# Collectanea Sudanica

vol. 1

Edited by
Waldemar Cisło
Jarosław Różański
Maciej Ząbek

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INTRODUCTION

Among the most often used criteria for merging two or more groups of people into one culture are anthropometrical characteristics, geographical territory, common history, language, religion and social organization including an economic system and authority structure. On the basis of these criteria can be distinguished the macroregion of the Sudan, separating, to put it simply, the sands and rocks of the Sahara from the forested region of Africa. *Collectanea Sudanica*, vol. 1. is the beginning of a new interdisciplinary publication series which takes as its theme the Sudan region (*bilād as-Sūdān* – بلاد السودان – the Lands of the Blacks[1]), including the territories of the two Sudan republics (Republic of the Sudan and Republic of South Sudan).

Certainly this research area allows for discussion. It is however necessary to emphasize that in Black Africa all efforts at situating, uniting, and classifying individual cultures and their greater circles come up against numerous difficulties, among which the most basic seems to be a poor knowledge of many tribes or ethnic groups. All classifications and distinctions appear here as debatable and only agreed upon as a last resort.

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[1] The name *bilād as-Sūdān* originates from medieval Arab geographers who gave this name to terrain inhabited by dark-skinned peoples south of the Sahara. Here follows a list of Arab geographers in chronological order: al-Jaqubi (891), al-Masudi (956), Ibn Hawqal (977), al-Bakri (1094), Idrisi (1166), Ibn Said (1274), Ibn Battuta (1377), Ibn Chaldun (1406), Maqrizi (1442) i Leo Africanus (1526).

The inhabitants of the Sudan merge with, and at the same time are distinguished from, the neighboring tribes and cultures. Their living environment continues to be chiefly the savannah region, along with its vegetation acclimated to the climate and soil, as well as the widespread raising of livestock. History also binds these peoples, but their main ties come from trade and mutual combat.

As noted above, this publication series has an interdisciplinary character. Its intent is to unite geographers, archeologists, ethnologists, linguists, cultural studies experts, political scientists, economists, sociologists, and all others who are involved in research for this region of Africa. The texts featured will not as a rule have a unified theme. Neither do they come from one research center, but are open to other research communities. Individual volumes are meant to present a broad spectrum of the region. The texts are published in English or in French. Thanks to this broad formula authors will be able to continually bring "something new" to the process of getting to know the region and its culture.

KAROL PIASECKI

CHANGES IN THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF THE SUDAN ZONE POPULATION[1]

Sudan in Arabic means "Land of the Black". From the anthropological point of view, however, Sudan – as a geographic and cultural zone – is a transitional area between Black and White Africa. To consider Sudan as a geographical zone one ought to include in our considerations the Sahel adjoining it in the north, the entire Sahara, and the southern edge or the equatorial forest border zone. Only in this way our considerations will make sense. The western edge of the area of our interest is the Atlantic Ocean and the Canary Islands that have always been connected with Africa. The eastern border of the area of our interest is the Red Sea, which in anthropological perspective means the Arabian Peninsula lying beyond it, as this narrow inner sea has always been a border easy to cross.

We will primarily be interested in the anthropological structure changes that have taken place over the last few millennia. Obvi-

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[1] This paper is a slightly revised version of the text published in Bilad as-Sudan, vol. 3, Legacy of past (Dziedzictwo przeszłości).

ously, we will have to refer to even more remote periods of time, as far as possible. The higher time limitation will be the beginning of the colonial era, that is essentially the onset of the modern era. We will of course utilize many later (sometimes just contemporary) materials that help to throw some light on the past. To investigate the changes in the Sudanese population we must begin with getting acquainted with its contemporary anthropological structure. Its complete discussion became possible with the development of anthropogeography, an extremely important field for anthropology, without which any un understanding of humanity's history would be impossible. The rapid development of this branch of anthropology was interrupted in the middle of the 20th century by the Second World War, following which anthropogeography came to be regarded as an attempt at a racist description of humanity.

The fundamental assumption of anthropogeography is the extension of zoological zoogeography onto the sub-species level with reference to genus Homo. There are many attempts at presenting the anthropological structure of Africa, and Sudan in particular, of which we will discuss the works by von Eicksted and Renato Biasutti[2]. The differences between them amount to the number of units distinguished, but their general areas are essentially similar (Plates 1 and 2). We shall concentrate on Biasutti's approach[3] as seen in Plate 1, supplementing it with references to Eichstedt[4].

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[2] For broader treatment see the papers in vol. 3 of Bilad as-Sudan and the same author. The theses presented there are in broad agreement with this author's views. Unfortunately the above-mentioned sources do not have anthropological structure maps and use a different methodology, which makes then of little use to us.

[3] R. Biasutti, *Le razze i popoli della Terra*, t. 3, *Africa*, Torino, 1959.

[4] W. Hirschberg, *Völkerkunde Africas*, Mannheim, 1965.

Plate 1. Distribution of contemporary African races (by R. Biasutti, *Le razze e i popoli della Terra*, t. 3, *Africa*, Torino, 1959, p. 95, changed): p – Pygmies, l –Libyans, (m+b) – rasa Mediterraneans with Berberoids, nr – Nordics, b – Brachycephals (Armenoids), su – Sudanese, nl – Nilots, sl – Silvids, e – Ethiopids, sh – Saharids.

The geographic races division of the contemporary world according to Biasutti is given in terms suggested by Andrzej Wierciński in the second edition of the Polish *Little Anthropological Dictionary*[5]. Biasutti's analysis involves several levels. The highest one is the *circles of forms* corresponding to subspecies in terms of zoological taxonomy, then we have *racial stems* corresponding to great races of other approaches, subdivided into *races* and *sub-races*. One should remember that the criteria which distinguish these units are essentially the physical build characteristics with no cultural or historical references.

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[5] A. Wierciński, entry „*rasa geograficzna*" (geographical race) [in:] *Mały Słownik Antropologiczny* (ed. 2), Warszawa, 1976, pp. 370-377.

Plate 2. Distribution of African races before European conquest by Eickstedta (from W. Hirschberg, *Völkerkunde Afrikas*, Mannheim,1965, s. 16, changed).

In Sudan and its adjacent areas in the north and south we are dealing with three circles of geographic forms. The first one is the Equatorial Forms Circle including the Negroid Racial Stem (a branch of the Pygmy with the Babinga and Bambuti races, and a branch of the Negroid with the Sudanese, Nilotic and Forest races). The second one is the Boreal Forms Circle with the Europoid Race Stem (here we have the Europid branch with the following races: Mediterranean (including the Berber sub-race), Oriental (Libian sub-race, and Nordic). The last two races belonging to the Subequatorial Derivative Forms Circle (Ethiopid branch) and the Ethiopian and the Saharan races.

According to Biasutti's map the north of Sudan is populated by the Libyan, Saharan, and Ethiopian races, with the Sudanese race in the south. The Libyan race appears in its western part, the Saharan race in the centre, and the Ethiopian race in the east. From north Sahara we can see the influences of the Mediterranean, Berber, and Nordic races, and the brachocephalic, under which

term we should understand the Armenoids that are not distinguished by Biasutti as a separate race.

To make these units clear let us present their brief characteristics (according to Biasutti[6]). And so[7]:

– The Pygmies are characterized by dwarfish body height (pigmoidal), slightly lower with the Bambuti (up to 143 cm) than with the Babinga (148[8] cm), reddish-brown skin, stocky body build, very clear prognatism[9], narrow and noneverted lips, very broad nose (broader with the Bambuti) with bulbous ending, and mesocephalic skull with brachiocephalic tendency. The eyes are black. The hair is curled in separate curls (this type of hair is sometimes called "fil-fil", the Arabic name for pepper, as in African markets pepper is sold "by heaps").

– The Libyans are characterized by swarthy skin, dark brown eyes, dark brown or black hair, medium height (165 cm), long skull, and narrow, protruding nose.

– The Mediterraneans are of lower height (up to 162 cm), lighter skin of matte white or swarthy, large dark brown eyes, dark brown hair, mesocephalic[10] skull, and very narrow, protruding nose.

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[6] Not all of these agree with the units employed by the Polish Anthropological School.

[7] The inconsistency in names between the text and the maps comes from the fact that the map shows an older version of Biasutti's division, not fully formalized.

[8] Here and onwards „height" refers to men. Women's height is usually ca. 10 cms lower.

[9] Prognatism means the protrusion of alveolar (dental) part of the face towards the front. The face straight in the profile and not protruding is called orthognatic. Mesognatism is the intermediate form.

[10] The relationship of the width of neurocranium to its length is one of the most important anthropological indices. In this context we distinguish long skulls (width clearly smaller than length) named *dolichocephalic*, shorter ones

- The Berberoids have darker skin, clearly broader nose, long head and mesognathic face with thick, slightly everted lips. Their hair is brown or black, frequently curly.
- The Sudanese[11] are characterized by prolonged head, black-brown skin, evident prognatism, strongly everted, broad lips, flat broad nose, tall body height (175 cms), and athletic or leptosomic body build.
- The Nilotes are taller than all the others (182 cms), have extremely dark-black skin and also extremely leptosomic body build with clearly elongated limbs and long, small head. Their noses are a bit narrower than previous races.
- The Silvids are of medium height (165 cms), dark brown skin, medium head and extremely broad nose.
- The Ethiopids have clearly dark skin, woolly or curly hair, medium height (168 cms), long skull, large almond-shape eyes, protruding straight and narrow nose with a high base, and orthognatic or mesognathic face.
- The Saharids have broader faces than the previous group and broader nose with deep base.
- The Nordics appearing in the Maghreb north represent the Boreal Forms Circle (Europoid). They have light skin, eyes and hair, are rather tall (173 cms), have long heads, and narrow, strongly protruding noses of high base.
- Biasutti's brachiocephals are of course the white Armenoids characterized by varying height (medium to tall), very short head, light milky skin, dark eyes and chestnut hair. Their noses are long, narrow, strongly protruding, straight or crooked.

(width and length practically same) named *brachycephalic*, and the *mesocephalic* being in-between the two main types.

[11] Of course this designation has no state or national character here.

The map given by von Eickstedt is clearly more detailed (Plate 2). The author does not distinguish separate Saharans among the Ethiopoids, thus giving the impression that the entire Sudan zone is dominated by the arrivals from Ethiopia. He is much more precise when dealing with the various units within the Europoids (the white Variety), clearly distinguishing the Berberoids from the Mediterraneans and Orientaloids. Unfortunately, he includes both the brachycephalic (that according to the Polish Anthropological School[12] and armenoid element derivatives) as well as the derivatives of the dolichocephalic oriental element under the Orientaloid group, which is an obvious misunderstanding. We can see here the dilemma of the geographic approach. As one descends lower and lower in the classifications, the unity thus distinguished begin to lose its broader sense, lacking the discriminative values[13] for generalization. This problem is solved only by individual typology that makes use of domination structures that allow determining the geographic ranges of anthropological formation[14].

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[12] The characteristic of the anthropological elements counted as white vary according to the Polish Anthropological School following the I. Michalski and T. Henzel's systems – in the part that concerns Nubia, and in practice, the entire Eastern Sudan, is presented in two papers in Polish by the author (*Struktura antropologiczna Nubii i Pustyni Nubijskiej*, [in:] *Wokół IV Katarakty. Społeczności wiejskie nad środkowym Nilem przed wielką zmianą*, Maciej Ząbek, ed., Warszawa, 2005, pp. 33-44, and *Struktura antropologiczna dawnej Nubii*, [in:] *Sudan. Bogactwo kultur i wewnętrzne napięcia*, Waldemar Cisły, Jarosław Różański and Maciej Ząbek, eds., Warszawa, 2012, pp. 83-94). The readers are referred to those papers for further details.

[13] Of course we mean the discrimination in mathematical (taxonomic) meaning, not cultural-political.

[14] Compare: I. Michalski, *Struktura antropologiczna Polski w świetle Wojskowego Zdjęcia Antropologicznego*, Łódź, 1949, and this same author: *Remarks about the anthropological structure of Egypt*, [in:] *Publications of the Joint*

The Berber substratum in North Africa is considerably old. Andrzej Wierciński connects it with the age of predynastic migrations[15] when the Berberoid reached Africa and India from West Asia. Discussing it in the terms of so-called Hamitic Hypothesis[16] it would be the first, the oldest hamitising wave. In their westward migration the Berbers have finally reached the Canary Islands[17] and the Iberian Peninsula[18]. All throughout North Africa, including the western Sahara, the anthropological Berber element and the Berber language strata are clearly connected. However, one should be careful when approaching the unity of anthropological, language, and culture structures. This also concerns the Berbers in the Canary Islands, where they have imposed their languages upon the earlier, cromanionoids-mediterranean anthropological substratum[19]. The subsequent migrations of the black populations to the islands did not change its language structure.

Arabic-Polish Anthropological Expedition 1958/1959, Warszawa-Poznań-Cairo, 1964, pp. 201-237.

[15] A. Wierciński, *Introductory remarks concerning the anthropology of Ancient Egypt*, "Bulletin de la Société d'Égypte", t. 32, 1958, pp. 73-84, and this same author: *Analiza struktury rasowej Egiptu w epoce przeddynastycznej*, "Materiały i Prace Antropologiczne", 56, 1963, pp. 5-80.

[16] Compare: K. Jaworska, *Charakterystyka antropologiczna niektórych szczepów dorzecza Ubangi*, "Acta Anthropologica Lodziendzia", 8, 1962, and K. Piasecki, *Structura…* 2005.

[17] Compare: I. Schwidetzky, *Die vorspanische Bevölkerung der Kanarischen Insel*, "Homo", Beihaft 1, 1963, and this same author: *Die vorspanische und die heutige Bevölkerung der Kanarischen Inseln. Kontinuität und Diskontinuität von Bevölkerungsstrukturen*, "Homo", 22, pp. 226-252.

[18] The connection between Iberia and Berberia is obvious and has frequently been pointed out in antiquity sources, particularly in the context of there having been another Iberia – the Caucasian one – besides the Transpyrenean Iberia.

[19] See: H. Vallois, Les hommes de Cro-Magnon et les "Guanches", "Anuario de Estudios Atlanticos, 1969, pp. 24-31 and I. Schwidetzky, *Investigaciones antropologicas en las Islas Canarias. Estudio comparative entre las población actual y prehistorica*, Sta Cruz de Tenerife, 1975.

The cromanionoid (also the paleoeuropean element) is one of two light-pigmented elements of the white race. These are its characteristics: tall, strong body build, large long head, short broad face, and relatively broad, straight, strongly protruding nose. The eyes are small, deep-seated, light blue, light blond hair (often red), very light pinkish skin. It appeared ca. 40 thousand years ago (some authors claim it was as long as 60 thousand years ago) in Europe where it has survived until today, chiefly in the northern part of the continent.

The cromanionoids component was presented in the anthropological structure of North Africa among the epipaleolithic population of the Caspian culture[20]. This culture survived in the Maghreb until the Neolithic. We do not know when exactly did the cromanionoids appeared in the Canary Islands. There is some ground to connect them with the megalithic cultures not only in the Canary Island but also all over the Sahara up to the Egyptian Western Desert. It is there, at the Nabta Plaja site, stone megalithic constructions were found, and where Gottfried Kurth claims the paleoeuropoids, that is cromanionoids and negroids[21], were present already in the paleolithic and mesolithic. Zygmunt Krzak claims that it was Sahara that was the homeland of megalithic cultures. This can by supported not only by the dating of local megalithic objects (the oldest calibration date is almost six thousand years BC) and the common appearance of the megaliths in

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[20] See: R.-P. Charles, Recherches sur l'unite de la structure de l'Africe Méditerranéenne, "Bulletin de la Sociéte de Géographie d'Égypte", vol. 36, 1964, pp. 41-86.

[21] See: G. Kurth, *Zur Rassengeschichte von Mittel- und Ostafrica*, [in:] *Rassengeschichte der Menschheit*. 3 Lieferung. Africa I: *Nord- und Mittelafrica*, Műnchen-Wien, 1975, pp. 171-183.

the Sahara, but also by the survival of the tradition of building stone circles in southern Sudan[22].

The Nordic element, marked in Biasutti's map in the Maghreb mountains and Tunis all but left out by von Eichsted, is an important component of the West Berber racial structure. In the earlier times it surely reached much farther east, if the Libyan mercenaries in Ptolomeid services were described as tall, blue-eyed blonds. Detailed anthropological survey of the Rif Mountains showed the extremely high percentage of blue-eyed blonds among some tribes of the local Berbers[23]. It is true that Carleton Coon does not describe them as Nordic, but he finds no difference between them and the dwellers of Northern Europe[24]. Both the light-pigmented racial components, and doubtlessly the cromanionoid, are most probably connected with the Garamantes who controlled the huge areas of Sahara from the earliest times until the age of Islamic expansion. We can also find the stories about tall, blue-eyed blonds[25]

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[22] See: Krzak Z., *Megality świata*, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków, 2001.

[23] See: C. S. Coon, *Tribes of the Rif*, Cambridge, 1931.

[24] Nothing suggests connecting the Nordics of the Rif Mountains with the German migrations to North Africa in the 5th century OE, or with the Slavic slaves of whom there were plenty in the area in the early Muslim epoch. The local tradition, which is extremely long-lasting as far as family coligations are concerned, is silent on the subject. Coon does not suggest this hypothesis, either.

[25] The chariots that appear rather frequently in the early Saharan rock art indicate an invasion of peoples from the east, from the steppes of Asia. It must have been much earlier than the possible raids in the West carried out by the Hyxos after conquering Egypt. The participation of the Nordic in them cannot be excluded. The Hyxos political and cultural influences in the sub-Saharan area are of no doubt(D. Lange, *Abwanderung der assyrichen tamkaru nach Nubien, Darfur und ins Tschadseegebiet*, [in:] *Europejczycy, Afrykanie*, Inni; Bronisław Nowak, Mirosław Nagielski and Jerzy Pysiak, eds., Warszawa, 2011, pp. 199-226) but all the iconographic sources present the Hyxos as dark-haired (in terms of the Polish School of Anthropology, an oriental or even armenoidal element). The Garamanta-Hyxos connection requires further study.

among the Garamantes. The Tuareg of today, though, owe the blue carnation of their skins to the clothing dyed with indigo, and they are not Nordic.

The orientalids in Eickstedt's map partially cover the are marked by Biasutti as mediterraneans and berberids. Identifying the north Saharan orientalid belt as a relative accumulation of the Arab tribes who marched West under the banner of the Prophet[26] is relatively easy. However, numerous mediterranean enclaves are most probably of much earlier origin. Another point that needs explanation is the origin of Kordofan in connection with the Arab tribes of the area[27]. It seems that the berberoid presence in Transaharan and Saharan structure was underestimated. On the other hand, Eickstedt has clearly overestimated its role in the population substratum of the whole of North Africa. We must also remember the depopulation of the locals due to slave trade which has significantly lowered the role of anthropological substratum in favour of the invaders. The rich tribes of Arab nomads have significantly grew in numbers in the meantime, chiefly at the expense of local populations, and changed their anthropological structure to a degree.

Of course, if it were possible to substitute the geographic races system and mapping of the anthropological formations in terms of PSA (Polish Anthropological School), the map of the anthropological structure of Sudan and the areas adjoining it would be much cleared. Unfortunately, as far as the typological data is concerned, we have too little of measurement data that covers Egypt, a part of East Africa, the northern and eastern edges of the Con-

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[26] Of course the Arabs appear in North Africa and the Sudan zone much earlier, but this was speeded up by islamization.

[27] Compare: A. N.-D. Lebeuf, *Les populations du Tchad (Nord du 10ᵉ)*, Paris, 1959.

go Forest, and some prehistoric series[28] scattered in space and time. All this, however – if we make a critical use of the works by Biasutti, Eckstedt, and other authors – allows us to construct preliminary hypotheses concerning the changes of anthropological structures.

The oldest early Holocene stage that we can connect with the Mesolithic age gives us a few bone findings, and some additional information in engravings and rock art. Paradoxically, what is most valuable here is the south European findings. The doubtlessly negroidal (bushmenoidal)[29] skeletons from epipaleolithic sites of Monte Circeo and Grimaldi Cave (in Italy) clearly demonstrate that the given racial element in mesolith must have covered the western shores of the Mediterranean Sea[30], the entire Sahara and Sudan. The available skeleton evidence and rock art prove that the population of Sudan in mesolith consisted not only of cromanionoids and mediterranoids[31], but of bushmenoids[32], as

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[28] The remaining material was either investigated using a different technique than the classical Martin method (R. Martin, K. Saller, *Lerhbuch der Anthropologie in systematischer Darstellung*, Stuttgard, 1957), or has been described in terms of medium values, or is still awaiting interpretation.

[29] An abridged description of the bushmenoid (negroidal) element according to Michalski and Henzel (T. Henzel, I. Michalski, *Podstawy klasyfikacji człowieka w ujęciu Tadeusza Henzla i Ireneusza Michalskiego*, "Przegląd Antropologiczny", t. 21, 2, 1955, pp. 537-662) goes as follows: very low height (up to 159 cms), light yellow-brownish skin, black hair (of the fil-fil type), dark eyes. The head small and very long, flattened face showing the influence of yellow variety, similarly with the eyelid form. Nose flat and very broad. Frequent steatopygia (deposits of fat in the buttocks of both sexes and in women's breasts).

[30] Also the European.

[31] See: D. Ferembach, *Historie raciale du Sahara (au Nord du Tropique du Cancer)*, [in:] *Rassengeschichte der Menschheit*. 3 Lieferung. Afrika I: *Nord- und Mittelafrika*, Műnchen-Wien, 1975, pp. 185-232.

[32] See: E. Strouhal, *Rassengeschichte* Ägyptens, [in:] *Rassengeschichte der Menschheit*. 3 Lieferung. Afrika I: *Nord- und Mittelafrika*, Műnchen-Wien, 1975, pp. 9-89.

well. This is further demonstrated by numerous images of people in both Saharan and Iberian rock art[33]. The gradual changes of climate and desertification of today's Sahara created better conditions for the black type of population, gradually eliminating the white population or pushing it further north. This was paralleled by the extinction of the cromanionoidal element whose size even in northern Europe has declined to just a few percent.

The effect of these changes was that right from the beginning of neolith there existed in Sub-Saharan Africa a compact block of the black type of population, which was internally differentiated due to the presence inside it of two evolutionally distinct groups: the older one (pygmoids, negroids and australoids) and the modern formation created by the equatorial and nigrid (sudanese)[34] element. The anthropological structure of the Sudan zone, originally of mixed character, has moved towards an increased role of the black element. It was at that time, most probably, that the equatorial element in western Sudan and the Sudanese in Eastern Sudan came to dominate over the elements of the older strata. The gradual expansion of the population of that strata towards the south eventually pushed the bushmenoids and pygmoids southward. The increasing role of cattle breeding led to the ex-

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[33] See: R. Biasutti, A. Micheli, *La prehistoria Africana*, [in:] *Le raze e I popoli della Terra*, t. 3, *Afrika*, Torino, 1959, pp. 3-71.

[34] Since these racial elements have not yet been described we present their brief characteristics. Sudan element (or Nigric) according to the typological system by Michalski (T. Henzel, I. Michalski, *Podstawy…* 1955)) is the most-pigmented one of all humankind. The skin is black, black eyes, grey woolly hair. Very tall (182 cms), very slim body build and characteristic very flat broad nose with deep base. This element is best adjusted to high temperatures and equatorial climate. The equatorial element according to K. Jaworska is tall, skin not so dark, mesocephalic skull, very broad nose in profile (from concaved to convected). The australoid, then, is mixed white-black element medium tall to tall, tendency to leptosome, dark brown skin, thick hair, very long skull, long face with very broad nose. The entire head build is very archaic.

tinction of the bushmenoids. The pygmoids, as a group connected with the forest environment, have never been particularly numerous in the savannah zone.

A subsequent stage of the change of Sudan's anthropological structure was the increasing expansion of the white element reaching Sudan from east and north, the so-called hamitization[35], even though we still see the dominance of the black variety[36].

Hamitization is the process of superimposing the white population[37] onto the black variety substratum. The usual effects of it are the individuals of "europeidal" features typical for the white variety, but dark-pigmented (as in the black variety) and with strongly curled hair. With women, we see more distinct tendency to the black variety features. As both black and white varieties are internally varied the result of crossing them may give even more morphological differentiation, hence the extreme variety of the forms observed. Even the most general observations show that the degree of mestization (mixing) increased clearly towards the south of Nubia (that is up the Nile). Of course, the recent years have obscured the ancient relations due to the arrival of large

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[35] In older literature and in some other languages and authors we find the spelling with h/kh, which seems not correct thanks to the possibility of confusion with the silent "h".

[36] See: M. – C. Chamla, *Les populations anciennes du sahara et regions limothropes, Étude des restos osseux humanes néolithiques et protohistoriques*, "Mém. De Centre Rech. Anthrop. Préhist. Ethnograph", 9, 1968, Paris.

[37] Here one should stress the difference between linguistic phenomena and the anthropological changes of biological character. The Kushites – culturally and historically Hamitic – use the kushitic languages that are related to the Semitic ones and do not have to be connected with the Hamites in biological terms, that is with the population that resulted from depositing layers of white variety immigrants upon the black-variety substratum. The best proof that the two can intermingle is the fact that most of today's, hamitized population of Sudan speaks Arabic, a Semitic language!

numbers of refugees from the south, particularly in the cities and larger villages.

Thus far, researchers in hamitization[38] show that there were a few (at least 3) migration waves clearly separated in time. The oldest one, dated for III millennium BC[39] at the earliest, was connected with the berberoid element, and in its east-west movement it followed the shores of North Africa to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. It is doubtlessly connected with the earliest spread of the Berber languages, and it is possible that it was preceded by the people who gave the beginning to Chad languages[40]. It may be connected with the introduction of cattle breeding, but it seems or likely to be connected to the megalithic peoples' migrations and the early stages of goat and sheep breeding.

The second wave of hamitization was dominated by the Mediterranean element that is generally regarded to the main component of the earliest agricultural peoples (also in Europe). The oriental element appeared with third wave. This type, represent-

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[38] For Polish works on the subject see: I. Michalski, *Remarks*…, K. Jaworska, *Charakterystyka*…, A. Wierciński, *Analiza*….

[39] It is not impossible that we could talk here about the turn of IV/III millennia BC.

[40] These languages appear primarily in central Sudan. According to Biasutti this area was peopled by the Sudanese population, and according to Eickstedt, the Saharan one. The connection of those languages with the Lappish (Saami) languages that has been proved beyond doubt by Maloletko (A. M. Maloletko, *Drevnie narody Sibiri. Etničeskij sostav po dannym toponimii, t.1, Predystorija* čeloveka *i jazyka. Uralcy*, Tomsk, 1999) makes one wonder about the early holocene relations between the white and black varieties, all the more so since the genetic Lappish-Berber connections have also been demonstrated (A. Achilli et all., *Saami and Berbers – an unexpected mitochondrial DNA link*, "American Journal of Human Genetics", 76, 2005, pp. 883-886). In any case the Chadic languages must have appeared in Africa much earlier than the Hamitic ones (the Berber languages belong to the semito-hamitic family which together Chadic constitutes the Afrasiatic languages).

ed by the Arab tribes specializing in camel and horse breeding, reached Africa either directly across the Red Sea or by going round from the north[41].

The last phase[42] of hamitization is connected with the beginnings of the bronze age and civilization influences, and it brings into view the armenoidal element, the one that is most scarce in Sudan, concentrating in the cities. One should not forget that the entire process was a very complex one, differing in time, and no wave of migrations was homogenous or short-lived. There were also secondary movements, reverse movement, etc. The chronology of various phases is only approximate, so it is easier to ascribe it to historical periods than to try finding individual dates for them.

The hamitization gradient that is easy to observe and clearly pointing southwards, manifested in the increasingly large presence of the black variety (Plate 3), finds its confirmation in the Lower Nile valley[43].

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[41] The Arabic tribes penetrated into Africa already in the first millenium BC, but their most intensive expansion is connected with the spread of Islam (Y. Fadl Hasan, *The Arabs of the Sudan*, Khartoum, 1973). Islamization of Nubia and the entire eastern Sudan was relatively the latest one thanks to the resistance of the local Christian states, so the "Arabization" of the Nile Valley in terms of the anthropological structure change is clearly weak. It really ends in the 19th century, when we see the last cases of the entire Arabian tribes resettling across the Red Sea.

[42] Of course one could also talk about the „post-hamitic" Europeanization of the anthropological structure, particularly in Eastern Sudan, where in the 19th century we see the Turkish (and even Hungarian!) influences connected with the presence of Ottoman troops (E. Strouhal, *Rassengeschichte*…). The West European influences in their former African colonies are just as numerous.

[43] See: A. Wierciński, *Analiza…*, I. Michalski, *Remarks…*, K. Piasecki, *Christianization and changes in Nubia's anthropological structure*, [in:] *Between the Cataracts*, „Polish Archeology in the Mediterranean, Supplement Series, vol. 2, fasc. 2, 2010, pp. 625-632.

Plate 3. Hamitization of modern Africa (by K. Piasecki, *Christianization and changes in Nubia's anthropological structure*, [in:] *Between the Cataracts*, „Polish Archeology in the Mediterranean", Supplement Series, volume 2, fasc.2, 2010, p. 626). Lines 25% i 50% show participation of white variety elements in anthropological structure. The points signified the localization of investigated series. b –berberoid, e – mediterranoid, h – armenoid, k – orientalid, y – cromanionoid.

Conclusions:

The Holocene history of the changes of the anthropological structure of the Sudan population has not been fully explained so far, particularly in its earliest stages. The data accumulated so far allows the following conclusions to drawn:

1. The epipaleolithic and Mesolithic population of Sudan was constituted by the archaic elements of the white variety: cro-

manionoid and mediterranoid elements, and the archaic elements of the black variety, i.e. negroid (bushmenoid) and pygmoid. Also, the presence of australoid as admixture (particularly in the east)[44] cannot be excluded, as it has appeared there in latter times,

2. The expansion of the younger elements of the black variety (equatorial and Sudanese) that came with the climate changes pushed the archaic elements into refugial areas and largely limited their number,

3. Neolithisation of Sudan is connected with succeeding Hamitization waves which are responsible for the varietal black-white mix that is typical for the anthropological characteristics of the area (in the sense of variety),

4. For particularising and verifying the above model more studies of the contemporary population and archaeological evidence are needed.

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[44] This element probably came to be in upper paleolith in near Asia with the superimposition of the residual, morphologically white Neanderthals onto the black variety (the Sudanese and equatorial elements). This element has subsequently migrated from there to south Asia and Austronesia.

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<div align="right">(translated by Piotr Klafkowski)</div>

Résumé

**Les transformations de la structure anthropologique
de la population de la zone du Soudan**

L'article résume les données sur les transformations de la structure anthropologique de la population de la zone soudanaise. Il aborde les approches de Biasutti et Eickstedt en les comparant avec les résultats de l'école polonaise d'anthropologie. Il met en évidence le rôle des composantes archaïques de la population (homme de Cro-Magnon et négroïde) et l'impact de la hamitisation sur la population contemporaine de cette région.

RYSZARD VORBRICH

LAND AND THE ENVIRONMENT VERSUS CUSTOMARY AND STATUTE LAWS.
Environmental and political pressures on the Daba of northern Cameroon

The Mandara Mountains in northern Cameroon exemplify the dynamic of cultural processes connected with various forms of space management. I have used the ethnic group of Daba living in the south-eastern edge of the Mandara massif in northern Cameroon to discuss the phenomena that are typical of the region.

Advantageous soil conditions and the abundance of flora and fauna in the mountain area favoured settlement. The area was settled by the remainder of various migrational waves which in the past marched across the area of present-day Cameroon. The settlers were primarily drawn to the areas by the defensive values of the mountains, found in the centre of plains, which were an area of numerous tribal wars and slave hunts. The Mandara mountains offered shelter to everybody who wanted to flee the expansion of the Muslim states of Central Sudan. In the 19th c., the mountains became a refuge zone surrounded from all sides (by the Kingdom of Mandara in north and the state of Fulbe in the

south), a unique island of the old, archaic culture, classified by ethnologists as paleonigritic type[1].

In the melting pot thus formed groups of migrants mixed in different proportions and assimilated to a different degrees the racial, linguistic and customary features of their neighbours. As a result – a unique complicated and specific complex of cultural features formed in many microregions of the massifs[2]. This led to the formation of several separate ethnic groups. Due to their animistic beliefs, they were called "Kirdi" ("pagans") by the Muslim neighbours[3].

The settlement of numerous human groups in the mountains complicated the existing ethnic relations. An increase of the density of population by several times triggered a process which led to the deterioration of the natural environment. The hunger for land motivated the highlanders to clear many forest zones. It did not permit the application of a long-term fallowness which favours the reconstruction of the natural arborescent flora. As a result, the country turned into steppes and many animal species left it. Tropical rains more easily washed the soil from slopes which did not have the protection of a permanent root system of the arbo-

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[1] I write about this more broadly in: *Ethnic and settlement processes in a refuge territory and forms of social and political organization*, "Hemispheres. Studies on Cultures and Societies", vol. 5 (1988), pp. 165-192.

[2] This concentration of ethnic and cultural boundaries led some researchers to indentify hundreds of micro ethnicities in the region, covering individual villages or settlements, with a population of between a few hundred and a few thousand. For example, in describing the ethnic situation of a single department of Guider, Jacques Lestringant speaks of "a hundred ethnic micro groups." Lestringant, *Les pays Guider Au Cameroun. Essai d'histoire regionale, Versailles,* 1964: p. 79.

[3] *Kirdi* originates from the *barma* language [although some sources trace it to the language of Shoa Arabs (ABÉ C., *Espace public et recompositions de la pratique au Cameroun*, Polis/RCSS/CSSR (2006), v. 13, Nos. 1–2, p. 41)] and means literally "the infidel," "the mangy dog" (Garine I., *Kirdi*, in: G. Balandier, J. Maquet (éds.), *Dictionnaire des civilisations africaines*, Paris 1968, p. 232.

rescent flora. The yield of the soil decreased. Famines were very frequent[4].

The demographic pressure could be discharged only after external political factors, which disinclined people from a resettlement of piedmont valleys, had ceased. Among the political factors, which interfered with an agricultural management of the piedmont valleys, one should primarily mention the pressure of warlike shepherds and especially that of Fulbe landlord. The mini-states they created (so-called lamidats, governed by local feudal lords – lamido) fought a "holy war" with the "pagans" from the mountains for almost the entire 19th century. The highlanders responded with a guerrilla war, which, at times, did not differ from banditry. The conflicts continued in the 20th c. even after the "colonial peace" was introduced by Germans and later French. The Fulbe landlords found support of representatives of local colonial authorities whom they convinced without any effort that a "pagan" is synonymous with a "bandit". The attitude of the colonial administration intensified both the aversion and isolation of the highlander population. The situation did not change much in the first decades of Cameroon's independence – the Fulbe landlords gained dominance in the new country, especially in the north. In this context, it is Daba highlanders who found themselves in the most disadvantageous position, as Lamido Babale, who claimed the right to rule the Daba-inhabited district of Mayo Oulo, was president Ahmadou Ahidjo's most trusted man. Babale's special clout enabled him in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s to perpetrate numerous acts of abuse, including physical abuse, against Daba highlanders.

Nonetheless it can be said that the Daba were the ethnic group which opposed external influence of both the Fulbe landlord and/

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[4] Famine would often force Daba highlanders to sell their children for a handful of millet. Cf. J. Lestringant, op. cit., pp. 120, 394).

or colonial administration for the longest time. At the beginning of the 20th c., i.e., at the birth of the colonial epoch, they were the last ethnic group of this part of Cameroon which, as a whole, retained independence with respect to the state of Fulbe-Adamaua that propagated Islam. The persistent resistance of the Daba to the French administration and to the Fulbe landlords, who represented the former, was the reason for numerous armed incidents during the interwar period. This independent stance of the highlanders led eventually (in 1940) to the formation of a special status administrative unit in the part of the ethnic Daba area. The status is depicted in the official name, i.e. Groupement Daba Independants. Eighteen local communities were included in to the administrative unit: they are formally and directly administered by a sub-prefect from distant Guider. This, however, is only nominal authority. No representative of the administration showed up for many years in any of the parts of the area. Hence, the political disintegration of the mountainous communities of the Daba. Each of the 18 villages was a socially and economy, and, to some extent, also politically independent unit of territorial organization. This situation led to the miniaturization of the local economic systems[5].

The formation of traditional forms of socio-political organization of Daba was not uniform in the entire ethnic area of Daba. The complex ethnogenesis of the tribes of the Mandara massif finds its reflection in the ethnic structure of the ethno-linguistic group under study. Five sub-groups can be distinguished: Daba-Hina, Moutouroua, Kola, Mousgoy and Daba-apparents in total

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[5] I write about this more broadly in *Daba – górale północnego Kamerunu. Afrykańska gospodarka tradycyjna pod presją historii i warunków ekologicznych* [Daba – Impact of History and Ecology on the African Tropical Economy], PTL. Prace Etnologiczne t. 13, Wrocław: PTL 1989, pp. 277.

from 20 to 30 thousand people, depending on the source[6]. The last two sub-groups are most numerous. The members of the sub--group know as Daba-Mousgoy, inhabiting mainly the Mousgoy canton, are estimated to number 6-7 thousand people whereas the inhabitants of Groupement Daba Independants, who can be associated with the Daba-apparents sub-group, are estimated to number over 8 thousand peoples. Both main sub-groups differ with respect to the types of traditional form of the socio-political organization, developed throughout centuries. In the middle of the 19th century Daba-Mousgoy created a strong expansive chiefdom. A simpler from of political and territorial organization, comprising single local communities, is more typical of the other sub-group, defined sometimes as Daba-Independents.

Different forms of the socio-political organization affected the formation of two separate types of spatial organization as well as exerted influence on the scale of an economic system among the main sub-groups of Daba.

Thanks to a strong centralized authority and military potential, Daba-Mousgoy could effectively oppose the pressure of culturally alien Fulbe on the piedmont areas, more easily accessible to agriculture. Their chiefdom was the only one of the few independent political units of the pagans (so called "Kirdi") which remained until the colonial times. In its heyday the chiefdom of Mousgoy comprised several villages. The villages did not form independent political and economic units. Their former chiefs, while retaining the functions of religious leaders, were under the authority of the chiefdom leader. A military organization of the chiefdom provided for the defence against any external threat as

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[6] Estimates vary, cf., A. Podlewski, *La dynamique des proncipales populations du Nord Cameroun, entre Bénoue et Lac Tchad,* Yaoundé, 1964 , p. 110; J. Lestringant, … tab. Population; H. Pierrete, *Esquise phonographique d,un parler Daba. La Mazagway*, Yaoundé 1978, p. 3, https://www.ethnologue.com/language/dbq.

well as for free and safe migration of individuals within the chiefdom. Daba-Mousgoy regarded the space between villages as a positive value, as something homely. The feeling of security combined with awareness of common interests, strengthened the feeling of solidarity and the economic links between local communities. A system of goods redistribution, typical of each chiefdom, linked all units and groups with respect to economy and outlined relatively extensive borders of the local economic system, convergent with the territory of the chiefdom.

The inhabitants of the mountainous settlements located in the area of the Groupement Daba Independants[7] retained the genuine acephalous character of the social organisation. While making use of the natural environment, they created a specific form of the political organization referred to by the present author as a "mountainous residential aggregate". The areas of individual mountainous residential aggregates overlap more or less those of physiographic massifs.

At the time of slave-hunts and attacks of Fulbe, a no-man's-land extended in deserted valleys between settlements located on the hills. Since the second half of the twentieth century, when threat has disappeared and the mountainous valleys have been partly brought under cultivation, borders between the mountainous residential aggregates, although not formally identified, usually proceed alongside valleys, rivers and streams. This gave the mountainous residential aggregates an easily noticeable character of spatially isolated human settlements. During tribal struggles, the social and economic isolation of individual settlement complexes was even greater. The cavalry of Fulbe ventured frequently (especially during the seed and harvest time) into the mounta-

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[7] For about 20 years they have officially used the name Groupement Daba, without the adjective "Independants".

inous valleys, apprehending farmers who travelled between the massifs or who tried to farm lots located a bit lower. Thus, the extensive and fertile areas of the mountainous valleys had a negative spatial value for the Daba highlanders. Space was evaluated here not from the viewpoint of its economic value but from that of its defensive value. Peaks of hills had a positive value. They did not provide sufficient amounts of soil and water for the dwellers but were safe. This contributed to a greater isolation of the settlers as a consequence, and was not conducive to the emergence of conflicts of frontier lands.

The reluctance to settle valleys remained in the psyche of the highlanders long after the political factors which created it had ceased to act. The territory of a typical mountainous residential aggregate remained to the end of the 20th century the fundamental unit of territorial organization of Daba highlanders. Enlarged by the adjoining areas of valleys, it reaches 30-40 km². The organization is formed by a socially, politically, economically and religiously integrated usually community of settlers of about 500 people, often of heterogeneous origin. The structure of kinship and territorial organization cross on the political plane. Particular residential aggregates are inhabited by mixed ancestral groups of which families whose pedigree goes back to first settler, the founder of the aggregate, are dominant. Within kinship groups, authority[8] is exercised by leader of lineage (or gens) as well as fathers of families.

In the old days they controlled the life of family (or gens), resolved controversies, helped relatives who needed assistance. The chief of the residential aggregate, the member of the dominant

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[8] From the anthropological perspective we should rather talk about leadership or decisive influence (R. Vorbrich, *Plemienna i postplemienna Afryka. Koncepcje i postaci wspólnoty w dawnej i współczesnej Afryce,* Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM 2012, pp. 114-115).

gens, provides for the stability of the local social (religious and economic) system. Thus he was the judge and mediator in controversies between different kinship groups as the "chief of the earth" (*bay*), he distributed arable lots, and to this day performs important functions in agricultural cults, mediates in contacts with the outside world[9]. In traditional local communities there were also leadership functions excluded from the authority of the political leader and taken over by the "war chief" (*bay hyl*) and the "rain chief" (*by van*)[10]. They served to provide for the security and integrity of the local group and for the efficient functioning of the economy.

The title of land co-ownership is held by all persons who are permanent inhabitants of the area of a residential aggregate and who belong to a kinship group that is politically recognized in this area. Since rights to the land are not gained through affiliation to a gens or a tribe but through the acquisition of the rights of a number of territorial community, in the case of Daba highlanders (as before said: Daba-Independents) we cannot speak of one common system of land management. In the case of traditional mountainous residential aggregates we are dealing here with many

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[9] Since the 1980s, "chieftains of the earth" were installed in secondary administration system, as accepted (appointed) by state authorities, "village chiefs". It helped to change their social status of traditional chiefs. On the one hand, they lost their independence from external factors, on the other hand, they have gained a new legitimacy of their power over members of the community. (R. Vorbrich, *Wódz jako funkcjonariusz. Despotyzm zdecentralizowany w społeczeństwie postplemiennym Kamerunu*, „Lud" t. 88 (2004), pp. 219-236.

[10] However, the war chief function has disappeared in the 70s of the last century. The last armed conflict between local communities took place in 1975-1976. The Teleki residents accused then the inhabitants Mandama of provoking drought. The function of rain chief is reborn in particular local communities (or regional communities) in each generation.

self-contained and independent land systems which determine the small scale of the local economic system.

In this way, the social and economic organisation of the Daba fitted the tribe society model. It is marked by low relevance of kinship in social relations and structures (while territorial bonds still prevail). It was limited (both in physical space and time) to public, legal and political connections. Economy of structures can be observed, seen in the cohesion and self-sufficiency of local communities as well as in the large degree of concentration of public roles in the same individuals and institutions[11].

On average, a mountainous residential aggregate is divided into districts situated on the opposite slopes of the massif. The number of the districts has grown recently: this was followed by an effective settlement and cultivation of border no-man lands. The latter have names, but their boundaries were initially not identified. Over time, such peripheral districts gained independence and definitively separated from the native mountainous residential aggregate.

This lay at the root of many local conflicts. Their character is discussed below in the example of the village of Zagalam (Zakalam).

The means for organising space described above began to change in the latter half of the twentieth century. As the political situation stabilised, the advent of a "postcolonial peace" changed people's perception of valleys as dangerous areas. The local population consequently began to increase as the process of settlement intensified in the "no-man's land" of the foothills. This star-

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[11] Compare definitions of tribal society: I. M. Lewis, *Tribal society*, in: D. Sills (ed.), *International encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, Cambridge 1964, v. 18, pp. 245-261 or A. W. Southall, *The illusion of Tribe*, in: R.R. Grinker, S. Lubkemann, Steiner C. (eds.) *Perspectives on Africa. A Reader in Culture, History, and Representation*, Chichester 2010, pp. 83–95.

ted a competition for land based on a new and different set of principles. Norms derived from common law, rooted in (non-transferable) community ownership of land, clashed here with norms that promoted the desacralisation and marketization of land. Those making claims to land could no longer merely appeal to tradition (the heritage of their ancestors – "seniority" in a hierarchical system of shared ownership).

Moreover, in this competition for land, a new element was introduced – the Government's economic policy, which set out two conflicting goals.

First, it sought to extend the state's jurisdiction to the whole of the territory (including the tribal areas) within the country's borders. Second, it sought to incorporate Cameroon's tribal communities into the wider national economy based on market principles.

Earlier attempts by the colonial administration to settle the issue of land ownership were generally not very favourable for traditional communities. Decrees issued in 1920 and 1921 introduced the concept of "vacant and ownerless lands" (*terres vacantes et sans maître*)[12]. This allowed vast expanses of the country (especially valuable forest areas) to be incorporated into state forest reserves. As a consequence, local Daba communities were left with only those lands that (according to the letter of the law) "belonged to natives or native communities on the basis of custom and tradition"[13]. This threatened to deprive the expanding population of highlanders of the ability to make use of fallow lands in the valleys.

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[12] Article 2 of the Decree (p. 52), cited after: G. Masson, *La misse en valeur des territoires du Cameroun places sous le mandate Français,* Paris 1928, p. 37.
[13] Ibid.

These lowlands were initially occupied by the Daba (and other inhabitants of the mountainous regions of northern Cameroon) in a spontaneous and rather haphazard manner. This mass movement "toward the valleys" prompted the authorities to legally regulate the phenomenon. The decree of 19 April 1959 already guaranteed the collective right to land in areas "necessary for current and future members of a community"[14].

However, the legislature was careful not to use even once in this case the term "property", and instead used the term "possession" or "occupation". As a result, the new land law did not give traditional local communities ownership rights to the land they used, but maintained (and normalised) only the right to collective use of larger areas of land than was currently effectively utilised. In its adaptation of legal terminology to the social realities of tribal communities, the legislature defined, first and foremost, the term traditionally associated with land tenure – "community". The decree stated that a community (*communauté*) is "a collection of people linked by bonds of kinship, living together by adoption or association in a given area"[15]. In the commentary to the definition, it is suggested that the concept of community refers primarily to ancestral structures (lineage). Significantly, it is stipulated as well that a community thus understood has no legal personality and therefore cannot own land, and possesses only the right to its use. This had profound consequences for the commoditisation (marketization) of the agricultural economy[16]. The

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[14] Laws adopted in independent Cameroon (in 1963 and 1966) specified more precisely the relation between a custom-based and state legal system (S. Melone, *La parente et la terre dans strategie du developpment,* Paris 1972, p. 158)

[15] Ibid, p. 159.

[16] It should be added that as early as 1927, plans were made for a special procedure to legalise individual rights to land, which was supposed to give it

still unclear status of land hampered its commoditization (and consequently blocked access to loans).

This situation changed with the land reforms of 1974 and 1976[17], which established terms for obtaining the title to land, and introduced new regulations concerning access to land (and forests) in Cameroon. They also introduced a "system of dominions", which created three categories of land: areas owned by (domains of) the state or other public authorities, private lands, and so-called. "national domains"[18].

From the point of view of local communities and their competition for land, of crucial importance were the lands included in the national and private domains. The national domain created a kind of land reserve, areas of which local communities living within traditional tribal structures could seek to have apportioned as community property. Such communities (*collectivités coutumières*)

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the quality of a good. This procedure required that an individual seeking to identify and register their property rights mark the site with stakes. On a specified day, an administration official, after informing the leaders of traditional local social structures, conducted a site visit, during which all those present were called on to make known any competing claims. A protocol was drawn up, and parties making competing claims had three months to document and formally present their case. (see Melone, op. cit., p. 160).

[17] Ordinance No. 74/1 of 6 July 1974 and Decree No. 76/165 of 27 April 1976.

[18] In addition to its unifying function, the reform aimed at establishing "unoccupied lands" that could be managed by the government as an instrument for intensifying agricultural production, especially in the context of its national development strategy. This reform strengthened the sphere of state ownership at the expense of local communities. It resulted in cases of populations of "indigenous peoples" being displaced from the land and property assets they had inherited. Cf. A. Teyssier, O Hamadou, C. Seighnobos, *Expériences de médiation foncière dans le Nord-Cameroun*, FAO Corporate Document Repository [http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y8999t/y8999t0l.htm#TopOfPage]

could be given areas of this category of land for collective use, but only under certain conditions[19].

Local communities which failed to acquire the status of administrative chiefdoms within a specified timeframe (in the 1970s and 1980s) were threatened with marginalization. They found themselves at a disadvantage in terms of access to land resources deemed part of the "national domain". At a particular disadvantage were the residents of settlements established in the late twentieth century in the valleys between mountains that were "sandwiched" between larger neighbours. It should therefore come as no surprise that over time (beginning in the early twenty-first century) there intensified a tendency among them to "fight" to become a chiefdom. This was supposed to open up a legal path to obtaining parts of the national domain.

An example of such activity is provided by the village of Zakalam (also written as Djakalam) in the Groupement Daba[20]. This small village (with a population of about 300) is sandwiched between large villages – groups of highland settlements with a long--standing status as chiefdoms: Mandama (to the east), Teleki (also written as Teriki – to the west), Matalao (to the north) and Taski (to the south).

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[19] As specified in the land decree, "a national domain free of any effective occupation (may be conferred) under a temporary concession provided that it will continue to be developed (utilised). This is a condition for a transition to (a form of) permanent concession and full ownership through the land registry". (Article I, Decree No.76/165 of 27 April 1976).

[http://yaounde.eregulations.org/media/decret%2076-165%20du%20 27%20avril%201976%20fixant%20les%

20conditions%20d%27obtention%20du%20titre%20au%20foncier%20 Cameroun.pdf]]

[20] A "groupement" in this case is the equivalent of a district (*commune*).

The relationship between Zakalam and Mandama illustrates well a new type of social relations and competition for land in the region of the Mandara massif.

Due to a historical coincidence, over the last 30 years Mandama has grown into a political and economic centre in Daba country. In the mid-twentieth century, M.T. (one of the sons of the then-village chief – Mazoum Bay) became the personal chauffeur of the wife of president M. Ahidjo, and the leader's half-brother – D.T. – was sent to school (on orders of the colonial authorities). Their children, who were educated in the city, currently hold high and influential positions in political, economic, and cultural institutions in the capital and on the regional level. This has given the current village chief (the uncle of these educated Daba elites) access to national decision-making and opinion-forming bodies. This has also allowed the other residents of Mandama to benefit from ties to the wider world. Mandama today has a health centre, two secondary schools, and a Catholic parish, and a new post office and other facilities have been built[21].

For Mandama, *Comité de Developpement du Groupement Daba* became the major instrument through which external development funding could be obtained. Its force is in the functional connection between traditional ancestral structures with the structures of the state and the society. The board of the Committee is almost entirely filled with close relations of the present chief Mandama, who are at the same time M.T's and R.D's cousins or descendants. The most important of them are placed in the central bodies of the state; R., for example, who is R.D's son, has a position of power at the office of the president of the republic.

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[21] Cf. R. Vorbrich, *The clay pot and the iron pot. The tribal society confronted with the nation and the global society*, "Hemispheres. Studies on Cultures and Societies" (2009), vol. 24, pp. 143-154.

The inhabitants of Zagalam lack such connections. The place was founded by settlers, who in the mid-20th century left the neighbouring mountains for the valley below. My studies conducted in 2004 and 2011 indicate that Zakalam elites think their village is underprivileged when it comes to access to land and to development funding (infrastructural projects). These are controlled by the administration of the region (arrondissement) of Guider and are intercepted by the inhabitants of the much bigger Mandama (with a population of between 1,300 and 1,500). Zakalam people complain of being treated like a periphery of Mandama. It is true that – many years ago (in the 1970s) – an inhabitant of Zakalam was nominated chief by the local administration, but the nomination was defective in substance. It came from Babale – the head of the Mayo Ouolo district – a very powerful, Fulbe feudal lord and a crony of the then president of Cameroon Ahmadou Ahidjo[22]. Now, thirty years after president Ahidjo stepped down (or in fact was deposed), a nomination like this is no sufficient legitimacy of the chief's powers and neither does it result in the establishment of a chiefdom. Under the 1977 decree, village chief (lowest rank) nomination is within the powers of the prefect. Therefore, the Chief of Zakalam may not be considered an equal of the chiefs of the neighbouring villages. This affects the status of the whole settlement and its development opportunities.

In these circumstances, Zakalam elites sought to obtain the status of a third-class chiefdom. Their efforts were through referring to tradition, namely by exploring the memories of the oldest

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[22] Babale was president A. Ahidjo's (a Fulbe by birth) most trusted collaborator. He enjoyed the official status of "spiritual father," but was also rumoured to be the president's "personal wizard." A token of close relations between the two men is the fact that A. Ahidjo built his private residence in the provincial town of Mayo Oulo.

villagers in order to provide arguments in favour of making Za-
kalam an administrative entity. Minutes of the meeting (written
in poor French) and the appended map are precious documents;
they illustrate how important oral tradition is for post-tribal com-
munities in their efforts to document the founding myth of the
local community in the process of building their identity vis-à-vis
the national identity. They also demonstrate how the founding
myth of a local community can be used to boost its legal status
and the legitimacy of the local structures of power. The founding
myth of a local community is used as a tool in building the status
of the group by making it an entity capable of effective competi-
tion for land and external resources. The minutes are quoted be-
low – in their original form, which better reflects the spirit of the
document.

In addition to legal measures, there are initiatives designed to
re-design the social organisation of the inhabitants of Zakalam.
Like in some of the neighbouring villages, a civil society structu-
re has been established – based not on blood bonds, but on di-
scretionary ties. It is *GIC: Des Agro-eleveurs «KASSAF» de Djagalam
(Zagalam, Zakalam)*[23]. The association's statutory objective is to
raise the "farming and pastoral awareness" of the local commu-
nity. The organisation is also a tool in making development reso-
urces of the outside world available to the community.

In this way, i.e., by referring to tradition (the founding myths
of the community expressed by the elders) as well as to elements
of "modernity" (GIC-type associations which are organisations
of discretionary nature), the inhabitants of Zakalam have formed

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[23] GIC associations in Cameroon are duly registered and operate under Loi
No. 92/006 of 14 August 1992 on groups of joint initiatives (*groupe d'initiative
commune* – GIC). This is key legislation for the formation of civil society institutions.
Its Article 4 requires such associations to be open and not to discriminate against
anybody on grounds of their tribal identity, religion, gender or ideology.

HISTOIRE DES RACES ET ELITES DE ZAKALAM LORS	Dimanche, le 18 /10/2009
REUNION TENUE LE 18 /10/2009	

L'an deux mille neuf, le dix huit octobre se sont réunis les élites de Zakalam le dimanche, pour parler de la situation de la race de Zakalam ; de nos ancêtres installés sur le terrain de Zakalam.

Il y avait nos grands-pères les nommés BAÏ-TOUMOK qui était le premier chef qui dirigeait les habitant se trouvant dans le village de Zakalam jusqu'à la limite entre Képé (Tériki). Ensuite après la mort de BAÏ-TOUMOK, le nommé BAÏ-MBONDOUM était nommé comme chef du village, le nommé BAÏ-ABIRDJIDJIQUE, BAÏ-KOULDELDE, BOURTEQUED qui a servi à la présence des blancs avec le chef le nommé BAÏ-TCHEBOU, qui aujourd'hui son enfant le nommé LAWAN AHMADOU TCHOUBOU a gouverné le village de Nguever de façon qu'il est mort en deux mille quatre de même année de la mort de AHMADOU TCHOUBOU son fils le nommé AHMADOU était nommé comme chef du village Nguever.

Lorsque BAÏ-GOUDOULVOU était nommé comme chef du village à Massabaye, il ne traversait pas le marigot de ZONGO VOURDAÏ et vers le côté du village de Zakalam c'était le nommé BAÏ-TOUMOUK qui dirigeait jusqu'à Képé (Tériki).

Les ancêtres appelaient ces deux chefs les nommés BAÏ-GOUDOULVOU et BAÏ-TOUMOUK (BAÏ-DOUM).

Le Lawan BANAÏ était nommé comme chef du village dans Zakalam par le chef BAÏ-KOUZOUBOULDA d'où Lawan BANAÏ a servi comme chef du village dans le village de Zakalam, puis BABALE chef de canton de Mayo-Oulo lui a nommé encore comme cehf du village de Zakalam.

Les noms de témoins tenus c'est jour de réunion le 18 Octobre 2009 un Dimanche matin à 7H30 min.

1°) YAKAÏ, race Woulab ;

2°) MAÏ-GALA, race Bokono ;

3°) TASSAÏ, race Zedegalar ;

4°) GARBOUS de race Dawoun-Tchévi.

a new social dimension, which can be denoted as post-tribal society.

By this term should be understood such a type of society in which the cultural characteristics, world vision, and structural elements typical of a tribal society, including the small scale of social systems, collectivism, and the resultant concept of a human being as subordinate to the community, the predominance of blood ties over voluntary ties and the related principles of loyalty, which in turn are connected with the domination of the ethnocentric attitude, etc., are, in a selective and modified manner, intertwined with institutions and principles imported from western cultural spheres: the relatively large scale of social systems, the idea of the nation as an integrated community, social organization based on the domination of random ties, parliamentarianism, etc[24].

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[24] Cf. R. Vorbrich, *Post-tribal society in Africa: The concept of community and the modernization of tradition (seen from a Polish perspective)*, in: K. Trzciński (ed.), *The state and development in Africa and other regions: past and present. Studies and essays in honour of Professor Jan J. Milewski*, Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR 2007, pp. 197-206.

The concept of post-tribal society more broadly I discuss in: *Plemienna i postplemienna Afryka. Koncepcje i postaci wspólnoty w dawnej i współczesnej Afryce* [The Tribal and Post-tribal Africa. Conceptions and figure of the community in old and contemporary Africa], Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM 2012, p. 434.

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Résumé
Terre et de l'environnement versus les lois coutumières et de loi de l'État.
Les pressions environnementales et politiques sur le Daba du nord du Cameroun

Mandara massif au Nord-Cameroun est un exemple de la dynamique des processus culturels associés aux différentes méthodes de planification de l'utilisation des terres. Les phénomènes typiques de la région sont examinées dans cette étude comme un exemple Daba groupe ethnique vivant dans le bord sud-est du Massif Mandara dans le sud du Cameroun.

Je souligne l'importance des conditions naturelles (l'environnement) et la pression de facteurs politiques pour les formes d'organisation sociale et les façons d'organiser l'espace. Je décris comment la vieille – tribale – formes d'organisation sociale sont confrontés avec les exigences d'une loi de l'État moderne. Pour des exemples précis, je montre comment les paysans forment les structures de la société civile d'être en mesure de fonctionner efficacement dans la société moderne, contribuant à la formation du type de société «post-tribale».

KATARZYNA MEISSNER

LES OBJECTIFS NON CACHÉES – LES OBJECTIFS CACHÉES. L'INCOMPATIBILITÉ DES SCÉNARIOS SUR LE CHAMP LOCAL DE LA COLLABORATION DE DÉVELOPPEMENT[1]

L'introduction

Au cours des dernières décennies les deux paradigmes étroitement liés – altruiste et de modernisation ont déterminé l'orientation de la politique de développement. Le premier d'entre eux se donnait pour but (moral !) d'agir pour le bien des autres, le deuxième visait au progrès technique et à la croissance économique. On retrouve leurs manifestations encore chez les décideurs

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et les opérateurs de développement qui se focalisent à obtenir des effets souhaités de leurs actions de développement.

Actuellement les projets de développement ciblent, à part le transfert de nouvelles technologies et de connaissances spéciales, la mise en œuvre de nouvelles structures et modèles d'organisation sociale à l'exemple de l'Ouest. On évite de formuler les sociétés en développement en termes de «primitives» et «retardées» et on les a remplacés par la devise «de l'égalité» et «du partenariat». Néanmoins on observe chez les opérateurs la tendance à se référer aux « représentations», comme le dirait Edward Saïd (2008), aux images difformes des collectivités locales qui remontent à l'époque coloniale.

Dans la littérature on peut retrouver les descriptions de ces représentations, des modèles élaborés de communautés locales qui ont influencé le caractère de la politique locale (à comparer Olivier de Sardan 1993; 1995). Les décideurs et les opérateurs de développement perçoivent les bénéficiaires comme des communautés compatibles qui fonctionnent selon le principe de consensus et de bien public. En conséquence, cela conduit à ne pas prendre en considération ni les différences classiques ni les antagonismes entre les femmes et les hommes, entre les anciens et les jeunes et même, ce qui est pire, à ne pas remarquer les tensions parmi les membres des structures formelles ou informelles telles que : groupes de parenté, de voisins, relations patron-client (sous formes de dyades, de triades et de réseau des courtiers). À l'inverse, on prend les membres de la collectivité rurale pour des individus qui prennent des décisions indépendamment de l'opinion des autres. En réalité, les niveaux de décision, surtout dans le domaine d'introduire de nouvelles solutions économiques (par exemple : la création des caisses de crédit ou des sociétés agricoles et d'élevage), sont très liées – les décisions dépendent aussi bien des opinions individuelles (par exemple : du chef de famille) que des opinions

collectives (des membres du clan). Les décideurs se réfèrent dans leur argumentation aussi à la spécifique culturelle des collectivités locales (coutumes, croyances, préjugés) en tant que facteur qui traduit le retard et l'aversion par rapport aux innovations de développement. Cependant, contrairement à l'opinion universelle, la logique symbolique et religieuse des collectivités rurales coexiste avec la logique technologique et économique. Néanmoins elle ne s'inscrit pas dans la définition de «la rationalité» du monde occidental. Les bénéficiaires interceptent d'habitude dans cette situation des solutions selon «le principe de sélectivité» et ils les adaptent aux contextes culturels locaux[2].

Il manque de place dans cet article pour critiquer les paradigmes invoqués et pour traiter des conséquences auxquelles ils mènent. Nous visons à signaler que ces méta-narrations ont masqué partiellement le fait que l'activité de développement est le débouché où les liens et les services sont à vendre (sous forme de projets, de slogans, de devises). Cette activité est simultanément une arène où les différents acteurs locaux de société rivalisent des influences et du prestige qui résulte de leur participation à l'entreprise de développement.

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[2] L'état néo-patrimonial constitue l'exemple d'une telle adaptation parce qu'il unit les formes traditionnelles du pouvoir avec les formes modernes. Comme l'élément traditionnel on a la structure de maîtrise où le pouvoir considère l'état pour sa propriété et il fonde son administration sur le maintien des clients. Le maîtrise du pouvoir par le courtier de la bureaucratie «moderne», mise en œuvre sur le territoire africain pendant la période coloniale, constitue l'élément adapté.

Le marché des biens et du service c'est-à-dire le projet de développement d'après les bénéficiaires

Dans les années 90 du XXe siècle, la réorientation de la politique de développement et la transition des macro-projets[3] aux projets réalisés à plus petite échelle démontre la subjectivité croissante de locales structures socio-progressives (par exemple: comités, associations et groupes ruraux) et leur influence réelle sur les objectifs et les directions des entreprises de développement. Les bénéficiaires, vus jusqu'à présent comme des sujets passifs de l'activité de développement, ont gagné le statut des partenaires actifs et de plus en plus conscients de la coopération. Le projet a abouti donc au changement de la forme des relations entre le donateur et les bénéficiaires et il est devenu aussi une occasion pour la confrontation continue des attentes et pour la hiérarchie des besoins des bénéficiaires.

Jean Pierre Oliver de Sardan (1993), anthropologue du développement, en analysant les micro-projets réalisés sur les territoires ruraux en Afrique, a conclu que les objectifs de développement des donateurs formulées «sur le papier» diffèrent des objectifs auxquelles visent les bénéficiaires «sur le terrain». Cette divergence est justifiable et inévitable parce qu'elle résulte de la confrontation des intérêts matériels et symboliques de deux parties impliquées dans le projet. Une telle idée a été soutenue par Norman Long (2001), créateur de la perspective centrée sur l'acteur (*actor oriented*

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[3] Cette transition résulte des conséquences négatives de la mise en œuvre dans les années 80 des programmes d'adaptations structurales qui ont provoqué la croissance du chômage, la diminution du niveau réel des salaires, l'accès pire à l'éducation et au service médical et aussi la détérioration de l'état de environnement. Par conséquent l'intérêt pour aide de développement (aide fatigue) a diminue de la part des pays du Nord riche ((Médard 2007, 11).

perspective). Il a traité le projet comme un type spécifique des interactions sociales où les deux catégories des sujets se confrontent face à face. Selon lui, d'un côté il y a les opérateurs du développement dits «développeurs» qui représentent l'aisance et qui possèdent une vision relativement cohérente de la politique de développement. De l'autre côté il y a les bénéficiaires dits «développés» qui viennent d'habitude du monde de l'indigence. Les premiers d'entre eux se donnent pour but de transmettre le savoir, le plus souvent sous forme de cours ou de formation. Les deuxièmes – préfèrent les biens résultant des entreprises de développement (Vorbrich 2013, 17). Richard Vorbrich (2010, 154), anthropologue culturel, remarque que le terme «projet» est pour les bénéficiaires comme une clef qui ouvre la porte au monde des biens et qui facilite à puiser dans les possibilités jusqu'à présent inconnues.

Une telle conceptualisation du projet s'appuie sur la confrontation pertinente des objectifs des scénarios des projets de développement où le rôle essentielle jouent les courtiers du développement[4]. D'une part les courtiers sont entre les donateurs et les institutions de développement devant lesquelles ils représentent la communauté et ils expriment les besoins de cette communau-

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[4] Le phénomène de courtier dans le contexte des entreprises de développement a été entamé dans les années 60 et 70 du XXe siècle (Boissevain 1974; Thoden van Velzen 1973). Pourtant la notion de «courtier du développement» et celle «d'agent du développement» sont introduits dans le langage anthropologie à partir des années 90 et on les traite comme synonymes (Bierschenk, Olivier de Sardan 1993; Neubert 1996). La conceptualisation de courtier au niveau des sociétés locales est liée avec la multiplication des transferts d'aide dans le dernier quart de siècle. Cela a provoqué, entre la fin du XXe et le début du XXIe siècle donc au moment où le projet du développement constitue une forme typique de la réalisation de politique de développement, l'apparition et la cristallisation du sujet local opérant sur l'arène locale qui est le courtier à se procurer des ressources extérieures pour l'espace sociale avec laquelle il s'identifie. Il représente (en théorie en tout cas) la société locale et exprime ses besoins auprès des structures de soutien et de financement (Bierschenk, Olivier de Sardan 1993).

té. D'autre part, ils sont entre le reste des membres de communauté et les bénéficiaires auxquels ils donnent la possibilité de distribuer les biens découlant de la coopération de développement. En fonctionnant à la jointure du monde global et local, les courtiers sont responsables de créer une image des bénéficiaires que les institutions de développement attendent. Dans ce contexte la tâche des courtiers consiste à formuler la hiérarchie de besoins des bénéficiaires d'une telle manière qu'ils s'harmonisent avec les solutions proposées par les bienfaiteurs et qu' ils opèrent le transfert des biens[5]. Selon Thomas Bierschenk (1991: 4), sociologue du développement, la distribution d'aide ne s'appuie pas sur l'existence de l'infrastructure qui facilite aux animateurs du projet l'arrivée sur place mais justement sur le fonctionnement des courtiers-acteurs actifs qui créent une sorte «d'entrées» et «de sorties» pour les entreprises locales de développement réalisées sous forme des projets[6].

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[5] Grâce à l'engagement à le courtier ils ont l'accès à «la rente du développement». C'est de cette façon que l'on détermine les différentes types de paiement, les pots-de vin où les champs de détournement qui découlaient de l'activité d'aide et qui étaient interceptés par les courtiers (Bierschenk, Olivier de Sardan 1993).

[6] Jeremy Boissevain (1974, 147) a déchiffré l'une des stratégies les plus anciennes de s'entremettre dans l'interception des biens. Il a déterminé le courtier du développement en tant qu' «un entrepreneur» professionnel qui manipulait les personnes et les informations afin d'atteindre ses propres profits. Selon Boissevain, la base d' opération des courtiers est la création et le maintient des contacts étendus avec les personnes qui contrôlent la redistribution des biens découlant d'opérations de développement. Dans ce contexte Boissevain distingue «les patrons» (*patrons*) qui contrôlent «le premier degré» des ressources tels que la terre, le travail ou l'argent et «les courtiers» (*brokers*) ayants «les ressources de deuxième degré», à savoir les contacts avec ceux qui contrôlent les ressources de premier degré.

Notre informateur principal que l'on appelera ici Aziz[7] était l'un de ces courtiers et il fonctionnait dans la région de Sahel au nord-ouest de Burkina Faso. Il a commencé sa vie adulte comme courtier entre la filiale burkinabé de la Croix Rouge et les compatriotes. Pendant presque 30 ans de coopération il a noué des contacts, des connaissances et des amitiés à la portée supra-locale, supra-régionale et internationale. Aziz pouvait se venter d'une très bonne connaissance du français, du baccalauréat et d'avoir terminé les cours : ethnographique, de musée et archéologique. Il était l'exemple de cette classe de courtiers qui a accentué les besoins de communauté dans des contextes convenables en fonctionnant entre le monde local et global.

En l'occurrence ce contexte constituait notre arrivée à Nenglélé afin de reconnaître le potentiel de développement et d'analyser les projets de développement[8] menés jusqu'au présent. En connaissant notre intérêt anthropologique de recherche, Aziz s'est présenté en tant qu'une personne avec l'expérience dans la réalisation d'entreprises internationales de développement[9] et aussi en tant

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[7] En raison de protéger les informateurs nous avons chiffré leurs prénoms. Les informations relevées pourraient leur nuire. De plus nous avons inventé la dénomination fictive Nenglélé pour la communauté où nous avons mené les recherches. En outre nous évitons exprès de donner les noms propres des groupes locales, des comités, des institutions de développement mais aussi des organisations étrangères non gouvernementales (surtout celles de Pologne) dont l'activité on examine. Il est à craindre que les informations présentées peuvent parvenir à eux ce qui pourrait provoquer la rupture de coopération et de contacts sur le terrain.

[8] C'était la version officielle et très générale du projet que nous avons présentée aux pouvoirs administratifs (préfet) après notre arrivée à Nenglélé. Le préfet nous a garanti la possibilité de mener les recherches et il nous a promis d'aider à chercher le guide et l'informateur convenable en même temps. C'est ainsi que nous avons rencontré Aziz.

[9] À titre d'exemple, en 2010 il a coopéré avec les membres d'une société africaine pendant la création de la bibliothèque et du centre culturelle pour les

qu'un activiste local agissant pour le développement de la communauté locale[10]. Il nous a rassuré de mettre à notre disposition ses contacts, son temps et sa voiture pour qu'on puisse obtenir des informations. Quand on l'a informé de ne pas pouvoir louer ni chauffeur ni voiture, il a constaté d'avoir compris notre situation et de ne pas s'attendre au payement[11]. Il a remarqué que «l'argent se finit un jour et ce sont de bonnes relations qui restent et qui apporteront des profits dans l'avenir». Aziz savait que le plus il faisait pour nous plus nous serions dépendant de lui, nous lui récompenserions et même on deviendrait «son anthropologue» (Rabinow 2010, 79) – en l'occurrence on deviendrait son partenaire dans le projet de développement[12]. Il a ajouté qu'il possédait une longue expérience dans la collaboration avec les anthropologiques (avec ceux de Pologne aussi) et qu'il avait avec eux non seulement des relations professionnelles mais aussi amicales. Selon lui «on ne demande pas d'argent des amis étrangers (…) il

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enfants et pour les jeunes. De 2007 il est engagé à le courtier dans les projets d'aide et de développement réalisés par les organisations non gouvernementales et missionnaires de Pologne. Le bâtiment de l'école et le puits sont le fruit de cette collaboration. Dans les années les plus proche on planifie un autre investissement, à savoir la réparation du barrage interrompu sur la rivière et la restauration du réservoir d'eau.

[10] En 2002 il a initié la formation d'association dans le dessin de soutenir l'alphabétisation des adultes (l'enseignement de compter, de lire et d'écrire dans la langue choisie). Pendant douze ans de son fonctionnement l'association a crée 32 endroits éducatifs et a rassemble 956 apprenants.

[11] Il a demandé le remboursement des coûts de fonctionnement de sa voiture et d'essence consommé pendant nos voyages.

[12] Après deux semaines de coopération sur le sujet de projets du développement Aziz nous a suggéré de trouver une organisation non gouvernementale en Pologne pour réaliser le projet à Nenglélé parce que les habitants possédaient l'expérience et ils étaient volontiers à coopérer. Ils leur manquait uniquement le soutien financier. Il a ajouté encore que ses amis polonais avaient déjà entrepris telles démarches.

faut les bien recevoir parce qu'ils pourront faire quelque chose pour lui dans l'avenir»[13].

L'engagement d'Aziz dans la réalisation des entreprises de développement était pour lui non seulement une activité qui lui faisait honneur (il avait d'ailleurs l'habitude de le souligner en disant «Ça me fait honneur») mais aussi une occasion pour réaliser ses buts, pour obtenir des profits provenant de la redistribution des ressources interceptées et pour créer le système néo-patrimonial local[14]. La sentence «si tu a quelque chose dans la main, partage-toi avec les autres» illustre très bien ce système. Elle reflète aussi le principe fondamental de fonctionnement dans le projet qui repose sur une chaîne spécifique de rendre mutuellement les services et d'échanger les dons et sur la gentillesse entre le courtier (le patron) et ses proches collaborateurs (les clients). En agissant selon leur propres «modèles de rationalité» (Long 2001), les courtiers les utilisent ainsi pour réaliser leur buts cachés dans le cadre des projets de développement. C'est pourquoi le système patron-client n'est pas perçu comme un phénomène «impudique» mais – comme l'indique Nicolas van de Wall (2005, 51)– il résulte de la spécificité culturelle de la forme principale d'organisation sociale en Afrique, à savoir le tribu et le clan. Pour cette raison la portée des systèmes entre Aziz et ses clients dépassait les personnes engagées dans la réalisation des projets de développement en embrassant les membres du clan de courtier largement compris.

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[13] L'utilisation de catégorie de «bonnes relations» ou «d'amitié» joue en rôle important dans les entreprises de développement. John Durston, anthropologue social, il constate que l'amitié au niveau des projets de développement est uniquement instrumentale. On peut la comparer à la relation patron-client donc elle ne sert qu'à la réalisation de profits financiers et/ou symboliques (Durston 2001).

[14] Jean Françis Bayard (1989) et Jean François Médard (1991) ont utilisé la notion de «clientélisme de développement» pour déterminer cette pratique.

Les avantages de la parenté ou de l'apparentement avec Aziz avait une étendue extrêmement large : des prêts accordés une seule fois pour monter un petit commerce[15], par le financement de l'éducation de proches parents[16] à la réception des enfants «au service» ou pour la formation[17]. Parfois la possibilité de faire connaissance avec le partenaire étranger d'Aziz était déjà une sorte de profit parce qu'elle constituait aussi une occasion pour le transfert des biens[18].

Edmund Leach (1982), anthropologue social, a suggéré de voir la stabilité du système patron-client d'une perspective différente, à savoir la capacité à contracter une dette. Quand ce système s'anime, les deux parties se transmettent les dons – au sens matériel ou à un autre. Pendant le reste de périodes il y a uniquement le sentiment de l'engagement non-payé – chez le client il a la forme

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[15] Aziz a prêté de l'argent deux fois à son neveu pour ouvrir un petit magasin alimentaire. Le neveu a géré mal son petit commerce et par conséquent il a fait faillite. Il était incapable de rendre de l'argent emprunté donc il a travaillé pour s'acquitter de ses dettes. Il était un bras second au camping local géré par Aziz et aussi son serviteur (il faisait le ménage et lavait sa voiture). Il jouait le rôle de «garçon de course» et il colportait une rumeur. Son comportement était souvent l'objet de plaisanteries et de moqueries de la part de son oncle. Parmi quatre femmes d'Aziz deux d'entre elles ont reçu le soutient financier pour ouvrir un petit commerce (la production et la vente des beignets)

[16] La troisième femme d'Aziz a reçu le soutien financier pour terminer l'école des infirmières et puis grâce aux contacts de son mari elle a trouvé le travail dans le chef-lieu de district. La quatrième femme a commencé l'éducation dans la même ville grâce au soutien financier.

[17] Aziz entretenait la fille de son ami. Elle a aidé sa femme dans les taches domestiques. En revanche Aziz payait pour l'éducation et l'alimentation de cette fille.

[18] Dans cette situation Aziz proposait souvent de petits tours dans la région pendant lesquels nous avons rendu la visite à ses amis. Pendant le trajet Aziz racontait des histoires sur leur situation matérielle difficile et sur leur problèmes de santé. Il soulignait en même temps son petit soutien financier à l'occasion de chaque rencontre avec eux et il nous suggérait d'une manière assez explicite de faire la même chose. Le refus de notre part serait une grande maladresse.

d'endettement moral tandis que chez le patron (le courtier) c'est la conscience d'avoir «une créance». La capacité à créditer les engagements matériels et surtout morales détermine la position du curtier – elle accroît son prestige et fait de lui un contractant désiré dans les entreprises prochaines de développement. Dans ce contexte, l'utilisation de la stratégie du patronage augmente non seulement les profits financiers mais avant tout elle renforce la position sur l'arène locale. Par la suite Aziz, grâce aux plusieurs systèmes patron-client avec les locaux et grâce aux contacts et à l'amitié avec les européens – il était perçu par les cohabitants comme une personne importante et puissante[19]. Son surnom «blanc-noir» le prouve le mieux. Ce jeu des mots «blanc-noir» déterminait la façon d'être d'Aziz. «Blanc-noir» celest une personne qui veut se communiquer avec ses compatriotes en langue européenne, qui fait la connaissance avec de nouveaux venus de l'Ouest, qui s'habille selon le modèle occidental et qui possède «les choses modernes» – le synonyme de la richesse[20] (par exemple : voiture, ordinateur, téléphone, maison en pierre taillée). «Blanc-noir» est perçu en tant qu'une personne développée – *a joungana-téme* – ce que en langue koromfé signifie «quelqu'un qui était enfermé et qui est sorti de cet enfermement». Cela se laisse voir dans l'acceptation des changements progressifs comme par exemple les coutumes et dans le cas d'Aziz elle concerne la déclaration à soutenir

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[19] Pendant nos conversations avec les habitants ils parlaient d'Aziz comme suit : «Il est important», «Il est membre de plusieurs associations», «C'est une personne qui sait mobiliser et qui fait comprendre» , «Il est écouté par les autres».

[20] Parmi les personnes interrogées, apparaissent deux catégories de richesse. La première, c'est la richesse traditionnelle, qui se manifeste par la présence d'un grand nombre de «choses anciennes» (*akan kone*), tels que : du mil, du bétail et de l'or. Deuxièmement, la richesse modernes liés à l'acquisition de «nouvelles choses» (*akan felen*), provenant du monde extérieur qu'ils peuvent acheter pour de l'argent.

l'interdiction de l'excision qui est officiellement interdite au Bur-
kina Faso[21].

Un projet – plusieurs objectifs

Le désaccord entre les objectifs du projet exprimées «sur le
papier» avec celles auxquelles visent les bénéficiaires «sur le ter-
rain», nous l'avons observé à Nenglélé pendant la surveillance
des préparatifs à la revitalisation du musée régional. Cette entre-
prise constituait l'introduction au projet du développement du
tourisme local (le projet était prévu pour 3 ans) – l'exposition
promouvant les valeurs culturelles et archéologiques de la région[22]
allait être fondé dans le siège rénové du musée. Aziz était l'auteur
de cette entreprise et avec un ami volontaire de France, ils ont
reçu la promesse de la financer du côté de Ministère de la Culture
au Burkina Faso. Le critère indispensable à remplir par les béné-
ficiaires était de former le conseil d'administration «compétent,
dynamique et responsable» comme le ministère le souhaitait. La
direction actuelle et le reste du personnel fonctionnait invaria-
blement depuis 10 ans (!) et ils n'ont rien fait pour le développe-
ment du musée ce qui a provoqué finalement sa destruction. Tou-
tefois il y avait encore un problème dans cette situation parce que
le président de l'administration ne voulait pas démissionner.

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[21] Le fait que Aziz était pour l'interdiction de l'excision a forcé la deuxième
d'Aziz à exciser leur fille en cachette. Elles ont quitté la maison d'Aziz pour
quelques semaines. Après cette période la femme d'Aziz est revenue mais leur
fille était morte et ils l'ont enterré la même nuit. Malgré son attitude d'adversaire
de l'excision, Aziz n'a pas divulgué cette nouvelle. Finalement ils ont annoncé
qu'elle était morte à cause d'une maladie gastrique non identifiée.

[22] Les stations archéologiques présentant l'art rupestre et le traditionalisme
culturel relativement maintenu chez le peuple Kurumba.

Aziz était mécontent d'un tel déroulement des événements et il cherchait une solution efficace. En profitant de sa haute position à Nenglélé, il a commencé à s'allier avec les participants stratégiques du projet : le mer et le chef. Jusqu'au présent ils n'étaient pas engagés directement dans le travail du musée mais avec l'apparition de nouvelles possibilités ils jouaient le rôle des parties prenantes. Le mer, en raison de son poste, tenait à la gestion efficace du projet parce que le Ministère de la Culture de Burkina Faso allait verser l'argent promis sur le compte du bureau de la commune. De plus, conformément aux nouvelles exigences du ministère, le représentant du pouvoir local devrait siéger dans le conseil d'administration du musée. Ce représentant aurait l'impact sur le travail du musée mais également l'accès réel aux sources de financement. D'après les nouvelles directives il y avait aussi la place pour le chef qui jouerait le rôle d'honneur du gardien de la tradition. Grâce à cette fonction, il légitimerait sa position et il aurait la possibilité de contrôler le travail de la direction d'autant plus que dans ses structures il y aurait des représentants de l'administration nationale à laquelle il n'avait pas de confiance. Pendant les négociations auxquelles nous avons participé, Aziz racontait des histoires sur les incorrections commises par le président, entre outres ses visites régulières dans le débit de boissons. Néanmoins il était beaucoup plus difficile d'obtenir les informations sur Aziz et ses motifs de l'engagement au changement de la direction surtout qu'il rejetait ouvertement le poste du président[23]. Pourquoi tenait-il tellement à la réalisation du projet? Il s'est avéré, après quelques semaines de notre observation que derrière le scénario de la revitalisation du musée se cachait la possibilité

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[23] Comme il a constaté tout seul, cela lui a donné une plus grande aisance d'exprimer l'opinion et a éloigné de lui les soupçons d'avoir opéré pour son intérêt personnel.

d'accumuler les mesures financières. Dans la version officielle du projet proclamée aux habitants, la question du prime pour le coordinateur local surveillant la revitalisation du musée n'a pas été mentionné. Cette fonction a été confié bien évidemment à Aziz.

Pendant les rencontres avec le mer et le chef, Aziz soulignait la mauvaise réputation du président précédent auprès des certains milieux diplomatiques[24] et ses lacunes en compétences linguistiques (manque du français courant lu et écrit) ce qui rendait plus difficile la collaboration avec les partenaires étrangers[25]. Il soulignait également la disparition tantôt des cotisations[26] de caisse du musée et tantôt des meubles du siège muséal (5 chaises, 3 bancs et une table). Tout ceci était fort désavantageux pour le mer parce que la caisse s'est située dans le mairie et l'équipement avait été offert par le ministre de la culture il y a quelques années[27]. Après

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[24] Il ne s'agit pas ici d'une simple connaissance de la langue des opérateurs, mais plutôt de la capacité à se servir de la rhétorique et de l'axiologie du discours de développement, par exemple par accentuer la situation des groupes marginalisés

[25] Dans les années 1998-1999 le président a travaillé comme aide-cuisinier à l'ambassade d'Allemagne à Ouagadougou. En profitant de cette situation, il a demandé de financer le projet de la construction de deux maisons pour les enseignants travaillant à Nenglélé. Il a reçu une donation de 700000 francs CFA (environ 10670 euros). Pour cette somme on pouvait construire à l'époque deux maisons en pierre taillée. Quand la délégation de l'ambassade est venue afin de le vérifier, au lieu de maisons de pierre taillé il y avait des maisons en brique de boue et avec le toit de tôle dont le coût de construction a été estimé à 70000 francs CFA (1067 euros). Le cuisinier et l'argent ont disparu. Après un an et demie le président est revenu à Nenglélé et il habite jusqu'au présent dans une des maisons pour les enseignants. Depuis lors toutes les demandes de soutien financier adressées à l'ambassade d'Allemagne ont été rejetées parce que sur le document il y avait la signature du président.

[26] Il a contacté le trésorier du musée et l'a prévenu des conséquences découlant de la fraude des cotisations. Malgré sa signature sur les chèques, le trésorier a constaté que le président les avait retirés.

[27] Quand on lui a posé la question sur la disparition des meubles, le président a répondu : «les termites les ont mangés».

deux mois de négociations le président a finalement renoncé et le nouveau conseil d'administration a été convoquée. Le préfet est entré en fonction du président, le mer est devenu son adjoint, le rôle du membre d'honneur a été confié au chef et Aziz a gardé le poste de conservateur et de guide[28].

Conclusion

La situation présentée ci-dessus constitue l'un des plusieurs exemples de divergence entre les objectifs non-cachées («sur le papier») et les objectifs cachées («sur le terrain»). Ce sont les échos des paradigmes : altruiste et de modernisation qui résonnent encore et sont à l'origine de cet état de choses. Pour cette raison les décideurs et les coordinateurs des projets de développement prennent toujours des positions extrêmes. D'un coté ils romantisent les revendications «éloignées» transmises par le courtier, de l'autre – ils maintiennent la tendance à essencialiser le développement et de le considérer comme une entreprise monolithique dirigée d'en haut. Par conséquent, l'utilisation de ces deux modèles de la politique se tourne contre les objectifs visées et contre les effets des projets de développement. Norman Long qu'on a cité déjà, a suggéré de voir le projet sous une autre optique – celle des bénéficiaires et non pas de donateurs. Ainsi on remarquera la contextualité locale de la pensée et de l'interprétation les processus de développement. D'habitude les objectifs des décideurs et des opérateurs du développement sont abstraites et nos recherches le confirment. Comme l'exemple du président précédent le montre, il ne visait ni à la promotion de la région ni au développement du

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[28] À part eux, les quatorze membres encore ont siégé dans le conseil d'administration.

tourisme mais uniquement au transfert des fonds promis par le ministère. En l'occurrence l'accès aux biens découlant de l'activité de développement était l'objectif cachée des bénéficiaires[29]. Pour arriver à ce fin ils profitaient des scénarios proposées par donateurs tels que la formation de nouveaux cadres dirigeants. Néanmoins ce n'était qu'une solution temporaire puisqu'on la suspendait au moment de terminer le projet. Pendant les élections de nouveau conseil d'administration, les bénéficiaires ont constaté plusieurs fois qu' «on peut le changer toujours» et que l'essentiel était d'obtenir de l'argent. Malheureusement cette divergence dans les objectifs des scénarios du projet entraîne la précarité ou l'échec. En général, avec la fin du projet et la disparition des animateurs, les scénarios sont oubliés et il reste aux bénéficiaires d' attendre aux rôles prochains à jouer.

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[29] Ryszard Vorbrich traite de cette conceptualisation des projets de développement plus largement (2013).

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Summary
Public targets – hidden targets
The discrepancy between transcripts
in the local field of development cooperation

The article presents the preliminary results of ethnographic field research that I conducted among the Kurumba living in the north-western Burkina Faso. It will answer the question of how agents of development – a special group of beneficiaries of development projects – carry hidden transcripts for maximizing the benefits sources (both material, financial and symbolic) following from development cooperation. During a two-month stay in the municipality that for the publication purposes I called Nenglélé I watched the practice of a particular development agent, whom for the purposes of this article I called Aziz.

KONRAD CZERNICHOWSKI

REASONS OF THE CONFLICT IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (2012-2014)

The Central African Republic is the country, in which the only
advocates are fruit, captains are fish and gendarmes are birds
(Central African saying)[1]

1. Introduction

The Central African Republic has been considered a fragile state for many years. The Fund for Peace prepares every year a ranking of failed states on the basis of 12 criteria: demographic pressures; massive movements of refugees or internal displaced persons; vengeance-seeking group grievance; chronic and sustained human flight; uneven economic development; poverty, sharp or severe economic decline; legitimacy of the state; progressive deterioration of public services; violation of human rights and rule of law; security apparatus; rise of factionalized elites and intervention of external actors. In the case of the Central African

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[1] Cited after: R. Wieczorek OFM Cap., *Listy z Serca Afryki,* Kraków 2002, p. 52. Avocado is in French *avocat,* the same as *advocate*. *Capitaine* is a popular name of fish, which occur in the Central African Republic and Cameroon, and weigh dozens of kilograms. *Tisserin gendarme* is a name of an African bird, known in English under the name of *village weaver*.

Republic the situation of movements of refugees (9.8 points with 10.0 meaning the state totally failed), security apparatus (9.7), the shortage of public services (9.5), intervention of external actors (9.4), uneven social and economic development (9.2) and emerging factions (9.1) look the worst. According to Fr. Jerzy Kiebała OFM Cap., who was a missionary there, students of the university in Bangui are mostly sons and daughters of ministers and those who have money. The number of students coming from the bush is marginal[2].

In 2013 the country was classified on the nineth position out of 178 states[3], which puts it on a high state of alert. It went down from the eighth place in 2008[4]. However, the ranking did not take into consideration the chaos emerged after Michel Djotodia's coup d'état in March 2013 and his resignation in January 2014. The state will probably go up in this ranking.

It is even worse in the ranking of simplicity of doing business. According to the World Bank's report "Doing Business 2014. Understanding Regulations for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises", the Central African Republic holds the last but one position[5]. In 2009 it was classified on the 180th place, that is eight places higher[6]. The aim of this article is to determine the actual reasons of the armed conflict.

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[2] The interview of the Movement "Maitri" with Fr. Jerzy Kiebała OFM Cap. made on 1.05.2007 in Wrocław.

[3] *The Failed State Index 2013,* in: http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable (accessed: 18.02.2014).

[4] K. Czernichowski, *Bezpośrednie inwestycje zagraniczne w Afryce,* „Afryka" (2009), No. 29-30, pp. 143-147.

[5] *Doing Business 2014. Understanding Regulations for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises,* World Bank, Washington 2013, p. 3.

[6] K. Czernichowski, *Bezpośrednie…, op. cit.,* pp. 143-147.

2. Coups d'état in the Central African Republic

The state has been experiencing numerous coups d'état, terror, killings, riots, violations of human rights since its independence in 1960. The most bloody dictator was Colonel Jean-Bédel Bokassa (1921-1966). In 1966 he overturned David Dacko (1930-2003), whose uncle he was (therefore some people saw in this coup nothing else but a familiar dispute). The political reason was the establishment of political relations with China by Dacko (which Bokassa did not like), as well as corruption within the government[7]. His coronation as emperor cost a lot of the state's income[8]. He ruled the country authoritatively till 1979, when Dacko was restored to power with the help of the Frenchmen.

In 1981 another coup d'état took place with General André Kolingba as the new leader. His rule could be characterized by nepotism. He introduced friends and members of his ethnie Yakoma to the head of strategic institutions. At the end of his presidency people with such roots were chairmen of 80 per cent of public companies[9].

In 1993 the first and the only to this day democratic elections were held. Ange-Félix Patassé was chosen the President[10]. His rule was however less democratic[11].

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[7] R. Kapuściński, *Gdyby cała Afryka…,* Agora, Warszawa 2011, p. 253.

[8] R. Oliver, A. Atmore, *Dzieje Afryki po 1800 roku,* Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza 2007, p. 354.

[9] *The Central African Crisis: From Predation to Stabilisation. Africa Report No°219,* 17.06.2014, International Crisis Group, p. 1.

[10] M. Tul, *Przewrót w Republice Środkowoafrykańskiej,* „Raport Afryka. Polish Centre for African Studies" (2013), April – June, p. 26.

[11] *The Central…, op. cit.,* p. 1.

In 2003 another coup d'état was lead by François Bozizé, the former army chief and Patassé's collaborator[12]. Nevertheless, he did not contribute to the establishment of peace and security. He sought help in maintaining his power overseas. As a result the Mirage aircraft from France made raids on the North of the Central African Republic. Bozizé's advisor was a businessman Didier Pereira, who lived in South Africa for 20 years. He mediated in the talks of the President of the Central African Republic with the President of South Africa (Jacob Zuma) about the supply of weapons. It was not realized because of legal obstacles on the side of South Africa[13]. The President of Chad, Idriss Déby, also gave his support to Bozizé by sending a contingent of soldiers[14].

In December 2012 rebel groups, mainly from Chad and the Sudan, under the common name "Seleka" (the word means in the language of Sango "covenant"[15], it can also come from the French "séléction" – "choice" or "selected"[16], because Sango has many loanwords from French[17]), initiated the uprising against

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[12] R. Wieczorek OFM Cap., *Pęknięte Serce Afryki,* Kraków: Wydawnictwo Serafin 2006, p. 23.

[13] M. Koziński, *Obecność wojsk RPA w Republice Środkowoafrykańskiej,* „Raport Afryka. Polish Centre for African Studies" (2013), April – June, pp. 20-21.

[14] L. Lombard, *Is the Central African Republic on the Verge of Genocide?,* in: http://africasacountry.com/is-the-central-african-republic-on-the-verge-of-genocide/ (5.12.2013 r.; accessed: 21.08.2014).

[15] P. Bouckaert, *'We Live and Die Here Like Animals',* in: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/13/we_live_and_die_here_like_animals_central_african_republic_muslim_christian_violence (13.11.2013 r.; accessed: 30.08.2014).

[16] R. Wieczorek OFM Cap., *W RCA nie chodzi o religię,* in: http://www.stacja7.pl/article/2468/W+RCA+nie+chodzi+o+religi%C4%99 (7.02.2014 r.; accessed: 24.02.2014).

[17] R. Modelski OFM Cap., *Koktajl misyjny,* Kraków – Poznań: Sorus 2010, p. 13.

Bozizé[18]. South Africa reinforced its troops to 200 soldiers[19]. In March 2013 Seleka mastered the capital Bangui and the rebels' head Michel Djotodia took power. French media published that his security adviser was a former French army officer. Djotodia's rule, which lasted less than one year, was characterized by looting and chaos. The new President usurper increased extraordinary expenses. During the unrest, the ministers of his government spent public money on expensive trips to Europe, India, Qatar, South Africa and Senegal[20]. François Bozizé fled abroad. Unlike previous coups d'état, this one was strongly condemned by the international community[21]. The African Union sent MISCA troops (the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic, French: *Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine*), which replaced MICOPAX[22] (the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic, French: *Mission de consolidation de la paix en Centrafrique*). MICOPAX had been coordinated by ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States) and had consisted of Chadian, Gabonese, Equatorial Guinean, Cameroonian and Congolese (from Congo-Brazzaville) soldiers. France supported MISCA with two

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[18] M. Tul, *op. cit.,* p. 25.

[19] M. Koziński, *op. cit.,* p. 21.

[20] *The Central…, op. cit.,* pp. 3-6.

[21] Compare: M. Tul, *op. cit.,* p. 25.

[22] R. Marchal, *Central African Republic: Back to War Again?,* in: http://theglobalobservatory.org/component/myblog/central-african-republic-back-to-war-again-/blogger/Roland%20Marchal/ (12.09.2013 r.; accessed: 30.08.2014).

thousand soldiers[23] within the operation "Sangaris"[24]. Only in December 2013 one thousand people were killed. As for 1 August 2014, 927 thousand people had to flee[25].

During peace talks in N'Djamena in January 2014 Michel Djotodia resigned. He is now in Benin, where he was granted asylum. As reported by the International Crisis Group in 2014, he lives in a comfortable environment – he has a farm, is building a house on the outskirts of Cotonou and is protected by Beninese soldiers[26].

Catherine Samba-Panza, a lawyer, a former mayor of Bangui[27] and an activist for women[28], was meanwhile elected the interim head of state. It is the third woman in the presidency (though temporary – elected for one year) in the African history, after Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf from Liberia and Joyce Banda from Malawi. Her task is to stabilize the situation in the country, so that free presidential elections can be held.

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[23] A. Jaulmes, *La France envoie 400 soldats supplémentaires en Centrafrique,* in: http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2014/02/14/01003-20140214ARTFI-G00377-la-france-envoie-des-renforts-en-centrafrique.php (14.02.2014 r.; accessed: 30.08.2014).

[24] *Opération Sangaris,* in: http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/centrafrique/operation-sangaris/operation-sangaris (10.12.2013 r.; accessed: 30.08.2014).

[25] *CAR: When refugees become more than statistics,* in: http://www.unocha.org/top-stories/all-stories/car-when-refugees-become-more-statistics (7.08.2014 r.; accessed: 22.08.2014).

[26] *The Central…, op. cit.,* s. 4.

[27] I. Cywa, *Komentarz: Konflikt w Republice Środkowoafrykańskiej: Krwawe „Serce Afryki",* in: http://www.pcsa.org.pl/products/komentarz%3a-konflikt-w-republice-%C5%9Brodkowoafryka%C5%84skiej%3a-krwawe-%E2%80%9Eserce-afryki%E2%80%9D-/ (accessed: 22.02.2014).

[28] G. Warner, *War in Africa: Faith or Economics?,* Radio "Interfaith Voices", 6.03.2014.

3. Arguments in favour of the religious nature of the current conflict

The conflict in the Central African Republic is sometimes called a religious war between Christians and Muslims. One can encounter, among others, the following sentences in the world media:

> *The killings of at least 30 people Wednesday by Muslim rebels who stormed a Catholic church in the Central African Republic marked the latest escalation of religious violence gripping the conflict-torn nation*[29].

> *A cycle of violence in the Central African Republic is quickly degenerating into a religious conflict between Christians and Muslims, amid a deteriorating humanitarian crisis, church leaders and U.N. officials warn*[30].

> *Thursday's violence is thought to have begun when Christian militias, loyal to the CAR's ousted President Francois Bozize, launched multiple attacks from the north – sparking retaliatory attacks from mainly Muslim armed fighters loyal to the new leadership*[31].

Seleka consists mainly of people confessing Islam who performed brutal killing of civilians. On 8 February 2014 Father Benedykt Pączka (former director of the Capuchin Mission Secretariat in Poland, and now a missionary in the Central African Republic)

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[29] G. Taylor, M. Somers, *Fears of religious war rise in Central African Republic after attack on Catholic church,* in: "The Washington Times", http://www. washingtontimes.com/news/2014/may/28/fears-of-religious-war-rise-in-central-african-rep/?page=all (28.05.2014; accessed: 20.08.2014).

[30] F. Nzwili, *Religious conflict rips through Central African Republic,* in: http://www.religionnews.com/2013/11/21/religious-conflict-rips-central-african-republic/ (21.11.2013; accessed: 20.08.2014).

[31] *'Hundreds dead' in Central African Republic violence,* in: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25273681 (6.12.2013; accessed: 21.08.2014).

visited the village Nzakoun. His attention was drawn to the fact that, when people heard the sound of an engine, fled into the bush. In the same village, he found houses with traces of blood, scattered clothing, bullet shells. Four days earlier there had been a massacre here. 22 people, including 9 children, had been murdered. Trying to pay attention of the world's media to this tragedy, he reports:

Bodies of dead people remained until Wednesday, when Seleka left the village. People came and… they could not believe what they saw. Then we go further – people who show us round present us the burned houses. There are 25 of them, with all their belongings. They buried their goods in these houses: motorbikes, bicycles, money and all that, which was of any value. A couple of motorbikes, bicycles, pots, beds, which had not burnt, remained. 14 motorbikes and 5 bikes had been destroyed by fire[32].

Seleka encountered resistance of Anti-Balaka, which had been established during François Bozizé's rule to protect against robberies[33]. It was, however, less well armed and less well organized than Seleka[34]. According to some sources, "Balaka" means in Sango language "machete"[35], and other sources give the meaning "anti-balles AK", from "blendé anti-balles d'automat Kalachnikow 47" – "resistant to Kalashnikov bullets"[36]. Anti-Balaka consists mainly of Christians (therefore some media call it Christian militia) who are willing to admit their faith and declare their actions

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[32] A. Ścibik, B. Pączka OFM Cap., *Serce Afryki krwawi,* in: http://www.opoka. org.pl/biblioteka/P/PS/as_rca.html (accessed: 18.02.2014).

[33] Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2014,* New York 2014, p. 90.

[34] *The Central…, op. cit.,* p. 9.

[35] I. Käihkö, M. Utas, *op. cit.,* p. 70; *'Hundreds…, op. cit.;* D. Smith, *Christian threats force Muslim convoy to turn back in CAR exodus,* in: http://www.theguardian. com/world/2014/feb/14/muslim-convoy-central-african-republic-exodus (14.02.2014; accessed: 22.02.2014); or G. Warner, *op. cit.*

[36] R. Wieczorek OFM Cap., *op. cit.*

in the name of Christianity[37]. Anti-Balaka had committed crimes against Muslim civilians, particularly in the region of Bosangoa in central-western part of the country[38]. According to "The Guardian", Anti-Balaka had killed all the Muslims except an eleven-year old girl in one village (though it may be surprising that the journalist did not mention the name of the village)[39].

Many civilian Muslims were forced to flee the war-torn country. Journalists reached some of them. They feel religiously discriminated. Gana El Hadji Chetima, a trader from Bossemtélé, said:

> *We are hated by the Christians from Central African Republic. They do not want Muslims at home and consider that Muslims are not Central Africans*[40].

Another Muslim woman lamented: *It is no longer a country for Muslims*[41].

The appointment of Mahamat Kamoun as the Prime Minister, the first ever Muslim to the office, may also reflect the religious nature of the conflict[42]. This is to ease the tensions between followers of the two religions.

4. Counterarguments

Monsignor Dieudonné Nzapalainga, Archbishop of Bangui, is strongly protesting against talking about Anti-Balaka as a Christian

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[37] I. Käihkö, M. Utas, *op. cit.,* p. 70.

[38] *World…, op. cit.,* p. 90.

[39] D. Smith, *op. cit.*

[40] *Le Journal Afrique,* TV5, 11.03.2014.

[41] G. Warner, *op. cit.*

[42] T. Scheen, *Ringen um Einfluss,* in: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/afrika/zentralafrikanische-republik-ringen-um-einfluss-13092440.html (12.08.2014; accessed: 23.08.2014).

militia since attacking people opposes to Christian morality. Anti-Balaka causes suffering of not only Muslims. Archbishop Nzapalainga appeals to call this formation a self-defense or a military militia, but not a Christian militia[43]. Anti-Balaka's connotations with Christianity result only from the fact that it was created against Seleka and that it is mostly formed by Christians, who make up 50 per cent of population (35 per cent are followers of traditional religions and 15 percent – Muslims)[44]. Some Anti-Balaka's members are soldiers of the former President François Bozizé[45], which further explains their brutality.

Seleka's connotations with Islam concern the fact that it is formed by the gangs coming from Sudan and Chad, where Islam dominates[46]. These groups are very diverse. In August 2014 there were even bloody clashes between the two factions of Seleka, aiming at taking control over barriers at the Bambari exit in the centre of the country[47].

Alicja Toton, who was a volunteer as a doctor in Bagandou in the south west of the Central African Republic in the years 2009-2010, did not encounter any signs of hostility between Christians and Muslims. If there were some tensions, they resulted from jealousy. The Muslims were generally better off financially since

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[43] *Prelate denounces use of term 'Christian militia' in Central African conflict,* in: http://www.catholicculture.org/news/headlines/index.cfm?storyid=20449 (11.02.2014; accessed: 22.02.2014).

[44] *Africa. Central African Republic,* in: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ct.html (18.02.2014; accessed: 22.02.2014).

[45] I. Cywa, *op. cit.*

[46] M. Cariou, *C. Africa's Nzapalainga, much more than an archbishop,* in: http://za.news.yahoo.com/c-africas-nzapalainga-much-more-archbishop-212426266.html (14.10.2013; accessed: 1.09.2014).

[47] *Centrafrique: violents combats entre factions de la Seleka à Bambari,* in: http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140826-rca-centrafrique-violents-combats-seleka-bambari-zoundeko-darass-pareto/ (26.08.2014; accessed: 30.08.2014).

they most often engaged in trade. Alicja Toton mentions a Muslim employed in the Catholic hospital where she worked. Every day before work he accompanied with the respectful attitude the staff who prayed. Both Christians and Muslims were treated in this hospital. The change of religion was socially acceptable[48].

Archbishop Dieudonné Nzapalainga and Imam Omar Layama Kobin, president of the Muslim community in the Central African Republic, travel currently across the country and call for peace. They have also written a common article for "Le Monde", in which they argue that the conflict in their country is not a war between Christians and Muslims, but the consequence of an acute humanitarian crisis caused by long periods of political and military instability[49]. This unstable situation, which lasted for decades, contributed to the progressive wallowing of the country in the socio-economic crisis[50].

5. Economic background of the conflict

Central African Republic depends largely on foreign aid. NGOs financed mainly by foreign donors have taken over the majority of social services[51]. The average life expectancy of women is

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[48] E-mail from A. Toton, 23.02.2014.

[49] D. Nzapalainga, O.K. Layama, *En Centrafrique, « le pire pourrait être encore à venir »,* in: http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2013/12/26/en-centrafrique-le-pire-pourrait-etre-encore-a-venir_4340283_3232.html (26.12.2013; accessed: 22.02.2014).

[50] Compare: *Rozmowa z ojcem Jerzym Steligą OFM Cap.,* „My a Trzeci Świat" (2009), No. 5, p. 3.

[51] *The Central…, op. cit.,* p. 1.

51 years[52], and of men – 48 years[53]. Continuous wars, rebellions and unrest destabilized the economy, eg. among many large and medium-sized enterprises in the district of Bimbo, adjacent to Bangui, now only one remains. The country that produced such products as milk and yogurt now imports them from abroad[54]. The weakness of the government, corruption, taking by multinational corporations profit from the unstable political situation enable the occurrence of the so-called "natural resources curse" in the Central African Republic, meaning an adverse effect on the development of resource-based economies and, in extreme cases, the petrification of one-party rule and enforcement of corrupt regimes in order to maintain favorable conditions for the exploitation of minerals[55]. It concerns the countries, in which at least 8 per cent of GDP is generated by the extractive industry and 40 per cent of export revenues are commodities[56]. These indicators are almost exactly the same in the case of the Central African Republic: 7 per cent and 39.8 per cent, respectively. It should be noted that these are the official figures that do not take into account estimates that 30 per cent of diamonds are smuggled abro-

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[52] *Life expectancy at birth, female (years),* in: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.FE.IN (accessed: 21.08.2014).

[53] *Life expectancy at birth, male (years),* in: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.MA.IN (accessed: 21.08.2014).

[54] *The Central…, op. cit.,* p. 8.

[55] Compare: A. Polus, *Polityczne aspekty klątwy surowcowej. Hipoteza? Teoria? Nowy paradygmat w studiach afrykanistycznych,* in: B. Ndiaye, P. Letko (eds.), *Afryka w stosunkach międzynarodowych. Historia, stan obecny, perspektywy,* Olsztyn: Institute of History and International Relations, University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn 2010, p. 191. Hypothesis of natural resource curse was tested by: K. Czernichowski, D. Kopiński, A. Polus, *Klątwa surowcowa w Afryce? Przypadek Zambii i Botswany,* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo CeDeWu 2012.

[56] A. Polus, *Relacje pomiędzy rządami a NGOs w afrykańskich państwach surowcowych,* Wrocław: Oficyna Wydawnicza ATUT – Wrocławskie Wydawnictwo Oświatowe 2013, p. 43.

ad. These unregistered diamonds are proportionally more valuable because it is more profitable to smuggle larger and therefore more expensive diamonds[57]. However, even assuming the same proportions, we would obtain a share of diamonds in total exports equal:

$$\frac{39,8\% \cdot 100\%}{100\% - 30\%} \sim 56,9\%$$

One of the premises of the economic nature of the conflict is that just before the attack, President François Bozizé had granted a Cameroonian company a license to prospect for diamonds and gold in the Dzanga-Sangha protected area, which caused protests by the Worldwide Fund for Nature. In addition, he signed contracts with other little-known companies. After Michel Djotodia's takeover of power about twenty companies asked the ministry of mining a concession for the exploration of mineral deposits or oil. The new government has been promising to revise, and possibly re-negotiate, the existing contracts, but he did not. The transparency of relationship between the state and business has not increased, either. On the one hand, the miners in the rich in diamonds west joined Anti-Balaka in response to the unrest caused by Seleka in order to take control of the mines. On the other hand, diamond dealers in the east of the country joined the ranks of Seleka in retaliation for looting organized by François Bozizé[58].

Alarmed by the fact of diamond smuggling and financing Seleka by the diamond industry, the Kimberley Process disabled the Central African Republic from the system of official trade in dia-

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[57] K. Matthysen, I. Clarkson, *Gold and diamonds in the Central African Republic. The country's mining sector, and related social, economic and environmental issues,* Antwerp: International Peace Information Service 2013, pp. 6-7.

[58] *The Central…, op. cit.,* pp. 4-10.

monds in 2013[59]. The history of this institution dates back to 2000, when just in Kimberley (the world centre of diamond mining) in South Africa the authorities and manufacturers from Botswana, Namibia and South Africa met. Two years later, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) was adopted. It stated that each load of diamonds had to have a certificate of origin. In case of its absence, it would be presumed that they are from a country, which had not acceded to the international regulations, and therefore they would not be allowed on the world market due to the risk of having been mined in the state covered by an armed conflict. In just eight years (from 1999 to 2007) the share of "blood diamonds" in international trade fell from 4 per cent to less than 1 per cent[60]. At present, 80 countries participate in the Kimberley Process[61], not counting the suspended from 23 May 2013 Central African Republic[62], from which – thanks to this decision – smuggling was reduced, though not completely[63].

The effects of the coup d'état in the Central African Republic in 2013 did not affect only the macroscale, but directly all citizens. As never before, the country experienced a wave of looting. Public buildings were being looted, the infrastructure of mobile telephony was being destroyed. Private or belonging to non-gov-

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[59] *Ibidem,* p. 11.

[60] K. Czernichowski, *Potencjał surowcowy Afryki a polityka koncernów międzynarodowych,* in: K. Jędrzejczyk-Kuliniak, L. Kwieciński, B. Michalski, E. Stadtmüller (eds.), *Regionalizacja w stosunkach międzynarodowych. Aspekty polityczno-gospodarcze,* Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek 2008, pp. 244-245.

[61] *KP Participants and Observers,* in: http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/kp-participants-and-observers (accessed: 27.08.2014).

[62] *Administrative Decision on ensuring that diamonds from the Central African Republic are not introduced into the legitimate trade,* in: http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/2014-administrative-decision-car (accessed: 27.08.2014).

[63] *The Central…, op. cit.,* p. 11.

ernmental organizations (or even the UN) cars were being stolen on a massive scale. Then they were being sold in neighbouring countries or recoated in PK5 – a commercial district of Bangui. Seleka's leaders were also organizing kidnapping of businessmen for ransom[64].

The economic consequences of Seleka's rule were dramatic. In 2013 the Gross National Income per capita was 320 USD[65]. In this period smuggling of arms, diamonds and timber was reported. Cultivation of cotton, coffee and tobacco, which was developed in the colonial times, fell. Only in 2013 tax revenues decreased by half. Three-quarters of budget expenditures was at the same time spent on safety. As a result, at the end of that year the treasury became insolvent against civil servants. A deepening of the economic crisis may be expected as Muslims, who controlled a large part of the trade, flee the country[66].

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[64] *Ibidem,* pp. 8-9.

[65] *GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$),* in: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD (accessed: 21.08.2014).

[66] *The Central…, op. cit.,* pp. 1-6.

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Résumé
Arrière-plan du conflit en République Centrafricaine
(2012-2014)

La République Centrafricaine vit dans une situation difficile depuis son indépendance en 1960. Beaucoup de médias pensent que le conflit actuel a un fond religieux. L'article indique que c'est une simplification. Bien sûr que la religion joue un rôle dans la situation politique, sociale et économique du pays mais elle n'est pas la cause du conflit actuel. Les musulmans et les chrétiens vivent ensemble en paix pendant de nombreuses années, parfois même dans les mariages.

Les principales raisons des combats, spécialement celui qui a été inauguré par les Séléka à la fin de 2012, sont la faiblesse et la corruption des gouvernements successifs. Ils n'ont pas réussi à éliminer des coups d'état, à arrêter la violence qui conduit à prendre le contrôle des ressources naturelles, comme les diamants ou l'or. Ils n'ont pas su combattre la contrebande grandissante non plus. Au lieu de tout cela, ils ont au

contraire essayé de faire des profits illicites des exploitation du pays. Face à cela, le Président par intérim Catherine Samba-Panza a une tâche difficile pour préparer les élections démocratiques car les combats se poursuivent même si certains partisans de Séléka ont été désarmés.

DR ALI ELMIRGHANI AHMED

ETHNIC AND LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY IN THE SUDAN

Introduction

The term 'ethnic' and 'Ethnicity' is a relatively new word. The anthropologists started to use it in the early 1950s. It doesn't directly translate into Arabic, but is derived from the Greek word ethnos, meaning "people".(Hassan, I. S. 2001, p. 167) It was first used in science to describe ethnic groups dating back one hundred years ago (Mukhtar, A. 2007, p. 9).

The concept of ethnicity was meant to explain social phenomena and processes that occurred on the surface and borders of many human societies, often becoming global issues. An example of that can be the situation of Armenians or Kurdish people that has had influence all over the world, developing or not, or the issue of racism in US, the country with one of the greatest diversity of ethnic groups in the world" (Hassan, I. S. 2001, p. 186).

Ethnic aspects of social, political, economic, cultural, multi--cultural and historical processes overlap and intertwine, becoming

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the key issues affecting the coexistence between groups and nations or the process of building and conforming their identity.

Some view an ethnic group as a group of people sharing the same characteristics and culture or occupying a certain geographical area, which brings them a sense of solidarity. They are aware of the distinction and recognize other groups also acting accordingly Mukhtar, A. 2007, p. 10) The other indicators of an ethnic group can be the control over money and goods that a tribe or a culture possesses. They restrict other group's access to them though they may share the same area. It can lead to acts of violence or migration in response to the behavior of other groups (Mahdi M. A. 2002, p. 74).

The above mentioned ways of defining ethnicity are now considered historical. Today we attribute them to tribal or village activity more than an ethnic one which is more the general idea. A good example of this relation is the tribes and ethnic groups of Sudan. The ethnic groups tend to struggle with each other in order to find their own place in a social, economic, political or cultural space while trying to achieve their own individual goals (Al Bashir, T. I. 2008.46)

The ethnic associations are stronger than social associations since the latter depends on human relations and the first on biological and genetic bonds Mahdi M. A. 2002, p. 68). The genetically connected groups are more likely to survive than those who are just socially bound since the biological bond is much stronger, but in result the merge in groups is held very tightly by one strong person determined by the birth. And this is precisely what happened in Africa (Mekawy, B. El Din 2007, p. 60).

Ethnic groups often justify their historical and administrative demands with their level of education, efficiency and experience, just as they claim to possess the land acquired before the political transformations that created the new reality (Deng, F., 1999, p. 9).

Language is the basic tool of expression for humans along with other means, a repository of ideas and opinions. The language of the people has clearly defined the way of thinking about things. Due to the historical development of Sudan, it is multilingual, with each tribe having their individual language. Even Arabic tribes branched into different dialects, with different words to describe the same things. For example the tribes from Kordofan and Darfur are Arab and they use the same language, but in completely different dialects. The Dinka tribes from the south of Sudan who speak the Dinka language also branched into several dialects (Mukhtar, A. 2007, p. 11).

Sudan is a country of people coexisting on the land of many languages used for communication and socialization, with classical Arabic functioning as the official language of the state in coexistence with other Sudanese dialects present and historical.

The total population of Sudan measured in 2004 was about thirty-four million people, 68% rural, 29% living in cities, and 3% being Arab nomads. The proportion of the Muslims is nearly 80%, concentrated mostly in the North of Sudan, in the South 18% of the people are Muslim, 17% are Christians and the remaining 65% are pagans or atheists (Mekawy, B. El Din 2007, p. 56).

Sudan's population is greatly diverted ethnically, including hundreds of different groups, languages, religions and cultures. Among many other classifications there is a general division of the local population into three main groups consisting Sudanese society: the Arabs, Nubians, and the Negroes, though we based our work on another classification, mentioned later in the text.

In Sudan there are nearly six hundred tribes speaking more than a hundred different local languages40% of them are Arabs, 60% are native Africans, with 30% of the population being Negroes, 12% of the tribes are from West Africa, 12% Nubians and Beja and 3% being Nubians from the North. Muslims constitute

two thirds of the population, the rest are Christians and followers of other religions. About 51% of the population speaks Arabic; the other 49% are other languages and dialects (Hassan, I. S. 2001, p. 218).

Before coming of the Arabs, the Sudanese societies were dispersed into many single states, split between different ethnicities, tribes and local religions. In Northern Sudan lived the Nubians with Christian faith (. It was multilingual and a multicultural kingdom. In Central Sudan lived the Beja tribes with their own language and culture. In the South there were Negro tribes with many different physical features and individual languages and the same can be said about the West of Sudan. In fact, such ethnic and linguistic diversity is no exception; it is often a natural state of many countries (Denq F. 1995, p. 8).

The combined factors of geographical position and history were shaping the personality and identity of Sudan cultures with their ethnic and racial diversity and affiliation to Arab or native African communities (Mekawy, B. El Din 2007, p. 60).

Many scholars and researchers have tried to interpret the Sudanese communities, which are characterized by diversity and pluralism on ethnic and linguistic levels. Their research at some point had to deal with the Sudanese cultural heritage which we know through archaeology, regarding the formation of communities and their languages (Mekawy, B. El Din 2007, p. 123). This is a historical introduction to studies of the population that lived within the borders of Sudan, and the factors that led to such diversity. In this framework, the study of ancient societies is based on the material culture of traditional communities to determine the conditions of the emergence of such linguistic and ethnic diversity. Sudan is one of the most culturally differentiated countries, founded on varied environment that is reflected in the multiplicity of beliefs, languages and customs (Al Amin, Y. M. 2002, p. 14).

The focus in such research extended not only on ethno biology and geography, but also on archaeology, with it's over a hundred years of tradition. The cooperation gave good results and reached its top during the campaign to save the monuments of Nubia at the beginning of the first half of the twentieth century (Al Mobarak, H. 1998, p. 183) Over forty foreign missions conducted exploration and survey on many archeological sites in the northern parts of Sudan. The cooperation of national and foreign missions led to the enrichment of academic studies, especially those related to identity and communication between the people from the beginning of Sudanese civilization (Alhardlo, A. 2004, p. 71).

There were several theories attempting to explain the past of Sudanese cultures, most of them dependent on the ancient history. Many Sudanese archaeologists have helped to enrich those ideas [Ali Osman Muhammad Salih, prof. Ahmed Muhammad Ali Hakim (Hakim, A. M. 1990, p. 40).. and improve their quality in explaining and understanding the overall look of the Sudanese civilization with its ethnic and linguistic multiplicity and diversity all these factors were making the task of understanding Sudan more difficult especially when we consider the fact that cultural residue of the times past is now analyzed outside of its time frame and thus is a subject of interpretation. The language and ethnicity were developing in a form of interconnected circles affected also by the geographical position and number of civilizations and the bigger and stronger the civilization was, the greater the reach of their culture (Arkell, A. J. 196, p. 29).

Halima Alhazji said that Sudanese ancestors still have great influence on the present and future (Alhazji, H. 1985, p. 14) and Professor Awan Sharif Qasim points out that the language and dialects are like a tape with all the events that have passed down during Sudan's history being printed on it (Qasim A. S. 2002, p. 49)

This view is shared by Yusuf Hassan Madani. In his studies of boats in Sudan, he analyzed them as a pattern in the history of material culture that lasted throughout many periods of history. He concluded that the names for parts of the boats have been affected by a number of external factors, yet at the same time they remained indigenously rooted. Prof. Ali Osman Mohammed Saleh (Salih, A. O. M. 1990, p. 65) in his interpretation of Sudanese culture as being the result of Nubian migration says that this is the effect of clash between Nubian culture and local cultures where the elements of dynastic monarchy encountered local languages and religions. The result was the Sudanese culture, still containing customs and traditions of Nubia, various native Sudanese communities and also the Arabic language, names for places and some characteristic features of economic and social developments (Hassan, Y. F. 1989, p. 72).

The study of the history at the beginning of Sudanese civilization through linguistic and historical analysis of the ancient communities with their multiple stages of cultural development and comparing the results with modern linguistic and ethnic features of Sudan will help to understand the country (Mahdi M. A. 2002, p. 94).

Ethnic and geographical map of Sudan

Many breeds of humanity have lived in Sudan since ancient times, varying and intertwining with each other resulting in the complicated ethnic map of modern Sudan. This is perhaps the source of the difficulty of telling one population group from another just by focusing on their language or ethnicity or apart from their cultural and social foundations (Dufa Allah, S. B. 1999, p. 36) The geographical and other factors independent from human

influence are also an element of this differentiation, separating people and providing constantly changing environment through the ages (Barbour, K. M. 1961, p. 81).

Mohammed Awad says that due to the multiplicity of regions and different nations in Sudan and its position in Africa, the cruel designation of national borders is somewhat irrelevant. If we take into account the changes Sudan went through since the ancient times and changes in people, as well as the easy pathway for migrations known as the old Sudanese belt, it becomes obvious that the boundaries of the research don't lay along the lines of political borders (Awad, M. 1951, p. 10) The African continent is a region of many migrations since the ancient times and until now. Many studies show that in the Upper Neolithic, the people living there are called Bushmen, inhabited the dry and exposed parts of the continent from the desert through Ethiopia, East Africa and even until the southern parts of the continent (Al Bashir, T. I. 2008, p. 97).

At the end of Upper Paleolithic, a new ethnic group emerged in the northern parts of the Africa. They showed resemblance to Caucasians, and the researchers have named this new ethnic group Hamitic. During the Mesolithic age (Arkell, A. J. 1975, p. 39) a new Negro group appeared showing different features, they inhabited the middle Nile Valley and other places in Africa. The researchers called them the Khartoum civilization (Adams, Y. W. 1977, p. 47).

The discoverer of this culture Arkell said that the features of this Negro ethnic group are similar to the properties of people living in the south of the Sudan at this moment. Arkell made a comparison between cemeteries and discovered that some of the traditions are still similar, for example people in Khartoum civilization removed the two upper teeth from the jaw while people in south of Sudan now remove the two teeth from the lower jaw.

There are also many physical anthropologists that study the graves of Khartoum civilizations while comparing the burial methods of old with the contemporary find that there are many similarities. But still we know no reason for those people to migrate from central to the south of Sudan (Harvey, C. P. D. 1982, p. 97).

Roland Oliver and say that the mastering of agriculture and animal husbandry was the reason for the four main ethnic groups in Africa, they are Pigmies, Hamitic, Caucasoid and Negroes, but still we don't possess enough knowledge to say which group exactly originated the contemporary societies in Africa, or from where they migrated from or if they did at all (Oliver, R .J. 1965, p. 67).

Mohammed Awad says that the Negro strain inhabited the south of Sudan while the Caucasian lived in the north, and also that the Negroes came earlier. They had access to the Nile valley while the other ethnic groups were detached. After settling up, the ethnic groups started developing cultural characteristics distinguishing one from another, and the development wasn't equal in every group, as some were developing faster. While some of the more advanced groups begun to domesticate animals and started using agriculture, other ones were still at the point of gathering food and using primitive stone tools to survive (Awad, M. 1951, p. 51).

Despite the diversity of the cultures and ethnic groups in the history of Sudan, many researchers think that they all are descendants of only two groups – The Bushmen and Pigmies. After that, the Negro groups came to the continent and dominated many parts of the Africa, especially the southwestern (Mukhtar, A. 2007, p. 39).

The last to appear were the Caucasian group, consisting of two branches – The Hamitic and Semitic, and they both successively mixed with Negro group. During the history of Sudan we find many examples of exchanging ethnic and cultural features and

mutual impact between indigenous groups and foreign ones adding to the richness of the ethnological map of Sudan. Atta el--Batthani analyzed the transformations that occurred in the North and Central Nile Valley, parts of Kordofan and Darfur. In the Eastern part, the ethnic groups speak Arabic and come from native Arab tribes mixed with other tribes, including non-Arabic ethnic groups coming from the North. For example, The Nuba from the Hamitic group, Beja from the same group and other local Negro groups. Most of the groups in west Darfur are Negro and parts of them are Hamitic, while the rest of the ethnic groups are Negro. Ethnic groups in central Sudan come from three types of the Negro group: Sudanese, Nile-Hamitic and Nilotic. Such division has its limitations, but it gives a general picture of ethnicity in a large part of Sudan. Any research dealing with this framework must necessarily consider other cultural, linguistic, economic and social factors. Until now only the UNESCO statement on race, cited after Achilles Montag (Fagan, M.B.1978, p. 81) says that the national and religious groups in their geographical, linguistic and cultural layers do not necessarily correspond to any genetically divergent groups, or at least there is no evidence of that. The author used the term Ethnic dynasty to refer to the human group characterized by ties of ethnicity and connection to any specific group. The term 'ethnic' is now used to describe interactions between specific groups, not to address the specificity of any group by itself.

The ethnic composition of Sudan is very diverse nowadays, but it varied all the time during its long history and the names for stages in cultural history of Sudan are derived from the names of the ethnic group's dominant at a time (Myers, O. H. 1948, p. 47).

At the time of the pharaohs in Egypt, the name used for Sudan was "Saito", meaning 'the arc' or 'the bow' because Sudanese people were renowned for their skill in using the bow. Greeks, Romans and part of Arab tribes have used the name 'Ramat Al-Hadag'

meaning "archer" for similar reasons. During many Egyptian Dynasties the name "Tuthmosis" was in use, meaning "people with black skin" or "Asmar" meaning "brown skin". This name was used describe many different tribes south of Aswan. During the peak of the ancient Sudanese culture, the people there were described with the name "Kush". It was once the name of a single ethnic group who grew in importance and dominated large parts of Sudan and other tribes. Kush was a strong civilization and remains of it are still found throughout all of Sudan, especially in the North, examples being 182 pyramids being left by and also more than 25 temples (Roman, W. L. 1979, p. 51).

The reference to black skin of the people was for a long time the name of Sudan, until it became the name for the country Ethiopia "the black country". It was even mentioned by Arabs in the XVII century.

The cultures present in Sudan during different eras since the Paleolithic concentrated along the Nile Valley and other parts, sometimes remote from the river. The cultural characteristics focused around manufacturing stone tools. Some of the cultural marks reflect contact with people from neighboring regions, evolved during the Stone Age, when some kind of stability occurred for the first time (settlements) and some tools other from stone and bone arms. A good example here is the famous Khartoum pottery (Arkell, 1975, p23) adorned with lines and other shapes, which became the formula borrowed and repeated in many areas of Central and Northern Sudan.

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HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE
OF ARAB MUSLIM COMMUNITIES
IN THE CENTRAL SUDAN ZONE

Introduction.
Geography and environment of the Sudan ecozone

Vast, predominantly plain territories located between the Sahara desert and equatorial forests spreading from the Atlantic Ocean up to the Red Sea are defined as the region or the zone of Sudan. This name stems from the medieval Arab geographers who called those territories stretching to the south of Sahara and inhabited by the black people *bilad as-Sudan*. In their indigenous language this meant „land of the black people"[1]. The first, non--Arabic piece of work on this topic was the research paper written by William Cooley, *The Negroland of the Arabs*, published for the first time in 1841. The author made an attempt to reconstruct the historical map of the region by listing its ethnic groups, cities and

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[1] The following Arab geographers may be chronologically listed at this point: al-Jaqubi (891), al-Masudi (956), Ibn Hawqal (977), al-Bakri (1094), Idrisi (1166), Ibn Said (1274), Ibn Battuta (1377), Ibn Khaldun (1406), Maqrizi (1442) and Leo Africanus (1526).

countries, trying to define the borders of the area[2]. In 1924, the next researcher of this region, Melville Herskovits managed to work out a more detailed outline assuming that Sudan was divided into East and West with a borderline crossing Lake Chad. Having been heavily criticized by Michael Horowitz, he finally took into consideration Sudan's detailed diversification in terms of language, law, religion, politics and economy and divided it into Eastern, Western and Central Sudan[3].

According to this division, Central Sudan, from Herskovits point of view, was to embrace the areas spreading from Central Niger to the Wadai plateau. In the end, however, Triminghan thesis was taken as granted which stated that Central Sudan stretched to the Darfur Plateau[4]. In other words, it embraced the region of the so called Chad Basin, from the Niger River in the West to the Marrah Mountains *(Jebel Marra)* in the East, locked in the North by the mountain massifs of Air, Tibesti and Ennedi, and in the South locked by the Benue River, highlands of the Northern Cameroon and the rivers of the Southern Chad. Due to cultural and political factors it is usually divided into the Western part embracing the areas spreading from Chad Lake to the Niger River (i.e. the regions of the present Southern Niger and Northern Nigeria) and the Eastern part (i.e. the present Northern Cameroon, Chad and Central African Republic excluding the forested areas).

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[2] From: Yusuf Fadl Hasan and Paul Doornbos (ed.), *The Central Bilad al-Sudan. Tradition and Adaptation*, Khartoum: El Tamaddon P. Press 1977, p. 2.

[3] Michael M. Horowitz, *A Reconsideration of the „Eastern Sudan"*,„Cathiers d'Etudes Africaines" (1967), pp: 381-398; Melville Herskovits, *A Preliminary Consideration of the Culture Areas of Africa*, „American Anthropologist" 26 (1924), p. 50-63; idem: *The Human Factor in Changing Africa*, New York 1962.

[4] J. S. Trimingham, *A History of Islam in West Africa*, London/Glasgow 1962, pp. 34 I 105.

The whole ecozone of Sudan also referred to by Horowitz as the „*cattle area"* is characterized by dry tropical climate with only one rainy season during summer, diversified in terms of rainfall depending on the latitude and the elevation above the sea level of a given region. The ecozone vegetation consists of open grassland or trees and bushes generally defined as savannah, sporadically crossed by mountain massifs. Travelling from the north to the south, dependent on the average annual rainfall one may encounter various types of the savannah ranging from half-desert dry Sahel savannah also called the thorny one, through the grass-shrub-like, park-like and forest-like savannah. The present landscape of the Sudan zone was heavily affected by transformations resulting from the pastoral and farming activity of people connected, among others, with deforestation, overgrazing of the grass areas and land cultivation. Climate crises including irregular, multiannual droughts or locusts along with strategies of adapting people to the environment are typical of this region. They embrace methods of using various food sources including migratory animals farming, extensive cultivation methods based on rainfall, being more intensive in places with artificial irrigation, and declining activities of hunting and gathering.

Generally speaking, Sudan zone has always enjoyed relatively favourable conditions for the development of farming and lack of natural barriers has for many centuries fostered long-lasting migrations there. It also encouraged the dissemination of practices connected with iron smelting and blacksmithing, craftsmanship and crops along with the inflow of other pastoral people both from the East (the Arabs) and the West (the Fulbe) searching for safety and new lands offering better water resources and fodder for animals. The above-mentioned peoples considerably affected the history and culture of this region. The wide-ranging trade developing there along with cultural ties between various regions

and ethnic groups led to the formation of new cities and creation of statehood. In this region of the world since the Middle Ages it has usually meant the expansion of Islam and the Arab culture which widened horizons of the locals and enabled them to establish relations with other regions of the world. Although the importance of Central Sudan is often undermined, it plays a leading role as a connector between Western and Eastern Sudan. Therefore, its significance deserves our special attention and has become the leading topic of this article.

Forms of statehood in central Bilad as-Sudan.
Slave hunters and refugial people

Kanem was the oldest state in Central Sudan – it was formed around the ninth century AD[5], around Chad Lake. The second oldest state was Kanem's successor – Bornu. Small states with strong urban centres like Kano, Zaria, Katsina and Gobir emerged in the fourteenth and fifteenth century to the West, on the territories of the Hausa people spreading to the country of Songhai upon the Niger River. In the nineteenth century they were finally conquered by Osman dan Fodio, who led the Fulbe tribes having arrived from the West. They established there a powerful Sokoto Sultanate and its dependent emirates (*lamibe*) in Adamawa Plateau.

Around the sixteenth century other state organisations were also formed there: in the Benue River Valley – Juku and Nupe, between the territories of Hausa and Songhai – Kebbi and to the East of Chad Lake – Baguirmi, and farther to the East – the Wadai and Darfur Sultanates. Origins of the centralised political structure

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[5] From this period comes the oldest record from the Arabic sources.

in Darfur date back to the state of Dajo from the thirteenth century and its successor from the fifteenth century in the form of Tunjur state (probably formed out of "Arabized" Nubians), dethroned by the Kayra clan emanating from the local Fur folk who named this land and ruled it until 1874.

Wadai, initially dependent on Darfur, was established in the sixteenth century probably by the Tunjur people led by Abd al-Karim. This state in the reign of Sabun in the second half of the eighteenth century became the key power of Central Sudan. Arab tribes flowing to Central Sudan from the east, known as Baggara or Shuwa, have never been regarded as the creators of the local statehood. Nevertheless, they exerted a significant impact on it, for example, by taking part in the process of Islamisation. Similarly, The Fulbe nomadic shepherds played an important role in the nineteenth century in the western part of Central Sudan, on the territories of the Hausa people.

All these Sudanese states, non-coherent in terms of ethnicity had a lot in common as far as culture and structure are concerned. Their rulers' primary concern was not only to increase the number of territories subject to them but also to deepen the process of Islamisation, bring the Arab judges, Muslim lawyers and other scholars as well as tradesmen and craftsmen.

Those states existed mainly thanks to profits derived from the control over trans-Saharan trade and trade exchange with the main hubs at the Mediterranean Sea. Its major export industry included ivory, pelt and other Sudanese goods such as honey, ostrich feathers and slaves, workers and soldiers in exchange for weapon, horses, camels, textiles and other consumables. Admittedly, intensity of trade there was lower than in West Africa or Sudan close to Nile (mainly due to the lack of gold), yet the significance of the route via Bilma, Kawar and Zawila or the so called Forty Days Road *(Darb al-Arba'in)* from Kutum in Darfur to Egypt

was of vital importance[6]. At the same time, those states benefited hugely from trade in salt extracted from the Saharan mines and transported farther into the savannah zone devoid in this mineral. They also organised regular expeditions to the south aimed at capturing slaves. Far-reaching trade also developed between East and West and it was predominantly based on copper extracted in Darfur and delivered to Kano and Bornu in exchange for Hausa textiles and Kola nuts cultivated in woodland areas of West Africa[7].

Thanks to trade relations with the Arab-Berber North along with traders, spiritual leaders and migratory pastoralist tribes coming from there Islam gained on popularity and started to play a significant role in the process of integrating the state apparatus through strengthening dynasties and the power elites. However, it was not powerful enough to eliminate local tribes whose existence was only consolidated by this religion treating them as extension of the family structures, which as a result weakened local state systems. It should be, however, stressed that not all the people in Sudan were zealous Muslims and Islam often had there its specific, syncretic and local aspect as local people who belonged to it did not always give up their beliefs and traditional practices. All the time political and power games were waged between particular tribes and nomads against the city dwellers and farmers settled there. Horses and camels owned by nomads often ensured them military advantage over farmers and enabled fast seizure of control over trade routes. They might have been the founders of the states like Kanem formed probably by the pastoral Barber

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[6] R. Karpiński, *Sudan Centralny do końca XVI w.*, in: M. Tymowski (ed.), *Historia Afryki od początku XIX w.*, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich 1996, p. 498 ff.

[7] Ibid., p. 856.

or Nilo-Saharan Zaghawa[8] tribes that conquered the agricultural Kanuri tribes *(Kanembu)*. It was similar to the case of the Baguirmi led by the dynasty of the nomadic Tubu people. Yet, shepherds had never completely dominated farmers or city dwellers either politically or economically. On the contrary, numerical advantage of the settled people and steady sedentarisation processes of a nomadic population always had the opposite effect. Interaction and collaboration of pastoral and farming economy were the prevailing trends. In case of antagonisms farmers had to quit their principles and either accept the dominance of nomads or look for shelter because the military advantage of the latter group was obvious. In the states of Hausa they found shelters behind powerful safety barricades of local cities constituting real refugia, the so called *birane* which embraced not only buildings but also agricultural land[9]. In case of people like Sara, Banda, Manza and other living outside the boundaries of the existing states there was no other way than exile to the lands relatively hardly accessible to nomads.

Farmers and non-Muslim people from this zone were almost regularly terrorised by the Arab slave hunters deriving from the so called *jallaba*[10] merchants and by migratory Baggara shepherds. Wars with the use of underhand tactics were there waged for centuries. Territories in the southern part of Sudan zone were directly called „the state of slaves" *(Dar Fertit)* where real hunts

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[8] The name Zaghawa is not clear enough. In a wider context it is used to define all nomads between Nile and Lake Chad. In a narrower context, the name is used only to the nomad ethnos classified to the language group Teda, living on the contemporary borderline between the Republic of Sudan and Chad; Ibid., p. 493 ff.

[9] Ibid., p. 531.

[10] The name stems from their favourite outfit, *djellaba,* being also the male national outfit of Sudanese Arabs.

were organised for the Nigritic tribes. Initially, they concentrated on the territories of the Eastern Sudan beyond the River Bahr al-Ghazal but following the flights of the locals (including the Banda people) they moved farther to the West, to the territories of the present southern Chad and the Central African Republic. At the end of the nineteenth century two famous Djellaba traders: al- Rahma Mansur az-Zubeir and Rabih Fadlallah az-Zubeir[11] distinguished themselves in this peculiar entrepreneurship. Moreover, Rabih Fadlallah az-Zubeir founded a specific quasi – state on the border of the present Central African Republic and Chad based on fortified camps known as *zeriba* which served as base camps for the slave hunters. Annually they sent from those territories circa six thousand slaves[12] through the state of Baguirmi and Wadai (in Egyptian Sudan slave trade was prohibited under the European influence) to Ottoman Libya.

Representatives of the Nigritic tribes who wanted to avoid death or slavery had the possibility, having negotiated it with the invaders, to pay tribute to the Sultans of Wadai or Darfur but if they opposed they had to leave their existing whereabouts. It was a common strategy used in pre-colonial Africa. Low population density, lack of formal land property and unregulated issues of settlement and boundaries facilitated the decisions on migration. Refugees flew away to the mountainous or swamp regions, relatively hardly accessible to nomads, like e.g. Mont Mela *(Jebel Mela)* in the eastern part of the present Central African Republic. Steep slopes of the mountains, caves and mazes of tunnels constituted a natural area for refugees. Similar shelters were also found in the Jos Plateau in the Mandara Massif in the present Cameroon

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[11] See: J. Vansina, *Kupcy z nad Nilu*, in: P. Curtin, S. Faierman, L. Thompson, J. Vansina, *Historia Afryki. Narody i cywilizacje*, Gdańsk: Marabut 2003, p. 528 ff.

[12] D. D. Cordel, *Des "Réfugiés" dans l'Afrique précoloniale*, „Politique Africaine" (2002), No. 85, pp. 16-29.

and Abou Telfan in Chad. People like Kirdi or Hajerai seeking shelter in those places have been referred to as refugial until today.

They created a specific culture characterised by fortified villages and habitations situated at the slopes of the mountains and the so called „emergency agriculture" caused by a repeated series of famine. Famine resulted both from a dense population on the refugial territories, recurring locust plagues and the tactic of the „burnt soil" used by the invaders who detected the presence of men by noticing the fields of millet, which encouraged to theft or destruction. Thus, a new strategy became popular[13]. Millet was replaced by cassava which was not only more productive but also hardly discernible among other plants as it was not grown on separate fields.

Migrations of Sudanese Arabs and their importance in the contemporary Chad

Arabs in Central Sudan nowadays referred to as Chad Arabs belong to the groups of Sudanese Arabs formed between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries as a distinctive ethnos in the Eastern Nilotic Sudan. Their ancestors flew from Arabia to Egypt and later on migrated along Nile to Nubia and Kordofan, from where they spread farther to the West, i.e. to the territories of Darfur and the present Chad up to the state of Bornu in the contemporary Nigeria. Immigration also headed for Central Sudan through Trans-Saharan routes, directly from Northern Africa but irrelevant in terms of numbers. Nevertheless, it is to be remembered that this way arrived merchants and various holy men *(fakih or marabouts)*, legal experts and religious leaders whose si-

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[13] Ibid.

gnificance in the process of spreading Islam, Arabic writing and general knowledge about the world proved to be invaluable.

In Eastern Sudan indigenous Arabs from Arabia by mixing with the locals through marriages and adopting many local communities to their tribes not only led to their Islamisation and Arabisation but they themselves underwent the process of Africaniation, namely Sudanisation. As a result of those adaptation processes Arabs nowadays do not greatly differ from the indigenous Sudanese either by the colour of their skin or by culture which underwent extensive convergence. Among them, however, there are two groups to be recognised: Arabs, the so called Ja'alin-Danagla stemming, to a greater extent, from the Arabised Nubian agricultural communities and Juhayna-Fezara who in majority were the descendants of the pastoral tribes from Arabia. Both groups are divided into many more tribes forming unstructured confederations[14]. The first group was formed by the above-mentioned Tunjur people who for some time took control over Darfur and who are considered to have been the founders of the Wadai state. The second group embraced all the remaining tribes of Arab nomads dealing mainly with camel farming, a typical activity of the Arab Bedouins. Many of those groups, when travelling to the centre of Sudan, were forced to change camel for cattle farming which was better accustomed to a bit more humid climate in the southern part of the Sudan zone. This way was formed a more Africanised than the previous ones subgroup of Juhaynaah Arabs called Baggara (Arabic *baggar:* a cow) specialising in cattle farming which became the fundamental basis of their economy. Apart from cattle farming they also dabbled in goat and sheep breeding, slave

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[14] For further information see: M. Ząbek, *Arabowie z Dar Hamid. Społeczność w sytuacji zagrożenia ekologicznego*, Warszawa: Dialog 1998.

trading or elephant and giraffe hunting, in which they were regarded as specialists[15].

Baggara Arabs, beside the Fulbe people, with time became the largest group of nomads and shepherds in the Sudan zone. Their tribes settled on the territories along the River White Nile in Eastern Sudan through the territories of the South Kordofan and Darfur, Central Chad, Northern Cameroon up to the state of Bornu (present north-east Nigeria) constituting the so called belt of Baggarah Arabs or Szuwa as they are called in the western part.

Nowadays, many Baggara groups, mainly because of losing their herds as a result of wars or overgrazing, deal with farming or trading and craft in the cities. Majority of them still pursue, however, the semi-nomadic type of economy based on migratory life stock grazing only during the rainy season whereas in the dry season (i.e. main part of the year) they carry on sedentary lifestyle in the villages. Their kinship system is based on the patrilineal lineage *(khaszimbet)* and flexible tribal communities system *(qabila)*. Many of them possess two houses – permanent one in a village close to the water sources and another in a nomadic camp. Men often have more than one wife. One of them usually lives in a pastoral camp whereas others live in the village. They are responsible for almost all tasks connected with house-keeping and family including constructing movable shelters called „mate houses” *(bet berish)*, milking cows and sale of milk, butter and cheese. Men take care of cattle herds and deal with millet, melons and cassava growing.

Baggara people are famous for their zealous religiousness and conscientious observance of Islam practices: praying, alms giving or going on regular pilgrimages to Mecca. They also formed the

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[15] For further information see: I. Cunnison, *Giraffe hunting among Humr Tribe*, „Sudan Notes and Records” vol. 39 (1996), p. 49-60.

most numerous group of Arabs in the Egyptian Sudan who supported the uprising of Mohammed Ahmed who declared himself Mahmid. Until present times Baggara people have boasted that Mahmid's successor – Khaliph *(Khalifa)* Abdullahi ibn Mohammed, who organised and led the uprising along with the Cultural Revolution in the spirit of Orthodox Islam, stemmed from their tribes.

In colonial times attempts were made to ascribe particular Baggara tribes to certain units of territorial administration, which however proved futile both in French Equatorial Africa and Anglo--Egyptian Sudan. Nowadays, in the independent Chad they constitute the worthwhile minority enjoying prestigious reputation but without great political influence. Their language, though not popular among non-Arab ethnic groups belongs, beside French, to the official languages in Chad. The reason for this state of affairs is more connected with the religious function of their language and Baggara people's importance in the economy and dissemination of Islam than their role in politics. In Chad, they belong to one of the most entrepreneurial groups. They handle almost entire wholesale trade and lion's part of the retail one. All the services like taxis and hotels are managed by them. They usually run Koranic schools and mosques by exerting significant influence on the Islamisation progress in this country. Their political strategy in Chad seems to be based on keeping distance and maintaining equilibrium towards all other ethnic groups.

The role of Sudanese route[16]
in the pilgrimage traffic to Mecca

Open, mainly plain areas of the Sudan zone without natural obstacles played, as above mentioned, the key role in the cultural exchange between West and East Africa through migration of pastoral tribes and far-reaching trade. Pilgrimage traffic of Islam believers to Mecca, who travelled via the so called Sudanese route, exerted a great effect on that trade. The pilgrimages left a powerful impression on the inhabitants of the countries they went through and served as a way to get together with the "others", to develop economic and political relations and cultural encounter between the folks of that region. They also boosted the migration of tribes (especially Fulbe-Mboror, Hausa, Bornu and Wadai) eastwards from the West, which in East Sudan was reflected in a considerable diaspora of those immigrants' ancestors called Fellata. That general name meant "strangers" or "foreigners" coming from the west of Africa and perceived by the Sudanese Arabs also as the ancestors of the early pilgrims to Mecca who decided not to come back to their countries of origin.

Walking pilgrimages or caravans of camels and donkeys started probably in the first centuries of Islam popularisation in this region (unfortunately there is no historical evidence on this topic) and lasted continuously until the 1960-s of the twentieth century when they became slowly superseded by air transport. Pilgrima-

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[16] Route, or the „Sudanese Road" (Arab. *'tariq Sudan*) to the holy places of Islam, had its starting point in the Nigerian city of Maiduguri and through Abeche, El-Geneina, El Obeid, Sennar led to Sawakin upon the Red Sea, from which people by means of ships reached Jidda and Mecca in Arabia; 'Umar al-Naqar, *The Historical Background to "the Sudan Road"*, in: Yusuf Fadl Hasan (ed.), *Sudan in Africa*, University of Khartoum 2006, p. 106.

ges were organised both by individuals and rulers of certain states. Their intensity depended on the possibilities to ensure the safety along the route against natural disasters and human threats by the Sudanese states.

It should be remembered that an attractive alternative, especially in case of majority of states located westwards from Wadai was offered by trans-Saharan routes and trails along the Mediterranean Sea to Egypt, and farther to Arabia. Eastwards from this state the "Sudanese route" to Sawakin upon the Red Sea was better known and more frequently used although since the collapse of the Nubian Christian states located upon Nile its significance has declined. Only after the formation of the so called "Black Sultanate" of the Funj people in Sennar, the Muslims started to use it. Obviously, Darfur inhabitants started to do it at the earliest, followed by their western neighbours from Wadai and all the others who could not endure to pass through the desert[17].

Popularity of trans-Saharan routes in the West of Africa was highly dependent upon the safety situation in Sahara and the states of the North Africa. Yet, from the territories spread farthest to the West, especially the early Empires of Ghana, Mala and Songhai, until the sixteenth century, the road through Sahara was much more often chosen than its shorter, but not so popular or even unknown counterpart in the form of „Sudanese route". It resulted from no willingness on the part of pilgrimages to become the pioneers and discoverers to risk the adventures in Sudan. In fact Sahara was a challenge but it was better known and once crossed it offered the route leading through the populated areas under Muslim Law and comfortable places to rest in the Osman caravanserais. Besides, though states between Lake Chad and Nile were, at least since the tenth century, under the influence of Islam,

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[17] Ibid., p. 101.

there were no religious centres founded until the sixteenth century. In the very Nile Sudan, as already pointed out, a serious problem was posed to the Muslim pilgrimages by the Nubian Christianity which hindered Muslims the access to the Red Sea or to Egypt and the same reaching Mecca. Thus, pilgrims from West Sudan as a rule set off in caravans from the City of Walata do the Moroccan Fez or from Timbuktu through Taghaza (famous for its salt mines and the crucial parking space for caravans) to Libyan oasis of Ghadames and farther along the coast to Egypt and Mecca[18]. The most well-known pilgrim of those times, the ruler Mali--Mansa Musa, travelled to Mecca via this very route in 1324.

Pilgrimages from West Africa flourished at the most in times of the Songhai Empire. From the city of Gao people embarked on a journey via route through the Air and Fezzan Mountains to Egypt following the example of the ruler of Songhai Askii Mohammed Great, who paved this way in 1515. He looked after the pilgrims and showed them great kindness. At his order pilgrims returning home were solemnly welcomed at the gates to the city of Gao and were given presents in exchange for their blessing[19].

Songhai people and other western Sudanese discovered "Sudanese Road" only after the Moroccan conquest in 1590 and the collapse of the Songhai Empire. Chaos which prevailed along with the increasing hostility from Tuareg tribes made them accept new conditions. For fear of capturing and slave trade they chose the city of Djenne as a new starting point for their pilgrimages. It was situated farther to the South and replaced Timbuktu and Gao. From that time pilgrimages headed for the South along Niger in the direction of the territories of the Hausa people where in the city of Maiduguri the "Sudanese Road" (*'tariq Sudan'*) started

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[18] 'Umar al-Naqar, ibid., p. 99.
[19] Ibid., p. 99.

passing through the cities of Abeche and El-Obejd to the Red Sea and afterwards to Mecca. Knowledge about it was spread thanks to the earlier migration of Fulbe-Mbororo shepherds and Baggarah Arabs. In this way, Central and Eastern Sudan, not affected by the Moroccan assault and free from the Tuaregs' aggression became the beneficiary of the Muslim pilgrimages' practices and trade resulting therefrom.

It should be noted, however, that this route did not straight away gain on popularity among all the western Sudanese people. The power of tradition often made people from the Hausa city of Katsina return to the North heading for the Air Plateau to Fezzan and Egypt. In the seventeenth and eighteenth century it was still an unsafe road and few people from those regions of Sudan decided to embark on a pilgrimage. Pilgrims left their homes unsure about coming back. Fewer caravans were organised due to the general crisis in the trans-Saharan trade resulting from declining price of gold in the basin of the Mediterranean Sea. There were no clear timetables of pilgrimages as it used to be in the past. Local Muslim lawyers and scholars (*ulama*) even announced that Muslims no longer had to make the pilgrimages and made statements (*fatawa*) offering other practices replacing them[20].

Only the creation of the Fulbe Sokoto Caliphate after 1804, preceded by the formation of other powerful Muslim states like: Bornu, Baguirmi, Wadai and Funj and the prohibition on attacking "people travelling to the House of God" by Osman Dan Fodio, laid the grounds for the formation of the homogenous Islamic structure spreading from Niger to Nile at the end of the seventeenth century. It protected the whole region by improving the conditions of pilgrims and popularizing this path among Muslims in the entire belt of Sudan. Organised governments ruling in the zone of

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[20] Ibid., p. 100.

Sudan along with parallels in religion, law and customs among them let the pilgrims travel around without being bothered by anyone.

More frequent pilgrimages on this route were accompanied by the development of trade in copper from Darfur, blacksmith goods, Hausa textiles, and Cola nuts from the forest zone and also on a smaller scale in dates, cereals, cattle and local cotton textiles. Other goods including Indian textile products, Cowrie shells, spices and sandalwood reached the Sudanese route through Suakin upon the Red Sea. It was possible, however, thanks to the formation of, in a certain sense, informal economic community of all those Sudanese states and ensuring all the Muslims including both pilgrimages and long distance traders the minimum of safety under the Islamic Sharia Law. This way, they were given the opportunity to use the unified fare systems (states along the route collected the sort of a duty, most often paid in kind), to issue guarantees or borrow money without usury, by means of which that kind of trade had developed.

Nevertheless, certain parts of that route still remained dangerous, like, for example, the route from Darfur through Kurdufan which became safe only after being conquered by the Sultan Mohammad Tairab from Darfur in 1785. Similarly dangerous was the route from Nile to the Red Sea crossing the territories of hostile tribes of Beja. Pilgrims, after reaching Nile, often chose the longer but safer passage through Egypt or even via Christian Ethiopia to Gonder and Massawa instead of going directly to Sawakin and Jedda[21].

Legends about Mahdi who was to appear in the East inspired the Islam believers from the West Sudan to embark on pilgrimages. The Mahdist uprising which was expected to cause the great

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[21] J. L. Burckhardt, *Travels in Nubia,* London 1819, pp. 405-407.

Hijra did not lead to it and even considerably weakened the pilgrimage traffic as numerous would-be pilgrims were concerned about their lives and possessions[22]. Only the annihilation of the uprising by the British revived this movement.

In the colonial times both extreme parts of the „Sudanese Road" (in Nigeria and Sudan) were under the British control and only its middle part (crossing Cameroon and Chad) was in the hands of France. The British, after the Mahdist uprising, started to control caravans on this route and issue special passports to pilgrims which had to be presented in control points. Still, this movement in the territories controlled by them was carried out undisturbed, contrary to the French colonies. The French, in an attempt to prevent the development of pro-Islamic ideas, formed numerous bureaucratic obstacles (ranging from non-issuing travel documents through the requirement to possess a defined amount of money, to accusations of illegal trade) to the free movement of persons and goods on this route. Still, they were unable to inhibit the process of illegal migration to the English-Egyptian Sudan which also due to economic reasons (the requirement of compulsory work binding on the French territories) was higher than ever before[23].

Further changes on the Sudanese Road began slowly to take place in the twentieth century. Since 1911 one could safely and relatively comfortably travel by railway from the city of El Obeid to Port Sudan – a new port situated upon the Red Sea. What was interesting, more often people who travelled via "Sudanese Road" were ruled by reasons other than the religious ones.

In 1920 transport by cars was introduced on the entire "Sudanese Road" to further develop in the 1940-s and later on. Unfor-

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[22] 'Umar al-Naqar, op. cit., p. 104.
[23] Ibid., p. 105.

tunately, the long-lasting war in Chad, which broke out shortly after gaining independence by that country, along with the present rebellion in Darfur halted that sort of pilgrimages. Besides, lack of asphalt roads hindered the development of bus transport which though more frequent from the 1960-s was gradually superseded by aircraft.

Finally, I can only express the hope that after annihilation of local conflicts in the region a modern asphalt highway will be created from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea and consequently the bus transport together with traditional pilgrimage and trade traffic on the route to Mecca will be restored. This process may be accelerated as many sections of this road have already been generated. All the countries of the Sudan zone could greatly benefit therefrom.

Conclusions

The importance of Central Sudan in the past as a vast border region meant the role of a bridge in the trade and cultural exchange not only between the North and Sub-Saharan Africa but also between Eastern and Western Sudan. It also came down to bringing together distant cultures, traditions, languages and religions.

First of all, lack of natural barriers enabled mass migrations of pastoral tribes of Arab origin from the eastern part and of Fulbe origin from the western part of *Bilad as-Sudan* which to a certain extent were interlocked but not mixed together. Migrations of the Fulbe people predominantly concentrated in southern, lower latitudes of this zone focusing on exploitation of both park--like and forest-like savannah regions, whereas Arabs reached mainly higher and drier latitudes of this zone. Besides, the Fulbe dominated to a high extent the western part of Central Sudan

(territories of present Nigeria and North Cameroon) while Arabs took over its eastern part (mainly the territories of the Middle Chad and Southern Darfur). Both groups of those exceptionally entrepreneurial people played a significant role in creating the statehood in this region, diversification of economy and Islamisation of the whole area.

Sudan zone served as an arena of rivalry between particular groups but also as a room for dialogue and cooperation. Migratory character of this zone fostered general development mainly in terms of the material civilization development through enrichment of particular groups including Arab traders. It also allowed for the flow of ideas and dissemination of the Islamic legal system *(Sharia),* Arabic alphabet and consolidation along with further dispersal of Arab-Muslim culture in the heart of the African continent. It was possible thanks to the formation of the great coalition of the Muslim states where pilgrims and traders were protected and subject to a similar law. It allowed for the creation of the longest route in the entire continent of both pilgrimage traffic and trade character in the form of the so called „Sudanese Road" which was in use from at least seventeenth century almost incessantly until the present times. It should be stressed that the importance of this "Sudanese Road" in Africa may only be compared to the role of "Silk Road" in Asia.

All these factors together enabled the zone of the early *bilad as-Sudan* to gain a considerable cultural, social and spiritual homogeneity thanks to the domination of Islam and Arab culture. Nowadays, this region serves as an influential centre aiming to propagate and preserve this culture in the entire Sub-Saharan Africa.

Simultaneously, it should be noted that though many local African people (i.e. Nigritic ones) underwent to a large extent the process of assimilation and acculturation in a more civilised and

Map 1. Range of occurrence of Baggara Arabs (Szuwa)

advanced, from universalistic perspective, Arab-Muslim civilisation, until now some of those people have managed to preserve their own identity and autonomy. Refugial populations serve as a perfect example. It illustrates vitality of African culture which has prevailed in this region despite the domination and agency of Arabs and the Fulbe people.

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R**ésumé**
L'importance historique des communautés arabes musulmanes dans la zone du Soudan central

Le but de l'article est de montrer l'importance du Soudan central, en tant qu'espace de grande frontière et de passerelle facilitant l'échange commercial et culturel non seulement entre l'Afrique du Nord et l'Afrique subsaharienne, mais aussi entre l'Est et l'Ouest de Bilad as-Soudan. L'article souligne le rôle des États musulmans précoloniaux dans cette région, des migrations de peuples pastoraux, de la domination de l'Islam et de la culture arabe, ainsi que de la création simultanée dans la région de multiples refuges territoriaux pour les peuples non-musulmans voulant préserver leur identité et leur spécificité.

PIOTR MALIŃSKI

SEARCHING FOR NUBIAN DESERT GOLD WITH A METAL DETECTOR.
Functioning and Organization of *dahaba* Occupational Group in Sudan

Introduction

Gold deposits laying in regions located between Middle Nile and the Red Sea were, since past times, attracting the attention of people trying to exploit them by different means. Information regarding this topic in written sources, as well as material remains related to gold exploitation have sparked interest of travellers, researchers and scholars. Thanks to that, gold mining in Nubian Desert[1] (since ancient to modern times) became a subject of numerous studies between many domains of science. The Egyptologists have been analysing related ancient Egyptian text resources (Vercoutter 1959; Gundlach 1977), while archaeologists conducted surface research (Bloss 1937; Newbold 1948), as well as site excavations (Castiglioni, Castiglioni and Vercoutter 1998;

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[1] The word *nub* in Ancient Egyptian language meant gold, while Nubia was perceived as a legendary "land of gold" (Klemm, Klemm and Murr 2002, 215).

Sadr 1997). A precious sources for the historians were works of medieval Arabic literature – authors of those manuscripts devoted much effort to describe Nubian gold (Lewicki 1967). A significant value as a source has also one of the relations of XIX-century European travellers (Linant de Bellefonds 1868). There are also numerous materials about search for this precious metal and its exploitation in later times – geological reports (Llewellyn 1903; Dunn 1911; Grabham 1929), mining companies reports, as well as broad fragments in scientific monographies (Whiteman 1971, 215-229).

Though the history of gold exploitation in Nubian Desert has been thus quite well described, its status today remains poorly investigated. An occurrence of recent years, however, dubbed by media as "Sudanese gold rush"[2] indisputably deserves scientific research – because of its scale, character and caused consequences. Especially interesting, for an ethnologist, is a phenomenon of searching for gold nuggets with the use of metal detectors. It represents a spectacular example of sudden civilization change, to which northern Sudanese tribe communities are exposed. An adaptation of the newest, technologically advanced inventions of Western world and their utilization in traditional economic activity (which for Sudanese is gold mining) has caused a number of cultural implications. Its social repercussion was founding a new, specialized occupational group. This article describes basic aspects of its organisation and functioning.

The article is based mainly on outcomes of ethnological field research, performed in February 2011 in north-western regions of Nubian Desert. The remaining data presented was gathered during earlier research expeditions of the author in northern Sudan. In the years 2005-2008, he approached a traditional methods

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[2] http://www.rp.pl/artykul/556710.html accessed 29.08.2012.

Plate 1. Ruins of the workers' settlement in abandoned Umm Nabari gold mine in the Nubian Desert (photo P. Maliński).

of gold mining in Middle Nile Valley and Bayuda Desert. In 2009, he performed a reconnaissance research in Wadi Gabgaba region of the Nubian Desert (visiting abandoned mines and mining villages, as well as other relicts of architecture related to exploitation of gold), while two years later he visited one of gold mining centers in Northern Kordofan (Soderi area). Observations and interviews undertaken in aforementioned localizations delivered diverse field research materials, allowing for obtaining review profile of the gold exploitation phenomenon.

Traditional methods
of gold exploitation in Middle Nile Valley

Before metal detectors became widely available in Sudan, gold was exploited using traditional methods. It is worth to mention two of them, used on eastern outskirts of Nubian Desert, as they were not extensively presented in research studies. Literature sources mentioning those methods are scarce, short and too general – while methods regarding gold mining in other regions of Sudan are the topic of several publications (Dunn 1921; Bell 1937).

A method functioning at least since VII century on Middle Nile was rinsing the particles of gold from river sediments (Yusuf Fadl Hassan 1967, 53). This manner, though simple, was very arduous and time-consuming. The starting material originated most frequently from Nile, it was acquired particularly after annual overflow, accumulating fluvial sediment (sand and loam) in certain places of the riverbed. Mineral sediments from periodic watercourses (*wadi*) crossing the desert, were also exploited. In both cases the rinsing took place by Nile. A basic tool used to this work was a flat pan (recently being made of tinware) with a diameter of several dozen centimetres. A few or more handfuls of material were placed inside and then the pan was submersed in water. While the edges of the vessel were at the level of the surface of water, the vessel was set in characteristic circular motion. Because of this, lighter fractions of sediment were mixing with water, forming a suspension gradually overflowing over the edges back to the river. In result, the pan was filled with clear water, and at its bottom remained a concentrate of heaviest minerals. From them, gold flakes and particles were being picked with the use of bird feather or metal needle. An experienced and industrious prospector was able to gather from 1 to 1,5 grams of gold in a week.

Plate 2. Women and children of the Manasir tribe during gold panning on the riverbank of Nile, near Hagar el-Beida village in 2005 (photo P. Maliński).

In the end of recent century, in some farming communities (e.g. Manasir), gold panning was considered the most important economic activity, second only to agriculture (Abdelrahim Mohammed Salih 1999, 49). During periods when working on the fields was not required, whole families of farmers were panning the gold. A popular phenomenon was groups of women and children in squatting position by the river and leaning over the pans. Men were performing heavier tasks, bringing materials from desert *wadi* on pack animals. A gold exploitation method described above has lost popularity in recent years – mainly because of its low efficiency.

A much more effective method of obtaining gold is mining, which is popular in northern Sudan among numerous groups of

amateurs (not professionally educated, but using traditional knowledge and experience). In this way outcrops of semi-transparent, white quartzite (*marwa*[3]) are exploited. They appear often in riverside and desert terrain, however gold is found only in few of them[4]. If the gold was found, the rock was extracted by an open-pit method, and then mined along the vein down the base. This way, the irregular shafts and adits are created, with depth between few to several dozen meters. To separate the quartzite, the simplest tools are used, such as hammers, mallets and wedges. Chipped blocks of quartzite weighing even several kilograms are loaded to plastic containers (*jerikan*), which the miners pull up to the surface using ropes. Material is then mechanically broken up in two stages: manual and automatic. First, the blocks are placed on a large harder rock base and crushed with a hammer. To limit the chipping, the rock base is surrounded by circular cover – a coiled, looped rope, additionally tied with rags. Its purpose is to protect the worker from being hurt by splinters, as well as to limit the loss of resources during breaking down the rock. The effect of this stage is a coarse quartzite aggregate. The dimensions of the chunks are usually several centimetres wide. The second stage of treatment is taking place in a simple construction impact crusher. Most commonly used model consists of a rotor placed at horizontal axis, to which several rows of swinging hammers (made of bulky steel rail) are fixed. The rotor is placed in a cylindrical cover (sometimes a fragment of empty tin barrel of diesel oil) to which the quartzite is poured. The axis of a rotor is powered (through a transmission belt) by stationary diesel engine with over a dozen kW of power[5]. The device crumbles quartzite to a fine powder. This loose mate-

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[3] Arabic word *marwa* means also "marble" (Ca'fer Efendi 1987, 72).

[4] Reddish quartzite is considered the most "rich".

[5] Due to the fact that the engine is cooled by a liquid, it is often accompanied by a 250 litre barrel of water. The coolant is used in a closed circuit (after aspi-

rial is then packed to sacks (*shawwaal*), used commonly in local agriculture and transport. The sacks are transported by cars from the mines to the riverbank of Nile, where powdered quartzite is being rinsed in traditional way (panned). In the case of remote mines distant from the river, instead of transporting sacks with quartzite, a more ergonomic solution is transporting water for rinsing. The water is brought by a water-cart, where basins dug in ground of several square meters surface are being filled with it. The basins' bottom is sloped stepwise to the depth of ca. 1.5 meters. In the most shallow edge of the basin there is a worker with a pan. The process of rinsing quartzite powder proceeds almost the same as panning the fluvial sediment. In its final step, however, the particles of gold are not hand-picked (which would be very difficult due to their microscopic size), but instead mercury is used. Several cubic centimetres of mercury poured on the bottom of the pan and mixed with concentrate of heaviest minerals, binds even the smallest particles of gold. Droplets of mercury are then quickly poured on a textile (often a fragment of worker's shirt) and squeezed. Inside the textile gold particles remain, partially polluted with mercury, which binds with gold and forms an amalgam. When a prospector gathers a larger quantity, he heats it with a gas burner – the remains of mercury evaporate leaving pure gold, which melts together forming an irregular ingot. The quartzite powder sedimenting slowly in the deepest side of basin is exploited from time to time and – after drying – it is being panned again. This effects in certain amount of gold, though much lesser than during first panning.

A gold mining method described above is based on organized team work, in which only men participate. To work, certain qu-

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ration and passing through the cooling system the water returns to the barrel).

Plate 3. An impact crusher grinding the quartzite in Soderi, Northern Kordofan (photo P. Maliński).

alifications are needed, and each workplace benefits the occupational specialization. The endeavour requires also initial financial assets, which will allow to buy the necessary equipment (the crusher being the most expensive) and ensure its maintenance and transport. The owners of the mines are rich Sudanese, who can afford the beginning of exploitation. If the exploitation begins to bring income, the owner usually takes one third, while two thirds are split between miners and other workers. The amount of earnings is dependent on many factors: the content of gold in quartzite rock, conditions of mining and transport, number of miners and efficiency of their work. It is therefore difficult to calculate typical earnings of a gold mine worker, though it surely exceeds

Plate 4. Men of the Rubatab tribe near the mining pits in Wadi al-Lakhla in Bayuda Desert (photo P. Maliński).

(several times) analogical earnings of a gold prospector panning the gold from fluvial sediments.

Functioning and organization of *dahaba*

Besides the aforementioned two methods of obtaining gold, a few years ago one more emerged in Sudan. It completely differs from the previous ones, because its purpose is to search for and exploit gold nuggets – as opposed to gold particles or dust. Localizing the nuggets requires special electronic equipment – the metal detectors. Mass import of metal detectors to Sudan, which

began between first and second decade of current century, caused quick adaptation and spread of the method. Currently, it is used on majority of gold-bearing regions of Sudan – especially on Nubian Desert[6].

The first stage of searching is to localize the outcrops of quartzite, called *kola*. Preferred outcrops are those on elevations and their slopes. Along with the surrounding rock they are subject to denudation, including processes of weathering and erosion[7]. As the result, both landform and structure of the ground change. Pieces of rock, falling down and flushing by atmospheric precipitation, accumulate along with sand brought by the wind at the base of a slope, creating mounds and alluvia. Thus, the forces of nature work much the same way that gold miners do – separating chunks of quartzite from the deposit, breaking them up and rinsing. This phenomenon is utilized by the gold nugget prospectors (*dahaba*). They search through slopes below outcrops with metal detectors, paying special attention to the ways the water flows (*darb al-mooya*). Prospection of these areas is not conducted by some specified method or plan, instead it has more chaotic character, partly intuitive, partly random. *Dahaba* themselves asked about this replied with amusement that they search the area by *taminjeri* method. The word is an Arabic title of the popular cartoon "Tom and Jerry"[8]. The plot of majority of its episodes consists of attempts to catch the mouse by the cat, which mostly take

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[6] The area called Nubian Desert by western geographers, is perceived by some Sudanese as two distinct deserts. While the land between Middle Nile and Wadi Gabgaba is called by them *Sahra Nubiyya* ("Nubian Desert"), the region between Wadi Gabgaba and the coast of Red Sea is referred to as *Sahra Shargiyya* ("Eastern Desert").

[7] Caused by atmospheric precipitation, wind, the Sun and the force of gravity.

[8] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tom_and_Jerry accessed 01.09.2012.

the form of chaotic pursuit. In a similar, not planned method the *dahaba* pursue the gold nuggets. The method changes in a moment of discovery of the first nugget. After its extraction – with a shovel (*kooreek*) or pickaxe (*abu raaseen*) – the surrounding area is thoroughly checked, especially area above (the quartzite outcrop) and below (where the water flows). Among *dahaba* there is widespread conviction that gold nuggets do not occur alone, so attempts are undertaken to find more of them. If the findings are successful, an area between places of all successful findings is even more thoroughly searched. Next, when the prospectors conclude that the area has been completely scanned by the use of metal detectors, they bring in the machinery. It is often an agricultural tractor (*traktur*) with a rear plough[9] (mounted on three--point linkage and operated hydraulically). Construction machines can also be used: bulldozers and tracked excavators, as well as loaders. Excavations consist of removing a several dozen centimetres[10] layer of ground on the whole area where gold nuggets were previously found. In most cases, the area does not exceed several hectares. The ground is then again searched using metal detectors. Due to removing the superficial layer of the ground, the range of the equipment is increased (exactly by the thickness of the removed layer), thus enabling the detection of gold nuggets deposited deeper. The search in the mentioned area are more systematized because of the marks left by vehicles. The marks are parallel strips, approximately as wide as the length of the ploughshare. The worker using a detector checks consecutive strips. After

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[9] It resembles a bit the rear plough with a horizontal cutting edge, used in Europe for clearing the snow.

[10] The thickness of the overburden being stripped depends on the machine used. A tractor with a rear plough gathers a layer of ground ca. 15-30 centimetres thick (depending also on type of ground).

Plate 5. A *dahaba* working in Wadi Adeela in Nubian Desert. In the background, an encampment (*kheema*) of three teams of gold prospectors (photo P. Maliński).

inspecting all of them and extraction of the gold nuggets (if any were found), the area is considered exploited.

A basic organization unit in an occupational group described above is an encampment called *kheema*[11]. A structure of typical *kheema* is presented in Diagram 1. An encampment is formed by a few (2-4) teams. The teams work independently, though they are not self-sufficient because they use a common machinery for excavations. Every team has their own metal detector, a car, a tent, and a gas cooker. The tents pitched near each other form a camp,

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[11] Literally "tent" (Tamis and Persson 2011, 123).

near which cars are parked. Every day[12], the teams set off to work (to different places, often distant from each other by a few kilometres away), and get back to the encampment for a meal and night. After complete exploitation of gold nuggets from the area the teams break camp and pack the equipment in the cars, which then move to another area. If gold is found in the new localization, the camp is set up again. If, however, no gold is found, people and cars move on to the next areas – until success.

A typical team consists of four people: three prospectors (*dahaba*) and a driver. In a team there are three main activities: working with the detector, mining with hand tools and cooking. The prospectors change their activities daily, so in three days one prospector is alternately: a metal detector worker, a digger and a cooker. The driver's duties are related to transport and delivering the supplies – encompassing driving, service and repair of the car.

A manner of searching for gold described above needs to be supplemented with some data regarding used metal detectors (*jihaaz*) and their service. Generally, they are portable devices, using a phenomenon of electromagnetic induction to localize metallic objects. First serial model of metal detector has been produced in Great Britain in 1942 for military purposes (demining). It is worth mentioning that its prototype has been designed and constructed by two Polish researchers: Józef Kosacki and Andrzej Garboś (Modelski 1986, 221). In the second half of the recent century, metal detectors were used for many other applications, e.g. in industry, construction, archaeology, and also for

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[12] There is an exception – the hottest season of a year, when the prospecting is performed at night. It is necessary not only for the comfort of the people, but also for the conditions of working with metal detectors. Some types of the detectors do not tolerate high temperature. Especially the coils of the detectors are vulnerable – being heated by sun causes interferences in electronic circuitry and loss of its sensitivity.

Diagram 1. Structure of the organization of staff and work assets in an encampment (*kheema*) consisting of three teams (drawn by P. Maliński).

treasure hunting. Over the course of time, many varieties of these devices were developed, with different constructions relying on different principles of operation. Among them appeared a type of detector specially designed and constructed for gold prospecting. In the beginning of 2011 in Northern Sudan its most popular model was Minelab GPX-4500, popularly called *jeepee'eks* or *jee-*

peeʻes[13]. It is a detector operating by bi-level pulse induction with application of SETA (*Smart Electronic Timing Alignment*)[14] technology. It consists of a harness worn on chest along with battery container (*shanṭa*), on which an aluminium arm with a handle and an armrest is hanged. On the higher end of the arm an electronic module is fixed (along with switches, knobs, and liquid crystal display), whereas on the lower end – a coil[15] (*tabak*). The equipment includes also headphones (*sammaaʻa*). The detector's operator, after wearing the harness, hangs the arm on it, puts headphones on, connects the elements of the detector with cables and activates it. During prospecting, the operator walks slowly, manipulating the arm of the detector, so that the coil moves from side to side just over the ground. When the coil gets in the proximity of a metallic object, a signal is heard in the headphones.

Though it seems easy, the proper exploitation of the device is rather complicated – the user's manual of this detector has over 100 pages. Regulation of the device and its correct preparation to work require knowledge of the English language, ability to set electronic menu, as well as some knowledge of physics (encompassing principles of working of electric circuits and the phenomenon of propagation of electromagnetic waves in solids). Abilities

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[13] The second name is sometimes a cause of misunderstandings because of its similarity to the name of satellite navigation devices GPS (*Global Positioning System*). The GPS receivers, frequently used in Sudan by Western archaeologists, are often perceived by the locals as a new, pocket size of metal detector, which can show on the screen "a path to the treasure". The misunderstandings of this type are even easier, because a metal detector in Sudan is called colloquially *jihaaz,* which means literally "an instrument" (Tamis and Persson 2011, 108) and can be referred to a GPS receiver as well.

[14] http://www.minelab.com/__files/f/3965/4901-0063-1.1%20Instruction%-20Manual%20GPX-4500_screen.pdf accessed 28.08.2012.

[15] While the producer offers seven models of coils, adapted to different conditions of using the detector, the Sudanese prefer those with the highest range.

of the most *dahaba*, however, are limited only to assemble the detector and switch it on. During research, no person able to set the parameters by using English menu has been found. None of the persons using this particular model knew the function of a button on the handle – used to periodic balancing the influence of the mineralization of the ground (during which the coil has to be manipulated in a certain way). The Sudanese simply used the button to check the battery life. After the button is pushed, there is a short sound in the headphones signalling the beginning of three second long tuning of the coil to the ground. By *dahaba*, it was interpreted as a signal of proper energy level of the battery (because when the battery was dead, there was obviously no sound).

Interestingly, it was the lack of knowledge about basic operation of metal detectors among the *dahaba* that made conducting ethnological research possible – which in turn provided data for this article. *Dahaba* decided to allow an ethnologist into their group on one condition – he will improve the sensitivity (*hassaas*) of their metal detectors. It was not a difficult task[16], it only required reading the manual and changing the level of sensitivity of the device in menu options. Effects of this change, empirically tested by *dahaba*, improved the mutual relationships and allowed to conduct field research among the group of gold nugget prospectors. During the research, use of types of detectors other than described above was noted. Very popular are American White's Electronics detectors (models GMT GoldMaster and Spectra V3i) and Teknetics T2 (colloquially called *tiknis*). Single specimens of Garret ACE 250 detector (*gareto*) are also found, as well as Jeo-

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[16] The author has a many years long experience with use of different types of metal detectors, gained in Poland both during archaeological research and other excavations, unrelated to archaeology.

hunter Basic 3D (*juhantyr*). The last mentioned model deserves special attention because of a rare construction – the detector signals processed by computer software can be observed live in a form of three-dimensional, coloured image displayed on screen. The device also shows depth of the object and specifies its shape and size. Among *dahaba*, the model arouses strong emotions, though not because its feature to observe nuggets before digging them up, but due to large number of "false positives" (perhaps as an effect of inept handling). According to producer, the range of the detector is 8 meters deep, so verifying the authenticity of these signals requires much exhaustive (and often fruitless) physical work.

The *dahaba* estimated the number of metal detectors, being used at Nubian Desert in the beginning of 2011, at around 30 000.

Plate 6. Metal detectors used by *dahaba* in 2011: Minelab GPX-4500, Garret ACE 250 and Teknetics T2 (photo P. Maliński).

According to them, only one third of the devices were acquired legally (which is certified by a document attached to the detector, confirming payment of duty for an imported product). The remaining detectors are supposed to be contraband and were smuggled to the Sudan from Eritrea, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The popularity of smuggled devices is attributed to lower prices than legal ones (which includes duty fee). Of course, government of Sudan tries to stop distribution and using illegal detectors, so certain preventive steps are taken. For example, the Nubian Desert is being regularly scouted by patrols of uniformed services working against contraband[17] (*mukaffaha*). The patrols check the documents confirming legality (duty fee) of the detectors and confiscate illegal ones. The encampments of prospectors not having such documents invented a tactic for avoiding loss of precious equipment. First of all, in the encampment there is a small and fast car referred to as *boksi*[18] (most commonly Toyota Hilux with rear wheel drive), ready for driving and equipped with water and food supplies for a driver lasting for a few days. Also, people in encampment as well as people working nearby attentively observe their surroundings. When a suspicious car, such as characteristic[19] Toyota Landcruiser (colloquially *kruzer*) used by patrols appears on the horizon, the *boksi* driver instantly drives away taking all the metal detectors from the encampment. If the devices are used outside the camp, *boksi* travels through all working areas, gathers the detectors and leaves as fast as possible. This way an inspection performed by the patrol in the encampment is futile. *Dahaba* may present to the inspectors a false story – for example that they are

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[17] Through the Nubian Desert passes a smuggling trail, connecting countries of the Horn of Africa with the Middle East.

[18] A name derived from English "box", referring to pick-up version of the car.

[19] They are usually painted in the colour of sand.

waiting for a worker who went to the city and took all detectors (legal, of course) for maintenance. They can also claim that they just camp on the desert (which is not forbidden in any way). The inspection of teams working in mining areas is futile as well[20], as they do not have the detectors anymore. However, sometimes the patrol pursues the fleeing *boksi*. In this case, the fugitive driver tries to reach an earlier chosen place, called *sharak* – "a trap" (Tamis and Persson 2011, 187). It is usually a ravine (*khoor*) with a bottom covered by thick layer of loose sand. *Boksi* passes through this obstacle thanks to its high speed and low weight (the car has a lightweight construction and it is loaded only with a driver, detectors and some supplies). In contrast, a bigger and heavier *kruzer* is transporting the patrolmen, barrels with fuel and water, weapons, ammunition and other equipment. As a result, it sinks in the sand or passes through it very slowly, using reduction drive and a differential lock. Anyway, at this time *boksi* is far away, hidden beneath dunes or rocks[21]. After some time has passed, the car goes back to the camp (the driver ensures that the patrol does not wait at the encampment) and the *dahaba* can resume their search with illegal detectors.

Despite this kind of difficulties with organization of the work and the aforementioned problems with proper use of the equipment, many of the *dahaba* are successful in the search for gold. The nuggets found with the use of the detectors are most often classified by weight or shape. Every class has its name, common-

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[20] If the *boksi* does not make it to the team before the patrol, sometimes the prospectors bury the detectors in the sand – to hide them and prevent confiscation.

[21] The driver of *boksi* tries not to leave traces of tires on the sand, by which a patrol could find him. Therefore, he tries to avoid escaping through the sand, driving on stony surface if possible.

ly used by the *dahaba*. This classification along with nomenclature is presented in Table 1.

Nugget mass [g]	Name	Translation
<1	*namusa*	"black fly"
1-4	*tas'ali*	"melon pip"
4-30	*janzabiil*	"ginger root"
30-100	*tabla*	"padlock"
100-1000	*baṭaaṭis*	"potato"
>1000	*khaliyya*	"honeycomb"

Table 1. Classification of the gold nuggets according to their weight

The contents are of approximate nature, and the names are not used consequently. There is a clear tendency to overstate the class of found nugget. It seems that this phenomenon is meant to improve the prestige of the finder (and his team) among the *dahaba*. As an example, one of the examined teams has excavated a gold nugget weighing almost 800 grams. It should be therefore classified as *baṭaaṭis*, but all members of the team unanimously called it (exaggerating) *khaliyya*[22]. It is worth mentioning that the largest known *khaliyya*, excavated by *dahaba* in 2010, weighed ca. 6 kg. This most valuable single find is popularly known and widely commented in desert encampments. However, during the interviews the prospectors stressed that there was a lot of cases where more smaller nuggets were densely located in a small area – probably originating from a single outcrop of quartzite. Accor-

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[22] A form of the found nugget could play a part in giving it this name. Its perforated, openwork structure was more similar to the honeycomb, than to a tuber of potato.

ding to gathered information, one team was reported to extract more than 120 kg of gold over a few days.

The gold nuggets found by the team members are seen as a collective property – they are, in fact, an effect of hard work of the whole team. During the research, all of the prospectors unanimously stated that the cases of usurping the gold nuggets practically do not happen. Everybody in the team is expected to be honest and sincere. Some questioned prospectors stated, that if somebody hid the found gold, intending not to share it with other team members, God would punish him by hiding gold nuggets from him, also intending not to share the gold with a dishonest man. A strong belief was noted that such curse could affect the whole team or even a whole encampment – so the failure in searching would be affecting all the people working with a fraud. To limit the possibility of dishonest behaviours, *dahaba* most often work in pairs, where the metal detector operator and the digger watch each other's actions. The prospectors preferring to work alone are quickly dismissed from a team. Such solutions exist to guarantee that all of the mined gold will be at disposal of the whole group. However, in the end, acquired resources have to be divided between all the members of the team. The system of this division, presented on Diagram 2, requires some explanation. From time to time, all the nuggets gathered by the team are being transported to one of the cities located by Nile and sold. From the money made, an amount is separated, called *masarif* or *mez*, reserved to buy supplies for the whole team. Among the supplies are foodstuff, gas for the gas cooker and several sets of batteries for the metal detector. The remaining sum of money is then divided in two stages. First, the money are split in three equal parts, respectively, for the prospectors, the metal detector and the car. These parts are then divided even further. The money for prospectors are split evenly among them. Considering that the typical team consists

Diagram 2. Distribution of profits in a *dahaba* team (drawn by P. Maliński).

of three prospectors, every one of them gets a third part, being a ninth part of the initial sum. The whole money reserved for the metal detector is given to its owner[23], in other words, the owner gets one third of the initial sum. The money for a car are being divided unevenly. Only a fourth is given to the driver (being a twelfth of total sum), the remaining three-fourth is given to the owner of a car. With this money, he has to provide automotive supplies – fuel, engine oil, gear oil, a set of filters of fuel, oil and air, as well as parts needed for maintenance of a car. These expenses are marked on the diagram as letter "X". In the end, the owner of a car gets one fourth of the total sum, reduced by "X". As the scheme presents, the largest part of the money goes to the owners of the metal detector and the car. The amount of earnings is related to amount of investment. The physical work, in contrast, provides less money. A comparison of workers' salaries shows the dependence of their value on physical fatigue. A driver (whose work is considered as the lightest) gets less money than a gold prospector.

The rules of division described above seem to be clear, yet in reality this system undergoes some modifications, which can significantly complicate it. Above all else, some prospectors can be at the same time the owners of instruments of work – for example, one of the prospectors can own the car or metal detector. In such cases, salaries being an effect of work and profits being an effect of ownership of instruments of work are added – with their sum going to one person.

Much more complicated situations occur when an instrument of work is attributed not to a single team, but to whole encamp-

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[23] If a detector is a common property of several persons – who contributed their money to buy it – the sum of salary money is divided among them. If the contributions were equal, the division is equal as well. In other cases, the division of the salary takes into account the percentage of the contributions of the owners.

ment (a tractor or bulldozer). Such machine brings profits both to its owner and its driver (who can also work as a prospector). These money are being drained from the assets of individual teams in a given encampment, taking into account the surface of auriferous terrain mined by a given team. In this matter, different, individual and sometimes casual (and not always clear) rules of profit partition are applied. Also, sometimes a team can find nuggets in place where a machine cannot reach (in higher parts of rock rubbles) and then the team does not have to share its profits with machine's owner or driver.

Summary

At the source of popularity of the gold searching method mentioned here, there are few factors worth describing in detail. First, the idea of search with a "treasure detector" seems to strongly influence the imagination of its users – especially those of Arabic--Muslim culture. A motif of buried treasures – and their clever and brave discoverers – is present in Arabic oral and written tradition since many centuries. The metal detector has become a tool which made possible a practical and effective realization of treasure hunting ethos. In this context, the ergonomics of the work with this tool is especially significant. It does not require – like mining – the long, arduous physical effort, to gather only a few particles of gold in the end. Using a metal detector is no more exhausting than usual, slow walk – by which one can (theoretically) find and possess a "golden treasure" of a value exceeding a many month salary of a gold mine worker. Also, a method of searching for gold nuggets with a metal detector is technologically easier than the mining method. First of all, it does not require hundreds of litres of water (which is scarce in the desert) needed to rinse the quartzite dust.

Costs of exploitation are also lower, because a metal detector – in contrast to impact crusher – does not need tens of litres of fuel, motor oil, spare parts and periodic repairs. Cost of batteries is relatively low, and the construction of a detector does not wear out (assuming proper use). The most important factor, making the method so popular, is its effectiveness. Though it is hardly a rule, it is not limited to single cases. In fact, the effectiveness of searching for gold with metal detector is full of risk and uncertainty. However, bravely taking a risk is one of typical behaviour pattern in the Arabic world, as well as certain fatalism – in form of surrendering to divine judgements (including failures). Such attitudes seem to predestine people of this culture to conduct the search for gold. A social image of *dahaba* which has been popularized in Sudan also plays an important role. For obvious reasons, cases of fortunate finders of gold nuggets are becoming popular thanks to their promotion in mass media and presence in contemporary oral literature. They bring the attention of audience, and for many may be an occupational motivation. In contrast, numerous examples of futile, fruitless search are not so interesting, because they do not affect the imagination of the Sudanese so strongly.

It is worth mentioning about consequences, which were caused by the emergence of described occupational group in Sudan. Apart from widely commented effects, by which the inflow of gold influenced state economy and finances, minor effects can be observed in the social and economical spheres. One of them is the appearance of large number of young Sudanese, who quickly got rich due to gold prospecting. Those people, thanks to quickly accumulated assets are able to successfully meet the social expectations, i.e. to marry and invest in enterprises meant to provide support for their families. They become a new model of prestige, clearly visible to their peers, who try to match it. On the other hand, suddenly becoming rich is a situation overgrowing some

young men. The wealth acquired in one day makes them instantly jump several levels up the social ladder, a position for which they are not prepared. It may have fatal consequences – among the *dahaba* there are young people that lost their fortune as fast as they have gained it, additionally developing addictions. Especially alcoholism is spreading on a scale never seen before (in northern Sudan). It seems that these phenomena inherently accompany every "gold rush". However, among the gold prospectors there are no assaults, pillage and robbery murders.

Amid another cultural consequences, which *dahaba* activity causes, emerged a problem of endangering the cultural heritage of Nubian Desert region. A vision of destruction, which a several thousand crowd of detectorists can achieve, gives especially archaeologists sleepless nights, as the prospectors are operating in regions, that are difficult to protect and conserve. It has to be noted, however, that these people are searching for precious gold, not "priceless" relics of the past. While the natural landscape is thoroughly changed (marks after searching for gold are now a characteristic phenomenon in many desert areas), destruction of cultural heritage are unlikely to be as common. The prospectors themselves state that "*dahaba* digs only when he hears signal in the headphones". Such attitude seems to point that every archaeological sites not containing metallic artefacts are safe from plundering. This does not, however, exclude a possibility of unintentional interference in various archaeological remains, during the excavation with the use of heavy machinery. Indeed, the level of danger or damaging the resources of archaeological heritage needs to be verified by the reconnaissance research, which would make the investigation of the state of known sites possible – and perhaps an occasion to discover new, unknown ones. The last idea can involve the *dahaba* themselves – using their field knowledge of poorly explored areas of Nubian Desert.

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Résumé
**À la recherche d'or avec le détecteur de métaux
sur le désert de Nubie.**
Le fonctionnement et l'organisation
du groupe professionnel *dahaba* au Soudan

Le texte traite des résultats de recherches ethnologiques sur le terrain, ménées par l'auteur dans les années 2005-2011 au Soudan. Ces recherches ont été consacrées aux méthodes traditionnelles et modernes d'extraction d'or dans la région de la vallée du Nil moyen, désert de Bayouda, désert de Nubie et du Kordofan septentrional. L'auteur présente avant tout le phénomène, appélé par les médias la «ruée vers l'or» qui consiste à la recherche massive des pépites d'or avec les détecteurs de métaux. La formation d'un nouveau groupe professionnel au Soudan, à savoir *dahaba* était l'une des conséquences de ce phénomène. Dans ce texte on décrit aussi bien le fonctionnement, les méthodes et l'organisation du travail que le système de répartitions des profits au sein du groupe. L'auteur aborde également la question du danger potenciel du patrimoine archéologique du désert de Nubie par des fouilles visant l'exploration et l'extraction de pépites d'or.

Keywords: gold, metal detector, occupational group, Nubian Desert, Sudan.

KATARZYNA GRABSKA
PETER MILLER

THE SOUTH SUDAN HOUSE IN AMARAT: SOUTH SUDANESE ENCLAVES IN KHARTOUM

In July 2011, South Sudan became an independent nation, and broke off from the North. This break up came as a violent experience for the people of the two nations. The dynamic changes that followed the separation of the two Sudans affected the lives of the people from the North and the South, as well as those con-

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sidered 'Jenubeen' (Southern or South Sudanese[1]) in the North and those considered 'Shageen' (Northern) in the South. With the political developments in the two nations and the introduction of new citizenship laws, Southerners became foreigners in the North, while Northerners lost their citizenship privileges in the South[2]. The political changes had profound impact on the social, political and economic reconfigurations, as well as identity claims in the two nations. Despite the large population movements that followed, with those considered Southern Sudanese moving to South Sudan, and those considered Northerners going to Sudan, and in the wake of the current civil conflict in South Sudan (on-going since 2013), there are increasing numbers of South Sudanese who either remained or became displaced in the North. These changes in the population composition as well as new political and economic arrangements between Sudan and South Sudan had a direct impact on the multidimensional transformations that took place in the Sudans, and in Khartoum in particular[3].

In what follows, we present the first reflections and impressions of our two different on-going ethnographic fieldworks that were carried out between 2015 and 2016, giving some insights into a particular enclave of South Sudan in one of the neighbourhoods in Khartoum, Amarat. The research is mainly ethnographic, during which we have followed lives of different groups in several neighbourhoods in Khartoum to understand their everyday life, iden-

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[1]   We use the term Southern Sudanese to denote those groups hailing from the South of Sudan before the emergence of the independent South Sudan in 2011. South Sudanese is a term used to denote those coming from or identified as affiliated with South Sudan. It should be noted that the Arabic translation is the same, *Jenubeen*, for the two politically different terms. This is also significant as it makes an interesting insight into the identity politics and practice in the two Sudans.

[2]   Babiker 2015.

[3]   See Casciarri et al 2015.

tity politics and their everyday practices. The notes presented below are based on in-depth interviews and life story interviews carried out with residents of Amarat, as well as other South Sudanese residing currently in Khartoum. They are substantiated by observation and participation in the everyday life in Amarat as both researchers resided there between 3 months and 2,5 years within the period of 2014-2016. We are both anthropologists who have been working with South and Southern Sudanese. Katarzyna Grabska has researched among the Nuer of South Sudan in Egypt, Kenya and South Sudan (see Grabska 2014), while Peter Miller is currently finishing his Master 1 with a specific focus on the Amarat neighbourhood, marriage practices and identity politics within in it.

We first introduce Amarat, a first-class wealthy neighbourhood in Khartoum, underscoring its heterogeneous character and juxtaposing it as a metaphor of 'Sudan'. The heterogeneous character of the neighbourhood is used as an analytical base to address the questions of the categorisation and use of urban spaces. Next, we situate the South Sudanese population in Amarat, stressing certain particular impacts of the 2011 separation on their lives. We then move on to describe their living arrangements, with a specific example of a 'South Sudanese house' in Amarat, which we believe symbolises the heterogeneity of the neighbourhood, but also a specific South Sudanese enclave within this residential quarter. The house also serves as a metaphor for the predicament of the current situation of South Sudanese in Sudan, as well as the on-going civil conflict in the South. The discourses of the residents of the house form the base of our second analytical axe, addressing the issue of identity transformations amongst urban migrants.

Amarat:
the "first class" neighbourhood of empty houses

Al-Amarat is a planned neighbourhood constructed in the 1960's, on what was the southern border of the colonial city of Khartoum[4]. Due to the rapid sprawling expansion of the city, Al-Amarat is now a central neighbourhood situated to the west of Khartoum International Airport, bordered by two of the city's highways, Africa Street and Mohammed Nageeb Street. Categorised as a "first class[5]" neighbourhood, Amarat was designed to accommodate a developing Sudanese upper class mainly composed of civil servants, and to symbolise a modern way of living in the newly independent Sudanese capital with villas, gardens, paved roads, and commercial streets[6]. Although this population is still very present in the neighbourhood today, it's significance is less and less important due to the gradual commercialisation of Amarat, with more and more residential buildings being turned into offices, company headquarters and commercial businesses.

Having been categorised as a "first class" neighbourhood, Amarat tends to be left out of analysis concerning marginalised pop-

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[4] Alawad Sikainga, 1996.

[5] Residential land classification in Khartoum started in 1906 with three classes: first, second, and third. This classification envisaged regrouping populations by their income. In 1924 'Native Lodging Areas' were added to, designed to accommodate temporary urban workers. In 1947 the 'Towns and Land Scheme Act' was introduced re-enforcing the division of housing in these three classes, adding the criterion of plot-size, building materials and lease duration. The 1st class encompasses the most wealthy population group, able to afford the largest plots and modern construction materials. The plot size diminishes and the building materials become more basic as the classification descends. The current classification system comprises 5 classes(Elhoweris 2006; Sauloup 2011).

[6] Denis, 2006.

Location of Amarat

ulations in Khartoum, such as the South Sudanese population. In fact, the "first class" definition tends to render an economically and socially homogenous image of the neighbourhood of inhabitants with privileged status therefore camouflaging the diversity that exists within. This official categorisation of the different neighbourhoods of the city erases the diversity of the local situation. Others have noted that this type of official classification and categorisation represents the imagined and socially constructed identity of an urban space, which in reality is far from homogenous[7]. Through our ethnographic observations in Amarat we have discovered a socially heterogeneous quarter that when an-

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[7] cf Gillette 2014; Sauloup 2011.

alysed in its complexity can serve as a metaphor for post separation Khartoum and Sudan.

Amarat has been known as a neighbourhood where the expatriate community is concentrated, due to the number of embassies, international organisations and think-tanks present, combined with the Sudanese State's desire to ensure that foreign nationals live in first-class areas. However, presence of the expat community in Amarat has reduced over the past years, partly due to the expulsion of several aid organisations, religious groups and individuals. The first wave of expulsions happened in 2009[8] as a manifestation of the Sudanese government's response to Omar al-Bashir's indictment by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur. Thirteen aid agencies working in Darfur were the principal targets of this expulsion, many of who had offices and/or personnel living in Amarat. The second wave came in 2012, after South Sudan's independence, and focused more on Catholic religious groups (considered sympathetic and collaborative with the South Sudanese population), foreign individuals, and a smaller number of aid agencies[9]. It is also worth noting that during the period of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), up until the period following the 2011 referendum on South Sudan's independence, there was a mass influx to Khartoum of personnel working for international organisations, many living and/or working in Amarat. After the independence of the South and with the more restrictive policies of Sudan regulating the presence and work of international organisations, a number of UN agencies and international NGOS left the country, some moving to the South.

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[8] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/04/sudan-arrest-warrant-prof_n_171768.html (consulted 21/03/16).

[9] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18296430 (consulted 21/03/16).

In addition to these two major exoduses, the country is suffering from an economic crisis, crippling the nation due to a loss in petrol revenues since South-Sudan's independence and the economic sanctions imposed on the country since Omar al-Bashir's indictment by the International Criminal Court. These are some of the reasons constantly used to explain the number of empty houses and stalled construction sites in Amarat.

The wealthy Sudanese residents of Amarat, those whom are generally associated with the neighbourhood, are typically the owners of their villas, constructed by their own families since the 1960's. They consider themselves, and are considered by some others, as belonging to one of[10] the top strata's of Sudanese society, and are therefore bearers of high levels of economic, cultural and symbolic capital. Today's residents tend to come from families with a significant social standing around the time of Sudan's independence, often working in previous governments as ministers or clerks; or for the State as doctors, engineers, professors, among others. They are generally highly educated with master or PhD degrees; the majority having frequented universities overseas, and therefore find themselves today in functions that ensure a relatively high income.

Amongst this seemingly homogenous population one can already notice ethnic diversity, symbolic of the multi-ethnic composition of Sudan as a whole and the 'melting-pot' of Khartoum. However, this 'ethnic diversity' amongst this 'elite' class reflects a wider and highly contested issue in Sudan: the centralisation and monopolisation of power. Almost all of Amarat's wealthy res-

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[10] It is important to underline that Amarat is home to one of the Sudanese elites, who cohabite in their neighbourhood with an international elite. There are many other elites, for example the religious elite (who tend to live in Omdurman), the less wealthy but intellectual elite, the elite connected to the government and civil service etc. See Babiker Mahmoud, 1984.

idents either come from groups originating in the Northern and Central Nile-Valley parts of the country, or migrant communities who established themselves economically through trade during colonial times. The first category tends to include populations that identifies themselves as Arab and/or Nubian[11], and more specifically those who claim to be Jaaliyin, Shaigiya and Danagla, groups synonymous with the monopolisation of political, military and trading power[12]. The second category can be characterised by dwindling Christian populations. They consist of Copts originating either from Egypt or Sudan who make up the largest group, and Roman-Catholic or Orthodox Christians originating from Greece and other Eastern Mediterranean countries, whose migration is linked to the nineteenth century expansion of the Ottoman Empire[13].

These Amarat residents express and maintain their domination through their symbolic capital[14]. Their enormous villas with well-tended gardens are guarded behind 3 metres walls – the style of the villa is seen as a far cry from the typical Sudanese home, the *hosh*, a single-story mud and dung construction. They tend to employ several domestic workers, cooks, cleaners, drivers, guards, and gardeners. Their capacity to do so is again a way to affirm their symbolic status as privileged classes. Yet, once an

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[11] The use of 'ethnic' identities is of course problematic from an anthropological point of view as it is linked to concrete racial origins instituted during the colonial time in Sudan.

[12] Ryle, 2011, p. 35.

[13] James, 2011, p. 47.

[14] 'Symbolic capital' references the concept coined by Pierre Bourdieu in his famous work, *La distinction.*. Symbolic capital refers to the resources available to an individual that grant them honour and prestige through the recognition by others. In our specific case, the villas, walls, luxurious cars etc., are all means by which certain Amarat residents can affirm their superior symbolic status vis-à-vis to others (Bourdieu, 1979).

exclusive neighbourhood, the residents of Amarat are becoming more and more economically diverse. Luxurious cars are accompanied by more common vehicles, a testament to the present heterogeneity of Amarat residents. However, as the price of cars is high in Sudan (particularly new models which are often observed in Amarat), the mere fact of owning one alludes to a certain economic status. The cars are kept immaculately clean, suggesting that the cleanliness of the car might be a way of distinguishing oneself from the general dusty environment of the street. The cleanliness relates also to keeping the moral standing, being proper, *adab* and respected[15]. The way of life of wealthier Amarat residents, enclosed in their private space behind their walls topped with barbed wire, and their habit to travel everywhere by car leads us to another vital point in understanding Amarat: the dichotomy of the use of space.

This dichotomy exposes that symbolic status of people: those 'of the street' who live more in the 'public space' and those who can afford their 'room of their own', to paraphrase the words of Virginia Wolf, in their private villas and behind the walls. Yet, their lives are much more in the public sphere, as they often represent the government, international and business elites who actively participate in the 'public' life. These residents are not often observed socialising in the street. Those who occupy the street – who work, socialise and live in this public space – represent another fringe of the population: the marginalised. They also represent the peripheral regions of Sudan that have suffered from underdevelopment for years, the direct effect of the centralisation of power and development[16]. They all share a history of a more or less recent migration to Khartoum, often citing war, famine

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[15] Fabos, 2008.
[16] City Limits, 2011.

and a lack of opportunities as their reasons to come to the capital. They come from South Sudan (some having returned during the period of peace, coming back when war broke out again), Darfur, South Kordofan, Nuba mountains and other border areas. There are also Ethiopian and Eritrean migrants and refugees who come to look for luck, money, protection and a better life in Sudan. They either work providing services to the wealthy resident families, or as labourers, or selling goods and providing services on the street to their peers and local residents for small gains. The two groups interact on a daily basis, and complement each other in their search for livelihoods and status. For example, those working on the street also offer services for the privileged classes of Amarat, such as car washing, transport, shoe shining. They also provide simple but necessary supplies such as cigarettes, street food, and phone cards[17].

The South Sudanese in Khartoum

Khartoum has been for a long time one of the major destinations for the displaced and migrant populations from South Sudan[18]. According to the recent UNHCR Rapid Assessment report (2014), following the secession of South Sudan in 2011, approximately 250,000 individuals of South Sudanese origin are estimated to have remained in Khartoum State. Of this population, 40,000 are estimated to be living in camp like situations in sites called 'open areas'. The open areas were initially established as departure points in October 2010, following an announcement by the South Sudan

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[17] See Sauloup 2011 and other literature on the street vendors in Khartoum.

[18] Assal 2004, 2006, 2008; Abusharaff, 2009; Bureau, 2011; De Geoffroy, 2009; Lavergne, 1999; Shultz, 2010; Aziz, 2013.

Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) and Commissioner for Voluntary and Humanitarian Work (CVHW) in Khartoum that individuals wishing to return to South Sudan should congregate in specific sites for organized voluntary return movements.

Displaced South Sudanese have been returning to the South with large numbers keeping multiple residences both in Khartoum and in the South in order to minimize risks. Officially organised returns were initially implemented by UNHCR, IOM and the Government of Sudan between October 2010 until the beginning of 2011, when returns ceased as resources were diverted to referendum preparations. Subsequently, a number of people remained stranded in these areas, devoid of infrastructure and functioning services. Since 2011, very few organized repatriations have taken place. Further to the independence of South Sudan and consequent changes in the legal status of individuals of South Sudanese origin in Sudan, more and more people joined these sites.

Since the outbreak of the most recent civil conflict in South Sudan in December 2013, more than 522,000 refugees have fled their homes and scattered across four East African countries, including an estimated 150,000 in Sudan[19]. Only since February 2015, there has been a dramatic increase of over 10,000 South Sudanese refugees in Sudan due to renewed fighting in Upper Nile state[20]. Newly arrived displaced have joined existing communities in both open and residential areas. Following the crisis in South Sudan, the President of Sudan declared that the South Sudanese in Sudan (including those fleeing the current conflict) enjoy the same status as Sudanese citizens in the country in line with the existing signed yet not applied Cooperation Agreement of 27 September 2012. As part of this agreement, Sudan and South Sudan

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[19] OCHA, 2015.
[20] OCHA, 2015.

ratified a Framework Agreement on the status of nationals of the other State and related matters, which establishes favourable principles for the treatment by each state of the nationals of the other state. In particular, it provides for a Four Freedoms Agreement, which should grant to nationals of each state the freedoms of residence, movement, economic activity, and the right to acquire and dispose of property on the territory of the other state.

The majority of South Sudanese's lives have been marked by displacement and uncertainty[21], and for those who live in Sudan this uncertainty has increased since South Sudan's independence. No longer Sudanese citizens, and despite the Four Freedoms Agreement, they face many difficulties in being able to access education and work. These issues will be discussed in greater detail within the discourses of the residents of the 'South Sudanese house'.

The 'South Sudanese' house in Amarat

South Sudanese in Amarat

Amarat would, in the first place, not be an obvious place of residence for South Sudanese in Khartoum. Yet, against the odds, and against the popular view of Amarat being a homogenous and privileged area, there are different South Sudanese residents in the neighbourhood. Their place of residence tends to be 'hidden' in one way or another from the public eye, long-term presence and knowledge of the area brings to the light "what the eye refuses to see"[22]. Some live in abandoned villas, crumbling and derelict, often cut off from the ethnographer's eye and the street by walls and fences. No longer used by those who used to be

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[21] Horst and Grabska, 2015; Grabska, 2014.
[22] Kibreab, 1996.

privileged but suffered a sudden economic or political decline in their status, they become a place of protracted temporal residence for those who have been displaced. The use of waste materials to board up holes in fences and walls alerts the inquisitive observer to the presence of inhabitants in houses that are otherwise perceived as 'empty'. Such 'ghost' houses, often empty for years and lacking facilities, have been taken over by South Sudanese and other marginalised communities who try to keep their presence discreet, for fear of being evicted. Others live in construction sites, allowed by the owner in return for guarding the construction materials from theft. These sites often do not have walls, instead clothes and blankets are hung up on washing lines to give some discretion. Children play amongst the concrete rubble and the conditions are dire, lacking in running water or toilets. The sites are furnished by what little the residents have, some stools, a bed or two and for some a television, the satellite dish placed on the outer wall of the construction site alluding to a presence within. Others live in make shift tents hidden down small back-alleys behind high-rise constructions (between Street 13 & 15 for example), using waste material to build their shelter. One close informer who worked as a guardian for a wealthy Amarat family was given accommodation by his employers, a wooden shack roughly 2x3 metres situated on the street in front of the house.

Yet, there are also better to do and well-established South Sudanese, who have well-established connections to Khartoum. Some have studied here, or worked in the formal sector before separation, and have strong political connections. While, in Amarat the living arrangements of South Sudanese are diverse, they all share their status as foreigners, *agnabi*, vis-à-vis the Sudanese state.

Having established an overview of the social composition of post separation Amarat as well as the living conditions of South Sudanese in this quarter, we will now analyse one house in par-

ticular. We perceive the house as a metaphor for the different South Sudanese enclaves that exist in Khartoum, but also the changing history of the house over the years as a metaphor for the changed status and thus experience of South Sudanese in the North.

The house

Located on street 37, in a prime location, opposite the Comboni School that caters to many South Sudanese students, the house is two stories high. Nowadays, the house resembles an abandoned villa, but has a particular status due to its historical past. The house used to be the Council of Southern States before 2011. Briefly, it became a South Sudanese Embassy after the separation. However, when the embassy of South Sudan was opened in Riyad, one of the new upscale and prestigious neighbourhoods of Khartoum, the house lost its prestige. The building remains the property of the South Sudanese government, yet it is no longer used for official functions. Occasionally, South Sudanese chiefs who live in the camps on the outskirts of the city meet there, as they do not have other places for their gatherings. With time, it became a run-down guesthouse hosting those who cannot afford accommodation and are referred by the South Sudan embassy. The referral seems to be a pivotal element in determining who can and cannot live there and reflects a number of contemporary South Sudanese dilemmas.

In the courtyard, there is a small garden where the residents of the house relax, eat and meet visitors. On the left of the compound, there is a row of toilets and bathrooms, separated from the house. Some are locked. There seem to be separate toilets for women and men. In the house, there are several rooms. We are told that some are shared and others are individual. Residents also sleep outside on the balconies when it is too hot in the summer. In the dilapidated courtyard, and against the walls of the

South Sudanese house

house, there are old banners indicating the name of the South Sudanese Consulate. Parts of the missing fence are replaced by Chinese cartons. Electricity meters are located on the outside wall of the house. We notice that they are all at zero.

Neighbours refer to the house as "the Dinka house". The status of the house as the "Dinka house" is significant, as it reflects the underlying ethnic divisions in the current conflict in the South. While there is a Nuer man working as a guard of the house, no Nuer people live in the house. The fact that most of the residents are referred by the embassy, and most of the Nuer people who come to Khartoum do not approach the South Sudanese embassy[23],

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[23] See field notes Grabska 2016; on general long-standing animosities between Dinka and Nuer people see Hutchinson 1996; Grabska 2014; Johnson 2004.

suggests that political divisions affect who has access to the house. While the house has a specific status within the neighbourhood, it is rather invisible for outsiders, within the area. It is well integrated in terms of architectural style, and similarly dilapidated condition to the neighbouring houses. It remains, as South Sudanese within the neighbourhood, invisible in a visible space.

During one of our joint visits to the house, we talked to a group of South Sudanese students who live there. Upon our arrival in the morning, we first met an elderly gentleman who most likely is from the Dinka Twic group. He was sceptical and refused to talk to us[24]. We finally met 'Mr. R'[25], who is 'in charge' of the house. He has been living there since 2011, and is therefore the longest resident of the house. A man in his fifties, he speaks fluent Arabic, and some English, but prefers to speak with us in English. This is also part of his identity performance and how he positions himself vis-à-vis others and us in the neighbourhood and the house. The co-author of this article, Peter, knows him as he had befriended him in the neighbourhood.

The residents and their predicaments
The house is inhabited by diverse groups and individuals, all coming from South Sudan. Older men, single mothers, and young university students, both men and women, and three families with children. At the time of fieldwork, there were between 20

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[24] His disliking of our presence was later confirmed by another incident. On his last day in Amarat, Peter wanted to say goodbye to the students. When he arrived, the man was standing outside the house. He informed him that no students were around and that he could not come in. When Peter sat around the corner to have a coffee, he heard the students talking in the garden and even saw them through the holes in the wall.

[25] All names have been changed. All interviews cited in the article were conducted by the authors between November 2015 and January 2016.

and 30 people living in the house. Below, we introduce some of the residents, those whom we spoke to and who shared their predicaments with us. In what follows, we present the views of those residents and their particular dilemmas that they are faced with in the house and in Khartoum more generally.

'Mr. R': 'the manager' of the house. Peter met him first through his other local contacts in Amarat. The man was introduced to him as 'Mr. R'. He wears a shirt, watch, and shined shoes. Older men and men of social status in South Sudanese communities would have their shoes shined often, in spite the fact that they have little money to survive on. The shining of shoes might be interpreted as a sign of 'status', similarly to the cleanness of cars, on the dusty roads of Khartoum. 'Mr. R' came to Khartoum in 2001 and used to work in some sort of agricultural job. He has a wife and several children, and they all moved up to Khartoum together. He proclaims that he is currently without work, yet, there must be some type of income that him and his family survive on. Performing the customary Dinka marriage obligations, Mr. R announces that he paid 100 cows for his wife in the South. Bride wealth remains a strong social obligation and functions as a social insurance system in the South where families honour cattle exchanges that constitute an important social bonding and livelihood strategy. His brother used to work for the government in the South, before being "released" in unexplained circumstances. His wife and their children are with Mr. R in Khartoum, under his responsibility. Mr. R declared that the children do not go to school, but later we learn from the wife of his deceased brother that the children do go to school. Mr. R is generally known in the area, and sometimes referred to as 'Sultan', which might be a sign of his symbolic status, despite his economically impoverished status. Most likely, he must have had some type of connection to the previous Embassy to first move to the house.

The students: The four female students came from Equatoria to study in Khartoum. The younger male students (aged between 25 and 30) all come from Warrap, Jongolei, Northern Bahr Ghazal and Aweil. They speak good English, and have been in Khartoum for one to two years. Some are on scholarships from the government, whilst others get by with money received from their parents. We are told that they do not have to pay rent, but they have to buy their own food and cover other expenses (electricity, water).

George: 34 years old from Warrap; first came to Khartoum in 1997, his brother was here for education. He did not even stay a year when his father came to bring him back to the village: "Because parents do not want their children to stay away. They think that they will come up with bad behaviour", he told us. This reflects also the control of parents over their children, and keeping them close to *cieng* (in Nuer/Dinka signifies home, village, community).He came back in 2010, but he failed to access university; he then returned again in 2014 and has been in Khartoum since. As he did not have any money, he finally gained access to the house through someone he knows at the embassy and came to stay there. He is studying first year chemistry at the Nileein University where some classes are held in Arabic, and others in English. He tells us that the students are struggling. When we came in the morning, he was the one who translated from Arabic and Dinka into English for us. He also connected us with Mr. R, who was around doing some business. George is not married yet. His eldest brother and his sister are married. The brother just before him is not, meaning that that he does not yet feel a pressure to marry. He also explained why he is 'late' in his education: "Because of the problems in our country, we had to wait with education. So I am a bit behind", he said.

Deng: 27 years old – came in 2014 from Aweil. He used to live in a village and is married with one child. He came to Khartoum alone to study. He told us that because of problems in the South

he had to stop education. "There are too many un-educated people in the South and not enough universities", he explained. "We (students) had to stay for 2 years doing nothing. We farmed a bit and helped our parents in the village". He came by plane to Khartoum and was very surprised when he arrived here: "There were a lot of buildings, and it looked very different from the village". But settling in was also difficult. For some months with a group of friends he was looking for a place to stay, but they could not find anything. Finally he ended up in the house in Amarat. He is currently attending his first year of University studying geology and mining.

James: from Bahr Al Ghazal, 26 years old, not married, a student in an Arabic speaking university, also studying geology and mining. "My main problem is that education is in Arabic. When I came to Khartoum in 2015, I did not speak this language. We are learning fast now. This is a problem not knowing the language. You just sit there, in the class and you understand nothing."

Dut and *Paul* are two other students living in the house. They are all first year students, residing in Khartoum since a year.

The students whom we met in the house did not know each other before they came to the house. In this way, they forged a small community through their shared residence and experience as foreign students in Khartoum. Upon arriving in Khartoum they had nowhere to stay, and all ended up staying here. When asked about what they think about living in Khartoum, or more specifically in Amarat, all respond in a similar way: "We didn't choose here, we're here to study, we had nowhere to live so we came here", therefore lacking opinions on the particularity of the neighbourhood. This gives an impression of coincidental strangers forming a community, with little experience of Khartoum outside of the house.

Ayen: a mother of three children. She has been in Khartoum for 12 years, therefore before independence. She wanted to return to the South and her luggage was packed, but then there was no transport. She finally came to the house 2 years ago, in 2014. She moved here because her aunt told her about it. Her husband is working occasionally, doing daily work, however he does not stay with the family in the house.

Discussions in the house and among South Sudanese in Khartoum: being a foreigner and being *Jenubeen*

The discussions and predicaments of the residents of the South Sudanese house accentuate the particular transformations that took place in the identities of South Sudanese residents in Khartoum after the separation. Their identities as foreign migrants on the one hand, and as *Jenubeen* on the other are constantly reconfigured and renegotiated in the context of changing legal status of South Sudanese in Sudan, the political context in South Sudan and the social and political relations between and among South Sudanese in Khartoum. On the one hand, since separation, South Sudanese became foreign migrants in Sudan. Below we show how this new legal status affects their living conditions, access to education, to work and to health services in the city. On the other hand, the South Sudanese house also reveals the dilemmas and conflicts hidden within the homogenous *Jenubeen* identity and the impact of the changing social norms and practices as a result of migration.

From being a Sudanese to being a foreigner in Khartoum: living conditions, education and work

Living conditions and choices: "No power to go anywhere else"
The group of displaced South Sudanese residents in the house reflects dilemmas related to the current predicaments of the South Sudanese in Khartoum. Access to housing for the displaced and South Sudanese residents is a major problem. Due to high rents, lack of access to previous housing, (as those who owned property before the separation mostly sold it before moving back to the South), and lack of income, many South Sudanese are destitute. Some reside in makeshift shelters in the 'open areas' in camp-like conditions on the outskirts of Khartoum. The house seems to offer an option of accommodation for those who cannot afford to rent their own place, but also have vital connections to the South Sudanese embassy. When asked how he enjoys living in the house, Mr. R says that he has no power to go anywhere else, so he stays here, suggesting that if he could he would leave. He also reports that the residents have no problems with the police or the Sudan government, as the official status of the building belonging to the South Sudanese government protects them.

Despite being in a privileged position in comparison with some other South Sudanese and benefitting from free of charge accommodation provided by the South Sudanese embassy, some of the residents of the house complain that the South Sudanese government is doing nothing to help with the upkeep of the house, which is covered in cracks. Any repair works or items that are needed depend on the inhabitants collecting money and carrying out the repairs themselves, as they did in 2014, renovating a small part of the house, but lacking the money to finish the job. They have to pay money to the council themselves for services like the rubbish collection.

Access to higher education

All students in the house report that as foreign nationals in Sudan the government demands that they pay higher tuition fees, making education at all levels inaccessible for many. Furthermore, to be able to sit for the Sudan Certificate (the national diploma that allows one to enter into University) the government requires foreign nationals to pay a higher fee in hard currency in order to obtain an Index Number. One student (of Nuer origins, and not a resident in the house) hoping to sit the Sudan certificate this year explained to us how in 2015 the price requested to obtain the index number was 65US$, raised to 150US$ for 2016. The obligation to pay in hard foreign currency is seen as an extra barrier by the Southerners, particularly with the current economic crisis and the falling value of the Sudanese pound. Quite simply this demand makes it unaffordable for the majority of students and therefore prevents them from having the opportunity to access university education. The positionality of the house residents is also in relation to other South Sudanese in Khartoum. Although they do not seem to be 'well-off' here, the students must be of a certain social-class/standing to be able to come to Khartoum (by plane especially) and study. Some have scholarships from the government for their fees; others rely on their parents (who also must be in privileged positions in the South to be able to afford paying the fees of their sons). This also illuminates the differentiated economic status of *nazeheen* – displaced – as the South Sudanese are referred to by the Sudanese population.

Access to work: "There are no jobs for us in Khartoum"

"There are no jobs for us here in Khartoum", said James. "You do just day jobs, some small jobs, whatever you have." Ayen looked concerned. She said that she could do any job, cleaning, selling tea, whatever, but in reality there are few jobs, especially for wom-

en. She has no income and in the house she can stay for free. The other woman who was living in the house whose husband passed away does not work. She was shy and covered her face with her-*tob* (a Sudanese cover) and refused to talk to us.

All inhabitants of the house commented that gaining money in Khartoum is a problem. As there is no work for men, they have to ask parents to sell their cows in the South, and send them money. This is particularly difficult given the current civil conflict and economic deprivation in the South. They all share resources in the house, cooking together, and sharing the little they have to survive.

These narratives exemplify the marginalised position of the South Sudanese in Khartoum. Before the separation, Southerners as citizens of Sudan were, at least in theory, able to access jobs in the formal sector, as well as had access, to health and educational services. While the opportunities for work in formal sector were quite restricted for Southerners, the presence of international organisations and the possibilities of being employed by them existed. After the separation, international organisations resolved formal employment contracts with Southerners and they were replaced to a larger extent by Sudanese citizens. Informally, however, some Southerners benefit from their previous employment arrangements and continue to work as guards, drivers or office staff. After the separation, the situation of the South Sudanese residents in Sudan has changed. As they are no longer citizens they do not have the right to work, confining them to the informal sector and increasing their perceived insecurity in terms of accessing employment[26].One young man reported that he was a driver in the South but his driving licence is not recognised in the North, nor can he obtain a work permit leaving him no other

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[26] Babiker, 2015; Vezzadini, 2014.

choice than to find day-to-day informal work. In Amarat, one can see South Sudanese, many of them young boys, working as car-washers, daily labourers, tea-sellers, clothes-washers, street-sellers (cigarettes, sugar-cane, peanuts), and guardians. Many, however, are unemployed and looking for casual work, and the majority have no stable revenues and live from hand to mouth, day to day. Students in the house, for example, navigate their precariousness by sharing the resources among themselves. Solidarity and sharing are vital in their strategies to navigate their marginal status in Amarat. People thus survive on informality and the social capital that they are able to generate, either as previous residents in Khartoum or through links to powerful networks of the South Sudanese government or North Sudanese citizens. This informality allows them to navigate the institutionalised constraints imposed on citizens of both nations after the separation.

Being Jenubeen: a social and political identity

The South Sudanese house also plays a role in cultivating a South Sudanese identity, and sharing daily lives with those who come from the same nation state, in the middle of a foreign city. Similarly as in refugee camps, the house serves as a metaphor of forming fictive kinship connections in exile[27]. The students all expressed meeting each other here in Khartoum, forming their community through this house. They are mostly all around the same age (27), and are in Khartoum for the first time in their lives, suggesting that their lives have been less marked by migration. George is the exception, as the eldest (in his 30's) and having come and gone from Khartoum several times.

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[27] Grabska, 2014.

"We are Jenubeen"and social tensions among
the South Sudanese in Khartoum

We ask: "How do you like Amarat? How do you like Khartoum? Is it different to live in Khartoum now as opposed to before the separation?" but no one really replies to the question directly. They all say: "… it is fine. Like other places in Khartoum." This response suggests that the residents of the house feel that they do not have a control over their lives in terms of where they can live. Yet, at the same time, the fact that they are not in war zones in South Sudan underlies their privileged status vis-à-vis those who stayed behind.

Ayen elaborates her response: "It is no different. It is the same. Maybe now it is a bit more respect. Because before people would abuse you on the street. Now they just do not pay attention to you. All places in Khartoum are the same, there is no difference with Amarat."

Other men commented that now it is different in the sense that they feel that they are South Sudanese. "*Jenubeen*", Ayen says proudly, "I am *Jenubeen*". And then she laughs. The sharing of a space with other South Sudanese in the house allows her and the others to reinforce their sense of being *Jenubeen* in the struggle with difficulties vis à vis the Sudanese state.

Questions around identity raise suspicions from some of the respondents. One of the young students asks why we are interested in 'tribes' and 'ethnic origin'. It seems that he feels that we are trying to point out that there are only certain groups living in the house, those groups who are supported by or are supporting the Government in Juba. We explain that we are interested to know how people identify themselves and how they talk about themselves. The issue of 'tribes' and identification raises the interest of others. Deng, one of the other students, explains: "Before tribes were identified by the language they spoke. Now, all people

in South Sudan talk about tribes. But the educated people know that this creates problems. "This comment is pertinent as the previous second civil war in the South (1983-2005), and the current conflict in the South (since December 2013) have been both described as generated by the 'educated' elites (*koor gaat duel gora*)[28]. The comment from the student might signal that those in the house, the educated students, know about the dangers of using 'tribalism' and ethnic divisions in generating conflicts. Thus, they want to distance themselves from the 'others', the 'uneducated ones' (or those who use that language) and redirect the blame for the current conflict in the South between the (Dinka dominated) government and the (Nuer dominated) rebels.

George commented:

> "Before, when the war was there, we were all one. Before the independence of South Sudan, we did not pay attention to tribes. But now, since the independence, people focus on tribes. They talk about tribes, because there are problems between tribes in the South. The conflict is because of this. But here in Khartoum at the university, people do not talk about this. They came here with a mission to complete their studies."

Despite the 'we are one discourse', the access to the house exemplifies the current situation of, and social tensions between, South Sudanese more generally in Khartoum. Mr. R seems to be the guardian to the house; "If you want to come and live in the house, you need to ask Mr. R for permission. And then after a while you need to also agree with these other people (embassy)". While the status of Mr. R is difficult to decipher, he is obviously the gatekeeper of the access to the house, giving him a somewhat privileged position, despite his apparent desire to leave if possible.

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[28] Jok and Hutchinson 1999; Grabska, 2014.

There is one more resident of the house that stands out, seemingly having a different status. We were told by other local residents that the old man in front of the 'Dinka House' is a Nuer, and that the rest of the members of the house do not really like him. He used to be a soldier, but works as a guard at the house, employed by the South Sudanese embassy, and sleeping outside. One informant warned us against hanging around too much with the man if we wanted to keep good relations with the others. We were also informed that our access to the residents in the house has to be approved by Mr. R. This vignette gives an inside to the conflicts within the house as well as the politics of accessing the residents. The only Nuer connected to the house does not benefit from the same status inside the house as the others, sleeping outside and living on the margins of the house. The practices and discourses in the house reveal the differentiated power position of the that reflects the current political conflict within South Sudan.

The discourse of 'we were one' permeates both the discussions of South Sudanese displaced in Khartoum with reference to their previous status in Sudan, when 'Sudan was one', as well as the description of Southern Sudan as being 'one' before the separation. This type of discourse tends to hide the underlying tensions, inequalities and conflicts that have been lurking under the surface of 'we were one' both in Sudan and in the South before separation. The history of the conflicts between the North and the South, and the marginalisation of the Southern citizens goes far back in time, and is exemplified in the first (1956-1972) and the second (1983-2005) civil wars between the North and the South. The marginalisation experienced from the North tended to unite the Southern groups. Yet, there were also bubbling conflicts between the different groups that came to a head in 1991 with a split in the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). It was the second civil war (1983-2005); the discovery of oil in the Western Upper

Nile region and the desire of the Khartoum government to control it; and the subsequent nine years of inter- and intra-ethnic fighting (1991-2000) that took place among the Nuer (and Dinka); that devastated the southern communities and resulted in a collapse of local social and livelihood systems. The impact of inter- and intra-ethnic violence which resulted from the John Garang-Riek Machar split in 1991 marked a turning point for Nuer-Dinka relations and concepts of ethnicity and (gender) identity. The ethnicised violence followed across borders, and in 1996, fighting took place between Dinka and Nuer in Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya as well as in Khartoum[29].

The deployment of the discourse "we are all one as 'Jenubeen'" and "we have no problem with these (Nuer or Dinka) people "reveals the marginalised and insecure position of South Sudanese in Khartoum as foreigners. As one of the Nuer informants commented:

> "Here in Khartoum, we are no longer citizens. We are under the government of another state, of Sudan. We cannot fight amongst ourselves because this will endanger our stay here. We are guests in this country (in Sudan). This is why when we see Dinka gathering on the street, we, the Nuer, we do not fight them. We just avoid them, by crossing the street to the other side."

Thus 'we are one' is deployed strategically to avoid further marginalisation of the South Sudanese in Khartoum but also recognising the changed position of Southerners within Sudan. But how would they position themselves in discussions and relations among themselves within the House? Or in South Sudan? What type of identities would be then evoked and mobilised in determining of 'who we are' and how 'we are one' would be then understood?

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[29] Grabska, 2014; Jok and Hutchinson, 1999.

Change in social relations as a result of migration: *"Marriage has been postponed"*

Amongst the students in the house Deng is the only one who is married. Bringing up the topic of marriage incites a lot of chat, jokes and laughter among the residents. The bride price is a central theme. With the current situation in the South, and their marginalised and impoverished situation in the North, young men are unable to marry in official ways. The bride price for the Dinka people is usually very high, with some 100 to 150 cows that the family of the groom must pay to the family of the bride. While the cow-based bride price has been changing over the years, with the increasing urbanisation of the South, changing economies and livelihood strategies, and the move of young people to urban areas in the North, the cows still constitute the main guarantee of the marriage. Although part of the bride-wealth can be paid in money, the meaning of cows for the Dinka (and for the Nuer) people remains central in securing social bonds. In Khartoum, away from their families and networks, as well as with lack of access to cattle, and often to money, young men had to put their marriage plans on hold. Cows have also become very expensive, the most expensive ones costing around 150 USD (3000 Sudanese Pounds). In Khartoum people pay with money, but they still need to pay cows and goats in the village. Even in Juba, marriages are changing.

The discourse, of "no cattle, no money, no marriage" seems to reflect a certain delay in accessing full adulthood for the men. As in Dinka custom, boys become fully men when they marry. This is when they acquire a status of respectable men, and later fathers[30]. The limited access to marriage because of the economic situation

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[30] Deng, 1972.

and the conflict in the South puts marriages on hold, or 'on credit'. As one of the Nuer chiefs in Khartoum explained, "people are still getting married, but only on an agreement. They cows will be paid later at home. When we go back."

Emerging reflections and conclusions

The ethnography presented here provides two different sets of reflections. One relates to the use of space and in particular the status of Amarat, as a neighborhood in wider Khartoum. While it is a wealthy neighborhood, its residents exemplify the diversity of nationalities, social status, and classes inhabiting Khartoum. The deeper investigation of the seemingly homogenous 'wealthy' composition of Amarat uncovers its heterogeneous composition, where some people are struggling to survive, yet not as much as those in other neighborhoods. The residents of the house, for that matter, show also the inequalities existing in the experiences of South Sudanese in Khartoum. They live rent free, with access to running water and toilets, in a 'villa lifestyle', whereas other compatriots live in camps or rakobas in the industrial sites of Khartoum.

The second set of reflections concern the effects of the separation of South Sudan and the on-going civil conflict in the South on the displaced South Sudanese in Khartoum. The civil conflict in the South generates new and old displacements towards the North. Yet, the experiences in Khartoum are now fundamentally different due to the changed status of South Sudanese communities vis-à-vis the Sudan state. The change in the identities of *Jenubeen* in Khartoum is two fold. One is related to the institutional changes at the national level, where Southerners have been deprived the status of locals and became foreigners in Khartoum.

This has a direct effect on their migratory trajectories and experiences. First, southern Sudanese used to come for education to Khartoum, yet, after the separation as foreigners, the cost of education has become very high, blocking access for many, as they are now foreign nationals and asked to pay in hard currency. Yet, as this fieldwork reveals, there continue to be some South Sudanese students who are able to carry out their studies, demonstrating the diversity of predicaments and migratory goals of South Sudanese population in Khartoum. Second, the lives of the people in the house also show the impossibility of accessing formal work and very little possibilities for informal employment also and hence, increasing their livelihood insecurity.

Two, the discourse of 'we are one' we are *Jenubeen* – exposes the hidden social tensions and transformations in the identity politics among the South Sudanese. The issues around access to the house reveal social conflicts infusing the South Sudanese in the South as well as in Khartoum. While the process of gaining access to the house is hard to clarify, there is seemingly an overrepresentation of Dinka residents with possible links to the South Sudanese government. While adults are arguably out of work, they find ways of surviving, with their privileged access to free of charge accommodation. Students also come from privileged background to be able to afford university fees in Khartoum (as expensive as 3,000 USD per semester), and have connections to be accommodated in the house. This emphasises the social inequalities that exist among the South Sudanese in Khartoum, with many not being able to access even basic education. The composition of the house and the relations in the house exemplify also inter-group conflicts that underlie the civil crisis in the South.

Lastly, the lives of the young residents in the house also reflect the effects of the on-going civil war in the South. Faced with pro-

tracted uncertainty[31], the displaced South Sudanese in Khartoum are forced to postpone their lives and transitions. With limited and late access to education, as well as limited possibilities to marry and thus access full adulthood, the conflict brings a disruption to their life projects. At the same time, displacement offers a chance for some to continue education and to escape social pressure to marry, and thus contribute to transforming some social relations[32].

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[31] Horst and Grabska, 2015.
[32] Grabska 2014, 2015.

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La maison sudiste à Amarat:
les enclaves sud-soudanaises à Khartoum

Cet article présente nos premières réflexions et impressions inspirées par nos deux terrains ethnographiques menés entre 2015 et 2016. Il offre une perspective sur une enclave sudiste particulaire à Amarat, un quartier à Khartoum. Il traite des questions plus vastes qui ont émergé à la suite de la séparation des deux Soudans. En juillet 2011, le Sud--Soudan est devenu une nation indépendante, et s'est éloigné du Nord du Soudan. La rupture était une expérience violente pour les personnes des deux nations, et les changements dynamiques qui ont suivi la séparation des deux Soudans ont on eu des consequances pour la vie des gens du nord et du sud, ainsi que ceux qui sont considérés comme «Jenubeen» (sud-soudanais) dans le nord et eux qui sont considérés comme «Shageen» (nord-soudanais) dans le Sud.

Avec les développements politiques dans les deux pays et l'introduction des nouvelles lois sur la citoyenneté, les ressortissants du sud deviennent des étrangers au Soudan de Nord, alors que les habitants du Nord perdent leurs privilèges de citoyenneté au Sud Soudan. Ces changements politiques ont eu un impact profond sur les aspects sociaux, politiques et économiques, sur les reconfigurations ainsi que les revendications d'identité dans les deux pays.

KATARZYNA GRABSKA

JEUNES FILLES ARMÉES, FEMMES VIOLÉES, PORTEUSES DE VALISES; MASCULINITÉS MILITARISÉES ET HOMMES DEVENUS FEMMES: LES GUERRES AU SUD SOUDAN

Les identités de genre
et les rapports de genre en transition?

Par un bel après-midi de mars 2007, j'étais assise dans un *luak* (une étable), regardant la mère de Nyariek en train de broyer le sorgho et de cuisiner le *walwal* (une bouillie de sorgho). Nyariek, une jeune fille Nuer de 16 ans que j'avais rencontrée au camp de réfugiés de Kakuma au Kénia, était retournée récemment au Sud-Soudan. Quand je suis tombée sur elle à Ler, au Sud-Soudan, elle m'avait demandé d'aller voir sa mère qu'elle n'avait pas vue depuis son départ pour le Kénia en 2001. Après un voyage dans un vieux mini-bus et une marche de trois heures à travers la savane poussiéreuse, nous atteignîmes Maper, le berceau de Nyariek. Dans le *luak*, j'ai écouté cette femme qui avait séjourné à Maper pendant les conflits raconter des histoires de guerre et de déplacement:

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«De quelle guerre voulez-vous que je parle?» me demanda-t-elle. «Elles étaient toutes là; elles venaient comme le jiom (le vent). Nous avons beaucoup souffert là-bas à cause du pétrole. D'abord les Arabes sont venus et c'était le koor kume, la guerre du gouvernement. Puis les Kinka commencèrent à se battre avec les Nuers et les gens ont dû s'enfuir d'un endroit à l'autre. Ensuite les Nuer commencèrent à se battre entre eux. Ces conflits étaient différents à cause des armes utilisées. Les mères restaient avec les enfants dans la brousse. Beaucoup d'hommes furent tués et les autres s'enfuirent. Des femmes ont été tuées et si vous aviez de la chance, vous étiez prise comme femme par l'ennemi. Les maisons ont été brulées, les vaches et les chèvres emmenées. Il y avait beaucoup de souffrance et de fuites. [A cause de la guerre] nous sommes devenus différents, les femmes et les hommes Nuer ne sont plus les mêmes qu'avant.

Au Sud-Soudan, les identités de genre et les «rôles» de genre prennent une place importante dans l'histoire des femmes et des hommes qui ont été, ces dernières décennies, confrontés aux guerres, à la violence communautaire, aux déplacements et à la vie en exil. Cette présentation traite des identités et des actions des femmes, des hommes, des jeunes gens et des personnes âgées impliqués dans les conflits armés au Sud-Soudan (entre 1983 et 2005), et traite en particulier des Nuer, un groupe ethnique vivant dans la région de l'ouest du haut Nil.

Quelles sont les implications des conflits armés pour les identités de genre et les rapports de pouvoir? Historiquement, les guerres sont considérées comme des «symboles de la masculinité», à travers l'agression masculine, la brutalité et la violence. Cette image a été perpétuée par le cinéma, la littérature, les chansons et les récits (White 2007). White montre que le rôle protecteur des hommes à l'égard des femmes y est accentué et le combat considéré comme le test ultime de la masculinité. Les femmes et

les filles sont injustement décrites comme des victimes, des pacificatrices et/ou comme les mères des nations chargées d'apporter leur soutien aux combattants héroïques. La capacité d'action (*agency*) des hommes domine les discours de guerre, tandis que les femmes et les filles sont rendues silencieuses et invisibles (Denov et Gervais 2007). Ma recherche montre que ces interprétations simplistes ne rendent pas compte des rôles complexes des femmes et des hommes pendant les guerres ni des changements subséquents dans les rapports de genre, lesquels restent alors inexplicables et non théorisés.

Cet article souligne trois points : tout d'abord, les femmes et les hommes sont touché(e)s par les conflits et pendant les guerres, de manières différentes et contradictoires. Mes données établissent que les guerres et les conflits offrent des opportunités d'*empowerment* (émancipation) non seulement pour les hommes, mais aussi pour certaines femmes, tandis que d'autres risquent de perdre leur statut social. Autrement dit, les inégalités de genre peuvent en partie être inversées. Le second point fait apparaître la multiplicité des identités de genre que les conflits engendrent: les hommes ne sont pas seulement agressifs et violeurs, et les femmes seulement des victimes passives. L'exemple des Nuer montre que les femmes jouent un rôle important dans la militarisation des identités masculines, bien que leur propre position s'en trouve affaiblie. Le troisième point de cette communication traite de la question des violences sexuelles commises contre les femmes pendant les conflits. Comment et dans quelles circonstances les violences ordinaires deviennent des violences ethnicisées qui se jouent sur le corps des femmes. Ces questions sont importantes pour faciliter les actions et politiques transformatives mises en place après les conflits.

Dans un premier temps, j'expliquerai le contexte et la méthodologie de mon étude, en privilégiant les sources des conflits civils

au Sud-Soudan. Je présenterai ensuite les conséquences générales des conflits et de la guerre sur la société soudanaise, avant d'analyser les impacts de la militarisation et de la guerre sur les identités de genre. Enfin, je démontrerai comment les identités de genre ont été transformées, revêtant des formes multiples et souvent contradictoires.

Méthodologie et contexte: la seconde guerre civile au Sud-Soudan: pétrole, armes, État et guerre des «gens instruits»

La guerre civile (1983-2005) au Sud-Soudan s'est caractérisée par un conflit entre le gouvernement national de Khartoum et les rebelles de l'APLS (Armée populaire de libération du Soudan) ainsi que par 9 années de violences ethniques entre ces mêmes groupes du Sud qui se sont battus pour prendre le contrôle du Sud-Soudan. Cette présentation traite du patriarcat étatique et militariste des rebelles sud-soudanais et, plus précisément, des conflits communautaires entre les Nuer et les Dinka (les deux principaux groupes ethniques au Sud-Soudan) et parmi les Nuer.

Si cette guerre civile a été le prolongement et le résultat du conflit précédent[1], les deux conflits se sont distingués par leur échelle et leur caractère. La lutte pour le contrôle des ressources naturelles (notamment le pétrole), l'usage de technologies modernes (les armes à feu au lieu des lances), le mépris par l'État des droits humains et la violence entre les groupes ethniques du Sud-Soudan à l'instigation des forces servant les intérêts de Khar-

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[1] Depuis l'indépendance du Soudan de la colonisation anglo-égyptienne (1956), le pays a souffert de plusieurs conflits internes. Entre 1956 et 1972, la première guerre civile s'est déroulée entre le gouvernement à Khartoum et les rebelles sud-soudanais.

toum, marquèrent une rupture par rapport aux précédents conflits nord-sud. La violence intercommunautaire utilisa un nouveau langage ethnicisé, absent de la lutte locale entre les Nuer et les Dinka jusqu'à la scission de l'APLS en 1991.

Cette présentation s'appuie sur une recherche doctorale ethnographique menée entre mai 2006 et septembre 2007 dans les camps de réfugiés au Kenya et auprès de rapatriés au Sud-Soudan (dans la région des Nuer à Ler) (Grabska 2010). Pendant six mois, j'ai vécu dans les camps de réfugiés à Kakuma où j'ai suivi la vie des familles soudanaises et des individus qui avaient décidé de rentrer au Sud-Soudan. Pendant presqu'un an, j'ai étudié sur place le processus de leur intégration et de leur établissement. Il s'agissait d'observer les changements dans les rapports et les identités de genre pendant la guerre, pendant les déplacements et après le retour au Sud-Soudan. Cette recherche s'est fondée sur les histoires de vie des familles et des individus déplacés.

L'impact du conflit

L'agitation politique et civile qui ravagea le Sud-Soudan en 1983 fit plus de deux millions de victimes et provoqua l'un des plus grands déplacements au monde, avec plus de cinq millions de personnes déplacées au sein du pays et entre 500000 et 700000 personnes qui cherchèrent refuge dans les pays voisins (International Crisis Group 2002; UNMIS 2006)[2]. Les régions de l'ouest du Nil Supérieur enregistrèrent les déplacements de population les plus importants pendant les conflits des années 90 autour du

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[2] Au Kenia, plus que 70'000 réfugiés habitaient dans les camps de réfugiés à Kakuma et vivaient à Nairobi; au Ouganda, il y avait plus que 212'000 réfugiés sud-soudanais qui vivaient parmi la population locale; en Ethiopie, 96,000 vivaient dans les camps de réfugiés.; En Egypte, 30,000 habitaient dans les villes; 45,000 étaient déplacés en République Démocratique de Congo (RDC), 36,000 en République Central d'Afrique et plus que 200,000 au Tchad (ICG 2002).

pétrole. Environ 70500 civils Nuer durent quitter la région rien qu'entre juin 1998 et décembre 1999 (Hutchinson 2000: 7). Depuis la signature de l'accord de paix entre le gouvernement de Khartoum et les rebelles soudanais (APLS) en janvier 2005, le retour et le rapatriement des populations sont en cours. Selon les statistiques, environ 350000 personnes sont déjà rentrées au Soudan. Un référendum prévu pour 2011 devrait déterminer l'avenir de l'État soudanais : on saura alors si le Sud se séparera et créera son propre État indépendant ou restera partie intégrante de l'État soudanais.

Les femmes et les hommes: La guerre et la violence

Ethnicisation du conflit entre les Dinka et les Nuer: la violence sur le corps des femmes

La majorité des Nuer, femmes et hommes, parlent des graves souffrances et des profonds traumatismes liés à la guerre. Les souffrances ont été si grandes qu'aux enterrements, les femmes ne versaient pas de larmes. « Nos larmes ont séché. Nous avons trop pleuré pendant les guerres, nous avons perdu tant d'enfants, nous avons vu tant de morts. Nous n'avons plus de larmes » expliqua une femme d'âge moyen à l'enterrement d'un dignitaire de Ler. La violence, la mort, les pertes et le déplacement ont été racontés par les réfugiés de Kakuma ou par ceux qui étaient restés au Soudan dans des récits souvent suspendus : il y avait des mots interrompus, des larmes et des silences prolongés. Beaucoup de femmes ont évoqué les viols, la violence, la torture, la faim, la fuite et la peur endurés pendant ces guerres. NyaDak, dans les 20 dernières années est restée à Ler pendant que sa mère était partie se faire soigner à Kakuma. Elle relate son expérience:

> Vous n'étiez jamais sûre de ne pas être enlevée la nuit, ou vos enfants ou votre nourriture. Ce pouvait être les Arabes ou les Brigades, ou les soldats du SPLA. Si vous faisiez l'erreur de donner toute la nourriture à un groupe, les autres vous accusaient d'être à l'ennemi et ils pouvaient soit faire de vous leur femme [viol], soit vous tuer sur le champ.

Au milieu des conflits politisés et renforcés par l'avidité des hommes, les femmes, les enfants et les aînés étaient tous exposés à une violence inter et intra ethnique, venant de partout, souvent de ceux-là mêmes qui étaient supposés être leurs protecteurs. Quand elles racontent leurs histoires remplies de lutte, de mort et de souffrance, ces femmes rient souvent, puisque le rire, comme elles me l'ont dit, est la seule façon d'affronter la perte et la douleur immense. D'autres fois, interrogées sur la guerre et les voyages lors des déplacements, elles deviennent silencieuses, ou jettent quelques mots dédaigneux: *«Qu'y a-t-il à dire? C'était la guerre, et maintenant c'est fini»*. C'est pendant ces moments de silence, de récits interrompus, de silencieux hochements de tête que je devais trouver un sens et comprendre leurs expériences insupportables, indescriptibles et douloureuses. Etudier la violence, sa nature sexuée et ses conséquences douloureuses, devint pour moi l'étude des non-dits, des soupirs et des silences (Jackson 2006).

Avant la deuxième guerre civile, les femmes Nuer et Dinka sont perçues comme des biens communautaires; elles ont le pouvoir de protéger les autres et le droit d'être protégées. Pendant les conflits intracommunautaires précédents, les femmes ne participaient pas à la lutte, mais avaient le droit de protéger les combattants blessés. Elles sont perçues comme des protectrices et des sauveuses qui accompagnent des frères, des pères et des maris dans les combats locaux. Si leurs hommes étaient blessés, les femmes couvraient leurs corps et les protégeaient de l'assaut de l'ennemi. Si un combattant, même du côté ennemi, courait dans

une maison, il était considéré comme ayant atteint un lieu sanctuarisé et ne pouvait pas être visé par le côté ennemi. Lorsque la règle consistant à ne pas viser les femmes dans les inimitiés intercommunautaires fut abandonnée et que les femmes devinrent les cibles de la violence ethnicisée, leurs capacités protectrices furent supprimées.

Pendant le conflit entre le gouvernement de Khartoum et les rebelles sud-soudanais, les femmes sud-soudanaises ont été souvent les cibles de la violence. Alors que l'État soudanais du nord et ses milices arabes prenaient pour cibles femmes et enfants pendant la guerre, les combattants Nuer et Dinka, eux, ne visèrent et ne tuèrent intentionnellement ni femmes, ni enfants, ni personnes âgées jusqu'en 1991, date de la scission dans le mouvement sud-soudanais (selon les intérêts politiques et la vision de l'avenir du Sud-Soudan). Tandis que John Garang, le Dinka et le dirigeant de l'ALPS, voulait que le Sud reste intégré dans l'État soudanais mais qu'il bénéficie d'une autonomie, Riek Machar, le commandant Nuer, et ses camarades préféraient créer un État sud-soudanais indépendant. La guerre sud-sud qui suivit fut souvent caractérisée par l'abandon des codes de combat précédemment honorés par les Nuer et les Dinka.

Les femmes et les enfants devinrent les premières victimes de la guerre «des gens instruits»[3] (Jok et Hutchinson 1999:131; Entretiens avec des personnes âgées). Les incendies de maisons et de récoltes, précédemment interdits dans les conflits communautaires entre les Nuer et les Dinka, devinrent partie intégrante de la tactique de guerre dans les conflits sud-sud. Le conflit sud-sud

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[3] La métaphore «la guerre des gens instruits» qui était utilisée par les personnes âgées pour décrire les sources du conflit fait référence aux deux commandants de l'ALPS, Dr. Garang et Dr. Machar qui ont terminé tous deux leurs études doctorantes en étranger. Cette métaphore montre l'intérêt de certains groupes politiques privilégiés au Sud-Soudan à continuer le conflit.

(après 1991) et les violences intracommunautaires affaiblirent la position sociale des femmes. Les changements dans les discours ethniques et de genre ainsi que la nature des violences firent des femmes les cibles prioritaires des violences ethniques. Le corps des femmes devint l'espace de la politique nationale, ethnique et clanique portée par les hommes.

L'anthropologue américaine Sharon Hutchinson, qui effectua des recherches de terrain parmi les communautés Nuer pendant les années 90, montre que la violence sud-sud des années 90 entraîna «une divergence et une militarisation rapide des identités ethniques des Nuer et des Dinka» et «une reformulation de la relation entre le genre et l'ethnicité dans les yeux de Nuer» (2000: 7). Historiquement, l'ethnicité des Nuer est fondée sur le concept performatif selon lequel les femmes peuvent acquérir l'identité ethnique/communautaire de leur mari par le mariage et le transfert de la dot (la dot est payée par la famille du mari). Comme le disent les femmes et les hommes Nuer, «les filles et les femmes appartiennent à tous, sauf au lit». Par conséquent, n'importe quelle fille ou femme Dinka peut devenir Nuer par le mariage (de même que les enfants nés d'un père Nuer). La violence sud-sud mena cependant au rejet de cette notion fluide d'ethnicité, selon les termes d' Hutchinson, «laquelle laissa la place à un concept d'ethnicité plus «primordialiste» enraciné dans les métaphores procréatrices du sang partagé» (2000: 8). Ceci a été confirmé par les personnes qui ont participé à ma recherche: «*maintenant, on peut être seulement Nuer par le sang*» (c'est-à-dire si on est né Nuer). Les femmes et les enfants ne peuvent donc plus obtenir une identité ethnique différente par le mariage et le bétail. Les identités ethniques des Nuer sont alors devenues plus rigides, le sang prenant le pas sur la dot. Dès lors que leur ethnicité fut perçue comme fixe, les femmes et les enfants Dinka et Nuer devinrent des cibles militaires et perdirent leur position privilégiée.

Hutchinson suggère que ce virage «primodialiste» survenu dans l'ethnicité des Nuer fut généré par les stratégies militaires du nord qui cherchaient à ‹diviser et régner› (2000:13). Ce tournant s'inscrit aussi dans la tendance globale vers une utilisation toujours plus répandue de la violence militarisée sur les femmes et les enfants. Ce durcissement des identités est commun aux conflits ethniques à travers le globe (Zarkov 2008; Giles and Hyndman 2004; El-Bushra 2000a, 2000b; Enloe 1983; Yuval Davis 1997; Korac 1996). Les femmes ne sont plus privilégiées dans les conflits intercommunautaires, elles deviennent au contraire des marqueuses de frontières dans les luttes d'identité ethno-nationalistes. L'ethnicité semble être en partie créée, maintenue et socialisée par le contrôle masculin des identités de genre, tandis que les droits humains et la dignité des femmes sont pris en otage dans les luttes de pouvoir masculines.

Le meurtre sans discernement de femmes et d'enfants, la destruction volontaire de propriétés par les Dinka et les groupes armés Nuer marquèrent un tournant dans le conflit sud-nord et dans la lutte inter- et intracommunautaire. La milice des Nuer et les forces de l'APLS brutalisèrent la population des Nuer Dok sur laquelle porte ma recherche. Elles enlevèrent, violèrent et tuèrent des femmes et des enfants souvent devant les yeux de leurs maris, de leurs frères et de leurs pères.

Majok, un jeune homme qui échappa à l'enrôlement forcé du SPLA et resta pendant la guerre à Ler raconte:

> Quand le Bridage [groupe dissident de Paulino Matip] arriva en 1998, je courus me cacher dans la brousse. Alors je vis un groupe de sept, peut-être dix askari [soldats en arabe] amener une jeune femme, ma voisine. Ils la violèrent, l'un après l'autre, tout en la battant. J'étais dans la brousse et je vis tout cela en face de moi. J'étais trop effrayé pour les arrêter. Quand ils eurent fini, ils la laissèrent là, dans une mare de sang. Elle a survécu, mais elle

a commencé à maigrir. Elle s'est plainte aux chefs, mais rien ne s'est passé. Beaucoup de femmes et de filles ont été violées pendant la guerre. La plupart d'entre elles ont été forcées par leur mari de divorcer ou ont épousé des vieux que cela ne dérangeait pas qu'elles soient keaagh, déjà utilisées.

Par de tels actes, les hommes de la milice détruisirent non seulement l'identité ethnique ancrée dans le corps des femmes, mais ils humilièrent aussi les hommes Nuer, devenus incapables de protéger leurs femmes et leurs enfants. Le viol, comme dans les autres conflits contemporains en ex-Yougoslavie, dans la région des Grands Lacs, au Liberia et au Sierra Leone, n'a pas utilisé seulement comme une arme pour exterminer d'autres groupes (Jacobs, Jackobson et Marchbank 2000; Giles et Hyndman 2004; Zarkov 2008). Il s'est agi aussi de soumettre et d'émasculer les hommes rivaux, afin de miner leur moral et leur esprit de lutte.

Reconfiguration des féminités et du champ d'action des femmes: femmes violées, porteuses de valises et jeunes filles armées

Pendant mon séjour au camp de réfugiés de Kakuma et à Ler au Sud-Soudan, les femmes et les hommes Nuer âgés ont commenté ces changements tactiques et la position sociale des femmes. Joy, une veuve d'une bonne quarantaine d'années, explique ceci :

Dans le passé, nous, les femmes, comptions sur les hommes pour nous protéger. Les hommes allaient combattre les Arabes, et les femmes trouvaient un endroit sûr et restaient derrière à préparer la nourriture et l'eau pour les soldats. Puis les choses ont changé. Les Arabes ont commencé à enlever les femmes et les enfants, et puis les Nuers et les Dinka se sont mis à se battre. C'était très dur de voir ceux de notre propre peuple se combattre. En même temps, vous ne pouviez vous échapper parce que vous apparteniez à ce peuple.

Dans leurs récits, les femmes Nuer insistent sur l'expérience genrée et physique des violences qu'elles subirent directement. La nature genrée de la violence dans la guerre menée par le gouvernement contre l'APLS et, encore plus significativement, dans le conflit sud-sud contribua au déplacement et à la reformulation des identités de genre. La violence genrée que les femmes endurèrent était énorme : nombre d'entre elles subirent de nombreux viols aux mains des soldats arabes, des troupes de l'APLS et d'autres rebelles du sud. La position des femmes au sein la communauté s'en trouva affaiblie, dans la mesure où elles étaient devenues plus vulnérables que les hommes. De plus, étant moins mobiles et moins à même de trouver un refuge, elles furent nombreuses à rester piégées au Soudan. Les femmes purent moins migrer et échapper aux effets brutaux des violences des hommes. La majorité des femmes restèrent dans leur village, elles furent enlevées par les ennemis pour servir de « femmes » ou de domestiques aux rebelles.

Néanmoins, la position et les rôles occupés par les femmes pendant la guerre civile ont été plus variés et complexes que ce qu'en a dit la littérature féministe dans sa représentation standard des victimes de violence, soutenant que leur socialisation pousse généralement les hommes à devenir agressifs et les femmes à se soumettre (Turshen et Twarigaramariya 1998; Turshen 2001). Toutefois, les femmes ne jouèrent pas seulement un rôle de victimes pendant les conflits. Elles participèrent directement à la guerre en tant que combattantes, ou éducatrices nationalistes. Loin d'être passives, elles prirent en charge la protection de leurs familles et de leurs biens pendant que leurs maris, fils et frères participaient au combat. Elles portèrent les blessés et les valises, fournirent de la nourriture et assumèrent d'autres services domestiques. Selon les femmes et les hommes Nuer qui allèrent en Éthiopie, l'APLS créa en 1986 un bataillon de femmes, le *Ketiba*

Benet. Trois cent jeunes filles reçurent un entraînement dans des camps éthiopiens aux côtés des recrues masculines (McCullum et Okech 2008: 47; HSBA 2008: 2). Le bataillon livra un seul combat. «*Trop de femmes et de jeunes filles sont mortes et l'APLS s'est rendu compte qu'il valait mieux les garder dans la caserne pour nous aider, nous les hommes*» commente un réfugié qui avait été une jeune recrue. Quelques femmes Nuer réfugiées au Kenia ont d'abord rejoint leur mari en Ethiopie où elles se sont entraînées par la suite comme soldates. La grande majorité vivait autour de la caserne militaire dans les camps d'entraînement et soutenait les soldats en leur fournissant des services domestiques et sexuels. Certains groupes de milice recrutèrent aussi des femmes. Sur la base de la préinscription des combattantes faites dans le cadre du projet de désarmement de la Mission de l'ONU au Soudan (UN-MIS), il y eut environ 3600 femmes combattantes en 2005 (HSBA 2008: 5).

La militarisation de la société au Sud-Soudan s'est diffusée dans les communautés et les ménages au-delà des rangs militaires et dans les espaces féminins[4]. Des femmes et des enfants ont dit posséder des fusils pour se défendre et se venger des ennemis. Il est arrivé aussi que ces fusils soient utilisés dans des disputes domestiques. De jeunes enfants ont porté des fusils plus grands qu'eux pour se protéger et protéger leurs troupeaux. Des femmes et des jeunes filles ont utilisé des armes comme moyens de protection, pour exercer leur pouvoir sur d'autres et pour affirmer leur autonomie.

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[4] The Small Arms Survey estime qu'au Sud Soudan il y a entre 1.9 et 3.2 millions les petits armes (small arms). Deux tiers est dans les mains de personnes civiles, 20 pourcents dans les mains du gouvernement à Khartoum, et le reste est partagé par l'ALPS et les autres groupes milices (Small Arms 2007: 2).

Certaines vantaient leur maîtrise du fusil et affirmaient préférer être armées plutôt que bien instruites: «*c'est plus facile d'être riche quand tu as un fusil. Tu peux juste tirer et tu obtiens ce que tu veux*». Cette déclaration d'une jeune femme de 18 ans révèle combien les femmes, loin d'être les victimes passives des conflits militaires, y participèrent activement en recourant à la violence. En tant que membres de la famille, elles devaient être protégées, mais elles se considéraient aussi comme chargées de la protection des autres. Ainsi, la guerre amena beaucoup de femmes à une plus grande confiance en soi. Malgré leurs expériences traumatisantes, les femmes devinrent des militantes et réclamèrent droit et respect. Ces témoignages font aussi ressortir la militarisation profonde des relations, que ce soit au sein de la communauté, à l'intérieur du ménage ou sur le plan personnel. Cette militarisation pénétra tous les segments de la société et se refléta même dans les pratiques de dénomination : par exemple, NyaKlang signifie «la fille à l'AK47 (le fusil le plus répandu parmi les rebelles et la population civile pendant les conflits)». Ce nom était très courant pendant la guerre.

Les femmes contribuèrent aussi activement à l'effort de guerre par l'usage de la violence. Leur influence sur les hommes de la famille à travers l'humiliation (voir Hutchinson 1996, 2000) fut largement exercée pendant le conflit. Riek Machar reconnait que les femmes Nuer pouvaient humilier les hommes par des chansons, et ceci eut une nette influence sur le recrutement des soldats dans l'APLS (Hutchinson 1996: 157). Les mères exercèrent une pression considérable sur leurs fils pour qu'ils rejoignent l'armée. Pendant mon séjour dans les régions de l'ouest du Nil Supérieur, j'ai souvent entendu des femmes louer par des chansons et des histoires les efforts de guerre héroïques de leurs fils, de leurs frères et de leur mari. Mais lorsque les soldats commencèrent à mourir au combat et que les fils ne rentrèrent pas, les femmes et les filles modifièrent

leurs chansons et refusèrent la cour des soldats («je n'épouserai pas un fantôme», Hutchinson 1996:159). Certaines de ces chansons incitaient d'autres femmes à la violence, notamment pendant les conflits inter- et intracommunautaires entre les Dinka et les Nuer. Jok (1998, 1999) et Hutchinson (2000) évoquent à propos des violences intercommunautaires le rôle des femmes qui encourageaient les hommes à voler du bétail et à venger leurs morts.

Pendant la guerre, elles assumèrent des fonctions de leadership, parfois même en tant que chefs de la communauté. Il s'agissait de transmettre des messages et leurs propres inquiétudes aux chefs suprêmes, à l'APLS et aux groupes de la contre-insurrection. Alors que la violence intercommunautaire montait en flèche, les femmes devinrent des pacificatrices.

Elles ont aussi utilisé leur corps pour négocier des compromis avec leurs maris, leurs frères et les autres hommes. Par exemple, en exil elles participèrent activement à des campagnes pro-paix en utilisant leur corps et «rôles» reproductifs. Beaucoup de ces initiatives virent le jour dans les camps de réfugiés au Kenya. Certaines femmes avertirent leurs maris qu'elles ne cuisineraient pas, n'auraient pas de relations sexuelles avec eux ou «ne produiraient pas d'enfants pour le Sud» si les hommes n'arrêtaient pas la lutte (Itto 2006:2). D'autres utilisèrent la nudité pour déshonorer leurs maris et les hommes de leur famille. En 2002, des femmes du Sud-Soudan marchèrent nues et en groupe dans les rues de Nairobi pour protester contre la lutte intercommunautaire au Sud-Soudan (Itto 2006:2; HSBA 2008:2; McCallum et Okech 2008)[5]. Plusieurs femmes de la diaspora s'associèrent malgré les divisions ethniques pour exiger la paix. La Voix des Femmes Soudanaises

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[5] Cette marche eut des conséquences modestes. Quelques femmes ont été invitées de participer au processus de paix qui se déroula plus vite grâce à leur pression.

pour la Paix, la Nouvelle Fédération des Femmes Soudanaises et la Nouvelle Association des Femmes Soudanaises prirent une importance internationale, attirant l'attention sur le conflit oublié. Quelques femmes pacificatrices furent finalement invitées dans les négociations de paix de Machakos, mais leur rôle dans l'esquisse de l'accord de paix fut mineur. Anne Itto, une ancienne ministre aujourd'hui membre de l'Assemblée nationale du Sud-Soudan, déplore que la version finale de l'accord de paix n'ait pas mentionné la souffrance et le rôle des femmes dans la guerre (2006: 2-4). Beaucoup de femmes Nuer à Kakuma et au Soudan exprimèrent leur mécontentement à cet égard: «*Ce n'est pas notre paix, c'est la paix des hommes, des soldats. Nous [les femmes] avons souffert de la guerre et les enfants morts n'ont pas été reconnus*». La question des droits des femmes et de l'égalité de genre n'a été mentionnée que dans la constitution provisoire du Sud-Soudan.

De façon générale, le corps et la puissance reproductive des femmes jouèrent un «rôle» pendant les conflits. L'accent fut pourtant mis sur un autre discours «des droits et des devoirs». Alors que les hommes étaient supposés «protéger le front militaire», le devoir premier des femmes était de «protéger le front reproductif». Tout au long du conflit, les dirigeants de l'armée et des communautés ne cessèrent d'exhorter les femmes à continuer d'accoucher, en guise de contribution à la lutte. A travers leur rôle «reproductif», elles fournissaient ainsi des enfants pour «les combats» de libération du Sud-Soudan. Par conséquent, les femmes eurent souvent de grandes familles, dont elles devaient s'occuper seules pendant que les maris étaient dans des camps de réfugiés ou au combat. L'interdiction d'avoir des relations sexuelles durant l'allaitement n'était pas respectée et les intervalles entre les grossesses se réduisirent (Jok 1998; Hutchinson 2000). Puisque les hommes étaient au combat, les femmes ont dû concevoir avec d'autres hommes, des membres de leur famille ou des étrangers. Quand

elles étaient enlevées par l'ennemi, elles étaient souvent prises comme femmes par des commandants puissants et procréaient en captivité.

Au Sud-Soudan, beaucoup de femmes restées au village évoquèrent des «mariages de protection et de convenance» avec des commandants et des soldats locaux en l'absence de leurs propres maris.

Nyajuc, une femme âgée qui resta à Ler pendant la guerre raconte:

> Nous devions donner naissance à des enfants, nos maris étaient dans la brousse, aussi qu'étions-nous supposées faire? Il valait mieux aller dans les casernes, au moins vous y aviez un enfant et parfois aussi de la nourriture, ou peut-être que l'homme vous protégerait des autres rebelles.

Le mariage et les services sexuels ont souvent été utilisés par les femmes et les filles dans les zones de conflits comme des moyens de survie (Devon et Gervais 2007). Les femmes utilisaient leur position genrée pour accéder à la sécurité et au bien-être. Au Sierra Leone, comme le montrent Utas (2005b), Devon et Gervais (2007), les filles négociaient leur sécurité en se mariant avec des commandants puissants, afin non seulement d'avoir accès à de la nourriture, mais aussi de réduire le risque de violence sexuelle par d'autres. Ceci témoigne de la capacité d'action (*agency*) et de l'ingéniosité de ces femmes qui, en utilisant leur genre et leur corps, cherchèrent la protection, le pouvoir, le statut et la survie.

La contribution reproductive des femmes à la lutte de libération ne fut cependant pas reconnue dans le discours public au Sud-Soudan après la guerre. Pendant la campagne du Mouvement populaire de libération du Soudan à Ler, le représentant régional loua le rôle joué par les femmes pendant la guerre, les remerciant pour les services rendus aux soldats héroïques, notamment la cuisine et le transport des blessés et des bagages. Leur contribution re-

productive a été minimisée, voire négligée, bien qu'elle ait eu des conséquences considérables sur leur santé et leur position dans la société. «*A cause de la guerre, les femmes n'ont plus d'enfants. Il y avait trop d'enfants, trop de femmes prises par la force*», commente Theresa Nyangule, la représentante d'Union de Femmes à Ler. «*Tout d'abord, les hommes sont arrivés et ont fait de nous leurs femmes, et maintenant les maris réapparaissent et demandent le divorce*», explique une autre veuve qui avait été enlevée par une milice Nuer. A travers la guerre et la violence, les hommes ont acquis davantage de droits sur les capacités reproductives et le corps des femmes. Ils ont obtenu par exemple le droit de réclamer des services sexuels et domestiques au nom de la responsabilité des femmes de «protéger le front reproductif». Hutchinson souligne que «le statut des femmes comme des agents indépendants aux yeux des hommes a décliné dans le contexte de glorification militarisée du pouvoir brut du fusil» (2000:12).

Masculinités militarisées et hommes devenus femmes

Je vivais avec AK-47
À mes côtés
Je dormais avec un œil ouvert
Je courais
Je m'échappais
Je faisais semblant d'être morte
Je me cachais
J'ai vu les miens mourir comme des mouches
   Emmanuel Jal, "Forced to Sin", Nuer 'Lost Boy' chanteur de rap

Comme dans les autres lieux affectés par des conflits (Richards 2005; Vight 2006; Utas 2003; Samuelson 2007), la vie des hommes Nuer était largement militarisée, que ce soit par la distribution des fusils, le recrutement forcé, la violence ou la diffusion d'idéo-

logies nationalistes. La militarisation était très répandue parmi les communautés du Sud-Soudan. Presque tous les jeunes et les hommes d'un certain âge que j'ai rencontrés au Kenya et plus tard au Soudan ont été militairement entraînés à un moment ou un autre de leur vie et ont participé à la lutte de libération. A la fin des années 80, pour répondre au besoin en recrues, John Garang, le dirigeant d'APLS, décida de former des jeunes cadres: entre 17000 et 40000 jeunes recrues (HRW 1994) furent entraînées dans des camps militaires en Ethiopie, selon les estimations de Human Rights Watch. Garang les qualifiait d'«Armée Rouge», d'«armée sans crainte» ou encore de«Pépinière du Soudan» : une jeune génération à qui l'on a fait croire qu'elle était l'avenir d'un Sud-Soudan indépendant (Eggers 2006:300).

Au Kénia, dans le camp de réfugiés de Kakuma, j'ai rencontré Kuok, un jeune homme timide de 27 ans, à la voix douce; j'ai suivi son installation après son retour à Ler, dans le Sud-Soudan. Il avait rejoint l'Armée de Libération du Peuple Soudanais (SPLA) quand il avait six ou sept ans. Ses parents étaient morts du kalazar (leishmaniose), laissant orphelins à un âge très jeune Kuok et ses frères et sœurs. Rejoindre le SPLA fut une façon de gérer sa marginalisation:

> Il y avait beaucoup d'enfants là où on recrutait. La plupart étaient recrutés par les chefs. Les commandants du SPLA allaient dire aux chefs qu'ils avaient besoin d'envoyer des garçons se former en Ethiopie. Certains enfants choisissaient d'y aller parce qu'ils étaient dans une situation difficile, soit qu'ils étaient orphelins, soit que la situation de leur famille était difficile. D'autres furent sélectionnés par leur famille ; des enfants souvent difficiles, perturbateurs, étaient envoyés se faire éduquer, l'éducation n'était pas alors valorisée. Puis il y en eut d'autres qui furent forcés [par les soldats du SPLA].

> Il y eut au moins 1500 garçons, certains petits ne savaient
> même pas marcher. Nous avons tous marché ensemble, à travers
> les fleuves et les déserts, et nous avons fini pas atteindre l'Ethio-
> pie.

Selon les récits des jeunes hommes, les enfants étaient soit enlevés de force par les soldats, soit envoyés par leurs parents pour soutenir «la lutte de la libération» et échapper à la mort ou à la famine. Pour quelques-uns, l'enrôlement militaire était deve-nu un devoir que les fils étaient supposés remplir. Leur importance dans l'économie du ménage, leur rôle de protecteurs, ne serait-ce que pour subvenir aux besoins de leurs parents âgés, renforçaient encore leur volonté d'intégrer l'armée. Les autres hommes et les autres garçons le faisaient volontiers: ils considéraient la guerre comme une occasion d'accéder à l'éducation, et aussi de gagner leur vie, d'améliorer leur position dans la communauté et de contrer leur marginalisation sociale. Malgré les conditions accablantes de la guerre, la violence, la famine et les impératifs politiques, communautaires et familiaux, quelques garçons et hommes du Sud-Soudan parvinrent à atteindre un certain degré de choix et à infléchir en partie les circonstances, notamment dans la recherche de l'éducation et d'un refuge pour être le plus autonome possible vis-à-vis du gouvernement et de la famille.

J'ai rencontré Wanten pour la première fois en janvier 2007 lors de mon arrivée à Bentiu. Mince et relativement petit pour un Nuer, son visage était beau, sans les marques ou les points qui sont les signes de virilité traditionnels chez les Nuer. Il était tou-jours habillé élégamment : pantalon, chaussures pointues et cirées, chemises repassée, ceinture de perles kéniane et un petit drapeau du nouveau Soudan sur son col collier. Né en 1980 près de Rub-kona, à l'ouest du Nuerland, il fut recruté de force en 1987 par le SPLA qui vint demander à ses parents un fils pour «l'éducation en Ethiopie». Avec d'autres enfants, il fut envoyé au camp de Fundi-

go en Ethiopie où ils subirent une formation de neuf mois, tout en vivant dans des casernes militaires.

> Nous allions à l'école le matin avec nos AK47 près de nous et l'après-midi nous étions entrainés. Cela dura neuf mois. Ensuite, les plus grands ont été envoyés se battre. Les autres attendaient leur tour dans le camp en s'entrainant tous les jours. Nous étions tous armés.
>
> Nous étions tous d'âge différent, Dinka ou Nuer. Il n'y avait pas d'autres enfants alentour. Les conditions dans le camp étaient mauvaises. Il n'y avait pas assez de nourriture, nous étions souvent affamés, il n'y avait rien là-bas. Nous pensions tous beaucoup à nos familles; elles nous manquaient terriblement. Elles ne savaient rien sur ce qui nous arrivait, elles ignoraient où nous étions. Certains garçons devenaient fous, ils commençaient à tirer autour d'eux; leur esprit devenait fou parce qu'ils étaient traumatisés, leurs parents leur manquaient, ils mourraient de faim. Beaucoup d'entre eux moururent au camp, d'autres se tuèrent. Nous étions tous des enfants avec des fusils. Tous, nous n'arrêtions pas de penser… En tant que garçon ou comme homme, on n'est pas censé partager ses pensées et ses sentiments avec les autres. Alors nous ne parlions pas de la peur ni de la solitude. Nous gardions cela pour nous-mêmes. Ces pensées ne faisaient que traverser notre esprit.
>
> Dans les camps, nos commandants et nos entraîneurs étaient tous Dinka ou Nuer, ils étaient tous Sud-Soudanais et ils nous disaient: «Nous vous entrainons à combattre l'ennemi, ainsi vous pourrez chasser l'ennemi de notre pays. Vous êtes les futurs leaders du Soudan. Vous prendrez notre place quand nous serons vieux et partirons». C'est ce que nous entendions et c'est ce en quoi nous avons cru. Comme nous étions des enfants, nous ne réfléchissions pas sur l'utilité

des combats et nous faisions ce qu'on nous disait de faire. Par moments j'avais peur, mais je devais surmonter mes peurs.

Je me suis battu pour la première fois à Pochalla. C'était la première fois que je tirais sur l'ennemi. Au début, j'étais effrayé et je tremblais tellement que je ne pouvais même pas tirer. Après cinq minutes, j'ai surmonté ma peur et j'ai commencé à tirer. Puis c'est devenu plus facile. On donnait des drogues à certains garçons pour qu'ils puissent tuer sans peur. Je n'en ai jamais pris parce que je connaissais leurs effets secondaires. Après les combats, nous ne partagions pas nos peurs et nos frustrations. On ne pouvait pas en parler. On devait être fort comme un garçon Nuer et comme un homme. On ne pouvait pas montrer sa faiblesse.

Ces récits de Wanten et des autres jeunes hommes montrent une autre transformation liée à la guerre dans les rapports de genre: la voie pour devenir un homme. L'initiation des garçons par la scarification (*gaar*) – commune parmi les Dinka et les Nuer – fut progressivement remise en question et rejetée par la jeunesse instruite et baptisée ainsi que par les architectes du projet de libération nationale du «Sud-Soudan». Les dirigeants de l'APLS promurent la différenciation non-ethnique dans les rangs de l'armée (Hutchinson 1996:270-298) et interdirent la scarification. Ce fut l'entraînement militaire qui devint la nouvelle initiation et la voie pour devenir un homme. Le bataillon avait remplacé l'âge-série (*ric*). En 1987, Riek Machar, qui était alors commandant de l'APLS dans la région ouest du Nil Supérieur, interdit par un décret la scarification des Nuer. La vie dans les camps d'entraînement est décrite comme une façon pour les enfants de devenir «des gens responsables» (*wic*), capables de s'occuper d'eux-mêmes, ce qui était pour les Nuer et les Dinka un signe de maturité (Evans-Pritchard 1951; Deng 1972; Hutchinson 1996).

Un autre jeune homme à Kakuma me raconte:

> Tant que vous étiez recruté comme soldat, vous deviez être un soldat. J'étais capable de me battre et de tuer des gens. Cela signifiait que j'étais une personne responsable. Et par la façon dont j'ai été formé, j'avais plus d'expérience qu'un enfant qui n'était pas formé. Personne d'autre ne pouvait prendre soin de moi. Je devins une personne responsable

Son récit et celui de Wanten montrent comment le fusil contribua à reconfigurer les concepts de virilité chez les Nuer. Dans le passé, les combats à la lance entre les communautés étaient un test de virilité pour les Nuer et les Dinka. Comme les autres armées, l'APLS proclama l'idéal de l'hyper-virilité ou de l'hyper-masculinité dans son entraînement militaire afin d'encourager l'agressivité, l'intrépidité et la compétitivité parmi les recrues. Ces idées sont clairement exprimées dans l'une des chansons pour la remise des diplômes de l'APLS:

> Même votre père, tirez-lui dessus!
> Même votre mère, tirez-lui dessus!
> Votre fusil est votre nourriture, votre fusil est votre femme.

Les nouvelles identités masculines de la jeunesse armée de fusils ont contribué aux conflits intergénérationnels. Les aînés eurent souvent le sentiment de n'être plus capables de contrôler la jeunesse qui avait acquis une position puissante en accédant aux fusils, à la violence et faisait preuve d'une indifférence extrême face aux devoirs communautaires.

Les histoires des jeunes recrues montrent que les armes étaient aussi synonymes d'intrépidité et offraient un éventail de possibilités, non seulement pour se libérer des communautés, mais aussi pour exercer un pouvoir sur d'autres en pillant leurs biens, en violant leurs femmes et en prenant leurs filles sans payer de dot. Cela produisit une communauté de jeunes hommes socialement isolés, armés et sauvagement entraînés non seulement à tuer,

mais aussi à torturer et à piller. Ce nouveau type de virilité pourrait être nommé hyper-virilité (ou hyper- masculinité). Cette expression indique un comportement stéréotypé «masculin» poussé à l'extrême et caractérisé en particulier par la force, l'agressivité et la domination sur les femmes ainsi que sur les aînés (Connell 2005). Les armes sont devenues des moyens de survie, ce qui continue à créer des problèmes majeurs pour le désarmement de la milice locale et des groupes de civils au Sud-Soudan.

Les guerres eurent d'autres conséquences pour les hommes qui avaient perdu leurs biens et dont les femmes et les enfants avaient été enlevés, violés ou tués. Leur incapacité croissante à subvenir à leurs besoins et à protéger leur famille, leur propriété et leur bétail, comme l'explique Hutchinson, provoqua «une crise de la virilité/masculinité» qui elle-même se traduisit par une augmentation de la violence domestique et des abus sexuels contre les femmes (2000:12). Les femmes et les hommes au Kenya et au Nuerland déplorent souvent la perte du *buom* des hommes (la force, le pouvoir) qui protégeait la famille. Quelques femmes regrettent le fait que les hommes ne sont «*plus des hommes*», ils sont devenus «femmes» – «*ils ne peuvent pas nous protéger. Ils ont été les premiers à s'enfuir quand les rebelles sont arrivés. Quand mon mari a été battu par la milice de Bul, il a pleuré comme un enfant et leur a dit immédiatement où se trouvaient nos ressources alimentaires. Nous avons perdu toute notre nourriture. Il (mon mari) est vraiment inutile*». Tandis que quelques femmes ont participé aux conflits ou bien ont accédé en exil au travail rémunéré, leurs maris sont souvent restés à la maison. Ils ont dû apprendre à maîtriser les tâches domestiques. «*Maintenant, les hommes sont devenus femmes; regarde les! Ils font le ménage, cuisinent pour les enfants, ils vont à l'hôpital, pendant que leurs femmes gagnent l'argent!*» me raconte un jeune homme réfugié à Kakuma. Ces commentaires sont répandus parmi les femmes et les hommes au Soudan.

La propagation de la violence genrée contre les femmes, qui apparut surtout après la scission de l'APLS en 1991, peut être en partie considérée comme la conséquence de l'émasculation des hommes. Je partage à cet égard la position de Henrietta Moore concernant la frustration ou l'émasculation des identités de genre particulières. Elle explique que «la frustration peut être comprise comme l'incapacité de soutenir ou de prendre une position genrée indépendante, ce qui engendre une crise, réelle ou imaginée, de la représentation de soi et/ou de son évaluation sociale» (1994: 66). Dans le cas des Nuer, pour les jeunes garçons et les hommes, cette frustration est liée à leur marginalisation, à leur appauvrissement en raison de la guerre et à l'absence de respect et de reconnaissance envers leur position de *wutni nuäri* (les vrai hommes Nuer). Cela a pour effet leur émasculation. Comme les hommes se sentent incapables d'assumer leur rôle de protecteurs et de subvenir aux besoins de leur famille, ils recourent à la violence. Ils la dirigent contre les autres femmes, mais aussi contre leur propre femme. Par conséquent, la violence domestique a augmenté parmi les familles Nuer au Kenya et au Soudan. Cette violence s'est répandue dans les camps de réfugiés et après le retour.

Vers une complexité des identités de genre

Ma recherche montre que les conflits civils et les violences genrées ont des impacts différents, complexes et multiples sur les femmes et les hommes. Les femmes et les hommes Nuer jouèrent des rôles décisifs dans le processus de militarisation de la société et des identités de genre. Soulignons que les femmes et les hommes ne sont pas des catégories homogènes et que les conflits et les violences ont des effets différents non seulement selon le genre mais aussi selon d'autres paramètres comme l'accès aux ressources,

le statut social, l'âge et la classe. La guerre peut avoir à la fois des effets d'*empowerment* (émancipation) et de *disempowerment* pour les femmes et les hommes qui mettent en œuvre leur capacité d'action (*agency*) pour résister, affronter, participer et survivre en temps de guerre.

La question de l'origine des violences sexuelles contre les femmes (et les hommes) pendant les conflits reste pertinente. Comment les violences sexuelles contre les femmes (et les hommes) aperçoivent?, comment sont-elles construites par le système politique dominant et de domination? Quel rôle jouent l'État, la société civile, les institutions sociales, politiques et économiques dans les transformations des violences et des inégalités de genre dans la période post-conflit?

L'image des hommes combattants agressifs qui affermissent leur pouvoir sur les femmes en temps de guerre et des femmes victimes de violences sexuelles est simpliste. Cette recherche souligne que les rôles sont multiples, contradictoires et nécessitent une exploration plus complexe des effets des conflits armés sur les rapports de genre. Les identités de genre sont multiples et hétérogènes. En raison de leur vulnérabilité physique et sexuelle, les femmes et les filles font face à la violence et à l'insécurité différemment des hommes (Cockburn 2001; Moser and Clark 2001; Giles and Hyndman 2004; Denov and Garvais 2007; Zarkov 2008). Les rôles des femmes dans la guerre sont cependant plus fluides et multidimensionnels, certaines d'entre elles étant activement engagées comme auteurs et partisanes de cette violence. Cette conclusion rejoint l'étude de Devon et Gervais sur des combattantes au Sierra Leone, qui souligne que les femmes et les jeunes filles dans les zones de conflit ne sont pas uniquement victimes de la violence, mais occupent plutôt une myriade de positions comme auteurs, actrices, porteuses, commandantes, esclaves domestiques et sexuelles, espionnes et boucliers humains (2007: 886). Cepen-

dant, il faut se garder de ne pas simplifier et homogénéiser les féminités et les masculinités qui émergent après les conflits. C'est important pour les processus de reconstruction dans la période post-conflit.

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Summary
**Daughters of AK-47, violated women and luggage porters –
militarised masculinities and men who became women:
Gender relations and wars in South Sudan**

Gender identities and relations have played an important aspect in women and men's experiences in South Sudan, who have been confronted with military struggle and civil wars. This article focuses on the changes in gender relations among the Nuer of Western Upper Nile during the second civil war in South Sudan (1983-2005). It is based on ethnographic fieldwork carried out between 2002 and 2008 in Egypt, Kenya and South Sudan. What are the implications of armed conflicts for gender identities and power relations? Historically, wars have been perceived as a « male » domain, where symbols of masculinity were tested, This image has been perpetuated by films, literature, songs and poetry for centuries (White 2007). During the wars, the portrayal of men as protectors of women is often accentuated, through the combat as a testing field of masculinity. Women and girls are unjustly described as victims, pacifists and "mothers of the nation" in charge of supporting the heroes. Men's *agency* dominates war discourses while women and girls are rendered silenced and invisible (Denov et Gervais 2007). This article shows that such interpretations are simplistic and do not account for the multiple and complex roles which women and men take on during the wars, thereby changing the power relations.

TIZAZU AYALEW TEKA
DAWIT GETU KEBEDE

CAUSES AND HUMAN SECURITY THREATS OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION OUTFLOW FROM BALE, SOUTHEASTERN ETHIOPIA[1]

1. Introduction

Migration related problems are striking Ethiopia heavily nowadays. The heated discourse on migration crisis in the local mass media, mainstream international mass media and from the public day to day discussion is common. Neither is it strange to hear of the phenomenon of exploitation and human rights abuses of

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Ethiopian migrants abroad. Xenophobic attacks in South Africa; terrorists' ruthless inhuman killings in Libya[2]; massive deportation of Ethiopian irregular migrants (around 170,000 individuals) from Saudi Arabia[3]; and hundreds of government sponsored returnees from Yemen uprooted by its recent violent conflict, and from Libya by the threat of Islamic State (ISIS), are only a few mentions of the chronic crisis Ethiopian migrants have dealt with.

Moreover, the problems related with "potential migrants", "returnees" or "current migrants" all over the country have been a crucial issue. There were an estimated 1.5 million irregular migrant Ethiopians who left the country illegally between the years 2008 and 2014[4]. Driven by fundamental factors such as poverty and unemployment; an existing strong culture of migration or due to the positive perception towards migration; and because of deception from illegal brokers[5], massive numbers of Ethiopians, particularly the youth are exposed to irregular migration.

According to the recent study by the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS), Ethiopians use three main channels for migration especially towards the Middle East. These are: through "Public Migration" that occurs by the official facilitation of the Ethiopian Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MoLSA); through

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[2] See Mehari T. (2015) 'Migration governance in Ethiopia: The need for a comprehensive National Policy on Migration'. The Reporter-English Edition. Retrieved October, 16, 2015, from http://www.thereporterethiopia.com/index. php/opinion/commentary/item/3481-migration-governance-in-ethiopia accessed on October 15, 2015, 3:31:08 PM.

[3] US Department of State, 2015.

[4] Tesfaye Getnet (2015) 'Illegal migration: For how long should it go on?'. Retrieved on November 7, 2015, 1:02:13 PM from http://www.capitalethiopia. com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5114:illeg al-migration-for-how-long-should-it-go-on&catid=35:capital&Itemid=27.

[5] MoLSA & MoFA (2010) 'Human Smuggling and Trafficking in Person in Ethiopia, its causes and solution'. A report Ministry of Labor and Social Affair and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 2010.

"legally registered Private Employment Agencies (PEAs)"; and finally through channels of "irregular migration using the services of illegal agents, which include illegal brokers, individual operators, or legally-registered companies that illegally provide employment brokerage services to migrants"[6]. However, amongst these channels, irregular or illegal ways of migration are the main contributors for current Ethiopian migration-related problems. For example, a United States Department of State report confirms that, 'the 200,000 regular labor migrants who travelled in 2012 represent just 30-40% of all Ethiopians migrating to the Gulf States and Middle East, implying that the remaining 60-70% (between 300,000-350,000) are either trafficked or smuggled with the facilitation of illegal brokers[7]. Further, more than the regular migrants, it is irregular migrants that are "thought to be increasing faster" and vulnerable to risks of human security crisis throughout all phases of the migration process[8].

Migration-related problems are common to all parts of Ethiopia. However, this study only takes into consideration selected areas of the Bale Zonal administration. This is because, even if this administrative area is one of the most vulnerable to migration problems in the country, nothing has been done in the area of the research world.

Only in 2015, as of May, there were a total of 489 migrants leaving the Zone[9]. And out of 170,000 Ethiopian returnees from Saudi Arabia from November 2013 up to March 2014, around 3932 were from Bale and out of these surprisingly 118 returned back to different countries in the Middle East[10]. Worst of all, of

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[6] RMMS, (2014a:35); see also Fernandez,(2010:252).

[7] United States Department of State, 2013, cited in RMMS, (2014a:35).

[8] King, (2012:6).

[9] Documents of Bale Zone Labor and Social affairs office.

[10] Ibid.

irregular migrants originating from Bale, an estimated between 30 up to 46 individuals[11] are believed to have died in April 2015 in a Mediterranean Sea boat accident. What the driving factors are which are contributing to the widespread prevalence of migration from the area, and the resulting vulnerability of human security risks are among the issues needed to be investigated but have not yet been investigated.

Hence, the study is designed with an overall objective of examining the specific contributing factors for cross border irregular migration and its threat against human security of migrants from Bale. Moreover, finding out the causes of international irregular migration outflow, identifying the vulnerable groups of society for irregular migration, and exploring human security risks of irregular migrants, beginning from their initial journey to their final arrival and thereafter in the hosting states, are the key specific guiding objectives that are addressed by this paper.

2. Methodology

The study follows a qualitative approach. Hence, data is obtained through qualitative tools to show readers the existing state of affairs of irregular migration prevalence, causes and the impact against migrants' security in Bale, thereby creating a precise understanding.

People directly concerned, such as returnees, families of victims, community members who are familiar with the issue, local government and non-government agents, participated as interviewees, key informants and focus group discussants all of whom were accessed by a careful selection based on their close famili-

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[11] An interview with Bale Zone Labor and Social Affair officers.

arity with the issue. Hence, from the Four Districts and one city administration – Sinana, Gasara, Agarfa, Ginnir and Robe town, 7 key informants, 19 interviewees and 3 FGDs were carried out. In addition, secondary sources of data which directly substantiated this study are reports, survey studies and documents of demographic figures on irregular migrants obtained from each of the selected sample study areas.

3. Overview of Trends and the Current Situation

3.1. Current Extent of the Situation

Bale is one of the major places of origin for irregular migration, amongst the known Zonal administrations both in the region or in the country as a whole. It is amongst the frequently listed Zonal administrations of the Oromia region which are known for the highest outflow of irregular migration such as Jimma, Eastern Hararghe and Arsi, (RMMS, 2014:20). As the data taken from the Zone Labor and Social Affairs Office revealed, there are an estimated more than 6456 migrants who left the Zone from 2011 to 2014/2015 (see table 1 below). This is not, however, the exact number. Since the nature of irregular migration is unpredictable, it is very difficult to trace everyone who leaves for this purpose. Because every process of irregular migration takes place covertly, it is not easy to track from the families and surrounding communities since mostly they are not willing to disclose information concerning migrants[12]. Key informants from government stakeholders affirmed the difficulty in recording the number of irreg-

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[12] An interview with Ginir Town Labor and Social affair officer, on December 17, 2015, Ginir.

ular migrants in each area of the Zone[13]. Hence, arguably the total number of irregular migrants from Bale will be much greater than the above estimated figure.

Amongst the total 18 *Woredas* (Districts) and three town administrations of the Zone, irregular migration is prevalent in ten *Woredas*: Sinna, Ginir, Agarfa, Gasera, Goro, Goba, Dinsho, Dallo Mana, Berberie, Gololcha; and in the three town administrations (Robe, Goba and Ginir)[14]. These areas are most populous and they are areas of agrarian settled life. The remaining Districts have a relatively low record of irregular migration.

Driven by various factors as this study revealed, the zone is at critical irregular migration prevalence. The Zonal Labor and Social Affairs officer and, officers in similar positions from all selected areas of the study confirmed[15] that, though recently different intervention mechanisms such as societal awareness creation, creating job opportunities and establishing an anti-irregular task force (a committee established to prevent irregular migration) are continuously working to address the issue, still the problem is not halted. However, the shocking risks such as massive deportation from Saudi Arabia, the death of more than thirty youth at one time in the Mediterranean Sea (majority of whom are from Robe town and surrounding villages), the beheading of thirty Ethiopians by ISIS, and the current political instability in some Arab states (Yemen and Syria), such grave kinds of violation against Ethiopian migrants, created at least a general awareness among the wider public regarding the time to time increasing risks of

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[13] Ibid; an interview with Agarfa District Labor and Social affair officer; an interview with a Bale Zone Labor and Social affair officer.

[14] The 2008 Bale Zone Labor and Social Affairs office plan to combat irregular migration.

[15] An interview with Bale Zone Labor and Social Affairs officer on November 11, 2015.

irregular migration. Moreover, the dreadful risks related to the above events have created something of a perception to fear greatly the risks of irregular migration, if not migration itself. At least family and community pressure in making and facilitating the opportunity for migration is steadily diminishing[16].

Similarly, the efforts by the different levels of government agents focusing on promoting awareness have created a relatively significant influence in controlling the situation compared to the previous years[17]. Thus, societal awareness creation campaigns through community conversations by directly involving the communities at grassroots institutions such as *Idir,* religious institutions and schools are intensively continuing especially in migration hub *Woredas* of the zone. In addition, creating job opportunities for youth through micro enterprises is also another effort of the local government's involvement in tackling irregular migration.

Not only government stakeholders, recently a number of Local and International NGOs such as Bale Integrated Rural Development Association (BIRDA), Community Development Association (CDA), Swedish International Development Association (SIDA), and Cooperazione International (COOPI) are engaged both directly and indirectly in the endeavor of anti-irregular migration campaigns in the Zone. All of the above ongoing significant efforts maintain feasible roles in the effort of fighting irregular migration outflow in Bale.

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[16] An interview with Bale Zone head of Labor and Social Affair office.

[17] Ibid.

Table 1. Estimated number of irregular migrants outflow in each *Woreda* of Bale, form 2011-2014/2015

No.	Districts	2011			2012			2013			2014/2015		
		M	F	Total	M	F	total	M	F	total	M	F	total
1	Agarfa	141	41	182	37	19	56	260	31	291	73	0	73
2	Berberie	104	46	150	0	0	0	51	12	63	11	0	11
3	Dallo Mana	52	64	116	12	4	16	70	24	94	7	2	9
4	Dawe Qechan	55	0	60	2	0	2	14	1	15	0	0	0
5	Dawe Serar	26	0	26	5	1	6	2	0	2	0	0	0
6	Dinsho	152	154	306	40	23	63	84	29	113	3	1	4
7	Gasera	190	15	205	90	46	136	752	80	832	79	5	84
8	Ginir	156	74	230	0	0	0	165	26	191	3	0	3
9	Ginir Town	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	5	0	5
10	Goba	401	135	536	1	9	10	105	53	158	3	0	3
11	Goba Town	45	126	171	14	27	41	15	23	38	0	0	0
12	Gollolcha	36	20	56	0	0	0	112	14	126	11	0	11
13	Goro	162	38	200	0	0	0	76	18	94	0	0	0
14	Gura Damolle	54	0	54	1	1	2	10	1	11	0	0	0
15	Harena Bulluq	54	6	60	5	9	14	18	3	21	0	0	0
16	Laga Hida	45	0	45	39	1	40	20	1	21	0	0	0
17	Mada Walabu	26	0	26	0	0	0	3	0	3	0	0	0
18	Rayitu	6	0	6	1	0	1	4	1	5	0	0	0
19	Robe town	216	50	266	0	0	0	154	63	217	40	7	47
20	Sawena	4	0	4	7	0	7	10	1	11	1	0	1
21	Sinana	254	20	274	75	1	76	301	43	344	112	0	112
	Total	2179	794	2973	329	141	470	2226	424	2650	348	15	363
	Grand total												6456

*Not available

Source, adopted from Bale Zone Labour and Social Affairs Office, 2015.

3.2. Trends in Irregular Migration outflow in Bale

The common mode of migration is through the facilitation of illegal brokers and also through employment agents[18]. As a survey study conducted in Robe town revealed, the *Dellala* (illegal brokers) are the major facilitators for female migration (BIRDA, 2014). In addition, employment agents, members of families and those who had migrated previously are also facilitating actors for irregular migration. Particularly, the brokers and the close relatives of migrants who reside abroad are the key facilitators[19].

Bale being a Muslim-dominant community, it is suggested that the religious affiliation[20] to the Middle East countries is considered as a contributing factor for the prevalence of irregular migration outflow. This factor is a similar case in other Muslim-majority areas both in Oromia region and at national level. For example, most frequently migration-prone areas like Jimma and East Hararghe Zones are Muslim majority. But in Christian-inhabited areas, also migration is prevalent. There is no sufficient justification to claim Muslims dominate irregular migration[21].

Related with Islamic tradition, the polygamy marriage practice among the Islamic community supported by the Sharia law has its own impact in creating "a biased treatment amongst family members"[22]. The problem is not the polygamy tradition itself which is well supported by the community as a principle of Islamic faith.

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[18] An interview with head of Bale Zone Labor and Social Affair Office.

[19] An interview with Sinana District Head of Labor and Social Affair office.

[20] BIRDA (Bale Integrated Rular Development Association) 9 2014). Base line Survey of the women and children trafficking situation in Robe *Woreda* of Bale Zone, BIRDA.

[21] An in-depth interview with the head of Bale Zone Labor and Social Affair office, on January 1, 2016.

[22] An interview with family member of current migrants, February 27, 2016, Robe.

Rather, for example, a man may have more than two wives and many children too. But he may not fairly manage the family which is in fact against the Sharia law. There is an inclination for better treatment of the newly married wives[23] at the expense of the rest. This biased practice creates a direct economic vulnerability as well as a feeling of exclusion in the rest of the family[24]. In the end, children become the most vulnerable in family groups for different socio-economic problems including irregular migration. Our interviewee[25] has been a victim of this problem and he told us that he knew many peers who, driven by such factors, ended up in irregular migration.

Migrants have experiences from a minimum two and three years to more than 8 years stay in host states. Some migrants re-migrate again and again at least more than two times. Especially those returnees who did not experience risks of exploitation have the intention to re-migrate. Conversely, those who were victims said that "I never wish migration even for my enemy"[26]. Migration is just like "being an animal or a slave that undermines our human dignity"[27]. This is what was repeatedly said by the returnees from Middle East countries, who experienced a shocking exploitation either directly themselves or as eyewitnesses to other Ethiopian victims of irregular migration. However, no matter how far they are victims and aware of the risks, still there are also returnee migrants and potential migrants who want to move abroad[28].

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[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] An interview with a returnee, January 17, 2015, Robe.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Key informant interview with head of Bale Zone Labor and Social Affair Office February 13, 2015, Robe.

Irregular migration following routes on land and sea is the common trend for migrant outflow from Bale. Hence from the three major migratory routes (see, map 1). Irregular migrants from Bale use the Northern or Mediterranean Sea route and Eastern route or Gulf of Aden route, just to exit illegally from Ethiopia. Robe and other major towns like Ginir are places where the initial process starts with the aid of local smugglers. Then, those potential migrants planning to make their destination Europe follow the Mediterranean Sea route which lies from the Ethio-Sudan border town of Metema and the transit states of Sudan and Libya. This route is one of the most dangerous routes along which thousands of mixed irregular migrants perish every year or are extremely exploited by traffickers (see, IOM, 2014a; Altai Consulting, 2015). The exploitation and other vulnerabilities to risks begin immediately after migrants cross the border town of Metema[29]. In different temporary arrival points in Sudan and Libya, most frequent extreme exploitations include kidnapping for ransom and inhospitable transportation devices such as journeying via overcrowded "patrol cars" and boats.

The second major route preferred by irregular migrants, followed by those who have the intention to make their destination point in the Gulf States, is the so-called Eastern or Gulf of Aden route. From Robe to Adama then Dire Dawa to Jigjiga, finally using Somalia/ Bassaso and Yemen as transit countries, (Yemen is in fact both destination and transit for Ethiopians) tens of thousands of irregular migrants from Ethiopia including from Bale illegally enter the Gulf States for employment as laborers. In both routes, migrants use land transportation including a journey on foot, and boat voyages irrespective of the risks. Moreover, by us-

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[29] An interview with family members of victim migrants, February 27, 2016, Robe.

Map 1. Main Migratory Routes from Bale, Ethiopia

ing both legal and fraudulent travel documents, migrants also enter other countries by air transportation. Fraudulent documents such as pilgrimage and tourist visas[30] are key means for irregular migration by air. There are also a very few migrants from Bale, who use the South African route.

Informants indicated that migrants from Bale pay a minimum of 20,000-40,000 Ethiopian Birr (ETB) (1000–2000USD) up to a maximum payment from 60,000-100,000 ETB (3000–5000USD) in accordance with their different arrival points and means of transportation. Sometimes up to 190,000 ETB (9500USD) is required for the Mediterranean Sea route[31].

The migration pattern in Bale indicates that, those who have better financial capabilities are more prone to migration in general than economically disadvantaged groups[32]. This attests that the poor are not likely to migrate since they cannot afford the financial costs for the whole migration process (Koser, 2005). If not a hundred percent of the migrants and potential migrants from Bale, then definitely the majority, are members of the community who are in relatively better economic positions. "How can we call it because of poverty, while a person migrates leaving his car"[33], responded a local government official.

Destination countries for irregular migrants from Bale are not only the Middle East or Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Arab States such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and

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[30] An interview with the Head of the Bale Zone Labor and Social Affair office on January 13, 2016.

[31] An interview with close relative of victims migrants, February 27, 2016, Robe.

[32] Key informant interview with the Head of the Bale Labor and Social Affairs office, December 20, 2015. Robe.

[33] An informant from Focus Group Discussion in Robe town; an interview with Bale Zone Labor and Social Affair Office.

the United Arab Emirates (UAE), rather, European states like Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, England, Norway, Holland and so on, are also good destinations. Migrants from families of relatively better economic background with good social networks abroad make their destinations Europe.

Another common trend in irregular migration outflow is that young men are more prone to irregular migration than females. Indeed, male migrants comprise the majority in migration outflow as the estimated figures indicate (see, table 2 and 3). Similarly, irregular migration to Europe following the Mediterranean Sea route is mostly preferred by male migrants rather than females, while the Eastern or the Gulf of Aden route is more evenly observed by both sexes.

3.3. Profile of Irregular Migrants

Taking into account data of available demographic figures obtained in some of our sample study areas, in terms of gender, the majority of irregular out-migrants from Bale are young males. For example, out of the total 6456 estimated number of current migrants from 2011 up to 2014/2015, around 5082 or 78.7% are male, while the rest 21% or 1374 are female (see table 2). In a similar vein, out of the total 3919 deported returnee migrants from Saudi, around 3320 or 84.7% were male while the rest 15% or 599 were female (see table 4). In terms of age, as our sample data containing lists of migrants by demographic composition shows, the majority of migrants were in their early 20s (20-25) with few above 25 up to 30 and below 20 up to 15 years old. Similarly, the data indicated that the majority of irregular migrants' education status is grade 10 completed. And there are also a considerable number of out-migrants below grade 10 and primary

school level, and very few graduates from technical and vocational training institutions.

Generally, male youths who accomplished their secondary school education are the most vulnerable social group in irregular migration outflow from Bale. Nonetheless, our key informants[34] particularly from the Agarfa District government stakeholders, explained that "in some areas of the District, it is the whole social group which is prone to irregular migration, except the elderly. Some elders and religious leaders are expressing their concern saying 'who is going to bury us, for whom are we going to preach', [respectively]".

3.4. Causes of Irregular Migration Outflow from Bale

The root cause for irregular migration in general and particularly from Bale is very complex and has varied aspects. These direct and indirect triggering factors are mainly interwoven from economic, socio-cultural and administrative factors. Moreover, as the data obtained from interview and focus group discussions show, these fundamental causes have a very interrelated nature: these are socio-economic factors, existence of various facilitating actors, and finally factors related with administrative problems.

3.4.1. Socio-Economic Factors
Poverty and unemployment
At the national level, there is no other factor equivalent to poverty which effected joblessness thereby contributing to the influx of irregular migration outflow (See Jones et. al., 2014). The current mounting labor migration of the youth is considered as just an immediate strategy to move out of poverty and unemploy-

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[34] Key informant interview with Agarfa Labor and Social Affair Officers, December 20, 2015, Agarfa.

ment. Almost all of our interviewees, particularly returnees and potential migrants, expressed that it is because of the need for better labor opportunities and livelihood that they decided to leave their home country. Therefore, seeking better livelihood and employment opportunities are key driving factors.

However, there is a different view by the informants on poverty and unemployment whether it is major or minor cause for irregular migration outflow from Bale. On one side almost all our informants particularly officials of each *Woreda* Labor and Social Affairs Office (with the exception of stakeholders from Agarfa *Woreda*), never want to accept poverty and unemployment as first rank causes of youth migration. This group of informants claim that Bale is a Zone rich in resources, with ample employment opportunities compared to other areas in the region or in the country. Nowadays, the beneficiaries from the resources and job opportunities from the Zone are people who come from other areas of the country such as *"Debub"*[35] (Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region [SNNPR]) and farmers from "Arsi"[36], while youths from Bale migrate. In addition, their basic reason in viewing poverty as a minor cause is, the expensive amount of money spent by migrants for migration; from 3000USD to more than 5000USD is the approximate payment for migrants until their arrival in the destination countries. They also mentioned migrants with good living standard; a person having an automobile, and who runs a good business[37] leaves as a migrant. Mentioning such kinds of premises, they conclude that poverty and unemployment

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[35] Key informant interview , Head of Bale Zone Labor and Social Affairs office, February 13, 2016, Robe.

[36] An interview with Agarfa District Labor and Social Affairs officers, on December 18, 2015.

[37] An interview with Robe town labor and social Affair Office December 3, 2015; interview with relative of the migrant.

are secondary level causes of migration outflow from Bale; instead they considered the society's strong culture of migration or the strong positive perception towards migration and poor work ethic of youth as significant viable factors for irregular migration outflow from Bale[38].

On the other side, returnee and potential migrant's interviewees did not have any other direct answer for the question why they migrated and the need to migrate; they replied only that it was the need for better job opportunities with attractive salaries that can bring significant change to their lives and the families. An interviewee who was a close friend to many of the migrants who died in April 19, 2015 in a boat accident, explained that "I and my 14 peers who died in the Sea were unemployed after we completed grade 10. They stayed jobless for four years after grade 10 before their migration". Moreover, an interviewee explained[39] that:

> In fact parents may be good economically, but they are not willing to give money if their children ask them to run their own business, they think it may be wasted by addiction or used for irrelevant purpose; but they are eager to give money if their children ask them for migration purpose.

Sometimes the money utilized for migration is not necessarily extra money, rather it is money saved purposely for migration expenses while struggling with subsistence livelihood for years. An interviewee from Agarfa District explained that:

> I spent 18,000 ETB for migration, this is not because I have [enough] money that I decide to leave; you know, I struggled for years to ac-

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[38] Key informant interview with Gasera District Labor and Social Affairs officers, November 17, 2015; key informant interview with head of Bale Zone labor and social Affair Office, February 13, 2015, Robe.

[39] An interview with close relative of victim migrant, February 27, 2016, Robe.

cumulate it, but unless I have additional support, I couldn't do anything here with that amount of money.

The unemployment problem is also creating hopelessness on the futurity of the primary and secondary school students as informants suggested[40]. Those school teenagers seeing their elders' joblessness, including some unemployed university and college graduates, are not sure about their future. What is the relevance of learning if we do not have a job in the end? This is the question they ask anticipating their future employment opportunities[41]. Thus, they are forced to cease their education and instead prefer migration to secure their future.

Unemployment related with shortage of land is also raised by our informants from Gasera District. They implied that land shortage because of population increase as another enabling factor for irregular migration of the youth[42]. The youth from rural areas, as the informants claim, know better how to farm than anything else[43]. However, nowadays, the existing rural farm lands are not proportionate to the increasing number of population in the district. Thus, the youth's access to farm land is becoming less. Therefore they are forced to choose migration to meet at least their basic needs. However, land shortage as a cause for irregular migration cannot be generalized to all the rest areas of Bale. Government stakeholders in the other areas strongly ascertain that there is no land deficiency in their respective areas.

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[40] Depth interview with Bale Integrated Rural Development Association (BIRDA) manager; two key informants from Agarfa District Labor and Social Affairs stakeholders; one key informant from Bale Zone Labor and Social Affairs office.

[41] An interview with Agarfa Labor and Social Affair Officers, Agarfa, December 20, 2015.

[42] An interview with Gassera district Labor and Social Affair officials.

[43] Ibid.

3.4.1.1. Existing positive perception towards migration (culture of migration)

Some literature in the area of irregular migration studies (see RMMS, 2014a; RMMS 2014b) termed the society's strong positive perception towards migration as a "culture of migration". Given the prevalence, it is not unusual to find at least one or more current migrant or returnee from the local neighborhood. Out of a dozen migrants, there is no doubt that a few of them significantly changed their own and family's lives. By whatever condition it has been obtained, money and materials sent back by migrants from abroad to parents in Ethiopia creates a sort of positive perception on other families and the community at large towards migration[44]. It is usual to encourage the youths to migrate; parents, peers, and even community members, openly tell the youth to go abroad and make money like other successful fellows. The success stories of a few individuals[45], is just like an adventure that everybody aspires to accomplish at whatever cost. The existing positive perception towards migration makes migration a thing of everyone's aspiration regardless of the risks. One of our key informants[46] explains below how migration is a culture among the community.

> Migration as a culture is peculiar here in Dega (wet) areas of our Zone, like Sinana, Gasera, Agarfa, Dinsho than the Qola (hot) areas;… in these areas people say somebody went abroad and stayed for four years then bought a car; another went abroad and built villa for his family; someone went abroad and bought a town land; but we seat here while we can bring big money.

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[44] Key informant interview, Head of Bale Zone Labor and Social Affair Office.

[45] Focus Group Discussion with *Maksegno Gebeya Iddir* committees.

[46] Interview with Key informant, Head of Bale Zone Labor and Social Affair officials, January 13, 2016, Robe.

Migration from Bale is something of an economic coping up strategy and if not exaggerated society uses it to get rid of poverty. There is a greater link between migration and generating income in order to invest in a family's basic socio-economic needs. Thus, migration is a cultured instrument in society regardless of both the domestic labor opportunities and the risks of irregular migration.

3.4.2. Existence of Various Facilitating Actors for Irregular Migration

Illegal brokers

Along with other interrelated triggering factors of irregular migration, the *Dellala*, (brokers) crucially served as an intermediary for the outflow of irregular migrants. The illegal brokers, what literature conventionally calls smugglers and traffickers, are an illicit instrument whereby migrants are recruited, transported and then enter into borders of other countries illegally having experienced the inevitable risks of exploitation. Ranged from those brokers who directly facilitate the situation living inside the community, to those brokers who live in major towns having a well-established network both in and outside the country, are the primary actors thereby pursuing their illicit business of migrant smuggling and trafficking.

The collaboration between migrants, the community and the illegal brokers complicates and aggravates the issue[47]. Different reasons are suggested: migrants and the community willingly collaborate with brokers because they are at least the means for them to reach the intended destination[48] whatever the risks in-

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[47] An interview with Head of Bale Zone Labor and Social Affairs Office, February 13, 2016.
[48] Ibid.

volved. If they are not willing, migrants and the community will not disclose information particular to brokers, because they no guarantee against direct threats, even to their life[49]. The latter reason seems more sound, because the brokers are not such regular individuals that anyone can easily disclose their illicit business, they have a big link even with corrupt government officials[50] in addition to their economic power built on both legal and illicit businesses.

One of our key informants[51] from local government stakeholders explained that:

> You can say the whole community here is a broker, they never want to disclose brokers even though they know who recruits migrants; brokers are there starting from the smallest *Kebele*, but who send some body's children is kept secret; the brokers may threaten them, by saying if you disclose us, your children cannot go abroad, and if they go they will be threatened; at the same time, the community complain us by saying, the illegal brokers are inside you chaining up to the federal government, and despite we disclose them (brokers), they are set free for unknown reasons sooner.

This complicated nature of illegal brokers still remains a curse in aggravating the problems related with irregular migration. As of the writing time of this study, there are not any sufficient prosecution cases initiated against illegal brokers in any areas of Bale except one case from Goba town[52]. As the head of Bale Zone Labor and Social Affairs Office confirmed to us, only one individual suspected of migrant smuggling crime has been arrested and prose-

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49 Key informant interview with Robe town Labor and Social Affairs office, December 3, 2015.

50 Ibid.

51 Key informant interview with Head of Bale Zone Labor and Social Affair Office, January 13, 2016.

52 Ibid.

cuted. But, he was released from prison paying a 15,000 ETB (750USD) guarantee. The informant[53] added that currently, two other cases of prosecution are initiated against suspected traffickers.

Local illegal brokers also participate in trafficking exploitation as one interviewee explains:[54]

> There are notorious brokers in Metema, who have the task of identifying potential migrants for ransom; during the death of my friends in the Sea, we were able to identify that there were Ethiopian brokers speaking local language.

Another interviewee[55] from Gasera *Woreda*, who was a victim of extreme exploitation in Yemen, explained that he and another six Ethiopians were transported by local brokers, on a land journey via the Gulf of Aden route, facing torture by smugglers demanding ransom. In general, the illegal brokers aggravate irregular migration outflow in smuggling migrants, and by extension, through trafficking exploitation both here in Bale and at different levels.

Pressures from families, peers and social networks

Family members and peers have direct facilitator roles in the migration process by persuading potential migrants by telling success stories of previous migrants. Parents even directly conduct deals with brokers and make payments for the purpose of their offspring's migration. Using network patterns one member of the community or the family migrates, then another follows the path.

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[53] Ibid.

[54] An interview with close family of victim migrants, February 27, 2016, Robe.

[55] An interview with Returnee migrant from Suadi Arabia, March 3, 2016, Gasera.

Family and friends from abroad also facilitate the process of migration. Propagating information[56] regarding employment chances, financial provision for traveling costs and fulfilling all necessary conditions, are all ways the migrant's relatives abroad facilitate for potential migrants. An interviewee[57] from Robe town who is a returnee from Saudi Arabia responded that, seeing his peers who had migrated before, he decided to migrate; and the travel cost around 70,000 ETB (3500USD) had been covered by his brother from abroad. In a similar story one interviewee[58] from Gasera, stated that he moved to Saudi Arabia leaving his job (government employed) for nothing but to be alike with his peers.

There is also direct and indirect impact of social networks in creating pressure from the homeland potential migrants. Inevitably, the remittances sent from migrants abroad either in the form of cash or in kind such as electronic devices and fashion clothing to members of families[59], are also influential factors to the nearby neighborhood and community youths in initiating them for migration.

There is a considerable number of current migrants from the Bale Zone, including labor migrants and irregular migrants, both in Middle East and Western States. Thus, particularly, those groups of Ethiopian immigrants who are relatively stable have the capacity to take family members or at least to facilitate conditions. This has been confirmed by data obtained from returnee informants

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[56] Key informant interview with Head of Bale Zone Labor and Social Affair Office, February 13, 2016, Robe.

[57] An interview with returnee migrant from Saudi Arabia, January 26, 2015, Robe.

[58] An interview with returnee migrant from Saudi Arabia, March 2, 2016, Gasera.

[59] Key informant interview with Head of Bale Zone Labor and Social Affair Office, February 13, 2016, Robe.

who had at least one or more close relatives abroad before their migration, which had direct influence on their decision to migrate.

Social Media

Nowadays, in addition to the mainstream communication media channels, new internet-based social media such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Viber, WhatsUp and so on are vibrantly simplifying the way we exchange information (see Edosomwan et al., 2011). Hence, these social media are also good facilitating actors for the current irregular migration crisis.

Social media, supported by the new technology, results from the easy accessibility of smart mobile phones for youth both of urban and rural areas. By using Facebook, which is the most popular social media, the youth, quickly and easily communicate with their peers abroad at a very cheap cost. Very impressive images posted on personal timelines of Facebook accounts are quickly observable by viewers everywhere. Even children sometimes convince their parents, making them view the attractive images sent via Facebook and Viber. Then the parents, who are not totally familiar with social media, are likely to be easily deceived to send their children to match them with those migrants who sent their impressive images. The community challenges government stakeholders during their awareness creation campaign by saying "why do you tell us not to send our children abroad when we see those who already left are in a comfortable situation; I became eager to send my child when he showed me his friend's photo at ease on Facebook". This was a response from one woman during the Agarfa District awareness creation campaign against irregular migration as the stakeholders themselves informed us.

3.4.3. Administrative Factors

Stakeholders of government agencies directly responsible for issues of irregular migration both at local and national level are still criticized and accused of providing insufficient and weak legal and practical measures against human trafficking and smuggling crimes. Even though the government recently attempted to fill the legal framework gap by introducing a comprehensive anti-trafficking and smuggling proclamation, its enforcement and prosecution of smugglers and traffickers, and protection of victims, no sufficient measures have been undertaken to date (United States Department of State, 2015). Similarly, preventing and countering illegal border crossing remains weak.

Government stakeholders were even very late in providing the intended measure in preventing the crime of irregular migration and their existing measures are inadequate compared with the grave crisis that irregular migration continues to bring. Particular to Bale, an organized anti-irregular migration intervention was introduced only since 2013[60], after the problem became severe. Despite its late intervention measures, nowadays as our observation and the data obtained from our informants show[61], the Zone is in good progress in its endeavors in the anti-irregular migration struggle.

Comparing Ethiopia's emigrant management system with other states, returnee interviewees explained that, migrants from some Asian countries such as the Philippines, Sri Lanka and India have good protection from their governments via their embassies. Further, they stated that, unlike Ethiopia, it is rare to see irregular migrants from these states. Treatment even by employers, includ-

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[60] An interview with Sinana District Labor and Social Affair Officers, December 27, 2015.

[61] Key informant interview, Head of Bale Zone Labor and Social Affair Office, February 13, 2016, Robe.

ing payment, are different between Ethiopians and them. There is no doubt that their legitimate existence is the primary factor, in addition to racial biases (See, Naami, 2014) for better treatment of Asian laborers than Black Africans including Ethiopians. Hence, the Ethiopian government's and its embassies poor emigrant governance system is also accountable for the existing irregular migration crisis.

Different from direct responsibility of government stakeholders in addressing the issues of irregular migration, returnees and potential migrates criticize the local bad governance as another determining factor. Interviewees both from members of the community[62] and returnees[63] strongly complain about the lack of good governance, such as the absence of quick responses to public questions, high tax overloads on small-scale businesses[64], lengthy bureaucratic services and very poor infrastructural delivery. One interviewee in Robe town explained that:

> A friend of mine, who died in the Sea, was an amateur sport trainer with his own football team; but he was unable to get a soccer field; his application to use the town's football stadium was rejected by the authorities; his final decision was to cease the sport and move abroad.

The interviewees also complain about the local stakeholders' weaknesses in creating jobs and youth entertainment corners. "Here in Robe, there are not any relevant entertainment places, we are wasting time at *chat/khat* rooms", the interviewee[65] explained.

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[62] A focus group discussion with *Maksegno gebeya Iddir* committee who are directly working against women and children trafficking in collaboration with international NGOs.

[63] An interview with returnees from Agarfa, and Robe town, from December 20, 2015 – January 1, 2016.

[64] An interview with a returnee, December 20, 2015.

[65] An interview with a potential migrant, February 27, 2016, Robe.

Another key factor associated with administrative issues is the poor infrastructural accessibility of the Zone. Though it is not unique to Bale, social provision, especially electricity, water, and telecommunication, are hardly accessible. Particularly, work opportunities in urban areas including small towns of the Zone are unthinkable without such a list of infrastructural accesses. Electricity and water service are in dire condition in the Zone, which directly affects the existing labor opportunities. This results in youth prefering migration irrespective of the risk. As our key informants from Zonal and District Labor and Social Affairs told us, out of the total deported returnees from Saudi, around 118 migrated back, some of whom were leaving their small scale enterprises established by the help of the government. The key reason, for returnees to give up their small scale business was the terrible condition of electricity[66]. As a Gasera *Woreda* government stakeholder clarified, returnees who have been organized by the government in small scale enterprises totally gave up their works and were dispersed because of lack of electric power. There are similar cases also in different *Woredas* of the Zone[67].

3.5. Impacts of Irregular Migration Against Migrants' Human Security in Bale

Recently, more than anything else, threats against human security of irregular migrants during transit points exposing them to illicit traffickers and smugglers, or a deliberate exploitation by employers, becomes a serious security issue occupying the concern of stockholders. Though migrants, whether in legal or in irregular

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[66] Key informant interview with Gasera Labor and Social Affair Officers, November 17, 2015.

[67] Key informant interview with the Head of Bale Zone Labor and Social Affair Office, February 13, 2016, Robe.

status, are vulnerable to insecurity, those more affected by human security risks are the irregular ones by virtue of their status (Mawadza, 2008:1).

Driven principally by the root factors found by the study as mentioned in the above section, Bale could be one of the areas in Ethiopia which are in a state of, so to say, an explosion of irregular migration outflow occurrences. Hence, vulnerability to the inevitable human security risks directly endangering the survival, livelihood and dignity of the migrants themselves, are the consequences of irregular cross border migration. The following section seeks to show the negative impact of irregular migration against human security of migrants, more specifically against their personal security of the migrants in particular reference to Bale.

3.5.1. Death through Murder and Accident

Irregular migrants are highly vulnerable including risks of death during their dangerous journey through illegal and life-threatening desert routes, and transportation channels such as suffocating containers and boat voyages. And also migrants sometimes are deliberately murdered by employers and smugglers. Some migrants also attempt to go on foot, exposing themselves to extreme vulnerability to inhospitable lands or deserts where food and water are hardly accessible at least for survival, and at the same time vulnerable to gangs and aggressive wild animals. As one returnee interviewee[68] told us, luckily he was able to arrive in Yemen after a 15 day journey on foot via Somalia *en route* to Gulf countries.

It was a shocking accident, still in recent memory, in which approximately 30-46 youths from Bale died at the same time in

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[68] An interview with a returnee from Saudi Arabia, November 20, 2015, Agrafa.

the Mediterranean Sea on April 19, 2015[69] in a boat capsize accident; the majority were from Robe town[70]. While they were planning to reach Europe, anticipating better employment and living standard opportunities, unfortunately they ended up in stories to be told for others to learn from them. From those deceased youth, around 14 were schoolmates who attended Mada Walabu primary school[71]. Worst of all, two brothers were among the dead, while a previous occasion one of the two brothers survived luckily listening the advice of their father who told them not go in one boat[72].

Regarding the exact number of the death toll, there are contrasting figures. While interviewees from victim families and closest friends estimate up to 46 individuals in total from Bale (30 from Robe town, 8 from Dello Mana, 4 from Goba, 2 from Sinana and 2 from Agarfa), key informants also provided their own figures. According to government stakeholders from Robe town, 17 individuals are believed to have died from Robe town. And for the key informant from Zonal labor and social affairs bureau, the death toll is estimated from 28-30, only in Robe. In fact, the majority of the death toll in the April 19, 2015 shipwreck, is believed to be in Bale, out of the total Ethiopian irregular migrants' death. During the accident Ethiopian irregular migrants up to 65 individuals (7 from Addis Ababa, 18 from Arsi, 12 individuals of unknown background, and including the above figures from Bale[73]), were estimated to have died in the Mediterranean Sea.

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[69] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/19/700-migrants-feared-dead-mediterranean-shipwreck-worst-yet.

[70] An interview with close migrant friends, February 27, 2016, Robe.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid.

[73] An interview with close friends of migrant victims, February 27, 2016, Robe.

In total an estimated 73 deaths have been recorded, between 2013-2014/2015, because of irregular migration risks from Bale. These are, however, only a few known to the public and to local authorities. Besides this, deliberate killings by smugglers[74] and employers are common cases. For example, during mass deportation of Ethiopian migrants from Saudi, a deported interviewee told us that "my friend was killed by an alleged Saudi security person who beat him brutally in front of me". Another returnee[75] also told us, "in only one day around 38 Ethiopians were killed" by the security polices and the *shabab* (youth in Arabic) in a town called *Manfouha* where the deportation was undertaken.

Similarly, an interview with another two returnee women ascertains that they were eye witnesses where Ethiopian migrants employed as domestic workers were deliberately killed by their employers. One of them died when thrown from a building, in response to her frequent requests for her legitimate work payment which had been delayed for years. The case of the other girl is complicated[76]; forced sexual relations (abuse) by her male employer was exposed to the wife, the end result was a murder through poisoning by the housewife.

Cases of either killing or harsh physical assaults against laborers by their employers are common when they ask payments, and in another case when migrants want to leave. One returnee[77] explains a story she knows below:

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[74] For further information regarding deliberate torture including killings, of Ethiopian migrants in Yemen by organized Smugglers, see Human Rights Watch (2014) 'Yemen's Torture Camps: Abuse of Migrants by Human Traffickers in a Climate of Impunity'.

[75] An interview with a returnee, December 20, 2015, Agarfa.

[76] An interview with a female returnee at Ginir, December 18, 2015, Ginir town.

[77] An interview with female returnee from Saudi, February 16, 2016, Robe.

In one occasion, relatives to my employers with their teenage came to home; at that occasion the teenage asked me a question are you an Ethiopia? Yes! I replied; then just as an ordinary thing he told me that by saying we had also an Ethiopian domestic worker, but one day when she was in the way to leave, my father has killed her crashing by automobile.

Similarly, another returnee interviewee at Ginir District explained that he was able to escape from his employer who directly threatened to kill him by hitting him with his car just because of the worker's decision to leave for other labor opportunity. Although he sustained minor physical injuries, he was able to escape from the murder threat.

Table 2: some recorded figures of death on the following selected *Woredas* of Bale Zone resulting from irregular migration only from 2013–2015

No.	Districts	Number of Death
1	Agarfa	15
2	Dello Mena	8
3	Gasera	6
4	Goba	4
4	Ginir	1
5	Goro	5
6	Robe town	30
7	Sinana	2
	Total	73

Source: researchers, based on figures obtained from the 2015/2016 plan of Bale Zone Anti-irregular migration committee (task force): Bale Zone Labor and Social Affair Office, and from interviews.

3.5.2. Sexual Exploitation

For Ethiopian women domestic workers, including those from Bale, unfortunately one of their common exploitations is sexual abuse and the resultant grave risks. Our interviews from with returnees told us that they know at least one or more cases of sexual exploitation against Ethiopian women domestic workers. The most shocking story was a case of exploitation which took place during the Saudi deportation measure. An informant, from Agarfa District, he was an eye witness where "six *shabaab* (youths) violently raped one Ethiopian migrant" during the violent deportation measures against Ethiopian irregular migrants. A similar story was the case of an Ethiopian domestic worker who was killed by her woman employer when her forced sexual relation with the husband revealed to the wife[78]. What we understand here is, the worst various forms of sexual abuses against the migrant domestic workers are not an end in themself; rather, they are followed by serious other risks such as death, health risks, pregnancy, and being handed over to security agents for deportation purposes. An interviewee told to us that one Ethiopian woman domestic worker has not only undergone an unwanted pregnancy, but also she was forced to leave her newlborn child there, while she retuned back to home[79]. If there is a very common exploitation story against Ethiopian house maids in Gulf States, it is cases of rape. What makes it complicated is it will not end up only in sexual abuse, rather worse risks will follow including murder as mentioned above. Multiple exploitations like rape, denial of salary, forced labor, deportation and so on all are what they faces.

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[78] An interview with a female returnee migrant from Qatar at Ginir on December 18, 2015.

[79] An interview with a female returnee migrant from Kuwait at Robe on.

3.5.3. Labor Exploitation and Forced Servitude

Labor exploitation is another severe human security threat against irregular migrants. Obviously, most migrants are unskilled labor workers in areas of cleaning, construction, shepherding, household maids, caretakers and so on. Forced labor and long work hours are among the common types of labor exploitation against Ethiopian irregular migrants[80] in Middle East countries. Hence, for labor workers, especially Ethiopian women employed as household maids, one of their extreme vulnerability is being forced to work for long hours, more than 18-20 hours per day. Our interviewees from among the returnees repeatedly told us that, "our employers considered us just as an animal like a donkey". This is how the victims of irregular migration express the ways of their labor exploitation.

Making the Ethiopian women employees work for relatives of employers, with whom migrants did not have an agreement, is another way by which migrants are exploited. One woman returnee explained that "I used to work for the relatives of my employers without my willingness; I was employed, firstly as a domestic servant to one house hold; later on, the housewife ordered me to work for her sister, then I did not have any choice, just to work for both households"[81].

Unfortunately, Ethiopian labor workers, particularly in the Middle East Arab countries, are considered as nothing more than the property of their employers. Except for a few lucky migrant workers, such is the story of many innocent Ethiopian migrant workers who have been always forced to do whatever their employers wished.

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[80] An interview with returnee at Robe, December, 27 2015.
[81] Ibid.

3.5.4. Financial Exploitation

Sadly, for some migrant workers, the exploitation they face did not end up in one of or two of the forms of exploitation commonly known. Rather a multiple and interrelated form of exploitation by various actors such as smugglers, employers and security person are experienced by irregular migrant labor workers. For instance, the exploitation by forced labor may not be the single abuse migrants faced, rather it is always coupled with financial exploitation since migrant workers are not sometimes paid appropriately even to the agreed payment, let alone the extra time the migrants work either for their employers or for employers relatives without their willingness.

Filled by hope, the money they expend for transportation and all other costs related to migration purposes, might be borrowed, or provided by families and closes relatives, to be paid back one day in the future after migrants accumulate money working abroad. Hence, nowadays a minimum 80,000 ETB (4000 USD) to a maximum of more than 100,000 Birr (5000 USD) is expected for expenses of all costs related to irregular migration. Surprisingly, sometimes this expense is covered by families selling their properties including land, houses, and domestic animals[82]. This sometimes causes family quarrels particularly between husband and wife over the financial expense to be covered for their son or daughter supposed to migrate. This story was experienced in Robe town when a family member disagreed to send their son. The father was against the idea of his son's migration. Conversely, the mother decided to send her son at the cost of her marriage. Finally, the family broke up, properties were divided and the son moved

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[82] Key informant interview, Head of Bale Labor and Social Affair Office, February 13, 2016, Robe.

abroad, the expense covered by his mother selling her half of the property obtained from divorce[83].

The most common financial exploitation is concerning salary payment. Salaries may be totally denied or cut from the normal agreed payment. In addition salaries may not be regularly paid monthly. These all are what informants either personally faced or observed from other Ethiopian migrant workers. For example, an interview with one returnee revealed that she was paid below the agreed salary and sometimes totally unpaid. Financial exploitation mostly leads to other more extreme vulnerability, differently from other abuses, such as forced labor and minor physical assault. Because the very purpose migrants go abroad as laborers is to make money and to pursue better livelihood. It is not only the danger of financial exploitation that migrant workers never tolerate, rather it makes them completely hopeless and results in other extreme vulnerability such as psychological disorder, suicide, or revenge against their employers. Worse, the final payment from an employer is sometimes simply murder. An interviewee[84] expressed her witness as one Ethiopian migrant worker was killed by their employers in response to her frequent request for the salary she worked for for years.

3.5.5. Physical Assault

Assault ranging from minor injuries to extreme physical assault such as physical paralysis and disabilities[85] are among the common risks that victims of irregular migration experience. Such risks to the physical security of migrants mostly occur either because of

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[83] Key informant interview, Robe town Labor and Social Affair, December 3, 2015, Robe.

[84] An interview with returnee, February 18, 2015, Ginir.

[85] Key informant interview, Head of Bale Zone Labor and Social Affair Office, February 13, 2016, Robe.

uncomfortable working environment or because of deliberate attack by employers, smugglers and security persons.

For example, an interviewee from the Ginir *Woreda* told to us that he was injured seriously in the leg when his employer intentionally hit him with his automobile[86]. Luckily, he was able to save his life, escaping from hit by the ruthless measure of his employer. Another interviewee from Robe town[87] was a witness of serious physical injuries inflicted on one Ethiopian woman domestic worker; when the migrant worker was at work wearing uncomfortable shoes, accidentally fell down on the floor and her back was totally broken and she found herself in a state of paralysis, unable to move by herself. Worse, their employers were unsympathetic to her suffering, instead cruelly shouting over her that the problem happened because of her own failure, and forcing her to do the usual domestic work. The interviewee further told to us that she saw another woman Ethiopian domestic worker who had been deliberately burned by hot water thrown over her by her employer.

Further, an interviewee from among the returnees described the worst story he observed in one smuggling camp in Yemen; "in that torturing house, individuals who lost their eyes, their leg or hand are common to see; torturing through hanging over, through beating, burning out over bodies until the ransom sends to them from migrant families" are the extreme threats to migrants' personal security from smugglers, the interviewee explained.

3.5.6. Psychological Assault and Mental Disorder

Returnees interviewed by us, who visited the temporary prison centers located in some Ethiopia Emphasis of Middle East State,

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[86] An interview with returnee migrant from Saudi, at Ginnir District on December, 18, 2015.

[87] An interview with women returnee from Kuwait, at Robe town, February, 14, 2016.

confirmed that there was there a crowd of Ethiopian irregular migrants, some of whom were crying, appearing in dire physical condition, in degraded spirits and generally in a state of mental and psychological illness[88]. These migrants in these temporary prison centers are those arrested by security policies, found in the streets without visa or employment papers. Worse, they are victims of multiple exploitations such as salary denials, sexual abuses, extreme physical and psychological assault and so on.

Racial assaults, making them to eat left over foods, denial of contacts with their families and even with other Ethiopian migrants and so on, are direct forms of psychological-threat exploitation against migrant domestic workers. Just "they considered us like a dog" one returnee responded[89]. Aside from the direct victims, it could not be difficult to guess how such a kind of inhuman cruelty will also create psychological illness indirectly on those who see or hear it. A returnee who was exposed to the sight of a murdered Ethiopian migrant worker by their employers told us as they suffer from it still now[90].

3.5.7. Deportation, Xenophobic Attack and Vulnerability to Risks of Political Instability

Very recently, massive, grave violations against irregular migrants of Ethiopia is becoming something of a recurrent phenomenon. Especially the Saudi massive deportation measures from November 2013 up to March 2014 followed by domestic political

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[88] An interview with a female returnee from United Arab Emirates, at Robe Town on; An interview with a female returnee from Qatar at Ginir District on December 18, 2015; an interview with a female returnee from Kuwait at Robe Town on February 20, 2016.

[89] An interview with one male returnee from Saudi Arabia, at Robe Town on February 7, 2016.

[90] Anonymous interview with a returnee, December 18, 2015, Ginir.

instabilities resulted in risks in countries like Yemen and Libya of complicated direct injuries on migrants themselves. For example, during the massive deportation from Saudi, a number of Ethiopians were killed or physically abused. In addition, properties accumulated for years were totally lost. Most of our interviews with returnees amongst the 3919 (see the table below) deported migrants from Saudi confirmed that, except for a few properties they held in hand, they lost their properties because of the violent deportation measures[91]. A similar case was also experienced due to domestic political instability in Yemen. Two recent returnees from Yemen told to us that, although they had returned by the help of the government, almost all their properties accumulated for years, estimated in money up to 5000USD was left there[92]. A similar story was also told to us by one returnee from Saudi Arabia[93].

Discrimination based on race and xenophobic-oriented threats are also sometimes experienced by Ethiopian irregular migrants. The Saudi Arabia deportation measure itself has also a tendency to xenophobia against non-nationals and citizens, as we understood from our interviewees. Participants during the violent deportation action were not only official security police, rather the "*shabaab*" were also good actors in the ruthless physical assault, rape, and robbery against the Ethiopian irregular migrants. For example, as our interviewee explained in his own words "the so called *shabaab* coming in group they shout against us by saying

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[91] Anonymous interview with returnees from November 1, 2015 up to March 3, 2016.

[92] Key informant interview, Head of Bale Zone Labor and Social affairs, February 13, 2015, Robe.

[93] An interview with a returnee form Saudi, February 16, 2016, Robe.

leave our country, they will kill you in minutes if they caught you"[94].

Arbitrary arrest and deportation is a frequent measure against Ethiopian irregular migrants. If a migrant is found to be of irregular status in the streets of Middle East States, their immediate fate is just detention, then after that deportation to their home countries[95] (see RMMS, 2014a:58). Sometimes irregular migrants also deliberately reveal themselves to security personnel, taking deportation as an advantage to escape from severe exploitation they faced by employers. One returnee[96] from United Arab Emirates told to us she retuned back by this mechanism.

Table 3. Deported migrants from Saudi Arabia and those who re-migrated (November 2013 and March 2014) Source: adopted from Bale Zone Labour and Social Affairs Offices.

No	Districts	M	F	Total	re-migrated		
					M	F	Total
1	Agarfa	425	42	467	28	1	29
2	Berbrie	86	14	100	0	0	0
3	Dallo manna	139	20	159	0	0	0
4	DaweQechan	14	1	15	0	0	0
5	DaweSerar	2	0	2	0	0	0
6	Dinsho	104	43	147	0	0	0
7	Gassera	726	88	814	29	0	29
8	Ginir	360	35	395	0	0	0
9	Ginir Town	*	*	*	*	*	*
10	Goba	160	87	247	4	1	5
11	Goba Town	26	34	60	0	0	0
12	Gollocha	187	19	206	0	0	0
13	Goro	122	28	150	0	0	0

[94] An interview with a returnee, December 11, 2015, Agarfa.

[95] An interview with a returnee, December 18, 2015, Ginir.

[96] An interview with a female returnee from United Arab Emirates, December 20, 2015, Ginir.

14	Guradamolle	10	1	11	0	0	0
15	Harena Bulluq	32	5	37	0	0	0
16	Lega Hida	52	2	54	0	0	0
17	Mada Walabu	18	8	26	0	0	0
18	Rayitu	7	1	8	0	0	0
19	Robe Town	224	109	333	47	8	55
20	Sawena	21	2	23	0	0	0
21	Sinana	605	60	665	0	0	0
	total	3320	599	3919	108	10	118

* Not available

3.5.8. Kidnapping for Ransom

Such kinds of exploitation cases against irregular migrants commonly occur during transit. Yemen, as the main transit country from the Horn of Africa including Ethiopia, is the place where serious exploitation in the form of kidnapping for ransom is rampant. At Haradh, "the smuggling town" in Yemen, where the majority of Horn African migrants pass through, an extreme exploitation including kidnapping for ransom and torture against migrants is operated on a daily bases (Human Right Watch, 2014). A returnee from Saudi Arabia told us the story of his own kidnapping in Yemen[97]:

> A group of gangs detained us while we were on the way to Saudi Arabia; then violently they separated the twelve Ethiopians from the Somali migrants for their believe that we are better than the Somalis for the ransom they needed; for a while, we remained their hostage; fortunately, the forceful retaliation we undertook against the gangs saved us from their torture and related abuses.

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[97] An interview with a returnee from Saudi Arabia at Agarfa, on December 18, 2015.

Another returnee from Saudi Arabia also explained the serious repeated trafficking risks he personally faced at different transit points in Somalia and Yemen:

> we were seven when the journey began; after three day stay in a broker house in Dire Dawa, journey on foot began via Somalia; then the broker intentionally missed from us; we stayed for a week missing the direction where to go; finally we got another broker who transported us to Yemen and transferred us to other brokers, then to the next brokers for each payment rises in double; I personally paid 20,000ETB for three brokers in sum, until my final arrival in Saudi.

Ethiopian irregular migrants also face kidnapping exploitation by smugglers in Sudan and Libya. These countries, being the major transit countries for Ethiopian irregular migrants making Europe their final destination, are also the place where ransoms are demanded as a form of financial exploitation and related personal security threats such as torture and grave physical assaults are undertaken against migrants. One interviewee from Robe town explained the kidnapping story of his two closest friends, (one of them in Sudan and the other in Libya) who experienced serious torture until the ransom was sent from their families[98].

The head of Bale Zone Labor and Social Affair Office, officers in similar positions from Robe town and Gasera *Woreda*, told us that they know cases of kidnapping in their respective areas. For example, "a father from Robe town paid 4000 USD, as a ransom for his son", the head of the Bale Zone Labor and Social Affair Office, explained. A key informant further told us:[99]

> parents heard the news of their son's kidnapping; at the moment there was no money in their hand for ransom that immediately de-

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[98] An interview with families of victim migrants on ,January 27, 2016, Robe.

[99] In-depth interview with the head of the Bale Zone Labor and Social Affair Office, January 13, 2015.

manded by smugglers; then the only option was to sell their urban land where their home is built; however, this solution created dispute between the husband and wife, the former being against selling the land; finally the parents sold half of the land and sent the ransom; unfortunately, their son was not alive.

3.5.9. Forced Confinement

For Ethiopian domestic workers in the Middle East countries, another aspect of their exploitation is forced confinement and related inhumane treatment basically in two ways[100]: one is using the sponsorship *(kafala)*[101] system as an instrument of control, including of the personal life of migrant workers such as sanctions on their movement and restriction of contact even with parents at home. The second is prohibiting migrant workers from escape, from fleeing exploitation at the hands of employers.

An interviewee[102], a returnee from Qatar, explained that:

> it is only for three months beginning from the employment date that we have the right to change employers or to leave as we like; and employers also treat us properly in these months; but after three months stay, you cannot move from their home until you finish the two years contract, and then after the employment agency also do not take responsibility whatever the employers exploit you.

A returnee[103] explained her story of confinement: "I was not allowed to go out of the compound; they confiscated my mobile phone; they sometimes allowed me to have contact with my parents only through their telephone, but they closely listen to what

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[100] An interview with returnee migrant, March 2, 2016, Gasera District; an interview with returnee migrant, February 18, Ginir.

[101] The *Kafala* or the sponsorship system is the only means through which migrant workers will obtain entry visa and residence permit in Middle East Arab countries (See, Naami, 2014).

[102] An interview with female returnee, December 18, 2015, Ginir.

[103] An interview with returnee migrant, February 16, 2015, Robe.

I am talking". Another returnee told us that she knows one Ethiopian woman domestic worker who was not paid her wage properly. When she asked to leave, they replied, 'you cannot go unless you finish our contract since we have sponsored you to come here'." Finally she retuned back after giving two years unpaid service. In addition, confiscation of passport, visa and all other documents[104] as well as other personal properties like mobile phones, immediately after their arrival, and thereafter inhumanely treating them, are the forms of exploitation related to forced confinement.

Conclusion

Bale is found to be one of the major areas in Ethiopia where migration in irregular ways is critically prevalent and migrants are encountering the inevitable and increasing risks of exploitation and insecurity. An estimated more than 6456 current migrants in irregular status have been recorded between 2013 and 2014/15. However, as it is known, it is difficult to know the exact number of irregular out-migrants, not simply because of stakeholders' poor migrant management system, rather *inter alia*, by virtue of migrants' irregular status and its volatility. Particular to the Bale Zone, pertinent to the very recent local authorities' (it has only been since 2013 that local stakeholders began to address the issue) intervention in their attempt to record migrant outflow and yet the weak intervention measure in addressing the issue, implies the possibility of the existence of a much greater number of irregular migrants.

Irregular migration is believed to be more prevalent in ten *Woredas* of the Zone such as Sinana, Agarfa, Gasera, Ginir, Goro,

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[104] Ibid.

Delo Mana, Goba, Gololcha, Dinsho, Berbrie and three town administrative areas namely Robe, Ginir and Goba towns. The rest of the areas of the Zone have relatively low records. This disparity is probably linked with the culture of migration. These irregular migrations outflow prone areas have a greater culture of migration influenced by existing potential social network links, in addition to population pressure.

The existing profile of irregular migrants indicates that young males are more exposed than their female counterparts. In terms of educational profile, most out-migrants are dominantly grade 10 or secondary school complete, with significant numbers of dropouts at primary school level as well. In sum, irregular migration outflow from Bale is dominated by male youths aged in early 20s who are secondary school graduates.

The dynamics of migration outflow cannot be determined because of the anecdotal nature of the available data. However, considering the growing concern among government stakeholders and non-government agents and their involvement in practically addressing the problem, more importantly taking in to account the general public opinion, the extent of irregular migration outflow is seemingly decreasing. Informed by the recent unprecedented human security crises like the massive deportation from Saudi and the worst Mediterranean Sea boat accident, stakeholders are significantly working on anti-irregular migration efforts focusing on awareness creation and job creation, which has its own possible impact in tackling the problem. The shocking incidents against the very personal security of migrants has created a rough understanding on the part of the general public regarding the existing and increasing severe risks of irregular migration. Therefore, without forgetting the prevalence of migration outflows in considerable numbers, irrespective of the risks, the communities' strong perception towards migration is seemingly improving.

In Bale, the key modes of migration are through the facilitation of illegal brokers and by individual operators supported by the family, community and social networks. Hence, irregular migrants assisted by illegal brokers, employment agents, and family members mainly from abroad, enter the borders of other countries via the two major migratory routes: the Mediterranean Sea route to Europe and the Gulf of Aden route to the Middle East.

From a minimum of 1000USD-3000USD to a maximum of 3500USD-9500USD expenses are required for migration in accordance with the different arrival points. The more financially capable, the more prone to irregular migration since the cost itself is a determinant factor in the migration decision, in addition to other factors.

Bale as a Muslim dominant community, religious affiliation to the Middle East Arab countries is suggested as another trend in migration. But this doesn't seem convincing basically for two reasons; first, the Middle East Arab countries are not the only destinations of irregular migrants from Bale, rather Western European countries are good destinations too. Second, in areas where non-Muslims live in a considerable number, there is an equal participation in irregular migration towards Arab states regardless of religious affiliation.

The fundamental causes for the existing prevalence of migration by irregular channels is not more or less outside what are commonly noted as general triggering factors. The socio-economic push-pull factors such as poverty and unemployment or under-employment; labor opportunities with better wages abroad; strong positive perception towards migration or culture of migration; existence of various actors in facilitating irregular migration, like illegal brokers, peer and family pressures, social networks, social medias; and finally administrative failures related with lack of good governance and poor infrastructure deliveries and so on

are all the dynamic root triggering and accelerating factors of the irregular migration outflow from Bale. Some of these factors provoke contesting claims. For instance, with respect to poverty and unemployment as causes of migration, though the strongest claim attests the mounting irregular migration as a key strategy to move out of poverty and joblessness, still claims are there viewing the culture of migration and poor work ethics as primary factors. Whatever the claims, all these core factors are very interrelated contributing causes and one cannot separate a certain factor exclusively from the rest; instead, all are so mutually interrelated that their cumulative impact is causing the current crisis.

The more visible negative impacts that irregular migration has continued to bring are threats to the human security of migrants themselves. Extreme personal insecurity directly endangering their survival, livelihood and dignity are the common vulnerability risks irregular migrants face, aggravated by their irregular status. Risks including trafficking exploitation in transit points as well as in destination countries by traffickers, smugglers, employers, security agents in security check-points and so on are inevitable abuses victims always face. To be more specific, what irregular migrants from Ethiopia including from Bale experienced revolving around extreme personal insecurities are death through murder and accidents; sexual abuse including common rape, financial exploitation, forced labor and enslavement; physical and psychological assault; kidnapping for ransom; forced confinement; deportation; xenophobic attack; vulnerability to risks of political instability in hosting or transit states. In fact, these lists are only the key extreme risks, passing over the more tolerable ones.

In the broader perspective, there is no doubt that irregular migration continues to bring a threat not only to the security of migrants, but to states' sovereignty and the international community as well. In general, dealing with the issue from a human

security perspective gives ample understanding of the intertwined nature of international irregular migration.

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