VIRAL LOADS
Anthropologies of urgency in the
time of COVID-19
Edited by Lenore Manderson,
Nancy J. Burke and Ayo Wahlberg
Viral Loads
EMBODYING INEQUALITIES: PERSPECTIVES FROM MEDICAL
ANTHROPOLOGY
Series Editors
Sahra Gibbon, UCL Anthropology
Jennie Gamlin, UCL Institute for Global Health
This series charts diverse anthropological engagements with the changing
dynamics of health and wellbeing in local and global contexts. It includes
ethnographic and theoretical works that explore the different ways
in which inequalities pervade our bodies. The series offers novel
contributions often neglected by classical and contemporary publications
that draw on public, applied, activist, cross-disciplinary and engaged
anthropological methods, as well as in-depth writings from the field. It
specifically seeks to showcase new and emerging health issues that are
the products of unequal global development.
Viral Loads
Anthropologies of urgency in
the time of COVID-19
Edited by
Lenore Manderson, Nancy J. Burke
and Ayo Wahlberg
First published in 2021 by
UCL Press
University College London
Gower Street
London WC1E 6BT
Available to download free: www.uclpress.co.uk
Collection © Editors, 2021
Text © Contributors, 2021
Images © Contributors and copyright holders named in captions, 2021
The authors have asserted their rights under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act
1988 to be identified as the authors of this work.
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Manderson, L., Burke, N.J. and Wahlberg, A. (eds). 2021. Viral Loads: Anthropogies
of urgency in the time of COVID-19. London: UCL Press. https://doi.org/10.14324/
111.9781800080232
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ISBN: 978-1-80008-025-6 (Hbk.)
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.14324/111.9781800080232
Contents
List of figures
List of tables
List of contributors
Acknowledgements
ix
xi
xiii
xxi
1 Introduction: stratified livability and pandemic effects
Ayo Wahlberg, Nancy J. Burke and Lenore Manderson
1
Part I: The power of the state
2 Care in the time of COVID-19: surveillance, creativity and
sociolismo in Cuba
Nancy J. Burke
27
3 Militarising the pandemic: lockdown in South Africa
Lenore Manderson and Susan Levine
47
4 Rights, responsibilities and revelations: COVID-19 conspiracy
theories and the state
Elisa J. Sobo and Elżbieta Drążkiewicz
67
Part II: Exclusion and blame
5 The 2020 Los Angeles uprisings: fighting for Black lives in the
midst of COVID-19
Hanna Garth
91
6 The biopolitics of COVID-19 in the UK: racism, nationalism
and the afterlife of colonialism
Jennie Gamlin, Sahra Gibbon and Melania Calestani
108
7 The shroud stealers: coronavirus and the viral vagility
of prejudice
Aditya Bharadwaj
128
CONTENTS
v
8 Unprecedented times? Romanian Roma and discrimination
during the COVID-19 pandemic
Cristina A. Pop
9 Turkey’s Diyanet and political Islam during the pandemic
Oğuz Alyanak
10 Citizen vector: scapegoating within communal boundaries
in Senegal during the COVID-19 pandemic
Ato Kwamena Onoma
147
162
181
Part III: Unequal burdens
11 Pandemic policy responses and embodied realities among
‘waste-pickers’ in India
Surekha Garimella, Shrutika Murthy, Lana Whittaker
and Rachel Tolhurst
201
12 The amplification effect: impacts of COVID-19 on
sexual and reproductive health and rights in Indonesia
Linda Rae Bennett and Setiyani Marta Dewi
222
13 Vulnerabilities within and beyond the pandemic: disability
in COVID-19 Brazil
Claudia Fonseca and Soraya Fleischer
243
14 ‘You are putting my health at risk’: genes, diets and
bioethics under COVID-19 in Mexico
Abril Saldaña-Tejeda
260
15 Scarcity and resilience in the slums of Dhaka city,
Bangladesh
Sabina Faiz Rashid, Selima Kabir, Kim Ozano, Sally Theobald,
Bachera Aktar and Aisha Siddika
281
Part IV: The reach of care
16 Making do: COVID-19 and the improvisation of care in the
UK and US
Ellen Block and Cecilia Vindrola-Padros
17 Carescapes unsettled: COVID-19 and the reworking
of ‘stable illnesses’ in welfare state Denmark
Sofie Rosenlund Lau, Marie Kofod Svensson,
Natasja Kingod and Ayo Wahlberg
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VIRAL LOADS
303
324
18 Care within or out of reach: fantasies of care and
connectivity in the time of the COVID-19 pandemic
Earvin Charles Cabalquinto and Tanja Ahlin
344
19 Pandemic times in a WhatsApp-ed nation: gender
ideologies in India during COVID-19
Haripriya Narasimhan, Mahati Chittem and Pooja Purang
362
20 Purity’s dangers: at the interstices of religion and
public health in Israel
Tsipy Ivry and Sarah Segal-Katz
384
Part V: Lessons for a future
21 Fracturing the pandemic: the logic of separation and
infectious disease in Tanzania
Rebecca Marsland
409
22 Living together in precarious times: COVID-19 in the
Philippines
Gideon Lasco
427
23 COVID-19 in Italy: a new culture of healthcare for future
preparedness
Chiara Bodini and Ivo Quaranta
443
Index
456
CONTENTS
vii
List of figures
3.1
6.1
11.1
11.2
14.1
14.2
14.3
14.4
15.1
17.1
19.1
19.2
19.3
19.4
19.5
19.6
19.7
19.8
20.1
Land invasion
Handmade banner supporting the National
Health Service (NHS)
Sifting and collection of recyclables
Policy screening flow
Caricature about obesity
Caricature about obesity
Caricature designed to educate children
Caricature designed to educate children
An adolescent prepares snacks in Dhaka
Health Minister Magnus Heunicke urging Danes to
‘flatten the curve’
When ur maid comes back after lockdown
With wives burdened, men want helpers back
When your mother is not cooking various dishes
during lockdown
Work from home
Dear Tummy
After three months of quarantine
The lockdown is to keep everyone safe and healthy
The social distance
Immersion pool in a mikveh in Haifa
59
114
202
208
268
269
269
270
290
325
368
369
371
373
374
374
375
375
390
LIST OF FIGURES
ix
List of tables
11.1
Inclusion and exclusion criteria
207
LIST OF TABLES
xi
List of contributors
Tanja Ahlin is a Lecturer in Anthropology and Science and Technology
Studies at the University of Amsterdam. For her doctoral research, she
conducted fieldwork in India and Oman on how digital technologies
shape care at a distance in Indian transnational families of nurses. She is
currently examining how communication technologies influence deaf and
hard-of-hearing people’s belonging and socialities. http://tanjaahlin.com/
Bachera Aktar is Assistant Director, Center of Excellence for Gender,
Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights in the James P. Grant School
of Public Health, BRAC University, Dhaka, Bangladesh, and has particular
interest in food and nutrition, health inequity and the social determinants
of health. She has over 11 years of experience of implementing public
health programmes and research in rural and urban areas in Bangladesh.
Oğuz Alyanak is Volkswagen Foundation Postdoctoral Fellow at the
University of Göttingen, Germany, and editorial assistant of social media
for Medical Anthropology. His dissertation was on Muslim men’s night
lives at the Franco-German borderland. He is now exploring occupational
injuries and illnesses among Turkish immigrants in Europe.
Linda Rae Bennett is a medical anthropologist and Associate Professor
at the Nossal Institute for Global Health, the University of Melbourne,
with 25 years of ethnographic experience researching sexual and
reproductive health and rights, gender-based violence and health
inequities in Indonesia.
Aditya Bharadwaj is Professor of Anthropology and Sociology at the
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva.
His current research examines infertility, childlessness and healthcare
seeking in resource-poor settings in Nepal and India.
Ellen Block is an Associate Professor of Anthropology in the Sociology
Department at the College of St Benedict and St John’s University in
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
xiii
Minnesota. Her work focuses on the intersections of health, kinship and
care in sub-Saharan Africa and the United States. Her current project
examines the professional and interpersonal effects of COVID-19 on
healthcare providers in the US. She is co-author of Infected Kin: Orphan
care and AIDS in Lesotho (2019).
Chiara Bodini is at the Centre for International and Intercultural
Health, University of Bologna, and specialises in infectious diseases
and in public health. Her work focuses on health inequalities and the
social determinants of health, and on the role of social movements and
community participation in health promotion and healthcare delivery.
Nancy J. Burke is Professor of Public Health and Anthropology and
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Endowed Chair,
University of California, Merced. She also serves as Co-Director of the
UC-Cuba Academic Initiative. Her current research includes projects
focused on ageing in Cuba, syndemic care for high-cost, high-utilising
safety-net patients in the United States, and cancer patient navigation
programmes in US public hospitals.
Earvin Charles Cabalquinto is a Lecturer in Communication in the
School of Communication and Creative Arts at Deakin University, and a
member of the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation.
He is interested in mobile intimacy and the digitalisation of both domestic
and public spaces. He is currently investigating how elderly people from
Culturally and Linguistically Diverse (CALD) backgrounds in Melbourne,
Australia, forge and sustain relationships among their close and distant
support networks. http://www.ecabalquinto.com.
Melania Calestani is Senior Lecturer at Kingston and St George’s,
University of London. She has carried out fieldwork on social/cultural
constructions of wellbeing and health in Andean Bolivia with indigenous
communities. In the UK, she has conducted ethnographic research on
processes of decision-making in the NHS. https://www.kingston.ac.uk/
staff/profile/dr-melania-calestani-871/.
Mahati Chittem is an Associate Professor of Health and Medical
Psychology in the Department of Liberal Arts at the Indian Institute of
Technology Hyderabad (IITH), Hyderabad, India. Her research interests
lie in chronic disease management, including doctor–patient–family
communication, end-of-life decision-making, and adherence to doctors’
recommendations, and in cultural contexts of health behaviours,
primarily diet, exercise and sex.
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VIRAL LOADS
Setiyani Marta Dewi is a sexual and reproductive health (SRH)
practitioner with 12 years of experience in SRH education and service
provision for vulnerable populations including female sex workers, street
youth, LGBTQI+ individuals and school-based adolescents in Indonesia.
Elżbieta Drążkiewicz is a Senior Research Fellow at the Slovak Academy
of Sciences, and specialises in organisational, political and economic
anthropology. Her research includes studies of foreign aid and development
management, public health governance and education systems. She is an
author of Institutionalised Dreams: The art of managing foreign aid.
Soraya Fleischer is a Professor in the Department of Anthropology,
University of Brasília, Brazil, currently studying the aftermath of the Zika
epidemic in northeast Brazil. She hosts Mundaréu (https://mundareu.
labjor.unicamp.br), a podcast aimed at bringing anthropology to a wider
public. http://lattes.cnpq.br/4854939558671572.
Claudia Fonseca is Professor of Anthropology at the Federal University
of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. She has conducted research on leprosy,
including questions of care, patient activism, stigma and deficiency. She
is presently engaged with lower-income urban families, examining the
interaction between community, kin networks and public policies for
the care of dependent members of the household.
Jennie Gamlin is Associate Professor at the UCL Institute for Global
Health and deputy director of the Centre for Gender and Global Health.
She teaches Critical Anthropology of Global Health and Gender and
Global Health. Jennie’s current research explores the coloniality of
gender and maternal health in Mexican Wixárika communities. She has
lived and worked in Mexico for extended periods. https://iris.ucl.ac.uk/
iris/browse/profile?upi=JBGAM46.
Surekha Garimella is a Senior Research Fellow leading the Accountability
for Informal Urban Equity Hub (ARISE) at The George Institute for Global
Health India (TGI). Her interdisciplinary background is in nutrition,
applied economics and public health; her present research includes
gendered health systems, ethics of research practice, political economy
and accountability.
Hanna Garth is a sociocultural and medical anthropologist at Princeton
University, specialising in the anthropology of food. Her work addresses
issues of inequality and structural violence, with regional interests in Latin
America, the Caribbean and the United States. She is the author of Food in
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
xv
Cuba: The pursuit of a decent meal, and co-editor of Black Food Matters:
Racial justice in the wake of food justice. http://www.hannagarth.com.
Sahra Gibbon is Associate Professor of Medical Anthropology in the
Anthropology Department at UCL, convenor and founder of the programme
in Biosocial Medical Anthropology at UCL, and co-editor with Jennie
Gamlin of the ‘Embodied Inequalities’ book series with UCL Press. She has
carried out research in the UK, Cuba and Brazil examining the interface
between genomics, public health and inequalities. https://www.ucl.ac.uk/
anthropology/people/academic-and-teaching-staff/sahra-gibbon.
Tsipy Ivry is Senior Lecturer and Chair of the graduate programme
in medical and psychological anthropology in the Anthropology
Department, University of Haifa. She is author of a comparative
ethnography, Embodying Culture: Pregnancy in Japan and Israel (2010).
Since 2006, she has studied the intersections of religion and reproductive
biomedicine, and most recently, pregnancy and childbirth following the
11 March 2011 disasters in Eastern Japan. https://sites.google.com/
hevra.haifa.ac.il/tsipy-ivry/home.
Selima Kabir is an Assistant Research Coordinator at the BRAC School
of Public Health, BRAC University, Bangladesh, where she uses her
different skills at work in collaboration with her passion for anthropological research. She is overseeing a project on Gender and COVID-19,
and has experience working on gender, sexual and reproductive health
and migration.
Natasja Kingod is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Steno Diabetes Center
in Copenhagen, Denmark. Her research focuses on diabetes selfmanagement, patient knowledge, praxiography and online and offline
peer-to-peer support in Denmark.
Gideon Lasco is a Senior Lecturer at the University of the Philippines
Diliman’s Department of Anthropology and Research Fellow at the Ateneo
de Manila University’s Development Studies Program. He obtained his
medical (MD) and master’s degrees (MSc in Medical Anthropology) from
the University of the Philippines and his PhD from the University of
Amsterdam. His research interests include contemporary issues including
the drug wars in Asia and the COVID-19 pandemic.
Sofie Rosenlund Lau is a social pharmacist, whose doctoral dissertation
concerned the routinisation of cholesterol-lowering medicines for the
prevention of cardiovascular disease in Denmark. She is a Postdoctoral
Researcher at the Center for Research and Education in General Medicine,
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VIRAL LOADS
University of Copenhagen, and is examining the reasons for and
consequences of the massive use of pharmaceuticals among frail seniors.
Susan Levine is Associate Professor of Anthropology in the School of
African and Gender Studies, Anthropology and Linguistics, University of
Cape Town. Her research interests include critical pedagogy, child labour
and child health, and she is the author of Children of a Bitter Harvest: Child
labour in the Cape winelands (2013).
Lenore Manderson is Distinguished Professor of Public Health and
Medical Anthropology in the School of Public Health, University of the
Witwatersrand, South Africa, and holds appointments also with Brown
University, US, and Monash University, Australia. Her current work on
inequality includes a major study of the complexity of informal caregiving
for Alzheimer’s disease and related dementias in rural South Africa.
http://www.lenoremanderson.com.
Rebecca Marsland is a Senior Lecturer in Social Anthropology at the
University of Edinburgh. She has carried out research on malaria, HIV/
AIDS and funerals in Tanzania. She is currently combining medical
anthropology with multispecies ethnography to think about insect health
and veterinary medicine.
Shrutika Murthy is a research assistant at The George Institute for Global
Health India (TGI), and works in the Accountability for Informal Urban
Equity Hub (ARISE). Her work and research interests revolve around
issues pertaining to caste, gender, urban poverty and health systems
and policy.
Haripriya Narasimhan is an anthropologist and Associate Professor in
the Department of Liberal Arts, IIT Hyderabad, India. She is currently
involved in two independent research projects that look at the world of
Hindi television soap operas, and the discourse on diabetes. She has
fieldwork experience in Tamilnadu and Mumbai, Maharashtra.
Ato Kwamena Onoma is a Senior Program Officer at the Council for the
Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) and
author of The Politics of Property Rights Institutions in Africa (2009) and
Anti-Refugee Violence and African Politics (2013). His current work
explores mobility, belonging and intercommunal relations in Africa
primarily through the prisms of epidemics and interment practices.
Kim Ozano is a social scientist working in the Accountability for Informal
Urban Equity Hub (ARISE) at the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine.
Her research focusses on participatory paradigms, health inequity,
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
xvii
inclusion and health systems strengthening. She is currently working on
generating quality criteria for participatory action research approaches
that aim to strengthen health systems.
Cristina A. Pop is an Assistant Professor of Medical Anthropology and
Medical Humanities at Creighton University, Nebraska. Her research
interests are reproductive health and healthcare, vaccination anxieties,
post-communist transformations and discourse analysis. She is currently
working on a book about cervical cancer in Romania.
Pooja Purang is a Professor of Psychology at the Department of
Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay.
Her areas of research include organisational justice, culture, diversity and
gender-related issues in the workplace.
Ivo Quaranta is Professor of Cultural and Medical Anthropology at the
University of Bologna, where he is current director of the Centre for
International and Intercultural Health. His main interests focus on the
analysis of the social production of suffering and the cultural elaboration of
illness experience; he has worked in northwest Cameroon, the UK and Italy.
Sabina Faiz Rashid is Dean and Professor at the BRAC School of Public
Health, BRAC University. A medical anthropologist by training, she has
over 25 years of work experience in Bangladesh. Her areas of expertise
are ethnographic and qualitative research, with a focus on urban
populations, adolescents and marginalised groups. She is particularly
interested in examining the impact of structural and social factors on the
ability of these populations to realise their health and rights.
Abril Saldaña-Tejeda is Associate Professor of Sociology at the
Department of Philosophy, Universidad de Guanajuato, Mexico, and
focuses on the social determinants of health, genomics and postgenomics.
She is currently exploring bioethical principles, practices and regulations
on human genome editing and stem cell research in Latin America.
Sarah Segal-Katz is a certified Halachic instructor from Beit Morasha.
She holds an MA in Jewish Philosophy and Kabbalah from Revivim
Honors program in Jewish Studies at the Hebrew University. SegalKatz is an activist in the fields of feminism, religion and state, currently
taking part in an appeal to the High Court of Justice regarding women’s
right to take state rabbinical exams. She is founder of Gluya Center.
https://sarahsegalkatz.com/
Aisha Siddika has a master’s in Gender Studies and worked at the BRAC
School of Public Health, BRAC University for one year (2019–2020).
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Elisa J. Sobo is Professor and Chair of Anthropology, San Diego State
University. Her recent work concerns parents’ use of cannabis-based
therapies for children with intractable epilepsy, ethnomedical understandings about healthy child development in relation to alternative
education and paediatric vaccination. She is currently part of a nationwide
participatory action research initiative focused on community-based
capacity building for an equitable and effective COVID-19 vaccination
rollout.
Marie Kofod Svensson is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Danish
Heart Association. Her doctoral research was on how children and their
families in Denmark experience life following diagnosis of congenital
heart disease (CHD). In her current research, she is exploring how
couples experience prenatal screening for congenital heart disease.
Sally Theobald has a Chair in Social Science and International Health
at the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, and a background of
geography and development studies. Her research focuses on gender,
health, and health systems strengthening in different contexts, including
in fragility and in informal urban settlements, in Africa and Asia.
Sally is PI for the GCRF Accountability for Informal Urban Equity Hub
(ARISE).
Rachel Tolhurst is a Reader at the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine
and Research Director of the GCRF Accountability for Informal Urban
Equity Hub (ARISE). Her research interests centre on social drivers of
inequities in health and wellbeing, including intersections between
gender equity, poverty and disability.
Cecilia Vindrola-Padros is a medical anthropologist interested in applied
health research and the development of rapid approaches to research.
She co-directs the Rapid Research Evaluation and Appraisal Lab
(RREAL) with Ginger Johnson, works as a Senior Research Fellow in the
Department of Targeted Intervention, University College London, and is
a Social Scientist at the NIAA Health Services Research Centre (HSRC),
Royal College of Anaesthetists (RCoA).
Ayo Wahlberg is Professor MSO at the Department of Anthropology,
University of Copenhagen. His research has focused on reproductive and
genetic technologies (in China and Denmark), traditional herbal medicine
(in Vietnam and the United Kingdom) and health. He currently leads a
five-year European Research Council (2015–2020) project ‘The Vitality
of Disease’.
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xix
Lana Whittaker is a Postdoctoral Research Associate, working in the
GCRF Accountability for Informal Urban Equity Hub (ARISE) at the
Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine. She is a human geographer, whose
research focusses on inequality, poverty and food insecurity, and the
interventions and policies that seek to address these issues.
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Acknowledgements
In the early months of 2020, the SARS-CoV-2 virus spread from Wuhan to
Tehran, Islamabad, Milan, Madrid, New York, New Delhi, Johannesburg
and Rio de Janeiro. Within weeks, lockdowns and border closures had
been strictly enforced. It soon became evident that the COVID-19
pandemic was impacting especially those who were already living
precarious lives. As medical anthropologists based in South Africa and
Australia, the US West coast and Denmark, respectively, we were
captivated by this unfolding and its impact, and the value to us, in sensemaking, of our own knowledge of anthropology. We reached out to our
colleagues throughout the world with a call for anthropologies of
urgency: the results of this outreach are found in the chapters in Viral
Loads. We are grateful to all contributors who responded unreservedly
and worked so meticulously on their chapters through the very difficult
months of 2020, juggling caring duties at home, work, home-schooling
and sometimes health crises with their commitment to the people and
places with whom they have been ethnographically engaged for years.
The results are a testament to their scholarship and provide important
ethnographic accounts and compelling analyses of the disturbing effects
of the pandemic.
We would like to thank Sahra Gibbon and Jennie Gamlin, editors
of the series ‘Embodying Inequalities: Perspectives from Medical
Anthropology’ at UCL Press, for welcoming our call to mobilise medical
anthropologists and for working with us to sharpen our vision and
objectives. We thank too very much our editor at the press, Chris Penfold,
for steadfastly guiding us through peer review and subsequent production,
helping us ensure the quality and relevance of Viral Loads. Likewise, we
would like to thank our production team, Jaimee Biggins, Melody Dawes
and Linda Mellor, for expeditiously bringing Viral Loads to print. And we
thank Margaret Ramsay for her superb indexing skills.
Viral Loads has truly been a cross-continental effort. Taking turns to
stay up late or rise early, we Zoomed across three, roughly equidistant
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
xxi
world time zones in California, Melbourne and Copenhagen. In realising
this book, Ayo Wahlberg would like to thank colleagues at the Department
of Anthropology, University of Copenhagen, all of whom have been
engaged in efforts to ethnographically examine the many consequences
of COVID-19. Ayo would like to acknowledge the European Research
Council project ‘The Vitality of Disease – Quality of Life in the Making’
(grant no. ERC-2014-STG-639275), as the Viral Loads project ended up
becoming a crucial part of the intellectual work that this project aimed
for. Nancy Burke would like to thank Raul Fernandez for raising questions
that led to this work; Niurca Acosta Hernández, Xiomara Hernández
Pérez and Elba Capote for their keen insights; and colleagues at the
University of California, Merced, for their intellectual community. Lenore
Manderson thanks the radio, TV and press journalists who early engaged
her to reflect on the pandemic as it came to be; and her colleagues at the
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, and friends throughout
South Africa, the US and Australia, whose accounts of the effects of
COVID-19 were a reminder of the tragedy to which we were witness.
xxii
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1
Introduction
Stratified livability and pandemic effects
Ayo Wahlberg, Nancy J. Burke
and Lenore Manderson
On the streets of Mumbai, in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, in South
Africa’s informal settlements and in overflowing hospital corridors in
Milan, Madrid and New York, the unfolding COVID-19 pandemic and
efforts to ‘flatten the curve’ laid bare and amplified, viscerally, failures of
government and healthcare governance. The pandemic exposed gross
variations in access to healthcare, and showed glaring disregard for
the lives of the majority of people, deeply rooted inequalities and uneven
co-morbidities. Thriving on human sociality, commensality and intimacy,
the SARS-CoV-2 virus raced through a globally connected world, disproportionately infecting those compelled to live and work in constricted
conditions. Laboratories around the world hurried to understand how
this virulence might be stopped – to develop treatments to inhibit COVID19’s potentially life-threatening progression, and to develop vaccines to
prevent transmission and further infection. As we write in February 2021,
vaccines are being rolled out. Even so, questions of production and
distribution globally have yet to be resolved, not least in less-resourced
parts of the world, and for those most vulnerable among ‘frontline’
workers, those living without legal documentation and those with limited
or no rights to healthcare. Meanwhile, morbidity and mortality continued
to rise at a staggering pace in the second wave, with hospitals in Los
Angeles, Stockholm, London, Manaus and Lisbon teetering. The only
strategy for most governments, when coronavirus surfaced in humans in
late 2019 and throughout 2020, was for individuals to be compelled and
responsibilised to do their part: stay at home, maintain physical distance,
INTRODUCTION
1
wash their hands and self-quarantine. The first months of 2021 suggest
that this will likely remain the primary strategy of control among most
populations.
The exhortatory measures of preventive action and isolation had
little regard for the limits to the capacity of many people to ‘shelter in
place’, observe hand hygiene and ensure physical distancing. As numerous
anthropologists and others have insisted (Iskander 2020, 1, 15; Kochhar
2020), these are luxuries of the few in a grossly uneven world where
millions live on the streets, in crowded quarters, without adequate water
and sanitation, making do. Further, people already living with (multiple)
chronic illnesses – the so-called ‘underlying conditions’ of COVID-19 –
have been asked by health authorities to take extra care by self-isolating,
again with little regard for their ability to do so, not least because such
chronic conditions disproportionately affect those who are least well off
(Manderson and Wahlberg 2020), and the accumulation of chronic
conditions places increasing economic pressure on them (Manderson
and Warren 2016). As the first year closed, the effects of the pandemic
and of efforts to contain it continued to be unevenly experienced in
racialised, disabling and discriminatory ways. As contributing authors in
this volume demonstrate, the COVID-19 pandemic loaded onto already
existing socio-economic inequalities, racial discrimination and uneven
access to healthcare, exacerbating what we call stratified livability.
Exigent temporalities have laid bare and amplified disadvantage. These
reverberations across disease risk, control, containment and care call for
anthropologies of urgency.
Over the past few decades, anthropologists have shown how
epidemics of HIV/AIDS, SARS, H1N1 influenza, cholera and Ebola are all
‘mirrors held up to society’ (Lindenbaum 2001, 380). These are seen to
follow and produce ‘cycles of shame and blame, stigmatising discourses,
isolation of the sick, fear of contagion, and end-of-the-world scenarios’
(Herring and Swedlund 2010, 4), as ‘an “outbreak narrative” is often
pushed by international agencies and governments in northern settings’
(Leach et al. 2010, 371). At the same time, Charles Briggs has illustrated
how communicability itself is infectious, with narratives of epidemics that
typically naturalise socio-economic, racial and sexual inequalities ‘as if
bacteria and viruses gravitate toward populations and respect social
boundaries’ (2005, 274). Through the designation of ‘risk groups’,
representations of epidemics are transformed into self-knowledge and
self-regulation while also intensifying stigmatisation and discrimination.
Most recently, in The Anthropology of Epidemics, Ann Kelly, Frédéric Keck
and Christos Lynteris have argued that:
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VIRAL LOADS
as a mode of constitution of social life that has been cast anew by
recent conceptions of virality, information, and communication …
epidemics necessitate not simply the study of the disease itself
and the way it affects social relations, but also the study of its modes
of anticipation, visualisation, fictionalisation, and materialisation
(2019, 1, 15).
In Viral Loads, we draw on such anthropological insights and ethnographic
evidence gleaned from other diseases, conditions and times, and use this
archive to illuminate the circumstances and effects of COVID-19. This is
the anthropology of urgency. Anthropologists have the responsibility to
bring knowledge of other infections and other disasters, structures and
systems, to anticipate and interpret responses to the pandemic. At the
same time, we carry a responsibility to chronicle such viral loads and their
social impact (Herring and Swedlund 2010; Kelly et al. 2019). This is not
ethnography conducted in haste as an alternative to the slow research
that is a hallmark of our discipline (Adams et al. 2014), although rapid
ethnographic assessment surely has its place in times of crisis. Nor is it a
pathography of the disease itself (MacPhail 2015). Rather, as we analyse
the particularities of this novel coronavirus and the social and political
responses that it has elicited, our prior work and long-term engagements
shape our interpretive lens.
On 3 April 2020, in the Financial Times, Arundhati Roy (2020)
argued that ‘(h)istorically, pandemics have forced humans to break
with the past and imagine their world anew. This one is no different. It is
a portal, a gateway between one world and the next’. In this volume, we
illustrate how COVID-19 serves as a portal to rethink and reimagine
health and medical care, health systems and welfare throughout the
world. It is also a portal to rethink the structures, systems and ideologies
that shape health and wellbeing. Like those involved in the front line
of social movements in 2020, we attend to the social and racialised
unevenness and gross economic disparities exposed in the uneven
distribution of illness and death, and in the limits of global and local
responses to the pandemic. The pandemic demands that we revisit and
sharpen our understandings of state power, public health and citizenship.
COVID-19, like any disease, is a social and political as well as a biological
fact, grinding against the lived realities of everyday life. Its examination
is a launching pad to draw out how any disease is implicated in and might
impact on social life.
In Viral Loads, the contributing authors mobilise anthropological
concepts to analyse how these developments interrupt daily lives, state
INTRODUCTION
3
infrastructures and healthcare systems, and, in turn, how these structures,
systems and everyday flows shape the course of the pandemic. This
interplay of biology and society finds form on all continents. COVID-19
instantiates anthropological theory and layers our evidence base. In
Viral Loads, we illustrate how the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the
stratified livability that medical, social and cultural anthropologists have
ethnographically documented over decades.
Lockdown: the power of the state
In Part I of this volume, ‘The power of the state’, we begin by considering
institutionalised and governmental responses to the pandemic as it
gained momentum and took shape and form throughout 2020. People
looked to the state for quick intervention as health crises unfolded, even
if they were surprised and sometimes resistant to the crude measures
available. Countries faced the deadly combination of a highly contagious
‘stealth’ virus, host populations with no immunity, decades of austerity,
the neglect of healthcare systems and an all too obvious lack of
‘preparedness’ (Benton and Dionne 2015; Caduff 2015; Lakoff 2017).
With this toxic mix, governments worldwide drew on nineteenthcentury tactics of infection control to contain infection and head off its
exponential transmission. Nation-states and the power structures within
them mandated curfews and lockdowns, closed borders, and tested and
quarantined people in more or less coercive and authoritarian ways.
Within six months, over half the world’s population was affected by
restrictions of movement, checking both global and local flows of goods
and populations. Physical distancing requirements and self-isolation
recommendations halted the habitual busyness of everyday life. Flights
were grounded, stay-at-home measures were enforced, movement
in public spaces was limited. The capacity to maintain these measures
fluctuated, in some cases, monitored through digital technology, a
viral network to ensure viral containment. Countries like Vietnam and
Finland managed to keep infection rates low by enforcing lockdown
and responding to localised outbreaks, but more widely, nation-states
responded to the economic, political and human costs of the virus very
differently. In countries like Brazil and the US, where political leaders
downplayed and even dismissed coronavirus, rates soared early; through
to the end of 2020, they continued to do so.
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VIRAL LOADS
Box 1 COVID-19: a timeline
• Late December 2019: Doctors in Wuhan, capital of China’s
Hubei province, raise concerns about a SARS-like virus in
patients presenting with pneumonia symptoms and are initially
censured by State authorities.
• 7 January 2020: Chinese health authorities rule out SARS and
race to subtype what media are calling a ‘mystery virus’.
• 12 January: WHO confirms that ‘a new type of coronavirus
(novel coronavirus, nCoV)’ has been identified.
• 23 January: Wuhan city goes into lockdown, closing airports,
train stations and highways in an effort to contain the outbreak,
but hundreds of thousands of people had already fled the city by
air, rail and road. International air travel out of Wuhan becomes
a key pandemic vector.
• 3 February: Built in 10 days, Huoshenshan Hospital opens for
coronavirus patients to alleviate overwhelmed hospitals in
Wuhan city.
• 11 February: The International Committee on Taxonomy of
Viruses (ICTV) names the novel coronavirus ‘severe acute
respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)’, which the
WHO promptly shortens to ‘COVID-19’.
• 9 March: Doctors in Bergamo, part of Italy’s northern Lombardy
region, warn of overwhelmed hospitals and critical shortages
in personal protective equipment, leading Prime Minister
Giuseppe Conte to impose a national quarantine. A week later,
military trucks are filmed moving coffins from Bergamo to
neighbouring provinces.
• 10 March: Schools are closed down in Iran, which has become
a COVID-19 epicentre, as hospitals are overwhelmed and
numerous senior government officials fall ill.
• 11–23 March: European countries follow suit announcing
lockdowns and/or restrictions: Denmark (11 March), Spain
(14 March), France (17 March), Germany (22 March), UK
(23 March).
• 23 March: President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa announces
a 21-day lockdown which would be enforced by the military, disproportionately impacting those living in informal settlements.
• 24 March: Prime Minister Narendra Modi announces a complete
lockdown in India, leading to frantic scenes and protests as
INTRODUCTION
5
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
6
migrant labourers try to return from major cities to their towns
of origin.
26 March: Under fire for mixed messaging and also downplaying
the seriousness of the pandemic, UK Prime Minister Boris
Johnson tests positive for COVID-19, eventually requiring
intensive care before recovering.
Early April: New York becomes the first epicentre of the US
as the city runs out of respirators and personal protection
equipment, leading to tensions between governor Andrew
Cuomo and the Federal Government as President Donald Trump
downplays the virus. Field hospital units are set up in parks and
refrigeration trucks are brought in to store bodies.
April: In Ecuador and Peru, bodies pile up in hospital corridors
and on streets as healthcare officials struggle to keep up with the
pandemic.
End April: Brazil becomes Latin America’s epicentre as hospitals
are overwhelmed and mass graves are dug to cope with the
growing numbers of dead. Meanwhile, President Jair Bolsonaro
insists that COVID-19 is a minor disease.
May–June: Throughout the world (US, Germany, Qatar,
Singapore and more) workers in meat plants and other factories
with cramped working and dormitory living conditions are
exposed to COVID-19 through workplace outbreaks.
8 July: President Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil tests positive for
COVID-19 while continuing to deny the seriousness of the
pandemic as Brazil sees infection and mortality rates soar.
20 July: Researchers at the University of Oxford report that a
vaccine they are developing has triggered an immune response
in 1,000 test persons.
2 October: President Donald Trump of the US tests positive for
COVID-19 and is transported from the White House to the
Walter Reed National Military Medical Center for treatment.
9 November: Pfizer and BioNTech announce by press release
that the mRNA vaccine they have been developing ‘was found to
be more than 90 per cent effective in preventing COVID-19’ in
Phase 3 trial participants.
8 December: 90-year-old Margaret Keenan from Coventry in the
UK becomes first person to receive a vaccine for COVID-19
outside of trials.
VIRAL LOADS
• 15 December: The US surpasses 300,000 deaths from COVID-19
as a surge in infections following Thanksgiving holiday
gatherings takes hold, while Brazil with the second largest tally
of deaths surpasses 180,000. Hospitals throughout the world
struggle to keep up with the ‘second wave’ and countries close
borders in attempts to contain new viral strains.
• 31 January: Globally, the reported number of infections was
close to 108 million, and the death toll directly associated with
COVID-19 had reached 2.1 million. Hospitals in the US, Sweden,
the UK, Brazil, Japan and Portugal struggled to keep up with a
‘second wave’ of patients.
Restrictive measures were near universally applied; these tended to
reinforce existing spatial inequalities. In many countries, the rich were
able to ‘escape’ to their holiday cottages, and middle-class workers juggled
home-schooling responsibilities while setting up home offices in their
living rooms. But so-called ‘essential workers’, often living in dense city
quarters, continued to work so that supermarkets and convenience stores
were open and home delivery available. Others – living on the fringes
of cities, in mobile homes and shelters, and on the streets – continued
working to maintain basic services – street cleaning, garbage collection,
and cleaning hospitals and hotels. Still others worked in unsafe yet
essential industries, including meat packing plants, which became super
spreader sites (Shultz 2020; Zhou 2020). Spatial inequality, characteristic
of cities worldwide, meant that those already disadvantaged and
discriminated were at much greater risk of exposure to COVID-19. Low
income, precarious employment and, for many, the challenges associated
with ‘illegal status’, further compromised their access care. These people
were also least able to take time off work to care for themselves and avoid
infecting others, and were at greatest risk of severe symptoms, sequelae
and death.
As a twenty-first-century pandemic, COVID-19 was shaped by
and is shaping contemporary social life, through forms of virtual
communication, global and regional political economies, the shifting
nature of nation-states, and the role of governments and supragovernment
entities. In the first substantive chapter of Viral Loads, Nancy J. Burke
describes how an app, Pesquisador Virtual, was designed and introduced
by the Universidad de las Ciencias Informáticas, with the Ministerio de
INTRODUCTION
7
Salud (MINSAP) of Cuba, to provide real-time identification of people
symptomatic of COVID-19. The app served as a tool in the country’s
arsenal against infection, along with brigades of physicians and medical
students going door-to-door to screen residents, population-based testing,
school and border closures, and mask-wearing enforced through fines.
These interventions were largely adapted from prior effective efforts in
controlling infectious disease (Whiteford 2000); the app enhanced rather
than displaced them. Meanwhile, as across the globe, new WhatsApp
groups began to promote food delivery for a fee, although in Cuba
restaurants also brought food to elderly residents for free. Nancy J. Burke
describes the systems of surveillance and governance enacted by the
Cuban state under the guise of care – along with official recognition of
tension between public health measures and cultural practices – and
creative moves among individuals and groups to support each other while
earning incomes as tourist revenue receded. These practices could coexist
as a result of Cuba’s particular form of post-Soviet socialism; their
intersections suggest one way in which care was produced and enacted
during the pandemic as in other crises, in the context of geopolitical
isolation. Even so, as several authors illustrate, these responses were not
atypical nor limited to a particular ideology or system of government.
Everywhere, people adapted to the convergence of seeming totalitarian
control with extraordinary kindness and expressions of solidarity.
Stringent lockdowns early in the pandemic were enforced in other
countries too, including South Africa, India and Bangladesh, as we
illustrate. Maintaining or reinstating total lockdowns became near
impossible, however, given the devastating socio-economic and personal
consequences of these measures for most people. Responding to the
emerging direct costs of lockdown, restrictions often loosened – but too
early, only to be tightened again regionally or nationally when spikes of
new infections occurred. The Australian city of Melbourne was one of the
few able to reinstate and – for three months – sustain harsh lockdown to
virtually eliminate all community transmission.
Viral transmission escalated rapidly in early 2020, in Wuhan,
Lombardy, Madrid and throughout the US, notably New York. This fuelled
a sense of urgency. Field hospitals were erected in parks and convention
centres were converted; military vehicles were requisitioned to transport
corpses; and political messaging centred on the metrics of COVID’s spread
and toll. Public health campaigns rolled out to exhort people to physically
distance, wash hands, wear masks, cough into elbows, monitor symptoms,
self-isolate and quarantine. Posters reiterating these messages were
plastered across cities. Plexiglass shields were introduced into shops
8
VIRAL LOADS
and public institutions, and, with symbolic payoff as much as protection
against infection, between drivers and pillion riders on motorcycles in
Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Distancing lines and standing
spots were painted on footpaths to organise queuing. Home living rooms
and kitchen tables were turned into offices where possible. And, as we
have already noted, so-called ‘essential services’ continued, such that
people in the lowest-paying jobs remained at risk – cleaners, couriers,
rickshaw drivers, bus drivers, fast food eatery staff, food production
workers and more (see Chapter 15 by Rashid and colleagues, and
Garimella and colleagues, Chapter 11). It is still too early for the
epidemiological data to demonstrate the price of this segregation between
those who serve and those able to continue to live within bubbles of
protection (Manderson and Veracini 2020).
Additional limitations on movement to contain viral spread slowed
the return of citizens living abroad. Governments grappled with imported
cases, from Italian tourists in Cuba to returning citizens in Senegal (see
Onoma, Chapter 10), then the inevitable shift to community spread. Such
measures to control contagion exacerbated the economic effects of the
pandemic for those most precariously employed. From street peddlers in
Bangladesh to bed and breakfast entrepreneurs in Havana, the lack of
access to potential customers has had devasting effects, increasing
hunger, indebtedness and fear. Countries like Australia and New Zealand,
because they are islands, simply closed their border to outsiders to the
cost of the travel and tourism industries. At the same time, the seeping of
infection into the community as a result of breaches in infection control
from quarantine hotels, via security guards and cleaning staff, highlighted
as vectors of disease not returning citizens but the marginalised workers
charged with containing them. Border control shifted in Australia
from nation to individual states, as the military moved in to prevent
people from crossing state boundaries. Lockdown contained and controlled
populations, overriding modes of everyday living that for many, until
then, had operated across borders for medical care, education, employment
and family connections (Ormond and Lunt 2020; Whittaker et al. 2010).
While the tensions and personal costs of containment were patent in
some countries, the to and fro across borders elsewhere slipped past, or
continued to warrant levels of militarisation that predated COVID-19 (De
León 2015). COVID-19 opened up questions of the role of the state in
caring for citizens, in contrast to the lesser regard of stateless people,
those living marginal lives (and marginalised experiences of COVID-19)
and those who, because of their pathways of mobility, were not even in
the record.
INTRODUCTION
9
As suggested above, lockdown measures were often enforced not
by virtual technology, but by deploying troops, in ways reminiscent of
population containment during other wars on infection – Ebola is the
most recent – and wars against populations and political interests (Benton
and Dionne 2015; Lynteris and Poleykett 2018). Viruses are microguerrillas, moving across surfaces and from person to person with stealth
and subterfuge, and militarisation was (and is) always about containing
populations. Microbes are less easily contained.
In Chapter 3, Lenore Manderson and Susan Levine describe South
Africa’s early and temporary success to contain transmission through
stringent lockdown, enforced by police, defence troops and private
security employees. Soldiers in camouflage and masks strong-armed
homeless residents into camps and broke into homes in informal
settlements, brandishing arms to threaten and kill particular citizens;
they patrolled shopping malls and apprehended those escaping to
beaches and parkland. Drawing on technologies that had been the
hallmark of apartheid, South Africa effected lockdown with relatively
little violence and resistance. Under apartheid, citizens were brutalised
by house arrests, curfews, detention, torture and imprisonment. But
with a backdrop of chronic and systemic poverty, the massification of
debility through TB and HIV/AIDS, and a robust public health infrastructure for coping with chronic disease, the country largely
accommodated rules around lockdown and its militant surveillance,
and the racial inflections of social hierarchy contained in their
imposition. In South Africa, political authority was sufficiently robust
to remain unchallenged even while COVID-19 deepened poverty,
unemployment and hunger. Viral spread eventually outran the measures
to contain it.
South Africa was only one of many countries to introduce lockdown
through emergency regulations, enabling law enforcement as if it were
wartime. In countries like Malaysia and South Korea too, lockdown,
isolation and quarantine were presented as necessary measures and
military personnel ensured their strict adherence. Elsewhere, as in Italy,
the earliest days of self-isolation were novel and anxiously romanticised,
with social media busy with clips of balcony concerts to rally public
support and confidence; this technology of support was echoed in various
ways, including in the UK, and as Aditya Bharadwaj describes in this
volume, in India. At the same time, individuals and collectivities flayed
the World Health Organization and United Nations and found in the
spread of the virus proof of ‘deep state’ conspiracy. In Chapter 4, Elisa J.
Sobo and Elżbieta Drążkiewicz take on this tendency toward conspiracy,
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VIRAL LOADS
and the emergence of collectives of seemingly incongruous groups
purporting conspiracy theories in the face of public health challenges.
They contend that such conspiracy theories serve as powerful tools to
express the tensions that arise between governance and freedom
as individual rights are pitted against state-defined visions of the
public good.
Exclusion, blame and consequence
Public responses to coronavirus took their cues from other viral outbreaks
and illnesses in the late twentieth and first decades of the twenty-first
century: HIV and AIDS, SARS-CoV-1, MERS, dengue, H1N1 (swine flu),
Ebola and Zika (MacPhail 2015; Mason 2016; Niehaus and Jonsson
2005; Williamson 2018). Scapegoating and increasing vitriol were
directed at governments, populations and communities associated with
likely spread of infection; to countries perceived as central to the
pandemic (notably China); and to questions of capacity to case find,
prevent and contain.
In Part II of the volume, ‘Exclusion and blame’, we attend to the
familiar ways in which the pandemic kindled scapegoating and conspiracy
theories, rumour, blame and stigma. Medical anthropologists have
documented at length the stigmatising power of infection, most markedly
in relation to HIV and AIDS, as viral spread was threaded into other
stigmatising identities, affiliations and activities – same-sex relationships, injecting drug use, sex work and place (Parker and Aggleton 2003;
Patton 1991; Rhodes et al. 2005). The stigma of these alliances flowed to
other identities linked to HIV infection, such that haemophilia and
particular ethnicities were also initially subject to powerful discourses
of blame. COVID-19 has been spared considerable stigma because its
spread, airborne, was less predictable and unassociated with perceived
breaches in morality. Even so, as the pandemic unfolded, we have witnessed
scapegoating towards populations who have long been subject to
discrimination.
COVID-19 brought to the surface the ways in which global
inequality is welded into the colonial past, underpinning racist regimes
in the present. Being Black quickly proved to be the best predictor of
infection and death from COVID-19 in countries like the US and UK.
Being a person of colour otherwise was weighted to risk of infection and
poor outcome, with this in turn tied to poverty, unemployment, food and
housing insecurities, chronic disease and comorbidities. Exposing these
INTRODUCTION
11
links between the social and the biological, anthropologists have drawn
on and foregrounded decades of work on structural violence, structural
vulnerability, syndemics and comorbidity, as well as colonialism,
neocolonialism, globalisation and their ugly legacies (Farmer 2001;
Fassin 2007). But in 2020 there was a global eruption of outrage against
racism, and COVID-19 spurred the Black Lives Matter movement against
institutionalised and personalised racism, and propelled insistence on
transformation. Hanna Garth makes this personal for us all. In her
account of outrage in Los Angeles following George Floyd’s murder on
25 May, Garth brings structural violence to the fore: not just because of
the concurrence of protests against violence and COVID-19 but because
the pandemic illustrated how racism determines health outcomes. Some
of the most striking mass-mediated images from 2020 were of maskwearing protestors on the streets in various cities in the US, at a time
where COVID-19 was disproportionately lethal for people of colour.
COVID-19 might have been less virulent in the US had there been less
violence, structural and literal, from racism.
At the societal level, everywhere, viral loads are disproportionately
shouldered by the disadvantaged and discriminated. Jennie Gamlin,
Sahra Gibbon and Melania Calestani in their chapter explore how legacies
of colonialism in the UK are experienced in populations placed in high
exposure roles as frontline health and social care providers. The naming
of these ‘essential workers’ ensuring food, amenities and care as BAME
(Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic) highlights the ‘nostalgic nationalism’
underlying pandemic preparedness and public health response. Gamlin
and colleagues connect the roles of EU migrants, caring for the ill
and dying, with ongoing isolationism arising in post-Brexit UK. The
government’s refusal of EU offers of personal protective equipment
for these caregivers, for example, left many unsafe and contributed to
the overrepresentation of Black and ethnic minority populations in
coronavirus death toll figures, again highlighting the continuity of present
inequalities to colonialism and its racial hierarchies.
Writing on the forms of discrimination that Dalit groups endured as
the pandemic unfolded in India, Aditya Bharadwaj introduces the figure
of the ‘shroud stealer’ from the writings of twentieth-century poet and
scholar Ahmed Ali, as an allegory for caste-based violence and inequality.
He discusses Dalit activists’ observation that the term ‘social distancing’
as a safety measure simply bled into established upper caste prejudice and
practices of ‘untouchability’. In this way pandemic responses in India
reinforced the dehumanisation of poverty and its stratification. ‘Shroud
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VIRAL LOADS
stealers’ who dug up graves to recover and resell burial shrouds as part of
a macabre economy during the 1918 influenza pandemic, Bharadwaj
argues, can help us reflect on the unfolding pandemic, and better
apportion responsibility, including our own.
Cristina A. Pop extends an examination of caste and related age-old
hierarchies in her analysis of how singling out the Roma in Romania
during the H1N1 flu pandemic (2009–10), and a recent measles epidemic
(2016–18), help explain Roma reactions to confinement measures during
the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic. As Pop shows, Romania’s
responses brought into public visibility old and new assumptions
about the need to purify the ‘social body’ from ‘corruption’, ‘superstition’
and ‘civil disobedience’, thereby setting the ground for continued discrimination against Roma.
The pandemic has also provided opportunities for publics to
question the legitimacy of the state, and for alternative congregations and
alliances to test their power against the state. Oğuz Alyanak addresses
this in his analysis of the ways Turkey’s ruling party, Adalet ve Kalkınma
Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP), retained its legitimacy
despite mounting criticism. Alyanak considers scholarly conversations on
moral authority and politics, with a particular emphasis on political
Islam, to explain how a moral discourse on COVID-19 (which validated
stigma against LGBT communities) enabled new configurations of state
power. As he illustrates, the Diyanet, the Turkish religious authority,
weighed heavily in conversations on the pandemic during its first phase
peak in mid-April, and through this, the AKP was able to divert attention
from its own mishandling of the situation. The use of political Islam,
however, was a dangerous manoeuvre, for it risked the lives of the very
people whom the Turkish state is meant to protect.
Pandemics call into question who falls inside and outside the
boundaries of state protection and belonging. Ato Kwamena Onoma
takes up questions of boundary maintenance, referencing the scapegoating of Peul migrants from Guinea during the 2013–16 Ebola
epidemic to explore current reactions to nationals returning to Senegal.
Blame on these returning citizens for the spread of the virus, expressed
on radio, social media and in news outlets, Onoma argues, illustrates
the limitations of citizenship and the porousness of communal
boundaries in public health crises. Tense relations between migrants
and home communities informed recent discourses, so demonstrating
how configurations of blame are always shaped by particular histories
and socio-economic realities.
INTRODUCTION
13
Unequal burdens
Anthropologists and others have documented how poverty and racial
discrimination are always ‘underlying conditions’ impacting health,
healthcare, vulnerability and poor outcomes (Benjamin 2020; Crane
and Pascoe 2020). Given how coronavirus spreads, housing and housing
conditions emerged as ‘hot spot’ sites for transmission, so exposing
the unequal distribution of space. In India, migrant workers fled their
cramped urban living conditions to return home during lockdown,
often travelling by foot for hundreds of kilometres. In Singapore,
known for its futuristic, modernised cityscapes, the living conditions of
thousands of migrant workers came to light as their crowded dormitories
turned into transmission hotspots (Kathiravelu 2020). In Melbourne,
people in social housing were criminalised with a second wave outbreak
on 4 July 2020, stimulating debate on state housing policies. In Cuba, the
call to shelter-in-place exposed the precarity of crumbling buildings,
whose modifications to create extra rooms to meet the government’s
commitment to housing for all inhibited airflow in sweltering tropical
heat.
The realities of lockdown and threat of COVID-19 infection for
those precariously housed and marginalised, as Surekha Garimella,
Shrutika Murthy, Lana Whittaker and Rachel Tolhurst illustrate, were
experienced as yet another of a series of insults and injuries to body
and mind. Garimella and colleagues mobilise the concept of ‘debility’ to
drive home the endemic versus exceptional nature of the pandemic on
those who live by waste-picking in India. In controlling COVID-19 and
ensuring critical care as needed, resources have been diverted from other
public health programmes, patient needs and vulnerable populations.
Linda Rae Bennett and Setiyani Marta Dewi illustrate how COVID-19
has amplified pre-existing challenges to sexual and reproductive health
and rights, with potential long-term consequences due to interrupted
services. They show how a clear ‘amplification effect’ from COVID-19 and
responses to it is discernible in Indonesia and beyond, as everyday lives
routinely marked by deprivation of resources, access to healthcare
and the denial of human rights, are disproportionally vulnerable to
COVID-19.
This cutback and suspension of services, with resources redirected
to address urgencies related to COVID-19, occurred widely. Claudia
Fonseca and Soraya Fleischer illustrate the impact of COVID-19 on
disability support for lower income Brazilians caught in the crossfire of
physical or mental disability, poverty and minimal state services. Their
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VIRAL LOADS
focus is on children born with microcephaly and other disabilities
associated with maternal infection of the Zika virus in 2015–16. Such
childhood disabilities precipitated a range of interventions supporting
both individual children and their families. COVID-19 deflected this
attention. Yet, as Garimella and colleagues also illustrate for India,
COVID-19 was a disaster neither new nor untoward. For populations who
are habitually without basic sanitation, steady employment or regular
housing, COVID-19 may be just one more misery, or the ‘last straw’ that
cuts off the meagre gains of the past few decades.
In Mexico, the challenge seems less about the diversion of resources
and more the strategic amplification of individual blame to obfuscate
underlying structural inequalities fuelling pandemic spread. Abril
Saldaña-Tejeda details the state’s continual attention to individual
bodies, diets and genetic make-up that place the responsibility for
‘risk’, ‘vulnerability’ and poor outcomes on individuals. Blaming and
fat-shaming became a focal point for infection, diverting public
attention from structural inequalities to individual bodies and personal
(ir)responsibility. Saldaña-Tejeda argues that attention must be given to
other forms of vulnerability and ‘underlying conditions’ such as police
brutality, pre-existing negligence and poverty if we are to understand the
disproportionate impact of COVID-19 in Mexico.
Sabina Faiz Rashid, Selima Kabir, Kim Ozano, Sally Theobald,
Bachera Aktar and Aisha Siddika draw on their collaborative research to
describe the devastating impact on vulnerable and impoverished
populations of measures to contain COVID-19 in Bangladesh. The nationwide lockdown initiated in Bangladesh in late March shut down public
transport, shops and all institutions (education, business, partial
government, etc.); millions of informal sector workers (street peddlers,
domestic workers, rickshaw drivers, construction workers, day labourers,
etc.) lost their only income source. As the authors illustrate, for adolescents
and young adults, the pandemic and resultant lockdown magnified preexisting instability, uncertainty, social suffering and neglect.
The reach of care
Shifts of resources and priorities to address COVID-19 everywhere came
at the cost of the already stretched capacity of health systems to diagnose
and treat endemic and chronic conditions such as diabetes and heart
disease, cancers and malaria. In countries with constrained resources,
‘normal capacity’ is limited at the best of times, vulnerable to austerity,
INTRODUCTION
15
neoliberalism, countless ‘structural adjustment’ and global health
projects. Here, medicine is unstable, access triaged and care practices
improvised on an everyday basis (Livingston 2012; Nguyen 2010;
Street 2014).
While lockdowns slowed infection and transmission, they were also
used initially to ‘buy time’ in the context of woeful lack of preparedness.
Few places, it turned out, had adequate infection control measures,
laboratory services, personal protection equipment, intubators and
mechanical ventilators to manage large numbers of acute cases. This was
so despite decades of public health warnings, particularly from 2003
(with SARS-CoV-1), and years of multilateral and regional investment to
develop and implement local pandemic preparedness plans (Caduff
2015; Sambala and Manderson 2018).
Early efforts were designed to control the pandemic and so avoid
overwhelming healthcare systems, as had happened in Wuhan as the
novel coronavirus took hold in January 2020. With speed, however,
Milan, Bergamo, Madrid, New York and New Delhi were overwhelmed;
with the onset of winter in the northern hemisphere, again municipal
governments erected tented field hospitals, appropriated other spaces,
and (in Europe) sent patients across national borders for hospital care.
Everywhere, healthcare systems were overwhelmed by an influx of
patients requiring intensive respiratory care, and often had to reprioritise
resources in anticipation of such influxes during first, second and third
peaks of infection. By January 2021, as the second wave of infection
peaked, intensive care unit capacity reached zero percent in major cities
in Europe, the US and elsewhere in the Americas, South Africa and
increasingly in countries across Asia. Rural hospitals struggled to cope,
and everywhere, exhausted healthcare workers struggled, yet again, to
locate beds and resources. The necessity of improvisation (Livingston
2012), and the hopelessness of such efforts, was by this time no longer an
index of national poverty, and systems in which shortages of supplies and
staff are common.
Ellen Block and Cecilia Vindrola-Padros illustrate how healthcare
workers in the UK and US grappled with an unknown disease while
working with massive shortages of personal protective equipment and,
at times, hospital beds and respirators. Forms of triage and improvisation
became a daily reality of ‘frontline’ healthcare workers in European
and American cities with surges of critically ill patients. Block and
Vindrola-Padros, in demonstrating how healthcare staff worked to
adapt to circumstances, overcoming often obdurate bureaucratic
obstacles, reinforce what anthropologists have long shown to be the case
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in situations of (chronic) crisis (Samuelsen 2020; Street 2014; Livingston
2012).
In writing on people living with (multiple) chronic conditions, Sofie
Rosenlund Lau, Marie Svensson, Natasja Kingod and Ayo Wahlberg
illustrate how established and institutionalised forms of care were
abruptly disrupted as resources shifted from welfare services and routine
prioritisations of care towards COVID-19. In Denmark, the political
decision to ‘postpone … all forms of outpatient surveillance of patients
with stable illnesses’ generated instability and uncertainty, especially for
people living with multiple conditions and in need of extensive social
support; Fonseca and Fleischer (this volume) also illustrate this for
families with children with disabilities in Brazil. Those living with
‘underlying conditions’ were asked to self-isolate, and the care provided
to them in the past was constrained. Care workers warned that isolation
would affect people with cognitive decline who could not understand why
loved ones had stopped visiting them. Lockdown worsened loneliness
that was already a burden, and exposed disease hierarchies within
Denmark’s universal healthcare system. At the same time, the intervention
kept COVID-19 mortality rates low through 2020.
COVID-19 has, in many ways, been the first digital pandemic,
although mobile phone coverage and internet connectivity have increased
dramatically over the past two decades. Notwithstanding a wide digital
divide, for millions of people, digital forms of communication and social
media platforms have made it possible for people to work from home,
participate in distance learning, shop online to avoid supermarket visits,
and socialise and provide care virtually. New technologies such as Zoom
and Teams flourished along with established social media such as
Facebook and WhatsApp to allow people to connect with colleagues,
friends and loved ones. Earvin Charles Cabalquinto and Tanja Ahlin
show how media platforms like Google, Facebook and YouTube came to
capitalise on ‘their moment’, partnering with organisations like the WHO
to ‘promote care at a distance’. These efforts, the authors show, generated
‘fantasies of caregiving’, allowing multinational social media giants to
amplify profits through advertisements and online engagements.
Meanwhile, the difficulties and struggles of people whose marginality
and vulnerability left them without the social networks, support systems
or technologies of care, were largely overlooked.
Haripriya Narasimhan, Mahati Chittem and Pooja Purang show
how, in India, living in an extended lockdown of over seven weeks (25
March to 18 May) presented an existential crisis for the middle classes.
Worried about getting essential commodities, a highly mediated class
INTRODUCTION
17
struggled with sudden changes in their daily lives. These anxieties were
attenuated by coronavirus-related statistics appearing on their mobiles
in this highly WhatsApp-ed nation (Agrawal 2018). With the highest
number of WhatsApp users in the world, the Indian middle classes
constantly chat with family or friends, forward jokes and memes, and
participate in serious debates on any number of ‘groups’. Narasimhan,
Chittem and Purang show how through the circulation of jokes and
memes, ‘traditional’ gender roles in the home were challenged not by
globalisation or feminism but by the virus. And while these media
satirised the revision of gender roles, they also illustrated how COVID-19
enforced changes as working men and women struggled to find order in
upended home and working life.
The challenges of a healthcare system under pressure pre-pandemic,
and the opportunities that the crisis afforded to review social conventions,
are also addressed in Tsipy Ivry and Sarah Segal-Katz’s chapter, this time
with pressure from religious authorities. Ivry and Segal-Katz describe
how women rabbinic scholars engaged in efforts to raise awareness of
the problematic interstices between institutional religious and health
services, and in doing so, turned COVID-19 into an opportunity. The
pandemic exposed contradictions between public health messages about
hygiene and risks of infection, and the mandated use of public ritual bath
houses on the cessation of menstrual bleeding. This contradiction at a
time of crisis allowed women to reclaim authority in rabbinic debates on
intimacy, and highlighted how religious authority overstepped and
underperformed in assuring hygienic conditions. In both these examples
– of India and the redistribution of domestic labour, and of Israel and
halachic laws on purity – the pandemic created opportunities to reflect on
the institutionalisation of gender and its inequalities.
Lessons for a future
When global media were still reporting on a ‘mystery virus’ in Wuhan
in January 2020, researchers and conspiracy theorists alike pondered
its origins. With the first confirmed cases linked to the Huanan Seafood
Market, scientists speculated about how and at which point the novel
coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 zoonotically jumped species, and so to the
pandemic. Culprits included horseshoe bats and pangolins – species that
evoke Mary Douglas’s (1966) analysis of anomaly and danger. While
some believed the spillover can be pinpointed to the seafood market,
others argued that given its ‘stealth’ nature, COVID-19 was likely already
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in circulation much earlier. Whatever the origins, COVID-19 intensified
global concerns about the effects of humanity’s encroachment on ever
greater swathes of forest and land. A year on, it continues to provoke
reflection.
Rebecca Marsland draws upon her many years of research on
malaria in Tanzania to illustrate not only the challenges that epidemics
and pandemics create in resource poor settings, but also the complexity
of interventions contingent on human/insect separation in contexts
better characterised by co-existence. She argues that despite many calls
for global solidarity in pandemic times, we are certainly not all ‘in it
together’. Marsland chronicles how viruses, bacteria and insect/animal
vectors intervene in human socialities. As efforts to control malaria have
consistently shown, interventions depend on a logic of separation in a
world where farming, urbanisation and industrialisation continue to
trouble nature/culture boundaries. Marsland makes a strong case for
thinking in terms of ‘multidemics’ rather than the singular experience
implied by the term pandemic.
Gideon Lasco carries these ideas into his argument that the
coronavirus pandemic has drawn attention to the necessity, for social
scientists and other publics, of an ecological, non-anthropocentric view
of the world. Noting that humans grapple with microbes, surround
themselves with plants and engage with non-human animals, Lasco
reflects on the Philippine experience of COVID-19, offering illustrative
examples, sketching tentative insights and concluding with a research
agenda for future work. Lasco argues that as the pandemic unfolds, we
need to ask how humans and non-humans can live together in precarious
times. He offers a way forward to think about environments and
ecologies, with implications for anthropological teaching, research and
practice.
Finally, in their chapter, Chiara Bodini and Ivo Quaranta show
how the pandemic drew attention to market-oriented reforms which
undermine the capacity of healthcare systems, with attention to Italy as
one of the regions outside of China which very early experienced
exponential infection rates. The collapse of hospitals in the north of
Italy in early 2020 was in some ways not surprising, given cuts during
preceding years; in this context, families lost loved ones and were
unable to say goodbye to them. Bodini and Quaranta emphasise that
future preparedness should not be reduced to maintaining medical
supplies and their adequate storage, of sufficient virological testing
and contact tracing capacities. They call for a culture of health and
healthcare capacity built up around local participatory action. Together,
INTRODUCTION
19
the chapters in this section point to a rethinking of ‘preparedness’ and
‘response’, away from a biomedical focus on how to extinguish an
outbreak and towards thinking about the building of more resilient and
balanced societies.
Past, present, future
Viruses are famously not fully alive; rather ‘they verge on life’ (Villareal
2004). For decades, virologists have sought to understand the
mechanisms by which viruses parasitise host cells in order to multiply
and spread. There are thousands of viruses, their pathogenic effects on
human hosts range from ‘mild flu-like symptoms’ to deadly organ failure.
The effect of COVID-19 on those who contract it spans this spectrum of
severity: extremely virulent for some (especially those who are elderly,
those with certain ‘underlying medical conditions’); less virulent for
others (Wahlberg 2020). While media reporting has focused on infection
and mortality rates, a growing number of people who contract COVID-19
live with its debilitating sequelae months after their infection. Initially
invisible by the focus on mortality, hundreds of thousands of ‘Long
COVID’ patients have found each other through social media to insist
that they be counted (#CountLongCovid) (Callard and Perego 2021). To
this day, we know little of the virus and its natural and social history. It
has simply not been around long enough. While many currently use
‘Long COVID’ to describe extended symptoms and drawn-out periods
of recovery, we do not know yet whether there might also emerge
post-viral syndromes or other debility or life-threatening conditions, as
occurs with other viral infections: shingles following chicken pox; postpolio syndrome decades after poliomyelitis; immune-compromised
conditions after dengue infections; cervical cancer following human
papillomavirus. COVID-19’s lethality has not unfolded. Equally, it is
unclear how often people get second or even third COVID-19 infections.
There are questions about terminology, clinical features, epidemiology,
the natural history and the social life of the disease/diseases. There
are also questions about how the disease is monitored, how we factor
in underreporting, and how we might best model and manage its
continued spread. The new directions of research in coming years, and
the translation of this into interventions and models of care, are matters
of thoughtful speculation.
In the twenty-first century, if it ever did, it no longer makes sense to
think in terms of epidemiological transition. Globally, multiple forms of
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infectious disease, noncommunicable disease and related disability
co-circulate, often with cascading co-morbidities (Manderson and Warren
2016). As COVID-19 burst on to the global health agenda, it joined a
long list of medical conditions which continue to affect millions of
people around the world. For over a century, medical anthropologists
have ethnographically studied how individuals, families and loved ones
perceive, live with and respond to medical conditions. COVID-19 is yet
another communicable condition that now syndemically interacts with
various other biological, social, economic and political conditions. The
virus itself, and the responses to it ethnographically documented in this
volume, have all too lucidly accentuated the stratified livability that
results when poverty, racial discrimination and disability are permanent
‘underlying conditions’.
While countless medical questions remain, as the chapters in Viral
Loads show, anthropologists have been at the forefront, alongside
epidemiologists and virologists, documenting, monitoring, analysing
and interpreting patterns of transmission, and tracking the social life
of the COVID-19 as it reshapes lives. It is essential that we remain so
engaged. As we document, the pandemic has exposed how, worldwide,
livability remains stratified and entrenched as lockdowns, viral
infections and (access to) medical care are experienced and lived in
racially, socio-economically and globally uneven ways. The biopolitical
distinctions between ‘making live’ and ‘letting die’, of bios and zoē, are
insufficient if we are to capture and account for the vast differences and
divides that separate, for example, the lives of India’s migrant labourers
stranded by lockdown, with little access to medical care, from the lives
of those who live in spacious, serviced residences that keep the outside
world at bay. Stratified livability calls for anthropologies of urgency if
we are to document and account for the far-reaching consequences of a
twenty-first-century pandemic in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America
and North America. This anthropology of urgency underscores the need
for our voices in other concurrent crises that threaten our lives: crises of
racism, violence, inequality and climate change. The comparative
analysis that the chapters in Viral Loads enables is essential. It sharpens
our understanding of the racialised, disabling and discriminatory ways
in which the pandemic and responses to it came to impact on people
around the world throughout 2020 and beyond. At the same time, it
demonstrates the strength of anthropological theory, rich ethnography
and critical engagement to make sense of a world that seems to be
imploding, and to reveal intersections, strategies and structures that
map possibilities.
INTRODUCTION
21
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INTRODUCTION
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Part I
The power of the state
2
Care in the time of COVID-19
Surveillance, creativity and sociolismo in Cuba
Nancy J. Burke
On 19 April, the Universidad de las Ciencias Informáticas in Cuba, in
collaboration with the Ministerio de Salud (MINSAP), announced the
launch of Virtual Screen, Pesquisador Virtual, an app designed to provide
‘real time identification of those with COVID-19 symptoms’. Users were
told ‘it is simple’, and instructed to download the app, input their personal
information, and, if they display symptoms, record their location, their
interactions over the previous week and any contact with COVID-19
patients (Redaccion OnCuba 2020a). Along with brigades of physicians
and medical students going door to door to actively screen residents,
administer tests and provide symptomatic treatment as needed, the app
was seen as another tool in Cuba’s arsenal for controlling the spread of
the virus that built on decades of effective infectious disease control. At
the same time, police handed out fines to those not wearing masks. New
services were promoted on WhatsApp groups, such as the delivery, for
a fee, of fresh vegetables to the homes of those unable or unwilling to
wait in long lines for daily provisions. Paladars (small, privately owned
restaurants) adapted delivery services to bring food to elderly residents
for free. Daily communications on state TV from the president and
minister of public health, while reiterating the importance of social
distancing, acknowledged how hard it was not to kiss people hello and to
maintain six feet between each other, especially for Cubans for whom
physical closeness is a part of daily life.
I explore the productive tensions inherent in the expansive forms of
surveillance and governance enacted by the Cuban state under the guise
of caring for the population since the arrival of the novel coronavirus
SARS-CoV-2, and the creative moves among individuals and groups to
CARE IN THE TIME OF COVID -19
27
support each other while earning an income as revenues from the tourist
sector disappeared. I propose that the co-existence and intersection of
these practices are made possible by Cuba’s particular form of post-Soviet
bureaucratic socialism (Hoffmann 2016) and are conditioned by multiple
forms of social and physical infrastructure. Analysis of these forms of care
is useful for understanding how care is enacted and experienced in a time
of crisis and geopolitical isolation.
Arundhati Roy (2020) posited the pandemic as a portal through
which to imagine new futures, but others have argued that pandemic
responses reveal what was already there (Whitacre et al. 2020). In the
United States, this has taken the form of revealing the gross generational
inequities that have led to disproportionate burdens of chronic illnesses
and persistent poverty in black and brown populations, and the
consequent disproportionate burden of death from complications linked
to COVID-19 (Garth, Chapter 5). In Cuba, the reforms and slight changes
that have occurred since the mid-2000s were revealed as just that – slight.
The pandemic response re-instantiated the value of what had been lauded
as the key triumphs of the Cuban Revolution – universal healthcare,
investment in education, and commitment to addressing inequality and
injustice throughout the world as operationalised in international medical
missions. It highlighted the bureaucratic nature of the government’s
approach to population health, using punitive means of enforcement, and
the valuable experience gained from participation in international and
local responses to prior epidemics (e.g. dengue, HIV/AIDS, Ebola). It also
created an opening for the re-assertion of comprehensive, coordinated
and centralised state power in the interest of the public’s health. At the
same time, the pandemic response afforded the creation of new forms of
relational care and entrepreneurism utilising online platforms and
cellular data. Such responses were made possible by Cuba’s socialist and
social infrastructure, including training a deep and expansive public
health workforce, and the changes, albeit complicated, that occurred
with the opening of the economy since the 1990s. These forms of
connectedness enabled creative approaches to resolver, or meet daily
needs, in a context where the combination of US sanctions, crumbling
municipal and housing infrastructures, loss of tourist revenue and the
pandemic made it more and more difficult to do so.
At the time of this writing (November 2020), Cuba has 8,110 cases
and 133 deaths.1 This equates to 12 deaths per million. Compared with
comparably sized nations such as Bolivia, the Dominican Republic
and Belgium, ranked 44, 46 and 18, respectively, with cases ranging
from 144,390 to 567,532, Cuba’s pandemic response has resulted
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in impressively low numbers. In the following, I detail the Cuban
government’s swift and early response as part of a professional ethos
of care, and highlight key aspects of the island’s socialist infrastructure
that underlie and pose challenges to this public health response and
its enforcement. I follow this with a description of individual acts of
community support, particularly on behalf of those most vulnerable.
I conclude with a reflection on what this convergence of humanitarian
intervention and governmentality reveals in this moment on the island.
Biopolitics and the anthropology of care
Anthropologists studying Cuba’s healthcare system have highlighted
the strong arm of the state in the maintenance of extraordinary health
outcomes with few financial resources, the techniques the government
has employed to engage citizens in the production of these metrics,
and their subsequent influences on subjectivity (Andaya 2013, 2014;
Brotherton 2005, 2012). Conducting research in the 1990s, Sean
Brotherton described the deprivations of what is referred to on the island
as the Special Period in a Time of Peace (el Periodo Especial), a time of
extreme economic scarcity that severely impacted living standards, led
to rising unemployment, and witnessed the plummeting of the value of
national currency and further deterioration of already faulty housing and
municipal infrastructures. This was seen as a state of exception (Agamben
2005) in which a well-educated population, ‘inundated with biomedical
knowledge’, developed ‘state fostered expectations and feelings of
entitlement’ to a level of wellbeing and healthcare that the socialist
government could no longer provide (Brotherton 2005, 360). Faced with
incomes insufficient to meet basic needs, Cubans relied more and more
on their networks of socios,2 friends and acquaintances connected
to resources, including accessing care and prescribed and necessary
medications (Brotherton 2012). Brotherton looked to Foucault’s
concept of biopolitics to theorise the production of ‘governable subjects’
(Burchell et al. 1991) on the island, arguing that strategies underlying
the establishment of the Cuban healthcare system required increasing
degrees of state intervention, management and protection, resulting in
a Cuban form of biological citizenship. Biopolitical strategies, according
to Foucault (1990, 139), seek to understand and regulate ‘the level of
health, life expectancy, and longevity’ of population groups. Care for the
health of the population is clearly a biopolitical endeavour, and one that
infers both intimate and disciplinary processes.
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29
As anthropologists have illustrated, physicians and nurses play
essential biopolitical roles within Cuba’s socialist health infrastructure
(Andaya 2014; Brotherton 2012; Burke 2013). Having been declared
‘symbols of the Revolution’ by Fidel Castro (Rojas 1986), they are
positioned within neighbourhoods and communities to reinforce the
values of the Revolution through their continuous contact with the
population, and their attention to lifestyle factors as elemental to health.
Most recently, oncology clinical trials have been inserted into Cuban
primary care practice, suggesting an extension of this biopolitical role
into experimental treatments (Graber 2018; see also Livingston 2012).
Within what Graber (2018) identifies as a professional ethos of care,
physicians build upon their intimate relationships with patients in their
neighbourhoods and health areas to incorporate palliative care and
clinical research into their primary work of disease prevention and
chronic disease management. In so doing, they engage in everyday
practices that transform their work (e.g. incorporating experimental
trials into clinical care) and their relationships with patients (normalising
cancer as a chronic illness). Graber illustrates how the contours of
individual care in the context of Cuba’s neighbourhood clinics serve as an
extension of the state’s commitment to care for the population. Responses
to pandemics, as we shall see, require a biopolitical approach that benefits
from the trust established in these micro-interactions.
Medical institutions have worked to direct humanitarian resources
to situations and places of extreme need (Farmer 2005), while they have
played a regulative role imposing coercive norms of behaviour through
conceptualisations of health and security (Foucault 1990; Ong 2003;
Rose 2009). Lisa Stevenson’s historical analysis of the mid-twentieth
century tuberculosis outbreak in Northern Canada provides some insight
into the complex tacking back and forth between the individual and
population, or between Foucault’s anatomo- and bio- politics, in the
context of epidemics (Garcia 2010; Livingston 2012; Stevenson 2014). In
her juxtaposition of the 1940s–1960s tuberculosis outbreak with the
more recent suicide epidemic among Northern Canadian Inuit (in the
1980s), Stevenson (2014) aligns government efforts to provide care to a
population through forced removal with the pain and suffering such
separations wrought on individuals and families. As she describes, this
‘anonymous care’, directed toward population groups rather than toward
named and known individuals and members of families and communities,
met bureaucratic ends but was experienced as a form of genocide by those
‘cared for’. This suggests important differences between ‘anonymous care’
aimed at population health, such as a population group experiencing a
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pandemic, and relational care provided to individuals, ‘the way that
someone comes to matter’ (Garcia 2010).
Reflections on the Cuban response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic raise
similar concerns. Rather than approaching HIV/AIDS transmission as
an individual behavioural challenge within a human rights/individual
choice framework, as occurred in much of the world, the Cuban
government in the 1980s responded to the return of 40,000 troops from
highly infected parts of Central Africa with classic public health strategies.
The government implemented routine testing, contact tracing with
partner notification, close surveillance and isolation of all seropositive
individuals. This swift population level disciplinary response was possibly
due to the socialist government’s willingness to do so, despite likely
opposition, and because of the comprehensive health system already in
place. While the government was largely successful in controlling viral
spread, especially compared with neighbouring Haiti and Puerto Rico,
this was achieved at the cost of the forced isolation of people who tested
positive in AIDS sanatoria. The approach was criticised as a violation of
human rights (Scheper-Hughes 1994, 2020).
Perhaps more prescient to the current pandemic response, was the
Cuban experience with the dengue outbreak of the 1980s, which also
involved a ‘massive and military’ response (Whiteford 2000, 63) that
resulted in the eradication of the source of the virus – the Aedes aegypti
mosquito – three months after the epidemic reached its highest peak
(Kouri et al. 1986). This response, explored further below, was multilevel,
coordinated across sectors, and required the mobilisation of thousands of
community health workers tasked with entering homes, assessing vector
control compliance and imposing fines if necessary. The epidemic,
recognised in May and brought under control by August, resulted in 0.46
deaths per 1,000 cases, the ‘lowest lethality index reported until then for
a dengue epidemic involving confirmed dengue haemorrhagic fever
(DHF)’ (Kouri et al. 1986). In the unfolding response to the COVID-19
pandemic, Cuba again employed traditional public health strategies
designed to contain, control and manage the population, and, through
them, the virus. At the same time, Cuban individuals worked through
their social networks – socios – to provide forms of relational care.
Heeding early warning signs
Cuba’s first cases of COVID-19 were confirmed on 11 March 2020 – three
Italian tourists visiting the town of Trinidad, a World Heritage Site. The
CARE IN THE TIME OF COVID -19
31
tourists were immediately isolated, as were the 11 people with whom
they had come into contact. But the government had been preparing well
before this. In January 2020, the National Action Plan for Epidemics, last
revised during the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014, was updated
and activated, surveillance commenced at all ports, and immigration
officials were trained in COVID-19 response (e.g. immediate testing
and quarantine of those suspected of being infected). In February,
polyclinics were reorganised across the island, and beds identified for
potential patients. Staff were trained in COVID-19 symptoms, testing and
quarantine, and in March meetings across Cuba’s 15 provinces started to
coordinate responses across sectors, identify and activate testing labs and
began research into diagnostics and treatments. Daily briefings from
the Ministry of Public Health on state TV began; tax payments were
suspended for all small businesses; and protections were put in place for
worker salaries and social security. Before the first case was confirmed,
deans from medical schools across the country had already called for
volunteers to participate in administration of active screening. Over
28,000 medical students responded (MEDICC 2020). In mid-March, 155
workshops turned their attention to manufacturing masks, schools were
closed and outbound travel by Cuban citizens was limited to humanitarian
reasons. By the end of the month, Camilo Cienfuegos, in Pinar del Rio,
was the first community put under quarantine.
On 1 April, face coverings were made obligatory, and by 5 April, all
police stations were staffed with someone from the district attorney’s
office, placed there to charge those in violation of COVID-19 regulations
according to Article 87 of the penal code (crimes against health). Alcohol
sales were limited, and drinking was prohibited in public; restaurants
were closed or limited to take-out. By 15 April, 20 communities in six
provinces were under total or partial quarantine and by 23 April, over
nine million of the island’s total 11.4 million population had been visited
in their homes or places of work as part of the active screening programme
(Gorry 2020; MEDICC 2020). At the end of the month, through primary
care case detection and contact tracing, the sources of infection for
85.7 per cent of active cases had been identified (Gorry 2020).
Mobilisation of the public health system
As in prior epidemics, Cuba’s readiness to act builds on the socialist
infrastructure of free and universal healthcare and education established
as a core tenet of the post-1959 Revolutionary state. Trained infectious
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disease specialists, microbiologists, laboratory technicians, epidemiologists and over 13,000 family doctors and nurses serving neighbourhoods
across the island positioned the country well for a quick response. This
density of trained health professionals was made possible by the
13 medical universities and 25 medical faculties across the country that
confer six-year medical degrees at no cost to students. Medical training
has been prioritised since Fidel Castro came into power in 1959, at which
time over 3,000 of the island’s 6,286 doctors migrated to the United
States (Gómez 2019), leaving the country with a dearth of trained
physicians equipped to build a new national healthcare system envisioned
to reflect socialist values and the principle of health as a human right.
Cuba’s public health infrastructure took shape over time, first in
1965 with the integral polyclinic programme (policlinico integral), and in
1974, with the ‘Medicine in the Community’ programme (policlinicos
comunitarios). In the 1980s, the healthcare system was re-envisioned to
become the well-known Family Doctor and Nurse programme, Medico y
Enfermera de la Familia (MEF). Elemental to this, physician and nurse
pairs were placed in every neighbourhood, thus creating consultorios
(neighbourhood clinics) responsible for the population of a ‘health area’,
usually of about 120 households. Physicians and nurses retain detailed
health histories of individuals embedded in families and social networks
and serve as a hub for referral to the next levels of care in the polyclinic
and hospital (Burke 2013). The achievements of Cuba’s health system,
which build upon this structure, are important not only for their impacts
on the population, but also because the government has used them to
gain international prestige, respect (Feinsilver, 2008, 1993) and, at times,
hard currency (Briggs and Mantini-Briggs 2009; Brotherton 2013). The
strength of Cuba’s health statistics has become a significant source of
Cuban nationalism and ‘global empowerment’ (Eckstein 1994, 128). The
MEF programme, central to the production of these health statistics, has
also been criticised for its potential role in neighbourhood level
surveillance (Brotherton 2012, 2008).
In the midst of the scarcities of the Special Period of the 1990s, the
public health system – like all industry on the island – was threatened.
While the government made a commitment to retain investments in
public health, education and biotechnology, the geopolitical isolation
resulting from the continuing US Trade Embargo and loss of the Soviet
Union greatly impacted access to externally produced medicines, basic
materials for local pharmaceutical production and clinical supplies. In
addition, vegetables, fruit and other basic elements of the Cuban diet
were difficult to find in urban centres due to lack of fuel. Building
CARE IN THE TIME OF COVID -19
33
initiatives designed to deliver on the state’s commitment of housing for
all slowed to a halt, leaving the crumbling housing inherited by the
Revolution to continue to decay (Coyula-Cowley 2000). Municipal
infrastructures including water and wastewater plants built over 50 years
previously were left to deteriorate (Cueto and de Leon 2010; Randal
2000; Westbrook and de Freitas Alves 2016).
Economic reforms enacted to stimulate the economy and bring in
much needed hard currency included continued investment in
biotechnology and expansion of patents (Reid-Henry 2010), investment
in tourism (recreational, educational and medical), introduction of a
dual currency and opening to entrepreneurism (Burke 2013). While the
scarcities experienced in the 1990s have to varying degrees continued
into the present, the strength of Cuba’s socialist public health infrastructure has been identified as the reason behind continuously robust
health indicators (Spiegel and Yassi 2004). A core element of this infrastructure is the libreta, or ration book. Despite the scarcities imposed by
the US Embargo and geopolitical shifts, Cuba is known as a place where
nadie se muere de hambre (no one dies from hunger) (Garth 2019) due to
a national food ration system which provides about half of an individual’s
monthly nutritional requirements, with additional rationed items for
children, the elderly and those with certain chronic conditions (e.g.
diabetes, cancer), at very low cost.
Since Fidel Castro fell ill and turned over power to his brother
Raul in 2006 and Raul to Miguel Díaz-Canel in 2018, Cuban politics
have undergone major transformations largely in the interest of
continuity (Hoffmann 2016). While scholars have argued over how to
characterise this period, referring to it as post-Soviet, post-socialist and
post-Soviet/post-socialist, some have suggested that the transition is
most appropriately described as a shift from a charismatic socialism
characterised by mass mobilisation to a more depersonalised bureaucratic
socialism which has brought with it a diversification of Cuba’s public
sphere, particularly through the liberalisation of access to digital media
and data, liberalisation of travel and migration, and more moderate
foreign policy (Hoffmann 2016). In the 2000s this transition led to
centralisation and efficiency campaigns that began to reshape the
healthcare system yet again, largely in response to the burden on the
system placed by Cuba’s robust and extensive medical missions (Briggs
and Mantini-Briggs 2009; Brotherton 2013; Feinsilver 2008).
In 2016, Cuba’s foreign policy opening resulted in rapprochement
with the United States. US President Obama’s visit to the island in March
that year symbolised hope and possibility for many and resulted in a
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reinvestment in tourism with the expectation of an onslaught of US
visitors. The 2016 election of Donald Trump as the 45th president of the
United States quashed this hope. With his election, the US Embargo
tightened, locked in by the Helms–Burton law passed in 1996, which
curtails foreign trade and investment on the island. In 2019, the Trump
administration imposed 86 new punitive measures including full
implementation of the Helms–Burton Act. From September 2019, this has
resulted in reductions in oil imports from Venezuela, which left Cuba
functioning with 50 per cent of its required fuel (Rodriguez 2020a).
Economic challenges were exacerbated by a regional drought that
reduced agricultural production over the prior year. In the context of the
pandemic, the Cuban government faced difficulty in procuring muchneeded respirators, and medical donations from China were stymied
by US intervention (Granma 2020; Rodriguez 2020a). The Jack Ma
Foundation’s donation of facemasks, diagnostic kits, ventilators and
gloves, for example, was thwarted because a major shareholder of the
Avianca Airlines cargo carrier set to bring the materials was a US-based
company, subject to the trade restrictions set by the US embargo
(Weissenstein 2020). As Cuban economist Jose Luiz Rodriguez argued,
‘At this point, no one questions that the pandemic is not just a health
crisis. It is what the social sciences describe as a “total social fact,” in the
sense that it convulses all social relations, and shocks all the actors,
institutions and values’ (2020b).
Prior epidemic experiences
In addition to Cuba’s robust primary care system, the healthcare
workforce’s experience with prior epidemics influenced the island’s
ability to respond. In Cuba these include dengue outbreaks (1981, 1997),
a neuropathy epidemic3 (1990s), cholera outbreaks (2012–13), and Zika
(2019). The 1980s dengue epidemic provides the clearest precedent
for the current pandemic in terms of response. Prior to 1981, dengue
haemorrhagic fever (DHF) had not been seen in the Caribbean region; it
was limited to Southeast Asia and the western Pacific (Kouri et al. 1986).
But in the summer of 1981, when infestations of the mosquito vector
Aedes aegypti were recorded in almost all the island’s urban centres, Cuba
was hit by a major dengue epidemic that included DHF cases and
fatalities. The Ministry of Health reported 344,203 cases between May
and August 1981, with 116,151 hospitalised and 158 deaths. The last
case was reported in October 1981. Similar to the swift response to
CARE IN THE TIME OF COVID -19
35
COVID-19, once the epidemic was recognised in June 1981, the
government launched an intensive national campaign to eradicate the
Aedes aegypti mosquito, initially managed by the Cuban civil defence and
later the Ministry of Public Health (Kouri et al. 1989). The government’s
response included 15 provincial directors, 60 entomologists, 27 general
supervisors, 729 team leaders, 2,801 inspectors and 1,947 vector
controllers (Whiteford 2000). On the ground, approximately 15,000
health workers were mobilised to conduct house-to-house inspections,
during which they identified potential mosquito larvae breeding grounds,
treated disposal containers with insecticides, and treated the insides of
apartments and buildings with portable blowers. The insecticide
Malathon was sprayed from planes, sanitary laws regarding treatment
of containers were enforced and health education about the mosquito
and its ability to transmit the virus intensified (Gessa and Gonzalez
1987; Kouri et al. 1986; Whiteford 2000). All available resources were
marshalled to quell the epidemic; the government spent close to US$43
million on the campaign, mainly on insecticides. But like the current
COVID-19 response, the Cuban government relied largely on existing
human capital. Household inspections and breeding ground removal
were conducted by community members who, after being trained,
became ‘vector controllers’ organised into brigades with the power to fine
those who failed to comply with regulations designed to reduce breeding
sites (Kouri et al. 1986; Whiteford 2000; Gessa and Gonzalez 1986). The
similarities with the current behavioural challenges associated with
reducing the spread of COVID-19 are clear, as is the role of infrastructure
– social and physical – in the state’s response. Neighbours surveilled each
other’s homes to ensure that they complied with eradication efforts and
could be fined if not. Those who failed to comply put others in danger, as
now those who fail to wear face coverings or maintain social distance may
put others at risk. Crumbling buildings and inadequate water supply
influenced, in the 1980s, the maintenance of water containers in
households; in 2020 these conditions make sheltering in place and
hygienic hand washing challenging.
Internationally, Cuban healthcare professionals have responded to
epidemics and natural disasters as part of a long tradition of international
humanitarianism begun in post-quake Chile in 1960. Since just 2005, the
Henry Reeve Brigade4 has provided free medical services in nearly 30
post-disaster and epidemic situations, including the cholera outbreak
following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and the 2014 Ebola epidemic in
West Africa (Ubieta 2019). Especially following the expulsion of Cuban
physicians from formerly allied states in Brazil, Ecuador and Bolivia, a
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robust cadre of doctors on the island with excellent field experience
were poised to support the pandemic response. When 28,000 students
responded to the medical school deans’ call for volunteers, they needed
to be supervised and their case findings evaluated and communicated to
clinicians. Family doctors in each neighbourhood, many of whom had
returned from international missions, filled this supervisory role.
Cuban doctors were the first to arrive in Wuhan, China (Granma
News Staff 2020). On 26 March, the first team to go abroad began
treating COVID-19 patients in Lombardy, Italy, and since this time over a
thousand health professionals have worked in 18 countries on three
continents. Of note is the number of women serving as part of the nurse
brigade working in Barbados (95 of the 101 are women). As mentioned
previously, Cuba’s international missions serve a symbolic as well as
financial role (Bernstein 2013; Briggs and Mantini-Briggs 2009;
Brotherton 2013).
The state is back
The government’s immediate response to the looming global pandemic
included both international support and, as mentioned above, the
re-instantiation of paternalistic controls on the population. In April, six
people confined to an isolation centre in Sancti Spiritus escaped. Isolation
centres, established in March 2020, are adapted schools and hotels in
which those either diagnosed with or suspected to have been exposed to
COVID-19 are housed, with the supervision of medical personnel. News
reports detail the limitations on movement for individuals in quarantine,
and the high degree of medical attention they receive including
temperature checks and PCR testing (Curbelo 2020). The escapees were
found in their own homes; upon their arrest only 24 hours later, they were
subject to three months to a year in prison (Redaccion OnCuba 2020b).
Police started imposing fines of 300 pesos (the equivalent of a month’s
salary) in April under the supposition of Article 87 of the penal code,5 but
the specific decree enforcing face covering was not published until
12 May. The state began limiting alcohol sales in May, and drinking in
public became a finable offence in the same month. Those criticising the
state’s approach to the pandemic or deemed to spread false information
on social media were subject to fines and arrest (Alemán 2020), a return,
in some senses, to the pre-transition mode of response to dissidence
(Hoffmann 2016). As noted by Amalia Peréz, ‘along with the amplifying
effects of inequality and precarity associated with this crisis, the expansion
CARE IN THE TIME OF COVID -19
37
of authoritarianism, hidden in the justification of health management
and prevention, is also a risk’ (Pérez and Correa 2020).
State provisions were also reinstated, fostering a return to what had
been a slow loosening of dependency with the burgeoning of the private
sector under Raul Castro’s reforms. The ration book, thought to be on its
way out just months prior, was restored and reinvigorated in April 2020
in attempts to keep Cubans from traveling far from home to different
grocery stores in search of basic goods, and to minimise long lines as
potential sources of infection. Cubans pay less than the equivalent of
US$2 for their monthly rations, which is estimated as 12 per cent of the
food’s real value (Benjamin n.d.). With the recognition of increasing
unequal access to hard currency between those living on a state salary or
pension and those working in the tourist sector or receiving remittances
from abroad over the last decade, government subsidisation of every
citizen regardless of income at the cost of approximately one billion/year
has been a point of contention. In 2011, for example, Raul Castro stated
that the ration system distributes food at ‘laughable prices’ and that a
system introduced in a time of shortages had turned into ‘an unbearable
burden for the economy and a disincentive to work’ (Benjamin n.d.). Raul
Castro’s reforms included a gradual reduction in the items included in
la libreta. But during the pandemic, the offerings expanded. In recognition
of the economic hit that citizens, especially those in the tourist sector,
have taken with the closure of the island in response to COVID-19, the
state began to pardon taxes for entrepreneurs and to ensure salaries for
state workers, including artists and musicians, in March 2020.
Care (and humour)
Among ordinary citizens, pandemic response revealed the creativity and
care Cubans have for each other, including via the well-known Cuban
turn to humour. Anthropologists working on the island in the 1990s and
since have chronicled the pivotal role of humour, jokes and laughter in
coping on a daily basis with scarcities and insecurities – food, water,
electricity and fuel – during and following Cuba’s Periodo Especial. Jokes
recorded included one popular in the 1980s mocking that the Revolution
had eradicated capitalism’s three classes (upper, middle and lower) only
to replace them with three new socialist ones: the dirigentes (few
communist officials at the top), the diplogente (the fewer diplomats and
foreigners in the middle) and the indigentes (the indigent masses at the
bottom). The egalitarianism of socialism made everyone equal by making
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everyone poor (Henken 2007). During the Special Period, another group
was added, the delincuentes (delinquents, people who survived by
breaking the law). As a Cuban blogger commented, ‘there seems to be a
direct relationship between the seriousness of the problems and the
ingenuity of our humour, so in times of crisis hilarity wins. The nineties
were marked by scarcities and abundant jokes; prodigious in both
problems and humour’ (Sanchez 2012).
Nadine Fernandez (2010) reminds us of this humour in her account
of the affectionate name many had for their white 1950s model
refrigerators in the 1990s: el coco – white on the outside and only water
on the inside. At the same time, she highlighted the sharp edges of this
humour when addressing race and difference. Other popular jokes of the
time include: ‘What are the three successes of the Cuban Revolution?
Medicine, education and athletics. What are the three failures of the
Cuban Revolution? Breakfast, lunch and dinner’. Tanuma (2007) argues
that such jokes indicate a post-utopian irony reflecting ambivalence
toward the status quo and the state. This ironic stance enabled criticism
in a somewhat acceptable manner.
Humour emerging in the context of the pandemic includes the
song by Virulo, Dale Candela, which critiques US President Trump’s
suggestion of injecting bleach as a means to kill the coronavirus. The
recurring refrain of ‘dale candela para que el virus se muera’ (heat it up so
that the virus dies) refers to uncooked bats as a source of the virus
(insomne 2020). Other jokes include those referring to the refrigerator
as a great place to store clothing (because there is no food), and finally
understanding what good la libreta serves, as a passport to leave the
house, since it is no longer useful for accessing food in empty state-run
bodegas.
Jokes like these are told while Cubans wait in long lines for
groceries, not adequately social distancing and fumbling with wearing
masks as the temperature continues to rise. Streets in Central Havana
became a hot spot for spreading the virus (OnCubaNews 2020), given
their crowding due to the state of the buildings, rising temperatures and
the need to resolver (meet daily needs). Nearly 80 per cent of the city was
built between 1902 and 1958, and a large proportion of this housing stock
was already in disrepair at the onset of the Revolution in 1959 (Kerr
2009). In central Havana, 85 per cent of housing is over 80 years old, and
the remainder between 40 and 80 years old (Coyula 2010). Much of this
housing is crumbling, overcrowded and in dire need of repair; there has
been little renovation of existing structures. In addition, municipal
utilities, including electricity and water, continue to breakdown. In
CARE IN THE TIME OF COVID -19
39
April 2020 residents of Havana were asked to reduce their electricity use
and preserve water in anticipation of the kinds of blackouts and brownouts
that characterised the Special Period.
Prior to the pandemic, Cubans expressed concern about how
President Trump’s crackdown on trade was impacting the availability of
prescription drugs – particularly hypertension medication, which many
people take daily – and food. As a result, people were traveling across the
city at the rumour of one store having canned tomatoes in order to get
them before they disappeared, and turning to the black market for
medications no longer available on pharmacy shelves. Since the onset of
the pandemic, these sanctions, resulting from the Helms–Burton Act,
have also impacted the availability of personal protective equipment
(PPE) and real time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction
(PCR) tests on the island, both acquired through donations from the Pan
American Health Organization (PAHO) and trade with China (Duran
2020). In response to the lack of PPE, ‘makers’ started to construct face
masks and shields out of recycled plastic bottles. They created a network
of collectors across neighbourhoods and towns, and shared patterns and
methods via social media to enable individuals across the island to join in.
Their makeshift masks are worn by medical personnel throughout Cuba
(Cabrera 2020).
In addition to waiting in lines and shopping for each other, Cubans
established WhatsApp groups to facilitate grocery delivery to the elderly,
and the state created online shopping options that were less successful
(Boza 2020). These groups were made possible by the increased access to
cellular data Cubans have had since 2016, and high speed internet in
homes and public spaces since 2017. With the quick adaptation of the
long Cuban tradition of sociolismo, the use of social networks and
friendships to meet daily needs, WhatsApp also facilitated entrepreneurial
endeavours such as gyms offering free classes and renting out bicycles.
Restaurants and cafeterias started using WhatsApp for pizza, dinner,
pastry and fresh juice delivery. Cuber, Cuba’s version of Uber, expanded
to deliver groceries and other products. Paladares such as cafeteria
Jaunky’s Pan repurposed their delivery service to ensure that elderly
Cubans could receive groceries at home at no cost (Lima 2020). Some of
these adaptations were expansions on or adaptations of pre-existing
entrepreneurial projects; others – particularly those designed to provide
support and social connections to older Cubans living alone – were
collective and creative responses to a recognised need, a way to minimise
suffering among the most vulnerable.
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Conclusions
Cuba’s pandemic response reveals the value of a deep and available public
health workforce, trained and experienced in epidemic response, and the
continued power of the state to mobilise across sectors in the context of
an emergency. Vietnam has also had success in keeping the pandemic at
bay through similar early closure of borders, multisector coordination,
healthcare system mobilisation, extensive monitoring and investigation
of potential cases, strict quarantine enforcement and massive health
education and communication campaigns. These endeavours, as in Cuba,
are made possible by a government willing to enforce containment
measures. The strong arm of the state was evidenced in Vietnam, for
example, in the quick quarantine of a community of 10,000 residents near
Hanoi when four cases were reported in February 2020. In April, the
country entered a heavily enforced nationwide 14-day lockdown (Minh
Hoang et al. 2020). Similar to the Cuban response, the Vietnamese
government developed several apps to facilitate case reporting and
contact tracing but took things a step further by making declarations of
health status and travel history via apps compulsory (Trevisan and Le
2020). At the end of April 2020, the country had only 270 cases; in
early December, it still had only 1,361 reported cases and 35 deaths.
As noted in a recent editorial in the American Journal of Public Health,
‘the Vietnamese experience suggests the need for a strong public
health infrastructure and good coordination among the government
agencies dealing with the emergency’ (Trevisan and Le 2020). It also
suggests, as does the Cuban response, the value of biopolitics to pandemic
control.
In the context of the pandemic, Cuban health professionals have
worked to ‘adapt biomedicine to people’s needs, and, by doing so, ensure
continuity of care’ (Graber 2018, 276). In this case, continuity refers to
everything from meeting basic needs to enforcing public health measures
to limit spread. The response to the pandemic highlights paternalistic and
egalitarian roles of the state (in the delivery of social goods per the mass
mobilisation model) as well as the space within this biopolitical regime
for individuals and communities’ ‘capacities to reshape and transform
health politics’ (Graber 2018, 277) through local interpretations and
enactments of care. Thus, the Cuban pandemic response contributes to
emerging trends in the anthropology of care that elaborate connections
between everyday practices, the inter-relational and intersubjective
aspects of care, and the regimes and hierarchies of governance. As Buch
CARE IN THE TIME OF COVID -19
41
so aptly describes in her review on anthropology and care, ‘(w)ithin these
discussions, care remains a shifting and unstable concept – alternately
referring to everyday practices, engagements with biomedicine,
biopolitics, affective states, forms of moral experience and obligation,
structures of exploitation, and the relationships between these various
things’ (2015, 279).
The Cuban pandemic response also reveals the value of the daily
practices of survival, captured in the term resolver, that Cubans have in
their back pocket, honed from prior and continuous experiences of
economic uncertainty. These include extensive networks of socios through
which needs for medicines and food might be met, and care for the most
vulnerable delivered. These networks have been characterised elsewhere
as essential infrastructure for urban living, filling in where public services
fail (Simone 2004). Challenges to shelter in place orders on the island
reveal the effects of persistent poverty and geopolitical isolation on
individuals’ ability to stay in lockdown in the midst of neglected housing,
electrical and sanitary infrastructure. As the images of crowded streets
and long lines on blogs and online newspaper sites attest, people find it
difficult to stay inside crumbling buildings with little to no air flow and at
times intermittent water and electricity.
The multiple forms of care emergent in the Cuban response to the
pandemic – bureaucratic approaches to population health which take the
form of anonymous care (Stevenson 2014) accompanied by new forms of
relational care facilitated by cellular data – take place within contexts
of social, public health and physical infrastructures in varying levels of
decay (buildings, water pipes and treatment plants, electrical conduits),
maintenance and transition (see also Cabalquinto and Ahlin, Chapter 18).
All are active participants conditioning Cuba’s pandemic response (Appel
et al. 2018; Larkin 2013).
In October 2020, Cuban airports re-opened to tourists, and entrepreneurs on the island who had thrived pre-pandemic with full bed and
breakfasts and tour groups breathed a sigh of relief. Since then, the
number of new infections have started creeping up. For example, on 27
November 2020, MINSAP reported 35 new cases of COVID-19. Twentyeight of these were tourists (Redaccion OnCuba 2020c). How the country
will continue to maintain pandemic control while opening up to
international tourism – an essential form of revenue on the island –
remains to be seen.
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Notes
1
2
3
4
5
https://oncubanews.com/cuba/cuba-casi-la-mitad-de-los-contagios-por-coronavirus-estasemana-fueron-importados/. Redaccion OnCuba. 2020c.
Socios are friends or acquaintances through which one accesses business advantages/
opportunities or resources needed for daily living. Socios are a key part of sociolismo, a strategy
Cubans employ to resolver, or get what they need, in a context of scarcity.
Over 50,000 cases of optical and peripheral neuropathy were diagnosed between 1991 and
1994, out of a population of 10.8 million. According to MINSAP, likely causes include
nutritional deficiencies stemming from the deprivations of the Special Period complicated by
alcohol and tobacco use (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1994).
Group of Cuban health professionals, established in 2005 in response to Hurricane Katrina,
regularly deployed to provide humanitarian support in response to disasters throughout the
world.
This article refers to crimes against health.
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3
Militarising the pandemic
Lockdown in South Africa
Lenore Manderson and Susan Levine
Until mid-2020, South Africa controlled the transmission of coronavirus
and avoided a heavy toll from COVID-19 by an early and stringent
lockdown enforced by police and defence troops. The iconic images of the
pandemic were of soldiers in camouflage and masks, strong-arming
homeless residents and populations in informal settlements. Such images
are redolent of South Africa’s long history of police, soldiers and private
security employees enforcing civil obedience; significant numbers of
citizens live with the memory of their own house arrests, detention and
imprisonment (Ross 2003). Consistent with apartheid’s deployment of
the military to curtail social movement, arms were used to threaten and
kill particular citizens at the height of South Africa’s aggressive COVID-19
response, so underlying the violence of class and race hierarchy. For those
old enough to have lived through the worst years of apartheid curfews,
passbooks, military surveillance, torture and house arrests, the sudden
arrival of COVID-19 not only deepened poverty, unemployment and
hunger, but it also unveiled the thin veneer of South Africa’s transition
to democracy. Having already endured chronic and systemic poverty,
the massification of debility through TB and HIV/AIDS, and an uneven
public health infrastructure to address chronic disease, the country
has accommodated rules governing lockdown and its different forms of
militant surveillance. The deadly experience of chronic pandemics
created the conditions under which citizens across the country, in both
urban and rural settings, complied to a much larger extent with public
health protocols than in other parts of the world where we continue to
witness the tragic results of anti-masker campaigns and COVID-19
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47
denialism. That said, the spatialisation of poverty in the form of insecure
and densely populated black townships has militated against the
possibility of adequate social distancing (Manderson and Levine 2020).
How and why did South Africa manage with so little violence and
resistance to enforce lockdown, and what counter factors came into play
to address what might have been the catastrophic transmission of the
virus in its early months? In this chapter, we show how lockdown in South
Africa was enforced through its militarisation, drawing on the techniques
and technologies of apartheid. We reflect on the unevenness of the
risk and outcomes of infection from early in the pandemic, including in
relation to the economic and social conditions of everyday life and access
to care. We draw inspiration from a diverse range of theoretical directions
and concepts to analyse South Africa’s lockdown. Derrida’s ‘hauntology’
allows us to apprehend the structural legacies of apartheid; Goffman’s
‘total institution’ provides understanding of how the military works;
Habermas (1975) allows us to comprehend the responsibility of the state
to its population, and so to question state shortfalls, not only in South
Africa but also in other settings. As we show, racism and capitalism
converge and co-exploit to sharpen the inequalities of the pandemic.
Lockdown
South Africa’s lockdown was initiated on 26 March, at the time one of the
strictest lockdowns to be imposed globally. It continued to be extended
thereafter at different levels, with the rise and fall of infections. Yet, even
by the time the lockdown was introduced, schools and universities had
already taken the first steps to deliver courses online, and retail, personal
services and other industries had contracted in scope and engagement.
Entry into corporate spaces and public buildings was limited; social
distancing and hand sanitisation were pervasive. Armed security guards
and police were far more visible along city streets and malls than they
might have been under ordinary circumstances; bank tellers and shop
assistants stepped back from customers; and television and radio news
and magazine programmes consistently attended programmes to the
sanitary requisites of prevention and the risks inherent in everyday life.
The lockdown reinforced these practices, with strict Stage 4 constraints
to movement that initially prohibited and later limited the hours of
outdoor exercise, walking dogs and other recreational uses of public
space, and mandated the use of masks when outside the home. The
sale and purchase of cigarettes was prohibited, most likely to obviate
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excursions to shops, although also because smoking increased the risk
associated for respiratory infection. Alcohol was also prohibited to limit
what are, under any circumstances, painfully high levels of intimate
partner violence (Friedman 2020), and as a measure to limit car accidents
and injuries due to inebriation, which might lead to hospitalisations that
would take up beds and medical services needed for patients with
respiratory distress. The lockdown and associated measures constraining
social life arguably contained the transmission of coronavirus for a time;
in theory, they enabled hospitals, laboratories and health services to
reorient to manage growing numbers of people with COVID-19. Some of
the constraints were subsequently judged unconstitutional and irrational
by the High Court of South Africa on 2 June 2020, by which time, 37,525
cases of coronavirus infection had been reported. And this was only the
beginning of what became a shocking escalation of cases that fed on
poverty, immiseration and civil unrest.
Even before lockdown had been declared, disinfectant dispensers
were handheld by guards at shop doors; within three months, pedal
dispensers had been installed in some premises to further minimise
human contact. At upmarket establishments, temperatures were taken
upon entry and contact details logged for tracking and tracing. Only a few
people at a time were (and, in November 2020, still were) allowed into
shops and government offices, including police stations and social security
offices; the remainder stood spaced out to observe social distancing
regulations, in South Africa as in the global north. Our social skin
expanded to accommodate distance in contexts of privilege where social
distancing is possible. In his May address to the nation, President Cyril
Ramaphosa said that ‘hugging and kissing is a thing of the past’ (Tembo
2020). Self-surveillance, the regulation of others through citizen arrests
and public shaming through social media platforms, assisted state
response. Although the use of social media to ‘sting’ people recalcitrant or
wilfully disobeying the law is not unique to South Africa (Sundaram
2015), the incremental encouragement of citizen surveillance pushed
Michel Foucault’s (2012) panopticon to its limit.
The temporary nature of this containment did not prepare South
Africans for the scale and speed of viral spread. At the first lockdown,
there were 927 reported cases; on 22 April, there were 4,546 cases and a
total of 65 deaths; these low numbers, relative to infections and death
rates elsewhere in the world, suggested that continued extreme state
measures were unnecessary. But the effectiveness of such measures to
avert a catastrophe were overestimated. By mid-July, South Africa was
number five in the global league stakes that no one wanted to win; the
MILITARISING THE PANDEMIC : LOCKDOWN IN SOUTH AFRICA
49
number of cases and deaths continued to rise and viral transmission
continued to accelerate across provinces and from urban to rural areas.
By mid-November 2020, there were 750,000 cases of infection and over
20,000 deaths, with rural areas and the poorest states increasingly
affected.
From the beginning of lockdown, the heightened presence of private
security forces, citizen arrests,1 the police, newly empowered national
park rangers and the massification of South Africa’s military response
to enforce COVID-19 lockdown regulations contributed to a highly
differentiated reality along the well-worn lines of class, race and gender.
Two key questions emerged from these events and the continued
repercussions of the pandemic: the extent to which social and economic
inequality results in vulnerability to infection; and, as discussed below,
the processes and consequences of militarisation in enforcing adherence
to lockdown. By mid-July, the top 10 countries globally in terms of total
reported cases of coronavirus were mostly countries with relatively large
populations. The unequal impact of COVID-19, however, reflected not
population density nor health systems factors alone, despite the fact that
these factors surely influenced patterns and risks of transmission and
infection. Rather, these countries, all high and middle-income countries,
were among the most unequal countries in their regions and in the world
(using World Bank Gini coefficients and government reports). We had, in
the early weeks of the pandemic, argued that COVID-19 would track
social fault lines and disproportionately infect and affect poor people
(Manderson and Levine 2020). COVID-19 did not ‘track’ such fault lines:
it fed on, burned into and abraded them. While vaccine development
proceeded at remarkable pace through 2020, with research groups and
pharmaceutical companies in the UK, Australia and the US fiercely
competing, questions of its production at scale, and its stability,
affordability, distribution and delivery, especially in countries with weak
health systems and limited human and other resources, have yet to be
addressed. In this respect, COVID-19, like HIV before it, will continue to
impact unevenly in ways that penalise both the individuals and countries
who are poorest and with the least power.
The one sure means we have to limit risk is to manage proximity, but
proximity is also a scarce resource for people who live in the insanitary
and crowded conditions that prevail in informal settlements, tenement
buildings, workers’ dormitories, high-rise apartments and public housing
estates, slums and favelas in cities like Cape Town, Mexico City, New York,
London, Delhi and Sao Paulo. People with low incomes, some without
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formal papers that allow them free access to services, routinely live with
their families and others in makeshift shelters, often confined to single
rooms. These are places with limited municipal services and poor social
care, areas that typically lack sewage, drainage and waste disposal. They
are characterised by extreme poverty and endemic unemployment,
property and intimate partner violence, drug and alcohol abuse, and gang
rule. The people in these environments live with disproportionate rates
of chronic disease, the outcome of a calculated necropolitics (Mbembe
2008). In South Africa, this includes especially HIV; in India and South
Africa, TB; and everywhere high rates of cardiometabolic disease, poor
nutrition and poor mental health. Poor people do not have enough food,
and lockdown has stripped many of even the most precarious and poorly
remunerated income-generating activities such as recycling, flower
markets and informal food stands. In some cases, in acknowledging this,
state and NGO entities have extended grants and food relief; in other
cases, they have not.
On 11 May, the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA)
introduced a programme – the Special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress
Grant – which would provide 350 rand (c. US$20) per month for six
months to people who were unemployed, were receiving no other
benefits, and met other conditions relating to age and residence (South
African Government 2020). Applications had to be electronic. Clearly, the
intervention was unlikely to assist people whose employment was always
precarious, who lacked access to basic virtual communication technology
or who could not afford to pay for data. Moreover, people living in impoverished conditions without resources cannot adhere to the rules of social
distance. They may not have reliable or clean water, and they may not be
able to buy soap to wash their hands regularly, nor afford to make or
purchase masks (Ross 2020). Further, despite little acknowledgement of
this in dominant discourse in relation to COVID-19, poor populations
everywhere have access to fewer health and medical services, are least
often insured, may have no right to care, may be unwilling to present for
care because of prior experiences of violence, disrespect and abuse, and
often lack transport and cash to access and pay for advice or medication.
COVID-19 magnified inequalities as it exploited them. Structural violence,
discrimination and fear feed into understandings of the pandemic and
everyday interactions, and were exploited by troops and police overseeing
adherence to lockdown in informal settlements. The assertion of military
power and the extension of police rights to punish caused as much
fear – if not more – than the virus itself.
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51
Theorising militarisation
In South Africa, as noted above, in order to enforce lockdown, there was
increased use of police, military and militia deployed from private
security companies and armed response teams, many of them soldiers
from civil wars and insurgencies in neighbouring countries. The
outsourcing to militarised forces to ensure public health compliance,
rather than to social or healthcare workers, centralised state power and
consolidated the uneven distribution of force along the lines of class and
race. Likewise, it deepened fear in the social context of collective grief,
loss and growing hunger and unemployment. The 1.5-metre rule of
interaction and social distance became a mnemonic of risk and its
embodiment in race and class. Such is the dystopic if not myopic landscape
of COVID-19.
The rationale for military engagement is perhaps obvious yet it
is useful, for our purposes, to reiterate this. The military is a highly
organised and tightly regimented institution – a ‘total institution’ (Goffman
1961) – comprising a large number of people trained to operate without
question, as part of a group, in unpredictable, volatile and dangerous
settings. The scenarios of future violence for which defence forces are
trained include terrorism with highly technical weaponry that might
include chemical and biological warfare, explosive devices, and armed
drones and guided missiles, and, on the other hand, low intensity and lowtechnology warfare such as that characteristic of recent civil wars and
episodic resistance in countries in southern and central Africa, including
Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, DR Congo and Rwanda. Many of the
troops and security officers involved in enforcing lockdown have had
experience in such settings. South African soldiers are also trained to work
alongside civilian entities in disaster management, including to rescue
affected populations, reduce population risk and run disaster management
centres. The laws that define these roles were invoked in 2020 to meet the
emergent needs of taming and containing the pandemic.2
Contemporary democracies, including South Africa after apartheid,
are meant to balance the lives of individuals and families with the
collective interests related to social, economic and public life. Habermas
(1975), among other theorists, has argued that by protecting contemporary democracy, the public sphere allows for mediation between family
and the state, in ways that might temper the arbitrary exercise of power.
The methods of governance for this include both formal and informal
public institutions that enable debate, dissent and consensus. The ensuing
debates, and power and authority, flow through political parties and
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parliamentary processes, trade unions and associations, and different
structures of authority (including those associated with formal religion
and traditional authority structures). The media, which in South Africa
has a strong tradition and enduring practice of directly engaging in public
life, also plays a significant role in governance in civil society. But the state
also controls the military (excluding those militarised states where the
reverse is true) and exercises power through it. COVID-19 has empowered
the military in many contexts to reassert state domination over civilian
populations under the guise of protection and care, while the military has
taken advantage of the virus to subvert attempts to protest against and
address systemic injustices and human rights abuses. COVID-19, like
other global pandemics, has laid bare the myth of democracy as outlined
by Habermas (1975). Let us take this moment to revisit the patriarchal
and racist foundations of democracy as established by an elite class of
white men to the exclusion of all others (Pateman 1989), and we will be
better equipped to understand the uneven distribution of care in societies
masquerading as egalitarian.
In South Africa after apartheid, the political rights of all people
were guaranteed in the constitution, one of the most liberal, and clear,
worldwide. The judicial system was established to assess claims between
individuals and communities or groups in the private sphere, and to
establish justice where points of contestation existed between specific
populations and the state. At the core of these structures and the
principles that underlie them are ideas of public good and the role of
the state to ensure this. The legitimacy of a welfare state, even with a
truncated active contribution to welfare, derives from its capacity to
protect civil liberty and allow for democratic debate, protect the general
population against sectarian interests (while allowing, within limits, their
articulation consistent with commitment to democracy) and to provide a
range of services essential for everyday life. The mandate to ensure and
protect public health derives from this: specific state entities have a
responsibility to guarantee conditions of public safety and wellbeing,
including through the provision of infrastructure and services. These
change with time. At present, they might include potable water, electricity,
drainage, sewerage and garbage collection, and adherence to environmental and occupational health and building standards, although not
all of these exist in all places, and although what is considered an
infrastructural right might also change (clean energy, for example).
Public health includes these services insofar as breaches in these areas
might indirectly or directly infringe on health, as has been long
documented in the case of bacterial disease outbreaks. In certain
MILITARISING THE PANDEMIC : LOCKDOWN IN SOUTH AFRICA
53
circumstances, the capacity of the state to maintain these conditions is
undermined, as might occur in the case of an extreme weather event such
as flood or drought or unprecedented local disaster (an explosion in
a crowded inner city area, for instance, or a fire in a high-rise block or
tearing through a suburb). Under such conditions, one can imagine the
value of a reserve army of workers, as a defence force not engaged in
active warfare might be regarded. How an army might be deployed in the
case of infectious disease not transmitted as a result of the breakdown of
infrastructure or social structure is less obvious. The use of the military in
previous epidemics, not in South Africa but elsewhere on the continent –
as occurred with Ebola – suggests that states are prepared to use
exceptional measures under exceptional circumstances and to suspend
usual protocol, as mandated by the constitutional responsibility of a state
to declare an emergency. The coronavirus pandemic was one such
moment.
In this context, discussion and debate about lockdown did not relate
to options, but were centrally concerned with the threat of escalating
infection and its venality. This extended to talk-back radio sessions on the
implications of closing institutions, to the way in which isolation might
impact on everyday life, to risks for specific activities. A week before the
initial lockdown, one of us (LM) led a 90-minute webinar and Q & A session
with the Institute of Plumbing South Africa, with hundreds of workers
sharing computers and cell phones at service points and workshops to
discuss the risks of infection as a result of using portable toilets on building
sites, or accepting calls to attend to plumbing problems at people’s homes.
These media, word of mouth, WhatsApp, Facebook and press reports all
allowed for the travel of information, of variable quality, about viral risk,
spread and encounters, in ways that facilitated citizen’s engagement in and
reinforced the lively quality of South Africa’s democratic institutions.
However, perhaps influenced by a rising mood of fear and anxiety,
there was limited discussion of the ways that state acts of care –
instantiated by advice about social distancing and hand washing and
institutionalised through strictly enforced lockdown – might affect
different populations. Although radio, television and social media provide
venues for critical and oppositional voices in South Africa, these were
unevenly distributed, and the most vocal concerns about lockdown
related to monetary impact – an inevitability as the economy shuttered
– and paid relatively limited attention to those whose lives were already
precarious. With the easing of restrictions across the country there was
an easing of draconian measures to curb the virus, but the easing of the
military and police response was also attributed to ordinary citizens and
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VIRAL LOADS
activist journalists who rendered visible the violence of the state and the
deepening of chaos at a moment that called for epistemic and ethical
generosity.
Ebola occurred, as anthropologists illustrated, in the context of
highly fragmented societies where the ghosts of colonial domination
seeped into the management of bodies and communities during the crisis
(Parker, et al. 2019; Sams, et al. 2017). In South Africa, with its specific
history of militarisation, the response to COVID-19 was remarkably if
uncomfortably accommodated, even as questions of race, racism and
structural violence gained purchase. It was tolerated too despite the
assumed impossible return of apartheid era curfews, lockdowns and the
use of the military to contain populations and the movement across
(internal) borders (Levine 2020).
The upscaling deployment of police and militia to urban and rural
South Africa distorts the temporal imaginary of the past as it animates the
present. The collapse of linear time is best indexed by Derrida’s illuminating
idea of ‘hauntology’, where the ghosts of the past enflesh the present
(see Davis 2005). In South Africa, the specific history of militarisation to
impose apartheid and enact gross human rights abuses might suggest that
this response would be intolerable. And yet, the mass use of surveillance
technologies to enforce COVID-19 lockdown regulations and curfews in
South Africa, as elsewhere, seem largely to have been tolerated to a far
greater extent than might be anticipated, with limited capacity to oppose
these measures when set against the immediate threat of viral invasion and
its effects on human lives. The increased presence of force, via the bodies of
armed security guards, police and soldiers, consolidated fear along the
lines of class and race, and sharpened the fear of the consequences of
disease in terms of growing hunger, unemployment and localised violence.
Without addressing questions of inequality, South Africa is likely to
face similar problems in containing future unfolding crises in health and
wellbeing. The uncomfortable trinity of class, race and gender remains
in South Africa – as elsewhere – a prism through which an ontology of
inequality surfaces at different intersectional axes, each of which requires
further elaboration with the unfolding COVID-19 pandemic.
Enforcing isolation
The initial and continued lockdowns depended, increasingly, on
enforcement. The informal settlements of South Africa, the slums of
Mexico and the favelas of Brazil have long been characterised by gun rule
MILITARISING THE PANDEMIC : LOCKDOWN IN SOUTH AFRICA
55
and the venal power of street gangs, but in mid-2020, these spaces were
equally sites of soldiers and police, using terror and the occasional display
of force to maintain social distancing, curfews and isolation. In South
Africa, on 26 March, 2,820 soldiers were mobilised to work with police to
enforce Stage 5 lockdown and its strict regulations to stave off catastrophic
levels of infection and death (Anon 2020). On 22 April 2020, 73,180
regular, reserve and auxiliary personnel of the South African National
Defence Force were deployed for nine weeks – until 26 June – in an
operation that cost around 4.5 billion rand (US$2.4 million). Even before
this decision, anecdotal accounts of unnecessary and at times gratuitous
use of force and police brutality were emerging; troops dressed in army
fatigues, in military formation, weapons at the ready, descended on
townships to disperse populations and enforce shelter in place. Local
municipalities commissioned armoured personnel carriers – the Casspirs,
Buffels and Hippos used to repress black populations under apartheid – to
round up people without homes and reinforce lockdown.3 People who
were homeless in Johannesburg and Pretoria were rounded up and
confined in sports stadiums and ovals. By late April, armed soldiers,
municipal police, private security forces (including former militia) and
national park rangers were being deployed to ‘fight’ the virus by fighting
those at risk of infection. The war on COVID-19 was claimed to be one of
the largest army deployments in the country’s history. Consistent eyewitness accounts and reports of police brutality and abuse went beyond
the levels of violence, already endemic, that mimic the enforcement of
law as applied to race and place under apartheid, and that continue to the
present as reactions to and a result of extreme inequality, deprivation and
xenophobia. While not on the same scale as apartheid era violence, and
with very different political groups in power, the muscle memory of
militia deployment and the unapologetic abuse of police power signals
the distinct failure of South Africa’s democratic transition to upturn the
ghosts of apartheid. The Marikana massacre for instance, in 2012, left 42
mine workers dead after then President Jacob Zuma ordered police to
shoot at unarmed mine workers who were fighting for a living wage.
Rather than an ethics of care in the face of grave adversity, the mining
tycoon resorted to apartheid-era murder. The elasticity of history keeps
looping back to this default response rather than more imaginative, or at
the very least, less violent approaches to deploying care in time of crisis.
The confluence of science, medicine and the army is not new; direct
links between the military and medical and surgical practice are well
established historically and in the present (Chua 2018; Cooter et al. 1999;
Harrison 2001; Pickstone 1992; Terry 2017). The matrix of South Africa’s
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VIRAL LOADS
response to COVID-19 follows the use of police to enforce vaccination
during the 2009 avian flu epidemic in Malawi (Sambala and Manderson
2017; 2018); the earlier use of surveillance and quarantine as a method
to stem the spread of HIV/AIDS in Cuba (Scheper-Hughes 1993); and the
controversial deployment of the military in Liberia during the height of
the epidemic of Ebola virus disease (EVD) (Aizenman 2020). The Ebola
epidemic was the largest of its type ever seen, characterised by its rapid
transmission and terrifying case fatality, with almost 30,000 people
infected and 11,000 fatalities, mainly in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.
Kelley Sams and colleagues (2017) point out that this was the first time
that anthropologists were early involved in relatively large numbers,
although along predictable lines: to help ensure that public health
interventions were locally relevant (Wilkinson et al. 2017). The measures
of militarisation and policing that characterised the response to COVID19 – to identify and quarantine cases – were amplified by (and amplified
the power of) the iatrogenic impact of war metaphors for patients
surviving or succumbing to illness (Sontag 2001). Further, in the race for
a vaccine, the United States launched Operation Warp Speed in
partnership with the US Defence Force and leading virologists. Its mission
was to defeat the enemy because ‘winning matters … a massive scientific,
industrial, and logistical endeavor unlike anything our country has seen’
(National Public Radio 2020). Since then, the language of war has
extended to reinvoke Cold War politics, with accusations of biological
warfare and cyber espionage of scientific research increasingly redolent
of the 1950s.
At the same time, the global upscaling of troops and other armed
personnel as frontline forces to combat the spread of coronavirus was
unprecedented. Far from the lexicon of war as metaphor to describe
battles against illness, actual militia were tasked with implementing
lockdown regulations to fight this viral enemy. Armed soldiers and police
were not the metaphorical fighter cells of the human immune system
under siege in bodies with HIV (Martin 1994); rather, as already
described, in South Africa, armed soldiers in camouflage and police with
masks were tasked to combat the virus by controlling population
mobility, density and interaction even while equally vulnerable to
infection. This militarised response was not unique; globally, defence
forces and technologies were deployed at unprecedented levels to
combat the spread of coronavirus. The first use of war infrastructure that
captured global media attention was, arguably, army vehicles carrying
coffins in Bergamo, Italy, in mid-March, when with hindsight, the number
of deaths was enviably low. In Malaysia, also in March, army forces with
MILITARISING THE PANDEMIC : LOCKDOWN IN SOUTH AFRICA
57
protective face masks joined police to enforce border control and national
lockdown.4 In the US, some 2,000 defence reserve personnel from
the National Guard were called up on 19 March, and by 24 March, 9,000
troops were providing transportation, engineering, and planning and
logistics, including administering tests and supporting medical personnel,
as part of state efforts to control the spread of infection (Lengyel 2020).
Field hospitals were erected to manage expanding caseloads and the need
for hospitalisation. In Belgrade from 9 July, police used tear gas, armoured
vehicles and horses to disperse people protesting against renewed
lockdown conditions implemented in an effort to manage the impact of
increased cases on Serbia’s health system. In Australia, from early July,
armed forces were patrolling the highways, truck routes and border
tracks dividing the states of Victoria, New South Wales and South
Australia. And over this time, countries worldwide, including those with
the greatest numbers of infections and others (Peru, Mexico, Chile, India,
Nigeria, Turkey, UK) militarised their responses to the pandemic. And
while the rhetoric of the deployment of defence forces has not surprisingly
tilted towards the care of the public, this ‘care’ has extended to patrol
stores and protect looting, forcibly transfer people believed to be infected
to hospital – in Nigeria, for example – and constrain everyday movement.
In Nigeria, military personnel did not receive training to carry out policing
functions, and this has been linked to reports of the systematic harassment
and brutalisation of the population, including the deaths of violators of
lockdown measures in Lagos, Abuja, Warri and elsewhere in the country
(Iweze 2020).
The murder of George Floyd by policemen in Minneapolis on
25 May 2020, and the consequent roll-out of protests across the US and
worldwide, extended the role of the military; troops increasingly
complemented armed police to constrain protests against systematic
racism and violence. The deployment of the military to ‘fight’ coronavirus
provided states with growing opportunities to demonstrate their capacity
to exercise physical control over members of the population for political
as well as biological purposes. At the same time, COVID-19 provided a
reason (or an excuse) for states to roundup and detain unregistered
migrants and refugees (e.g. in Malaysia and in South Africa).5 By using
the military to do this, states illustrated how the war on coronavirus
might serve a dual purpose: containing viral spread and rooting out
people, too, who were seen to be undesirable.
Thus the war on coronavirus interlocked with and enabled not a
war against poverty, but a war against people who were poor. Throughout
2020, as people were evicted from houses for which they could no longer
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Figure 3.1 Land invasion. On an otherwise quiet Sunday in August, the
Anti-Land Invasion Unit arrived at the settlement next to the new area
called Covid, and, without warning to the community, proceeded to tear
it down. Contract workers employed by the city carried the big pieces of
tin to two waiting trucks. Photo: Samantha Reinders/NPR
pay rent, new informal settlements sprang up. Three settlements in the
Cape Flats, on the periphery of the City of Cape Town – ‘Covid’, ‘Sanitizer’
and ‘19’ (as in COVID-19) – are named as wry mnemonics of their history.
But the tin shacks that people built for shelter were destroyed as quickly
as they were built, torn down by contract workers and employees of the
city’s Anti-Land Invasion Unit, donned in riot gear and armed (Reinders
2020; see Figure 3.1).
The world was already lethal
The murder of George Floyd – suffocated under the force of a police
officer’s knee – ignited the massification of protestors in cities across the
United States and, with speed, worldwide. President Donald Trump
deployed armed forces to disperse peaceful protesters with tear gas and
rubber bullets in the name of implementing curfew regulations put in
place to limit the duration of public protest. Outside the White House,
ostensibly to protect a photo shoot of the president, protestors were
denied their constitutional right to peaceful protest. Floyd was the latest
MILITARISING THE PANDEMIC : LOCKDOWN IN SOUTH AFRICA
59
link in a tragic (and continuing) chain of brutal deaths and injuries
involving police, again, in the US and worldwide – Australia, United
Kingdom, France, Belgium, South Africa: Rodney King, Malice Wayne
Green, Abner Louima, Amadou Diallo, Eric Garner, Michael Brown,
Freddie Gray, Philando Castile, Ahmaud Arbery and Breonna Taylor,
among them (Allman 2020; Stott et al. 2020; Taskinsoy 2020). Greater
public scrutiny of police brutality of Black South Africa began to appear
on Facebook posts. In a world battling with two forms of breath restriction
– the suffocating effects of COVID-19 and the ‘I can’t breathe’ movement
triggered by Floyd’s murder – Black people around the world not only fear
and die from the virus; they also fear and are killed by security officers
(see Garth, Chapter 5). Thus the pandemics of racism and COVID-19 are
aligned and solicit similar militarised responses.
Troops deployed by President Cyril Ramaphosa to maintain the
nationwide lockdown to contain infection, as described above, were
extended from an initial three weeks and continued until 30 September.
As noted, armed private security companies were also granted the right
to enforce COVID-19 regulations. The police were able – as before – to
issue fines, and to strong-arm, arrest and remove ‘disobedient’ members
of the public. As radical new modes of sociality were introduced to
diminish the wanderlust of the virus and its multiple forms of transmission,
President Ramaphosa praised the courage, resilience, responsibility and
sacrifices of ordinary South Africans. He failed, however, to be precise
about the shape of these sacrifices, and he failed to condemn officers who
abused their power by contributing to the ‘economy of terror’ that brought
together the toxic combination of a militarised state apparatus with a
deathly virus (for a comparison with Haiti, see James 2010).
As noted, deeply reminiscent of curfews that constrained the
movement of dehumanised populations by criminalising black Africans
as ‘vagrants’ under apartheid, the police enforced COVID-19 curfews in
overcrowded areas, especially in informal settlements that lack the most
basic necessities – always and particularly during COVID-19 – of running
water, indoor toilets and electricity (Manderson and Levine 2020). The
Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs Nkosaaana
Dlamini Zuma is partly responsible for the declaration of a curfew that
became established in law as: ‘Every person is confined to his or her place
of residence from 8:00 pm until 05:00 am daily, except where a person
has been granted a permit’. Surveillance technologies returned with the
ease of muscle memory, and thus the haunting. The pandemic had been
militarised. An SMS message from a friend living in Athlone – a mostly
coloured neighbourhood in Cape Town – read:
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My brother in Knysna passed away today at noon due to a stroke.
The police kept us behind walls. I was even sprayed by pepper spray
on my way to get airtime … I can’t even go to his funeral, I’m just
very sad … I couldn’t see for a couple of days because of the pepper
spray … wish this lockdown was over, but hey I’m not taking any
chances now, too afraid of the cops and army … A young mom that
was still breastfeeding was shot on her boob with a rubber bullet, an
elderly man was shot with a Taser, some people got fines for standing
behind their gates in their own yards, as much as R1500. Oh my
God, there’s so much to tell, but my airtime will not make it. … they
really treat us like animals, and that’s the part the President doesn’t
see (Mara).
Against the opportunity to radically change South Africa’s default position
in times of crisis that leans into the logic of militarised force aimed at
the poor, cities across the country afforded even greater power to law
enforcement officers. In the Western Cape, the province initially hardest
hit by the pandemic, the Cape Metro Police were backed by the City of
Cape Town’s traffic services, the latter reported to operate a ‘heavily
armed municipal militia’ (Farr and Green 2020). Defence Minister
Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula justified the use of military force in terms of
tightening regulations, and to ‘make sure that our people understand
fully the dangers of getting this virus’. The return of apartheid-era military
tanks including iconic Casspirs, renamed by the Democratic Alliance
(DA), the ruling party in the province, as ‘hardened vehicles’ (Farr and
Green 2020), offers obvious material and symbolic links between the past
and present moment that continues to violate black lives. This violation
corroborates videos and stories circulating via social media and personal
communication of police abuse, killing and humiliation of members of
the public during national lockdown. This includes most recently the
eviction of Bulelani Qolani, dragged naked from his shack, which the
police ripped apart before his eyes (Lali and Stent 2020). Greg Nicolson,
a journalist with the South African newspaper the Daily Maverick, had
written, nine weeks earlier: ‘I have a strong feeling that we may see a
rise in incidents of what we regard as abuse simply because the police and
the soldiers out there are not quite clear how to enforce the curfew
arrangements’ (Nicolson 2020).
Reports in local newspapers and social media indicate that whether
or not the laws and regulations protected people from the virus, or slowed
its spread, the police and others granted exceptional authority grossly
abused their power. After Collins Khosa was verbally assaulted by police
MILITARISING THE PANDEMIC : LOCKDOWN IN SOUTH AFRICA
61
for standing outside his house, his parents report that police chased him
into the house, ripped his shirt, broke their door down, swore and fired
rubber bullets (Lali and Stent, 2020). The racism of criminalisation
during COVID-19 regulations ricocheted against the tide of global forms
of dehumanisation captured locally in Collins Khosa’s murder and
globally in George Floyd’s. In his exceptional reporting on the murder of
Khosa, Kneo Mokgopa (2020) wrote:
The killing of Floyd sparked global protests under the hashtag,
‘Black Lives Matter’. The death of George Floyd gathered international outrage, including from our own government, and protests
around the globe. So many of us have tried to figure why it is that
Collins Khosa’s death, and the litany of other black people killed by
South African law enforcement, could not ignite the same outrage
and protests, even within our borders.
Mokgopa’s response to reports that 12 people were killed in the first few
weeks of lockdown signals that no impoverished person was shocked by
the fact that in South Africa the police kill more than three times the
number of people killed by the police in the United States. It instantiates
Derrida’s idea of hauntology and the normalisation of systemic violence
that the pandemic revealed. Mokgopa’s conclusion was this:
If you are poor and black your life does not count to this society. It is
often the state that will come to you with a gun. Your home can be
destroyed, you can be assaulted, tortured and killed with impunity.
This is the experience of impoverished people across South Africa.
Our dignity is continuously vandalised by the state (2020).
Conclusion
In acknowledging the hardship that such extreme measures placed on
the majority of the population, in April 2020 President Ramaphosa
announced a ‘500 billion rand (around US$26 billion) package to shore
up an economy devastated by the fallout from the coronavirus pandemic
and support those who’ve been worst affected’ (Naidoo 2020). This
massive relief package was intended to support the economy and
vulnerable people, in recognition that efforts to contain COVID-19 would
result in increased homelessness, destitution and mass unemployment. In
this respect and in terms of scale, COVID-19 was reminiscent of the 1918
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H1N1 pandemic (the so-called ‘Spanish Flu’), the most devastating
pandemic of modern times (Philips 2020). Then, a century ago, South
Africa was one of the five worst-hit parts of the world, with about 300,000
dead within six weeks. After it had finally ebbed, a doctor reflected in the
South African Medical Record in January 1919: ‘It has truly been an
irreparable calamity which has fallen on South Africa’ (Philips 2020).
The 1918 flu was not the only experience of pandemic in South
Africa. More people have been infected and died from HIV and AIDS
in South Africa than anywhere else in the world; in 2017, 7.7 million
people were living with HIV. In the early twenty-first century, under the
leadership of President Thabo Mbeki, when deaths from AIDS were
escalating, the police curbed protest action by the Treatment Action
Campaign (TAC) demanding access to antiretroviral treatment (Robins
2004). Looking back, one wonders how infection rates and the immense
social and individual suffering in Sub-Saharan Africa could have been
limited if governments had been as pro-active as the present moment
(Heywood 2009; 2020). And yet with 2020 hindsight, the lockdown has
only intensified poverty, hunger and unemployment, and led to the
further curtailment of rights among the country’s most vulnerable
residents. It has yet to flatten the curve.
A healthcare intervention of the magnitude raised by the South
African government needed a strong infrastructure based on an economy
of compassion, not terror. Diseases of poverty including HIV, tuberculosis,
hypertension and diabetes, plus the additional public health crises of
gender-based violence, drug and alcohol dependence and food insecurity,
co-mingle with vices of power, systemic racism and privilege. In the
context of these multiple layers of vulnerability, the presence of the state
in the form of curfews and surveillance technologies, however violent and
punitive, has also been greeted by some as a form of state care and
concern. Especially among middle and upper class South Africans who
feared the fates of the US, Italy, the UK, Belgium and other countries with
waves and second wave spikes, the strong arm approach deployed by the
president has been largely well received. Unlike the tenor of this general
praise, for the poor and dispossessed the COVID-19 pandemic was less of
a rupture than a deepening of social fragility.
Jake Skeets (2020) writes that the world before COVID-19 ‘was
already lethal’, and that systemic disaster capitalism has diminished the
possibility of hope, for there is no past to which we would wish to return:
‘If we yearn for a time before the pandemic, what do we yearn for?’ What
indeed, do we yearn for? If we could answer this question, it might be
possible to remake a world beyond COVID. This would be a world that
MILITARISING THE PANDEMIC : LOCKDOWN IN SOUTH AFRICA
63
would dismantle the machinery of force that deepens public suffering in
the face of pandemic. It would fuel modes of care that require the total
abolition of racial capitalism, and the global forces of colonial pillage that
render some lives more valuable than others.
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
In terms of Section 42 of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977, a South African Citizen has
the right to arrest the following persons: Trespassers; Persons engaged in an affray (Public
Fighting); and Persons who he (sic) has a reasonable suspicion have committed a Schedule One
Offence.
South Africa, Disaster Management Act, 2002 (Act no. 57 of 30 December 2002).
See this for example: https://edition.cnn.com/2020/04/02/africa/homeless-communitysouth-africa-coronavirus-intl/index.html.
There are links here to the police use of pepper balls to disperse people protesting the death of
George Floyd in Washington DC on 1 June, and the consistent oppositional force to resist
#BlackLivesMatter protests worldwide.
Al Jazeera reporters have been arrested and interrogated and there are reports of sustained
online abuse (13 July 2020).
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4
Rights, responsibilities and
revelations
COVID-19 conspiracy theories and the state
Elisa J. Sobo and Elz·bieta Dra˛z·kiewicz
This is what Bill Gates and George Soros want to do... Secretly stick
you with a chip while testing you for the corona virus.... the Dems
have a bill on the house floor ready to vote on it to require this ....
House Bill 6666.... no bull.... look it up and WAKE UP !!!! (10 May
2020, Facebook post showing deeply inserted nasal swab, https://
www.facebook.com/john.barno.1/posts/3216228888396817,
original punctuation)
When the SARS-CoV-2 virus began its global spread, launching the
COVID-19 pandemic, the race for a vaccine began. Simultaneously,
authorities sought to reduce the novel coronavirus’s propagation and
lower the strain on hospitals and morgues. Around the world, governments
began regulating not only where people could go and with whom but how
to dress (with masks and gloves) and behave (no shaking hands, keeping
2 m distance from each other and so on). As epidemiologists turned to
intensified contact tracing, private companies and governing bodies
joined forces to create new technologies for scaling up surveillance,
including virtual queuing tools, devices warning individuals should they
get too close to others and contact tracing apps.
All this was discussed daily in households and on social media. In
many instances, concerns over control, authority, transparency and
freedom – fuelled by competition between officially sanctioned, expert
knowledge and popular knowledge – supported the circulation of
RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND REVELATIONS
67
‘conspiratorial beliefs’. Around the world, fraught discussions ensued
regarding COVID-19 cover-ups, pandemic geopolitics, bot and humanly
driven disinformation floods on social media, and reporting bias in
the press.
The rapid incorporation of COVID-19 into conspiratorial schemes
worldwide (Freeman et al. 2020; Uscinski and Enders 2020) provides us
with a useful set of cross-culturally comparable conspiracy theories
involving the state, and thus a useful lens through which to enhance our
thinking about how conspiracy theories work as sociocultural critiques –
and what work they do for those who have built careers or identities
promoting them, cynically or not (see Bailey 1994). Our project draws on
ideas propagated in the first two-thirds of 2020. We focus on discourses
circulated via platforms like Twitter and Facebook within Ireland, Poland
and the US (where we have worked for many years). With this focus, we
ask how the 2020 pandemic is loaded onto and used by those with vested
interests to amplify, in the Global North, structure-agency, governancefreedom, responsibilities-rights tensions – tensions related to ideal visions
of and for the state and, ultimately, for justice and liberty. To gain insight,
we aim our investigation toward so-called conspiracy theories questioning
state-sponsored health interventions including but not limited to
vaccination. Because no approved COVID-19 vaccine existed at the time
of our investigation, the prospect of vaccination provided a particularly
viable projective screen for existential concerns: it was easily drawn into
use as evidence for the central claims of those already backing a conspiratorial world view.
We are interested specifically in how, in Ireland, Poland and the
US, and likely other democratic states, local conditions shape people’s
reception of, and by extension compliance with, governmental public
health emergency efforts, and how conspiracy theories come into
play in the process. We are interested in readings of disease threats
that connect ‘facts on the ground’ in ways that differ from how
authorised public health experts would have us connect them – readings
thereby labelled as ‘conspiracy theories’. After preeminent political
anthropologist F.G. Bailey, we see this as a competitive process of ‘claim
and counterclaim … about the way our world is and the way it should
be’ (1991, 17). Such a focus affords us the opportunity to interrogate
what COVID-19-related conspiracy theories might accomplish for those
vested in broadcasting them, and how and why even seemingly similar
conspiratorial ideas can vary in important local and historically
particular ways.
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Pandemic sense-making and dissent
We begin by observing that, in conspiratorial theorising, knowledge
is not an end in itself (Boyer 2006; Briggs 2004). This view lines up with
general anthropological thinking on knowledge as instrumental – as
used to interpret and act in the world; consequently, it is not distinguishable from culture (Barth 2002; see also Bailey 1991, 17–18).
Further, theorising about the world does not begin with knowledge
but with how people know things, and so we must examine the processes
by which people make connections in a fragmented world, how these
reflect particular styles of reasoning and what can be known under
particular historical circumstances (Hastrup 2004). This is especially
relevant in the context of COVID-19, with all its unknowns and the
ways these have been exacerbated by the diverse containment,
communication and transparency strategies adopted by different
governments.
Today’s pandemic conspiracy theories are less contests regarding
specific detailed facts (although they may be this overtly) than contests
regarding values. Adopting Bailey’s vantage, through COVID-19
conspiracy assertions, communities place their values ‘onto the front
stage’ for affirmation (1994, 152). Their theories are testimonials to
deep-rooted understandings about the state’s role in relation to citizens
and other stakeholders, corporations included.
Such visions of how society should function and of the prerogatives
and limits of government vary across societies. If conspiracy theories are
shaped by our worldviews (e.g. Harambam 2020), consequently, even
when the contents of conspiracy theories appear similar across societies,
their meanings must differ, at least to some degree.
Using case studies, we interrogate publicly propagated conspiratorial views on vaccination and other public health measures (social
distancing, contact tracing, testing) related to the present pandemic. The
anthropologist’s task – the remit of all social theorists, in fact – is to ‘find
explanation beyond the truth of the events themselves’ (Hastrup 2004,
468). As Engle-Merry and Coutin (2014) point out, to understand
conflicts over knowledge we must understand the political dynamics of
these conflicts – which may remain unseen to those embroiled in them
(see also Bailey 1994). Taking political context seriously is crucial not
only to fully grasping what various conspiracy theories have to tell us.
It is paramount to diffusing harm-promoting aspects of COVID-19
denialism.
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Conspiratorial thinking
So-called conspiracy theories are fluid networks of ideas deployed against
the grain of accepted understandings to argue that specific events do not
unfold at random or as the secondary fall-out of mundane social processes
or day-to-day, disinterested bureaucratic decisions. Rather, agents work
covertly and malevolently backstage, pulling strings. Often, conspiracy
theories assume that conspirators act to harm others; they operate
through dichotomous categorisations of ‘us’ vs ‘them’, good vs evil.
Although lay discourse tends to lump them together, disdainfully,
conspiracy theories vary. Some have little more in common than their
reliance on suspicions regarding secret operations. Further, conspiracy
theories may contain multiple individually false claims; or they may
spuriously connect substantively well-justified ‘facts’. They may stand
alone, or conjoin, or nest into ‘superconspiracies’ (Barkun 2013). The
salience of conspiracy theories within group culture and their importance
for social belonging also varies. Sometimes they are paramount to group
identity. When such groups are put on the defensive they may close
ranks; their ideas may become ‘self-sealing’ (Sunstein and Vermeule
2009, 204). That said, a group’s members can hold richly diverse and
sometimes contradictory positions in support of the same core concern
(Harambam 2020).
Medical conspiracies and the state
Much of anthropology’s conspiracy theory-related scholarship has
appeared in medical anthropology, partly reflecting the subfield’s
longstanding involvement with health aid flows from the Global North
to the Global South. Such programmes often provoke concerns related
to sovereignty, exploitation and social coherence – i.e. perceived ruptures
in the social contract. When voiced in local idioms these can be read as
conspiracy theories (see Leach and Fairhead 2007; Fassin 2011).
Many cultures use blood-stealing and organ-thieving stories to
index how they physically fuel the global economy. International medical
research in sub-Saharan Africa provides a ‘particularly prolific’ matrix for
such stories (Geissler and Pool 2006, 975). They express colonial trauma
and critique both the non-democratic distribution of science’s benefits,
and the state’s role in supporting this.
Epidemics also implore conspiratorial interpretations where the
state has historically failed in its duties toward citizens. Take the 2008
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cholera outbreak in Harare, Zimbabwe. When the government insisted
that individual behaviour change (better handwashing and food hygiene)
would stem transmission, residents pushed back. They pointed
to structural drivers such as the dilapidated water and sanitation
infrastructure, and condemned various arms of the state for victimblaming and corruption. In challenging official discourses, they expressed
‘an aspirational vision of citizenship based on political rights, social
recognition, and access to high-quality public services delivered by a
robust, responsible state’ (Chigudu 2019, 415).
In Venezuela, cholera conspiracy theories directly addressed an
‘economy of erasure’ in which marginalised populations remained
unheard (Briggs 2004; see also Mathur 2015). The theories embodied a
bid to be seen – and a refusal to be reduced, for instance by epidemiology,
which thrives by ‘turning people into categories and numbers’ (Briggs
2004, 167). They articulated local–global links in ways that questioned
the discursive production and segregation of these domains in addition
to highlighting their state’s failures (p. 175).
Similar insights are seen in ideas regarding HIV/AIDS, widely
rumoured initially to have been invented for nefarious genocidal
purposes. State-backed corporate treachery did undergird the pandemic’s
hold in some ways in some locations, for instance, through machinations
related to the construction of a dam in Haiti that destroyed various
communities’ livelihoods, pushing people into HIV-fostering survival
strategies (Farmer 1992). In Eastern Indonesia, HIV/AIDS-related
conspiracy theories reflected everyday experiences of ‘inconsistent
applications of policies, missing information, and omissions in formal
practice’ and colonisation, militarisation and racialisation in the study
setting (Butt 2005, 432). South African men’s conspiracy theories in
Bushbuckridge linked HIV/AIDS-related suspicions to precarity wrought
by job loss and, more broadly, deindustrialisation, itself subtended by the
distribution of power and of racism in the globalised economy (Niehaus
and Jonsson 2005, e.g. 182, 202). Conspiracy theories pervaded US HIV/
AIDS discourses also, in ways similarly linked to social, political and
economic marginalisation (Sobo et al. 1997).
A waiting matrix
COVID-19 emerged in the context of many already-circulating,
conglomerate ‘superconspiracies’ (Barkun 2013). For instance, it was
quickly fitted into, and helped amplify, conspiracy theories circulating
RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND REVELATIONS
71
regarding the health dangers of 5G networks – themselves rooted in much
older worries about the profit-minded capitalist promotion of purportedly
unsafe electromagnetic technologies, and worries about modernity
itself (Tiffany 2020). 5G’s initial roll-out in China, where COVID-19 was
identified, seemed proof of a causal link. It also boosted antecedent
chauvinistic prejudices, which situations of crisis intensify (see Butter and
Knight 2020; Bovensiepen 2016).
In England, pre-existing anti-Semitic and antimuslim prejudice fed
belief among 20 per cent of the population that ‘Jews have created the
virus [SARS-CoV-2] to collapse the economy for financial gain’ and that
‘Muslims are spreading the virus as an attack on Western values’ (Freeman
et al. 2020). Likewise, labelling SARS-CoV-2 as the ‘Chinese Virus’ or
‘Kung Flu’ drew upon already well-established jingoist and racist tropes.
It also expressed pre-existing geopolitical tensions: as some in the US
blamed its rival China for covering up a laboratory accident or worse in
Wuhan, others on social media lauded China for besting the Global North
via how efficiently they managed the pandemic. In these and related
narratives, SARS-CoV-2 is cast not as coincidental but as part of larger
conspiratorial machinations.
In addition to underwriting racist scapegoating and related
brutalities, COVID-19 conspiracy theories entail other risks. Vaccination
is, internationally, the desired ‘magic bullet’ in the fight against SARSCoV-2. However, given that, for instance, about one in five members of a
representative sample of English adults surveyed believe this vaccine ‘will
be used to carry out mass sterilization’ or ‘will contain microchips to
control the people’ (Freeman et al. 2020), mass vaccination promises to
prove an uphill battle. (The vaccine rollout, which began well after this
chapter was written, has, in fact, been challenged by those who question
its ultimate aims; e.g. Sobo 2021.)
Contested expertise
The dominant way for establishment experts to deal with conspiracy
theories is to try to ‘debunk’ them, often ineffectively. A rich social science
literature explains that ‘debunking’ disregards people’s extant knowledge
(e.g. Leach and Fairhead 2007). Further, enhanced communications
and computing technologies now support a subjective ‘incredulity
toward metanarratives’ or ‘grand narratives’ (Lyotard 1984; Vine and
Carey 2017). The technocultural environment of the internet intensifies
the situation further in the Global North by democratising the
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‘knowledge-power hierarchy’ (Kirmayer et al. 2013, 180), reinforcing
expert-doubting overconfidence in one’s capacities for discernment.
How this plays out varies across nations. In the US, for instance,
idealised distaste for any concentration of power (Fenster 2008), an
emphasis on free thinking, and the sanctity of free choice further deepen
distrust of authority. The good citizen does not follow blindly. This
is further supported in the realm of healthcare by institutionalised
requests that patients self-educate and ask providers questions regarding
treatment options, and the doubt-sustaining demand that patients (now,
‘consumers’) consent to and assume the risks even of biomedicallyindicated procedures.
The debunking approach to conspiracy theories and other dissenting
knowledge does sometimes work, for example, for hypocognised
problems or those not already freighted with cultural meaning. But
COVID-19 was for most people immediately associated with prior
epidemic diseases, including not just HIV/AIDS and H1N1 influenza but
the first SARS-COV panic (2003–04). Further, COVID-19 is characterised
by a much higher degree of indeterminacy.
The uncertainty regarding specific origins, successful cures,
prevention measures and risk for transmission expressed within the
scientific community is exacerbated in the public mind by conflicting
messages from different health authorities (regarding interactions with
ibuprofen, who is vulnerable, etc.) – and from national and regional
leaders. Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko has touted washing
with, and drinking, vodka as a cure; in the US Donald Trump has promoted
hydroxychloroquine, a drug approved for malaria and rheumatoid arthritis;
officials in Bolivia have distributed ivermectin, an anti-parasite drug, as an
ostensible cure. None of these recommendations have authorised science’s
endorsement (O’Grady 2020). A good example of the doubt-reinforcing
confluence of varied advice was seen in the dilemma masks posed for the
public as the pandemic took hold (wear them, don’t wear them, use special
ones, homemade is fine, only health services professionals should wear
them, etc.).
Negotiating boundaries between bogus and genuine claims is
typical of the work done by people exploring alternative or dissenting
perspectives (Pelkmans and Machold 2011; Mathur 2015). The plethora
of positions the public has been provided by the state and others regarding
COVID-19 supports doubt; doubt creates discomfort (Pelkmans 2013).
Yet, an erosion of trust in authoritative and scientific knowledge does not
extinguish the ‘will to truth’ (Aupers 2012). On the contrary, it opens a
space for alternative forms of knowing. Lay investigation flourishes in
RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND REVELATIONS
73
publics already convinced of their own discernment and primed to
express this by an ethos of wariness of expertise, and with reference to the
oppositional forces of local and global governance, and of agency and
structure.
Accordingly, COVID-19 conspiracy theories ask universally: what
are governments trying to do through COVID-19? What information are
governments hiding? What are they revealing? Why? And who is behind
it all? Who profits? We explore some answers below, bearing in mind that
beyond the theories described sit those vested in their propagation –
those who leverage them as evidence of a priori claims, profiting
themselves in various ways in the process.
New viral loadings: leveraging pandemic
conspiracy theories
To explore the critiques of power conspiracy theories entail, and how they
are deployed, we present three case studies. In each, interested parties
actively characterised the pandemic counterfactually, for their own
advantage.
Ireland: rejecting foreign rule and state corruption
Irish people expressing conspiratorial views on the pandemic questioned
whether the risk was as severe as the authorities suggested. Many applied
neologisms popular in the English-speaking world such as ‘plandemic’ or
‘scamdemic’ to suggest premeditated duplicity. For example, in May,
member of parliament Mattie McGrath used this construction to imply
that the lockdown regulations negatively affecting the Irish economy
were a scam benefiting foreign corporations:
It’s a joke at this stage. We need to move on and get back to work.
We are now at the stage where instead of having a pandemic it’s
becoming a scamdemic. Big businesses, the likes of [foreign
superstores] Tesco and Aldi, and all the big places are flying, but all
the small stores, small businesses, small retailers, they are being
squeezed out of it by the two-metre social distancing. It just makes
things totally unworkable (Farrell and Mooney 2020).
Gemma O’Doherty, once a celebrated investigative journalist, now best
known for her fringe right-wing views and anti-vaccine statements, took
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a similar stance. O’Doherty is a founder of Anti-Corruption Ireland,
which she defines as a ‘formation devoted to ending this toxic culture
of corruption that is ripping our republic to shreds’. Her agenda includes
the ‘fight against the threat of globalism’ and its risk to ‘national
sovereignty, cultural and natural heritage, and endangering our independence’. Through social media, O’Doherty repeatedly implied that use
of existing vaccines correlated with the COVID-19 death rate, and that
COVID-19 vaccines would pose risks too when introduced. One of her
widely circulated flyers claimed that ‘Covid19 is no more serious than the
flu’, and that because ‘we don’t close the economy for [flu] and never
quarantine the healthy … social distancing is fraudulent’ (O’Doherty
2020a). In a leaflet, she argued:
The state’s draconian reaction to Covid19 has nothing to do
with protecting health. It’s an orchestrated ploy to implement the
final phase of totalitarian ‘one world’ governance. This is the core
objective of UN Agenda 2030, a plan to destroy nation states
and depopulate our planet. It is also known as the New World Order.
The State is forcing citizens to give up their fundamental rights,
freedoms, and privacy using: orweallian [sic] surveillance via
carcinogenic 5G, DNA-Altering mandatory vaccines, cashless
society, control of media/end free speech (O’Doherty 2020b).
O’Doherty and her followers often share and recycle Twitter and Facebook
posts originating elsewhere, and other conspiracy theory proponents
around the world return the favour. However, conspiratorial views
propagated by O’Doherty and her followers are more than recycled
internationally circulating tropes. While almost every conspiracy theory
propagated during the pandemic expresses concern over a loss of
freedom, in Ireland this view resonates particularly strongly with the
colonial legacy of, and national sentiments rooted in, the conflict with
Britain (Moore and Sanders 2002). The painful memory of brutal foreign
rule was particularly visible in the arguments made by O’Doherty and
John Waters when they legally challenged Ireland’s lockdown restriction,
in the High Court, in April and May 2020. Their supporters perceived
their actions as protective of the freedoms of Irish people. Those lauding
O’Doherty’s and Waters’ legal efforts often spoke of them as courageous
patriots ready to fight corrupt politicians and countering state efforts to
suppress citizens. Frequently, they would draw parallels between the
1922 Irish civil war and the pandemic situation, describing the fight
against lockdown measures as participation in the unfinished revolution.
RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND REVELATIONS
75
O’Doherty and Waters, in their court statements and in public
communications at the time, frequently referenced the new COVID-19
situation as ‘the police state’. On 28 April, at the height of the court case
dispute, O’Doherty tweeted, ‘The words Irish and freedom are inextricably
linked. No people fought harder for it throughout history than us. We’re
not going to give it away now to an unhinged police mob, an unelected
government and their #fakenews who shamed themselves again today
#LockdownIreland #Covid19’ (O’Doherty 2020c).
In other communications, O’Doherty referred to Irish police (the
Garda Síochána) as Gestapo or Nazi forces, and criticised COVID-19 laws
that allowed for armed Gardaí at COVID-19 checkpoints. In Ireland, such
use of force resonates specifically with memories of the colonial state and
the brutal policing exercised by the British to control the Irish population
(as one response, when the Garda Síochána was formed in 1923, it was
purposefully primarily unarmed). When Irish conspirationists evoke the
police state, they not only prey upon general concerns over the loss of
freedom, but specifically Irish sentiments and fears.
In her pandemic communications, O’Doherty often referenced an
‘unelected government’ that is supposedly inflating death rates to frighten
the public while using mass immigration to make the Irish a minority.
For some, an ‘unelected government’ might refer to international
organisations. In the Irish context, however, the phrase had additional
inward-facing meaning.
Just before COVID-19 hit Ireland, in February 2020 parliamentary
elections had been a three-way race, in which Sinn Féin, a left-wing party,
received the most first-preference votes it had received since the 1970s.
This was a big blow for the two dominant centre-right parties: Fine Gael
(the governing party, led by Leo Varadkar), which came in third, and
Fianna Fáil, which came in second. The votes clearly showed dissatisfaction
with the establishment. However, before a new government was formed,
infection began to spread. Emergency legislation was enacted by the
outgoing rather than the incoming Senate, and state governance
remained in the hands of Varadkar. In response, conspirationists such as
O’Doherty and Waters cast COVID-19 as a plot to allow ‘the establishment’
to remain in power, disregarding the election’s results. In line with this
logic, the (old) government misled people into believing that their
immune systems could not deal with the virus: it enforced a very strict
lockdown, and introduced emergency laws (according to conspirationists)
to ‘buy more time’ in power.
Seemingly universal conspiracy theories gain traction when they
amplify or provide a fitting explanation for a story already being told
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locally. In the Irish context, resonance with the specific political situation
coincident to the pandemic’s outbreak fuelled their appeal.
Poland: retaining democratic desires
On 24 June 2020, six months into the pandemic and just days before the
Polish presidential election, Poland’s President Andrzej Duda made an
official visit to Washington, DC. During the live broadcast of this bilateral
meeting, Polish national television announced: ‘Poland will be the first
country that will be supplied by the USA with the coronavirus vaccine’.
Given that this news came to Duda from Donald Trump, and was
propagated by state-owned media managed by Duda supporters, its
veracity was hard to assess. However, it was immediately picked up by
‘scamdemic’-endorsing social media channels. On 25 June, a member of
Facebook’s Nie wierzę w Koronawirusa – Grupa wsparcia/NIE JESTEŚ Sam
(I don’t believe in Coronavirus – Support group/YOU ARE NOT ALONE),
to which over 93,000 people belong, asked, ‘I gdzie będą pierwsze testy?’
(‘and where will they do initial testing?’). Answering herself, she implied
Poland. Other members quickly echoed her concerns, suggesting
sarcastically that their reward for friendship with the US was to be first in
line for this. Interlocutors agreed that, just as during the world wars, the
Polish nation would become a battlefield for all empires and ‘mięso
armatnie’ (cannon fodder) for the more powerful, who would force Polish
citizens to receive vaccinations experimentally. Associating Duda with
the ‘Jewish lobby’, some concluded that this was retaliation for when, in
2009, the country refused to buy vaccines from Big Pharma corporations
(Nie wierzę w Koronawirusa 2020).
The views expressed by this group’s members (mostly followers
of alt-right presidential candidate Krzysztof Bosak, who was running
against Duda) resemble the superconspiracies discussed above, their
threads weaving pandemic worries into well-rehearsed anti-Semitic and
Big Pharma tropes. However, as in the Irish case, here, too, ‘universal’
ideas need, for traction, to resonate with locally rooted sentiments
and already-internalised culturally specific tropes. The Polish people
endured struggles for independence from Russia, Prussia and the AustroHungarian Empire in the nineteenth century, from Fascist Germany and
the Soviet Union during World War II, and from Communism in the
1940s–80s. These tropes are highly relevant to Bosak’s followers.
However, conspiracy theories can be utilised by actors on all
sides of the political spectrum when a nation is entangled in political
rivalry, as is Poland: divided societies are particularly susceptible to
RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND REVELATIONS
77
conspiratorial thinking. Conspiracy theories help to simplify complex
histories, enabling people to make sense of constant political changes
and diverse perspectives (Boyer 2006). When a proliferation of groups
occurs, and differences between factions are subtle and mostly entail
boundary-making, conspiracy theories become central to identity,
keeping group members alert to opponents’ manipulations (Moore and
Sanders 2002).
These processes are visible in the ways in which Poland’s private
media expressed concerns over governmental mismanagement of the
pandemic. A recurring theme of their criticism was that the ‘state is
purposely hiding the numbers’ to enhance its chances of winning the
elections, in part by lifting the lockdown quickly. The state’s rush to run
elections at a time when health risks were still high only enhanced public
suspicion of its motives.
The idea that the government was hiding the truth behind a façade
caught on strongly. Healthcare professionals attested that unreliable
COVID-19 counts simply reflected systematic failures and insufficiencies
of the country’s healthcare system. Regardless, the theory that ‘the
Government is lying to us’ and ‘hiding the truth’ propagated in private
media. It never was labelled as paranoid thinking in the way that alt-right
candidate Bosak’s followers’ theories were labelled as such: conspiratorial
ideas voiced by the opponents of the ruling party have retained their
status as a justified form of political criticism.
Humphrey (2003) argues that, in the post-socialist Eastern
European and Central Asian region, omnipresent conspiratorial thinking
and a culture of suspicion is justified given the high number of actual
conspiracies experienced in the last century (see also Carey 2017). The
fact that a government with a known history of abusing democracy was
managing this pandemic made many conspiratorial accusations highly
plausible. However, the deep lack of trust in the Polish state is not just a
result of this reality (Drążkiewicz 2016). It inheres in the political
philosophy that underwrote Poland’s post-1989 political culture – a
philosophy born out of the struggle against communism and built on the
assumption that true democracy cannot be realised in and by the state.
This ideology presumes that government is the enemy of the people and
so should never be trusted. Although since 1989 the government has
changed often, Polish suspicion towards authority abides regardless of
who is in power. In this context critical questions and theories that might
be labelled as conspiracy theories are given space as a valid form of
political engagement.
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US: shoring up a dream
In the US, well-known tropes also are in play, but here they are linked to
the crumbling American Dream of self-built prosperity, and to concerns
regarding the freedoms meant to support it. Well before COVID-19,
employment and wages for the US masses were declining. The notable
uptick in suicides and drug and alcohol-related deaths among collegeeducated Whites, a demographic once favoured for economic mobility if
not stability, demonstrates pervasive anxiety about achieving the
American Dream (Krause and Sawhill 2018).
The nation’s failure to protect citizens from predatory lenders
(which led to the 2008 foreclosure crisis and subsequent recession)
coupled with ‘government bailouts’ meant to shore up corporate wealth
catalysed increasing cynicism regarding once-trusted institutions. The
internet enabled disheartened citizens to engage with each other in ways
heretofore impossible (see ‘contested expertise’, above). Yet as Bailey
notes, culture entails ‘lies that make life possible’ through their capacity
to both legitimise actions and ‘neutralize despair’ (1994, 4). So, rather
than questioning the American Dream as myth, which would mean giving
up on the prospect, many citizens found it more satisfying to blame their
downward mobility on ‘bad apples’, favouring the proposition that a few
(very powerful) bad actors in positions of power barred them from
‘success’. This perspective fuelled populist desire for leadership from
beyond ‘the establishment’.
Enter Donald Trump, a self-proclaimed self-made man promising
to ‘drain the swamp’ – the US federal government – of said bad actors
(Bierman 2018). To gain followers, Trump courted and received the
endorsement of an ‘alternative media’ superstar, far-right extremist and
conspiracy theory monger Alex Jones. The ethos of suspicion long held
strongly at the fringes of US society ripened with Trump’s candidacy,
throughout which he encouraged distrust of science and of the mainstream
press. His presidency brought the phrases ‘alternative facts’ and ‘fake
news’ squarely into the national and then international lexicon (see
Glassner 2018) as he encouraged his base to blame downward mobility on
those previously in power (the Democrats), and their elite allies.
Then, in 2017, an anonymous source purportedly named after the
letter by which the government designates those with access to restricted
information – Q – gained a following after bringing to light news of
Trump’s secret struggle on America’s behalf to overthrow a ‘deep state’
during a soon-coming ‘storm’ or ‘great awakening’. Q’s proselytisers
RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND REVELATIONS
79
(Jones included) use religious tropes and deploy in-group/out-group
rhetoric to foster a sense of social belonging among adherents, who form
a loose community active on social media. This millennialist conspiracy
cult – QAnon – casts itself as a patriotic vanguard doing work of historic
significance. It seems to appeal most to individuals feeling somewhat
isolated or otherwise struggling (LaFrance 2020; Roose et al. 2020).
The vigilantism of a few acolytes aside, most adherents use the
internet to do their own research into the often-cryptic messages Q
‘drops’, seeking to connect otherwise disparate dots. For instance, after
a White House pandemic briefing on 14 March 2020, spurred by
‘scamdemic’-type suspicions, some drew a connection between Trump’s
necktie colour choice (yellow) and the maritime flag signalling system,
asserting that Trump thereby proclaimed the pandemic a hoax.
Amidst ideas circulating, some singled out White House coronavirus
task force member Anthony Fauci, Director of the National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases, as a deep state pawn. In this scenario,
Fauci’s contradiction of some of Trump’s statements signalled his
disloyalty (QAnon had already cast Fauci as a traitor, linking him to
Hillary Clinton; LaFrance 2020). In addition to mounting calls to fire
Fauci, some undertook a short-lived campaign to display hospitals as
empty, despite media reports to the contrary (Nguyen 2020).
As Trump moved to ‘reopen’ the US economy ‘by Easter’ (12 April
2020), Fauci continued urging caution. His requests for social distancing,
face masks and so on were seen by denialists as direct, tyrannical threats
to various civil liberties, including not just the right to make a living in
industries ordered shut, but how to live. Beginning in mid-April, antilockdown protests led by pre-existing right-wing militias (Wilson 2020)
began in various states. Resentments were fitted into antecedent
conspiracy theories regarding the state’s ulterior motives. Further, in
keeping with the way conspiracy theories function to affirm discernment,
rally attendees self-identified as knowing the truth: the masses were
being duped so that others could profit.
And here is a thread we wish to pull vigorously: a concern with
corporate nefariousness, giving expression to a US-specific need for
sustaining faith in one’s chances to attain the American Dream despite
increasing wealth inequity. Trump’s base, cultivated from among the
disaffected, preserves an imagined ladder to self-made success through
faith in his leadership (not coincidentally, at his election convention
Trump promised to ‘save the American Dream’). In part from this loyalty,
simultaneous to anti-lockdown protests, rumours linking Fauci to Big
Pharma bourgeoned. But there was more to it than that. Fauci sees
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COVID-19 squarely through the lens of authorised science – a lens
discounted by Trump’s base and consistently pelleted with ‘alternative
facts’ by others drawn to conspiracy theories. Moreover, Fauci argues,
again pointing to science, that COVID-19 will be vaccine preventable.
This simple contention expanded the anti-Fauci, anti-lockdown faction,
providing a dog whistle for so-called anti-vaxxers.
Although some would stereotype anti-vaxxers as liberals who favour
alternative medicine, alternative schools and expensive organic food, a
good proportion are fundamentalist homeschoolers and survivalists
undesiring of any interaction with the state. Others are part of Trump’s
base. Beyond vaccination’s purported health risks (which Trump has
endorsed), these citizens worry that vaccine mandates disregard civil
liberties – and many believe that they do so in support of profits for
Big Pharma, in whose shadow the government works. In many minds,
Big Pharma itself underwrote the creation and spread of SARS-CoV-2, or
at least exaggerated its dangers, specifically to sell vaccines. Fauci, along
with Bill Gates and others, supposedly invested in vaccines and so stands
to profit immensely. Conjoined to this story is worry that vaccines will
introduce into the body microchips to monitor the population and, in
some renditions, sap free will.
Seeing common cause, anti-vaxxers not normally associated with
Trump’s vocal base have been motivated to speak up. As they do, it
becomes clear that the liberal–conservative dichotomy is false. For one
thing, both factions would replace the anti-vax label, and the extremism
it implies, with a focus on informed choice. Both see themselves as
freedom fighters. Both see Big Pharma as out to get ‘us’, its interest in
profits potentially opening a door to mandatory vaccination or even to
vaccine-fuelled enslavement by authoritarian states or a global regime.
Although each group is somewhat differently anchored in terms of a
priori social networks, and although the right-wing #FireFauci, ‘reopen
America’ mandate is ultimately broader than that of the vaccination
rights or the ‘health/medical freedom’ contingent, current confluences
in their discourses illustrate how conspiracy theories are leveraged.
They reveal how alt-right messaging is being deployed by an ‘alt’ alt-right
– one for which personal freedoms, self-determination and antiauthoritarianism, are likewise more important than the social good writ
large. In Krugman’s words, for them, ‘freedom’ references a right to ‘the
untrammeled pursuit of self-interest’ or ‘sacralized selfishness’ (2020).
Similarities don’t stop there. Like many of QAnon’s prominent
proponents, many ‘wellness entrepreneurs’ promoting ‘medical freedom’
also have built enviable fortunes via conspiracy mongering, for instance
RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND REVELATIONS
81
through goods and services sold on their websites. Coming together to
protest state handling of COVID-19 gives all parties access to crossover
markets (Breland 2020; Satija and Sun 2019). As a key driver of success,
avarice is a virtue, not a sin, so long as everyone is equally free to take a
piece of the pie.
Big Pharma, in contrast, is cast in this narrative as wanting the pie
for itself. Further, Big Pharma is seen as posing as if the final authority
while, given their emphasis on self-sovereignty, those fusing anti-vax
interests onto anti-lockdown rhetoric encourage followers to ‘do their
homework’ and make up their own minds. Encouragement toward selfeducation also flows forth from many mainstream US organisations,
including some corners of orthodox healthcare: savvy consumerism and
self-determination are that central to US national consciousness. So are
the concerns regarding corporate duplicity leveraged in conspiracy
theories. These themes are played to different effect by different factions,
but their deployment from all sides should not be surprising, given their
cultural salience.
The world as seen through this conspiracy theory lens ‘is not some
bizarre parallel universe’ (LaFrance 2020). It is the same universe in
which most Americans live, shaped by and reinforcing of the national
ethos. What appears as one conspiracy theory on the surface may contain
several versions of something proximally the same, but different in terms
of the ends desired and the lifestyles represented. When surface fusion
brings separate interest groups closer to their aims, conjoined action will
not represent a compromise.
Implications
The above conspiracy theories point to perceived ruptures in the social
contract, sometimes directly articulating ideas regarding what that
contract should be (‘normative rules’, as per Bailey; also, a collusive lie
[1991, 35]). Social and political tensions inform these anxious counternarratives in ways that ‘put [political] relations to the test’ (Fassin 2011,
48), giving voice to a demand to mend those tears in the social fabric or
flouted rules that make the world feel unjust.
But the case studies showed more than political contests. They also
spoke to political anthropology’s concern with how ‘true-believers’
persuade others to forego reason and follow a ‘jack o’lantern’ (Bailey
2008, 5): crafting messages that resonate generatively with people’s
locally specific governance-related anxieties is central here (see Lepselter
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2016). Health – being essential, fragile and fickle – serves exceedingly
well as a projective screen for such concerns. The theories deployed in our
case studies also gained leverage through their enmeshment with preexisting superconspiracies (e.g. regarding Big Pharma, the Deep State).
This was no coincidence. Not only does history matter to a
conspiracy’s appeal (see Ryer 2015); known conspiracy theory advocates
took an active role in ensuring the absorption of COVID-19-linked ideas
into pre-existing frameworks, elaborating and endorsing the newer
ideas as further evidence of prior claims against various state formation.
They also deployed them for gain (e.g. for votes or to sell goods). Extending
Bailey’s observations regarding witchcraft accusations and other political
transactions (1994, 1991), the case studies showed that conspiracy theories
have instrumental utility in addition to expressive value.
Notwithstanding, the conspiracy theories contained some potentially
hazardous counterfactual assertions, such as recommendations to shun
COVID-19 vaccinations if and when they arrive. Addressing the existential
concerns underwriting these directives and the alternative facts used to
support them, rather than simply endeavouring to provide ‘correct’
information, may be helpful in lessening the prospect of harm.
Undesired governance
In our examples, four problematic expressions of state power served as
focal points for dissent. First there was ‘the Nanny State’, which distrusts
citizens to make appropriate health decisions, and so over-interferes
through regulation. A Corrupted Nanny State further uses current crises,
like COVID-19, for its own political gain. A Nanny State in either form
transmutes into a Police State if force is conjoined to this aim.
Then there was the Façade or Cardboard State – terms borrowed
from Polish politics. On the surface, a Cardboard State appears as a
functioning democracy. Yet its façade hides a corrupt and broken system,
which, while benefitting the elite, is at constant risk of collapse. Such an
unsustainable state hides things because it cannot keep up; it pretends
away COVID-19 because it does not have the resources to stem the
pandemic or because admitting the problem would work against its selfpresentation of successful governance.
We saw also the Shadow State. As Wedel (2011) argues, the Shadow
State is made of ‘flexians’ – members of corporate boards and think tanks
who pull governmental strings in service of capitalist profit-making. This
state fails citizens not through patronising over-interference or ineptitude
but because it is not calling the shots to begin with.
RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND REVELATIONS
83
Corporations (for example Big Pharma) can run a Shadow State,
and corrupt politicians can run the Corrupted Nanny or Cardboard State.
The regular Nanny State is simply overbearing; the Police State, merely
totalitarian. But the Deep State has highly developed, overtly sinister plans
with occult origins – plans whose aims extend well beyond simple selfinterest. Sometimes termed the New World Order, the Deep State is not
tethered to actual government institutions. Instead, like smoke and
mirrors, it exists to deflect attention from one’s state and its shortcomings
– but its invocation confirms that shortcomings do exist: government for
the people is hobbled.
Not all states express themselves in all these ways; and other
expressions likely exist. Further, expressions vary on the ground.
Regardless, our comparative work shows that conspiracy theories are not
a prerogative of some specific political system or a particular historical
moment (Ryer 2015; contra Marcus 1999). Nor are they simply an
expression of anxiety over the condition of modernity or globalisation, as
some have suggested (for example Aupers 2012; Harding and Stewart
2003).
Their main purpose is articulation of social and political criticism.
A state described by a conspiracy theory using any of the above guises,
combined or alone, and however indirectly, has disappointed citizens, as
our cases demonstrate. This explains how apparently universal tropes can
express locally particular complaints about the state’s failure to uphold its
end of the governance bargain.
Fact and fiction
This brings us back to the boundaries between conspiracy theories and
‘genuine’ claims, an issue of concern for health and state authorities
during this pandemic as well as for social scientists. As Hastrup (2004)
points out, knowledge is always messy. It is reductive and selective; it
turns empirical complexity into clear, but therefore limited, propositions,
and we always disregard some information. Further, people like to doubt
(Carey 2017). But individual activities in relation to knowledge do not
occur in a vacuum. Our work helps illuminate the role of the state here,
even beyond the typology offered.
For one thing, any emphasis on ascertaining the truth value of
competing ideas forces people to take sides in polarised ways. This
observation is particularly relevant in relation to ideas about COVID-19
because so much bureaucratic effort has been dedicated to prioritising
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certain truth claims over others. And, as Carey demonstrates, the more
involved the state is with people’s quotidian lives – the more it is
‘experienced via its apparatus as a complex infrastructure’, the more
fertile the ground will be for conspiracy theories (2017, 98). The
intensified structuring role that states have taken in this pandemic,
coupled with the historical realities that we outlined for Ireland, Poland
and the US, has helped COVID-19 conspiracy theories take wing.
As Pelkmans (2013) warned, the collapse of trust in institutions and
the absence of actual certainty gives the conspiratorial imagination
free rein.
Moreover, knowledge is always political, and knowledge systems
are always generating conflicts (Engle-Merry and Coutin 2014). As we
have seen in the Polish case especially, the boundaries between conspiracy
theories and legitimate (authorised) theories often blur (see also Bailey
1994). Further, the designation ‘conspiracy theory’ is always political,
produced by people in positions of power. Pelkmans and Machold
highlight the ‘distorting effects of the fields of power through which
theories travel’ (2011, 77), noting that conspiracy theories begin in an
unmarked state, as all theories do. The label’s application – or not –
imposes a definition of the situation favouring those who apply it; and if
they have more power than conspiracy theory proponents, particularly
if a conspiracy theory’s truth claims are weak, the label is likely to stick.
Consequently, the label ‘conspiracy theory’ is both a lumping device for
dissenting narratives and a reciprocating technology for the production
of doubt: it denounces as implausible the sceptical views a conspiracy
theory promotes. It attempts to impose if not reinforce marginalisation
(see Briggs 2004).
Yet, even labelled as such, conspiracy theories can affect the state,
inhibiting for instance an effective pandemic response through the
doubt they sow. Since trust is a relational issue (if you trust me, I trust
you), the state is not a passive player here: the state’s choice of governance
strategies makes a difference, adding to or preventing the spread of
conspiracy theories and further mistrust. Regardless, conspiracy theories
can offer the disempowered ‘a pretty satisfying approximation [of truth],
demonstrating how in the modern interconnected world, people make
sense of the actions and motives of powerful others with reference to old,
familiar scripts’ (Brown and Theodossopoulos 2003, 334). Particularly in
regard to COVID-19, conspiracy theories reveal, in superficially universal
but deeply local ways, that state systems are neither as they seem, nor as
they should be.
RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND REVELATIONS
85
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768392920568224/.
Niehaus, Isak and Gunvor Jonsson. 2005. ‘Dr Wouter Basson, Americans, and wild beasts: Men’s
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179–208. https://doi.org/10.1080/01459740590933911.
O’Doherty, Gemma. 2020a. Anti-Corruption Ireland. Accessed 29 June 2020. https://anticorruptionireland.com/.
O’Doherty, Gemma. 2020b. ‘COVID19 is a staged event to usher in a police state and a globalist
“one world” government’. Anti-Corruption Ireland. Accessed 22 August 2020. https://anticorruptionireland.com/downloads/.
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O’Doherty, Gemma (@gemmaod1). 2020c. Twitter, 28 April 2020. Accessed 29 June 2020. https://
twitter.com/gemmaod1/status/1255176537000873984?s=20.
O’Grady, Siobhán. 2020. ‘Trump is not the only leader pushing unproven coronavirus remedies’.
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world/trump-is-not-the-only-leader-pushing-unproven-coronavirus-remedies/ar-BB14u
PBD?li=BBqdg4K.
Pelkmans, Mathijs. 2013. Ethnographies of Doubt: Faith and uncertainty in contemporary societies.
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Pelkmans, Mathijs and Rhys Machold. 2011. ‘Conspiracy theories and their truth trajectories’.
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Part II
Exclusion and blame
5
The 2020 Los Angeles uprisings
Fighting for Black lives in the midst of COVID-19
Hanna Garth
On Memorial Day, 25 May 2020, George Floyd, a 46-year-old Black man
was murdered by a white police officer in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Floyd
was under arrest for allegedly using a counterfeit bill at a local market.
A witness captured the murder on their phone and the video went viral.
The officer killed Floyd with a carotid chokehold, pressing his knee into
Floyd’s neck as Floyd called out for his mama until his last breath. Protests
began in Minneapolis on 26 May; as people gathered to pay their respects
at a memorial that formed outside the Cup Foods store where Floyd was
murdered, people began to demonstrate, and eventually a crowd of
hundreds chanting ‘I Can’t Breathe’ and ‘Black Lives Matter’ marched to
the 3rd Precinct of the Minneapolis Police.
Floyd’s murder took place a few months into the COVID-19
lockdowns and quarantines taking place across the United States where,
by 26 May, there were over 1.6 million cases of COVID-19 and around
100,000 deaths. Reporters and media pundits speculated that after weeks
stuck inside, the Memorial Day holiday weekend and the start of summer
coalesced to draw people out of their homes and onto the streets to protest
in greater numbers than ever before. This is a very different take from my
own. In Los Angeles, I observed the ways in which the protests following
Floyd’s murder in the midst of the pandemic illuminated longstanding
connections between white supremacy, structural inequality and poverty
in Black and Brown communities. The racialised disparities of COVID-19
are an additional form of state sanctioned violence on top of police
brutality that Black and Latinx people face, and these two forms of
violence converged to push people to fight for something better. Months
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into the pandemic, it was clear that government leadership to control the
pandemic would not come from the federal level, and increasingly local
leaders were clear that opening up the economy, not saving lives, was
their priority. A political system and general social ethos that favoured
profits over lives would not eliminate the forms of white supremacy and
structural inequality that undergird the plague of police violence
in the US.
In Los Angeles, the protests began on 27 May, the day after they
started in Minneapolis, beginning in downtown LA where protestors
walked onto the 101 Freeway, blocking traffic. LA County Sheriff
Villanueva tweeted that he ‘shared the nation’s outrage’ and that ‘police
brutality is unacceptable under any circumstances’. Protestors returned
to downtown LA the following day (Pierce 2020). The size and tone of
these protests were relatively small and subtle. Organisers from the local
chapter of Black Lives Matter and the Movement for Black Lives (M4BL)
regularly gathered downtown to protest police misconduct, brutality,
and ongoing killings and anti-Black violence perpetuated by the Los
Angeles Police Department (LAPD). For years, organisations like the LA
chapter of Black Lives Matter, Dignity and Power Now, and Reform
LA Jails have been relentlessness in fighting against police violence and
misconduct, and for the removal of the District Attorney Jackie Lacey.
Since 2013, when the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter movement was
created by three radical Black organisers in the Los Angeles area – Alicia
Garza, Patrisse Khan Cullors and Opal Tometi, in response to the
acquittal of George Zimmerman, the man who murdered 17-year-old
Black boy, Trayvon Martin – the work of these organisations has been
mainstream.
Beginning in Los Angeles in 2013, #BlackLivesMatter became a
national and then a global movement. In 2013, as Garza, Cullors and
Tometi joined thousands in the streets of Ferguson, Los Angeles, New
York and beyond, ‘they were armed with the statistic that in the U.S., a
Black person is killed by a state sanctioned actor every 28 hours’ (Burton
2015). #BlackLivesMatter, movements for prison abolition and police
abolition, are not merely virtual mediatised movements; they are serious,
organised movements that have made and continue to make significant
progress to interrogate and eliminate anti-Blackness and racial inequality
(Kelley 2016). ‘The most effective Black political mobilisation since the
civil rights era’ (Castillo 2020), #BlackLivesMatter has grown into a
global movement (Smith 2015; 2017; Kerrigan 2015; Vargas 2015). By
3 July 2020, the New York Times claimed, ‘Black Lives Matter May
Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History’.1
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The scaled-up iteration of the Black Lives Matter movement in
response to George Floyd’s death occurred in the midst of the pandemic,
but it seemed that the protests were not contributing to the spread of
COVID-19. Instead, the powerfulness of the movement shed light not only
on police brutality, but also on other racialised injustices, including the
disproportionate number of cases and deaths from COVID-19.
In the BLM-LA podcast series entitled ‘This is Not a Drill! The Power
of Protest!’ one of BLM’s founders, Patrisse Khan Cullors, spoke of her
motivation to continue fighting for Black life: ‘It wasn’t until I had a child
that the urgency of changing this place felt almost like a desperation’. She
had long been ‘living with the terror of knowing how vulnerable I am, I
feel like I could handle something happening to me, but if something
were to happen to my child. Looking at my child and not ever ever ever
imagining anyone harming him, no one but Black mothers know that
kind of agony’. These thoughts and sentiments motivate many involved in
the M4BL.
I have lived in Los Angeles since 2007, and since 2009 I have
conducted research on the efforts of food justice organisations to increase
access to healthy food in South and East LA (Garth 2020; Garth and
Reese 2020). Although I lived and conducted research in these areas
during the rise of the M4BL, I was not heavily involved in the movement.
In July 2013, I watched Zimmerman’s acquittal for the murder of Trayvon
Martin, and the subsequent uprisings, unfold from my living room, my
oldest son in my arms. He was six months old, and, without childcare,
I decided not to join the protests with him. Instead, I donated money and
was politically supportive of the cause. In May 2020, I gave birth to our
third child, and with COVID-19 we had been strictly quarantining since
the birth. So, seven years after the first, I sat in my living room, a baby in
my arms, watching the uprisings unfold. I sought to keep my composure
for the sake of my children, who were already under stress from the ways
in which COVID-19 and quarantining had disrupted their lives. But I am
not OK (Cox 2020). I fear for the lives and safety of my children and my
family in the face of the virus, but from the day they were born until the
day I die I will fear for their lives in the face of state-sanctioned police
violence.
Following George Floyd’s murder, the scale of protests grew
significantly. By Saturday 30 May, organised protests had spread
throughout Los Angeles. I received text messages from the M4BL and
followed the calls for action on the Black Lives Matter – Los Angeles
Facebook page. A protest at Pan Pacific Park, located next to one of LA’s
iconic shopping centres – the Grove – was set for noon on Saturday, and
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that day Governor Newsom declared a state of emergency and called in
the National Guard. On 31 May, the city of Los Angeles set a 6 p.m.
curfew; Santa Monica set its curfew for 4 p.m.; other cities followed with
curfews at different times. A barrage of text messages came into our
phones through the emergency notification services, advising of different
curfew times.
Almost immediately, BLM-LA started organising around specific
needs for the city and greater Southern California communities. BLM-LA
set a Zoom meeting with Los Angeles Police commissioners on 2 June,
demanding action for over 600 police murders committed by LAPD,
calling for accountability and the prohibition of unnecessary force and
violence on peaceful protestors. The meeting was open to the public and
quickly hit the 500-person limit. Local-level organising in the city and
greater region was well coordinated, with planned protests going out on
social media accounts in tandem with other M4BL text message updates
to anyone who had subscribed. The protests dovetailed with demands for
specific changes to law and policy, including defunding the LAPD and
eliminating police officers from schools in the Los Angeles Unified School
District (LAUSD). Beyond the core Black Lives Matter group, organisations
from across the city began posting statements and creating action plans
in general support of Black Lives and antiracism, and calling for LAPD to
be defunded or reformed.
In this chapter, I draw upon the Black radical tradition to analyse
the links between the 2020 uprisings and the disparities of the COVID-19
pandemic in Los Angeles. I analyse the ways in which state-sanctioned
police murder of Black people is linked to health disparities and the
neglect of Black communities. As Black, Latinx and other Angelenos of
colour are more likely to serve as essential workers, disproportionately
exposed to the virus, they are also less likely to have adequate healthcare
coverage or adequate access to testing. Ultimately, as the rapid spread of
the virus threatens all Angelenos, the City of Los Angeles made efforts
(and at the time of writing, is still doing so) to curb the COVID-19 spread
in predominately Black and Latinx areas of the city, as part of a broader
campaign to flatten the curve. While COVID-19 comes to the forefront,
there has been insufficient attention to the problems caused by decades
of divestment, loss of well-paying jobs and the relentless police violence
that plague communities of colour. Lockdowns, protests, job loss,
declining wages, ‘frontline’ jobs, a collapsing healthcare system (which
was already stretched), ‘underlying medical conditions’, police violence
and imprisonment combined in a very deadly way in 2020 and in doing
so, laid starkly bare longstanding forms of systemic racism.
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Histories of violence and corrupt police
in South LA
Police violence in communities like South LA has been relentless for
generations, and uprisings have been a critical way of drawing
attention to these injustices in an effort to create change. The 1992
Los Angeles Uprisings were a pivotal moment, and particularly
impactful for South Los Angeles communities. These began on 29 April
1992 and lasted six days, after a jury acquitted four LAPD officers
caught on tape beating Rodney King, a Black Angeleno. As in 2020, the
Army National Guard and the Marines were brought in to try to stop
the protests. In South Los Angeles, 55 people were killed, over 2,000
people injured and property damage was estimated at one billion
dollars.
For many residents, these 1992 uprisings were yet another iteration
of the Watts rebellion of 11 August 1965, when the Watts area of South
Los Angeles erupted into protests after an incident of police brutality with
a Black motorist. On this occasion, there were at least 34 deaths and an
estimated $40 million in property damage. Again, the National Guard
was brought in to quell the situation.
During these earlier uprisings in response to police violence against
Black community members, the damaged property was largely confined
to majority Black neighbourhoods. Most buildings were commercial
or retail. In the aftermath of the protests, many local businesses closed
and never reopened, with consequent job losses and increased unemployment.
The 1992 uprisings drew international attention to Los Angeles.
People worldwide were made aware of the stark inequalities between the
LA they saw on TV and the LA in which many lived. This attention to
disparities yielded some good – organisations and money began to go
toward thinking through how to improve conditions. Nearly 30 years on,
however, South LA continues to suffer from race-based marginalisation
and underdevelopment. An estimated 31 per cent of South LA households
are below the poverty line; 39 per cent of residents have not graduated
from high school – the highest in the country. Post-1992, there have been
ongoing problems associated with job insecurity, declining real wages
and police violence. In the context of the rapid spread of COVID-19, a
system where access to healthcare is tied to job-based health insurance,
job insecurity and low wage insecure labour can brew a public health
disaster in areas like South LA.
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Nearly 30 years later …
In early June 2020, as Los Angeles was in the midst of the BLM uprisings,
community leader, food justice activist and US Navy Iraq-War Veteran
Dr D’Artagnan Scorza posted the following on Facebook:2
The civil unrest across the nation and here in our community is not the
product of an isolated incident. These protests are part of a rebellion
spurred on by centuries-old racism and oppression manifested in the
killing of unarmed black men and women. These men and women,
like George Floyd and Breonna Taylor, died at the hands of those who
were tasked with protecting and serving them. Their deaths violate
the social contract between the community and police.
From the 1964 Watts uprising to the 1992 Los Angeles
uprisings (which I lived through) to today, there have always been
calls for restraint. But, how can you ask us to restrain ourselves
when this country has allowed knees to be pressed upon our
collective necks?
Scorza, a widely respected local leader, is not someone I would describe
as having very radical politics. However, he has a clear understanding of
the role that racism and police violence play in his community and in the
everyday lives of those who live in and near South Los Angeles. He
continues, connecting the uprisings with his personal story:
As a Black man who leads an organisation supporting the growth
and development of Black male youth, and as a father of a young
Black boy, I am anguished and enraged. I’m beyond tired and fed up
with these cycles of police violence and the promise of change.
I can’t remain silent because silence equates to consent and I don’t
consent to what happened to George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and the
many others who have died at the hands of police who use their
power to destroy life.
But, I’m tired of the words that I’ve used in the past to try and
make meaning of what’s happening right now. I’m tired of saying
‘we need change’, ‘reform the system’, ‘we need review boards’ and
everything else that comes with calls for change. What we really
need is to LIVE and do so with the dignity of our lives uninhibited.
We not only need to Live, but we are demanding the right to Live.
The right to jog in peace. The right to sit in our homes in peace. The
right to breathe in peace …
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Here, Scorza openly shifts from a reformist position toward an abolitionist
position, underscoring that his previous calls for reform and review have
not worked. He fears for his own life and the life of his Black son. He
continues:
It is clear that our policing institutions have utterly failed us and we
need to rethink what ‘protection’, not policing looks like. Much like
the military, our police need to be overseen by civilians who make
determinations about when force is to be used. The fact that police
even have the power to use ‘force’ is a power in and of itself we have
the right to revoke. No individual should be allowed to make that
determination on their own.
More so, what we need is solidarity and the complete
obliteration of White Supremacy. We need to tear down the ideology
that devalues Black life and Black bodies. America must boldly
affirm that Black lives matter and in doing so put a knee in the neck
of police brutality, systemic and institutionalised racism. This is
not a moment to ‘protect’, we must act swiftly with courageous
leadership to ensure that White Supremacy dies, not us.
Scorza highlights that the issues that fuelled the 2020 uprisings are the
long-standing, structural problems of South Los Angeles that derive from
and build on centuries of racism and anti-Blackness. He notes the lack of
response to calls for police reform and the urgent need for a system that
actually protects everyone from harm. This system cannot come from a
foundation of white supremacy.
From 2000 to early 2020, police had killed 886 people in LA County;
the majority were Black or Latinx. While many Black activists had long
understood the connections between white supremacy, structural
inequality and poverty in Black and Brown communities, the uprisings of
2020 and the COVID-19 pandemic illuminated these connections for
many more people. It was clear that at national and local levels, the
current political system was not going to eliminate white supremacy or
the forms of structural inequality perpetuated by it that deeply impact
living conditions in places like South Los Angeles. The problems we were
seeing more clearly with the spread of COVID-19, and the poor response
to it, also illuminated some of the core problems that Black Lives Matter
activists care about: the ways in which our social support systems fail us
under contemporary capitalism. The healthcare system, school system,
food distribution system and many others that were essential for the
wellbeing of all Angelenos, but have been unable to function properly
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under the conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic, are intricately
interwoven with settler colonialism, racial capitalism, white supremacy
and the carceral state (Beliso-De Jesús and Pierre 2020; Ralph 2019;
Speed 2020).
COVID-19 and health inequality
Whitney N. Laster Pirtle has argued, ‘Racial capitalism is a fundamental
cause of the racial and socioeconomic inequities within the novel
coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) in the United States’ (2020, 504). The
epidemiological patterns of COVID-19 have made clear the ways in which
racial capitalism results in unequal access to basic services in response to
human needs. This is embodied as differential risk for contracting disease,
and differential experiences of morbidity and mortality. The problematic
disparities along lines of race and socioeconomic status were evident
early in the pandemic. In places like South Los Angeles, it was clear that
COVID-19 would capitalise on structural violence and vulnerability
(Manderson and Levine 2020, 368). By 26 April, LA County (excluding
Long Beach and Pasadena) had 19,516 confirmed cases, with data on
race and ethnicity for 10,699 cases (LA County 2020): 46.4 per cent were
Latino, 23.7 per cent were white, 11.5 per cent were Asian, 8 per cent
were African American. Native Hawaiians or other Pacific Islanders had
the highest population rate of COVID-19 cases (840 per 100,000),
followed by Latinos (114 per 100,000), African Americans (102 per
100,000), then white people (78 per 100,000). When some businesses
were allowed to reopen in late July, these disparities widened. Latinos
and African Americans are more likely to work in high-risk businesses
such as restaurants and grocery stores, and are more likely to rely on
public transportation, so increasing their risk of exposure to coronavirus.
For these essential workers, ‘social distancing and self-isolation are
luxuries they cannot afford’ (Polonijo 2020). Lower income areas had less
testing availability initially, but by early July access to testing in lowincome areas improved. On 9 July, Public Health Director Barbara Ferrer
reported that ‘Latinos are now more than twice as likely as whites to be
infected with the novel coronavirus and twice as likely to die. Blacks were
27 per cent more likely to be infected and nearly twice as likely to die from
the virus compared to whites’ (Rosenfeld 2020).
By 10 September, African Americans and Latinos were overrepresented in deaths from COVID-19: African Americans represented
7.7 per cent of COVID-19 deaths, but only 6.0 per cent of the population.
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Latino deaths were 48.4 per cent of COVID-19 deaths, but 38.9 per cent
of the population (CDPH 2020). Jim Mangia, CEO of St John’s Well Child
and Family Center, commented: ‘When you’re in the middle of a
pandemic, you really get a sense of where the priorities lie. More people
got COVID in South L than in any other part of the county. More people
died of COVID here’. The disparities were not only about the types of
work and other activities in which residents of South LA might have
disproportionately engaged. Long-standing structural problems such
as lower rates of health insurance and a general lack of sufficient
infrastructure and services in lower-income areas disproportionately
characterised the lives of Black and Latino residents (Artiga et al. 2020).
As Barbara Ferrer noted, ‘the most prominent conditions that lead to
death among COVID-19 patients – heart disease, respiratory illness and
diabetes – are also more common in communities with higher rates of
poverty. They are also less likely to have access to care’ (Rosenfeld 2020).
The disparities of COVID-19 and the Black Lives Matter uprisings of
2020 are inextricably linked, and build upon a foundation of racial
capitalism and the general devaluation of Black lives in the US. Cedric
Robinson (1983) argues that all forms of capitalism are racialised because
the historical development of capitalism was based on the forces of racism
and hierarchy. Tracing forms of racialised social hierarchy from the
formation of Europe, Robinson shows the continued entwining of
capitalism and racialised hierarchy. Racial capitalism has a ‘fundamental
impact on health inequities’ (Laster Pirtle 2020, 504). LA area leaders and
politicians are increasingly recognising the links between racism,
discrimination and health inequities, and are also beginning to see the
connection to policing and prisons. In early June, Los Angeles County
Supervisor Hilda Solis opened a news briefing on COVID-19 with the
statement that COVID was joined by a second public health crisis –
‘unabated and unaccountable police violence’:
We’ve seen another public health crisis highlighted. According
to the (American) Public Health Association, addressing law
enforcement violence should be a public health priority. The root
cause of health inequities, especially during the pandemic, is
systemic racism and discrimination (KCET 2020).
In her analysis of the events of 2020 in Los Angeles, Supervisor Solis laid
bare the connections between racial capitalism, the carceral state and
health inequalities. Just as jobs were eliminated and real wages declined
in places like South LA, the state of California significantly expanded its
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prison system. City budgets were increasingly allocated to policing at the
expense of healthcare, mental health, housing programmes, healthcare
and food programmes. As people struggled with job loss and declining
wages, the social programmes that could have been a safety net were
eliminated or reduced, and instead residents faced the threat of police
violence and imprisonment (Gilmore 2007; Ralph 2020).
Abolition as a public health measure
On 5 June 2020, National Public Radio aired a report by Ailsa Chang.
Chang interviewed three Black men who had lived through multiple
uprisings as residents of South Los Angeles. Bruce Patton, one of the
interviewees, told her: ‘There’s no need for a policeman to have a gun.
That is what gives them the propensity to kill you. It’s their approach to
the people in these communities that make police officers fear for their
lives’. Chang summarised Patton’s understanding that his ‘community has
been fighting back against a problem that never seems to change – police
violence against black people. And for Patton, at least, the solution to that
problem is very clear. He says we need to take all guns away from the
police’ (Chang 2020). Marqueece Harris-Dawson, another native of
South LA and city councilman, told Chang that while he thought there
was a use for LAPD and other police departments, the police needed to
focus on fewer things: ‘We ask police departments to solve homelessness.
We ask them to solve truancy. We ask them to solve blight, traffic
problems, pedestrian safety. We ask them to solve a whole bunch of
problems that they oftentimes are not the appropriate set of individuals
to do’. Harris-Dawson suggested that instead of (over)funding the police
to do this, we should spend more money on schools and healthcare.
Chang’s third guest, Gilbert Johnson, reflected: ‘The community is rising
up. Right now, we have opportunity. We have a chance to really organise
and galvanise all this momentum and push it in a positive way. We’re
going to see a lot more change, and a lot more people are out protesting
because they want change. So, yes, I see this as a moment of hope amidst
all the chaos’ (Chang 2020).
Although local residents have varying views on the role of the
police, Black Lives Matter LA calls for law enforcement, as it currently
exists, to be completely abolished. In general, Black Lives Matter groups
carefully craft their messaging so they can maintain abolitionist visions
of eradicating the police and prisons, but not be seen as too radical for
progressive uptake and media coverage (Shange 2016). The recent calls
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have been for abolition to happen through defunding police departments,
with governments allocating police budgets to reinvest in community
needs. The abolition of policing as we know it is tied to the abolition of
jails (local city or county level institutions), prisons (state or federal
level institutions) and detention centres, which all function together and
are central to the state enactment of anti-black violence. As the quote
from Supervisor Solis illustrates, police violence is a public health crisis,
and addressing this should be a public health priority. One way to do so
is to completely abolish the law enforcement system as we currently
know it.
The protests of 2020 were peaceful but forceful, and the protestors
drew attention on a worldwide scale to the horrors of our carceral
state and the relentless murders of Black people by law enforcement
officers. At the extreme end of the 2020 uprisings, people set fire to
police cars, a few businesses and burned trash to create fires in the
streets. The protests themselves did not involve much looting, but after
the protesters moved through the streets of Los Angeles, looters moved
in. We watched from our living room as dozens of people broke into
local stores, taking shoes, clothing and pharmaceuticals from a local
drug store. The local news media focused on the looters, insinuating
that police force against the protestors was acceptable; the language of
‘looting’ and ‘rioting’ was used to delegitimise protests in which all
Americans have the right to engage, and to cast protestors as violent
and unruly, so justifying even more police violence against them (Bonilla
and Rosa 2015). The response from law enforcement was disturbing.
An LAPD SUV drove into a crowd, striking protestors. Tear gas was
launched at protestors holding the line. And with the nightly curfews,
whether peaceful or not, protestors were arrested if they were out after
6 p.m. Like Robin D.G. Kelley (2020), I wondered, ‘what kind of society
values property over Black lives?’
The initial response from city leadership was chilling. On 1 June,
I watched LAPD Chief Michel Moore announce at a live press conference,
as Mayor Garcetti looked on, that ‘the blood of George Floyd’s death is on
the hands of protesters’. But this marked a turn, and Moore was forced to
recant, claiming that he ‘misspoke’. Later, outside LAPD headquarters
Mayor Garcetti joined protestors and ‘took a knee’, an act of kneeling now
widely recognised as a silent protest against police brutality and racism
in the US. Soon after, he announced that he would take $100 million
dollars from the LAPD budget and give it to communities of colour. The
city later agreed to reduce the police department budget by $1.8 billion,
a step some viewed as moving in the right direction toward abolition and
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101
others viewed as insufficient and inadequate. Things seemed to shift at
the national level as well. The streets in front of the White House were
renamed Black Lives Matter Plaza. The officer who killed Floyd was
arrested and charged. Minneapolis banned police use of chokeholds, and
(then) presidential candidate Joe Biden asked the US Congress to outlaw
chokeholds.
This was just the beginning. More text messages came from the
M4BL; we had to keep going; these small concessions were not enough. It
is our duty to fight for our freedom. By 4 June, the curfews stopped. On
Sunday 7 June, protestors danced and sang at the largest gathering to
date at one of LA’s famous intersections, Hollywood and Highland, near
the Dolby Theater where the Academy Awards or ‘Oscars’ are usually
hosted. The protests continued across the city, with people socially
distanced and masked lining major boulevards, holding signs proclaiming
Black Lives Matter. It seemed that more white people were turning out to
support Black Lives Matter than ever before. Those who took their support
beyond symbolic gestures and actually marched and gave monetary
support strengthened the power of the uprisings in cities across the
US and the world. The City of Dallas announced a ‘duty to intervene’
rule that requires officers to stop other officers who engage in inappropriate use of force. Statues and monuments celebrating racist figures were
officially and unofficially removed in cities across the US. Confederate
flags were removed and banned by organisations nationwide, including
the US Marine Corps.
State systems, inequality and the Black radical tradition
Using the Black radical tradition to analyse the junctures of the 2020
uprisings and the disparities of COVID-19, it is clear that the liberal
capitalist state played a significant role in the state sanctioned killing of
Black people, both from a virus and from murderous police (Robinson
1983). The state response to COVID-19 prioritised reopening the economy
over public safety. Black and Latino laborers had to return to work in
order for the most fundamental elements of the economy – grocery stores,
warehouses, public services – to continue functioning, demonstrating
some of the ways in which racial capitalism and incessant drive for profit
are lethal for Black and Latino communities under COVID-19 (Dawson
2018).
Just before the uprisings of 2020, LA had been reeling from the
effects of COVID-19, in terms of morbidity, mortality and economics. In a
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population of around 10 million, by late May there were over one million
unemployment claims filed in Los Angeles County. One article reported
that only 45 per cent of LA residents were employed in March 2020
(Wagner 2020). This led to deep concerns about housing and food
insecurity. Springing into action, community organisations seemed to
come together around mutual aid, and local organisations were quick
to pivot their services toward the needs of the COVID-19 era. For instance,
to mitigate housing loss, on 4 March LA County invoked an eviction
moratorium, banning evictions on residential and commercial tenants.
Organisations across the city offered programmes for emergency food
distribution. The Los Angeles Regional Food Bank ramped up its
distribution programmes. Approximately 405,000 students, or 72.4 per
cent of students of Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) qualified
for free and reduced-price meals, based on their family’s income. These
children normally eat free breakfast and lunch at school during the school
year and receive free meals during summer programmes through the
school district or Los Angeles area Parks and Recreation programmes. On
18 March, a week after closing the schools, LAUSD – the second largest
public school system in the US – began distributing food at some of the
closed school sites and other central locations across the city. Initially, the
food was only intended for students and their families, but, shortly
thereafter, it began to be distributed to anyone in need. Smaller
organisations, like Community Services Unlimited Ltd. in South Los
Angeles, also quickly developed systems for distributing food in their
neighbourhoods. These forms of coming together as a community to
support one another in times of crisis, as Nancy Burke also illustrates for
Cuba (Chapter 2), are precisely the kinds of futures that Black Lives
Matter is fighting for.
Under COVID-19, Angelenos started to see the ways in which our
systems – education, healthcare, food distribution – were still expected to
be supported by the state, but had long been precarious. COVID-19 was
the tipping point, causing a complete breakdown of these systems as
healthcare systems were overloaded with COVID-19 cases and people
seeking preventative healthcare and ‘nonessential care’ were turned
away. Grocery store shelves were empty and store managers did not know
when they would be restocked. Schools closed completely leaving
hundreds of thousands of kids with nothing but a promise that online
learning would come soon. The pandemic led to a devastating loss of life,
and a great increase in inequality and precariousness for low-income
Angelenos. In realising this, Angelenos came together around fear and
devastation, but with a sense of hope and an understanding that only
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103
through community organising, and not dependence on that state, could
lives be saved (Sojoyner 2017; Vargas 2010). People started to see the
connections between school and food, between work and healthcare.
They questioned what it meant that school closures could lead to massive
food insecurity, and that schools had long been responsible for ensuring
that children and their families had enough to eat. Similarly, people
started to see that if healthcare was tied to work and people lost their jobs
due to business closures, then millions of people would be without access
to healthcare. It became increasingly clear how current infrastructure was
putting people in increasingly precarious situations.
This understanding of how government systems and state infrastructures fail us also opened many people to the possibility of abolition
– abolishing the police and prisons. This did not mean police reform,
but the full abolition of policing, of corrupt political systems that protect
law enforcement officers that murder Black people, and everyone else
who is complicit with this system. The abolition of the prison system
dovetails with the abolition of policing. The goal to eliminate both of
these racist systems is part of a broader vision to transform education,
healthcare and other systems deeply enmeshed in the current economic
system. These need to be untethered from racial capitalism so that our
communities can survive and thrive. This was what Black Lives Matter
LA was fighting for and increasing numbers of Angelenos were joining
the fight.
Conclusions
On 9 June, George Floyd was laid to rest in Houston, Texas, and, again,
we watched from our living room as crowds gathered outside the
cemetery, and stood witness as his casket passed by in a horse-drawn
carriage. They gathered to celebrate his life, mourn his loss and to mourn
the violent loss of thousands of other Black people at the hands of the
police. Some were outraged by the crowds that gathered during a surge
in the COVID-19 pandemic in Texas. But the political moment, the need
to gather and physically be present in the fight for Black freedom, seemed
to outweigh the risk of COVID-19. After all, we may outlive the virus, but
we will still face the battle against state-sanctioned anti-Black violence.
Whereas we understand the COVID-19 pandemic to be temporary, police
violence against Black people is endemic, part of a total climate of antiBlackness (Sharpe 2016).
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Thinking of the COVID-19 pandemic and the violence of the
carceral state as parallel plagues that have differential patterns of
endangering lives and ending lives across the world, anthropological
and social theory can help to illuminate their uneven impacts and
consequences in places like South Los Angeles. The forms of police
violence and murder that sparked the BLM uprisings of 2020 are
distinctly racialised and impact Black Angelenos at significantly higher
rates than white Angelenos. And while the virus does not discriminate
along racial or socioeconomic lines as it invades and attacks human
bodies, how the virus attacks the body, and bodily vulnerability to severe
disease, are the outcomes of pre-existing conditions, access to healthcare,
workplace conditions and other social and economic factors. The
COVID-19 virus is loaded onto a long history of inequality and racialised
state violence.
Yet, as we fight against racialised police violence under COVID-19,
governments worldwide are enlisting new forms of surveillance and
monitoring tied to military and policing, as a number of authors in this
volume illustrate. As militarised surveillance is ramped up to fight off the
spread of COVID-19, Saiba Varma (2020, 376) reminds us,
COVID-19 offers us something. It raises profound questions about
our reliance on policing as a catchall solution. Even in an unprecedented health crisis, the state’s carceral capacities are bolstered
– in calls to ‘put the military in charge of health care expansion’,
in surveilling and fining violations of pandemic restrictions, and in
everyday descriptions of the pandemic as war.
In our highly connected, unequal world, the focus on investing money and
energy into solutions that bolster the capability of military and police to
fight disease and kill potential ‘threats’ is also directly tied to the failures of
governments to provide for people’s basic needs. As tech developers and
companies profit from surveillance technologies, under racial capitalism
this likely translates into heightened surveillance and arrests, and
potentially moves us towards increasing rates of incarceration and death in
Black communities. The 2020 uprisings and COVID-19 have revealed the
ways in which the drastic disparities in disease incidence are tied to the
overfunding of policing at the expense of community services. But while
the COVID-19 pandemic fuelled a political drive to ‘flatten the curve’ in Los
Angeles, little effort has been made to flatten the curve of increasing
inequities.
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Acknowledgements
I thank Alicia Wright for research assistance, and Saiba Varma for
feedback on drafts of this chapter. I thank Nancy J. Burke, Ayo Wahlberg
and Lenore Manderson for their editorial feedback, which served to
significantly improve this chapter.
Notes
1
2
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html.
Used here with permission from Dr Scorza.
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6
The biopolitics of COVID-19 in the UK
Racism, nationalism and the afterlife
of colonialism
Jennie Gamlin, Sahra Gibbon and
Melania Calestani
Historical social inequalities continue to shape the epidemiological profile
of COVID-19, visibilising how some bodies are more exposed than others.
While there has long been evidence of health disparities among Black,
Asian and ethnic minorities in the UK, and growing concern with the role
of racism in perpetuating them (Nazroo 2003), the finding that certain
communities face a higher risk of contracting and dying from COVID-19
has newly exposed deep-rooted national divisions. The brutal killing of
George Floyd in the US in May 2020,1 and the global protest and activism
led by the #BlackLivesMatter movement, reignited discussion around
the relationship of racism and life expectancy. By mid-July 2020, as
transmission steadied in the first wave of the pandemic, the UK had
reached the highest overall and population level COVID-19 mortality in
Western Europe, with clear disproportionately high death rates among
Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic populations. The stark embodied effects
of racism and inequality precipitated growing public calls to consider how
colonialism and imperialism continues to have consequences for the
health of minority communities (Siddique and Grierson 2020). We refer
to these historically defined patterns and processes, along with the
presence of colonial structures within the National Health Service itself,
as the afterlife of colonialism, as they represent the permanence of the past
in the present.
In this chapter, by analysing the government’s response of putting
forth policy decisions by a bullish go-it-alone strategy that initially
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rejected WHO advice and European Union (EU) collaborative preparations, we draw on anthropological insights to consider the presence
of Britain’s colonial past in the populations, biopolitics and institutions
that defined the handling and impact of COVID-19. The overrepresentation of Black and ethnic minority populations in UK2 death
toll figures for coronavirus tracks the fault lines of social and economic
exclusions that give continuity to colonialism and its production
and exploitation of racial hierarchies. We examine how the acronym
BAME (Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic) has become a proxy for
social and economic differences and inequalities, while reinforcing
the othering of specific groups along lines established by colonialism.
Building upon and extending approaches to power and structural
inequalities (Farmer 1999; Fassin 2007, 2013) by drawing on Hartman’s
notion of the ‘afterlife of slavery’ (2007), we argue that ethno-racial
differences in the epidemiological profile of coronavirus are the afterlife
of colonialism – the persistence of political domination in the bodies of
racialised people.
This afterlife also operates at the level of biopolitics through the
lingering sentiments of Empire and we bring in Franklin’s discussion of
‘nostalgic nationalism’ (2019) to unpack the post-Brexit management of
this global emergency. The political moment in which COVID emerged
coincided with the UK’s departure from the EU, which was itself the
outcome of a very close referendum result. The Brexit moment on 31
January 2020 was one of a newfound ideational sovereignty, an imagined
identity that hinged almost entirely upon a colonially-given political
superiority, and the subsequent belief in British exceptionalism that has
proven to endure long beyond the UK’s political dominance. We examine
these complex intersections with the material politics of epidemic
response (Lynteris and Poleykett 2018), and the ongoing isolationism
arising from the UK’s tortured pathway to leaving the EU, particularly in
the allocation and resourcing of personal protective equipment (PPE).
Populations and biopolitics also collide in the colonial patterning of care
provision by Britain’s National Health Service (NHS), the centrepiece of
the UK’s epidemic response, an institution sustained in large part by the
combined labour of EU and colonial diaspora communities. Hence the
afterlife of colonialism is both lived and delivered as a mentality and a
relational dynamic. These same populations, including first, second and
later generations of families invited to the UK in the days of dwindling
colonial power, are also caring for the ill and dying. In association with
mortality rates, we will reflect upon the ethnic patterning of care provision
and the coloniality of the NHS.
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Epidemiological histories and contemporary revelations
Through its long history of longitudinal cohort studies, the UK has been at
the forefront of a global effort to demonstrate the social determinants of
health. The Whitehall Studies on the health of British civil servants, and
other epidemiological studies, have provided powerful evidence of how
social inequalities shape chronic disease morbidity and mortality and
pattern the social gradient in health (Marmot 2005). While some have
pointed to the failure of a social determinants approach to fully address
‘structural inequalities’ (Breilh 2013; Yates-Doerr 2020), a succession of UK
conservative governments has done little to address the inequalities upon
which COVID has played. As a result of the policy of austerity that has
characterised the UK’s health and social policy since the economic crisis of
2008, inequalities have become more entrenched, increasing alongside
unemployment and poverty and affecting healthcare services (Stuckler
et al. 2017); in this sense, unequal morbidity and mortality from COVID-19
could have been anticipated and expected. Black men were, during the first
wave of the pandemic, at least three times more likely to die than white
men, and men and women of Bangladeshi origin were twice as likely to
have died. As of 30 June 2020, people of Indian, Chinese, Pakistani, other
Asian and Black ethnicity were 10–50 per cent more likely to have died than
their white counterparts (PHE 2020).
Racism is causally implicated in health inequalities among minority
communities and race is increasingly recognised as a ‘social determinant
of health’ (Williams et al. 2019; Marmot 2020), but there has been little
work at a national level to analyse the intersections of race with other
social and economic factors (Chouhan and Nazroo 2020). There are
significant data gaps on ethnicity and health, with ongoing questions
about the quality and accuracy of information collected (Aspinall et al.
2003). Until June 2020, there was no comprehensive disaggregated
national data about ethnicity on death certificates. In relation to
COVID-19, this has been described as a form of ‘state negligence’ (Hirsch
2020). There is no epidemiological research on why generations of
diasporas with heritage in British colonies still experience excess burdens
of morbidity, the ‘underlying conditions’ now explanatory variables of
COVID-19 mortality in the UK. Despite an emerging terrain of epigenetic
research (Kuzawa and Sweet 2009), the link between present-day health
and inequality and past histories of exploitation, domination and violence
has not yet been included in policy-focused research into health
inequalities. The fact that epidemiologists and the media alike did not
anticipate excess mortality during a pandemic in the most vulnerable
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populations is a sign of the naturalisation of social inequalities and how
entrenched racism has rendered race inequality and health invisible.
Perhaps, as Davis (2019) suggests, through the stereotype of the afterlife
of slavery, we have naturalised the idea that non-white bodies are stronger
and more resilient than white bodies.
The emerging narrative of BAME and COVID-19
Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic – in its acronym form as BAME – has
become the accepted label to define and sort many different ethnic groups
by their shared characteristic of not being of white European descent. It
also defines different peoples whose histories largely return to once
colonised locations in the Global South. This categorisation of difference
serves to define the self as much as the other, making it a relational
identity. This must be historicised in the context of colonial hierarchies
based on racial and often ‘biologised’ notions of superiority as culture is
transposed onto race. These diaspora populations and subsequent
generations who have settled in the UK do not share homogenising
biological characteristics that differentiate them from white Europeans,
other than not having whiter skin. This category suggests that nonwhiteness, where ‘whiteness’ is a racialised and privileged social category
(Echeverría 2016), somehow makes a person more vulnerable to the
virus. The lumping together of Black, Asian and ethnic minority groups
under ‘BAME’ is inherently racist as it does not describe who they are,
their ancestry or heritage, but who they are not, as we discuss later.
The term BAME, while widely used in the UK including by advocates
within and for ethnic minority communities, is problematic when ascribed
to social and ethnic groups in relation to health. It suggests that innate
biological, genetic or essentialised cultural factors are at play. This
disguises the role of social and political history, the afterlife of colonialism.
The widespread use of this acronym during the pandemic obscures social
causality and demonstrates the coloniality of contemporary social and
political dynamics and their embodiment.
With no national requirement to record the ethnicity of hospital
patients, the first suggestion that in the UK ethnic minorities were more
severely affected by COVID-19 came not from demographic data, but
from anecdotal evidence on nightly news reports and reports of deaths
and local hospitalisation rates. The first 12 doctors known to have died
after contracting coronavirus were ‘non-white’ (Siddique and Marsh
2020). From mid-March, a distorted picture of disease distribution and
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death began to emerge. According to the 2011 census in England and
Wales, non-white ethnic minority communities constituted 14 per cent of
the population, but in April 2020, 35 per cent of almost 2,000 critically ill
patients were in this category (Intensive Care National Audit and Research
Centre 2020). Local surveys published in The Guardian and Times
newspapers in early April suggested that 19 per cent of recorded hospital
deaths to this date were from ethnic minority communities, with higher
numbers of ethnic minority residents having higher death rates (Barr
et al. 2020). The evidence began to grow across media outlets as the
tributes, memorials and daily roll call of faces and names to those who
had died from COVID-19 appeared – health professionals, porters,
cleaners and other key workers such as bus drivers. Here was visible
evidence of the disproportionate effect on communities by COVID-19.
Dr Ayache was one. Syrian-born Fayez Ayache had treated three
generations of Jennie Gamlin’s family at the local village practice, retiring
from full-time employment in 2018. He rejoined the service during the
pandemic. On 8 April, six days after being admitted to the same hospital
in Ipswich at which he had given a lifetime’s service, he died, positive for
COVID-19 (BMA 2020). In a statement made after his death, his daughter
Layla recalled her father’s dedication to his work and to the NHS:
This is why the NHS was important to dad; because it brought
people together, it gave a freedom that some had never experienced
before, and it gave hope and light to those who were wandering a
darkened path. The NHS is a lifeline for so many that dad felt it his
duty to serve within (BMA 2020).
By mid-April, the UK government’s rallying call that ‘we are in this
together’ was increasingly hollow as the unequal impact of COVID-19
became clearer. Bowing to public pressure and criticism, the government
launched an inquiry into the disproportionate deaths among BAME
communities by Public Health England (PHE), led by its National Director
for Health and Wellbeing, Professor Kevin Fenton. PHE also recommended
that health workers from BAME communities should be ‘risk assessed’ to
consider whether their assigned roles placed them at increased risk of
infection (Kanani and Issar 2020). By early May, comprehensive data on
ethnicity and hospital deaths began to provide a more robust picture of
inequalities. One report suggested that between the end of February and
April 2020, ‘Black and Asian’ people in the UK were 71 and 62 per cent
more likely to die from COVID-19 than ‘white’ people (Williamson et al.
2020). Another report by the Institute for Fiscal Studies suggested that
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even after adjusting for age, sex and geography, the death rate for ‘people
of black African descent’ was 3.5 times that of ‘white British people’ (Platt
and Warwick 2020). In early June, PHE confirmed that people from
Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic communities were twice as likely to die
as ‘white’ communities if they developed COVID-19. However, PHE did
not offer explanations or propose any policy interventions to address this
disparity, leading to immediate accusations that this final section of the
report, purportedly concerning the need to address structural racism, had
been censored by the Health Secretary. The report was finally published
two weeks later after leaks to the press indicated specific mention of
structural racism. The controversy around this report, which coincided
with and was informed by widespread activism around the murder of
George Floyd in the US and the Black Lives Matter movement, opened up
dialogue on the health effects of institutional and historical racism. We
return to this later in this chapter.
The specific patterning of care, as the wider context within which
the British response to coronavirus played out, is itself an afterlife of
colonialism (Fitzgerald et al. 2020), reflecting the permanence of the past
in the present through an attitude of nostalgic nationalism. In the
following section, we explore this further through the idea of ‘heroism’ – a
description of health and social care workers at the height of the first
wave of the epidemic – and how this was belied by the UK’s Brexit-fuelled
isolationist policy.
Occupational health and Brexit isolationism
From mid-March to July 2020, countrywide, ‘Thank you’ signs with
rainbows for NHS workers appeared in street-facing windows of homes
and chalk messages on pavements (Figure 6.1). Thousands of people
came outside their houses to ‘clap for carers’ each Thursday at 8 p.m.,
thanking mainly NHS healthcare professionals for their outstanding work
during these unprecedented times.
Some healthcare professionals were frustrated with this Thursday
ritual, arguing that ‘the health service is not a charity and it is not staffed
by heroes’ (The Guardian 21 May 2020). On Thursday 28 May, as Prime
Minister Boris Johnson was clapping for carers, a silent protest (‘Doctors,
not Martyrs’ – The Times of India 29 May 2020) was held outside Downing
Street, organised by Indian-origin doctor Meenal Viz, who had raised
more than £53,000 towards a legal battle against the UK government over
the lack of PPE. Similarly, the previous week, an anonymous NHS doctor
THE BIOPOLITICS OF COVID -19 IN THE UK
113
Figure 6.1 Handmade banner supporting the National Health Service
(NHS) in south London in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Photo:
Sahra Gibbon
wrote an article in The Guardian, emphasising some of the issues at stake
when analysing the material politics of the UK epidemic response to
COVID-19:
It would ... be nice to have clarity about many things, from testing
to isolation to proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE). It
would also be nice to have worked for the past 10 years in an
adequately funded NHS, staffed by people listened to by the
government. It would be nice to see appropriate remuneration for
the low-paid staff holding the service together, to see that the value
of immigrants to the NHS is appreciated (Anonymous, The Guardian
21 May 2020).
The notion of heroism echoes wartime victories, but the underfunding of
the NHS, and the availability of PPE and virus testing, intersects with the
politics of the UK COVID-19 response in more complex ways. The WHO
has emphasised the need to consider how the social determinants
of health and health inequalities are shaped ‘by the distribution of
money, power and resources at global, national and local levels’
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(Gideon 2014, 31). In the UK, recent and more distant historical
entanglements, including Brexit and the foundational history of the NHS,
must be understood as central in shaping occupational health at the time
of COVID-19 and in understanding the disproportionate rate of deaths
among ethnic minority NHS employees. Of the initial 119 NHS staff
known to have died during the first wave, 64 per cent were from an ethnic
minority background (Cook et al. 2020).
Key workers such as NHS staff, and food supply chain and utility
workers, continued of necessity to work outside their homes, exposing
them more to infection (van Dorn et al. 2020). According to the independent
charity The Health Foundation (2020), in London, ethnic minority key
workers constitute 54 per cent of the food production, process and sale
sector (including all food retail and processing) and 48 per cent of the
health and social care sector; 11 and 13 per cent for areas outside London.
An NHS Workforce Race Equality Standard Report (2019) emphasised that
ethnic minority staff members are underrepresented in senior pay bands
and are overrepresented in band 5 – the lowest band, in which salaries start
from £22,128 (Royal College of Nursing, 2020).
The majority (44.9 per cent) of ethnic minority health workers are
employed in NHS trusts, although their role has been marginalised
(Simpson et al. 2010), overrepresented in the lowest band with more
difficulties in reaching senior positions. Moreover, a report published in
October 2020 by East London Care and London Partnership demonstrated
that their experience as ethnic minority employees is mixed, with the
COVID-19 pandemic reinforcing health inequalities, racism and
discrimination. Their current experiences cannot be disentangled from
the foundational history of the NHS.
Fitzgerald and colleagues describe the NHS as ‘imperially-resourced’
(2020, 1169), with today’s NHS an afterlife of colonialism. The first
significant wave of overseas-trained doctors, many Jewish and other
Central European refugees from fascist states, entered Britain in the
thirties (Simpson et al. 2010). In the fifties, migration from the Indian
subcontinent became important in recruiting doctors, nurses and other
health workers in Britain. In 1948, qualified nurses were recruited for the
newly formed NHS, mainly from 16 colonies, particularly the Caribbean
(Fitzgerald et al. 2020, 9); in the early 2000s trained nurses migrated for
work from various South Asian and African countries (Mackintosh et al.
2006). The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine’s continued
dominance in global health is another afterlife of colonialism, within
which an ‘us and them’ pervades in their institution’s name (MacLeod and
Lewis, 1988).
THE BIOPOLITICS OF COVID -19 IN THE UK
115
Although nationality is not an indicator of ethnicity, today 37 per
cent of doctors employed in the NHS received their primary qualification
outside the UK, and the top seven countries of origin of doctors and top
five of nurses to the NHS are former British colonies – India, Pakistan,
Nigeria, Ghana, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe and Egypt (Fitzgerald et al. 2020,
9). In addition, some 144,000 EU health and care workers in England and
30,000 doctors, totalling 11 per cent of the 280,000 doctors currently on
the register, gained their primary medical qualification in the European
Economic Area (EEA) (Simpkin and Mossialos 2017).
A disproportionate number of ethnic minority NHS staff members
from various socio-economic backgrounds, including hospital consultants,
nurses and healthcare assistants, have died as a result of COVID-19. Five
days before admission to hospital with COVID-19, consultant urologist
Abdul Mabud Chowdhury appealed for ‘appropriate PPE and remedies’
to ‘protect ourselves and our families’ (BBC News, 10 April 2020).
Dr Chowdhury died on 8 April, one of 1,431 deaths, still (in December
2020) the highest daily mortality of COVID-19 (Office of National
Statistics, 12 June 2020). The lack of availability of PPE was documented
closely in the press as a contributing factor in the death of health workers.
A shipment of PPE from Turkey did not meet the UK safety standards
(Rawlinson 2020), further aggravating the crisis. A survey of 3,500 UK
nurses, conducted early April 2020 (Dean 2020), identified that 67 per
cent did not have access to sufficient PPE, leaving them terrified. Serena,
a nurse in her 40s, elaborated on this with the third author, Melania,
during an interview at the end of April 2020, after relocating to her
home country in continental Europe.3 She had been in the UK for
20 years, living in London and working in an NHS high dependency unit
(HDU). She described how, in the last month of her employment (March
2020), the health system was ‘under a massive strain’ and she felt unsafe
at work because of unavailable PPE:
When the first patients came through with ‘query COVID’, that was
probably February, March already. There wasn’t actually even
testing provided yet for these patients. I remember one of the first
patients being tested and it came back as positive. By then I literally
was wearing my normal uniform and a pair of gloves. That uniform,
I also took [it] home to wash. That was the first positive case.
Serena continued; after that, scrubs were provided by the hospital and
staff members were no longer required to wash uniforms at home.
However, PPE was allocated regionally on the basis of confirmed
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COVID-19 cases, and there was no standardisation of PPE across different
units within her hospital or across the NHS:
Only once there is chest compression, intubation, defibrillation done,
or any invasive or non-invasive oxygen therapy then you get the full
PPE which is a visor; a facemask; a hair hat; a full gown; and double,
triple gloving. This is provided in ITU [Intensive Therapy Unit]. On the
HDU [High Dependency Unit] setting I’ve been working in, this was
not provided. We would have literally just had a surgical face mask and
a pinny, which is an apron [with] no sleeves and a pair of gloves.
The lack of PPE also has to be understood in light of Brexit. Following a
UK-wide referendum in June 2016, in which 52 per cent voted in favour
of leaving the EU, the government began to withdraw with the aim of
completing this on 31 December 2020. A key message of the Vote Leave
campaign during the 2016 Brexit Referendum, which appeared on
its campaign bus, was We send the EU £350m a week – let’s fund our
NHS instead, implying that the underfunding of the NHS was due to
Britain’s obligations to the EU rather than decisions of the Conservative
government. The promise to fund the NHS was disowned immediately
after the referendum (Simpkin and Mossialos 2017).
COVID-19 presented the UK’s Conservative government with its first
opportunity post-Brexit to demonstrate national prowess as a ‘sovereign’
nation. Its ‘go it alone’ strategy, driven by the idea of a national past
characterised by ‘multiple nostalgias’ (Balthazar 2017; Berliner 2012;
Franklin 2019), had profound negative consequences for healthcare
professionals’ occupational health. By 12 March, the UK dropped the Test
and Trace system, claiming that it was no longer feasible due to the level
of contagion (Mueller and Bradley 2020), although this had been highly
successful in Germany and Vietnam. Instead, the UK assumed a stance of
isolationism, reinforcing the government’s determination to present itself
as independent from the EU.4 In the coming weeks, it emerged that the
UK simply did not have the testing capacity. On 16 March, it was
announced that NHS staff could access COVID-19 testing (Moore 2020),
although it was unclear how this would be implemented. When Serena
developed a cough after her first patient tested positive, she was not
offered a COVID-19 test. Neither was another colleague who had attended
the same patient. Serena explained, ‘it’s not the routine that you get
swabbed … Unfortunately, staff sickness is very high, so my understanding
is that the testing is literally for staff to return to work instead of prevention
from spreading it to anyone else’.
THE BIOPOLITICS OF COVID -19 IN THE UK
117
A strong sense of obligation to work during epidemics/pandemics
coexists with concerns about lack of protection, lack of testing and the
welfare of dependents (Shaw et al. 2006). While this affects all health
workers and others employed in health facilities, it is widely hypothesised
that people from minority groups are less likely to raise concerns about
adequate protection (for example PPE) and are at increased risk of
infection (Kapilashrami and Bhui 2020). For instance, the death of three
ethnic minority cleaners at St George’s Hospital in Tooting (London) in
May 2020 led their colleagues to discuss strike action amid claims that
their own and their families’ health was at risk every time they did a shift
(Porter 2020) because of the lack of PPE and test provision.
The material politics of epidemiological control, as this concerns
PPE and testing in the UK, enact and constitute relations of power (see
Lynteris and Poleykett 2018). The availability of PPE and tests intersects
in complex ways with the UK epidemic response and the ongoing
isolationism arising from UK’s withdrawal from EU. The UK government
missed out on four rounds of procurement of PPE and ventilators launched
by the EU in late February and March (Wintour and Boffey 2020), leaving
healthcare professionals, other hospital staff members and their
respective families feeling unsafe. While key workers played a huge part
of the coronavirus response, there is continued reluctance to acknowledge
the historical nature of inequalities, to recognise the UK’s dependency on
non-British born key workers, or to reward them with good pay and
conditions and/or preferential access to citizenship. This essentially
discriminates against foreign workers who pay through their taxes into
the NHS system, and staff the system, but do not have equal access to it.
This is clearly illustrated by the UK’s ‘immigration health surcharge’
(IHS), created in 2015, which resulted in all migrant workers paying
twice to use the NHS, both through their taxes and the charge.5
The emerging picture of this injustice filtered through the individual
voices of migrant health workers using social media. Syrian refugee and
NHS hospital cleaner Hassan Akkad, for example, filmed himself sitting
in his car after his work shift and called for ‘fairer treatment’.6 This was
picked up across national and high-profile social media outlets.7 Akkad
responded, again from his car, that the support expressed to his first post
had ‘restored his faith in this country’ adding that ‘Britain is great because
of you’. While this sentiment reflected the nostalgic nationalism that
characterised discourse around COVID-19 and the NHS, the public profile
of social media discourse and the growing pressure from trade unions and
campaigners, highlighting the moral injustice of the situation, ultimately
forced a humiliating reversal of the government IHS policy in early May.
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The IHS, also known as the NHS or ‘healthcare’ surcharge, is a levy on the
majority of UK visa applications, in addition to other Home Office
immigration fees. This essentially adds £624 per year per person to the
cost of a UK visa, or £470 a year for children, students and Youth Mobility
visas. This fee will also apply to EU citizens after Brexit in 2021. Although
NHS and care workers are now exempt, critics continue to press for
further changes, such as extending the IHS exemption to other categories
of essential workers.
National identity and the underlying
conditions of racism
The ‘afterlife of colonialism’ acknowledges the legacy of institutional and
historical racism and its role in the biopolitics of COVID-19 in the UK. This
was both revealed and compounded by the events that unfolded in June
2020 in response to Black Lives Matter and the findings of PHE’s
investigation into COVID-19 and Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic groups.
The afterlife of slavery is a ‘measure of man (sic) and ranking of life
and worth that has yet to be undone … skewed life chances, limited access
to health and education, premature death, incarceration and impoverishment’ (Hartman 2007, 6). Adapting this idea to contemporary Britain, we
use the afterlife of colonialism as a method of reasoning and knowledge
production that ‘brings the past and present closer together’ by theorising
how ‘racial hierarchies have been and continue to be replenished’ (Davis
2019, 13). This illuminates relationships between the British state and
diverse black and ethnic minority groups, whose bodies are entangled
with past articulations of empire and white native British superiority,
specifically through ideas of race and identity as biologically inherited.
These inequalities are related to social deprivation, often with reference
to how jobs, work environments and housing make it difficult to ‘socially
distance’ and because complex sociocultural aspects of working and living
environments heighten vulnerability, making COVID-19 contagion more
likely. ‘Underlying health conditions’ such as diabetes, heart disease
and obesity may also heighten vulnerability to COVID-19 among members
of these communities. While these chronic ‘underlying’ conditions
are frequently framed as ‘epigenetic’8 or ‘biological’ factors, they are the
dynamic outcome and product of embodied social inequalities and
interactions (Gravlee 2020; Lock 2015).
Afua Hirsch (2020) writes: ‘Racism is a system that kills our bodies’.
The disproportionate burden of ‘underlying health conditions’ and
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119
generalised social inequalities from systemic or structural racism reflects
the embodied afterlife of colonialism. But also, identities such as those of
British Black and ethnic minority groups, historically associated with the
Global South, have now become social locations or positionalities defined
by colonial history. As Kapilashrami and Bhui state, ‘(e)thnic inequalities
in the experience and outcomes of illnesses, especially mental illnesses,
have a long research history of contested explanations and evidence
[that] fails to capture the complexity of life-course adversity, combined
with social structures and interactions with pathophysiologies’ (2020, 2).
For many people who belong to ethnic minority groups, life course
experiences of social location, defined by a colonial past, continue to lead
to work stress due to race inequality, racism and discrimination.
Relational identity categories such as BAME are a constant reminder
of non-whiteness in a white state, making skin colour an identifier of
national belonging and social location. As Appadurai writes in The Heart
of Whiteness (1993), nations are not natural facts and the linking of state
and nation was a tenuous collective project to which a sense of national
identity was key. This process implied racial hierarchies. In Violence and
the Body (2003), Aldama emphasises the role of discursive violence in
reinforcing othering, subalternity and the abjection of those positioned at
the margins and borders of dominant cultural apparatuses: this social
location traumatises the interior psyche formation of subjects. The
‘otherisation’ of certain bodies, central to the process of identity formation
under colonial domination, is ‘in some cases more extreme and oblique
under the new social orders of the global economy’ (Aldama 2003,
5). This otherisation as inferior is the basis of racism as a structural
determinant of health and the outcome of intergenerational trauma
(Kuzawa and Sweet 2009; Guthman 2014) that was, and continues to be,
part of the ongoing process of British national identity.
The idea of a nation-state was aligned to western theories of state
and involved the erasure of non-European structures of social organisation
through colonialism. As both western economies and epistemologies
expanded colonially across the globe, so too, through capitalist expansion,
nation-states emerged as the only legitimate geopolitical formations
(Mignolo 2002). Race and the idea of biological inheritance were key,
defining an imaginary biological origin to attach to the state and national
identity. In the UK, Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic share not belonging
to a biologically inherited identity (white British), so that the BAME
category was colonial in origin and is relational in practice. Historians of
the colonial period, such as Fisher and O’Hara (2009), have demonstrated
how colonisation effectively created the scientific concept of race.
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As Laura Briggs suggests (2015, 27), ‘science and medicine made race
their object’, with the dichotomy of modern and pre-modern contingent
on racial hierarchies in what Silverblatt (in Fisher and O’Hara 2009, iv)
describes as a ‘revolution in the possible ways of being human’ that
attributed different human status depending on skin colour (see also
Smith 2003; Wolfe 1999).
This fitting together of race, nation and identity, for Britain, hinged
on creating and maintaining an imaginary superiority and imagined
inferiority. Yet, as the collective experience of COVID-19 has demonstrated,
this ideational sense of superiority is detached from Britain’s actual
performance as a nation. COVID-19 presented an opportunity to
demonstrate post-imperialist exceptionalism. However, the nativist notion
of national identity, that plays to a nostalgia for the past, consistently
harmed the UK’s response. Sarah Franklin (2019) uses the concept of
‘nostalgic nationalism’ to frame discourse around individual and national
belonging. At the heart of this is a sense of loss, derived from a loss of
command power over an empire. Injured white nationalism played a very
important role in influencing millions to vote to leave the EU in June 2016.
The campaign slogans of ‘take back control’ and ‘Let’s give 3.5 million to the
NHS instead’ were hugely influential. Boris Johnson, then campaign leader
not yet prime minister, was the personification of the specific brand of
nationalist Britishness that he was selling, inviting film crews to cover him
eating ice cream cones by the seaside and bringing trays with mugs of tea
to journalists.
This aspirational nationalism is reinforced by the NHS. As we have
shown, this is an institution served by Black and ethnic minorities for the
benefit of a white nation, so mirroring British colonialism and tying
Britain’s imperialist past to its divided present. The reminder that Britain
was once an empire reinforces their otherisation in relation to their social
location as ‘colonised subjects’ (Aldama 2003, 8) or people of empire.
Without present-day BAME, there can be no coloniser. The NHS helps
Britain retain this status as a coloniser. The irony of this post-empire
dynamism is clear in the Brexit–NHS–COVID-19 trilogy. Writing before
COVID-19 emerged, Fitzgerald and colleagues (2020) argue that Brexit
must be situated in relation to biomedical policy in Britain in order to
capture understandings of ancestry and health along with the forms of
racial inheritance that structure the state and its welfare system. The
Leave campaign’s appeal to ‘nostalgic nationalism’ led to patterns of
voting shaped by emotions. The NHS conjures up a similar nationalistic
sentiment; the offer of exchanging the EU for the NHS, a centrepiece of
the Leave campaign, generated a similarly emotional reaction.
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121
The vital roles of EU citizens and Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic
healthcare workers to ensure that the NHS functioned and survived, to
save the lives of COVID-19 patients, to clean hospitals and drive buses,
has brought inequality in health outcomes to the fore. It has also
demonstrated their vital contribution to British society. While the UK
appeared to have flattened the initial curve of coronavirus infections, it
did not do so in relation to ethnic diversity: Britain did not become a
multicultural network of equals, nor a cultural ‘melting pot’, but rather an
uneven nation of whites and non-whites that extends to more recent
diasporas of diverse origins. The idea of a category for all non-white
people creates discomfort, yet the concept of whiteness makes visible the
privileges that have protected some and made others more vulnerable.
The COVID-19 pandemic made this starkly visible. Positioning whiteness
as a category of experience, analogous with the afterlife of colonialism,
Ahmed (2007) describes how groups of white people ‘take up space’,
making this a category of experience not biology. ‘Whiteness could be
described as an ongoing and unfinished history which orientates bodies
in specific directions’ (Ahmed 2007, 150), a ‘property of persons, cultures
and places’. Institutional spaces are shaped by their proximity to certain
bodies. The British National Health Services is a rare outlier, a British
institution where whiteness does not dominate; the bodies that shape the
NHS are Black and ethnic minority staff – healthcare providers, support
and managerial staff, cleaners and technicians. However, this diversity
has not led to equality – rather, it is evidence of entrenched inequality.
Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic has evidenced the inseparability of Britain’s
imperial past from its divided present, suggesting an afterlife of
colonialism that undermines the life chances of many, while reproducing
patterns of racial inequalities. The overrepresentation of Black and ethnic
minority populations in daily UK death toll figures for coronavirus tracks
the fault lines of social and economic exclusions that we argue were
defined through colonialism.
In a global pandemic, critical medical anthropology has the task to
draw to the surface the social and political origins of illness (Sesia et al.
2020; Pfeiffer and Nichter 2008). Rather, racism, national identity,
nationalism and class, and their entanglement, continue to bear down on
systemic embodied inequalities in the British healthcare system and have
left specific groups particularly vulnerable to COVID-19. Asymmetrical
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power structures also dominate global health, so that ‘the contemporary
health crisis can serve as a reminder that the colonisation of medicine,
economics and politics remains alive’ (Ghilardi et al. 2020). Understanding
how social and lived environments shape biological vulnerability without
newly homogenising or re-stigmatising already vulnerable communities
in an era of COVID-19 is a profound challenge. In post-Brexit UK, the
afterlife of colonialism and nostalgic nationalism continues to be relevant.
The danger comes from long standing and older risks of biologising
inequality and social difference, where poverty, adversity or lived
environments permanently mark bodies across lifetime and generations.
Negotiating biosocial differences in the time of coronavirus is a fraught
terrain. It provides both the opportunity to reveal the profound extent to
which structural social inequalities shape health, while risking the everpresent danger that these differences will be subsumed by rendering the
biological immutable.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the participants of the study ‘Healthcare professionals’ experiences and challenges at the time of COVID-19’ (Kingston
University REC reference number LR1545) who generously volunteered
their time to be interviewed.
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
On 25 May 2020, George Floyd, a 46-year-old Black American man, was killed in Minneapolis,
Minnesota, during an arrest for allegedly using a counterfeit bill (Hill et al. 2020).
The term United Kingdom (UK) refers to the union of all four nations, Northern Ireland, Scotland,
Wales and England. However, Britain (which is the same as Great Britain) only includes Scotland,
Wales and England. Citizens of the UK all have ‘British’ nationality as well as their individual
nationality – Irish, Welsh, Scottish or English. Southern Ireland or Éire, is a separate country and
is not part of the UK or Britain; however, the islands of Ireland and Britain are collectively known
as the ‘British Isles’, although this does not confer political unity.
The real name has been changed and continental European nationality has been used to protect
the research participant’s identity, as requested by the interviewee. This interview was part
of the study ‘Healthcare professionals’ experiences and challenges at the time of COVID-19’.
The study received favourable ethical approval by Kingston University Ethics Committee
(REC reference number LR1545).
This was in contrast to the EU response. The European Commission recommended a common
EU approach towards contact-tracing apps (New European Parliament, 6 May 2020).
This was linked to a slightly different controversy that had excluded particular NHS migrant
workers such as porters and cleaners from the government’s ‘bereavement scheme’. There was
a similar dramatic reversal of this policy in mid-May.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-politics-52761960/hassan-akkad-explains-the-videowhich-caused-a-u-turn.
THE BIOPOLITICS OF COVID -19 IN THE UK
123
7
8
See, for instance, Gallagher, Paul. 2020. ‘Syrian refugee behind viral NHS video to carry on
fight for migrants’ rights’. inews.co.uk, 21 May 2020. Accessed 2 August 2020. https://inews.
co.uk/news/hassan-akkad-syrian-refugee-nhs-viral-video-boris-johnson-430090.
See, for instance, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/science-and-disease/
burden-covid-19-falls-poorer-backgrounds-uk/.
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7
The shroud stealers
Coronavirus and the viral vagility of prejudice
Aditya Bharadwaj
The emergence of SARS-CoV-2 and the COVID-19 pandemic galvanised
global containment, and prophylactic action centred on the strategies of
self-isolation and social distancing. These twin procedures of social
exclusion quickly became the widely accepted intervention against a
viral load currently evading scientific excogitation. This exclusionary
approach, undergirding seemingly innocuous global public health
measures, is infected with a series of discriminatory assumptions built
into the socio-political architecture of democratic states around the globe.
The emergence of SARS-CoV-2 did more than expose the structurally
violent and iniquitous stratifications irreversibly scarring lives across the
globe. The pandemic sanitised and normalised an inherently violent
mode of pandemic governance inaugurated as a benign prophylactic
action that rapidly became parasitic on culturally entrenched and
socially sanctioned stratifications, including most notably caste, gender,
class, race and religion. These social stratifications became unwitting
experimental sites for incubating and cultivating alleged herd immunity
among those who were already socially isolated, politically excluded and
economically marginalised. For example, in some parts of the world the
twin prescription of self-isolation and social distancing rapidly exposed
existing class (and caste) privilege (see Manderson and Levine 2020),
effectively locking out millions for whom the luxury of maintaining and
sustaining both distance and isolation turned into an unattainable
suicidal feat, as I discuss below. This mode of pandemic governance did
not just unleash a vulgar biopolitics of ‘make live and let die’ (Foucault
2003; Lemke 2011) but rather a form of crass neoliberal fix that allowed
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a category of subject-citizens to die for the greater good. This inhumane
spectacle featuring the untimely demise of an already socially distant
and economically isolated citizen was consistently reimagined as
prevention, precaution and protection. The vision of the global governing
elite – ranging from nation-states to international organisations orchestrating the prophylactic intervention – emerged as inherently blinkered.
These governing elites either ignored or elected to remain ignorant of
the viral vagility of prejudice already infesting and infecting lives of
millions around the globe. This is a tragedy not so much because certain
categories of people disproportionately died, such as the ‘the footloose’
labourers in India, the so-called BAME (Black, Asian and Minority
Ethnic) in the United Kingdom, African Americans, ‘illegal immigrants’
and ‘other’ minorities in the United States, and vulnerable and frail older
people with chronic health problems around the globe. But rather it is an
unspeakable tragedy because, to borrow from Foucault, the government
of pandemic could not see these subjugated citizens.1 And when they did
finally appear from the ground fog shrouding the stratified polity in
which they existed – in most cases broken, isolated, starving or displaced
– they were allowed to die for the greater privileged good. A certain
vitiation of the biopolitical logic emerged. That is, the purported calculus
behind the calculating gaze of the biopolitical state simply missed seeing
the many millions assumed to be subjected to its disciplinary logics. For
example, while the ‘Black Lives Matter’ and ‘I Can’t Breathe’ anti-racism
protests in the US exposed the state’s ruinous complicity in scarring
innumerable black lives, the state responded by merely averting its racist
gaze. The state saw the protests as just another instance of wanton
lawlessness, a predominant attribute it routinely assigns to a figment of
its racist imagination: the ungovernable black citizen. This projection
also allowed the state to recast the anti-racism movement as nothing
more than a breach of its ‘pandemic demarche’ demanding self-isolation
and social distancing from law-abiding citizens. However, the state
hypocritically looked away as its ‘support base’ blatantly violated, often
with brazen impunity, the same restrictions in the name of freedom
and liberty.
The philosophical commentaries and critiques that followed
the emergence of this global emergency were uniquely shaped by the
ideological attachments of the commentators. Unmistakeably, as a point
of departure, these musings took the lives, rights and liberties of those
who could either collaborate with or militate against the disciplinary
modality implicit in the proposed distancing and isolating interventions as the norm. Giorgio Agamben (2020) saw the response to be
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‘disproportionate’ and the resultant state of exception as a normal
governing paradigm. For Agamben, it was:
almost as if with terrorism exhausted as a cause for exceptional
measures, the invention of an epidemic offered the ideal pretext for
scaling them up beyond any limitation. The other no less disturbing
factor is the state of fear that in recent years has evidently spread
among individual consciences and that translates into an authentic
need for situations of collective panic for which the epidemic
provides once again the ideal pretext. Therefore, in a perverse
vicious circle, the limitations of freedom imposed by governments
are accepted in the name of a desire for safety that was created by
the same governments that are now intervening to satisfy it.
Povinelli (2016) has already shown that terrorism, exhausted or not, like
SARS-CoV-2, is a virus in the late liberal governance modality. For Povinelli,
the ‘virus is an active antagonistic agent built out of the collective
assemblage that is late liberal geontopower’ (2016, 19). Geontopower is a
‘set of discourse, affects, and tactics used in late liberalism to maintain or
shape the coming relationship of the distinction between Life and Nonlife’
(Povinelli 2016, 4). While the moving balance between life and non-life –
with the figure of the virus as one of its key embodiments (the perennial
‘zombie’, neither dead nor alive) – somewhat disrupts Agamben’s running
battle with the biopolitical state, the limits to Povinelli’s argument are
perhaps reached in cultural contexts such as India. While outside the scope
of this chapter, it will probably suffice to say that for millennia Vedanta
philosophy has mulled over the life and non-life binary as nothing more
than alternate states suffusing the Universe: jad (matter/unconscious/
insentient) and chaten (alive/conscious/sentient).
Not to be exceeded in the emerging scene of philosophy gone ‘viral’,
philosophy’s self-styled agent provocateur Slavoj Žižek produced extended
pamphlets, seeing in the coronavirus epidemic an opportunity to ‘give a
new boost of life to [reinvented] Communism’ (2020). Esposito’s blunt
organic analogy painstakingly developed in Immunitas: The Protection and
Negation of Life, equating the human body’s immune system to (protective
cover of) law, suddenly became timely and prophetic. Similitude between
the unfolding pandemic and a search for immunisation against the
menacing threat, SARS-CoV-2, looped back to the subliminal thesis of
ingesting poison/danger to neutralise poison/danger or, as in the case of
COVID-19, vaccine/part virus. Esposito’s philosophical sermon was as if
proclaiming: immunisation against the other by incorporating the other.
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Learning to live with the other. Eliminating incompatibility between
(immunitary) self and (communitary) other. In other words, ‘to conceptualize the function of immune systems in a different way, making them into
relational filters between inside and outside instead of exclusionary barriers
… by disabling the apparatuses of negative immunization, and by enabling
new spaces of the common’ (Esposito in Bird and Short 2013, 6),
However, these philosophical commentaries and others attached
to (rightly) critiquing the biopolitical state neglected the rampant reemergence and re-enactment of brutal old prejudices. These prejudices
weren’t exactly state generated, but nevertheless they were efficiently
mined by the biopolitical state as a governing resource. It was as if the
SARS-CoV-2 breathed new life into old discriminations and bequeathed
a certain viral vagility to indifference and prejudice. For instance, in the
US the pandemic raged like an out-of-control forest fire: on 31 December
2020, in that country alone, nearly 20.5 million people had been reported
infected and 355,000 had died from coronavirus. Fatalities were (and are
still, at time of writing) disproportionately higher in communities and
neighbourhoods with large African American populations (Zephyrin et al.
2020). Additionally, as joblessness and economic precarity deepens, taps
are being turned off because of non-payment of bills ‘even as the CDC
calls for frequent hand washing’ (Laxmi 2020). In the UK, a similar story
played out as COVID-19 disproportionately impacted Black, Asian and
Minority Ethnic people, the so-called BAME. Fatality among doctors and
care staff was similarly reported to be higher among ‘the BAME’. The virus
of prejudice, like SARS-CoV-2, exploited underlying biological weaknesses
and socio-political prejudices. The latter is rather well reflected and
encapsulated by the use of this offensive acronym, BAME: in one deft
move all diversity, complexity and experience was reduced to bureaucratised categories, sutured together as a biopolitical convenience sample.
BAME became an alternative to Other. And as I will show later in this
chapter, in India the Dalit and other vulnerable groups were singled out
to face up to centuries’ old persecution, albeit now enjoying a new lease
of life in the garb of social distancing and isolation.2 The word Dalit (dälit)
means ‘ground down’, ‘broken to pieces’, ‘crushed’. It seeks to ‘convert a
negative description into a confrontational identity and to become a
particular sort of political subject’ (Rao 2009, 1). Treated as untouchables
for millennia, the postcolonial state in India recognised the historic
injustice and established the group of Scheduled Castes (SC) within the
newly established constitution. The Scheduled Castes are estimated to
include around 170 million people. The practice of untouchability was
formally banned as the constitution came into force on 26 January 1950.
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Key remedial initiatives established constitutionally guaranteed policies
of positive discrimination and affirmative action to better support the
integration of the SC and ST (Scheduled Tribes, currently numbering
80 million people). However, the cultural force of prejudice continues to
vitiate and subvert the constitutionally established principles of equality
and non-discrimination. This is notwithstanding the fact that the Dalit
community has emerged as a major political force in the Indian democracy
(see Rao 2009; Ciotti 2010). It seems the pious utterances enshrined in
the constitution continue to be an ineffective vaccine against the virus of
culturally entrenched prejudice.
In this chapter, I do no more than grapple with the viral vagility of
prejudice in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. In so doing, I meditate
on the texture of structural violence, exploring how horrific forms of
social exclusion and marginalisation exacerbated as the pandemic gained
traction. In pointing out this intensification, I take a literary detour to
gesture at the ‘already there’ normalised to euphemised forms of violence
that were amplified as states enjoined the citizens to retreat into relative
privileged isolation and distancing. Drawing on examples from India,
I introduce the notion of ‘shroud stealers’ to reflect on the unfolding
pandemic and to better apportion responsibility, including our own
culpability as academic spectators and commentators.
Kafan Chor: ‘the shroud stealer’ and the
pandemic of poverty
The influenza pandemic of 1918 birthed a curious figure in the city of
Delhi: kafan chor, the shroud thief. Having just lost thousands of Indian
soldiers in the First World War, the city was suddenly facing the terrifying
spectre of yet more death. From the account provided by writer–poet and
scholar Ahmed Ali (1910–94), we learn that ‘filled with anger against the
inhumanity of man, Nature wanted to demonstrate her own callousness
and might’ (Ali 1940, 169). Ali vividly captures the unfolding pandemic:
Men carried dead bodies on their shoulders by the score. There was
not a single hour of the day when a few dead bodies were not carried
outside the city to be buried. Soon the graveyards became full, and
it was difficult to find even three yards of ground to put a person in
his final resting-place. In life they had had no peace, and even in
death there seemed no hope of rest. A new cemetery was made
outside the city where people buried relations by the score.
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The Hindus were lucky that way. They just went to the bank of the
sacred Jamuna, cremated the dead, and threw away the ashes and
unburned bones in the water. Many were thrown away without a
shroud or cremation (1940, 169).
At the peak of the pandemic, Ali describes a ‘gruesome menace’ emerging
in Delhi in the form of shroud thieves. Stealing shrouds became a quick
way of ‘procuring bread’ and ‘earning a livelihood’. Ali’s ghoulish
description is written with the anguished authority of an eyewitness. It
jolts the reader into sitting up and becoming a spectator – aware but
unable to act – given the slow unravelling of the human condition:
Many went to the graveyards at dead of night with spades and long
iron hooks. It was not difficult to dig open the new graves, especially
because they had been dug and filled up in a hurry. With the help of
their iron hooks they pulled out the winding-sheets and got good
money for them. Hyenas and jackals thus found their task made
easier for them. They could enter the newly opened graves and fill
their bellies to the full (Ali 1940, 170).
According to Ali, the ‘grave-diggers’ amassed a fortune during the
pandemic. The scavenging shroud thieves, for the first time in a long
while, did not do too badly either. The cloth merchants, banias, raised the
price of ‘line-cloth’ used for ‘winding sheets’, kafan. Those who could not
afford a proper kafan settled for a cheaper thinner shroud that would
barely conceal the dead body, and so ‘the person would starve, but spend
a little more to give his dear one a decent shroud’ (Ali 1940, 171).
Similarly, the reader learns that the ghassals, whose job it was to wash the
dead for their final journey, did ‘roaring business’ as they ‘laved the bodies
with water’ and pocketed gold and silver rings left on the corpses (Ali
1940, 171).
Ali evokes for the reader a macabre economy that sprang up in the
height of the pandemic. His account is not a first-person narrative of
unfolding events, nor is it in any straightforward sense rooted in historical
evidence. But Ali’s pathos laden commentary is a conjuring of collective
grief, disbelief transmogrified into memory. It is a traumatic archive of
source material which summons pensive reflections on the nature
of precarity haunting the human condition. A disparate cast of characters
in Ali’s account see opportunity in the pandemic, and in their own unique
way – digging graves or robbing them, selling shroud or offering ghassal
– become grotesque iterations of a kafan chor, the shroud stealer.
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The notion of stealing better typifies the suggested debasement in
Ali’s account as opposed to mere thievery (thief is the literal English
translation for chor). The very act of stealing the shroud and its many
surrogate enactments in the figure of the banias and the ghassals, for
example, are tantamount to stealing human dignity and losing it
altogether. Whether for profit or livelihood, the shroud stealers offer a
haunting commentary on human depredation. This theme was elevated in
the heart wrenching literary evocations of one of the pioneering figures of
modern Hindi and Urdu literature, Munshi Premchand (1880–1936).
Premchand wrote over a dozen novels and over 300 short stories describing
in vivid detail the tribulations of the middle classes and the crippling
poverty of the socially excluded. In his 1936 story Kafan, the shroud,
Premchand offers a masterful meditation on dehumanising poverty in a
stratified social landscape. The story’s main protagonists, abjectly poor
father (Ghisu) and son (Madho), must face an intractable crisis as Madho’s
labouring wife, Budhiya, dies in childbirth. The penniless duo neither have
the money to buy a shroud nor the means to give the dead woman a decent
funeral. While the father and son manage to beg and cobble together
enough from the village landlord, merchants and moneylender, they end
up spending the money on liquor and a minor feast, even as Budhiya’s
body languishes in the hut unattended and unshrouded. The decline and
descent into this seemingly ugly self-indulgence is gradual:
‘We need only the shroud now.’
‘Let’s get a cheap one.’
‘Of course. It will be night when the corpse is carried to the pyre, no
one will look at the shroud.’
‘What an unjust custom! She, who didn’t have even tattered rags
to cover her body while she was alive, must now have a new shroud.’
‘And it burns to ashes with the corpse.’
‘So it does. Now if we had these five rupees earlier, we could’ve
bought her some medicines.’ (Premchand 2017, 662)
Premchand suggests that the father and son duo were able to guess
the other’s weakening resolve. They prolonged their search for the
perfect shroud into the evening, only to find themselves at the door of
the wine house. It is here their resolve finally crumbles, and with it,
the veneer of worldly decorum and appropriacy, the preserve of the
well-fed rich.
This surface reading codes a paradigmatic commentary that
Premchand rustles into the storyline, straddling multiple narrative
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devices ranging from darkly comical to manifestly ironic and cathartic.
This ‘readerly’ text, to borrow from Roland Barthes (1974), takes one to
the door of a certain ‘writerly’ complexity. The characters are damned and
framed as if embodying prevailing societal judgements and indifference.
The potential judgement implicit in a privileged reading is coded into
carefully worked up character portraits. Time and again, the author loops
the surface reading back to the reader, demanding a deeper incredulous
response. Eventually, the reader begins to detect the literary sleight of
hand, astutely distilling culturally framed assumptions into the textured
but wilfully stereotyped characters. Premchand’s characters, in other
words, reveal the reader’s latent complicity (and by extension society’s
perfidious culpability) in maintaining structurally violent stratifications
that the characters must perennially endure. Premchand hides the
cultural context in the narrative fold to expose multiple seething realities
haunting the duo. Manifestly, the reader encounters two inherently
unsavoury characters: indolent, amoral, insensitive, self-centred, callous,
wretched. The reader also learns that the father and son belong to the
ostracised Dalit community: in 1936, a Dalit would have been routinely
brutalised as an untouchable. However, an array of deeper meanings
continually surface to tangle the syntagmatic thread. For example, the
protagonists’ financial precarity emerges as a feature of their marginal
status but equally an element of their everyday resistance practices
(torpid laziness) that allowed them to eke out a living under the
exploitative and stratified feudal gaze. The fact that the duo end up
spending the money for the shroud on feasting and drinking liquor
doubles up as an allegory for the caste-based violence scarring their lives.
That is, culturally sanctioned upper caste maleficence deprives them both
of dignity and of the means to a dignified life. This is also a moment of
escape from the guilt and unexpressed trauma of sitting helplessly and
watching Budhiya come to a painful end. The story reveals how grovelling,
beseeching and snivelling is expediently deployed by Ghisu to extract
money from an unjust order that owed him much more than money for a
mere shroud. The disgust and condescension with which the landlord
obliges, throwing a paltry sum of money at Ghisu, characterises the
stratified order in which he has evolved to deploy strategic subservience
as a survival strategy. Ghisu knows when to yield and when to wield ‘the
weapons of the weak’ (cf. Scott 1985). At one point in the story, Ghisu
sneers at his guilt-ravaged son who is suddenly confronted with the
horror of squandering money for the shroud on food and drink: ‘The same
people who gave us the money [will give the shroud]. They won’t hand
over the money to us anymore. If they do, we’ll have another feast here.
THE SHROUD STEALERS
135
And they’ll pay for the shroud again’ (Premchand 2017, 664). By about
the end of the story, repeatedly punctuated by innovative theodicies
justifying their actions, father and son dance and collapse in the throes of
inebriate stupor. To the bitter end, Ghisu remains confident of his ability
to extract at least a shroud from the unjust society that barely gave him
enough to clothe his own existence of bare life.
Premchand paints the unrelenting despoliation of the human
condition. These are brought about by practices of ritualised humiliation,
built into the architecture of a hierarchically segregated social structure
incubating extreme forms of precarity. The feasting and drunken reverie
becomes an eerie cipher for near schizophrenic lamenting, a death dance
of the living dead, and an outward projection of the internalised societal
suggestion that both father and son are at best subhuman. Both Ghisu and
his son ventriloquise a culturally sanctioned debasement, electing to
become amplified caricatures of an inhumane society personified by the
upper caste landlord and moneylender. The need to beg for a shroud by
gaming the very people who game into existence the violent stratified
order in which one dies, is perhaps the core message in the story.
Premchand corrugates into the story the multiple readings of the text; in
so doing, he forces the reader to confront the shroud-stealing social order
that Ghisu and his son endure on a daily basis.
Stratified proxemics: vitiated life and structural violence
A baby plays with a shroud covering its dead mother at a station in
Bihar, in one of the most tragic visuals to emerge from the daily
reports of migrants stranded by the coronavirus lockdown. In a clip
widely shared on social media, the toddler tugs at the cloth placed
over his mother’s body. The cloth comes off but his mother doesn’t
move; she had died moments before. According to her family, she
died of extreme heat, hunger and dehydration (Kumar and Ghosh
2020).3
In March 2020, hundreds upon thousands of migrant workers and their
families were left stranded as the Indian government ordered a
countrywide lockdown in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The
problem was exacerbated by the timeline of the decision: 1.3 billion
citizens were given notice of a mere four hours to retreat into self-isolation
and to ensure social distance. The lockdown rapidly turned into an
extensional threat for India’s poor who quickly found themselves out of
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work and with no safe place to harbour in the city (more on this below;
see also Garimella and colleagues, Chapter 11). It seemed that the
biopolitical state had no plan. It took, as the norm, the lives and
circumstances of those who could isolate and participate in tokenistic
display of solidarity with the state. Relatively privileged citizens were
summoned to lockdown and called upon to join the state from the comfort
of their homes to celebrate the impending end of the pandemic. Mirroring
similar public gestures in other settings, the state invited citizens to
partake in nightly candle vigils and to beat household utensils, perhaps
imagined as a ritual to ward off the evil virus, and to show (middle class)
solidarity from the comfort of their balconies, gardens and terraces.4
Meanwhile, panic ensued in less salubrious neighbourhoods across
the country as people began making contingency arrangements and
desperately attempting to stockpile. The suddenness of the lockdown
particularly hurt millions of ‘footloose’ (Breman 1996) daily-wage
labourers who, overnight, were without work and money. With infinite
foresight, reasoning and desperation, workers decided to retreat to the
relative safety of their homes, often thousands of kilometres from
megalopolises like Mumbai and Delhi where the majority worked as daily
wage labourers (EPW 2020). The ILO noted that ‘the lockdown measures
in India, which are at the high end of the University of Oxford’s COVID-19
Government Response Stringency Index, have impacted these workers
significantly, forcing many of them to return to rural areas’ (ILO 2020, 6).
With no means of other transportation available, workers and their
families began converging to walk home along national highways.
Thousands continued the trek on foot; a lucky few persuaded interstate
haulers to ferry them in the back of their trucks. Hunger, dehydration,
heat stroke, exhaustion and vehicle accidents claimed many lives. An
exact account of these fatalities, collateral damage of COVID-19, is not yet
available.5 Further, India’s surprisingly low death rate linked to COVID19, with a case fatality rate of 1.8 per cent, is being questioned (Lancet
2020a, b); India lacks the capacity to count and certify deaths due to
COVID-19 using the RT-PCR test (Nature 2020). This is hardly surprising
given the lopsided nature of India’s vast healthcare system – from stateof-the-art hubs for medical tourists to decrepit rural healthcare centres
of questionable quality and few resources. Healthcare in India is
incorporated under ‘the ‘State’ list of legislation and jurisdiction, different
from the ‘Union’ and ‘Concurrent’ lists, thus enabling various state
governments to assume control and responsibility of health provision
for their populations’ (Bharadwaj 2016, 110).6 The Indian healthcare
landscape can at best be defined as ‘mixed’, a vestige of its post-colonial
THE SHROUD STEALERS
137
mixed economy developmental planning. In the emerging neoliberal
India of the twenty-first century, however, this mixed approach championing public primary health and private curative healthcare provision
has further consolidated as a two-tier system skewed in favour of private
healthcare delivery. It is this mixed-up model that the state’s pandemic
response scrambled into action. The true extent of the pandemic and how
it impacted the Dalit and other vulnerable groups in India will probably
never emerge. This pessimism is only exacerbated by the prevailing state
of chronic underinvestment and concomitant limited capacity to test and
trace, and to establish a credible and coordinated, nationwide, pandemic
surveillance system.
When the state did finally rouse from its candle-lit vigil torpor, it
responded to the unfolding tragedy by commandeering special trains and
buses to transport people home. However, bureaucratic hurdles and
delays, general confusion and lack of information, coupled with rumour
and panic, made the task even more arduous. Left wageless and eventually
homeless, daily-wage labourers and itinerant workers were rapidly
recapitulated and euphemised – both in government and media discourse
– as ‘migrants’ in their own country.7 The searing heat and unending wait
in queues, the overcrowded trains, running often without water or
adequate sanitation, added to the fatalities – as in the case of a woman
whose partially shrouded anonymity, thanks to gawking smartphonewielding bystanders, momentarily went ‘viral’ on social media (see
Narasimhan, Chittem and Purang, Chapter 19). The footage was seized
by local politicians to expediently criticise the sitting administration in an
election year (DNA 2020; Kumar and Ghosh 2020).
As Breman (1996) showed more than two decades ago, the footloose
proletariat in India is largely detached from its place of origin, and seldom
grows roots in the workplaces to which it temporarily finds employment
(also see Sainath 1996). The bulk of such labour is drawn from the Dalit
community and other oppressed groups low down on the caste pecking
order. Emerging data indicate the deepening economic impact of the
entwining of caste and the COVID-19 pandemic. Drawing on nationally
representative panel data for 21,799 individuals between May 2018 and
April 2020, Deshpande and Ramachandran (2020) show that far from
being a ‘great leveler’, the COVID-19 pandemic disproportionately
impacted lowest-ranked castes due to ‘lower levels of human capital and
over-representation in vulnerable jobs’. The study found that ‘the rate of
job loss was three times higher for the SCs (Scheduled Castes) and job
loss for individuals involved in daily wage jobs, relative to December
2019, was more than nine times higher’ (Deshpande and Ramachandran
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2020, 1, 10). While the pandemic and resulting lockdown exacerbated
pre-existing inequalities, the resulting economic precarity will only
increase as the pandemic wears on. This is particularly true in the light of
emerging analysis from the World Bank (2020). The World Bank
assessment notes that while India has made progress in reducing absolute
poverty, declining from 21.6 per cent in 2011 to 13.4 per cent in 2015,
thus lifting more than 90 million people out of extreme poverty, India’s
GDP contracted (year-on-year in quarter 1, financial year 2021) by an
astonishing 23.9 per cent because of pre-existing domestic issues and the
pandemic-linked national lockdown. The sudden collapse has hit poor
people particularly hard. To date, the ILO predicted that 90 per cent of
about 400 million workers in the informal economy faced serious risk of
falling deeper into poverty during the pandemic (ILO 2020, 6).
The pandemic accentuated the scale of social exclusion, marginalisation and discrimination experienced by the Dalit. For instance, the
National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) in India has actively
monitored the impact of the pandemic and the subsequent lockdown on
the Dalit, Adivasi (tribal) and other marginalised communities. A press
statement released by the National Dalit Movement for Justice (NDMJNCDHR) and data collected by NDMJ show how the pandemic has
worsened the situation (International Dalit Solidarity Network 2020). One
can glean from these emerging data sources a clear rise in instances of
caste-based untouchability, physical and sexual assaults, police brutality,
reported and unreported murders, inadequate to no PPE for Dalit sanitation
workers, and rising levels of hunger and deaths during the lockdown period
(International Dalit Solidarity Network 2020). The NCDHR pointed out
that the deployment of the term ‘social distancing’ as a safety measure
simply bled into established upper caste prejudice and the practice of
‘untouchability’ in both subtle and egregious ways. Dalit activist Ramesh
Nathan explained:
But what happened was that the Hindu fundamentalist organisations
gradually started using this to justify Manusmriti (ancient legal
Hindu text dated 100 ce). They did a lot of propaganda in the social
media and other media, saying ‘this is what we have been saying’
and ‘we should not let people in our homes, we should not touch
other people, we should not shake hands’. They started to reinforce
the caste system. For us, the term social distancing has already
prevailed in our society due to the caste system. The Dalits have
been presented as unseen-able, unapproachable and untouchable.
These are the major elements of the caste system. Social distancing
THE SHROUD STEALERS
139
reinforced these ideas. We are hurt that the dominant caste system
is taking advantage of the situation to once again push for casteist
ideas (sic) (TwoCircles.net 2020).
It has become common at mere mention, even in liberal western media,
to qualify – often in parentheses – the word Dalit as ‘former untouchables’.
This is legally accurate. The Untouchability (Offenses) Act, 1955, was
amended and renamed in 1976 the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955
(PCR Act), in addition to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (POA Act) (see Thorat 2009). But the
notion of ‘former untouchable’, like the homogenising BAME acronym in
the British media and policy discourse, is both offensive and inadequate.
As the lived experience of segregation of over 200 million Dalit
demonstrates, the practice of ‘untouchability’ remains a festering legacy
of caste-based social distancing. Thus a well-established prejudice further
validated ‘distancing’ while singling out the Dalit body as the primary
source of (COVID-19) contagion.
The spatial separation of individuals and classes in India has a long
history, marking, maintaining and restricting commensality (Ghurye
1961). The ideologically policed and scripturally sanctioned separation
of humans is hierarchically arranged and horizontally divided so as to
separate ideals of purity from sources of pollution. This is not just a
simplistic opposition of the pure and impure (Dumont 1970; also see
Dirks 2001; Jodhka 2018); it is also a feature of a long cultural process of
reimagining the impure as perennial contagion stalking and staking the
pure. The impure in this respect does not emerge as a site for pollution
per se but, more pertinently, as the source of defilement. In classical
Brahminical puritanism, defilement assumed a certain mobile and
projectile velocity and ferocity. It encompassed an array of bodily organs,
discharge and matter, and corporeal contact; even the shadow of impure
subjects were menacing sources of contamination and defilement
(also see Fuller 2004). The solution against such a spectral menace
was reconceived under the modernising impulse of colonial rule (Dirks
2001). As a form of social distancing, literal and metaphoric, this
reconceiving disallowed the sources of imagined pollution and abject
defilement to infect the pristine sociality fenced off for the untouched
pure. The resultant violence – symbolic and graphic, between the
untouched and the untouchable – stood for a purity that could not be
touched by the untouchable ‘super spreaders’ of contagious pollution.
The dehumanisation that grew out of culturally sanctioned ‘concepts of
hygiene, purity and contamination’ (cf. Savage 2007) became key to both
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maintaining distance and enforcing isolation between stratified categories
of humans. In this respect, the separation of castes was a foundational
source of violence between the untouched and the untouchable.
The tropes of purity and pollution emerged as a legitimising justification
to sustain and contain a violent mode of social control. This structurally
violent system of stratification, euphemised as the caste system,
institutionalised inequality so as to contain and maintain social distance
between humans.
There is a well-documented history of prejudicial barriers and castebased dogmas in moments of rupture like plagues and pandemics (see
Kidambi 2004; Ramanna 2012). For instance, in 1896 the Hindu Plague
Hospital in Pune was managed by the priestly caste, Brahmins, and
as British colonial officer Charles Rand reported, it was only open to
Brahmins and other upper castes (Chamadia 2020). In its inaugural year
alone, Brahmins formed 62.2 per cent of the total number of patients
(Chamadia 2020), although they were likely around 7 per cent of the
population (Plowden 1883, 227). Similarly, Kidambi (2004) described
how the draconian measures employed by the colonial administration to
control the bubonic plague of the 1890s repeatedly ran into caste-based
objections, especially when measures involved coming into contact with
lower castes or accepting food cooked by a subordinate caste. The upper
caste preoccupation with the inherent contagious impurity of lower castes
ironically mirrored not only the iniquitous colonial hierarchy but also its
unshakeable belief in ‘sanitary disorder’ predicated on an ‘orthodox
contagionist doctrine’ (Kidambi 2004, 51).
Dr B.R. Ambedkar, the father of the Indian constitution, a Dalit,
scholar and advocate for Dalit rights, powerfully dissected the rabid
anatomy of caste and caste prejudice in a paper presented at an anthropology seminar at Columbia University in 1916. Ambedkar located the viral
vagility of prejudice in the ‘fissiparous character of caste, as a consequence
of the virtue of self-duplication that is inherent in it’ (Pritchett 1979, 21).
In 1948 he further developed the fissiparous character of caste structuring
untouchability, explaining how and why ‘the Hindu will not live in the
quarters of the untouchables and will not allow the untouchables to live
inside Hindu quarters’ (Ambedkar 1948, 22). For Ambedkar, the caste
system cordoned off territory to create permanent spaces of segregation,
‘a cordon sanitaire putting the impure people inside a barbed wire, into
a sort of a cage’ (1948, 22). The untouchable ghetto for Ambedkar was an
unending and inherently violent form of social distance.
SARS-CoV-2 offers a unique opportunity for reflection, and an
opportunity to revisit Ambedkar’s life’s work. The virus of caste and the
THE SHROUD STEALERS
141
cordon sanitaire imposed by the caste system reproduce the viral vagility
of SARS-CoV-2 in the here and now. And as some of us spectate and
protest with anguished horror in privileged quarantine, we must remain
attentive to our own culpability.
Addendum
We are all shroud stealers now. As we begin to imagine life beyond the
pandemic, some of us will be forced to reimagine the metaphor of kafan
and kafan chor afresh. The shroud, kafan, and the thief, chor, are ultimate
allegories: the former representing peeling away the frayed shards of
human dignity and the latter typifying profit-making from structurally
violent contexts overseeing unshrouded demise of vulnerable others. This
is not mere production of ‘bare life’ under a ‘state of exception’ (Agamben
1998), for the excluded, the marginal and the poor are often expediently
included in the project of state formation (see Gupta 2012). The notion
of kafan and chor reveals the amorphous indeterminacy of structural
violence. As Gupta rightly reminds us, structural violence ‘is a crime
without a perpetrator’, that is, it is hard to identify the perpetrator
(2012, 21). Akhil Gupta argues that ‘one must keep in mind that certain
classes of people have a stake in perpetuating a social order in which
such extreme suffering is not only tolerated but also taken as normal’
(2012, 21). He further contends that those who disproportionately
benefit from the status quo are complicit in the violence directed against
the poor. However, he singles out the agents of such violence ‘in a country
like India’, as including not only the (ruling and other) elites, but also the
burgeoning middle class. Vocalising this partial truth in different guises
is the predominant approach employed by the purveyors of liberal
critique, so as to diagnose and locate the mêlées elsewhere. The globally
distributed classes of people who circuitously benefit from insidious
structural violence (myself and Gupta included) emerge as consciousstricken diagnosticians and commentators. This faceless crowd of
innocent bystanders grows on the margins of a carefully crafted problem
space that includes the biopolitical state, its crony elites and the vast
swathe of indifferent middle class. The diagnosis remains partial,
inherently incomplete and vulnerable to degenerating into sanctimonious
politics of outrage and condemnation. Thus we, the faceless liberal crowd,
are kafan chor in two significant ways. First, we wittingly or unwittingly
obfuscate our involvement in the violence against so-called marginalised
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people: Dalit, ‘BAME’, Black, Roma, or ‘similar others’ (cf. other
discussions on race, ethnicity and inequality in this volume). In so doing
we further feed biopolitical turpitude, forcing inhumane options
(disguised as choice) on those who seldom experience choice in choiceobsessed neoliberal formations. Second, we set up home on the margins
of structurally violent spaces, sometimes literally but mostly metaphorically, so as to live off the life, labour and death of our entrapped
neighbours. Through our vote or support for the biopolitical state or
via our schizophrenic relationship to neoliberal citizenship, we remain
complicit.
In this sense, Premchand’s heart-wrenching literary virtuosity
forces a certain ethical recognition. Stratified poverty and social exclusion
dehumanises the very humans it ensnares. More importantly, Premchand
successfully jolts a reflexive awareness – of the reader’s own moral and
ethical poverty – into existence. The well-ingrained impulse within us to
critique the biopolitical calculus of the modern state aside, one hopes the
pandemic will also unleash a moment of critical self-appraisal of our selfcentred solipsism. After all, the biopolitical state works for us, and its
egregious overreach is almost always justified, sanitised in our name. This
is a certain post-pandemic condition in the making: shroud stealers (like
me and you) mulling innovative theodicies to better understand how and
why the pursuit of an untrammelled life made us complicit in foisting an
undignified end on a category of people who, as in life, died without a
shard of shroud to their name.
The ‘government of pandemic’ working to protect both fragility and
vulnerability endemic to privilege operates by tapping into vagile
prejudices of our times. Perhaps we needed a global pandemic so as to
wake up to the subcutaneous biopolitical brutality lurking under the thick
skin of the modern state – to reiterate, empowered by us to speak and act
in our name. This also means that the logic of make live and let die needed
to appear that much more clearly and show how an exceptional state of
exception further extended and distended state power to allow a certain
category of people to perish (as opposed to merely die). But more
crucially, the pandemic revealed unsavoury truths about us, a faceless
crowd of shroud stealers, content with merely critiquing the biopolitical
excesses of the governing elite. And, we are able to do so safe in the
knowledge that our ends will be shrouded in a modicum of dignity, even
as our picket fenced life will struggle to obfuscate the ugly, povertystricken and violent existence of our irreversibly scarred and socially
distant neighbours.
THE SHROUD STEALERS
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Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
According to Foucault, government ‘must be allowed the very broad meaning it had in
the sixteenth century. “Government” did not refer only to political structures or to the
management of states; rather, it designated the way in which the conduct of individuals or of
groups might be directed – the government of children, of souls, of communities, of the sick’
(2002, 326).
At a cursory glance, class in contemporary neoliberal India may appear to be overtaking caste
as the primary source of social stratification. In this respect the upper caste poor may now be
‘outcaste’, to be avoided for fear of contracting COVID-19. However, caste privilege continues
to dominate; it allows an upper caste person, even in an economically marginal state, to benefit
from caste-ordained prejudices and suffer none of the culturally sanctioned outcomes a Dalit
routinely endures (see further below; see also Ciotti 2010). A good comparison is between
white working-class poor and African American poor in the US. An outcome rooted in economic
precariousness may be unfavourable for both, but the actual consequence is almost always
worse if the protagonist is Black. There is little evidence that class privilege fails to guarantee
a good health outcome because racist prejudices are built into the biomedical view of the Black
body (Davis 2019; see also Maybank et al. 2020).
At the time of going to press the horrifying second wave is unfolding in India. The appalling
mismanagement and cavalier overconfidence of the state resulted in severe vaccine and oxygen
shortages. The daily infection and mortality rates are simply incalculable due to sporadic
recordkeeping. As funeral pyres burn day and night and the poor who cannot afford cremations
abandon their dead in rivers or bury the dead in river sandbanks, the state’s complicitous
silence has become deafening. To add to the horror stories about a gang stealing shrouds from
crematoriums to sell on the market began circulating in local media (Times of India 2021).
It is highly likely that this ‘pandemic ritual’ was inspired by the impromptu balcony concerts and
community singing in Italy, but in India it was an invitation from the sovereign rather than a
spontaneous show of solidarity, reducing the ritualised display to mere political theatre.
Even when information is available, reports suggest rampant ‘undercounting’ of COVID-19
linked fatalities (Pulla 2020).
According to Balarajan and colleagues, ‘India’s total expenditure on health was estimated at
4.13% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2008–09, with public expenditure on health
being 1.10% of the share of GDP. Private expenditures on health have remained high over the
last decade, with India having one of the highest proportions of household out-of-pocket
expenditures on health in the world, estimated at 71.1% in 2008–09’ (2011, 4).
In India, mass media, particularly new media, is in a state of crisis. A large section of news
media is criticised as having thrown its weight behind the state. Euphemistically referred to as
the godi media, literally ‘lap’ or cradling something or someone in one’s lap. A vast section of
regional and national media is being dismissed by critics in India as compromised or in the ‘lap’
of the state. These godi media outlets routinely peddle fake news, often bordering on shrill
jingoism and bigotry. However, a section of independent news media channels and newspapers
have asserted journalistic freedom and resisted the ‘godi news outlets’. A growing number of
people are also turning to these sources for more accurate information and editorial
assessments.
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8
Unprecedented times? Romanian
Roma and discrimination during
the COVID-19 pandemic
Cristina A. Pop
Romania has the largest Roma minority in Europe, and here, the COVID-19
pandemic has revealed a pattern of anti-Roma attitudes that have
infused the government’s attempts to contain the virus. In this essay, I
consider two events revolving around the Romanian Roma – the lockdown
of Țăndărei, a town with a significant Roma minority, and the public
controversy surrounding the publication on social media of a derogatory
meme about the Roma stuck in Țăndărei during the lockdown. I examine
the ways in which the pandemic has intensified and even institutionalised
racist attitudes against Roma, and I show how the Roma have worked
around public attempts to confine and ridicule them. While the COVID-19
crisis raises unprecedented challenges for many around the globe, to
the Romanian Roma the pandemic may just be the latest in a series of
instances in which they have found themselves shamed for their
transnational mobility and subjected to containment. I review two such
precedents – the swine flu (H1N1) pandemic of 2009–10 and the measles
epidemic of 2016–18 – to show that, in contexts of heightened public
concern about confinement and contagion, the Roma have been
at the same time subjected, and creatively resistant, to biopolitical
constraints.
Romanian Roma include several heterogenous groups. While many
Roma live in permanent settlements, either as city dwellers or village
residents, some are more itinerant, traveling across Romania or back and
forth between Romania and other countries in eastern and western
Europe. A minority of the Romanian Roma display their wealth by living
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in opulent mansions whose intricate and pharaonic architectural designs
often make headlines in the tabloid press (Dumbara 2016). These
contrast with Roma communities of people living in extreme poverty
in decrepit neighbourhoods, sometimes in landfill slums. Many
Roma have assimilated, to various degrees, with the Romanian majority;
fewer continue to practise traditional crafts such as tinsmithing and
coppersmithing. Yet notwithstanding their diversity, most Romanian
Roma share several potentially unifying ethnic identity markers, such as
the high value attached to notions of purity, respect and shame, honour
and family (Pons 1995; Tesăr 2012; Berta 2019). Despite their diversity,
the majority of Romanians reify the Roma as a monolithic entity, and
refer to them in stereotypical terms as unlawful, unclean, underclass and
itinerant, but also as talented musicians and dancers, and family-oriented
people (Szeman 2018). Fonseca, for example, details various Roma
communities in Albania, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia and other countries
in her ethnography about European gypsies, and describes the Romanian
Roma as ‘the least obedient people in the world’ (1995, 140).
From their first arrival in the fourteenth century into the Carpathian
territories situated at the north of the Danube river, the Roma (designated
in the past as ‘gypsies’ [țigani]) were enslaved and used as an unpaid
labour force, especially in Christian Orthodox monasteries. This
continued until the mid-nineteenth century when they were liberated
once a new generation of politicians who had been educated in western
Europe during the 1848 revolutions came to power in Romania’s historical
provinces of Moldova and Valachia (Fonseca 1995; Djuvara 2008).
Between 1946 and 1989, under the communist regime which prioritised
class struggle over ethnic identity, the Roma were not officially recognised
as an ethnic group. With notable exceptions, such as the 1977 Plan for the
Forced Integration of Nomadic Gypsies (Ștefănescu 2020), the communist
state did not try to assimilate the Roma, and communist policies
emphasised social emancipation for all classes. Ideas of progress rather
than ethnic assimilation informed state programmes to force nomadic
Roma into permanent settlements, discontinue their traditional
occupations and enrol their children in Romanian schools (Pons 1995;
Szeman 2018). Like other Romanian citizens, the Roma benefited from
social welfare and free medical care, but given their resistance to
assimilationist policies of the communist state, they continued to be
discriminated against (Pons 1995; Fonseca 1995). Most Romanian
citizens were denied transnational mobility in this Cold War period, yet
despite being enclosed behind the Iron Curtain, the Roma managed to
engage in international travel, often smuggling coveted western
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merchandise, from blue jeans to contraceptive pills, back into Romania.
They were border-crossers even at a time when the outside world was out
of reach of most Romanians. The Roma’s transnational mobility reinforced
the Romanian majority’s stereotypes about their structural nomadism.
This established the foundation of their future casting as scapegoats in
the time of epidemics. After all, people do not travel alone across borders;
viruses travel with them.
After the demise of the communist regime in 1989, the Romanian
state formally recognised the Roma as an ethnic group, using the
ethnonym ‘Roma’ [Rrom]. While most prefer to be called Rrom, some
would still favour to be called țigan [gypsy], despite the derogatory
connotations of this former ethnonym. Their official acknowledgment as
an ethnic group subjected Roma to new forms of marginalisation and
discrimination (Vincze and Raț 2013), and sometimes to racially
motivated violence. For instance, the state has differentially targeted the
fertility of various socio-demographic groups, incentivising increased
fertility for high-income urban professionals but discouraging it for
minorities – especially the Roma (Raţ 2009). Universal child allowance,
introduced in 1993, was only distributed through schools for children
over seven, although in 2007 the law was modified to allow children who
did not attend school – the majority Roma – to also receive the allowance.
Paid maternity leave is available only for a mother’s first three births and
only for mothers who were employed and had contributed to the public
insurance fund for at least 12 months before giving birth. These elitist
family policies have daunted the most fertile categories of population –
especially the Roma minority – which is also the poorest. In an eugenicistsounding comment, political analyst Ionuț Popescu asked the state to
decide ‘what [type of] natality should be encouraged’. Alluding to Roma
parents, Popescu cautioned against the commodification of having
children (Benezic 2011).
The Roma were among the first Romanian citizens to take advantage
of the post-communist dismantling of previous policies. In the early 1990s,
with the removal of the Iron Curtain and European borders gradually
opening up to eastern Europeans, many Roma began to migrate to western
Europe in search of economic opportunities. Some surrendered Romanian
citizenship and became stateless persons in the hope, seldom fulfilled, of
being granted refugee status or western country citizenship (Pons 1995).
With Romania struggling to attest to its commitment to ‘European values’
in preparation to joining the European Union, negative stereotypes about
the ‘uncivilised’ Roma became more prevalent in public discourses.
The Roma became the designated scapegoats for Romania’s geopolitical
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149
fiascos (Pons 1995; Fonseca 1995). After Romania was finally admitted
to the European Union in 2007, Romanian Roma joined millions of other
Romanian citizens in seasonal or, in some cases, permanent economicdriven transnational migration to other European countries, particularly to
Italy, Spain, France and the United Kingdom (Berta 2019; Szeman 2018).
For over seven centuries of cohabitation, Romanians have developed
stigmatising stereotypes about țigani. The dehumanising and marginalising lens through which Roma are viewed is evident in extensive
idiomatic expressions, images and stories about gypsies. In general, Roma
are represented as delinquent, lazy, untrustworthy and dirty. In its form
as a verb, ‘to gypsy’ (a se țigăni) denotes nagging, bartering or excessive
negotiating for a minor thing. People speak idiomatically of ‘drowning
like the gypsy ashore’ (a se îneca ca țiganul la mal) to denote failing a
project or an endeavour in its final stage; ‘[swallowed food] taking the
gypsy’s way’ (a se duce pe calea țiganului) to refer to choking; ‘tossing
death at the gypsies’ (a arunca moartea în țigani) to refer to wrongfully
blaming someone; ‘moving around, like the gypsy and his tent’ (a se muta
ca țiganul cu cortul) to denote instability and untrustworthiness. The most
common ethnic slur that non-Roma Romanians use to refer to Roma is
‘crow’ [cioară], a reference to the fact that Roma are believed to have dark
complexions, although many ‘white gypsies’ have very light skin, blond
hair and light-coloured eyes, and for this reason, are assumed to be
kidnapped Romanians. As a child growing up in Romania, to ensure that
I stayed close to my adult family members in a crowded place, I was told
that țiganii were child abductors. In an ironic twist, it was the ethnic
majority of Romanians who feared assimilation by the Roma through
human trafficking. As we shall see, these ethnic slurs acquired new
meanings during the COVID-19 pandemic.
On 16 March 2020, in response to the emerging coronavirus
pandemic, the president of Romania, Klaus Iohannis, issued Decree
195 and declared a state of emergency. The Romanian government
periodically updated the stipulations of the decree through 11 military
ordinances, issued between 17 March and 11 May. On 4 April 2020, the
government issued Military Ordinance 7, which stipulated the lockdown
of Țăndărei, a town of 12,000 in southern Romania, about 150 kilometres
east of the capital city of Bucharest (Budușan 2020). A significant
minority of Roma – 30 per cent of the town’s population – live in Țăndărei.
As European countries implemented lockdowns and closed borders
following coronavirus outbreaks, hundreds of thousands of Romanian
citizens, including Romanian Roma, working in Italy, Spain, France and
other western European countries, returned to Romania. In a 24-hour
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period on 25 and 26 March, two Roma men from Țăndărei, aged 60 and
39, died after testing positive for COVID-19. These deaths, along with
other cases of people surviving the coronavirus – a total that would
rapidly escalate to seven deaths and 37 cases by 6 April – were traced to
a funeral that took place in the Roma community of Țăndărei in midMarch (Pocotilă 2020). In response to this outbreak, the Romanian
Minister of Internal Affairs, Marcel Vela, declared on 1 April 2020: ‘The
main issue is that they [the Roma of Țăndărei] are remaining in contact
with one another. They don’t follow the rules, they move around and are
hard to contain’ [my translation from Romanian] (Pocotilă 2020;
Duminică 2020). In this discourse, Vela points to the irreconcilable
otherness of the Roma; he insinuates derogatory connotations to social
values otherwise widely recognised as positive, such as closeness, and
alludes to the stereotype of the Roma as being obstinate unruly wanderers.
Three days later, on 4 April, Țăndărei was placed under lockdown by
police and special forces, as specified under Military Ordinance 7. While
the lockdown came in response to the increase of COVID-19 cases among
the Roma community of Țăndărei, the non-Roma majority of the town
was subjected to the same restrictions. The town reopened on 14 May,
following the stipulations of Military Ordinance 11.
Days after the lockdown of the town, several Romanian intellectuals
shared on social media an offensive meme that ridiculed the Roma
confined in Țăndărei. Vladimir Tismăneanu, professor of politics at the
University of Maryland (College Park) in the United States, posted on his
Facebook account a meme that he had received from Denisa Comănescu,
the general director of Romania’s most well-known academic publishing
house, Humanitas. The meme, posted on 10 April, was the picture of a
flock of crows sitting on a wooden fence, with text that read: ‘Țăndărei
Airport. All flights have been cancelled’. Tismăneanu shared the meme
with the comment: ‘Super cool, thank you, Denisa Comănescu’. [Super
tare, mulțumesc Denisa Comănescu.] Tismăneanu, born into a family of
communist activists, had defected from Romania in 1981 and has been
living in the US since 1982. A prominent intellectual figure of the
Romanian diaspora, he is also the director of the Centre for the Study of
Post-communist Societies at the University of Maryland (College Park).
Although Tismăneanu deleted his Facebook post minutes after publishing
it, a public controversy ensued. Sociologist and Roma activist Ciprian
Necula publicly denounced Tismăneanu’s post as racist. Later the same
day, Tismăneanu published ‘An error, an explanation’ [O eroare, o
precizare] on his Facebook page, acknowledging his previous posting of
the meme, but claiming that he had missed its ‘racist implications’ because
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he no longer lived in Romania (Necula 2020). He later deleted this
explanation as well. On 11 April, Tismăneanu posted an apology for
having circulated the ‘racist, inappropriate, and most importantly, hurtful
meme’, and admitted that not residing in Romania was no excuse for his
actions. Romania’s National Council Against Discrimination [Consiliul
Național pentru Combaterea Discriminării CNCD] filed a formal complaint,
fined Tismăneanu and notified the University of Maryland. The
University’s officials acknowledged and firmly condemned the racist
character of Tismăneanu’s post but did not further sanction their
professor, on the grounds that he had not displayed any racist behaviour
prior to this incident. Denisa Comănescu, general director of Humanitas
publishing house and the original source of the meme, also apologised
publicly, claiming that she had not realised the racist undertones of the
image (Păvălucă 2020). The controversy dragged in other prominent
Romanian intellectuals, among them celebrated writer Mircea Cărtărescu,
who, in a Facebook post also later deleted, praised Tismăneanu for
apologising and denounced those who had shamed him as hypocrites
(Mutler 2020; Dobrescu 2020; Tolontan 2020).
In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the ‘crow’ ethnic slur
acquired new meanings. ‘Crow’ had been previously used to refer to the
Roma in reference to the stereotype that most Roma have darker
complexions than other ethnic groups, just as crows are darker than other
birds. But crows also have the ability to fly, and the picture that Comănescu
and Tismăneanu circulated showed the birds sitting on a fence. The
immobile crow became an ironic allusion to the fact that Roma were
deprived of their stereotypical proclivity for mobility by the forced
quarantine. The intended humour of the meme depended upon preexisting derogatory characterisation of Roma as ‘unruly wanderers’, now
forced to stay in place. The wooden fence that stands for ‘Țăndărei
Airport’ can be seen as an intended comic hint to the quasi-rural infrastructure of the town.
On 1 May 2020, in response to the Țăndărei lockdown but unrelated
to the racist meme scandal, the former president of Romania, Traian
Băsescu, declared on live TV that:
The gypsies have to understand that their way of life cannot be
tolerated. Romania has to be a country where state institutions have
control over all territory. No matter how much [the gypsies] protest,
they have to understand that, neither police nor constabulary, and,
if necessary, not even the armed forces will ever step back’ [my
translation from Romanian] (Mihai 2020).
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Băsescu had been Romania’s president for two consecutive terms between
2004 and 2014, and the COVID-19 pandemic was not the first time he had
publicly expressed anti-Roma attitudes. Despite being officially recognised
as an ethic group in 1989, Romania has never officially acknowledged
that, alongside Jews, Roma were subjected to extermination during the
Holocaust. In a press release published during Băsescu’s first term on
the Romanian Presidency website in 2005, the Roma were excluded from
the Holocaust commemorations. This omission prompted calls from the
Roma community to review the content of the press release.1 Even if, in
2010, Băsescu declined to sign into law a nationalist proposal to officially
replace the ethnonym ‘Roma’ with the more derogatory ‘gypsy’, he made
repeated racist comments about the Roma, whom he frequently called
‘gypsies’. In 2014, he was finally fined by the CNCD for his disparaging
statements.
As often happens during social and political crises, xenophobic
attitudes are activated by a collective search for a scapegoat. In such
circumstances, ‘the other’ is suddenly more noticeable and potentially
culpable. In Romania, the COVID-19 public health crisis granted renewed
but unwarranted visibility to the Roma (Matache and Bhabha 2020), in
ways that are reminiscent of how they were treated during earlier
pandemics and epidemics. Continually socialised into circumstances of
discrimination, the Roma have previously been quick to work around
forms of biopolitical surveillance. This is why their responses to
coronavirus events, including Țăndărei’s lockdown and the public
controversy surrounding the meme, were neither dramatic nor
unprecedented. As anthropologists Veena Das and Erving Goffman (Das
and Goffman 2013) remind us, even though ‘stigma’ and ‘contagion’ are
‘theoretically distinct concepts’, they ‘tend to slide in each other’ especially
when ‘stigmatized diseases lead to the drawing of boundaries within the
domestic and its immediate environment of kinship and village or
neighborhood community’. To better understand the Romanian Roma’s
earlier experiences of being subjected to prejudice in the context of
intense public concerns about contagion and confinement, I consider two
recent examples: the swine flu (H1N1) pandemic of 2009–10 and the
measles epidemic of 2016–18.
Romanian medical care facilities, including maternity hospitals,
were placed under quarantine during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, with
strict limitations of access for everyone but medical workers and patients.
In December 2009, as a parturient mother in a public maternity clinic in
a large city in northern Romania, along with my family members, I had to
observe these restrictions to access healthcare. While hospitalised in the
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153
quarantined clinic, I noticed the presence of members of extended
families of several Roma women who had given birth. A rumour circulated
among patients and medical staff that the Roma had bribed the hospital
doorman to secure access to their parturient relatives. Despite the
rumours and the disparaging comments about breaking the quarantine
rules, the medical workers turned a blind eye and the Roma women’s
family members were not forced to leave the hospital.
As a patient and newly delivered mother myself, I observed ethnic
segregation in that maternity hospital on four distinct occasions between
2002 and 2009. Roma women were put together in the room closest to
the hospital’s entrance, with the least privacy. They were separated from
Romanians, Hungarians and members of other ethnic groups in a space
closest to hospital hallway traffic. Two Roma women from a town in
southern Romania, who I interviewed later as part of a research project
(Pop 2016), recalled being segregated in the public maternity hospital in
Romania’s capital city Bucharest where they had given birth. The practice
of segregating people of Roma ethnicity appears to be widespread in
Romanian public hospitals, especially in maternity wards, as stated
in Open Society Foundation and World Health Organization reports
(Refworld 2015, WHO 2013). Similar practices have also been documented
in Bulgaria and Hungary, where parturient Roma women are routinely
placed together in ‘gypsy rooms’ (Iszák 2004).
This concern about segregating the Roma from the other patients
inside the hospital during the H1N1 pandemic of 2009–10 overlapped
with the temporary quarantine provision of separating all hospital
patients from the outside world. Ironically, this confinement within
confinement created a breaching opportunity for Roma family members.
Since the practice of segregating Roma patients was already part of the
default racist setting of the hospital space, the family members of
the Roma women were prepared to penetrate spatial boundaries and
successfully used informal payments for that purpose. The fact that they
were only aiming to visit ‘the gypsy room’ – a quasi-liminal space, already
separated from the rest of the hospital – may explain why medical staff
seemed unconcerned that Roma family members were being granted
access inside the hospital during the flu quarantine. Perhaps Roma’s
intrusion seemed less real or less important to medical personnel, since
they only had access to the actual (and metaphorical) margins of care; for
this reason, there was little risk that they might infect other patients. The
Roma disregarded the interdiction to enter the quarantined hospital, and
successfully worked their way around it. In some sense, like the medical
staff, they may have felt that the quarantine did not even apply to them
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because they only needed access to a marginalised part of the building,
which already ensured that they were separated from others in the
hospital. Roma family members found ways to break access interdictions
precisely because their previous exposure to quotidian forms of structural
violence prepared them to expect segregation and discrimination and to
develop strategies to overcome these instances. While medical workers
and other patients viewed the informal payments to the doorman as
bribery – a form of corruption that reinforced the majority’s stereotypes
of Roma’s unlawfulness – the success of informal contributions raises
questions about how these perpetuate structural violence and racism
against the Roma. ‘Bribery’ only worked with the complicity of the nonRoma majority (represented in this context by the doorman and hospital
medical workers). The non-Roma rewarded transgressive behaviours by
granting the Roma family members access to the quarantined hospital
only to denounce such behaviours as expressions of Roma’s inclination
toward illicit action. Roma constantly face segregation and marginalisation
(Vincze and Raț 2013; Szeman 2018), and on a daily basis work around
formal interdictions. Overcoming barriers to hospital access during the
swine flu pandemic provides only one example of many that prepared the
grounds for Roma to not take the COVID-19 quarantine seriously.
During the 2016–18 measles outbreak, the Romanian Roma were
alleged to have brought the disease from Italy. Measles spread to Romania
in January 2016 and peaked in 2018. It has continued to spread; according
to statistics released by CNSCBT, by May 2020, 20,107 cases and 64
fatalities had been reported. Data from the European Centre for Disease
Prevention and Control identified epidemic spread in several European
countries, but Italy and Romania accounted for 34 per cent and 30 per cent
respectively of all cases by March 2018. With a notification rate of 226.8 per
million population (compared to the European average of 28.7 per million
population), Romania was by far the most affected country, with the
deadliest outbreak among European nations. According to Romania’s
National Centre for Surveillance and Control of Communicable Disease
[CNSCBT], the epidemic had started in a rural community from northwestern Romania, whose members, mostly Roma who traded clothing and
household goods, were consistently travelling back and forth between
Romania and Italy (Măgrădean and Tobias 2016). Genetic analysis
established that the B3 strain of the measles virus had been brought from
Italy and was different from the endemic D4 type that had circulated in
eastern Europe during past epidemics (CNSCBT 2016).
Measles infection spread rapidly around Romania, and was
particularly deadly among Roma infants and children. This influenced
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155
claims that the Roma had brought the virus from Italy (Măgrădean and
Tobias 2016) despite the fact that, in 2016, over one million Romanians
lived and worked in Italy and they too regularly travelled between the two
countries. The higher measles incidence and mortality among the Roma
was therefore a symptom of a structural rather than contingent problem.
Designed as a one-size-fits-all national scale programme rather
than a targeted regional and local project, Romania’s measles-mumpsrubella (MMR) vaccination campaign failed in its outreach to many Roma
communities and reproduced old discriminations while creating new
excluded populations. Community health workers blamed the low
vaccination rates on Roma’s ‘lack [of] identification papers’ and ‘itinerant
lifestyles’ (Coman 2017): they argued that many Roma were officially
registered neither in Romania nor Italy, and therefore fell between the
national immunisation programmes of the two countries. However,
investigative journalists who covered the measles outbreak in several,
mostly poor and rural, Roma communities in southern and western
Romania found that parents had expressed their intention to vaccinate
their children, and complained about being forgotten by public health
authorities. From the Roma’s perspective, the measles outbreak became
‘an epidemic of neglect’ (Drăgan et al. 2018). Excluded from the
healthcare systems of both Romania and Italy, some Roma used traditional
healing remedies against measles. Without access to vaccination and
allopathic medical care, some Roma community members attempted to
prevent measles with imitative magic methods, like dressing babies in red
clothes – a reference to the fact that rujeolă, the word for measles in
Romanian, designates the colour red. Others used traditional folk
remedies, such as rubbing the baby’s body with brandy or wine (Simina
2017). Journalists highlighted the prejudice held by the Romanian
majority against the Roma minority, reporting the manner in which social
workers, family doctors and other health providers used ethnic slurs and
talked about Roma in a condescending manner (Drăgan et al. 2018).
Ignoring some of the structural reasons for low vaccination rates, a few
welfare assistants admitted to having used intimidation tactics, such as
withholding financial aid to low-income Roma parents on the grounds
that they had not vaccinated their children (Ursu 2018). These people,
who represented state authority, dismissed the Roma as superstitious and
ignorant about the benefits of biomedicine. The use of alternatives to
allopathic medicine only reinforced, among the non-Roma majority,
clichés about gypsies practising the occult. However, Roma’s resort to
symbolic magic and traditional prevention can be understood in a more
pragmatic manner, as an attempt to use the only available resources at
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their disposal to prevent illness. The structural violence that shapes the
provision of care to many Romanian Roma explains these alternative
tactics of prevention and healing.
Even when the MMR vaccination was available, ethnic discrimination
prevented Roma children’s access to the vaccine. A 2016 study comparing
paediatric vaccination in Roma and non-Roma children in countries from
central and eastern Europe, including Romania, found that the odds of
being vaccinated for a Roma child was 38.6 per cent that of a non-Roma
child for MMR for the region. In Romania there is a 31.1 per cent gap in
MMR vaccination between Roma and non-Roma, which places Romania,
along with Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the country with the highest
vaccination gap in the region (Duval et al. 2016). Ethnic origin, lack of
access to healthcare, socio-economic status, lack of awareness of the need
for immunisation, and perceived and real discrimination have all
contributed to this immunisation gap. Overall, the measles epidemic of
2016–18 exposed the existence of entire Roma populations who were
omitted from mainstream healthcare because of structural barriers such as
poverty, racism and discrimination. The epidemic also highlighted the
centrality of stereotypical narratives in official public health discourses that
shame the Roma for their transnational mobility.
The systemic forces through which the Roma were singled out
during the H1N1 flu pandemic of 2009–10 and the measles epidemic of
2016–18 serve as the background against which we should understand
Roma’s reactions to confinement in Țăndărei during the early months of
the COVID-19 pandemic. Their resistance to the normative powers of
biomedicine and the state is more practical than ideological. The Roma
have naturalised structural vulnerability to a degree that has prepared
them to effectively elude it. While enclosure in their town was enforced
by both police and military forces, the Roma live-streamed parties on
TikTok, to the despair of authorities. One man from Țăndărei recorded his
coronavirus hospitalisation and healing process. In his vlog, posted on
YouTube and widely circulated by Romanian mass media, he first speaks
through a mask, advising people to stay home and take the virus seriously,
and later emerges from his hospital bed, takes off his mask, and invites
family and friends to a welcome home party (Literas 2020a, 2020b).
Although the non-Roma population of Țăndărei was subject to the same
lockdown measures, national TV aired only footage of the streets of the
Roma neighbourhoods of the town, with adults and children ignoring
social distancing requirements and wandering around. This prompted
several other TV channels to feature footage of the police and armed
forces patrolling the streets of Țăndărei and enforcing the quarantine
UNPRECEDENTED TIMES? ROMANIAN ROMA AND DISCRIMINATION
157
under the caption ‘game of cat and mouse between the population and
the police’ (Știrile PROTV 2020).
Structural violence against the Romanian Roma, in the present as
in the past, has taken the form of discrimination, segregation, prejudice,
marginalisation and poverty. These structural forces expand beyond
Romania, impacting the lives of Roma throughout central and eastern
Europe. In Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia many Roma live in extreme
poverty, in crowded dwellings, with no access to running water, under
conditions that impede their capacity to adhere to the simplest
preventive measures. During the COVID-19 pandemic, similar racialised
anxieties about infection and about the Roma spreading the virus
were recorded in Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia (Neuberger 2020;
McLaughlin 2020). While Romania is not the only country to witness
pandemic-triggered prejudice against the Roma, the Țăndărei lockdown
exposed the full extent of state’s and civil society’s institutionalised
racism.2
In the last decade, Țăndărei has been repeatedly featured in the
national and even international news. In 2010, several men among the
very affluent Roma of Țăndărei were charged with human trafficking,
accused of taking children from Romania and forcing them to panhandle
in the United Kingdom. The lawsuit dragged on for almost 10 years before
the case was dismissed in court in February 2020 due to insufficient
evidence. The verdict was controversial and allegations of corruption
circulated in the mass media. Wealthy Roma were suspected of having
bought the state authorities’ complicity to hide incriminating evidence.
Though there seems to be no causal link between the accusations of
human trafficking against the Roma of Țăndărei and the subsequent
lockdown of the town as COVID-19 gained ground, many Romanians
connected the two instances (Ștefănescu 2020); they both illustrated a
perception about the Roma as situated beyond and above the state’s
regulations. However, some Roma challenged this perception, arguing
instead that both the human trafficking case and Roma’s civil disobedience during the lockdown should be understood as examples of the
government’s inability to punish and discipline the delinquent Roma
(Baias 2020; Barberá 2020). Roma activist Duminică (2020) argued for
the need to shift the focus from a particular ethnic group to the state and
its governance style. In his opinion, the fact that the Roma escaped state
control both before and during the COVID-19 pandemic illustrated the
state’s complicity and corruption. The pandemic, then, exposed and
deepened existing mutual mistrust between the Roma minority and
Romanian authorities, and reinforced stereotypes on both sides about
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‘unlawful gypsies’ and the ‘weak state’. The public health crisis produced
by COVID-19 brought into public visibility old and new assumptions
about the need to purify the ‘social body’ from ‘corruption’, ‘superstition’
and ‘civil disobedience’ (see also Matache and Bhabha 2020).
Locking down entire communities because of COVID-19 was unprecedented in Romania. Yet, as suggested by previous instances such
as the swine flu pandemic and measles epidemic, the discourses that
circulated about the Romanian Roma among ordinary citizens,
intellectual and political elites, and authorities during the coronavirus
pandemic were not without precedent. By successfully – in a pragmatic
rather than ideological manner – working around discrimination by
(literally or figuratively) breaking boundaries, the Roma at the same time
reinforced stigmatising narratives and attitudes held by the Romanian
majority. The COVID-19 pandemic set the ground for future discrimination
against Roma.
Notes
1
2
In fact, Romanian lexicons do not agree with definitions of the Holocaust. In the Romanian
academy thesaurus (DEX 1996, 463), the meaning of the ‘Holocaust’ is the ‘killing (through
fire) of a very large number of people’, while in the Abridged Dictionary of the Romanian
Language MDLR (Breban 1997, 281), the Holocaust is defined as ‘the massacre of the Jews by
the Nazis’. There are no changes in more recent editions of these lexicons.
The only other Romanian area to be quarantined was Suceava, a city of 100,000 people from
northeast Romania. As stipulated in Military Ordinance 6 from 30 March 2020, Suceava was
locked down along with eight other adjacent villages, after the public health authorities
recorded 593 cases. To compare the magnitude of the outbreaks, by the time Țăndărei was
quarantined on 4 April, there were approximately 30 cases in a town one-tenth the size of
Suceava.
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9
Turkey’s Diyanet and political
Islam during the pandemic
Oğuz Alyanak
On 10 January 2020, two months before the first COVID-19 positive
case was announced in Turkey but anticipating its eventuality, a
taskforce led by the country’s Minister of Health, Fahrettin Koca, was
formed to oversee efforts to tackle the pandemic. Like his counterparts
in other countries, as cases began to be reported, Koca addressed the
nation regularly on measures taken by the government to contain the
spread of the virus. Schools were closed on 12 March and a partial flight
ban was put in place the next day. Leisure venues such as bars and
nightclubs were shut down and the ban was extended to gatherings in
mosques on 16 March. All hospitals with infectious disease units were
transformed into pandemic hospitals, and from the last week of March,
partial curfews were enforced nation-wide. For most Turks used to
seeing the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, addressing them
daily through their television screens, Koca’s regular appearance was a
somewhat welcome change.
Yet the measures mandated by Turkey’s Scientific Advisory Board,
which to Koca’s dismay were not followed literally by government officials,
were insufficient to contain the spread of the virus. In the first three weeks
of April, Turkey experienced a daily average of 97 deaths and 3,907 cases.
Then came a rather abrupt change of discourse. Turks started to see
their president and other state representatives, such as the head of the
Presidency of Religious Affairs (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı
Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, Diyanet hereafter), Ali Erbaş, take the stage to
comment on the pandemic. Other religious scholars were also invited to
participate in televised debates. Although these actors were not public
health experts, they weighed in on the discussion and brought to it a new
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dimension which had less to do with the pandemic’s biological tenets, and
more with its moral foundations. But why the change of discourse?
In this chapter, I examine how Turkey’s ruling Adalet ve Kalkınma
Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP hereafter) relied on a
moralist discourse to retain its legitimacy while facing mounting criticism
amid the pandemic. Reflecting on scholarly conversations on moral
authority and politics, with a particular emphasis on the notion of
political Islam, I show how the use of a moralist discourse enabled
new configurations of state power during the first wave of COVID-19 in
Turkey. Through the deployment of the Diyanet, which weighed in on
conversations on the pandemic during its initial peak in mid-April,1 the
AKP was able to divert attention from any mishandling of the situation,
such as not enforcing measures to quarantine Turkish citizens, including
those returning from the Islamic holy sites, as I describe in the next
section. The Diyanet continued to be an instrumental actor. Rather than
providing moral guidance on what it considered catastrophe sent by
Allah, it also pursued a moralist discourse by blaming actors and forces
that it considered to be behind COVID-19. One such force was the
neoliberal world order, which, according to the Diyanet, led individuals
to lose their moral compass, so bringing this calamity onto them.
Another was one of the AKP’s usual targets: individuals who practise
non-heteronormative relations, particularly members of the LGBTQI+
community in Turkey, who the Diyanet designated the perpetrators of
COVID-19 in late April.
‘Searching for someone to blame’, Atlani-Dault and colleagues
argued in a recent paper on COVID-19, ‘is part of the process of making
sense of any disaster, akin to the phenomenon of moral panic’ (2020,
e137). However, the act of blaming does more than contribute to growing
anxieties during epidemics and pandemics. It also plays into the hands of
public authorities such as politicians who are intent on evading criticism
while garnering popular support.
Naming the crisis: public health or political survival?
From the first case of COVID-19 documented in Turkey on 11 March, the
AKP was under attack for failing to take the necessary measures to prevent
the spread of the virus. First, criticism was levelled at the AKP’s handling
of pilgrims returning home from Saudi Arabia in mid-March. Rather than
enforcing the quarantine of those who had returned back from the holy
sites, which by then were considered COVID-19 hotspots, AKP officials
TURKEY ’S DIYANET AND POLITICAL ISLAM DURING THE PANDEMIC
163
initially advocated self-isolation measures. The second criticism came in
response to the AKP’s delay in enforcing a suspension of religious services
such as the Cumas (Friday prayers), which required the temporary closure
of the country’s 82,000 or so mosques. The failure to institute harsh
responses in both cases were cited by critics as causing the spike in
infections in early April (Tremblay 2020). In subsequent months, scholars
and healthcare workers criticised the government for not taking seriously
the warnings issued by members of independent scientific councils, such
as the Turkish Medical Association (Türk Tabipleri Birliği, TTB hereafter),
which advocated a strict lockdown. A report by regional officers of the
TTB in late August 2020, for example, indicated that many ICU units in
COVID-19 wards were running at near-full capacity, raising concerns for
how hospitals might manage increasing numbers of severe cases
anticipated in the winter months of 2020–21 (Ahval 2020a).
Critics also questioned the veracity of state-issued COVID-19
statistics (Evin 2020). Even though, in government’s accounts, COVID-19
related deaths had not reached numbers comparable to countries like
Italy or France, the TTB drew attention to the government’s failure to
disclose data on cases, counting only symptomatic individuals (Reuters
2020a). In a televised statement on 1 October, Koca acknowledged that
this was the case, and that since 29 July the country had only been
reporting data on ‘patients’ with symptoms and had excluded
asymptomatic COVID-19 positive ‘cases’ from the count (bianet English
2020a). In response, the World Health Organization issued a statement
inviting Turkey to report data on all positive cases. Koca rejected this,
arguing that ‘the current stage of the pandemic justifies shifting the
emphasis from the number of positive cases to patients’ (Ahval 2020b).
Backing his Health Minister, Erdoğan went a step further, calling the TTB
chair a ‘terrorist’ and suggesting the medical group be closed (bianet
English 2020b).2
In Turkey, according to Kirişçi (2020), COVID-19 was not a public
health crisis but a crisis of political survival. The AKP had faced numerous
crises during nearly 20 years in power but, given the scale and direct
impact on the economy and people’s livelihoods, COVID-19 was seen by
some analysts as the ultimate blow to its rule (Schenkkan 2020). At its
first peak in mid-April, the pandemic led to the resignation of Turkey’s
interior minister, which, although quickly overruled by the Turkish
president, was perceived as a sign of tensions building within the
administration (Reuters 2020b). There were also rumours that the
minister of health was considering resignation (Uğurluoğlu 2020).
Globally, however, rather than catalysing a crisis of legitimacy, the
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pandemic presented an opportunity for most autocrats around the world
to strengthen their rule (The Economist 2020). In Turkey as elsewhere,
COVID-19 enabled increased authoritarianism, with individuals detained
over provocative posts on social media (Reuters 2020c). Doctors and
healthcare workers were probed over statements that contradicted official
accounts (Human Rights Watch 2020a), and journalists were arrested for
reporting on cases of infection (Reporters Without Borders 2020).
One part of AKP’s strategy to retain its legitimacy amid the pandemic
was to suppress critical voices. Another part was to construct an
alternative discourse, which would resonate with large segments of the
population and garner popular support. To that end, the AKP shifted
public discussion on the pandemic from its scientific roots to its moral
tenets, and in this shift, the Diyanet played an instrumental role. This was
not the first time that the Diyanet was instrumentalised to overcome a
crisis. Mosques in Turkey are governed by the Diyanet, and in July 2016,
following a coup attempt, the Diyanet took on a central role in backing
the government. By mentioning the failed coup in Friday sermons, which
would normally concern practical issues pertaining to religious life, the
Diyanet assisted the AKP in constructing a narrative that exculpated its
politicians, many of whom were criticised for prior ties to the clique
behind the coup, thereby directing attention to the enemies within. The
Diyanet also used its mosques to recite prayers, such as the sela (salat-alJanazah) and the ezan (the call to prayer) outside regular namaz times,
reminding people of its support of government’s policies and inviting all
Muslims to do the same (Gill 2016).
As positive cases of Coronavirus soared across Turkey from late
March, the Diyanet used its mosques once again to capture the country’s
soundscape by reciting prayers outside regular namaz times, and by
preaching to the public on television, online and in Friday sermons
(Alyanak 2020). It also assisted the government to initiate a funding
campaign led by the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services to help
ease the financial burdens of the pandemic on individuals. On 1 April
2020, the head of the Diyanet, Ali Erbaş, made a televised statement on
Turkey’s official news channel, TRTHaber, declaring his institution’s
support for the Presidential COVID-19 campaign, Biz Bize Yeteriz
Türkiyem/We Are All We Need Turkey (Biz Bize Yeteriz Türkiyem 2020).
There, Erbaş pointed out religion’s historical role in overcoming obstacles,
directly referencing to the coup attempt. He drew on verses from the
Qur’an to make a case for favourable returns by Allah to those who
support this campaign. The zekats, or alms, which Muslims are obliged to
donate throughout Ramadan, could be sent to this campaign, Erbaş
TURKEY ’S DIYANET AND POLITICAL ISLAM DURING THE PANDEMIC
165
stated. By mid-November 2020, over 41 billion liras (US$5.5 billion) had
been paid to households under the campaign budget.
Political Islam as a public health hazard
In early March, The Washington Post published a trenchant op-ed on
Turkey. Its author, Can Dündar, a prominent Turkish journalist who
currently lives in exile, pointing to the Diyanet, argued that political Islam
was obstructing rational health policy in Turkey. ‘The government’s
enormously influential Directorate of Religious Affairs, an agency that is
supposed to regulate the role of Islam, has become one of the key
institutions in the fight against COVID-19 – and not always for the better’,
wrote Dündar. He continued: ‘By obstructing science and misallocating
vital resources, political Islam in Turkey has become a direct threat to the
health of the nation. Turks now find themselves fighting the virus even as
they confront the ignorance that leads to bad policy’. Dündar spoke of an
ongoing ‘tug of war between reason and belief’ in Turkey – a confrontation
from which the AKP benefited as the majority of its voters were
conservative constituents. Not only did the Diyanet weigh in on debates
about the pandemic, but the Turkish president also adopted a discourse
akin to it, arguing that the pandemic would be overcome through
‘patience and prayers’ (Dündar 2020). Critics like Dündar found such
statements dangerous as they saw the need for scientific/medical
authority to address the pandemic, albeit cognisant of how far the moral
discourse could go in convincing millions in the country to retain their
support of the AKP.
Why the Diyanet? To address this question, we need to take a
moment to clarify the Diyanet’s role in Turkey, and its growing influence
under AKP’s rule. The Diyanet was established in 1924 not as a ministry,
but a separate state institution responsible for curbing religion’s
encroachment in politics by serving as the central authority on Islam. Its
purpose was to fill the gap left as a result of the abolition of the Caliphate
and Sharia, as well as the dismantlement of religious institutions
and foundations (such as tekkes, medreses, zaviyes and dergahs) – key
institutions of civil society in the Ottoman Empire – following the collapse
of the Ottoman Empire,3 thereby acting as ‘a new structure of control and
oversight between the state and Islam’ (Davison 2003, 338). Representing
official Islam, the Diyanet was to take over the role traditionally assumed
by religious congregations (Mardin 1977). However, it failed in this role,
as many of these top-down reforms did not resonate with the rural
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population, and different factions within Turkey’s Islamic movement
continued to operate in covert ways.
Following Turkey’s transition into a multiparty system in 1950,
Turkish politicians benefited from de facto links to these religious
congregations for popular support (Çakır 1990) and used the Diyanet as
‘an administrative tool to indoctrinate and propagate official ideology
regarding Islam’ (Gözaydın 2014: 13). Over time, this became known as
political Islam. Several political parties have been accused of political
Islamic policies, and some have been closed down for their ties to religious
congregations. In 2008, the AKP, too, was accused of using Islam for
political gain and was charged with violating the constitution’s secularism
clause. The case was shy by one vote for AKP’s closure in Turkey’s
Constitutional Court. The AKP continued to rely on its allies in Turkey’s
Islamic movement, most notably, the alleged perpetrator of the 2016
coup attempt, the Gülen movement. Yet, as relations between the Gülen
movement and the AKP soured, Erdoğan started to revamp the influence
of the Diyanet as the official source of moral authority in order to
undermine the influence of ‘unofficial’ Islamic discourses in Turkey and
overseas (Bruce 2019). In the last decade, the Diyanet’s budget has
increased over five-fold. Today, the institution sits on a budget of
11 billion Turkish lira, exceeding most other ministries in Turkey (T24
2019). It has its own publications and a television channel and runs a
fatwa hotline for individuals to consult on practical matters pertaining to
Islamic doctrines.4 Moreover, the Diyanet acts as a key commentator on
controversial matters that pertain to public and private life (Mutluer
2018; Kocamaner 2019). Recent examples include Diyanet’s comments
equating feminism with immorality on International Women’s Day in
2008; recommendations extended to single individuals, such as college
students, to refrain from cohabitation in 2013, to engaged couples to not
flirt or hold hands in 2016, and to married women to submit to their
husband even in cases of domestic violence in 2020. A controversial fatwa
issued in 2018 legitimised a father’s lust for his own daughter; in 2019, a
fatwa criticised television series considered to promote nonheteronormative and premarital relations, and deemed un-Islamic and morally
corrupting; and, most recently, the Diyanet linked the coronavirus
pandemic to non-heteronormative relationships.
The Diyanet’s conservative stance on these issues is not surprising.
Many religious authorities around the world draw on conservative
guidelines to regulate affairs pertaining to the family, public morality and
gender. Oftentimes, these guidelines resonate with certain segments of
the population while drawing criticism from others. Yet, a legitimate
TURKEY ’S DIYANET AND POLITICAL ISLAM DURING THE PANDEMIC
167
question to ask that is relevant to the pandemic is whether the appeal of
such views warrants religious authorities like the Diyanet taking a stance
on issues that are tangential to their mission to enlighten the public on
religious matters. In Turkey, the Diyanet’s intervention in the COVID-19
debate came at the expense of resources allocated to battling the
pandemic. Islamic authority was not used to protect human life, which,
in Islam, is considered a gift from Allah that should be revered and
protected (Daar and al Khitamy 2001; Shomali 2008). Rather, it was used
to exculpate a government that had failed to do so. To illustrate this point,
I now turn to two critical interventions made by the Diyanet during the
peak of the pandemic in April.
Blaming the neoliberal world order: Islam’s
view on disease outbreaks
In late April 2020, the Diyanet committee, Supreme Council for Matters
of Religion, issued a 56-page document entitled İslam’ın Salgın
Hastalıklara Bakışı (Islam’s View on Disease Outbreaks). The document
is structured with 13 chapters, each addressing a question posed and
accompanied by a lengthy appendix detailing the doctrinal genealogy of
practical measures, such as the interruption of communal prayers,
funerary services and possible modifications to the imminent Ramadan
fasting. Of the 13 chapters, 5 related to questions asking whether
outbreaks such as COVID-19 were a test or an opportunity for people to
pull themselves together (Chapter 3); if people had brought onto
themselves such diseases and catastrophes, and the lessons to be learned
from them (Chapter 4); whether outbreaks were a warning sign from the
Divine (Chapter 5); if they were a punishment or torment sent by Allah
(Chapter 6); and whether they could be read as omens signalling the Day
of Judgement (Chapter 7).
The theme underlying these chapters was that the pandemic was
not caused by a virus alone, but by humans due to their own moral
failures. The virus should therefore be perceived as a lesson from Allah to
avoid ‘mistakes, denial (of Allah’s omnipresence), rebellion, oppression,
unruliness, heresy, perversion, and exploitation, which in the past has led
Allah to destroy certain nations and tribes’ (Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulu
2020b, 17). Science and technology are seen not as an aid in overcoming
hardship, but the cause of such hardship. Greater reliance on science and
technology, according to the document, has led humans to see themselves
as independent of their creator, thereby forgetful of the presence of a
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higher authority: ‘Allah, the Holy, sent a virus barely visible under the
microscope to the modern human who has forgotten the presence of his
Creator, who has gone astray from his very raison d’être of being a kul
[submitting pupil], and started seeing himself as the owner and conqueror
of all things’ (Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulu 2020, 20b).
As one of Diyanet’s main missions is to enlighten society on matters
pertaining to religion, what it can offer best is a religious explanation of a
disease outbreak. In Islamic discourse, everything experienced on Earth
– good and bad, fortunate and unfortunate – is willed by Allah. COVID-19
is no exception. On this point, the document states the following:
One of the major trials of humans is diseases. According to Islamic
belief, just like goodness and good deeds, diseases and calamities,
too, are created by Allah, the Supreme, for various reasons …
Without Allah’s permission, no calamity reaches its destination. It is
Allah the Almighty who also provides the cure and it is Allah who is
Almighty (Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulu 2020b, 9).
Facing the inevitability of Allah’s will, a person of faith is asked
to contemplate the reasons behind Allah’s doing in dispatching a
calamity that brings life to a halt: ‘It is necessary to see these outbreaks
and catastrophes as verses sent by Allah for believers and all humans to
draw lessons’ (Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulu 2020b, 10). Yet, the Diyanet does
more than invite believers to (re)turn to religion. The document also
claims that the contemporary world order pushes believers to adopt
choices which run contrary to Islamic guidelines. For the Diyanet, the
underlying cause behind the pandemic needs to be sought in this world
order:
On the one side, there is hunger, starvation, drought, and illnesses
which have not been experienced, and on the other, there is
exploitation due to brutal capitalism, wars, invasions, migrations,
injustices etc. which has disrupted the order of our old world, and
has laid bare once again that humans, as our Creator has stated, ‘are
of a blood-shedding and malice-bringing kind’ (Din İşleri Yüksek
Kurulu 2020b, 20).
A few pages later, the document again invites humans to comprehend the
order created by Allah on the principles of accident and fate, which differs
from the order that we abide by today. Those who understand this order,
and who abide by divine laws, will succeed in it. The caveat with the
TURKEY ’S DIYANET AND POLITICAL ISLAM DURING THE PANDEMIC
169
Diyanet’s advice, however, is that the world order that leads to tests such
as COVID-19 is also one in which the Turkish state is deeply embedded.
Not only was Turkey one of the main exporters of personal protective
equipment throughout the pandemic,5 that is, by Diyanet’s logic, a
profiteer of Allah’s wrath, it had also been transformed into a largely
privatised economy that relied heavily on the construction and tourism
sectors, both threatened by the pandemic. Some critics today view AKP’s
reluctance to enforce a total lockdown even during the peak of the
pandemic as a manoeuvre to save the economy (Erdemir and Lechner
2020). Yet, if the economy matters, then the Diyanet’s critique of the
neoliberal world order risks harming the very establishment that it relies
on both financially and politically. To evade such an outcome, the AKP’s
neoliberal agenda was not criticised. No decision maker in the political or
economic realm was called to task. Moral failures were described as the
failure of individuals to break free from exploitative and unjust conditions.
No explanation was given regarding the political actors in Turkey who
perpetuate these conditions.
One of the risks in making morally charged statements is that they
render the agents behind such remarks vulnerable to the criticisms that
they extend. In this case, although the Diyanet reprimanded individuals
for participating in a neoliberal world order that prioritises consumption
over frugality, and worldly temptations over heavenly rewards, over the
years, both the Diyanet and the AKP had been criticised for the lavish
lifestyles sought of their own members, such as riding in imported luxury
cars or living in the newly built Presidential Palace. This left the Diyanet
in a discursive conundrum. Yet, as I illustrate below, the Diyanet was able
to invent a way out of this conundrum by fabricating a new culprit.
Moving beyond its usual judgements pertaining to the moral realm,
the Diyanet shifted gears and directly intervened in the realm of public
health where COVID-19 became not only the result of perceived moral
failures of individuals and neo-liberal structures, but also a disease
caused by some of these individuals. These were people following nonheteronormative values.
Reframing the narrative: non-heteronormativity
as the cause of COVID-19
LGBTQI+ communities around the world have long faced blame
for disease outbreaks. Same-sex couples, and others engaging in nonheteronormative practices, have not only encountered severe
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discrepancies in accessing healthcare due to being posited as perpetuators
of infectious diseases (Lichtenstein 2003), they have also been directly
targeted by conservative groups and politicians. Much of the scholarship
on the stigmatisation of these groups has focused on the HIV pandemic,
but blame for other disease outbreaks including the most recent COVID19 pandemic continues to be attached to marginalised communities
(UNAIDS 2020). A report circulated by the United Nations Office of the
High Commissioner of Human Rights in mid-April made this precise point
by calling on state authorities and stakeholders ‘to speak out against
stigmatisation and hate speech directed at LGBTQI+ people in the context
of the pandemic’ (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights 2020, 8). Despite the call, in several cases LGBTQI+
people were accused of spreading the disease. In South Korea, for
example, where the government’s intensive tracing of the virus resulted
in public disclosure of patient information, the discussion of nightclubs,
described in the media as COVID-19 hotspots, quickly turned into gaybashing because some of these venues were associated with the country’s
LGBTQI+ community (Kwon and Hollingsworth 2020).
In Turkey, the backlash against the LGBTQI+ community and others
living non-heteronormative lifestyles was government sanctioned. While
there is no body of law that directly targets members of the LGBTQI+
community or limits their public presence, Turkey is not a signatory to
any LGBTQI+ resolutions enacted by the United Nations Human Rights
Council and the General Assembly, including the 2008 statement on
LGBTQI+ rights (Human Rights Watch 2008). Same-sex marriages and
civil unions are considered unconstitutional and remain outlawed.
Annual Pride parades have been banned since 2016 to ensure the
so-called safety of Turkish citizens and to protect public order. Here the
term ‘public’ continues to be defined through a narrow and moralist
definition that excludes relationships that lie outside a heteronormative
and conjugal frame. More recently, television channels portraying samesex couples or promoting promiscuity or homosexuality have been fined
for corrupting general morality and the family unit (Muedini 2018, 43–5;
bianet English 2019). There have also been several attempts to pass laws
to ban ‘promiscuous’ relations such as zina (extramarital sex/adultery)
and to regulate cohabitation and unmarried life, as evident in the
President’s proposal of measures to reinstall the ban on zina that had
been retracted by the Turkish Constitutional Court in 1999 (Alyanak and
Üstek 2013).
A few days after the circulation of Diyanet’s document on disease
outbreaks, the head of the Diyanet, Ali Erbaş, made the following
TURKEY ’S DIYANET AND POLITICAL ISLAM DURING THE PANDEMIC
171
statement in his address to the public through the Cuma hutbesi [the
communal Friday namaz sermon]:
Islam accepts adultery as one of the biggest sins [haram]. It curses
homosexuality. What is the reason of that? The reason is that it
brings with it illnesses and decay to lineages. Every year, thousands
of people are exposed to HIV virus caused by this big sin –
committing adultery, living out of wedlock, whose name is
‘unchastity’ in Islamic literature. Let’s take action together to protect
people from these evils. (DuvaR.English 2020).
It is no surprise to see the Diyanet take a position that condemns nonheteronormative relations. Like most religious institutions around the world,
the Diyanet condemns same-sex and promiscuous relations. Its rationale for
this comes from a particular reading of the Qur’an, whereby relations outside
of marriage incite Allah’s wrath. The oft-cited example here is the plight of
Lut (Lot), which is brought up in several surahs (chapters) of the Qur’an.
According to the story, Lut, the nephew of Prophet Abraham, was sent to the
people of Lut (Sodom and Gomorrah in the Book of Genesis) to plead with
them to stop their sexual perversions, such as sodomy, prostitution and
extramarital affairs. However, the people, including Lut’s own wife,
dismissed his recommendations. Allah consequently ordered Lut to leave his
wife and the tribe, and decimated the tribe.
For Erbaş, the story of the Lut has direct parallels to the plight faced
by humans during the COVID-19 pandemic. But this is not the first time
that Erbaş had drawn on this story. In 2019, in another hutbe that he
delivered in a mosque in the Central Anatolian city of Konya, Erbaş
reminded the congregation of the dire consequences of dismissing Allah’s
commands in the Qur’an: ‘Our Rabb [Lord] has reminded us that many
times in history tribes who faced moral decay and perversions were
decimated’ (Evrensel 2019).
Similar comments are regularly made by conservative pundits in
Turkey, who – unlike those defending LGBTQI+ rights, who are fined for
their statements – do not face legal consequences of hate speech. But in
this instance, these comments came from a religious institution which
acts within the capacity of an official state apparatus responsible for
guiding millions of believers in Turkey and overseas. The Diyanet’s
statement should therefore be read as one that reveals the contours of
religion as sanctioned by the Turkish state, which singles out a part of the
population, targets those within it as carriers of disease, and sees them as
worthy of punishment and decimation.
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A few days after Erbaş made this comment, critics targeted him for
his hate speech, which is prohibited in the Turkish constitution and
criminalised under the penal code. The Ankara branch of the Human
Rights Association in Turkey and the Ankara Bar Association both filed
cases against Erbaş, asking for his resignation (Human Rights Watch
2020b). However, rather than finding his assertion discriminatory, the
Turkish president sided with him. ‘An attack against the Diyanet is an
attack on the state’, argued Erdoğan. Overnight, hundreds of thousands of
AKP supporters shared their backing on Twitter by commenting under
#AliErbasYalnizDegildir [Ali Erbaş is not alone] (Öztürk 2020). Other
trending hashtags in subsequent days included #YallahHollandaya [Go
to Holland], suggesting that critics pack their bags and move to the
Netherlands, which in Turkey is characterised by its liberal politics on
same-sex relations, and #LGBTIstemiyoruz [We don’t want LGBT]. Other
actors soon joined this debate. Kerem Kınık, the head of the Turkish branch
of the Red Crescent, the international non-governmental organisation that
provides disaster relief, made a claim similar to Erbaş. Using his Twitter
account, Kınık argued on 28 June, a day after the International Pride Day,
that his institution would fight anyone who promoted a corrupting
mentality, spoke of abnormalities as the new normal, or forced paedophilic
dreams on young minds. In response, the International Red Cross
Committee, IFRC, issued a declaration disapproving of this comment,
which led to the head of Communications for the Turkish Presidency
issuing a denunciation of IFRC (Reuters 2020d). Furthermore, an inquiry
was opened against the Ankara Bar Association by the Attorney General
for insulting religious values, and soon after, the Turkish president
once again took centre stage, targeting LGBTQI+ groups as the hub of
perversions and spreaders of disease. In his national address on 27 April,
the Turkish president attacked the proponents of LGBTQI+ rights directly,
arguing that they were complicit in these perversions and asking the
Turkish population to take a stance against them.
Seeking blame in LGBTQI+ groups is an easy – and oft utilised –
political ploy to manufacture consent among the public – not just in
Turkey but in other countries, too. Similarities with Russia and Brazil, run
by leaders with authoritarian tendencies, are obvious. So too was the
similarity with the US under the presidency of Donald Trump. Same-sex
relationships have long provided an easy way out of political blunders in
Turkey. Each time governments were accused of corruption or criticised
for their lack of competency in navigating Turkish national and international policy, themes such as family values and same-sex relationships
have been brought into the conversation. Seen as a danger to moral
TURKEY ’S DIYANET AND POLITICAL ISLAM DURING THE PANDEMIC
173
integrity, non-heteronormative lifestyles were put under the spotlight
when bills were proposed by government officials to ban these choices. In
the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, these discussions took a new and
poignant turn. Not only were extra-marital relations and homosexuality
seen as moral perversions, they were also seen as epicentres of the disease,
thereby constituting a public health hazard. As fears among the Turkish
public heightened over the spread of the virus, overnight discussion
focused on non-heteronormativity as the source of the pandemic.
What the Diyanet, and the Turkish president, did was more than
blame a marginalised community for moral decay. Blaming moral ills on
what these actors consider to be sexual perversions, with the focus most
notably on same-sex couples, is an unfortunate norm in Turkey that many
LGBTQI+ institutions are trying to debunk. In a recent Pew Research
survey, 57 per cent of the population in Turkey still views homosexuality
unfavourably, and only 25 per cent of those surveyed indicated that
homosexuality should be accepted by society (Poushter and Kent 2020).
The Turkish president speaks directly to this 57 per cent, assuring them that
he shares a similar sentiment by making statements that affirm his belief
that same-sex relations are a sexual perversion with no place in Turkish
culture and morals. In the COVID-19 moment, he further spoke of those
associated with this ‘perversion’ as the main culprit of the disease outbreak,
emphasising the presumption that sexual ‘perversions’ are more than a
moral threat. Members of the LGBTQI+ groups in Turkey already face
many obstacles in the country, and having the Diyanet and the Turkish
president view them as morally perverse, though terrifying, is nothing new.
What is different during the COVID-19 pandemic, however, is that the
Diyanet, and Erdoğan, hold these groups responsible for a disease outbreak
that continues to agitate the public on a daily basis, and that generates
uncertainties and fear for people’s very lives and livelihoods.
What really does COVID-19 have to do with non-heteronormative
relations? Epidemiologically, there are no links between promiscuity, or
homosexuality, and the coronavirus. From a political perspective,
however, there is much at stake in creating a link between the virus and
what is seen as sexual perversity, as it helps to divert attention away from
the actions and accountability of state actors.
Conclusion
I opened this chapter with the Turkish Minister of Health, Fahrettin Koca,
and his Scientific Advisory Board, heralding Turkey’s initial response to
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the pandemic. As the cases and deaths related to COVID-19 began to soar
from late March, however, we witnessed in Turkey a rather abrupt change
of discourse propagated by a new set of actors, including the Turkish
president and the head of the Diyanet. I asked why that was the case. My
intention in asking this question was not to downplay the social or cultural
tenets of the disease outbreak. I do not advocate a scientific approach that
dismisses the contributions of moral authorities to the debate on COVID19. However, in Turkey, the contribution of religious authorities to
understanding and responding to COVID-19 had less to do with devising
culturally sensitive modes of healing, and more with seeking blame in
actors who have long been subject to the government’s disciplinary
measures. Rather than seek morally and biomedically attuned solutions
to the pandemic, what we saw in Turkey during the first wave of the
pandemic was religious authorities such as the Diyanet engaging in a
blatant attack on AKP’s ideological opponents. This explains how political
Islam hindered the makings of what critics such as Dündar called a
rational public health policy in Turkey.
The Diyanet’s controversial intervention into the debate also played
into the hands of the AKP – not only by furthering a repressive political
agenda that it has adopted over the years, but also by helping change the
narrative on the pandemic. The Diyanet’s statement was so controversial
that it alone sufficed to turn public attention to LGBTQI+ groups
overnight, leading to the tabling of discussions on measures taken by the
AKP government to tackle the pandemic. Criticism over the government’s
handling of the pandemic, as evident in its delayed response to returning
pilgrims and its hesitation to close down mosques, swiftly transformed
into criticism of homosexuality.
Scholars working on stigma and disease outbreaks have shown how
certain groups, who are readily marginalised in their specific societies,
are targeted in the midst of public health crises (Songwathana and
Manderson 2001; Castro and Farmer 2005; Singer 2009; Gregg 2011).
While much of this conversation draws on evidence provided by studies
on HIV, COVID-19 follows this trend. In Turkey, marginalised groups were
targeted specifically to divert attention from the practical responses, or
their lack, of the government. Other critics who have pointed out the
shortcomings of the AKP’s strategy to tackle the pandemic were also
criticised by Erdoğan as well as by other figures close to the AKP
government, such as the Turkish chief of the International Red Crescent.
Can Dündar, a journalist in exile, was one such critic whom Erdoğan
considers a member of a terrorist organisation (International Press
Institute 2015). The TTB chair, Şebnem Korur Fidancı, is another figure
TURKEY ’S DIYANET AND POLITICAL ISLAM DURING THE PANDEMIC
175
whom Erdoğan publicly called a terrorist for having previously signed a
petition in support of a peaceful negotiation of the country’s Kurdish
conflict. Yet, this kind of targeting also had a practical impact on the
livelihood of marginalised communities. By falsely identifying them as
responsible for COVID-19, the government exposed them to further
stigma, with the potential to quickly turn into other kinds of violence
(Yuzgun 1993; Biçmen and Bekiroğulları 2014; Başaran 2014; Özbay
2015; Yenilmez 2017).
In Turkey, political Islam jeopardises public health, and helps the
AKP deflect criticism for its mishandling of the pandemic. This strategy
comes at the cost of the lives of the very people whom the Turkish state is
meant to protect – not just those who agree with the government’s vision
of a proper mode of sexual relations and romance, but also those who
choose to disagree with it. The preamble of the Turkish constitution
considers the right for all Turkish citizens to lead an honourable life as a
birth right. This law should apply to all.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Funda Üstek-Spilda for commenting on earlier
drafts, and the editors of this volume for extending an invitation to
contribute.
Notes
1
2
3
4
176
According to the Turkish health minister, Turkey had experienced its second peak in the first
wave of the pandemic after the Eid-al-Adha holiday (30 July–3 August 2020), with hospitals
and intensive care units reaching 47 and 60 per cent occupancy rates respectively (Hurriyet
Daily News 2020). The first peak here corresponds to the initial spike in the number of cases in
mid-April, when the cases more than doubled (from 2,148 to 5,138) within the first ten days
of the month.
A month later, Fahrettin Koca reverted from his initial stance, and decided to disclose the total
number of cases in Turkey. On 25 November, 28,351 cases were announced – the fourth highest
number of daily cases in the world following the US, India and Brazil. The numbers continued
to climb in the following days (bianet English 2020c).
After the Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923, a string of reforms – known today as the
Kemalist reforms – was passed by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, which led to the
abolishment of the Islamic state known as the Caliphate (1924), the sharia courts which relied
on Islamic law (1924) and numerous religious institutions (1925). The Diyanet was established
in 1924 to undertake the tasks previously undertaken by these institutions, but due to the
country’s secular (laik) outlook, its role was limited to the regulation of texts for hutbes, or
religious sermons (Mutluer 2018, 4).
Fatwa (fetva in Turkish) – religious advice and rulings – are issued by muftis, or Islamic jurists,
in response to questions pertaining to religious conduct. For example, a Muslim with diabetes
may ask a mufti whether it is acceptable to take medication while fasting. In response, the mufti
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5
would refer to Islamic texts, including the Qur’an, and a collection of Prophet Muhammed’s
sayings and deeds, known as the hadiths, to pass a judgement on the issue (Alobalan and
Al-Moujahed 2017). Fatwas can be issued via telephone or email or consulted by going to the
Diyanet’s Supreme Council for Matters of Religion (Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulu) website
(Bruinessen 2018; Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulu Başkanlığı 2020a).
During the first week of May, with Turkish authorities calling the pandemic in Turkey
under control, a decree was passed to lift restrictions on the export of personal protective
equipment to Western European countries. The shipment of PPE had previously led to rising
diplomatic tensions between Turkey and countries in Western Europe, which were hit hard
during the first wave, such as Spain, Italy and the UK (Ant 2020; Sabbagh and McKernan
2020).
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10
Citizen vector
Scapegoating within communal boundaries
in Senegal during the COVID-19 pandemic
Ato Kwamena Onoma
The Ministry of Health and Social Action of Senegal reported the first
positive test for COVID-19 in the country on 2 March 2020. Thereafter,
there was a slow but steady growth in the numbers of confirmed cases
and fatalities, with the Ministry’s Communique No. 198 of 15 September
2020 listing a total of 14,529 cases, 10,692 recoveries and 298 deaths.1
Initial cases were all people who were infected abroad and had travelled
to the country; the first case of community transmission was reported on
12 March 2020 in the Ministerial Communique No. 11. While the
metropolitan area of Dakar, the capital of the country, recorded the
highest number of cases, by September 2020, cases had been reported in
all 14 regions of the country.
The state adopted an approach which focused on slowing the spread
of the disease. Early on, it had emphasised an aggressive process of
contact tracing, hospitalisation of positive cases, and testing and isolating
the contacts of those who tested positive in specific locations (Faye
2020b). Measures adopted in mid-March 2020 included the closure of the
country’s airspace and land borders, suspension of commercial passenger
flights and interregional travel within the country, and the closure of
schools, places of worship, bars, night clubs, restaurants and beaches. All
forms of assembly were banned in public and private spaces, a night-time
curfew was imposed, and markets were closed on certain days of the
week to facilitate their disinfection (Faye 2020a). Senegalese social
anthropologist Sylvain Faye (2020a) has written on people’s resistance to
some of these measures, many of which were progressively eased from
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11 May 2020 as the president, Macky Sall, sought to reduce the economic
impact of the pandemic by encouraging Senegalese to ‘learn how to live
in the presence of the virus’ (BIG 2020).
The first four cases of disease involved European citizens who had
travelled to the country. On 11 March 2020, the Ministry of Health and
Social Action reported COVID-19 case No. 5 to be a male Senegalese
emigrant based in Italy and visiting relatives in the country. In the days that
followed, both the Ministry and the media reported more cases of
Senegalese emigrants returning from Southern European countries like
Spain and Italy who tested positive for COVID-19. These emigrants, based
in Southern Europe, are predominantly from the central west and major
urban areas across the country, and so they include a mix of ethnic groups.
They started migrating to Italy and Spain in the 1980s, marking a turn from
earlier migration that originated in the Senegal River Valley and tended to
flow towards France and other African countries (Fall 2017; Mbaye 2005;
Riccio 2008; Tall 2008a; Mboup 2000). Popular views on these migrants
have swayed over time and space, from adulation and glorification to
vilification and derision (Mbodji 2008; Uberti 2014; Riccio and Uberti
2013). They are commonly referred to in Senegal as ‘Modou’; ‘Modou’ is a
shortened form of the name ‘Momodou’, a variant of the name of the
Prophet Mohammed and a common given name among these migrants.
The repetition follows similar patterns of double iteration in the Wolof
language, the lingua franca in Senegal. In this chapter, I use the term
‘Senegalese emigrants’ because some regard ‘Modou’ as pejorative (Thiam
2020). I note otherwise when I refer to other migrant populations.
While a number of these emigrants travelled legally to their
destination countries and then overstayed visas, many more migrated
illegally, using routes that involved dangerous crossings over the Atlantic
Ocean, Mediterranean Sea and Sahara Desert (Willems 2008; Tall 2008b;
Riccio 2008; Tall 2008b; Uberti 2014). Most earlier migrants were
farmers from rural areas who lacked formal education; those who
migrated more recently were from urban areas and were informal sector
workers, unemployed youth, small business owners, and in some cases,
employed professionals (Uberti 2014; Tandian 2008; Tall 2008a). In their
host countries they took up diverse employment opportunities, with
many working as hawkers, farm labourers, and unskilled and semi-skilled
capacity in manufacturing industry and the construction and hospitality
sectors (Riccio 2008, 85–7; Tall 2008b). The vast majority of these
migrants are male. They often leave their wives and children in Senegal,
partly to maximise the savings they can repatriate back home (Tall 2008a,
53–4; Uberti 2014).
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The announcement of COVID-19 case No. 5 and media coverage of
other Senegalese emigrants returning to the country from areas with high
numbers of COVID-19 cases raised concerns about returning citizens, as
evident in many other countries across the world (Zeidan 2020; Boda
2020; Online Reporters 2020). In Senegal, these concerns degenerated
into scapegoating these emigrants (Faye 2020a). On radio, various social
media platforms including WhatsApp and Facebook, and in comments on
news stories, people widely blamed these emigrants for spreading the
disease in the country. In comments in response to online news stories,
some Senegalese portrayed these emigrants as negligent or thoughtless,
unwittingly spreading the disease by refusing to respect the lockdown
rules in Europe and by not getting tested or self-isolating before interacting
with people upon their return to Senegal (Gueye 2020a, 2020b, 2020c;
Seneweb News 2020a, 2020b, 2020c). Other commentators of online
news stories cast them as unpatriotic and wilful, returning to Senegal
knowing they carried the virus and intent on spreading the disease and
ruining the country (Gueye 2020a, 2020b, 2020c; Seneweb News 2020a,
2020b, 2020c).
In online comments on news stories, people called on these
emigrants to stay away from Senegal and put pressure on the government
to suspend commercial flights, close the country’s land borders and refuse
entry at border posts, thus forcing emigrants to return to their points of
departure or languish in the desert (Seneweb News 2020b, 2020c; Gueye
2020c). These online comments mirrored thoughts expressed on radio
and on social media platforms like Facebook and WhatsApp. Across the
country, people reported returning emigrant neighbours to the authorities
who proceeded to round up, question, test and quarantine them
(Dakaractu 2020; Sakhanokho 2020). The Observatory of the Senegalese
of the Diaspora, a non-governmental organisation created in 2013
with the stated goal of ‘promoting the interests of Senegalese Diasporas
around the world by all legal means’, condemned this scapegoating in a
communique on 13 April 2020 (Thiam 2020). These attacks were so
pervasive even earlier that on 17 March 2020, the Ministry of Health and
Social Action decided to reduce the amount of detail it provided in its
daily communiques to curb the scapegoating of ‘foreigners and emigrants’
(Willane 2020).
The scapegoating of migrants during the COVID-19 pandemic in
many ways mirrored the ways Peul migrants from Guinea to Senegal were
cast as vectors during the 2013–16 outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD)
that centred on the Mano River Basin countries of Sierra Leone, Liberia
and Guinea. The difficult days under the first president of Guinea, Sekou
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Touré, saw large-scale migration of Peul – known as Fulani in other areas
of West and Central Africa – to Senegal; this flow of migrants has
continued in a less intense manner since then (Diallo 2009). As the EVD
epidemic of 2013–16 threatened to spread beyond the borders of the
Mano River Basin countries, Peul migrants were described as spreading
EVD in Senegal. Some Senegalese began to call for the country’s borders
with Guinea to be closed to curb what was portrayed as an uncontrolled
‘horde’ of Peul migrants entering the country. Others called for Peul
migrants to be counted and secluded, and for others to avoid physical
contact with them by boycotting their shops and sitting apart from them
on public transportation (Onoma 2020a). The diagnosis of the only case
of EVD in Senegal in August 2014 – a young Peul student who was in
Senegal to visit relatives – only heightened the scapegoating of this
community (Onoma 2017).
The treatment of Senegalese emigrants as vectors of COVID-19 in
Senegal differs from that of Peul migrants during the EVD epidemic in
important ways. Unlike Peul migrants who were scapegoated in Senegal
where they were considered as foreigners, Senegalese emigrants were
scapegoated in their country of origin, a place where they are not only
recognised as citizens but are also usually celebrated as national heroes
toiling abroad for the benefit of their families, communities and country
(Diop 2008, 28; Riccio 2005; 2008; Tall 2002; Fouquet 2008; Mbodji
2008).
The scapegoating of certain populations during disease outbreaks is
very common and has been widely studied across public health outbreaks
including the plague, cholera, yellow fever, HIV, MERS, SARS and EVD
(Benton and Dionne 2015; M’Bokolo 1982; White 2010; Mason 2012;
Echenberg 2002; Eichelberger 2007; Markel and Stern 2002; Ngalamulume
2012; Ginzburg 1990; Eamon 1998). These outbursts usually target noncitizens, foreigners and those generally cast as ‘other’. People blame these
outsiders for the origin and spread of diseases, subject them to verbal and
physical attacks, and advocate their exclusion from the national territory
or mass seclusion (Onoma 2020a; Benton and Dionne 2015; Monson 2017;
Eichelberger 2007; Markel and Stern 2002). Motivations for these outbursts
include concern over their spreading of germs from their places of
origin, and broader anxieties over what is portrayed as their resistance of
public health measures (White 2010; Gussow 1989; Echenberg 2002;
Onoma 2017; Mason 2012; Trauner 1978; Onoma 2018). The process of
constructing these others as public health dangers is often embedded in
long-standing processes of identity formation that fashion the civilised and
hygienic self by distinguishing it from the other cast as uncivilised and
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insalubrious (Onoma 2017), and anxieties over the potential propagation
of diseases are enmeshed in concerns over the spread of what are portrayed
as the less than desirable behaviours and values of these others.
In this chapter, I explore the scapegoating of Senegalese emigrants
in their country of origin by their fellow citizens to reflect on the extent to
which communal boundaries shape scapegoating during public health
crises. I elaborate on the lively debate between Senegalese based in the
country and emigrants over citizenship and its value, during the troubling
times of the COVID-19 pandemic. I examine the gap between discourses
that portray communal boundaries as critical in social interactions, and
the lived experiences of people who regularly work around these
boundaries in their quotidian interactions. Pointing out that scapegoating
during public health crises is not reserved for those portrayed as
‘foreigners’ adds to the literature on social relations in Africa and beyond.
This raises questions of the extent to which a focus on these boundaries
affords an understanding of the intricacies of social interactions during
times of crisis when such boundaries are most vociferously invoked.
I base this chapter on my analysis of online comments on news
stories concerning the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic and its
unfolding in Senegal. These online comments only constitute one facet of
popular discourses that occurred over radio, social media platforms like
WhatsApp and Facebook, and in face-to-face interactions. There are clear
challenges with the use of online comments in social analysis (Henrich
and Holmes 2013; Taylor et al. 2016), including knowing whether people
are who they claim to be. Also, the propensity for anonymity to encourage
people to express their views without censure or restraint makes it
difficult (for social analysts) to claim that comments online represent
wider social views. The use of spam bots to comment on online content
further undermines our capacity to gauge popular views (Schneier 2020).
At the same time, these comments are readily accessible and perceived
anonymity may encourage people to share their ‘true’ views (Henrich and
Holmes 2013; Taylor et al. 2016).
Communal boundaries and social relations
During public health crises, those outside of communal boundaries,
identified as strangers and foreigners, can become the targets of
scapegoating and abuse, while those within these lines, defined as citizens
and autochthones, are spared maltreatment and cast as unfortunate
victims (Benton and Dionne 2015; M’Bokolo 1982; White 2010; Mason
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2012; Eichelberger 2007; Markel and Stern 2002; Ngalamulume 2012;
Ginzburg 1990; Eamon 1998; Onoma 2020a). In exclusionary discourses
that proliferate worldwide, citizens and autochthones are said to properly
belong to the territory in which they reside, where they are imbued with
a plenitude of rights, including to residence, land ownership, participation
in economic activities and politics, and standing before judicial systems.
Strangers across the intercommunal line, in contrast, are cast as
interlopers who have left their own homes to appropriate and settle in the
territories of others. Their rights to own land, participate in economic
activities, contest elections, vote and enjoy a peaceful life are challenged
in discourses that urge them to go back to where they properly belong.
Such invective is often accompanied by physical attacks and this has
sometimes led to xenophobic terror, mass expulsion and genocide
(Mamdani 2002; Onoma 2013; Jackson 2006; Geschiere 2009).
While exclusionary discourses often portray boundaries between
communities as thick walls that prevent links and interactions across
groups, the specification of these boundaries is characterised by great
ambiguity. The idea of origins as deployed in these discourses is nebulous
and the subject of both manipulation and contestation. Autochthones are
described alternately as those who have sprung out of their territory, as
opposed to those who moved there from elsewhere, those who arrived
first in the territory, those who arrived there before other populations
against whom they are involved in contestations, and so on (Jackson
2006; Konings 2008; Nyamnjoh 2015; Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000).
As noted in the literature, the determination of precedence in these
discourses and disputes is a highly political process to which various
resources, including force, are regularly deployed (Berry 2000; Murphy
and Bledsoe 1987).
The specification of territory to which groups belong invokes deeply
contested geopolitical questions. Actors involved in disputes over where
communal markers lie and who lives on either side of these boundaries
regularly switch between geopolitical scales (village, town, district,
region, nation-state), making these contestations complex and leaving
very few safe from potential accusations of being strangers (Jackson
2006; Onoma 2018). While judico-legal citizens of a country may band
together to expel migrants from another country, citizens belonging to an
ethnic group may expel their fellow citizens from what is cast as an ethnic
homeland, demanding that they go back to their own area of the country
(Eyoh 1999; Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000; Geschiere 2009).
In conjuring neatly bounded communities demarcated by thick
boundaries, these discourses underestimate the flux and fluidity of (inter)
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communal markers, the politics of borderlines, and the tendency of
people to cross boundaries and go where they are thought to not belong
(Nyamnjoh 2016; Jackson 2006; Bauman 1997; Douglas 1984). They
underestimate the extent to which borders between communities
constitute zones of encounters and interactions rather than barriers that
are immutable and able to guarantee absolute separation (Nyamnjoh
2015a, 2015b; Hay 2014, 2016). Given this, we need to critically examine
the ability of these boundaries to protect those within their confines from
indignities and violence, while exposing those outside of their ambit to
scapegoating and social exclusion during public health crises.
The situation of migrants troubles assumptions about the extent to
which communal lines serve to protect those within them – citizens –
from exclusion in their homelands, while exposing ‘strangers’ who have
wandered away from their homelands to scapegoating. Those who
discriminate against immigrants and ask them to ‘go back home’ imply
that these travellers and their offspring only properly belong in the ‘places
of origin’ that they have left behind (Eyoh 1999; Geschiere and Nyamnjoh
2000; Onoma 2013). The ties of emigrants to and their standing in their
places of origin are far more precarious than these exclusionary discourses
suggest. These ties are the subject of constant negotiation and contestation
(Onoma 2018; Nyamnjoh 2005; 2011). Scholars recognise that the
extent to which those at home see generations of emigrants as still
possessing the full plethora of rights that accrue to ‘sons and daughters of
the soil’ depends on factors that go beyond their ability to prove deep
family ties to ‘home’ areas. Scholars have cited visits to these home areas,
financial support of family and friends there, restraint in the face of
exploitative and abusive behaviour by relatives at home, accessibility at
all times to those at home, support of community members who also
happen to be abroad, and participation in local development projects and
investment in their home country, as determinants of the status of these
ties (Ferguson 1999; Englund 2004; Tabappsi 1999; Nyamnjoh 2001;
2005; de Sardan 1999; Lindley 2007; Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000;
Onoma 2018; Tazanu 2012). Emigrants who neglect these ‘duties’
potentially face sanctions that include insults and name-calling, threats
of and reported mystical attacks, including through witchcraft and
marabouts, and ostracism by their families and communities at large
(Tabappsi 1999; Nyamnjoh 2001; 2005; Lindley 2007; Onoma 2018;
Tazanu 2012).
Remittances have come to assume a central position in interactions
between migrants and people left in their home communities, and the
perceived refusal of some migrants to remit is a central cause of problems
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with their relatives in home communities (Nyamnjoh 2006; Onoma
2018; Lindley 2007). But the attitude of home communities to remittances
is ambivalent, mixing covetousness with concern (Nyamnjoh 2011).
Remittances, like other forms of external interventions, reshape
landscapes and reorder hierarchies by favouring and empowering some
while disempowering and marginalising others. Concern over financial
remittances also coincides with trepidation over ‘foreign’ values, norms
and practices that are brought back by migrants from their travels
abroad (Riccio 2005, 2008; Uberti 2014; Nyamnjoh 2011). Anxiety over
emigrants bringing COVID-19 to Senegal plays into the tensions between
gratitude for remittances and apprehension about the invasion of Senegal
by not only of remittances, norms and practices, but also disease. Fears of
the spread of COVID-19 by returning migrants capture broader
preoccupations with the transgression of boundaries and upending of
social orders by movements and flows, which people at once embrace,
agonise over and even resist.
COVID-19 and the lightness of citizenship in Senegal
Senegalese emigrants in Southern European countries are widely
recognised as investing significantly to maintain healthy relations with
their home communities (Daffe 2008; Tall 2008b; Riccio 2005; 2008;
Mboup 2000; Tall 1994; Barro 2008; Gueye 2002). Like the Cameroonian
‘bushfallers’ described by Nyamnjoh (2011), they approach migration as
going abroad to work, where they amass and repatriate wealth, returning
back home at the earliest possibility (Tall 2008b). Once they acquire
residential and work permits, many regularly visit Senegal to spend time
with wives and children left behind, to see other members of the family,
to attend religious events, and to establish and monitor businesses that
many of them create in the retail and wholesale, real estate, transportation,
agriculture and fisheries sectors. Many are uninterested in integrating
into the communities abroad where they find themselves, often seeing
themselves strictly as sojourners (Riccio 2002, 2008; Fouquet 2008).
These emigrants contribute to the livelihoods of their families
by paying utility bills, covering the costs of schooling, hospitalisations,
funerals and baptisms, and covering daily expenses on food. They
contribute to community development projects in their areas of origin,
including the construction of mosques, schools and clinics, the acquisition
of ambulances, sinking of boreholes and so on. In addition, they invest
heavily in many sectors of the Senegalese economy (Daffe 2008; Tall
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2008b; Riccio 2005; 2008; Mboup 2000; Daffe 2008; Tall 1994; Barro
2008; Gueye 2002). Senegal is one of the highest recipients of migrant
remittances in Africa (Diop 2008), and these transfers were estimated at
US$2.5 billion in 2019 (World Bank n.d.). In a 2001 study, in some
villages in the Louga Region of Senegal, 90 per cent of household revenue
was identified as coming from migrant remittances (Tall 2008b, 54).
In this context, the question of citizenship assumed a central
position in conversations on scapegoating; it was one of the principal
grounds on which some emigrants and some Senegalese residents
questioned the legitimacy of scapegoating, because people who were
targeted were within the ambit of their own communities. One version of
this argument focused on the space where scapegoating was taking place,
contending that emigrants could not be scapegoated in Senegal because
they were Senegalese, were born in the country and had sacrificed
themselves through travel for the wellbeing of their families, communities
and country (Seneweb News 2020a). This argument partakes in the
fetishisation of citizenship that was a feature of early responses to the
COVID-19 pandemic. Border closures that ostensibly sought to curb
the spread of the virus through international travel were often carefully
crafted to allow citizens to return ‘home’, including when they were
infected by COVID-19. This move ignored the fact that many people do
not call their countries of citizenship ‘home’, and had no interest in going
to these places to shelter from the pandemic. Further, it elides the fact
that many people call territories where they do not have citizenship
home, and that they needed, for various reasons, to return to these places
during the pandemic (Onoma 2020c). These moves are grounded in the
territorialisation of identity that ties people to specific geographical
terrains (Mamdani 2002; Malkki 2009), ignoring the ability and tendency
of people to fashion temporary and situational ties to multiple homes.
A second argument focused on the perpetrators of scapegoating.
The contention was that Senegalese could not scapegoat these emigrants
since they were of the same nationality. One can understand from this
argument that scapegoating should only occur between people on
opposing sides of intercommunal boundaries. One commentator, on an
online news story, exclaimed: ‘Unbelievable! Brothers who are racist
toward their fellow citizens!’ (Seneweb News 2020a). There were overt
efforts by some to shift attention to the ‘proper’ targets of scapegoating,
‘foreigners’. People repeatedly brought up the fact that the first four cases
of coronavirus infection in Senegal were European citizens, and that
while news stories proliferated about the threat posed by Senegalese
emigrants, Europeans infected with the disease continued to enter the
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189
country. These Europeans, instead of the emigrants, some commentators
implied, should be held responsible for the spread of disease. One
commentator on an online news story could not hide his or her incredulity
at the ‘misplaced’ targeting of the Senegalese: ‘You people like to lynch
your own compatriots, but as for strangers, they are just great!’ (Seneweb
News 2020d). Other online commentators blamed conspiracies that
shifted blame away from ‘strangers’ and onto Senegalese emigrants as
perpetrated by European embassies, the Senegalese state and even
sections of the media (Seneweb News 2020a).
Underlying this incredulity over the scapegoating of ‘fellow citizens’
and ‘compatriots’ was a primordialist vision of identity and ties imbued
with notions of blood and origins. This perspective posits interactions as
posterior to and almost entirely shaped by ties of blood and common
origins (Mbembe 2001; Diagne 2002). It strays from the view that
context-laden interactions are what define ties, which are always tentative
and evolving.
The urge to respect the law of communal boundaries, by showing
solidarity towards fellow Senegalese emigrants and scapegoating
Europeans instead, reflected a global pandemic of xenophobia that
accompanied the public health crisis of COVID-19 (Zhu 2020; Human
Rights Watch 2020; Eric 2020), as also occurred in other disease
outbreaks (Benton and Dionne 2015; White 2010; Mason 2012;
Eichelberger 2007; Markel and Stern 2002). In Senegal, these calls did
not always fall on receptive ears. Being a citizen, including one who had
contributed to the development of the country, their community, and the
wellbeing of their kin, it was asserted, did not give a person the right to
endanger the country and those who live in it (Gueye 2020d).
A commentator on one online story pointed out that ‘(t)he fact that you
send Western Union or Ria to your family in need does not give you the
right to contaminate Senegalese’ (Seneweb News 2020b).
People argued that what was important was not which community
people belonged to, but what threat they posed to other Senegalese and
to the country. Some argued that Senegalese emigrants from Southern
European countries posed a greater danger than foreigners on account of
their numbers, their membership of wider networks in Senegal, and the
difficulties they faced in self-isolating and practising social distancing
relative to foreigners (Seneweb News 2020a, 2020e). Sylvain Faye
(2020a) has written on the challenges with social distancing, selfisolation and confinement in Senegal. In addition to these challenges,
people invoked the supposedly ‘uneducated’, ‘undisciplined’ and
‘stubborn’ character of these emigrants. Faye has also discussed the
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‘authoritarian’ visions and measures that undergird the tendency to
denounce, as evidence of stubbornness and indiscipline, people’s efforts
to balance the imperative of pandemic control and prevention with the
needs of precarious lives lived in a context where propitiousness for
these measures are far from certain (Faye 2020a, 2020b). For Senegalese
emigrants, these characterisations also suggest frustrations over the newfound celebrity status of formerly unemployed youth, who after high-risk
voyages abroad, occasionally return with fortunes that better educated
and formally employed relatives and neighbours in Senegal could only
dream of.
The focus on xenophobia during epidemics accords with the broader
view that posits communal lines as overwhelmingly influential on social
interactions (Ekeh 1975; Jackson 2006; de Sardan 1999; Geschiere 2009;
Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000). While the literature emphasises ‘others’
as the targets of scapegoating during epidemics and pandemics (Onoma
2017; Benton and Dionne 2015; M’Bokolo 1982; White 2010; Mason
2012; Echenberg 2002; Eichelberger 2007; Markel and Stern 2002;
Ngalamulume 2012; Ginzburg 1990; Eamon 1998), the scapegoating of
fellow citizens in Senegal shows that communal boundaries do not always
exert determinate influences on social interactions. This insight ties in
with a wealth of work that questions the extent to which communal lines
shape quotidian interactions. Nyamnjoh (2015a, 2015b), in his work on
conviviality, has emphasised the ways in which people and communities,
including those who emphasise these lines as primordial to social
interactions, routinely work around these boundaries. The literature on
the incorporation of strangers in African communities (Guyer 1993;
Bledsoe 1980; Colson 1970) has emphasised the capacity of people to
rope those considered as assets into their families and clans regardless of
which side of the communal line they fell. This same literature underlined
the limited extent to which belonging on the same side of the communal
line, including having jural ties, influenced the tendency toward
conviviality in African society (Murphy and Bledsoe 1987). In my previous
work on refugee-host relations (Onoma 2013), I have shown how
belonging to different ethnic groups did not discourage Guineans from
incorporating refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia during recent civil
wars in those countries.
In social research on medicine and diseases, Cohn’s reflections
(2018) on solidarity across communal lines during communicable
disease outbreaks question the tendency to see periods of epidemics as
always coinciding with xenophobia. My previous reflections (Onoma
2020b) on how acts of xenophilia and conviviality persist even during
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191
outbreaks of xenophobia further illustrate the tendency to work around
communal lines, even when people invoke these boundaries most
vociferously. This work of destabilising the influence of communal
boundaries on social relations is also evident in Napier’s reflections on
the implications of advances in the fields of theoretical immunology and
stem cells, regenerative medicine and epigenetics, for our understanding
of social relations (2012, 2017). He points at our frequent and almost
compulsive search for and outreach to the other over lines that bound
the self, and argues that such outreach is beneficial to the self. Of
particular importance in the work of Napier is the way in which he casts
this outreach and its consequences as fundamental to the constitution
of the self. This raises the spectre that there may not be a well bounded
and stable self that is anterior to these interactions across lines (2012,
2017).
Conclusion
This account of Senegalese emigrants who are scapegoated by their
‘compatriots’ in ‘their own country’ suggests that communal lines do not
necessarily help us make sense of the social dynamics that are
characteristic of epidemics. Consistent with other literature on relations
between migrants and home communities, and the exploitation,
contestations and tensions that bedevil these relations, I suggest that
citizenship and being on the ‘right side’ of communal boundaries does not
necessarily protect emigrants from the indignity of scapegoating during
crises such as that of pandemics.
In scapegoating Senegalese emigrants based in Southern Europe
during the COVID-19 pandemic, no effort was made to question their
Senegalese citizenship, and participants in debates over these emigrants
displayed their capacity to scapegoat even those who they recognise as
legitimate members of the Senegalese body politic. People did not claim
that these emigrants were ‘no longer part of us’. Instead, the argument
was that ‘they are dangerous so we should keep them at arm’s length even
if they happen to be part of us’. People did not cast them as other in order
to scapegoat them. The understanding instead was that certain members
of the body politic can be dangerous, and the community has a right
to protect itself by ensuring their distance. Communal boundaries did
not have a determinate effect on how people pursued what they saw
as the goal of securing their health, no matter how problematic their
actions were.
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Note
1
The communiques of the Ministry of Health and Social Action are on the website of the Ministry
at http://www.sante.gouv.sn/taxonomy/term/14 (accessed 16 September 2020).
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Part III
Unequal burdens
11
Pandemic policy responses and
embodied realities among
‘waste-pickers’ in India
Surekha Garimella, Shrutika Murthy, Lana
Whittaker and Rachel Tolhurst
Accounts of hardship among waste-picking communities and sanitation
workers have appeared intermittently in the print and social media since
March 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic took hold in India. These accounts
brought to public consciousness the lack of personal protective equipment
(mainly gloves and masks) among sanitation workers, and the risks they
faced in relation to exposure to the virus, in the context of increased
medical waste, including masks, that were being seen in public spaces and
landfill areas. There were also accounts of loss of livelihoods because of the
nation-wide lockdown for three weeks from 25 March to 14 April 2020.
During this time waste pickers were unable to go out and collect and recycle
dry waste, and this severely impacted their ability to feed themselves.
Emerging accounts highlighted the negative impact of measures taken to
contain COVID-19, while they also laid bare the troubling reality of wastepicking communities, of lives lived on the margins of societies, with little
to no recognition and protection (social, income, health and safety
protections) despite the crucial work they do to keep cities and commons
clean. For these communities, COVID-19 has intensified the uncertainty
hardwired into their work, their living spaces and their everyday lives.
Public health practices around masking, washing hands and physical
distancing, while necessary to reduce the risk of contracting the virus, have
little resonance with the living and working conditions of waste-picking
communities; for these community members, protecting and taking care of
themselves is extremely difficult (Figure 11.1).
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201
Figure 11.1 Sifting and collection of recyclables at Naidupeta dump
yard at Guntur, Andhra Pradesh, India. Photo: Arise Hub, The George
Institute for Global Health India
The word ‘waste’ can be traced back to the Latin word, vastus, which
means ‘unoccupied, uncultivated’ (Gidwani and Reddy 2011). Gidwani
and Reddy trace the entry of waste as a political-juridical concept to latethirteenth century England, where it was used in the context of
usufructuary1 rights of tenants. The tenant could not allow the land to go
to waste if he (never she) were to continue to hold such right. Waste
therefore originated in the context of property and land. In India, in some
local contexts, this still remains the case. For instance, in Tamil the word
poramboke nilam means land which is outside the revenue accounts of the
government, but literally the term means waste land. Barbara HarrissWhite (2020), among others, has noted that along with the proliferation of
waste, research on waste and waste work is also rapidly expanding although
still fragmented. Rarely is the waste economy looked at as a whole.
Waste pickers are among the poorest, most marginalised and
stigmatised in India (Harriss-White 2020; Doron 2018; Kornberg 2019;
Shankar and Sahni 2017). Waste makes us uneasy, it reminds us of our
‘all-too-mortal bodies’; and this discomfort is, as Martha Nussbaum notes,
‘projected outward onto groups who can serve as, so to speak, the
surrogate dirt of a community, enabling the dominant group to feel clean
and heavenly’ (Morrison 2015, 37). Waste pickers mainly come from the
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most marginalised castes and communities in India. In his essay,
‘Untouchability and Lawlessness’, B.R. Ambedkar (Maharashtra 1989)
writes that under the caste order, ‘the scavenger’s work is beneath the
dignity of the Hindus’.2 Even today in India, the occupation of handling
waste, both formally and informally, remains a function of caste (Singh
2014; Doron 2018). Other sites of inequity operate along with caste
(Gidwani and Maringanti 2016; Gidwani 1992; Gidwani and Baviskar
2011). For instance, poor working-class people who migrate to cities
in search of other work are often absorbed into waste-picking work
(Kornberg 2019; Shankar and Sahni 2017).
In India, in The Solid Waste Management Rules (SWM), waste
pickers were for the first time explicitly recognised and defined by the
government (GOI 2016b).3 A waste picker was defined as:
A person or groups of persons informally engaged in collection and
recovery of reusable and recyclable solid waste from the source of
waste generation, the streets, bins, material recovery facilities,
processing and waste disposal facilities for sale to recyclers directly
or through intermediaries to earn their livelihood.
Urban India generates around 42 million tonnes of municipal waste and
the Twelfth Schedule4 mandates local urban administrative bodies to
maintain the streets and keep cities clean. The formal structures of urban
municipalities are able to recycle only 30 per cent of the waste and rely on
waste pickers and existing informal waste collection and recycling
networks to meet the larger tasks of keeping cities clean. Waste picking
is informal work, but it plays a key role in waste management. Wastepicking communities save resources for the municipality by collecting
over 80 per cent of total recyclable waste and contributing to a substantial
portion of the waste economy (Harriss-White 2020). The current system
of waste management in India is built on this informality, and relies on
the coercive and unequal power relations that arise out of these informal
arrangements as well as caste-derived ideas of purity and pollution.
According to the Constitution of India, public health and sanitation are
state5 matters. However, solid waste management is the responsibility of
local urban administration. Article 243W of the Constitution refers to
‘public health, sanitation conservancy and solid waste management’ as a
direct responsibility of municipalities. Though waste management is
a municipal responsibility, it is fast moving away from public sector
control, bringing ‘private players into confrontations with informal waste
pickers’ (Shankar and Sahni 2017: 55). No official data are available on
EMBODIED REALITIES AMONG ‘WA STE-PICKERS’ IN INDIA
203
the number of people engaged in waste picking, but up to one and a half
million people are estimated to be involved in this work, accounting for
up to 10 per cent of waste pickers globally (GOI 2016a; Bose and
Bhattacharya 2017).
Waste pickers face constant harassment from state institutions and
are often suspected as ‘thieves masquerading as waste collectors’
(Shankar and Sahni 2017: 61) by residents and police.6 Women enter
the workforce on an unequal footing with men (Sankaran 2013) due to
the sexual division of labour, and this affects their standing in the public
sphere as much as in private life.7 Wages for the kinds of work performed
‘typically by women’ are classified as ‘light work’, thus attracting lesser
wages than those paid to men (Sankaran 2013). In waste picking, women
occupy the bottom of the wage ladder, their working conditions differing
from men even when they pursue similar activities. Shankar and Sahni
(2017) argue that in the informal waste sector, men occupy the
‘transactional’ segment of the ‘waste ladder’, while women and children
are usually at the bottom of the hierarchy and ‘handle waste in its raw
form’ (Shankar and Sahni 2017: 251). Caste-patriarchy8 shapes the lives
of both men and women waste pickers.9
The informal waste economy comprises socially, occupationally and
economically differentiated categories of ‘waste people’ – waste pickers/
collectors, ragpickers, manual scavengers and sanitation workers among
other categories. This line of work is characterised by the symbolic and
practical manifestations of caste, religion and gender. Most waste pickers/
collectors are poor Scheduled Castes (Dalits) and Muslims who have been
systematically forced into this profession because of their status as
lower caste and low status. Exiting from this occupation remains difficult.
It is often argued that the labour in waste economies is deliberately
informalised to contain costs (by paying low wages) and to express
contempt for Dalits (by subjugating them and suppressing particular
communities). Increasingly, informal activity has become hard-wired into
the business model of municipal contracting wherein acute revenue stress
and practices of new public management have forced the municipality to
subcontract services, including that of sanitation. Informal labour
contractors often bring in labourers and their families from adjoining
states and pay them to work as waste pickers in cities. These migrant
labourers are often heavily disadvantaged: they are paid abysmal wages
without any perks, housed on common land in tent-like shacks without
proper access to water and electricity; they are unable to communicate
and integrate with the local population; are constantly regarded as
‘outsiders’; and are further discriminated against because of the nature
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of their work. Recent governance shifts toward reforming the waste
management sector through increased privatisation and mechanisation
threaten to dispossess waste pickers from their livelihoods (Gidwani
and Corwin 2017). These precarious conditions are manifestations of
intersectional linkages of hierarchies of gender, caste, class and religion
interlocking with processes of economic liberalisation, urbanisation and
migration among others (Butt 2019). Waste pickers’ marginalisation,
enmeshed in the gender, caste and class axis, is simultaneously associated
with both the materiality of waste and the ritual and symbolic pollution
of untouchability, further entrenching their exclusion (Gill 2009; Reddy
2018).
Despite the social, economic, public health and ecological importance
of their work, waste pickers are not given due recognition for their role,
and they continue to struggle under the pressures of poverty, stigma and
compromised citizenship. In contrast, ‘(w)ithin the waste economy, the
municipal sanitation workers are considered to be the ‘aristocracy’
of waste labour’ (Harriss-White 2017, 421); they benefit from higher
salaries, better living conditions, job security and health insurance, in
comparison to informal waste pickers/collectors. But, even for this
aristocracy: ‘Sanitation for sanitation workers is conspicuously absent;
the dirtier and more dangerous the work, the lower the pay and the more
physically taxing the work conditions’ (Harriss-White 2020, 8).
We share preliminary insights from our ongoing work with waste
pickers in India in the ARISE (Accountability for Urban Informal Equity)
project in this chapter. We analysed selective policies that were in place
pre-COVID-19 and additional policies that were introduced during the
pandemic. In addition, we share what we are learning from ongoing work
with waste-picking communities.
Policies and what they reveal
In the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak, the Indian government announced
a nation-wide lockdown to start on 25 March, thereby severely restricting
the movement of individuals across the country. The lockdown was
initially imposed for 21 days, and it was extended to a period of three
months. This large-scale restriction on movement was particularly
disruptive for poor, marginalised and vulnerable sections of population.
Waste-picking communities found themselves in a situation where they
could no longer go out and collect waste. The immediate fall out of this
was the fear of going hungry. Waste needs to be collected and sold on a
EMBODIED REALITIES AMONG ‘WA STE-PICKERS’ IN INDIA
205
daily basis to ensure a cash flow in people’s homes and sufficient money
to buy food to eat.
At the same time as initiating the lockdown, the federal and state
governments and the courts announced various social security measures,
some of which specifically focused on the most vulnerable. The scale and
frequency of these announcements was unprecedented, with many orders
amended then revoked within hours of their release, and often not updated
on the official government websites, making it increasingly difficult to track
these updates. In this light, a group of activists, researchers, lawyers and
students came together collectively to set up a crowdfunded COVID-19
India policy tracker called ‘COVIDIndiaTrack’.10 The main objectives of this
tracker were to make information easily accessible on a real-time basis,
monitor the implementation of policies, and demand some basic
accountability. For sourcing policies pertaining to COVID-19, we relied on
this tool extensively. In addition, we frequently checked the official
government handles used on social media platforms, especially Twitter, in
order to keep abreast with the latest announcements.
The policy analysis we attempted involved three stages. First, we
searched for policies pertaining to waste-picking communities before
and after COVID-19. Second, we scrutinised these for fit and relevance,
based on a dynamic and evolving criteria of inclusion and exclusion (see
Table 11.1, below). Finally we analysed a subset of these policies based
on Carol Bacchi’s ‘What’s the problem represented to be?’ approach
(2014). The search strategy was split into two streams: pre-COVID-19
and post-COVID-19. The post-COVID stream was further split into federal
and state governments (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and
Karnataka), where the cities in which we work are located. An evolving
inclusion and exclusion criteria also aided the policy screening process.
The main objective of the policy screening was to identify policies
of direct relevance to waste-picking communities. However, most of the
post COVID-19 policies made no explicit mention of ‘waste-picking
communities’ or ‘waste pickers’. Instead, they used overarching categories
like vulnerable sections of society, poor persons, homeless and street
children, to name a few. As a result, we included these policies for analysis
because these spaces are where the waste-picking communities are located.
Based on the first round of searches, we shortlisted 150 policies announced
by the union government and 30, 13 and 6 policies announced by the state
governments of Karnataka, Himachal Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh,
respectively.
In the first round of screening, we read through the summaries
that had been drafted by COVIDIndiaTrack and made a quick note of the
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Table 11.1 Inclusion and exclusion criteria
Inclusion criteria
Exclusion criteria
Social protection/relief: Provision Test kits
of food, relief kits, cash, insurance
– all the central/state
Employment – including
government officials as contrast
Hospital management
Orders relating to restriction of
movements
Corporate social responsibility
(CSR)
Harassment and discrimination
Car insurance
Waste disposal including medical
waste
Violence against healthcare
workers
Management of dead bodies
Transportation of goods during
lockdown (our focus is on
movement of people)
Education
Migrant workers and labourers
Continuation of existing health
services: immunisation,
tuberculosis (TB)
Access to healthcare
Fake news
Homeless, street/pavement
dwellers
Containment – travellers coming
into India
Pharmaceutical interventions
Personal protective equipment
(PPE) – only if sanitation workers
employed in hospitals
Testing – only if experienced
Agriculture/rural areas focus
Documents detailing safety
measures/employment within
specific government departments
Child protection
central topics that were the focus of the policy and relevant to our
analysis. Based on this screening, we identified 22 policies pre-COVID
and 97 policies post-COVID: 75 policies released by the union
government and 11, 7 and 4 policies released by the state governments
of Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh respectively
EMBODIED REALITIES AMONG ‘WA STE-PICKERS’ IN INDIA
207
Figure 11.2 Policy screening flow. Source: authors
(see Figure 11.2). In the second round of screening, we read through
the shortlisted policies in greater detail and made a note of those that
would classify for Carol Bacchi’s ‘What’s the problem represented to be?’
approach and those that would be good for providing background
information. Finally, 18 policies were selected for analysis. We chose to
use Bacchi’s framework because it looks at problem definitions and
solutions as inextricably linked together.
Pre-COVID-19
Representation and visibility
The policies that apply to waste picking are located in a sociocultural and
economic context within which people handle waste to earn their
livelihoods. Policies are not merely spaces to search for gaps but provide
insight into how waste pickers and their problems are represented.
A common thread in pre-COVID-19 policies11 was emphasis on the
importance of the role of the informal sector as the ‘backbone of municipal
solid waste management (MSWM) value chain in India’ (GOI 2016b),
which includes the kabaadi system and waste pickers, and the relevance
of legal recognition to strengthen the informal systems of collection that
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are integral to MSWM. In India, the kabaadi system consists a network of
kabaadiwalas (junk or scrap dealers), itinerant waste collectors and
buyers. The latter collect recyclables from households (such as cardboard,
newspapers, glass bottles and plastic) and sell these to scrap dealers at a
fixed rate per kilogram, depending upon the composition and valuation
of items collected. The Solid Waste Management Rules (GOI 2016b)
recognise the role of the informal sector in waste management and
emphasise the establishment of a system for the integration of authorised
waste pickers and waste collectors (by issuing identity cards and formation
of self-help groups) to facilitate their participation in the solid waste
management system, including door-to-door collection of waste. But
silence on the issue of caste and its centrality in waste picking remains,
and to a great extent there are efforts to gloss over the intertwining of
caste and waste and render it as a managerial issue (Gatade 2015).
Treating caste and waste as a bureaucratic issue is not new, and Butt
(2019) has shown in his work on colonial Punjab how the colonial regime
cemented links between waste work, governance and caste.
For unspecified reasons, different typologies are used to classify
waste-picking communities in different policy documents. The First
National Commission on Labour of 1969 (GOI 1969) used the terms
‘sweepers’ and ‘scavengers’, while The Second National Commission on
Labour of 2002 (GOI 2002) used all terminologies – ragpickers, waste
pickers, scrap collectors and waste collectors – interchangeably. ‘Waste
workers’ as a term was used to refer to all workers who earned their
livelihoods by dealing with waste, including the municipal sanitation
workers and ‘manual scavengers’. The National Commission for
Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector, 2007 (NCEUS) (GOI 2007)
identified ‘ragpickers’ as self-employed workers; however, the document
made a distinction between ‘ragpickers’ and self-employed persons
owning businesses that recycle scrap and junk. The report also positioned
the ‘ragpicker’ as economically better off than a ‘casual worker’. Until late
2016, the National Urban Livelihood Mission (NULM) document and
Municipal Solid Waste (management and handling) Rules refer to them
as ragpickers, and only in later policy documents was the terminology of
‘waste pickers’ used more consistently. The impact of these ambiguities on
the recognition of the work that waste pickers do, on the dignity of their
profession, and whether a lack of definition impinges on access to social
security schemes of the government, remains poorly understood.
In the policies, there is some recognition of the vulnerabilities of
and problems faced by urban poor in general and particular sections
of the urban population, including ‘Scheduled castes, Scheduled tribes,
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209
minorities, female-headed households, persons with disabilities, the
destitute, migrant labourers, and especially vulnerable occupational
groups such as street vendors, ragpickers, domestic workers, beggars,
construction workers, etc.’ (Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs
2016, 11). These include a lack of social security and lack of access to
healthcare, and are considered to belong to vulnerable occupational
groups. Solutions proffered include the initiation of special projects
to address livelihood issues of the most vulnerable sections of this
population, including those with physical disabilities, people categorised
as ragpickers, domestic workers, rickshaw pullers and sanitation workers
(GOI 2018).
Recognition/identity cards
The SWM and PWM rules specifically mandate that waste pickers must
be provided with identification documents. Because waste picking is an
informal activity and waste pickers mainly live in informal settlements
and on pavements, they do not possess identification cards. Not having
a card means a lack of access to government welfare schemes. In
addition, waste pickers are subject to harassment by the police and the
general public. They are commonly assumed to be thieves and tend to
be the first people to get picked up by the police in the event of theft.
Many organisations that work with waste pickers advocate that they be
issued with official identity cards. Reddy and Kumar (2018), for
example, make the case that ensuring the welfare of waste pickers lies
in issuing them with identity cards that acknowledge their occupation
and their right to access, collect and sell waste across their respective
states. Waste pickers in turn argue that identity cards will benefit them
in multiple ways, including by increasing their access to waste in both
private and public areas, and, by giving their occupation legitimacy in
the eyes of the police and the citizenry, reducing the harassment they
routinely face. In Karnataka, a project for providing identity cards to
waste pickers was initiated in 2011 by Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara
Palike (BBMP), making it the first urban local body to register waste
pickers in India. Through this project, over 6,000 waste pickers in the
city were identified and issued identification cards, with another 7,000
approved and waiting for cards to be issued (Reddy and Kumar 2018).
However, waste pickers noted that the identity cards also had negative
impact, since those who were unable to gain these cards, for reasons
such as being identified as migrants, faced even greater exclusion and
marginalisation.
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Access to government health schemes
The Unorganised Workers Social Security Act UWSSA (2008) (GOI 2008)
extends to ‘ragpickers’ and provides for the formulation of welfare schemes
related to, inter alia, life and disability cover, and health and maternity
benefits. Under Schedule I of the Act, several schemes have been listed to
which workers can have access. Among these are the Janani Suraksha
Yojana (JSY) of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, which is a safe
motherhood intervention to reduce maternal and neonatal mortality
through promotion of institutional deliveries among poor pregnant
women. This federal scheme integrates cash assistance with delivery and
post-delivery care. There is also the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana
(RSBY) of the Labour Ministry, a national health insurance scheme for
people living below the poverty line which provides protection from
financial liabilities that arise out of hospitalisation. This scheme has
now moved under the aegis of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare,
and in 2018 it was subsumed by the federal government scheme
Ayushman Bharat-Pradhan Mantri Jan Aarogya Yojana (PMJAY), which is
implemented by states on a cost-sharing basis. This is meant to avoid
duplication of multiple schemes for the same population group, and to
reduce the burden of furnishing multiple cards for services by families
(because coverage is for families). Earlier, poor people found it very difficult
to decipher and understand which scheme covered what services. Changes
to schemes aimed to prevent them from having to access multiple service
providers as well as being denied services due to non-applicability of
specific schemes in specific facilities. While the intent is commendable, in
actual practice, the autonomy of states to shape the policies with relevance
to their context has been curtailed due to the centralised nature of this
scheme (Krishnakumar 2019;12 The Week 201813). The standing committee
report on Urban Development14 in 2008, among other things, acknowledged
the occupational health issues involved with ‘rag picking’ and recommended
that those involved in such work be provided with ‘personal protective
equipment like gloves and spectacles and things like that so that they do not
contract diseases’ (55). But the lack of identity cards remains a gatekeeping
issue which prevents access to these schemes. In 2013, RSBY was extended
to ‘ragpickers’ and ‘sanitation workers’.15 The RSBY website claims that
registration under the scheme is easy. The 2013 notification requires that
the state government identify ‘ragpickers’ provided that they are at least 18
years of age; and ‘ragpickers’ must provide a self-declaration confirming
that they are a ‘ragpicker’, and a document of proof of occupation. Acquiring
proof of occupation is not easy for waste pickers, however.
EMBODIED REALITIES AMONG ‘WA STE-PICKERS’ IN INDIA
211
During COVID times
As indicated earlier, a flurry of orders, guidelines and rules were issued by
federal and state governments to deal with COVID-19 and its impact; this
remained dynamic to the end of December 2020. Insurance schemes for
health workers have been announced; these include sanitation workers but
not waste pickers or waste workers. Sanitation workers are formally
employed by the city’s administration to clean public spaces including
sewers and manholes, empty toilet pits and septic tanks, segregate different
kinds of waste, and operate pumping stations and treatment plants. They
are tenured or ‘regular’ employees and are given employee benefits such as
a pension and health insurance. In times of COVID-19, the government
heralded them as ‘frontline workers’ or ‘frontline warriors’. Schemes to
provide additional food for the poor were also introduced, but these were
limited to a three-month period at the beginning of the lockdown. While
these schemes were welcome initiatives, they built onto existing schemes
and did not directly address the exclusionary nature of existing schemes.
This appears to be based on the assumption that problems in accessing
these schemes are only due to COVID-related disruptions, but they do not
address the impact of loss of work, hunger and inability to access healthcare,
nor do they take into account the problems faced by waste-picking communities in accessing these schemes, even in regular times.
In addition to reviewing policies as part of our ongoing research, we
conducted interviews with nine waste pickers and sanitation workers
from Bengaluru, Vijayawada and Shimla. We also interviewed five key
informants from these cities. Across these sites, we are working with a
cross-section of waste workers: in Bengaluru, we are working with waste
pickers who engage in door-to-door collection of segregated dry waste. In
Vijayawada, we are working with waste pickers in the informal sector
who are own account workers (Murthy 2020; Saligram 2020). In Shimla,
we are working with tenured sanitation workers and contractual door-todoor garbage collectors.
Tapestries of wellbeing and ill-health
The interviews revealed a preoccupation with food insecurity and hunger,
inability to access health services, and the waste-picking community’s
dependence on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other
community-based organisations. Some of the interviewees16 spoke about
complete dependence on NGOs to feed themselves and their families, and
the difficulties faced by these organisations in delivering medicines to the
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communities where waste pickers live. Sujatha, one of our interviewees,
told us that if her family and others ‘had not received any support from
the NGO, it would have been very, very tough. They gave us one month’s
provisions and then we got some from the public distribution system
(‘ration shop’) which helped us “maintain” our lives’. She also went on to
say that the organisation had offered to supply the medicines. But this did
not happen, and she does not know why; ‘they had to go to a nearby
medical store and buy it. But mostly people go to the nearby public facility
and pick-up medicines’.
Waste pickers depend on the regular flow of cash which they
generate through picking, sorting and selling on a daily basis to feed
themselves and their families. Because of the lockdown, their only source
of income was cut off. People consistently spoke about lack of food, lack
of money to seek care if needed and the immense stress/distress in such
situations. Kamal, for example, spoke to us about how food relief was
necessary and helpful, but it did not resolve other stresses related to cash
flow. Being unable to access health services was a major source of stress:
Each rupee matters now for a person. Just lentils and rice alone
won’t run the house, right? But the lockdown … honestly has
troubled us, no one even has a rupee. We are managing somehow
but if someone falls ill at home or if some problems arise then
meeting these costs would be a huge issue. We don’t have money to
go to doctor, so we go to the government hospital here but for the
people who work here (indicating migrant workers), their homes
run because they send money.
Suresh conveyed the stress due to the lockdown slightly differently,
referring to the inability to work, the role of the police, and her perception
that the government did not seem to understand their situation:
We are also struggling more now, we are not allowed to go outside,
the police are not allowing anyone to leave their homes. Two to
three people are physically challenged; they are not able to do any
work. Mainly many are depending on begging at door to door in the
near places. They are completely helpless; this needs to be
recognised by the government.
People also spoke about feeling distressed at what they were seeing
around them, but also solidarity in troubled times and looking out for
each other, as Annie put it:
EMBODIED REALITIES AMONG ‘WA STE-PICKERS’ IN INDIA
213
most of the people are facing problems in this pandemic, they need
some food. Some people are in critical position, kids are crying for
food. Due to social stigma parents are not ready to ask help. I am
also facing problems but two times I have prepared food for the
hungry people. They are not my relatives; I don’t know who they are
when I helped them.
While some of the issues had an urgency shaped by the challenges of
managing their lives during the pandemic, the key informants who had
worked with waste pickers for many years now shared that many issues that
waste pickers were facing were not unique to the pandemic, but were ones
that they faced at any time. Indhu, one of our key informants, told us:
The fear is also there, and they also fear that sometimes they are
diagnosed with something that requires 10 days rest or 15 days rest
or something like that … they can’t afford that. It sounds like help
should not be taken for granted but this is the bitter realities that
these people … there was this one woman … I can give you a lot of
community examples because this is what we encounter on a dayto-day basis. She had elephantiasis on her left leg and she just
refuses to go to doctor because she has seven children to take care
of and if she loses a day of work what will happen? They won’t have
anything to eat. So, if there is a community health camp where they
can go for one hour come back that is all fine, but not where it takes
days for them and regular follow ups for them. Frankly speaking,
those who work in the godowns [warehouses] and scrap shops,
their owners also exploit them in many ways. I won’t say like very
good and nice things about them because it is true, this exploitation
still happens even if we associate with them it happens back of the
hand. So, it’s like a daily wage kind of a thing, you lose one day’s
work if you go to the hospitals, then there is bill and all that.
Most waste pickers constantly struggle to eat and survive, and seek care.
While the government has provided welfare and health insurance
schemes that are expected to meet the needs of poor people including
waste pickers, to what extent these actually meet their needs remains
moot. Even when there is a possibility of seeking care, stigma, fear and
the experience of being treated poorly by health workers means that they
avoid accessing these services. As another key informant elaborated, a lot
of hard work and convincing building of trust has to be done before many
very poor people will agree to access health services, and they are
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dependent on NGOs and citizen groups to help them. Previously waste
pickers were reluctant to present for care because of fear of stigma. This
is particularly so because many belong to Scheduled tribes, and from the
perspective of key informants, their persistent experience of stigma and
social exclusion impacts their willingness to access health services. Aman,
for instance, emphasised the work involved in talking to women about
institutional deliveries and antenatal care, and allaying their fears about
going to hospitals. Slowly, he remarked, ‘we are seeing an increasing
willingness to access government services including medical services’.
Aman continued:
There are no medical shops, for example, in dumping yards … they
will have to come to the city. They will have to travel around 12 km.
And I want to tell you one more thing … with regards to the dumping
yard, there’s one pregnant woman and they don’t follow institutional
deliveries … they don’t do that. So, they’d rather … they deliver at
their houses itself. We spent a lot of time talking to the woman and
assured her that we will take her to the government hospital where
she can get good care. When she started to experience labour pain
she called us and we spoke to her and arranged for an auto to take
her to the government hospital, we spoke to the doctor and paid for
her medicines too. So, she, her family and the community were very
happy that we could help them during this time. And they said …
this is the first time … in our community … this is the first time …
this much service and care has been provided to us (Aman).
From these narratives, it is clear that while experiences shared find their
immediacy in the fallout of COVID-19, these are not unique to the
pandemic, but rather are issues that waste-picking communities grapple
with on an everyday basis. Living with and through a pandemic adds
to their vulnerability; as Bennett and Dewi (this volume) show, the
pandemic amplifies their marginality and the health consequences of this.
Accountabilities
The slew of policies released by the federal and state governments during
the COVID-19 pandemic allocated responsibilities for implementation to
different arms of the bureaucracy. For example, advice on the provision
of safe and potable water to those residing in urban slums and belonging
to the poorest strata of society simply reinforced what needs to happen
with or without the pandemic. Access to safe and potable water for the
EMBODIED REALITIES AMONG ‘WA STE-PICKERS’ IN INDIA
215
poor is a longstanding unmet need. The initiation of the lockdown to
reduce the spread of the disease ended up further stigmatising wastepicking communities, at a stroke taking away their chances of earning a
living and feeding themselves. The efforts to provide food to these
communities were not based on their realities as detailed in policy
statements, and the exclusions built into public distribution systems
remained. The interviewees we spoke with elaborated on the negative
impacts of the lockdown:
Lockdown is a problem. It is tough for people, the labourers like
waste pickers … we have no salary … it is not that monthly we get
money then we sleep and that’s it. For us the money depends on
how much work we do. So, government should have thought about
us, the sanitation workers on the road who do cleanliness work …
they do the work of sanitation workers also so government should
have also thought that the one who uses his cycle to pick up
materials and sell … whose lives revolve around this … they should
have thought about people like us. If they have told us ‘okay, you do
your work don’t create issues’ … if we or someone had said this or
allowed us to do so, we could have lived better. In such a state how
will one feel? You tell me. It was not necessary to do this, people can
maintain distance and work. Doing so it would have been better for
us, but with lockdown it is like … stay at home like how one has to
stay in jail. What is the use of it? Instead … People live their lives to
eat food so if we can’t get food then what will we do? Better than
this is … we do our work but we maintain distance. People have to
work, if they cannot work then what will they do? People with
money can sit at home, what problems do they have? (Kamal)
Others spoke of the inability to gain access to rations supposed to be
provided by the government. From our own interviews and observations,
we found that civil society organisations and concerned citizens tried
hard to fill this gap and supply food and medicines to the waste-picking
communities in the cities where we work. As one of them told us:
Nothing from either the government or the corporation. The
councillor from the ward provided support. He gave us two kilos of
rice each and that is not even enough to last one day (Shalini).
I know this information from the community people, TV news and
newspapers. And village volunteers also told. They said to us who
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are having ration card, they are only eligible for receiving Rs. 1000.
In this community, only two or three families are having ration cards
(Suresh).
Affirming what the waste pickers have shared with us, civil society
organisations, well-meaning citizen groups, and individuals were the
ones supplying food and care. Aman, a key informant, narrated how he
reached out to the municipal commissioner and shared a note about the
guidelines for sanitation workers during COVID-19. Aman was pleasantly
surprised when the commissioner responded by asking Aman if he needed
any help to support the waste-picking community with whom he works.
Aman immediately brought to the notice of the commissioner that many
waste pickers did not have ration cards, and although the government
was supplying food aid without these cards, they were unable to access
other aid. For example, each family was to get a thousand rupees, but not
possessing the card meant that they could not get this small financial
relief being offered. He provided a list of names of waste pickers who did
not have these cards with the local administration. The following day,
Aman found that rice and lentils were being distributed to waste pickers
who did not have ration cards. However, the people who were doing this
were not local officials, but the wife of the commissioner and her friends
who were part of Indian Administrative Service (IAS) Wives Association.
Essentially, the administration lacked the mechanisms to give relief to
those without ration cards. The inability to access identity cards has
remained a problem for many of the waste pickers, although some have
fared better than others:
In my caste, there is no differentiating. But others are facing problems.
Those who belong to the Yerukula and Pamula communities are
facing problems. But we are not getting any help from the government.
I have applied many times for Ration card, Aadhar card and housing,
and only after a long struggle I got them (Annie).
Discrimination against and stigmatisation of waste pickers practised in
everyday social encounters and in policy spaces remains a huge barrier.
Aman spoke of the commonplace discrimination against waste pickers,
which he has struggled to counter for over a decade working with them.
Discrimination takes many forms, including in governance spaces like
municipal corporations. Waste pickers are integrated into waste
management systems, but are systematically discriminated against
through entrenched hiring practices, which remain contractual and
EMBODIED REALITIES AMONG ‘WA STE-PICKERS’ IN INDIA
217
intensify informality and precarity among waste pickers. This is a direct
reflection of how little authorities value the work that waste pickers do.
Although sympathy was expressed and relief provided by individuals and
groups during the lockdown, Aman remains circumspect about whether
the realisation of the particular vulnerability of waste pickers will
translate into lasting positive or less discriminatory change.
Discussion
Drawing on policy discourse analysis and experiences shared by waste
pickers and key informants working with waste-picking communities, we
suggest that while the COVID-19 pandemic is in many ways exceptional,
the policy responses and their impacts in specific contexts are an acute
manifestation of what is already built into the worlds and everyday lives
of waste-picking communities. Policy making by design creates and
defines different masses of bodies for their government, and defines the
contours of embodiment among individuals and groups. To make sense
of this, we feel that the concept of ‘debility’, as articulated by Puar (2017),
can allow us to interrogate the experiences of waste pickers in India. Puar
articulates debility as a ‘durational death’, a way in which bodies are
allowed neither to live nor to die. By ‘creating injury’ and maintaining this
population as perpetually debilitated, and yet alive, this population can
be controlled and used. Debility differs from disability; it foregrounds the
‘slow wearing down of populations’ (2017, xiv) rather than focusing on
the before-and-after of an event that produces disability.
Puar argues that the ‘precarity of certain bodies and populations’ is
maintained by making them available for maiming. As researchers, we
are grappling with whether precarity and debility as concepts can be used
to understand how waste workers are treated to generate a more holistic
and intersectional understanding of waste picking, its markers and
the lived realities of those engaged in this work, their families and
communities. It helps us to understand how waste workers are deliberately
held in a socially and economically constrained position. Their marginalisation is sedimented in both everyday social and national and local
policy spaces in order to maintain the status quo, because India cannot
function as a clean (pure and modern) state without the marginality of
those charged with the work of cleaning. To extrapolate from Deleuze
and Guattari, ‘the state apparatus needs, at its summit, pre-disabled
people’ (see Puar 2017, 63) and, we suggest, needs this precarity to
continue its claims to cleanliness and purity.
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Puar (2017) argues that the social acceptance of disability relies on
the obfuscation and deep proliferation of debility. The acceptance of
certain kinds of understandings of waste work valorise the fact that waste
pickers contribute around 20 per cent of the work involved in recycling
waste. This blurs other more obscene aspects of waste work, and
articulates waste pickers as hard-working citizens who contribute to
society and therefore need to be rewarded.
The experiences of waste pickers highlight an urgent need to rethink
overarching governance and accountability structures and systems that
define ‘waste picking’, and those who make their living from this, to
provide an accommodative frame of policy making centred on their
rights. Such re-thinking demands that we develop an emic understanding
of embodiment with those who are marginalised and oppressed. We need
to integrate this understanding with discourses of intersectionality to
move towards a framing capable of transforming power relations and
redressing the inequalities in the health and wellbeing of waste-picking
communities.
Acknowledgements
This chapter is written on the basis of our ongoing work with sanitation
workers and waste-picking communities in Bengaluru (Karnataka),
Guntur, Vijayawada (Andhra Pradesh) and Shimla (Himachal Pradesh),
in India through the Accountability for Informal Urban Equity Hub
(ARISE). ARISE is funded by the United Kingdom Research and
Innovation (UKRI) Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF). We would
like to thank Barathi Nakkeeran and Prasanna Saligram from our team at
the George Institute for Global Health, India, for their help and insights
on all policy-related issues. Ethical clearance was obtained from the
George Institute Ethics Committee and the Liverpool School of Tropical
Medicine Research Governance and Ethics Office.
Notes
1 An usufructuary right allows the tenant to use and enjoy a property over a certain period, as
long as he or she is able to maintain the property, pay taxes, and whatever else may be required
as per applicable laws of the land. It is not ownership.
2 Page 47, https://www.mea.gov.in/Images/attach/amb/Volume_05.pdf .
3 Solid Waste Management Rules. 2016. Government of India, Ministry of Environment, Forest
and Climate Change. Rule 3(1)(58).
4 Twelfth Schedule of the Indian Constitution: the Powers, Authority and Responsibilities of
Municipalities. This schedule has 18 items. The Twelfth Schedule was added by the 74th
EMBODIED REALITIES AMONG ‘WA STE-PICKERS’ IN INDIA
219
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Amendment Act of 1992. In this chapter we refer to items within the purview of the
municipalities.
Item 6, Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.
‘It wasn’t uncommon for the police to round up waste pickers for investigation in cases of theft
in a locality’ (Shankar and Sahni 2017, 255).
Sankaran (2013) also points out that one of the reasons for the disparity between the wage
rates of men and women in India is the interplay between the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and
the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976.
Women are ‘embraced by multiple patriarchies’ that produce different effects on women in
different castes and communities (Rao 2003). While there are similarities between the
oppression(s) women face across castes and communities, Dalit Bahujan scholarship in
this regard suggests that it is crucial to delineate the differences in order to avoid possible
erasures.
It is crucial, when thinking of structures of power, to think of not only the ‘victims’ (Andersen
and Collins 2015). Relying too heavily on the experiences of Black women can erase our
ability to see race, class and gender as an integral part of everyone’s experiences: ‘What
intersectionality does rather than what intersectionality is lies at the heart of intersectionality’
(Collins and Bilge 2020, 3).
https://covid-india.in.
Deendayal Antyodaya Yojana – National Urban Livelihoods Mission, Empowering Marginalized
Groups – Convergence Between SBM and DAY-NULM March 2018, National Urban Policy
Framework 2018. (GOI 2018). Other policies have been used to support our argument as
appropriate.
https://frontline.thehindu.com/cover-story/article26641511.ece.
https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2018/09/24/modis-ayushman-bharat-schemerejected-by-five-states.html.
https://eparlib.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/63614/1/14_Urban_Development_38.pdf#.
http://www.nrhmhp.gov.in/sites/default/files/files/Extension%20of%20RSBY%20to%20
5%20new%20Categories%20.pdf.
We have used pseudonyms for the interviewees to protect their identities.
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12
The amplification effect
Impacts of COVID-19 on sexual and
reproductive health and rights in Indonesia
Linda Rae Bennett and Setiyani Marta Dewi
Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo declared the spread of COVID-19 a
national disaster on 13 April 2020. Since this declaration, people living in
the cities of Jakarta and Yogyakarta have endured extreme flooding,
multiple dengue outbreaks, a notable earthquake and a full-scale volcanic
eruption within their provincial boundaries. They have lived daily with
appalling air, water and waste pollution, abysmal overcrowding in
informal urban settlements, and, in the case of Jakarta residents,
knowledge that their home is literally sinking. These circumstances typify
the ongoing precarity that Indonesians face in their everyday lives, and
form critical context for understanding the impacts of additional threats
such as the COVID-19 pandemic.
In this chapter, we offer a contextualised analysis of the ways
in which COVID-19, and responses to it, have impacted on the sexual
and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) of vulnerable Indonesian
communities living in Jakarta and Yogyakarta. The communities we focus
on are youth, particularly street-dwelling youth, people living with HIV,
transwomen and female sex workers. We share the recent experiences of
these communities via the observations of frontline workers engaged in
the promotion of SRHR both before and during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Frontline workers are thus positioned as experts on their experiences of
how COVID-19 has impacted their work, as well as mediators seeking to
reduce the impacts of the pandemic on the communities they support.
Half of the frontline workers we have spoken with are also members of
the communities with whom they work.
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Through our analysis of frontline worker narratives, we trace how
the pandemic has amplified pre-existing inequalities. The concept of
amplification has received most attention in the field of risk analysis
(Kasperson et al. 1988), with a focus on exploring how media reporting
and public communications about epidemics and other threats shape
the social construction of risk perception (Masuda and Garvin 2006; Wirz
et al. 2018). In this chapter, we are not concerned with risk perception.
Rather we use the term amplification to describe how the concrete and
often overlapping conditions of deprivation have been intensified within
the pandemic. We adapt the notion of deprivation amplification as we
identify how everyday lives that are routinely marked by deprivation of
income and resources, access to healthcare, and the denial of human
rights, respect and citizenship, have been rendered disproportionally
vulnerable to the impacts of COVID-19. By focusing on SRHR, we place
the larger health footprint of the COVID-19 pandemic at the centre of
analysis. We track how COVID-19 has amplified the vulnerability
of marginalised communities to poorer health outcomes more widely.
Frontline worker informants paint a vivid picture of Indonesia’s brittle,
patchy and under-resourced health system. This image is verified by data on
health expenditure and sexual and reproductive health (SRH) outcomes,
which we outline briefly to contextualise recent declines in the provision of
SRH services. Indonesia’s expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP is
low, remaining below average in comparison with other middle-income
countries; last verified in 2017, it was 3.1 per cent of gross domestic product
(WHO 2021).1 Despite the introduction of the national health insurance
programme in 2014, the Government of Indonesia’s (GoI) contribution to
the cost of healthcare remained at 39 per cent in 2017, while out-of-pocket
health expenditure was estimated at around 61 per cent (WHO 2021).
Additionally, the health worker to population ratio in Indonesia remains
lower than recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO)
(Anderson et al. 2014; Agustina et al. 2019), with a particular shortage of
nurses and midwives who are crucial for the provision of SRH services.
Indonesia’s performance against key SRH indicators is highly deficient,
with underinvestment in health and failure to address poverty both
contributing to poor SRH outcomes. Indonesia’s maternal mortality rate was
the highest of all ASEAN nations in 2017, with 177 deaths per 100,000 live
births (World Bank 2020a), and considerable variation between regions,
impacting especially remote, poor and adolescent women (Nababan et al.
2018). Unmet need for contraception is estimated to be approximately
15 per cent among married couples and much higher among unmarried
people who have no legal access to contraception (World Bank 2020b).
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Legal access to safe abortion in Indonesia is highly constrained, unless a
woman’s life is deemed to be at risk. Approximately two million induced
abortions occur annually, and deaths from unsafe abortion contribute to at
least 15 per cent of the country’s maternal mortality (Landiyanto 2010).
Early marriage and adolescent child bearing are still prevalent, particularly
in remote and low-income communities, where up to 40 per cent of women
become mothers before the age of 18 (Bennett 2014).
Another indicator of Indonesia’s lack of investment in SRHR is the
consistent increase in HIV infections since 2012. Heterosexual transmission
is now the primary mode of new infections, and a gradual feminisation of
the epidemic is occurring, with younger women most vulnerable (Bennett
and Spagnoletti 2019). Out of an estimated population of 640,000 HIV
positive Indonesians in 2018, only 17 per cent were receiving antiretroviral
(ARV) treatment (HIV and AIDS Data Hub for Asia Pacific 2020) and
only 15 per cent of HIV-positive pregnant Indonesian women received
the WHO-recommended regimen for prevention of mother-to-child
transmission (HIV and AIDS Data Hub for Asia Pacific 2020). The underinvestment in SRHR and the neglect of vulnerable populations forms the
backdrop for understanding the additional SRH burden experienced by
these communities since the onset of the pandemic.
Below we address how COVID-19 has necessitated a shift in research
praxis, and the importance of resisting closing ethnographic fields in
times of crisis. We discuss our inclusive definition of frontline workers
and their holistic approach to supporting marginalised Indonesian
communities. We establish how access to SRH services for vulnerable
communities has been impacted during the pandemic, and how these
impacts have been shaped by long-term inequalities. The concept of
invisible citizens is then deployed to analyse the systematic exclusion of
specific individuals from state-sponsored healthcare and emergency
financial assistance. This brings us to our core argument – that COVID-19
has amplified inequalities, making it all the more important to ethnographically engage with vulnerable communities and highlight how
recent detrimental impacts on their SRHR are embedded in the persistent
politics of discrimination and deprivation.
Reshaping research praxis and engaging
frontline workers
International border closures, neighbourhood lockdowns and social
distancing measures, introduced to slow the spread of COVID-19, inhibit
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our capacity to enter the ethnographic field, and we do not know when
these will be removed. However, rather than accepting a forced closingoff of the field, we chose to adapt, and propelled by the wish to maintain
ongoing dialogue with valued Indonesian colleagues at a time when their
voices clearly need to be heard, we extended our research praxis. Through
online stakeholder consultations we identified several groups particularly
vulnerable to the impacts of COVID-19 in Indonesia. These groups
are people living with HIV, youth – including street-dwelling youth –
transwomen and female sex workers. We then put aside former anxieties
over how virtual/digital ethnography could potentially lead to the loss of
intimacy, rapport and trust with research participants, although we are
mindful (and grateful) that our foray into virtual data collection and
collaboration is underpinned by decades of ethnographic research and
practice in the SRH field in Indonesia.
Significant attention has been accorded to the crucial roles of frontline health workers, and their vulnerability in the context of COVID-19
(Amnesty International 2020; Nguyen et al. 2020). In Indonesia, very
high infection and mortality rates among frontline healthcare workers
have been verified, resulting in pressure on the GoI to better protect them
(Amnesty International 2020). In this study, we extend the definition of
frontline workers from such qualified healthcare workers to others also
actively engaged in the promotion of SRHR. We interviewed a total of
20 frontline workers who support vulnerable communities in various
ways: providing counselling and clinical SRH services; facilitating access
to services and running outreach programmes; providing peer support
and distributing condoms; providing information about SRH and
available services; managing or implementing targeted programmes; and
providing emergency financial assistance.
An eclectic group of frontline workers was purposively sampled to
provide access to the first-hand experiences of people whose work focuses
on supporting communities with poor access to SRH services under
normative (pre-COVID-19) circumstances. Our broad definition of frontline workers recognised the complex needs of and complexity of working
with vulnerable communities to address intersecting axes of disadvantage.
Our informants viewed biomedical solutions to health problems as ‘only
one part of the problem’ facing their friends and clients. They emphasised
that efforts to improve SRH among vulnerable communities should also
include: facilitating access to health services; education and advocacy;
creating belonging and countering the impacts of stigma; and facilitating
poverty alleviation. This holistic conceptualisation of their roles resonates
with the observations of Sarradon-Eck et al. (2014) in their research with
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225
frontline social workers and urban homeless populations in France. They
describe a logic of care (Mol 2008) and support among French frontline
workers that propelled them to engage with clients in a more holistic way
than hospital-based health workers (Sarradon-Eck et al. 2014, 260). In
drawing on narratives from our research, we show how frontline workers
reveal a consistent logic of care driven by a commitment to provide broad
support to vulnerable community members. The breadth of their work
and perspectives enabled us to explore how poorer SRH outcomes for
vulnerable communities during the pandemic have been produced by and
through pre-existing and intensified patterns of inequality, not merely
due to an interruption of routine services.
Our sample of frontline workers included four transwomen, 11
women, four men and one person identifying as queer, reflecting the
gender imbalance in the field of SRHR in Indonesia. This gender
asymmetry also reflects that many SRH programmes in Indonesia focus
on women as recipients, and tend to employ women as programme
managers, outreach workers and peer educators/leaders with the
exception of programmes dedicated to men who have sex with men.
We acknowledge the limits of our inclusion of voices from vulnerable
community members (except for the ten frontline workers who were also
community members) and hope to remedy this when collaborative
community-based research becomes safe. To protect anonymity,
pseudonyms are used for direct quotes from frontline workers, and we
refer to the gender and professional role of informants only as identifying
features.
Data were collected in June and July 2020 via WhatsApp (for
recruitment and follow up), email (used for stakeholder consultations,
sharing plain language statements and clarifying points of interest from
interviews) and Zoom (to conduct and record virtual interviews). While
we relied on digital technology to be co-present with our participants, the
interviews focused on people’s concrete experiences in the physical
world. Children, pets and partners drifted in and out of focus during
interviews due to the shared ‘work from home if you can’ situation. We
were struck by the parallels in atmosphere between the virtual interviews
and experiences of face-to-face ethnography conducted in people’s
physical homes. An unforeseen but welcome aspect stemming from the
infusion of domesticity was an enhanced sense of informality and
intimacy in our dialogue, and a willingness of people to share their time
generously. Virtual interviews were conducted with relative ease, as most
informants were using the chosen communication mediums in their
professional lives, and had reliable internet access. While these conditions
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facilitated dialogue with frontline workers, we note that the vulnerable
community members that our informants support are not all in the same
position, and many could not be expected to participate in virtual research
without significant financial and technological assistance. Thus, the field
in this instance could stretch no further than the boundaries of a reliable
internet connection and a smartphone with credit enough to run the
Zoom application for an hour or more. Most interviews took around one
and a half hours and up to two and a half hours.
Impacts of COVID-19 on sexual and reproductive
health and rights
While the full extent of COVID-19 impacts on SRH cannot be precisely
measured during the crisis, Riley and colleagues (2020) have estimated
that a 10 per cent decline in women’s access to SRH services and
contraception in low- and middle-income countries during the COVID-19
pandemic will have vast impacts, including a rapid escalation in maternal
mortality. In Indonesia, where frontline workers have described
widespread reductions in the availability of SRH services and the number
of women accessing those services, shortages of hormonal contraceptives
and condoms, reduced access to voluntary testing and counselling (VCT)
and to antiretroviral drugs (ARV), we can expect dramatic increases in
negative SRH outcomes. With this knowledge, frontline workers are
legitimately arguing for the GoI to recognise SRH services as an essential
area of healthcare both during the COVID-19 pandemic and under
ordinary circumstances.
Maternal health, family planning and safe abortion services
Frontline workers reported a wide range of interruptions to routine SRH
services in Yogyakarta and Jakarta, stemming from the GoI response to
COVID-19 and the low capacity of the health system prior to the pandemic.
Clinical health workers described recent changes in their roles, such as
being seconded to COVID-19 testing and tracing, and to emergency
rooms to replace colleagues who were unable to work after contracting
COVID-19. This redeployment of staff led to decreased opening hours in
both public and private SRH clinics. Our informants reported that early
in the pandemic, many clinics were only managing to open one or two
days a week, when they had previously been open five or six days a week.
In some districts primary health clinics contracted and offered emergency
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227
services only, such as responding to birth complications, but offered no
other SRH services.
Reduced uptake of SRH services also resulted from communities
receiving inadequate information regarding which services were
considered essential according to the GoI response plan. Many frontline
workers reported that vulnerable community members were confused
over which clinics were open, during what hours and what services were
available. The GoI health communication efforts during the pandemic
firmly focused on messaging related to managing COVID-19 (Hort et al.
2020) and neglected to provide adequate information about how other
services have been reorganised.
Melati, who coordinates SRH programmes for youth, explained the
increased risks women faced without clear definitions of emergency or
essential SRH services:
For instance, in [location deleted] area … only pregnant women
having a medical situation [emergency] can come to the health
service. Well, actually the definition of emergency could be different
between the providers and also the clients. And it could be very
dangerous because like when the women experiencing the
complications and stuff it can lead them to stay away. I mean like,
they don’t give the parameters on what is considered as an emergency
or not.
Others reported that primary health clinics where they worked had
attempted to continue offering a range of basic services. However, the
definition of essential services by the Ministry of Health did not include
programmes for hard-to-reach groups, such as youth-friendly services
and dedicated programmes for sex workers, which were part of routine
services in highly resourced clinics prior to the pandemic (MOH 2020).
As a response to the pandemic, primary healthcare clinics shifted
to offering services only by appointment, and increasingly clinics
are dictating that appointments must be made online not in person. The
length of standard appointments shortened as infection spread, and
whenever possible tele-health appointments were (and are) encouraged.
These changes represent barriers to participation for vulnerable groups
without access to the internet or smartphones, or cash to buy phone
credit.
Our participants confirmed that some primary health clinics could
not provide women with long-acting reversible contraceptives (LARC)
such as inter-uterine devices (IUDs) and implants, because these methods
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must be administered by clinical health workers, many of whom were
seconded to the COVID-19 response. Participants were also concerned
about the depletion of LARC supplies at the national level, as Melati
explained:
In April, BKKBN [the National Family Planning Board] said that
there will be a stock-out of IUD in the country. And also, we are
afraid that it will happen to other contraceptive methods like pills
and injectables. Because like, we import them from India, and since
India is on lockdown … there is a … shortage in many provinces.
Health workers also expressed concern over their clients’ preferences for
short-acting contraceptives such as the pill or monthly injectables because
free access to these types of contraceptives requires regular visits to health
clinics. Clients were less willing to attend clinics due to fear of COVID-19
infection, and delayed access to the contraceptive method of their choice
was assumed to be related to the increasing number of women presenting
at clinics with unintended pregnancies.
Another consequence of reduced access to free SRH services has
been higher demand for services in the private sector, because private
SRH clinics are not obliged to offer COVID-related services as are primary
health clinics, and thus attending them is perceived as having lower
COVID-19 risk. However, there has also been a reported reduction in the
availability of safe abortion services, which many people seek to access in
the private sector because of the restricted legality of abortion in
Indonesia. Hati, a SRH phone counsellor, described the ongoing barriers
to accessing safe abortion during the COVID-19 pandemic:
It’s more difficult [to access safe abortion] for people in a less
privileged group of course, so … promoting medical abortion [in
Indonesia] … may be the only choice that we have now [during the
pandemic]. Because if women go to the surgical clinic it will take
like … a million rupiah, and then if you want a safe service on
abortion, if you want to have … a good service on abortion, you
have to pay … multiple times to a doctor. Ya, because it can only
happen in a private hospital.
Rising costs of care in the private sector made SRH services increasingly
accessible only to middle class and elite Indonesians. Rose, who directs a
CBO supporting street-dwelling youth, described how reduced access to
free healthcare at primary health clinics at the beginning of the COVID-19
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229
pandemic led to higher costs for pregnant women seeking care from
private midwives:
What we know at that time [at the beginning of the pandemic] the
primary health care clinic reached full capacity in offering services,
these clinics quickly went over capacity. So pregnant women were
not going to the puskesmas for service. Many decided to visit private
midwives for their check-ups. But the cost for just one visit is very
expensive and so they only went once.
Low-income street-dwelling youth who become pregnant are already at
higher risk of pregnancy and birth-related complications due to age and
poverty, and their ability to access their four pre-natal visits (recommended
by the GoI and known as the K4) has been compromised by reduced
access to free services.
STI and HIV prevention and related services
Routine STI and HIV testing, and mobile testing, stalled in many of the
urban neighbourhoods of Jakarta and Yogyakarta. Free mobile clinics and
outreach services offering SRH services to hard-to-reach communities are
the most accessible services for vulnerable groups, particularly streetdwelling youth, transwomen and sex workers (Hegarty et al. 2020). The
cessation of mobile outreach services that offer VCT and free condoms to
hard-to-reach groups amplified the vulnerability of those groups to poor
SRH outcomes. Many primary healthcare clinics offering SRH services are
poorly equipped to offer non-judgemental and non-discriminatory
services (Waluyo et al. 2015), as Niko explains: ‘In health facilities
[primary healthcare clinics], young people who are vulnerable are often
told by a health worker to “stop being sex workers, to stop being gay, and
to pray more often”’.
With the suspension of mobile clinics and outreach programmes
specialised in the provision of SRH services, highly vulnerable groups lost
access to their routine avenues for accessing SRH care. Ari, a peer
educator with female sex workers, explains the situation for low-income
sex workers unable to access free condoms due to constrained outreach
services:
Many people from the [sex worker] community … complain about
this. Sex worker friends who only make 50 thousand rupiah or
30 thousand rupiah per customer cannot also provide condoms …
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So, they [sex workers] really need a free condom, they really need
it. I have met a lot of sex worker friends whose fees are cheap,
50 thousand rupiah, yes, some even say that they only get paid
15 thousand rupiah. Well, just imagine if they have to set aside
money again for a condom, in one day they will need to increase
their customers for example from 10 customers to 15 customers just
to cover the condom cost. It should not be like that huh?
Access to free condoms for sex workers also declined as social distancing
requirements and funding cuts diminished the capacity of community
outreach programmes. Madu, an outreach worker in a HIV prevention
and treatment programme, also noted the shortage of condoms among
female sex workers: ‘We are still [in June 2020] meeting sex workers who
have to buy their condoms themselves, they are not receiving them free,
first because the supply [of free condoms] is depleted, and second because
peer distribution is interrupted because of COVID’. For most sex workers,
purchasing condoms is not an option because they are expensive,
especially when people experience a dramatic loss of income.
Reduced outreach services for people living with HIV also occurred,
particularly affecting the availability of voluntary testing and counselling.
Our participants working to support people living with HIV observed that
the number of people seeking routine VTC in Jakarta and Yogyakarta
dropped by 75 per cent or more between April and August (when we
completed our virtual field work), and there is growing concern within
the HIV positive community and frontline workers about rising HIV
infections. Utama, a programme coordinator and outreach worker with
HIV positive Indonesians and LGBTQI+ communities, expressed his
concerns as follows:
Yeah maybe people can go to the private service, go that way [to
access VTC], but for the clinic situation, all I hear is that COVID is
the primary issue, and for now, other issues are getting less
attention. So I’m worried, yes I’m worried about it [the lack of
access to VCT] … if VCT access is low now … later we can see many
new cases, and new cases without a diagnosis. I’m worried … very
worried about this.
While ARV is a necessary treatment for HIV as a chronic condition, it is
also an important component to ensure the SRH and wellbeing of people
living with HIV, to maintain a low risk of maternal-to-child transmission,
and to lower the risk of transmission to sexual partners. At the beginning
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of the pandemic, there was expressed concern about constrained access
to antiretroviral drugs for HIV positive Indonesians (Luis et al. 2020;
Pangestika 2020). The Ministry of Health technical guidelines for service
provision at primary health clinics during the COVID-19 pandemic state
that access to ARV for registered HIV positive individuals should be
maintained. However, this guideline is accompanied by an explicit caveat
that ARV should be provided only where ‘stocks are adequate’ (MOH
2020, 15), which the GoI has been unable to guarantee.
Shortages in the supply of ARV were initially reported in Java, Bali
and in Ambon and other outer islands of the archipelago between March
and May 2020 (Ibnu Aqil 2020). Later in the pandemic, supplies of ARV
stock were (in August 2020) reportedly secure on the island of Java, but
other locations across Indonesia were still vulnerable to stock-outs, partly
due to the interruption of domestic and international transport systems.
This resulted in innovative responses among people living with HIV,
including sharing limited ARV supplies, making do with out-of-date ARV
drugs and visiting hospitals more regularly to access ARV – as often as
every four days (UNAIDS 2020). HIV positive and queer communities,
international non-governmental organisations and HIV organisations
across and beyond Indonesia used crowd sourcing to raise funds and
hired special couriers to deliver ARV to remote areas, put highly visible
pressure via social media on international suppliers of ARV to increase the
pace of shipments to Indonesia, and advocated to the Ministry of Health.
Bunga, a programme director who works with HIV positive Indonesians
and female sex workers, described lobbying the GoI to prevent future
stock-outs of ARV drugs:
Another work in progress is to ensure this is not happening again in
the future [ARV shortages] … The Ministry of Health is only able to
procure drugs which are included in the e-catalogue. So, we
advocated to influence a faster process for some essential [ARV]
drugs to be included in the e-catalogue. Two of them have been
included in the last month [May 2020].
The health-seeking behaviour of vulnerable groups has also been shaped
by their responses to COVID-19, which frontline workers associate with
loss of income stemming from the pandemic. A survey conducted by the
UNAIDS Indonesia branch in April 2020, measuring the impact of COVID19 on the wellbeing of young HIV positive Indonesians, confirmed that 56
per cent of survey participants had lost their jobs since the beginning of
the pandemic (UNAIDS 2020). Melati, who coordinates SRH programmes
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for youth, describes the impact of this on the young people with whom
she works:
Like for young people … when they lose their job, it makes them
become vulnerable because it limits their ability to fulfil their daily
basics. So, I mean like if the daily basics are not fulfilled yet, they
won’t think that their sexual and reproductive health is an important
thing.
Reduced mobility, particularly for people who have no independent
means of transport, has also constrained access to services. Communitylevel responses to COVID-19 across Indonesia have varied, with some
neighbourhoods imposing strict lockdowns and travel bans, further
inhibiting people’s ability to access SRH care beyond their immediate
neighbourhoods. Low-income communities have fewer transport options,
and if they want to access healthcare they must risk exposure on public
transport. Ira works for an organisation supporting children living with
HIV and their caregivers, and conveys the pressure this has put on families
seeking continuity of care for their children:
According to the policy [regarding HIV care for children] they
should be taken to a doctor first if they are ill, not directly to the
hospital. So they must take two trips. For them to reach the hospital
they only have the option of public transport, they can’t use the
online motorcycle taxi, as this kind of service has declined due to
social distancing. If they don’t have a motor bike, the other option is
to rent a car and that is much more expensive.
Reproductive cancer prevention and screening programmes
Mobile outreach mammogram services, targeting poor and homeless
women in Jakarta, were also reportedly paused due to the perceived
COVID-19 risk related to outreach work and the unavailability of
healthcare workers to run the mobile units. Again, the same pattern
emerges: the most vulnerable members of society are the first to lose
access to essential SRH services, as a result of the GoI’s priorities in
relation to its COVID-19 response. Community-based outreach screening
services for cervical and breast cancer also stalled, and are likely to be
suspended for at least 12 months. This is due to significant government
funding cuts to community-based organisations providing SRH health
services for the financial year beginning July 2020 (Spagnoletti et al.
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2020). Below, Hannah, a researcher in the area of cervical cancer,
describes the likely impact of funding cuts on cervical cancer prevention:
I just got the news from my colleagues [at a cancer prevention
service] that their operating budget for the next 12 months is cut.
They will go from 30 staff down to 15, and even those 15 will just be
part time. They will only be open three days a week. And they won’t
be able to offer mass pap smear screenings in the community. There
will be a significant reduction in free pap smear tests offered [over
the next 12 months], down from 4000 to 1000. This is because the
Government decided to focus on COVID-19.
Free human papilloma virus (HPV) vaccination of teenage girls has also
been deferred, and it is estimated that around 120,000 girls in 2020 may
not receive their second dose of the HPV vaccine, and thus will not be
protected against HPV infection (Ramdan 2020). Despite significant
lobbying for the HPV vaccination to be added to the national immunisation
programme, there is no commitment from the Ministry of Health to do so.
Home-based schooling in response to COVID-19 also means
Indonesian adolescents are missing crucial opportunities for SRH
education that only occur for most in school. Government funding for
adolescent-friendly outreach programmes, run by primary health clinics,
has been reduced by up to 70 per cent for the remainder of 2020 due to
the redirection of operating funds to the COVID-19 response. Ina, a senior
official in charge of adolescent health programmes at district level,
describes these funding cuts and their impact:
The original budget for [youth outreach] this year was about 800
million rupiah … but it turns out we have received only about 200
million … This changed in the month of March, when COVID
happened … since April we have received nothing at all, so going
out for outreach was only possible from January to March this year.
Invisible citizens
In Indonesia, identity cards confer rights, and without these cards
vulnerable communities and individuals are structurally excluded from
full citizenship. Currently (and prior to COVID-19), people from within
these communities who have no legal identity are, in effect, invisible. In
theory, Indonesian citizens are entitled to free healthcare and financial
assistance to alleviate extreme poverty, both of which are crucial in the
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context of catastrophic income loss. The financial assistance schemes
introduced in response to COVID-19 are supposed to operate at district
and village levels, and provide cash payments of 600,000 rupiah per
family, per month.2 This equates to less than 50 per cent of the minimum
wage in Yogyakarta and less than 25 per cent of the minimum wage in
Jakarta (Yumna et al. 2020). At the time of writing (October 2020)
600,000 rupiah was equivalent to US$40; the cost of a standard
appointment with a private midwife in an urban area around 50,000
rupiah or US$5.
However, a key criticism of the GoI’s COVID-19 response has been
its failure to ensure that emergency financial assistance reaches the most
vulnerable communities – those already living below the poverty line
prior to COVID-19. The increased cost of SRH care has been felt acutely
within marginalised communities with limited access to financial support
from the GoI, and dramatic loss of income for those who cannot work due
to social distancing and lockdown measures. Frontline workers identified
that a key barrier to those most in need receiving support is their
ineligibility for financial assistance and free healthcare. The GoI’s COVID19 social assistance payments are available only to citizens who can
produce a current identity card, either the NIK (national identity card) or
KTP (residents’ card), and are registered as residing in the same locale as
they seek benefits. Highly mobile populations, including street-dwelling
youth and families, and sex workers, are frequently unable to produce
this requisite proof of residence. Because they have no fixed address, or
proof of residence, they are rendered invisible. Vin, a director of a
transwomen’s CBO, explained:
The help [financial assistance from GoI] so far is not given just by
name, right … If you don’t have an identity card in the place where
you live now, for example, you can’t access it [financial assistance]
like that. So you do have to have a residence. Not everyone has a
regular residence and not everyone has an ID card for where they
live, for example some only have one from where they originally
come from. Maybe there is a way to access the help via a local
community leader, who knows who we are, but until now my friends
don’t know if this is possible.
Loss of income, lack of a secure residence and the absence of a legal
identity therefore converge to result in deprivation amplification,
rendering people disproportionally vulnerable to the impacts of COVID19 compared to those with legal citizenship and relative economic
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security. Vulnerable community members also reported discriminatory
treatment when seeking to access support designed to protect Indonesians
during the pandemic, as Anggi, a transwoman activist, described:
Since the COVID-19 pandemic hit the whole of Indonesia and
especially in [location removed], the impact has been very large on
the transwoman community and marginal communities in general.
This impact is due to limited access to what’s it called? … [financial
assistance], due to considerable levels of pre-existing stigma and
discrimination. The attention given to minority groups has been so
drastically reduced it is now almost non-existent. Even those who
clearly have ID cards in their area are finding they are not registered
to receive the payment. They are missing from the government
assistance data base.
Motivated by the introduction of Indonesia’s universal healthcare system
in 2014, Berenschot and colleagues (2014) documented how Javanese of
low-income, rural and remote backgrounds might access the new system,
and identified multiple barriers to accessing free healthcare. They
observed that ‘social marginalization and bureaucratic unresponsiveness
– often in vicious combination – generate a gap between rights-on-paper
and rights-as-realized’ (Berenschot et al. 2018). Six years after the
establishment of the national health insurance scheme, the situation has
changed little, but now with the amplifying effect of COVID-19 in play.
Without a current identity card, it is still impossible to apply for coverage
under the national health insurance scheme, and so even nominally free
health services must be paid for out-of-pocket. Moreover, low-income
communities who experience intergenerational cycles of poverty have
low rates of registration of births, marriages and deaths in many parts of
Indonesia (Platt 2017). The absence of birth and marriage certificates
make obtaining an identity card difficult because this requires an
application to a civil court, letters from a village or neighbourhood leader,
and witnesses (with their own identity cards) to verify the identity of the
person. These processes were described as unnecessarily complicated,
arduous and time consuming by our informants.
Currently, the health and welfare needs of people under the age of
18 are assumed by the state to be protected within the family unit. Their
ability to access services, hormonal contraceptives, condoms and essential
medicines is understood as contingent on their parents’ approval and
support. Niko works with vulnerable youth including those who are HIV
positive, who sell sex and who identify as LGBTQI+. He explains how
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state regulations are highly problematic for young people without family
support:
According to the law people under 18 need consent from their
parents [or guardians] before they can have a test [HIV or other STI
test]. But in reality these teenagers are not open to their families
about their behaviour outside the house or their sexual orientation.
To get access to health services some people under 18 steal their
family KTP. There is also some confusion around who is eligible to
be a guardian. Some health [youth friendly] services will allow a
community worker to act as a guardian, but many of them do not.
Failure to recognise the independence of youth before the age of 18 (or,
for many, prior to marriage) prevents them from acquiring individual
identity cards, and this in turn prevents them from accessing free SRH
healthcare. Moreover, widespread denial and condemnation of youth
sexuality in Indonesia mean that youth below age 18 are not considered
sexual citizens and subsequently young people have no legal status as
consumers of SRH services.
Another vulnerable group with constrained access to identity cards
is women living in abusive relationships, whose male partners control
their access to the family identity card and subsequently to healthcare,
including access to free contraception. Bunga, who works in a HIV
prevention and treatment programme, noted that others, too, lacked
proof of identity:
Transwomen and younger sex workers … are most likely not to have
the ID card … Without the ID card they are then not linked to the
safety net that is provided by the government. It is common [to not
have an ID card] among sex workers who are mobile, or living
within an abusive relationship. So, I have, I observed many cases of
this … their husbands, their boyfriends keep their ID cards.
Bunga also described that identity cards were increasingly being held as
collateral by money lenders until such time that debts can be cleared: ‘It
is now common in Indonesia to have female sex workers who are …
trapped in a loan, we now have what we call, like online loans, and also
traditional loans. So, you’re able to borrow money easily, but you need to
give the ID card [as security]’. Low-income women are more likely to be
forced into these kinds of debt arrangements than men, because they
typically lack other forms of capital that can be used to guarantee
THE AMPLIFICATION EFFECT
237
repayment. Loss of income due to COVID-19, compounded by debt, and
the loss of access to healthcare and financial support, can create a vicious
dynamic of deprivation amplification for women.
Conclusion: The amplification effect
Multiple overlapping conditions of exclusion and deprivation, shaping
the everyday lives of marginalised urban Indonesian communities, have
been amplified during the pandemic. We have used amplification
conceptually to capture frontline workers’ assertions that COVID-19 is not
the root cause of the challenges they are now facing, but rather, that it has
revealed and rapidly intensified pre-existing inequalities. In Melati’s
words, ‘We can’t blame it all on COVID’. She further explains, ‘previously,
the access [to SRH services for vulnerable groups] is not really there
and because of COVID, like, it’s become more visible’. The pre-existing
dynamics of under-investment in SRH, the othering of vulnerable
communities, and the exclusion of individuals from full citizenship, all
contribute to the amplification of poor access to SRH services and other
forms of deprivation during the COVID-19 pandemic.
In theory, Indonesia’s comprehensive policy should promote the
SRHR reproductive rights of citizens, but the implementation of this
policy has been limited and variable. Underpinning the GoI’s failure to
implement this policy is the highly selective allocation of resources, the
neglect of many SRH issues and the exclusion of non-conforming groups.
Prior to COVID-19, budget allocation and human resources for SRH were
overwhelmingly directed towards population control via the vigorous
promotion of family planning (for married couples) and maternal health
(once a woman is pregnant) (Bennett 2014), perpetuating a narrow
focus on SRH concerns for married women who are already pregnant or
who are seeking to limit family size. The consequence is that the core
operational funds for primary health clinics are delegated to the provision
of family planning and maternal health services, while other SRH services
must be met by discretionary funds, which are not guaranteed. Frontline
workers confirmed that SRH services for groups defined as hard-to-reach
or most-at-risk in terms of SRH have not been designated as core services
in the context of COVID-19, and were the first to be cut when the
pandemic hit Indonesia. The observations of frontline workers are
confirmed by the priorities in the Ministry of Health’s operational
guidelines for primary healthcare centres during the pandemic, issued in
May 2020 (MOH 2020).
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Critical SRH issues that the government excludes from its health
budget include: access to safe abortion including medical abortion (both
of which are illegal unless a woman’s life is deemed at risk); access to
contraception for unmarried people (which is illegal); affordable fertility
treatment (excluded from the national health insurance scheme); and
screening and treatment for intimate partner violence including sexual
violence (guidelines exist but have not been operationalised beyond
pilots) (Bennett and Spagnoletti 2019). The government continues to
neglect or underinvest in: access to free HIV and other STI testing,
counselling and treatment; prevention of HIV3 and other STI transmission
via condom promotion; comprehensive programmes for PMTC; the
provision of comprehensive SRH education; access to youth-friendly SRH
services; access to non-judgemental SRH services; and the prevention
and treatment of reproductive cancers (Bennett and Spagnoletti 2019).
In mainstream GoI health discourses, the latter group of neglected
SRH issues is closely associated with practices labelled as deviant, affecting
only individuals who engage in deviant behaviour. An entrenched culture
of othering, based on the dominant sexual morality of Indonesian society,
exists at all levels of the health system from policy and budget allocation
to the level of service provision (Bennett 2015). Most of our informants
expressed deep concern over the stigmatisation and othering of vulnerable
groups, and a small number exhibited discriminatory attitudes towards
clients themselves. Jupe is a health worker in a primary health clinic and
she shared the following concern: ‘Mostly, what I regret, is that they
[clients] have no shame when coming to the health service, they are young,
unmarried, often having unprotected sex, and they just casually come to us
for service … this is what I regret’. Jupe’s negative judgement of unmarried
youth seeking free SRH care at her clinic is not uncommon. In contrast,
when asked what was required to improve the access of vulnerable groups
to SRH care, Hati suggested: ‘We need to address stigma and discrimination
in the system … health workers should be the first group to achieve zero per
cent stigma and discrimination in their behaviour’.
We have exposed the invisibility of poor, young (under 18) and
marginalised community members as citizens, and illustrated how the
lack of a legal identity prevents people from accessing free healthcare
or financial assistance. The lack of citizenship is a profound driver of
deprivation, and will continue to amplify the vulnerability of marginalised
groups over the longer term, cementing pre-existing class inequalities.
We have demonstrated that it is crucial to explore the intersections
between economic hardship and health impacts to unpick the experiences
and patterns of deprivation flowing from COVID-19.
THE AMPLIFICATION EFFECT
239
Indonesia’s failure to include comprehensive SRH services as
essential services within its COVID-19 response (UNFPA 2020) will result
in a dramatically larger long-term health footprint stemming from the
pandemic, in which women, youth, poor and vulnerable groups will be
disproportionally affected. The increasing visibility of Indonesia’s failure
to protect the SRHR of its citizens due to global media coverage of the
pandemic could lead to greater international pressure on the GoI to
increase its investment in SRH. However, achieving a more inclusive
health system also requires recognition of full citizenship for marginalised
and vulnerable groups, including the sexual citizenship of young people.
Recognition of the prevalence and impact of stigma among health
workers is also essential to improve the uptake of SRH services by
vulnerable groups. The government’s failure to adequately invest in SRH
services as essential, during a state of emergency, is consistent with
historical trends of under investment in health and a dangerously narrow
definition of what constitutes legitimate SRH concerns. Longstanding
politics of neglect and exclusion have been amplified through COVID-19
responses, reinforcing multiple intersecting barriers to peoples’ ability to
exercise their rights to health and livelihoods.
Acknowledgements
We wish to thank the frontline health workers who generously volunteered
their time and energy to participate in this research while also managing
an extraordinarily high burden of care in responding to the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia. We also acknowledge the financial
support for this project received from the Indonesia Democracy Hallmark
Research Initiative administered through the University of Melbourne.
Notes
1
2
3
240
The most recent population-based demographic health survey in Indonesia was conducted in
2017; the next is due to be conducted in 2022.
These schemes are called bantuan sosial tunai (cash social assistance) and bantuan langsung
tunai (direct cash assistance).
Another structural factor shaping access to SRH services for vulnerable groups is the
outsourcing of this work to international non-governmental organisations and CBOs. For
instance, in 2016, the GoI dissolved the National AIDS Commission and contracted out this role
to UNFPA. The strategy of outsourcing does have some benefits for vulnerable communities,
but also reinforces the notion that these communities are, and should remain, other in relation
to their SRHR. The outsourcing also gives a clear message that the government does not
support the promotion of condoms for HIV prevention.
VIRAL LOADS
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13
Vulnerabilities within and
beyond the pandemic
Disability in COVID-19 Brazil
Claudia Fonseca and Soraya Fleischer
Epidemics affect poor people in disproportional numbers, as illustrated
for different eras, regions and pathologies. It is no surprise, therefore,
that the coronavirus pandemic, held to be the greatest global health
disaster since the 1918 Spanish flu, has not materialised everywhere in
the same way. The unpredictable meanders of an ‘emerging’ and littleknown disease such as COVID-19 are compounded by the complex
political, economic and social circumstances of each of its concrete
manifestations. This complexity is what brings Herring and Swedlund to
endorse a ‘syndemic approach’ to the study of epidemics – one that
requires researchers to look:
beyond individual infections to consider how they may be capacitated
by the presence of other diseases and conditions and sustained by
social inequity and the unjust exercise of power, which channels and
sustains damaging disease clusters in disadvantaged populations
(2010, 5).
At the same time, each new pathogen has its own specific properties that,
in interaction with the health authorities’ leanings of the moment, elicit
a certain response. Lakoff (2017), in his analysis of the World Health
Organization’s reaction to health threats in recent history, reflects on how
many of the organisation’s authorised experts had come to the conclusion
that an alarmist reaction to the outbreak of infectious disease could, in
the long run, be counter-productive. Particularly in the case of countries
VULNERABILITIES WITHIN AND BEYOND THE PANDEMIC
243
in urgent need of improved sanitation and more efficient health systems,
money channelled toward combatting a momentary epidemic might be
better spent on infrastructure aimed at attenuating less spectacular
(although more epidemiologically significant) contagious diseases and
non-communicable chronic conditions (malaria, diarrhoeal infections,
diabetes, heart disease, etc.). Specialists had become understandably
wary lest the declaration of a ‘global health threat’, incurring drastic
measures, cause more harm than good.
Nonetheless, recognising WHO’s failure to apprehend the seriousness
of the Ebola outbreak in 2014, its experts revised their stance, once again
attending to the very real possibility of a global catastrophe. Thus, with
the explosion of COVID-19 globally in early 2020, and in the absence of
vaccines or effective medicines to combat the highly contagious and often
lethal air-borne virus, the organisation was quick to advocate a radical
measure – generalised home confinement – even knowing it might spell out
temporary deprivation for a good part of the world’s population.
In our syndemic approach to COVID-19 in Brazil, we thus propose,
first, to consider how dubious political leadership dovetails with the
past decade’s neoliberal austerity programmes and budget cuts to produce
a national calamity in which deaths by COVID-19 are surpassed only by
those in the US. The disadvantaged population that interests us here is
people with disabilities, rendered particularly vulnerable by this virus.
Whereas epidemics of the past are remembered as having affected
younger, able-bodied members of the workforce, COVID-19 is reputed to
strike down primarily older people, those with disabilities and people
suffering from debilitating chronic conditions. Given this context, we
argue that Brazilian president Bolsonaro’s negationist stand – his refusal
to heed WHO orientations to contain the pandemic, his tireless combat
against any change in routine activities, whether school attendance,
commerce, travelling, tourism and even the use of face masks – could be
seen as the logical offshoot of his radical neoliberalism (Neiburg and
Thomasz 2020; Ortega and Orsini 2020). Predicated on the survival of
those regarded as physically and morally fit, Bolsonaro’s philosophy
would tacitly condone a sort of culling of unproductive elements of the
population.
Second, by comparing the present situation with the previous
epidemic of the Zika virus, which also especially impacted Brazil, we
underline how a distinct political mood produced a vastly different
mise-en-scène of expert knowledge, bringing medical researchers
and health specialists to work in concert with public authorities.
Furthermore, during the Zika epidemic, those who suffered most from
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the infection – children born with congenital Zika syndrome – were cast
not as lamentably expendable, but as victims worthy of special attention.1
During COVID-19 however, Zika ‘survivors’, most classified as severely
disabled, live with the spectre of eugenicist discrimination as they vie for
medical services grown scarce due to the impact of emergency cases of
COVID-19 on health resources and services.
We then focus on a novel feature of the pandemic’s recommended
preventive measures. To contain the spread of infectious diseases, in
the past authorities would typically place only the sick and ailing in
quarantine – a policy of variable efficacy. With COVID-19, however, when
infection is for many asymptomatic, global health specialists have strongly
recommended social distancing for the entire population, raising
questions of how such a measure is organised and morally framed by
people living in radically unequal conditions. If, in Brazil, Bolsonaro’s
most rabid supporters viewed these recommendations as the senseless
infringement of basic rights that would devastate the economy, other
observers tended to depict strict adherence as a life-saving civic virtue to
reduce cases of infection and alleviate the load on overburdened hospitals.
Here, ethnographic observations2 defy simplistic conclusions that might
link specific political loyalties to one or other course of prevention. They
also cast light on community-based strengths as well as structural
vulnerabilities, exploring contextually conditioned understandings of
how best – morally and pragmatically – to confront the pandemic.
Politics and negationism in Brazil under Bolsonaro
At the end of the 1980s, Brazil emerged from over 20 years of a harsh
military dictatorship to a new era of democratic nation-building. The next
30 years witnessed the expansion of public services, as well as varying
efforts to diminish the vast gap between rich and poor, the result of the
country’s long legacy of colonial exploitation and an economy historically
dependent on slave labour. The election in 2002 of President Luis Ignácio
(Lula) Silva – heralding into national power the left-leaning Workers’
Party government with its avowed platform of minority rights, development and social justice for all – appeared to crown these efforts.
Just how Brazil came to plunge in so short a time from Lula’s term
in office into the elected presidency of Bolsonaro – an obscure, far-right
politician with no particular party base – has been the subject of myriad
analyses (see, for example, Neiburg and Thomaz, 2020). What interests
us here is how, in the wake of economic recession, relentless media
VULNERABILITIES WITHIN AND BEYOND THE PANDEMIC
245
scandals on corruption at every level of government, and the impeachment
of Lula’s anointed successor (the country’s first female president, Dilma
Rousseff) for minor infringements of budget laws, the country’s electorate
was polarised between two radically opposed blocks. Voters who saw a
more egalitarian income distribution, the expansion of quality public
services and the promotion of human rights as priority issues, continued
to support the Workers’ Party. On the other hand, those most concerned
by violent crime, the erosion of ‘traditional’ family values and political
corruption, opted for what they saw as a strong-arm candidate with
military sympathies: Jair Bolsonaro.
During Bolsonaro’s first year in government, 2019, under the firm
hand of a minister of economy trained at the University of Chicago, his
administration passed through Congress major institutional reforms that
diminished job stability and downsized pension benefits, while it quietly
worked toward the privatisation of banks, utilities, universities and other
government-run institutions. The Public Health System (Sistema Único de
Saúde, better known as SUS), that attends over 80 per cent of the country’s
population, was particularly hard hit by austerity measures. Although
guaranteed by the 1988 Constitution, and inaugurated in 1994, the free
and universal system of healthcare was slow to gain momentum. Highcomplexity services are to this day concentrated in the state capitals
where ailing patients could be routinely seen forming enormous lines in
front of the major public hospitals. The lack of basic equipment,
technology, medications and medical specialists has been steadily
denounced in newspaper headlines for decades. Never completely
satisfactory, in recent years SUS has suffered more than ever from
successive financial cuts, structural downsizing and political attacks
dictated by the government’s openly neoliberal and capital-oriented
policies. As a result, patients desperate for treatment have increasingly
resorted to juridical procedures to guarantee their constitutional right to
health (Biehl, 2016). The system, already ill-equipped to deal with
routine sickness and disability, would be pushed to the verge of collapse
by the disaster of COVID-19.
The first official death by coronavirus – that of a domestic worker
who had caught the virus from her employer recently returned from a trip
abroad – was registered on 16 March. Within days, the Minister of Health
(Luis Henrique Mandetta, a medical doctor) had confirmed community
transmission throughout Brazil. Although after taking office in early 2019
he had done little to reverse the decline of the deteriorated public health
system, his prompt reaction to the threat of COVID-19 earned him the
respect of most Brazilians. While Bolsonaro followed the example of his
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idol, US President Donald Trump, referring to COVID-19 as a ‘paltry flu’
that did not warrant sacrificing economic routine, Mandetta vigorously
promoted policies of social distancing that would curb transit across
international borders, limit inter-city transportation, suspend school
attendance and rein in the activities of most ‘non-essential’ public and
commercial services. While the president adamantly resisted wearing
face masks (even after 22 members of his entourage tested positive for
COVID-19), his Minister of Health consistently recommended their use.
And, countering Bolsonaro’s claim that (hydroxy)chloroquine was a
miracle treatment for the disease, Mandetta (in keeping with the position
of WHO and mainstream medical research) firmly resisted endorsing a
protocol to encourage the drug’s use.
Regardless of their political leanings, a growing number of state and
municipal executives appeared to side with the Minister of Health over
the president. Overriding presidential objections, the Supreme Court
itself condoned the right of local governments to impose emergency
restrictions – closing schools, shutting down non-essential businesses
and imposing individual fines on people who refused to use face masks
in public. In response, the president and most his cabinet resisted
acknowledging the seriousness of the threat. Bolsonaro continued to
decry physical distancing, attending rallies throughout the nation where,
maskless, he would shake hands and embrace supporters in the crowd.
After the president joined protesters calling for military intervention to
combat the ‘anti-democratic’ policies of social distancing imposed by state
and municipal authorities, 20 state governors released an ‘Open letter to
Brazilian society in Defence of Democracy’. Their call for national union
against a common enemy, coronavirus, under the guidance of sciencebased medicine, failed to convince the president.
Given such tensions, it was no surprise when on 16 April – with an
explosion of COVID-19 casualties welling on the horizon – Bolsonaro
fired his health minister. Mandetta’s low-profile successor (also an MD)
fell from grace barely a month later. The new minister (the third in five
weeks), a military general who openly admitted he had no experience
whatsoever in the field of health, began work in mid-May, promptly
issuing a protocol to promote the use of chloroquine for all stages of
COVID-19 and intensifying the use of army infrastructure for the
medicine’s frenetic production.3 As to other demands posed by the
pandemic – such as expanding the availability of diagnostic tests and
rationalising the distribution of much-needed basic hospital supplies –
the new commander of national health exhibited relatively modest
interest.
VULNERABILITIES WITHIN AND BEYOND THE PANDEMIC
247
Already at the end of April, it was evident that, in many regions,
the precarious conditions afforded by the country’s run-down public
health system fell far short of the challenges posed by the pandemic.
Especially in poorer areas, decentralised and sporadically funded health
administrations encountered untold obstacles in their attempts to find
and stock test kits for adequate diagnosis, build and equip quality field
hospitals, purchase functioning ventilators or even procure routine
protective equipment for health workers. Manaus, capital of the State of
Amazonas and an important crossroad for a good number of indigenous
groups, proved to be one of the first hard-hit capitals. By the second half
of May, the town was crawling with national and international reporters
anxious to broadcast this worst-case scenario of ill-equipped hospitals,
overrun ICUs and a sky-rocketing death toll that required mass burials.
The deaths by COVID-19 of indigenous leaders and the pandemic’s
devastation of their tribes, alongside the government’s blind eye to illegal
miners and religious missionaries (major vectors of the virus) within their
traditional territories, would all come to reinforce the accusation of
genocide which, at time of writing (December 2020), is pending against
Bolsonaro in the Hague’s International Criminal Court.
With the number of cases of infection rising throughout the country,
Bolsonaro flailed about for new ways to justify his negationist stance.
Among other tactics, he intensified his attacks against news reports
and statistics on the disease’s high lethality. While observers noted a
considerable rise in pulmonary-related deaths compared to previous
years and argued that COVID-19 deaths were being underreported,
Bolsonaro insisted that their number had been blown completely out of
proportion by a conspiracy of journalists, global health specialists and
leftist intellectuals out for ‘political gain’. Right up to one of the worst
moments of the pandemic, with deaths at over a thousand a day, the
president insisted that misinformation about the pandemic had caused
much panic and promised that the ‘true’ facts would soon be known.
Aside from his disregard for mainstream science, what most
disturbed journalists and a good part of the general public was Bolsonaro’s
apparent lack of empathy for victims of the pandemic. When pressed by
journalists to comment on the country’s rising death toll, he displayed an
indifference bordering on cynicism: ‘I’m not a gravedigger, OK?’; ‘It’s a
shame, but what am I supposed to do about it? I may be Messias [his
middle name, meaning “Messiah”], but I don’t perform miracles’. Citing
the opinion of specialists, that eventually 70 per cent of the population
would inevitably be infected, he insisted there was ‘no running from
truth, everyone has to die sometime’.
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VIRAL LOADS
Bolsonaro’s pronouncements echoed that of a small contingent of
authorities around the globe who, at the start of the pandemic, had
predicted that COVID-19 would prove fatal for only a small percentage of
the population – principally the elderly, the disabled and people suffering
from debilitating chronic illness. The prognostic supported those decision
makers who favoured letting the virus run its course, with economic and
other activities in full steam, until the population reached ‘herd immunity’.
Loss of the population’s more fragile members could be minimised by
‘vertical segregation’, that is, by having those categorised as vulnerable
remain homebound, while the younger, hale and hearty masses would
go about business as usual. Some deaths would be inevitable, but, from
this typically ‘ableist’ point of view, individuals who deviated from the
corporeal standard of the perfect specimen could be considered not fully
human (Ortega and Orsini, 2020). Shocking though it may appear, this
view has the merit of elucidating a philosophy of government that
tolerates the idea of ‘letting die’ a certain portion of a country’s population
which, even in normal times, could be seen as a burden on the economy.
As a British financial journalist suggested, ‘from an entirely disinterested
economic perspective, COVID-19 might even prove mildly beneficial in
the long-term by disproportionately culling elderly dependants’ (Warner,
2020).
The social Darwinist undertones of this discourse have understandably received colossal criticism (Ecks 2020; Butler 2020; Queiroz 2020).
We would add that, in the Brazilian context, with the country still coming
to grips with the previous epidemic of Zika – and the tide of neurologically
disabled children left in its wake – they take on particularly problematic
connotations.
Living with disability during successive epidemics
Coronavirus is, of course, far from the first epidemic to cause alarm
among Brazilian authorities. From leprosy and syphilis arriving with the
first Europeans to epidemics of smallpox, plague and cholera that would
periodically erupt in the country’s major ports, doctors have worked for
centuries alongside government authorities in an attempt to contain
damage. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, with European and
North American attention turned toward yellow fever and other tropical
diseases that threatened colonial endeavours, Brazil became an
international centre of medical research. By the early twentieth century,
in close collaboration with their overseas counterparts – including
VULNERABILITIES WITHIN AND BEYOND THE PANDEMIC
249
specialists from the Pasteur Institute and the Rockefeller Foundation –
Brazilian medical researchers were going beyond treatment, applying
their research and translation efforts to the systematic prevention of
disease (Castro et al. 2010; Lowy 2017).
Over the next decades, a new philosophy of public health, developed
in institutions such as Fundação Oswaldo Cruz (with flourishing centres
in Rio de Janeiro and Salvador), played a fundamental role in the
promotion of not only vaccines, but also – especially after the Spanish flu
– sanitary reforms designed to clean up the vectors of infectious diseases
(rats, mosquitoes, bacteria-ridden waste products) that plagued urban
areas. Aside from developing and deploying a vaccine against yellow
fever, national authorities organised effective campaigns against the
Aedes aegypti mosquito, which was and is responsible for three other less
lethal infections: dengue, chikungunya and Zika (Segata 2017). But
although these diseases were considered of lesser significance, worries
appeared in 2015 as medical observers began to suspect links between a
perplexing spate of children born with the severely debilitating condition
of microcephaly and the Zika virus (Diniz 2017).
The way President Dilma’s administration confronted the Zika
epidemic, in comparison with the present national government’s
treatment of COVID-19, yields insights not only into the ways political
leadership can shape the alliance between public health and science but
also into the experience of the most vulnerable potential victims rising to
the challenges of care and prevention. Zika, like COVID-19, was a
relatively unknown entity when it first caught the attention of authorities.
A first generation ‘Zika mother’, living in one of the country’s poorer
northeastern states, commonly went through her entire pregnancy with
no inkling of any serious health threat to herself or to the baby in her
womb (Diniz 2017). Primary care centres where most women had
prenatal check-ups were generally not equipped with ultrasound
technology, and the sonogram was not part of routine protocol. Only
those women willing to pay for the exam (motivated, for example, by the
desire to know the baby’s sex) would have discovered signs of foetal
anomaly. For the most part, mothers and their medical attendants were
taken by surprise at the arrival of an infant with severe disabilities, and
often ill-prepared to deal with the particular risks (for both mother and
child) involved in such a birth.
Even during the following year’s ‘second generation’ of victims,
including those in Brazil’s more prosperous southeast, the imprecision
of diagnosis4 and delay in test results did little to assuage the anxiety of
women who had experienced Zika-like symptoms during pregnancy.
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Foetal prognosis, plagued with uncertainty, was of little help in a woman’s
reproductive decisions – whether she should think about a legally
questionable abortion (more common in the upper classes) or prepare
home and family for the care of a disabled child. In other words, although
they were eventually able to tie the significant number of newborns with
neurological anomalies to congenital Zika,5 researchers acknowledged
they knew little about the disease – whether concerning its vertical and
sexual modes of transmission or its long-term consequences.
In the case of both COVID-19 and Zika, there was an urgent demand
for medical research to provide answers. Articulations around the idea of
science, however, were of an entirely different order. When Zika first
became an issue, President Dilma Rousseff of the Workers’ Party was
under heavy political siege that would soon bring about her impeachment.
Nonetheless, under the slogan ‘A mosquito is not stronger than our entire
country’, her government embraced the combat against Zika, organising
campaigns to eradicate vectors, publicly expressing solidarity with its
victims, and using financial and administrative incentives to promote
university-based research on the disease’s various facets. Aside from local
scientists, researchers from abroad flocked to the epidemic’s geographic
epicentre in hopes of mapping the as yet uncharted social and medical
territories of the disease. Mothers allowed their bodies (and those of their
babies) to be repeatedly scrutinised, their blood samples gathered and
stocked, in the hope of accelerating medical discoveries that could
eventually help their children lead better lives (Fleischer 2019).
Some women may have been frustrated by the lack of feedback and
the discontinuity of interest in their cases; many would lament the
inadequacy of available health services. However, neither they nor
medical staff, nor even the general media, ever expressed doubt about the
validity of the scientific endeavour. The contrast with the present
government’s reaction to COVID-19 could not be starker. By the time the
coronavirus pandemic struck, Bolsonaro and his Minister of Education
were systematically denigrating the country’s major public universities,
cutting funds and downplaying the science produced at mainstream
research centres. In the case of COVID-19, the president and his Minister
of Health further confounded onlookers by apparently denying the results
of any study (on chloroquine, for example) that did not confirm their own
preconceived ideas.
During the worst moments of both epidemics, people looked to
government for measures that would help minimise suffering and death.
In the case of COVID-19, this care was designed to keep affected patients
from dying – hence, the rush to multiply intensive care units and to procure
VULNERABILITIES WITHIN AND BEYOND THE PANDEMIC
251
respirators. In the case of Zika – not in itself a particularly lethal disease –
the ‘victims’ that demanded the most energies and investments were the
babies born to women infected during pregnancy. Even though medical
care had guaranteed survival, these young children inevitably suffered
sequelae from the disease that left them particularly vulnerable to
complications from COVID-19. Yet, to the desperation of their caregivers,
at no time were these children included in the pandemic’s ‘populations at
risk’, much less singled out to receive priority at hospitals and ICUs.
With general immunodeficiency caused by Congenital Zika
Syndrome, these young children lack resistance to colds, and are at
heightened risk of eye and ear infections, bronchitis, pulmonary allergies
and other childhood diseases. Because of neurological complications,
they have difficulty in swallowing. With food and saliva leaking into their
lungs, they require frequent hospitalisation for pneumonia and other
forms of respiratory intercurrences. Constantly bombarded with
analgesics, antibiotics and other medicines, they are also in danger of
developing problems linked to overmedication: resistance to certain
drugs, liver intoxication and other iatrogenic syndromes. To access highcost medicines, the children need new prescriptions from doctors every
month. And, as they grow, periodic interventions are required to refit
feeding tubes, adjust prosthetic devices and perform reparative surgeries
(Lima and Fleischer 2020). Yet, faced with hospital services completely
flooded with victims of COVID-19, these children find it increasingly
difficult to get the routine treatment they need.
During the pandemic, the mothers’ fragile hopes – that their
children not only survive but lead meaningful lives – have grown dim.
Without a regular supply of pharmaceuticals, there is no way to assuage
their children’s chronic pain, nor regulate their sleep (so as to allow other
members of the family some rest). The children are at constant risk of
convulsions that may set them back months in terms of cognitive and
motor skills. As hospital services have been cut to a bare minimum,
suspended altogether, or, at best, gone shakily online, some sectors have
posted short videos on social media so that women themselves can give
the necessary neuro- and physiotherapy to their toddlers at home.
However, many women do not feel competent to replicate rehabilitation
exercises on their own. Some may not have access to digital resources;
and, even when they do, results may be frustrating, either because older
children, now involved in online schooling, monopolise the computer
or because, given the mother’s already heavy load of domestic chores,
she simply cannot find the necessary time to learn and practise new
therapeutic techniques.
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Today, even for critical situations, these ‘micro mothers’ 6 ask
themselves if it’s worth braving public transportation, waiting long hours
in hospital corridors and exposing their children to the risk of infection
by coronavirus – especially when they are unsure of the reception they
will get. During the first years of the Zika epidemic, the babies’ need
for intensive professional care was recognised as a legitimate cause,
thanks largely to collective political action, including street marches and
demonstrations in front of government offices. In the present situation of
generalised quarantine caused by COVID-19, traditional forms of political
organisation are restricted, and the efficacy of online activism (webinars,
interviews and podcasts) remains doubtful. The mothers have thus joined
a growing number of ‘vulnerable’ categories of people in Brazil who,
following the example of similar groups around the globe, elaborate
online manifestos to reiterate the right of all patients – no matter what
physical or mental health condition – as equally worthy of attention in
any medical emergency. Nonetheless, under the shadow of Bolsonaro’s
macho style of government, patients are left wondering if, in their case,
the financial trimming of public services does not spell out the moral
withdrawal of state concern.
Social distancing in a setting of inequality
As with Zika and other health emergencies, the pandemic exposed glaring
inequalities Brazil’s citizens have lived with for decades. The disease
wreaked havoc particularly in urban peripheries and rural townships –
those regions peopled largely by poor, Afro-Brazilian and indigenous
groups (Gragnani 2020). In these areas, with lack of basic infrastructure
(piped-in water, city-supervised sewers, routine garbage collection), the
vectors of infectious disease proliferate. In this context of ‘environmental
racism’ (Carvalho, 2017), even the simplest measures recommended to
avoid COVID-19 (for example frequent handwashing) appear of doubtful
application. As to treatment of those infected, most well-off Brazilians
have private health insurance which – at least in the past – has guaranteed
them adequate hospital care. The rest of the population (i.e. the vast
majority) is used to facing crowded public health facilities, praying
they will find professionals and equipment available to cure their
ills. Acknowledging not only regional differences but also these class- and
race-based disparities, one medical specialist after the other, when
interviewed about coronavirus, repeats the evidently consensual verdict:
in Brazil, there exist many different pandemics.
VULNERABILITIES WITHIN AND BEYOND THE PANDEMIC
253
The apparently democratic preventive measure of social distancing
also plays out differently in the various socio-economic groups. On the
one hand, individuals from the moneyed sectors may barricade
themselves in their relatively comfortable homes. Those lucky enough to
have a guaranteed end-of-the-month pay check are able to stock food,
construct their home gym and enjoy reliable internet services to make
their confinement slightly less trying. The other half of the economically
active population – those who are precariously employed and autonomous
workers of the informal labour market – is aware that if they do not keep
working, they will be unable to maintain even the most modest mode of
existence.7 The few months of emergency aid (just over US$100 dollars)
provided by the federal government allowed for some relief, but as the
pandemic progressed and lockdowns were extended (or renewed), it
became clear that the respite afforded by stop-gap solutions would be
short-lived. In such conditions, staying home does not necessarily spell
out staying healthy (Yates-Doerr 2020).
The sensitive ethical dilemma between survival and contagion is
further complicated in homes including a person with a disability, where
the coordination of multiple caregivers must occur while striving to avoid
the danger of contamination. Such is the case of Taina’s family, an
Afro-Brazilian household on the outskirts of Porto Alegre (southern
Brazil) that revolves around a spritely pre-teen who, since early infancy,
has suffered from an acute form of fibromyalgia. Despite seizures of
unbearable pain often accompanied by epileptic-type convulsions that
have caused her to miss months of class, when the 2020 school year began
(in March), Taina was a well-appreciated eighth-grader at the nearby
public school. To some extent, her family is luckier than those of most of
her friends whose parents – many of them cleaning ladies and janitors –
were laid off with no financial compensation. To complement his
minuscule retiree’s pension, her father does odd jobs and at the time was
being paid to renovate a neighbour’s house. Her mother, Aline, works
with a nearby NGO, where she supervises extra-curricular activities for
around 50 local children. During this period of confinement, however,
Aline pays a heavy toll to keep her job, attending simultaneously to
household chores and professional obligations (now conducted entirely
on WhatsApp) for which she remains on call literally for 12 hours a day.
Given her daughter’s needs, Aline now also stands in as physiotherapist, providing twice-daily massages to diminish the frequency of
Taina’s seizures. The public hospital service attending Taina since her
birth suspended activities in mid-March, announcing shortly afterwards
it would not reopen, and Aline is still searching for a new facility willing
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VIRAL LOADS
to care for Taina in the event of a life-endangering crisis such as those she
has suffered in the past. Lacking the support of a specialised service,
mother and daughter have fallen back on their neighbourhood’s vastly
overburdened primary care unit. Another problem the family must
confront is how to guarantee the costly medicine needed to assuage
Taina’s bouts of intense pain. Public services designed to facilitate
the endless bureaucracy required to access government-subsidised
medications are all downtown, a good distance away, and many have
operated only sporadically during the pandemic. Meanwhile, Aline takes
on piecemeal work as a seamstress to cover the higher price she pays for
medicines at the local pharmacy.
Perhaps the greatest challenge the family must face during the
pandemic is to coordinate the care network that surrounds Taina. At any
moment she might have a life-threatening convulsion, and her parents
have long since decided she must never be left alone. However, the
network they normally rely on, composed of different members of their
extended family, has grown tenuous. Taina’s grandparents live in their
own home at the far end of the back patio, but they are no longer available
as before. The grandmother, being treated for diabetes and heart disease,
is so worried about contagion that she will not share dinnerware with
her near 80-year-old husband because he refuses to give up his job as a
doorman at an apartment complex downtown. Aline’s sister, owner of a
small food store where she attends customers from morning to night, has
stopped coming by for fear of contaminating her relatives. Another
brother – a delivery boy, now completely swamped with work that
constantly exposes him to risk of infection – has reduced contact with his
family to an occasional phone call. To keep Taina company, her mother
has to rely on the girl’s two older siblings – young adults who have not
given up their sociable routines.
A closer look suggests that none of the girl’s hands-on caregivers
follow the rules of social distancing to the letter. Aside from chores
(bill payments, health check-ups) that regularly take her outside the
home, Aline is frequently involved in volunteer work. In these times of
exceptional hardship, she spends Saturdays at the community centre
distributing parcels of food and clothes to her students’ families and,
twice a week, she helps a neighbour ladle out soup (made with food
donations) to members of the area’s neediest families. The fact that few
of their ‘clients’ wear masks does not appear to deter the volunteers’
enthusiasm. Asked if she isn’t worried about contamination, Aline
answers with an unequivocal ‘of course’, but it would seem the moral
injunction of neighbourhood solidarity overrides even such a fear.
VULNERABILITIES WITHIN AND BEYOND THE PANDEMIC
255
As the pedagogical slogans urging people to stay home gain impetus,
debates on the public scene often seem to frame adherence to quarantine
as a question not only of personal health and civic morality, but also of
party politics. Circumstances conspire to paint a person’s free transit in
public byways as a proclamation of pro-Bolsonaro political leanings
(Canzian 2020). Yet, the alacrity with which observers tend to see those
who fail to adhere to total confinement as scientifically illiterate and
politically conservative may be ill-advised. True, those shopkeepers
constantly lobbying to open commerce apparently adhere to Bolsonaro’s
cost-benefit evaluations that put the country’s economic health above
people’s lives. The same might be said of the crowds of beautiful people
at tourist sites, teenagers herding through the shopping malls and
bohemians out for a pick-me-up at their favourite bar. But for the majority
of people passing through the streets of working class neighbourhoods
where it would appear business carries on almost as usual, our experience
suggests that attitudes are characterised more by ambivalence than firm
conviction. Observation of the various strategies deployed by workingclass families such as Taina’s to get through this period of crisis leads us
to believe that the class-based parameters of many of our instruments of
evaluation do not begin to describe the complex package of acute
perception, conditions of possibility and imperatives of social solidarity
that permit people to forge meaningful existences during the pandemic.
Conclusion: Coronavirus and culling in
the neo-neoliberal age
Our syndemic approach to COVID-19 in present-day Brazil is meant to
underline the highly variable ways that the disease plays out in different
contexts. Political circumstances that conspired to put a ‘negationist’
president in power, together with the chief executive’s consistent
undermining of public trust in science, have no doubt been responsible
for a percentage of the country’s high death toll (at 31 December 2020).
The survival-of-the-fittest philosophy openly avowed by Bolsonaro has
also had consequences. On the one hand, it explains the federal government’s refusal to elaborate a coordinated plan to contain the pandemic.
On the other hand, it has caused many people who are vulnerable – the
chronically ill and disabled – to doubt their entitlement to basic
constitutional rights. Finally, the colossal number of under- and irregularly
employed workers obliged to eke out a daily living renders the major
prevention measure against COVID-19 – social distancing – awkward if
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not entirely unfeasible for a good part of the population. Threading its
way through all these contextual particularities, we find the overriding
issue of structural inequality.
The neoliberal cut-backs taking place in Brazil, as well as many
other countries throughout the world, have been branded by certain
scholars as a form of necropolitics (Ortega and Orsini 2020; Yancy 2020).
The term is meant to highlight the usually implicit tenets of regimes
whose social policies appear to separate ‘grievable’ from ‘ungrievable’
lives, that is, those people ‘who should be protected against death at
all costs and those whose lives are considered not worth safeguarding
against illness and death’ (Butler 2020, 3). COVID-19 may have
exacerbated this trend, but tacit forms of ‘culling’ the population are not
particularly new. As Manderson and Wahlberg (2020) point out, in many
parts of the world – especially where resources are scarce – health workers
have long been sorting out which patients should receive priority
attention.
In Brazil, black, indigenous and poor people – those most likely to be
found in the public health facilities – are suffering a mortality rate from
COVID-19 many times that of middle-class whites. But how can one forget
that in ‘normal’ times the average life expectancy of an individual from
these disadvantaged groups is years shorter than that of their white,
middle-class counterparts? Between chronic unemployment, structural
racism, police violence, miserable work wages and inadequate and poorly
resourced health facilities, one might conclude that the mechanisms that
lead to a de facto hierarchy of more and less worthy humanities were
operational long before COVID-19.
Recognition that Brazilians have learned to live with chronically
precarious institutional support expands our focus beyond the present
pandemic to the informal means through which most people routinely
manage to hold home and hearth together despite adverse conditions.
Our observations in this chapter on the care-giving networks of young
children with disabilities point to the importance of local forms of social
organisation in facing new, acute ordeals within a context of economic
and institutional precarity. We would suggest that the strategies mounted
by extended families and neighbourhood associations appear to work, at
times, even better than many of the state and humanitarian interventions,
exactly because they are based on established relations of cooperation
and interdependence ensconced in day-to-day tasks (Bersani 2020, 13;
see also Ennis-McMillan and Hedges 2020). This sort of spontaneous
mutual aid, found in the lower-income urban periphery and isolated rural
areas throughout Brazil (as well as in many other regions of the world),
VULNERABILITIES WITHIN AND BEYOND THE PANDEMIC
257
may be of limited scope and patchy duration. But so are many of the social
programmes organised by public authorities. Any sort of coordinated
effort to contain the pandemic and minimise suffering must take into
account these community resources as well as local modes of existence.
However, if concern with the present catastrophe does not extend to the
reformulation of policies for ‘normal’ times, and the development of longlasting infrastructures that guarantee wellbeing for the population as a
whole, further tragedy is bound to ensue.
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
These reflections are the result of an ethnographic study under the coordination of Soraya
Fleischer, conducted from 2016 to the present in Recife, with parents and family members of
children born with congenital Zika syndrome (Fleischer and Lima 2020). In early 2020, the
research team branched out from an interest in the everyday challenges faced by these families
to contemplate the influence of COVID-19 in this scenario. Funding for this research comes
from CNPq and the University of Brasília.
Claudia Fonseca has carried out fieldwork on the outskirts of Porto Alegre over the past two
decades. Material for the present article was collected through telephone interviews in May
and June of 2020 with members of the community organisation Coletivo Autônomo do Morro
within the framework of ‘Living with Disabilities’, a research project funded by the Newton
Foundation (British Council) and CNPq.
Notwithstanding the existence of an abundant national supply, the country received not long
afterward a colossal shipment of the product supposedly sent by US President Donald Trump
himself.
Until 2016, the only existing laboratory tests were for dengue.
To date, authorities have tabulated approximately 4,000 children born with what they label
Congenital Zika Virus Syndrome (CZVS). Since 2016, numbers have tapered off, leading WHO
to pull the disease off the list of immediate epidemiological concerns (Lakoff 2017), but –
especially with the detection of a new strain of virus in June 2020 – the disease is still very
much on the map of Brazil’s public health concerns.
‘Micro family’, a term coined by the mothers themselves, refers to the major visible symptom of
microcephalic babies who suffer from the foetal syndrome.
While the officially unemployed fluctuated at somewhere between 11 and 13 million, by late
June, surveyors were talking of some 75,000,000 Brazilians outside the job market.
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brasil-53338421.
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present. Oxford/New York: Berg.
Lakoff, Andrew. 2017. Unprepared: Global health in a time of emergency. Berkeley, CA: University of
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Anthropology 39(5): 428–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/01459740.2020.1761352
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Yates-Doerr, Emily. 2020. ‘Stay home, stay healthy’ is dangerous language’. Ms. 4 March 2020.
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‘You are putting my health at risk’
Genes, diets and bioethics under COVID-19
in Mexico
Abril Saldaña-Tejeda
On 27 March 2020, as rates of infection were rapidly escalating worldwide,
the Mexican government reported 717 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and
12 deaths. For some at least, this suggested that the country would avoid
the worst outcome of economic collapse and devastating numbers of
fatalities. But due to undertesting and underreporting, many saw these
figures as underestimating the problem (Gobierno de Mexico 2020a). From
the beginning of the pandemic, Mexico had one of the lowest testing rates
in the Americas, with only 2,350 per 1 million residents examined. Some
argued that the government’s strategy of testing only serious cases made
it difficult to develop appropriate interventions (Agren 2020). Others
suggested that public health officials followed the only strategy possible in
a country within which 41.9 per cent of its 126.2 million population lived
in poverty (Coneval 2018), where 56 per cent of the working population
were in informal employment (INEGI 2020).
From late February, the government offered daily televised briefings
on the pandemic; to the time of writing in mid-September, these were
continuous. The briefings were held and hosted by the Undersecretary of
Health, Hugo López-Gatell Ramírez, an epidemiologist with an impressive
academic record and robust experience in health crises, an engaged
public speaker able to captivate the public in a way no previous health
authority had before. During the first months of the ‘stay at home’
campaign, in daily briefings, Gatell and his team covered important issues
related to lockdown, including domestic violence and mental health.
Gatell also dedicated special briefings to answer questions from children
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and mothers on their respective national days, taking advantage of
the state’s presence to promote awareness of self-care practices under
COVID-19 and ‘healthy lifestyles’. In some ways, these briefings were key
to promote an image of Gatell as caring representative of the state.
Children and mothers were asked to send their questions through homemade videos; questions were carefully selected and some widely
commented in social media. Gatell also aligned with many other social
justice agendas; he started to use green ties and later, green facemasks to
promote the decriminalisation of abortion in the country.
Soon after the briefings started, Gatell began to be presented as a
sex symbol. WhatsApp stickers circulated with Gatell’s image, and he
was reported to be trending in Twitter, ranked the third most popular
epidemiologist in the world (Ojeda de la Torre 2020). By mid-April,
piñatas of him were on sale in the streets. In Mexico, being made into a
piñata is proof of iconic status, reflecting political and social views of
approval, mockery or national indignation.
Gatell made the most of his popularity and high rates of approval to
address another public health challenge that, before COVID-19, had ignited
heated legislative debate. Gatell had been spearheading the national
campaign to legislate the use of warning labels on processed foods and
sugar sweetened beverages. The new law, passed just before the country
entered into lockdown, required processed food companies to provide easy
to understand, correct, direct, simple and visible nutritional information on
their products, especially those high in sugar, sodium and saturated fats.
This small but significant victory of public health over profit was celebrated
by many activists and non-governmental organisations. The COVID-19
crisis seemed the perfect setting to publicly sustain the need to continue
to successfully address excessive weight gain and obesity, something
that the country had attempted, with little success, since the early 2000s.
In early April, the media drew attention to comorbidities among
COVID-19 patients: up to 85 per cent of deaths caused by COVID-19
were associated with cardiometabolic disease, including obesity (Torres
2020). The risk of death due to COVID-19 among those living with obesity
increased by 78 per cent, 73 per cent with diabetes and 38 per cent with
hypertension (Solís and Carreño 2020). By late July, there were 370,712
confirmed cases and 41,908 fatalities by COVID-19. Some 67 per cent
of fatalities had suffered from at least one comorbidity of diabetes,
hypertension, obesity and cardiovascular disease. Up to 17 per cent of
confirmed cases and 43 per cent of deaths were among people who
suffered from hypertension; 17 per cent of confirmed cases and 38 per
cent of deaths among those living with diabetes. Finally, up to 18 per cent
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261
of confirmed cases and 25 per cent of fatalities were reported as obese
(Gobierno de México 2020b).
In this chapter, I explore Mexico’s public health campaign against
obesity prior to and after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, and
document the increasing stigmatisation of fatness as a result of contemporary discourses of vulnerability and risk. I first look at genetic and
epigenetic approaches to obesity rates among Mexican mestizos before
COVID-19. I briefly expose concerns regarding the potential racialising
impact of the new life science, and question the tendency among epigenetic
studies to place women’s reproductive bodies and their consumption
choices at the centre of social interventions designed to improve the health
of future generations. Through a review of Mexico’s long obsession with
diets and foodways from colonisation to the eugenic movement of the
twentieth century, I argue that a new focus on diets and ‘healthy choices’ is
highly problematic under COVID-19. A renewed focus on individual
responsibility continues to occlude major structural problems that would
better explain Mexico’s food landscape and why people eat what they do.
Second, I look at public and medical discourses that identify a genetic
advantage among Mexican mestizos. I argue that the continuous use of
genetic profiles as substitutes for national representation converges and
supports the resurgence of old eugenic tropes of foodways and diets as
ways of enhancing the nation’s population. Such obsession with the ‘truths’
invested in the body – its genetic makeup and its power to ‘heal’ the nation
through social intervention and self-care – silence the (evident) social
factors behind the heath disaster that we are witnessing today due to
the pandemic. I expose the stigmatising effects of the state’s war against
obesity and how such effects have materialised in misinformation and
discrimination. Finally, I look at the bioethical guide of extreme triage in
Mexico and the heated debate around it. I show how the impact of the war
against obesity goes beyond fat stigmatisation to directly affect individual
possibilities of survival. I argue that notions of vulnerability and risk
associated with COVID-19 are materialised in public health policy, and
public health debates and policies seem to fuel fatphobic messages and
practices that might have a direct impact on people’s notions of risk under
COVID-19 and on patients’ willingness to seek help when needed.
Obesity in Mexico: genetic vulnerabilities and strengths
In Mexico, according to the National Health and Nutrition Survey 2018
(NHNS), seven out of ten adults (aged 20 and older) suffered from
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overweight and/or obesity (75.2 per cent), along with three out of ten
children between the ages of 5 and 11 years old (35.6 per cent) and
almost four out of ten adolescents between the ages of 12 and 19 years of
age (38.4 per cent) (INSP 2018). During the last decades, these rates
have caused great concern for the government, and public health officials
have consistently warned against the ‘anti-evolutionary essence’ of
obesity and the threat it represents to the ‘viability of the nation’
(Secretaría de Salud 2013, 7). These concerns have underpinned
substantial private and governmental funding to research the genetic
basis of obesity.
From its foundation in 2005, backed by substantial private and
governmental funding, the National Institute for Genomic Medicine
(INMEGEN) engaged with a series of international collaborations to
explore the genetic basis of diabetes and obesity. Mexican mestizos were
found to be especially susceptible to obesity due to their Amerindian
origin (INMEGEN 2014; SIGMA Type 2 Diabetes Consortium 2014).
Official and media outlets were swift to interpret and circulate these
findings, strengthening the idea that Mexicans were predisposed to
obesity and ‘carried it in their genes’ (Olivares 2012; Forbes 2013; Ruiz
Jaimes 2013), with obesity predisposition often linked to the Thrifty
Gene Hypothesis (TGH) (see Saldaña-Tejeda and Wade 2018). In simple
terms, this hypothesis supports the idea that where ancestral populations
lived in a harsh environment, the natural selection of a thrifty gene
allowed them to store energy for times of famine (Neel 1962). In a
modern environment of food abundance and sedentary lifestyles, the
continued storing of energy explains obesity population clusters. These
genetic hypotheses were soon accompanied by epigenetic explanations
of obesity that stressed the role of environmental factors to regulate
gene function and modification. Epigenetics offered the opportunity
to escape the criticism of genetic determinism, while accommodating
well to public health agendas by focusing on state interventions that
might modify the genetic makeup of the nation. An epigenetic approach
backed up the idea that genes could be ‘switched’ off and on through
environmental (often dietary) interventions and foetal developmental
programming, often targeting intrauterine environments and therefore
women’s reproductive bodies (Sharp et al. 2018; Warin et al. 2015). In
the last decades, the state has consistently recommended further
investment in genetic and epigenetic research and the development
of a genoteca del obeso, that is, a biobank of samples from obese patients
from public clinics and hospitals (Secretaría de Salud 2013). Critics of
genomic medicine based on ancestry highlight its potential as a ‘racialised
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science’ or a ‘backdoor to eugenics’ (Duster 2003; Smedley and Smedley
2005; Koenig et al. 2008). Epigenetic approaches do not escape
such criticism, given their tendency to focus on the actions of selfdisciplining citizens (often poor and/or negatively racialised mothers)
and their power to somehow reverse problematic global health rates
in future generations (Saldaña-Tejeda and Wade 2019). Epigenetic
studies of foetal exposures often centre around the ‘abnormal’ dietary
‘choices’ of mothers, positioning women as the main vehicles of poor
intergenerational health (Manderson 2016; Pentecost 2018; Yates-Doerr
2015; Saldaña-Tejeda 2018).
Mexico has long seen diets and foodways as pathways to enhance
the racial makeup of the population and convert souls to Christianity.
From early Spanish colonisation, European foods were presented as
morally and nutritionally superior (Earle 2010). Indians were advised to
eat ‘that which the Castilian people ate’ to become ‘strong and pure and
wise’ (Burkhart 1989, 166). After independence, political elites continued
to blame indigenous diets for the ‘underdevelopment’ of the population
and favoured the consumption of processed, industrialised foods that
signalled a modern, Mexican nation (Pilcher 1998; Aguilar-Rodríguez
2007). Ideas on health and heredity eventually materialised in the
eugenic environmentalist measures of the twentieth century. Diets, food
practices and hygiene – along with moral values – were believed to be the
root of all national problems and were the basis of interventions that
targeted Mexican families, particularly indigenous and other poor
mothers (Aguilar-Rodríguez 2007; Vargas Domínguez 2017).
Under COVID-19 and its known comorbidities, diets and ‘healthy’
food choices became again the focus of public interventions. As with
genetic and epigenetic approaches to chronic diseases, the focus on
individual responsibility worked to silence major structural problems that
would better explain Mexico’s food landscape and why people eat what
they do. As Galvez (2018) shows, the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) signed in 1994 by Canada, the US and Mexico
changed Mexico’s food systems and resulted in a deep transformation
of the welfare state. Market-based ideas about how to solve society’s
problems (i.e. chronic diseases) began to frame citizens as consumers
able to make rightful choices in the marketplace. In this frame, the
medical gaze centred on the need to educate consumers, overlooking
the social determinants of health and the effects of neoliberalism
on the country’s food systems (Galvez 2018). The transformation of
Mexico’s peasant cooperatives into urban communities is only one
example of such effects.
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Created after the 1910 Mexican Revolution, peasant cooperatives
known as ejidos were the centre of an agrarian reform that lasted
60 years. Designed to allocate and redistribute land in order to provide
a subsistence base for millions of peasants, ejidos historically entailed a
set of obligations for beneficiaries such as working the land and living
in villages. However, from the 1980s, socioeconomic processes that
led to NAFTA resulted in the commodification of communal land that, in
2017, amounted to 51 per cent of Mexican territory. The use of land for
agricultural activities was gradually replaced by mining industry,
activities linked to ‘flex crops’ (for example, corn and soybeans, able to be
used for food, feed, fuel or industrial material) and logging. As Torres
(2019, 73) states, ‘all around Mexico, ejidatarios (ejido holders) are
selling, renting, or leasing their lands; they have become a new kind of
individual owner, with many rights over the ejido plots but without the
obligations towards families or communities that they used to have’.
These systemic changes altering the food landscape converged with
years of governmental failure to address extreme poverty and food
insecurity. For instance, in 2013, when the National Strategy to Prevent
Obesity and Diabetes was launched, the administration of Enrique Peña
Nieto (2012–18) announced its signature policy, the Crusade Against
Hunger. This programme aimed to alleviate extreme poverty by giving a
basic allotment of staple food consisting, ironically, largely of processed
foods, so increasing the exposure of low-income families to a commoditised
food economy (Galvez 2018). Mothers also received cash transfers from
the government that, like previous social assistance programmes, were
conditional on them attending multiple ‘training’ sessions to ‘learn’ how to
make healthy choices for their families. The programme failed. In the
end, it reached only 0.1 per cent of its initial intended beneficiaries and the
population living under extreme poverty increased by up to 13 per cent
from 2014 to 2018 (Cruz Vargas 2020). In August 2019, a media
investigation revealed that the Crusade Against Hunger was involved in
one of the most notorious corruption scandals in the country’s recent
history. Rosario Robles Berlanga, the head of the programme, was
prosecuted for participating in a large corruption network that diverted
some US$263 million dollars of public resources from the Crusade (Nájar
2019).
With a renewed focus on genes and/or diets to address COVID-19
and its major comorbidities, the body was, again, placed at the centre of
the discussion. Diets, genes and prescriptions of ‘self-care’ converge to
leave the state’s failures unaccountable for the devastating effects of
COVID-19 so far. As Mendenhall (2012) shows for diabetes, a syndemic
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framework on chronic diseases helps to unveil the ways that adverse
social conditions (for example, poverty, stress, lack of healthcare) weaken
a population’s defences, exposing it to a cluster of health disasters such as
those in Mexico today. In the case of obesity, diabetes and COVID-19,
disease clustering is deeply linked to adverse syndemic interactions
(Singer 2020). However, an incessant focus on genes, diets and individual
choices obscures the social and historically situated dimensions of COVID19 and creates new barriers and challenges for those defined as the source
of the problem.
Mestizaje under COVID-19: from strong national
genes to sinful bodies
When the first cases of coronavirus were identified in Mexico, the
narrative of genetic health risks associated with mestizaje gave way to a
hopeful idea of national genetic strength. At the beginning of the
lockdown, a widely-read national newspaper, El Universal, published a
column by García Soto (2020) in which he described a special meeting
between President Manuel López Obrador and the health team
coordinating the national COVID-19 strategy. According to García Soto,
the president was informed that the country could expect up to 2,000
deaths by COVID-19, but:
due to genetics, the Mexican race was more resistant to this type of
virus than other races, such as the European. It was argued that
[resistance] was linked to the Mexican genome and with mestizaje,
it was expected that [race] was going to positively affect the impact
of the new coronavirus among the Mexican population.
A few days later, Julio Granados Arriola a renowned Mexican immunogeneticist, spoke out in support of this supposed advantage, stating that
‘genetic admixture and not the purity of our populations (was) providing
strength in this global crisis’ (Gilet 2020). He challenged the idea that we
are all exposed to coronavirus in equal ways, and dismissed the idea that a
genetic strength among racially mixed populations in Latin America was ‘a
colonial mechanism’ that denied the situated experiences of Mexican
mestizos.
Under the COVID-19 Host Genetics Initiative, phenotypes around
the world are being investigated to determine major genetic risk factors
for the virus across populations (2020). Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina and
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Chile have collaborated with the initiative to study the effects of national
genetic profiles in the severity of the virus in Latin America. As in Mexico,
Chile’s media circles and scientists have stressed the need to have their
own genetic component represented in the initiative, as clinical outcomes
could be unique due to indigenous ancestry (Valenzuela 2020). The
increasing use of genetic profiles as substitutes for national representations seems to have prompted the resurgence of old eugenic tropes of
foodways and diets believed to be associated with the racial ‘betterment’
of populations.1 For instance, in a column supporting Mexican’s genetic
advantage to navigate the virus, Gil Gamés (2020) explained that
ancestral food practices were behind what he called ‘gene modification’
among Mexican mestizos and that food was the basis of Mexicans’ genetic
strength; he echoed eugenic ideas of heredity and evolution, and the
power of foodways and other environmental factors to ‘improve’ the racial
profile of the nation (Weismantel 1989; Stepan 1991).
The idea of genetic strength linked to mestizaje as protecting against
coronavirus was shattered by the rapid increase in confirmed cases
and fatalities in Latin America, as naïve ideas in genetic capital were
confronted by the social and biological reality of viral encounters. By the
first week of July 2020, Latin America, with only eight per cent of the
world’s population, had accounted for half of COVID-19 global deaths
(Tharoor 2020). By 18 May, around 20,000 cases of COVID-19 had been
confirmed among indigenous peoples from the Amazonia region and its
2,400 territories across eight countries (Martin 2020). Black Brazilians
were said to be 62 per cent more likely to die from the virus than whites
(Genot 2020) and migrants, refugees and displaced people were left
without basic needs to navigate the virus as borders shut down (Segnana
2020). In Mexico, people treated at a private hospital were reported 60
per cent less likely to die by COVID-19 than those in public health units
(Solís and Carreño 2020). Up to 71 per cent of COVID-19 fatalities were
among people with an educational attainment of primary school or less
(i.e. incomplete primary school or no formal education); up to 46 per cent
were retired, unemployed or part of the informal economy (Hernández
Bringas 2020). As this suggests, race, class and other social factors are
tightly tied to the devastating effects of COVID-19. Nonetheless, public
attention focused on what Foucault would call ‘truths’ invested in the
body, the strength of the national genetic makeup to resist the virus, and
the strength of character of its citizens to assume responsibility for their
individual and collective survival.
The current obsession with the body, which because of shape and
weight has been publicly deemed as ‘at risk’ and ‘a risk’ of COVID-19, draws
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267
Figure 14.1 Caricature about obesity circulating in social media,
source unknown
on and produces misinformation and stigma. Messages and caricatures
began to circulate about the virus and people living with excessive weight
gain and obesity. In its Twitter account, the national newspaper, La
Jornada, published the image of a fat man sitting on a couch, watching TV,
gorging on junk food, transmogrifying into the virus and dying (La Jornada
online 2020). In another image, a morbidly obese man carries an oversize
bottle of Coca-Cola and angrily states ‘Gatell is killing us’. The man is
accompanied by the iconic little white bear that represents Mexico’s
number one high-caloric and processed food label: Bimbo (Figure 14.1).
The bear responds to the man: Gatell is irresponsible. In another cartoon,
a morbidly obese woman wearing a facemask angrily decries a ‘normal
weight’ young woman for not doing so. ‘You must wear a mask’ she says.
‘You are putting my health in danger’ (Figure 14.2). People living with
obesity are caricatured as angry, lazy and irresponsible, bad citizens, and
embodied obstacles to the government’s strategy to address the pandemic
and save the nation. The idea is promoted that people living with obesity
are the only ones at risk, the only ones expected to wear facemasks.
On 5 November 2020, President Manuel López Obrador announced
a government strategy to address obesity and stated that the majority of
deaths by COVID-19 was linked to this condition. The president stated
that obesity was caused by bad eating habits and presented a cartoon
(Figure 14.3) to be distributed among 30 million households in Mexico.
In the cartoon, a young thin girl educates an overweight boy about the
dangers of junk food. ‘You have a junk body’ says the girl, as the boy shows
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Figure 14.2 Caricature about obesity circulating in social media,
source unknown
Figure 14.3 Caricature designed to educate children on the dangers of
obesity and junk food. Commissioned by Mexican Secretariat of Health
and authored by Rafael Barajas (El Fisgón) Source: Gobierno de México:
https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/590444/CPM_
Campan_a_nutricio_n_folleto__05nov20.pdf
her the food items he has brought for school lunch. The cartoon depicts
fat children as obsessed with junk food, ignorant and unable to control
themselves. It shows the boy eating from a trash can to suggest that junk
food is trash, it accuses people diagnosed as overweight or obese as a
burden to the state and to taxpayers, and finally (Figure 14.4) it warns
against COVID-19’s comorbidities and explains other countries’ better
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269
Figure 14.4 Caricature designed to educate children on the dangers of
obesity and junk food. Commissioned by Mexican Secretariat of Health
and authored by Rafael Barajas (El Fisgón) Source: Gobierno de México:
https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/590444/CPM_
Campan_a_nutricio_n_folleto__05nov20.pdf
outcomes through lower rates of obesity among their population. ‘COVID
is less lethal’ in countries where people eat better and exercise. The
cartoon has been widely criticised for stigmatising fatness, promoting
fatphobia and strengthening the idea that people’s health is the outcome
of individual choices and responsibility.
In April 2020, a joint international consensus statement, written by
a multidisciplinary group of experts, criticised the gap between
stigmatising narratives around obesity and current scientific knowledge
(Rubino et al. 2020). At stake were long-lasting effects of stigmatisation
on the mental health of people living with obesity and their right to
medical care. Le Brocq and colleagues (2020) also pointed to the allconsuming fear, anxiety and uncertainty that COVID-19 had caused
among people diagnosed with obesity in the UK. Respondents worried
about not getting medical support if they were admitted to hospital,
either because of lack of proper equipment or because of stigma or
extreme triage guidelines. The authors warned against such stigma
leading to people’s reluctance to seek healthcare, with the potential of
worsening COVID-19 outcomes. This was especially relevant as many
identified as particularly vulnerable to COVID-19 were already being
denied regular care as hospitals were overwhelmed by emergency
admissions of people with COVID-19 (Manderson and Wahlberg 2020).
As always in the normalisation of privilege for certain kinds of
bodies (i.e. by race, gender or ability), stigmatisation is often materialised
in practices and policies that directly affect people’s possible survival. As
I illustrate below, the war against obesity as a public health and political
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strategy extends beyond fat stigmatisation. COVID-19 has forced many
countries to swiftly develop bioethical guides to allocate limited medical
resources. These guidelines illustrate how notions of vulnerability and
risk manifest in public health policy, and how a focus on obesity as risk
may extend beyond stigmatisation by conditioning people’s possibilities
of receiving the care that they deserve and to which they have a right.
Bioethical guidelines of extreme triage under COVID-19
Assuming a shortage of medical resources, many countries in Latin America
have discussed or already established bioethical guidelines, referred to as
extreme triage, for resource allocation in cases of public health emergency
such as COVID-19. Under the principle of social justice, these guidelines
propose to allocate resources to save as many lives as possible. Chile,
México, Argentina, Colombia, Brazil and Uruguay have developed triage
guidelines to administer scarce resources (Carvajal 2020; Woites 2020;
Moreno Molina 2020; Giordano 2020). Although these guidelines were
drafted independently and not through a regional initiative, they coincided
on the main criteria for critical medical care allocation: evaluating the
possibility that a patient will improve and survive, with or without
comorbidities, and in light of their age, in other words, ‘years of life to be
saved’. In a brief on ethics guidance on the use of scarce resources for
critical healthcare during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Pan American
Health Organization stressed the need to treat all people equitably.
However, the document also highlights the need to save the greatest
number of lives and to prioritise those most likely to survive treatment
(PAHO 2020).
An emergency resource allocation strategy involves abandoning the
Hippocratic Oath, the idea of equality between people, and the sacredness
of life. In a crisis as presently experienced with COVID-19, health professionals require direction to proceed in the face of limited resources.
In April 2020, Helen Ouyang (2020), a New York emergency department
doctor, vividly described her experience during the first outbreak of the
pandemic, as hospitals were flooded by patients, dead and alive. She
argued the need for bioethical guidelines of extreme triage for those at
the front line, physically and emotionally exhausted by attending to the
flow of COVID-19’s patients and potentially risking their own health and
lives to save others. However, it is possible to support the need for triage
guidelines while also questioning the criteria used to evaluate and decide
how to allocate critical medical care.
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Triage guidelines sparked a heated debate across the globe (Del
Missier 2020). Bioethicists were accused of ‘playing God’ by deciding who
deserves the chance to live and who not. In many countries, public
opinion forced bioethicists to rewrite and retract recommendations for
limited medical resource allocation. In some Latin American countries,
the most prominent voices pointed at age discrimination. In Mexico,
critics compared the guidelines with Nazi atrocities against people
perceived as old or ill (Miranda 2020); in Argentina, bioethicists
questioned age as a criterion to determine outcome, given that a young
individual could suffer from more severe pathologies than an older one
(Woites 2020). Others pointed to increasing evidence that structural
factors and comorbidities were more sensitive than age at predicting the
lethality and severity of COVID-19 (Bello-Chavolla et al. 2020).
The guidelines also recommended limited resources be allocated in
light of patients’ ‘past situation’, that is, ‘the presence of pre-existing
comorbidities that might impact on the patients’ expectation to benefit
from treatment’ (Consejo de Salubridad 2020, 11). Pre-existing diseases
were therefore used to evaluate a patient’s eligibility to receive medical
care. Vulnerable populations were mentioned throughout the guidelines,
but these were narrowed to ethnic minority groups, people who are
unemployed, pregnant women, other women and people working in
the health sector. The label ‘vulnerability’ was avoided, so referring
to patients’ comorbidities suggests that vulnerability implies protection.
In contrast, the term ‘situation’ allows the guidelines to recommend
exclusion from medical care without appearing contradictory.
However, as Barnes and colleagues suggest, ‘care always has a past
and how we respond to past injustices is one of the largest ethical questions
we need to face’ (2015, 11). In the area of research ethics and public health
ethics, vulnerability first appeared in the 1979 Belmont Report, in which
populations in need of special protection are described. Some populations
– ethnic minorities, people economically disadvantaged, the very sick and
those without capacity for free consent (i.e. persons confined to institutions)
– were entitled to protection. Other landmark documents in research ethics,
including the International Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving
Human Subjects (1982) and the Declaration of Helsinki (2000), also
address questions of vulnerability and vulnerable populations (Luna 2019).
The former identifies three groups of vulnerable populations that, linked to
their social or physical conditions, were ‘relatively (or absolutely) incapable
of protecting their own interests’ (CIOMS 2002, 69). Lack of power was
therefore the main criterion defining certain subpopulations as vulnerable
and in need of protection.
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This lack of power has been at the centre of debates regarding the
notion of vulnerability. For many, the notion of vulnerability contains the
risk of reducing politics to care, complicating the possibility of a vulnerable
political subject (Ferrarese 2016, 157). Such risks derived from the
tendency to reflect on vulnerability as embodied and historically are
seen as unworthy of the political sphere. Embodied vulnerability, tied to
capability/capacity, strengthens the perceived incompatibility between
politics and the expression of suffering and needs. The long negligence of
the body, as opposed to mind and reason, as a subject of investigation
in philosophical thought and sociology, maintains the idea of the body
as located in the private realm (Malacrida and Low 2008). Thus, the
current focus on the body operates as a mechanism to leave the state
unaccountable for the political and social roots of health inequalities, and
keeps the individual body in its place through notions of self-care and
individual/private responsibility. The body as private or apolitical could
also be behind the stigmatisation and condescending practices that often
occur when labelling whole groups as vulnerable (Luna 2019). For
instance, a private amusement park in the city of Monterrey, northeast
Mexico, announced that older adults, children and people with obesity
were forbidden entrance for their own protection from coronavirus
(Zuñiga 2020). The park did not specify how staff would ‘diagnose’
someone as obese nor clarify if measures would be implemented to avoid
discrimination. People have been reported being denied entrance into
casinos if perceived as obese for ‘their own protection’. People with
other comorbidities, less easy to diagnose by sight, such as diabetes or
hypertension, are allowed to occupy these spaces freely. A national
newspaper, Animal Político, reported that since June 2020, companies
started to refuse hiring people with chronic diseases, over 55 years of
age, or with other ‘risks’ linked to COVID-19 (2020). According to an
unemployed man interviewed for this chapter, COVID-19 had resulted
in discrimination against those suffering from known comorbidities
(Casasola 2020). This leads us to ask who or what are these businesses
‘protecting’? What forms and meanings does the notion of ‘vulnerability’
take in these cases? Although, as Ferrarese (2016) argues, the discourse
of vulnerability is already fully political through the polemics to which
it gives rise, we must be attentive of the ways that both ‘vulnerability’ and
‘risk’ are used, as these terms are heavily charged with complex and,
sometimes, contradictory meanings.
During their daily briefings, public health officials never referred to
obesity as a vulnerability to COVID-19, and instead, spoke of risk when
referring to chronic diseases. While vulnerability invokes the need for
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273
special protection, risk demands accountability and personal responsibility.
This idea of risk works to justify labour and other forms of discrimination.
As Kippax and Stephenson (2016) show in the case of HIV prevention, a
turn to ‘vulnerable populations’ rather than ‘risky individuals’ focused
attention on the social and cultural ‘drivers’ of vulnerability; vulnerability
could work to deny the power of collective action and agency over social
and cultural structures. Social practices instead of individual behaviours
might better account for how peoples’ actions contribute to change.
COVID-19 raises how and when languages of vulnerability and risk
are deployed, and how these narratives impact people living with obesity.
Such narratives have political implications, with potential impact on the
health of individuals and possibilities for collective action. We must also
acknowledge the agency of those whose bodies are insistently labelled as
‘at risk’ of infection or ‘a risk’ (to others) of transmitting infection. The
perceptions and experiences of people living with known conditions must
be taken into account in any action and public health strategy (Le Brocq
et al. 2020). Garland-Thomson et al. (2020), disability bioethicists,
remind us of the need to transform medical subjects into political ones.
They denounce as unethical and illegal the way in which extreme triage
guides under COVID-19 allocate resources unequally on the basis of
ability. Eugenics, they remind us, was also a scientific gaze to categorise
human variation in order to create ‘a better future’ with the ‘best’ kind of
people.
Conclusions
Bioethics must go beyond procedures such as informed consent and
ethical committees to account for the political nature of health policies
and scientific endeavours (Hernández 2019). We must explore the
political implications of new public health discourses and policies on
peoples’ situated experiences. In this chapter, I have illustrated that
narratives around obesity increase stigmatisation of fatness, as the
government’s war against obesity has become a war against people with
excessive weight gain and/or obesity. Through an analysis of the guide, I
argue that avoiding the notion of vulnerability in relation to COVID-19,
and instead using the term ‘past situation’ to justify the denial of critical
medical care to some people, neglects social factors linked to health
inequalities and social injustice. This implies that people with serious
cardiometabolic disease – obesity, diabetes and heart disease – are at risk
of being denied care since they are at risk either of not responding to care
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and dying anyway, or surviving COVID-19 with compounded comorbidities and reduced life expectancy.
Attention must be given to other forms of vulnerability to COVID-19
beyond known comorbidities. This is urgent as democratic action gives
way to the imposition of state emergency measures in order to care,
surveil or discipline those deemed ‘at risk’ and ‘a risk’ (see Manderson and
Levine, Chapter 3). For instance, in Mexico, Giovanni López, a 30-yearold bricklayer, was beaten to death by police officers for not wearing a
face mask in public. Police brutality is a pre-existing condition, but it
complicates the implementation of state measures to care for the wider
population. Similarly, domestic violence has taken a toll on women during
lockdown. In Mexico in March 2020 alone, when the ‘stay at home’
campaign started, 115,614 emergency calls linked to sexual and physical
violence against woman were reported (SESNSP 2020). Violence is also
a pre-existing condition that impacts women’s possibility to survive
the pandemic. Similarly, as elsewhere in the world, people working in
Mexico’s food system have been severely affected by COVID-19 (Gross
and Yates-Doerr 2020). By early June, more than 1,000 workers in the
country’s largest food market, the Mercado de Abastos, had tested positive
for the virus (Gómez 2020a). Farmers’ organisations warned of an
unprecedented social crisis due to the lack of social protection and
sanitation standards in agriculture (Gómez 2020b). In addition, there
is a risk that people may avoid food markets and revert to the processed
food that the government is so fiercely fighting to eliminate from
people’s diets.
What these ‘past situations’ show is the importance of acknowledging
the complex and intricate shapes that vulnerability and risk assume under
COVID-19. Language is never neutral, and narratives around COVID-19’s
comorbidities must be revised with caution to avoid concrete and longlasting effects upon the people living with these conditions. The current
language of risk strengthens fat phobia in a country that has recently
started to study the extent of weight discrimination (Soto et al. 2014).
The focus on obesity might also produce misleading information (for
example, the relative risk to infection of people with obesity) while
justifying a public health strategy to tackle COVID-19 that many perceive
as disastrous. People living with obesity have been easy targets to blame
for the states’ pre-existing negligence and failures, including the appalling
condition of its healthcare system. COVID-19’s comorbidities could be
understood as embodied palimpsests not of past situations but past
injustices. In the case of obesity, these exist in the colonial erasure of
traditional diets in favour of western food practices and in reproducing
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275
racial and gendered ideas of heredity and care. This past must be revised
to make reparations and allow us to imagine a more just and ethical
future for all.
Note
1
To read more about the creation of Mexican national genome see Vasquez and Deister (2019).
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15
Scarcity and resilience in the
slums of Dhaka city, Bangladesh
Sabina Faiz Rashid, Selima Sara Kabir,
Kim Ozano, Sally Theobald, Bachera Aktar
and Aisha Siddika
Bangladesh reported its first confirmed case of COVID-19 on 8 March
2020; thereafter infection spread significantly. However, with inadequate
testing, the statistics fail to capture the extent of coronavirus infections
and deaths. Public health restrictions, such as the national lockdown –
loosely referred to as a ‘general holiday’ deliberately to avoid mentioning
coronavirus – meant that many poor people returned to their villages
from cities, thus spreading the virus widely. Those who remained in
Dhaka and other cities, where the cost of living was already very high,
experienced catastrophic economic consequences. Moreover, despite
government and private sector responses, the pandemic overburdened
the country’s fragile and under-resourced health system (Anwar et al.
2020).
Bangladesh, a country of 165.6 million (2.2 per cent of the global
population) (BBS 2020), is currently the eighth most populous country
in the world; 27 per cent of this population (41 million) lives in cities
(BBS 2016). United Nations International Children’s Education Fund
(UNICEF) Bangladesh estimates that around 3.5 per cent of the
population migrates internally every year, mostly to urban areas (UNICEF
Bangladesh 2020). Further, between 1996 and 2005, the Centre for
Urban Studies estimated that the total population of Dhaka’s slums more
than doubled, from 1.5 to 3.4 million people (Gruebner et al. 2014), and
given the rate of migration into the capital, an estimated 5.3 million now
live there (Hossain 2020). Many urban migrants live in slums with
SCARCITY AND RESILIENCE IN THE SLUMS OF DHAKA CITY
281
heterogenous communities, with varying structures and services. Slums
are often squeezed around the periphery of the city or along railway lines,
under bridges and elsewhere near factories or near waste dumps, and are
characterised by congested living spaces, poorly maintained housing,
vulnerability to monsoon rains and floods, and lack access to sufficient
water and sanitation facilities, and little rubbish collection, street cleaning
or related services (UNICEF Bangladesh 2020). With few rights and
agency, and weak informal governance structures, slums tend to be
hidden spaces for crime, gang violence and drug trade. Life is precarious,
with sudden evictions and thousands of families often displaced overnight
(Rashid 2004; Islam et al. 2009). In addition, although Bangladesh
has improved the availability of food due to increased production over
recent decades, 40 million people – one-quarter of the population –
remain food insecure, and 11 million people suffer from acute hunger
(WFP Bangladesh 2018). These figures will worsen with the impact of
COVID-19 (bdnews24.com 2020).
The closure of businesses between 26 March and 31 May led to huge
income losses for the working poor, with hardships continuing even after
many businesses re-opened in June (Shawon 2020). Around 86 per cent
of the workforce in Bangladesh, the majority women, depends on informal
sector activities (ILO 2013). Around 3,596 garment factories actively
operate in Bangladesh, employing 3.5 million people (Ovi 2018). Another
3.5 million work as construction workers on sub-contracts, and thousands
as domestic workers on monthly or no-contracts (Double Repression
2020). Millions of these informal workers – street peddlers, domestic
workers, factory and construction workers, and more, the majority
women – lost their jobs during lockdown (Ovi 2018; Double Repression
2020). Most of those who lost employment live in Dhaka’s slums.
Adolescents from poor urban slums are vulnerable because of their
age, gender, lack of life experiences and other vulnerabilities which result
in exploitation and abuse. The proportion of adolescents in secondary
schools in Bangladesh is the lowest in South Asia (Haider 2019). Young
adult and adolescent boys from very poor households are more likely than
girls to start earning to contribute to their families (Ovi 2018). They start
working informally, with short-term or no contracts, in order to support
their families, rather than going to school or college. They often work in
the most hazardous jobs, conditions and circumstances (UNICEF 2020),
in work that is mainly unregistered and outside of state regulation and
labour laws. Adolescent women also drop out or cannot continue their
studies because of the complex interplay of poverty, crime and social
pressures to marry early (The Daily Star 2014). As we describe, poor
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adolescents and young adults working in the informal sector have been
directly and adversely affected by the pandemic and state policies
(Acharya et al. 2020).
Methodology
In this chapter we draw on narrative phone interviews collected from 12
individuals (5 males, 7 females; adolescents and youth) living in urban
slums, conducted from late March to the end of June 2020. The first
author has long-term and trusting relationships with the respondents
through volunteering, support and research interactions since 2006, and
has a critical understanding of their contexts and relationships. This
addressed any challenges emerging from phone interviews with respect
to positionality, building trust and the mediation of power (Au 2019).
Qualitative inductive thematic analysis was conducted drawing on
multiple theoretical frameworks based on critical medical anthropology
(Singer 2004), structural violence (Farmer 2009) and intersectionality
(Tolhurst et al. 2012). We examined affect as the mental and physical
response to the emergency, while we considered how resulting emotions
are externalised through relational social practices and materiality; we
view feelings as a product of the interactions between self and the world.
By understanding how emotions or affect can have practical implications
for the lives of urban youth, we were able to deeply consider the impact
of distress and persistent worry caused by the pandemic. The analytic
frameworks on which we drew supported analysis of the interactions of
varying forms of violence (physical, economic, political and social),
which, as illustrated by intersectionality theory, are often mediated by
more ‘micro’ level characteristics. These are in turn shaped by meso and
macro structures of power, making visible the levels of social injustice
faced by young people in slums. We discuss how the materiality
experienced by poor people is not simply one of a materiality of poverty:
adolescents and young people in the slums use material forms to creatively
make and remake their social identities and communities, and try to
transform their socioeconomic situations and lives. As in many places
where poverty is endemic, the situation is complex and nuanced, and
young people are not a passive homogenised group; they exert agency
despite the structures and constraints of their environments (BönischBrednich and Trundle 2010). We need to see beyond the view of lowincome residents as oppressed in power relations, and instead, as
Cresswell argues (2004, 27), appreciate the ‘entangled processes relating
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283
to power’ that occur in slums, where people may act in ways to resist,
change and challenge existing spaces, in ‘subversive ways,’ in order to
survive.
The sudden loss of income with economic contraction as a consequence of the lockdown brought a sense of desperation and panic about
impending hunger, and distress associated with the pressures of providing
for one’s family and household. The enforcement of lockdown by the
police, who are greatly feared, and constant insecurity of the future,
resulted in much trauma and anxiety. Unlike in rural areas, where most
people own their own homes, renting is common in urban slums. Basic
services are erratically available, and utilities are shared among numerous
families in different areas of the slums. Below, we illustrate the everyday
lived experiences, emotions and feelings of young people, and show how
their existing precarity and the struggles that they face were magnified by
the lack of state support in response to COVID-19.
Where are the jobs? Desperation sets in
With lockdown, adolescents and youth who sold wares on the street
were suddenly left without work, generating emotions of desperation,
fear, frustration and powerlessness. Among some of the adolescents
interviewed, the uncertainty of the lockdown resulted in sleeplessness,
lack of appetite and palpitations, and arguments in the household with
family members.
Shiuli’s life on the streets, selling small towels, books and paper
fans, began nearly 10 years ago. She now has 3 children, after eloping at
the age of 14 with her unreliable husband, who is in and out of jail and
frequently disappears. While Shiuli (21) has the support of her mother,
the pandemic has left her helpless and she was increasingly apprehensive
about her children’s future. In April and May, despite lockdown, Shiuli
and other street peddlers, wearing masks, surrounded the few cars still
on the streets, begging. ‘I am surviving on what people give when they
come outside to buy something; not every day they can give me money or
food’. Most passers-by did not hand out any cash for fear of contact and
consequent transmission. As lockdown continued, Shiuli increasingly felt
hopeless, ‘begging on an almost empty road, when everything is closed …
when you have no other source of getting money or food and you have
no idea when the situation will improve or become normal like before.
I pass every single minute thinking, when will someone come and give me
something?’
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Similarly, Hanif (17) had previously sold flowers on a busy road in
Dhaka city, but overnight, his income disappeared and he had no savings.
He lives with his mother, siblings and a cousin in a one-room space in
Badda, where most accommodation is less than 45 square feet with
occupancy of up to six family members. Many mothers of respondents
lost their jobs as housemaids in the homes of middle class and wealthy
residents, due to their own fears of transmission and infection. All
members of Hanif’s household, except for his mother, had work prior to
lockdown, earning small amounts of money from informal jobs. When
flower selling was no longer possible, Hanif was disheartened, but one
day, taking matters into his own hands, he convinced his neighbour to
rent him a rickshaw on credit so that he could work as a taxi driver. Within
a few days, however, local regulations related to the lockdown were
changed to prohibit rickshaws from operating. While adolescents in
solvent families adjusted to remote learning and spent the rest of their
time with their families, young people like Hanif carried the entire weight
of managing households on their shoulders: ‘My life is not like others who
are staying in their flats and maintaining physical distance. I have to find
a means of earning to look after my family’. Paying the rent (approximately
US$35 per month) was a constant reminder to Hanif of his responsibility
as a son, so out of desperation he borrowed money from the owner of a
neighbouring electronics shop, an informal loan provider. He now has the
additional stress and ongoing anxiety of repaying this money with
interest.
Meena (19), whose husband was ill and unemployed, worked up to
10 hours every day without any weekend breaks, even during the initial
stage of the nationwide lockdown, as they relied on her income as a
domestic aid to manage the household and meet the needs of her two
children. She spoke of constant exhaustion due to her long hours at work,
but it was regular income and provided her with a level of security. When
she saw the police patrolling the streets, she was frightened and asked for
temporary leave, but was only given a few days off. However, as the
lockdown continued, her employers fired her, forcing her to manage on
loans. She defied the lockdown and walked to nearly 30 houses and flats
in affluent residential areas in search of a new job. She explained that the
guards would turn her away, because ‘no one is employing anyone now
because of the pandemic. Everyone is too scared of transmission of the
virus (from poor people)’.
Adhering to public health restrictions and the lockdown put
adolescents in a precarious economic situation. Faruq (19), who lost his
informal job, spent the first week of lockdown sitting inside the room he
SCARCITY AND RESILIENCE IN THE SLUMS OF DHAKA CITY
285
shared with his mother, attempting to maintain physical distance despite
the fact that this was a near impossibility for him and others living in an
extremely congested slum. During the second week his mother asked him
to get some rice. Faruq, quite despondent, reflected: ‘If I stay at home
sitting idle, I risk facing starvation, and if I go outside I risk contamination.
I finally decided to go outside and pull a rickshaw’. On his first day of
pulling Faruq earned BDT 400 (c. US$4.73), but soon after the police
confiscated the rickshaw. Faruq regained it a few days later by bribing the
police.
Mukta (21) and her work colleagues experienced momentary hope
in April when announcements were made that garment factories would
re-open in May, but their hopes were dashed when, instead, lockdown
was extended until 31 May. The closure of factories also meant that
promised unpaid salaries could not be accessed. Like her colleagues,
Mukta knew the risks of crowding together to claim her unpaid salary, but
she had run out of money and as fears of hunger and panic grew, she had
no option: ‘If the factory remains closed, how will we manage our rent,
buy food for the rest of the days? We now eat twice a day. The rice we have
will run out soon’.
Research in Mumbai has revealed how the middle classes depict
slums as ‘filthy, dirty and noisy’ to justify the segregation and exclusion of
and discrimination against slum residents (Chandola 2010). As we have
already illustrated, Meena was turned away by guards in well-to-do
suburbs for fears of spreading the virus, and police confiscated rickshaws
and harassed poor people who broke the rules of wearing masks and
defied lockdown. These acts of everyday exclusion reveal how young
people’s lives were constantly under scrutiny and threat. However, they
were determined to manage and were entrepreneurial in trying to find
alternative sources of income, exhibiting certain levels of agency and
resistance to the obstacles and challenges faced.
The Bangladesh government announced a stimulus package of
US$8.657 billion in April to compensate people for economic losses
caused by COVID-19 (Foyez 2020). This included US$595 million for
salaries and allowances for garment workers and employees (Hossain
2020). However, adolescents, young people and adults living on the
margins did not get any benefits from this social safety net as the
programme targeted elderly populations; widows, destitute and deserted
women; and people with disabilities (World Bank 2019). Workers who
labour on the streets, in office buildings and factories, in grocery shops
and households, rickshaw pullers and daily labourers, were all excluded.
Those younger than 18 years old did not have access to a NID (identity
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card) and so were not entitled to support, and participants older than 18
years with ID cards also often felt betrayed when they did not receive any
relief materials, such as rice and other dry foods, if they fell into other
categories of exclusion. Young women were especially vulnerable, as
most were employed in the informal sector with low pay, and had less
security and protection in their jobs than their male counterparts. They
were also more likely to live in working poverty before the pandemic
(Rashid et al. 2020a).
Informal networks (both reciprocal and supportive, and exploitative)
are a key part of settlement life, and it was through these networks that
young people from poor households were able to gain access to informal
credit in the absence of formal systems of support. Little is known yet about
how the pandemic has impacted on money-lending and borrowing
behaviour; however, from past crises such as sudden floods, we know that
Dhaka slum-dwellers rely on social capital and networks to survive. The
congested living conditions in slums create diverse close-knit communities,
within which members have strong trusting relationships with each other.
This allows members to request financial support from each other, simply
and informally, in the form of small credits (Aßheuer et al. 2013). Among
the 51 participants reported in our March 2020 study, ‘residents mentioned
that they had received food from different non-government organizations,
local politicians, some well-off families in the locality, and from their
employers’ (Rashid et al. 2020b). However, 16 of the 51 did not receive
food support at all. However, as the pandemic continued and insecurity
increased in many households, there was an increasing risk that support
would wane, and residents were increasingly worried about how to
pay rent, pay back loans, purchase food and feed their families. Uncertainty
of how long the situation would last added a new level of powerlessness,
frailty and a sense of vulnerability: ‘We have lost control of everything.
Our lives remain in God’s hands now’. Despite these statements of despair,
most persisted in exploring options to manage their livelihoods and support
their families.
Hunger, insecurity and panic: a bleak future lies ahead
For adolescents and young people, including most of our respondents,
the fear of having no money at all, going without food and losing their
homes, was very real; hunger, not the pandemic, was the greater concern.
This was experienced most harshly in slums where vulnerable and lowincome groups like food vendors, the majority women and youth, were
SCARCITY AND RESILIENCE IN THE SLUMS OF DHAKA CITY
287
disproportionately affected by lockdown with massive job losses and
income constraints affecting access to food (Corburn et al. 2020). To add
to these worries, they had to manage and placate younger children,
including siblings, who were unaware of the full impact of the pandemic.
Their anxiety and despair were palpable in interviews.
Rubel (18) lives with his mother, younger brother and several others
in a one-room space in one of the largest slums in Bangladesh. He used to
work in a plastics factory before lockdown, and, like others, he received
no salary following the unexpected shutdown of the business. He does not
know when he can return to work, or how he and his family will deal with
the economic crisis they are already in. They are on the brink of starvation:
‘We have already run out of our supply of rice. I am panicking! I have no
idea how we will manage if things go on like this.’ Rubel, as a male, with
no father in the household, is responsible for providing for his family but
feels incapable of doing so.
Poverty also means that many women are taking on these responsibilities in the slums. For example, Meena, with no job, no money and a
sick husband, was desperately hungry. She broke lockdown to walk one
mile with her baby to receive a relief package from her mother. ‘I can’t
afford a mask, so I used my scarf to cover my mouth and walked with my
baby because my mother called me to say she had some rice to share with
me.’ She was stopped by police, but they felt sorry for her and did not
reprimand her as she was female and they realised she was hungry.
Many adolescents and young people interviewed for this research
had heard about government relief materials being distributed and were
hopeful that this would tide them over until the country opened up. There
were reports that government officers had gone around slum areas
collecting information about NID (national identification cards), but, as
noted above, no respondents received food aid. Although Kabir, Jewel,
Meena and Shirin (21, 20, 19 and 20, respectively) placed their names on
the official list as entitled to food support, internal bureaucracy and
corruption within these local offices prevented them from receiving aid.
‘My landlord gets relief for himself and his tenants, but he doesn’t distribute
anything to us.’ Numerous reports have detailed the mismanagement of the
distribution of resources, which favoured certain groups, and there is
limited coordination between different bodies responsible for distributing
state-funded food and/or cash aid programmes (Rashid et al. 2020a).
When Khokon (18) and his colleagues were not paid their wages
from various informal jobs, for example in shops and garment factories,
they took to the streets to demand food and relief. Law enforcement
officers had anticipated such action and were ready to punish protestors,
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but even so, protests continued in various parts of the city through April
(Arab News 2020). Chance (2015) refers to this as a ‘public drama’, in
which poor residents collectively mobilise and identify with each other,
creating a form of ‘living politics’, thereby moving beyond the boundaries
between the home and city to make themselves seen and heard, in a place
hostile to their needs. Through these demonstrations poor people try to
gain rights, resources and recognition of their plight.
When the lockdown ended in May, people rushed back to their jobs,
placing themselves at possible risk of infection. For many, the trade-off
was either death from the virus or death from starvation. Nearly all
respondents made repeated phone calls to people in their social networks,
trying everything they could to gain access to cash to buy food. Young
people turned to informal social connections to learn of sporadic labour
opportunities, and drew on existing relationships to buy food on credit
from street vendors, to negotiate with their landlords for waivers, and to
sell various goods in the city, despite the lockdown. Kabir and Jewel spoke
about selling their wives’ and sister’s only jewellery (one gold chain
and two silver chains). Loans were taken out in the early stages of the
pandemic, sometime in May, only two months into lockdown, as people
began to exhaust their networks and as their anxiety escalated about
being caught in a cycle of debt.
Many of the adolescents, despite their age, continued to experience
enormous pressure to provide for their families as heads of households
(Figure 15.1). Kabir, for example, had taken on the responsibility of
looking after his unmarried younger sister and younger brother after they
lost their parents at a young age. His brother recently passed year 10
school, and Kabir reflected: ‘Now with this corona, we are in a bad way.
No one is happy and I couldn’t even feed the neighbourhood sweets to
celebrate that my brother did so well in his exams’. For poor people,
education is valued greatly and is seen as an eventual path out of poverty,
although the reality is quite different. Kabir was unable to continue to
support his brother’s education, and this ‘left him restless and awake most
nights’. Shirin (20) recalled how she and her sister had recently relocated
from one slum to another with better housing and facilities. Before
COVID-19 and lockdown, both young women were working in a garment
factory and their mother was a housemaid. However, soon after lockdown,
all three became unemployed, forcing them to live on their meagre
savings. When their landlord came to demand cash for rent, they used
their savings to pay him for the month of April. Shirin worried that she
did not have any income to pay him in May. During Eid (religious festival),
Shirin bought her younger siblings some clothes as per the customary
SCARCITY AND RESILIENCE IN THE SLUMS OF DHAKA CITY
289
Figure 15.1 An adolescent prepares snacks in a slum in Dhaka city,
Bangladesh. Photo: Farzana Manzoor/BRAC JPGSPH
rituals of Eid. She wanted them to have nice things and was distressed to
see them unhappy. ‘They are young and don’t understand … we couldn’t
deny them, although we didn’t buy anything for ourselves’. Kellett (2002,
28) states that those who are poor are conscious of their low social
position, and their attempts to aspire for more and to live better suggest
that ‘their efforts can be interpreted as a “striving for dignity and respect”’.
As Perlman argues (1976, 242–3), contrary to the assumptions of the
urban poor as ‘disorderly’ (as is commonly portrayed in Bangladeshi
media and narratives), ‘most are socially well organised’, and aspire to
better lives, education, housing and upward mobility in employment.
However, they face insurmountable barriers to realise their dreams.
The narratives of young people living in Dhaka indicate the depth
of suffering that many urban residents experienced and the adversity they
faced, even though they managed to survive. Despite their ingenious
ways of trying to manage the world of social, economic and political
hierarchies, the situation placed large amounts of stress on adolescents
and youth. They have had to shoulder enormous burdens by taking on the
responsibilities of adults. Most of those interviewed were already married,
had children and were supporting their siblings and other family members
financially, despite their youth and that they struggled emotionally,
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mentally and physically to take on these expectations. The emotional toll
and feelings of distress impacted on the young respondents, particularly
as their situation became increasingly uncertain.
Gatekeepers and fear
As the above examples indicate, adolescents and young slum residents
had to deal with various gatekeepers and powerful individuals, inside
and outside the slums, including angry and demanding landlords and
aggravated law enforcement officers.
In Meena’s case, the tenants in her block of slums decided to
confront the landlord with examples of other landlords waiving rent for
residents. Yet, when the landlord arrived, most tenants got cold feet and
pleaded for more time instead. Kabir and Shiuli were fortunate, as their
landlord knew them as long-time tenants and he did not insist on
payment. While the situation varied therefore based on people’s (prepandemic) relationships with their landlords, all of them experienced
heightened anxiety and panic, as they worried about convincing their
landlord to give them more time for rent payments. At the same time,
landlords whose sole income came from rent were also beginning to
struggle. With around 50,000 slum-dwellers returning to their villages to
avoid paying rent, landlords faced the constraints of demanding rent and
risking the tenant leaving, or giving tenants extended time to pay so that
they remained (BRAC 2020). At the same time, most adolescents were
born in Dhaka or had lived in the city for most of their lives, and did
not consider that returning to their natal or parents’ village was an
option. Further, options to return to a rural village were limited with
the introduction and enforcement of a government travel ban on
passenger travel via water, rail and on domestic air routes from 24 March,
and restrictions on road public transport from 26 March until 31 May
(Kamruzzaman and Sakib 2020a; Kamruzzaman and Sakib 2020b).
The police and army patrol officers acted as another set of gatekeepers, causing terror among residents if they left the slums during
lockdown. Kabir spoke with us of breaking the lockdown rules and selling
mangoes in the streets: ‘A crowd was gathering near us … the police
started coming at us with sticks to beat us. I ran and hid in a corner … We
grabbed a few of our mangoes and just ran. Luckily I was not hit by the
police.’ Likewise, Jewel explained his panic when being confronted by
the police: ‘I was walking to work (when lockdown restrictions had eased
up) and I had my mask with me, but not over my face/mouth. The police
SCARCITY AND RESILIENCE IN THE SLUMS OF DHAKA CITY
291
started yelling at me, asking why I didn’t have my mask on properly. I just
put on my mask quietly and didn’t say anything.’ Shahnaz explained some
of the contradictions of interacting with the law:
Usually the police come to our area and take money from the local
shopkeepers and smaller drug stores. Now with the coronavirus
they harass us to stay inside, but over the last few months, we see
them less and less. In a way it’s good because they don’t take money
from our local people anymore. They are scared of the virus.
Newspapers reported that police threatened low-income people who had
to defy lockdown to earn their livelihoods (Sajid 2020), beating them and
enforcing humiliating punishment, for instance, forcing men to do sit-ups
while holding their ears. Many people view the police as the ‘enemy’, as
holding excessive power, and as corrupt and abusive. Crime and insecurity
tend to be rampant in slum settlements, and usually the police are paid
off, with little recourse to justice for poor residents. For adolescents, being
confronted by a police officer is traumatic and a stark reminder of their
lack of power. However, in this chapter, we follow Lombard’s (2014) call
to focus on ‘the everyday’ and analyse adolescents and youth as ‘more or
less autonomous actors who creatively engage with, and shape’, and give
meaning, to the places and spaces they inhabit. This allows us to see
young slum residents not simply as passive subjects with little agency in
the face of overwhelming poverty; in both subtle and overt ways many
challenged the regulations imposed by the state.
Distrust and fear of the police, and general lack of trust in law
enforcement bodies, has been documented in other epidemics, such as
Ebola (Van Belle et al. 2020). Effective and transparent urban governance
that enables and promotes trust in communities is needed for effective
emergency responses. In slums this is absent. Without formal governance,
non-state organisations and resident-led informal governance mechanisms
stepped in. For example, in Dhaka, the few landlords who owned their own
compounds introduced rules to increase physical distancing as much as
feasible among the tenants when using shared facilities (Rashid et al.
2020b).
Faith in times of pandemic
For most participants, religion offered some solace. In late March and
early April, despite the lockdown, many people were still congregating for
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prayers. Rubel (18), Hanif (17) and Faruq (19) went to the mosque on
a regular basis during the early weeks of lockdown, and explained:
‘COVID-19 is a consequence of people’s sin and a punishment from Allah,
because people no longer pray as much as they should’. The pandemic,
they argued, was evidence of wrath from the divine for peoples’ perceived
lack of morality and sin. Hanif informed us that he had heard that those
who perform ablutions five times before prayers were protected from the
virus, because it ‘keeps them clean’. Meena shared how in her despair,
she needed immediate comfort and went to pray in the woman’s section
of the mosque; when leaving, she placed 10 BDT (UA$0.12), not a small
amount for her, into the box for donations. As poor as she was, she felt
compelled to donate a small amount, hoping that her prayers for salvation
from her current circumstances would be heard.
Where institutions, systems, communities and even families failed
to provide the required support, and trust was shaken, many residents
were left with only their faith to cope with overwhelming feelings of
helplessness. Places of worship also became sites of temporary solidarity
and meeting places in the slums, although primarily for men. Local
mosques encouraged people to continue to attend Friday prayers until 6
April 2020. Until then, according to those interviewed, soap was available
for hand washing and people practised some physical distancing inside
the prayer rooms. Moreover, for most people, the mosque was viewed as
safer than other sites such as crowded markets, because it was considered
a sacred space, leaving some to assume divine protection against
transmission of the virus. The comfort and security of meeting others in
the mosque also overrode any fears of infection. Religious beliefs and
faith in the divine were viewed as a protection against COVID-19, and this
theme was repeated by the majority of our respondents (Rabbani 2020).
Conclusion
Deep structures of vulnerability and structural violence shaped the
conditions of everyday life during lockdown for young people living in
slums, and produced multilevel challenges. As we have illustrated, an
intersectional approach highlights how, during the pandemic, different
social axes (here, youth, gender, class, poverty, sources of livelihood)
intersected with social location (here, Dhaka’s slums) through time, and
were shaped by interconnected systems, structure and processes of power,
oppression and domination to shape all aspects of people’s lives. We have
also illustrated the importance of affect: that is, people experienced
SCARCITY AND RESILIENCE IN THE SLUMS OF DHAKA CITY
293
emotional vulnerabilities in response to the economic and social
constraints that characterised the COVID-19 pandemic and its unfolding.
We have described the heterogeneity of slum residents and depicted
how young people’s lives were (and are) enmeshed in struggles with
powerful and diverse interest groups, yet their narratives attest to their
continued resilience and inventiveness to manage multiple constraints.
When officials declared a state of emergency and imposed sudden
restrictions, young people, already in a precarious situation, were affected
emotionally and materially by the scarcity in their lives. The rules,
imposed by the state and the police who were regulating spaces and
COVID-19 related behaviours, receive limited attention in public health
discourses. The lockdown threatened people with starvation, and
addressing this required that they acted in ways that contravened
with the precautions to prevent the spread of the pandemic – staying at
home and maintaining physical distance. The role of the police force, the
extensive curtailing of employment opportunities, restricted movement,
and economic and home insecurities, disrupted social relationships and
gendered expectations. All presented challenges beyond the control of
individuals, and required resources and infrastructure to mitigate them
(Coetzee and Kagee 2020).
However, within conditions of deprivation, young people immediately
tried to remake their local and social worlds. They made independent
decisions in the light of the limited options that were available. They
frantically explored all kinds of existing and new networks for support to
cope, irrespective of restrictions, looking for alternate income sources,
taking loans, exploring social relationships, negotiating and navigating
with powerful actors, and turning to faith to manage anxiety and distress.
Driven by panic, desperation and the need for quick action for survival, as
they grappled with physical hunger and daily mental anxiety, adolescents
took risks with the police, landlords and loan agents, when normally they
might be fearful or reluctant to engage with them. Their actions showed
resilience as they attempted to create a semblance of normalcy in a world
turned upside down. We do not wish, here, to romanticise or overstate the
agency of adolescents and young people in slums in Dhaka, but most young
people tried to transform or navigate, in whatever ways were possible,
existing relationships of domination, oppression and exploitation
(Cresswell 2004, 29). Sharp and colleagues (2000, 20) argue that power is
messy and not simply one of a binary model of domination/resistance. It
must be understood as ‘an amalgam of forces, processes, practices and
relations, all of which spin out along the precarious threads of society and
space’ (Sharp et al. 2000, 20).
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The narratives of adolescents and young people show us how slums
are sites of complex social interactions. Cresswell (2004, 11) states that
the focus on the everyday, lived experiences of the poor highlights the
complicated ‘interplay of people and the environment’ as it is continually
constructed and co-constructed. Simone (2004, 14) argues that by
highlighting the struggles and negotiations in which people in poor
communities actively engage, these narratives make ‘visible urban
possibilities that have been crowded out or left diffuse or opaque’ in
debates that often essentialise the identities of settlement dwellers.
COVID-19 brings new challenges to existing structural violence,
deepens this violence, and sharpens the vulnerability of young people
and their families. The structural, social, economic and political realities
interact to leave young people and their families marginalised and at
risk, not only from hunger and malnutrition, but at risk of catastrophic
economic losses with long-lasting repercussions. As their lives unfolded
during the pandemic, it became clear that the unequal distribution
of power and wealth across class, gender, age and location created
and perpetuated power inequalities and inequities. Critical medical
anthropology combined with intersectionality can help make visible
varying forms of structural violence (physical, social, economic, political),
and illustrate how these are often mediated by more ‘micro’ level
characteristics and unique circumstances of identity and lack of power
and privilege. Poverty and patriarchal gender norms shaping early
marriage, norms related to male rice-winners, and lack of voice, for
example, interact to shape individual experiences in varying ways.
Definitions of vulnerability tend to exclude young people as they are
often viewed as resilient and able to recover, and so they remain among
the ‘invisible’ poor. But in our research, the lives of many young people
have been ones of missed dreams and lost opportunities as they transition
into social adulthood quickly, taking on roles and responsibilities while
still very young. The reality is that they do not lament this loss, for they
have no choices or options. Their micro worlds are ones of survival and
resilience, and this is the familiar terrain they have navigated since they
were very young. They are pragmatic about the circumstances of their
lives. Being confronted with illnesses and death is an everyday reality for
many poor adolescents living in Dhaka’s slums. In this context, COVID-19
was yet another addition to an already long list of health and other
challenges that they faced (Rashid et al. 2020a).
There has been limited discussion on the impact of COVID-19 on
youth in marginalised contexts, and our research makes visible the
experiences of adolescents and young people in urban slums, amplifying
SCARCITY AND RESILIENCE IN THE SLUMS OF DHAKA CITY
295
the urgency to address the levels of social injustice that exist. Authorities
must rethink their engagement with young people living in slums, and
respond and recognise the links between governance, health and equity
(Arab News 2020). Young people in slums can support mitigation strategies
for the short- and long-term impacts of COVID-19, if they are engaged
with and participate in shaping responses. The voices and perspectives of
adolescents and youth presented here are common among most urban poor
populations in the city. Their struggles, however, are largely invisible.
It is not enough to understand why young people live in such
deprivation and how they manage and cope. We need to closely examine
who is most affected by this pandemic and how to promote justice. The
distribution of wealth in the country, and the discrepancies in resources
within the population, shape the risk of infection and its outcomes. But it
would be myopic to create a national policy to mitigate the impact of
COVID-19 without also addressing the unique challenges faced by
younger populations. We need to critically reflect not only on the failures
of the local state, but also on existing global policies and politics. All
combine to impact adversely on the lives of those who are most vulnerable.
Acknowledgements
All research activities were reviewed and approved by the Institutional
Review Board (IRB) at BRAC James P. Grant School of Public Health
(JPGSPH), BRAC University. Cash incentives of 200 taka were provided
at the time of each interview. Data were recorded with consent from
the participants, transcribed and translated. Informed consent took
place over the phone. All names used are pseudonyms. We thank the
participants for so readily sharing their experiences. The research
was supported by the core fund of the BRAC JPGSPH, BRAC University;
we received no additional external funding for the research, authorship
and/or publication of this chapter. Time for some authors to input was
supported by the UKRI GCRF Accountability for Informal Urban Equity
Hub (also known as ARISE); a UKRI Collective Fund award, RC Grant
reference, ES/S00811X/1. ARISE is a research consortium aiming to
enhance accountability and improve the health and wellbeing of
marginalised populations living in informal urban settlements in Kenya,
Sierra Leone, Bangladesh and India. We are grateful to Aisha and
Sumona, colleagues at the school, who collected some of the data at
different points of the research project, and to the editors of this volume
for their positive and constructive comments.
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Part IV
The reach of care
16
Making do
COVID-19 and the improvisation of
care in the UK and US
Ellen Block and Cecilia Vindrola-Padros
COVID-19 has disrupted all aspects of healthcare delivery across the
globe. The novel coronavirus has upended both the expectation of relative
stability in care and service delivery in the Global North and the assurance
that providers and patients will have access to – and knowledge about –
the best ways to treat disease. The pandemic has forced healthcare
workers (HCWs) to contend with limited knowledge about a disease,
uncertainty about the best treatments and practices available and a crisis
of faith in the system and in their own ability to provide care. As a result,
significant improvisation has occurred at both an institutional level and
at a microlevel of everyday practice. Based on data from qualitative
interviews with healthcare workers in the United States (US) and United
Kingdom (UK), in this chapter we examine the striking similarities in
improvisational strategies and techniques that healthcare systems and
HCWs have employed during the COVID-19 pandemic. Such improvisation
has resulted in structural institutional changes as well as microlevel
changes as a response to resource shortages, risk reduction strategies
and lifesaving techniques. This improvisation in the UK and the US
demonstrates the flexibility of seemingly rigid institutions. At first, the
crisis conditions that led to such improvisation appeared to flatten
inequalities by mimicking the precarity and uncertainty of practising
medicine in resource-poor contexts. Ultimately, however, the COVID-19
pandemic – like all catastrophes – merely serves to reveal the fault lines
of inequality and the fractures of healthcare systems.
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Context and methods
The COVID-19 pandemic set unprecedented demand on healthcare
systems globally. Emerging research from multiple countries has included
reports of HCW fatigue, distress and anxiety as well as positive emotional
responses (e.g. ‘growth under pressure’) and helpful coping mechanisms
(Liu et al. 2020; Song et al. 2020; Sun et al. 2020). In the US, the largely
inadequate response to COVID-19 has been widely publicised, and as of
this writing (December 2020), the country continues to lead in both cases
and number of deaths globally. Responses to the pandemic, however, vary
widely by state, by city and by hospital system, everywhere deeply
entrenched in local politics. Because there is no national healthcare
system in the US, there is no centralised system of personal protective
equipment (PPE) acquisition, no standard way to deal with suspected
COVID-19 patients when they show up at the emergency room (ER) and
no formal coordination of communication channels to share emerging
research and best practices. Instead, each hospital or hospital system,
sometimes based on directives from the local and federal government and
sometimes based on directives by hospital administrators, has developed
its own strategies to manage patient flow and the reorganisation of
hospital space, COVID-19 testing, medical student and junior doctor1
training and PPE acquisition. HCWs have learned from others’ experiences
through informal channels and grassroots movements.
In the case of the UK, the COVID-19 pandemic impacted a public
healthcare system, the National Health Service (NHS), already struggling
with workforce issues including high vacancy and low retention rates
of staff, limited bed capacity and funding cuts (Dayan et al. 2018). In
March 2020, the UK went into lockdown with social distancing policies
implemented across the population to reduce the transmission of COVID19 and the burden on the healthcare system. By April, the NHS had put
in place protocols across the system to manage the flow of COVID patients
and reduce the volume of non-COVID patients in their hospitals, including
suspending a range of services. While there was some variation in how
different hospitals responded, national-level recommendations on the
expansion of critical care capacity, cancellation of elective care and
workforce redesign were made available and followed in most cases
(NHS 2020).
Hospitals and HCWs in both countries were unprepared for the
needs of patients and staff as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. Early in
the pandemic, it became clear that there would be a need for improvisation
both at the institutional level and at the level of everyday practice in order
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to manage the changed flow of patients and reduce risks to patients,
families and frontline workers. Despite vast differences between the
US and the UK, the kinds of responses in institutional structures and
healthcare practices were strikingly similar in both contexts, indicating a
similar sense of uncertainty, global sharing of knowledge and a disease
which applies pressure in similar ways, resulting in similar improvisational
strategies.
Both studies were designed as rapid appraisals (Vindrola-Padros et
al. 2020). The US-based study consisted of 55 hour-long semi-structured
interviews conducted between April and September 2020 with healthcare
workers from 18 different states, including doctors, nurses and advanced
care providers.2 Findings were analysed using MAXQDA. The UK study
combined a review of UK healthcare policies (n=70 policies), mass media
and social media analysis of frontline staff experiences and perceptions
(n=101 newspaper articles, n=146,000 posts) and in-depth (telephone)
interviews with frontline staff (n=123 interviews). The findings from all
streams were analysed using framework analysis.
Improvisation and instability
The uncertainty of COVID-19 lies both in its emergence and its complexity.
The rapid appearance of COVID-19 created many uncertainties socially,
economically and medically. For HCWs treating COVID-19 patients,
medical uncertainty centred on the unknowns surrounding infectiousness risk, treatments, symptoms and COVID-19-induced complications.
Treatment recommendations for COVID-19 and best practices for
supportive care changed rapidly during the first year of the pandemic,
especially during the first few months. The widely publicised early hopes
for the benefits of drugs such as hydroxychloroquine were quickly
dismissed (Self et al. 2020) as clinical trials for more effective drugs such
as remdesivir were underway (Beigel et al. 2020). In Wuhan, China, Italy
and New York City, three places hit hard by early waves of COVID-19,
poor patient outcomes quickly led to changing supportive care practices
such as more consistent use of proning (placing the patient on their
stomach) and delaying intubation (Coppo et al. 2020; Rola et al. 2020).
However, in the early stages of the pandemic, while HCWs gained a better
sense of supportive ventilation strategies and gained confidence in the
approach to hypoxia in COVID-19 patients, adaptations were largely
anecdotal, and did not address uncertainty about long-term outcomes.
This led to constantly changing guidelines on the clinical management of
MAKING DO
305
patients, the reorganisation of the infrastructure for care delivery (from
acute care to rehabilitation) and, considering the use and reuse of PPE in
the context of fluctuating equipment stock, the establishment of adequate
standards for infection control (Hoernke et al. 2020; Vindrola-Padros
et al. 2020).
Additionally, at the beginning of the pandemic very little was
known about COVID-19 complications, as countries rapidly battled to
save lives as a first priority. Some months into the pandemic, it became
clear that COVID-19 is a multisystem disease, affecting the gastrointestinal,
nervous, musculoskeletal, endocrine and cardiac systems (Kakodkar et al.
2020; Zhang et al. 2020). However, knowledge about long-term outcomes
has been gradual as clinicians and scientists have had to wait for
complications to manifest within their patients and for research results
to be published. This has caused considerable uncertainty surrounding
the delivery of rehabilitation care for the varying and complex needs
of patients.
As a result of the rapidly changing information and availability of
resources, healthcare workers and hospital administrators have adapted
both by changing institutional protocols and structures at the macro
level and improvising at the micro level to improve patient outcomes and
keep frontline workers safe. For institutions that are typically rigid in both
their organisational structure and their daily practices, the level of
uncertainty, the rapid pace of change and the need for improvisation was
both unprecedented and unsettling. In many ways, the provision of care
in the early days of the pandemic mimicked care provision in resourcepoor contexts, where healthcare providers have to contend with a lack of
evidence-based treatments, limited resources including both drugs and
PPE, and the need to shift, tinker and adapt to rapidly changing and
unpredictable contexts.
It is not surprising, then, that comparison can be made between the
challenges of providing care during the COVID-19 pandemic and
ethnographies of medicine stemming from the Global South where
resources, space and human capital are habitually limited. Such resourcepoor hospitals often show the ‘fluid, experimental, and improvised
nature of biomedicine’ (Street 2014, 16). At first, the COVID-19 pandemic
resembled these contexts in how they wrought uncertainty and
necessitated improvisation. In writing about improvisation in a public
cancer ward in Botswana, Julie Livingston observes the ‘daily imperative’
to ‘improvise new options from the resources available – material and
social’ (Livingston 2012, 181). The urgency and precarity that requires
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such improvisation was felt by HCWs in the US and the UK, particularly
at the start of COVID-19 before best practices had been established and
when it was uncertain how long resources would last. While, as Gawande
(2002) points out, doctors have always had to contend with a gap between
what they know and what they aim for, HCWs in the US and the UK
are unaccustomed to having to improvise at the speed or scale that
COVID-19 required.
Many healthcare workers said that meetings and communications
noting changes were occurring daily, and they had trouble keeping up.
HCWs were patching together information and supplies, from making
their own PPE, to joining social media platforms with doctors from all
over the world to learn about emerging best practices. For doctors in the
Global South, decision making has long been constrained by structural
and resource limitations, and such improvisation and flexibility is
standard. In Malawi, Wendland shows how doctors cobble together ‘social
networks, material goods, short-term opportunities and ideas to craft ad
hoc solutions to the problems they faced’ (2010, 154). In Dewachi’s
powerful ethnography of post-war Iraq (2017), after years of United
Nations sanctions, healthcare infrastructure was crumbling and HCWs
could not access the supplies they needed to treat their patients and care
for themselves. Doctors reused PPE, improvised by replacing catheters
with nasal tubes and sterilised disposable gloves, strategies strikingly
similar to those used by our interlocutors. As in the context of COVID-19,
while not ideal, these ‘improvised practices became essential to saving
lives’ (Dewachi 2017, xxi). However, unlike those contexts of entrenched
poverty, protracted post-war situations and chronic structural
vulnerability, the need for improvisation in responding to the uncertainties
of COVID-19 in the US and the UK are temporary. And yet, many of the
HCWs in this study alluded to the hospitals feeling like a war zone. The
difference between the experience of practising medicine – and receiving
care – in the US and UK early during the COVID-19 pandemic, and in
these other contexts of precarity and war in the Global South, is that the
war-like conditions or long-term structural conditions that lead to
entrenched precarity do not resolve quickly. Nonetheless, COVID-19
reveals how improvisation can become necessary in a time of crisis, even
among wealthier nations and relatively resource-rich healthcare contexts.
Given the high likelihood of future pandemics or disasters that require
nimble healthcare responses, much can be gained from analysing the
efficacy of improvisational strategies employed by HCWs in response to
COVID-19.
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Improvisation at the institutional level
One of the most surprising areas of improvisation and adaptation
during the COVID-19 pandemic has been at the institutional level. Large
institutions tend towards both homogeneity and intractability (DiMaggio
and Powell 1983). Hospitals and health systems have historically been
extremely rigid and slow to change. While HCWs are typically able to
nimbly respond to changes in medical practice, such as new treatments,
hospital and healthcare reform is notoriously challenging, particularly in
public hospital settings (Edwards and Saltman 2017). Yet, as a result of
massive global disruption, hospitals and health systems have had to adapt
quickly. In both the US and the UK, hospitals and healthcare systems have
made massive shifts in organisational structure and protocols, putting
into place new systems and changes that might normally take a decade to
implement.
As healthcare workers and hospital administrators in the US and the
UK watched COVID-19 devastate parts of China and Italy, they began to
prepare for the inevitable onslaught on their shores. In both locales, one
of the first changes to be implemented was to restructure the physical
space of the hospital. Elective surgeries were suspended, emergency
departments quickly altered their triage processes to identify those who
might have COVID-19, and many hospitals chose to segregate those
patients until their infection status was confirmed. In the US, different
hospitals had vastly different approaches: some kept patients for longer
in the ER until they knew their infection status; some sent any patient
suspected of COVID-19 or with respiratory issues to COVID-designated
floors until their status was confirmed. In the UK, in order to increase
capacity across hospitals, in April 2020, the NHS announced the prioritisation of cancer treatments and suspension of all non-urgent elective
surgery for three months. Operating rooms were repurposed and private
facilities were commissioned for NHS services (Willan et al. 2020).
Strategies to address workforce gaps included: the redeployment of staff;
the reintegration of recently retired staff into the active workforce; and
early graduation of medical students (Song et al. 2020). In addition,
changes were rapidly made to the hospital infrastructure, as critical care
units needed to expand to other areas of the hospital and staff improvised
space to set up new beds and equipment and the electrical sockets and
connections required to power the ventilators.
These changes not only required changing the triaging system, but
also required considerable physical changes in the space of the hospital.
While some hospitals created zones for COVID and non-COVID patients,
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converting paediatric intensive care units (ICUs), surgical wards and
private facilities into spaces for COVID patients, others tore down walls,
erected tents and installed HEPA filters to the windows creating negative
pressure rooms. In the UK, the Nightingale Hospitals (referred to by the
general public as ‘pop-up’ hospitals as they were built in a matter of days)
were created to help London hospitals deal with the surge in patients
requiring hospitalisation. In New York City, one of the hardest hit locales
in the US, a Navy ship was parked in New York’s harbour to handle patient
overflow, the convention centre was converted into a field hospital, and
a pop-up tent hospital was erected in Central Park to accommodate
coronavirus patients. One hospital system in a midwestern city in the US
converted a long-term acute care facility into a COVID hospital in less
than a week and began sending COVID patients from all of their partner
hospitals to that location. Kieran, a doctor and quality officer for that
hospital system, reflected on that time: ‘It was very intense. Within, you
know, literally a week or two we got that whole thing up and running and
that provided a mental model for how we could co-locate all our COVID
patients into one location and really begin to standardise our approach to
their management’. The completion of the physical rearrangement, which
required intensive work by construction workers, engineers, infectious
disease experts and environmental service specialists, was necessary
before the work of figuring out how to care for patients could really begin.
One of the most frustrating things for healthcare workers was the
pace of change. Daily calls, system-wide email directives and meetings
after hours informed HCWs of a new approach to patient care or a new
way of organising hospital space, only to be changed again a week later.
This occurred in relation to testing guidelines in the UK, as Rachel, one of
the nurses working in the ICU, indicated, ‘at one point we were told we
might not get tested even though one person in the team had confirmed
COVID-19, which seemed to go against previous suggestions’. Some
hospitals tried out a cohort model, segregating COVID-patients to a
certain area, but quickly realised there was too much spill over of COVID
patients into non-COVID units. Because of the experimental nature of
improvisation at a structural level, the guidelines were not always
evidence based, and sometimes they simply did not work. Dave, a chief
medical officer for a large urban public hospital in the US said, ‘Just the
tolerance for change, and, you know, basically shutting an entire
ambulatory and surgical system down to only essentials and trying to
restart it for 7000 employees … it’s been challenging. It’s been a lot of
long hours and I would just say it’s been emotionally draining’. Laughing,
he added, ‘It’s like change management on steroids’.
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While the pace of change was stressful, it was not impossible, as
hospital administrators might have guessed. Some changes were borne
out of necessity. For example, in the US and UK, telemedicine implementation and adoption ramped up very quickly (Car et al. 2020; Alexander
et al. 2020), and thus avoided some of the bureaucratic slowdowns
that would occur under normal circumstances. In the UK, the NHS
implemented telemedicine in order to support patients and avoid them
visiting their general practitioners or coming into hospital, so reducing
the risk of the spread of COVID-19 (Leite et al. 2020). Telemedicine in the
UK was also used to monitor patients waiting for surgical procedures
and identify any potential cases of deterioration that would need to be
escalated to emergency care. John, a cardiothoracic surgeon in the UK
who was redeployed to critical care, explained: ‘One change we had to
make is that every patient who has been deferred an [elective] operation
will receive a phone call each week to monitor symptoms and triage
patients at home. We can then see who is deteriorating and ask them
to come to the emergency department’. William, a nurse practitioner
in the US, said: ‘The nice thing that COVID did was instead of slowly
implementing telehealth and trying to work through all the kinks in it
slowly over months at a time, kind of all the resources got put into it’.
While these kinds of rapid systemic changes created overwhelming waves
of new protocols and procedures for HCWs to learn, they were grateful
for the extra communication.
Additionally, several HCWs said the difficulty of the situation
brought their colleagues closer together. Dave, a chief medical officer in
the US, described in detail some conflict he was having with colleagues
over PPE directives. But, he added:
Despite these interactions, overall, we were much more on the same
page. I could have never gotten thirty-five senior leader physicians
to get on a call every night. There’s no way in hell. I couldn’t even
get them on a call one night, and now they’re calling in every night,
faithfully. And everybody’s pitching in to try to help each other out.
And I’m like, oh, my God, this is great. We can leverage this success
onward.
Robert, a chief information officer in the US, was also surprised by the
flexibility in implementing massive structural changes at his hospital, and
noted: ‘So that’s good to learn that we can be pretty nimble, we can make
adjustments pretty quickly and succeed’. David, a doctor in the UK,
associated the speed of changes with the reduction of barriers encountered
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pre-COVID-19. He said, ‘[The pandemic] demonstrated that change can
be done quickly, what normally takes a year can be done in [a]week, less
red tape. We are able to do more in a short time’. Whether these changes
are lasting beyond this pandemic is of course unknown.
Improvisation as resource scarcity
Much improvisation also occurred as a result of scarcity or the fear of
future scarcity, particularly regarding personal protective equipment. In
the UK, HCWs reported several adaptations to delivering care in order to
preserve PPE, such as the use of verbal prescriptions, open bays with
multiple COVID-19 patients, limiting visitors and fewer HCWs seeing
patients on ward rounds. Some HCWs resorted to privately purchasing
PPE and some NHS units received donations of PPE, including 3D printed
masks and visors. Extreme examples from the media analysis included
HCWs improvising PPE out of children’s safety goggles, cooking aprons
and bin liners.
In the US and the UK, PPE shortages varied from place to place, as
did administrators’ and HCWs’ responses to shortages. In some places,
HCWs were directed to use a certain number of masks, gowns and face
shields per shift. In others, PPE was used for a certain number of patients
or certain types of patients. For example, Julie, a paediatric ICU nurse in
Chicago, received one N95 mask per shift but a new surgical mask to put
on top of it with each patient. In addition, each room had a designated
face shield which nurses shared when they entered the room, which, Julie
noted, ‘was kind of gross’. Melissa, an ER doctor in the US, explained how
she tinkered with the order of patients to preserve PPE:
We didn’t have enough of the outer yellow gowns, so we were trying
to use them in a wise way. If I had a COVID rule-out patient, I saw
them first. And I could put another gown on for anyone that had
COVID plus MRSA or Pseudomonas, one of these other contagious
infections. And then I’d get rid of those. And then I would have a
new set that I’d wear for COVID only patients but since they already
had COVID you could just wear the same gown in each room. In the
end it meant that you’re wearing this yellow gown for eight patients
or ten in a row trying to preserve it because the floor was running
out of them, and was trying to keep them for the nurses who had to
go in and give medications and bring meals and all these other
moments of contact.
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Melissa’s creative strategy was not implemented as policy, but providers
shared such strategies with each other in order to ensure adequate PPE
for the whole team. In the UK, there were similar examples of rationing
and individual processes of negotiation led by HCWs who believed the
measures implemented in their hospital were not safe. Janet, a healthcare
assistant, explained:
They were saying that we were the ones that really should be using
[PPE] and anyone who was in the room but is further away doesn’t
need it, because they’re not at the mouth of the patient … you were
begging to have more … you’d have to really make a stand and say
well, ‘everybody in my team is wearing it’.
In both countries, several HCWs mentioned that this type of coordination
and communication brought their team closer, and in some instances broke
down hierarchies between doctors, nurses and other frontline workers.
One of the most frustrating and disconcerting things about PPE
shortages were the constantly changing recommendations, which were
both hard to keep track of and undermined HCWs’ confidence that they
were able to protect themselves adequately. At first, some HCWs were told
they only needed to use a surgical mask when seeing a COVID-19 patient,
unless performing an aerosolising procedure such as an intubation.
However, as Quinn, an ER doctor in one of the early US hotspots noted,
the HCWs pushed back on this recommendation because it felt unsafe:
‘Everyone was like, that’s total bullshit and not based on science but just
based on the lack of supplies. And that’s not appropriate’. After HCWs
organised in protest, their hospital changed its recommendation to allow
use of N95 masks with all COVID-19 patients. In the UK study, frontline
staff found it difficult to follow national-level PPE guidance when there
were shortages, leading to re-use and improvisation of personal protective
equipment (Hoernke et al. 2020). Linda, a charge nurse, said:
Some staff felt messages of what PPE is required, in what situations,
that there was a little bit of distrust … If the advice keeps changing,
are we getting the right message? And is this message safe? Which
caused a bit of worry and anxiety for some of the staff because at the
same time they were hearing on the press that colleagues in other
hospitals were getting sick.
Josh, a junior doctor in his last year of training in the southern United
States, reflected on the fact that he was being told to use PPE in ways
contradictory to everything he had learned in medical school:
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I gotta say, it was really funny to have something that the infection
prevention people have always trained you so very well on and then
all of a sudden we’re in this pandemic, and the masks are no longer
one time use, right? Because they anticipated that if we did that, we
would run out of masks. I think some places around the country did
run out of masks. Now, we didn’t. But if you consider the fact that
we were reusing masks, I kind of consider that as having run out of
the masks because they weren’t being used the appropriate way
they were initially intended.
In other words, the only reason hospitals had not completely run out of
PPE is because they were using it inappropriately. While most interviewees
in both countries said they had not yet completely run out of PPE,
HCWs’ experiences with PPE protocols provides a stark reminder that
inappropriate PPE usage is a dangerous form of shortage as well, because
its effectiveness is unknown.
To preserve PPE, healthcare workers also had to creatively improvise
storage, preservation and cleaning techniques. HCWs stored N95 masks
in paper bags or rested them on styrofoam cups so they would not touch
anything while not in use, while some treated them with UV lights or
hydrogen peroxide to try and kill any virus particles on them. In some
cases, hospital administrators came up with a system for sending PPE
away to be cleaned. But, as Josh noted, clean does not necessarily equate
with effective: ‘Maybe it comes back clean but there’s also a question of
does it lose effectiveness? Its filtration, does that lose effectiveness?
Because, even if it comes back clean, great it’s clean. But after how many
uses does the material itself start allowing more stuff through?’. In both
countries, HCWs reported foregoing food and water during their shifts in
order to preserve PPE and avoid risk of infection. In the UK, there were
several cases of dehydration among HCWs who were using full PPE; in
many cases, this was because HCWs were not taking the recommended
hydration and bathroom breaks because they did not want to ‘waste’ PPE.
Peter, a junior doctor explained: ‘So, there were times, for instance, where
you needed to go to the loo, but you didn’t want to waste PPE’.
While PPE was the primary target of resource scarcity management,
HCWs in the UK and the US feared a shortage of ventilators as well, which
led to the redistribution and improvisation of machines. In some cases,
HCWs used backup ventilators and transport ventilators normally used in
ambulances when supplies were low. In most places, hospitals restricted
the use of non-invasive ventilation strategies that utilise positive airway
pressure such as CPAP and BPAP machines, due to the risk of aerosolising
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particles (Pirzada et al. 2020; Arulkumaran et al. 2020). However, HCWs
made creative adjustments to use these non-invasive strategies in order
to make use of them. Leo, a junior doctor in the US, explained how his
colleagues adjusted bag valve masks to avoid release of aerosolising
particles:
Technically we’re not allowed to use a bag valve mask right now.
Some of my colleagues have come up with some clever ways to
insert a viral filter into the rest of the system and use these one-way
valves and shut off different pieces so you can say, look, you could
probably use this as a bag valve mask, and this is probably compliant
with the wishes of those above us.
These tactics both avoided intubating patients for whom intermediate
positive air support was sufficient and preserved ventilators for patients
who needed them. In the UK, HCWs used anaesthetic machines for
ventilation because, although these were not fit for the purpose, they felt
that they had to ‘make do with what they had at the time’. Like many
tactics used to address resource shortages, these stopgap measures and
improvisations were informal and their effectiveness unexamined.
Improvisation as risk reduction strategy
In addition to PPE, HCWs and hospitals implemented many micro and
macro changes to reduce the risk of acquiring and transmitting COVID-19
between patients, themselves and their families. In both the US and the
UK, most hospitals administered temperature checks and symptom
monitoring for all HCWs arriving at work (although the consistency of
these practices varied by hospital). HCWs also reported taking additional
precautions upon entering and leaving the hospital to protect their family
members at home. Kristen, a nurse working in a COVID unit in the eastern
US, was particularly diligent because her husband, who worked from
home, was fearful she would contract the virus and bring it home to him
and their three young children. She explained:
On the way to work, I put everything in the canvas washable tote
bag. I only bring my wallet in. I leave for work in my scrubs, but
when I’m coming home, I take my scrubs off at the hospital, put on
pants and a t-shirt. I have a tracker thing where my husband has me
share my ETA on my way home. He likes to get the washing machine
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going, and the thing is already open and the water and soap already
in so I don’t touch anything. The basement door is open, everything’s
ready to go. So I leave my shoes in the car I come inside. I put the
t-shirt, the pants, my scrubs and the canvas tote all right in the
wash. I have a bleach spray for my phone. And then I have to run
upstairs naked, take a shower and then he’s fine.
While on the extreme end of cautiousness, most HCWs in both the US and
the UK had some kind of rigorous routine, which added a significant
amount of time and effort to their already long workday.
One primary strategy that both served to preserve PPE and reduce
risk of infection was to limit the number of people and times one entered
the room of a COVID-19 patient. In the UK, to reduce the risk of infection
and respond to concerns about mask shortages, HCWs were told ‘if a
member of staff does not need to go into the risk area, they should be kept
out’. Leo, a junior doctor in the US, said:
For a while there we were having some shortages of PPE. So we tried
to come up with clever ways of getting around that. Let’s count one
person and put them in the room and then we’re just going to pass
you in stuff, you’re just going to sit in there for an hour, because
we’re just going to see if there’s anything else we need to do.
Leo also described what he called an intubation box, a plexiglass box some
doctors had made, which they would place over the patient’s head and
reach into to perform intubations. He marvelled, ‘The level of ingenuity of
emergency room doctors, I think, is very, very high. They’re always looking
for clever things to do to solve problems that don’t have easy solutions and
I definitely have seen that kind of stuff’. Jeff, an American ER doctor, and
his colleagues developed similarly creative strategies:
Pretty early on we realised we had to try to minimise the number of
times you have to go into a room so we were trying to batch care. So,
don’t trickle in orders for labs like that so the nurse has to go in once
an hour to get new lab draws. We tried do all that at once so they
just have to go in one time … I’ve heard of pretty innovative things
in ICUs where instead of putting the IV pumps on the bed right next
to the patient, they’ll actually run a really long IV line through the
door to the nurse’s station. So it probably looks crazy, just huge long
IV lines running across the floor but it keeps the nurse from having
to go in.
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The combination of PPE shortages and uncertainties around the
transmission of COVID-19 created a scenario ripe for innovation. The
constant need for innovation and the uncertainty of these measures
created both a sense of solidarity among HCWs and an ever-present
reminder that the infection could be anywhere, which was also a source
of stress (Block 2020).
Improvisation as a lifesaving technique
At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, in particular in places hit hard
early on, case fatality rates were high and severely ill patients had poor
outcomes (Fan et al. 2020; Horby et al. 2020). In the absence of evidencebased approaches, HCWs improvised based on anecdotal experience,
communication with personal networks and social media message boards
aimed at medical professionals (Chan et al. 2020). While it takes time for
randomised controlled studies and clinical trials to go from study design
to publication, healthcare providers sought ways to share information,
including improvisation strategies. At first, HCWs were troubled by their
own lack of knowledge about managing COVID-19. For example,
Jonathan, a senior clinical site manager in the UK interviewed early in the
pandemic, said:
The thing with COVID that’s, I think, been troubling the most
people, and definitely for me, is the lack of knowledge, and so you
can read everything and I’ve been listening to the NHS podcast
every week, I’ve been reading everything that’s available online. I’ve
been doing everything I can to keep myself as up to date as possible
but there’s just not a lot out there. And so that’s been quite scary, as
a healthcare professional, certainly for me, you arm yourself with as
much knowledge and practical application as possible. But when
the knowledge is in deficit all you’ve got is some kinds of application
and very little knowledge.
Matt, an ER doctor in the US, expressed similar sentiments in June 2020,
just as the first infection peak was subsiding:
Doctors like to think we’re so damn smart, we have all these tricks
up our sleeve that we can do to get people better … And we just do
not have that with this virus. It’s like, we don’t know why some
people get so sick and others don’t. We don’t know if any of the
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things we’re doing are working or have no impact or are harming
people. So I think that’s the most infuriating thing about the virus
… I just feel totally powerless.
As HCWs gained experience caring for COVID-19 patients, they shared
anecdotal information about supportive care practices that seemed to be
working to support the patient through the disease (as opposed to treating
it). Some key practices, including delaying intubation, which has now
been studied (Rola et al. 2020), were first communicated through these
informal networks. Jeff, an American ER doctor, described how this
information improved his approach to patient care:
It’s definitely been a boom of creativity in terms of how we can do
this more efficiently and safer, a big sea change, and I think probably
it will be seen later in clinical studies that the mortality has gone
down. Initially they were saying, you need to put a breathing tube
down and intubate the patient once they hit a certain threshold of
oxygen, which is pretty standard for most of our patients. But we
found, [COVID patients] kind of paradoxically tolerate a lot lower
oxygen saturations than most people. So the clinical decision to
intubate them was really pushed further down the line over the last
couple of months, and those patients have actually done pretty well.
So it turned out that, for whatever reason, keeping them off
the ventilator as long as we can has really hopefully saved a lot of
lives. Initially I’m not sure what was going on in Italy and China, but
that wasn’t recognised. So that the fact that that could be recognised
and changed within about a month was pretty amazing. And that
was from a lot of the work in New York. So, just that kind of flexibility
to change practice patterns and change what people have been
doing for the last 50 years was pretty impressive because medicine
can be pretty intransigent in terms of, you know, taking 20 years to
change and things have been changing week by week, especially
early on.
The medical research on COVID-19 is being published at a feverish
pace, and HCWs’ experience in caring for and treating COVID-19 patients
has also increased. As a result, the need to improvise as a lifesaving
technique is becoming less necessary. However, managing long-term
complications for COVID-19 patients and the complex needs of patients
with particular co-morbidities will require creativity and ingenuity for
some time.
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Improvisation and inequality
During the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic in the US and the UK,
improvisation – and the conditions that have necessitated it – in many
ways flattened inequalities between wealthy and poor communities,
nations and healthcare systems. Healthcare workers were overwhelmed with patients, lacked evidence-based treatments and supportive
care practices, and experienced acute shortages of PPE and medical
devices needed to treat severe respiratory illnesses. COVID-19 patients in
wealthy nations, such as Italy and the US, have had astonishingly high
mortality rates and deaths (Livingston and Bucher 2020; Johns Hopkins
Coronavirus Resource Center 2020). Yet, as the first acute crisis phase of
the virus passed, and HCWs learned from each other and from emerging
studies, patient outcomes improved (Fan et al. 2020). As the war-like
conditions subsided, it became clear that COVID-19 disease and all the
reverberating effects, like other major disasters, only served to reveal the
fault lines of inequality both for HCWs and for patients. While in theory,
anyone is at risk of contracting and dying of COVID-19, in reality race,
poverty, occupation and living conditions are risk factors for both
infection and death (Patel et al. 2020; Bowleg 2020; El-Khatib et al. 2020;
Pan et al. 2020; Abedi et al. 2020).
Josh, an ER junior doctor in the US, explained the living conditions
and working conditions that might lead to poor patient outcomes:
It’s a lot easier to social distance when you have a family of four in
4000 square feet in your suburb and have a bunch of yard space
between you and your neighbour, than when you are in a row home
in an urban area with a multi-generational household. And there’s
also an economic strain where you might have to go out in the
community to do the work you have to do … And you know there’s
baseline health status even with chronic disease … It’s honestly a
structure of racism that persists, that is really apparent and really
disheartening.
Matt, an ER doctor in the US, described a Latinx woman who was
intubated for COVID-19. Upon being extubated, she learned that her
husband and son had died of COVID while she was hospitalised. He
added, ‘We are not seeing that from wealthy white folks in the suburbs
going through that problem’.
Inequality also exists for healthcare workers, both in terms of
workplace conditions and vulnerability to COVID-19. In the UK study,
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research participants highlighted that HCWs of lower seniority, females
and ethnic minorities faced greater barriers accessing PPE than their
colleagues during times of shortages. Female HCWs expressed concerns
regarding the lack of small-sized masks and reported having to deliver
care despite failed fit-tests for N95 masks. During the 2015 MERS
outbreak in Korea, female HCWs experienced similar difficulties, with
oversized coveralls impairing clinical skills and large masks not adequately
sealing around their faces, raising concerns about both patient and HCW
safety (Kang et al. 2018). Despite only making up 21 per cent of the NHS
workforce, Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) HCWs have been
overrepresented in the proportion of HCW deaths from COVID-19 in the
UK, accounting for 63 per cent of nurses and 95 per cent of medical staff
deaths (Cook et al. 2020). Supporting the concerns raised by our
participants, lack of access to PPE was perceived by BAME HCWs as a
major contributing factor to the higher death rates (see also Gamlin,
Gibbon and Calestani, this volume Chapter 6).
Conclusion
In the US and the UK, the COVID-19 pandemic necessitated improvisation
both at the institutional level and at the microlevel of everyday clinical
practice. In a matter of days and weeks, hospitals rearranged their
physical spaces and drastically changed their flow of patients to deal
with the influx of people and the insidious infectiousness of COVID-19. In
light of the uncertainty they were facing, healthcare workers tinkered and
adapted to improve patient outcomes, protect themselves and their
patients, preserve PPE and respond to broader resource shortages in
providing supportive care for COVID-19 patients. While in the early stages
of the pandemic, as tropes about being ‘in it together’ and emphasising
everyone’s susceptibility to COVID-19 abounded, rates of infection and
clinical outcomes clearly demonstrated the ways that pre-existing and
intersecting structures of inequality play out in this context as well.
Ethnographies of medical improvisation have typically been located
in resource-poor contexts where protracted conditions of poverty and
conflict necessitate creative tinkering and adjustments (Livingston 2012;
Street 2014; Dewachi 2017; Wendland 2010). Yet, the flexibility and
adaptability demonstrated here suggests that perhaps improvisation is
not merely a reflection of the conditions brought about by war or
intractable poverty. The ingenuity and creativity of healthcare workers in
both the US and the UK speaks to their ability to adapt to extremely
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challenging situations and reveals the surprisingly versatile nature of
healthcare institutions and healthcare workers to effectively mobilise at
both the institutional level and in everyday care in response to a crisis.
Perhaps healthcare as practised always requires improvisation –
a constant working around the exigencies and emergencies of the
present – from the prioritisation that occurs on the fly during ordinary
triaging, to the constant titration and experimentation that occurs with
treatments, dosages and prescriptions. As many of our interlocutors
noted, particularly those who work in emergency medicine, a high level
of uncertainty and the need to respond to people in crisis is precisely
the job they signed up for. As Josh, an American ER doctor, explained,
‘[COVID] probably has just highlighted things that were already there …
I think people who are drawn to emergency medicine like the idea that
they feel that they’re able to help people no matter what their complaint
is with limited to no information.’ Quinn, another ER doctor in the US,
said, ‘For me [COVID] just kind of reaffirms my identity of, you know,
when there’s an emergency, you’re there. And you have the skill set to
be there and help out.’ Healthcare workers always have to think on their
feet and to quickly act on their best judgement when faced with a person
in crisis. Yet, healthcare systems in the US and the UK typically mask this
improvisation through protocols, procedures and evidence-based
practices in an attempt to homogenise treatment and minimise risk,
adverse events and litigation. Unlike most emergencies, HCWs had
not initially internalised the appropriate series of steps they needed to
take with this novel coronavirus, so acting on their judgement and
expertise felt like a novel form of improvisation. But the fact that such
nimble change was possible is noteworthy and undermines the supposed
rigidity of such institutions and provides important lessons for future
medical crises.
Notes
1
2
In the UK, a junior doctor is the equivalent to a resident.
Advanced care providers include nurse practitioners and physicians’ assistants.
References
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Shahjouei, Jiang Li and Ramin Zand. 2020. ‘Racial, economic, and health inequality and
COVID-19 infection in the United States’. Journal of Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities: 1–11.
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17
Carescapes unsettled
COVID-19 and the reworking of
‘stable illnesses’ in welfare state Denmark
Sofie Rosenlund Lau, Marie Kofod Svensson,
Natasja Kingod and Ayo Wahlberg
On 11 March 2020, Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen
addressed the nation through a televised press conference. Flanked by
Health Minister Magnus Heunicke and infectious disease experts, she
announced that Denmark would be going into lockdown. Images of
overflowing hospital wards and overworked healthcare workers in Italy,
and an expected spike in COVID-19 cases as people returned from skiing
holidays in the Alps, prompted Frederiksen to be one of the first heads of
state in Europe to send everyone home from work and school and to close
national borders. Armed with a cardboard prop, Heunicke animated why
‘flattening the curve’ was necessary by contrasting the (by now)
internationally recognisable red peak that inevitably bursts through a
black dotted line representing national hospital capacity with the
smoother green hill that remained within capacity (see Figure 17.1). For
Denmark to remain green, strict stay-at-home measures, physical
distancing, sneezing and coughing into elbows, and scrupulous hand
hygiene were essential. Drawing on what was becoming clear from
outbreaks in China, Italy and Spain, the prime minister emphasised that
people living with a range of chronic conditions and older people were
especially ‘at risk’ of hospitalisation and death from COVID-19. These
groups were advised to self-isolate, while others would be allowed to
leave their homes for shopping, pharmacy visits and outdoor leisure,
albeit while adhering to strict physical distancing and hygiene
requirements.
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Figure 17.1 Health Minister Magnus Heunicke urging Danes to ‘flatten
the curve’. Photo: Martin Sylvest/Ritzau Scanpix
In the meantime, behind the scenes, the National Health Board was
instructed to urgently devise a plan to ensure that Danish hospitals were
ready for an influx of COVID-19 patients who might require intensive
oxygen therapy and in some cases respiratory care. While time was of the
essence, it was imperative to raise the dotted black line on the Health
Minister’s ‘flatten the curve’ chart as high as possible in order to avoid
overwhelming the healthcare system. The Prime Minister insisted that
this was one of the most important objectives of Denmark’s national
lockdown:
We need to prevent the collapse of our healthcare system. Should
that happen, it would have consequences for everyone’s lives. … We
are demonstrating our samfundssind [Danish; ‘social solidarity
mentality’]. And we stand together in looking after those who are
most vulnerable. Yes, in fact, we are standing together in caring for
our society. … Right now we are seeing the value of the strong social
contract that we Danes have with each other (Statsministeriet
2020a).1
Two days later, on 13 March 2020, the National Board of Health drew up
a ‘Memo on reduction of hospital activity in connection with COVID-19’
(Board of Health 2020), and sent it to all hospitals in the country.
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Alongside plans for how to increase numbers of beds in intensive care
units, hospitals were instructed to free up staff to look after an expected
influx of hospitalised COVID-19 patients: ‘The Board of Health deems
that this can be achieved by reducing outpatient activities in a number of
clinical specialities [since] all forms of outpatient check-ups for patients
with a stable illness can be postponed or redirected’ (Board of Health
2020, our emphasis). Likewise, diagnostic and treatment ‘guarantees’,
which had been enshrined in law in 2002 to ensure that serious diseases
were detected earlier and treatments commenced as quickly as possible,
were suspended in order to reroute resources (see Manderson and
Wahlberg 2020). In these ways, Denmark’s healthcare agenda was
transformed overnight from a decades-long focus on chronic conditions
to a focus on a singular infectious disease. While this exceptional focus on
COVID-19 subsided during the summer with fewer confirmed cases, with
winter approaching, by late 2020, doctors were warning that a ‘second
wave’ influx of patients was leading to cancelled elective operations and
fewer outpatient visits (Møller and Goos 2020).
In this chapter, we explore the ways in which COVID-19 unsettled
not only Denmark’s universal, tax-funded healthcare system, but also the
lives of those living with chronic medical conditions. Although fears of an
overwhelmed hospital system never came close to materialising in spring
2020, and we have yet to see the full effects of Denmark’s ‘second wave’,
the knock-on consequences of shifting resources and political attention to
a single infectious disease has already and will continue to impact on the
lives of those with chronic conditions, not least since, as the prime
minister commented, Danes will have to ‘learn to live with the virus’
(Frederiksen 2020).
Chronic conditions emerged as the premiere focus of Danish
healthcare policy from the early 2000s. We describe how a series of
‘carescapes’ (policies, services and programmes determined by nationstate, local government and employers, aimed at providing care for
‘deserving citizens’) coalesced and stabilised around some of the most
prevalent chronic conditions within Denmark’s welfare state, in
conjunction and at times in tension with various ‘caringscapes’ (forms of
informal care carried out by family members and loved ones) (Bowlby
and McKie 2019). Henriette Langstrup (2013, 1010) has argued that it is
exactly through and around both formalised and informal forms of care
that ‘chronic care infrastructures’ arise, encompassing the medications,
knowledge and equipment that allow for the work required to manage
disease over time and distribute it between various actors and locations.
Within such infrastructures of chronic care, the emphasis has been on
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encouraging and teaching patients to ‘live with’ their (multiple) medical
condition(s) in order to ensure that they remain as independent as
possible and able to lead ‘normal’ lives. Danish healthcare and interrelated
eldercare has come to promote self-care and rehabilitation together with
enabling treatment and support interventions under slogans like ‘help for
self-help’ and ‘as long as possible in one’s own home’ (Kjellberg et al.
2011; Christensen 2020). At the same time, however, a string of reports
from healthcare authorities in the past decade (most recently in
September 2020) have drawn attention to glaring health inequalities in a
welfare state that claims to provide universal healthcare for all: People
with limited education experience more illness, suffer greater
consequences from their illnesses, and die earlier than people with a
higher education (Board of Health 2020). Reflecting this, in Denmark’s
fourth largest city, Aalborg, people living in well-off neighbourhoods in
the western part of the city live a staggering 13 years longer on average
than those living just a few kilometres to the east (Board of Health 2020).
Despite declared goals of universal access to and equal provision of high
quality care to all citizens, socioeconomic inequalities continue to shape
both ‘carescapes’ and ‘caringscapes’ in Denmark in ways that render
chronic care infrastructures more or less accessible and relevant for those
living with long-term conditions.
Only a few weeks into the national lockdown, general practitioners,
cardiologists and oncologists began warning that the ‘massive corona-focus
can cost lives’ (Nielsen 2020), as clinicians experienced a worrying fall in
numbers of appointments and referrals.2 These numbers might well reflect
the result of government officials’ appeal to Danes’ samfundssind, which for
some meant ‘holding off’ on using the healthcare system for routine
purposes (GP visits, dental care and outpatient check-ups), albeit others
were wary of infection risks in hospital and clinic settings. Whatever the
cause, healthcare providers felt a need to use national media outlets to
appeal to the general public to not refrain from seeing a doctor if
experiencing symptoms that could indicate any serious condition, not least
since early detection was essential for the best possible outcomes.
But what of those already living with and managing a known
chronic condition? In this chapter, we build on our long-term fieldwork
engagements in Denmark, well before the COVID-19 pandemic, with
families living with congenital heart defects, persons living with type 1
diabetes and ‘frail’ seniors. We explore the kinds of disruptions and
concerns experienced by people living with medical conditions other than
COVID-19 during Denmark’s national lockdown, calls to self-isolate and
shifts of healthcare resources away from ‘stable illnesses’. In addition, we
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explore how these families experienced receiving information and advice
on being particularly ‘at risk’.
Over the past six years, though engaged in individual ethnographic
projects, we have collectively explored how novel forms of chronic living
have been taking shape in welfare state Denmark. Working together with
the Danish Heart Foundation, Marie Svensson has carried out fieldwork
among families living with congenital heart defects to gain insights into the
everyday challenges they face in the years following the birth of a hjertebarn
(heart-child) (Svensson et al. 2020). Based at the Steno Diabetes Center
Copenhagen, Natasja Kingod has developed new forms of online–offline
ethnography to explore how people living with type 1 diabetes use peer-topeer online platforms – especially the Facebook groups function – to
exchange experiences and tips with people who share the same diagnosis
(Kingod 2018; Kingod and Cleal 2019; Kingod and Grabowski 2020).
Sofie Rosenlund Lau has worked with home carers to examine how
multimorbidity and resultant polypharmacy are managed in home settings
through regular visits by healthcare professionals (Lau 2020). In addition,
Ayo Wahlberg has been leading a five-year collaborative ethnographic
study of chronic conditions, designed to characterise chronic living in the
twenty-first century (Wahlberg 2018).3 While the pandemic continues to
progress at time of writing (December 2020) with hospitals experiencing a
second influx of COVID-19 patients and numerous restrictions currently
being reimplemented in Denmark, our empirical insights were gathered in
spring 2020 as COVID-19 disrupted the everyday lives of Danes for the
first time.
The birth of ‘kronikere’ in Danish healthcare
In the 1980s and 1990s, Danish healthcare authorities were preoccupied
with what was considered a somewhat embarrassing vital statistic: on
average, Danes were living significantly shorter lives than citizens in
neighbouring countries like Sweden or Norway (Juel and KamperJørgensen 1989). In response to this anomaly, in 1992 then Health Minister
Ester Larsen established a Life Expectancy Commission to investigate why
‘Danish life expectancy is not advancing as gainfully as in other countries’
(Ministry of Health 1994, 1). Two years later, their conclusion was clear:
lifestyle – especially smoking – was to blame. Consequently, a series of
public health initiatives were developed under a collective banner of KRAM
(an acronym for the Danish words for diet, smoking, alcohol and exercise,
which also means ‘hug’, an important part of pre-COVID-19 Danish sociality
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when meeting friends and family). Sine Knudsen and Peter Triantafillou
have argued that these developments amounted to a ‘lifestylisation of the
social’ in Denmark, leading to the consolidation of an extensive ‘lifestyle
dispositive’ (2020, 3). Within such a dispositive, ‘although health and
illness are the products of the sum of social and environmental influences,
it is our lifestyle – made up by our consumption of tobacco, alcohol,
accidents, physical exercise and diet – that constitutes the primary cause of
… disease’ (Frandsen and Triantafillou 2011, 212). To address this, a series
of initiatives targeting individual health behaviours (KRAM campaigns)
were launched (Vallgårda 2011). By the turn of the millennium, healthcare
officials had proclaimed success as life expectancy was again catching up
with neighbouring countries, albeit unequally so, not least because
Denmark’s record in diagnosing and effectively treating cancers continued
to lag behind neighbouring welfare states (see Bergeron-Boucher et al.
2019). At the same time, as elsewhere in the world, increasing life
expectancy had ushered in a new challenge – how to improve the lives of
those who were now living with lifelong chronic conditions:
In recent years, average life expectancy has increased significantly
more in Denmark than in those countries we normally compare
ourselves to. … But health is not only about length of life. At least as
important is quality of life. … We [must] focus much more than
hitherto on both length and quality of life, not least quality of life in
the years after working life when major diseases are more prevalent
(Government of Denmark 2002, 6).
And so, alongside the ‘lifestylisation of the social’ in Denmark, we have over
the past two decades witnessed what Ayo Wahlberg and Nikolas Rose have
described as a governmentalisation of living ‘in the course of which the
social and personal consequences of living with disease come to be an
object of political concern, and made knowable, calculable and thereby
amenable to various strategies of intervention’ (2015, 60). As a direct
consequence of these more recent developments in Denmark’s universal,
tax-financed healthcare system, the figure of the ‘kronikere’ (a Danish
neologism used to designate those living with a chronic condition) has
emerged as an object of concern (Wind and Vedsted 2008, 7–8) around
whom chronic care infrastructures have coalesced. In Henriette Langstrup’s
work on chronic care, such infrastructures are defined as ‘made up of
various inconspicuous elements (medication, standards, control visits,
doses, daily routines, sheets of article for registration and more) that tend
to sink into the daily practices of patients and professionals’ (2013, 1010).
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These chronic care infrastructures allow for what the Board of
Health, in its COVID-19 instructions to hospitals, described as ‘patients
with a stable illness’. Yet, as we consider below, describing people in this
way unwarrantably overlooks the many forms of ‘illness work’ (Corbin
and Strauss 1985, 1988) or ‘chronic homework’ (Mattingly et al. 2011)
involved in keeping an illness stable, the costly resources that make
chronic care infrastructures possible (not to mention extending these to
people across the community), and the grave inequalities that can render
such illness work more or less impossible ‘independently’. In what follows,
we show how, by identifying those living with chronic medical conditions
as particularly at risk and by asking them to self-isolate, Denmark’s efforts
to control the COVID-19 pandemic amplified and highlighted the often
laborious work involved in keeping illnesses ‘stable’, the challenging ways
risk is negotiated by those already ill, and the often unrecognised efforts
of individuals, families and ‘auxiliary’ care workers to (self-)manage
chronic conditions. We now turn to three ethnographic descriptions of
how families experienced their new-found and unsolicited status as
‘particularly at risk’ of COVID-19 and its complications.
In and out of risk – living with a complex congenital
heart defect in a pandemic
‘I think the guidelines on what hjertebørn [heart-children] should do have
been confusing and conflicting … one day almost isolate and the next day
not at all’, Anita wrote in an email at the beginning of May 2020, when
asked how her heart-child, 10-year-old Mikael, and the rest of the family,
were coping during the COVID-19 pandemic. In Denmark, around 16,000
children and youth under 18 years live with a congenital heart defect
(CHD) (Hjerteforeningen n.d.); worldwide, this is the most common major
birth defect (Linde et al. 2011, 2241). CHDs encompass a broad spectrum
of defects from ‘simple’ (without symptoms or need for treatment) to
‘complex’ and life-threatening (requiring surgery soon after birth coupled
with lifelong follow up) (National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute 2017).
In Denmark today, as in other countries with well-resourced healthcare
systems, even some of the most complex CHDs have been transformed into
chronic conditions (Jacobsen et al. 2010, 40; Lüscher 2017, 2021).
However, as children with CHDs live longer, it is becoming increasingly clear that many live with risks of complications, deteriorations,
further surgical interventions and reduced long-term survival compared to
the background population (Larsen et al. 2017; Lüscher 2017, 2021).
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For Anita and Mikael’s father, Ole, risks related to Mikael’s CHDs
have been all too clear since his birth. Anita and Ole thought they had
welcomed a healthy baby boy to the world, only to learn that Mikael had
a complex CHD, needed surgery urgently and might not survive. Mikael
has so far undergone three heart surgeries that have completely rebuilt
his heart, but this is a temporary solution, and he may require a heart
transplant in the future. The risks and high stakes of Mikael’s CHD have
taken a detrimental toll on Ole, who has struggled with his mental health
since the diagnosis, leaving it very much up to Anita to care for Mikael
and his younger sister, Maja, as well as provide an income for the family.
Like most families living with CHDs in Denmark, Mikael’s family try
to de-emphasise the risks of CHDs in their everyday lives. This is encouraged
by healthcare providers who urge families to focus on the positives of the
present rather than on their children as sick, limited and with a future full
of risks. For Mikael’s family, living with his health risks is a routine aspect
of everyday life. He is vaccinated against influenza and pneumonia and is
kept at home if there is much illness in his school, and Mikael, according to
his mother, pointed out to a classmate visiting for a playdate, ‘in this house,
we sanitise our hands!’ The outbreak of COVID-19 accentuated such risks
and moved them to the forefront of everyday life. It was, in fact, the hand
sanitiser that made Anita aware that ‘there are actually people who are
starting to panic’, as the pharmacy was unable to fulfil her routine order of
hand sanitiser at the end of February. Fourteen days later, the Danish
government announced a national lockdown, which was, as we noted
above, to a large extent directed at so-called ‘vulnerable groups’ such as
people with chronic conditions and the elderly.
In the following weeks, it became apparent to Anita that she needed
to find out whether Mikael was ‘particularly vulnerable’, and especially
whether he could return to school once the lockdown ended. This proved
difficult, as it was for many parents. Calls to The Danish Heart Foundation’s
‘heart-line’ doubled during March–May 2020, and many sought peer
advice on the Facebook page of the Foundation’s children’s club in
the same period (around 50 posts with over 1,200 comments). In these
early weeks of the pandemic, families came to rely on and expand their
caringscapes, as priorities within the national healthcare system shifted
towards COVID-19. At first, Mikael’s GP deemed him ‘at particular risk’,
much like Anita had interpreted the general guidelines. However, things
changed rapidly, and Anita ‘panicked when one day it was said [in the
guidelines] by both the pediatric cardiologists and the Board of Health
that he was at ‘particular risk’, and then the next day he wasn’t!’ More
phone calls ensued, first unsuccessfully to Mikael’s current cardiologist,
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and then to his former cardiologist, who agreed with the GP. However,
Mikael’s social worker decided that the decision on whether Anita would
be granted compensation for lost earnings, so that she could home-school
Mikael, had to be made by a medical consultant who did not know Mikael.
As the family had previously experienced collaboration with municipal
social workers as rather cumbersome, like many other Danish parents to
disabled or chronically ill children (For Lige Vilkår 2019, 2), Anita was
quite surprised when she was granted financial compensation.
Each month a new assessment arrives, and Mikael could suddenly
fall out of risk in the eyes of the Danish welfare system. As sole provider,
this would force Anita to assess whether Mikael’s risk of infection
from COVID-19 would outweigh the financial risks were she to take
unpaid leave from her job as a nursery teacher, which Anita felt made her
‘particularly exposed’ to infection. Coupled with stories of doctors’
experiences of complications from COVID-19 flooding the media, such as
blood clots, she and Ole were left extremely confused and worried.
Yet, keeping Mikael at home was not without risks either. Anita had
already been forced to defend to colleagues why Ole’s mental health
problems meant that he could not home-school Mikael. Anita and Ole
also had to leave conversations about the pandemic until moments where
‘small ears are not listening’, as Anita phrased it, because ‘it is just difficult
for him, when it is something that makes him feel sick’. Mikael’s checkups, for example, would cause such unwanted attention to his heart
defect every six months. Now, the reminders were daily. One and a half
weeks into isolation, Mikael got sick – out of fear Anita thinks. While he
vomited, he told her that he was scared. Unfortunately, Mikael’s therapy
sessions, originally initiated to help him deal with psychological and
social problems at school, were also paused. Furthermore, the risks he
had so far evaded concerning his ‘underlying’ CHD now surfaced. When
he started therapy again after the lockdown, he told his mother bluntly
on the way home that ‘you are super lucky that I have survived all of this
[e.g. three heart surgeries], because there are not many who do!’ Homeschooling, however, relieved Mikael of long school days that often left
him physically exhausted. He was also comfortable with less socialising,
as his social interactions with peers after school were already limited due
to exhaustion but also because he struggled with forging friendships. Yet,
Anita realised while home-schooling Mikael, ‘he is fine with just sitting on
his own. It’s not because there is anything wrong with that, but you can
get a little weird by just being on your own’. So, although she feared the
consequences were he to contract COVID-19, Anita realised that keeping
Mikael at home was a ‘balancing act’. It involved ‘[keeping] several balls
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in the air in terms of when you are doing the wrong or the right thing, and
it is the kind of thing you can only know in the future’.
For Mikael’s family, this balancing act had to be done in the midst of
a dramatic shaking up of the carescapes and chronic care infrastructures
on which they normally leaned. Mikael’s current cardiologist was
impossible to reach; previously routine precautions to avoid infections
now caused panic (hand sanitiser) or proved impossible (staying home
from school sporadically when there were bouts of influenza); the
struggle for compensation for lost earnings was an everyday (uncertain)
reality rather than a short-term solution during hospitalisations for
surgery; therapy was paused when Mikael perhaps needed it more than
ever; and guidelines on CHDs were constantly changing. Their situation
exemplifies how depending on what struggles already surround the
chronic condition, COVID-19 affects families differently. For this family,
exacerbated social isolation, financial problems and mental health issues
posed a particular risk that added to those related to Mikael’s physical
health.
Many children with CHDs were, unlike Mikael, placed outside of
risk groups, or were categorised as ‘at risk’ but still advised to attend
kindergarten and school. However, for those ‘at risk’ isolated at home, the
Danish government’s attempts to shield people with chronic conditions
created a heavy extra burden of risk. Ina, mother of Julie, aged 15 and
with a moderate CHD, reflected on the consequences of the COVID-19
pandemic, writing:
I don’t think that the fear will ever recede. … Now it is not just the
congenital condition that is a risk, now there are also external risks
that I cannot regulate or control. No matter how much I look after
my child and keep distance, it can come to us and ruin an entire
family. We cannot shut ourselves in for the rest of our lives, but how
do we move on?
Navigating noise in online type 1 diabetes
communities during COVID-19
As with congenital heart defects, uncertainty surrounding COVID-19 has
been evident within several Danish Facebook communities for people
living with type 1 diabetes. News about the unfolding pandemic made it
to Danish television in early 2020 and gave rise to new communities on
Facebook, where people shared their fears and concerns in the wake of
CARESCAPES UNSETTLED : COVID -19 AND WELFARE STATE DENMARK
333
the global lockdown. To meet rising demand for information from
the public, doctors created their own Facebook community to take the
pressure off clinics and to provide reliable and evidence-based answers to
the many questions on COVID-19 from the public. Offshoots within the
larger patient-driven Danish online diabetes communities emerged
around COVID-19 where interpretations of the government’s guidelines
were shared and debated: are we at higher risk of contracting COVID-19?
Do we experience more severe complications if infected by COVID-19?
The flood of information from both news media and from peers within
Facebook communities made it difficult for lay people to distinguish
between health misunderstandings and facts.
With the rise of social media in the 2000s, and the opportunity to
create interest groups on Facebook in 2010, the classical ‘field site’ has
become ever more fragmented and its boundaries fluid (Hine 2015). At
the same time, although they are a convenient 24/7 space to share
important information, tips and knowledge on how to live with a chronic
condition, online peer-to-peer communities have not replaced traditional
‘in real life’ conversations (Kingod et al. 2017; Borkman 1976). In times
of uncertainty and despair when living with a chronic condition that
involves complex self-care management regimes, mobile technologies are
a valuable part of everyday chronic care infrastructures that enable
patients to seek out peer knowledge through a single tap on their
smartphone. Hence online caringscapes have come to supplement the
support of loved ones through their offers of reciprocal informal care
(Kingod 2020).
In Denmark, people living with diabetes co-create and tinker
with different types of knowledge both from peers within communities
on social media channels and from more conventional authoritative
guidelines (Kingod 2018). Tinkering occurs to fit self-care technologies to
bodies and medical guidelines to daily living with type 1 diabetes. With
the complex chronic homework that goes into keeping type 1 diabetes
‘stable’, patients seek inspiration from peers online on how to interpret
and adjust medical guidelines with the purpose of living a better life with
the disease (see also Mattingly et al. 2011). This type of patient-to-patient
knowledge is based on everyday embodied experiences that reach into all
corners of daily life.
Lisa, mother to an 8-year-old daughter with type 1 diabetes, was
confused by the initial authoritative statements in relation to COVID-19
risk for those living with type 1 diabetes. As she explained in a text-based
conversation in a restricted Facebook community for mothers of children
with type 1 diabetes:
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I don’t know if I should let her [daughter] go out at all. I talked to the
Danish Diabetes Association and they told me that I should keep her
at home and not send her to school. They even wrote that as a relative
to a person with diabetes you can work from home to reduce the risk
of catching the virus. But then I can see within other Facebook
communities that there are great misunderstandings and differing
understandings about these guidelines. First, the Ministry of Health
said that people with diabetes were at high risk, then they changed it
to people with poorly regulated blood sugar and then they were
suddenly not at risk at all. Now the Diabetes Association has suggested
my girl is at risk again. What should I believe in and do?!
Lisa is referring to contradictory information from Danish health authorities
and other government spokespeople that flooded news channels and were
recirculated on Facebook in the early weeks and months of the pandemic.
Initial information placed people with diabetes in a category of ‘high risk’
in relation to catching COVID-19. While all citizens are at risk of contracting
COVID-19, people with diabetes were given a double ‘at risk’ status, not
only in relation to catching the virus but also to developing severe
complications. For many people self-managing type 1 diabetes, being at
health risk while immunologically and clinically vulnerable does not
necessarily create feelings of being sick (see also Jauho 2019). Still,
although the risks were unclear, many people with diabetes self-isolated at
home during the first months as the pandemic spread. Lisa’s daughter has
lived with type 1 diabetes for several years, and Lisa sees her as perfectly
normal and capable of doing the same everyday life things as her friends.
This is confirmed at quarterly check-ups at the clinic where her daughter
receives her long-term blood sugar measurement, a haemoglobin A1c test
that indicates her average blood sugar level over the past two to three
months. Lisa uses this number as an indication of how well her daughter is
managing her type 1 diabetes; for several years, this number has been
within the ‘normal’ range.
Lisa is an active member of several Facebook communities. These
have become an important part of her family’s caringscapes and have
enabled her to emotionally cope with the heavy burden of receiving her
daughter’s diagnosis years ago. She remembers that she was terrified and
devastated, harbouring ‘forbidden feelings’ about her daughter as ‘broken
and fragile’. By lurking in a larger community on Facebook and belonging
to a smaller private group, she experienced support from like-minded
mothers with children at the same age. For years, Lisa was a member of a
closed community targeting the specific insulin pump brand her daughter
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335
uses. She is also a member of a community that encourages and advises
people on how to ‘hack’ their insulin pumps with complicated algorithms
in order to fit the technologies to bodies and daily lives (Gavrila et al.
2019).
With the first cases of coronavirus, the government quickly closed
institutions and schools; only grocery stores and pharmacies remained
open. Lisa found a good rhythm in home-schooling her daughter, and she
felt safe with the recommendation to distance her family from other
people. When the government announced that primary schools would be
the first institutions to re-open, Lisa felt unsure what to do. Confused
about the different categories of risk in relation to diabetes, she joined a
newly established Facebook community, ‘My child should not be a guinea
pig for COVID-19’,4 which quickly gained more than 38,000 members.
She checked the online activities of this community several times a day to
receive support and guidance in her own decision-making processes
about whether or not to send her child to school. Navigating an online sea
of information was not easy, as posts turned into long threads with
contradictory answers on governmental restrictions and guidelines.
Online noise is a side effect of the bombardment of information on news
and social media channels (whether contradictory or not) that people
living with type 1 diabetes in Denmark must process, interpret and attune
their lives to (Kingod and Cleal 2019). With the strength of aligned voices
of parental fear, Lisa concluded that her daughter should stay home for
another 14 days, so she could see whether the situation in Denmark had
stabilised, with infections and hospitalisation rates declining. Lisa would
lurk within the large community, and then discuss answers from this
community with members in the closed group. Members of this smaller
group have known each other for several years and they meet offline, and
Lisa feels safest in expressing her concerns among peers that she knows
and trusts. Lisa and peer mothers remain unconvinced about the safety of
the situation. They keep themselves and each other updated online, share
news feeds within the group, and discuss school and governmental
guidelines. The category and presence of double risk will stay with them
for a long time. Further, they have become increasingly exposed to the
noise of massive amounts of health information. With changes in
caringscapes and carescapes, in terms of the growing availability of peerto-peer exchanges on social media between quarterly check-ups at the
clinic and the shifting of resources towards COVID-19, many forms of
type 1 diabetes care, formal and informal, moved online. Lisa and her
peers were placed in yet another ‘at risk’ category – the uncertainty of
how to evaluate health information they found online – and so she
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devised a strategy of discussing it with other mothers in a smaller
Facebook group.
Cancelled appointments – disrupted social care among
‘frail’ seniors
‘Up we go’, announced Wicky, the home care worker, as she raised Viggo’s
elevation bed to her hip level. It was 8:15 a.m. on a cold Monday morning
in February 2020 as news of a ‘mystery virus’ that had devastated Wuhan
and since spread to Italy and Spain was making headlines in Denmark.
Wicky was there to wake Viggo and help him get washed and dressed.
Viggo contributed as best he could by taking off his shirt and following
Wicky’s guidance. They chatted a bit during the work. ‘So, did your family
visit this Friday?’ Wicky asked. ‘Yeah, my son was here. He brought
fastelavnsboller [cream buns]’, Viggo recalled with a wide smile. ‘Haha,
you should have seen the blood sugar’, he continued. Wicky laughed. She
helped him get dressed and moved his 100 kg body to the wheelchair.5
Viggo was diagnosed with diabetes in 1991. Years of uncontrolled blood
sugar had damaged the nerves in his feet, and eventually a wound on his
heel resulted in untreatable gangrene. Four years ago, he lost the leg. He
stayed for a short time at a rehabilitation centre, and had difficulty
adapting after he returned home. His house was not fit for a wheelchair,
and, despite daily home care visits, he was alone and had no one to help
him on a regular basis. One morning, struggling to reach something on a
shelf, he fell and broke his remaining leg. Afterwards, he was granted the
penthouse senior apartment in a new multi-storey building and received
more intensive home care.
Viggo had grown up, with four siblings, in a small apartment in a
rough neighbourhood of southern Copenhagen. After primary school, he
joined the Danish Railway Network and worked for 40 years as a train
conductor. When he was diagnosed with diabetes, he was, in train
terminology, ‘dropped off’, and took early retirement. Besides the diabetes,
Viggo suffered from chronic pain and depression, and took medicines for
raised blood pressure, raised cholesterol, oedema and vitamin deficiency.
In total, to manage his various conditions, he took 17 pills per day.
During the last two decades, therefore, as with nine other interlucotors in a project on ‘frail’ elderly and medicines, Viggo intimately
experienced health inequalities as someone from a particular socioeconomic background living with a multitude of illnesses (Lau 2020). As
a result of their ‘lifestyles’ through many decades, these elderly are aging
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‘unhealthily’; when the COVID-19 pandemic struck, they were already at
risk of functional decline and early death. These seniors are all dependent
on help from a variety of social and healthcare institutions, including
home care – a comprehensive, yet strictly standardised, carescape made
possible by the Danish welfare state (Tufte and Dahl 2016) – and, due to
high levels of multimorbidity, their daily living is primarily centred
around and shaped by chronic homework (Mattingly et al. 2011). For
Viggo, as for most seniors receiving daily home care services, every day
looked more or less the same. A helper from the home care team woke
him up in the morning. Twice a week, Monday and Thursday, he was
provided an assisted shower. Afterwards, he ate his breakfast and drank
his coffee while listening to the radio. At 10:00 a.m., the nurse called him,
or dropped by to monitor his blood sugar and give him insulin injections.
Afterwards, Viggo went on an outdoor trip; most days this included some
kind of visit to a health clinic. Twice a week, he rolled himself down to the
nursing clinic, where the pressure bandages on his leg were replaced.
He went for regular checks at a diabetes clinic, an eye clinic and a foot
therapist. Some trips included assisted transport, which required a lot
of waiting time and often took the entire day. On other days, he brought
himself across the parking lot to visit his general practitioner, the
physiotherapy clinic or the pharmacy. In the afternoon, he often stopped
at the grocery store at the ground level of his apartment building to buy
bread, cold cuts and condiments for his breakfast and lunch. Dinner was
provided by a private distributor commissioned by the welfare state,
responsible for delivering microwaveable meals twice weekly. He ate
most meals alone at home, but occasionally his daughter and her partner
would drop in and prepare dinner, or his sister would take him out to eat
at a local cafe. In the evening, Viggo called his children or sister and
watched a movie while waiting, first for the nurse and his nightly insulin
shot, then for the home care worker to help him back to bed.
In summing up these daily routines of chronic living that shaped
his everyday life, Viggo’s caringscape seemed mainly connected to the
chronic care infrastructures related to addressing his medical conditions
and preventing decline. But it would be a great mistake not to include the
social interactions embedded in these infrastructures: it was exactly these
interactions which constituted enough enacted togetherness (Nyman et al.
2012) to create meaning in Viggo’s daily life, hence to keep a lurking
social death at bay. Viggo thrived in the company of others and suffered
in his homely solitude. To counteract feelings of loneliness, the radio or
the TV was constantly turned on. Viggo used his phone frequently and,
despite deteriorating sight and fine motor skills, used Facebook and other
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social media. However, what counted most in ‘keeping up spirits’, as he
framed it, were the daily trips out of the apartment. He always dressed
up, even for the short strolls down to the nursing clinic. His hair was
combed and he wore a fancy flat cap, giving him a slightly modern look.
Viggo cared about his appearance. For some time, it had bothered him
that he wore a slipper on his remaining foot, as it was almost impossible
to find a nice and tidy shoe that would fit his oedematous ankle. He was
full of joy the day the local shoe store finally brought him a tailored shoe.
Appearance was important because Viggo used his outdoor trips to get in
contact with other people. These trips meant so much to him, because, as
he said, he needed the conversations with others to ‘feel alive’. The trips
were pivotal to Viggo’s everyday life; they allowed social interactions and
provided meaningfulness; when returning home in the afternoon, he felt
he had accomplished something that day; he had seen and talked to other
people.
For Viggo, the lockdown and self-isolation that came into force on
11 March 2020 dramatically altered these daily routines and disrupted his
already confined social life. Viggo was, like other so-called vulnerable
persons, told to stay at home as much as possible. Previously daily trips out
of the apartment were reduced to a minimum, and instead substituted with
more movies and, for Viggo, unhealthy solitude. Visits from family and
friends were restricted. No more coffee chats or cream buns. His family kept
away to minimise the risk of bringing the virus into his home, as an act of
caring. Yet, for Viggo, the cancelled appointments changed the foundation
not only of his chronic care work but, more essentially, of social care. As
COVID-19 changed Viggo’s carescape in terms of the availability of clinical
and social resources in his daily life, it automatically altered his caringscape
and subsequently Viggo’s ability to care for himself.
Despite these efforts to keep Viggo out of harm’s way, on 23 March
2020 Viggo died from coronavirus infection and its complications.
Care interrupted
Three weeks into Denmark’s lockdown in late March, just as Viggo’s
passing had added yet another COVID-19 casualty to the climbing daily
mortality numbers published in newspapers and online media, Prime
Minister Frederiksen held another of her regular press briefings, this time
with a special message for those ‘vulnerable groups’ who had been
advised to self-isolate: ‘It pains me to say this to our elderly and most
vulnerable: you will need to adjust your lives against your risk of
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339
contracting COVID-19. We are asking the weakest to be the strongest.
This is a harsh message’ (Statsministeriet 2020b). While Denmark
emerged out of its ‘first wave’ relatively unscathed when compared to
Italy, Brazil and the United States, we have seen here through the
experiences of Mikael, Lisa and Viggo, their families and the healthcare
professionals on whom they rely, how COVID-19 has generated new
forms of chronic homework, concern, worries and in Viggo’s case, his
death. As we have shown, in the past two decades, Denmark’s healthcare
system has come to be reconfigured around kronikere who lead lives
with what the National Health Board calls ‘stable illnesses’. Yet, as the
disruptions brought on by COVID-19 have shown, speaking of ‘stable
illnesses’ belies the complex efforts that go into maintaining stability, and
masks the genuine concerns that the pandemic brought as families
struggled to come to grips with what it meant to be ‘particularly at risk’.
The navigation and interpretation of risk in relation to COVID-19
has become an extra burden for people with chronic conditions and
their families. These families were already leading lives with many forms
of risk related to their medical conditions and their socio-economic
conditions, and COVID-19 added to already existing anxieties and
difficulties. While the National Board of Health retracted its call for a
massive rerouting of resources to address the pandemic, and COVID-19
units were closed down in a number of hospitals due to a lack of patients
during the summer months, Denmark’s ‘second wave’ took hold towards
the end of 2020, again leading doctors and nurses to warn of the knock-on
consequences and necessary reprioritisations that rising hospitalisation
rates entail. Likewise, the worries that a circulating novel coronavirus
have generated for people living with (multiple) chronic conditions have
not dissipated and will not do so any time soon.
Chronic conditions do not disappear because a pandemic arrives.
While these ‘other’ conditions are (however provisionally) moved to the
bottom of the healthcare agenda and prioritisation lists within healthcare
systems, disrupted treatment and monitoring, calls for self-isolation and
designating the chronically ill as ‘vulnerable groups’ who are ‘particularly
at risk’, all serve to move ‘stable’ chronic conditions to the forefront
of everyday life for patients and their families, much more so than in
‘non-pandemic’ times. The chronic care infrastructures, carescapes and
caringscapes that had coalesced around people living with conditions like
congenital heart defects, type 1 diabetes and multiple chronic conditions
have been unsettled by a pandemic that has raised questions about how
healthcare systems should be financed and organised in the coming years
and decades, not least in the face of looming austerity. In the months and
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years to come, we will learn how a communicable condition like COVID19 has reshaped care- and caringscapes, hence complicated and unsettled
the chronic care infrastructures and chronic homework routines aimed at
keeping chronic conditions ‘stable’.
Acknowledgements
Sofie Rosenlund Lau would like to acknowledge Velux Fonden for
supporting her research. Marie Kofod Svensson would like to acknowledge
the Danish Heart Foundation and Natasja Kingod Steno Diabetes Centre
for their continued funding. Ayo Wahlberg acknowledges the European
Research Council (grant no. ERC-2014-STG-639275). All authors would
like to thank the families who shared their experiences during the first
months of the COVID-19 pandemic in Denmark.
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
Throughout this chapter, we have translated quotes from Danish politicians, policy papers and
interlocutors, which originally appeared or were in Danish.
A December 2020 study from the Danish Cancer Association confirmed these fears, showing
that there were 2,800 fewer cancer diagnoses from March to May 2020; an early indication of
knock-on consequences when resources are shifted in such a massive way (Munch 2020).
Each project was ethically approved by relevant authorities nationally and at the University of
Copenhagen.
Original in Danish: Mit barn skal ikke være forsøgskanin for covid-19.
For empirical insights from Viggo’s daily life and passing, see also Lau, Kristensen and Oxlund
(2020).
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18
Care within or out of reach
Fantasies of care and connectivity in
the time of the COVID-19 pandemic
Earvin Charles Cabalquinto and Tanja Ahlin
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have become an
integral part of contemporary society. They are fundamental in forging and
sustaining everyday interactions, as mobile phones and online channels
enable a sense of co-presence (Licoppe 2004; Baldassar et al. 2016),
intimacy (Vincent and Fortunati 2009) and care practices (Ahlin 2018)
across geographic distances. Individuals can choose from a range of mobile
devices, online channels and mobile applications, which give shape to
different polymedia environments (Madianou and Miller 2012). With the
COVID-19 pandemic, smartphones, social media channels and a wide
range of mobile applications have served as lifelines. As the ongoing health
crisis constrains people’s movements and social interactions because of
distancing requirements, travel bans and lockdowns, ICTs have been key to
sustaining relationships in already networked societies.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, global technology corporations
have adopted the language of care to promote digital connectivity. For
instance, Facebook launched its spectrum of care-themed reactions, and
thematic ‘we are all in this together’ stickers have been embedded in
Facebook Messenger. Instagram, also run by Facebook, introduced a
sticker signalling the call to ‘stay at home’ to encourage people to selfisolate and practise social distancing. The impulse and imperative to care
crystallised in the form of a ‘care emoji’, a smiley face hugging a heart,
launched by Facebook in April 2020. Such digital objects reflect one of the
many ways through which online platforms highlight virtual connection
as a form of self and social care.
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In this chapter, we critically examine how selected online platforms
appropriate the notion of care and its provision as key in promoting
digital communication during a pandemic. We focus on how Facebook,
Google, YouTube and Instagram deploy discursive strategies to reiterate
the importance of digital practices in the delivery and access of care –
individual, social and corporatised. We chose these platforms, which are
global, although most popular in Anglo-American and European parts of
the world, to provide a snapshot of how commonly used online channels
reconfigure and position their services during a crisis.
Our inquiry is guided by three steps. We first consider how online
platforms have adopted and framed the rhetoric of care thus far during
the pandemic. Second, we describe various digitally mediated activities
that online platforms promote and mobilise as a form of care. Lastly, we
interrogate how the articulation of ‘staying connected and informed’ in a
health crisis context facilitates digital surveillance, profit accumulation
and digital exclusion in a networked society. In the study that informs this
chapter, we conducted a textual analysis (Flick 2011) of the community
guidelines of online platforms from April to May 2020 by paying attention
to how the vocabulary of care was used in online texts and narratives.
Scholars have previously used this method efficiently to analyse the
deployment of discursive and emotionally charged contents to promote
online platform use among dispersed individuals (Peile 2014; Cabalquinto
and Wood-Bradley 2020). We then contrasted care-related themes
that arise from our textual analysis of the online platforms’ community
guidelines to several studies on the benefits and limits of digital connectivity as expressions of care.
Social media channels are not only created to facilitate sociality and
connectivity. Rather, business protocols and a system of governance
established by technology companies shape the operation of online
platforms. An individual’s online interactions and activities are recorded,
segregated, stored and even sold to third parties (Helmond 2015; van
Dijck 2012, 2013). Online platforms use convenience and connectivity to
conceal the lack of transparency in collecting and manipulating data to
amplify profit and individual control (van Dijck 2013). Additionally,
through targeted and effective advertising, online platforms become
essential tools for profit accumulation and mobility control (Andrejevic
2003). In this chapter, we engage with these key issues on the operations
of online platforms, particularly pinpointing how technology companies
frame and legitimise digital connectivity during the pandemic.
Overall, our focus is on how social media platforms exploit care to
achieve their business goals. We examine how technology companies
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utilise various mechanisms to promote digital connectivity as a ‘lifeline’
in enabling a secure and safe way of managing one’s wellbeing, and
sustaining intimate relationships during the COVID-19 pandemic. We
argue that the strategies of the four examined online platforms, in
positioning social media use as ‘essential’ in dealing with the pandemic,
necessitates a critical investigation. Such an inquiry is crucial because the
practices of technology companies are often embedded in the realms of
entrepreneurship, data governance and digital inequalities. In the
following sections, we highlight how Facebook, Google, YouTube and
Instagram promote a digitally connected, equitable and safe environment
– accessible to some but a fantasy to others.
Digital care in pandemic times
ICTs have played an important part in supporting care well before the onset
of the pandemic. This includes the role of ICTs in care in studies of
transnational families. Baldassar and colleagues (2007, 2014, 2016), for
example, have shown how the use of mobile phones and online channels in
caregiving at a distance is informed by family obligations, individual
(financial, practical and other) capacities and the negotiation of
commitments. To explicitly emphasise how technologies influence care at
a distance, ICTs in transnational family care have been further analysed
through a theoretical approach grounded in science and technology
studies. Within this approach, care is described as something that is enacted
through practices in which people, social systems and technologies are
involved (Mol et al. 2010). Thus, care is enacted within ‘transnational care
collectives’, which include people and non-human actors: mobile phones,
webcams and online platforms (Ahlin 2018). The impact of ICTs on family
care practices has been described as detrimental in some cases (Turkle
2012; Wajcman 2015) and positive in others, particularly at times of crisis
(Horst and Miller 2006; Brown 2016). In the context of crisis, dispersed
individuals enact ‘crisis caregiving’ (Baldassar 2014) by increasing both
cross-border mobility and digital communication. Such studies have shown
that digital technologies play an essential part in shaping what care comes
to mean and how it is practiced when physical distance is introduced
among people.
In our analysis here, we add a third party to the mix of people and
ICTs in care, namely the technological companies that provide the
infrastructure for ICTs to function. We critically interrogate the nuances
of mediated care by focusing on how technology companies deploy
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various strategies in promoting their online services as key in the transfer
of care during a crisis. In the context of a global pandemic, how are care
practices articulated, represented and deployed by online platforms?
We approach the discursive articulation of mediated care as a
by-product of the socio-cultural, economic and political structures of online
social platforms (Light et al. 2016). These platforms operate through
business protocols and systems of governance that capture, analyse and
commodify the personal data of individual users (van Dijck 2013). To
ensure the continued use of online platforms by individuals and
corporations, companies frame connectedness through digital media as
inevitable in maintaining personal relationships (Helmond 2015) and
highlight how sharing one’s personal experiences on social media is a form
of caring for valued individuals (John 2013). At the same time, the
architecture of online platforms (which includes easy-to-code likes, shares
and emoticons), facilitates the processes of collection, value making and
commodification of personal data (Wahl-Jorgensen 2018). Technological
companies that own online platforms rationalise their collecting, storing
and processing of personal data through the rhetoric of convenience (van
Dijck 2013). Yet scholars such as Andrejevic (2003) have critiqued such use
of the notions of comfort and connectedness, arguing that enterprises
deploy such rhetorical mechanisms to subject individual social media users
to commodification and control.
In reflecting on the politics of care rhetoric appropriated by
technology companies in their operations during the COVID-19 pandemic,
we draw on the conceptual frame of ‘fantasy production’ (Tadiar 2004).
Tadiar (2004) proposes this concept as a fruitful notion for her analysis
of various texts, discourses and strategies of the Philippine government
in sustaining and advancing its economy through privatisation,
international partnerships and global connections. For Tadiar, fantasy
production denotes the imaginaries of those in power to reinforce the
regime of profit accumulation, domination and marginalisation. For
instance, the ideals of modernisation or security are often articulated
through the mutual partnerships of an elite and oligarchic government
and multinational corporations and international companies. In this
arrangement, individuals in privileged positions implement various
mechanisms to realise visions of advancement, including the privatisation
and deregulation of social welfare services. As a result, these individuals
and their institutions accumulate profit while those with limited or no
resources struggle to achieve a good life (Tadiar 2004). In the Philippines,
people from lower socioeconomic classes often have no access to a stable
income due to the privatisation of public services and social welfare
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347
systems; consequently, this leads them to migrate abroad in search of
work opportunities.
Ultimately, the fantasy of production reveals that the imagination of
conditions or outcomes of those in a privileged position remain an
aspiration for those with limited resources, living in poor conditions. This
proposition, we argue, echoes the contemporary visions, operations and
strategies of business-oriented technology companies in promoting
digital connectivity as a powerful means for survival and safety, and for
sustaining a business-as-usual modality.
The economies of a digital lifeline
The data from the four online platforms that we examined show that
technology companies have been consistent in communicating values of
connectivity, convenience and support during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The language of ‘being there’ for the consumers serves as a strategy for
technology companies to position themselves as supportive and ‘caring’. By
communicating the relevance of services during challenging times,
corporations develop and even improve their ability to sustain the
relationship between their services and the target market, leading to the
accumulation of profit (Hyken 2017). In our close and critical reading of
the community guidelines of Facebook, Google, YouTube and Instagram,
we uncovered three key categories through which online platforms
communicate care: (1) a space for enacting digital wellness, (2) connected
communities and (3) a credible digital resource hub in a pandemic.
We found that through the rhetoric of care, the prescribed activities in
online spaces link to surveillance, profit accumulation and digital
inequalities. Through these findings we flesh out the fantasy of care in the
digital realm.
Prescribing digital wellness
The online platforms that we examined each highlighted the importance
of staying connected to family members and friends while being at home
during the pandemic, framing care in ways that showed how digital
corporations articulate ‘caring about’ their users in turbulent times.
To start with, online platforms developed phrases such as ‘stay close’
(Facebook Messenger), ‘keep people safe and informed’ (Facebook), ‘stay
connected and informed’ (Google), ‘stay home with me’ (YouTube) and
‘Keeping people informed, safe and supported’ (Instagram). Such phrases
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highlight the vital role that online platforms are seen to play in supporting
people to cope, while simultaneously promoting physical distance, safety
and knowledge. Further, effective taglines often involved prescribing
digital activities for care. For instance, Facebook promoted the importance
of chat, voice and videocalls to generate a sense of closeness while
practising physical distancing: ‘Call friends and family to hear a familiar
voice. Make a video call to feel close when you’re not together’ (Facebook
2020a). YouTube (2020) emphasised physical distancing through a wide
range of ‘timely tips’ in the form of playlists to highlight for various indoor
activities, such as working out, cooking, crafting and so on. Here are some
examples (YouTube 2020):
Workout with me – At Home #WithMe: Turn your home into your
personal gym with these exercises that require just a pair of dumbbells
or no equipment at all.
Cook with me – At Home #WithMe: Join creators in their kitchens to
chop, sauté and cook up a feast with these videos made to accompany
you during your own meal prep.
Plant with me – At Home #WithMe: Exercise your green thumb by
repotting, watering, and online shopping for new plants.
With such campaigns, the online platforms illuminate a broad range of
digital activities in which their users could engage from the safety of their
homes while physically distanced from others.
Further, online platforms incorporated emotionally laden features
(Wahl-Jorgensen 2018) such as care-themed digital artefacts. For instance,
Facebook Messenger introduced an augment reality filter, GIFs, stickers,
emojis and other features (Facebook Messenger 2020). Facebook (2020b)
also allowed individual users to use the #SafeHands profile sticker.
Instagram (2020) promoted the stay home sticker for stories and YouTube
(2020) introduced the hashtag #WithMe, which content producers could
use to categorise recorded videos. Google urged people to ‘stay home and
save lives’ through an especially designed Doodle (Google 2020a). These
digital designs primarily promoted ways of managing one’s wellbeing and
showing care for others by staying at home. Such practices are grounded
in the idea of networked connectivity, a notion which suggests that
individuals enact an imagined and ambient co-presence with distant
others (Madianou 2016). Ultimately, the creative features of Facebook,
Google, YouTube and Instagram promoted intimate, personalised and
ambient connectivity during the pandemic, in the context of prescribed
physical distancing associated with lockdowns and travel bans.
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Connected communities
Online platforms commonly employed the word ‘community’ in promoting
digital connectedness, and they specifically referred to education-based
communities, business communities and local communities. For instance,
Facebook Messenger (2020) promoted the use of group voice and video
calls for educators, free messaging tools for business customers, and
messenger for communities of faith, civic organisations or activity groups.
The following examples are from the Facebook Messenger (2020) website
entitled ‘Here are some ways that Messenger can help you stay together
during the pandemic’:
Educators: Messenger can help you stay connected with your
community even when you can’t be together in person. Communicate
updates or check in on each other with group voice and video calls.
Local community: Whether it’s a community of faith, civic
organisation or activity group, this climate of uncertainty has made
maintaining personal connections with those in our community
more important than ever.
Facebook (2020b) also encouraged users to use the hashtag #Healthy
AtHome and #SafeHands. For the former, individuals were encouraged
to record and upload a video of their healthy household activities to the
World Health Organization’s social media channels using the hashtag
#HealthyAtHome. For the latter, individuals were invited to record
themselves while washing their hands and to share their video to social
media channels using the hashtag #SafeHands. YouTube (2020)
encouraged individual users to engage with a community of ‘creators’ who
presented different skills, activities and performances, and, if they wanted
to create a video, to use the hashtag #WithMe (YouTube 2020). Google
highlighted the ‘Stay Home. Save Lives’ campaign, mapping out the five
ways to ‘help stop coronavirus’: (1) Stay home as much as you can, (2) Keep
a safe distance, (3) Wash hands often, (4) Cover your cough and (5) Sick?
Call ahead (Google 2020b). Google also highlighted the use of training
resources and Google Hangout to enable remote working, learning and the
development of skills, career or business (Google 2020b). Lastly, Instagram
showcased the video chat feature, allowing connectivity among different
individuals online (Instagram 2020). Further, the ‘Stay Home’ sticker was
added and users could opt to include this sticker in their Instagram story.
The sticker promotes the act of staying at home and performing social
distancing (Instagram 2020).
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Credible digital resource hub
Digital corporations marketed their online tools and services as credible
sources to deal with and combat the effects of the pandemic. Technology
companies forged partnerships with health organisations to promote and
legitimise social media use. Both Facebook and Google, for example,
established partnerships with the World Health Organization (WHO) and
national ministries of health across various countries (Facebook 2020a;
Google 2020b). Thus, these two companies served as launch pads for the
production and circulation of relevant and verified health information. By
controlling what kind of information is shared through their platforms,
technology companies countered the spread of misinformation and
disinformation in an effort to combat a ‘coronavirus infodemic’ (Ali and
Kurasawa 2020; Skopeliti and John 2020). For example, both Facebook
(2020a) and Google (2020b) promoted handwashing tips or observing
proper hygiene, as evident on Facebook Messenger (2020), Instagram
(2020) and YouTube (YouTube Help 2020). Through partnerships with the WHO, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and
national ministries of health, Facebook launched the Coronavirus
(COVID-19) Information Centre (Facebook 2020b). Health experts
utilised videos to present accurate information produced by the WHO.
Further, the Centre alerted people to stay safe and avoid scams online,
such as unapproved medical treatments or false fundraisers (Facebook
2020a, Facebook Messenger 2020). Instagram emphasised the
‘educational resources’ in Instagram search, connecting individuals to
resources from the WHO and local health ministries (Instagram 2020):
People who search for information related to the coronavirus or
COVID-19 on Instagram will start to see an educational message
connecting them to resources from the World Health Organization
and local health ministries. We are working quickly to make this
available globally over the coming weeks. … Over the past few
weeks we’ve added a notice at the top of feed for countries affected
by COVID-19. The notice includes reliable resources from expert
health organisations. In addition, we’ve been highlighting resources
from these organisations when people view related hashtags.
In some cases, online platforms employ strategies to also manage the
spread of health misinformation. For instance, Instagram (2020) added
special stickers to promote ‘accurate information’ posted by ‘credible’
health organisations. Similarly, Facebook Messenger (2020) highlighted
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‘verified accounts’ – particularly WHO as the only credible source of
information on COVID-19 – and issued the following instructions on how
to recognise misinformation and refrain from spreading it:
Verify facts with trusted official sources, and watch out for
people running scams such as unapproved medical treatments
or false fundraisers. If you aren’t sure that something’s true, don’t
share it. …
Prevent the spread of misinformation. Verify the facts with
other trusted sources such as the World Health Organization or your
ministry of health. Look for forward indicators that alert you when
you are receiving a forwarded message, which helps you know
when a message that you received was not created by the person
who sent it. If you’re not sure if something is accurate, please don’t
forward it.
By assuming the role of gatekeeping, online platforms significantly shaped
the public discourse on COVID-19. Yet, as the pandemic continues, it remains
unclear which sources are more accurate than others and who should make
a final decision on this issue. Experts are in continuous open disagreement
about measurements such as compulsory face masks, limitations of personal
contact and restrictions on various types of events (Nicholds 2020). In
imposing measurements, different national ministries draw on different
analyses. By contrast, online platforms are transnational, which makes
the prescription of one single guideline challenging if not impossible.
Organisations such as WHO may base their recommendations on scientific
research, but in the past several months, scientific research on COVID-19 has
been published faster than usual to solve the many puzzles of the virus. Some
of these studies, published in prestigious academic journals, have already
been retracted (Boseley and Davey 2020). Moreover, the very notion of an
infodemic, which refers to an overabundance of (mis)information, is
predicated on social media platforms that are difficult to tame, as they remain
a source of all sorts of contradictory information. The effort to provide
accurate information on online platforms may thus be little more than lipservice, while technological companies behind them profit from their users
engaging in debates that arise from contradictions and controversies.
Framing online platforms as credible sources of information was
paired with philanthropic endeavours. Facebook started the COVID-19
Solidarity Response Fund to support the WHO’s global efforts to combat
the pandemic, support frontline workers, assist patients, and support the
fast development of the vaccine and treatment by matching the first
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US$10 million donated (Facebook 2020c). Google.org will match up to
$10.5 million to benefit the COVID-19 Solidarity Response Fund of WHO
(Google 2020c). These practices demonstrate how progress and security
are envisioned to be achieved through partnerships on a global scale. The
strategies are operationalised by providing medical protective equipment
to medical workers and donations to those hit by COVID-19 (Jin 2020).
Through such actions, technology companies position themselves as
socially responsible and caring. Yet, building on their increasing userbase,
these companies simultaneously also reinstate their dominant position in
a global and digital market. In the context of fantasy production (Tadiar
2004), positive images of partnerships are highlighted, which may then
conceal and reinforce existing hierarchies and divides within and between
societies.
Care and surveillance
In the discursive practices of care on social media, technology corporations
aim to create an over-arching impression of care. Through the use of
stickers related to the prevention of COVID-19, and by sharing health
resources deemed credible by online platforms, users are enacted as
caring for each other, their families, friends and the wider community. At
the same time, through providing healthcare advice, regularly updated
information on government regulations and tips on how to survive and
thrive during the quarantine, for example through YouTube’s (2020)
‘At Home #WithMe’ campaign, the online platforms appear as caring
towards their users.
However, on the online platforms the boundaries between ‘we care
for you’ and ‘we are tracking you’ are blurred; the practices of care and
exploitation are interrelated. Online platforms are operated through
business protocols that collect users’ data, which may then be sold for
various purposes, including data mining for research and targeted marketing
based on personal information and captured mediated interactions, and
targeted promotion to businesses (Kennedy 2016). For example, Facebook
Messenger (2020) issued the following message targeting business owners:
Messaging helps businesses stay connected to customers when they
can’t be there in person. Leverage free messaging tools to provide
customers with important information and consider setting up
automated responses to frequently asked questions such as shop
closures, opening hours and more.
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Since Facebook receives nearly all its revenue through advertising, such
strategies have undoubtedly contributed to increases in profits (Swartz
2020). Through such ‘care for business’, the users of online platforms are
simultaneously enacted as consumers and providers of data that translate
into corporation profits. Thus, while encouraging their users in various
care activities both online and offline, technology companies generate
profit by attracting advertisers and investors. Facebook, for instance, had
a daily average of 1.73 billion users for March 2020, which translated into
an increase of 11 per cent profit (Facebook 2020d). In the first quarter of
2020, Facebook (2020d) earned more than US$17 billion based on
advertising and other sources.
Moreover, the data that users share on online platforms are surveyed
with the aim of tracking the spread of COVID-19. The platforms share
such data with governments and researchers. Google and Facebook are
among the companies with the largest amount of non-public data that can
be tapped for disease tracking (DeChiaro 2020). During the COVID-19
pandemic in China, ‘sick posts’ that users published on Weibo, a popular
local social media platform, were used to identify outbreaks (Holder
2020), and content that users post on online platforms can be used
for broader law enforcement and control. In Europe, the data shared by
users on such platforms has been used to assess whether or not people
are abiding the quarantine rules. In Italy, more than 500,000 profiles on
Instagram were scraped to identify people violating quarantine
(Ng 2020a). This raises privacy concerns, but around the world, privacy
commissioners have encouraged such practices, lifting data restrictions
to enable more efficient tracking of people (Ng 2020b). Under pressure to
reach the end of the pandemic, and despite intense ethical debates of
digital tracking (Klar and Lanzerath 2020), government agencies are
increasingly allowing technology and private companies to legitimise the
harvesting and monetisation of people’s data (Manokha 2020).
Exclusive care
The four online platforms that we examined target a particular audience
of digitally literate and networked individuals. Who, then, is excluded
from the use of online platforms during a pandemic? The most obvious
excluded group are those who lack the finances to access a digital
technology and a stable internet connection. According to the
International Telecommunication Union (2019a), 3.6 billion people in
the world are offline, mostly in low income countries. This digital divide
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results from the inaccessibility of digital devices and services, poor
telecommunication infrastructures or nationally regulated access to
social media, and limited access to data (Hargittai 2002; Brandhorst
2020; Cabalquinto 2018a, 2020; Ahlin and Li 2019). The divide may also
be a result of people’s limited technological literacy, including older
people and others who have only recently accessed digital technology
(Cabalquinto 2018b; Wilding 2006; Ahlin 2018; Baldassar et al. 2007).
In the platforms that we examined, the omission of elderly people
was especially obvious in terms of who was addressed through the
content promoted on the platforms. The audiences were commonly young
adults and families with school-aged children. For example, in its
campaign ‘Get Digital’, Facebook (2020e) provided a range of resources
specifically targeting (1) youth, (2) parents and caregivers, and (3)
educators:
Get Digital in your online communities! Bring digital citizenship
and wellbeing into your online world. Our engaging activities are
expert informed and reinforce and expand on the digital skills you
are learning at school and at home.
Get Digital at home! You and your child can improve your
digital citizenship with resources created in conjunction with online
safety experts. The easy-to-use tips and tools are designed to help
you start a conversation with your child to build and reinforce their
digital skills.
Get Digital in the classroom! Bring digital citizenship into your
classroom with the Get Digital programme. These ready-to-use
lessons provide educators with tools and resources to help young
people learn digital citizenship and wellbeing skills.
From such content, Facebook emerges as a platform oriented towards
young people, especially children and their parents, and those who work
with children professionally. By contrast, none of the content we analysed
on Facebook and the other three platforms under study addressed digital
citizenship and wellbeing for people who do not belong to any of these
categories. Older people remain invisible users of online platforms, despite
their increased use of digital technologies worldwide (Todd 2018).
Further, in our analysis the users that the online platforms address
were presumed to have a home, which indicates specific socioeconomic
status. The calls for donations and fundraisers promoted, for example
through Facebook Messenger in the form of ‘Donation stickers’, imagine
a user who is able to give away money to others. Yet, around the world,
CARE WITHIN OR OUT OF REACH: FANTA SIES OF CARE
355
homelessness is a widespread phenomenon and homeless people have
been identified as among the most vulnerable populations for COVID-19
(Tsai and Wilson 2020). Even for those with homes, the conditions to
safely remain in shelter are shaped by their access to a range of resources.
For instance, in the European Union in 2017, more than 20 million
workers lived in households at risk of poverty (Eurofound 2017). People
from such households may continue living at or fall below the poverty
threshold, and such low-waged, often contract workers have been among
many ‘essential workers’ during the COVID-19 pandemic (O’Connor
2020). The structural forces, such as living in inadequate and temporary
housing, also contribute to an individual’s risk (Team and Manderson
2020).
In many countries across the globe, economic inequalities are
strongly shaped by race and ethnicity, which is further reflected in health
disparities (van Dorn et al. 2020; Manderson and Levine 2020). This has
led to critical anthropological discussions of the ‘Stay Home’ message
(Yates-Doerr 2020). Besides the issue of socioeconomic class, the
assumption behind this message is the fantasy of familial and other social
relations as essentially ‘good’ and unproblematic. Through maintaining
the particular fantasy of home and family as a safe haven, the online
platforms in our study gloss over the dramatic increase of domestic
violence and (sexual) abuse across various types of relationships,
especially against women and children, during the COVID-19 pandemic
internationally (Usher et al. 2020; Khaddari 2020). Yet, the online
platforms we examined offer few campaigns to support those who are
suffering at home from isolation and violence.
Finally, beyond stickers, the texts published on online websites we
examined, dedicated especially to the COVID-19 pandemic, promote a
sense of ‘digital wellness’, particularly through video calling. Facebook
(2020a), for example, has published suggestions such as ‘Call friends and
family to hear a familiar voice. Make a video call to feel close when you’re
not together’. Calling through digital technologies has been described as
a form of care practice available to people who are physically separated
from each other (Ahlin 2020; Arnold 2020). However, calls can also
create tensions among family members and may be emotionally
disturbing. Here, digital media use becomes both a burden and blessing
(Horst 2006) in enacting mediated caregiving. For example, Facebook
use may help to enact co-presence at a distance, but it also makes people
acutely aware of the physical distance between them. This contradiction
becomes palpable when physical contact is impossible online or when
internet connection is interrupted (Cabalquinto 2018a). Nonetheless,
356
VIRAL LOADS
promoting digital connectivity, exclusively in positive terms, is thus
another layer that adds to the fantasy of care through digital media.
Conclusion
Social media platforms have appropriated discourses on safety, connectivity,
care and social relations during the COVID-19 pandemic. Our examination
of four selected online platforms illustrates how care is articulated through
digital technologies. First, to enact and experience digital wellness, one
must access a wide range of online and credible resources, which relate
to personal activities and lifestyle. Second, the notion of care is framed
through connectedness in a community, encompassing an education,
business or locale setting. Lastly, the online platforms we examined
showcase connectivity as crucial for coping with the pandemic. They
position themselves as caring for a digitally connected society through their
partnership with WHO and national health institutions and through
philanthropic projects. This approach contributes to gaining trust among
individual users. In a sense, digital corporations embed online platforms as
a way to express ‘caring about’ by prescribing certain practices, such as
labelling and posting ‘accurate’ information, and providing digital tools and
resources that enable those practices. Further, the partnership between
online platforms and health institutions creates an accessible space for
educational or business purposes or managing one’s wellbeing.
We have in this chapter presented a snapshot of how selected social
media channels frame their services during the pandemic. Future
research should also examine how other online platforms promote digital
connectivity during and after the pandemic, including perhaps how
digital platforms contribute to questions of vaccination. Such an approach
would provide a point of comparison on the diverse strategies of social
media channels as shaped by economic and political agendas. Further,
future studies can explore the implications of the partnership between
government agencies and tech companies on data privacy, capitalism and
democratic processes in post-pandemic futures.
Online platforms produce and maintain a particular fantasy of care,
family and social relations. As we have critically reflected, care is complex
and heterogenous, often differentially performed and experienced
depending on people, technologies and social structures. As Tadiar
(2004) notes, fantasies also create opportunities for profit making,
domination and marginalisation along various lines. As the possibility to
care is shaped by finances, time, social capital and health, the ideals of
CARE WITHIN OR OUT OF REACH: FANTA SIES OF CARE
357
safety, security, care and connectedness tend to remain in the imaginaries
of those who are in power and/or privileged (Tadiar 2004). The textual
and visual deployment of these ideals on online platforms may deepen
the gap between people of different socioeconomic status. Those who are
relatively privileged remain in the safety of their homes and post ‘Stay
home’ stickers on each other’s virtual walls, and they are able to engage
with the benefits of connectivity, yet what such practices seem to
contribute to is increased disconnection from the realities of many people
around the world. By appealing to emotions – as fear and uncertainty
become glossed over with fantasies of care – the corporations that own
online platforms tap into shared data as a way to enhance their profits and
increase surveillance. The crisis of COVID-19 offers an opportunity to
reflect on the politics of care embedded in the consumption of online
platforms and the consequences that are triggered by their use.
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19
Pandemic times in a
WhatsApp-ed nation
Gender ideologies in India during COVID-19
Haripriya Narasimhan, Mahati Chittem
and Pooja Purang
In India, going ‘viral’ is a matter of prestige, attention and popularity. Lots
of things go viral, not just COVID-19. YouTube videos, TikTok shots and
WhatsApp memes all circulate in the public sphere, virus-like, on and on,
with no end in sight. As the nation struggles to deal with the coronavirus
pandemic, a look at other ‘viral’ circulations yields interesting and
(sometimes worrying) concerns. In this chapter, we focus on one such
phenomenon very specific to COVID-19 experience in India.
A simple search on Google about mobile phone distribution in
India illustrates the enormous growth of information technology and
internet and cell phone communication in the last two decades. In a
country in which less than 1 per cent of the population was covered by
landline phones in the late 1980s, the population latched on to cell
phones (mobile phones) as soon as they reached India’s shores. India
today is one of those countries that is perpetually on the phone. Some
15 GB (gigabytes) are consumed per person every month in the country,
with some 26 per cent of the population said to own smart phones
(Ericsson Corporation 2020, 13). This is a country with a population of
1.2 billion. Working from home during COVID-19 lockdown has only
increased this consumption.
The increase in mobile phone usage in India was well documented
by Roger Jeffrey and Assa Doron (2013). They had seen the futility of
making and receiving phone calls in India through landlines from the
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1960s to the 1990s, and keenly recognised the first decade of the new
millennium as a revolution in communication. Now one could call another
person on a phone and not worry about either the cost of the call or
getting cut off. As they discuss in another piece (Jeffrey and Doron 2011),
a lot of effort from the state and the corporate world went into making
India a cell phone nation. In 1987, only 0.3 per cent of the population had
access to phones. By 2010, this increased to an incredible 60 per cent,
mostly through cell phones.
In 1991, the Indian government introduced an economic policy to
open up the economy; the economic growth stimulated by this has been
well documented (Fernandes 2000). So has the emergence of what
came to be known as the ‘new middle class’ in India (see Fuller and
Narasimhan 2014). Some of the features that distinguish this middle class
from the older ‘Nehruvian socialist’ middle class include a desire for the
consumption of goods and technologies, if not necessarily ideas that
challenge inequality and hierarchy, a significant feature of Indian society,
as Aditya Bharadwaj illustrates in Chapter 7. Mobile phones were a
commodity that captured the attention not only of the upwardly mobile
middle classes, but also of a much wider cross section of society.
Projections abound about how smartphone and mobile phone
subscriptions will grow exponentially in India. One claim is that by 2026,
this will reach 1.2 billion phones (Ericsson Corporation 2020, 13). With
a population of over 1.35 billion people at time of writing (December
2020), this is almost one phone per person. Such calculations can be
dismissed as the fanciful or ambitious claims of large corporations.
Nonetheless, the significance of access to mobile phone technology,
particularly in India, cannot be dismissed. We argue that it is essential to
understand people’s access to and interactions with digital technologies
to get a sense of what is happening in contemporary India.
The mobile phone is of course not just a technology. It is an enabler
and disruptor of socialities (Nakassis 2014; Venkatraman 2017). As
recent anthropological studies illustrate (Jeffrey and Doron 2011, 2013;
Venkatraman 2017; Tenhunen 2018; Rangaswamy and Cuttrell 2012),
mobile phones take on various meanings beyond their materiality.
Tenhunen (2018) showed how women in rural Bengal used the newly
arrived mobile phones in the first decade of the millennium to seek
support from natal families against violence and other forms of inequality
in their affinal residences. The power that mobile phones afforded to
women became a point of contention in rural Tamilnadu, where boys and
young men had far more access to mobile phones than did their sisters
(Venkatraman 2017), and only marriage and the desire to keep a check
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363
on their daughters’ welfare led parents to buy mobile phones for their
married daughters.
Mobile phones became increasingly common not only in rural areas,
but also among working class people of urban areas, who used the phones
to compete successfully in the highly competitive business environment.
Young men used Facebook as a medium to engage in romantic
relationships, albeit brief and often unsatisfactory (Rangaswamy and
Arora 2016); mobile phones provided access to Facebook for people
who still had little access to laptops and personal computers. This
contrasts with the US, where young college students have been frustrated
with Facebook for leading them to constantly monitor their own and
others’ lives (and selfhood) online (Gershon 2011). Daniel Miller (2012)
some years ago alerted us to the importance of looking at digital
technologies as cultural sites. The newly emerged subdiscipline of digital
anthropology has until now confined its focus mostly to social network
sites, as evident in the vast multi-site project undertaken by Miller and
others, ‘Why we post’.
WhatsApp is a major form of communication in India, and this
motivated us to examine the circulations on that medium more closely.
The extended lockdown that India experienced resulted in an already
active public sphere going wild with images, videos and texts, including
information (often wrong or alarming) about COVID-19, and about its
impact on our everyday lives. It is here that we intervene to argue for a
closer look at forms of viral circulations, and to pause and engage with
cultural notions that emerge anew or are refreshed via mobile phones in
a country that is constantly online. The ubiquity of mobile phones in India
means that memes circulate in various languages across vast distances,
and are talked about in the mainstream press and in people’s homes.
WhatsApp has come to take such an important place in Indian public
discourse that the derisive term ‘WhatsApp University’ has emerged to
discredit spurious and sometimes dangerous information circulating on
the medium.
Studying memes in anthropology
In order to understand memes from an anthropological perspective, we
have to look to scholarship from the fields of media, communications and
journalism (Denisova 2019). Pointing out the inadequacy in Richard
Dawkins’ 1976 definition of memes, emerging from biological sciences
and genetics, Denisova (2019) cites more useful interpretations such as
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those by scholars Esteves and Miekle (2015), who see memes as a form of
story-telling. Denisova herself defines memes as ‘context-bound viral
texts that proliferate on mutation and replication’ (2019, 10). As she
elaborates, memes gather meaning only with ‘audience’ participation. As
texts or images, the meaning is only half-done. Those who read, ‘forward’
and comment when receiving a ‘WhatsApp’ bestow meaning to the meme.
This is related to the context in which the memes are born and sent
forward.
Memes related to COVID-19 can be seen as ‘biosocial experience of
an infectious disease pandemic in the age of internet’ (Marcus and Singer
2017, 342). They symbolise the churn happening inside the homes of the
middle class in India pertaining to expected gendered behaviours and
their (imagined) upending due to the pandemic. In that sense, they are
‘cultural artifacts’ (2017, 342). To borrow again from Marcus and Singer,
memes circulating during the pandemic are a ‘noteworthy social response
to a lethal epidemic in the digital age’ (2017, 342).
In this chapter, we examine memes that emerged in the context of
the national lockdown announced by the central government of India,
which lasted from 24 March to 31 May 2020. These memes were
circulated on WhatsApp and appeared in newspaper articles and online
in social media. We juxtapose these with first-hand narratives in two
different timelines during the lockdown. The experiences of women with
children, both with paid employment and without, against the backdrop
of the lockdown, provides an opportunity to separate the ‘imagined’
realities of lockdown life for men, and the actual ways in which it played
out for women.
Our methods were as follows. HN observed memes circulating on
WhatsApp from April 2020 onwards. These memes were shared in groups
to which she belonged, both of friends and family, and co-residents in the
gated community in which she lives. HN also looked at some memes in
online newspaper articles. These data were analysed in juxtaposition
with interview data, generated by MC as part of a study on mothers’ lives
during lockdown. We used a longitudinal design with qualitative
interviews at three time points: at the start, during and after the
lockdown. Interview questions asked at the first time point focused on
(i) women’s thoughts and views on COVID-19 and the lockdown, (ii) their
relationships with household members (e.g., husband, children
and elderly relatives), (iii) self-care behaviours, including diet, exercise
and sleep), (iv) experiences and challenges of working from home, and
(v) their aspirations and concerns for themselves and their families
during and after the lockdown. Data from the first time point T1 (i.e.
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365
second week of lockdown) were analysed by all of us and helped frame a
semi-structured interview schedule for the second time point during the
lockdown (T2 – weeks seven and eight of lockdown). These in turn
informed the interviews which were conducted at the third point (T3 –
early 2021). Informed consent was collected from every participant for
each interview. Demographic data (e.g. age, type of marriage [arranged
or love marriage], occupation of mother and father, number of children)
were collected during the interviews. Transcribed interviews were
analysed using thematic analyses.
Lockdown in India: a brief history
Little was known in India of the SARS-CoV-2 virus – the novel coronavirus
– at the beginning of 2020. Through January and February, news about a
virus causing numbers of deaths in China appeared here and there, but at
least to the larger public, the first indication that something might be
seriously wrong came only in March. Holi, the spring festival which
occurred in the first week of March, was relatively subdued. On 19 March,
the prime minister Narendra Modi addressed the nation, informing
people of the dangers of the virus and asking for co-operation for a whole
day curfew – a ‘Janata curfew’ (people’s curfew) – on 22 March. On 25
March, an extended lockdown was announced, to take effect four hours
later. This lasted through various phases until 31 May. From June
onwards, the country was expected to ‘unlock’ in stages; regulations that
guided this were released by the central government and, to an extent,
state governments.
The short duration between the announcement of the lockdown
and its implementation meant that many people were caught unawares
and could not move out of their homes. Many were stranded in places
they were visiting. Flights, trains and all forms of intra- and interstate
transport were cancelled, as were private cab and bus services. Offices,
schools, colleges, restaurants, malls and entertainment centres closed.
Economic and social activity came to a complete halt, except for essential
services. This was reflected in photographs of millions of labourers,
migrants to industrial hubs in western India such as Mumbai and Surat,
making their way back to their homes, mostly by foot, in the east and the
north, in states like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Heartrending scenes of
small children walking barefoot with their parents, with little to eat
except for biscuits and water, since roadside eateries called dhabas were
closed, were given front page coverage on newspapers and were broadcast
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widely on television. This huge wave of internal migration, an unexpected
effect of the lockdown, was documented by photographs, videos, cartoons
and memes. In this chapter, we do not include memes on migration, but
it is impossible to discuss the lockdown related to COVID-19 without
referring to this migrant labour crisis.
Among those who could not go to work because of the lockdown
were domestic helpers, called ‘maids’ in middle class India. The majority
of these helpers are women, although it is not unusual to find male
helpers in some parts of the country. The number of women employed in
this sector is hard to estimate. The National Sample Survey Organisation
(NSSO) suggest that four million women work as ‘domestic workers’
(Press Information Bureau 2019); unofficial estimates suggest that the
number is closer to 50 million (Viswanath 2020). Many lost their jobs
during lockdown because their employers did not feel it necessary to pay
them. How these women from very poor households survived through
those nine weeks has yet to be described.
Ray and Qayum’s seminal study on domestic help in the eastern
Indian city of Kolkata (2009)1 traces the origins of present-day domestic
labour in the colonial period. The authors refer to this phenomenon as a
‘culture of servitude’, to denote the institutionalised and normalised form
it takes in the Indian context. It is assumed to be usual for middle class as
well as rich households to have ‘servants’ in India; it is also expected that
domestic work is undertaken by others, with the distribution of tasks
predicated on inequality and subservience.
Sara Dickey (2013, 2016), in her recent work on domestic workers
in south India, points to the heavy dependence of middle class women on
their domestic helpers. Helpers who have worked in households for many
years are treated at times as part of the family, although at other times
they are expected to ‘know their place’ and observe distance. In either
case, both domestic helpers and their employers are acutely aware that
the former are indispensable for the functioning of the household. This is
particularly so when women work outside of the home, usually in jobs
that do not involve manual labour; such women have domestic helpers
who come to their houses every day, to sweep and mop floors, wash
dishes, and wash and sometimes hang clothes to dry.
Domestic helpers are different from a ‘cook’, whose job is confined
only to the kitchen and to cutting vegetables and meat. Some domestic
helpers stay permanently with a family and are referred to as ‘live-in
maids’. Most women in our respective cities, in Mumbai and Hyderabad,
worked in several households in one neighbourhood, where the quantum
of work might differ from one household to another. At time of writing
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(December 2020), these ‘essential workers’ still faced problems in
returning to pre-COVID levels of employment. In the gated community
where HN lives, many domestic workers had been replaced by electric
dishwashers, with one dishwasher maker reporting a 400–500 per cent
increase in sales (Koshi 2020). Until then seen as a luxury good owned
and used only by the rich, COVID-induced lockdown prompted middle
class women to turn to electrical appliances for household chores. There
was also continuing concern about disease spread by domestic workers,
consistent with the concept of lower class and lower caste bodies as
polluting (Dickey 2000; Bharadwaj, Chapter 7, this volume; Garimella,
Murthy, Whittaker and Tolhurst, Chapter 11, this volume).
Lockdown in meme
Although men and women were both at home during the lockdown, men
were not expected to do household chores. In many parts of India, there
is a strong taboo against men touching a broom or a mop. However,
popular memes circulated during this time showed a parallel universe
where men were engaged in backbreaking household work while women
were relaxing. The video we discuss below (see Figure 19.1), circulated
on WhatsApp, is a perfect example.
A man is seen lying in bed and reading a magazine. Suddenly his
hair flays, as happens in movies and TV serials, indicating the appearance
Figure 19.1 When ur maid comes back after lockdown. Facebook, https://
www.facebook.com/officialspwrites/videos/2068890199923609/
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of a romantic interest nearby. The ‘maid’ comes running through the
streets, with her anklet-adorned feet and slippers, her right hand holding
a bag drawn over her right shoulder. The man tosses a towel, in cotton,
the kind of usually seen on characters who play ‘servants’ in movies and
comes running towards the front door. In his hand, he holds a bucket of
water, a mop stick and a broom. He looks eagerly at the landing and turns
away disappointed. Suddenly he stops and turns to see the woman
stopping to catch her breath at the landing. She points her fingers at him
teasingly. She then asks him … He does an aarti (brief welcome ritual)
with the bucket, welcoming her home, as one would do to a new bride
entering her in-laws’ house (sasuraal). He gives her the bucket of water
and the mop (jaadu-pocha), gestures as if to touch her cheeks, and then
makes another affectionately dismissive gesture. He has tears of joy in his
eyes as he watches the woman go inside.
This video suggests a sexual tension inherent between a male
employer and a female worker. It also sexualises and objectifies the
woman worker, negating the labour of her work and identity. The same
Figure 19.2 With wives burdened, men want helpers back. Twitter feed,
Samar Halankar. Accessed 3 May 2020
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369
apparent anxiety with which men wanted domestic workers back in their
homes is captured in the newspaper article in Figure 19.2.
In this article, men point to their wives’ good mood being dependent
on the availability of a domestic help. Without her, the wife is cranky, and
she takes it out on her husband. One man complained about having to
take on specific household chores, such as cutting onions, which most
men did not do, pre-COVID. The comments from men stem not from their
realisation of the drudgery, boredom and backbreaking nature of
household work, which in India involves considerable manual work.
Their woes have more to do with the fact that with a helper around, their
wives complain less and allegedly prepare more (and better) food for
them. Moreover, when a paid helper – a ‘maid’ – is available, men are not
asked to undertake household chores.
Another characteristic of lockdown was an explosion of images
of people cooking, trying out new recipes and resurrecting old ones.
This has been remarked upon by many commentators around the
world; it is not unique to India. The WhatsApp memes targeted women
specifically, however, either as those who should be cooking enormous
amounts of food, or as those who have not done so and have therefore
abandoned their dutiful wifely behaviour. The meme in Figure 19.3
follows this trajectory of provoking a woman who is clearly not
interested in cooking.
The meme in Figure 19.3, using a popular line – kab khoon khaulega
re tera – from the cult film Gangs of Wasseypur (2012), shows the character
played by actor Richa Chadha, the wife of gangster Sardar. Her son Faisal
(played by actor Nawazzudin Siddiqui) asks her when her blood will boil,
that is, when will she get angry and jealous enough to copy other women
and cook delicious dishes for her family. During lockdown, without maids
and cooks, middle class women took to cooking enthusiastically. While
many women (including HN) admitted to searching online and trying out
new recipes, these memes articulate something else – an arena of
competition among women to outdo each other at a task routinely tied to
gendered roles.
In a lengthy article in The Telegraph, published in Kolkata, the
gendered implications of lockdown were discussed (Sarkar 2020). In
households where both men and women had paid jobs, the stress was
depicted in a number of cartoons in the piece. A more relaxed atmosphere
was said to prevail in those homes where the woman did not have paid
employment, and therefore had no meetings to attend on Zoom or phone
calls from work to answer. One meme shows a woman informing the
prime minister Mr Narendra Modi (referred to using the respectful
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Figure 19.3 When your mother is not cooking various dishes during
lockdown. https://humornama.com/memes/when-your-mother-is-notcooking-various-dishes-during-lockdown/. Meme artwork: Rishav Sen
Choudhury
address of ‘ji’) not to lift lockdown, since she has domestic help from her
husband and is under no major inconvenience.
Subarna Ghosh, mentioned in another article, was left angry
during the lockdown, when she found herself working a lot more than
usual while her husband and children went on with their lives
nonchalantly (Pandey 2020). She started a petition on change.org,
calling on the prime minister to speak to men about undertaking
household chores in his monthly radio address, Mann ki Baat (the voice
of the heart), which he made to the citizens of India. Pertinent to our
discussion here, apart from Ms Ghosh’s unhappiness, is the ‘maid’ whose
absence increased her workload and made her realise how little
housework was undertaken by others in her home. In her words,
‘domestic help also helps maintain peace in our homes’. She is upset with
her husband for not sharing in household chores, not only because she
believes he should do so, but also because, prior to lockdown, the maid
fulfilled a crucial role in keeping the household running. If the lockdown
had not prevented people’s mobility, especially of maids, then chances
are that Mrs Ghosh would not have started the petition. The article refers
to a set of memes in Bengali which satirised what lockdown had come to
mean.2 One is as follows:
Lockdown uthe geley, karo jodi kajer meso dorkar hoy amake bolben
Let me know if anyone needs a maid uncle once lockdown is over.
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In Bengali, a maid is referred to as kajer masi, i.e. working aunt or maid
aunt. A man who does household chores now calls himself kajer meso, i.e.
household help uncle or maid uncle. Biplab Basu of Greenwood Park,
New Town, lists his daily chores:
Bason maja, ghor jhar dewa, ghor mochha, washing machine theke
kapor mela.
Wash dishes, sweep the floor, wipe it dry, take the washed clothes
out of the washing machine to dry.
These men present lockdown as a capacity-building exercise in honing
specific skills, which has come to define who they are – domestic helpersin-the-making.
Another popular meme widely circulated on WhatsApp was shared
by the noted industrialist Anand Mahindra in April (Jagran Trending Desk
2020). It shows, Vijaykanth, a Tamil actor, popular in the 1980s and 1990s.
He is dressed in formal clothing, with a black shirt and trousers and a
jacket, a laptop on his lap. He is seated in a chair and speaking (Figure
19.4). The meme is entitled ‘expectations’, as opposed to the ‘reality’ of a
man cooking. Mahindra, who has millions of ‘followers’ on social media,
and whose words media keenly watch, deftly remarks that he too dressed
informally at home during meetings, wearing a formal piece of clothing on
top and informal lungi not visible in camera. He avoids commenting on the
subtext, that of men multi-tasking at home, cooking and attending office
work. It is not just the sartorial difference of the two men that informs this
meme. The man in lungi is not only pretending to be attending a meeting
while dressed informally. He’s actually cooking. He’s present in the meeting
only aurally, with the video clearly switched off.
What’s the reality here, and what’s the expectation? When a major
influencer like Mahindra shares such a meme for laughs, it brings home
the fact that lockdown is widely understood as a space for a ‘role-reversal’
and a shift in gender dynamics in India. One of the comments to
Mahindra’s ‘share’ is a simple text: ‘Some couples are now MAID for each
other’. In cooking for her family, a woman is assumed to be the maid; now
the man has become a maid as well. The meme is a pun on the well-known
phrase ‘made for each other’. It is also a telling commentary on the
absence of the usual ‘maid’ as a result of lockdown.
Another issue often commented on in memes was about weight gain
during lockdown, resulting from excessive cooking and eating, with very
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Figure 19.4 Work from home. Shared on Twitter by Anand Mahindra,
@anandmahindra, 5 April 2020. Accessed 20 December 2020
little physical exercise. In this context, a number of memes also talked
about the danger of obesity (see also Saldaña-Tejeda, Chapter 14). While
some target men, a number focused on women’s weight gain. The
implication is that women put on weight by not doing enough household
chores. In the absence of a maid or cook, the conjecture is that the
husband had done all the work. The meme in Figure 19.5 features a
gender-neutral character talking to its tummy, saying ‘should I tell you
separately (meaning, once again) that there is a lockdown, and you
should not come out?’ And in Figure 19.6, a woman goes for a medical
consultation thinking she is pregnant; it turns out she’s just obese. ‘The
lockdown is to keep everyone safe and healthy, not to become
sweetmakers’, says another text meme.
The comments on obesity are ironic given the huge labour crisis that
occurred post lockdown. Data continues to emerge of jobs lost and
livelihoods severely affected by the pandemic and the resulting economic
situation, as many memes reflected (Figure 19.7). Another meme
captured the spectre of hundreds and thousands of migrant workers
leaving urban areas on foot, back to their villages. Entitled ‘The Social
Distance’, it pictorially renders the wide gap in the lives of middle class
and poor people. While the middle classes, who have come to be called
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373
Figure 19.5 Dear Tummy. WhatsApp. Accessed 19 April 2020
Figure 19.6 After three months of quarantine. WhatsApp. Accessed
19 April 2020
the ‘balcony class’, gathered on their balconies to show their appreciation
for frontline workers on 22 March 2020 (the day of Janata curfew) in a
manner reminiscent of Italy and the UK, poor migrants gathered their
belongings and started the long walk home (Figure 19.8).
Nonetheless, memes were laughs that were ‘forwarded’ and ‘shared’.
These often caricatured women as shrill and shrewish, relishing the
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Figure 19.7 The lockdown is to keep everyone safe and healthy.
WhatsApp. Accessed 27 April 2020
Figure 19.8 The social distance. Artwork: Ananda Vikatan
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375
opportunity provided by the lockdown to lord over their husbands. This
‘joke’ in Hindi, circulated on WhatsApp, is one example:
पेट पर से बार नीचे सरकते बरमड़ू ा को ऊपर चढ़ाते संता ने खश
़ु ी जाहिर की !
मझ़ु े लगता िै मैं दब़ु ला िो गया िूँ ... देखो ये बरमड़ू ा हकतना लजू िोने लगा िै !
हकचन से िाथ में बेलन पकड़े उसकी बीबी प्ीतो बािर आई और बोली !
आइने में अपनी शकल देखो धयान से ... ! मिीने भर से दारू निीं हमली तम़ु िे तो तम़ु िारे हदमाग ने भी काम करना बंद
कर हदया िै ! सब़ु ि से मेरा पेटीकोट पिने घमू रिे िो ! फौरन उतारो उसे !
Santa the husband says he must have lost weight since his ‘bermuda’
[as shorts are called in India] are very loose. His wife, Preeto,
coming with a belan [stick used to make roti], says to him furiously,
‘your brain has stopped working because of non-availability of
alcohol. Since morning you have been wearing my petticoat and
walking around. Remove it immediately’.
Alcohol shops were shut during the lockdown. The meme here stereotypes
the man as excessively fond of drinking, without which he cannot think.
The woman is portrayed as dominating, the man as an idiot who has lost
his thinking capacity. Santa is a popular Sikh character, usually portrayed
as a dimwit in jokes.
Lockdown in reality
We now move to empirical vignettes from women during lockdown, to see
how these images played out in real life. A recent survey by well-known
economist Ashwini Deshpande (2020) found that there was a marginal
increase in the time that men spent on domestic work. The memes shared
through WhatsApp seem to reflect this, either with mild or extreme
exaggeration. But we turn to the narratives of women, especially those
who had paid employment and were mothers, and examine their
experiences of the lockdown. As mentioned above, this study had three
stages, of which two are completed. The third stage will look at the same
women in January 2021. We provide some excerpts from interviews,
before moving to the analysis.
I don’t enjoy doing all this domestic stuff. So, I have been feeling so
lucky and so grateful that I have somebody helping me out with all
this. Because trust me, if I had to do the household work, I would be
in a very shitty mood. Like snapping at everybody, because oh my
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god! You know. The kind of a mess these kids make, the mess I make
um … there is really no way I would be so (laughing) happy. So, I am
very, very grateful and so lucky that I am in this situation. And from
the beginning of the lockdown, I have been thinking, oh my god! I am
so lucky that I have got this girl along with me. You know, because I
was coming here only for four days, and I am like what is the point of
spending all this money on a flight ticket, why should I bring her?
Then I thought let me see you know, she will get out of the house,
what is the big deal? So, I am so grateful to her, that she is here, baba.
Malati is a 38-year-old upper caste, stay-at-home mother of two young
children (9 and 4 years old). She had a love marriage with a man from
another caste. A resident of Hyderabad, she had recently moved to
Mumbai, and had come on a visit to Hyderabad when the lockdown
happened. She found herself ‘stuck’ in the city. She had brought with her
a ‘live-in maid’ whose presence she deeply appreciated. About her
husband, Malati had this to say:
So I do the cooking, and you know Kishore [husband] can’t cook to
save his life. So, he goes out and buys whatever groceries I need. He
has actually begun to learn the name of vegetables, and learn the
name of you know, dals. He had no idea about these things,
absolutely no idea. So, he has totally impressed me with the
knowledge of how to pick the right vegetables, how to get stuff and
all these things … he has become more domesticated … after he is
done with his meal, he takes up the plate and takes it to the kitchen
which he would normally not do. He … after his shower he picks up
his clothes and puts them in tub to be washed and all that. You
know, it sounds really spoiled, but um … (laughing)
For Malati, with two small children and a full-time paid helper, it still
mattered a lot that her husband was doing some tasks at home, even if
some of them were his own, and she appreciated the learning curve he
had negotiated.
Both working women and those who were at home full time
commented at length in interviews on the loss of maids and cooks due to
lockdown. One of their ‘lockdown memories’, as was the case for middle
class women across India, was the sudden non-availability of maids. The
revelation that from now on for the foreseeable future, at least before
constraints due to COVID-19 were lifted, women were expected to sweep,
mop floors and wash dishes, came to many as a rude jolt. This was
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377
particularly so for working women, who simultaneously had to manage
housework, answer calls and be available to their superiors at work. One
of the ‘positives’ women took from this was not waiting for the maid to
turn up. The maids do not have fixed hours of work, although a maid and
her employer might agree on an approximate time. Being able to work at
home at one’s own pace without depending on another person was also
liberating for some women. But some of them also mentioned that maids
helped them to achieve ‘peace’ in a personal sense, by taking away stress,
as well as to ensure the smooth running of the household.
Shailaja, one of the respondents, commented that the lockdown did
not initially have particular impact on her, because she expected it would
last only for a few weeks, from late March to April, although it was then
extended until May and then June. Like many others, Shailaja assumed
that sooner or later, her life, and that of her family, would return to
normal. But the lockdown was extended again and again, and life seemed
to be in limbo, with husband and children at home, and this hit women
hard. Some women working as maids returned to their native villages,
fearing infection were they to remain in the city. For women like Shailaja,
it became essential that she find household help. She had two children
aged 10 and 5. As a stay-at-home mother, she managed to enlist her
husband and older daughter in household work.
I do the cooking and cleaning, Karthik [husband] does the dishes. I
think yeah, Karthik does the dishes. Ribhav [son], shower, and
whatever … he takes care of it. Nandini [daughter] helps me with
the laundry. Ah … Ribhav I think is too small so I won’t count him.
But yeah, Karthik and Nandini yeah. So, dishes part and all Karthik
is taking care of, cooking and cleaning I am doing, laundry me and
Nandini together we do it. Again Nandini’s room and all is up to her.
She has to clean it and dust it off.
Working mothers emphasised the importance of ‘structure’ in their lives.
This was a struggle to locate and put in place, at least in the initial days of
the lockdown. Malini, aged 36 with two children, found it extremely
difficult to run a school virtually. As she explained, the first week of the
lockdown was especially hard:
That week was difficult because, everything, my home has changed.
My husband is working all the time, even on Sundays many times.
I suddenly have him all the time in home. So, that was a big, big shift
in our entire family structure. So, you know, plus with my children
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being home all the time. And they are not used to – they have like
physical activities in the evening. So, I think, for me, the difficult
part was to manage my work. And yet make sure, that ah … my
presence is equally felt at home. That was one, one challenge that I
had to overcome. The other challenge was that to help everybody at
home, realised that while I am at home, I am still doing my work. So
to respect that time and space, that okay I am on a call or when I am
working, I am working. I can’t be available to you.
Far from feeling in charge, women mentioned the struggle to find
‘balance’ between being at home and engaged for their family, and
attending to all the household requirements, while also, as in this case,
continuing their paid work. After a few weeks, Malini managed to
establish some structure to the way her household functioned. But her
husband was always at work, and her mother-in-law was staying with
them, and Malini felt the pressure to ensure that the household did not
collapse. She explained that she took the lead to organise tasks and
delegate duties, lest, in her words, ‘if I don’t do it, or if I didn’t do it, we
would be living on Maggi [instant noodles] or something, yaar. We would
not have food on the table [laughing]. Our clothes won’t be [washed] big
time I guess’. In addition to her established career in the field of education,
which kept her very busy, during the lockdown Malini also tried many
dishes and felt extremely happy with her family’s response to her cooking.
Shabari, in her mid-thirties and a manager in an IT firm, had calls
to take from 9 p.m. since her clients are based in the US. She has an intercaste marriage – what is termed a love marriage in India – which means
that she and her husband knew each other much better before marriage
than do couples whose marriages are arranged. She often mentioned her
husband’s cooperation with her in managing the home. A self-confessed
‘control freak’, Shabari said the lockdown taught her not to bother if her
garden wasn’t tidied up for several days. As a secretary in charge of the
housing society which administered the complex where she lived, she was
involved in the decision to stop maids and cooks from entering the
building, and in keeping lockdown protocol, facing wrath from fellow
residents. Without help, she found it very difficult to keep her huge
bungalow (a ‘villa’ in Indian real estate terminology) tidy all the time. She
spent nearly five hours on weekends just cleaning the house. It was
therefore essential for her to have a ‘cooperative’ husband prepared to
vacuum and help in other ways.
Cooking took a toll on her even though she insisted she enjoyed it
and her husband, Madan, also helped in the kitchen. Perhaps the ‘love
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379
marriage’ gave her a little more leeway than women in arranged marriages
had. However, as a working woman, it was difficult to manage both the
household and the people in it, and demands from work:
I think home, as I said … because there is no house help … and we
… we have … like a considerable-sized place … and this just means
that you need to be aware … If you have to plan for lunch, then you
have to cook in the morning, which also means that you know, plan
ahead. Like usually what happens is when I cook the lunch itself I
think … what should I cook for dinner. Toh my plan is ready at that
point in time. And when I cook the dinner, I know that okay what I
am gonna do tomorrow. Which is, you see, in the mind is stressful
right? Because you are always constantly thinking.
Conclusion
The four women whose narratives we summarised above were very clear
about who was responsible for the running of the household – they were.
They sought help from spouses in the absence of maids, in one case, even
with a domestic helper also present. In our sample of 14 women, 6 of
them also had elderly parents or parents-in-law staying with them. They
felt a strong sense of duty in ensuring that they were taken care of. In the
extended interviews, women voiced their worries about their own
physical and mental health, not having time for themselves, lack of
exercise for their children, and their children’s school work. Those with
paid work felt under even more pressure.
The interviews were conducted only with women, but questions were
asked about their spouses and their participation in household activities.
Interviews with men might have offered different perspectives on lockdown
and its impact on households. Almost all women observed that their
husbands did share in some tasks, whether it had to do with children or
doing minor chores in the kitchen. Women did not complain much, unlike
Mrs Ghosh who started a petition demanding the intervention of the prime
minister. However, they did not acquiesce quietly, batting for the home and
the kitchen as their exclusive domain. Contrary to popular assumptions
that women who stayed at home would have an easier transition to life in
lockdown, they were emphatic that they made sure that their husbands and
young children stepped up to the situation and did their bit.
However, the man with the broomstick and a mop, a towel on his
shoulder wiping his forehead of sweat, as seen in the video that went viral,
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did not manifest. Women admitted to ‘training’ their husbands to undertake
various tasks at home. Men featured in memes and newspaper articles,
attending meetings in informal clothing while cooking, squatting on the
floor and washing dishes while their wives chatted away on the phone
(including with the PM), and being woolly headed enough to not realise
what they were wearing. These images did not emerge in women’s
narratives. A time-use survey conducted in 2019 across India (for the first
time) showed that urban men spend 94 minutes per day on ‘unpaid
domestic service for household members’, while urban women spend 293
minutes doing the same ‘service’ (Time Use Survey 2019). The question
then arises as to why the memes showed women lazing around and men
hard at work in the kitchen. Was this wishful thinking, a ‘could have been
this’ scenario? If so, whose wishful thinking was it? Does the sheer presence
of such memes reflect a ‘nightmare’ scenario dreamed up largely by men?
Where the identity of the creators of such memes is unknown, given
the fact that more men than women own mobile phones in India, it is
possible that these memes were a doomsday version playing out.
Nevertheless, mere speculation does not help situate where contemporary
India stands in its approach to the home, and to changing gender
dynamics as increasing numbers work from home. Articles touting the
benefits of working from home appear with increasing frequency online.
The Indian IT industry is a flagship project for the urban middle class.
News of more and more IT companies, looking at working from home as
a serious option, not only for health and safety reasons but also to save
costs on renting huge office space, percolates the public space (TNM
2020). Washing dishes or cutting vegetables may not remain a dream (or
nightmare) for men for long.
For an anthropological take on various dimensions to COVID-19 and
its impact on our lives, memes such as the ones described in this chapter
call for more serious attention. Blevins (2020) argues that memes are to be
seen from three angles – as revelation, critique and ideation. As Marshall
McLuhan (1964) pointed out long ago, we have to ask what this medium
does, and how crucial a given medium is in transmitting a message. What
does it reveal and what does it hide? Who does it exclude and who does it
suddenly allow to emerge? In line with Blevins’ (2020) argument, we
propose that these memes appeared to ‘imagine new futures’. Daniel Miller
(2020) suggests that memes can be serious or humorous depending on the
situation. In Irish memes, he detected a moral undertone about the right
behaviour to observe during the pandemic.
In this line, what might we say about the memes shared in India
through WhatsApp? Devoid of (female) domestic helpers, women
PANDEMIC TIMES IN A WHATS APP-ED NATION
381
attempted to involve men in household work, with varying degrees of
success. The memes reflect the animated discussion of this shift in
domestic relations and labour. But if our empirical data are any indication,
the man who had supposedly completely transformed into a ‘maid uncle’
by the end of the lockdown has not yet made his appearance. With one
more cycle of interviews to do, we could say ‘watch this space!’. What is
certain at this stage is that the pandemic-induced lockdown has
inaugurated a vibrant debate on men’s participation in household tasks,
at least among urban, middle class, Indians.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to acknowledge the support of Indian Council of Social
Science Research (ICSSR), Government of India, for its support to this
research. Our thanks also to Akash Rajoria, Sravya Vallala and Shoban
Babu Dharavath for transcribing the interviews.
Notes
1
2
This Facebook group called ‘Quarantine Cooking’ also calls itself a mental health support
group. Most members appear to be Bengali-speaking. https://www.facebook.com/groups/
560796447893450.
We thank Saloka Sengupta for this translation.
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20
Purity’s dangers
At the interstices of religion and public
health in Israel
Tsipy Ivry and Sarah Segal-Katz
In Purity and Danger, Mary Douglas (1966, 30) argued that materialist
explanations of biblical rules concerning the body, such as in relation to
diet and sex, as beneficial to health, are insufficient. By pointing out the
semiotic rationale of these rules within a sorting system that classifies
conditions of pollution and purity, she insisted that even if some of Moses’
rules were ‘hygienically beneficial it is a pity to treat him as an enlightened
public health administrator, rather than as a spiritual leader’ (1966, 30).
Douglas never conceived of hygiene/contamination versus purity/
defilement classification systems as mutually exclusive, but the COVID-19
pandemic provides a sharp perspective on their interplay and on the
institutional division of labour between religious and public health
experts. In this chapter, we look at how a purification ritual risks becoming
a site of infection and how spiritual leaders take on public health
responsibilities.
Toward the end of March, the Israeli media reported that religious
centres in Israel, particularly those with ultra-orthodox populations, were
registering high coronavirus infection rates. Community members were
accused of transgressing governmental lockdown restrictions and
endangering public health, thus reigniting stereotypes of faith-based
communities as resistant to state and public health rationales. By midMarch, however, rabbinic authorities affiliated to the full range of Jewish
religious observance – ranging from ultra-orthodox to modern orthodox
– had already invested in restructuring communal and family life in order
to facilitate adherence to public health measures.
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This entailed a deep transformation, particularly given the
intensive sociality of Jewish faith-based communities, including large
families which, in densely populated urban settings, means overcrowded
housing. The restructuring of long-standing religious styles of worship
and sociality – the social configuration of praying, religious learning
and the scale of Passovers meals – involved innovative negotiations of
rabbinic laws. Marital sexuality became a locus of particular tension, as
the halachic (rabbinic legal) requirement that women immerse in a
mikveh (ritual bath) before resuming sexual relations after menstruation
was seen to place women, and their families and communities, at risk of
infection. For observant couples comprising women of fertility age who
are not pregnant, this meant the imminent disruption of the rhythm of
marital intimacy, namely, the recurrent cycle of sexual abstinence and
complete 11–14 day physical distance upon the onset of menstrual
bleeding followed by reunion after the woman’s immersion in the
mikveh.
In mid-March, swimming pools and men’s mikvehs were closed,
along with gyms, shopping malls, restaurants and more.1 However,
women’s mikvehs remained open. The state-authorised chief rabbinate
assured the public that women’s mikvehs were safe and under state
supervision and encouraged women to continue their immersion practice.
Yet, at the same time, the public was informed of cases of women who
tested positive soon after visiting the mikveh, although in no cases was
the mikveh identified as the source of infection. In response to ensuing
public anxiety, halachic opinions suggesting alternatives to immersion
in a public mikveh were published in social and public media by rabbis
who were not part of the state-authorised religious establishment. These
alternatives were condemned by various rabbinic figures. The debate
intensified when two women rabbinic scholars, Sarah Segal-Katz and
Dr Chanah Adler-Lazarowitz, a gynaecologist by profession, published a
public statement on the lack of institutional supervision and general
uncertainty about the sanitary condition of mikvehs. Their statement
encouraged women to consider not immersing if they were unsure about
hygienic standards and claimed that there were halachically appropriate
ways to uphold abstinence if the risk of infection was to linger. The
statement led to a heated public debate on the safety of mikvehs, the
observance of family purity laws (FPL) and kosher ways to negotiate their
observance.
On 1 April, a few days before the Passover holiday and in the midst
of an almost complete lockdown in Israel, Rabbanit2 Malka Piotrokowski,
a prominent modern-orthodox scholar of rabbinic law, participated with
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three other women rabbinic scholars in a public Zoom panel discussion
on the mikveh (Karish-Hazony 2020). The panel, organised by Makor
Rishon, a newspaper with a wide readership among various orthodox
and traditional Jewish communities, received 13,000 views as of 30
September 2020. Piotrokowski opened with a direct attack on the
established rabbinic authorities:
I have been waiting to hear, for once, in an unusual reality, that a
cohort of rabbis have gathered and strained their brains [to find a
halachic solution] … because until Sarah [Segal-Katz] and Chanah
[Adler-Lazarowitz] came out bravely, and it was clear they are going
to pay for it personally, there was no clear guidance. Much worse,
I know that an unequivocal demand by the Ministry of Health to
close the mikvehs was silenced; no one considered it (KarishHazony, 2020, Hebrew, translated by Ivry).
Piotrokowski thus condemned the macro politics of religion and health,
according to which health concerns are overridden by religious
considerations (see Ivry 2013). Yet, drawing on her own experience as a
halachic instructor, Piotrokowski admitted that, ‘Personally, when women
consulted me … about whether to go to the mikveh, I couldn’t bring
myself to say “don’t go”, because I am acutely and painfully aware of the
implications of not going to the mikveh’ (Karish-Hazony 2020). Thus,
prioritising religious obligations over public health concerns can be
traced to the micro politics of intimacy.
COVID-19 offered an opportunity to challenge this order of priorities
by asking how the pandemic entered the macro and micro politics of
religion, health and marital intimacy. We examine the suggestions
emerging from public debates on women’s mikvehs among religious
scholars and lay people, paying particular attention to the interaction
between two bodies of authoritative knowledge, rabbinic law and
biomedicine and public health, in challenging the structure of rabbinic
authority and illuminating relations between state and religion. We
consider two specific kinds of threats: the risk of infection by COVID-19
and other pathogens – as negotiated by references to biomedical and
public health discourses – and, in line with Mary Douglas (1966), the
danger associated with pollution, with references to rabbinic discourse
about the spiritual consequences of violating FPL. We heed the political
interplay between these risks and dangers while exploring the tensions
between public health initiatives and communities of faith.
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Religion, state and public health
Religious belief systems and social structures emerge in the public health
literature as being potentially either impediments or incentives to health
promotion (Chatters 2000; Idler 2014; Van Ness 1999). Affiliation to a
faith community has been identified as influencing a range of health
outcomes throughout the life cycle including longevity, depression,
cancer survival, suicide (Li et al. 2016), reproduction (Gaydos et al. 2010)
and child health (Bramadat et al. 2017). The involvement of religious
leaders and organisations in public health initiatives, and their
accompanying tensions, has also been noted (e.g. Murray et al. 2011).
In Israel, representatives of orthodox Jewish communities are
involved in shaping health policies as part of their general political
participation. At the level of legislation, tensions gather around issues
at both the beginning of life (e.g. abortion (Ivry 2015)) and the end of
life (e.g. the legal definition of brain death (Gabbay and Fins 2019)).
Ultra-orthodox Jewish communities are often perceived as presenting
challenges to maternal and child health. For example, there is higher
vaccine hesitancy among ultra-orthodox (16 per cent) and orthodox
(9.5 per cent) Jews than among secular Jews and Arabs (Velan 2016),
and ultra-orthodox women use state-funded prenatal care services
selectively (Sher et al. 2003). Yet, ethnographic work has complicated
notions of ‘compliance’ (Ivry 2015; Ivry et al. 2011), and orthodox Jewish
communities tend to be eager consumers of healthcare and medical
services, particularly community tailored programmes (Ivry 2010; Ivry
and Teman 2019).
Such public health programmes echo an institutional imperative,
authorised as Ministry of Health (MH) formal guidance since February
2011, to make public health services culturally and linguistically accessible
to all ethnic and cultural minorities in Israel. Nonetheless, the expectation
that medical care providers cultivate sensitivity to religious commitments
may have questionable consequences. In one specific rabbinic organisation,
FLOH (a pseudonym of Fertility in Light of Halacha), in which rabbis
negotiate halachically appropriate routes to reproductive medicine with
doctors on behalf of religious patients, they may also use their authority to
pressure medical experts into compromising safety standards (Ivry 2013).
A similar prioritisation of religious concerns emerged from the debates
over women’s mikvehs, albeit on a larger scale at the level of government
ministries. Unlike the rabbis documented by Ivry (2013), the women
rabbinic scholars whose public statement ignited the current debate
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387
advocated against the exemption of religious medical services from full
adherence to state safety standards. We now explore the debates as a
collaboration between Tsipy Ivry, a medical anthropologist, and one of the
leading figures in the public debates, Sarah Segal-Katz, a rabbinical scholar
and long-term mikveh attendant volunteer.
Methodology
Ivry had studied the intersection between medicine, rabbinic Judaism and
women’s reproductive health (Ivry 2010, 2015; Ivry et al. 2011; Ivry and
Teman 2019), and was drawn to the debates over women’s mikvehs. After
conducting a few short, informal telephone conversations with former
informants, she collected over 100 texts including articles published in the
public and religious media on the subject from mid-March to mid-April
2020, statement papers and formal instructions issued by the MH and the
Ministry of Religious Services (MRS) and watched Zoom panel discussions.
Ivry then embarked in a dialogical collaboration with Sarah Segal Katz,
bringing together the medical anthropological perspective of a nonparticipant online observer (Ivry) and the rabbinical scholar/activist
perspective of a deeply involved participant observer (Segal-Katz). This
was an opportunity, for Ivry, to rethink a decade-long exploration of the
politics of medicine and religion from the vantage point of a pandemic; for
Segal-Katz, it was an opportunity to reflect on the consequences of a debate
in which she is deeply involved.
We discussed how best to bring the responses of observant women
and men into our analysis and decided, due to ethical considerations, not
to opt for seeking permission to quote (anonymously) from conversations
in the exclusive social networks in which Segal-Katz participates as a leader,
respondent and observer. Rather, Segal-Katz retrieved a range of responses
from the open public Facebook network, that, she believes, allows for a
preliminary mapping of responses. Our combined collection of data thus
includes a wide variety of responses from women and men, religious and
non-religious people, healthcare providers and mikveh attendants who
participated in the debates between mid-March and mid-April. Excerpts
from four Zoom panel discussions were transcribed verbatim in Hebrew
and selected quotations, along with posts from the public Facebook
discussions, were translated into English by Ivry. Both authors analysed the
materials in light of four orienting questions: which discourses – religious
and/or public health – are used, by whom, on what scale and to what
effect? We applied these questions to the dataset described above, noticing
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how different contestants negotiated their religious and/or public health
rationales, and the political consequences of this.
A short history is now required of transformations in FPL over the
last two millennia – laws that have often served as the battleground for
struggles over rabbinic authority, thus echoing Foucault’s (1990) notion
of sexuality as a dense transfer point of power relations.
Family purity laws
According to Leviticus 15, the onset of menstrual bleeding places a
woman in a state of ritual impurity which renders her a niddah (separated,
removed from the community of the pure) for seven days. Leviticus 17–26
warns twice that sexual relations and other forms of physical closeness
with a niddah are strictly forbidden and violators are punished by being
cut off from the people of Israel (karet). Menstrual impurity lapses on the
eighth day. Bleeding beyond the seven days or a resumption of spotting is
deemed an abnormal impurity (zavah) and requires women to count
seven more days before they may perform purification rituals.
The collapse of Jewish national sovereignty, the destruction of the
Second Temple in 70 ce, and the subsequent development of rabbinic
Judaism wrought a change in the niddah laws. The period of sexual
abstinence was extended, arguably for fear of confusing irregular
bleeding (zavah) with normal menstrual blood (Rosenak 2011; Wasserfall
1999). The extension received the status of a full-fledged rabbinic law in
the second century ce and has since retained its authority in orthodox
and ultra-orthodox communities around the world. Whereas biblical law
assumed a simple timeline to ritual purity, from the second century
women were instructed to systematically inspect their menstrual flow and
all genital discharges. Only after ascertaining seven ‘clean’ days via pieces
of cloth and daily check-ups, may a woman immerse in a mikveh. While
biblical law had held women accountable for self-diagnosing, the Mishnah
allocated this authority to rabbis, and women were expected to bring
samples of their vaginal discharges to rabbis for their ruling (Fonrobert
1999). This still occurs in many ultra-orthodox communities. There is
extensive discussion in contemporary rabbinic literature about the correct
observance of FPL, including the appropriate length of sexual abstinence
and how to count it (Ivry 2013). There are both historical (Cohen 1999;
Wasserfall 1999) and contemporary accounts (Avishai 2008) of women
choosing to lengthen the period of abstinence for contraceptive purposes
or as a means of empowerment (Wasserfall 1999). In addition, the
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Figure 20.1 Immersion pool in a mikveh in Haifa. During outbreaks
mikveh attendants are expected to sterilise the railings and tiles leading
to the pool after each immersion. A blessing is recited by women before
immersion: ‘Blessed are You, our G-d, Who has sanctified us with His
commandments, and commanded us concerning the immersion’. This is
written in Hebrew on the sign over the pool. Photo: Merav Fenigstein Gizbar
architectural structure and dimensions of a mikveh were specified to
ensure that a person of average size is completely covered by the water;
only rain water collected without direct human intervention can purify
menstrual impurity and a woman’s body must be fully immersed in the
water. This led to the requirement that the immersion be witnessed by
another woman.
Contemporary mikvehs in Israel are designed to meet orthodox
rabbinic requirements, as represented by MRS, and sanitation standards
set by MH. They are, accordingly, built as a complex of private preparation
rooms, each equipped with a bathtub, cleansing paraphernalia, a mirror
to confirm that no object remains that might separate the woman’s body
from the water (a single hair is considered a separation), and a door
leading to a common immersion pool (Figure 20.1). Until the outbreak of
Covid-19, a woman was expected to conduct lengthy preparations inside
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one of these private rooms according to detailed rabbinic instructions,
which include soaking for 30 minutes in a hot bath, washing her entire
body with soap, shampooing her hair, cutting her nails and more. She
then calls the woman mikveh attendant, who confirms that she has
done all the necessary preparations, leads her to the immersion pool
and supervises her immersion. ‘Secular’ cleanliness (to use Douglas’
[1966] idiom) is only a prerequisite to the purification ritual, and it was
precisely the fear that ‘secular’ public health standards of hygiene were
compromised that ignited the women’s mikveh crisis.
The mikveh as a state service
In contemporary Israel – a state constituted to be both democratic and
Jewish – mikveh immersion is a personal choice as part of the freedom to
practise religion granted by the state. Mikvehs are a state-funded religious
service that operate under the mandate of MRS and according to MH
regulations. These regulations, issued in 1999, require that to operate
legally, mikvehs must hold a business licence, which is conditional on
fulfilling MH health and safety standards. According to an MRS report
from 22 April 2020, over 700 mikvehs operate throughout Israel and
around 130,000 women immerse in them each month (Ministry of
Religious Services, 2020).
The use of mikvehs extends beyond self-defined religiously
observant Jewish women (Cicurel 2000). Of Israel’s six million Jewish
citizens, 30 per cent identify themselves as religiously observant and
25 per cent as traditional (Central Bureau of Statistics 2018). The
observant communities are divided into various categories according to
theological orientation, attitudes and commitment to Halacha, styles of
observance, ethnic origin and political inclination (Ivry and Teman
2019). Orthodox Judaism maintains a powerful and controversial legal
standing within the apparatus of state governance with state-sanctioned
religious courts ruling on matters of personal status and family laws and
the orthodox rabbinate having full authority over citizens registered as
Jewish. Jewish Israelis can only marry under the authority of the chief
rabbinate; one prerequisite for marriage is that the woman, regardless of
her self-definition, brings a certificate testifying that she has immersed in
a mikveh. Israel endorses freedom of religion, but freedom from religion
is a contested issue (Ferziger 2008; Neuberger 1999).
Orthodox Jewish representatives also play an important role in
policy making. For example, Ya’akov Litzman, the minister of health who
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handled the Covid-19 outbreak until his resignation on 25 April, is an
ultra-orthodox Jew. Despite popularity associated with the implementation of several health reforms, Litzman was criticised for his handling of
the pandemic and accused of using his position to prevent senior MH
executives from closing women’s mikvehs. Decades earlier, senior MH
executives had also refrained from closing mikvehs that failed to meet
MH standards of safety, arguing that ‘closing the mikvaot without
providing an alternative solution would cause the religious public, for
whom this service is vital, great distress’ (Adler-Lazarowitz and SegalKatz 2020).3
Underlying this is the notion that religious obligations are nonnegotiable and the rules unchanging. This does not conform with either
the history of contestation over FPL or recent gendered challenges to
rabbinic authority. While FPL were deemed throughout history the
epitome of a woman’s Jewish identity and a source of pleasure and
empowerment (e.g. Cicurel 2000; Waserfall 1999), women continued to
negotiate and resist the rabbinic laws of niddah and to foster their own
private versions of observance, sometimes despite explicit protests
(Cohen 1999). However, for the past four decades, women’s initiatives to
reclaim authority over the observance of FPL have increasingly been
made public.
The rise of women’s rabbinic authority
Orthodox commentators and scholars of Jewish orthodoxy have claimed
that observant Judaism is undergoing a ‘women’s literacy revolution’
(El-Or 2002; Ross 2004). Orthodox women can now become halachically
proficient through a variety of institutional routes, and women rabbinic
scholars, such as Piotrokowski, are becoming more prominent. The
majority of institutional opportunities for women to qualify and become
certified as halachic experts lie in the realm of FPL. Avishai (2008, 209)
pointed out a ‘cultural industry surrounding niddah’ that began in the
1980s, and the list of formally certified women professionals now includes
premarital educators who teach FPL to brides and niddah consultants
who are trained to answer women’s questions on the observance of
the niddah laws and to serve ‘as quasi marriage counsellors, medical
professionals and sex educators’ (Avishai 2008, 210; see also Zimmerman
2001). Women halachic experts are advancing new kinds of knowledge
that is simultaneously traditional and modern, religiously committed and
emancipatory (Avishai 2008).
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These experts also offer new venues of consultation that almost
bypass direct engagement with male rabbis, thus steadily transforming
the structure of authority while emphasising their full commitment
to traditional structures. Feminist religious women’s movements
with their commitment to both Halacha and feminist ideals exerted
important influence over these developments (Irshai 2014; Irshai and
Zion-Waldoks 2013). Observant women’s advocacy groups have struggled
with gender inequality in religious marriage and divorce and with sexual
harassment and abuse perpetrated by rabbinic figures. Social networks
have given these struggles considerable momentum. Segal-Katz and
Adler-Lazarowitz are both rabbinic scholars and instructors, co-leaders
and participants in large closed Facebook groups dedicated to discussions
on the halachic lives of women.4 Segal-Katz, an orthodox feminist activist
on issues of religion and state, has been active in Advot, a group that was
involved in a successful petition to the high court submitted by ITIM,5
granting women the right to immerse in the mikveh without supervision.
COVID-19 rode on the wave of women’s efforts to reclaim authority over
FPL and, with health at stake, pushed them forward.
Sanctified state regulations and halachic alternatives
in ‘times of distress’
From mid-March 2020, the numbers of confirmed infection cases were
rising and lockdown restrictions were tightening. Businesses were closed
by state order and citizens were warned to wear masks, to refrain from
gathering, to keep a minimum of two metres from other people, and not
to go more than 100 metres from their homes. On 12 March, Ashkenazi
Chief Rabbi Lau issued guidance that sanctified state regulations,
emphasising that ‘these restrictions are halachically binding’ (Berger
2020). The guidance included detailed instructions limiting various
gatherings in synagogues including learning, prayer quorums, weddings,
funerals and other religious celebrations. The instructions concerning
women’s ritual immersion were comparatively brief and vague, stating
that ‘the routine of “home purity” should be continued and there is no
place for apprehension. A woman who, according to MH instructions,
must self-quarantine, should act as her situation necessitates’. What her
situation necessitated remained unclear.
In the ensuing days, 15 women who had immersed in various
mikvehs around the country and two mikveh attendants tested positive,
two mikvehs were closed and women who had visited the mikveh on the
PURITY ’S DANGERS
393
same day as those infected went into self-quarantine. The MRS issued
instructions for the operation and use of mikvehs, including that women
wash and prepare in their homes to shorten their visit and that mikveh
attendants monitor the chlorination of the water in the immersion pool
more often and change the water once a day. Tiles, railings and all
surfaces were to be sterilised after each immersion, and women’s visits to
the mikveh were to be scheduled in advance to ensure 15-minute intervals
between each immersion. The media reported that rabbis abroad had
issued instructions to close women’s mikvehs for fear of infection. By 16
March, the MH had negotiated plans to issue a full lockdown during and
possibly beyond the week of the Passover holiday, leading to the closing
of all public institutions excluding mikvehs.
On 17 March, Rabbi Haim Amsalem, a rabbinic scholar, former
member of parliament, and Mizrahi social activist, uploaded a post on
Facebook suggesting that in ‘times of great distress’ (she’at dechak)
women be permitted to immerse in their own bathtubs on condition that
this fulfils rabbinic requirements concerning the structure, dimensions,
and volume and quality of water. His post, quoting the halachic literature,
addressed men – the traditional audience of halachic texts – occasionally
insinuating the difficulty of sexual abstinence. Immediate responses on
Facebook ranged from women’s assertions that the mikveh is ‘the practice
that has protected us [spiritually and physically] for generations’, doubts
by both women and men about Amsalem’s qualifications as a rabbi, and,
more specifically, requests for a simpler clarification of the dimensions of
an appropriate bathtub.6 The chief rabbinate published unequivocal
condemnation of Amsalem’s solution, explicitly addressing women
and praising their devoutness to FPL. Women were encouraged to
proceed with the practice and not ‘lend their ears to lies, because [proper
observance of the FPL] is crucial to the well-being of our souls’.
On 18 March, 100 new COVID-19 cases were reported. The
following day, after more women tested positive after immersing in the
mikveh, Kolech, the leading orthodox feminist movement, published a
handwritten halachic opinion (not a ruling) by Rabbi Dr Daniel Sperber,
an authority in Israeli modern-orthodox circles and a supporter of
orthodox feminism. Sperber cited the Mishna to argue for ‘leniency on the
prohibition against physical closeness for women who choose not to
immerse’. Soon after, the Sephardi Chief Rabbi Eliyahu Bakshi-Doron
published his opposition, reinforcing the danger of breaking FPL and
invoking the traditional notion of death as a consequence of breaking a
taboo (Douglas 1992, 16). Both rabbis avoided any detailed discussion of
the sanitary condition of the mikvehs.
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Evidence-based halachic statement
On 20 March, as new lockdown restrictions were implemented, Segal-Katz
and Adler-Lazarowitz published a public statement addressed to women
entitled, ‘Women, be very careful for your souls/lives (venishmarten
lenaphshoteichen)’.7 The two women authors identified themselves as
halachic instructors who had received ‘a flood of questions’ about the safety
of immersion and were striving to provide responsible answers:
We felt that it was preferable to obtain a clear picture of the
actual reality before issuing a halachic response. We therefore wish
here to inform the public of what we have learned regarding the
mikveh system over the years. In so doing, we hope to allow
the public to make an informed decision about observing the
mitzvah of immersion as long as the MH refrains from ensuring
proper standards in every mikveh (Adler-Lazarowitz and SegalKatz 2020).
Unlike the previous rabbinic statements, this one recognised the difficulty
of giving halachic instructions, highlighted the contingency of halachic
decisions on empirical realities and, importantly, called for personal
‘evidence-based halachic decision-making’. Segal-Katz and AdlerLazarowitz (2020) informed the public of repeated institutional warnings
about the non-implementation of MH standards in the mikvehs long
before the outbreak of COVID-19. For example, the state comptroller in
2004 had criticised the ‘unsatisfactory and undersupervised’ conditions
of mikvehs, but recommendations for increased sanitary supervision and
increased training of mikveh attendants had been ignored. A report from
2015 (Achrak-Wein et al. 2015) stated that only 75 per cent of mikvehs
actually held a valid business licence. In a parliamentary discussion in
2017, the director-general of MRS admitted that ‘they simply lack the
means or ability to enforce the business licenses of mikvehs’. Segal-Katz
and Adler-Lazarowitz reported that MH supervision was infrequent and
mikveh attendants monitored sanitation alone. Public swimming pools,
by comparison, are monitored by MH on a fortnightly basis for chlorine
and bacteria levels, and pools that deviate from standards are closed.
Following the outbreak of COVID-19, MRS updated mikveh instructions;
however, according to Segal-Katz and Adler-Lazarowitz, ‘not all mikvehs
have been supplied with all the means for disinfecting the mikveh and
protecting mikveh attendants, some of whom are in a high risk group
because of their age’.
PURITY ’S DANGERS
395
Segal-Katz and Adler-Lazarowitz wrote as citizen scientists (Conrad
and Hilchey 2011), quoting institutional reports, their own research and
their own experiences. But they also drew on rabbinic scholarship, claiming
that ‘it is forbidden by Halacha to put oneself in potential danger if there is
no safe immersion option’. They encouraged women observing FPL and
their spouses to be ‘stringent in matters of life and death’, reminded readers
that many couples contend with long periods of abstinence after birth,
miscarriage and irregular bleeding, and stressed the importance of couples
cultivating ‘emotional and spiritual affinity’. In their evidence-based
attitude, neither health risks nor halachic obligations are taken for granted.
Their statement provoked an immediate response signed by 46 community
rabbis, reasserting that physical touch between spouses was forbidden
according to Halacha, that mikvehs under MRS responsibility were safe and
that the virus cannot survive in water chlorinated according to MH
instructions. However, MRS data indicated a 16.8 per cent decrease in the
number of women using mikvehs since the outbreak of COVID-19.
On 1 April, the head rabbi of FLOH addressed observant women in a
special broadcast on Arutz 7, a popular religious news channel (Arutz 7
2020). He suggested that women take contraceptive pills continuously to
prevent menstruation and so delay the need to visit the mikveh as long
as possible. Reassuring them of the safety of long-term contraception,
he asked women who resisted this for ideological reasons ‘to make as
much effort’ to prevent menstruation for the sake of shalom bayit (marital
harmony) and to ask their gynaecologists to prescribe them several
packages of contraceptives. Consistent with its strategic approach to
technology to advance the observance of religious duties (Ivry 2010, 2013,
2015), FLOH thus advocated a hormonal solution to a halachically
aggravated problem, dismissing considerations of safety (Bartz et al. 2020;
Huber et al. 2020). While there were intense discussions in 2006 about
FLOH’s hormonal solution to delay ovulation for women with ‘halachic
infertility’ due to the length of observance required by FPL (Ivry 2013), this
2020 solution raised few responses. Instead, women complained about the
shortage of contraceptive pills in pharmacies, implying the wide use of
contraceptives by women in religious communities to work around mikveh
requirements both with and without rabbinic permission.
Negotiating uncertainties
Segal-Katz and Adler-Lazarowitz’s statement prompted a heated debate,
not only because of their explicit call for couples to take halachic decisions
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into their own hands. Their description of the infrastructure of mikvehs
attempted to achieve a somewhat paradoxical feat: to clarify the
uncertainty about the sanitary conditions while appealing to MH for
supervision and transparency. This attempt to demystify various
interrelated uncertainties seems to have challenged the public.
Most participants in the open Facebook discussions on the topic
were women, including medical doctors, an epidemiologist, the head of
a local religious committee, mikveh attendants, niddah consultants and
pre-marital instructors. Initially, participants tended to reduce the
message, in particular questions of uncertainty, potentiality, and
contingency of the halachic and medical systems. Many interpreted the
statement as either an (unsolicited) rabbinic ruling – rather than a
confession about the inability to give halachic answers – or as an
unequivocal proclamation of all mikvehs as dangerous places – rather
than an attempt to alert the public to potential health risks and to advocate
for systematic state supervision, clarity and transparency. Participants’
acknowledgement of uncertainty in one arena, Halacha or public health,
often led to statements of certainty in the other. See, for example, an
exchange on Facebook between Segal-Katz and RT:
RT:
[The solution is] simply not to immerse. That’s what I’ve
written as a medical doctor in two other discussion groups.
The discussion should proceed to consider the halachic
question of where the limit of distancing between spouses
should be.
Segal-Katz: I hinted at such space of halachic discussion. If this is indeed
all that is left to us, these will be the questions. The question
is though: is this indeed all that is left?
RT:
Unfortunately, that is what’s left.
RT interpreted the statement as an unequivocally negative assessment
and concluded that immersion was unsafe by default. Segal-Katz
attempted to emphasise uncertainty, but this did not change RT’s
conviction that the public health aspect was non-negotiable. Other
participants conveyed the opposite, namely, that halachic obligation was
non-negotiable even if there was uncertainty about safety:
I am so ambivalent … I immersed in the mikveh a short while ago,
I was trembling from fear, and then I heard that a mikveh attendant
in Maale Adumim tested positive … This can happen in other
mikvehs as well, clearly there is no way not to immerse, especially
PURITY ’S DANGERS
397
since [the pandemic] is here for a long time … It was the first
time I really wanted to cry my heart out after immersion, only
from the stress that my body accumulated during the long days
before immersion.
Anxiety notwithstanding, many participants insisted that even doubts
about their hygiene would not open the mikveh to negotiation. N stated:
‘This is all very important but we must immerse, we shall not remain
without [the option] to immerse’. Segal-Katz then reminded participants of the contingency of halachic considerations on public health
assessments and of the negotiability of Halacha on even the most
binding obligations: ‘If there is a danger to life here, if not for an
individual woman but for the general public, then the halachic
consideration will not necessarily reach the same conclusion’. Faced
with the negotiability of Halacha, N returned to the public health arena
to doubt the severity of the sanitary condition of mikvaot and the
potential health risk; ‘some (public health) professors’ she wrote, ‘claim
that there is needless public panic and that statistically more people die
of influenza’.
Several trajectories thus emerged. The first echoed the criticisms of
several Israeli health professionals: ‘There are professors who claim that
much of the current crisis is due to anxiety … statistically more die of flu,
so I am not sure I understand’. The second draws on participants’ own
experiences of the cleanliness and aesthetics of mikvehs. Y wrote: ‘I have
never seen a dirty mikveh. The most I have seen is a mikveh operating in
an old building but always clean and sterile’. S, on the other hand,
described how filthy her local mikveh was, reminding the participants
that ‘not all the mikvehs are clean’. The participants used cleanliness and
sterility as interchangeable terms, while Segal-Katz repeatedly pointed
out that cleanliness was not the same thing as sterility. A third trajectory
of scepticism related to MRS instructions.
L:
I know that they doubled the quantity of chlorine stated
in the instructions … I spoke yesterday to the mikveh
attendant who told me they sterilize the rooms between
women.
Segal-Katz: Implementation and strict adherence to the instructions are
wonderful, but are you sure this is really happening?
According to Halacha, can a woman who works in the mikveh
and receives her salary from the religious local authority,
testify to the condition of the water and the sanitation as a
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whole? She has not taken an MH course that qualifies her to
supervise and assess the level of sanitation, and if she says
there’s a problem, isn’t she endangering her employment?
Can she really testify to everything being excellent, or is it,
halachically, a conflict of interest? Everybody’s intentions are
good, but it is necessary to establish order and professional
supervision in the mikvehs.
Women responded with testimonies about having their temperature
taken before entering the mikveh and the diligence with which mikveh
attendants cleaned between immersions: ‘I doubt whether the virus can
survive more than three minutes’. Others noted, however, that even
people with no temperature can later test positive and that little is known
about the virus.
Mikveh attendants themselves depicted their meticulousness in
following MRS instructions. One even scolded Segal-Katz: ‘What do you
think? That there is lawlessness here? There are water checks, there is
chlorine in the water automatically and tablets are added, we change the
water frequently, I have to report the number of towels used … this is
sacred work (avodat kodesh)’. While Segal-Katz attempted to transfer
responsibility for safety standards to MH, the attendants sanctified their
work and MRS instructions and saw themselves as responsible for
ensuring safety. Segal-Katz responded:
I am familiar with the instructions and the heavy load that mikveh
attendants carry … what you witness around you cannot be a
reflection of everything that happens in all mikvehs. There are
mikveh attendants who are willing to follow the instructions but
lack the necessary equipment or there is a problem with the
frequency of changing the water. So please enjoy the good that you
witness, but understand that I am raising awareness about the
sanitary conditions in places where the instructions are not applied
fully because more test tubes are needed now than usual and …
there are even sometimes problems … ensuring a 15-minute gap
between immersions.
Both mikveh attendants and women who defended the safety of mikvehs
attempted to establish certainty. However, depictions of mikvehs that
‘smell of bleach’ also raised ironic responses such as: ‘There is chlorine in
the water, it is changed twice a week, it’s really revolting but sacred’ and
‘the mikveh is so sterilized that you can get bleach poisoning from corona’.
PURITY ’S DANGERS
399
Women thus expressed the paradox of a purification ritual that had
become potentially infectious.
Facing uncertainty about the sanitary conditions
of mikvehs
When uncertainty about the state of sanitation was acknowledged, some
participants tried to measure the risk against similar risks in other public
arenas – ‘People can sneeze on you in the supermarket too’ – leading
some to compare general health risks with the dangers of non-compliance
with religious obligations: ‘The mikveh is within the category of pikuach
nefesh [meaning it endangers one’s life not to immerse in a mikveh]; it is
as necessary to religious people as food’. The participant thus reversed
the meaning of the halachic idiom of pikuah nefesh, which allows
for temporary violations of Halacha when a life is endangered, echoing
MH avoidance of closing mikvehs that do not meet safety standards
and rabbis’ difficulties telling women not to immerse due to health
risks (Piotrokowski cited in Karish-Hazony, 2020, Hebrew, translated
by Ivry).
Segal-Katz was accused of ‘a cold halachic discourse’, of misunderstanding the ‘sacred value of the spousal union’, and of overlooking the
stressful real-life struggles of couples during the pandemic. One head of a
local religious authority accused her of causing needless anxiety and
reassured women of the safety of the mikvehs under his jurisdiction. Other
participants protested MRS strategies. They reported feeling ‘offended as a
woman and a person’ or ‘cheated – they endanger my life for immersion’
and asked how ‘the health of religious women is being discarded?’ After
discussing and rejecting alternatives to mikveh (bathtubs, natural springs,
the sea), some participants declared immersion during a pandemic as
irresponsible.
Some women demanded clarification of the uncertainty. S asked
Segal-Katz directly: ‘I would be grateful for a focused and clear answer.
Your writing takes many directions. For those who are halachically
committed, please write an answer to the point … to immerse or not to
immerse?’ Segal-Katz answered: ‘I am trying to say that I cannot give
halachic answers in a situation where it is unclear whether the necessary
conditions in the mikveh are fulfilled’. Participants continued pleading for
an unequivocal (male) rabbinic ruling in the face of the uncertainty. The
rabbinic authorities answered this plea to an extent when, on 6 April,
FLOH and the Association of Community Rabbis in Israel published a list
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of mikvehs that adhered to MH standards and the names of the responsible
rabbis. However, the supervision procedures remained unclear. SegalKatz continued to update the public on her personal website about women
who had tested positive, sharing women’s reports on safety standards
in mikvehs.
By 11 May, after the first wave of COVID-19 was deemed contained,
the MRS cancelled the requirement for a 15-minute interval between
immersions. Following the outbreak of the second wave, with thousands
of new cases each day and new lockdown instructions, including strict
limits on mobility, for at least three weeks starting from 18 September,
MRS published a statement allowing women to walk further than the
permitted one kilometre to visit a mikveh. MH was silent.
Segal-Katz’s preliminary mapping of observant women’s choices
during the second wave suggests great diversity. Some women continue
to immerse in public mikvehs (where health and safety is now being
monitored more strictly by MRS) and they see attempts to question the
sanitation of the mikveh as heresy. Others are foregoing immersion and
reducing their commitment to FPL. Between these poles, women continue
to immerse after checking the state of sanitation and sharing their
findings, travelling, when possible, to well-maintained and less crowded
mikvehs in remote areas, or immersing in natural springs or the sea.
Finally, some women have deferred immersion and remain fully
committed to the halachic rules of physical separation and some take
long-term contraception.
Purity’s dangers and risks
What, then, can controversies over the potential infectiousness of a
purification ritual during a pandemic teach us about the intersection
between religion and public health? What can religious scholars’
negotiations over public health responsibilities show about the role of a
pandemic in challenging state and religious structures of authority?
The women’s mikveh crisis demonstrates that an event such as a
pandemic can illuminate long-standing institutional dysfunctions and
intensify ongoing inter-communal and inter-institutional strife. The
outbreak of COVID-19 loaded onto the macro and micro politics of
religion, health and gender, particularly women’s ongoing efforts to
reclaim authority over rabbinic laws organising sexuality and question
rabbinic authority. The statement that ignited the debates entangled
public health discourse with rabbinic scholarship, calling for MH
PURITY ’S DANGERS
401
intervention to ensure the safety of a religious ritual and drawing public
attention to the issue at hand. This call for both public and institutional
attention was made in the name of women’s health, the health of their
communities and the entire public.
Significantly, rabbis incorporated biomedical knowledge into rabbinic
considerations. Yet, as work on FLOH illustrates, biomedical knowledge
and technologies are often presented as progressive ways of assisting
religious commitments while downplaying risks (Ivry 2010, 2013). In
contrast, Segal-Katz and Adler-Lazarowitz pursued a powerful public
health risk discourse in the context of rising morbidity and mortality rates.
In 1966, Douglas pointed out the role of danger in guarding ‘the
ideal order of society’ (1966, 3), noting that ‘pollution beliefs can be used
in a dialogue of claims and counter-claims to status’ (1966, 3). If dangers
are to risks as pre-modern is to modern, then negotiating a matrix of
contingencies around dangers, risks, pollution and viral contagion at the
interstices of two authority systems – a state public health governance of
risk and a religious system of authority – seem to have the dramatic
potential to reorganise the social order.
However, in addressing the moral implications of risk discourse,
Douglas argued that being ‘“at risk” is not an equivalent but the reciprocal
of being “in sin”. To be “at risk” is equivalent to being sinned against,
being vulnerable to the events caused by others, whereas being “in sin”
means being the cause of harm’ (1992, 28). By pointing out both purity’s
risks and dangers, Segal-Katz and Adler-Lazarowitz tried to remind
observant women, their spouses and mikveh attendants of their matrix of
religious and citizenship rights and obligations while advocating against
religious exceptionalism. Yet, the introduction of a matrix of contingencies
and contradictions stimulated attempts to separate the systems and
declare one of them non-negotiable.
Such separations are ‘useful’ for policymakers to draw on when
prioritising religious obligations over health concerns. Underlying the
prioritisation of religion in the name of cultural sensitivity or commitment
to Halacha, religious obligations are presented as a non-negotiable set of
rules. However, the debates over women’s mikvehs illustrate what
medical anthropologists have argued for decades, namely, that any
consideration of health policy should take into account the open-ended,
power-ridden, and multivocal diversity of cultures and religious
communities. Specifically, intercommunal structures of meaning
and governance and gendered challenges carry simultaneously
conservative and transformative powers, thus opening up many spaces
for negotiation.
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Acknowledgements
Tsipy Ivry is grateful to Aviya Lensky for her dedicated assistance with
the collection and organisation of the database on which this article is
grounded.
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Men also immerse in the mikveh, but this is rendered a custom and not a commandment.
‘Rabbanit’ designates a woman rabbinic scholar (not the wife of a rabbi). An appeal to the high
court to make women elegible to attend state exams is pending.
Names by alphabetical order.
Segal-Katz is co-leader of ‘Tranquil Immersion’ (Tovlot benachat) with 1,400 participants, and
Adler-Lazarowitz is co-leader of ‘Halachic Feminists’ with 11,000 participants.
ITIM is an ‘advocacy organization working to build a Jewish and democratic Israel’ https://
www.itim.org.il/en/
Segal-Katz published on her internet site the halachic opposition of Rabbanit Tikochinski
(2020).
The title converts the famous verse from Deuteronomy quoted previously, which is originally
phrased in the second person male plural, into the second person female plural.
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Part V
Lessons for a future
21
Fracturing the pandemic
The logic of separation and infectious
disease in Tanzania
Rebecca Marsland
As COVID-19 unfolded, a stark picture of global health inequalities
emerged. This invites reflection on the ‘pan’ in pandemic, for as
anthropologists know all too well, when it comes to infectious disease, we
are certainly not ‘all in it together’. Instead, public health measures
require us to isolate ourselves from other human beings, and other forms
of life – viruses, bacteria, and insect and animal vectors. Pandemics
fragment; they do not create unity.
In this chapter, I reflect on the pandemic via another globalised
infectious disease – malaria – which, in contrast with COVID-19, is
experienced as part of ordinary life. I consider how public health measures
used to interrupt the transmission of malaria, COVID-19 and many
other infectious diseases frequently depend on what I call a ‘logic of
separation’. This logic, in which it is assumed that humans can be
separated from each other and from other forms of life, informs the
protective barriers that we try to put in place between humans and
pathogenic microbes. Interrogating this logic may help us understand
responses to COVID-19 – not just in relation to the lockdowns that have
taken place across the world, but because this new virus is considered to
have crossed the ‘species barrier’. It is likely that future disease prevention
efforts will focus with renewed intensity on relations between humans
and nonhuman species, through the One Health approach to control and
surveillance.
In African countries, COVID-19 has not been so severe as in the
Americas, Europe and South-East Asia (WHO n.d.). This has been
FRACTURING THE PANDEMIC : INFECTIOUS DISEA SE IN TANZANIA
409
attributed to a swift response by African health ministries, the greater
experience of individuals and public health systems with infectious
disease in contrast to the Global North, and the younger population.
African countries have had to weigh up the economic costs of lockdown,
and so in general have imposed fewer restrictions. The situation in
Tanzania is less clear. The late Tanzanian president, John Magufuli,
closed schools and universities, but did not enforce a lockdown or social
distancing, citing economic danger to life. Controversially, he instead
encouraged Tanzanians to attend church to pray. No data have been
published since 29 April 2020, when the number of confirmed cases had
reached 509 (BBC News 2020a).1 In May, Tanzanians crossing the borders
into Zambia and Kenya were tested, found positive and turned back. In
June, President Magufuli announced that the virus had been defeated.
President Magufuli died on 17 March 2021, and a month later his
successor, President Samia Suluhu, announced that an expert committee
would advise her on COVID-19.2 Given reports of the detention of
journalists who have criticised Magufuli (BBC News 2020b), I have
assumed that Tanzanian friends and colleagues cannot speak freely about
COVID-19. Instead, the research on which I draw in this chapter comes
from fieldwork in Kyela District, in the southwest of Tanzania, originally
conducted from 2000 to 2002, and since then, through multiple return
visits. I understand that there was no upsurge in funerals in Kyela in 2020,
as there was during the peak of the HIV pandemic, but this is not evidence
of the absence of infections or deaths from coronavirus.
My long engagement with people who live in Kyela allows me to
reflect on some of the limits to interventions that depend on the logic of
separation. Kyela, located on the north shore of Lake Nyasa, is low-lying
and malaria is holoendemic. In the early 2000s, people trod an uneasy
line in their efforts to separate themselves from the causes of malaria in
order to avoid risk of infection. Their use of and sometimes reluctance to
use insecticide-treated mosquito nets (ITNs) in order to inhabit separate
spaces to mosquitoes to protect themselves from malaria were tied up
with moral concerns about sociality at funerals and overlapping
ontological worlds. I draw on this experience to illustrate how the logic of
separation can puncture multispecies and social worlds, and requires
people to produce pluriversal solutions, if they are to hold these worlds
together. I relate this to the indifference, as manifested in their resistance
to ITNs, of mosquitoes to this logic and the reluctance of global health
science to debate the associated risk of the loss of a partial immunity to
malaria that could, in theory, result when transmission is temporarily
interrupted. To conclude, I argue that it is important to acknowledge the
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complex relations between humans, nonhumans, social structures,
biology and political agendas that the logic of separation ignores, and
consider lessons for responses to COVID-19, in particular One Health.
Pandemic/polydemic?
What is a pandemic? Does this word adequately reflect the ways that
people everywhere experience a pathogen with global reach? A pandemic
is defined loosely as a disease that spreads over two (or more) continents
and is destructive of human life. Its etymology (pan – all, demos – a
population of people in a democracy) reveals a once deprecatory term
that in the seventeenth century referred disapprovingly to a ‘political
system in which all the people govern equally’ (Oxford English Dictionary,
n.d.) and to ‘vulgar forms of love’ (Harrison 2016, 130). As European
imperialism intensified and hastened the spread of pathogens through
the forced movement of people through slavery, colonial rule and
impoverishment, the word’s negative connotations were linked to disease.
Despite the imperial and post-imperial role of Europe and North
America in spreading disease to the global south, an ‘outbreak narrative’
(Wald 2008) has formed in which it is imagined that new diseases emerge
in the ‘global south’ and travel to the economic centres of the ‘global
north’. In this narrative, the African continent is prominent. Viruses,
themselves seen as ancient life forms (Wald 2008, 33), emerge out of a
place which in the western imagination is also positioned back in time
(Fabian 1983). The colonial ‘heart of darkness’ image of Africa still
conjures up an antediluvian zone where humans are part of a fecund
‘nature’ that brings forth disease. China, despite its technological
sophistication and superpower status, occupies a similar place in the
western imagination; it, too, is thought to be a place located in primordial
time, where ‘spillover’ across the species barrier is likely to occur (Lynteris
2020a; Zhan 2005). The US and Europe do not feature in this imagined
geography of disease emergence (Wald 2008, 44), even though swine flu
originated in the US and BSE (‘mad cow disease’) in the UK. The fact that
in Africa COVID-19 has not caused the devastation that was predicted
further indicates the blind spots that the outbreak narrative produces
(Chigudu 2020).
Malaria shares with pandemic disease its prevalence and high
mortality rates across more than two continents. However, it is understood
to be endemic rather than pandemic. This endemicity is linked to the
distribution of the Anopheles mosquitoes which spread malaria. Anopheles
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411
once transmitted malaria in England, Italy, North America and Siberia,
and its present-day prevalence in the tropics is an outcome of the history
of human ecology, rather than a straightforward relationship with
geographical place (Packard 2007). In 2018, malaria caused 405,000
deaths in the Americas, sub-Saharan Africa, South and East Asia
(Medicines for Malaria Venture n.d.).
The meanings of pandemic, epidemic and endemic are, as historian
Mark Harrison notes, highly ‘elastic’ (2016, 139), with distinctions in
meaning mirroring their social and emotional significance. Plague is still
framed as a pandemic, even if its prevalence is insignificant (Lynteris
2020b). The historian Charles Rosenberg points out that in the nineteenth
century tuberculosis ‘did not elicit the sense of crisis that accompanied
epidemics of yellow fever and cholera’ (1992, 285). The everyday quality
of an old disease like malaria contrasts with the fear and urgency
generated by the new disease COVID-19, and the global social, economic
and political upheaval associated with what is unknown about the virus
SARS-CoV-2. The distinction between crisis and the everyday is a political
matter, raising questions about how different human lives are valued
(Marsland and Prince 2012).
Pandemics are not equal in their effects. The risks of infection,
serious disease and fatality are higher in some socio-economic groups
than others. Social divisions are firmed up as the borders around
nation-states are policed and quarantines put into place, and while
pathogens hold the same biological forms (give or take mutations)
wherever they go, they are not, to use Nading’s (2013) phrase, ‘entangled
with’ the same socio-economic groups, political systems, economies,
social structures or geographical locations. A disease can manifest
differently in different bodies or as time passes, and there can be a range
of ways of interpreting the symptoms. Within biomedicine, different
specialisms produce alternative understandings of a disease, and create
new kinds of social relationships (Berg and Mol 1998). We can extend
these ideas about multiplicity to pandemics: Mignolo (2018), challenging
the western concept of the universal as assumed to be a universal,
encourages us to think in terms of a pluriverse. In acknowledging the
pluriversal nature of pandemics, I propose here the idea of polydemics
and highlight the ‘interconnected diversity’ (Mignolo 2018, x) of
the effects of, and responses to, the same pathogen. Thinking about
polydemics acknowledges that disease outbreaks are filtered through
‘many cosmologies, [and there is] no longer one that subsumes and
regulates all the others’ (Mignolo 2018, x) and so allows us to see that
different versions of a pandemic can coexist.
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The logic of separation
We can examine the ‘interconnected diversity’ of a global outbreak by
considering a key component of infectious disease control, elimination and
eradication: that is, in the absence of a vaccine, the cycle of transmission is
broken by separating humans from each other or from nonhumans. This is
a ‘contagionist’ view of infectious disease (Rosenberg 1992), within which
‘barriers to transmission and contamination become the main technology
through which health is delivered’ (Hinchliffe 2015, 30). With this logic of
separation, single disease interventions from control measures to
eradication campaigns are orchestrated from the top. The emphasis is on
technological innovation, at the expense of primary healthcare and
improvements to standards of living. In this way, social inequality is allowed
to continue – life is promoted under conditions that might otherwise cause
death. The approach medicalises politics because it sidesteps questions
about the distribution of wealth and discrimination based on ‘race’ and
gender.
Techniques of separation such as quarantine, social distancing and
cordons sanitaires focus on humans, their susceptibility to pathogens and
their role in facilitating the movement of microorganisms. But vectors
and microbes do not recognise human social borders, and the public
health response to this is to understand and implement borders that
take nonhumans into account. And so other forms of life, often not
considered as part of our society (Latour 2004), are also singled out for
separation.
Anxieties about the hazards of nonhuman life crossing over into
human spaces are central to outbreak narratives. New pathogens are
considered to ‘spillover’ when the pristine zone of nature is entered by
humans, or creatures from it encroach on human ‘territory’ (Quammen
2013; Wald 2008). ‘Spillback’, the transmission of disease from humans to
other species, rarely features in outbreak narratives even though it can
establish new reservoirs of disease and zoonotic cycles (Guth et al. 2020,
3). That spillback is marginal to this narrative reveals the anthropocentricity
of the logic of separation. The wild places where spillover is predominantly
thought to take place are cast in the media as dangerous, exotic and
uncivilised. Humans local to them are often racialised as animal-like, with
discriminatory discourses of race projected onto hierarchies that distinguish
between human and nonhuman (Haraway 1989; Mavhunga 2011). These
pejorative racial hierarchies combine with fears about boundary-crossing
pollution (Douglas 1966), as evident in the association of outbreaks with
the consumption of wild animals. The hunting of bats and bushmeat
FRACTURING THE PANDEMIC : INFECTIOUS DISEA SE IN TANZANIA
413
(Ebola), and sale of civet cats as food in China (SARS) confound the
western category of ‘food’; pangolins (COVID-19) used in Chinese
Traditional Medicine likewise fall outside of the western category of
‘medicine’ (Lynteris 2020a; Zhan 2005). Thus, nonhuman forms of life are
incorporated into biomedical understandings of hygiene, and the
management of ‘inappropriate’ human contact with animals becomes a
matter of medical concern (Keck and Lynteris 2018, 9).
The separation of humans and nonhumans in biomedical thinking
about outbreaks has been incorporated into pandemic preparedness;
with COVID-19 this is likely to intensify. The One Health idea has been
taken up by the WHO, the World Organization for Animal Health and the
Food and Agriculture Organization to address the threat of emerging
zoonotic diseases. The western division between the human and
nonhuman world is fundamental to One Health projects, which
understand interactions between human, animal and environmental
health in terms of the historical distinctions between these categories
(MacGregor and Waldman 2017; Wolf 2015). The geographer Steve
Hinchliffe argues that One Health is ‘one world-ist’ because it aims to
generate a ‘single biosecure planet’ where ‘good’ and ‘bad’ forms of life are
separated out. In practice, biosecurity predominantly exists in the Global
North, whereas the Global South is potentially dangerous because of
‘interspecies intimacy’ (2015, 30). This logic of separation of humans and
nonhumans is also at the centre of malaria control. Attending to this may
offer clues to thinking about the response to COVID-19.
The emphasis in malaria control has been on separating humans from
nonhumans (mosquitoes and the parasitic Plasmodia that cause malaria)
rather than separating humans from humans. Still, in colonial settings,
‘native’ humans were seen as a reservoir of infection and a danger to
colonising humans (Litsios 1996; Manderson 1996; Packard 2016; Packard
and Brown 1997). Public health measures were intended to protect colonial
settlers from local populations, and towns were segregated accordingly.
Homes for Europeans were often located in elevated land (where there
were fewer mosquitoes), at a distance from areas designated for the
residence of local populations and immigrant labourers (Curtin 1992;
Goerg 1998; Harrison 2016, 137). In 1930s South Africa, assumptions
about ‘malaria tolerant Africans’ justified segregation, and health officials
claimed that Africans did not need to live in areas provided with malaria
control services (Packard 2016). The segregation of colonised humans
reflects the fact that they were not considered to be fully human; they were
rarely distinguished from an environment that harboured diseases harmful
to Europeans (Vaughan 1992, 42).
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The logic of separation depends on a western cosmology in which
humans occupy a separate space to nonhumans. In this world, humans, and
some domesticated nonhumans, are assigned places marked out by culture;
other forms of life are designated to places of nature (Descola 2013). In this
understanding of the world, foundational to western thinking although not
universal, nature is seen to be subdued and exploited by humans (DeMello
2012, 36–40). As this logic of separation travels and interacts with different
cosmologies, it becomes pluriversal. This is how polydemics proliferate.
The ethnography that follows illustrates how efforts to separate humans
from mosquitoes can generate a pluriverse.
A world without mosquitoes?
The Plasmodia parasites that cause malaria are transmitted by Anopheles
mosquitoes – the vectors of malaria. Since this link between mosquitoes
and malaria was discovered by Ronald Ross in 1897, the separation of
humans from mosquitoes has been a major component of malaria control:
killing adult mosquitoes using insecticide, killing mosquito larva with
larvicide, using repellents and sleeping under bed nets. In the 1990s,
ITNs were found to be effective at reducing transmission, and have been
promoted since then. The Plasmodia can also be targeted with antimalaria
drugs either as treatment or prophylaxis. Malaria has been eliminated
from some parts of the world with improved socioeconomic conditions,
referred to by Packard as ‘growing out of malaria’ (2007, 65).3
Mosquito control is part of the logic of separation in global health
(Beisel 2015). It originated with the goal of eradication, a possibility that
has fallen in and out of sight. In the 1950s, the Global Malaria Eradication
Programme (GMEP) used the insecticide dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane
(DDT) to kill mosquitoes and interrupt the transmission cycle (Stepan
2011). DDT had been developed during the Second World War, and was
used primarily in parts of Asia to protect troops from mosquitoes. This led
to a new era of confidence in the use of a single technology to control
malaria (Packard 2007, 143). In the context of the Cold War, the GMEP
fell into the US strategy to demonstrate its superiority to socialist regimes.
It was known that mosquitoes would develop resistance to DDT, but
eradication work went ahead (Packard 1997; 1998). The consequences
were disastrous: DDT lost its efficacy, and there were large epidemics of
malaria in the 1960s and 1970s (Litsios 1996, 83).
These epidemics were a result of the ‘rebound effect’. Those who
survive childhood without dying of malaria develop partial immunity.
FRACTURING THE PANDEMIC : INFECTIOUS DISEA SE IN TANZANIA
415
They may still experience mild symptoms if infected, but they are unlikely
to develop severe or fatal malaria. Partial immunity relies on ‘endemic
stability’ in which there are high levels of infection but little disease
(Coleman et al. 2001). Immunity is also lost during pregnancy, and is not
acquired at all when malaria transmission is unstable. The risk of death is
higher for nonimmune adults than it is for infants.
After the failure of the GMEP, malaria control was neglected.
Eradication had never been seriously attempted in Africa because there was
insufficient infrastructure and resources to support it; hence here there was
no rebound effect. However, the burden of malaria continued to grow with
reduced spending on malaria control, increased poverty and parasite
resistance to chloroquine – the most affordable antimalarial treatment.
This resurgence led to the launch of Rollback Malaria (RBM) in 1998; a
partnership between the WHO, malaria-affected countries, development
agencies, donors, researchers, non-governmental organisations and the
private sector. RBM’s target was to halve the burden of malaria by 2010
with the use of ITNs, effective treatment and early warning systems to
control epidemics.
In 2000, I watched a health education film with about two hundred
other people in a bus station in Kyela. I’d travelled there with a team of
Tanzanians who worked for the social marketing NGO, Population
Services International (PSI), and were promoting ITNs as part of the RBM
campaign. They were touring the country and teaching people how to use
ngao (shield), a tablet of insecticide that could be dissolved in water, in
which a mosquito net could be soaked, then hung up in the shade to dry.
Afterwards, the ITN would kill any mosquito that landed on it for a period
of about three months; it would then have to be treated again. The film,
which I described in my fieldnotes from February 2000, was part of their
road show:
A young woman is sleeping fitfully, raising her hand to swat away the
mosquitoes which are filling the air with their remorseless highpitched hum. When she wakes, she has a high fever and is very ill
indeed. When her parents discover her, they have a heated argument
about where to take her for treatment. Her mother wants to take her
to see the medical officer at the nearest health facility. Her father
argues that she should go to see a mganga (a traditional healer) to get
some herbs and to divine in order to find out which spirit has made
her sick. Her mother gives in reluctantly and they go to see the
mganga. However, after the mganga’s administrations, the girl is still
ill, and her father then angrily accuses an elderly neighbour of
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bewitching her. In the midst of all this, the young woman starts
convulsing, and her father leaves his quarrel to help his wife give their
daughter more of the herbs from the mganga. It is at this point that his
wife’s brother appears on the scene and he insists that the sick woman
is taken to hospital. At first her father is angry, and complains that he
is head of the household, and cannot listen to decisions made by the
brother of his wife. But, in the end they all go to hospital.
A few days later, the woman is much better, and not only that,
her father has learnt at the hospital that her illness was malaria.
There he was advised that to prevent malaria, his family should
sleep under a mosquito net, and he also learnt to treat the net with
insecticide so that it can kill and repel mosquitoes. The father left
his superstitious ways and made up the quarrel with his family.
Peace and happiness reigned in the household.
The film was faithful to a genre of colonial health education films which
commonly depicted two opposing characters. One would demonstrate
moral failings by seeking help from a traditional healer, believing in
witchcraft and exhibiting personality flaws such as argumentativeness.
The other would follow the directions of biomedicine, and would be
rewarded with ‘health, fertility and prosperity’ (Vaughan 1992, 183).
In the PSI film a message intended to reshape people’s relationship to
mosquitoes was tied into this moral lesson. The film aimed to teach people
to use bednets and to treat them with insecticide. The message, consistent
with the logic of separation, was that a division must be created between
the spaces of human and insect life.
ITNs are more effective than untreated nets. Their repellent effect
reduces the number of mosquitoes in the environment and discourages
them from biting. ITNs also kill other insects that disturb sleep or spread
disease, such as bed lice, fleas and other species of mosquito. In the early
days of RBM, Anopheles mosquitoes tended to bite at night when people
were sleeping, and so ITNs afforded protection at a time when malaria
transmission is highest. Trials in Tanzania demonstrated that their use led
to a clear reduction in mortality from malaria (Lengeler 2001).
The challenge was to persuade people to use them. Research was
carried out to identify beliefs about malaria – it could be caught by sitting
in the hot sun, getting caught in the rain, working too hard or drinking dirty
water – that might be corrected through education, and replaced with
knowledge of the role of mosquitoes and parasites (Winch et al. 1996).
Between 1997 and 1999, the Ifakara Health Research and Development
Centre trialled social marketing to provide ITNs at near cost price with
FRACTURING THE PANDEMIC : INFECTIOUS DISEA SE IN TANZANIA
417
relative success. ITNs were popular when people could afford them:
according to Renggli and colleagues (2013), 72.7 per cent of Tanzanian
households were using ITNs by 2012. However, people were not always
able to pay for ITNs, and often the sole ITN was used by the head of
household – the man, not women and children who are more vulnerable to
severe malaria. Local health officials had underestimated the market for
the largest nets, because they thought that people in villages did not sleep
in large beds (Marsland 2006). The large nets are used by women and
children who share sleeping mats. People were less likely to buy insecticide
to re-treat nets (Armstrong Schellenberg et al. 2001), and so long-lasting
insecticidal nets were introduced.
Another ‘barrier’ (to use the public health jargon) in Kyela was
widespread acceptance that humans and non-domestic creatures inhabit
the same spaces. Mosquitoes can be avoided in great density if one sits
in the smoke of a fire, but this is uncomfortable and inconvenient.
Mosquitoes fly in and out of houses and latrines, and bite people when
they are resting in the shade under cocoa bushes and mango trees. They
are part of a way of living that includes other wild creatures: termites
must be dug out of kitchens, and bat manure scraped from roofs. Longlegged spiders span the surfaces of walls, scorpions hide in beds and
clothing, rats and mice run across the rafters and chew their way into
stored sacks of grain, monkeys steal the cocoa crop, and at night pods of
hippopotamus trespass and feast on the rice paddy and green mamba
snakes suddenly drop out of trees. People, domestic animals and wild
creatures muddled along together. The notion that somehow people
might erect a permanent barrier between themselves and these various
insects and animals seemed unthinkable and unrealistic.
The everyday presence of wild creatures in human spaces challenged
the notion that pests are unwanted forms of life that enter human spaces
(Knight 2000). Nobody particularly liked mosquitoes, but their presence
was rarely questioned. And so, an important part of RBM’s work was to
instil the idea that mosquitoes should not be tolerated: they are enemies
because they spread malaria. ITNs divided space up into zones where
mosquitoes could circulate freely with people, and human sleeping places
that they could not enter. This was quickly accepted, and applied to
ordinary, night-time, indoor sleeping arrangements.
In conversations with people in Kyela, it became clear to me that
because mosquitoes were ubiquitous, part of the everyday mundane world,
and despite the suffering and nuisance they caused, it had not occurred to
people to regard their presence as a problem that could be acted upon.4
Unlike entomologists (Kelly 2012) and public health workers, they did not
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VIRAL LOADS
know the mosquito in microscopic detail. Instead, the female mosquito,
which feeds on blood to provide nutrition for her eggs, made herself known
through her irritating whine, the itchy lumps that she left on ankles, and
the satisfying smear of blood left on the wall if someone successfully
swatted her. Most people knew that mosquitoes caused malaria in some
way, but they were not that interested in knowing any more. They would
say things like ‘they say malaria is caused by mosquitoes, but I don’t know
if it is’, or ‘the scientists say it is caused by mosquitoes, but I can’t comment
on that’. This ‘not knowing’ reflected a ‘combination of secrecy, uncertainty,
and skepticism’ (Last 2007, 9) in relation to medical knowledge.
Those willing to expand commented on mosquitoes as a reflection
of the poor state of the environment in which they lived (see also Kelly
and Lezaun 2014; Nading 2014, 17). They told me that mosquitoes were
a product of rain, living in a valley or close to standing water, leading to
complaints about the conditions in which people live. Many people lived
in homes constructed from mud bricks and bamboo with thatched roofs.
Even those who could afford burnt bricks and corrugated iron roofs
usually had open eaves, and screens on windows or doors were rare.
Homes were not mosquito proof, hence the advantage of the ITN, as it
formed a mosquito-free zone where people slept. For the poorest people
in Kyela, mosquitoes were emblematic of their poverty: they had no
choice but to live in mosquito-ridden environments.
Despite ‘not knowing’ about mosquitoes, ITNs featured in some
local bylaws that had been passed against ‘misleading traditions of the
Nyakyusa’. One of the clauses in the bylaws pertained to malaria, and
stipulated that during funerals and the subsequent mourning period, ‘the
relatives of the deceased (women folk) with small children are forbidden
to be at a funeral without a mosquito net’. This acknowledged a problem
that RBM had not adequately taken into account – that people do not
always sleep inside, and when they sleep outside they rarely use an ITN
(see also Moshi et al. 2017; 2018). Unofficially, by making it compulsory
to sleep under nets at funerals, the bylaw undermined the moral authority
of the community to complain about women who slept under nets and so,
in a roundabout way, protected people from the murmurs of dissatisfaction
that led to a form of witchcraft called imbepo sya bandu (the breath of the
people). This operates as a form of indigenous law, whereby members of
the community mutter about a person who has committed an offence
against them. These words manifest a collective breath with the power to
cause magical harm (Marsland 2015; Wilson 1951).
At funerals, female relatives and neighbours of the bereaved sleep
at her home in order to take part in the mourning songs, to help with
FRACTURING THE PANDEMIC : INFECTIOUS DISEA SE IN TANZANIA
419
cooking and to collect firewood and water. Houses are not big enough to
accommodate all these women overnight, and so they sleep outside. The
mosquitoes would bite them so much that they could not sleep, and
afterwards my exhausted neighbours came to show me their arms,
covered in mosquito bites as evidence of their suffering. It was unthinkable
to sleep under a mosquito net on these occasions, because suffering was
an important element of the work of mourning (see also Moshi et al.
2018). Women were both literally and symbolically close to mosquitoes
at funerals, because they left a mark which could be shown to others as a
sign of wretchedness in their grief. Building on Monica Wilson’s
ethnographies, mosquitoes act as a ‘prophylactic against the effects of
death’ (1957, 89), that is, the madness that is part of grief. Wilson
described how mourners would associate themselves with dirt as would
a mad person. Mosquitoes are not dirt, but only a mad person would sleep
outside and proudly show others their mosquito bites. To sleep under a
mosquito net would invite the disapproval of others, and therefore imbepo
sya bandu. It would be seen as ‘showing off’, an act of individual selfpreservation at a time when group solidarity was required.
In 2000–02, it was possible to imagine a world in which separating
humans and mosquitoes from each other made sense and seemed
achievable, despite people’s apparent resignation to the presence of
mosquitoes and local notions of the immorality of protecting oneself against
mosquitoes at funerals. But women in Kyela were anxious that they would
be seen to be guilty of failing to protect human relations, which were
essential to protect against witchcraft. ‘Knowing or not knowing the
mosquito’, I wrote in my fieldnotes, ‘was a moral matter’. For scientists
working in the field of global health, knowing the mosquito meant that it
was essential to live apart from it and save millions of lives. For women in
Kyela, not knowing and tolerating the mosquito was essential to live healthy
social lives. One mosquito could be eradicated or separated out from
human worlds; the other mosquito was entangled in human social lives.
Over time, however, women in Kyela supported each other to make
use of ITNs at funerals. They clubbed together to buy enough mosquito
nets to take with them and hang up under trees. By making sure that
everyone had access to ITNs, it was possible to maintain healthy social
connections while separating themselves from mosquitoes at night. By
2008, ITNs were a normal feature of funeral arrangements. For them,
malaria control required they prevent witchcraft and mosquito bites at
the same time. This takes us back to the idea of the pluriversal polydemic.
In Kyela, people were able to hold together these contradictory
understandings of being in the world and to resolve them.
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VIRAL LOADS
A decade later, Anopheles mosquitoes were developing resistance to
the pyrethroid insecticide used to treat bed nets, and changing their
behaviour to feed during the day and evening (Finda et al. 2019; Moshi et
al. 2017). Mosquitoes have not signed up to the logic of separation, which
is based on a cosmology that sees nonhumans as inert or at best tractable.
They are not biddable to human agendas, and through their resistance to
our chemical challenges and nets, they bind us closer to them. Malaria is
shaped by multispecies co-existences (Kelly and Beisel 2011).
This resistance of mosquitoes means that malaria could be
transmitted even when ITNs were used. This raises the question of the
rebound effect. If ITNs successfully interrupted the transmission of
malaria, people might lose or never acquire immunity to malaria. With
mosquito resistance, malaria could resurge. Studies conducted in the
1990s to examine the relationship between ITNs and immunity (Guyatt
et al. 1999) concluded that it was too difficult to make any predictions.
ITN programmes should continue ‘in the absence of other tools to control
malaria adequately’, but they should be carefully monitored (Mathanga
and Molyneux 2001, 1220). One team of researchers recommended that
improvements in health services, and better use of antimalarials, would
be preferable to the risks of the rebound effect (Trape and Rogier 1996).
Between 2000 and 2002, I asked health workers in Tanzania
about this, and they were clear that ‘bed nets should not be withheld
when so many children are dying from malaria’. Prior to this, questions
about the link between acquired immunity and the use of ITNs had been
dismissed by prominent scientists as ‘irresponsible’; one commented that
any intervention in the host-parasite life cycle was bound to lead to
‘surprises’, but that ‘this is not a reason to deny anyone the protective
measures that are available’ (Brown 1997).5 Randall Packard (2007, 242)
describes a similar conversation with the Director of the Malaria Control
and Evaluation Partnership in Africa. These responses are reminiscent
of the tendency of those advocating vertical, technical, public health
interventions to dismiss critique (Parker and Allen 2014, 227). The
mainstream view was that the combination of available technology,
cautiously optimistic scientific evidence and moral urgency were sufficient
to dispel any lingering doubts about acquired immunity and to press on.
Debate was suppressed with the claim that critique could endanger the
good that ITNs promised.
The current response to the resistance of mosquitoes to insecticide
is to invest in the development of new insecticides along with integrated
vector management led by the Innovative Vector Control Consortium.6 If
vector control were to fail, the remaining technologies would be
FRACTURING THE PANDEMIC : INFECTIOUS DISEA SE IN TANZANIA
421
diagnostics, antimalarial treatment and the distant prospect of a vaccine.
Beyond one paper (Griffin et al. 2015), it is hard to find published
evidence that the rebound effect is taken seriously. There is, however, still
a debate to be had. Vaccines are generally accepted as a means to confer
immunity to disease, but acquired immunity is not. This is for good
reason; it would require that a number of deaths should be tolerated – in
effect a sacrifice.
Immunity is solely conceived of in biological terms, but it operates
in a social context. Could we extend it to ‘biosocial immunity’? This might
allow us to move beyond the logic of separation and open up the debate.
We could consider anthropologist Uli Beisel’s (2015, 153) recommendation to take seriously the possibility that people may have to coexist
with mosquitoes and ‘slowly rework the complex knots of mosquitohuman-parasite entanglements’. Currently, social immunity is used to
describe the efforts of social insects – honeybees, ants, termites – to
collectively cooperate to reduce the risk of disease (Cremer et al. 2007,
693). Could local, collective collaborations take this up by finding ways
to make the acquisition of immunity to malaria safer through better
healthcare, or by working to understand how social inequalities, poor
standards of living and multispecies communities are tied up with the
bodily immune response to malaria parasites?
Conclusions: lessons for COVID-19
These reflections on malaria – a global disease with high mortality, but
one which is experienced as ordinary – invite us to consider how the logic
of separation is shaping responses to the globalised spread of COVID-19.
This logic has fractured our everyday worlds into unfamiliar pieces, and
finds danger in nonhuman life ‘spilling over’ into what we perceive to be
our separate human world. The outbreak narrative imagines this is more
likely in African countries, and COVID-19 is likely to increase One Health
efforts on the continent. The pandemic so far has turned out to be not so
devastating in most countries in Africa as it has in the Global North, but
they are likely to be required to prioritise the prevention of emerging
zoonotic diseases. There are multispecies and pluriversal lessons here for
One Health, which, despite its holistic aspirations, is based on the logic
of separation – of humans, animals and the environment. Resistant
mosquitoes have exposed the categories of nature and culture on which
this logic is based for the ‘fictive, man-made arbitrary creations that they
are’ (Douglas 1966, 200). If this logic is not questioned, we risk ignoring
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the tightening human–nonhuman entanglements that currently threaten
the viability of ITNs and other vector control measures.
This takes us to the suppressed debates about acquired immunity to
malaria, which provide a clue to the public disgust at proposals to mitigate
COVID-19 by permitting herd immunity to develop without a vaccine.
Herd immunity is a multispecies concept originating in veterinary science
(Jones and Helmreich 2020), and it assumes that sacrificing human lives
is acceptable to control the disease and to protect others. But as with
malaria, there has been no discussion about a biosocial approach to
immunity, that is, how collective care and social forms of protection might
promote an immune response.
The term pandemic suggests that the events that follow in the wake
of a pathogen are the same across the world, and it has generated an
outbreak narrative that is based on a particular, western medical,
cosmology. Unpacking the logic of separation through the example of
malaria control in Tanzania highlights how a pluriversal response was
required to accommodate this cosmology, enforced through the
biomedical measure of the ITN and based on non-universal, historically
shaped categories of nature–culture, human–nonhuman, and biological–
social. People in Kyela at once acknowledged the logic of separation, but
also worked out how to maintain multispecies and social relationships
that would ordinarily be incompatible with this logic. To be successful,
One Health responses to COVID-19 will also need to work their way
through a multispecies pluriverse, and pay attention to the interconnected
diversity of this, in anticipating and responding to future polydemics.
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to James Staples, Lenore Manderson, Ayo Wahlberg and
Nancy Burke for feedback on this chapter.
Notes
1
2
3
In 2019 Tanzanian authorities were criticised for not providing sufficient information to the
World Health Organization (WHO) about a suspected Ebola case (WHO 2019).
https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tanzania-covid-19-expert-committeeformed-3368024, accessed on 19 April 2021.
‘Horizontal’ interventions, such as those carried out in the 1930s by the Tennessee River Valley
Authority (Carter 2014) and in colonial Malaya (Manderson 1996, 154–57, 164–65)
deliberately attempted to bring this about, but during and after the Cold War, this was
associated with socialism, and thus became politically unacceptable in northern capitalist
countries, most notably the US (Packard 2007, 149).
FRACTURING THE PANDEMIC : INFECTIOUS DISEA SE IN TANZANIA
423
4
5
6
In contrast, Nading (2014) describes how women carrying out dengue control work in
Nicaragua take great pleasure in getting to know mosquitoes.
After the Brown article, a small controversy played out on the pages of New Scientist. Lengeler
and Tanner (1997) claimed that Snow and Marsh’s findings would dissuade donors from
funding nets. Snow and Marsh’s response (1997) was that they had never suggested that nets
should not be used; they simply wanted to examine the long-term effects of using ITNs.
https://www.ivcc.com/, accessed 29 October 2020.
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22
Living together in precarious times
COVID-19 in the Philippines
Gideon Lasco
Ostrich
On 4 August 2020, just as Metro Manila, Philippines, was living through
a newly reimposed lockdown, two ostriches escaped from a gated upper
middle-class village, running through streets made deserted by the
restrictions on public transportation and stay-at-home mandates. Within
hours, the footage of the ostriches had gone viral on social media, giving
rise to numerous memes, celebrity reactions and even political
commentary. ‘The absurdity of the runaway ostriches – which are not
native to the Philippines – made them an Internet sensation and a
welcome distraction during one of the world’s longest and most stringent
lockdowns’, a report from The Washington Post observed (Cabato 2020).
Just like the other animals – fake and real – that went viral
throughout the world at the height of the pandemic (see, for example,
Daly 2020), the ostriches were a reminder, foremost, that this is a morethan-human world. In my own house in Los Baños – some 50 kilometres
away from Manila – olive-backed sunbirds have taken up residence in the
small garden. Like dogs, sunbirds can live up to 12, even 15 years. Without
the pandemic and the quarantine, I surely would not have had the
opportunity – and the perspective – to notice my nonhuman companions.
Of course, the ostrich is something else: not only is it relatively rare,
it is also relatively big for a bird. In the viral videos, one notable aspect
was how people actually talked to the ostriches. In their macro-ness, they
seemed amenable to conversation. ‘You need a quarantine pass!’, a village
guard jokingly shouted after them, referring to the slip of paper issued to
LIVING TOGETHER IN PRECARIOUS TIMES
427
one member of each household that served as a requirement for going out
of one’s house. Adding to the birds’ appeal was the fact that their mad
dash through the streets of Quezon City was a transgression of the world
as we knew it: roads are for people; ostriches belong to the zoo, or in the
wild. Seeing these birds on the streets had some subversive quality,
especially at a time when humans themselves were confined to their
houses.
In the end, one of the ostriches died and was cooked into a local dish
called adobo, eliciting some outrage because such a ‘cute’ animal – an
animal that belongs to a ‘more charismatic species who are “big like us”’
(Greenhough 2012, 291) – should not have been eaten. Anthropologists,
of course, would have immediately bracketed such responses in terms of
cultural norms of what is good to eat. Elsewhere, there were questions
about the legalities of keeping an ostrich in a subdivision.
Framework
This is all in keeping with the turn towards multispecies anthropology
and the conceptualisation of the Anthropocene (for example, Chakrabarty
2009; D’Souza 2015), falling under the rubrics of science, technology
and society studies that see humans as enmeshed, entangled and
imbricated in networks with nonhuman actors (Latour 1993). I will not
rehearse the literature, for as the cultural geographer Hayden Lorimer
(2005, 84) puts it, ‘To do so would very likely bore the most devoted and
risk baffling the uninitiated’. However, it is important to stress that today,
as we live through a pandemic – or more aptly, a syndemic (Singer et al.
2017) – a multispecies perspective is not just a fancy theory but an
ecological and even existential necessity.
Indeed, a multispecies perspective is upon us whether we like it or
not. Ten years ago, ‘living with a virus’ may have been a title of a
conference, a panel or an academic paper, but today it is a catchphrase
used by politicians and physicians alike. We are learning, via the hard and
painful way, what Donna Haraway calls the ‘foolishness of human
exceptionalism’ (2008, 244), for, as Jane Goodall averred back in April,
‘it is our disregard for nature and our disrespect for animals that has
caused this pandemic’ (Burton 2020).
Moreover, and relevant to COVID-19, a ‘public health optimism’ that
imagined a world free from disease – borne of the Pasteurian belief in
antibiotics and vaccines – has not aged well. Not only are humans
becoming increasingly affected by non-communicable diseases like
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hypertension and diabetes; microbes have adapted to antibiotics, and
today antimicrobial resistance is a growing threat (Chandler et al. 2016).
Viruses have proven particularly difficult to diagnose and treat, as they,
too, can mutate, especially when they cross species. Consequently, the
pandemic has forced humans to grapple with a world where we are
vulnerable, even through the air we breathe, a world where microbes
pose an existential threat.
How, then, can anthropology account for the interspecies encounters
in the time of COVID-19? One approach – one that I follow in this chapter
– entails following species as they travel amid the milieu of the pandemic
and expanding conceptions of their trajectories beyond the individual level
(e.g. ‘How did the ostrich qua species reach the Philippines in the first
place?’). Analytically, it also involves moving nonhumans from the level of
zoe or ‘bare life’ to that of bios – ‘with legibly biographical and political lives’
(Agamben 1998, in Kirksey and Helmreich 2010, 545), and foregrounding
them in our ethnographies. In the oft-cited language of Eduardo Kohn
(2013, 4), we must move towards ‘an anthropology that is not just confined
to the human but is concerned with the effects of our entanglements with
other kinds of living selves’ – and just as importantly, recognise that such a
perspective is as valid and vital in highly urbanised cities like Manila as it is
in the Amazonian rainforest – or the Philippines’ own lush tropical jungles.
If not more so: after all, the world has never been more urbanised and has
brought species together in unprecedented proximity and intimacy, and
this is why pandemics are closely linked with urbanisation (SantiagoAlarcon and MacGregor-Fors 2020).
For the purpose of this chapter, what is more useful is to highlight that
this perspective, or set of perspectives, has long animated the ‘national
anthropology’ in the Philippines, albeit often implicitly. For instance, at the
2018 conference of Ugnayang Pang-Agham Tao (UGAT), the country’s
association of anthropologists, the theme was ‘Our Interconnectedness:
Doing Anthropology in Times of Environmental Crisis’. The conference
featured presentations that ranged from human–seaweed relations in the
Tawi-Tawi Islands and human–elephant communications in a zoo, to living
with crocodiles in Palawan Island and with cats in urban settings. Taken
together, these papers underscored that far from linear, let alone vertical,
our encounters with nonhumans are best characterised as ‘rhizomatic’
(Deleuze and Guattari 1988) – that is, non-hierarchical and relational (see
also Ogden et al. 2013).
This ecological consciousness comes to us not just as part and
periphery of global anthropological currents, but also from our interlocutors who have always thought along these lines, not as a way of
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429
thinking, but as a way of living. As our wealth of ethnography, folklore
and cultural history shows, local notions of ecology have always seen the
world as animated by more-than-human actors. When the Mindanao
indigenous leader Bae Inatlawan performed a ceremony in April to pray
amid the pandemic, she mentioned the trees, the birds and the eagle in
the same breath as humans and the virus, unknowingly, as she spoke of
humans belonging to the forest as much as the forest belonging to
humans, endorsing the tenets of ‘biophilia’ (Kellert and Wilson 1993).
Such knowledge is vital not just in asserting the local character of
our anthropology but also in tempering our own aspirations as to what
this way of thinking might mean for the world. Writing on human–pig
relations among the Pala’wan, Will Smith (2020) rightfully warns against
a ‘post-environmentalism’ that assumes ‘affective relationships’ will
always be based on loving and caring. His warning echoes the insight of
Padmapani Perez (2018) in her work on conservation in Benguet and
Borneo – we cannot idealise indigenous peoples as ‘noble green savages’.
As for microbes, while little – if any – local research has been in
terms of characterising human relations with them, the above warning is
likewise useful, for, while we can either view them as noxious germs that
must be killed with antibiotics – or as ‘good bacteria’ to be cultivated and
consumed, it is more insightful to view them in terms of what Paxson
(2008, 18) calls ‘microbiopolitics’, or the ‘recognition and management,
governmental and grassroots, of human encounters with the vital
organismic agencies of bacteria, viruses, and fungi’.
My own thinking in this direction was inspired by my fieldwork with
forest guards in Mindanao, but also by my childhood experiences of
growing up near Mt Makiling in the university town of Los Baños,
southeast of Manila, and by my travels to ecotourism destinations of the
world. Before the pandemic, I had the opportunity to visit the Amazon
rainforest and the Galápagos Islands. In the former I saw the intimacy
with which people lived with wildlife. In the Galápagos I glimpsed the
world without humans, although within a few centuries of human
settlement on Isabela Island, guava trees had invaded hectares upon
hectares of land, while Darwin’s finches approached humans with
evolutionary innocence, unaware of the havoc we have wrought
throughout much of the planet.
My visit to the Galápagos – weeks before the first cases of COVID-19
were reported in the Philippines – reminded me of environmental writer
Robert Macfarlane’s (2016) call to imagine ourselves as ‘inhabitants not
just of a human lifetime or generation, but also of deep time’. Can we
approach the pandemic in those same terms – not as a singular moment
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in human history, but as event in longer processes? And, following Anna
Tsing (2013), can we analyse how nature comes into being rather than
seeing it as a backdrop for this account?
Coronavirus
First, of course, we need to attend to the encounter between humans and
microbes, including bacteria and the coronavirus itself. Technically,
viruses are not a ‘species’ because they don’t fulfil the criteria of ‘organism’.
Anthropologists, however, have labelled them as quasi-species, and, in
any case, part of a multispecies perspective is to question the ontology
and validity of our biological categories.
Microbes have been around for billions of years. Scientists tell us
that they’re the earliest organisms, hardy enough to survive in the depths
of the earth, the deepest parts of the oceans, perhaps even in space, as the
recent brouhaha over possible life on Venus showed (see Lasco 2020a).
But as far as humans are concerned, viruses are a recent phenomenon.
People never viewed illness as caused by microbes prior to their discovery.
For example, the Filipino national hero and polymath Jose Rizal, whose
medical practice came at the twilight of humoral theory, opined that El
aire, el calor, el frio, el vapor de tierra y la indigestion, son las unicas causas
patogenas que se admiten en el pais (‘Winds, heat, cold, vapors of the earth,
and indigestion are the main causes of illness in the country’) (Bantug
1953, 12).
The Pasteurian worldview – which today remains the dominant
mode of thinking on illness – sees the world as made up of noxious
microbes against which humans must battle through antibiotics or
vaccines. According to anthropologist Heather Paxson (2008, 15), this
view explains why people ‘blame colds on germs, demand antibiotics
from doctors, and drink ultra-pasteurized milk and juice, while politicians
on the campaign trail slather on hand sanitizer’. Likely, it explains the
appeal of Filipino soap commercials from the 1970s onwards that depict
germs on the body as being eliminated ‘99 per cent of the time’. Although,
as mentioned above, this view has been shattered by the failure of
medicine to eradicate pathogens, it remains at the fore of people’s
consciousness.
In some ways, however, the pre-Pasteurian worldview is still upon
us, with microbes and wind melding in people’s conceptions, as when
President Rodrigo Duterte interpreted airborne transmission to mean
that COVID-19 is nasa hangin, even as the outdoor hangin does not
LIVING TOGETHER IN PRECARIOUS TIMES
431
correspond with biomedical understandings of airborne transmission (for
instance, as occurring in poorly ventilated, indoor spaces) (see Tan and
Lasco forthcoming). Similarly, people’s ‘germ consciousness’ may not
correspond with Pasteurian notions of virus. As Michael Tan (2008, 91)
noted:
Concepts about microorganisms vary, sometimes with amusing
variations. The idea that food dropped on the floor isn’t necessarily
dirty if it hasn’t been on the floor for a certain time (varying between
30 seconds and 5 minutes) is tied to childhood concepts that the
dropped food ‘scares’ off germs … Germs are often given qualities
of humans, if not the supernatural. Women fear toilet seats,
believing that the germs lie waiting, ready to pounce on the
vulnerable. Terms such as kumakapit (sticking on) show that the
germs’ mode of infection [is] not often understood. I have found
villagers speaking of intestinal parasites (bulate) as ‘adult germs’
(mikrobyong naging laki).
These insights resonate today when people talk about ‘madapuan’ ng virus
and ‘matamaan’ ng COVID. When Duterte joked, back in February, just as
the threat of a pandemic was emerging, that he wanted to slap the virus,
he was reaching for an object. The microscopic, transcending our sensory
faculties in terms of scale, is semantically transposed to language that
facilitates our ability to visualise and conceptualise the virus, on top of
technologies that render the virus visible. Unlike colonial plagues that did
not localise onto a tangible object, COVID-19 has acquired an objecthood.
Thanks to our technologies of imagination, we visualise the virus as this
red pathogen with spikes, even though viruses actually do not have colour
and the red is merely the human attempt at visualisation. But such is the
certitude of the virus’ existence as this red, spiked object that food writers
have even compared it to the rambutan, much to the outcry of many
Southeast Asians (Estrada 2020).
Beyond the processes of visualisation, there are also the politics of
association, as when certain groups of people and places get lumped
together with the virus – from Chinese tourists, returning overseas
Filipino workers (and returning Senegalese workers, see Onoma, Chapter
10), to Donald Trump referring to the coronavirus the ‘China virus’ or the
‘Wuhan virus’.
Yet already before the pandemic, anthropologists had documented
a shift to a post-Pasteurian view that considers microbes not as harmful
but in some ways potentially useful (Paxson 2008). From the Yakult and
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yoghurt to keffir and kombucha, we have become patrons of microbial
goodness. Now more than ever, we recognise microbes and macrobes alike
as what Donna Haraway (2006) terms ‘companion species’.
The microbial presence in the human body is actually even more
profound. Year after year, scientists continue to chart the full extent of
so-called ‘normal flora’. As the Human Microbiome Project of the National
Institutes of Health (2012, n.p.) revealed:
The human body contains trillions of microorganisms – outnumbering
human cells by 10 to 1. Because of their small size, however, microorganisms make up only about 1 to 3 percent of the body’s mass (in a
200-pound adult, that’s 2 to 6 pounds of bacteria), but play a vital
role in human health.
Additionally, and contrary to popular imagination, 50 per cent of the
oxygen we utilise comes from microbes. At one point, this recognition led
to questions over the necessity of handwashing, while Japanese doctors
voiced concerns that ‘hygiene addiction’ might actually remove good
microbes (Uranaka 2001).
The pandemic has at least temporarily suspended – or superseded
– this paradigm, renewing our suspicion of microbes, helping make sense
of the ‘rituals of disinfection’ of our time (Lasco 2020b) regardless of their
biomedical efficacy. Suddenly, people are potential vectors of a virus,
despite the fact that we have long been exchanging all kinds of microbes
not just among ourselves but also our nonhuman companions (Rillig et al.
2015). And while this exchange with every handshake, hug or huddle has
largely been unwitting, it is worth mentioning that once upon a time,
human vectors of a virus arrived in the Philippines not as a threat, but as
salvation, as when orphan boys from Mexico came to the country, their
blood containing the weakened viral strains of smallpox as part of the
Balmis expedition (Mark and Rigau-Perez 2009).
The divergence between local and biomedical knowledge of
microbes can have public consequences, and when this tension is
adjudicated by the powers that be – as when Duterte decided that one
metre physical distancing was good enough (Reuters Staff 2020) – we
see, often painfully, what is truly at stake with the ‘microbiopolitics’ of
COVID-19. Indeed, the contested knowledge claims about the virus –
whether it is airborne, whether masks are enough, whether face shields
are needed – all rest on our understandings of the virus and how it is
mediated. But, ultimately, it is political actors who make the decision with
life-and-death consequences for their constituents.
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Of course, it’s not like other microbes have disappeared. Floodwaters
still pose the risk of leptospirosis infection, and tuberculosis has not left
us. Neither have HIV and other venereal diseases, or the myriad other
viruses in and around us that are harmless and perhaps even beneficial
– to say nothing about the viruses and bacteria that afflict nonhumans
and can potentially cause zoonoses and human pandemics (Levitt 2020).
We have always been exchanging microbes, from one community to
another, but microbiopolitics foregrounds the ways in which some viruses
are visible and others, invisible.
Finally, we see this microbiopolitics in the conceptualisation of
vulnerability and resistance, as when people say, Ang tibay ng mga
mahirap (‘The poor are strong’). In my ongoing ethnographic research on
local health knowledge and how it has affected how people make sense of
the pandemic (see Tan and Lasco 2021), I have encountered people
saying that the poor – particularly those in urban areas – cannot be
infected by the coronavirus because they are exposed to a lot of bacteria
and, therefore, have higher resistensya to viruses. Resistensya is to the
physical as resilience is to the social, and both have been used to justify
health and social disparities in the time of COVID-19. To borrow from
Stawkowski’s (2016, 155) account of marginalised communities living in
the aftermath of radioactive pollution in Kazakhstan, it seems that for the
urban poor in Manila and elsewhere, ‘their only option is to become (or
believe themselves to be) enhanced human beings who can survive in
toxic environments’.
Nonhuman animals
Beyond and alongside the virus, other animals have been involved in the
pandemic in various ways. As Deleuze and Guattari (1988, 11) write: ‘We
form a rhizome with our viruses, or rather our viruses cause us to form a
rhizome with other animals’. Animals figure in the purported genesis of
the virus’ jump to humans; they figure in the way humans cope with the
virus, in entanglements that range from abuse to affection. And I refer not
just to the ability of dogs to detect the presence of a virus, even though
this is an amazing reminder that our sensory universes hardly overlap.
At the start of the pandemic, animals figured in two major ways.
First, there was the question of which animals served as vectors or hosts,
that is, which animals were to blame for the pandemic. Pangolins were
proposed as intermediate hosts, which struck a chord among Filipino
environmentalists, given that the pangolin is poached heavily in Palawan.
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Eventually, suspicion fell on bats; this remains the current view. But bats
have always had coronaviruses. In the Philippines, a study found that
among bats from two campuses of the University of the Philippines, 55
per cent had coronaviruses of some sort (Watanabe et al. 2010). The
question is how the virus jumped from bats to humans, why and how bats
have come to be in such close proximity to humans, and why this
particular strain of coronavirus is so virulent and effective.
The indictment of certain species as disease carriers – potential or
real – is a matter of life and death for them. When millions of chickens
were culled in Indonesia as a result of avian flu, Celia Lowe (2010)
described those chickens as part of a ‘viral cloud’ of H5N1 in the country.
Similarly, in November 2020, millions of minks were killed in Denmark
over fears of spread and potential mutation of the coronavirus through
them. To quote one report: ‘Mass graves have appeared in the Danish
countryside filled with the slaughtered animals’ (Murray 2020). Farmers
were in tears, although their concern was more over their lost livelihoods
than the lost lives of the animals whose fur is used to make luxury
garments and fake eyelashes. Evidently, unlike the ostrich, which, when
turned into adobo, sparked outcry in the Philippines, certain species do
not attract as much human sympathy: a further reminder of our local
moral taxonomies.
Another major way in which animals have figured in the pandemic
is via the narrative of ‘nature’s revenge’ – or of a healing planet. In the
early months of the pandemic, the news media repeatedly circulated
images of animals roaming and ‘reclaiming’ the streets: from deer in
Japan and monkeys in Thailand to wild goats in Wales and wild boar in
Spain (Kretchmer 2020). But as environmental scientists have pointed
out, COVID-19 is actually not ‘good’ for the environment. Discarded
personal protective equipment is contributing to plastic waste, while
economic deprivation has led people to hunt down and poach endangered
species. Zoos and wildlife parks are losing revenue and funding, leaving
their animals vulnerable both to hunger and the virus itself (Wang et al.
2020). Two months into the lockdown, Filipinos were greeted by the
pitiable sight of an emaciated lion in the privately owned Malabon Zoo,
its owner appealing for cash donations (for which he felt embarrassed
because ‘the focus should be on humans’):
[Some were] apologizing that during this time, the focus has been
on human beings and somehow the animals seem to have been
forgotten. And I had to assure them that [they were right; the focus
should be on] people, especially the poor and the hungry people.
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So I myself am ashamed to be asking for help for the animals during
these trying times (Valenzuela 2020).
Beyond the material consequences of the pandemic to animals, social
scientists have warned that such narratives simplify the discourse and
reinforce the ‘apart-ness’ of humans from so-called ‘nature’ (Searle and
Turnbull 2020). Of course, animals do not just figure as part of the
etymology of the virus and its ecological impacts, but also in the
phenomenological experience of the pandemic. Dogs and cats have
served as quarantine companions, immune to the rules of physical
distancing. Already, there is emerging literature from various countries
on how human–dog relations were also disrupted during lockdowns
(Morgan et al. 2020; Tomé 2020); how the presence of pets became more
important than ever; and how the constant presence of humans in their
houses has endangered intimacy between households of humans and
nonhumans.
Plants
All of the above point to the pandemic as a more-than-human event. But
it is also more-than-animal. One fascinating development during the
pandemic is the ersatz ‘botanic boom’. Biking in my hometown in Laguna,
I would see tricycles packed with potted plants, plants being sold on the
highways, people traveling all the way from Manila just to buy plants.
Social media, too, has become overgrown with monsteras and carnivorous
plants. And not just for the upper and middle classes. I see people in lowincome neighbourhoods walking with plants they just purchased, tending
to their recently refurbished gardens.
Filipinos have long cared for and nurtured plants; the Spanish priest
and chronicler Antonio Morga described the first bonsai seen by
westerners on his visit to Manila in 1603. These seemingly mundane
houseplants actually come from different places, finding their way from
colony to metropole and back to colony – a reminder that just like the
pandemic, colonialism, too, was a multispecies process that involved
uprooting and transplanting different species. The irony now is how
‘plants are able to travel much more freely than humans in the time of the
pandemic’, as a friend pointed out.
Another notable observation is the growing trend of naming
houseplants. To name is to confer importance, and humans only give
names to people and things that matter to them. While mostly said in jest,
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being ‘plant parents’ – plantito, plantita – establishes a form of kinship
that is arguably new, at least among the many who have recently
discovered the joys of nurturing houseplants. And with this, there is
growing concern about the commodification of plants. What happens
when something taken for granted suddenly has value, and when that
value can be quantified in monetary terms? Plants hold immense value,
but they have to be literally uprooted for such value to be realised, like
trees in a forest that are more valuable dead than alive. Given that ferns
can now sell for far more than rice, how will this phenomenon shape our
mountains, and transform our ways of living?
At the personal level, of course, plants matter differently to different
people. Some may see them as a project to be shared with others. Others
may see nature in them, even as they are far from ‘natural’ given all the
artificial interventions from breeding and transportation to potting and
cultivation. And then there are those who perceive the health benefits of
plants, an inkling increasingly supported by the notion of ‘biophilia’
(Ulrich 1993).
But the plants thriving in our homes cannot be dissociated from
their ecological entanglements. For instance, their popularity has
prompted cries of alarm from environmentalists who fear its impacts on
biodiversity (Lim and Lasco 2020):
Some of the plants on sale are sourced from our mountains and other
unique ecosystems, disrupting habitats and potentially further
endangering plant species and the wild fauna that depend on them
for food and shelter. With rarity and ‘exotic-ness’ being valued
characteristics in plant collecting, this craze might drive unscrupulous
entrepreneurs deeper into our forests in search of plants that will
command high prices in both local and international markets.
Already, Department of Environment and Natural Resources offices
in many parts of the country are reporting encroachments driven by
the demand for these plants.
They also warn that ‘plants can also bring along with them pests and
diseases that can infest, infect, and kill other plants in one’s collection’
(Lim and Lasco 2020), further underscoring the limits of thinking in
terms of individual species. Although plants are thought to be immune to
coronaviruses, it is also worth adding that they are not without their own
viral nemeses, not to mention all kinds of pests – as consequence of their
participation in our lifeworld – even as they can also forge alliances with
microbes (Wilkinson et al. 2019).
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My own thinking about plants (Lasco 2020c) is that they link us to
the past by serving as enduring lifelong companions. My mother has held
on to her bonsai since she was in her early twenties, taking the plants with
her from apartment to apartment until, when my parents had the money
to buy their own land, the bonsai, too, were allowed take root in the
ground. ‘They’ve been around for much longer than you, and unlike
human children, they never leave’, she told me, showing that trees are
‘portable companions’ that can follow humans – not just in the sense of
Lucia Monge’s planton movil (Vich 2016; see also www.luciamonge.com).
Perhaps beyond the COVID-19 pandemic, the plants we have today will
hold a special place as companions through a difficult moment. Moreover,
at a time when life itself seems most precarious, perhaps plants offer an
alternative vision of life, one of growth and regeneration, with each new
leaf signifying hope and positive change.
But regardless of the entanglement of motivations that have allowed
plants to take root in our households, and mindful of the threats to plant
life that the pandemic has exacerbated, the question remains: Can our
newfound affection for plants translate to heightened concern for the
planet?
Living together
In light of the necessity of multispecies ways of thinking about the world,
our mandate is clear: we must act on the implications, from the personal
to the political, of our more-than-human togetherness amid the precarities
of our time. At a personal level, this can simply mean a greater appreciation
for the world-at-large, perhaps making us less lonely, wherever we are.
Here in Los Baños, I have not welcomed a single guest since March, but
the sunbirds, our two dogs, the narra trees and even the Stephanie erecta
that I have been nurturing, all keep me company. They also raise the
stakes of whom – and what – we are responsible for.
At a professional level, thinking of and about interspecies connections
should enrich our praxis and broaden our conceptions of the ‘field’ to
include what these connections actually do, and what they mean, for
the people with whom we engage. At the outset, I already argued for the
methodological necessity of following species as they travel, and
foregrounding them in our ethnographies. But in light of COVID-19
and its aftermath, we need to go back to our interlocutors, human
and nonhuman, and see how they are living, and living together, in a
pandemic. Given our current constraints, we need methodological
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innovations and research ethics adaptations that facilitate and support
these changes. Surely, many anthropologists are already working on this,
and we will hopefully see the fruits of their labours in the coming years.
Logistically, this can also lead to engagements with people from
other disciplines –microbiologists, horticulturists, zoologists, farmers,
physicians – and a host of other fields, advocacies and activisms. If the
task at hand is ‘thick description’, and if it entails long-term observation,
then we have a lot to offer in helping people understand their own work,
especially among those dealing with other species. While resisting the
urge to view terms of engagement solely as terms of endearment, we need
to trace the connections – from affectionate to antagonistic – that make
up the ‘convivium’ of organisms to which we belong.
Finally, at a political level, it entails recognising the power relations
that underwrite, disrupt, destroy and render antagonistic our relations
with nonhumans – the structural violence that not only exposes humans
to harmful species, but exposes other species to human harm. Although
those at the forefront of thinking about post-human politics are suggesting
an attention to land and indigenous peoples as priorities (see Panelli
2010), this is something we in the Philippines have always known.
It also entails challenging the neoliberal order that renders vulnerable
not just humans, but the whole planet, from the rising incidence of diabetes
among our pets, global warming that threatens animal habitats and, of
course, the pathogenic viruses that result from habitat destruction, illegal
wildlife trade and industrial farming. On the local scale, we see this unfold
in what Wolfram Dressler (2011) calls ‘nature as capital’, as when national
parks protecting immense biodiversity are viewed in terms of their ‘market
value’. Surely, anthropologists can speak to debates on valuing and
expanding our time-honoured notions of reciprocity and kinship to
‘natureculture’ (Fuentes 2010) around us. It may even lead us to interrogate
our symbolic taxonomies – how some species are seen as more worthy of
compassion than others – as well as rethinking our unsustainable ways of
life. After all, do we really need millions of rodents in farms just so humans
can have fur coats and fake eyelashes?
I conclude with three questions. The first one, raised in the 2018
UGAT conference, remains salient as ever. In light of our interconnectedness,
how do we live together in precarious times, in times of environmental,
medical and political crises? Mindful that structural violence and state
violence (see Tandog 2020) necessarily extend to nonhumans, we should
also ask: How can we bear witness to forms of more-than-human
togetherness, from abuse to affection, in ways that lead to action, in ways
that do justice to both humans and other species? Finally, returning to
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anthropology’s core mission: How do we do all this in ways that allow us to
deepen our understanding of what it means to be human in a more-thanhuman world?
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23
COVID-19 in Italy
A new culture of healthcare for future
preparedness
Chiara Bodini and Ivo Quaranta
When the first autochthonous cases of COVID-19 were diagnosed in
Lombardy in late February 2020, the whole country went into a shock
(Raffaetà 2020). Both the virus and the effect it elicited quickly spread to
the rest of Europe. Suddenly, what had been described as a ‘Chinese
virus’, a threat confined to far away countries perceived as ‘less developed’,
was inside our borders, in the very heart of a rich and productive region
in Northern Italy. The severe underestimation of the pandemic in Italy,
that was already rapidly spreading worldwide, resulted in the slow and
chaotic reaction of Italian authorities facing the diffusion of the virus. The
lack of preparedness, and fragmentations in governance between central
government and the regions, led to contradictory messages being
communicated to the public and incoherent and inconsistent measures
being adopted. This led to the exposure of large numbers of people,
including many ‘essential services’ workers. Huge numbers of critically ill
patients required hospital care in a healthcare system that had suffered
from budget cuts and privatisation over the past decades, particularly in
its primary care and public health components. It was a very long time
since hospitals in Europe had been overwhelmed in the way that they
were in Lombardy, and this was seen as a wake-up call for other European
countries and a portent of how COVID-19 might impact other settings.
Measures to contain the epidemic, including a two-month national
lockdown, were introduced.
However – as we argue in this chapter – the response to COVID-19,
consistent with the culture and the organisation of health and medicine
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in Italy, was largely biomedical, and so failed to incorporate the social
dimensions of the disease. This response was inadequate to build future
preparedness.
COVID-19 in Italy
In late January 2020, two Chinese tourists visiting Rome were diagnosed
with COVID-19. The news was alarming as it showed that the virus had
entered the country, but not too disturbing as it fitted the stereotype of a
foreign-borne virus that could be controlled by closing the borders. In
what appeared to be strategic timing, the day before these cases were
diagnosed, the government had blocked all flights to and from China; this
measure was later labelled as detrimental as it made it impossible to test
and trace people coming from China who chose other indirect routes to
reach Italy. For two more weeks, no other measures were taken, until – on
21 February – the first Italian case of COVID-19 was diagnosed in
Lombardy. To the shock of many, the 38-year-old man, labelled as ‘patient
1’, had not travelled to China, and all efforts to find ‘patient 0’ and trace
the origin of the virus failed. From then on, the situation rapidly escalated,
with new diagnoses concentrated in the same geographical area.
Lombardy became the first ‘red zone’ under lockdown. Still, the belief was
that the virus came from abroad and, if contained where it had first been
found, the rest of the country would be spared (Horton 2020a).
Unfortunately, the data later showed that the virus had been circulating
in Lombardy since at least a month before, with hundreds of cases of
infection – including severe ones – that had not been tested and therefore
not diagnosed.
The period that followed was intense and confusing. The central
government and regional authorities took decisions in an uncoordinated
way, and messages to the population were openly contradictory.
While the people in Codogno were locked in their homes, neighbouring
cities such as Milan and Bergamo launched a media campaign to
emphasise that life there was going on as usual – ‘Milan does not stop’
(#milanononsiferma) – and that there was no reason to panic. Similar
messages appeared on social media, posted by key political figures from
different parties.
Less than a week later, on 4 March, schools and universities
were closed across the country and, on 8 March, a national lockdown
was imposed. It was an unprecedented measure for Italy and for the
world. People could not go out of their homes unless they carried a
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self-declaration that stated the reason to do so – for health, work or to
assist relatives in need – and few were so permitted. The (rather arbitrary)
application of this norm resulted in thousands of fines ranging from 400
to 3,000 euros , many of which have been contested.
Many praised the Italian government for acting decisively. However,
the delay in implementing lockdown measures are, at time of writing,
under investigation: this applies especially in the province of Bergamo,
the hardest hit by the epidemic. Government documents, made public
over the northern summer 2020, showed that on 3 March the National
Scientific Committee had called for a ‘red zone’ in the area, and an
investigation is ongoing to find out why this had not been applied,
although allegedly motivated by the desire to avoid the economic
consequences of a lockdown. At the same time, for several weeks, even
under the lockdown, so-called ‘essential services’ continued to function,
exposing health providers, transport workers and cleaners, among others,
to a higher risk of infection.
The daily report issued by the Civil Protection from early March was
dominated by the escalating number of new cases, hospital admissions,
patients in intensive care units (ICU) and deaths. The National Health
System (NHS), although still considered as one of the best in Europe,
soon became insufficient to admit and adequately treat all patients,
especially in Lombardy. Despite a referral system which included all
public and some private facilities throughout the country, there were
increasing reports by physicians in Lombardy that patients were being
told to stay at home because hospital facilities were overloaded, and that
patients could not be ventilated – despite meeting the clinical criteria for
such action – because there were not enough ventilators available. These
reports were so shocking that they were silenced or openly contested by
public authorities, but they circulated widely, particularly among health
professionals. A few weeks later, the army trucks moving coffins of
coronavirus victims from Bergamo because there were no spaces available
in local cemeteries could not so easily be concealed.
The lack of preparedness and insufficient human and material
resources, combined with an elderly population and a high level of air
pollution in the areas most affected, likely contributed to a particularly
high mortality rate in the first wave of the pandemic. Delays in admitting
patients to the hospitals and inappropriate approaches to both
antimicrobial and intensive care treatment were particularly called into
question by public health officials and health activist networks; so too was
the approach to test and trace in Italy in ways that did not follow the
recommendations of the World Health Organization (WHO).
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As of 22 December 2020, Italy had recorded 1,977,370 cases and
69,842 COVID-19 deaths. One quarter of the cases and almost one third
of the deaths were recorded in Lombardy (Ministry of Health 2020).
A healthcare response to a public health emergency
Interviewed in early April, the president of the Medical Board of Bergamo,
the city in Lombardy that became the symbol of the COVID-19 crisis in the
country, declared:
The National Healthcare Service (NHS) has been dramatically
dismantled, hospitals and community services … A public health
emergency has been mistakenly considered as an emergency of
intensive care units. At the beginning, COVID cases were not
isolated, epidemiological investigations were not done, patients
were not tested, doctors did not have personal protective equipment
(Marinoni 2020).
In a few words, Dr Marinoni summarised the failure of the initial response
to the crisis and identified its root causes.
It is now clear that Italy was not prepared for the epidemic, and its
preparedness plan, drawn up in 2006 and unknown to most health
professionals, has been judged ‘old and inadequate’ (Giuffrida and
Boseley 2020). In addition to this, since the early 1990s the NHS has been
subject to reforms and budget cuts that severely altered its capacity to
react to a sudden increase in health needs (Geddes da Filicaia 2020). As
in many countries across the globe, privatisation affects the capacity of
public state-funded and government-run health systems to coordinate
large-scale preventive campaigns, and limits their capacity to expand
curative services in crisis situations, while eroding the broad public’s
confidence in the health system as a whole (De Ceukelaire and Bodini
2020). Moreover, the regionalisation of healthcare – very much part of a
broader design to progressively dismantle and privatise the NHS –
significantly delayed the adoption of coherent measures to contain the
disease and strengthen the health system. While the Italian public health
authorities at regional and national levels tried to cope with the growing
epidemic, the highly fragmented health system resulted in a complex
situation that became difficult to manage (Villa et al. 2020).
The area that suffered the most from these processes, now considered
the weakest link of the NHS, is primary healthcare (PHC), particularly at
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the intersection of public health, primary care departments and family
doctors. Structural weaknesses date back to the healthcare reform of 1978,
when, under pressure from the physicians themselves, legislators decided
that family doctors would not be employed by the NHS, but would be
contracted as private professionals under a national agreement. A decade
after, what were initially called ‘local social and healthcare units’ (Unità
Sanitarie Locali, USL) became ‘local healthcare enterprises’ (Aziende
Sanitarie Locali, ASL), with a double shift: the removal of the word ‘social’
and the shift from ‘unit’ to ‘enterprise’. This change marked the inauguration
of the managerialisation of the NHS, which coincided with the progressive
reduction of the national public healthcare budget. The participation of
citizens at different levels of the system’s governance, included in the
original reform, was never developed.
The region that most aggressively pursued privatisation, and that
developed secondary and tertiary-level hospitals to the detriment of
primary care, is Lombardy. This has been repeatedly used as (part of) the
explanation of why the region was hit harder by coronavirus and why the
region failed to implement a coherent and effective strategy in an effort
to contain it. To date, the problems of primary care and public health
organisation have not been addressed, and professionals in the field are
still left alone to face a new wave of infections.
As a critical situation, the pandemic revealed the impact of austerity
and market-oriented reforms in undermining the capacity of the NHS to
perform its biopolitical duties of health promotion, prevention and care
(Basu et al. 2017). It also made explicit the cultural values informing
national health policy: the pandemic was mainly dealt with at the hospital
level, with a reactive approach that focused on acute care, infection
control and virology, rather than a proactive public health approach
grounded on epidemiological surveillance and health promotion.
Moreover, although the spread of the virus began to be contained mainly
through lockdown and people’s willingness to modify their social
behaviour, the NHS did not act through its community-based local
articulations such as primary care health facilities and professionals.
These were, in fact, rather inaccessible to the public, as either closed
down (as in the case of many primary care facilities) or overwhelmed (as
in the case of GPs). It was not until late April that special ‘home care units’
were established, in order to assist and monitor patients who did not meet
the criteria for hospitalisation. However, their implementation has been
uneven across the country in terms of both capacity and timeliness.
The inadequate management of the COVID-19 epidemic,
particularly evident in the region that invested the most in a privatised,
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market-oriented and hospital-centric healthcare system, draws attention
to the failures of such an approach in dealing with a complex public
health emergency. More intensive care beds and ventilators, although
necessary at the beginning of the crisis, soon became a technical fix that
was ineffective at the source of the problem. In the community, the virus
was circulating, undetected by an inadequate public health effort.
Cultural values informing national health policy
These preliminary considerations help us understand how human agency
contributes to shaping the local configuration of COVID-19 in a specific
context. In order to further develop the analysis, we now examine the
implicit cultural assumptions that guided the Italian response to the
pandemic.
The initial underestimation of the pandemic was clearly rooted in
the fallacious idea that highly contagious infectious diseases are a medical
reality confined to low-income countries in the Global South (Kleinman
and Watson 2006). Consistent with this, the initial tracing operations
focused on ‘Chinese contacts’ of the first cases. Rather than engaging in
collaborative and cooperative actions with Chinese (and other national)
authorities, the government decided to stop flights arriving in Italy from
the risk regions, ignoring the most basic global health assumptions on the
collective nature of any local phenomenon (Biehl and Petryna 2013;
Farmer et al. 2013). Looking at the patterns of its distribution and at the
different national responses to it, we can certainly consider COVID-19 as
an indicator of our glocal (Kearney 1995) (dis-)order: an assemblage by
which the viral pathogen mingles with specific social configurations
within which people’s actions unfold at the local and global level.
Infectious viruses are about social networks and cultural norms, as much
as about microbes. As virological research makes clear, viruses are inert,
sometimes for thousands of years, unable to attack us. We transmit viral
data though our social networks and cultural pathways. We give viral
information to each other by how we live and what we do. Understanding
cultural contexts is therefore just as important as sequencing genomes in
tackling viral outbreaks (Napier and Fischer 2020).
The very absence of an adequate pandemic plan testifies the lack of
a global health perspective in the Italian institutional response, that
might have been able to explicitly address the social nature of the virus
agency. The Italian response reduced COVID-19 to its aetiology: SARSCoV-2. Even the National Scientific Committee, appointed on 5 February
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2020 by the government to manage the emergency, has been mainly
informed by a reductionist medical perspective with little acknowledgement of socially-oriented approaches including public health,
epidemiology and the social sciences. In so doing, the complex reality of
COVID-19 was stripped of its social dimensions, limiting the possibility
for action (Rajan et al. 2020).
A behavioural approach to prevention
Such reductionism was also present in the preventive strategy adopted by
the state, rooted in a well-known behavioural approach geared around
the spread of information for the adoption of individual practices such as
avoiding contact, frequently washing hands, wearing masks and gloves
and so on. Such campaigns, as they unfolded in Italy, have a number of
limitations and side effects which were not adequately considered.
In the first place, in general behavioural campaigns fail to address
possible structural constraints impacting on individual behaviour. This
was particularly evident when trying to halt the transmission of
coronavirus in the cases of homeless people, asylum seekers and refugees
living in overcrowded centres, seasonal migrant workers living in informal
settlements, Roma people living in camps (see also Pop, Chapter 8) and
detainees in prisons. Despite vibrant protests by people who were
imprisoned, and different advocacy actions by groups, associations and
networks working with vulnerable populations, very little was done to
improve the structural conditions contributing to their risks for contagion.
On the contrary, rather than highlighting such constraints, people’s
culture and values tended to be presented as obstacles in health
promotion, leading to forms of blaming of different groups of people.
Depending on the phase of the emergency and the lockdown, these
included migrants who were alleged to bring the virus from abroad (as
Onoma, Chapter 10, also describes), even if at the time – given the
situation in Italy – the risk was rather that they would become infected
upon arrival. Blame was also directed at people walking or jogging in
parks, who were accused of placing individual interest above everything
else; and youth, who were charged with returning too quickly to
socialising after the lockdown was eased. Both public authorities and the
social media accused these groups of people of deliberately ignoring
public health norms and so of being responsible for the spread of infection.
Framing the issue of responsibility in individual terms undermined
the very possibility for a representation of the crisis as a collective
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condition to be dealt with in cooperative terms. Even now, rather than
imagining new forms of sociality as a collective response to the perduring
emergency, we are facing increasing sanitisation of sociality, with the risk
of its very criminalisation. To strip COVID-19 of its social dimensions
inevitably precludes the possibility of acknowledging the importance of
looking at people’s perspectives, and of considering how to promote their
wellbeing. Paraphrasing Napier and colleagues (2014, 1611), if we ignore
what brings value and meaning to another’s life, it becomes difficult to
make it better when it is necessary to do so.
Yet little room was left for an approach capable of taking into
consideration people’s understandings of their needs and how to meet
them. Unless we look at health as a cultural construct and equip our
healthcare services with the proper competence to foster the participation
of people in the very definition of their best interests, we are always at risk
of producing ineffective interventions. Again, we have a cultural issue
here, related to the biomedical devaluation of the cultural dimensions of
health and wellbeing.
People as a resource
If there is one lesson from social science analysis of past epidemics, it is that
people’s behaviours make a difference and, therefore, the ability to actively
involve them in the processes that concern them can be decisive (Packard
2016; Richards 2016). Yet, to address people’s behaviours implies the need
to consider their capabilities, for example, to negotiate the terms of their
social engagement and circumstances in a given local reality. Despite the
fact that it was only through a lockdown that the emergency was kept
under control, people’s behaviours were never assumed as a possible
resource in managing the crisis. Yet these behaviours made a difference
also by attending to the needs of those who were most affected by the
economic and relational consequences of lockdown.
At the grassroots level, many initiatives took shape. In the
Municipality of Bologna, for example, formal and informal civil society
groups organised themselves to support those in need, delivering to them
food supplies, medical equipment and pharmaceuticals. This effort
largely came from below, as in many other places throughout the country,
while public services were shut down and public officials were discussing
what should be done in endless online meetings. Well-established charity
organisations linked to churches, political parties, trade unions and
private foundations were joined (or, at times, were preceded) by many
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new and often informal networks, largely composed of students and
people who, due to the lockdown, suddenly had a lot of spare time and
felt the urge to help others. New needs also appeared and were rapidly
addressed by grassroots solidarity networks, such as the need for laptops
and tablets for families with children who – with all schools closed – had
to follow distance learning programmes.
Even in the City of Bologna, with a centuries-old tradition of good
governance and progressive welfare policies, it took several weeks, even
months, for the public system to acknowledge, support and finally
regulate such efforts. Meanwhile, this activity remained fully voluntary
and largely autonomous of public institutions, and was hyperlocal in
nature, involving people at the level of buildings, blocks and streets.
These forms of mutual support from below were the only ones capable of
making a difference for those already trapped by socio-economic
inequalities, who were, and still are, the most vulnerable to and affected
by the pandemic (see also Burke, Chapter 2).
These initiatives were crucial in complementing the institutional
actions prescribed by the national government and by local authorities,
which invested a substantial part of the public budget to support those
most in need. In this regard, Italy might be seen as a good example in
addressing both the medical and the socio-economic consequences
of the COVID-19 pandemic (Horton 2020a). Yet a critical dimension
is in the incapacity of government, at all levels, to develop the operative
integration of social and medical actions grounded in community
participation as a form of care and the promotion of equity.
In the summer of 2020, as transmission of COVID-19 slowed down,
local and national institutions developed emergency plans in order to be
adequately prepared for a possible second wave of the pandemic (as
occurred a few months later). Such plans were mainly designed to enhance
the capacity of medical services to treat patients, to store equipment for
testing and treatment, and to ensure a proper supply of personal protective
equipment. In other words, preparedness was again tailored on pathology
rather than on the wider reality of which pathology is part. By stripping
COVID-19 of its social dimensions, again, institutional preparedness ended
up limiting its effective responsiveness. No attention was given to those
dynamics that made resilient specific local contexts, i.e. community
participation. The crucial role of social relations is the main issue that was
exposed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet Italian institutions have not been
able so far to consider them as part of any form of preparedness.
In anthropological terms, preparedness should be seen as a means by
which a specific social order is produced, especially in a critical time in
COVID -19 IN ITALY
451
which habitual forms of relatedness are compromised and need to be
rethought. The post COVID-19 scenario cannot be imagined as a return to
a previous normality, as if the impact of the pandemic might leave no trace
in our conscience and social arrangements. Clearly, we have to talk of new
forms of normalisation, by which a new social order becomes embodied
and can promote our unproblematic being-in-the-world. In order to avoid
that such a process of re-normalisation ends up in naturalising the
medicalisation and criminalisation of sociality, we must engage in forms of
creative social relatedness to produce new forms of sociality capable of
sustaining a meaningful collective existence. For this reason, we need to
include the promotion of those forms of social relatedness that have proved
protective in our institutional responses to the pandemic. If we reduce
preparedness merely to the adoption of protective individual behaviours,
we are stripping the person of its constitutive social dimension. As
anthropology has long taught us, by focusing on the body, cultural practice
articulates broader social and political issues. This is precisely why it is
crucial to work beyond the sole adoption of protective individual behaviours
and towards the idea of designing forms of protective social relatedness.
Primary healthcare as a space for integrated action
Institutional action on COVID-19 has not valued community participation
as a resource in dealing with the emergency, despite its crucial role in
giving birth to adaptative forms of sociality. Such a lack stems in part from
having relegated institutional action to the hospital level, without
drawing on the network of community-based primary care services, the
only component of the health system capable of proximate contact with
local neighbourhoods and their inhabitants. As already discussed above,
primary healthcare (PHC) has been severely undermined over the last
decades by processes of underfinancing and cultural devaluation (Geddes
da Filicaia 2020). Yet PHC represents the only articulation of the NHS
capable of producing forms of participation and mutual trust between
institutional actors and people.
This is not intended to diminish the decisive role that hospital
settings have played in treating people affected by COVID-19; this would
be both ungenerous and inaccurate. Rather, it highlights that the
healthcare system is culturally calibrated on values that do not take into
account the proximity of services to local neighbourhoods, the only
context in which it would be possible to create a proactive synergy
between institutions and people’s agency.
452
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Again COVID-19 seems to play a pedagogic role in making manifest
the limitation and contradictions of our social reality, shedding light on
its fault lines, a critical situation that unveils those implicit processes that
inform our social reality.
A different approach for future preparedness
By dividing medical action from social support, and by formulating the
latter mainly in a top-down manner centred on individuals, Italy ended
up limiting its institutional capacity to manage the local configuration of
the pandemic. The focus of Italy’s response was mainly on the virus,
SARS-CoV-2, rather than on the disease, COVID-19. The current challenge
is related to the possibility of grounding medical and social services with
a view of health as a cultural construct that requires the participation of
people to define their needs. This must be socially produced, and this can
only occur through the constitutive relations that people have with the
social circumstances of their life in a given context. Unless we are capable
of taking into account the constitutive social dimensions of medical
reality, we are bound to a permanent state of emergency.
Future preparedness, in other words, should not be reduced to the
adequate storage of medical supplies. It should rather take advantage of
the lessons we are learning in the current global predicament. On the one
hand, we need a global perspective capable of looking at health as a
common global good, and we need to strengthen an approach that looks
at the mutual involvement of the contexts we imagine as local, with
awareness that one’s own interests coincide with the promotion of those
of others. On the other hand, we need to place as central community
involvement and participation (Rajan et al. 2020), with the aim of
considering people as actors in the process of health promotion, avoiding
their reduction to a ‘mere population’ (in Foucauldian terms) crushed by
top-down measures and incapable of generating their active valorisation
(Loewenson et al. 2020). To do so, we need a culture of health and
healthcare capable of creating conceptual and political room for local
participatory action in local services.
As anthropologists, we know well that communities are not entities
but forms of relatedness rooted in the ongoing symbolic processes of
belonging. Institutions should accommodate and rely on forms of
symbolic belonging that emerge at the grassroots level (especially if they
proved to be resilient in facing the critical circumstances produced by the
pandemic). Otherwise, when community participation is most needed,
COVID -19 IN ITALY
453
we run the risk of having no community to rely on. Social policy should
complement medical reasoning in designing emergency plans for future
preparedness, bearing in mind the symbolic performance of institutional
activity. Our challenge today relates to the ability to create organisational
settings capable of overcoming those cultural fragmentations that reduce
care to disease treatment, while they strip health of those social
relationships on which we might act for its promotion (Wilkinson and
Kleinman 2016).
Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare the many strains that Italy’s
healthcare system has amassed over past decades. Yet we have shown
how analysis cannot be reduced to the mere impact of austerity measures:
we also need to address the broader cultural assumptions at the core of
medical and public health policy. As we have shown for the Italian
context, in order to design an effective preparedness, we need an
institutional culture capable of considering health as a cultural construct
to be socially generated, where participation is the means to operationalise
both: people’s involvement in defining their best interest, and their
engagement in transformative actions.
Quite timely, on 26 September 2020 The Lancet chief editor, Richard
Horton (2020b), claimed that we should look at COVID-19 as a syndemic
rather than a pandemic. In introducing the concept of syndemic, Merrill
Singer (2009) referred to the constitutive social embeddedness of any
given biological reality, and their complex articulations at the local as well
as global level. Along such a line of reasoning, in this chapter we have
showed the local emergence of COVID-19 in Italy, arguing for a finer
approach capable of addressing its social articulation at the local level.
Likewise, we have tried to show how to translate the outcome of such a
theoretical approach in designing institutional responses capable of taking
into proper account the constitutive social dimensions of COVID-19.
The concept of syndemic is most welcome if it helps to drive
institutional reasoning towards the appreciation of human agency and
responsibility in medical reality, and coherently of public health
interventions as cultural practices by which a specific social order is
produced, and, by focusing on the body, naturalised. The way we
approach the present critical situation related to COVID-19 will inevitably
have a deep impact on the way we represent ourselves, social relations
and the global scenario – in a nutshell, the very meaning of humanity.
454
VIRAL LOADS
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Index
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), Turkey
mishandling of pandemic by 13, 162–4,
170, 175
moralist discourse on pandemic by 13,
163, 165–6, 175
suppression of critical voices by 165–6,
175–6
violation of secularism clause by 167
Adler-Lazarowitz, Chanah 385–6, 392–6,
402–3n4
Agamben, Giorgio 29, 129–30, 142, 429
Ali, Ahmet 12, 132–3
Amazonian rainforest 429–30
Ambedkar, B.R. 141, 203
Andrejevic, Mark 345, 347
‘anonymous care’ 30–1, 42
anthropology of care 29, 41–2 See also
biopolitics of pandemic
apartheid 10, 47
structural legacies of 48, 55–6, 60–1
Australia 9, 50
Melbourne 8, 14
use of armed forces in 58, 60
authoritarianism 81, 173
COVID-19-related 4, 38, 165, 185,
190
Avishai, Orit 389, 392
Bacchi, Carol 206, 208
Bailey, F.G. 68–9, 79, 82–3, 85
Bangladesh 8
catastrophic consequences of lockdown
in 281–2
dependence on informal economy
in 282–3, 285, 287–9
government stimulus/support
package 286, 288
police enforcement of lockdown in 284–6,
288–9, 291–2, 294
population of 281–2
See also Dhaka, impact of lockdown on
adolescents/youth in
Băsescu, Traian 152–3
biodiversity 437, 439
bioethics and notions of vulnerability 15, 17,
119, 123, 262, 271–5
lack of power as main criterion 272–3, 284,
292, 295
See also COVID-19 amplification of
vulnerability; healthcare: triaged access
to; COVID-19 ‘risk groups’, designation of
456
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biopolitics of pandemic
Cuban approach 29–30, 37, 41–2
‘make live and let die’ approach 21,
128–31, 137, 142–3, 249
Roma responses 147, 153
in UK 109, 119, 447
See also Foucault, Michel: concept of
biopolitics
Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME)
communities 12, 120–1, 129, 140, 143,
319
disproportionate infection/death rates
among 108–9, 111–14, 116, 131, 319
inherent racism of acronym 111, 131,
140
#BlackLivesMatter (BLM) 12, 62, 108, 129
#BlackLivesMatter uprisings, LA 91, 95–6,
108, 113
abolitionist views of 92, 97, 100–1, 104
link with disparities of COVID-19 99, 102,
105
radical Black founders of 92–3
use of armed forces/curfews against 58–9,
64n4, 94, 101–2
white support for 102
See also Floyd, George, murder of;
Movement for Black Lives; racism,
systemic; underlying conditions of
COVID-19: police brutality
Black radical tradition, US 93, 102
Bolsonaro, Jair
negationist stand on COVID-19 244–5,
247–9, 251, 256
positive test for COVID-19 6
survival of the fittest philosophy 244, 248,
253, 256
Bosak, Krzysztof 77–8
Brazil
as COVID-19 epicentre 4, 6–7
decline of Public Health System (SUS)
in 246, 248, 251
emergency aid 254
favelas of 1, 50, 56
as international centre of medical
research 249–50
Workers’ Party of 245–6, 251
See also disability support, impact of
COVID-19 on; syndemic: COVID-19 as;
Zika virus
Breman, Jan 137–8
Briggs, Charles 2, 33–4, 37, 69, 71, 85
Brotherton, P. Sean 29–30, 33–4
Bulgaria 148, 154, 158
cancer 20, 239, 329
impact of COVID-19 on screening and
treatment of 15, 233–4, 308, 341n2
normalising of 30, 34
Cape Town 50, 61
Anti-Land Invasion Unit activities 59
carceral state 98–9, 101, 104–5
Carreño, Hiram 261, 267
caste-based structural violence 128, 136,
140–1
‘shroud stealer’ as allegory for 12, 132–6,
142–3
See also viral vagility of prejudice: and
Indian caste system
caste system, India
and imposition of cordon sanitaire 141–2,
413
and practice of untouchability 12, 131,
135, 139–41, 203, 205
Scheduled Castes (SC) 131–2, 138, 140,
204, 209
Scheduled Tribes (ST) 132, 140
and tropes of purity and pollution 140–1,
203, 218
upper caste prejudice and 12, 139–41
See also Dalit, India
Castro, Fidel 30, 33–4
Castro, Raul 34, 38
Chile 36, 58, 266–7, 271
Chimudu, Simukai 71, 411
China 11, 19, 354, 411
donation of masks, respirators from 35
See also Wuhan
cholera 2, 35–6, 184, 249, 412
conspiracy theories 71
chronic disease
care infrastructure for 10, 15, 30, 34,
326–7, 329–30, 337–8
impact of COVID-19 on care 2, 11, 28, 47,
244, 249, 256, 273, 324, 331–2, 338–9
link between inequality and 11, 28, 51,
110, 119, 129, 318
mobile technologies as support mechanism
for 333–4, 344, 346
See also Denmark’s universal healthcare
system: focus on chronic care; syndemic:
framework on chronic disease
See also comorbidities; cancer; diabetes;
heart disease
citizen surveillance 10, 47, 49 See also Cuban
state systems of surveillance/control
citizenship 3, 402
aspirational vision of 71
biological 29, 149, 189, 192
compromised 205
contested discourses about 185–7
digital 355
limitations of 13, 205
neoliberal 143
preferential access to 118
See also COVID-19 amplification of
vulnerability: lack/denial of citizenship
and
Cold War 57, 148, 415
colonial/imperial legacy 12, 55, 75, 411
health of black/ethnic minority
communities as 108–10, 122
notions of ideational superiority as 109,
111, 119, 121
racism/racial inequality as 11–12, 64, 70,
98, 108, 122
See also racial hierarchies, post-colonial
continuation of
colonialism
afterlife of 108–9, 111, 113, 115, 119–20,
122–3
as multispecies process 436
Comănescu, Denisa 151–2
communal boundaries in public health
crises 153–4, 159
scapegoating within 185, 187–92
See also xenophobia: COVID-19 related
community
participation in health promotion 451–4
support/solidarity during COVID-19 8, 10,
103–4, 215, 225–8, 245, 255, 350
See also Cuban responses to COVID-19:
relational care through social networks/
socios
comorbidities 11, 20, 261, 264–5, 270–3, 275,
317
multimorbidity 328, 338
conspiratorial theorising/thinking 69–70, 83
medical 70–1, 73, 84–5
See also COVID-19 conspiracy theories
Corrupted Nanny State 83–4
COVID-19
anthropological insights into 2–4, 11,
19–21, 109, 356, 381, 451–2
biomedical discourses on 19, 73, 175, 386,
402, 414, 432–3, 444, 448–50
denialism 48, 69, 80
human visualisation of 432
‘microbiopolitics’ of 430, 433–4
as portal to rethinking healthcare 3, 28
‘stealth’ nature of 4, 18
timeline 5–7
See also biopolitics of pandemic; ‘outbreak
narratives’; underlying conditions of
COVID-19
COVID-19 amplification of vulnerability 2, 14,
37
adolescents and youth and 225, 228–30,
233–7, 239, 295
female sex workers and 225, 228, 230, 237
lack/denial of citizenship and 223–4,
234–5, 238–40
people living with HIV and 225, 230–3,
236
transwomen and 225, 230, 235, 237
waste pickers and 215
women and 227–30, 233, 237–9
See also health inequalities; inequalities
exposed by COVID-19; sexual and
reproductive health rights, Indonesia;
waste pickers, India
COVID-19 configurations of shame and
blame 2, 11, 15, 71, 449
nonhumans and 18, 414, 434–6
INDEX
457
references to ‘Chinese virus’ 72, 432, 443
on social media 13, 49, 79, 147, 151–2
See also COVID-19, designated ‘risk groups’:
blaming/stigmatisation as focal point of;
LGBTQI+ communities: blaming of;
scapegoating
COVID-19 conspiracy theories
anti-Semitic tropes 72, 77
around 5G networks 72
boundaries between fact and fiction 84–5
debunking approach to 72–3, 174
‘deep state’ 10–11, 68, 73–4, 79–80, 83–4
in Ireland 68, 74–7, 85
in Poland 77–8, 85
link with identity/belonging 70, 78–9
see also QAnon; social media: spreading of
misinformation via; Trump, Donald:
conspiracy-mongering/spreading of
disinformation by; vaccines, conspiracy
theories around
COVID-19 deaths 3, 6–7, 17, 41, 49–50, 91,
303
among black/ethnic minorities 11–12, 28,
93, 98–9, 103, 105, 131, 267
conspiracy theories around 75–6, 248
of healthcare workers 115–16, 118, 319
in India 137, 139
in Italy 5, 57, 164, 318, 444, 446
in Latin America 244, 248–9, 260–1,
266–7, 257
underreporting of 20, 248, 260
See also Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic
communities: disproportionate
infection/death rates among; Turkey:
COVID-19 infection rates/deaths in
COVID-19, designated ‘risk groups’ 2, 7, 9, 11,
252
blaming/stigmatisation as focal point
of 15, 262, 267–8, 271, 273–5
link between inequality and 50, 98, 108,
112, 118, 123, 233, 252–3, 255
COVID-19 improvisational strategies, US/UK
HCWs 303, 307, 320
addressing workforce gaps 308
altering triage processes 16, 308, 310
creative use of ventilators 305, 313–15, 317
and faultlines of inequality 303, 318–19
implementing telemedicine 310
informal information networks 305, 316–17
infrastructural 306, 308–10
as life-saving technique 303, 316–17
prioritising cancer treatments 308
for risk reduction 303, 305, 310, 314–15
suspending non-elective surgeries 308, 310
using and reusing PPE 306–7, 311–13,
315–16
See also healthcare workers (HCWs) US/
UK, challenges facing
COVIDIndiaTrack policy analysis 206, 208–9,
212
bureaucratic accountability 215, 219
inclusion and exclusion criteria 207
recognition of vulnerabilities 209–10
Cresswell, Tim 283, 294–5
criminalisation of COVID-19 regulations 14,
37, 60, 62, 64n1, 445, 450, 452
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Cuba
impact of US trade embargo on 33–5, 40
shift to bureaucratic socialism in 34
during Special Period 29, 33, 38–40, 43n3
tourism in 28, 34–5, 42
Cuba, international humanitarian tradition
of 29–30
Henry Reeve Brigade 36–7, 43n4
Cuban responses to COVID-19 27, 32, 37
creative attitudes to resolver 28, 39, 42–3
humour in context of 38–9
lessons from previous pandemics 31–2, 41
relational care through social networks/
socios 28–9, 31, 40, 42–3n2
See also Cuban state systems of
surveillance/control
Cuban Revolution 28, 30, 32, 34, 38–9
Cuban socialist public health system 8, 28–9,
37
mobilisation of 32–3, 41–2
National Action Plan for Epidemics 32–3
primary health care system 30, 32, 35
See also biopolitics of pandemic: Cuban
approach
Cuban state systems of surveillance/control 8,
33, 36–7, 41, 57
Pesquisador Virtual app 7, 27
role of MEF programme in 33
tensions around/criticism of 8, 27, 31, 33,
37
Dalit, India
as confrontational identity 131
impact of COVID-19 pandemic on 138–40
as political force 132
prejudice against 12, 131, 135, 140–1,
143–4n2, 204
Danish Heart Foundation 328, 331
debility 14, 20
as ‘durational death’ 218–19
massification of 10, 47
Deleuze, Gilles 218, 429, 434
Delhi 16, 50, 132–3
dengue 11, 20, 222, 250
Cuban response to 28, 31, 35–6
dengue haemorrhagic fever (DHF) 31, 35
Denisova, Anastasia 364–5
Denmark, lockdown in 5, 324
disrupted social care of seniors
during 337–40
impact on people living with congenital
heart disease 17, 326–8, 330–2
patient-driven online diabetes communities
during 333–7
National Board of Health hospital
guidelines on 325–7, 330–1, 340
Denmark’s universal healthcare system 17
focus on chronic care/kronikere 326–7,
329–30, 340
inequalities within 327, 330, 337
and informal ‘carescapes’ 326–7, 330–1,
334–6, 340–41
KRAM health initiatives 328–9
Derrida, Jacques
concept of ‘hauntology’ 48, 55, 61–2
Deshpande, Ashwini 138, 376
Dhaka, impact of lockdown on adolescents/
youth in
emotional distress and anxiety 283–5,
290–1, 294
insecurity and hunger as greatest fear 284,
286–7, 292, 294
intersecting vulnerabilities 15, 282–3, 287,
293–5
lack of state support 286–7
plight of street peddlers 9, 15, 282,
284
relational networks as survival
strategy 283, 287, 289, 294
solace of religion 292–3
See also power relations: and discourses of
intersectionality; structural violence:
COVID-19 deepening of
diabetes 15, 34, 119, 244, 255, 261, 273
as disease of poverty 63, 99, 265–6
genetic basis of 263
See also Denmark, lockdown in: patientdriven online diabetes communities
during
Dickey, Sara 367–8
Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulu 168–9
disability support, impact of COVID-19 on 14,
17, 246, 252–3
and coordination of care networks 254–5,
257–8
Diyanet, Turkey
condemnation of nonheteronormativity 171–4, 176
controversial moralistic discourses of 163,
167
critique of neoliberal world order 168–70
intervention in COVID-19 debate 13,
162–3, 168–70
as political tool 163, 165–7, 175
domestic violence 167, 260, 275 See also
intimate partner violence
Doron, Assa 362–3
Douglas, Mary 384, 413, 423
analysis of anomaly and danger 18, 386,
394, 402
and notion of ‘secular’ cleanliness 390
Duterte, Rodrigo 431–3
Ebola epidemic 2, 10–11, 28, 32, 36, 55, 244,
292, 414
militarisation of response to 57
scapegoating of Peul migrants during 13,
183–4
Erbaş, Ali 162, 165, 171–3
Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip 162, 164, 167, 173–6
Esposito, Roberto 130–1
essential workers 119, 356, 368
and higher risk of infection 7, 9, 12, 94, 98,
102, 444
See also frontline workers
eugenics 149, 245, 262, 264, 267, 274
European Union (EU) 121
collaborative preparations for
COVID-19 109, 118, 123n4
health workers in UK 12, 116, 122
poverty levels in 356
Romanian attempts to join 149
See also United Kingdom: post-Brexit
isolationism of
evictions See under housing insecurity
Façade or Cardboard State 83–4
Facebook 54, 60, 261, 339, 362
chronic care support groups on 328, 331,
333–7
launch of ‘care emoji’ 344
and political protest 93, 96
#SafeHands/#HealthyAtHome
hashtags 349–50
spread of conspiracy theories via 67–8, 75,
77
See also social media
‘fake news’ 76, 79, 144n6
Farmer, Paul 12, 30, 71, 109, 283
fatwa 167, 176n4
Fauci, Anthony 80–1
Faye, Sylvain 181, 183, 190–1
feminism
equation with immorality 167
religious 392–4
Ferrer, Barbara 98–9
Floyd, George, murder of 96, 123n1
‘I can’t breathe’ movement 60, 91, 129
Minneapolis protests against 91–2
as spark for anti-racism protests 12, 58–9,
62, 93, 96, 101–2, 104, 108
See also #BlackLivesMatter; Movement for
Black Lives
food insecurity 11, 38, 50, 63, 265, 282, 287
emergency food distribution, LA 103–4
See also hunger; waste-pickers, India: food
insecurity/fear of hunger among
Foucault, Michel 49, 267, 388
concept of biopolitics 29–30, 128–9, 144n1
See also biopolitics of pandemic
France 5, 60, 150, 164, 182, 226
Franklin, Sarah 117
concept of ‘nostalgic nationalism’ 12, 109,
113, 118, 121, 123
Frederiksen, Mette 324, 326, 339
frontline SRHR workers 222–3, 227–8, 231–2,
235, 238
and holistic engagement with clients 224–6
frontline workers 1, 57, 94, 212, 352, 374
See also healthcare workers: frontline
Gates, Bill 67, 81
Geddes da Filicaia, Marco 446, 452
Germany 5–6, 77, 117
Goffman, Erving 48, 52, 153
Gómez, Carolina 33, 275
Graber, Nils 30, 41
Guardian, The 112–14
Guattari, Félix 218, 429, 434
Guinea 13, 57, 183–4, 191
H1N1 epidemics 2, 11, 73, 63, 243, 250
segregation of Roma during 13, 147,
153–5, 157
Habermas, Jürgen 48, 52–3
Haiti 31, 36, 60, 71
halachic family purity laws (FPL), Israel 389
changes in niddah laws 389, 392, 397
INDEX
459
historic contestation over 388, 392–3
interplay between risks and dangers 384,
386, 394–5, 397–8, 400–2
See also ˜women’s mikveh crisis, Israel
Haraway, Donna 413, 428, 433
Harrison, Mark 411–12, 414
Harriss-White, Barbara 202–3, 205
Hartman, Saidiya
notion of ‘afterlife of slavery’ 109, 111, 119
Hastrup, Kirsten 69, 84
Havana, Cuba 9, 39–40
health inequalities
connection with structural racism 12–14,
94–5, 99, 108, 110, 113, 153–7, 356
everyday/systemic 210, 212, 214–15, 219
exposed by COVID-19 1–2, 95–9, 108, 110,
113–14, 122, 212, 318
lack of state accountability for 174, 206,
265, 273–4
See also Denmark’s universal healthcare
system: inequalities within
healthcare 17
triaged access to 15–16, 308, 310
uneven/limited access to 1–2, 14, 94–5,
97, 99, 103–4, 153, 156
See also health inequalities; Mexico:
extreme triage guidelines in; public
healthcare systems
healthcare workers (HCWs) 6, 16, 36, 156,
324, 353
Danish home/auxiliary 330, 338
frontline 12, 16, 305–6, 312
in Turkey 164–5,
See also frontline SRHR workers
healthcare workers US/UK, challenges facing
constantly changing
recommendations 309–13
inequality 318–19
medical uncertainty/lack of
knowledge 303, 305–7, 316
shortage of PPE 5, 12, 16, 40, 109, 113–14,
116–18, 139, 306, 312–13, 315–16, 318
shortage of ventilators 313–14
stress and anxiety 304, 310, 312, 314,
316
See also COVID-19 improvisational
strategies, US/UK HCWs
heart disease 15, 99, 119, 244, 255, 274
congenital heart defects (CHDs) 327–8,
330–3
hypertension 40, 63, 261, 273, 429
Helmond, Anne 345, 347
herd immunity See immunity: herd
Herring, D. Ann 2–3, 243
Hirsch, Afua 110, 119
HIV/AIDS 2, 10–11, 28, 47, 50–1, 63
conspiracy theories around 71, 73
Cuban response to 31, 57
feminisation of 224
See also COVID-19 amplification of
vulnerability: people living with HIV
and
Horton, Richard 444, 451, 454
Hossain, Md Shahadat 281, 286
housing insecurity 11, 14, 103, 282
and evictions 59, 61
460
VIRAL LOADS
Hungary 154, 158
hunger 9–10, 47, 52, 55, 63, 136–7, 139, 169,
212, 281, 294–5
Crusade Against Hunger, Mexico 265
See also food insecurity
hydroxychloroquinine 305, 416
Bolsonaro’s promotion of 247, 251
Trump’s promotion of 73
ICT ‘fantasies of caregiving’ during
pandemic 17, 347–8, 357
in context of digital divide/inequality 17,
346, 348, 353–6, 358
in context of physical distancing 344, 346,
349–50, 356
COVID-19 Solidarity Response Fund 352–3
exploitation of care rhetoric 345, 347–50,
353–5
facilitation of digital surveillance 345, 353,
358
gatekeeping strategies 351–2
notion of community connectedness 350,
357
partnerships with health
organisations 350–3, 357
promotion of ‘digital wellness’/
wellbeing 348, 355–7
See also social media; YouTube
identity
ethnic 148
imagined 109
national 119–22
relational 111, 120
territorialisation of 189–90
See also COVID-19 conspiracy theories: link
with identity/belonging
immunity
biosocial 422–3
herd 128, 249, 423
partial 410, 415–16
See also Rollback Malaria campaign: link
between ITNs and acquired immunity
India
1918 flu pandemic in 132–4
growth of ICT in 362–4
healthcare landscape in 137–8, 144n5
middle-class reliance on domestic help
in 367–8, 370–2, 377–9
new middle class in 142, 363
See also caste system, India
India, lockdown in 5, 8
and challenge to traditional gender
roles 17–18, 365, 368–9, 370–1, 372–3,
378, 381–2
dehumanising impact of 12, 15, 140–2
Hindu fundamentalist views on 139–41
impact on stranded migrant workers 14,
21, 136–8, 366–7, 374–5
impact on working mothers 376–81
loss of jobs/livelihoods due to 368,
373–4
media discourse on 138–9, 144n6
middle class solidarity around 10, 137–8,
142, 144n3, 374–5
and public distribution system (ration
cards) 213, 216–17
See also biopolitics of pandemic: ‘make live
and let die’ approach; COVIDIndiaTrack
analysis; sanitation workers, India;
waste-picking communities, India
inequalities exposed by COVID-19 38
class 47, 50, 52, 55, 128, 137, 239, 253,
256–7, 267, 293, 368
gender 18, 49–50, 55, 128, 293, 295, 369
justification of 286, 434
sexual and reproductive health 2, 14,
223–4, 226, 238
socio-economic 2, 9, 50, 97–8, 103, 138–9,
253
spatial 7, 14, 48, 50–1, 59, 140–41
See also health inequalities; racial
inequalities exposed by COVID-19;
structural inequality
Information and Communication Technologies
(ICTs) 344
commodification of personal data by 345,
347, 353–4
and transnational care collectives 346
See also ICT ‘fantasies of caregiving’ during
pandemic
intimate partner violence 49, 51, 237, 239
See also domestic violence
Ireland 68, 74, 85
challenges to lockdown restrictions in 75–6
Italy, COVID-19 pandemic in 57, 63, 155–6,
305, 308, 337, 340, 354
and contradictory public messages 443–4
Cuban medical support for 37
lack of preparedness of NHS for 5, 19, 317,
324, 443, 446–8
and role of social/cultural articulation at
local level 448–52, 454
romanticisation of 10, 144n3, 374
See also Lombardy region as first ‘red zone’
Jakarta 222, 227, 230–1, 233, 235
Jeffrey, Robin 362–3
job insecurity 95, 104, 284, 287 See also
unemployment
Jones, Alex 79–80
Khoza, Collins 60, 62
King, Rodney 60, 95
Koca, Fahrettin 162, 164, 174, 176n2
Kyela district, Tanzania 19, 410, 423
beliefs about malaria in 417
colonial health education in 416–17
multispecies co-existences in, acceptance
of 418–21
See also malaria
LaFrance, Adrienne 80, 82
Lakoff, Andrew 4, 243, 258
Langstrup, Henriette 326, 329
LGBTQI+ communities 231, 236
blaming of 13, 163, 167, 170–1, 173–6
See also Diyanet, Turkey: condemnation of
non-heteronormativity
Liberia 57, 183, 191
Livingston, Julie 15–16, 30, 306, 318–19
logic of separation 19
anthropocentricity of 413
at centre of malaria control 414–15, 417,
421
and ‘contagionist’ view of infection 413
and puncturing of multispecies and social
relationships 410–11, 414, 421, 423
See also One Health responses to COVID-19
Lombardy region as first ‘red zone’ 8, 37, 443,
447
Bergamo 5, 15, 67, 444–6
and overwhelming of hospitals 5, 19, 443,
445
London 1, 50, 115–16, 118
Nightingale hospitals 309
‘Long COVID’
#CountLongCovid support group 20
López-Gatell Ramírez, Hugo 260–1, 268
Los Angeles
healthcare system 94–5, 97, 100, 103–5
Police Department (LAPD) 92, 94–5,
100–101 See also police brutality and
racism, US
Lula See Silva, Luis Ignácio
Lynteris, Christos 10, 109, 118, 411–12, 414
Madrid See Spain
malaria 15, 19, 73, 244
Anopheles mosquito as vector of 411–12,
415, 417, 421
endemicity of 410–12
failure of GMEP treatment for 415–16
rebound effect 415–16, 421–2
See also Kyela district, Tanzania; logic of
separation: at centre of malaria control;
Rollback Malaria campaign
Malawi 57, 307
Malaysia 10, 58
Mandetta, Luis Henrique 246–7
Mantini-Briggs, Clara 33–4, 37
Martin, Trayvon 92–3
memes 18, 362
anthropological perspective on 364–5,
376, 381–2
derogatory/racist 147, 151–3
Indian lockdown in 368–76
MERS 11, 184, 319
Mexico 15
extreme triage guidelines 262, 270–2,
274
impact of NAFTA on food systems 264–5
informal economy of 260, 267
genetic strength linked to mestizaje 262–3,
266–7
government’s war against obesity in 261–2,
265, 268–9, 274
militarised response to pandemic in 58,
272–3
obsession with diets and foodways 262,
264–5
Spanish colonisation of 262, 264
undertesting/underreporting of COVID-19
in 260
See also obesity
Mexico City, slums of 50, 56
microbes 19
divergence between local and biomedical
knowledge of 433
INDEX
461
human relationships with 10, 409, 413,
430–3, 448
Pasteurian notions of 428–9, 431–2
usefulness of 432–3
Mignolo, Walter 120, 412
migrant workers, impact of pandemic on 14, 58
UK 114, 118, 123n5
See also India, lockdown in: impact on
stranded migrant workers; Senegalese
emigrants
militarisation of pandemics 9–10, 50, 52–3,
56–8, 71, 105 See also under South
Africa, lockdown in; Mexico
Ministry of Health (MH), Israel 387–8
lockdown guidelines 393–4
sanitation standards for mikveh 390,
391–2, 395, 397, 399
Ministry of Religious Services (MRS),
Israel 389, 391, 396
on use of mikvehs during lockdown 388,
393–5, 398–401
Modi, Narendra 5, 366, 370–1, 380–1
Mokgopa, Kneo 62
Moore, Ronnie 75, 78
Mossialos, Elias 116–17
Movement for Black Lives (M4BL) 92–4, 102
multispecies perspective 422, 431, 438
as ecological necessity 19, 421, 428, 430
incompatibility of logic of separation
with 410, 415, 421, 423
and notion of ‘biophilia’ 430, 437
and relationship between humans and
nonhumans 409, 411, 427–9, 438–40
See also ‘outbreak narratives’: and anxieties
about nonhuman life
Mumbai 1, 137, 286, 366–7, 377
National Council Against Discrimination
(CNCD), Romania 152–3
National Health Service (NHS), UK
coloniality of 109, 113, 115–16, 121
dropping of Test and Trace system 117
ethnic patterning of care provision in 109,
112–13, 115–16, 118, 122
high vacancy/low retention rates of
staff 304
lack of PPE and testing in 16, 109, 113–14,
116–18
and notions of ‘heroism’ of health/care
workers 113–14
underfunding of 114, 117, 304
See also COVID-19 improvisational
strategies, US/UK HCWs; Public Health
England
Necula, Ciprian 151–2
neoliberal austerity policies 341
undermining of health systems by 4, 15,
110, 244, 246, 257, 447–8, 454
neoliberalism 128, 138
effect on Mexican food systems 264–5
See also Diyanet, Turkey: critique of
neoliberal world order
New York 1, 50
changing care practices in 305, 309, 317
as first epicentre of US pandemic 6, 8, 16,
271, 305
462
VIRAL LOADS
nostalgic nationalism See Franklin, Sarah:
concept of ‘nostalgic nationalism’
Nyamnjoh, Francis 186–8, 191
obesity 265–6, 268, 269, 275
genetic and epigenetic approaches to 119,
262–4, 266–7
risk of death of COVID due to 261–2
and stigmatisation of fatness 262, 268–70,
271, 273–4
See also Mexico: government’s war against
obesity in
O’Doherty, Gemma 74–6
One Health responses to COVID-19 409, 411,
422–3
‘outbreak narratives’ 2, 411
and anxieties about nonhuman life 413–14,
422–3
Packard, Randall 412, 414–15, 421, 450
Paxson, Heather 430–2
Pesquisador Virtual app 7–8
Philippines 347–8, 430–3, 435, 439
botanic boom in 436–8
ostrich internet sensation 427–9
study of bats in 435
physical distancing See social distancing
Piotrokowski, Malka 385–6, 392, 400
Poland 68, 77–8, 85, 148
Poleykett, Branwyn 10, 109, 118
police brutality and abuse 10, 15, 47, 76, 139
in South Africa 51, 55–6, 59–62
See also under underlying conditions of
COVID-19
police brutality and racism, US 58–60, 91–2
Los Angeles 92–6, 100–1, 104–5
as public health crisis 99, 101
See also Black Lives Matter; 1965 Watts
Rebellion
political Islam 163, 167
as threat to public health 13, 168, 175–6
polydemics 411
and concept of ‘interconnected
diversity’ 412–13, 423
pluriversal 410, 412, 415, 421–3
poverty 11
dehumanisation/depredation of 12,
60–2, 133–6, 140, 143
and homelessness 10, 47, 56, 63, 138, 206,
233, 356, 449
impact of COVID-19 on 138–9
spatialisation of 48
systemic/chronic 10, 47
See also underlying conditions of COVID-19:
poverty and discrimination as
power relations 203
and discourses of intersectionality 219,
283–4, 295
of epidemiological control 118
human-nonhuman 439
sexuality as dense transfer point of 388
Premchand, Munshi 134–6, 143
primary healthcare 413, 452
primary healthcare, COVID-19 overburdening of
in Brazil 250, 255
in Indonesia 227–30, 232, 234, 238–9
in Italy 443, 446–7
in UK’s NHS 446–7, 452
See also under Cuban socialist public health
system
Puar, Jasbir K. 218–19
Public Health England (PHE) 110, 112–13, 119
public health initiatives 3–5, 8–9, 261–2
tensions between religion and 384, 386–7,
401–2
See also women’s mikveh crisis, Israel
public healthcare systems 15, 41
challenges to/lack of preparedness of 4, 6,
16, 18, 63, 78
impact of market-oriented reforms on 19
See also Cuban socialist public health
system; Denmark’s universal healthcare
system; National Health Service, UK
QAnon 80, 82
quarantine 91, 142, 153–5, 163, 245, 253,
256, 393, 413
social media platforms and 353–4
quarantine enforcement 2, 4–5, 8–10, 412
in Cuba 32, 37, 41, 57
in Romania 152, 157–8
in Senegal 183
in South Africa 57
in Vietnam 41
rabbinic authority, Israel
Fertility in Light of Halacha (FLOH) 387,
396, 400, 402
gendered challenges to 18, 385–6, 388,
292–3, 401–2
and restructuring of worship and sociality
during pandemic 384–5, 393
women scholars/rabbanit 18, 385–7,
392–3, 395, 403n2
See also halachic family purity laws, Israel;
women’s mikveh crisis, Israel: interaction
between rabbinic discourse and public
health
racial capitalism 64, 98–9, 102, 104–5
racial discrimination See racism
racial hierarchies, post-colonial continuation
of 10, 12, 47, 99, 109, 111, 119, 121,
141, 367, 413
racial inequalities exposed by COVID-19 2–3
in South Africa 48, 50, 55–6, 60, 62
in UK 11, 108, 110
in US 11–12, 28, 91–3, 98
See also #BlackLivesMatter: link with
disparities of COVID-19
racism 2, 11, 21, 53, 55, 60, 62, 120, 413
scapegoating as form of 72, 153
systemic 63, 94, 97, 99, 120, 122, 129, 157
See also #BlackLivesMatter; colonial/
imperial legacy: racism/racial inequality
as; health inequalities: connection with
structural racism; memes: derogatory/
racist
Ramaphosa, Cyril 5, 49, 60, 62
Robinson, Cedric 99, 102
Rollback Malaria (RBM) campaign
insecticide-treated mosquito nets
(ITNs) 410, 415–20, 423
link between ITNs and acquired
immunity 421–2
Roma
dehumanisation of 150
ethnic identity of 148
human trafficking case 158
impact of measles epidemic on 13, 147,
153, 155–7, 159
negative stereotyping of 148–52, 156, 159
pre-COVID segregation and marginalisation
of 149–50, 153–6
resistance to assimilation policies 148
transnational mobility of 147–9
See also memes: derogatory/racist;
structural violence: against Roma
Romanian lockdown measures 159
and ‘civil disobedience’ of Roma 13, 157–9
and institutionalisation of racism 13, 143,
147, 151–2, 157–8
in Suceava 159n2
See also biopolitics of pandemic: Roma
responses
Rosenberg, Charles E. 412–13
Rosenfeld, David 98–9
Rousseff, Dilma 246, 250–1
Roy, Arundhati 3, 28
Sahni, Rohini 202–4
Sanders, Andrew 75, 78
sanitation workers, India
increased risk of COVID-19 for 201, 212
lack of protective equipment for 201, 205
SARS-COV-1 virus 2, 11, 16, 73, 184, 414
SARS-COV-2 virus 1, 5, 18, 27, 67, 72, 81,
128, 130–1, 141–2, 366, 412, 448, 453
See also COVID-19
scapegoating 11, 13
of Roma 149, 153
of returning Senegalese emigrants 183,
185, 187, 189–92, 449
See also Ebola epidemic: scapegoating of
Peul migrants during; racism:
scapegoating as form of
Scorza, D’Artagnan 96–7
self-isolation 8, 324
and ‘at risk’ groups 2, 17, 324, 327, 335,
339–40
enforced 55–6
limited capacity for 2, 4, 10, 14, 36, 42, 98,
128, 190
See also under social exclusion
Senegalese emigrants 181
local reactions to returning 9, 13, 182–3,
190
role in economy/local livelihoods 187–9
See also scapegoating: of returning
Senegalese emigrants
sexual and reproductive health rights (SRHR),
Indonesia 2, 14
access to safe abortion 224, 227, 229, 238
barriers to accessing free healthcare 224,
234–7, 239
ethnographic research on 224–7
gender imbalance 226
low capacity/under-investment of GOI
in 223–4, 227, 238–9
INDEX
463
maternal mortality rate 223–4, 227
reproductive cancer screening 233
rising private sector costs 229–31
STI and HIV prevention and
treatment 230–3, 235, 237,
239–40n3
unmet contraception needs 223, 227–31,
236–8
youth programmes 228–30, 233–4
See also COVID-19 amplification of
vulnerability; frontline SRHR workers
Shadow State 83–4
Shankan, V. Kalyan 202–4
Sierra Leone 57, 183, 191, 296
Silva, Luis Ignácio 245–6
Simpkin, Victoria L. 116–17
Singer, Merrill 266, 283, 365, 454
Slovakia 148, 158
social contract, ruptures in 70, 82
social distancing 1–2, 4, 8–9, 27, 39, 54, 69,
304, 413
difficulties with/criticisms of 48–9, 74–5,
98, 190, 255, 318
enforced 56
impact on SRH care 224, 231, 233
impact on work/livelihoods 235, 253–7
as threat to civil liberty/basic rights 80,
245, 247
See also under social exclusion
social exclusion 109, 122
dehumanisation of 143
geopolitical discourses 184, 186–7
self-isolation/social distancing as form
of 12, 128–32, 136–7, 139–40, 285–6,
356
social injustice 28, 53, 118
faced by young slum-dwellers 283, 296
historic 131, 272, 274–5
racialised 93, 95
social media
and facilitation of work from home 17,
254, 362
hate speech on 173
as scapegoating/blaming mechanism 183
spreading of misinformation via 37, 68, 75,
77, 351–2
as technology of support 10, 17–18, 20, 40,
55, 96, 157, 205
as tool for social analysis 183, 185, 189
See also COVID-19 configurations of shame
and blame: on social media; Facebook;
ICT ‘fantasies of caregiving’ during
pandemic
sociality 328–9, 410
new modes of 60, 384–5, 450, 452
solid waste management (SWM), India 203
informal system as backbone of 203–4, 208
kabaadi system 208–9
Municipal Solid Waste Management
(MSWM) 208
See also waste pickers, India
Solis, Hilda 99, 101
Solís, Patricio 261, 267
South Africa
scale and speed of viral spread in 49–50,
56
464
VIRAL LOADS
South Africa, lockdown in
apartheid-style militarisation of 47–52,
55–6, 58, 60–1, 63
constraints/prohibitions under 48–9
disproportionate impact on informal
settlements of 1, 5, 10, 47, 50–1,
59–61
massification of surveillance under 47, 49,
55
South African Social Security Agency (SASSA)
COVID-19 grant 51
South Korea 10, 171
Soviet Union 33, 77
Spain 1, 5, 8, 16, 182, 324, 337, 435
Spanish flu See H1N1 epidemics
state power 3
and enforcement of lockdowns 4, 8–9, 28,
36, 41, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 58
moralist discourses and 163
problematic expressions of 83–5
and technologies of surveillance 10, 57,
60–1, 63, 67, 105, 153, 155
See also COVID-19 conspiracy theories:
‘deep state’; South Africa, lockdown in:
massification of surveillance under
Stevenson, Lisa 30, 42
stigmatising power of infection 11
and designated ‘risk groups’ 2, 123, 324,
328, 330
LGBTQI+ 11, 171
in poorest strata of society 215–17
stratified livability 2, 4, 21
Street, Alice 306, 319
structural inequality 15, 56, 123, 141–2, 257
link between white supremacy and 91–2,
97–8
See also chronic disease: link between
inequality and
structural violence
COVID-19 deepening of 11–12, 51, 55, 98,
283, 293, 295
extension to nonhumans 439
against Roma 149, 155, 157–8
See also caste-based structural violence
structural vulnerability 11, 15, 98, 157, 293,
307 See also bioethics and notions of
vulnerability; COVID-19 amplification of
vulnerability
Swedlund, Alan C. 2–3, 243
swine flu See H1N1 epidemics
syndemic
COVID-19 as 11, 21, 243–4, 428, 454
framework on chronic disease 265–6
Tadiar, Neferti Xina M. 357–8
notion of fantasy production 347–8, 353
Țăndărei, Romania 147, 150–3, 157–8
Taylor, Breonna 60, 96
Thiam, Jamil 182–3
Tismăneanu, Vladimir 151–2
tourism, impact of COVID on 8–9, 28, 31–2
Trump, Donald
armed enforcement of curfew regulations
by 59–60
conspiracy-mongering/spreading of
disinformation by 39, 73, 77, 79–81, 432
crackdown on foreign trade by 35, 40
downplaying of virus by 6, 80, 247
endorsement by far-right of 79–81
positive COVID-19 test 6
tuberculosis (TB) 10, 30, 47, 51, 63, 412
Turkey 116
COVID-19 infection rates/deaths in 162,
165, 175–6n1
criminalisation of hate speech in 171–3
export of PPE equipment from 170, 177n5
2016 failed coup attempt 165, 167
militarised response to pandemic in 58
veracity of COVID-19 statistics in 164,
176n2
See also Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Turkey;
Diyanet, Turkey; political Islam
Turkish Medical Association (TTB) 164, 175
underlying conditions of COVID-19 2, 17, 20
police brutality/violence 15, 56, 91–2, 99,
275, 284–6, 291–2
poverty and racial discrimination 13–15,
21, 28, 42, 50–1, 63, 94, 97–9, 110, 119,
257
unemployment 51, 110, 257, 267
COVID-19 deepening of 10–11, 29, 52, 55,
63, 102–3, 138, 258n7
United Kingdom (UK) 5–7, 10, 60, 63
post-Brexit isolationism of 12, 109, 113,
115–18
See also Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic
communities: disproportionate death
rates among; health inequalities:
connection with systemic racism;
National Health Service, UK
United Nations 10
International Children’s Education Fund
(UNICEF) 281–2, 351
urbanisation, link with pandemics 29, 205,
429
US
anti-lockdown protests in 81–2
COVID-19 infection rates in 4, 6–8, 91,
131, 304
generational inequities in 28
Helms-Burton Act 35, 40
movements for prison abolition in 92, 101,
104
sustained faith in American Dream 79–81
2008 foreclosure crisis 79
See also Los Angeles; New York; police
brutality, US; Trump, Donald
vaccination/immunisation 250, 331, 413,
422–3, 428, 431
hesitancy in orthodox Jewish
communities 387
against HPV 234
against malaria 422
against MMR 156–7
vaccines, conspiracy theories around 69, 72,
74–5, 81
Big Pharma tropes 77, 81–3
vaccines, COVID-19 244
development of/race for 1, 6, 50, 57, 67–8,
130, 352–3
possible contribution of digital platforms
to 357
rollouts of 1, 72
van Dijck, Jose 345, 347
Vaughan, Megan 414, 417
Venezuela 35, 71
Vietnam 4, 9, 41, 117
viral vagility of prejudice 128–9, 131
and Indian caste system 132, 141–2
viruses 10, 19–20, 409, 430
as ancient life forms 411, 448
mutation of 429
as quasi-species 431
zoonotic 18, 413–14, 422, 429, 434
Wahl-Jorgensen, Karin 347, 349
Wald, Patricia 411, 413–14
waste pickers, India 14, 201–2
as backbone of MSWM 203–4, 208, 219
conflict with private players 203, 205
discrimination against/stigmatisation
of 202–3, 205, 214–17
food insecurity/fear of hunger among 201,
205–6, 212–14, 216–17
harassment from state institutions 204
inability to access healthcare 210, 212–15
issuing of identity cards to 209–11, 217
legal recognition of 203, 208–11
loss of income due to lockdown 201, 205,
213, 216
migrant labour among 204–5
ragpickers 204, 209–11
and sexual division of labour 204, 220n7
Waters, John 75–6
1965 Watts Rebellion 95–6
WhatsApp See memes; social media
white supremacy See structural inequality: link
between white supremacy and
Whiteford, Linda M. 8, 31, 36
whiteness 111, 120, 122
women’s mikveh crisis, Israel
evidence-based halachic statement
on 394–7, 400–1
Facebook discussions on 388, 393–4,
397–400
and interaction between rabbinic discourse
and public health 18, 385–6, 388,
391–2, 397, 401–2
medical anthropological perspective
on 387–8
and micro-politics of spousal
intimacy 285–6, 396, 400–1
and negotiability of halacha 392, 397–8,
402
and risk of COVID-19 infection 384, 386,
393–4, 397, 399
Zoom panel discussions on 385–6, 388
See also Ministry of Religious Services,
Israel; public health initiatives: tensions
between religion and
World Bank 50, 139, 189, 223, 243, 286
World Health Organization (WHO) 5, 10,
109, 114, 154, 164, 223, 243
recommendations to treat/contain
pandemic 17, 244, 247, 352, 414, 445
social media partnerships with 350–2
INDEX
465
Wuhan 5, 8, 16, 18, 37, 72, 305, 337,
432
Huanan Seafood Market in 18
xenophobia 56
COVID-19 related 153, 186, 190–2
See also scapegoating
Yogyakarta 222, 227, 230–1, 235
YouTube 17, 75, 157, 345–6, 348, 351
466
VIRAL LOADS
‘At Home #WithMe’ campaign 349–50,
353
Zika virus 11, 35, 244–5, 258n1
and children with congenital Zika
syndrome 14, 249–50, 251–2,
258n1, 5
vulnerability of survivors 252–3
Zimbabwe 52, 71, 116
Zimmerman, George 92–3
‘Viral Loads demonstrates anthropology’s power of description, analysis and theory to capture
a global tragedy as it unfolds. Anthropologists from around the world draw on their own deep
knowledge to trace COVID’s impact on social, economic and political life.’ – Melissa Parker,
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
‘This impressive collection of well researched and preciously substantiated essays shows that
evidence-based scholarship has not gone to sleep despite the COVID-19 menace and its
imposition of physical and social distancing. If anything, the pandemic has introduced an urgency
to social enquiry informed by improvisation and complementarity between virtual and face-toface encounters.’ – Francis B. Nyamnjoh, University of Cape Town
‘In Viral Loads, the editors and contributors offer a penetrating analysis of how, worldwide, the
COVID pandemic has exposed and exploited the racially, socioeconomically and globally
uneven ways in which people live; it demands, in response, that we extend our rationales
emergent from anthropological and interdisciplinary architectures. This broad and intensive work
is as much a book of the academy as it is of the heart, with enormously important ramifications
for humankind in the present and for the future. This is a magnificent work of action and reflection
that must be read carefully and with care. To not do so is to ensure the present as the continuing
model for the future.’ – Carlos G. Vélez-Ibáñez, Arizona State University
Viral Loads illustrates how the COVID-19 pandemic, and responses to it, lay bare and load onto
people’s lived realities in countries around the world. Social unevenness and gross economic
disparities have shaped global and local responses to the pandemic, while effects of both the
virus and efforts to contain it have amplified these inequalities. In reflecting on how the pandemic
has interrupted daily lives, state infrastructures and healthcare systems, the contributing authors
mobilise anthropological theories and concepts to locate the pandemic in a highly connected
and exceedingly unequal world.
Lenore Manderson is Distinguished Professor of Public Health and Medical Anthropology
in the School of Public Health, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa.
Nancy J. Burke is Professor of Public Health and Anthropology and John D. and Catherine
T. MacArthur Foundation Endowed Chair, University of California, Merced.
Ayo Wahlberg is Professor at the Department of Anthropology, University of Copenhagen.
m
Cover image:
© Mlungisi Mlungwana
Cover design:
www.ironicitalics.com