταυτόν) et le différent (ἕτερον) – semblent révéler la cause qui mène toutes ces déductions à une conclusion absurde. Dans cette série de déductions faites à partir de la première hypothèse « s'il est un » (137b4), l'un n'ayant pas de partie et n'étant pas un tout, l'un n'a donc ni figure, ni limite, ni extrémité, ne se trouve nulle part, et n'est ni en mouvement ni au repos ; aussi, l'un n'étant ni même ni différent par rapport à lui-même et aux autres, il n'est donc ni semblable ni dissemblable, ni égal ni inégal, ni jeune ni vieux, et n'est pas situé dans le temps.

Considérons les raisonnements de Parménide partant de la première hypothèse. Selon ces raisonnements, d'une part, l'un doit être et ne pas être un tout, car étant un, il n'a pas de partie mais rien ne lui manque non plus. D'autre part, l'un doit être et ne pas être le même que lui-même, car étant donné que toute chose qui peut se mettre en comparaison avec l'un est aussi un en tant que quelque chose, l'un n'est donc différent de rien, mais comme le dit Parménide « Οὐχ ἥπερ τοῦ ἐνός φύσις, αὐτὴ δῆπου καὶ τοῦ ταύτου. (139d2-3) » De même, avec la deuxième hypothèse « si l'un est tel, il a des parties » (142c9-d1), et que l'un et l'être sont des parties d'un tout, alors ce qui permet de les différencier est en dehors de l'un et de l'être (143b1-3). Comme pour la première hypothèse, l'un étant un, il exclut toute différenciation.

Les inférences dans ces raisonnements présupposent toutes une contradiction entre l'unité et la différenciation, ce qui fait que les rapports entre l'unité, la totalité et l'identité sont contradictoires. Autrement dit, une fois que la différenciation peut être introduite, alors tous ces raisonnements de Parménide déduisent ensuite l'opposition de celle-ci à l'unité, et excluent tout intermédiaire d'unité différenciée.

Schofield articule l'énoncé de Parménide « étant un, il n'est pas identique à lui-même » en expliquant l'identité comme étant la reconnaissance d'une qualité en tant que qualité du soi, et non pas simplement comme étant cette qualité. L'unité et l'identité sont certainement deux choses différentes. Si l'on reconnaît l'identité de l'un avec lui-même, alors ce n'est pas son unité qui nous permet de saisir cette identité, en revanche, c'est grâce à la reconnaissance de l'identité entre l'un et son unité, que l'un est identique à lui-même. Autrement dit, l'identité (ταυτόν) exige une mise en rapport entre la chose et « son caractère identifiant<sup>1</sup> » comme le dit Schofield. C'est pour cela que, l'un, étant un, est simplement un et non pas identique à lui-même.

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1 Malcolm Schofield, « Plato on Unity and Sameness », vol. 24 / 1, Cambridge University Press, 1974, p. 33-45, p. 34.

L'unité et l'identité sont donc les deux attributs nécessaires, comme le démontre Schofield, si l'on veut affirmer quoi que ce soit. Cependant, mise à part l'interdépendance entre l'unité et l'identité, on remarque en même temps un lien étroit entre l'identité et la différenciation. Dans cet argument de Parménide, l'un, étant un, n'est pas identique lui-même, car afin de reconnaître son identité, il faut différencier déjà l'un et son identité afin de les identifier l'un à l'autre. Autrement dit, même dans un rapport d'identité d' $A=A$ , ce rapport identitaire ne peut pas être saisi sans une différenciation entre A et son soi-même qui rend A un A. L'unité d'une chose n'est donc pas un acquis immédiat, en revanche, à travers l'identification d'une chose à son caractère identifiant, une chose gagne son unité. Or, la thèse de Schofield néglige que l'identification nécessite la différenciation entre la chose et son soi-même, et l'unité est donc un résultat de la différenciation et la mise en rapport identitaire d'une chose et son soi-même.

Dans l'argument de Parménide qui affirme que l'un n'est pas différent de quelque chose de différent, on retrouve donc ce même rapport sous-jacent entre l'identité et la différenciation : « Il ne sera pas différent de quelque chose de différent, tant qu'il restera un ; en effet, ce n'est pas à ce qui est un qu'il convient d'être différent de quelque chose, mais à cela seul qui est différent de quelque chose de différent, et à rien d'autre. » (139c3-5)

Selon ce raisonnement, une chose n'est différente que quand elle ne partage aucune identité avec ce dont elle est différente. Or, afin d'établir ce rapport différencié entre l'un et un autre, l'autre, étant un autre, est nécessairement une unité comparable vis-à-vis de l'un, mais étant chacun une unité, l'un et l'autre sont mêmes, donc n'ont rien de différent. De plus, aucun rapport différencié ne peut être établi si les deux choses n'ont rien de comparable, et la commensurabilité exige déjà une certaine identité. De nouveau, la mise en contradiction entre l'identité et la différenciation conduit vers ce résultat où rien n'est identique à lui-même, rien n'est différent des autres.

Cette implication mutuelle de l'identité et de la différenciation peut être confirmée par la présence du Même ( $\tau\acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\acute{\omicron}\nu$ ) et de l'Autre ( $\tau\acute{o}$  ἕτερον) dans le *Sophiste*, figurant les deux plus grands genres, qui participent l'un à l'autre mutuellement. Le *Sophiste*, comme un miroir du *Parménide*, manifeste le fondement d'une unité différenciée dans le reflet de la communauté des genres articulés par le Même et l'Autre. La participation du Même et de l'Autre dans le *Sophiste* s'opposant à la mise en contradiction de l'identité et de la différence du *Parménide*, le *Sophiste* nous permet de revenir aux critiques de Parménide contre les formes intelligibles, et de leur répondre, en indiquant dans quelle mesure il est possible que la forme intelligible reste identique à elle-même tout en acceptant la participation de nombreuses autres choses. Si l'être peut être une unité tout en étant différencié, alors un tout peut aussi garder son unité tout en étant différencié en parties. De même, l'unité d'une forme pourra rester intacte nonobstant sa participation aux multiples.

Ce projet s'attache à démontrer premièrement que les déductions absurdes dans le *Parménide* sont une conséquence nécessaire de la mise en contradiction de l'identité et de la différenciation, et deuxièmement, que l'être ne peut pas être saisi seulement en tant qu'unité différenciée, et enfin, que l'unité de l'être est articulée par l'identité, ainsi que par la différenciation.

## *Unity and differentiation of Being: 139b4-148d8 Plato's Parmenides*

Among all the demonstrations made by Parmenides in the second part of the dialogue, the deductions concerning two pairs of predicates - namely the relation between *the one*, the Whole and the parts, as well as identity (*ταυτόν*) and difference (*ἕτερον*) - seem to reveal the cause that leads all these deductions to an absurd conclusion. In these series of deductions made from the first hypothesis "if it is one" (137b4), *the one*, having no part and not being a whole, neither figure, nor limit, nor extremity; the one is nowhere, and is neither moving nor at rest; the one is neither identical nor different in relation to itself and to others. It is therefore neither similar nor dissimilar, neither equal nor unequal, neither young nor old, and is not situated in the time.

Let us consider Parmenides' reasoning from the first hypothesis. According to this reasoning, on the one hand, *the one* must be and not be a whole, because, being one, it has no part, but at the same time it has nothing missing either. On the other hand, *the one* must be and not be identical to itself; since anything that can be compared with *the one* is itself also one thing, *the one* is different from nothing. As Parmenides says, "Οὐχ ἕπερ τοῦ ἐνὸς φύσις, αὐτὴ δὴπου καὶ τοῦ ταύτου. (139d2-3) Similarly, according to the second hypothesis of Parmenides, "if the one is as such, it has parts" (142c9-d1), and *the one* and the being are parts of a whole, then the difference that distinguishes *the one* and the being is a certain third thing other than *the one* and the being. (143b1-3) Just like the first hypothesis, *the one* by being one, it excludes all differentiation.

The inferences in this reasoning all presuppose a contradiction between unity and differentiation, putting the unity, the totality and the identity in a contradictory relation to each other. In other words, once differentiation can be introduced, all Parmenides' arguments lead to the opposite of unity, and exclude any intermediates of differentiated unity.

Schofield articulates Parmenides' statement "by being one, it is not identical to itself" by explaining identity as the recognition of a quality as the quality of its own, hence not just as being the quality. Unity and identity are certainly two different things. If we recognize that *the one* is identical to itself, then it is not its unity that allows us to grasp this identity. Besides, through the recognition of the identity between *the one* and its unity, *the one* is identical to itself. In other words, the identity (*ταυτόν*) requires that one thing and "its identifying character", as Schofield names it<sup>1</sup>, be put into relation. That is why, *the one*, by being one, is simply one and not identical to itself.

Unity and identity are therefore the two necessary attributes as Schofield demonstrates, if one wants to assert anything. However, apart from the interdependence between unity and identity, we notice at the same time a close link between identity and differentiation. In this argument of Parmenides, *the one*, by being one, is not identical to itself, because, in order to recognize its identity, it is necessary to differentiate one and its identity for the purpose of identifying one with the other. In other words, even in an identical relation of  $A = A$ , this relation of identity cannot be grasped without a differentiation between  $A$  and what makes  $A$  an  $A$ . Hence,

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<sup>1</sup> Malcolm Schofield, « Plato on Unity and Sameness », vol. 24 / 1, Cambridge University Press, 1974, p. 33-45, p. 34.



the unity of a thing is not something of which we can have immediate acquisition; rather, it can be grasped through the identification of a thing with its identifying character. However, Schofield's thesis neglects the fact that identification requires the differentiation between the thing and its own self, and unity is thus a result of both differentiation and identification.

We can find the same relationship between identity and differentiation in Parmenides' argument which claims that one is not different from something different: "It won't be different from another, as long as it is one; for it is not proper to one to be different from something, but proper to different-from-another alone, and to nothing else." (139c3-5)

According to this reasoning, one thing can be different from something else only when it shares absolutely no identity with what it is different from. Now, if we try to establish this differentiating relationship between one and the other, the other, by being the other, is necessarily a comparable unit in regard to the one. However, by being a unit for the both sides, one and the other are the same, and have nothing different accordingly. Moreover, no differentiating relationship can be established if two things are not comparable, and commensurability already requires certain identity as their common basis. Again, the contradiction between identity and differentiation leads to this result where nothing is identical to itself, and nothing is different from others.

This mutual implication between identity and differentiation can be confirmed by the presence of the Sameness (*ταυτόν*) and the Difference (*τό ἕτερον*) in the *Sophist*, as the two greatest kinds, the Sameness and the Difference participate mutually one into the other. The *Sophist*, like a mirror of the *Parmenides*, manifests the foundation of a differentiated unity in the reflection of community of kinds articulated by the Sameness and the Difference. The participation of the Sameness and the Difference in the *Sophist*, opposing to the contradiction of the identity and the difference in the *Parmenides*, shades some new lights on the criticisms of Parmenides against the intelligible forms, by indicating to what extent it is possible for the intelligible form to remain identical to itself while accepting the participation of many other things. If being can be a unit while being differentiated, then a whole can also keep its unity while being differentiated into parts. Likewise, the unity of a form may remain intact, notwithstanding its participation in multiples.

This project seeks to demonstrate firstly that the absurd inferences in *Parmenides* are a necessary consequence if we make identity and differentiation into a contradictory relation, and secondly, that being can only be grasped as differentiated unity, and finally, that the unity of being is articulated by identity, as well as by differentiation.

### *«Théétète» & «Parménide»: le problème des parallèles structurels et discursifs.*

L'expérience montre que l'étude des textes de Platon peut être basé sur une variété de procédures d'interprétation. Les tendances des dernières décennies ont fait sérieusement trembler des stratégies traditionnelles de la lecture des dialogues de Platon. Et surtout, il nous semble clair que la tentative d'identifier la question principale du texte concret, en procédant de la division habituelle en physique, logique, l'éthique, l'ontologie, le gnoseologie, l'épistémologie, ne conduisent pas à la réussite. Dans ce cadre nous voyons maintenant la possibilité de comparer les dialogues, qui sont liés aux disciplines différentes. Ce droit de comparaison était largement bloqué par les modèles précédents d'études de Platon.

Cela est particulièrement vrai pour des dialogues, qui sont unis dans certains cycles - soit par leur sujet dramatique, soit par les noms et l'identification philosophique des personnages qui participent dans ces dialogues. L'un de ces groupes (cycles) de dialogues est l'Eleatic: «Théétète», «Sophiste», «Le Politique» et «Parménide». Le «Parménide» a «dramatiquement» disparu de ce cycle pour 50 ans. Socrate dans le dialogue «Parménide» est jeune, dans le dialogue «Théétète» Socrate se souvient vaguement d'une rencontre avec le grand philosophe d'Élée, mais ne risque pas de faire l'interprétation d'une fois entendu de grand philosophe d'Élée. La division thématique d'interpréter «Théétète» - comme un dialogue consacré à la connaissance et le dialogue «Parménide» comme un dialogue consacré aux idées (cette modèle d'interprétation existait depuis les néoplatoniciens) a longtemps dominé les routes d'interprétations de Corpus Platonicum.

Le dialogue «Parménide» se prétends d'être lu donc lire comme un texte plutôt "ontologique". Cependant, pour être tout à fait d'accord avec cette grille de la lecture, la proposition de Parménide interfère avec la pratique des logos, qui marque également le passage à des hypothèses. Au contraire, nous voyons un énorme exercice de méthodologie. La recherche d'une manière fiable et correcte d'obtenir des connaissances. À cet égard, les parallèles entre «Parménide» et «Théétète» sont tout à fait appropriés, même si ces dialogues semblent d'être différents.

Un examen plus approfondi des dialogues révèle des similitudes dans certains argumentations clés de discours de Platon.

On sait que pour Platon, le discours dialectique est toujours lié à la clarification de la relation de La Partie et le Tout (de l'Un et de l'Autre). Ces 2 concepts jouent un rôle important dans les dialogues «Parménide» et «Théétète».

Ainsi, au début de dialogue, le jeune Théétète est confus quant à la définition de la connaissance comme un ensemble avec la pluralité de compétences spécifiques. Dans la dernière série de tentatives pour définir la connaissance (en tant que le véritable opinion avec le logos), on tente de découvrir comment l'intégralité du sens se développe s'il ya d'autres éléments indivisibles, et donc incompréhensibles.

Nous affirmons que c'est cette partie de dialogue «Théétète» qui a des parallèles incontestables de l'intrigue et la sémantique de dernières hypothèses de Parménide.

Les hypothèses 5-8 sont liées à la situation du non-existence de l'Un. Dans les cinquième et sixième hypothèses la possibilité de parler du non-existant est évoquée.

Dans la septième et huitième hypothèse, l'accent est fait sur les conclusions pour l'Autre. La conclusion est en tous cas négative: dans le premier cas, le jugement sur l'Un non-existant est soit dénué de sens, soit impossible.

Dans le second cas, il est impossible de faire le jugement sur l'Autre. Particulièrement important est l'utilisation par Platon du même exemple dans le cas de la septième hypothèse de «Parménide» et la troisième étape d'argumentation qui concernait la véritable opinion et le logos dans le «Théétète» (208s et plus). C'est une question de *σκιαγραφία*.

Ainsi, dans la septième hypothèse, L'Autre se révèle différente par rapport à soi, à la suite de quoi la possibilité d'établir au moins une sorte de similitude ou de différence est perdue. Si l'Un n'est pas et il n'y a que d'Autre, il semble aussi y avoir une limite, et sans limites, et un et plusieurs (Parménides 165c).

Aristote a demandé d'expliquer le philosophe d'Elée ce qu'il voulait dire. Et Parménide dit: «Les figures d'un tableau vues de loin se confondent toutes en une seule et paraissent semblables <...> Si on s'approche, au contraire, elles paraissent plusieurs et différentes, et la diversité se manifestant, on les reconnaît pour diverses et dissemblables entre elles» (165c-d).

Platon fait référence aux éléments de l'image, qui permet de créer l'illusion de l'intégrité et de l'unité de l'image. À courte distance, cette illusion disparaît et une image uni disparaît. C'est le même que Platon écrit dans le «Théétète»: «Maintenant, Théétète, que je suis près de cette définition, je n'y saisis pour mon compte absolument rien, comme devant certains tableaux ; dans l'éloignement, je croyais y voir quelque chose» (208e).

L'attribut se révèle d'être un élément d'un dessin *sciagraphic*. Seulement en regardant sur lui de loin, il semble qu'il est la côté d'une unité (camardise de Théétète )Mais lorsque nous considérons cet attribut comme une sorte de source indicant de la connaissances, nous perdons réellement ce que nous recherchons.

Par conséquent, la camardise hors de personnage qui a cette qualité (Théétète) devient aussi illusoire que les différences et l'altérité dont il est question dans l'hypothèse VII de «Parménide». Sans l'existence de l'unité (dans un cas - "de l'Un", dans l'autre cas - de définition de la connaissance), ils n'ont pas de sens.

Il reste encore une question importante: Socrate dit que nous ne pouvons pas parler de la connaissance comme d'une opinion vraie avec le Logos que dans trois manières: en allant de l'Intégralité vers les parties, en allant de parties vers l'Unité ou en distinguant un trait distinctif. En attendant, les hypothèses finales de Parménide sont quatre, mais pas trois.

L'explication suivante pour cette divergence des étapes de la recherche épistémique est possible: dans le dialogue «Théétète» Socrate dit à un moment donné: «L'opinion correcte de chaque chose se rapporte-t-elle à un trait distinctif?» (209b). La définition de la connaissance est absente, mais nous avons un ensemble d'une vraie opinion et d'un attribut particulier.

Et cette dernière argumentation dans «Théétète» est similaire à la huitième hypothèse, où l'Autre est considéré comme un existant absolument sans égard à l'Un. Le résultat: en l'absence d'Un, il n'y a ni opinion, ni rien du tout (166a-167b).

Dans «Théétète», l'hypothèse selon laquelle l'opinion vraie inclut un attribut conduit Socrate à la conclusion que nous ne soutenons absolument rien: le Logos est déjà contenu dans la vraie opinion, si celle-ci comporte un trait distinctif. Par conséquent, notre définition de la connaissance en tant qu'opinion avec le logos est inutile et n'indique rien (209 d-e).

Il nous semble qu'avec cette lecture de la dernière partie du «Théétète», les parallèles avec le dialogue «Parménide» deviennent encore plus distincts. Et puis la dialectique dans «Parménide», peut être vraiment considérée comme un exercice dans la méthodologie de la recherche noétique, et pas seulement comme un texte qui a des intentions ontologiques primaires.

*“Theaetetus” and “Parmenides”. The problem of structural and content parallels.*

The study of the Plato's text can be done through a whole verity of different interpretational methods. The tendency of the last few decades has fundamentally changed our strategy in reading these. That's why this we start to understand that our attempts to identify the core question of the text using the usual methods of dividing it into physics, ethics, logic or ontology and epistemology does not lead us to success. As a result, we find ourselves able to compare various dialogues, addressed to different disciplines – a possibility often blocked off by the more traditional Platonic studies.

This is especially relevant for dialogues that are bound together into groups – either through their dramatic scenario or by the names and philosophical identities of the characters that we can find within. As most know, one of such groups is Eleatic: “Theaetetus”, “Sophist”, “Statesman” and “Parmenides”. The last falls out of the group by about 50 years. In “Parmenides” Socrates reminisces about his meeting with a great man but does not even risk interpreting what he heard from the numinous elder. The dialogues's thematic separation: “Theaetetus” – about knowledge, “Parmenides” – about ideas, that was taken by the neoplatonism, had thusly was dominant in science for a long time.

At the same time, such a combination of both texts can be inaccurate. Certainly, “Parmenides” is a dialogue about ideas. The aporias of the introductory part of the texts force the interlocutors to turn to a series of exercises. One and the Other, which had been put to a head against each other, represent ideas and things, as well as a few principles that stand behind them (comparison “Timaeus”: that which is undivided and remains undivided in instances of division), the contradictions of participation between which serve as the theme of the prologue of the text.

As such, one desires to read “Parmenides” as “ontological par excellence”. However, there is an issue that prevents us from fully agreeing with this, namely the proposal of Parmenides to exercise in discussions-logos, which signifies the transition to hypotheses. Rather, what we see instead is a grandiose exercise in methodology: the search of a reliable and correct method of gaining knowledge. Because of this, the parallels between “Parmenides” and “Theaetetus” are fitting, despite the seeming differences between the dialogues.

An even more perceptive gaze cast upon the dialogues will reveal the similarities in some discussions that are key for Plato's intention. As it is known, for Plato dialectic discussions are always tied to explaining the ties between the part and the whole. They play a vital role both in “Theaetetus” and “Parmenides”. So, we see in the very beginning, young Theaetet mistakes the definition of knowledge as a some whole with various specific skills and practices. In the last series of attempts to define knowledge (as true opinion with logos), a key role is played by the attempt to understand how to put together the whole of reason in the case when it includes undividable and thus unknowable elements.

We claim, that precisely this part of “Theaetetus” has undeniable plot and semantic parallels with the final hypotheses of “Parmenides”. Hypotheses five and six discuss the possibility of expressing about the nonexistent One. Seven and eight deal with the expressions of the Other. The conclusions are ultimately negative: in the first case, conclusions about the nonexistent One are either meaningless or impossible to achieve. In the second instance, it is meaningless or impossible to reach a conclusion of the Other. Of particular importance is Plato’s usage of the same kind of example in the seventh hypothesis of “Parmenides” and the third stage of ponderings about true opinion with logos in “Theaetetus”. This means skiagraphy.

As such, in the seventh hypothesis the other is different to the self, and it becomes impossible to determine any kinds of similarities or differences. If the One does not exist, and there is only the Other, then it will seem as both finite and infinite, one and many.

Aristotle asks the Eleatic philosopher to explain what he means and Parmenides replies: “It is akin to the pictures that we create via shadows (skiagraphy): when you look upon it from afar, they seem similar and united <...> But when you get closer, they all are seen as being many and different and, because of the phantom of the Other, seem to not resemble themselves” (165c-d). Plato points out the elements of the picture that allow for the creation of the illusion of whole and unity of the image. At closer distances this illusion is dispelled and the image disappears. Plato writes the exact same thing in “Theaetetus” precisely in the place that interests us: “Theaetet, now that I have become closer to what we were talking about, as if it were indeed made from shadows (skiagraphy), I cannot discern even a fraction. But when I was looking from afar, I thought that there was something there” (208e).

A feature is thus a part of a skiagraphic picture. Only when looking from a distance, does it seem that he is a part of some kind of unity. But when we look at this feature as an identifiable source of knowledge, we actually lose what we seek. That is why the sign of pug nose without his master (Theaetetus) becomes equally illusionary, as those differences which were spoken of in the seventh hypothesis of “Parmenides”. Without the existence of unity (existence of knowledge, or the existence of “One”) they are meaningless.

One important question remains: Socrates told us that thinking about true knowledge and its relation to logos, we can only do it along three methods: moving from whole to its parts, from parts to the whole or by discerning the differentiating feature. But in “Parmenides”, there are four concluding hypothesis, not three.

It is possible that the following could explain this mismatch of epistemological search stages. In “Theaetetus” Socrates said as follows: “Does that mean that the correct meaning of every single thing is also includes its differentiating feature?” (209b) The definition of knowledge is lacking but we still have something – the true opinion plus the differentiating feature. And this, the last reasoning of “Theaetetus” has a parallel in the eight hypothesis, where the Other is treated as being completely unrelated to One. The conclusion to this rather short hypothesis is negative: with the lack of One there is no meaning, there is simply nothing (166a-167b). In “Theaetetus” the proposition that true opinion includes in it the feature of the item, brings Socrates to the conclusion that we are discussing nothing: logos is already included in the true opinion, if the later includes the differentiating feature. As such, our definition of knowledge as opinion with logos is meaningless as it points to nothing.

We believe that with such a reading of the last part of “Theaetetus” parallels with “Parmenides” become even more obvious. The dialectic of One-Other, Thing-Idea, presented in

“Parmenides” really can be viewed as an exercise in methodology of noetic search and not as a text containing only the initial ontological intentions.

Szaif Jan

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*Pseudo-Objects in a World of Seeming (Parmenides 164b5–165e1)*

The view that for Plato “being-something-or-other” entails the attribution of being *tout court* seems to have gained rather widespread acceptance in recent years among authors writing on this topic. This analysis, convincingly presented by Lesley Brown, is confirmed, for instance, by arguments in the *Sophist* that aim to show that even the predication of not-being entails that the object is a being. Yet it is still an open question whether “being”, predicated absolutely, can be equated with the notion of real existence. One of the main issues, in this respect, relates to the status of unreal objects—a class that includes things such as fictitious objects, illusions, perhaps also things in the past or future. In some contexts, Plato clearly refers to inexistent objects as “things that are not”. But how can we relate, for instance, to the object of an illusion as a “thing that is not” if we have to be able to characterize it in order to relate to it, and any form of characterization entails the attribution of being? Is his use of the terminology of being perhaps ambiguous such that in some contexts “to be” (predicated absolutely) means to exist or to be real, while in others it indicates characterizability (“being such and such”), which might be applicable also to illusory or fictitious objects to the extent that they can be characterized and distinguished from each other?

My essay is going to approach the topic of illusory objects by looking at the second to last dialectical demonstration in the *Parmenides* (164b5–165e1), which I’ll refer to as “exercise VII”. It discusses objects that exhibit some kind of being, just in virtue of being different, but aren’t true objects since their unity and stability is a matter of mere seeming. Against proposals that identify the entities in question with the objects of sense-perception (Miller, referencing *Republic X*) or with the *apeira* of the *Philebus* (Cornford and others), I am going to argue that exercise VII offers an ontological discussion of illusory objects, notwithstanding certain important connections with these two other topics. After a brief comparison with some passages in other dialogues on objects of illusion, the essay will conclude with a comment on the implications for our understanding of Plato’s ontology.

Since there is so little agreement about how best to make sense of the second part of the *Parmenides*, I’ll have to indicate what my approach is. Parmenides (as the lead interlocutor) introduces the dialectical pieces of the second part as a kind of *preliminary exercise* in dialectic. We should take him by his word and not expect definitive solutions. Arranged in a dilemmatic and antinomic form, these pieces of reasoning either turn their object(s) of investigation into something ineffable and inconceivable or reveal them as deeply paradoxical with contrary determinations throughout. That said, these exercises are also not futile. It stands to reason that they are meant to direct the reader toward the discovery of important philosophical issues and to provide starting-points for further inquiry.

The underlying hypothesis of exercise VII, “the One is not”, is (strictly speaking) false since the One, or unit/unit, is undeniably a feature of reality. Yet it is still apt to serve as a starting-point for a discussion of pseudo-objects that lack any form of unity. The world made up of such

“objects” is not the physical world, as we can tell from the fact that Plato’s late dialogues *Timaeus*, *Statesman* and *Philebus* assert very clearly that the physical world is a place for processes that create temporary instances of stable being, or “in-formation” through Forms resulting in *whole* (i.e., unified) objects—an idea already foreshadowed in the classical theory of participation in the so-called middle-period dialogues. Exercise VII begins by attributing some form of being to the things “other than the (inexistent) One”.

They have to “be others” (i.e., be different things), or else we couldn’t even refer to them as “others”. Yet their otherness cannot relate back to the One since, *ex hypothesi*, the One “is not”. It has to occur among the others themselves. While this otherness constitutes them as a plurality of sorts, each of them individually must also be a plurality (again because of the unreality of the One). Yet in each case, such plurality is indeterminate, as any specific discreet quantity or “number” would likewise imply the reality of units and unity. At the same time, each of these indeterminate “masses” (*onkoi*) appears as one object distinct from others. This is, however, mere appearance or seeming since unity is unreal, and it is also something inherently unstable since any object in this scenario, even the smallest, will immediately turn into the appearance of an immeasurable collection of parts as soon as it is pondered more closely. This mode of seeming, with its sudden transitions to opposite instances of seeming, affects also the other apparent characteristics of these pseudo- objects, including their mutual limits (*peras*) and their identity and otherness as (fake) countables. Yet this illusion cannot be overcome. Close scrutiny will dispel the appearance of a given unified object only to give rise to new pseudo-objects out of the fragmentation of the former apparent object.

The opposing exercise VIII (165e2–166c2) adds to the assumptions of VII the new assumption that the things “other than the One, if it is not” have no share in not-being. Consequently, the others are now devoid not only of unity and determinate plurality, but also of the illusory appearance of unity and plurality. For illusory appearance, as an ontological phenomenon, presupposes participation in not-being (a claim that has parallels in the ontological investigations of the *Sophist* and becomes somewhat clearer there). From this outcome of VIII, we can infer that the “others” as described in VII do, by contrast, share in this mode of not-being, in addition to their indeterminate otherness.

In sum, exercise VII envisages a world that, lacking instances of real unity, becomes the locus of an unavoidable illusion of unity, filled with deceptive pseudo-objects. With the genus of *apeira* described in the *Philebus* (23e–25b) these objects share the inherent instability and lack of quantitative determination, with the visual aspects of material objects (*Republic X*) the unavoidable dependency on the spectator’s viewpoint.

Time permitting, I would then also include a brief comparison with passages on illusion in visual perception and on merely apparent pleasure (as an object of the mind’s internal perception; *Philebus* 41a–44a).

What do these results tell us about the ontological status of illusory objects in Plato? On the one hand, the illusory objects of exercise VII are obviously excluded from the domain of truth or true reality. On the other, they also stand out from the nothingness of the total non-object discussed in the first exercise (137c–142a) — the self-annihilating hypothesis of an absolute One. We are therefore entitled to read exercise VII, within its context, as a pointer toward a theory that would grant illusory objects at least a minimal level of *being*, taking into account that they can be distinguished and truthfully characterized as seeming objects.

## *Platon über scheinhafte Gegenstände im Parmenides (164b5–165e1)*

In der jüngeren Platonforschung ist die von Lesley Brown überzeugend begründete Auffassung vielerseits akzeptiert worden, dass für Platon *Sosein* bzw. *Etwas-Sein* das *Sein schlechthin* einer Sache impliziert. Dies wird unter anderem durch jene Stellen im *Sophistes* gestützt, an denen Platon zu zeigen versucht, dass sogar das Prädizieren von Nichtsein impliziert, dass der Bezugsgegenstand ein Seiendes ist. Damit ist aber noch nicht geklärt, ob Sein-schlechthin bei Platon mit *Wirklichsein* bzw. Realexistenz gleichgesetzt werden kann oder schlicht nur *Bestimmtsein* meint, was vielleicht auch fiktive oder eingebildete Gegenstände einschließen könnte. Wir finden Textpassagen bei Platon, in denen er unwirkliche Gegenstände als *Nichtseiendes* bezeichnet (z.B. Gegenstände der Einbildung oder auch ganze Klassen von Gegenständen, deren Realität bestritten wird). Aber muss man solcherlei Gegenstände nicht charakterisieren können, um sich gedanklich überhaupt auf sie beziehen zu können, und wäre dies nicht eine Form des Bestimmtseins? Ist Platons Gebrauch der Seinsattribution vielleicht mehrdeutig dergestalt, dass sie in bestimmten Zusammenhängen für reales Existieren, in anderen aber einfach nur für Bestimmtsein oder Charakterisierbarkeit steht?

Mein Vortrag behandelt das Thema eingebildeter bzw. illusionärer Gegenstände und ihres ontologischen Status anhand eines Textes in Platons *Parmenides*. Im zweitletzten dialektischen Beweisgang (164b5–165e1), den ich hier als „Übung VII“ etikettiere, geht es um Gegenstände, denen schlicht schon durch ein Anderes-Sein eine gewisse Form von Sein anhaftet, deren gegenständliche Einheit und Beständigkeit jedoch bloßer Schein ist. Ziel meiner Ausführungen wird sein zu belegen, dass Übung VII spezifisch illusionäre Gegenständlichkeit behandelt und nicht Wahrnehmungsgegenstände im allgemeinen (Miller, mit Verweis auf *Politeia X*) oder die *apeira* des *Philebos* (Cornford u.a.). Trotz wichtiger Berührungspunkte mit diesen beiden letztgenannten Thematiken geht es in Übung VII, so meine These, um die Entwicklung eines Begriffs bloß scheinhafter Gegenständlichkeit. Nach einem kurzgehaltenen Vergleich mit Textpassagen in anderen Platonischen Texten zu illusionären Gegenständen werde ich abschließend eine Einschätzung darüber abgeben, was sich aus dieser Interpretation von Übung VII für unser Verständnis der Seinsbegrifflichkeit Platons ergeben könnte.

Jede Interpretation der „dialektischen Übungen“ im zweiten Teil des *Parmenides* muss auch zur heftig umstrittenen Frage der richtigen interpretatorischen Herangehensweise Stellung beziehen. Parmenides, der als Dialogfigur für diese Argumentationsstücke verantwortlich ist, bezeichnet sie bekanntlich als dialektische Vorübungen. Ich schließe mich den Interpreten an, die Parmenides beim Wort nehmen und darum nicht mit der Erwartung einer ausgereiften, aber nur verklausuliert mitgeteilten Theorie an diese Argumentationsstücke herangehen. Einem dilemmatischen und antinomischen Schema folgend, endet jeder dieser Beweisgänge mit dem Ergebnis, dass der untersuchte Gegenstand entweder der Untersuchung als etwas Unsagbares und Undenkbares entgleitet oder sich als durchgehend konträr bestimmt und darum zutiefst paradoxal erweist. Trotz dieses äußerlich rein destruktiven Charakters sollen diese Übungen dem Leser helfen, philosophische Problemstellungen zu erschließen, und ihm Ausgangspunkte für die weitere Untersuchung an die Hand geben.

Die in Übung VII vorausgesetzte Hypothese vom Nichtsein des Eins ist strenggenommen falsch, da Einheit und die Existenz von Einheiten offenkundig Aspekte der wirklichen Welt sind. Gleichwohl kann diese Hypothese als Grundlage für eine Untersuchung von Gegenständen, denen reale Einheit mangelt, dienen. Diese hypothetische Welt ohne Einheit ist nicht die uns durch die



Sinne vertraute physische Welt. Dass sich im sinnlich gegebenen Bereich ein Werden zu Form und Ganzheit manifestiert, wird in Spätwerken wie dem *Timaios*, dem *Politikos* und dem *Philebus* ganz deutlich ausgesprochen, ist aber auch schon in der Ideenlehre des mittleren Werkes angelegt. Übung VII beginnt damit, demjenigen, was das Andere gegenüber dem nichtseienden Eins ist, eine gewisse Art des Seins zuzuschreiben, nämlich das Anderes-Sein. Ohne diese Attribution von Differenz könnte man sich auf es gar nicht als auf ein Anderes beziehen. Dieses Anderes-Sein kann sich aber nicht auf das Eins zurückbeziehen, da letzteres, gemäß der Hypothese, nicht existiert. Die Differenz muss also wechselseitig unter den Anderen bestehen. Ohne sie wären diese Anderen keine Pluralität. Ferner muss auch ein jedes von ihnen selbst wiederum eine Pluralität sein (aufgrund der Abwesenheit des Eins), jedoch eine unbestimmte Pluralität, da jede bestimmte diskrete Quantität („Zahl“) ebenso die Eins voraussetzen würde. Gleichwohl erscheint jede dieser unbestimmten „Massen“ (*onkoi*) als jeweils ein Gegenstand. Dieser Schein von Gegenständlichkeit ist illusionär, da ja Einheit

„nicht ist“, und überdies unbeständig, da der Schein unvermittelt in sein Gegenteil umschlagen kann. Denn sobald der Betrachter es genauer bedenkt oder besieht, wird sich ihm selbst der kleinste solche Scheingegenstand plötzlich als eine unermessliche Pluralität von Bruchstücken der vormaligen Einheit darstellen. Jeder der Teile aber, die sich ihm jetzt darbieten, wird wiederum den Schein der Einheit erzeugen, der sich aber bei genauerer Betrachtung ebenso wieder auflöst, und so fort. Dieses instabile Scheinen betrifft nicht nur die Einheit, sondern auch andere Eigenschaften dieser vermeintlichen Gegenstände, einschließlich ihrer wechselseitigen Begrenzungen (*peras*) und ihrer Selbigkeit und Andersheit als (vermeintlich) zählbarer Gegenstände. Der täuschende Schein kann (unter den hypothetischen Voraussetzungen) nicht überwunden werden, da die genauere Betrachtung jeweils nur den einen durch einen anderen täuschenden Schein ersetzt.

In Übung VIII (165e2–166c2), dem antinomischen Gegenstück zu Übung VII, kommt zu den in VII getroffenen Voraussetzungen noch die Annahme hinzu, dass das Andere des nichtseienden Einen auch an Nichtsein keinen Anteil hat. Daraus ergibt sich dann, dass diese Anderen je ein eines oder bestimmt vieles nicht nur nicht sein können (was auch in VII der Fall war), sondern noch nicht einmal als solches fälschlich erscheinen können. Denn täuschender Schein oder falsches Meinen seien nur durch Teilhabe an Nichtsein möglich, was aber unter den Voraussetzungen von Übung VIII ausgeschlossen ist. (Dieser Gedanke hat eindeutige Parallelstellen im *Sophistes* und bekommt auch dort erst einen klareren Inhalt.) Im Rückschluss auf die scheinhaften Gegenstände der Übung VII bedeutet dies, dass ihnen neben dem unbestimmten Anderssein auch noch dieser Modus von Nichtsein (qua täuschendem Scheinen) anhaften muss. Somit erweist sich also die Welt, in der die Eins/Einheit abwesend ist, als ein Ort bloß scheinhafter Gegenstände, denen aber doch noch zumindest noch ein vages (nicht quantifizierbares) Anderssein anhaftet. Mit dem Genus der *apeira* im *Philebus* (23e–25b) teilen sie die quasi wesensmäßige Unstetigkeit und den Mangel numerischer Bestimmtheit, mit den sinnlichen Gegebenheitsweisen materieller Objekte (*Politeia X*) die Abhängigkeit vom Betrachterstandpunkt.

Wenn es die Zeit gestattet, werden diese Ergebnisse noch durch einen Vergleich mit Textpassagen zu Wahrnehmungstäuschungen und zur Theorie eingebildeter Lustempfindungen (als Gegenständen einer Art innerer Wahrnehmung, *Philebus* 41a–44a) ergänzt werden.

Abschließend ist festzuhalten, dass jene durch wechselseitige Andersheit und scheinhaftes Sein (und damit Nichtsein) bestimmten illusionären Gegenstände sich einerseits deutlich von der völligen Nichtigkeit jenes „Ungegenstandes“, des absoluten Eins, abheben, der in der ersten

dialektischen Übung des Parmenides erörtert worden ist (137c– 142a). Andererseits schließt sie der bloß scheinhaft-ephemere Charakter ihres Einsseins und Bestehens aus dem Bereich des Wirklichen aus. Wir dürfen darum Übung VII als Verweis in Richtung einer Theorie lesen, die illusionären Gegenständen einen minimalen Seinsgrad zugesteht, da wir sie unterscheiden und wahrheitsgemäß als Scheinhaftes charakterisieren können.

### *Apuleian Evidence regarding Pre-Plotinian Interpretation of the Parmenides*

The multi-level metaphysical interpretation of *Parmenides* surfaces openly in Plotinus, most obviously in *Ennead* V.i [10] 8, where Plotinus is *denying* his originality. Furthermore, only three of the nine ‘hypotheses’ are correlated with a metaphysical level, so that Plotinus says nothing about the referent of the final two pictures that emerge from the affirmation of the One, nor about what emerges from its denial. For complete interpretations Proclus had to employ Amelius and Porphyry. Plotinus himself *presupposes* such an interpretation of *Parmenides*, rather than announcing it. Proclus does not credit Plotinus with the invention of such an interpretation, since at *Theol. Plat.* 2.4.31.4-22 he thinks that Origenes, having shared the same education, ought to have attributed the same transcendence to the One, following the first hypothesis. Ammonius Saccas is thus credited with separating the Ones described in the first two hypotheses.

Clearly, then, one does not have to resort to any special pleading to explain why Coptic versions of the Gnostic treatises read by Plotinus presuppose such a metaphysical interpretation of *Parmenides*. The Coptic versions are not infected with Plotinian doctrines; rather the original treatises were already infused with a reading of Platonism readily available in Alexandria.

A tension has long been recognized in Alcinous’ use of the final part of *Parmenides*, which is often employed in his syllogistic chapter (6), but possibly also in his version of negative theology (10.165.5-16, 34-38). His interpretation of *Parmenides* is thus less than clear. Now, since the publication of the *Expositio* (Stover 2016), we see similar tensions in Apuleius. Chapter 29 says that the *Parmenides* taught *argumentum in utramque partem* [as if a New Academic document]; but it had lessons also about Platonic Ideas, and led one merely to suspect a metaphysical message about how the world [*universum*] was both one and many, and all things were constructed from opposites. It seems that Apuleius already knew, but was uncertain about, one or more interpretations of the final part that related it to first principles. His theory demands that he resists interpretations involving two (or more) divine Ones, in much the same way as he reads *Epistle II* 312e (linked by Plotinus with the *Parmenides*) as postulating only one divine King, cause of all (*Apol.* 64).

In this light I revisit the problems of *De Plat.* 190, where it seems that Apuleius models his description of Plato’s first god on *both* the Timaeian demiurge *and* elements of negative theology probably originating in the first hypothesis. But for acute textual difficulties with certain words, the combination would probably be immediately in evidence: *Sed haec de Deo sentit, quod sit incorporeus. Is unus, ait, ap<e>rimetros[?], genitor rerumque omnium exstructor[?]*. While Plato rarely uses ἀσώματος (never of god), *incorporeus* is unsurprising in this era, but the first of several alpha-privative descriptions of a type common in negative theology. What most manuscripts record as *aprimetros* or *apimetros* seems to be another alpha-privative term not used by Plato (whatever *ait* might imply). Furthermore, it is likely to qualify how god is ‘one’: not as a unit, but as something that no measure can circumscribe (cf. *Parm.* 137d7-138b6; 140c1-d8).

More important are the words: *quem quidem caelestem pronuntiat indictum, innominabilem, et ut ait ipse aoraton adamaston* (i.e. ἀόρατον, ἀδάμαστον). *Caelestem* here is the OLD's *caelestis*<sup>2</sup>, a slightly poetic noun for 'god' rather than the adjective meaning 'heavenly', which is scarcely compatible with the description *ultramundanus* (204); hence it is not an epithet. *Adamaston* is almost indefensible here; it is never used by Plato as the text might imply; it is out of place in a list of epistemological terms; and it is more naturally an epithet of a horse than of any god. Rather one should read *adoxaston* (ἀδόξαστον) in the light of *Parm.* 142a4-5: οὐδ' ὀνομάζεται ἄρα οὐδὲ λέγεται οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδὲ γινώσκεται, οὐδέ τι τῶν ὄντων αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεται. Apuleius applies to the principal god notions that Plato applied to the One of the first hypothesis. We may compare Philo *De Somniis* 1.67: τοῦ ἀκατονομάστου καὶ ἀρρήτου καὶ κατὰ πάσας ιδέας ἀκαταλήπτου θεοῦ. This likewise compresses into fewer words the essence of Plato's οὐδὲ δοξάζεται etc.

I suggest that Apuleius' Greek source wrote ἄρρητον, ἀκατονόμαστον, καὶ ὡς φησιν αὐτὸς ἀόρατον, ἀδόξαστον, and that the point of the appeal to Plato's actual terms is that Plato never applied the first two to the divine, while the last two were at least applied at *Phaedo* 79b12 and 84a8 to divine reality, as ἀσώματος had indirectly been at *Phaedo* 85e1. The problem in spotting the overall reference to the *Parmenides* is that Apuleius' world shared Alcinoüs' well known love of *modifying* Plato's terminology (possible in Alcinoüs even when he uses a verb such as καλεῖ, e.g. 4.155.17, 32). As for the words ἄρρητον and ἀκατονόμαστον, they are found in conjunction numerous times from Philo on, with Origen (*c.Cels.* 7.43.3) arguing *against* Celsus' assumption (7.42.9), shared with Apuleius, that such terms reflected Plato's view of the supreme god. Their conjunction certainly belongs to the discourse of *Parmenides*-exegesis, since our earliest commentary also uses it to describe the 'god above all' (anon. *in Parm.* I.4).

I conclude that before Apuleius, indeed before Philo, there had been an attempt to interpret the first hypothesis of *Parmenides* as applying to a transcendent god who is properly thought of as One and is marked by non-possession of the properties that Plato there denies to the One. It is very difficult to see how this reading would not entail postulating a different entity (but not necessarily a god) behind the second hypothesis. Such a move would mark the beginning of a multi-layered metaphysical interpretation of the hypotheses.

I do not plan to revisit Dodds' attribution of the first hermeneutic steps to Eudorus (even though this fits), nor to rely on Simplicius' report of Porphyry's report of Moderatus' doctrine of three Ones for establishing the earliness of the metaphysical interpretation. Rather I want to emphasize the diversity of pre-Plotinian interpretation of the *Parmenides*, and that there are signs of the influence of the *Parmenides* over the theology of relatively conservative pre-Plotinian Platonists who do not consistently employ negative theology for the supreme god. A metaphysical interpretation does not entail a 'Neoplatonic' interpretation.

## *Le témoignage d'Apulée au sujet de l'interprétation pré-plotinienne du Parménide*

L'interprétation métaphysique à plusieurs niveaux du *Parménide* fait surface chez Plotin, de manière la plus évidente dans *Ennéade* V 1 [10] 8, où Plotin *nie* toute originalité. De plus, seulement trois des neuf « hypothèses » se rapportent au niveau métaphysique, et c'est pourquoi

Plotin ne dit rien au sujet du référent des deux images finales dont découle l'affirmation de l'Un, ni au sujet de ce qui découle de sa négation. Pour ce qui est d'interprétations complètes du *Parménide* Proclus devait avoir recours à Amélius et Porphyre. Plotin lui-même *présuppose* une telle interprétation du *Parménide*, au lieu de l'annoncer. Proclus n'accorde pas à Plotin la paternité d'une telle interprétation, puisqu'il estime en *Theol. plat.* 2.4.31.4-22 qu'Origène, ayant reçu la même formation que Plotin, aurait dû attribuer la même transcendance à l'Un de la première hypothèse. Ainsi Ammonius Saccas est-il considéré par Proclus comme celui qui est responsable de la séparation de l'Un décrit dans la première hypothèse et celui décrit dans la seconde.

Il est donc manifeste qu'il n'est pas nécessaire de chercher tout particulièrement à expliquer pourquoi les versions coptes des traités gnostiques, que Plotin a lus, présupposent une telle interprétation métaphysique du *Parménide*. Les versions coptes ne sont pas contaminées par des doctrines plotiniennes ; ces traités-là étaient déjà imprégnés de cette lecture du platonisme présente à Alexandrie.

On reconnaît depuis longtemps l'existence d'une tension dans l'usage que fait Alcinoos de la section finale du *Parménide*, section souvent sollicitée dans son chapitre syllogistique (6), peut-être aussi dans sa version de la théologie négative (10.165.5-16, 34-38). Il en résulte que son interprétation du *Parménide* manque parfois de clarté. Or, depuis la publication de l'*Expositio* (Stover 2016), on peut constater des tensions du même ordre chez Apuleius. Au chapitre 29 on lit que le *Parménide* enseigne l'*argumentum in utramque partem* [comme s'il s'agissait d'un document issu de la Nouvelle Académie] ; mais le dialogue comportait également des leçons concernant les Idées platoniciennes, et on pourrait soupçonner qu'il ajoute des leçons sur la manière dont le monde (*universum*) est à la fois un et multiple, et toutes choses composées d'opposées. Il semble qu'Apulée connaissait déjà, quoique sans être convaincu, une interprétation de la section finale qui mettait celle-ci en rapport avec les premiers principes. Sa théorie était telle qu'Apulée devait résister aux interprétations comportant deux (ou plusieurs) Uns divins. C'est le cas de sa lecture de la *Lettre II*, 312e (que Plotin associe au *Parménide*), où Apulée ne trouve qu'un seul Roi divin, cause de tout (*Apol.* 64).

À la lumière de l'*Expositio* j'aimerais examiner à nouveau frais les problèmes que pose *De Plat.* 190, où Apulée semble fonder sa description du premier dieu de Platon à la fois sur le demiurge du *Timée* et sur les éléments de la théologie négative issue vraisemblablement de la première hypothèse du *Parménide*. Sans les graves difficultés textuelles et terminologiques, ses sources jumelles apparaîtraient sans doute sur le champ : *Sed haec de Deo sentit, quod sit incorporeus. Is unus, ait, ap<e>rimetros[?], genitor rerumque omnium exstructor[?]*. Tandis que Platon emploie rarement ἀσώματος (jamais au sujet de dieu), on n'est guère surpris de lire dans ce contexte le terme *incorporeus*, mais le premier d'une série de description employant des alpha-privatifs d'un type répandu en théologie négative. Ce que la plupart des manuscrits rapportent comme *aprimetros* ou *apimetros* (ἀπρίμετρος, ἀπίμετρος) semble être un autre terme avec alpha-privatif absent chez Platon (quelle que puisse être les implications du *ait*). Il est probable, en outre, que l'adjectif qualifie la manière dont dieu est « un » : non pas comme une unité, mais comme quelque chose qu'aucune mesure ne peut circonscrire (cf. *Parm.* 137d7-138b6 ; 140c1-d8).

Plus importante encore est le passage suivant : quem quidem caelestem pronuntiat indictum, innominabilem, et ut ait ipse aoraton adamaston (c'est-à-dire ἀόρατον, ἀδάμαστον). *Caelestem* est le *caelestis*<sup>2</sup> du Oxford Latin Dictionary, substantif légèrement poétique pour « dieu » plutôt que l'adjectif signifiant « céleste », qui n'est guère compatible avec le qualificatif *ultramundanus* (204) ; Pour moi, le mot n'est pas une épithète. *Adamaston* est ici à toute fin

pratique indéfendable ; il n'est jamais employé par Platon contrairement à ce que le ait d'Apulée sembler laisser entendre ») ; il n'est pas à sa place dans une suite de termes épistémologiques ; il est plus naturel de l'attribuer à un cheval qu'à un dieu. On devrait plutôt lire adoxaston (ἀδόξαστον) à la lumière de Parm. 142a4-5 : οὐδ' ὀνομάζεται ἄρα οὐδὲ λέγεται οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδὲ γινώσκεται, οὐδέ τι τῶν ὄντων αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεται. Apulée attribue au dieu suprême des notions que Platon attribuait à l'Un de la première hypothèse. On peut comparer ce passage à Philon, De Somniis 1.67: τοῦ ἀκατονομάστου καὶ ἄρρητου καὶ κατὰ πάσας ἰδέας ἀκαταλήπτου θεοῦ. Ce passage condense également en peu de mots l'essence de la formulation platonicienne οὐδὲ δοξάζεται, etc.

Je propose comme explication que la source grecque d'Apulée comportait les termes suivants : ἄρρητον, ἀκατονόμαστον, καὶ ὡς φησιν αὐτὸς ἀόρατον, ἀδόξαστον, et que la raison de la référence aux termes platoniciens réside dans le fait que Platon n'attribue jamais au divin les deux premiers (ἄρρητον, ἀκατονόμαστον), tandis que les deux derniers (ἀόρατον, ἀδόξαστον) l'étaient du moins en *Phédon* 79b12 et 84a8 à la réalité divine, comme indirectement ἀσώματος en *Phédon* 85e1. La difficulté d'identifier la référence générale au *Parménide* est dû au fait que le monde d'Apulée partageait la prédilection bien connue d'Alcinoos à *modifier* la terminologie de Platon (y compris, chez Alcinoos, lors même qu'il fait usage d'un verbe tel que καλεῖ, p. ex. 4.155.17, 32). Quant aux mots ἄρρητον et ἀκατονόμαστον, on les trouve ensemble à plusieurs reprises à partir de Philon, chez Origène (*c.Cels.* 7.43.3), qui argumente *contre* le présupposé de Celsus (7.42.9), que partage Apulée, selon lequel ces termes expriment la conception platonicienne du dieu suprême. L'usage conjoint de ἄρρητον et d'ἀκατονόμαστον fait assurément partie de la tradition exégétique du *Parménide*, nos plus anciens commentaires l'employant aussi pour décrire le « dieu au-dessus de tout » (anon. *in Parm.* I.4).

J'en conclus qu'avant Apulée, et même avant Philon, on avait tenté d'interpréter la première hypothèse du *Parménide* comme se référant à un dieu transcendant conçu comme l'Un n'ayant pas les attributs que Platon refuse d'attribuer à l'Un. Il est difficile de ne pas penser que cette lecture implique le postulat d'une entité différente (quoique pas nécessairement un dieu) en rapport à la seconde hypothèse. Un tel postulat marque le début d'une interprétation métaphysique à plusieurs niveaux des hypothèses.

Je n'ai pas l'intention de réexaminer la thèse de Dodds consistant à attribuer la première étape herméneutique à Eudore (même si cette attribution est possible), ni de fonder mon analyse sur le compte rendu, par Simplicius, de la doctrine de Moderatus des trois Uns pour établir le caractère précoce de l'interprétation métaphysique. Je souhaite plutôt insister sur la diversité des interprétations pré-plotiniennes du *Parménide*, et sur le fait qu'il existe des traces d'une influence du *Parménide* sur la théologie des platoniciens pré-plotiniens relativement conservateurs qui n'ont pas recours de manière systématique à la théologie négative pour parler le dieu suprême. Bref, une interprétation métaphysique n'implique pas nécessairement une interprétation « néoplatonicienne ».

## *From the Parmenides to the Theaetetus*

This paper will show the continuity of considerations after the *Parmenides* by observing the relationship between the *Parmenides* and the *Theaetetus*, paying particular attention to the expression ‘nothing is one thing just by itself’ in the *Theaetetus* and the conditional phrase, ‘if one is not’ in the second part of the *Parmenides*. Although there have been many discussions on interpretations of this latter phrase, scholars have paid little attention to the phrase in the *Theaetetus*: ‘nothing is one thing just by itself (ἐν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ οὐδέν ἐστίν, 152d2-3)’. However, there is a close relationship between these phrases, and I will interpret these phrases from the first part of the *Theaetetus*.

For many years, scholars have debated the Third Man Problem in the *Parmenides* based on the analysis by Vlastos. While Vlastos analyses the argument, he neglects the words ‘seem (δοκεῖν)’ and ‘appear (φαίνεσθαι)’ in showing the logical structure of this argument (132a1-b2). This makes it difficult to see the continuity of cognitive considerations from the *Parmenides* to the *Theaetetus*. So, the central problem in this argument is how big things and Big itself can be recognised as they are. I suppose that Plato tries to solve this problem in the first part of the *Theaetetus* by clarifying the construction of perception.

In the first part of the *Theaetetus*, after Theaetetus defines knowledge as perception, Socrates states that Theaetetus mentions the very same thing Protagoras does, though in a rather different way. Socrates then explains this, using the example of the wind. Protagoras says that the wind itself, by itself, is either cold or not; however, it is cold for one who feels cold, and it is not cold for another. Theaetetus agrees with Protagoras that things are for an individual such as he or she perceives them.

Thus, Protagoras resupposes that ‘to be’ must be predicated with ‘for someone’ because if ‘to be’ can be used by itself, there is an objective and absolute measure, independent of individual perception. For this reason, Protagoras’ human-measure thesis and the definition of knowledge as perception hold the same position in that they cannot adopt the use of ‘to be’ absolutely. Therefore, they should stand in the same position as ‘nothing is one thing just by itself’ (152d2–3).

Next, Socrates says that ‘he [Protagoras] perhaps put this [human-measure thesis] as a riddle for the common crowd of us, while he revealed the *Truth* as a Secret Doctrine to his own pupils’. He then says, ‘I mean the theory that (X) *nothing is one thing just by itself*’ (152d2–3). Next, he explains this idea from two points of view. One is (A), the use of ‘to be’, that is, the problem of language already discussed in the previous argument. The other is (B), the state of the world, or the flux-stream thesis.

In Socrates’ explanation as follows, since (A) and (X) appear twice, I will refer first as (A1) (X1) and second as (A2) (X2). (A1) states that you cannot correctly speak of anything either as something or as qualified in some way.

If you speak of something as big, it will also appear small; if you speak of it as heavy, it will also appear light, and similarly with everything since (X1) states that nothing is one, either as one thing or qualified in one way. (B) The fact is that, as a result of movement, change and mixture

with one another, (A2) all things that we say are, which is not the right way to speak of them, are coming to be because (X2) nothing ever is, but things are always coming to be.(152d4-e1)

Thus,(X) has two interpretations, (X1) and (X2). (X1) is based on the human-measure thesis, and (X2) is based on the flux-stream thesis. In a sense, (X) is ambiguous, but (X1) and (X2) stand in the same position, as they cannot admit 'being' in itself. Therefore, the human-measure thesis and the flux-stream thesis admit (X) 'nothing is one thing just by itself' for different reasons. On the other hand, (A1) is also ambiguous because it can be interpreted from (B), the flux-stream thesis, that if you speak of something as big, it will also appear small; therefore, it is coming to being as big for you. This ambiguity connects the human-measure thesis with the flux-stream thesis by the use of 'to be'.

Plato states that, in this theory, the agreement of the whole succession of wise men can be assumed, apart from Parmenides, including not only Protagoras but Heraclitus and Empedocles as well. Remarkably, only Parmenides is excluded from the whole succession of wise men, and Plato adds Epicharmus and Homer to this party as well. This contrast is important in the first part of the *Theaetetus* because Plato emphasises it, depicting the simile of conflict between the two parties in the last part of the refutations (180b9–181b4). Parmenides only admits an eternal being itself without movement and change (180d1, e3–5). Protagoras disagrees in admitting the being itself without relativising it as the human-measure thesis does.

Then, Parmenides' being does not permit movement and change against the flux-stream thesis. This is why the contrast seems to be a conflict between the two parties. Plato's position must be noted. As is generally known, Plato's Form is eternal being itself, without movement and change. Therefore, (X) is an anti-thesis of his theory of Forms.

He says that we have come forward little by little and without noticing it; we have gotten ourselves into the middle space (meson) between the two sides (180e5–181a2). His theory of Forms explains the relationship between the Form and perceptual objects. For this reason, Plato cannot stand either the position of the wise men or that of Parmenides; he assumes the middle position. The construction of the arguments in the first part of the *Theaetetus* shows us that Plato chooses the middle position between Parmenides and Protagoras/Heraclitus and considers the possibility of building a theory of knowledge without the presupposition of being itself. It is necessary to pay attention to the expression 'one being just by itself', which is used to refer to the Form in the *Republic* and the *Symposium* and is prohibited by the Secret Doctrine.

This paper evaluates the Secret Doctrine in the *Theaetetus* from the texts. It reveals that the three theses in the first part of the *Theaetetus* are based on the Secret Doctrine that nothing is one being just by itself, thus opposing Parmenides' thesis. This has a close relationship with the conditional phrase, 'if one is not' in the second part of the *Parmenides*.

It is concluded that Plato tries to examine his theory of Forms by criticising it from the viewpoint of Parmenides. That is why he bases his position on the argument of the *Parmenides*. While the second part of the *Parmenides* is composed of formal arguments(164b5-c4), the first part of the *Theaetetus* is composed of the critics against anti-Parmenidean theories. There, Plato considers the possibility of building a theory of knowledge without the presupposition of 'what is (being)', and he argues that there are many difficulties with it in the *Theaetetus*.



## Von den *Parmenides* zum *Theaetetus*

Dieses Papier wird die Kontinuität der Betrachtungen nach den *Parmenides* zeigen, indem es die Beziehung zwischen den *Parmenides* und dem *Theaetetus* beobachtet, wobei es dem *Theaetetus* und dem Bedingungssatz "wenn es nicht so ist" besonders auf den Ausdruck "Nichts ist nur eine Sache" ankommt "Im zweiten Teil des *Parmenides*. Obwohl es viele Diskussionen über Interpretationen dieser letzten Phrase gegeben hat, haben Gelehrte der Phrase im *Theaetetus* wenig Beachtung geschenkt: "Nichts ist eine Sache allein (ἐν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ οὐδέν ἐστίν᾽εν, 152d2-3)". Es besteht jedoch eine enge Beziehung zwischen diesen Phrasen, und ich werde diese Phrasen aus dem ersten Teil des *Theaetetus* interpretieren.

Seit vielen Jahren diskutieren Wissenschaftler das Dritte-Mann-Problem in den *Parmenides* basierend auf der Analyse von Vlastos. Während Vlastos das Argument analysiert, vernachlässigt er die Worte "scheinen(δοκεῖν)"und "erscheinen(φαίνεσθαι)", wenn er die logische Struktur dieses Arguments zeigt(132a1-b2). Dies macht es schwierig, die Kontinuität der kognitiven Überlegungen von den *Parmenides* zum *Theaetetus* zu sehen. Das zentrale Problem bei diesem Argument ist also, wie große Dinge und Big selbst erkannt werden können. Ich nehme an, dass Plato versucht, dieses Problem im ersten Teil des *Theaetetus* zu lösen, indem er die Konstruktion der Wahrnehmung erklärt.

Im ersten Teil des *Theaetetus*, nachdem *Theaetetus* das Wissen als Wahrnehmung definiert, stellt Sokrates fest, dass *Theaetetus* das gleiche erwähnt, was Protagoras tut, wenn auch auf eine andere Weise. Sokrates erklärt das am Beispiel des Windes. Protagoras sagt, dass der Wind an sich entweder kalt ist oder nicht; es ist jedoch kalt für jemanden, der sich kalt fühlt, und es ist nicht kalt für einen anderen. *Theaetetus* stimmt mit Protagoras überein, dass die Dinge für ein Individuum sind, wie er oder sie sie wahrnimmt.

Protagoras setzt also voraus, dass "zu sein" mit "für jemanden" vorhergesagt werden muss, denn wenn "sein" für sich selbst verwendet werden kann, gibt es ein objektives und absolutes Maß, unabhängig von der individuellen Wahrnehmung. Aus diesem Grund haben Protagoras 'These des menschlichen Maßes und die Definition von Wissen als Wahrnehmung die gleiche Position, indem sie den Gebrauch von "Sein" nicht absolut annehmen können. Daher sollten sie in der gleichen Position stehen wie "nichts ist nur eine Sache" (152d2-3).

Als nächstes sagt Sokrates, dass er [Protagoras] diese [menschliche Maßthese] vielleicht als ein Rätsel für die gemeinsame Menge von uns stellte, während er seinen Schülern die Wahrheit als eine Geheimlehre offenbarte. Er sagt dann: "Ich meine die Theorie, dass (X) nichts allein ist" (152d2-3). Als nächstes erklärt er diese Idee aus zwei Blickwinkeln. Eines ist (A), die Verwendung von "sein", das heißt, das Problem der Sprache, das bereits im vorhergehenden Argument diskutiert wurde. Das andere ist (B), der Zustand der Welt oder die Flux-Stream-These.

In der folgenden Erklärung von Sokrates wird, da (A) und (X) zweimal auftreten, ich zuerst als (A1) (X1) und zweitens als (A2) (X2) bezeichnen. (A1) besagt, dass man von irgendetwas weder als etwas noch als in irgendeiner Weise qualifiziert bezeichnen kann.

Wenn Sie von etwas so Großem sprechen, wird es auch klein erscheinen; Wenn Sie davon sprechen, dass es schwer ist, wird es auch hell erscheinen und ähnlich mit allem, da (X1) feststellt, dass nichts eins ist, entweder als eine Sache oder auf eine Art qualifiziert. (B) Tatsache ist, dass aufgrund von Bewegung, Veränderung und Vermischung miteinander, (A2) alle Dinge, die wir sagen, die nicht der richtige Weg sind, um von ihnen zu sprechen, entstehen, weil (X2) Nichts ist jemals, aber die Dinge kommen immer wieder. (152d4-e1)

Somit hat (X) zwei Interpretationen, (X1) und (X2). (X1) basiert auf der Human-Measure-These, und (X2) basiert auf der Flux-Stream-These. In gewissem Sinne ist (X) mehrdeutig, aber (X1) und (X2) stehen in der gleichen Position, da sie nicht an sich "sein" können. Die These des Menschenmaßes und die Flux-Stream-These lassen daher (X) aus verschiedenen Gründen "nichts für sich allein sein". Andererseits ist (A1) auch mehrdeutig, weil es aus (B), der Fluss-Strom-These, interpretiert werden kann, dass, wenn Sie von etwas als groß sprechen, es auch klein erscheinen wird; Daher wird es so groß für dich. Diese Ambiguität verbindet die These des menschlichen Maßes mit der Fluss-Strom-These durch den Gebrauch von "sein".

Plato stellt fest, dass in dieser Theorie die Zustimmung der ganzen Folge von Weisen angenommen werden kann, abgesehen von Parmenides, einschließlich nicht nur Protagoras, sondern auch Heraklit und Empedokles. Bemerkenswerterweise ist nur Parmenides von der ganzen Reihe der Weisen ausgeschlossen, und Platon fügt dieser Partei auch Epicharmus und Homer hinzu. Dieser Gegensatz ist wichtig im ersten Teil des Theaetetus, weil Platon dies betont, indem er im letzten Teil der Widerlegungen das Gleichnis des Konflikts zwischen den beiden Parteien darstellt (180b9-181b4). Parmenides gibt nur ein ewiges Wesen ohne Bewegung und Veränderung zu (180d1, e3-5). Protagoras ist nicht damit einverstanden, das Wesen selbst zuzulassen, ohne es zu relativieren, wie es die These des menschlichen Maßes tut.

Dann erlaubt Parmenides 'Wesen keine Bewegung und Veränderung gegen die Flux-Stream-These. Deshalb scheint der Gegensatz ein Konflikt zwischen den beiden Parteien zu sein. Platons Position muss beachtet werden. Wie allgemein bekannt ist, ist Platons Form das ewige Sein selbst, ohne Bewegung und Veränderung. Daher ist (X) eine Antithese seiner Theorie der Formen.

Er sagt, dass wir nach und nach gekommen sind, ohne es zu bemerken; Wir haben uns in den mittleren Raum (Meson) zwischen den beiden Seiten gebracht (180e5-181a2). Seine Theorie der Formen erklärt die Beziehung zwischen der Form und Wahrnehmungsobjekten. Aus diesem Grund kann Platon weder die Position der Weisen noch die von Parmenides ertragen. er nimmt die mittlere Position ein. Die Konstruktion der Argumente im ersten Teil des Theaetetus zeigt uns, dass Plato die mittlere Position zwischen Parmenides und Protagoras / Heraklit wählt und die Möglichkeit in Betracht zieht, eine Erkenntnistheorie ohne die Voraussetzung des Selbstwerdens aufzubauen. Es ist notwendig, auf den Ausdruck "ein Wesen allein zu sein" zu achten, das zur Bezeichnung der Form in der Republik und auf dem Symposium verwendet wird und durch die Geheimlehre verboten ist.

Dieses Papier bewertet die Geheimlehre im Theaetetus aus den Texten. Es zeigt, dass die drei Thesen im ersten Teil des Theaetetus auf der Geheimlehre basieren, dass nichts allein ist, was Parmenides 'These widerspricht. Dies steht in engem Zusammenhang mit dem Bedingungssatz "wenn nicht" im zweiten Teil des Parmenides.

Daraus wird geschlossen, dass Plato versucht, seine Theorie der Formen zu untersuchen, indem er sie aus der Sicht von Parmenides kritisiert. Deshalb stützt er sich auf das Argument der *Parmenides*. Während der zweite Teil des *Parmenides* aus formalen Argumenten besteht (164b5-c4), besteht der erste Teil des *Theaetetus* aus Kritikern gegen antiparmenidische Theorien. Dort betrachtet Platon die Möglichkeit, eine Theorie des Wissens ohne die Voraussetzung des "was ist (Sein)" aufzubauen, und er argumentiert, dass es im *Theaetetus* viele Schwierigkeiten damit gibt.

### *How does the Sophist reply to the Parmenides? -or- Why the One is not among the Megista Gene*

This paper explores the relation of the *Sophist* to the *Parmenides*; in what ways the *Sophist* responds to the questions, aporias and demands raised in the *Parmenides*. It aims to show how the problems encountered in the first part and the categories used in the second part of the *Parmenides* relate to the solutions proposed in the *Sophist*.

The *Parmenides* has been interpreted in various ways: as a logical exercise and as a theory about gods, even as an example of perfect symmetry in impossibility. It has been acclaimed as the best collection of antinomies ever produced, but also, as an impossible map; how the theory of forms should not be thought. Its purpose; a parody, or – training; pedagogic, exercise necessary for the proper way to truth. Not, however, to discard with forms, but, on the contrary, to affirm their necessity and refinement; if we are not to end up abandoning forms and, with them, the possibility of dialectics and Philosophy altogether.

The first part of the *Parmenides* famously raises several problems for forms and participation, yet, it also makes clear the case for the necessity of forms, in order for the possibility of dialectics, for logoi and Logos, for Philosophy to be saved. These problems culminate in the ‘Greatest Difficulty’, the total separation of our world and the world of gods, the unknowability of forms and its devastating consequences for Logos.

Many commentators have drawn attention to the layout of categories employed in the second part of the dialogue, by Parmenides, to perform the exercise of dialectic on his own doctrine of the One. When seen in the light of the posterior list of the Megista Gene in the *Sophist*, may provide significant clues pointing to a way out of the aporetic ending of the dialogue.

Most of these clues are to be found in the *Sophist*; in the Gigantomachia and the definition of being as dynamis. The relation between soul and ousia, the movement of knowledge, the soul knowing ousia, is configured as a relation of dynamis, as capacity to act and suffer; the soul knows and ousia is known. To the Gods, the Stranger responds that Being must move, enough to be known, since knowing is a form of acting and suffering – of dynamis. Otherwise being, being one, cannot be known, and (there is a two) moreover, there is no contact between the two worlds; we are back into the Greatest Difficulty of the *Parmenides*; the total destruction of the possibility of dialegesthai dynamein, and Philosophy altogether. To the Giants, that it must stand still, enough, to be minimally known, since knowledge is knowledge of something enduring - stable, αεί - a proposition about something, that, while fleeting, must have a solid, communicable meaning; if we are to say and know anything about anything at all.

In the relation between soul and ousia, both movement and rest are involved. For if ousia only moved we would have no stable knowledge, nowhere to stand, as even the propositions of language would have already slipped away. Having no knowledge of the aei on, of something stable, we could know nothing and thus say nothing of being and ousia. Equally, if ousia was only in rest, we could not know anything since we would not be able to be affected by being nor affect it, since

knowing is a form of acting and suffering. There would be no connection between the two worlds and we would fall back into the Greatest Difficulty.

In the *Sophist*, Logos was born in the soul from the interconnection and weaving of ideas, *κοινωνία και συμπλοκή των ειδών*. Plato says to posit the whole as lacking nous, life and movement – that it stands *σεμνόν και άγιον*, solemn and sacred, knowing nothing, would be a great mistake, and fundamental, as it would destroy completely the possibility of Philosophy and Logos in general. If there is no movement, there is no noein at all. And if everything moves it is impossible to know anything at all, as knowledge is knowledge of the *αί ον*, of that which always is. Similarly, that everything communicates with everything is untenable, for we would know everything; all things would be reduced to the Same. As is that nothing communicates, for, again, we could know nothing.

The definition of Being as Dynamis, radical as it is, appears at stages of the dialogue to be treated as provisional. It is used to bridge the positions of Giants and Gods, materialists and idealists, but accomplishes in so doing much more. Dynamis reveals both movement and rest to be necessary conditions for the knowledge of ousia and conduits not only the passage to the Parricide and the existence of non-being, but also from the non-dialectical pre-Socratic couple of movement and rest, to the dialectical couple of Same and Other; the kernel of the Megista Gene, that dominates later Platonism, as in the *Timaeus*. In this move, Plato advances beyond the Eleatic doctrine and the stories of his predecessors about the nature and number of being. This surpassing, through the persona of the Eleatic Stranger, we shall argue, represents the surpassing and parricide of Parmenides, of Eleatic Dialectics; a refutation of the thesis of the One itself.

Indeed, the Stranger in the *Sophist* leads us to cross the paternal advice - not to stray into non-being, never to admit that things that are not are – to disjunct the whole from the One. Against Parmenides' En to Pan; Being can either be whole or one. Since it is necessarily whole, as everything that was made was made whole, it is not one. The whole is more than one; so, either being is void of being, or, the one is solely the one of the name. This disjunction will prove fundamental to affirm the existence of non-being, in the form of being of difference.

Responding to the 'Greatest Difficulty', the stakes are high; if there is no relation between the world of gods, of forms and our own, if the One is, then we can know nothing. In other words, either the One is, or, forms and knowledge, dynamis, causality and communication between the soul and ousia, between forms themselves. If there are no forms, if they exist but isolated or if we have no access to them; no Philosophy, no Logos is possible. What takes place between the two dialogues may be seen as a devastating critique to Eleatic dialectics; Not to discard with forms, but on the contrary, to affirm their necessity and the correct way of their articulation, which if not properly understood, exercised, may lead to the abandonment of forms, of dialectics and of Philosophy altogether; a total ruin of thought.

Can the Megista Gene be simply a random list, from which the One is absent? Is the One to be considered as a form at all? We shall argue that this complex and fragmented, disparate between dialogues, attack on the Eleatic doctrine is reflected and resolved in the *Sophist*; in the Parricide and in the reasons for which the One does not figure in the list of the Megista Gene.

## *Comment le Sophiste répond-il au Parménide -ou - Pourquoi l'Un n'est parmi les Megista Gene*

Cette étude explore la relation du *Sophiste* aux *Parménide*; de quelle manière le *Sophiste* répond aux questions, apories et aux demandes soulevées dans le *Parménide*. Il vise à montrer comment les problèmes rencontrés dans la première partie et les catégories utilisées dans la deuxième partie du *Parménide* se rapportent aux solutions proposées dans le *Sophiste*.

Le *Parménide* a été interprété de diverses manières: comme un exercice logique et comme une théorie sur les dieux, même comme un exemple de symétrie parfaite dans l'impossibilité. Il a été reconnu comme la meilleure collection d'antinomies jamais produite, mais aussi comme une carte impossible; comment la théorie des formes ne faut pas être pensée. Son but; une parodie ou – une entraînement; pédagogique, exercice nécessaire au bon chemin de la vérité. Cependant, de ne pas écarter avec les formes, mais, au contraire, affirmer leur nécessité et leur raffinement; si nous ne devons pas finir par abandonner les formes et, avec elles, la possibilité de la dialectique et de la Philosophie tout à fait.

La première partie du *Parménide* soulève plusieurs problèmes pour les formes et la participation, mais elle met en évidence la nécessité des formes pour que la dialectique, le logoi et le Logos, la Philosophie soient sauvés. Ces problèmes culminent dans la 'plus grande difficulté', à la séparation totale de notre monde et du monde des dieux, à l'inconnaissabilité des formes et ses conséquences dévastatrices pour Logos.

De nombreux commentateurs ont attiré l'attention sur la disposition des catégories employées dans la deuxième partie du dialogue, par Parménide, pour effectuer l'exercice de la dialectique sur sa propre doctrine de l'Un. Vu à la lumière de la liste postérieure du Megista Gene chez le *Sophiste*, cela peut fournir des indices significatifs indiquant un moyen de sortir de la fin du dialogue aporétique.

La plupart de ces indices se trouvent dans le *Sophiste*; dans la Gigantomachie et la définition d'être comme dynamis. La relation entre l'âme et l'ousia, le mouvement de la connaissance, où l'âme connaît l'ousia, est configurée comme une relation de dynamis: comme capacité d'agir et de souffrir; l'âme connaît et ousia est connue. Aux dieux, l'Étranger répond que l'être doit bouger, assez pour être connu, car connaître est une forme d'agir et de souffrir - de dynamis. Sinon, l'être, étant un, ne peut pas être connu, de plus, il n'y a pas de contact entre les deux mondes; nous sommes returnees dans la plus grande difficulté des *Parménide*; la destruction totale de la possibilité du dialegesthai dynamis et de la Philosophie. Pour les géants, il faut qu'il soit assez constant pour être connu, car la connaissance est la connaissance de quelque chose de durable - stable, - une proposition à propos de quelque chose qui, bien que fugace, doit avoir un sens solide et communicable; si nous devons dire quelque chose et savoir quelque chose du tout.

Dans la relation entre l'âme et l'ousia, le mouvement et le repos sont impliqués. Car, si ousia ne bougeait pas, nous n'aurions aucune connaissance stable, nulle part où se tenir, car même les propositions de langage auraient déjà disparu. N'ayant aucune connaissance de l'aei on, de quelque chose de stable, nous ne pouvions rien savoir et ne rien dire de l'être et de l'ousia. De même, si ousia était seulement en repos, nous ne pourrions rien savoir puisque nous ne pourrions pas être affectés par l'être ni l'affecter, car connaître est une forme d'action et de souffrance. Il n'y aurait aucun lien entre les deux mondes et nous retomberions dans la plus grande difficulté.

Dans le *Sophiste*, Logos est né dans l'âme de l'interconnen et du tissage des idées, *κοινωνία και συμπλοκή των ειδών*. Platon dit que poser le tout comme dépourvu de *nous*, de vie et de mouvement - qu'il soit solennel et sacré, sachant que rien ne serait q' une grande erreur, et fondamental, car cela détruirait complètement la possibilité de la Philosophie et du Logos en général. S'il n'y a pas de mouvement, il n'y a pas de *noein* non-plus. Et si tout bouge, il est impossible de savoir quoi que ce soit, car la connaissance est la connaissance de l'aei on, permanent, de ce qui est toujours. De même, que tout communique avec tout est intenable, car nous saurions tout; tout serait réduit à la Même. Également que rien ne communique, car, encore une fois, nous ne pouvions rien savoir.

La définition de l'être comme dynamis, aussi radicale soit-elle, apparaît aux moments du dialogue d'être provisoire. Elle est utilisé pour combler les positions des géants et des dieux, des matérialistes et des idéalistes, mais accomplit beaucoup plus. Dynamis révèle à la fois le mouvement et le repos comme conditions nécessaires à la connaissance de l'ousia et conduit non seulement au passage au Parricide et à l'existence du non-être, mais aussi du couple Pré-Socratique non-dialectique de mouvement et de repos, à la couple dialectique du Même et de l' Autre; le noyau du Megista Gene, qui domine le Platonisme postérieur, comme dans le *Timée*. Dans ce mouvement, Platon avance au-delà de la doctrine Élématique et des histoires de ses prédécesseurs sur la nature et le nombre de l'être. Nous affirmerons que ce dépassement, à travers le personnage d'Étranger d'Élée, représente le dépassement et le parricide de Parménide, de la dialectique Élématique; une réfutation de la thèse de l'Un soi-même.

En effet, l'Étranger, dans le *Sophiste*, nous conduit à traverser le conseil paternel – de ne pas égarer dans le non-être, ne jamais admettre que les choses qui ne sont pas sont; de disjoindre le Tout de l'Un. Contre le 'En to Pan' de Parménides; l'Être peut être tout/entier ou un. Comme il est nécessairement entier, car tout ce qui a été fait a été fait en entier, il n'en est pas un. Le tout est plus q'un; donc, soit l'être est vide de l'être ou l'un est uniquement celui du nom. Cette disjonction s'avérera fondamentale pour affirmer l'existence du non-être, sous la forme d'être de différence

En réponse à la 'plus grande difficulté', les enjeux sont élevés; s'il n'y a pas de relation entre le monde des dieux, des formes et le nôtre, si l'Un est, alors nous ne pouvons rien savoir. En d'autres termes, soit l'Un est, soit, formes et connaissances, dynamis, causalité et communication entre l'âme et l'ousia, entre les formes elles-mêmes. S'il n'y a pas de formes, si elles existent mais isolées ou si nous n'y avons pas d'accès; pas de Philosophie, pas de Logos est possible. Ce qui se passe entre les deux dialogues peut être considéré comme une critique dévastatrice de la dialectique Élématique; Ne pas se finir avec de formes, mais au contraire, affirmer leur nécessité et la manière correcte de leur articulation, qui, si elle n'est pas bien comprise, peut conduire à l'abandon total des formes, de la dialectique et de la Philosophie; à une ruine totale de la pensée.

Les Megista Gene peut-il être simplement une liste aléatoire, de laquelle l'Un est absent? Est-ce que l'Un doit être considéré comme une forme du tout? Nous soutiendrons que cette attaque complexe et fragmentée entre dialogues à la doctrine Élématique, est reflétée et résolue chez le *Sophiste*; dans le Parricide et dans les raisons pour lesquelles l'Un ne figure pas dans la liste du Megista Gene.

### *Philosophizing With Ifs : the Dialectical Challenge of Plato's Parmenides*

A common feature of both parts of Plato's *Parmenides* is the use of a mode of reasoning originally provided by Zeno's argument, and subsequently endowed of a dialectical function, widely implemented in the second part of the dialogue. This mode of reasoning takes the form of the *reductio ad absurdum*, on which, according to Socrates' analysis (127d6-128b6), Zeno's argument is based. In its strictest application, the *reductio ad absurdum* performs a negative purpose, consisting in refuting a hypothesis by exposing the absurd consequences it entails. In the first part of the dialogue, Parmenides shows how this mode of reasoning might be used against Socrates' claim that there are Forms separated from the many entities partaking of them (128e6-135c2). Yet, in order to explain the manner of training he recommends to Socrates, Parmenides still refers to Zeno's practice (135d8), just insisting that it should not be applied to visible entities but to entities one would mostly grasp through reasoning (135d8-e4), that the consequences of contradicting a hypothesis should be reviewed as well as the consequences of the initial hypothesis itself (135e8-136a2), and that the consequences should be considered both for the entity hypothetized and for other entities, and in relation both to that entity itself and to the others (136a4-c5). Then, either the dialectical method is confined to a negative purpose, or the implemented mode of reasoning proves able to yield positive outcomes, as suggested by Parmenides' remark about the possibility for a trained philosopher to discern the truth with masterly skill (136c5). One cannot dismiss the first branch of the disjunction and choose the second branch without demonstrating that, in Plato's *Parmenides*, the *reductio ad absurdum* is turned into a productive and rewarding method. Giving such a demonstration is precisely at what my paper aims. This approach agrees with the contention that Plato's *Parmenides* tells how the dialectical method was taught to young Socrates, who shall later remember Parmenides with awe (*Thet.* 183e3-184a9), regarding him as a master of dialectics (*Soph.* 217c5-7). It also conforms to the presumption that Parmenides' cross-examination of Socrates' hypothesis of Forms conveys a deeper understanding of this hypothesis, opening a path towards meeting the objections, at least for a mind strong enough to carry out a thorough examination of issues (ἀπορίαι) at stake, and to become experimented in dialectics (133a8-c1, 135a7-b2).

My paper will focus on the second part of the dialogue, where Parmenides exemplifies the training required to achieve such an understanding. I will proceed in two steps. In a first step, I intend to assess the positive content of the conditional sentences which his mode of reasoning leads Parmenides to form (with or without a question mark or a word of negation), generally using the present indicative tense in the *protasis* (the clause containing the condition, introduced by εἰ) and the future indicative tense or the present optative tense with ἄν in the *apodosis* (the clause containing the consequence, sometimes introduced by a correlative word such as ἄρα), this deductive scheme being subject to many variations throughout the dialogue with young Aristotle. The tentative nature of the discourse thus generated is reflected by a shift in meaning of the word ὑπόθεσις, which comes to indicate not merely that the so called statement is a starting-point, but above all that it is put forward to be pondered over and scrutinized, setting up a framework within which participants are less requested to endorse positions than to secure a thought process.

However, in the course of this process, both questioner and respondent rely on some kind of knowledge, which, being implied by their deductions, involves a conception of the entities under examination and of the meaning of the terms used to characterize those entities (such as “being”, “whole” and “parts”, “motion” and “rest”). Even the most critical commentators, who undertake to discuss Parmenides’ views or to point out the flaws of his logic, are induced to take into account and sometimes emphasize those very views and logic with the help of which the characters draw their conclusions. Can we reckon this kind of knowledge as positive outcome of the dialectical method? Actually, this knowledge is outlined (by the characters) only to be challenged (by the characters’ own dialectics), resulting in the commentators’ criticisms supporting Parmenides’ dialectical practice rather than thwarting it. And, indeed, the characters’ tentative knowledge appears to be if not invalidated (together with the initial hypothesis), at least questioned by the absurd or contradictory conclusions it helps to attain (in accordance with the logic of *the reductio ad absurdum*). So, what are we to do with a knowledge only useful to be put at the test and then rebutted? What does “philosophizing with ifs” mean?

The answer to these questions cannot be but a pragmatic one, especially since a pragmatic kind of answer conforms to the model displayed by the characters. Their thought process is the main source available for whatever positive outcome the dialectical method might bring, and brings actually, as notified by the recurrent characterization of the reflections as true (a point underlined in 161e4-7) and by the word ἀληθέστατα ending the dialogue (166c5). Thus, in a second step, in order to indicate how such positive outcome might be identified, I will draw attention to the recursive structure of the exercise performed by Parmenides and Aristotle, on the ground that the preceding deductions cannot impact the following ones, or the following deductions retrospectively shed light on the preceding ones, unless some lesson is learned from the exercise. Yet, although the characters happen to vary their conceptions in line with their arguments, sometimes suggesting inventive proposals (as in 156d3-e7, where the “instant” is invoked to reconcile the contradictory conclusions of the first two deductions or in 162a4, where the “bond” metaphor makes possible to be for not-being, and to not be for being), this lesson definitely does not consist of a set of tenets. Are we to acknowledge that the ultimate goal of the dialectical exercise is restricted to making young philosophers like Socrates more skilled in raising puzzling difficulties (as young dialecticians in *Resp.* VII 539b6-7, *Phl.* 15d8-16a3)? The antinomic pattern of the dialogue (where each new deduction seems to be aimed at undermining the former one), together with the gradual evocation (including the dream simile in 164d2) of the deceptive effects of appearances (on which Aristotle’s answers sometimes also depend) might lead to such a conclusion, were it not for the regular references to the issue concerning the conditions, limits and scope of human knowledge (see 142a3-6, 155d6-e3, 160c5-d6, 164a7-b3, echoing 134a3-e6 in the first part of the dialogue).

### *Philosopher avec des « si » : le défi dialectique du Parménide de Platon*

Un trait commun aux deux parties du *Parménide* de Platon est l’utilisation d’un mode de raisonnement d’abord fourni par l’argument de Zénon, et investi ensuite d’une fonction dialectique, largement mise en œuvre dans la seconde partie du dialogue. Ce mode de raisonnement prend la forme de la réduction à l’absurde, sur laquelle, d’après l’analyse de Socrate (127d6-128b6), l’argument de Zénon se fonde. Dans son application la plus stricte, la réduction à l’absurde vise un but négatif, consistant à réfuter une hypothèse en exposant les conséquences absurdes qu’elle



entraîne. Dans la première partie du dialogue, Parménide montre comment ce mode de raisonnement pourrait être utilisé contre la proposition, avancée par Socrate, selon laquelle il y a des Formes séparées des multiples entités qui en participent (128e6-135c2). Or, afin d'expliquer quelle sorte d'entraînement il recommande à Socrate, Parménide se réfère encore à la pratique de Zénon (135d8), se contentant de préciser qu'elle ne doit pas être appliquée aux entités visibles mais à des entités que l'on saisirait surtout par le raisonnement (135d8-e4), que les conséquences de la contradiction d'une hypothèse doivent être passées en revue tout autant que les conséquences de l'hypothèse initiale elle-même (135e8-136a2), et que ces conséquences doivent être considérées à la fois pour l'entité posée en hypothèse et pour les autres entités, et en relation à la fois avec cette entité elle-même et avec les autres (136a4-c5). Ainsi, de deux choses l'une : ou la méthode dialectique est confinée à un but négatif, ou le mode de raisonnement mis en œuvre s'avère capable de déboucher sur un résultat positif, comme le suggère la remarque de Parménide sur la possibilité, pour un philosophe entraîné, de discerner la vérité de façon maîtrisée (136c5). On ne saurait écarter la première branche de l'alternative et choisir la seconde sans démontrer que, dans le *Parménide* de Platon, la réduction à l'absurde devient une méthode productive et enrichissante. Donner une telle démonstration est l'objectif de ma communication. Cette approche s'accorde avec la pensée que le *Parménide* de Platon raconte comment la méthode dialectique a été enseignée au jeune Socrate, qui se souviendra ensuite de Parménide avec déférence (*Théét.* 183e3-184a9), le considérant comme un maître de dialectique (*Soph.* 217c5-7). Elle se conforme également à la présomption selon laquelle l'examen par Parménide de l'hypothèse des Formes de Socrate apporte une compréhension plus profonde de cette hypothèse, indiquant la voie pour répondre aux objections, du moins à un esprit assez fort pour mener un examen des difficultés (*ἀπορίαι*) en jeu, et pour acquérir une expérience de la dialectique (133a8-c1, 135a7-b2).

Ma communication se concentrera sur la seconde partie du dialogue, où Parménide donne une illustration de l'entraînement requis pour parvenir à une telle compréhension. Je procéderai en deux étapes. Dans une première étape, je prévois d'évaluer le contenu positif des phrases conditionnelles que son mode de raisonnement pousse Parménide à construire (avec ou sans point d'interrogation ou mot de négation), utilisant généralement l'indicatif présent dans la protase (la proposition contenant la condition, régulièrement introduite par *εἰ*) et le futur de l'indicatif ou le présent de l'optatif avec *ἄν* dans l'apodose (la proposition contenant la conséquence, parfois introduite par un mot de corrélation tel que *ἄρα*), ce schème déductif donnant lieu à de nombreuses variations au cours du dialogue avec Aristote le jeune. La nature suspensive du discours ainsi engendré est reflétée par un glissement de sens du mot *ὑπόθεσις*, qui en vient à indiquer non pas simplement que l'énoncé ainsi nommé est un point de départ, mais surtout qu'il est avancé pour être soupesé et scruté, instituant un cadre de travail à l'intérieur duquel les participants sont moins invités à adopter des positions qu'à garantir un processus de réflexion. Néanmoins, dans le cours de ce processus, le questionneur et le répondant s'appuient tous deux sur une espèce de connaissance qui, étant solidaire de leurs déductions, implique une certaine conception des entités soumises à l'examen et du sens des termes employés pour les caractériser (tels « être », « tout » et « partie », « mouvement » et « repos »). Les commentateurs même les plus critiques, qui entreprennent de discuter les idées de Parménide ou de relever ses fautes logiques, sont amenés à prendre en compte voire à mettre l'accent sur les idées et la logique à l'aide desquels les personnages infèrent leurs conclusions. Pouvons-nous compter cette espèce de connaissance parmi les résultats positifs de la méthode dialectique ? En réalité, cette connaissance n'est exposée (par les personnages) que pour être mise à l'épreuve (par leur dialectique propre), au point que les critiques des commentateurs

confortent la pratique dialectique de Parménide plus qu'elles ne la contrarient. Et, en fait, la connaissance suspensive que les personnages invoquent paraît être sinon invalidée (de pair avec l'hypothèse initiale), du moins mise en doute par les conclusions absurdes ou contradictoires qu'elle permet d'atteindre (conformément à la logique de la réduction à l'absurde). Dès lors, qu'avons nous à faire d'une connaissance qui n'est utile que pour être mise à l'épreuve et par suite rejetée ? Que signifie « philosopher avec des "si" » ?

La réponse à ces questions ne peut être que pragmatique, d'autant plus que l'espèce pragmatique de réponse se conforme au modèle présenté par les personnages. Leur processus de réflexion est la principale source disponible pour un résultat positif, quel qu'il soit, que la méthode dialectique pourrait amener. Ainsi, dans une seconde étape, afin d'indiquer comment on pourrait identifier ce résultat positif, je porterai l'attention sur la structure récursive de l'exercice accompli par Parménide et Aristote, en partant du principe que les déductions précédentes ne peuvent avoir un impact sur les suivantes, ou les déduction suivantes jeter une lumière rétrospective sur les précédentes, qu'à la condition qu'un enseignement soit tiré de l'exercice. Toutefois, même si les personnages en viennent à faire varier leurs conceptions pour les ajuster à leurs arguments, suggérant parfois d'inventives propositions (comme en 156d3-e7, où l'« instant » est invoqué pour réconcilier les conclusions contradictoires des deux premières déductions et en 162a4, où la métaphore du « lien » ouvre la possibilité, pour le non-étant d'être, et pour l'être, de ne pas être), cet enseignement ne consiste manifestement pas en une série de thèses. Devons-nous reconnaître que le but ultime de la dialectique se limite à rendre les jeunes philosophes comme Socrate plus habiles à soulever d'embarrassantes difficultés (tels les jeunes dialecticiens de *Rép.* VII 539b6-7, *Phil.* 15d8-16a3) ? La construction antinomique du dialogue (où chaque nouvelle déduction semble avoir pour but de détruire la précédente), de pair avec l'évocation graduelle (incluant l'image du rêve en 164d2) de l'effet trompeur des apparences (dont Aristote fait aussi parfois dépendre ses réponses) pourraient conduire à une telle conclusion, n'étaient les références régulières à la question des conditions, des limites et de la portée de la connaissance humaine (voir 142a3-6, 155d6-e3, 160c5-d6, 164a7-b3, en écho à 134a3-e6 dans la première partie du dialogue).

*The Being of 'the One that is Not' in Parmenides 160b5-163b6*

After completing the four (or five) deductions that start from the hypothesis “If the One is”, at 160b5 Parmenides turns to the first deduction starting from the opposed hypothesis, “If the One is not.” Around two-thirds of the way through this deduction Parmenides makes it explicit that this One, though it is not, nonetheless participates in being (161e3); and in a crucial passage whose text is disputed, he goes on to make the general claim that what is not must have a share in what is – since it *is* what is not – and that what is must have a share in what is not – since it *is not* what is not (162a1-b3). The exact significance of this claim, which is crucial for the interpretation of the deduction (and of the dialogue as a whole), is disputed in the literature. After showing that two interpretations that have been offered are inadequate, I shall discuss and add further support for a third interpretation that, in my view, makes the best sense of the passage in its immediate context and in the general progression of the deductions of the second half of the dialogue.

The first interpretation I shall consider maintains that the claim that (e.g.) not being must partake of being in order *to be* not-being is made in the text in order to reduce it to absurdity.<sup>1</sup> On this interpretation, Parmenides is diagnosing a mistaken view of the role of Being in the possession of properties. According to this mistaken view, in order for a subject to participate in F, it must participate in Being toward F; but since participating in Being will also require such an intermediate participation in Being, we are faced with an infinite regress. This line of interpretation leads towards a reduction of the importance of the Form of Being in Plato’s ontology and its possible elimination altogether. I shall argue against this interpretation by showing that, properly read, the passage does not lead to the regress alleged. Furthermore, this interpretation fails to do justice to the role of this passage in the deduction in which it figures, and indeed to the progress of the deductions in the second part in general.

The two other interpretations I shall address do understand the passage within these broader contexts, but they do so in diametrically opposed ways. Both of these views maintain that, beneath the paradoxical surface of the deductions in the *Parmenides*, Plato is concerned to work out the ontological relationship between phenomenal objects and Forms in a way that overcomes the problems for the Theory of Forms raised by Parmenides in the first part of the dialogue. Both of these views also agree that it is fruitful to suppose that the ontology underlying the deductions involves something like the principles of the One and the Indefinite Dyad attributed to Plato by Aristotle. One of these views<sup>2</sup> takes the deduction in which our passage occurs to be concerned with phenomenal being. This view points to the fact that after establishing that the One that is not has both being and not-being, Parmenides goes on to remark that the only way it could have those contrary characters is by having them one at a time and changing between them. This argumentative move is similar to that which Parmenides performs in an earlier deduction, where he analyzes such transitions between contrary states as involving the instant (155e-157b). Since that deduction is, uncontroversially, concerned with phenomenal being, the interpretation under

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1 Cf. Gill 2012.

2 Cf. Migliori 1990.

consideration holds that this is also the case in our deduction: we have here an analysis of a being that is “mixed” product of the one and the indefinite dyad.

Despite the similarities between our deduction and that in which the instant figures, I believe that the above interpretation is mistaken. I shall argue that the text of the deduction, and the progression of the argument in the deductions as a whole, best supports a version of the third type of interpretation. According to this view,<sup>1</sup> in our deduction the One that is not but participates in being in fact possesses the atemporal, non-spatial being of the Forms. The progress of the deductions can be seen to be involved in teasing apart this sort of being from that which characterizes phenomenal beings. In the very first deduction, the ultimate denial of being to the One is conspicuously framed in terms that refer only to being in time. Similarly, in the second deduction, the one under consideration is, for the most part, clearly a one that possesses spatio-temporal being. These two deductions establish a preliminary identification of being as such with spatio-temporal being, and it is essentially being of this sort with which the third (or appendix) deduction is concerned. So, too, the remaining two deductions under the hypothesis “If the One is”, insofar as they are concerned with the things other than the one, have no occasion to reflect on the kind of being characteristic of Forms. It is in the first deduction under the hypothesis “If the One is not”, that is, in our deduction, that Parmenides enters into an analysis of this sort of being, describing it, paradoxically, as that which is *not* – not, that is, in the way that spatio-temporal beings are. I shall argue that such an interpretation can make good sense of the details of the deduction.

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### *L'être de « l'Un qui n'est pas » dans Parménide 160b5-163b6*

Après avoir parcouru les quatre (ou cinq) déductions qui partent de l'hypothèse « Si l'Un est », Parménide passe (à 160 b 5) à la première déduction qui part de l'hypothèse opposée, c'est-à-dire « Si l'Un n'est pas ». Aux deux tiers environ de cette déduction, Parménide précise que l'Un dont il parle, bien qu'il ne soit pas, participe néanmoins à l'être (161e3); et dans un passage crucial dont le texte est contesté, il affirme en général que ce qui n'est pas doit avoir une part de l'être - puisqu'il *est* ce qui n'est pas - et que ce qui est doit avoir une part du non-être - puisqu'il *n'est pas* ce qui n'est pas (162a1-b3). La signification exacte de cette affirmation, qui est cruciale pour l'interprétation de la déduction (et du dialogue dans son ensemble), est contestée dans la littérature. Après avoir montré que deux des interprétations proposées sont insuffisantes, je discuterai et apporterai un soutien supplémentaire à une troisième interprétation qui, à mon avis, donne le

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Miller 1986, Sanday 2015.

meilleur sens du passage, et dans son contexte immédiat et dans la progression générale des déductions de la seconde moitié du dialogue.

La première interprétation que je considérerai insiste que l'affirmation selon laquelle (par exemple) le non-être doit participer à l'être pour être le non-être est énoncée dans le texte pour la réfuter en raisonnant par l'absurde.<sup>1</sup> Selon cette interprétation, Parménide diagnostique une conception erronée du rôle de l'être dans la possession d'attributs. Selon cette opinion erronée, pour qu'un sujet participe à F, il doit participer à l'Être envers F ; mais, puisque participer à l'Être requiert également une telle participation intermédiaire à l'Être, nous sommes menés à une régression infinie. Cette ligne d'interprétation conduit à une réduction de l'importance de la forme de l'Être dans l'ontologie de Platon et même à son éventuelle élimination. Je vais contester cette interprétation en montrant que le passage ne conduit pas à la régression alléguée. En outre, cette interprétation ne rend pas justice au rôle de ce passage dans la déduction dans laquelle elle figure, ni à sa place dans l'évolution des déductions dans la deuxième partie du dialogue.

Les deux autres interprétations que je vais aborder visent à comprendre le passage dans ces contextes plus larges, mais elles le font de manière diamétralement opposée. Ces deux points de vue soutiennent tous les deux que, sous la surface paradoxale des déductions du *Parménide*, Platon se préoccupe de définir la relation ontologique entre les objets phénoménaux et les Formes, de manière à surmonter les problèmes soulevés par Parménide dans la première partie du dialogue. Ces deux points de vue s'accordent également sur le fait qu'il est utile de supposer que l'ontologie sous-jacente aux déductions implique quelque chose qui ressemble aux principes de l'Un et de la Dyade indéfinie attribués à Platon par Aristote. Le premier<sup>2</sup> de ces points de vue affirme que la déduction où se trouve notre passage se rapporte à l'être phénoménal. Cette interprétation met en valeur le fait que, après avoir établi que l'Un qui n'est pas doit posséder et l'être et le non-être, Parménide continue en remarquant que la seule façon dont il est possible d'avoir ces caractères contraires est de les avoir l'un après l'autre, c'est-à-dire de changer de l'un à l'autre. Ce mouvement argumentatif ressemble à celui que Parménides effectue dans une déduction antérieure, où il insiste que de telles transitions entre des états contraires impliquent l'existence de « l'instant » (155e-157b). Vu que cette déduction antérieure concerne sans aucun doute l'être phénoménal, l'interprétation à l'examen insiste que c'est également le cas dans notre déduction : nous avons ici l'analyse d'un être qui est un produit « mixte » de l'un et de la dyade indéfinie.

Malgré les similitudes entre notre déduction et celle où nous trouvons l'analyse de l'instant, à mon avis l'interprétation fondée sur ce point est erronée. Je soutiendrai que et le texte de la déduction, et la progression de l'argument dans l'ensemble des déductions, sont mieux expliqués par une autre interprétation. Selon ce point de vue,<sup>3</sup> dans notre déduction, l'Un qui n'est pas mais qui participe à l'être possède en réalité l'être atemporel et non-spatial des Formes. On peut voir qu'au fur et à mesure que les déductions déroulent, il s'effectue une dissociation de ce genre d'être d'avec celui qui caractérise les êtres phénoménaux. À la fin de la toute première déduction, en niant l'être de l'un Parménide emploie des termes qui se réfèrent uniquement à l'être dans le temps. De même, dans la seconde déduction, l'Un en question est, pour la plupart, clairement un Un qui possède un être spatio-temporel. Ces deux déductions établissent une identification préliminaire de l'être en tant que tel avec l'être spatio-temporel, et c'est ce genre d'être avec lequel la troisième déduction (ou « l'appendice », comme on le nomme parfois) est concernée. De même, les deux

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1 Cf. Gill 2012.

2 Cf. Migliori 1990.

3 Cf. Miller 1986, Sanday 2015.

autres déductions sous l'hypothèse « Si l'Un est », dans la mesure où elles concernent des choses autres que celui-ci, n'ont aucune occasion de réfléchir sur le genre d'être qui caractérise les Formes. C'est dans la première déduction sous l'hypothèse « Si l'Un n'est pas », c'est-à-dire dans notre déduction, que Parménide entre dans une analyse de ce genre d'être, le décrivant, paradoxalement, comme ce qui n'est pas – n'est pas, c'est-à-dire, à la manière des êtres spatio-temporels. Je montrerai qu'une telle interprétation peut donner un bon sens aux détails de la déduction.

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### *Reading with the Mind's I: The Role of Selfhood in Proclus' Reading of the First Deduction of the Parmenides.*

Plato famously starts the dialectical exercise of the second half of the *Parmenides* with an apparently aporetic argument starting from the premise “the One is” and coming to the conclusion that “the One neither is nor is one” and that there is “neither name, nor account, nor scientific understanding, nor perception, nor opinion” of it (*Parm.* 137c–142a). Proclus in his *Commentary on Plato's Parmenides* famously reads this argument as the fulfillment of Plato's proposed dialectical move from a hypothesis (namely, “the One is”) to “the unhypothetical starting point” (vis, the One), from which all sciences should then receive their grounding (*Resp.* VI 510b). In this he is following his predecessor Plotinus, who already took the first deduction as an account of the One, among other things precisely because it denies being of the One, and because the One is supposed to be identical with the Good, which in the *Republic* is said to be “beyond being” (*Resp.* VI 509b).

There is much that is unclear in this interpretation of the *Parmenides*, and many difficulties stand in the way of taking the deduction as an account of Plato's first principle. In my paper I want to focus on a specific difficulty that Proclus faces and how his solution sheds light on his understanding of the argument and the principle it argues for. The difficulty is the following: how can the argument of the first deduction lead to the first principle, if it denies everything of its subject, the One, even being and being one? It would seem that the argument shows that the One is not a principle, but rather nothing. This is an important difficulty for Proclus as he repeatedly turns to it (see *In Parm.* VI 1072.3-11, 1081.8-1082.12 and 1105.25-1106.2). In response to this difficulty, Proclus appeals to an innate and non-representational access that the soul possesses of the One in the form of “the one of the soul.” The latter has often been understood as a capacity of the soul for so-called “mystical union”, and thus understandably Proclus' appeal to the one of the soul has not been found very helpful. There is, however, one passage (*In Parm* IV 957.22-958.10) where Proclus gives a philosophical account of the one of the soul as the soul's power to unite all of its parts, activities and passions as belonging to a single I or self. This passage has, however, been ignored for precisely its philosophical clarity since interpreters could not believe that this same faculty responsible for something as esoteric as mystical union could also have such an understandable and prosaic function (e.g. Dillon (1987) p.208)). I however argue that there is no reason not to take Proclus to be talking about one and the same capacity of the soul that would be responsible for different effects: its self-identity and its “mystical union” whatever that might be. And since the one of the soul is simply supposed to be the soul's participation in the One itself, then if the one of the soul is the soul's self or “I”, then the One itself must simply be Selfhood itself. It is important to be clear here: Beierwaltes (1979, p. 345) has pointed out that the One cannot be an I because it is not self-reflexive, as any individual I or Self has a relation to itself (exemplified by statements whereby it identifies itself as the subject of different activities). But the claim made here is not that the One is an individual Self from which all of reality is derived. Rather, the claim is that the One is abstract Selfhood as such, what it is to be a Self, and not a particular Self that would attribute to itself any particular activities. Through this, we can shed light also on the enigmatic

“henads” or “unities” that Proclus posits as identical with the gods: just as the one is Selfhood itself, they would be individual, sovereign Selves, existing for themselves (and not as features of a substance with many parts, like the soul). This would make sense as Proclus attributes to them intelligence, will and self-reflection (*ET* 121,122, 131). Furthermore, Proclus explains that the one of the soul is not merely a power to be a Self, but rather a drive or will towards unity, that is, towards uniting the soul around a coherent stable Self (For instance, VII 510.5-12). This is in line with the identity of the One and of the Good, and the Platonic claim that the soul possesses an innate striving towards the Good (on which see Kamtekar, (2006)). The soul’s self thus contains an inchoate knowledge of the unity it strives towards. For this reason, our acquaintance with unity through our own selves can supply a meaning to “the One” as Selfhood, even when all ontic determinations are denied of it, as they are in the first deduction of the *Parmenides*. This would be a knowledge of unity mediated by “neither name, nor account, nor scientific understanding, nor perception, nor opinion” as the *Parmenides* says, but rather an immediate knowledge of Unity or Selfhood through our own existence as selves.

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*Lesen mit dem Ich: Die Rolle der Selbstheit bei Proklos' Lektüre der ersten Hypothese von Platons Parmenides.*

Bekanntlich fängt Platon die dialektische Übung der zweiten Hälfte des *Parmenides* mit einem aporetischen Argument an, das mit der Prämisse “Das Eine ist” beginnt und am Ende schlussfolgert, dass “das Eine weder ist noch ist eins” und dass es “weder Name, noch Logos, noch Wissenschaft, noch Wahrnehmung und noch Meinung“ davon und darüber gibt (*Parm.* 137c–142a). In seinem *Kommentar zum Platons Parmenides* liest Proklos dieses Argument als die Erfüllung von der im Platons *Staat* versprochenen dialektischen Aufstieg von einer Hypothese (nämlich, “Das Eine ist”), zu einem “unhypothetischen Anfang“ (d.h. das Eine), in den alle Wissenschaften begründet wären. (*Resp.* 510b). Dabei folgt er sein Vorgänger Plotin, der schon die erste Hypothese als eine Beschreibung des Einen gelesen hatte, genau weil sie unter anderen das Sein dem Einen verneint, denn das Eine soll mit dem Guten identisch sein, das im *Staat* als “jenseits des Seins” gekennzeichnet wird. (*Resp.* 509b).

Es gibt viel Unklarheit in dieser Interpretation des *Parmenides* und viele Schwierigkeiten stehen im Weg, die erste Hypothese als eine Beschreibung des ersten Prinzips Platons zu deuten. In meinem Beitrag will ich auf eine bestimmte Schwierigkeit konzentrieren und auch darauf, wie Proklos' Lösung Licht auf seine Verständnis des Arguments und des Prinzips, wofür es argumentiert, wirft. Die Schwierigkeit ist folgendes: wie kann das Argument der ersten Hypothese zum ersten Prinzip führen, wenn es dem Einen allem abspricht, sogar das Sein und die Einheit? Es



sieht so aus als ob es eher zeigen würde, dass das Eine überhaupt nichts sei, und nicht dass es das erste Prinzip ist. Diese ist eine wichtige Schwierigkeit für Proklos, denn er behandelt sie mehrmals. (siehe *In Parm.* VI 1072.3-11, 1081.8-1082.12 and 1105.25-1106.2). Um darauf zu antworten, beruft Proklos sich auf einen eingeborenen Zugang zum Einen in Form des so genannten "Eine der Seele". Dieses letzte wurde oft als ein Vermögen der Seele für "mystische Einung" verstanden, und deshalb hat Proklos' Verweis darauf seinen Lesern nicht als die hilfreichsten gegolten. Es gibt aber eine Textstelle (*In Parm* IV 957.22-958.10), in der Proklos philosophisch Rechenschaft über das Eine der Seele abgibt, als das Vermögen der Seele alle ihrer Teile, Tätigkeiten und Leidenschaften als einem einzigen Ich zugehörig zu vereinen. Diese Passage wurde aber bisher kaum geachtet besonders deswegen, dass es philosophisch so hell ist. Denn Interpreten könnten nicht daran glauben, dass dieselbe Fähigkeit, die für die esoterische "mystische Einung" verantwortlich ist, auch die Erklärung für etwas so alltäglich und verständlich als die Einheit des Selbst sei. (e.g. Dillon (1987) p.208)). Ich aber argumentiere, dass es keinen Grund gibt, warum ein Seelenvermögen zwei Wirkungen nicht haben kann: die Selbstidentität der Seele und die "mystische Einung". Aber da das Eine der Seele einfach die Teilnahme der Seele an das Eine selbst sein soll, dann wenn das Eine der Seele ist das Selbst oder Ich der Seele, dann muss das Eine selbst die Selbstheit als solches sein. Es stimmt, dass Beierwaltes (1979, p. 345) klar dargelegt hat, dass das Eine kein Ich sein kann, weil das Eine nicht selbst-reflexiv ist, aber jedes Ich oder Selbst ein Selbstbezug haben muss (z.B. wenn es sich als der Subjekt verschiedener Handlungen sich identifiziert.) Aber die Aussage, die hier gemacht wird, ist nicht, dass das Eine ein Individuum sei, von dem ausgehend die ganze Wirklichkeit abzuleiten wäre. Sondern ist meine Aussage, dass das Eine die abstrakte Selbstheit als solches ist, d.h., was es bedeutet ein Selbst zu sein, und kein partikuläres Selbst, der zu sich selbst in Bezug stehen würde indem es sich als der Subjekt irgendetwas identifizieren würde. Dadurch wird es möglich auch die enigmatischen "Henaden" oder "Einheiten" von Proklos' System zu erhellen, die er für identisch mit den Göttern hält. Genau wie das Eine die Selbstheit an sich ist, so sind die Henaden so viele unabhängige Selbst, die für sich selbst existieren (und nicht, wie das Selbst der Seele, Vermögen eines Wesens sind). So eine Interpretation würde Sinn ergeben, denn Proklos schreibt die Henaden Intelligenz, Wille und Selbst-Bezug zu (*ET* 121,122, 131). Außerdem erklärt Proklos, dass das Eine der Seele nicht nur ein Vermögen zur Selbstidentität ist, sondern auch ein Trieb oder eine Wille zur Einheit ist, d.h., eine Wille die ganze Seele um ein kohärentes Selbst zu vereinen (siehe, z.B. *In Parm.* VII 510.5-12). Dies stimmt mit der Gleichsetzung vom Einen und Guten überein, sowie mit der platonischen Aussage, dass die Seele einen eingeborenen Wille zum Guten besitzt (darüber, Kamtekar, (2006)). Das Ich der Seele besitzt also eine unausgeformte Erkenntnis der Einheit, nach der es strebt. Aus diesem Grund kann unsere Bekanntschaft mit der Einheit durch unseres eigene Ich "das Eine" mit Bedeutung versehen, als "das Selbst an sich", sogar wenn alle ontische Bestimmung ihm abgesprochen werden, wir im erster Hypothese des *Parmenides*. Dies wäre eine Erkenntnis des Einen vermittelt von "weder Name, noch Logos, noch Wissenschaft, noch Wahrnehmung und noch Meinung" wie es im *Parmenides* lautet, sondern eine unmittelbare Erkenntnis der Einheit oder Selbstheit durch unser eigenes Dasein als Selbst.

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*On coming to be older and younger than yourself at the same time  
(Parmenides 141a6-d3)*

At *Parmenides* 141a6-b2, we find an argument whose striking conclusion is that “that which comes to be older than itself comes to be, at the same time, younger than itself”<sup>1</sup> (Τὸ πρεσβύτερον [...] ἑαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον καὶ νεώτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἅμα γίγνεται; 141b1-2). Since young Aristotle seems puzzled by this conclusion, Parmenides provides a second argument that runs from 141b3 to d3.<sup>2</sup> However, it is not clear how these arguments are supposed to work. One half of the conclusion seems unproblematic since whatever is in time is always coming to be older than itself. But the second half is not –why would anything also and at the same time come to be younger than itself? Moreover, this part of the conclusion does not seem to follow from the arguments’ premises. So, one wonders what kind of conception of time could Plato assume to allow him this claim.

Scholars have offered two main readings of this passage. I call the first one the “Renewal reading.” The thought behind this reading is that something in time comes to be younger than itself in the sense that it becomes ‘afresh’ or ‘new’ by reason of replacement of parts.<sup>3</sup> One might think this works like Theseus’ ship. If Theseus is always replacing pieces of his ship, every day his ship is one day older than it was, but it is also always newer than it was the day before because it has new parts. It can be objected that not everything that exists in time replaces its parts with new ones. But we can think about it in a different way. This year I am 36. In a sense, it is the first time I look the way I look. I am a new me, with new grey hairs and wrinkles. So even if my parts are not getting youthful, they are anew because they are different than they were before. A problem with the Renewal reading is that it assumes that all things that exist in time require a constant and uninterrupted replacement of parts. However, it is entirely possible for things to exist from one time to the other without replacing any of its parts, even if they will eventually replace them. Moreover, some things could only exhibit local movement without replacing any of their parts (for example, everlasting celestial bodies).

A different take on the passage –which I call the “Circular time reading”– argues that Plato assumes here a circular or periodic conception of time. According to this reading, anything in time is getting farther from its beginning, and thus coming to be older than itself; but it is also approaching its beginning in the next period, and thus it is getting younger than itself.<sup>4</sup> However, for this reading to work, one would require that everything in time would come to be again at the moment it perishes, without intervals of non-existence. Otherwise, it seems odd to say that even during the time where something does not exist (the time between its destruction and its new beginning) it is still getting younger and older. Moreover, –as Cornford (1939, 128) already noted–, elsewhere in the *Parmenides*, Plato’s conception of time seems to be linear.

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1 Translation by Gill and Ryan (1997), with minor modifications.

2 These arguments belong to the first deduction of the second half of the *Parmenides* (137c-142a), but they apply not only to the One but also to anything in time. See *Prm.* 141a. See also *Prm.* 155d.

3 See Allen (1997, 242).

4 See Syrianius, *In Parm.* Fr. 9 *apud* Proclus, *In Parm.* 1226.22–1227.24.

In this paper, I propose a different reading. My main thesis is that things in time come to be simultaneously older and younger than themselves because for Parmenides a thing's past and present selves are equally real. Thus, whatever temporal relation is predicated of any of these past and present selves is true of the thing in question, if it is indeed the same object. Consider the following: all my past selves are getting younger with respect to my current self, my current self is getting older than myself at any given past moment, and since both all my past selves and my current self are equally me, then I can say of myself that overall (i.e. taking into account my past and present selves) I am at the same time getting older than myself (i.e. my present self in relation to my past selves) and younger than myself (i.e. my past selves in relation to my present self). For example, my 20 year-old me is at every moment getting younger and younger than my present 36 years-old self. The same applies to all my past selves with respect to my present self. If I am not only my current self but also all my past selves, then I can say that, overall, I am simultaneously coming to be older than myself and younger than myself. Since my past selves are as real as my present self, every day I look older and younger than myself.

This conception of time is supported by the textual evidence and follows from the fact that for Plato the terms “younger” and “older” are correlative,<sup>1</sup> and Parmenides and Aristotle admit that things get older than themselves. Let me explain. First, to say that for Plato “younger” and “older” are correlative terms means that if one thing is older than a second one, then the latter is younger than the former, and vice versa (see 141a7-8; 141c1-2). Now, at 141a6-7, Aristotle and Parmenides agree that if something is in time it is always coming to be older than itself. This implies that past selves of anything in time must be real “if in fact it [i.e. the thing in time] is to have something it comes to be older than” (141b2-3). Once we grant this and given that “younger” is the correlative of “older”, any past self of a thing is coming to be younger than the present one, if it is indeed the same thing. Thus, if speaking in general of something that exists in time (and not with regard to any particular time), we can claim that it is always coming to be older than itself and at the same time younger than itself.

If this reading is right, in this passage of the *Parmenides*, Plato seems to reject presentism in favour of a growing universe theory where the past and present exist. This reading does not assume, like the Renewal reading, that things in time have to replace their parts, nor does it demand, like the Circular time reading, a periodic conception of time.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Prm.* 133c8-d5 and compare with *Resp.* 4, 438a-c; *Chrm.* 167e, *Tht.* 160a, *Symp.* 199d-e, *Soph.* 255d; compare also with *Arist. Top.* 6.4, and *Cat.* 5.

*Sobre llegar a ser más viejo y más joven que uno mismo al mismo tiempo*  
(Parménides 141a6-d3)

En *Parménides* 141a6-b2, se encuentra un argumento cuya sorprendente conclusión es que “lo que llega a ser más viejo que sí mismo llega a ser, al mismo tiempo, también más joven que sí mismo”<sup>1</sup> (Τὸ πρεσβύτερον [...] ἑαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον καὶ νεώτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἅμα γίγνεται; 141b1-2). Como el joven Aristóteles parece desconcertado por esta conclusión, Parménides ofrece un segundo argumento en su favor (141b3 a d3).<sup>2</sup> Sin embargo, no está claro cómo se supone que funcionan estos argumentos. La primera mitad de la conclusión no parece problemática ya que todo lo que está en el tiempo siempre se está haciendo más viejo que sí mismo. Sin embargo, la segunda mitad es más difícil de comprender ¿Por qué las cosas también y al mismo tiempo llegan a ser más jóvenes que ellas mismas? Esta parte de la conclusión no parece desprenderse de las premisas de los argumentos. Debido a ello, la pregunta que puede hacerse es ¿qué concepción del tiempo podría haber asumido Platón para permitir dicha afirmación?

Existen dos lecturas de este pasaje. A la primera la llamo la teoría de la “renovación.” La idea es que algo en el tiempo llega a ser más joven que sí mismo en el sentido de que se vuelve “nuevo” o se “renueva” porque va sustituyendo sus partes.<sup>3</sup> Se puede pensar que esto funciona como el barco de Teseo. Si Teseo siempre está reemplazando piezas de su barco, todos los días el barco es un día más viejo de lo que era antes, pero también siempre es más nuevo de lo que era el día anterior porque tiene piezas nuevas. Uno puede objetar que no todo lo que existe en el tiempo reemplaza sus partes por otras nuevas. Pero la situación se puede pensar de manera diferente. Este año cumplí 36 años. En cierto sentido, es la primera vez que me veo como me veo. Soy un nuevo yo, con nuevas canas y arrugas. De esta manera, incluso si mis partes no se vuelven más juveniles, son nuevas porque son diferentes a las de antes. Un problema con la teoría de la renovación es que asume que todo lo que existe en el tiempo requiere un reemplazo constante e ininterrumpido de sus partes. Sin embargo, es posible pensar que las cosas existan de un momento a otro sin reemplazar ninguna de sus partes, incluso si eventualmente las reemplazarán. Además, algunas cosas podrían solo exhibir movimiento local sin reemplazar ninguna de sus partes (como, por ejemplo, los cuerpos celestes).

Una interpretación diferente del pasaje –a la que llamo la “lectura del tiempo circular” – sostiene que Platón supone aquí una concepción circular o periódica del tiempo. De acuerdo con esta interpretación, cualquier cosa en el tiempo se está alejando de su comienzo, y así llega a ser más vieja que ella misma; pero también se acerca a su comienzo en el próximo período y, por lo tanto, también se está volviendo más joven que ella misma.<sup>4</sup> Sin embargo, para que esta lectura funcionase, uno requeriría que las cosas comenzaran a existir de nuevo en el momento en que perecen, sin intervalos de inexistencia. De lo contrario, resulta extraño decir que incluso durante el tiempo en que algo no existe (el tiempo entre su destrucción y su nuevo comienzo) aún se está volviendo cada vez más vieja y más joven. Además, como Cornford (1939, 128) ya ha señalado, en otras partes del *Parménides*, la concepción del tiempo de Platón parece ser lineal.

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1 Traducción de Santa Cruz (1988) con ligeras modificaciones.

2 Estos argumentos pertenecen a la primera deducción de la segunda mitad del *Parménides* (137c-142a), pero su conclusión aplican no solo para el Uno sino para cualquier cosa dentro del tiempo. Ver *Prm.* 141a. Ver también *Prm.* 155d.

3 Ver Allen (1997, 242).

4 Ver Syrianus, *In Parm.* Fr. 9 *apud* Proclus, *In Parm.* 1226.22–1227.24.

En este artículo, propongo una lectura diferente. Mi tesis principal es que las cosas en el tiempo llegan a ser simultáneamente más viejas y más jóvenes que ellas mismas porque para Parménides los pasados y presentes de una misma cosa son igualmente reales. Por lo tanto, cualquier relación temporal que se predique sobre los pasados y presentes de una cosa, es verdad para la cosa en cuestión, si es realmente el mismo objeto. Consideremos lo siguiente: todos mis yos del pasado son cada vez más jóvenes con respecto a mi yo actual, mi yo actual se está haciendo más viejo que mis yos en cualquier momento del pasado, y ya que todos mis yos pasados y mi yo actual son igualmente yo, entonces puedo decir que, en general (es decir, teniendo en cuenta mis yos pasados y mi yo presente), soy al mismo tiempo más viejo que yo mismo (es decir, mi yo presente en relación con mis yos pasados) y más joven que yo mismo (es decir, mis yos pasados en relación con mi yo presente). Por ejemplo, mi yo de 20 años se está volviendo cada vez más joven que mi yo actual de 36 años. Lo mismo se aplica a todos mis yos pasados con respecto a mi yo presente. Si no solo soy mi yo actual, sino también todos mis yos del pasado, entonces puedo decir que, en general, estoy llegando a ser, al mismo tiempo, más viejo y más joven que yo mismo. Como mi yo pasado es tan real como mi yo presente, todos los días me veo más viejo y más joven que yo mismo.

Esta concepción del tiempo está respaldada por la evidencia textual y se desprende del hecho de que para Platón los términos "más joven" y "más viejo" son correlativos,<sup>1</sup> y de que Parménides y Aristóteles admiten que las cosas se vuelven más viejas que ellas mismas. Me explico. En primer lugar, decir que para Platón "más joven" y "más viejo" son términos correlativos significa que si una cosa es más vieja que otra, entonces la segunda es más joven que la primera, y viceversa (véase 141a7-8; 141c1-2) Ahora bien, en 141a6-7, Aristóteles y Parménides están de acuerdo en que si algo está en el tiempo, siempre llega a ser más viejo que sí mismo. Esto implica que los seres pasados de cualquier cosa en el tiempo deben ser reales "si es que tiene que tener algo respecto de lo cual llegue a ser más vieja" (141b2-3). Una vez que concedemos esto y dado que "más joven" es el correlativo de "más viejo", cualquier ser pasado de una cosa llega a ser más joven que su ser presente, si es que son la misma cosa. Por lo tanto, si hablamos en general de alguna cosa que existe en el tiempo (y no con respecto a algún momento en particular), podemos afirmar que siempre es más vieja que sí misma y, al mismo tiempo, más joven que sí misma.

Si esta lectura es correcta, en este pasaje de *Parménides*, Platón parece rechazar el presentismo a favor de una teoría del universo de bloque donde el pasado y el presente existen. Esta lectura no supone, como la teoría de la renovación, que las cosas en el tiempo tengan que reemplazar sus partes, ni exige, como la lectura del tiempo circular, una concepción periódica del tiempo.

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<sup>1</sup> Véase *Prm.* 133c8-d5 y compárese con *Resp.* 4, 438a-c; *Chrm.* 167e, *Tht.* 160a, *Symp.* 199d-e, *Soph.* 255d; comparar también con Arist. *Top.* 6.4, y *Cat.* 5



## Vlad Marilena

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### *The One and its Two Manners of Being. The Divination of the Unspeakable and the Genesis of Thinking*

My paper focuses on the first two hypotheses about the One in the second part of Plato's *Parmenides* (137 c 4-155 e 3). I propose a philosophical analysis of these two hypotheses, trying to understand what links them, as well as what separates them essentially, and why, despite a certain similarity between them, they lead to totally opposite consequences. Starting from this analysis, I will draw some conclusions regarding why Proclus and Damascius – the two commentators of the *Parmenides* in the Neoplatonic School – differ in their interpretation of the first hypothesis.

Both hypotheses put *the One* in a certain relationship with *being*. They both assume that the One *is*: either the One *is* One (εἰ ἐν ἑστίν... τὸ ἐν), as in the first hypothesis, or the One *is* (ἐν εἰ ἕστί), as in the second hypothesis. Yet, why do we need two formulations of the relationship between One and being? When we say that “the One is One” (first hypothesis), we already implicitly say that “the One *is*”... One, as the second hypothesis suggests. Equally, when we say that “the One *is*” (second hypothesis), we implicitly understand that, essentially, “the One is ...the One”, which leads us back to the first hypothesis. But then, why is the second hypothesis different from the first? I argue that each of the hypotheses starts from a particular sense of *being* and from a particular function that *being* plays in the human thinking. Moreover, I argue that we are dealing with two different ways of hypothesizing, and that the argumentation in the two cases reflects different levels of abstractness, different manners in which our thinking can try to grasp the reality.

In the first hypothesis, the One does not appear as a proper object of thinking referring to it and trying to describe it. Here, *being* (from the expression “the One *is* One”) simply reflects the fact that the human thinking assumes any object as *being*. It is like when we ask ourselves “what *is* X”, without yet knowing anything about X, but simply announcing it as *being* the goal of our search. This *being* does not function as an attribute of the One. Rather, we deal with a thinking that tries to identify an ideal object (this “One”) in itself, *before* it enters the game of argumentations *about* it. I will discuss the paradoxical effects of this attempt. The most striking of them is the very fact that we are still using argumentation: Plato deals with this *One* through philosophical arguments, exposing the consequences of admitting it. Moreover, this primordial thinking – which tries to precede the predication level, but still uses argumentation – eventually leads to a paradoxical conclusion: i.e. that the One *is not*, and cannot even be named One. Yet, though this conclusion seems to come in contradiction with the hypothesis from which it derives, I suggest that it actually confirms it. Both the hypothesis and the conclusion describe the paradoxical status of this “zero degree” thinking, which tries to establish a certain relationship with the One, before predicating anything about it. Thus, the first aporia shows us how, while trying to access its object in itself, our thinking comes to face the unspeakable. For Plato, this seems to be an essential condition of our thinking. Thus, even through, at the end of this aporia, he seems to suggest that the One cannot be like that, still, in the third aporia, he will restate and reintegrate this peculiar condition of the One, as well as of the thinking in relationship to the One.



While in the first hypothesis, *being* suggested the original act through which our thinking assumes an object and posits it as goal of the enquiry, in the second hypothesis, *being* becomes an attribute of the One. In fact, this second hypothesis grasps the moment in which our thinking passes from the simple act of establishing an object of thought (indicating it as *being* that particular thing) to affirming this “being” *about* it. The second aporia explains the interaction between the object of thought (the One) and this “being” that we apply to it. This aporia is an attempt to describe the One as affected by the attribute of *being*. The insertion of the *being* as attribute of the One leads us to the conclusion that we can eventually say and think anything about this One. Thus, this attribution of the *being* determines the genesis of thinking in its full, structural complexity.

If the first “being” didn’t say anything about the One, but simply isolated it as object of our thinking, but which remains inaccessible, the second “being” affects the One as an attribute; moreover, “being” itself is also thoroughly affected by the One, as its own attribute, while this double affection determines the very act of thinking. In this respect, these two *aporiai* of the One present two distinct stages of human thinking: if the second one presents the usual manner in which our thinking analyses any object of thought, describing it and implying about it, the first one presents a thinking which tries to grasp the One as such, not affected by the fact that we think about it. Thus, the second hypothesis is essentially different from the first one, because it implies a different sense of *being*, but also a different manner in which thinking assumes the relationship between One and being. While the second aporia describes the genesis and even self-generation of thinking, the first aporia is an example of pre-thinking, a thinking prior to the actual process of speaking about “something”.

This distinction between the two kinds of *being* – and between the two kinds of thinking associate to each – can help us better understand Damascius’ peculiar interpretation about the first hypothesis (*De principiis*, ed. Westerink, vol. I, p. 1-26). Unlike Proclus, for whom the first *aporia* is a negative discourse about the first principle and a hymn dedicated to it, Damascius tends to interpret this *aporia* as an example of philosophical divination. I will discuss what he means by “divination” and why he claims that, in this context, Plato tries to suggest the Ineffable, above the One itself.

### *L’Un et ses deux manières d’être. La divination de l’indicible et la genèse de la pensée*

Mon exposée se concentre sur les deux premières hypothèses concernant l’Un dans la deuxième partie du *Parménide* de Platon (137 c 4-155 e 3). Je propose une analyse philosophique de ces deux hypothèses, en essayant de comprendre ce qui les relie, ainsi que ce qui les sépare essentiellement, et pourquoi, malgré une certaine similarité, elles conduisent à des conséquences totalement opposées. À partir de cette analyse, je vais tirer quelques conclusions sur la raison pour laquelle Proclus et Damascius – les deux commentateurs néoplatoniciens du *Parménide* – diffèrent dans leur interprétation de la première hypothèse.

Les deux hypothèses placent l’Un dans une certaine relation avec l’être. Chacune d’elles suppose que l’Un est : soit l’Un *est* Un (εἰ ἐν ἐστιν ... τὸ ἐν), comme dans la première hypothèse, soit l’Un *est* (ἐν εἰ ἔστιν), comme dans la seconde hypothèse. Pourtant, pourquoi a-t-on besoin de deux formulations de la relation entre l’Un et l’être ? Quand nous disons que « l’Un est Un » (première

hypothèse), nous disons déjà implicitement que « l'Un *est* » ... Un, comme le suggère la deuxième hypothèse. De même, lorsque nous disons que « l'Un *est* » (deuxième hypothèse), nous comprenons implicitement que, essentiellement, « l'Un est ... l'Un », ce qui nous ramène à la première hypothèse. Mais alors, pourquoi la seconde hypothèse est-elle différente de la première ? Je soutiens que chacune des hypothèses part d'un sens particulier de *l'être* et d'une fonction particulière que *l'être* joue dans la pensée humaine. De plus, je maintiens que nous avons affaire à deux manières différentes de formuler des hypothèses, et que l'argumentation dans les deux cas reflète des niveaux différents d'abstraction, des manières différentes dans lesquelles notre pensée peut essayer de saisir la réalité.

Dans la première hypothèse, l'Un n'apparaît pas comme un objet proprement dit d'une pensée qui se réfère à lui en essayant de le décrire. Ici, l'être (de l'expression « l'Un *est* Un ») reflète simplement le fait que la pensée humaine assume chaque objet comme *étant*. C'est comme lorsque nous nous demandons « qu'est-ce que X », sans rien savoir à propos de X, mais simplement pour l'annoncer comme *étant* le but de notre recherche. Cet *être* ne fonctionne pas comme un attribut de l'Un. Au contraire, il s'agit d'une pensée qui tente d'identifier un objet idéal (cet « Un ») en soi, *avant* qu'il n'entre dans le jeu des arguments à son sujet. Je discuterai les effets paradoxaux de cette tentative. Le plus frappant d'entre eux est le fait même que nous utilisons encore l'argumentation : Platon traite de cet Un à travers des arguments philosophiques, exposant les conséquences de son admission. De plus, cette pensée primordiale – qui tente de devancer le niveau de la prédication, mais utilise encore l'argumentation – mène finalement à la conclusion que l'Un *n'est pas*, et ne peut même pas être nommé *Un*. Pourtant, bien que cette conclusion semble contredire l'hypothèse dont elle dérive, je suggère qu'en réalité elle la confirme. Tant l'hypothèse que la conclusion décrivent le statut paradoxal d'une pensée qui tente d'établir une certaine relation avec l'Un, avant de prédiquer quoi que ce soit à son sujet. Ainsi, la première aporie nous montre comment, tout en essayant d'accéder à son objet en soi, notre pensée rencontre l'indicible. Pour Platon, cela semble être une condition essentielle de notre pensée. Ainsi, même si, à la fin de cette aporie, il semble suggérer que l'Un ne peut pas être ainsi, pourtant, dans la troisième aporie, il réaffirmera et réintégrera cette condition particulière de l'Un, ainsi que de la pensée en relation avec cet Un.

Si, dans la première hypothèse, *l'être* suggérait l'acte original par lequel notre pensée assume un objet et l'établit comme but de l'enquête, dans la seconde hypothèse, *l'être* devient un attribut de l'Un. En fait, cette seconde hypothèse saisit le moment où notre pensée passe du simple acte d'établir un objet de pensée (l'indiquant comme *étant* cette chose particulière) à affirmer cet « être » à son sujet. La deuxième aporie explique l'interaction entre l'objet de la pensée (l'Un) et cet « être » que nous lui appliquons. Cette aporie est une tentative de décrire l'Un comme affecté par l'attribut de *l'être*. L'insertion de *l'être* comme attribut de *l'Un* nous conduit à la conclusion que nous pouvons finalement dire et penser *tout* à propos de cet Un. Ainsi, cette attribution de *l'être* détermine la genèse de la pensée dans toute sa complexité structurelle.

Si le premier « être » ne disait rien au sujet de l'Un, mais l'isolait simplement comme objet de la pensée, qui reste inaccessible, le second « être » affecte l'Un comme un attribut ; en outre, l'être aussi est fortement affecté par l'Un, comme son propre attribut, tandis que cette double affection détermine l'acte même de la pensée. À cet égard, ces deux apories de l'Un présentent deux étapes distinctes de la pensée humaine : si la seconde présente la manière habituelle dans laquelle notre pensée analyse tout objet de pensée, la première présente une pensée qui essaie de saisir l'Un en tant que tel, pas encore affecté par le fait que nous y pensons. Ainsi, la seconde hypothèse est essentiellement différente de la première, car elle implique un sens différent de *l'être*, mais aussi une

manière différente selon laquelle la pensée assume la relation entre l'Un et l'être. Alors que la deuxième aporie décrit la genèse et même l'autogénération de la pensée, la première aporie est un exemple de pré-pensée, une pensée préalable au processus même de parler de « quelque chose ».

Cette distinction entre les deux types *d'être* – et entre les deux types de pensée associée à chacun – peut nous aider à mieux comprendre l'interprétation particulière de Damascius au sujet de la première hypothèse (*De principiis*, éd. Westerink, volume 1, p. 1-26). Contrairement à Proclus, pour lequel la première aporie est un discours négatif sur le premier principe et un hymne qui lui est adressé, Damascius a tendance à interpréter cette aporie comme un exemple de divination philosophique. Je vais parler de ce qu'il entend par « divination » et pourquoi il prétend que, dans ce contexte, Platon essaie de suggérer l'Ineffable, au-dessus de l'Un même.

### *On the division into eight: Parmenides' scheme in 136a-b*

Countless attempts have been made to make sense of the second part of Plato's *Parmenides*. Not only are the details and workings of the different arguments obscure, it is also unclear how the eight (or nine, counting the coda of 155e-157b) different hypotheses relate to each other and how they differ. Different proposals have been made to account for the opposite conclusions reached in the different sections, and in particular, to account for the different conclusions of the sections that ostensibly ask the same thing, i.e. between the first and second, the third and fourth, the fifth and sixth and the seventh and eighth. Some have proposed that the difference is the result of the fact that the hypotheses treat of different, or different kinds of, 'ones' (and/or 'manies'), e.g. the form of one, individual sensible things, or Parmenides' One; or, in M. M. McCabe's interpretation, 'austere' and 'generous' individuals.<sup>1</sup> Others, like C. Meinwald,<sup>2</sup> suggest that different kinds of predication (in Meinwald's case, *pros heauto* predication and *pros ta alla* predication) are in operation in the different hypotheses, and that this accounts for their different results.

In this paper, I will investigate a third option, and one that is suggested by an often-ignored claim made by Parmenides himself in 136a, when he introduces the task that will follow in the second part. Here Parmenides says that:

“You must consider not only what happens if a particular hypothesis is true, but also what happens if it is not true.”

“What do you mean?” he [i.e. Young Socrates] said.

“Take, for instance,” he replied, “that hypothesis of Zeno's if the many exist, you should inquire what will happen to the many themselves in relation to themselves and to the one, and to the one in relation to itself and to the many, and also what will happen to the one and the many in relation to themselves and to each other, if the many do not exist.” (135e-136b, trans. North Fowler)

If we look carefully at this passage, we see that Parmenides here gives us an outline of an exercise with eight parts concerning the many:

- A) If the many exist
  - 1. what will happen to the many themselves in relation to themselves
  - 2. what will happen to the many themselves in relation to the one
  - 3. what will happen to the one in relation to itself
  - 4. what will happen to the one in relation to the many
- B) If the many do not exist (here we have to fill in the steps on the model of A)
  - 5. what will happen to the many themselves in relation to themselves

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1 M. M. McCabe 2015, “Unity in the *Parmenides*: The Unity of the *Parmenides*” in *Platonic Conversations*, OUP, 138-84.

2 See e.g. C. Meinwald 1992, “Good-bye to the Third Man” in R. Kraut (ed) *The Cambridge Companion to Plato*, CUP, 365-96

6. what will happen to the many themselves in relation to the one
7. what will happen to the one in relation to itself
8. what will happen to the one in relation to the many

If we shift the topic from the many to the one, we can generate the following table, which would seem to be a *prima facie* blueprint for the discussion of the second half:

- A) If the one exists
1. what will happen to the one in relation to itself
  2. what will happen to the one in relation to the many
  3. what will happen to the many themselves in relation to themselves
  4. what will happen to the many themselves in relation to the one
- B) If the one does not exist
5. what will happen to the one in relation to itself
  6. what will happen to the one in relation to the many
  7. what will happen to the many themselves in relation to themselves
  8. what will happen to the many themselves in relation to the one

In this paper, I will look at whether and to what extent the second part of the *Parmenides* maps onto the scheme offered by Parmenides in 136a-b. I will argue that it does, as long as we tweak the scheme a little, and I will compare my reading with other prominent accounts, most notably those of McCabe and Meinwald. I argue that core insights of their accounts can be preserved even if we take Parmenides' scheme as our guide.

Parmenides goes on to make another often overlooked remark, namely that the one – which forms the object of study in the exercise of the second half – is only one of the topics they could have chosen. To train himself, Socrates should complete similar exercises also about the same and different, motion and rest, becoming and destruction and being and non-being. If my paper is given a 40 minute slot, I will explore what these additional exercises would look like in light of Parmenides' scheme.

### *La division en huit: Le schéma de Parménide en 136a*

De nombreuses tentatives ont été faites pour donner un sens à la seconde partie de la *Parménide* de Platon. Non seulement sont les détails et le fonctionnement des différents arguments obscurs, il est également difficile de savoir comment les huit (ou neuf, en comptant la coda de 155e-157b) différentes hypothèses se rapportent et comment elles diffèrent. Différentes propositions ont été faites pour tenir compte des conclusions opposées des différentes sections et, en particulier, pour tenir compte des différentes conclusions des sections qui apparemment posent la même question, c'est-à-dire entre le premier et le deuxième, le troisième et le quatrième, le cinquième et le sixième, et le septième et le huitième. Certains ont proposé que la différence résulte du fait que les hypothèses traitent de différents types de «uns» (et/ou des «plusieurs»), par exemple la forme de

l'un, les choses sensibles individuelles, ou l'Un de Parménide; ou, dans l'interprétation de M. M. McCabe, des individus «austères» et «généreux». D'autres, comme C. Meinwald, suggèrent que différents types de prédication (dans le cas de Meinwald, la prédication du *pros beauto* et la prédication du *pros ta alla*) sont en vigueur dans les différentes hypothèses, ce qui explique leurs différents résultats.

Dans cet article, j'examinerai une troisième option, suggérée par une affirmation souvent ignorée de Parménide lui-même dans 136a-b, lorsqu'il introduit la tâche qui suivra dans la deuxième partie du dialogue. Ici Parménide dit que:

(Parménide) χρῆ δὲ καὶ τόδε ἔτι πρὸς τούτῳ ποιεῖν, μὴ μόνον εἰ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ὑποτιθέμενον σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑποτίθεσθαι, εἰ βούλει μᾶλλον γυμνασθῆναι.

(Socrate) πῶς λέγεις; φάναι.

(Parménide) οἶον, ἔφη, εἰ βούλει, περὶ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἦν Ζήνων ὑπέθετο, εἰ πολλά ἐστι, τί χρῆ συμβαίνειν καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς πολλοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἓν καὶ τῷ ἓνι πρὸς τε αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολλά: καὶ αὖ εἰ μὴ ἐστι πολλά, πάλιν σκοπεῖν τί συμβήσεται καὶ τῷ ἓνι καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα (135e-136b)

Si nous regardons attentivement ce passage, nous voyons que Parménide nous donne ici un aperçu d'un exercice en huit parties concernant le 'plusieur' ou le 'nombre':

A) Si les plusieurs existe

1. qu'advient-il des plusieurs eux-mêmes par rapport à eux-mêmes
2. qu'advient-il des plusieurs eux-mêmes par rapport à l'un
3. qu'advient-il de l'un par rapport à lui-même
4. qu'advient-il de 'un par rapport aux plusieurs

B) Si le nombre n'existe pas (il faut remplir les étapes sur le modèle de A)

5. qu'advient-il des plusieurs eux-mêmes par rapport à eux-mêmes
6. qu'advient-il des plusieurs eux-mêmes par rapport à l'un
7. qu'advient-il de l'un par rapport à lui-même
8. qu'advient-il de 'un par rapport aux plusieurs

Si nous déplaçons le sujet des plusieurs au sujet de l'un, nous pouvons générer le tableau suivant, ce qui semblerait être un schéma de base pour la discussion du second partie du dialogue:

A) Si l'un existe

1. qu'advient-il de l'un par rapport à lui-même
2. qu'advient-il de l'un par rapport aux plusieurs
3. qu'advient-il des plusieurs eux-mêmes par rapport à eux-mêmes
4. qu'advient-il des plusieurs eux-mêmes par rapport à l'un

B) Si l'un n'existe pas

1. qu'advient-il de l'un par rapport à lui-même
2. qu'advient-il de l'un par rapport aux plusieurs
3. qu'advient-il des plusieurs eux-mêmes par rapport à eux-mêmes
4. qu'advient-il des plusieurs eux-mêmes par rapport à l'un

Dans cet article, j'examinerai si – et dans quelle mesure – la deuxième partie de *Parménide* correspond au schéma proposé par Parménide en 136a-b. Je dirai que c'est le cas, et je comparerai ma lecture à celle d'autres comptes importants, notamment ceux de McCabe et de Meinwald. Je soutiens que les idées fondamentales de leurs comptes peuvent être préservées même si nous prenons le schéma de Parménide comme nôtre guide.

Parménide poursuit en faisant une autre remarque souvent négligée, notamment que l'un – qui fait l'objet de l'étude dans l'exercice du second partie du dialogue – n'est qu'un des sujets qu'elle aurait pu choisir. Pour s'entraîner, Socrate devrait accomplir des exercices similaires, aussi sur le sujet du même et différent, du mouvement et repos, du devenir et destruction, et sur l'être et le non-être. Si j'aurais 40 minutes, j'explorerai ces exercices supplémentaires à la lumière du schéma de Parménide.

## *Diakrisis et Sugkrisis dans le Parménide*

L'un des intérêts du *Parménide* est d'offrir un témoignage sur la langue platonicienne de la participation. Ce témoignage concerne le couple de contraires que sont la *diakrisis* et la *sugkrisis*. Hérité de la physique, ce couple est employé par Platon pour désigner la dialectique non sans une certaine hésitation sur laquelle je voudrais m'interroger.

Dans la première partie du *Parménide*, la séparation ou non-participation est assimilée à ce qu'exprime le verbe « διακρίνεσθαι » (être discriminé, distingué, dissocié) comme en témoigne le passage consacré à l'aporie posée au niveau des Formes (ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἶδεσι, 129<sup>e</sup>2-3). Ce verbe est alors le contraire de « συγκεράννυσθαι » (être confondu, 129<sup>e</sup>2), un verbe assimilable à *sugkrinein* comme en témoigne par exemple le *Sophiste* (243b5-6).

Ce passage du *Parménide* retient l'attention en raison de son contexte : il concerne le vœu de Socrate de trouver une solution à l'aporie du mélange des formes, à propos duquel il use de l'expression « entrelacée en tous sens (παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένην », 130a1), dans laquelle on reconnaît la métaphore tisserande employée pour décrire la dialectique dans le *Sophiste*, la *sumplokè*. Et cette métaphore ressurgit dans le paradigme du tissage du *Politique* en relation explicite avec le couple de la *συγκριτική* et de la *διακριτική*, (282b7) à savoir les deux techniques fondamentales dont relèvent la technique de la torsion et l'entrelacement (στρεπτικόν τὸ δὲ συμπλεκτικόν, 282d5) et le cardage, de sorte que la *sumplokè* est ici assimilée à la *sugkritikè*. Assimilation étonnante, parce que si dans le *Philèbe* *diakrinein* est employé pour désigner une partie de la dialectique, Platon y évite le mot *sugkrinein*. Mais le *Philèbe* fournit peut-être une piste pour expliquer cette réticence. En effet, deux occurrences du verbe *diakrinein* concernent l'une le discernement dans l'analyse des mélanges de plaisirs et de douleurs (46b4), à savoir le fait d'examiner séparément (κρίνειν ... χωρὶς 20<sup>e</sup>1), ou encore un à un (καθ' ἕν ἕκαστον, 65b6), l'autre occurrence correspondant à la partie de la dialectique qui saisit les êtres toujours identiques à soi (περὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταῦτὸν αἰεὶ, 58a2-3), autrement dit la partie séparatrice et discriminatrice de la dialectique qui correspond, dans le paradigme du tissage du *Politique*, au cardage. Cette partie de la dialectique est examinée aussi dans le *Sophiste* : L'Étranger montrera que la diacritique mérite le nom de technique (226 c 8) de purification capable de séparer le meilleur du pire (226 d 1, 6, 9, 231b9) et le genre anonyme qui sépare le semblable du semblable (ὁμοιον ἀφ' ὁμοίου, 226d2-3). Or la dialectique du *Philèbe* ne s'arrête pas à la discrimination puisqu'elle doit aussi mélanger, selon une image orphique bien connue, « les sources » (κρήναι, 61c5), à savoir des ingrédients caractérisés par leur différence et non des éléments indifférenciés (61d1) ». Cela est confirmé par le *Sophiste* où *diakrinein* ne revient pas simplement à séparer les genres, mais à distinguer (*διακρίνειν*) selon chaque genre (κατὰ γένος), ceux qui communiquent ou non (κοινωνεῖν ἕκαστα δύναται καὶ ὅπη μή, 253<sup>e</sup>1-2). De même dans le *Timée*, l'opération de la discrimination est le préalable pour toute opération de mélange : quand le démiurge veut fabriquer la moelle, il doit d'abord séparer les triangles de leur genre propre (séparer les triangles qui donnent la terre de ceux du feu etc.) pour pouvoir les mélanger en *summetria* et confectionner la panspermie (73b6-c3). Un tel vocabulaire correspond parfaitement à celui du



*Philèbe*, où c'est le mélange (μείξις) que désignent les formes du verbe συμμειγνύναι, ce qu'on pourrait appeler plus adéquatement le « co-mélange » qui constitue la seconde opération complémentaire de la dialectique et non ce que désigne le mot *sugkrisis*.

La question est alors de comprendre pourquoi la *sumplokè* est assimilée à une *sugkritikè* dans le *Politique* et le *Parménide*. Ces dialogues ne sont-ils pas généralement considérés comme étant à l'extrême opposé l'un de l'autre dans l'évolution de la pensée de Platon ? Faut-il se contenter de mettre la réponse à cette question sur le compte de l'absence de terminologie scientifique fixe de Platon ?

L'examen du terme *sugkrisis* dans ces dialogues montre qu'il est réservé à la physique. Dans la seconde partie du *Parménide*, lors du passage mutuel de l'un au multiple, *diakrisis* est le contraire de « συγκρίνεσθαι » (être associé, condensé, 156b5). Et l'Étranger recourt à ce couple dans le *Sophiste* (243b5-6) pour qualifier l'entreprise des physiciens qui font « devenir plusieurs » ou « un ou deux » et le chaud en froid.

Cet usage physique est confirmé dans le *Timée* où le couple est exclusivement réservé aux phénomènes du monde physique, que ce soit au plan macroscopique (structure de la sensation, la vue, 67 d 6); ou au plan microscopique (structure géométrique des quatre éléments, les relations des triangles; la division et la condensation des particules, 58 b 7; poussée circulaire qui produit associations et dissociations de particules, 80 c5 etc.).

Or, dans le *Philèbe* l'unique occurrence du couple συγκρίσις / διακρίσις, 42c10) a pour contexte la détérioration de la nature qui entraîne la douleur. Il n'y a aucune autre occurrence de *sugkrisis* dans le *Philèbe*, comme pour suggérer que la *sugkrisis* n'est que l'inverse trop symétrique d'une opération qui conduit à la destruction. Elle ne fait qu'associer et condenser des choses séparées comme dans un tas. Ainsi, lors de la dissociation « διάλυσις » (32a1) des humeurs, c'est encore διάκρισις qui est synonyme de dissociation explicitement opposée à l'harmonie (31d4). On se croirait dans les descriptions des blessures du *Timée* : le feu entaille nos corps (61d7) et des maladies : la désintégration de la chair (67 d 6 ; 83<sup>e</sup>5).

Mais la *diakrisis* du *Philèbe* est opposée à leur coagulation ou congélation (πήξις) due au froid (32a7), des mots synonymes de *sugkrisis*, dans le *Timée* (πηγνύμενον est employé synonymiquement avec συγκριθὲν 49b7-c3). Et lors de la secousse de la *khôra* : les quatre genres (le feu, l'eau, la terre, l'air) sont séparés (διακρινόμενα) d'un côté et de l'autre comme les grains dans un crible ou un van (52e7) : ce qui est raréfié et léger va vers le haut et ce qui est dense et lourd va vers le bas (52e-53b). En effet, dans le *Sophiste*, διακρίνειν est synonyme de filtrer, διηθεῖν), tamiser (διαττᾶν), βράπτειν (226b6). Au lieu d'user du verbe correspondant à l'opération inverse, la *sunkrisis*, *Timée* use du verbe compresser « συνωθεῖν » (*Timée* 53a6) qui constitue un degré plus fort qu'une simple condensation (*sugkrisis*).

Or, il convient de noter que, dans le *Parménide*, pour qualifier la méthode de Parménide et Zénon au plan des choses visibles (ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς ὁρωμένοις), Socrate se contente de dire « διήλθετε » (130a1), en reprenant le verbe réservé au parcours détaillé qui caractérise selon lui la méthode de Parménide et Zénon (136e2). Ce vocabulaire qui renvoie traditionnellement au catalogue ou à la liste doit être mis en relation avec l'importance du mot *pân*, vraisemblablement le sujet sous-entendu de l'ensemble des hypothèses de la deuxième partie du *Parménide* dont le *Sophiste* montre qu'il caractérise la pensée de Parménide et dont le *Philèbe* montre qu'il ramasse en les confondant toutes choses (61d1), autrement dit réalise une *sugkrisis*.

La *sugkrisis* ne serait-elle pas alors la trace d'un résidu méréologique de la pensée de Parménide sur celle de Platon? C'est à répondre à cette question que sera consacrée notre contribution.

### *Diakrisis and Sugkrisis in the Parmenides*

One benefit of the *Parmenides* is to offer an investigative trail about Plato's primitive language of participation. This concerns a pair of opposites *diakrisis* and *sugkrisis*. Inherited from physics, this couple is used by Plato to designate dialectics but not without some hesitation.

In the first part of the *Parmenides*, separation or non-participation is assimilated to what is called "διακρίνεσθαι" (to be discriminated, distinguished, dissociated) as evidenced by the passage dedicated to the aporia of the Forms (ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἶδεσι, 129e2-3). This verb is used as the opposite of "συγκεράννυσθαι" (to be confused, 129e2), a verb assimilable to *sugkrinein* as evidenced for example by *Sophist* 243b5-6. This passage of the *Parmenides* holds the attention because of its context: it concerns the wish of Socrates to find a solution to the aporia of the mixture of the forms, about which he uses the expression "intertwined in all directions (παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένην, 130a1), in which we recognize the weaver metaphor used to describe the dialectic in the *Sophist*, *sumplokè*. This metaphor resurfaces in the paradigm of the weaving of the *Politics* in an explicit relation with συγκριτική and διακριτική, (282b7) that is to say the two fundamental techniques of which the technique of the torsion and the interlace (στρεπτικόν τὸ δὲ συμπλεκτικόν, 282d5) and carding, with the result to identifying *sumplokè* to *sugkritikè*. An astonishing assimilation, because, if, in the *Philebus*, *diakrinein* is used to designate a part of the dialectic, Plato avoids using the word *sugkrinein*. But the *Philebus* provides a track to explain this reluctance. Indeed, one of the two relevant occurrences of *diakrinein* concerns discernment in the analysis of mixtures of pleasures and pains (46b4), namely the fact of examining separately (κρίνειν ... χωρὶς 20e1), or one by one ( καθ' ἕν ἕκαστον, 65b6), the other occurrence corresponding to the part of the dialectic which grasps the being always identical to itself (περὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταῦτόν αἰ, 58a2-3), in other words the separating and discriminatory part of dialectics which corresponds, in Plato's *Statesman* to carding in the paradigm of weaving. This part of dialectics is also mentioned in the *Sophist*: The Stranger shows that *Diacritikè* deserves the name of a purifying technique (226 c 8), capable of separating the best from the worst (226 d 1, 6, 9, 231b9) and the like from the like (226d2-3). Now in the *Philebus*, dialectics do not stop at discrimination since it must, according to a well-known Orphic image, mix "the sources" (κρήναι, 61c5), namely ingredients characterized by their difference, and not mere undifferentiated elements (61d1). This is confirmed in the *Sophist* where *diakrinein* does not mean to separate the genera, but to distinguish (διακρίνειν) according to each genus (κατὰ γένος), those who communicate and those that do not (κοινωνεῖν ἕκαστα δύναται καὶ ὅπη μή, 253e1-2). Similarly in the *Timaeus*, the operation of discrimination is the prerequisite for any mixing operation: when the demiurge wants to make the marrow, he must first separate the triangles of their own kind (separate the triangles that give the earth of those of the fire etc.) to be able to mix them in *summetria* (73b6-c3). Such a vocabulary perfectly corresponds to that of the *Philebus*, where it is the mixture (μείξις) that the forms of the verb *συμμειγνύναι* refer to, more

appropriately called the "co-mixture" which constitutes the second complementary operation of the dialectic and not what the word *sugkrisis* means.

The question then is to understand why *sumplokè* is assimilated to *sugkritikè* in the *Statesman* and the *Parmenides*. Are not these dialogues generally considered to be at the opposite of each other in the evolution of Plato's thought? Is it enough to put the answer to this question on the account of Plato's lack of a fixed scientific terminology?

A look on the term *sugkrisis* in Plato's *Dialogues* shows that it is reserved to physics. In the second part of the *Parmenides*, concerned with the mutual passage from one to many, *diakrisis* is the opposite of "συγκρίνεσθαι" (to be associated, condensed, 156b5). And the Stranger resorts to this couple in the *Sophist* (243b5-6) to qualify the physicists' way of explaining how many comes out of one, and how heat turns into cold.

This physical use is confirmed in the *Timaeus* where the couple is exclusively reserved for the phenomena of the physical world, whether macroscopically (the structure of sensation, sight, 67d6); or at the microscopic level (the geometrical structure of the four elements, the relations of the triangles, the division and the condensation of the particles, 58b 7; the circular thrust which produces associations and dissociations of particles, 80c5, etc.).

Now, in the *Philebus*, the unique occurrence of the pair *συγκρίσις* / *διακρίσις* (42c10) occurs in a context of deterioration of nature that causes pain. There is no other occurrence of *sugkrisis* in the *Philebus*, so as to suggest that *sugkrisis* is only the symmetrical inverse of an operation that leads to destruction. It only associates separate things like in a pile. Thus, during the dissociation "διάλυσις" (32a1) of moods, *διακρίσις* is explicitly opposed to harmony (31d4). The same happens in the *Timaeus*' descriptions of wounds such as the fire cutting out our bodies (61d7) or those of diseases, for instance the disintegration of the flesh (67 d 6; 83e5).

But one must notice also that, in the *Philebus*, the *diakrisis* is opposed to coagulation or freezing (*πήξις*, 32a7), words synonymous with *sugkrisis*, in the *Timaeus* (*πηγνύμενον* is used synonymously with *συγκριθὲν* 49b7-c3). And during the shaking of the *khôra*: the four genera (fire, water, earth, air) are separated (*διακρινόμενα*) from one side and the other like grains in a sieve or a van (52e7): what is rarefied and light goes up and what is dense and heavy goes down (52e-53b). Indeed, in the *Sophist*, *διακρίνειν* is synonymous with filtering (*διηθεῖν*), sift (*διαττᾶν*), (226b6). Instead of using the verb corresponding to the inverse operation, *sunkrisis*, Timaeus uses the verb compress "*συνωθεῖν*" (Timaeus, 53a6) which constitutes a higher degree of condensation (*sugkrisis*).

Now, it should be noticed that in the *Parmenides*, to qualify the method of Parmenides and Zeno in the field of visible things (*ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ὁρωμένοις*), Socrates is content to say "*διήλθετε*" (130a1), taking again the verb reserved for characterizing Parmenides' and Zeno's method (136e2). This vocabulary, which traditionally refers to catalogs or lists, must be related to the word *Pan*, presumably the subject implied by all the hypotheses of the second part of the *Parmenides*, a word of which the *Philebus* shows that it means picking up things by confusing them all (61d1), making in other words a *sugkrisis* of everything.

Would not *sugkrisis* then be the verbal trace of a mereological residue of Parmenides' thought on Plato's? It is to answer this question that our contribution will be devoted.

*On the second part of Plato's Parmenides: hypothesis and the inconsistencies of the first two deductions*

Richard Robinson in his paper 'Plato's *Parmenides*. II'<sup>1</sup> holds that Plato's hope for human reason seems less high in the *Parmenides* than in earlier dialogues. He points out that the theory of Form here is not an eminently reasonable hypothesis as it was in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*. Besides, the method of hypothesis is severely lamed by the discovery that a hypothesis and its contradictory may both lead to absurdities. Consequently, it is no longer sufficient to establish a proposition merely by deducing a falsehood from its contradictory. Thus, he concludes that his observations perhaps explains why we hear no more of this method after the *Parmenides*.

Is his conclusion true? I tend to reject his dismissal of the *Parmenides*' methodological contribution. A proper reading of the *Parmenides* (134c9-137c3) is the key to understanding the hypothetical method in the dialogue. Following Meinwald and Sayre, I take it to be the precondition to interpret the deductions as the rational responses to the problems including the 'Greatest Difficulty' of the first part. More specifically, I think it will also give clues to explain and eliminate the inconsistencies between the first deduction (137c-142a) and the second deduction (142b-155e). By doing this, we can refute Robinson's criticism that the hypothesis proposed for the deductions is vague. Moreover, we can justify the methodological value of the second part of the *Parmenides* and comprehensively respond to Robinson's underestimate of its role in both reasoning and method, with his paper focusing on this part of the dialogue where he finds the examples bewildering and absurd.

The investigation of the second part of the *Parmenides* will contribute to enriching our understanding of Plato's application of hypothesis, by extending the general discussion on the method of hypothesis from the *Meno*, *Phaedo* and *Republic*. This possibility is often ignored by those commentators who agree that the reflections in the *Parmenides* merely achieve fulfilment in later dialogues. I want to reconsider the metaphysical framework from this part that may support Plato's views on knowledge stated in other dialogues. For instance, in the *Meno*, Socrates resorts to the knowledge without an explicit appeal to the theory of Form. In the *Theaetetus*, Socrates is seeking the definition of knowledge without explicitly appealing to the Form. Cornford argues that the exclusion of the Form is a strategy to learn how we might address the problem of knowledge without the forms. There is another interesting point to connect the hypothesis for the second part of the *Parmenides* to the three dialogues as above. Robinson points out that the *Parmenides* gives another way of doing what elenchus does in the early dialogues. In other words, what the second part demonstrates is the elenchus of the philosopher, who thought himself beyond the need of elenchus. Does it make sense to the practice of the hypothesis in this part? It is worth a warrant with an analysis of the *Parmenides* 135e9-136a2.

Furthermore, I would like to question Robinson's analysis of the unity of the *Parmenides*. He argues that not only the second part but the whole of the *Parmenides* is only an exercise in method. In the light of this, the dialogue is a unity This analysis seems to standardly take the

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<sup>1</sup> Robinson, R. 'Plato's Parmenides. II', *Classical Philology*, 37 (1942):159–186.

deductions to be purely aporetic that aim at perplexing and challenging the readers, not providing a training in the sense of resolving the problems internally within the deductions and externally from the first part of the *Parmenides*. I will defend a more positive interpretation of the deductions. I want to offer an explanation of why the deductions take the form as they do now, by focusing on the reconstructions of the first and second deductions as good reasoning.

Forms are the objects of knowledge. My main claim is that the epistemic access to forms can be acquired by alleviating or even eliminating the inconsistencies of the first two deductions. Initially, I will clarify the relation between the two explanations of ‘dialectic’ exemplified at 135c. It is also worth clarifying that the current goal of resolving the problems of the first part of the *Parmenides* is to fulfil the forms’ explanatory role instead of rescuing them in all aspects. Taking the dilemma of participation as an example, my proposal is to demonstrate how the first two deductions shed light on an alternative view of the conception of unity. After all, I argue that understanding the first two deductions is crucial in order to understand the rest of the deductions. I aim to resolve the problem of the inconsistency of the hypothesis regarding the “one” of the deduction 1 and that of the rest of the deductions. Among the rest of the deductions, especially I aim to show that the hypothesis of the deduction 1 is consistent with the beginning of the deduction 2. I argue that Meinwald’s emendation for the case that the hypothesis at 137b4 is formally different from the deductions is not a satisfactory resolution. I will prove that the hypothesis for the deductions does not change compared with that of 136b4. Moreover, I argue that the dispute on this inconsistency does not mean that the hypothesis has a closer link with the first part of the *Parmenides*. To set out the analysis, I am with the dominance of the predicative interpretation (*‘if it is one’*) since I will prove that it fits better into the explanation of the rival consequences of the first two deductions. That is, *‘if one is’* in the deduction 2 can be read as a predicative statement about the one. In this regard, we understand that Plato deliberately draws a distinction between the respective objects of the two deductions. It reminds us to reexamine what the one is as well as the relation between the one and many. I will conduct the reexamination by comparing between the deduction 1 and 8. Through the reexamination, I maintain that the form of unity, neither a part nor a composition of parts, is accountable for the structure and unity of the others. It unifies the things but never functions as involving a quantitative relation. It will become more evident by endorsing the analysis of the hypothesis practised in the first deduction. Besides, it is the second hypothesis rather than the first one that leads to the differentiation between the two deductions regarding the one and the properties.

My attempts of establishing the conception of unity and interpreting the relations of the two deductions are completed together with my analysis of the dialectic method endorsing hypothesis in the second part of the *Parmenides*. While the conception of unity has its epistemological significance linking to other dialogues, I find the method here consisting of different ways of applying hypothesis so it is not necessary to draw a distinct line between the lateral and veridical application of the hypothesis only in this part.

*Sur la seconde partie de Parménide de Platon : hypothèse et incohérences des deux premières déductions*

Il y'a au moins trois bonnes raisons pour que je dévoile la signification épistémologique de la deuxième partie du *Parménide* de Platon. Tout d'abord, j'espère reconsidérer le cadre métaphysique à partir de cette partie qui pourrait étayer les vues de la connaissance de Platon sur les dialogues de différentes périodes. Par exemple, Socrate, dans le *Ménon*, propose ce qu'est la connaissance mais ne donne pas d'appel explicite à la théorie de la forme intelligible comme prévu ; et dans le *Théétète*, se manifeste également désireux de répondre à la même question, sans succès. Cornford soutient que l'exclusion des formes intelligibles constitue une stratégie pour apprendre comment nous aborderions le problème de la connaissance sans formes intelligibles. Richard Robinson défend dans son article « sur la deuxième partie de *Parménide* »<sup>1</sup> que l'espoir de Platon pour l'être humain semble moins fort dans le *Parménide*, tout en mettant en évidence que la théorie de la forme intelligible ici n'est pas une hypothèse éminemment raisonnable comme elle fût dans le *Phédon* et la *Republic*. En outre, la méthode de l'hypothèse est sévèrement entachée par la découverte qu'une hypothèse et ses contradictions conduiraient toutes aux absurdités, de manière à ce qu'il ne suffit plus d'établir une proposition seulement en déduisant un faux à partir de son contradictoire. Il conclut donc que ses observations expliqueraient pourquoi on n'entend plus parler de la méthode à la suite du *Parménide*.

Mais sa conclusion est-elle la vérité ? Une lecture propre de 134c9-137c3 est la clé pour comprendre la méthode hypothétique dans le dialogue. C'est la condition préalable pour interpréter les déductions comme des réponses rationnelles pour les problèmes, y compris la difficulté majeure (l'aporie) de la première partie. De même, ça nous donnera des indications pour expliquer et éliminer les inconsistances entre la première déduction et la seconde déduction. En faisant cela, on peut réfuter le criticisme de Robinson, qui constate que l'hypothèse est vague.

Je suppose au contraire que l'investigation de la deuxième partie du *Parménide* contribuera à enrichir notre compréhension sur l'application de l'hypothèse de Platon en prolongeant la discussion générale sur la méthode de l'hypothèse dans la forme intelligible précédente du *Ménon*, *Phédon* et *République*. Cette possibilité est trop souvent ignorée par les commentateurs qui sont enclins à accepter que les réflexions dans le *Parménide* ne font que s'accomplir dans les dialogues ultérieurs. À travers cela, on peut en plus justifier la valeur méthodologique de la seconde partie du *Parménide* et répondre largement à la sous-estimation de Robinson sur son rôle en matière de raisonnement et de méthode dans son article axé sur cette partie du dialogue où il trouve des exemples déroutants et absurdes. Il y a un autre point intéressant dans l'article de Robinson qui m'inspire à m'accorder une importance sur l'hypothèse pour la deuxième partie du *Parménide* et à proposer de la relier aux trois dialogues ci-dessus. Robinson souligne dans son article que le *Parménide* donne une autre façon de faire ce que l'elenchus fait dans les premiers dialogues. En d'autres termes, ce que la deuxième partie démontre, c'est l'elenchus du philosophe, qui se croyait au-delà du besoin de l'elenchus ? Est-ce que cela a un sens pour la pratique de l'hypothèse dans cette partie ?

Par ailleurs, Robinson défend que non seulement la deuxième partie mais aussi tout le *Parménide* n'est qu'un exercice de la méthode. À la lumière de cela, le dialogue est une unité. Je m'empêche de douter de cette analyse sur l'unité du *Parménide* comme moins exacte et

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1 Robinson, R. 'Plato's Parmenides. II', *Classical Philology*, 37 (1942):159-186.

convaincante. Il semble que cette analyse considère ces déductions aporétiques dans le but de déconcerter et de défier les lecteurs, au lieu de fournir une formation dans le sens de résoudre les problèmes appartenant apparemment à la première partie du *Parménide* mais inhérents aux déductions. Je défendrai l'interprétation plus positive des déductions. « Une réponse rationnelle », affirme Rickless. J'espère fournir des réponses rationnelles directement aux problèmes métaphysiques et épistémologiques dérivés de la première partie du *Parménide*, et indirectement aux questions de la connaissance du *Ménon* et *Théétète*. Je voudrais expliquer pourquoi les déductions se présentent sous la forme actuelle, en mettant mon accent sur la reconstruction des premières et deuxième déductions en tant que raisonnements valables.

Les formes intelligibles sont l'objet de la connaissance. Ma principale revendication consiste à ce que l'accès épistémologique aux formes intelligibles peut être acquis à travers l'atténuation, voire même l'élimination des incohérences des deux premières déductions. Au départ, je clarifierai la relation entre les deux explications de la « dialectique » illustrées en 135c. Il convient également de préciser que l'objectif actuel de résoudre les problèmes de la première partie du *Parménide* est de satisfaire au rôle explicatif des formes intelligibles au lieu de les sauver à tout prix. Prenant le dilemme de participation comme exemple, une solution réalisable dans ma proposition est de démontrer comment les deux premières déductions éclairent un autre point de vue sur la conception de l'unité. Après tout, comprendre les deux premières déductions est censé crucial pour comprendre le reste des déductions. Et j'insiste sur ce qu'au moins de nombreuses contradictions et incohérences entre les deux premières déductions au centre d'intérêt des commentateurs peuvent être éliminées à juste titre dans mon interprétation. Pour l'analyse, j'adhère à l'interprétation prédicative (« L'Un, c'est l'Un »), parce qu'elle répond mieux à l'explication des conséquences rivales des deux premières déductions. C'est-à-dire, (« L'Un est ») dans la déduction 2 peut être lu comme une expression prédicative à propos de la première. À cet égard, on comprend que Platon fait la différence thématique entre l'un et multiple. À travers le réexamen, je maintiens que la forme intelligible de l'unité, ni tout ni partie, est responsable de la structure et de l'unité des autres. Elle unifie les choses mais ne fonctionne jamais comme une relation quantitative. Elle deviendra plus évidente en approuvant l'analyse de l'hypothèse utilisée dans la première déduction. À part ça, c'est plutôt la deuxième hypothèse que la première qui conduit à la différenciation entre les deux déductions concernant l'une et les propriétés.

Mes tentatives d'établir la conception de l'unité et d'interpréter les relations entre les deux déductions s'achèvent spontanément avec mon analyse sur la méthode dialectique concernant l'hypothèse dans la deuxième partie du *Parménide*. Alors que la conception de l'unité jouit de sa signification épistémologique liée aux autres dialogues, je trouve que la méthode se compose de différentes manières d'appliquer une hypothèse, il n'est pas donc nécessaire de tracer une ligne distincte entre l'application latérale et verticale de l'hypothèse.

### *En tant que dans le Parménide*

L'opérateur *qua* permet d'indiquer sous quel rapport quelque chose est dit de quelque chose d'autre ; il peut être exprimé par exemple par le datif grec  $\eta\acute{\iota}$  ou l'expression française « en tant que » (voir Bäck: 1996). Dans sa somme consacrée aux propriétés logiques de cet opérateur, Allan Bäck commence par les *Premiers Analytiques* d'Aristote et mentionne à peine Platon. Cette omission s'accorde avec l'interprétation de commentateurs comme Grégory Vlastos qui estiment que le type de rapports introduit par l'opérateur *en tant que* est tout simplement incompatible avec les Formes platoniciennes : puisque une Forme *F* est supposée être toujours *F* et jamais non-*F* (voir, par exemple, *Banquet* 211a), on voit mal en effet comment elle pourrait être dite *F* sous un certain rapport et non-*F* sous un autre (Vlastos : 1981). Même dans le *Sophiste* où Platon soutient que les Formes sont stables car elles sont objets de connaissance (249b-c), il ne dit jamais que le Changement est stable *en tant qu'*il est un Forme. Dans cette optique, Platon semblerait complètement ignorer la possibilité d'appliquer l'opérateur *en tant que* aux Formes. Mon objectif dans cette intervention est de démontrer la fausseté de ce diagnostic en ce qui concerne le *Parménide*. Dans la première partie (1), je chercherai à rassembler des preuves textuelles indiquant que Platon applique l'opérateur *en tant que* à la Forme de l'Un dans le seconde chaîne déductive résultant de l'hypothèse « si l'Un est » (DII) (sur l'Un comme Forme dans le *Parménide*, voir Walker : 1938 ; pour une interprétation opposée, voir Brisson : 1994). Dans la seconde partie (2), j'interpréterai ces preuves et expliquerai la fonction de l'*en tant que* dans la seconde moitié du dialogue (135d-166c).

(1) Le résultat de la seconde chaîne déductive résultant de l'hypothèse « si l'Un est » (142b-155e) consiste à montrer que l'Un tout à la fois est *F* est con-*F* pour une série de valeurs de *F* (où con-*F* désigne la propriété contraire de *F* ; pour cette terminologie, voir Rickless : 2007). Je me concentrerai particulièrement sur trois arguments de cette chaîne déductive. Dans le premier (a), Parménide montre que l'Un est en soi et en autrui (145b-e). L'argument, dont j'exposerai en détail la logique dans ma présentation orale, repose sur le fait que Parménide a montré antérieurement en DII que l'Un possède des parties et est un tout (142c-d) et que différentes conceptions de la relation entre tout et parties sont en concurrence dans DII (voir Harte : 2002). Ainsi, *en tant que* ( $\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ , 145e3) tout distinct de ses parties, l'Un n'est pas en soi et est donc en autrui. Cependant, *en tant que* ( $\eta\acute{\iota}$ , 145e4) totalité des parties identique au tout, l'Un est en soi. Dans le second argument (b) (147c-148d), Parménide soutient que, puisque l'Un et les autres sont différents l'un de l'autre, ils sont affectés de la même façon (par la Différence). Mais être affecté de la même façon n'est rien d'autre qu'être semblable à quelque chose. Par conséquent, *en tant que* ( $\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ H1, 148a4) l'Un et les autres sont différents, ils sont semblables l'un à l'autre. Cependant la Différence est le contraire de l'Identité. Donc, ce qui est identique est dans une condition contraire à ce qui est différent. Comme ce qui est différent est semblable (comme on vient de le montrer), ce qui est identique est dissemblable. Or Parménide a montré un peu plus tôt que l'Un est identique aux autres (146d-147b). Il s'en suit donc qu'*en tant que* ( $\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ H1, 148b3) l'Un est identique aux autres, il leur est dissemblable. (Cet argument est suivi d'un appendice que j'explorerai davantage lors de ma



présentation). Le troisième argument **(c)** (154a-155c) présuppose que l'Un est plus vieux que les autres (153a-b). Puisque la différence entre deux termes demeure constante quand une quantité égale leur est ajoutée ( $(a + m) - (b + m) = a - b$ , appelons cette relation « R1 »), l'Un ne devient ni plus vieux ni plus jeune que les autres quand une quantité égale de temps leur est ajoutée. Mais, puisque d'autre part, le rapport entre deux termes  $a$  et  $b$ , où  $a$  est plus grand que  $b$ , diminue lorsqu'une quantité égale leur est ajoutée (si  $a > b$ , alors  $(a+m) : (b+m) < a : b$ , appelons cette relation « R2 » ; voir Allen: 1983), l'Un devient plus jeune que les autres et les autres deviennent plus vieux que l'Un quand une quantité égale de temps leur est ajoutée. Autrement dit, *qua* R1, l'Un ne devient pas plus jeune que les autres, mais *qua* R2, il devient plus jeune qu'eux (cf. les deux  $\xi$  en 155b4-c4). Ce dernier cas est sans doute légèrement plus complexe que les deux précédents puisque les rapports selon lesquels les prédicats « plus jeune » et « plus vieux » sont attribués (ou non) à l'Un sont eux-mêmes des relations mathématiques. On notera également qu'ici l'opérateur *en tant que* s'applique aussi aux autres (et donc, peut-être, aux autres Formes). Dans tous les cas, les arguments **(a)-(c)** démontrent que l'opérateur *en tant que* est bien appliqué à l'Un dans la seconde moitié du *Parménide*. Voyons à présent la fonction de cet opérateur.

(2) Il existe au moins deux approches concurrentes pour interpréter le sens général de la seconde moitié du *Parménide* (voir Gill: 2012). Pour certains commentateurs, les différentes chaînes déductives présentent de véritables antinomies. Par exemple, il y a un conflit direct entre la première chaîne déductive (137c-142a), selon laquelle si l'Un est, alors il est ni  $F$  ni  $\text{con-}F$  pour un certain nombre de valeurs de  $F$ , et la seconde chaîne déductive selon laquelle si l'Un est, il est à la fois  $F$  et  $\text{con-}F$  pour ces mêmes valeurs. Ces antinomies auraient pour fonction de faire prendre conscience au lecteur (ou à Socrate ou à un Platon plus jeune) de la nécessité d'abandonner certaines présuppositions au sujet des Formes (Rickless : 2007) ou de l'Un comme sujet de prédications (Ryle : 1939). D'autres commentateurs (« non-antinomistes ») estiment au contraire que le conflit opposant les différentes chaînes déductives n'est qu'apparent et qu'il est neutralisé lorsque l'on prend conscience que les différentes chaînes déductives ne portent pas sur le même sujet (cf. l'approche néoplatonicienne) ou que les prédicats  $F$  et  $\text{con-}F$  qui sont attribués – ou non – à l'Un le sont tantôt d'un point de vue définitionnel (*pros heauto*) tantôt du point de vue de la prédication ordinaire (*pros ta alla*) (voir Meinwald : 1991). Cependant, pour être véritablement couronnée de succès, la stratégie non-antinomiste se doit de dissiper non seulement les conflits entre les différentes chaînes déductives, mais aussi ceux survenant *au sein même* d'une chaîne déductive donnée (Peterson: 1996). Il est en effet impossible pour l'Un d'être à la fois  $F$  et  $\text{con-}F$  sans violer le principe de non-contradiction. Cependant, comme le montre ma première partie pour certaines valeurs de  $F$  au moins, ce n'est *pas en tant que* la même chose que l'Un est  $F$  et  $\text{con-}F$ . L'opérateur *en tant que* apparaît donc comme un outil puissant permettant de désamorcer les contradictions apparentes au sein d'une chaîne déductive de la seconde moitié du dialogue. En ce sens, mon intervention permet un pas supplémentaire vers une lecture totalement non-antinomiste de la seconde moitié du *Parménide*.

### *Qua operator in the Parmenides*

*Qua* connectives or operators are the devices that enable to focus on the respect according to which something is said of something else; they are indicated by linguistic expressions such as the Greek dative  $\xi$  or the English 'in so far as' (see Bäck: 1996). In his impressive monograph on the logical properties of *qua* connectives, Allan Bäck starts with Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* and

says almost nothing about Plato. In omitting Plato from his story, he is in line with scholars like Gregory Vlastos who argue that Plato's Forms are simply incompatible with the type of qualifications introduced by *qua* connectives: since the Form of *F*-ness is always *F* and never not-*F* (see e.g. *Symposium* 211a), how could we say, for instance, that *F* is *F* in some respects, but not-*F* in others (Vlastos: 1981)? Even in the *Sophist* where Plato argues that Forms are stable because they are objects of knowledge (249b-c), Plato never explicitly says that Change rests *qua* Form or *insofar as* it is a Form. He seems to ignore altogether the possibility to apply *qua* connectives to Forms. In this talk, I argue that this diagnosis is not correct for the *Parmenides*. In the first part (1), I gather textual evidence in order to prove that Parmenides applies the *qua* operator to the Form of the One in the second Deduction (DII) of his exercise (for the One as a Form in the *Parmenides*, see e.g. Walker: 1938; for an opposite view, see Brisson: 1994). In the second part (2), I interpret my textual evidence and explain the function of *qua* connectives in the overall strategy of the second part of the dialogue.

(1) On any interpretation, the outcome of DII (142b-155e) is that, if the One is, it is both *F* and con-*F* for various values of *F* (where con-*F* is the property contrary to being *F*, see Rickless: 2007 for the terminology). I will focus particularly on three arguments. In the first **(a)**, Parmenides argues that the One is both in itself and in others (145b-e). This argument, whose complicated logic I will unpack in my presentation, relies on the fact that Parmenides showed earlier in DII that the One has parts and is a whole (142c-d) and that different views of the relationship between wholes and parts are competing in DII (see Harte: 2002). Taken as (ἕΗι, 145e3) a whole different from its parts, the One is not in itself and therefore is in another; but taken as (ἕῆ, 145e4) all the parts identical with the whole, the One is in itself. In the second argument that interests me **(b)** (147c-148d), Parmenides argues that since the One and the others are both different, they are affected in the same way (by Difference). But being affected in the same way is being like each other. So, insofar as (ἕΗι, 148a4) the One and the others are different, they are like each other. Now Difference and Identity are opposite. So what is different is in an opposite condition to what is identical. Since being different from something is being like this thing (as it has just been shown), being identical to something is being unlike this thing. But Parmenides showed prior to (b) that the One is identical to the others (146d-147b). Therefore in so far (ἕΗι, 148b3) as the One is identical to the others, it is unlike them. (This argument has a *coda* that complicates the matter but I leave it for my oral presentation). The third argument **(c)** (154a-155c) builds on the fact that the One has proved to be older than the others (153a-b). Since the difference between two terms remains constant when an equal quantity is added to them ( $(a + m) - (b + m) = a - b$ , call this 'R1' for Relation 1), the One does not *become* older or younger than the others when an equal quantity of time is added to both of them. Since, on the other hand, the ratio between two terms *a* and *b*, where *a* is greater than *b*, decreases when an equal quantity is added to them (if  $a > b$ , then  $(a+m) : (b+m) < a : b$ , call this 'R2' and see Allen: 1983 for discussions), the One becomes younger than the others and the others older than the one when an equal quantity of time is added to them. So *qua* R1, the One does not become younger than the others, but *qua* R2, it does (see the two ἕῆ at 155b4-c4). This case is slightly more complicated than the two first, because the respects according to which the predicates 'younger' or 'older' are attributed or not attributed to the One are themselves mathematical relationships. Note also that, here, the *qua* operator holds for the others as well (perhaps, then, the other Forms). In any case, **(a)-(c)** offer ample evidence that the *qua* connectives are applied to the One in DII of the *Parmenides*. Let us now turn to the interpretation of the role of these connectives.

(2) There are (at least) two competitive approaches for understanding the overall meaning of *Parmenides*' second half (see Gill: 2012). Some scholars consider that the opposing deductions about the One present real antinomies. For instance, there is a direct conflict between the First Deduction (137c-142a), according to which if the One is, then it is not *F* and not *con-F* for various values of *F*, and the second Deduction according to which if the One is, it *is* both *F* and *con-F* for the same values of *F*. These antinomies would then force the reader (or Socrates or a younger Plato) to give up specific assumptions about the Forms (Rickless: 2007) or about the One as a subject of predication (Ryle: 1939). Other scholars (call them the 'non-antinomists') think that the conflicts between opposing deductions are merely apparent. They argue that these conflicts can be neutralized once we realized either that the subjects of the different conflicting deductions are not the same (it is the Neo-Platonists' approach) or that the many values of *F* and *con-F* are attributed (or not attributed) to the One sometimes from a definitional point of view (*pros beauto*) sometimes from the point of view of ordinary predication (*pros ta alla*) (see Meinwald: 1991). Nevertheless, in order to be completely successful, the strategy of the non-antinomists must not only show that the conflicts *between* the deductions are only apparent, but also that the conflicts *inside* a given deduction are only apparent (see Peterson: 1996). It is indeed impossible without violating the law of non-contradiction for the One to be both *F* and *con-F* as it is supposed to be the case in DII. However, as my first part shows, for some values of *F* and *con-F* at least, it is not *qua* the same thing that the One is *F* and *con-F*. It then turns out that the *qua* operator is a powerful tool for dissolving apparent contradictions *inside* a deductive chain of the second part of the *Parmenides*. For this reason, my talk will contribute to an overall non-antinomist reading of the *Parmenides*' second half.

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